{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_52106/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_52106","id":"gutenberg_52106","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/52106","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Psychiatry/Psychology","Category: Sociology","Ethics","Ethics -- History","Prehistoric peoples"],"text":"THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE MORAL IDEAS\n\n\n[Macmillan icon]\n\nMACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED\n\nLONDON . BOMBAY . CALCUTTA\nMELBOURNE\n\n\nTHE MACMILLAN COMPANY\n\n\nNEW YORK . BOSTON . CHICAGO\nDALLAS . SAN FRANCISCO\n\n\nTHE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, LTD.\n\nTORONTO\n\n\n\n\nTHE ORIGIN\n\nAND DEVELOPMENT\n\nOF THE\n\nMORAL IDEAS\n\n\nBY\n\nEDWARD WESTERMARCK, PH.D., LL.D.\n\n\nMARTIN WHITE PROFESSOR OF SOCIOLOGY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF\nLONDON\n\nPROFESSOR OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY AT THE UNIVERSITY OF FINLAND,\nHELSlNGFORS\n\nAUTHOR OF \"THE HISTORY OF HUMAN MARRIAGE\"\n\n\n\n\nIN TWO VOLUMES\n\nVOL. I\n\n_SECOND EDITION_\n\n\n\nMACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED\n\nST. MARTIN'S STREET, LONDON\n\n1924.\n\n\n\n\nCOPYRIGHT\n\n_First Edition_ 1906\n_Second Edition_ 1912\n_Reprinted_ 1924\n\n\n\nPRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE\n\n\nTHE frequent references made in the present work, on my own authority,\nto customs and ideas prevalent among the natives of Morocco, require a\nword of explanation. Seeing the close connection between moral\nopinions and magic and religious beliefs, I thought it might be useful\nfor me to acquire first-hand knowledge of the folk-lore of some\nnon-European people, and for various reasons I chose Morocco as my\nfield of research. During the four years I spent there, largely among\nits country population, I have not only collected anthropological\ndata, but tried to make myself familiar with the native way of\nthinking; and I venture to believe that this has helped me to\nunderstand various customs occurring at a stage of civilisation\ndifferent from our own. I purpose before long to publish the detailed\nresults of my studies in a special monograph on the popular religion\nand magics of the Moors.\n\nFor these researches I have derived much material support from the\nUniversity of Helsingfors. I am also indebted to the Russian Minister\nat Tangier, M. B. de Bacheracht, for his kindness in helping me on\nseveral occasions when I was dependent on the Sultan's Government. All\nthe time I have had the valuable assistance of my Moorish friend\nShereef [(]Abd-es-Sal\u00e2m el-Ba[k.][k.]\u00e2li, to whom credit {vi} is due\nfor the kind reception I invariably received from peasants and\nmountaineers, not generally noted for friendliness towards Europeans.\n\nI beg to express my best thanks to Mr. Stephen Gwynn for revising the\nfirst thirteen chapters, and to Mr. H. C. Minchin for revising the\nremaining portion of the book. To their suggestions I am indebted for\nthe improvement of many phrases and expressions. I have likewise to\nthank my friend Mr. Alex. F. Shand for kindly reading the proofs of\nthe earlier chapters and giving me the benefit of his opinion.\n\nThroughout the work the reader will easily find how much I owe to\nBritish science and thought--a debt which is greater than I can ever\nexpress.\n\nE. W.\n\nLondon,\n\n_January_, 1906.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\nPREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION\n\n\nTHE present edition is only a reprint of the first, with a few\ninaccurate expressions corrected.\n\nE. W.\n\nLondon,\n\n_July_, 1912.\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n\nINTRODUCTORY\n\nThe origin of the present investigation, p. 1.--Its subject-matter,\np. 1 _sq._--Its practical usefulness, p. 2 _sq._\n\n\nCHAPTER I\n\nTHE EMOTIONAL ORIGIN OF MORAL JUDGMENTS\n\nThe moral concepts essentially generalisations of tendencies in\ncertain phenomena to call forth moral emotions, pp. 4-6.--The assumed\nuniversality or \"objectivity\" of moral judgments, p. 6 _sq._--Theories\naccording to which the moral predicates derive all their import from\nreason, \"theoretical\" or \"practical,\" p. 7 _sq._--Our tendency to\nobjectivise moral judgments, no sufficient ground for referring them\nto the province of reason, p. 8 _sq._--This tendency partly due to the\ncomparatively uniform nature of the moral consciousness, p.\n9.--Differences of moral estimates resulting from circumstances of a\npurely intellectual character, pp. 9-11.--Differences of an emotional\norigin, pp. 11-13.--Quantitative, as well as qualitative, differences,\np. 13.--The tendency to objectivise moral judgments partly due to the\nauthority ascribed to moral rules, p. 14.--The origin and nature of\nthis authority, pp. 14-17.--General moral truths non-existent, p. 17\n_sq._--The object of scientific ethics not to fix rules for human\nconduct, but to study the moral consciousness as a fact, p. 18.--The\nsupposed dangers of ethical subjectivism, pp. 18-20.\n\n\nCHAPTER II\n\nTHE NATURE OF THE MORAL EMOTIONS\n\nThe moral emotions of two kinds: disapproval, or indignation, and\napproval, p. 21.--The moral emotions retributive emotions, disapproval\nforming a sub-species of resentment, and approval a sub-species of\nretributive kindly emotion, _ibid._--Resentment an aggressive attitude\nof mind toward a cause of pain, p. 22 _sq._--Dr. Steinmetz's\nsuggestion that revenge is essentially rooted in the feeling of power\nand superiority, and originally \"undirected,\" pp. 23-27.--The true\nimport of the facts adduced as evidence for this hypothesis,\npp. 27-30.--The collective responsibility usually involved in the\ninstitution of the blood-feud, pp. 30-32.--Explanation of it,\npp. 32-35.-- {viii} The strong tendency to discrimination which\ncharacterises resentment not wholly lost even behind the veil of\ncommon responsibility, p. 35 _sq._--Revenge among the lower animals,\np. 37 _sq._--Violation of the \"self-feeling\" a common incentive to\nresentment, p. 38 _sq._--But the reaction of the wounded\n\"self-feeling\" not necessarily, in the first place, concerned with the\ninfliction of pain, p. 39 _sq._--Revenge only a link in a chain of\nemotional phenomena for which \"non-moral resentment\" may be used as a\ncommon name, p. 40.--The origin of these phenomena, pp. 40-42.--Moral\nindignation closely connected with anger, p. 42 _sq._--Moral\nindignation, like non-moral resentment, a reactionary attitude of mind\ndirected towards the cause of inflicted pain, though the reaction\nsometimes turns against innocent persons, pp. 43-48.--In their\nadministration of justice gods still more indiscriminate than men,\npp. 48-51.--Reasons for this, p. 51 _sq._--Sin looked upon in the light\nof a contagious matter, charged with injurious energy, pp. 52-57.--The\ncurse looked upon as a baneful substance injuring or destroying\nanybody to whom it cleaves, p. 57 _sq._--The tendency of curses to\nspread, pp. 58-60.--Their tendency to contaminate those who derive\ntheir origin from the infected individual, p. 60 _sq._--The vicarious\nsuffering involved in sin-transference not to be confounded with\nvicarious expiatory sacrifice, p. 61.--Why scapegoats are sometimes\nkilled, pp. 61-64.--Why sacrificial victims are sometimes used as\nscapegoats, p. 64 _sq._--Vicarious expiatory sacrifices,\npp. 65-67.--The victim accepted as a substitute on the principle of\nsocial solidarity, p. 67 _sq._--Expiatory sacrifices offered as ransoms,\np. 68 _sq._--Protests of the moral consciousness against the infliction\nof penal suffering upon the guiltless, pp. 70-72.\n\n\nCHAPTER III\n\nTHE NATURE OF THE MORAL EMOTIONS (_continued_)\n\nWhilst, in the course of mental evolution, the true direction of the\nhostile reaction involved in moral disapproval has become more\napparent, its aggressive character has become more disguised,\np. 73.--Kindness to enemies not a rule in early ethics, p. 73 _sq._--At\nthe higher stages of moral development retaliation condemned and\nforgiveness of enemies laid down as a duty, pp. 74-77.--The rule of\nretaliation and the rule of forgiveness not radically opposed to each\nother, p. 77 _sq._--Why enlightened and sympathetic minds disapprove\nof resentment and retaliation springing from personal motives, p. 78\n_sq._--The aggressive character of moral disapproval has also become\nmore disguised by the different way in which the aggressiveness\ndisplays itself, p. 79.--Retributive punishment condemned, and the end\nof punishment considered to be either to deter from crime, or to\nreform the criminal, or to repress crime by eliminating or secluding\nhim, pp. 79-81.--Objections to these theories, p. 82 _sq._--Facts which,\nto some extent, fill up the gap between the theory of retribution and\nthe utilitarian theories of punishment, pp. 84-91.--The aggressive\nelement in moral disapproval has undergone a change which tends to\nconceal its true nature by narrowing the channel in which it discharges\nitself, deliberate and discriminating resentment being apt to turn\nagainst the will rather than against the willer, p. 91 _sq._--Yet it is\nthe instinctive desire to inflict counter-pain that gives to moral\nindignation its most important characteristic, p. 92 _sq._--Retributive\nkindly emotion a friendly attitude of mind towards a cause of pleasure,\np. 93 _sq._--Retributive kindly emotion among the lower animals,\np. 94.--Its intrinsic object, p. 94 _sq._--The want of discrimination\nwhich is sometimes found in retributive kindness, p. 95.--Moral approval\na kind of retributive kindly emotion, _ibid._--Moral approval sometimes\nbestows its favours upon undeserving individuals for the merits of others,\npp. 95-97.--Explanation of this, p. 97 _sq._--Protests against the notion\nof vicarious merit, p. 98 _sq._\n\n\n{ix} CHAPTER IV\n\nTHE NATURE OF THE MORAL EMOTIONS (_concluded_)\n\nRefutation of the opinion that moral emotions only arise in\nconsequence of moral judgments, p. 100 _sq._--However, moral\njudgments, being definite expressions of moral emotions, help us to\ndiscover the true nature of these emotions, p. 101.--Disinterestedness\nand apparent impartiality characteristics by which moral indignation\nand approval are distinguished from other, non-moral, kinds of\nresentment or retributive kindly emotion, pp. 101-104.--Besides, a\nmoral emotion has a certain flavour of generality, p. 104 _sq._--The\nanalysis of the moral emotions which has been attempted in this and\nthe two preceding chapters holds true not only of such emotions as we\nfeel on account of the conduct of others, but of such emotions as we\nfeel on account of our own conduct as well, pp. 105-107.\n\n\nCHAPTER V\n\nTHE ORIGIN OF THE MORAL EMOTIONS\n\nWe may feel disinterested resentment, or disinterested retributive\nkindly emotion, on account of an injury inflicted, or a benefit\nconferred, upon another person with whose pain, or pleasure, we\nsympathise, and in whose welfare we take a kindly interest,\np. 108.--Sympathetic feelings based on association, p. 109 _sq._--Only\nwhen aided by the altruistic sentiment sympathy induces us to take a\nkindly interest in the feelings of our neighbours, and tends to\nproduce disinterested retributive emotions, p. 110 _sq._--Sympathetic\nresentment to be found in all animal species which possess altruistic\nsentiments, p. 111 _sq._--Sympathetic resentment among savages, p. 113\n_sq._--Sympathetic resentment may not only be a reaction against\nsympathetic pain, but may be directly produced by the cognition of the\nsigns of anger (punishment, language, &c.), pp. 114-116.--Disinterested\nantipathies, p. 116 _sq._--Sympathy springing from an altruistic\nsentiment may also produce disinterested kindly emotion,\np. 117.--Disinterested likings, _ibid._--Why disinterestedness,\napparent impartiality, and the flavour of generality have become\ncharacteristics by which so-called moral emotions are distinguished\nfrom other retributive emotions, p. 117 _sq._--Custom not only a\npublic habit, but a rule of conduct, p. 118.--Custom conceived of as a\nmoral rule, p. 118 _sq._--In early society customs the only moral\nrules ever thought of, p. 119.--The characteristics of moral\nindignation to be sought for in its connection with custom, p.\n120.--Custom characterised by generality, disinterestedness, and\napparent impartiality, p. 120 _sq._--Public indignation lies at the\nbottom of custom as a moral rule, p. 121 _sq._--As public indignation\nis the prototype of moral disapproval, so public approval is the\nprototype of moral approval, p. 122.--Moral disapproval and approval\nhave not always remained inseparably connected with the feelings of\nany special society, p. 122 _sq._--Yet they remain to the last public\nemotions if not in reality, then as an ideal, p. 123.--Refutation of\nthe opinion that the original form of the moral consciousness has been\nthe individual's own conscience, p. 123 _sq._--The antiquity of moral\nresentment, p. 124.--The supposition that remorse is unknown among the\nlower races contradicted by facts, p. 124 _sq._--Criticism of Lord\nAvebury's statement that modern savages seem to be almost entirely\nwanting in moral feeling, pp. 125-129.--The antiquity of moral\napproval, p. 129 _sq._\n\n\n{x}\nCHAPTER VI\n\nANALYSIS OF THE PRINCIPAL MORAL CONCEPTS\n\nOur analysis to be concerned with moral concepts formed by the\ncivilised mind, p. 131.--Moral concepts among the lower races,\npp. 131-133.--Language a rough generaliser, p. 133.--Analysis of the\nconcepts _bad_, _vice_, and _wrong_, p. 134.--Of _ought_ and _duty_,\npp. 134-137.--Of _right_, as an adjective, pp. 137-139.--Of _right_,\nas a substantive, p. 139 _sq._--Of the relations between _rights_ and\n_duties_, p. 140 _sq._--Of _injustice_ and _justice_, pp. 141-145.--Of\n_good_, pp. 145-147.--Of _virtue_, pp. 147-149.--Of the relation\nbetween _virtue_ and _duty_, p. 149 _sq._--Of _merit_, p. 150\n_sq._--Of the relation between _merit_ and _duty_, p. 151 _sq._--The\nquestion of the _super-obligatory_, pp. 152-154.--The question of the\nmorally _indifferent_, pp. 154-157.\n\n\nCHAPTER VII\n\nCUSTOMS AND LAWS AS EXPRESSIONS OF MORAL IDEAS\n\nHow we can get an insight into the moral ideas of mankind at large,\np. 158.--The close connection between the habitualness and the\nobligatoriness of custom, p. 159.--Though every public habit is not a\ncustom, involving an obligation, men's standard of morality is not\nindependent of their practice, p. 159 _sq._--The study of moral ideas\nto a large extent a study of customs, p. 160.--But custom never covers\nthe whole field of morality, and the uncovered space grows larger in\nproportion as the moral consciousness develops, p. 160 _sq._--At the\nlower stages of civilisation custom the sole rule for conduct,\np. 161.--Even kings described as autocrats tied by custom, p. 162.--In\ncompetition with law custom frequently carries the day, p. 163\n_sq._--Custom stronger than law and religion combined, p. 164.--The\nlaws themselves command obedience more as customs than as laws,\n_ibid._--Many laws were customs before they became laws, p. 165.--The\ntransformation of customs into laws, p. 165 _sq._--Laws as expressions\nof moral ideas, pp. 166-168.--Punishment and indemnification, p. 168\n_sq._--Definition of punishment, p. 169 _sq._--Savage punishments\ninflicted upon the culprit by the community at large, pp. 170-173.--By\nsome person or persons invested with judicial authority,\npp. 173-175.--The development of judicial organisation out of a previous\nsystem of lynch-law, p. 175.--Out of a previous system of private\nrevenge, p. 176.--Public indignation displays itself not only in\npunishment, but to a certain extent in the custom of revenge, p. 176\n_sq._--The social origin of the _lex talionis_, pp. 177-180.--The\ntransition from revenge to punishment, and the establishment of a\ncentral judicial and executive authority, pp. 180-183.--The\njurisdiction of chiefs, p. 183 _sq._--The injured party or the accuser\nacting as executioner, but not as judge, p. 184_sq._--The existence of\npunishment and judicial organisation among a certain people no exact\nindex to its general state of culture, p. 185.--The supposition that\npunishment has been intended to act as a deterrent, p. 185\n_sq._--Among various semi-civilised and civilised peoples the criminal\nlaw has assumed a severity which far surpasses the rigour of the _lex\ntalionis_, pp. 186-183.--Wanton cruelty not a general characteristic\nof the public justice of savages, pp. 188-190. Legislators referring\nto the deterrent effects of punishment, p. 190 _sq._--The practice of\npunishing criminals in public, p. 191 _sq._--The punishment actually\ninflicted on the criminal in many cases much less severe than the\npunishment with which the law threatens him, p. 192 _sq._--The\ndetection of criminals was in earlier times much rarer and more\nuncertain than it is now, p. 193.--The chief explanation of the great\nseverity of certain {xi} criminal codes lies in their connection with\ndespotism or religion or both, pp. 193-198.--Punishment may also be\napplied as a means of deterring from crime, p. 198 _sq._--But the\nscope which justice leaves for determent pure and simple is not wide,\np. 199.--The criminal law of a community on the whole a faithful\nexponent of moral sentiments prevalent in that community at large,\npp. 199-201.\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII\n\nTHE GENERAL NATURE OF THE SUBJECTS OF ENLIGHTENED MORAL\nJUDGMENTS\n\nDefinitions of the term \"conduct,\" p. 202 _sq._--The meaning of the\nword \"act,\" p. 203 _sq._--The meaning of the word \"intention,\"\np. 204.--There can be only one intention in one act, p. 204 _sq._ The\nmoral judgments which we pass on acts do not really relate to the\nevent, but to the intention, p. 205 _sq._--A person morally\naccountable also for his deliberate wishes, p. 206.--A deliberate wish\nis a volition, p. 206 _sq._--The meaning of the word \"motive,\"\np. 207.--Motives which are volitions fall within the sphere of moral\nvaluation, _ibid._--The motive of an act may be an intention, but an\nintention belonging to another act, _ibid._--Even motives which\nconsist of non-volitional conations may indirectly exercise much\ninfluence on moral judgments, p. 207 _sq._--Refutation of Mill's\nstatement that \"the motive has nothing to do with the morality of the\naction,\" p. 208 _sq._--Moral judgments really passed upon men as\nacting or willing, not upon acts or volitions in the abstract, p. 209.\n--Forbearances morally equivalent to acts, p. 209 _sq._--Distinction\nbetween forbearances and omissions, p. 210.--Moral judgments refer not\nonly to willing, but to not-willing as well, not only to acts and\nforbearances, but to omissions, p. 210 _sq._--Negligence,\nheedlessness, and rashness, p. 211.--Moral judgments of blame\nconcerned with not-willing only in so far as this not-willing is\nattributed to a defect of the \"will,\" p. 211 _sq._--Distinction\nbetween conscious omissions and forbearances, and between not-willing\nto refrain from doing and willing to do, p. 212.--The \"known\nconcomitants of acts,\" p. 213.--Absence of volitions also gives rise\nto moral praise, p. 213 _sq._--The meaning of the term \"conduct,\"\np. 214.--The subject of a moral judgment is, strictly speaking, a\nperson's will, or character, conceived as the cause either of\nvolitions or of the absence of volitions, p. 214 _sq._--Moral\njudgments that are passed on emotions or opinions really refer to the\nwill, p. 215 _sq._\n\n\nCHAPTER IX\n\nTHE WILL AS THE SUBJECT OF MORAL JUDGMENT AND THE INFLUENCE OF\nEXTERNAL EVENTS\n\nCases in which no distinction is made between intentional and\naccidental injuries, pp. 217-219.--Yet even in the system of\nself-redress intentional or foreseen injuries often distinguished from\nunintentional and unforeseen injuries, pp. 219-221.--A similar\ndistinction made in the punishments inflicted by many savages, p. 221\n_sq._--Uncivilised peoples who entirely excuse, or do not punish,\npersons for injuries which they have inflicted by mere accident,\np. 222 _sq._--Peoples of a higher culture who punish persons for bringing\nabout events without any fault of theirs, pp. 223-226.--At the earlier\nstages of civilisation gods, in particular, attach undue importance to\nthe outward aspect of conduct, pp. 226-231.--Explanation of all these\nfacts, pp. 231-237.--The great influence which the outward event\nexercises upon moral estimates even among ourselves, pp. 238-240.\n--Carelessness generally not punished if no injurious result\nfollows, p. 241.--An unsuccessful attempt to commit a criminal act, if\npunished at all, as a rule punished much less {xii} severely than the\naccomplished act, p. 241 _sq._--Exceptions to this rule, p. 242.--The\nquestion, which attempts should be punished, p. 243.--The stage at\nwhich an attempt begins to be criminal, and the distinction between\nattempts and acts of preparation, p. 243 _sq._--The rule that an\noutward event is requisite for the infliction of punishment, p. 244\n_sq._--Exceptions to this rule, p. 245.--Explanation of laws referring\nto unsuccessful attempts, pp. 245-247.--Moral approval influenced by\nexternal events, p. 247.--Owing to its very nature, the moral\nconsciousness, when sufficiently influenced by thought, regards the\nwill as the only proper object of moral disapproval or praise,\np. 247 _sq._\n\n\nCHAPTER X\n\nAGENTS UNDER INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY\n\nAn agent not responsible for anything which he could not be aware of,\np. 249.--The irresponsibility of animals, pp. 249-251.--Resentment\ntowards an animal which has caused some injury, p. 251.--At the lower\nstages of civilisation animals deliberately treated as responsible\nbeings, _ibid._--The custom of blood-revenge extended to the animal\nworld, pp. 251-253.--Animals exposed to regular punishment, pp. 253-255.\n--The origin of the medi\u00e6val practice of punishing animals, p. 255 _sq._\n--Explanation of the practice of retaliating upon animals, pp. 256-260.\n--At the earlier stages of civilisation even inanimate things treated\nas if they were responsible agents, pp. 260-262.--Explanation\nof this, pp. 262-264.--The total or partial irresponsibility of\nchildhood and early youth, pp. 264-267.--According to early custom,\nchildren sometimes subject to the rule of retaliation, p. 267.\n--Parents responsible for the deeds of their children, p. 267\n_sq._--In Europe there has been a tendency to raise the age at which\nfull legal responsibility commences, p. 268 _sq._--The irresponsibility\nof idiots and madmen, p. 269 _sq._--Idiots and insane persons objects\nof religious reverence, p. 270 _sq._--Lunatics treated with great\nseverity or punished for their deeds, pp. 271-274.--Explanation of\nthis, p. 274 _sq._--The ignorance of which lunatics have been victims\nin the hands of lawyers, pp. 275-277.--The total or partial\nirresponsibility of intoxicated persons, p. 277 _sq._--Drunkenness\nrecognised as a ground of extenuation, pp. 278-280.--Not recognised as\na ground of extenuation, p. 280 _sq._--Explanation of these facts,\np. 281 _sq._\n\n\nCHAPTER XI\n\nMOTIVES\n\nMotives considered only in proportion as the moral judgment is\ninfluenced by reflection, p. 283.--Little consideration for the sense\nof duty as a motive, _ibid._--Somewhat greater discrimination shown in\nregard to motives consisting of powerful non-volitional conations,\np. 283 _sq._--Compulsion as a ground of extenuation, p. 284\n_sq._--\"Compulsion by necessity,\" pp. 285-287.--Self-defence,\npp. 288-290.--Self-redress in the case of adultery, and other survivals of\nthe old system of self-redress, pp. 290-294.--The moral distinction\nmade between an injury which a person inflicts deliberately, in cold\nblood, and one which he inflicts in the heat of the moment, on\nprovocation, pp. 294-297.--Explanation of this distinction, p. 297\n_sq._--The pressure of a non-volitional motive on the will as a ground\nof extenuation, p. 298 _sq._--That moral judgments are generally\npassed, in the first instance, with reference to acts immediately\nintended, and consider motives only in proportion as the judgment is\ninfluenced by reflection, holds good not only of moral blame, but of\nmoral praise, pp. 299-302.\n\n\n{xiii} CHAPTER XII\n\nFORBEARANCES AND CARELESSNESS--CHARACTER\n\nWhy in early moral codes the so-called negative commandments are much\nmore prominent than the positive commandments, p. 303.--The little\ncognisance which the criminal laws of civilised nations take of\nforbearances and omissions, p. 303 _sq._--The more scrutinising the\nmoral consciousness, the greater the importance which it attaches to\npositive commandments, p. 304 _sq._--Yet the customs of all nations\ncontain not only prohibitions, but positive injunctions as well, p.\n305.--The unreflecting mind apt to exaggerate the guilt of a person\nwho out of heedlessness or rashness causes harm by a positive act,\n_ibid._--Early custom and law may be anxious enough to trace an event\nto its source, pp. 305-307.--But they easily fail to discover where\nthere is guilt or not, and, in case of carelessness, to determine the\nmagnitude of the offender's guilt, p. 307 _sq._--The opinion that a\nperson is answerable for all the damage which directly ensues from an\nact of his, even though no foresight could have reasonably been\nexpected to look out for it, p. 308 _sq._--On the other hand, little\nor no censure passed on him whose want of foresight or want of\nself-restraint is productive of suffering, if only the effect is\nsufficiently remote, p. 309 _sq._--The moral emotions may as naturally\ngive rise to judgments on human character as to judgments on human\nconduct, p. 310.--Even when a moral judgment immediately refers to a\ndistinct act, it takes notice of the agent's will as a whole, p. 310\n_sq._--The practice of punishing a second or third offence more\nseverely than the first, p. 311 _sq._--The more a moral judgment is\ninfluenced by reflection, the more it scrutinises the character which\nmanifests itself in that individual piece of conduct by which the\njudgment is occasioned, p. 312 _sq._--But however superficial it be,\nit always refers to a will conceived of as a continuous entity, p. 313.\n\n\nCHAPTER XIII\n\nWHY MORAL JUDGMENTS ARE PASSED ON CONDUCT AND CHARACTER--MORAL\nVALUATION AND FREE-WILL\n\nExplanation of the fact that moral judgments are passed on conduct and\ncharacter, p. 314.--The correctness of this explanation proved by the\ncircumstance that not only moral emotions, but non-moral retributive\nemotions as well, are felt with reference to phenomena exactly similar\nin nature to those on which moral judgments are passed,\npp. 314-319.--Whether moral or non-moral, a retributive emotion is\nessentially directed towards a sensitive and volitional entity, or\nself, conceived of as the cause of pleasure or the cause of pain,\np. 319.--The futility of other attempts to solve the problem, p. 319\n_sq._--The nature of the moral emotions also gives us the key to the\nproblem of the co-existence of moral responsibility with the general\nlaw of cause and effect, p. 320.--The theory according to which\nresponsibility, in the ordinary sense of the term, and moral judgments\ngenerally, are inconsistent with the notion that the human will is\ndetermined by causes, p. 320 _sq._--Yet, as a matter of fact, moral\nindignation and moral approval are felt by determinists and\nlibertarians alike, p. 321 _sq._--Explanation of the fallacy which\nlies at the bottom of the conception that moral valuation is\ninconsistent with determinism, p. 322.--Causation confounded with\ncompulsion, pp. 322-324.--The difference between fatalism and\ndeterminism, pp. 324-326.--The moral emotions not concerned with the\norigin of the innate character, p. 326.\n\n\n{xiv} CHAPTER XIV\n\nPRELIMINARY REMARKS--HOMICIDE IN GENERAL\n\nNecessity of restricting the investigation to the more important modes\nof conduct with which the moral consciousness is concerned, p. 327\n_sq._--The six groups into which these modes of conduct may be\ndivided, p. 328.--The most sacred duty which we owe to our\nfellow-creatures generally considered to be regard for their lives,\n_ibid._--Among various uncivilised peoples human life said to be held\nvery cheap, p. 328 _sq._--Among others homicide or murder said to be\nhardly known, p. 329 _sq._--In other instances homicide expressly said\nto be regarded as wrong, p. 330 _sq._--In every society custom\nprohibits homicide within a certain circle of men, p. 331.--Savages\ndistinguish between an act of homicide committed within their own\ncommunity and one where the victim is a stranger, pp. 331-333.--In\nvarious instances, however, the rule, \"Thou shalt not kill,\" applies\neven to foreigners, p. 333 _sq._--Some uncivilised peoples said to\nhave no wars, p. 334.--Savages' recognition of intertribal rights in\ntimes of peace obvious from certain customs connected with their wars,\np. 334 _sq._--Savage custom does not always allow indiscriminate\nslaughter even in warfare, p. 335 _sq._--The readiness with which\nsavages engage in war, p. 337.--The old distinction between injuries\ncommitted against compatriots and harm done to foreigners remains\namong peoples more advanced in culture, p. 337 _sq._--The readiness\nwith which such peoples wage war on foreign nations, and the\nestimation in which the successful warrior is held, pp. 338-340.--The\nlife of a guest sacred, p. 340.--The commencement of international\nhostilities preceded by special ceremonies, _ibid._--Warfare in some\ncases condemned, or a distinction made between just and unjust war,\npp. 340-342.--Even in war the killing of an enemy under certain\ncircumstances prohibited, either by custom or by enlightened moral\nopinion, pp. 342-344.\n\n\nCHAPTER XV\n\nHOMICIDE IN GENERAL (_continued_)\n\nHomicide of any kind condemned by the early Christians, p. 345.--Their\ntotal condemnation of warfare, p. 345 _sq._--This attitude towards war\nwas soon given up, pp. 346-348.--The feeling that a soldier scarcely\ncould make a good Christian, p. 348.--Penance prescribed for those who\nhad shed blood in war, p. 348 _sq._--Wars forbidden by popes, p. 349.\n--The military Christianity of the Crusades, pp. 348-352.--Chivalry,\npp. 352-354.--The intimate connection between chivalry and religion\ndisplayed in tournaments, p. 354 _sq._--The practice of private war,\np. 355 _sq._--The attitude of the Church towards private war, p.\n356.--The Truce of God, p. 357.--The main cause of the abolition of\nprivate war was the increase of the authority of emperors or kings,\np. 357 _sq._--War looked upon as a judgment of God, p. 358.--The attitude\nadopted by the great Christian congregations towards war one of\nsympathetic approval, pp. 359-362.--Religious protests against war,\npp. 362-365.--Freethinkers' opposition to war, pp. 365-367.--The idea\nof a perpetual peace, p. 367.--The awakening spirit of nationalism,\nand the glorification of war, p. 367 _sq._--Arguments against\narbitration, p. 368.--The opposition against war rapidly increasing,\np. 368 _sq._--The prohibition of needless destruction in war, p. 369\n_sq._--The survival, in modern civilisation, of the old feeling that\nthe life of a foreigner is not equally sacred with that of a\ncountryman, p. 370.--The behaviour of European colonists towards\ncoloured races, p. 370 _sq._\n\n\n{xv} CHAPTER XVI\n\nHOMICIDE IN GENERAL (_concluded_)\n\nSympathetic resentment felt on account of the injury suffered by the\nvictim a potent cause of the condemnation of homicide, p. 372\n_sq._--No such resentment felt if the victim is a member of another\ngroup, p. 373.--Why extra-tribal homicide is approved of,\n_ibid._--Superstition an encouragement to extra-tribal homicide,\n_ibid._--The expansion of the altruistic sentiment largely explains\nwhy the prohibition of homicide has come to embrace more and more\ncomprehensive circles of men, _ibid._--Homicide viewed as an injury\ninflicted upon the survivors, p. 373 _sq._--Conceived as a breach of\nthe \"King's peace,\" p. 374.--Stigmatised as a disturbance of public\ntranquillity and an outrage on public safety, _ibid._--Homicide\ndisapproved of because the manslayer gives trouble to his own people,\np. 374 _sq._--The idea that a manslayer is unclean, pp. 375-377.--The\ninfluence which this idea has exercised on the moral judgment of\nhomicide, p. 377.--The disapproval of the deed easily enhanced by the\nspiritual danger attending on it, as also by the inconvenient\nrestrictions laid on the tabooed manslayer and the ceremonies of\npurification to which he is subject, p. 377 _sq._--The notion of a\npersecuting ghost may be replaced by the notion of an avenging god,\npp. 378-380.--The defilement resulting from homicide particularly\nshunned by gods, p. 380 _sq._--Priests forbidden to shed human blood,\np. 381 _sq._--Reasons for Christianity's high regard for human life,\np. 382.\n\n\nCHAPTER XVII\n\nTHE KILLING OF PARENTS, SICK PERSONS, CHILDREN-FETICIDE\n\nParricide the most aggravated form of murder, pp. 383-386.--The custom\nof abandoning or killing parents who are worn out with age or disease,\np. 386 _sq._--Its causes, pp. 387-390.--The custom of abandoning or\nkilling persons suffering from some illness, p. 391 _sq._--Its causes,\np. 392 _sq._--The father's power of life and death over his children,\np. 393 _sq._--Infanticide among many savage races permitted or even\nenjoined by custom, pp. 394-398.--The causes of infanticide, and how\nit has grown into a regular custom, pp. 398-402.--Among many savages\ninfanticide said to be unheard of or almost so, p. 402 _sq._--The\ncustom of infanticide not a survival of earliest savagery, but seems\nto have grown up under specific conditions in later stages of\ndevelopment, p. 403.--Savages who disapprove of infanticide, p. 403\n_sq._--The custom of infanticide in most cases requires that the child\nshould be killed immediately or soon after its birth, p. 404\n_sq._--Infanticide among semi-civilised or civilised races,\npp. 405-411.--The practice of exposing new-born infants vehemently\ndenounced by the early Fathers of the Church, p. 411.--Christian\nhorror of infanticide, p. 411 _sq._--The punishment of infanticide in\nChristian countries, p. 412 _sq._--Feticide among savages, p. 413\n_sq._--Among more civilised nations, p. 414 _sq._--According to\nChristian views, a form of murder, p. 415 _sq._--Distinctions between\nan _embryo informatus_ and an _embryo formatus_, p. 416 _sq._--Modern\nlegislation and opinion concerning feticide, p. 417.\n\n\nCHAPTER XVIII\n\nTHE KILLING OF WOMEN, AND OF SLAVES--THE CRIMINALITY OF HOMICIDE\nINFLUENCED BY DISTINCTIONS OF CLASS\n\nThe husband's power of life and death over his wife among many of the\nlower races, p. 418 _sq._--The right of punishing his wife capitally\nnot universally {xvi} granted to the husband in uncivilised\ncommunities, p. 419.--The husband's power of life and death among\npeoples of a higher type, _ibid._--Uxoricide punished less severely\nthan matricide, p. 419 _sq._--The estimate of a woman's life sometimes\nlower than that of a man's, sometimes equal to it, sometimes higher,\np. 420 _sq._--The master's power of life and death over his slave,\np. 421 _sq._--The right, among many savages, of killing his slave at his\nown discretion expressly denied to the master, p. 422 _sq._--The\nmurder of another person's slave largely regarded as an offence\nagainst the property of the owner, but not exclusively looked upon in\nthis light, p. 423.--When the system of blood-money prevails, the\nprice paid for the life of a slave less than that paid for the life of\na freeman, _ibid._--Among the nations of archaic culture, also, the\nlife of a slave held in less estimation than that of a freeman, but\nnot even the master in all circumstances allowed to put his slave to\ndeath, pp. 423-426.--Efforts of the Christian Church to secure the\nlife of the slave against the violence of the master, p. 426.--But\nneither the ecclesiastical nor the secular legislation gave him the\nsame protection as was bestowed upon the free member of the Church and\nState, pp. 426-428.--In modern times, in Christian countries, the life\nof the negro slave was only inadequately protected by law, p. 428\n_sq._--Why the life of a slave is held in so little regard,\np. 429.--The killing of a freeman by a slave, especially if the victim\nbe his owner, commonly punished more severely than if the same act were\ndone by a free person, p. 429 _sq._--In the estimate of life a\ndistinction also made between different classes of freemen, p. 430\n_sq._--The magnitude of the crime may depend not only on the rank of\nthe victim, but on the rank of the manslayer as well, pp. 431-433.\n--Explanation of this influence of class, p. 433.--In progressive\nsocieties each member of the society at last admitted to\nbe born with an equal claim to the right to live, _ibid._\n\n\nCHAPTER XIX\n\nHUMAN SACRIFICE\n\nThe prevalence of human sacrifice, pp. 434-436.--This practice much\nmore frequently found among barbarians and semi-civilised peoples than\namong genuine savages, p. 436 _sq._--Among some peoples it has been\nnoticed to become increasingly prevalent in the course of time,\np. 437.--Human sacrifice partly due to the idea that gods have an\nappetite for human flesh or blood, p. 437 _sq._--Sometimes connected\nwith the idea that gods require attendants, p. 438.--Moreover, an\nangry god may be appeased simply by the death of him or those who\naroused his anger, or of some representative of the offending\ncommunity, or of somebody belonging to the kin of the offender, pp.\n438-440.--Human sacrifice chiefly a method of life-insurance, based on\nthe idea of substitution, p. 440.--Human victims offered in war,\nbefore a battle, or during a siege, p. 440 _sq._--For the purpose of\nstopping or preventing epidemics, p. 441 _sq._--For the purpose of\nputting an end to a devastating famine, p. 442 _sq._--For the purpose\nof preventing famine, p. 443 _sq._--Criticism of Dr. Frazer's\nhypothesis that the human victim who is killed for the purpose of\nensuring good crops is regarded as a representative of the corn-spirit\nand is slain as such, pp. 444-451.--Human victims offered with a view\nto getting water, p. 451 _sq._--With a view to averting perils arising\nfrom the sea or from rivers, pp. 452-454.--For the purpose of\npreventing the death of some particular individual, especially a chief\nor a king, from sickness, old age, or other circumstances, pp.\n454-457.--For the purpose of helping other men into existence, p. 457\n_sq._--The killing of the first-born child, or the first-born son,\np. 458 _sq._--Explanation of this practice, pp. 459-461.--Human\nsacrifices offered in connection with the foundation of buildings,\np. 461 _sq._--The building-sacrifice, like other kinds of human\nsacrifice, probably based on the idea of substitution, pp.462-464.\n--The belief that {xvii} the soul of the victim is converted\ninto a protecting demon, p. 464 _sq._--The human victim regarded as a\nmessenger, p. 465 _sq._--Human sacrifice not an act of wanton cruelty,\np. 466.--The king or chief sometimes sacrificed, _ibid._--The victims\nfrequently prisoners of war or other aliens, or slaves, or criminals,\npp. 466-468.--The disappearance of human sacrifice, p. 468.--Human\nsacrifice condemned, p. 465 _sq._--Practices intended to replace it,\np. 469.--Human effigies or animals offered instead of men, p. 469\n_sq._--Human sacrifices succeeded by practices involving the effusion\nof human blood without loss of life, p. 470.--Bleeding or mutilation\npractised for the same purpose as human sacrifice, p. 470 _sq._--Why\nthe penal sacrifice of offenders has outlived all other forms of human\nsacrifice, p. 471.--Human beings sacrificed to the dead in order to\nserve them as slaves, wives, or companions, pp. 472-474.--This custom\ndwindling into a survival, p. 475.--The funeral sacrifice of men and\nanimals also seems to involve an intention to vivify the spirits of\nthe deceased with blood, p. 475 _sq._--Manslayers killed in order to\nsatisfy their victims' craving for revenge, p. 476.\n\n\nCHAPTER XX\n\nBLOOD-REVENGE AND COMPENSATION--THE PUNISHMENT OF DEATH\n\nThe prevalence of the custom of blood-revenge, pp. 477-479.--Blood-revenge\nregarded not only as a right, but as a duty, p. 479 _sq._--This duty\nin the first place regarded as a duty to the dead, whose spirit is\nbelieved to find no rest after death until the injury has been\navenged, p. 481 _sq._--Blood-revenge a form of human sacrifice,\np. 482.--Blood-revenge also practised on account of the injury inflicted\non the survivors, p. 482 _sq._--Murder committed within the family or\nkin left unavenged, p. 483.--The injury inflicted on the relatives of\nthe murdered man suggests not only revenge, but reparation,\n_ibid._--The taking of life for life may itself, in a way, serve as\ncompensation, p. 483 _sq._--Various methods of compensation,\np. 484.--The advantages of the practice of composition, p. 484 _sq._--Its\ndisadvantages, p. 485.--The importance of these disadvantages depends\non the circumstances in each special case, p. 486 _sq._--Among many\npeoples the rule of revenge strictly followed, and to accept\ncompensation considered disgraceful, p. 487.--The acceptance of\ncompensation does not always mean that the family of the slain\naltogether renounce their right of revenge, p. 487 _sq._--The\nacceptance of compensation allowed as a justifiable alternative for\nblood-revenge, or even regarded as the proper method of settling the\ncase, p. 488 _sq._--The system of compensation partly due to the\npressure of some intervening authority, p. 489 _sq._--The adoption of\nthis method for the settling of disputes a sign of weakness,\np. 491.--When the central power of jurisdiction is firmly established,\nthe rule of life for life regains its sway, _ibid._--A person may\nforfeit his right to live by other crimes besides homicide, p. 491\n_sq._--Opposition to and arguments against capital punishment,\npp. 492-495.--Modern legislation has undergone a radical change with\nreference to capital punishment, p. 495.--Arguments against its\nabolition, p. 495 _sq._--The chief motive for retaining it in modern\nlegislation, p. 496.\n\n\nCHAPTER XXI\n\nTHE DUEL\n\nDuelling resorted to as a means of bringing to an end hostilities\nbetween different groups of people, p. 497 _sq._--Duels fought for the\npurpose of settling disputes between individuals, either by conferring\non the victor the right of possessing {xviii} the object of the\nstrife, or by gratifying a craving for revenge and wiping off the\naffront, pp. 498-502.--The circumstances to which these customs are\ndue, p. 503 _sq._--The duel as an ordeal or \"judgment of God,\" p. 504\n_sq._--The judicial duel fundamentally derived its efficacy as a means\nof ascertaining the truth from its connection with an oath, p. 505\n_sq._ How it came to be regarded as an appeal to the justice of God,\np. 506 _sq._--The decline and disappearance of the judicial duel,\np. 507.--The modern duel of honour, pp. 507-509.--Its causes,\np. 509.--Arguments adduced in support of it, p. 509 _sq._\n\n\nCHAPTER XXII\n\nBODILY INJURIES\n\nIn the case of bodily injuries the magnitude of the offence, other\nthings being equal, proportionate to the harm inflicted,\npp. 511-513.--The degree of the offence also depends on the station of\nthe parties concerned, and in some cases the infliction of pain held\nallowable or even a duty, p. 513.--Children using violence against\ntheir parents, _ibid._--Parents' right to inflict corporal punishment\non their children, p. 513 _sq._--The husband's right to chastise his\nwife, pp. 514-516.--The master's right to inflict corporal punishment\non his slave, p. 516 _sq._--The maltreatment of another person's slave\nregarded as an injury done to the master, rather than to the slave,\np. 517.--Slaves severely punished for inflicting bodily injuries on\nfreemen, p. 510.--The penalties or fines for bodily injuries\ninfluenced by the class or rank of the parties when both of them are\nfreemen, p. 518 _sq._--Distinction between compatriots and aliens with\nreference to bodily injuries, p. 519.--The infliction of sufferings on\nvanquished enemies, p. 519 _sq._--The right to bodily integrity\ninfluenced by religious differences, p. 520--Forfeited by the\ncommission of a crime, p. 520 _sq._--Amputation or mutilation of the\noffending member has particularly been in vogue among peoples of\nculture, p. 521 _sq._--The disappearance of corporal punishment in\nEurope, p. 522.--Corporal punishment has been by preference a\npunishment for poor and common people or slaves, p. 522 _sq._--The\nstatus of a person influencing his right to bodily integrity with\nreference to judicial torture, p. 523 _sq._--Explanation of the moral\nnotions regarding the infliction of bodily injuries, p. 524.--The\nnotions that an act of bodily violence involves a gross insult, and\nthat corporal punishment disgraces the criminal more than any other\nform of penalty, p. 524 _sq._\n\n\nCHAPTER XXIII\n\nCHARITY AND GENEROSITY\n\nThe mother's duty to rear her children, p. 526.--The husband's and\nfather's duty to protect and support his family, pp. 526-529.--The\nparents' duty of taking care of their offspring in the first place\nbased on the sentiment of parental affection, p. 529.--The\nuniversality not only of the maternal, but of the paternal, sentiment\nin mankind, pp. 529-532.--Marital affection among savages,\np. 532.--Explanation of the simplest paternal and marital duties,\np. 533--Children's duty of supporting their aged parents, pp. 533-538.\nThe duty of assisting brothers and sisters, p. 538.--Of assisting more\ndistant relatives, pp. 538-540.--Uncivilised peoples as a rule\ndescribed as kind towards members of their own community or tribe,\nenjoin charity between themselves as a duty, and praise generosity as\na virtue, pp. 540-546.--Among many savages the old people, in\nparticular, have a claim to support and assistance, p. 546.--The sick\noften carefully attended to, pp. 546-548.-- {xix} Accounts of\nuncharitable savages, p. 548 _sq._--Among semi-civilised and civilised\nnations charity universally regarded as a duty, and often strenuously\nenjoined by their religions, pp. 549-556.--In the course of\nprogressing civilisation the obligation of assisting the needy has\nbeen extended to wider and wider circles of men, pp. 556-558.--The\nduty of tending wounded enemies in war, p. 558.--Explanation of the\ngradual expansion of the duty of charity, p. 559.--This duty in the\nfirst place based on the altruistic sentiment, p. 559 _sq._--Egoistic\nmotives for the doing of good to fellow-creatures, p. 560.--By\nniggardliness a person may expose himself to supernatural dangers,\npp. 560-562.--Liberality may entail supernatural reward, p. 562 _sq._\n--The curses and blessings of the poor partly account for the fact that\ncharity has come to be regarded as a religious duty, pp. 563-565.--The\nchief cause of the extraordinary stress which the higher religions put\non the duty of charity seems to lie in the connection between\nalmsgiving and sacrifice, the poor becoming the natural heirs of the\ngod, p. 565.--Instances of sacrificial food being left for, or\ndistributed among, the poor, p. 565 _sq._--Almsgiving itself regarded\nas a form of sacrifice, or taking the place of it, pp. 566-569.\n\n\nCHAPTER XXIV\n\nHOSPITALITY\n\nInstances of great kindness displayed by savages towards persons of a\nforeign race, pp. 570-572.--Hospitality a universal custom among the\nlower races and among the peoples of culture at the earlier stages of\ntheir civilisation, pp. 572-574.--The stranger treated with special\nmarks of honour, and enjoying extraordinary privileges as a guest,\npp. 574-576.--Custom may require that hospitality should be shown even\nto an enemy, p. 576 _sq._--To protect a guest looked upon as a most\nstringent duty, p. 577 _sq._--Hospitality in a remarkable degree\nassociated with religion, pp. 578-580.--The rules of hospitality in\nthe main based on egoistic considerations, p. 581.--The stranger,\nsupposed to bring with him good luck or blessings, pp. 581-583.--The\nblessings of a stranger considered exceptionally powerful, p. 583\n_sq._--The visiting stranger regarded as a potential source of evil,\np. 584.--His evil wishes and curses greatly feared, owing partly to\nhis quasi-supernatural character, partly to the close contact in which\nhe comes with the host and his belongings, pp. 584-590.--Precautions\ntaken against the visiting stranger, pp. 590-593.--Why no payment is\nreceived from a guest, p. 593 _sq._--The duty of hospitality limited\nby time, p. 594 _sq._--The cause of this, p. 595 _sq._--The decline of\nhospitality in progressive communities, p. 596.\n\n\nCHAPTER XXV\n\nTHE SUBJECTION OF CHILDREN\n\nThe right of personal freedom never absolute, p. 597.--Among some\nsavages a man's children are in the power of the head of their\nmother's family or of their maternal uncle, p. 597 _sq._--Among the\ngreat bulk of existing savages children are in the power of their\nfather, though he may to some extent have to share his authority with\nthe mother, p. 598 _sq._--The extent of the father's power subject to\ngreat variations, p. 599.--Among some savages the father's authority\npractically very slight, p. 599 _sq._--Other savages by no means\ndeficient in filial piety, p. 600 _sq._--The period during which the\npaternal authority lasts, p. 601 _sq._--Old age commands respect and\ngives authority, pp. 603-605.--Superiority of age also gives a certain\namount {xx} of power, p. 605 _sq._--The reverence for old age may\ncease when the grey-head becomes an incumbrance to those around him,\nand imbecility may put an end to the father's authority over his\nfamily, p. 606 _sq._--Paternal, or parental, authority and filial\nreverence at their height among peoples of archaic culture,\npp. 607-613.--Among these peoples we also meet with reverence for the\nelder brother, for persons of a superior age generally, and especially\nfor the aged, p. 614 _sq._--Decline of the paternal authority in\nEurope, p. 615 _sq._--Christianity not unfavourable to the\nemancipation of children, though obedience to parents was enjoined as\na Christian duty, p. 616 _sq._--The Roman notions of paternal rights\nand filial duties have to some extent survived in Latin countries,\np. 617 _sq._--Sources of the parental authority, p. 618 _sq._--Among\nsavages, in particular, filial regard is largely regard for one's\nelders or the aged, p. 619.--Causes of the regard for old age,\npp. 619-621.--The chief cause of the connection between filial\nsubmissiveness and religious beliefs the extreme importance attached\nto parental curses and blessings, pp. 621-626.--Why the blessings and\ncurses of parents are supposed to possess an unusual power, p. 626\n_sq._--Explanation of the extraordinary development of the paternal\nauthority in the archaic State, p. 627 _sq._--Causes of the downfall\nof the paternal power, p. 628.\n\n\nCHAPTER XXVI\n\nTHE SUBJECTION OF WIVES\n\nAmong the lower races the wife frequently said to be the property or\nslave of her husband, p. 629 _sq._--Yet even in such cases custom has\nnot left her entirely destitute of rights, p. 630 _sq._--The so-called\nabsolute authority of husbands over their wives not to be taken too\nliterally, p. 631 _sq._--The bride-price does not _eo ipso_ confer on\nthe husband absolute rights over her, p. 632 _sq._--The hardest\ndrudgeries of life often said to be imposed on the women, p. 633\n_sq._--In early society each sex has its own pursuits, p. 634.--The\nrules according to which the various occupations of life are divided\nbetween the sexes are on the whole in conformity with the indications\ngiven by nature, p. 635 _sq._--This division of labour emphasised by\ncustom and superstition, p. 636 _sq._--It is apt to mislead the\ntravelling stranger, p. 637.--It gives the wife authority within the\ncircle which is exclusively her own, _ibid._--Rejection of the broad\nstatement that the lower races in general hold their women in a state\nof almost complete subjection, pp. 638-646.--The opinion that a\npeople's civilisation may be measured by the position held by the\nwomen not correct, at least so far as the earlier stages of culture\nare concerned, p. 646 _sq._--The position of woman among the peoples\nof archaic civilisation, pp. 647-653.--Christianity tended to narrow\nthe remarkable liberty granted to married women under the Roman\nEmpire, p. 653 _sq._--Christian orthodoxy opposed to the doctrine that\nmarriage should be a contract on the footing of perfect equality\nbetween husband and wife, p. 654 _sq._--Criticism of the hypothesis\nthat the social _status_ of women is connected with the system of\ntracing descent, p. 655 _sq._--The authority of a husband who lives\nwith his wife in the house or community of her father, p. 656\n_sq._--Wives' subjection to their husbands in the first place due to\nthe men's instinctive desire to exert power, and to the natural\ninferiority of women in such qualities of body and mind as are\nessential for personal independence, p. 657.--Elements in the sexual\nimpulse which lead to domination on the part of the man and to\nsubmission on the part of the woman, p. 657 _sq._--But if the man's\ndomination is carried beyond the limits of female love, the woman\nfeels it as a burden, p. 658 _sq._--In extreme cases of oppression, at\nany rate, the community at large would sympathise with her, and the\npublic resentment against the oppressor would result in customs or\nlaws limiting the {xxi} husband's rights, p. 659.--The offended woman\nmay count upon the support of her fellow-sisters, _ibid._--The\nchildren's affection and regard for their mother gives her power,\n_ibid._--The influence which economic conditions exercise on the\nposition of woman, pp. 659-661.--The status of wives connected with\nthe ideas held about the female sex in general, p. 661.--Woman\nregarded as intellectually and morally vastly inferior to man,\nespecially among nations more advanced in culture, pp. 661-663.\n--Progress in civilisation has exercised an unfavourable influence\non the position of woman by widening the gulf between the sexes,\np. 663.--Religion has contributed to her degradation by regarding her\nas unclean, p. 663 _sq._--Women excluded from religious worship and\nsacred functions, pp. 664-666.--The notion that woman is unclean,\nhowever, gives her a secret power over her husband, as women are\nsupposed to be better versed in magic than men, pp. 666-668.--The\ncurses of women greatly feared, p. 668.--Woman as an asylum, p. 668\n_sq._--In archaic civilisation the _status_ of married women was\naffected by the fact that the house-father was invested with some part\nof the power which formerly belonged to the clan, p. 669.--Causes of\nthe decrease of the husband's authority over his wife in modern\ncivilisation, _ibid._\n\n\nCHAPTER XXVII\n\nSLAVERY\n\nDefinition of slavery, p. 670 _sq._--The distribution of slavery and\nits causes among savages, pp. 671-674.--The earliest source of slavery\nwas probably war or conquest, p. 674 _sq._--Intra-tribal slavery among\nsavages, p. 675 _sq._--The master's power over his slave among\nslave-holding savages, pp. 676-678.--Among the lower races slaves are\ngenerally treated kindly, pp. 678-680.--Intra-tribal slaves,\nespecially such as are born in the house, generally treated better\nthan extra-tribal or purchased slaves, p. 680 _sq._--Slavery among the\nnations of archaic culture, pp. 681-693.--The attitude of Christianity\ntowards slavery, pp. 693-700.--The supposed causes of the extinction\nof slavery in Europe, pp. 697-701.--The chief cause the transformation\nof slavery into serfdom, p. 701.--Serfdom only a transitory condition\nleading up to a state of entire liberty, pp. 701-703.--The attitude of\nthe Church towards serfdom, p. 703 _sq._--The negro slavery in the\ncolonies of European countries and the Southern States of America, and\nthe legislation relating to it, pp. 704-711.--The support given to it\nby the clergy, pp. 711-713.--The want of sympathy for, or positive\nantipathy to, the coloured race, p. 713 _sq._--The opinions regarding\nslavery and the condition of slaves influenced by altruistic\nconsiderations, p. 714 _sq._--The condition of slaves influenced by\nthe selfish considerations of their masters, p. 715 _sq._\n\n\n\n\nTHE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT\nOF THE MORAL IDEAS\n\n\n\n\nTHE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT\nOF THE MORAL IDEAS\n\n\nINTRODUCTORY\n\n\nTHE main object of this book will perhaps be best explained by a few\nwords concerning its origin.\n\nIts author was once discussing with some friends the point how far a\nbad man ought to be treated with kindness. The opinions were divided,\nand, in spite of much deliberation, unanimity could not be attained.\nIt seemed strange that the disagreement should be so radical, and the\nquestion arose, Whence this diversity of opinion? Is it due to\ndefective knowledge, or has it a merely sentimental origin? And the\nproblem gradually expanded. Why do the moral ideas in general differ\nso greatly? And, on the other hand, why is there in many cases such a\nwide agreement? Nay, why are there any moral ideas at all?\n\nSince then many years have passed, spent by the author in trying to\nfind an answer to these questions. The present work is the result of\nhis researches and thoughts.\n\nThe first part of it will comprise a study of the moral concepts:\nright, wrong, duty, justice, virtue, merit, &c. Such a study will be\nfound to require an examination into the moral emotions, their nature\nand origin, as also into the relations between these emotions and the\nvarious {2} moral concepts. There will then be a discussion of the\nphenomena to which such concepts are applied--the subjects of moral\njudgments. The general character of these phenomena will be\nscrutinised, and an answer sought to the question why facts of a\ncertain type are matters of moral concern, while other facts are not.\nfinally, the most important of these phenomena will be classified, and\nthe moral ideas relating to each class will be stated, and, so far as\npossible, explained.\n\nAn investigation of this kind cannot be confined to feelings and ideas\nprevalent in any particular society or at any particular stage of\ncivilisation. Its subject-matter is the moral consciousness of mankind\nat large. It consequently involves the survey of an unusually rich and\nvaried field of research--psychological, ethnographical, historical,\njuridical, theological. In the present state of our knowledge, when\nmonographs on most of the subjects involved are wanting, I presume\nthat such an undertaking is, strictly speaking, too big for any man;\nat any rate it is so for the writer of this book. Nothing like\ncompleteness can be aimed at. Hypotheses of varying degrees of\nprobability must only too often be resorted to. Even the certainty of\nthe statements on which conclusions are based is not always beyond a\ndoubt. But though fully conscious of the many defects of his attempt,\nthe author nevertheless ventures to think himself justified in placing\nit before the public. It seems to him that one of the most important\nobjects of human speculation cannot be left in its present state of\nobscurity; that at least a glimpse of light must be thrown upon it by\nresearches which have extended over some fifteen years; and that the\nmain principles underlying the various customs of mankind may be\narrived at even without subjecting these customs to such a full and\nminute treatment as would be required of an anthropological\nmonograph.\n\nPossibly this essay, in spite of its theoretical character, may even\nbe of some practical use. Though rooted in the emotional side of our\nnature, our moral {3} opinions are in a large measure amenable to\nreason. Now in every society the traditional notions as to what is\ngood or bad, obligatory or indifferent, are commonly accepted by the\nmajority of people without further reflection. By tracing them to\ntheir source it will be found that not a few of these notions have\ntheir origin in sentimental likings and antipathies, to which a\nscrutinising and enlightened judge can attach little importance;\nwhilst, on the other hand, he must account blamable many an act and\nomission which public opinion, out of thoughtlessness, treats with\nindifference. It will, moreover, appear that a moral estimate often\nsurvives the cause from which it sprang. And no unprejudiced person\ncan help changing his views if he be persuaded that they have no\nfoundation in existing facts.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I\n\nTHE EMOTIONAL ORIGIN OF MORAL JUDGMENTS\n\n\nTHAT the moral concepts are ultimately based on emotions either of\nindignation or approval, is a fact which a certain school of thinkers\nhave in vain attempted to deny. The terms which embody these concepts\nmust originally have been used--indeed they still constantly are so\nused--as direct expressions of such emotions with reference to the\nphenomena which evoked them. Men pronounced certain acts to be good or\nbad on account of the emotions those acts aroused in their minds, just\nas they called sunshine warm and ice cold on account of certain\nsensations which they experienced, and as they named a thing pleasant\nor painful because they felt pleasure or pain. But to attribute a\nquality to a thing is never the same as merely to state the existence\nof a particular sensation or feeling in the mind which perceives it.\nSuch an attribution must mean that the thing, under certain\ncircumstances, makes a certain impression on the mind. By calling an\nobject warm or pleasant, a person asserts that it is apt to produce in\nhim a sensation of heat or a feeling of pleasure. Similarly, to name\nan act good or bad, ultimately implies that it is apt to give rise to\nan emotion of approval or disapproval in him who pronounces the\njudgment. Whilst not affirming the actual existence of any specific\nemotion in the mind of the person judging or of anybody else, the\npredicate of a moral judgment attributes to the subject a tendency to\narouse an emotion. The moral {5} concepts, then, are essentially\ngeneralisations of tendencies in certain phenomena to call forth moral\nemotions.\n\nHowever, as is frequently the case with general terms, these concepts\nare mentioned without any distinct idea of their contents. The\nrelation in which many of them stand to the moral emotions is\ncomplicated; the use of them is often vague; and ethical theorisers,\ninstead of subjecting them to a careful analysis, have done their best\nto increase the confusion by adapting the meaning of the terms to fit\ntheir theories. Very commonly, in the definition of the goodness or\nbadness of acts, reference is made, not to their tendencies to evoke\nemotions of approval or indignation, but to the causes of these\ntendencies, that is, to those qualities in the acts which call forth\nmoral emotions. Thus, because good acts generally produce pleasure and\nbad acts pain, goodness and badness have been identified with the\ntendencies of acts to produce pleasure or pain. The following\nstatement of Sir James Stephen is a clearly expressed instance of this\nconfusion, so common among utilitarians:--\"Speaking generally, the\nacts which are called right do promote, or are supposed to promote\ngeneral happiness, and the acts which are called wrong do diminish, or\nare supposed to diminish it. I say, therefore, that this is what the\nwords 'right' and 'wrong' mean, just as the words 'up' and 'down' mean\nthat which points from or towards the earth's centre of gravity,\nthough they are used by millions who have not the least notion of the\nfact that such is their meaning, and though they were used for\ncenturies and millenniums before any one was or even could be aware of\nit.\"[1] So, too, Bentham maintained that words like \"ought,\" \"right,\"\nand \"wrong,\" have no meaning unless interpreted in accordance with the\nprinciple of utility;[2] and James Mill was of opinion that \"the very\nmorality\" of the act lies, not in the sentiments raised in the breast\nof him who perceives or contemplates it, but in \"the consequences of\nthe act, good or evil, and their being {6} within the intention of the\nagent.\"[3] He adds that a rational assertor of the principle of\nutility approves of an action \"because it is good,\" and calls it good\n\"because it conduces to happiness.\"[4] This, however, is to invert the\nsequence of the facts, since, properly speaking, an act is called good\nbecause it is approved of, and is approved of by an utilitarian in so\nfar as it conduces to happiness.\n\n[Footnote 1: Stephen, _Liberty_, _Equality_, _Fraternity_, p. 338.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Bentham, _Principles of Morals and Legislation_, p. 4.]\n\n[Footnote 3: James Mill, _Fragment on Mackintosh_, pp. 5, 376.]\n\n[Footnote 4: _Ibid._ p. 368.]\n\nSuch confusion of terms cannot affect the real meaning of the moral\nconcepts. It is true that he who holds that \"actions are right in\nproportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to\nproduce the reverse of happiness,\"[5] may, by a merely intellectual\nprocess, pass judgment on the moral character of particular acts; but,\nif he is an utilitarian from conviction, his first principle, at\nleast, has an emotional origin. The case is similar with many of the\nmoral judgments ordinarily passed by men. They are applications of\nsome accepted general rule: conformity or non-conformity to the rule\ndecides the rightness or wrongness of the act judged of. But whether\nthe rule be the result of a person's independent deductions, or be\nbased upon authority, human or divine, the fact that his moral\nconsciousness recognises it as valid implies that it has an emotional\nsanction in his own mind.\n\n[Footnote 5: Stuart Mill, _Utilitarianism_, p. 9 _sq._]\n\nWhilst the import of the predicate of a moral judgment may thus in\nevery case be traced back to an emotion in him who pronounces the\njudgment, it is generally assumed to possess the character of\nuniversality or \"objectivity\" as well. The statement that an act is\ngood or bad does not merely refer to an individual emotion; as will be\nshown subsequently, it always has reference to an emotion of a more\npublic character. Very often it even implies some vague assumption\nthat the act must be recognised as good or bad by everybody who\npossesses a sufficient knowledge of the case and of all attendant\ncircumstances, and who has a \"sufficiently developed\" {7} moral\nconsciousness. We are not willing to admit that our moral convictions\nare a mere matter of taste, and we are inclined to regard convictions\ndiffering from our own as errors. This characteristic of our moral\njudgments has been adduced as an argument against the emotionalist\ntheory of moral origins, and has led to the belief that the moral\nconcepts represent qualities which are discerned by reason.\n\nCudworth, Clarke, Price, and Reid are names which recall to our mind a\ntheory according to which the morality of actions is perceived by the\nintellect, just as are number, diversity, causation, proportion.\n\"Morality is eternal and immutable,\" says Richard Price. \"Right and\nwrong, it appears, denote what actions are. Now whatever any thing is,\nthat it is, not by will, or degree, or power, but by nature and\nnecessity. Whatever a triangle or circle is, that it is unchangeably\nand eternally. . . . The same is to be said of right and wrong, of\nmoral good and evil, as far as they express real characters of\nactions. They must immutably and necessarily belong to those actions\nof which they are truly affirmed.\"[6] And as having a real existence\noutside the mind, they can only be discerned by the understanding. It\nis true that this discernment is accompanied with an emotion: \"Some\nimpressions of pleasure or pain, satisfaction or disgust, generally\nattend our perceptions of virtue and vice. But these are merely their\neffects and concomitants, and not the perceptions themselves, which\nought no more to be confounded with them, than a particular truth\n(like that for which Pythagoras offered a hecatomb) ought to be\nconfounded with the pleasure that may attend the discovery of it.\"[7]\n\n[Footnote 6: Price, _Review of the Principal Questions in Morals_, pp.\n63, 74 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 7: _Ibid._ p. 63.]\n\nAccording to another doctrine, the moral predicates, though not\nregarded as expressions of \"theoretical\" truth, nevertheless derive\nall their import from reason from \"practical\" or \"moral\" reason, as it\nis variously {8} called. Thus Professor Sidgwick holds that the\nfundamental notions represented by the word \"ought\" or \"right,\" which\nmoral judgments contain expressly or by implication, are essentially\ndifferent from all notions representing facts of physical or psychical\nexperience, and he refers such judgments to the \"reason,\" understood\nas a faculty of cognition. By this he implies \"that what ought to be\nis a possible object of knowledge, _i.e._, that what I judge ought to\nbe, must, unless I am in error, be similarly judged by all rational\nbeings who judge truly of the matter.\" The moral judgments contain\nmoral _truths_, and \"cannot legitimately be interpreted as judgments\nrespecting the present or future existence of human feelings or any\nfacts of the sensible world.\"[8]\n\n[Footnote 8: Sidgwick, _Methods of Ethics_, pp. 25, 33 _sq._]\n\nYet our tendency to objectivise the moral judgments is no sufficient\nground for referring them to the province of reason. If, in this\nrespect, there is a difference between these judgments and others that\nare rooted in the subjective sphere of experience, it is, largely, a\ndifference in degree rather than in kind. The aesthetic judgments,\nwhich indisputably have an emotional origin, also lay claim to a\ncertain amount of \"objectivity.\" By saying of a piece of music that it\nis beautiful, we do not merely mean that it gives ourselves aesthetic\nenjoyment, but we make a latent assumption that it must have a similar\neffect upon everybody who is sufficiently musical to appreciate it.\nThis objectivity ascribed to judgments which have a merely subjective\norigin springs in the first place from the similarity of the mental\nconstitution of men, and, generally speaking, the tendency to regard\nthem as objective is greater in proportion as the impressions vary\nless in each particular case. If \"there is no disputing of tastes,\"\nthat is because taste is so extremely variable; and yet even in this\ninstance we recognise a certain \"objective\" standard by speaking of a\n\"bad\" and a \"good\" taste. On the other hand, if the appearance of\nobjectivity in the moral judgments is so illusive as to {9} make it\nseem necessary to refer them to reason, that is partly on account of\nthe comparatively uniform nature of the moral consciousness.\n\nSociety is the school in which men learn to distinguish between right\nand wrong. The headmaster is Custom, and the lessons are the same for\nall. The first moral judgments were pronounced by public opinion;\npublic indignation and public approval are the prototypes of the moral\nemotions. As regards questions of morality, there was, in early\nsociety, practically no difference of opinion; hence a character of\nuniversality, or objectivity, was from the very beginning attached to\nall moral judgments. And when, with advancing civilisation, this\nunanimity was to some extent disturbed by individuals venturing to\ndissent from the opinions of the majority, the disagreement was\nlargely due to facts which in no way affected the moral principle, but\nhad reference only to its application.\n\nMost people follow a very simple method in judging of an act.\nParticular modes of conduct have their traditional labels, many of\nwhich are learnt with language itself; and the moral judgment commonly\nconsists simply in labelling the act according to certain obvious\ncharacteristics which it presents in common with others belonging to\nthe same group. But a conscientious and intelligent judge proceeds in\na different manner. He carefully examines all the details connected\nwith the act, the external and internal conditions under which it was\nperformed, its consequences, its motive; and, since the moral estimate\nin a large measure depends upon the regard paid to these\ncircumstances, his judgment may differ greatly from that of the man in\nthe street, even though the moral standard which they apply be exactly\nthe same. But to acquire a full insight into all the details which are\napt to influence the moral value of an act is in many cases anything\nbut easy, and this naturally increases the disagreement. There is thus\nin every advanced society a diversity of opinion regarding the moral\nvalue of certain modes of conduct which results from circumstances of\na purely {10} intellectual character--from the knowledge or ignorance\nof positive facts,--and involves no discord in principle.\n\nNow it has been assumed by the advocates of various ethical theories\nthat all the differences of moral ideas originate in this way, and\nthat there is some ultimate standard which must be recognised as\nauthoritative by everybody who understands it rightly. According to\nBentham, the rectitude of utilitarianism has been contested only by\nthose who have not known their own meaning:--\"When a man attempts to\ncombat the principle of utility . . . his arguments, if they prove\nanything, prove not that the principle is wrong, but that, according\nto the applications he supposes to be made of it, it is\nmisapplied.\"[9] Mr. Spencer, to whom good conduct is that \"which\nconduces to life in each and all,\" believes that he has the support of\n\"the true moral consciousness,\" or \"moral consciousness proper,\"\nwhich, whether in harmony or in conflict with the \"pro-ethical\"\nsentiment, is vaguely or distinctly recognised as the rightful\nruler.[10] Samuel Clarke, the intuitionist, again, is of opinion that\nif a man endowed with reason denies the eternal and necessary moral\ndifferences of things, it is the very same \"as if a man that has the\nuse of his sight, should at the same time that he beholds the sun,\ndeny that there is any such thing as light in the world; or as if a\nman that understands Geometry or Arithmetick, should deny the most\nobvious and known proportions of lines or numbers.\"[11] In short, all\ndisagreement as to questions of morals is attributed to ignorance or\nmisunderstanding.\n\n[Footnote 9: Bentham, _Principles of Morals and Legislation_, p. 4 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 10: Spencer, _Principles of Ethics_, i. 45, 337 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 11: Clarke, _Discourse concerning the Unchangeable\nObligations of Natural Religion_, p. 179.]\n\nThe influence of intellectual considerations upon moral judgments is\ncertainly immense. We shall find that the evolution of the moral\nconsciousness to a large extent consists in its development from the\nunreflecting to the reflecting, from the unenlightened to the\nenlightened. All higher emotions are determined by cognitions, they\narise {11} from \"the presentation of determinate objective\nconditions\";[12] and moral enlightenment implies a true and\ncomprehensive presentation of those objective conditions by which the\nmoral emotions, according to their very nature, are determined.\nMorality may thus in a much higher degree than, for instance, beauty\nbe a subject of instruction and of profitable discussion, in which\npersuasion is carried by the representation of existing data. But\nalthough in this way many differences may be accorded, there are\npoints in which unanimity cannot be reached even by the most accurate\npresentation of facts or the subtlest process of reasoning.\n\n[Footnote 12: Marshall, _Pain_, _Pleasure_, _and Aesthetics_, p. 83.]\n\nWhilst certain phenomena will almost of necessity arouse similar moral\nemotions in every mind which perceives them clearly, there are others\nwith which the case is different. The emotional constitution of man\ndoes not present the same uniformity as the human intellect. Certain\ncognitions inspire fear in nearly every breast; but there are brave\nmen and cowards in the world, independently of the accuracy with which\nthey realise impending danger. Some cases of suffering can hardly fail\nto awaken compassion in the most pitiless heart; but the sympathetic\ndispositions of men vary greatly, both in regard to the beings with\nwhose sufferings they are ready to sympathise, and with reference to\nthe intensity of the emotion. The same holds good for the moral\nemotions. The existing diversity of opinion as to the rights of\ndifferent classes of men and of the lower animals, which springs from\nemotional differences, may no doubt be modified by a clearer insight\ninto certain facts, but no perfect agreement can be expected as long\nas the conditions under which the emotional dispositions are formed\nremain unchanged. Whilst an enlightened mind _must_ recognise the\ncomplete or relative irresponsibility of an animal, a child, or a\nmadman, and _must_ be influenced in its moral judgment by the motives\nof an act--no intellectual enlightenment, no scrutiny of facts, can\ndecide how far the interests of the {12} lower animals should be\nregarded when conflicting with those of men, or how far a person is\nbound, or allowed, to promote the welfare of his nation, or his own\nwelfare, at the cost of that of other nations or other individuals.\nProfessor Sidgwick's well-known moral axiom, \"I ought not to prefer my\nown lesser good to the greater good of another,\"[13] would, if\nexplained to a Fuegian or a Hottentot, be regarded by him, not as\nself-evident, but as simply absurd; nor can it claim general\nacceptance even among ourselves. Who is that \"Another\" to whose\ngreater good I ought not to prefer my own lesser good? A\nfellow-countryman, a savage, a criminal, a bird, a fish--all without\ndistinction? It will, perhaps, be argued that on this, and on all\nother points of morals, there would be general agreement, if only the\nmoral consciousness of men were sufficiently developed.[14] But then,\nwhen speaking of a \"sufficiently developed\" moral consciousness\n(beyond insistence upon a full insight into the governing facts of\neach case), we practically mean nothing else than agreement with our\nown moral convictions. The expression is faulty and deceptive,\nbecause, if intended to mean anything more, it presupposes an\nobjectivity of the moral judgments which they do not possess, and at\nthe same time seems to be proving what it presupposes. We may speak of\nan intellect as sufficiently developed to grasp a certain truth,\nbecause truth is objective; but it is not proved to be objective by\nthe fact that it is recognised as true by a \"sufficiently developed\"\nintellect. The objectivity of truth lies in the recognition of facts\nas true by all who understand them _fully_, whilst the appeal to a\n_sufficient_ knowledge assumes their objectivity. To the verdict of a\nperfect intellect, that is, an intellect which knows everything\nexisting, all would submit; but we can form no idea of a moral\nconsciousness which could lay claim to a similar authority. If the\nbelievers in an all-good {13} God, who has revealed his will to\nmankind, maintain that they in this revelation possess a perfect moral\nstandard, and that, consequently, what is in accordance with such a\nstandard must be objectively right, it may be asked what they mean by\nan \"all-good\" God. And in their attempt to answer this question, they\nwould inevitably have to assume the objectivity they wanted to prove.\n\n[Footnote 13: Sidgwick, _op. cit._ p. 383.]\n\n[Footnote 14: This, in fact, was the explanation given by Professor\nSidgwick himself in a conversation which I had with him regarding his\nmoral axioms.]\n\nThe error we commit by attributing objectivity to moral estimates\nbecomes particularly conspicuous when we consider that these estimates\nhave not only a certain quality, but a certain quantity. There are\ndifferent degrees of badness and goodness, a duty may be more or less\nstringent, a merit may be smaller or greater.[15] These quantitative\ndifferences are due to the emotional origin of all moral concepts.\nEmotions vary in intensity almost indefinitely, and the moral emotions\nform no exception to this rule. Indeed, it may be fairly doubted\nwhether the same mode of conduct ever arouses exactly the same degree\nof indignation or approval in any two individuals. Many of these\ndifferences are of course too subtle to be manifested in the moral\njudgment; but very frequently the intensity of the emotion is\nindicated by special words, or by the way in which the judgment is\npronounced. It should be noticed, however, that the quantity of the\nestimate expressed in a moral predicate is not identical with the\nintensity of the moral emotion which a certain mode of conduct arouses\non a special occasion. We are liable to feel more indignant if an\ninjury is committed before our eyes than if we read of it in a\nnewspaper, and yet we admit that the degree of wrongness is in both\ncases the same. The quantity of moral estimates is determined by the\nintensity of the emotions which their objects tend to evoke under\nexactly similar external circumstances.\n\n[Footnote 15: It will be shown in a following chapter why there are no\ndegrees of rightness. This concept implies accordance with the moral\nlaw. The adjective \"right\" means that duty is fulfilled.]\n\n{14} Besides the relative uniformity of moral opinions, there is\nanother circumstance which tempts us to objectivise moral judgments,\nnamely, the authority which, rightly or wrongly, is ascribed to moral\nrules. From our earliest childhood we are taught that certain acts\n_are_ right and that others _are_ wrong. Owing to their exceptional\nimportance for human welfare, the facts of the moral consciousness are\nemphasised in a much higher degree than any other subjective facts. We\nare allowed to have our private opinions about the beauty of things,\nbut we are not so readily allowed to have our private opinions about\nright and wrong. The moral rules which are prevalent in the society to\nwhich we belong are supported by appeals not only to human, but to\ndivine, authority, and to call in question their validity is to rebel\nagainst religion as well as against public opinion. Thus the belief in\na moral order of the world has taken hardly less firm hold of the\nhuman mind than the belief in a natural order of things. And the moral\nlaw has retained its authoritativeness even when the appeal to an\nexternal authority has been regarded as inadequate. It filled Kant\nwith the same awe as the star-spangled firmament. According to Butler,\nconscience is \"a faculty in kind and in nature supreme over all\nothers, and which bears its own authority of being so.\"[16] Its\nsupremacy is said to be \"felt and tacitly acknowledged by the worst no\nless than by the best of men.\"[17] Adam Smith calls the moral\nfaculties the \"vicegerents of God within us,\" who \"never fail to\npunish the violation of them by the torments of inward shame and\nself-condemnation; and, on the contrary, always reward obedience with\ntranquillity of mind, with contentment, and self-satisfaction.\"[18]\nEven Hutcheson, who raises the question why the moral sense should not\nvary in different men as the palate does, considers it {15} \"to be\nnaturally destined to command all the other powers.\"[19]\n\n[Footnote 16: Butler, 'Sermon II.--Upon Human Nature,' in _Analogy of\nReligion_, _&c._ p. 403.]\n\n[Footnote 17: Dugald Stewart, _Philosophy of the Active and Moral\nPowers of Man_, i. 302.]\n\n[Footnote 18: Adam Smith, _Theory of Moral Sentiments_, p. 235.]\n\n[Footnote 19: Hutcheson, _System of Moral Philosophy_, i. 61.]\n\nAuthority is an ambiguous word. It may indicate knowledge of truth,\nand it may indicate a rightful power to command obedience. The\nauthoritativeness attributed to the moral law has often reference to\nboth kinds of authority. The moral lawgiver lays down his rules in\norder that they should be obeyed, and they are authoritative in so far\nas they have to be obeyed. But he is also believed to know what is\nright and wrong, and his commands are regarded as expressions of moral\ntruths. As we have seen, however, this latter kind of authority\ninvolves a false assumption as to the nature of the moral predicates,\nand it cannot be justly inferred from the power to command. Again, if\nthe notion of an external lawgiver be put aside, the moral law does\nnot generally seem to possess supreme authority in either sense of the\nword. It does not command obedience in any exceptional degree; few\nlaws are broken more frequently. Nor can the regard for it be called\nthe mainspring of action; it is only one spring out of many, and\nvariable like all others. In some instances it is the ruling power in\na man's life, in others it is a voice calling in the desert; and the\nmajority of people seem to be more afraid of the blame or ridicule of\ntheir fellowmen, or of the penalties with which the law threatens\nthem, than of \"the vicegerents of God\" in their own hearts. That\nmankind prefer the possession of virtue to all other enjoyments, and\nlook upon vice as worse than any other misery,[20] is unfortunately an\nimagination of some moralists who confound men as they are with men as\nthey ought to be.\n\n[Footnote 20: _Idem_, _Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of\nBeauty and Virtue_, p. 248.]\n\nIt is said that the authority of the moral law asserts itself every\ntime the law is broken, that virtue bears in itself its own reward,\nand vice its own punishment. But, to be sure, conscience is a very\nunjust retributer. The more a person habituates himself to virtue the\nmore he {16} sharpens its sting, the deeper he sinks in vice the more\nhe blunts it. Whilst the best men have the most sensitive consciences,\nthe worst have hardly any conscience at all. It is argued that the\nhabitual sinner has rid himself of remorse at a great cost;[21] but it\nmay be fairly doubted whether the loss is an adequate penalty for his\nwickedness. We are reminded that men are rewarded for good and\npunished for bad acts by the moral feelings of their neighbours. But\npublic opinion and law judge of detected acts only. Their judgment is\nseldom based upon an exhaustive examination of the case. They often\napply a standard which is itself open to criticism. And the feelings\nwith which men regard their fellow-creatures, and which are some of\nthe main sources of human happiness and suffering, have often very\nlittle to do with morality. A person is respected or praised, blamed\nor despised, on other grounds than his character. Nay, the admiration\nwhich men feel for genius, courage, pluck, strength, or accidental\nsuccess, is often superior in intensity to the admiration they feel\nfor virtue.\n\n[Footnote 21: Ziegler, _Social Ethics_, p. 103.]\n\nIn spite of all this, however, the supreme authority assigned to the\nmoral law is not altogether an illusion. It really exists in the minds\nof the best, and is nominally acknowledged by the many. By this I do\nnot refer to the universal admission that the moral law, whether\nobeyed or not, ought under all circumstances to be obeyed; for this is\nthe same as to say that what ought to be ought to be. But it is\nrecognised, in theory at least, that morality, either alone or in\nconnection with religion, possesses a higher value than anything else;\nthat rightness and goodness are preferable to all other kinds of\nmental superiority, as well as of physical excellence. If this theory\nis not more commonly acted upon, that is due to its being, in most\npeople, much less the outcome of their own feelings than of\ninstruction from the outside. It is ultimately traceable to some great\nteacher whose own mind was ruled by the ideal of moral perfection, and\nwhose {17} words became sacred on account of his supreme wisdom, like\nConfucius or Buddha,[22] or on religious grounds, like Jesus. The\nauthority of the moral law is thus only an expression of a strongly\ndeveloped, overruling moral consciousness. It can hardly, as Mr.\nSidgwick maintains, be said to \"depend upon\" the conception of the\nobjectivity of duty.[23] On the contrary, it must be regarded as a\ncause of this conception--not only, as has already been pointed out,\nwhere it is traceable to some external authority, but where it results\nfrom the strength of the individual's own moral emotions. As clearness\nand distinctness of the conception of an object easily produces the\nbelief in its truth, so the intensity of a moral emotion makes him who\nfeels it disposed to objectivise the moral estimate to which it gives\nrise, in other words, to assign to it universal validity. The\nenthusiast is more likely than anybody else to regard his judgments as\ntrue, and so is the moral enthusiast with reference to his moral\njudgments. The intensity of his emotions makes him the victim of an\nillusion.\n\n[Footnote 22: \"Besides the ideal king, the personification of Power\nand Justice, another ideal has played an important part in the\nformation of early Buddhist ideas regarding their Master. . . . It was\nthe ideal of a perfectly Wise Man, the personification of Wisdom, the\nBuddha\" (Rhys Davids, _Hibbert Lectures on Some Points in the History\nof Buddhism_, p. 141).]\n\n[Footnote 23: Sidgwick, _op. cit._ p. 104.]\n\nThe presumed objectivity of moral judgments thus being a chimera,\nthere can be no moral truth in the sense in which this term is\ngenerally understood. The ultimate reason for this is, that the moral\nconcepts are based upon emotions, and that the contents of an emotion\nfall entirely outside the category of truth. But it may be true or not\nthat we have a certain emotion, it may be true or not that a given\nmode of conduct has a tendency to evoke in us moral indignation or\nmoral approval. Hence a moral judgment is true or false according as\nits subject has or has not that tendency which the predicate\nattributes to it. If I say that it is wrong to resist evil, and yet\nresistance to evil has no tendency whatever to call {18} forth in me\nan emotion of moral disapproval, then my judgment is false.\n\nIf there are no general moral truths, the object of scientific ethics\ncannot be to fix rules for human conduct, the aim of all science being\nthe discovery of some truth. It has been said by Bentham and others\nthat moral principles cannot be proved because they are first\nprinciples which are used to prove everything else.[24] But the real\nreason for their being inaccessible to demonstration is that, owing to\ntheir very nature, they can never be true. If the word \"Ethics,\" then,\nis to be used as the name for a science, the object of that science\ncan only be to study the moral consciousness as a fact.[25]\n\n[Footnote 24: Bentham, _Principles of Morals and Legislation_, p. 4.\n_Cf._ H\u00f6ffding, _Etik_, p. 43.]\n\n[Footnote 25: _Cf._ Simmel, _Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaft_, i.\np. iii. _sq._; Westermarck, 'Normative und psychologische Ethik,' in\n_Dritter Internationaler Congress f\u00fcr Psychologie in M\u00fcnchen_,\np. 428 _sq._]\n\nEthical subjectivism is commonly held to be a dangerous doctrine,\ndestructive to morality, opening the door to all sorts of libertinism.\nIf that which appears to each man as right or good, stands for that\nwhich is right or good; if he is allowed to make his own law, or to\nmake no law at all; then, it is said, everybody has the natural right\nto follow his caprice and inclinations, and to hinder him from doing\nso is an infringement on his rights, a constraint with which no one is\nbound to comply provided that he has the power to evade it. This\ninference was long ago drawn from the teaching of the Sophists,[26]\nand it will no doubt be still repeated as an argument against any\ntheorist who dares to assert that nothing can be said to be truly\nright or wrong.\n\n[Footnote 26: Zeller, _History of Greek Philosophy_, ii. 475.]\n\nTo this argument may, first, be objected that a scientific theory is\nnot invalidated by the mere fact that it is likely to cause mischief.\nThe unfortunate circumstance that there do exist dangerous things in\nthe world, proves that something may be dangerous and yet true.\nAnother question is whether any scientific truth really is mischievous\n{19} on the whole, although it may cause much discomfort to certain\npeople. I venture to believe that this, at any rate, is not the case\nwith that form of ethical subjectivism which I am here advocating. The\ncharge brought against the Sophists does not at all apply to it. I do\nnot even subscribe to that beautiful modern sophism which admits every\nman's conscience to be an infallible guide. If we had to recognise, or\nrather if we did recognise, as right everything which is held to be\nright by anybody, savage or Christian, criminal or saint, morality\nwould really suffer a serious loss. But we do not, and we cannot, do\nso. My moral judgments are my own judgments; they spring from my own\nmoral consciousness; they judge of the conduct of other men not from\ntheir point of view but from mine, not with primary reference to their\nopinions about right and wrong, but with reference to my own. Most of\nus indeed admit that, when judging of an act, we also ought to take\ninto consideration the moral conviction of the agent, and the\nagreement or disagreement between his doing and his idea of what he\nought to do. But although we hold it to be wrong of a person to act\nagainst his conscience, we may at the same time blame him for having\nsuch a conscience as he has. Ethical subjectivism covers all such\ncases. It certainly does not allow everybody to follow his own\ninclinations; nor does it lend sanction to arbitrariness and caprice.\nOur moral consciousness belongs to our mental constitution, which we\ncannot change as we please. We approve and we disapprove because we\ncannot do otherwise. Can we help feeling pain when the fire burns us?\nCan we help sympathising with our friends? Are these phenomena less\nnecessary or less powerful in their consequences, because they fall\nwithin the subjective sphere of experience? So, too, why should the\nmoral law command less obedience because it forms part of our own\nnature?\n\nFar from being a danger, ethical subjectivism seems to me more likely\nto be an acquisition for moral practice. {20} Could it be brought home\nto people that there is no absolute standard in morality, they would\nperhaps be somewhat more tolerant in their judgments, and more apt to\nlisten to the voice of reason. If the right has an objective\nexistence, the moral consciousness has certainly been playing at\nblindman's buff ever since it was born, and will continue to do so\nuntil the extinction of the human race. But who does admit this? The\npopular mind is always inclined to believe that it possesses the\nknowledge of what _is_ right and wrong, and to regard public opinion\nas the reliable guide of conduct. We have, indeed, no reason to regret\nthat there are men who rebel against the established rules of\nmorality; it is more deplorable that the rebels are so few, and that,\nconsequently, the old rules change so slowly. Far above the vulgar\nidea that the right is a settled something to which everybody has to\nadjust his opinions, rises the conviction that it has its existence in\neach individual mind, capable of any expansion, proclaiming its own\nright to exist, and, if need be, venturing to make a stand against the\nwhole world. Such a conviction makes for progress.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II\n\nTHE NATURE OF THE MORAL EMOTIONS\n\n\nIN the preceding chapter it was asserted, in general terms, that the\nmoral concepts are based on emotions, and the leading arguments to the\ncontrary were met. We shall now proceed to examine the nature of the\nmoral emotions.\n\nThese emotions are of two kinds: disapproval, or indignation, and\napproval. They have in common characteristics which make them moral\nemotions, in distinction from others of a non-moral character, but at\nthe same time both of them belong to a wider class of emotions, which\nI call retributive emotions. Again, they differ from each other in\npoints which make each of them allied to certain non-moral retributive\nemotions, disapproval to anger and revenge, and approval to that kind\nof retributive kindly emotion which in its most developed form is\ngratitude. They may thus, on the one hand, be regarded as two distinct\ndivisions of the moral emotions, whilst, on the other hand,\ndisapproval, like anger and revenge, forms a sub-species of\nresentment, and approval, like gratitude, forms a sub-species of\nretributive kindly emotion. The following diagram will help to\nelucidate the matter:--\n\n                           Retributive Emotions.\n                                     |\n                  ----------------------------------------\n                  |                                      |\n              Resentment.                   Retributive Kindly Emotion.\n                  |                                      |\n        -----------------             ---------------------------\n        |               |             |                         |\n  Anger and          Moral          Moral          Non-moral retributive\n   Revenge.       disapproval.     approval            Kindly Emotion,\n                        |             |              including Gratitude.\n                        ---------------\n                               |\n                        Moral Emotions.\n\n{22} That moral disapproval is a kind of resentment and akin to anger\nand revenge, and that moral approval is a kind of retributive kindly\nemotion and akin to gratitude, are, of course, statements which call\nfor proof. An analysis of all these emotions, and a detailed study of\nthe causes which evoke them, will, I hope, bear out the correctness of\nmy classification. In this connection only the analysis can be\nattempted. The study of causes will be involved in the treatment of\nthe subjects of moral judgments.\n\nResentment may be described as an aggressive attitude of mind towards\na cause of pain. Anger is sudden resentment, in which the hostile\nreaction against the cause of pain is unrestrained by deliberation.\nRevenge, on the other hand, is a more deliberate form of non-moral\nresentment, in which the hostile reaction is more or less restrained\nby reason and calculation.[1] It is impossible, however, to draw any\ndistinct limit between these two types of resentment, as also to\ndiscern where an actual desire to inflict pain comes in. In its\nprimitive form, anger, even when directed against a living being,\ncontains a vehement impulse to remove the cause of pain without any\nreal desire to produce suffering.[2] Anger is strikingly shown by many\nfish, and notoriously by sticklebacks when their territory is invaded\nby other sticklebacks. In such circumstances of provocation the whole\nanimal changes colour, and, darting at the trespasser, shows rage and\nfury in every movement;[3] but we can hardly believe that any idea of\ninflicting pain is present to its mind. As we proceed still lower down\nthe scale of animal life we find the conative element itself gradually\ndwindle away until nothing is left but mere reflex action.\n\n[Footnote 1: _Cf._ Ribot, _Psychology of the Emotions_, p. 220 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 2: There are some good remarks on this in Mr. Hiram\nStanley's _Studies in the Evolutionary Psychology of Feeling_,\np. 138 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 3: Romanes, _Animal Intelligence_, p. 246 _sqq._]\n\nThat the fury of an injured animal turns against the real or assumed\ncause of its injury is a matter of notoriety, and everybody knows that\nthe same is the case with the {23} anger of a child. No doubt, as\nProfessor Sully observes, \"hitting out right and left, throwing things\ndown on the floor and breaking them, howling, wild agitated movements\nof the arms and whole body, these are the outward vents which the gust\nof childish fury is apt to take.\"[4] But, on the other hand, we know\nwell enough that Darwin's little boy, who became a great adept at\nthrowing books and sticks at any one who offended him,[5] was in this\nrespect no exceptional child. Towards the age of one year, according\nto M. Perez, children \"will beat people, animals, and inanimate\nobjects if they are angry with them; they will throw their toys, their\nfood, their plate, anything, in short, that is at hand, at the people\nwho have displeased them.\"[6] That a similar discrimination\ncharacterises the resentment of a savage is a fact upon which it is\nnecessary to dwell at some length for the reason that it has been\ndisputed, and because there are some seeming anomalies which require\nan explanation.\n\n[Footnote 4: Sully, _Studies in Childhood_, p. 232 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 5: Darwin, 'Biographical Sketch of an Infant,' in _Mind_,\nii. 288.]\n\n[Footnote 6: Perez, _first Three Years of Childhood_, p. 66 _sq._]\n\nIn a comprehensive work,[7] Dr. Steinmetz has made the feeling of\nrevenge the object of a detailed investigation, which cannot be left\nunnoticed. The ultimate conclusions at which he has arrived are these:\nRevenge is essentially rooted in the feeling of power and superiority.\nIt arises consequently upon the experience of injury, and its aim is\nto enhance the \"self-feeling\" which has been lowered or degraded by\nthe injury suffered. It answers this purpose best if it is directed\nagainst the aggressor himself, but it is not essential to it that it\nshould take any determinate direction, for, _per se_, and originally,\nit is \"undirected.\"[8]\n\n[Footnote 7: _Ethnologische Studien zur ersten Entwicklung der\nStrafe_.]\n\n[Footnote 8: Strictly speaking, this theory is not new. Dr. Paul R\u00e9e,\nin his book _Die Entstehung des Gewissens_, has pronounced revenge to\nbe a reaction against the feeling of inferiority which the aggressor\nimpresses upon his victim. The injured man, he says (_ibid._ p. 40) is\nnaturally reluctant to feel himself inferior to another man, and\nconsequently strives, by avenging the aggression, to show himself\nequal or even superior to the aggressor. A similar view was previously\nexpressed by Schopenhauer (_Parerga und Paralipomena_, ii. 475 _sq._).\nBut Dr. Steinmetz has elaborated his theory with an independence and\nfulness which make any question of priority quite insignificant.]\n\n{24} We are told, in fact, that the first stage through which revenge\npassed within the human race was characterised by a total, or almost\ntotal, want of discrimination. The aim of the offended man was merely\nto raise his injured \"self-feeling\" by inflicting pain upon somebody\nelse, and his savage desire was satisfied whether the man on whom he\nwreaked his wrath was guilty or innocent.[9] No doubt, there were from\nthe outset instances in which the offender himself was purposely made\nthe victim, especially if he was a fellow-tribesman; but it was not\nreally due to the feeling of revenge if the suffering was inflicted\nupon him, in preference to others. Even primitive man must have found\nout that vengeance directed against the actual culprit, besides being\na strong deterrent to others, was a capital means of making a\ndangerous person harmless. However, Dr. Steinmetz adds, these\nadvantages should not be overestimated, as even indiscriminate revenge\nhas a deterring influence on the malefactor.[10] In early times, then,\nvengeance, according to Dr. Steinmetz, was in the main \"undirected.\"\n\n[Footnote 9: Steinmetz, _op. cit._ i. 355, 356, 359, 561.]\n\n[Footnote 10: _Ibid._ i. 362.]\n\nAt the next stage it becomes, he says, somewhat less indiscriminate. A\nproper victim is sought for even in cases of what we should call\nnatural death, which the savage generally attributes to the ill-will\nof some foe skilled in sorcery;[11] though indeed Dr. Steinmetz doubts\nwhether in such cases the unfortunate sufferer is really supposed to\nhave committed the deed imputed to him.[12] At all events, a need is\nfelt of choosing somebody for a victim, and \"undirected\" vengeance\ngradually gives way to \"directed\" vengeance. A rude specimen of this\nis the blood-feud, in which the individual culprit is left out of\nconsideration, but war is carried on against the group of which he is\na member, either his family or his tribe. And {25} from this system of\njoint responsibility we finally come, by slow degrees, says Dr.\nSteinmetz, to the modern conception, according to which punishment\nshould be inflicted upon the criminal and nobody else.[13] Dr.\nSteinmetz believes that the _vis agens_ in this long process of\nevolution lies in the intellectual development of the human race: man\nfound out more and more distinctly that the best means of restraining\nwrongs was to punish a certain person, namely, the wrong-doer.[14] On\nthis utilitarian calculation our author lays much stress in the latter\npart of his investigation; whereas in another place he observes that a\nrevenge which is directed against the offender is particularly apt to\nremove the feeling of inferiority, by effectually humiliating the\nhitherto triumphant foe.[15]\n\n[Footnote 11: _Ibid._ i. 356 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 12: _Ibid._ i. 359 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 13: Steinmetz, _op. cit._ i. 361.]\n\n[Footnote 14: _Ibid._ i. 358, 359, 361 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 15: _Ibid._ i. 111.]\n\nIn this historical account the main points of interest are the initial\nstage of \"undirected\" vengeance, and the way in which such vengeance\ngradually became discriminate. If, in primitive times, a man did not\ncare in the least on whom he retaliated an injury, then of course the\ndirection of his vengeance could not be essential to the revenge\nitself, but would be merely a later appendix to it. The question is,\nwhat evidence can Dr. Steinmetz adduce to support his theory? Of\nprimitive man we have no direct experience; no savage people now\nexisting is a faithful representative of him, either physically or\nmentally. Yet however greatly the human race has changed, primitive\nman is not altogether dead. Traits of his character still linger in\nhis descendants; and of primitive revenge, we are told, there are\nsufficient survivals left.[16]\n\n[Footnote 16: _Ibid._ i. 364.]\n\nUnder the heading \"Perfectly Undirected Revenge,\" Dr. Steinmetz\nsets out several alleged cases of such so-called survivals[17] 1. An\nIndian of the Omaha tribe, who was kicked out of a trading\nestablishment which he had been forbidden to enter, declared in a rage\nthat he would revenge himself for an injury so gross, and, \"seeking\nsome object to destroy, he encountered a {26} sow and pigs, and\nappeased his rage by putting them all to death.\" 2. The people of that\nsame tribe believe that if a man who has been struck by lightning is\nnot buried in the proper way, and in the place where he has been\nkilled, his spirit will not rest in peace, but will walk about till\nanother person is slain by lightning and laid beside him. 3. At the\nburial of a Loucheux Indian, the relatives sometimes will cut and\nlacerate their bodies, or, as sometimes happens, will, \"in a fit of\nrevenge against fate,\" stab some poor, friendless person who may be\nsojourning among them. 4. The Navahoes, when jealous of their wives,\nare apt to wreak their spleen and ill-will upon the first person whom\nthey chance to meet. 5. The Great Eskimo, as it is reported, once\nafter a severe epidemic swore to kill all white people who might\nventure into their country. 6. The Australian father, whose little\nchild happens to hurt itself, attacks his innocent neighbours,\nbelieving that he thus distributes the pain among them and\nconsequently lessens the suffering of the child. 7. The Brazilian\nTupis ate the vermin which molested them, for the sake of revenge; and\nif one of them struck his foot against a stone, he raged over it and\nbit it, whilst, if he were wounded with an arrow, he plucked it out\nand gnawed the shaft. 8. The Dacotahs avenge theft by stealing the\nproperty of the thief or of somebody else. 9. Among the Tshatrali\n(Pamir), if a man is robbed of his meat by a neighbour's dog, he will,\nin a fit of rage, not only kill the offending dog, but will, in\naddition, kick his own. 10. In New Guinea the bearers of evil tidings\nsometimes get knocked on the head during the first outburst of\nindignation evoked by their news. 11. Some natives of Motu, who had\nrescued two shipwrecked crews and safely brought them to their home in\nPort Moresby, were attacked there by the very friends of those they\nhad saved, the reason for this being that the Port Moresby people were\nangry at the loss of the canoes, and could not bear that the Motuans\nwere happy while they themselves were in trouble. 12. Another story\nfrom New Guinea tells us of a man who killed some innocent persons,\nbecause he had been disappointed in his plans and deprived of valuable\nproperty. 13. Among the Maoris it sometimes happened that the friends\nof a murdered man killed the first man who came in their way, whether\nenemy or friend. 14. Among the same people, chiefs who had suffered\nsome loss often used to rob their subjects of property in order to\nmake good the damage. 15. If the son of a Maori is hurt, his maternal\nrelatives, to whose tribe he is considered to belong, come to pillage\nhis father's house or village. 16. If {27} a tree falls on a Kuki his\nfellows chop it up, and if one of that tribe kills himself by falling\nfrom a tree the tree from which he fell is promptly cut down. 17. In\nsome parts of Daghestan, when the cause of a death is unknown, the\nrelatives of the deceased declare some person chosen at random to have\nmurdered him, and retaliate his death upon that person.\n\n[Footnote 17: _Ibid._ i. 318 _sqq._]\n\nI have been obliged to enumerate all these cases for the reason that a\ntheory cannot be satisfactorily refuted unless on its own ground. I\nmay confess at once that I scarcely ever saw an hypothesis vindicated\nby the aid of more futile evidence. The cases 7 and 16 illustrate just\nthe reverse of \"undirected\" revenge, and, when we take into\nconsideration the animistic beliefs of savages, present little to\nastonish us. In case 17 the guilt is certainly imputed to somebody at\nrandom, but only when the culprit is unknown. Cases 1, 4, 10 and 12\nand perhaps also 11, imply that revenge is taken upon an innocent\nparty in a fit of passion; in cases 1 and 12 the offender himself\ncannot be got at, in case 10 the man who is knocked on the head\nappears for the moment as the immediate cause of the grief or\nindignation evoked, while case 11 exhibits envy combined with extreme\ningratitude. In case 9 the anger is chiefly directed against the\n\"guilty\" dog, and against the \"innocent\" one evidently by an\nassociation of ideas. Cases 8 and 14 illustrate indemnification for\nloss of property, and in case 8 the thief himself is specifically\nmentioned first. In case 15 the revenging attack is made upon the\nproperty of those people among whom the child lives, and who may be\nconsidered responsible for the loss its maternal clan sustains by the\ninjury. Case 6 merely shows the attempt of a superstitious father to\nlessen the suffering of his child. As regards case 5, Petitot, who has\nrecorded it, says expressly that the white people were supposed to\nhave caused the epidemic by displeasing the god Tornrark.[18] Case 2\npoints to a superstitious belief which is interesting enough in\nitself, but which, so far as I can see, is without any bearing\nwhatever on the point we are discussing. Case 3 looks like a\ndeath-offering. The stabbing of an innocent person is mentioned in\nconnection with, or rather as an alternative to, the self-laceration\nof the mourners, which last has probably a sacrificial character.\nMoreover, there is in this case no question of a culprit. In case 13,\nfinally, the idea of sacrifice is very conspicuous. Dr. Steinmetz has\nborrowed his statement from Waitz, whose account is incomplete.\nDieffenbach, the original authority, says that the custom in question\nwas called by the Maori _taua tapu_, _i.e._, sacred fight, {28} or\n_taua toto_, _i.e._, fight for blood. He describes it as follows:--\"If\nblood has been shed, a party sally forth and kill the first person\nthey fall in with, whether an enemy or belonging to their own tribe;\neven a brother is sacrificed. If they do not fall in with anybody, the\n_tohunga_ (that is, the priest) pulls up some grass, throws it into a\nriver, and repeats some incantation. After this ceremony, the killing\nof a bird, or any living thing that comes in their way, is regarded as\nsufficient, provided that blood is actually shed. All who participate\nin such an excursion are _tapu_, and are not allowed either to smoke\nor to eat anything but indigenous food.\"[19] It seems probable that\nthis ceremony was undertaken in order to appease the enraged spirit of\nthe dead,[20] and at the same time it may have been intended to\nrefresh the spirit with blood.[21] The question, however, is, Why was\nnot his death avenged upon the actual culprit? To this Dr. Steinmetz\nwould answer that the deceased was thought to be indiscriminate in his\ncraving for vengeance.[22] But so far as the resentment of the dead is\nconcerned, the \"sacred fight\" of the Maoris only seems to illustrate\nthe impulsive character of anger. From Dieffenbach's description of\nit, it is obvious that the friends of the slain man considered it to\nbe a matter of paramount importance that blood should be shed\nimmediately. If no human being came in their way, an animal was\nkilled, but then an incantation was uttered beforehand. I presume that\nthe reason for this was the terror which the supposed wrath of the\ndead man's spirit struck into the living, combined perhaps with the\nidea that it was in immediate need of fresh blood. The Maoris\nconsidered all spirits of the dead to be maliciously inclined towards\nthem,[23] and the ghost of a person who had died a violent death was\ncertainly looked upon as especially dangerous. The craving for\ninstantaneous shedding of blood is even more conspicuous in another\ncase which may be appropriately mentioned in this connection. The\nAetas of the Philippine Islands, we are told, \"do not always {29} wait\nfor the death of the afflicted before they bury him. Immediately after\nthe body has been deposited in the grave, it becomes necessary,\naccording to their usages, that his death should be avenged. The\nhunters of the tribe go out with their lances and arrows to kill the\nfirst living creature they meet with, whether a man, a stag, a wild\nhog, or a buffalo.\"[24] Dr. Steinmetz himself quotes some other\ninstances from the same group of islands, in which, when a man dies,\nhis nearest kinsmen go out to requite his death by the death of the\nfirst man who comes in their way.[25] It is worth noticing that the\nPhilippine Islanders have the very worst opinion of their ghosts, and\nbelieve that these are particularly bloodthirsty soon after death.[26]\n\n[Footnote 18: Petitot, _Les Grands Esqimaux_, p. 207 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 19: Dieffenbach, _Travels in New Zealand_, ii. 127.]\n\n[Footnote 20: _Cf._ _ibid._ ii. 129.]\n\n[Footnote 21: The latter object is suggested by some funeral\nceremonies which will be noticed in a following chapter. Among the\nDyaks, \"a father who lost his child would go out and kill the first\nman he met, as a funeral ceremony,\" believing that he thus provided\nthe deceased with a slave to accompany him to the habitation of souls\n(Tylor, _Primitive Culture_, i. 459). Among the Garos, it was formerly\nthe practice, \"whenever the death of a great man amongst them\noccurred, to send out a party of assassins to murder and bring back\nthe head of the first Bengali they met. The victims so immolated\nwould, it was supposed, be acceptable to their gods\" (Dalton,\n_Descriptive Ethnology of Bengal_, p. 68).]\n\n[Footnote 22: _Cf._ Steinmetz, _op. cit._ i. 343.]\n\n[Footnote 23: Taylor, _Te Ika a Maui_, p. 221.]\n\n[Footnote 24: Earl, _Papuans_, p. 132.]\n\n[Footnote 25: Steinmetz, _op. cit._ i. 335 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 26: Blumentritt, 'Der Ahnencultus der Malaien des\nPhilippinen-Archipels' in _Mittheilungen der Geogr. Gesellsch. in\nWien_, xxv. 166 _sqq._ De Mas, _Informe sobre el estado de las Islas\nfilipinas en 1842_, _Orijen, &c._ p. 15.]\n\nDr. Steinmetz also refers to some statements according to which, among\ncertain Australian tribes, the relatives of a person who dies avenge\nhis death by killing an innocent man.[27] But in these cases the\navenged death, though \"natural\" according to our terminology, is, in\nthe belief of the savages, caused by sorcery, and the revenge is not\nso indiscriminate as Dr. Steinmetz seems to assume. Among the\nWellington tribe, as appears from a statement which he quotes himself,\nit is the sorcerer's life that must be taken for satisfaction.[28] In\nNew South Wales, after the dead man has been interrogated as to the\ncause of his death, his kinsmen are resolute in taking vengeance, if\nthey \"imagine that they have got sure indications of the perpetrator\nof the wrong.\"[29] Among the Central Australian natives, \"not\ninfrequently the dying man will whisper in the ear of a _Railtchawa_,\nor medicine man, the name of the man whose magic is killing him,\" and\nif this be not done, \"there is no difficulty, by some other method, of\nfixing sooner or later on the guilty party\"; but only after the\nculprit has been revealed by the medicine man is it decided by a\ncouncil of the old men whether an avenging party is to be arranged or\nnot.[30] Among the aborigines of West Australia, the survivors are\n\"pretty busy in seeking out\" the sorcerer who is supposed to have\ncaused the death of their friend.[31]\n\n[Footnote 27: Steinmetz, _op. cit._ i. 337 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 28: Hale, _U.S. Exploring Expedition Vol. VI.--Ethnography\nand Philology_, p. 115; quoted by Steinmetz, _op. cit._ i. 337.]\n\n[Footnote 29: Fraser, _Aborigines of New South Wales_, p. 86.]\n\n[Footnote 30: Spencer and Gillen, _Native Tribes of Central\nAustralia_, p. 476 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 31: Calvert, _Aborigines of Western Australia_, p. 20 _sq._]\n\n{30} To sum up: all the facts which Dr. Steinmetz has adduced as\nevidence for his hypothesis of an original stage of \"undirected\"\nrevenge only show that, under certain circumstances, either in a fit\nof passion, or when the actual offender is unknown or out of reach,\nrevenge may be taken on an innocent being, wholly unconnected with the\ninflicter of the injury which it is sought to revenge. There is such\nan intimate connection between the experience of injury and the\nhostile reaction by which the injured individual gives vent to his\npassion, that the reaction does not fail to appear even when it misses\nits aim. Anger, as Seneca said, \"does not rage merely against its\nobject, but against every obstacle which it encounters on its\nway.\"[32] Many infants, when angry and powerless to hurt others,\n\"strike their heads against doors, posts, walls of houses, and\nsometimes on the floor.\"[33] Well known are the \"amucks\" of the\nMalays, in which \"the desperado assails indiscriminately friend and\nfoe,\" and, with dishevelled hair and frantic look, murders or wounds\nall whom he meets without distinction.[34] But all this is not\nrevenge; it is sudden anger or blind rage. Nor is it revenge in the\ntrue sense of the word if a person who has been humiliated by his\nsuperior retaliates on those under him. It is only the outburst of a\nwounded \"self-feeling,\" which, when not directed against its proper\nobject, can afford no adequate consolation to a revengeful man.\n\n[Footnote 32: Seneca, _De ira_, iii. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 33: Stanley Hall, 'A Study of Anger,' in _American Jour. of\nPsychology_, x. 554.]\n\n[Footnote 34: Crawfurd, _History of the Indian Archipelago_, i. 67.\n_Cf._ Ellis, 'The Amok of the Malays,' in _Jour. of Mental Science_,\nxxxix. 325 _sqq._ In the Andaman Islands, it is not uncommon for a man\n\"to vent his ill-temper, or show his resentment at any act, by\ndestroying his own property as well as that of his neighbours\" (Man,\n'Aboriginal Inhabitants of the Andaman Islands,' in _Jour. Anthr.\nInst._ xii. 111). Among the Kar Nicobarese, when a quarrel takes\nplace, in serious cases, a man will probably burn his own house down\n(Kloss, _In the Andamans and Nicobars_, p. 310). But in these\ninstances it is not certain whether the offended party destroys his\nown property in blind rage, or with some definite object in view.]\n\nIn the institution of the blood-feud some sort of collective\nresponsibility is usually involved.[35] If the {31} offender is of\nanother family than his victim, some of his relatives may have to\nexpiate his deed.[36] If he belongs to another clan, the whole clan\nmay be held responsible for it.[37] And if he is a member of another\ntribe, the vengeance may be wreaked upon his fellow-tribesmen\nindiscriminately.[38]\n\n[Footnote 35: _Cf._ Post, _Anf\u00e4nge des Staats- und Rechtsleben_,\np. 180; R\u00e9e, _op. cit._ p. 49 _sq._; Steinmetz, _op. cit._ i. ch. vi.]\n\n[Footnote 36: Besides the authorities quoted _infra_, see Leuschner,\nin Steinmetz, _Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse von eingeborenen V\u00f6lkern in Afrika\nund Ozeanien_, (Bakwiri); _ibid._ p. 49 (Banaka and Bapuku); Rautanen,\n_ibid._ p. 341 (Ondonga); Walter, _ibid._ p. 390 (natives of Nossi-B\u00e9\nand Mayotte, near Madagascar); von Langsdorf, _Voyages and Travels_,\ni. 132 (Nukahivans); Forbes, _A Naturalist's Wanderings in the Eastern\nArchipelago_, p. 473 (Timorese); Foreman, _Philippine Islands_, p. 213\n(Igorrotes of Luzon); Kovalewsky, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxv. 113\n(people of Daghestan); _Idem_, _Coutume contemporaine et loi\nancienne_, p. 248 _sq._ (Ossetes); Merzbacher, _Aus den Hochregionen\ndes Kaukasus_, ii. 51 (Khevsurs).]\n\n[Footnote 37: Bridges, in _A Voice for South America_, xiii. 207\n(Fuegians). Dorsey, 'Omaha Sociology,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._\niii. 369. Ridley, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ ii. 268 (Kamilaroi in\nAustralia). Godwin-Austen, _ibid._ ii. 394 (Garo Hill tribes).]\n\n[Footnote 38: von Martins, _Beitr\u00e4ge zur Ethnographie Amerika's_,\ni. 127 _sqq._ (Brazilian Indians). Crawfurd, _op. cit._ iii. 124\n(natives of Celebes). Kohler, in _Zeitschr. f. vgl. Rechtswiss._\nvii. 383 (Goajiros of Columbia). _Ibid._ vii. 376 (Papuans of New\nGuinea). Curr, _The Australian Race_, i. 70. Scaramucci and Giglioli,\n'Notizie sui Danakil,' in _Archivio per l'antropologia e la etnologia_,\nxiv. 39. Leuschner, in Steinmetz, _Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_, p. 23 (Bakwiri).\n_Ibid._ p. 49 (Banaka and Bapuku).]\n\n\"Among the Fuegians,\" says Mr. Bridges, \"etiquette and custom\nrequire that all the relatives of a murdered person should . . . visit\ntheir displeasure upon every connection of the manslayers, each\npersonally.\" The avengers of blood would by no means be satisfied with\na party of natives if they should actually deliver up into their hands\na manslayer, or kill him themselves, \"but would yet exact from all the\nmurderer's friends tribute or infliction of injuries with sticks or\nstones.\"[39] Among the Indians of British Columbia and Vancouver\nIsland, \"grudges are handed down from father to son for generations,\nand friendly relations are never free from the risk of being\ninterrupted.\"[40] Among the Greenlanders, the revenge for a murder\ngenerally \"costs the executioner himself, his children, cousins, or\nother relatives their lives; or if these are inaccessible, some other\nacquaintance in the neighbourhood.\"[41] Among the Maoris,\nblood-revenge might be taken on any relative of the homicide, \"no\nmatter how distant.\"[42] In Tana, {32} revenge \"is often sought in the\ndeath of the brother, or some other near relative of the culprit.\"[43]\nAmong the Kabyles, \"la vengeance peut porter sur chacun des membres de\nla famille du meurtrier, quel qu'il soit.\"[44] The Bedouins, according\nto Burckhardt, \"claim the blood not only from the actual homicide, but\nfrom all his relations; and it is these claims that constitute the\nright of _th\u00e1r_, or the blood-revenge.\"[45] Among the people of Ibrim,\nin Nubia, on the other hand, the same traveller observes, \"it is not\nconsidered as sufficient to retaliate upon any person within the fifth\ndegree of consanguinity, as among the Bedouins of Arabia; only the\nbrother, son, or first cousin can supply the place of the\nmurderer.\"[46] Traces of collective responsibility in connection with\nblood-revenge are found among the Hebrews.[47] It has prevailed, or\nstill prevails, among the Japanese[48] and Coreans,[49] the\nPersians[50] and Hindus,[51] the ancient Greeks[52] and Teutons.[53]\nIt was a rule among the Welsh[54] and the Scotch in former days,[55]\nand is so still in Corsica,[56] Albania,[57] and among some of the\nSouthern Slavs.[58] In Montenegro, if a homicide who cannot be caught\nhimself has no relatives, revenge is sometimes taken on some\ninhabitant of the village or district to which he belongs, or even on\na person who only is of the same religion and nationality as the\nmurderer.[59] In Albania, under similar circumstances, the victim may\nbe a person who has had nothing else to do with the offender than that\nhe has perhaps once been speaking to him.[60]\n\n[Footnote 39: Bridges, in _South American Missionary Magazine_,\nxiii. 151 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 40: Macfie, _Vancouver Island and British Columbia_, p. 470.]\n\n[Footnote 41: Cranz, _History of Greenland_, i. 178.]\n\n[Footnote 42: Shortland, _Traditions and Superstitions of the New\nZealanders_, p. 213 _sq._ _Cf._ _ibid._ p. 218 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 43: Turner, _Samoa_, p. 317.]\n\n[Footnote 44: Hanoteau and Letourneux, _La Kabylie_, iii. 61.]\n\n[Footnote 45: Burckhardt, _Notes on the Bedouins and Wah\u00e1bys_, p. 85.\nSee, also, Layard, _Discoveries in the Ruins of Nineveh and Babylon_,\np. 306; Lane, _Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians_, i. 133.]\n\n[Footnote 46: Burckhardt, _Travels in Nubia_, p. 128.]\n\n[Footnote 47: _2 Samuel_, xiv. 7. _Cf._ _ibid._ xxi.]\n\n[Footnote 48: Dautremer, 'The Vendetta or Legal Revenge in Japan,' in\n_Trans. Asiatic Soc. Japan_, xiii. 84.]\n\n[Footnote 49: Griffis, _Corea_, p. 227.]\n\n[Footnote 50: Spiegel, _Er\u00e2nische Alterthumskunde_, iii. 687. Polak,\n_Persien_, ii. 96.]\n\n[Footnote 51: Dubois, _Description of the Character, Manners, and\nCustoms of the People of India_, p. 195.]\n\n[Footnote 52: Leist, _Alt-arisches Jus Gentium_, p. 424.]\n\n[Footnote 53: _Gotlands-Lagen_, 13.]\n\n[Footnote 54: Walter, _Das alte Wales_, p. 138.]\n\n[Footnote 55: Mackintosh, _History of Civilisation in Scotland_,\nii. 279.]\n\n[Footnote 56: Gregorovius, _Wanderings in Corsica_, i. 179.]\n\n[Footnote 57: Gop[vc]evi['c], _**Oberalbanien und seine Liga_,\np. 324 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 58: Miklosich, 'Die Blutrache bei den Slaven,' in\n_Denkschriften der kaiserl. Akademie d. Wissensch. Philos.-histor.\nClasse_, Vienna, xxxvi. 131, 146 _sq._ Krauss, _Sitte und Brauch der\nS\u00fcdslaven_, p. 39.]\n\n[Footnote 59: Lago, _Memorie sulla Dalmazia_, ii. 90.]\n\n[Footnote 60: Gop[vc]evi['c], _op. cit._ p. 325.]\n\nThere is no difficulty in explaining these facts. The following\nstatement made by Mr. Romilly with reference {33} to the Solomon\nIslanders has, undoubtedly, a much wider application:--\"In the cases\nwhich call for punishment, the difficulties in the way of capturing\nthe actual culprits are greater than any one, who has not been engaged\nin this disagreeable work, can imagine.\"[61] Though it may happen that\na manslayer is abandoned by his own people,[62] the system of\nblood-revenge more often seems to imply, not only that all the members\nof a group are engaged, more or less effectually, in the act of\nrevenge, but that they mutually protect each other against the\navengers. A homicide frequently provokes a war,[63] in which family\nstands against family, clan against clan, or tribe against tribe. In\nsuch cases the whole group take upon themselves the deed of the\nperpetrator, and any of his fellows, because standing up for him,\nbecomes a proper object of revenge. The guilt extends itself, as it\nwere, in the eyes of the offended party. So, also, any person who\nlives on friendly terms with the offender, or is supposed to\nsympathise with him, is liable to arouse a feeling of resentment, and\nmay consequently, in extreme cases, have to expiate his crime.\nMoreover, because of the close relationship which exists between the\nmembers of the sam__e group, the actual culprit will be mortified by any\nsuccessful attack that the avengers make on his people, and, if he be\ndead, its painful and humiliating effects may still be supposed to\nreach his spirit. \"When the offender himself is beyond the reach of\ndirect attack,\" says Mr. Wilkins, \"it is not beneath a Bengali's view\nto try to wound him through his children or other members of his\nfamily.\"[64] Among the South Slavonians, in a similar case, the\navengers of blood first attempt to kill the father, brother, {34} or\ngrown-up son of the murderer, \"so as to inflict upon him a very heavy\nand painful loss\"; and only when this has been tried in vain, are more\ndistant relatives attacked.[65] The Bedouins of the Euphrates even\nprefer killing the chief man among the murderer's relations within the\nsecond degree to taking his own life, on the principle, \"You have\nkilled my cousin, I will kill yours.\"[66] And the Californian Nishinam\n\"consider that the keenest and most bitter revenge which a man can\ntake is, not to slay the murderer himself, but his dearest\nfriend.\"[67] In these instances vengeance is exacted with reference\nrather to the loss suffered by the survivors than to the injury\ncommitted against the murdered man, the culprit being subjected to a\ndeprivation similar to that which he has inflicted himself. So, also,\namong the Marea, if a commoner is slain by a nobleman, his death is\nnot avenged directly on the slayer, but on some commoner who is\nsubservient to him.[68] If, again, among the Quianganes of Luzon, a\nnoble is killed by a plebeian, another nobleman, of the kin of the\nmurderer, must be killed, while the murderer himself is ignored.[69]\nIf, among the Igorrotes, a man slays a woman of another house, her\nnearest kinsman endeavours to slay a woman belonging to the household\nof the homicide, but to the guilty man himself he does nothing.[70] In\nall these cases the culprit is not lost sight of; vengeance is\ninvariably wreaked upon somebody connected with him. But any\nconsideration of guilt or innocence is overshadowed by the blind\nsubordination to that powerful rule which requires strict equivalence\nbetween injury and punishment--an eye for an eye and a tooth for a\ntooth--and which, when strained to the utmost, cannot allow the life\nof a man to be sacrificed for that of a woman, or the life of a\nnobleman to be {35} sacrificed for that of a commoner, or the life of\na commoner to expiate the death of a noble. This rule, as we shall see\nlater on, is not suggested by revenge itself, but is due to the\ninfluence of other factors which intermingle with this feeling, and\nhelp, with it, to determine the action.\n\n[Footnote 61: Romilly, _Western Pacific and New Guinea_, p. 81. _Cf._\nFriedrichs, 'Mensch und Person,' in _Das Ausland_, 1891, p. 299.]\n\n[Footnote 62: See, _e.g._, Scott Robertson, _The K\u00e1firs of the\nHindu-Kush_, p. 440.]\n\n[Footnote 63: Dr. Post's statement (_Die Geschlechtsgenossenschaft der\nUrzeit_, p. 156) that the blood-revenge \"characterisirt sich . . . ganz\nund gar als ein Privatkrieg zwischen zwei Geschlechtsgenossenschaften,\"\nhowever, is not quite correct in this unqualified form, as may be\nseen, _e.g._, from von Martius's description of the blood-revenge of\nthe Brazilian Indians, _op. cit._ i. 127 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 64: Wilkins, _Modern Hinduism_, p. 411.]\n\n[Footnote 65: Krauss, _op. cit._ p. 39.]\n\n[Footnote 66: Blunt, _Bedouin Tribes of the Euphrates_, ii. 206 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 67: Powers, _Tribes of California_, p. 320.]\n\n[Footnote 68: Munzinger, _Ostafrikanische Studien_, p. 243.]\n\n[Footnote 69: Blumentritt, quoted by Spencer, _Principles of Ethics_,\ni. 370 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 70: Jagor, _Travels in the Philippines_, p. 213.]\n\nNevertheless, the strong tendency to discrimination which\ncharacterises resentment, is not wholly lost even behind the veil of\ncommon responsibility. Mr. Howitt has come to the conclusion that,\namong the Australian Kurnai, if a homicide has been committed by an\nalien tribe, the feud \"cannot be satisfied but by the death of the\noffender,\" although it is carried on, not against him alone, but\nagainst the whole group of which he is a member.[71] It is only \"if\nthey fail to secure the guilty person\" that the natives of Western\nVictoria consider it their duty to kill one of his nearest\nrelatives.[72] Concerning the West Australian aborigines, Sir George\nGrey observes, \"The first great principle with regard to punishments\nis, that all the relations of a culprit, in the event of his not being\nfound, are implicated in his guilt; if, therefore, the principal\ncannot be caught, his brother or father will answer nearly as well,\nand failing these, any other male or female relative, who may fall\ninto the hands of the avenging party.\"[73] Among the Papuans of the\nTami Islands, revenge may be taken on some other member of the\nmurderer's family only if it is absolutely impossible to catch the\nguilty person himself.[74] That the blood-revenge is in the first\nplace directed against the malefactor, and against some relative of\nhis only if he cannot be found out, is expressly stated with reference\nto various peoples in different parts of the world;[75] and it is {36}\nprobable that much more to the same effect might have been discovered,\nif the observers of savage life had paid more attention to this\nparticular aspect of the matter. Among the Fuegians, the most serious\nriots take place when a manslayer, whom some one wishes to punish,\ntakes refuge with his relations or friends.[76] Von Martius remarks of\nthe Brazilian Indians in general that, even when an intertribal war\nensues from the committing of homicide, the nearest relations of the\nkilled person endeavour, if possible, to destroy the culprit himself\nand his family.[77] With reference to the Creek Indians, Mr. Hawkins\nsays that though, if a murderer flies and cannot be caught, they will\ntake revenge upon some innocent individual belonging to his family,\nthey are \"generally earnest of themselves, in their endeavours to put\nthe guilty to death.\"[78] The same is decidedly the case in those\nparts of Morocco where the blood-feud still prevails.\n\n[Footnote 71: Fison and Howitt, _Kamilaroi and Kurnai_, p. 221.]\n\n[Footnote 72: Dawson, _Australian Aborigines_, p. 71.]\n\n[Footnote 73: Grey, _Journals of Expeditions_, ii. 239.]\n\n[Footnote 74: Bamler, quoted by Kohler, in _Zeitschr. f. vergl.\nRechtswiss._ xiv. 380.]\n\n[Footnote 75: Riedel, _De sluik- en kroesharige rassen tusschen\nSelebes en Papua_, p. 434 (natives of Wetter). Chalmers, _Pioneering\nin New Guinea_, p. 179. Kohler, in _Zeitschr. f. vergl. Rechtswiss._\nxiv. 446 (some Marshall Islanders). Merker, quoted by Kohler, _ibid._\nxv. 53 _sq._ (Wadshagga). Brett, _Indian Tribes of Guiana_, p. 357.\nBernau, _Missionary Labours in British Guiana_, p. 57. Dall, _Alaska_,\np. 416. Boas, 'The Central Eskimo,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ vi. 582.\nJacob, _Leben der vorisl\u00e2mischen Beduinen_, p. 144. Kovalewsky,\n_Coutume contemporaine_, p. 248 (Ossetes). Popovi['c], _Recht und\nGericht in Montenegro_, p. 69; Lago, _op. cit._ ii. 90 (Montenegrines).\nMiklosich, _loc. cit._ p. 131 (Slavs). Wilda, _Strafrecht der Germanen_,\np. 173 _sq._ (ancient Teutons).]\n\n[Footnote 76: Hyades and Deniker, _Mission scientifique du Cap Horn_,\nvii. 375.]\n\n[Footnote 77: von Martius, _op. cit._ i. 128.]\n\n[Footnote 78: Hawkins, in _Trans. American Ethn. Soc._ iii. 67.]\n\nNot only has Dr. Steinmetz failed to prove his hypothesis that revenge\nwas originally \"undirected,\" but this hypothesis is quite opposed to\nall the most probable ideas we can form with regard to the revenge of\nearly man. For my own part I am convinced that we may obtain a good\ndeal of knowledge about the primitive condition of the human race, but\nnot by studying modern savages only. I have dealt with this question\nat some length in another place,[79] and wish now merely to point out\nthat those general physical and psychical qualities which are not only\ncommon to all races of mankind, but which are shared by them with the\nanimals most allied to man, may be assumed to have been present also\nin the earlier stages of {37} human development. Now, concerning\nrevenge among animals, more especially among monkeys, many anecdotes\nhave been told by trustworthy authorities, and in every case the\nrevenge has been clearly directed against the offender.\n\n[Footnote 79: _History of Human Marriage_, p. 3 _sqq._]\n\nOn the authority of a zoologist \"whose scrupulous accuracy was\nknown to many persons,\" Darwin relates the following story:--\"At the\nCape of Good Hope an officer had often plagued a certain baboon, and\nthe animal, seeing him approaching one Sunday for parade, poured water\ninto a hole and hastily made some thick mud, which he skilfully dashed\nover the officer as he passed by, to the amusement of many bystanders.\nFor long afterwards the baboon rejoiced and triumphed whenever he saw\nhis victim.\"[80] Prof. Romanes considers this to be a good instance of\n\"what may be called brooding resentment deliberately preparing a\nsatisfactory revenge.\"[81] This, I think, is to put into the statement\nsomewhat more than it really contains; but at all events it records a\ncase of revenge, in the sense in which Dr. Steinmetz uses the word.\nThe same may be said of other instances mentioned by so accurate\nobservers as Brehm and Rengger in their descriptions of African and\nAmerican monkeys, and of various examples of resentment in elephants\nand even in camels.[82] According to Palgrave, the camel possesses the\npassion of revenge, and in carrying it out \"shows an unexpected degree\nof far-thoughted malice, united meanwhile with all the cold stupidity\nof his usual character.\" The following instance, which occurred in a\nsmall Arabian town, deserves to be quoted, since it seems to have\nescaped the notice of the students of animal psychology. \"A lad of\nabout fourteen had conducted a large camel, laden with wood, from that\nvery village to another at half an hour's distance or so. As the {38}\nanimal loitered or turned out of the way, its conductor struck it\nrepeatedly, and harder than it seems to have thought he had a right to\ndo. But not finding the occasion favourable for taking immediate\nquits, it 'bode its time'; nor was that time long in coming. A few\ndays later the same lad had to re-conduct the beast, but unladen, to\nhis own village. When they were about half way on the road, and at\nsome distance from any habitation, the camel suddenly stopped, looked\ndeliberately round in every direction, to assure itself that no one\nwas within sight, and, finding the road far and near clear of\npassers-by, made a step forward, seized the unlucky boy's head in its\nmonstrous mouth, and lifting him up in the air flung him down again on\nthe earth with the upper part of his skull completely torn off, and\nhis brains scattered on the ground.\"[83] We are also told that\nelephants, though very sensitive to insults, are never provoked, even\nunder the most painful or distracting circumstances, to hurt those\nfrom whom they have received no harm.[84] Sometimes animals show a\nremarkable degree of discrimination in finding out the proper object\nfor their resentment. It is hardly surprising to read that a baboon,\nwhich was molested in its cage with a stick, tried to seize, not the\nstick, but the hand of its tormentor.[85] More interesting is the\n\"revenge\" which an elephant at Versailles inflicted upon a certain\nartist who had employed his servant to tease the animal by making a\nfeint of throwing apples into its mouth:--\"This conduct enraged the\nelephant; and, as if it knew that the painter was the cause of this\nteasing impertinence, instead of attacking the servant, it eyed the\nmaster, and squirted at him from its trunk such a quantity of water as\nspoiled the paper on which he was drawing.\"[86]\n\n[Footnote 80: Darwin, _Descent of Man_, p. 69.]\n\n[Footnote 81: Romanes, _Animal Intelligence_, p. 478.]\n\n[Footnote 82: Brehm, _Thierleben_, i. 156. _Idem_, _From North Pole to\nEquator_, p. 305. Rengger (_Naturgeschichte der S\u00e4ugethiere von\nParaguay_, p. 52) gives the following information about the\nCay:--\"F\u00fcrchtet er . . . seinen Gegner, so nimmt er seine Zuflucht zur\nVerstellung, und sucht sich erst dann an ihm zu r\u00e4chen, wenn er ihn\nunvermuthet \u00fcberfallen kann. So hatte ich einen Cay, welcher mehrere\nPersonen die ihn oft auf eine grobe Art geneckt hatten, in einem\nAugenblicke lass, wo sie im besten Vernehmen mit ihm zu sein glaubten.\nNach ver\u00fcbter That kletterte er schnell auf einen hohen Balken, wo man\nihm nicht beikommen konnte, und grinste schadenfroh den Gegenstand\nseiner Rache an.\" See, moreover, Watson, _The Reasoning Power in\nAnimals_, especially pp. 20, 21, 24, 156 _sq._; Romanes, _op. cit._\np. 387 _sqq._; but also Morgan, _Animal Life and Intelligence_, p. 401\n_sq._]\n\n[Footnote 83: Palgrave, _Narrative of a Year's Journey through Central\nand Eastern Arabia_, i. 40.]\n\n[Footnote 84: Watson, _op. cit._ p. 26 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 85: Aas, _Sjaeleliv og intelligens hos Dyr_, i. 72.]\n\n[Footnote 86: Smellie, _Philosophy of Natural History_, i. 448.]\n\nI find it inconceivable that anybody, in the face of such facts, could\nstill believe that the revenge of early man was at first essentially\nindiscriminating, and became gradually discriminating from\nconsiderations of social expediency. But by this I certainly do not\nmean to deny that violation of the \"self-feeling\" is an extremely\ncommon and powerful incentive to resentment. It is so {39} among\nsavage[87] and civilised men alike; even dogs and monkeys get angry\nwhen laughed at. Nothing more easily rouses in us anger and a desire\nfor retaliation, nothing is more difficult to forgive, than an act\nwhich indicates contempt, or disregard of our feelings. Long after the\nbodily pain of a blow has ceased, the mental suffering caused by the\ninsult remains and calls for vengeance. This is an old truth often\ntold. According to Seneca, \"the greater part of the things which\nenrage us are insults, not injuries.\"[88] Plutarch observes that,\nthough different persons fall into anger for different reasons, yet in\nnearly all of them is to be found the idea of their being despised or\nneglected.[89] \"Contempt,\" says Bacon, \"is that which putteth an edge\nupon anger, as much, or more, than the hurt itself.\"[90] But, indeed,\nthere is no need to resort to different principles in order to explain\nthe resentment excited by different kinds of pain. In all cases\nrevenge implies, primordially and essentially, a desire to cause pain\nor destruction in return for hurt suffered, whether the hurt be bodily\nor mental; and, if to this impulse is added a desire to enhance the\nwounded \"self-feeling,\" that does not interfere with the true nature\nof the primary feeling of revenge. There are genuine specimens of\nresentment without the co-operation of self-regarding pride;[91] and,\non the other hand, the reaction of the wounded \"self-feeling\" is not\nnecessarily, in the first place, concerned with the infliction of\npain. If a person has written a bad book which is severely criticised,\nhe may desire to repair his reputation by writing a better book, not\nby humiliating his critics; and if he attempts the latter rather than\nthe former, he does so, not merely in order to enhance his\n\"self-feeling,\" {40} but because he is driven on by revenge. Dr. Boas\ntells us that the British Columbia Indian, when his feelings are hurt,\nsits down or lies down sullenly for days without partaking of food,\nand that, \"when he rises his first thought is, not how to take\nrevenge, but to show that he is superior to his adversary.[92]\n\n[Footnote 87: Turner, 'Ethnology of the Ungava District,' in _Ann.\nRep. Bur. Ethn._ xi. 270 (Hudson Bay Indians). Georgi, _Russia_, iii.\n205 (Aleuts). Sarasin, _Ergebnisse naturwiss. Forschungen auf Ceylon_,\niii. 537 (Veddahs). von Wrede, _Reise in [H.]adhramaut_, p. 157\n(Bedouins). Winterbottom, _Native Africans in the Neighbourhood of\nSierra Leone_, i. 211.]\n\n[Footnote 88: Seneca, _De ira_, iii. 28.]\n\n[Footnote 89: Plutarch, _De cohibenda ira_, 12.]\n\n[Footnote 90: Bacon, 'Essay LVII. Of Anger,' in _Essays_, p. 514.]\n\n[Footnote 91: Bain, _Emotions and the Will_, p. 177.]\n\n[Footnote 92: Boas, _First General Report on the Indians of British\nColumbia_, read at the Newcastle-upon-Tyne meeting of the British\nAssociation, 1889, p. 19.]\n\nIn the feeling of gratification which results from successful\nresentment, the pleasure of power or superiority also may form a very\nimportant element, but it is never the exclusive element.[93] As the\nsatisfaction of every desire is accompanied by pleasure, so the\nsatisfaction of the desire involved in resentment gives a pleasure by\nitself. The angry or revengeful man who succeeds in what he aims at,\ndelights in the pain he inflicts for the very reason that he desired\nto inflict it.\n\n[Footnote 93: _Cf._ Ribot, _op. cit._ p. 221 _sq._]\n\nRevenge thus only forms a link in a chain of emotional phenomena, for\nwhich \"non-moral resentment\" may be used as a common name. In this\nlong chain there is no missing link. Anger without any definite desire\nto cause suffering, anger with such a desire, more deliberate\nresentment--all these phenomena are so inseparably connected with each\nother that no one can say where one passes into another. Their common\ncharacteristic is that they are mental states marked by an aggressive\nattitude towards the cause of pain.\n\nAs to their origin, the evolutionist can hardly entertain a doubt.\nResentment, like protective reflex action, out of which it has\ngradually developed, is a means of protection for the animal. Its\nintrinsic object is to remove a cause of pain, or, what is the same, a\ncause of danger. Two different attitudes may be taken by an animal\ntowards another which has made it feel pain: it may either shun or\nattack its enemy. In the former case its action is prompted by fear,\nin the latter by anger, and it depends on the circumstances which of\nthese emotions is the actual {41} determinant. Both of them are of\nsupreme importance for the preservation of the species, and may\nconsequently be regarded as elements in the animal's mental\nconstitution which have been acquired by means of natural selection in\nthe struggle for existence. We have already noted that, originally,\nthe impulse of attacking the enemy could hardly have been guided by a\nrepresentation of the enemy as suffering. But, as a successful attack\nis necessarily accompanied by such suffering, the desire to produce it\nnaturally, with the increase of intelligence, entered as an important\nelement in resentment. The need for protection thus lies at the\nfoundation of resentment in all its forms.\n\nThis view is not new. More than one hundred and fifty years before\nDarwin, Shaftesbury wrote of resentment in these words:--\"Notwithstanding\nits immediate aim be indeed the ill or punishment of another, yet it\nis plainly of the sort of those [affections] which tend to the\nadvantage and interest of the self-system, the animal himself; and is\nwithal in other respects contributing to the good and interest of the\nspecies.\"[94] A similar opinion is expressed by Butler, according to\nwhom the reason and end for which man was made liable to anger is,\nthat he might be better qualified to prevent and resist violence and\nopposition, while deliberate resentment \"is to be considered as a\nweapon, put into our hands by nature, against injury, injustice, and\ncruelty.\"[95] Adam Smith, also, believes that resentment has \"been\ngiven us by nature for defence, and for defence only,\" as being \"the\nsafeguard of justice and the security of innocence.\"[96] Exactly the\nsame view is taken by several modern evolutionists as regards the\n\"end\" of resentment, though they, of course, do not rest contented\nwith saying that this feeling has been given us by nature, but try to\nexplain in what way it has developed. \"Among members of the same\nspecies,\" says Mr. Herbert Spencer, \"those individuals which have not,\nin any considerable degree, resented aggressions, must have ever\ntended to disappear, and to have left behind those which have with\nsome effect made counter-aggressions.\"[97] Mr. {42} Hiram Stanley,\ntoo, quoting Junker's statement regarding the pigmies of Africa, that\n\"they are much feared for their revengeful spirit,\"[98] observes that,\n\"other things being equal, the most revengeful are the most successful\nin the struggle for self-conservation and self-furtherance.\"[99] This\nevolutionist theory of revenge has been criticised by Dr. Steinmetz,\nbut in my opinion with no success. He remarks that the _feeling_ of\nrevenge could not have been of any use to the animal, even though the\n_act_ of vengeance might have been useful.[100] But this way of\nreasoning, according to which the whole mental life would be excluded\nfrom the influence of natural selection, is based on a false\nconception of the relation between mind and body, and, ultimately, on\na wrong idea of cause and effect.\n\n[Footnote 94: Shaftesbury, 'Inquiry concerning Virtue or Merit,' ii.\n2. 2, in _Characteristicks_, ii. 145.]\n\n[Footnote 95: Butler, 'Sermon VIII.--Upon Resentment,' _op. cit._\np. 457.]\n\n[Footnote 96: Adam Smith, _Theory of Moral Sentiments_, p. 113.]\n\n[Footnote 97: Spencer, _Principles of Ethics_, i. 361.]\n\n[Footnote 98: Junker, _Travels in Africa during the Years 1882-1886_,\np. 85.]\n\n[Footnote 99: Hiram Stanley, _op. cit._ p. 180. _Cf._ also Guyau,\n_Esquisse d'une Morale sans obligation ni sanction_, p. 162\n_sq._]\n\n[Footnote 100: Steinmetz, _Ethnol. Studien, &c._ i. 135.]\n\nFrom non-moral resentment we shall pass to the emotion of moral\nindignation. That this is closely connected with anger is indicated by\nlanguage itself: we may feel indignant on other than moral grounds,\nand we may feel \"righteous anger.\" The relationship between these\nemotions is also conspicuous in their outward expressions, which, when\nthe emotion is strong enough, present similar characteristics. When\npossessed with strong moral indignation, a person looks as if he were\nangry,[101] and so he really is, in the wider sense of the term. This\nrelationship has not seldom been recognised by moralists, though it\nhas more often been forgotten. Some two thousand years ago Polybius\nwrote:--\"If a man has been rescued or helped in an hour of danger,\nand, instead of showing gratitude to his preserver, seeks to do him\nharm, it is clearly probable that the rest will be displeased and\noffended with him when they know it, sympathising with their neighbour\nand imagining themselves in his case. Hence arises a notion in every\nbreast of the meaning and theory of duty, which is in fact the\nbeginning and end of justice.\"[102] Hartley regarded resentment and\ngratitude {43} as \"intimately connected with the moral sense.\"[103]\nAdam Smith made the resentment of \"the impartial spectator\" a\ncorner-stone of his theory of the moral sentiments.[104] Butler found\nthe essential difference between sudden and deliberate anger to\nconsist in this, that the \"natural proper end\" of the latter is \"to\nremedy or prevent only that harm which implies, or is supposed to\nimply, injury or moral wrong.\"[105] And to Stuart Mill, the sentiment\nof justice, at least, appeared to be derived from \"the animal desire\nto repel or retaliate a hurt or damage to oneself, or to those with\nwhom one sympathises.\"[106]\n\n[Footnote 101: Notice, for instance, Michelangelo's Moses.]\n\n[Footnote 102: Polybius, _Historiae_, vi. 6.]\n\n[Footnote 103: Hartley, _Observations on Man_, i. 520.]\n\n[Footnote 104: Adam Smith, _op. cit._ _passim_.]\n\n[Footnote 105: Butler, _op. cit._ p. 458.]\n\n[Footnote 106: Stuart Mill, _Utilitarianism_, p. 79.]\n\nMoral indignation, or disapproval, like non-moral resentment, is a\nreactionary attitude of mind directed towards the cause of inflicted\npain. In a subsequent chapter we shall see that both are in a similar\nway determined by the answer given to the question, What is the cause\nof the pain?--a fact which, whilst strongly confirming their affinity,\nthrows light upon some of the chief characteristics of the moral\nconsciousness. Nay, moral indignation resembles non-moral resentment\neven in this respect that, in various cases, the aggressive reaction\nturns against innocent persons who did not commit the injury which\ngave rise to it. The collective responsibility assumed in certain\ntypes of blood-revenge is an evidence of this in so far as such\nrevenge is not merely a matter of individual practice, but has the\nsanction of custom. And even punishment, which, in the strict sense of\nthe term, is a more definite expression of public, or moral,\nindignation than the custom of private retaliation, is often similarly\nindiscriminate.\n\nLike revenge, and for similar reasons, punishment sometimes falls on a\nrelative of the culprit in cases when he himself cannot be caught. In\nFiji, says Mr. Williams, \"the virtue of vicarious suffering is\nrecognised.\" It once happened that a warrior left his charged musket\nso {44} carelessly that it went off and killed and wounded some\nindividuals, whereupon he fled himself. His case was judged worthy of\ndeath by the chiefs of the tribe, and the offender's aged father was\nin consequence seized and strangled.[107]\n\n[Footnote 107: Williams and Calvert, _Fiji_, p. 24.]\n\nIn other cases an innocent person is killed for the offence of\nanother, not because the offender cannot be seized, but with a view to\ninflicting on him a loss, according to the rule of like for like. The\npunishment, then, is meant for the culprit, though the chief sufferer\nis somebody else. According to the Laws of [Hv]ammurabi, \"if a builder\nhas built a house for a man and has not made strong his work, and the\nhouse he built has fallen, and he has caused the death of the owner,\nthat builder shall be put to death.\" But \"if he has caused the son of\nthe owner of the house to die, one shall put to death the son of that\nbuilder.\"[108] Similarly, \"if a man has struck a gentleman's daughter\nand caused her to drop what is in her womb, he shall pay ten shekels\nof silver for what was in her womb.\" But \"if that woman has died, one\nshall put to death his daughter.\"[109] The following custom which Mr.\nGason reports, as existing among the Australian Dieyerie, in case a\nman should unintentionally kill another in a fight, is probably based\non a similar principle:--\"Should the offender have an elder brother,\nthen he must die in his place; or, should he have no elder brother,\nthen his father must be his substitute; but in case he has no male\nrelative to suffer for him, then he himself must die.\"[110]\n\n[Footnote 108: _Laws of [Hv]ammurabi_, 229 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 109: _Ibid._ 209 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 110: Gason, 'Manners and Customs of the Dieyerie Tribe,' in\nWoods, _Native Tribes of South Australia_, p. 265.]\n\nThis extreme disregard of the suffering of guiltless persons is\nprobably not so much due to downright callousness as to a strong\nfeeling of family solidarity. The same feeling is very obvious in\nthose numerous instances in which both the criminal himself and\nmembers of his family are implicated in the punishment.\n\n{45} Among the Atkha Aleuts, the punishment for certain offences was\nsometimes carried so far as to include the wife of the offender.[111]\nAmong the E[(w]e-speaking peoples of the Slave Coast, \"a person found\nguilty of having procured, or endeavoured to procure, the death of\nanother through the agency of the gods Huntin and Loko, is put to\ndeath, and his family is generally enslaved as well.\"[112] Among the\nMatabele, if a person is declared by the witch-doctor to have caused\ninjury to somebody else by making charms, he \"is immediately put to\ndeath, his wife and the whole of his family sharing his fate.\"[113]\nAmong the Shilluks of the White Nile, \"murder is punished with death\nto the criminal and the forfeiture of wives and children to the\nSultan, who retains them in bondage.\"[114] Among the Kafirs, in cases\nof trespasses against the king, the sentence falls not only on the\nindividual, but on his whole house.[115] In Madagascar, the code of\nnative laws, up to recent time, reduced for many offences the\nculprit's wife and children to slavery.[116] In some parts of the\nMalay Archipelago, according to Crawfurd, a father and child are\nconsidered almost inseparable, hence when the one is punished the\nother seldom escapes.[117] In Bali, the law prescribes that for\ncertain kinds of sorcery the offender shall be put to death. It adds,\n\"If the matter be very clearly made out, let the punishment of death\nbe extended to his father and his mother, to his children and to his\ngrand-children; let none of them live; let none connected with one so\nguilty remain on the face of the land, and let their goods be in like\nmanner confiscated.\"[118]\n\n[Footnote 111: Petroff, 'Report on Alaska,' in _Tenth Census of the\nUnited States_, p. 158.]\n\n[Footnote 112: Ellis, _E[(w]e-speaking Peoples of the Slave Coast_,\np. 225.]\n\n[Footnote 113: Decle, _Three Years in Savage Africa_, p. 153.]\n\n[Footnote 114: Petherick, _Travels in Central Africa_, ii. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 115: Ratzel, _History of Mankind_, ii. 445.]\n\n[Footnote 116: Sibree, _The Great African Island_, p. 181. Ellis,\n_History of Madagascar_, i. 174, 175, 193.]\n\n[Footnote 117: Crawfurd, _op. cit._ i. 82.]\n\n[Footnote 118: _Ibid._ iii. 138.]\n\nThe Chinese doctrine of responsibility is to a great extent based\nupon family solidarity; in great crimes all the male relatives of the\noffender are held responsible for his deed. Every male relative, of\nwhatever degree, who may be dwelling under the roof of a man guilty of\ntreason, is doomed to death, with the exception of young boys, who are\nallowed their lives, but on the condition that they are made eunuchs\nfor service in the imperial palace.[119] In ancient Mexico, traitors\nand conspirators were not only themselves killed, but their children\nand relatives {46} were made slaves to the fourth generation.[120]\nAccording to an Athenian law, a man who committed sacrilege or\nbetrayed his country was banished with all his children.[121]\nAristotle mentions a case of sacrilege in which \"the bones of the\nguilty dead were disentombed and cast beyond the borders of Attica;\nthe living clan were condemned to perpetual exile, and the city was\nsubsequently purified.\"[122] The Macedonian law involved in punishment\nthe kindred of conspirators against the monarch.[123] Dionysius of\nHalicarnassus states that some of the Greeks \"think it reasonable to\nput to death the sons of tyrants together with their fathers, whereas\nothers punish them with perpetual banishment\"; and he contrasts this\nwith the Roman principle that \"the sons shall be exempted from all\npunishment, whose fathers are offenders, whether they happen to be the\nsons of tyrants, of parricides, or of traitors.\"[124] But after the\nend of the Marsic, and civil wars, this rule was transgressed;[125]\nand later on Arcadius, though expressly ordaining that the punishment\nof the crime shall extend to the criminal alone,[126] took a different\nview of the punishment for treason. By a special extension of his\nimperial clemency, he allows the sons of the criminal to live,\nalthough in strict justice, being tainted with hereditary guilt, they\nought to suffer the punishment of their father. But they shall be\nincapable of inheritance; they shall be abandoned to the extreme of\npoverty and perpetual indigence; they shall be excluded from all\nhonours and from the participation of religious rites; the infamy of\ntheir father shall ever attend them, and such shall be the misery of\ntheir condition, that life shall be a punishment and death a\ncomfort.[127] Among the Anglo-Saxons, before the time of Cnut, the\nchild, even the infant in the cradle, was liable to be sold into\nslavery for the payment of penalties incurred by the father, being\n\"held by the covetous to be equally guilty as if it had\ndiscretion.\"[128] Even later, the child of an outlaw, following the\ncondition of the father, also became an outlaw; and this grievance was\nonly partly remedied by Edward the Confessor, who relieved from the\nconsequences of the father's outlawry such children as were born\nbefore he was {47} outlawed, but not such as were born afterwards.[129]\nDuring the Middle Ages it was the invariable rule to confiscate the\nentire property of an impenitent heretic, a rule which was justified\non the ground that his crime is so great that something of his\nimpurity falls upon all related to him.[130] The Pope Alexander IV.\nalso excluded the descendants of an heretic to the second generation\nfrom all offices in the Church.[131] Owing to religious influence,\nillegitimate children were not only deprived of the title to\ninheritance, but they were treated by some law-books as almost\nrightless beings, on a par with robbers and thieves.[132] If a person\ncommitted suicide, his goods were confiscated, and, according to a\nFrench medi\u00e6val law, his wife was besides deprived of her own private\nproperty.[133] Even in the latter half of the eighteenth century, in\nFrance, in the case of an attempt made against the life of the king,\nthe whole family of the criminal was banished.[134] Nay, in various\nEuropean countries, up to quite recent times--in England till\n1870--forfeiture of property has been the punishment prescribed for\ncertain crimes, including suicide;[135] which means, if not actually\nthe imposition of penalties on the survivors in a case where the\nculprit himself is out of reach, at least a gross disregard of their\nordinary rights of property. It is hardly necessary to point out how\noften, in the very society in which we live, \"social punishments\" are\ninflicted upon children for their father's wrongs.\n\n[Footnote 119: Douglas, _Society in China_, p. 71 _sq._ _Ta Tsing Leu\nLee_, sec. ccliv. p. 270.]\n\n[Footnote 120: Bancroft, _Native Races of the Pacific States_, ii. 459.]\n\n[Footnote 121: Meursius, _Themis Attica_, ii. 2, in Gronovius,\n_Thesaurus Graecarum Antiquitatum_, v. 1968.]\n\n[Footnote 122: Aristotle, _De republica Atheniensium_ 1. _Cf._\n_ibid._ 20.]\n\n[Footnote 123: Curtius Rufus, _De gestis Alexandri Magni_, vi. 11. 20.]\n\n[Footnote 124: Dionysius of Halicarnassus, _Antiquitates Romanae_,\nviii. 80.]\n\n[Footnote 125: _Ibid._ viii. 80.]\n\n[Footnote 126: _Codex Iustinianus_, ix. 47. 22.]\n\n[Footnote 127: _Ibid._ ix. 8. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 128: Laws of Cnut, ii. 77. _Cf._ Lappenberg, _History of\nEngland under the Anglo-Saxon Kings_, ii. 414; Wilda, _op. cit._ p. 906.]\n\n[Footnote 129: _Leges Edwardi Confessoris_, 19.]\n\n[Footnote 130: Lecky, _History of Rationalism in Europe_, ii. 36,\nn. 1. Eicken, _Geschichte und System der mittelalterlichen\nWeltanschauung_, p. 572 _sq._ Paramo, _De origine et progressu Sancti\nInquisitionis_ p. 587 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 131: Eicken, _op. cit._ p. 573.]\n\n[Footnote 132: _Ibid._ p. 573.]\n\n[Footnote 133: Du Boys, _Histoire du droit criminel des peuples\nmodernes_, ii. 236.]\n\n[Footnote 134: Hertz, _Voltaire und die franz\u00f6sische Strafrechtspflege\nim achtzehnten Jahrhundert_, p. 27.]\n\n[Footnote 135: Stephen, _History of the Criminal Law of England_, i.\n487 _sq._; iii. 105.]\n\nFor the explanation of these facts we have to remember what has been\nsaid before about collective responsibility in the case of revenge.\nSpeaking of the Chinese doctrine of family solidarity, Dr. de Groot\nobserves that, \"under the influence of this doctrine, families, not\nmen individually, came to be regarded, from the Government's point of\nview, as the smallest particles, the molecules of the nation, each\nindividual being swallowed up in the circle of his kinsfolk.\"[136]\nSuch a doctrine assumes that the other members of the family-group\nare, in a way, accessories {48} to any crime committed by a\nfellow-member. \"Human nature,\" says Lord Kames, \"is not so perverse,\nas without veil or disguise to punish a person acknowledged to be\ninnocent. An irregular bias of imagination, which extends the\nqualities of the principal to its accessories, paves the way to that\nunjust practice. This bias, strengthened by indignation against an\natrocious criminal, leads the mind hastily to conclude, that all his\nconnections are partakers of his guilt.\"[137] Among the ancients we\nalso meet with a strong belief that, according to the course of\nnature, wicked fathers have wicked sons. \"That which is begot,\" says\nPlutarch, \"is not, like some production of art unlike the begetter,\nfor it proceeds from him, and is not merely produced by him, so that\nit appropriately receives his share, whether that be honour or\npunishment.\"[138] To destroy, or to make harmless, the family of an\noffender may be, not only an act of retaliation, but a precaution;\naccording to an old Greek adage, \"a man is a fool if he kills the\nfather and leaves the sons alive.\"[139] This especially holds good for\ntreason, which generally suggests accomplices; and of all crimes for\nwhich penalties are imposed upon other individuals besides the\nculprit, treason is probably the most common. This crime is also\nparticularly apt to evoke the hatred of those who have the power to\npunish, hence the punishment of it, being closely allied to an act of\nrevenge, is often inflicted without due discrimination. Moreover, by\nbeing extended to the criminal's family, the punishment falls more\nheavily upon himself as well. Again, in case the crime is of a\nsacrilegious character, it is supposed to pollute everybody connected\nwith the criminal, and even the whole community where he dwells.\n\n[Footnote 136: de Groot, _Religious System of China_ (vol. ii. book)\ni. 539.]\n\n[Footnote 137: Kames, _Sketches of the History of Man_, iv. 148.]\n\n[Footnote 138: Plutarch, _De sera numinis vindicta_, 16. _Cf._\nDionysius of Halicarnassus, _op. cit._ viii. 80.]\n\n[Footnote 139: Schmidt, _Ethik der alten Griechen_, ii. 126.]\n\nIn their administration of justice, gods are still more indiscriminate\nthan men. They hold the individual responsible for the whole to which\nhe belongs. They {49} punish the community for the sins of one of its\nmembers. They visit the iniquity of the fathers and forefathers upon\nthe children and descendants.\n\nThe Sibuyaus, a tribe belonging to the Sea Dyaks, \"are of opinion\nthat an unmarried girl proving with child must be offensive to the\nsuperior powers, who, instead of always chastising the individual,\npunish the tribe by misfortunes happening to its members. They,\ntherefore, on the discovery of the pregnancy fine the lovers, and\nsacrifice a pig to propitiate offended Heaven, and to avert that\nsickness or those misfortunes that might otherwise follow; and they\ninflict heavy mulcts for every one who may have suffered from any\nsevere accident, or who may have been drowned within a month before\nthe religious atonement was made.\"[140] According to Chinese beliefs,\nwhole kingdoms are punished for the conduct of their rulers by spirits\nwho act as avengers with orders or approval from the _Tao_, or\nHeaven.[141] Prevalent opinion in China, continuously inspired anew by\nliterature of all times and ages, further admits that spiritual\nvengeance may come down upon the culprit's offspring in the form of\ndisease or death.[142] When a maimed or deformed child is born the\nJapanese say that its parents or ancestors must have committed some\ngreat sin.[143] The Vedic people ask Varuna to forgive the wrongs\ncommitted by their fathers.[144] Says the poet:--\"What we ourselves\nhave sinned in mercy pardon; my own misdeeds do thou, O god, take from\nme, and for another's sin let me not suffer.\"[145] According to the\nancient Greek theory of divine retribution, the community has to suffer\nfor the sins of some of its members, children for the sins of their\nfathers.[146] Hesiod says that often a whole town is punished with\nfamine, pestilence, barrenness of its women, or loss of its army or\nvessels for the misdeeds of a single individual.[147] Cr[oe]sus atoned\nby the forfeiture of his kingdom for the crime of Gyges, his fifth\nancestor, who had murdered his master and usurped his throne.[148]\nCytissorus brought down the anger of gods upon his descendants by {50}\nrescuing Athamas, whom the Achaians intended to offer up as an\nexpiatory sacrifice on behalf of their country.[149] When hearing of\nthe death of his wife, Theseus exclaims, \"This must be a heaven-sent\ncalamity in consequence of the sins of an ancestor, which from some\nremote source I am bringing on myself.\"[150] According to Hebrew\nnotions, sin affects the nation through the individual and entails\nguilt on succeeding generations.[151] The anger of the Lord is kindled\nagainst the children of Israel on account of Achan's sin.[152] The sin\nof the sons of Eli is visited on his whole house from generation to\ngeneration.[153] Because Saul has slain the Gibeonites, the Lord\nsends, in the days of David, a three years' famine, which ceases only\nwhen seven of Saul's sons are hanged.[154] The sins of Manasseh are\nexpiated even by the better generation under Josiah.[155] The notion\nof a jealous God who visits the iniquity of the fathers upon the\nchildren unto the third and fourth generation of them that hate\nHim,[156] is also frequently met with in the Old Testament Apocrypha.\n\"The inheritance of sinners' children shall perish, and their\nposterity shall have a perpetual reproach.\"[157] \"The seed of an\nunrighteous bed shall be rooted out.\"[158] The same idea has survived\namong Christian peoples. It was referred to in Canon Law as a\nprinciple to be imitated by human justice,[159] and by Innocent III.\nin justification of a bull which authorised the confiscation of the\ngoods of heretics.[160] Up to quite recent times it was a common\nbelief in Scotland that the punishment of the cruelty, oppression, or\nmisconduct of an individual descended as a curse on his children to\nthe third and fourth generation. It was not confined to the common\npeople; \"all ranks were influenced by it; and many believed that if\nthe curse did not fall upon the first or second generation it would\ninevitably descend upon the succeeding.\"[161] In the dogma that the\nwhole human race is condemned on {51} account of the sin of its first\nparents, the doctrine of collective responsibility has reached its pitch.\n\n[Footnote 140: St. John, _Life in the Forests of the Far East_, i. 63.]\n\n[Footnote 141: de Groot, _op. cit._ (vol. iv. book) ii. 432, 435.\nDavis, _China_, ii. 34 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 142: de Groot, _op. cit._ (vol. iv. book) ii. 452.]\n\n[Footnote 143: Griffis, _Mikado's Empire_, p. 472.]\n\n[Footnote 144: _Rig-Veda_, vii. 86. 5. _Cf._ _Atharva-Veda_, v. 30. 4;\nx. 3. 8.]\n\n[Footnote 145: _Rig-Veda_, ii. 28. 9. _Cf._ _ibid._ vi. 51. 7;\nvii. 52. 2.]\n\n[Footnote 146: N\u00e4gelsbach, _Nachhomerische Theologie des griechischen\nVolksglaubens_, p. 34 _sq._ Schmidt, _op. cit._ i. 67 _sqq._ Farnell,\n_Cults of the Greek States_, i. 76 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 147: Hesiod, _Opera et dies_, 240 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 148: Herodotus, i. 91.]\n\n[Footnote 149: _Ibid._ vii. 197.]\n\n[Footnote 150: Euripides, _Hippolytus_, 831 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 151: Oehler, _Theology of the Old Testament_, i. 236.\nDorner, _System of Christian Doctrine_, ii. 325. Montefiore, _Hibbert\nLectures_, p. 103. Robertson Smith, _Religion of the Semites_, p. 421.\nSchultz, _Old Testament Theology_, ii. 308. Bernard, 'Sin,' in\nHastings, _Dictionary of the Bible_, iv. 530, 534.]\n\n[Footnote 152: _Joshua_, vii. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 153: _1 Samuel_, ii. 27 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 154: _2 Samuel_, xxi. 1 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 155: _Deuteronomy_, i. 37; iii. 26; iv. 21. _2 Kings_,\nxxiii. 26; xxiv. 3. _Jeremiah_, xv. 4 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 156: _Exodus_, xx. 5; xxiv. 7, _Numbers_, xiv. 18.\n_Deuteronomy_, v. 9. _Cf._ _Leviticus_, xxvi. 39.]\n\n[Footnote 157: _Ecclesiasticus_, xli. 6. _Cf._ _ibid._ xvi. 4;\nxli. 5, 7 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 158: _Wisdom of Solomon_, iii. 16. _Cf._ _ibid._ iii. 12,\n13, 17 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 159: Eicken, _op. cit._ p. 572.]\n\n[Footnote 160: Lecky, _History of Rationalism in Europe_, ii. 37 n.]\n\n[Footnote 161: Stewart, _Sketches of the Character, &c., of the\nHighlanders of Scotland_, p. 127.]\n\nMen originally attribute to their gods mental qualities similar to\ntheir own, and imagine them to be no less fierce and vindictive than\nthey are themselves. Thus the retribution of a god is, in many cases,\nnothing but an outburst of sudden anger, or an act of private revenge,\nand as such particularly liable to comprise, not only the offender\nhimself, but those connected with him. Plutarch even argued that the\npunishments inflicted by gods on cities for ill-deeds committed by\ntheir former inhabitants allowed of a just defence, on the ground that\na city is \"one continuous entity, a sort of creature that never\nchanges from age, or becomes different by time, but is ever\nsympathetic with and conformable to itself,\" and therefore \"answerable\nfor whatever it does or has done for the public weal, as long as the\ncommunity by its union and federal bonds preserves its unity.\"[162] He\nfurther observes that a bad man is not bad only when he breaks out\ninto crime, but has the seeds of vice in his nature, and that the\ndeity, knowing the nature and disposition of every man, prefers\nstifling crime in embryo to waiting till it becomes ripe.[163]\n\n[Footnote 162: Plutarch, _De sera numinis vindicta_, 15.]\n\n[Footnote 163: _Ibid._ 20.]\n\nBut there are yet special reasons for extending the retribution of a\ngod beyond the limits of individual guilt. Whilst the resentment of a\nman is a matter of experience, that of a god is a matter of inference.\nThat some particular case of suffering is a divine punishment, is\ninferred either from its own peculiar character, suggesting the direct\ninterference of a god, or from the assumption that a certain act, on\naccount of its offensiveness, cannot be left unpunished. Now\nexperience shows that, in many instances, the sinner himself escapes\nall punishment, leading a happy life till his death; hence the\nconclusion is near at hand that any grave misfortune which befalls his\ndescendants, is the delayed retribution of the offended {52} god.[164]\nSuch a conclusion is quite in harmony with the common notions of\ndivine power. It especially forces itself upon a mind which has no\nidea of a hell with _post mortem_ punishments for the wicked. And,\nwhere the spirit of a man after his death is believed to be still\nardently concerned for the welfare of his family,[165] the affliction\nof his descendants naturally appears as a punishment inflicted upon\nhimself. As Dr. de Groot observes, the doctrine of the Chinese, that\nspiritual vengeance may descend on the offender's offspring, tallies\nperfectly with their conception \"that the severest punishment which\nmay be inflicted on one, both in his present life and the next, is\ndecline or extermination of his male issue, leaving nobody to support\nhim in his old age, nobody to protect him after his death from misery\nand hunger by caring for his corpse and grave, and sacrificing to his\nmanes.\"[166]\n\n[Footnote 164: _Cf._ Isocrates, _Oratio de pace_, 120; Cicero, _De\nnatura Deorum_, iii. 38; N\u00e4gelsbach, _op. cit._ p. 33 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 165: _Cf._ Schmidt, _op. cit._ i. 71 _sq._ (ancient\nGreeks).]\n\n[Footnote 166: de Groot, _op. cit._ (vol. iv. book) ii. 452.]\n\nThe retributive sufferings which innocent persons have to undergo in\nconsequence of the sins of the guilty, are not always supposed to be\ninflicted upon them directly, as a result of divine resentment. They\nare often attributed to infection. Sin is looked upon in the light of\na contagious matter which may be transmitted from parents to children,\nor be communicated by contact.\n\nThis idea is well illustrated by the funeral ceremonies of the\nTahitians. \"When the house for the dead had been erected, and the\ncorpse placed upon the platform or bier, the priest ordered a hole to\nbe dug in the earth or floor near the foot of the platform. Over this\nhe prayed to the god by whom it was supposed the spirit of the\ndeceased had been required. The purport of his prayer was that all the\ndead man's sins, and especially that for which his soul had been\ncalled to the _po_, might be deposited there, that they might not\nattach in any degree to the survivors, and that the anger of the god\nmight be appeased.\" All who were employed in embalming the dead were\nalso, during the process, carefully avoided by every person, {53} as\nthe guilt of the crime for which the deceased had died was believed to\ncontaminate such as came in contact with the corpse; and as soon as\nthe ceremony of depositing the sins in the hole was over, all who had\ntouched the body or the garments of the deceased, which were buried or\ndestroyed, fled precipitately into the sea to cleanse themselves from\nthe pollution.[167] In one part of New Zealand \"a service was\nperformed over an individual, by which all the sins of the tribe were\nsupposed to be transferred to him, a fern stalk was previously tied to\nhis person, with which he jumped into the river and there unbinding,\nallowed it to float away to the sea, bearing their sins with it.\"[168]\nThe Iroquois White Dog Feast, which was held every year in January,\nFebruary, or early in March,[169] implied, according to most\nauthorities, a ceremony of sin-transference.[170] The following\ndescription of it is given by Mrs. Jemison, a white woman who was\ncaptured by the Indians in the year 1755:--Two white dogs, without\nspot or blemish, are strangled and hung near the door of the\ncouncil-house. On the fourth or fifth day the \"committee,\" consisting\nof from ten to twenty active men who have been appointed to\nsuperintend the festivities, \"collect the evil spirit, or drive it off\nentirely, for the present, and also concentrate within themselves all\nthe sins of their tribe, however numerous or heinous. On the eighth or\nninth day, the committee having received all the sin, as before\nobserved, into their own bodies, they take down the dogs, and after\nhaving transfused the whole of it into one of their own number, he, by\na peculiar sleight of hand, or kind of magic, works it all out of\nhimself into the dogs. The dogs, thus loaded with all the sins of the\npeople, are placed upon a pile of wood that is directly set on fire.\nHere they are burnt, together with the sins with which they were\nloaded.\"[171] Among the Bad\u00e1gas of India, at a burial, \"an elder,\nstanding by the corpse, offers up a prayer that the dead may not go to\nhell, that the sins committed on earth may be forgiven, and that the\nsins may be borne by a calf, which is let loose in the jungle and used\nthenceforth for no manner of work.\"[172] At Utch-Kurgan, in Turkestan,\nMr. Schuyler saw an old man, constantly {54} engaged in prayer, who\nwas said to be an _iskatchi_, that is, \"a person who gets his living\nby taking on himself the sins of the dead, and thenceforth devoting\nhis life to prayer for their souls.\"[173]\n\n[Footnote 167: Ellis, _Polynesian Researches_, i. 401 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 168: Taylor, _Te Ika a Maui_, p. 101.]\n\n[Footnote 169: Beauchamp, 'Iroquois White Dog Feast,' in _American\nAntiquarian_, vii. 236 _sq._ Hale, 'Iroquois Sacrifice of the White\nDog,' _ibid._ vii. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 170: Beauchamp, _loc. cit._ p. 237 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 171: Seaver, _Narrative of the Life of Mrs. Mary Jemison_,\np. 158 _sqq._ _Cf._ Mr. Clark's description, quoted by Beauchamp,\n_loc. cit._ p. 238.]\n\n[Footnote 172: Thurston, 'Bad\u00e1gas of the Nilgiris,' in the Madras\nGovernment Museum's _Bulletin_, ii. 4. _Cf._ Metz, _Tribes inhabiting\nthe Neilgherry Hills_, p. 78; Graul, _Reise nach Ostindien_,\niii. 296 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 173: Schuyler, _Turkistan_, ii. 28.]\n\nIn ancient Peru, an Inca, after confession of guilt, bathed in a\nneighbouring river, and repeated this formula:--\"O thou River, receive\nthe sins I have this day confessed unto the Sun, carry them down to\nthe sea, and let them never more appear.\"[174] According to Vedic\nbeliefs, sin is a contamination which may be inherited, or contracted\nin various ways,[175] and of which the sinner tries to rid himself by\ntransferring it to some enemy,[176] or by invoking the gods of water\nor fire.[177] It is washed out by Varuna, in his capacity of a\nwater-god,[178] and by Trita, another water-god,[179] and even by \"the\nWaters\" in general, as appears from the prayer addressed to them:--\"O\nWaters, carry off whatever sin is in me and untruth.\"[180] For a\nsimilar reason, as it seems, water became in the later, Brahmanic age,\nthe \"essence (sap) of immortality\"[181] and the belief in its\npurifying power still survives in modern India. No sin is too heinous\nto be removed, no character too black to be washed clean, by the\nwaters of Ganges.[182] At sacred places of pilgrimage on the banks of\nrivers, the Hindus perform special religious shavings for the purpose\nof purifying soul and body from pollution; and persons who have\ncommitted great crimes or are troubled by uneasy consciences, travel\nhundreds of miles to such holy places where \"they may be released from\nevery sin by first being relieved of every hair and then plunging into\nthe sacred stream.\"[183] So, also, according to Hindu beliefs, contact\nwith cows purifies, and, as in the Parsi ritual, the dung and urine of\ncows have the power of preventing or cleansing away not only material,\nbut moral defilements.[184] In post-Homeric Greece, individuals and a\nwhole people were cleansed from their sins by water or some other\nmaterial means of purification.[185] Plutarch, after observing {55}\nthat \"there are other properties that have connection and\ncommunication, and that transfer themselves from one thing to another\nwith incredible quickness and over immense distances,\" asks whether it\nis \"more wonderful that Athens should have been smitten with a plague\nwhich started in Arabia, than that, when the Delphians and Sybarites\nbecame wicked, vengeance should have fallen on their descendants.\"[186]\nThe Hebrews annually laid the sins of the people upon the head of a\ngoat, and sent it away into the wilderness;[187] and they cleansed\nevery impurity with consecrated water or the sprinkling of blood.[188]\nTo this day, the Jews in Morocco, on their New-Year's day, go to the\nsea-shore, or to some spring, and remove their sins by throwing stones\ninto the water. The words of the Psalmist, \"wash me thoroughly from\nmine iniquity, and cleanse me from my sin,\"[189] were not altogether a\nfigure of speech; nor is Christian baptism originally a mere symbol.\nIts result is forgiveness of sins;[190] by the water, as a medium of\nthe Holy Ghost, \"the stains of sin are washed away.\"[191] That sin is\ncontagious has been expressly stated by Christian writers. Novatian\nsays that \"the one is defiled by the sin of the other, and the\nidolatry of the transgressor passes over to him who does not\ntransgress.\"[192]\n\n[Footnote 174: Tylor, _Primitive Culture_, ii. 435.]\n\n[Footnote 175: _Atharva-Veda_, v. 30. 4; x. 3. 8; vii. 64. i. _sq._\n_Cf._ Oldenberg, _Religion des Veda_, p. 290.]\n\n[Footnote 176: _Rig-Veda_, x. 36. 9; x. 37. 12.]\n\n[Footnote 177: _Ibid._ x. 164. 3. _Atharva-Veda_, vii. 64. 2. _Cf._\nKaegi, _Rig-Veda_, p. 157; Oldenberg, _op. cit._ pp. 291-298, 319 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 178: _Cf._ Hopkins, _Religions of India_ pp. 65 n. 1, 66.]\n\n[Footnote 179: _Atharva-Veda_, vi. 113. 1 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 180: _Rig-Veda_, i. 23. 22. Sin is also looked upon as a\ngalling chain from the captivity of which release is besought (_ibid._\ni. 24. 9, 13 _sq._; ii. 27. 16; ii. 28. 5; v. 85. 8; vi. 74. 3; &c.).]\n\n[Footnote 181: Hopkins, _op. cit._ p. 196.]\n\n[Footnote 182: Monier Williams, _Br[=a]hmanism and Hind[=u]uism_, p.\n347.]\n\n[Footnote 183: _Ibid._ p. 375.]\n\n[Footnote 184: Barth, _Religions of India_, p. 264. _Laws of Manu_,\niii. 206; v. 105, 121, 124; xi. 110, 203, 213.]\n\n[Footnote 185: Stengel, _Die griechischen Kultusaltert\u00fcmer_, p. 138\n_sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 186: Plutarch, _De sera numinis vindicta_, 14.]\n\n[Footnote 187: _Leviticus_, xvi.]\n\n[Footnote 188: _Numbers_, viii. 7; xix. 4-9, 13 _sqq._; xxxi. 23.\n_Leviticus_, xvi. 14 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 189: _Psalms_, li. 2.]\n\n[Footnote 190: Harnack, _op. cit._ ii. 140 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 191: _Catechism of the Council of Trent_, ii. 2. 10, p. 162.]\n\n[Footnote 192: Quoted by Harnack, _op. cit._ ii. 119.]\n\nIn this materialistic conception of sin there is an obvious confusion\nbetween cause and effect, between the sin and its punishment. Sin is\nlooked upon as a substance charged with injurious energy, which will\nsooner or later discharge itself to the discomfort or destruction of\nanybody who is infected with it. The sick Chinese says of his disease,\n\"it is my sin,\" instead of saying, \"it is the punishment of my\nsin.\"[193] Both in Hebrew and in the Vedic language the word for sin\nis used in a similar way.[194] \"In the consciousness of the pious\nIsraelite,\" Professor Schultz observes, \"sin, guilt, and punishment,\nare ideas so directly connected that the words for them are\ninterchangeable.\"[195] {56} The prophets frequently and emphatically\ndeclare that there is in sin itself a power which must destroy the\nsinner.[196] So, too, as M. Bergaigne points out, there is in the\nVedic notion of sin, \"la croyance \u00e0 une sorte de vertu propre du\np\u00e9ch\u00e9, gr\u00e2ce \u00e0 laquelle il produit de lui-m\u00eame son effet n\u00e9cessaire, \u00e0\nsavoir le ch\u00e2timent du p\u00e9cheur.\"[197] Sins are thus treated like\ndiseases, or the germs of diseases, of which patients likewise try to\nrid themselves by washing or burning, or which are described in the\nvery language often applied to sins as fetters which hold them\nchained.[198] All kinds of evil are in this way materialised. The\nShamanistic peoples of Siberia, says Georgi, \"hold evil to be a\nself-existing substance which they call by an infinitude of particular\nnames.\"[199] According to Moorish ideas, _l-bas_, or \"misfortune,\" is\na kind of infection, which may be contracted by contact and removed by\nwater or fire; hence in all parts of Morocco water- and\nfire-ceremonies are performed annually, either on the _[(]\u00e2shur_-eve\nor at midsummer, _l-[(]an[s.]ara_, for the purpose of purifying men,\nanimals, and fruit-trees.[200] And just as the Moors, on these {57}\noccasions, rid themselves of _l-bas_, so, in modern Greece, the women\nmake a fire on Midsummer Eve, and jump over it, crying, \"I leave my\nsins.\"[201]\n\n[Footnote 193: Edkins, _Religion in China_, p. 134.]\n\n[Footnote 194: Holzman, 'S\u00fcnde und S\u00fchne in den Rigvedahymnen und den\nPsalmen,' in _Zeitschr. f. V\u00f6lkerpsychologie_, xv. 9.]\n\n[Footnote 195: Schultz, _op. cit._ ii. 306. _Cf._ Curtiss, _Primitive\nSemitic Religion To-day_, p. 124 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 196: _Ibid._ ii. 308 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 197: Bergaigne, _Religion v\u00e9dique_, iii. 163. _Cf._\n_Rig-Veda_, x. 132. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 198: Oldenberg, _op. cit._ p. 288.]\n\n[Footnote 199: Georgi, _Russia_, iii. 257.]\n\n[Footnote 200: The various methods of transferring or expelling evil,\nwhich abundantly illustrate the materialistic notions held about it,\nhave been treated by Dr. Frazer with unrivalled learning (_The Golden\nBough_), iii. 1 _sqq._ I have little doubt that the fire- and\nwater-ceremonies, once practised all over Europe on a certain day\nevery year, belong to the same group of rites. \"The best general\nexplanation of these European fire-festivals,\" says Dr. Frazer\n(_ibid._ iii. 300), \"seems to be the one given by Mannhardt, namely,\nthat they are sun-charms or magical ceremonies intended to ensure a\nproper supply of sunshine for men, animals, and plants.\" But it should\nbe noticed that in Europe, as in Morocco, a purificatory purpose is\nexpressly ascribed to them by the very persons by whom they are\npractised (see Frazer, _op. cit._ iii. 238 _sqq._), that they\nalternate with lustration by water (see Grimm, _Teutonic Mythology_,\nii. 588 _sqq._). On the other hand, in Dr. Frazer's exhaustive\ndescription of these ceremonies I fail to discover a single fact which\nwould make Mannhardt's hypothesis at all probable. Dr. Frazer says\n(_op. cit._ iii. 301), \"The custom of rolling a burning wheel down a\nhillside, which is often observed at these times, seems a very natural\nimitation of the sun's course in the sky.\" To me it appears as a\nmethod of distributing the purificatory energy over the fields or\nvineyards. Notice, for instance, the following statements:--In the\nRhon Mountains, Bavaria, \"a wheel wrapt in combustibles, was kindled\nand rolled down the hill; and the young people rushed about the fields\nwith their burning torches and brooms. . . . In neighbouring villages\nof Hesse . . . it is thought that wherever the burning wheels roll,\nthe fields will be safe from hail and storm\" (_ibid._ iii. 243 _sq._).\nAt Volkmarsen, in Hesse, \"in some places tar-barrels or wheels wrapt\nin straw used to be set on fire, and then sent rolling down the\nhillside. In others the boys light torches and whisps of straw at the\nbonfires and rush about brandishing them in their hands\" (_ibid._ iii.\n254). In M\u00fcnsterland, \"boys with blazing bundles of straw run over the\nfields to make them fruitful\" (_ibid._ iii. 255). Dr. Frazer says\n(_ibid._ iii. 301), \"The custom of throwing blazing discs, shaped\nliked suns, into the air is probably also a piece of imitative magic.\"\nBut why should it not, in conformity with other practices, be regarded\nas a means of purifying the air? According to old writers, the object\nof Midsummer fires was to disperse the aerial dragons (_ibid._ iii.\n267). It would carry me too far from my subject to enter into further\ndetails. I have dealt with the matter in my article 'Midsummer Customs\nin Morocco.' in _Folk-Lore_, xvi. 27-47.]\n\n[Footnote 201: Grimm, _Teutonic Mythology_, ii. 623.]\n\nClosely connected with the primitive conception of sin, is that of a\ncurse. In fact, the injurious energy attributed to a sinful act, is in\nmany cases obviously due to the curse of a god. The curse is looked\nupon as a baneful substance, as a miasma which injures or destroys\nanybody to whom it cleaves. The curse of Moses was said to lie on\nmount Ebal, ready to descend with punishments whenever there was an\noccasion for it.[202] The Arabs, when being cursed, sometimes lay\nthemselves down on the ground so that the curse, instead of hitting\nthem, may fly over their bodies.[203] According to Teutonic notions,\ncurses alight, settle, cling, they take flight, and turn home as birds\nto their nests.[204] It is the vulgar opinion in Ireland \"that a curse\nonce uttered must alight on something: it will float in the air seven\nyears, and may descend any moment on the party it was aimed at; if his\nguardian angel but forsake him, it takes forthwith the shape of some\nmisfortune, sickness or temptation, and strikes his devoted\nhead.\"[205] We shall later on see that curses are communicated through\nmaterial media. In some parts of Morocco, if a man is not powerful\nenough to avenge an infringement on his marriage-bed, he leaves seven\ntufts of hair on his head and goes to another tribe to ask for help.\nThis is _l-[(]\u00e2r_, a conditional curse, which is first seated in the\ntufts, and {58} from there transferred to those whom he invokes.\nSimilarly, a person under the vow of blood-revenge lets his hair grow\nuntil he has fulfilled his vow. The oath clings to his hair, and will\nfall upon his head if he violates it.[206]\n\n[Footnote 202: _Deuteronomy_, xi. 29.]\n\n[Footnote 203: Goldziher, _Abhandlungen zur arabischen Philologie_, i.\n29. Wellhausen, _Reste arabischen Heidentums_, p. 139, n. 4.]\n\n[Footnote 204: Grimm, _op. cit._ iv. 1690.]\n\n[Footnote 205: _Ibid._ iii. 1227. Wood-Martin, _Traces of the Elder\nFaiths of Ireland_ ii, 57 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 206: The same practice prevailed among the ancient Arabs\n(Wellhausen, _op. cit._ p. 122), and some other cases are recorded by\nDr. Frazer (_op. cit._ i. 370 _sq._). I cannot accept Wellhausen's\nexplanation (_op. cit._ p. 124) that the hair is allowed to grow for\nthe purpose of being sacrificed when the vow is fulfilled.]\n\nGenerally, a curse follows the course which is indicated by the\ncurser. But it does not do so in every case, and it has a tendency to\nspread. In ancient India[207] and among the Arabs[208] and\nHebrews,[209] there was a belief that a curse, especially if it was\nundeserved, might fall back on the head of him who uttered it. The\nsame belief prevailed, or still prevails, among the Irish;[210] so,\nalso, according to an English proverb, \"curses, like chickens, come\nhome to roost.\" According to Plato, the curse of a father or mother\ntaints everything with which it comes in contact. Any one who is found\nguilty of assaulting a parent, shall be for ever banished from the\ncity into the country, and shall abstain from the temples; and \"if any\nfreeman eat or drink, or have any other sort of intercourse with him,\nor only meeting him have voluntarily touched him, he shall not enter\ninto any temple, nor into the agora, nor into the city, until he is\npurified; for he should consider that he has become tainted by a\ncurse.\"[211] Plutarch asks whether Jupiter's priest was forbidden to\nswear for the reason that \"the peril of perjury would reach in common\nto the whole commonwealth, if a wicked, godless, and forsworn person\nshould have the charge and superintendence of the prayers, vows, and\nsacrifices made on behalf of the city.\"[212] The Romans believed that\ncertain horrid imprecations had such power, that not only the object\nof them never escaped their influence, but that the person who used\nthem also was sure {59} to be unhappy.[213] Among the Arinzes, an oath\nis reckoned a terrible thing:--\"They do not suffer a person, who has\nbeen under the necessity of expurgating himself in so dreadful a\nmanner, to remain among them: he is sent into exile.\"[214] According\nto Bedouin notions, a solemn oath should only be taken at a certain\ndistance from the camp, \"because the magical nature of the oath might\nprove pernicious to the general body of Arabs, were it to take place\nin their vicinity.\"[215] \"To take an oath of any sort,\" says\nBurckhardt, \"is always a matter of great concern among the Bedouins.\nIt seems as if they attached to an oath consequences of a supernatural\nkind. . . . A Bedouin, even in defence of his own right, will seldom\nbe persuaded to take a solemn oath before a kadhy, or before the tomb\nof a sheikh or saint, as they are sometimes required to do; and would\nrather forfeit a small sum than expose himself to the dreaded\nconsequences of an oath.\"[216] Exactly the same holds good for the\nMoors. The conditional self-curse is supposed in some degree to\npollute the swearer even though the condition referred to in the oath\nbe only imaginary, in other words, though he do not perjure himself.\nThis, I think, is the reason why, among the Berbers in the South of\nMorocco, persons who have been wrongly accused of a crime, sometimes\nentirely undress themselves in the sanctuary where they are going to\nswear. They believe that, if they do so, the saint will punish the\naccuser; and I conclude that at the bottom of this belief there is a\nvague idea that the absence of all clothes will prevent the oath from\nclinging to themselves. They say that it is bad not only to swear, but\neven to be present when an oath is taken by somebody else. And at\nDemnat, in the Great Atlas, I was told that when a person has made\noath at a shrine, he avoids going back to his house the same way as he\ncame, since otherwise, at least if he {60} has sworn false, his family\nas well as himself would have to suffer.\n\n[Footnote 207: _Atharva-Veda_, ii. 7. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 208: Goldziher, _Abhandlungen_, i. 38 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 209: _Ecclesiasticus_, xxi. 27.]\n\n[Footnote 210: Wood-Martin, _op. cit._ ii. 57 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 211: Plato, _Leges_, ix. 881.]\n\n[Footnote 212: Plutarch, _Questiones Romanae_, 44.]\n\n[Footnote 213: _Idem_, _Vita Cassi_, 16.]\n\n[Footnote 214: Georgi, _op. cit._ iii. 54 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 215: Burckhardt, _Bedouins and Wah\u00e1bys_, p. 73.]\n\n[Footnote 216: _Ibid._ p. 165.]\n\nIf a curse is infectious, it is naturally liable to contaminate those\nwho derive their origin from the infected individual. The house of\nGlaucus was utterly extirpated from Sparta, in accordance with the\nwords of the oracle, \"There is a nameless son of the Oath-god who has\nneither hands nor feet; he pursues swiftly, until, having seized, he\ndestroys the whole race, and all the house.\"[217] So, too, the Erinyes\nvisited the sins of the fathers even on the children and\ngrandchildren;[218] and the Erinyes were originally only\npersonifications of curses.[219] It is said in the Ecclesiasticus:--\"A\nman that useth much swearing shall be filled with iniquity, and the\nplague shall never depart from his house. . . . If he swear in vain,\nhe shall not be innocent, but his house shall be full of\ncalamities.\"[220] Casalis remarks of the Basutos, that \"the dreadful\nconsequences that the curse of Noah has had for Ham and his\ndescendants appear quite natural to these people.\"[221] The Dhark\u00e2r\nand Majhw\u00e2r in Mirzapur, believe that a person who forswears himself\nwill lose his property and his children;[222] but as we do not know\nthe contents of the oath, it is possible that the destruction of the\nlatter is not ascribed to mere contagion, but is expressly imprecated\non them by the swearer.[223] Among the Rejangs of Sumatra, {61} \"any\naccident that happens to a man, who has been known to take a false\noath, or to his children or grandchildren, is carefully recorded in\nmemory, and attributed to this sole cause.\"[224] Among the Karens the\nfollowing story is told:--\"Anciently there was a man who had ten\nchildren, and he cursed one of his brethren, who had done him no\ninjury; but the curse did the man no harm, and he did not die. Then\nthe curse returned to the man who sent it, and all his ten children\ndied.\"[225] The Moors are fond of cursing each other's father or\nmother, or grandfather, or grandfather's father, such a curse being\nunderstood to involve their descendants as well. The Rev. R. Taylor\nsays of the Maoris, \"To bid you go and cook your father would be a\ngreat curse, but to tell a person to go and cook his great-grandfather\nwould be far worse, because it included every individual who has\nsprung from him.\"[226]\n\n[Footnote 217: Herodotus, vi. 86. _Cf._ Hesiod, _Opera et dies_,\n282 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 218: Aeschylus, _Eumenides_, 934 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 219: Aeschylus (_Eumenides_, 416 _sq._) expressly designates\nthe Erinyes by the title of \"curses\" ([Greek: a)rai\\]), and Pausanias\nderives the name Erinys from an Arcadian word signifying a fit of\nanger. _Cf._ von Lasaulx, 'Der fluch bei Griechen und R\u00f6mern,' in\n_Verzeichnis der Vorlesungen an der Julius-Maximilians-Universitaet zu\nW\u00fcrzburg im Sommer-Semester_ 1843, p. 8; M\u00fcller, _Dissertations on the\nEumenides of Aeschylus_, p. 155 _sqq._; Rohde, 'Paralipomena,' in\n_Rheinisches Museum f\u00fcr Philologie_, 1895, p. 16 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 220: _Ecclesiasticus_, xxiii. 11. _Cf._ _ibid._ xli. 5\n_sqq._; _Wisdom of Solomon_, iii. 12 _sq._, xii. 11.]\n\n[Footnote 221: Casalis, _Basutos_, p. 305.]\n\n[Footnote 222: Crooke, _Tribes and Castes of the North-Western\nProvinces and Oudh_, ii. 287; iii. 444. _Cf._ _ibid._ i. 132.]\n\n[Footnote 223: Among these tribes it is usual to swear by \"putting a\nbamboo on the head,\" or \"touching a broad-sword, touching the feet of\na Br\u00e2hman, holding a cow's tail, touching Ganges water.\" But among\nmany of the other tribes described by Mr. Crooke, persons swear on the\nheads of their children (_ibid._ i. 11, 130, 172; ii. 96, 138, 339,\n357; iii. 40, 113, 251, 262; iv. 35), or with a son or grandson in the\narms (_ibid._ ii. 428), and in such cases the death of the child would\nnaturally be expected to follow perjury as a direct result of it.\nAmong the Kol, the usual form of an oath is, \"May my children die if I\nlie\" (_ibid._ iii. 313).]\n\n[Footnote 224: Marsden, _History of Sumatra_, p. 240.]\n\n[Footnote 225: Mason, in _Jour. Asiatic Soc. Bengal_,\nxxxvii. pt. ii. 137.]\n\n[Footnote 226: Taylor, _Te Ika a Maui_, p. 208.]\n\nThus, from the conception that sins and curses are contagious it\nfollows that an innocent person may have to suffer for the sin of\nanother. His suffering does not necessarily relieve the sinner from\npunishment; sin, like an infectious disease, may spread without\nvacating the seat of infection. But, as we have seen, it may also be\ntransferred, and sin-transference involves vicarious suffering. At the\nsame time, this kind of vicarious suffering must not be confounded\nwith vicarious expiatory sacrifice. As a general rule, the scapegoat\nis driven or cast away, not killed. The exceptions to this rule seem\nto be due to two different causes. On the one hand, the scapegoat may\nbe chased to death, or perhaps be pushed over a precipice,[227] for\nthe sake of ridding the community as {62} effectively as possible of\nthe evils loaded on the victim. Thus the Bhotiy\u00e1s of Juh\u00e1r take a dog,\nmake him drunk, \"and having fed him with sweetmeats, lead him round\nthe village and let him loose. They then chase and kill him with\nsticks and stones, and believe that by so doing no disease or\nmisfortune will visit the village during the year.\"[228] On the other\nhand, the transference of evil may be combined with a sacrifice. But\nof such a combination only a few instances are recorded, and most of\nthem are ambiguous. Considering further that in these cases, or at\nleast in the best known of them, the act of transference takes place\n_after_ the victim has been killed, it seems to me extremely probable\nthat we have here to do with a fusion of two distinct rites into one,\nand that the victim is not offered up as a sacrifice in its capacity\nof a scapegoat, but, once sacrificed, has been made use of as a\nconductor for all the evils with which the people are beset.\n\n[Footnote 227: According to the Mishna, the Hebrew scapegoat was not\nallowed to go free in the wilderness, but was killed by being pushed\nover a precipice (Robertson Smith, _Religion of the Semites_, p. 418).\nSee also the ambiguous passage in Servius, _In Virgilii Aeneidos_,\niii. 57.]\n\n[Footnote 228: Atkinson, 'Notes on the History of Religion in the\nHim\u00e1laya of the N.W. Provinces,' in _Jour. Asiatic Soc. Bengal_, liii.\npt. i. 62.]\n\nIn his list of scapegoats, Dr. Frazer refers to a case of human\nsacrifice witnessed by the Rev. J. C. Taylor at Onitsha, on the\nNiger.[229] A young woman was drawn, with her face to the earth, from\nthe king's house to the river. As the people drew her along, they\ncried, \"Wickedness! Wickedness!\" so as to notify to the passers-by to\nscreen themselves from witnessing the dismal scene. The sacrifice was\nto take away the iniquities of the land. The body was dragged along in\na merciless manner \"as if the weight of all their wickedness were thus\ncarried away\"; and it was finally drowned in the river. Our informant\nalso heard that there was a man killed, as a sacrifice for the sins of\nthe king. \"Thus two human beings were offered as sacrifices, to\npropitiate their heathen deities, thinking that they would thus atone\nfor the individual sins of those who had broken God's laws during the\npast year. . . . Those who had fallen into gross sins during the past\nyear--such as incendiarisms, thefts, fornications, adulteries,\nwitchcrafts, incests, slanders, &c.--were expected to pay in\ntwenty-eight _ngugus_, or _\u00a3_2 0_s._ 7\u00bd_d._, as a fine; and this money\nwas taken into the interior, to purchase two sickly persons, to be\n{63} offered as a sacrifice for all these abominable crimes--one for\nthe land, and one for the river.\"[230] As will be seen in a following\nchapter, human sacrifices to rivers are very common in the Niger\ncountry. In the cases mentioned by the English missionary, the idea of\nvicarious expiation is obvious. But I find no evidence of actual\nsin-transference.\n\n[Footnote 229: Frazer, _op. cit._ iii. 109 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 230: Crowther and Taylor, _Gospel on the Banks of the\nNiger_, p. 344 _sq._]\n\nDr. Frazer further mentions a custom which, according to Strabo,\nprevailed among the Albanians of the Eastern Caucasus.[231] In the\ntemple of the Moon they kept a number of sacred slaves, of whom many\nwere inspired and prophesied. When one of these men exhibited more\nthan usual symptoms of inspiration or insanity, the high priest had\nhim bound with a sacred chain and maintained him in luxury for a year.\nAt the end of the year he was anointed with unguents and led forth to\nbe sacrificed. A man thrust a sacred spear into his side, piercing his\nheart. From the manner in which the victim fell, omens were drawn as\nto the welfare of the commonwealth. Then the body was carried to a\ncertain spot where all the people stood upon it as a purificatory\nceremony.[232] Dr. Frazer maintains that \"the last circumstance\nclearly indicates that the sins of the people were transferred to the\nvictim, just as the Jewish priest transferred the sins of the people\nto the scapegoat by laying his hand on the animal's head.\"[233] So it\nmay be, although, in my opinion, the purificatory ceremony described\nby Strabo also allows of another interpretation. The victim was\nevidently held to be saturated with magic energy; this is commonly the\ncase with men, or animals, or even inanimate things, that are offered\nin sacrifice, and in the present instance the man was regarded as holy\nalready, long before he was slain. To stand on the corpse, then, might\nhave been regarded as purifying in consequence of the benign virtue\ninherent in it, just as, according to Muhammedan notions, contact with\na saint cures disease, not by transferring it to the saint, but by\nannihilating it or expelling it from the body of the patient. But\nwhether the ceremony in question involved the idea of sin-transference\nor not, there is no indication that the sacrifice of the slave was of\nan expiatory character. The same may be said both of the Egyptian\nsacrifice of a bull, mentioned by Herodotus, and of the white dog\nsacrifice performed by the Iroquois. The Egyptians first invoked the\ngod and slew the bull. They then cut off his head and flayed the body.\nNext {64} they took the head, and heaped imprecations on it, praying\nthat, if any evil was impending either over those who sacrificed or\nover the land of Egypt, it might be made to fall upon that head. And\nfinally, they either sold the head to Greek traders or threw it into\nthe river[234]--which shows that the real scapegoat, the head, was not\nregarded as a sacrifice to the god. Among the Iroquois, also, the\nvictims were slain before the sins of the people were transferred to\nthem. According to Hale's and Morgan's accounts of this rite, which\nhave reference to different tribes of the Iroquois, no mention of\nsin-transference is made in the hymn which accompanied the\nsacrifice.[235] Only blessings were invoked. This was the beginning of\nthe chant:--\"Now we are about to offer this victim adorned for the\nsacrifice, in hope that the act will be pleasing and acceptable to the\nAll-Ruler, and that he will so adorn his children, the red men, with\nhis blessings, when they appear before him.\"[236] Mr. Morgan even\ndenies that the burning of the dog had the slightest connection with\nthe sins of the people, and states that \"in the religious system of\nthe Iroquois, there is no recognition of the doctrine of atonement for\nsin, or of the absolution or forgiveness of sins.\"[237]\n\n[Footnote 231: Frazer, _op. cit._ iii. 112 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 232: Strabo, xi. 4. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 233: Frazer, _op. cit._ iii. 113.]\n\n[Footnote 234: Herodotus, ii. 39.]\n\n[Footnote 235: Hale, in _American Antiquarian_, vii. 10 _sqq._ Morgan,\n_League of the Iroquois_, p. 217 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 236: Hale, _loc. cit._ p. 10.]\n\n[Footnote 237: Morgan, _op. cit._ p. 216.]\n\nI think we can see the reason why, in some cases, a sacrificial victim\nis used as scapegoat. The transference of sins or evils is not looked\nupon as a mere \"natural\" process, it can hardly be accomplished\nwithout the aid of mysterious, magic energy. Among the Berbers of Ait\nZel[t.]n, in Southern Morocco, sick people used to visit a\nmiracle-working wild olive-tree, growing in the immediate vicinity of\nthe supposed grave of S\u00eedi Butl\u00eela. They there relieve themselves of\ntheir complaints by tying a woollen string to one of its branches; in\ncase of headache the patient previously winds the string three times\nround the top of his head, whilst, in case of fever, he spits on the\nstring, and, when tying it to the tree, says, \"I left my fever in\nthee, O wild olive-tree.\" He believes that he may thus transfer his\ndisease to this tree because there is _baraka_, \"benign virtue,\" in\nit; he would not expect to be cured {65} by tying the string to any\nordinary tree. This illustrates a principle of probably world-wide\napplication. In Morocco, and, I presume, in other countries where\ndisease-transference is believed in, rags tied to a tree are a sure\nindication that the tree is regarded as holy. Similarly I venture to\nbelieve that the transference of sins and evils to a scapegoat is\ngenerally supposed to require magic aid of some kind or other. Among\nthe Hebrews, it took place on the Day of Atonement only, and the act\nwas performed by the high-priest.[238] Among the Iroquois, it was by\n\"a kind of magic\" that the sins of the people were worked into the\nwhite dogs;[239] and that the animals themselves were held to be\ncharged with supernatural energy, appears from the fact that,\naccording to one account, the ashes of the pyre on which one of them\nwas burnt were \"gathered up, carried through the village, and\nsprinkled at the door of every house.\"[240] Considering, then, that\nsacrificial victims, owing to their close contact with the deities to\nwhom they are offered, are held more or less sacred, the idea of\nemploying them as scapegoats is certainly near at hand. But this does\nnot make the sacrifice expiatory. In fact, I know of no instance of an\nexpiatory sacrifice being connected with a ceremony of sin-transference.\nHence the materialistic conception of sin hardly helps to explain the\nbelief that the sins of a person may be atoned by another person being\noffered as a sacrifice to the offended god.\n\n[Footnote 238: _Leviticus_, xvi. 21.]\n\n[Footnote 239: Seaver, _op. cit._ p. 160.]\n\n[Footnote 240: Beauchamp, _loc. cit._ p. 239.]\n\nA sacrifice is expiatory if its object is to avert the supposed anger\nor indignation of a superhuman being from those on whose behalf it is\noffered. In various cases the offended god is thought to be appeased\nonly by the death of a man. But it is not always necessary that the\nvictim should be the actual offender. The death of a substitute may\nexpiate his guilt. The expiatory sacrifice may be vicarious.\n\nWe shall see, in a subsequent chapter, that, as a general {66} rule,\nhuman victims are sacrificed for the purpose of saving the lives of\nthe sacrificers: before the beginning of a battle or during a siege,\npreviously to a dangerous sea-expedition, during epidemics, famines,\nor on other similar occasions, when murderous designs are attributed\nto some superhuman being on whose will the lives of men are supposed\nto depend. But these sacrifices are not always expiatory in nature. A\ngod may desire to cause the death of men not only because he is\noffended, but because he delights in human flesh, or because he wants\nhuman attendants, or--no one knows exactly why. It is impossible to\nfind out in each particular case whether the sacrifice is meant to be\nan expiation or not; it is not certain that the sacrificers know it\nthemselves. Yet in many instances there can be no doubt that its\nobject is to serve as a vicarious atonement.\n\nIn Eastern Central Africa, \"if a freeman were to set fire to the\ngrass or reeds beside a lake, and cause a great conflagration close to\nthe chosen abode of the deity, he is liable to be offered up to the\ngod that is thus annoyed,\" but if he be the owner of many slaves he\ncan easily redeem himself by offering one of them in his place.[241]\nThe Ojibways, it is said, were once visited with an epidemic, which\nthey regarded as a divine punishment sent them on account of their\nwickedness; and when all other efforts failed, \"it was decided that\nthe most beautiful girl of the tribe should enter a canoe, push into\nthe channel just above the Sault, and throw away her paddle.\"[242] In\nB[oe]otia, a drunken man having killed a priest of Dionysus Aegobolus,\nand a pestilence having broken out immediately after, the calamity was\nregarded as a judgment on the people for the sacrilege, and the oracle\nof Delphi ordered them to expiate it by sacrificing to the god a\nblooming boy.[243] In his work on the Jews, Philo of Byblus states\nthat \"it was the custom among the ancients in cases of great dangers,\nthat the rulers of a city or a nation, in order to avert universal\ndestruction, should give the dearest of their children to be killed as\na ransom offered to avenging demons.\"[244] The idea that sins could be\nexpiated by the death of one who {67} had not deserved it, was\nfamiliar to the Hebrews. It was said that \"the death of the righteous\nmakes atonement.\"[245] The passage in Isaiah liii. 12 was interpreted\nof Moses, who \"poured out his soul unto death[246] and was numbered\nwith the transgressors (the generation that died in the wilderness)\nand bare the sin of many \"that he might atone for the sin of the\ngolden calf.[247] Ezekiel suffered \"that he might wipe out the\ntransgressions of Israel.\"[248] And of the Maccabaean martyrs it is\nsaid, \"Having become as it were a vicarious expiation for the sins of\nthe nation, and through the blood of those godly men and their atoning\ndeath, divine providence saved Israel which had before been evil\nentreated.\"[249] In these cases, of course, there was no sacrifice in\nthe proper sense of the term, but they obviously illustrate the same\ncharacteristic of the divine mind. In fact, the death of Christ, by\nwhich he atoned and obliterated the sins of all ages, was conceived as\na sacrifice, or spoken of in sacrificial figures.[250]\n\n[Footnote 241: Macdonald, _Africana_, i. 96 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 242: Dorman, _Origin of Primitive Superstitions_, p. 208.]\n\n[Footnote 243: Pausanias, ix. 8. 2.]\n\n[Footnote 244: Eusebius, _Praeparatio Evangelica_, i. 10. 40 (Migne,\n_Patrologia_, Ser. Gr. xxi. 85).]\n\n[Footnote 245: Moore, in Cheyne and Black, _Encyclopaedia Biblica_,\niv. 4226.]\n\n[Footnote 246: _Exodus_, xxxii. 32.]\n\n[Footnote 247: _S[=o][t.][=a]h_, 14 A, quoted by Moore, _loc. cit._\ncol. 4226.]\n\n[Footnote 248: _Sanhedrin_, 39 A, quoted _ibid._ col. 4226.]\n\n[Footnote 249: _4 Maccabaeans_, xvii. 22, quoted _ibid._ col. 4232.]\n\n[Footnote 250: See Moore, _loc. cit._ col. 4229 _sqq._]\n\nIt is said that, according to early ideas, \"it did not essentially\nconcern divine justice that the punishment of faults committed should\nfall precisely on the guilty; what did concern it was that it should\nfall on some one, that it should have its accomplishment.\"[251] Men,\nwe are told, could not fail to discern that a transgression produces\nsuffering as its consequence, and, seeing this, they \"associate\nsuffering with the expiation of sin, and, in atoning for their\ntransgressions, they mark their contrition by the suffering which they\ninflict vicariously on the victim. They argue thus: 'I have broken a\nlaw of God. God exacts pain as a consequence of such a breach. I will\ntherefore slay this lamb, and its sufferings shall make the atonement\nrequisite.'\"[252] But, so far as I can see, this interpretation of the\nidea of vicarious expiation is not supported by facts. The victim\nwhose suffering or death is calculated to appease the wrathful god is\nnot anybody {68} at random, whosoever he may be. He is a\nrepresentative of the community which has incurred the anger of the\ngod, and is accepted as a substitute on the principle of social\nsolidarity. So, also, according to the Western Church, Christ\ndischarged the punishment due to the sins of mankind and propitiated\nthe justice of his Father, in his capacity of a man, as a\nrepresentative of the human race; whereas in the East, where it was\nmaintained that the _deity_ suffered (though he suffered through the\nhuman nature which he had made his own), the idea of substitution\ncould hardly take root, since, as Harnack remarks, \"the dying\n_God_-man really represented no one.\"[253] The Greek Church regarded\nthe death of Christ as a ransom for mankind paid to the devil, and\nthis doctrine was also accepted by the most important of the Western\nFathers, although it flatly contradicted their own theory of\natonement.[254] There can be no doubt that expiatory sacrifices are\nfrequently offered as ransoms, in other words, that the god or demon\nis supposed to be appeased, not by the suffering of the victim, but by\nthe gift. Among men it often occurs that the offended party is induced\nby some material compensation to desist from avenging the injury--in\nmany societies such placability is even prescribed by custom,--and\nsomething similar is naturally believed to be the case with gods. From\nthis point of view, of course, it is not necessary that the victim\nshould be a person who is connected with the offender by ties of\nsocial solidarity, although he may still be regarded as in a way a\nsubstitute. He may be an alien or a slave; or animals or inanimate\nthings may be offered to expiate the sins of men. Among the Dacotahs,\n\"for the expiation of sins or crimes a sacrifice is made of some kind\nof an animal.\"[255] Of the Melanesian sacrifices, says Dr. Codrington,\n\"some are propitiatory, substituting an animal for the person who has\noffended.\"[256] The Sh\u00e1n\u00e1rs of Tinnevelly offer up a {69} goat, a\nsheep, or a fowl, in order \"to appease the angry demon, and induce him\nto remove the evil he has inflicted, or abstain from the infliction he\nmay meditate.\"[257] It would be almost absurd to suppose that in\nsimilar cases the suffering or death of the animal is looked upon in\nthe light of a vicarious _punishment_. Of the Hebrew sin-offering,\nProfessor Kuenen aptly remarks:--[258]\"According to the Israelite's\nnotion, Yahveh in his clemency permits the soul of the animal\nsacrificed to take the place of that of the sacrificer. No transfer of\nguilt to the animal sacrificed takes place: the blood of the latter is\nclean and remains so, as is evident from the very fact that this blood\nis put upon the altar; it is a token of mercy on Yahveh's part that he\naccepts it. . . . Nor can it be asserted that the animal sacrificed\nundergoes the punishment in the place of the transgressor: this is\nsaid nowhere, and therefore, in any case, gives another, more sharply\ndefined idea than that which the Israelite must have formed for\nhimself; moreover, it is irreconcilable with the rule that the\nindigent may bring the tenth part of an ephah of fine flour as a\nsin-offering.\"[259] It should also be noticed that a purifying effect\nwas ascribed to contact with the victim's blood: the high priest\nshould put or sprinkle some blood upon the altar \"and cleanse it, and\nhallow it from the uncleanness of the children of Israel.\"[260]\n\n[Footnote 251: R\u00e9ville, _Prolegomena of the History of Religions_,\np. 135.]\n\n[Footnote 252: Baring-Gould, _Origin and Development of Religious\nBelief_, i. 387 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 253: Harnack, _op. cit._ iii. 312 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 254: _Ibid._ iii. 307, 315 n. 2.]\n\n[Footnote 255: Schoolcraft, _Indian Tribes of the United States_,\nii. 196.]\n\n[Footnote 256: Codrington, _Melanesians_, p. 127.]\n\n[Footnote 257: Percival, _Land of the Veda_, p. 309 _sq._ _Cf._\nCaldwell, _Tinnevelly Sh\u00e1n\u00e1rs_, p. 37.]\n\n[Footnote 258: Kuenen, _Religion of Israel_, ii. 266 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 259: _Leviticus_, v. 11 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 260: _Ibid._ xvi. 18 _sq._]\n\nTo sum up:--The fact that punishments for offences are frequently\ninflicted, or are supposed to be inflicted, by men or gods upon\nindividuals who have not committed those offences, is explicable from\ncircumstances which in no way clash with our thesis that moral\nindignation is, in its essence, directed towards the assumed cause of\ninflicted pain. In many cases the victim, in accordance with the\ndoctrine of collective responsibility, is punished because he is\nconsidered to be involved in the guilt--even when he is really\ninnocent--or because he is regarded as a fair {70} representative of\nan offending community. In other cases, he is supposed to be polluted\nby a sin or a curse, owing to the contagious nature of sins and\ncurses. The principle of social solidarity also accounts for the\nefficacy ascribed to vicarious expiatory sacrifices; but in many\ninstances expiatory sacrifices only have the character of a ransom or\nbribe.\n\nAnd whilst thus our thesis as to the true direction of moral\nindignation is not in the least invalidated by facts, apparently, but\nonly apparently, contradictory, it is, on the other hand, strongly\nsupported by the protest which the moral consciousness, when\nsufficiently guided by discrimination and sympathy, enters against the\ninfliction of penal suffering upon the guiltless. Such a protest is\nheard from various quarters, both with reference to human justice and\nwith reference to the resentment of gods.\n\nConfucius taught that the vices of a father should not discredit a\nvirtuous son.[261] Plato lays down the rule that \"the disgrace and\npunishment of the father is not to be visited on the children\"; on the\ncontrary, he says, if the children of a criminal who has been punished\ncapitally avoid the wrongs of their father, they shall have glory, and\nhonourable mention shall be made of them, \"as having nobly and\nmanfully escaped out of evil into good.\"[262] According to Roman law,\n\"crimen vel poena paterna nullam maculam filio infligere potest.\"[263]\n\"Nothing,\" says Seneca, \"is more unjust than that any one should\ninherit the quarrels of his father.\"[264] The Deuteronomist enjoins,\n\"The fathers shall not be put to death for the children, neither shall\nthe children be put to death for the fathers: every man shall be put\nto death for his own {71} sin.\"[265] Lawgivers have been anxious to\nrestrict the blood-feud to the actual culprit. The Koran forbids the\navenger of blood to kill any other person than the manslayer\nhimself.[266] In England, according to a law of Edmund, the feud was\nnot to be prosecuted against the kindred of the slayer, unless they\nmade his misdeed their own by harbouring him.[267] So, also, in\nSweden, in the thirteenth century, the blood feud was limited by law\nto the guilty individual;[268] and we meet with a similar restriction\nin Slavonic law-books.[269]\n\n[Footnote 261: _Lun Y\u00fc_, vi. 4. _Cf._ _Th\u00e2i-Shang_ 4.]\n\n[Footnote 262: Plato, _Leges_, ix. 854 _sqq._ Plato makes an exception\nfor those whose fathers, grandfathers, and great-grandfathers have\nsuccessively undergone the penalty of death: \"Such persons the city\nshall send away with all their possessions to the city and country of\ntheir ancestors, retaining only and wholly their appointed lot\"\n(_ibid._ ix. 856). But this enactment had no doubt a purely\nutilitarian foundation, the offspring of a thoroughly wicked family\nbeing considered a danger to the city.]\n\n[Footnote 263: _Digesta_, xlviii. 19. 26. _Cf._ _ibid._ xlviii. 19. 20.]\n\n[Footnote 264: Seneca, _De ira_, ii. 34. _Cf._ Cicero, _De officiis_,\ni. 25.]\n\n[Footnote 265: _Deuteronomy_, xxiv. 16. _Cf._ _2 Kings_ xiv. 6.]\n\n[Footnote 266: _Koran_, xvii. 35.]\n\n[Footnote 267: _Laws of Edmund_, ii. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 268: Nordstr\u00f6m, _Bidrag till den svenska\nsamh\u00e4lls-f\u00f6rfattningens historia_, ii. 103, 334, 335, 399. Wilda,\n_op. cit._ p. 174.]\n\n[Footnote 269: Kovalewsky, _Coutume contemporaine_, p. 248. In\nMontenegro it was enjoined by Daniel I. (Post, _Anf\u00e4nge des Staats- und\nRechtsleben_, p. 181).]\n\nPassing to the vengeance of gods: according to the Atharva-Veda, Agni,\nwho forgives sin committed through folly and averts Varuna's wrath,\nalso frees from the consequence of a sin committed by a man's father\nor mother.[270] Theognis asks, \"How, O king of immortals, is it just\nthat whoso is aloof from unrighteous deeds, holding no transgression,\nnor sinful oath, but being righteous, should suffer what is not\njust?\"[271] According to Bion, the deity, in punishing the children of\nthe wicked for their fathers' crimes, is more ridiculous than a doctor\nadministering a potion to a son or grandson for a father's or\ngrandfather's disease.[272] The early Greek notion of an inherited\ncurse was modified into the belief that the curse works through\ngenerations because the descendants each commit new acts of\nguilt.[273] The persons who prohibited the sons of such as had been\nproscribed by Sylla, from standing candidates for their fathers'\nhonours, and from being admitted into the senate, were supposed to\nhave been punished by the gods for this injustice:--\"In process of\ntime,\" says Dionysius of Halicarnassus, \"a blameless punishment, the\navenger of their crimes, pursued {72} them, by which they themselves\nwere brought down from the greatest height of glory, to the lowest\ndegree of obscurity; and none, even, of their race are now left, but\nwomen.\"[274] Among the Hebrews, Jeremiah and Ezekiel broke with the\nold notion of divine vengeance. The law of individual responsibility,\nwhich had already previously been laid down as a principle of human\njustice, was to be extended to the sphere of religion.[275] \"Every one\nshall die for his own iniquity: every man that eateth the sour grape,\nhis teeth shall be set on edge.\"[276] \"The soul that sinneth, it shall\ndie. The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father, neither shall\nthe father bear the iniquity of the son: the righteousness of the\nrighteous shall be upon him, and the wickedness of the wicked shall be\nupon him.\"[277]\n\n[Footnote 270: _Atharva-Veda_, v. 30. 4. _Cf._ Macdonell, _Vedic\nMythology_, p. 98.]\n\n[Footnote 271: Theognis, 743 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 272: Plutarch, _De sera numinis vindicta_ 19. _Cf._ _ibid._\n12; Cicero, _De natura Deorum_, iii. 38.]\n\n[Footnote 273: Farnell, _op. cit._ i. 77. Maine, _Ancient Law_, p. 127.]\n\n[Footnote 274: Dionysius of Halicarnassus, _op. cit._ viii. 80.]\n\n[Footnote 275: _Cf._ Montefiore, _op. cit._ p. 220; Kuenen, _op. cit._\nii. 35 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 276: _Jeremiah_, xxxi. 30.]\n\n[Footnote 277: _Ezekiel_, xviii. 20. For Talmudic views, see Deutsch,\n_Literary Remains_, p. 52.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III\n\nTHE NATURE OF THE MORAL EMOTIONS (_continued_)\n\n\nIT was said in the last chapter that moral disapproval is a\nsub-species of resentment, and that resentment is, in its essence, an\naggressive attitude of mind towards an assumed cause of pain. It was\nshown that, in the course of mental evolution, the true direction of\nthe hostile reaction involved in moral disapproval has become more\napparent. We shall now see that, at the same time, its aggressive\ncharacter has become more disguised.\n\nThis is evidenced by the changed opinion about anger and revenge which\nwe meet at the higher stages of moral development. Retaliation is\ncondemned, and forgiveness of injuries is laid down as a\nduty.\n\nThe rule that a person should be forbearing and kind to his enemy has\nno place in early ethics.\n\n\"Let those that speak evil of us perish. Let the enemy be clubbed,\nswept away, utterly destroyed, piled in heaps. Let their teeth be\nbroken. May they fall headlong into a pit. Let us live, and let our\nenemies perish.\" Such were the requests which generally concluded the\nprayers of the Fijians.[1] A savage would find nothing objectionable\nin them. On the contrary, he regards revenge as a duty,[2] and\nforgiveness of enemies as a sign of weakness, or cowardice, or want of\nhonour.[3] Nor {74} is this opinion restricted to the savage world. In\nthe Old Testament the spirit of vindictiveness pervades both the men\nand their god. The last thing with which David on his death-bed\ncharged Solomon was to destroy an enemy whom he himself had spared.[4]\nSirach counts among the nine causes of a man's happiness to see the\nfall of his enemy.[5] The enemies of Yahveh can expect no mercy from\nhim, but utter destruction is their lot.[6] To do good to a friend and\nto do harm to an enemy was a maxim of the ancient Scandinavians.[7] It\nwas taken for a matter of course by popular opinion in Greece[8] and\nRome. According to Aristotle, \"it belongs to the courageous man never\nto be worsted\"; to take revenge on a foe rather than to be reconciled\nis just, and therefore honourable.[9] Cicero defines a good man as a\nperson \"who serves whom he can, and injures none except when provoked\nby injury.\"[10] Except in domestic life and in the case of friends,\nProfessor Seeley observes, \"people not only did not forgive their\nenemies, but did not wish to do so, nor think better of themselves for\nhaving done so. That man considered himself fortunate who on his\ndeathbed could say, in reviewing his past life, that no one had done\nmore good to his friends or more mischief to his enemies. This was the\ncelebrated felicity of Sulla; this the crown of Xenophon's panegyric\non Cyrus the Younger.\"[11]\n\n[Footnote 1: Fison, quoted by Codrington, _Melanesians_, p. 147, n. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 2: See _infra_, on Blood-revenge.]\n\n[Footnote 3: _Cf._ Domenech, _Great Deserts of North America_, ii. 97,\n338, 438 (Dacotahs); Boas, _first General Report on the Indians of\nBritish Columbia_, p. 38; Baker, _Albert N'yanza_ i. 240 _sq._\n(Latukas).]\n\n[Footnote 4: _1 Kings_, ii. 8 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 5: _Ecclesiasticus_, xxv. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 6: _Cf._ Montefiore, Hibbert Lectures, p. 40.]\n\n[Footnote 7: Maurer, _Bekehrung des Norwegischen Stammes_, ii. 154 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 8: Maury, _Histoire des religions de la Gr\u00e8ce antique_, i.\n383. Schmidt, _Ethik der alten Griechen_, ii. 309 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 9: Aristotle, _Rhetorica_, i. 9. 24. _Cf._ Aeschylus,\n_Choeophori_, 309 _sqq._; Plato, _Meno_, p. 71; Xenophon,\n_Memorabilia_, ii. 6. 35.]\n\n[Footnote 10: Cicero, _De officiis_, iii. 19. iii. 19. _Cf._ _ibid._\nii. 14; but _cf._ also _ibid._ i. 25, where it is said that nothing is\nmore worthy of a great and a good man than placability and moderation.]\n\n[Footnote 11: Seeley, _Ecce Homo_, p. 273.]\n\nBut side by side with the doctrine of resentment, we meet, among\npeoples of culture, the doctrine of forgiveness.\n\n\"Recompense injury with kindness,\" says Lao-Tsze.[12] According to\nMencius, \"a benevolent man does not lay up anger, nor cherish\nresentment against his brother, but only regards him with affection\nand love.\"[13] In the laws of Manu the following rule is laid down for\nthe twice-born man:--\"Against an angry man let him not in return show\nanger, let him bless {75} when he is cursed.\"[14] It is said in the\nBuddhistic Dhammapada: \"Hatred does not cease by hatred at any time;\nhatred ceases by love, this is an old rule . . . . Among men who hate\nus we dwell free from hatred. . . . Let a man overcome anger by love,\nlet him overcome evil by good; let him overcome the greedy by\nliberality, the liar by truth.\"[15] According to one of the Pahlavi\ntexts, we ought not to indulge in wrathfulness; wrath is one of the\nfiends besetting man, and \"goodness is little in the mind of a man of\nwrath.\"[16]\n\n[Footnote 12: _T\u00e2o Teh King_, ii. 63. 1. According to _Th\u00e2i-Shang_, 4,\na bad man \"broods over resentment without ceasing.\"]\n\n[Footnote 13: Mencius, v. 1. 3. 2.]\n\n[Footnote 14: _Laws of Manu_, vi. 48. _Cf._ _ibid._ viii. 313;\nMonier-Williams, _Indian Wisdom_, pp. 444, 446; Muir, _Additional\nMoral and Religious Passages, rendered from the Sanskrit_, p. 30.]\n\n[Footnote 15: _Dhammapada_, i. 5; xv. 197; xvii. 223. _Cf._ _J[=a]taka\nTales_, i. 22; Oldenberg, _Buddha_, p. 298.]\n\n[Footnote 16: _D\u00een\u00e2-\u00ee-Ma\u00een\u00f4g-\u00ee Khirad_, ii. 16; xli. 11; xxxix. 26.]\n\nIn Leviticus hatred is condemned:--\"Thou shalt not hate thy brother\nin thine heart. . . . Thou shalt not avenge, nor bear any grudge\nagainst the children of thy people.\"[17] Sirach, whom I have already\nquoted, says in another passage, \"Forgive thy neighbour the hurt that\nhe has done unto thee, so shall thy sins also be forgiven when thou\nprayest.\"[18] According to the Talmud, \"whosoever does not persecute\nthem that persecute him, whosoever takes an offence in silence, he who\ndoes good because of love, he who is cheerful under his sufferings\nthey are the friends of God, and of them the Scripture says, And they\nshall shine forth as does the sun at noon-day.\"[19] The Koran, whilst\nrepeating the old rule, \"an eye for an eye and a tooth for a\ntooth,\"[20] at the same time teaches that Paradise is \"for those who\nrepress their rage, and those who pardon men; God loves the kind.\"[21]\nMuhammedan tradition puts the following words in the mouth of the\nProphet:--\"Say not, if people do good to us, we will do good to them,\nand if people oppress us, we will oppress them: but resolve that if\npeople do good to you, you will do good to them, and if they oppress\nyou, oppress them not again.\"[22] Professor Goldziher emphasises\nMuhammed's opposition to the traditional rule of the Arabs that an\nenemy is a proper object of hatred;[23] and Syed Ameer Ali has\ncollected various passages from the writings of Muhammedan scholars,\nwhich prove that, {76} in spite of what has often been said to the\ncontrary, forgiveness of injuries is by no means foreign to the spirit\nof Islam.[24] Thus the author of the Kashsh\u00e2f prescribes, \"Seek again\nhim who drives you away; give to him who takes away from you; pardon\nhim who injures you: for God loveth that you should cast into the\ndepth of your souls the roots of His perfections.\"[25] That \"the\nsandal-tree perfumes the axe that fells it,\" is a saying in everyday\nuse among the Muhammedans of India.[26] And Lane often heard Egyptians\nforgivingly say, on receiving a blow from an equal, \"God bless thee,\"\n\"God requite thee good,\" \"Beat me again.\"[27]\n\n[Footnote 17: _Leviticus_, xix. 17 _sq._ _Cf._ _Exodus_, xxiii. 4.]\n\n[Footnote 18: _Ecclesiasticus_, xxviii. 2. _Cf._ _ibid._ x, 6;\n_Proverbs_, xxv. 21.]\n\n[Footnote 19: Deutsch, _Literary Remains_, p. 58. _Cf._ Katz, _Der\nwahre Talmudjude_, p. 11, _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 20: _Koran_, ii. 190: \"Whoso transgresses against you,\ntransgress against him like as he transgressed against you.\"]\n\n[Footnote 21: _Ibid._ iii. 125. _Cf._ _ibid._ xxiii. 98; xxiv. 22;\nxli. 34.]\n\n[Footnote 22: Lane-Poole, _Speeches and Table-Talk of Mohammad_, p. 147.]\n\n[Footnote 23: Goldziher, _Mohammedanische Studien_, i. 15 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 24: Ameer Ali, _Ethics of Islam_, p. 26 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 25: _Ibid._ p. 7. _Idem_, _Life and Teachings of Mohammed_,\np. 280.]\n\n[Footnote 26: Poole, _Studies in Mohammedanism_, p. 226.]\n\n[Footnote 27: Lane, _Modern Egyptians_, p. 314 _sq._]\n\nThe principles of forgiveness had also advocates in Greece and\nRome. In one of the Platonic dialogues, Socrates says, \"We ought not\nto retaliate or render evil for evil to any one, whatever evil we may\nhave suffered from him\"; though he wisely adds that \"this opinion has\nnever been held, and never will be held, by any considerable number of\npersons.\"[28] The Stoics strongly condemned anger as unnatural and\nunreasonable. \"Mankind is born for mutual assistance, anger for mutual\nruin.\"[29] \"Anger is a crime of the mind; . . . it often is even more\ncriminal than the faults with which it is angry.\"[30] He is the best\nand purest \"who pardons others as if he sinned himself daily, but\navoids sinning as if he never pardoned.\"[31] \"If any one is angry with\nyou, meet his anger by returning benefits for it.\"[32] \"The cynic\nloves those who beat him.\"[33]\n\n[Footnote 28: Plato, _Crito_, p. 49.]\n\n[Footnote 29: Seneca, _De ira_, i. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 30: _Ibid._ i. 16; ii. 6.]\n\n[Footnote 31: Pliny, _Epistol\u00e6_, ix. 22 (viii. 22).]\n\n[Footnote 32: Seneca, _op. cit._ ii. 34.]\n\n[Footnote 33: Epictetus, _Dissertationes_, iii. 22, 54.]\n\nForgiveness of enemies is thus by no means an exclusively Christian\ntenet, although it has never before or after been inculcated with the\nsame emphasis as it was by Jesus. \"Love your enemies; bless them that\ncurse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them which\ndespitefully use you, and persecute you.\"[34] When St. Peter asked,\n\"Lord, how oft shall my brother sin against me, and I forgive him?\ntill seven times?\" Jesus replied, \"I say not unto thee, Until seven\ntimes: but, Until seventy times seven,\"[35]--that is, as often as he\nrepeats the offence. It would seem that Jesus by these sentences\nexpressly forbade men to avenge themselves, or even {77} to feel\nresentment on their own behalf; and so also he was understood by St.\nPaul.[36]\n\n[Footnote 34: _St. Matthew_, v. 44. _Cf._ _ibid._ v. 39 _sq._; vi. 14\n_sq._; _St. Luke_, vi. 27 _sqq._; xvii. 3 _sq._; _St. Mark_,\nxi. 25 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 35: _St. Matthew_, xviii. 21 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 36: _Romans_, xii. 19 _sqq._; _1 Thessalonians_, v. 14\n_sq._; _Colossians_, iii. 12 _sq._]\n\nThe rule of retaliation and the rule of forgiveness, however, are not\nso radically opposed to each other as they appear to be. What the\nlatter condemns is, in reality, not every kind of resentment, but\nnon-moral resentment; not impartial indignation, but personal hatred.\nIt prohibits revenge, but not punishment. According to the Laws of\nManu, crime was so indispensably to be followed by punishment, that if\nthe king pardoned a thief or a perpetrator of violence, instead of\nslaying or striking him, the guilt fell on the king;[37] and if\nLao-tsze was an enemy to the infliction of any kind of suffering, it\nwas because he held that in a well-governed State the necessity for\npunishment could not arise, as crime would cease to exist.[38] The\nChinese book, _Merits and Errors Scrutinised_, which regards it as a\nmerit to refrain from avenging an injury, adds that, \"if a man should\nomit to avenge the injuries of his parents, it would become an\nerror.\"[39] Jesus was certainly not free from righteous indignation.\nIt does not appear that he ever forgave the legalists who sinned\nagainst the kingdom of God, and he told his disciples that, if a\nbrother who had trespassed against his brother neglected to hear the\nchurch, he should be looked upon as a heathen and a publican.[40]\nChristian writers have laid much stress upon the circumstance that\nJesus enjoined men to forgive their own enemies, but not to abstain\nfrom resenting injuries done to others. According to Thomas Aquinas,\n\"the good bear with the wicked to this extent, that, so far as it is\nproper to do so, they patiently endure at their hands the injuries\ndone to themselves; but they do not bear with them to the extent of\nenduring the injuries done to God and their neighbours. For Chrysostom\nsays, 'For it {78} is praiseworthy to be patient under one's own\nwrongs, but the height of impiety to dissemble injuries done to\nGod.'\"[41] Practically, at least, Christianity has not altered the\nvalidity of the Aristotelian rule that anger admits not only of an\nexcess, but of a defect, and that we ought to feel angry at certain\nthings.[42] As Plutarch says, we even think those worthy of hatred who\nare not vexed at hateful individuals; and we can sympathise with the\nman who, hearing somebody praise Charillus, king of Sparta, for his\ngentleness, replied, \"How can Charillus be good, who is not harsh even\nto the bad?\"[43] Moreover, the belief in a transcendental retributive\njustice, in an ultimate punishment of badness, which we meet with in\nTaouism,[44] Brahmanism, Buddhism,[45] Christianity,[46] side by side\nwith the doctrine of forgiveness, is based upon the demand that wrong\nshould be resented.\n\n[Footnote 37: _Laws of Manu_, viii. 316, 346 _sq._ _Cf._ _Gautama_,\nxii. 45; _\u00c2pastamba_, i. 9. 25. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 38: Douglas, _Confucianism and Taouism_, p. 204.]\n\n[Footnote 39: 'Merits and Errors scrutinised,' in _Indo-Chinese\nGleaner_, iii. 153.]\n\n[Footnote 40: _St. Matthew_, xviii. 15 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 41: Thomas Aquinas, _Summa Theologia_, ii.-ii. 108. 1. 2.\n_Cf._ Lactantius, _De ira Dei_, 17.]\n\n[Footnote 42: Aristotle, _Ethica Nicomachea_, ii. 7. 10; iii. 1. 24;\niv. 5. 3 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 43: Plutarch, _De invidia et odio_, 5.]\n\n[Footnote 44: Douglas, _op. cit._ p. 257.]\n\n[Footnote 45: _Dhammapada_, i. 15, 17; x. 137 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 46: _Cf._ _Romans_, xii. 19: \"Vengeance is mine; I will\nrepay, saith the Lord.\"]\n\nIt is easy to see why enlightened and sympathetic minds disapprove of\nresentment and retaliation springing from personal motives. Such\nresentment is apt to be partial. It is too often directed against\npersons whom impartial reflection finds to be no proper objects of\nindignation, and still more frequently it is unduly excessive. As\nButler ays, \"we are in such a peculiar situation, with respect to\ninjuries done to ourselves, that we can scarce any more see them as\nthey really are, than our eye can see itself.\"[47] \"As bodies seem\ngreater in a mist, so do little matters in a rage\"; hence the old rule\nthat we ought not to punish whilst angry.[48] The more the moral\nconsciousness is influenced by sympathy, the more severely it condemns\nany retributive infliction of pain which it regards as undeserved; and\nit seems to be in the first place with a {79} view to preventing such\ninjustice that teachers of morality have enjoined upon men to love\ntheir enemies. It would, indeed, be absurd to blame a person for\nexpressing moral indignation at an act simply because he himself\nhappens to be the offended party; practically we allow him to be even\nmore indignant than the impartial spectator would be, whereas\nexcessive placability often meets with censure. Like Aristotle, we\nmaintain that \"to submit to insult, or to overlook an insult offered\nto our friends, shows a slavish spirit\"[49]; and we agree with the\nConfucian maxims, that injuries should be recompensed, not with\nkindness, but with justice, and that nobody but he who deserves it\nshould be an object of hatred.[50]\n\n[Footnote 47: Butler, 'Sermon IX.--Upon Forgiveness of Injuries,' in\n_Analogy of Religion, &c._, p. 469.]\n\n[Footnote 48: Plutarch, _De cohibenda ira_, 11. Montaigne, _Essais_,\nii. 31 (_Oeuvres_, p. 396).]\n\n[Footnote 49: Aristotle, _Ethica Nicomachea_, 5. 6.]\n\n[Footnote 50: _Lun Y\u00fc_ xiv. 36. 3; xvii. 9. 1, 5; xvii. 24. 1.\nDouglas, _Confucianism and Taouism_, p. 9. _Cf._ _Chung Yung_, x. 3;\nxxxi. 1; xxxiii. 4.]\n\nAt the same time, the injunctions of moralists that unjust resentment\nshould be suppressed, are far from introducing any absolutely new\nelement into the estimation of conduct. They only represent a higher\nstage of a process of moral development the early phases of which are\nfound already in primitive societies. Even the savage who enjoins\nrevenge as a duty, regards revenge under certain circumstances as\nwrong.[51] The restraining rule of like for like, as we shall see, is\nan instance of this.\n\n[Footnote 51: Concerning the Dacotahs, Prescott observes, \"There are\ncases where the Indians say retaliation is wrong, and they try to\nprevent it\" (Schoolcraft, _Indian Tribes_, ii. 197).]\n\nThe aggressive character of moral disapproval has become more\ndisguised, not only by the more scrutinising attitude towards the\nresentment and retaliation which distinguishes the moral consciousness\nof a higher type, but by the different way in which the aggressiveness\ndisplays itself. The infliction of suffering merely for the sake of\nretribution is condemned, and the rule is laid down that we should\nhate, not the sinner, but only the sin.\n\nPunishment, which expresses more or less faithfully the moral\nindignation of the society which inflicts it, is externally similar to\nan act of revenge; it causes, or is intended {80} to cause, pain in\nreturn for inflicted pain. For ages it was looked upon as a matter of\ncourse that if a person had committed an offence he should have to\nsuffer for it. This is still the notion of the multitude, as also of a\nhost of theorisers, who, by calling punishment an expiation, or a\nreparation, or a restoration of the disturbed equilibrium of justice,\nonly endeavour to give a philosophical sanction to a very simple fact,\nthe true nature of which they too often have failed to grasp. The\ninfliction of pain, however, is not an act which the moral\nconsciousness regards with indifference, even in the case of a\ncriminal; and to many enlightened minds with keen sympathy for human\nsuffering, it has appeared both unreasonable and cruel that the State\nshould wilfully torment him to no purpose. But whilst retributive\npunishment has been condemned, punishment itself has been defended; it\nis only looked upon in a different light, not as an end by itself, but\nas a means of attaining an end. It is to be inflicted, not because\nwrong has been done, but in order that wrong be not done. Its object\nis held to be, either to deter from crime, or to reform the criminal,\nor by means of elimination or seclusion, to make it physically\nimpossible for him to commit fresh crimes.\n\nThese views were expressed already in Greek and Roman\nantiquity.[52] According to Plato, a reasonable man punishes for the\nsake of deterring from wickedness, or with a view to correcting the\noffender.[53] Aristotle looks upon punishment as a moral medicine.[54]\nSeneca maintains that the law, in punishing wrong, aims at three ends:\n\"either that it may correct him whom it punishes, or that his\npunishment may render other men better, or that, by bad men being put\nout of the way, the rest may live without fear.\"[55] In modern times\nall these theories have had, and still have, their numerous adherents.\nAccording to Hugo Grotius, \"men are so bound together by their common\n{81} nature, that they ought not to do each other harm, except for the\nsake of some good to be attained\"; hence \"man is not rightly punished\nby man merely for the sake of punishing\"; advantage alone makes\npunishment right--\"either the advantage of the offender, or of him who\nsuffers by the offence, or of persons in general.\"[56] For a long time\nthe view taken by Hobbes, that \"the aym of Punishment is not a\nrevenge, but terrour,\"[57] remained the leading doctrine on the\nsubject, among philosophers, as well as legislators. It was shared by\nMontesquieu,[58] Beccaria,[59] and filangieri,[60] by Anselm von\nFeuerbach[61] and Schopenhauer,[62] and, in the main, by Bentham.[63]\nDuring the nineteenth century the principle of determent was largely\nsuperseded by the principle of reformation; whilst certain\ncontemporary criminologists--like some previous ones[64]--are of\nopinion that punishment should aim to repress crime by an \"absolute\"\nor \"relative elimination\" of the criminal, that is, in extreme cases\nby killing him, but generally by incarcerating him in a criminal\nlunatic asylum, or by banishing him for ever or for a certain period,\nor by interdicting him from a particular neighbourhood.[65]\n\n[Footnote 52: _Cf._ Laistner, _Das Recht in der Strafe_, p. 9 _sqq._;\nThonissen, _Le droit p\u00e9nal de la r\u00e9publique Ath\u00e9nienne_, p. 418 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 53: Plato, _Protagoras_, p. 324. _Idem_, _Politicus_, p.\n293. _Idem_, _Gorgias_, p. 479. _Idem_, _Leges_, ix. 854; xi. 934;\nxii. 944.]\n\n[Footnote 54: Aristotle, _Ethica Nicomachea_, ii. 3. 4.]\n\n[Footnote 55: Seneca, _De clementia_, i. 22. _Cf._ _Idem_, _De ira_,\ni. 19.]\n\n[Footnote 56: Grotius, _De iure belli et pacis_, ii. 20. 4 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 57: Hobbes, _Leviathan_, ii. 28, p. 243.]\n\n[Footnote 58: Montesquieu, _Lettres Persanes_, 81.]\n\n[Footnote 59: Beccaria, _Dei delitti e delle pene_, _passim_.]\n\n[Footnote 60: filangieri, _La scienza della legislazione_, iii. 2. 27,\nvol. iv. 13 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 61: von Feuerbach-Mittermaier, _Lehrbuch des gemeinen in\nDeutschland g\u00fcltigen Peinlichen Rechts_, p. 38 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 62: Schopenhauer, _Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung_,\nii. 683 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 63: Bentham, _Principles of Morals and Legislation_, p. 170\n_sq._ n. 1: \". . . Example is the most important end of all.\" _Idem_,\n_Rationale of Punishment_, p. 19 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 64: See von Feuerbach-Mittermaier, _op. cit._ p. 40.]\n\n[Footnote 65: Garofalo, _Criminologie_, p. 251 _sqq._ Ferri,\n_Criminal Sociology_, p. 204 _sqq._]\n\nThe advocates of these various theories are unanimous in condemning\nretributive punishment as wrong. Without the grounds of social\ndefence, says M. Guyau, \"the punishment would be as blameworthy as the\ncrime, and . . . the lawgivers and the judges, by deliberately\ncondemning the guilty to punishment, would become their fellows.\"[66]\nFor my own part I believe, on the contrary, that those who would\nventure to carry out all the consequences to which the theories of\nsocial defence or of reformation might lead, would be regarded even as\nmore criminal than those they punished, not only by the {82}\nopponents, but probably by the very supporters of the theories in\nquestion. A brief statement of some of those consequences will, I\nhope, suffice to prove that punishment can hardly be guided\nexclusively by utilitarian considerations, but requires the sanction\nof the retributive emotion of moral disapproval.\n\n[Footnote 66: Guyau, _Esquisse d'une morale sans obligation ni\nsanction_, p. 148.]\n\nThe principle of repressing crime by eliminating the criminal may at\nonce be put aside, because it has no reference to the _punishment_ of\ncriminals, although it contains a suggestion--and a most excellent one\nindeed--as to the proper mode of treating them. Their exclusion from\nthe company of their fellow-men--not to speak of their elimination by\ndeath--certainly entails suffering, but, according to the principle\nwith which we are dealing, this suffering is not _intended_. On the\nother hand, punishment, in the ordinary sense of the word, always\ninvolves an express intention to inflict pain, whatever be the object\nfor which pain is inflicted. We do not punish an ill-natured dog when\nwe tie him up so as to prevent him from doing harm, nor do we punish a\nlunatic by confining him in a madhouse.\n\nAccording to the principle of determent, the infliction of suffering\nin consequence of an offence is justified as a means of increasing\npublic safety. The offender is sacrificed for the common weal. But why\nthe offender only? It is quite probable that a more effective way of\ndeterring from crime would be to punish his children as well; and if\nthe notion of justice derived all its import from the result achieved\nby the punishment, there would be nothing unjust in doing so. The only\nobjection which, from this point of view, might ever be raised against\nthe practice of visiting the wrongs of the fathers upon the children,\nis that it is needlessly severe; the innocence of the children could\ncount for nothing. Nor do I see why the law should not allow our own\njudges now and then to follow the example of their Egyptian colleague\nwho in an intricate lawsuit caused a person avowedly innocent to be\nbastinadoed with the hope that whoever was the real {83} culprit might\nbe induced to confess out of compassion.[67] Moreover, if the object\nof punishment is merely preventive, the heaviest punishment should be\nthreatened where the strongest motive is needed to restrain.\nConsequently, an injury committed under great temptation, or in a\npassion, should be punished with particular severity; whereas a crime\nlike parricide might be treated with more indulgence than other kinds\nof homicide, owing to the restraining influence of filial affection.\nCould the moral consciousness approve of this?\n\n[Footnote 67: Burckhardt, _Arabic Proverbs_, p. 103 _sq._]\n\nAgain, if punishment were to be regulated by the principle of\nreforming the criminal, the result would in some cases be very\nastonishing. There is no more incorrigible set of offenders than\nhabitual vagrants and drunkards, whereas experience has shown that the\nmost easily reformed of all offenders is often some person who has\ncommitted a serious crime. According to the reformation theory, the\nlatter should soon be set free, whilst the petty offender might have\nto be shut up for all his life. Nay more, if the criminal proves\nabsolutely incorrigible, and not the slightest hope of his reformation\nis left, there would no longer be any reason for punishing him at\nall.[68] The reformationist may also be asked why he does not try some\nmore humane method of improving people's characters than by the\ninfliction of suffering.\n\n[Footnote 68: _Cf._ Morrison, _Crime and its Causes_, p. 203;\nDurkheim, _Division du travail social_, p. 94.]\n\nIt may seem strange that theories which are open to such objections\nshould have been able to attract so many intelligent partisans. These\ntheories must at least possess a certain plausibility. If punishment\non the one hand springs from moral indignation, and on the other hand\nis frequently interpreted as a means either of deterring from crime or\nof reforming the criminal, there must obviously be some connection\nbetween these ends and the retributive aim of moral resentment. There\nmust be certain facts which, to some extent, fill up the gap between\nthe theory of retribution and the other theories of punishment.\n\n{84} The doctrine of determent regards punishment as a means of\npreventing crime. A crime always involves the infliction of pain; and\nthe one thing which men try to prevent for its own sake is pain. The\none thing which arouses resentment is likewise pain. There must\nconsequently be a general coincidence between the acts which people\nresent and the acts which the law would punish if it were framed on\nthe principle of determent. But the resemblance between the desire to\ndeter and resentment is greater still. Resentment is not only aroused\nby pain, but is a hostile attitude towards its cause, and its\nintrinsic object is to remove this cause, that is, to prevent pain. An\nact of moral resentment is therefore apt to resemble a punishment\ninflicted with a view to deterring from crime, provided that the\npunishment is directed against the cause of crime--the criminal\nhimself--and is not unduly severe.\n\nThe doctrine of reformation aims at the removal of a criminal\ndisposition of mind by improving the offender. Moral resentment\nlikewise aims at the removal of a volitional cause of pain, by\nbringing about repentance in the offender. That repentance ought to be\nfollowed by forgiveness, partial or total, is a widely recognised\nmoral claim.\n\nAccording to the Chinese Penal Code, whoever, having committed an\ninjury which can be repaired by restitution or compensation,\nsurrenders himself voluntarily, and acknowledges his guilt to a\nmagistrate, before it is otherwise discovered, shall be freely\npardoned, though all claims upon his property shall be duly\nliquidated.[69] In Madagascar, according to a law made in 1828, \"all\nthe fines shall be reduced one-half, according to the nature of the\nfines, if the persons guilty accuse themselves.\"[70] According to\nZoroastrianism, one element of atonement consists in repentance, as\nmanifested by avowal of the guilt and by the recital of a formula, the\n_Patet_.[71] It is said in the Laws of Manu:--\"In proportion as a man\nwho has done wrong, himself {85} confesses it, even so far he is freed\nfrom guilt, as a snake from its slough. . . . He who has committed a\nsin and has repented, is freed from that sin, but he is purified only\nby the resolution of ceasing to sin and thinking 'I will do so no\nmore.'\"[72] According to the Rig-Veda, Varuna inflicts terrible\npunishments on the hardened criminal, but is merciful to him who\nrepents; to Varuna the cry of anguish from remorse ascends, and before\nhim the sinner comes to discharge himself of the burden of his guilt\nby confession.[73] So, also, Zeus pardons the repentant.[74] The main\ndoctrine of Judaism on the subject of atonement is comprised in the\nsingle word Repentance. No teachers, says Mr. Montefiore, \"exalted the\nplace and power of repentance more than the Rabbis. There was no sin\nfor which in their eyes a true repentance could not obtain forgiveness\nfrom God.\"[75] According to the Talmud, a space of only two fingers'\nbreadth lies between Hell and Heaven: the sinner has only to repent\nsincerely, and the gates to everlasting bliss will spring open.[76]\nJesus commanded his disciples to forgive injuries if followed by\nrepentance:--\"If thy brother trespass against thee, rebuke him; and if\nhe repent, forgive him. And if he trespass against thee seven times in\na day, and seven times in a day turn again to thee, saying, I repent;\nthou shalt forgive him.\"[77]\n\n[Footnote 69: _Ta Tsing Leu Lee_, sec. xxv. p. 27 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 70: Ellis, _History of Madagascar_, i. 386.]\n\n[Footnote 71: Darmesteter, in _Sacred Books of the East_,\niv. p. lxxxvi.]\n\n[Footnote 72: _Laws of Manu_, xi. 229, 231. _Cf._ _ibid._ xi. 228, 230.]\n\n[Footnote 73: _Rig-Veda_, i. 25. 1 _sq._; ii. 28. 5 _sqq._; v. 85. 7\n_sq._; vii. 87. 7, 88. 6 _sq._, 89. 1 _sqq._ Barth, _Religions of\nIndia_, p. 17.]\n\n[Footnote 74: _Ilias_, ix. 502 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 75: Montefiore, _op. cit._ pp. 524, 335 n.]\n\n[Footnote 76: Deutsch, _Literary Remains_, p. 53. _Cf._ _ibid._ p. 56;\nKatz, _Der wahre Talmudjude_, p. 87 _sq._; Kohler, 'Atonement,' in\n_Jewish Encyclopedia_, ii. 279; Moore, 'Sacrifice' in Cheyne and\nBlack, _Encyclop\u00e6dia Biblica_, iv. 4224 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 77: _St. Luke_, xvii. 3 _sq._]\n\nBut repentance not only blunts the edge of moral indignation and\nrecommends the offender to the mercy of men and gods: it is the sole\nground on which pardon can be given by a scrupulous judge. When\nsufficiently guided by deliberation and left to itself, without being\nunduly checked by other emotions, the feeling of moral resentment is\napt to last as long as its cause remains unaltered, that is until the\nwill of the offender has ceased to be offensive; and it ceases to be\noffensive only when he acknowledges his guilt and repents. It is true\nthat the mere performance of certain ceremonies is frequently supposed\nto relieve the performer of his sins,[78] and that the {86} same end\nis thought to be attained by pleasing God in some way or other, by\nsacrifice, or alms-giving, or the like. Men even lay claim to divine\nforgiveness as a right belonging to them in virtue of some meritorious\ndeeds of theirs, according to the doctrine of _opera supererogativa_--a\ndoctrine which, in substance, is not restricted to Roman Catholicism,\nbut is found, in a more or less developed form, in Judaism,[79]\nMuhammedanism,[80] Brahmanism,[81] and degenerated Buddhism.[82] But\nall such ideas are objectionable to the moral consciousness of a\nhigher type. They are based on the crude notion that sin is a material\nsubstance which may be removed by material means; or on the belief\nthat an offender may compound with the deity for sinning against him,\nin the same way as he pacifies his injured neighbour, by bribery or\nflattery; or on the assumptions that by a good or meritorious deed a\nman has done more than his duty, that a good deed stands in the same\nrelation to a bad deed as a claim to a debt, that the claim is made on\nthe same person to whom the debt is due, namely, God--even though it\nbeinclihedinclihed only by his mercy--and that the debt consequently\nmay be compensated by the claim in the same way as the payment of a\ncertain sum may compensate for a loss inflicted. This doctrine\nattaches badness and goodness to external acts rather than to mental\nfacts. Reparation implies compensation for a loss. The loss may be\ncompensated by the bestowal of a corresponding advantage; but no\nreparation can be given for badness. Badness can only be forgiven, and\nmoral forgiveness can be granted only on condition that the agent's\nmind has undergone a radical alteration for the better, that the\nbadness of the will has given way to repentance.[83] Hence the\nReformation {87} proscribed offerings for the redemption of sins,\ntogether with the trade in indulgences; and we meet with an analogous\nmovement in other comparatively advanced forms of religion. In\nreformed Brahmanism, repentance is declared to be the only means of\nredeeming trespasses.[84] The idea expressed in the Psalms, that God\ndelights not in burnt offerings, but that the sacrifices of God are a\nbroken and a contrite heart,[85] became the prevailing opinion among\nthe Rabbis, most of whom regarded repentance as the _conditio sine qu\u00e2\nnon_ of expiation and the forgiveness of sins.[86] Let us also\nremember that he who commanded his followers to forgive a brother for\nhis sin, at the same time pronounced the qualification: \"if he\nrepent.\"[87]\n\n[Footnote 78: _Supra_, p. 53 _sqq._ Heriot, _Travels through the\nCanadas_, p. 378 (ancient Mexicans). Adair, _History of the American\nIndians_, p. 150. Krasheninnikoff, _History of Kamchatka_, p. 178.\nWilliams and Calvert, _Fiji_, p. 24.]\n\n[Footnote 79: Montefiore, _op. cit._ p. 525 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 80: _Koran_, xi. 116. Sell, _Faith of Isl\u00e1m_, p. 220 _sq._\nAccording to Muhammadanism, however, it is only \"little sins\" that are\nforgiven if some good actions are done, whereas \"great sins\" can only\nbe forgiven after due repentance (_ibid._ p. 214).]\n\n[Footnote 81: Wheeler, _History of India_, ii. 475.]\n\n[Footnote 82: _Indo-Chinese Gleaner_, iii. 150, 161, 164. Davis,\n_China_, ii. 48.]\n\n[Footnote 83: This point was certainly not overlooked by the Catholic\nmoralists, but even the most ardent apology cannot explain away the\nidea of reparation in the Catholic doctrine of the justification of\nman (_cf._ Manzoni, _Osservazioni sulla Morale Cattolica_, p. 100).\nPenance consists of contrition, confession, and satisfaction, and\ncontrition itself is chiefly \"a willingness to compensate\" (_Catechism\nof the Council of Trent_, ii. 5. 22).]\n\n[Footnote 84: Goblet d'Alviella, _Hibbert Lectures on the Origin and\nGrowth of the Conception of God_, p. 263.]\n\n[Footnote 85: _Psalms_, li. 16 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 86: Moore, _loc. cit._ col. 4225.]\n\n[Footnote 87: _Cf._ Martineau, _Types of Ethical Theory_, ii. 203.]\n\nThat moral indignation is appeased by repentance, and that repentance\nis the only proper ground for forgiveness, is thus due, not to the\nspecifically moral character of such indignation, but to its being a\nform of resentment. This is confirmed by the fact that an angry and\nrevengeful man is apt to be in a similar way influenced by the sincere\napologies of the offender. As Aristotle said, men are placable in\nregard to those who acknowledge and repent their guilt: \"there is\nproof of this in the case of chastising servants; for we chastise more\nviolently those who contradict us, and deny their guilt; but towards\nsuch as acknowledge themselves to be justly punished, we cease from\nour wrath.\"[88] To take an instance from the savage world. The\nCaroline Islander, according to Mr. Christian, \"is inclined to be\nrevengeful, and will bide his time patiently until his opportunity\ncomes. Yet he is not implacable, and counts reconciliation a noble and\na princely thing. There is a form of etiquette to be observed on {88}\nthese occasions--a present (_katom_) is made, an apology offered--a\npiece of sugar-cane accepted by the aggrieved party--honour is\nsatisfied and the matter ends.\"[89] In the case of revenge, external\nsatisfaction or material compensation is often allowed to take the\nplace of genuine repentance, and the humiliation of the adversary may\nbe sufficient to quiet the angry passion. But the revenge felt by a\nreflecting mind is not so readily satisfied. It wants to remove the\ncause which aroused it. The object which resentment is chiefly intent\nupon, Adam Smith observes, \"is not so much to make our enemy feel pain\nin his turn, as to make him conscious that he feels it upon account of\nhis past conduct, to make him repent of that conduct, and to make him\nsensible, that the person whom he injured did not deserve to be\ntreated in that manner.\"[90] The delight of revenge, says Bacon,\n\"seemeth to be not so much in doing the hurt, as in making the party\nrepent.\"[91]\n\n[Footnote 88: Aristotle, _Rhetorica_, ii. 3. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 89: Christian, _Caroline Islands_, p. 72.]\n\n[Footnote 90: Adam Smith, _Theory of Moral Sentiments_, p. 138 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 91: Bacon, 'Essay IV. Of Revenge,' in _Essays_, p. 45. _Cf._\nMontaigne, _Essais_, ii. 27 (_Oeuvres_, p. 384).]\n\nWe can now see the origin of the idea that the true end of punishment\nis the reformation of the criminal. This idea merely emphasises the\nmost humane element in resentment, the demand that the offender's will\nshall cease to be offensive. The principle of reformation has thus\nitself a retributive origin. This explains the fact, otherwise\ninexplicable, that the amendment which it has in view is to be\neffected by the infliction of pain. It also accounts for the\ninconsistent attitude of the reformationist towards incorrigible\noffenders, already commented upon. Resentment gives way to forgiveness\nonly in the case of repentance, not in the case of incorrigibility.\nHence, not even the reformationist regards incorrigibility as a\nlegitimate ground for exempting a person from punishment, although\nthis flatly contradicts his theory about the true aim of all\npunishment.\n\nThus the theories both of determent and of reformation are ultimately\noffspring of the same emotion that first {89} induced men to inflict\npunishment on their fellow-creatures. It escaped the advocates of\nthese theories that they themselves were under the influence of the\nvery principle they fought against, because they failed to grasp its\ntrue import. Rightly understood, resentment is preventive in its\nnature, and, when sufficiently deliberate, regards the infliction of\nsuffering as a means rather than as an end. It not only gives rise to\npunishment, but readily suggests, as a proper end of punishment,\neither determent or amendment or both. But, first of all, moral\nresentment wants to raise a protest against wrong. And the immediate\naim of punishment has always been to give expression to the righteous\nindignation of the society which inflicts it.\n\nNow it may be thought that men have no right to give vent to their\nmoral resentment in a way which hurts their neighbours unless some\nbenefit may be expected from it. In the case of many other emotions,\nwe hold that the conative element in the emotion ought not to be\nallowed to develop into a distinct volition or act; and it would seem\nthat a similar view might be taken with reference to the\naggressiveness inherent in moral disapproval. It is a notion of this\nkind that lies at the bottom of the utilitarian theories of\npunishment. They are protests against purposeless infliction of pain,\nagainst crude ideas of retributive justice, against theories hardly in\nadvance of the low feelings of the popular mind. Therefore, they mark\na stage of higher refinement in the evolution of the moral\nconsciousness; and if the principles of determent and reformation are\nopen to objections which will be shared by almost everyone, that is\ndue to other circumstances than their demand that punishment should\nserve a useful end. As we have seen, they ignore the fact that a\npunishment, in order to be recognised as just, must not transgress the\nlimits set down by moral disapproval, that it must not be inflicted on\ninnocent persons, that it must be proportioned to the guilt, that\noffenders who are amenable to discipline must not be treated more\nseverely {90} than incorrigible criminals. These theories also seem to\nexaggerate the deterring or reforming influence which punishments\nexercise upon criminals,[92] whilst, in another respect, they take too\nnarrow a view of its social usefulness. Whether its voice inspire fear\nor not, whether it wake up a sleeping conscience or not, punishment,\nat all events, tells people in plain terms what, in the opinion of the\nsociety, they ought not to do. It gives the multitude a severe lesson\nin public morality; and it is difficult to see how quite the same\neffect could be attained by any other method. Retaliation is such a\nspontaneous expression of indignation, that people would hardly\nrealise the offensiveness of an act which evokes no signs of\nresentment. Of course, punishment, in the legal sense of the term, is\nonly one form--the most concrete form--of public retaliation; it is,\nindeed, probable that public opinion exercises a greater influence on\nmen than punishment would do without its aid.[93] But punishment, in\ncombination with public opinion, has no doubt to some extent an\neducating, and not merely a deterring, influence upon the members of a\nsociety. As Sir James Stephen observes, \"the sentence of the law is to\nthe moral sentiment of the public in relation to any offence what a\nseal is to hot wax. It converts into a permanent final judgment what\nmight otherwise be a transient sentiment.\"[94] finally, it must not be\noverlooked that the infliction of punishment upon the perpetrator of a\ngrave offence gratifies a strong general desire, and, even though the\npain which always accompanies an unsatisfied desire would by itself\nafford no sufficient justification for subjecting the offence to such\nintense {91} suffering, other more serious consequences might easily\nresult from leaving him unpunished. The public indignation might find\na vent in some less regular and less discriminating mode of\nretaliation, like lynching; or, on the other hand, by remaining\nunsatisfied, the desire might dwindle away from want of nourishment,\nand the moral standard suffer a corresponding loss.\n\n[Footnote 92: On the limited efficiency of punishment as a deterrent,\nsee Ferri, _op. cit._ p. 82 _sq._ On the moral insensibility of the\ninstinctive and habitual criminal, and absence of remorse, see\nHavelock Ellis, _The Criminal_, p. 124 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 93: _Cf._ Locke, _Essay concerning Human Understanding_, ii.\n28. 12 (_Philosophical Works_, p. 283); Shaftesbury, 'Inquiry\nconcerning Virtue and Merit,' i. 3. 3, in _Characteristicks_, ii. 64.]\n\n[Footnote 94: Stephen, _History of the Criminal Law of England_, ii.\n81. _Cf._ Shaftesbury, _op. cit._ ii. 64: \"As to punishments and\nrewards, their efficacy is not so much from the fear or expectation\nwhich they raise, as from a natural esteem of virtue, and detestation\nof villainy, which is awaken'd and excited by these publick\nexpressions of the approbation and hatred of mankind in each case.\"]\n\nHowever, it is not to be believed that, in practice, the infliction of\npunishment is, or ever will be, regulated merely by considerations of\nsocial utility, even within the limits of what is recognised as\nlegitimate by the moral sentiment. The retributive desire is so\nstrong, and appears so natural, that we can neither help obeying it,\nnor seriously disapprove of its being obeyed. The theory that we have\na right to punish an offender only in so far as, by doing so, we\npromote the general happiness, really serves in the main as a\njustification for gratifying such a desire, rather than as a\nfoundation for penal practice. Moreover, this theory refers, and\npretends to refer, only to outward behaviour--to punishment, not to\nthe emotion from which punishment springs. It condemns the retributive\nact, not the retributive desire.\n\nBut at the same time the aggressive element in the emotion itself has\nundergone a change, which tends to conceal its true nature by partly\nleading it into a new channel, or, rather, by narrowing the channel in\nwhich it discharges itself. Resentment is directed against the cause\nof the offence by which it was aroused--broadly speaking, the\noffender. But when duly reflecting upon the matter, we cannot fail to\nadmit that the real cause was not the offender as a whole, but his\nwill. Deliberate and discriminating resentment is therefore apt to\nturn against the will rather than against the willer; as we have seen,\nit is desirous to inflict pain on the offender chiefly as a means of\nremoving the cause of pain suffered, _i.e._, the existence of the bad\nwill. If this is the case with deliberate resentment in general, it\nmust particularly be the case with moral indignation, which is more\nlikely to be {92} influenced by sympathy, and hence more discriminate,\nthan non-moral resentment. This fact gives rise to the moral\ncommandment that we should hate, not the sinner, but the sin. The\nhostile reaction should be focussed on the will of the offender, and\nhis sensibility should be regarded merely as an instrument through\nwhich the will is worked upon. But there is little hope that such a\ndemand can ever be strictly enforced. Professor Sidgwick justly\nremarks that, though moralists try to distinguish between anger\ndirected \"against the act\" and anger directed \"against the agent,\" it\nmay be fairly doubted whether it is within the capacity of ordinary\nhuman nature to maintain this distinction in practice.[95] The will\nwhich offends, and the sensibility which suffers, cannot seriously be\nlooked upon as two different entities the one of which should not be\npunished for the fault of the other. The person himself is held\nresponsible for the offence. The hostile reaction turns against his\nwill because only by acting upon the will can the cause of pain be\nremoved. But since the remotest ages the aggressive attitude towards\nthis cause has been connected with an instinctive desire to produce\ncounter-pain; and, though we may recognise that such a desire, or\nrather the volition into which it tends to develop, may be morally\njustifiable only if it is intended to remove the cause of pain, we can\nhardly help being indulgent to the gratification of a human instinct\nwhich seems to be well nigh ineradicable. It is the instinctive desire\nto inflict counter-pain that gives to moral indignation its most\nimportant characteristic. Without it, moral condemnation and the ideas\nof right and wrong would never have come into existence. Without it,\nwe should no more condemn a bad man than a poisonous plant. The reason\nwhy moral judgments are passed on volitional beings, or their acts, is\nnot merely that they are volitional, but that they are sensitive as\nwell; and however much we try to concentrate our indignation on the\nact, it derives its peculiar flavour from being directed {93} against\na sensitive agent. I have heard persons of a highly sympathetic cast\nof mind assert that a wrong act awakens in them only sorrow, not\nindignation; but though sorrow be the predominant element in their\nstate of mind, I believe that, on a close inspection, they would find\nthere another emotion as well, one in which there is immanent an\nelement of hostility, however slight. It is true that the intensity of\nmoral indignation cannot always be measured by the actual desire to\ncause pain to the offender; but its intensity seems nevertheless to be\nconnected with the amount of suffering which the indignant man is\nwilling to let the offender undergo in consequence of the offence.\nWhich of us could ever, quite apart from any utilitarian\nconsiderations, feel the same sympathy with a person who suffers on\naccount of his badness as with one who suffers innocently? It is one\nof the most interesting facts related to the moral consciousness of a\nhigher type, that it in vain condemns the gratification of the very\ndesire from which it sprang. It is like a man of low extraction, who,\nin spite of all acquired refinement, bears his origin stamped on his face.\n\n[Footnote 95: Sidgwick, _Methods of Ethics_, p. 364.]\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nWhilst resentment is a hostile attitude of mind towards a cause of\npain, retributive kindly emotion is a friendly attitude of mind\ntowards a cause of pleasure. Just as in the lower forms of anger there\nis hardly any definite desire to produce suffering, only a vehement\ndesire to remove the cause of pain, so in the lower form of\nretributive kindly emotion there is hardly any definite desire to\nproduce pleasure, only a friendly endeavour to retain the cause of the\npleasure experienced. When the emotion contains a definite desire to\ngive pleasure in return for pleasure received, and at the same time is\nfelt by the favoured party in his capacity of being himself the object\nof the benefit, it is called gratitude. We often find intermingled\nwith gratitude a feeling of indebtedness; he upon whom a benefit has\nbeen conferred feels himself as a debtor, and regards the benefactor\nas his creditor. This feeling has {94} even been represented as\nessential to, or as a condition of, gratitude;[96] but it is not\nimplied in what I here understand by gratitude. It is one thing to be\ngrateful, and another thing to feel that it is one's duty to be\ngrateful. A depression of the \"self-feeling,\" a feeling of\nhumiliation, also frequently accompanies gratitude as a motive for\nrequiting the benefit; but it is certainly not an element in gratitude\nitself.\n\n[Footnote 96: Horwicz, _Psychologische Analysen_, ii. 333: \"Ohne\ndieses Gef\u00fchl des Verbundenseins . . . . kann keine Dankbarkeit\nauskommen.\" _Cf._ Milton, _Paradise Lost_, iv. 52 _sqq._]\n\nRetributive kindly emotion is a much less frequent phenomenon in the\nanimal kingdom than is the emotion of resentment. In many animal\nspecies not even the germ of it is found, and where it occurs it is\ngenerally restricted within narrow limits. Anybody may provoke an\nanimal's anger, but only towards certain individuals it is apt to feel\nretributive kindliness. The limits for this emotion are marked off by\nthe conditions under which altruistic sentiments in general tend to\narise--a subject which will be discussed in another connection.\nIndeed, social affection is itself essentially retributive. Gregarious\nanimals take pleasure in each other's company, and with this pleasure\nis intimately associated kindly feeling towards its cause, the\ncompanion himself. Social affection presupposes reciprocity; it is not\nonly a friendly sentiment towards another individual, but towards an\nindividual who is conceived of as a friend.\n\nThe intrinsic object of retributive kindliness being to retain a cause\nof pleasure, we may assume that the definite desire to produce\npleasure in return for pleasure received is due to the fact that such\na desire materially promotes the object in question--exactly in the\nsame way as the definite desire to inflict pain in return for pain\ninflicted has become an element in resentment because such a desire\npromotes the intrinsic object of resentment, the removal of the cause\nof pain. And as natural selection accounts for the origin of\nresentment, so it also accounts for the {95} origin of retributive\nkindly emotion. Both of these emotions are useful states of mind; by\nresentment evils are averted, by retributive kindliness benefits are\nsecured. That there is such a wide difference in their prevalence is\nexplicable from the simple facts that gregariousness--which is the\nroot of social affection, and, largely at least, a condition of the\nrise of retributive kindly emotions--is an advantage only to some\nspecies, not to all, and that even gregarious animals have many\nenemies, but few friends.\n\nIn some cases the friendly reaction in retributive kindliness is\ndirected towards individuals who have in no way been the cause of the\npleasure which gave rise to the emotion. So intimate is the connection\nbetween the stimulus and the reaction, that he who is made happy often\nfeels a general desire to make others happy.[97] But such an\nindiscriminate reaction is only an offset of the emotion with which we\nare here concerned. Moreover, retributive kindly emotion often confers\nbenefits upon somebody nearly related to the benefactor, if he himself\nbe out of reach, or in addition to benefits conferred on him. But in\nsuch cases the gratitude towards the benefactor is the real\nmotive.\n\n[Footnote 97: That a happy man wants to see glad faces around him, is\nalso due to another cause, which has been pointed out by Dr. Hirn\n(_Origins of Art_, p. 83): from their expression he wants to derive\nfurther nourishment and increase for his own feeling.]\n\nThat moral approval--by which I understand that emotion of which moral\npraise or reward is the outward manifestation--is a kind of\nretributive kindly emotion and as such allied to gratitude, will\nprobably be admitted without much hesitation.[98] Its friendly\ncharacter is not, like the hostile character of moral disapproval,\ndisguised by any apparently contradictory facts. To confer a benefit\nupon a person is not generally regarded as wrong, unless, indeed, it\ninvolves an encroachment on somebody's rights or is contrary to the\nfeeling of justice. And that moral approval sometimes bestows its\nfavours upon undeserving {96} individuals for the merits of others,\ncan no more invalidate the fact that it is essentially directed\ntowards the cause of pleasure, than the occasional infliction of\npunishments upon innocent individuals invalidates the fact that moral\ndisapproval is essentially directed against the cause of pain.\nUnmerited rewards are explicable on grounds analogous to those to\nwhich we have traced unmerited punishments.\n\n[Footnote 98: The relationship between gratitude and moral approval\nhas been recognised by Hartley (_Observations on Man_, i. 520) and\nAdam Smith (_Theory of Moral Sentiments_, _passim_).]\n\nThe doctrine of family solidarity leads, not only to common\nresponsibility for crimes, but to common enjoyment of merits.\n\nIn Madagascar, exemption from punishment was claimed by the\ndescendants of persons who had rendered any particular service to the\nsovereign or the State, as also by other branches of the family, on\nthe same plea.[99] According to Chinese ideas, the virtuous conduct of\nany individual will result, not only in prosperity to himself, but in\na certain quantity of happiness to his posterity, unless indeed the\npersonal wickedness of some of the descendants neutralise the benefits\nwhich would otherwise accrue from the virtue of the ancestor;[100]\nand, conversely, the Chinese Government confers titles of nobility\nupon the dead parents of a distinguished son.[101] The idea that the\ndead share in _punya_ or _p\u00e2pa_, that is, the merit or demerit of the\nliving, and that the happiness of a man in the next life depends on\nthe good works of his descendants, was early familiar to the civilised\nnatives of India; almost all legal deeds of gift contain the formula\nthat the gift is made \"for the increase of the _punya_ of the donor\nand that of his father and mother.\"[102]\n\n[Footnote 99: Ellis, _History of Madagascar_, 376.]\n\n[Footnote 100: Giles, _Strange Stories from a Chinese Studio_, i. 426,\nn. 3; ii. 384, n. 63. Doolittle, _Social Life of the Chinese_, ii. 398.]\n\n[Footnote 101: Giles, _op. cit._ i. 305, n. 6. Wells Williams, _Middle\nKingdom_, i. 422.]\n\n[Footnote 102: Barth, _Religions of India_, p. 52, n. 4.]\n\nBut the vicarious efficacy of good deeds is not necessarily restricted\nto the members of the same family.\n\nIn a hymn of the Rig-Veda we find the idea that the merits or the\npious may benefit their neighbours.[103] According to one of the\nPahlavi texts, persons who are wholly unable to perform good works are\nsupposed to be entitled to a share of any supererogatory good works\nperformed by others.[104] The Chinese believe that {97} whole kingdoms\nare blessed by benevolent spirits for the virtuous conduct of their\nrulers.[105] Yahveh promised not to destroy Sodom for the sake of ten\nrighteous, provided that so many righteous could be found in the\ntown.[106] The doctrine of vicarious reward or satisfaction through\ngood works is, in fact, more prevalent than the doctrine of vicarious\npunishment. Jewish theology has a great deal more to say about the\nacceptance of the merits of the righteous on behalf of the wicked,\nthan about atonement through sacrifice.[107] The Muhammedans, who know\nnothing of vicarious suffering as a means of expiation, confer merits\nupon their dead by reciting chapters of the Koran and almsgiving, and\nsome of them allow the pilgrimage to Mecca to be done by proxy.[108]\nChristian theology itself maintains that salvation depends on the\nmerit of the passion of Christ; and from early times the merits of\nmartyrs and saints were believed to benefit other members of the\nChurch.[109]\n\n[Footnote 103: _Rig-Veda_, vii. 35. 4.]\n\n[Footnote 104: _D\u00een\u00e2-\u00ee-Ma\u00een\u00f4g-\u00ee Khirad_ xv. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 105: de Groot, _Religious System of China_ (vol. iv. book)\nii. 435.]\n\n[Footnote 106: _Genesis_, xviii. 32.]\n\n[Footnote 107: Robertson Smith, _Religion of the Semites_, p. 424, n. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 108: Lane, _Modern Egyptians_, pp. 247, 248, 532. Sell, _op.\ncit._ pp. 242, 278, 287, 288, 298. _Cf._ Wallin, _F\u00f3rsta Resa fr\u00e5n\nCairo till Arabiska \u00f6knen_, p. 103.]\n\n[Footnote 109: Harnack, _History of Dogma_, ii. 133, n. 3.]\n\nFor the explanation of these and similar facts various circumstances\nhave to be considered. Good deeds may be so pleasing to a god as to\ninduce him to forgive the sins of the wicked in accordance with the\nrule that anger yields to joy. There is solidarity not only between\nmembers of the same family, but between members of the same social\nunit; hence the virtues of individuals may benefit the whole community\nto which they belong. The Catholic theologian argues that, since we\nare all regenerated unto Christ by being washed in the same baptism,\nmade partakers of the same sacraments, and, especially, of the same\nmeat and drink, the body and blood of Christ, we are all members of\nthe same body. \"As, then, the foot does not perform its functions\nsolely for itself, but also for the benefit of the eyes; and as the\neyes exercise their sight, not for their own, but for the common\nbenefit of all the members; so should works of satisfaction be deemed\ncommon to all the members of the {98} Church.\"[110] Moreover, virtues,\nlike sins, are believed to be in a material way transferable. In Upper\nBavaria, when a dead person is laid out, a cake of flour is placed on\nhis breast in order to absorb the virtues of the deceased, whereupon\nthe cake is eaten by the nearest relatives.[111] And we are told that,\nin a certain district in the north of England, if a child is brought\nto the font at the same time as a body is committed to the ground,\nwhatever was \"good\" in the deceased person is supposed to be\ntransferred to the little child, since God does not allow any\n\"goodness\" to be buried and lost to the world, and such \"goodness\" is\nmost likely to enter a little child coming to the sacrament of\nBaptism.[112] A blessing, also, no less than a curse, is looked upon\nin the light of material energy; goodness is not required for the\nacquisition of it, mere contact will do. Blessings are hereditary:--\"The\njust man walketh in his integrity: his children are blessed after\nhim.\"[113]\n\n[Footnote 110: _Catechism of the Council of Trent_, ii. 5. 72.]\n\n[Footnote 111: _Am Urquell_, ii. 101.]\n\n[Footnote 112: Peacock, 'Executed Criminals and Folk-Medicine,' in\n_Folk-Lore_, vii. 280.]\n\n[Footnote 113: _Proverbs_, xx. 7.]\n\nIt is no doubt more becoming for a god to pardon the sinner on account\nof the merits of the virtuous, than to punish the innocent for the\nsins of the wicked. It shows that his compassion overcomes his wrath;\nand the mercy of the deity is, among all divine attributes, that on\nwhich the higher monotheistic religions lay most stress. Allah said,\n\"Whoso doth one good act, for him are ten rewards, and I also give\nmore to whomsoever I will; and whoso doth ill, its retaliation is\nequal to it, or else I forgive him.\"[114] Nevertheless, the moral\nconsciousness of a higher type can hardly approve that the wicked\nshould be pardoned for the sake of the virtuous, or that the reward\nfor an act should be bestowed upon anybody else than the agent. The\ndoctrine of vicarious merit or recompense is not just; it involves\nthat badness is unduly ignored; it is based on crude ideas of goodness\nand merit. The theory of _opera supererogativa_, as we have seen,\nattaches badness {99} and goodness to external acts rather than to\nmental facts, and assumes that reparation can be given for badness,\nwhereas the scrutinising moral judge only forgives badness in case it\nis superseded by repentance. If thus a bad act cannot be compensated\nby a good one, even though both be performed by one and the same\nperson, it can still less be compensated by the good act of another\nman. From various quarters we hear protests against the notion of\nvicarious merit--protests which emphasise the true direction of moral\nreward. Ezekiel, who reproved the old idea that the children's teeth\nare set on edge because the fathers have eaten sour grapes, also\ntaught that a wicked son is to reap no benefit from the blessings\nbestowed upon a righteous father.[115] \"Fear the day,\" says the Koran,\n\"wherein no soul shall pay any recompense for another soul.\"[116] The\nBuddhistic Dhammapada contains the following passage, which sums up\nour whole argument:--\"By oneself the evil is done, by oneself one\nsuffers; by oneself evil is left undone, by oneself one is purified.\nThe pure and the impure stand and fall by themselves, no one can\npurify another.\"[117]\n\n[Footnote 114: Lane-Poole, _Speeches and Table-Talk of Mohammad_,\np. 147.]\n\n[Footnote 115: _Ezekiel_, xviii. 5 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 116: _Koran_, ii. 44.]\n\n[Footnote 117: _Dhammapada_, xii. 165.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV\n\nTHE NATURE OF THE MORAL EMOTIONS (_concluded_)\n\n\nWE have seen that moral disapproval is a form of resentment, and that\nmoral approval is a form of retributive kindly emotion. It still\nremains for us to examine in what respects these emotions differ from\nkindred non-moral emotions--disapproval from anger and revenge,\napproval from gratitude--in other words, what characterises them as\nspecifically _moral_ emotions.\n\nIt is a common opinion, held by all who regard the intellect as the\nsource of moral concepts, that moral emotions only arise in\nconsequence of moral judgments, and that, in each case, the character\nof the emotion is determined by the predicate of the judgment. We are\ntold that, when the intellectual process is completed, when the act in\nquestion is definitely classed under such or such a moral category,\nthen, and only then, there follows instantaneously a feeling of either\napprobation or disapprobation as the case may be.[1] When we hear of a\nmurder, for instance, we must discern the wrongness of the act before\nwe can feel moral indignation at it.\n\n[Footnote 1: Fleming, _Manual of Moral Philosophy_, p. 97 _sqq._\nFowler, _Principles of Morals_, ii. 198 _sqq._]\n\nIt is true that a moral judgment may be followed by a moral emotion,\nthat the finding out the tendency of a certain mode of conduct to\nevoke indignation or approval is apt to call forth such an emotion, if\nthere was none before, or otherwise to increase the one existing. It\nis, moreover, true that the predicate of a moral judgment, as {101}\nwell as the generalisation leading up to such a predicate, may give a\nspecific colouring to the approval or disapproval which it produces,\nquite apart from the general characteristics belonging to that emotion\nin its capacity of a moral emotion; the concepts of duty and justice,\nfor instance, no doubt have a peculiar flavour of their own. But for\nall this, moral emotions cannot be described as resentment or\nretributive kindliness called forth by moral judgments. Such a\ndefinition would be a meaningless play with words. Whatever emotions\nmay follow moral judgments, such judgments could never have been\npronounced unless there had been moral emotions antecedent to them.\nTheir predicates, as was pointed out above, are essentially based on\ngeneralisations of tendencies in certain phenomena to arouse moral\nemotions; hence the criterion of a moral emotion can in no case depend\nupon its proceeding from a moral judgment. But at the same time moral\njudgments, being definite expressions of moral emotions, naturally\nhelp us to discover the true nature of these emotions.\n\nThe predicate of a moral judgment always involves a notion of\ndisinterestedness. When pronouncing an act to be good or bad, I mean\nthat it is so, quite independently of any reference it might have to\nmy own interests. A moral judgment may certainly have a selfish\nmotive; but then it, nevertheless, pretends to be disinterested, which\nshows that disinterestedness is a characteristic of moral concepts as\nsuch. This is admitted even by the egoistic hedonist, who maintains\nthat we approve and condemn acts from self-love. According to\nHelvetius, it is the love of consideration that a virtuous man takes\nto be in him the love of virtue; and yet everybody pretends to love\nvirtue for its own sake, \"this phrase is in every one's mouth and in\nno one's heart.\"[2]\n\n[Footnote 2: Helvetius, _De l'Homme_, i. 263.]\n\nIf the moral concepts are essentially generalisations of tendencies in\ncertain phenomena to call forth moral emotions, and, at the same time,\ncontain the notion of {102} disinterestedness, we must conclude that\nthe emotions from which they spring are felt disinterestedly. Of this\nfact we find an echo--more or less faithful--in the maxims of various\nethical theorisers, as well as practical moralists. We find it in the\nutilitarian demand that, in regard to his own happiness and that of\nothers, an agent should be \"as strictly impartial as a disinterested\nand benevolent spectator\";[3] in the \"rule of righteousness\" laid down\nby Samuel Clarke, that \"We so deal with every man, as in like\ncircumstances we could reasonably expect he should with us\";[4] in\nKant's formula, \"Act only on that maxim which thou canst at the same\ntime will to become a universal law\";[5] in Professor Sidgwick's\nso-called axiom, \"I ought not to prefer my own lesser good to the\ngreater good of another\";[6] in the biblical sayings, \"Thou shalt love\nthy neighbour as thyself,\"[7] and, \"Whatsoever ye would that men\nshould do to you, do ye even so to them.\"[8] The same fact is\nexpressed in the Indian Mahabharata, where it is said:--\"Let no man do\nto another that which would be repugnant to himself; this is the sum\nof righteousness; the rest is according to inclination. In refusing,\nin bestowing, in regard to pleasure and to pain, to what is agreeable\nand disagreeable, a man obtains the proper rule by regarding the case\nas like his own.\"[9] Similar words are ascribed to Confucius.[10] When\nTsze-kung asked if there is any one word which may serve as a rule of\npractice for all one's life, the Master answered, \"Is not Reciprocity\nsuch a word? What you do not want done to yourself, do not do to {103}\nothers.\" And in another utterance Confucius showed that the rule had\nfor him not only a negative, but a positive form. He said that, in the\nway of the superior man, there are four things to none of which he\nhimself had as yet attained; to serve his father as he would require\nhis son to serve him, to serve his prince as he would require his\nminister to serve him, to serve his elder brother as he would require\nhis younger brother to serve him, and to set the example in behaving\nto a friend as he would require the friend to behave to him.[11]\n\n[Footnote 3: Stuart Mill, _Utilitarianism_, p. 24.]\n\n[Footnote 4: Clarke, _Discourse concerning the Unchangeable\nObligations of Natural Religion_, p. 201.]\n\n[Footnote 5: Kant, _Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten_, sec. 2\n(_S\u00e4mmtliche Werke_, iv. 269).]\n\n[Footnote 6: Sidgwick, _Methods of Ethics_, p. 383. However, as we\nhave seen above, this so-called \"axiom\" is not a correct\nrepresentation of the disinterestedness of moral emotions.]\n\n[Footnote 7: _Leviticus_, xix. 18. _St. Matthew_, xxii. 39.]\n\n[Footnote 8: _St. Matthew_, vii. 12. _Cf._ _St. Luke_, vi. 31.]\n\n[Footnote 9: _Mahabharata_, xiii. 5571 _sq._, in Muir, _Religious and\nMoral Sentiments, rendered from Sanskrit Writers_, p. 107. _Cf._\n_Panchatantra_, iii. (Benfey's translation, ii. 235).]\n\n[Footnote 10: _Lun Y\u00fc_, xv. 23. _Cf._ _ibid._ xii. 2; _Chung Yung_,\nxiii. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 11: _Chung Yung_, xiii. 4.]\n\nThis \"golden rule\" is not, as has been sometimes argued, a rule of\nretaliation.[12] It does not say, \"Do to others what they wish to do\nto you\"; it says, \"Do to others what you wish, or require, them to do\nto you.\" It brings home to us the fact that moral rules are general\nrules, which ought to be obeyed irrespectively of any selfish\nconsiderations. If formulated as an injunction that we should treat\nour neighbour in the same manner as we consider that he, under exactly\nsimilar circumstances, ought to treat us, it is simply identical with\nthe sentence, \"Do your duty,\" with emphasis laid on the\ndisinterestedness which is involved in the very conception of duty. So\nfar, St. Augustine was right in saying that \"Do as thou wouldst be\ndone by\" is a sentence which all nations under heaven are agreed\nupon.[13]\n\n[Footnote 12: Letourneau, _L'\u00e9volution religieuse dans les diverses\nraces humaines_, p. 553.]\n\n[Footnote 13: St. Augustine, quoted by Lilly, _Right and Wrong_, p. 106.]\n\nDisinterestedness, however, is not the only characteristic by which\nmoral indignation and approval are distinguished from other,\nnon-moral, kinds of resentment or retributive kindly emotion. It is,\nindeed, itself a form of a more comprehensive quality which\ncharacterises moral emotions--apparent impartiality. If I pronounce an\nact done to a friend or to an enemy to be either good or bad, that\nimplies that I assume it to be so independently of the fact that the\nperson to whom the act is done is my friend or my enemy. Conversely,\nif I pronounce an {104} act done by a friend or by an enemy to be good\nor bad, that implies that I assume the act to be either good or bad\nindependently of my friendly or hostile feelings towards the agent.\nAll this means that resentment and retributive kindly emotion are\nmoral emotions in so far as they are assumed by those who feel them to\nbe uninfluenced by the particular relationship in which they stand,\nboth to those who are immediately affected by the acts in question,\nand to those who perform those acts. A moral emotion, then, is tested\nby an imaginary change of the relationship between him who approves or\ndisapproves of the mode of conduct by which the emotion was evoked and\nthe parties immediately concerned, whilst the relationship between the\nparties themselves is left unaltered. At the same time it is not\nnecessary that the moral emotion should be really impartial. It is\nsufficient that it is tacitly assumed to be so, nay, even that it is\nnot knowingly partial. In attributing different rights to different\nindividuals, or classes of individuals, we are often, in reality,\ninfluenced by the relationship in which we stand to them, by personal\nsympathies and antipathies; and yet those rights may be moral rights,\nin the strict sense of the term, not mere preferences, namely, if we\nassume that any impartial judge would recognise our attribution of\nrights as just, or even if we are unaware of its partiality.\nSimilarly, when the savage censures a homicide committed upon a member\nof his own tribe, but praises one committed upon a member of another\ntribe, his censure and praise are certainly influenced by his\nrelations to the victim, or to the agent, or to both. He does not\nreason thus: it is blamable to kill a member of one's own tribe, and\nit is praiseworthy to kill a member of a foreign tribe--whether the\ntribe be mine or not. Nevertheless, his blame and his praise must be\nregarded as expressions of moral emotions.\n\nFinally, a moral emotion has a certain flavour of generality. We have\npreviously noticed that a moral judgment very frequently implies some\nvague assumption {105} that it must be shared by everybody who\npossesses both a sufficient knowledge of the case and a \"sufficiently\ndeveloped\" moral consciousness. We have seen, however, that this\nassumption is illusory. It cannot, consequently, be regarded as a\n_conditio sine qu\u00e2 non_ for a moral judgment, unless, indeed, it be\nmaintained that such a judgment, owing to its very nature, is\nnecessarily a chimera--an opinion which, to my mind, would be simply\nabsurd. But, though moral judgments cannot lay claim to universality\nor \"objectivity,\" it does not follow that they are merely individual\nestimates. Even he who fully sees their limitations must admit that,\nwhen he pronounces an act to be good or bad, he gives expression to\nsomething more than a personal opinion, that his judgment has\nreference, not only to his own feelings, but to the feelings of others\nas well. And this is true even though he be aware that his own\nconviction is not shared by those around him, nor by anybody else. He\nthen feels that it _would be_ shared if other people knew the act and\nall its attendant circumstances as well as he does himself, and if, at\nthe same time, their emotions were as refined as are his own. This\nfeeling gives to his approval or indignation a touch of generality,\nwhich belongs to public approval and public indignation, but which is\nnever found in any merely individual emotion of gratitude or\nrevenge.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe analysis of the moral emotions which has been attempted in this\nand the two preceding chapters, holds good, not only for such emotions\nas we feel on account of the conduct of others, but for such emotions\nas we feel on account of our own conduct as well. Moral\nself-condemnation is a hostile attitude of mind towards one's self as\nthe cause of pain, moral self-approval is a kindly attitude of mind\ntowards one's self as a cause of pleasure. Genuine remorse, though\nfocussed on the will of the person who feels it, involves, vaguely or\ndistinctly, some desire to suffer. The repentant man wants to think of\nthe wrong he has committed, he wants clearly to realise {106} its\nwickedness; and he wants to do this, not merely because he desires to\nbecome a better man, but because it gives him some relief to feel the\nsting in his heart. If punished for his deed, he willingly submits to\nthe punishment. The Philippine Islander, says Mr. Foreman, if he\nrecognises a fault by his own conscience, will receive a flogging\nwithout resentment or complaint, although, \"if he is not so convinced\nof the misdeed, he will await his chance to give vent to his\nrancour.\"[14] We may feel actual hatred towards ourselves, we may\ndesire to inflict bodily suffering upon ourselves as a punishment for\nwhat we have done;[15] nay, there are instances of criminals, guilty\nof capital offences, having given themselves up to the authorities in\norder to appease their consciences by suffering the penalty of the\nlaw.[16] Yet the desire to punish ourselves has a natural antagonist\nin our general aversion to pain, and this often blunts the sting of\nthe conscience. Suicide prompted by remorse, which sometimes occurs\neven among savages,[17] is to be regarded rather as a method of\nputting an end to agonies, than as a kind of self-execution; and\nbehind the self-torments of the sinner frequently lurks the hopeful\nprospect of heavenly bliss. Self-approval, again, is not merely joy at\none's own conduct, but is a kindly emotion, a friendly attitude\ntowards one's self. Such an attitude, for instance, lies at the bottom\nof the feeling that one's own conduct merits praise or reward.\n\n[Footnote 14: Foreman, _Philippine Islands_, p. 185. _Cf._ Hinde, _The\nLast of the Masai_, p. 34; Z\u00f6ller, _Das Togoland_, p. 37.]\n\n[Footnote 15: _Cf._ Jodl, _Lehrbuch der Psychologie_, p. 675.]\n\n[Footnote 16: von Feuerbach, _Aktenm\u00e4ssige Darstellung merkw\u00fcrdiger\nVerbrechen_, i. 249; ii. 473, 479 _sq._ von Lasaulx, _S\u00fchnopfer der\nGriechen und R\u00f6mer_, p. 6.]\n\n[Footnote 17: See _infra_, on Suicide.]\n\nNot every form of self-reproach or of self-approval is a moral\nemotion--no more than is every form of resentment or retributive\nkindly emotion towards other persons. We may be angry with ourselves\non account of some act of ours which is injurious to our own\ninterests. He who has lost at play may be as vexed at himself as he\nwho has {107} cheated at play, and the egoist may bitterly reproach\nhimself for having yielded to a momentary impulse of benevolence, or\neven to conscience itself. In order to be moral emotions, our\nself-condemnation and self-approval must present the same\ncharacteristics as make resentment and retributive kindliness moral\nemotions when they are felt with reference to the conduct of other\npeople. A person does not feel remorse when he reproaches himself from\nan egoistic motive, or when he afterwards regrets that he has\nsacrificed the interests of his children to the impartial claim of\njustice. Nor does a person feel moral self-approval when he is pleased\nwith himself for having committed an act which he recognises as\nselfish or unjust. And besides being disinterested and apparently\nimpartial, remorse and moral self-approval have a flavour of\ngenerality. As Professor Baldwin remarks, moral approval or\ndisapproval, not only of other people, but of one's self, \"is never at\nits best except when it is accompanied, in the consciousness which has\nit, with the knowledge or belief that it is also socially shared.\"[18]\nIndeed, almost inseparable from the moral judgments which we pass on\nour own conduct seems to be the image of an impartial outsider who\nacts as our judge.\n\n[Footnote 18: Baldwin, _Social and Ethical Interpretation in Mental\nDevelopment_, p. 314.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V\n\nTHE ORIGIN OF THE MORAL EMOTIONS\n\n\nWE have found that resentment and retributive kindly emotion are\neasily explicable from their usefulness, both of them having a\ntendency to promote the interests of the individuals who feel them.\nThis explanation also holds good for the moral emotions, in so far as\nthey are retributive emotions: it accounts for the hostile attitude of\nmoral disapproval towards the cause of pain, and for the friendly\nattitude of moral approval towards the cause of pleasure. But it still\nremains for us to discover the origin of those elements in the moral\nemotions by which they are distinguished from other, non-moral,\nretributive emotions. First, how shall we explain their\ndisinterestedness?\n\nWe have to distinguish between different classes of conditions under\nwhich disinterested retributive emotions arise. In the first place, we\nmay feel disinterested resentment, or disinterested retributive kindly\nemotion, on account of an injury inflicted, or a benefit conferred,\nupon another person with whose pain, or pleasure, we sympathise, and\nin whose welfare we take a kindly interest. Our retributive emotions\nare, of course, always reactions against pain, or pleasure, felt by\nourselves; this holds true for the moral emotions as well as for\nrevenge and gratitude. The question to be answered, then, is, Why\nshould we, quite disinterestedly, feel pain calling forth indignation\nbecause our neighbour is hurt, and pleasure calling forth approval\nbecause he is benefited?\n\n{109} That a certain act causes pleasure or pain to the by-stander is\npartly due to the close association which exists between these\nfeelings and their outward expressions. The sight of a happy face\ntends to produce some degree of pleasure in him who sees it; the sight\nof the bodily signs of suffering tends to produce a feeling of pain.\nIn either case the feeling of the spectator is the result of a process\nof reproduction, the perception of the physical manifestation of the\nfeeling recalling the feeling itself on account of the established\nassociation between them.\n\nSympathetic pain or pleasure may also be the result of an association\nbetween cause and effect, between the cognition of a certain act or\nsituation and the feeling generally produced by this act or situation.\nA blow may cause pain to the spectator before he has witnessed its\neffect on the victim. The sympathetic feeling is of course stronger\nwhen both kinds of association concur in producing it, than when it is\nthe result of only one. As Adam Smith observes, \"general lamentations\nwhich express nothing but the anguish of the sufferer, create rather a\ncuriosity to inquire into his situation, along with some disposition\nto sympathise with him, than any actual sympathy that is very\nsensible.\"[1] On the other hand, the sympathy which springs from an\nassociation between cause and effect is much enhanced by the\nperception of outward signs of pleasure or pain in the individual with\nwhom we sympathise.\n\n[Footnote 1: Adam Smith, _Theory of Moral Sentiments_, p. 7.]\n\nBut the sympathetic feeling which results from association alone is\nnot what is generally understood by sympathy. Arising merely from the\nhabitual connection of certain cognitions with certain feelings in the\nexperience of the spectator, it is, strictly speaking, not at all\nconcerned with the _feelings_ of the other person. It is not a reflex\nof what he feels--which, indeed, is a matter of complete\nindifference--and the activity which it calls forth is thoroughly\nselfish. If it is a feeling of pain, the spectator naturally, for his\nown sake, tries to get rid of it; but this {110} may be done by\nturning the back upon the sufferer, and looking out for some\ndiversion. The sympathetic feeling which springs from association\nalone, may also produce a benevolent or hostile reaction against its\nimmediate cause: the smiling face often evokes a kindly feeling\ntowards the smiler, and \"the sight of suffering often directs\nirritation against the sufferer.\"[2] In such cases it is the other\nperson himself, rather than his benefactor or his tormentor, that is\nregarded as cause by the sympathiser. When based on association alone,\nthe sympathetic feeling thus lacks the most vital characteristic of\nsympathy, in the popular sense of the term: it lacks kindliness.[3]\n\n[Footnote 2: Leslie Stephen, _Science of Ethics_, p. 243.]\n\n[Footnote 3: The difference between sympathy and kindly (\"tender\")\nemotion has been commented upon by Professor Ribot (_Psychology of the\nEmotions_, p. 233), and by Mr. Shand, in his excellent chapter on the\n'Sources of Tender Emotion,' in Stout's _Groundwork of Psychology_,\np. 198 _sqq._]\n\nSympathy, in the ordinary use of the word, requires the co-operation\nof the altruistic sentiment or affection--a disposition of mind which\nis particularly apt to display itself as kindly emotion towards other\nbeings. This sentiment,[4] only, induces us to take a kindly interest\nin the feelings of our neighbours. It involves a tendency, or\nwillingness, and, when strongly developed, gives rise to an eager\ndesire, to sympathise with their pains and pleasures. Under its\ninfluence, our sympathetic feeling is no longer a mere matter of\nassociation; we take an active part in its production, we direct our\nattention to any circumstance which we believe may affect the feelings\nof the person whom we love, to any external manifestation of his\nemotions. We are anxious to find out his joys and sorrows, so as to be\nable to rejoice with him and to suffer with him, and, especially, when\nhe stands in need of it, to console or to help him. For the altruistic\nsentiment is not merely willingness to sympathise; it is above all a\nconative {111} disposition to do good. The latter aptitude must be\nregarded rather as the cause than as the result of the former;\naffection is not, as Adam Smith maintained,[5] merely habitual\nsympathy, or its necessary consequence. It is true that sympathetic\npain, unaided by kindliness, may induce a person to relieve the\nsuffering of his neighbour, instead of shutting his eyes to it; but\nthen he does so, not out of regard to the feelings of the sufferer,\nbut simply to free himself of a painful cognition. Nor must it be\nsupposed that the altruistic sentiment prompts to assistance only by\nstrengthening the sympathetic feeling. The sight of the wounded\ntraveller may have caused no less pain to the Pharisee than to the\ngood Samaritan; yet it would have been impossible for the Samaritan to\ndismiss his pain by going away, since he felt a desire to assist the\nwounded, and his desire would have been left ungratified if he had not\nstopped by the wayside. To the egoist, the relief offered to the\nsufferer is a means of suppressing the sympathetic pain; to the\naltruist, the sympathetic pain is, so to say, a means of giving\nrelief. The altruist wants to know, to feel the pain of his neighbour,\nbecause he desires to help him. Why are the most kind-hearted people\noften the most cheerful, if not because they think of alleviating the\nmisery of their fellow-creatures, instead of indulging in the\nsympathetic pain which it evokes?\n\n[Footnote 4: I use the word \"sentiment\" in the sense proposed by Mr.\nShand, in his article, 'Character and the Emotions,' in _Mind_, N.S.\nv. 203 _sqq._, and adopted by Professor Stout, _op. cit._ p. 221\n_sqq._ Sentiments cannot be actually felt at any one moment; \"they are\ncomplex mental dispositions, and may, as divers occasions arise, give\nbirth to the whole gamut of the emotions\" (_ibid._ p. 223 _sq._).]\n\n[Footnote 5: Adam Smith, _op. cit._ p. 323.]\n\nIt is obvious, then, that sympathy aided by the altruistic\nsentiment--sympathy in the common sense--tends to produce\ndisinterested retributive emotions. When we to some extent identify,\nas it were, our feelings with those of our neighbour, we naturally\nlook upon any person who causes him pleasure or pain as the cause of\nour sympathetic pleasure or pain, and are apt to experience towards\nthat person a retributive emotion similar in kind, if not always in\ndegree, to the emotion which we feel when we are ourselves benefited\nor injured. In all animal species which possess altruistic sentiments\nin some form or other, we may be sure to find sympathetic resentment\nas their accompaniment. {112} A mammalian mother is as hostile to the\nenemy of her young as to her own enemy. Among social animals whose\ngregarious instinct has developed into social affection,[6]\nsympathetic resentment is felt towards the enemy of any member of the\ngroup; they mutually defend each other, and this undoubtedly involves\nsome degree of sympathetic anger. With reference to animals in\nconfinement and domesticated animals, many striking instances of this\nemotion might be quoted, even in cases when injuries have been\ninflicted on members of different species to which they have become\nattached. Professor Romanes' terrier, \"whenever or wherever he saw a\nman striking a dog, whether in the house, or outside, near at hand or\nat a distance, . . . . used to rush in to interfere, snarling and\nsnapping in a most threatening way.\"[7] Darwin makes mention of a\nlittle American monkey in the Zoological Gardens of London which, when\nseeing a great baboon attack his friend, the keeper, rushed to the\nrescue and by screams and bites so distracted the baboon, that the man\nwas able to escape.[8] The dog who flies at any one who strikes, or\neven touches, his master, is a very familiar instance of sympathetic\nresentment. The Rev. Charles Williams mentions a dog at Liverpool who\nsaved a cat from the hands of some young ruffians who were maltreating\nit: he rushed in among the boys, barked furiously at them, terrified\nthem into flight, and carried the cat off in his mouth, bleeding and\nalmost senseless, to his kennel, where he laid it on the straw, and\nnursed it.[9] In man, sympathetic resentment begins at an early age.\nProfessor Sully mentions a little boy under four who was indignant at\nany picture where an animal suffered.[10]\n\n[Footnote 6: The connection between social affection and the\ngregarious instinct will be discussed in a subsequent chapter.]\n\n[Footnote 7: Romanes, _Animal Intelligence_, p. 440.]\n\n[Footnote 8: Darwin, _Descent of Man_, p. 103. _Cf._ Fisher, in _Revue\nScientifique_, xxxiii. 618. A curious instance of a terrier \"avenging\"\nthe death of another terrier, his inseparable friend, is mentioned by\nCaptain Medwin (_Angler in Wales_, ii. 162-164, 197, 216\n_sq._).]\n\n[Footnote 9: Williams, _Dogs and their Ways_, p. 43.]\n\n[Footnote 10: Sully, _Studies of Childhood_, p. 250.]\n\nThe altruistic sentiments of mankind will be treated at {113} length\nin subsequent chapters. We shall find reason to believe that not only\nmaternal, but to some extent, paternal and conjugal affection,\nprevailed in the human race from ancient times, and that social\naffection arose in those days when the conditions of life became\nfavourable to an expansion of the early family, when the chief\nobstacle to a gregarious life--scarcity of food--was overcome, and\nsociality, being an advantage to man, became his habit. There are\nstill savages who live in families rather than in tribes, but we know\nof no people among whom social organisation outside the family is\ntotally wanting. Later discoveries only tend to confirm Darwin's\nstatement that, though single families or only two or three together,\nroam the solitudes of some savage lands, they always hold friendly\nrelations with other families inhabiting the same district; such\nfamilies occasionally meeting in council and uniting for their common\ndefence.[11] But as a general rule, to which there are few exceptions,\nthe lower races live in communities larger than family groups, and all\nthe members of the community are united with one another by common\ninterests and common feelings. Of the harmony, mutual good-will, and\nsense of solidarity, which under normal conditions prevail in these\nsocieties, much evidence will be adduced in following pages. Mr.\nMelville's remark with reference to some Marquesas cannibals may be\nquoted as to some extent typical. \"With them,\" he says, \"there hardly\nappeared to be any difference of opinion upon any subject whatever. .\n. . They showed this spirit of unanimity in every action of life:\neverything was done in concert and good fellowship.\"[12] When a member\nof the group is hurt, the feeling of unanimity takes the form of\npublic resentment. As Robertson observed long ago, \"in small\ncommunities, every man is touched with the injury or affront offered\nto the body of which he is a member, as if it were a personal attack\nupon his own honour or safety. The desire of revenge is communicated\nfrom breast to breast, {114} and soon kindles into rage.\"[13] Speaking\nof some Australian savages, Mr. Fison remarks:--\"To the savage, the\nwhole gens is the individual, and he is full of regard for it. Strike\nthe gens anywhere, and every member of it considers himself struck,\nand the whole body corporate rises up in arms against the\nstriker.\"[14] Nobody will deny that there is a disinterested element\nin this public resentment, even though every member of the group\nconsider the enemy of any other member to be actually his own enemy as\nwell, and, partly, hate him as such.\n\n[Footnote 11: Darwin, _op. cit._ p. 108.]\n\n[Footnote 12: Melville, _Typee_, p. 297 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 13: Robertson, _History of America_, i. 350. _Cf._\nClifford's theory of the \"tribal self\" (_Lectures and Essays_, p. 290\n_sqq._). He says (_ibid._ p. 291), \"The savage is not only hurt when\nanybody treads on his foot, but when anybody treads on his tribe.\"]\n\n[Footnote 14: Fison and Howitt, _Kamilaroi and Kurnai_, p. 170.]\n\nOur explanation of what has here been called \"sympathetic resentment,\"\nhowever, is not yet complete. This emotion, as we have seen, may be a\nreaction against sympathetic pain; but it may also be directly\nproduced by the cognition of the signs of anger. In the former case it\nis, strictly speaking, independent of the _emotion_ of the injured\nindividual; we may feel resentment on his behalf though he himself\nfeels none. In the latter case it is a reflected emotion, felt\nindependently of the cause of the original emotion of which it is a\nreflection--as when the yells and shrieks of a street dog-fight are\nheard, and dogs from all sides rush to the spot, each dog being\napparently ready to bite any of the others. In the former case, it is,\nby the medium of sympathetic pain, closely connected with the\ninflicted injury; in the latter case it may even be the reflection of\nan emotion which is itself sympathetic, and the origin of which is\nperhaps out of sight. In an infuriated crowd the one gets angry\nbecause the other is angry, and very often the question, Why? is\nhardly asked. This form of sympathetic resentment is of considerable\nimportance both as an originator and as a communicator of moral ideas.\nTo teach that a certain act is wrong is to teach that it is an object,\nand a proper object, of moral indignation, and the aim of the\ninstructor {115} is to inspire a similar indignation in the mind of\nthe pupil. An intelligent teacher tries to attain this end by\nrepresenting the act in such a light as to evoke disapproval\nindependently of any appeal to authority; but, unfortunately, in many\ncases where the duties of current morality are to be enjoined, he\ncannot do so--for a very obvious reason. Of various acts which, though\ninoffensive by themselves, are considered wrong, he can say little\nmore than that they are forbidden by God and man; and if,\nnevertheless, such acts are not only professed, but actually felt, to\nbe wrong, that is due to the fact that men are inclined to sympathise\nwith the resentment of persons for whom they feel regard. It is this\nfact that accounts for the connection between the punishment of an act\nand the consequent idea that it deserves to be punished. We shall see\nthat the punishment which society inflicts is, as a rule, an\nexpression of its moral indignation; but there are instances in which\nthe order is reversed, and in which human, or, as it may be supposed,\ndivine, punishment or anger is the cause, and moral disapproval the\neffect. Children, as everybody knows, grow up with their ideas of\nright and wrong graduated, to a great extent, according to the temper\nof the father or mother;[15] and men are not seldom, as Hobbes said,\n\"like little children, that have no other rule of good and evill\nmanners, but the correction they receive from their Parents, and\nMasters.\"[16] The case is the same with any outbreak of public\nresentment, with any punishment inflicted by society at large. However\nselfish it may be in its origin, to whatever extent it may spring from\npersonal motives, it always has a tendency to become in some degree\ndisinterested, each individual not only being angry on his own behalf,\nbut at the same time reflecting the anger of everybody else.\n\n[Footnote 15: _Cf._ Baring-Gould, _Origin and Developwent of Religious\nBelief_, i. 212.]\n\n[Footnote 16: Hobbes, _Leviathan_, i. 2, p. 76.]\n\nAny means of expressing resentment may serve as a communicator of the\nemotion. Besides punishment, language deserves special mention. Moral\ndisapproval may {116} be evoked by the very sounds of certain words,\nlike \"murder,\" \"theft,\" \"cowardice,\" and others, which not merely\nindicate the commission of certain acts, but also express the\nopprobrium attached to them. By being called a \"liar,\" a person is\nmore disgraced than by any plain statement of his untruthfulness; and\nby the use of some strong word the orator raises the indignation of a\nsympathetic audience to its pitch.\n\nAll the cases of disinterested resentment which we have hitherto\nconsidered fall under the heading of sympathetic resentment. But there\nare other cases into which sympathy does not enter at all. Resentment\nis not always caused by the infliction of an injury; it may be called\nforth by any feeling of pain traceable to a living being as its direct\nor indirect cause. Quite apart from our sympathy with the sufferings\nof others, there are many cases in which we feel hostile towards a\nperson on account of some act of his which in no way interferes with\nour interests, which conflicts with no self-regarding feeling of ours.\nThere are in the human mind what Professor Bain calls \"disinterested\nantipathies,\" sentimental aversions \"of which our fellow-beings are\nthe subjects, and on account of which we overlook our own interest\nquite as much as in displaying our sympathies and affections.\"[17]\nDifferences of taste, habit, and opinion, are particularly apt to\ncreate similar dislikes, which, as will be seen, have played a very\nprominent part in the moulding of the moral consciousness. When a\ncertain act, though harmless by itself (apart from the painful\nimpression it makes upon the spectator), fills us with disgust or\nhorror, we may feel no less inclined to inflict harm upon the agent,\nthan if he had committed an offence against person, property, or good\nname. And here, again, our resentment is sympathetically increased by\nour observing a similar disgust in others. We are easily affected by\nthe aversions and likings of our neighbours. As Tucker said, \"we grow\nto love things we perceive {117} them fond of, and contract aversions\nfrom their dislikes.\"[18]\n\n[Footnote 17: Bain, _Emotions and the Will_, p. 268.]\n\n[Footnote 18: Tucker, _Light of Nature Pursued_, i. 154.]\n\nWe have already seen that sympathy springing from an altruistic\nsentiment may produce, not only disinterested resentment, but\ndisinterested retributive kindly emotion as well. When taking a\npleasure in the benefit bestowed on our neighbour, we naturally look\nwith kindness upon the benefactor; and just as sympathetic resentment\nmay be produced by the cognition of the outward signs of resentment,\nso sympathetic retributive kindly emotion may be produced by the signs\nof retributive kindliness. Language communicates emotions by terms of\npraise, as well as by terms of condemnation; and a reward, like a\npunishment, tends to reproduce the emotion from which it sprang.\nMoreover, men have disinterested likings, as they have disinterested\ndislikes. As an instance of such likings may be mentioned the common\nadmiration of courage when felt irrespectively of the object for which\nit is displayed.\n\nHaving thus found the origin of disinterested retributive emotions, we\nhave at the same time partly explained the origin of the moral\nemotions. But, as we have seen, disinterestedness is not the sole\ncharacteristic by which moral indignation and approval are\ndistinguished from other retributive emotions: a moral emotion is\nassumed to be impartial, or, at least, is not knowingly partial, and\nit is coloured by the feeling of being publicly shared. However, the\nreal problem which we have now to solve is not how retributive\nemotions may become apparently impartial and be coloured by a feeling\nof generality, but why disinterestedness, apparent impartiality, and\nthe flavour of generality have become characteristics by which\nso-called moral emotions are distinguished from other retributive\nemotions. The solution of this problem lies in the fact that society\nis the birthplace of the moral consciousness; that the first moral\njudgments expressed, not the private emotions of isolated individuals,\nbut emotions which were {118} felt by the society at large; that\ntribal custom was the earliest rule of duty.\n\nCustoms have been defined as public habits, as the habits of a certain\ncircle, a racial or national community, a rank or class of society.\nBut whilst being a habit, custom is at the same time something else as\nwell. It not merely involves a frequent repetition of a certain mode\nof conduct, it is also a rule of conduct. As Cicero observes, the\ncustoms of a people \"are precepts in themselves.\"[19] We say that\n\"custom commands,\" or \"custom demands,\" and speak of it as \"strict\"\nand \"inexorable\"; and even when custom simply allows the commission of\na certain class of actions, it implicitly lays down the rule that such\nactions are not to be interfered with.\n\n[Footnote 19: Cicero, _De Officiis_, i. 41.]\n\nThe rule of custom is conceived of as a moral rule, which decides what\nis right and wrong.[20] \"Les loix de la conscience,\" says Montaigne,\n\"que nous disons naistre de nature, naissent de la coustume.\"[21] Mr.\nHowitt once said to a young Australian native with whom he was\nspeaking about the food prohibited during initiation, \"But if you were\nhungry and caught a female opossum, you might eat it if the old men\nwere not there.\" The youth replied, \"I could not do that; it would not\nbe right\"; and he could give no other reason than that it would be\nwrong to disregard the customs of his people.[22] Mr. Bernau says of\nthe British Guiana Indians:--\"Their moral sense of good and evil is\nentirely regulated by the customs and practices inherited from their\nforefathers. What their predecessors believed and did must have been\nright, and they deem it the height of presumption to suppose that any\ncould think and act otherwise.\"[23] The moral evil of the pagan\nGreenlanders \"was all that was contrary to laws and customs, as {119}\nregulated by the angakoks,\" and when the Danish missionaries tried to\nmake them acquainted with their own moral conceptions, the result was\nthat they \"conceived the idea of virtue and sin as what was pleasing\nor displeasing to Europeans, as according or disaccording with their\ncustoms and laws.\"[24] \"The Africans, like most heathens,\" Mr. Rowley\nobserves, \"do not regard sin, according to their idea of sin, as an\noffence against God, but simply as a transgression of the laws and\ncustoms of their country.\"[25] The Ba-Ronga call derogations of\nuniversally recognised custom _yila_, prohibited, tabooed.[26] The\nBedouins of the Euphrates \"make no appeal to conscience or the will of\nGod in their distinctions between right and wrong, but appeal only to\ncustom.\"[27] According to the laws of Manu, the custom handed down in\nregular succession since time immemorial \"is called the conduct of\nvirtuous men.\"[28] The Greek idea of the customary, [Greek:\nto\\ no/mimon], shows the close connection between morality and custom;\nand so do the words [Greek: e)/thos, \u00ea)/thos], and [Greek: e)thika/],\nthe Latin _mos_ and _moralis_, the German _Sitte_ and _Sittlichkeit_.[29]\nMoreover, in early society, customs are not only moral rules, but the\nonly moral rules ever thought of. The savage strictly complies with\nthe Hegelian command that no man must have a private conscience. The\nfollowing statement, which refers to the Tinnevelly Shanars, may be\nquoted as a typical example:--\"Solitary individuals amongst them\nrarely adopt any new opinions, or any new course of procedure. They\nfollow the multitude to do evil, and they follow the multitude to do\ngood. They think in herds.\"[30]\n\n[Footnote 20: _Cf._ Austin, _Lectures on Jurisprudence_, i. 104;\nT\u00f6nnies, 'Philosophical Terminology,' in _Mind_, N.S., viii. 304. Von\nJhering (_Zweck im Recht_, ii. 23) defines the German _Sitte_ as \"die\nim Leben des Volks sich bildende verpflichtende Gewohnheit\"; and a\nsimilar view is expressed by Wundt (_Ethik_, p. 128 _sq._).]\n\n[Footnote 21: Montaigne, _Essais_, i. 22 (_[OE]uvres_, p. 48).]\n\n[Footnote 22: Fison and Howitt, _op. cit._ p. 256 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 23: Bernau, _Missionary Labours in British Guiana_, p. 60.]\n\n[Footnote 24: Rink, _Greenland_, p. 201 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 25: Rowley, _Religion of the Africans_, p. 44.]\n\n[Footnote 26: Junod, _Ba-Ronga_, p. 477.]\n\n[Footnote 27: Blunt, _Bedouin Tribes of the Euphrates_, ii. 224.]\n\n[Footnote 28: _Laws of Manu_, ii. 18.]\n\n[Footnote 29: For the history of these words, see Wundt, _op. cit._ p.\n19 _sqq._ For other instances illustrating the moral character of\ncustom, see Maclean, _Compendium of Kafir Law and Customs_, p. 34\n(Amaxosa); Macpherson, _Memorials of Service in India_, p. 94\n(Kandhs); Kubary, _Ethnographische Beitr\u00e4ge zur Kenntniss der\nKarolinischen Inselgruppe_, i. 73 (Pelew Islanders); Smith, _Chinese\nCharacteristics_, p. 119.]\n\n[Footnote 30: Caldwell, _Tinnevelly Shanars_, p. 69.]\n\nDisobedience to custom evokes public indignation. In {120} the lower\nstages of civilisation, especially, custom is a tyrant who binds man\nin iron fetters, and who threatens the transgressor, not only with\ngeneral disgrace, but often with bodily suffering. \"To believe that\nman in a savage state is endowed with freedom either of thought or\naction,\" says Sir G. Grey, \"is erroneous in the highest degree\";[31]\nand this statement is corroborated by an array of facts from all\nquarters of the savage world.[32] Now, as the rule of custom is a\nmoral rule, the indignation aroused by its transgression is naturally\na moral emotion. Moreover, where all the duties incumbent on a man are\nexpressed in the customs of the society to which he belongs, it is\nobvious that the characteristics of moral indignation are to be sought\nfor in its connection with custom. The most salient feature of custom\nis its generality. Its transgression calls forth public indignation;\nhence the flavour of generality which characterises moral disapproval.\nCustom is fixed once for all, and takes no notice of the preferences\nof individuals. By recognising the validity of a custom, I implicitly\nadmit that the custom is equally binding for me and for you and for\nall the other members of the society. This involves disinterestedness;\nI admit that a breach of the custom is equally wrong whether I myself\nam immediately concerned in the act or not. It also involves apparent\nimpartiality; I assume that my condemnation of the act is independent\nof the relationship in which the parties concerned in it stand to me\npersonally, or, at least, I am not aware that my condemnation is\ninfluenced by any {121} such relationship. And this holds good\nwhatever be the origin of the custom. Though customs are very\nfrequently rooted in public sympathetic resentment or in public\ndisinterested aversions, they may have a selfish and partial origin as\nwell. At first the leading men of the society may have prohibited\ncertain acts because they found them disadvantageous to themselves, or\nto those with whom they particularly sympathised. Where custom is an\noppressor of women, this oppression may certainly be traced back to\nthe selfishness of men. Where custom sanctions slavery, it is\ncertainly not impartial to the slaves. Yet in the one case as in the\nother, I assume custom to be in the right, irrespectively of my own\nstation, and I even expect the women and slaves themselves to be of\nthe same opinion. Such an expectation is by no means a chimera. Under\nnormal social conditions, largely owing to men's tendency to share\nsympathetically the resentment of their superiors, the customs of a\nsociety are willingly submitted to, and recognised as right, by the\nlarge majority of its members, whatever may be their station. Among\nthe Rejangs of Sumatra, says Marsden, \"a man without property, family,\nor connections, never, in the partiality of self-love, considers his\nown life as being of equal value with that of a man of substance.\"[33]\nHowever selfish, however partial a certain rule may be, it becomes a\ntrue custom, a moral rule, as soon as the selfishness or the\npartiality of its makers is lost sight of.\n\n[Footnote 31: Grey, _Journals of Expeditions in North-West and Western\nAustralia_, ii. 217.]\n\n[Footnote 32: Tylor, 'Primitive Society,' in _Contemporary Review_,\nxxi. 706. _Idem_, _Anthropology_, p. 408 _sq._ Avebury, _Origin of\nCivilisation_, p. 466 _sqq._ Eyre, _Journals of Expeditions into\nCentral Australia_, ii. 384, 385, 388. Curr, _The Australian Race_, i.\n51. Mathew, 'Australian Aborigines,' in _Jour. and Proceed. Roy. Soc.\nN.S. Wales_, xxiii. 398. _Idem_, _Eaglehawk and Crow_, p. 93. Taplin,\n'Narrinyeri,' in Woods, _Native Tribes of South Australia_, pp. 35,\n136 _sq._ Hawtrey, 'Lengua Indians of the Paraguayan Chaco,' in _Jour.\nAnthr. Inst._ xxxi. 292. Murdoch, 'Ethnological Results of the Point\nBarrow Expedition,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ ix. 427 _sq._ (Point\nBarrow Eskimo). Holm, 'Ethnologisk Skizze af Angmagsalikerne,' in\n_Meddelelser om Gr\u00f6nland_, x. 85. Nansen, _First Crossing of\nGreenland_, ii. 295. Johnston, _British Central Africa_, p. 452. New,\n_Life, Wanderings, and Labours in Eastern Africa_, p. 110 (Wanika).\nScott Robertson, _K\u00e1firs of the Hindu-Kush_, p. 183 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 33: Marsden, _History of Sumatra_, p. 247.]\n\nIt will perhaps be argued that, by deriving the characteristics of\nmoral indignation from its connection with custom, we implicitly\ncontradict our initial assumption that moral emotions lie at the\nbottom of all moral judgments. But it is not so. Custom is a moral\nrule only on account of the indignation called forth by its\ntransgression. In its ethical aspect it is nothing but a\ngeneralisation of emotional tendencies, applied to certain modes of\nconduct, and transmitted from generation to generation. Public\nindignation lies at the bottom of it. In its capacity {122} of a rule\nof duty, custom, _mos_, is derived from the emotion to which it gave\nits name.\n\nAs public indignation is the prototype of moral disapproval, so public\napproval, expressed in public praise, is the prototype of moral\napproval. Like public indignation, public approval is characterised by\na flavour of generality, by disinterestedness, by apparent\nimpartiality. But of these two emotions public indignation, being at\nthe root of custom and leading to the infliction of punishment, is by\nfar the more impressive. Hence it is not surprising that the term\n\"moral\" is etymologically connected with _mos_, which always implies\nthe existence of a social rule the transgression of which evokes\npublic indignation. Only by analogy it has come to be applied to the\nemotion of approval as well.\n\nThough taking their place in the system of human emotions as public\nemotions felt by the society at large, moral disapproval and approval\nhave not always remained inseparably connected with the feelings of\nany special society. The unanimity of opinion which originally\ncharacterised the members of the same social unit was disturbed by its\nadvancement in civilisation. Individuals arose who found fault with\nthe moral ideas prevalent in the community to which they belonged,\ncriticising those ideas on the basis of their own individual feelings.\nSuch rebels are certainly no less justified in speaking in the name of\nmorality true and proper, than is society itself. The emotions from\nwhich their opposition against public opinion springs may be, in\nnature, exactly similar to the approval or disapproval felt by the\nsociety at large, though they are called forth by different facts or,\notherwise, differ from these emotions in degree. They may present the\nsame disinterestedness and apparent impartiality--indeed, dissent from\nthe established moral ideas largely rises from the conviction that the\napparent impartiality of public feelings is an illusion. As will be\nseen, the evolution of the moral consciousness involves a progress in\nimpartiality and justice; it tends towards an equalisation {123} of\nrights, towards an expansion of the circle within which the same moral\nrules are held applicable; and this process is in no small degree\neffected by the efforts made by high-minded individuals to raise\npublic opinion to their own standard of right. Nay, as we have already\nnoticed, individual moral feelings do not even lack that flavour of\ngenerality which characterises the resentment and approval felt\nunanimously by a body of men. Though, perhaps, persecuted by his own\npeople as an outcast, the moral dissenter does not regard himself as\nthe advocate of a mere private opinion.[34] Even when standing alone,\nhe feels that his conviction is shared at least by an ideal society,\nby all those who see the matter as clearly as he does himself, and who\nare animated with equally wide sympathies, an equally broad sense of\njustice. Thus the moral emotions remain to the last public\nemotions--if not in reality, then as an ideal.\n\n[Footnote 34: _Cf._ Pollock, _Essays in Jurisprudence and Ethics_,\np. 309.]\n\nThe fact that the earliest moral emotions were public emotions implies\nthat the original form of the moral consciousness cannot, as is often\nasserted, have been the individual's own conscience. Dr. Martineau's\nobservation, that the inner springs of other men's actions may be read\noff only by inference from our own experience, by no means warrants\nhis conclusion that the moral consciousness is at its origin engaged\nin self-estimation, instead of circuitously reaching this end through\na prior critique upon our fellow-men.[35] The moral element which may\nbe contained in the emotion of self-reproach or self-approval, is\ngenerally to such an extent mixed up with other and non-moral\nelements, that it can be disentangled only by a careful process of\nabstraction, guided by the feelings of other people with reference to\nour conduct or by our own feelings with reference to the conduct of\nothers. The moral emotion of remorse presupposes some notion of right\nand wrong, and the application of this notion to one's own conduct.\nHence it could never have {124} been distinguished as a special form\nof, or element in, the wider emotion of self-reproach, unless the idea\nof morality had been previously derived from another source. The\nsimilarity between regret and remorse is so close, that in certain\nEuropean languages there is only one word for both.[36]\n\n[Footnote 35: Martineau, _Types of Ethical Theory_, ii. 29 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 36: As, in Swedish, the word _\u00e5nger_.]\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nFrom what has been said above it is obvious that moral resentment is\nof extreme antiquity in the human race, nay, that the germ of it is\nfound even in the lower animal world, among social animals capable of\nfeeling sympathetic resentment. The origin of custom as a moral rule\nno doubt lies in a very remote period of human history. We have no\nknowledge of a savage people without customs, and, as will be seen\nsubsequently, savages often express their indignation in a very\nunmistakable manner when their customs are transgressed. Various data\nprove that the lower races have some feeling of justice, the flower of\nall moral feelings. And the supposition that remorse is unknown among\nthem,[37] is not only unfounded, but contradicted by facts. Indeed,\ngenuine remorse is so hidden an emotion even among ourselves, that it\ncannot be expected to be very conspicuous among savages. As we have\nseen, it requires a certain power of abstraction, as well as great\nimpartiality of feeling, and must therefore be sought for at the\nhighest reaches of the moral consciousness rather than at its lowest\ndegrees. But to suppose that savages are entirely without a conscience\nis quite contrary to what we may infer from the great regard in which\nthey hold their customs, as also contrary to the direct statements of\ntravellers who have taken some pains to examine the matter. The answer\ngiven by the young Australian when asked by Mr. Howitt whether he\nmight not eat a female opossum if the old men were not present,[38]\ncertainly indicates conscientious respect for a moral rule, and is, as\nMr. Fison observes, \"a striking instance of that 'moral {125} feeling'\nwhich Sir John Lubbock denies to savages.\"[39] Dr. H\u00fcbbe-Schleiden\nasserts that, among the people whom he had in his service, he found\nthe Negroes, in their sense of duty, not inferior, but rather superior\nto the Europeans.[40] Mr. New says of the Wanika:--\"Conscience lives\nin them as the vicegerent of Almighty God, and is ever excusing or\nelse accusing them. It may be blunted, hardened, resisted, and largely\nsuppressed, but there it is.\"[41] M. Arbousset once desired some\nBechuanas to tell him whether the blacks had a conscience. \"Yes, all\nhave one,\" they said in reply. \"And what does it say to them?\" \"It is\nquiet when they do well and torments them when they sin.\" \"What do you\ncall sin?\" \"The theft, which is committed trembling, and the murder\nfrom which a man purifies and re-purifies himself, but which always\nleaves remorse.\"[42] Mr. Washington Matthews refers to a passage in a\nNavaho story which \"shows us that he who composed this tale knew what\nthe pangs of remorse might be, even for an act not criminal, as we\nconsider it, but merely ungenerous and unfilial.\"[43]\n\n\n[Footnote 37: Avebury, _Origin of Civilisation_, pp. 421, 426.]\n\n[Footnote 38: See _supra_, p. 118.]\n\n[Footnote 39: Fison and Howitt, _op. cit._ p. 257 n.]\n\n[Footnote 40: H\u00fcbbe-Schleiden, _Ethiopien_, p. 184 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 41: New, _op. cit._ p. 96.]\n\n[Footnote 42: Arbousset and Daumas, _Exploratory Tour to the\nNorth-East of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope_, p. 322.]\n\n[Footnote 43: Matthews, 'Study of Ethics among the Lower Races,' in\n_Journal of American Folk-Lore_, xii. 7.]\n\nA different opinion as to the existence of moral feelings among\nsavages has been expressed by Lord Avebury. To him even modern savages\nseem to be \"almost entirely wanting in moral feeling\"; and he says\nthat he has \"been forced to this conclusion, not only by the direct\nstatements of travelers but by the general tenor of their remarks, and\nespecially by the remarkable absence of repentance and remorse among\nthe lower races of men.\"[44] The importance of the subject renders\n{126} it necessary to scrutinise the facts which Lord Avebury has\nadduced in support of his conclusion.\n\n[Footnote 44: Avebury, _op. cit._ pp. 414, 426. Lord Avebury quotes\nBurton's statement that in Eastern Africa, as also among the Yoruba\nnegroes, conscience does not exist, and that \"repentance\" expresses\nregret for missed opportunities of mortal crime. Speaking of the stage\nof savagery represented by the Baka\u00efri, Dr. von den Steinen likewise\nobserves (_Unter den Naturv\u00f6lkern Zentral-Brasiliens_, p. 351),\n\"Goodness and badness exist only in the crude sense of doing to others\nwhat is agreeable or disagreeable, but the moral consciousness, and\nthe ideal initiative, influenced neither by prospect of reward nor\nfear of punishment, are entirely lacking.\" Lippert maintains\n(_Kulturgeschichte der Menschheit_, i. 27) \"dass sich das Gewissen\nbeim Naturmenschen nicht als 'Selbsttadel,' sondern nur als Furcht\nzeigt.\"]\n\nMr. Neighbors states that, among the Comanches of Texas, \"no\nindividual action is considered a crime, but every man acts for\nhimself according to his own judgment, unless some superior power--for\ninstance, that of a popular chief--should exercise authority over\nhim.\" Another writer says, \"The Redskin has no moral sense whatever.\"\nAmong the Basutos, according to Casalis, morality \"depends so entirely\nupon social order that all political disorganisation is immediately\nfollowed by a state of degeneracy, which the re-establishment of order\nalone can rectify.\" Similar accounts are given as regards Central\nAfrica and some other places. Thus at Jenna, and in the surrounding\ndistricts, \"whenever a town is deprived of its chief, the inhabitants\nacknowledge no law--anarchy, troubles, and confusion immediately\nprevail, and till a successor is appointed all labour is at an end.\"\nThe Damaras \"seem to have no perceptible notion of right or wrong.\"\nThe Tasmanians were \"without any moral views and impressions.\" Eyre\nsays of the Australians that they have \"no moral sense of what is just\nand equitable in the abstract\"; and a missionary had very great\ndifficulty in conveying to those natives any idea of sin. The Kacharis\nhad \"in their own language no words for sin, for piety, for prayer,\nfor repentance\"; and of another of the aboriginal tribes of India Mr.\nCampbell remarks that they \"are . . . said to be without moral sense.\"\nLord Avebury in this connection even quotes a statement to the effect\nthat the expressions which the Tonga Islanders have for ideas like\nvice and injustice \"are equally applicable to other things.\" The South\nAmerican Indians of the Gran Chaco are said by the missionaries to\n\"make no distinction between right and wrong, and have therefore\nneither fear nor hope of any present or future punishment or reward,\nnor any mysterious terror of some supernatural power.\" Finally, Lord\nAvebury observes that religion, except in the more advanced races, has\nno moral aspect or influence, that the deities are almost invariably\nregarded as evil, and that the belief in a future state is not at\nfirst associated with reward or punishment.[45]\n\n[Footnote 45: Avebury, _op. cit._ p. 417 _sqq._]\n\nMany of the facts referred to by Lord Avebury do not at all presuppose\nthe absence of moral feelings. It is difficult to see why the\nmalevolence of gods should prevent men from having notions of right\nand wrong, and we know from the Old Testament itself that there may be\na moral law without Paradise {127} and Hell. The statement concerning\nthe Comanches only implies that, among them, individual freedom is\ngreat; whilst the social disorder which prevails among various peoples\nat times of political disorganisation indicates that the cohesiveness\nof the political aggregate is weak, as well as a certain discrepancy\nbetween moral ideas and moral practice. In Morocco, also, the death of\na Sultan is immediately followed by almost perfect anarchy, and yet\nthe people recognise both the moral tenets of the Koran and the still\nmore stringent tenets of their ancient customs. As to the Basutos,\nCasalis expressly states that they have the idea of moral evil, and\nrepresent it in their language by words which mean ugliness, or\ndamage, or debt, or incapacity;[46] and M. Arbousset once heard a\nBasuto say, on an unjust judgment being pronounced, \"The judge is\npowerful, therefore we must be silent; if he were weak, we should all\ncry out about his injustice.\"[47] Moreover, a people may be\nunconscious of what is just \"in the abstract,\" and of moral \"notions,\"\nin the strict sense of the term, and at the same time, in concrete\ncases, distinguish between right and wrong, just and unjust. Of the\nWestern Australians, Mr. Chauncy expressly says that they have a keen\nsense of justice, and mentions an instance of it;[48] whilst our\nlatest authorities on the Central Australians observe that, though\ntheir moral code differs radically from ours, \"it cannot be denied\nthat their conduct is governed by it, and that any known breaches are\ndealt with both surely and severely.\"[49] As regards the Tonga\nIslanders, Mariner states that \"their ideas of honour and justice do\nnot very much differ from ours except in degree, they considering some\nthings more honourable than we should, and others much less so\"; and\nin another place he says that \"the notions of the Tonga people, in\nrespect to honour and justice . . . are tolerably well defined, steady\nand universal,\" though not always acted upon.[50] The statement that\nthe American Indians have \"no moral sense whatever,\" sounds very\nstrange when compared with what is known about their social and moral\nlife; Buchanan, for instance, asserts that they \"have a strong innate\nsense of justice.\"[51] Of course, there may be diversity of opinion as\nto what constitutes the \"moral sense\"; if the conception of sin or\nother theological notions are regarded as essential to it, it is\nprobably {128} wanting in a large portion of mankind, and not only in\nthe least civilised. When missionaries or travellers deny to certain\nsavages moral feelings and ideas, they seem chiefly to mean feelings\nor ideas similar to their own.\n\n[Footnote 46: Casalis, _Basutos_, p. 304.]\n\n[Footnote 47: Arbousset and Daumas, _op. cit._ p. 389.]\n\n[Footnote 48: Brough Smyth, _Aborigines of Victoria_, ii. 228.]\n\n[Footnote 49: Spencer and Gillen, _Native Tribes of Central\nAustralia_, p. 46.]\n\n[Footnote 50: Mariner, _Natives of the Tonga Islands_, ii. 159, 163.]\n\n[Footnote 51: Buchanan, _Sketches of the History, &c., of the North\nAmerican Indians_, p. 158.]\n\nOf many savage and barbarous peoples it is directly affirmed that they\nhave a sense of justice. Mr. Man says concerning the Andaman\nIslanders, \"Certain traits which have been noticeable in their\ndealings with us would give colour to the belief that they are not\naltogether lacking in the sense of honour, and have some faint idea of\nthe meaning of justice.\"[52] Colonel Dalton states that, among the\nKorw\u00e1s on the highlands of Sirg\u00faja, when several persons are\nimplicated in one offence, he has found them \"most anxious that to\neach should be ascribed his fair share of it, and no more, the oldest\nof the party invariably taking on himself the chief responsibility as\nleader or instigator, and doing his utmost to exculpate as\nunaccountable agents the young members of the gang.\"[53] The Aleuts,\naccording to Veniaminof, are \"naturally inclined to be just,\" and feel\ndeeply undeserved injuries.[54] Kolben, who is nowadays recognised as\na good authority,[55] wrote of the Hottentots, \"The strictness and\ncelerity of the Hottentot justice are things in which they outshine\nall Christendom.\"[56] Missionaries have wondered that, among the\nZulus, \"in the absence for ages of all revealed truth and all proper\nreligious instruction, there should still remain so much of mental\nintegrity, so much ability to discern truth and justice, and withal so\nmuch regard for these principles in their daily intercourse with one\nanother.\"[57] Z\u00f6ller ascribes to the Negro a well-developed feeling of\njustice. \"No European,\" he says, \"at least no European child, could\ndiscriminate so keenly between just and unjust punishment.\"[58] Mr.\nHinde observes:--\"One of the most marked characteristics of black\npeople is their keen perception of justice. They do not resent merited\npunishment where it is coupled with justice upon other matters. The\nMasai have their sense of justice particularly strongly\ndeveloped.\"[59] Dieffenbach writes of the Maoris, \"There is a high\nnatural sense of justice amongst them; {129} and it is from us that\nthey have learnt that many forbidden things can be done with impunity,\nif they can only be kept secret.\"[60] Justice is a virtue which always\ncommands respect among the Bedouins, and \"injustice on the part of\nthose in power is almost impossible. Public opinion at once asserts\nitself; and the Sheykh, who should attempt to override the law, would\nspeedily find himself deserted.\"[61]\n\n[Footnote 52: Man, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xii. 92.]\n\n[Footnote 53: Dalton, _Descriptive Ethnology of Bengal_, p. 230.]\n\n[Footnote 54: Veniaminof, quoted by Dall, _Alaska_, p. 398.]\n\n[Footnote 55: Theophilus Hahn remarks (_The Supreme Being of the\nKhoi-Khoi_, p. 40) that Kolben's reports have been doubted by European\nwriters without any good reason.]\n\n[Footnote 56: Kolben, _Present State of the Cape of Good Hope_,\ni. 301. _Cf._ _ibid._ i. 339.]\n\n[Footnote 57: Quoted by Tyler, _Forty Years among the Zulus_, p. 197.]\n\n[Footnote 58: Z\u00f6ller, _Kamerun_, ii. 92. _Cf._ _Idem_, _Das Togoland_,\np. 37.]\n\n[Footnote 59: Hinde, _The Last of the Masai_, p. 34. _Cf._ Foreman,\n_Philippine Islands_, p. 185.]\n\n[Footnote 60: Dieffenbach, _Travels in New Zealand_, ii. 106.]\n\n[Footnote 61: Blunt, _Bedouin Tribes of the Euphrates_, ii. 224 _sqq._]\n\nMuch less conspicuous than the emotion of public resentment is the\nemotion of public approval. These public emotions are largely of a\nsympathetic character, and, whilst a tendency to sympathetic\nresentment is always involved in the sentiment of social affection, a\ntendency to sympathetic retributive kindly emotion is not. Among the\nlower animals this latter emotion seems hardly to occur at all, and in\nmen it is often deplorably defective. Resentment towards an enemy is\nitself, as a rule, a much stronger emotion than retributive kindly\nemotion towards a friend. And, as for the sympathetic forms of these\nemotions, it is not surprising that the altruistic sentiment is more\nreadily moved by the sight of pain than by the sight of pleasure,[62]\nconsidering that its fundamental object is to be a means of protection\nfor the species. Moreover, sympathetic retributive kindliness has\npowerful rivals in the feelings of jealousy and envy, which tend to\nmake the individual hostile both towards him who is the object of a\nbenefit and towards him who bestows it. As an ancient writer observes,\n\"many suffer with their friends when the friends are in distress, but\nare envious of them when they prosper.\"[63] But though these\ncircumstances are a hindrance to the rise of retributive kindly\nemotions of a sympathetic kind, they do not prevent public approval in\na case when the whole society profits by a benefit, nor have they any\nbearing on those disinterested instinctive likings of which I have\nspoken above. I think, then, we may {130} safely conclude that public\npraise and moral approval occurred, to some degree, even in the\ninfancy of human society. It will appear from numerous facts recorded\nin following chapters, that the moral consciousness of modern savages\ncontains not only condemnation, but praise.\n\n[Footnote 62: _Cf._ Jodl, _Lehrbuch der Psychologie_, p. 686.]\n\n[Footnote 63: Schmidt, _Ethik der alten Griechen_, i. 259.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI\n\nANALYSIS OF THE PRINCIPAL MORAL CONCEPTS\n\n\nWE have assumed that the moral concepts are essentially\ngeneralisations of tendencies in certain phenomena to call forth moral\nemotions. We have further assumed that there are two kinds of moral\nemotions: indignation and approval. If these assumptions hold good,\neither indignation or approval must be at the bottom of every moral\nconcept. That such is really the case will, I think, become evident\nfrom the present chapter, in which the principal of those concepts\nwill be analysed.\n\nOur analysis will be concerned with moral concepts formed by the\ncivilised mind. Whilst the most representative of English terms for\nmoral estimates have equivalents in the other European languages, I do\nnot take upon myself to decide to what extent they have equivalents in\nnon-European tongues. That all existing peoples, even the very lowest,\nhave moral emotions is as certain as that they have customs, and there\ncan be no doubt that they give expression to those emotions in their\nspeech. But it is another question how far their emotions have led to\nsuch generalisations as are implied in moral concepts. Concerning the\nFuegians M. Hyades observes, \"Les id\u00e9es abstraites sont chez eux \u00e0 peu\npr\u00e8s nulles. Il est difficile de d\u00e9finir exactement ce qu'ils\nappellent un homme bon et un homme m\u00e9chant; mais \u00e0 coup s\u00fbr ils n'ont\npas la notion de ce qui est bon ou mauvais, abstraction faite de\nl'individu ou de l'objet auquel ils appliqueraient l'un ou l'autre\n{132} de ces attributs.\"[1] The language of the Californian Karok,\nthough rich in its vocabulary, is said to possess no equivalent for\n\"virtue.\"[2] In the aboriginal tongues of the highlanders of Central\nIndia \"there seem to be no expressions for abstract ideas, the few\nsuch which they possess being derived from the Hind\u00ed. . . . . The\nnomenclature of religious ceremony, of moral qualities, and of nearly\nall the arts of life they possess, are all Hind\u00ed.\"[3] On a strict\nexamination of the language of the Tonga Islanders, Mariner could\ndiscover \"no words essentially expressive of some of the higher\nqualities of human merit, as virtue, justice, humanity; nor of the\ncontrary, as vice, injustice, cruelty, &c. They have indeed\nexpressions for these ideas,\" he adds, but these expressions \"are\nequally applicable to other things. To express a virtuous or good man,\nthey would say, _tangata lill\u00e9_, a good man, or _tangata loto lill\u00e9_,\na man with a good mind; but the word lill\u00e9, good (unlike our word\nvirtuous), is equally applicable to an axe, canoe, or anything\nelse.\"[4] Of the Australian natives about Botany Bay and Port Jackson\nCollins wrote, \"That they have ideas of a distinction between good and\nbad is evident from their having terms in their language significant\nof these qualities.\" A fish of which they never ate, was _wee-re_, or\nbad, whereas the kangaroo was _bood-yer-re_, or good; and these\nexpressions were used not only for qualities which they perceived by\ntheir senses, but for all kinds of badness and goodness, and were the\nonly terms they had for wrong and right. \"Their enemies were wee-re;\ntheir friends bood-yer-re. On our speaking of cannibalism, they\nexpressed great horror at the mention, and said it was wee-re. On\nseeing any of our people punished or reproved for ill-treating them,\nthey expressed their approbation, and said it was bood-yer-re, it was\nright.\"[5]\n\n[Footnote 1: Hyades and Deniker, _Mission scientifique du Cap Horn_,\nvii. 251.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Powers, _Tribes of California_, p. 22.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Forsyth, _Highlands of Central India_, p. 139.]\n\n[Footnote 4: Mariner, _Natives of the Tonga Islands_, ii. 147 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 5: Collins, _English Colony in New South Wales_, i. 548 _sq._]\n\n{133} Considering, moreover, that even the European languages make use\nof such general terms as \"good\" and \"bad\" for the purpose of\nexpressing moral qualities, it seems likely that, originally, moral\nconcepts were not clearly differentiated from other more comprehensive\ngeneralisations, and that they assumed a more definite shape only by\nslow degrees. At the same time we must not expect to find the\nbeginning of this process reflected in the vocabularies of languages.\nThere is every reason to believe that a savage practically\ndistinguishes between the \"badness\" of a man and the \"badness\" of a\npiece of food, although he may form no clear idea of the distinction.\nAs Professor Wundt observes, \"the phenomena of language do not admit\nof direct translation back again into ethical processes: the ideas\nthemselves are different from their vehicles of expression, and here\nas everywhere the external mark is later than the internal act for\nwhich it stands.\"[6] Language is a rough generaliser; even superficial\nresemblance between different phenomena often suffices to establish\nlinguistic identity between them. Compare the rightness of a line with\nthe rightness of conduct, the wrongness of an opinion with the\nwrongness of an act. And notice the different significations given to\nthe verb \"ought\" in the following sentences:--\"They ought to be in\ntown by this time, as the train left Paris last night\"; \"If you wish\nto be healthy you ought to rise early\"; \"You ought always to speak the\ntruth.\" Though it may be shown that in these statements the predicate\n\"ought\" signifies something which they all have in common--the\nreference to a rule,[7]--we must by no means assume that this\nconstitutes the essence of the moral \"ought,\" or gives us the clue to\nits origin.\n\n[Footnote 6: Wundt, _Ethik_, p. 36 (English translation, p. 44).]\n\n[Footnote 7: _Cf._ Stephen, _Liberty, Equality, Fraternity_,\np. 343 _sq._]\n\nDiscarding all questions of etymology as irrelevant to our subject,[8]\nwe shall, in our analysis of moral concepts, {134} endeavour to fix\nthe true import of each concept by examining how, and under what\ncircumstances, the term expressing it is generally applied. We shall\nrestrict ourselves to the principal, typical terms which are used as\npredicates in moral judgments. If we succeed in proving that they are\nall fundamentally derived from either moral indignation or moral\napproval, there can be no reasonable doubt as to the origin of the\nrest.\n\n[Footnote 8: The attempt to apply the philological method to an\nexamination of moral concepts has, in my opinion, proved a\nfailure--which may be seen from Mr. Baynes' book on _The Idea of God\nand the Moral Sense in the Light of Language_.]\n\nThe tendency in a phenomenon to arouse moral indignation is directly\nexpressed by the term _bad_, and a disposition of mind which is\ncharacterised by some special kind of badness is called _vice_.\nClosely allied to the term \"bad\" is the term _wrong_. But there is a\ndifference in the use of these words. Whilst \"bad\" may be applied both\nto a person's character and to his conduct, only his conduct may be\nsaid to be \"wrong.\" The reason for this is that the concept of moral\nwrongness is modelled on the idea of a moral law, the breach of which\nis regarded as \"wrong.\" And, by laying down a moral law, we only\nenjoin a certain mode of conduct; we do not command a person to have a\ncertain character.\n\nThe moral law is expressed by the term _ought_, a term which, in\nmodern ethics, generally occupies a central position among moral\npredicates. The notion which it embodies is frequently looked upon as\nultimate and incapable of analysis--\"too elementary\" (to quote\nProfessor Sidgwick) \"to admit of any formal definition.\"[9] This view,\nI think, instead of simplifying the matter, has been one of the chief\ncauses of the prevailing confusion in ethical thought.\n\n[Footnote 9: Sidgwick, _Methods of Ethics_, p. 33.]\n\nFar from being a simple notion, \"ought\" appears to me clearly\ndecomposable, even though it have a special flavour of its own. First\nof all, it expresses a conation. When I feel that I ought to do a\nthing, I experience an impulse to do it, even though some opposite\nimpulse may finally determine my action. And when I say to another\nman, \"You ought to do this, or that,\" there is certainly implied {135}\na purpose to influence his action in a certain direction. In the\nnotion of _duty_, the ethical import of which is identical with that\nof \"ought,\" this conative element is not so obvious.\n\nClosely connected with the conative nature of \"ought\" is the\nimperative character it is apt to assume. But, though frequently used\nimperatively, \"ought\" is not necessarily and essentially imperative.\nEven if the \"ought\" which I address to myself, in a figurative sense,\nmay be styled a command, it is hardly appropriate to speak of a\npresent command with reference to past actions. The common phrase,\n\"You ought to have done this, or that,\" cannot be called a\ncommand.\n\nThe conation expressed in \"ought\" is determined by the idea that the\nmode of conduct which ought to be performed is not, or will possibly\nnot be, performed. It is also this idea of its not being performed\nthat determines the emotion which gives to \"ought\" the character of a\nmoral predicate. The doing of what ought not to be done, or the\nomission of what ought not to be omitted, is apt to call forth moral\nindignation--this is the most essential fact involved in the notion of\n\"ought.\" Every \"ought\"-judgment contains implicitly a negation. Nobody\nwould ever have dreamt of laying down a moral rule if the idea of its\ntransgression had not presented itself to his mind. We may reverse the\nwords of the Apostle,[10] and say that where no transgression is,\nthere is no law. When Solon was asked why he had specified no\npunishment for one who had murdered a father, he replied that he\nsupposed it could not occur to any man to commit such a crime.[11]\nSimilarly, the modern Shintoist concludes that the prim\u00e6val Japanese\nwere pure and holy from the fact that they are represented as a people\nwho had no moral commandments.[12] It is this prohibitive character of\n\"ought\" that has imparted to duty that idea of antagonism to\ninclination which has found its most famous expression {136} in the\nKantian ethics, and which made Bentham look upon the word itself as\nhaving in it \"something disagreeable and repulsive.\"[13] It is the\nintrinsic connection between \"ought\" and \"wrong\" that has given to\nduty the most prominent place in ethical speculation whenever moral\npessimism has been predominant. Whilst the ancient Greeks, with whom\nhappiness was the state of nature, never spoke of duty, but held\nvirtue to be the Supreme Good, Christianity, on the other hand, which\nlooked upon man as a being born and bred in sin, regarded morals\npre-eminently as the science of duty. Then, again, in modern times,\nKant's categorical imperative came as a reaction against that moral\noptimism which once more had given the preference to virtue,\nconsidering everything in the world or in humanity as beautiful and\ngood from the very beginning.[14] It is also worth noting that the\nfeeling of self-complacency connected with the consciousness of having\nacted in accordance with the law of duty, has no distinctively\nexpressive name in ordinary language, while the opposite feeling is\nknown by so familiar and distinctive a term as \"remorse.\" This is not,\nas has been said,[15] \"a significant indication of the moral condition\nof mankind,\" but a significant indication of the true import of the\nnotion of duty itself.\n\n[Footnote 10: _Romans_, iv. 15.]\n\n[Footnote 11: Diogenes La\u00ebrtius, _Solon_, 10. Cicero, _Pro S. Roscio\nAmerino_, 25.]\n\n[Footnote 12: Griffis, _Religions of Japan_, p. 72.]\n\n[Footnote 13: Bentham, _Deontoiogy_, i. 10.]\n\n[Footnote 14: Ziegler, _Social Ethics_, pp. 22, 75 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 15: Murray, _Introduction to Ethics_, p. 108.]\n\nIt is not, then, in the emotion of approval that we must seek for the\norigin of this concept. We may undoubtedly applaud him who is faithful\nto his duty, but the idea of duty involves no applause. There is no\ncontradiction in the omission of an act being disapproved of and the\nperformance of it being praised. \"Ought\" and \"duty\" express only the\ntendency of an omission to call forth disapproval, and say nothing\nabout the consequences of the act's performance. The conscientious man\nrefuses the homage paid to him, by saying, \"I have only done my duty.\"\nDuty is a \"stern {137} lawgiver,\" who threatens with punishment, but\npromises no reward.[16]\n\n[Footnote 16: The intrinsic connection between duty and disapproval\nhas previously been noticed by Stuart Mill (in a note to James Mill's\n_Analysis of the Human Mind_, ii. 325), according to whom \"no case can\nbe pointed out in which we consider anything as a duty, and any act or\nomission as immoral or wrong, without regarding the person who commits\nthe wrong and violates the duty as a fit object of punishment.\" _Cf._\nalso Bain, _Emotions and the Will_, ch. 15, and Gizycki, _Introduction\nto the Study of Ethics_, English adaptation by Stanton Coit, p. 102\n_sq._]\n\nThe ideas of \"ought\" and \"duty\" thus spring from the same source as\nthe ideas of \"bad\" and \"wrong.\" To say that a man ought to do a thing\nis, so far as the morality of his action is concerned, the very same\nthing as to say that it is bad, or wrong, of him not to do it--in\nother words, that the not-doing of it has a tendency to call forth\nmoral disapproval.\n\n\"Wrong\" is popularly regarded as the opposite of _right_, and they are\nreally contradictories, but only within the sphere of positive moral\nvaluation. We do not call the actions of irresponsible beings, like\nanimals or infants, \"right,\" although they are not wrong; nor do we\npronounce morally indifferent actions of responsible beings to be\n\"right,\" unless we wish thereby especially to mark their moral value\nas not being wrong. An act which is permissible is of course not\nwrong, and so far it may be said to be right; but it would be more\naccurate to say that people have _a_ right to do it. The adjective\n\"right,\" in its strict sense, refers to cases from which the\nindifferent is excluded. A right action is, on a given occasion, _the_\nright action, and other alternatives are wrong. \"Right\" is thus\nclosely related to \"ought,\" but at the same time \"right\" and\n\"obligatory\" are not identical. I cannot quite subscribe to the view\nof Professor Sidgwick, that \"in the recognition of conduct as 'right'\nis involved an authoritative prescription to do it.\"[17] What is right\nis in accordance with the moral law; the adjective \"right\" means that\nduty is fulfilled. It is true that the super-obligatory also is right.\nBut \"right\" takes no notice of the super-obligatory as distinct from\nthe obligatory, and what goes {138} beyond duty always involves the\nfulfilment of some duty. It may be admitted to be \"not only right,\"\nbut not to be more right. Right has no comparative. A duty is either\nfulfilled or not, and unless it be perfectly fulfilled the conduct is\nwrong. There are degrees of wrongness and of goodness, as the moral\nindignation and the moral approval may be stronger or weaker, but\nthere are no degrees of rightness.\n\n[Footnote 17: Sidgwick, _op. cit._ p. 106.]\n\nThe fact that the right action is a duty fulfilled accounts for the\nerroneous opinion so generally held by ethical writers that \"right\" is\nintrinsically connected with moral approval.[18] The choice of the\nright alternative may give us satisfaction and call forth in us an\nemotion of approval. This emotion may be the motive for our pointing\nout the rightness of the act, and the judgment in which we do so may\neven intrinsically contain applause. The manner in which the judgment\n\"That is right,\" is pronounced, often shows that it is meant to be an\nexpression of praise. But this does not imply that the concept \"right\"\nby itself has reference to moral approval and involves praise. It only\nmeans that in one word is expressed a certain concept--the concept\nthat a duty is fulfilled--_plus_ an emotion of approval. That \"right\"\n_per se_ involves no praise is obvious from the fact that we regard it\nas perfectly right to pay a debt and to keep a promise, or to abstain\nfrom killing, robbing, or lying, although such acts or omissions\ngenerally have no tendency whatever to evoke in us an emotion of moral\napproval.\n\n[Footnote 18: Hutcheson, _Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the\nPassions and Affections, with Illustrations on the Moral Sense_, p.\n279. Clifford, _Lectures and Essays_, pp. 294, 304 _sq._ Fowler and\nWilson, _Principles of Morals_, ii. 199. Alexander, _Moral Order and\nProgress_, p. 399.]\n\nThe concept of \"right,\" then, as implying that the opposite mode of\nconduct would have been wrong, ultimately derives its moral\nsignificance from moral disapproval. This may seem strange considering\nthat \"right\" is commonly looked upon as positive and \"wrong\" as its\nnegation. But we must remember that language and popular conceptions\nin these matters start {139} from the notion of a moral rule or\ncommand. It is a matter of paramount importance that such modes of\nconduct as are apt to arouse moral indignation should be avoided.\nPeople try to prevent them by prohibitions and injunctions, often\nemphasised by threats of penalties for the transgressors. The whole\nmoral and social discipline is based upon commands; customs are rules\nof conduct, and so are laws. It is natural, then, that the notion of a\ncommand should figure uppermost in popular conceptions of morality.\nObedience to the command is right, a breach of it is wrong. But the\nfact which gives birth to the command itself is the indignation called\nforth by the act which the command forbids, or by the omission of that\nwhich it enjoins.\n\nI have spoken here of \"right\" as an adjective. Used as a substantive,\nto denote _a right_, it also, in whatever sense it be used, expresses\na concept which is rooted in the emotion of moral disapproval. To have\na right to do a thing is to be allowed to do it, either by positive\nlaw, in the case of a legal right, or by the moral law, in the case of\na moral right; in other words, to have a moral right to do a thing\nmeans that it is not wrong to do it. But generally the concept of \"a\nright\" means something more than this. From the fact that an act is\nallowable, that it is not wrong, it follows, as a rule, that it ought\nnot to be prevented, that no hindrance ought to be put in the way of\nits performance; and this character of inviolability is largely\nincluded in the very concepts of rights. That a man has a right to\nlive does not merely mean that he commits no wrong by supporting his\nlife, but it chiefly means that it would be wrong of other people to\nprevent him from living, that it is their duty not to kill him, or\neven, as the case may be, that it is their duty to help him to live.\nAnd in order to constitute a right in him, the duty in question must\nbe a duty _to him_. That a right belonging to A is not merely a duty\nincumbent on B, but a duty _to_ A incumbent on B, will become evident\nfrom an example. To kill another {140} person's slave may be condemned\nas an injury done to the slave himself, in which case it is a duty to\nthe slave not to kill him; or to kill another person's slave may be\ncondemned on account of the loss it causes to the master, in which\ncase it is deemed a duty to the master not to kill the slave. In the\nlatter case we can hardly say that the duty of not killing the slave\nconstitutes a right to live in the slave--it only constitutes a right\nin the master to retain his slave alive, not to be deprived of him by\nan act causing his death.\n\nSo commonly does the conception of a right belonging to a person\ncontain the idea of a duty which other persons owe him, that it seems\nnecessary to point out the existence of rights in which no such idea\nis involved. A man's right to defend his country, for instance, does\nnot intrinsically imply that it is wrong of the enemy to disable him\nfrom doing so. But, on the other hand, there are rights which are\nnothing else than duties towards those who have the rights. A right is\nnot always a person's right to a certain activity, or to abstaining\nfrom a certain activity; it may have exclusive reference to other\npeople's acts or omissions. That a man has the right to be rewarded by\nhis country only means that his country is under an obligation to\nreward him. That a father has a right to be obeyed by his children\nonly means that it is a duty incumbent on his children to obey him.\nThat a person has the right of bodily integrity only means that it is\nwrong to inflict on him a bodily injury. These rights may, no doubt,\nif violated, give rise to certain rights of activity: a man may have a\nright to claim the reward which is due to him, a father to exact from\nhis children the obedience which they owe him, a person who is wronged\nto defend himself. But the rights of claiming a reward, of exacting\nobedience, of resisting wrong, are certainly not identical with the\nrights of being rewarded, of being obeyed, of not being\nwronged.\n\nIt is commonly said that rights have their corresponding duties. But\nif this expression is to be used, it must be {141} remembered that the\nduty which \"corresponds\" to a right, as a matter of fact, is either\nincluded in that right or simply identical with it. The identity\nbetween the right and the duty, then, consists in this, that the\nnotion of a right belonging to a person is identical with the notion\nof a duty towards him. Rights and duties are not identical in the\nsense that it is always a duty to insist on a right, though this has\nbeen urged.[19] If anybody prevents me from making use of my right it\nmay no doubt be deemed a duty on my part not to tolerate the wrong\ncommitted against me, but nothing of the kind is involved in the\nconcept of a right. And the same may be said with reference to the\nassertion that a right to do a thing is always, at the same time, a\nduty to do it--an assertion which is a consequence of the doctrine\nthat there is nothing morally indifferent and nothing that goes beyond\nduty; in other words, that all conduct of responsible beings is either\nwrong or obligatory. Even if this doctrine were psychologically\ncorrect--which it is not--even if there were a constant coincidence\nbetween the acts which a person has a right to perform and acts which\nit is his duty to perform, that would not constitute identity between\nthe concepts of rights and duties. According to the meaning of a\nright, A's right may be B's duty towards A, but A's right cannot be\nA's duty towards B or anybody else.\n\n[Footnote 19: Alexander, _op. cit._ p. 146 _sq._]\n\nClosely connected with the notions of wrongness and rightness are the\nnotions of _injustice_ and _justice_. Injustice, indeed, is a kind of\nwrongness. To be unjust is always to be unjust to somebody, and this\nimplies a doing of wrong to somebody, a violation of somebody's right.\n\"Justice,\" again, is a kind of rightness. It involves the notion that\na duty to somebody, a duty corresponding to a right, is fulfilled;[20]\nwe say that justice \"demands\" that it should be fulfilled. As an act\nis \"right\" if its omission {142} is wrong, so an act is \"just,\" in the\nstrict sense of the word, if its omission is unjust. But, like the\nadjective \"right,\" the adjective \"just\" is also sometimes used in a\nwider sense, to denote that something is \"not unjust.\" As\nnon-obligatory acts that are \"not wrong\" can hardly be denied to be\n\"right,\" so non-obligatory acts that are \"not unjust\" can hardly be\ndenied to be \"just,\" although they are not demanded by justice.\n\n[Footnote 20: According to the _Institutiones_ of Justinian (i. 1. 1)\n\"justice is the constant and perpetual will to render to each one his\nright,\"--\"justitia est constans et perpetua voluntas jus suum cuique\ntribuens.\"]\n\nAt the same time, \"injustice\" and \"justice\" are not simply other names\nfor violating or respecting rights. Whenever we style an act \"unjust,\"\nwe emphasise that it involves partiality. We do not denominate murder\nand robbery unjust, but wrong or criminal, because the partiality\ninvolved in their commission is quite obscured by their general\nwrongness or criminality; but we at once admit their gross injustice\nwhen we consider that the murderer and robber indulged their own\ninclinations with utter disregard of their neighbours' rights. And we\nlook upon \"unjust\" as an exceedingly appropriate term for a judge who\ncondemns an innocent man with the intention to save the culprit, and\nfor an employer who keeps for himself a profit which he ought to share\nwith his employees. Again, when we style an act \"just,\" in the strict\nsense of the term, we point out that an undue preference would have\nbeen shown to somebody by its omission. It is true that, as Adam Smith\nobserves, \"we may often fulfil all the rules of justice by sitting\nstill and doing nothing,\"[21] and that the man who barely abstains\nfrom violating either the person or the estate or the reputation of\nhis neighbours so far does justice to them; but in such a case we\nhardly apply the epithet \"just,\" simply because there is no reason for\nemphasising the partiality involved in the opposite mode of conduct.\nOn the other hand, we say it is just, or, more emphatically, that\njustice demands, that the innocent should not suffer in the place of\nthe guilty, or that the employer should give his employees all their\ndues.\n\n[Footnote 21: Adam Smith, _Theory of Moral Sentiments_, p. 117.]\n\nIt is necessary to note that the impartiality which justice {143}\ndemands is impartiality within the recognised order of rights, whether\nthese rights themselves have a partial origin or not. A father is\nunjust if he gives away property to one of his children in preference\nto others, in case all of them are recognised to have a right to an\nequal share in his property, even though it be only a conditional\nright; and a man is unjust if he keeps for himself a profit to which\nanother man has an equal right. But in a society which regards slavery\nas a morally permissible institution, a man is not necessarily deemed\nunjust if he beats a slave in a case where it would have been wrong to\nbeat a freeman. However, in the case of unequal rights, justice admits\nof no greater difference of treatment than what the difference in\nrights implies. It may be just to punish a man who by a crime has\nforfeited that right to be protected from wilfully inflicted pain\nwhich every law-abiding citizen possesses, but it is unjust to extend\nthe inequality between his condition and the condition of others\nbeyond the inequality of their rights by inflicting upon him a\npunishment which is unduly severe.\n\nIt is the emphasis laid on the duty of impartiality that gives justice\na special prominence in connection with punishments and rewards. A\nman's rights depend to a great extent upon his actions. Other things\nbeing equal, the criminal has not the same rights to inviolability as\nregards reputation, or freedom, or property, or life, as the innocent\nman; the miser and egoist have not the same rights as the benefactor\nand the philanthropist. On these differences in rights due to\ndifferences in conduct, the terms \"just\" and \"unjust\" lay stress; for\nin such cases an injustice would have been committed if the rights had\nbeen equal. When we say of a criminal that he has been \"justly\"\nimprisoned we point out that he was no victim of undue partiality, as\nhe had forfeited the general right to freedom on account of his crime.\nWhen we say of a benefactor that he has been \"justly\" rewarded, we\npoint out that no favour was partially bestowed upon him in preference\nto others, as he had acquired the special right of being rewarded. But\nthe {144} \"justice\" of a punishment or a reward, strictly speaking,\ninvolves something more than this; as we have seen, what is strictly\n\"just\" is always the discharge of a duty corresponding to a right\nwhich would have been in a partial manner disregarded by a\ntransgression of the duty. If it is just that a person should be\nrewarded, he ought to be rewarded, and to fulfil this duty is to do\nhim justice. Again, if it is just that a person should be punished, he\nought to be punished, and his not being punished is an injustice to\nother persons. It is an injustice towards all those whose condemnation\nof the wrong act finds its recognised expression in the punishment,\ninasmuch as their rightful claim that the criminal should be punished,\ntheir right of resisting wrong, is thereby violated in favour of the\nwrong-doer. Moreover, his not being punished is an injustice towards\nother criminals, who have been punished for similar acts, in so far as\nthey have a right to demand that no undue preference should be shown\nto anybody whose guilt is equal to theirs. Retributive justice may\nadmit of a certain latitude as to the retribution. It may be a matter\nof small concern from the community's point of view whether men are\nfined or imprisoned for the commission of a certain crime. But it may\nbe a demand of justice that, under equal circumstances, all of them\nshould be punished with the same severity, since the crime has equally\naffected their rights.\n\nThe emphasis which \"injustice\" lays on the partiality of a certain\nmode of conduct always involves a condemnation of that partiality.\nLike every other kind of wrongness, \"injustice\" is thus a concept\nwhich is obviously based on the emotion of moral disapproval. And so\nis the concept of \"justice,\" whether it involves the notion that an\ninjustice would be committed if a certain duty were not fulfilled, or\nit is simply used to denote that a certain mode of conduct is \"not\nunjust.\" But there is yet another sense in which the word \"just\" is\napplied. It may emphasise the impartiality of an act in a tone of\npraise. Considering how difficult it is to be perfectly impartial and\nto give every man his due, especially when one's own interests are\n{145} concerned, it is only natural that men should be applauded for\nbeing just, and consequently that to call a person just should often\nbe to praise him. So, also, \"justice\" is used as the name for a\nvirtue, \"the mistress and queen of all virtues.\"[22] But all this does\nnot imply that an emotion of moral approval enters into the concept of\njustice. It only means that one word is used to express a certain\nconcept--a concept which, as we have seen, ultimately derives its\nimport from moral disapproval--_plus_ an emotion of approval. That the\nconcept of justice by itself involves no reference to the emotion of\nmoral approval appears from the fact that it is no praise to say of an\nact that it is \"only just.\"\n\n[Footnote 22: Cicero, _De officiis_, iii. 6.]\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nFrom the concepts springing from moral disapproval we pass to those\nspringing from moral approval. Foremost among these ranks the concept\n_good_.[23]\n\n[Footnote 23: Professor Bain, who takes a very legal view of the moral\nconsciousness, maintains (_Emotions and the Will_, p. 292) that\n\"positive good deeds and self-sacrifice . . . transcend the region of\nmorality proper, and occupy a sphere of their own.\" A similar opinion\nhas been expressed by Prof. Durkheim (_Division du travail social_),\nand, more recently, by Dr. Lagerborg, in his interesting essay, 'La\nnature de la morale' (_Revue internationale de Sociologie_, xi. 466).\nProf. Durkheim argues (p. 30) that it would be \"contraire \u00e0 toute\nm\u00e9thode\" to include under the same heading acts which are obligatory\nand acts which are objects of admiration, and at the same time exempt\nfrom all regulation. \"Si donc, pour rester fid\u00e8le \u00e0 l'usage, on\nr\u00e9serve aux premiers la qualification de moraux, on ne saurait la\ndonner \u00e9galement aux seconds.\" But I fail to see that ordinary usage\nrecognises regulation as the test of morality. On the contrary, terms\nlike \"goodness\" and \"virtue,\" though having no reference whatever to\nany moral rule, have always hitherto been applied to qualities\navowedly moral.]\n\nThough \"good,\" being affixed to a great variety of objects, takes\ndifferent shades of meaning in different cases, there is one\ncharacteristic common to everything called \"good.\" This is hardly, as\nMr. Spencer maintains,[24] its quality of being well adapted to a\ngiven end. It is true that the good knife is one which will cut, the\ngood gun one which carries far and true. But I fail to see that \"good\"\nin a moral sense involves any idea of an adaptation to a given\npurpose, and, by calling conduct {146} \"good,\" we certainly do not mean\nthat it \"conduces to life in each and all.\" \"Good\" simply expresses\napproval or praise of something on account of some quality which it\npossesses. A house is praised as \"good\" because it fulfils the end\ndesired, a wine because it has an agreeable taste, a man on account of\nhis moral worth. \"Good,\" as a moral epithet, involves a praise which\nis the outward expression of the emotion of moral approval, and is\naffixed to a subject of moral valuation on account of its tendency to\ncall forth such an emotion.\n\n[Footnote 24: Spencer, _Principles of Ethics_, i. 21 _sqq._]\n\n\"Good\" has commonly been identified with \"right,\" but such an\nidentification is incorrect. A father does right in supporting his\nyoung children, inasmuch as he, by supporting them, discharges a duty\nincumbent upon him, but we do not say that he does a good deed by\nsupporting them, or that it is good of him to do so. Nor do we call it\ngood of a man not to kill or rob his neighbours, although his conduct\nis so far right. The antithesis between right and wrong is, in a\ncertain sense at least, contradictory, the antithesis between good and\nbad is only contrary. Every act--provided that it falls within the\nsphere of positive moral valuation--that is not wrong is right, but\nevery act that is not bad is not necessarily good. Just as we may say\nof a thing that it is \"not bad,\" and yet refuse to call it \"good,\" so\nwe may object to calling the simple discharge of a duty \"good,\"\nalthough the opposite mode of conduct would be bad. On the other hand,\nno confusion of ethical concepts is involved in attributing goodness\nto the performance of a duty, or, in other words, praising a man for\nan act the omission of which would have incurred blame. To say of one\nand the same act that it is right and that it is good, really means\nthat we look upon it from different points of view. Since moral praise\nexpresses a benevolent attitude of mind, it is commendable for a man\nnot to be niggard in his acknowledgment of other people's right\nconduct; whereas, self-praise being objectionable, only the other\npoint of view is deemed proper when he passes a {147} judgment upon\nhimself. He may say, without incurring censure, \"I have done my duty,\nI have done what is right,\" but hardly, \"I have done a good deed\"; and\nit would be particularly obnoxious to say, \"I am a good man.\" The best\nman even refuses to be called good by others:--\"Why callest thou me\ngood? there is none good but one, that is, God.\"[25]\n\n[Footnote 25: _St. Matthew_, xix. 17.]\n\nWhilst \"goodness\" is the general expression for moral praise, _virtue_\ndenotes a disposition of mind which is characterised by some special\nkind of goodness. He who is habitually temperate possesses the virtue\nof temperance, he who is habitually just the virtue of justice. And\neven when a man is simply said to be \"virtuous,\" this epithet is given\nto him, more or less distinctly, with reference to some branch of\ngoodness which constitutes his virtue. A Supreme Being, to whom is\nattributed perfect goodness, is not called virtuous, but\ngood.\n\nIt was the opinion of Aristotle that virtue is imperfect so long as\nthe agent cannot do the virtuous action without a conflict of\nimpulses. Others maintain, on the contrary, that virtue essentially\nexpresses effort, resistance, and conquest. It has been represented as\n\"mediation through pain\";[26] according to Kant, it is \"the moral\ndisposition in struggle.\"[27] But I do not see that virtue presupposes\nstruggle, nor that it is lessened by being exercised with little or no\neffort. A virtue consists in the disposition to will or not to will\nacts of a certain kind, and is by no means reduced by the fact that no\nrival impulses make themselves felt. It is true that by struggle and\nconquest a man may display more virtue, namely, the virtue of\nself-restraint in addition to the virtue gained by it. The vigorous\nand successful contest against temptation constitutes a virtue by\nitself. For instance, the quality of mind which is exhibited in a\nhabitual and victorious effort to conquer strong sexual passions is a\nvirtue distinguishable from that of chastity. But even this virtue of\n{148} resisting seductive impulses is not greater, _ceteris paribus_,\nin proportion as the victory is more difficult. Take two men with\nequally strong passions and equally exposed to temptations, who\nearnestly endeavour to lead a chaste life. He who succeeds with less\nstruggle, thanks to his greater power of will, is surely inferior\nneither in chastity nor in self-restraint. Suppose, again, that the\ntwo men were exposed to different degrees of temptation. He who\novercomes the greater temptation _displays_ more self-restraint; yet\nthe other man may possess this virtue in an equal degree, and his\nchastity is certainly not made greater thereby. He may have more\nmerit, but merit is not necessarily proportionate to virtue.\n\n[Footnote 26: Laurie, _Ethica_, p. 253 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 27: Kant, _Kritik der praktischen Vernunft_, i. 1. 3\n(_S\u00e4mmtliche Werke_, v. 89).]\n\nThe virtues are broad generalisations of mental dispositions which, on\nthe whole, are regarded as laudable. Owing to their stereotyped\ncharacter, it easily happens, in individual cases, that the possession\nof a virtue confers no merit upon the possessor; and, at least from\nthe point of view of the enlightened moral consciousness, a man's\nvirtues are no exact gauge of his moral worth. In order to form a just\nopinion of the value of a person's character, we must take into\naccount the strength of his instinctive desires and the motives of his\nconduct. There are virtues that pay no regard to this. A sober man,\nwho has no taste for intoxicants, possesses the virtue of sobriety in\nno less degree than a man whose sobriety is the result of a difficult\nconquest over a strong desire. He who is brave with a view to be\napplauded is not, as regards the virtue of courage, inferior to him\nwho faces dangers merely from a feeling of duty. The only thing that\nthe possession of a virtue presupposes is that it should have been\ntried and tested. We cannot say that people unacquainted with\nintoxicants possess the virtue of sobriety, and that a man who never\nhad anything to spend distinguishes himself for frugality. For to\nattribute a virtue to somebody is always to bestow upon him some\ndegree of praise, and it is no praise, only irony, to say of a man\nthat he \"makes a virtue of necessity.\"\n\n{149} Attempts have been made to reconcile the Aristotelian and the\nKantian views of the relation between virtue and effort, by saying\nthat virtue is the harmony won and merit is the winning of it.[28]\nThis presupposes that a man to whom virtue is natural has had his\nfights. But, surely, it is not always so. Who could affirm that every\ntemperate, or charitable, or just man has acquired the virtue only as\na result of inward struggle? There are people to whom some virtues at\nleast are natural from the beginning, and others who acquire them with\na minimum of effort.\n\n[Footnote 28: Dewey, _Study of Ethics_, p. 133 _sq._ Simmel,\n_Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaft_, i. 228. _Cf._ also Shaftesbury\n'Inquiry concerning Virtue and Merit,' i. 2. 4, in _Characteristicks_,\nii. 36 _sqq._]\n\nThere has been much discussion about the relation between virtue and\nduty. It has been said that \"they are co-extensive, the former\ndescribing conduct by the quality of the agent's mind, the latter by\nthe nature of the act performed\";[29] that they express the same\nideal, virtue subjectively, duty objectively;[30] or that virtue, in\nits proper sense, is \"the quality of character that fits for the\ndischarge of duty,\" and that it \"only lives in the performance of\nduty.\"[31] At the same time it is admitted that \"the distinctive mark\nof virtue seems to lie in what is beyond duty,\" and that \"though every\nvirtue is a duty, and every duty a virtue, there are certain actions\nto which it is more natural to apply the term virtuous.\"[32] Prof.\nSidgwick, again, in his elaborate chapter on 'Virtue and Duty,'\nremarks that he has \"thought it best to employ the terms so that\nvirtuous conduct may include the performance of duty as well as\nwhatever good actions may be commonly thought to go beyond duty;\nthough recognising that virtue in its ordinary use is most\nconspicuously manifested in the latter.\"[33]\n\n[Footnote 29: Alexander, _op. cit._ p. 244.]\n\n[Footnote 30: Grote, _Treatise on the Moral Ideals_, p. 22. _Cf._\nSeth, _Study of Ethical Principles_, p. 239.]\n\n[Footnote 31: Muirhead, _Elements of Ethics_, p. 190 n.*]\n\n[Footnote 32: Alexander, _op. cit._ p. 243 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 33: Sidgwick, _op. cit._ p. 221.]\n\nIt can be no matter of surprise that those who regard the notion of\n\"duty\" as incapable of being analysed, or {150} who fail to recognise\nits true import, are embarrassed by its relation to virtue. We do not\ncall it a virtue if a man habitually abstains from killing or robbing,\nor pays his debts, or performs a great number of other duties. We do\ncall chastity and temperance and justice virtues, although we regard\nit as obligatory on a man to be chaste, temperate, just. We also call\nhospitality, generosity, and charity virtues in cases where they go\nbeyond the strict limits of duty. \"The relation of virtue and duty is\ncomplicated,\" says Professor Alexander.[34] \"In its common use each\nterm seems to include something excluded from the other,\" observes\nProfessor Sidgwick.[35] But, indeed, the relation is not complicated,\nfor there is no other intrinsic relation between them than their\ncommon antagonism to \"wrong.\" That something is a duty implies that\nits non-performance tends to evoke moral indignation, that it is a\nvirtue implies that its performance tends to evoke moral approval.\nThat the virtues actually cover a comparatively large field of the\nprovince of duty is simply owing to their being dispositions of mind.\nWe may praise the habits of justice and gratitude, even though we find\nnothing praiseworthy in an isolated just or grateful act.\n\n[Footnote 34: Alexander, _op. cit._ p. 244.]\n\n[Footnote 35: Sidgwick, _op. cit._ p. 219.]\n\nThere has been no less confusion with regard to the relation between\nduty and _merit_. Like the notions of \"good\" and \"virtue,\" the\n\"meritorious\" derives its origin from the emotion of moral approval;\nbut while the former merely express a tendency to give rise to such an\nemotion, \"meritorious\" implies that the object to which it refers\nmerits praise, that it has a just claim to praise, or, in other words,\nthat it ought to be recognised as good. This makes the term\n\"meritorious\" more emphatic than the term \"good,\" but at the same time\nit narrows its province in a peculiar way. Just as the expression that\nsomething ought to be done implies the idea of its not being done, so\nthe word \"meritorious\" suggests the idea of goodness which may fail of\ndue recognition. And as it is meaningless to speak of duty in a case\nwhere the {151} opposite mode of conduct is entirely out of the\nquestion, so it would be an absurdity to attribute merit to somebody\nfor an act the goodness of which is universally admitted. Thus\n\"meritorious\" involves a restriction. It would be almost blasphemous\nto call the acts of a God conceived to be infinitely good meritorious,\nsince it would suggest a limitation of his goodness.\n\nThe emphatic claim to praiseworthiness made by the \"meritorious\" has\nrendered it objectionable to a great number of moralists. It has been\nidentified with the \"super-obligatory\"--a conception which is to many\nan abomination. From what has been said above, however, it is manifest\nthat they are not identical. As the discharge of a duty may be\nregarded as a good act, so it may also be regarded as an act which\nought to be recognised as good. Practically, no doubt, there is a\ncertain antagonism between duty and merit. We praise, and, especially,\nwe regard as deserving praise, only what is above the average,[36] and\nwe censure what is below it. No merit is conferred upon him who\nperforms a duty which is seldom transgressed, or the transgression of\nwhich would actually incur punishment or censure. We do not think that\na man ought to be praised for what his own interest prompts him to\nperform; and, since the transgression of a moral command which is\nusually obeyed is generally censured or punished, there is under\nordinary circumstances nothing meritorious in performing a duty. But\nthough thus probably most acts which are deemed meritorious fall\noutside the limits of duty as roughly drawn by the popular mind, we\nare on the other hand often disposed to attribute merit to a man on\naccount of an act which, from a strict point of view, is his duty, but\na duty which most people, under the same circumstances, would have\nleft undischarged. This shows that the antagonism between duty and\nmerit is not absolute. And in the concept of merit _per se_ no such\nantagonism is involved.\n\n[Footnote 36: Merit, as Professor Alexander puts it (_op. cit._ p.\n196), \"expresses the interval which separates the meritorious from the\naverage.\"]\n\n{152} I confess that I fail to grasp what those writers really mean\nwho identify the \"meritorious\" with the \"super-obligatory,\" and at the\nsame time deny the existence of any super-obligatory. Do they shut\ntheir eyes to the important psychical fact indicated by the term\n\"merit,\" or do they look upon it as a chimera inconsistent with a\nsufficiently enlightened moral consciousness? For my own part, I\ncannot see how the moral consciousness could dispense with the idea\nthat there are actions which merit praise or reward, which ought to be\npraised or rewarded. The denial of merit can be defended from a purely\ntheological point of view, but then only with regard to man's relation\nto God. It is obvious that a fallen being who is sinning even when he\ndoes his best, could not be recognised as good by God and could have\nno merit. But it is hardly just, nor is it practically possible, that\na man should measure his fellow-man by a superhuman standard of\nperfection, and try to suppress the natural emotion of moral approval\nand the claims springing from it, by persuading himself that there is\nno mortal being who ever does anything which ought to be recognised as\ngood.\n\nQuite distinct from the question of merit, then, is that of the\n_super-obligatory_. Can a man do more than his duty, or, in other\nwords, is there anything good which is not at the same time a duty?\nThe answer depends on the contents given to the commandments of duty,\nhence it may vary without affecting the concept of duty itself. If we\nconsider that there is an obligation on every man to promote the\ngeneral happiness to the very utmost of his ability, we must also\nmaintain that nobody can ever do anything good beyond his duty. The\nsame is the case if we regard \"self-realisation,\" or a \"normal\"\nexercise of his natural functions, as a man's fundamental duty. In all\nthese cases \"to aim at acting beyond obligation,\" as Price puts\nit,[37] is \"the same with aiming at acting contrary to obligation, and\ndoing more than is fit to be done, the same with doing wrong.\" It can\nhardly be denied, however, {153} that those who hold similar views have\nactually two standards of duty, one by which they measure man and his\ndoings in the abstract, with reference to a certain ideal of life\nwhich they please to identify with duty, and another by which they are\nguided in their practical moral judgments upon their own and their\nneighbours' conduct. The conscientious man is apt to judge himself\nmore severely than he judges others, partly because he knows his own\ncase better than theirs,[38] and partly because he is naturally afraid\nof being intolerant and unjust. He may indeed be unwilling to admit\nthat he ever can do more than his duty, seeing how difficult it is\neven to do what he ought to do, and impressed, as he would be, with\nthe feeling of his own shortcomings. Yet I do not see how he could\nconscientiously deny that he has omitted to do many praiseworthy or\nheroic deeds without holding himself blamable for such omissions.\n\n[Footnote 37: Price, _Review of the Principal Questions in Morals_,\np. 204 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 38: _Cf._ Sidgwick, _op. cit._ p. 221.]\n\nProfessor Sidgwick observes that \"we should not deny that it is, in\nsome sense, a man's strict duty to do whatever action he judges most\nexcellent, so far as it is in his power.\"[39] This, as it seems to me,\nis not a matter of course, and nothing of the kind is involved in the\nnotion of duty itself. We must not confound the moral law with the\nmoral ideal. Duty is the minimum of morality, the supreme moral ideal\nof the best man is the maximum of it. Those who sum up the whole of\nmorality in the word \"ought\" identify the minimum and the maximum, but\nI fail to see that morality is better for this. Rather it is worse.\nThe recognition of a \"super-obligatory\" does not lower the moral\nideal; on the contrary it raises it, or at any rate makes it more\npossible to vindicate the moral law and to administer it justly. It is\nnowadays a recognised principle in legislation that a law loses part\nof its weight if it cannot be strictly enforced. If the realisation of\nthe highest moral ideal is commanded by a moral law, such a law will\nalways remain a dead letter, and morality will gain nothing. Far above\nthe anxious {154} effort to fulfil the commandments of duty stands the\nfree and lofty aspiration to live up to an ideal, which, unattainable\nas it may be, threatens neither with blame nor remorse him who fails\nto reach its summits. Does not experience show that those whose\nthoughts are constantly occupied with the prescriptions of duty are\napt to become hard and intolerant?\n\n[Footnote 39: _Ibid._ p. 219.]\n\nThose who deny the existence of anything morally \"praiseworthy\" which\nis not a duty, are also generally liable to deny the existence of\nanything morally _indifferent_ in the conduct of responsible beings.\nThe \"super-obligatory\" and the \"indifferent\" have this in common, that\nthey are \"ultra-obligatory,\" and the denial of the one as well as of\nthe other is an expression of the same tendency to look upon the moral\nlaw as the sole fact of the moral consciousness. Even Utilitarianism\ncannot consistently admit of anything indifferent within the province\nof moral valuation, since two opposite modes of conduct can hardly\nproduce absolutely the same sum of happiness. Such a repudiation of\nthe \"indifferent\" being quite contrary to the morality of common\nsense, which, after all, no ethical theory can afford to neglect,\nconsiderable ingenuity has been wasted on vain attempts to show that\nthe \"indifferent\" is nothing but a rude popular conception unable to\nkeep its ground against a thoroughgoing examination. Professor Ziegler\nironically asks:--\"Such outward matters as eating and drinking are\nsurely morally indifferent? And yet is eating and drinking too much,\nis spending too much time in outdoor exercise, is lounging idly about,\nmorally indifferent? or, on the other hand, is it morally allowable or\nwholesome to reduce oneself and make oneself weak and ill by fasting,\nor to become a hypochondriac by continually staying indoors?\"[40] This\nargument, however, involves a confusion of different volitions. The\nfact that eating or drinking generally, or eating or drinking too much\nor too little, are no matters of indifference, surely does not prevent\n{155} eating or drinking on some certain occasion from being\nindifferent. Mr. Bradley again observes:--\"It is right and a duty that\nthe sphere of indifferent detail should exist. It is a duty that I\nshould develop my nature by private choice therein. Therefore,\n_because_ that is a duty, it is a duty _not_ to make a duty of every\ndetail; and thus in every detail I have done my duty.\"[41] This\nstatement also shows a curious confusion of entirely different facts.\nIt may be very true that it is a duty to recognise certain actions as\nindifferent. This is one thing by itself. But it is quite another\nthing to perform those actions. And if it is a duty to recognise\ncertain actions as indifferent how could it possibly at the same time\nbe held a duty to perform them?\n\n[Footnote 40: Ziegler, _op. cit._ p. 85.]\n\n[Footnote 41: Bradley, _Ethical Studies_, p. 195, n. 1.]\n\nIt has been maintained that the sphere of the indifferent forms the\ntotality of \"ought\"; that when the same end may be reached by a\nvariety of means, an action may be indifferent merely in relation to\nthe choice of means, but not so far as regards the attainment of the\nend, and hence is only apparently indifferent.[42] \"If it is my moral\nduty to go from one town to another,\" says Mr. Bradley, \"and there are\ntwo roads which are equally good, it is indifferent to the proposed\nmoral duty _which_ road I take; it is not indifferent _that_ I do take\none or the other; and whichever road I do take, I am doing my duty on it,\nand hence it is far from indifferent: my walking on road A is a matter\nof duty in reference to the end, though not a matter of duty if you\nconsider it against walking on road B; and so with B--but I can escape\nthe sphere of duty neither on A nor on B.\" All this is true, but forms\nno argument against the \"indifferent.\" The statement, \"You ought to go\nto the town and to take either road A or B,\" refers to two volitions\nwhich are regarded as wrong, namely, the volition not to go to the\ntown at all, and the volition to take any road not A or B; and it\n{156} refers also to two pairs of volitions in reference to which it\nindicates that the choice between the volitions constituting each pair\nis indifferent. You may choose to take road A or not to take it; you\nmay choose to take road B or not to take it. The \"indifferent\" is\nalways an alternative between contradictories. It can therefore never\nform part of an \"ought\"-totality, being itself a totality as complete\nas possible. This is somewhat disguised by a judgment which makes an\nobligation of a choice between A and B, but becomes conspicuous if we\nconsider a simple case of indifference. Suppose that it is considered\nindifferent whether you speak or do not speak on a certain occasion.\nWhat is here the \"ought\" that forms the totality of the indifferent?\nWould there be any sense in saying that you ought either to speak or\nnot to speak? or is the alternative, speaking--not speaking, only a\nlink in an indefinite chain of alternatives, each of which is by\nitself indifferent, in a relative sense, but the sum of which forms\nthe \"ought\"? You may be permitted--it will perhaps be argued--in a\ngiven moment to speak or to abstain from speaking, to write or to\nabstain from writing, to read or to abstain from reading, and so on;\nbut however wide the province of the permissible may be, there must\nalways be a limit inside which you ought to remain. That you do this\nor that may be a matter of indifference, but only of relative\nindifference, for it is not indifferent what you do on the whole;\nhence there is nothing absolutely indifferent. Such an argument,\nhowever, involves a misapprehension of the true meaning of the\n\"indifferent.\" The predicate expressing indifference refers to certain\ndefinite volitions and their contradictories, not to the whole of a\nman's conduct in a certain moment. The whole of a man's conduct is\nnever indifferent. But neither is the whole of a man's conduct ever\nwrong. In the moment when a murderer kills his victim he is fulfilling\nan endless number of duties: he abstains from stealing, lying,\ncommitting adultery, suicide, and so on. The predicate \"wrong\" only\nmarks the moral {157} character of a special mode of conduct. Why\nshould not the indifferent be allowed to do the same?\n\n[Footnote 42: Simmel, _op. cit._ i. 35 _sqq._ Alexander, _op. cit._\np. 50 _sqq._ Murray, _op. cit._ p. 26 _sq._ Bradley, _op. cit._\np. 195 _sq._]\n\nIt has, finally, been observed that the so-called \"indifferent\" is\nsomething \"the morality of which can only be individually\ndetermined.\"[43] This remark calls attention to the fact that no mode\nof conduct can be regarded as indifferent without a careful\nconsideration of individual circumstances, and that much which is\napparently indifferent is not really so. This, however, does not\ninvolve an abolition of the indifferent. Such an abolition would be\nthe extreme of moral intolerance. He who tried to put it into practice\nwould be the most insupportable of beings, and to himself life would\nbe unbearable. Fortunately, such a man has never existed. The attempts\nto make every action, even the most trivial, of responsible beings a\nmatter of moral concern, are only theoretical fancies without\npractical bearing, a hollow and flattering tribute to the idol of\nDuty.\n\n[Footnote 43: Martensen, _Christian Ethics_, p. 415.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII\n\nCUSTOMS AND LAWS AS EXPRESSIONS OF MORAL IDEAS\n\n\nMORAL ideas are expressed in moral judgments. We have hitherto\nexamined the predicates of such judgments, the import and origin of\nthe moral concepts. Now a much wider field or research remains for us\nto traverse. We shall direct our attention to the subjects of moral\njudgments, to the mass of phenomena which, among different peoples and\nin different ages, have had a tendency to call forth moral blame and\nmoral praise. We shall discuss the general characteristics which all\nthese phenomena have in common. We shall classify the most important\nof them, and study the moral ideas held with reference to the\nphenomena of each class separately. And in both cases we shall not\nonly analyse, but try to find an answer to the question, Why?--the\nultimate aim of all scientific research. But before entering upon this\nvast undertaking, we must define the lines on which it is to be\nconducted. How can we get an insight into the moral ideas of mankind\nat large?\n\nIn answering this question I need not dwell upon such obvious means of\ninformation as direct experience, or records of moral maxims and\nsentiments found in proverbs, literary and philosophical works, and\nreligious codes. The sources which, from an evolutionary point of\nview, are of the most comprehensive importance for our study, are\ntribal and national customs and laws. It is to these sources that the\npresent chapter will be devoted.\n\n{159} We have seen that a custom, in the strict sense of the word, is\nnot merely the habit of a certain circle of men, but at the same time\ninvolves a moral rule. There is a close connection between these two\ncharacteristics of custom: its habitualness and its obligatoriness.\nWhatever be the foundation for a certain practice, and however trivial\nit may be, the unreflecting mind has a tendency to disapprove of any\ndeviation from it for the simple reason that such a deviation is\nunusual. As Abraham Tucker observes, \"it is a constant argument among\nthe common people, that a thing must be done, and ought to be done,\nbecause it always has been done.\"[1] Children show respect for the\ncustomary,[2] and so do savages. \"If you ask a Kaffir why he does so\nand so, he will answer--'How can I tell? It has always been done by\nour forefathers.'\"[3] The only reason which the Eskimo can give for\nsome of their present customs, to which they adhere from fear of ill\nreport among their people, is that \"the old Innuits did so, and\ntherefore they must.\"[4] In the behaviour of the Aleut, who \"is\nbashful if caught doing anything unusual among his people,\"[5] and in\nthe average European's dread of appearing singular, we recognise the\ninfluence of the same force of habit.\n\n[Footnote 1: Tucker, _Light of Nature_, ii. 593. _Cf._ also Simmel,\n_Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaft_, i. 65 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 2: Sully, _Studies of Childhood_, p. 280 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 3: Leslie, _Among the Zulus and Amatongas_, p. 146.]\n\n[Footnote 4: Hall, _Arctic Researches_, p. 569.]\n\n[Footnote 5: Dall, _Alaska_, p. 396.]\n\nOn the other hand, it should be remembered that not every public habit\nis a custom, involving an obligation; certain practices, though very\ngeneral in a society, may even be reprobated by almost every one of\nits members. The habits of a people must therefore be handled with\ndiscretion by the student of moral ideas. Yet when he has no reason to\nconclude as to some special habit that it is held obligatory, he may,\nprobably always, be sure that it is either allowed, or, in spite of\nall assurances of its wickedness, that the disapproval of it is not\ngenerally very deep or genuine. In a community where lying is a {160}\nprevailing vice, truthfulness cannot be regarded as a very sacred\nduty; and where sexual immorality is widely spread, the public\ncondemnation of it always smacks of hypocrisy. Men's standard of\nmorality is not independent of their practice. The conscience of a\ncommunity follows the same rule as the conscience of an individual.\n\"Commit a sin twice,\" says the Talmud, \"and you will think it\nperfectly allowable.\"[6] Hence for the study of the inmost convictions\nof a nation, its \"bad habits\" form a valuable complement to its\nprofessed opinions.\n\n[Footnote 6: Deutsch, _Literary Remains_, p. 58.]\n\nThe dictates of custom being dictates of morality, it is obvious that\nthe study of moral ideas will, to a large extent, be a study of\ncustoms. But at the same time it should be borne in mind that custom\nnever covers the whole field of morality, and that the uncovered space\ngrows larger in proportion as the moral consciousness develops. Being\na rule of duty, custom may only indirectly be an expression of moral\napproval, by claiming, in certain cases, that goodness should be\nrewarded. But even when demanding praise, custom is not always a\nreliable exponent of merit; it includes politeness, and politeness is\na great deceiver. Custom may compel us to praise a man for form's\nsake, when he deserves no praise, and to thank him when he deserves no\nthanks. Moreover, custom regulates external conduct only. It tolerates\nall kinds of volitions and opinions if not openly expressed. It does\nnot condemn the heretical mind, but the heretical act. It demands that\nunder certain circumstances certain actions shall be either performed\nor omitted, and, provided that this demand is fulfilled, it takes no\nnotice of the motive of the agent or omitter. Again, in case the\ncourse of conduct prescribed by custom is not observed, the mental\nfacts connected with the transgression, if regarded at all, are dealt\nwith in a rough and ready manner, according to general rules which\nhardly admit of individualisation. Yet the incongruity between custom\nand morality which ensues from these circumstances is on {161} the\nwhole more apparent than real. It is rather an incongruity between\ndifferent moral standards. The unreflecting moral consciousness, like\ncustom, cares comparatively little for the internal aspect of conduct.\nIt does not ask whether a man goes to church on Sunday from a\nreligious motive or from fear of public opinion; it does not ask\nwhether he stays at home from love of ease or from dissent of belief\nand avoidance of hypocrisy. It is ready to blame as soon as the\ndictate of custom is disobeyed. The rule of custom is the rule of duty\nat early stages of development. Only progress in culture lessens its\nsway.\n\nFinally, the moral ideas which are expressed in the customs of a\ncertain circle of men are not necessarily shared by every one of its\nmembers. This may, in the present connection, be considered a matter\nof slight importance by him who regards morality as \"objectively\"\nrealised in the customs of a people, and who denies the individual the\nright to a private conscience. But from the subjective point of view\nwhich I am vindicating, individual conviction has a claim to equal\nconsideration with public opinion, nay frequently, to higher respect,\nrepresenting as it does in many cases a higher morality, a moral\nstandard more purified by reflection and impartiality. At the lower\nstages of civilisation, however, where a man is led by his feelings\nmore than by his thoughts, such a differentiation of moral ideas\nhardly occurs. The opinions of the many are the opinions of all, and\nthe customs of a society are recognised as rules of duty by all its\nmembers.\n\nIn primitive society custom stands for law, and even where social\norganisation has made some progress it may still remain the sole rule\nfor conduct.[7] The authority of {162} a chief does not necessarily\ninvolve a power to make laws. Even kings who are described as\nautocrats may be as much tied by custom as is any of their\nsubjects.\n\n[Footnote 7: Cranz, _History of Greenland_, i. 170. Dall, _op. cit._\np. 381 (Tuski). Dobrizhoffer, _Account of the Abipones_, p. 95.\nShooter, _Kafirs of Natal and the Zulu Country_, p. 101 _sq._ Holden,\n_Past and Future of the Kaffir Races_, p. 336. Mungo Park, _Travels in\nthe Interior of Africa_, p. 16. Scaramucci and Giglioli, 'Notizie sui\nDanakil,' in _Archivio per l'antropologia e la etnologia_, xiv. 39.\nEarl, _Papuans_, p. 105 (Arru Islanders). Forbes, _A Naturalist's\nWanderings in the Eastern Archipelago_, p. 473 (Timorese). Dalton,\n_Ethnology of Bengal_, p. 51 (Manipuris). Rockhill, _Land of the\nLamas_, p. 220 (Eastern Tibetans).]\n\nThe Rejangs of Sumatra \"do not acknowledge a right in the chiefs to\nconstitute what laws they think proper, or to repeal or alter their\nancient usages, of which they are extremely tenacious and jealous.\"\nThere is no word in their language which signifies law, and the\nchiefs, in pronouncing their decisions are not heard to say, \"So the\nlaw directs,\" but, \"Such is the custom.\"[8] According to Ellis, \"the\nveneration of the Malagasy for the customs derived from tradition, or\nany accounts of their ancestors . . . influences both their public and\nprivate habits; and upon no individual is it more imperative than upon\ntheir monarch, who, absolute as he is in other respects, wants either\nthe will or the power to break through the long-established\nregulations of a superstitious people.\"[9] The king of Ashanti,\nalthough represented as a despotic monarch, is nevertheless under an\nobligation to observe the national customs which have been handed down\nto the people from remote antiquity, and a practical disregard of this\nobligation, in the attempt to change some of the old customs, cost one\nof the kings his throne.[10] \"The Africans,\" says Mr. Winwood Reade,\nwith special reference to Dahomey, \"have sometimes their enlightened\nkings, as the old barbarians had their sages and their priests. But it\nis seldom in the power of the heads of a people to alter those customs\nwhich have been held sacred from time immemorial.\"[11] The Basutos,\namong whom \"the chiefs have the right of making laws and publishing\nregulations required by the necessities of the times,\" regard such\nlaws, or _molaos_, as inferior to the _mekhoas_, \"the use and wont,\"\nwhich constitute the real laws of the country.[12] Among the ancient\nIrish, there was no sovereign authority competent to enact a new law,\nthe function of the king being merely, as chief of the tribal\nassembly, to see that the proper customs were observed.[13]\n\n[Footnote 8: Marsden, _History of Sumatra_, p. 217.]\n\n[Footnote 9: Ellis, _History of Madagascar_, i. 359.]\n\n[Footnote 10: Beecham, _Ashantee and the Gold Coast_, p. 90 _sq._ _Cf._\nStuhlmann, _Mit Emin Pascha ins Herz von Afrika_, p. 523\n(A-l[=u]r).]\n\n[Footnote 11: Reade, _Savage Africa_, p. 52 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 12: Casalis, _Basutos_, p. 228.]\n\n[Footnote 13: _Ancient Laws of Ireland_, iii. p. lxxxvi. _sq._ Cherry,\n_Growth of Criminal Law_, p. 33.]\n\n{163} In competition with law, custom frequently carries the day. In\nIndia, especially in the South, \"custom has always been to a great\nextent superior to the written law.\"[14] In the Ramnad case, the\nJudicial Committee expressly declared that, \"under the Hindu system of\nlaw, clear proof of usage will outweigh the written text of the\nlaw.\"[15] It was also a maxim of the Roman jurists that laws may be\nabrogated by desuetude or contrary usage;[16] and in modern times the\nsame doctrine is acted upon in Scotland.[17] Moreover, when a custom\ncannot abrogate the law, it may still have a paralysing influence on\nits execution. According to the laws of European nations, a man who\nhas killed another in a duel is to be treated as a homicide; yet\nwherever the duel exists as a custom, the law against it is\nineffective. So it is on the Continent, and so it was in England in\nthe eighteenth century, when a well-informed writer could affirm that\nhe had \"not found any case of an actual execution in England in\nconsequence of a duel fairly fought.\"[18] In this instance the\nineffectiveness of the law is owing to the fact that the law has not\nbeen able to abolish an old custom. But the superiority of custom also\nshows itself in cases where the law itself is getting antiquated, and\na new custom, enforced by public opinion, springs up in opposition to\nit. Thus, contrary to law and earlier usage, it is nowadays the custom\nof certain European countries that a sentence of death is not carried\ninto execution. Even \"bad habits\" tend to weaken the authority of the\nlaw. Probably the two most prominent civil vices of the Chinese are\nbribery and gambling. Against both these vices their penal code speaks\nwith no uncertain sound; and yet, according to {164} Professor\nDouglas, it is no exaggeration to say that if the law were enforced,\nit would make a clean sweep of ninety-nine of every hundred officials\nin the empire.[19] Other illustrations of the same principle may be\nfound much nearer home.\n\n[Footnote 14: Burnell, quoted by Nelson, _View of the Hind[=u] Law_,\np. 136.]\n\n[Footnote 15: Mayne, _Treatise on Hindu Law and Usage_, p. 41.]\n\n[Footnote 16: _Institutiones_, i. 2. 11. _Digesta_, i. 3. 32.]\n\n[Footnote 17: Mackenzie, _Studies in Roman Law_, p. 54.]\n\n[Footnote 18: Quoted by Bosquett, _Treatise on Duelling_, p. 80. _Cf._\n_A Short Treatise upon the Propriety and Necessity of Duelling_,\nprinted at Bath in 1779. In 1808, however, Major Campbell was\nsentenced to death and executed for killing Captain Boyd in a duel\n(Storr, 'Duel,' in _Encyclop\u00e6dia Britannica_, vii. 514).]\n\n[Footnote 19: Douglas, _Society in China_, p. 82.]\n\nCustom has proved stronger than law and religion combined. Sir Richard\nBurton writes of the Bedouins, \"Though the revealed law of the Koran,\nbeing insufficient for the Desert, is openly disregarded, the\nimmemorial customs of the _Kazi al-Arab_ (the Judge of the Arabs) form\na system stringent in the extreme.\"[20] So, also, the Turkomans are\nruled, often tyrannised over, by a mighty sovereign, invisible indeed\nto themselves, but whose presence is plainly discerned in the word\n_deb_--\"custom,\" \"usage.\" Our authority adds:--\"It is very remarkable\nhow little the 'Deb' has suffered in its struggle of eight centuries\nwith Mahommedanism. Many usages, which are prohibited to the Islamite,\nand which the Mollahs make the object of violent attack, exist in all\ntheir ancient originality.\"[21]\n\n[Footnote 20: Burton, _Pilgrimage to Al-Madinah and Meccah_, ii. 87.]\n\n[Footnote 21: V\u00e1mb\u00e9ry, _Travels in Central Asia_, p. 310 _sqq._]\n\nThe laws themselves, in fact, command obedience more as customs than\nas laws. A rule of conduct which, from one point of view, is a law, is\nin most cases, from another point of view, a custom; for, as Hegel\nremarks, \"the valid laws of a nation, when written and collected, do\nnot cease to be customs.\"[22] There are instances of laws that were\nnever published, the knowledge and administration of which belonged to\na privileged class, and which nevertheless were respected and\nobeyed.[23] And among ourselves the ordinary citizen stands in no need\nof studying the laws under which he lives, custom being generally the\nsafe guiding star of his conduct. Custom, as Bacon said, is \"the\nprincipal magistrate of man's life,\"[24] or, as the ancients put it,\n\"the king of all men.\"[25]\n\n[Footnote 22: Hegel, _Philosophie des Rechts_, \u00a7 211, p. 199.]\n\n[Footnote 23: Rein, _Japan_, p. 314.]\n\n[Footnote 24: Bacon, 'Essay xxxix. Of Custom and Education,' in\n_Essays_, p. 372.]\n\n[Footnote 25: Herodotus, iii. 38.]\n\n{165} Many laws were customs before they became laws. Ancient customs\nlie at the foundation of all Aryan law-books. Mr. Mayne is of opinion\nthat Hindu law is based upon customs which existed even prior to and\nindependent of Brahmanism.[26] The Greek word [Greek: no/mos] means\nboth custom and law, and this combination of meanings was not owing to\npoverty of language, but to the deep-rooted idea of the Greek people\nthat law is, and ought to be, nothing more and nothing less than the\noutcome of national custom.[27] A great part of the Roman law was\nfounded on the _mores majorum_; in the Institutes of Justinian, it is\nexpressly said that \"long prevailing customs, being sanctioned by the\nconsent of those who use them, assume the nature of Laws.\"[28] The\ncase was similar with the ancient laws of the Teutons and\nIrish.[29]\n\n[Footnote 26: Mayne, _op. cit._ p. 4.]\n\n[Footnote 27: Ziegler, _Social Ethics_, p. 30. Schmidt, _Ethik der\nalten Griechen_, i. 201.]\n\n[Footnote 28: _Institutiones_, i. 2. 9.]\n\n[Footnote 29: Joyce, _Social History of Ancient Ireland_, i. 181.]\n\nThe transformation of customs into laws was not a mere ceremony. Law,\nlike custom, is a rule of conduct, but, while custom is established by\nusage and obtains, in a more or less indefinite way, its binding force\nfrom public opinion, a law originates in a definite legislative act,\nbeing set, as Austin says, by a sovereign person, or a sovereign body\nof persons, to a person or persons in a state of subjection to its\nauthor.[30] By becoming laws, then, the customs were expressly\nformulated, and were enforced by a more definite sanction. It seems\nthat the process in question arose both from considerations of social\nutility and from a sense of justice. Cicero observes that it was for\nthe sake of equity that \"laws were invented, which perpetually spoke\nto all men with one and the same voice.\"[31] From these points of view\nit was neither necessary nor desirable that more than a limited set of\ncustoms should pass into laws. There are customs which are too\nindefinite to assume the stereotyped shape of law.[32] There are\nothers, the breach {166} of which excites too little public\nindignation, or which are of too little importance for the public\nwelfare, to be proper objects of legislation. And there are others\nwhich may be said to exist unconsciously, that is, which are\nuniversally observed as a matter of course, and which, never being\ntransgressed, are never thought of.\n\n[Footnote 30: Austin, _Lectures on Jurisprudence_, i. 87, 181, &c.]\n\n[Footnote 31: Cicero, _De officiis_, ii. 12.]\n\n[Footnote 32: _Cf._ Aristotle, _Ethica Nicomachea_, v. 10. 6.]\n\nLaws which are based on customs naturally express moral ideas\nprevalent at the time when they are established. On the other hand,\nthough still in existence, they are not necessarily faithful\nrepresentatives of the ideas of a later age. Law may be even more\nconservative than custom. Though the latter exercises a very\npreservative influence on public opinion, it _eo ipso_ changes when\npublic opinion changes. Even among savages, in spite of their extreme\nregard for the customs of their ancestors, it is quite possible for\nchanges to be introduced; the traditions of the Central Australian\nArunta, for instance, indicate their own recognition of the fact that\ncustoms have varied from time to time.[33] But the legal form gives to\nan ancient custom such a fixity as to enable it to survive, as a law,\nthe change of public opinion and the introduction of a new custom. In\nall progressive societies, as Sir Henry Maine observes, social\nnecessities and social opinion are always more or less in advance of\nlaw. \"We may come indefinitely near to the closing of the gap between\nthem, but it has a perpetual tendency to re-open.\"[34]\n\n[Footnote 33: Spencer and Gillen, _Native Tribes of Central\nAustralia_, p. 12 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 34: Maine, _Ancient Law_, p. 24.]\n\nThe moral ideas of a people are less extensively represented in its\nlaws than in its customs. This is a corollary of the fact that there\nare always a great number of customs which never become laws.\nMoreover, whilst law, like custom, directly expresses only what is\nobligatory, it hardly ever deals with merit, even indirectly. The\nChinese have a method of rewarding and commemorating meritorious and\nvirtuous subjects by erecting gates in their honour, and conferring\nupon them marks of public distinction;[35] {167} and the Japanese and\nCoreans award prizes in the form of money or silver cups or monumental\ncolumns to signal exemplars of filial piety, arguing that, if the law\npunishes crime, it ought also to reward virtue.[36] In Europe we have\ntitles and honours, pensions for distinguished service, and the like;\nbut the distribution of them is not regulated by law, and has often\nlittle to do with morality.\n\n[Footnote 35: de Groot, _Religious System of China_ (vol. ii. book) i.\n769, 789 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 36: Griffis, _Corea_, p. 236.]\n\nLaw, like custom, only deals with overt acts, or omissions, and cares\nnothing for the mental side of conduct, unless the law be\ntransgressed. Yet, as will be seen subsequently, though this\nconstitutes an essential difference between law and the enlightened\nmoral consciousness, it throws considerable light on the moral\njudgments of the unreflecting mind.\n\nBeing a general, and at the same time a strictly defined, rule of\nconduct, a law can even less than a custom make special provision for\nevery case so as to satisfy the demand of justice. This disadvantage,\nhowever, was hardly felt in early periods of legislation, when little\naccount was taken of what was behind the overt act; and at later\nstages of development, the difficulty was overcome by leaving greater\ndiscretion to the judge. The history of legal punishments in England,\nfor instance, shows a change from a system which, except in cases of\nmisdemeanour, left no discretion at all to judges, to a system under\nwhich unlimited discretion is left to them in all cases except those\nwhich are still liable to capital punishment--practically, high\ntreason and murder.[37] The study of law, then, must for our purpose\nbe supplemented by the study of judicial practice.\n\n[Footnote 37: Stephen, _History of the Criminal Law of England_, ii. 87.]\n\nLaws which represent public opinion are no more than customs safe\nexponents of the moral ideas held by particular members of the\nsociety. But on the other hand, there are cases in which a law, unlike\na custom, may express the ideas, or simply the will, of a few, or even\nof {168} a single individual, that is, of the sovereign power only. It\nis obvious that laws imposed upon a barbarous people by civilised\nlegislators may differ widely from the people's own ideas of right and\nwrong. For instance, when studying the moral sentiments of the\nTeutonic peoples from their early law-books, we must carefully set\naside all elements of Roman or Christian origin. At the same time,\nhowever, it should be remembered that the moral consciousness of a\npeople may gradually be brought into harmony with a law originally\nforeign to it. If the law is in advance of public opinion--as Roman\nlaw undoubtedly was in Teutonic countries--it may raise the views of\nthe people up to its own standard by awaking in them dormant\nsentiments, or by teaching them greater discrimination in their\njudgments. And, as has been already noticed, what is forbidden and\npunished may, for the very reason that it is so, come to be regarded\nas wrong and worthy of punishment.\n\nFinally, a law may enjoin or forbid acts which by themselves are\nregarded as indifferent from a moral point of view. This is, for\ninstance, the case with the laws which require marriages to be\ncelebrated at certain times and places only, and which forbid the\ncultivation of tobacco in England. Jurists divide crimes into _mala in\nse_ and _mala quia prohibita_. The former would be wrong even if they\nwere not prohibited by law, the latter are wrong only because they are\nillegal.\n\nA law expresses a rule of duty by making an act or omission which is\nregarded as wrong a crime, that is, by forbidding it under pain of\npunishment. Law does not in all cases directly threaten[38] with\npunishment--I say directly, since all law is coercive, and all\ncoercion at some stage involves the possibility of punishment.[39]\nSanctions, or the consequences by which the sovereign political\nauthority threatens to enforce the laws set by it, may {169} have in\nview either the indemnification of the injured party, or the suffering\nof the injurer. In the latter case the sanctions are called\npunishments. But, though highly important, the distinction between\nindemnification and punishment is not absolute. A person who causes\nharm to another would hardly have to pay damages unless some kind of\nguilt or quasi-guilt were imputed to him; and, on the other hand,\npunishment may actually consist in the damages he has to pay.\nMoreover, the suffering involved in punishment must be regarded as a\nkind of indemnification in so far as it is intended to gratify the\ninjured party's craving for revenge. The pleasure of vengeance, says\nBentham, \"is a gain; it calls to mind Samson's riddle--it is sweet\ncoming out of the terrible, it is honey dropping from the lion's\nmouth.\"[40] In cases where the injured party is allowed to decide\nwhether the injurer shall be punished or not, or what punishment\n(within certain limits) shall be inflicted upon him, it is obvious\nthat punishment is largely looked upon as a means of indemnification.\nHowever, the fact that such a privilege is granted to the injured\nparty indicates the existence of some degree of sympathetic resentment\nin the public. Punishment, in all its forms, is essentially an\nexpression of indignation in the society which inflicts it.[41] Hence\nit is of extreme importance for the study of moral ideas, and calls\nfor our careful consideration.\n\n[Footnote 38: \"Not every sovereign can make sure of enforcing his\ncommands; and sometimes laws are made without even any great intention\nof enforcing them\" (Pollock, _Essays in Jurisprudence and Ethics_,\np. 9 _sq._).]\n\n[Footnote 39: _Cf._ Stephen, _op. cit._ i. 2.]\n\n[Footnote 40: Bentham, _Theory of Legislation_, p. 309.]\n\n[Footnote 41: \"Die Missbilligung ist das Wesentliche aller Strafe\"\n(von Bar, _Die Grundlagen des Strafrechts_, p. 4). \"La peine consiste\ndans une r\u00e9action passionnelle d'intensit\u00e9 gradu\u00e9e\" (Durkheim,\n_Division du travail social_, p. 96).]\n\nBy punishment I do not understand here every suffering inflicted upon\nan offender in consequence of his offence, but only such suffering as\nis inflicted upon him in a definite way by, or in the name of, the\nsociety of which he is a permanent or temporary member. This\ndefinition holds good whatever may be the opinion about the final\nobject of punishment. Whether its purpose is, or is supposed to be,\neither reformation, or determent, or retribution, its immediate aim is\nalways to cause suffering. {170} We should not call it punishment if\nthe reformation of the criminal were attempted, say, by means of\nhypnotism.\n\nIt is a common opinion that punishment, in this sense of the word, is\na social institution of comparatively modern origin, which has sprung\nfrom, and gradually superseded, the earlier custom of individual or\nfamily revenge. This opinion may seem plausible to the student of\nEuropean and Eastern law, but, as we shall see, the early history of\ncivilised races is apt to give a somewhat erroneous idea of the\nevolution of punishment. Even among savages public indignation\nfrequently assumes that definite shape which constitutes the\ndifference between punishment and mere condemnation.[42]\n\n[Footnote 42: See Steinmetz, _Ethnologische Studien zur ersten\nEntwicklung der Strafe_, ii. 327 _sqq._; Makarewicz, _\u00c9volution de la\npeine_, _passim_.]\n\nSavage punishment sometimes simply consists in publicly putting the\noffender to shame.\n\nIn Greenland the courts of justice were the public assemblies,\nwhich at the same time supplied the national sports and\nentertainments. Here \"nith-songs\" were used for settling all sorts of\ncrimes or breaches of public order or custom, with the exception of\nthose which could only be expiated by death; by means of cutting\ncapers and singing, the offender was told of his faults, and the\nopposite virtues were praised to all who were present.[43] The same\ninstitution is found, with only incidental differences, among several\nother tribes within and beyond the Arctic circle.[44] And, knowing the\nsensitiveness of these peoples, we may assume that the punishment in\nquestion is by no means lenient. In Greenland \"it now and then happens\nthat some one or other, wounded, perhaps, by a single word from one of\nhis kinsfolk, runs away to the mountains, and is lost for several days\nat least.\"[45] And Adair, speaking of the public jesting by which\nNorth American Indians used to punish young people who were guilty of\npetty crimes, says that \"they would sooner die by torture, than renew\ntheir shame by repeating the actions.\"[46]\n\n[Footnote 43: Rink, _Eskimo Tribes_, p. 24 _sq._ _Idem_, _Greenland_,\npp. 141, 150. Cranz, _op. cit._ i. 165 _sq._ Holm, 'Ethnologisk Skizze\naf Angmagsalikerne,' in _Meddelelser om Gr\u00f6nland_, p. 87.]\n\n[Footnote 44: Kane, _Arctic Explorations_, ii. 128 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 45: Nansen, _Eskimo Life_, p. 267 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 46: Adair, _History of the American Indians_, p. 429 _sq._]\n\n{171} In other instances the community as a whole expresses its\nindignation by inflicting suffering of a more material kind upon the\nculprit.\n\nIn certain Australian tribes, when a native for any transgression\nincurs the displeasure of his tribe, custom compels him to \"stand\npunishment,\" as it is called; that is, he stands with a shield at a\nfair distance, while the whole tribe, either simultaneously or in\nrapid succession, cast their spears at him. Their expertness generally\nenables those who are exposed to this trial to escape without serious\ninjury, though instances of a fatal result occasionally occur;\nhowever, there is a certain propriety even in this extraordinary\npunishment, as the accuracy and force with which the weapons are\nthrown will depend very much on the opinion entertained of the\nenormity of the offence.[47] Among the North-West-Central Queensland\naborigines, though each individual, within certain limits, can do what\nhe pleases, \"he has to reckon not only with the particular person\ninjured, or his relatives, but also, in some cases, with the whole\ncamp collectively. Thus the camp as a body, as a camp council, will\ntake upon itself to mete out punishment in crimes of murder, incest,\nor the promiscuous use of fighting-implements within the precincts of\nthe camping-ground: death, and probably the digging of his own grave,\nawaits the delinquent in the former case, while 'crippling,' generally\nwith knives, constitutes the penalty for a violation of the latter.\"\nAgain, if a woman makes herself obnoxious in the camp, especially to\nthe female portion of it, she is liable to be set upon and \"hammered\"\nby her fellow-sisters collectively, the men on such occasions not\ninterfering.[48] Among the Bangerang tribe of Victoria, \"any one who\nhad suffered a wrong complained of it, if at all, at night aloud to\nthe camp, which was silent and attentive. Then the accused was heard.\nAfterwards those who chose, men or women, expressed their views on the\nsubject; and if general opinion pronounced the grievance a good one,\nthe accused accepted the penalty sanctioned by custom.\"[49] Among\nvarious tribes in Western Victoria, \"should a person, through bad\nconduct, become a constant anxiety and trouble {172} to the tribe, a\nconsultation is held, and he is put to death.\"[50] Among the Mpongwe,\nif a man murders another, he is put to death, not by the nearest of\nkin, but by the whole community, being either drowned or burned\nalive.[51] Among the Hudson Bay Eskimo, \"when a person becomes so bad\nin character that the community will no longer tolerate his presence\nhe is forbidden to enter the huts, partake of food, or hold any\nintercourse with the rest. Nevertheless, as long as he threatens no\none's life, but little attention is paid to him. Should he be guilty\nof a murder, several men watch their opportunity to surprise him and\nput him to death, usually by stoning. The executioners make no\nconcealment of their action and are supported by public opinion in the\ncommunity.\"[52]\n\n[Footnote 47: Hale, _U.S. Exploring Expedition. Vol. VI. Ethnography\nand Philology_, p. 114. _Cf._ Eyre, _Journals of Expeditions of\nDiscovery into Central Australia_, ii. 388; Collins, _English Colony\nin New South Wales_, i. 586; Brough Smyth, _Aborigines of Victoria_,\nii. 295.]\n\n[Footnote 48: Roth, _Ethnological Studies among the North-West-Central\nQueensland Aborigines_, pp. 139, 141. Curr, _The Australian Race_,\ni. 61 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 49: Curr, _Squatting in Victoria_, p. 245.]\n\n[Footnote 50: Dawson, _Australian Aborigines_, p. 76.]\n\n[Footnote 51: Burton, _Two Trips to Gorilla Land_, i. 105.]\n\n[Footnote 52: Turner, 'Ethnology of the Ungava District,' in _Ann.\nRep. Bur. Ethn._ xi. 186.]\n\nAmong various savage peoples expulsion from the tribe is the\npunishment of persons whose conduct excites great public indignation,\nand among others such persons are outlawed.\n\nThe Chippewyans, among whom \"order is maintained in the tribe\nsolely by public opinion,\" the chief having no power to punish crimes,\noccasionally expel from the society individuals whose conduct is\nexceptionally bad and threatens the general peace.[53] The Salish, or\nflathead Indians, sometimes punished notorious criminals by expulsion\nfrom the tribe or band to which they belonged.[54] Sir E. F. Im Thurn,\nwhilst praising the Indians of Guiana for their admirable morality as\nlong as they remain in a state of nature, adds that there are\nexceptions to the rule, and that such individuals \"are soon killed or\ndriven out from their tribe.\"[55] Among the Bedouins of the Euphrates,\n\"in extreme cases, and as the utmost penalty of the law, the offender\nis turned out of the tribe\";[56] and the same is the case among the\nBeni Mzab.[57] In the Scotch Highlands, even to this day, instances\nare common of public opinion operating as a punishment, to the extent\nof forcing individuals into exile.[58] There are cases reported from\nvarious parts of the savage world of banishment being inflicted as a\npunishment for sexual {173} offences;[59] and other instances of\nexpulsion are mentioned by Dr. Steinmetz.[60] In some cases, however,\nexpulsion is to be regarded rather as a means of ridding the community\nfrom a pollution, than as a punishment in the proper sense of the\nterm.[61]\n\n[Footnote 53: Richardson, _Arctic Searching Expedition_, ii. 26 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 54: Hale, _op. cit._ p. 208.]\n\n[Footnote 55: Im Thurn, _Among the Indians of Guiana_, p. 213.]\n\n[Footnote 56: Blunt, _Bedouin Tribes of the Euphrates_, ii. 206.]\n\n[Footnote 57: Chavanne, _Sahara_, p. 315. Tristram, _Great Sahara_,\np. 207.]\n\n[Footnote 58: Stewart, _Highlanders of Scotland_, p. 380.]\n\n[Footnote 59: Westermarck, _History of Human Marriage_, p. 61\n_sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 60: Steinmetz, _op. cit._ ii. ch. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 61: See _infra_, on Homicide.]\n\nNearly related to the punishment of expulsion is that of outlawry.\nVon Wrede states that the Bedouins of [H.]adhramaut give a respite of\nthree days to the banished man, and that after the lapse of this\nperiod every member of the tribe is allowed to kill him.[62] Among the\nWyandots the lowest grade of outlawry consists in a declaration that,\nif the offender shall continue in the commission of crimes similar to\nthat of which he has been guilty, it will be lawful for any person to\nkill him, whilst outlawry of the highest degree makes it the duty of\nany member of the tribe who may meet with the offender to kill\nhim.[63] Among the ancient Teutons, also, outlawry was originally a\ndeclaration of war by the commonwealth against an offending member,\nand became only later on a regular means of compelling submission to\nthe authority of the courts.[64]\n\n[Footnote 62: von Wrede, _Reise in [H.]adhramaut_, p. 51.]\n\n[Footnote 63: Powell, 'Wyandot Government,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._\ni. 68.]\n\n[Footnote 64: Pollock and Maitland, _History of English Law before the\ntime of Edward I._ i. 49.]\n\nMost generally, however, punishment is inflicted upon the culprit, not\nby the whole of the community, but by some person or persons invested\nwith judicial authority. Indeed, it is not only civilised races who\nhave judges and courts of justice. Among savages and barbarians\njustice is very frequently administered by a council of elders or by a\nchief.[65] Even people of so low a type as the Australian aborigines\nhave their tribunals.\n\n[Footnote 65: Petroff, 'Report on Alaska,' in _Tenth Census of the\nUnited States_, p. 152 (Aleuts). Morgan, _League of the Iroquois_, p.\n330. Powell, in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ i. 63, 66 _sq._ (Wyandots).\n_Idem_, 'Sociology,' in _American Anthropologist_, N.S. i. 706 (North\nAmerican tribes). Schoolcraft, _Indian Tribes of the United States_,\ni. 277 (Creeks). von Martius, _Beitr\u00e4ge zur Ethnographie Amerika's_,\ni. 88 (Brazilian Indians). Cook, _Journal of a Voyage round the\nWorld_, p. 41 (Tahitians). Lister, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxi. 54\n(Bowditch Islanders). Codrington, _Melanesians_, p. 345 (Solomon\nIslanders). Hunt, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxviii. 6 (Murray\nIslanders). Kohler, in _Zeitschr. f. vergl. Rechtswiss._ xiv. 448;\nSenfft, in Steinmetz, _Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_, p. 448; Kubary, 'Die\nEbongruppe im Marshall's Archipel,' in _Journal des Museum Godeffroy_,\ni. 37 (Marshall Islanders). _Idem_, _Ethnographische Beitr\u00e4ge zur\nKenntniss der Karolinischen Inselgruppe_, p. 73 _sqq._; _Idem_, 'Die\nPalau-Inseln,' in _Journal des Museum Godeffroy_, iv. 42 (Pelew\nIslanders). von Kotzebue, _Voyage of Discovery_, iii. 208 (Caroline\nIslanders). Worcester, _Philippine Islands_, p. 107 (Tagbanuas of\nPalawan). Marsden, _History of Sumatra_, p. 217 (Rejangs). von\nBrenner, _Besuch bei den Kannibalen Sumatras_, p. 211 (Bataks).\nForbes, _A Naturalist's Wanderings in the Eastern Archipelago_, p. 243\n(Kubus of Sumatra). Man, _Sonthalia_, p. 88 _sq._ Cooper, _Mishmee\nHills_, p. 238. Macpherson, _Memorials of Service in India_, p. 83\n(Kandhs). Stewart, in _Jour. As. Soc. Bengal_, xxiv. 609, 620 (Nagas,\nOld Kukis). Dalton, _Ethnology of Bengal_, p. 45 (Kukis). Forsyth,\n_Highlands of Central India_, p. 361 (Byg\u00e1s). Shortt, in _Trans. Ethn.\nSoc._ N.S. vii. 241 (Todas). Batchelor, _Ainu and their Folk-Lore_, p.\n278; von Siebold, _Die Aino auf der Insel Yesso_, p. 34. From Africa a\ngreat number of instances might be quoted, _e.g._:--Nachtigal, _Sahara\nund Sudan_, i. 449 (Ted\u00e2). Petherick, _Egypt, the Soudan, and Central\nAfrica_, p. 320 (Nouaer tribes). Beltrame, _Il Fiume Bianco_, p. 77\n(Shilluk). Laing, _Travels in the Timannee, &c. Countries_, p. 365\n(Soolimas). Mungo Park, _Travels in the Interior of Africa_, p. 15\n_sq._ (Mandingoes). Leuschner, in Steinmetz, _Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_, p.\n22 (Bakwiri). _Ibid._ p. 47 (Banaka and Bapuku). Tellier, _ibid._ p.\n175 (Kreis Kita, in the French Soudan). Bosman, _New Description of\nthe Coast of Guinea_, p. 331 (Negroes of Fida). Casati, _Ten Years in\nEquatoria_, p. 158, 163 (Akkas, Mambettu). Stuhlmann, _Mit Emin Pascha\nins Herz von Africa_, p. 523 (A-l[=u]r). _Emin Pasha in Central\nAfrica_, p. 89 (Wanyoro). Baskerville, in Steinmetz, _Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_,\np. 193 (Waganda). Beverley, _ibid._ p. 214 (Wagogo). Lang, _ibid._ p.\n253 _sqq._ (Washambala). Desoignies, _ibid._ p. 279 _sq._ (Msalala).\nDecle, _Three Years in Savage Africa_, pp. 71, 73, 74, 487 (Barotse,\nWakamba). Junod, _Les Ba-Ronga_, p. 155 _sq._ Burton, _Zanzibar_, ii.\n94 (Wanika). Holub, _Seven Years in South Africa_, ii. 319 (Marutse).\nKohler, in _Zeitschr. f. vergl. Rechtswiss._ xiv. 316 (Herero).\nAndersson, _Lake Ngami_, p. 197 (Ovambo). Rautanen, in Steinmetz,\n_Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_, p. 340 (Ondonga). Kolben, _Present State of the\nCape of Good Hope_, p. 86, 297 (Hottentots). Kohler, in _Zeitschr. f.\nvergl. Rechtswiss._ xv. 333 (Bechuanas). Casalis, _Basutos_, pp. 224,\n226. Maclean, _Compendium of Kafir Laws and Customs_, pp. 35, 110.\nHolden, _Past and Future of the Kaffir Races_, pp. 333, 336. Shooter,\n_Kafirs of Natal_, p. 99 _sq._]\n\n{174} Speaking of the native tribes of Central Australia, Messrs.\nSpencer and Gillen observe:--\"Should any man break through the strict\nmarriage laws, it is not only an 'impersonal power' which he has to\ndeal with. The head men of the group or groups concerned consult\ntogether with the elder men, and, if the offender, after long\nconsultation, be adjudged guilty and the determination be arrived at\nthat he is to be put to death--a by no means purely hypothetical\ncase--then the same elder men make arrangements to carry the sentence\nout, and a party, which is called an _ininja_, is organised for the\npurpose.\"[66] We hear of similar councils from various parts of the\nAustralian continent. In his description of the aborigines of New\nSouth Wales, Dr. Fraser states, \"The Australian council of old and\nexperienced men--this aboriginal senate and witenagemot--has the power\nto decree punishment for tribal offences.\" The chiefs sit as\nmagistrates to decide all cases which are brought before them, such as\nthe divulging of sacred things, speaking to a mother-in-law, the\nadultery of a wife; and there is even a {175} tribal executioner. At\nthe same time, many grievances are arranged without the intervention\nof the chiefs; for instance, if a man has been found stealing from his\nneighbour, or two men quarrel about a woman, a fight ensues, the one\nor the other gets his head broken, and there the matter ends.[67] The\nNarrinyeri have a judgment council of the elders of the clan, called\n_tendi_, which is presided over by the chief of the clan; and when any\nmember of the _tendi_ dies, the surviving members select a suitable\nman from the clan to succeed him. \"All offenders are brought to this\ntribunal for trial. In cases of the slaying by a person or persons of\none clan of the member of another clan in time of peace, the\nfellow-clansmen of the murdered man will send to the friends of the\nmurderer and invite them to bring him to trial before the united\n_tendies_. If, after full inquiry, he is found to have committed the\ncrime, he will be punished according to the degree of guilt.\"[68]\nAmong another Australian tribe, the Gournditch-mara, again, the\nheadman, whose office was hereditary, \"settled all quarrels and\ndisputes in the tribe. When he had heard both sides, and had given his\ndecision in a matter, no one ever disputed it.\"[69]\n\n[Footnote 66: Spencer and Gillen, _op. cit._ p. 15.]\n\n[Footnote 67: Fraser, _Aborigines of New South Wales_, p. 39.]\n\n[Footnote 68: Taplin, 'Narrinyeri,' in Woods, _Native Tribes of South\nAustralia_, p. 34 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 69: Fison and Howitt, _Kamilaroi and Narrinyeri_, p. 277.]\n\nAmong the Australian aborigines, then, we find cases in which\npunishment is inflicted by the whole community, and other cases in\nwhich it is inflicted by a tribunal or a chief. There can be little\ndoubt that the latter system has developed out of the former; there\nare obvious instances of transition from the one to the other. Among\nthe North-West-Central Queensland natives, for instance, in cases of\nmajor offences, such as murder, incest, or physical violence, the old\nmen are only said to \"influence\" aboriginal public opinion.[70] It is\nan inconvenient, and in larger communities a difficult, procedure for\nthe whole group to inflict punishments in common, hence the\nadministration of justice naturally tends to pass into the hands of\nthe leading men or the chief. But the establishment of a judicial\nauthority within the society may also have a different origin. Very\nfrequently judicial organisation {176} seems to have developed, not\nout of a previous system of lynch-law, but out of a previous system of\nprivate revenge.\n\n[Footnote 70: Roth, _op. cit._ p. 141.]\n\nAn act of individual or family revenge is by itself, of course, an\nexpression of private, not of public, feelings--of revenge, not of\nmoral indignation. But the case is different with the _custom_ of\nrevenge. We shall see in a following chapter that blood-revenge is\nregarded not only as a right, but, very frequently, as a duty\nincumbent upon the relatives of the slain person. So, also, revenge\nmay be deemed a duty in cases where there is no blood-guiltiness.\nAmong the Australian Geawe-gal tribe, for instance, the offender,\naccording to the magnitude of his offence, was to receive one or more\nspears from men who were relatives of the deceased person; or the\ninjured man himself, when he had recovered strength, might discharge\nthe spears at the offender. And our authority adds, \"Obedience to such\nlaws was never withheld, but would have been enforced, without doubt,\nif necessary, by the assembled tribe.\"[71] The obligatory character of\nrevenge implies that its omission is disapproved of. It is of course\nthe man on whom the duty of vengeance is incumbent that is the\nimmediate object of blame, when this duty is omitted; and the blame\nmay partly be due to contempt, especially when there is a suspicion of\ncowardice. But behind the public censure there is obviously a desire\nto see the injurer suffer. Instances may be quoted in which the\nsociety actually assists the avenger, in some way or other, in\nattaining his object. Speaking of the Fuegians, M. Hyades\nobserves:--\"Nous avons entendu parler d'individus coupables de meurtre\nsur leur femme, par exemple, et qui, poursuivis par tout un groupe de\nfamilles, finissaient, quelquefois un an ou deux apr\u00e8s leur crime, par\ntomber sous les coups des parents de la victime. Il s'agit l\u00e0 plut\u00f4t\nd'un acte de justice que d'une satisfaction de vengeance. Nous devons\nfaire remarquer en outre que, dans ces cas, le meurtrier est abandonn\u00e9\nde tous, et qu'il ne peut se soustraire que pendant un temps {177}\nrelativement assez court au ch\u00e2timent qui le menace.\"[72] Amongst the\nCentral Eskimo, who have \"no punishment for transgressors except the\nblood vengeance,\" a man has committed a murder or made himself odious\nby other outrages, \"he may be killed by any one simply as a matter of\njustice. The man who intends to take revenge on him must ask his\ncountrymen singly if each agrees in the opinion that the offender is a\nbad man deserving death. If all answer in the affirmative he may kill\nthe man thus condemned, and no one is allowed to revenge the\nmurder.\"[73] Among the Greenlanders, in cases of extreme atrocity, the\nmen of a village have been known to make common cause against a\nmurderer, and kill him, though it otherwise is the business of the\nnearest relatives to take revenge.[74] It is also noteworthy that,\namong the crimes which in savage communities are punished by the\ncommunity at large, incest is particularly prominent. The chief reason\nfor this I take to be the absence of an individual naturally\ndesignated as the avenger.\n\n[Footnote 71: Fison and Howitt, _op. cit._ p. 282.]\n\n[Footnote 72: Hyades and Deniker, _Mission scientifique du Cap Horn_,\nvii. 240 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 73: Boas, 'Central Eskimo,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ vi. 582.]\n\n[Footnote 74: Nansen, _Eskimo Life_, p. 163.]\n\nThus public indignation displays itself not only in punishment, but,\nto a certain extent, in the custom of revenge. In both cases the\nsociety desires that the offender shall suffer for his deed. Strictly\nspeaking, the relationship between the custom of revenge and\npunishment is not, as has been often supposed, that between parent and\nchild. It is a collateral relationship. They have a common ancestor,\nthe feeling of public resentment.\n\nBut whilst public opinion demands that vengeance shall be exacted for\ninjuries, it is also operative in another way. Though in some cases\nthe resentment may seem to outsiders to be too weak or too much\nchecked by other impulses, it may in other cases appear unduly great.\nAs a matter of fact, we frequently find the practice of revenge being\nregulated by a rule which requires equivalence between the injury and\nthe suffering inflicted in return for {178} it. Sometimes this rule\ndemands that only one life shall be taken for one;[75] sometimes that\na death shall be avenged on a person of the same rank, sex, or age as\nthe deceased;[76] sometimes that a murderer shall die in the same\nmanner as his victim;[77] sometimes that various kinds of injuries\nshall be retaliated by the infliction of similar injuries on the\noffender.[78] This strict equivalence is not characteristic of\nresentment as such.[79] There is undoubtedly a certain proportion\nbetween the pain-stimulus and the reaction; other things being equal,\nresentment increases in intensity along with the pain by which it is\nexcited. The more a person feels offended, the greater is his desire\nto retaliate by inflicting counter-pain, and the greater is the pain\nwhich he desires to inflict. But resentment involves no accurate\nbalancing of suffering against suffering, hence there may be a crying\ndisproportion between the act of revenge and the injury evoking\nit.[80] As Sir Thomas Browne observes, a revengeful mind \"holds no\nrule in retaliations, requiring too often a head for a tooth, and the\nsupreme revenge for trespasses, which a night's rest should\nobliterate.\"[81] If, then, the rule of {179} equivalence is not\nsuggested by resentment itself, this rule must be due to other\nfactors, which intermingle with resentment, and help, with it, to\ndetermine the action. One of these factors, I believe, is\nself-regarding pride, the desire to pull down the humiliating\narrogance of the aggressor naturally suggesting the idea of paying him\nback in his own coin; and it seems probable that the natural\ndisposition to imitate, especially in cases of sudden anger, acts in\nthe same direction. But besides this qualitative equivalence between\ninjury and retaliation, the _lex talionis_ requires, in a rough way,\nquantitative equivalence, and this demand has no doubt a social\norigin. If the offender is a person with whose feelings men are ready\nto sympathise, their sympathy will keep the desire to see him suffer\nwithin certain limits; and if, under ordinary circumstances, they tend\nto sympathise equally with both parties, the injurer and the person\ninjured, and, in consequence, confer upon these equal rights, they\nwill demand a retaliation which is only equal in degree to the\noffence. By suffering a loss the offender compensates, as it were, for\nthe loss which he has inflicted; and when equal regard is paid to his\nfeelings and to those of his victim, it is deemed just that the loss\nrequired of him as a compensation should be equivalent to the loss for\nwhich he compensates, anything beyond equivalence being regarded as\nundeserved suffering. If this explanation is correct, the rule of\nequivalence must originally have been restricted to offences within\nthe social group; for, according to early custom and law, only members\nof the same society have equal rights. In speaking of the tit-for-tat\nsystem prevalent among the Guiana Indians, Sir E. F. Im Thurn\nexpressly says, \"Of course all this refers chiefly to the mutual\nrelations of members of the same tribe.\"[82] And when we find savages\nacting according to the same principle in their relations to other\ntribes, the reason for this may be sought partly in the strong hold\nwhich that principle has taken of their minds, and partly in the\ndangers accompanying intertribal revenge, {180} which make it\ndesirable to restrict it within reasonable limits.\n\n[Footnote 75: Krause, _Tlinkit-Indianer_, p. 245 _sq._ Macfie,\n_Vancouver Island and British Columbia_, p. 470. Foreman, _Philippine\nIslands_, p. 213 (Negrito and Igorrote tribes in the province of La\nIsabela). Low, _Sarawak_, p. 212 (Dyaks). von Langsdorf, _Voyages and\nTravels_, i. 132 (Nukahivans).]\n\n[Footnote 76: Jagor, _Travels in the Philippines_, p. 213 (Igorrotes).\nBlumentritt, quoted by Spencer, _Principles of Ethics_, i. 370 _sq._\n(Quianganes of Luzon). Munzinger, _Ostafrikanische Studien_, p. 243\n(Marea). _Koran_, ii. 173.]\n\n[Footnote 77: von Martius, _op. cit._ i. 129 (Brazilian Indians).\nWallace, _Travels on the Amazon_, p. 499 (Uaup\u00e9s). Schoolcraft,\n_Indian Tribes of the United States_, iii. 246 (Dacotahs). Steller,\n_Kamtschatka_, p. 355; Hickson, _A Naturalist in North Celebes_, p.\n198 (Sangirese of Manganitu). Fraser, _Journal of a Tour through Part\nof the Him[=a]l[=a] Mountains_, p. 339 (Butias). Ellis, _History of\nMadagascar_, i. 371. Munzinger, _op. cit._ p. 502 (Barea and Kun\u00e1ma).\nde Abreu, _Canary Islands_, p. 27 (aborigines of Ferro).]\n\n[Footnote 78: Im Thurn, _op. cit._ p. 213 _sq._ (Guiana Indians).\n_Glimpses of the Eastern Archipelago_, p. 86 (Bataks). Arbousset and\nDaumas, _Tour to the North-East of the Colony of Good Hope_, p. 67\n(Mantetis). Munzinger, _op. cit._ p. 502 (Barea and Kun\u00e1ma). Post,\n_Afrikanische Jurisprudenz_, p. 27 (various other African peoples), de\nAbreu, _op. cit._ p. 71 (aborigines, of Gran Canaria).]\n\n[Footnote 79: _Cf._ Tissot, _Le droit p\u00e9nal_, i. 226; Steinmetz,\n_Ethnol. Studien zur ersten Entwicklung der Strafe_, i. 401;\nMakarewicz, _op. cit._ p. 13.]\n\n[Footnote 80: von Martius, _op. cit._ i. 128 (Brazilian aborigines).\nCalder, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ iii. 21 (Tasmanians). Forbes, _A\nNaturalist's Wanderings in the Eastern Archipelago_, p. 473\n(Timorese). Sarasin, _Forschungen auf Ceylon_, iii. 539 (Veddahs).\nJacob, _Das Leben der vorisl\u00e2mischen Beduinen_, p. 144 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 81: Browne, _Christian Morals_, iii. 12, p. 94.]\n\n[Footnote 82: Im Thurn, _op. cit._ p. 214.]\n\nThe regulations to which the practice of revenge is subject, help us\nto understand the transition from revenge to punishment, and the\nestablishment of a special judicial authority. As long as retaliation\nis in the hands of private individuals, there is no guarantee, on the\none hand, that the offender will have to suffer, on the other hand,\nthat the act of retaliation will be sufficiently discriminate.\n\nThe injured party may be too weak, or otherwise unable, to avenge\nhimself. His readiest course, then, is to appeal to the chief for\nhelp. The chief, on his part, has an interest in interfering--he may\nof course expect a handsome reward for his assistance,[83]--and, in so\nfar as the community at large wishes that the offender shall suffer,\nthe chief may even be bound to interfere. Thus in the Sandwich\nIslands, the family or the friends of an injured person--who in cases\nof assault or murder were by common consent justified in taking\nrevenge--used to appeal to the chief of the district or to the king,\nwhen they were too weak to attack the offender themselves.[84] Among\nthe Wanyoro, according to Emin Pasha, should the murderer escape, the\nnearest relatives of the murdered man apply to the chief of the tribe\nto procure the punishment of the culprit.[85] The Indians of Brazil,\nwhen offended, sometimes bring their cause before the chief; but they\ndo it seldom, since they consider it disgraceful for a man not to be\nable to avenge himself.[86] The judicial authority granted to the\nBasuto chief \"also insures justice to foreigners, and to individuals\nwho, having no relations, are deprived of their natural defenders and\navengers.\"[87] In ancient Greece, in early times, special care was\ntaken by the State for the protection of the weak and helpless, who\notherwise had been unavenged.[88] In the Middle Ages, the {181} poor\nand the weak were placed under the King's protection; the intervention\nof royal justice, as Du Boys observes, \"apparaissait comme un bienfait\npour les faibles et un secours pour les opprim\u00e9s.\"[89]\n\n[Footnote 83: Steinmetz, _Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_, p. 311. _Cf._ Brunner,\n_Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte_, i. 165.]\n\n[Footnote 84: Ellis, _Tour through Hawaii_, p. 429.]\n\n[Footnote 85: _Emin Pasha in Central Africa_, p. 86.]\n\n[Footnote 86: von Martius, _op. cit._ i. 132.]\n\n[Footnote 87: Casalis, _op. cit._ p. 226.]\n\n[Footnote 88: Leist, _Gr\u00e6co-italische Rechtsgeschichte_, p. 372.]\n\n[Footnote 89: **Du Boys, _Histoire du droit criminel de l'Espagne_,\np. 237.]\n\nWhilst resentment on behalf of injuries inflicted upon persons who are\nunable to avenge themselves has thus, to some extent, contributed\ntowards the establishment of a central judicial and executive\nauthority, the sympathy naturally felt for the object of an improper\nand immoderate revenge undoubtedly tended to bring about a similar\nresult. The same feeling which checked indiscriminate revenge by\nestablishing the rule of strict equivalence, restricted it once more,\nand in a more effective way, by referring the case to a judge who was\nless partial, and more discriminate, than the sufferer himself or his\nfriends. Speaking of the feuds of the Teutons, Kemble remarks,\n\"Setting aside the loss to the whole community which may arise from\nprivate feud, the moral sense of men may be shocked by its results: an\nindividual's own estimate of the satisfaction necessary to atone for\nthe injury done to him, may lead to the commission of a wrong on his\npart, greater than any he hath suffered; nor can the strict rule of\n'an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth,' be applied where the\nexaction of the penalty depends upon the measure of force between\nappellant and defender.\"[90] In the Island of Bali the judge steps in\nbetween the prosecutor and the person whom he pursues, \"so as to\nrestrain the indiscriminate animosity of the one, and to determine the\ncriminality of the other.\"[91] Crawfurd, in his account of native\ncustoms in the Malay Archipelago, says that \"the law even expressly\ninterdicts all interference when there appears a character of fairness\nin the quarrel.\"[92] A Karen, we are told, always thinks himself right\nin taking the law into his own hands, this being the custom of the\ncountry, and \"he is never interfered with, unless he is guilty of some\n{182} act contrary to Karen ideas of propriety, when the elders and\nthe villagers interfere and exercise a check upon him.\"[93] Among the\nBasutos the authority of the chief is stated to be \"sufficiently\nrespected to protect criminated persons, until their cases have been\nlawfully examined.\"[94] Among the Californian Gallinomero the avenger\nof blood has his option between money and the murderer's life; \"but he\ndoes not seem to be allowed to wreak on him a personal and\nirresponsible vengeance,\" the chief taking the criminal and executing\nthe punishment.[95]\n\n[Footnote 90: Kemble, _Saxons in England_, i. 268 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 91: Raffles, _History of Java_, ii. p. ccxxxvii.]\n\n[Footnote 92: Crawfurd, _History of the Indian Archipelago_, iii. 120.]\n\n[Footnote 93: Mason, in _Jour. Asiatic Soc. Bengal_, xxxvii. pt. li.\n145. _Cf._ MacMahon, _Far Cathay and Farther India_, p. 188.]\n\n[Footnote 94: Casalis, _op. cit._ p. 226.]\n\n[Footnote 95: Powers, _Tribes of California_, p. 177.]\n\nBesides the desire that the offender shall suffer and the desire that\nhis suffering shall correspond to his guilt, there is a third factor\nof importance which has contributed to the substitution of punishment\nfor revenge and to the rise of a judicial organisation. For every\nsociety it is a matter of great consequence that there should be peace\nbetween its various members. Though the system of revenge helps to\nkeep down crime,[96] it also has a tendency to cause disturbance and\ndestruction. Any act of vengeance which goes beyond the limits fixed\nby custom is apt to call forth retaliation in return. Among the\nOssetes, says Baron von Haxthausen, \"if the retaliation does not\nexceed the original injury the affair terminates; but if the wound\ngiven is greater than the one received, the feud begins afresh from\nthe other side.\"[97] The custom of blood-revenge certainly does not\nimply that the avenger of unjustifiable homicide may himself be a\nproper object of retaliation;[98] but in the absence of a tribunal it\nmay be {183} no easy thing to decide the question of guilt, and,\nbesides, the dictate of custom may be overruled by passion. As a\nmatter of fact, the blood-feud often consists of a whole series of\nmurders, the revenge itself calling forth a new act of redress, and so\non, until the state or hostility may become more or less\npermanent.[99] In the long run this will prove injurious both to the\nfamilies implicated in the feud and to society as a whole, and some\nmethod of putting a stop to the feud will readily be adopted. One such\nmethod is to substitute the payment of blood-money for revenge;\nanother is to submit the cause to an authority invested with\njudicatory power. Casalis tells us that the Basutos are often heard to\nsay, \"If we were to revenge ourselves, the town or community would\nsoon be dispersed\"; and he adds that the instinctive fear of the\ndisorders that might arise from the exercise of individual law has\ninduced them to allow the chief of the tribe a certain right over the\nperson of every member of the community.[100]\n\n[Footnote 96: Taylor, _Te Ika a Maui_, p. 96 (Maori). Im Thurn, _op.\ncit._ pp. 213, 330 (Guiana Indians). Burckhardt, _Bedouins and\nWah\u00e1bys_, p. 84, _sq._; Blunt, _Bedouins of the Euphrates_, ii. 207;\nLayard, _Discoveries in the Ruins of Nineveh and Babylon_, p. 305\n_sq._ (Bedouins). Kohl, _Reise nach Istrien_, i. 409 _sq._\n(Montenegrines). Stephen, _History of the Criminal Law of England_, i.\n60 (Anglo-Saxons). Nordstr\u00f6m, _Svenska samh\u00e4lls-f\u00f6rfattningens\nhistoria_, ii. 228 (ancient Scandinavians). Steinmetz, _Ethnol.\nStudien zur ersten Entwicklung der Strafe_, ii. 125 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 97: von Haxthausen, _Transcaucasia_, p. 411.]\n\n[Footnote 98: Among the aborigines of Western Victoria, when life has\nbeen taken for life, the feud is ended (Dawson, _op. cit._ p. 70).\nAmong the Greenlanders, if the victim of revenge \"be a notorious\noffender, or hated for his bloody deeds, or if he have no relations,\nthe matter rests\"; but more frequently the act of vengeance costs the\navenger himself his life (Cranz, _op. cit._ i. 178). Among the\nBedouins, \"if the family of the man killed should in revenge kill two\nof the homicide's family, the latter retaliate by the death of one. If\none only be killed, the affair rests there and all is quiet; but the\nquarrel is soon revived by hatred and revenge\" (Burckhardt, _Bedouins\nand Wah\u00e1bys_, p. 86). In his book, _Das Leben der vorisl\u00e2mischen\nBeduinen_, Dr. Jacob likewise observes (p. 144):--\"Irrt\u00fcmlich ist die\nAnsicht, dass Blut immer neues Blut fordere. Was f\u00fcr einen Get\u00f6dteten\nein Anderer erschlagen, so galt die Sache in der Regel damit f\u00fcr\nerledigt und abgetan.\" _Cf._ Achelis, _Moderne V\u00f6lkerkunde_, p. 407,\nn. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 99: Nelson, 'Eskimo about Bering Strait,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur.\nEthn._ xviii. 293. Miklosich. 'Blutrache bei den Slaven,' in\n_Denkschriften d. kaiserl. Akademie d. Wissensch. Phil.-hist. Classe_,\nVienna, xxxvi. 132; &c.]\n\n[Footnote 100: Casalis, _op. cit._ p. 225. _Cf._ Boyle, _Adventures\namong the Dyaks of Borneo_, p. 217; Marsden, _op. cit._ p. 249 _sq._\n(Rejangs).]\n\nAs may be expected, it is only by slow degrees that revenge has\nyielded to punishment, and the private avenger has been succeeded by\nthe judge and the public executioner of his sentence. Among many\nsavages the chief is said to have nothing whatever to do with\njurisdiction.[101] Among {184} others he acts merely as an adviser, or\nis appealed to as an arbiter;[102] or the injured party may choose\nbetween avenging himself and appealing to the chief for redress;[103]\nor the judicial power with which the chief is invested is stated to be\nmore nominal than real.[104] It is also interesting to note that in\nseveral cases the injured party or the accuser acts as executioner,\nbut not as judge.\n\n[Footnote 101: Keating, _Expedition to the Source of St. Peter's\nRiver_, i. 123 (Potawatomis). Richardson, _Arctic Searching\nExpedition_, ii. 27 (Chippewyans), Carver, _Travels_, p. 259\n(Naudowessies). Dobrizhoffer, _Account of the Abipones_, ii. 163; &c.]\n\n[Footnote 102: Lewis and Clarke, _Travels to the Source of the\nMissouri River_, p. 306 _sq._ (Shoshones). Powers, _Tribes of\nCalifornia_, p. 45 (Karok and Yurok). Dunbar, 'Pawnee Indians' in\n_Magazine of American History_, iv. 261. Arbousset and Daumas, _op.\ncit._ p. 67 (Mantetis). Ellis, _Yoruba-speaking Peoples of the Slave\nCoast_, p. 300 (Tshi- and E[(w]e-speaking peoples of the African West\nCoast). Burckhardt, _Bedouins and Wah\u00e1bys_, pp. 68, 70. Blunt, _op.\ncit._ ii. 232 _sq._ (Bedouins of the Euphrates). von Haxthausen,\n_Transcaucasia_, p. 415 (Ossetes).]\n\n[Footnote 103: Ellis, _Tour through Hawaii_, p. 429. Williams and\nCalvert, _Fiji and the Fijians_, p. 23. Forbes, _A Naturalist's\nWanderings in the Eastern Archipelago_, p. 473 (Timorese).]\n\n[Footnote 104: Falkner, _Description of Patagonia_, p. 123. Anderson,\n_Lake Ngami_, p. 231 (Damaras).]\n\nThus among some Australian tribes, \"a man accused of a serious\noffence gets a month's citation to appear before the tribunal, on pain\nof death if he disobeys. If he is found guilty of a private wrong, he\nis painted white, and made to stand out at fifty paces in front of the\naccuser and his friends, all fully armed. They throw at him a shower\nof spears and 'bumarangs,' from which he protects himself with a light\nshield.\"[105] Among the Aricara Indians of the Missouri, who, for the\nmost part, punish murder with death, the nearest relative of the\nmurdered man was deputed by the council to act the part of\nexecutioner.[106] With reference to the natives of Bali, Raffles says\nthat \"in the execution of the punishment awarded by the court there is\nthis peculiarity, that the aggrieved party or his friends are\nappointed to inflict it.\"[107] In some parts of Afghanistan, \"if the\noffended party complains to the Sirdar, or if _he_ hears of a murder\ncommitted, he first endeavours to bring about a compromise, by\noffering the Khoon Behau, or price of blood; but if the injured party\nis inexorable, the Sirdar lays the affair before the King, who orders\nthe Cauzy to try it; and, if the criminal is convicted, gives him up\nto be executed by the relations of the deceased.\"[108] Among the\npeoples round Lake Nyassa and Tanganyika and among the Bantu tribes\ngenerally, \"when a murderer is caught and proved guilty he is given\nover {185} to the relatives of the person murdered, who have power to\ndispose of him as they choose.\"[109] A similar practice prevails among\nthe Mishmis,[110] Bataks,[111] and Kamchadales.[112] It was also\nrecognised by early Slavonic,[113] Teutonic, and English codes.[114]\nAccording to the provisions of a code granted so late as 1231, by the\nAbbey of St. Bertin to the town of Arques, when a man was convicted of\nintentional homicide, he was handed over to the family of the murdered\nperson, to be slain by them.[115]\n\n[Footnote 105: Fraser, _Aborigines of New South Wales_, p. 40 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 106: Bradbury, _Travels in the Interior of America_, p. 168.]\n\n[Footnote 107: Raffles, _op. cit._ ii. p. ccxxxvii.]\n\n[Footnote 108: Elphinstone, _Kingdom of Caubul_, ii. 105 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 109: Macdonald, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxii. 108.]\n\n[Footnote 110: Cooper, _Mishmee Hills_, p. 238.]\n\n[Footnote 111: von Brenner, _op. cit._ p. 212.]\n\n[Footnote 112: Georgi, _Russia_, iii. 137.]\n\n[Footnote 113: Macieiowski, _Slavische Rechtsgeschichte_, ii. 127.]\n\n[Footnote 114: Wilda, _Strafrecht der Germanen_, p. 167. _Lex Salica_,\n68. _Laws of Cnut_, i. 53. _Leges Henrici I._ lxxi. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 115: _Leges vill\u00e6 de Arkes ab abbate S. Bertini concess\u00e6_,\n28 (d'Achery, _Spicilegium_, iii. 608).]\n\nBut although, in innumerable cases, punishment and judicial\norganisation have succeeded a previous system of revenge, and thus are\nproducts of social development, their existence or non-existence among\na certain people is no exact index to the general state of culture\nwhich that people has attained. Even among low savages we have noticed\ninstances of punishments which are inflicted by the community as a\nwhole, as also by special judicial authorities. On the other hand, we\nare taught by the history of European and Oriental nations, that the\nsystem of revenge is not inconsistent with a comparatively high degree\nof culture.[116] We can now see the reason for this apparent anomaly.\nIn a small savage community, all the members of which are closely\nunited with each other, an injury inflicted upon one is readily felt\nby all. The case may be different in a State consisting of\nloosely-connected social components, which, though forming a political\nunity, have little communication between themselves, and take no\ninterest in each other's private dealings. And, whilst in the smaller\nsociety public resentment is thus more easily aroused, such a society\nalso stands in more urgent need of internal peace.\n\n[Footnote 116: See _infra_, on Blood-revenge.]\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nOur assumption that punishment is, in the main, an expression of\npublic indignation, is opposed to another theory, according to which\nthe chief object of punishment, not only ought to be, but actually is,\nor has been, {186} to prevent crime by deterring people from\ncommitting it. We are even told that punishment, inflicted for such a\npurpose, is, largely, at the root of the moral consciousness; that\npunishment is not the result of a sense of justice, but that the sense\nof justice is a result of punishment; that, by being punished by the\nState, certain acts gradually came to be regarded as worthy of\npunishment, in other words, as morally wrong.[117]\n\n[Footnote 117: R\u00e9e, _Ursprung der moralischen Empfindungen_, p. 45\n_sqq._ _Idem_, _Entstehung des Gewissens_, p. 190 _sqq._]\n\nThere are certain facts which seem to support the supposition that\npunishment has, to a large extent, been intended to act as a\ndeterrent. We find that among various semi-civilised and civilised\npeoples the criminal law has assumed a severity which far surpasses\nthe rigour of the _lex talionis_.\n\nSpeaking of the Azteks, Mr. Bancroft observes that \"the greater\npart of their code might, like Draco's, have been written in blood--so\nsevere were the penalties inflicted for crimes that were comparatively\nslight, and so brutal and bloody were the ways of carrying those\npunishments into execution.\"[118] The punishment of death was\ninflicted on the man who dressed himself like a woman, on the woman\nwho dressed herself like a man,[119] on tutors who did not give a good\naccount of the estates of their pupils,[120] on those who carried off,\nor changed, the boundaries placed in the fields by public\nauthority;[121] and should an adulterer endeavour to save himself by\nkilling the injured husband, his fate was to be roasted alive before a\nslow fire, his body being basted with salt and water that death might\nnot come to his relief too soon.[122] Nor did the ancient Peruvian\ncode economise human suffering by proportioning penalties to crimes;\nthe punishment most commonly prescribed by it was death.[123] The\npenal code of China, though less cruel in various respects than the\nEuropean legislation of the eighteenth century, awards death for a\nthird and aggravated theft, for defacing the branding inflicted for\nformer offences,[124] and for privately casting copper coin;[125]\nwhilst for the commission of the most heinous crimes {187} the penalty\nis \"to be cut into ten thousand pieces,\" which appears to amount, at\nleast, to a license to the executioner to aggravate and prolong the\nsufferings of the criminal by any species of cruelty he may think\nproper to inflict.[126] In Japan, before the revolution of 1871, \"the\npunishments for crime had been both rigorous and cruel; death was the\nusual punishment, and death accompanied by tortures was the penalty\nfor aggravated crimes.[127] According to the Mosaic law, death is\ninflicted for such offences as breach of the Lord's day,[128] going to\nwizards,[129] eating the fat of a beast of sacrifice,[130] eating\nblood,[131] approaching unto a woman \"as long as she is put apart for\nher uncleanness,\"[132] and various kinds of sexual offences.[133] The\nlaws of Manu provide capital punishment for those who forge royal\nedicts and corrupt royal ministers;[134] for those who break into a\nroyal store-house, an armoury, or a temple, and those who steal\nelephants, horses, or chariots;[135] for thieves who are taken with\nthe stolen goods and the implements of burglary;[136] for cut-purses\non the third conviction;[137] whilst a wife, who, proud of the\ngreatness of her relatives or her own excellence, violates the duty\nwhich she owes to her lord, shall be devoured by dogs in a place\nfrequented by many, and the male offender shall be burnt on a red-hot\niron bed.[138]\n\n[Footnote 118: Bancroft, _Native Races of the Pacific States_, ii. 454.]\n\n[Footnote 119: Clavigero, _History of Mexico_, i. 358.]\n\n[Footnote 120: _Ibid._ i. 359.]\n\n[Footnote 121: _Ibid._ i. 355.]\n\n[Footnote 122: Bancroft, _op. cit._ ii. 465 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 123: Garcilasso de la Vega, _First Part of the Royal\nCommentaries of the Yncas_, i. 145, 151 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 124: Wells Williams, _Middle Kingdom_, i. 512.]\n\n[Footnote 125: _Ta Tsing Leu Lee_, sec. ccclix. p. 397.]\n\n[Footnote 126: _Ibid._ sec. ccliv. p. 269 n. [dagger]]\n\n[Footnote 127: Reed, _Japan_, i. 323. Thunberg, _Travels_, iv. 65.]\n\n[Footnote 128: _Exodus_, xxxi. 14.]\n\n[Footnote 129: _Leviticus_, xx. 6.]\n\n[Footnote 130: _Ibid._ vii. 25.]\n\n[Footnote 131: _Ibid._ vii. 27.]\n\n[Footnote 132: _Ibid._ xviii. 19.]\n\n[Footnote 133: _Ibid._ xviii. 6 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 134: _Laws of Manu_, ix. 232.]\n\n[Footnote 135: _Ibid._ ix. 280.]\n\n[Footnote 136: _Ibid._ ix. 270.]\n\n[Footnote 137: _Ibid._ ix. 277.]\n\n[Footnote 138: _Ibid._ viii. 371 _sq._]\n\nIncreasing severity has been a characteristic of European\nlegislation up to quite modern times. Towards the end of the\nthirteenth century, the English law knows some seven crimes which it\ntreats as capital, namely, treason, homicide, arson, rape, robbery,\nburglary, and grand larceny; but the number of capital offences grew\nrapidly.[139] From the Restoration to the death of George III.--a\nperiod of 160 years--no less than 187 such offences, wholly different\nin character and degree, were added to the criminal code; and when, in\n1837, the punishment of death was removed from about 200 crimes, it\nwas still left applicable to exactly the same offences as were capital\nat the end of the thirteenth century.[140] Pocket-picking was\npunishable with death until the year 1808;[141] horse-stealing,\ncattle-stealing, {188} sheep-stealing, stealing from a dwelling-house,\nand forgery, until 1832;[142] letter-stealing and sacrilege, until\n1835;[143] rape, until 1841;[144] robbery with violence, arson of\ndwelling-houses, and sodomy, until 1861.[145] And not only was human\nlife recklessly sacrificed, but the mode of execution was often\nexceedingly cruel. In the beginning of the fifteenth century, the\n_Peine forte et dure_, or pressing to death with every aggravation of\ntorture, was adopted as a manner of punishment suitable to cases where\nthe accused refused to plead.[146] Burning alive of female offenders\nstill occurred in England at the end of the eighteenth century,[147]\nbeing considered by the framers of the law as a commutation of the\nsentence of hanging required by decency.[148] Still more cruel was the\npunishment inflicted on male traitors: they were first hanged by the\nneck and cut down before life was extinct, their entrails were taken\nout and burned before their face, then they were beheaded and\nquartered, and the quarters were set up in diverse places.[149] This\npunishment continued to exist in England as late as in the reign of\nGeorge III., and even then Sir Samuel Romilly, the great agitator\nagainst its continuance, brought upon himself the odium of the law\nofficers of the Crown, who declared that he was \"breaking down the\nbulwarks of the Constitution.\"[150] Such cruelties were not peculiar\nto the English. On the contrary, as Sir James Stephen observes, though\nEnglish people, as a rule, have been singularly reckless about taking\nlife, they have usually been averse to the infliction of death by\ntorture.[151] In various parts of the Continent we find such\npunishments as breaking on the wheel, quartering alive, and tearing\nwith red-hot pincers, in use down to the end of the eighteenth\ncentury.\n\n[Footnote 139: Pollock and Maitland, _op. cit._ ii. 511.]\n\n[Footnote 140: May, _Constitutional History of England_, ii. 595.\nMackenzie, _Studies in Roman Law_, p. 424 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 141: Pike, _History of Crime in England_, ii. 450.]\n\n[Footnote 142: _Ibid._ ii. 451. Stephen, _History of the Criminal Law\nof England_, i. 474.]\n\n[Footnote 143: Pike, _op. cit._ ii. 451. Stephen, _op. cit._ i. 474.]\n\n[Footnote 144: Stephen, _op. cit._ i. 475.]\n\n[Footnote 145: _Ibid._ i. 475.]\n\n[Footnote 146: For the manner in which this torture was inflicted, see\nAndrews, _Old-Time Punishments_, p. 203 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 147: _Ibid._ p. 198. Stephen, _op. cit._ i. 477.]\n\n[Footnote 148: Andrews, _op. cit._ p. 192.]\n\n[Footnote 149: Holinshed, _Chronicles of England, &c._ i. 310. Thomas\nSmith, _Commonwealth of England_, p. 198.]\n\n[Footnote 150: Andrews, _op. cit._ p. 203. An earlier method of\npunishing traitors was boiling to death, which was adopted by Henry\nVIII. as a punishment for poisoners as well (Holinshed, _op. cit._\ni. 311).]\n\n[Footnote 151: Stephen, _op. cit._ i. 478. _Cf._ Thomas Smith, _op.\ncit._ p. 193 _sq._]\n\nIt is interesting to compare these punishments with those practised\namong savages. Wanton cruelty is not a general characteristic of their\npublic justice.\n\n{189} Among several uncivilised peoples capital punishment is said\nto be unknown or almost so.[152] Among others it is restricted to a\nfew particularly atrocious offences. Among the Greenlanders \"none are\nput to death but murderers, and such witches as are thought to have\nkilled some one by their art.\"[153] The Aleuts punished with death\nmurderers and betrayers of community secrets.[154] In Samoa and New\nGuinea murder and adultery are punished capitally;[155] among the\nBataks, open robbery and murder, provided that the offender is unable\nto redeem his life by a sum of money;[156] among the Kukis, only\ntreason or an attempt at violence on the person of the King.[157]\nAmong the Mishmis, adultery committed against the consent of the\nhusband is punished with death, but all other crimes, including\nmurder, are punished by fines; however if the amount is not\nforthcoming the offender is cut up by the company assembled.[158] In\nKar Nicobar the only cause for a \"death penalty\" that Mr. Distant\ncould discover was madness.[159] Among the Soolimas \"murder is the\nonly crime punishable with death.\"[160] Among the Congo natives \"the\nonly capital crimes are stated to be those of poisoning and\nadultery.\"[161] Of the kingdom of Fida Bosman writes, \"Here are very\nfew capital crimes, which are only murthers, and committing adultery\nwith the King's or his great men's wives.\"[162] Among the Wanika two\ncrimes are visited with capital punishment--murder and an improper use\nof sorcery;[163] among the Wagogo[164] and Washambala,[165] witchcraft\nonly. Among the Basutos every murderer is by law liable to death, but\nthe sentence is generally commuted into confiscation; an incorrigible\nthief sometimes pays with his head, but is generally fined, whereas\ntreason and rebellion against authority are treated with more\nseverity.[166] Among the Kafirs, cases of assault on the persons of\nwives of the chiefs, {190} and what are deemed aggravated cases of\nwitchcraft, are the only crimes which usually involve the punishment\nof death, very summarily inflicted; whereas this punishment seldom\nfollows even murder, when committed without the supposed aid of\nsupernatural powers.[167]\n\n[Footnote 152: von Siebold, _Ethnol. Studien \u00fcber die Aino auf Yesso_,\np. 35; Batchelor, _Ainu and their Folk-Lore_, p. 284. Dalton, _op.\ncit._ p. 115 (Kakhyens). Marsden, _op. cit._ p. 248 (Rejangs of\nSumatra). Riedel, _De sluik- en kroesharige rassen tusschen Selebes en\nPapua_, p. 103 (Serangese). Worcester, _op. cit._ pp. 413, 492\n(Mangyans and Tagbanuas). Kubary, 'Die Palau-Inseln,' in _Journal des\nMuseum Godeffroy_, iv. 42 (Pelew Islanders). de Abreu, _op. cit._\np. 152 (Canary Islanders). Frisch, _Die Eingeborenen S\u00fcd-Afrika's_,\np. 322 (Hottentots).]\n\n[Footnote 153: Cranz, _op. cit._ i. 177.]\n\n[Footnote 154: Petroff, _loc. cit._ p. 152.]\n\n[Footnote 155: Turner, _Samoa_, p. 178. Chalmers, _Pioneering in New\nGuinea_, p. 179.]\n\n[Footnote 156: Marsden, _op. cit._ p. 389.]\n\n[Footnote 157: Dalton, _op. cit._ p. 45. Stewart, in _Jour. As. Soc.\nBengal_, xxiv. p. 627.]\n\n[Footnote 158: Griffith, _ibid._ vi. 332.]\n\n[Footnote 159: Distant, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ iii. 6.]\n\n[Footnote 160: Laing, _Travels_, p. 365.]\n\n[Footnote 161: Tucker, _Expedition to Explore the River Zaire_, p. 383.]\n\n[Footnote 162: Bosman, _op. cit._ p. 331.]\n\n[Footnote 163: New, _op. cit._ p. 111.]\n\n[Footnote 164: Beverley, in Steinmetz, _Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_, p. 215.]\n\n[Footnote 165: Lang, _ibid._ p. 259.]\n\n[Footnote 166: Casalis, _op. cit._ p. 228.]\n\n[Footnote 167: Maclean, _Compendium of Kafir Laws and Customs_,\np. 35 _sq._]\n\nNor, as it seems, is savage justice fond of torturing its victims\nbefore they are killed. The Maoris exclaimed loudly against the\nEnglish method of executing criminals, first telling them that they\nare to die, then letting them lie for days and nights in prison, and\nfinally leading them slowly to the gallows. \"If a man commits a crime\nworthy of death,\" they said, \"we shoot him, or chop off his head; but\nwe do not tell him first that we are going to do so.\"[168] Dr.\nCodrington gives the following description of the cases of burning\npersons alive which have occasionally happened in Pentecost\nIsland:--\"In fighting time there, if a great man were very angry with\nthe hostile party, he would burn a wounded enemy. When peace had been\nmade and the chiefs had ordered all to behave well that the country\nmight settle down in quiet, if any one committed such a crime as would\nbreak up the peace, such as adultery, they would tie him to a tree,\nheap fire-wood round him, and burn him alive, a proof to the opposite\nparty of their detestation of his wickedness. This was not done coolly\nas a matter of course in the execution of a law, but as a horrible\nthing to do, and done for the horror of it; a horror renewed in the\nvoice and face of the native who told me of the roaring flames and\nshrieks of agony.\"[169] This story is not without interest when\ncompared with the cold-blooded burning of female criminals and women\nsuspected of witchcraft in Christian Europe.\n\n[Footnote 168: Yate, _Account of New Zealand_, p. 105.]\n\n[Footnote 169: Codrington, _op. cit._ p. 347.]\n\nThere is sufficient evidence to show that the severe punishments\nadopted by peoples of a higher culture have been regarded by them as\nbeneficial to society. The legislators themselves often refer to the\ndeterrent effects of punishment.\n\nThe Peruvian Incas considered that light punishments gave\nconfidence to evil-doers, whilst \"through their great care in\npunishing a man's first delinquency, they avoided the effects of his\nsecond and third, and of the host of others that are committed in\nevery commonwealth where no diligence is observed {191} to root up the\nevil plant at the commencement.\"[170] According to the Prefatory Edict\nof the Emperor Kaung-hee, published in 1679, the chief ends proposed\nby the institution of punishments in the Chinese Empire \"have been to\nguard against violence and injury, to repress inordinate desires, and\nto secure the peace and tranquillity of an honest and unoffending\ncommunity.\"[171] In the Laws of Manu punishment is described as a\nprotector of all creatures:--\"If the king did not, without tiring,\ninflict punishment on those worthy to be punished, the stronger would\nroast the weaker, like fish on a spit; the crow would eat the\nsacrificial cake and the dog would lick the sacrificial viands, and\nownership would not remain with any one, the lower ones would usurp\nthe place of the higher ones. The whole world is kept in order by\npunishment, for a guiltless man is hard to find; through fear of\npunishment the whole world yields the enjoyments which it owes.\"[172]\nEven the gods, the D\u00e2navas, the Gandharvas, the R\u00e2kshasas, the bird\nand snake deities, give the enjoyments due from them only if they are\ntormented by the fear of punishment.[173] In medi\u00e6val law-books\ndeterment is frequently referred to as an object of punishment.[174]\nAnd in more modern times, till the end of the eighteenth century at\nleast, the idea that punishment should inspire fear was ever present\nto the minds of legislators.\n\n[Footnote 170: Garcilasso de la Vega, _op. cit._ i. 151 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 171: _Ta Tsing Leu Lee_, p. lxvii.]\n\n[Footnote 172: _Laws of Manu_, vii. 14, 15, 20-22, 24 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 173: _Ibid._ vii. 23.]\n\n[Footnote 174: _Leges Burgundionum_, Leges Gundebati, 52: \"Rectius\nenim paucorum condempnatione multitudo corregitur, quam sub specie\nincongruae civilitatis intromittatur occasio, quae licentiam tribuat\ndelinquendi.\" _Capitulare Aquisgranense An._ 802, 33: \"Sed taliter hoc\ncorripiantur, ut caeteri metum habeant talia perpetrandi\" (Migne,\n_Patrologi\u00e6 cursus_, xcvii. 230). _Chlotar II. Edictum de Synodo\nParisiensi_, 24: \"In ipsum capitali sententia judicetur, qualiter alii\nnon debeant similia perpetrare\" (Migne, _op. cit._ lxxx. 454). For\nother instances, see Brunner, _Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte_,\nii. 588, n. 6.]\n\nThe same idea is also conspicuous in the practice of punishing\ncriminals in public.[175] A petty thief in the pillory and a scold on\nthe cucking-stool were, in earlier times, spectacles familiar to\neverybody, whilst persons still living remember seeing offenders\npublicly whipped in the streets. \"A gallows or tree with a man hanging\nupon it,\" says Mr. Wright, \"was so frequent an object in the country\nthat it seems to have been almost a natural ornament of a landscape,\nand it is thus introduced by no {192} means uncommonly in medi\u00e6val\nmanuscripts.\"[176] In atrocious cases it was usual for the court to\ndirect the murderer, after execution, to be hung upon a gibbet in\nchains near the place where the fact was committed, \"with the\nintention of thereby deterring others from capital offences\"; and in\norder that the body might all the longer serve this useful purpose, it\nwas saturated with tar before it was hung in chains.[177] The\npopularity which mutilation as a punishment enjoyed during the Middle\nAges was largely due to the opinion, that \"a malefactor miserably\nliving was a more striking example of justice than one put to death at\nonce.\"[178]\n\n[Footnote 175: G\u00fcnther, _Die Idee der Wiedervergeltung_, i. 211 _sq._\nn. 31.]\n\n[Footnote 176: Wright, _History of Domestic Manners and Sentiments in\nEngland during the Middle Ages_, p. 346.]\n\n[Footnote 177: Holinshed, _op. cit._ i. 311. Blackstone, _Commentaries\non the Laws of England_, iv. 201. Cox, 'Hanging in Chains,' in _The\nAntiquary_, xxii. 213 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 178: Strutt, _View of the Manners, &c. of the Inhabitants of\nEngland_, ii. 8.]\n\nWe shall now consider whether these facts really contradict our thesis\nthat punishment is essentially an expression of public indignation.\n\nIt may, first, be noticed that the punishment actually inflicted on\nthe criminal is in many cases much less severe than the punishment\nwith which the law threatens him. In China the execution of the law\nis, on the whole, lenient in comparison with its literal and _prima\nfacie_ interpretation.[179] \"Many of the laws seem designed to operate\nchiefly _in terrorem_, and the penalty is placed higher than the\npunishment really intended to be inflicted, to the end that the\nEmperor may have scope for mercy, or, as he says, 'for leniency beyond\nthe bounds of the law.'\"[180] In Europe, during the Middle Ages,\nmalefactors frequently received charters of pardon, and in later times\nit became a favourite theory that it was good policy, in framing penal\nstatutes, to make as many offences as possible capital, and to leave\nto the Crown to relax the severity of the law. In England, about the\nbeginning of the nineteenth century, the punishment of death was\nactually inflicted in only a small proportion of the cases in {193}\nwhich sentence was passed; indeed, \"not one in twenty of the sentences\nwas carried into execution.\"[181] This discrepancy between law and\npractice bears witness, not only to the extent to which the minds of\nlegislators were swayed by the idea of inspiring fear, but to the\nlimitation of determent as a penal principle. It has been observed\nthat the excessive severity of laws hinders their execution. \"Society\nrevolted against barbarities which the law prescribed. Men wronged by\ncrimes, shrank from the shedding of blood, and forbore to prosecute:\njuries forgot their oaths and acquitted prisoners, against evidence:\njudges recommended the guilty to mercy.\"[182] Yet, in spite of all\nsuch deductions, there can be no doubt that the hangman had plenty to\ndo. Hanging persons, says Mr. Andrews, was almost a daily occurrence\nin the earlier years of the nineteenth century, \"for forging notes,\npassing forged notes, and other crimes which we now almost regard with\nindifference.\"[183]\n\n[Footnote 179: Staunton, in his Preface to _Ta Tsing Leu Lee_,\np. xxvii. _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 180: Wells Williams, _op. cit._ i. 392 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 181: Stephen, _op. cit._ i. 471. May, _op. cit._ ii. 597.]\n\n[Footnote 182: May, _op. cit._ ii. 597.]\n\n[Footnote 183: Andrews, _op. cit._ p. 218. _Cf._ Olivecrona, _Om\nd\u00f6dsstraffet_, p. x.]\n\nAnother circumstance worth mentioning is, that in earlier times the\ndetection of criminals was much rarer and more uncertain than it is\nnow.[184] It has been argued on utilitarian grounds that, \"to enable\nthe value of the punishment to outweigh that of the profit of the\noffence, it must be increased, in point of magnitude, in proportion as\nit falls short in point of certainty.\"[185] But the rareness of\ndetection would also for purely emotional reasons tend to increase the\nseverity of the punishment. When one criminal out of ten or twenty is\ncaught, the accumulated indignation of the public turns against him,\nand he becomes a scapegoat for all the rest.\n\n[Footnote 184: _Cf._ Morrison, _Crime and its Causes_, p. 175.]\n\n[Footnote 185: Bentham, _Principles of Morals and Legislation_, p.\n184. _Cf._ Paley, _Moral and Political Philosophy_, vi. 9 (_Complete\nWorks_, ii. 371).]\n\nHowever, the chief explanation of the great severity of certain\ncriminal codes lies in their connection with despotism or religion or\nboth.[186] An act which is prohibited {194} by law may be punished,\nnot only on account of its intrinsic character, but for the very\nreason that it is illegal. When the law is, from the outset, an\nexpression of popular feelings, the severity of the penalty with which\nit threatens the transgressor depends, in the first place, on the\npublic indignation evoked by the act itself, independently of the\nlegal prohibition of it. But the case is different with laws\nestablished by despotic rulers or ascribed to divine lawgivers. Such\nlaws have a tendency to treat criminals not only as offenders against\nthe individuals whom they injure or against society at large, but as\nrebels against their sovereign or their god. Their disobedience to the\nwill of the mighty legislator incurs, or is supposed to incur, his\nanger, and is, in consequence, severely resented. But however severe\nthey be, the punishments inflicted by the despot on disobedient\nsubjects are not regarded as mere outbursts of personal anger. In the\narchaic State the king is an object of profound regard, and even of\nreligious veneration. He is looked upon as a sacred being, and his\ndecrees as the embodiment of divine justice. The transgression of any\nlaw he makes is, therefore, apt to evoke a feeling of public\nindignation proportionate to the punishment which he pleases to\ninflict on the transgressor. Again, as to acts which are supposed to\narouse the anger of invisible powers, the people are anxious to punish\nthem with the utmost severity so as to prevent the divine wrath from\nturning against the community itself. But the fear which, in such\ncases, lies at the bottom of the punishment, is certainly combined\nwith genuine indignation against the offender, both because he rebels\nagainst God and religion, and because he thereby exposes the whole\ncommunity to supernatural dangers.\n\n[Footnote 186: This has been previously pointed out by Prof. Durkheim,\nin his interesting essay, 'Deux lois de l'\u00e9volution p\u00e9nale' (_L'ann\u00e9e\nsociologique_, iv. [1899-1900], p. 64 _sqq._), with which I became\nacquainted only when the present chapter was already in type.\nMontesquieu observes (_De l'esprit des lois_, vi. 9 [_[OE]uvres_, p.\n231]), \"Il serait ais\u00e9 de prouver que, dans tous ou presque tous les\n\u00c9tats d'Europe, les peines ont diminu\u00e9 ou augment\u00e9 \u00e0 mesure qu'on\ns'est plus approch\u00e9 ou plus \u00e9loign\u00e9 de la libert\u00e9.\"]\n\n{195} Various facts might be quoted in support of this explanation.\nWhilst the punishments practised among the lower races generally, are\nnot conspicuous for their severity, there are exceptions to this rule\namong peoples who are governed by despotic rulers.\n\nUnder the Ashanti code, even the most trivial offences are\npunishable with death.[187] In Madagascar, also, \"death was formerly\ninflicted for almost every offence.\"[188] In Uganda the ordinary\npunishments were \"death by fire, being hacked to pieces by reed\nsplinters, fine, imprisonment in the stocks _mvuba_, or in the\n**slave fork _kaligo_, also mutilation. It is most common to see\npeople deprived of an eye, or in some cases of both eyes; persons\nlacking their ears are also frequently met with.\"[189] Among the\nWassukuma, whose chieftains used to have power of life and death over\ntheir subjects, a person who was guilty of disobedience to his ruler,\nor of some action which the ruler considered wicked and punishable,\nwas condemned to death.[190] In the Sandwich Islands, \"a chief takes\nthe life of one of his own people for any offence he may commit, and\nno one thinks he has a right to interfere.\"[191]\n\n[Footnote 187: Ellis, _Tshi-speaking Peoples of the Gold Coast_, p. 166.]\n\n[Footnote 188: Ellis, _History of Madagascar_, i. 374.]\n\n[Footnote 189: Ashe, _Two Kings of Uganda_, p. 293. _Cf._ Wilson and\nFelkin, _Uganda and the Egyptian Soudan_, i. 201.]\n\n[Footnote 190: Kollmann, _Victoria Nyanza_, p. 431.]\n\n[Footnote 191: Ellis, _Tour through Hawaii_, p. 431.]\n\nIn the old monarchies of America and Asia there was an obvious\nconnection between the punishments prescribed by their laws and the\nreligious-autocratic form of their governments. According to\nGarcilasso de la Vega, the Peruvians--among whom the most common\npunishment was death--maintained \"that a culprit was not punished for\nthe delinquencies he had committed, but for having broken the\ncommandment of the Ynca, who was respected as God,\" and that, viewed\nin this light, the slightest offence merited to be punished with\ndeath.[192] In China the Emperor was regarded as the vicegerent of\nHeaven especially chosen to govern all nations, and was supreme in\neverything, holding at once the highest legislative and executive\npowers, without limit or control.[193] According {196} to ancient\nJapanese ideas, \"the duty of a good Japanese consists in obeying the\nMikado, without questioning whether his commands are right or wrong.\nThe Mikado is god and vicar of all the gods, hence government and\nreligion are the same.\"[194] In Rome the criminal law, which for a\nlong time was characterised by great moderation,[195] gradually grew\nmore severe according as absolutism made progress. Sylla, the\ndictator, not only put thousands of citizens to death by proscription\nwithout any form of trial, but fixed, in the Cornelian criminal code,\nfor heinous offences the punishment called _aqu\u00e6 et ignis\ninterdictio_. Under the Emperors some new and cruel capital\npunishments were introduced, such as burning alive and exposing to\nwild beasts; whilst at the same time offences such as driving away\nhorses or cattle were made capital.[196] In medi\u00e6val and modern Europe\nthe increase of the royal power was accompanied by increasing severity\nof the penal codes. Every crime came to be regarded as a crime against\nthe King. Indeed, breach of the King's peace became the foundation of\nthe whole Criminal Law of England; the right of pardon, for instance,\nas a prerogative of the Crown, took its origin in the fact that the\nKing was supposed to be injured by a crime, and could therefore waive\nhis remedy.[197] And the King was not only regarded as the fountain of\nsocial justice, but as the earthly representative of the heavenly\nlawgiver and judge.[198]\n\n[Footnote 192: Garcilasso de la Vega, _op. cit._ i. 145.]\n\n[Footnote 193: Wells Williams, _op. cit._ i. 393.]\n\n[Footnote 194: Griffis, _Religions of Japan_, p. 92. _Cf._ _Idem_,\n_Mikado's Empire_, p. 100.]\n\n[Footnote 195: _Cf._ Livy, x. 9; Polybius, vi. 14; Gibbon, _History of\nthe Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire_, v. 318, 326.]\n\n[Footnote 196: Mackenzie, _Studies in Roman Law_, pp. 408, 409, 414.\nGibbon, _op. cit._ v. 320. _Cf._ Mommsen, _R\u00f6misches Strafrecht_, p. 943.]\n\n[Footnote 197: Cherry, _Growth of Criminal Law in Ancient\nCommunities_, pp. 68, 105.]\n\n[Footnote 198: Henke, _Grundriss einer Geschichte des deutschen\npeinlichen Rechts_, ii. 310. Abegg, _Die verschiedenen\nStrafrechtstheorieen_, p. 117. Du Boys, _Histoire du droit criminel\nde l'Espagne_, p. 323.]\n\nOf the connection between punishment and the belief in supernatural\nagencies many instances are found already in the savage world.[199]\nThe great severity with which certain {197} infractions of custom are\npunished has obviously a superstitious origin. In Polynesia, according\nto Ellis, \"the prohibitions and requisitions of the tabu were strictly\nenforced, and every breach of them punished with death, unless the\ndelinquents had some very powerful friends who were either priests or\nchiefs.[200] Among the western tribes of Torres Straits, \"death was\nthe penalty for infringing the rules connected with the initiation\nperiod _i.e._, for sacrilege.\"[201] Among the Port Lincoln aborigines\nthe women and children are not allowed to see any of the initiation\nceremonies, and \"any impertinent curiosity on their part is punishable\nwith death, according to the ancient custom.\"[202] Among the Masai,\nwho believe that the boiling of milk will cause the cows to run dry,\n\"any one caught doing so can only atone for the sin with a fearfully\nheavy fine, or, failing that, the insult to the holy cattle will be\nwiped out in his blood.\"[203] The penalty of death which is frequently\nimposed on incest or other sexual offences is largely due to the\ninfluence of religious or superstitious beliefs.[204] And in various\ncases of sacrilege the offender is offered up as a sacrifice to the\nresentful god.[205]\n\n[Footnote 199: Steinmetz, _Ethnol. Studien zur ersten Entwicklung der\nStrafe_, ii. 340 _sq._ The connection between punishment and religion\nhas been emphasised by Prof. Durkheim (_Division du travail social_,\np. 97 _sqq._) and M. Mauss ('La religion et les origines du droit\np\u00e9nal,' in _Revue de l'histoire des religions_, vols. xxxiv. and\nxxxv.). But Prof. Durkheim exaggerates the importance of this\nconnection by assuming (p. 97) that \"le droit p\u00e9nal \u00e0 l'origine \u00e9tait\nessentiellement religieux.\"]\n\n[Footnote 200: Ellis, _Tour through Hawaii_, p. 394. _Cf._ Olmsted,\n_Incidents of a Whaling Voyage_, p. 248 _sq._; Mauss, in _op. cit._\nxxxv. 55.]\n\n[Footnote 201: Haddon, 'Ethnography of the Western Tribes of Torres\nStraits,' in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xix. 335.]\n\n[Footnote 202: Sch\u00fcrmann, 'Aboriginal Tribes of Port Lincoln,' in\nWoods, _Native Tribes of South Australia_, p. 234.]\n\n[Footnote 203: Johnston, _Kilima-njaro Expedition_, p. 425.]\n\n[Footnote 204: See _infra_, on Sexual Morality.]\n\n[Footnote 205: See _infra_, on Human Sacrifice.]\n\nAccording to Hebrew notions, it is man's duty to avenge offences\nagainst God; every crime involves a breach of God's law, and is\npunishable as such, and hardly any punishment is too severe to be\ninflicted on the ungodly.[206] These ideas were adopted by the\nChristian Church and by Christian governments.[207] The principle\n{198} stated in the Laws of Cnut, that \"it belongs very rightly to a\nChristian king that he avenge God's anger very deeply, according as\nthe deed may be,\"[208] was acted upon till quite modern times, and\nlargely contributed to the increasing severity of the penal codes. It\nwas therefore one of the most important steps towards a more humane\nlegislation when, in the eighteenth century, this principle was\nsuperseded by the contrary doctrine, \"Il faut faire honorer la\nDivinit\u00e9, et ne la venger jamais.\"[209]\n\n[Footnote 206: _Cf._ Robertson Smith, _Religion of the Semites_,\np. 162 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 207: von Eicken, _Geschichte und System der mittelalterlichen\nWeltanschauung_, p. 563 _sqq._ Abegg, _op. cit._ p. 111 _sq._ Wilda,\n_Strafrecht der Germanen_, p. 530 _sq._ G\u00fcnther, _op. cit._ ii. 12\n_sqq._ Henke, _op. cit._ ii. 310 _sq._ Brunner, _op. cit._ ii. 587.]\n\n[Footnote 208: _Laws of Cnut_, ii. 40.]\n\n[Footnote 209: Montesquieu, _De l'esprit des lois_, xii. 4\n(_[OE]uvres_, p. 282).]\n\nFrom the fact, then, that crimes are punished not only as wrongs\nagainst individuals, but as wrongs against the State, and, especially,\nas wrongs against some despotic or semi-divine lawgiver, or against\nthe Deity, it follows that even seemingly excessive punishments may,\nto a large extent, be regarded as manifestations of public resentment.\nThis emotion does not necessarily demand like for like. The law of\ntalion presupposes equality of rights; it is not applicable to\nimpersonal offences, nor to offences against kings or gods. And as the\ndemands of public resentment may exceed the _lex talionis_, so they\nmay on the other hand fall short of it. Moreover, though the degree of\npunishment on the whole more or less faithfully represents the degree\nof indignation aroused by any particular crime in comparison with\nother crimes belonging to the same penal system, we must not take the\ncomparative severity of the criminal laws of different peoples as a\nsafe index to the intensity of their reprobation of crime. As we have\nseen before, the strength of moral indignation cannot be absolutely\nmeasured by the desire to cause pain to the offender. When the emotion\nof resentment is sufficiently refined, the infliction of suffering is\nregarded as a means rather than as an end.\n\nBy all this I certainly do not mean to deny that punishment, though in\nthe main an expression of public indignation, is also applied as a\nmeans of deterring from crime. Criminal law is preventive, its object\nis to forbid and {199} to warn, and it uses punishment as a threat.\nBut the acts which the law forbids are, as a rule, such as public\nopinion condemns as wrong, and it is their wrongness that in all ages\nhas been regarded as the justification of the penalties to which they\nare subject. It is true that there are instances in which the law\npunishes acts which in themselves are not apt to evoke public\nresentment, and others in which the severity of the punishment does\nnot exactly correspond with the resentment they evoke. The State may\nhave a right to sacrifice the welfare of individuals in order to\nattain some desirable end. It may have a right to do so in cases where\nno crime has been committed, it would therefore seem to be all the\nmore justified in doing so when the evil has been preceded by a\nwarning. And yet, in the case of punishment, it is only within narrow\nlimits that such a right is granted to the State. To punish a person\ncould not simply mean that he has to suffer for the benefit of the\nsociety; there is always opprobrium connected with punishment. Hence\nthe scope which justice leaves for determent pure and simple is not\nwide. Sir James Stephen observes:--\"You cannot punish anything which\npublic opinion, as expressed in the common practice of society, does\nnot strenuously and unequivocally condemn. To try to do so is a sure\nway to produce gross hypocrisy and furious reaction.\"[210] Experience\nshows that the fate of all disproportionately severe laws which make\ntoo liberal use of punishment as a deterrent is that they come to be\nlittle followed in practice and are finally annulled. As Gibbon says,\n\"whenever an offence inspires less horror than the punishment awarded\nto it, the rigour of penal law is obliged to give way to the common\nfeelings of mankind.\"\n\n[Footnote 210: Stephen, _Liberty, Equality, Fraternity_, p. 159. _Cf._\nMommsen, _R\u00f6misches Strafrecht_, p. 91 _sq._]\n\nNumerous data, to be referred to in following chapters, will show how\nfaithfully punishment reflects the emotion of resentment, and how\nimpossible it would be to explain it from considerations of social\nutility without close reference {200} to the feeling of justice. Why,\nfor instance, should the attempt to commit a crime, when its failure\nobviously depends on mere chance, be punished less severely than the\naccomplished crime, if not because the indignation it arouses is less\nintense? Would not the same amount of suffering be requisite to deter\na person from attempting to murder his neighbour as to deter him from\nactually committing the murder? And is there any reason to suppose\nthat the unsuccessful offender is less dangerous to society than he\nwho succeeds? All the facts referring to criminal responsibility, as\nwe shall see, suggest resentment, not determent, as the basis of\npunishment, and so does the gradation of the punishment conformably to\nthe magnitude of the crime.[211] According to the principle of\ndeterment, as expressed by Anselm von Feuerbach and others, punishment\nshould be neither more nor less severe than is necessary for the\nsuppression of crime.[212] But if this rule were really acted upon,\nthe penalties imposed, especially on minor offences, which the law has\nbeen utterly unable to suppress, would certainly be much less lenient\nthan they actually are. Moreover, if there were no intrinsic\nconnection between punishment and resentment, how could we explain the\npredilection of early law for the principle of talion--an eye for an\neye, a tooth for a tooth, a life for a life--[213] which, as we have\nseen, so frequently regulates the custom of revenge?\n\n[Footnote 211: _Cf._ Durkheim, _Division du travail social_, p. 93 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 212: von Feuerbach, _Ueber die Strafe als Sicherungsmittel\nvor k\u00fcnftigen Beleidigungen des Verbrechers_, p. 83. von Gizycki,\n_Introduction to the Study of Ethics_, p. 188.]\n\n[Footnote 213: On this subject, see G\u00fcnther, _op. cit._\n_passim_.]\n\nThe criminal law of a society may thus, on the whole, be taken for a\nfaithful exponent of moral sentiments prevalent in that society at\nlarge. The attempt to make law independent of morality, and to allot\nto it a kingdom of its own, is really, I think, only an excuse for the\nmoral shortcomings which it reveals if scrutinised from the standpoint\nof a higher morality. Law does not show us the moral consciousness in\nits refinement. But refinement {201} is a rare thing, and criminal law\nis in the main on a level with the unreflecting morality of the vulgar\nmind. Philosophers and theorisers on law would do better service to\nhumanity if they tried to persuade people not only that their moral\nideas require improvement, but that their laws, so far as possible,\nought to come up to the improved standard, than they do by wasting\ntheir ingenuity in sophisms about the sovereignty of Law and its\nindependence of the realm of Justice.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII\n\nTHE GENERAL NATURE OF THE SUBJECTS OF ENLIGHTENED MORAL\nJUDGMENTS\n\n\nTHE subjects of moral judgments call for a very comprehensive\ninvestigation, which will occupy the main part of this work. As\nalready said, we shall first discuss the general nature, and\nafterwards the particular branches, of those phenomena which have a\ntendency to evoke moral condemnation or moral praise; and in each case\nour investigation will be both historical and explanatory. The present\nchapter, however, will be neither the one nor the other. It seems\ndesirable to examine the general nature of the subjects of moral\nvaluation from the standpoint of the enlightened moral consciousness\nbefore dealing with the influence which their various elements have\ncome to exercise upon moral judgments in the course of evolution. By\ndoing this, we shall be able, from the outset, to distinguish between\nelements which are hardly discernible, or separable, at the lower\nstages of mental development, as also to fix the terminology which\nwill be used in the future discussion.\n\nMoral judgments are commonly said to be passed upon conduct and\ncharacter. This is a convenient mode of expression, but the terms need\nan explanation.\n\nConduct has been defined sometimes as \"acts adjusted to ends,\"[1]\nsometimes as acts that are not only adjusted to ends, but definitely\nwilled.[2] The latter definition is too {203} narrow for our present\npurpose, because, as will be seen, it excludes from the province of\nconduct many phenomena with reference to which moral judgments are\npassed. The same may be said of the former definition also, which,\nmoreover, is unnecessarily wide, including as it does an immense\nnumber of phenomena with which moral judgments are never concerned.\nThough no definition of conduct could be restricted to such phenomena\nas actually evoke moral emotions, the term \"conduct\" seems,\nnevertheless, to suggest at least the possibility of moral valuation,\nand is therefore hardly applicable to such \"acts adjusted to ends\" as\nare performed by obviously irresponsible beings. It may be well first\nto fix the meaning of the word \"act.\"\n\n[Footnote 1: Spencer, _Principles of Ethics_, i. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 2: _E.g._, Mackenzie, _Manual of Ethics_, p. 85.]\n\nAccording to Bentham, acts may be distinguished as external, or acts\nof the body, and internal, or acts of the mind. \"Thus, to strike is an\nexternal or exterior act: to intend to strike, an internal or interior\none.\"[3] But this application of the word is neither popular nor\nconvenient. The term \"act\" suggests something besides intention,\nwhilst, at the same time, it suggests something besides muscular\ncontractions. To intend to strike is no act, nor are the movements\ninvolved in an epileptic fit acts.\n\n[Footnote 3: Bentham, _Principles of Morals and Legislation_, p. 73.]\n\nAn act comprises an event and its immediate mental cause. The event is\ngenerally spoken of as the outward act, but this term seems to be too\nnarrow, since the intentional production of a mental fact--for\ninstance, a sensation, or an idea, or an emotion like joy or sorrow or\nanger--may be properly styled an act. The objection will perhaps be\nraised that I confound acts with their consequences, and that what I\ncall the \"event\" is, as Austin maintains, nothing but bodily\nmovements. But Austin himself admits that he must often speak of\n\"acts\" when he means \"acts and their consequences,\" since \"most of the\nnames which seem to be names of acts, are names of acts, coupled with\ncertain of their consequences, {204} and it is not in our power to\ndiscard these forms of speech.\"[4] I regard the so-called consequences\nof acts, in so far as they are intended, as acts by themselves, or as\nparts of acts.\n\n[Footnote 4: Austin, _Lectures on Jurisprudence_, i. 427, 432 _sq._]\n\nThe very expression \"outward act\" implies that acts also have an inner\naspect. Intention, says Butler, \"is part of the action itself.\"[5] By\nintention I understand a volition or determination to realise the idea\nof a certain event; hence there can be only one intention in one act.\nCertain writers distinguish between the immediate and the remote\nintentions of an act. Suppose that a tyrant, when his enemy jumped\ninto the sea to escape him, saved his victim from drowning with a view\nto inflicting upon him more exquisite tortures. The immediate\nintention, it is maintained, was to save the enemy from drowning, the\nremote intention was to inflict upon him tortures.[6] But I should say\nthat, in this case, we have to distinguish between two acts, of which\nthe first was a means of producing the event belonging to the second,\nand that, when the former was accomplished, the latter was still only\nin preparation. A distinction has, moreover, been drawn between the\ndirect and the indirect intention of an act:--\"If a Nihilist seeks to\nblow up a train containing an Emperor and others, his direct intention\nmay be simply the destruction of the Emperor, but indirectly also he\nintends the destruction of the others who are in the train, since he\nis aware that their destruction will be necessarily included along\nwith that of the Emperor.\"[7] In this case we have two intentions,\nand, so far as I can see, two acts, provided that the nihilist\nsucceeded in carrying out his intentions, namely (1) the blowing up of\nthe train, and (2) the killing of the emperor; the former of these\nacts does not even necessarily involve the latter. But I fail to see\nthat there is any intention at all to kill other {205} persons.\nProfessor Sidgwick maintains that it would be thought absurd to say\nthat, in such a case, the nihilist \"did not intend\" to kill them;[8]\nbut the reason for this is simply the vagueness of language, and a\nconfusion between a psychical fact and the moral estimate of that\nfact. It might be absurd to bring forward the nihilist's non-intention\nas an extenuation of his crime; but it would hardly be correct to say\nthat he intended the death of other passengers, besides that of the\nemperor, when he only intended the destruction of the train, though\nthis intention involved an extreme disregard of the various\nconsequences which were likely to follow. He knowingly exposed the\npassengers to great danger; but if we speak of an intention on his\npart to expose them to such a danger, we regard this exposure as an\nact by itself.\n\n[Footnote 5: Butler, 'Dissertation II. Of the Nature of Virtue,' in\n_Analogy of Religion, &c._ p. 336.]\n\n[Footnote 6: Mackenzie, _op. cit._ p. 60. The example is borrowed from\nStuart Mill, _Utilitarianism_, p. 27 note.]\n\n[Footnote 7: Mackenzie, _op. cit._ p. 61. _Cf._ Sidgwick, _Methods of\nEthics_, p. 202, n. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 8: Sidgwick, _op. cit._ p. 202, n. 1. On the subject of\n\"indirect intention,\" _cf._ also Bentham, _op. cit._ pp. 84, 86.]\n\nA moral judgment may refer to a mere intention, independently of its\nbeing realised or not. Moreover, the moral judgments which we pass on\nacts do not really relate to the event, but to the intention. In this\npoint moralists of all schools seem to agree.[9] Even Stuart Mill, who\ndrew so sharp a distinction between the morality of the act and the\nmoral worth of the agent, admits that \"the morality of the action\ndepends entirely upon the intention.\"[10] The event is of moral\nimportance only in so far as it indicates a decision which is final.\nFrom the moral point of view there may be a considerable difference\nbetween a resolution to do a certain thing in a distant future and a\nresolution to do it immediately. However determined a person may be to\ncommit a crime, or to perform a good deed, the idea of the immediacy\nof the event may, in the last moment, induce him to change his mind.\n\"The road to hell is paved with good intentions.\" External events are\ngenerally the direct causes of our moral emotions; indeed, without the\n_doing_ of harm and the _doing_ of good, the moral consciousness would\nnever {206} have come into existence. Hence the ineradicable tendency\nto pass moral judgments upon acts, even though they really relate to\nthe final intentions involved in acts. It would be both inconvenient\nand useless to deviate, in this respect, from the established\napplication of terms. And no misunderstanding can arise from such\napplication if it be borne in mind that by an \"act,\" as the subject of\na moral judgment, is invariably understood the event _plus_ the\nintention which produced it, and that the very same moral judgment as\nis passed on acts would also, on due reflection, be recognised as\nvalid with reference to final decisions in cases where accidental\ncircumstances prevented the accomplishment of the act.\n\n[Footnote 9: Sidgwick, _op. cit._ p. 201.]\n\n[Footnote 10: Stuart Mill, _Utilitarianism_, p. 27 note. _Cf._ James\nMill, _Fragment on Mackintosh_, p. 376.]\n\nIt is in their capacity of volitions that intentions are subjects of\nmoral judgments. What is perfectly independent of the will is no\nproper object of moral blame or moral praise. On the other hand, any\nvolition may have a moral value. But, so far as I can see, there are\nvolitions which are not intentions. A person is morally accountable\nalso for his deliberate wishes, and the reason for this is that a\ndeliberate wish is a volition. I am aware that, by calling deliberate\nwishes \"volitions,\" I offend against the terminology generally adopted\nby psychologists. However, a deliberate wish is not only from a moral\npoint of view--as being a proper subject of moral valuation--but\npsychologically as well, so closely akin to a decision, that there\nmust be a common term comprising both. In the realm of conations,\ndeliberate wishes and decisions form together a province by\nthemselves. In contradistinction to mere conative impulses, they are\nexpressions of a person's character, of his will. A deliberate wish\nmay just as well as a decision represent his \"true self.\" It has been\nargued that a person may will one thing and yet wish the opposite\nthing. Locke observes:--\"A man whom I cannot deny, may oblige me to\nuse persuasions to another, which, at the same time I am speaking, I\nmay wish may not prevail upon him. In this case it is plain the will\nand desire run counter, I will the action that {207} tends one way,\nwhilst my desire tends another, and that the direct contrary way.\"[11]\nYet in this case I either do not intend to persuade the man, but only\nto discharge my office by speaking to him words which are apt to have\na persuasive effect on him; or, if I do intend to persuade him, I do\nnot in the same moment feel any deliberate wish to the contrary,\nalthough I may feel such a wish before or afterwards. We cannot\nsimultaneously have an intention to do a thing and a deliberate wish\nnot to do it.\n\n[Footnote 11: Locke, _Essay concerning Human Understanding_, ii. 21.\n30 (_Philosophical Works_, p. 219).]\n\nIf it is admitted that moral judgments are passed on acts simply in\nvirtue of their volitional character, it seems impossible to deny that\nsuch judgments may be passed on the motives of acts as well. By\n\"motive\" I understand a conation which \"moves\" the will, in other\nwords, the conative cause of a volition.[12] The motive itself may be,\nor may not be, a volition. If it is, it obviously falls within the\nsphere of moral valuation. The motive of an act may even be an\nintention, but an intention belonging to another act. When Brutus\nhelped to kill C\u00e6sar in order to save his country, his intention to\nsave his country was the cause, and therefore the motive, of his\nintention to kill C\u00e6sar. The fact that an intention frequently acts as\na motive has led some writers to the conclusion that the motive of an\nact is a part of the intention. But if the intention of an act is part\nof the act itself, and a motive is the cause of an intention, the\nmotive of an intention cannot be a part of that intention, since a\npart cannot be the cause of the whole of which it forms a part.\n\n[Footnote 12: \"The term 'motive,'\" says Professor Stout (_Groundwork\nof Psychology_, p. 233 _sq._) \"is ambiguous. It may refer to the\nvarious conations which come into play in the process of deliberation\nand tend to influence its result. Or it may refer to the conations\nwhich we mentally assign as the ground or reason of our decision when\nit has been fully formed.\" Motive, in the former sense of the term, is\nnot implied in what I here understand by motive. On the other hand, it\nshould be observed that there are motives not only for decisions, but\nfor deliberate wishes--another circumstance which shows the affinity\nbetween these two classes of mental facts.]\n\nBut even motives which, being neither deliberate wishes {208} nor\nintentions, consist of non-volitional conations, and, therefore, are\nno proper subjects of moral valuation, may nevertheless indirectly\nexercise much influence on moral judgments. Suppose that a person\nwithout permission gratifies his hunger with food which is not his\nown. The motive of his act is a non-volitional conation, an appetite,\nand has consequently no moral value. Yet it must be taken into account\nby him who judges upon the act. Other things being equal, the person\nin question is less guilty in proportion as his hunger is more\nintense. The moral judgment is modified by the pressure which the\nnon-volitional motive exercises upon the agent's will. The same is the\ncase when the motive of an act is the conative element involved in an\nemotion. If a person commits a certain crime under the influence of\nanger, he is not so blamable as if he commits the same crime in cold\nblood. Thus, also, it is more meritorious to be kind to an enemy from\na feeling of duty, than to be kind to a friend from a feeling of love.\nNo man deserves blame or praise for the pressure of a non-volitional\nconation upon his will, unless, indeed, such a pressure is due to\nchoice, or unless it might have been avoided with due foresight. But a\nperson may deserve blame or praise for not resisting that impulse, or\nfor allowing it to influence his will for evil or good.\n\nIt is true that moral judgments are commonly passed on acts without\nmuch regard being paid to their motives;[13] but the reason for this\nis only the superficiality of ordinary moral estimates. Moral\nindignation and moral approval are, in the first place, aroused by\nconspicuous facts, and, whilst the intention of an act is expressed in\nthe act itself, its motive is not. But a conscientious judge cannot,\nlike the multitude, be content with judging of the surface only.\nStuart Mill, in his famous statement that \"the motive has nothing to\ndo with the morality of the action, though much with the worth of the\nagent,\"[14] has drawn a distinction {209} between acts and agents\nwhich is foreign to the moral consciousness. It cannot be admitted\nthat \"he who saves a fellow creature from drowning does what is\nmorally right, whether his motive be duty, or the hope of being paid\nfor his trouble.\" He ought, of course, to save the other person from\ndrowning, but at the same time he ought to save him from a better\nmotive than a wish for money. It may be that \"he who betrays his\nfriend that trusts him is guilty of a crime, even if his object be to\nserve another friend to whom he is under greater obligations\";[15] but\nsurely his guilt would be greater if he betrayed his friend, say, in\norder to gain some personal advantage thereby. Intentions and motives\nare subjects of moral valuation not separately, but as a unity; and\nthe reason for this is that moral judgments are really passed upon men\nas acting or willing, not upon acts or volitions in the abstract. It\nis true that our detestation of an act is not always proportionate to\nour moral condemnation of the agent; people do terrible things in\nignorance. But our detestation of an act is, properly speaking, a\nmoral emotion only in so far as it is directed against him who\ncommitted the act, in his capacity of a moral agent. We are struck\nwith horror when we hear of a wolf eating a child, but we do not\nmorally condemn the wolf.\n\n[Footnote 13: _Cf._ James Mill, _Fragment on Mackintosh_, p. 376;\nSidgwick, _op. cit._ p. 364.]\n\n[Footnote 14: Stuart Mill, _Utilitarianism_, p. 26.]\n\n[Footnote 15: _Ibid._ p. 26.]\n\nA volition may have reference not only to the doing of a thing, but to\nthe abstaining from doing a thing. It may form part not only of an\nact, but of a forbearance. A forbearance is morally equivalent to an\nact, and the volition involved in it is equivalent to an intention.\n\"Sitting still, or holding one's peace,\" says Locke, \"when walking or\nspeaking are proposed, though mere forbearances, requiring as much the\ndetermination of the will, and being as often weighty in their\nconsequences as the contrary actions, may, on that consideration, well\nenough pass for actions too.\"[16] Yet it is hardly correct to call\nthem acts. Bentham's division of acts into acts of commission {210}\nand acts of omission or forbearance[17] is not to be recommended. A\nnot-doing I do not call an act, and the purpose of not doing I do not\ncall an intention.[18] But the fact remains that a forbearance\ninvolves a distinct volition, which, as such, may be the subject of\nmoral judgment no less than the intention involved in an act.\n\n[Footnote 16: Locke, _op. cit._ ii. 21, 28 (_Philosophical Works_,\np. 218).]\n\n[Footnote 17: Bentham, _op. cit._ p. 72.]\n\n[Footnote 18: _Cf._ Clark, _Analysis of Criminal Liability_, p. 42.]\n\nWilling not to do a thing must be distinguished from not willing to do\na thing; forbearances must be distinguished from omissions. An\nomission--in the restricted sense of the word--is characterised by the\nabsence of volition. It is, as Austin puts it, \"the not doing a given\nact, without adverting (at the time) to the act which is not\ndone.\"[19] Now moral judgments refer not only to willing, but to\nnot-willing as well, not only to acts and forbearances, but to\nomissions. It is curious that this important point has been so little\nnoticed by writers on ethics, although it constitutes a distinct and\nextremely frequent element in our moral judgments. It has been argued\nthat what is condemned in an omission is really a volition, not the\nabsence of a volition; that an omission is bad, not because the person\ndid not do something, but because he did something else, \"or was in\nsuch a condition that he could not will, and is condemned for the acts\nwhich brought him into that condition.\"[20] In the latter case, of\ncourse, the man cannot be condemned for his omission, since he cannot\nbe blamed for not doing what {211} he \"could not will\"; but to say\nthat an omission is condemned only on account of the performance of\nsome act is undoubtedly a psychological error. If a person forgets to\ndischarge a certain duty incumbent on him, say, to pay a debt, he is\ncensured, not for anything he did, but for what he omitted to do. He\nis blamed for not doing a thing which he ought to have done, because\nhe did not think of it; he is blamed for his forgetfulness. In other\nwords, his guilt lies in his negligence.\n\n[Footnote 19: Austin, _op. cit._ i. 438.]\n\n[Footnote 20: Alexander, _Moral Order and Progress_, p. 34 _sq._ So,\nalso, Professor Sidgwick maintains (_op. cit._ p. 60) that \"the proper\nimmediate objects of moral approval or disapproval would seem to be\nalways the results of a man's volitions so far as they were\nintended--_i.e._, represented in thought as certain or probable\nconsequences of such volitions,\" and that, in cases of carelessness,\nmoral blame, strictly speaking, attaches to the agent, only \"in so far\nas his carelessness is the result of some wilful neglect of duty.\" A\nsimilar view is taken by the moral philosophy of Roman Catholicism.\n(G\u00f6pfert, _Moraltheologie_, i. 113). Binding, again, assumes (_Die\nNormen_, ii. 105 _sqq._) that a person may have a volition without\nhaving an idea of what he wills, and that carelessness implies a\nvolition of this kind. Otherwise, he says, the will could not be held\nresponsible for the result. But, as we shall see immediately, the\nabsence of a volition may very well be attributed to a defect of the\nwill, and the will thus be regarded as the cause of an unintended\nevent. To speak of a volition or will to do a thing of which the\nperson who wills it has no idea seems absurd.]\n\nClosely related to negligence is heedlessness, the difference between\nthem being seemingly greater than it really is. Whilst the negligent\nman omits an act which he ought to have done, because he does not\nthink of it, the heedless man does an act from which he ought to have\nforborne, because he does not consider its probable or possible\nconsequences.[21] In the latter case there is acting, in the former\ncase there is absence of acting. But in both cases the moral judgment\nrefers to want of attention, in other words, to not-willing. The fault\nof the negligent man is that he does not think of the act which he\nought to perform, the fault of the heedless man is that he does not\nthink of the probable or possible consequences of the act which he\nperforms. In rashness, again, the party adverts to the mischief which\nhis act may cause, but, from insufficient advertence assumes that it\nwill not ensue; the fault of the rash man is partial want of\nattention.[22] Negligence, heedlessness, and rashness, are all\nincluded under the common term \"carelessness.\"\n\n[Footnote 21: The meaning of the word \"negligence,\" in the common use\nof language, is very indefinite. It often stands for heedlessness as\nwell, or for carelessness. I use it here in the sense in which it was\napplied by Austin (_op. cit._ i. 439 _sq._).]\n\n[Footnote 22: Austin, _op. cit._ i. 440 _sq._ Clark, _op. cit._, p. 101.]\n\nOur moral judgments of blame, however, are concerned with not-willing\nonly in so far as this not-willing is attributed to a defect of the\nwill, not to the influence of intellectual or other circumstances for\nwhich no man can be held responsible. That power in a person which we\ncall his \"will\" is regarded by us as a cause, not only of {212} such\nevents as are intended, but of such events as we think that the person\n\"could\" have prevented by his will. And just as, in the case of\nvolitions, the guilt of the party is affected by the pressure of\nnon-voluntary motives, so in the case of carelessness mental facts\nfalling outside the sphere of the will must be closely considered by\nthe conscientious judge. But nothing is harder than to apply this rule\nin practice.\n\nEqually difficult is it, in many cases, to decide whether a person's\nbehaviour is due to want of advertence, or is combined with a\nknowledge of what his behaviour implies, or of the consequences which\nmay result from it--to decide whether it is due to carelessness, or to\nsomething worse than carelessness. For him who refrains from\nperforming an obligatory act, though adverting to it, \"negligent\" is\ncertainly too mild an epithet, and he who knows that mischief will\nprobably result from his deed is certainly worse than heedless. Yet\neven in such cases the immediate object of blame may be the absence of\na volition--not a want of attention, but a not-willing to do, or a\nnot-willing to refrain from doing, an act in spite of advertence to\nwhat the act implies or to its consequences. I may abstain from\nperforming an obligatory act though I think of it, and yet, at the\nsame time, make no resolution not to perform it. So, too, if a man is\nruining his family by his drunkenness, he may be aware that he is\ndoing so, and yet he may do it without any volition to that effect. In\nthese cases the moral blame refers neither to negligence or\nheedlessness, nor to any definite volition, but to disregard of one's\nduty or of the interests of one's family. At the same time, the\ntransition from conscious omissions into forbearances, and the\ntransition from not-willing to refrain from doing into willing to do,\nare easy and natural; hence the distinction between willing and\nnot-willing may be of little or no significance from an ethical point\nof view. For this reason such consequences of an act as are foreseen\nas certain or probable have commonly been included under the term\n\"intention,\"[23] {213} often as a special branch of intention--\"oblique,\"\nor \"indirect,\" or \"virtual\" intention;[24] but, as was already noticed,\nthis terminology is hardly appropriate. I shall call such consequences\nof an act as are foreseen by the agent, and such incidents as are\nknown by him to be involved in his act, \"the known concomitants\" of\nthe act. When the nihilist blows up the train containing an emperor\nand others, with a view to killing the emperor, the extreme danger to\nwhich he exposes the others is a known concomitant of his act. So,\nalso, in most crimes, the breach of law, as distinct from the act\nintended, is a known concomitant of the act, inasmuch as the criminal,\nthough aware that his act is illegal, does not perform it for the\npurpose of violating the law. As Bacon said, \"no man doth a wrong for\nthe wrong's sake, but thereby to purchase himself profit, or pleasure,\nor honour, or the like.\"[25]\n\n[Footnote 23: _Cf._ Sidgwick, _op. cit._ p. 202.]\n\n[Footnote 24: Bentham, _op. cit._ p. 84. Austin, _op. cit._ i. 480.\nClark, _op. cit._ pp. 97, 100.]\n\n[Footnote 25: Bacon, 'Essay IV. Of Revenge' in _Essays_, p. 45. _Cf._\nGrotius, _De jus belli et pacis_, ii. 20. 29. 1: \"Vi quisquam gratis\nmalus est.\"]\n\nAbsence of volitions, like volitions themselves, give rise not only to\nmoral blame, but to moral praise. We may, for instance, applaud a\nperson for abstaining from doing a thing, beneficial to himself but\nharmful to others, which, in similar circumstances, would have proved\ntoo great a temptation to any ordinary man; and it does not\nnecessarily lessen his merit if the opposite alternative did not even\noccur to his mind, and his abstinence, therefore could not possibly be\nascribed to a volition. Very frequently moral praise refers to known\nconcomitants of acts rather than to the acts themselves. The merit of\nsaving another person's life at the risk of losing one's own, really\nlies in the fact that the knowledge of the danger did not prevent the\nsaver from performing his act; and the merit of the charitable man\nreally depends on the loss which he inflicts upon himself by giving\nhis property to the needy. In these and analogous cases of\nself-sacrifice for a good end, the merit, strictly speaking, consists\nin not-willing to {214} avoid a known concomitant of a beneficial act.\nBut there are instances, though much less frequent, in which moral\npraise is bestowed on a person for not-willing to avoid a known\nconcomitant which is itself beneficial. Thus it may on certain\nconditions be magnanimous of a person not to refrain from doing a\nthing, though he knows that his deed will benefit somebody who has\ninjured him, and towards whom the average man in similar circumstances\nwould display resentment.\n\nAll these various elements into which the subjects of moral judgments\nmay be resolved, are included in the term \"conduct.\" By a man's\nconduct in a certain case is understood a volition, or the absence of\na volition in him--which is often, but not always or necessarily,\nexpressed in an act, forbearance, or omission--viewed with reference\nto all such circumstances as may influence its moral character. In\norder to form an accurate idea of these circumstances, it is necessary\nto consider not only the case itself, but the man's character, if by\ncharacter is understood a person's will regarded as a continuous\nentity.[26] The subject of a moral judgment is, strictly speaking, a\nperson's will conceived as the cause either of volitions or of the\nabsence of volitions; and, since a man's will or character is a\ncontinuity, it is necessary that any judgment passed upon him in a\nparticular case, should take notice of his will as a whole, his\ncharacter. We impute a person's acts to _him_ only in so far as we\nregard them as a result or manifestation of his character, as directly\nor indirectly due to his will. Hume observes:--\"Actions are, by their\nvery nature, temporary and perishing; and where they proceed not from\nsome _cause_ in the character and disposition of the person who\nperformed them, they can neither redound to his honour, if good; nor\ninfamy, if evil. . . . The person is not answerable for them; and as\nthey proceeded {215} from nothing in him, that is durable and\nconstant, and leave nothing of that nature behind them, it is\nimpossible he can, upon their account, become the object of punishment\nor vengeance.\"[27] There is thus an intimate connection between\ncharacter and conduct as subjects of moral valuation. When judging of\na man's conduct in a special instance, we judge of his character, and\nwhen judging of his character, we judge of his conduct in general.\n\n[Footnote 26: _Cf._ Alexander, _op. cit._ p. 49: \"Character is simply\nthat of which individual pieces of conduct are the manifestation.\" To\nthe word \"character\" has also been given a broader meaning. According\nto John Grote (_Treatise on the Moral Ideals_, p. 442), a person's\ncharacter \"is his habitual way of thinking, feeling, and acting.\"]\n\n[Footnote 27: Hume, _Enquiry concerning Human Understanding_, viii. 2\n(_Philosophical Works_, iv. 80). _Cf._ _Idem_, _Treatise of Human\nNature_, iii. 2 (_ibid._ ii. 191). See also Schopenhauer, _Die beiden\nGrundprobleme der Ethik_ (_S\u00e4mmtliche Werke_, vol. vii.), pp. 123,\n124, 281.]\n\nIt will perhaps be remarked that moral judgments are passed not only\non conduct and character, but on emotions and opinions; for instance,\nthat resentment in many cases is deemed wrong, and love of an enemy is\ndeemed praiseworthy, and that no punishment has been thought too\nsevere for heretics and unbelievers. But even in such instances the\nobject of blame or praise is really the will. The person who feels\nresentment is censured because his will has not given a check to that\nemotion, or because the hostile attitude of mind has led up to a\ndefinite volition. Very frequently the irascible impulse in resentment\nor the friendly impulse in kindly emotion develops into a volition to\ninflict an injury or to bestow a benefit on its object; and the words\nresentment and love themselves are often used to denote, not mere\nemotions, but states of mind characterised by genuine volitions. An\nemotion, or the absence of an emotion, may also, when viewed as a\nsymptom, give rise to, and be the apparent subject of, a moral\njudgment. We are apt to blame a person whose feelings are not affected\nby the news of a misfortune which has befallen his friend, because we\nregard this as a sign of an uncharitable character. We may be\nmistaken, of course. The same person might have been the first to try\nto prevent the misfortune if it had been in his power; but we judge\nfrom average cases.\n\nAs for opinions and beliefs, it may be said that they involve\nresponsibility in so far as they are supposed to {216} depend on the\nwill. Generally it is not so much the opinion itself but rather the\nexpression, or the outward consequence, of it that calls forth moral\nindignation; and in any case the blame, strictly speaking, refers\neither to such acts, or to the cause of the opinion within the will.\nThat a certain belief, or \"unbelief,\" is never as such a proper object\nof censure is recognised both by Catholic and Protestant theology.\nThomas Aquinas points out that the _sin_ of unbelief consists in\n\"contrary opposition to the faith, whereby one stands out against the\nhearing of the faith, or even despises faith,\" and that, though such\nunbelief itself is in the intellect, the cause of it is in the will.\nAnd he adds that in those who have heard nothing of the faith,\nunbelief has not the character of a sin, \"but rather of a penalty,\ninasmuch as such ignorance of divine things is a consequence of the\nsin of our first parent.\"[28] Dr. Wardlaw likewise observes:--\"The\nBible condemns no man for not knowing what he never heard of, or for\nnot believing what he could not know. . . . Ignorance is criminal only\nwhen it arises from wilful inattention, or from aversion of heart to\ntruth. Unbelief involves guilt, when it is the effect and\nmanifestation of the same aversion--of a want of will to that which is\nright and good.\"[29] To shut one's eyes to truth may be a heinous\nwrong, but nobody is blamable for seeing nothing with his eyes\nshut.\n\n[Footnote 28: Thomas Aquinas, _Summa Theologica_, ii.-ii. 10. 1 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 29: Wardlaw, _Sermons on Man's Accountableness for his\nBelief, &c._ p. 38.]\n\nAfter these preliminary remarks, which refer to the scrutinising and\nenlightened moral consciousness, we shall proceed to discuss in\ndetail, and from an evolutionary point of view, the various elements\nof which the subjects of moral judgments consist.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IX\n\nTHE WILL AS THE SUBJECT OF MORAL JUDGMENT AND THE INFLUENCE OF\nEXTERNAL EVENTS\n\n\nHOWEVER obvious it may be to the reflecting moral consciousness that\nthe only proper object of moral blame and praise is the will, it would\nbe a hasty conclusion to assume that moral judgments always and\nnecessarily relate to the will. There are numerous facts which tend to\nshow that such judgments are largely influenced by external events\ninvolved in, or resulting from, the conduct of men.\n\nSome peoples are said to make no distinction between intentional and\naccidental injuries. Most statements to this effect refer to revenge\nor compensation.\n\nVon Martius states that, among the Arawaks, \"the blood-revenge is\nso blind and is practised so extensively, that many times an\naccidental death leads to the destruction of whole families, both the\nfamily of him who killed and of the family of the victim\";[1] and,\naccording to Sir E. F. Im Thurn, the smallest injury done by one\nGuiana Indian to another, even if unintentional, must be atoned by the\nsuffering of a similar injury.[2] Adair, in his work on the North\nAmerican Indians, says that they pursued the law of retaliation with\nsuch a fixed eagerness, that formerly if a little boy shooting birds\nin the high and thick cornfields unfortunately chanced slightly to\nwound another with his childish arrow, \"the young vindictive fox was\nexcited by custom to watch his ways with the utmost earnestness, till\nthe wound was returned in as equal a manner {218} as could be\nexpected.\"[3] Among the Ondonga in South Africa,[4] the Nissan\nIslanders in the Bismarck Archipelago,[5] and certain Marshall\nIslanders,[6] the custom of blood-revenge makes no distinction between\nwilful and accidental homicide. Among the Kasias \"destruction of human\nlife, whether by accident or design, in open war or secret, is always\nthe cause of feud among the relations of the parties.\"[7] It seems\nthat the blood-revenge of the early Greeks was equally indiscriminate.[8]\nAs for the blood-feuds of the ancient Teutons, Wilda maintains that,\neven in prehistoric times, it was hardly conformable to good custom to\nkill the involuntary manslayer;[9] but there is every reason to\nbelieve that custom made no protest against it. According to the myth\nof Balder, accident was no excuse for shedding blood. Loke gives to\nH\u00f6dur the mistletoe twig, and asks him to do like the rest of the\ngods, and show Balder honour, by shooting at him with the twig. H\u00f6dur\nthrows the mistletoe at Balder, and kills him, not knowing its power.\nAccording to our notions, blind H\u00f6dur is perfectly innocent of his\nbrother's death; yet the avenger, Vali, by the usual Germanic vow,\nneither washes nor combs his hair till he has killed H\u00f6dur. It is also\ninstructive to note that the narrator of this story finds himself\ncalled upon to explain, and, in a manner, to excuse the Asas for not\npunishing H\u00f6dur at once, the place where they were assembled being a\nsacred place.[10] We find survivals of a similar view in laws of a\ncomparatively recent date. The earliest of the Norman customals\ndeclares quite plainly that the man who kills his lord by misadventure\nmust die.[11] And, according to a passage in 'Leges Henrici I.,' in\ncase A by mischance falls from a tree upon B and kills him, then, if\nB's kinsman must needs have vengeance, he may climb a tree and fall\nupon A.[12] This provision has been justly represented as a curious\ninstance of a growing appreciation of moral differences, which has not\ndared to abolish, but has tried to circumvent the ancient\nrule.[13]\n\n[Footnote 1: von Martius, _Beitr\u00e4ge z\u00fcr Ethnographie Amerika's_,\ni. 693 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 2: Im Thurn, _Among the Indians of Guiana_, p. 214.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Adair, _History of the American Indians_, p. 150.]\n\n[Footnote 4: Rautanen, in Steinmetz, _Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_, p. 341.]\n\n[Footnote 5: Sorge, _ibid._ p. 418.]\n\n[Footnote 6: Kohler, in _Zeitschr. f. vergl. Rechtswiss._ xiv. 443.\nSee also _Idem_, _Shakespeare vor dem Forum der Jurisprudenz_, p.\n188.]\n\n[Footnote 7: Fisher, in _Jour. Asiatic Soc. Bengal_, ix. 835.]\n\n[Footnote 8: Rohde, _Psyche_, pp. 237, 238, 242.]\n\n[Footnote 9: Wilda, _Strafrecht der Germanen_, p. 174.]\n\n[Footnote 10: _Snorri Sturluson_, 'Gylfaginning,' 50, in _Edda_, p.\n59. _Cf._ Brunner, _Forschungen zur Geschichte des deutschen und\nfranz\u00f6sischen Rechtes_, p. 489.]\n\n[Footnote 11: Pollock and Maitland, _History of English Law before the\nTime of Edward I._ ii. 482.]\n\n[Footnote 12: _Leges Henrici I._ xc. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 13: Pollock and Maitland, _op. cit._ ii. 471.]\n\n{219} Among the Kandhs \"similar compensation is made in all cases\nboth of excusable homicide and of manslaughter.\"[14] And the same is\nsaid to be the case among various other savages or barbarians.[15]\n\n[Footnote 14: Macpherson, _Memorials of Service in India_, p. 82.]\n\n[Footnote 15: Crawfurd, _History of the Indian Archipelago_, iii. 123.\nEllis, _E[(w]e-speaking Peoples of the Slave Coast_, p. 223.\nMunzinger, _Ostafrikanische Studien_, p. 502 (Barea and Kun\u00e1ma).]\n\nHowever, this want of discrimination between intentional and\naccidental injuries is not restricted to cases of revenge or\ncompensation. Early punishment is sometimes equally indiscriminate.\n\nAmong the K\u00e1firs of the Hindu-Kush, \"murder, justifiable homicide,\nand killing by inadvertence in a quarrel, are all classed as one\ncrime, and punished in the same way. Extenuating circumstances are\nnever considered. The single question asked is, Did the man kill the\nother? The penalty is an extremely heavy blood-ransom to the family of\nthe slain man, or perpetual exile combined with spoliation of the\ncriminal's property.\"[16] Parkyns tells us the following story from\nAbyssinia:--A boy who had climbed a tree, happened to fall down right\non the head of his little comrade standing below. The comrade died\nimmediately, and the unlucky climber was in consequence sentenced to\nbe killed in the same way as he had killed the other boy, that is, the\ndead boy's brother should climb the tree in his turn, and tumble down\non the other's head till he killed him.[17] The Cameroon tribes do not\nrecognise the circumstance of accidental death:--\"He who kills another\naccidentally must die. Then, they say, the friends of each are equal\nmourners.\"[18] Among the negroes of Accra, according to Monrad,\naccidental homicide is punished as severely as intentional.[19]\n\n[Footnote 16: Scott Robertson, _K\u00e1firs of the Hindu-Kush_, p. 440.]\n\n[Footnote 17: Parkyns, _Life in Abyssinia_, ii. 236 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 18: Richardson, 'Observations among the Cameroon Tribes of\nWest Central Africa,' in _Memoirs of the International Congress of\nAnthropology_, Chicago, p. 203. See also Leuschner, in Steinmetz,\n_Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_, p. 24 (Bakwiri); _ibid._ p. 51 (Banaka and\nBapuku).]\n\n[Footnote 19: Monrad, _Guinea-Kysten og dens Indbyggere_, p. 88.]\n\nYet it would obviously be a mistake to suppose that, at early stages\nof civilisation, people generally look only at the harm done, and not\nin the least at the will of him who did it. Even in the system of\nprivate redress we often {220} find a distinction made between\nintentional or foreseen injuries on the one hand, and unintentional\nand unforeseen injuries on the other. In many instances, whilst\nblood-revenge is taken for voluntary homicide, compensation is\naccepted for accidental infliction of death.[20] And sometimes the\nchief or the State interferes on behalf of the involuntary manslayer,\nprotecting him from the persecutions of the dead man's family.\n\n[Footnote 20: _Cf._ Kohler, _Shakespeare vor dem Forum der\nJurisprudenz_, p. 188, n. 1.]\n\nAmong the African Wapokomo intention makes a difference in the\nrevenge.[21] Among the Papuans of the Tami Islands blood-revenge is\ncommon in the case of murder, but is not exacted in the case of\naccidental homicide; the involuntary manslayer has only to pay a\ncompensation and to leave the community for a certain length of\ntime.[22] Among the Namaqua Hottentots custom demands that\ncompensation should be accepted for unintentional killing.[23] We meet\nwith the same principle among the Albanians[24] and the Slavs,[25] in\nthe past history of other European peoples,[26] in ancient\nYucatan,[27] and in the religious law of Muhammedanism.[28] Among the\nKabyles of Algeria, \"si les m[oe]urs n'autorisent jamais la famille\nvictime d'un homicide volontaire \u00e0 amnistier un crime, elles lui\npermettent presque toujours de pardonner la mort qui ne r\u00e9sulte que\nd'une maladresse ou d'un accident.\" They have a special ceremony by\nwhich the family of the deceased grant pardon to the involuntary\nmanslayer, but the pardon must be given unanimously. The manslayer\nthen becomes a member of the _kharuba_, or _gens_, of the\ndeceased.[29] Among the Omahas, \"when one man killed another\naccidentally, he was rescued by the interposition of the chiefs, and\nsubsequently was punished as if he were a murderer, but only for a\nyear or two.\"[30] The {221} ancient law of the Hebrews, which\nrecognised the right and duty of private revenge in cases of\nintentional homicide, laid down special rules for homicide by\nmisfortune. He who killed another unawares and unwittingly might flee\nto a city of refuge, where he was protected against the avenger of\nblood as long as he remained there.[31] In ancient Rome the\ninvoluntary manslayer seems to have been exposed to the blood-feud\nuntil a law attributed to Numa ordained that he should atone for the\ndeed by providing a ram to be sacrificed in his place.[32]\n\n[Footnote 21: Kraft, in Steinmetz, _Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_, p. 292.]\n\n[Footnote 22: Bamler, quoted by Kohler, in _Zeitschr. f. vergl.\nRechtswiss._ xiv. 380.]\n\n[Footnote 23: Fritsch, _Die Eingeborenen S\u00fcd-Afrika's_, p. 363.]\n\n[Footnote 24: Gop[vc]evi['c], _Oberalbanien und seine Liga_, p. 327.]\n\n[Footnote 25: Miklosich, 'Blutrache bei den Slaven,' in _Denkschriften\nder kaiserl. Akademie der Wissensch. Philos.-histor. Classe_, Vienna,\nxxxvi. 131.]\n\n[Footnote 26: Leist, _Gr\u00e6co-italische Rechtsgeschichte_, p. 324.\n_Ancient Laws of Ireland_, iii. p. cxxiv. For the ancient Teutons, see\n_infra_, p. 226.]\n\n[Footnote 27: de Landa, _Relacion de las cosas de Yucatan_, p. 134.]\n\n[Footnote 28: _Koran_, iv. 94. _Cf._ Sachau, _Muhammedanisches Recht\nnach Schafiitischer Lehre_, p. 761 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 29: Hanoteau and Letourneux, _La Kabylie_, iii. 68 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 30: Dorsey, 'Omaha Sociology,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._\niii. 370.]\n\n[Footnote 31: _Deuteronomy_, iv. 42. _Numbers_, xxxv. 11 _sqq._\n_Joshua_, xx. 3 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 32: Servius, _In Virgilii Bucolica_, 43. _Cf._ von Jhering,\n_Das Schuldmoment im r\u00f6mischen Privatrecht_, p. 11.]\n\nAmong some peoples who accept compensation even for wilful murder, the\nblood-price is lower if life is taken unintentionally.[33]\n\n[Footnote 33: Beverley, in Steinmetz, _Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_, p. 215\n(Wagogo). Dareste, _Nouvelles \u00e9tudes d'histoire du droit_, p. 237\n(Swanetians of the Caucasus).]\n\nAccording to Bowdich, \"a person accidentally killing another in\nAhanta, pays 5 oz. of gold to the family, and defrays the burial\ncustoms. In the case of murder, it is 20 oz. of gold and a slave; or,\nhe and his family become the slaves of the family of the\ndeceased.\"[34] Ancient Irish law imposed an Eric fine for accidental\nor unintentional homicide, to be paid to the relatives of the dead\nman, whilst a double fine was due for homicide where anger was shown,\n_i.e._, where probably there was what we should call \"malice.\"[35]\n\n[Footnote 34: Bowdich, _Mission from Cape Castle to Ashantee_, p. 258,\nn. [double dagger].]\n\n[Footnote 35: Cherry, _Growth of Criminal Law in Ancient Communities_,\np. 22.]\n\nIn the punishments inflicted by many savages, a similar distinction is\nmade between intentional and accidental harm, although, at the same\ntime, some degree of guilt is frequently imputed to persons who, in\nour opinion, are perfectly innocent.\n\nSpeaking of the West Australian aborigines, Sir G. Grey\nobserves:--\"If a native is slain by another wilfully, they kill the\nmurderer, or any of his friends they can lay hands on. If a native\nkills another accidentally, he is punished according to the\ncircumstances of the case.\" And the punishment may be severe enough.\n\"For instance, if, in inflicting spear wounds as a punishment for some\noffence, one of the agents should spear the culprit through the thigh,\nand accidentally so injure the {222} femoral artery that he dies, the\nman who did so would have to submit to be speared through both thighs\nhimself.\"[36] In New Guinea, according to Dr. Chalmers, murder is\npunished capitally, whereas a death caused by accident is expiated by\na fine.[37] Among the Mpongwe, \"except in the case of a chief or a\nvery rich man, little or no difference is made between wilful murder,\njustifiable homicide, and accidental manslaughter.\"[38] Kafir law\nseems to demand no compensation for what is clearly proved to have\nbeen a strictly accidental injury to property, but the case is\ndifferent in regard to accidental injuries to persons, if the injury\nbe of a serious nature. Thus \"it seems to make little or no\ndistinction between wilful murder and any other kind of homicide;\nunless it be, perhaps, that in purely accidental homicide the full\namount of the fine may not be so rigidly insisted upon.\"[39] Among the\nA-l[=u]r, in the case of accidental injuries, a compensation is paid\nto the injured party and a fine to the chief. Whilst the strict\npunishment for murder is death, the culprit is allowed to redeem\nhimself if it cannot be proved that he committed the deed\nwilfully.[40] The Masai regard accidental homicide, or injury, as \"the\nwill of N'gai,\" \"the Unknown,\" and \"the elders arrange what\ncompensation shall be paid to the injured person (if a male) or to the\nnearest relative. If a woman is killed by accident, all the killer's\nproperty becomes the property of the nearest relative.\"[41] The\nEastern Central Africans, according to the Rev. D. Macdonald, \"know\nthe difference between an injury of accident and one of\nintention.\"[42] And so do the natives of Nossi-B\u00e9 and Mayotte, near\nMadagascar.[43]\n\n[Footnote 36: Grey, _Journals of Expeditions of Discovery in\nNorth-West and Western Australia_, ii. 238 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 37: Chalmers, _Pioneering in New Guinea_, p. 179.]\n\n[Footnote 38: Burton, _Two Trips to Gorilla Land_, i. 105.]\n\n[Footnote 39: Maclean, _Compendium of Kafir Laws and Customs_,\npp. 113, 67, 60.]\n\n[Footnote 40: Stuhlmann, _Mit Emin Pascha ins Herz von Afrika_, p. 524.]\n\n[Footnote 41: Hinde, _The Last of the Masai_, p. 108.]\n\n[Footnote 42: Macdonald, _Africana_, i. 11.]\n\n[Footnote 43: Walter, in Steinmetz, _Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_, p. 393.]\n\nNay, there are instances of uncivilised peoples who entirely excuse,\nor do not punish, a person for an injury which he has inflicted by\nmere accident, even though they may compel him to pay damages for\ninvoluntary destruction of property.\n\nWe are told that the Pennsylvania Indians \"judge with calmness on\nall occasions, and decide with precision, or endeavour {223} to do so,\nbetween an accident and a wilful act; the first, they say, they are\nall liable to commit, and therefore it ought not to be noticed, or\npunished; the second being a wilful or premeditated act, committed\nwith a bad design, ought on the contrary to receive due\npunishment,\"[44] Among some of the Marshall Islanders unintentional\nwrongs are punished only if the injured party be a person of note, for\ninstance, a chief, or a member of a chief's family.[45] Among the\nPapuans of the Tami Islands, \"accidental injuries are not punished.\nGenerally the culprit confesses his deed, and makes an apology. If he\nhas caused the destruction of some valuable, he has to repair the\nloss.\"[46] Among the Wadshagga there is no punishment for an\naccidental hurt; but if anybody's property has been damaged thereby, a\ncompensation amounting to one half of the damage may be required.[47]\nThe Hottentots do not nowadays punish accidents, even in the case of\nhomicide.[48] Among the Washambala a person is held responsible only\nfor such injuries as he has inflicted intentionally or caused by\ncarelessness.[49] In some parts of West Africa, if a man, woman, or\nchild, not knowing what he or she does, damages the property of\nanother person, \"native justice requires, and contains in itself, that\nif it can be proved the act was committed in ignorance that was not a\nculpable ignorance, the doer cannot be punished according to the\nlaw.\"[50]\n\n[Footnote 44: Buchanan, _North American Indians_, p. 160 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 45: Kohler, in _Zeitschr. f. vergl. Rechtswiss._ xiv. 448.]\n\n[Footnote 46: Bamler, quoted by Kohler, _ibid._ xiv. 381.]\n\n[Footnote 47: Merker, quoted by Kohler, _ibid._ xv. 64.]\n\n[Footnote 48: Kohler, _ibid._ xv. 353.]\n\n[Footnote 49: Lang, in Steinmetz, _Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_, p. 261.]\n\n[Footnote 50: Miss Kingsley, in her Introduction to Dennett's _Notes\non the Folklore of the Fjort_, p. xi.]\n\nThese instances of occasional discrimination in savage justice are\nparticularly interesting in the face of the fact that, even among\npeoples who have attained a higher degree of culture, innocent persons\nare often punished by law for bringing about events without any fault\nof theirs.\n\nIt is a principle of the Chinese law that \"all persons who kill or\nwound others purely by accident, shall be permitted to redeem\nthemselves from the punishment of killing or wounding in an affray, by\nthe payment in each case of a fine to the family of the person\ndeceased or wounded.\"[51] But there are exceptions to this rule. Any\n{224} person who kills his father, mother, paternal grandfather or\ngrandmother, and any wife who kills her husband's father, mother,\npaternal grandfather or grandmother, \"purely by accident, shall still\nbe punished with 100 blows and perpetual banishment to the distance of\n3,000 _lee_. In the case of wounding purely by accident, the persons\nconvicted thereof shall be punished with 100 blows and three years'\nbanishment: in these cases, moreover, the parties shall not be\npermitted to redeem themselves from punishment by the payment of a\nfine, as usual in the ordinary cases of accident.\"[52] Again, slaves\nwho accidentally kill their masters, \"shall suffer death, by being\nstrangled at the usual period.\"[53] It is also a characteristic\nprovision of the Chinese law that an act of grace is necessary for\nrelieving all those from punishment who have offended accidentally and\ninadvertently.[54]\n\n[Footnote 51: _Ta Tsing Leu Lee_, sec. ccxcii. p. 314.]\n\n[Footnote 52: _Ibid._ sec. cccxix. p. 347. _Cf._ _ibid._ sec. ccxcii.\np. 314.]\n\n[Footnote 53: _Ibid._ sec. cccxiv. p. 338.]\n\n[Footnote 54: _Ibid._ sec. xvi. p. 18.]\n\nIt is said in the Laws of [Hv]ammurabi:--\"If a man has struck a man in\na quarrel, and has caused him a wound, that man shall swear 'I did not\nstrike him knowing' and shall answer for the doctor. If he has died of\nhis blows, he shall swear, and if he be of gentle birth he shall pay\nhalf a mina of silver. If he be the son of a poor man, he shall pay\none-third of a mina of silver.\"[55]\n\n[Footnote 55: _Laws of [Hv]ammurabi_, 206 _sqq._]\n\nIt has been observed that the purpose of the Hebrew law of sanctuary\nwas not merely to protect the involuntary manslayer from\nblood-revenge, but at the same time to punish him and compel him to\nexpiate the blood he has shed.[56] If he left the city of refuge\nbefore the death of the high-priest, the avenger of blood might kill\nhim without incurring blood-guiltiness; and he was not permitted to\npurchase an earlier return to his possession with a money\nransom.[57]\n\n[Footnote 56: Goitein, _Das Vergeltungsprincip im biblischen und\ntalmudischen Strafrecht_, p. 25 _sq._ Keil, _Manual of Biblical\nArch\u00e6ology_, ii. 371.]\n\n[Footnote 57: _Numbers_, xxxv. 26 _sqq._]\n\nAccording to the Laws of Manu, \"he who damages the {225} goods of\nanother, be it intentionally or unintentionally, shall give\nsatisfaction to the owner and pay to the king a fine equal to the\ndamage\";[58] and various rites of expiation are prescribed for a\nperson who kills a Br\u00e2hmana by accident,[59] whereas the intentional\nslaying of a Br\u00e2hmana is inexpiable.[60]\n\n[Footnote 58: _Laws of Manu_, viii. 288.]\n\n[Footnote 59: _Ibid._ xi. 73 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 60: _Ibid._ xi. 90. _Gautama_, xxi. 7. According to some\nauthorities, however, the wilful slaying of a Br\u00e2hmana was expiable by\na penance of greater severity (B\u00fchler's note, in his translation of\nthe 'Laws of Manu,' _Sacred Books of the East_, xxv. 449).]\n\nDemosthenes praises the Athenian law for making the penalty of\nunintentional homicide less than that of intentional. The punishment\nfor murder was death, from which, however, before the sentence was\npassed, the murderer was at liberty to escape by withdrawing from his\ncountry and remaining in perpetual exile. But he who was convicted of\ninvoluntary homicide had to leave the country only for some shorter\ntime, until he had appeased the relatives of the deceased.[61] As will\nbe seen subsequently, the real object of this law was not so much to\npunish the involuntary manslayer, as to save him from being persecuted\nby the dead man's ghost, and to rid the community of a pollution.\nHowever, the Athenian law does not represent the ideas of early times.\nAs Dr. Farnell observes, the constitution and the legend about the\nfoundation of the court at the Palladium, which was established to try\ncases of unintentional blood-shedding, shows that the ancient practice\nwas susceptible of improvement.[62] Nor does the Roman law, which, in\nits developed shape, with such a remarkable consistency carried out\nthe Cornelian principle, \"in maleficiis voluntas spectatur non\nexitus,\"[63] seem to have been equally discriminate in early\ntimes.[64] In the Law of the Twelve Tables there are still some faint\ntraces left of the notion that expiation was required of a person who\naccidentally shed human blood.[65]\n\n[Footnote 61: Demosthenes, _Contra Aristocratem_, 71 _sq._ p. 643 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 62: Aristotle, _De republica Atheniensium_, 57. Farnell,\n_Cults of the Greek States_, i. 304.]\n\n[Footnote 63: _Digesta_, xlviii. 8. 14.]\n\n[Footnote 64: von Jhering, _Das Schuldmoment im r\u00f6mischen\nPrivatrecht_, p. 16. Mommsen, _R\u00f6misches Strafrecht_, p. 85.]\n\n[Footnote 65: Mommsen, _op. cit._ p. 85.]\n\n{226} The principle of ancient Teutonic law was, \"Qui inscienter\npeccat, scienter emendet\"--a maxim laid down by the compiler of the\nso-called 'Laws of Henry I.,'[66] no doubt translating an old English\nproverb.[67] In historic times, the law, distinguishing between _vili_\nand _vadhi_, treats intentional homicide as worse than unintentional.\nIn one case there can, in the other there can not, be a legitimate\nfeud; and whilst wilful manslaughter can be expiated only by _w\u00edte_,\nas well as _wer_, the involuntary manslayer has to pay _wer_ to the\nfamily of the dead, but no _w\u00edte_ to the authorities.[68] Yet the\n_wer_ to be paid was not merely compensation for the loss sustained,\nas Wilda, misled by his enthusiasm for Teutonic law, has erroneously\nassumed;[69] it was punishment as well.[70] And the character of\ncriminality attached to accidental homicide survived the system of\n_wer_. When homicide became a capital offence, homicide by\nmisadventure was included in the law. However, the involuntary\nmanslayer was not executed, but recommended to the \"mercy\" of the\nprince. This was the case in England in the later Middle Ages,[71] and\nin France still more recently.[72] And when the English law was\naltered, and the involuntary offender no longer was in need of mercy,\nhe nevertheless continued to be treated as a criminal. He was punished\nwith forfeiture of his goods. According to the rigour of the law such\na forfeiture might have been exacted even in the year 1828, when the\nlaw was finally abolished after having fallen into desuetude in the\ncourse of the previous century.[73]\n\n[Footnote 66: _Leges Henrici I._ xc. 11.]\n\n[Footnote 67: Pollock and Maitland, _History of the English Law before\nthe Time of Edward I._ i. 54.]\n\n[Footnote 68: Wilda, _op. cit._ p. 545 _sqq._, 594. _Idem_, _Deutsche\nRechtsgeschichte_, i. 165. Pollock and Maitland, _op. cit._ ii. 471.]\n\n[Footnote 69: Wilda, _op. cit._ p. 578.]\n\n[Footnote 70: Geyer, _Die Lehre von der Nothwehr_, p. 87 _sq._ Trummer\n_Vortr\u00e4ge \u00fcber Tortur, &c._ i. 345. Brunner, _Forschungen_, p. 505 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 71: Bracton, _De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angli\u00e6_, fol.\n134, vol. ii. 382 _sq._; fol. 104 b, vol. ii, 152 _sq._ Brunner,\n_Forschungen_, p. 494 _sqq._ Biener, _Das englische Geschwornengericht_,\ni. 120, 392. Pollock and Maitland, _op. cit._ ii. 479.]\n\n[Footnote 72: Beaumanoir, _Les coutumes du Beauvoisis_, 69, vol. ii.\n483. Esmein, _Histoire de la proc\u00e9dure criminelle en France_, p. 255.]\n\n[Footnote 73: Stephen, _History of the Criminal Law of England_, iii. 77.]\n\nIf men at the earlier stages of civilisation generally {227} attach\nundue importance to the outward aspect of conduct, the same is still\nmore the case with their gods.\n\nThe Tshi-speaking peoples of the Gold Coast believe that the god\nSasabonsum \"takes delight in destroying all those who have offended\nhim, even though the offence may have been accidental and\nunintentional\"; whereas, among the same people, it is the custom that\neven deaths resulting from accidents, not to speak of minor injuries,\nare compensated for by a sum of money.[74] Miss Kingsley says she is\nunable, from her own experience, to agree with Mr. Dennett's statement\nwith reference to the Fjort, that ignorance would save the man who had\neaten prohibited food. From what she knows, Merolla's story is\ncorrect: the man, though he eat in ignorance, dies or suffers\nseverely. \"It is true,\" she adds, \"that one of the doctrines of\nAfrican human law is that the person who offends in ignorance, that is\nnot a culpable ignorance, cannot be punished; but this merciful dictum\nI have never found in spirit law. Therein if you offend, you suffer;\nunless you can appease the enraged spirit, neither ignorance nor\nintoxication is a feasible plea in extenuation.\"[75] The Omahas\nbelieve that to eat of the totem, even in ignorance, would cause\nsickness, not only to the eater, but also to his wife and\nchildren.[76]\n\n[Footnote 74: Ellis, _Tshi-speaking Peoples of the Gold Coast_,\npp. 35, 301.]\n\n[Footnote 75: Miss Kingsley, in her Introduction to Dennett's\n_Folklore of the Fjort_, p. xxviii.]\n\n[Footnote 76: Frazer, _Totemism_, p. 16.]\n\nSpeaking of the sacred animals of the ancient Egyptians, Herodotus\nsays, \"Should any one kill one of these beasts, if wilfully, death is\nthe punishment; if by accident, he pays such fine as the priests\nchoose to impose. But whoever kills an ibis or a hawk, whether\nwilfully or by accident, must necessarily be put to death.\"[77]\nAccording to the Chinese penal code, \"whoever destroys or damages,\nwhether intentionally or inadvertently, the altars, mounds, or\nterraces consecrated to the sacred and imperial rites, shall suffer\n100 blows, and be perpetually banished to distance {228} of 2000\n_lee_.\"[78] In these cases the punishment inflicted by human hands is\nobviously a reflection of the supposed anger of superhuman\nbeings.\n\n[Footnote 77: Herodotus, ii. 65. _Cf._ Pomponius Mela, 9.]\n\n[Footnote 78: _Ta Tsing Leu Lee_, sec. clviii. p. 172.]\n\nThe Shintoist prays for forgiveness of errors which he has committed\nunknowingly.[79] According to the Vedic hymns, whoever with or without\nintention offends against the eternal ordinances of Varuna, the\nAll-knowing and Sinless, arouses his anger, and is bound with the\nbonds of the god--with calamity, sickness, and death.[80] Forgiveness\nis besought of Varuna for sins that have been committed in\nunconsciousness;[81] even sleep occasions sin.[82] The singer\nVasishtha is filled with pious grief, because daily against his will\nand without knowledge he offends the god and in ignorance violates his\ndecree.[83] \"All sages,\" say the Laws of Manu, \"prescribe a penance\nfor a sin unintentionally committed\"; such a sin \"is expiated by the\nrecitation of Vedic texts, but that which men in their folly commit\nintentionally, by various special penances.\"[84] Among the present\nHindus, \"even in cases of accidental drinking of spirits through\nignorance on the part of any of the three twice-born classes, nothing\nshort of a repetition of the initial sacramentary rites, effecting a\ncomplete regeneration, is held sufficient to purge the sin.\"[85]\n\n[Footnote 79: Selenka, _Sonnige Welten_, p. 210 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 80: _Cf._ Kaegi, _Rigveda_, p. 66 _sq._; Oldenberg, _Die\nReligion des Veda_, p. 289.]\n\n[Footnote 81: _Rig-Veda_, v. 85. 8.]\n\n[Footnote 82: _Ibid._ vii. 86. 6; x. 164. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 83: _Ibid._ vii. 88. 6. _Cf._ Kaegi, _op. cit._ p. 68.]\n\n[Footnote 84: _Laws of Manu_, xi. 45 _sq._ _Cf._ _Vasishtha_, 20.]\n\n[Footnote 85: R\u00e1jendral\u00e1la Mitra, _Indo-Aryans_, i. 393.]\n\nIn the Greek literature there are several instances of guilt being\nattached to the accidental transgression of some sacred law, the\ntransgressor being perfectly unaware of the nature of his deed.\nOedipus is the most famous example of this. Actaeon is punished for\nhaving seen Diana. Pausanias, the Spartan king, made sacrifice to Zeus\nPhyxius, to atone for the death of the maiden whom he had slain by\nmisfortune.[86]\n\n[Footnote 86: Farnell, _op. cit._ i. 72.]\n\nThe Babylonian psalmist, assuming that one of the {229} gods is angry\nwith him because he is suffering pain, exclaims:--\"The sin which I\ncommitted I know not. The transgression I committed I know not. The\naffliction which was my food--I know it not. The evil which trampled\nme down--I know it not. The lord in the wrath of his heart has\nregarded me; the god in the fierceness of his heart has punished\nme.\"[87] In another psalm it is said:--\"He knows not his sin against\nthe god, he knows not his transgression against the god and the\ngoddess. Yet the god has smitten, the goddess has departed from\nhim.\"[88]\n\n[Footnote 87: Zimmern, _Babylonische Busspsalmen_, p. 63.]\n\n[Footnote 88: Sayce, _Hibbert Lectures on the Religion of the Ancient\nBabylonians_, p. 505. _Cf._ M\u00fcrdter-Delitzsch, _Geschichte Babyloniens\nund Assyriens_, p. 38.]\n\nSo, also, the Hebrew psalmist cries out, \"Who can understand his\nerrors? cleanse thou me from secret faults.\"[89] Unintentional error,\nas Mr. Montefiore observes, would be as liable to incur divine\npunishment as the most voluntary crime, if it infringed the tolerably\nwide province in which the right or sanctity of Yahveh was\ninvolved.[90] Whilst a deliberate moral iniquity was punished under\nthe penal law, a sin committed \"through ignorance, in the holy things\nof the Lord,\" required a sin- or trespass-offering for its\nexpiation.[91] Speaking of the developed sacrificial system of the\nJews, Professor Moore remarks, \"The general rule in the Mishna is that\nany transgression the penalty of which, if wilful, would be that the\noffender be cut off, requires, if committed in ignorance or through\ninadvertence, a _[h.]a[t.][t.][=a]th_ [or sin-offering]; the catalogue\nof these transgressions ranges from incest and idolatry to eating the\n(internal) fat of animals and imitating the composition of the sacred\nincense, but does not include the commonest offences against\nmorals.\"[92] The Rabbis also maintained that a false oath, even if\nmade unconsciously, involves man in sin, and is punished as such.[93]\n{230} We meet with a similar opinion in medi\u00e6val Christianity. The\nprinciple laid down by St. Augustine,[94] and adopted by Canon\nLaw,[95] that \"ream linguam non facit, nisi mens rea,\" was not always\nacted upon. Various penitentials condemned to penance a person who, in\ngiving evidence, swore to the best of his belief, in case his\nstatement afterwards proved untrue.[96] In other cases, also, the\nChurch prescribed penances for mere misfortunes. If a person killed\nanother by pure accident, he had to do penance--in ordinary cases,\naccording to most English penitentials, for one year,[97] according to\nvarious continental penitentials, for five[98] or seven[99] years;\nwhereas, according to the Penitential of Pseudo-Theodore, he who\naccidentally killed his father or mother was to atone his deed with a\npenance of fifteen years,[100] and he who accidentally killed his son\nwith a penance of twelve.[101] The Scotists even expressly declared\nthat the external deed has a moral value of its own, which increases\nthe goodness or badness of the agent's intention; and though this\ndoctrine was opposed by Thomas Aquinas, Bonaventura, Suarez, and other\nleading theologians, it was nevertheless admitted by them that,\naccording to the will of God, certain external deeds entail a certain\naccidental reward, the so-called _aureola_.[102] In some cases the\nsecular law, also, punishes misadventure on religious grounds. Thus\nthe Salic law treated with great severity any person who accidentally\nput fire to a church, although it imposed no penalty on other cases of\n{231} unintentional incendiary;[103] and even to this day the Russian\ncriminal law prescribes penitence for homicide by misadventure, \"in\norder to quiet the conscience of the culprit.\"[104] According to the\nKoran, he who kills a believer by mistake shall expiate his deed, not\nonly by paying blood-money to the family of the dead (unless they\nremit it), but by setting free a believing slave; and as to him who\ncannot find the means, \"let him fast for two consecutive months--a\npenance this from God.\"[105]\n\n[Footnote 89: _Psalms_, xix. 12.]\n\n[Footnote 90: Montefiore, _Hibbert Lectures on the Religion of the\nAncient Hebrews_, p. 103. _Cf._ _ibid._ p. 515 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 91: _Leviticus_, iv. 22 _sqq._; v. 15 _sqq._ _Numbers_,\nxv. 24 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 92: Moore, 'Sacrifice,' in Cheyne and Black, _Encyclop\u00e6dia\nBiblica_, iv. 4205.]\n\n[Footnote 93: Montefiore, _op. cit._ p. 558.]\n\n[Footnote 94: St. Augustine, _Sermones_, clxxx. 2 (Migne, _Patrologi\u00e6\ncursus_, xxxviii. 973).]\n\n[Footnote 95: Gratian, _Decretum_, ii. 22. 2. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 96: _P[oe]nitentiale Bed\u00e6_, v. 3 (Wasserschleben,\n_Bussordnungen der abendl\u00e4ndischen Kirche_, p. 226). _P[oe]nit.\nEgberti_, vi. 3 (_ibid._ p. 238). _P[oe]nit. Pseudo-Theodori_, xxiv. 5\n(_ibid._ p. 593).]\n\n[Footnote 97: _P[oe]nit. Theodori_, i. 4. 7 (_ibid._ p. 188).\n_P[oe]nit. Bed\u00e6_, iv. 5 (_ibid._ p. 225). _P[oe]nit. Egberti_, iv. 11\n(_ibid._ p. 235). According to _P[oe]nit. Pseudo-Theodori_, xxi. 2\n(_ibid._ p. 586), the penance was to last for five years.]\n\n[Footnote 98: _P[oe]nit. Hubertense_, 2 (_ibid._ p. 377). _P[oe]nit.\nMerseburgense_, 2 (_ibid._ p. 391). _P[oe]nit. Bobiense_, 4 (_ibid._\np. 408). _P[oe]nit. Vindobonense_, 2 (_ibid._ p. 418). _P[oe]nit.\nCummeani_, vi. 2 (_ibid._ p. 478). _P[oe]nit. XXXV. Capitulornm_, 1\n(_ibid._ p. 506). _P[oe]nit. Vigilanum_, 27 (_ibid._ p. 529).]\n\n[Footnote 99: _P[oe]nit. Parisiense_, 1 (_ibid._ p. 412). _P[oe]nit.\nFloriacense_, 2 (_ibid._ p. 424).]\n\n[Footnote 100: _P[oe]nit. Pseudo-Theodori_, xxi. 18 (_ibid._ p. 588).]\n\n[Footnote 101: _P[oe]nit. Pseudo-Theodori_, xxi. 19 (_ibid._ 588).]\n\n[Footnote 102: G\u00f6pfert, _Moraltheologie_, i. 185.]\n\n[Footnote 103: _Lex Salica_ (Harold's text), 71. Brunner,\n_Forschungen_, p. 507, n. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 104: Foinitzki, in _Le droit criminel des \u00e9tats europ\u00e9ens_,\nedited by von Liszt, p. 531.]\n\n[Footnote 105: _Koran_, iv. 94.]\n\nHow shall we explain all these facts? Do they faithfully represent\nideas of moral responsibility? Do they indicate that, at the earlier\nstages of civilisation, the outward event as such, irrespectively of\nthe will of the agent, is an object of moral blame?\n\nMost of the statements which imply a perfect absence of discrimination\nbetween accident and intention, refer to the system of private\nredress. Under this system a personal injury is regarded as a matter\nwhich the injured party or his kin have to settle for themselves. It\ncertainly does not allow them to treat the offender just as they\nplease; as we have seen, it is more or less regulated by custom. But\nat the same time it makes considerable allowance for the personal\nfeelings of the sufferer, and these feelings are apt to be neither\nimpartial nor sufficiently discriminate. Whether, in a savage\ncommunity, public opinion prescribes, or merely permits, revenge in\ncases of accidental injury, is a question which the ordinary\nobservations of travellers leave unanswered. It is important to note\nthat one of the first steps which early custom or law took towards a\nrestriction of the blood-feud was to save the life of the involuntary\nmanslayer. Moreover, in many cases where the system of revenge has\nbeen succeeded by punishment, the injured party may still have a voice\nin the matter. In Abyssinia, for instance, \"a life for a life is the\nsentence passed upon the murderer; but, obtaining {232} the consent of\nthe relatives of the deceased, he is authorised by law to purchase his\npardon.\"[106] According to ancient Swedish law, an injury could not be\ntreated as accidental unless the injured party acknowledged it as\nsuch.[107] In England, even in the days of Henry III., the king could\nnot protect the manslayer from the suit of the dead man's kin,\nalthough he had granted him pardon on the score of misadventure.[108]\nIndeed, so recently as 1741, a royal order was made for a hanging in\nchains \"on the petition of the relations of the deceased.\"[109] And to\nthis day English criminal courts, when dealing with some slight\noffence, mitigate the punishment \"because the prosecutor does not\npress the case,\" or even give him leave to settle the matter and\nwithdraw the prosecution.[110]\n\n[Footnote 106: Harris, _Highlands of \u00c6thiopia_, ii, p. 94.]\n\n[Footnote 107: von Amira, _Nordgermanische Obligationenrecht_, i. 382.]\n\n[Footnote 108: _Three Early Assize Rolls for the County of\nNorthumberland_, _s\u00e6c. XIII_, p. 98.]\n\n[Footnote 109: Amos, _Ruins of Time_, p. 23.]\n\n[Footnote 110: Kenny, _Outlines of Criminal Law_, p. 23.]\n\nIn the case of accidental homicide, deference may also have to be\nshown for the supposed feelings of the dead man's ghost, which, angry\nand bloodless, is craving for revenge and thirsting for blood. To\nleave its desires ungratified would be both dangerous and unmerciful.\nThat this has something to do with the rigid demand of life for life\nin the case of homicide by misadventure seems all the more likely as\nin some instances when the involuntary manslayer is pardoned, other\nblood is to be shed instead of his. Among the Yao and Wayisa, near\nLake Nyassa, it is the custom \"by way of propitiation to give up a\nslave or some relative of the criminal's, to 'go along with the one\nwho was slain,' and this seems to be invariably done when one is\nkilled by accident, in which case the slayer may escape, the deputy\ntaking as it were his place.\"[111] We may assume that a similar idea\nunderlies the ancient Roman law which provided a ram to be sacrificed\nin the place of the involuntary manslayer.\n\n[Footnote 111: Macdonald, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xii. 108.]\n\nBut the dead man's ghost not only persecutes his own family if\n**neglectful of their duty, it also attacks the manslayer {233} and\ncleaves to him like a miasma. The manslayer is consequently regarded\nas unclean, and has, both for his own sake and for the sake of the\ncommunity in which he lives, to undergo some ceremony of purification\nin order to rid himself of the dangerous and infectious pollution.\nThis notion will be illustrated in a following chapter. In the present\nconnection I merely desire to point out that the pollution is there,\nwhether the shedding of blood was intentional or accidental. And, as\nwill be shown, though this state of uncleanness does not intrinsically\ninvolve guilt, it easily becomes a cause of moral disapproval, whilst\nthe ceremony of purification is apt to be looked upon in the light of\npunishment. We shall also find that the notion of a persecuting ghost\nmay be replaced by the notion of an avenging god, it being a fact of\ncommon occurrence that the doings or functions of one mysterious being\nare transferred to another. We shall, finally, see that the infection\nof uncleanness is shunned by gods even more than it is shunned by men;\nand this largely helps to explain the attitude of religion towards\nunintentional and unforeseen shedding of human blood.\n\nThere are other, more general reasons for the want of discrimination\noften displayed by religion in regard to the accidental transgression\nof a religious law. When a thing is _taboo_ in the strict sense of the\nword, it is supposed to be charged with mysterious energy which will\ninjure or destroy the person who eats or touches the forbidden thing,\nwhether he does so wilfully or by mistake. As Professor Jevons\ncorrectly observes, \"the action of taboo is always mechanical; contact\nwith the tabooed object communicates the taboo infection as certainly\nas contact with water communicates moisture. . . . The intentions of\nthe taboo-breaker have no effect upon the action of the taboo; he may\ntouch in ignorance, or for the benefit of the person he touches, but\nhe is tabooed as surely as if his motive were irreverent or his action\nhostile.\"[112] So, also, according to primitive notions, the effect of\na curse or an {234} oath is purely mechanical; hence a person who\nswears falsely in ignorance exposes himself to no less danger than a\nperson who perjures himself knowingly. As regards religious offences\nin the strictest sense of the term--that is, offences against some god\nwhich are supposed to arouse his resentment--it should be remembered\nthat, just as a man who is hurt is unable to judge on the matter as\ncoolly as does the community at large, so a god whose ordinances are\ntransgressed is thought to be less discriminating in his anger than a\ndisinterested human judge, and, consequently, more apt to be\ninfluenced by the external event. And where nearly every calamity is\nregarded as a divine punishment, a person who is suffering without\nknowing what sin he has committed, naturally infers that a god is\npunishing him for some secret fault.\n\n[Footnote 112: Jevons, _Introduction to the History of Religion_, p. 91.]\n\nThus it may be that, in the point which we are discussing, as in\nvarious other respects, the religious beliefs of a people do not\nfaithfully represent their general notions of moral responsibility. It\nis profoundly wrong to assume, from the legend of Oedipus and other\nsimilar cases, that the ancient Greeks, in general, held a person\n\"equally responsible for an accident which occurs to him, and for an\nact of which the agent is aware.\" Even the transgression of a sacred\nlaw, when committed in ignorance, seems to have excited pitiful horror\nrather than moral indignation. Oedipus had killed his father in\nself-defence, and married his mother, perfectly ignorant of his\nrelation to them. The gods punished the Thebans with pestilence for\nharbouring such a wretch on their soil. But when \"time that sees all,\nfound him out in his unwitting sin,\" it was not blame, but terror and\ndeep compassion for the unhappy man that, according to the\ntragedian,[113] spoke from the lips of the people. Moreover, in the\nlatter tragedy Oedipus persistently vindicates his innocence:--\"Whatever\nI have done was done unwittingly\"--\"Before the law I have no guilt.\"\nAnd, addressing himself to Creon, who has accused him of parricide and\nincest, he {235} exclaims:--\"O shameless soul, where, thinkest thou,\nfalls this thy taunt,--on my age, or on thine own? Bloodshed--incest\n--misery--all this thy lips have launched against me,--all this that\nI have borne, woe is me! by no choice of mine: for such was the pleasure\nof the gods, wroth, haply, with the race from of old. . . Tell me, now,\n--if, by voice of oracle, some divine doom was coming on my sire, that he\nshould die by a son's hand, how couldst thou justly reproach me\ntherewith, who was then unborn, whom no sire had yet begotten, no\nmother's womb conceived? And if, when born to woe--as I was born--I\nmet my sire in strife, and slew him, all ignorant what I was doing,\nand to whom,--how couldst thou justly blame the unknowing deed?[114]\nNever was a more pathetic appeal made to the court of Justice from the\nindiscriminate verdict of angry gods.\n\n[Footnote 113: Sophocles, _[OE]dipus Tyrannus_.]\n\n[Footnote 114: _Idem_, _[OE]dipus Coloneus_, 960 _sqq._ (Jebb's\ntranslation, p. 155).]\n\nWhilst the grossest want of discrimination may thus be explained from\nrevengeful feelings and superstitious beliefs, there still remain a\nmultitude of cases which must be regarded as genuine expressions of\nmoral indignation. As to these, it should, first, be remembered that\neven the reflecting moral consciousness may hold a person blamable for\nthe unintentional and unforeseen infliction of an injury, namely, in\ncases where it assumes want of proper foresight. Now, as we know, it\nis often difficult enough to discern whether, or to what extent, an\nunintended injury is due to carelessness on the part of the agent;\nsometimes even it is no easy thing to tell whether an injury was\nintended or not. It is not to be expected, then, that distinctions of\nso subtle a nature should be properly made by the uncultured mind, and\nleast of all is it to be expected that such distinctions should be\nembodied in early custom and law, which are based on average cases and\nallow of no minute individualisation. It has been observed that the\nroughness of Teutonic justice may be partly explained from the\ndifficulty in getting any proof of intention or of its absence, from\nthe lack of any proper distinctions between {236} misadventure and\ncarelessness, and from the fact that the so-called misadventures of\nearly times covered many a blameworthy act.[115] And all this holds\ngood not merely of the ancient Teutons. It may further be said that\nthe more defective the power of discrimination, the greater is the\ntendency to presume guilt. In Morocco a man who runs away after\nkilling another is presumed to have committed the deed intentionally,\nhowever innocent he really may be. Among the Teutons the presumption\nwas always against the manslayer; he had to proclaim what he had done,\nand to prove that the deed was not intended[116]--unless, indeed, the\nmisadventure belonged to a certain type of injuries which by their\nvery nature entailed no guilt. For instance, if a man carried a spear\nlevel on his shoulder and another ran upon the point, he was free from\nblame; whereas, if harm ensued by pure accident from a distinct act,\nthe agent was liable.[117] As von Amira remarks, the Swedish notion of\n_vadhav\u00e6rk_ was not a merely negative conception, but implied that\nthere was danger connected with the act.[118]\n\n[Footnote 115: Pollock and Maitland, _op. cit._ i. 55; ii. 475, 483.\nvon Amira, _Nordgermanisches Obligationenrecht_, i. 377 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 116: Wilda, _op. cit._ i. 345. Brunner, _Forschungen_, p.\n500 _sq._ Pollock and Maitland, _op. cit._ ii. 471.]\n\n[Footnote 117: Wilda, _op. cit._ p. 584. Trummer, _op. cit._ i. 427.\nBrunner, _Forschungen_, p. 499 _sq._ von Amira, 'Recht,' in Paul's\n_Grundriss der germanischen Philologie_, ii. pt. ii. 172. Pollock and\nMaitland, _op. cit._ i. 53 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 118: von Amira, _Nordgermanisches Obligationenrecht_, i. 377.]\n\nWhere the distinction between guilt and innocence is difficult to\ndraw, it may be wise policy to presume guilt. According to Sir R.\nBurton, the Mpongwe jurists say that little or no difference is\ngenerally made between wilful murder and accidental manslaughter in\norder that people should be more careful;[119] and a similar idea may\nlie at the bottom of the Dahoman law which punishes capitally any\nperson whose house takes fire, even if it happens accidentally.[120]\nBut the presumption of guilt is not only, nor in the first place,\nowing to considerations of social utility, combined with a reckless\nindifference to undeserved suffering. {237} The unreflecting mind is\nshocked by the harm done, and cares little for the rest. It does not\npress the question whether the harm was caused by the agent's will or\nnot. It does not make any serious attempt to separate the external\nevent from the will, and it is inclined to assume that there is a\ncoincidence between the two. This is not altogether bad psychology\nsince, as a rule, men will what they do. \"Le fait juge l'homme,\" says\nan old French proverb; and in morals, also, \"the tree is known by the\nfruit.\" However, there are cases of injuries in which not even\nuncivilised men can fail to discover, at once, the absence of any evil\nintention. This certainly does not mean that the injurer escapes all\ncensure. Every feeling of pain, sympathetic pain included, which is\ncaused by a living being, has a certain tendency to give rise to an\naggressive impulse towards its cause; hence savages, even though they\ndistinguish between intentional and unintentional harm, are inclined\nto impute some degree of guilt to any person who involuntarily commits\na forbidden deed, though he be in reality quite innocent. But the\nreason for this is only want of due reflection. If it is clearly\nunderstood that a certain event is the result of merely external\ncircumstances, that it was neither intended by the agent nor could\nhave been foreseen by him, in other words, that it in no way was\ncaused by his will--then there could be no moral indignation at all.\nIt would be simply absurd to suppose that an outward event as such,\nassumed to be absolutely unconnected with any defect of will, could\never give rise to moral blame. Such an event could not even call forth\na feeling of revenge. Sudden anger itself cools down when it appears\nthat the cause of the inflicted pain was a mere accident. Even a dog,\nas has been observed, distinguishes between being stumbled over and\nbeing kicked.\n\n[Footnote 119: Burton, _Two Trips to Gorilla Land_, i. 105.]\n\n[Footnote 120: Ellis, _E[(w]e-speaking Peoples of the Slave Coast_,\np. 224.]\n\nThat the indiscriminate attitude of early custom and law towards\naccidental injuries does not imply any difference in principle between\nthe enlightened and unenlightened moral consciousness as regards the\nsubject of moral valuation, {238} becomes perfectly obvious when we\nconsider what a great influence the outward event exercises upon moral\nestimates even among ourselves. \"The world judges by the event, and\nnot by the design,\" says Adam Smith. \"Everybody agrees to the general\nmaxim, that as the event does not depend on the agent, it ought to\nhave no influence upon our sentiments, with regard to the merit or\npropriety of his conduct. But when we come to particulars, we find\nthat our sentiments are scarce in any one instance exactly conformable\nto what this equitable maxim would direct.\"[121] Even in the criminal\nlaws of civilised nations chance still plays a prominent part.\nAccording to the present law of England, though a person is not\ncriminally liable for the involuntary and unforeseen consequences of\nacts which are themselves permissible, the case is different if he\ncommits an act which is wrong and criminal,[122] or, as it seems, even\nif he commits an act which is wrong without being forbidden by\nlaw.[123] Thus death caused unintentionally is regarded as murder, if\nit takes place within a year and a day[124] as the result of an\nunlawful act which amounts to a felony.[125] For instance, a person\nkills another accidentally by shooting at a domestic fowl with intent\nto steal it, and he will probably be convicted of murder.[126] Again,\na near-sighted man drives at a rapid rate, sitting at the bottom of\nhis cart, and thereby causes the death of a foot-passenger; he is\nguilty of manslaughter.[127] A man recklessly and wantonly throws a\nlighted match into a haystack, careless whether it take fire or not,\nand so burns down the stack; his crime is arson. But if he did not\nintend to throw the lighted match on the haystack, he would probably\nnot be guilty of any offence at all, \"unless death was caused, in\nwhich case he would be guilty of manslaughter.\"[128] Even if the\nunintended death is to some {239} extent owing to the negligence of\nthe injured party himself, it may be laid to the charge of the\ninjurer. This at all events was the law in Hale's time, \"If a man,\" he\nsays, \"receives a wound, which is not in itself mortal, but either for\nwant of helpful applications, or neglect thereof, it turns to a\ngangrene, or a fever, and that gangrene or fever be the immediate\ncause of his death, yet, this is murder or manslaughter in him that\ngave the stroke or wound.\"[129] So far as I know, the severity of the\nEnglish law on unintentional homicide--which, in fact, is a survival\nof ancient Teutonic law[130]--is without a parallel in the European\nlegislation of the present day. Both the French[131] and the\nGerman[132] laws are much less severe; and so is the Ottoman Penal\nCode,[133] and Muhammedan law in general.[134] Yet the unintended\ndeadly consequence of a criminal act always affects the punishment\nmore or less.\n\n[Footnote 121: Adam Smith, _Theory of Moral Sentiments_, p. 152.]\n\n[Footnote 122: According to Harris (_Principles of the Criminal Law_,\np. 156), the act should be a _malum in se_, not merely a _malum quia\nprohibitum_.]\n\n[Footnote 123: Kenny, _op. cit._ p. 41.]\n\n[Footnote 124: Stephen, _History of the Criminal Law of England_,\niii. 8.]\n\n[Footnote 125: _Ibid._ iii. 22.]\n\n[Footnote 126: _Ibid._ iii. 83.]\n\n[Footnote 127: Harris, _op. cit._ p. 157.]\n\n[Footnote 128: Stephen, _op. cit._ ii. 113.]\n\n[Footnote 129: Hale, _History of the Pleas of the Crown_, i. 428.]\n\n[Footnote 130: _Lex Wisigothorum_, vi. 5. 6: \"Si dum quis calce, vel\npugno, aut quacumque percussione injuriam conatur inferre, homicidii\nextiterit occasio, pro homicidio puniatur.\"]\n\n[Footnote 131: _Code P\u00e9nal_, art. 309.]\n\n[Footnote 132: _Strafgesetzbuch_, art. 226.]\n\n[Footnote 133: _Ottoman Penal Code_, art. 177. _Cf._ _ibid._ art. 174.]\n\n[Footnote 134: Sachau, _op. cit._ p. 761 _sq._]\n\nI presume that nobody after due deliberation would maintain that the\nmoral guilt of the offender is enhanced by the death of him whom he\ninvoluntarily happened to kill. Sir James Stephen, nevertheless, makes\nan attempt to defend, from a moral point of view, the severe English\nlaw on the subject, which he thinks \"is much to be preferred to the\nlaw of France.\" He asks, \"Is there anything to choose morally between\nthe man who violently stabs another in the chest with the definite\nintention of killing him, and a man who stabs another in the chest\nwith no definite intention at all as to the victim's life or death,\nbut with a feeling of indifference whether he lives or dies?\"[135]\nPerhaps not. But I venture to maintain that there is a considerable\nmoral difference between the man who shoots at another with the\ndefinite intention of killing him, and the man who, firing at\nanother's chickens, with the intention of stealing them, accidentally\nkills the owner whom {240} he does not see. It will perhaps be argued\nthat the law has a utilitarian purpose, its object being to make\npeople more careful. But if this were the case one would expect that\nthe law should punish with equal severity acts which involve the same\ndegree of danger, and which result in similar injuries. To fire at a\nsparrow may be as dangerous to people's lives as to fire at another\nperson's chicken, and, in the latter case, the danger is hardly\nincreased by the intention to steal the chicken. I take the truth to\nbe this. The degree of punishment corresponds to the degree of\nindignation aroused by the deed. Public imagination is shocked by the\nactual event. The agent, being guilty either of criminal intention, or\nof gross disregard of other people's interests, or of criminal\nheedlessness, is a proper object of punishment. Owing to that want of\ndiscrimination which characterises the popular mind, his guilt is\nexaggerated on account of the grave consequences of his act; and the\nresult is that he is punished not only for the fault of his will, but\nfor his bad luck as well. Sir James Stephen seems to admit this, when\nsaying that the shock which the offence gives to the public feeling\nrequires that the offender should himself suffer \"a full equivalent\nfor what he has inflicted,\" from which \"he ought to be excused only on\ngrounds capable of being understood by the commonest and most vulgar\nminds.\"[136] Though thoroughly dissenting from the opinion that\ncriminal law should try to gratify the feelings of \"the commonest and\nmost vulgar minds,\" I think that, as a matter of fact, it is not much\nabove their standard of justice, being in the main an expression of\npublic sentiments.\n\n[Footnote 135: Stephen, _op. cit._ iii. 91 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 136: _Ibid._ iii. 91.]\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIn the cases which we have hitherto considered the external event\nwhich a person brings about involuntarily, either makes him liable to\npunishment though he really is free from guilt, or increases his\npunishment beyond the limits of his guilt. But the influence of chance\nalso shows {241} itself in the opposite way. A person who is guilty of\ncarelessness generally escapes all punishment if no injurious result\nfollows, and an unsuccessful attempt to commit a criminal act, if\npunished at all, is, as a rule, punished much less severely than the\naccomplished act.\n\nThe Hottentots nowadays punish attempt, but only leniently.[137] The\nWadshagga punish it less severely than the accomplished act.[138]\nAmong some of the Marshall Islanders it is not punished at all.[139]\nThe same holds good of the Ossetes[140] and Swanetians[141] of the\nCaucasus, as also of ancient Russian law.[142] The Teutons, as a\ngeneral rule, had no punishment for him who tried to do harm, but\nfailed; and if they did punish an unsuccessful attempt, the penalty\nwas out of proportion lenient.[143] This feature of ancient Teutonic\nlaw has had a lasting effect upon European legislation, largely\nthrough the influence it exercised upon the Italian jurists of the\nMiddle Ages,[144] whose theories laid the foundation of modern laws\nand doctrines on attempt. In conformity with the Roman law, they held\nattempts to commit crimes to be punishable, and in atrocious cases\nthey even admitted that the attempt might be subject to the same\npunishment as the accomplished crime. But their general theory was\nthat it should be punished less severely, and that the penalty should\nbe lenient in proportion as the actual deed was remote from the act\nintended.[145] These views were generally adopted by the later\nlegislation. Among present European lawbooks, the French Code\nP\u00e9nal[146] is almost the only one that punishes an attempt {242} with\nthe same severity as the finished crime.[147] And the French law on\nthe subject is of modern origin; before the year IV. the present rule\nwas applied only to the _conatus proximus_ in a few specified cases of\na very heinous character.[148]\n\n[Footnote 137: Kohler, in _Zeitschr. f. vergl. Rechtswiss._ xv. 353.]\n\n[Footnote 138: Merker, quoted by Kohler, _ibid._ xv. 63.]\n\n[Footnote 139: Kohler, _ibid._ xiv. 418.]\n\n[Footnote 140: Kovalewsky, _Coutume contemporaine_, p. 296 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 141: Dareste, _Nouvelles \u00e9tudes d'histoire du droit_, p. 237.]\n\n[Footnote 142: Kovalewsky, _op. cit._ pp. 291, 299.]\n\n[Footnote 143: Wilda, _op. cit._ p. 598 _sqq._ Zachari\u00e4, _Die Lehre\nvom Versuche der Verbrechen_, i. 164 _sqq._; ii. 130 _sq._ Brunner,\n_Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte_, ii. 558 _sqq._ Pollock and Maitland,\nii. 475, 509.]\n\n[Footnote 144: Seeger, _Versuch der Verbrechen in der Wissenschaft des\nMittelalters_, p. 8.]\n\n[Footnote 145: Zachari\u00e4, _op. cit._ i. 169; ii. 141. von\nFeuerbach-Mittermaier, _Lehrbuch des Peinlichen Rechts_, p. 74.]\n\n[Footnote 146: _Code P\u00e9nal_, art. 2: \"Toute tentative de crime qui\naura \u00e9t\u00e9 manifest\u00e9e par un commencement d'ex\u00e9cution, si elle n'a \u00e9t\u00e9\nsuspendue ou si elle n'a manqu\u00e9 son effet que par des circonstances\nind\u00e9pendantes de la volont\u00e9 de son auteur, est consid\u00e9r\u00e9e comme le\ncrime m\u00eame.\"]\n\n[Footnote 147: Chauveau and H\u00e9lie, _Th\u00e9orie du Code P\u00e9nal_, i. 347 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 148: _Ibid._ i. 337 _sq._]\n\nBesides the provision of the Code P\u00e9nal concerning attempt, there are\na few other exceptions, of an earlier date, to the general rule. The\nRomans seemed to have followed the principle \"dolus pro facto\naccipitur,\"[149] at least if the crime attempted was a serious\none.[150] A somewhat similar line was adopted by ancient Irish law.\nThe general impression produced by the rules in the commentary to the\nBook of Aicill is, that the attempt to commit an injurious act was\ntreated as equivalent to its commission, unless the result was very\ninsignificant. Thus, if an attempt was made to slay, or to inflict an\ninjury which would endure for life, and blood was shed, the fine was\nthe same as if the attempt had succeeded; whereas, if the injury did\nnot amount to the shedding of blood, the fine was reduced\none-half.[151] And if a man went to kill one person and killed another\nby mistake, a fine for the intention, in addition to the fine due to\nthe friends of the murdered man, was due to him whose death was\nintended, even though no injury was actually done to him.[152] In\nEngland, at the end of the Middle Ages, the will was taken for the\ndeed in cases of obvious attempts to murder; but this rule appears to\nhave been considered too severe--even in an age when death was the\ncommon punishment for felony--and to have fallen into disuse several\ncenturies ago.[153]\n\n[Footnote 149: _Digesta_, xlviii. 8. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 150: Seeger, _Versuch der Verbrechen nach r\u00f6mischcm Recht_,\npp. 1, 2, 49. _Idem_, _Versuch der Verbrechen in der Wissenschaft des\nMittelalters_, p. 9. Mommsen, _R\u00f6misches Strafrecht_, p. 97 _sq._\nApuleius, _Florida_, iv. 20:--\"In maleficiis etiam cogitata scelera\nnon perfecta adhuc vindicantur, cruenta mente, pura manu. Ergo sicut\nad poenam sufficit meditari punienda.\"]\n\n[Footnote 151: _Ancient Laws of Ireland_, iii. pp. cviii. _sq._ 139.]\n\n[Footnote 152: Cherry, _Growth of Criminal Law in Ancient\nCommunities_, p. 32.]\n\n[Footnote 153: Stephen, _op. cit._ ii. 222 _sq._ Thomas Smith,\n_Common-wealth of England_, p. 194 _sq._]\n\n{243} The question, which attempts should be punished, and even the\nelementary question, what constitutes an attempt, have been answered\ndifferently by different jurists and legislators.[154] In England all\nattempts whatever to commit indictable offences, whether felonies or\nmisdemeanours, are punishable by law.[155] The French[156] and\nGerman[157] codes, on the other hand, do not punish, except in a few\nparticular cases, attempts to commit _d\u00e9lits_ or _Verbrechen_, that\nis, what the English jurists would describe as misdemeanours.\n\n[Footnote 154: See Cohn, _Zur Lehre vom versuchten und unvollendeten\nVerbrechen_, i. 6 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 155: Stephen, _op. cit._ ii. 224.]\n\n[Footnote 156: _Code P\u00e9nal_ art. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 157: _Strafgesetzbuch_, art. 43.]\n\nAgain, should a person be punished for attempting to commit a crime in\na manner in which success is physically impossible, as if he attempts\nto steal from a pocket which is empty, or puts into a cup pounded\nsugar which he believes to be arsenic? This question has given rise to\na whole literature. Seneca's statement that \"he who mixes a sleeping\ndraught, believing it to be poison, is a poisoner,\"[158] seems to have\nhad the support of Roman law.[159] In England, some time ago, the man\nwho attempted to pick an empty pocket, was not held liable for an\nattempt to steal;[160] but this case has been overruled, and it\nappears now to be the law that an indictment would lie for such an\nattempt.[161] According to the French[162] and Italian[163] codes, it\nwould not be punished, according to some German law-books, it\nwould;[164] whilst the Strafgesetzbuch contains no special provisions\nfor attempts of a similar character.\n\n[Footnote 158: Seneca, _De beneficiis_, v. 13. _Cf._ _Idem_, _Ad\nSerenum_, 7.]\n\n[Footnote 159: Seeger, _Versuch nach r\u00f6mischem Recht_, p. 30.]\n\n[Footnote 160: Stephen, _op. cit._ ii. 225.]\n\n[Footnote 161: Harris, _Principles of the Criminal Law_, p. 209 n. _c._]\n\n[Footnote 162: Stephen, _op. cit._ ii. 225.]\n\n[Footnote 163: Alimena, in _Le droit criminel des \u00e9tats europ\u00e9ens_,\ned. by von Liszt, p. 123.]\n\n[Footnote 164: von Feuerbach-Mittermaier, _op. cit._ p. 76. Cohn, _op.\ncit._ i. 14.]\n\nFinally there are different rules as to the stage at which an attempt\nbegins to be criminal, or as to the distinction between attempts and\nacts of preparation. The Romans, it is supposed, drew no such\ndistinction.[165] The French law regards as permissible acts of\npreparation many {244} things which in England would be punished as\nattempts.[166] In England lighting a match with intent to set fire to\na haystack has been held to amount to a criminal attempt to burn it,\nalthough the defendant blew out the match on seeing that he was\nwatched. But it was said in the same case that, if he had gone no\nfurther than to buy a box of matches for the purpose, he would not\nhave been liable, the act being too remote from the offence to be\ncriminal.[167] \"Liability will not begin until the offender has done\nsome act which not only manifests his _mens rea_ but also goes some\nway towards carrying it out.\"[168]\n\n[Footnote 165: Seeger, _Versuch nach r\u00f6mischem Recht_, p. 49.]\n\n[Footnote 166: Chauveau and H\u00e9lie, _op. cit._ i. 357 _sqq._ Stephen,\n_op. cit._ ii. 226.]\n\n[Footnote 167: Holmes, _Common Law_. p. 67 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 168: Kenny, _op. cit._ p. 79.]\n\nIf we go a step further, we come to designs unaccompanied by any\nattempt whatever to realise them. The laws of all countries agree as\nto the principle that an outward event is requisite for the infliction\nof punishment. \"Cogitationis p[oe]nam nemo patitur.\"[169]\n\n[Footnote 169: _Digesta_, xlviii. 19. 18.]\n\nThis fact again illustrates the influence which external deeds\nexercise upon the moral feelings of men. In the average man moral\nemotions are hardly ever called into existence by calm and penetrating\nreflection. There are certain phenomena which for some reason or other\nare apt to arouse in him such emotions, but he does not seek for them.\nThey must force themselves upon his mind, and the more vigorously they\ndo so, the stronger are the emotions they excite. Nothing makes a\ngreater impression on him than facts which are perceptible by the\nsenses. He will admit that an intention, or even a mere wish, to do\nsomething wrong is wrong by itself, but an outward event is generally\nneeded for shaking him up. This, I think, is the original reason why\npersons have not been punished for intentions unaccompanied by\nexternal deeds. No doubt, the principle that \"the thought of man shall\nnot be tried,\" is strongly supported by the fact that, as a medi\u00e6val\nwriter puts it, \"the devil himself knoweth not the thought of\nman.\"[170] But considering how ready people {245} have been to presume\nguilt in cases of unintentional injuries, it seems very incredible\nthat they originally refrained from punishing bare intentions merely\non account of insufficient evidence. Indeed, as an exception to the\nrule, in a few cases when the crime designed is regarded with extreme\nhorror, the very intention may give such a shock to public imagination\nas to call for punishment.\n\n[Footnote 170: Quoted by Pollock and Maitland, _op. cit._ ii. 474.]\n\nAccording to Chinese law, \"any person convicted of a design to kill\nhis or her father or mother, grandfather or grandmother, whether by\nthe father's or mother's side; and any woman convicted of a design to\nkill her husband, husband's father or mother, grandfather or\ngrandmother, shall, whether a blow is, or is not struck in\nconsequence, suffer death by being beheaded.\"[171] This exceptional\nlaw obviously owes its origin to the extreme reverence in which\nparents and ancestors are held by the Chinese, and to the wife's\nsubjection to her husband. In medi\u00e6val laws referring to heresy we\nhave another instance of punishment being inflicted for a mere state\nof mind without any corresponding act. According to Julius Clarus,\nthis exception to the rule is due to the fact that the crime of heresy\nitself consists in \"sola mentis cogitatione.\"[172] But the real reason\nwhy the law in this case troubled itself about men's thoughts, and\neven allowed them to be put on their trial for their tacit opinions on\nbare suspicion, is the detestation in which heresy was held and the\nextreme attention it attracted. By all this, of course, I do not mean\nto deny that a judicious and enlightened legislator may find other\ngrounds for taking no notice of mere intentions than their inability\nto arouse public indignation. I only speak of matters of\nfact.\n\n[Footnote 171: _Ta Tsing Leu Lee_, sec. cclxxxiv. p. 305.]\n\n[Footnote 172: Julius Clarus, _Practica Criminalis_, qu. 91 (_Opera\nomnia_, ii. 625).]\n\nAgain, as regards acts of preparation and many cases of unsuccessful\nattempts, it may be said that the agent perhaps would have altered his\nmind before he came to the point, or that the failure of his attempt\nwas possibly due {246} to a change of intention in the last\nmoment.[173] But there are innumerable cases in which the attempt,\nwith no less certainty than the accomplished crime, displays a\ncriminal intention which is final. And it is particularly instructive\nto note that, among the very peoples who treat unintentional injuries\nwith the greatest severity, unsuccessful attempts are treated with the\ngreatest leniency. This is well illustrated by a comparison between\nTeutonic and Roman law; in either case the former chiefly looks at the\nevent, the latter chiefly at the intention of the agent. If there is\nno punishment for a bare attempt to commit a crime, that is because\nsuch an attempt makes no impression on the public. If an attempt is\npunished more heavily according as it is more advanced, that is\nbecause it calls forth greater indignation in proportion as it comes\nnear to the crime intended. And if even the _conatus proximus_ is\npunished with less severity than the accomplished crime, that is\nbecause the indignation it evokes is less. This explanation is\ncorroborated by concessions made by theorisers who have in vain\nendeavoured to find more rational grounds for existing laws on\nattempt. They have ultimately found it necessary to resort to phrases\nsuch as \"the natural sense of justice,\" or to appeal to the feelings\nof the multitude.[174] {247} M. Rossi observes, \"Nous pensons que le\nsens commun et la conscience publique ont constamment tenu le m\u00eame\nlangage. 'Le d\u00e9lit n'a pas \u00e9t\u00e9 consomm\u00e9, donc la punition doit \u00eatre\nmoindre.' Cette id\u00e9e de proportion mat\u00e9rielle, ce sentiment de\njustice, grossi\u00e8re j'en conviens, est naturel \u00e0 l'homme.\"[175] This is\nthe view taken by the unreflecting moral consciousness. To him whose\nfeelings are tempered by thought, \"a man,\" as Seneca says, \"is no less\na brigand, because his sword becomes entangled in his victim's\nclothes, and misses its mark.\"[176]\n\n[Footnote 173: As a rule, the man who voluntarily desists from the\nattempt to commit a crime would not be punished at all (see Seeger,\n_Versuch nach r\u00f6mischem Recht_, p. 50; Charles V.'s _Peinliche\nGerichts Ordnung_, art. 178; the French _Code P\u00e9nal_, art. 2; the\nItalian _Codice Penale_, art. 61; Finger, _Compendium des\n\u00f6sterreichischen Rechtes--Strafrecht_, i. 181; and, for various German\nlaws, Zachari\u00e4, _op. cit._ ii. 311 _sq._, and Cohn, _op. cit._ i. 12\n_sq._), or he would be punished more leniently than if there had been\nno such desistance (Zachari\u00e4, ii. 239, _sqq._ Cohn, i. 12 _sq._). On\nthis subject see also Herzog, _R\u00fccktritt vom Versuch und Th\u00e4tige\nReue_, _passim_.]\n\n[Footnote 174: Leli\u00e8vre, _De conatu delinquendi_, p. 361 (quoted by\nZachari\u00e4, _op. cit._ ii. 66, n. 2): \"Ceterum libenter fateor, me\npotius sentire aliquam necessitatem paululum levius in perfectum\ncrimen ac in maleficium consummatum animadvertendi, quam reddere\nposse claram necessitates rationem.\" Abegg, _Die verschiedenen\nStrafrechtstheorieen_, p. 65: \"F\u00fcr uns folgt aber jene nothwendige\nBeobachtung der concreten Unterschiede, in dem Gebiete der\nErscheinung, nach der aus dem Gerechtigkeitsprincipe abgeleiteten\nRegel, dass Jeder f\u00fcr _seine That_, und was er _verdient_ habe, leiden\nsolle.\" Zachari\u00e4, _op. cit._ ii. 51:--\"So macht sich in dem\nnat\u00fcrlichen Gerechtigkeits-Gef\u00fchl des Einzelnen und des ganzen Volkes\nauch von selbst die Unterscheidung zwischen der Strafe des vollendeten\nund der des blos versuchten Verbrechens geltend. . . . Es kann\nfreilich seyn, dass der gr\u00f6sste Theil der Menschen f\u00fcr ein solches\nnat\u00fcrliches Gef\u00fchl keine Gr\u00fcnde anzugeben vermag; allein das\nStrafrecht, welches ja gerade auf die grosse Menge zu wirken hat, kann\ndessenungeachtet solche unwillk\u00fcrlich im Volke sich geltend machende\nAnsichten nicht unber\u00fccksichtigt lassen.\" _Cf._ also Finger, _op.\ncit._ i. 177.]\n\n[Footnote 175: Rossi, _Trait\u00e9 de droit p\u00e9nal_, ii, 318.]\n\n[Footnote 176: Seneca, _Ad Serenum_, 7.]\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIn the same way as moral indignation, is moral approval influenced by\nexternal events. Though we would not praise a person for some deed of\nhis which we clearly recognise to reflect no merit on his will, the\nbenefits which result from a good act easily induce us to exaggerate\nthe goodness of the agent. On the other hand, it is success alone that\nconfers upon a man the full reward which he deserves; good intentions\nwithout corresponding deeds meet with little applause even when the\nfailure is due to mere misfortune. \"In our real feeling or sentiment,\"\nHume observes, \"we cannot help paying a greater regard to one whose\nstation, joined to virtue, renders him really useful to society, than\nto one who exerts the social virtues only in good intentions and\nbenevolent affections.\"\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIt is thus only from want of due reflection that moral judgments are\ninfluenced by outward deeds. Owing to its very nature, the moral\nconsciousness, when sufficiently influenced by thought, regards the\nwill as the only proper object of moral disapproval or moral praise.\nThat moral qualities are internal, is not an invention of any\nparticular moralist or any particular religion; it has been recognised\nby thoughtful men in many different countries and different {248}\nages. \"He that is pure in heart is the truest priest,\" said\nBuddha.[177] In the Taouist work, 'Kan ying peen,' it is written:--\"If\nyou form in your heart a good intention, although you may not have\ndone any good, the good spirits follow you. If you form in your heart\na bad intention, although you may not have done any harm, the evil\nspirits follow you.\"[178] According to the Th\u00e2i-Shang, mere wishes are\nsufficient to constitute badness.[179] One of the Pahlavi texts puts\nthe following words into the mouth of the Spirit of Wisdom:--\"To be\ngrateful in the world, and to wish happiness for every one; this is\ngreater and better than every good work.\"[180] God, says the Koran,\n\"will not catch you up for a casual word in your oaths, but He will\ncatch you up for what your hearts have earned.\"[181] According to the\nRabbis, the thought of sin is worse than sin, and an unchaste thought\nis a \"wicked thing.\"[182] It was an ancient Mexican maxim that \"he who\nlooks too curiously on a woman commits adultery with his eyes\"[183]--a\nstriking parallel to the passage in St. Matthew v. 28. \"Voluntas\nremuneratur, non opus,\" says the Canonist. \"Licet gladio non occidat,\nvoluntate tamen interficit.\" \"Non ideo minus delinquit, cui sola deest\nfacultas.\"[184]\n\n[Footnote 177: Hopkins, _Religions of India_, p. 319.]\n\n[Footnote 178: Douglas, _Confucianism and Taouism_, p. 270.]\n\n[Footnote 179: _Th\u00e2i-Shang_, 4.]\n\n[Footnote 180: _D\u00een\u00e2-\u00ee-Ma\u00een\u00f4g\u00ee Khirad_, lxiii. 3 _sqq._ _Cf._ _ibid._\ni. 10, where it is said that the good work which a man does\nunwittingly is little of a good work, though the sin which a man\ncommits unwittingly amounts to a sin in its origin.]\n\n[Footnote 181: _Koran_, ii. 225. _Cf._ Ameer Ali, _Ethics of Isl\u00e2m_,\np. 26.]\n\n[Footnote 182: Schechter, in Montefiore, _op. cit._ p. 558. _Cf._\nDeutsch, _Literary Remains_, p. 52.]\n\n[Footnote 183: Sahagun, _Historia general de las cosas de Nueva\nEspa\u00f1a_, vi. 22, vol. ii. 147: \"Dice el refran que el _que\ncuriosamente mira \u00e1 la muger adult\u00e9ra_ con la vista.\"]\n\n[Footnote 184: Gratian, _Decretum_, ii. 33. 3. 25, 30, 29.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER X\n\nAGENTS UNDER INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY\n\n\nWE hold an agent responsible not only for his intention, but for any\nknown concomitant of his act, as also for any such unknown concomitant\nof it as we attribute to want of due attention. But for anything which\nhe could not be aware of he is not responsible. Hence certain classes\nof agents--animals, children, idiots, madmen--are totally or partially\nexempted from moral blame and legal punishment.\n\nThough animals are undoubtedly capable of acting, we do not regard\nthem as proper objects of moral indignation. The reason for this is\nnot merely the very limited scope of their volitions and their\ninability to foresee consequences of their acts, since these\nconsiderations could only restrict their responsibility within\ncorrespondingly narrow limits. Their total irresponsibility rests on\nthe presumption that they are incapable of recognising any act of\ntheirs as right or wrong. If the concomitant of an act is imputable to\nthe agent only in so far as he could know it, it is obvious that no\nact is wrong which the agent could not know to be wrong.\n\nIt is a familiar fact that, by discipline, we may teach domesticated\nanimals to live up to a certain standard of behaviour, but this by no\nmeans implies that we awake in them moral feelings. When some writers\ncredit dogs and apes with a conscience,[1] we must remember that an\n{250} observer's inference is not the same as an observed fact.[2] It\nseems that the so-called conscience in animals is nothing more than an\nassociation in the animal's mind between the performance of a given\nact and the occurrence of certain consequences, together with a fear\nof those consequences.[3]\n\n[Footnote 1: Romanes, _Mental Evolution in Animals_, p. 352. Perty,\n_Seelenleben der Thiere_, p. 67. Brehm, _From North Pole to Equator_,\np. 298.]\n\n[Footnote 2: _Cf._ Lloyd Morgan, _Animal Life and Intelligence_, p. 399.]\n\n[Footnote 3: _Cf._ _ibid._ p. 405.]\n\nThe following is one of the most striking instances of what\nProfessor Romanes regards as \"conscience\" in animals; it refers to a\nterrier which had never, even in its puppyhood, been known to steal,\nbut on the contrary used to make an excellent guard to protect\nproperty from other animals, servants, and so forth, even though these\nwere his best friends. \"Nevertheless,\" says Professor Romanes, \"on one\noccasion he was very hungry, and in the room where I was reading and\nhe was sitting, there was, within easy reach, a savoury mutton chop. I\nwas greatly surprised to see him stealthily remove this chop and take\nit under a sofa. However, I pretended not to observe what had\noccurred, and waited to see what would happen next. For fully a\nquarter of an hour this terrier remained under the sofa without making\na sound, but doubtless enduring an agony of contending feelings.\nEventually, however, conscience came off victorious, for emerging from\nhis place of concealment and carrying in his mouth the stolen chop, he\ncame across the room and laid the tempting morsel at my feet. The\nmoment he dropped the stolen property he bolted again under the sofa,\nand from this retreat no coaxing could charm him for several hours\nafterwards. Moreover, when during that time he was spoken to or\npatted, he always turned away his head in a ludicrously\nconscience-stricken manner. Altogether I do not think it would be\npossible to imagine a more satisfactory exhibition of conscience by an\nanimal than this; for . . . the particular animal in question was\nnever beaten in its life.\" The author then adds in a note that \"mere\ndread of punishment cannot even be suspected to have been the motive\nprinciple of action.\"[4] It may be so, if by punishment be understood\nthe infliction of physical pain. But it can hardly be doubted that the\nterrier suspected his master to be displeased with his behaviour, and\nthe dread of displeasure or reproof may certainly have been the sole\nreason for his bringing back the stolen food. Among {251} \"high-life\"\ndogs, as Professor Romanes himself observes, \"wounded sensibilities\nand loss of esteem are capable of producing much keener suffering than\nis mere physical pain.\"[5] But fear of the anticipated consequences of\nan act, even when mixed with shame, is not the same as the moral\nfeeling of remorse. There is no indication that the terrier felt that\nhis act was wrong, in the strict sense of the word.\n\n[Footnote 4: Romanes, 'Conscience in Animals,' in _Quarterly Journal\nof Science_, xiii. 156 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 5: _Idem_, _Animal Intelligence_, p. 439.]\n\nHowever, though most of us, on due reflection, would deny that animals\nare proper objects of moral censure, there is a general tendency to\ndeal with them as if they were. The dog or the horse that obstinately\nrefuses to submit to its master's will arouses a feeling of resentment\nwhich almost claims to be righteous; and the shock given to public\nfeeling by some atrocious deed committed by a beast calls for\nretribution. As Adam Smith observes, \"the dog that bites, the ox that\ngores, are both of them punished. If they have been the causes of the\ndeath of any person, neither the public, nor the relations of the\nslain, can be satisfied, unless they are put to death in their turn:\nnor is this merely for the security of the living, but, in some\nmeasure, to revenge the injury of the dead.\"[6]\n\n[Footnote 6: Adam Smith, _Theory of Moral Sentiments_, p. 137.]\n\nIf thus our own resentment towards an animal which has caused some\ninjury, when not duly tempered by reason, often comes near actual\nindignation, it is not surprising to find that, at the lower stages of\nhuman civilisation, animals are deliberately treated as responsible\nagents. The American Indian who eats the vermin which molest him\ndefends his action by arguing that, as the animal has first bitten\nhim, he is only retaliating the injury on the injurer.[7] The custom\nof blood-revenge is often extended to the animal world. The Kukis,\nsays Mr. Macrae, \"are of a most vindictive disposition; blood must\nalways be shed for blood; if a tiger kills {252} any of them, near a\n_Parah_ [or village], the whole tribe is up in arms, and goes in\npursuit of the animal; when if he is killed, the family of the\ndeceased gives a feast of his flesh, in revenge of his having killed\ntheir relation. And should the tribe fail to destroy the tiger, in\nthis first general pursuit of him, the family of the deceased must\nstill continue the chase; for until they have killed either this, or\nsome other tiger, and have given a feast of his flesh, they are in\ndisgrace in the _Parah_, and not associated with by the rest of the\ninhabitants. In like manner, if a tiger destroys one of a hunting\nparty, or of a party of warriors, on an hostile excursion, neither the\none nor the other (whatever their success may have been) can return to\nthe _Parah_, without being disgraced, unless they kill the tiger.\"[8]\nOf the Sea Dyaks we are told that they will not willingly take part in\ncapturing an alligator, unless the alligator has first destroyed one\nof themselves; \"for why, say they, should they commit an act of\naggression, when he and his kindred can so easily repay them? But\nshould the alligator take a human life, revenge becomes a sacred duty\nof the living relatives, who will trap the man-eater in the spirit of\nan officer of justice pursuing a criminal. . . . The man-eating\nalligator is supposed to be pursued by a righteous Nemesis; and\nwhenever one is caught, they have a profound conviction that it must\nbe the guilty one, or his accomplice, for no innocent leviathan could\nbe permitted by the fates to be caught by man.\"[9] So, also, the\nMalagasy will never kill a crocodile, except in retaliation for one of\ntheir friends or neighbours who has been destroyed by a crocodile.\n\"They believe that the wanton destruction of one of these reptiles\nwill be followed by the loss of human life, in accordance with the\nprinciple of _lex talionis_. The inhabitants living in the\nneighbourhood of the lake It\u00e0sy, to the west of the central province,\nare accustomed to make a yearly proclamation {253} to the crocodiles,\nwarning them that they shall revenge the death of some of their\nfriends by killing as many _vo\u00e0y_ in return, and warning the\nwell-disposed crocodiles to keep out of the way, as they have no\nquarrel with them, but only with their evil-minded relatives who have\ntaken human life.\"[10]\n\n[Footnote 7: Harmon, _Journal of Voyages and Travels in the Interior\nof North America_, p. 327. Southey, _History of Brazil_, i. 223. _Cf._\nBastian, _Der Mensch in der Geschichte_, iii. 25.]\n\n[Footnote 8: Macrae, 'Account of the Kookies,' in _Asiatick\nResearches_, vii. 189.]\n\n[Footnote 9: Perham, 'Sea Dyak Religion,' in _Journal of the Straits\nBranch of the Royal Asiatic Society_, No. 10, p. 221 _sq._ _Cf._\nFrazer, _Golden Bough_, ii. 390.]\n\n[Footnote 10: Sibree, _The Great African Island_, p. 269.]\n\nAnimals are not only exposed to the blood-feud, but are often exposed\nto regular punishment. This is the case among the Mambettu in Central\nAfrica. Casati mentions the following instance:--\"A goat was chased\nand persecuted by a dog, and in the fight for self-defence the latter\nreceived a thrust from the goat's horn. The poor dog, which was the\nvaluable property of a powerful man, died shortly after. This serious\nmatter was much discussed and commented upon, and finally referred to\nthe king for judgment. The poor goat was sentenced to be slaughtered\nbefore its victim's corpse, its flesh was served to the Mambettu [that\nis, people of the superior race], and that of the dog to the Mege\n[that is, people of the conquered race].\"[11] Among the Maori,\naccording to Polack, the crime of impiety is not confined to man only,\nbut even a pig straying over a sacred place incurs the punishment of\ndeath.[12] In Muhammedan East Africa, some time ago, a dog was\npublicly scourged for having entered a mosque.[13] The Bogos kill a\nbull or cow which causes the death of a man.[14] According to the\nnative code of Malacca, if a buffalo or a head of cattle \"be tied in\nthe forest, in a place where people are not in the habit of passing,\nand there gore anybody to death, it shall be put to death\"; but the\nowner of the animal shall not be held liable.[15] According to Hebrew\nlaw, \"if an ox gore a man or a woman, that they die: then the ox shall\nbe surely stoned, and his flesh shall not be eaten\"; and, in the case\nof sexual intercourse {254} between a man, or woman, and a beast, not\nonly the human offender, but the beast, is to be put to death.[16] It\nis prescribed in the Vend\u00eed\u00e2d that, if a mad dog which bites without\nbarking, smite a sheep or wound a man, \"the dog shall pay for the\nwound of the wounded as for wilful murder.\"[17] Plato had undoubtedly\nborrowed from Attic custom or law the idea which underlies the\nfollowing regulation in his 'Laws':--\"If a beast of burden or other\nanimal cause the death of any one, except in the case of anything of\nthat kind happening to a competitor in the public contests, the\nkinsman of the deceased shall prosecute the slayer for murder, and the\nwardens of the country, such, and so many as the kinsman appoint,\nshall try the cause, and let the beast when condemned be slain by\nthem, and let them cast it beyond the borders.\"[18] In various\nEuropean countries animals have been judicially sentenced to death,\nand publicly executed, in retribution for injuries inflicted by them.\nAdvocates were assigned to defend the accused animals, and the whole\nproceedings, trial, sentence, and execution, were conducted with all\nthe strictest formalities of justice.[19] These proceedings seem to\nhave been particularly common from the end of the thirteenth till the\nseventeenth century; the last case in France occurred as late as\n1845.[20] Not only domestic animals, but even wild ones, were thus put\non trial.[21] \"In 1565 the Arlesians asked for the expulsion of the\ngrasshoppers. The case came before the Tribunal de l'Officialit\u00e9, and\nMa\u00eetre Marin was assigned to the insects as counsel. He defended his\nclients with much zeal. Since the accused had been created, he argued\nthat they were justified in eating what was necessary to them. The\nopposite counsel cited the serpent in the Garden of Eden, and sundry\nother animals {255} mentioned in Scripture, as having incurred severe\npenalties. The grasshoppers got the worst of it, and were ordered to\nquit the territory, with a threat of anathematisation from the altar,\nto be repeated till the last of them had obeyed the sentence of the\nhonourable court.\"[22] From an earlier period we have records of\nmaledictions and excommunications of vermin and obnoxious insects. In\n1120, a bishop of Laon is reported to have excommunicated the\ncaterpillars which were ravaging his diocese, with the same formula as\nthat employed the previous year by the Council of Rheims in cursing\nthe priests who persisted in marrying in spite of the canons.[23] Such\nmaledictions and excommunications, however, were probably regarded\nrather as magical means of expulsion than as punishments.[24] Not long\nago, when swarms of locusts ravaged the gardens of Tangier, the\nShereef of Wazzan expelled the injurious animals by spitting into the\nmouth of one of them.\n\n[Footnote 11: Casati, _Ten Years in Equatoria_, i. 176.]\n\n[Footnote 12: Polack, _Manners and Customs of the New Zealanders_,\ni. 240.]\n\n[Footnote 13: von Amira, _Thierstrafen und Thierprocesse_, p. 30.]\n\n[Footnote 14: Munzinger, _Die Sitten und das Recht der Bogos_, p. 83.]\n\n[Footnote 15: Newbold, _British Settlements in the Straits of\nMalacca_, ii. 257.]\n\n[Footnote 16: _Exodus_, xxi. 28 _sq._ _Leviticus_, xx. 15 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 17: _ Vend\u00eed\u00e2d_, xiii. 31. _Cf._ _ibid._ xiii. 32 _sqq._;\n_Yasts_, xxiv. 44.]\n\n[Footnote 18: Plato, _Leges_, ix. 873.]\n\n[Footnote 19: Chambers, _Book of Days_, i. 127. Pertile, 'Gli animali\nin giudizio,' in _Atti del R. Instituto Veneto_, ser. vi. vol. iv. 139. ]\n\n[Footnote 20: von Amira, _Thierstrafen_, pp. 2, 15, 16, 28 _sq._ In\nEngland such proceedings seem to have hardly occurred at all (_ibid._\np. 15), but, as we shall see, an animal which caused the death of a\nman was forfeited as deodand.]\n\n[Footnote 21: See Chambers, _op. cit._ i. 127 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 22: Marlinengo-Cesaresco, _Essays in the Study of\nFolk-Songs_, p. 183 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 23: Desmaze, _Les p\u00e9nalit\u00e9s anciennes_, p. 31 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 24: This is the opinion of von Amira, who, however--as it\nseems to me, without sufficient evidence--suggests that the\nmaledictions did not refer to ordinary animals, but to human souls or\ndevils in disguise (_Thierstrafen_, p. 16 _sqq._).]\n\nIt has been suggested that the medi\u00e6val practice of punishing animals\nafter human fashion was derived from the Mosaic law.[25] But this\nhypothesis does not account for the comparatively late appearance of\nthe practice, nor for the fact that, in some cases, other punishments\nshort of death were inflicted upon offending beasts.[26] It seems much\nmore probable that the procedure in question developed out of an\nancient European custom, to which it stood in the relationship of\npunishment to revenge.[27] According to the customs or laws of various\nso-called Aryan peoples--Greeks,[28] Romans,[29] Teutons,[30]\nCelts,[31] Slavs,[32]--an {256} animal which did some serious damage,\nespecially if it caused the death of a man, was to be given up to the\ninjured party, or his family, obviously in order that it might be\nretaliated upon.[33] According to the Welsh Laws, \"that is the only\ncase in which the murderer is to be given up for his deed.\"[34] The\nfact that afterwards, in the later Middle Ages, this form of reprisal\nwas in certain instances transformed into regular punishment, only\nimplies that the principle according to which punishment succeeded\nvengeance in the case of human crimes was, by way of analogy, extended\nto injuries committed by animals.\n\n[Footnote 25: _Ibid._ pp. 4, 47 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 26: Pertile, _loc. cit._ p. 148.]\n\n[Footnote 27: _Cf._ Brunner, _Forschungen zur Geschichte des deutschen\nund franz\u00f6sischen Rechtes_, p. 517 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 28: Plutarch, _Vita Solonis_, 24. Xenophon, _Histori\u00e6\nGr\u00e6c\u00e6_, ii. 4. 41.]\n\n[Footnote 29: _Institutiones_, iv. 9. _Digesta_, ix. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 30: _Lex Salica_ (cod. i.), 36. _Lex Ripuariorum_, 46.\nGrimm, _Deutsche Rechtsalterth\u00fcmer_, p. 664 _sqq._ Brunner,\n_Forschungen_, p. 513 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 31: _Ancient Laws of Ireland_, i. 161; iv. 177, 179, 181.\n_Welsh Laws_, iv. i. 17 (_Ancient Laws and Institutes of Wales_,\np. 391).]\n\n[Footnote 32: Macieiowski, _Slavische Rechtsgeschichte_, iv. 333.]\n\n[Footnote 33: See _Lex Wisigothorum_, viii. 4. 20; _Schwabenspiegel_,\nLandrechtbuch, 204; Dirksen, _Civilistische Abhandlungen_, i. 104; von\nJhering, _Geist des r\u00f6mischen Rechts_, i. 123; Hepp, _Die Zurechnung\nauf dem Gebiete des Civilrechts_, p. 103; Grimm, _Deutsche\nRechtsalterth\u00fcmer_, p. 664; Brunner, _Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte_, ii.\n556; _Idem_, _Forschungen_, p. 513.]\n\n[Footnote 34: _Welsh Laws_, iv. 1. 17 (_Ancient Laws and Institutes of\nWales_, p. 391).]\n\nThere has been considerable diversity of opinion concerning the\npurpose of inflicting punishments upon animals. Some writers suggest\nthat it was possibly done with a view to deterring other animals from\ncommitting similar injuries.[35] According to others, the animal was\nexecuted in order that the hateful act should be forgotten; Gratian,\nreferring to St. Augustine,[36] says, \"Non propter culpam, sed propter\nmemoriam facti pecus occiditur, ad quod mulier accesserit.\"[37] A\ntheory which has gained much adherence explains the punishment as a\nsymbolic act, performed for the purpose of inspiring horror of the\ncrime into the minds of men.[38] M. Thonissen maintains that, at\nAthens, \"on frappait l'animal auteur d'un homicide, afin que le\npeuple, en voyant p\u00e9rir un \u00eatre priv\u00e9 de raison, con\u00e7ut une grande\nhorreur pour l'effusion du sang humain.\"[39] It has also been supposed\nthat the animal was punished with intention to intimidate those {257}\nwho were responsible for its acts,[40] or that it was killed because\nit was dangerous.[41] But the true solution of the problem seems\nsimple enough. The animal had to suffer on account of the indignation\nit aroused. It was regarded as responsible for its deed.[42] In early\nrecords the punishment is frequently spoken of as an act of\n\"justice\";[43] and the protests of Beaumanoir and others against this\nopinion[44] only show that it was held in good earnest, if not by all,\nat least by many. From certain details we can also see how closely the\nresponsibility ascribed to animals resembled the responsibility of\nmen. In some of the texts of the Salic law the animal is spoken of as\n\"auctor criminis.\"[45] In an ancient Irish law-tract it is said that,\nwhen a bee has blinded a person's eye, the whole hive \"shall pay the\nfine,\" and \"the many become accountable for the crime of one, although\nthey all have not attacked.\"[46] Youth was a ground for acquittal, as\nappears from a case which occurred at Lavegny in 1457, when a sow and\nher six young ones were tried on a charge of their having murdered and\npartly eaten a child: whilst the sow, being found guilty, was\ncondemned to death, the young pigs were acquitted on account of their\nyouth and the bad example of their mother.[47] In Burgundy, a\ndistinction was made between a mischievous dog that entered a room\nthrough an open door and one that committed a burglary; the latter was\na _larron_, and was to be punished as such.[48] The repetition of a\ncrime aggravated the punishment;[49] {258} and the animal \"principal\"\nwas punished more severely than the \"accessories.[50]\n\n[Footnote 35: Leibniz, _Essais de Theodic\u00e9e_, p. 182 _sq._ Lessona,\nquoted by d'Addosio, _Bestie delinquenti_, p. 145.]\n\n[Footnote 36: St. Augustine, _Qu\u00e6stiones in Leviticum_, 74 (_ad Lev._\nxx. 16): \"Nam pecora inde credendum est jussa interfici, quia tali\nflagitio contaminata, indignam refricant facti memoriam\" (Migne,\n_Patrologi\u00e6 cursus_, xxxiv. 709).]\n\n[Footnote 37: Gratian, _Decretum_, ii. 15. 1. 4. _Cf._ _Mishna_, fol.\n54, quoted by Rabbinowicz, _L\u00e9gislation criminelle du Talmud_, p. 116.]\n\n[Footnote 38: Ayrault, _Des proc\u00e8s faicts au cadaver, aux cendres, \u00e0\nla m\u00e9moire, aux bestes brutes_, fol. 24. Ortolan, _\u00c9l\u00e9ments du droit\np\u00e9nal_, p. 188. Tissot, _Le droit p\u00e9nal_, i. 19 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 39: Thonissen, _Le droit p\u00e9nal de la r\u00e9publique Ath\u00e9nienne_,\np. 414.]\n\n[Footnote 40: Du Boys, quoted by d'Addosio, _op. cit._ p. 139.]\n\n[Footnote 41: Lessona, quoted _ibid._ p. 145.]\n\n[Footnote 42: _Cf._ Post, _Die Grundlagen des Rechts_, p. 359;\nFriedrichs, 'Mensch und Person,' in _Das Ausland_, 1891, pp. 300, 315;\nand, especially, d'Addosio, _op. cit._ p. 146 _sqq._: \"Nel medioevo si\npun\u00ec l'animale perch\u00e8 lo si ritenne in certo modo _conscio_ delle sue\nazioni, in certo modo _libero_, in certo modo _responsabile_.\"]\n\n[Footnote 43: von Amira. _op. cit._ p. 9.]\n\n[Footnote 44: Beaumanoir, _Les coutumes du Beauvoisis_, lxix. 6, vol.\nii. 485 _sq._ Chambers, _op. cit._ i. 127. Lichtenberg, _Vermischte\nSchriften_, iv. 481.]\n\n[Footnote 45: _Lex Salica_, edited by Hessels, coll. 209-212, 215.]\n\n[Footnote 46: _Ancient Laws of Ireland_, iv. 179.]\n\n[Footnote 47: Chambers, _op. cit._ i. 128.]\n\n[Footnote 48: _Ancien Coutumier de Bourgogne_, 23 (_Revue historique\nde droit fran\u00e7ais et \u00e9tranger_, iii. 549): \"Il deust hauoir faire\njustice del larron.\"]\n\n[Footnote 49: Pertile, _loc. cit._ p. 148: \"La _Carta de Logu_\nd'Eleonora giudicessa d'Arborea (1395) prescrive: che venendo trovato\nun asino in danno sui fondi altrui, per la prima volta gli si tagli un\norecchio; la seconda, l'altro; e la terza, si confischi la bestia\nconsegnandola alla corte principesca.\" _Cf._ _Vend\u00eed\u00e2d_,\nxiii. 32 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 50: d'Addosio, _op. cit._ p. 16.]\n\nConsidering the feelings to which even the cultured mind is\nsusceptible with reference to a mischievous beast, it is not difficult\nto understand the attitude of the ignorant. The savage, not only\nmomentarily, while in a rage, but permanently and in cold blood,\nobliterates the boundaries between man and beast. He regards all\nanimals as practically on a footing of equality with man. He believes\nthat they are endowed with feelings and intelligence like men, that\nthey are united into families and tribes like men, that they have\nvarious languages like human tribes, that they possess souls which\nsurvive the death of the bodies just as is the case with human souls.\nHe tells of animals that have been the ancestors of men, of men that\nhave become animals, of marriages that take place between men and\nbeasts. He also believes that he who slays an animal will be exposed\nto the vengeance either of its disembodied spirit, or of all the other\nanimals of the same species which, quite after human fashion, are\nbound to resent the injury done to one of their number.[51] Is it not\nnatural, then, that the savage should give like for like? If it is the\nduty of animals to take vengeance upon men, is it not equally the duty\nof men to take vengeance upon animals?\n\n[Footnote 51: Tylor, _Primitive Culture_, i. 467 _sqq._ Frazer,\n_Golden Bough_, ii. 389 _sqq._ Liebrecht, _Zur Volkskunde_, p. 17.\nAchelis, _Moderne V\u00f6lkerkunde_, p. 373 _sqq._ _Idem_, 'Animal\nWorship,' in _Open Court_, xi. 705 _sq._ Waitz, _Anthropologie der\nNaturv\u00f6lker_, ii. 180 (Negroes). von den Steinen, _Unter den\nNaturv\u00f6lkern Zentral-Brasiliens_, p. 351. Im Thurn, _Among the Indians\nof Guiana_, p. 350 _sqq._ Dorman, _Origin of Primitive Superstitions_,\npp. 223, 253. Lumholtz, _Unknown Mexico_, i. 331 (Tarahumares).\nMooney, 'Myths of the Cherokee,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ xix. pp.\n250, 261 _sq._ Nelson, 'Eskimo about Bering Strait,' _ibid._ xviii.\n423. Hose and McDougall, 'Relations between Men and Animals in\nSarawak,' in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxxi. 173 _sqq._, especially\np. 205 _sq._]\n\nNor are these beliefs restricted to savages. Muhammedans maintain, not\nonly that animals will share with men the general resurrection, but\nthat they will be judged according to their works. Their tradition\nsays that God \"will raise up animals at the last day to receive {259}\nreward and to show His perfection and His justice. Then the hornless\ngoat will be revenged on the horned one.\"[52] We can hardly wonder\nthat the Zoroastrian law inflicted punishments on dogs which hurt men\nor animals, when we read in the Vend\u00eed\u00e2d that a dog has the characters\nof eight sorts of people.[53] The fable and the _M\u00e4rchen_ for a long\ntime related in good earnest their stories of animals that behaved\nexactly like men.[54] Even to this day, in certain districts of\nEurope, as soon as a peasant is dead, it is customary for his heir to\nannounce the change of ownership to every beast in the stall, and to\nthe bees also;[55] and in some parts of Poland, when the corpse of the\nrustic proprietor is being carried out, all his cattle are let loose,\nthat they may take leave of their old master.[56] In the Middle Ages\nanimals were sometimes accepted as witnesses; a man who was accused of\nhaving committed a murder in his house appeared before the tribunal\nwith his cat, his dog, and his cock, swore in their presence that he\nwas innocent, and was acquitted.[57] It was not only the common people\nthat ascribed intelligence to beasts. According to Porphyry, all the\nphilosophers who have endeavoured to discover the truth concerning\nanimals have acknowledged that they to a certain extent participate of\nreason;[58] and the same idea is expressed by Christian writers of a\nmuch later date. In the sixteenth century, Beno\u00eet wrote that animals\noften speak.[59] In the middle of the following century, Hieronymus\nRorarius published a book entitled 'Quod animalia bruta ratione\nutantur melius homine.' And about the same time Johann Crell, in his\n'Ethica Christiana,' expressed the opinion that animals at all events\npossess faculties analogous to reason and free-will, that they have\nsomething similar to virtues and vices, that they {260} deserve\nsomething like rewards and punishments, and are consequently punished\nby God and man.[60] This, as it seems to me, is the correct\nexplanation of the medi\u00e6val practice of punishing animals, even\nthough, in some cases, as M. M\u00e9nabr\u00e9a observes, the obnoxious animal\nwas regarded as an embodiment of some evil spirit and was punished as\nsuch.[61] The beast or insect was retaliated upon for the simple\nreason that it was regarded as a rational being.\n\n[Footnote 52: _Koran_, vi. 38. Sell, _Faith of Isl\u00e1m_, p. 223.]\n\n[Footnote 53: _Vend\u00eed\u00e2d_, xiii. 44 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 54: See Grimm, _Reinhart Fuchs_, p. i. _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 55: Ralston, _Songs of the Russian People_, p. 315. Wuttke,\n_Der deutsche Volksaberglaube der Gegenwart_, p. 428.]\n\n[Footnote 56: Ralston, _op. cit._ p. 318.]\n\n[Footnote 57: Michelet, _Origines du droit fran\u00e7ais_, pp. 76, 279\n_sq._ Chambers, _op. cit._ i. 129.]\n\n[Footnote 58: Porphyry, _De abstinentia ab esu animalium_, iii. 6.]\n\n[Footnote 59: Beno\u00eet, quoted by d'Addosio, _op. cit._ p. 214.]\n\n[Footnote 60: Crell, _Ethica Christiana_, ii. 1, p. 65 _sq._:--\"Hinc\naliquid etiam virtuti et vitio simile, seu recte et prave factum:\nquorum illud est, cum bruta natur\u00e6 su\u00e6 ductum sequuntur, hoc cum a\nnaturali via exorbitant. Unde tandem etiam aliquid **pr\u00e6mio aut\np[oe]n\u00e6, et huic quidem maxime simile. Unde bestias etiam a Deo\npunitas, aut p[oe]nas certas lege illis constitutas, cernimus.\"]\n\n[Footnote 61: M\u00e9nabr\u00e9a, _De l'origine de la forme et de l'esprit des\njugements rendus au moyen-age contre les animaux_, p. 35.]\n\nAt the earlier stages of civilisation even inanimate things are\ntreated as if they were responsible agents. The Kukis take revenge not\nonly on a murderous tiger, but on a murderous tree. \"If a man should\nhappen to be killed, by an accidental fall from a tree, all his\nrelations assemble, and cut it down; and however large it may be, they\nreduce it to chips, which they scatter in the winds, for having, as\nthey say, been the cause of the death of their brother.\"[62] Among the\naborigines of Western Victoria, \"when the spear or weapon of an enemy\nhas killed a friend, it is always burnt by the relatives of the\ndeceased; but those captured in battle are kept, and used by the\nconquerors.\"[63] The North American Redskins, when struck with an\narrow in battle, \"will tear it from the wound, break and bite it with\ntheir teeth, and dash it on the ground.\"[64] The British Guiana\nIndian, when hurt either by falling on a rock, or by the rock falling\non him, \"attributes the blame, by a line of argument still not\nuncommon in more civilised life, to the rock.\"[65] The gods of the\nVedic age cursed the trees which had injured them.[66] Xerxes\ncommanded {261} that the Hellespont should be stricken with three\nhundred lashes,[67] and Cyrus \"wreaked his vengeance\" on the river\nGyndes by dispersing it through three hundred and sixty channels.[68]\nPausanias relates that when Theagenes had died, one of his enemies\nwent up to his statue every night, and whipped the brass. At last,\nhowever, \"the statue checked his insolence by falling on him; but the\nsons of the deceased prosecuted the statue for murder. The Thasians\nsank the statue in the sea, herein following the view taken by Draco,\nwho, in the laws touching homicide which he drew up for the Athenians,\nenacted that even lifeless things should be banished if they fell on\nanybody and killed him.\"[69] As Dr. Frazer remarks, the punishment of\ninanimate objects for having accidentally been the cause of death was\nprobably much older than Draco.[70] At Athens there was a special\ntribunal for the purpose.[71] Demosthenes states that, if a stone or a\npiece of wood or iron or any such thing fell and struck a man, and the\nperson who threw the thing was not known, but the people knew, and\nwere in possession of, the object which killed the man, that object\nwas brought to trial at the court of the Prytaneum.[72] Plato lays\ndown the following rule in his 'Laws':--\"If any lifeless thing deprive\na man of life, except in the case of a thunderbolt or other fatal dart\nsent from the gods,--whether a man is killed by lifeless objects\nfalling upon him, or by his falling upon them, the nearest of kin\nshall appoint the nearest neighbour to be a judge, and thereby acquit\nhimself and the whole family of guilt. And he shall cast forth the\nguilty thing beyond the border.\"[73] Teutonic law, which still\nrecognised the principle of private revenge, treated the inanimate\nmurderer with less ceremony.[74] According to the Laws of Alfred, when\nmen were at work together in {262} a forest, and by misadventure one\nlet a tree fall on another, which killed him, the tree belonged to the\ndead man's kinsfolk if they took it away within thirty days.[75] Later\non, in England, a thing by which death was caused was \"forfeited to\nGod, that is to the King, God's Lieutenant on earth, to be distributed\nin works of charity for the appeasing of God's wrath.\"[76] This law\nremained in force till 1846.[77]\n\n[Footnote 62: Macrae, in _Asiatick Researches_, vii. 189 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 63: Dawson, _Australian Aborigines_, p. 53.]\n\n[Footnote 64: Robertson, _History of America_, i. 351 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 65: Im Thurn, _op. cit._ p. 354.]\n\n[Footnote 66: Oldenberg, _Religion des Veda_, p. 518.]\n\n[Footnote 67: Herodotus, vii. 35.]\n\n[Footnote 68: _Ibid._ i. 190.]\n\n[Footnote 69: Pausanias, vi. 11. 6. _Cf._ _ibid._ v. 27. 10.]\n\n[Footnote 70: Frazer, _Pausanias_, ii. 371.]\n\n[Footnote 71: Aristotle, _De republica Atheniensium_, 57. Pausanias,\ni. 28. 10.]\n\n[Footnote 72: Demosthenes, _Contra Aristocratem_, 76, p. 645.]\n\n[Footnote 73: Plato, _Leges_, ix. 873 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 74: See Trummer, _Vortr\u00e4ge \u00fcber Tortur, &c._ i. 376 _sq._\nBrunner, _Forschungen_, p. 521 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 75: _Laws of Alfred_, ii. 13.]\n\n[Footnote 76: Coke. _Third Part of the Institutes of the Laws of\nEngland_, p. 57.]\n\n[Footnote 77: Stephen, _History of the Criminal Law of England_, iii.\n78. Pollock and Maitland, _History of English Law before the Time of\nEdward I._ ii. 473.]\n\nIn some of these cases superstitious dread may have been a motive for\ndestroying or banishing the instrument of death. There are facts which\nprove that such an object is looked upon as a source of danger.\nAccording to the Ripuarian law, people are forbidden to make use of a\nthing which has been \"auctor interfectionis\";[78] and in Norway, in\nquite modern times, sickles, axes, and other objects with which men\nhave been killed, have been seen lying about abandoned and unused.[79]\nAgain, among the aborigines of West Australia, if a person has been\nkilled by a thrust of the native wooden spear, _ghici_, his\ncountry-men think that his soul remains in the point of the weapon\nwhich caused his death, and they burn it after his burial, so that the\nsoul may depart.[80] But it is also obvious that an inanimate thing\nwhich is the cause of a hurt is apt to evoke a genuine feeling of\nresentment. We kick the chair over which we stumble, we curse the\nstone which hurts us; Dr Nansen says that, when he was crossing\nGreenland, it would have caused him \"quite real satisfaction\" to\ndestroy a sledge which was **\"heavy to draw.\"[81] When we thus behave\nas if the offending object were capable of feeling our resentment, we\nfor a moment vaguely believe that it is alive.[82] But our anger very\nsoon passes {263} away when we realise the true nature of its object.\nThe case is different with men at earlier stages of civilisation. They\ndo not suppose that things which hurt them are senseless; on the\ncontrary, they personify such things, not only hastily and\nmomentarily, but deliberately and permanently; hence their resentment\nlasts. The Guiana Indian, says Sir E. F. Im Thurn, \"attributes any\ncalamity which may happen to him to the intention of the immediate\ninstrument of its infliction, and he not unnaturally sees in the\naction of this instrument evidence of its possession of a spirit.\"[83]\nTrees, especially, are very commonly supposed to possess souls similar\nto those of men, and are treated accordingly.[84] Pausanias writes\nthat \"lifeless things are said to have inflicted of their own accord a\nrighteous punishment on men\"; and as the best and most famous instance\nof this he mentions the sword of Cambyses.[85] In England the\ninanimate murderer was to be given up to the kinsmen of the slain\nsurely not as a compensation for the loss they had suffered, but as an\nobject upon which their vengeance was to be wreaked.[86] It was called\n_la bane_, that is, \"the slayer\"; Bracton also calls it the\n\"malefactor.\"[87] It did not matter that its owner was recognised as\ninnocent; the punishment was not intended for him.[88] But in some\nwell-defined cases the \"slayer\" was free from guilt. A ship or other\nvessel from which a person was drowned by misfortune was not forfeited\nas deodand in case the accident happened in salt water--as Coke\nindicates, on account of the great dangers to which the vessel is\nexposed \"upon the raging waves in respect of the wind and\ntempest.\"[89] Moreover, if a boy under fourteen fell from a cart, or\nfrom a horse, it was {264} no deodand, \"because he was not of\ndiscretion to look to himself,\" and so the cart, or horse, could not\nbe regarded as blamable. But if a cart ran over a boy, or a tree fell\nupon him, or a bull gored him, it was deodand, because, apparently, it\nwent out of its way to kill him.[90] The fact of motion was one of\nconsiderable importance in the case of animals and inanimate things,\nas it was in the case of men. Thus Bracton would distinguish between\nthe horse which throws a man and the horse off which a man tumbles,\nbetween the tree that falls and the tree against which a man is\nthrown; and, as a general rule, a thing was not a deodand unless it\ncould be said \"movere ad mortem.\"[91] If anybody was drowned by\nfalling from a ship under sail, not only the ship itself but the\nthings moving in it were deemed the cause of his death; whereas the\nmerchandise lying at the bottom of the vessel was not presumed to be\nguilty, and consequently was not forfeited.[92] But if any particular\nmerchandise fell upon a person and caused his death, that merchandise\nbecame a deodand, and not the ship.[93] As Mr. Holmes observes, a ship\nis the most persistent example of motion giving personality to a\nthing. \"She\" is still personified not only in common parlance, but in\ncourts of justice. In maritime cases of quite recent date judges of\ngreat repute have pronounced the proceeding to be, not against the\nowner, but \"against the vessel for an offence committed by the\nvessel.\"[94]\n\n[Footnote 78: _Lex Ripuariorum_, lxx. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 79: Liebrccht, _Zur Volkskund_, p. 313.]\n\n[Footnote 80: Salvado, _M\u00e9moires historiques sur l'Australie_,\np. 260 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 81: Nansen, _Eskimo Life_, p. 213 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 82: _Cf._ Dugald Stewart, _Philosophy of the Active and\nMoral Powers of Man_, i. 125; Hall, 'Study of Anger,' in _American\nJournal of Psychology_, x. 506 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 83: Im Thurn, _op. cit._ p. 354.]\n\n[Footnote 84: See Frazer, _Golden Bough_, i. 169 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 85: Pausanias, i. 28. 11.]\n\n[Footnote 86: Pollock and Maitland, ii. 474.]\n\n[Footnote 87: Bracton, _De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angli\u00e6_, fol.\n116, vol. ii. 236 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 88: Holmes, _Common Law_, p. 25.]\n\n[Footnote 89: Bracton, _op. cit._ fol. 122, vol. ii. 286 _sq._ Coke,\n_op. cit._ p. 58. Sir James Stephen supposes (_op. cit._ iii. 78) that\n\"deodands were not in use at sea, because the local customs of England\ndid not extend to the high seas.\" But Coke expressly says (p. 58) that\nthere can be no deodand of the ship even \"in _aqua salsa_, being any\narm of the sea, though it be in the body of the County.\"]\n\n[Footnote 90: Coke, _op. cit._ p. 57. Hale, _History of the Pleas of\nthe Crown_, i. 422. Stephen, _op. cit._ iii. 78.]\n\n[Footnote 91: Bracton, _op. cit._ fol. 136 b, vol. ii, 400 _sq._ Hale,\n_op. cit._ i. 420 _sqq._ Pollock and Maitland, _op. cit._ ii. 474, n.\n4. Stephen, _op. cit._ iii. 77. Holmes, _op. cit._ p. 25\n_sq._]\n\n[Footnote 92: Britton, i. 2. 14, vol. i. 16.]\n\n[Footnote 93: Hale, _op. cit._ i. 422.]\n\n[Footnote 94: Holmes, _op. cit._ p. 29.]\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nLike the lower animals, human beings in their earliest childhood are\nincapable of forming notions of right and wrong, hence they are not\nresponsible for any act of theirs. Responsibility commences with the\ndawn of a moral consciousness, and increases along with the evolution\nof the intellect. Only by slow degrees the capacity of recognising\n{265} act as right or wrong develops in the child. It soon learns that\ncertain acts are forbidden, but to know that an act is forbidden is\nnot the same as to recognise it as wrong. Nor does the knowledge of a\nmoral rule involve the ability to apply that rule in particular cases.\nNor can the youthful intellect be expected to possess the same degree\nof foresight as the intellect of a grown-up man. Hence the total or\npartial irresponsibility of childhood and early youth.\n\nThis irresponsibility is admitted by the laws of civilised nations. In\nEngland,[95] Scotland,[96] and the United States,[97] children under\nseven are absolutely exempt from punishment. In other modern countries\ncriminal responsibility does not commence until the age of nine,[98]\nten,[99] twelve,[100] or fourteen.[101] In some it is to be decided in\neach case whether a child is punishable or not.[102] Thus the French\nCode P\u00e9nal provides that a person under eighteen years of age shall\nnot be punished if it be decided that he has acted without discernment\n(_sans discernement_) whereas, if he has acted with discernment (_avec\ndiscernement_), his punishment is to be mitigated according to a fixed\nscale.[103] Most laws set down an intermediate period between that of\ncomplete irresponsibility and that of complete responsibility.\nAccording to English law there is a presumption that children from\nseven to fourteen are not possessed of the degree of knowledge\nessential to criminality, though this presumption may be rebutted by\nproof to the contrary;[104] and, according to the German\nStrafgesetzbuch, a person from twelve to eighteen may be acquitted if,\nwhen he committed the offence, he did {266} not possess the\nintelligence requisite to know that it was criminal.[105] Other laws,\nagain, regard a certain age _eo ipso_ as a ground of extenuation, its\nupper limit being fixed sometimes at sixteen,[106] sometimes at\neighteen,[107] sometimes at twenty,[108] sometimes at twenty-one.[109]\n\n[Footnote 95: Stephen, _op. cit._ ii. 97 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 96: Erskine-Rankine, _Principles of the Law of Scotland_,\np. 546.]\n\n[Footnote 97: Bishop, _Commentaries on the Criminal Law_, \u00a7 368, vol.\ni. 209.]\n\n[Footnote 98: Italian _Codice Penale_, art. 53. Spanish _C\u00f3digo Penal\nreformado_, art. 8, \u00a7 2.]\n\n[Footnote 99: Austrian (Finger, _op. cit._ i. 110), Dutch (van Hamel,\nin _L\u00e9gislation p\u00e9nale compar\u00e9e_, edited by von Liszt, p. 444),\nPortuguese (Tavares de Medeiros, _ibid._ p. 199), Russian (Foinitzki,\n_ibid._ p. 529) law.]\n\n[Footnote 100: German _Strafgesetzbuch_, art. 55.]\n\n[Footnote 101: Swedish (Uppstr\u00f6m, in _L\u00e9gislation p\u00e9nale compar\u00e9e_, p.\n483), Finnish (Forsman, _ibid._ p. 565) law.]\n\n[Footnote 102: French, Belgian, Ottoman law (Rivi\u00e8re, _ibid._ p. 7).]\n\n[Footnote 103: _Code P\u00e9nal_, art. 66 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 104: Stephen, _op. cit._ ii. 98. Kenny, _Outlines of\nCriminal Law_, p. 50.]\n\n[Footnote 105: _Strafgesetzbuch_, art. 56.]\n\n[Footnote 106: Dutch law (van Hamel, _loc. cit._ p. 444).]\n\n[Footnote 107: Spanish (_C\u00f3digo Penal reformado_, art. 9, \u00a7 2),\nSwedish (Uppstr\u00f6m, _loc. cit._ p. 484), Finnish (Forsman, _loc. cit._\np. 566) law.]\n\n[Footnote 108: Austrian law (Finger, _op. cit._ i. 112).]\n\n[Footnote 109: Italian (_Codice Penale_, art. 56), Russian (Foinitzki,\n_loc. cit._ p. 529), Portuguese (Tavares de Medeiros, _loc. cit._ p.\n199), Brazilian (_Codigo Penal dos Estados Unidos do Brazil_, art. 42,\n\u00a7 11) law. According to the _Ottoman Penal Code_, art. 40, \"a guilty\nperson who has not arrived at the age of puberty may not be punished\nwith the punishment enacted against the offence of which he has been\nfound guilty.\"]\n\nRoman law, as it seems, made out a _pr\u00e6sumptio juris_ of general\nincapacity to commit a crime under puberty, rebuttable by evidence of\ncapacity, at any rate in the age called \"next to puberty,\" the limits\nof which are not clearly settled.[110] In the Irish Book of Aicill it\nis said that \"the man who incites a fool is he who pays for his\ncrime\"; and to this the Commentary adds that a man is a fool till the\nend of seven years, and a fool of half sense till the end of\nfourteen[111]--a provision similar to that of Canon Law.[112]\nAccording to Muhammedan law, the rule of talion is applicable only to\npersons of age.[113] In China criminal responsibility is affected not\nonly by youth, but by old age as well. \"Offenders whose age is not\nmore than seven nor less than ninety years, shall not suffer\npunishment in any case, except in that of treason or rebellion.\" \"Any\noffender whose age is not more than ten nor less than eighty years, .\n. . shall, when the crime is capital, but not {267} amounting to\ntreason, be recommended to the particular consideration and decision\nof His Imperial Majesty.\" And \"any offender whose age is not more than\nfifteen, nor less than seventy years . . . shall be allowed to redeem\nhimself from any punishment less than capital, by the payment of the\nestablished fine, except in the case of persons condemned to\nbanishment as accessories to the crimes of treason, rebellion, murder\nof three or more persons in one family, or homicide by magic or\npoisoning, upon all of which offenders the laws shall be strictly\nexecuted.\"[114]\n\n[Footnote 110: Clark, _Analysis of Criminal Liability_, p. 70. von\nJhering, _Das Schuldmoment im r\u00f6mischen Privatrecht_, p. 42 _sqq._\nMommsen _R\u00f6misches Strafrecht_, p. 75 _sq._ In the _Institutiones_ (i.\n22) puberty is fixed at the completion of the fourteenth year for\nmales, and of the twelfth for females. According to the Law of the\nTwelve Tables, children were punished for theft, though less severely\nthan adults (Gellius, _Noctes Attic\u00e6_, xi. 18. 8. Pliny, _Historia\nnaturalis_, xviii. 3).]\n\n[Footnote 111: _Ancient Laws of Ireland_, iii. 157.]\n\n[Footnote 112: Katz, _Grundriss des kanonischen Strafrechts_, p. 8.]\n\n[Footnote 113: Sachau, _Muhammedanisches Recht_, p. 762. Jaffur\nShurreef says (_Qanoon-e-Islam_, p. 36) that, among the Muhammedans of\nIndia, previous to the period of puberty all the good and evil deeds\nof boys and girls are laid to the charge of their parents.]\n\n[Footnote 114: _Ta Tsing Leu Lee_, sec. xxii. _sq._]\n\nAccording to early custom, children who have committed an injury are\nsometimes,[115] but not always,[116] subject to the rule of\nretaliation. Even in Homeric Greece, manslaughter committed in\nchildhood seems to have been visited with banishment for life.[117] In\nother cases parents are responsible for the deeds of their\nchildren.[118] Among the West African Fjort, for instance, children\nare not themselves liable for their actions, but the injured party can\nclaim compensation from the parents if he likes to do so.[119] Among\nthe Teutons, \"like the master for the slave, the father answered for\nand made claims on behalf of the child. The ceremony of investing him\nwith arms as a _wehrhaft_, or weapon-bearing member of the community,\nwas the usual period for the assumption of rights and liabilities; and\nthis customarily (not always) took place at the age of twelve.\"[120]\nAccording to ancient Swedish law, an injury was treated in the same\nway as if it had been accidental, in case the offender was under the\nage of fifteen;[121] according to the Icelandic Gr\u00e1g\u00e1s, in case he was\n{268} under sixteen.[122] However, as we have seen, accidental\ninjuries had to be paid for. Where offences are dealt with according\nto the principle of compensation, it is impossible to decide how far\nparents' liability for their children involves a recognition of the\nmoral irresponsibility of the child, or is simply due to the fact that\nchildren, having no property, are themselves unable to compensate.\nThat the latter point of view was largely adopted by early custom and\nlaw appears from the fact that, when compensation was succeeded by\npunishment, the period of irresponsibility was reduced. In England the\nage-limit of twelve years, which prevailed in Anglo-Norman days, was\nafterwards disregarded in criminal cases.[123] We read in the\nNorthumberland Assize Roll, A.D. 1279, \"Reginald . . . aged four, by\nmisadventure slew Robert . . . aged two; the justice granted that he\nmight have his life and members because of his tender age.\"[124] A\nlittle later we hear that a child under the age of seven shall not\nsuffer judgment in a case of homicide.[125] In 1457, an infant of four\nwas held liable in trespass, though the language of the court shows a\ndisposition to exempt the infant.[126] From the eighteenth century\ninstances are recorded of a girl of thirteen who was burnt for killing\nher mistress, and of a boy of eight who was hanged for arson.[127] In\n1748, a boy of ten, being convicted for the murder of a girl of five,\nwas sentenced to death, and all the judges to whom this case was\nreported agreed that, \"in justice to the publick,\" the law ought to\ntake its course. The execution, however, was respited, and the boy at\nlast had the benefit of His Majesty's pardon.[128] It appears from\nthese facts, and from others of a similar character referring to\ncontinental countries,[129] that there has been a tendency to raise\nthe age {269} at which full legal responsibility commences. And we\nhave reason to hope that legislation has not yet said its last word on\nthe subject.\n\n[Footnote 115: Senfft, in Steinmetz, _Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_, p. 449\n(Marshall Islanders). Miklosich, 'Blutrache bei den Slaven,' in\n_Denkschriften d. kaiserl. Akadamie d. Wissensch. Philos.-hist.\nClasse_, Vienna, xxxvi. 131 (Turks of Daghestan). See also _supra_,\np. 217 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 116: Lang, in Steinmetz, _Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_, p. 257\n(Washambala).]\n\n[Footnote 117: _Iliad_, xxiii. 85 _sqq._ _Cf._ M\u00fcller, _Dissertations\non the Eumenides_, p. 95.]\n\n[Footnote 118: Nicole, in Steinmetz, _Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_ p. 132\n(Diakit\u00e9-Sarrakolese). Marx, _ibid._ p. 357 (Amahlubi).]\n\n[Footnote 119: Dennett, in _Jour. African Society_, i. 276.]\n\n[Footnote 120: Wigmore, 'Responsibility for Tortious Acts,' in\n_Harvard Law Review_, vii. 447.]\n\n[Footnote 121: Wilda, _Strafrecht der Germanen_, p. 642 _sq._\nNordstr\u00f6m, _Bidrag till den svenska samh\u00e4lls-f\u00f6rfattningens historia_,\nii. 73. _Cf._ von Amira, _Nordgermanisches Obligationenrecht_,\ni. 375 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 122: _Gr\u00e1g\u00e1s_, Vigslo\u00fei, 32, vol. ii. 63.]\n\n[Footnote 123: Wigmore, _loc. cit._ p. 447.]\n\n[Footnote 124: _Three Early Assize Rolls for the County of\nNorthumberland_, p. 323.]\n\n[Footnote 125: Pollock and Maitland, _op. cit._ ii. 84.]\n\n[Footnote 126: Wigmore, _loc. cit._ p. 447 _sq._ n. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 127: Wilson, _History of Modern English Law_, p. 124.]\n\n[Footnote 128: Foster, _Report of Crown Cases_, p. 70 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 129: Trummer, _op. cit._ i. 428, 432 _sqq._ (Germany).\nJousse, _Trait\u00e9 de la justice criminelle de France_, ii. 617; Tissot,\n_Droit p\u00e9nal_, i. 30 (France).]\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe principle that intellectual incapacity lessens or excludes\nresponsibility also applies to idiots and madmen. Though idiots are\nable to acquire some knowledge of general moral rules, the application\nof those rules is frequently beyond their powers;[130] and their\ncapacity of foreseeing the consequences of their acts is necessarily\nvery restricted. The same to some extent holds good of madmen; but, as\nwill be shown in the next chapter, there is another ground for their\nirresponsibility besides the derangement of the intellect.\n\n[Footnote 130: von Krafft-Ebing, _Lehrbuch der gerichtlichen\nPsychopathologie_, p. 70.]\n\nAll modern laws admit that, at least under certain circumstances,\nidiocy or madness exempts a person from criminal responsibility.\nAccording to Roman law, lunatics were even free from the obligation of\npaying indemnities for losses inflicted by them;[131] and so mild was\ntheir lot at Rome, that it became a practice for citizens to shirk\ntheir public duties by feigning madness.[132] Even savages recognise\nthat lunatics and maniacs are not responsible for their deeds. The\nAbipones maintained that it was \"wrong and irrational to use arms\nagainst those who are not in possession of their senses.\"[133] Among\nthe North American Potawatomis many \"are said to be 'foolish,' and not\nsensible of crime.\"[134] The Iroquois are \"persuaded that a person who\nis not in his right senses is not to be reprehended, or at least not\nto be punished.\"[135] Hennepin states that \"they had one day in the\nyear which might be called the Festival of Fools; for in fact they\npretended to be mad, rushing from hut to hut, so that if they\nill-treated any one or carried off anything, they would say next day,\n{270} 'I was mad; I had not my senses about me.' And the others would\naccept this explanation and exact no vengeance.\"[136] The Melanesians\n\"are sorry for lunatics and are kind to them, though their remedies\nare rough\"; at Florida, for instance, a man went out of his mind,\nchased people, stole things and hid them, but \"no one blamed him,\nbecause they knew that he was possessed by a _tindalo_ ghost.\"[137]\nAmong the West African Fjort fools and idiots are not responsible\npersonally for their actions.[138] Among the Wadshagga crimes\ncommitted by lunatics are judged of more leniently than others.[139]\nAmong the Matabele madmen, being supposed to be possessed of a spirit,\n\"were formerly under the protection of the King.\"[140] In Eastern\nAfrica the natives say of an idiot or a lunatic, \"He has fiends.\"[141]\nEl Hajj [(]Abdssalam Shabeeny states that in Hausaland \"a man guilty\nof a crime, who in the opinion of the judge is possessed by an evil\nspirit, is not punished.\"[142]\n\n[Footnote 131: von Vangerow, _Lehrbuch der Pandekten_, iii. 36. von\nJhering, _Das Schuldmoment im r\u00f6mischen Privatrecht_, p. 42. Thon,\n_Rechtsnorm und subjectives Recht_, p. 106, n. 70.]\n\n[Footnote 132: _Digesta_, xxvii. 10. 6.]\n\n[Footnote 133: Dobrizhoffer, _Account of the Abipones_, ii. 234.]\n\n[Footnote 134: Keating, _Expedition to the Source of St. Peter's\nRiver_, i. 127.]\n\n[Footnote 135: Charlevoix, _Voyage to North America_, ii. 24 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 136: Hennepin, _Description de la Louisiane_, Les M[oe]urs\ndes Sauvages, p. 71 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 137: Codrington, _Melanesians_, p. 218.]\n\n[Footnote 138: Dennett, in _Jour. African Society_, i. 276.]\n\n[Footnote 139: Merker, quoted by Kohler, in _Zeitschr. f. vergl.\nRechtswiss._ xv. 64.]\n\n[Footnote 140: Decle, _Three Years in Savage Africa_, p. 154.]\n\n[Footnote 141: Burton, _Lake Regions of Central Africa_, ii. 320.]\n\n[Footnote 142: [(]Abdssalam Shabeeny, _Account of Timbuctoo and\nHousa_, p. 49.]\n\nThe idea that derangement of the mind is due to spiritual possession,\noften makes the idiot or the insane an object of religious\nreverence.[143] The Macusis regard lunatics as holy.[144] The\nBrazilian Paravilhana believe that idiots are inspired.[145] According\nto Schoolcraft, \"regard for lunatics, or the demented members of the\nhuman race, is a universal trait among the American tribes.\"[146] So,\nalso, the African Barolong give a kind of worship to deranged persons,\nwho are said to be under the direct influence of a deity.[147] A\ncertain kind of madness was regarded by the ancient Greeks as a divine\ngift, and consequently as \"superior to a sane mind.\"[148] Lane states\nthat, among the modern {271} Egyptians, an idiot or a fool is vulgarly\nregarded \"as a being whose mind is in heaven, while his grosser part\nmingles among ordinary mortals; consequently he is considered an\nespecial favourite of heaven. Whatever enormities a reputed saint may\ncommit (and there are many who are constantly infringing precepts of\ntheir religion), such acts do not affect his fame for sanctity; for\nthey are considered as the results of the abstraction of his mind from\nworldly things--his soul, or reasoning faculties, being wholly\nabsorbed in devotion--so that his passions are left without control.\nLunatics who are dangerous to society are kept in confinement, but\nthose who are harmless are generally regarded as saints.\"[149] The\nsame holds good of Morocco. Lunatics are not even obliged to observe\nthe Ramadan fast, the most imperative of all religious duties; of a\nperson who, instead of abstaining from all food till sunset, was\ntaking his meal in broad daylight in the open street, I heard the\npeople forgivingly say, \"The poor fellow does not know what he is\ndoing, his mind is with God.\"[150]\n\n[Footnote 143: _Cf._ Tylor, _Primitive Culture_, ii. 128.]\n\n[Footnote 144: Andree, _Ethnographische Parallelen_, _Neue Folge_, p. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 145: von Martius, _Beitr\u00e4ge zur Ethnographie Amerika's_,\ni. 633.]\n\n[Footnote 146: Schoolcraft, _Indian Tribes of the United States_,\niv. 49.]\n\n[Footnote 147: Tylor, _Primitive Culture_, ii. 130.]\n\n[Footnote 148: Plato, _Ph\u00e6drus_, p. 244.]\n\n[Footnote 149: Lane, _Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians_,\np. 237.]\n\n[Footnote 150: _Cf._ Gr\u00e5berg di Hems\u00f6, _Specchio geografico, e\nstatistico dell' impero Marocco_, p. 182 _sq._]\n\nOn the other hand there are peoples who treat their lunatics in a very\ndifferent manner. The tribes of Western Victoria put them to death,\n\"as they have a very great dread of mad people.\"[151] In Kar Nicobar\nmadness is said to be the only cause for a death \"penalty\" that seems\nto exist there, the afflicted individual being garrotted with two\npieces of bamboo;[152] but this practice seems to be a method of\ngetting rid of a dangerous individual, rather than a penalty in the\nproper sense of the word. Among the Washambala a lunatic who commits\nhomicide is killed--as our informant observes, \"not really on account\nof his deed, but in order to prevent him from causing further\nmischief.\"[153] Among the Turks of Daghestan, we are told, mad people\nare subject to the rule of blood-revenge.[154]\n\n[Footnote 151: Dawson, _op. cit._ p. 61.]\n\n[Footnote 152: Distant, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ iii. 6.]\n\n[Footnote 153: Lang, in Steinmetz, _Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_, p. 257.]\n\n[Footnote 154: Miklosich, _loc. cit._ p. 131.]\n\n{272} In China lunatics are held responsible for their acts, although\nthe ordinary penalty applicable is commuted, as for instance, in\nmurder to imprisonment with fetters subject to His Majesty's pleasure.\nBut when a lunatic deliberately kills his parents or grandparents, a\nrepresentation will not serve; he is to be executed at once on the\nspot where the murder was committed or on the city execution ground,\nand the sentence--slicing to pieces--is to be carried out in all its\nhorror though the lunatic be already dead.[155]\n\n[Footnote 155: Alabaster, _Commentaries on Chinese Law_, pp. 93, 96.\n_Cf._ Douglas, _Society in China_, pp. 72, 122.]\n\nAccording to ancient Welsh law, no vengeance is to be exercised\nagainst an idiot,[156] nor is the king to have any fine for the act of\nsuch a person.[157] But, \"if idiots kill other persons, let _galanas_\n[that is, blood-money] be paid on their behalf, as for other persons;\nbecause their kindred ought to prevent them doing wrong.\"[158] The\nSwedish provincial laws treated an injury committed by a lunatic in\nthe same manner as an injury by misadventure, provided that the\nrelatives of the injurer had publicly announced his madness, or,\naccording to some laws, had kept him tied in bonds which he had\nbroken; but if they had omitted to do so, the injury was treated as if\nit had been done wilfully.[159] The Icelandic Gr\u00e1g\u00e1s even lays down\nthe rule that a madman who has committed homicide shall suffer the\nsame punishment as a sane person guilty of the same crime.[160] In\nEngland, in the times of Edward II. and Edward III., proof of madness\nappears not to have entitled a man to be acquitted, at least in case\nof murder, but to a special verdict that he committed the offence when\nmad, and this gave him a right to pardon.[161] Such a right, indeed,\nimplies the admission that lunacy has a claim to forbearance; but from\nwhat we know about the treatment of lunatics during the Middle Ages\nand much later, we cannot be sure that the insane offender escaped\n{273} all punishment. In a case which occurred in 1315, it was\npresented that a certain lunatic wounded himself with a knife, and\nfinally died of his wounds; his chattels were confiscated.[162] Lord\nBacon says in his 'Maxims of the Law,' \"If an infant within years of\ndiscretion, or a madman, kill another, he shall not be impeached\nthereof: but if he put out a man's eye, or do him like corporal hurt,\nhe shall be punished in trespass\"; in these latter cases, \"the law\ndoth rather consider the damage of the party wronged, than the malice\nof him that was the wrong-doer.\"[163] In none of the German town-laws\nbefore the beginning of the seventeenth century is there any special\nprovision for the offences of lunatics;[164] and, according to the\nStatutes of Hamburg of 1605, though a madman who kills a person shall\nnot be punished as an ordinary manslayer, he is yet to be\npunished.[165] In Germany recognised idiots and madmen were not seldom\npunished with great severity, and even with death, in the seventeenth\nand eighteenth centuries.[166] One of the darkest pages in the history\nof European civilisation may be filled with a description of the\nsufferings which were inflicted upon those miserable beings up to\nquite modern times.[167] Many of them were burnt as witches or\nheretics, or treated as ordinary criminals. For unruly and crazy\npeople, who nowadays would be comfortably located in an asylum,\nwhipping-posts and stocks were made use of. Shakespeare speaks of\nmadmen as deserving \"a dark house and a whip\";[168] and Swift observes\nthat original people like Diogenes and others, if they had lived in\nhis day, would have been treated like madmen, that is, would have\nincurred \"manifest danger of phlebotomy, and whips, and chains, and\ndark chambers, and straw.\"[169] The writings of {274} Esquirol, the\nparliamentary debates on the asylums of Bedlam and York, and the\nreports presented under the auspices of La Rochefoucauld to the\nNational Assembly of 1789, contain a picture unique in its sadness--\"a\npicture of prisons in which lunatics, criminal lunatics, and criminals\nare huddled together indiscriminately without regard to sex or age, of\nasylums in which the maniac, to whom motion is an imperious necessity,\nis chained in the same cell with the victim of melancholia whom his\nravings soon goad into furious madness, and of hospitals in which the\nepileptic, the scrofulous, the paralytic and the insane sleep side by\nside--a picture of cells, dark, foul, and damp, with starving,\ndiseased, and naked inmates, flogged into submission, or teased into\nfury for the sport of idle spectators.\"[170]\n\n[Footnote 156: _Dimetian Code_, ii. 1. 32 (_Ancient Laws and\nInstitutes of Wales_, p. 200).]\n\n[Footnote 157: _Venedotian Code_, ii. 28. 3 (_ibid._ p. 98).]\n\n[Footnote 158: _Welsh Laws_, iv. 1. 2 (_ibid._ p. 389).]\n\n[Footnote 159: von Amira, _Nordgermanisches Obligationenrecht_, i. 375.]\n\n[Footnote 160: _Gr\u00e1g\u00e1s_, Vigslo\u00fei, 33, vol. ii. 64.]\n\n[Footnote 161: Stephen, _op. cit._ ii. 151.]\n\n[Footnote 162: Wigmore, _loc. cit._ p. 446.]\n\n[Footnote 163: Bacon, _Maxims of the Law_, reg. 7 (_Works_,\nvii. 347 _sq._).]\n\n[Footnote 164: Trummer, _op. cit._ i. 428.]\n\n[Footnote 165: _Ibid._ i. 432.]\n\n[Footnote 166: _Ibid._ i. 438 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 167: See Tuke, _Chapters in the History of the Insane in the\nBritish Isles_, p. 43 _sq._; Maudsley, _Responsibility in Mental\nDisease_, p. 10 _sq._; Lecky, _History of European Morals_, ii. 85 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 168: Shakespeare, _As you Like it_, iii. 2.]\n\n[Footnote 169: Swift, _Tale of a Tub_, sec. 9 (_Works_, x. 163).]\n\n[Footnote 170: Wood-Renton, 'Moral Mania,' in _Law Quarterly Review_,\niii. 340.]\n\nWhatever share indifference to human suffering may have had in all\nthese atrocities and all this misery, it is likely that\nthoughtlessness, superstition, and ignorance have had a much larger\nshare. We have noticed that, when a certain deed gives a shock to\npublic feelings, the circumstances in which it has been committed are\neasily lost sight of. Considering that the Chinese punish persons who\nhave killed their father or mother by pure accident, it is not\nsurprising that they punish madmen who kill a parent wilfully. Even a\nman like Smollett, the well-known writer, thought it would be neither\nabsurd nor unreasonable for the legislature to divest all lunatics of\nthe privilege of insanity in cases of enormity, and to subject them\n\"to the common penalties of the law.\"[171] Moreover, as we have seen,\nmadness is often attributed to demoniacal possession,[172] and in\nother cases it is regarded as a divine punishment.[173] From a pagan\n{275} point of view this would make the lunatic an object of pity or\ndread, rather than of indignation; as the Roman legislator said, the\ninsane murderer ought not to be punished, because his insanity itself\nis a sufficient penalty.[174] But in Christian Europe, where up to\nquite recent times men were ever ready to punish God's enemies, a\nlunatic, who was supposed to have the devil in him, or whose\naffliction was regarded as the visitation of God upon heresy or\nsin,[175] was a hateful individual and was treated accordingly.\nFinally, we have to take into account that the sensibility of a\nlunatic was thought to be inferior to that of a sane person;[176] that\nthe mental characteristics of insanity were little understood; and\nthat, in consequence, many demented persons were treated as if they\nwere sane because they were thought to be sane, and others, though\nrecognised as lunatics, were treated as responsible because they were\nthought to be responsible. The history of the English law referring to\ninsanity bears sad testimony to the ignorance of which lunatics have\nbeen victims in the hands of lawyers.\n\n[Footnote 171: Smollett, quoted by Tuke, _op. cit._ p. 96.]\n\n[Footnote 172: See also Doughty, _Arabia Deserta_, i. 258 _sq._;\nWestermarck, 'Nature of the Arab _[vG]inn_ illustrated by the Present\nBeliefs of the People of Morocco,' in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxix, 254;\nAndree, _op. cit._ p. 2 _sq._; Tuke, _op. cit._ p. 1; Pike, _History\nof Crime in England_, i. 39; von Krafft-Ebing, _op. cit._ p. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 173: Plato, _Leges_, ix. 854. Esquirol, _Des maladies\nmentales_, i. 336.]\n\n[Footnote 174: _Digesta_, i. 18. 14; xlviii. 9. 9.]\n\n[Footnote 175: Wood-Renton, _loc. cit._ p. 339.]\n\n[Footnote 176: _Ibid._ p. 339.]\n\nFrom the year 1724 there is a dictum of an English judge to the effect\nthat a man who is to be exempted from punishment \"must be a man that\nis totally deprived of his understanding and memory, and doth not know\nwhat he is doing, no more than an infant, than a brute, or a wild\nbeast.\"[177] From the beginning of the nineteenth century, the power\nof distinguishing right from wrong in the abstract was regarded as the\ntest of responsibility;[178] whilst in the existing doctrine, dating\nfrom the trial of M[(]Naughten in 1843, the question of knowledge of\nright and wrong, instead of being put generally and indefinitely, is\nput in reference to the particular act at the particular time of\ncommitting it.[179] This series of doctrines certainly shows a\nnoteworthy progress {276} in discrimination. But at the same time the\nanswers given by the fourteen English judges to the questions put to\nthem by the House of Lords in consequence of M[(]Naughten's case still\ndisplay an ignorance which would nowadays be hardly possible. In reply\nto the question--\"If a person under an insane delusion as to existing\nfacts, commits an offence in consequence thereof, is he thereby\nexcused?\"--the judges declared that, on the assumption \"that he\nlabours under such partial delusion only, and is not in other respects\ninsane, . . . he must be considered in the same situation as to\nresponsibility as if the facts with respect to which the delusion\nexists were real. For example, if under the influence of his delusion\nhe supposes another man to be in the act of attempting to take away\nhis life, and he kills that man, as he supposes, in self-defence, he\nwould be exempt from punishment. If his delusion was that the deceased\nhad inflicted a serious injury to his character and fortune, and he\nkilled him in revenge for such supposed injury, he would be liable to\npunishment.\"[180] The mistake committed in this answer does not lie in\nthe conclusion, but in the premise. \"Here,\" as Professor Maudsley\nobserves, \"is an unhesitating assumption that a man, having an insane\ndelusion, has the power to think and act in regard to it reasonably;\nthat, at the time of the offence, he ought to have and to exercise the\nknowledge and self-control which a sane man would have and exercise,\nwere the facts with respect to which the delusion exists real; that he\nis, in fact, bound to be reasonable in his unreason, sane in his\ninsanity.\"[181] Modern science, however, teaches us another lesson. It\nhas shown that a delusion of the kind suggested never stands alone,\nbut is in all cases the result of a disease of the brain which\ninterferes more or less with every function of the mind, and that few\ninsane persons who do violence can be truly said to have a full\nknowledge of the nature and quality of their acts at the time they are\nperforming {277} them.[182] A perhaps still greater defect in the\ndoctrine of the fourteen judges is the absence of all reference to the\ninfluence of insane impulses; but with this subject we are not\nconcerned at present. In this connection my object has been merely to\nshow that the irresponsibility of the insane, in so far as it depends\non intellectual derangement, has been generally recognised in\nproportion as their intellectual derangement has been recognised, and\nthat the exceptions to this rule are explicable from beliefs which,\nthough materially affecting the treatment of the insane, have no\nreference to the principle of responsibility itself.\n\n[Footnote 177: Howell, _Collection of State Trials_, xvi. 765.]\n\n[Footnote 178: Harris, _Principles of the Criminal Law_, p. 18. Kenny,\n_op. cit._ p. 53.]\n\n[Footnote 179: Clark and Finnelly, _Reports of Cases decided in the\nHouse of Lords_, x. 202.]\n\n[Footnote 180: _Ibid._ x. 211.]\n\n[Footnote 181: Maudsley, _op. cit._ p. 97.]\n\n[Footnote 182: Griesinger, _Mental Pathology and Therapeutics_, p. 72\n_sq._ Maudsley, _op. cit._ p. 96.]\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThere are temporary states of mind in which the agent no more knows\nwhat he is doing than an idiot or a madman, such as somnambulism,\nnarcosis, fury. For these states, of course, the rule holds good, that\nnobody is responsible for what he does in ignorance, although he may\nbe responsible for his ignorance. Responsibility in connection with\nanger and rage will be more appropriately dealt with in another place.\nI shall here restrict myself to the case of drunkenness.\n\nA person is irresponsible, or only partly responsible, for what he\ndoes when drunk, according as he is ignorant of the nature of his act,\nas also in so far as the intoxicant contributed to the rise of some\npowerful impulse which determined his will. If he commits an offence\nin a state of extreme intoxication, he can reasonably be blamed only\nfor what he did when sober. If he made himself drunk for the purpose\nof committing the offence, then the offence is intended, and he is\nequally responsible for his act as if he had accomplished it\nstraightway. If he became intoxicated without any fault of his, for\ninstance, if he did not know, and could not know, the intoxicating\nquality of the liquor which made him drunk, he is free from blame. But\nin other cases he is guilty of heedlessness, or rashness, or, if he\nforesaw the danger, of blamable indifference to {278} the probable\nconsequences of his act. This is the clear theory of the question. But\nwe cannot expect to find it accurately expressed in practice.\n\nVery generally drunkenness is recognised as a ground of extenuation.\nWe hear from various sources that the North American Indians were\nexceedingly merciful to intoxicated offenders. According to\nCharlevoix, the Iroquois \"suffer themselves to be ill used by drunken\npeople, without defending themselves, for fear of hurting them. If you\nendeavour to shew them the folly of this conduct, they say, 'Why\nshould we hurt them? They know not what they do.'\" Even \"if a savage\nkills another belonging to his cabin, if he is drunk (and they often\ncounterfeit drunkenness when they intend to commit such actions),[183]\nall the consequence is, that they pity and weep for the dead. 'It is a\nmisfortune (they say), the murderer knew not what he did.'\"[184] James\nmakes a similar statement with reference to the Omahas.[185] In his\ndescription of the aborigines of Pennsylvania, Blome observes, \"It is\nrare that they fall out, if sober; and if drunk they forgive it,\nsaying, it was the drink, and not the man that abused them.\"[186]\nBenjamin Franklin tells us of some Indians who had misbehaved in a\nstate of intoxication, and in consequence sent three of their old men\nto apologise; \"the orator acknowledged the fault, but laid it upon the\nrum, and then endeavoured to excuse the rum.\"[187] The detestable\ndeeds which men did under the influence of _pulcre_, or the native\nMexican wine, the Aztecs attributed to the god of wine or to the wine\nitself, and not in the least to the drunken man. Indeed, if anybody\nspoke ill of or insulted an intoxicated person, he was liable to be\npunished for disrespect to the god by which that person was supposed\nto be possessed. {279} Hence, says Sahagun, it was believed, not\nwithout ground, that the Indians made themselves drunk on purpose to\ncommit with impunity crimes for which they would have been punished if\nthey had committed them sober.[188]\n\n[Footnote 183: _Cf._ Hennepin, _op. cit._ p. 71.]\n\n[Footnote 184: Charlevoix, _op. cit._ ii. 23, 25. According to Loskiel\n(_History of the Mission of the United Brethren among the Indians in\nNorth America_, i. 16), the Iroquois, though they laid all the blame\non the rum, punished severely murder committed in drunkenness.]\n\n[Footnote 185: James, _Expedition from Pittsburgh to the Rocky\nMountains_, i. 265.]\n\n[Footnote 186: Blome, in Buchanan, _North American Indians_, p. 328.]\n\n[Footnote 187: Franklin, _Autobiography_, ch. ix. (_Works_, i. 164).]\n\n[Footnote 188: Sahagun, _Historia general de las cosas de Nueva\nEspa\u00f1a_, i. 22, vol. i. 40.]\n\nAmong the Karens of India \"men are not unfrequently killed in drunken\nbroils; but such cases are not allowed by Karen custom to be a cause\nof action. No price can be demanded for persons who lose their lives\nin such circumstances. It is argued there was no malice, no intention\nto kill; and the person who died was perhaps as much to blame as the\nman who killed him; and people are not well responsible for what they\ndo in a state of intoxication.\"[189] Among the Kandhs, \"for wounds,\nhowever serious, given under circumstances of extreme provocation, or\nin a drunken squabble, slight compensation is awarded.\"[190] Among\nsome of the Marshall Islanders blood-revenge is generally not taken\nfor an act of homicide which has been committed in drunkenness,\ncompensation being accepted instead.[191] So, also, according to the\nancient law of the East Frisians, a man who has killed another when\ndrunk is allowed \"to buy off his neck by a sum of money paid to the\nking and to the relatives of the slain.\"[192]\n\n[Footnote 189: Mason, in _Jour. As. Soc. Bengal_, xxxvii. pt. ii. 146.]\n\n[Footnote 190: Macpherson, _Memorials of Service in India_, p. 82.]\n\n[Footnote 191: Jung, quoted by Kohler, in _Zeitschr. f. vergl.\nRechtswiss._ xiv. 446.]\n\n[Footnote 192: _Das Ostfriesische Land-Recht_, iii. 18.]\n\nRoman law regarded drunkenness as a ground of extenuation;[193] the\nJurist Marcian mentions _ebrietas_ as an example of _impetus_, thereby\nintimating that a drunken person, when committing a crime, should not\nbe put on the same footing with an offender acting in cold blood, and\ncalculating his act with clear consciousness.[194] In Canon law\ndrunkenness is said to be a ground which deserves the indulgence of a\nreasonable judge, because whatever is done in that state is done\nwithout consciousness on the part of the actor.[195] Indeed, had not\nGod shown {280} indulgence for the offence committed by Lot when\ndrunk?[196] Partly on the authority of Roman law, partly on that of\nCanon law, the earliest practitioners of the Middle Ages followed the\nprinciple that drunkenness is a ground of extenuation; and this\ndoctrine remained strongly rooted in the later jurisprudence, in which\na drunken person was likened to one under the influence of sleep, or\ndrunkenness was regarded as equivalent to insanity.[197] It was not\nuntil the sixteenth century that a mere general rule, with regard to\ndrunkenness as a ground of extenuation, was felt to be insufficient.\nSince the time of Clarus, especially, the opinion began to prevail,\nthat the effect of the highest degree of drunkenness was, indeed, to\nexempt from the punishment of _dolus_, but that the offender was still\nsubject to the punishment of _culpa_, except in two cases, namely,\nfirst, when he inebriated himself intentionally, and with a\nconsciousness that he might commit a crime while drunk, in which case\nthe drunkenness was not allowed to be any ground of exculpation at\nall; and, secondly, when he became intoxicated without any fault on\nhis part, as, for example, in consequence of inebriating substances\nhaving been mingled with his wine by his comrades, in which case he\nwas relieved even from the punishment of _culpa_.[198] These views, in\nthe main, gradually determined the German practice, and similar\nopinions prevailed in the practice of Italy, Spain, Portugal, and the\nNetherlands.[199] In the annals of Prussian criminal justice of 1824,\na case is reported of a man who was punished with only one year's\nimprisonment for having killed his little child in a state of\ndrunkenness.[200] In other countries a different principle was acted\nupon. An ordinance of Francis I. declared that drunkenness should not\nin any case absolve from the ordinary punishment;[201] and this rule\nwas sanctioned and {281} applied by the later French jurisprudence.[202]\nIn the Code P\u00e9nal, the state of drunkenness is not mentioned as a\nmitigating circumstance; yet the rigour of the law has been tempered\nby the doctrine that intoxication produces a temporary insanity and\nthat every kind of insanity is a ground of exculpation.[203] In\nEngland,[204] Scotland,[205] and the United States,[206] a state of\nvoluntary drunkenness is no excuse for crime. Speaking of a person who\ncommits homicide when drunk, Hale says that \"by the laws of England\nsuch a person shall have no privilege by this voluntary contracted\nmadness, but shall have the same judgment as if he were in his right\nsenses.\"[207] However, in a case where the intention with which the\nact was done is the essence of the offence, the drunkenness of the\naccused may be taken into account by the jury when considering the\nmotive or intent with which he acted.[208] According to Chinese law,\nalso, intoxication does not affect the question of responsibility.[209]\n\n[Footnote 193: _Digesta_, xlviii. 19. 11. 2; xlix. 16. 6. 7. Mommsen,\n_R\u00f6misches Strafrecht_, p. 1043.]\n\n[Footnote 194: _Digesta_, xlviii. 19. 11. 2.]\n\n[Footnote 195: Gratian, _Decretum_, ii. 15. 1. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 196: _Ibid._ ii. 15. 1. 9.]\n\n[Footnote 197: Mittermaier, _Effect of Drunkenness on Criminal\nResponsibility_, p. 6.]\n\n[Footnote 198: Clarus, _Practica criminalis_, qu. lx. nr. 11 (_Opera\nomnia_, ii. 462).]\n\n[Footnote 199: Mittermaier, _op. cit._ p. 7. Du Boys, _Histoire du\ndroit criminel de l'Espagne_, p. 290. Italian _Codice Penale_, art. 46\n_sqq._ Spanish _C\u00f3digo Penal reformado_, art. 9, \u00a76.]\n\n[Footnote 200: _Zeitschr. f. die Criminal-Rechts-Pflege in den\nPreussischen Staaten_, edited by Hitzig, iii. 60.]\n\n[Footnote 201: Isambert, Decrusy, and Armet, _Recueil g\u00e9n\u00e9ral des\nanciennes lois fran\u00e7aises_, xii. 527.]\n\n[Footnote 202: Mittermaier, _op. cit._ p. 8.]\n\n[Footnote 203: _Ibid._ p. 12 _sq._ Rivi\u00e8re, _loc. cit._ p. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 204: Stephen, _History of the Criminal Law of England_,\nii. 165.]\n\n[Footnote 205: Hume, _Commentaries on the Law of Scotland_, i. 38.\nErskine-Rankine, _op. cit._ p. 545.]\n\n[Footnote 206: Bishop, _op. cit._ \u00a7 400 _sq._ vol. i. 231 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 207: Hale, _op. cit._ i. 32.]\n\n[Footnote 208: Harris, _op. cit._ p. 21. Stephen, _Digest_, art. 32,\np. 22.]\n\n[Footnote 209: Giles, _Strange Stories from a Chinese Studio_, ii. 30,\nn. 2.]\n\nThe great forbearance with which injuries inflicted in a state of\nintoxication are treated by various peoples at comparatively low\nstages of civilisation, is no doubt, to some extent, due to lack of\nforesight. Failing to anticipate the harmful consequences which may\nfollow from drunkenness, they also fail to recognise the culpability\nof indulging in it. The American Indians are notorious drunkards, and\nlook upon drunkenness as a \"delightful frolick.\"[210] Among the Kandhs\ndrunkenness is likewise universal, and their \"orgies are evidently not\nregarded as displeasing to their gods.\"[211] The belief that an\nintoxicated person is possessed with a demon and acts under its\ninfluence, also helps {282} to excuse him.[212] On the other hand,\nwhere the law makes no difference between an offender who is sober and\nan offender who is drunk, the culpability of the latter is exaggerated\nin consequence of the stirring effect which the outward event has upon\npublic feelings. So great is the influence of the event that certain\nlaws, most unreasonably, punish a person both for what he does when\ndrunk and for making himself drunk. Thus Aristotle tells us that\nlegislators affixed double penalties to crimes committed in\ndrunkenness.[213] The same was done by Charles V., in an edict of\n1531,[214] and by Francis I. in 1536.[215] Hardly more reasonable is\nit that the very society which shows no mercy whatever to the\nintoxicated offender, is most indulgent to the act of intoxication\nitself when not accompanied by injurious consequences. Of course it\nmay be argued that drunkenness is blamable in proportion as the person\nwho indulges in it might expect it to lead to mischievous results. It\nhas also been said that, if drunkenness were allowed to excuse, the\ngravest crimes might be committed with impunity by those who either\ncounterfeited the state or actually assumed it. Some people even\nmaintain that inebriation brings out a person's true character. In a\nChinese story we read, \"Many drunkards will tell you that they cannot\nremember in the morning the extravagances of the previous night, but I\ntell you this is all nonsense, and that in nine cases out of ten those\nextravagances are committed wittingly and with malice prepense.\"[216]\nHowever, with all allowance for such considerations, I venture to\nbelieve that in this, as in many other cases where an injury results\nfrom want of foresight, the extreme severity of certain laws is\nlargely due to the fact that the legislator has been more concerned\nwith the external deed than with its source.\n\n[Footnote 210: Adair, _History of the American Indians_, p. 5. Catlin,\n_North American Indians_, ii. 251. Colden, in Schoolcraft, _Indian\nTribes_, iii. 191. Prescott, _ibid._ iii. 242. James, _op. cit._ i. 265.]\n\n[Footnote 211: Campbell, _Wild Tribes of Khondistan_, p. 165.\nMacpherson, _op. cit._ p. 81 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 212: _Cf._ Dorsey, 'Siouan Cults,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._\nxi. 424.]\n\n[Footnote 213: Aristotle, _Ethica Nicomachea_, iii. 5. 8.]\n\n[Footnote 214: Damhouder, _Praxis rerum criminalium_, lxxxiv. 20,\np. 241.]\n\n[Footnote 215: Isambert, Decrusy, and Armet, _op. cit._ xii. 527.]\n\n[Footnote 216: Giles, _op. cit._ ii. 30.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XI\n\nMOTIVES\n\n\nNO enlightened and conscientious moral judge can regard his judgment\nas final, unless he know the motive, or motives, of the volition by\nwhich his judgment is occasioned. But in ordinary moral estimates\nlittle attention is paid to motives. Men desire that certain acts\nshould be performed, and that certain other acts should be abstained\nfrom. The conative causes of acts or forbearances are not equally\ninteresting, and they are often hidden. They are considered only in\nproportion as the moral judgment is influenced by reflection.\n\nTake, for instance, acts which are performed from a sense of duty. It\nis commonly said that a person ought to obey his conscience. Yet, in\npoint of fact, by doing so he may expose himself to hardly less\ncensure than does the greatest villain. The reason for this is not far\nto seek. A man's moral conviction is to some extent an expression of\nhis character, hence he may be justly blamed for having a certain\nmoral conviction. And the blame which he may deserve on that account\nis easily exaggerated, partly because people are apt to be very\nintolerant concerning opinions of right and wrong which differ from\ntheir own, partly owing to the influence which external events\nexercise upon their minds.\n\nSomewhat greater discrimination is shown in regard to motives\nconsisting of powerful non-volitional conations which in no way\nrepresent the agent's character, but to which {284} he yields\nreluctantly, or by which he is carried away on the spur of the moment.\nIn many such cases even the law--which regards it as no excuse if a\nperson commits a crime from a feeling of duty[1]--displays more or\nless indulgence to the perpetrator of a harmful deed.\n\n[Footnote 1: _Cf._ the case Reg. _v._ Morby, _Law Reports, Cases\ndetermined in the Queen's Bench Division_, viii. 571 _sqq._]\n\nThus, in the eye of the law, compulsion is oftentimes a ground of\nextenuation. Strictly speaking, a volition can never be compelled into\nexistence;[2] to act under compulsion really means to act under the\ninfluence of some non-voluntary motive, so powerful that every\nordinary human will would yield to it. As Aristotle puts it, pardon is\ngiven when \"a man has done what he ought not to have done through fear\nof things beyond the power of human nature to endure, and such that no\nman could undergo them. And yet, perhaps, there are some things which\na man must never allow himself to be compelled to do, but must rather\nchoose death by the most exquisite torments.\"[3] This principle has\nbeen in some degree recognised by legislation. In many cases of\nfelony, if a married woman commits the crime in the presence of her\nhusband, the law of England presumes that she acts under his coercion,\nand therefore excuses her from punishment, unless the presumption of\nlaw is rebutted by evidence;[4] but children and servants are not\nacquitted if committing crimes by the command of a parent or a\nmaster.[5] Besides the presumption made in favour of married women,\ncompulsion by threats of injury to person or property is recognised as\nan excuse for crime only, as it seems, in cases in which the\ncompulsion is applied by a body of rebels or rioters, and in which the\noffender takes a subordinate part in the offence.[6] In a time of\npeace, on the other hand, though a man be violently assaulted, and\nhave no other possible {285} means of escaping death but by killing an\ninnocent person, if he commit the act he will be guilty of murder;\n\"for he ought rather to die himself, than kill an innocent.\"[7] It has\neven been laid down as a general principle that \"the apprehension of\npersonal danger does not furnish any excuse for assisting in doing any\nact which is illegal.\"[8] But the English law relating to _duress per\nminas_, and to constraint in general, seems to be harsher both than\nmost modern continental laws[9] and than Roman law.[10] Some of the\nItalian practitioners were even of opinion that a person who committed\nhomicide by the command of his prince or some other powerful man was\nexempt from all punishment.[11] According to the Talmud, any offence\nperpetrated under compulsion or in mortal fear is excusable in the eye\nof the law, excepting only murder and adultery.[12]\n\n[Footnote 2: Bradley, _Ethical Studies_, p. 40, n. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Aristotle, _Ethica Nicomachea_, iii. i. 7 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 4: Hale, _History of the Pleas of the Crown_, i. 44 _sqq._\n434. Harris, _Principles of the Criminal Law_, p. 25. Stephen,\n_History of the Criminal Law of England_, ii. 105 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 5: Hale, _op. cit._ i. 44. Harris, _op. cit._ p. 26.]\n\n[Footnote 6: Stephen, _op. cit._ ii. 106.]\n\n[Footnote 7: Hale, _op. cit._ i. 51. Harris, _op. cit._ p. 24 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 8: Denman, C. J., in Reg. _v._ Tyler, reported in Carrington\nand Payne, _Reports of Cases argued and ruled at Nisi Prius_, viii. 621.]\n\n[Footnote 9: _Code P\u00e9nal_, art. 64; Chauveau and H\u00e9lie, _Th\u00e9orie du\nCode P\u00e9nal_, i. 534 _sqq._ Italian _Codice Penale_, art. 49. Spanish\n_C\u00f3digo Penal reformado_, art. 8, \u00a7 9 _sqq._ Finger, _Compendium des\n\u00f6sterreichischen Rechtes--Das Strafrecht_, i. 119. Foinitzki, in\n_L\u00e9gislation p\u00e9nale compar\u00e9e_, edited by von Liszt, p. 530 (Russian\nlaw). _Ottoman Penal Code_, art. 42.]\n\n[Footnote 10: Mommsen, _R\u00f6misches Strafrecht_, p. 653. Janka, _Der\nstrafrechtliche Notstand_, p. 48.]\n\n[Footnote 11: Janka, _op. cit._ p. 60. A different view, however, is\nexpressed by Covarruvias (_De matrimoniis_, ii. 3. 4. 6 _sq._ [_Opera\nomnia_, i. 139]):--\"Metus numquam excusat nec a mortali, nec a veniali\ncrimine. Peccatum maximum malum, nec eo quid grauius.\"]\n\n[Footnote 12: Benny, _Criminal Code of the Jews according to the\nTalmud Massecheth Synhedrin_, p. 125.]\n\nSuppose, again, that the motive of breaking the law is what has been\ncalled \"compulsion by necessity.\" The old instance of shipwrecked\npersons in a boat unable to carry them all is a standing illustration\nof this principle. Sir James Stephen says, that \"should such a case\narise, it is impossible to suppose that the survivors would be\nsubjected to legal punishment.\"[13] Yet, in a very similar case,\noccurring in the year 1884, they were. Three men and a boy escaped in\nan open boat from the shipwreck of the yacht _Mignonette_. After\npassing eight days without food, and seeing no prospect of relief, the\nmen killed the boy, who was {286} on the verge of death, in order to\nfeed on his body. Four days later they were rescued by a passing ship;\nand, on their arrival in England, two of the men were tried for the\nmurder of the boy. The defence raised was that the act was necessary\nfor the purpose of self-preservation. But it was held by the Court for\nCrown Cases Reserved, that such necessity was no justification of the\nact of causing death when there was a distinct intention to take away\nthe life of another innocent person. However, the sentence of death\nwas afterwards commuted by the Crown to six months' imprisonment.[14]\nIn the same case it was even said that if the boy had had food in his\npossession, and the others had taken it from him, they would have been\nguilty of theft.[15] Bacon's proposition that \"if a man steal viands\nto satisfy his present hunger, this is no felony nor larceny,\"[16] is\nnot law at the present day.[17] It was expressly contradicted by Hale,\nwho lays down the following rule:--\"If a person, being under necessity\nfor want of victuals, or clothes, shall upon that account\nclandestinely, and _animo furandi_ steal another man's goods, it is\nfelony and a crime by the laws of England punishable with death; altho\nthe judge, before whom the trial is, in this case (as in other cases\nof extremity) be by the laws of England intrusted with a power to\nreprieve the offender before or after judgment, in order to the\nobtaining the king's mercy.\"[18] Britton excuses \"infants under age,\nand poor people, who through hunger enter the house of another for\nvictuals under the value of twelve pence.\"[19] According to the\nSwedish Westg\u00f6ta-Lag, a poor man who can find no other means of\nrelieving himself and his family from hunger may thrice with impunity\nappropriate food belonging to somebody else, but if he does so a\nfourth time he is punished for theft.[20] The Canonist says,\n\"Necessitas legem non {287} habet\"[21]--\"Raptorem vel furem non facit\nnecessitas, sed voluntas.\"[22] This principle has the sanction of the\nGospel. Jesus said to the Pharisees, \"Have ye not read what David did,\nwhen he was an hungered, and they that were with him; How he entered\ninto the house of God, and did eat the shewbread, which was not lawful\nfor him to eat, neither for them which were with him, but only for the\npriests?\"[23]\n\n[Footnote 13: Stephen, _op. cit._ ii. 108. So, also, according to\nBacon's _Maxims of the Law_, reg. 5 (_Works_, vii. 344), homicide is\nin such a case justifiable.]\n\n[Footnote 14: Reg. _v._ Dudley and Stephens, in _Law Reports, Cases\ndetermined in the Queen's Bench Division_, xiv. 273 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 15: _Ibid._ xiv. 276.]\n\n[Footnote 16: Bacon, _Maxims of the Law_, reg. 5 (_Works_, vii. 343).]\n\n[Footnote 17: Reg. _v._ Dudley and Stephens, in _Law Reports, Queen's\nBench Division_, xiv. 286.]\n\n[Footnote 18: Hale, _op. cit._ i. 54.]\n\n[Footnote 19: Britton, i. 11, vol. i. 42.]\n\n[Footnote 20: _Westg\u00f6ta-Lagen II._ \u00feiufua bolker, 14, p. 164 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 21: Gratian, _Decretum_, iii. 1. 11.]\n\n[Footnote 22: _Ibid._ iii. 5. 26.]\n\n[Footnote 23: _St. Matthew_, xii. 1 _sqq._]\n\nAccording to Muhammedan law, the hand is not to be cut off for\nstealing any article of food that is quickly perishable, because it\nmay have been taken to supply the immediate demands of hunger.[24] We\nare told that \"no Chinese magistrate would be found to pass sentence\nupon a man who stole food under stress of hunger.\"[25] In ancient\nPeru, according to Herrera, \"he that robb'd without need was banish'd\nto the Mountains Andes, never to return without the Inga's leave, and\nif worth it paid the value of what he had taken. He that for want\nstole eatables only was reprov'd, and receiv'd no other punishment,\nbut enjoyn'd to work, and threatened, that if he did so again, he\nshould be chastiz'd by carrying a stone on his back, which was very\ndisgraceful.\"[26] We even hear of savages who regard \"compulsion by\nnecessity\" as a ground of extenuation. Among the West African Fjort\nrobbery of plantations, committed in a state of great hunger, is\nexempt from punishment in case there is no deception or secrecy in the\nmatter; however, payment for damage done is expected.[27] Cook says of\nthe Tahitians:--\"Those who steal clothes or arms, are commonly put to\ndeath, either by hanging or drowning in the sea; but those who steal\nprovisions are bastinadoed. By this practice they wisely vary the\npunishment of the same crime, when committed from different\nmotives.\"[28]\n\n[Footnote 24: Lane, _Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians_,\np. 121.]\n\n[Footnote 25: Giles, _Strange Stories from a Chinese Studio_, ii. 217,\nn. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 26: Herrera, _General History of the West Indies_, iv. 337.]\n\n[Footnote 27: Dennett, in _Jour. African Society_, i. 276.]\n\n[Footnote 28: Cook, _Journal of a Voyage round the World_, p. 41 _sq._]\n\n{288} A special kind of self-preservation is self-defence. Here the\nground of justification is not merely the motive of the agent, but\nalso the wrongness or criminality of the act which he tries to\nprevent. Hence the right of inflicting injuries as a necessary means\nof self-preservation has been more generally recognised in the case of\nself-defence than in other cases of \"compulsion by necessity.\" \"Vim vi\nrepellere\" was regarded by the ancients as a natural right,[29] as a\nlaw \"non scripta, sed nata\";[30] and the same view was taken by the\nCanonist.[31] Even in the savage world self-defence and killing in\nself-defence are not infrequently justified by custom.[32] But in\nother instances the influence of the external event makes itself felt\nalso in the case of self-defence. Among the Fjort, though a person who\nkills another in self-defence is exempt from punishment, he is\nexpected to pay damages.[33] Among the Hottentots self-defence is\nregarded as a mitigating circumstance, but not as an excuse in the\nfull sense of the word.[34] Among other peoples it is not considered\nat all.[35] Among the ancient Teutons a person who committed homicide\nin self-defence had to pay _wer_;[36] and in Germany such a person\nseems to have been subject to punishment still in the later Middle\nAges.[37] In England, in the thirteenth century, he was considered to\ndeserve royal pardon, but he also needed it.[38]\n\n[Footnote 29: _Digesta_, xliii. 16. i. 27: \"Vim vi repellere licere\nCassius scribit idque ius natura comparatur.\"]\n\n[Footnote 30: Cicero, _Pro Milone_, 4 (10).]\n\n[Footnote 31: Gratian, _Decretum_, i. 1. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 32: Merker, quoted by Kohler, in _Zeitschr. f. vergl.\nRechtswiss._ xv. 64 (Wadshagga). Lang, in Steinmetz, _Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_,\np. 257 (Washambala).]\n\n[Footnote 33: Dennett, in _Jour. African Society_, i. 276.]\n\n[Footnote 34: Kohler, in _Zeitschr. f. vergl. Rechtswiss._ xv. 353.]\n\n[Footnote 35: Steinmetz, _Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_, p. 50 (Banaka and\nBapuku). Tellier, _ibid._ p. 176 (Kreis Kita). Marx, _ibid._ p. 357\n(Amahlubi). Senfft, _ibid._ p. 450 (Marshall Islanders).]\n\n[Footnote 36: Geyer, _Lehre von der Nothwehr_, p. 88 _sqq._ Trummer,\n_Vortr\u00e4ge \u00fcber Tortur, &c._ i. 430. Stemann, _Den danske Retshistorie\nindtil Christian V.'s Lov_, p. 659. _Cf._ _Leges Henrici I._ lxxx. 7;\nlxxxvii. 6.]\n\n[Footnote 37: Trummer, _op. cit._ i. 428 _sqq._ von Feuerbach-Mittermaier,\n_Lehrbuch des Peinlichen Rechts_, p. 64. Brunner observes (_Deutsche\nRechtsgeschichte_, ii. 630), \"Nicht das Benehmen des Get\u00f6teten war die\ncausa des Todschlags, sondern nur die feindselige Absicht des\nTodschlagers.\"]\n\n[Footnote 38: Bracton, _De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angli\u00e6_, fol.\n132 b, vol. ii. 366 _sqq._ Pollock and Maitland, _History of English\nLaw before the Time of Edward I._ ii. 574.]\n\n{289} In self-defence there should of course be a proportion between\nthe injury which the aggressor intended to inflict and the injury\ninflicted on him by the person attacked. The most widely-recognised\nground on which life is allowed to be taken in self-defence is danger\nof death. But it is not the exclusive ground. Among the Wakamba \"a\nthief entering a village at night can be killed\"; though, if he is,\nthe incident generally gives rise to a blood-feud between his family\nand the family of the slayer.[39] In Uganda \"there is no penalty for\nkilling a thief who enters an enclosure at night\";[40] and among\nvarious peoples at higher stages of culture we likewise find the\nprovision that a nocturnal thief or house-breaker may be killed with\nimpunity, though a diurnal thief may not.[41] This law, however, seems\nto have been due not so much to the fact that by night the proprietor\nhad less chance of recovering his property, as to the greater danger\nto which he was personally exposed.[42] The Roman Law of the Twelve\nTables allows the diurnal thief also to be killed, in case he defends\nhimself with a weapon;[43] and, as regards the nocturnal thief, Ulpian\nexpressly says that the owner of the property is justified in killing\nhim only if he cannot spare the life of the thief without peril to\nhimself.[44] The same rule was laid down by Bracton[45] and by\nGrotius. The latter observes, \"No one ought to be slain directly for\nthe sake of mere things, which would be done if I were to kill an\nunarmed flying thief with a missile, and so recover my goods: but if I\nam myself in danger of life, then I may repel the danger even with\ndanger to the life of another; nor does this cease to hold, however I\nhave come into that danger, whether by trying to retain my property,\nor to {290} recover it, or to capture the thief; for in all these\ncases I am acting lawfully according to my right.\"[46]\n\n[Footnote 39: Decle, _Three Years in Savage Africa_, p. 488.]\n\n[Footnote 40: Ashe, _Two Kings of Uganda_, p. 294.]\n\n[Footnote 41: _Ta Tsing Leu Lee_, sec. cclxxvii. p. 297 (Chinese).\n_Exodus_, xxii. 2 _sq._ _Lex Duodecim Tabularum_, viii. 11 _sq._\nPlato, _Leges_, ix. 874. _Lex Baiuwariorum_, ix. (viii.) 5. Du Boys,\n_Histoire du droit criminel de l'Espagne_, p. 288 (Spanish\nPartidas).]\n\n[Footnote 42: _Cf._ Gregory IX. _Decretales_, v. 12. 3; _Mishna_, fol.\n72, quoted by Rabbinowicz, _L\u00e9gislation criminelle du Talmud_, p. 122.]\n\n[Footnote 43: _Lex Duodecim Tabularum_, viii. 12. Cicero, _Pro\nMilone_, 3 (9).]\n\n[Footnote 44: _Digesta_, xlviii. 8. 9.]\n\n[Footnote 45: Bracton, _op. cit._ fol. 144 b, vol. ii. 464 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 46: Grotius, _De jure belli et pacis_, ii. 1. 12. 1.]\n\nAccording to the law of England, a woman is justified in killing one\nwho attempts to ravish her; and so also the husband or father may kill\na man who attempts a rape on his wife or daughter, if she do not\nconsent.[47] We meet with similar provisions in many other laws,\nmodern and ancient.[48] St. Augustine says that the law allows the\nkilling of a ravisher of chastity, either before or after the act, in\nthe same manner as it permits a person to kill a highwayman who makes\nan attempt upon his life.[49] According to the Talmud, it is\npermissible to kill a would-be criminal, in order to prevent the\ncommission of either murder or adultery \"to save an innocent man's\nlife, or a woman's honour\"; but when the crime has already been\naccomplished, the criminal cannot be thus disposed of.[50]\n\n[Footnote 47: Harris, _op. cit._ p. 145.]\n\n[Footnote 48: Erskine-Rankine, _Principles of the Law of Scotland_, p.\n558. _Ottoman Penal Code_, art. 186. Nordstr\u00f6m, _Bidrag till den\nsvenska samh\u00e4lls-f\u00f6rfattningens historia_, ii. 349 (ancient Swedish\nlaws). Plato, _Leges_, ix. 874.]\n\n[Footnote 49: St. Augustine, _De libero arbitrio_, i. 5 (Migne,\n_Patrologi\u00e6 cursus_, xxxii. 1227).]\n\n[Footnote 50: Benny, _op. cit._ p. 125. Rabbinowicz, _op. cit._ p. 124.]\n\nAmong many peoples who in other cases prohibit self-redress, an\nadulterer and an adulteress may be put to death by the aggrieved\nhusband, especially if they be caught _flagrante delicto_. Such a\ncustom prevails in various uncivilised societies where justice is\ngenerally administered by a council of elders or the chief.[51] Among\nthe ancient {291} Peruvians \"a man killing his wife for adultery was\nfree; but if for any other fault he died for it, unless he were a man\nin dignity, and then some other penalty was inflicted.\"[52] According\nto Chinese penal law, \"when a principal or inferior wife is discovered\nby her husband in the act of adultery, if such husband at the very\ntime that he discovers kills the adulterer, or adulteress, or both, he\nshall not be punishable.\"[53] By the law of Nepal, the Parbattia\nhusband retains the privilege of avenging, with his own hand, the\nviolation of his marriage bed, and anyone, save a learned Brahman or a\nhelpless boy, who instead of using his own sword, should appeal to the\ncourts, would be covered with eternal disgrace.[54] In all purely\nMoslem nations custom \"overwhelms with ignominy the husband or son of\nan adulteress who survives the discovery of her sin; he is taboo'd by\nsociety; he becomes a laughing-stock to the vulgar, and a disgrace to\nhis family and friends.\"[55] According to the 'Lex Julia de\nadulteriis,' a Roman father had a right to kill both his married\ndaughter and her accomplice if she was taken in adultery either in his\nhouse or in her husband's, provided that both of them were killed, and\nthat it was done at once. The husband, on the other hand, had no such\nright as to his wife in any case, and no such right as to her\naccomplice unless he was an infamous person or a slave, taken, not in\nhis father-in-law's house, but in his own.[56] However, it seems that\nin more ancient times the husband was entitled to kill an adulterous\nwife;[57] and his right of self-redress in the case of adultery was\nagain somewhat extended by Justinian beyond the very narrow limits set\ndown by the Lex Julia.[58] According to an Athenian law, \"if one man\nshall kill another . . . after catching him with his wife, or with his\nmother, or with a {292} sister, or with a daughter, or with a\nconcubine whom he keeps to beget free-born children, he shall not go\ninto exile for homicide on such account.\"[59] Ancient Teutonic law\nallowed a husband to kill both his unfaithful wife and the adulterer,\nif he caught them in the act;[60] according to the Laws of Alfred, an\nadulterer taken _flagrante delicto_ by the woman's lawful husband,\nfather, brother, or son, might be killed without risk of\nblood-feud.[61] In the thirteenth century, however, there are already\nsigns that, in England, the outraged husband who found his wife in the\nact of adultery might no longer slay the guilty pair or either of\nthem, although he might emasculate the adulterer.[62] The present law\ntreats the killing of an adulterer taken in the act in the same way as\nhomicide committed in a quarrel; by slaying him, the husband is guilty\nof manslaughter only, though, if the killing were deliberate and took\nplace in revenge after the fact, the crime would be murder. This seems\nto be the only case in English law in which provocation, other than by\nactual blows, is considered sufficient to reduce homicide to\nmanslaughter, if the killing be effected by a deadly weapon.[63] There\nare corresponding provisions in other modern laws.[64] As a rule,\nflagrant adultery does not justify homicide, but serves as an\nextenuating circumstance.[65] But according to the French Code P\u00e9nal,\n\"dans le cas d'adult\u00e8re . . . le meurtre commis par l'\u00e9poux sur son\n\u00e9pouse, ainsi que sur le complice, \u00e0 l'instant o\u00f9 il les surprend en\nflagrant d\u00e9lit dans la maison conjugale, est excusable.\"[66] And in\nRussia, though the law does not exempt from punishment a {293} husband\nwho thus avenges himself, the jury show great indulgence to him.[67]\n\n[Footnote 51: Dalton, _Descriptive Ethnology of Bengal_, p. 45;\nStewart, in _Jour. As. Soc. Bengal_, xxiv. 628 (Kukis). Macpherson,\n_Memorials of Service in India_, p. 83; Hunter, _Annals of Rural\nBengal_, iii. 76 (Kandhs). Anderson, _Mandalay to Momien_, p. 140\n(Kakhyens). MacMahon, _Far Cathay and Farther India_, p. 273\n(Indo-Burmese border tribes). Crawfurd, _History of the Indian\nArchipelago_, iii. 130. von Brenner, _Besuch bei den Kannibalen\nSumatras_, pp. 211, 213. Modigliani, _Viaggio a N\u00edas_, p. 495. Dorsey,\n'Omaha Sociology,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ iii. 364. Dyveyrier,\n_Exploration du Sahara_, p. 429 (Touareg). Barrow, _Travels into the\nInterior of Southern Africa_, i. 207 (Kafirs). Among the Gaika tribe\nof the Kafirs, however, \"a man is fined for murder, if he kills an\nadulterer or adulteress in the act, although he be the husband of the\nadulteress\" (Maclean, _Compendium of Kafir Laws and Customs_, p. 111).\nAmong the Wakamba, \"if a man is caught in adultery at night, the\nhusband has a right to kill him; but if the injured man thus takes the\nlaw into his own hands in the daytime, he is dealt with as a murderer\"\n(Decle, _op. cit._ p. 487).]\n\n[Footnote 52: Herrera, _op. cit._ iv. 338.]\n\n[Footnote 53: _Ta Tsing Leu Lee_, sec. cclxxxv. p. 307.]\n\n[Footnote 54: Hodgson, _Miscellaneous Essays_, ii. 235, 236, 272.]\n\n[Footnote 55: Burton, _Sind Revisited_, ii. 54 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 56: _Digesta_, xlviii. 5. 21 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 57: Gellius, _Noctes Attic\u00e6_, x. 23. 5. _Cf._ Mommsen,\n_R\u00f6misches Strafrecht_, p. 625.]\n\n[Footnote 58: _Novell\u00e6_, cxvii. 15.]\n\n[Footnote 59: Demosthenes, _Contra Aristocratem_, 53, p. 637.]\n\n[Footnote 60: Wilda, _Strafrecht der Germanen_, p. 823. Nordstr\u00f6m,\n_op. cit._ ii. 62 _sq._ Stemann, _op. cit._ p. 325.]\n\n[Footnote 61: _Laws of Alfred_, ii. 42.]\n\n[Footnote 62: Pollock and Maitland, _op. cit._ ii. 484. The same right\nis granted by a Spanish medi\u00e6val law to a father, or a husband, who\nfinds a man having illegitimate sexual intercourse with his daughter,\nor wife (Du Boys, _Histoire du droit criminel de l'Espagne_, p. 93).]\n\n[Footnote 63: Hale, _op. cit._ i. 486. Harris, _op. cit._ p. 145.\nCherry, _Lectures on the Growth of Criminal Law_, p. 82 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 64: Italian _Codice Penale_, art. 377. Spanish _C\u00f3digo Penal\nreformado_, art. 438. _Ottoman Penal Code_, art. 188.]\n\n[Footnote 65: G\u00fcnther, _Idee der Wiedervergeltung_, iii. 233 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 66: _Code P\u00e9nal_, art. 324.]\n\n[Footnote 67: Foinitzki, _loc. cit._ p. 548.]\n\nWhilst the law referring to self-defence has gradually become more\nliberal, the law referring to self-redress in the case of adultery has\nthus, generally speaking, become more severe. The reason for this is\nobvious. A husband who slays his unfaithful wife or her accomplice\ndoes not defend, but avenges himself; and it is to be expected that a\nsociety in which punishment has only just succeeded revenge should\nstill admit, or tolerate, revenge in extreme cases. The privilege\ngranted to the outraged husband is not the sole survival of the old\nsystem of self-redress lingering on under the new conditions.\nAccording to Kafir custom or law, the relatives of a murdered man\nbecome liable only to a very light fine if they kill the murderer.[68]\nThe ancient Teutons, at a time when their laws already prohibited\nprivate revenge, did not look upon an avenger of blood in the same\nlight as an ordinary manslayer;[69] and even the Church recognised the\ndistinction.[70] Some of the ancient Swedish laws entirely excused\nhomicide committed in revenge immediately after the crime.[71]\nAccording to the \u00d6stg\u00f6ta-Lag, an incendiary taken in flagrancy might\nbe at once burnt in the fire,[72] and ancient Norwegian law permitted\nthe slaying of a thief caught in the act.[73] In the Laws of Ine there\nis an indication that a thief's fate was at the discretion of his\ncaptor,[74] and a law of \u00c6thelstan implies that the natural and proper\ncourse as to thieves was to kill them.[75] In the Laws of King Wihtr\u00e6d\nit is said, \"If any one slay a layman while thieving; let him lie\nwithout 'wergeld.'\"[76] So also, according to Javanese law, if a thief\nbe caught in the act it is lawful to put him to death.[77] For our\npresent {294} purpose it is important to note that all such cases\nimply a recognition of the principle that an act committed on extreme\nprovocation requires special consideration. To declare that an\nadulterer or adulteress caught in flagrancy, or a manifest thief, may\nbe slain with impunity, is a concession to human passions, which are\nnaturally more easily aroused by the sight of an act than by the mere\nknowledge of its commission. It was for a similar reason that the Law\nof the Twelve Tables punished _furtum manifestum_ much more heavily\nthan _furtum nec manifestum_;[78] and that the Laws of Alfred imposed\ndeath as the penalty for fighting in the King's hall if the offender\nwas taken in the act, whereas he was allowed to pay for himself if he\nescaped and was subsequently apprehended.[79]\n\n[Footnote 68: Maclean, _op. cit._ p. 143. _Cf._, however, _ibid._\np. 110.]\n\n[Footnote 69: Wilda, _op. cit._ p. 562. Stemann, _op. cit._ p. 582 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 70: Wilda, _op. cit._ pp. 180, 565. Labbe-Mansi, _Sacrorum\nConciliorum collectio_, xii. 289.]\n\n[Footnote 71: Nordstr\u00f6m, _op. cit._ ii. 414 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 72: _Ibid._ ii. 416.]\n\n[Footnote 73: Wilda, _op. cit._ p. 889.]\n\n[Footnote 74: _Laws of Ine_, 12. _Cf._ Stephen, _op. cit._ i. 62.]\n\n[Footnote 75: _Laws of \u00c6thelstan_, iv. 4.]\n\n[Footnote 76: _Laws of Wihtr\u00e6d_, 25.]\n\n[Footnote 77: Crawfurd, _op. cit._ iii. 115.]\n\n[Footnote 78: _Institutiones_, iv. 1. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 79: _Laws of Alfred_, ii. 7.]\n\nThe difference between an injury which a person inflicts deliberately,\nin cold blood, and one which he inflicts in the heat of the moment,\nunder the disturbance of great excitement caused by a wrong done to\nhimself, has been widely recognised. There are instances reported of\nsavages who distinguish between murder and manslaughter. And the laws\nof all civilised nations agree in regarding, on certain conditions,\npassion aroused by provocation as a mitigating circumstance at the\ncommission of a crime.\n\nThe Australian Narrinyeri, as we have seen, have a tribunal, called\n_tendi_, consisting of the elders of the clan, to which all offenders\nare brought for trial. \"In case of the slaying by a person or persons\nof one clan of the member of another clan in time of peace, the\nfellow-clansmen of the murdered man will send to the friends of the\nmurderer and invite them to bring him to trial before the united\ntendies. If, after full inquiry, he is found to have committed the\ncrime, he will be punished according to the degree of guilt. If it\nwere a case of murder, with malice aforethought, he would be handed\nover to his own clan to be put to death by spearing. If it should be\nwhat we call manslaughter, he would receive a good thrashing, or be\nbanished from his clan, or compelled to go to his mother's {295}\nrelations.\"[80] In the Pelew Islands, if two natives are quarrelling,\nand the one says to the other, \"Your wife is bad,\" the insulted party\nis entitled to chastise the provoker with a stone, and is not held\nliable even if the latter should die in consequence.[81] The Eastern\nCentral Africans \"are aware of the difference between murder and\nhomicide,\" even though the punishment of the two crimes is often the\nsame.[82] Among the Kandhs only slight compensation is awarded \"for\nwounds, however serious, given under circumstances of extreme\nprovocation.\"[83] \"_Valdeyak_, or manslaughter,\" says Georgi, \"is not\ncapital among the Tungusians, when it has been occasioned by some\nantecedent quarrel. The slayer is however whipped, and obliged to\nmaintain the family of the deceased: he undergoes no reproaches on\naccount of the affair; but on the contrary is considered as a brave\nand courageous man for it.\"[84]\n\n[Footnote 80: Taplin, 'Narrinyeri,' in Woods, _Native Tribes of South\nAustralia_, p. 34 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 81: Kubary, 'Die Palau-Inseln,' in _Journal des Museum\nGodeffroy_, iv. 43 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 82: Macdonald, _Africana_, i. 172.]\n\n[Footnote 83: Macpherson, _op. cit._ p. 82.]\n\n[Footnote 84: Georgi, _Russia_, iii. 83. _Cf._ also Turner, 'Ethnology\nof the Ungava District,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ xi. 186.]\n\nAmong the ancient Peruvians, \"when one killed another in a quarrel,\nthe first thing enquired into was, who had been the aggressor; if the\ndead man, then the punishment was slight, at the will of the Inga; but\nif the surviver had given the provocation, his penalty was death, or\nat least perpetual banishment to the Andes, there to work in the\nInga's fields of corn, which was like sending him to the galeys. A\nmurderer was immediately publickly put to death, tho' he were a man of\nquality.\"[85] Among the Mayas of Yucatan and Nicaragua, in case of\ngreat provocation or absence of malice, homicide was atoned by the\npayment of a fine.[86]\n\n[Footnote 85: Herrera, _op. cit._ iv. 337 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 86: Bancroft, _Native Races of the Pacific States_, ii. 658.]\n\nFrom certain passages in the Mosaic law the conclusion has been\ndrawn that the ancient Hebrews did not consider it obligatory to\ninflict death upon him who had killed his neighbour in a fit of\npassion.[87] It is said that a man shall be put to death if he \"come\npresumptuously upon his neighbour, to slay him with guile,\"[88] or if\nhe \"hate his neighbour, and lie in wait for him, and rise up against\nhim, and smite him mortally that he die.\"[89] On the other hand, he\nshall be allowed a resort to a city {296} of refuge if \"he lie not in\nwait,\"[90] or if he thrust his neighbour \"suddenly without\nenmity.\"[91]\n\n[Footnote 87: Goitein, _Das Vergeltungsprincip im biblischen und\ntaltmudischen Strafrecht_, p. 33 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 88: _Exodus_, xxi. 14.]\n\n[Footnote 89: _Deuteronomy_, xix. 11 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 90: _Exodus_, xxi. 13.]\n\n[Footnote 91: _Numbers_, xxxv. 22, 25.]\n\nProfessor Leist suggests that in ancient Greece, at a time when\nblood-revenge was a sacred duty in the case of premeditated murder,\nhomicide committed without premeditation could be forgiven by the\navenger of blood.[92] Plato, in his 'Laws,' draws a distinction\nbetween him \"who treasures up his anger and avenges himself, not\nimmediately and at the moment, but with insidious design, and after an\ninterval,\" and him \"who does not treasure up his anger, and takes\nvengeance on the instant, and without malice prepense.\" The deed of\nthe latter, though not involuntary, \"approaches to the involuntary,\"\nand should therefore be punished less severely than the crime\nperpetrated by him who has stored up his anger.[93] Aristotle, also,\nwhilst denying that \"acts done from anger or from desire are\ninvoluntary,\"[94] maintains that \"assaults committed in anger, are\nrightly decided not to be of malice aforethought, for they do not\noriginate in the volition of the man who has been angered, but rather\nin that of the man who so angered him.\"[95] And he adds that \"everyone\nwill admit that he who does a disgraceful act, being at the same time\nfree from desire, or at any rate feeling desire but slightly, is more\nto be blamed than is he who does such an act under the influence of a\nstrong desire; and that he who, when not in a passion, smites his\nneighbour, is more to be blamed than is he who does so when in a\npassion.\"[96] Cicero likewise points out that \"in every species of\ninjustice it is a very material question whether it is committed\nthrough some agitation of passion, which commonly is short-lived and\ntemporary, or from deliberate, prepense, malice; for those things\nwhich proceed from a short, sudden fit, are of slighter moment than\nthose which are inflicted by forethought and preparation.\"[97]\n\n[Footnote 92: Leist, _Gr\u00e6co-italische Rechtsgeschichte_, pp. 325, 352.]\n\n[Footnote 93: Plato, _Leges_, ix. 867.]\n\n[Footnote 94: Aristotle, _Ethica Nicomachea_, iii. 1. 21.]\n\n[Footnote 95: _Ibid._ v. 8. 9.]\n\n[Footnote 96: _Ibid._ vii. 7. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 97: Cicero, _De officiis_, i. 8.]\n\nOf ancient Russian law M. Kovalewsky observes, \"L'existence d'une\nexcitation violente est prise en consid\u00e9ration, par notre antique\nl\u00e9gislation, qui d\u00e9clare le crime accompli sous leur influence non\nimputable.\"[98] According to ancient Irish law, \"homicide was\ndivisible into the two classes of simple manslaughter and murder, the\ndifference between which lay in the {297} existence or absence of\nmalice aforethought, the fine in the latter being double what it was\nin the former case\"; and for a wound which was inflicted inadvertently\nin lawful anger, the payment was made upon a diminished scale.[99] The\nancient Teutons, also, held a wrong committed in sudden anger and on\nprovocation to be less criminal than one committed with premeditation\nin cold blood;[100] this opinion seems partly to be at the bottom of\nthe distinction which they made between open and secret homicide.[101]\nAccording to the law of the East Frisians, a man who kills another\nwithout premeditation may buy off his neck with money, not so he who\ncommits a murder with malice aforethought.[102] It is curious that\nBracton should take no notice of the different grades of evil\nintention which may accompany voluntary homicide, and that he should\nomit altogether the question of provocation;[103] Beaumanoir, the\nFrench jurist, who lived in the same age, mentions in his 'Coutumes du\nBeauvoisis' provocation as an extenuating circumstance,[104] and the\nsame view was taken by the Church.[105] Coke, in his Third\nInstitute--which may be regarded as the second source of the criminal\nlaw of England, Bracton being the first--gives an account of malice\naforethought, and adds, \"Some manslaughters be voluntary, and not of\nmalice forethought, upon some sudden falling out. _Delinquens per iram\nprovocatus puniri debet mitius_.\"[106] Hume says that in Scotland \"the\nmanslayer on suddenty was to have the benefit of the girth or\nsanctuary: he might flee to the church or other holy place; from which\nhe might indeed be taken for trial, but to be returned thither, safe\nin life and limb, if his allegation of _chaude melle_ were\nproved.\"[107] All modern codes regard provocation under certain\ncircumstances as a mitigating circumstance.[108] According to the\ncriminal law of Montenegro, great provocation may even relieve a\nhomicide of all guilt.[109]\n\n[Footnote 98: Kovalewsky, _Coutume contemporaine_, p. 291.]\n\n[Footnote 99: _Ancient Laws of Ireland_, iii. pp. xciii. cx.]\n\n[Footnote 100: Wilda, _op. cit._ p. 560 _sqq._, 701. Stemann, _op.\ncit._ p. 574. von Amira, in Paul's _Grundriss der germanischen\nPhilologie_, ii. pt. ii. 174.]\n\n[Footnote 101: Wilda, _op. cit._ p. 569. von Amira, _loc. cit._ p. 173.]\n\n[Footnote 102: _Das Ostfriesische Land-Recht_, iii. 17 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 103: _Cf._ Stephen, _op. cit._ iii. 33.]\n\n[Footnote 104: Beaumanoir, _Coutumes du Beauvoisis_, xxx. 101, vol. i.\n454 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 105: Gregory III. _Judicia congrua penitentibus_, 3\n(Labbe-Mansi, _op. cit._ xii. 289).]\n\n[Footnote 106: Coke, _Third Institute_, p. 55.]\n\n[Footnote 107: Hume, _Commentaries on the Law of Scotland_, i. 365.]\n\n[Footnote 108: G\u00fcnther, _op. cit._ iii. 256 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 109: _Ibid._ iii. 255 _sq._]\n\nIt has been said that a man who acts under the influence of great\npassion has not, at the time, a full knowledge of the nature and\nquality of his act, and that {298} the clemency of the law is \"a\ncondescension to the frailty of the human frame, to the _furor\nbrevis_, which, while the frenzy lasteth, rendereth the man deaf to\nthe voice of reason.\"[110] But the main cause for passion extenuating\nhis guilt is not the intellectual disability under which he acts, but\nthe fact that he is carried away by an impulse which is too strong for\nhis will to resist. This is implied in the provision of the law, that\n\"provocation does not extenuate the guilt of homicide unless the\nperson provoked is at the time when he does the act deprived of the\npower of self-control by the provocation which he has received.\"[111]\n\n[Footnote 110: Foster, _Report of Crown Cases_, p. 315.]\n\n[Footnote 111: Stephen, _Digest_, art. 246, p. 188.]\n\nThat anger has been so generally recognised as an extenuation of guilt\nis largely due to the fact that the person who provokes it is himself\nblamable; both morality and law take into consideration the degree of\nprovocation to which the agent was exposed. But, at the same time, the\npressure of a non-volitional motive on the will may by itself be a\nsufficient ground for extenuation. In certain cases of mental disease\na morbid impulse or idea may take such a despotic possession of the\npatient as to drive him to the infliction of an injury. He is mad, and\nyet he may be free from delusion and exhibit no marked derangement of\nintelligence. He may be possessed with an idea or impulse to kill\nsomebody which he cannot resist. Or he may yield to a morbid impulse\nto steal or to set fire to houses or other property, without having\nany ill-feeling against the owner or any purpose to serve by what he\ndoes.[112] The deed to which the patient is driven is frequently one\nwhich he abhors, as when a mother kills the child which she loves\nmost.[113] In such cases the agent is of course acquitted by the moral\njudge, and if he is condemned by the law of his country and its\nguardians, the reason for this can be nothing but ignorance. We must\nremember that this form of madness was hardly known even to medical\n{299} men till the end of the 18th century,[114] when Pinel, to his\nown surprise, discovered that there were \"many madmen who at no period\ngave evidence of any lesion of the understanding, but who were under\nthe dominion of instinctive and abstract fury, as if the affective\nfaculties had alone sustained injury.\"[115] And there can be no doubt\nthat the fourteen English judges who formulated the law on the\ncriminal responsibility of the insane, made no reference to this\n_manie sans d\u00e9lire_ simply because they had not sufficient knowledge\nof the subject with which they had to deal.[116]\n\n[Footnote 112: Maudsley, _Responsibility in Mental Disease_, p. 133\n_sqq._ von Krafft-Ebing, _Lehrbuch der gerichtlichen Psychopathologie_,\np. 308 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 113: Gadelius, _Om tv\u00e5ngstankar_, p. 168 _sq._ Paulhan,\n_L'activit\u00e9 mentale_, p. 374.]\n\n[Footnote 114: Maudsley, _op. cit._ p. 141.]\n\n[Footnote 115: Pinel, _Trait\u00e9 m\u00e9dico-philosophique sur l'ali\u00e9nation\nmentale_, p. 156: \"Je ne fut pas peu surpris de voir plusieurs ali\u00e9n\u00e9s\nqui n'offroient \u00e0 aucune \u00e9poque aucune l\u00e9sion de l'entendement, et qui\n\u00e9toient domin\u00e9s par une sorte d'instinct de fureur, comme si les\nfacult\u00e9s affectives seules avoient \u00e9t\u00e9 l\u00e9s\u00e9es.\"]\n\n[Footnote 116: Sir James Stephen (_Digest_, art. 28, p. 20 _sq._)\nthinks it _possible_ that, according to the present law of England, an\nact is not criminal if the person who does it is, at the time when it\nis done, prevented by any disease affecting his mind from controlling\nhis own conduct, unless the absence of the power of control has been\nproduced by his own default.]\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThat moral judgments are generally passed, in the first instance, with\nreference to acts immediately intended, and consider motives only in\nproportion as the judgment is influenced by reflection, holds good,\nnot only of moral blame, but of moral praise. Every religion presents\ninnumerable examples of people who do \"good deeds\" only in expectation\nof heavenly reward. This implies the assumption that the Deity judges\nupon actions without much regard to their motives; for if motives were\nduly considered, a man could not be held rewardable for an act which\nhe performs solely for his own benefit. We are told that the homage\nwhich the Chinese \"render the gods and goddesses believed to be\nconcerned in the management of the affairs of this world is\nexceedingly formal, mechanical, and heartless,\" and that \"there seems\nto be no special importance attached to purity of heart.\"[117]\nAccording to Caldwell, \"the Hindu religionist enjoins the act alone,\nand affirms that motives have nothing to do with merit.\"[118] The\nargument, \"Obey the law because it will {300} profit you to do so,\"\nconstitutes the fundamental motive of Deuteronomy, as appears from\nphrases like these: \"That it may go well with thee,\" \"That thy days\nmay be prolonged.\"[119] Speaking of the modern Egyptians, Lane\nobserves that \"from their own profession it appears that they are as\nmuch excited to the giving of alms by the expectation of enjoying\ncorresponding rewards in heaven as by pity for the distresses of their\nfellow-creatures, or a disinterested wish to do the will of God.\"[120]\nSomething similar may be said, not only of the \"good deeds\" of\nMuhammedans, but of those of many Christians. Did not Paley expressly\ndefine virtue as \"the doing good to mankind, in obedience to the will\nof God, and for the sake of everlasting happiness\"?[121]\n\n[Footnote 117: Doolittle, _Social Life of the Chinese_, ii. 397.]\n\n[Footnote 118: Caldwell, _Tinnevelly Shanars_, p. 35.]\n\n[Footnote 119: _Cf._ Montefiore, _Hibbert Lectures_, p. 531.]\n\n[Footnote 120: Lane, _Modern Egyptians_, p. 293.]\n\n[Footnote 121: Paley, _Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy_,\ni. 7 (_Complete Works_, ii. 38).]\n\nSuch views, however, cannot hold their ground against the verdict of\nthe scrutinising moral consciousness. They have been repeatedly\ncontradicted by the great teachers of morality. Confucius required an\ninward sincerity in all outward practice, and poured scorn on the\npharisaism which contented itself with the cleansing of the outside of\nthe cup and platter.[122] He said that, \"in the rites of mourning,\nexceeding grief with deficient rites is better than little\ndemonstration of grief with superabounding rites; and that in those of\nsacrifice, exceeding reverence with deficient rites is better than an\nexcess of rites with but little reverence.\"[123] \"Sacrifice is not a\nthing coming to a man from without; it issues from within him, and has\nits birth in his heart. When the heart is deeply moved, expression is\ngiven to it by ceremonies.\"[124] The virtuous man offers his\nsacrifices \"without seeking for anything to be gained by them.\"[125]\n\"The Master said, 'See what a man does. Mark his motives.'\"[126] The\npopular Taouist work, called 'The Book of Secret Blessings,'\ninculcates the necessity {301} of purifying the heart as a preparation\nfor all right-doing.[127] The religious legislator of Brahmanism,\nwhilst assuming in accordance with the popular view that the\nfulfilment of religious duty will be always rewarded to some extent,\nwhatever may be the motive, maintains that the man who fulfils his\nduties without regard to the rewards which follow the fulfilment, will\nenjoy the highest happiness in this life and eternal happiness\nhereafter.[128] According to the Buddhistic Dhammapada, \"if a man\nspeaks or acts with an evil thought, pain follows him, as the wheel\nfollows the foot of the ox that draws the carriage. . . . If a man\nspeaks or acts with a pure thought, happiness follows him, like a\nshadow that never leaves him.\"[129] In his description of the\nBuddhists of Mongolia, the Rev. James Gilmour observes:--\"Mongol\npriests recognise the power of motive in estimating actions . . . .\nThe attitude of the mind decides the nature of the act. He that offers\na cup of cold water only, in a proper spirit, has presented a gift\nquite as acceptable as the most magnificent of donations.\"[130] With\nreference to the Hebrews, Mr. Montefiore says:--\"If it were true that\nthe later Judaism of the law laid exclusive stress in its moral\nteaching upon the mere outward act and not upon the spirit--upon doing\nrather than being, as we might nowadays express it--we should scarcely\nfind that constant harping upon the heart as the source and seat of\ngood and evil. What more legal book than Chronicles? Yet it is there\nthat we find the earnest supplication for a heart directed towards\nGod. . . . The eud\u00e6monistic motive is strongest in Deuteronomy; it is\nweakest with the Rabbis.\"[131] Few sayings are quoted and applied more\nfrequently in the Rabbinical literature than the adage which closes\nthose tractates of the Mishna which deal with the sacrificial\nlaw:--\"He that brings few offerings is as he that brings many; let his\nheart be directed {302} heavenward.\"[132] The same faults which Jesus\nchastises in the hypocritical Rabbis of his day are also chastised in\nthe Talmud. It is said, \"Before a man prays let him purify his\nheart,\"[133] and, \"Sin committed with a good motive is better than a\nprecept fulfilled from a bad motive.\"[134] Rabbi Elazar says, \"No\ncharity is rewarded but according to the degree of benevolence in it,\nfor it is said, 'Sow (a reward) for yourselves in giving alms as\ncharity, you will reap according to the benevolence.'\"[135] Nor is the\ndoctrine which requires disinterested motives for the performance of\ngood deeds foreign to Muhammedan moralists. \"Whatever we give,\" says\nthe author of the Akhl\u00e2k-i-Jel\u00e2li, \"should be given in the fulness of\nzeal and good-will. . . . We should spend it simply to please God, and\nnot mix the act with any meaner motive, lest thereby it be rendered\nnull and void.\"[136]\n\n[Footnote 122: _Cf._ Legge, _Religions of China_, p. 261 _sq._; Girard\nde Rialle, _Mythologie compar\u00e9e_, p. 214.]\n\n[Footnote 123: _L\u00ee K\u00ee_, ii. 1. 2. 27. _Cf._ _Lun Y\u00fc_, iii. 4. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 124: _L\u00ee K\u00ee_, xxii. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 125: _Ibid._ xxii. 2.]\n\n[Footnote 126: _Lun Y\u00fc_, ii. 10. 1 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 127: Douglas, _Confucianism and Taouism_, p. 272.]\n\n[Footnote 128: Wheeler, _History of India_, ii. 478.]\n\n[Footnote 129: _Dhammapada_, 1 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 130: Gilmour, _Among the Mongols_, p. 239.]\n\n[Footnote 131: Montefiore, _op. cit._ pp. 483, 533. _1 Chronicles_,\nxxii. 19; xxviii. 9; xxix. 18 _sq._ _2 Chronicles_, xi. 16; xv. 12;\nxvi. 9.]\n\n[Footnote 132: Montefiore, _op. cit._ p. 484.]\n\n[Footnote 133: _Ibid._ p. 174.]\n\n[Footnote 134: Nazir, fol. 23 B, quoted by Hershon, _Treasures of the\nTalmud_, p. 74.]\n\n[Footnote 135: Succah, fol. 49 B, _ibid._ p. 11.]\n\n[Footnote 136: Quoted by Ameer Ali, _Ethics of Isl\u00e2m_, p. 38 _sq._]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XII\n\nFORBEARANCES AND CARELESSNESS--CHARACTER\n\n\nTHE observation has often been made that in early moral codes the\nso-called negative commandments, which tell people what they ought not\nto do, are much more prominent than the positive commandments, which\ntell them what they ought to do. The main reason for this is that\nnegative commandments spring from the disapproval or acts, whereas\npositive commandments spring from the disapproval of forbearances or\nomissions, and that the indignation of men is much more easily aroused\nby action than by the absence of it. A person who commits a harmful\ndeed is a more obvious cause of pain than a person who causes harm by\ndoing nothing, and this naturally affects the question of guilt in the\neyes of the multitude. A scrutinising judge of course carefully\ndistinguishes between willfulness and negligence, whereas, to his\nmind, a forbearance is morally equivalent to an act. The unreflecting\njudge, on the other hand, is much less concerned with the question of\nwilfulness than with the distinction between acting and not-acting.\nEven the criminal laws of civilised nations take little cognisance of\nforbearances and omissions;[1] and one reason for this is that they\nevoke little public indignation. Even if it be admitted that the rules\nof beneficence, so far as details are concerned, must be left in a\ngreat measure to {304} the jurisdiction of private ethics, the limits\nof the law on this head, as Bentham remarks, seem \"to be capable of\nbeing extended a good deal farther than they seem ever to have been\nextended hitherto.\" And he appropriately asks, \"In cases where the\nperson is in danger, why should it not be made the duty of every man\nto save another from mischief, when it can be done without prejudicing\nhimself, as well as to abstain from bringing it on him?\"[2]\n\n[Footnote 1: Stephen, _History of the Criminal Law of England_, ii.\n113. Hepp, _Zurechnung auf dem Gebiete des Civilrechts_, p. 115 (Roman\nlaw).]\n\n[Footnote 2: Bentham, _Principles of Morals and Legislation_, p. 322\n_sq._ To a certain extent, however, this has been admitted by\nlegislators even in the Middle Ages. Frederick II.'s Sicilian Code\nimposed a penalty on persons who witnessed conflagrations or\nshipwrecks without helping the victims, and a fine of four augustales\non anyone who, hearing the shrieks of an assaulted woman, did not\nhurry to her rescue (_Constitutiones Napolitana sive Sicul\u00e6_, i. 28,\n22 [Lindenbrog, _Codex legum antiquarum_, pp. 715, 712]). Bracton says\n(_De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angli\u00e6_, fol. 121, vol. ii. 280 _sq._)\nthat he who could rescue a man from death and did not do it, ought not\nto be exempt from punishment. It was a principle of the Canon law that\nhe who does not prevent the infliction of an injury upon his neighbour\nwhen it lies in his power to do so, is to be regarded as an accomplice\nin the offence (Geyer, _Lehre von der Nothwehr_, p. 74. Gregory IX.\n_Decretales_, v. 12, 6. 2: \"Qui potuit hominem liberare a morte, et\nnon liberavit, eum occidit\").]\n\nThe more scrutinising the moral consciousness, the greater the\nimportance which it attaches to positive commandments. This is well\nillustrated by a comparison between Old and New Testament morality. As\nProfessor Seeley observes,[3] \"the old legal formula began 'thou shalt\nnot,' the new begins with 'thou shalt.' The young man who had kept the\nwhole law--that is, who had refrained from a number of actions--is\ncommanded to do something, to sell his goods and feed the poor.\nCondemnation was passed under the Mosaic law upon him who had sinned,\nwho had done something forbidden--the soul that sinneth shall die;\nChrist's condemnation is pronounced upon those who had not done\ngood--'I was an hungered and ye gave me no meat.' The sinner whom\nChrist habitually denounces is he who has done nothing.\" This\ncharacteristic is repeatedly manifested in His parables--as in the\ncase of the priest and Levite who passed by on the other side; in the\ncase of Dives, of whom no ill is recorded except that a beggar lay at\nhis {305} gate full of sores and yet no man gave unto him; in the case\nof the servant who hid in a napkin the talent committed to him.\nHowever, to say that the new morality involved the discovery of \"a new\ncontinent in the moral globe,\"[4] is obviously an exaggeration. The\ncustoms of all nations contain not only prohibitions, but positive\ninjunctions as well. To be generous to friends, charitable to the\nneedy, hospitable to strangers, are rules which, as will be seen, may\nbe traced back to the lowest stages of savagery known to us. The\ndifference in question is only one of degree. Of the Bangerang tribe\nin Victoria Mr. Curr observes:--\"Aboriginal restraints were, in the\nmajority of cases, though not altogether, of a negative character; an\nindividual might not do this, and might not eat that, and might not\nsay the other. What he should do under any circumstances, or that he\nshould do anything, were matters with which custom interfered less\nfrequently.\"[5]\n\n[Footnote 3: Seeley, _Ecce Homo_, p. 176.]\n\n[Footnote 4: _Ibid._ p. 179.]\n\n[Footnote 5: Curr, _Recollections of Squatting in Victoria_, p. 264 _sq._]\n\nWhilst the unreflecting mind has a tendency to overlook or underrate\nthe guilt of a person who, whether wilfully or by negligence, causes\nharm by doing nothing, it is on the other hand, apt to exaggerate the\nguilt of a person who, not wilfully but out of heedlessness or\nrashness, causes harm by a positive act. In reality the latter person\nis blamable not for what he did, but for what he omitted to do, for\nwant of due attention, for not thinking of the probable consequences\nof his act or for insufficient advertence to them. But the superficial\njudge largely measures the agent's guilt by the actual harm done, and\nin many cases even attributes to carelessness what was due to sheer\nmisfortune.\n\nAs Sir F. Pollock and Prof. Maitland rightly observe, it is not true\nthat barbarians will not trace the chain of causation beyond its\nnearest link--that, for example, they will not impute one man's death\nto another unless that other has struck a blow which laid a corpse at\nhis feet.[6] {306} Among the Wanyoro, should a girl die in childbirth,\nthe seducer is also doomed to die, unless he ransom himself by payment\nof some cows.[7] Among the Wakamba, if a man is the second time guilty\nof manslaughter in a state of drunkenness, the elders may either\nsentence him to death, \"or make the seller of drink pay compensation\nto the family of the victim.\"[8] According to the native code of\nMalacca, if vicious buffaloes or cattle \"be tied in the highway, where\npeople are in the habit of passing and repassing, and gore or wound\nany person, the owner shall be fined one tahil and one paha, and pay\nthe expense necessary for the cure of the wounded individual. Should\nhe be gored to death, then the owner shall be fined according to the\nDiyat, because the owner is criminal in having tied the animal in an\nimproper place.\"[9] In the Laws of Alfred it is said that, if a man\nhave a spear over his shoulder and anybody stake himself on it, the\nman with the spear has to pay the _wer_.[10] According to an ancient\ncustom, in vogue in England as late as the thirteenth century, one who\nwas accused of homicide was, before going to the wager of battle,\nexpected to swear that he had done nothing through which the dead man\nhad become \"further from life and nearer to death\";[11] and damages\nwhich the modern English lawyer would without hesitation describe as\n\"too remote\" were not too remote for the author of the so-called 'Laws\nof Henry I.'[12] \"At your request I accompany you when you are about\nyour own affairs; my enemies fall upon and kill me; you must pay for\nmy death.[13] You take me to see a wild beast show or that interesting\nspectacle a madman; beast or madman kills me; you must pay. You hang\nup your sword; some one else knocks it down so that it cuts me; you\nmust pay.\"[14] In all these cases you did something that helped to\nbring {307} about death or wound, and you are consequently held\nresponsible for the mishap.\n\n[Footnote 6: Pollock and Maitland, _History of English Law before the\nTime of Edward I._ ii. 470.]\n\n[Footnote 7: _Emin Pasha in Central Africa_, p. 83.]\n\n[Footnote 8: Decle, _Three Years in Savage Africa_, p. 487.]\n\n[Footnote 9: Newbold, _British Settlements in the Straits of Malacca_,\nii. 256 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 10: _Laws of Alfred_, 36.]\n\n[Footnote 11: _Leges Henrici I._ xc. 11. Bracton, _op. cit._\nfol. 141 b, vol. ii. 440 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 12: Pollock and Maitland, _op. cit._ ii. 470 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 13: _Leges Henrici I._ lxxxviii. 9.]\n\n[Footnote 14: _Ibid._ xc. 11. Pollock and Maitland, _op. cit._ ii. 471.]\n\nBut though early custom and law may be anxious enough to trace an\nevent to its source, they easily fail to distinguish between external\nand internal causes, to discover where there is guilt or not, and, in\ncase of carelessness, to determine the magnitude of the offender's\nguilt. Ancient Teutonic law, as we have seen, distinguished between\n_vili_ and _vadhi_. It punished the involuntary manslayer less heavily\nthan the voluntary one, but it punished him all the same; and whether\nthe unintended deed was combined with heedlessness or was purely\naccidental was a question with which the law did not at all concern\nitself.[15] According to the Laws of [Hv]ammurabi, \"if the doctor has\ntreated a gentleman for a severe wound with a lancet of bronze, and\nhas caused the gentleman to die, or has opened an abscess of the eye\nfor a gentleman with the bronze lancet and has caused the loss of the\ngentleman's eye, one shall cut off his hands.\"[16] In the Mosaic law\ndistinction was made between presence and absence of enmity in the\nmanslayer, but the difference between carelessness and misfortune was\nnot considered,[17] except when the instrument of death was a goring\nox.[18] However, in this, as in many other respects, great progress\nwas made by the later legislation of the Jews. The Rabbis took\nconsiderable pains to distinguish between purely accidental homicide\nand homicide due to carelessness; the former they exempted from all\npunishment, whereas the latter incurred the punishment of confinement\nto a city of refuge.[19] They even distinguished between cases in\nwhich the death was exclusively due to the carelessness of the agent,\nand cases in which the deceased contributed to it by some blamable act\nof his own. A father or a teacher {308} who in punishing his son or\npupil unintentionally caused his death, and a person who by order of\nthe Sanhedrim inflicted corporal punishment on a culprit and in doing\nso happened by mistake to kill him--such persons were not confined in\na city of refuge, but escaped punishment altogether.[20] Whatever else\nmay be said of these provisions, they certainly show remarkable\ndiscernment in a point where legislators of a ruder type have been\nvery indiscriminate. In the oldest English records we see no attempt\nto distinguish cases in which the dead man himself was reprehensible\nfrom others in which no fault could be imputed to him, and we find\nthat many horses and boats bore the guilt which should have been\nascribed to beer.[21] When a drunken carter was crushed beneath the\nwheel of his cart, the cart, the cask of wine which was in it, and the\noxen that were drawing it, were all deodand.[22] According to the\ncustomary law of the Ossetes, if a stolen gun went off in the hands of\nthe thief who was carrying it away, and killed him, the thief's kin\nhad a just feud against the owner of the gun.[23]\n\n[Footnote 15: Wilda, _Strafrecht der Germanen_, p. 578. Geyer, _op.\ncit._ p. 88. Brunner, _Forschungen zur Geschichte des deutschen und\nfranz\u00f6sischen Rechtes_, p. 499.]\n\n[Footnote 16: _Laws of [Hv]ammurabi_, 218.]\n\n[Footnote 17: _Numbers_, xxxv. 16 _sqq._ _Deuteronomy_, xix. 4 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 18: _Exodus_, xxi. 28-32, 35 _sq._ _Cf._ _Laws of\n[Hv]ammurabi_, 250 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 19: Rabbinowicz, _L\u00e9gislation criminelle du Talmud_,\np. 173 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 20: _Ibid._ p. 174. Benny, _Criminal Code of the Jews\naccording to the Talmud Massecheth Synhedrin_, p. 115 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 21: Pollock and Maitland, _op. cit._ ii. 474, n. 4.]\n\n[Footnote 22: _Three Early Assize Rolls for the County of\nNorthumberland_, p. 96 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 23: Kovalewsky, _Coutume contemporaine_, p. 295.]\n\nModern laws generally hold a person liable for harm caused by him\nthrough want of ordinary care and foresight, and it depends on the\nnature of the case whether he will have to pay damages or to suffer\npunishment. Yet, as we have previously noticed, his punishment is\ndetermined not only by the degree of carelessness of which he was\nguilty or the danger to which he exposed his fellow-men, but, largely,\nby the harm resulting; whereas, if nobody happens to be hurt, little\nnotice is taken of his fault. To such an extent are men's judgments in\nthese matters influenced by external facts, that even nowadays many\namong ourselves will hold a person answerable for all the damage which\ndirectly ensues from an act of his, even though no foresight could\nhave reasonably been expected {309} to look out for it.[24] Not long\nago there were plausible, if insufficient, grounds adduced for\nasserting that in English courts a plea that there was neither\nnegligence nor an intent to do harm was no answer to an action which\ncharged the defendant with having hurt the plaintiff's body.[25] And\nof late years attacks have been made by continental jurists upon the\nRoman principle that there is no liability where there is no\nfault[26]--a principle which, more or less modified, has been adopted\nby modern laws.[27] Although they take pains to point out the\ndifference between punishment and indemnification, the very language\nthey use indicates the quasi-ethical basis on which their theory\nrests. It is only just, they say, that he who has caused the evil\nshould compensate for it, since the injured party \"is still much more\ninnocent than he.\" And the \"sense of justice\" is appealed to for\ncompelling a man who faints in the street and in the fall happens to\nbreak some fragile articles to indemnify the owner for his loss.[28]\nThus, whilst loss from accident is generally allowed to lie where it\nfalls, an exception is made where the instrument of misfortune is a\nhuman being. This is a most unreasonable exception, but one not\ndifficult to explain. People are ready to blame a person who commits a\nharmful deed, whether he deserves blame or not; at the same time they\nare apt to overlook the indirect and more remote cause of the harm\nwhich lies in the sufferer's own conduct. Hence the liability, if not\nthe guilt, is laid on him who is a cause of pain by _doing_ something,\neven though it be by merely spasmodic contractions of his muscles;\nwhereas the other party, who only exposed himself to the risk of being\nhurt, is regarded as the \"more innocent.\"\n\n[Footnote 24: Holmes, _Common Law_, p. 80.]\n\n[Footnote 25: Stanley _v._ Powell, in _Law Reports, Queen's Bench\nDivision_, 1891, i. 86 _sqq._ Pollock and Maitland, _op. cit._\nii. 475 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 26: von Jhering, _Schuldmoment im r\u00f6mischen Privatrecht_,\n_passim_, especially pp. 20 _sqq._, 40 _sqq._ Hepp, _op. cit._ p. 106.]\n\n[Footnote 27: Forsman, _Bidrag till l\u00e4ran om skadest\u00e5nd i brottm\u00e5l_,\np. 158 _sq._ Pollock, _Law of Torts_, p. 129 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 28: Thon, _Rechtsnorm und subjectives Recht_, p. 106, n. 71.]\n\nWhilst culpability or quasi-culpability is thus imputed to the\ninnocent committer of a harmful deed, little or no {310} censure is\npassed on him whose want of foresight or want of self-restraint is\nproductive of suffering, if only the effect is sufficiently remote.\nThis is exemplified by the frivolous leniency with which drunkenness,\nnot long ago, was looked upon in many civilised countries, and by the\ncriminal indifference with which law and public opinion still regard\nthe production of offspring that are almost with certainty doomed to\nmisery on account of the vices, poverty, or bodily infirmities of the\nparents. To interfere here, it is argued, would be to intrude upon the\nindividual's right of freedom, or to meddle with the affairs of\nProvidence. But men are not, generally, allowed to do mischief simply\nin order to gratify their own appetites, and Providence might equally\nwell be called in to answer for any other kind of human shortcoming. I\npresume the true explanation to be, that in this, as in many other\nkindred cases, the cause and effect are so distant from each other\nthat the near-sighted eye does not distinctly perceive the connection\nbetween them. Indeed, there is hardly any other point in which the\nmoral consciousness of civilised men still stands in greater need of\nintellectual training than in its judgments on cases which display\nwant of care or foresight. And there is no safer measure of the moral\nenlightenment of a man than the scrupulosity with which he considers\nthe possible consequences of acts, and the number of positive\ncommandments which are contained in his catalogue of duties.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThat moral indignation and moral approval are from the very beginning\nfelt, not with reference to certain modes of conduct _per se_, but\nwith reference to persons on account of their conduct, is obvious from\nthe intrinsic nature of those emotions. As we noticed before, they\nderive one of their most essential characteristics from their being\ndirected against sensitive agents. Hence they may as naturally give\nrise to judgments on human character as to judgments on human conduct.\nAnd even when a moral judgment immediately refers to a distinct act,\nit takes notice of the {311} agent's will as a whole. The forgiveness\nwhich follows sincere repentance, and the distinction made between\ninjuries committed deliberately in cold blood and injuries committed\nin the heat of passion, indicate that men, in their moral judgments,\nare apt to consider something more than a momentary volition. The same\ntendency is at the bottom of the common practice of punishing a second\nand third offence more severely than the first.\n\nAmong the Masai, \"if a man is convicted of a particular crime\nseveral times, or constitutes himself a public nuisance, he is\nproclaimed an outlaw, his property is confiscated, and he is beaten\naway from any settlement or village he goes near. Unless an outlaw can\nfind friends among non-Masai tribes, he dies of starvation.\"[29] Among\nthe Wakamba \"a murder is judged by the elders; if it is a man's first\noffence of that kind he is punished by a fine. . . . But a man\nconvicted for the second time of murder is killed at once, everyone\nsetting on him the moment judgment is delivered. . . . For rape a\nfirst offender is flogged, and has to pay a fine of one cow; for the\nsecond offence he is killed.\"[30] Among the Wyandots of North America,\n\"a woman guilty of adultery, for the first offence is punished by\nhaving her hair cropped; for repeated offences her left ear is cut\noff.\"[31] The laws of the Incas, also, were more lenient to a first\noffence than to a second;[32] and in the kingdom of Mechoacan, whilst\nthe first theft was not severely punished, the thief who repeated his\ncrime was thrown down a precipice and his carcass was left to the\nbirds of prey.[33] Among the Aleuts, for the first theft \"corporal\npunishment was inflicted; for the second offence of the kind some\nfingers of the right hand were cut off; for the third, the left hand\nand sometimes the lips were amputated; and for the fourth offence the\npunishment was death.\" Other crimes, again, \"were punished at first by\nreprimand by the chief before the community, and upon repetition the\noffender was bound and kept in such a condition for some time.\"[34]\nThe Kamchadales \"burn the hands of people who have been frequently\ncaught in theft, but for the first offence the thief must restore what\nhe hath stolen, and live alone {312} in solitude, without expecting\nany assistance from others.\"[35] Among the Ainu, \"for breaking into\nthe storehouse or dwelling of another, a very sound beating was\nadministered for the first offence; for the second, sometimes the nose\nwas cut off, sometimes the ears, and in some cases both the nose and\nears were forfeited. . . . Persons who had committed such a crime\ntwice were driven bag and baggage out of the home and village to which\nthey belonged.\"[36] Among the Murray Islanders repetition of an\noffence such as murder or robbery generally incurred a penalty of\ndeath, whereas the first offence was punished only by a fine.[37]\nAccording to the Javanese N\u00edti S\u00e1stra, if a man violates the law, he\nmay for the first transgression be punished by a pecuniary fine, for\nthe second by a punishment affecting his person, but for the third he\nmay be punished with death.[38] The Penal Code of the Chinese\nprescribes that, for the first offence, individuals convicted of being\nconcerned in a theft shall be branded in the lower part of the left\narm with two words signifying thief, that for the second offence they\nshall be branded again with the same words in the lower part of the\nright arm, but that for the third offence they shall suffer death by\nbeing strangled, after remaining the usual period in confinement.[39]\nIn Nepal, in the case of theft or petty burglary, for the first\noffence one hand is cut off, for the second the other hand, whilst the\nthird offence is capital.[40] Herodotus mentions with approval that in\nancient Persia not even the king was allowed to put any one to death\nfor a single crime.[41] According to the Vend\u00eed\u00e2d, the gravity of a\ncrime does not depend only on the gravity of the deed, but on its\nfrequency as well.[42] In ancient Rome the repetition of a crime\naggravated its punishment.[43] According to early English law, the\npunishment upon a second conviction for nearly every offence was death\nor mutilation.[44] In modern European legislation, the principle that\nthe criminality of certain crimes is increased by their repetition is\ngenerally recognised.\n\n[Footnote 29: Hinde, _The Last of the Masai_, p. 108.]\n\n[Footnote 30: Decle, _op. cit._ p. 487.]\n\n[Footnote 31: Powell, 'Wyandot Government,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._\ni. 66.]\n\n[Footnote 32: Herrera, _General History of the West Indies_,\niv. 338 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 33: _Ibid._ iii. 255.]\n\n[Footnote 34: Veniaminof, quoted by Petroff, 'Report on Alaska,' in\n_Tenth Census of the United States_, p. 152.]\n\n[Footnote 35: Krasheninnikoff, _History of Kamschatka_, p. 179.]\n\n[Footnote 36: Batchelor, _Ainu and their Folk-lore_, p. 285.]\n\n[Footnote 37: Hunt, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxviii. 6.]\n\n[Footnote 38: Raffles, _History of Java_, i. 262.]\n\n[Footnote 39: _Ta Tsing Leu Lee_, sec. cclxix. p. 285.]\n\n[Footnote 40: Hodgson, _Miscellaneous Essays_, ii. 235.]\n\n[Footnote 41: Herodotus, i. 137.]\n\n[Footnote 42: _Vend\u00eed\u00e2d_, iv. 17 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 43: Mommsen, _R\u00f6misches Strafrecht_, p. 1044.]\n\n[Footnote 44: Stephen, _op. cit._ i. 58.]\n\nThe more a moral judgment is influenced by reflection, the more it\nscrutinises the character which manifests itself {313} in that\nindividual piece of conduct by which the judgment is occasioned. But\nhowever superficial it be, it always refers to a will conceived of as\na continuous entity, to a person regarded as a cause of pleasure or\npain. This holds good of savage and civilised men alike. Even tame\nanimals, in response to a hurt or a benefit, behave differently\ntowards different persons according to their previous experience of\nthe agent.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIII\n\nWHY MORAL JUDGMENTS ARE PASSED ON CONDUCT AND CHARACTER--MORAL\nVALUATION AND FREE-WILL\n\n\nWE have examined the general nature of the subjects of moral judgments\nfrom an evolutionary point of view. We have seen that such judgments\nare essentially passed on conduct and character, and that allowance is\nmade for the various elements of which conduct and character are\ncomposed in proportion as the moral judgment is scrutinising and\nenlightened. But an important question still calls for an answer, the\nquestion, Why is this so? We cannot content ourselves with the bare\nfact that nothing but the will is morally good or bad. We must try to\nexplain it.\n\nAfter what has been said above the explanation is not far to seek.\nMoral judgments are passed on conduct and character, because such\njudgments spring from moral emotions; because the moral emotions are\nretributive emotions; because a retributive emotion is a reactive\nattitude of mind, either kindly or hostile, towards a living being (or\nsomething looked upon in the light of a living being), regarded as a\ncause of pleasure or as a cause of pain; and because a living being is\nregarded as a true cause of pleasure or pain only in so far as this\nfeeling is assumed to be caused by its will. The correctness of this\nexplanation I consider to be proved by the fact that not only moral\nemotions, but non-moral retributive emotions as well, are felt with\nreference to phenomena {315} exactly similar in nature to those on\nwhich moral judgments are passed.\n\nLike moral indignation, the emotion of revenge can be felt only\ntowards a sentient being, or towards something which is believed to be\nsentient. We may be angry with inanimate things for a moment, but such\nanger cannot last; it disappears as soon as we reflect that the thing\nin question is incapable of feeling pain. Even a dog which, in playing\nwith another dog, hurts itself, for instance, by running into a tree,\nchanges its angry attitude immediately it notices the real nature of\nthat which caused it pain.[1]\n\n[Footnote 1: Hiram Stanley, _Studies in the Evolutionary Psychology of\nFeeling_, p. 154 _sq._]\n\nEquivalent to injuries resulting from inanimate things are injuries\nresulting accidentally from animate beings. If my arm or my foot gives\na push to my neighbour, and he is convinced that the push was neither\nintended nor foreseen nor due to any carelessness whatever on my part,\nsurely he cannot feel angry with me. Why not? Professor Bain answers\nthis question as follows:--\"Aware that absolute inviolability is\nimpossible in this world, and that we are all exposed by turns to\naccidental injuries from our fellows, we have our minds disciplined to\nlet unintended evil go by without satisfaction of inflicting some\ncounter evil upon the offender.\"[2] Perhaps another answer would be\nthat an accidental injury in no way affects the \"self-feeling\" of the\nsufferer. But neither of these explanations goes to the root of the\nquestion. Let us once more remember that even a dog distinguishes\nbetween being stumbled over and being kicked; and this can neither be\nthe result of discipline, nor have anything to do with the feeling of\nself-regarding pride.[3] The reason is that the dog scents an enemy in\nthe person who kicks him, but not in the one who stumbles. My\nneighbour, more clearly still, makes a distinction between a part of\nmy body and myself as a {316} volitional being, and finds that _I_ am\nno proper object of resentment when the cause of the hurt was merely\nmy arm or my foot. An event is attributed to _me_ as its cause only in\nproportion as it is considered to have been brought about by my will;\nand _I_, regarded as a volitional and sensitive entity, can be a\nproper object of resentment only as a cause of pain.\n\n[Footnote 2: Bain, _Emotions and the Will_, p. 185.]\n\n[Footnote 3: The Koussa Kafirs, according to Lichtenstein (_Travels in\nSouthern Africa_, i. 254), expect a similar discrimination from the\nelephant; for \"if an elephant is killed . . . they seek to exculpate\nthemselves towards the dead animal, by declaring to him solemnly, that\nthe thing happened entirely by accident, not by design.\"]\n\nWe can hardly feel disposed to resent injuries inflicted upon us by\nanimals, little children, or madmen, when we recognise their inability\nto judge of the nature of their acts. They are not the real causes of\nthe mischief resulting from their deeds, since they neither intended\nnor foresaw nor could have foreseen it. \"Why,\" says the Stoic, \"do you\nbear with the delirium of a sick man, or the ravings of a madman, or\nthe impudent blows of a child? Because, of course, they evidently do\nnot know what they are doing. . . . . Would anyone think himself to be\nin his perfect mind if he were to return kicks to a mule or bites to a\ndog?\"[4] Hartley observes, \"As we improve in observation and\nexperience, and in the faculty of analysing the actions of animals, we\nperceive that brutes and children, and even adults in certain\ncircumstances, have little or no share in the actions referred to\nthem.\"[5]\n\n[Footnote 4: Seneca, _De ira_, iii. 26 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 5: Hartley, _Observations on Man_, i. 493.]\n\nDeliberate resentment considers the motives of acts. Suppose that a\nman tells us an untruth. Our feelings towards him are not the same if\nhe did it in order to save our life as if he did it for his own\nbenefit. Moreover, our anger abates, or ceases altogether, if we find\nthat he who injured us acted under compulsion, or under the influence\nor a non-volitional impulse, too strong for any ordinary man to\nresist. Then, the main cause or the injury was not his will, conceived\nas a continuous entity. It yielded to the will of somebody else,\nreluctantly, as it were out of necessity, or to a powerful conation\nwhich forms no part of his real self. He was merely an instrument in\nanother's hands, or he was \"beside himself,\" \"beyond himself,\" \"out of\nhis {317} mind.\" When we are angry, says Montaigne, \"it is passion\nthat speaks, and not we.\"[6] The religious psychology of the ancient\nGreeks ascribed acts committed upon sudden excitement of mind to the\n_Ate_ which bewilders the mind and betrays the man into deeds which,\nin his sober senses, he is heartily sorry for. Hence the Ate has in\nits train the _Litae_--the humble prayers of repentance, which must\nmake good, before gods and men, whatever has been done amiss.[7] The\nVedic singer apologises, \"It is not our own will, Varuna, that leads\nus astray, but some seduction--wine, anger, dice, and our folly.\"[8]\nIn the Andaman Islands violent outbreaks of ill-temper or resentment\nare looked upon as the result of a temporary \"possession,\" and the\nvictim is, for the time being, considered unaccountable for his\nactions.[9] Madness, as we have seen, is frequently attributed to\ndemoniacal possession. In ancient Ireland, again, it was believed to\nbe often brought on by malignant magical agency, usually the work of\nsome druid, hence in the Glosses to the Senchus M\u00f3r a madman is\nrepeatedly described as one \"upon whom the magic wisp has been\nthrown.\"[10] What a person does in madness is not an act committed by\n_him_.\n\n  \"Was 't Hamlet wrong'd Laertes? Never Hamlet:\n  If Hamlet from himself be ta'en away,\n  And when he's not himself does wrong Laertes,\n  Then Hamlet does it not, Hamlet denies it.\n  Who does it, then? His madness: if 't be so,\n  Hamlet is of the faction that is wrong'd;\n  His madness is poor Hamlet's enemy.\"[11]\n\n[Footnote 6: Montaigne, _Essais_, ii. 31 (_[OE]uvres_, p. 396).]\n\n[Footnote 7: _Iliad_, ix. 505 _sqq._ M\u00fcller, _Dissertations on the\nEumenides_, p. 108.]\n\n[Footnote 8: _Rig-Veda_, vii. 86. 6.]\n\n[Footnote 9: Man, in _Jour. Anthrop. Inst._ xii. 111.]\n\n[Footnote 10: Joyce, _Social History of Ancient Ireland_, i. 224.]\n\n[Footnote 11: Shakespeare, _Hamlet_, v. 2.]\n\nWe resent not only acts and volitions, but also omissions, though\ngenerally less severely; and when a hurt is attributed to want of\nforesight, our resentment is, _ceteris paribus_, proportionate to the\ndegree of carelessness {318} which we lay to the offender's charge. A\nperson appears to us as the cause of an injury which we think he could\nhave prevented by his will. But a hurt resulting from carelessness is\nnot to the same extent as an intentional injury caused by the will.\nAnd the less foresight could have been expected in a given case, the\nsmaller share has the will in the production of the event.\n\nOur resentment is increased by a repetition of the injury, and reaches\nits height when we find that our adversary nourishes habitual ill-will\ntowards us. On the other hand, as we have noticed in a previous\nchapter,[12] the injured party is not deaf to the prayer for\nforgiveness which springs from genuine repentance. Like moral\nindignation, non-moral resentment takes into consideration the\ncharacter of the injurer.\n\n[Footnote 12: _Supra_, ch. iii.]\n\nPassing to the emotion of gratitude, we find a similar resemblance\nbetween the phenomena which give rise to this emotion and those which\ncall forth moral approval. We may feel some kind of retributive\naffection for inanimate objects which have given us pleasure; \"a man\ngrows fond of a snuff-box, of a pen-knife, of a staff which he has\nlong made use of, and conceives something like a real love and\naffection for them.\"[13] But gratitude, involving a desire to please\nthe benefactor, can reasonably be felt towards such objects only as\nare themselves capable of feeling pleasure. Moreover, on due\ndeliberation we do not feel grateful to a person who benefits us by\npure accident. Since gratitude is directed towards the assumed cause\nof pleasure, and since a person is regarded as a cause only in his\ncapacity of a volitional being, gratitude presupposes that the\npleasure shall be due to his will. For the same reason motives are\nalso taken into consideration by the benefited party. As Hutcheson\nobserves, \"bounty from a donor apprehended as morally evil, or\nextorted by force, or conferred with some view of self-interest, will\nnot procure real good-will; nay, it may raise indignation.\"[14] {319}\nLike moral approval, gratitude may be called forth not only by acts\nand volitions, but by absence of volitions, in so far as this absence\nis traceable to a good disposition of will. And, like the moral judge,\nthe grateful man is, in his retributive feeling, influenced by the\nnotion he forms of the benefactor's character.\n\n[Footnote 13: Adam Smith, _Theory of Moral Sentiments_, p. 136.]\n\n[Footnote 14: Hutcheson, _Inquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil_,\np. 157.]\n\nThe cognitions by which non-moral resentment and gratitude are\ndetermined are thus, as regards their general nature, precisely\nsimilar to those which determine moral indignation and approval.\nWhether moral or non-moral, a retributive emotion is essentially\ndirected towards a sensitive and volitional entity, or self, conceived\nof as the cause of pleasure or the cause of pain. This solves a\nproblem which necessarily baffles solution in the hands of those who\nfail to recognise the emotional origin of moral judgments, and which,\nwhen considered at all, has, I think, never been fully understood by\nthose who have essayed it. It has been argued, for instance, that\nmoral praise and blame are not applied to inanimate things and those\nwho commit involuntary deeds, because they are administered only\n\"where they are capable of producing some effect\";[15] that moral\njudgment is concerned with the question of compulsion, because \"only\nwhen a man acts morally of his own free will is society sure of\nhim\";[16] that we do not regard a lunatic as responsible, because we\nknow that \"his mind is so diseased that it is impossible by moral\nreprobation alone to change his character so that it maybe\nsubsequently relied upon.\"[17] The bestowal of moral praise or blame\non such or such an object is thus attributed to utilitarian\ncalculation;[18] whereas in reality it is determined by the nature of\nthe moral emotion which lies at the bottom of the judgment. And, as\nStuart Mill observes (though he never seems to have realised the full\nimport of his objection), whilst we may administer praise and blame\nwith the express design of influencing conduct, \"no anticipation of\nsalutary effects {320} from our feeling will ever avail to give us the\nfeeling itself.\"[19]\n\n[Footnote 15: James Mill, _Fragment on Mackintosh_, p. 370.]\n\n[Footnote 16: Ziegler, _Social Ethics_, p. 56 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 17: Clifford, _Lectures and Essays_, p. 296.]\n\n[Footnote 18: See also James Mill, _op. cit._ pp. 261, 262, 375.]\n\n[Footnote 19: Stuart Mill, in a note to James Mill's _Analysis of the\nPhenomena of the Human Mind_, ii. 323.]\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe nature of the moral emotions also gives us the key to another\nimportant problem--a problem which has called forth endless\ncontroversies--namely, the co-existence of moral responsibility with\nthe general law of cause and effect. It has been argued that\nresponsibility, and moral judgments generally, are inconsistent with\nthe notion that the human will is determined by causes; that \"either\nfree-will is a fact, or moral judgment a delusion.\" The argument has\nbeen well summed up by Sir Leslie Stephen as follows:--\"Moral\nresponsibility, it is said, implies freedom. A man is only responsible\nfor that which he causes. Now the _causa caus\u00e6_ is also the _causa\ncausati_. If I am caused as well as cause, the cause of me is the\ncause of my conduct; I am only a passive link in the chain which\ntransmits the force. Thus, as each individual is the product of\nsomething external to himself, his responsibility is really shifted to\nthat something. The universe or the first cause is alone responsible,\nand since it is responsible to itself alone, responsibility becomes a\nmere illusion.\"[20] We are told that, if determinism were true, human\nbeings would be no more proper subjects of moral valuation than are\ninanimate things; that the application of moral praise and blame would\nbe \"in itself as absurd as to applaud the sunrise or be angry at the\nrain\";[21] that the only admiration which the virtuous man might\ndeserve would be the kind of admiration \"which we justly accord to a\nwell-made machine.\"[22] Nor are these inferences from the doctrine of\ndeterminism only weapons forged by its opponents; they are shared by\nmany of its own adherents. Richard Owen and his followers maintained\nthat, since a man's character is made _for_ him, not _by_ him, there\nis no justice in punishing {321} him for what he cannot help.[23] To\nStuart Mill responsibility simply means liability to punishment,\ninflicted for a utilitarian purpose.[24] So also Prof. Sidgwick--whose\nattitude towards the free-will theory is that of a sceptic--argues\nthat the common retributive view of punishment, and the ordinary\nnotions of \"merit,\" \"demerit,\" and \"responsibility,\" involve the\nassumption that the will is free, and that these terms, if used at\nall, have to be used in new significations. \"If the wrong act,\" he\nsays, \"and the bad qualities of character manifested in it, are\nconceived as the necessary effects of causes antecedent or external to\nthe existence of the agent, the moral responsibility--in the ordinary\nsense--for the mischief caused by them can no longer rest on him. At\nthe same time, the Determinist can give to the terms 'ill-desert' and\n'responsibility' a signification which is not only clear and definite,\nbut, from an utilitarian point of view, the only suitable meaning. In\nthis view, if I affirm that A is responsible for a harmful act, I mean\nthat it is right to punish him for it; primarily, in order that the\nfear of punishment may prevent him and others from committing similar\nacts in future.\"[25]\n\n[Footnote 20: Leslie Stephen, _Science of Ethics_, p. 285.]\n\n[Footnote 21: Martineau, _Types of Ethical Theory_, ii. 41 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 22: Balfour, _Foundations of Belief_, p. 25.]\n\n[Footnote 23: Stuart Mill, _Examination of Sir William Hamilton's\nPhilosophy_, p. 506.]\n\n[Footnote 24: _Ibid._ p. 506 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 25: Sidgwick, _Methods of Ethics_, p. 71 _sq._]\n\nIf these conclusions are correct it is obvious that, whether the\ninfliction of punishment be justifiable or not, the _feeling_ of moral\nindignation or moral approval is, from the deterministic point of\nview, absurd. And yet, as a matter of fact, these emotions are felt by\ndeterminists and libertarians alike. Apparently, they are not in the\nleast affected by the notion that the human will is subject to the\ngeneral law of cause and effect. Emotions are always determined by\nspecific cognitions, and last only as long as the influence of those\ncognitions lasts. It makes me sorry to hear that some evil has\nbefallen a friend; but my sorrow disappears at once when I find that\nthe rumour was false. I get angry with a person who hurts me; but my\nanger subsides as soon as I recognise that the hurt was purely\naccidental. My indignation is aroused by an {322} atrocious crime; but\nit ceases entirely when I hear that the agent was mad. On the other\nhand, however convinced I am that a person's conduct and character are\nin every detail a product of causes, that does not prevent me from\nfeeling towards him retributive emotions--either anger or gratitude,\nor moral resentment or approval. Hence I conclude that a retributive\nemotion is not essentially determined by the cognition of free-will. I\nhold that Spinoza is mistaken in his assumption that men feel more\nlove or hatred towards one another than towards anything else, because\nthey think themselves to be free.[26] And I attribute the conception\nthat moral valuation is inconsistent with determinism either to a\nfailure to recognise the emotional origin of moral judgments or to\ninsufficient insight into the true nature of the moral emotions. At\nthe same time it seems easy to explain the fallacy which lies at the\nbottom of that conception.\n\n[Footnote 26: Spinoza, _Ethica_, iii. 49, Note.]\n\nWe have seen that the object of moral approval and disapproval is the\nwill, and that a person's responsibility is lessened in proportion as\nhis will is exposed to the pressure of non-volitional conations. Full\nresponsibility thus presupposes freedom from such pressure, and,\nparticularly, freedom from external compulsion. Hence the inference\nthat it also presupposes freedom from causation, and that complete\ndetermination involves complete irresponsibility. Compulsion is\nconfounded with causation; and this confusion is due to the fact that\nthe cause which determines the will is actually looked upon in the\nlight of a constraining power outside the will.\n\nThe popular mind has a strong belief in the law of cause and effect.\nWhen reflecting on the matter, it admits that everything which happens\nin this world has a cause; and if the natural cause is hidden, it\nreadily calls in a supernatural cause to account for the event. Now,\nin the case of human volitions the chain of causation is often\nparticularly obscure; as Spinoza said, whilst men are conscious of\ntheir volitions and desires, they \"never even {323} dream, in their\nignorance, of the causes which have disposed them so to wish and\ndesire.\"[27] Hence, when in a philosophic mood, they are liable to\nattribute their acts to the influence of an external power ruling over\nhuman affairs, a god or an all-powerful fate. No doubt, Providence and\nFate[28] may effect their purposes without the will of man as their\ntool; what happens \"by chance,\" being frequently no less wonderful\nthan any decree of a human will, may likewise be traced to a\nsupernatural cause. But, on the other hand, the fact that the deeds of\nmen are generally preceded by volitions, is so obvious that it could\nnot escape even the simplest mind--indeed, so strongly are primitive\nmen impressed by this fact that they are apt to attribute every event\nto a will. Acknowledging, then, the connection between volition and\ndeed, the fatalist regards the former only as an instrument in the\nhands of a force outside the agent, which compels his will to execute\nits plans. Sometimes it reaches its goal in a way quite unforeseen by\nthe agent himself. Muhammed said, \"When God hath ordered a creature to\ndie in any particular place, He causeth his wants to direct him to\nthat place\";[29] and it is a popular saying throughout Islam that\n\"whenas Destiny descends she blindeth human sight.\"[30] Sometimes the\nexternal power causes its victim to will its decree, by exciting in\nhim some irresistible passion, as when Zeus urged Clytemnestra to the\nslaughter of Agamemnon; or the volitions of a person are themselves\nregarded as decreed by that power. In W\u00e4rend, in Sweden, when somebody\nhas killed another, as also when the manslayer himself suffers the\npenalty of death, the women say, full of compassion, \"Well, this was\nhis destiny, to be sure,\" or \"Poor fellow, it was a pitiful fate.\"[31]\nIn one of the Pahlavi texts the following words are put into the mouth\nof the Spirit of {324} Wisdom:--\"Even with the might and powerfulness\nof wisdom and knowledge, even then it is not possible to contend with\ndestiny. Because, when predestination as to virtue, or as to the\nreverse, comes forth, the wise becomes wanting in duty, and the astute\nin evil becomes intelligent; the faint-hearted becomes braver, and the\nbraver becomes faint-hearted; the diligent becomes lazy, and the lazy\nacts diligently. Just as is predestined as to the matter, the cause\nenters into it, and thrusts out everything else.\"[32]\n\n[Footnote 27: _Ibid._ pt. i. Appendix.]\n\n[Footnote 28: In a Pahlavi text fate is defined as \"that which is\nordained from the beginning,\" and divine providence as that which the\nsacred beings \"also grant otherwise\" (_D\u00een\u00e2-\u00ee Ma\u00een\u00f4g-\u00ee Khirad_,\nxxiv. 6 _sq._).]\n\n[Footnote 29: Lane, _Arabian Society in the Middle Ages_, p. 6.]\n\n[Footnote 30: Burton, in his translation of the _Arabian Nights_, i.\n62, n. 2.]\n\n[Footnote 31: Hylt\u00e9n-Cavallius, _W\u00e4rend och Wirdarne_, i. 206.]\n\n[Footnote 32: _D\u00een\u00e2-\u00ee Ma\u00een\u00f4g-\u00ee Khirad_, xxiii. 3 _sqq._]\n\nNor is it only the popular mind that, when human volitions are\nconcerned, interprets causation as compulsion. Even such philosophers\nas Hamilton[33] and Mansel[34] seemed quite unable to distinguish\nbetween determinism and fatalism. Professor Laurie likewise\nobserves:--\"Determinism is the term adopted of late years to veil\nfatalism and confound issues . . . . Freedom or fate, these are the\nsole alternatives.\"[35] Surely, it is those who identify determinism\nwith fatalism that \"confound issues.\" And a similar confusion lurks\nbehind the main argument which has been adduced in support of\nfree-will. It is said that \"I ought\" implies \"I can,\" and that men are\nnot accountable for what they cannot avoid. This is perfectly true if\nby \"cannot\" is meant compulsion, and by \"can\" freedom from compulsion.\nBut it is certainly not true if \"I can\" is intended to mean that \"I\"\nam a first cause, not determined by anything else.\n\n[Footnote 33: Hamilton, _Lectures on Metaphysics_, ii. 410 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 34: Mansel, _Prolegomena Logica_, p. 329 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 35: Laurie, _Ethica_, pp. 307, 319.]\n\nWhen a person's will is believed to be constrained by a power outside\nhim, he can obviously not be held responsible for what he does under\nthe influence of such constraint. We are responsible only for that\nwhich is due to our will. A licentious man who has grown up in a\ncorrupt society is less blamable than an equally licentious man who\nhas always lived under conditions favourable to virtue; and if we hear\nof a criminal that he was kidnapped as a child by a band of\npickpockets and trained to their profession, we {325} no doubt look\nupon him with some indulgence. In these cases, however, it may be said\nthat, though the person's conduct is largely due to the influence of\nexternal circumstances upon his will, this influence was not\nirresistible, that he might have saved himself with an effort of will,\nand that consequently he is not wholly irresponsible. But in the case\nof a restraining destiny no escape is possible; the compulsion is\ncomplete. Hence the logical outcome of radical fatalism is a denial of\nall moral imputability, and a repudiation of all moral judgment.[36]\n\n[Footnote 36: Of the inhabitants of North-Eastern Africa, Munzinger\nobserves (_Ostafrikanische Studien_, p. 66):--\"Seien sie Christen,\nHeiden, odor Mohammedaner, schreiben sie Leben und Tod, Gl\u00fcck und\nUngl\u00fcck, Tugend und Verbrechen der unmittelbaren Hand Gottes zu. Mit\ndieser blinder Nothwendigkeit entschuldigt sich der Misseth\u00e4ter,\ntr\u00f6stet sich der Ungl\u00fcckliche.\" _Cf._ also Doughty, _Arabia Deserta_,\ni. 155, on the Bedouins. However, men are not philosophers in the\nordinary practice of life, hence the fatalist is generally as ready as\nanybody else to judge on his neighbour's conduct. According to various\nancient writers, the power of destiny is limited so as not to exclude\npersonal responsibility (see Schmidt, _Ethik der alten Griechen_, i.\n59 _sq._).]\n\nNot so with determinism. Whilst fatalism presupposes the existence of\na person who is constrained by an outward power, determinism regards\nthe person himself as in every respect a product of causes. It does\nnot assume any part of his will to have existed previous to his\nformation by these causes; his will is not constrained by them, it is\nmade by them. When we say of a person that he is influenced by\nexternal circumstances or subdued by fate, we regard _him_ as existing\nindependently of that which influences or subdues him, we attribute to\nhim an innate character which is acted upon from the outside. He would\nhave been different if he had grown up under different conditions of\nlife, or if fate had left him alone. But it would be absolutely\nmeaningless to say that he would be different if the causes to which\nhe owes his existence had been different; for instance, if he were the\noffspring of different parents. This shows that we distinguish between\nthe original self of a person and the self which is partly innate and\npartly the product of external circumstances. His innate character\nbelongs to his original {326} self; and, strictly speaking, it is on\nthe innate character only that the scrutinising moral judge, so far as\npossible, passes his judgment, carefully considering the degree of\npressure to which it has been exposed both from the non-voluntary part\nof the individual himself and from the outside world.[37] According to\nthe fatalist, the innate character is _compelled_; hence personal\nresponsibility is out of the question. According to the determinist\nthe innate character is _caused_; but this has nothing whatever to do\nwith the question of responsibility. The moral emotions are no more\nconcerned with the origin of the innate character than the aesthetic\nemotions are concerned with the origin of the beautiful object. In\ntheir capacity of retributive emotions, the moral emotions are\nessentially directed towards sensitive and volitional entities\nconceived, not as uncaused themselves, but only as causes of pleasure\nor pain.\n\n[Footnote 37: That the proper subject of moral judgment is the innate\ncharacter was emphasised by Schopenhauer in his prize-essays on _Die\nFreiheit des Willens_ (_S\u00e4mmtliche Werke_, vii. 83 _sqq._) and _Die\nGrundlage der Moral_ (_ibid._ vii. 273 _sqq._). The innate character,\nhe says, that real core of the whole man, contains the germ of all his\nvirtues and vices. And though Schopenhauer be mistaken in his\nstatement that a person's character always remains the same, it seems\nto me indisputable that the succeeding changes to which it may be\nsubject are imputable to _him_ only in so far as they are caused by\nhis innate character.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIV\n\nPRELIMINARY REMARKS--HOMICIDE IN GENERAL\n\n\nWE have discussed the general nature of those phenomena which have a\ntendency to evoke moral blame or moral praise. We have seen that moral\njudgments are passed on conduct and character, and we have seen why\nthis is the case. It now remains for us to examine the particular\nmodes of conduct which are subject to moral valuation, and to consider\nhow these modes of conduct are judged of by different peoples and in\ndifferent ages.\n\nIf carried out in every detail such an investigation could never come\nto an end. Among other things, it would have to take into account all\ncustoms existing among the various races of men, since every custom\nconstitutes a moral rule. And the impossibility of any such\nundertaking becomes apparent when we consider the extent to which the\nconduct of man, and especially of savage man, is hampered by custom.\nAmong the Wanika, for instance, \"if a man dares to improve the style\nof his hut, to make a larger doorway than is customary; if he should\nwear a finer or different style of dress to that of his fellows, he is\ninstantly fined.\"[1] If, during the performance of a ceremony, the\nancestors of an Australian native were in the habit of painting a\nwhite line across the forehead, their descendant must do the same.[2]\nDr. Nansen's statement with reference to the Greenlanders, {328} that\ntheir communities had originally customs and fixed rules for every\npossible circumstance,[3] is essentially true of many, if not all, of\nthe lower races.\n\n[Footnote 1: New, _Life, Wanderings, and Labours in Eastern Africa_,\np. 110.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Spencer and Gillen, _Native Tribes of Central Australia_,\np. 11.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Nansen, _Eskimo Life_, p. 104.]\n\nIt is necessary, then, that we should restrict ourselves to the more\nimportant modes of conduct with which the moral consciousness of\nmankind is concerned. These modes of conduct may be conveniently\ndivided into six groups. The first group includes such acts,\nforbearances, and omissions as directly concern the interests of other\nmen, their life or bodily integrity, their freedom, honour, property,\nand so forth. The second includes such acts, forbearances, and\nomissions as chiefly concern a man's own welfare, such as suicide,\ntemperance, asceticism. The third group, which partly coincides with,\nbut partly differs from, both the first and the second, refers to the\nsexual relations of men. The fourth includes their conduct towards the\nlower animals; the fifth, their conduct towards dead persons; the\nsixth, their conduct towards beings, real or imaginary, that they\nregard as supernatural. We shall examine each of these groups\nseparately, in the above order. And, not being content with a mere\ndescription of facts, we shall try to discover the principle which\nlies at the bottom of the moral judgment in each particular case.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIt is commonly maintained that the most sacred duty which we owe our\nfellow-creatures is to respect their lives. I venture to believe that\nthis holds good not only among civilised nations, but among the lower\nraces as well; and that, if a savage recognises that he has any moral\nobligations at all to his neighbours, he considers the taking of their\nlives to be a greater wrong than any other kind of injury inflicted\nupon them.\n\nAmong various uncivilised peoples, however, human life is said to be\nheld very cheap.\n\nThe Australian Dieyerie, we are told, would for a mere trifle kill\ntheir dearest friend.[4] In Fiji there is an \"utter disregard of {329}\nthe value of human life.\"[5] A Masai will murder his friend or\nneighbour in a fight over a herd of captured cattle, and \"live not a\nwhit the less merrily afterwards.\"[6] Among the Bachapins, a Bechuana\ntribe, murder \"excites little sensation, excepting in the family of\nthe person who has been murdered; and brings, it is said, no disgrace\nupon him who has committed it; nor uneasiness, excepting the fear of\ntheir revenge.\"[7] The Or\u00e1ons of Bengal \"are ready to take life on\nvery slight provocation,\" and Colonel Dalton doubts whether they see\nany moral guilt in it.[8] Some of the Himalayan mountaineers are\nreported to put men to death merely for the satisfaction of seeing the\nblood flow and of marking the last struggles of the victim.[9] Among\nthe Pathans, on the north-western frontier of the Punjab, \"there is\nhardly a man whose hands are unstained,\" and each person \"counts up\nhis murders.\"[10]\n\n[Footnote 4: Gason, 'Manners and Customs of the Dieyerie Tribe,' in\nWoods, _Native Tribes of South Australia_, p. 258.]\n\n[Footnote 5: Williams and Calvert, _Fiji and the Fijians_, p. 115.]\n\n[Footnote 6: Johnston, _Kilima-njaro Expedition_, p. 419.]\n\n[Footnote 7: Burchell, _Travels in the Interior of Southern Africa_,\nii. 554.]\n\n[Footnote 8: Dalton, _Descriptive Ethnology of Bengal_, p. 256.]\n\n[Footnote 9: Fraser, _Journal of a Tour through the Him[=a]l[=a]\nMountains_, p. 267.]\n\n[Footnote 10: Temple, quoted by Spencer, _Principles of Ethics_, i.\n343. For other instances of the indifference of savages to human life,\nsee Egede, _Description of Greenland_, p. 123; Cranz, _History of\nGreenland_, i. 177; Holm, 'Ethnologisk Skizze af Angmagsalikerne,' in\n_Meddeleser om Gr\u00f6nland_, x. 87, 179 _sq._; Coxe, _Russian Discoveries\nbetween Asia and America_, p. 257 (Aleuts of Unalaska);\nKrasheninnikoff, _History of Kamtschatka_, p. 204; Steller,\n_Beschreibung von dem Lande Kamtschatka_, p. 294; Boyle, _Adventures\namong the Dyaks of Borneo_, p. 116 (Malays); Powell, _Wanderings in a\nWild Country_, p. 262 (aborigines of New Britain); Scaramucci and\nGiglioli, 'Notizie sui Danakil,' in _Archivio per antropologia e la\netnologia_, xiv. 26; Wilson and Felkin, _Uganda_, ii. 310 (Gowane);\nSchweinfurth, _Heart of Africa_, i. 286 (Bongo); Arnot, _Garenganze_,\np. 71 (Barotse); Tuckey, _Expedition to Explore the River Zaire_, p.\n383 (Congo natives); Waul, _Five Years with the Congo Cannibals_, p.\n105 (Bolobo).]\n\nOn the other hand, there are uncivilised peoples among whom homicide\nor murder is said to be hardly known.\n\nAmong the Omahas, \"before liquor was introduced there were no\nmurders, even when men quarrelled.\"[11] Captain Lyon could learn of no\ninstances of manslaughter having ever occurred among the Eskimo of\nIgloolik.[12] In Tutuila, of the Samoa group, according to Brenchley,\nthere had been but one case of assassination in the course of twenty\nyears.[13] The Veddahs of Ceylon know of manslaughter only as a\npunishment.[14] {330} The Bedouin of the Euphrates, says Mr. Blunt, \"is\nessentially humane, and never takes life needlessly. If he has killed\na man in war he rather conceals the fact than proclaims it aloud,\nwhile murder or even homicide is almost unknown among the tribes.\"[15]\nAmong the Bakwiri, in Cameroon, Zoller never heard of any person\nhaving killed a member of his own community.[16] Murders, says\nCailli\u00e9, \"are rare among the Bambaras, and never committed by the\nMandingoes.\"[17] Among the Wanika \"wilful cold-blooded murders are\nalmost unknown.\"[18] Among the Basutos perfect safety is enjoyed \"on\nroads where the traveller might have been robbed a hundred times over\nwithout the least hope of aid, and in houses where the doors and\nwindows have neither bolts nor bars,\" and cases of murder are very\nrare.[19]\n\n[Footnote 11: Dorsey, 'Omaha Sociology,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._\niii. 369.]\n\n[Footnote 12: Lyon, _Private Journal_, p. 350.]\n\n[Footnote 13: Brenchley, _Jottings during the Cruise of H.M.S.\n\"Cura\u00e7oa\" among the South Sea Islands_, p. 58.]\n\n[Footnote 14: Sarasin, _Ergebnisse naturwissenschaftlicher Forschungen\nauf Ceylon_, iii. 539. _Cf._ Tennent, _Ceylon_, ii. 444. Hartshorne,\nin _Indian Antiquary_, viii. p. 320.]\n\n[Footnote 15: Blunt, _Bedouin Tribes of the Euphrates_, ii. 203. _Cf._\n_ibid._ ii. 207.]\n\n[Footnote 16: Z\u00f6ller, _Kamerun_, i. 188.]\n\n[Footnote 17: Cailli\u00e9, _Travels through Central Africa_, i. 353.]\n\n[Footnote 18: New, _op. cit._ p. 98.]\n\n[Footnote 19: Casalis, _Basutos_, p. 301. For other instances, see\nHall, _Arctic Researches_, p. 571 (Eskimo); Dobrizhoffer, _Account of\nthe Abipones_, ii. 148; Turner, _Samoa_, p. 178; Ellis, _Tour through\nHawaii_, p. 429; Brooke, _Ten Years in Sar\u00e1wak_, i. 61 (Sea Dyaks);\nLow, _Sarawak_, p. 133; Marsden, _History of Sumatra_, p. 471 (Poggi\nIslanders); Steller, _De Sangi-Archipel_, p. 26; Riedel, _De sluik- en\nkroesharige rassen tusschen Selebes en Papua_, p. 41 (Ambon and Uliase\nIslanders); von Siebold, _Aino auf der Insel Yesso_, pp. 11, 35;\nMunzinger, _Ostafrikanische Studien_, p. 532 (Barea and Kun\u00e1ma);\nHolub, _Seven Years in South Africa_, ii. 319 (Marutse); Maclean,\n_Compendium of Kafir Laws and Customs_, pp. 61, 143 _sq._; Shooter,\n_Kafirs of Natal_, p. 137.]\n\nIn other instances homicide is expressly said to be regarded as wrong.\n\nThe Greenlanders described by Dr. Nansen hold it atrocious to kill\na fellow-creature, except in some particular cases.[20] The Dacotahs\nsay that it is a great crime to take their fellow's life, unless in\nrevenge, \"because all have a right to live.\"[21] In Tierra del Fuego\nhomicide rarely occurs, as Mr. Bridges remarks, because of an\ninveterate custom according to which human life is held sacred: \"le\nmeurtrier est mis au ban de ses compatriotes; isol\u00e9 de tous, il est\nfatalement condamn\u00e9 \u00e0 p\u00e9rir de faim ou \u00e0 tomber un jour sous les coups\nd'un groupe de justiciers improvis\u00e9s.\"[22] The Andaman Islanders\ncondemn murder as _y[=u]bda_, or sin.[23] The natives of Botany Bay,\nNew {331} South Wales, though a trivial offence in their ideas\njustifies the murder of a man, \"highly reprobate the crime when\ncommitted without what they esteem a just cause.\"[24] According to Mr.\nCurr's experience, the Australian Black undoubtedly feels that murder\nis wrong, and its committal brings remorse; even after the\nperpetration of infanticide or massacres, though both are practised\nwithout disguise, those engaged in them are subject to remorse and low\nspirits for some time.[25]\n\n[Footnote 20: Nansen, _Eskimo Life_, p. 162.]\n\n[Footnote 21: Prescott, in Schoolcraft, _Indian Tribes of the United\nStates_, ii. 195.]\n\n[Footnote 22: Hyades and Deniker, _Mission scientifique du Cap Horn_,\nvii. 374, 243.]\n\n[Footnote 23: Man, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xii. 112.]\n\n[Footnote 24: Barrington, _History of New South Wales_, p. 19. _Cf._\nLumholtz, _Among Cannibals_, p. 126 (natives of Northern\nQueensland).]\n\n[Footnote 25: Curr, _The Australian Race_, i. 100, 43 _sq._ For other\ninstances, see Keating, _Expedition to the Source of St. Peter's\nRiver_, i. 127 (Potawatomis); Harmon, _Journal of Voyages in the\nInterior of North America_, p. 348 (Indians on the east side of the\nRocky Mountains); Hall, _Arctic Researches_, p. 572 (Eskimo); Mariner,\n_Natives of the Tonga Islands_, ii. 162; Macdonald, _Oceania_, p. 208\n(Efatese); Yate, _Account of New Zealand_, p. 145; Arbousset and\nDaumas, _Exploratory Tour to the North-East of the Colony of the Cape\nof Good Hope_, p. 322 (Bechuanas); Fritsch, _Die Eingeborenen\nS\u00fcd-Afrikra's_, p. 322 (Hottentots).]\n\nIt is of particular importance in this connection to note that, in\nearly civilisation, blood-revenge is regarded not as a private matter\nonly, but as a duty, and that, where this custom does not prevail, the\ncommunity punishes the murderer, frequently with death. We may without\nhesitation accept Professor Tylor's statement that \"no known tribe,\nhowever low and ferocious, has ever admitted that men may kill one\nanother indiscriminately.\"[26] In every society--even where human life\nis, generally speaking, held in low estimation--custom prohibits\nhomicide within a certain circle of men. But the radius of the circle\nvaries greatly.\n\n[Footnote 26: Tylor, 'Primitive Society,' in _Contemporary Review_,\nxxi. 714.]\n\nSavages carefully distinguish between an act of homicide committed\nwithin their own community and one where the victim is a stranger.\nWhilst the former is under ordinary circumstances disapproved of, the\nlatter is in most cases allowed, and often regarded as praiseworthy.\nIt is a very common notion in savage ethics that the chief virtue of a\nman is to be successful in war and to slay many enemies.\n\nAmong the K\u00e1firs of the Hindu-Kush \"killing strangers might or\nmight not be considered inexpedient, but it would {332} hardly be\nconsidered a crime\"; killing fellow-tribesmen, on the other hand, is\nlooked upon in a very different light.[27] The Koriaks do not regard\nmurder as a great crime, unless it occur within their own tribe.[28]\nThe early Aleuts considered the killing of a companion a crime worthy\nof death, \"but to kill an enemy was quite another thing.\"[29] To an\nAht Indian the murder of a man is no more than the killing of a dog,\nprovided that the victim is not a member of his own tribe.[30]\nAccording to Humboldt, the natives of Guiana \"detest all who are not\nof their family, or their tribe; and hunt the Indians of a\nneighbouring tribe, who live at war with their own, as we hunt\ngame.\"[31] In the opinion of the Fuegians, \"a stranger and an enemy\nare almost synonymous terms,\" hence they dare not go where they have\nno friends, and where they are unknown, as they would most likely be\ndestroyed.[32] The Australian Black nurtures an intense hatred of every\nmale at least of his own race who is a stranger to him, and would\nnever neglect to assassinate such a person at the earliest moment that\nhe could do so without risk to himself.[33] In Melanesia, also, a\nstranger as such was generally throughout the islands an enemy to be\nkilled.[34]\n\n[Footnote 27: Scott Robertson, _K\u00e1firs of the Hindu-Kush_, p. 194.]\n\n[Footnote 28: Krasheninnikoff, _op. cit._ p. 232.]\n\n[Footnote 29: Veniaminof, quoted by Petroff, 'Report on Alaska,' in\n_Tenth Census of the Untied States_, p. 155.]\n\n[Footnote 30: Sproat, _Scenes and Studies of Savage Life_, p. 152.]\n\n[Footnote 31: von Humboldt, _Personal Narrative of Travels_, v. 422.]\n\n[Footnote 32: Stirling, in _South Ammerican Missionary Magazine_, iv.\n11. Bridges, in _A Voice for South America_, xiii. 210.]\n\n[Footnote 33: Curr, _The Australian Race_, i. 64, 85 _sq._ Mathew, in\n_Jour. & Proceed. Roy. Soc. N. S. Wales_, xviii. 398.]\n\n[Footnote 34: Codrington, _Melanesians_, p. 345.]\n\nIn Savage Island the slaying of a member of another tribe--that is,\na potential enemy--\"was a virtue rather than a crime.\"[35] To a young\nSamoan it was the realisation of his highest ambition to be publicly\nthanked by the chiefs for killing a foe in mortal combat.[36]\n\"According to Fijian beliefs, men who have not slain any enemy are, in\nthe other world, compelled to beat dirt with their clubs--the most\ndegrading punishment the native mind can conceive--because they used\ntheir club to so little purpose;[37] and in Futuna it was deemed no\nless necessary to have poured out blood on the field of battle in\norder to hold a part in the happy future life.[38] In the Western\nislands of Torres Straits \"it was a meritorious deed to kill\nforeigners either in fair fight {333} or by treachery, and honour and\nglory were attached to the bringing home of the skulls of the\ninhabitants of other islands slain in battle.\"[39] In the Solomon\nIslands,[40] New Guinea,[41] and various parts of the Malay\nArchipelago, he who has collected the greatest number of human heads\nis honoured by his tribe as the bravest man; and some peoples do not\nallow a man to marry until he has cut off at least one human head.[42]\nAmong many of the North American Indians, again, he who can boast of\nthe greatest number of scalps is the person most highly esteemed.[43]\nAmong the Seri Indians the highest virtue \"is the shedding of alien\nblood; and their normal impulse on meeting an alien is to kill, unless\ndeterred by fear.\"[44] Among the Chukchi \"it is held criminal to\nthieve or murder in the family or race to which a person belongs; but\nthese crimes committed elsewhere are not only permitted, but held\nhonourable and glorious.\"[45] So, too, the Gallas consider it\nhonourable to kill an alien, though criminal to kill a countryman.[46]\n\n[Footnote 35: Thomson, _Savage Island_, p. 104. See also _ibid._ p. 94.]\n\n[Footnote 36: Pritchard, _Polynesian Reminiscences_, p. 57.]\n\n[Footnote 37: Seemann, _Viti_, p. 401. _Cf._ Williams and Calvert,\n_op. cit._ p. 97 _sq._; Erskine, _Islands of the Western Pacific_,\np. 248.]\n\n[Footnote 38: Smith, in _Jour. Polynesian Society_, i. 39.]\n\n[Footnote 39: Haddon, in _Reports of the Cambridge Anthropological\nExpedition to Torres Straits_, v. 277.]\n\n[Footnote 40: Romilly, _Western Pacific_, p. 73. Penny, _Ten Years in\nMelanesia_, p. 46. Codrington, _op. cit._ p. 345.]\n\n[Footnote 41: Romilly, _Western Pacific_, p. 76.]\n\n[Footnote 42: Bock, _Head-Hunters of Borneo_, pp. 216, 221, &c.\n(Dyaks). Bickmore, _Travels in the East Indian Archipelago_, p. 205\n(Alfura of Ceram). Dalton, _op. cit._ p. 40 (Nagas of Upper Assam).]\n\n[Footnote 43: The well-known practice of scalping, though very common,\nwas not universal among the North American Indians (see Gibbs, 'Tribes\nof Western Washington and Northwestern Oregon,' in _Contributions to\nN. American Ethnology_, i. 192; Powers, _Tribes of California_, p. 321).]\n\n[Footnote 44: McGee, 'Seri Indians,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethnol._\nxvii. 132.]\n\n[Footnote 45: Georgi, _Russia_, iii. 183.]\n\n[Footnote 46: Macdonald, _Africana_, i. 229. For other instances, see\nHarmon, _op. cit._ p. 301 (Tacullies); Burton, _City of the Saints_,\np. 139 (Dacotahs); Macpherson, _Memorials of Service in India_, p.\n94 (Kandhs); MacMahon, _Far Cathay_, p. 262 (Indo-Burmese border\ntribes); Macdonald, _Africana_, i. 194 _sq._ (Eastern Central\nAfricans); Johnston, _Kilima-njaro Expedition_, p. 419 (Masai).]\n\nAt the same time there are, among the lower races, various instances\nin which the rule, \"Thou shalt not kill,\" applies even to foreigners.\nHospitality, as will be seen in a subsequent chapter, is a stringent\nduty in the savage world. Custom requires that the host should\nentertain and protect a stranger who comes as his guest, and by\nkilling him the host would perpetrate an outrage hardly possible.\nMoreover, even in the case of intertribal relations, we must not\nconclude that what is allowed in war is also allowed in times of\npeace. The prohibition of homicide may extend beyond the tribal\nborder, to {334} members of different tribes who for some reason or\nother are on friendly terms with each other.[47] We must not suppose\nthat a tribe of savages generally either lives in a state of complete\nisolation, or is always at odds with its neighbours. In Australia, for\ninstance, one tribe of natives, as a rule, entertains amicable\nrelations with one, two, or more other tribes.[48] Among the Central\nAustralian natives, say Messrs. Spencer and Gillen, \"there is no such\nthing as one tribe being in a constant state of enmity with another\";\non the contrary, where two tribes come into contact with one another\non the border land of their respective territories, friendly feelings\nare maintained between the members of the two.[49] Some uncivilised\npeoples are even said to have no wars. The Veddahs of Ceylon never\nmake war upon each other.[50] According to the reports of the oldest\ninhabitants of Umnak and Unalaska, the people there had never been\nengaged in war either among themselves or with their neighbours,\nexcept once with the natives of Alaska.[51] To the Greenlanders\ndescribed by Dr. Nansen war is \"incomprehensible and repulsive, a\nthing for which their language has no word.\"[52]\n\n[Footnote 47: See, _e.g._, Scott Robertson, _op. cit._ p. 194 (K\u00e1firs\nof the Hindu-Kush).]\n\n[Footnote 48: Curr, _The Australian Race_, i. 62 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 49: Spencer and Gillen, _Native Tribes of Central\nAustralia_, p. 32.]\n\n[Footnote 50: Sarasin, _op. cit._ iii. 488.]\n\n[Footnote 51: Coxe, _op. cit._ p. 244.]\n\n[Footnote 52: Nansen, _Eskimo Life_, p. 162.]\n\nThat savages to some extent recognise the existence of intertribal\nrights in times of peace is obvious from certain customs connected\nwith their wars. Some South Sea Islanders and North American Indians\nconsider it necessary for a party which is about to attack another to\ngive notice beforehand of their intention, in order that their\nopponents may be prepared to meet them.[53] The cessation of\nhostilities is often accompanied by the conclusion of a special treaty\nand by ceremonies calculated to make it binding.[54] The Tahitians,\nfor instance, wove a wreath of {335} green boughs furnished by each\nside, exchanged two young dogs, and, having also made a band of cloth\ntogether, offered the wreath and the band to the gods with\nimprecations on the side which should first violate so solemn a treaty\nof peace.[55] Nor does savage custom always allow indiscriminate\nslaughter even in warfare. The inviolability of heralds is not\ninfrequently recognised.[56] Among the aborigines of New South Wales\nthe tribal messenger known to be a herald by the red net which he\nwears round his forehead, passes in safety between and through hostile\ntribes;[57] and among the North American Omahas \"the bearer of a peace\npipe was generally respected by the enemy, just as the bearer of a\nflag of truce is regarded by the laws of war among the so-called\ncivilised nations.\"[58] And many uncivilised races have made it a rule\nin war to spare the weak and helpless.\n\n[Footnote 53: Hale, _U.S. Exploring Expedition. Vol. VI. Ethnography\nand Philology_, p. 72 (Micronesians). Gibbs, _loc. cit._ p. 190\n(Indians of Western Washington and North-Western Oregon).]\n\n[Footnote 54: See Farrer, _Military Manners and Customs_, p. 162 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 55: Ellis, _Polynesian Researches_, i. 318.]\n\n[Footnote 56: See Farrer, _Militarv Manners and Customs_, p. 161.]\n\n[Footnote 57: Fraser, _Aborigines of New South Wales_, p. 41.]\n\n[Footnote 58: Dorsey, 'Omaha Sociology,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._\niii. 368.]\n\nThe Samoans considered it cowardly to kill a woman;[59] and even in\nFiji the \"enlightened party\" objected to the killing of women, urging\nthat it is \"just as cowardly to kill a woman as a baby.\"[60] The\nAbipones, in their wars, \"generally spared the unwarlike, and carried\naway innocent boys and girls unhurt.\"[61] An old Spanish writer tells\nus of the Guanches of Gran Canaria that, \"in their wars, they held it\nas base and mean to molest or injure the women and children of the enemy,\nconsidering them as weak and helpless, therefore improper objects of\ntheir resentment\";[62] and similar views prevail among the Berbers\n(Shlu[h.]) of Southern Morocco, as also among the Algerian Kabyles[63]\nand the Touareg.[64] Though the Masai and Wa-kikuyu \"are eternally at\nwar to the knife with each other, there is a compact between them not\nto molest the womenfolk of either party.\"[65] \"The Masai,\" says Mr.\nHinde, \"never interfere with women in their raids, and the women cheer\n{336} loudly and encourage their relatives during the fight.\"[66]\nAmong the Latukas, though women are employed as spies and thus become\nexceedingly dangerous in war, there is nevertheless a general\nunderstanding that no woman shall be killed.[67] The Basutos maintain\nthat respect should be paid during war to women, children, and\ntravellers, as also that those who surrender should be spared and open\nto ransom; and, though these rules are not invariably respected, the\npublic voice always disapproves of their violation.[68]\n\n[Footnote 59: Turner, _Nineteen Years in Polynesia_, p. 304.]\n\n[Footnote 60: Seemann, _Viti_, p. 180.]\n\n[Footnote 61: Dobrizhoffer, _op. cit._ ii. 141.]\n\n[Footnote 62: Abreu de Galindo, _History of the Discovery and Conquest\nof the Canary Islands_, p. 66.]\n\n[Footnote 63: Hanoteau and Letourneux, _La Kabylie_, ii. 76.]\n\n[Footnote 64: Hourst, _Sur le Niger et au pays des Touaregs_,\np. 223 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 65: Thomson, _Through Masai Land_, p. 177.]\n\n[Footnote 66: Hinde, _The Last of the Masai_, p. 6, n.*]\n\n[Footnote 67: Baker, _Albert N'yanza_, i. 355.]\n\n[Footnote 68: Casalis, _op. cit._ p. 223 _sq._ For regard paid to\nwomen, old people, and children in war, see also Richardson, _Arctic\nSearching Expedition_, i. 367 (Western Eskimo); Catlin, _North\nAmerican Indians_, ii. 240; Azara, _Voyages_, ii. 145 (Payaguas).]\n\nSometimes custom even requires that the life of the captive shall be\nspared.\n\nIt is against Masai tradition to kill prisoners of war.[69] Among\nthe Kabyles \"il faut que l'exasp\u00e9ration des partis soit extr\u00eame pour\nqu'un bless\u00e9 ou un prisonnier soit mis \u00e0 mort.\"[70] The Touareg do not\nkill their prisoners after a fight.[71] Among the Bedouins of the\nEuphrates \"the person of the enemy is sacred when disarmed or\ndismounted; and prisoners are neither enslaved nor held to other\nransom than their mares.\"[72] \"Captives,\" says Mr. Dorsey, \"were not\nslain by the Omahas and Ponkas. When peace was declared the captives\nwere sent home, if they wished to go. If not they could remain where\nthey were, and were treated as if they were members of the tribe.\"[73]\nAmong the Wyandots prisoners of war were frequently adopted into the\ntribe. \"The warrior taking the prisoner has the first right to adopt\nhim. If no one claims the prisoner for this purpose, he is caused to\nrun the gauntlet as a test of his courage. If at his trial he behaves\nmanfully claimants are not wanting, but if he behaves disgracefully he\nis put to death.\"[74]\n\n[Footnote 69: Hinde, _op. cit._ p. 64.]\n\n[Footnote 70: Hanoteau and Letourneux, _op. cit._ 75.]\n\n[Footnote 71: Hourst, _op. cit._ p. 207.]\n\n[Footnote 72: Blunt, _op. cit._ ii. 239.]\n\n[Footnote 73: Dorsey, 'Omaha Sociology,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._\niii. 332.]\n\n[Footnote 74: Powell, _ibid._ i. 68.]\n\nThus we notice even among uncivilised races very obvious traces of\nwhat is called \"international law,\"[75] if not as a rule, at least as\nan exception. On the other hand, the {337} readiness with which war is\nengaged in, not only in self-defence or out of revenge, but for the\nsake of gain, indicates how little regard is paid to human life\noutside the tribe. The Kandhs, for instance, maintain \"that a state of\nwar may be lawfully presumed against all tribes and nations with whom\nno express agreement to the contrary exists.\"[76] And if a few savage\npeoples live in perpetual peace, it seems that the chief reason for\nthis is not a higher standard of morality, but the absence of all\ninducements to war.\n\n[Footnote 75: See also Wheeler, _The Tribe, and Intertribal Relations\nin Australia_, _passim_.]\n\n[Footnote 76: Hunter, _Annals of Rural Bengal_, iii. 75.]\n\nWhen we from the lower races pass to peoples more advanced in culture,\nwe find that the social unit has grown larger, that the nation has\ntaken the place of the tribe, and that the circle within which\nhomicide is prohibited as a crime of the first order has been extended\naccordingly. But the old distinction between injuries committed\nagainst compatriots and harm done to foreigners remains. Even when the\nsubject is not touched upon in the laws referring to homicide we may,\nfrom the general attitude of the people towards members of other\nnations, infer that public opinion is not very scrupulous as to the\ntaking of their lives. How the Chinese looked upon the \"red-haired\nbarbarians,\" the \"foreign devils,\" is well known from recent history.\nIn former days, Japan's attitude towards her neighbours and the whole\nworld was that of an enemy and not of a friend.[77] The Vedic hymns\nare full of imprecations of misfortune upon men of another race.[78]\nThat among the ancient Teutons the lot of a stranger was not an\nenviable one is testified even by language; the German word _elender_\nhas acquired its present meaning from the connotation of the older\nword which meant an \"outlandish\" man.[79] The stranger as such--unless\nhe belonged to a friendly, neighbouring tribe--had originally no legal\nrights at all; for his protection he was dependent on individual {338}\nhospitality, and hospitality was restricted by custom to three days\nonly.[80] According to the Swedish Westg\u00f6ta-Lag, he who killed a\nforeigner had to pay no compensation to the dead man's relatives, nor\nwas he outlawed, nor exiled.[81] The Laws of King Ine let us\nunderstand in what light a stranger was looked upon:--\"If a far-coming\nman, or a stranger, journey through a wood out of the highway, and\nneither shout nor blow his horn, he is to be held for a thief, either\nto be slain or redeemed.\"[82] However, as commerce increased and the\nstranger was more often seen in Teutonic lands, royal protection was\nextended to him; and a consequence of this was that thenceforth he who\nkilled the stranger had to pay a _wergeld_, part, or the whole, of\nwhich went to the king.[83] In Greece, in early times, the\n\"contemptible stranger\"[84] had no legal rights, and was protected\nonly in case he was the guest of a citizen;[85] and even later on, at\nAthens, whilst the intentional killing of a citizen was punished with\ndeath and confiscation of the murderer's property, the intentional\nkilling of a non-citizen was punished only with exile.[86] The Latin\nword _hostis_ was originally used to denote a foreigner;[87] and the\nsaying of Plautus, that a man is a wolf to a man whom he does not\nknow,[88] was probably an echo of an old Roman proverb. Mommsen\nsuggests that in ancient days the Romans did not punish the killing of\na foreigner, unless he belonged to an allied nation; but already in\nthe prehistoric period a change was introduced, the foreigner being\nplaced under the protection of the State.[89]\n\n[Footnote 77: Griffis, _Religions of Japan_, p. 129.]\n\n[Footnote 78: Roth, 'On the Morality of the Veda,' in _Jour. American\nOriental Society_, iii. 338.]\n\n[Footnote 79: _Cf._ Grimm, _Deutsche Rechtsalterth\u00fcmer_, p. 396;\nGummere, _Germanic Origins_, p. 288.]\n\n[Footnote 80: Grimm, _op. cit._ p. 397 _sqq._ Brunner, _Deutsche\nRechtgeschichte_, i. 273.]\n\n[Footnote 81: _Westg\u00f6ta-Lagen I._ Af mandrapi, v. 4 p. 13.]\n\n[Footnote 82: _Laws of Ine_, 20. _Cf._ _Laws of Wihtr\u00e6d_, 28.]\n\n[Footnote 83: Brunner, _op. cit._ i. 273 _sq._ Gummere, _op. cit._ p.\n288. Pollock and Maitland, _History of English Law before the Time of\nEdward I._ i. 52.]\n\n[Footnote 84: _Iliad_, ix. 648.]\n\n[Footnote 85: Hermann-Bl\u00fcmner, _Lehrsb\u00fcch der griechischen\nPrivatalterth\u00fcmer_, p. 492. Schmidt, _Ethik der alten Griechen_, ii. 325.]\n\n[Footnote 86: Meier and Sch\u00f6mann, _Der altische Process_, p. 379.]\n\n[Footnote 87: Cicero, _De officiis_, i. 12.]\n\n[Footnote 88: Plautus, _Asinaria_, ii. 4. 88.]\n\n[Footnote 89: Mommsen, _R\u00f6misches Strafrecht_, p. 622 _sqq._]\n\nHow little regard is felt for the lives of strangers also appears from\nthe readiness with which war is waged on {339} foreign nations,\ncombined with the estimation in which the successful warrior is held\nby his countrymen. The ancient Mexicans were never at a loss for an\nexcuse to pick a quarrel with their neighbours, so as to be able to\nprocure victims for sacrifices to their gods.[90] \"No profession was\nheld in more esteem amongst them than the profession of arms. The\ndeity of war was the most revered by them, and regarded as the chief\nprotector of the nation.\"[91] The Mayas not only wanted to increase\ntheir dominions by encroachments upon their neighbours' territory, but\nundertook raids with no other object than that of obtaining captives\nfor sacrifice.[92] Speaking of the wars of the ancient Egyptians, M.\nAm\u00e9lineau observes, \"Nous n'avons pas un seul mot dans la litt\u00e9rature\n\u00e9gyptienne, m\u00eame dans les [oe]uvres \u00e9gypto-chr\u00e9tiennes, qui nous fasse\nentendre le plus l\u00e9ger cri de r\u00e9probation pour la guerre et ses\nhorreurs.\"[93] Among the Hebrews the most cruel wars of extermination\nwere expressly sanctioned by their religion. That an idolatrous people\nhad no right to live was taken as a matter of course; but wars were\nalso unscrupulously waged from worldly motives, and in their moral\ncode there is no attempt to distinguish between just and unjust\nwar.[94] Among the Mohammedans it is likewise the unbeliever, not the\nforeigner as such, that is regarded as the most proper object of\nslaughter. Although there is no precept in the Koran which, taken with\nthe context, justifies unprovoked war,[95] the saying that \"Paradise\nis under the shadow of swords\"[96] is popularly applied to all warfare\nagainst infidels. Among the Celts[97] and Teutons a man's highest\naspiration was to acquire military glory. The Scandinavians considered\nit a disgrace for a man to die {340} without having seen human blood\nflow;[98] even the slaying of a tribesman they often regarded lightly\nwhen it had been done openly and bravely. In Greece, in ancient times\nat least, war was the normal relation between different states, and\npeace an exception, for which a special treaty was required;[99] while\nto conquer and enslave barbarians was regarded as a right given to the\nGreeks by Nature. The whole statecraft of the early Republic of Rome\nwas no doubt based upon similar principles;[100] and in later days,\nalso, the war policy of the Romans was certainly not conducted with\nthat conscientiousness which was insisted upon by some of their writers.\n\n[Footnote 90: Bancroft, _Native Races of the Pacific States_, ii. 420.\nClavigero, _History of Mexico_, i. 371.]\n\n[Footnote 91: Clavigero, _op. cit._ i. 363.]\n\n[Footnote 92: Bancroft, _op. cit._ ii. 740, 745.]\n\n[Footnote 93: Am\u00e9lineau, _L'\u00e9volution des id\u00e9es morales dans l'\u00c9gypte\nancienne_, p. 344.]\n\n[Footnote 94: _Cf._ Seldeft, _De Synedriis et Pr\u00e6fecturis Juridicis\nveterum Ebr\u00e6orum_, iii. 12, p. 1179 _sqq._; Lament, _\u00c9tudes sur\nl'histoire de l'humanit\u00e9_, i. 384 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 95: This was later on admitted by Lane (_Modern Egyptians_,\np. 574), who had previously maintained that the duty of waging holy\nwar is strongly urged in the Koran.]\n\n[Footnote 96: Pool, _Studies in Mohammedanism_, p. 246.]\n\n[Footnote 97: Logan, _The Scottish Gael_, i. 101. de Valroger, _Les\nCeltes_, p. 186.]\n\n[Footnote 98: _Nj\u00e1la_, ch. 40, vol. i. 167. Maurer, _Rekehrung des\nNorwegischen Stammes_, ii. 172.]\n\n[Footnote 99: Schmidt, _Ethik der alten Griechen_, ii. 280. Laurent,\n_op. cit._ i. 46. Plato, _Leges_, i. 625. Livy, xxxi. 29: \"Cum\nalienigenis, cum barbaris aeternum omnibus Graecis bellum est.\"]\n\n[Footnote 100: _Cf._ Lecky, _History of European Morals_, ii. 257.]\n\nHowever, the foreigner is not entirely, or under all circumstances,\ndevoid of rights. Among the nations of archaic civilisation, as among\nthe lower races, hospitality is a duty, and the life of a guest is as\nsacred as the life of any of the permanent members of the household.\nIn various cases the commencement of international hostilities is\npreceded by special ceremonies, intended to justify acts which are not\nconsidered proper in times of peace. In ancient Mexico it was usual to\nsend a formal challenge or declaration of war to the enemy, as it was\nheld discreditable to attack a people unprepared for defence;[101]\nand, according to the fecial law of the Romans, no war was just unless\nit was undertaken to reclaim property, or unless it was solemnly\ndenounced and proclaimed beforehand.[102] In some cases warfare is\ncondemned, or a distinction is made between just and unjust war with\nreference to the purpose for which the war is waged. The Chinese\nphilosophers were great advocates of peace.[103] According to\nLao-Tsze, a superior man uses weapons \"only on the compulsion of\nnecessity\";[104] there is no calamity greater {341} than lightly\nengaging in war,[105] and \"he who has killed multitudes of men should\nweep for them with the bitterest grief.\"[106] In the Indian poem,\nMahabharata, needless warfare is condemned; it is said that the\nsuccess which is obtained by negotiations is the best, and that the\nsuccess which is secured by battle is the worst.[107] Among the\nHebrews the sect of the Essenes went so far in their reprobation of\nwar that they would not manufacture any martial instruments\nwhatever.[108] Roman historians, even in the case of wars with\nbarbarians, often discuss the sufficiency or insufficiency of the\nmotives \"with a conscientious severity a modern historian could hardly\nsurpass.\"[109] According to Cicero, a war, to be just, ought to be\nnecessary, the sole object of war being to enable us to live\nundisturbed in peace. There are two modes of settling controversies,\nhe says, one by discussion, the other by a resort to force. The first\nis proper to man, the second is proper to brutes, and ought never to\nbe adopted except where the first is unavailable.[110] Seneca regards\nwar as a \"glorious crime,\" comparable to murder:--\"What is forbidden\nin private life is commanded by public ordinance. Actions which,\ncommitted by stealth, would meet with capital punishment, we praise\nbecause committed by soldiers. Men, by nature the mildest species of\nthe animal race, are not ashamed to find delight in mutual slaughter,\nto wage wars, and to transmit them to be waged by their children, when\neven dumb animals and wild beasts live at peace with one\nanother.\"[111] History attests that the Romans, in their intercourse\nwith other nations, did not act upon Cicero's and Seneca's lofty\ntheories of international morality; as Plutarch observes, the two\nnames \"peace\" and \"war\" are mostly used only as coins, to procure, not\nwhat is just, but what is expedient.[112] Yet there seems to have been\na general {342} feeling in Rome that the waging of a war required some\njustification. In declaring it, the Roman heralds called all the gods\nto witness that the people against whom it was declared had been\nunjust and neglectful of its obligations.[113]\n\n[Footnote 101: Clavigero, _op. cit._ i. 370. Bancroft, _op. cit._\nii. 420, 421, 423.]\n\n[Footnote 102: Cicero, _De officiis_, i. 11.]\n\n[Footnote 103: _Cf._ Lanessan, _Morale des philosophes chinois_,\npp. 54, 107.]\n\n[Footnote 104: _T\u00e1o Teh King_, xxxi. 2.]\n\n[Footnote 105: _Ibid._ lxix. 2.]\n\n[Footnote 106: _Ibid._ xxxi. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 107: _Mahabharata_, Bhisma Parva, iii. 81 (pt. xii. _sq._\np. 6).]\n\n[Footnote 108: Philo, _Quod liber sit quisquis virtuti studet_, p. 877.]\n\n[Footnote 109: Lecky, _History of European Morals_, ii. 258.]\n\n[Footnote 110: Cicero, _De officiis_, i. 11.]\n\n[Footnote 111: Seneca, _Epistul\u00e6_, 95.]\n\n[Footnote 112: Plutarch, _Vita Pyrrhi_, xii. 3, p. 389.]\n\n[Footnote 113: Livy, i. 32.]\n\nEven in war the killing of an enemy is, under certain circumstances,\nprohibited either by custom or by enlightened moral opinion. Among the\nancient Nahuas, who never accepted a ransom for a prisoner of war, the\nperson of an ambassador was at all events held sacred.[114] In the\n'Book of Rewards and Punishments,' which embodies popular Taouism, it\nis said, \"Do not massacre the enemies who yield themselves, nor kill\nthose who offer their submission.\"[115] The Hebrews, whilst being\ncommanded to \"save alive nothing that breatheth\" of the cities which\nthe Lord had given them for an inheritance, were to deal differently\nwith cities which were very far off from them: to kill only the men,\nand to take to themselves the women and the little ones.[116] The Laws\nof Manu lay down very humane rules for a king who fights with his foes\nin battle:--\"Let him not strike with weapons concealed in wood, nor\nwith such as are barbed, poisoned, or the points of which are blazing\nwith fire. Let him not strike one who in flight has climbed on an\neminence, nor a eunuch, nor one who joins the palms of his hands in\nsupplication, nor one who flees with flying hair, nor one who sits\ndown, nor one who says 'I am thine'; nor one who sleeps, nor one who\nhas lost his coat of mail, nor one who is naked, nor one who is\ndisarmed, nor one who looks on without taking part in the fight, nor\none who is fighting with another foe; nor one whose weapons are\nbroken, nor one afflicted with sorrow, nor one who has been grievously\nwounded, nor one who is in fear, nor one who has turned to flight; but\nin all these cases let him remember the duty of honourable\nwarriors.\"[117] The Mahabharata contains expressions of {343} similar\nchivalrous sentiments in regard to enemies. A car-warrior should fight\nonly with a car-warrior, a horse-man with a horse-man, a foot-soldier\nwith a foot-soldier. \"Always being led by consideration of fitness,\nwillingness, bravery, and strength, one should strike another after\nhaving challenged him. None should strike another who is confiding or\nwho is panic-striken. One fighting with another, one seeking refuge,\none retreating, one whose weapon is broken, and one who is not clad in\narmour should never be struck. Charioteers, animals, men engaged in\ncarrying weapons, those who play on drums and those who blow conchs\nshould never be smitten.\"[118] Among the Greeks, in the Homeric age,\nit was evidently regarded as a matter of course that, on the fall of a\ncity, all the men were slain, and the women and children carried off\nas slaves;[119] but in historic times such a treatment of a vanquished\nfoe grew rarer, and seems, under ordinary circumstances, to have been\ndisapproved of.[120] The rulers of this land, says the messenger in\nthe 'Heraclid\u00e6,' do not approve of slaying enemies who have been taken\nalive in battle.[121] In Rome the customs of war underwent a similar\nchange. In ancient days the normal fate of a captive was death, in\nlater times he was generally reduced to slavery; but many thousands of\ncaptives were condemned to the gladiatorial shows, and the vanquished\ngeneral was commonly slain in the Mamertine prison.[122] On the other\nhand, nations or armies that voluntarily submitted to Rome were\nhabitually treated with great leniency. Cicero says:--\"When we obtain\nthe victory we must preserve those enemies who behaved without cruelty\nor inhumanity during the war; for example, our forefathers received,\neven as members of their state, the Tuscans, the Aequi, the Volscians,\nthe Sabines, and the Hernici, but utterly destroyed Carthage and\nNumantia. . . . And, while we {344} are bound to exercise\nconsideration toward those whom we have conquered by force, so those\nshould be received into our protection who throw themselves upon the\nhonour of our general, and lay down their arms, even though the\nbattering rams should have struck their walls.\"[123]\n\n[Footnote 114: Bancroft, _op. cit._ ii. 426, 412.]\n\n[Footnote 115: Douglas, _Confucianism and Taouism_, p. 261.]\n\n[Footnote 116: _Deuteronomy_, xx. 13 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 117: _Laws of Manu_, vii. 90 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 118: _Mahabharata_, Bhisma Parva, i. 27 _sqq._ (pt. xii.\n_sq._ p. 2).]\n\n[Footnote 119: _Iliad_, ix. 593 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 120: Schmidt, _Ethik der alten Griechen_, ii. 281 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 121: Euripides, _Heraclid\u00e6_, 966.]\n\n[Footnote 122: Laurent, _op. cit._ iii. 20 _sq._ Lecky, _History of\nEuropean Morals_, ii. 257.]\n\n[Footnote 123: Cicero, _De officiis_, i. 11.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XV\n\nHOMICIDE IN GENERAL (continued)\n\n\nCHRISTIANITY introduced into Europe a higher regard for human life\nthan was felt anywhere in pagan society. The early Christians\ncondemned homicide of any kind as a heinous sin. And in this, as in\nall other questions of moral concern, the distinction of nationality\nor race was utterly ignored by them.\n\nThe sanctity which they attached to the life of every human being led\nto a total condemnation of warfare, sharply contrasting with the\nprevailing sentiment in the Roman Empire. In accordance with the\ngeneral spirit of their religion, as also with special passages in the\nBible,[1] they considered war unlawful under all circumstances. Justin\nMartyr quotes the prophecy of Isaiah, that \"nation shall not lift up\nsword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more,\"[2] and\nproceeds to say that the instruction in the word of God which was\ngiven by the twelve Apostles \"had so good effect that we, who\nheretofore were continually devouring each other, will not now so much\nas lift up our hand against our enemies.\"[3] Lactantius asserts that\n\"to engage in war cannot be lawful for the righteous man, whose\nwarfare is that of righteousness itself.\"[4] Tertullian asks, \"Can it\nbe lawful to {346} handle the sword, when the Lord Himself has\ndeclared that he who uses the sword shall perish by it?\"[5] And in\nanother passage he states that \"the Lord by his disarming of Peter\ndisarmed every soldier from that time forward.\"[6] Origen calls the\nChristians the children of peace, who, for the sake of Jesus, never\ntake up the sword against any nation; who fight for their monarch by\npraying for him, but who take no part in his wars, even though he urge\nthem.[7] It is true that, even in early times, Christian soldiers were\nnot unknown; Tertullian alludes to Christians who were engaged in\nmilitary pursuits together with their heathen countrymen.[8] But the\nnumber of Christians enrolled in the army seems not to have been very\nconsiderable before the era of Constantine,[9] and, though they were\nnot cut off from the Church, their profession was looked upon as\nhardly compatible with their religion. St. Basil says that soldiers,\nafter their term of military service has expired, are to be excluded\nfrom the sacrament of the communion for three whole years.[10] And\naccording to one of the canons of the Council of Nice, those\nChristians who, having abandoned the profession of arms, afterwards\nreturned to it, \"as dogs to their vomit,\" were for some years to\noccupy in the Church the place of penitents.[11]\n\n[Footnote 1: _St. Matthew_, v. 9, 39, 44. _Romans_, xii. 17.\n_Ephesians_, vi. 12.]\n\n[Footnote 2: _Isaiah_, ii. 4.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Justin Martyr, _Apologia I. pro Christianis_, 39 (Migne,\n_Patrologi\u00e6 cursus_, Ser. Graeca, vi. 387 _sq._).]\n\n[Footnote 4: Lactantius, _Divin\u00e6 institutiones_, vi. ('De vero cultu')\n20 (Migne, _op. cit._ vi. 708).]\n\n[Footnote 5: Tertullian, _De corona_, 11 (Migne, _op. cit._ ii. 92).]\n\n[Footnote 6: Tertullian, _De idolatria_, 19 (Migne, _op. cit._ i. 691).]\n\n[Footnote 7: Origen, _Contra Celsum_, v. 33; viii. 73 (Migne, _op.\ncit._ Ser. Graeca, xi. 1231 _sq._, 1627 _sq._).]\n\n[Footnote 8: Tertullian, _Apologeticus_, 42 (Migne, _op. cit._ i. 491).]\n\n[Footnote 9: Le Blant, _Inscriptions chr\u00e9tiennes de la Gaule_,\ni. 84 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 10: St. Basil, _Epistola CLXXXVIII._, _ad Amphilochium_,\ncan. 13 (Migne, _op. cit._ Ser. Graeca, xxxii. 681 _sq._).]\n\n[Footnote 11: _Concilium Nic\u00e6num_, A.D. 325, can. 12 (Labbe-Mansi,\n_Sacrorum Conciliorum collectio_, ii. 674).]\n\nA divine law which prohibited all resistance to enemies could\ncertainly not be accepted by the State, especially at a time when the\nEmpire was seriously threatened by foreign invaders. Christianity\ncould therefore never become a State-religion unless it gave up its\nattitude towards war. And it gave it up. Already in 314 a Council\ncondemned soldiers who, from religious motives, {347} deserted their\ncolours.[12] The Fathers of the fourth and fifth centuries did not\naltogether disapprove of war. Chrysostom and Ambrose, though seeing\nthe difficulty of reconciling it with the theory of Christian life\nwhich they found in the New Testament, perceived that the use of the\nsword was necessary to preserve the State.[13] St. Augustine went much\nfarther. He tried to prove that the practice of war was quite\ncompatible with the teachings of Christ. The soldiers mentioned in the\nNew Testament, who were seeking for a knowledge of salvation, were not\ndirected by our Lord to throw aside their arms and renounce their\nprofession, but were advised by him to be content with their\nwages.[14] St. Peter baptised Cornelius, the centurion, in the name of\nChrist, without exhorting him to give up the military life,[15] and\nSt. Paul himself took care to have a strong guard of soldiers for his\ndefence.[16] And was not the history of David, the \"man after God's\nown heart,\" an evidence of those being wrong who say that \"no one who\nwages war can please God\"?[17] When Christ declared that \"all they\nthat take the sword shall perish with the sword,\"[18] He referred to\nsuch persons only as arm themselves to shed the blood of others\nwithout either command or permission of any superior or lawful\nauthority.[19] A great deal depends on the causes for which men\nundertake war, and on the authority they have for doing so. Those wars\nare just which are waged with a view to obtaining redress for wrongs,\nor to chastising the undue arrogance of another State. The monarch has\nthe power of making war when he thinks it advisable, and, even if he\nbe a sacrilegious {348} king, a Christian may fight under him,\nprovided that what is enjoined upon the soldier personally is not\ncontrary to the precept of God.[20] In short, though peace is our\nfinal good, though in the City of God there is peace in eternity,[21]\nwar may sometimes be a necessity in this sinful world.\n\n[Footnote 12: _Concilium Arelatense I._ A.D. 314, can. 3 (Labbe-Mansi,\n_op. cit._ ii. 471). _Cf._ Le Blant, _op. cit._ i. p. lxxxii.]\n\n[Footnote 13: Gibb, 'Christian Church and War,' in _British Quarterly\nReview_, lxxiii. 83.]\n\n[Footnote 14: St. Augustine, _Epist. CXXXVIII._, _ad Marcellinum_, 15\n(Migne, _op. cit._ xxxiii. 531 _sq._).]\n\n[Footnote 15: St. Augustine, _Epist. CLXXXIX._, _ad Bonifacium_, 4\n(Migne, _op. cit._ xxxiii. 855).]\n\n[Footnote 16: St. Augustine, _Epistola XLVII._, _ad Publicolam_, 5\n(Migne, _op. cit._ xxxiii. 187).]\n\n[Footnote 17: St. Augustine, _Epist. CLXXXIX._, _ad Bonifacium_, 4\n(Migne, _op. cit._ xxxiii. 855).]\n\n[Footnote 18: _St. Matthew_, xxvi. 52.]\n\n[Footnote 19: St. Augustine, _Contra Faustum Manich\u00e6um_, xxii. 70\n(Migne, _op. cit._ xlii, 444).]\n\n[Footnote 20: St. Augustine, _Contra Faustum Manich\u00e6um_, xxii. 75\n(Migne, _op. cit._ xlii. 448).]\n\n[Footnote 21: St. Augustine, _De civitate Dei_, xix. 11.]\n\nBy the writings of St. Augustine the theoretical attitude of the\nChurch towards war was definitely settled, and later theologians only\nreproduced or further elaborated his views. Yet it was not with a\nperfectly safe conscience that Christianity thus sanctioned the\npractice of war. There was a feeling that a soldier scarcely could\nmake a good Christian. In the middle of the fifth century, Leo the\nPope declared it to be contrary to the rules of the Church that\npersons after the action of penance--that is, persons then considered\nto be pre-eminently bound to obey the law of Christ--should revert to\nthe profession of arms.[22] Various Councils forbade the clergy to\nengage in warfare,[23] and certain canons excluded from ordination all\nwho had served in an army after baptism.[24] Penance was prescribed\nfor those who had shed blood on the battle-field.[25] Thus {349} the\necclesiastical canons made in William the Conqueror's reign by the\nNorman prelates, and confirmed by the Pope, directed that he who was\naware that he had killed a man in a battle should do penance for one\nyear, and that he who had killed several should do a year's penance\nfor each.[26] Occasionally the Church seemed to wake up to the evils\nof war in a more effective way; there are several notorious instances\nof wars being forbidden by popes. But in such cases the prohibition\nwas only too often due to the fact that some particular war was\ndisadvantageous to the interests of the Church. And whilst doing\ncomparatively little to discourage wars which did not interfere with\nher own interests, the Church did all the more to excite war against\nthose who were objects of her hatred.\n\n[Footnote 22: Leo Magnus, _Epistola XC._, _ad Rusticum_, inquis. 12\n(Migne, _op. cit._ liv. 1206 _sq._).]\n\n[Footnote 23: One of the Apostolic Canons requires that any bishop,\npriest, or deacon who devotes himself to military service shall be\ndegraded from his ecclesiastical rank (_Canones ecclesiastici qui\ndicuntur Apostolorum_, 83 [74] [Bunsen, _Analecta Ante-Nic\u00e6na_, ii.\n31]). The Councils of Toulouse, in 633 (ch. 45, in Labbe-Mansi, _op.\ncit._ x. 630), and of Meaux, in 845 (can. 37, _ibid._ xiv. 827),\ncondemned to a similar punishment those of the clergy who ventured to\ntake up arms. Gratian says (_Decretum_, ii. 23. 8. 4) that the Church\nrefuses to pray for the soul of a priest who died on the battle-field.\nNotwithstanding the canons of Councils and the decrees of popes,\necclesiastics frequently participated in battles (Nicolaus I.\n_Epistol\u00e6 et Decreta_, 83 [Migne, _op. cit._ cxix. 922]. Robertson,\n_History of the Reign of Charles V._ i. 330, 385. Ward, _Foundation\nand History of the Law of Nations_, i. 365 _sq._ Buckle, _History of\nCivilisation in England_, i. 204; ii. 464. Bethune-Baker, _Influence\nof Christianity on War_, p. 52. D\u00fcmmler, _Geschichte des\nOstfr\u00e4nkischen Reichs_, ii. 637).]\n\n[Footnote 24: Grotius, _De jure belli et pacis_, i. 2. 10. 10.\nBingham, _Antiquities of the Christian Church_, iv. 4. 1 (_Works_,\nii. 55).]\n\n[Footnote 25: _P[oe]nitentiale Bigotianum_, iv. i. 4 (Wasserschleben,\n_Bussordnungen der abendl\u00e4ndischen Kirche_, p. 453). _P[oe]nit.\nVigilanum_, 27 (_ibid._ p. 529). _P[oe]nit. Pseudo-Theodori_, xxi. 15\n(_ibid._ p. 587 _sq._). _Cf._ _Mort de Garin le Loherain_, p. 213:\n\"Ainz se repent et se claime cheti; Ses pechi\u00e9s plore au soir et au\nmatin, De ce qu'il a tans homes mors et pris.\"]\n\n[Footnote 26: Wilkins, _Concilia Magn\u00e6 Britanni\u00e6 et Hiberni\u00e6_, i. 366.]\n\nIt has been suggested that the transition from the peaceful tenets of\nthe primitive Church to the essentially military Christianity of the\ncrusades, was chiefly due to the terrors and the example of Islam.\n\"The spirit of Muhammedanism,\" says Mr. Lecky, \"slowly passed into\nChristianity, and transformed it into its image.\" Until then, \"war was\nrather condoned than consecrated, and, whatever might be the case with\na few isolated prelates, the Church did nothing to increase or\nencourage it.\"[27] But this view is hardly consistent with facts.\nChristianity had entered on the war-path already before it came into\ncontact with Muhammedanism. Wars against Arian peoples had been\nrepresented as holy wars, for which the combatants would be rewarded\nby Heaven.[28] The war which Chlodwig made upon the Visigoths was not\nonly undertaken with the approval of the clergy, but it was, as Mr.\nGreenwood remarks, \"properly their war, and Chlodwig undertook it in\nthe capacity of a religious champion in all things but the\ndisinterestedness which ought to distinguish that character.\" Remigius\nof Reims assisted him by his countenance and advice, and the {350}\nCatholic priesthood set every engine of their craft in motion to\nsecond and encourage him.[29] In the Church itself there were germs\nout of which a military spirit would naturally develop itself. The\nfamous dictum, \"Nulla salus extra ecclesiam,\" was promulgated as early\nas the days of Cyprian. The general view of medi\u00e6val orthodoxy was,\nthat those beyond the pale of the Church, heathen and heretics alike,\nwere unalterably doomed to hell, whereas those who would acknowledge\nher authority, confess their sins, receive the sacrament of baptism,\npartake of the eucharist and obey the priest, would be infallibly\nsaved. If war was allowed by God, could there be a more proper object\nfor it than the salvation of souls otherwise lost? And for those who\nrefuse to accept the gift of grace offered to them, could there be a\njuster punishment than death? Moreover, had not the Israelites fought\ngreat battles \"for the laws and the sanctuary\"?[30] Had not the Lord\nHimself commissioned them to attack, subdue, and destroy his enemies?\nHad He not commanded them to root out the natives of Canaan, who,\nbecause of their abominations, had fallen under God's judgment, and to\nkill man and beast in the Israelitish cities which had given\nthemselves to idolatry, and to burn all the spoil, with the city\nitself, as a whole offering to Yahveh?[31] There was no need, then,\nfor the Christians to go to the Muhammedans in order to learn the art\nof religious war. The Old Testament, the revelation of God, gave\nbetter lessons in it than the Koran, and was constantly cited in\njustification of any cruelty committed in the name of religion.[32]\n\n[Footnote 27: Lecky, _History of European Morals_, ii. 251 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 28: Gibb, _loc. cit._ p. 86.]\n\n[Footnote 29: Greenwood, _First Book of the History of the Germans_,\np. 518.]\n\n[Footnote 30: _1 Maccabees_, xiii. 3. Thomas Aquinas (_Summa\ntheologica_, ii-ii. 188. 3) quotes this passage in support of the\ndoctrine, that fighting may be directed to the preservation of divine\nworship.]\n\n[Footnote 31: _Deuteronomy_, xiii. 15 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 32: _Cf._ Constant, _De la religion_, ii. 229 _sq._]\n\nIt was thus in perfect consistency with the general teachings of the\nChurch that she regarded an exploit achieved against the infidels as a\nmerit which might obliterate the guilt of the most atrocious crimes.\nSuch a {351} deed was the instrument of pardon to Henry II. for the\nmurder of Becket,[33] and was supposed to be the means of cure to St.\nLouis in a dangerous illness. Fighting against infidels took rank with\nfastings, penitential discipline, visits to shrines, and almsgivings,\nas meriting the divine mercy.[34] He who fell in the battle could be\nconfident that his soul was admitted directly into the joys of\nParadise.[35] And this held good not only of wars against Muhammedans.\nThe massacres of Jews and heretics seemed no less meritorious than the\nslaughter of the more remote enemies of the Gospel. Nay, even a slight\nshade of difference from the liturgy of Rome became at last a\nlegitimate cause of war.\n\n[Footnote 33: Lyttelton, _History of the Life of King Henry the\nSecond_, iii. 96.]\n\n[Footnote 34: _Cf._ Milman, _History of Latin Christianity_, iv. 209.]\n\n[Footnote 35: _Cf._ Laurent, _\u00c9tudes sur l'histoire de l'humanit\u00e9_,\nvii. 257.]\n\nIt is true that these views were not shared by all. At the Council of\nLyons, in 1274, the opinion was pronounced, and of course eagerly\nattacked, that it was contrary to the examples of Christ and the\nApostles to uphold religion with the sword and to shed the blood of\nunbelievers.[36] In the following century, Bonet maintained that,\naccording to Scriptures, a Saracen or any other disbeliever could not\nbe compelled by force to accept the Christian faith.[37] Franciscus a\nVictoria declared that \"diversity of religion is not a cause of just\nwar\";[38] and a similar opinion was expressed by Soto,[39] Covarruvias\na Leyva,[40] and Suarez.[41] According to Balthazar Ayala, the most\nillustrious Spanish lawyer of the sixteenth century, it does not\nbelong to the Church to punish infidels who {352} have never received\nthe Christian faith, whereas those who, having once received it,\nafterwards endeavour to prevent the propagation of the Gospel, may,\nlike other heretics, be justly persecuted with the sword.[42] But the\nmajority of jurisconsults, as well as of canonists, were in favour of\nthe orthodox view that unbelief is a legitimate reason for going to\nwar.[43] And this principle was, professedly, acted upon to an extent\nwhich made the history of Christianity for many centuries a perpetual\ncrusade, and transformed the Christian Church into a military power\neven more formidable than Rome under C\u00e6sar and Augustus. Very often\nreligious zeal was a mere pretext for wars which in reality were\ncaused by avarice or desire for power. The aim of the Church was to be\nthe master of the earth rather than the servant of heaven. She\npreached crusades not only against infidels and heretics, but against\nany disobedient prince who opposed her boundless pretensions. And she\nencouraged war when rich spoils were to be expected from the victor,\nas a thankoffering to God for the victory He had granted, or as an\natonement for the excesses which had been committed.\n\n[Footnote 36: Bethune-Baker, _op. cit._ p. 73.]\n\n[Footnote 37: Bonet, _L'arbre des batailles_, iv. 2, p. 86: \"Selon la\nsainte Escripture nous ne pouvons et si ne devons contredire ne\nefforcer ung mescreant \u00e0 recepvoir ne le saint bapteme ne la sainte\nfoy ainsi les devons laisser en leur franche volont\u00e9 que Dieu leur a\ndonn\u00e9e.\"]\n\n[Footnote 38: Franciscus a Victoria, _Relectiones Theologic\u00e6_, vi. 10,\np. 231: \"Caussa iusti belli non est diuersitas religionis.\" Yet\ninfidels may be constrained to allow the Gospel to be preached\n(_ibid._ v. 3. 12, p. 214 _sq._).]\n\n[Footnote 39: Soto, _De justititia et jure_, v. 3. 5, fol. 154.]\n\n[Footnote 40: Covariuvias a Leyva, _Regul\u00e6_, _Pecatum_, ii. 10. 2\n(_Opera omnia_, i. 496): \"Infidelitas non priuat infideles dominio,\nquod habent iure humano, vel habuerunt ante legem Euangelicam in\nprouinciis et regnis, quae obtinent.\"]\n\n[Footnote 41: Suarez, cited by Nys, _Droit de la guerre et les\npr\u00e9curseurs de Grotius_, p. 98.]\n\n[Footnote 42: Ayala, _De iure et officiis bellicis et disciplina\nmilitari_, i. 2. 29 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 43: Nys, _op. cit._ p. 89. _Idem_, in his Introduction to\nBonet's _L'arbre des batailles_, p. xxiv. According to Conradus Brunus\n(_De legationibus_, iii. 8, p. 115), for instance, any war waged by\nChristians against the enemies of the Christian faith is just, as\nbeing undertaken for the defence of religion and the glory of God in\norder to recover the possession of dominions unjustly held by infidels.]\n\nOut of this union between war and Christianity there was born that\ncurious bastard, Chivalry. The secular germ of it existed already in\nthe German forests. According to Tacitus, the young German who aspired\nto be a warrior was brought into the midst of the assembly of the\nchiefs, where his father, or some other relative, solemnly equipped\nhim for his future vocation with shield and javelin.[44] Assuming arms\nwas thus made a social distinction, which subsequently derived its\nname {353} from one of its most essential characteristics, the riding\na war-horse. But Chivalry became something quite different from what\nthe word indicates. The Church knew how to lay hold of knighthood for\nher own purposes. The investiture, which was originally of a purely\ncivil nature, became, even before the time of the crusades, as it\nwere, a sacrament.[45] The priest delivered the sword into the hand of\nthe person who was to be made a knight, with the following words,\n\"Serve Christi, sis miles in nomine Patris, Filii, et Spiritus Sancti,\nAmen.\"[46] The sword was said to be made in semblance of the cross so\nas to signify \"how our Lord God vanquished in the cross the death of\nhuman lying\";[47] and the word \"Jesus\" was sometimes engraven on its\nhilt.[48] God Himself had chosen the knight to defeat with arms the\nmiscreants who wished to destroy his Holy Church, in the same way as\nHe had chosen the clergy to maintain the Catholic faith with Scripture\nand reasons.[49] The knight was to the body politic what the arms are\nto the human body: the Church was the head, Chivalry the arms, the\ncitizens, merchants, and labourers the inferior members; and the arms\nwere placed in the middle to render them equally capable of defending\nthe inferior members and the head.[50] \"The greatest amity that should\nbe in this world,\" says the author of the 'Ordre of Chyualry,' \"ought\nto be between the knights and clerks.\"[51] The several gradations of\nknighthood were regarded as parallel to those of the Church.[52] And\nafter the conquest of the Holy Land the union between the profession\nof arms and the religion of Christ became still more intimate by the\ninstitution of the two military orders of monks, the Knights Templars\nand Knights of St. John of Jerusalem.\n\n[Footnote 44: Tactitus, _Germania_, 13. According to Honor\u00e9 de Sainte\nMarie (_Dissertations historiques et critiques sur la Chevalerie_, p.\n30 _sqq._), Chivalry is of Roman, according to some other writers, of\nArabic origin. M. Gautier (_La Chevalerie_, pp. 14, 16) repudiates\nthese theories, and regards Chivalry as \"un usage germain id\u00e9alis\u00e9 par\nl'\u00c9glise.\" See also Rambaud, _Histoire de la civilisation fran\u00e7aise_,\ni. 178 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 45: Scott, 'Essay on Chivalry,' in _Miscellaneous Prose\nWorks_, vi. 16. Mills, _History of Chivalry_, i. 10 _sq._ For a\ndescription of the various religious ceremonies accompanying the\ninvestiture, see _The Book of the Ordre of Chyualry or Knyghthode_,\nfol. 27 b _sqq._ _Cf._ also Favyn, _Theater of Honour and\nKnight-Hood_, i. 52.]\n\n[Footnote 46: Favyn, _op. cit._ i. 52.]\n\n[Footnote 47: _Ordre of Chyualry_, fol. 31 a _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 48: Mills, _op. cit._ i. 71.]\n\n[Footnote 49: _Ordre of Chyualry_, fol. 11 b.]\n\n[Footnote 50: _Le Jouuencel_, fol. 94 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 51: _Ordre of Chyualry_, fol. 12 a.]\n\n[Footnote 52: Scott, _loc. cit._ p. 15.]\n\n{354} The duties which a knight took on himself by oath were very\nextensive, but not very well defined. He should defend the holy\nCatholic faith, he should defend justice, he should defend women,\nwidows, and orphans, and all those of either sex that were powerless,\nill at ease, and groaning under oppression, and injustice.[53] In the\nname of religion and justice he could thus practically wage war almost\nat will. Though much real oppression was undoubtedly avenged by these\nsoldiers of the Church, the knight seems as a rule to have cared\nlittle for the cause or necessity of his doing battle. \"La guerre est\nma patrie, Mon harnois ma maison: Et en toute saison Combatre c'est ma\nvie,\" was a saying much in use in the sixteenth century.[54] The\ngeneral impression which Froissart gives us in his history is, that\nthe age in which he lived was completely given over to fighting, and\ncared about nothing else whatever.[55] The French knights never spoke\nof war but as a feast, a game, a pastime. \"Let them play their game,\"\nthey said of the cross-bow men, who were showering down arrows on\nthem; and \"to play a great game,\" _jouer gros jeu_, was their\ndescription of a battle.[56] Previous to the institution of Chivalry\nthere certainly existed much fighting in Christian countries, but\nknighthood rendered war \"a fashionable accomplishment.\"[57] And so\nall-absorbing became the passion for it that, as real injuries were\nnot likely to occur every day, artificial grievances were created, and\ntilts and tournaments were invented in order to keep in action the\nsons of war when they had no other employments for their courage. Even\nin these images of war--which were by no means so harmless as they\nhave sometimes been represented to be[58]--the intimate connection\n{355} between Chivalry and religion displays itself in various ways.\nBefore the tournament began, the coats of arms, helmets, and other\nobjects were carried into a monastery, and after the victory was\ngained the arms and the horses which had been used in the fight were\noffered up at the church.[59] The proclamations at the tournaments\nwere generally in the name of God and the Virgin Mary. Before battle\nthe knights confessed, and heard mass; and, when they entered the\nlists, they held a sort of image with which they made the sign of the\ncross.[60] Moreover, \"as the feasts of the tournaments were\naccompanied by these acts of devotion, so the feasts of the Church\nwere sometimes adorned with the images of the tournaments.\"[61] It is\ntrue that the Church now and then made attempts to stop these\nperformances.[62] But then she did so avowedly because they prevented\nmany knights from joining the holy wars, or because they swallowed up\ntreasures which might otherwise with advantage have been poured into\nthe Holy Land.[63]\n\n[Footnote 53: _Ordre of Chyualry_, foll. 11 b, 17 a. Sainte-Palaye,\n_M\u00e9moires sur l'ancienne Chevalerie_, i. 75, 129.]\n\n[Footnote 54: De la Nou\u00eb, _Discours politiques et militaires_, p. 215.]\n\n[Footnote 55: See Sir James Stephen's essay on 'Froissart's\nChronicles,' in his _Hor\u00e6 Sabbatic\u00e6_, i. 22 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 56: Sainte-Palaye, _op. cit._ ii. 61.]\n\n[Footnote 57: Millingen, _History of Duelling_, i. 70.]\n\n[Footnote 58: Sainte-Palaye, _op. cit._ i. 179; ii. 75. Du Cange,\n'Dissertations sur l'histoire de S. Louys,' in Petitot, _Collection\ndes M\u00e9moires relatifs \u00e0 l'histoire de France_, iii. 122 _sq._ Honor\u00e9\nde Sainte Marie, _op. cit._ p. 186.]\n\n[Footnote 59: Sainte-Palaye, _op. cit._ i. 151.]\n\n[Footnote 60: _Ibid._ ii. 57.]\n\n[Footnote 61: _Ibid._ ii. 57 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 62: Du Cange, _loc. cit._ p. 124 _sqq._ Honor\u00e9 de Sainte\nMarie, _op. cit._ p. 186. Sainte-Palaye, _op. cit._ ii. 75.]\n\n[Footnote 63: Du Cange, _loc. cit._ p. 125 _sq._]\n\nClosely connected with the feudal system was the practice of private\nwar. Though tribunals had been instituted, and even long after the\nkings' courts had become well-organised and powerful institutions, a\nnobleman had a right to wage war upon another nobleman from whom he\nhad suffered some gross injury.[64] On such occasions not only the\nrelatives, but the vassals, of the injured man were bound to help him\nin his quarrel, and the same obligation existed in the case of the\naggressor.[65] Only greater crimes were regarded as legitimate causes\nof private war,[66] but this rule was not at all strictly\nobserved.[67] As {356} a matter of fact, the barons fled to arms upon\nevery quarrel; he who could raise a small force at once made war upon\nhim who had anything to lose. The nations of Europe were subdivided\ninto innumerable subordinate states, which were almost independent,\nand declared war and made treaties with all the vigour and all the\nceremonies of powerful monarchs. Contemporary historians describe the\nexcesses committed in prosecution of these intestine quarrels in such\nterms as excite astonishment and horror; and great parts of Europe\nwere in consequence reduced to the condition of a desert, which it\nceased to be worth while to cultivate.[68]\n\n[Footnote 64: The right of private war generally supposed nobility of\nbirth and equality of rank in both the contending parties (Beaumanoir,\n_Coutumes du Beauvoisis_, lix. 5 _sq._ vol. ii. 355 _sqq._; Robertson,\n_History of the Reign of Charles V._ i. 329). But it was also granted\nto the French _communes_, and to the free towns in Germany, Italy, and\nSpain (Du Boys, _Histoire du droit criminel des peuples modernes_,\nii. 348).]\n\n[Footnote 65: Du Cange, _loc. cit._ pp. 450, 458.]\n\n[Footnote 66: _Ibid._ p. 445 _sq._ Arnold, _Deutsche Urzeit_, p. 341.\nvon W\u00e4chter, _Beitr\u00e4ge zur deutschen Geschichte_, p. 46.]\n\n[Footnote 67: We read of a nobleman who declared war against the city\nof Frankfort, because a lady residing there had promised to dance with\nhis cousin, but danced with another; and the city was obliged to\nsatisfy the wounded honour of the gentleman (von W\u00e4chter, _op. cit._\np. 57).]\n\n[Footnote 68: Robertson, _op. cit._ i. 332.]\n\nThe Church made some feeble attempts to put an end to this state of\nthings. Thus, about the year 990, ordinances were directed against the\npractice of private war by several bishops in the south of France, who\nagreed to exclude him who violated their ordinances from all Christian\nprivileges during his life, and to deny him Christian burial after his\ndeath.[69] A little later, men engaged in warfare were exhorted, by\nsacred relics and by the bodies of saints, to lay down their arms and\nto swear that they would never again disturb the public peace by their\nprivate hostilities.[70] But it is hardly likely that such directions\nhad much effect as long as the bishops and abbots themselves were\nallowed to wage private war by means of their vidames, and exercised\nthis right scarcely less frequently than the barons.[71] Nor does it\nseem that {357} the Church brought about any considerable change for\nthe better by establishing the Truce of God, involving obligatory\nrespite from hostilities during the great festivals of the Church, as\nalso from the evening of Wednesday in each week to the morning of\nMonday in the week ensuing.[72] We are assured by good authorities\nthat the Truce was generally disregarded, though the violator was\nthreatened with the penalty of excommunication.[73] Most barons could\nprobably say with Bertram de Born:--\"La paix ne me convient pas; la\nguerre seule me pla\u00eet. Je n'ai \u00e9gard ni aux lundis, ni aux mardis. Les\nsemaines, les mois, les ann\u00e9es, tout m'est \u00e9gal. En tout temps, je\nveux perdre quiconque me nuit.\"[74] The ordinance enjoining the\n_treuga Dei_ was transgressed even by the popes.[75] It was too\nunpractical a direction to be obeyed, and was soon given up even in\ntheory by the authorities of the Church. Thomas Aquinas says that, as\nphysicians may lawfully apply remedies to men on feast-days, so just\nwars may be lawfully prosecuted on such days for the defence of the\ncommonwealth of the faithful, if necessity so requires; \"for it would\nbe tempting God for a man to want to keep his hands from war under\nstress of such necessity.\"[76] And in support of this opinion he\nquotes the first Book of the Maccabees, where it is said, \"Whosoever\nshall come to make battle with us on the sabbath day, we will fight\nagainst him.\"[77]\n\n[Footnote 69: 'Charta de Treuga et Pace per Aniciensem Praesulem\nWidonem in Congregatione quamplurium Episcoporum, Principium, et\nNobilium hujus Terrae sancita,' in Dumont, _Corps universel\ndiplomatique du droit des gens_, i. 41.]\n\n[Footnote 70: Raoul Glaber, _Histori sui temporis_, iv. 5 (Bouquet,\n_Rerum Gallicarum et Francicarum Scriptores_, x. 49). Robertson, _op.\ncit._ i. 335.]\n\n[Footnote 71: Brussel, _Nouvel examen de l'usage g\u00e9n\u00e9ral des fiefs en\nFrance_, i. 144. How much the prelates were infected by the general\nspirit of the age, appears from a characteristic story of an\narchbishop of Cologne who gave to one of his vassals a castle situated\non a sterile rock. When the vassal objected that he could not subsist\non such a soil, the archbishop answered, \"Why do you complain? Four\nroads unite under the walls of your castle\" (Du Boys, _Histoire du\ndroit criminel de l'Espagne_, p. 504).]\n\n[Footnote 72: Raoul Glaber, _op. cit._ v. 1 (_loc. cit._ p. 59). Du\nCange, _Glossarium ad scriptores medi\u00e6 et infim\u00e6 Latinitatis_, vi.\n1267 _sq._ Henault, _Nouvel abr\u00e9g\u00e9 chronologique de l'histoire de\nFrance_, p. 106.]\n\n[Footnote 73: Du Cange, _Glossarium_, vi. 1272. Nys, _Droit de la\nguerre et les pr\u00e9curseurs de Grotius_, p. 114.]\n\n[Footnote 74: Villemain, _Cours de litt\u00e9rature fran\u00e7aise_,\n_Litt\u00e9rature du Moyen Age_, i. 122 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 75: Belli, _De re militari_, quoted by Nys, _op. cit._ p. 115.]\n\n[Footnote 76: Thomas Aquinas, _op. cit._ ii.-ii. 40. 4.]\n\n[Footnote 77: _Maccabees_, ii. 41.]\n\nIt seems that the main cause of the abolition of private war was not\nany measure taken by the Church, but the increase of the authority of\nemperors or kings. In France the right of waging private war was\nmoderated by Louis IX., checked by Philip IV., suppressed by {358}\nCharles VI.[78] In England, after the Norman Conquest, private wars\nseem to have occurred more rarely than on the Continent, probably\nowing to the strength of the royal authority, which made the execution\nof justice more vigorous and the jurisdiction of the King's court more\nextensive than was the case in most other countries.[79] In Scotland\nthe practice of private war received its final blow only late in the\neighteenth century, when the clans were reduced to order after the\nrebellion of 1745.[80] Whilst, then, it is impossible to ascribe to\nthe Church any considerable part in the movement which ultimately led\nto the entire abolition of private war, we have, on the other hand, to\ntake into account the encouragement which the Church gave to the\nwarlike spirit of the time by the establishment of Chivalry[81] and by\nsanctioning war as a divine institution. War came to be looked upon as\na judgment of God and the victory as a sign of his special favour.\nBefore a battle, the service of mass was usually performed by both\narmies in the presence of each other, and no warrior would fight\nwithout secretly breathing a prayer.[82] Pope Adrian IV. says that a\nwar commenced under the auspices of religion cannot but be\nfortunate;[83] and it was commonly believed that God took no less\ninterest in the battle than did the fighting warriors. Bonet, who\nwrote in the fourteenth century, puts to himself the question, why\nthere are so many wars in the world, and gives the answer, \"que toutes\nsont pour le pechi\u00e9 du siecle dont nostre seigneur Dieu pour le pugnir\npermet les guerres, car ainsi le maintient l'escripture.\"[84]\n\n[Footnote 78: Robertson, _op. cit._ i. 55, 56, 338 _sqq._ Hallam,\n_View of the State of Europe during the Middle Ages_, i. 207. Brussel,\n_op. cit._ i. 142.]\n\n[Footnote 79: _Ibid._ i. 343 _sq._ Prof. Freeman (_Comparative\nPolitics_, p. 328 _sq._) mentions as the last instance of private war\nin England one from the time of Edward IV.]\n\n[Footnote 80: Lawrence, _Essays on some Disputed Questions in Modern\nInternational Law_, p. 254 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 81: I do not understand how M. Gautier can say (_op. cit._\np. 6) that Chivalry was the most beautiful of those means by which the\nChurch endeavoured to check war.]\n\n[Footnote 82: Mills, _History of Chivalry_, i. 147.]\n\n[Footnote 83: Laurent, _op. cit._ vii. 245.]\n\n[Footnote 84: Bonet, _op. cit._ iv. 54, p. 150.]\n\nSimilar opinions have retained their place in the orthodox creeds both\nof the Catholic and Protestant {359} Churches up to the present day.\nThe attitude adopted by the great Christian congregations towards war\nhas been, and is still, to a considerable degree, that of sympathetic\napproval. The Catechism of the Council of Trent brings home that there\nare on record instances of slaughter executed by the special command\nof God Himself, as when the sons of Levi, who put to death so many\nthousands in one day, after the slaughter were thus addressed by\nMoses, \"Ye have consecrated your hands this day to the Lord.\"[85] Even\nquite modern Catholic writers refer to the canonists who held that a\nState might lawfully make war upon a heretic people which was\nspreading heresy, and upon a pagan people which prevented the\npreaching of the Gospel.[86] Again, when the Protestant Churches\nbecame State-Churches, their ministers, considering themselves as in\nthe service of the State, were ready to champion whatever war the\nGovernment pleased to undertake. As Mr. Gibb observes, the Protestant\nminister was as ready with his Thanksgiving Sermon for the victories\nof a profligate war, as the Catholic priest was with his _Te Deum_;\n\"indeed, the latter was probably the more independent of the two,\nbecause of his allegiance to Rome.\"[87] The new Confessions of Faith\nexplicitly claimed for the State the right of waging war, and the\nAnabaptists were condemned because they considered war unlawful for a\nChristian.[88] Even the necessity of a just cause as a reason for\ntaking part in warfare, which was reasserted at the time of the\nReformation, was subsequently allowed to drop out of sight. Mr. Farrer\ncalls attention to the fact that in the 37th article of the English\nChurch, which is to the effect that a Christian at the command of the\nmagistrate may wear weapons and serve in wars, the word _justa_ in the\nLatin form preceding the word _bella_ has been omitted altogether.[89]\n\n[Footnote 85: _Catechism of the Council of Trent_, iii. 6. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 86: Adds and Arnold, _Catholic Dictionary_, p. 944.]\n\n[Footnote 87: Gibb, _loc. cit._ p. 90.]\n\n[Footnote 88: _Augsburg Confession_, i. 16. _Second Helvetic\nConfession_, xxx. 4.]\n\n[Footnote 89: Farrer, _Military Manners and Customs_, p. 208.]\n\n{360} Nor did the old opinion that war is a providential institution\nand a judgment of God die with the Middle Ages. Lord Bacon looks upon\nwars as \"the highest trials of right; when princes and states that\nacknowledge no superior upon earth shall put themselves upon the\njustice of God, for the deciding of their controversies by such\nsuccess as it shall please Him to give on either side.\"[90] R\u00e9al de\nCurban says that a war is seldom successful unless it be just, hence\nthe victor may presume that God is on his side.[91] According to\nJeremy Taylor, \"kings are in the place of God, who strikes whole\nnations, and towns, and villages; and war is the rod of God in the\nhands of princes.\"[92] And it is not only looked upon as an instrument\nof divine justice, but it is also said, generally, \"to work out the\nnoble purposes of God.\"[93] Its tendency, as a theological writer\nassures us, is \"to rectify and exalt the popular conception of God,\"\nthere being nothing among men \"like the smell of gunpowder for making\na nation perceive the fragrance of divinity in truth.\"[94] By war the\ndifferent countries \"have been opened up to the advance of true\nreligion.\"[95] \"No people ever did, or ever could, feel the power of\nChristian principle growing up like an inspiration through the\nnational manhood, until the worth of it had been thundered on the\nbattle-field.\"[96] War is, \"when God sends it, a means of grace and of\nnational renovation\"; it is \"a solemn duty in which usually only the\nbest Christians and most trustworthy men should be commissioned to\nhold the sword.\"[97] According to M. Proudhon, it is the most sublime\nphenomenon of our moral life,[98] a divine revelation more\nauthoritative than the Gospel itself.[99] The warlike people is the\nreligious people;[100] war is the sign of {361} human grandeur, peace\na thing for beavers and sheep. \"Philanthrope, vous parlez d'abolir la\nguerre; prenez garde de d\u00e9grader le genre humain.\"[101]\n\n[Footnote 90: Bacon, _Letters and Life_, i. (_Works_, viii.), 146.]\n\n[Footnote 91: R\u00e9al de Curban, _La science du gouvernement_, v. 394 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 92: Taylor, _Whole Works_, xii. 164.]\n\n[Footnote 93: 'The Sword and Christianity,' in _Boston Review devoted\nto Theology and Literature_, iii. 261.]\n\n[Footnote 94: _Ibid._ iii. 259, 257.]\n\n[Footnote 95: Holland, _Time of War_, p. 14.]\n\n[Footnote 96: _Boston Review_, iii. 257.]\n\n[Footnote 97: 'Christianity and War,' in _Christian Review_, xxvi. 604.]\n\n[Footnote 98: Proudhon, _La guerre et la paix_, ii. 420.]\n\n[Footnote 99: _Ibid._i.62; ii. 435.]\n\n[Footnote 100: _Ibid._ i. 45.]\n\n[Footnote 101: _Ibid._ i. 43.]\n\nIn order to prove the consistency of war with Christianity appeals are\nstill, as in former days, made to the Bible; to the divinely-sanctioned\nexample of the ancient Israelites, to the fact that Jesus never\nprohibited those around Him from bearing arms, to the instances of the\ncenturions mentioned in the Gospel, to St. Paul's predilection for\ntaking his spiritual metaphors from the profession of the soldier, and\nso on.[102] According to Canon Mozley, the Christian recognition of\nthe right of war was contained in Christianity's original recognition\nof nations.[103] \"By a fortunate necessity,\" a universal empire is\nimpossible.[104] Each nation is a centre by itself, and when questions\nof right and justice arise between these independent centres, they\ncannot be decided except by mutual agreement or force. The aim of the\nnation going to war is exactly the same as that of the individual in\nentering a court, and the Church, which has no authority to decide\nwhich is the right side, cannot but stand neutral and contemplate war\nforensically, as a mode of settling national questions, which is\njustified by the want of any other mode.[105] A natural justice, Canon\nMozley adds, is inherent not only in wars of self-defence; there is an\ninstinctive reaching in nations and masses of people after alteration\nand readjustment, which has justice in it, and which arises from real\nneeds. The arrangement does not suit as it stands, there is want of\nadaptation, there is confinement and pressure; there are people kept\naway from each other that are made to be together, and parts separated\nthat were made to join. All this uneasiness in States naturally leads\nto war. Moreover, there are wars of progress which, so far as they are\nreally necessary for the due advantage of mankind and {362} growth of\nsociety, are approved of by Christianity, though they do not strictly\nbelong to the head of wars undertaken in self-defence.[106] A doctrine\nwhich thus, in the name of religion, allows the waging of wars for\nrectifying the political distribution of nationalities and races, and\nforwarding the so-called progress of the world, naturally lends itself\nto the justification of almost any war entered upon by a Christian\nState.[107] As a matter of fact, it would be impossible to find a\nsingle instance of a war waged by a Protestant country, from any\nmotive, to which the bulk of its clergy have not given their sanction\nand support. The opposition against war has generally come from other\nquarters.\n\n[Footnote 102: See _e.g._, Browne, _Exposition of the Thirty-Nine\nArticles_, p. 827 _sq._; _Christian Review_, xxvi. 603 _sq._;\n_Eclectic Magazine_, xiii. 372.]\n\n[Footnote 103: Mozley, 'On War,' in _Sermons preached before the\nUniversity of Oxford_, p. 119.]\n\n[Footnote 104: _Ibid._ p. 112.]\n\n[Footnote 105: _Ibid._ p. 100 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 106: _Ibid._ 104 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 107: On the principle of progress, Canon Mozley himself\njustifies (_ibid._ p. 110 _sq._) not only the wars undertaken against\ntwo Eastern empires which have shut themselves up and excluded\nthemselves from the society of mankind, but \"two of the three great\nEuropean wars of the last dozen years.\" This was said in 1871.]\n\nThere have been, and still are, Christian sects which, on religious\ngrounds, condemn war of any kind. In the fourteenth century the\nLollards taught that homicide in war is expressly contrary to the New\nTestament; they were persecuted partly on that account.[108] Of the\nsame opinion were the Anabaptists of the sixteenth century; and they\ncould claim on their side the words of men like Colet and Erasmus.\nFrom the pulpit of St. Paul's Colet thundered that \"an unjust peace is\nbetter than the justest war,\" and that, \"when men out of hatred and\nambition fight with and destroy one another, they fight under the\nbanner, not of Christ, but of the Devil.\"[109] According to Erasmus\n\"nothing is more impious, more calamitous, more widely pernicious,\nmore inveterate, more base, or in sum more unworthy of a man, not to\nsay of a Christian,\" than war. It is worse than brutal; to man no wild\nbeast is more destructive than his fellow-man. When brutes fight, they\nfight with weapons which nature has given them, whereas we arm\nourselves for mutual slaughter with weapons which nature never thought\nof. Neither do beasts break out {363} in hostile rage for trifling\ncauses, but either when hunger drives them to madness, or when they\nfind themselves attacked, or when they are alarmed for the safety of\ntheir young. But we, on frivolous pretences, what tragedies do we act\non the theatre of war! Under colour of some obsolete and disputable\nclaim to territory; in a childish passion for a mistress; for causes\neven more ridiculous than these, we kindle the flame of war.\nTransactions truly hellish, are called holy wars. Bishops and grave\ndivines, decrepit as they are in person, fight from the pulpit the\nbattles of the princes, promising remission of sins to all who will\ntake part in the war of the prince, and exclaiming to the latter that\nGod will fight for him, if he only keeps his mind favourable to the\ncause of religion. And yet, how could it ever enter into our hearts,\nthat a Christian should imbrue his hands in the blood of a Christian!\nWhat is war but murder and theft committed by great numbers on great\nnumbers! Does not the Gospel declare, in decisive words, that we must\nnot revile again those who revile us, that we should do good to those\nwho use us ill, that we should give up the whole of our possessions to\nthose who take a part, that we should pray for those who design to\ntake away our lives? The world has so many learned bishops, so many\ngrey-headed grandees, so many councils and senates, why is not\nrecourse had to their authority, and the childish quarrels of princes\nsettled by their wise and decisive arbitration? \"The man who engages\nin war by choice, that man, whoever he is, is a wicked man; he sins\nagainst nature, against God, against man, and is guilty of the most\naggravated and complicated impiety.\"[110] These were the main arguments\nof reason, humanity, and religion, which Erasmus adduced against war.\nThey could not leave the reformers entirely unaffected. Sir Thomas More\ncharged Luther himself and his disciples with carrying the doctrines of\npeace to the extreme limits {364} of non-resistance.[111] But, as we\nhave noticed, these peaceful tendencies only formed a passing phase in\nthe history of Reformation, and were left to the care of sectarians.\n\n[Footnote 108: Perry, _History of the English Church_, First Period,\npp. 455, 467.]\n\n[Footnote 109: Green, _History of the English People_, ii. 93.]\n\n[Footnote 110: Erasmus, _Adagia_, iv. 1, col. 893 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 111: Farrer, _Military Manners and Customs_, p. 185.]\n\nAmong these the Quakers are the most important. By virtue of various\npassages in the Old and the New Testament,[112] they contend that all\nwarfare, whatever be its peculiar features, circumstances, or\npretexts, is wholly at variance with the Christian religion. It is\nalways the duty of Christians to obey their Master's high and holy\nlaw--to suffer wrong, to return good for evil, to love their enemies.\nWar is also inconsistent with the Christian principle that human life\nis sacred, and that death is followed by infinite consequences. Since\nman is destined for eternity, the future welfare of a single\nindividual is of greater importance than the merely temporal\nprosperity of a whole nation. When cutting short the days of their\nneighbour and transmitting him, prepared or unprepared, to the awful\nrealities of an everlasting state, Christians take upon themselves a\nmost unwarrantable responsibility, unless such an action is expressly\nsanctioned by their divine Master, as was the case among the\nIsraelites. In the New Testament there is no such sanction, hence it\nmust be concluded that, under the Christian dispensation, it is\nutterly unlawful for one man to kill another, under whatever\ncircumstances of expediency or provocation the deed may be committed.\nAnd a Christian who fights by the command of his prince, and in behalf\nof his country, not only commits sin in his own person, but aids and\nabets the national transgression.[113]\n\n[Footnote 112: _Isaiah_, ch. ii. _sqq._ _Micah_, iv. 1 _sqq._ _St.\nMatthew_, v. 38 _sqq._; xxvi. 52. _St. Luke_, vi. 27 _sqq._ _St.\nJohn_, xviii. 36. _Romans_, xii. 19 _sqq._ _1 Peter_, iii. 9.]\n\n[Footnote 113: Gurney, _Views & Practices of the Society of Friends_,\np. 375 _sqq._]\n\nIt must be added that views similar to these are also found\nindependently of any particular form of sectarianism. According to Dr.\nWayland, all wars, defensive as well as offensive, are contrary to the\nrevealed will of God, aggression from a foreign nation calling not for\nretaliation and {365} injury, but rather for special kindness and\ngood-will.[114] Theodore Parker, the Congregational minister, looks\nupon war as a sin, a corrupter of public morals, a practical denial of\nChristianity, a violation of God's eternal love.[115] W. Stokes, the\nBaptist, observes that Christianity cannot sanction war, whether\noffensive or defensive, because war is an \"immeasurable evil, by\nhurling unnumbered myriads of our fellow-men to a premature judgment\nand endless despair.\"[116] Moreover, those who compare the state of\nopinion during the last years with that of former periods, cannot fail\nto observe a marked progress of a sentiment antagonistic to war in the\nvarious sections of the Christian Church.[117] Yet, speaking\ngenerally, the orthodox are still of the same opinion as Sir James\nTurner, who declared that \"those who condemn the profession or art of\nsoldiery, smell rank of Anabaptism and Quakery\";[118] and war is in\nour days, as it was in those of Erasmus,[119] so much sanctioned by\nauthority and custom, that it is deemed impious to bear testimony\nagainst it. The duties which compulsory military service imposes upon\nthe male population of most Christian countries presuppose that a\nChristian should have no scruples about taking part in any war waged\nby the State, and are recognised as binding by the clergy of those\ncountries. With reference to the Church of England, Dr. Thomas Arnold\nasks, \"Did it become a Christian Church to make no other official\ndeclaration of its sentiments concerning war, than by saying that\nChristian men might lawfully engage in it?\"[120]\n\n[Footnote 114: Wayland, _Elements of Moral Science_, pp. 375, 379.]\n\n[Footnote 115: Parker, _Sermon of War_, p. 23.]\n\n[Footnote 116: Stokes, _All War inconsistent with the Christian\nReligion_, p. 41.]\n\n[Footnote 117: _Cf._ Gibb, _loc. cit._ p. 81.]\n\n[Footnote 118: Turner, _Pallas Armata_, p. 369.]\n\n[Footnote 119: Erasmus, _op. cit._ iv. 1. 1. col. 894.]\n\n[Footnote 120: Arnold, _On the Church_, p. 136.]\n\nThe protest against war which exercised perhaps the widest influence\non public opinion came from a school of moralists whose tendencies\nwere not only anti-orthodox, but distinctly hostile to the most\nessential dogmas of Christian theology. Bayle, in his Dictionary,\ncalls Erasmus' essay {366} against war one of the most beautiful\ndissertations ever written.[121] He observes that the more we consider\nthe inevitable consequences of war, the more we feel disposed to\ndetest those who are the causes of it.[122] Its usual fruits may,\nindeed, \"make those tremble who undertake or advise it, to prevent\nevils which, perhaps, may never happen and which, at the worst, would\noften be much less than those which necessarily follow a\nrupture.\"[123] To Voltaire war is an \"infernal enterprise,\" the\nstrangest feature of which is that \"every chief of the ruffians has\nhis colours consecrated, and solemnly prays to God before he goes to\ndestroy his neighbour.\"[124] He asks what the Church has done to\nsuppress this crime. Bourdaloue preached against impurity, but what\nsermon did he ever direct against the murder, rapine, brigandage, and\nuniversal rage, which desolate the world? \"Miserable physicians of\nsouls, you declaim for five quarters of an hour against the mere\npricks of a pin, and say no word on the curse which tears us into a\nthousand pieces.\"[125] Voltaire admits that under certain\ncircumstances war is an inevitable curse, but rebukes Montesquieu for\nsaying that natural defence sometimes involves the necessity of\nattack, when a nation perceives that a longer peace would place\nanother nation in a position to destroy it.[126] Such a war, he\nobserves, is as illegitimate as possible:--\" It is to go and kill your\nneighbour for fear that your neighbour, who does not attack you,\nshould be in a condition to attack you; that is to say, you must run\nthe risk of ruining your country, in the hope of ruining without\nreason some other country; this is, to be sure, neither fair nor\nuseful.\"[127] The chief causes which induce men to massacre in all\nloyalty thousands of their brothers and to expose their own people to\nthe most terrible misery, are the ambitions and {367} jealousies of\nprinces and their ministers.[128] Similar views are expressed in the\ngreat Encyclop\u00e9die:--\"La guerre est le plus terrible des fl\u00e9aux qui\nd\u00e9truisent l'esp\u00e8ce humaine: elle n'\u00e9pargne pas m\u00eame les vainqueurs;\nla plus heureuse est funeste. . . . Ce ne sont plus aujourd'hui les\npeuples qui d\u00e9clarent la guerre, c'est la cupidit\u00e9 des rois qui leur\nfait prendre les armes; c'est l'indigence qui les met aux mains de\nleurs sujets.\"[129]\n\n[Footnote 121: Bayle, _Dictionnaire historique et critique_, vi. 239,\nart. Erasme.]\n\n[Footnote 122: _Ibid._ ii. 463, art. Artaxata.]\n\n[Footnote 123: _Ibid._ i. 472, art. Alting (Henri).]\n\n[Footnote 124: Voltaire, _Dictionnaire philosophique_, art. Guerre\n(_[OE]uvres compl\u00e8tes_, xl. 562).]\n\n[Footnote 125: _Ibid._ p. 564.]\n\n[Footnote 126: Montesquieu, _De l'esprit des lois_, x. 2 (_[OE]uvres\ncompl\u00e8tes_, p. 256).]\n\n[Footnote 127: Voltaire, _loc. cit._ p. 565.]\n\n[Footnote 128: _Ibid._ pp. 466, 564. For Voltaire's condemnation of\nwar, see Morley, _Voltaire_, p. 311 _sq._ I have availed myself of\nLord Morley's translation of some of the passages quoted.]\n\n[Footnote 129: _Encyclop\u00e9die m\u00e9thodique_, Art militaire, ii. 618 _sq._]\n\nHowever vehemently Voltaire and the Encyclopedists condemned war, they\ndid not dream of a time when all wars would cease. Other writers were\nmore optimistic. Already in 1713 Abb\u00e9 Saint-Pierre--whose abbotship\ninvolved only a nominal connection with the Church--had published a\nproject of perpetual peace, which was based on the idea of a general\nconfederation of European nations.[130] This project was much laughed\nat; Voltaire himself calls its author \"un homme moiti\u00e9 philosophe,\nmoiti\u00e9 fou.\" But once called into being, the idea of a perpetual peace\nand of a European confederation did not die. It was successively\nconceived by Rousseau,[131] Bentham,[132] and Kant.[133] But on the\nother hand it met with a formidable enemy in the awakening spirit of\nnationalism.\n\n[Footnote 130: Saint-Pierre, _Projet de Trait\u00e9 pour rendre la paix\nperp\u00e9tuelle entre les souverains Chr\u00e9tiens_.]\n\n[Footnote 131: Rousseau, _Extrait du Projet de paix perp\u00e9tuelle, de M.\nl'Abb\u00e9 de Saint-Pierre_ (_[OE]uvres compl\u00e8tes_, i. 606 _sqq._).]\n\n[Footnote 132: Bentham, _A Plan for an universal and perpetual Peace_\n(_Works_, ii. 546 _sqq._).]\n\n[Footnote 133: Kant, _Zum ewigen Frieden._]\n\nThe Napoleonic oppression called forth resistance. Philosophers and\npoets sounded the war trumpet. The dream of a universal monarchy was\nlooked upon as absurd and hateful, and the individuality of a nation\nas the only possible security for its virtue.[134] War was no longer\nattributed to the pretended interests of princes or to the caprices of\ntheir advisers. It was praised as a vehicle of the highest right,[135]\nas a source or national renovation.[136] {368} By war, says Hegel,\n\"finite pursuits are rendered unstable, and the ethical health of\npeoples is preserved. Just as the movement of the ocean prevents the\ncorruption which would be the result of perpetual calm, so by war\npeople escape the corruption which would be occasioned by a continuous\nor eternal peace.\"[137] Similar views have been expressed by later\nwriters. War is glorified as a stimulus to the elevated virtues of\ncourage, disinterestedness, and patriotism.[138] It has done more\ngreat things in the world than the love of man, says Nietzsche.[139]\nIt is the mother of art and of all civil virtues, says Mr.\nRuskin.[140] Others defend war, not as a positive good, but as a\nnecessary means of deciding the most serious international\ncontroversies, denying that arbitration can be a substitute for all\nkinds of war. Questions which are intimately connected with national\npassions and national aspirations, and questions which are vital to a\nnation's safety, will never, they say, be left to arbitration. Each\nState must be the guardian of its own security, and cannot allow its\nindependence to be calmly discussed and adjudicated upon by an\nexternal tribunal.[141] Moreover, arbitration would prove effective\nonly where the contradictory pretensions could be juridically\nformulated, and these instances are by far the less numerous and the\nless important.[142] And would it not, in many cases, be impossible to\nfind impartial arbiters? Would not arbitration often be influenced by\na calculation of the forces which every power interested could bring\ninto the field, and would not war be resorted to where arbitration\nfailed to reconcile conflicting interests, or where a decision was\nopposed to a high-spirited people's sense of justice? These and\nsimilar arguments are constantly adduced against the idea of a\nperpetual peace. But at the same time the opponents of war are\nbecoming more numerous {369} and more confident every day. Already\nafter the fall of Napoleon, when there was a universal longing for\npeace in the civilised world, the first Peace Societies were\nformed;[143] and the idea of Saint-Pierre, from being the dream of a\nphilosopher, has become the object of a popular movement which is\nrapidly increasing in importance. There is every reason to believe\nthat, when the present high tide of nationalism has subsided, and the\nsubject of war and peace is no longer looked upon from an exclusively\nnational point of view, the objections which are now raised against\narbitration will at last appear almost as futile as any arguments in\nfavour of private war or blood-revenge. There is an inveterate\ntendency in the human mind to assume that existing conditions will\nremain unchanged. But the history of civilisation shows how unfounded\nany such assumption is with reference to those conditions which\ndetermine social relationships and the extent of moral rights and duties.\n\n[Footnote 134: Fichte, _Reden an die deutsche Nation_. _Cf._ _Idem_,\n_Ueber den Begriff des wahrhaften Krieges_.]\n\n[Footnote 135: Arndt, quoted by J\u00e4hns, _Krieg, Frieden und Kultur_,\np. 302.]\n\n[Footnote 136: Anselm von Feuerbach, _Unterdr\u00fcckung und\nWiederbefreiung Europens_.]\n\n[Footnote 137: Hegel, _Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts_, \u00a7 324,\np. 317 (English translation, p. 331).]\n\n[Footnote 138: See, _e.g._, Mabille, _La Guerre_, p. 139.]\n\n[Footnote 139: Nietzsche, _Also sprach Zarathustra_, i. 63.]\n\n[Footnote 140: Ruskin, _Crown of Wild Olive_, Lecture on War (_Works_,\nvi. 99, 105).]\n\n[Footnote 141: Lawrence, _op. cit._ p. 275 _sq._ Sidgwick, 'Morality\nof Strife,' in _International Journal of Ethics_, i. 13.]\n\n[Footnote 142: Geffken, quoted by J\u00e4hns, _op. cit._ p. 352, n. 2.]\n\n[Footnote 143: J\u00e4hns, _op. cit._ p. 307 _sq._]\n\nIt is said that, though Christianity has not abolished war, it has\nnevertheless, even in war, asserted the principle that human life is\nsacred by prohibiting all needless destruction. The Canon, 'De treuga\net pace,' laid down the rule that non-resisting persons should be\nspared;[144] and Franciscus a Victoria maintained not only that\nbetween Christian enemies those who made no resistance could not\nlawfully be slain,[145] but that even in war against the Turks it was\nwrong to kill children and women.[146] However, this doctrine of mercy\nwas far in advance of the habits and general opinion of the time.[147]\nIf the simple peasant was often spared, that was largely from motives\nof prudence,[148] or because the valiant knight considered him\nunworthy of the lance.[149] As late as the seventeenth century,\nGrotius was certainly not supported by the spirit of the age when he\nargued that, \"if justice {370} do not require, at least mercy does,\nthat we should not, except for weighty causes tending to the safety of\nmany, undertake anything which may involve innocent persons in\ndestruction\";[150] or when he recommended enemies willing to surrender\non fair conditions, or unconditionally, to be spared.[151] Afterwards,\nhowever, opinion changed rapidly. Pufendorf, in echoing the doctrine\nof Grotius,[152] spoke to a world which was already convinced; and in\nthe eighteenth century Bynkershoek stands alone in giving to a\nbelligerent unlimited rights of violence.[153] In reference to the\nassumption that this change of opinion is due to the influence of the\nChristian religion, it is instructive to note that Grotius, in support\nof his doctrine, appealed chiefly to pagan authorities, and that even\nsavage peoples, without the aid of Christianity, have arrived at the\nrule which in war forbids the destruction of helpless persons and\ncaptives.\n\n[Footnote 144: Gregory IX. _Decretales_, i. 34. 2.]\n\n[Footnote 145: Franciscus a Victoria, _op. cit._ vi. 13, 35, 48; pp.\n232, 241, 246 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 146: _Ibid._ vi. 36, p. 241.]\n\n[Footnote 147: Hall, _Treatise on International Law_, p. 395, n. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 148: d'Argentr\u00e9, _L'histoire de Bretagne_, p. 391.]\n\n[Footnote 149: Mills, _op. cit._ p. 132.]\n\n[Footnote 150: Grotius, _op. cit._ iii. 11. 8.]\n\n[Footnote 151: _Ibid._ iii. 11. 14 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 152: Pufendorf, _De jure natur\u00e6 et gentium_, viii. 6. 8,\np. 885.]\n\n[Footnote 153: van Bynkershoek, _Questiones juris publici_, i. 1, p.\n31: \"Omnis enim vis in bello justa est.\" Hall, _Treatise on\nInternational Law_, p. 395, n. 1.]\n\nThe prevailing attitude towards war indicates the survival, in modern\ncivilisation, of the old feeling that the life of a foreigner is not\nequally sacred with the life of a countryman. In times of peace this\nfeeling is usually suppressed; it appears in no existing law on\nhomicide, nor does it, generally, find expression in public opinion.\nIt dares to disclose itself only in the form of national\naggressiveness, under the flag of patriotism, or, perhaps, in the\ntreatment of the aborigines of some distant country. The behaviour of\nEuropean colonists towards coloured races only too often reminds us of\nthe manner in which savages treat members of a foreign tribe. It was\nsaid that the frontier peasants at the Cape found nothing morally\nwrong in the razzias which they undertook against the Bushmans,\nwithout any provocation whatsoever, though they would consider it a\nheinous sin to do the same to their Christian fellow-men.[154] In\nAustralia {371} there are instances reported of young colonists\nemploying the Sunday in shooting blacks for the sake of sport. \"The\nlife of a native,\" says Mr. Lumholtz, \"has but little value,\nparticularly in the northern part of Australia, and once or twice\ncolonists offered to shoot blacks for me so that I might get their\nskulls. On the borders of civilisation men would think as little of\nshooting a black man as a dog. The law imposes death by hanging as the\npenalty for murdering a black man, but people live so far apart in\nthese uncivilised regions that a white man may in fact do what he\npleases with the blacks. . . . In the courts the blacks are\ndefenceless, for their testimony is not accepted. The jury is not\nlikely to declare a white man guilty of murdering a black man. On the\nother hand if a white man happens to be killed by the blacks, a cry is\nheard throughout the whole colony.\"[155]\n\n[Footnote 154: Waitz, _Introduction to Anthropology_, p. 314.]\n\n[Footnote 155: Lumholtz, _Among Cannibals_, p. 346 _sqq._ See also\nMathew, in _Jour. & Proceed. Roy. Soc. N. S. Wales_, xxiii. 390;\nBreton, _Excursions in New South Wales_, p. 200 _sq._; Stokes,\n_Discoveries in Australia_, ii. 459 _sqq._]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVI\n\nHOMICIDE IN GENERAL (_concluded_)\n\n\nIN the last two chapters we have only been concerned with the\nstatement of facts; we shall now make an attempt to explain those\nfacts. What is the source of the moral commandment, \"Thou shalt not\nkill\"? And what is the cause of its original narrowness and of its\nsubsequent extension?\n\nMr. Spencer suggests that the taking of life was regarded as a wrong\ndone to the family of the dead man or to the society of which he was a\nmember, before it came to be conceived of as a wrong done to the\nmurdered man himself.[1] But considering the mutual sympathy which\nprevails in small savage communities, it seems extremely probable that\nsympathetic resentment felt on account of the injury suffered by the\nvictim has from the beginning been a potent cause of the condemnation\nof homicide. Savages, no less than civilised mankind, practically\nregard a man's life as his highest good. Whatever opinions may be held\nabout the existence after death, whatever blessings may be supposed to\nawait the disembodied soul, nobody likes to be hurried into that\nexistence by another's will. According to early beliefs, the soul of a\nmurdered man is furious with the person who slew him, and finds no\nrest until his death has been avenged.[2] His friends and comrades\npity his fate and {373} feel resentment on his behalf; whereas, in a\nstate of culture where sympathy is restricted to a narrow group of\npeople, no such resentment will be felt if the victim is a member of\nanother group. On the contrary, when he is regarded as an actual or\npotential enemy, or when the slaying of him is taken for a test of\ncourage, the manslayer will be applauded by his own people, and his\ndeed will be styled good or meritorious. In some cases superstition,\nalso, is an encouragement to extra-tribal homicide. The Kukis believe\nthat, in paradise, all the enemies whom a man has killed will be in\nattendance on him as slaves.[3] A similar belief partly lies at the\nbottom of the custom of head-hunting;[4] whilst, according to other\nnotions, the soul of the man whose head is procured is transformed\ninto a guardian spirit.[5] A Kayan chief said of the custom in\nquestion, \"It brings us blessings, plentiful harvests, and keeps off\nsickness and pains; those who were once our enemies, hereby become our\nguardians, our friends, our benefactors.\"[6] Now, progress in\ncivilisation is generally marked by an expansion of the altruistic\nsentiment; and this largely explains why the prohibition of homicide\nhas come to embrace more and more comprehensive circles of men, and\nfinally, in the most advanced cases, the whole human race.\n\n[Footnote 1: Spencer, _Principles of Ethics_, ii.]\n\n[Footnote 2: See _infra_, on Blood-revenge.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Dalton, _Descriptive Ethnology of Bengal_, p. 46.]\n\n[Footnote 4: Ling Roth, _Natives of Sarawak_, ii. 141.]\n\n[Footnote 5: Wilken, _Het animisme bij de volken van den Indischen\nArchipel_, p. 124.]\n\n[Footnote 6: Furness, _Home-Life of Borneo Head-Hunters_, p. 59.]\n\nBut whilst homicide is censured as a wrong done to the person slain,\nit is at the same time viewed as an injury inflicted upon the\nsurvivors. It deprived his friends of his company, his family and\ncommunity of a useful member. In Arabia, when a man was killed, his\ntribesmen, instead of mentioning his name, used to say, \"Our blood has\nbeen spilt.\"[7] According to Lafitau, the loss of a single person\nseemed to the North American Indians a subject or great regret,\nbecause it weakened the family.[8] {374} Among the Basutos, again,\nmurder is condemned \"as a violation of the sacred rights of a father,\nwho is deprived of the services of his son, or of a widow and orphans,\nwho are left without support.\"[9] Especially when a person is\nconsidered more or less the property of another, the taking of his\nlife is largely looked upon as an offence against the owner. Mr.\nWarner states of the Kafirs, \"All homicide must . . . be atoned for;\nthe principle assumed being, that the persons of individuals are the\nproperty of the Chief, and that having been deprived of the life of a\nsubject, he must be compensated for it.\"[10] We meet with a somewhat\nsimilar notion in the history of English legislation. In his book on\nthe Commonwealth of England, Thomas Smith observes, \"Attempting to\nimpoison a man, or laying a waite to kill a man, though hee wound him\ndangerously, yet if death follow not, it is no fellony by the law of\nEngland, for the Prince hath lost no man, and life ought to be giuen\nwe say for life only.\"[11] In the Middle Ages homicide was conceived\nas a breach of the \"King's peace\"; and both before and afterwards it\nhas been stigmatised as a disturbance of public tranquillity and an\noutrage on public safety. In the Anglo-Saxon _wer_ and _wite_ we find\na clear distinction between the private and public aspects of\nhomicide.[12]\n\n[Footnote 7: Robertson Smith, _Marriage and Kinship in Early Arabia_,\np. 26.]\n\n[Footnote 8: Lafitau, _M[oe]urs des sauvages ameriquains_, ii. 163.]\n\n[Footnote 9: Casalis, _Basutos_, p. 224 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 10: Warner, in Maclean, _Compendium of Kafir Laws_,\np. 60 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 11: Thomas Smith, _Common-wealth of England_, p. 194 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 12: _Cf._ Pollock and Maitland, _History of English Law\nbefore the Time of Edward I._ i. 48.]\n\nA manslayer not only causes a loss to the group which he deprives of a\nmember, but he also may give trouble to his own people, who, in\nconsequence, disapprove of his act. Among the Yahgans of Tierra del\nFuego, says Mr. Bridges, \"many things conspire to make the shedding of\nblood a fearful thing. A murderer imperils all his friends and\nconnections more or less, and consequently estranges them from\nhimself. This state of things is the greatest safeguard to human life\nwe can conceive.\"[13] Among the K\u00e1firs of the Hindu-Kush, \"the mere\nkilling of an {375} individual is looked upon as a small affair,\nprovided that he does not belong to the tribe, or to another near\ntribe with which it is at peace, for in the latter case it might\nresult in war.\"[14]\n\n[Footnote 13: Bridges, in _South American Missionary Magazine_,\nxiii. 153.]\n\n[Footnote 14: Scott Robertson, _K\u00e1firs of the Hindu-Kush_, p. 194.]\n\nWe have still to notice the common idea that a manslayer is unclean.\nThe ghost of the victim persecutes him, or actually cleaves to him\nlike a miasma; and he must undergo rites of purification to get rid of\nthe infection. Until this is done, he is among many peoples regarded\nas a source of danger, and is consequently cut off from free\nintercourse with his fellows.\n\nAmong the Ponka Indians Mr. Dorsey found the belief that a murderer\nis surrounded by the ghosts, who keep up a constant whistling; that he\ncan never satisfy his hunger, though he eat much food; and that he\nmust not be allowed to roam at large lest high winds arise.[15] Of the\nwarriors among certain North American Indians Adair wrote that, \"as\nthey reckon they are become impure by shedding human blood,\" they\nhasten to observe a fast of three days.[16] Among the Natchez,\naccording to Charlevoix, \"those who for the first time have made a\nprisoner or taken off a scalp, must, for a month, abstain from seeing\ntheir wives, and from eating flesh. They imagine, that if they should\nfail in this, the souls of those whom they have killed or burnt, would\neffect their death, or that the first wound they should receive would\nbe mortal; or at least, that they should never gain any advantage over\ntheir enemies.\"[17] The Kafirs and Bechuanas practise various\nceremonies of purification after their fights.[18] The Basutos say,\n\"Human blood is heavy, it prevents him who has shed it from running\naway.\"[19] They consider it necessary that, on return from battle,\n\"the warriors should rid themselves, as soon as possible, of the blood\nthey have shed, or the shades of their victims would pursue them\nincessantly and disturb their slumbers\"; hence they go in full armour\nto the nearest stream, and, as a rule, at the moment they enter the\nwater a diviner, placed {376} higher up, throws some purifying\nsubstances into the current.[20] Among the Bantu Kavirondo, \"when a\nman has killed an enemy in warfare he shaves his head on his return\nhome, and his friends rub 'medicine' (generally the dung of goats)\nover his body to prevent the spirit of the deceased from worrying the\nman by whom he has been slain.\"[21] Among the Ja-luo, a warrior who\nhas slain an enemy not only shaves his hair, but, after entering the\nvillage, prepares a big feast to propitiate the man he has killed so\nthat his ghost may not give trouble.[22] Among the Wagogo of German\nEast Africa, the father of a young warrior who has shed blood gives to\nhis son a goat \"to clean his sword.\"[23] After the slaughter of the\nMidianites, those Israelites who had killed any one, or touched the\nslain, had to remain outside the camp for seven days, purifying\nthemselves and everything in their possession either by water, or\nfire, or both.[24] So, also, if a person had been slain in the land of\nIsrael, and the perpetrator of the deed could not be detected, the\nelders of the city which was next unto the slain had to undergo a\nceremony of purification in order to rid the city of \"the guilt of\ninnocent blood.[25] According to the Laws of Manu, a person who has\nunintentionally killed a Br\u00e2hmana shall make a hut in the forest and\ndwell in it during twelve years;[26] in order to remove the guilt he\nshall throw himself thrice headlong into a blazing fire,[27] or walk\nagainst the stream along the whole course of the river Sarasvat\u00ee,[28]\nor shave off all his hair.[29] The ancient Greeks believed that one\nwho had suffered a violent end, when newly dead, was angry with the\nauthor of his death.[30] The blood-guilty individual, as though\ninfected with a miasma, shunned all contact and conversation with\nother people, and avoided entering their dwellings.[31] Even the\ninvoluntary manslayer had to leave the country for some time;\naccording to Plato's 'Laws,' he \"must go out of the way of his victim\nfor the entire period of a year, and not let himself be found in any\nspot which was familiar to him throughout the country.\"[32] {377} Nor\nmust he return to his land until sacrifice had been offered and\nceremonies of purification performed.[33]\n\n[Footnote 15: Dorsey, 'Siouan Cults,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ xi. 420.]\n\n[Footnote 16: Adair, _History of the American Indians_, p. 388.]\n\n[Footnote 17: Charlevoix, _Voyage to North America_, ii. 203.]\n\n[Footnote 18: Arbousset and Daumas, _Exploratory Tour to the Colony of\nthe Cape of Good Hope_, p. 394 _sqq._ Alberti, _De Kaffers aan de\nZuidkust van Afrika_, p. 104.]\n\n[Footnote 19: Casalis, _op. cit._ p. 309.]\n\n[Footnote 20: _Ibid._ p. 258.]\n\n[Footnote 21: Johnston, _Uganda Protectorate_, ii. 743 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 22: _Ibid._ ii. 794.]\n\n[Footnote 23: Cole, 'Notes on the Wagogo of German East Africa,' in\n_Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxxii. 321.]\n\n[Footnote 24: _Numbers_, xxxi. 19 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 25: _Deuteronomy_, xxi. 1 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 26: _Laws of Manu_, xi. 73.]\n\n[Footnote 27: _Ibid._ xi. 74.]\n\n[Footnote 28: _Ibid._ xi. 78.]\n\n[Footnote 29: _Ibid._ xi. 79.]\n\n[Footnote 30: Plato, _Leges_, ix. 865.]\n\n[Footnote 31: M\u00fcller, _Dissertations on the Eumenides of \u00c6schylus_, p.\n103. Aeschylus says (Eumenides, 448 _sqq._) it is the custom that a\nmurderer should not speak anything until he has been sprinkled with\nthe spurted blood of a slain sucking-pig. _Cf._ Apollonius Rhodius,\n_Argonautica_, iv. 700 _sqq._; Aristotle, _De republica Atheniensium_,\n57.]\n\n[Footnote 32: Plato, _Leges_, ix. 865.]\n\n[Footnote 33: Demosthenes, _Contra Aristocratem_, 71 _sqq._, p. 643\n_sq._ M\u00fcller, _Dissertations_, p. 106 _sq._ Frazer, _Golden Bough_, i.\n341. On the uncleanness of manslayers see also Tylor, _Primitive\nCulture_, ii. 433 _sq._; Frazer, _op. cit._ i. 331 _sqq._]\n\nThe state of uncleanness incurred by the shedding of human blood does\nnot intrinsically involve moral guilt. As appears from many of the\ninstances just referred to, it results not only from the murder of a\ntribesman, but from so meritorious a deed as the slaying of a foe. In\nNukahiva, for instance, a man who has killed the highest person, or\none of the highest, among the enemy, is tabooed for ten days, during\nwhich he is not allowed to hold intercourse with his wife nor to\nmeddle with fire; but, at the same time, he is treated with\ndistinction, and presents of pigs are brought to him.[34] On the other\nhand, there can be no doubt that in various cases the polluting effect\nattributed to manslaughter has exercised some influence upon the moral\njudgment of the act. Whenever the commission of an act of homicide has\nany tendency at all to call forth moral blame, the disapproval of the\ndeed will easily be enhanced by the spiritual danger attending on it,\nas also by the inconvenient restrictions laid on the tabooed manslayer\nand the ceremonies of purification to which he is subject. The\ndeprivations which he has to undergo come to be looked upon in the\nlight of a punishment, and the rights of cleansing as a means of\nremoving guilt. The taboo rules which, among the Omahas, a murderer\nwhose life was spared had to observe for a period varying from two to\nfour years are spoken of by Mr. Dorsey as his \"punishment,\" and this\nseems also partly to have been the native point of view. The murderer\nsometimes wandered at night, crying, and lamenting his offence, until,\nat the end of the designated period, the kindred of his victim heard\nhis crying, and said:--\"It is enough. Begone, and walk among the\ncrowd. {378} Put on moccasins and wear a good robe.\"[35] Moreover, the\nnotion of a persecuting ghost may be replaced by the notion of an\navenging god. Confusions are common in the world of mystery; doings or\nfunctions attributed to one being are afterwards transferred to\nanother--this is a rule of which many important examples will be given\nin following chapters. The Jb\u00e2la of Northern Morocco do not nowadays\nbelieve in ghosts, yet they regard a person who has shed human blood\nto be in some degree unclean for the rest of his life. Poison oozes\nout from underneath his nails; hence anybody who drinks the water in\nwhich he has washed his hands will fall dangerously ill. The meat of\nan animal which he has killed is difficult to digest, and so is any\nfood eaten in his company. If he comes to a place where people are\ndigging a well, the water will at once run away. He is said to be\n_mejn\u00fbn_, haunted by _jn\u00fbn_ (_jinn_), a race of beings entirely\ndistinct from men, living or dead. The Greenlanders believed that an\nabortion or a child born under concealment was transformed into an\nevil spirit called _\u00e1ngiaq_, for the purpose of avenging the\ncrime.[36] In Eastern Central Africa, \"after killing a slave, the\nmaster is afraid of _Chilope_. This means that he will become\nemaciated, lose his eye-sight, and ultimately die a miserable death.\nHe therefore goes to his chief and gives him a certain fee (in cloth,\nor slaves, or such legal tenders), and says, 'Get me a charm\n(_luasi_), because I have slain a man.' When he has used this charm,\nwhich may be either drunk or administered in a bath, the danger passes\naway.\"[37] Among the Omahas the ghost of the murdered man was not lost\nsight of; the murderer \"was obliged to pitch his tent about a quarter\nof a mile from the rest of the tribe when they were going on the hunt\nlest the ghost of his victim should raise a high wind, which might\ncause damage.\" But at the same time his deed was considered offensive\nto {379} Wakanda; no one wished to eat with him, for they said, \"If we\neat with whom Wakanda hates, for his crime, Wakanda will hate us.\"[38]\nIn the Chinese books there are numerous instances of persons haunted\nby the souls of their victims on their death-bed, and in most of these\ncases the ghosts state expressly that they are avenging themselves\nwith the special authorisation of Heaven.[39] The Greek belief in the\nErinys of a murdered man no doubt originated in the earlier notion of\na persecuting ghost, whose anger or curses in later times were\npersonified as an independent spirit.[40] And the transformation went\nfurther still: the Erinyes were represented as the ministers of Zeus,\nwho by punishing the murderer carried out his divine will. Zeus was\nconsidered the originator of the rites of purification; when visited\nwith madness by the Erinyes, Ixion appealed to Zeus Hikesios, and at\nthe altar of Zeus Meilichios Theseus underwent purification for the\nshedding of kindred blood.[41] Originally, as it seems, only the\nmurder of a kinsman was an offence against Zeus and under the ban of\nthe Erinyes, but later on their sphere of action was expanded, and all\nbloodshed, if the victim had any rights at all within the city, became\na sin which needed purification.[42] Uncleanness was thus transformed\ninto spiritual impurity. When the pollution with which a manslayer is\ntainted is regarded as merely the work of a ghost or of some\nspirit-substitute who, like the Moorish _jn\u00fbn_, has nothing to do with\nthe administration of justice, it may be devoid of all moral\nsignificance in spite of the dread it inspires; but the case is\ndifferent when it comes to be conceived of as a divine punishment, or\nas a sin-pollution in the eyes of the supreme god. Such a\ntransformation of ideas could hardly take place {380} unless the act,\nconsidered polluting, were by itself apt to evoke moral disapproval.\nBut it is obvious that the gravity of the offence is increased by the\nreligious aspect it assumes.\n\n[Footnote 34: von Langsdorf, _Voyages and Travels_, i. 133.]\n\n[Footnote 35: Dorsey, 'Omaha Sociology,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._\niii. 369.]\n\n[Footnote 36: Rink, _Tales and Traditions of the Eskimo_, pp. 45,\n439 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 37: Macdonald, _Africana_, i. 168.]\n\n[Footnote 38: Dorsey, 'Omaha Sociology,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._\niii. 369.]\n\n[Footnote 39: de Groot, _Religious System of China_, (vol. iv. book)\nii. 441.]\n\n[Footnote 40: See M\u00fcller, _Dissertations_, p. 155 _sqq._; Rohde,\n_Psyche_, p. 247; _Idem_, 'Paralipomena,' in _Rheinisches Museum f\u00fcr\nPhilologie_, 1895, p. 6 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 41: Farnell, _Cults of the Greek States_, i. 66 _sqq._\nRohde, _Psyche_, p. 249. _Idem_, in _Rheinisches Museum_, 1895, p. 18.\nStengel, _Die griechischen Kultusaltert\u00fcmer_, p. 140.]\n\n[Footnote 42: Farnell, _op. cit._ i. 68, 71. Rohde, _Psyche_, p. 247.]\n\nIn yet another way the defiling effect attributed to the taking of\nhuman life has had an influence on religious and moral ideas. Such\ndefilement is shunned not only by men, but, in a still higher degree,\nby gods. The shedding of human blood is commonly prohibited in sacred\nplaces. \"In almost every Indian nation,\" says Adair, \"there are\nseveral peaceable towns, which are called 'old-beloved,' 'ancient,\nholy, or white towns'; they seem to have been formerly 'towns of\nrefuge,' for it is not in the memory of their oldest people, that ever\nhuman blood was shed in them; although they often force persons from\nthence, and put them to death elsewhere.\"[43] The Aricaras of the\nMissouri, according to Bradbury, have in the centre of the largest\nvillage a sacred lodge called the \"medicine lodge,\" which, \"in one\nparticular corresponds with the sanctuary of the Jews, as no blood is\non any account whatsoever to be spilled within it, not even that of an\nenemy.\"[44] At Athens the prosecution for homicide began with\ndebarring the criminal from all sanctuaries and assemblies consecrated\nby religious observances.[45] According to Greek ideas, purification\nwas an essential preliminary to an acceptable sacrifice.[46] Hector\nsaid, \"I shrink from offering a libation of gleaming wine to Zeus with\nhands unwashed; nor can it be in any way wise that one should pray to\nthe son of Kronos, god of the storm-cloud, all defiled with blood\n{381} and filth.\"[47] In many parts of Morocco, a man who has slain\nanother person is never afterwards allowed to kill the sacrificial\nsheep at the \"Great Feast.\"[48] When David had in his heart to build a\ntemple, God said to him, \"Thou shalt not build a house for my name,\nbecause thou hast been a man of war, and **hast shed blood.\"[49] A\ndecree of the penitential discipline of the Christian Church, which\nwas enforced even against emperors and generals, forbade anyone whose\nhands had been imbrued in blood to approach the altar without a\npreparatory period of penance.[50]\n\n[Footnote 43: Adair, _History of the American Indians_, p. 159.]\n\n[Footnote 44: Bradbury, _Travels in the Interior of America_, p. 165\n_sq._ Our informer adds, \"Nor is any one, having taken refuge there,\nto be forced from it\"; but with facts of this kind we are not\nconcerned at present. They belong to the right of sanctuary, in the\nstrict sense of the term, and, as will be seen, this right is based on\na different principle, which prevents even the polluted manslayer,\ntainted with newly shed blood, from being dragged out of the sanctuary\nto which he has fled in the capacity of a suppliant.]\n\n[Footnote 45: Aristotle, _De republica Atheniensium_, 57. M\u00fcller,\n_Dissertations_, p. 103.]\n\n[Footnote 46: Donaldson, 'Expiatory and Substitutionary Sacrifices of\nthe Greeks,' in _Transactions Roy. Soc. Edinburgh_, xxvii. 433.\nFarnell, _op. cit._ i. 72.]\n\n[Footnote 47: _Iliad_, vi. 266 _sqq._ _Cf._ Vergil, _\u00c6neis_,\nii. 717 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 48: I found this custom prevalent both among Arab and Berber\ntribes in different parts of the country; see my article, \"The Popular\nRitual of the Great Feast in Morocco,\" in _Folk-Lore_, xxii. 144.]\n\n[Footnote 49: _1 Chronicles_, xxviii. 2 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 50: Lecky, _History of European Morals_, ii. 39.]\n\nWhilst, from fear of contaminating anything holy, casual restrictions\nhave thus been imposed on all kinds of manslayers, whether murderers\nor those who have killed an enemy in righteous warfare, more stringent\nrules have been laid down for persons permanently connected with the\nreligious cult. Adair states that the \"holy men\" of the North American\nIndians, like the Jewish priests, were by their function absolutely\nforbidden to shed human blood, \"notwithstanding their propensity\nthereto, even for small injuries.\"[51] Herodotus says of the Persian\nMagi that they \"kill animals of all kinds with their own hands,\nexcepting dogs and men.\"[52] The Druids of Gaul never went to war,[53]\nprobably in order to keep themselves free from blood-pollution;[54] it\nis true, they sacrificed human victims to their gods, but those they\nburnt.[55] To the same class of facts belong those decrees of the\nChristian Church which forbade clergymen taking part in a battle.\nMoreover, if a Christian priest passed a sentence of death {382} he\nwas punished with degradation and imprisonment for life;[56] nor was\nhe allowed to write or dictate anything with a view to bringing about\nsuch a sentence.[57] He must not perform a surgical operation by help\nof fire or iron.[58] And if he killed a robber in order to save his\nlife, he had to do penance till his death.[59] The hands which had to\ndistribute the blood of the Lamb of God were not to be polluted with\nthe blood of those for whose salvation it was shed.[60]\n\n[Footnote 51: Adair, _op. cit._ p. 152.]\n\n[Footnote 52: Herodotus, i. 40. The Shluh of Southern Morocco and some\nother Berber tribes, in the central parts of the same country,\nconsider that not only homicide, but the killing of a dog for ever\nafter prevents a person from performing sacrifice at the \"Great\nFeast\"; see _Folk-Lore_, xxii, 144.]\n\n[Footnote 53: C\u00e6sar, _De bello gallico_, vi. 14.]\n\n[Footnote 54: d'Arbois de Jubainville, _Civilisation des Celtes_,\np. 254.]\n\n[Footnote 55: C\u00e6sar, _De bello gallico_, vi. 16.]\n\n[Footnote 56: Gratian, _Decretum_, ii. 23. 8. 30.]\n\n[Footnote 57: _Concilium Lateranense IV._, A.D. 1215, ch. 18\n(Labbe-Mansi, _Sacrorum Conciliorum collectio_, xxii. 1007).]\n\n[Footnote 58: _Concilium Lateranense IV._, A.D. 1215, ch. 18\n(Labbe-Mansi, _op. cit._ xxii. 1007).]\n\n[Footnote 59: Thomassin, _Dictionnaire de discipline eccl\u00e9siastique_,\nii. 1074.]\n\n[Footnote 60: _Ibid._ ii. 1069.]\n\nIt cannot be doubted that this horror of blood-pollution had a share\nin that regard for human life which from the beginning, and especially\nin early times, was a characteristic of Christianity. But in other\nrespects also, Christian feelings and beliefs had an inherent tendency\nto evoke such a sentiment. The cosmopolitan spirit of the Christian\nreligion could not allow, in theory at least, that the life of a man\nwas less sacred because he was a foreigner. The extraordinary\nimportance it attached to this earthly life as a preparation for a\nlife to come naturally increased the guilt of any one who, by cutting\nit short, not only killed the body, but probably to all eternity\ninjured the soul.[61] In a still higher degree than most other crimes,\nhomicide was regarded as an offence against God, because man had been\nmade in His image.[62] Gratian says that even the slayer of a Jew or a\nheathen has to undergo a severe penance, \"quia imaginem Dei et spem\nfutur\u00e6 conversionis exterminat.\"[63]\n\n[Footnote 61: _Concilium Lugdumense I._, A.D. 1245, Additio, de\nHomicidio (Labbe-Mansi, _op. cit._ xxiii. 670).]\n\n[Footnote 62: von Eicken, _Geschichte und System der Mittelalterlichen\nWeltanschauung_, p. 568.]\n\n[Footnote 63: Gratian, _Decretum_, i. 50. 40.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVII\n\nTHE KILLING OF PARENTS, SICK PERSONS, CHILDREN--FETICIDE\n\n\nWE have found that among mankind at large there is a moral rule which\nforbids people to kill members of their own society. We shall now see\nthat the stringency of this rule is subject to variations, depending\non the special relationship in which persons stand to one another or\non their social _status_, and that there are cases to which it does\nnot apply at all.\n\nOwing to the regard which children are expected to feel for their\nparents, parricide is considered the most aggravated form of murder.\nNowhere have parents been more venerated by their children than among\nthe nations of archaic culture, and nowhere has parricide been\nregarded with greater horror. In China it is punished with the most\nignominious of all capital punishments, the so-called \"cutting into\nsmall pieces\"; and in some instances, when the crime has occurred in a\ndistrict, in addition to all punishments inflicted on persons, the\nwall of the city where the deed was committed is pulled down in parts,\nor modified in shape, a round corner is substituted for a square one,\nor a gate removed to a new situation, or even closed up altogether.[1]\nIn Corea the parricide is burned to death.[2] {384} Among the ancient\nEgyptians, we are told, he was sentenced to be lacerated with\nsharpened reeds, and after being thrown on thorns he was burned.[3] In\nExodus we read of the \"smiting\" of parents, but parricide is not\nexpressly mentioned, perhaps because the Hebrew legislator, like Solon\nat Athens,[4] did not think it possible that any one could be guilty\nof so unnatural a barbarity.[5] Herodotus states that the same notion\nwas held by the ancient Persians, who said that no one ever yet killed\nhis own father or mother, and that all cases of so-called parricide if\ncarefully examined, would be found to have been committed by\nsupposititious children or those born in adultery, it being beyond the\nbounds of probability that a true father should be murdered by his own\nson.[6] Plato says in his 'Laws':--\"If a man could be slain more than\nonce, most justly would he who in a fit of passion has slain father or\nmother undergo many deaths. How can he whom, alone of all men, even in\ndefence of his life, and when about to suffer death at the hands of\nhis parents, no law will allow to kill his father or his mother who\nare the authors of his being, and whom the legislator will command to\nendure any extremity rather than do this--how can he, I say, lawfully\nreceive any other punishment?\"[7] At Athens parricides were the only\npersons accused of murder who were not allowed the chance of escaping\nbefore sentence was passed, but were instantly arrested.[8] According\nto Roman Law, a committer of _parricidium_ was not subjected to any of\nthe regular modes of capital punishment, but for \"the most execrable\nof crimes\" was provided \"the most strange of punishments.\" The\ncriminal was sewn up in a leathern sack with a cur, a cock, a viper,\nand an ape, and, when cooped up in this fearful prison, was hurled\ninto the sea, or into {385} some neighbouring river.[9] But by the\nterm _parricidium_ was not understood the murder of a parent only.\nAccording to the 'Lex Pompeia de parricidiis,' it included the murder\nof any of the following persons: an ascendant or descendant in any\ndegree,[10] a brother or sister, an uncle or aunt, a cousin, a husband\nor wife, a bridegroom or bride, a father- or mother-in-law, a son- or\ndaughter-in-law, a step-parent or step-child, a patron; and Mommsen\nsuggests that in earlier times it had a still wider significance,\nbeing applied to intentional homicide in general.[11] But whilst the\npunishment just referred to was in other cases of _parricidium_\nreplaced by banishment, it was, during the Empire at least, actually\ninflicted upon him who murdered an ascendant.[12]\n\n[Footnote 1: Doolittle, _Social Life of the Chinese_, i. 338 _sq._\nSmith, _Chinese Characteristics_, p. 229.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Griffis, _Corea_, p. 236.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Diodorus Siculus, _Bibliotheca historica_, i. 77. 8.]\n\n[Footnote 4: Diogenes La\u00ebrtius, _Solon_, 10. Cicero, _Pro S. Roscio\nAmerino_, 25. Orosius, _Histori\u00e6_, v. 16.]\n\n[Footnote 5: _Exodus_, xxi. 15. _Cf._ Keil, _Manual of Biblical\nArch\u00e6ology_, ii. 376.]\n\n[Footnote 6: Herodotus, i. 137.]\n\n[Footnote 7: Plato, _Leges_, ix. 869. _Cf._ _ibid._ ix. 873.]\n\n[Footnote 8: M\u00fcller, _Dissertations on the Eumenides of \u00c6schylus_, p.\n91. _Cf._ Euripides, _Orestes_, 442 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 9: _Institutiones_, iv. 18. 6.]\n\n[Footnote 10: Unless the descendant was in the _potestas_ of him who\ncommitted the deed.]\n\n[Footnote 11: Mommsen, _R\u00f6misches Strafrecht_, pp. 644, 645, 612 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 12: _Ibid._ p. 645 _sq._]\n\nWhilst Christianity generally increased the sanctity of human life, it\ncould add nothing to the horror with which parricide was regarded by\nthe ancients. The Church punished it more severely than ordinary\nmurder,[13] and so did, at least in Latin countries, the secular\nauthorities.[14] In France, even to this day, a person convicted of\nparricide is \"conduit sur le lieu de l'ex\u00e9cution en chemise, nu-pieds,\net la t\u00eate couverte d'un voile noir\";[15] and whilst _meurtre_ is\nexcusable if provoked by grave personal violence or by an attempt to\nbreak into a dwelling-house by day, parricide is never excusable under\nany circumstances.[16]\n\n[Footnote 13: Gregory III., _Judicia congrua p[oe]nitentibus_, ch. 3\n(Labbe-Mansi, _Conciliorum collectio_, xii. 289). _P[oe]nitentiale\nBigotianum_, iv. 1 (Wasserschleben, _Bussordnungen der abendl\u00e4ndischen\nKirche_, p. 453). _P[oe]nitent. Pseudo-Theodori_, xxi. 18 (_ibid._\np. 588).]\n\n[Footnote 14: Chauveau and H\u00e9lie, _Th\u00e9orie du Code P\u00e9nal_, iii. 394\n(France). Salvioli, _Manuale di storia del diritto italiano_, p. 570.\nIn Scotland, also, parricide formerly had a place in the list of\naggravated murders (Hume, _Commentaries on the Law of Scotland_, i.\n459 _sq._; for a sentence passed in 1688, see Pitcairn, _Criminal\nTrials in Scotland_, iii. 198); though nowadays it is penalised in the\nsame way as other forms of murder (Erskine, _Principles of the Law of\nScotland_, p. 559). There never was any special punishment for\nparricide in English law (Blackstone, _Commentaries on the Laws of\nEngland_, iv. 202. Stephen, _History of the Criminal Law of England_,\niii. 95).]\n\n[Footnote 15: _Code P\u00e9nal_, art. 13.]\n\n[Footnote 16: _Ibid._ art. 321 _sqq._]\n\n{386} As regards the feelings with which ordinary parricide is looked\nupon by uncivilised peoples, direct information is almost entirely\nwanting. It is rarely mentioned at all, no doubt because it is very\nunusual.[17] Among the Kafirs of Natal, though murder is generally\npunished by a fine, death is inflicted on him who kills a parent.[18]\nAmong the Ossetes a parricide draws upon himself a fearful punishment:\nhe is shut up in his house with all his possessions, surrounded by the\npopulace and burned alive.[19] To judge from the respect which, among\nthe majority of uncivilised peoples, children are considered to owe to\ntheir parents, it seems very probable that the murder of a father or a\nmother is generally condemned by them as a particularly detestable\nform of homicide. But to this rule there is an important exception.\nAccording to a custom prevalent among various savages or barbarians, a\nparent who is worn out with age or disease is abandoned or killed.\n\n[Footnote 17: Among the Omahas there have been a few cases of\nparricide caused by drunkenness (Dorsey, 'Omaha Sociology,' in _Ann.\nRep. Bur. Ethn._ iii. 369). A Chukchi killed his father for charging\nhim with cowardice and awkwardness (Sarytschew, 'Voyage of Discovery,'\nin _Collection of Modern and Contemporary Voyages_, vi. 51). In L\u00e1nda\n\"it is no uncommon thing for a son to murder his father in order to\nstep into his shoes\" (_Emin Pasha in Central Africa_, p. 230). See\nalso Wilson and Felkin, _Uganda_, i. 224.]\n\n[Footnote 18: Shooter, _Kafirs of Natal_, p. 103.]\n\n[Footnote 19: von Haxthausen, _Transcaucasia_, p. 415.]\n\nHearne states that, among the Northern Indians, one half at least of\nthe aged persons of both sexes, when no longer capable of walking, are\nleft alone to starve and perish of want.[20] Among the Californian\nGallinomero, when the father can no longer feebly creep to the forest\nto gather his back-load of fuel or a basket of acorns, and is only a\nburden to his sons, \"the poor old wretch is not infrequently thrown\ndown on his back and securely held while a stick is placed across his\nthroat, and two of them seat themselves on the ends of it until he\nceases to breathe.\"[21] The custom of killing or abandoning old\nparents has been noticed among several other North {387} American\ntribes,[22] the natives of Brazil,[23] various South Sea\nIslanders,[24] a few Australian tribes,[25] and some peoples in\nAfrica[26] and Asia.[27] According to ancient writers, it occurred\nformerly among many Asiatic[28] and European nations, including the\nVedic people[29] and peoples of Teutonic extraction.[30] As late as\nthe fifth or sixth century it was the custom among the Heruli for\nrelatives to kindle a funeral pile for their old folks, although a\nstranger was employed to give the death wound.[31] And there is an old\nEnglish tradition of \"the Holy Mawle, which they fancy hung behind the\nchurch door, which when the father was seaventie, the sonne might\nfetch to knock his father in the head, as effete and of no more\nuse.\"[32]\n\n[Footnote 20: Hearne, _Journey to the Northern Ocean_, p. 346.]\n\n[Footnote 21: Powers, _Tribes of California_, p. 178.]\n\n[Footnote 22: Nansen, _First Crossing of Greenland_, ii. 331 (natives\non the east coast of Greenland). Seemann, _Voyage of \"Herald,\"_ ii. 66\n(Eastern Eskimo). Catlin, _North American Indians_, i. 217. Lafitau,\n_M[oe]urs des sauvages ameriquains_, i. 488 _sq._ Domenech, _Seven\nYears' Residence in the Great Deserts of North America_, ii. 325\n(north-western tribes). Lewis and Clarke, _Travels to the Source of\nthe Missouri River_, p. 442 (Dacotahs, Assiniboins, the hunting tribes\non the Missouri).]\n\n[Footnote 23: von Martius, _Beitr\u00e4ge zur Ethnographie Amerika's_, i.\n126, 127, 393. von Eschwege, _Brasilien_, i. 231 _sq._ (Uerequen\u00e1s).\nAmong the Fuegians the practice in question seems to occur only\naccidentally (Bridges, in _A Voice for South America_, xiii. 206).]\n\n[Footnote 24: Codrington, _Melanesians_, p. 347. Romilly, _Western\nPacific_, p. 70 (Solomon Islanders). Brainne, _Nouvelle-Cal\u00e9donie_, p.\n255. Turner, _Samoa_, p. 335 _sq._ (Efatese). Seemann, _Viti_, p. 192\n_sq._ Williams and Calvert, _Fiji_, pp. 116, 157 _sq._ Angas,\n_Polynesia_, p. 342 (natives of Kunaie).]\n\n[Footnote 25: Eyre, _Central Australia_, ii. 382. Dawson, _Australian\nAborigines_, p. 62 (tribes in Western Victoria).]\n\n[Footnote 26: Arnot, _Garenganze_, p. 78 n. Andersson, _Lake Ngami_,\np. 197 _sq._ (Damaras). Kolben, _Present Stale of the Cape of Good\nHope_, i. 322, 334; Hahn, _The Supreme Being of the Khoi-Khoi_, p. 86\n(Hottentots). Lepsius, _Letters from Egypt_, p. 202 _sq._ (Negro\ntribes to the south of Kordofan). Post, _Afrikanische Jurisprudenz_,\ni. 298 _sq._ Sartori, 'Die Sitte der Alten- und Krankent\u00f6tung,' in\n_Globus_, lxvii. 108.]\n\n[Footnote 27: Hooper, _Ten Months among the Tents of the Tuski_, p.\n188 _sq._; Dall, _Alaska_, p. 383 _sqq._ (Chukchi). Rockhill, _Land of\nthe Lamas_, p. 81 (Kokonor Tibetans).]\n\n[Footnote 28: Herodotus, i. 216 (Massagetae). Strabo, xi. 8. 6\n(Massagetae); xi. 11. 3 (Bactrians); xi. 11. 8 (Caspians).]\n\n[Footnote 29: Zimmer, _Altindisches Leben_, p. 328.]\n\n[Footnote 30: Grimm, _Deutsche Rechtsalterth\u00fcmer_, p. 486 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 31: Procopius, _De bello gothico_, ii. 14. _Cf._ Grimm,\n_Kleinere Schriften_, ii. 241.]\n\n[Footnote 32: Thoms, _Anecdotes and Traditions_, p. 84.]\n\nHowever cruel this custom may appear to be, something is certainly to\nbe said in its favour. It is particularly common among nomadic hunting\ntribes, owing to the hardships of life and the inability of decrepit\npersons to keep up in the march. Mr. Morgan observes that, whilst\n{388} \"among the roving tribes of the wilderness the old and helpless\nwere frequently abandoned and, in some cases, hurried out of existence\nas an act of greater kindness than desertion,\" this practice was\nunknown among the Iroquois, who \"resided in permanent villages, which\nafforded a refuge for the aged.\"[33] With reference to certain tribes\nof Western Victoria, Mr. Dawson remarks that the old people are a\nburden to the tribe, and, should any sudden attack be made by an\nenemy, the most liable to be captured, in which case they would\nprobably be tortured and put to a lingering death.[34] Moreover, in\ntimes when the food-supply is insufficient to support all the members\nof a community, it is more reasonable that the old and useless should\nhave to perish than the young and vigorous. Hahn was told that, among\nthe Hottentots, aged parents were sometimes abandoned by very poor\npeople who had not food enough to support them.[35] And among peoples\nwho have reached a certain degree of wealth and comfort, the practice\nof killing the old folks, though no longer justified by necessity, may\nstill go on, partly through survival of a custom inherited from harder\ntimes, partly from the humane intent of putting an end to lingering\nmisery.[36] What appears to most of us as an atrocious practice may\nreally be an act of kindness, and is commonly approved of, or even\ninsisted upon, by the old people themselves. Speaking of the ancient\nHottentot custom of famishing super-annuated parents in order to cause\ntheir death, Kolben remarks:--\"If you represent to the Hottentots, as\nI have done very often, the inhumanity of this custom, they are\nastonished at the representation, as proceeding, in their opinion,\nfrom an inhumanity of your own. The custom, in their way of thinking,\nis supported by very pious and very filial considerations. 'Is it not\na cruelty.' they ask you, 'to suffer either man or woman to languish\nany considerable {389} time under a heavy, motionless old age? Can you\nsee a parent or a relative shaking and freezing under a cold, dreary,\nheavy, useless old age, and not think, in pity to them, of putting an\nend to their misery by putting, which is the only means, an end to\ntheir days?'\"[37] When Mr. Hooper, hearing of an old Chukchi woman who\nwas stabbed by her son, made some remarks on the frightful nature of\nthe act, his native companions answered him:--\"Why should not the old\nwoman die? Aged and feeble, weary of life, and a burden to herself and\nothers, she no longer desired to cumber the earth, and claimed of him\nwho owned nearest relationship the friendly stroke which should let\nout her scanty remnant of existence.\"[38] Catlin tells us that, among\nthe North American tribes who roamed about the prairies, the infirm\nold people themselves uniformly insisted upon being left behind,\nsaying, \"that they are old and of no further use--that they left their\nfathers in the same manner--that they wish to die, and their children\nmust not mourn for them.\"[39] In Melanesia, says Dr. Codrington, when\nsick and aged people were buried alive, it is certain that \"there was\ngenerally a kindness intended\"; they used themselves to beg their\nfriends to put them out of their misery, and it was even considered a\ndisgrace to the family of an aged chief if he was not buried\nalive.[40] In Fiji, also, it was regarded as a sign of filial\naffection to put an aged parent to death. In his description of the\nFijians Dr. Seemann observes, \"In a country where food is abundant,\nclothing scarcely required, and property as a general rule in the\npossession of the whole family rather than that of its head, children\nneed not wait for 'dead men's shoes' in order to become well off, and\nwe may, therefore, quite believe them when declaring that it is with\naching heart and at the repeated entreaties of their parents that they\nare induced to commit {390} what we justly consider a crime.\"[41] The\nceremony is not without a touch of tragic grandeur:--\"The son will\nkiss and weep over his aged father as he prepares him for the grave,\nand will exchange loving farewells with him as he heaps the earth\nlightly over him.\"[42] One reason why the old Fijian so eagerly\ndesired to escape extreme infirmity was perhaps \"the contempt which\nattaches to physical weakness among a nation of warriors, and the\nwrongs and insults which await those who are no longer able to protect\nthemselves\"; but another, and as it seems more potent, motive was the\nbelief that persons enter upon the delights of the future life with\nthe same faculties, mental and physical, as they possess at the hour\nof death, and that the spiritual life thus commences where the\ncorporeal existence terminates. \"With these views,\" \"says Dr. Hale,\n\"it is natural that they should desire to pass through this change\nbefore their mental and bodily powers are so enfeebled by age as to\ndeprive them of their capacity for enjoyment.\"[43] Finally, we have to\nobserve that in many cases the old people are not only killed, but\neaten, by the nearest relatives, and that the motive, or at least, the\nsole motive, for this procedure is not hunger or desire for human\nflesh.[44] It is described as \"an act of kindness\" or as a \"pious\nceremony,\" as a method of preventing the body from being eaten up by\nworms or injured by enemies.[45] Considering that many cannibals have\nan aversion to the bodies of men who have died a natural death, it is\nnot unreasonable to suppose that, in some instances, the old person is\nkilled for the purpose of being eaten, and that this is done with a\nview to benefiting him.[46] But, on the other hand, the \"pious\nceremony,\" like so many other funeral customs which are supposed to\ncomfort the dead, may be the survival of a practice which was\noriginally intended to promote the selfish interests of the living.\n\n[Footnote 33: Morgan, _League of the Iroqnois_, p. 171.]\n\n[Footnote 34: Dawson, _op. cit._ p. 62.]\n\n[Footnote 35: Hahn, _op. cit._ p. 86.]\n\n[Footnote 36: Tylor, 'Primitive Society,' in _Contemporary Review_,\nxxi. 705. _Idem_, _Anthropology_, p. 410 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 37: Kolben, _op. cit._ i. 322.]\n\n[Footnote 38: Hooper, _op. cit._ p. 188 _sq._ _Cf._ Sarytschew, _loc.\ncit._ vi. 50; Dall, _op. cit._ p. 385; von Wrangell, _Expedition to\nthe Polar Sea_, p. 122.]\n\n[Footnote 39: Catlin, _North American Indians_, i. 217.]\n\n[Footnote 40: Codrington, _op. cit._ p. 347. Turner, _Samoa_, p. 335\n_sq._ (Efatese).]\n\n[Footnote 41: Seemann, _Viti_, p. 193.]\n\n[Footnote 42: Fison and Howitt, _Kamilaroi and Kurnai_, p. 175.]\n\n[Footnote 43: Hale, _op. cit._ p. 65. Williams and Calvert, _op. cit._\np. 156. See also Erskine, _Islands of the Western Pacific_, p. 248.]\n\n[Footnote 44: For instances, see Steinmetz, _Endokannibalismus_,\n_passim_.]\n\n[Footnote 45: _Ibid._ pp. 3, 5, 17.]\n\n[Footnote 46: _Cf._ Herodotus' statement regarding the Massagetae,\ni. 216.]\n\n{391} Closely connected with the custom of doing away with decrepit\nparents is the habit, prevalent among certain peoples, of abandoning\nor killing persons suffering from some illness.\n\n\"The white man,\" Mr. Ward observes, \"can never, as long as he may\nlive in Africa, conquer his repugnance to the callous indifference to\nsuffering that he meets with everywhere in Arab and Negro. The dying\nare left by the wayside to die. The weak drop on the caravan road, and\nthe caravan passes on.\"[47] Among the Kafirs instances are not rare in\nwhich the dying are carried to the bush and left to perish, and among\nsome of them epileptics are cast over a precipice, or tied to a tree\nto be devoured by hyenas.[48] The Hottentots abandon patients\nsuffering from small-pox.[49] The southern Tan\u00e0la in Madagascar take a\nperson who becomes insensible during an illness, to the spot in the\nforest where they throw their dead, and should the unfortunate\ncreature so cast away revive and return to the village, they stone him\noutright to death.[50] In New Caledonia \"il est rare qu'un malade rend\nnaturellement le dernier soupir: quand il n'a plus sa connaissance,\nsouvent m\u00eame avant son agonie, on lui ferme la bouche et les narines\npour l'\u00e9touffer, ou bien on le tiraille de tous c\u00f4t\u00e9s par les jambes\net par les bras.\"[51] In Kandavu, of the Fiji Group, sick persons were\noften thrown into a cave, where the dead also were deposited.[52] In\nEfate, if a person in sickness showed signs of delirium, his grave was\ndug, and he was buried forthwith, to prevent the disease from\nspreading to other members of the family.[53] The Alfura \"kill their\nsick when they have no hope of their recovery.\"[54] Dobrizhoffer says\nof the Patagonians, \"Actuated by an irrational kind of pity, they bury\nthe dying before they expire.\"[55] In cases of cholera or small-pox\nepidemics, North American Indians have been known to desert their\nvillages, leaving all their sick behind, of whatever age or sex.[56]\nAccording to Dr. Nansen, it is not inconsistent with the moral code of\nthe Greenlanders \"to hasten the death of those {392} who are sick and\nin great suffering, or of those in delirium, of which they have a\ngreat horror.\"[57] Lieutenant Holm states that, in Eastern Greenland,\nwhen an individual is seriously ill, he consents, if his relatives\nrequest it, to end his sufferings by throwing himself into the sea;\nwhereas it is rare that a sick person is put to death, except in cases\nof disordered intellect.[58] At Igloolik \"a sick woman is frequently\nbuilt or blocked up in a snow-hut, and not a soul goes near to look in\nand ascertain whether she be alive or dead.\"[59]\n\n[Footnote 47: Ward, _Five Years with the Congo Cannibals_, p. 262.]\n\n[Footnote 48: Shooter, _Kafirs of Natal_, p. 238 _sq._ Kidd, _The\nEssential Kafir_, p. 247.]\n\n[Footnote 49: Le Vaillant, _Travels into the Interior Parts of\nAfrica_, ii. 112.]\n\n[Footnote 50: Sibree, _The Great African Island_, p. 291.]\n\n[Footnote 51: Brainne, _op. cit._ p. 255.]\n\n[Footnote 52: Williams and Calvert, _op. cit._ p. 159.]\n\n[Footnote 53: Turner, _Samoa_, p. 336.]\n\n[Footnote 54: Pfeiffer, _A Lady's Second Journey round the World_, i. 387.]\n\n[Footnote 55: Dobrizhoffer, _Account of the Abipones_, ii. 262.]\n\n[Footnote 56: Domenech, _op. cit._ ii. 326.]\n\n[Footnote 57: Nansen, _Eskimo Life_, p. 163.]\n\n[Footnote 58: 'East Greenland Eskimo,' in _Science_, vii. 172.]\n\n[Footnote 59: Lyon, _Private Journal_, p. 357. For other instances,\nsee Sartori, in _Globus_, lxvii. nr. 7 _sq._; von Martius, _op. cit._\ni. 126, 127, 393 (Brazilian tribes); Steller, _Beschreibung von dem\nLande Kamtschatka_, p. 354; Dawson, _op. cit._ p. 61, quoted _supra_,\np. 271.]\n\nThese and similar facts are largely explained by the pitiful condition\nof the invalid, the hardships of a wandering life, and the\nsuperstitious notions of ignorant men. In some cases the practice of\nkilling a dying person seems to be connected with a belief that the\ndeath-blow will save his soul.[60] In 1812, a leper was burnt alive at\nKatwa, near Calcutta, by his mother and sister, who believed that by\ntheir doing so he would gain a pure body in the next birth.[61] By\ncarrying the patient away before he dies, the survivors escape the\nsupposed danger of touching a corpse.[62] In the poorer provinces of\nthe kingdom of Kandy, when a sick person was despaired of, the fear of\nbecoming defiled, or of being obliged to change their habitation,\nfrequently induced those about him to take him into a wood, in spite\nof his cries and groans, and to leave him there, perhaps in the\nagonies of death.[63] But the most common motive for abandoning or\ndestroying sick people seems to be fear of infection or of demoniacal\npossession, which is regarded as the cause of various diseases.[64]\nAmong the North American Indians, we are told, \"the custom of\nabandoning the infirm or sick arose {393} from a superstitious fear of\nthe evil spirits which were supposed to have taken possession of\nthem.\"[65] In Tahiti, says Ellis, \"every disease was supposed to be\nthe effect of direct supernatural agency, and to be inflicted by the\ngods for some crime against the tabu, of which the sufferers had been\nguilty, or in consequence of some offering made by an enemy to procure\ntheir destruction. Hence, it is probable, in a great measure, resulted\ntheir neglect and cruel treatment of their sick.\"[66]\n\n[Footnote 60: Sartori, _loc. cit._ p. 127.]\n\n[Footnote 61: Crooke, _Popular Religion and Folk-Lore of Northern\nIndia_, ii. 169.]\n\n[Footnote 62: Shooter, _op. cit._ 239 (Kafirs of Natal). Kidd, _The\nEssential Kafir_, p. 247.]\n\n[Footnote 63: Joinville, 'Religion and Manners of the People of\nCeylon,' in _Asiatick Researches_, vii. 437 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 64: See Sartori, _loc. cit._ p. 110 _sq._; Lippert,\n_Kulturgeschichte der Menschheit_, i. 110; ii. 411.]\n\n[Footnote 65: Dorman, _Origin of Primitive Superstitions_, p. 392.]\n\n[Footnote 66: Ellis, _Polynesian Researches_, i. 395.]\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nWhilst the regard which children owe their parents makes parricide an\naggravated form of murder, the paternal power sometimes implies that,\nunder certain circumstances, the father is allowed to kill even his\ngrown-up child. Though the Chinese Penal Code provides a slight\npunishment for parents who punish disobedient children with death,[67]\nthe crime is practically ignored by the authorities.[68] Among the\nHebrews, in early times, a father might punish his incontinent\ndaughter with death.[69] The Roman house-father had _jus vit\u00e6\nnecisque_--the power of life and death--over his children. However,\nthis power did not imply that he could kill them without a just\ncause;[70] already in pagan times a father who killed his son\n\"latronis magis quam patris jure,\" was punished as a murderer.[71] As\nDean Milman observes, long before Christianity entered into Roman\nlegislation, \"the life of a child was as sacred as that of the parent;\nand Constantine, when he branded the murder of a son with the {394}\nname of parricide, hardly advanced upon the dominant feeling.[72] Nor\nis there any reason to suppose that, among savages, the father\npossesses an absolute right of life and death over his children. On\nthe contrary, among many of the lower races the existence of such a\nright is expressly denied.[73]\n\n[Footnote 67: _Ta Tsing Leu Lee_, sec. cccxix. p. 347:--\"If a father,\nmother, paternal grandfather or grandmother, chastises a disobedient\nchild or grandchild in a severe and uncustomary manner, so that he or\nshe dies, the party so offending shall be punished with 100\nblows.--When any of the aforesaid relations are guilty of killing such\ndisobedient child or grandchild designedly, the punishment shall be\nextended to 60 blows and one year's banishment.\"]\n\n[Footnote 68: Douglas, _Society in China_, p. 78 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 69: _Genesis_, xxxviii. 24.]\n\n[Footnote 70: Mittermaier, 'Beytr\u00e4ge zur Lehre vom Verbrechen des\nKindesmordes,' in _Neues Archiv des Criminalrechts_, vii. 4. Walter,\n_Geschichte des R\u00f6mischen Rechts_, \u00a7 537, vol. ii. 147. von Jhering,\n_Geist des r\u00f6mischen Rechts_, ii. 220. Mommsen, _R\u00f6misches\nStrafrecht_, p. 619.]\n\n[Footnote 71: _Digesta_, xlviii. 9. 5. Orosius, _Histori\u00e6_, v. 16.\nMommsen, _R\u00f6misches Strafrecht_, p. 618.]\n\n[Footnote 72: Milman, _History of Latin Christianity_, ii. 25.]\n\n[Footnote 73: Lang, in Steinmetz, _Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse von eingeborenen\nV\u00f6lkern in Afrika und Ozeanien_, p. 224 (Washambala). Desoignies,\n_ibid._ p. 271 (Msalala). Marx, _ibid._ p. 349 (Amahlubi). Kohler,\n'Recht der Hottentotten,' in _Zeitschr. f. vergl. Rechtswiss._ xv.\n347. Post, _Afrikanische Jurisprudenz_, i. 52 _sq._]\n\nBut whilst a father only in rare cases, and then merely as a measure\nof justice, is allowed to put to death his grown-up child, he very\nfrequently has the right of destroying a new-born infant. Nay, in many\ninstances infanticide is not only permitted, but enjoined by custom.\n\nAmong a great number of uncivilised peoples it is usual to kill an\ninfant if it is a bastard,[74] or if its mother dies,[75] or if it is\ndeformed or diseased,[76] or if there is anything unusual or uncanny\nabout it, or if it for some reason or other is regarded as an unlucky\nchild. In some parts of {395} Africa, for instance, a child who is\nborn with teeth,[77] or who cuts the upper front teeth before the\nunder,[78] or whose teeth present some other kind of irregularity,[79]\nis put to death. Among the natives of the Bondei country a child who\nis born head first is considered an unlucky child, and is strangled in\nconsequence.[80] The Kamchadales used to destroy children who were\nborn in very stormy weather;[81] and in Madagascar infants born in\nMarch or April, or in the last week of a month, or on a Wednesday or a\nFriday, were exposed or drowned or buried alive.[82] Among various\nsavages it is the custom that, if a woman gives birth to twins, one or\nboth of them are destroyed.[83] They are regarded sometimes as an\nindication of unfaithfulness on the part of the mother--in accordance\nwith the notion that one man cannot be the father of two children at\nthe same time[84]--sometimes as an evil portent or as the result of\nthe wrath of a fetish.[85] Miss Kingsley observes, \"There is always\nthe sense of there being something uncanny regarding twins in West\nAfrica, and in those tribes where they are not killed they are\nregarded {396} as requiring great care to prevent them from dying on\ntheir own account.\"[86] The Kafirs believe that unless the father\nplaces a lump of earth in the mouth of one of the babies he will lose\nhis strength.[87]\n\n[Footnote 74: Turner, _Samoa_, p. 304 (Savage Islanders). Elton, in\n_Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xvii. 93 (some Solomon Islanders). Munzinger,\n_Ostafrikanische Studien_, p. 145 (Beduan). Dyveyrier, _Exploration du\nSahara_, p. 428 (Touareg). Burton, _Sindh_, p. 244 (Belochis).\nHaberland, 'Der Kindermord als Volkssitte,' in _Globus_, xxxvii. 58.\nThe natives of Australia often kill half-caste children (Roth,\n_Ethnological Studies among the North-West-Central Queensland\nAborigines_, p. 184. Curr, _Recollections of Squatting in Victoria_,\np. 252. Haberland, _loc. cit._ p. 58).]\n\n[Footnote 75: Collins, _English Colony in New South Wales_, i. 607\n_sq._ (aborigines of Port Jackson). Dale, 'Natives inhabiting the\nBondei Country,' in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxv. 182. Comte de Cardi,\n'Ju-Ju Laws and Customs in the Niger Delta,' _ibid._ xxix. 58. Nansen,\n_First Crossing of Greenland_, ii. 330; Holm, 'Ethnologisk Skizze af\nAngmagsalikerne,' in _Meddelelser om Gr\u00f6nland_, x. 91 (Greenlanders).\nHaberland, _loc. cit._ p. 28 _sq._ Ploss, _Das Kind_, ii. 252, 254,\n258 _sq._ Chamberlain, _Child and Childhood in Folk-Thought_,\np. 110 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 76: Dawson, _op. cit._ p. 39 (tribes of Western Victoria).\nKicherer, quoted by Moffat, _Missionary Labours and Scenes in Southern\nAfrica_, p. 15 (Bushmans). Shooter, _Kafirs of Natal_, p. 89. Chapman,\n_Travels in the Interior of South Africa_, ii. 285 (Banamjua). Reade,\n_Savage Africa_, p. 244 (Equatorial Africans). New, _Life, Wanderings,\nand Labours in Eastern Africa_, p. 118; Krapf, _Travels_, p. 193 _sq._\n(Wanika). Georgi, _Russia_, iii. 134 (Kamchadales). Sarytschew, _loc.\ncit._ vi. 50; von Wrangell, _op. cit._ p. 122 (Chukchi). Simpson,\nquoted by Murdoch, 'Point Barrow Expedition,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur.\nEthn._ ix. 417 (Eskimo). Powers, _Tribes of California_, p. 382\n(Yokuts). Guinnard, _Three Years' Slavery among the Patagonians_, p.\n144. Haberland, _loc. cit._ p. 58 _sq._ Ploss, _Das Kind_, ii. 252,\n254, 255, 258.]\n\n[Footnote 77: Ploss, _Das Kind_, ii. 257, 259.]\n\n[Footnote 78: Livingstone, _Missionary Travels_, p. 577. Kingsley,\n_Travels in West Africa_, p. 472. Allen and Thomson, _Expedition to\nthe River Niger_, i. 243 _sq._ Mockler-Ferryman, _British Nigeria_,\np. 286 (Ibos).]\n\n[Footnote 79: Baumann, _Usambara_, pp. 131 (Wabondei), 237 (Wapare).]\n\n[Footnote 80: Dale, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxv. 183.]\n\n[Footnote 81: Krasheninnikoff, _History of Kamschatka_, p. 217.]\n\n[Footnote 82: Ploss, _Das Kind_, ii. 257. _Cf._ Little, _Madagascar_,\np. 60.]\n\n[Footnote 83: Dawson, _op. cit._ p. 39 (tribes of Western Victoria).\nSpencer and Gillen, _Native Tribes of Central Australia_, p. 52.\n_Idem_, _Northern Tribes of Central Australia_, p. 609. Romilly,\n_Western Pacific_, p. 70 (Solomon Islanders). Kolben, _op. cit._ i.\n144 (Hottentots). Shooter, _op. cit._ p. 88 (Kafirs of Natal).\nLivingstone, _Missionary Travels_, p. 577. Decle, _Three Years in\nSavage Africa_, p. 160 (Matabele). Chapman, _op. cit._ ii. 285\n(Banamjua). Baumann, _Usambara_, p. 131 (Wabondei). New, _op. cit._\npp. 118 (Wanika, formerly), 458 (Wadshagga). Burton, _Two Trips to\nGorilla Land_, i. 84. Kingsley, _Travels in West Africa_, p. 472\n_sqq._ Schoen and Crowther, _Journals_, p. 49 (Ibos on the Niger).\nComte de Cardi, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxix. 57 _sq._ (Negroes of the\nNiger Delta). Nyendael, quoted by Ling Roth, _Great Benin_, p. 35\n(people of Arebo). Ploss, _Das Kind_, ii. 267 _sq._ (African peoples),\n274 (some South American Indians). Schneider, _Die Naturv\u00f6lker_, i.\n305 _sq._ (some South American Indians). Krasheninnikoff, _op. cit._\np. 217 (Kamchadales).]\n\n[Footnote 84: Waitz, _Anthropologie der Naturv\u00f6lker_, iii. 394, 480\n(South American Indians). Dapper says (_Africa_, p. 473) that no twins\nare ever found in the country of Benin, because the people considered\nit a great dishonour to give birth to twins.]\n\n[Footnote 85: Allen and Thomson, _op. cit._ i. 243. Baumann,\n_Usambara_, p. 131 (Wabondei).]\n\n[Footnote 86: Kingsley, _Travels in West Africa_, p. 473, According to\nNyendael, twin-births are, on the contrary, esteemed good omens in\nmost parts of the Benin territory (Ling Roth, _Great Benin_, p.\n35).]\n\n[Footnote 87: Kidd, _The Essential Kafir_, p. 202.]\n\nIn the instances just referred to, the infant is killed either\nbecause, after the death of its mother, there is nobody to nurse it,\nor on account of the fault of its parents, especially the mother, or\nbecause it is held desirable that the sickly or defective should die\nat once, or out of superstitious fear. However, among many of the\nlower races, infanticide is not restricted to similar more or less\nexceptional cases, but is practised on a much larger scale. Custom\noften decides how many children are to be reared in each family, and\nnot infrequently the majority of infants are destroyed.\n\nInfanticide is common among various tribes in North and South\nAmerica.[88] Dobrizhoffer says that it was a rare exception among the\nAbipones to find a woman who had brought up two or three sons, whilst\nsome mothers killed all the children they bore, \"no one either\npreventing or avenging these murders.\"[89] According to Azara, the\nGuanas buried alive the majority of their female infants, and the\nMbayas suffered only one boy or one girl in a family to live;[90] but\nthe correctness of his statements has been questioned.[91] On the\nother hand there can be no doubt as to the extreme prevalence of\ninfanticide in the islands of the South Seas. In some of the principal\ngroups of Polynesia it was practised publicly and systematically,\nwithout compunction, to an extent almost incredible. During the whole\nperiod of his residence in the Society Islands, Ellis does {397} not\nrecollect having met with a single pagan woman who had not imbrued her\nhands in the blood of her offspring, and he thinks that there, as also\nin the Sandwich Islands, two-thirds of the children were destroyed by\ntheir parents.[92] \"No sense of irresolution or horror,\" he says,\n\"appeared to exist in the bosoms of those parents who deliberately\nresolved on the deed before the child was born. They often visited the\ndwellings of the foreigners, and spoke with perfect complacency of\ntheir cruel purpose\"; and when the missionaries tried to dissuade them\nfrom executing their intention, the only answer generally received was\nthat it was the custom of the country.[93] The Line Islanders allowed\nonly four children of a family to get the chance of life; the mother\nhad a right to rear one child, whereas it rested with the husband to\ndecide whether any more should live.[94] In Radack every mother was\npermitted to bring up three children, but the fourth and every\nsucceeding one she was obliged to bury alive herself, unless she was\nthe wife of a chief.[95] In Vaitupu, of the Ellice Archipelago, also,\n\"infanticide was ordered by law,\" and only two children were allowed\nto a family.[96] In New Zealand and the Marquesas infanticide, though\nnot so general, was yet of frequent occurrence and not regarded as a\ncrime.[97] In most of the Melanesian groups it was very common.[98] In\nthe Solomon Islands there still seem to be several places where it is\nthe custom to kill nearly all children soon after they are born, and\nto buy other children from foreign tribes, good care being taken not\nto buy them too young.[99] The practice of infanticide occurred at\nleast occasionally in Tasmania,[100] and, as it seems, almost\nuniversally in Australia. Mr. Curr supposes that the Australian woman,\nas a rule, reared only two boys and one girl, the rest of her children\nbeing destroyed.[101] \"In the laws known to her,\" says Mr. Brough\nSmyth, \"infanticide is a necessary practice, and one which, if\ndisregarded, would, under certain circumstances, be disapproved {398}\nof; and the disapproval would be marked by punishment.\"[102] Mr.\nTaplin was assured that, among the Narrinyeri, more than one-half of\nthe children born fell victims to this custom;[103] and in the\nDieyerie tribe hardly an old woman, if questioned, but will admit of\nhaving destroyed from two to four of her offspring.[104]\n\n[Footnote 88: Bessels, quoted by Murdoch, 'Point Barrow Expedition,'\nin _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ ix. 417 (Eskimo of Smith Sound). Nelson,\n'Eskimo about Bering Strait,' _ibid._ xviii. 289. Gibbs, 'Tribes of\nWestern Washington and Northwestern Oregon,' in _Contributions to\nNorth American Ethnology_, i. 198. Powers, _op. cit._ pp. 177, 184\n(Californian tribes). Yarrow, in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ i. 99 (Pimas\nof Arizona), Hawtrey, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxxi. 295 (Lengua\nIndians of the Paraguayan Chaco).]\n\n[Footnote 89: Dobrizhoffer, _op. cit._ ii. 98. For another account of\nthe infanticides of the Abipones, see _infra_, p. 400.]\n\n[Footnote 90: Azara, _Voyages dans l'Am\u00e9rique m\u00e9ridionale_, ii. 93, 115.]\n\n[Footnote 91: Wied-Neuwied, _Reise nach Brasilien_, ii. 39.]\n\n[Footnote 92: Ellis, _Polynesian Researches_, i. 252. _Idem_, _Tour\nthrough Hawaii_, p. 325.]\n\n[Footnote 93: _Idem_, _Polynesian Researches_, i. 250.]\n\n[Footnote 94: Tutuila, 'Line Islanders,' in _Jour. Polynesian\nSociety_, i. 267.]\n\n[Footnote 95: von Kotzebue, _Voyage of Discovery_, iii. 173.]\n\n[Footnote 96: Turner, _Samoa_, p. 284.]\n\n[Footnote 97: Hale, _U.S. Exploring Expedition. Vol. VI. Ethnography\nand Philology_, p. 15.]\n\n[Footnote 98: Codrington, _Melanesians_, p. 229. Turner, _Samoa_, p.\n333 (Efatese). Gill, _Life in the Southern Isles_, p. 213 (islands of\nTorres Straits). Atkinson, in _Folk-Lore_, xiv. 248 (New\nCaledonians).]\n\n[Footnote 99: Romilly, _Western Pacific_, p. 68 _sq._ _Cf._ Guppy,\n_Solomon Islands_, p. 42.]\n\n[Footnote 100: Ling Roth, _Aborigines of Tasmania_, p. 167 _sq._\nBonwick, _Daily Life and Origin of the Tasmanians_, p. 85. Brough\nSmyth, _Aborigines of Victoria_, ii. 386.]\n\n[Footnote 101: Curr, _The Australian Race_, i. 70.]\n\n[Footnote 102: Brough Smyth, _op. cit._ i. p. xxi. _Cf._ Oberl\u00e4nder,\n'Die Eingeborenen der Kolonie Victoria,' in _Globus_, iv. 279.]\n\n[Footnote 103: Taplin, 'Narrinyeri,' in Woods, _Native Tribes of South\nAustralia_, p. 13.]\n\n[Footnote 104: Gason, 'Manners and Customs of the Dieyerie Tribe,'\n_ibid._ p. 259.]\n\nAmong the Todas of India, up to the period of Mr. Sullivan's visit\nto their hills, about the year 1820, only one female child was allowed\nto live in each family.[105] With reference to the Kandhs, or Khonds,\nMacpherson observes, \"The practice of female infanticide is, I\nbelieve, not wholly unknown amongst any portion of the Khond people,\nwhile it exists in some of the tribes of the sect of Boora to such an\nextent, that no female infant is spared, except when a woman's first\nchild is a female, and that villages containing a hundred houses may\nbe seen without a female child.\"[106]\n\n[Footnote 105: Metz, _Tribes inhabiting the Neilgherry Hills_, p. 16.]\n\n[Footnote 106: Macpherson, _Memorials of Service in India_, p. 132.]\n\nIt is said that among the Guanches of the Canary Islands, in\nancient times, all children, except the first-born, were killed.[107]\nThe people of Madagascar frequently practised infanticide; but Ellis\nsays that they were much less addicted to it than the South Sea\nIslanders, a numerous offspring being generally a source of much\nsatisfaction.[108] According to Kolben, infanticide was common among\nthe Hottentots;[109] whereas Sparrman only states that \"the Hottentots\nare accustomed to inter, in case of the mother's death, children at\nthe breast alive,\"[110] and Le Vaillant altogether denies the\nexistence of customary infanticide among them.[111] Among the Swahili,\naccording to Baumann, infanticides are very common and hardly\ndisapproved of.[112] But the peoples of the African continent are not\ngenerally addicted to infanticide, except in such special cases as\nhave already come under our notice.\n\n[Footnote 107: Ploss, _Das Kind_, ii. 259 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 108: Little, _Madagascar_, p. 60. Ellis, _History of\nMadagascar_, i. 155, 160.]\n\n[Footnote 109: Kolben, _op. cit._ i. 333.]\n\n[Footnote 110: Sparrman, _Voyage to the Cape of Good Hope_, i. 358 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 111: Le Vaillant, _op. cit._ ii. 58 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 112: Baumann, _Usambara_, p. 42.]\n\nThe custom of infanticide, in its extensive form, has been attributed\nto various motives. Among some peoples mothers are said to kill their\nnew-born infants on account {399} of the trouble of rearing them,[113]\nor the consequent loss of beauty.[114] Another cause is the long\nsuckling time, generally lasting, among savages, for two, three, four\nyears, or even more, owing to want of soft food and animal milk.[115]\nWhen, as is very commonly the case, the husband must not cohabit with\nhis wife during the whole of this period,[116] he is naturally\ninclined to form other connections, and this seems in some instances\nto induce the mother to destroy her child.[117] In another respect,\nalso, the long suckling-time is an inducement to infanticide; among\ncertain Australian tribes an infant is killed immediately on birth\n\"when the mother is, or thinks she is, unable to rear it owing to\nthere being a young child whom she is still feeding.\"[118] Among the\nPimas of Arizona, again, infanticide is said to be connected with the\ncustom of destroying all the property of the husband when he dies.\n\"The women of the tribe, well aware that they will be poor should\ntheir husbands die, and that then they will have to provide for their\nchildren by their own exertions, do not care to have many children,\nand infanticide, both before and after birth, prevails to a great\nextent. This is not considered a crime.\"[119] But there can be little\ndoubt that the wholesale infanticide of many of the lower races is in\nthe main due to the hardships of savage life. The helpless infant may\nbe a great burden to the parents both in times of peace and in times\nof war. It may prevent the mother from following her husband about on\nhis wanderings in search of food, or otherwise encumber her in her\nwork.[120] Mr. Curr states of the Bangerang tribe of Victoria, with\nwhom he was intimate for ten years, that their habit of killing nearly\nhalf {400} of the children born resulted \"principally from the\ndifficulty, if not the impossibility, of transporting several children\nof tender age from place to place on their frequent marches.\"[121]\nConcerning the Abipones, Charlevoix observes:--\"They seldom rear but\none child of each sex, murdering the rest as fast as they come into\nthe world, till the eldest are strong enough to walk alone. They think\nto justify this cruelty by saying that, as they are almost constantly\ntravelling from one place to another, it is impossible for them to\ntake care of more infants than two at a time; one to be carried by the\nfather, and the other by the mother.\"[122] Among the Lenguas of the\nParaguayan Chaco an interval of seven or eight years is always\nobservable between children of the same family, infants born in this\ninterval being immediately killed. The reasons for this practice, says\nMr. Hawtrey, are obvious. \"The woman has the hard work of carrying\nfood from garden and field, and all the transport to do; the Lenguas\nare a nomadic race, and their frequent moves often entail journeys of\nfrom ten to twenty miles a day. . . . Travelling with natives under\nthese circumstances, one is forced to the conclusion that it would be\nimpossible for a mother to have more than one young child to carry and\nto care for.\"[123] Moreover, a little forethought tells the parents\nthat their child before long will become a consumer of provisions\nperhaps already too scanty for the family. Savages often suffer\ngreatly from want of food, and may have to choose between destroying\ntheir offspring or famishing themselves. Hence they often have\nrecourse to infanticide as a means of saving their lives; indeed,\namong several tribes, in case of famine, children are not only killed,\nbut eaten.[124] Urgent want is frequently represented by our\nauthorities as the main cause of infanticide;[125] and {401} their\nstatements are corroborated by the conspicuous prevalence of this\ncustom among poor tribes and in islands whose inhabitants are confined\nto a narrow territory with limited resources.\n\n[Footnote 113: Ellis, _Polynesian Researches_, i. 256 (Tahitians).\n_Idem_, _Tour through Hawaii_, p. 327. Polack, _Manners and Customs of\nthe New Zealanders_, ii. 92. Gason, _loc. cit._ p. 258 (Dieyerie\ntribe).]\n\n[Footnote 114: Williams, _Missionary Enterprises_, p. 565\n(Tahitians).]\n\n[Footnote 115: See Westermarck, _History of Human Marriage_, p. 484.]\n\n[Footnote 116: _Ibid._ p. 483.]\n\n[Footnote 117: Schneider, _Die Naturv\u00f6lker_, i. 297, 307.]\n\n[Footnote 118: Spencer and Gillen, _Native Tribes of Central\nAustralia_, pp. 51, 264. _Idem_, _Northern Tribes of Central\nAustralia_, p. 608. Oberl\u00e4nder, _loc. cit._ p. 279.]\n\n[Footnote 119: Yarrow, _loc. cit._ p. 99.]\n\n[Footnote 120: Turner, _Nineteen Years in Polynesia_, p. 394 (people\nof Vat\u00e9, New Hebrides). Polack, _op. cit._ ii. 93 (Maoris).]\n\n[Footnote 121: Curr, _Squatting in Victoria_, p. 252. Oberl\u00e4nder,\n_loc. cit._ p. 279. _Cf._ Fison and Howitt, _Kamilaroi and Kurnai_, p.\n259; Fraser, _Aborigines of New South Wales_, p. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 122: Charlevoix, _History of Paraguay_, i. 405.]\n\n[Footnote 123: Hawtrey, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxxi. 295.]\n\n[Footnote 124: See Steinmetz, _Endokannibalismus_, pp. 8, 13, 14, 17.]\n\n[Footnote 125: Nansen, _First Crossing of Greenland_, ii. 330. Nelson,\nin _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ xviii. 289 (Eskimo about Behring Strait).\nBrough Smyth, _op. cit._ i. 53; ii. 386 (aboriginal tribes of\nAustralia and Tasmania), von Kotzebue, _op. cit._ iii. 173 (natives of\nRadack). Tutuila, in. _Jour. Polynesian Soc._ i. 263 (Line Islanders).\nCampbell, _Wild Tribes of Khondistan_, p. 140 (Kandbs of Sooradah).\nMarshall, _A Phrenologist amongst the Todas_, p. 194. Kolben, _op.\ncit._ i. 144 (Hottentots). See also Haberland, _loc. cit._ p. 26;\nDimitroff, _Die Geringsch\u00e4tzung des menschlichen Lebens und ihre\nUrsachen bei den Naturv\u00f6lkern_, p. 162 _sqq._; Sutherland, _Origin\nand Growth of the Moral Instinct_, i. 115 _sqq._]\n\nIn the chapter dealing with human sacrifice we shall notice that\ninfanticide is in some cases practised as a sacrificial rite. In other\ncases infants are killed for medicinal purposes, without being\nsacrificed to any divine being.[126] Thus in the Luritcha tribe, in\nCentral Australia, \"it is not an infrequent custom, when a child is in\nweak health, to kill a younger and healthy one and then to feed the\nweakling on its flesh, the idea being that this will give to the weak\nchild the strength of the stronger one.\"[127] A curious motive for\nfemale infanticide is also worth mentioning. That the victims of this\npractice are most commonly, among several peoples almost exclusively,\nfemales,[128] is generally due to the greater usefulness of the men\nboth as food-providers and in war. But the Hakka, a Mongolian tribe in\nChina, often put their girls to a cruel death with a view to inducing\nthereby the soul to appear the next time in the shape of a\nboy.[129]\n\n[Footnote 126: See _infra_, p. 458 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 127: Spencer and Gillen, _Native Tribes of Central\nAustralia_, p. 475. _Cf._ _ibid._ p. 52.]\n\n[Footnote 128: _Cf._ Haberland, _loc. cit._ p. 56 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 129: Hubrig, quoted by Ploss, _Das Kind_, ii. 263.]\n\nThus various considerations have led men to destroy their own\noffspring. Under certain circumstances the advantages, real or\nimaginary, assumed to result from the deed have been sufficiently\ngreat to silence the voice of parental love, which, as will be seen,\nis to be found even in the bosom of a savage father. The resistance\noffered by this instinct would be so much the less as the child is\nkilled immediately after its birth, at a period of its life {402} when\nthe father's affection for it is as yet only dawning Even where, at\nfirst, infanticide was an exception, practised by a few members of the\ntribe, any interference from the side of the community may have been\nprevented by the notion that a person possesses proprietary rights\nover his offspring; and, once become habitual, infanticide easily grew\ninto a regular custom. In cases where it was found useful to the\ntribe, it would be enforced as a public duty; and even where there no\nlonger was any need for it, owing to changed conditions of life, the\nforce of habit might still keep the old custom alive.\n\nThough infanticide is thus regarded as allowable, or even obligatory,\namong many of the lower races, we must not suppose that they\nuniversally look upon it in this light. Mr. McLennan grossly\nexaggerated its prevalence when he asserted that female infanticide is\n\"common among savages everywhere.\"[130] Among a great number of them\nit is said to be unheard of or almost so,[131] and to these belong\npeoples of so low a type as the Andaman Islanders,[132] the\nBotocudos,[133] and certain Californian tribes.[134] The Veddahs of\nCeylon have never been known to practise it.[135] Among the Yahgans of\nTierra del Fuego, Mr. Bridges informs me, it occurred only\noccasionally, and then it was almost always the deed of the mother,\nwho acted from \"jealousy, or hatred of her husband, or because of\ndesertion and wretchedness.\"[136] Mr. Fison, who has lived for a long\ntime among uncivilised races, thinks it will be found that infanticide\nis far less common among the lower savages than it is among the more\nadvanced tribes.[137] Considering {403} further that the custom of\ninfanticide, being opposed to the instinct of parental love,\npresupposes a certain amount of reasoning or forethought, it seems\nprobable that, where it occurs, it is not a survival of earliest\nsavagery, but has grown up under specific conditions in later stages\nof development.[138] It is, for instance, very generally asserted that\ncertain Indians in California never committed infanticide before the\narrival of the whites;[139] and Ellis thinks there is every reason to\nsuppose that this custom was practised less extensively by the\nPolynesians during the early periods of their history than it was\nafterwards.[140]\n\n[Footnote 130: McLennan, _Studies in Ancient History_, p. 75.]\n\n[Footnote 131: See Westermarck, _History of Human Marriage_, p. 312\n_sq._; and, besides the authorities there referred to, Dorsey, 'Omaha\nSociology,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ iii. 369; Kirke, _Twenty-five\nYears in British Guiana_, p. 160; Chalmers, _Pioneering in New\nGuinea_, p. 163; Hodgson, _Miscellaneous Essays_, p. 123 (B\u00f3do and\nDhim\u00e1ls); Baumann, _Durch Massailand zur Nilquelle_, p. 161\n(Masai).]\n\n[Footnote 132: Man, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xii. 329.]\n\n[Footnote 133: Wied-Neuwied, _op. cit._ ii. 39. Keane, in _Jour.\nAnthr. Inst._ xiii. 206.]\n\n[Footnote 134: Powers, _op. cit._ pp. 192, 271, 382.]\n\n[Footnote 135: Sarasin, _Ergebnisse naturwissenschaftlicher\nForschungen auf Ceylon_, iii. 469, 539.]\n\n[Footnote 136: Bridges, in a letter dated Downeast, Tierra del Fuego,\nAugust 28th, 1888.]\n\n[Footnote 137: Fison and Howitt, _Kamilaroi and Kurnai_, p. 134 _sqq._\n_Cf._ Farrer, _Primitive Manners and Customs_, p. 224; Sutherland,\n_op. cit._ i. 114 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 138: _Cf._ Darwin, _Descent of Man_, p. 594.]\n\n[Footnote 139: Powers, _op. cit._ p. 207. _Cf._ _ibid._ p. 183.]\n\n[Footnote 140: Ellis, _Polynesian Researches_, i. 249.]\n\nWhere infanticide is not sanctioned by custom, the occasional\ncommission of it has a tendency to call forth disapproval or excite\nhorror. The Blackfeet are said to believe that women who have been\nguilty of this crime will never reach the happy mountain after death,\nbut are compelled to hover round the seats of their crimes, with\nbranches of trees tied to their legs.[141] Speaking of another North\nAmerican tribe, the Potawatomis, Keating observes:--\"In a few\ninstances, it is said that children born deformed have been destroyed\nby their mothers, but these instances are rare, and whenever\ndiscovered, uniformly bring them into disrepute, and are not\nunfrequently punished by some of the near relations. Independently of\nthese cases, which are but rare, a few instances of infanticide, by\nsingle women, in order to conceal intrigue, have been heard of; but\nthey are always treated with abhorrence.\"[142] Among the Omahas\n\"parents had no right to put their children to death.\"[143] The Aleuts\nbelieved that a child-murder would bring misfortune on the whole\nvillage.[144] The Brazilian Macusis[145] and Botocudos[146] look upon\nthe deed with horror. At Ulea, {404} of the Caroline Islands, \"the\nprince would have the unnatural mother punished with death.\"[147] So,\ntoo, Herr Valdau tells us of a Bakundu woman who, accused of\ninfanticide, was condemned to death.[148] In Ashanti a man is punished\nfor the murder of his child.[149] Among the Gaika tribe, of the\nKafirs, the killing of a child after birth is punishable as murder,\nthe fine going to the chief.[150] Nay, even peoples among whom\ninfanticide is habitual seem now and then to have a feeling that the\nact is not quite correct. Mr. Brough Smyth asserts that the Australian\nBlack is himself ashamed of it;[151] and Mr. Curr has no doubt that he\nfeels, in the commencement of his career at least, that infanticide is\nwrong, as also that its committal brings remorse.[152]\n\n[Footnote 141: Richardson, in Franklin, _Journey to the Shores of the\nPolar Sea_, p. 77.]\n\n[Footnote 142: Keating, _op. cit._ i. 99.]\n\n[Footnote 143: Dorsey, in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ iii. 268.]\n\n[Footnote 144: Dall, _op. cit._ p. 399.]\n\n[Footnote 145: Waitz, _op. cit._ iii. 391.]\n\n[Footnote 146: Wied-Neuwied, _op. cit._ ii. 39.]\n\n[Footnote 147: von Kotzebue, _op. cit._ iii. 211.]\n\n[Footnote 148: Valdau, in _Ymer_, v. 280.]\n\n[Footnote 149: Bowdich, _Mission from Cape Coast Castle to Ashantee_,\np. 258.]\n\n[Footnote 150: Maclean, _Compendium of Kafir Laws and Customs_, p. 111.]\n\n[Footnote 151: Brough Smyth, _op. cit._ i. 54.]\n\n[Footnote 152: Curr, _The Australian Race_, i. 100.]\n\nThe custom of infanticide in most cases requires that the child should\nbe killed immediately or soon after its birth. Among certain North\nAmerican Indians \"the right of destroying a child lasted only till it\nwas a month old,\" after which time the feeling of the tribe was\nagainst its death.[153] Ellis says of the Society Islanders:--\"The\nhorrid act, if not committed at the time the infant entered the world,\nwas not perpetrated at any subsequent period . . . . If the little\nstranger was, from irresolution, the mingled emotions that struggled\nfor mastery in its mother's bosom, or any other cause, suffered to\nlive ten minutes or half an hour, it was safe; instead of a monster's\ngrasp, it received a mother's caress and a mother's smile, and was\nafterwards nursed with solicitude and tenderness.\"[154] Almost the\nsame is said of other South Sea Islanders[155] and of tribes\ninhabiting the Australian continent.[156] That the custom of\ninfanticide is generally {405} restricted to the destruction of\nnew-born babies also appears from various statements as to the\nparental love of those peoples who are addicted to this practice.[157]\nIn Fiji \"such children as are allowed to live are treated with a\nfoolish fondness.\"[158] Among the Narrinyeri, \"only let it be\ndetermined that an infant's life shall be saved, and there are no\nbounds to the fondness and indulgence with which it is treated\";[159]\nand with reference to other Australian tribes we are told that it is\nbrought up with greater care than generally falls to the lot of\nchildren belonging to the poorer classes in Europe.[160] Among the\nIndians of the Pampas and other Indians of that neighbourhood, who\nabandon deformed or sickly-looking children to the wild dogs and birds\nof prey, an infant becomes, from the moment it is considered worthy to\nlive, \"the object of the whole love of its parents, who, if necessary,\nwill submit themselves to the greatest privations to satisfy its least\nwants or exactions.\"[161] In Madagascar, according to Ellis, \"nothing\ncan exceed the affection with which the infant is treated by its\nparents and other members of the family; the indulgence is more\nfrequently carried to excess than otherwise.\"[162] From these and\nsimilar facts, as also from the general absence of statements to the\ncontrary, I conclude that murders of children who have been allowed to\nsurvive their earliest infancy are very rare, though not quite\nunknown,[163] among the lower races.\n\n[Footnote 153: Schoolcraft, quoted by Sutherland, _op. cit._ i. 119.]\n\n[Footnote 154: Ellis, _Polynesian Researches_, i. 255.]\n\n[Footnote 155: Waitz-Gerland, _op. cit._ vi. 138, 139, 638. Angas,\n_Savage Life and Scenes in Australia and New Zealand_, i. 313.]\n\n[Footnote 156: Ploss, _Das Kind_, ii. 255. Spencer and Gillen, _Native\nTribes of Central Australia_, p. 51. _Iidem_, _Northern Tribes of\nCentral Australia_, p. 608.]\n\n[Footnote 157: See _infra_, p. 529 _sqq._; also Haberland, _loc. cit._\np. 29, and Sutherland, _op. cit._ i. 115 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 158: Williams and Calvert, _op. cit._ p. 142.]\n\n[Footnote 159: Taplin, in Woods, _Native Tribes of South Australia_,\np. 15.]\n\n[Footnote 160: Brough Smyth, _op. cit._ i. 51. Meyer, 'Manners and\nCustoms of the Aborigines of the Encounter Bay Tribe,' in Woods,\n_Native Tribes of South Australia_, p. 186.]\n\n[Footnote 161: Guinnard, _op. cit._ p. 144.]\n\n[Footnote 162: Ellis, _History of Madagascar_, i. 161.]\n\n[Footnote 163: Among the Sandwich Islanders \"the infant, after living\na week, a month, or even a year, was still insecure, as some were\ndestroyed when able to walk\" (Ellis, _Tour through Hawaii_, p. 325).\nAmong the Eskimo about Behring Strait, \"girls were often killed when\nfrom 4 to 6 years of age\" (Nelson, in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._\nxviii. 289).]\n\nThe custom of infanticide prevails, or has prevailed, not only in the\nsavage world, but among semi-civilised and {406} civilised races. In\nthe poorest districts of China female infants are often destroyed by\ntheir parents immediately after their birth, chiefly on account of\npoverty.[164] Though disapproved of by educated Chinese, the practice\nis treated with forbearance or indifference by the mass of the people,\nand is acquiesced in by the mandarins.[165] \"When seriously appealed\nto on the subject,\" says the Rev. J. Doolittle, \"though all deprecate\nit as contrary to the dictates of reason and the instincts of nature,\nmany are ready boldly to apologise for it, and declare it to be\nnecessary, especially in the families of the excessively poor.\"[166]\nHowever, infanticide is neither directly sanctioned by the government,\nnor agreeable to the general spirit of the laws and institutions of\nthe Empire;[167] and it is prohibited both by Buddhism and\nTaouism.[168] According to Dr. de Groot, the belief that the spirits\nof the dead may, with authorisation of Heaven, take vengeance on the\nliving, has a very salutary effect on female infanticide in China.\n\"The fear that the souls of the murdered little ones may bring\nmisfortune, induces many a father or mother to lay the girls they are\nunwilling to bring up in the street for adoption into some family, or\ninto a foundling-hospital.\"[169]\n\n[Footnote 164: Gutzlaff, _Sketch of Chinese History_, i. 59. Wells\nWilliams, _Middle Kingdom_, ii. 240 _sqq._ Douglas, _Society in\nChina_, p. 354 _sqq._ Doolittle, _Social Life of the Chinese_, ii. 206.]\n\n[Footnote 165: Doolittle, _op. cit._ ii. 203, 208 _sq._ Wells\nWilliams, _op. cit._ i. 836; ii. 242. Douglas, _Society in China_, p.\n354. Ploss, _Das Kind_, ii. 262.]\n\n[Footnote 166: Doolittle, _op. cit._ ii. 208.]\n\n[Footnote 167: Staunton, in his translation of _Ta Tsing Leu Lee_,\np. 347 n. *]\n\n[Footnote 168: _Th\u00e2i Shang_, 4. Giles, _Strange Stories from a Chinese\nStudio_, ii. 377. Douglas, _Confucianism and Taouism_, p. 267.\n_Indo-Chinese Gleaner_, iii. 164.]\n\n[Footnote 169: de Groot, _Religions System of China_, (vol. iv. book)\nii. 457 _sqq._]\n\nIn ancient times the Semites, or at least some of them, not only\npractised infanticide, but, under certain circumstances, approved of\nit or regarded it as a duty. According to an ancient Arabic proverb,\nit was a generous deed to bury a female child;[170] and we read of\n[(]O[s.]aim the Fazarite who did not dare to save alive his daughter\nLac\u00ee[t.]a, without concealing her from the people, although she was\nhis only child.[171] Considering that among the {407} nomads of\nArabia, who suffer constantly from hunger during a great part of the\nyear, a daughter is a burden to the poor, we may suppose, with\nProfessor Robertson Smith, that \"infanticide was as natural to them as\nto other savage peoples in the hard struggle for life.\"[172] It was\ncondemned, however, by the Prophet:--\"Slay not your children for fear\nof poverty: we will provide for them; beware! for to slay them is ever\na great sin.\"[173] In the Mosaic Law, on the other hand, infanticide\nis never touched upon, and, in all probability, it hardly occurred\namong the Hebrews in historic times. But we have reason to believe\nthat, at an earlier period, among them as also among other branches of\nthe Semitic race, child-murder was frequently practised as a\nsacrificial rite.[174]\n\n[Footnote 170: Freytag, _Arabum Proverbia_, i. 229.]\n\n[Footnote 171: Robertson Smith, _Kinship and Marriage in Early\nArabia_, p. 293.]\n\n[Footnote 172: _Ibid._ p. 294.]\n\n[Footnote 173: _Koran_, xvii. 33; also, _ibid._ vi. 141, 152, and\nlxxxi. 8 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 174: See _infra_, on Human Sacrifice.]\n\nThe murder of female infants, whether by the direct employment of\nhomicidal means, or by exposure to privation and neglect, has for ages\nbeen a common practice, or even a genuine custom, among various Hindu\ncastes.[175] Yet they are well aware that it is prohibited by their\nsacred books; according to the Laws of Manu, the King shall put to\ndeath \"those who slay women, infants, or Br\u00e2hmanas.\"[176] Even the\nRajputs, who--out of family pride and owing to the expenses connected\nwith the marriage ceremony--were particularly addicted to infanticide,\nconsidered that a family in which such a deed had been perpetrated\nwas, in consequence, an object of divine displeasure. On the twelfth\nday, therefore, the family priest was sent for, and, by suitable\ngratuities, absolution was obtained. In the room where the infant was\nborn and destroyed, he also prepared and ate some food with which the\nfamily provided him; this was considered a _hom_, or burnt offering,\nand, by eating it in that place, the priest was supposed to take the\nwhole _hutteea_, or sin, upon himself, and to cleanse the family from\nit.[177]\n\n[Footnote 175: Wilkins, _Modern Hinduism_, 431. Chevers, _Manual of\nMedical Jurisprudence for India_, p. 750 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 176: _Laws of Manu_, ix. 232.]\n\n[Footnote 177: 'Oude as it was before the Annexation,' in _Church\nMissionary Intelligencer_, xi. 81 _sq._]\n\n{408} Exposure of new-born children was practised by the people of the\nVedic age,[178] as also by other so-called Aryan peoples in ancient\ntimes.[179] The Teutonic father had to decide whether the child,\nwhilst still lying on the ground, should be accepted as a member of\nthe family, or whether it should be exposed. If he lifted it up, and\nsome water was poured over it, or a drop of milk or honey passed its\nlips, it was generally safe. But apart from these restrictions, custom\nseems to have been in favour of exposure only under certain\ncircumstances, exactly similar to those in which infanticide is\npractised among many modern savages: if the child was born out of\nwedlock, or if it was deformed or sickly, or if it was born on an\nunlucky day, or in case of twins--one of whom was always supposed to\nbe illegitimate--or if the parents were very poor. The exposed infant,\nhowever, was not necessarily destined to die, but was, in many cases,\nadopted by somebody who could afford to rear it.[180]\n\n[Footnote 178: Kaegi, _Rigveda_, p. 16.]\n\n[Footnote 179: Strieker, 'Ethnographische Notizen \u00fcber den Kindermord\nund die k\u00fcnstliche Fruchtabtreibung,' in _Archiv f\u00fcr Anthropologie_,\nv. 451 (Celts and Slavs).]\n\n[Footnote 180: Grimm, _Deutsche Rechtsalterth\u00fcmer_, p. 455 _sq._\nWilda, _Strafrecht der Germanen_, pp. 704, 725. Maurer, _Bekehrung des\nNorwegischen Stammes_ ii. 181. Weinhold, _Altnordisches Leben_, p.\n261. Nordstr\u00f6m, _Bidrag till den svenska samh\u00e4lls-f\u00f6rfattningens\nhistoria_, ii. 44. Stemann, _Den danske Retshistorie indtil Christian\nV.'s Lov_, p. 359.]\n\nThe exposure of deformed or sickly infants was undoubtedly an ancient\ncustom in Greece; in Sparta, at least, it was enjoined by law. It was\nalso approved of by the most enlightened among the Greek philosophers.\nPlato condemns all those children who are imperfect in limbs, as also\nthose who are born from depraved citizens, to be buried in some\nobscure and unknown place; he maintains, moreover, that when both\nsexes have passed the age assigned for presenting children to the\nState, no child is to be brought to light, and that any infant which\nis by accident born alive, shall be done away with.[181] Aristotle not\nonly lays down the law with respect to the exposing or bringing up of\nchildren, that \"nothing imperfect or maimed shall be brought up,\" but\nproposes that {409} the number of children allowed to each marriage\nshall be regulated by the State, and that, if any woman be pregnant\nafter she has produced the prescribed number, an abortion shall be\nprocured before the fetus has life.[182] These views were in perfect\nharmony with the general tendency of the Greeks to subordinate the\nfeelings of the individual to the interest of the State. Confined as\nthey were to a very limited territory, they were naturally afraid of\nbeing burdened with the maintenance of persons whose lives could be of\nno use. It is necessary, says Aristotle, to take care that the\nincrease of the people should not exceed a certain number, in order to\navoid poverty and its concomitants, sedition and other evils.[183] Yet\nthe exposure of healthy infants, which was frequently practised in\nGreece, was hardly approved of by public opinion, although\ntolerated,[184] except at Thebes, where it was a crime punishable with\ndeath.[185]\n\n[Footnote 181: Plato, _Respublica_, v. 460 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 182: Aristotle, _Politica_, vii. 16, p. 1335.]\n\n[Footnote 183: _Ibid._ ii. 6, p. 1265.]\n\n[Footnote 184: Schmidt, _Ethik der alten Griechen_, ii. 138, 463.\nHermann-Blumner, _Lehrbuch der griechischen Privatalterth\u00fcmer_, p. 77.]\n\n[Footnote 185: Aelian, _Varia Histori\u00e6_, ii. 7.]\n\nIn Rome custom or law enjoined the destruction of deformed infants.\nAccording to a law of the Twelve Tables, referred to by Cicero,\nmonstrous abortions were not suffered to live.[186] With reference to\na much later period Seneca writes, \"We destroy monstrous births, and\nwe also drown our children if they are born weakly or unnaturally\nformed\"; he adds that it is an act of reason thus to separate what is\nuseless from what is sound.[187] But there was no tendency in Rome to\nencourage infanticide beyond these limits. It has been observed that,\nwhilst the Greek policy was rather to restrain, the Roman policy was\nalways to encourage, population.[188] Being engaged in incessant wars\nof conquest, Rome was never afraid of being over-populated, but, on\nthe contrary, tried to increase the number of its citizens by\naccording special privileges to the fathers of many children, and\nexempting poor parents from most {410} of the burden of taxation.[189]\nThe power of life and death which the Roman father possessed over his\nchildren undoubtedly involved the legal right of destroying or\nexposing new-born infants; but it is equally certain that the act was\nfrequently disapproved of.[190] An ancient \"law,\" ascribed to\nRomulus--which, as Mommsen suggests, could have been merely a priestly\ndirection[191]--enjoined the father to bring up all his sons and at\nleast his eldest daughter, and forbade him to destroy any well-formed\nchild till it had completed its third year, when the affections of the\nparent might be supposed to be developed.[192] In later times we find\nthe exposure of children condemned by poets, historians, philosophers,\njurists. Among nefarious acts committed in sign of grief on the day\nwhen Germanicus died, Suetonius mentions the exposure of new-born\nbabes.[193] Epictetus indignantly opposes the saying of Epicurus that\nmen should not rear their children:--\"Even a sheep will not desert its\nyoung, nor a wolf; and shall a man? 'What! will you have us to be\nsilly creatures, like the sheep?' Yet they desert not their young. 'Or\nsavage, like wolves?' Yet even they desert them not. Come, then, who\nwould obey you if he saw his little child fall on the ground and\ncry?\"[194] Julius Paulus, the jurist, pronounced him who refused\nnourishment to his child, or exposed it in a public place, to be\nguilty of murder[195]--a statement which is to be understood, not as a\nlegal prohibition of exposure, but only as the expression of a moral\nopinion.[196] On the other hand, though the exposure of healthy\ninfants was disapproved of in Pagan Rome, it was not generally\nregarded as an offence of very great magnitude, especially if the\nparents were destitute.[197] {411} During the Empire it was practised\non an extensive scale, and in the literature of the time it is spoken\nof with frigid indifference. Since the life of the victim was\nfrequently saved by some benevolent person or with a view to\nprofit,[198] it was not regarded in the same light as downright\ninfanticide, which, in the case of a healthy infant, seems to have\nbeen strictly prohibited by custom.[199]\n\n[Footnote 186: Cicero, _De legibus_, iii. 8.]\n\n[Footnote 187: Seneca, _De ira_, i. 15.]\n\n[Footnote 188: Lecky, _History of European Morals_, ii. 27.]\n\n[Footnote 189: Montesquieu, _De l'esprit des lois_, 20 _sqq._\n(_[OE]uvres_, p. 398 _sqq._). Lecky, _History of European Morals_,\nii. 27.]\n\n[Footnote 190: Denis, _Histoire des th\u00e9ories et des id\u00e9es morales dans\nl'antiquit\u00e9_, ii. 110.]\n\n[Footnote 191: Mommsen, _R\u00f6misches Strafrecht_, p. 619.]\n\n[Footnote 192: Dionysius of Halicarnassus, _Antiquitates Roman\u00e6_,\nii. 15.]\n\n[Footnote 193: Suetonius, _Caligula_, 5.]\n\n[Footnote 194: Epictetus, _Dissertationes_, i. 23.]\n\n[Footnote 195: _Digesta_, xxv. 3. 4.]\n\n[Footnote 196: Noodt, 'Julius Paulus, sive de partus expositione et\nnece apud veteres,' in _Opera omnia_, i. 465 _sqq._ Walter,\n_Geschichte des R\u00f6mischen Rechts_, \u00a7 538, vol. ii. 148 _sq._\nSpangenberg, 'Verbrechen des Kindermords und der Aussetzung der\nKinder,' in _Neues Archiv des Criminalrechts_, iii. 10 _sqq._ Mommsen,\n_R\u00f6misches Strafrecht_, p. 620, n. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 197: Quintilian, _Declamationes_, 506. Plutarch, _De amore\nprolis_, 5.]\n\n[Footnote 198: Lecky, _History of European Morals_, ii. 28. Lallemand,\n_Histoire des enfants abandonn\u00e9s et d\u00e9laiss\u00e9s_, p. 59.]\n\n[Footnote 199: Mommsen, _R\u00f6misches Strafrecht_, p. 619.]\n\nAs is generally the case in the savage world, so among semi-civilised\nand civilised nations whose customs allow or tolerate infanticide, the\nchild, if not suffered to live, has to be killed in its earliest\ninfancy. Among the Chinese[200] and Rajputs[201] it is destroyed\nimmediately after its birth. In the Scandinavian North the killing or\nexposure of an infant who had already been sprinkled with water was\nregarded as murder.[202] At Athens parents were punished for exposing\nchildren whom they had once begun to rear.[203]\n\n[Footnote 200: Gutzlaff, _op. cit._ i. 59.]\n\n[Footnote 201: _Church Missionary Intelligencer_, xi. 81. Chevers,\n_op. cit._ p. 752.]\n\n[Footnote 202: Grimm, _Deutsche Rechtsalterth\u00fcmer_, i. 457.]\n\n[Footnote 203: Schoemann, _Griechische Alterth\u00fcmer_, i. 503.]\n\nThe practice of exposing new-born infants, so common in the Pagan\nEmpire, was vehemently denounced by the early Fathers of the\nChurch.[204] They tried to convince men that, if the abandoned infant\ndied, the unnatural parent was guilty of nothing less than murder,\nwhilst the sinful purposes for which foundlings were often used formed\nanother argument against exposure.[205] The enormity of the crime of\ncausing an infant's death was enhanced by the notion that children who\nhad died unbaptised were doomed to eternal perdition.[206] According\nto a decree of the Council of Mentz in 852, the penance imposed on the\nmother was heavier if she killed an unbaptised than if she killed a\n{412} baptised child.[207] In the year 1556, Henry II. of France made\na law which punished as a child-murderer any woman who had concealed\nher pregnancy and delivery, and whose child was found dead, \"priv\u00e9,\ntant du saint sacrement de baptesme, que s\u00e9pulture publique et\naccoustum\u00e9e.\"[208] This statute--to which there is a counterpart in\nEngland in the statute 21 Jac. I. c. 27,[209] and in the Scotch law of\n1690, c. 21[210]--thus went so far as to constitute a presumptive\nmurder, avowedly under the influence of that Christian dogma to which\nMr. Lecky attributes, in the first instance, \"the healthy sense of the\nvalue and sanctity of infant life which so broadly distinguishes\nChristian from Pagan societies.\"[211]\n\n[Footnote 204: See Terme and Monfalcon, _Histoire des enfans trouv\u00e9s_,\np. 67 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 205: Justin Martyr, _Apologia I. pro Christianis_, 29, 27\n(Migne, _Patrologi\u00e6 cursus_, Ser. Graeca, vi. 373 _sq._, 369 _sqq._).]\n\n[Footnote 206: _Cf._ Spangenberg, in _Neues Archiv des Criminalrechts_,\niii. 20; Lecky, _History of European Morals_, ii. 23.]\n\n[Footnote 207: _Canon Hludowici regis_, 9 (Pertz, _Monum. Germani\u00e6\nhistorica_, iii. 413).]\n\n[Footnote 208: Isambert, Decrusy, and Armet, _Recueil g\u00e9n\u00e9ral des\nanciennes lois fran\u00e7aises_, xiii. 472 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 209: Blackstone, _Commentaries on the Laws of England_,\niv. 198.]\n\n[Footnote 210: Erskine, _Principles of the Law of Scotland_, p. 560.]\n\n[Footnote 211: Lecky, _History of European Morals_, ii. 23.]\n\nIf the Pagans had been comparatively indifferent to the sufferings of\nthe exposed infant, the Christians became all the more cruel to the\nunfortunate mother, who, perhaps in a fit of despair, had put to death\nher new-born child. The Christian emperor Valentinian I. made\ninfanticide a capital offence.[212] According to the Coutume de\nLoudunois, a mother who killed her child was burned.[213] In Germany\nand Switzerland she was buried alive with a pale thrust through her\nbody;[214] this punishment was prescribed by the criminal code of\nCharles V., side by side with drowning.[215] Until the end of the\neighteenth, or the beginning of the nineteenth, century, infanticide\nwas a capital crime everywhere in Europe, except in Russia.[216] Then,\nunder the influence of that rationalistic movement which compelled men\nto rectify so many preconceived opinions,[217] it became manifest that\nan unmarried woman {413} who destroyed her illegitimate child was not\nin the same category as an ordinary murderess.[218] It was pointed out\nthat shame and fear, the excitement of mind, and the difficulty in\nrearing the poor bastard, could induce the unfortunate mother to\ncommit a crime which she herself abhorred. That no notice had been\ntaken of all this, is explicable from the extreme severity with which\nfemale unchastity was looked upon by the Church. At present most\nEuropean lawbooks do not punish infanticide committed by an unmarried\nwoman even nominally with death.[219] In France the law which regards\ninfanticide as an aggravated form of _meurtre_[220] has become a dead\nletter;[221] and in England no woman seems for a long time to have\nbeen executed for killing her new-born child under the distress of\nmind and fear of shame caused by child-birth.[222]\n\n[Footnote 212: _Codex Theodosianus_, ix. 14. 1. _Institutiones_,\nix. 16, 7.]\n\n[Footnote 213: Tissot, _Le droit p\u00e9nal_, ii. 40.]\n\n[Footnote 214: Osenbr\u00fcggen, _Das alamannische Strafrecht im deutschen\nMittelalter_, p. 229 _sq._ _Idem_, _Studien zur deutschen und\nschweizerischen Rechtsgeschichte_, p. 358.]\n\n[Footnote 215: Charles V.'s _Peinliche Gerichts Ordnung_, art. 131.]\n\n[Footnote 216: de Feyfer, _Verhandeling over den Kindermoord_, p. 225.\nvon Fabrice, _Die Lehre von der Kindsabtreibung und vom Kindsmord_,\np. 251.]\n\n[Footnote 217: Berner, _Lehrbuch des Deutschen Strafrechtes_, p. 497.]\n\n[Footnote 218: Bentham maintained (_Theory of Legislation_, p. 264\n_sq._) that infanticide ought not to be punished as a principal\noffence. \"The offence,\" he says, \"is what is improperly called the\ndeath of an infant, who has ceased to be, before knowing what\nexistence is,--a result of a nature not to give the slightest\ninquietude to the most timid imagination; and which can cause no\nregrets but to the very person who, through a sentiment of shame and\npity, has refused to prolong a life begun under the auspices of\nmisery.\"]\n\n[Footnote 219: de Feyfer, _op. cit._ p. 228. For modern legislation on\ninfanticide, see also Spangenberg, in _Neues Archiv des\nCriminalrechts_, iii. 360 _sqq._; von Fabrice, _op. cit._ p. 254 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 220: _Code P\u00e9nal_, art. 300, 302.]\n\n[Footnote 221: Garraud, _Trait\u00e9 th\u00e9oretique et pratique du droit p\u00e9nal\nfran\u00e7ais_, iv. 251.]\n\n[Footnote 222: Stephen, _History of the Criminal Law of England_,\niii. 86.]\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nHand in hand with the custom of infanticide goes feticide, which\nprevails extensively in the savage world.[223] The same considerations\nas induce savages to kill their new-born infants also induce them to\ndestroy the fetus before it has proceeded into the world from the\nmother's body. Besides, women procure abortion with a view to avoiding\nthe disagreeable incidents accompanying the state of pregnancy; or,\nvery frequently, in order to conceal illicit intercourse.[224]\nConsidering that the same degree of sympathy cannot be felt with\nregard to a child not yet born as with regard to an infant, it is not\nsurprising to find that feticide is practised without objection even\nby {414} some peoples who never commit infanticide. Thus in Samoa,\nwhere the latter practice was perfectly unknown, the destruction of\nunborn children prevailed to a melancholy extent, and the same was the\ncase in the Mitchell Group.[225] Among the Dacotahs, who only\noccasionally killed infants, abortion procured by artificial means was\nnot held objectionable.[226] On the other hand there are savages who\nconsider it a crime. Some Indian tribes in North America abhor the\npractice.[227] The natives of Tenimber and Timor-laut punish it with\nheavy fines.[228] Regarding the Kafirs, Mr. Warner states that \"the\nprocuring of abortion, although universally practised by all classes\nof females in Kafir society, is nevertheless a crime of considerable\nmagnitude in the eye of the Law; and when brought to the notice of the\nChief, a fine of four or five head of cattle is inflicted. The\naccomplices are equally guilty with the female herself.\"[229]\n\n[Footnote 223: Ploss, _Das Weib_, i. 842 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 224: _Ibid._ i. 851 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 225: Turner, _Samoa_, pp. 79, 280.]\n\n[Footnote 226: Schoolcraft, _Indian Tribes of the United States_, iii.\n243. Keating, _op. cit._ i. 394.]\n\n[Footnote 227: Ploss, _Das Weib_, i. 848.]\n\n[Footnote 228: Riedel, _De sluik- en kroesharige rassen tusschen\nSelebes en Papua_, p. 302.]\n\n[Footnote 229: Warner, in Maclean, _Compendium of Kafir Laws and\nCustoms_, p. 62. _Cf._ Brownlee, _ibid._ p. 111; Holden, _Past and\nFuture of the Kaffir Races_, p. 334.]\n\nPassing to more civilised nations, we notice that, among Hindus and\nMuhammedans, artificial abortion is extremely common and is hardly\nreprobated by public opinion, whatever religion or law may have to say\non the subject.[230] It is especially resorted to by unmarried women\nas a means of escaping punishment and shame. \"In a country like\nIndia,\" says Dr. Chevers, \"where true morality is almost unknown, but\nwhere the laws of society exercise the most rigorous and vigilant\ncontrol imaginable over the conduct of females, and where six-sevenths\nof the widows, whatever their age or position in life may be, are\nabsolutely debarred from re-marriage, and are compelled to rely upon\nthe uncertain support of their relatives, it is scarcely surprising\nthat great crimes should be frequently practised to conceal the\nresults of immorality, and that the procuring of criminal abortion\nshould, especially, be an act of {415} almost daily commission, and\nshould have become a trade among certain of the lower midwives.\"[231]\nIn Persia every illegitimate pregnancy ends with abortion; the act is\ndone almost publicly, and no obstacle is put in its way.[232] In\nTurkey, both among the rich and poor, even married women very commonly\nprocure abortion after they have given birth to two children, one of\nwhich is a boy; and the authorities regard the practice with\nindifference.[233] In ancient Greece, as we have seen, feticide was\nunder certain circumstances recommended by Plato and Aristotle, in\npreference to infanticide. In Rome it was prohibited by Septimius\nSeverus and Antoninus, but the prohibition seems to have referred only\nto those married women who, by procuring abortion, defrauded their\nhusbands of children.[234] During the Pagan Empire, abortion was\nextensively practised, either from poverty, or licentiousness, or\nvanity; and, although severely disapproved of by some,[235] \"it was\nprobably regarded by the average Romans of the later days of Paganism\nmuch as Englishmen in the last century regarded convivial excesses, as\ncertainly wrong, but so venial as scarcely to deserve censure.\"[236]\nSeneca thinks Helvia worthy of special praise because she had never\ndestroyed her expected child within her womb, \"after the fashion of\nmany other women, whose attractions are to be found in their beauty\nalone.\"[237] The Romans drew a broad line between feticide and\ninfanticide. An unborn child was not regarded by them as a human\nbeing; it was a _spes animantis_, not an _infans_.[238] It was said to\nbe merely a part of the mother, as the fruit is a part of the tree\ntill it becomes ripe and falls down.[239]\n\n[Footnote 230: _Laws of Manu_, v. 90; _Vish['n]u Pur\u00e1['n]a_,\np. 207 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 231: Chevers, _op. cit._ p. 712.]\n\n[Footnote 232: Polak, _Persien_, i. 217.]\n\n[Footnote 233: Ploss, _Das Weib_, i. 846 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 234: _Digesta_, xlvii. 11. 4. _Cf._ Rein, _Criminalrecht der\nR\u00f6mer_, p. 447.]\n\n[Footnote 235: Paulus, quoted in _Digesta_, xxv. 3, 4.]\n\n[Footnote 236: Lecky, _History of European Morals_, ii. 21 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 237: Seneca, _Ad Helviam_, 16.]\n\n[Footnote 238: Spangenberg, 'Verbrechen der Abtreibung der\nLeibesfrucht,' in _Neues Archiv des Criminalrechts_, ii.\n23.]\n\n[Footnote 239: _Ibid._ ii. 22.]\n\nVery different opinions were held by the Christians. A sanctity,\npreviously unheard of, was attached to human life from the very\nbeginning. Feticide was regarded as a {416} form of murder.\n\"Prevention of birth,\" says Tertullian, \"is a precipitation of murder;\nnor does it matter whether one take away a life when formed, or drive\nit away while forming. He also is a man who is about to be one. Even\nevery fruit already exists in its seed.\"[240] St. Augustine, again,\nmakes a distinction between an embryo which has already been formed,\nand an embryo as yet unformed. From the creation of Adam, he says, it\nappears that the body is made before the soul. Before the embryo has\nbeen endowed with a soul it is an _embryo informatus_, and its\nartificial abortion is to be punished with a fine only; but the\n_embryo formatus_ is an animate being, and to destroy it is nothing\nless than murder, a crime punishable with death.[241] This distinction\nbetween an animate and inanimate fetus was embodied both in Canon[242]\nand Justinian law,[243] and passed subsequently into various\nlawbooks.[244] And a woman who destroyed her animate embryo was\npunished with death.[245]\n\n[Footnote 240: Tertullian, _Apologeticus_, 9 (Migne _op. cit._\ni. 319 _sq._).]\n\n[Footnote 241: St. Augustine, _Questiones in Exodum_, 80; _Idem_,\n_Questiones Veteris et Novi Testamenti_, 23 (Migne, _op. cit._\nxxxiv.-xxxv. 626, 2229).]\n\n[Footnote 242: Gratian, _Decretum_, ii. 32. 2. 8 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 243: As regards the time from which the fetus was considered\nto be animate a curious distinction was drawn between the male and the\nfemale fetus. The former was regarded as _animatus_ forty days after\nits conception, the latter eighty days. This theory, however--which\nwas derived, as it seems, either from an absurd misinterpretation of\n_Leviticus_, xii. 2-5, or from the views of Aristotle (_De animalibus\nhistori\u00e6_, vii. 3; _cf._ Pliny, _Historia naturalis_, vii. 6)--was not\naccepted by the glossarist of the Justinian Code, who fixed the\nanimation of the female, as well as of the male, fetus at forty days\nafter its conception; and this view was adopted by later jurists\n(Spangenberg, in _Neues Archiv des Criminalrechts_, ii. 37 _sqq._).]\n\n[Footnote 244: von Fabrice, _op. cit._ p. 202 _sq._ Berner, _op. cit._\np. 501. Wilda, _op. cit._ p. 720 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 245: Fleta, i. 23. 12 (England). Charles V's _Peinliche\nGerichts Ordnung_, art. 133. Spangenberg in _Neues Archiv des\nCriminalrechts_, ii. 16.]\n\nThe criminality of artificial abortion was increased by the belief\nthat an _embryo formatus_, being a person endowed with an immortal\nsoul, was in need of baptism for its salvation. In his highly esteemed\ntreatise De fide, written in the sixth century, St. Fulgentius says,\n\"It is to be believed beyond doubt, that not only men who are come to\nthe use of reason, but infants, whether they die in their mother's\nwomb, or after they are born, without baptism, {417} in the name of\nthe Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are punished with everlasting\npunishment in eternal fire, because though they have no actual sin of\ntheir own, yet they carry along with them the condemnation of original\nsin from their first conception and birth.\"[246] And in the Lex\nBajuwariorum this doctrine is expressly referred to in a paragraph\nwhich prescribes a daily compensation for children killed in the womb\non account of the daily suffering of those children in hell.[247]\nSubsequently, however, St. Fulgentius' dictum was called in question,\nand no less a person than Thomas Aquinas suggested the possibility of\nsalvation for an infant who died before its birth.[248] Apart from\nthis, the doctrine that the life of an embryo is equally sacred with\nthe life of an infant was so much opposed to popular feelings, that\nthe law concerning feticide had to be altered. Modern legislation,\nthough treating the fetus as a distinct being from the moment of its\nconception,[249] punishes criminal abortion less severely than\ninfanticide.[250] And the very frequent occurrence of this crime[251]\nis an evidence of the comparative indifference with which it is\npractically looked upon by large numbers of people in Christian\ncountries.\n\n[Footnote 246: St. Fulgentius, _De fide_, 27 (Migne, _op. cit._\nlxv. 701).]\n\n[Footnote 247: _Lex Bajuwariorum_, viii. 21 (vii. 20).]\n\n[Footnote 248: Lecky, _History of the Rise and Influence of the Spirit\nof Rationalism in Europe_, i. 360, n. 2.]\n\n[Footnote 249: Henke, _Lehrbuch der gerichtlichen Medicin_, 99, p. 75.\nBerner, _op. cit._ p. 502.]\n\n[Footnote 250: von Fabrice, _op. cit._ p. 199. For modern laws\nreferring to criminal abortion, see _ibid._ p. 206 _sqq._, and\nSpangenberg, in _Neues Archiv des Criminalrechts_, ii. 178 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 251: See Ploss, _Das Weib_, i. 848 _sqq._; Schmidt's\n_Jahrb\u00fccher der in- und ausl\u00e4ndischen Gesammten Medicin_, xciii. 97.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVIII\n\nTHE KILLING OF WOMEN AND OF SLAVES--THE CRIMINALITY OF HOMICIDE\nINFLUENCED BY DISTINCTIONS OF CLASS.\n\n\nAMONG many of the lower races a husband is said to possess the power\nof life and death over his wife; but what this actually means is not\nalways obvious. It is quite probable that, in some cases, the husband\nmay put his wife to death whenever he pleases, without having to fear\nany disagreeable consequences. In other instances he, by doing so, at\nall events exposes himself to the vengeance of her family. Among the\nBangerang tribe of Victoria, for instance, \"he might ill-treat her,\ngive her away, do as he liked with her, or kill her, and no one in the\ntribe interfered; though, had he proceeded to the last extremity, her\ndeath would have been avenged by her brothers or kindred.\"[1] So,\nalso, among the aborigines of North-West-Central Queensland, \"a wife\nhas always her 'brothers' to look after her interests,\" and if a man\nkills his wife he has to deliver up one of his own sisters for his\nlate wife's friends to put to death.[2] We shall see in a subsequent\nchapter that many statements in which absolute marital power is\nascribed to savage husbands are not to be interpreted too literally. I\nventure to believe that the husband's so-called power of life and\ndeath is generally {419} restricted by custom to cases where the wife\nhas committed some offence, and, especially, where she has been guilty\nof unfaithfulness.\n\n[Footnote 1: Curr, _Recollections of Squatting in Victoria_, p. 248.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Roth, _Ethnological Studies among the North-West-Central\nQueensland Aborigines_, p. 141. _Cf._ Fison and Howitt, _Kamilaroi and\nKurnai_, p. 281 (Geawe-gal tribe).]\n\nThe right of punishing the wife capitally, however, is by no means\nuniversally granted to the husband in uncivilised communities. Among\nthe Gaika tribe of the Kafirs, \"if he puts her to death, he is\npunished as a murderer.\"[3] Among the Bakwiri he has to suffer death\nhimself if he kills his wife; if she is unfaithful to him he is only\npermitted to beat her.[4] From the information we possess of the lower\nraces it does not seem to be the general rule that husbands punish\ntheir adulterous wives with death; but whether they have the right of\ndoing so is a question seldom touched upon by our authorities.[5] We\nshall see that savage custom often gives to the husband only very\nlimited rights over his wife, and requires that he should treat her\nwith respect.\n\n[Footnote 3: Brownlee, in Maclean, _Compendium of Kafir Laws and\nCustoms_, p. 117.]\n\n[Footnote 4: Schwarz, quoted by Post, _Afrikanische Jurisprudenz_,\ni. 401.]\n\n[Footnote 5: See Steinmetz, _Ethnologische Studien zur ersten\nEntwicklung der Strafe_, ii. 303.]\n\nAmong various peoples of a higher type the husband has, under certain\ncircumstances, had the right of punishing his wife capitally; but this\nseems to be nearly all that is involved in that \"power of life and\ndeath\" which he is said to have possessed over her.[6] However, whilst\ncustom or law forbade him to kill his wife without sufficient cause,\nsuch a deed was hardly looked upon with the same horror, or treated\nwith the same severity, as the murder of a husband by his wife, owing\nto the former's superior position in the family. Among the Langobardi,\naccording to the laws of King Rothar, a husband who killed his wife\nhad to pay the same compensation as anybody else would have had to pay\nfor taking her life, but if a wife killed her husband, she was put to\ndeath, and her property forfeited {420} to the family of the dead.[7]\nIn Russia, in the seventeenth century, whilst a husband who murdered\nhis wife was, according to law, obnoxious to corporal punishment, a\nwife who murdered her husband was buried alive, with the head above\nthe ground, and left to perish by hunger.[8] According to English law,\na woman who killed her husband was guilty of \"petit treason,\" that is,\nmurder in its most odious degree.[9]\n\n[Footnote 6: Rein, _Japan_, p. 424. Hommel, _Die semitischen V\u00f6lker\nund Sprachen_, i. 417 (Babylonians). Leist, _Altarisches Jus Civile_,\ni. 196, 275 (\"Aryan\" peoples). Wilda, _Strafrecht der Germanen_, p.\n705; Nordstr\u00f6m, _Bidrag till den svenska samh\u00e4lls-f\u00f6rfattningens\nhistoria_, ii. 61 _sq._; Weinhold, _Altnordisches Leben_, p. 250;\nKeyser _Efterladte Skrifter_, ii. pt. ii. 28 _sq._ (Teutons).]\n\n[Footnote 7: _Edictus Rothari_, 200 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 8: Macieiowski, _Slavische Rechtsgeschichte_, iv. 292. For a\nCorsican law concerning matricide, see Cibrario, _Economia politica\ndel medio eve_, i. 344; and for the punishment inflicted for the same\ncrime on a woman in Nuremberg, in 1487, see Du Boys, _Histoire du\ndroit criminel des peuples modernes_, ii. 607.]\n\n[Footnote 9: Blackstone, _Commentaries on the Laws of England_, iv. 203.]\n\nAmong many peoples the life of a woman is held cheaper than that of a\nman, independently of the relationship between the slayer and his\nvictim. In Burma, if a woman was accidentally killed, less\ncompensation had to be paid than for a man. A Burman explained this in\nthe following words:--\"A woman is worth less than a man _in that way_.\nA maidservant can be hired for less than a manservant, a daughter can\nclaim less than a son. They cannot do so much work; they are not so\nstrong. If they had been worth more, the law would have been the other\nway; of course they are worth less.\"[10] Among Muhammedans the price\nof blood for a woman is half the sum which is the price of blood for a\nfree man.[11] In ancient India the murder of a woman, unless she was\nwith child, was in the eye of the law on a par with the murder of a\nS\u00fbdra.[12] According to Cambrian law, the _galanas_, or blood-price,\nof a woman was half the _galanas_ of her brother.[13] Among the\nTeutons the _wergeld_ of a woman varied: sometimes it was the same as\nthat for a man, sometimes only half as much, but sometimes twice as\nmuch, or, if she was pregnant, {421} even more.[14] These variations\ndepended upon the different points of view from which the offence was\nlooked upon. By herself she was worth less than a man, as a mother she\nwas worth more;[15] and, quite apart from her value, the natural\nhelplessness of her sex tended to aggravate the crime.[16] Among\nmodern savages and barbarians, also, the estimate of a woman's life is\nin some instances lower than that of a man's,[17] in some equal to\nit,[18] and in some higher.[19] Among the Gallas the killing of a free\nman can be atoned for only by one thousand cattle, whereas fifty are\ndeemed sufficient for the killing of a woman.[20] On the other hand,\namong the Iroquois two hundred yards of wampum were paid for the\nmurder of a woman, and only one hundred for that of a man.[21] Among\nthe Rejangs of Sumatra, whilst the compensation for murder is eighty\ndollars if the victim was an ordinary man or boy, it is one hundred\nand fifty dollars if the person murdered was a woman or a girl.[22]\nAmong the Ag[=a]r, a Dinka tribe, the murder of a man must be atoned\nfor by a fine of thirty cows, that of a woman by forty cows.[23] Where\nwives are purchased, the killing of a woman involves the destruction\nof valuable property, and is dealt with accordingly.\n\n[Footnote 10: Fielding, _The Soul of a People_, p. 171.]\n\n[Footnote 11: Lane, _Arabian Society in the Middle Ages_, p. 18.]\n\n[Footnote 12: _Baudh\u00e2yana_, i. 10. 19. 3. Leist, _Alt-arisches Jus\nGentium_, p. 305 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 13: _Venedotian Code_, ii. 1. 16. According to the 'Laws of\nthe Brets and Scots,' the estimate of a married woman is less by a\nthird part than that of her husband, whereas the estimate of an\nunmarried woman is equal to that of her brother (Innes, _Scotland in\nthe Middle Ages_, p. 181).]\n\n[Footnote 14: Grimm, _Deutsche Rechtsalterth\u00fcmer_, p. 404 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 15: This point of view is very conspicuous in the Salic Law\n(_Lex Salica_ [Herold's text], 28).]\n\n[Footnote 16: Wilda, _op. cit._ p. 571. Keyser, _op. cit._ ii. pt. ii.\n29. Brunner, _Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte_, ii. 614 _sq._ Pardessus,\n_Loi Salique_, p. 662.]\n\n[Footnote 17: Post, _Anf\u00e4nge des Staats- und Rechtsleben_, p. 192.\n_Idem_, _Studien zur Entwicklungsgeschichte des Familienrechts_, p.\n119 _sq._ Gibbs, 'Tribes of Western Washington and North-western\nOregon,' in _Contributions to North American Ethnology_, i. 190.\nGeorgi, _Russia_, ii. 261; V\u00e1mb\u00e9ry, _T\u00fcrkenvolk_, p. 305 (Kirghiz).\nDecle, _Three Years in Savage Africa_, p. 487 (Wakamba).]\n\n[Footnote 18: Schoolcraft, _Indian Tribes of the United States_, i.\n277 (Creeks). Dorsey, 'Omaha Sociology,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._\niii. 370. Woodthorpe, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxvi. 21 (Shans).]\n\n[Footnote 19: Post, _Studien zur Entwicklungsgeschichte des\nFamilienrechts_, p. 119 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 20: Paulitschke, _Ethnographie Nordost-Afrikas_, p. 263.]\n\n[Footnote 21: Loskiel, _History of the Mission of the United Brethren\namong the Indians in North America_, i. 16.]\n\n[Footnote 22: Marsden, _History of Sumatra_, p. 222.]\n\n[Footnote 23: _Emin Pasha in Central Africa_, p. 338.]\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nAs a husband often has \"the power of life and death\" over his wife, so\nwe may expect to find, even more often, {422} that a master has the\nsame power over his slave. The latter, as a rule, can hardly count on\nthe support of his family, and when, as is frequently the case, he is\na prisoner of war, the right of killing an enemy easily passes into\nthe right of killing the slave. In the literature dealing with the\nlower races we repeatedly meet with the statement that the owner may\nkill his slave at pleasure, or that he is not accountable for killing\nhim.[24] Yet this seems to mean rather that, if he does so, no\ncomplaint can be brought against him, or no vengeance taken on him,\nthan that he has an unconditional moral right to put to death a slave\nwhom he no longer cares to keep; we shall see that savage custom very\ncommonly requires that slaves should be treated with kindness by their\nmasters. In many cases the master is expressly denied the right of\nkilling his slave at his own discretion.[25] Among the Bataks, the\nowner, though allowed to punish his slave, must take care that the\nlatter does not succumb to the punishment.[26] Among the Rejangs, if a\nman kills his slave, he pays half his price as compensation to the\nfeudal chief of the country.[27] In Madagascar \"masters have full\npower over their slaves, excepting as to life\";[28] and the same is\nsaid of the Tshi-speaking peoples of the Gold Coast.[29] The\nMandingoes allow the owner to do what he likes to a prisoner of war\nand to a person who has lost his freedom through insolvency, but he is\nforbidden to kill a house-slave.[30] Among the Barea and Kun\u00e1ma, by\nputting {423} to death a slave who is a native of the country, the\nmaster even exposes himself to the blood-revenge of the family of the\nslain.[31]\n\n[Footnote 24: Monrad, _Bidrag til en Skildring af Guinea-Kysten_, p.\n42 (Negroes of Accra). Bowdich, _Mission to Ashantee_, p. 258 (people\nof Ashanti). Ward, _Five Years with the Congo Cannibals_, p. 105\n(Bolobo). Macdonald, _Africana_, i. 168 (Eastern Central Africans).\nBurton, _Zanzibar_, ii. 95 (Wanika). Cooper, _Mishmee Hills_, p. 238.\n_Glimpses of the Eastern Archipelago_, p. 106 (Highlanders of\nPalembang). Hale, _U.S. Exploring Expedition. Vol. VI. Ethnography and\nPhilology_, p. 33 (Maoris). Gibbs, _loc. cit._ p. 189 (Thlinkets).\nSteinmetz, _Studien_, ii. 308 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 25: Steinmetz, _Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse von eigeborenen V\u00f6lkern\nin Afrika und Ozeanien_, p. 43 (Banaka and Bapuku). Mademba, _ibid._\np. 83 (natives of the Sansanding States). Lang, _ibid._ p. 241\n(Washambala). Desoignies, _ibid._ p. 278 (Msalala).]\n\n[Footnote 26: _Glimpses of the Eastern Archipelago_, p. 114.]\n\n[Footnote 27: Marsden, _op. cit._ p. 222.]\n\n[Footnote 28: Ellis, _History of Madagascar_, i. 196.]\n\n[Footnote 29: Ellis, _Tshi-speaking Peoples of the Gold Coast_, p. 291.]\n\n[Footnote 30: Post, _Afrikanische Jurisprudenz_, i. 95.]\n\n[Footnote 31: Munzinger, _Ostafrikanische Studien_, p. 484.]\n\nThe murder of another person's slave is of course largely regarded as\nan offence against the property of the owner, but, in many cases at\nleast, it is not exclusively looked upon in this light. Where the\nmaster himself is not allowed to kill his slave, the slave possesses\nthe right to live in the full sense of the term. Sometimes there is in\nthis respect little difference between him and a freeman. Among the\nBeni Amer, whilst the murder of a slave who has been bought is merely\ncompensated for by the payment of the purchase sum, the murder of a\nslave who belongs to his master by birth is avenged by his relatives,\nor, if he has none, by the master himself; should the murderer be too\nhigh a person, the matter drops, but there is no question of payment\nin any case.[32] Where the system of blood-money prevails, the price\npaid for the life of a slave is less than that paid for the life of a\nfreeman. Among the Kirghiz the former is only half of the latter.[33]\nIn Axim, on the Gold Coast, according to Bosman, the murderer of a\nslave was usually fined thirty-six crowns, whilst five hundred crowns\nwere demanded for the murder of a free-born negro.[34]\n\n[Footnote 32: _Ibid._ p. 309.]\n\n[Footnote 33: Georgi, _op. cit._ ii. 261.]\n\n[Footnote 34: Bosman, _New Description of the Coast of Guinea_,\np. 141 _sq._]\n\nThe rule that the life of a slave is held in less estimation than the\nlife of a freeman applies to the nations of archaic culture; yet not\neven the master is among them in all circumstances allowed to put his\nslave to death. In ancient Mexico the murder of a slave, though\ncommitted by the master, was a capital offence.[35] In Corea, a slave\nmay not be killed by his owner before the latter has obtained the\npermission of the board of punishments, or of the high provincial\nauthorities.[36] According to the {424} Chinese Penal Code, a master\nwho, instead of complaining to a magistrate privately, beats to death\na slave who has been guilty of theft, adultery, or any other similar\ncrime, shall be punished with one hundred blows. If he beats to death,\nor intentionally kills, a slave who has committed no crime, he shall\nbe punished with sixty blows and one year's banishment, and the wife\nor husband, as also the children, of the deceased slave shall be\nentitled to their freedom.[37] Again, a freeman who kills another's\nslave shall be strangled.[38]\n\n[Footnote 35: Bancroft, _op. cit._ ii. 223.]\n\n[Footnote 36: Rockhill, 'Notes on some of the Laws, Customs, and\nSuperstitions of Korea,' in _American Anthropologist_, iv. 180. _Cf._\nGriffis, _Corea_, p. 239.]\n\n[Footnote 37: _Ta Tsing Leu Lee_, sec. cccxiv. p. 340.]\n\n[Footnote 38: _Ibid._ sec. cccxiii. p. 336.]\n\nAccording to Hebrew law, a master who smites his slave so that he dies\nunder his hand, \"shall be surely punished\"; but if the slave continues\nto live for a day or two after the assault, the master goes free on\nthe score that the slave is \"his money.\"[39] Muhammed strongly\nenjoined the duty of kindness to slaves; yet, according to Muhammedan\nlaw, the master may even kill his own slave with impunity for any\noffence, and incurs but a slight punishment--as imprisonment for a\nperiod at the discretion of the judge--if he kills him wantonly.[40]\nThe price of blood for a slave is his or her value; but by the\n[H.]anafee law a man is obnoxious to capital punishment for the murder\nof another man's slave.[41]\n\n[Footnote 39: _Exodus_, xxi. 20 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 40: Lane, _Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians_, p.\n115. _Idem_, _Arabian Society in the Middle Ages_, p. 251.]\n\n[Footnote 41: _Idem_, _Modern Egyptians_, p. 119. _Idem_, _Arabian\nSociety_, p. 18 _sq._]\n\nAmong the ancient Teutons the master was irresponsible in the eye of\nthe law as to all dealings between himself and his slave; legally the\nslave was on a par with the horse and the ox, and to kill him was only\nto inflict a certain loss upon the owner.[42] In ancient Wales the\nposition of a slave seems to have been very similar; there was no\n_galanas_ for a bondman, \"only payment of his worth to his master,\nlike the worth of a beast.\"[43] Among the Greeks, in the Homeric age,\nthe master evidently {425} could punish his slaves with death;[44] but\nin later times, at least at Athens, he was obliged to hand over to the\nmagistrate any slave of his who deserved capital punishment.[45] What\nhappened to a master who killed his own slave we do not know exactly,\nbut at any rate he had to undergo a ceremony of purification.[46]\nPlato says in his 'Laws,' that if a person kills the slave of another\nin anger, he shall pay twice the amount of the loss to his owner.[47]\nBut he adds, \"If any one kills a slave who has done no wrong, because\nhe is afraid that he may inform of some base and evil deeds of his\nown, or for any similar reason, in such a case let him pay the penalty\nof murder, as he would have done if he had slain a citizen.\"[48]\n\n[Footnote 42: Grimm, _Deutsche Rechtsalterth\u00fcmer_, p. 342 _sqq._\nBrunner, _Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte_, i. 96. Kemble, _Saxons in\nEngland_, i. 208 _sqq._ Stemann, _op. cit._ p. 281 _sqq._ Keyser, _op.\ncit._ ii. pt. i. 289.]\n\n[Footnote 43: _Dimetian Code_, iii. 3. 8.]\n\n[Footnote 44: _Odyssey_, iv. 743; xix. 489 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 45: Schmidt, _Ethik der alten Griechen_, ii. 217.\nHermann-Bl\u00fcmner, _Lehrbuch der griechischen Privatalterth\u00fcmer_, p. 88,\nn. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 46: Plato, _Leges_, ix. 865, 868. Schmidt, _op. cit._\nii. 217 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 47: Plato, _Leges_, ix. 868.]\n\n[Footnote 48: _Ibid._ ix. 872.]\n\nIn Rome, in ancient times, the master had by law the absolute power of\nlife and death over his slaves; and he who killed another man's slave\nwas not criminally prosecuted, but had merely to compensate the owner\nfor the destruction of his property.[49] Even during the Empire a\nslave was counted a thing, not a person; himself incapable of\nsuffering an _injuria_, he was viewed as a mechanical medium only,\nthrough which an insult could be transmitted to his master.[50] Yet\nthis doctrine was not rigidly adhered to. After the publication of the\nLex Cornelia, the change was introduced that he who killed a slave\nbelonging to somebody else could be punished for murder;[51] and later\non even the master's power of life and death was restricted by law.\nClaudius declared that sick slaves who had been exposed by their\nowners in a languishing condition, and afterwards recovered, should be\nperfectly free and never more return to their former servitude;\nmoreover, \"if any one chose to kill at once, rather than expose, a\nslave, he should be liable for murder.\"[52] {426} By a constitution of\nAntoninus Pius he who put his slave to death without a sufficient\ncause (_sine causa_) was to be punished equally with him who killed\nthe slave of another.[53] Hadrian even made an attempt to induce\nslave-owners to hand over to the authorities slaves who had been\nguilty of some capital crime, instead of themselves inflicting the\npunishment on the guilty.[54]\n\n[Footnote 49: Mommsen, _R\u00f6misches Strafrecht_, p. 616.]\n\n[Footnote 50: _Institutiones_, iv. 4. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 51: Gaius, _Institutionum juris civilis commentarii_, iii.\n213. _Cf._ Mommsen, _R\u00f6misches Strafrecht_, p. 616.]\n\n[Footnote 52: Suetonius, _Claudius_, 25.]\n\n[Footnote 53: Gaius, _op. cit._ i. 53. _Institutiones_, i. 8. 2.]\n\n[Footnote 54: Spartian, _Vita Hadriani_, 18. _Cf._ Mommsen, _R\u00f6misches\nStrafrecht_, p. 617, n. 2.]\n\nFaithful to her principle that human life is sacred, the Church made\nefforts to secure the life of the slave against the violence of the\nmaster; but neither the ecclesiastical nor the secular legislation\ngave him the same protection as was bestowed upon the free member of\nthe Church and State. Various Councils punished the murder of a slave\nwith two years' excommunication only, if the slave had been killed\n\"sine conscientia judicis\";[55] and the same punishment was adopted by\nsome Penitentials.[56] Edgar made the penance last three years,\nwhereas, if a freeman was killed, the penance was of seven years'\nduration.[57] Facts do not justify Mr. Lecky's statement that, \"in the\npenal system of the Church, the distinction between wrongs done to a\nfreeman, and wrongs done to a slave, which lay at the very root of the\nwhole civil legislation, was repudiated.\"[58]\n\n[Footnote 55: _Concilium Agathense_, A.D. 506, canon 62 (Labbe-Mansi,\n_Sacrorum Conciliorum collectio_, viii. 335). _Concilium Epaonense_,\nA.D. 517, canon 34 (_ibid._ viii. 563). _Concilium Wormatiense_, A.D.\n868, canon 38 (_ibid._ xv. 876).]\n\n[Footnote 56: _P[oe]nitentiale Cummeani_, vi. 29 (Wasserschleben,\n_Bussordungen der abendl\u00e4ndischen Kirche_, p. 480). _P[oe]nit.\nPseudo-Theodori_, xxi. 12 (_ibid._ p. 587).]\n\n[Footnote 57: _Canons enacted under Edgar_, Modus imponendi\np[oe]nitentiam, 4, 11 (_Ancient Laws and Institutes of England_, p.\n405 _sq._).]\n\n[Footnote 58: Lecky, _History of European Morals_, ii. 66. Mr. Lecky\nstates (_ibid._ ii. 66 _sq._) that the Council of Illiberis excluded\nfor ever from the communion a master who killed his slave. I have only\nbeen able to find the following enactment made by a Council held at\nIlliberis in the beginning of the fourth century:--\"Si qua domina\nfurore zeli accensa flagris verberaverit ancillam suam, ita ut in\ntertium diem animam cum cruciatu effundat; eo quod incertum sit,\nvoluntate, an casu occiderit; si voluntate, post septem annos; si\ncasu, post quinquennii tempora, acta legitima p[oe]nitentia, ad\ncommunionem placuit admitti\" (_Concilium Eliberitanum_, ch. 5\n[Labbe-Mansi, _op. cit._ ii. 6]).]\n\nBeyond a law of Constantine, to the effect that a master {427} who put\nhis slave to death in a non-judicial way, was to be punished as a\nmurderer,[59] and a reiteration of some previous enactments, the\nChristian emperors seem to have done little to guard the life of the\nslave. Whilst it was provided that any master who applied to his slave\ncertain atrocious tortures with the object of killing him should be\ndeemed a manslayer, it was emphatically said that no charge whatever\nshould be brought against him if the slave died under moderate\npunishment, or under any punishment not inflicted with the intention\nof killing him.[60] Arcadius and Honorius even passed a law refusing\nprotection to a slave who should fly to a church for refuge from his\nmaster;[61] but this law was, in the West, followed by regulations of\nan opposite character.[62] The barbarian invasions certainly did not\nimprove the condition of slaves, and in Teutonic countries it was only\nby slow degrees that the introduction and spread of a higher\ncivilisation exercised its humanising influence on the relation\nbetween master and slave. The Visigothic Code prohibited a person from\nkilling any of his slaves who had committed no offence.[63] According\nto the Capitularia, the master had to pay a penalty for causing the\ndeath of a guiltless slave, provided that he died at once; but if he\nsurvived the injury only a day or two, the master was not punishable\nfor his deed, because the slave was his _pecunia_.[64] In a later\nperiod any intentional killing of an innocent slave was punished by\nlaw, but the law probably remained a dead letter.[65] In the\nthirteenth century Beaumanoir, the French jurisconsult, could\nwrite:--\"Plus cortoise est nostre coustume envers les sers que en\nautre pa\u00efs, car li segneur poent penre de lor sers, et \u00e0 mort et \u00e0\nvie, toutes les fois {428} qu'il lor plest, et tant qu'il lor\nplet.\"[66] Nay, even in quite modern times, in Christian countries,\nwhere negro slavery prevailed as a recognised institution, the life of\nthe slave was only inadequately protected by their laws.\n\n[Footnote 59: _Codex Theodosianus_, ix. 12. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 60: _Ibid._ ix. 12. Lecky, _History of European Morals_,\nii. 62 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 61: _Codex Theodosianus_, ix. 45. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 62: Babington, _The Influence of Christianity in promoting\nthe Abolition of Slavery in Europe_, p. 37. Biot, _De l'abolition de\nl'esclavage ancien en Occident_, p. 239.]\n\n[Footnote 63: _Lex Wisigothorum_, vi. 5. 12.]\n\n[Footnote 64: _Capitularia_, vi. 11 (Georgisch, _Corpus Juris\nGermanici antiqui_, col. 1513). This law is borrowed from _Exodus_,\nxxi. 20 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 65: Grimm, _Deutsche Rechtsalterth\u00fcmer_, p. 344 _sq._ _Cf._\nPotgiesser, **_Commentarii juris Germanici de statu servorum veteri\nperinde atqve novo_, ii. 1. 10, 13, 24; iii. 6 (pp. 308, 309, 311,\n312, 321, 633 _sqq._).]\n\n[Footnote 66: Beaumanoir, _Les coutumes du Beauvoisis_, xlv. 36, vol.\nii. p. 237.]\n\nIn most of the British colonies, it was only by force of comparatively\nrecent acts, made for the most part subsequent to the year 1797, that\nthe same punishment was prescribed for the murder of a slave as for\nthe murder of a free person. Prior to this period the former crime was\nsubject only to a small pecuniary penalty, in Barbados not exceeding\n\u00a315.[67] In the French colonies, according to the Code Noir, a master\nwho killed his slave should be punished \"selon l'atrocit\u00e9 des\ncirconstances.\"[68] In all the North American Slave-States there was a\ntime when the murder of a slave, whether by his master or a third\nperson, was atoned for by a fine. In South Carolina this was the case\nas late as 1821, and only since then the wilful, malicious, and\npremeditated killing of a slave, by whomsoever perpetrated, was a\ncapital offence in all the slave-holding States.[69] But this does not\nmean that no distinction was made between the killing of a slave and\nthe killing of a freeman. In South Carolina, according to an enactment\nof 1821, he who killed a slave on a sudden heat of passion was\npunished simply with a fine of five hundred dollars and imprisonment\nnot exceeding six months.[70] In the Statutes of Tennessee the law\nreferring to the wilful murder of a slave contained the provision that\nit should not be extended to \"any person killing any slave in the act\nof resistance to his lawful owner or master, or any slave dying under\nmoderate correction\";[71] and a very similar provision was made by the\nlaws of Georgia.[72] In other words, a correction causing the death of\nthe victim {429} was not necessarily immoderate in the eye of the law.\nIn a still higher degree the life of the slave was endangered by\nanother law, which prevailed universally both in the Slave-States and\nin the British Colonies. Neither a slave, nor a free negro, nor any\ndescendant of a native of Africa whatever might be the shade of his\ncomplexion, could be a witness against a white person, either in a\ncivil or criminal case.[73] This law placed the slave, who was seldom\nwithin the view of more than one white man at a time, entirely at the\nmercy of this individual, and its consequences were obvious. Speaking\nof slavery in the United States in 1853, Mr. Goodell remarks:--\"Upon\nthe most diligent inquiry and public challenge, for fifteen or twenty\nyears past, not one single case has yet been ascertained in which,\neither during that time or previously, a master killing his slave, or\nindeed any other white man, has suffered the penalty of death for the\nmurder of a slave.\" Nevertheless, murders of slaves by white men had\nbeen notoriously frequent.[74]\n\n[Footnote 67: Stephen, _Slavery of the British West India Colonies\ndelineated_, i. 36, 38.]\n\n[Footnote 68: _Code Noir_, \u00c9dit donn\u00e9 au mois de Mars 1724, art. 39,\np. 304.]\n\n[Footnote 69: Brevard, _Digest of the Public Statute Law of South\nCarolina_, ii. 240 _sq._ Stroud, _Laws relating to Slavery in the\nUnited States of America_, p. 55 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 70: Stroud, _op. cit._ p. 64.]\n\n[Footnote 71: Caruthers and Nicholson, _Compilation of the Statutes of\nTennessee_, p. 677.]\n\n[Footnote 72: Prince, _Digest of the Laws of the State of Georgia_,\np. 787.]\n\n[Footnote 73: Brevard, _op. cit._ ii. 242. Stroud, _op. cit._ p. 106\n_sq._ Stephen, _Slavery of the British West India Colonies_, i. 166,\n174. In the French Colonies, also, slaves could not be legal\nwitnesses, but their testimony might be heard by the judge, merely to\nserve as a suggestion, or unauthenticated information, which might\nthrow light on the evidence of other witnesses (_Code Noir_, \u00c9dit du\nmois de Mars 1685, art. 30, p. 44).]\n\n[Footnote 74: Goodell, _American Slave Code in Theory and Practice_,\np. 209 _sq._]\n\nThat the life of a slave is held in so little regard is due to that\nwant of sympathy with his fate which accounts also for his unfree\ncondition, and to the proprietary rights over him which, in\nconsequence, have been granted to his master. For similar reasons the\nkilling of a freeman by a slave, especially if the victim be his\nowner, is commonly punished more severely than if the same act were\ndone by a free person. The less the sympathy felt for an individual,\nthe more intense is the resentment which he excites by offensive\nbehaviour. According to the Chinese Penal Code, a slave who designedly\nkills, or strikes so as to kill, his master, shall suffer death \"by a\nslow and painful execution.\"[75] Plato says that, if a slave\nvoluntarily murders a freeman, {430} the public executioner shall lead\nhim in the direction of the sepulchre of the dead man, to a place\nwhence he can see the tomb, and after inflicting upon him as many\nstripes as the complainant shall order, put the murderer, if he\nsurvives the scourging, to death.[76] Though the slave has committed\nthe act in a fit of passion, the relatives of the deceased shall\nnevertheless be under an obligation to kill him, and this may be done\nin any manner they please;[77] nay, even in self-defence a slave is\nnot allowed to kill a freeman, any more than a son is allowed to kill\nhis father.[78] At Rome, also, a slave was more heavily punished for\nthe commission of homicide than a freeman.[79] Says the ancient\njurist, \"Maiores nostri in omni supplicio severius servos quam liberos\nfamosos quam integr\u00e6 fam\u00e6 homines punierunt.\"[80]\n\n[Footnote 75: _Ta Tsing Leu Lee_, sec. cccxiv. p. 338.]\n\n[Footnote 76: Plato, _Leges_, ix. 872.]\n\n[Footnote 77: _Ibid._ ix. 868.]\n\n[Footnote 78: _Ibid._ ix. 869.]\n\n[Footnote 79: Mommsen, _R\u00f6misches Strafrecht_, p. 631 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 80: _Digesta_, xlviii. 19. 28. 16.]\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIn the estimate of life a distinction is made not only between freemen\nand slaves, but between different classes of freemen. Among certain\npeoples a person who kills a chief is punished with death, though\nmurder is not generally a capital offence.[81] Where the system of\ncompensation prevails, the blood-price very frequently varies\naccording to the station or rank of the victim.[82] Among the Rejangs\nof Sumatra the compensation for the murder of a superior chief is five\nhundred dollars, for that of an inferior chief two hundred and fifty\ndollars; for that of a common person, man or boy, eighty dollars; for\nthat of a common person, woman or girl, one hundred and fifty dollars;\nfor the legitimate child or wife of a superior chief, two hundred and\nfifty dollars.[83] The body of every Ossetian has {431} a settled\nvalue in the eyes of the judges, which seems to be fixed by public\nopinion; thus the father of a family bears a higher value than an\nunmarried man, and a noble is rated at twice as much as an ordinary\nfreeman.[84] In Eastern Tibet the murderer of a man of the upper class\nis fined 120 bricks of tea, the murderer of a middle-class man only\n80, and so on down through the social scale, the life of a beggar\nbeing valued at a nominal amount only; but if the victim was a lama,\nthe murderer has to pay a much higher price, possibly 300 bricks.[85]\nAccording to the doctrine of modern Buddhism, \"when the life of a man\nis taken, the demerit increases in proportion to the merit of the\nperson slain.\"[86] The laws of the Brets and Scots estimated the life\nof the king of Scots at a thousand cows; that of an earl's son, or a\nthane, at a hundred cows; that of a villein, at sixteen cows.[87] A\nsimilar system prevailed among the Celtic peoples generally,[88] as\nalso among the Teutons. A man's _wergeld_, or life-price, varied\naccording to his rank, birth, or office; and so minutely was it\ngraduated, that a great part of many Teutonic laws was taken up by\nprovisions fixing its amount in different cases.[89] In English laws\nof the Norman age the _wer_ of a _villanus_ is still only reckoned at\n_\u00a3_4, whilst that of the _homo plene nobilis_ is _\u00a3_25.[90]\n\n[Footnote 81: Woodthorpe, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxvi. 21 (Shans).\nShooter, _Kafirs of Natal_, p. 103.]\n\n[Footnote 82: Maclean, _Compendium of Kafir Laws and Customs_, p. 144.\nCasalis, _Basutos_, p. 225. Ellis, _Tshi-speaking Peoples of the Gold\nCoast_, p. 301. Munzinger, _Ostafrikanische Studien_, pp. 242 _sq._\n(Marea), 314 (Beni Amer). Forbes, _A Naturalist's Wanderings in the\nEastern Archipelago_, p. 145 (Lampongers of Sumatra). Modigliani,\n_Viaggio a N\u00edas_, p. 494. Richardson, _Arctic Searching Expedition_,\ni. 386 (Kutchin). Gibbs, _loc. cit._ p. 190 (Indians of Western\nWashington and North-western Oregon). Paget, _Hungary and\nTransylvania_, ii. 411 n. (Hungarians).]\n\n[Footnote 83: Crawfurd, _History of the Indian Archipelago_, iii. 112.]\n\n[Footnote 84: von Haxthausen, _Transcaucasia_, p. 409. Kovalewsky,\n_Coutume contemporaine_, p. 355 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 85: Rockhill, _Land of the Lamas_, p. 221.]\n\n[Footnote 86: Hardy, _Manual of Budhism_, p. 478.]\n\n[Footnote 87: Innes, _Scotland in the Middle Ages_, p. 180 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 88: _Ancient Laws of Ireland_, iii. 103, &c. Skene, _Celtic\nScotland_, iii. 152. de Valroger, _Les Celtes_, p. 471.]\n\n[Footnote 89: Grimm, _Deutsche Rechtsalterth\u00fcmer_, pp. 272-275, 289.\nBrunner, _Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte_, i. 104, 105, 107, 108, 224, 247\n_sqq._ Kemble, _Saxons in England_, i. 276 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 90: _Leges Henrici I._ lxx. 1; lxxvi. 4. _Cf._ _Laws of\nWilliam the Conqueror_, i. 8.]\n\nThe magnitude of the crime, however, may depend not only on the rank\nof the victim, but on the rank of the manslayer as well.[91] Among the\nPhilippine Islanders, \"murder committed by a slave was punished with\ndeath--committed by a person of rank, was indemnified by {432}\npayments to the injured family.\"[92] In Fijian estimation, says Mr.\nWilliams, offences \"are light or grave according to the rank of the\noffender. Murder by a chief is less heinous than a petty\n**larceny committed by a man of low rank.\"[93] Among the\nE[(w]e-speaking peoples of the Slave Coast, \"in cases of murder and\nmanslaughter, if the homicide be of rank superior to the person\nkilled, he pays the compensation demanded by the family of the latter,\nor, in default of payment, forfeits his own life. If the homicide be\nof equal rank with the person killed, the family of the deceased have\nthe right to demand his life, though compensation is usually accepted;\nbut when he is lower in rank his life is nearly always forfeited.\"[94]\nVery similar rules prevail among the Tshi-speaking peoples of the Gold\nCoast.[95] Among the Marea, if a nobleman kills another nobleman, the\nfamily of the deceased generally take revenge on him; whereas, if a\ncommoner kills a nobleman, he is not only executed himself, but his\nproperty is confiscated and his nearest relatives become subject to\nthe murdered man's family.[96] According to the religious law of\nBrahmanism, the enormity of all crimes depends on the caste of him who\ncommits them, and on the caste of him against whom they are\ncommitted.[97] If a Br\u00e2hmana slays a Br\u00e2hmana, the king shall brand\nhim on the forehead with a heated iron and banish him from his realm,\nbut if a man of a lower caste murders a Br\u00e2hmana, he shall be punished\nwith death and the confiscation of all his property.[98] If such a\nperson slays a man of equal or lower caste, other suitable punishments\nshall be inflicted upon him.[99] A fine of a thousand cows is the\npenalty for slaying a Kshatriya, that of a hundred for slaying a\nVaisya, and that of ten cows only for slaying a S\u00fbdra.[100] In Rome,\nalso, at a certain period of its history, the {433} offence was\nmagnified in proportion to the insignificance of the offender. During\nthe Republic there was no law sanctioning such a distinction, with\nreference to crimes committed by free citizens; but from the beginning\nof the Empire, the citizens were divided into privileged classes and\ncommonalty--_uterque ordo_ and _plebs_--and, whilst a commoner who was\nguilty of murder was punished with death, a murderer belonging to the\nprivileged classes was generally punished with _deportatio_ only.[101]\nIn the Middle Ages a similar privilege was granted by Italian and\nSpanish laws to manslayers of noble birth.[102]\n\n[Footnote 91: These two principles do not always go together. Among\nthe Rejangs the amount of the blood-money is not proportioned to the\nrank and ability of the murderer, but regulated only by the quality of\nthe person murdered (Marsden, _op. cit._ p. 246).]\n\n[Footnote 92: Bowring, _Visit to the Philippine Islands_, p. 123.]\n\n[Footnote 93: Williams and Calvert, _Fiji_, p. 22.]\n\n[Footnote 94: Ellis, _E[(w]e-speaking Peoples_, p. 223.]\n\n[Footnote 95: _Idem_, _Tshi-speaking Peoples_, p. 301.]\n\n[Footnote 96: Munzinger, _Ostafrikanische Studien_, p. 242, _sq._\n_Cf._ _ibid._ p. 314 (Beni Amer).]\n\n[Footnote 97: Hopkins, _Religions of India_, p. 263.]\n\n[Footnote 98: _Baudh\u00e1yana_, i. 10. 18. 18 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 99: _Ibid._ i. 10. 18. 20.]\n\n[Footnote 100: _Ibid._ i. 10. 19. 1 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 101: Mommsen, _R\u00f6misches Strafrecht_, pp. 650, 1032 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 102: Du Boys, _Histoire du droit criminel des peuples\nmodernes_, ii. 402. _Idem_, _Histoire du droit criminel de l'Espagne_,\npp. 357, 359. _Cf._ _ibid._ p. 635 _sq._]\n\nIn a society which is divided into different classes, persons\nbelonging to a higher class are naturally apt to sympathise more with\ntheir equals than with their inferiors. An injury inflicted on one of\nthe former tends to arouse in them a higher degree of sympathetic\nresentment than a similar injury inflicted on one of the latter. So,\nalso, their resentment towards the criminal will, _ceteris paribus_,\nbe more intense if he is a person of low rank than if he is one of\nthemselves. Where the superior class, as was originally the case\neverywhere, are the leaders of such a society, their feelings will\nfind expression in its customs and laws, and thus moral distinctions\nwill arise which are readily recognised by the common people also,\nowing to the admiration with which they look up to those above them.\nBut in a progressive society this state of things will not last. The\ndifferent classes gradually draw nearer to each other. The once\nall-powerful class loses much of its exclusiveness, as well as of its\nimportance and influence. Sympathy expands. In consequence,\ndistinctions which were formerly sanctioned by custom and law come to\nbe regarded as unjust prerogatives, worthy only of abolition. And it\nis at last admitted that each member of the society is born with an\nequal claim to the most sacred of all human rights, the right to\nlive.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIX\n\nHUMAN SACRIFICE\n\n\nIT still remains for us to consider some particular cases in which\ndestruction of human life is sanctioned by custom or law.\n\nMen are killed with a view to gratifying the desires of superhuman\nbeings. We meet with human sacrifice in the past history of every\nso-called Aryan race.[1] It occurred, at least occasionally, in\nancient India, and several of the modern Hindu sects practised it even\nin the last century.[2] There are numerous indications that it was\nknown among the early Greeks.[3] At certain times it prevailed in the\nHellenic cult of Zeus;[4] indeed, in the second century after Christ\nmen seem still to have been sacrificed to Zeus Lyc\u00e6us in Arcadia.[5]\nTo the historic age likewise belongs the sacrifice of the three\nPersian prisoners of war whom Themistocles was compelled to slay\nbefore the battle of Salamis.[6] In Rome, also, human sacrifices,\nthough {435} exceptional, were not unknown in historic times.[7] Pliny\nrecords that in the year 97 B.C. a decree forbidding such sacrifices\nwas passed by the Roman Senate,[8] and afterwards the Emperor Hadrian\nfound it necessary to renew this prohibition.[9] Porphyry asks, \"Who\ndoes not know that to this day, in the great city of Rome, at the\nfestival of Jupiter Latiaris, they cut the throat of a man?\"[10] And\nTertullian states that in North Africa, even to the proconsulship of\nTiberius, infants were publicly sacrificed to Saturn.[11] Human\nsacrifices were offered by Celts,[12] Teutons,[13] and Slavs;[14] by\nthe ancient Semites[15] and Egyptians;[16] by the Japanese in early\ndays;[17] and, in the New World, by the Mayas[18] and, to a frightful\nextent, by the Aztecs. \"Scarcely any author,\" says Prescott in his\n'History of the Conquest of Mexico,' \"pretends to estimate the yearly\nsacrifices throughout the empire at less than twenty thousand, and\nsome carry the number as high as fifty thousand.\"[19] The same\npractice is imputed by Spanish writers to the Incas of Peru, and\nprobably not without good reason.[20] Before their rule, at all\nevents, it {436} was of frequent occurrence among the Peruvian\nIndians.[21] It also prevailed, or still prevails, among the\nCaribs[22] and some North American tribes;[23] in various South Sea\nislands, especially Tahiti and Fiji;[24] among certain tribes in the\nMalay Archipelago;[25] among several of the aboriginal tribes of\nIndia;[26] and very commonly in Africa.[27]\n\n[Footnote 1: See Hehn, _Wanderings of Plants and Animals from their\nFirst Home_, p. 414 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 2: Weber, _Indische Streifen_, i. 54 _sqq._ Wilson, 'Human\nSacrifices in the Ancient Religion of India,' in _Works_, ii. 247\n_sqq._ Oldenberg, _Religion des Veda_, p. 363 _sqq._ Barth, _Religions\nof India_, p. 57 _sqq._ Monier Williams, _Br[=a]hmanism and\nHind[=u]ism_, p. 24. Hopkins, _Religions of India_, pp. 198, 363.\nR\u00e1jendral\u00e1la Mitra, _Indo-Aryans_, ii. 69 _sqq._ Crooke, _Popular\nReligion and Folk-Lore of Northern India_, ii. 167 _sqq._ Chevers,\n_Manual of Medical Jurisprudence for India_, p. 396 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 3: See Geusius, _Victim\u00e6 Human\u00e6_, _passim_; von Lasaulx,\n_S\u00fchnofper der Griechen und R\u00f6mer_, _passim_; Farnell, _Cults, of the\nGreek States_, i. 41 _sq._; Stengel, _Die griechischen Kultusaltert\u00fcmer_,\np. 114 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 4: _Cf._ Farnell, _op. cit._ i. 93; Stengel, _op. cit._\np. 116.]\n\n[Footnote 5: Pausanias, viii. 38. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 6: Plutarch, _Themistocles_, 13.]\n\n[Footnote 7: _Idem_, _Questiones Roman\u00e6_, 83. See Landau, in _Am\nUr-Quell_, iii. 1892, p. 283 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 8: Pliny, _Historia naturalis_, xxx. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 9: Porphyry, _De abstinentia ab esu animalium_, ii. 56.]\n\n[Footnote 10: _Ibid._ ii. 56.]\n\n[Footnote 11: Tertullian, _Apologeticus_, 9 (Migne, _Patrologi\u00e6\ncursus_, i. 314).]\n\n[Footnote 12: C\u00e6sar, _De bello gallico_, vi. 16. Tacitus, _Annales_,\nxiv. 30. Diodorus Siculus, _Bibliotheca_, v. 31, p. 354. Pliny,\n_Historia naturalis_, xxx. 4. Strabo, iv. 5, p. 198. Joyce, _Social\nHistory of Ancient Ireland_, i. 281 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 13: Tacitus, _Germania_, 9. Adam of Bremen, _Gesta\nHammaburgensis ecclesi\u00e6 pontificum_, iv. 27 (Migne, _op. cit._ cxlvi.\n644). Grimm, _Teutonic Mythology_, i. 44 _sqq._ Vigfusson and Powell,\n_Corpus Poeticum Boreale_, i. 409 _sq._ Freytag, 'Riesen und\nMenschenopfer in unsern Sagen und M\u00e4rchen,' in _Am Ur-Quell_, i. 1890,\npp. 179-183, 197 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 14: Mone, _Geschichte des nordischen Heidenthums_, i. 119,\nquoted by Frazer, _Golden Bough_, ii. 52. Krauss, in _Am Ur-Quell_,\nvi. 1896, p. 137 _sqq._ (Servians).]\n\n[Footnote 15: Ghillany, _Die Menschenopfer der alten Hebr\u00e4er_,\n_passim_. Robertson Smith, _Religion of the Semites_, p. 362 _sqq._\nWellhausen, _Reste arabischen Heidentums_, p. 115 _sq._ von Kremer,\n_Studien zur vergleichenden Culturgeschichte_, i. 42 _sqq._ Chwolsohn,\n_Die Ssabier und der Ssabismus_, ii. 147 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 16: Am\u00e9lineau, _L'\u00e9volution des id\u00e9es morales dans l'\u00c9gypte\nAncienne_, p. 12.]\n\n[Footnote 17: Griffis, _Religions of Japan_, p. 75. Lippert,\n_Seelencult_, p. 79.]\n\n[Footnote 18: Bancroft, _Native Races of the Pacific States_,\nii. 704, 725.]\n\n[Footnote 19: Prescott, _History of the Conquest of Mexico_, p. 38.\n_Cf._ Clavigero, _History of Mexico_, i. 281; Acosta, _Natural and\nMoral History of the Indies_, ii. 346.]\n\n[Footnote 20: Acosta, _op. cit._ ii. 344. de Molina, 'Fables and Rites\nof the Yncas,' in _Narratives of the Rites and Laws of the Yncas_, pp.\n55, 56, 59. According to Cieza de Leon (_Segunda parte de la Cr\u00f3nica\ndel Per\u00fa_, p. 100), the practice of human sacrifice has been much\nexaggerated by Spanish writers, but he does not deny its existence\namong the Incas; nay, he gives an account of such sacrifices (_ibid._\np. 109 _sqq._). Sir Clements Markham seems to attach undue importance\nto the statement of Garcilasso de la Vega that human victims were\nnever sacrificed by the Incas (_First Part of the Royal Commentaries\nof the Yncas_, i. 130, 131, 139 _sqq._ n. [dagger]). _Cf._ Prescott,\n_History of the Conquest of Peru_, p. 50 _sq._ n. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 21: Garcilasso de la Vega, _op. cit._ i. 50, 130.]\n\n[Footnote 22: M\u00fcller, _Geschichte der Amerikanischen Urreligionen_,\np. 212 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 23: _Ibid._ p. 142. _sqq._ R\u00e9ville, _Religions des peuples\nnon-civilis\u00e9s_, i. 249 _sq._ Dorman, _Origin of Primitive\nSuperstitions_, p. 208 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 24: Schneider, _Naturv\u00f6lker_, i. 191 _sq._ Fornander,\n_Account of the Polynesian Race_, i. 129. Ellis, _Polynesian\nResearches_, i. 106, 346-348, 357 (Society Islanders). Williams,\n_Missionary Enterprises in the South Sea Islands_, p. 548 _sq._\n(especially the Hervey Islanders and Tahitians). von Kotzebue, _Voyage\nof Discovery_, iii. 248 (Sandwich Islanders). Lisiansky, _Voyage round\nthe World_, pp. 81 _sq._ (Nukahivans), 120 (Sandwich Islanders). Gill,\n_Myths and Songs from the South Pacific_, p. 289 _sqq._ (Mangaians).\nWilliams and Calvert, _Fiji_, pp. 188, 195; Wilkes, _Narrative of the\nU.S. Exploring Expedition_, iii. 97; Hale, _U.S. Exploring Expedition,\nVol. VI. Ethnography and Philology_, p. 57 (Fijians). Codrington,\n_Melanesians_, p. 134 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 25: Ling Roth, _Natives of Sarawak and British North\nBorneo_, ii. 215 _sqq._ Bock, _Head-Hunters of Borneo_, p. 218 _sq._\n(Dyaks).]\n\n[Footnote 26: Woodthorpe, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxvi. 24 (Shans,\n&c.). Colquhoun, _Amongst the Shans_, p. 152 (Steins inhabiting the\nsouth-east of Indo-China). Lewin, _Wild Races of South-Eastern India_,\np. 244 (Pankhos and Bunjogees). Godwin-Austen, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._\nii. 394 (Garo hill tribes). Dalton, _Descriptive Ethnology of Bengal_,\npp. 147 (Bh\u00faiyas), 176 (Bh\u00famij), 281 (Gonds), 285 _sqq._ (Kandhs).\nHislop, _Aboriginal Tribes of the Central Provinces_, p. 15 _sq._\n(Gonds). Macpherson, _Memorials of Service in India_, p. 113 _sq._\nCampbell, _Wild Tribes of Khondistan_, _passim_ (Kandhs).]\n\n[Footnote 27: Schneider, _Religion der afrikanischen Naturv\u00f6lker_, p.\n118. Reade, _Savage Africa_, p. 52 (Dahomans, &c.). Ling Roth, _Great\nBenin_, p. 63 _sqq._ Ellis, _E[(w]e-speaking Peoples of the Slave\nCoast_, p. 117 _sqq._ _Idem_, _Yoruba-speaking Peoples of the Slave\nCoast_, p. 296. _Idem_, _Tshi-speaking Peoples of the Gold Coast_, p.\n169 _sqq._ Cruickshank, _Eighteen Years on the Gold Coast_, ii. 173.\nSchoen and Crowther, _Expedition up the Niger_, p. 48 _sq._ (Ibos).\nArnot _Garenganze_, p. 75 (Barotse). Arbousset and Daumas,\n_Exploratory Tour to the North-East of the Colony of the Cape of Good\nHope_, p. 97 (Marimos, a Bechuana tribe). Macdonald, _Africana_, i. 96\n_sq._ (Eastern Central Africans). Ellis, _History of Madagascar_, i.\n422; Sibree, _The Great African Island_, p. 303 (Malagasy).]\n\nFrom this enumeration it appears that the practice of human sacrifice\ncannot be regarded as a characteristic of savage races. On the\ncontrary, it is found much more {437} frequently among barbarians and\nsemi-civilised peoples than among genuine savages, and at the lowest\nstages of culture known to us it is hardly heard of. Among some\npeoples the practice has been noticed to become increasingly prevalent\nin the course of time. In the Society Islands \"human sacrifices, we\nare informed by the natives, are comparatively of modern institution:\nthey were not admitted until a few generations antecedent to the\ndiscovery of the islands**\";[28] and in ancient legends there seems to\nbe certain indications that they were once prohibited in\nPolynesia.[29] In India human sacrifices were apparently much rarer\namong the Vedic people than among the Brahmanists of a later age.[30]\nWe are told that such sacrifices were adopted by the Aztecs only in\nthe beginning of the fourteenth century, about two hundred years\nbefore the conquest, and that, \"rare at first, they became more\nfrequent with the wider extent of their empire; till, at length,\nalmost every festival was closed with this cruel abomination.\"[31] Of\nthe Africans Mr. Winwood Reade remarks, \"The more powerful the nation\nthe grander the sacrifice.\"[32]\n\n[Footnote 28: Ellis, _Polynesian Researches_, i. 106.]\n\n[Footnote 29: Fornander, _op. cit._ i. 129.]\n\n[Footnote 30: Wilson, _Works_, ii. 268 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 31: Prescott, _History of the Conquest of Mexico_, p. 36.]\n\n[Footnote 32: Reade, _Savage Africa_, p. 52.]\n\nMen offer up human victims to their gods because they think that the\ngods are gratified by such offerings. In many cases the gods are\nsupposed to have an appetite for human flesh or blood.[33] The Fijian\ngods are described as \"delighting in human flesh.\"[34] Among the\nOoryahs of India the priest, when offering a human sacrifice to the\nwar-god Manicksoro, said to the god, \"The sacrifice we now offer you\nmust eat.\"[35] Among the Iroquois, when an enemy was tortured at the\nstake, the savage executioners leaped around him crying, \"To thee,\nArieskoi, great spirit, we slay this victim, that thou mayest eat his\nflesh and be moved thereby to give us henceforth luck and {438}\nvictory over our foes.\"[36] Among the ancient nations of Central\nAmerica the blood and heart of the human victims offered in sacrifice\nwere counted the peculiar portion of the gods.[37] Thus, in Mexico,\nthe high-priest, after cutting open the victim's breast, tore forth\nthe yet palpitating heart, offered it first to the sun, threw it then\nat the feet of the idol, and finally burned it; sometimes the heart\nwas placed in the mouth of the idol with a golden spoon, and its lips\nwere anointed with the victim's blood.[38]\n\n[Footnote 33: See Lippert, _Seelencult_, p. 77 _sqq._; Schneider,\n_Naturv\u00f6lker_, i. 190.]\n\n[Footnote 34: Williams and Calvert, _op. cit._ p. 195.]\n\n[Footnote 35: Campbell, _Wild Tribes of Khondistan_, p. 211. _Cf._\nMacpherson, _Memorials of Service in India_, p. 120 (Kandhs).]\n\n[Footnote 36: M\u00fcller, _Geschichte der Amerikanischen Urreligionen_,\np. 142.]\n\n[Footnote 37: Bancroft, _op. cit._ ii. 307, 310, 311, 707 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 38: Clavigero, _op. cit._ i. 279.]\n\nBut the human victim is not always, as has been erroneously\nsupposed,[39] intended to serve the god as a food-offering. The\nTshi-speaking peoples of the Gold Coast, as Major Ellis observes,\nmaintain that their gods require not only food, but attendants; \"the\nghosts of the human victims sacrificed to them are believed to pass at\nonce into a condition of ghostly servitude to them, just as those\nsacrificed at the funerals of chiefs are believed to pass into a\nghostly attendance.\"[40] Cieza de Leon mentions the prevalence of a\nsimilar belief among the ancient Peruvians. At the hill of Guanacaure,\n\"on certain days they sacrificed men and women, to whom, before they\nwere put to death, the priest addressed a discourse, explaining to\nthem that they were going to serve that god who was being\nworshipped.\"[41]\n\n[Footnote 39: R\u00e9ville, _Hibbert Lectures on the Native Religions of\nMexico and Peru_, p. 75 _sq._ _Idem_, _Prolegomena of the History of\nReligions_, p. 132. Trumbull, _Blood Covenant_, p. 189. Steinmetz,\n_Endokannibalismus_, p. 60, n. 1. Schrader, _Reallexikon der\nindogermanischen Altertumskunde_, p. 603.]\n\n[Footnote 40: Ellis, _Tshi-speaking Peoples of the Gold Coast_, p. 169.]\n\n[Footnote 41: Cieza de Leon, _Segunda parte de Cr\u00f3nica del Per\u00fa_,\np. 109.]\n\nMoreover, an angry god may be appeased simply by the death of him or\nthose who aroused his anger, or of some representative of the\noffending community, or of somebody belonging to the kin of the\noffender. Among the E[(w]e-speaking peoples of the Slave Coast, \"in\nthe case of human victims the gods are not believed to devour the\n{439} souls; and as these souls are, by the majority of the natives,\nbelieved to proceed to Dead-land like all others, the object of human\nsacrifice seems to be to gratify or satiate the malignancy of the gods\nat the expense of chosen individuals, instead of leaving it to\nchance--the victims are in fact slain for the benefit of the community\nat large.\"[42] One reason why the human victims are so frequently\ncriminals, is no doubt the intention of appeasing the god by offering\nup to him an individual who is hateful to him. The Sandwich Islanders\n\"sacrifice culprits to their gods, as we sacrifice them in Europe to\njustice.\"[43] Among the Teutons the execution of a criminal was, in\nmany cases at least, a sacrifice to the god whose peculiar cult had\nbeen offended by the crime.[44] Thus the Frisian law describes as an\nimmolation to the god the punishment of one who violates his\ntemple.[45] In ancient Rome the corn thief, if he was an adult, was\nhanged as an offering to Ceres;[46] and Ovid tells us that a priestess\nof Vesta who had been false to her vows of chastity was sacrificed by\nbeing buried alive in the earth, Vesta and Tellus being the same\ndeity.[47] In consequence of the sacrilege of Menalippus and Com\u00e6tho,\nwho had polluted a temple of Artemis by their amours, the Pythian\npriestess ordained that the guilty pair should be sacrificed to the\ngoddess, and that, besides, the people should every year sacrifice to\nher a youth and a maiden, the fairest of their sex.[48] The Hebrew\n_cherem_, or ban, was originally applied to malefactors and other\nenemies of Yahveh, and sometimes also to their possessions.\n\"_Cherem_,\" says Professor Kuenen, \"is properly dedication to Yahveh,\nwhich in reality amounted to destruction or annihilation. The persons\nwho were {440} 'dedicated,' generally by a solemn vow, to Yahveh, were\nput to death, frequently by fire, whereby the resemblance to an\nordinary burnt-offering was rendered still more apparent; their\ndwellings and property were also consumed by fire; their lands were\nleft uncultivated for ever. Such punishments were very common in the\nancient world. But in Israel, as elsewhere, they were at the same time\nreligious acts.\"[49] The sacrifice of offenders has, in fact, survived\nin the Christian world, since every execution performed for the\npurpose of appeasing an offended and angry god may be justly called a\nsacrifice.[50]\n\n[Footnote 42: Ellis, _E[(w]e-speaking Peoples of the Slave Coast_,\np. 119.]\n\n[Footnote 43: von Kotzebue, _op. cit._ iii. 248. _Cf._ Lisiansky, _op.\ncit._ 120.]\n\n[Footnote 44: von Amira, in Paul's _Grundriss der germanischen\nPhilologie_, ii. pt. ii. 177. Brunner, _Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte_,\nii. 587, 684 _sq._ Vigtusson and Powell, _op. cit._ i. 410. Gummere,\n_Germanic Origins_, p. 463.]\n\n[Footnote 45: _Lex Frisionum_, Additio sapientium, 12.]\n\n[Footnote 46: Granger, _Worship of the Romans_, p. 260.]\n\n[Footnote 47: Ovid, _Fasti_, vi. 457 _sq._ _Cf._ Mommsen, _R\u00f6misches\nStrafrecht_, p. 902.]\n\n[Footnote 48: Pausanias, vii. 19. 4.]\n\n[Footnote 49: Kuenen, _Religion of Israel_, i. 290 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 50: See _supra_, p. 197 _sq._ For various instances of\nexpiatory human sacrifice, involving vicarious atonement, see _supra_,\np. 66 _sq._]\n\nIt is impossible to discover in every special case in what respect the\nworshippers believe the offering of a fellow-creature to be gratifying\nto the deity. Probably they have not always definite views on the\nsubject themselves. They know, or believe, that on some certain\noccasion, they are in danger of losing their lives; they attribute\nthis to the designs of a supernatural being; and, by sacrificing a\nman, they hope to gratify that being's craving for human life, and\nthereby avert the danger from themselves. That this principle mainly\nunderlies the practice of human sacrifice appears from the\ncircumstances in which such sacrifices generally occur.\n\nHuman victims are often offered in war, before a battle, or during a\nsiege.\n\nC\u00e6sar wrote of the Gauls, \"They who are engaged in battles and\ndangers, either sacrifice men as victims, or vow that they will\nsacrifice them . . . ; because they think that unless the life of a\nman be offered for the life of a man, the mind of the immortal gods\ncannot be rendered propitious.\"[51] The Lusitanians sacrificed a man\nand a horse at the commencement of a military enterprise.[52] Before\ngoing to war, or before the beginning of a battle, or during a siege,\nthe Greeks offered a human victim to ensure victory.[53] When\nhard-pressed in battle, {441} the King of Moab sacrificed his eldest\nson as a burnt offering on the wall.[54] In times of great calamities,\nsuch as war, the Phenicians sacrificed some of their dearest friends,\nwho were selected by votes for this purpose.[55] During a battle with\nking Gelo of Syracuse, the general Hamilcar sacrificed innumerable\nhuman victims, from dawn to sunset;[56] and when Carthage was reduced\nto the last extremities, the noble families were compelled to give up\ntwo hundred of their sons to be offered to Baal.[57] In Hindu\nscriptures and traditions success in war is promised to him who offers\na man in sacrifice.[58] In Jeypore \"the blood-red god of battle\" is\npropitiated by human victims. \"Thus, on the eve of a battle, or when a\nnew fort, or even an important village is to be built, or when danger\nof any kind is to be averted, this sanguinary being must be\npropitiated with human blood.\"[59] In Great Benin human blood was shed\nin a case of common danger when an enemy was at the gate of the\ncity.[60] The Yorubas sacrifice men in times of national need.[61]\nAmong the E[(w]e-speaking peoples of the Slave Coast, such sacrifices\n\"are ordinarily only made in time of war, pestilence, or great\ncalamity.\"[62] The Tahitians offered human sacrifices in seasons of\nwar, or when war was in agitation.[63]\n\n[Footnote 51: C\u00e6sar, _De bello gallico_, vi. 16.]\n\n[Footnote 52: Livy, _Epitome_, 49.]\n\n[Footnote 53: Pausanias, iv. 9. 4 _sqq._; ix. 17. 1. Plutarch,\n_Themistocles_, 13. _Idem_, _Aristides_, 9. _Idem_, _Pelopidas_, 21\n_sq._ Lycurgus, _Oratio in Leocratem_, (ch. 24) 99. Apollodorus,\n_Bibliotheca_, iii. 15. 4. Porphyry, _De abstinentia ab esu\nanimalium_, ii. 56. Geusius, _op. cit._ i. ch. 16 _sq._ Stengel, _op.\ncit._ p. 115 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 54: _2 Kings_, iii. 27.]\n\n[Footnote 55: Porphyry, _op. cit._ ii. 56.]\n\n[Footnote 56: Herodotus, vii. 167.]\n\n[Footnote 57: Diodorus Siculus, xx. 14.]\n\n[Footnote 58: Chevers, _op. cit._ p. 399.]\n\n[Footnote 59: Campbell, _Wild Tribes of Khondistan_, p. 52.]\n\n[Footnote 60: Ling Roth, _Great Benin_, p. 72.]\n\n[Footnote 61: Ellis, _Yoruba-speaking People of the Slave Coast_,\np. 296.]\n\n[Footnote 62: _Idem_, _E[(w]e-speaking Peoples of the Slave Coast_, p.\n117.]\n\n[Footnote 63: Ellis, _Polynesian Researches_, i. 276 _sqq._, 346.]\n\nAfter a victory, captured enemies are sacrificed to the god to\nwhose assistance the success is ascribed. This sacrifice has been\nrepresented as a thank-offering;[64] but, in many cases at least, it\nseems to be offered either to fulfil a vow previously made, or to\ninduce the god to continue his favours for the future.[65] Among the\nKayans of Borneo it is the custom that, when captives are brought to\nan enemy's country, \"one should suffer death, to bring prosperity and\nabolish the curse of the enemy in their lands.\"[66]\n\n[Footnote 64: Diodorus Siculus, xx. 65 (Carthaginians). de Molina,\n_loc. cit._ p. 59 (Incas); &c.]\n\n[Footnote 65: Ellis, _Tshi-speaking Peoples_, p. 170. Cruickshank,\n_op. cit._ ii. 173. Dubois, _Character, Manners, and Customs of the\nPeople of India_, p. 488. Jordanes, _De origine actibusque Getarum_, 5\n(41). _Cf._ Jephthah's vow (_Judges_, xi. 30 _sqq._).]\n\n[Footnote 66: Brook, _Ten Years in Sar\u00e1wak_, ii. 304 _sq._]\n\nHuman sacrifices are offered for the purpose of stopping or preventing\nepidemics.\n\n{442} The Phenicians sacrificed \"some of their dearest friends,\" not\nonly in war, but in times of pestilence.[67] In similar circumstances\nthe ancient Greeks had recourse to human sacrifices.[68] In seasons of\ngreat peril, as when a pestilence was raging, the ancient Italians\nmade a vow that they would sacrifice every living being that should be\nborn in the following spring.[69] In West Gothland, in Sweden, the\npeople decreed a human sacrifice to stay the _digerd\u00f6d_, or Plague,\nhence two beggar children, having just then come in, were buried\nalive.[70] In Fur, in Denmark, there is a tradition that, for the same\npurpose, a child was interred alive in the burial ground.[71] Among\nthe Chukchi, in 1814, when a sudden and violent disease had broken out\nand carried off both men and reindeer, the Shamans, after having had\nrecourse in vain to their usual conjurations, determined that one of\nthe most respected chiefs must be sacrificed to appease the irritated\nspirits.[72] In Great Benin, \"when the doctors declared a man had died\nowing to Ogiwo, if they think an epidemic imminent, they can tell\nOverami [the king] that Ogiwo vex. Then he can take a man and a woman,\nall the town can fire guns and beat drums. The man and woman are\nbrought out, and the head Jujuman can make this prayer: 'Oh, Ogiwo,\nyou are very big man; don't let any sickness come for Ado. Make all\nfarm good, and every woman born man son.'\"[73] In the same country\ntwelve men, besides various animals, were offered yearly on the\nanniversary of the death of Adolo, king Overami's father. King\nOverami, calling his father loudly by name, spoke as follows: \"Oh,\nAdolo, our father, look after all Ado [that is, Great Benin], don't\nlet any sickness come to us, look after me and my people, our slaves,\ncows, goats, and fowls, and everything in the farms.\"[74]\n\n[Footnote 67: Porphyry, _op. cit._ ii. 56.]\n\n[Footnote 68: Geusius, _op. cit._ i. ch. 13. Stengel, _op. cit._ p.\n116. Frazer, _Golden Bough_, iii. 125 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 69: Festus, _De verborum significatione_, 'Ver sacrum,'\nM\u00fcller's edition, p. 379. Nonius Marcellus, _De proprietate sermonis_,\n'Versacrum,' p. 522. Servius, _In Virgilii \u00c6neidos_, vii. 796.]\n\n[Footnote 70: Afzelius, _Swenska Folkets Sago-H\u00e4fder_, iv. 181.]\n\n[Footnote 71: Nyrop, _Romanske Mosaiker_, p. 69, n. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 72: von Wrangell, _Expedition to the Polar Sea_, p. 122 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 73: Moor and Roupell, quoted by Read and Dalton,\n_Antiquities from the City of Benin_, p. 7; also by Ling Roth, _Great\nBenin_, p. 71 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 74: Moor and Roupell, quoted by Ling Roth, _op. cit._ p. 70\n_sq._; also by Read and Dalton, _op. cit._ p. 6.]\n\nThe sacrifice of human victims is resorted to as a method of putting\nan end to a devastating famine.\n\n{443} Instances of this practice are reported to have occurred among\nthe ancient Greeks[75] and Phenicians.[76] In a grievous famine, after\nother great sacrifices, of oxen and of men, had proved unavailing, the\nSwedes offered up their own king D\u00f3maldi.[77] Chinese annals tell us\nthat there was a great drought and famine for seven years after the\naccession of T'ang, the noble and pious man who had overthrown the\ndynasty of Shang. It was then suggested at last by some one that a\nhuman victim should be offered in sacrifice to Heaven, and prayer be\nmade for rain, to which T'ang replied, \"If a man must be the victim I\nwill be he.\"[78] Up to quite recent times, the priests of Lower Bengal\nhave, in seasons of scarcity, offered up children to Siva; in the\nyears 1865 and 1866, for instance, recourse was had to such sacrifices\nin order to avert famine.[79]\n\n[Footnote 75: Pausanias, vii. 19. 3 _sq._ Diodorus Siculus, iv. 61. 1\n_sqq._ Geusius, _op. cit._ i. ch. 14.]\n\n[Footnote 76: Porphyry, _op. cit._ ii. 56.]\n\n[Footnote 77: Snorri Sturluson, 'Ynglingasaga,' 15, in _Heimskringla_,\ni. 30.]\n\n[Footnote 78: Legge, _Religions of China_, p. 54.]\n\n[Footnote 79: Hunter, _Annals of Rural Bengal_, i. 128.]\n\nFor people subsisting on agriculture a failure of crops means\nstarvation and death,[80] and is, consequently, attributed to the\nmurderous designs of a superhuman being, such as the earth spirit, the\nmorning star, the sun, or the rain-god. By sacrificing to that being a\nman, they hope to appease its thirst for human blood; and whilst some\nresort to such a sacrifice only in case of actual famine, others try\nto prevent famine by making the offering in advance. This I take to be\nthe true explanation of the custom of securing good crops by means of\nhuman sacrifice, of which many instances have been produced by Dr.\nFrazer.[81] There are obvious links between this custom and that of\nthe actual famine-sacrifice. Thus the ancient Peruvians sacrificed\nchildren after harvest, when they prepared to make ready the land for\nthe next year, not every year, however, but \"only when the weather was\nnot good, and seasonable.\"[82] In Great Benin, \"if there is too much\n{444} rain, then all the people would come from farm and beg Overami\n[the king] to make juju, and sacrifice to stop the rain. Accordingly a\nwoman was taken, a prayer made over her, and a message saluting the\nrain god put in her mouth, then she was clubbed to death and put up in\nthe execution tree so that the rain might see. . . . In the same way\nif there is too much sun so that there is a danger of the crops\nspoiling, Overami can sacrifice to the Sun God.\"[83] The principle of\nsubstitution admits of a considerable latitude in regard to the stage\nof danger at which the offering is made; the danger may be more\nimminent, or it may be more remote. This holds good of various kinds\nof human sacrifice, not only of such sacrifices as are intended to\ninfluence the crops. I am unable to subscribe to the hypothesis\ncautiously set forth by Dr. Frazer, that the human victim who is\nkilled for the purpose of ensuring good crops is regarded as a\nrepresentative of the corn-spirit and is slain as such. So far as I\ncan see, Dr. Frazer has adduced no satisfactory evidence in support of\nhis supposition; whereas a detailed examination of various cases\nmentioned by him in connection with it indicates that they are closely\nrelated to human sacrifices offered on other occasions, and explicable\nfrom the same principle, that of substitution.\n\n[Footnote 80: _Cf._ Sleeman, _Rambles and Recollections_, i. 204\n_sqq._:--\"In India, unfavourable seasons produce much more disastrous\nconsequences than in Europe. . . . More than three-fourths of the\nwhole population are engaged in the cultivation of the land, and\ndepend upon its annual returns for subsistence. . . . Tens of\nthousands die here of starvation, under calamities of season, which in\nEurope would involve little of suffering to any class.\"]\n\n[Footnote 81: Frazer, _Golden Bough_, ii. 238 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 82: Herrera, _op. cit._ ii. 111.]\n\n[Footnote 83: Moor and Roupell, quoted by Read and Dalton, _op. cit._\np. 7; also by Ling Roth, _Great Benin_, p. 71.]\n\n\"The best known case of human sacrifices, systematically offered to\nensure good crops,\" says Dr. Frazer, \"is supplied by the Khonds or\nKandhs.\" The victims, or Meriahs, are represented by our\nauthorities[84] as being offered to propitiate the Earth goddess, Tari\nPennu or Bera Pennu, but from their treatment both before and after\ndeath it appears to Dr. Frazer that the custom cannot be explained as\nmerely a propitiatory sacrifice. The flesh and the ashes of the\nMeriah, he observes, were believed to possess a magic power of\nfertilising the land, quite independent of the indirect efficacy which\nthey might have as an offering to secure the goodwill of the deity.\nFor, though a part of the flesh was offered to the Earth Goddess, the\nrest of it {445} was buried by each householder in his fields, and the\nashes of the other parts of the body were scattered over the fields,\nlaid as paste on the granaries, or mixed with the new corn. The same\nintrinsic power was ascribed to the blood and tears of the Meriah, his\nblood causing the redness of the turmeric and his tears producing\nrain; and magic power as an attribute of the victim appears, also in\nthe sovereign virtue believed to reside in anything that came from his\nperson, as his hair or spittle. Considering further that, according to\nour authorities, the Meriah was regarded as \"something more than\nmortal,\" or that \"a species of reverence, which it is not easy to\ndistinguish from adoration, is paid to him,\" Dr. Frazer concludes that\nhe may originally have represented the Earth deity or perhaps a deity\nof vegetation, and that he only in later times came to be regarded\nrather as a victim offered to a deity than as himself an incarnate\ndeity.[85]\n\n[Footnote 84: Campbell, _Wild Tribes of Khondistan_. Macpherson,\n_Memorials of Service in India_.]\n\n[Footnote 85: Frazer, _op. cit._ ii. 245 _sq._]\n\nThe premise on which Dr. Frazer bases his argument appears to me\nquite untenable. It is an arbitrary supposition that the ascription of\na magical power to the Meriah \"indicates that he was much more than a\nmere man sacrificed to propitiate a deity.\"[86] A sacrifice is very\ncommonly believed to be endowed with such a power, not as an original\nquality, but in consequence of its contact or communion with the\nsupernatural being to which it is offered. Just as the Meriah of the\nKandhs is taken round the village, from door to door, and some pluck\nhair from his head, while others beg for a drop of his spittle, so,\namong the nomadic Arabs of Morocco, at the Muhammedan \"Great Feast,\" a\nman dressed in the bloody skin of the sheep which has been sacrificed\non that occasion, goes from tent to tent, and beats each tent with his\nstick so as to confer blessings on its inhabitants. For he is now\nendowed with _l-baraka del-[(]id_, \"the benign virtue of the feast\";\nand the same power is ascribed to various parts of the sacrificed\nsheep, which are consequently used for magical purposes. If Dr.\nFrazer's way of arguing were correct we should have to conclude that\nthe victim was originally the god himself, or a representative of the\ngod, to whom it is now offered in sacrifice. But the absurdity of any\nsuch inference becomes apparent at once when we consider that, in\nMorocco, every offering to a holy person, for instance to a deceased\nsaint, is considered to participate in its sanctity. When the saint\nhas his feast, and animals and other presents are brought to his tomb,\nit is customary for his descendants--who have a right to the\nofferings--to distribute {446} some flesh of the slaughtered animals\namong their friends, thereby conferring _l-baraka_ of the saint upon\nthose who eat it; and even candles which have been offered to the\nsaint are given away for the same purpose, being instinct with his\n_baraka_. Of course, what holds good of the Arabs in Morocco does not\nnecessarily hold good of the Kandhs of Bengal; but it should be\nremembered that Dr. Frazer's argument is founded on the notion that\nthe ascription of a magic power to a victim which is offered in\nsacrifice to a god indicates that the victim was once regarded as a\ndivine being or as the god himself; and the facts I have recorded\ncertainly prove the arbitrariness of this supposition.\n\n[Footnote 86: _Ibid._ ii. 246.]\n\nThis is by no means the only objection which may be raised against\nDr. Frazer's hypothesis. In his description of the rite in question he\nhas emphasised its connection with agriculture to a degree which is\nfar from being justified by the accounts given by our authorities. Mr.\nMacpherson states that the human sacrifice to Tari Pennu was\ncelebrated as a public oblation by tribes, branches of tribes, or\nvillages, both at social festivals held periodically, and when special\noccasions demanded exceptional propitiations. It was celebrated \"upon\nthe occurrence of an extraordinary number of deaths by disease; or\nshould very many die in childbirth; or should the flocks or herds\nsuffer largely from disease, or from wild beasts; or should the\ngreater crops threaten to fail\"; while the occurrence of any marked\ncalamity to the families of the chiefs, whose fortunes were regarded\nas the principal indication of the disposition of Tari towards their\ntribes, was held to be a token of wrath which could not be too\nspeedily averted.[87] Moreover, besides these social offerings, the\nrite was performed by individuals to avert the wrath of Tari from\nthemselves and their families, for instance, if a child, when watching\nhis father's flock, was carried off by a tiger.[88] So, also, Mr.\nCampbell observes that the human blood was offered to the Earth\ngoddess, \"in the hope of thus obtaining abundant crops, averting\ncalamity, and insuring general prosperity\";[89] or that it was\nsupposed \"that good crops, and safety from all disease and accidents,\nwere ensured by this slaughter.\"[90] According to another authority,\nMr. Russell, the assembled multitude, when dancing round the victim,\naddressed the earth in the following words, \"O God, we offer this\nsacrifice to you; give us good crops, seasons, and health.\"[91] Nor\nwas the magic {447} virtue of the Meriah utilised solely for the\nbenefit of the crops. According to one account, part of the flesh was\nburied near the village idol as an offering to the earth, and part on\nthe boundaries of the village;[92] whilst in the invocation made by\nthe priest, the goddess was represented as saying, \"Let each man place\na shred of the flesh in his fields, in his grain-store, and in his\nyard.\"[93] The ashes, again, were scattered over the fields, or \"laid\nas paste over the houses and granaries.\"[94] It is also worth noticing\nthat, among the Kandhs of Maji Deso, the offering was not at all made\nfor the special purpose of obtaining cereal produce, \"but for general\nprosperity, and blessings for themselves and families\";[95] and that\nin the neighbouring principality, Chinna Kimedy, inhabited for the\nmost part by Ooryahs, the sacrifice was not offered to the earth\nalone, \"but to a number of deities, whose power is essential to life\nand happiness,\" especially to the god of war, the great god, and the\nsun god.[96] Now, whilst all these facts are in perfect agreement with\nthe theory of substitution, they certainly do not justify the\nsupposition that the Meriah was the representative of a deity of\nvegetation.\n\n[Footnote 87: Macpherson, _op. cit._ p. 113 _sq._ See, also, _ibid._\npp. 120, 128 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 88: _Ibid._ p. 113 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 89: Campbell, _op. cit._ p. 51.]\n\n[Footnote 90: _Ibid._ p. 56. _Cf._ _ibid._ p. 73.]\n\n[Footnote 91: Russell, quoted _ibid._ p. 54.]\n\n[Footnote 92: Russell, quoted _ibid._ p. 55.]\n\n[Footnote 93: Macpherson, _op. cit._ p. 122 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 94: _Ibid._ p. 128.]\n\n[Footnote 95: Campbell, _op. cit._ p. 181.]\n\n[Footnote 96: _Ibid._ p. 120. _Cf._ _ibid._ p. 197:--Among the Ooryahs\nhuman sacrifice is \"performed on important occasions, such as going to\nbattle, building a fort in an important village, and to avert any\nthreatened danger.\"]\n\nThe same may be said about other cases mentioned by Dr. Frazer,\nwhen more closely examined. \"The Indians of Guayaquil, in Ecuador,\" he\nsays, \"used to sacrifice human blood and the hearts of men when they\nsowed their fields.\"[97] But our authority, Cieza de Leon, adds that\nthose Indians also offered human victims when their chiefs were sick\n\"to appease the wrath of their gods.\"[98] \"The Pawnees,\" Dr. Frazer\nwrites, \"annually sacrificed a human victim in spring when they sowed\ntheir fields. The sacrifice was believed to have been enjoined on them\nby the Morning Star, or by a certain bird which the Morning Star had\nsent to them as its messenger . . . . They thought that an omission of\nthis sacrifice would be followed by the total failure of the crops of\nmaize, beans, and pumpkins.[99] James, to whom Dr. Frazer refers, and\nother authorities say that the human sacrifice was a propitiatory\noffering made _to_ that star,[100] a planet which especially with the\nSkidi--the only section {448} of the Pawnees who offered human\nsacrifices--was an object of superstitious veneration.[101] Sickness,\nmisfortune, and personal mishaps of various kinds were often spoken of\nas attributable to the incurred ill-will of the heavenly bodies;[102]\nand the object of the sacrifice to the morning star is expressly said\nto have been \"to avert the evil influences exerted by that\nplanet.\"[103] According to Mr. Dunbar, whose important[104] article\ndealing with the subject has escaped Dr. Frazer's notice, \"the design\nof the bloody ordeal was to conciliate that being and secure a good\ncrop. Hence,\" he continues, \"it has been supposed that the morning\nstar was regarded by them as presiding over agriculture, but this was\na mistake. They sacrificed to that star because they feared it,\nimagining that it exerted malign influence if not well disposed. It\nhas also been stated that the sacrifice was made annually. This, too,\nwas an error. It was made only when special occurrences were\ninterpreted as calling for it.\"[105] At the present day the Indians\nspeak of the sacrifice as having been made to Ti-ra'-wa, the Supreme\nBeing or the deity \"who is in and of everything.\"[106] In the detailed\naccount of the rite, which was given to Mr. Grinnell by an old chief\nwho had himself witnessed it several times, it is said:--\"While the\nsmoke of the blood and the buffalo meat, and of the burning body,\nascended to the sky, all the people prayed to Ti-ra'-wa, and walked by\nthe fire and grasped handfuls of the smoke, and passed it over their\nbodies and over those of their children, and prayed Ti-ra'-wa to take\npity on them, and to give them health, and success in war, and\nplenteous crops . . . . This sacrifice always seemed acceptable to\nTi-ra'-wa, and when the Skidi made it they always seemed to have good\nfortune in war, and good crops, and they were always well.\"[107]\nAccording to this description, then, the human sacrifice of the\nPawnees, like that of the Kandhs, was not an exclusively agricultural\nrite, but was performed for the purpose of averting dangers of various\nkinds. And this is also suggested by Mr. Dunbar's relation of the last\ninstance of this sacrifice, which occurred in April, 1838. In the\nprevious winter the Skidi, soon after starting on their hunt, had a\nsuccessful fight with a band of Oglala Dacotahs, and fearing that the\nDacotahs would retaliate by coming upon them in overwhelming force,\n{449} they returned for safety to their village before taking a\nsufficient number of buffaloes. \"With little to eat, they lived\nmiserably, lost many of their ponies from scarcity of forage, and,\nworst of all, one of the captives proved to have the small-pox, which\nrapidly spread through the band, and in the spring was communicated to\nthe rest of the tribe. All these accumulated misfortunes the Ski'-di\nattributed to the anger of the morning star; and accordingly they\nresolved to propitiate its favour by a repetition of the sacrifice,\nthough in direct violation of a stipulation made two years before that\nthe sacrifice should not occur again.\"[108]\n\n[Footnote 97: Frazer, _op. cit._ ii. 238.]\n\n[Footnote 98: Cieza de Leon, _La Cr\u00f3nica del Per\u00fa_ [parte primera],\nch. 55 (_Biblioteca de autores espa\u00f1oles_, xxvi. 409).]\n\n[Footnote 99: Frazer, _op. cit._ ii. 238.]\n\n[Footnote 100: James, _Expedition from Pittsburg to the Rocky\nMountains_, i. 357. Grinnell, _Pawnee Hero Stories and Folk-Tales_, p.\n357. Dunbar, 'Pawnee Indians,' in _Magazine of American History_,\nviii. 738.]\n\n[Footnote 101: Dunbar, _loc. cit._ p. 738.]\n\n[Footnote 102: _Ibid._ p. 736.]\n\n[Footnote 103: Grinnell, _op. cit._ p. 357.]\n\n[Footnote 104: Mr. Dunbar is \"born and reared among the Pawnees,\nfamiliar with them until early manhood, a frequent visitor to the\ntribe in later years\" (Grinnell, _op. cit._ p. 213).]\n\n[Footnote 105: Dunbar, _loc. cit._ p. 738 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 106: Grinnell, _op. cit._ pp. 357, 358, xvii.]\n\n[Footnote 107: _Ibid._ p. 367.]\n\n[Footnote 108: Dunbar, _loc. cit._ p. 740.]\n\nNor is there any reason whatever to suppose that the Brahman boys\nwhom the Gonds of India used to kidnap and keep as victims to be\nsacrificed on various occasions,[109] were regarded as representatives\nof a spirit or god. They were offered up to Bh\u00edmsen, the chief object\nof worship among the Gonds, represented by a piece of iron fixed in a\nstone or in a tree,[110] now \"to sanctify a marriage, now to be wedded\nto the soil, and again to be given away to the evil spirit of the\nepidemic raging,\" or \"on the eve of a struggle.\"[111]\n\n[Footnote 109: Frazer, _op. cit._ ii. 241.]\n\n[Footnote 110: _Panjab Notes and Queries_, \u00a7 550, vol. ii. 90.]\n\n[Footnote 111: _Ibid._ \u00a7 721, vol. ii. 127 _sq._]\n\nDr. Frazer writes:--\"At Lagos In Guinea it was the custom annually\nto impale a young girl alive soon after the spring equinox in order to\nsecure good crops . . . . A similar sacrifice used to be annually\noffered at Benin.\"[112] But Dr. Frazer omits an important fact\nmentioned or alluded to by the two authorities he quotes which gives\nus the key to the custom, without suggesting that it has anything to\ndo with the corn-spirit. Adams states that the young woman was impaled\n\"to propitiate the favour of the goddess presiding over the rainy\nseason, that she may fill the horn of plenty.\"[113] And M. Bouche\nobserves, \"Au B\u00e9nin, on a conserv\u00e9 jusqu'\u00e0 pr\u00e9sent un usage qui\nr\u00e9gnait jadis \u00e0 Lagos et ailleurs: celui d'empaler une jeune fille, au\ncommencement de la saison des pluies, afin de rendre les orichas\npropices aux r\u00e9coltes.\"[114] From these statements it appears that the\nsacrifice was intended to influence the rain, on which the crops\nessentially depend. That its immediate object was to produce rain is\nexpressly affirmed by Sir R. Burton. At Benin he saw \"a young woman\nlashed to a scaffolding upon the summit of a tall blasted tree and\nbeing devoured by the turkey-buzzards. The people declared it to be a\n'fetish,' or {450} charm for bringing rain.\"[115] We have previously\nnoticed that the people of Benin also have recourse to a human\nsacrifice if there is too much rain, or too much sun, so that the\ncrops are in danger of being spoiled.[116] The theory of substitution\naccounts for all these cases.\n\n[Footnote 112: Frazer, _op. cit._ ii. 239.]\n\n[Footnote 113: Adams, _Sketches taken during Ten Voyages to Africa_,\np. 25.]\n\n[Footnote 114: Bouche, _Sept ans en Afrique occidentale_, p. 132.]\n\n[Footnote 115: Burton, _Abeokuta_, i. 19 n.*]\n\n[Footnote 116: _Supra_, p. 443 _sq._]\n\nThe practice of offering human victims for the purpose of\npreventing drought and famine by producing rain is apparently not\nrestricted to West Africa. In the beginning of their year, the ancient\nMexicans sacrificed many prisoners of war and children who had been\npurchased for that purpose, to the gods of water, so as to induce them\nto give the rain necessary for the crops.[117] The Pipiles of\nGuatemala celebrated every year two festivals which were accompanied\nby human sacrifices, the one in the beginning of the rainy season, the\nother in the beginning of the dry season.[118] In India, among the\naboriginal tribes to the south-west of Beerbhoom, Sir W. W. Hunter\n\"heard vague reports of human sacrifices in the forests, with a view\nto procuring the early arrival of the rains.\"[119] Without venturing\nto express any definite opinion on a very obscure subject which has\nalready led to so many guesses,[120] I may perhaps be justified in\nhere calling attention to the fact that Zeus Lyc\u00e6us, in whose cult\nhuman sacrifices played a prominent part, was conceived of as a god\nwho sent the rain.[121] It appears from ancient traditions or legends\nthat the idea of procuring rainfall by means of such sacrifices was\nnot unfamiliar to the Greeks. A certain Molpis offered himself to Zeus\nOmbrios, the rain-god, in time of drought.[122] Pausanias tells us\nthat once, when a drought had for some time afflicted Greece,\nmessengers were sent to Delphi to inquire the cause, and to beg for a\nriddance of the evil. The Pythian priestess told them to propitiate\nZeus, and that Aeacus should be the intercessor; and then Aeacus, by\nsacrifices and prayers to Panhellenian Zeus, procured rain for\nGreece.[123] But Diodorus adds that the drought and famine, whilst\nceasing in all other parts of the country, still continued in Attica,\nso that the {451} Athenians once more resorted to the Oracle. The\nanswer was now given them that they had to expiate the murder of\nAndrogeus, and that this should be done in any way his father, Minos,\nrequired. The satisfaction demanded by the latter was, that they every\nnine years should send seven boys and as many girls to be devoured by\nthe Minotaur, and that this should be done as long as the monster\nlived. So the **Athenians did, and the calamity ceased.[124]\n\n[Footnote 117: Sahagun, _Historia general de las cosas de Nueva\nEspa\u00f1a_, i. 50. Torquemada, _Monarchia Indiana_, ii. 251. Clavigero,\n_op. cit._ i. 297.]\n\n[Footnote 118: Stoll, _Ethnologie der Indianerst\u00e4mme von Guatemala_,\np. 46.]\n\n[Footnote 119: Hunter, _Annals of Rural Bengal_, i. 128.]\n\n[Footnote 120: See Immerwahr, _Die Kulte und Mythen Arkadiens_, i. 16\n_sqq._ Professor Robertson Smith suggests ('Sacrifice,' in\n_Encyclop\u00e6dia Britannica_, xxi. 136) that the human sacrifices offered\nto Zeus Lyc\u00e6us were originally cannibal feasts of a wolf tribe.]\n\n[Footnote 121: Pausanias, viii. 38. 4. Farnell, _op. cit._ i. 41.]\n\n[Footnote 122: Farnell, _op. cit._ i. 42.]\n\n[Footnote 123: Pausanias, ii. 29. 7 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 124: Diodorus Siculus, _op. cit._ iv. 61. 1 _sqq._]\n\nAs an instance of the close relationship which exists between human\nsacrifices offered for agricultural purposes and other human\nsacrifices, the following case may also be mentioned. According to\nStrachey, the Indians in some part of Virginia had a yearly sacrifice\nof children. These sacrifices they held so necessary that if they\nshould omit them, they supposed their gods \"would let them no deare,\nturkies, corne, nor fish,\" and, besides, \"would make a great slaughter\namongst them.\"[125]\n\n[Footnote 125: Strachey, _History of Travaile into Virginia\nBritannia_, p. 95 _sq._]\n\nMen require for their subsistence not only food, but drink. Hence when\nthe earth fails to supply them with water, they are liable to regard\nit as an attempt against their lives, which can be averted only by the\nsacrifice of a human substitute.\n\nIn India, in former times, human victims were offered to several\nminor gods \"whenever a newly excavated tank failed to produce\nsufficient water.\"[126] In K\u00e2thi\u00e2w\u00e2r, for instance, if a pond had been\ndug and would not hold water, a man was sacrificed; and the Vadala\nlake in Bombay \"refused to hold water till the local spirit was\nappeased by the sacrifice of the daughter of the village\nheadman.\"[127] There is a legend that, when the bed of the Saugor lake\nremained dry, the builder \"was told, in a dream, or by a priest, that\nit would continue so till he should consent to sacrifice his own\ndaughter, then a girl, and the young lad to whom she had been\naffianced, to the tutelary god of the place. He accordingly built a\nlittle shrine in the centre of the valley, which was to become the bed\nof the lake, put the two children in, and built up the doorway. He had\nno sooner done so than the whole of the valley became filled with\nwater.\"[128] When Colonel Campbell was rescuing Meriahs among the\n{452} Kandhs, it was believed by some that he was collecting victims\nfor the purpose of sacrificing them on the plains to the water deity,\nbecause the water had disappeared from a large tank which he had\nconstructed.[129] According to a story related by Pausanias, the\ndistrict of Haliartus was originally parched and waterless, hence one\nof the rulers went to Delphi and inquired how the people should find\nwater in the land. \"The Pythian priestess commanded him to slay the\nfirst person he should meet on his return to Haliartus. On his arrival\nhe was met by his son Lophis, and, without hesitation, he struck the\nyoung man with his sword. The youth had life enough left to run about,\nand where the blood flowed water gushed from the ground. Therefore the\nriver is called Lophis.\"[130]\n\n[Footnote 126: R\u00e1jendral\u00e1la Mitra, _op. cit._ ii. 111.]\n\n[Footnote 127: Crooke, _Popular Religion of Northern India_, ii. 174.]\n\n[Footnote 128: Sleeman, _Rambles_, i. 129 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 129: Campbell, _Wild Tribes of Khondistan_, p. 129.]\n\n[Footnote 130: Pausanias, ix. 33. 4.]\n\nHuman sacrifices are offered with a view to averting perils arising\nfrom the sea or from rivers.\n\nWhen the Greeks were afflicted by stress of weather at Aulis, they\nwere bidden to sacrifice Iphigenia, in order to lull the winds.[131]\nMenelaus was persecuted by the Egyptians for sacrificing two children\nwhen he was desirous of sailing away and contrary winds detained\nhim.[132] According to an Athenian writer, the colonists who first\nwent to Lesbos were directed by an oracle to throw a virgin into the\nsea, as an offering to Poseidon.[133] Sextus Pompeius cast men into\nthe sea as an offering to Neptune.[134] Hamilcar, also, following a\ncustom of his country, threw a company of priests into the sea, as a\nsacrifice to the sea god.[135] The Saxons, when they were about to\nleave the coast of Gaul and sail home, sacrificed the tenth part of\ntheir captives.[136] The Vikings of Scandinavia, when launching a new\nship, seemed to have bound a victim to the rollers on which the vessel\nslipped into the sea, thus reddening the keel with sacrificial\nblood.[137] In 1784, at the launching of one of the Bey of Tripoli's\ncruisers, a black slave was led forward and fastened at the prow of\nthe vessel.[138] The Fijians launched their canoes over the living\nbodies of slaves as rollers,[139] or, according to {453} another\naccount, when a large canoe was launched, they laid hold of the first\nperson, man or woman, whom they encountered, and carried the victim\nhome for a feast.[140] On the deck of a new boat belonging to the most\npowerful chief in the group, ten or more men were slaughtered, in\norder that it might be washed with human blood.[141]\n\n[Footnote 131: Aeschylus, _Agamemnon_, 215 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 132: Herodotus, ii. 119.]\n\n[Footnote 133: Athen\u00e6us, _Deipnosophist\u00e6_, xi. 15.]\n\n[Footnote 134: Dio Cassius, _Historia Romana_, xlviii. 48.]\n\n[Footnote 135: Diodorus Siculus, xiii. 86.]\n\n[Footnote 136: Sidonius Apollinaris, _Epistul\u00e6_, viii. 6. 15.]\n\n[Footnote 137: Vigfusson and Powell, _op. cit._ i. 410; ii. 349.]\n\n[Footnote 138: Simpson, quoted by Grant Allen, _Evolution of the Idea\nof God_, p. 263.]\n\n[Footnote 139: Erskine, _Cruise among the Islands of the Western\nPacific_, p. 249.]\n\n[Footnote 140: Wilkes, _U.S. Exploring Expedition_, iii. 97. _Cf._\nWilliams and Calvert, _op. cit._ p. 175.]\n\n[Footnote 141: Wilkes, _op. cit._ iii. 97.]\n\nThe Zu\u00f1i Indians have a tradition that the waters of their valley\nonce rose in a flood and compelled the inhabitants to flee to a\ntable-land several hundred feet high for safety; and when the waters\nstill rose, threatening to submerge the table-land itself, the priest\ndetermined to sacrifice a youth and a maiden to propitiate them.[142]\nWhen Seleucus Nicator founded Antioch on the Orontes, the high priest\nsacrificed a virgin at a place between the town and the river,[143]\npresumably in order to prevent the town from being flooded by the\nriver. When the converted Franks marched to Italy under their king,\nTheodebert, to fight against the Goths under Vitigis, and were on the\npoint of crossing the Po, they sacrificed what children and wives of\nGoths they found, and threw their corpses into the river, according to\nProcopius, \"as the first fruits of the war.\"[144] At Rome, every year\non the Ides of May, the Vestal Virgins threw from the Sublician bridge\ninto the Tiber thirty human effigies formed of rushes; the Romans\nthemselves were of opinion that at an earlier period living men had\nbeen hurled into the river, and that it was Hercules who first\nsubstituted images of straw.[145] In West Africa human sacrifices are\noften offered to rivers. Major Ellis states that at each town or\nconsiderable village upon the banks of the river Prah sacrifice is\nheld on a day about the middle of October, to Prah. \"As loss of life\nfrequently occurs in this river, from persons attempting to cross it\nwhen flooded, from a sudden rise, or from those hundred minor\naccidents which must always occur in the neighbourhood of a deep and\nstrong stream, the gods of the Prah are considered very malignant. The\nsacrifice is, in consequence, proportionate. The usual sacrifice in\nformer times was two human adults, one male and one female. They. . . .\nwere decapitated on the bank of the river, and the stool and image\nof the god washed with their {454} blood. The bodies were then cut\ninto a number of pieces, which were distributed amongst the mangroves,\nor the sedge bordering the river, for the crocodiles to eat;\ncrocodiles being sacred in Prah.\"[146] According to M. le Comte de\nCardi, all the river-side tribes of the Niger Delta used to propitiate\nthe river deity by the sacrifice of a copper-coloured girl, procured\nfrom a tribe of Ibos inhabiting a country away in the hinterland of\nNew Calabar, or in some places an Albino; and it seems that this\ncustom is still practised in the British Protectorate.[147] The Ibos\nthemselves were in the habit of throwing human beings into the river\nto be eaten by alligators or fishes, or to fasten them to trees or\nbranches, close to the river, where they were left to perish by\nhunger.[148] In Eastern Central Africa, also, human sacrifices are\noffered to rivers.[149] And in the East Indies there are various\ntraditions of such sacrifices being made to the divine crocodiles of\nthe sea.[150]\n\n[Footnote 142: Stevenson, 'A Chapter of Zu\u00f1i Mythology,' in _Memoirs\nof the International Congress of Anthropology_, Chicago, p. 316.]\n\n[Footnote 143: Malala, _Chronographia_, viii. 255 (200).]\n\n[Footnote 144: Procopius, _Bellum Gothicum_, ii. 25.]\n\n[Footnote 145: Ovid, _Fasti_, 621 _sq._ Dionysius of Halicarnassus,\n_Antiquitates Roman\u00e6_, i. 38. Hartland, _Legend of Perseus_, iii.\n78.]\n\n[Footnote 146: Ellis, _Tshi-speaking Peoples_, p. 64 _sq._ _Cf._\n_Idem_, _Land of Fetish_, p. 122.]\n\n[Footnote 147: Comte de Cardi, 'Ju-ju Laws and Customs in the Niger\nDelta,' in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxix. 54. _Cf._ Mockler-Ferryman,\n_British Nigeria_, p. 235.]\n\n[Footnote 148: Schoen and Crowther, _op. cit._ p. 49.]\n\n[Footnote 149: Macdonald, _Africana_, i. 96.]\n\n[Footnote 150: Tylor, 'Anniversary Address,' in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._\nxxi. 408. Hartland, _op. cit._ iii. 70 _sq._]\n\nIn the cases which we have hitherto considered the offering of human\nsacrifices is mostly a matter of public concern, a method of ensuring\nthe lives of many by the death of one or a few. But human life is also\nsacrificed, by way of substitution, for the purpose of preventing the\ndeath of some particular individual, especially a chief or a king,\nfrom sickness, old age, or other circumstances.\n\nIn Guatemala, in the case of a dangerous illness, human sacrifice\nwas resorted to when all other attempts to cure the patient failed. Of\nthe Indians of Guayaquil, Cieza de Leon states:--\"When the chiefs were\nsick, to appease the wrath of their gods, and pray for health, they\nmade . . . . sacrifices of a superstitious nature, killing men (as I\nwas told), and believing that human blood was a grateful\noffering.\"[151] Acosta writes:--\"They vsed in Peru to sacrifice yong\nchildren of foure or six yeares old vnto tenne; and the greatest parte\nof these sacrifices were for the affaires that did import the Ynca, as\nin sickness for his health, and when he went to the {455} warres for\nvictory, or when they gave the wreathe to their new Ynca, which is the\nmarke of a King, as heere the Scepter and the Crowne be. In this\nsolemnitie they sacrificed the number of two hundred children, from\nfoure to ten yeares of age . . . . If any Indian qualified or of the\ncommon sorte were sicke, and that the Divine told him confidently that\nhe should die, they did then sacrifice his owne sonne to the Sunne or\nto Virachoca, desiring them to be satisfied with him, and that they\nwould not deprive the father of life.\"[152] According to Molina, \"the\nLord Ynca offered sacrifices [of children] when he began to reign,\nthat the _huacas_ [or idols] might give him health, and preserve his\ndominions in peace.\"[153] Herrera tells us that the ancient Peruvians,\nwhen any person of note was sick, and the priest predicted his death,\nsacrificed the patient's son, \"desiring the idol to be satisfie'd with\nhim, and not to take away his father's life.\"[154] Garcilasso de la\nVega, again, denies the existence of any such custom in the kingdom of\nthe Incas,[155] but asserts that, before their reign, the Indians of\nPeru offered up their own children on certain occasions.[156]\nAccording to Jerez, some of the Peruvian Indians sacrificed their own\nchildren each month, and anointed with the blood the faces of their\nidols and the doors of their temples.[157] The Tonga Islanders had a\nceremony called _nawgia_, or the ceremony of strangling children as\nsacrifices to the gods, for the recovery of a sick relative. Our\ninformant says:--\"All the bystanders behold the innocent victim with\nfeelings of the greatest pity; but it is proper, they think, to\nsacrifice a child who is at present of no use to society, and perhaps\nmay not otherwise live to be, with the hope of recovering a sick\nchief, whom all esteem and whom all think it a most important duty to\nrespect, defend, and preserve, that his life may be of advantage to\nthe country.\"[158] The Tahitians offered human sacrifices during the\nillnesses of their rulers.[159] In the Philippines, if a prince was\ndangerously ill or dying, slaves were slaughtered in order to satisfy\nthe malignant ancestral soul who was supposed to have caused the\ndisease.[160] Among the Dyaks, when a raja \"falls sick, or goes on a\njourney, it is {456} common for him to vow a head to his tribe in case\nof recovery or of safe return. Should he die, one or two heads are\nusually offered by the tribe as a kind of sacrifice.\"[161] Among the\nBanj\u00e2r\u00eelu of Southern India, who are great travelling traders, it was\nformerly the custom \"before starting out on a journey to procure a\nlittle child, and bury it in the ground up to its shoulders, and then\ndrive their loaded bullocks over the unfortunate victim, and in\nproportion to the bullocks thoroughly trampling the child to death, so\ntheir belief in a successful journey increased.\"[162] In India human\nsacrifices were also offered to the goddess Chandik\u00e1 to save the life\nof a king.[163] It is probable that the idea of substitution likewise\naccounts for the sacrifice of a young girl which a certain raja is\nreported to have offered in 1861, at the shrine of the goddess Durga,\nin the town of Jaip\u00far, when he installed himself at his father's\ndecease,[164] and for the sacrifice of a Brahmin which a raja of\nRatanp\u00far had offered up to Dev\u00ed every year.[165] In Great Benin, once\na year, at the end of the rainy season, all the king's beads were\nbrought out by the boys in whose care they were kept. They were put in\na heap, and a slave was compelled to kneel down over them. The king\ncut or struck the head of the slave with a spear so that the blood ran\nover the beads, and said to them, \"Oh, beads, when I put you on, give\nme wisdom and don't let any juju or bad thing come near me.\" Then the\nslave was told, \"So you shall tell the head juju when you see him.\"\nThe slave was led out and beheaded, but his head was brought in again,\nand the beads were touched with it.[166] Among the ancient Gauls\npersons who were troubled with unusually severe diseases either\nsacrificed men or promised that they would make such sacrifices.[167]\nIn the Ynglingasaga we are told that King Aun sacrificed nine sons,\none after the other, to Odin for the purpose of obtaining a\nprolongation of his life.[168] According to Macrobius, the ancient\nRomans immolated children to the goddess Mania, the mother of the\nLares, \"to promote the health of the families.\"[169] Suetonius states\nthat Nero, frightened by the sight of a comet, sacrificed a number of\nRoman noblemen {457} in order to avert the disaster from himself.[170]\nAntinous, according to one account, sacrificed himself to prolong the\nlife of Hadrian.[171] The notion that the death of one person may\nserve as a substitute for the death of another still prevails in the\nVatican. When, during Leo XIII.'s last illness, one of the Cardinals\ndied, it was said that his death had saved the life of the Pope,\nHeaven being satisfied with one victim. In Morocco, if a son or a\ndaughter dies, it is customary to say to the afflicted parents, \"Why\nare you sorry? Your child took away your misfortune (_bas_).\" A\nsimilar custom prevails in Syria and Palestine.[172]\n\n[Footnote 151: Cieza de Leon, _La Cr\u00f3nica del Per\u00fa_ [parte primera],\nch. 55 (_Biblioteca de autores espa\u00f1oles_, xxvi. 409).]\n\n[Footnote 152: Acosta, _op. cit._ ii. 344.]\n\n[Footnote 153: de Molina, _loc. cit._ p. 55.]\n\n[Footnote 154: Herrera, _General History of the West Indies_, iv. 347.]\n\n[Footnote 155: Garcilasso de la Vega, _op. cit._ i. 131.]\n\n[Footnote 156: _Ibid._ i. 50.]\n\n[Footnote 157: Jerez, 'Conquista del Per\u00fa,' in _Biblioteca de autores\nespa\u00f1oles_, xxvi. 327.]\n\n[Footnote 158: Mariner, _Natives of the Tonga Islands_, ii. 220.]\n\n[Footnote 159: Ellis, _Polynesian Researches_, i. 346.]\n\n[Footnote 160: Blumentritt, quoted by Wilken, 'Ueber das Haaropfer,'\nin _Revue coloniale internationale_, 1887, i. 364 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 161: Pfeiffer, _A Lady's Second Journey round the World_,\ni. 86.]\n\n[Footnote 162: Cain, 'Bhadrachellam and Rekapalli Taluqas,' in _Indian\nAntiquary_, viii. 219.]\n\n[Footnote 163: Crooke, _Popular Religion in Northern India_, ii. 168.]\n\n[Footnote 164: _North Indian Notes and Queries_, \u00a7 310, vol. i. 40.]\n\n[Footnote 165: _Panjab Notes and Queries_, \u00a7 869, vol. ii. 162.]\n\n[Footnote 166: Moor and Roupell, quoted by Read and Dalton, _op. cit._\np. 7; also by Ling Roth, _Great Benin_, p. 71.]\n\n[Footnote 167: C\u00e6sar, _De bello gallico_, vi. 16.]\n\n[Footnote 168: Snorri Sturluson, 'Ynglingasaga,' 25, in\n_Heimskringla_, i. 45 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 169: Macrobius, _Saturnalia_, i. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 170: Suetonius, _Nero_, 36.]\n\n[Footnote 171: Spartian, _Vita Hadriani_, 14. Aurelius Victor, _De\nC\u00e6saribus_, 14. Dio Cassius, _Historia Romana_, lxix. 11.]\n\n[Footnote 172: Curtiss, _Primitive Semitic Religion To-day_, p. 208.]\n\nMen are sacrificed not only to preserve the lives of other men, but to\nhelp other men into existence. Barrenness is attributed to some god\nkeeping back the children which would otherwise be born in the due\ncourse of nature. And in order to remove this obstacle a human being,\ngenerally a child, is sacrificed to serve, as it were, as a\nsubstitute. This I take to be the explanation of the practice of\noffering a human sacrifice with a view to promoting fecundity, a\npractice which has been particularly common in India.\n\nIn the history of ancient Mexico we read of Nezahualcoyotl, prince\nof the Tezcucans, who had been married some years without being blest\nwith issue. \"The priests represented that it was owing to his neglect\nof the gods of his country, and that his only remedy was to propitiate\nthem by human sacrifice.\"[173] In Hindu traditions and books a\nnumerous offspring is promised to him who offers a man in\nsacrifice.[174] In Jainteapore, east of Sylhet, human sacrifices were\nmade to the goddess Kali, in hopes of procuring progeny.[175] Speaking\nof the Mahadeo sandstone hills which, in the Sathpore range, overlook\nthe Nerbudda to the south, Sir W. H. Sleeman states:--\"When a woman is\nwithout children she makes votive offerings to all the gods who can,\nshe thinks, assist her; and promises of still greater in case they\nshould grant what she wants. Smaller promises being found of no avail,\nshe at last promises her first-born, if a {458} male, to the god of\ndestruction, Mahadeo. If she gets a son she conceals from him her vows\ntill he has attained the age of puberty; she then communicates it to\nhim, and enjoins him to fulfil it.\" From that moment he regards\nhimself as devoted to the god, and, at the annual fair on the Mahadeo\nhills, throws himself from a perpendicular height of four or five\nhundred feet, and is dashed to pieces upon the rocks below.[176] In\none of the tales of Somadeva an ascetic tells a woman that, if she\nkilled her young son and offered him to the divinity, another son\nwould certainly be born to her.[177] We meet with a similar idea in\nthe story of king Somaka. For some time he did not succeed in getting\na single son from any of his one hundred wives. Finally he got a\nsingle son; but he wanted more, and asked the family priest whether\nthere was not a ceremony which could help him to a hundred sons. The\nfamily priest answered:--\"O king! let me set on foot a sacrifice, and\nthou must sacrifice thy son, Jantu, in it. Then on no distant date, a\ncentury of handsome sons will be born to thee. When Jantu's fat will\nbe put into the fire as an offering to the gods, the mothers will take\na smell of that smoke, and bring forth a number of sons, valorous and\nstrong. And Jantu also will once more be born as a self-begotten son\nof thine, in that very mother; and on his back there will appear a\nmark of gold.\" The son was sacrificed; the wives smelt the smell of\nthe burnt-offering; all of them became with child; and when ten months\nhad passed one hundred sons were born to Somaka, of whom Jantu was the\neldest, being born of his former mother. But the family priest\ndeparted this life, and was grilled for a certain period in a terrible\nhell as a punishment for what he had done.[178]\n\n[Footnote 173: Prescott, _History of the Conquest of Mexico_, p. 91.]\n\n[Footnote 174: Chevers, _op. cit._ p. 399.]\n\n[Footnote 175: Macnaghten, quoted _ibid._ p. 397.]\n\n[Footnote 176: Sleeman, _op. cit._ i. 132 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 177: Crooke, _Popular Religion of Northern India_, ii. 173.]\n\n[Footnote 178: _Mahabharata_, Vana Parva, 127 _sq._ (pt. vi.\np. 188 _sq._).]\n\nAmong certain peoples it is a regular custom to kill the firstborn\nchild, or the firstborn son.\n\nAmong some natives of Australia a mother used to kill and eat her\nfirst child, as this was believed to strengthen her for later\nbirths.[179] In New South Wales the firstborn of every lubra used to\nbe eaten by the tribe \"as part of a religious ceremony.\"[180] In the\nrealm of Khai-muh, in China, according to {459} a native account, it\nwas customary to kill and devour the eldest son alive.[181] Among\ncertain tribes in British Columbia the first child is often sacrificed\nto the sun.[182] The Indians of Florida, according to Le Moyne de\nMorgues, sacrificed the firstborn son to the chief.[183] We are told\nthat, among the people of Senjero in Eastern Africa, many families\n\"must offer up their firstborn sons as sacrifices, because once upon a\ntime, when summer and winter were jumbled together in a bad season,\nand the fruits of the field would not ripen, the sooth-sayers enjoined\nit.\"[184] The heathen Russians often sacrificed their firstborn to the\ngod Perun.[185] The rule laid down in Exodus[186] and Numbers,[187]\nthat all the firstborn of men and of beasts belonged to the Lord, but\nthat the former were to be redeemed, seems to indicate the existence\nof an earlier custom among the Hebrews of offering up as a sacrifice,\nnot only the firstling of an animal, but the firstborn child. As\ntraces of such a custom may probably be regarded the story of\nAbraham's surrender of his firstborn son to God and the tradition of\nthe origin of the Passover.[188] Among the Hindus, until the beginning\nof the last century, many parents sacrificed their firstborn to the\nriver Ganges.[189]\n\n[Footnote 179: Brinton, _Religions of Primitive Peoples_, p. 17 n.*\n_Cf._ von Scherzer, _Reise der Oesterreichischen Fregatte Novara um\ndie Erde_, iii. 32.]\n\n[Footnote 180: Brough Smyth, _Aborigines of Victoria_, ii. 311.]\n\n[Footnote 181: de Groot, _Religious System of China_ (vol. ii. book)\ni. 679.]\n\n[Footnote 182: Boas, in _Fifth Report on the North-Western Tribes of\nCanada_, pp. 46, 52.]\n\n[Footnote 183: Bry, _Narrative of Le Moyne_, Descriptions of the\nIllustrations, 34, p. 13. _Cf._ Lafitau, _M[oe]urs des sauvages\nameriquains_, i. 181; Strachey, _op. cit._ p. 84.]\n\n[Footnote 184: Krapf, _Travels_, p. 69 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 185: Mone, quoted by Frazer, _Golden Bough_, ii. 52.]\n\n[Footnote 186: _Exodus_, xiii. 2, 15.]\n\n[Footnote 187: _Numbers_, xviii. 15.]\n\n[Footnote 188: See Ghillany, _op. cit._ p. 494 _sqq._; Kuenen,\n_Religion of Israel_, ii. 92; Frazer, _op. cit._ ii. 47 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 189: R\u00e1jendral\u00e1la Mitra, _op. cit._ ii. 70, 76.]\n\nIn some instances the firstborn seems to be killed, not in sacrifice\nto a god, but for the purpose of being eaten as a kind of\nmedicine.[190] In other cases the act is a sacrifice in the true sense\nof the word and, apparently, substitutional in character. Considering\nthat children are occasionally sacrificed to save the lives of their\nparents, or for the health of the families, or to promote fecundity,\nit seems probable that the regular sacrifice of the firstborn has\nsimilar objects in view. This supposition, indeed, is strongly\nsupported by some statements in which the motive of the act is\nexpressly mentioned.[191] Among the {460} Coast Salish of British\nColumbia the first child is sacrificed to the sun \"to secure health\nand happiness to the whole family.\"[192] The same is reported of a\nneighbouring people, the Kutonaqa. The mother prays to the sun:--\"I am\nwith child. When it is born I shall offer it to you. Have pity upon\nus.\"[193] Among some tribes of South-Eastern Africa it is a rule that,\nwhen a woman's husband has been killed in battle and she marries\nagain, the first child to which she gives birth after her second\nmarriage must be put to death, whether she has it by her first or her\nsecond husband. Such a child is called \"the child of the assegai,\" and\nif it were not killed, death or accident would be sure to befall the\nsecond spouse, and the woman herself would be barren.[194] Among some\npeoples, including the ancient Hindus, we find the belief that the son\nis in some sense identical with his father, that he is a new birth, a\nnew manifestation of the same person.[195] The new birth might be\nsupposed to endanger the life of the father, just as, according to a\nnotion prevalent among the ancient Teutons[196] and in some parts of\nItaly,[197] a person would soon die if his name were given to his son\nor grandson whilst he was still alive. Among the Brazilian Tupis the\nfather was accustomed to take a new name after the birth of each new\nson;[198] whilst, on killing an enemy, a person used to take the\nenemy's name so as to annihilate not only his body but also his\nsoul.[199] Among the Kafirs, \"if a mother gives birth to twins, one is\nfrequently killed by the father, for the natives think that unless the\nfather places a lump of earth in the mouth of one of the babies he\nwill lose his strength.\"[200] In some {461} cases the practice of\nkilling the firstborn son might possibly be traced back to a similar\nbelief. But I can quote no fact directly supporting this suggestion.\n\n[Footnote 190: _Cf._ _supra_, p. 401.]\n\n[Footnote 191: _Cf._ _Micah_, vi. 7: \"Shall I give my firstborn for my\ntransgression, the fruit of my body for the sin of my soul?\"]\n\n[Footnote 192: Boas, _op. cit._ p. 46.]\n\n[Footnote 193: _Ibid._ p. 52.]\n\n[Footnote 194: Macdonald, _Light in Africa_, p. 156. Frazer, _op.\ncit._ ii. 51 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 195: Hartland, _op. cit._ i. 217 _sq._ von den Steinen,\n_Unter den Naturv\u00f6lkern Zentral-Brasiliens_, p. 336 _sq._ Leist,\n_Alt-arisches Jus Gentium_, p. 98 _sqq._ _Idem_, _Alt-arisches Jus\nCivile_, i. 189 _sqq._ _Laws of Manu_, ix. 8: \"The husband, after\nconception by his wife, becomes an embryo and is born again of her.\"]\n\n[Footnote 196: Storm, quoted by Noreen, _Spridda Studier_, Anara\nSamlingen, p. 4.]\n\n[Footnote 197: Placucci, _Usi e pregiudizj dei contadini della\nRomagna_, p. 23.]\n\n[Footnote 198: von den Steinen, _op. cit._ p. 337.]\n\n[Footnote 199: Staden, quoted by Andree, _Anthropophagie_, p. 103.]\n\n[Footnote 200: Kidd, _The Essential Kafir_, p. 202. I am indebted to\nMr. N. W. Thomas for drawing my attention to this statement.]\n\nHuman sacrifices are offered in connection with the foundation of\nbuildings. This is a wide-spread custom, which not only occurs among\nvarious uncivilised and semi-civilised peoples of the present day, but\nwhich is proved to have existed among the so-called Aryan races.[201]\nIn India we find traces of it in traditions and popular beliefs.[202]\nThe Hindu rajas, we are told, used to lay the foundation of public\nbuildings in human blood.[203] When Mr. Grierson wanted to photograph\na Bih[=a]r peasant house, the grandmother of the family refused to\nallow any of the children to appear in the picture, her reason being\nthat the Government was building the bridge across the Gandak and\nwanted children to bury under the foundations.[204] Among the ancient\nRomans the old custom survived in the practice of placing statues or\nimages under the foundations of their buildings.[205] In the island of\nZacynthus the peasants to this day believe that in order to secure the\ndurability of important buildings, such as bridges and fortresses, it\nis desirable to kill a man, especially a Muhammedan or a Jew, and bury\nhim on the spot.[206] South Slavonian folk-tales speak of the\nimmuration of a woman or a child as a foundation sacrifice.[207] In\nServia no city was thought to be secure unless a human being, or at\nleast the shadow of one, was built into its walls;[208] and the\nBulgarians, when {462} going to build, are still said to take a thread\nand measure the shadow of some casual passer-by, and then bury the\nmeasure under the foundation-stone, expecting that the man whose\nshadow has been thus treated will soon die.[209] A similar custom\nprevails in Roumania.[210] According to Nennius, when Dinas Emris in\nWales was founded by Gortigern, all the materials collected for the\nfortress were carried away in one night; and materials were thus\ngathered thrice, and were thrice carried away. When he then asked of\nhis Druids, \"Whence this evil?\" the Druids told him that it was\nnecessary to find a child whose father was unknown, put him to death,\nand sprinkle with his blood the ground on which the citadel was to be\nbuilt.[211] A Scotch legend tells that, when St. Columba first\nattempted to build a cathedral on Iona, the walls fell down as they\nwere erected; he then received supernatural information that they\nwould never stand unless a human victim was buried alive, and, in\nconsequence, his companion, Oran, was interred at the foundation of\nthe structure.[212] It is reported that, when not long ago the Bridge\nGate of Bremen city walls was demolished, the skeleton of a child was\nfound embedded in the groundwork;[213] and when the new bridge at\nHalle, finished in 1843, was building, \"the common people fancied a\nchild was wanted to be walled into the foundations.\"[214]\n\n[Footnote 201: Sartori, 'Ueber das Bauopfer,' in _Zeitschrift f\u00fcr\nEthnologie_, xxx. 5 _sqq._ Tylor, _Primitive Culture_, i. 104 _sqq._\nBaring-Gould, _Strange Survivals_, p. 4 _sqq._ Trumbull, _Threshold\nCovenant_, p. 46 _sqq._ Grant Allen, _Evolution of the Idea of God_,\np. 249 _sqq._ Liebrecht, _Zur Volkskunde_, p. 284 _sqq._ Andree,\n_Ethnographische Parallelen_, p. 18 _sqq._ Nyrop, _Romanske Mosaiker_,\np. 63 _sqq._ Krause, 'Das Bauopfer bei den S\u00fcdslaven,' in\n_Mittheilungen der Anthropologischen Gesellschaft in Wien_, xvii. 18\n_sqq._ Wuttke, _Der deutsche Volksaberglaube der Gegenwart_, \u00a7 440,\np. 300 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 202: Winternitz, 'Bemerkungen \u00fcber das Bauopfer bei den\nIndern,' in _Mittheil. Anthr. Gesellsch. in Wien_, xvii. [37] _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 203: Wheeler, _History of India_, iv. 278.]\n\n[Footnote 204: Grierson, _Bih[=a]r Peasant Life_, p. 4.]\n\n[Footnote 205: Coote, 'A Building Superstition,' in _Folk-Lore\nJournal_, i. 23.]\n\n[Footnote 206: Schmidt, _Volksleben der Neu-Griechen_, p. 197.]\n\n[Footnote 207: Krauss, _loc. cit._ p. 19 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 208: Ralston, _Songs of the Russian People_, p. 127.]\n\n[Footnote 209: _Ibid._ p. 127. Krauss, _loc. cit._ p. 21.]\n\n[Footnote 210: _Folk-Lore Record_, iii. 283.]\n\n[Footnote 211: Nennius, _Historia Britonum_, Irish Version, ch. 18,\np. 93.]\n\n[Footnote 212: Gomme, 'Some Traditions and Superstitions connected\nwith Buildings,' in _The Antiquary_, iii. 11. Carmichael, _Carmina\nGadelica_, ii. 316.]\n\n[Footnote 213: Baring-Gould, _Strange Survivals_, p. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 214: Grimm, _Teutonic Mythology_, iii. 1142.]\n\nIt seems highly probable that the building-sacrifice, like other kinds\nof human sacrifice, is based on the idea of substitution. A new house\nor dwelling-place is commonly regarded as dangerous, a wall or a tower\nis liable to fall down and cause destruction of life, a bridge may\nbreak, or the person who crosses it may tumble into the water and be\ndrowned. In the Babar Islands, before entering a new house, offerings\nare thrown inside, that the spirit, Orloo, may not make the {463}\ninmates ill.[215] Before the Sandwich Islanders could occupy their\nhouses \"offerings were made to the gods, and presents to the priest,\nwho entered the house, uttered prayers, went through other ceremonies,\nand slept in it before the owner took possession, in order to prevent\nevil spirits from resorting to it, and to secure its inmates from the\neffects of incantation.\"[216] Among the Kayans of Borneo, on the\noccasion of the king or principal chief taking possession of a\nnewly-built house, a human victim was killed, and the blood was\nsprinkled on the pillars and under the house.[217] The Russian peasant\nbelieves that the building of a new house \"is apt to be followed by\nthe death of the head of the family for which the new dwelling is\nconstructed, or that the member of the family who is the first to\nenter it will soon die\"; and, in accordance with a custom of great\nantiquity, the oldest member of a migrating household enters the new\nhouse first.[218] In German folk-tales \"the first to cross the bridge,\nthe first to enter the new building or the country, pays with his\nlife.\"[219] Even nowadays, in the North of Europe, there is a\nwide-spread fear of being the first to enter a new building or of\ngoing over a newly-built bridge; \"if to do this is not everywhere and\nin all cases thought to entail death, it is considered supremely\nunlucky.\"[220] This superstition has been interpreted as a survival of\na previous sacrifice;[221] but there can be no doubt, I think, that\nthe foundation sacrifice itself owes its origin to similar notions and\nfears of supernatural dangers. Uncultured people are commonly afraid\nof anything new, or of doing an act for the first time;[222] and,\napart from this, the erecting of a new building is an intrusion upon\n{464} the land of the local spirit, and therefore likely to arouse its\nanger. There are houses which remain haunted by spirits all their\ntime.[223] It is natural, then, that attempts should be made to avert\nthe danger. And, human life being at stake, no preventive could be\nmore effective than the offering up of a human victim.\n\n[Footnote 215: Riedel, _De sluik- en kroesharige rassen tusschen\nSelebes en Papua_, p. 343.]\n\n[Footnote 216: Ellis, _Polynesian Researches_, iv. 322.]\n\n[Footnote 217: Burns, 'Kayans of the North-West of Borneo,' in\n_Journal of the Indian Archipelago_, iii. 145.]\n\n[Footnote 218: Ralston, _Songs of the Russian People_, p. 126. _Cf._\nKrauss, _loc. cit._ p. 21 _sq._ (Southern Slavs).]\n\n[Footnote 219: Grimm, _Teutonic Mythology_, i. 45, n. 2.]\n\n[Footnote 220: Baring-Gould, _Strange Survivals_, p. 2. For various\ninstances of similar beliefs, see Sartori, in _Zeitschr. f. Ethnol._\nxxx. 14 _sqq._; Crawley, _Mystic Rose_, p. 25.]\n\n[Footnote 221: Baring-Gould, _op. cit._ p. 4.]\n\n[Footnote 222: Crawley, _op. cit._ p. 25.]\n\n[Footnote 223: Westermarck, 'Nature of the Arab _[vG]inn_, illustrated\nby the Present Beliefs of the People of Morocco,' in _Jour. Anthr.\nInst._ xxix. 253, 260.]\n\nOn the other hand it is maintained that the foundation-sacrifice is\npartly, if not exclusively, performed for the purpose of converting\nthe soul of the victim into a protecting demon.[224] This opinion, no\ndoubt, has the support of beliefs actually held by some of the peoples\nwho practise the rite. When the gate of the new city of Tavoy, in\nTenasserim, was built, Mason was told by an eye-witness that a\ncriminal was put in each post-hole to become a guardian spirit.[225]\nThe Burmese kings used to have victims buried alive at the gates of\ntheir capitals, \"so that their spirits might watch over the\ncity.\"[226] Formerly, in Siam, \"when a new city gate was being\nerected, it was customary for a number of officers to lie in wait near\nthe spot, and seize the first four or eight persons who happened to\npass by, and who were then buried alive under the gate-posts, to serve\nas guardian angels.\"[227] But whatever be the present notions of\ncertain peoples concerning the object of the building-sacrifice, I do\nnot believe that its primary object could have been to procure a\nspirit-guardian. According to early ideas, the ghost of a murdered man\nis not a friendly being, and least of all is he kindly disposed\ntowards those who killed him. Several instances are known in which\nlater generations have put upon human sacrifices an interpretation\nobviously foreign to their original purpose.[228] Thus, according to a\nNorth {465} German tradition, a master-builder was immured by a\ncertain knight in the tower which he had built, as a punishment for\nboasting that he could have built a still finer tower if he had liked\nto do so.[229] An Indian raja, we are told, was once building a bridge\nover the river Jargoat Chun\u00e2r, and when it fell down several times he\nwas advised to sacrifice a Brahman girl to the local deity; however,\n\"she has now become the Mar\u00ee or ghost of the place, and is regularly\nworshipped in time of trouble.\"[230] Considering that the\nfoundation-sacrifice was offered for the purpose of protecting the\nliving against the attacks of the spirit of the place, it is quite\nintelligible that the ghost of the victim came in time to be looked\nupon as a guardian spirit; and it was all the more natural to\nattribute to the dead the function of a guard in cases where he was\nburied at the gate. But he was buried there, I presume, simply because\nthat spot was thought to be the most dangerous. The gate of a town\ncorresponds to the entrance of a house, and the threshold has almost\nuniversally been regarded as the proper haunt of what the Moors call\n\"the owners of the place.\"[231]\n\n[Footnote 224: Tylor, _Primitive Culture_, i. 106. Grant Allen, _op.\ncit._ p. 248 _sqq._ Lippert, _Christenthum, Volksglaube und\nVolksbrauch_, p. 456 _sq._ _Idem_, _Kulturgeschichte der Menschheit_,\nii. 270. Gaidoz, in _M\u00e9lusine_, iv. 14 _sqq._ Sartori, in _Zeitsthr.\nf. Ethnol._ xxx. 32 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 225: Tylor, _Primitive Culture_, i. 107.]\n\n[Footnote 226: Woodthorpe, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxvi. 24. See also\nShway Yoe, _The Burman_, i. 286.]\n\n[Footnote 227: Alabaster, _Wheel of the Law_, p. 212 _sq._ _Cf._\nGaidoz, _loc. cit._ p. 14 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 228: See Nyrop, _Romanske Mosaiker_, p. 73 _sqq._; also\n_infra_, p. 465 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 229: Nyrop, _op. cit._ p. 73.]\n\n[Footnote 230: Crooke, _Popular Religion of Northern India_, ii. 174.]\n\n[Footnote 231: See Trumbull, _Threshold Covenant_, _passim_.]\n\nWhilst the man who is sacrificed is in some cases described as a\nguardian, he is in other cases regarded as a messenger. The Mayas of\nYucatan maintained that the human victims whom they offered in times\nof distress were sent as messengers to the spirit-world to make known\nthe wants of the people.[232] The same idea prevailed in Great Benin.\nWhen the head jujuman had said the prayer in which he asked Ogiwo to\nlet no sickness come for Benin, he thus addressed the slaves who were\ngoing to be clubbed to death and tied in the sacrifice-trees:--\"So you\nshall tell Ogiwo. Salute him proper.\"[233] A message was likewise sent\nto the head juju with the slave who was sacrificed to it;[234] and a\nmessage saluting the rain-god was put in the {466} mouth of the woman\nwho was sacrificed when there was too much rain.[235] Mr. Ling Roth\nsuggests that the main object of the human sacrifices which were\noffered in Benin \"was the sending of prayers, by means of the special\nmessengers, for the welfare of the community, to the spirits of the\ndeparted, or to other spirits, such as the spirits of the beads, the\nRain-God, Sun-God, the God-Ogiwo\"; and he thinks that this explains \"a\ncult of world-wide prevalence.\"[236] But considering that in Yucatan\nand Benin, as elsewhere, the human victim was sacrificed for the\navowed purpose of averting some mortal danger from the community or\nthe king, I conclude that there, also, the primary object of the rite\nwas to offer a substitute, though this substitute came to be used as a\nmessenger.\n\n[Footnote 232: Dorman, _op. cit._ p. 213.]\n\n[Footnote 233: Moor and Roupell, quoted by Read and Dalton, _op. cit._\np. 7; also by Ling Roth, _Great Benin_, p. 72.]\n\n[Footnote 234: _Supra_, p. 456.]\n\n[Footnote 235: _Supra_, p. 444.]\n\n[Footnote 236: Ling Roth, _op. cit._ p. 72.]\n\nI do not affirm that the practice of human sacrifice is in every case\nbased on the idea of substitution; the notion that a certain god has a\ndesire for such sacrifices may no doubt induce his worshippers to\ngratify this desire for a variety of purposes. But I think there is\nsufficient evidence to prove that, when men offer the lives of their\nfellow-men in sacrifice to their gods, they do so as a rule in the\nhopes of thereby saving their own. Human sacrifice is essentially a\nmethod of life-insurance--absurd, no doubt, according to our ideas,\nbut not an act of wanton cruelty. When practised for the benefit of\nthe community or in a case of national distress, it is hardly more\ncruel than to advocate the infliction of capital punishment on the\nground of social expediency, or to compel thousands of men to suffer\ndeath on the battle-field on behalf of their country. The custom of\nhuman sacrifice admits that the life of one is taken to save the lives\nof many, or that an inferior individual is put to death for the\npurpose of preventing the death of somebody who has a higher right to\nlive. Sometimes the king or chief is sacrificed in times of scarcity\nor pestilence, but then he is probably held personally responsible for\nthe calamity.[237] Very frequently {467} the victims are prisoners of\nwar or other aliens, or slaves, or criminals, that is, persons whose\nlives are held in little regard. And in many cases these are the only\nvictims allowed by custom.\n\n[Footnote 237: Frazer, _Golden Bough_, i. 15 _sq._]\n\nThis was generally the case among the ancient Teutons,[238] though\nthey sometimes deemed a human sacrifice the more efficacious the more\ndistinguished the victim, and the nearer his relationship to him who\noffered the sacrifice.[239] The Gauls, says C\u00e6sar, \"consider that the\noblation of such as have been taken in theft, or robbery, or any other\noffence, is more acceptable to the immortal gods; but when a supply of\nthat class is wanting, they have recourse to the oblation of even the\ninnocent.\"[240] Diodorus Siculus states that the Carthaginians in\nformer times used to sacrifice to Saturn the sons of the most eminent\npersons, but that, of later times, they secretly bought and bred up\nchildren for that purpose.[241] The chief aim of the wars of the\nancient Mexicans was to make prisoners for sacrificial purposes; other\nvictims were slaves who were purchased for this object, and many\ncriminals \"who were condemned to expiate their crimes by the sacrifice\nof their lives.\"[242] The Yucatans sacrificed captives taken in war,\nand only if such victims were wanting they dedicated their children to\nthe altar \"rather than let the gods be deprived of their due.\"[243] In\nGuatemala the victims were slaves or captives or, among the Pipiles,\nillegitimate children from six to twelve years old who belonged to the\ntribe.[244] In Florida the human victim who was offered up at harvest\ntime was chosen from among the Spaniards wrecked on the coast.[245] Of\nthe Peruvian Indians before the time of the Incas, Garcilasso de la\nVega states that, \"besides ordinary things such as animals and maize,\nthey sacrificed men and women of all ages, being captives taken in\nwars which they made against each other.\"[246] Among the Tshi-speaking\npeoples of the Gold Coast, \"the persons ordinarily sacrificed to the\ngods are prisoners of war or slaves. When the latter, they are usually\naliens, as a protecting god is not so well satisfied with the\nsacrifice of his own people.\"[247] In Great Benin, according to\nCaptain Roupell, the people who were kept for sacrifice were bad men,\nor men with bad sickness, {468} and they were all slaves.[248] In Fiji\nthe victims were generally prisoners of war, but sometimes they were\nslaves procured by purchase from other tribes.[249] In Nukahiva \"the\ncustom of the country requires that the men destined for sacrifice\nshould belong to some neighbouring nation, and accordingly they are\ngenerally stolen.\"[250] In Tahiti \"the unhappy wretches selected were\neither captives taken in war, or individuals who had rendered\nthemselves obnoxious to the chiefs or the priests.**\"[251] The Muruts\nof Borneo \"never sacrifice one of their own people, but either capture\nan individual of a hostile tribe, or send to a friendly tribe to\npurchase a slave for the purpose.\"[252] It is said to be contrary to\nthe K\u00e1y\u00e1n custom to sell or sacrifice one of their own nation.[253]\nThe G[=a]ro hill tribes \"generally select their victims out of the\nBengali villages in the plains.\"[254] The Kandhs considered that the\nvictim must be a stranger. \"If we spill our own blood,\" they said, \"we\nshall have no descendants\";[255] and even the children of Meriahs, who\nwere reared for sacrificial purposes, were never offered up in the\nvillage of their birth.[256]\n\n[Footnote 238: Grimm, _Teutonic Mythology_, i. 45.]\n\n[Footnote 239: Holtzmann, _Deutsche Mythologie_, p. 232.]\n\n[Footnote 240: C\u00e6sar, _De bello gallico_, vi. 16.]\n\n[Footnote 241: Diodorus Siculus, xx. 14.]\n\n[Footnote 242: Clavigero, _op. cit._ i. 282.]\n\n[Footnote 243: Bancroft, _op. cit._ ii. 704.]\n\n[Footnote 244: Stoll, _op. cit._ p. 40.]\n\n[Footnote 245: Bry, _op. cit._ p. 11.]\n\n[Footnote 246: Garcilasso de la Vega, _op. cit._ i. 50.]\n\n[Footnote 247: Ellis, _Tshi-speaking Peoples_, p. 170.]\n\n[Footnote 248: Ling Roth, _Great Benin_, p. 70.]\n\n[Footnote 249: Hale, _U.S. Exploring Expedition. Vol. VI. Ethnography\nand Philology_, p. 57. _Cf._ Wilkes, _op. cit._ iii. 97.]\n\n[Footnote 250: Lisiansky, _op. cit._ p. 81 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 251: Ellis, _Polynesian Researches_, i. 346.]\n\n[Footnote 252: Denison, quoted by Ling Roth, _Natives of Sarawak_,\nii. 216.]\n\n[Footnote 253: Burns, in _Jour. of Indian Archipelago_, iii. 145.]\n\n[Footnote 254: Godwin-Austen, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ ii. 394.]\n\n[Footnote 255: Macpherson, _Memorials of Service in India_, p. 121.]\n\n[Footnote 256: Campbell, _Wild Tribes of Khondistan_, p. 53.]\n\nWe find that various peoples who at a certain period have been\naddicted to the practice of human sacrifice, have afterwards, at a\nmore advanced stage of civilisation, voluntarily given it up. The\ncause of this is partly an increase, or expansion, of the sympathetic\nsentiment, partly a change of ideas. With the growth of enlightenment\nmen would lose faith in this childish method of substitution, and\nconsequently find it not only useless, but objectionable; and any\nsentimental disinclination to the practice would by itself, in the\ncourse of time, lead to the belief that the deity no longer cares for\nit, or is averse to it. Brahmanism gradually abolished the immolation\nof human victims, incompatible as it was with the precept of _ahims\u00e2_,\nor respect for everything that has life; \"the liberation of the\nvictim, or the substitution in its stead and place of a {469} figure\nmade of flour paste, both of which were at first matter of sufferance,\nbecame at length matter of requirement.\"[257] According to the\nMahabharata, the priest who performs a human sacrifice is cast into\nhell.[258] In Greece, in the historic age, the practice was held in\nhorror at least by all the better minds, though it was regarded as\nnecessary on certain occasions.[259] It was strongly condemned by\nenlightened Romans. Cicero speaks of it as a \"monstrous and barbarous\npractice\" still disgracing Gaul in his day;[260] and Pliny, referring\nto the steps taken by Tiberius to stop it, declares it impossible to\nestimate the debt of the world to the Romans for their efforts to put\nit down.[261]\n\n[Footnote 257: Barth, _Religions of India_, p. 97.]\n\n[Footnote 258: _Supra_, p. 458.]\n\n[Footnote 259: Stengel, _op. cit._ p. 117. _Cf._ Donaldson, _loc.\ncit._ p. 464.]\n\n[Footnote 260: Cicero, _Pro Fonteio_, 10 (21).]\n\n[Footnote 261: Pliny, _Historia naturalis_, xxx. 4 (1).]\n\nThe growing reluctance to offer human sacrifice led to various\npractices intended to replace it.[262] Speaking of the Italian custom\nof dedicating as a sacrifice to the gods every creature that should be\nborn in the following spring, Festus adds that, since it seemed cruel\nto kill innocent boys and girls, they were kept till they had grown\nup, then veiled and driven beyond the boundaries.[263] Among various\npeoples human effigies or animals were offered instead of\nmen.\n\n[Footnote 262: _Cf._ Krause, 'Die Abl\u00f6sung der Menschenopfer,' in\n_Kosmos_, 1878, iii. 76 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 263: Festus, _op. cit._ 'Ver sacrum,' p. 379.]\n\nAmong the Malays of the Malay Peninsula dough models of human\nbeings, actually called \"the substitutes,\" are offered up to the\nspirits on the sacrificial trays; and in the same sense are the\ndirections of magicians, that \"if the spirit craves a human victim a\ncock may be substituted.\"[264] We are told that, in Egypt, King Amosis\nordered three waxen images to be burned in the temple of Heliopolis in\nlieu of the three men who in earlier times used to be sacrificed\nthere.[265] The Romans offered dolls;[266] and in old Hindu families\nbelonging to the sect of the V\u00e1m\u00e1ch\u00e1ris a practice still obtains of\nsacrificing an effigy {470} instead of a living man.[267] In India,\nGreece, and Rome, animals, also, were substituted for human\nvictims.[268] Of a similar substitution there is probably a trace in\nthe Biblical story of Isaac being exchanged for a ram, and in the\npaschal sacrifice.[269] On the Gold Coast the human victim who was\nformerly sacrificed to the god of the Prah is nowadays replaced by a\nbullock which is specially reserved and fattened for the\npurpose.[270]\n\n[Footnote 264: Skeat, _Malay Magic_, p. 72.]\n\n[Footnote 265: Porphyry, _op. cit._ ii. 55.]\n\n[Footnote 266: Leist, _Gr\u00e6co-italische Rechtsgeschichte_, p. 272 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 267: R\u00e1jendral\u00e1la Mitra, _op. cit._ ii. 109 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 268: Leist, _Gr\u00e6co-italische Rechtsgeschichte_, p. 267\n_sqq._ Frazer, _Golden Bough_, ii. 38, n. 2. Pausanias, ix. 8. 2. For\nvarious modifications of human sacrifice in India, see Wilson,\n_Works_, ii. 267 _sq._; Crooke, _Popular Religion of Northern India_,\nii. 175 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 269: See _supra_, p. 458.]\n\n[Footnote 270: Ellis, _Tshi-speaking Peoples_, p. 66.]\n\nIn other cases human sacrifices have been succeeded by practices\ninvolving the effusion of human blood without loss of life. We are\ntold that, in Laconia, Lycurgus established the scourging of lads at\nthe altar of Artemis Orthia, in place of the sacrifice of men, which\nhad previously been offered to her;[271] and Euripides represents\nAthena as ordaining that, when the people celebrate the festival of\nArtemis the Taurian goddess, the priest, to compensate her for the\nsacrifice of Orestes, \"must hold his knife to a human throat, and\nblood must flow to satisfy the sacred claims of the goddess, that she\nmay have her honours.\"[272] There are also many instances of bleeding\nor mutilation practised for the same purpose as human sacrifice,\nprobably according to the principle of _pars pro toto_, though it is\nimpossible to decide whether they really are survivals of an earlier\nsacrifice.\n\n[Footnote 271: Pausanias, ix. 16. 10.]\n\n[Footnote 272: Euripides, _Iphigenia in Tauris_, 1458 _sqq._]\n\nBesides the ceremony of _nawgia_, already described,[273] the Tonga\nIslanders had another ceremony called _tootoo-nima_, or cutting off a\nportion of the little finger, as a sacrifice to the gods, for the\nrecovery of a superior relation who was ill; and so commonly was this\ndone that, in Mariner's days, there was scarcely a person living in\nthe Tonga Islands who had not lost one or both little fingers, or at\nleast a considerable portion of them.[274] In Chinese literature there\nare frequently mentioned instances of persons cutting off flesh from\ntheir bodies to cure parents or paternal grandparents dangerously ill.\nIn most cases {471} it remains unmentioned how the flesh was prepared;\nbut it is sometimes stated that porridge or broth was made of it, or\nthat it was mixed with medicine. Dr. de Groot maintains that it was in\nthe first place the ascription of therapeutic virtues to parts of the\nhuman body that prompted such filial self-mutilation. But he adds that\n\"often also we read of thigh-cutters invoking Heaven beforehand,\nsolemnly asking this highest power to accept their own bodies as a\nsubstitute for the patients' lives they wanted to save; their\nmutilation thus assuming the character of self-immolation.\"[275]\nAccording to the testimony of a native writer, there is scarcely a\nrespectable house in all Bengal, the mistress of which has not at one\ntime or other shed her blood, under the notion of satisfying the\ngoddess Chandik\u00e1 by the operation. \"Whenever her husband or a son is\ndangerously ill, a vow is made that on the recovery of the patient,\nthe goddess would be regaled with human blood. . . . The lady performs\ncertain ceremonies, and then bares her breast in the presence of the\ngoddess, and with a nail-cutter (_naruna_) draws a few drops of blood\nfrom between her breasts and offers them to the divinity.\"[276]\nGarcilasso de la Vega states that, whilst some of the Peruvian Indians\nbefore the time of the Incas sacrificed men, there were others who,\nthough they mixed human blood in their sacrifices, did not obtain it\nby killing anyone, but by bleeding the arms and legs, according to the\nimportance of the sacrifice, and, in the most solemn cases, by\nbleeding the root of the nose where it is joined by the\neyebrows.[277]\n\n[Footnote 273: _Supra_, p. 455.]\n\n[Footnote 274: Mariner, _op. cit._ ii. 222.]\n\n[Footnote 275: de Groot, _Religious System of China_, (vol, iv. book)\nii. 386 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 276: R\u00e1jendral\u00e1la Mitra, _op. cit._ i. 111 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 277: Garcilasso de la Vega, _op. cit._ i. 52.]\n\nThere is one form of human sacrifice which has outlived all others,\nnamely, the penal sacrifice of offenders. There can be no moral\nscruples in regard to a rite which involves a punishment regarded as\njust. Indeed, this kind of human sacrifice is even found where the\noffering of animals or lifeless things has fallen out of use or become\na mere symbol. For this is the only sacrifice which is intended to\npropitiate the deity by the mere death of the victim; and gods are\nbelieved to be capable of feeling anger and revenge long after they\nhave ceased to have material needs. The last trace of human sacrifice\nhas {472} disappeared only when men no longer punish offenders\ncapitally with a view to appeasing resentful gods.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nHuman beings are sacrificed not only to gods, but to dead men, in\norder to serve them as companions or servants, or to vivify their\nspirits, or to gratify their craving for revenge.\n\nFrom various quarters of the world we hear of the immolation of men\nfor the service of the dead, the victims generally being slaves,\nwives, or captives of war, or, sometimes, friends.[278] This rite\noccurs or has occurred, more or less extensively, in Borneo[279] and\nthe Philippine Islands,[280] in Melanesia and Polynesia,[281] in many\ndifferent parts of Africa,[282] and among some American tribes.[283]\nIn America, however, it was carried to its height by the more\ncivilised nations of Central America and Mexico, Bogota and Peru.[284]\nThere is evidence to show that the funeral ceremonies {473} of the\nancient Egyptians occasionally included human sacrifice at the gate of\nthe tomb, although the practice would seem to have been exceptional,\nat any rate after Egypt had entered upon her period of greatness.[285]\nIt has been suggested that in China the burial of living persons with\nthe dead dates from the darkest mist of ages, and that the cases on\nrecord in the native books are of relatively modern date only because\nin high antiquity the custom was so common, that it did not occur to\nthe annalists and chroniclers to set down such everyday matters as\nanything remarkable.[286] In the fourteenth century of our era, the\nfuneral sacrifice of men was abolished, even for emperors and members\nof the imperial family,[287] but it has assumed a modified shape under\nwhich it still maintains itself in China. \"Daughters, daughters-in-law,\nand widows especially imbued with the doctrine that they are the\nproperty of their dead parents, parents-in-law, and husbands, and\naccordingly owe them the highest degree of submissive devotion, often\ntake their lives, in order to follow them into the next world.\" And\nthough it has been enacted that no official distinctions shall be\nawarded to such suttees, whereas honours are granted to widowed wives,\nconcubines, and brides who, instead of destroying themselves, simply\nabjure matrimonial life for good, sutteeism of widows and brides still\nmeets with the same applause as ever, and many a woman is no doubt\nprevailed upon, or even compelled, by her own relations, to become a\nsuttee.[288] Professor Schrader observes that \"it is no longer\npossible to doubt that ancient Indo-Germanic custom ordained that the\nwife should die with her husband.\"[289] It has been argued, it is\ntrue, that the burning of widows begins rather late in India;[290]\nyet, though the modern ordinance of suttee-burning be a corrupt\ndeparture {474} from the early Brahmanic ritual, the practice seems to\nbe, not a new invention by the later Hindu priesthood, but the revival\nof an ancient rite belonging originally to a period even earlier than\nthe Veda.[291] In the Vedic ritual there are ceremonies which\nobviously indicate the previous existence of such a rite.[292] From\nGreece we have the instances of Evadne throwing herself into the\nfuneral pile of her husband,[293] and of the suicide of the three\nMessenian widows mentioned by Pausanias.[294] Sacrifice of widows\noccurred, as it seems as a regular custom, among the Scandinavians,[295]\nHeruli,[296] and Slavonians.[297] \"The fact,\" says Mr. Ralston, \"that,\nin Slavonic lands, a thousand years ago, widows used to destroy\nthemselves in order to accompany their dead husbands to the world of\nspirits, seems to rest on incontestable evidence\"; and if the dead was\na man of means and distinction, he was also solaced by the sacrifice\nof his slaves.[298] Funeral offerings of slaves occurred among the\nTeutons[299] and the Gauls of C\u00e6sar's time;[300] and in the Iliad we\nread of twelve captives being laid on the funeral pile of\nPatroclus.[301]\n\n[Footnote 278: See Tylor, _Primitive Culture_, i. 458 _sqq._; Spencer,\n_Principles of Sociology_, i. 203 _sqq._; Liebrecht, _Zur Volkskunde_,\np. 380 _sq._; Schneider, _Naturv\u00f6lker_, i. 202 _sqq._; Hehn, _op.\ncit._ p. 416 _sqq._; Westermarck, _History of Human Marriage_, p. 125\n_sq._; Frazer, _Pausanias_, iii. 199 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 279: Brooke, _Ten Years in Sar\u00e1wak_, i. 74. Hose and\nMcDougall, 'Relations between Men and Animals in Sarawak,' in _Jour.\nAnthr. Inst._ xxxi. 207 _sq._ Bock, _Head-Hunters of Borneo_, pp. 210\nn., 219 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 280: Blumentritt, 'Der Ahnencultus und die religi\u00f6sen\nAnschauungen der Malaien des Philippinen Archipels,' in _Mittheilungen\nd. Geograph. Gesellsch. in Wien_, xxv. 152 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 281: Westermarck, _op. cit._ p. 125 _sq._ Brenchley, _op.\ncit._ p. 208 (natives of Tana). Williams and Calvert, _op. cit._ p.\n161 _sq._ (Fijians). Lisiansky, _op. cit._ p. 81 (Nukahivans).\nMariner, _op. cit._ ii. 220 _sq._ (Tonga Islanders). Taylor, _Te Ika a\nMaui_, p. 218 (Maoris). von Kotzebue, _op. cit._ iii. 247 (Sandwich\nIslanders).]\n\n[Footnote 282: Rowley, _Africa Unveiled_, p. 127. _Idem_, _Religion of\nthe Africans_, p. 102 _sq._ Schneider, _Religion der afrikanischen\nNaturv\u00f6lker_, p. 118 _sqq._ Westermarck, _op. cit._ p. 125. Ramseyer\nand K\u00fchne, _Four Years in Ashantee_, p. 50. Mockler-Ferryman, _British\nNigeria_, pp. 235, 259 _sqq._ Burton, _Mission to Gelele_, ii. 19\n_sqq._ (Dahomans). _Idem_, _Abeokuta_, i. 220 _sq._ _Idem_, _Lake\nRegions of Central Africa_, i. 124 (Wadoe); ii. 25 _sq._ (Wanyamwezi).\nWilson, _Western Africa_, pp. 203, 219. Ellis, _Tshi-speaking Peoples\nof the Gold Coast_, p. 159 _sqq._ _Idem_, _E[(w]e-speaking Peoples of\nthe Slave Coast_, pp. 117, 118, 121 _sqq._ Nachtigal, _Sahara und\nSudan_, ii. 687 (Somra\u00ef and Njillem). Baker, _Isma\u00eflia_, p. 317 _sq._\n(Wanyoro). Casati, _Ten Years in Equatoria_, i. 170 (Mambettu).\nCallaway, _Religious System of the Amazulu_, p. 212 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 283: Spencer, _Principles of Sociology_, i. 204. Dorman,\n_op. cit._ p. 210 _sqq._ Westermarck, _op. cit._ p. 125. Macfie,\n_Vancouver Island and British Columbia_, p. 448. Charlevoix, _Voyage\nto North America_, ii. 196 _sq._ (Natchez). Rochefort, _Histoire\nnaturelle et morale des Iles Antilles_, p. 568 _sq._ (Caribs).]\n\n[Footnote 284: Tylor, _Primitive Culture_, i. 461. Spencer,\n_Principles of Sociology_, i. 205. Dorman, _op. cit._ p. 212 _sqq._\nAcosta, _op. cit._ ii. 313, 314, 344 (Peruvians).]\n\n[Footnote 285: Wiedemann, _Ancient Egyptian Doctrine of the\nImmortality of the Soul_, p. 62 n.]\n\n[Footnote 286: de Groot, _op. cit._ (vol. ii. book) i. 721.]\n\n[Footnote 287: _Ibid._ (vol. ii. book) i. 724.]\n\n[Footnote 288: _Ibid._ (vol. ii. book) i. 735, 754, 748.]\n\n[Footnote 289: Schrader, _Prehistoric Antiquities of the Aryan\nPeoples_, p. 391.]\n\n[Footnote 290: Hopkins, _op. cit._ p. 274.]\n\n[Footnote 291: Tylor, _Primitive Culture_, i. 465 _sqq._ Zimmer,\n_Altindisches Leben_, p. 331.]\n\n[Footnote 292: _Rig-Veda_, x. 18. 8 _sq._ Macdonell, _Vedic\nMythology_, p. 165. Hillebrandt, 'Eine Miscelle aus dem Vedaritual,'\nin _Zeitschr. d. Deutschen Morgenl\u00e4nd. Gesellsch._ xl. 711. Oldenberg,\n_Religion des Veda_, p. 587.]\n\n[Footnote 293: Euripides, _Supplices_, 1000 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 294: Pausanias, iv. 2. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 295: Grimm, _Deutsche Rechtsalterth\u00fcmer_, p. 451.]\n\n[Footnote 296: Procopius, _op. cit._ ii. 14.]\n\n[Footnote 297: Dithmar of Merseburg, _Chronicon_, viii. 2 (Pertz,\n_Monumenta Germani\u00e6 historica_, v. 861). Zimmer, _op. cit._ p. 330.]\n\n[Footnote 298: Ralston, _Songs of the Russian People_, p. 327 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 299: Grimm, _op. cit._ p. 344.]\n\n[Footnote 300: C\u00e6sar, _De bello gallico_, vi. 19. In the ancient\nannals of the Irish there is one trace of human sacrifice being\noffered as a funeral rite (Cusack, _History of the Irish Nation_,\np. 115 n.*).]\n\n[Footnote 301: _Iliad_, xxiii. 175.]\n\nAccording to early notions, men require wives and servants not only\nduring their life-time, but after their death. The surviving relatives\nwant to satisfy their needs, out of affection or from fear of\nwithholding from the dead what belongs to them--their wives and their\nslaves. The destruction of innocent life seems justified by the low\nsocial standing of the victims and their subjection to their husbands\nor masters. However, with advancing civilisation this sacrifice has a\ntendency to {475} disappear, partly, perhaps, on account of a change\nof ideas as regards the state after death, but chiefly, I presume,\nbecause it becomes revolting to public feelings. It then dwindles into\na survival. As a probable instance of this may be mentioned a custom\nprevalent among the Tacullies of North America: the widow is compelled\nby the kinsfolk of the deceased to lie on the funeral pile where the\nbody of her husband is placed, whilst the fire is lighting, until the\nheat becomes intolerable.[302] In ancient Egypt little images of clay,\nor wood, or stone, or bronze, made in human likeness and inscribed\nwith a certain formula, were placed within the tomb, presumably in the\nhopes that they would there attain to life and become the useful\nservants of the dead.[303] So also the Japanese[304] and Chinese,\nalready in early times, placed images in, or at, the tombs of their\ndead as substitutes for human victims; and these images have always\nbeen considered to have no less virtual existence in the next world\nthan living servitors, wives, or concubines. In China the original\nimmolations were, moreover, replaced by the custom of allowing the\nnearest relatives and slaves of the deceased simply to settle on the\ntomb, instead of entering it, there to sacrifice to the manes, and by\nprohibiting widows from remarrying.[305]\n\n[Footnote 302: Wilkes, _U.S. Exploring Expedition_, iv. 453.]\n\n[Footnote 303: Wiedemann, _Ancient Egyptian Doctrine of the\nImmortality of the Soul_, p. 63.]\n\n[Footnote 304: Tylor, _Primitive Culture_, i. 463.]\n\n[Footnote 305: de Groot, _op. cit._ (vol. ii. book) i. 794 _sqq._]\n\nThe practice of sacrificing human beings to the dead is not\nexclusively based on the idea that they require servants and\ncompanions. It is extremely probable that the funeral sacrifice of men\nand animals in many cases involves an intention to vivify the spirits\nof the deceased with the warm, red sap of life.[306] This seems to be\nthe meaning of the Dahoman custom of pouring blood over the graves of\nthe ancestors of the king.[307] So, also, in Ashanti \"human sacrifices\nare frequent and ordinary, to {476} water the graves of the\nKings.\"[308] In the German folk-tale known under the name of 'Faithful\nJohn,' the statue said to the King, \"If you, with your own hand, cut\noff the heads of both your children, and sprinkle me with their blood,\nI shall be brought to life again.\"[309] According to primitive ideas,\nblood is life; to receive blood is to receive life; the soul of the\ndead wants to live, and consequently loves blood. The shades in Hades\nare eager to drink the blood of Odysseus' sacrifice, that their life\nmay be renewed for a time.[310] And it is all the more important that\nthe soul should get what it desires as it otherwise may come and\nattack the living. The belief that the bloodless shades leave their\ngraves at night and seek renewed life by drawing the blood of the\nliving, is prevalent in many parts of the world.[311] As late as the\neighteenth century this belief caused an epidemic of fear in Hungary,\nresulting in a general disinterment, and the burning or staking of the\nsuspected bodies.[312] It is also possible that the mutilations and\nself-bleedings which accompany funerals are partly practised for the\npurpose of refreshing the departed soul.[313] The Samoans called it\n\"an offering of blood\" for the dead when the mourners beat their heads\nwith stones till the blood ran.[314]\n\n[Footnote 306: _Cf._ Spencer, _Principles of Sociology_, i. 288 _sq._;\nRockholz, _Deutscher Glaube und Brauch_, i. 55; Sepp, _V\u00f6lkerbrauch\nbei Hochzeit, Geburt und Tod_, p. 154; Trumbull, _Blood Covenant_,\np. 110 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 307: Reade, _Savage Africa_, p. 51 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 308: Bowdich, _Mission from Cape Castle to Ashantee_, p. 289.]\n\n[Footnote 309: Grimm, _Kinder- und Hausm\u00e4rchen_, p. 29 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 310: _Odyssey_, xi. 153.]\n\n[Footnote 311: Trumbull, _Blood Covenant_, p. 114 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 312: Farrer, _Primitive Manners and Customs_, p. 23 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 313: _Cf._ Spencer, _Principles of Sociology_, i. 181 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 314: Turner, _Nineteen Years in Polynesia_, p. 227.]\n\nFinally, as offenders are sacrificed to gods in order to appease their\nwrath, so manslayers are in many cases killed in order to satisfy\ntheir victims' craving for revenge. In the next chapter we shall see\nthat the execution of blood-revenge largely falls under the heading of\n\"human sacrifice for the dead.\"\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XX\n\nBLOOD-REVENGE AND COMPENSATION--THE PUNISHMENT OF DEATH\n\n\nACCORDING to early custom, a person who takes the life of another may\nhimself be killed by the relatives of his victim, or some other member\nof his family, clan, or tribe may be killed in his stead.[1] The\ncustom of blood-revenge is found among a host of existing savages and\nbarbarians, and has long survived among many peoples who have reached\na higher degree of culture.\n\n[Footnote 1: The collective responsibility usually involved in the\nblood-feud has been discussed _supra_, p. 30 _sqq._]\n\nWe meet with blood-revenge in the midst of Japanese civilisation, not\nas a mere fact, but as a legally permitted custom. The avenger had\nonly to observe certain prescribed formalities and regulations: there\nwas a regular official to whom he must announce his resolve, and he\nmust fix the time within which he would carry it out. The way in which\nthe enemy was killed was of no importance, except that, even in\nancient times, the man who had recourse to assassination was\nreprehensible.[2] Among the Hebrews blood-revenge continued to exist\nduring the periods of the Judges and Kings, and even later; under the\nOld Kingdom, says Wellhausen, \"the administration of justice was at\nbest but a scanty supplement to the practice of self-help.\"[3] It is a\nrule among {478} all the Arabs that whoever sheds the blood of a man\nowes blood on that account to the family of the slain person.[4] Says\nthe Koran:--\"O ye who believe! Retaliation is prescribed for you for\nthe slain.\"[5] In ancient Eran blood-revenge survived the\nestablishment of tribunals.[6] There is evidence left of its\nprevalence in early times among the Aryan population of India, though\nno mention is made in the S\u00fbtras of blood revenge as an existing\ncustom.[7] Among the Greeks it was only in the post-Homeric age that\nit was given up as a fundamental principle, the avenger being\ntransformed into an accuser.[8] In Gaul and Ireland, though justice\nwas administered by Druids or Brehons, their judgments seem to have\nbeen merely awards founded upon a submission to arbitration, the\ninjured person being at liberty to take the law into his own hands and\nredress himself.[9] In the preface to the Senchus M\u00f3r we read that\nretaliation prevailed in Erin before Patrick, and that Patrick brought\nforgiveness with him.[10] Among the clans of Scotland, as is well\nknown, the blood-feud has existed up to quite modern times; in the\nCatholic period even the Church recognised its power by leaving the\nright hand of male children unchristened, that it might deal the more\nunhallowed and deadly a blow to the enemy.[11] In England it was at\nleast theoretically possible down to the middle of the tenth century\nfor a manslayer to elect to bear the feud of the kindred of the slain,\ninstead of paying the _wer_;[12] and long after the Conquest we still\nmeet with a law against the system of {479} private revenge.[13] In\nFrisland, Lower Saxony, and parts of Switzerland, the blood-feud was\npractised as late as the sixteenth century.[14] In Italy it prevailed\nextensively, even among the upper classes, in the sixteenth and\nseventeenth centuries.[15] In Corsica,[16] Albania,[17] and\nMontenegro,[18] it exists even to this day.\n\n[Footnote 2: Rein, _Japan_, p. 326. Dautremer, 'The Vendetta or Legal\nRevenge in Japan,' in _Trans. Asiatic Soc. Japan_, xiii. 84 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 3: Wellhausen, _Prolegomena to the History of Israel_, p. 467.]\n\n[Footnote 4: Burckhardt, _Notes on the Bedouins and Wah\u00e1bys_, p. 85.]\n\n[Footnote 5: _Koran_, ii. 173. _Cf._ _ibid._ xvii. 35.]\n\n[Footnote 6: Geiger, _Civilization of the Eastern Ir[=a]nians_,\nii. 31 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 7: Leist, _Alt-arisches Jus Gentium_, p. 422.]\n\n[Footnote 8: _Idem_, _Gr\u00e6co-italische Rechtsgeschichte_, \u00a7 50 _sq._,\nespecially pp. 375, 381. In Rome blood-revenge appears to have been\nvery early suppressed. There is an echo of it in certain legends, but\neven in them it is represented as objectionable (Mommsen, _History of\nRome_, i. 190).]\n\n[Footnote 9: Maine, _Early History of Institutions_, lect. ii.\nd'Arbois de Jubainville, 'Des attributions judiciaires de l'autorit\u00e9\npublique chez les Celtes,' in _Revue Celtique_, vii. 5. _Ancient Laws\nof Ireland_, iii. p. lxxxix.]\n\n[Footnote 10: Skene, _Celtic Scotland_, iii. 152.]\n\n[Footnote 11: Mackintosh, _History of Civilisation in Scotland_,\nii. 279.]\n\n[Footnote 12: Pollock and Maitland, _History of English Law before the\nTime of Edward I._ i. 48.]\n\n[Footnote 13: Cherry, _Growth of Criminal Law in Ancient Communities_,\np. 85.]\n\n[Footnote 14: G\u00fcnther, _Idee der Wiedervergeltung_, i. 207 _sq._\nFrauenst\u00e4dt, _Blutrache und Todtschlags\u00fchne im Deutschen Mittelalter_,\np. 21. _Cf._ Arnold, _Deutsche Urzeit_, p. 342.]\n\n[Footnote 15: Simonde de Sismondi, _Histoire des r\u00e9publiques\nitaliennes du moyen \u00e2ge_, xvi. 456.]\n\n[Footnote 16: Gregorovius, _Wanderings in Corsica_, i. 176 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 17: Gop[vc]evi['c], _Oberalbanien und seine Liga_, p. 322\n_sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 18: Kohl, _Reise nach Istrien_, i. 406 _sqq._ Popovi['c],\n_Recht und Gericht in Montenegro_, p. 69.]\n\nBlood-revenge is regarded not only as a right, but as a duty. We are\ntold that the holiest duty a West Australian native is called on to\nperform is that of avenging the death of his nearest relation. \"Until\nhe has fulfilled this task, he is constantly taunted by the old women;\nhis wives, if he be married, would soon quit him; if he is unmarried,\nnot a single young woman would speak to him; his mother would\nconstantly cry, and lament she should ever have given birth to so\ndegenerate a son; his father would treat him with contempt, and\nreproaches would constantly be sounded in his ear.\"[19] Among the\ntribes of Western Victoria \"a man would consider it his bounden duty\nto kill his most intimate friend for the purpose of avenging a\nbrother's death, and would do so without the slightest hesitation.\"[20]\nIn his description of the Eskimo about Behring Strait, Mr. Nelson\nstates that blood-revenge is considered a sacred duty among all the\nEskimo, a duty incumbent on the nearest male relative; if the son of\nthe murdered man is an infant, it rests with him to seek revenge as\nsoon as he attains puberty.[21] Among the Dacotahs \"no one can escape\nthis law of retaliation; public opinion would brand with disgrace\nwhoever fled under such circumstances.\"[22] The Brazilian aborigines\n{480} consider it a moral obligation, a matter of conscience, for a\nson, a brother, or a nephew, to avenge the death of his relative.[23]\nSpeaking of the Guiana Indians, Sir E. F. Im Thurn observes that, \"in\nall primitive societies where there are no written laws and no supreme\nauthority to enforce justice, such vengeance has been held as a sacred\nduty.\"[24] Confucius affirmed, in the strongest and most unrestricted\nterms, the duty of avenging the murder of a father or a brother.[25]\nIn Japan \"the man who was weak enough not to try to put to death the\nmurderer of his father or his lord, was obliged to flee into hiding;\nfrom that day, he was despised by his own companions.\"[26] The Lord\nsaid to Moses:--\"The revenger of blood himself shall slay the\nmurderer; when he meeteth him, he shall slay him.\"[27] A similar rule,\nas we have seen, is laid down in the Koran.[28] The idea that\nblood-revenge is a sacred duty incumbent on the kindred of the\ndeceased was probably held by all so-called Aryan peoples.[29] It\nstill prevails in Albania,[30] Montenegro,[31] and Corsica. \"Not to\ntake revenge is considered by the genuine Corsicans as degrading. . . .\nAny one who shrinks from avenging himself . . . is allowed no rest\nby his relations, and all his acquaintances upbraid him with\npusillanimity.\"[32]\n\n[Footnote 19: Grey, _Journals of Expeditions of Discovery in\nNorth-West and Western Australia_, ii. 240.]\n\n[Footnote 20: Dawson, _Australian Aborigines_, p. 71.]\n\n[Footnote 21: Nelson, 'Eskimo about Bering Strait,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur.\nEthn._ xviii. p. 292 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 22: Domenech, _Seven Years' Residence in the Great Deserts\nof North America_, ii. 338.]\n\n[Footnote 23: von Martius, _Beitr\u00e4ge zur Ethnographie Amerika's_,\ni. 128.]\n\n[Footnote 24: Im Thurn, _Among the Indians of Guiana_, p. 329 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 25: Legge, _Chinese Classics_, i. 111. Douglas,\n_Confucianism and Taouism_, p. 145.]\n\n[Footnote 26: Dautremer, _loc. cit._ p. 83. _Cf._ Griffis, _Corea_, p.\n227 (Coreans).]\n\n[Footnote 27: _Numbers_, xxxv. 19.]\n\n[Footnote 28: For modern Arabs, see Burckhardt, _Notes on the Bedouins\nand Wah\u00e1bys_, p. 313 _sq._; Blunt, _Bedouin Tribes of the Euphrates_,\nii. 207.]\n\n[Footnote 29: Geiger, _op. cit._ ii. 32 (Avesta people). Leist,\n_Alt-arisches Jus Gentium_, p. 422. _Idem_, _Gr\u00e6co-italische\nRechtsgeschichte_, p. 323 _sqq._ de Valroger, _op. cit._ p. 472\n(Celts). Nordstr\u00f6m, _Bidrag till den svenska samh\u00e4lls-f\u00f6rfattningens\nhistoria_, ii. 229; Stemann, _Den Danske Retshistorie indtil Christian\nV.'s Lov_, p. 574; Keyser, _Efterladte Skrifter_, ii. pt. ii. 95;\nRosenberg, _Nordboernes Aandsliv_, i. 487 (Teutons). Miklosich, 'Die\nBlutrache bei den Slaven,' in _Denkschriften der kaiserl. Akademie d.\nWissensch. Philos. histor. Classe_, Vienna, xxxvi. 127 _sqq._ Ewers,\n_Das alteste Recht der Russen_, p. 50 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 30: Hahn, _Albanesische Studien_, i. 176.]\n\n[Footnote 31: Popovi['c], _op. cit._ p. 69. Kohl, _op. cit._ i. 409,\n413 _sqq._ Miklosich, _loc. cit._ p. 145.]\n\n[Footnote 32: Gregorovius, _op. cit._ i. 180 _sq._ For other instances\nof blood-revenge as a duty, see Boas, 'Central Eskimo,' _Ann. Rep.\nBur. Ethn._ vi. 582; Petroff, 'Report on Alaska,' in _Tenth Census of\nthe United States_, p. 158 (Atkha Aleuts); Kohler, in _Zeitschr. f.\nvergl. Rechtswiss._ vii. 376 (Papuans of New Guinea); Modigliani,\n_Viaggio a N\u00edas_, p. 471; Bowring, _Visit to the Philippine Islands_,\np. 177; Macpherson, _Memorials of Service in India_, p. 82 (Kandhs);\nRadde, _Die Chews'uren_, p. 115; von Haxthausen, _Transcaucasia_, p.\n406 _sqq._ (Ossetes); Munzinger, _Die Sitten und das Recht der Bogos_,\np. 87; Mungo Park, _Travels in the Interior of Africa_, p. 13 (Feloops\nbordering on the Gambia); Leuschner, in Steinmetz, _Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse\nvon eingeborenen V\u00f6lkern in Afrika und Ozeanien_, p. 23 (Bakwiri);\n_ibid._ p. 49 (Banaka and Bapuku); Nicole, _ibid._ p. 132\n(Diakit\u00e9-Sarrakolese); Lang, _ibid._ p. 256 _sq._ (Washambala); Kraft,\n_ibid._ p. 292 (Wapokomo); Viehe, _ibid._ p. 311 (Ovaherero);\nRautanen, _ibid._ p. 341 (Ondonga); Sorge, _ibid._ p. 418 (Nissan\nIslanders in the Bismarck Archipelago).]\n\n{481} The duty of blood-revenge is, in the first place, regarded as a\nduty to the dead, not merely because he has been deprived of his\nhighest good, his life, but because his spirit is believed to find no\nrest after death until the injury has been avenged.[33] The\ndisembodied soul carries into its new existence an eager longing for\nrevenge, and, till the crime has been duly expiated, hovers about the\nearth, molesting the manslayer or trying to compel its own relatives\nto take vengeance on him.\n\n[Footnote 33: See Kohler, _Shakespeare vor dem Forum der\nJurisprudenz_, p. 131 _sq._; Steinmetz, _Ethnol. Studien zur ersten\nEntwicklung der Strafe_, i. 291 _sqq._; _Idem_, _Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_,\np. 49 (Banaka and Bapuku); Nicole, _ibid._ p. 132 (Diakit\u00e9-Sarrakolese);\nLang, _ibid._ p. 257 (Washambala).]\n\nAccording to Yakut beliefs, a person who is murdered becomes a\n_yor_, that is, his ghost never comes to rest.[34] The Cheremises\nimagine that the spirits of persons who have died a violent death\ncause illness, especially fever and ague.[35] The Saoras of India seem\nto have most fear of the spirits of those who have died violent\ndeaths.[36] The Burmese believe that persons who meet a violent death\nbecome \"nats \"and haunt the place where they were killed.[37] The\nHudson Bay Eskimo regard the island of Akpatok as tabooed since the\nmurder of part of the crew of a wrecked vessel, who camped on that\nisland; \"not a soul visits that locality lest the ghosts of the\nvictims should appear and supplicate relief from the natives, who have\nnot the proper offerings to make to appease them.\"[38] The Omahas\nbelieve that the spirits of those who have been killed reappear after\ndeath, their errand being \"to solicit vengeance on the perpetrators of\nthe deed.\"[39] According to Genesis, the voice of {482} blood shed\ncried for vengeance until the murderer was punished.[40] A similar\nnotion prevailed among the Bedouins, hence they thought they might\nescape the taking of revenge by covering up the blood with earth.[41]\nOne of the most popular ghost stories in folk-tales is that which\ntreats of the ghost of a murdered person flitting about the haunts of\nthe living with no gratification but to terrify them.[42] According to\nRohde, this belief was in full force at Athens in the fifth and fourth\ncenturies before Christ.[43] Aeschylus attributes an Erinys to the\nheinous crime of a man's neglecting his duty as avenger of\nblood[44]--in other words, the soul of the slain turned its anger\nagainst the neglectful relative. Traces of the same belief still\nsurvive in various parts of Europe.[45] In W\u00e4rend, in Sweden, the\npeople maintain that the unsatisfied ghost of a murdered man visits\nhis relatives at night, and disturbs their rest; and it was an ancient\ncustom among them that, if the murderer was not known, the nearest\nrelation of the dead, before the knell began, went forward to the\ncorpse and asked the dead himself to avenge his murder.[46]\n\n[Footnote 34: Sumner, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxxi. 101.]\n\n[Footnote 35: Abercromby, _Pre- and Proto-historic Finns_, i. 168 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 36: Fawcett, in _Jour. Anthrop. Soc. Bombay_, i. 59.]\n\n[Footnote 37: Schway Yoe, _The Burman_, i. 286.]\n\n[Footnote 38: Turner, 'Ethnology of the Ungava District,' in _Ann.\nRep. Bur. Ethn._ xi. 186.]\n\n[Footnote 39: James, _Expedition from Pittsburgh to the Rocky\nMountains_, i. 267.]\n\n[Footnote 40: _Genesis_, iv. 10.]\n\n[Footnote 41: Jacob, _Leben der vorisl\u00e2mischen Beduinen_, p. 146.\n_Cf._ Schwally, _Leben nach dem Tode_, p. 52 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 42: See Dyer, _The Ghost World_, p. 65 _sqq._; Andree,\n_Ethnographische Parallelen_, p. 80 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 43: Rohde, _Psyche_, p. 240. _Cf._ _Idem_, 'Paralipomena,'\nin _Rheinisches Museum f\u00fcr Philologie_, 1895, p. 19 _sq._; Schmidt,\n_Ethik der alten Griechen_, ii. 125 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 44: Aeschylus, _Choephori_, 283 _sqq._ _Cf._ _ibid._ 400\n_sqq._; Plato, _Leges_, ix. 866.]\n\n[Footnote 45: Dyer, _op. cit._ p. 68 _sqq._ Thorpe, _Northern\nMythology_, ii. 19 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 46: Hylt\u00e9n-Cavallius, _W\u00e4rend och Wirdarne_, ii. 274; i. 473.]\n\nFrom one point of view, blood-revenge is thus a form of human\nsacrifice. Sometimes it even formally bears a strong resemblance to\ncertain other human sacrifices which are offered to the dead. Among\nsome Queensland tribes, when the assassin has been caught red-handed,\nthe slayer and slain are buried together in the same grave;[47] and\namong the ancient Teutons the avenger by preference slew the culprit\nat the feet of the murdered man, or at his tomb.[48] Blood-revenge\nalso resembles other kinds of human sacrifice so far that it serves as\na safeguard for the sacrificer--in this case the avenger, who would\notherwise expose himself to the persecutions of the revengeful spirit\nof the dead.\n\n[Footnote 47: Roth, _Ethnological Studies among the North-West-Central\nQueensland Aborigines_, p. 165.]\n\n[Footnote 48: Wilda, _Strafrecht der Germanen_, pp. 170, 692.]\n\nBut the practice of blood-revenge is not exclusively {483} based on a\ndesire to avenge the injury done to a fellow-creature and to gratify\nthe angry passion of his soul. The act which caused his death is at\nthe same time an injury inflicted upon the survivors. Hence, in many\ncases, a murder committed within the family or kin is left\nunavenged.[49] Among the Iroquois, says Loskiel, any one who has\nmurdered his own relative escapes without much difficulty, since the\nfamily, who alone have a right to take revenge, do not choose to\nweaken their influence by depriving themselves of another member\nbesides the one whom they have already lost.[50] Again, when the\nmurderer belongs to an extraneous family, the injury inflicted on the\nrelatives of the murdered man suggests not only revenge, but reparation.\n\n[Footnote 49: Steinmetz, _Ethnologische Studien zur ersten Entwicklung\nder Strafe_, ii. 159 _sqq._ Mauss, 'La religion et les origines du\ndroit p\u00e9nal,' in _Revue de l'histoire des religions_, xxxv. 44.\nKovalewsky, 'Les origines du devoir,' in _Revue internationale de\nSociologie_, ii. 86. _Cf._ Seebohm, _Tribal Custom in Anglo-Saxon\nLaw_, pp. 30, 42 (Welsh); Robertson Smith, _Religion of the Semites_,\np. 420; _Idem_, _Marriage and Kinship in early Arabia_, p. 25. Among\nthe Jb\u00e2la of Northern Morocco blood-revenge is taken for the killing\nof a cousin, but not for the killing of a brother.]\n\n[Footnote 50: Loskiel, _History of the Mission of the United Brethren\namong the Indians in North America_, i. 16.]\n\nThe taking of life for life may itself, in a way, serve as\ncompensation. It seems that, in some cases, the blood of the slain\nhomicide is supposed to restore, as it were, to the family of his\nvictim the loss of life which he has caused them.[51] Such an idea\nprobably underlies a custom which Burckhardt heard existed among the\nHallenga, who draw their origin from Abyssinia. When the slayer has\nbeen seized by the relatives of the deceased, a family feast is\nproclaimed, at which the murderer is brought into their midst. While\nhis throat is then slowly cut with a razor, the blood is caught in a\nbowl and handed round amongst the guests, \"every one of whom is bound\nto drink of it at the moment the victim breathes his last.\"[52] Among\nvarious Arabic-speaking tribes in Morocco I have met with a practice\nwhich also, possibly, involves a vague idea of restoration. On the\nperpetration of his deed the avenger {484} licks off the blood from\nthe blade of the dagger with which he killed his victim; and in one\ninstance related to me, he bit off a piece of flesh from the dead body\nand sucked its blood.[53] Mr. Trumbull even goes so far as to believe\nthat, among the Hebrews, the primal idea of the _goel_'s mission was\nnot to wreak vengeance, but \"to restore life for life, or to secure\nthe adjusted equivalent of a lost life.\"[54] But it is difficult to\nsuppose that the exacting of blood-revenge ever could have been looked\nupon as an equivalent in the full sense of the term. If the loss of\nlife is to be compensated some other practice must take its place.\n\n[Footnote 51: _Cf._ Trumbull, _Blood Covenant_, p. 126 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 52: Burckhardt, _Travels in Nubia_, p. 356.]\n\n[Footnote 53: _Cf._ Goldziher, in Robertson Smith, _Kinship and\nMarriage in Early Arabia_, p. 296 n. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 54: Trumbull, _Blood Covenant_, pp. 260, 263.]\n\nSometimes the manslayer, instead of being killed, is adopted as a\nmember of the family of his victim.[55] Among the Kabyles of Algeria,\nfor instance, a person who has killed another unintentionally, goes to\nthe parents of the dead and says to them: \"If you want to kill me,\nkill me, here is my winding-sheet. If not, pardon me, and I shall\nhenceforth be one of your children.\" And from this day the manslayer\nis considered to belong to the _kharouba_, or _gens_, of the\ndeceased.[56] Among the Jb\u00e2la of Northern Morocco, again, a homicide\nsometimes induces the avenger to abstain from his persecutions by\ngiving him his sister or daughter in marriage; and a similar custom\nhas been noticed among the Beni Amer[57] and Bogos.[58] In other cases\nslaves are given to the relatives of the slain in order to atone for\nthe guilt;[59] but most commonly the compensation consists of cattle,\nmoney, or other property.\n\n[Footnote 55: See Steinmetz, _Studien_, i. 410 _sqq._, 439 _sqq._;\nKovalewsky, in _Revue Internationale de Sociologie_, ii. 87 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 56: Hanoteau and Letourneux, _La Kabylie_, iii. 68 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 57: Munzinger, _Ostafrikanische Studien_, p. 322.]\n\n[Footnote 58: _Idem_, _Die Sitten und das Recht der Bogos_, p. 83.\n_Cf._ Kohler, _Nachwort zu Shakespeare vor dem Forum der\nJurisprudenz_, p. 15 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 59: Squier, 'Arch\u00e6ology and Ethnology of Nicaragua,' in\n_Trans. American Ethn. Soc._ iii. pt. i. 129. _Idem_, _Nicaragua_, ii.\n345 (ancient Nicaraguans). Macdonald, _Africana_, i. 171 (Eastern\nCentral Africans).]\n\nBy giving presents to the relatives of his victim, the offender not\nonly repairs the loss which he has inflicted {485} upon them, but also\nappeases their wounded feelings.[60] The pleasure of gain tends to\nsuppress their passion, and the loss and humiliation which the\nadversary suffers by the gift exercise a healing influence on their\nresentment.[61] Sometimes the present is chiefly intended to serve as\nan apology. Among the Iroquois, according to Mr. Morgan, the white\nwampum which the murderer sent to the family of his victim and which,\nif accepted, for ever wiped out the memory of his deed, \"was not in\nthe nature of a compensation for the life of the deceased, but of a\nregretful confession of the crime, with a petition for forgiveness.\"[62]\nCompensation, moreover, has the advantage of saving the injured party\nthe dangers involved in a blood-feud, the uncertainty of the issue,\nand the serious consequences which may result from the accomplished\nact of revenge. Whilst the carrying out of the principle of \"life for\nlife\" often leads to protracted hostilities between the parties,\ncompensation has a tendency to bring about a durable peace. For this\nreason it is to the interest of society at large to encourage the\nlatter practice; and this encouragement naturally adds to its attractions.\n\n[Footnote 60: R\u00e9e, _Entstehung des Gewissens_, p. 57 _sqq._ Steinmetz,\n_Studien_, i. 472 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 61: _Cf._ Miklosich, _loc. cit._ p. 148; Kohl, _op. cit._ i.\n426, 436 (Montenegrines and Albanians).]\n\n[Footnote 62: Morgan, _League of the Iroquois_, pp. 331, 333. _Cf._\nTurner, _Samoa_, p. 326 (people of Aneiteum).]\n\nBut in spite of its merits, the practice of composition has, in\ncomparison with blood-revenge, various disadvantages. It is not\nequally calculated to satisfy a revengeful mind. It has to contend\nwith the conservatism of ancient custom. It may be taken as a token of\ncowardice or weakness, whereas the blood-feud gives to its perpetrator\nan opportunity to display his courage and skill. It may be considered\noffensive to the dead kinsman. Finally, if it is to flourish, it\npresupposes a certain amount of wealth.[63] {486} The importance of\nthese difficulties depends on the circumstances in each special case.\nVindictiveness, conservatism, the desire for fighting, and the\nestimation in which courage and martial ability are held, are\nnaturally subject to variations, and so are people's wealth and their\nwillingness to compensate. The ideas held concerning the spirits of\nthe departed are likewise variable. The readiness with which\nblood-money was accepted among the Greeks of the Homeric age has been\nexplained by their belief in the disembodied soul's dreamlike\nexistence in Hades, without strong passions and without the power to\nmolest the living; whilst the later custom of demanding life for life\nhas been interpreted as the result of a change of ideas which\nattributed much greater activity to the dead.[64] In other cases the\ndeceased is supposed to be appeased by a mere ceremony, or by a\nvicarious sacrifice. The Ossetes believe that he often appears in a\ndream to some of his descendants, \"tant\u00f4t pour exiger de lui la\nvengeance, tant\u00f4t pour lui permettre, au contraire, de la remplacer\npar un simple office des morts . . . . Rev\u00eatu d'habits de deuil, les\ncheveux \u00e9pars, l'assassin Oss\u00e8te vient sur la tombe de celui qu'il a\ntu\u00e9, pour accomplir une c\u00e9r\u00e9monie dont le but av\u00e9r\u00e9 est de se\nconsacrer lui-m\u00eame \u00e0 sa victime. Cette c\u00e9r\u00e9monie est connue sous le\nnom de _kifaeldic\u00efn_: le meurtrier se livre spontan\u00e9ment au d\u00e9funt,\nqui, en la personne de son descendant, lui pardonne son offense.\"[65]\nIn Eastern Central Africa, says Mr. Macdonald, \"if one man slay\nanother, the friends of the deceased are justified in killing the\nmurderer on the spot. But if they catch him alive they put him in a\nslave-stick, till compensation be made by a heavy fine of from four to\ntwenty slaves. When the fine is paid the life of the murderer is not\ndemanded, but several of the slaves obtained in compensation are\nkilled, to accompany the deceased.\"[66] In other instances the dead is\nperhaps supposed to be appeased by the mere compensation {487} paid to\nhis descendants, or his feelings are simply disregarded when they\ncollide with the interests of the living.[67] Generally speaking, the\nquestion whether compensation is to be accepted or not, must be\nsettled by a balancing of advantages and drawbacks.\n\n[Footnote 63: For the influence of wealth on the practice of\ncomposition, see Steinmetz, _Studien_, i. 427 _sqq._, and Lippert,\n_Kulturgeschichte der Menschheit_, ii. 591. Occasionally, however,\ncomposition occurs even among such a poor people as the Yahgans of\nTierra del Fuego. \"Sometimes,\" says Mr. Bridges (in _A Voice for South\nAmerica_, xiii. 207), \"the murderer is suffered to live, but he is\nmuch beaten and hurt, and has to make many presents to the relatives\nof the dead.\"]\n\n[Footnote 64: Schmidt, _Ethik der alten Griechen_, ii. 125 _sqq._\nRohde, _Psyche_, pp. 8 _sqq._, 238.]\n\n[Footnote 65: Kovalewsky, _Coutume contemporaine et loi ancienne_,\np. 238.]\n\n[Footnote 66: Macdonald, _Africana_, i. 170 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 67: _Cf._ Steinmetz, _Studien_, i. 452.]\n\nWe may expect, then, to find the customs regarding blood-revenge and\ncompensation to vary exceedingly among different peoples. Among many\nthe rule of revenge is strictly followed, and compensation never, or\nrarely, accepted, at least for intentional homicide. This group\nincludes not only tribes who are in a state of savagery, but peoples\nlike the Beni Amer,[68] Marea,[69] Kabyles of Jurjura,[70] and Jb\u00e2la\nof Morocco. Burckhardt says of the Bedouins:--\"The stronger and the\nmore independent a tribe is, the more remote from cultivated\nprovinces, and the wealthier its individuals, the less frequently are\nthe rights of the _Thar_ commuted into a fine. Great sheiks, all over\nthe Desert, regard it as a shameful transaction to compromise in any\ndegree for the blood of their relations.\"[71] Among the mountains of\nDaghestan[72] and in parts of Albania[73] it is likewise considered\ndisgraceful to accept compensation for the murder of a relative.\n\n[Footnote 68: Munzinger, _Ostafrikanische Studien_, p. 321 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 69: _Ibid._ p. 242.]\n\n[Footnote 70: Hanoteau and Letourneux, _op. cit._ iii. 61 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 71: Burckhardt, _Notes on the Bedouins and Wah\u00e1bys_, p. 178,\n_Cf._ Burton, _Pilgrimage to Al-Madinah and Meccah_, ii. 103.]\n\n[Footnote 72: Kovalesky, in _Revue internationale de Sociologie_,\nii. 87.]\n\n[Footnote 73: Hahn, _op. cit._ i. 178.]\n\nIn some instances the acceptance of compensation does not necessarily\nmean that the family of the slain altogether renounce their right of\nrevenge. Among the Ahts, \"though it is usual to accept large presents\nas expiation for murder, yet, practically, this expiation is not\ncomplete, and blood alone effectually atones for blood. An accepted\npresent never quite cancels the obligation to punish in the breast of\nthe offended person or tribe.\"[74] Among the Somals, \"after the\nequivalent is paid, the {488} murderer or one of his clan, contrary to\nthe spirit of El Islam, is generally killed by the kindred or tribe of\nthe slain.\"[75] Among the Berbers (Shlu[h.]) of the province of S\u00fbs,\nin Southern Morocco, a person who commits homicide immediately flees\nto another tribe, and places himself under its protection. His\nrelatives then pay _ddit_, or blood-money, to the family of the\nvictim, but this only prevents the offended party from taking revenge\non any of them, and does not entitle the murderer to return; if he\nappears outside the tribe to whom he has fled for refuge, he is at any\ntime liable to be killed. Among the Ossetes, again, it was formerly \"a\nprevalent custom for a murderer to pay a fixed price for a certain\ntime to the family of the murdered man, say for a year, during which\ntime the blood-revenge remained dormant.\"[76]\n\n[Footnote 74: Sproat, _Scenes and Studies of Savage Life_, p. 153.]\n\n[Footnote 75: Burton, _First Footsteps in East Africa_, p. 87 n. [dagger].\n_Cf._ Paulitschke, _Ethnographie Nordost-Afrikas_, p. 263.]\n\n[Footnote 76: von Haxthausen, _Transcaucasia_, p. 405.]\n\nIn many instances, on the other hand, custom allows the acceptance of\ncompensation as a perfectly justifiable alternative for blood-revenge,\nor even regards it as the proper method of settling the case. Among\nthe Indians of Western Washington and North-Western Oregon the\nprinciple of life for life, though fully recognised, is sometimes\nabrogated in favour of material damages.[77] Among the Thlinkets \"the\nmurder of a relative can be atoned for by a certain number of\nblankets.\"[78] Among the Californian Karok the murder of a man's\nnearest relative may be compounded for by the payment of money.[79]\nThe Kutchin demand blood-money for a slain kinsman, but avenge his\ndeath should such be denied.[80] Among the Kandhs the custom of\nblood-revenge was modified by the principle of money compensation, the\nacceptance of such compensation being in no case considered\ndisgraceful.[81] In the Malay Archipelago, whilst the more ferocious\ntribes {489} insist, in many situations, upon a literal compliance\nwith the law of retaliation, other tribes constantly accept a\npecuniary compensation.[82] Among the majority of the Bedawee tribes\nof Egypt compensation is generally taken in commutation for\nvengeance;[83] and the same is the case among the Aenezes, though it\nwould reflect shame on the friends of the slain person if they were to\nmake the first overture.[84] Among the Wadshagga, again, the\nacceptance of blood-money is obligatory.[85] The Vend\u00eed\u00e2d forbids the\nfollowers of Zoroastrianism to refuse the compensation offered for a\ndeed of bloodshed.[86] Among the Irish the public opinion of the\nvillage held that the quarrels between its members should be\ncompromised in a certain manner. However, if the guilty party did not\npay the amount awarded, the community did not compel him to do so, and\nthe injured party was then at liberty to avenge his own wrongs by\nreprisals or levying of private war.[87] Among the Teutons the kindred\nof the slain might, in early times, choose between taking revenge or\naccepting compensation, just as they liked; but later on they were\nexpected by public opinion, and finally required by public authority,\nnot to pursue the feud if the proper composition was forthcoming,\nexcept in a few extreme cases.[88]\n\n[Footnote 77: Gibbs, 'Tribes of Western Washington and Northwestern\nOregon,' in _Contributions to North American Ethnology_, i. 189.]\n\n[Footnote 78: Petroff, _loc. cit._ p. 165.]\n\n[Footnote 79: Powers, _Tribes of California_, p. 21.]\n\n[Footnote 80: Richardson, _Arctic Searching Expedition_, i. 386.]\n\n[Footnote 81: Hunter, _Annals of Rural Bengal_, ii. 76. Macpherson,\n_Memorials of Service in India_, p. 82.]\n\n[Footnote 82: Crawfurd, _History of the Indian Archipelago_, iii. 111.]\n\n[Footnote 83: Lane, _Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians_,\np. 120.]\n\n[Footnote 84: Burckhardt, _Notes on the Bedouins and Wah\u00e1bys_, p. 87.]\n\n[Footnote 85: Merker, quoted by Kohler, in _Zeitschr. f. vergl.\nRechtswiss._ xv. 56.]\n\n[Footnote 86: Geiger, _op. cit._ ii. 34.]\n\n[Footnote 87: _Ancient Laws of Ireland_, iii. p. lxxx.]\n\n[Footnote 88: Keyser, _op. cit._ ii. pt. ii. 95. Pollock and Maitland,\n_op. cit._ i. 46 _sq._ _Gotlands-Lagen_, 13.]\n\nThus the exaction of life for life, from being a duty incumbent on the\nfamily of the dead, becomes a mere right of which they may or may not\navail themselves, as they please, and is at last publicly disapproved\nof or actually prohibited. Among the circumstances by which this\nprocess has been brought about there is still one which calls for\nspecial attention, namely, the pressure of some intervening authority,\nthe elders of the tribe,[89] or {490} the chief, inducing the avenger\nto lay down his weapon and to accept money for blood. I do not say\nthat the practice of compensation has originated in such an\nintervention; we meet it among peoples who know nothing of courts,\njudges, or regular arbitrators.[90] But when we hear of chiefs making\nefforts to check the blood-feud by persuading the injured party to\naccept remuneration in money or property, it is impossible to doubt\nthat some connection exists between the system of compensation and the\njudicial power of the chief. Among the Indians of Brazil, when blood\nis shed, either designedly or accidentally, by one of the same tribe,\nthe chief not seldom insists upon the acceptance of compensation by\nthe family of the deceased.[91] Of the people of Nias, amongst whom\nthe offender may suffer death at the hands of the avenger, we read\nthat even grave cases, when brought before the chief, are often\npunished by fines only.[92] Among the Dooraunees, in Western\nAfghanistan, \"if the offended party complains to the Sirdar, or if\n_he_ hears of a murder committed, he first endeavours to bring about a\ncompromise, by offering the Khoon Behau, or of price of blood.\"[93]\nThe Teutonic nations, as Kemble observes, in the course of time made\nthe State the arbitrator between the parties \"by establishing a tariff\nat which injuries should be rated, and committing to the State the\nduty of compelling the injured person to receive, and the wrong-doer\nto pay, the settled amount. It thus engaged to act as a mediator\nbetween the conflicting interests, with a view to the maintenance of\nthe general peace.\"[94]\n\n[Footnote 89: _Cf._ V\u00e1mb\u00e9ry, _Das T\u00fcrkenvolk_, p. 305 _sq._ (Kirghiz);\nMunzinger, _Ostafrikanische Studien_, p. 500 (Barea and Kun\u00e1ma).]\n\n[Footnote 90: _E.g._, the Fuegians (Bridges, in _South American\nMissionary Magazine_, xiii. 152. _Idem_, in _A Voice for South\nAmerica_, xiii. 207).]\n\n[Footnote 91: von Martius, _Beitr\u00e4ge zur Ethnographie Amerika's_, i.\n130. _Idem_, in _Jour. Roy. Geographical Soc._ ii. 199.]\n\n[Footnote 92: Modigliani, _Viaggio a N\u00edas_, p. 496.]\n\n[Footnote 93: Elphinstone, _Kingdom of Caubul_, ii. 105 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 94: Kemble, _Saxons in England_, i. 270.]\n\nWe have previously discussed the important measure of substituting\npunishment for revenge by transferring the judicial and executive\npower of the avenger to a special authority within the body politic,\ncommissioned with {491} the administration of justice. The system of\ncompensation was only one or the methods adopted by such an authority\nfor the settling of disputes; and, on the whole, it was a sign of\nweakness. Speaking of the Rejangs of Sumatra, Marsden observes that\nthe practice of expiating murder by the payment of a certain sum of\nmoney \"had doubtless its source in the imbecility of government, which\nbeing unable to enforce the law of retaliation, the most obvious rule\nof punishment, had recourse to a milder scheme of retribution, as\nbeing preferable to absolute indemnity.\"[95] When the central power of\njurisdiction is firmly established, the rule of life for life regains\nits sway.[96] Thus, in the mature legislation of semi-civilised and\ncivilised peoples, up to quite recent times, murder has almost\ninvariably been treated as a capital offence--unless, indeed,\ncommitted by some person belonging to a specially privileged class,\nsuch as the Peruvian Incas,[97] the Br\u00e2hmanas of India,[98] or, in\nEngland, all who had the benefit of Clergy, that is, every man who\nknew how to read, with the exception of those who were married to\nwidows.[99] But among many of the lower races, also, manslayers are\nsubject to capital punishment, in the proper sense of the term--to\ndeath inflicted, not by an individual avenger, but by the community at\nlarge or by some special authority.[100]\n\n[Footnote 95: Marsden, _History of Sumatra_, p. 246.]\n\n[Footnote 96: _Cf._ Brunner, _Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte_, ii. 599\n_sq._ (Teutonic peoples).]\n\n[Footnote 97: R\u00e9ville, _Hibbert Lectures on the Native Religions of\nMexico and Peru_, p. 151.]\n\n[Footnote 98: _Laws of Manu_, viii. 380 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 99: Stephen, _History of the Criminal Law of England_, i.\n458 _sqq._ According to the Cornelian law, a free Roman citizen could\nnot be punished capitally for the commission of murder, but was simply\nexiled from Italy, whereas a slave was executed for a similar crime\n(Mommsen, _R\u00f6misches Strafrecht_, p. 631 _sq._).]\n\n[Footnote 100: _Supra_, pp. 171, 172, 189. Veniaminof, quoted by\nPetroff, _loc. cit._ p. 152 (Aleuts). Adair, _History of the American\nIndians_, p. 150. Morgan, _League of the Iroquois_, p. 331. Harmon,\n_Journals of Voyages and Travels_, p. 348 (Indians on the east side of\nthe Rocky Mountains). Turner, _Samoa_, pp. 178, 295, 334 (Samoans,\nnatives of Arorae, Efatese). Thomson, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxxi.\n143 (Savage Islanders). Hickson, _A Naturalist in North Celebes_, p.\n198 (Sangirese, in former days). Abreu de Galindo, _History of the\nDiscovery and Conquest of the Canary Islands_, p. 27 (aborigines of\nFerro). Johnston, _Uganda Protectorate_, ii. 882 (Mutei). Beltrame,\n_Il Fiume Bianco e i D\u00e9nka_, p. 77. In all these cases homicide or\nmurder is said to be punished with death; but it may be that, in some\nof them, our authorities have not sufficiently distinguished between\npunishment and blood-revenge.]\n\nIt is not only by the slaying of a fellow-creature that a person may\nforfeit his right to live. Among various peoples custom allows, or\nsometimes even compels, the offended party to kill the offender in\ncases which involve {492} no blood-guiltiness, especially\nadultery;[101] and we hear of capital punishment being inflicted not\nonly for homicide, but for treason,[102] incest,[103] adultery,[104]\nwitchcraft,[105] sacrilege,[106] theft,[107] and other offences.[108]\nWe have seen that among semi-civilised and civilised nations,\nparticularly, the punishment of death has been applied to a great\nvariety of offences, many of which appear to us almost venial.[109]\nAnd we have discussed both the origin of the idea that justice\nrequires life for life, and the circumstances that have led to the\ninfliction of punishments the severity of which, apparently at least,\nbears no proportion to the magnitude of the crime.[110]\n\n[Footnote 101: _Supra_, p. 290 _sqq._ _Infra_, on Sexual Morality.\nPost, _Studien zur Entwicklungsgeschichte des Familienrechts_,\np. 134 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 102: _Supra_, p. 189.]\n\n[Footnote 103: _Infra_, on Sexual Morality.]\n\n[Footnote 104: _Supra_, p. 189. _Infra_, on Sexual Morality.]\n\n[Footnote 105: _Supra_, p. 189 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 106: _Supra_, p. 197.]\n\n[Footnote 107: _Infra_, on the Right of Property.]\n\n[Footnote 108: _Supra_, p. 195.]\n\n[Footnote 109: _Supra_, p. 186 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 110: _Supra_, ch. vii.]\n\nBut whilst, among peoples of culture, capital punishment has been\ninflicted far beyond the limits of the _lex talionis_, we meet, on the\nother hand, among such peoples with opinions to the effect that it\nshould not be applied even in the most atrocious cases. The old\nphilosopher Lao-tsze, the founder of Taouism, condemned it both as\nuseless and as irreverent. The people, he argued, do not fear death;\nto what purpose, then, is it to try to frighten them with death? There\nis only one who presides over the infliction of it. \"He who would\ninflict death in the room of him who presides over it may be described\nas hewing wood instead of a great carpenter. Seldom is it that he who\nundertakes the hewing, instead of the great carpenter, does not cut\nhis own hands.\"[111] Nor does Confucius seem to have been in favour of\ncapital punishment. When Ch\u00ee {493} K'ang asked his opinion as to the\nkilling of \"the unprincipled for the good of the principled,\"\nConfucius replied:--\"Sir, in carrying on your government, why should\nyou use killing at all? Let your evinced desires be for what is good,\nand the people will be good.\"[112] The early Christians generally\ncondemned the punishment of death, as well as all other forms of\nshedding human blood;[113] but when the Church obtained an ascendency,\nthe condemnation of it was modified into the doctrine that no priest\nor bishop must take any part in a capital charge.[114] Later on, from\nthe twelfth century at least, the priest might assist at judicial\nproceedings resulting in a sentence of death, if only he withdrew for\nthe moment, when the sentence was passed.[115] And whilst\nostentatiously sticking to the principle, \"Ecclesia non sitit\nsanguinem,\"[116] the Church had frequent recourse to the convenient\nmethod of punishing heretics by relegating the execution of the\nsentence to the civil power, with a prayer that the culprit should be\npunished \"as mildly as possible and without the effusion of blood,\"\nthat is, by the death of fire.[117] In modern times the views of the\nearly Christians regarding capital punishment have been revived by the\nQuakers;[118] but the powerful movement in favour of its abolition\nchiefly derives its origin from the writings of Beccaria and the\nFrench Encyclopedists.\n\n[Footnote 111: _T\u00e2o Teh King_, 74.]\n\n[Footnote 112: _Lun Y\u00fc_, xii. 19.]\n\n[Footnote 113: Hetzel, _Die Todesstrafe_, p. 71 _sqq._ G\u00fcnther, _Die\nIdee der Wiedervergeltung_, i. 271. Lactantius, _Divin\u00e6\nInstitutiones_, vi. ('De vero cultu') 20 (Migne, _Patrologi\u00e6 cursus_,\nvi. 708): \". . . occidere hominem sit semper nefas, quem Deus sanctum\nanimal esse voluit.\"]\n\n[Footnote 114: _Supra_, p. 381 _sq._ Lecky, _History of European\nMorals_, ii. 39. Laurent, _\u00c9tudes sur l'histoire de l'Humanit\u00e9_, iv.\n223; vii. 233.]\n\n[Footnote 115: Gerhohus, _De \u00e6dificio Dei_, 35 (Migne, _op. cit._\ncxciv. 1282).]\n\n[Footnote 116: Katz, _Grundriss des kanonischen Strafrechts_, p. 54.]\n\n[Footnote 117: Lecky, _History of European Morals_, ii. 41.]\n\n[Footnote 118: Gurney, _Views & Practices of the Society of Friends_,\npp. 377 n. 1, 389.]\n\nThe great motive force of this movement has been sympathy with human\nsuffering and horror of the destruction of human life--feelings which\nhave been able to operate the more freely, the less they have been\nchecked either by the belief in the social expediency of {494} capital\npunishment, or by the notion of a vindictive god who can be\nconciliated only by the death of the offender. It has been argued that\nthe punishment of death is no more effective as a deterrent from crime\nthan are certain other punishments. According to Beccaria, it is not\nthe intensity of a pain which produces the greatest effect on the mind\nof man, but its continuance; hence the execution of a culprit,\noccupying a short time only, must be a less deterring example than\nperpetual slavery, which ought to be the penalty for the greatest\ncrimes.[119] Moreover, the circumstances which unavoidably attend the\npractical application of the punishment of death are such as excite\nthe sympathy of the public in favour of the perpetrator of the crime\nand thereby seriously impair the efficacy of the punishment as an\nexample.[120] An execution is regarded as less degrading than many\nother forms of punishment; when a man dies on the scaffold there is a\ncounterpoise to the disgrace in the admiration excited by his\nfirmness, whereas there is no such counterpoise when a man goes off in\nthe prison van to be immured in a cell.[121] Statistical data prove,\nit is said, that, where capital punishment has been abolished either\nfor certain crimes or generally, crime has not become more frequent\nafter the abolition, whilst the re-enactment of capital punishment, or\ngreater strictness in its execution, has nowhere diminished the number\nof offences punishable with death.[122] And the punishment of death is\nno more required by the dictates of abstract justice than it is\nrequisite for the safety of the community. It is quite an arbitrary\nassumption, based on the rude theory of talion, that death must be\ninflicted on him who has caused death; such an assumption can be\nrefuted simply by showing that there are many degrees of\nhomicide.[123] Nay, far from being postulates of the highest justice,\nlaws which {495} prescribe capital punishment may lead to the highest\ninjustice. As Bentham observes, \"the punishment of death is not\nremissible\"; error is possible in all judgments, but whilst in every\nother case of judicial error compensation can be made, death alone\nadmits of no compensation.[124] And not only may the innocent have to\nsuffer an irreparable punishment, but the criminal easily escapes his\npunishment altogether. Experience shows that the punishment of death\nhas the disadvantage of diminishing the repressive power of the legal\nmenace, because witnesses, judges, and jurymen exert themselves to the\nutmost in order to avoid arriving at a verdict of guilty in many cases\nwhere an execution would be the consequence of such a verdict.[125]\nFinally, the punishment of death almost entirely misses one of the\nmost essential aims of every legitimate punishment, the reformation of\nthe criminal. Nay, by putting him to a speedy death we actually\nprevent him from morally reforming himself, and from manifesting the\nfruits of sincere repentance; and we perhaps deprive him of the\nopportunity of making good his claim to mercy at the hands of another\nand a higher Tribunal, on which we are arrogantly encroaching in a\nmatter of which we are wholly unfit to judge.[126]\n\n[Footnote 119: Beccaria, _Dei delitti e delle pene_, \u00a7 16.]\n\n[Footnote 120: Romilly, _Punishment of Death_, p. 56 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 121: _Ibid._ p. 47 _sq._ Hetzel, _op. cit._ p. 454 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 122: Mittermaier, _Die Todesstrafe_, p. 150 _sqq._\nOlivecrona, _Om d\u00f6dsstraffet_, p. 130 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 123: Mittermaier, _op. cit._ pp. 62, 133. von Mehring,\n_Frage von der Todesstrafe_, p. 19 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 124: Bentham, _Rationale of Punishment_, p. 186 _sqq._ _Cf._\nHetzel, _op. cit._ p. 442 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 125: Bentham, _op. cit._ p. 191 _sq._ Mittermaier, _op.\ncit._ pp. 98 _sqq._, 148.]\n\n[Footnote 126: Romilly, _op. cit._ p. 3 _sqq._]\n\nUnder the influence of these and similar arguments, but chiefly owing\nto an increasing reluctance to take human life, the legislation of\nEurope has, from the end of the eighteenth century, undergone a\nradical change with reference to the punishment of death. In several\nEuropean and American States it has been formally abolished, or is\nnowadays never inflicted,[127] whilst in the rest it is practically\nrestricted to cases of wilful murder. But it still has as strenuous\nadvocates as ever, and receives much support from popular feelings. It\nis said that the abolition of capital punishment would remove one of\nthe {496} best safeguards of society; that it definitely prevents the\ncriminal from doing further mischief; that it is a much more effective\nmeans of deterring from crime than any other penalty; that its\nabolition would have the disadvantage of crimes widely differing in\ntheir nature being placed on the same footing; that a person\ncriminally disposed, if he knew that he would only be punished with\nimprisonment for life, would, instead of merely perpetrating robbery,\ncommit murder at the same time, being aware that no higher penalty on\nthat account would be inflicted; and so forth. As usually, religion\nalso is called in to give strength to the argument. Several writers\nmaintain that the statements in the Bible which command capital\npunishment have an obligatory power on all Christian legislators;[128]\nwe even meet with the assertion that the object of this punishment is\nnot the protection of civil society, but to carry out the justice of\nGod, in whose name \"the judge should sentence and the executioner\nstrike.\"[129] But I venture to believe that the chief motive for\nretaining the punishment of death in modern legislation is the strong\nhold which the principle of talion has on the minds of legislators, as\nwell as on the mind of the public. This supposition derives much\nsupport from the fact that capital punishment is popular only in the\ncase of murder. \"Blood, it is said, will have blood, and the\nimagination is flattered with the notion of the similarity of the\nsuffering, produced by the punishment, with that inflicted by the\ncriminal.\"[130]\n\n[Footnote 127: G\u00fcnther, _op. cit._ iii. 347 _sqq._ von Liszt,\n_Lehrbuch des Deutschen Strafrechts_, p. 261.]\n\n[Footnote 128: Mittermaier, _op. cit._ p. 128 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 129: Clay, _The Prison Chaplain_, p. 357.]\n\n[Footnote 130: Bentham, _Rationale of Punishment_, p. 191.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXI\n\nTHE DUEL\n\n\nWHEN the system of revenge was replaced by the system of punishment,\nthe offended party generally lost the right of killing the offender.\nBut there are noteworthy exceptions to this rule. In a previous\nchapter we have seen that, among various peoples, in cases involving\nunusually great provocation, an avenger who slays his adversary is\neither entirely excused by custom or law, or becomes subject to a\ncomparatively lenient punishment.[1] A few words still remain to be\nsaid about the most persistent survival of the custom of exacting\nvengeance with eventual destruction of life, the modern duel. But in\nconnection with this survival it seems appropriate to discuss the\npractice of duelling in general, in its capacity of a recognised\nsocial institution.\n\n[Footnote 1: _Supra_, p. 290 _sqq._]\n\nDuelling, or the fighting in single combat on previous challenge, is\nsometimes resorted to as a means of bringing to an end hostilities\nbetween different groups of people. Among the aborigines of New South\nWales \"the war often ends in a single combat between chosen\nchampions.\"[2] In Western Victoria quarrels between tribes are\nsometimes settled by duels between the chiefs, and the result is\naccepted as final. \"At other times disputes are decided by combat\nbetween equal numbers of warriors, painted {498} with red clay and\ndressed in war costume; but real fighting seldom takes place, unless\nthe women rouse the anger of the men and urge them to come to blows.\nEven then it rarely results in a general fight, but comes to single\ncombats between warriors of each side; who step into the arena, taunt\none another, exchange blows with the liangle, and wrestle together.\nThe first wound ends the combat.\"[3] Among the Thlinkets feuds between\nclans or families were commonly settled by duels between chosen\nchampions, one from each side.[4] Ancient writers tell us that among\nthe Greeks, Romans, and Teutons, combats were likewise agreed upon to\ntake place between a definite number of warriors, for the sake of\nending a war.[5] According to Tacitus, the Germans had the custom of\ndeciding the event of battle by a duel fought between some captive of\nthe enemy and a representative of the home army.[6] In all these\ncases, as it seems, the duel originates in a desire for a speedy peace.\n\n[Footnote 2: Fraser, _Aborigines of New South Wales_, p. 40.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Dawson, _Australian Aborigines_, p. 77.]\n\n[Footnote 4: Holmberg, 'Ethnographische Skizzen \u00fcber die V\u00f6lker des\nrussischen Amerika,' in _Acta Societatis Scientiarum Fennic\u00e6_,\niv. 322 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 5: See Grotius, _De jure belli et pacis_, ii. 20. 43. 1;\nGrimm, _Deutsche Rechtsalterth\u00fcmer_, p. 928.]\n\n[Footnote 6: Tacitus, _Germania_, 10.]\n\nIn other instances duels are fought for the purpose of settling\ndisputes between individuals, either by conferring on the victor the\nright of possessing the object of the strife, or by gratifying a\ncraving for revenge and wiping off the affront.\n\nThus, among the pagan Norsemen, any person who confided in his\nstrength and dexterity with his weapons could acquire property by\nsimply challenging its owner to surrender his land or fight for it.\nThe combat was strictly regulated; the person challenged was allowed\nto strike first, he who retired or who lost his weapon was regarded as\nvanquished, and he who received the first wound, or who was most\nseriously wounded, had to pay a fixed sum of money in order to save\nhis life.[7] In the {499} islands outside Kamchatka, if a husband\nfound that a rival had been with his wife, he would admit that the\nrival had at least an equal claim to her. \"Let us try, then,\" he would\nsay, \"which of us has the greater right, and shall have her.\" After\nthat they would take off their clothes and begin to beat each other's\nbacks with sticks, and he who first fell to the ground unable to bear\nany more blows, lost his right to the woman.[8] Among the Eskimo about\nBehring Strait Mr. Nelson was told by an old man that in ancient\ntimes, when a husband and a lover quarrelled about a woman, they were\ndisarmed by the neighbours and then settled the trouble with their\nfists or by wrestling, the victor in the struggle taking the woman.[9]\nAmong the Chippewyans Richardson saw more than once a stronger man\nassert his right to take the wife of a weaker countryman in\nconsequence of a successful combat. \"Any one,\" he says, \"may challenge\nanother to wrestle, and, if he overcomes, may carry off his wife as\nthe prize. . . . The bereaved husband meets his loss with the\nresignation which custom prescribes in such a case, and seeks his\nrevenge by taking the wife of another man weaker than himself.\"[10] In\nthe tribes of Western Victoria, described by Mr. Dawson, a young chief\nwho cannot get a wife, and falls in love with one belonging to a chief\nwho has more than two, can, with her consent, challenge the husband to\nsingle combat, and, if the husband is defeated, the conqueror makes\nher his legal wife.[11] \"In some points,\" says Mr. Riedel, \"the\naboriginal law of retaliation in Australia corresponds with the code\nof honour, so called, which certain classes in Europe have long\nmaintained. When one blackfellow carries off the {500} wife of\nanother, the injured husband and the betrayer meet in mortal combat;\nand the spear that spills the life blood repairs the wounded honour of\nthe one, or justifies in the eyes of society the crime of the\nother.\"[12] Among the aborigines of Western Australia \"duels are\ncommon between individuals who have private quarrels to settle, a\ncertain number of spears being thrown until honour is satisfied.\"[13]\nAmong the Dieyerie tribe, should anybody accuse another wrongfully, he\nis challenged to fight by the person he has accused, and this settles\nthe matter.[14] Of the duels fought among the natives of\nNorth-West-Central Queensland Dr. Roth gives us an interesting\naccount. Supposing an individual considers himself aggrieved, a duel\noften takes place at a distance from camp. There is no intention of\nkilling. With two-handed swords, the combatants would only aim at\nstriking each other on the head; with spears, they would only make for\nthe fleshy parts of the thighs; with stone-knives, they would only cut\ninto the shoulders, flanks, and buttocks, producing gashes an inch or\nmore deep, and up to seven or even eight inches long. The lying upon\nthe back on the ground--a posture in which no lawful incisions with a\nstone-knife can be made--is the sign of defeat, indicating that the\ncombatant has had enough, and gives in. But the matter has not yet\ncome to an end; the duels of these savages are not so defective in\npoint of justice as the modern duels of Europe. \"The fight between the\ntwo individuals being at length brought to a termination, steps are\ntaken by the old men and elders to inquire into the rights or wrongs\nof the dispute. If the victor turns out to be the aggrieved party he\nhas to show good cause, as for instance that the man whom he had just\ntaken upon himself to punish had raped his gin, gave him the _munguni_\n[or death-bone], or wrought him some similarly flagrant wrong: under\nsuch circumstances, no further action is taken by anyone. If, {501} on\nthe other hand, the victor happens to be the aggrieved party only in\nhis own opinion, and not in that of those to whom he is answerable,\nand who do not believe the grounds on which he commenced the fight to\nbe sufficient, he has to undergo exactly the same mutilations\nsubsequently at the hands of the vanquished as he himself had\ninflicted.\" And should one of the combatants be killed in the duel,\nwhich may sometimes happen, the survivor, unless he can show that he\nhad sufficient provocation or cause, \"will be put to death in similar\nmanner, at the instance of the camp-council, and usually undergo the\nextra degradation of digging his own as well as his victim's\ngrave.\"[15] Of the South American Charruas Azara writes:--\"Ce sont les\nparties elles-m\u00eames qui arrangent leurs diff\u00e9rends particuliers: si\nelles ne sont pas d'accord, elles se chargent \u00e0 coups de poing,\njusqu'\u00e0 ce qu'une des deux tourne le dos et laisse l'autre, sans\nreparler de l'affaire. Dans ces duels, ils ne font jamais usage des\narmes; et je n'ai jamais ou\u00ef dire qu'il y ait eu quelqu'un de\ntu\u00e9.\"[16] If an Apache kills another, \"the next-of-kin to the defunct\nindividual may kill the murderer--if he can. He has the right to\nchallenge him to single combat, which takes place before all assembled\nin the camp, and both must abide the result of the conflict. There is\nno trial, no set council, no regular examination into the crime or its\ncauses; but the ordeal of battle settles the whole matter.\"[17] Among\nthe Central Eskimo, \"strange as it may seem, a murderer will come to\nvisit the relatives of his victim (though he knows that they are\nallowed to kill him in revenge) and will settle with them. He is\nkindly welcomed, and sometimes lives quietly for weeks and months.\nThen he is suddenly challenged to a wrestling match, and if defeated\nis killed, or if victorious he may kill one of the opposite party, or\nwhen hunting, he is {502} suddenly attacked by his companions and\nslain.\"[18] Richardson heard that some of the Eskimo \"decided their\nquarrels by alternate blows of the fist, each in turn presenting his\nhead to his opponent.\"[19] The Tunguses formerly had a duel with\narrows called _koutschiguera_, which was fought \"only in the presence\nof the elders, who marked out the spot, settled the distance of the\ncombatants, and gave the signal for letting fly.\"[20] The Santals have\na tradition that years long since there was a custom amongst them \"of\ndeciding their disputes, when the parties were males, by the ordeal of\nsingle combat. The bow and arrow or hanger served in lieu of pistol\nand sword for these rustic duels. Such affairs of honour were always\nfatal to one party, but of late times, as equitable remedies have been\nbrought nearer to them, this remnant of a barbarous age has\ndisappeared.**\"[21] Mr. Man also heard that the Kols at one time\npreferred the duel to any other mode of seeking redress for a\nwrong.[22] The ancient Swedes were even compelled by law to fight\nduels to repair their wounded honour. The so-called 'Hedna-lag,' a\nfragment of an old pagan law, prescribes that, if any man says to\nanother, \"You are not a man's equal, you have not the heart of a man,\"\nand the other replies, \"I am a man as good as you,\" they shall\nencounter in a place where three roads meet. If he who has suffered\nthe insult does not appear, he shall be held to be what the other one\ncalled him, and he shall henceforth be allowed neither to swear nor to\ngive evidence in any case. If, on the other hand, they meet in single\ncombat, and the offended party kills the offender, he shall have to\npay no compensation for it; but if the offender kills his opponent, he\nshall pay half his price.[23]\n\n[Footnote 7: Lea, _Superstition and Force_, p. 111 _sq._ Keyser,\n_Efterladte Skrifter_, ii. pt. i. 391. Weinhold, _Altnordisches\nLeben_, p. 297. von Amira, 'Recht,' in Paul's _Grundriss der\ngermanischen Philologie_, iii. 217 _sq._ Arnesen, _Historisk\nIndledning til den gamle og nye Islandske Raettergang_, p. 158 _sq._\nRosenberg, _Traek af Livet paa Island i Fristats-Tiden_, p. 98 n.]\n\n[Footnote 8: Steller, _Beschreibung von dem Lande Kamtschatka_, p. 348.]\n\n[Footnote 9: Nelson, 'Eskimo about Behring Strait,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur,\nEthn._ xviii. 292.]\n\n[Footnote 10: Richardson, _Arctic Searching Expedition_, ii. 24 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 11: Dawson, _op. cit._ p. 36. For other instances of rights\nto women being acquired by duels, see Westermarck, _History of Human\nMarriage_, p. 159 _sqq._; Post, _Afrikanische Jurisprudenz_, ii. 23\n_sq._ (people of Kordofan).]\n\n[Footnote 12: Riedel, _Aborigines of Australia_, p. 6.]\n\n[Footnote 13: Calvert, _Aborigines of Western Australia_, p. 22.]\n\n[Footnote 14: Gason, 'Manners and Customs of the Dieyerie Tribe,' in\nWoods, _Native Tribes of South Australia_, p. 266.]\n\n[Footnote 15: Roth, _Ethnological Studies among the North-West-Central\nQueensland Aborigines_, p. 139 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 16: Azara, _Voyages dans l'Am\u00e9rique m\u00e9ridionale_, ii. 16.]\n\n[Footnote 17: Cremony, _Life among the Apaches_, p. 293.]\n\n[Footnote 18: Boas, 'Central Eskimo,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ vi. 582.]\n\n[Footnote 19: Richardson, _Arctic Searching Expedition_, i. 367 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 20: Georgi, _Russia_, iii. 83.]\n\n[Footnote 21: Man, _Sonthalia and the Sonthals_, p. 90.]\n\n[Footnote 22: _Ibid._ p. 90.]\n\n[Footnote 23: Leffler, _Om den fornsvenska hednalagen_, p. 40 _sq._\n(in _K. Vitterhets Historie och Antiqvitets Akademiens M\u00e5nadsblad_,\n1879, p. 139 _sq._). Professor Leffler is inclined to believe that\nthis fragment once formed a part of the older Vestg\u00f6talag (_op. cit._\np. 35, in the _M\u00e5nadsblad_, p. 134).]\n\n{503} These customs and rules are due to a variety of circumstances.\nTo recognise the duel as a means of acquiring a right to land or\nwomen, is a concession to superior strength in a society where there\nis no government, or where the government is weak; whilst in the\nopportunity given to the challenged party to oppose the avenger on\nequal terms we may trace the interfering influence of public opinion.\nThe duel is also in a higher degree than downright violence calculated\nto bring about a definite arrangement; and in some cases, as we have\nseen, it is a mere sham-fight, which may serve as a preventive against\nthe infliction of more serious injuries, by showing which party is the\nweaker and, consequently, has to give in. In other cases, again, the\nchallenge is a method of bringing forward an offender who otherwise\nmight be out of reach, and of limiting the fight to the parties\nthemselves, so as to prevent whole families from making war upon each\nother.[24] Moreover, a duel may be preferable to an ordinary act of\nrevenge as a means of wiping off an affront and of satisfying the\nclaims of honour; it displays more courage, it commands more respect.\nIn several of the cases referred to it is obviously a mitigated form\nof revenge, a method of settling a point of honour in a comparatively\nharmless way, and as such it has certain advantages over the practice\nof compensation; it requires no wealth on the part of the offender,\nand allows of no doubt as to the courage of the sufferer.[25] The\nQueensland aborigines are said to be very proud of the wounds they\nreceive in their single combats,[26] and the duelling Eskimo \"consider\nit cowardly to evade a stroke.\"[27] The duel {504} may, finally, be\nregarded as the most equitable form of settling disputes in cases\nwhere both parties claim to be in the right. Sometimes it is even\nresorted to as a means of ascertaining the truth, as an ordeal or\n\"judgment of God.\"\n\n[Footnote 24: _Cf._ Arnesen, _op. cit._ pp. 150, 166 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 25: According to Dr. Steinmetz, the origin of the duel is\n\"die Beschr\u00e4nkung des Rachekampfes. . . . Die treibende Kraft, welche\nzu dieser duellartigen Beschr\u00e4nkung f\u00fchrte, war die Exogamie, die\nverwandtschaftlichen Beziehungen zwischen Gruppen, der Friedensverlangen\nerzeugende, erweiterte Verkehr derselben. Negative Bedingungen waren:\ndas Fehlen einer rechtsprechenden centralen Regierungsgewalt, und das\nnicht Erf\u00fclltsein der Entwicklungsbedingungen der Composition,\nnamentlich der Mangel an \u00f6konomischen G\u00fctern, welche die materielle\nEntsch\u00e4digung unm\u00f6glich machte\" (Steinmetz, _Studien zur ersten\nEntwicklung der Strafe_, ii. 67, 87).]\n\n[Footnote 26: Roth, _op. cit._ p. 140.]\n\n[Footnote 27: Richardson, _Arctic Searching Expedition_, i. 368.]\n\nThe wager of battle is well known to every student of medi\u00e6val law.\nOutside Europe we meet with a similar institution in the Malay\nArchipelago. In his 'History of the Indian Archipelago,' Mr. Crawfurd\nstates:--\"The trial by combat or duel, and the appeal to the judgment\nof God by various descriptions of ordeal, are not unknown. The Malay\nlaws direct that the combat or ordeal shall be had recourse to in the\nabsence of evidence, in the following words: 'If one accuse and\nanother deny, and there be no witnesses on either side, the parties\nshall either fight or submit to the ordeal of melted tin or boiling\noil.'\"[28] The natives of the Barito River basin in Borneo have the\nfollowing ordeal, called the _Hagalangang_:--\"Both parties are placed\nin boxes at a distance of seven fathoms opposite one another, the\nboxes being made of nibong laths and so high as to reach a man's\nbreast. Then both receive a sharpened bamboo of a lance's length to\nthrow at each other at a given signal. The wounded person is supposed\nto be guilty.\"[29] Among the Teutons the judicial combat seems to have\ndeveloped out of the ancient practice of settling disputes by private\nduelling. In a time when the community did its best to suppress acts\nof revenge, it was no doubt a wise measure to adopt the duel as a form\nof judicial procedure, investing it with the character of an\nordeal.[30] It seems probable that the duel assumed this character\nalready among the pagan Teutons.[31] Like other ordeals it was\nresorted to in cases where there was some doubt as to the guilt of the\naccused.[32] To {505} appeal to \"the judgment of God\" was an expedient\nsubstitute for human evidence in a society where nothing was more\ndifficult than to procure reliable witnesses, and where superstition\nreigned supreme. Speaking of the Franks, M. Esmein observes:--\"En\ndehors du flagrant d\u00e9lit ou de l'aveu de l'accus\u00e9, tout \u00e9tait\nincertitude. . . . Par solidarit\u00e9 forc\u00e9e, jamais un homme ne\nt\u00e9moignera contre un autre homme du m\u00eame groupe; il ne t\u00e9moignera pas\nnon plus par crainte de la vengeance et des repr\u00e9sailles contre un\nhomme appartenant \u00e0 un autre groupe.\"[33] I shall later on try to\nprove that the ordeal is not, as it is often supposed to be,\nprimordially based on the belief in an all-knowing, all-powerful, and\njust god, who protects the innocent and punishes the guilty, but that\nit largely springs from the same notion as underlies the belief in the\nefficacy of an oath. The ordeal, then, intrinsically involves an\nimprecation with reference to the guilt or innocence of a suspected\nperson, and its proper object is to give reality to this imprecation,\nfor the purpose of establishing the validity or invalidity of the\nsuspicion. This also holds good of the judicial combat. The issue of\nthe fight decided the question of guilt because of the imprecation\ninvolved in the oath preceding the duel. Before the conflict commenced\neach party asserted his good cause in the most positive manner,\nconfirmed his assertion by a solemn oath on the Gospels or on a relic\nof approved sanctity, and called upon God to grant victory to the\nright. Such an oath was an indispensable preliminary to every combat,\nand the defeat was thus not merely the loss of the suit, but also a\nconviction of perjury, to be punished as such.[34] That the real\nobject of the judicial duel was to correct the abuses of compurgation\nby oath appears from various {506} facts. Gundebald, king of the\nBurgundians, says expressly, in the preamble to a law by which he\nauthorises the wager of battle, that his reason for doing so is, that\nhis subjects may no longer take oaths upon uncertain matters, or\nforswear themselves upon certain.[35] Charlemagne urged the use of the\nduel as greatly preferable to the shameless oaths which were taken\nwith so much facility, and Otho II. ordered its employment in various\nforms of procedure for the same reason.[36] Witnesses might have to\nfight as well as principals. A Bavarian law even directed the claimant\nof an estate to combat not the defendant, but his witness;[37] and in\nthe later Middle Ages, after enlightened legislators had been\nstrenuously and not unsuccessfully endeavouring to limit the abuse of\nthe judicial combat, the challenging of witnesses was still the\nfavourite mode of escaping legal condemnation.[38] Some codes required\nthe witnesses to come into court armed, and to have their weapons\nblessed on the altar before giving their testimony.[39] The practice\nof blessing the arms before the duel took place[40] was no doubt\nintended to enable them the better to carry out the imprecation by\nsaturating them with sanctity, or by increasing their natural\nsanctity; weapons are commonly regarded with superstitious veneration,\nhence oaths taken upon them are held to be particularly binding.[41]\nBut though the judicial duel fundamentally derived its efficacy as a\nmeans of ascertaining the truth from its connection with an oath, it\nhas, owing to the tendency of magic to fuse into religion, readily\ncome to be regarded as an appeal to the justice of God, just as curses\nare transformed into {507} prayers and perjury becomes an offence\nagainst the Deity.\n\n[Footnote 28: Crawfurd, _History of the Indian Archipelago_, iii. 92.]\n\n[Footnote 29: Schwaner, _Borneo_, i. 212.]\n\n[Footnote 30: Dahn observes (_Bausteine_, ii. 57) that \"der Kampf\nurspr\u00fcnglich gar kein Gottesurtheil, sondern lediglich eine Verweisung\nder Parteien auf Selbsth\u00fclfe . . . war.\" _Cf._ Patetta, _Le ordalie_,\np. 178.]\n\n[Footnote 31: Patetta, _op. cit._ p. 179.]\n\n[Footnote 32: See Unger, 'Der gerechtliche Zweikampf bei den\ngermanischen V\u00f6lkern,' in _G\u00f6ttinger Studien_, 1847, Zweite\nAbtheilung, p. 358 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 33: Esmein, _Cours \u00e9l\u00e9mentaire du droit fran\u00e7ais_, p. 96 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 34: _Lex Baiuwariorum_, ii. 1. Jourdan, Decrusy, and\nIsambert, _Recueil g\u00e9n\u00e9ral des anciennes lois fran\u00e7aises_, ii. 840\n_sqq._ Bracton, _De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angli\u00e6_, fol. 141 b\n_sq._, vol. ii. 438 _sqq._: \"Sic me Deus adjuvet & haec sancta.\" Lea,\n_Superstition and Force_, p. 166 _sq._ Brunner, _Deutsche\nRechtsgeschichte_, ii. 415. von Amira, 'Recht,' in Paul's _Grundriss\nder germanischen Philologie_, iii. 218. Unger, _loc. cit._ p. 386.\nTuchmann, in _M\u00e9lusine_, iv. 130.]\n\n[Footnote 35: _Leges Burgundionum_, Leges Gundebati, 45.]\n\n[Footnote 36: Lea, _op. cit._ p. 118.]\n\n[Footnote 37: _Lex Baiuwariorum_, xvii. 2 (xvi. 2).]\n\n[Footnote 38: Beaumanoir, _Coutumes du Beauvoisis_, lxi. 58, vol. ii.\n398. Lea, _op. cit._ p. 120 _sq._ Unger, _loc. cit._ p. 379 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 39: Lea, _op. cit._ p. 120.]\n\n[Footnote 40: Esmein, _op. cit._ p. 95.]\n\n[Footnote 41: For the worship of, and swearing by, weapons, see Du Cange,\n'Juramentum super arma,' in _Glossarium ad scriptores medi\u00e6 et infim\u00e6\nLatinitatis_, iii. 1616 _sq._; Grimm, _Deutsche Rechtsalterth\u00fcmer_,\npp. 165, 166, 896; Pollock, _Oxford Lectures_, p. 269 _sq._ n. 1;\nJoyce _Social History of Ancient Ireland_, i. 286 _sq._ In Morocco,\nalso, an oath taken on a weapon is considered a particularly solemn\nform of swearing.]\n\nIn most European countries the judicial duel survived the close of the\nMiddle Ages, but disappeared shortly afterwards.[42] Various\ncircumstances contributed to its decline and final disappearance. From\nan early period Councils and popes had declared against it,[43] but\nwith little success; many ecclesiastics, indeed, not only connived at\nthe practice, but authorised it, and questions concerning the property\nof churches and monasteries were decided by combat.[44] There were\nother more powerful causes at work--the growth of communes, devoted to\nthe arts of peace, seeking their interest in the pursuits of industry\nand commerce, and enjoying the advantage of settled and permanent\ntribunals; the revival of Roman law, which began to undermine all the\ninstitutions of feudalism;[45] the ascendency of the royal power in\nits struggle against the nobles; the increase of enlightenment, the\ndecrease of superstition. But though finally banished from the courts\nof justice, the duel did not die. In the sixteenth century, when the\njudicial combat faded away, the duel of honour began to flourish.[46]\nBuckle justly observes that, \"as the trial by battle became disused,\nthe people, clinging to their old customs, became more addicted to\nduelling\";[47] hence the judicial duel may be regarded as the direct\nparent of the modern duel.[48] The Church and the State naturally\ntried to suppress this sanguinary survival of barbarism. The Council\nof Trent declared that \"the detestable custom of duelling, introduced\nby the contrivance of the devil, that by the bloody death of the body\n{508} he may accomplish the ruin of the soul,\" was to be utterly\nexterminated from the Christian world, and that not only principals\nand seconds, but anyone who had given counsel in the case of a duel,\nor had in any other way persuaded a person thereunto, as also the\nspectators thereof, should be subjected to excommunication and\nperpetual malediction.[49] In England, Cromwell's Parliament made a\ndetermined effort to check the practice.[50] A Scotch law of 1600\nrendered the bare act of engaging in a duel, without license from the\nking, a capital offence.[51] About the same period the Spanish Cortes\npassed a law which subjected all parties to a duel to the penalties of\ntreason.[52] In 1602, Henry IV. of France issued an edict condemning\nto death whoever should give or accept a challenge or act as\nsecond;[53] and already several edicts against duelling had been\npromulgated under Louis XIII.[54] when, in 1626, there was published a\nnew one punishing with death any person who had killed his adversary\nin a duel, or had been found guilty of sending a challenge a second\ntime.[55] But all these enactments had little or no effect. We are\ntold that in the eight years between 1601 and 1609, two thousand men\nof noble birth fell in duels in France; and, according to Lord Herbert\nof Cherbury, who was ambassador at the court of Louis XIII., there was\nscarce a Frenchman worth looking on who had not killed his man in a\nduel.[56] As Robertson observes, in reference to duelling, \"no custom,\nhow absurd soever it may be, if it has subsisted long, or derives its\nforce from the manners and prejudices of the age in which it prevails,\nwas ever abolished by the bare promulgation of laws and statutes.\"[57]\nIn spite of laws which directly prohibit duelling, or which punish\nwith great severity anyone who kills another in a duel, sometimes even\nsubjecting {509} him to punishment for murder,[58] the duel still\nprevails in many European countries as a recognised custom, so much\nsupported by public opinion that the laws referring to it are seldom\nor never applied.\n\n[Footnote 42: Lea, _op. cit._ p. 199 _sqq._ In England, however, it\nwas formally abolished by law as late as 1819 (Stephen, _History of\nthe Criminal Law of England_, i. 249 _sq._).]\n\n[Footnote 43: Du Boys, _Histoire du droit criminel des peuples\nmodernes_, ii. 182. Lea, _op. cit._ p. 206 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 44: Robertson, _History of the Reign of the Emperor Charles\nV._ i. 357 _sq._ 'Notitia gurpitionis,' in Bouquet, _Recueil des\nhistoriens des Gaules et de la France_, ix. 729.]\n\n[Footnote 45: Lea, _op. cit._ pp. 200-205, 211 _sq._ Unger, _loc.\ncit._ p. 392 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 46: Storr, 'Duel,' in _Encyclop\u00e6dia Britannica_, vii. 512.]\n\n[Footnote 47: Buckle, _Miscellaneous and Posthumous Works_, i. 386.\n_Cf._ Bosquett, _Treatise on Duelling_, p. 79.]\n\n[Footnote 48: Storr, _loc. cit._ p. 511.]\n\n[Footnote 49: _Canons and Decrees of the Council of Trent_, Session\nxxv. 19, p. 274 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 50: Pike, _History of Crime in England_, ii. 192.]\n\n[Footnote 51: Hume, _Commentaries on the Law of Scotland_, ii. 281.\nErskine, _Principles of the Law of Scotland_, p. 560.]\n\n[Footnote 52: Truman, _Field of Honor_, p. 70.]\n\n[Footnote 53: Isambert, Taillandier, and Decrusy, _Recueil g\u00e9n\u00e9ral des\nanciennes lois fran\u00e7aises_, xv. 351 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 54: _Ibid._ xvi. 21, 106, 146.]\n\n[Footnote 55: _Ibid._ xvi. 176, 179.]\n\n[Footnote 56: Storr, _loc. cit._ p. 512.]\n\n[Footnote 57: Robertson, _op. cit._ i. 66.]\n\n[Footnote 58: G\u00fcnther, _Die Idee der Wiedervergeltung_, iii. 225, n.\n467. Stephen, _History of the Criminal Law of England_, iii. 99 _sqq._\nGelli, _Il duello_, p. 21.]\n\nThis curious practice of taking the law into one's own hands, which we\nfind existing in the midst of modern civilisation, is explicable,\npartly from the indifference with which legislators have treated\noffences against honour,[59] partly from the force of habit. The\ninsulted person, finding no adequate legal remedy for the affront he\nhas suffered, determines to be his own avenger, and challenges the\noffender to fight. Nor is revenge his only motive. He desires also to\nwash off the indignity by showing that he respects his honour more\nthan his life. The notion that a challenge to mortal combat effaces\nthe blot which an insult has imprinted upon a man's honour is a\nsurvival from a period when the honourable man was above everything a\nbrave man.[60] By displaying courage the offended party demonstrates\nthat he is not worthy of contempt, by showing timidity he condemns\nhimself. So far as justice is concerned, the duel, of course, became\nan absurdity as soon as it ceased to be looked upon in the light of an\nordeal. It compels the insulted person to expose himself to a fresh\ninjury from the side of an impudent offender, it allows the scoundrel\nto repay the most condign censure with a mortal stroke. But when a\nman's honour is at stake the voice of justice is easily silenced, and\nthe pressure of ancient habit is greater than ever. As is usual in\nsimilar cases, a variety of more or less futile arguments are adduced\nto give their support to the survival. Lord Kames maintained that, if\ntwo persons agree to decide their quarrel by single combat, the State\nhas nothing to do with it, since they need not make use of the\nprotection which the State offers them.[61] But, as a matter of fact,\nthe {510} duel is not a private affair between two individuals. As\nMoore observed, \"a refusal of the duel is attended with such\nmortifying circumstances, with such an imputation of meanness and\ncowardice . . . , with such a studied contempt in public, and\nexclusion from the polite circle in private, as renders the\nalternative both cruel and inhuman\";[62] and it would seem that the\nState ought to protect its members against such a compulsion. It is\nsaid that the duel \"grasps the sword of justice, which the laws have\ndropped, punishing what no code can chastise--contempt and\ninsult.\"[63] But we find that in countries where it no longer\nprevails, laws against insults, courts of honour, and especially more\nrefined ideas as regards honorary satisfaction, have made it as\nuseless as it is absurd, a matter of the past which nobody desires to\nrevive.\n\n[Footnote 59: _Cf._ Bentham, _Theory of Legislation_, p. 299 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 60: That the modern duel is a special development of\nChivalry has been pointed out by Buckle (_History of Civilization in\nEngland_, ii. 136 _sq._).]\n\n[Footnote 61: Kames, _Sketches of the History of Man_, i. 415 n.]\n\n[Footnote 62: Moore, _Full Inquiry into the Subject of Suicide_,\nii. 276.]\n\n[Footnote 63: Quoted by Millingen, _History of Duelling_, i. 300.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXII\n\nBODILY INJURIES\n\nCLOSELY related to the right to life is the right to bodily integrity.\nIndeed, homicide is, generally speaking, the highest form of bodily\ninjury which can, in the nature of things, be inflicted, although\nthere are some forms of ill-treatment which are more terrible than\ndeath itself.[1]\n\n[Footnote 1: _Cf._ Stephen, _History of the Criminal Law of England_,\niii. 11.]\n\nIn the case of bodily injuries the magnitude of the offence is, other\nthings being equal, proportionate to the harm inflicted. At the lower\nstages of civilisation we meet with the principle of an eye for an eye\nand a tooth for a tooth, or the offender has to pay an adequate\ncompensation for the injury.[2] It is said in the Laws of Manu that,\nif a blow is struck against men in order to give them pain, the judge\nshall inflict a fine in proportion to the amount of pain caused.[3]\nAccording to Muhammedan law, retaliation for intentional wounds and\nmutilations is allowed, but a fine may be accepted instead. The fine\nfor depriving a man of any of his five senses, or dangerously wounding\nhim, or grievously disfiguring him for life, or cutting off a member\nthat is single, as the {512} nose, is the whole price of blood; the\nfine for a member of which there are two and not more, as a hand or a\nfoot, is half the price of blood; the fine for a member of which there\nare ten, as a finger or a toe, is a tenth of the price of blood.[4]\nThe scale of fines for bodily injuries contained in many of the early\nTeutonic law-books is minute to a degree.[5] According to various\ntexts of the Salic law, 100 solidi--that is, a moiety of the\n_wergeld_--must be paid for depriving a man of a hand, foot, eye, or\nthe nose; the thumb and great toe were valued at 50 solidi; the second\nfinger with which the bow was drawn, at 35.[6] With respect to other\nacts of violence, the fine varied according to several circumstances,\nas, whether the blow was given with a stick or with closed fist,\nwhether the brain was laid bare, whether certain bones were obtruded\nand how much, whether blood flowed from the wound on the ground, and\nso forth.[7] In the Anglo-Saxon codes almost every part and particle\nof the body, every tooth, toe, and nail, had its price. According to\nthe Laws of Aethelbirht, for instance, twenty shillings were paid for\nstriking off a thumb, three for a thumb nail, eight for the\nforefinger, eleven for the little finger.[8] In early Celtic law\ndifferent amounts of injury were taxed with a similar affected\nprecision.[9] Nothing can better give us an idea of the business-like\nmanner in which the whole subject was treated than the Irish law\nagainst castration. If the injured persons be people to whom the\norgans extirpated are of no use, \"such as a decrepit old man or a man\nin orders, there is nothing due to them for the loss of them, but\nbody-fine according to the severity of the wound.\"[10] {513} After\nthis one is almost surprised to read in the ancient laws of Ireland\nthat, when a person had once been maimed, and received part or all of\nhis body-fine, no subsequent wrong-doer could insist that the injured\nperson should be rated as a damaged article.[11]\n\n[Footnote 2: Post, _Afrikanische Jurisprudenz_, ii. 61 _sqq._\nMunzinger, _Ostafrikanische Studien_, pp. 208 (Takue), 502 (Barea and\nKun\u00e1ma). Burton, _Two Trips to Gorilla Land_, i. 105 (Mpongwe).\nMaclean, _Compendium of Kafir Laws and Customs_, p. 61 _sq._\nMacpherson, _Memorials of Service in India_, p. 82 (Kandhs). Earl,\n_Papuans_, p. 83 (Papuans of Dory). Kubary, _Die socialen\nEinrichtungen der Pelauer_, p. 74 (Pelew Islanders). Petroff, 'Report\non Alaska,' in _Tenth Census of the United States_, p. 105 (Thlinkets).]\n\n[Footnote 3: _Laws of Manu_, viii. 286.]\n\n[Footnote 4: Lane, _Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians_, p.\n120. Sachau, _Muhammedanisches Recht_, p. 764.]\n\n[Footnote 5: Wilda, _Strafrecht der Germanen_, p. 729. Stemann, _Den\ndanske Retshistorie indtil Christian V.'s Lov_, p. 658. Stephen,\n_History of the Criminal Law of England_, i. 56. Lappenberg, _History\nof England under the Anglo-Saxon Kings_, ii. 422.]\n\n[Footnote 6: _Lex Salica_, edited by Hessels, coll. 163-167, 170,\n172-177, 179.]\n\n[Footnote 7: _Ibid._ col. 100 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 8: _Laws of \u00c6thelbirht_, 54.]\n\n[Footnote 9: _Ancient Laws of Ireland_, iii. pp. cix., 349.\n_Venedotian Code_, iii. 23 (_Ancient Laws and Institutes of Wales_,\np. 151 _sqq._). _Dimetian Code_, ii. 17 (_ibid._ p. 246 _sqq._).\n_Gwentian Code_, ii. 6 _sq._ (_ibid._ p. 340 _sq._).]\n\n[Footnote 10: _Ancient Laws of Ireland_, iii. 355.]\n\n[Footnote 11: _Ibid._ iii. pp. cix., cxi., 349, 351.]\n\nHowever, the degree of the offence depends not only on the suffering\ninflicted, but on the station of the parties concerned; and in some\ncases the infliction of pain is held allowable or even a duty.\n\nBy using violence against their parents, children grossly offend\nagainst the duty of filial regard and submissiveness. It is said in\nthe Laws of [Hv]ammurabi, that a man who has struck his father shall\nlose his hands.[12] According to Exodus, \"he that smiteth his father,\nor his mother, shall be surely put to death.\"[13] In Corea the man who\nstrikes his father is beheaded.[14] On the other hand, parents are\nallowed to inflict corporal punishment on their children; but this is\nnot the case everywhere--indeed, among many of the lower races\nchildren are never, or hardly ever, subject to such punishment.[15]\nAmong the Australian Dieyerie the children are never beaten, and\nshould any woman violate this law, she is in turn beaten by her\nhusband.[16] The Efatese, says Mr. Macdonald, \"are shocked to see\nEuropeans correcting their children; I never saw an Efatese beating a\nchild.\"[17] The Eskimo {514} visited by Mr. Hall never inflict\nphysical chastisement upon the children; \"if a child does wrong--for\ninstance, if it becomes enraged, the mother says nothing to it till it\nbecomes calm. Then she talks to it, and with good effect.\"[18] Among\nthe Tehuelches of Patagonia \"the children are indulged in every way,\nride the best horses, and are not corrected for any misbehaviour.\"[19]\nAmong the Gaika tribe of the Kafirs, again, parents may inflict\ncorporal punishment on their children, but are fined for causing\npermanent injuries to their persons, such as the loss of an eye or a\ntooth.[20]\n\n[Footnote 12: _Laws of [Hv]ammurabi_, 195.]\n\n[Footnote 13: _Exodus_, xxi. 15.]\n\n[Footnote 14: Griffis, _Corea_, p. 236.]\n\n[Footnote 15: Curr, _Recollections of Squatting in Victoria_, p. 252\n(Bangerang tribe). Angas, _Savage Life and Scenes in Australia_, i. 94\n(tribes of the Lower Murray). Calvert, _Aborigines of Western\nAustralia_, p. 30 _sq._ Lumholtz, _Among Cannibals_, p. 192 _sq._\n(Northern Queensland aborigines). Kubary, 'Die Palau-Inseln in der\nS\u00fcdsee,' in _Journal des Museum Godeffroy_, iv. 56 (Pelew Islanders).\nMan, _Sonthalia and the Sonthals_, p. 78. von Siebold, _Die Aino auf\nder Insel Yesso_, p. 11. Murdoch, 'Ethnological Results of the Point\nBarrow Expedition,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ ix. 417 (Point Barrow\nEskimo). Boas, 'Central Eskimo,' _ibid._ vi. 566. Richardson, in\nFranklin, _Journey to the Shores of the Polar Sea_, p. 68 (Crees).\nLumholtz, _Unknown Mexico_, p. 274 (Tarahumares). Rautanen, in\nSteinmetz, _Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_, p. 329 (Ondonga). See also Steinmetz,\n_Ethnologische Studien zur ersten Entwicklung der Strafe_, ii. ch. vi.\n\u00a7 2, especially p. 203; _Idem_, 'Das Verh\u00e4ltnis zwischen Eltern und\nKindern bei den Naturv\u00f6lkern,' in _Zeitschrift f\u00fcr Socialwissenschaft_,\ni. 610 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 16: Gason, 'Manners and Customs of the Dieyerie Tribe,' in\nWoods, _Native Tribes of South Australia_, p. 258.]\n\n[Footnote 17: Macdonald, _Oceania_, p. 195.]\n\n[Footnote 18: Hall, _Arctic Researches_, p. 568.]\n\n[Footnote 19: Musters, _At Home with the Patagonians_, p. 197.]\n\n[Footnote 20: Brownlee, in Maclean, _Compendium of Kafir Laws and\nCustoms_, p. 118.]\n\nThe power which the husband possesses over his wife much more commonly\nimplies the right of inflicting pain on her than of punishing her\ncapitally; but even among savages and barbarians the former right is\nnot universally granted to him. The Pelew Islanders do not allow a\nhusband to beat his wife.[21] Among various Eskimo tribes the women\nare rarely, if ever, beaten.[22] Among the Central Eskimo the husband\n\"is not allowed to maltreat or punish his wife; if he does, she may\nleave him at any time, and the wife's mother can always command a\ndivorce.\"[23] Many, or most, of the North American Indians consider it\ndisgraceful for a husband to beat his wife.[24] Among the Kalmucks a\nman has no right to raise his hand against a woman.[25] Among the\nMadis women are never beaten.[26] Among the Ondonga a man is not\nallowed to chastise his wife.[27] Among the Gaika tribe of the Kafirs\n\"a husband may beat his wife for misconduct; but if he should strike\nout her eye or a tooth, or otherwise maim her, he is fined at the\ndiscretion of the Chief.\"[28] {515} According to the native code of\nMalacca, \"a man may beat his wife, but not as he would chastise a\nslave, and not till blood flows\"; if he should do so, he is fined.[29]\nAccording to Muhammedan law, a husband may chastise an obstinate wife,\nbut he must not cause her great suffering, nor inflict on her a\nwound.[30] We read in the Laws of Manu:--\"A wife, a son, a slave, a\npupil, and a younger brother of the full blood, who have committed\nfaults, may be beaten with a rope or a split bamboo, but on the back\npart of the body only, never on a noble part; he who strikes them\notherwise will incur the same guilt as a thief.\"[31] In Europe the\nidea expressed by the ancient Roman that \"he who beats his wife or\nchildren lays hands on that which is most sacred and holy,\"[32] was\nshared neither by the ancient Teutons[33] nor by medi\u00e6val legislators.\nAccording to the Jydske Lov, a husband was allowed to chastise his\nwife with a stick or rod, though not with a weapon; but he had to take\ncare not to break any limb of her body.[34] In the Coutumes du\nBeauvoisis it is said that a man may beat his wife if she belies or\ncurses him, or disobeys his \"reasonable\" commands, or for some other\nsimilar reason, though he must not kill or maim her.[35] Among Russian\nand South Slavonian[36] peasants public opinion still permits the\nhusband to inflict corporal punishment on his wife. In Russia \"the\nbridegroom, while he is leading his bride to her future home, gives\nher from time to time light blows from a whip, saying at each stroke:\n'Forget the manners of thine own {516} family, and learn those of\nmine.' As soon as they have entered their bedroom, the husband says to\nhis wife, 'Take off my boots.' The wife immediately obeys her\nhusband's orders, and, taking them off, finds in one of them a whip,\nsymbol of his authority over her person. This authority implies the\nright of the husband to control the behaviour of his wife, and to\ncorrect her every time he thinks fit, not only by words, but also by\nblows. The opinion which a Russian writer of the sixteenth century . . .\nexpresses as to the propriety of personal chastisement, and even as\nto its beneficial effects on the health, is still shared by the\ncountry people. . . . The customary Court seems to admit the use of\nsuch disciplinary proceedings by not interfering in the personal\nrelations of husband and wife. 'Never judge the quarrel of husband and\nwife,' is a common saying, scrupulously observed by the village\ntribunals, which refuse to hear any complaint on the part of the\naggrieved woman, at least so long as the punishment has not been of\nsuch a nature as to endanger life or limb.\"[37]\n\n[Footnote 21: Kubary, 'Die Palau-Inseln,' in _Jour. des Museum\nGodeffroy_, iv. 43.]\n\n[Footnote 22: King, in _Jour. Ethn. Soc._ i. 147. _Cf._ Murdoch, _loc.\ncit._ p. 414.]\n\n[Footnote 23: Boas, in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ vi. 579.]\n\n[Footnote 24: Waitz, _Anthropologie der Naturv\u00f6lker_, iii. 101. _Cf._\nPowers, _Tribes of California_, p. 178 (Gallinomero).]\n\n[Footnote 25: Liadov, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ i. 405.]\n\n[Footnote 26: Ratzel, _History of Mankind_, iii. 40.]\n\n[Footnote 27: Rautanen, in Steinmetz, _Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_, p. 329.]\n\n[Footnote 28: Brownlee, in Maclean, _op. cit._ p. 117.]\n\n[Footnote 29: Newbold, _British Settlements in the Straits of\nMalacca_, ii. 311 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 30: Sachau, _Muhammedanisches Recht_, pp. 10, 44, 849.]\n\n[Footnote 31: _Laws of Manu_, viii. 299 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 32: Plutarch, _Cato Major_, xx. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 33: Nordstr\u00f6m, _Bidrag till den svenska samh\u00e4llsf\u00f6rfattningens\nhistoria_, ii. 61 _sq._ Stemann, _op. cit._ p. 323 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 34: _Jydske Lov_, ii. 82.]\n\n[Footnote 35: Beaumanoir, _Coutumes du Beauvoisis_, lvii. 6, vol. ii.\np. 333: \"Il loist bien \u00e0 l'homme batre se feme, sans mort et sans\nmehaing, quant ele le meffet; si comme quant ele est en voie de fere\nfolie de son cors, ou quant ele dement son baron ou maudist, ou quant\nele ne veut obeir \u00e0 ses resnables commandemens que prode feme doit\nfere: en tel cas et en sanllables est il bien mestiers que li maris\nsoit castierres de se feme resnablement. . . . Li maris le doit\ncastier et repenre selonc toutes les manieres qu'il verra que bon sera\npor li oster de tel visse, exept\u00e9 mort ou mehaing.\"]\n\n[Footnote 36: Krauss, _Sitte und Branch der S\u00fcdslaven_, p. 526.]\n\n[Footnote 37: Kovalewsky, _Modern Customs and Ancient Laws of Russia_,\np. 44 _sq._ _Cf._ Meiners, _Vergleichung des \u00e4ltern und neuern\nRusslandes_, ii. 167 _sq._; _Idem_, _History of the Female Sex_, i. 160.]\n\nIt seems that, wherever slavery exists, the master has a right to\ninflict corporal punishment on his slave, even though he be forbidden\nto deprive him of any of his limbs. According to the Chinese Penal\nCode, the master, or relations of the master of a guilty slave, may\nchastise such slave in any degree short of occasioning his death,\nwithout being liable to any punishment;[38] whereas \"all slaves who\nare guilty of designedly striking their masters, shall, without making\nany distinction between principals and accessories, be beheaded.\"[39]\nAmong the Hebrews, if a man by blows destroyed an eye or a tooth, or\nany other member belonging to his man-servant or maid-servant, he was\nbound to let the injured person go free, though full retribution was\nlegally ordained for bodily injuries done to free Israelites.[40] In\nthe North American Slave States and {517} in the colonies of all\nEuropean Powers the master could inflict any number of blows upon his\nslave, but if he mutilated him he was fined or subjected to a very\nmoderate term of imprisonment.[41]\n\n[Footnote 38: _Ta Tsing Leu Lee_, sec. cccxiv. p. 340.]\n\n[Footnote 39: _Ibid._ sec. cccxiv. p. 338.]\n\n[Footnote 40: _Exodus_, xxi. _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 41: 'Negro Act' of 1740, \u00a7 37, in Brevard, _Digest of the\nPublic Statute Law of South Carolina_, ii. 241. Stephen, _Slavery of\nthe British West India Colonies_, i. 36 _sq._ Edwards, _History of the\nBritish West Indies_, ii. 192.]\n\nThe maltreatment of another person's slave has, even by civilised\nlegislators, been regarded as an injury done to the master rather than\nto the slave. According to Muhammedan law, the fine imposed on a free\nperson for injuring a slave varies according to the value of the\nslave.[42] In the Institutes of Justinian it is said that, \"if a man\nwere to flog another man's slave in a cruel manner, an action would,\nin this case, lie against him,\" but that the master has no right of\naction against a person who has struck the slave with his fist.[43] In\nthe Negro Act of 1740 it was prescribed that, if a slave was beaten by\nany person who had not sufficient cause or lawful authority for so\ndoing, and if he or she was maimed or disabled by such beating from\nperforming his or her work, the offender should pay to the owner of\nthe slave \"the sum of 15 shillings current money per diem, for every\nday of his lost time, and also the charge of the cure of such\nslave.\"[44] But if the beating of the slave caused no loss of service\nto his master, the offender was not, as a rule, punished by law. A\ndecision of the Supreme Court of Maryland established expressly the\nlaw to be, in that State, that trespass would not lie by a master for\nan assault and battery on his slave, unless it were attended with a\nloss of service.[45] If, on the other {518} hand, the offender was a\nslave and his victim a white man, the injury was regarded in a very\ndifferent light. We read in an act of Georgia passed in 1770:--\"If any\nslave shall presume to strike any white person, such slave . . . shall\n. . . for the second offence suffer death: But in case any such slave\nshall grievously wound, maim, or bruise any white person, though it\nshall be only the first offence, such slave shall suffer death.\"[46]\nAnd to offer violence, to strike, attempt to strike, struggle with, or\nresist any white person, was, even by the latest meliorating laws\nissued in the British Colonies, declared to be a crime in a slave\nwhich, if the white person had been wounded or hurt, and in some\nislands even without that condition, should subject the offender to\ndeath, dismemberment, or other severe penalties.[47] We read in one of\nthe codes of ancient Wales:--\"If a freeman strike a bondman, let him\npay him twelve pence. . . . If a bondman strike any freeman, it is\njust to cut off his right hand, or his right foot.\"[48] According to\nChinese law, a freeman striking a slave shall \"be punished less\nseverely by one degree than in the ordinary cases of the same\noffence\"; whereas \"a slave striking a freeman shall, in proportion to\nthe consequences, be punished one degree more severely than is by law\nprovided in similar cases between equals.\"[49]\n\n[Footnote 42: Lane, _Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians_,\np. 120.]\n\n[Footnote 43: _Institutiones_, iv. 4. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 44: Brevard, _op. cit._ ii. 231 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 45: Harris and Johnson, _Reports of Cases argued and\ndetermined in the General Court and Court of Appeals of the State of\nMaryland_, i. 4. Of all the Slave States, so far as I know, Kentucky\nwas the only one where the owner of a slave might bring an action of\ntrespass against anyone who whipped, stroke, or otherwise **abused the\nslave without the owner's consent, notwithstanding the slave was not\nso injured that the master lost his services thereby (Morehead and\nBrown, _Digest of the Statute Laws of Kentucky_, ii. 1481). In\nTennessee, according to an act of 1813, a person was punished if he\n\"wantonly and without sufficient cause\" beat or abused the slave of\nanother (Caruthers and Nicholson, _Compilation of the Statutes of\nTennessee_, p. 678).]\n\n[Footnote 46: Prince, _Digest of the Laws of the State of Georgia_,\np. 781.]\n\n[Footnote 47: Stephen, _Slavery of the British West India Colonies_,\ni. 188. Edwards, _History of the British West Indies_, ii. 202 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 48: _Gwentian Code_, ii. 5. 31 _sq._ (_Ancient Laws and\nInstitutes of Wales_, p. 339). For ancient Swedish law on this\nsubject, see _Gotlands-Lagen_, i. 19. 37.]\n\n[Footnote 49: _Ta Tsing Leu Lee_, sec. cccxiii. p. 336.]\n\nVery frequently the penalties or fines for bodily injuries are\ninfluenced by the class or rank of the parties even when both of them\nare freemen. Among the Marea, whilst a commoner who wounds another\ncommoner simply pays him compensation for the hurt, a commoner who\nwounds a nobleman must abandon to him all his property and become his\nslave.[50] At Zimm\u00e9 the fines for assaults \"vary greatly, according to\nthe rank of the party complaining.\"[51] {519} Among the Ossetes the\nlimbs of a noble are rated at twice as much as the limbs of an\nordinary freeman.[52] The Laws of [Hv]ammurabi contain the following\nprovisions:--\"If a man has caused the loss of a gentleman's eye, his\neye one shall cause to be lost. If he has shattered a gentleman's\nlimb, one shall shatter his limb. If he has caused a poor man to lose\nhis eye or shattered a poor man's limb, he shall pay one mina of\nsilver. If a man has made the tooth of a man that is his equal to fall\nout, one shall make his tooth fall out. If he has made the tooth of a\npoor man to fall out, he shall pay one-third of a mina of silver,\"[53]\nAccording to the Laws of Manu, if a man of a low caste does hurt to a\nman of any of the three highest castes, the offending member shall be\ncut off;[54] and he who intentionally strikes a Br\u00e2hmana in anger,\neven if it were only with a blade of grass, \"will be born during\ntwenty-one existences in the wombs of such beings where men are born\nin punishment of their sins.\"[55] In early Teutonic and Celtic codes\nwe meet with the principle that the compensation by which a bodily\ninjury is to be atoned for varies according to the rank of the parties\nconcerned.[56]\n\n[Footnote 50: Munzinger, _Ostafrikanische Studien_, p. 244.]\n\n[Footnote 51: Colquhoun, _Amongst the Shans_, p. 132.]\n\n[Footnote 52: von Haxthausen, _Transcaucasia_, p. 409.]\n\n[Footnote 53: _Laws of [Hv]ammurabi_, 196-198, 200 _sq._ _Cf._ _ibid._\n202 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 54: _Laws of Manu_, viii. 279.]\n\n[Footnote 55: _Ibid._ iv. 166. _Cf._ _ibid._ iv. 167.]\n\n[Footnote 56: Kemble, _Saxons in England_, i. 134. _Ancient Laws of\nIreland_, iii. p. cxi. _Dimetian Code_, ii. 17. 17 (_Ancient Laws and\nInstitutes of Wales_, p. 248). _Gwentian Code_, ii. 7. 13 (_ibid._\n342). de Valroger, _Les Celtes_, p. 470. Innes, _Scotland in the\nMiddle Ages_, p. 180.]\n\nWe have noticed that men in their estimation of human life,\nparticularly at the earlier stages of culture, discriminate between\nfellow-tribesmen or compatriots and aliens. A similar distinction is\nmade with reference to other bodily injuries. It reaches its pitch in\nthe sufferings inflicted on vanquished enemies. The treatment to which\nthe Kamchadales subjected their male prisoners of war included\n\"burning, hewing them to pieces, tearing their entrails out when\nalive, and hanging them by the feet.\"[57] Some of the Dacotahs, when\nthey had taken a captive, \"secured him {520} to a stake and allowed\ntheir women to torture him by mutilating him previous to killing\nhim\";[58] and of many other North American Indians it is said that\nthey \"devote their captives to death, with the most agonising\ntortures.\"[59] The wars of the Society Islanders, Ellis observes, were\nmost merciless and destructive; \"invention itself was tortured to find\nout new modes of inflicting suffering.\"[60] On the other hand, there\nare not wanting instances of savage warfare being conducted on more\nhumane principles. Dobrizhoffer tells us that \"cruelty towards\ncaptives and enemies is abhorred by the Abipones, who never torture\nthe dying\";[61] and among the Somals no injury is done to enemies who\nhave been severely wounded in the battle.[62] Civilised nations\nmaintain that, in time of war, no greater injuries should be inflicted\nupon the enemy than are necessary to obtain the end of the war.\n\n[Footnote 57: Krasheninnikoff, _History of Kamschatka_, p. 200.]\n\n[Footnote 58: Dorsey, 'Omaha Sociology,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._\niii. 313.]\n\n[Footnote 59: Adair, _History of the American Indians_, p. 388.]\n\n[Footnote 60: Ellis, _Polynesian Researches_, i. 293. _Cf._ Williams,\n_Narrative of Missionary Enterprises_, p. 533 (Samoans); Foreman,\n_Philippine Islands_, p. 185; Ellis, _Tshi-speaking Peoples of the\nGold Coast_, p. 172 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 61: Dobrizhoffer, _Account of the Abipones_, ii. 411.]\n\n[Footnote 62: Paulitschke, _Ethnographie Nordost-Afrikas_, p. 255.]\n\nThe right to bodily integrity is influenced by religious differences\nas well as national. According to Muhammedan law, the compensation for\ninjuries inflicted on a Jew or a Christian is a third, for those\ninflicted on a Parsee only a fifteenth, of the sum to be paid for\nsimilar injuries done to a Moslem.[63] A medi\u00e6val Spanish law\nprescribes that a Christian who beats a Jew shall pay four maravedis,\nbut that a Jew who beats a Christian shall pay ten.[64]\n\n[Footnote 63: Sachau, _op. cit._ p. 764.]\n\n[Footnote 64: 'Fuero de Sepulveda,' art. 37 _sq._, quoted by Du Boys,\n_Histoire du droit criminel de l'Espagne_, p. 74.]\n\nThe right to bodily integrity may be forfeited by the commission of a\ncrime. As has been already noticed, physical injuries are frequently\nresented according to the law of like for like;[65] and in other\ncases, also, the infliction {521} of corporal suffering--by\nmutilation, scourging, and so forth--is a common penalty. Amputation\nor mutilation of the offending member has particularly been in vogue\namong so-called peoples of culture.[66] It is often **mentioned\nin the Code of [Hv]ammurabi[67] and in the Laws of Manu.[68] It\noccurred among the Greeks,[69] Romans,[70] and Teutons.[71] Medi\u00e6val\ncodes contain numerous instances of it.[72] The Laws of Alfred\nprescribe that a male _theow_ who commits a rape upon a female _theow_\nshall be emasculated;[73] and in a later age Bracton reserves the same\npunishment for the deflowerer of a virgin, with the addition that the\noffender shall also lose his eyes, \"on account of his looking at the\nbeauty, for which he coveted possession of the virgin.\"[74] According\nto a law of Cnut, an adulteress shall have her nose and ears cut\noff.[75] Aethelstan enjoined that an illicit coiner should lose his\nright hand;[76] whereas in later times this punishment was restricted\nto those who struck anybody in the king's presence or in his\ncourt.[77] By the statute law of Scotland the punishment of forgery,\nor falsifying of writings, was at first the amputation of the hand,\nafterwards dismembering of it, joined with other pains.[78] In some\ncountries a perjurer lost the offending fingers or his right hand,[79]\nin others he had his tongue cut {522} off or pierced with a hot\niron;[80] and in England, before the Conquest, a man might lose his\ntongue by bringing a false and scandalous accusation.[81] In the\nseventeenth century a person in Scotland was sentenced to have his\ntongue bored because he had libelled the Lord Justice General.[82] In\nGerman and Austrian codes we find, even in the eighteenth century,\ntraces of the principle of punishing the offending member;[83] and in\nFrance the last survival of it--the amputation of the right hand of a\nparricide before his execution--disappeared only in 1832.[84] Growing\nrefinement of feeling has made people averse from the use of surgery\nin the administration of justice; and in most European countries\ngrown-up offenders are no longer liable to corporal punishment of any\nkind.[85]\n\n[Footnote 65: _Supra_, p. 178. See also _Laws of [Hv]ammurabi_, 196,\n197, 200; _Exodus_, xxi. 24 _sq._; _Leviticus_, xxiv. 19 _sq._;\n_Deuteronomy_, xix. 21; _Koran_, v. 49; Sachau, _op. cit._ p. 762\n_sq._ (Muhammedan law); Leist, _Alt-arisches Jus Gentium_, p. 426\n_sq._ (Greeks); _Lex Duodecim Tabularum_, viii. 2; G\u00fcnther, _Idee der\nWiedervergeltung_, p. 186 _sqq._ (Teutons).]\n\n[Footnote 66: For its occurrence in modern Persia, see Polak,\n_Persien_, i. 256, 329 _sq._; in Fez, see Leo Africanus, _History and\nDescription of Africa_, ii. 470. The Koran (v. 42) orders theft to be\npunished by cutting off the hands of the thief, but this punishment is\nnow seldom practised in Muhammedan countries. Among the lower races I\nhave met only with a few instances of punishing the offending member.\nIn Ashanti intrigue with the female slaves of the royal household is\npunished by emasculation (Ellis, _Tshi-speaking Peoples of the Gold\nCoast_, p. 287); and the Kamchadales burn the hands of people who have\nbeen frequently caught in theft (Krasheninnikoff, _op. cit._ p. 179).]\n\n[Footnote 67: _Laws of [Hv]ammurabi_, 192, 194, 195, 218, 226, 253.]\n\n[Footnote 68: _Laws of Manu_, viii. 270-272, 279-283, 322, 334, 374;\nxi. 105.]\n\n[Footnote 69: G\u00fcnther, _op. cit._ i. 94 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 70: _Ibid._ i. 155 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 71: _Ibid._ i. 195 _sqq._ Wilda, _op. cit._ p. 510. Grimm,\n_Deutsche Rechtsalterth\u00fcmer_, p. 740.]\n\n[Footnote 72: Du Boys, _Histoire du droit criminel des peuples\nmodernes_, ii. 699. _Idem_, _Histoire du droit criminel de l'Espagne_,\np. 94. Cibrario, _Economia politica del medio eve_, i. 346 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 73: _Laws of Alfred_, ii. 25.]\n\n[Footnote 74: Bracton, _De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angli\u00e6_, fol.\n147, vol. ii. 480 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 75: _Laws of Cnut_, ii. 54.]\n\n[Footnote 76: _Laws of \u00c6thelstan_, 14.]\n\n[Footnote 77: Strutt, _View of the Manners, Customs, &c., of the\nInhabitants of England_, iii. 43.]\n\n[Footnote 78: Erskine, _Principles of the Law of Scotland_, p. 571.]\n\n[Footnote 79: Stemann, _op. cit._ p. 645. Charles V.'s _Peinliche\nGerichts Ordnung_, art. 107, p. 235. Pollock and Maitland, _History of\nEnglish Law before the Time of Edward I._ ii. 453. G\u00fcnther, _op. cit._\nii. 57.]\n\n[Footnote 80: Du Boys, _Histoire du droit criminel des peuples\nmodernes_, ii. 699. _Idem_, _Histoire du droit criminel de l'Espagne_,\np. 599 _sq._ Pitcairn, _Criminal Trials in Scotland_, iii. 539.]\n\n[Footnote 81: Pollock and Maitland, _op. cit._ ii. 539.]\n\n[Footnote 82: Rogers, _Social Life in Scotland_, ii. 35.]\n\n[Footnote 83: G\u00fcnther, _op. cit._ ii. 55-57, 65; iii. 79.]\n\n[Footnote 84: Chauveau and H\u00e9lie, _Th\u00e9orie du Code P\u00e9nal_, iii. 394.]\n\n[Footnote 85: See von Liszt, _Le droit criminel des \u00e9tats europ\u00e9ens_,\n_passim_; Wrede, _Die K\u00f6rperstrafen bei allen V\u00f6lkern_, _passim_.]\n\nCorporal punishment has generally been, by preference, a punishment\nfor poor and common people or slaves.[86] Blows and abusive language,\nsays Plutarch, seem to be more fitting for slaves than the\nfreeborn.[87] According to the religious law of the Hindus, a Br\u00e2hmana\nshall not suffer corporal punishment for any offence.[88] Among the\nHebrews[89] and Muhammedans,[90] among the Romans[91] and in the\nMiddle Ages,[92] the punishment of mutilation could generally be\ncommuted to a fine. For a long period, in {523} Christian Europe, as\nwell as in Pagan Rome during the Empire,[93] the punishment was more\nsavage in proportion as the delinquent was more helpless. \"En crimes,\"\nsays Loysel, \"les villains sont plus gri\u00e9vement punis en leurs corps\nque les nobles. . . . Et o\u00f9 le vilain perdroit la vie, ou un membre de\nson corps, le noble perdra l'honneur, et r\u00e9ponse en cour.\"[94] Indeed,\nwhilst the slave incurred the penalty of mutilation for the most\ntrifling offence, the noble might be exempted from corporal punishment\nof any kind.[95] In a similar manner the social _status_ of a person\nhas influenced his right to bodily integrity with reference to\njudicial torture. According to the Chinese Penal Code, \"it shall not,\nin any tribunal of government, be permitted to put the question by\ntorture to those who belong to any of the eight privileged classes, in\nconsideration of the respect due to their character.\"[96] In Rome,\nunder the Republic, torture was exclusively confined to the\nslaves.[97] In medi\u00e6val Christendom it was made use of to an extent\nand with a cold-blooded ferocity unknown to any heathen nation, and in\ncases of heresy and treason it was applied to every class of the\ncommunity.[98] But the tortures inflicted on the nobles and the clergy\nwere lighter than in the case of ordinary laymen, and proof of a more\ndecided character was required to justify their being exposed to\ntorment.[99] \"Noble persons and persons of quality,\" says Dumoulin,\n\"cannot so easily be subjected to torture as persons who are of mean\nand plebeian rank.\"[100] Guazzini, an eminent Italian jurisconsult and\na recognised expositor of the law of torture in the days of its\nhighest ascendency and ripest maturity, observes that the torment\ninflicted {524} on a person shall be proportionate to his age, his\nphysical constitution, his mental habits, and his social\n_status_;[101] and he adds that bishops and others in high civil\ndignity are exempt from torture even under strong presumptions of\nguilt.[102]\n\n[Footnote 86: See, for instance, the _Laws of Manu_, viii. 267, 279.]\n\n[Footnote 87: Plutarch, _De educatione puerorum_, 12.]\n\n[Footnote 88: _Baudh\u00e2yana_, i. 10. 18. 17. _Institutes of Vishnu_, v. 2.]\n\n[Footnote 89: G\u00fcnther, _op. cit._ i. 55.]\n\n[Footnote 90: _Ibid._ i. 74 _sq._ Lane, _Manners and Customs of the\nModern Egyptians_, p. 120. Sachau, _op. cit._ p. 764. According to\nMuhammedan law, it is not obligatory for the injured party to accept\ncompensation in lieu of mutilation.]\n\n[Footnote 91: G\u00fcnther, _op. cit._ i. 124 _sqq._ Mommsen, _R\u00f6misches\nStrafrecht_, p. 981.]\n\n[Footnote 92: Du Boys, _Histoire du droit criminel des peuples\nmodernes_, ii. 557 _sq._ Strutt, _op. cit._ ii. 8.]\n\n[Footnote 93: _Cf._ Mackenzie, _Studies in Roman Law_, p. 414 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 94: Loysel, _Institutes coutumi\u00e8res_, vi. 2. 31 _sq._, vol.\nii. 219 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 95: Du Boys, _Histoire du droit criminel de l'Espagne_,\np. 469.]\n\n[Footnote 96: _Ta Tsing Leu Lee_, sec. cccciv. p. 441.]\n\n[Footnote 97: Mommsen, _R\u00f6misches Strafrecht_, p. 405.]\n\n[Footnote 98: Suarez de Paz, _Praxis ecclesiastica et secularis_, v.\n1. 3. 12, fol. 154 b. _Cf._ Lecky, _Rise and Influence of the Spirit\nof Rationalism in Europe_, i. 328.]\n\n[Footnote 99: Lea, _Superstition and Force_, p. 526 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 100: Dumoulin, quoted by Welling, 'Law of Torture,' in _The\nAmerican Anthropologist_, v. 210 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 101: Guazzini, _Tractatus ad defensam inquisitorum_, xxx. 4.\n24, vol. ii. 86.]\n\n[Footnote 102: _Ibid._ xxx. 17, vol. ii. 102 _sq._]\n\nThe moral notions regarding the infliction of bodily injuries require\nlittle comment. They are based on the principle of sympathetic\nresentment, modified by the ascription of particular rights to some\nand particular duties to others, on account of the relation in which\nthe parties stand to each other; and they follow the same rules as the\nideas concerning homicide, to the exclusion, of course, of all such\nconsiderations as result from fear of the slain man's ghost or from\nthe religious horror of taking life. One point, however, calls for\nspecial attention. The forcible interference with another person's\nbody not only causes physical pain but commonly entails disgrace upon\nthe sufferer. This largely accounts for the fact that a person's right\nto bodily integrity varies so much according to his social\nstanding.[103] Even among the lower races we meet with the notions\nthat an act of bodily violence involves a gross insult, and that\ncorporal punishment disgraces the criminal more than any other form of\npenalty. According to the Malay Code, \"the persons who may be put to\ndeath without the previous knowledge of the king or nobles, are an\nadulterer, a person guilty of treason, a thief who cannot otherwise be\napprehended, and a person who offers another a grievous affront, such\nas a blow over the face.\"[104] Among the Maoris a blow with the fist\nwould lead to a combat with arms.[105] The Thlinkets consider corporal\npunishment to {525} be the greatest indignity to which a freeman can\nbe subjected, hence they never inflict it.[106] And civilised nations\nwho are ready to punish certain criminals with death, hold whipping to\nbe a punishment too infamous to be employed.\n\n[Footnote 103: _Cf._ _Dimetian Code_, ii. 17. 17 (_Ancient Laws and\nInstitutes of Wales_, p. 248): \"The Law says that the limbs of all\npersons are of equal worth; if a limb of the king be broken, that it\nis of the same worth as the limb of the villain: yet, nevertheless,\nthe worth of saraad [or fine for insult] to the king, or to a breyr,\nis more than the saraad of a villain, if a limb belonging to him be\ncut.\" See also _Gwentian Code_, ii. 7. 12 _sq._ (_ibid._ p. 342).]\n\n[Footnote 104: Crawfurd, _History of the Indian Archipelago_,\niii. 105 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 105: Shortland, _Traditions and Superstitions of the New\nZealanders_, p. 227.]\n\n[Footnote 106: Holmberg, 'Ethnograph. Skizzen \u00fcber die V\u00f6lker des\nrussischen Amerika,' in _Acta Societatis Scientiarum Fennic\u00e6_, iv. 321.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXIII\n\nCHARITY AND GENEROSITY\n\nIN previous chapters we have examined the regard for the life and\nphysical well-being of others as displayed in moral ideas concerning\nhomicide and the infliction of bodily harm. We shall now consider the\nsame subject from another point of view, namely, the valuation of such\nconduct as positively promotes the existence and material comfort of a\nfellow-creature.\n\nThere is one duty so universal and obvious that it is seldom\nmentioned: the mother's duty to rear her children, provided that they\nare suffered to live. Another duty--equally primitive, I believe, in\nthe human race--is incumbent on the married man: the protection and\nsupport of his family. We hear of this duty from all quarters of the\nsavage world.\n\nAmong the North American Indians it was considered disgraceful for\na man to have more wives than he was able to maintain.[1] Mr. Powers\nsays that among the Patwin, a Californian tribe which he believes to\nrank among the lowest in the world, \"the sentiment that the men are\nbound to support the women--that is to furnish the supplies--is\nstronger even than among us.\"[2] Among the Iroquois it was the office\nof the husband \"to make a mat, to repair the cabin of his wife, or to\nconstruct a new one.\" The product of his hunting expeditions, {527}\nduring the first year of marriage, belonged of right to his wife, and\nafterwards he shared it equally with her, whether she remained in the\nvillage, or accompanied him to the chase.[3] Among the Botocudos,\nwhose girls are married very young, remaining in the house of the\nfather till the age of puberty, the husband is even then obliged to\nmaintain his wife, though living apart from her.[4] Among the Lengua\nIndians of the Paraguayan Chaco the child of a woman whose husband\ndeserts her is generally killed at birth, the mother feeling that it\nis the man's part of married life to provide meat for his\noffspring.[5] Azara states that, among the Charruas, \"du moment o\u00f9 un\nhomme se marie, il forme une famille \u00e0 part, et travaille pour la\nnourrir.\"[6] Of the Fuegians it is said that, \"as soon as a youth is\nable to maintain a wife, by his exertions in fishing or bird-catching,\nhe obtains the consent of her relations.\"[7] The wretched Rock Veddahs\nin Ceylon \"acknowledge the marital obligation and the duty of\nsupporting their own families.\"[8] Among the Maldivians, \"although a\nman is allowed four wives at one time, it is only on condition of his\nbeing able to support them.\"[9] The Nairs, we are told, consider it a\nhusband's duty to provide his wife with food, clothing, and\nornaments;[10] and almost the same is said by Dr. Schwaner with\nreference to the tribes of the Barito district, in the south east part\nof Borneo.[11] Among the cannibals of New Britain the chiefs have to\nsee that the families of the warriors are properly maintained.[12]\nConcerning the Tonga Islanders Mariner states that \"a married woman is\none who cohabits with a man, and lives under his roof and\nprotection.\"[13] Among the Maoris \"the mission of woman was to\nincrease and multiply, that of man to defend his home.\"[14] With\nreference to the Kurnai in South Australia, Mr. Howitt states that\n\"the man has to provide for his family with the assistance of his\nwife. His share is to hunt for their support, and to fight for their\nprotection.\"[15] In Lado, in Africa, the bridegroom has to assure his\nfather-in-law three times that he will {528} protect his wife, calling\nthe people present to witness.[16] Among the Touareg a man who deserts\nhis wife is blamed, as he has taken upon himself the obligation of\nmaintaining her.[17]\n\n[Footnote 1: Waitz, _Anthropologie der Naturv\u00f6lker_, iii. 109. Carver,\n_Travels through the Interior Parts of North America_, p. 367.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Powers, _Tribes of California_, p. 222.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Heriot, _Travels through the Canadas_, p. 338.]\n\n[Footnote 4: von Tschudi, _Reisen durch S\u00fcdamerika_, ii. 283.]\n\n[Footnote 5: Hawtrey, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxxi. 295.]\n\n[Footnote 6: Azara, _Voyages dans l'Am\u00e9rique m\u00e9ridionale_, ii. 22.]\n\n[Footnote 7: King and Fitzroy, _Voyages of the \"Adventure\" and\n\"Beagle,\"_ ii. 182.]\n\n[Footnote 8: Tennent, _Ceylon_, ii. 441.]\n\n[Footnote 9: Rosset, 'Maldive Islands,' in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xvi.\n168 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 10: Stewart, 'Notes on Northern Cachar,' in _Jour. Asiatic\nSoc. Bengal_, xxiv. 614.]\n\n[Footnote 11: Schwaner, _Borneo_, i. 199.]\n\n[Footnote 12: Angas, _Polynesia_, p. 373.]\n\n[Footnote 13: Mariner, _Natives of the Tonga Islands_, ii. 167.]\n\n[Footnote 14: Johnston, _Maoria_, p. 28 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 15: Fison and Howitt, _Kamilaroi and Kurnai_, p. 206.]\n\n[Footnote 16: Wilson and Felkin, _Uganda_, ii. 90.]\n\n[Footnote 17: Chavanne, _Die Sahara_, p. 209. _Cf._ Hanoteau and\nLetourneux, _La Kabylie_, ii. 167.]\n\nAmong many of the lower races a man is not even permitted to marry\nuntil he has given some proof of his ability to support and protect\nhis family.[18] Indeed, so closely is the idea that a man is bound to\nmaintain his family connected with that of marriage and fatherhood,\nthat sometimes even repudiated wives with their children are, at least\nto a certain extent, supported by their former husbands.[19] And upon\nthe death of a husband, the obligation of maintaining his wife and her\nchildren devolves on his heirs, the wide-spread custom of a man\nmarrying the widow of his deceased brother being not only a privilege,\nbut, among several peoples, even a duty.[20]\n\n[Footnote 18: Westermarck, _History of Human Marriage_, p. 18.]\n\n[Footnote 19: _Ibid._ p. 19.]\n\n[Footnote 20: _Ibid._ p. 511 _sq._]\n\nTurning to peoples who have reached a higher stage of culture:--Ab\u00fb\nShug\u00e2[(] says that, among Muhammedans, parents are obliged to support\ntheir families, \"if the children are both poor and under age, or both\npoor and lastingly infirm, or both poor and insane.\"[21] But that this\nduty chiefly devolves on the father is evident from the fact that the\nmother is even entitled to claim wages for nursing them.[22]\nBuddhistic law goes so far as to prescribe that the parents shall\nprovide their son with a beautiful wife, and give him a share of the\nwealth belonging to the family.[23] It has been observed that in the\nConfucian books there is no mention of any real duties incumbent upon\nthe father towards his children;[24] nor does the Decalogue contain\nanything on the subject; nor any law of ancient Greece or Rome.[25]\nBut, as has been justly {529} argued, if legal prescriptions are\nwanting, that is because they are thought to be superfluous, nature\nitself having sufficiently prepared men for the performance of their\nduties towards their offspring.[26] So, also, it is regarded as a\nmatter of course that the husband shall support his wife, however\ngreat power he may possess over her. Among the Romans _manus_ implied\nnot only the wife's subordination to the husband, but also the\nhusband's obligation to protect the wife.[27]\n\n[Footnote 21: Sachau, _Muhammedanisches Recht_, p. 18.]\n\n[Footnote 22: _Ibid._ p. 99 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 23: Hardy, _Manual of Budhism_, p. 495.]\n\n[Footnote 24: Faber, _Digest of the Doctrines of Confucius_, p. 82.]\n\n[Footnote 25: Leist, _Gr\u00e6co-italische Rechtsgeschichte_, p. 13.]\n\n[Footnote 26: _Ibid._, p. 13. Schmidt, _Ethik der alten Griechen_, ii.\n141. Adam Smith, _Theory of Moral Sentiments_, p. 199 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 27: Rossbach, _Untersuchungen \u00fcber die r\u00f6mische Ehe_, p. 32.\n_Cf._ _Laws of Manu_, ix. 74, 75, 95.]\n\nThe parents' duty of taking care of their offspring is, in the first\nplace, based on the sentiment of parental affection. That the maternal\nsentiment is universal in mankind is a fact too generally admitted to\nneed demonstration; not so the father's love of his children. Savage\nmen are commonly supposed to be very indifferent towards their\noffspring; but a detailed study of facts leads us to a different\nconclusion. It appears that, among the lower races, the paternal\nsentiment is hardly less universal than the maternal, although it is\nprobably never so strong and in many cases distinctly feeble. But more\noften it displays itself with considerable intensity even among the\nrudest savages. In the often-quoted case of the Patagonian chief who,\nin a moment of passion, dashed his little son with the utmost violence\nagainst the rocks because he let a basket of eggs which the father\nhanded to him fall down, we have only an instance of savage\nimpetuosity. The same father \"would, at any other time, have been the\nmost daring, the most enduring, and the most self-devoted\" in the\nsupport and defence of his child.[28] Similarly the Central Australian\nnatives, in fits of sudden passion, when hardly knowing what they do,\nsometimes treat a child with great severity; but as a rule, to which\nthere are very few exceptions, they are kind and considerate to their\nchildren, the men as well as the women carrying them when they get\ntired on the march, {530} and always seeing that they get a good share\nof any food.[29] All authorities agree that the Australian Black is\naffectionate to his children.[30] \"From observation of various tribes\nin far distant parts of Australia,\" says Mr. Howitt, \"I can assert\nconfidently that love for their children is a marked feature in the\naboriginal character. I cannot recollect having ever seen a parent\nbeat or cruelly use a child; and a short road to the goodwill of the\nparents is, as amongst us, by noticing and admiring their children. No\ngreater grief could be exhibited, by the fondest parents in the most\ncivilised community at the death of some little child, than that which\nI have seen exhibited in an Australian native camp, not only by the\nimmediate parents, but by the whole related group.\"[31] Other\nrepresentatives of the lowest savagery, as the Veddahs[32] and\nFuegians,[33] are likewise described as tender parents. Though few\npeoples have acquired a worse reputation for cruelty than the Fijians,\neven the greatest censurer of their character admits that the\nexhibition of parental love among them \"is sometimes such as to be\nworthy of admiration\";[34] whilst, according to another authority, \"it\nis truly touching to see how parents are attached to their\nchildren.\"[35] The Bangala of the Upper Congo, \"swayed one moment by a\nthirst for blood and indulging in the most horrible orgies, . . . may\nyet the next be found approaching their homes looking forward with\n{531} the liveliest interest to the caresses of their wives and\nchildren.\"[36] Carver asserts that he never saw among any other people\ngreater proofs of parental or filial tenderness than among the North\nAmerican Naudowessies.[37] Among the Point Barrow Eskimo \"the\naffection of parents for their children is extreme\";[38] and the same\nseems to be the case among the Eskimo in general.[39] Concerning the\nAleuts Veniaminof wrote long ago:--\"The children are often well fed\nand satisfied, while the parents almost perish with hunger. The\ndaintiest morsel, the best dress, is always kept for them.\"[40] Mr.\nHooper, again, found parental love nowhere more strongly exemplified\nthan among the Chukchi; \"the natives absolutely doat upon their\nchildren.\"[41] Innumerable facts might indeed be quoted to prove that\nparental affection is not a late product of civilisation, but a normal\nfeature of the savage mind as it is known to us.[42]\n\n[Footnote 28: King and Fitzroy, _op. cit._ ii. 155. _Cf._ _ibid._ ii.\n154; Musters, _At Home with the Patagonians_, p. 196 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 29: Spencer and Gillen, _Native Tribes of Central\nAustralia_, p. 50 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 30: Curr, _The Australian Race_, i. 402; iii. 155. _Idem_,\n_Recollections of Squatting in Victoria_, p. 252. Angas, _Savage Life\nand Scenes in Australia_, i. 94. Brough Smyth, _Aborigines of\nVictoria_, i. 51; ii. 311. Ridley, _Aborigines of Australia_, p. 23.\nEyre, _Journals of Expeditions of Discovery into Central Australia_,\nii. 214 _sq._ Sturt, _Expedition into Central Australia_, ii. 137.\nCalvert, _Aborigines of Western Australia_, p. 30 _sq._ Taplin,\n'Narrinyeri,' in Woods, _Native Tribes of South Australia_, p. 15.\nGason, 'Manners and Customs of the Dieyerie Tribe,' _ibid._ p. 258.\nHill and Thornton, _Aborigines of New South Wales_, pp. 2, 4. Fraser,\n_Aborigines of New South Wales_, pp. 2, 44. Lumholtz, _Among\nCannibals_, p. 193.]\n\n[Footnote 31: Fison and Howitt, _op. cit._ p. 189. _Cf._ _ibid._ p. 259.]\n\n[Footnote 32: Bailey, 'Wild Tribes of the Veddahs of Ceylon,' in\n_Trans. Ethn. Soc._ N.S. ii. 291. Deschamps, _Carnet d'un voyageur au\npays des Veddas_, p. 380.]\n\n[Footnote 33: King and Fitzroy, _op. cit._ i. 76; ii. 186. Weddell,\n_Voyage towards the South Pole_, p. 156. Pertuiset, _Le Tr\u00e9sor des\nIncas \u00e0 la Terre de Feu_, p. 217.]\n\n[Footnote 34: Williams and Calvert, _Fiji and the Fijians_, p. 116.]\n\n[Footnote 35: Seemann, _Viti_, p. 193. _Cf._ _ibid._ p. 194.]\n\n[Footnote 36: Ward, _Five Years with the Congo Cannibals_, p. 141.\n_Cf._ _ibid._ p. 139.]\n\n[Footnote 37: Carver, _op. cit._ p. 240 _sq._ _Cf._ _ibid._ p. 378 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 38: Murdoch, 'Ethnological Results of the Point Barrow\nExpedition,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ ix. 417.]\n\n[Footnote 39: Hall, _Arctic Researches_, p. 568. Parry, _Second Voyage\nfor the Discovery of a North-West Passage_, p. 529. Boas, 'Central\nEskimo,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ vi. 566. Turner, 'Ethnology of the\nUngava District,' _ibid._ xi. 191. Seemann, _Voyage of \"Herald,\"_ ii.\n65. Cranz, _History of Greenland_, i. 174.]\n\n[Footnote 40: Veniaminof, quoted by Dall, _Alaska_, p. 397. _Cf._\n_ibid._ p. 393; Petroff, 'Report on Alaska,' in _Tenth Census of the\nUnited States_, p. 158.]\n\n[Footnote 41: Hooper, _Ten Months among the Tents of the Tuski_, p. 201.]\n\n[Footnote 42: Dobrizhoffer, _Account of the Abipones_, ii. 214 _sq._\nWied-Neuwied, _Reise nach Brasilien_, ii. 40 (Botocudos). Wallace,\n_Travels on the Amazon_, p. 518 _sq._ (Amazon Indians; but on the\nBrazilian Indians generally, _cf._ von Martius, in _Jour. Roy. Geo.\nSoc._ ii. 198, and _Idem_, _Beitr\u00e4ge zur Ethnographie Amerika's_, i.\n125). Im Thurn, _Among the Indians of Guiana_, pp. 213, 219.\nMacCauley, 'Seminole Indians of Florida,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ v.\n491. Dunbar, 'Pawnee Indians,' in **_Magazine of American History_,\nviii. 745. Catlin, _North American Indians_, ii. 242. Ten Kate,\n_Reizen en onderzoekingen in Noord-Amerika_, p. 364 _sq._ Sproat,\n_Scenes and Studies of Savage Life_, p. 160 (Ahts). Franklin,\n_Journey to the Shores of the Polar Sea_, p. 68 (Crees). Elliott,\n'Report on the Seal Islands,' in _Tenth Census of the United States_,\np. 238. Krasheninnikoff, _History of Kamschatka_, p. 232 (Koriaks).\nGeorgi, _Russia_, i. 25 (Laplanders); iii. 13 (Tunguses), 158\n(Kamchadales). Castr\u00e9n, _Nordiska resor och forskningar_, ii. 121\n(Ostyaks). Prejevalsky, _Mongolia_, i. 71. Scott Robertson, _K\u00e1firs of\nthe Hindu-Kush_, p. 189. Blunt, _Bedouin Tribes of the Euphrates_, ii.\n214. Dalton, _Desiriptive Ethnology of Bengal_, p. 68 (Garos).\nMarshall, _A Phrenologist amongst the Todas_, p. 200; Shortt, 'Hill\nTribes of the Neilgherries,' in _Trans. Ethn. Soc._ N.S. vii. 254\n(Todas). Kloss, _In the Andamans and Nicobars_, p. 228 (Nicobarese).\nMan, _Sonthalia and the Sonthals_, p. 78. Wallace, _Malay\nArchipelago_, p. 450 (Malays). Schwaner, _op. cit._ i. 162 (Malays of\nthe Barito River Basin in Borneo). Low, _Sarawak_, p. 148 (Malays).\nBock, _Head-Hunters of Borneo_, p. 210 (Dyaks). Ling Roth, _Natives of\nSarawak and British North Borneo_, i. 68 (Land Dyaks). Forbes, _A\nNaturalist's Wanderings in the Eastern Archipelago_, p. 321 (natives\nof Timor-laut). Forbes, _Insulinde_, p. 182 (natives of Ritobel)\nSeligmann, in _Reports of the Cambridge Anthropological Expedition to\nTorres Straits_, v. 199; Haddon, _ibid._ v. 229, 274 (Western\nIslands). Romilly, _From my Verandah in New Guinea_, p. 51. Chalmers,\n_Pioneering in New Guinea_, p. 163. Christian, _Caroline Islands_, p.\n72 (Ponapeans). Kubary, 'Die Bewohner der Mortlock Inseln,' in\n_Mittheilungen der Geogr. Gesellsch. in Hamburg_, 1878-9, p. 261.\nMacdonald, _Oceana_, p. 195 (Efatese). Turner, _Samoa_, p. 317\n(natives of Tana), von Kotzebue, _Voyage of Discovery_, iii. 165\n(Natives of Radack). Mariner, _op. cit._ ii. 179 (Tongans).\nDieffenbach, _Travels in New Zealand_, ii. 26, 107; Crozet, _Voyage to\nTasmania_, p. 66 (Maoris). Dove, 'Aborigines of Tasmania,' in\n_Tasmanian Journal of Natural Science_, i. 252. Reade, _Savage\nAfrica_, p. 245 (Equatorial Africans). Casati, _Ten Years in\nEquatoria_, i. 186 (Central African Negroes). Cailli\u00e9, _Travels\nthrough Central Africa_, i. 352 (Mandingoes). Holub, _Seven Years in\nSouth Africa_, ii. 296 (Marutse). Livingstone, _Missionary Travels_,\np. 126 (Bechuanas). Johnston, _Uganda Protectorate_, ii. 539\n(Pigmies). Sparrman, _Voyage to the Cape of Good Hope_, i. 219\n(Hottentots). Shaw, 'Betsileo Country and People,' in _Antananarivo\nAnnual and Madagascar Magazine_, iii. 82. See also _supra_, p. 405;\nSteinmetz, 'Verh\u00e4ltnis zwischen Eltern und Kindern bei den\nNaturv\u00f6lkern,' in _Zeitschrift f\u00fcr Socialwissenschaft_, i. 610 _sqq._;\n_Idem_, _Ethnologische Studien zur ersten Entwicklung der Strafe_, ii.\nch. vi. \u00a72.]\n\n{532} When dealing with the origin of the altruistic sentiment we\nshall find reason to believe that paternal affection not only prevails\namong existing men, savage and civilised, but that it belonged to the\nhuman race from the very beginning, and that the same was the case\nwith the germ of marital affection, inducing the male to remain with\nthe female till after the birth or the offspring, and to defend and\nsupport her during the periods of pregnancy and motherhood. It is true\nthat among several savage peoples conjugal love is said to be unknown;\nbut what is meant by this is, I think, typically expressed in Major\nEllis's statement referring to some Gold Coast natives, that among\nthem \"love, as understood by the people of Europe, has no\nexistence.\"[43] The love of a savage is certainly very different from\nthe love of a civilised man; nevertheless we may discover in it traces\nof the same ingredients. Even rude savages, such as the Bushmans,\nFuegians, Andaman Islanders, and Australian aborigines, seem often to\nbe lovingly attached to their wives.[44]\n\n[Footnote 43: Ellis, _Tshi-speaking Peoples of the Gold Coast_, p.\n285. I have dealt with this subject in my _History of Human Marriage_,\np. 356 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 44: _Ibid._ p. 358 _sq._]\n\n{533} The prevalence of paternal and marital affection accounts for\nthe origin of the family (consisting of parents and children), and for\nthe functions of the man as father and husband. The growing intensity\nof these sentiments has naturally increased the stability of the\nfamily tie; and other factors, of a selfish nature, have contributed\ntowards the same result. From various points of view it is desirable\nfor a man to have children. They are to him objects of pride; when\ngrown-up, they add to his safety and power; they support him when he\ngets old; they make offerings to his spirit when he is dead. And no\nless useful is the possession of a wife. When the generative power is\nno longer restricted to a certain season of the year, she becomes a\nlasting cause of sensual delight; she is a mother of children; she\nmanages the household; she acts as a carrier, she works in the field.\n\nEvery social institution has a tendency to become a matter of moral\nconcern because of the persistence of habit. But the simplest paternal\nand marital duties have a deeper foundation than the mere force of the\nhabitual. If a man leaves his wife and children without protection and\nsupport, the other members of the community will sympathise with them,\nand feel resentment towards the neglectful husband and father. He will\nbe looked upon as the cause of their sufferings, because he omitted to\ndo what other men in his position would have done. His conduct will be\nrepulsive to everyone who himself possesses those sentiments of which\nhe proves destitute. He will be held guilty of a breach of contract,\nsince by marrying he took upon himself the burden of maintaining his\nwife and their common offspring. To thoughtful minds his\nresponsibility towards his children is further increased by the fact\nthat he is the author of their being, and for that reason the source\nof their misery. Finally, the community as a whole will suffer by his\nnegligence.\n\nThe parents' duty of taking care of their offspring lasts until the\nlatter are able to shift for themselves. On the other hand, when the\nparents, in their turn, get in need of {534} support, their care is to\nbe reciprocated by the children. The practice of killing or abandoning\ndecrepit parents is an exception even in the savage world, and, as we\nhave seen, restricted to extreme cases in which it may be regarded as\nan act of kindness or of hard necessity. There are always savage\npeoples among whom aged parents, though suffered to live, are said to\nbe grossly neglected by their children. But, so far as I know, these\npeoples are not numerous, and can hardly be regarded as\nrepresentatives of a custom common to any larger ethnic group.\n\nThus, according to Hearne, \"old age is the greatest calamity that\ncan befall a Northern Indian; for when he is past labour, he is\nneglected, and treated with great disrespect, even by his own\nchildren. They not only serve him last at meals, but generally give\nhim the coarsest and worst of the victuals; and such of the skins as\nthey do not chuse to wear, are made up in the clumsiest manner into\nclothing for their aged parents.\"[45] Yet among the same people\nRichardson witnessed \"several unquestionable instances of tenderness\nand affection shown by children to their parents, and of compliance\nwith their whims, much to their own personal inconvenience.\"[46] In\nhis work on the tribes of California Mr. Powers observes:--\"filial\npiety cannot be said to be a distinguishing quality of the Wailakki,\nor, in fact, of any Indians. No matter how high may be their station,\nthe aged and decrepit are counted a burden. The old man, hero of a\nhundred battles, sometime 'lord of the lion heart and eagle eye,' when\nhis fading eyesight no more can guide the winged arrow as of yore, is\nignominiously compelled to accompany his sons into the forest, and\nbear home on his poor old shoulders the game they have killed.\"[47]\nBut concerning the Indians of Upper California Beechey writes, \"When\nany of their relations are indisposed, the greatest attention is paid\nto their wants, and it was remarked by Padre Arroyo that filial\naffection is stronger in these tribes than in any civilised nation on\nthe globe with which he was acquainted.\"[48] Among the Indians on the\neast side of the Rocky Mountains, \"the aged are commonly treated with\nmuch respect, which they consider themselves as entitled to claim\";\nand they \"are not suffered to want any thing which they need, and\nwhich {535} it is in the power of their relations to procure for\nthem.\"[49] The religious teachers of the Iroquois inculcated the duty\nof protecting aged parents, as divinely enjoined:--\"It is the will of\nthe Great Spirit that you reverence the aged, even though they be as\nhelpless as infants.\"[50] The Aleuts described by Veniaminof\nconsidered disregard of one's parents to be the greatest and most\ndishonourable of crimes; \"we should sincerely love them,\" they said,\n\"do all we could toward their support, remain with them, and care for\nthem until their death.\"[51] The children of the Central Eskimo are\nvery dutiful, obeying the wishes of their parents and taking care of\nthem in their old age;[52] and statements to the same effect are made\nwith reference to other Eskimo tribes.[53] Cranz, who did not\ngenerally panegyrise the moral qualities of the Greenlanders, wrote\nthat the bonds of filial and parental love seem stronger in them than\namongst other nations, and that \"ingratitude in up-grown children\ntowards their old decrepit parents, is scarcely exemplified among\nthem.\"[54] Among the Botocudos Prince Wied-Neuwied saw a young man\ncarrying about his blind father, not leaving him alone for a single\nmoment.[55] Among the Fuegians \"grown-up children are expected to\nsupport their parents when they become aged; the son generally makes\nhis father, if he is past work, a canoe every season, and if the aged\nman is a widower he lives entirely under the charge of his eldest\nson.\"[56] The Australian natives are much praised for the regard with\nwhich they treat their parents and elders. With reference to the\nWestern tribes, Bishop Salvado observes:--\"Les fils adultes payent de\nretour l'affection de leurs parents. S'ils sont vieux, ils r\u00e9servent\npour eux les meilleurs pi\u00e8ces de gibier, ou de tout autre mets, et se\nchargent de venger leurs offenses.\"[57] Among the Kukis of India,\n\"when past work, the father and mother are supported by their\nchildren.\"[58] Among the B\u00f3do and Dhim\u00e1ls \"it is {536} deemed shameful\nto leave old parents entirely alone; and the last of the sons, who by\nhis departure does so, is liable to fine as well as disinheritance.\"[59]\nAmong the Betsileo of Madagascar \"the old are never left destitute or\nto their own devices. . . . It is by no means uncommon to see the son\ncarrying the aged parent on his back, when necessity or inclination\ndemands locomotion.\"[60] Among the Mandingoes \"the aged who are unable\nto support themselves are always maintained and treated with respect\nby their children.\"[61] That uncivilised races commonly regard it a\nstringent duty for children to maintain their aged parents and to\nadminister to their wants, is also obvious from statements testifying\ntheir filial regard in general terms.[62] On the other hand, the fact\nthat some peoples are said to be deficient in this sentiment, does not\nimply that they fail to recognise the simple duty of supporting old\nand helpless parents.\n\n[Footnote 45: Hearne, _Journey to the Northern Ocean_, p. 345 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 46: Richardson, _Arctic Searching Expedition_, ii. 17.]\n\n[Footnote 47: Powers, _op. cit._ p. 118 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 48: Beechey, _Voyage to the Pacific and Behring's Strait_,\nii. 402.]\n\n[Footnote 49: Harmon, _Voyages and Travels in the Interior of North\nAmerica_, p. 348.]\n\n[Footnote 50: Morgan, _League of the Iroquois_, p. 171.]\n\n[Footnote 51: Veniaminof, quoted by Petroff, _loc. cit._ p. 155.]\n\n[Footnote 52: Boas, 'Central Eskimo,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._\nvi. 566.]\n\n[Footnote 53: Murdoch, 'Point Barrow Expedition,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur.\nEthn._ ix. 417. Turner, 'Ungava District,' _ibid._ xi. 191.]\n\n[Footnote 54: Cranz, _op. cit._ i. 174, 150. _Cf._ Egede, _Description\nof Greenland_, p. 147; Holm, 'Ethnologisk Skizze af Angmagsalikerne,'\nin _Meddelelser om Gr\u00f6nland_, x. 93.]\n\n[Footnote 55: Wied-Neuwied, _op. cit._ ii. 40.]\n\n[Footnote 56: Bridges, 'Manners and Customs of the Firelanders,' in _A\nVoice for South America_, xiii. 206.]\n\n[Footnote 57: Salvado, _M\u00e9moires historiques sur l'Australie_, p. 277.\n_Cf._ Curr, _The Australian Race_, iii. 155; Gason, 'Dieyerie Tribe,'\nin Woods, _Native Tribes of South Australia_, p. 258; Mathew,\n'Australian Aborigines,' in _Jour. & Proceed. Roy. Soc. N. S. Wales_,\nxxiii. 388.]\n\n[Footnote 58: Lewin, _Wild Races of South-Eastern India_, p. 256.]\n\n[Footnote 59: Hodgson, _Miscellaneous Essays_, i. 123.]\n\n[Footnote 60: Shaw, in _Antananarivo Annual_, iii. 82.]\n\n[Footnote 61: Cailli\u00e9, _op. cit._ i. 352.]\n\n[Footnote 62: See _infra_, on the Subjection of Children.]\n\nAt a higher stage of civilisation reverence for parents reaches its\npitch, and the duty of maintaining them in their old age is taken for\na matter of course. Among the present Hindus \"it would certainly be\nregarded as a most disgraceful thing were a man who could do anything\nfor the support of an aged father or mother to allow the burden of\ntheir maintenance to fall on strangers\";[63] and it is common for\nunmarried soldiers to stint themselves almost to starvation point,\nthat they may send home money to their parents.[64] The priesthood of\nmodern Buddhism teach that children shall \"respect their parents, and\nperform all kinds of offices for them, even though they should have\nservants whom they could command to do all that they require.\"[65] At\nancient Athens, before a man could become a magistrate, evidence was\nto be produced that he had treated his parents properly; and a person\nwho refused his parents food and dwelling lost his right of speaking\nin the national assembly.[66] According to {537} the Icelandic Gr\u00e1g\u00e1s,\na man should maintain in the first place his mother, in the second his\nfather, in the third his own children.[67] The Talmud enjoins the duty\nof maintaining parents;[68] and so does Muhammedan law, \"if the\nparents are both poor and lastingly infirm, or both poor and\ninsane.\"[69]\n\n[Footnote 63: Wilkins, _Modern Hinduism_, p. 418.]\n\n[Footnote 64: Monier Williams, _Indian Wisdom_, p. 440, n. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 65: Hardy, _op. cit._ p. 494. _Cf._ _ibid._ p. 495.]\n\n[Footnote 66: Schmidt, _Ethik der alten Griechen_, ii. 144.]\n\n[Footnote 67: _Gr\u00e1g\u00e1s_, Omaga-balkr, 1, vol. i. 232.]\n\n[Footnote 68: Katz, _Der wahre Talmudjude_, p. 119.]\n\n[Footnote 69: Sachau, _op. cit._ p. 17 _sq._]\n\nChristianity, as will be shown, in one essential point changed the\nnotions of antiquity regarding children's duties towards their\nparents: it made these duties subordinate to men's duties towards God.\n\"Verily I say unto you, There is no man that hath left house, or\nbrethren, or sisters, or father, or mother, or wife, or children, or\nlands, for my sake, and the gospel's, but he shall receive an\nhundredfold now in this time, houses, and brethren, and sisters, and\nmothers, and children, and lands, with persecutions; and in the world\nto come eternal life.\"[70] There are numerous legends and lives of\nsaints in which the desertion of the nearest relations is recorded as\none of the leading features of their sanctity, and as one of their\nchief titles to honour.[71] Some Catholic writers were of opinion that\na man might lawfully abandon his parents, even though they could not\nbe supported without him, and enter religion, committing the care of\nthem to God. But Thomas Aquinas says that this would be tempting God,\nadding however that he who has already professed religion \"ought not,\non any plea of supporting his parents, to quit the cloister in which\nhe is buried with Christ, and entangle himself again in worldly\nbusiness.\"[72] Yet our duties towards our parents come next to our\nduties towards God. We ought to aid them when in want, and to\nsupplicate God in their behalf that they may lead prosperous and happy\nlives.[73]\n\n[Footnote 70: _St. Mark_, x. 29 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 71: _Cf._ Farrer, _Paganism and Christianity_, p. 196.]\n\n[Footnote 72: Thomas Aquinas, _Summa Theologica_, ii.-ii. 101. 4.]\n\n[Footnote 73: _Catechism of the Council of Trent_, iii. 5. 10 _sq._]\n\nThe duty of supporting aged parents has its root in {538} the\nsentiments of affection, gratitude, and regard, and, to some extent,\nin superstitious fear. However feeble they be, the parents have in\ntheir hands a powerful weapon--the curse; or, when they are dead,\ntheir ghosts may avenge their wrongs on their neglectful children. All\nthese circumstances will be discussed in the chapter dealing with the\nsubjection of children.\n\nWe have further to consider the duty of assisting brothers and sisters\nand more distant relatives. Among the Aleuts, says Veniaminof, a\nbrother \"must always aid his brother in war as well as in the chase,\nand each protect the other; but if anybody, disregarding this natural\nlaw, should go to live apart, caring only for himself, such a one\nshould be discarded by his relatives in case of attack by enemies or\nanimals, or in time of storms; and such dishonourable conduct would\nlead to general contempt.\"[74] Among the Point Barrow Eskimo \"the\nolder children take very good care of the smaller ones\";[75] and of\nthe Sia Indians (Pueblos) we are told that \"a marked trait is their\nloving kindness and care for younger brothers and sisters.\"[76] Dr.\nSchweinfurth writes:--\"Notwithstanding . . . that certain instances\nmay be alleged which seem to demonstrate that the character of the\nDinka is unfeeling, these cases never refer to such as are bound by\nthe ties of kindred. Parents do not desert their children, nor are\nbrothers faithless to brothers, but are ever prompt to render whatever\naid is possible.\"[77] I presume that these examples of fraternal\nrelations may, on the whole, be regarded as expressive of universal\nfacts. According to Confucius, the love which brother should bear to\nbrother is second only to that which is due from children to\nparents.[78]\n\n[Footnote 74: Veniaminof, quoted by Petroff, _loc. cit._ p. 155.]\n\n[Footnote 75: Murdoch, in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ ix. 417.]\n\n[Footnote 76: Stevenson, 'Sia,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ xi. 22.]\n\n[Footnote 77: Schweinfurth, _Heart of Africa_, i. 169.]\n\n[Footnote 78: Douglas, _Confucianism and Taouism_, p. 123.]\n\nThe duty of assisting more distant relatives is much more variable. It\nmay be said that, as a general rule, among {539} savages and\nbarbarians--with the exception, perhaps, of those who live in small\nfamily-groups--as also among the peoples of archaic culture, this duty\nis more prominent and extends further than amongst ourselves. The\nblood-tie has much greater strength, related families keep more\nclosely together for mutual protection and aid. The Angmagsaliks of\nEastern Greenland, says Lieutenant Holm, consider that the tie of\nblood imposes mutual assistance as a duty under all circumstances.[79]\nThe Omahas maintain that \"generosity cannot be exercised toward\nkindred, who have a natural right to our assistance.\"[80] Among the\nnatives of Madagascar \"the claims of relationship are distinctly\nrecognised by custom and law. If one branch of a family becomes poor,\nthe members of the same family support him; if he be sold into slavery\nfor debt, they often unite in furnishing the price of his redemption.\n. . . The laws facilitate and encourage, and sometimes even enforce,\nsuch acts of kindness.\"[81] In his description of the Australian\nBangerang, Mr. Curr observes, \"Though their ways were different from\nours, it always seemed to me that the bonds of friendship between\nblood relations were stronger, as a rule, with savages than amongst\nourselves.\"[82] Among the Philippine Islanders \"families are very\nunited, and claims for help and protection are admitted, however\ndistant the relationship may be.\"[83] Of the Burmans it is said, \"No\npeople can be more careful in preserving and acknowledging the bonds\nof family relationship to the remotest degrees, and not merely as a\nmatter of form, but as involving the duty of mutual assistance.\"[84]\nAmong the ancient Hindus, Persians, Greeks, and Romans, persons\nbelonging to the four generations of near relatives--the Sapindas,\nSyngeneis, Anchisteis, or Propinqui--were expected to assist {540}\neach other whenever it was needed.[85] The Scandinavians considered\nhim to be a bad man who did not help his kindred against strangers,\neven though there was enmity between the relatives.[86]\n\n[Footnote 79: Holm, in _Meddelelser om Gr\u00f6nland_, x. 87.]\n\n[Footnote 80: Dorsey, 'Omaha Sociology,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._\niii. 274.]\n\n[Footnote 81: Ellis, _History of Madagascar_, i. 138. _Cf._ Sibree,\n_The Great African Island_, p. 256 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 82: Curr, _Recollections of Squatting in Victoria_, p. 274.]\n\n[Footnote 83: Foreman, _Philippine Islands_, p. 186.]\n\n[Footnote 84: Forbes, _British Burma_, p. 59.]\n\n[Footnote 85: Leist, _Alt-arisches Jus Civile_, i. 47 _sqq._, 231 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 86: Rosenberg, _Nordboernes Aandsliv_, i. 488.]\n\nBut the duty of helping the needy and protecting those in danger goes\nbeyond the limits of the family and the _kin_. Uncivilised peoples\nare, as a rule, described as kind towards members of their own\ncommunity or tribe. Between themselves charity is enjoined as a duty,\nand generosity is praised as a virtue. Indeed, their customs regarding\nmutual aid are often much more stringent than our own. And this\napplies even to the lowest savages.[87]\n\n[Footnote 87: The prevalence of mutual aid in uncivilised communities\nhas been duly emphasised by Prince Kropotkin, _Mutual Aid_, p. 76 _sqq._]\n\n\"La disposition \u00e0 la g\u00e9n\u00e9rosit\u00e9,\" says M. Hyades, \"est un trait\ncharact\u00e9ristique des Fu\u00e9giens. Ils aiment \u00e0 partager ce qu'ils ont\navec tous ceux qui les entourent.\"[88] Captain Weddell likewise speaks\nof \"the philanthropic principle which these people exhibit towards one\nanother.\"[89] Burchell tells us that the Bushmans, between themselves,\n\"exercise the virtues of hospitality and generosity, often in an\nextraordinary degree.\"[90] The Veddahs of Ceylon are friendly towards\neach other, and ready to help a person in distress.[91] The Andamanese\ndisplay much mutual affection in their social relations, and\nfrequently make presents of the best that they possess. \"Every care\nand consideration,\" says Mr. Man, \"are paid by all classes to the very\nyoung, the weak, the aged, and the helpless, and these, being made\nspecial objects of interest and attention, invariably fare better in\nregard to the comforts and necessaries of daily life than any of the\notherwise more fortunate members of the community.\"[92] The Australian\nnatives are almost universally praised for their friendly behaviour\ntowards persons {541} belonging to their own people.[93] Presents\ngiven to one of a group are speedily divided as far as possible among\nthe rest, and when a black man has employment at a station he\ngenerally gives away most of his earnings to his comrades in the\ncamp.[94] \"Between the males of a tribe,\" says Mr. Curr, \"there always\nexists a strong feeling of brotherhood, so that, come weal come woe, a\nman can always calculate on the aid, in danger, of every member of his\ntribe.\"[95] Regarding the Central Australian natives, Messrs. Spencer\nand Gillen observe that their treatment of one another \"is marked on\nthe whole by considerable kindness, that is, of course, in the case of\nmembers of friendly groups, with every now and then the perpetration\nof acts of cruelty.\"[96] Collins says that the aborigines about Botany\nBay and Port Jackson \"applauded acts of kindness and generosity, for\nof both these they were capable.\"[97]\n\n[Footnote 88: Hyades and Deniker, _Mission scientifique du Cap Horn_,\nvii. 243.]\n\n[Footnote 89: Weddell, _op. cit._ p. 168. According to other\nauthorities, the Fuegians, though free from malevolence and cruelty,\nare not distinguished for active benevolence (Bridges, in _A Voice for\nSouth America_, xiii. 208, 213. Bove, _Patagonia_, pp. 133, 137.\nLovisato, 'Appunti etnografici sulla Terra del Fuoco,' in _Cosmos di\nGuida Cora_, viii. 145, 151. _Cf._ also Hyades and Deniker, _op. cit._\nvii. 238, 240, 243 _sq._).]\n\n[Footnote 90: Burchell, _Travels in the Interior of Southern Africa_,\nii. 54.]\n\n[Footnote 91: Sarasin, _Ergebnisse naturwissenschaftlicher Forschungen\nauf Ceylon_, iii. 545, 550. Schmidt, _Ceylon_, p. 276.]\n\n[Footnote 92: Man, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xii. 93 _sq._ _Cf._\nPortman, _ibid._ xxv. 368.]\n\n[Footnote 93: Curr, _The Australian Race_, i. 49. Hodgson,\n_Reminiscences of Australia_, p. 88. Oldfield, 'Aborigines of\nAustralia,' in _Trans. Ethn. Soc._ N.S. iii. 226. Eyre, _op. cit._ ii.\n385 _sq._ Brough Smyth, _op. cit._ ii. 279. Lumholtz, _Among\nCannibals_, p. 176. Mathew, in _Jour. & Proceed. Roy. Soc. N.S.\nWales_, xxiii. 387 _sq._ Breton, _Excursions in New South Wales_, p.\n218. Fison and Howitt, _op. cit._ p. 259. Wyatt, 'Manners and\nSuperstitions of the Adelaide and Encounter Bay Aboriginal Tribes,' in\nWoods, _Native Tribes of South Australia_, p. 162. Schuermann,\n'Aboriginal Tribes of Port Lincoln,' _ibid._ pp. 243, 244,\n247.]\n\n[Footnote 94: Schuermann, _loc. cit._ p. 244. Ridley, _K\u00e1milar\u00f3i_, p.\n158. Fison and Howitt, _op. cit._ p. 256. Lumholtz, _Among Cannibals_,\npp. 199, 343. Stirling, _Report of the Horn Expedition to Central\nAustralia. Part IV. Anthropology_, p. 36.]\n\n[Footnote 95: Curr, _The Australian Race_, i. 62.]\n\n[Footnote 96: Spencer and Gillen, _Native Tribes of Central\nAustralia_, p. 50.]\n\n[Footnote 97: Collins, _English Colony in New South Wales_, i. 549.]\n\nPassing to savages and barbarians who have reached a somewhat\nhigher level of culture:--We are told by Mr. Catlin, with reference to\nthe North American Indians, that, \"to their friends, there are no\npeople on earth that are more kind.\"[98] According to Adair, \"they are\nvery kind and liberal to every one of their own tribe, even to the\nlast morsel of food they enjoy\"; Nature's school \"teaches them the\nplain easy rule, 'do to others, as you would be done by.'\"[99] Harmon\npraises the generosity of the Indians:--\"They are more ready, in\nproportion to their means, to assist a neighbour who may be in want,\nthan the inhabitants, generally, of civilised countries. An Indian\nrarely kills an animal, without sending a part of it to a neighbour if\nhe has one near him.\"[100] The Naudowessies \"supply the deficiency of\ntheir friends with any superfluity of their own,\" and \"in dangers they\nreadily give assistance to those of their band {542} who stand in need\nof it, without any expectation of return.\"[101] Among the Iroquois\n\"kindness to the orphan, hospitality to all, and a common brotherhood,\nwere among the doctrines held up for acceptance by their religious\ninstructors\"; an Iroquois \"would surrender his dinner to feed the\nhungry, vacate his bed to refresh the weary, and give up his apparel\nto clothe the naked.\"[102] Among the Omahas grades of merit or bravery\nwere of two sorts: to the first class belonged such as had given to\nthe poor on many occasions, and had invited guests to many feasts. To\nthe second class belonged those who, besides having done these things\nmany times, had killed several of the foe, and had brought home many\nhorses. When a person sees a poor man or woman, they said, he should\nmake presents to the unfortunate being; thus he can gain the goodwill\nof Wakanda as well as that of his own people.[103] The Ahts of\nVancouver Island succour any one in need of help, without looking for\nany ulterior benefit.[104] The Aleuts were instructed to be kind to\nothers and to refrain from selfishness; it was the custom for the\nsuccessful hunter or fisher, particularly in times of scarcity, to\nshare his prize with all, not only taking no larger share, but often\nless than the others.[105] Among the Eskimo about Behring Strait,\nwhenever a successful trader accumulates property and food, and is\nknown to work solely for his own welfare, he becomes an object of\nenmity and hatred among his fellow-villagers, which ends in one of two\nways--the villagers may compel him to make a feast and distribute his\ngoods, or they may kill him and divide his property among\nthemselves.[106] According to the Greenland creed, all those who had\nstriven and suffered for the benefit of their fellow-men should find a\nhappy existence after death in the abodes of the supreme being,\nTornarsuk.[107] \"The Greenlander,\" says Dr. Nansen, \"is the most\ncompassionate of creatures with regard to his neighbour. His first\nsocial law is to help others.\"[108] Captain Hall holds an equally\nfavourable opinion of those Eskimo with whom he came in contact. \"As\nbetween themselves,\" he says, \"there can be no people exceeding them\nin this virtue kindness of heart. Take, for instance, times of great\nscarcity of food. If one family happens to have any provisions on\n{543} hand, these are shared with all their neighbours. If one man is\nsuccessful in capturing a seal, though his family may need it all to\nsave them from the pangs of hunger, yet the whole of his people about,\nincluding the poor, the widow, the fatherless, are at once invited to\na seal-feast.\"[109] They believe that all Innuits who have been good,\n\"that is, who have been kind to the poor and hungry,\" will after death\ngo to Koodleparmiung, or heaven, whereas those who have been bad,\n\"that is, unkind to one another,\" will go to Adleparmeun, or\nhell.[110] Many of the South American peoples are praised for their\nkind disposition of mind;[111] the Guiana Indians seemed to a\nChristian missionary to be \"generous to a fault.\"[112] The Caribs had\nall their interests in common, lived in great harmony, and loved each\nother heartily.[113]\n\n[Footnote 98: Catlin, _North American Indians_, ii. 241.]\n\n[Footnote 99: Adair, _History of the American Indians_, pp. 431, 429.]\n\n[Footnote 100: Harmon, _op. cit._ p. 349.]\n\n[Footnote 101: Carver, _op. cit._ p. 247.]\n\n[Footnote 102: Morgan, _League of the Iroquois_, pp. 172, 329.]\n\n[Footnote 103: Dorsey, 'Omaha Sociology,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._\niii. 333, 274. _Cf._ _Idem_, 'Siouan Sociology,' _ibid._ xv. 232\n(Kansas).]\n\n[Footnote 104: Sproat, _op. cit._ p. 166.]\n\n[Footnote 105: Veniaminof, quoted by Petroff, _loc. cit._ p. 155, and\nDall, _Alaska_, p. 392.]\n\n[Footnote 106: Nelson, 'Eskimo about Bering Strait,' in _Ann. Rep.\nBur. Ethn._ xviii. 305.]\n\n[Footnote 107: Rink, _Greenland_, p. 141.]\n\n[Footnote 108: Nansen, _First Crossing of Greenland_, ii. 304. _Cf._\n_ibid._ ii. 334; Nansen, _Eskimo Life_, pp. 116, 177; Egede, _op.\ncit._ pp. 123, 126 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 109: Hall, _Arctic Researches_, p. 567.]\n\n[Footnote 110: _Ibid._ p. 571 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 111: von Martius, _Beitr\u00e4ge zur Ethnographie Amerika's_,\ni. 217, 641 (Guarayos, Macusis). Musters, _op. cit._ p. 195\n(Patagonians).]\n\n[Footnote 112: Brett, _Indian Tribes of Guiana_, p. 276.]\n\n[Footnote 113: de Poircy-Rochefort, _Histoire naturelle et morale des\nIles Antilles_, p. 460.]\n\nAmong the Tonga Islanders the sentiment of humanity, or a\nfellow-feeling for one another, is universally approved. They \"are not\nonly not selfish, but admire liberality, and are practically liberal.\"\nWhen any one is about to eat, he always shares what he has with those\nabout him without any hesitation, and not to do so would be considered\nexceedingly vile and selfish. So, also, \"if one chief sees something\nin the possession of another, which he has a strong desire to have, he\nhas only to ask him for it, and in all probability it is readily and\nliberally given.\"[114] Not even the Fijians, who took great pains to\ninstil into the minds of their youth a contempt for compassionate\nimpulses and an admiration for relentless cruelty,[115] were destitute\nof humanity and friendly feelings.[116] In Aneiteum, of the New\nHebrides, the people believed that the sin which would be visited with\nthe severest punishment in the land of the dead was stinginess or\nniggardliness in giving away food, and that the virtue which received\nthe highest reward was a generous hospitality and a giving liberally\nat feasts.[117] In Tana, another island belonging to the same group,\n\"one man has only to ask anything from his neighbours, and he gets\nit.\"[118] Of the New Caledonians Mr. Atkinson states that, among\nthemselves, they are \"of a generosity that seems to arise mainly from\naversion to refuse any request.\"[119] The Dyaks are described as\nhospitable, {544} kindly, and humane, \"to a degree which well might\nshame ourselves\";[120] whilst the practice of head-hunting is carried\non by every tribe at the expense of its neighbour, the members of each\ncommunity have strong feelings of sympathy for each other.[121] Among\nthe Sea Dyaks, says Grassland, \"if any are sick or unable to work, the\nrest help; and there seems to me a much stronger bond of union amongst\nthem than I have ever seen among the labouring classes in England.\"[122]\n\n[Footnote 114: Mariner, _op. cit._ ii. 153, 154, 165.]\n\n[Footnote 115: Erskine, _Cruise among the Islands of the Western\nPacific_, p. 247.]\n\n[Footnote 116: _Ibid._ pp. 247, 273. Williams and Calvert, _op. cit._\npp. 93, 115 _sq._ Seemann, _Viti_, p. 192.]\n\n[Footnote 117: Inglis, _In the New Hebrides_, p. 31.]\n\n[Footnote 118: Campbell, _A Year in the New Hebrides_, p. 169.]\n\n[Footnote 119: Atkinson, in _Folk-Lore_, xiv. 248.]\n\n[Footnote 120: Boyle, _Adventures among the Dyaks of Borneo_, p. 215.]\n\n[Footnote 121: Bock, _Head-Hunters of Borneo_, p. 210 _sq._ Brooke,\n_Ten Years in Sar\u00e1wak_, i. 57.]\n\n[Footnote 122: Crossland, quoted by Ling Roth, _Natives of Sarawak_,\ni. 85.]\n\nThe Santals are gentle and very obliging, and sociable to a fault\namong their own people.[123] The Hos \"are charitable to those\ndeserving aid.\"[124] The Todas believe that, after death, the souls of\ngood people will have enjoyment in heaven, whilst the souls of bad\npeople will suffer punishment; \"a good man is, in the Toda estimation,\none who is given to deeds of charity, and a bad man one who is\nuncharitable (this in order of precedence), quarrelsome, thieving,\n&c.\"[125] Mr. Batchelor states that \"a more kind, gentle, and\nsympathetic people than the Ainos of Japan would be very difficult to\nfind\"; anything given to them they always divide with their\nfriends.[126] The Samoyedes are ready to share their last morsel with\ntheir companions; and it is said that nobody can surpass the poor\nOstyak in benevolence and other virtues of the heart.[127] \"The finest\ntrait in the character of a Bedouin (next to good faith),\" Burckhardt\nobserves, \"is his kindness, benevolence, and charity. . . . Among\nthemselves, the Bedouins constitute a nation of brothers; often\nquarrelling, it must be owned, with each other, but ever ready, when\nat peace, to give mutual assistance.\"[128] Generosity is a virtue\nwhich always commands particular respect in the desert.[129] The Arabs\nof the Soudan have a saying that \"you must always put other people's\nthings on your head, and your own under your arm. Then, if there be\ndanger of the things falling off your head, you must raise your arm,\nand let fall your own things to save those of others.\"[130]\n\n[Footnote 123: Man, _Sonthalia_, p. 19 _sq._ Hunter, _Annals of Rural\nBengal_, i. 215.]\n\n[Footnote 124: Tickell, 'Memoir on the Hod\u00e9sum,' in _Jour. Asiatic\nSoc. Bengal_, ix. (pt. ii.) 807.]\n\n[Footnote 125: Thurston, 'Todas of the Nilgiris,' in the Madras\nGovernment Museum's _Bulletin_, i. 166 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 126: Batchelor, _Ainu of Japan_, p. 19. Holland, 'Ainos,' in\n_Jour. Anthr. Inst._ iii. 235.]\n\n[Footnote 127: Castr\u00e9n, _op. cit._ i. 238; ii. 55.]\n\n[Footnote 128: Burckhardt, _Notes on the Bedouins and Wah\u00e1bys_, p. 208.]\n\n[Footnote 129: Wallin, _Reseanteckningar fr\u00e5n Orienten_, iii. 244.\nBlunt, _Bedouin Tribes of the Euphrates_, ii. 224.]\n\n[Footnote 130: Richardson, _Mission to Central Africa_, i. 117.]\n\n{545} The Barea are a benevolent people, kind even to\nstrangers.[131] The Manganja, in the neighbourhood of Lake Nyassa,\n\"are generous in the distribution of food,\" and even when starving\nthey share the last morsel with their friends.[132] Sir H. Johnston\nsays that he has never met with \"a more kindly, sensible, considerate\nset of beings\" than the Wa-taveita.[133] The Eastern Central Africans,\nthe Rev. D. Macdonald observes, \"are not mere animals composed of\ngreed and selfishness. They often shew great bravery and devotedness.\nI can point to one man who saved my life on three separate occasions\nat the risk of his own.\"[134] Among the Bechuanas a regard for the\npoor, for widows, and for orphans, is everywhere considered to be a\nsacred duty.[135] Among all the virtues the Basutos appreciate none\nmore than kindness. They have a saying that \"one link only sounds\nbecause of another\"--which implies that we cannot do without the help\nof our fellow-creatures,--and another saying that \"one does not skin\none's game without showing it to one's friends\"--that is, when we have\nbeen successful in our undertakings, it becomes us to be generous. If\nany food is brought to them while they are in each other's society,\nhowever small may be the quantity, every one must have a taste.[136]\nThe Kafirs are a kindly race; Lichtenstein says that \"whenever anyone\nkills an ox he must invite all his neighbours to partake of it, and\nthey remain his guests till the whole is eaten.\"[137] Of the\nHottentots Kolben states:--\"They are certainly the most friendly, the\nmost liberal, and the most benevolent people to one another that ever\nappear'd upon earth . . . . They are charmed with opportunities of\nobliging each other, and one of their greatest pleasures lies in\ninterchanging gifts and good offices.\"[138] \"A Hottentot,\" says\nBarrow, \"would share his last morsel with his companions.\"[139] Drury\nwrote of the people of Madagascar:--\"They certainly treat one another\nwith more humanity than we do. Here is no one miserable, if it is in\nthe power of his neighbours to help him. Here is love, tenderness, and\ngenerosity which might {546} shame us; and . . . . this is . . . . all\nover the island.\"[140] Ellis likewise observes that, in Madagascar,\nassisting in distress, and lending and borrowing property and money,\nare carried on much more commonly and freely than amongst neighbours\nor relatives in England, and that a kindness of heart in these things\nis always esteemed excellent.[141]\n\n[Footnote 131: Munzinger, _Ostafrikanische Studien_, p. 534.]\n\n[Footnote 132: Rowley, _Africa Unveiled_, p. 47.]\n\n[Footnote 133: Johnston, _Kilima-njaro Expedition_, p. 436.]\n\n[Footnote 134: Macdonald, _Africana_, i. 270, 266.]\n\n[Footnote 135: Arbousset and Daumas, _Exploratory Tour to the\nNorth-East of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope_, p. 402.]\n\n[Footnote 136: Casalis, _Basutos_, pp. 206, 207, 301, 306, 309 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 137: Leslie, _Among the Zulus and Amatongas_, p. 203.\nLichtenstein, _Travels in Southern Africa_, i. 272.]\n\n[Footnote 138: Kolben, _Present State of the Cape of Good Hope_, i.\n334 _sq._ _Cf._ _ibid._ i. 167.]\n\n[Footnote 139: Barrow, _Travels into the Interior of Southern Africa_,\ni. 151.]\n\n[Footnote 140: Drury, _Adventures during Fifteen Years' Captivity on\nthe Island of Madagascar_, p. 172 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 141: Ellis, _History of Madagascar_, i. 139. For other\nAfrican instances, see Mungo Park, _Travels in the Interior of\nAfrica_, p. 17 (Mandingoes); Burton, _Abeokuta_, i. 303 (Yoruba);\n_Idem_, _Two Trips to Gorilla Land_, i. 106 (Mpongwe); Monrad,\n_Guinea-Kysten og dens Indbyggere_, p. 7; Johnston, _River Congo_, p.\n423 (races of the Upper Congo); Wilson and Felkin, _op. cit._ i. 225\n(Waganda).]\n\nAmong many savages the old people, in particular, have a claim to\nsupport and assistance, not only from their own children or relatives,\nbut from the younger members of the community generally.\n\nAmong the Australian natives the old men get the best and largest\nshare of everything, and are allowed to monopolise the youngest and\nbest-looking women, whilst a young man must consider himself fortunate\nif he can get an old woman for wife.[142] Among the Tonga Islanders\n\"every aged man and woman enjoys the attentions and services of the\nyounger branches of society.\"[143] In the Kingsmill Islands\n\"generosity, hospitality, and attention to the aged and infirm are\nvirtues highly esteemed and generally practised among all the\nnatives.\"[144] Among the Kafirs, when persons advanced in years become\nsick and helpless, \"everyone is eager to afford them assistance.\"[145]\nIn the opinion of the Aleuts, \"feeble old men must be respected and\nattended when they need aid, and the young and strong should give them\na share of their booty and help them through all their troubles,\nendeavouring to obtain in exchange their good advice only.\"[146]\n\n[Footnote 142: Eyre, _op. cit._ ii. 385 _sq._ Mathew, in _Jour. &\nProceed. Roy. Soc. N.S. Wales_, xxiii. 407. Lumholtz, _Among\nCannibals_, p. 163. _Cf._ Grey, _Journals of Two Expeditions of\nDiscovery in North-West and Western Australia_, ii. 248; Brough Smyth,\n_op. cit._ i. 138; Spencer and Gillen, _Native Tribes of Central\nAustralia_, p. 51.]\n\n[Footnote 143: Mariner, _op. cit._ ii. 155.]\n\n[Footnote 144: Hale, _U.S. Exploring Expedition. Vol. VI. Ethnography\nand Philology_, p. 95.]\n\n[Footnote 145: Lichtenstein, _op. cit._ i. 265.]\n\n[Footnote 146: Veniaminof, quoted by Petroff, _loc. cit._ p. 155.]\n\nThe sick, also, are often very carefully attended to.\n\nAmong the coast tribes of British Columbia Mr. Duncan \"always found\none or two nurses to an invalid, if the case was {547} at all bad; the\nsympathy of the nurses, too, seemed very great.\"[147] Beechey says of\nthe wild Indians of Upper California:--\"The very great care taken of\nall those who are affected with any disease ought not to be allowed to\nescape a remark. When any of their relations are indisposed, the\ngreatest attention is paid to their wants.\"[148] Keating noticed the\nkind and humane treatment which the Potawatomis extended even to the\nidiots.[149] The Koriaks \"carefully attend those who are sick.\"[150]\nThe same is said of the Ainos of Japan,[151] and the Tagbanuas of the\nPhilippine Islands.[152] In Sarawak no relative is abandoned because\nan injury or illness may have incapacitated him for work.[153] When a\nDyak is ill at home, the women nurse the patient in turn.[154] In\nSamoa \"the treatment of the sick was invariably humane.\"[155] In\nTana,[156] Humphrey's Island,[157] Erromanga,[158] and Tasmania,[159]\nthey were likewise kindly attended to; and the same is the case at\nleast among many of the Australian tribes.[160] Concerning the\naborigines of Herbert River, in Northern Queensland, Lumholtz\nwrites:--\"The natives are very kind and sympathetic towards those who\nare ill, and they carry them from camp to camp. This is the only noble\ntrait I discovered in the Australian natives.\"[161] In various parts\nof Australia the blind, and especially the aged blind, are carefully\ntended; travellers on the northern coast of the continent have noticed\nthat these are generally the fattest of the company, being supplied\nwith the best of everything.[162] \"No trait in the character of the\nMalagasy,\" says Ellis, \"is more creditable to their humanity, and more\ngratifying to our benevolent feelings, than the kind, patient, and\naffectionate manner in which they attend upon the sick.\"[163] A\nsimilar praise is bestowed upon the {548} Mandingoes[164] and\nKafirs.[165] Among the Zulus, says Mr. J. Tyler, \"work, however\nimportant, is at once suspended that they may help their afflicted\nfriends.\"[166]\n\n[Footnote 147: Duncan, quoted by Mayne, _Four Years in British\nColumbia_, p. 292 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 148: Beechey, _op. cit._ ii. 402.]\n\n[Footnote 149: Keating, _Expedition to the Source of St. Peter's\nRiver_, i. 100.]\n\n[Footnote 150: Krasheninnikoff, _op. cit._ p. 233.]\n\n[Footnote 151: von Siebold, _Die Aino auf der Insel Yesso_, p. 11.]\n\n[Footnote 152: Worcester, _Philippine Islands_, p. 494.]\n\n[Footnote 153: St. John, _Life in the Forests of the Far East_, ii. 323.]\n\n[Footnote 154: Bock, _Head-Hunters of Borneo_, p. 211.]\n\n[Footnote 155: Turner, _Samoa_, p. 141. _Cf._ Pritchard, _Polynesian\nReminiscences_, p. 146.]\n\n[Footnote 156: Turner, _Samoa_, p. 323.]\n\n[Footnote 157: _Ibid._ p. 276.]\n\n[Footnote 158: Robertson, _Erromanga_, p. 399.]\n\n[Footnote 159: Ling Roth, _Aborigines of Tasmania_, p. 47. Bonwick,\n_Daily Life and Origin of the Tasmanians_, p. 10.]\n\n[Footnote 160: Brough Smyth, _op. cit._ ii. 284 (West Australian\nnatives). Schuermann, 'Aboriginal Tribes of Port Lincoln,' in Woods,\n_Native Tribes of South Australia_, p. 225.]\n\n[Footnote 161: Lumholtz, _Among Cannibals_, p. 183.]\n\n[Footnote 162: Ridley, _K\u00e1milar\u00f3i_, p. 169. Eyre, _op. cit._ ii. 382\nBarrington, _History of New South Wales_, p. 23. Stirling, _op. cit._\np. 36.]\n\n[Footnote 163: Ellis, _History of Madagascar_, i. 231 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 164: Cailli\u00e9, _op. cit._ i. 354.]\n\n[Footnote 165: Lichtenstein, _op. cit._ i. 266.]\n\n[Footnote 166: Tyler, _Forty Years among the Zulus_, p. 195.]\n\nWhilst the information which I have been able to gather on the social\ncustoms of uncivilised races seems to indicate that, in the majority\nof cases, mutual kindness and goodwill prevail within their\ncommunities, there are not wanting statements of a different\ncharacter. But these statements are, after all, exceptional, and some\nof them are either ambiguous or obviously inexact. Only too often\ntravellers represent to us the savage, not as he is in his daily life\namidst his own people, but as he behaves towards his enemy, or towards\na stranger who enters his country uninvited. As an experienced\nobserver remarks, \"the savage, passionate and furious with the feeling\nof revenge, slaughtering and devouring his enemy and drinking his\nblood, is no longer the same being as when cultivating his fields in\npeace; and it would be as unjust to estimate his general character by\nhis actions in these moments of unrestrained passion, as to judge of\nEuropeans by the excesses of an excited soldiery or an infuriated\nmob.\"[167] Moreover, many accounts of savages date from a period when\nthey have already been affected by contact with a \"higher culture,\" as\nwe call it, a culture which almost universally has proved to exercise\na deteriorating influence on the character of the lower races. Among\nthe North American Indians, for instance, \"there was more good-will,\nhospitality, and charity, practised towards one another\" before white\npeople came and resided among them;[168] whereas contact with\ncivilisation has made them \"false, suspicious, avaricious and\nhard-hearted.\"[169] As has been truly said, \"search modern history,\nand in the North {549} and South and East and West the story is ever\nthe same--we come, we civilise, and we corrupt or exterminate.\"[170]\n\n[Footnote 167: Dieffenbach, _Travels in New Zealand_, ii. 130 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 168: Warren, in Schoolcraft, _Indian Tribes of the United\nStates_, ii. 139.]\n\n[Footnote 169: Domenech, _Seven Years' Residence in the Great Deserts\nof North America_, ii. 69.]\n\n[Footnote 170: Boyle, _op. cit._ p. 108.]\n\nAmong the semi-civilised and civilised nations charity has universally\nbeen regarded as a duty, and has often been strenuously enjoined by\ntheir religions. When Spain and Peru first came into contact, the\nAmericans surpassed the Spaniards in brotherly love and systematic\ncare for the needy. They had a poor-law according to which the blind,\nlame, aged, and infirm, who could not till their own lands so as to\nclothe and feed themselves, should receive sustenance from the public\nstores.[171] The ancient Mexicans, according to Clavigero, seemed to\ngive without reluctance what had cost them the utmost labour to\nacquire.[172] \"The great virtue of the Coreans is their innate respect\nfor and daily practice of the laws of human brotherhood. Mutual\nassistance and generous hospitality among themselves are distinctive\nnational traits.\"[173] According to Chinese law, \"all poor destitute\nwidowers and widows, the fatherless and childless, the helpless and\nthe infirm, shall receive sufficient maintenance and protection from\nthe magistrates of their native city or district, whenever they have\nneither relations nor connections upon whom they can depend for\nsupport.\"[174] \"Benevolence,\" said Confucius, \"is more to man than\neither water or fire.\"[175] To assist the needy, to feed the hungry,\nto clothe the naked, to succour the sick, to save men in danger--these\nand similar acts of kindness are, according to Chinese beliefs, merits\nwhich will be rewarded by the unseen powers that watch human conduct,\nwhereas the uncharitable and parsimonious are threatened with divine\npunishments.[176] In a book of Buddhistic-Confucian flavour, {550} as\nfamiliar to the youth of Japan as the Sermon on the Mount is to us, it\nis said, \"Above all things, men must practise charity; it is by\nalmsgiving that wisdom is fed.\"[177] According to the Dhammapada, \"the\nuncharitable do not go to the world of the gods; fools only do not\npraise liberality; a wise man rejoices in liberality, and through it\nbecomes blessed in the other world.\"[178] Indeed, in the didactic\npoetry of Buddhism the virtue of beneficence occupies the most\nprominent place; without any regard to what is the measure of the real\nbenefit thereby extended to the recipient of the gift, the legends set\nbefore us as a duty the most unbounded generosity, pushed even to the\nextreme of self-destruction.[179] And in its conception of charity and\nliberality, as in all other points of worldly morality, Buddhism does\nnot differ from the standard recognised in India since ancient\ntimes.[180] Already in the Vedic hymns praise is bestowed on those who\nfrom their abundance willingly dispense to the needy, on those who do\nnot turn away from the hungry, on those who are kind to the poor.[181]\nIn the Hitopadesa it is said that the good man shows pity even to the\nworthless, as the moon does not withdraw its light even from a member\nof the lowest caste.[182] The sacred law-books of India are full of\nprescriptions enjoining almsgiving as a duty on all twice-born\nmen.[183] \"A householder must give as much food as he is able to spare\nto those who do not cook for themselves, and to all beings one must\ndistribute food without detriment to one's own interest.\"[184] The\nstudent \"should always without sloth give alms out of whatever he has\nfor food.\"[185] The Br\u00e2hmana who has completed his studentship should\nwithout tiring \"perform works of {551} charity with faith.\"[186]\nAlmsgiving confers merit on the giver, it frees him from guilt, it\ndestroys sin;[187] \"for whatever purpose a man bestows any gift, for\nthat purpose he receives in his next birth with due honour its\nreward.\"[188] On the other hand, he who cooks for himself alone eats\nnothing but sin.[189] Speaking of the modern Hindus, Mr. Wilkins\nobserves:--\"The charity of the Hindus is great. . . . There is no\npoor-law in India, no guardians of the poor, no workhouses, excepting\nfor the Europeans in the Presidency towns. The poor of a family, the\nhalt, the lame, the blind, the weak, the insane, are provided for by\ntheir family, if it is at all able to do it; in cases where there are\nfew or no relatives, then the burden is taken up by others. It is a\n'work of merit.'\"[190]\n\n[Footnote 171: Garcilasso de fa Vega, _First Part of the Royal\nCommentaries of the Yncas_, ii. 34.]\n\n[Footnote 172: Clavigero, _History of Mexico_, i. 81.]\n\n[Footnote 173: Griffis, _Corea_, p. 288.]\n\n[Footnote 174: _Ta Tsing Leu Lee_, sec. lxxxix. p. 93. On the\ncharitable institutions of the Chinese, see Staunton, _ibid._ p. 93 n.\n*; Smith, _Chinese Characteristics_, p. 186 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 175: Douglas, _Confucianism and Taouism_, p. 109.]\n\n[Footnote 176: 'Merits and Errors Scrutinized,' in _Indo-Chinese\nGleaner_, iii. 159, 161 _sqq._ _Th\u00e2i Shang_, 3. 'Divine Panorama,' in\nGiles, _Strange Stories from a Chinese Studio_, ii. 370, 371, 374, 379.\nDouglas, _Confucianism and Taouism_, pp. 259, 272 _sq._ Davis,\n_China_, ii. 48. Edkins, _Religion in China_, p. 89 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 177: Chamberlain, _Things Japanese_, p. 309.]\n\n[Footnote 178: _Dhammapada_, 177.]\n\n[Footnote 179: Oldenberg, _Buddha_, p. 301.]\n\n[Footnote 180: _Cf._ Kern, _Manual of Indian Buddhism_, p. 72.]\n\n[Footnote 181: _Rig-Veda_, x. 117. Kaegi, _Rigveda_, p. 18.]\n\n[Footnote 182: _Hitopadesa_, Mitral\u00e2bh\u00e2, 63.]\n\n[Footnote 183: _Gautama_, v. 21; x. 1 _sq._ _Institutes of Vishnu_,\nlix. 28. _Baudh\u00e2yana_, ii. 7. 13. 5. _Laws of Manu_, ix. 333; x. 75,\n79; xi. 1 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 184: _Laws of Manu_, iv. 32.]\n\n[Footnote 185: _Anug\u00eet\u00e2_, 31.]\n\n[Footnote 186: _Laws of Manu_, iv. 226. _Cf._ _ibid._ iv. 227.]\n\n[Footnote 187: _Institutes of Vishnu_, lix. 15, 30; ch. xc. _sqq._\n_Gautama_, xix. 11, 16. _Vasishtha_, xx. 47; xxii. 8. _Laws of Manu_,\niii. 95; iv. 229 _sqq._; xi. 228.]\n\n[Footnote 188: _Laws of Manu_, iv. 234.]\n\n[Footnote 189: _Institutes of Vishnu_, lxvii. 43. _Laws of Manu_, iii.\n118. _Cf._ _Rig-Veda_, x. 117. 6.]\n\n[Footnote 190: Wilkins, _Modern Hinduism_, p. 416 _sq._]\n\nOf the ancient Persians Thucydides said that they preferred giving to\nreceiving.[191] To be charitable towards the poor of their own faith\nwas among them a religious duty of the first order.[192] Zoroaster\nthus addressed V\u00eesht\u00e2spa:--\"Let no thought of Angra Mainyu ever infect\nthee, so that thou shouldst indulge in evil lusts, make derision and\nidolatry, and shut to the poor the door of thy house.\"[193] The holy\nSraosha is the protector of the poor.[194] In the Sh\u00e2yast it is said\nthat the clothing of the soul in the next world is formed out of\nalmsgiving.[195]\n\n[Footnote 191: Thucydides, ii. 97. 4.]\n\n[Footnote 192: See Geiger, _Civilization of the Eastern Ir[=a]nians_,\ni. 164 _sqq._; Mills, in _Sacred Books of the East_, xxxi. p. xxii.]\n\n[Footnote 193: _Yasts_, xxiv. 37.]\n\n[Footnote 194: _Ibid._ xi. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 195: _Sh\u00e2yast L\u00e2-Sh\u00e2yast_, xii. 4. _Cf._ _Bundahis_, xxx. 28.]\n\nIt seems that among the ancient Egyptians charity was considered no\nless meritorious.[196] \"The god,\" M. Maspero observes, \"does not\nconfine his favour to the prosperous and the powerful of this world;\nhe bestows it also upon {552} the poor. His will is that they be fed\nand clothed, and exempted from tasks beyond their strength; that they\nbe not oppressed, and that unnecessary tears be spared them.\"[197] In\nthe memorial inscriptions, where the dead plead their good deeds,\ncharity is often referred to. \"I harmed not a child,\" says one\nEgyptian, \"I injured not a widow; there was neither beggar nor needy\nin my time; none were hungered, widows were cared for as though their\nhusbands were still alive.\"[198] In the inscription in honour of a\nlady who had been charitable to persons of her own sex, whether girls,\nwives, or widows, it is said, \"The god rewarded me for this, rejoicing\nme with the happiness which he has granted me for walking after his\nway.\"[199]\n\n[Footnote 196: Brugsch, _History of Egypt under the Pharaohs_, i. 29\n_sq._ Tiele, _History of the Egyptian Religion_, p. 226 _sq._ Renouf,\n_Hibbert Lectures on the Religion of Egypt_, p. 72 _sqq._ Am\u00e9lineau,\n_L'\u00e9volution des id\u00e9es morales dans l'\u00c9gypt Ancienne_, pp. 145, 354.]\n\n[Footnote 197: Maspero, _Dawn of Civilization_, p. 191. _Cf._\nSchiapparelli, _Del sentimento religioso degli antichi egiziani_, p.\n18; Am\u00e9lineau, _op. cit._ p. 268.]\n\n[Footnote 198: Wiedemann, _Religion of the Ancient Egyptians_, p. 253.]\n\n[Footnote 199: Renouf, _op. cit._ p. 75.]\n\nCharity was urgently insisted upon by the religious law of the\nHebrews.[200] \"Thou shalt open thine hand wide unto thy brother, to\nthy poor, and to thy needy, in thy land\"; \"for this thing the Lord thy\nGod shall bless thee in all thy works, and in all that thou puttest\nthine hand unto.\"[201] Even \"if thine enemy be hungry, give him bread\nto eat; and if he be thirsty, give him water to drink: . . . the Lord\nshall reward thee.\"[202] Especially in the Old Testament Apocrypha and\nin Rabbinical literature almsgiving assumed an excessive\nprominence--so much so that the word which in the older writings means\n\"righteousness\" in general, came to be used for almsgiving in\nparticular.[203] \"Shut up alms in thy storehouses: and it shall\ndeliver thee from all affliction.\"[204] \"As water will quench a\nflaming fire, so alms maketh an atonement for sins.\"[205] \"For alms\ndoth deliver from death, and shall purge away all sin. Those that\nexercise alms and {553} righteousness shall be filled with life.\"[206]\nThe charitable man is rewarded with the birth of male issue.[207]\nAlmsgiving is equal in value to all other commandments.[208] He who\naverts his eyes from charity commits a sin equal to idolatry.[209] To\nsuch an extreme was almsgiving carried on by the Jews, that some\nRabbis at length decreed that no man should give above a fifth part of\nhis goods in charity.[210]\n\n[Footnote 200: _Deuteronomy_, xiv. 29; xv. 7 _sqq._; xvi. 11, 14.\n_Leviticus_, xix. 9 _sq._; xxv. 35.]\n\n[Footnote 201: _Deuteronomy_, xv. 11, 10.]\n\n[Footnote 202: _Proverbs_, xxv. 21 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 203: Addis, 'Alms,' in _Encyclop\u00e6dia Biblica_, i. 118. _Cf._\nMontefiore, _Hibbert Lectures on the Religion of the Ancient Hebrews_,\np. 484 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 204: _Ecclesiasticus_, xxix. 12.]\n\n[Footnote 205: _Ibid._ iii. 30.]\n\n[Footnote 206: _Tobit_, xii. 9. _Cf._ _ibid._ i. 3, 16; ii. 14; iv. 7\n_sqq._; xii. 8.]\n\n[Footnote 207: _Bava Bathra_, fol. 10 B, quoted by Hershon, _Treasures\nof the Talmud_, p. 24.]\n\n[Footnote 208: Rab Assi, quoted by Kohler, 'Alms,' in _Jewish\nEncyclopedia_, i. 435.]\n\n[Footnote 209: _Kethuboth_, fol. 68 A, quoted by Katz, _Der wahre\nTalmudjude_, p. 36.]\n\n[Footnote 210: Katz, _op. cit._ p. 42.]\n\nAlmsgiving, prayer, and fasting were the three cardinal disciplines\nwhich the synagogue transmitted to both the Christian Church and the\nMuhammedan mosque.[211] According to Islam, the duty next in\nimportance to prayer is that of giving alms.[212] Muhammed repeatedly\nannounces that the path which leads to God is the helping of the\norphans and the relieving of the poor.[213] \"Ye cannot attain to\nrighteousness until ye expend in alms of what ye love.\"[214] \"Those\nwho expend their wealth by night and day, secretly and openly, they\nshall have their hire with their lord.\"[215] It is said that \"prayer\ncarries us half-way to God, fasting brings us to the door of His\npalace, and alms procure us admission.\"[216] Certain alms, called\nZak\u00e2t, are prescribed by law; it is an indispensable duty for every\nMuhammedan of full age to bestow in charity about one-fortieth of all\nsuch property as has been a year in his possession, provided that he\nhas sufficient for his subsistence and has an income equivalent to\nabout \u00a35 per annum.[217] Other charitable gifts are voluntary, and\nconfer merit upon the giver.\n\n[Footnote 211: _Cf._ _Tobit_, xii. 8; Kohler, in _Jewish\nEncyclopedia_, i. 435.]\n\n[Footnote 212: See Sale's 'Preliminary Discourse,' in Wherry,\n_Commentary on the Qur\u00e1n_, i. 172; Lane, _Manners and Customs of the\nModern Egyptians_, p. 105.]\n\n[Footnote 213: _Koran_, ii. 267, 269, 275; viii. 42; ix. 60; xc. 12,\n14 _sq._; xciii. 6 _sqq._; &c.]\n\n[Footnote 214: _Ibid._ iii. 86.]\n\n[Footnote 215: _Ibid._ ii. 275]\n\n[Footnote 216: Sell, _Faith of Isl\u00e1m_, p. 284.]\n\n[Footnote 217: _Ibid._ p. 283. Palmer, 'Introduction' to his\ntranslation of _The Qur'\u00e1n_, i. p. lxxiii. Ameer Ali, _Life and\nTeaching of Mohammed_, p. 268.]\n\nBy Christianity charity of the religious type which we {554} find in\nthe East was introduced into Europe. We have certainly no reason to\nblame the ancient Greeks and Romans for neglecting their poor. Among\nthem slavery in a great measure replaced pauperism; and what slavery\ndid for the very poor, the Roman system of clientage did for those of\na somewhat higher rank.[218] Moreover, the relief of the indigent was\nan important function of the State.[219] The Areopagus provided public\nworks for the poor.[220] At Rome gratuitous distribution of corn was\nthe rule for many centuries;[221] agrarian laws furnished free\nhomesteads to the landless, on conquered or public territory;[222]\nsince the days of Nerva a systematic support of poor children was\nenjoined in all the cities of Italy.[223] A few examples of private\ncharity, also, have descended to us already from early times, such as\nEpaminondas collecting dowers for poor girls,[224] and Cimon feeding\nand clothing the poor;[225] and from the days of the Pagan Empire\nthere are recorded several cases of individual beneficence. Charitable\nbequests are alluded to in the burial inscriptions; when some great\ncatastrophe happened, relief was willingly given to the sufferers;\nprivate infirmaries were established for slaves.[226] The duty of\ncharity was forcibly enjoined by some of the moralists. The wise man,\nsays Seneca, \"will dry the tears of others, but will not mingle his\nown with them; he will stretch out his hand to the shipwrecked\nmariner, will offer hospitality to the exile, and alms to the\nneedy.\"[227] But his alms are not thrown away by chance; his purse\nwill open easily, but never leak. He will choose out the worthiest\nwith the utmost care, and never give without sufficient reason; for\nunwise gifts must be reckoned among foolish extravagances.[228] So\nalso Cicero, {555} whilst styling beneficence and liberality \"virtues\nthat are the most agreeable to the nature of man,\" is anxious to warn\nhis readers against imprudence in practising them, \"lest our kindness\nshould hurt both those whom it is meant to assist, and others.\"[229]\n\n[Footnote 218: See Lecky, _History of European Morals_, ii. 73.]\n\n[Footnote 219: Boissier, _Religion Romaine_, ii. 206.]\n\n[Footnote 220: Farrer, _Paganism and Christianity_, p. 183.]\n\n[Footnote 221: Naudet, 'Des secours publics chez les Romains,' in\n_M\u00e9moires de l'Acad\u00e9mie des inscriptions et belles-lettres_,\nxiii. 43 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 222: _Ibid._ p. 71 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 223: Aurelius Victor, _Epitome_, xii. 8.]\n\n[Footnote 224: Cornelius Nepos, _Epaminondas_, 3.]\n\n[Footnote 225: Plutarch, _Cimon_, 10.]\n\n[Footnote 226: Lecky, _History of European Morals_, ii. 77 _sq._\nBoissier, _op. cit._ ii. 213 _sq._ Farrer, _Paganism and\nChristianity_, p. 182.]\n\n[Footnote 227: Seneca, _De clementia_, ii. 6.]\n\n[Footnote 228: _Idem_, _De vita beata_, 23 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 229: Cicero, _De officiis_, i. 14 _sq._]\n\nIn a very different light was charity viewed by the Christians.\nUnlimited open-handedness became a cardinal virtue. An ideal Christian\nwas he who did what Jesus commanded the young man to do: who went and\nsold what he had and gave it to the poor.[230] Promiscuous almsgiving\nwas enjoined as a duty:--\"Give to him that asketh thee, and from him\nthat would borrow of thee turn not thou away.\"[231] The discharge of\nthis duty was even more profitable to the giver than to the receiver.\nThere is perhaps no precept in the Gospel to which a promise of\nrecompense is so frequently annexed as to that concerning charity.\nEternal life is promised to those who feed the hungry, give drink to\nthe thirsty, take in the stranger, clothe the naked, visit the\nsick.[232] Charity was regarded as an atonement. \"God,\" says St.\nAugustine, \"is to be propitiated through alms for sins past\";[233] and\ncountless times is the thought expressed, that almsgiving is a safe\ninvestment of money at good interest with God in heaven.[234] Cyprian,\nwho is the father of the Romish doctrine of good works, establishes an\narithmetical relation between the number of alms-offerings and the\nblotting out of sins.[235] \"The food of the needy,\" says Leo the\nGreat, \"is the purchase-money of the kingdom of heaven.\"[236] \"As long\nas the market lasts,\" says St. Chrysostom, \"let us buy alms, or rather\nlet us purchase salvation through alms.\"[237] The rich man is only a\ndebtor; all that he possesses beyond {556} what is necessary, belongs\nto the poor, and ought to be given away.[238] The poor, no longer\nlooked down upon, became instruments of salvation. To them was given\nthe first place in the Church and in the Christian community. St.\nChrysostom says of them, \"As fountains flow near the place of prayer\nthat the hands that are about to be raised to heaven may be washed, so\nwere the poor placed by our fathers near to the door of the Church,\nthat our hands might be consecrated by benevolence before they are\nraised to God.\"[239] Gregory the Great announces, and the Middle Ages\nre-echo, \"The poor are not to be lightly esteemed and despised, but to\nbe honoured as patrons.\"[240] Thus it happened that even in the\ndarkest periods, when all other Christian virtues were nearly extinct,\ncharity survived unimpaired.[241] Later on Protestantism, by denying\nthe atoning effect of good deeds, deprived charity of a great deal of\nits religious attraction. And in modern times the enlightened opinion\non the subject, recognising the demoralising influence of\nindiscriminate almsgiving, rather agrees with the principles laid down\nby Cicero and Seneca, than with the literal interpretation of the\ninjunctions of Christ.\n\n[Footnote 230: _Cf._ _Acts_, ii. 45.]\n\n[Footnote 231: _St. Matthew_, v. 42. _Cf._ _St. Luke_, vi. 30.]\n\n[Footnote 232: _St. Matthew_, xxv. 34 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 233: St. Augustine, _Enchiridion_, 70 (Migne, _Patrologi\u00e6\ncursus_, xl. 265).]\n\n[Footnote 234: See Uhlhorn, _Die christliche Liebesth\u00e4tigkeit_, i. 270.]\n\n[Footnote 235: Cyprian, _De opere et eleemosynis_, 24 (Migne, _op.\ncit._ iv. 620). _Cf._ Harnack, _History of Dogma_, ii. 134, n. 2.]\n\n[Footnote 236: Leo Magnus, _Sermo X., de Collectis_, 5 (Migne, _op.\ncit._ liv. 165 _sq._).]\n\n[Footnote 237: St. Chrysostom, _Homilia VII., de P[oe]nitentia_\n(Migne, _op. cit._ Ser. Graeca, xlix. _sq._ 333).]\n\n[Footnote 238: Uhlhorn, _op. cit._ p. 294 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 239: St. Chrysostom, _De verbis Apostoli, Habentes eumdem\nspiritum_, iii. 11 (Migne, _op. cit._ Ser. Graeca, li. _sq._ 300).]\n\n[Footnote 240: Quoted by Uhlhorn, _op. cit._ i. 315.]\n\n[Footnote 241: _Cf._ Milman, _History of Latin Christianity_,\nix. 33 _sq._]\n\nIn the course of progressing civilisation the obligation of assisting\nthe needy has been extended to wider and wider circles of men. The\ncharity and generosity which savages require as a duty or praise as a\nvirtue have, broadly speaking, reference only to members of the same\ncommunity or tribe. Kindness towards foreigners is looked upon in a\nvery different light. \"The virtues of the Negroes,\" Monrad observes,\n\"are entirely restricted to their own tribe. The doing good to a\nstranger they would generally find ridiculous.\"[242] To the\nGreenlander a foreigner, especially if he be of another race, is \"an\nindifferent object, whose welfare he has no interest in\nfurthering.\"[243] {557} The Bedouin, says Doughty, \"has two faces,\nthis of gentle kindness at home, the other of wild misanthropy and his\nteeth set against the world besides.\"[244] At higher stages of\ncivilisation the duty of charity embraces a wider group of people, in\nproportion to the largeness of the social unit or to the scope of the\nreligion by which it is enjoined. But it is still more or less\nrestrained by national or religious boundaries. M. Am\u00e9lineau observes\nthat the charity referred to on ancient Egyptian papyri is \"la charit\u00e9\nlimit\u00e9e \u00e0 ceux de la m\u00eame nation.\"[245] According to Zoroastrianism,\ncharity should be restricted to the followers of the true religion; to\nsuccour an unbeliever would be like a strengthening of the dominion of\nEvil.[246] The Zak\u00e2t, or legal alms of the Muhammedans, must not be\ngiven to a non-Muslim, because it is regarded as a fundamental part of\nworship;[247] similarly the [S.]adaqah, or offering on the feast-day\nknown as [(]Idu'l-Fi[t.]r, is confined to true believers.[248] Nor has\nChristian charity always been free from religious narrowness. Fleury\nsays that the early Christians, in the care they took of the poor,\nalways preferred Christians before infidels, because \"their principal\nregard was to their spiritual concerns, and to their temporal welfare\nonly in order to their spiritual.\"[249] The principle of the Church\nwas, \"Omnem hominem _fidelem_ judica tuum esse fratrem.\"[250] In the\nseventeenth century the Scotch clergy taught that food or shelter must\non no occasion be given to a starving man unless his opinions were\northodox.[251] On the other hand, Christianity of a higher type\npreaches charity towards all men; and so does advanced Judaism and\nBuddhism. It is said in the Talmud, with reference to the treatment of\nthe poor, that no distinction should be made between such as are Jews\nand such as are not.[252] In modern times charity now and then {558}\nsteps over the barriers of nationality even when the sufferers belong\nto distant nations. Whilst our indigent compatriots are generally\nrecognised to have a greater claim on our pity than needy strangers, a\ngreat calamity in one country readily calls forth a charitable\nresponse in other nations. Mr. Pike believes that the contribution of\none hundred thousand pounds sterling which England, in the year 1755,\nwhen Lisbon was laid in ruins by an earthquake, sent for the relief of\nthe sufferers, inaugurated this new era of international\ncharitableness. \"Compassion.\" he observes, \"was at last shown by\nEnglishmen, not simply for Englishmen and Protestants, but for\nforeigners professing a different religion; pity, for once, triumphed\nover intolerance and national prejudice.\"[253] And in war, in the case\nof enemies rendered harmless by wounds or disease, the growth of human\nfeeling has passed beyond the simple requirement that they shall not\nbe killed or ill-used, and has cast upon belligerents the duty of\ntending them so far as is consistent with the primary duty to their\nown wounded.[254] However, it must not be imagined that this humane\nprinciple, which has only lately been recognised in Europe, is a\nunique outcome of Christian civilisation at its height. It is said in\nthe Mahabharata that, when a quarrel arises among good men, a wounded\nenemy is to be cured in the conqueror's own country, or to be conveyed\nto his home.[255] Strangely enough, even from the savage world we hear\nof something like an anticipation of the Geneva Convention. Among\ncertain tribes in New South Wales, as soon as the fight is concluded,\n\"both parties seem perfectly reconciled, and jointly assist in tending\nthe wounded men.\"[256]\n\n[Footnote 242: Monrad, _op. cit._ p. 4.]\n\n[Footnote 243: Nansen, _Eskimo Life_, p. 159.]\n\n[Footnote 244: Doughty, _Arabia Deserta_, i. 368 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 245: Am\u00e9lineau, _op. cit._ p. 354.]\n\n[Footnote 246: Geiger, _op. cit._ i. 165.]\n\n[Footnote 247: Sell, _op. cit._ p. 284. _Cf._ _Koran_, ix. 60.]\n\n[Footnote 248: Sell, _op. cit._ p. 318.]\n\n[Footnote 249: Fleury, _Manners and Behaviour of the Christians_,\np. 133 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 250: Laurent, _\u00c9tudes sur l'histoire del'Humanit\u00e9_, iv. 94.]\n\n[Footnote 251: Buckle, _History of Civilization in England_, iii. 277.]\n\n[Footnote 252: _Gitin_, fol. 61 A, quoted by Katz, _Der wahre\nTalmudjude_, p. 38. _Cf._ Chaikin, _Apologie des Juifs_, p. 10.]\n\n[Footnote 253: Pike, _History of Crime in England_, ii. 346.]\n\n[Footnote 254: 'Convention signed at Geneva, August 22, 1864, for the\nAmelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field,'\nin Lorimer, _Institutes of the Law of Nations_, ii. Appendix no. vi.\nHall, _Treatise on International **Law_, p. 399. Heffter, _Das\nEurop\u00e4ische V\u00f6lkerrecht der Gegenwart_, \u00a7 126, p. 267, n. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 255: _Mahabharata_, xii. 3547, quoted by Lorimer, _op. cit._\nii. 431.]\n\n[Footnote 256: Brough Smyth, _op. cit._ i. 160.]\n\n{559} The gradual expansion of the duty of charity is due to the fact\nthat this duty, in the first place, is based on the altruistic\nsentiment, and consequently follows the same general law of\ndevelopment. Many cases referred to above imply that savages are by no\nmeans strangers to affection, and that in their communities there is\nnot only mutual assistance, but general kindness of heart. Numerous\ninstances to the same effect might easily be added. When a Fuegian is\nvery ill the near relatives show much grief;[257] and Darwin tells us\nthat the Fuegian boy who was taken on board the _Beagle_ and brought\nto Europe, used to go to the sea-sick and say, in a plaintive voice,\n\"Poor, poor fellow!\"[258] The Veddahs are praised not only for their\ncharitable behaviour towards each other, but for their natural\ntenderness of heart.[259] The aborigines of Victoria are said to \"have\nthe greatest love for their friends and relatives,\" and to testify the\nliveliest joy when a companion after a long absence returns to the\ncamp.[260] Forster mentions an instance of affection among the natives\nof Tana, which, as he says, \"strongly proves that the passions and\ninnate quality of human nature are much the same in every\nclimate.\"[261] Melville declares that, after passing a few weeks in\nthe Typee valley of the Marquesas, he formed a higher estimate of\nhuman nature than he ever before entertained.[262] It can hardly be\ndoubted that in every human society there is, normally, some degree of\nsocial affection between its members;[263] and it seems that the\nevolution of this sentiment in mankind has been much more in the\ndirection of greater extensiveness than of greater intensity.\n\n[Footnote 257: Bridges, in _A Voice for South America_, xiii. 206.]\n\n[Footnote 258: Darwin, _Journal of Researches_, p. 207.]\n\n[Footnote 259: Sarasin, _op. cit._ iii. 545, 550.]\n\n[Footnote 260: Brough Smyth, _op. cit._ i. 138.]\n\n[Footnote 261: Forster, _Voyage round the World_, ii. 325.]\n\n[Footnote 262: Melville, _Typee_, p. 297.]\n\n[Footnote 263: See _infra_, on the Origin and Development of the\nAltruistic Sentiment.]\n\nWhere the members of a group have affection for each other, mutual aid\nwill be regarded as a duty both because it will be practised\nhabitually, and because a {560} failure to afford it will call forth\nsympathetic resentment on behalf of the sufferer, But we need, here\nagain, to look below the surface. Men may be induced to do good to\ntheir fellow-creatures not only by kindly feelings towards them, but\nby egoistic motives; and such motives, through having a share in\nmaking beneficence a tribal habit, at the same time influence the\nmoral estimation in which it is held. The Basutos say that \"the knife\nthat is lent does not return alone to its master\"--a kindness is never\nthrown away.[264] Of the Asiniboin, a Siouan tribe, Mr. Dorsey states\nthat \"nothing is given except with a view to a gift in return.\"[265]\nWhen the Andaman Islanders make presents of the best that they\npossess, they tacitly understand that an equivalent should be rendered\nfor every gift.[266] Among the Makololo \"the rich show kindness to the\npoor, in expectation of services.\"[267] In his description of the\nGreenlanders, Dr. Nansen observes that all the small communities\ndepend for their existence on the law of mutual assistance, on the\nprinciple of common suffering and common enjoyment. \"A hard life has\ntaught the Eskimo that even if he is a skilful hunter and can, as a\nrule, manage to hold his own well enough, there may come times when,\nwithout the help of his fellows, he would have to succumb. It is\nbetter, therefore, for him to help in his turn.\"[268] That similar\nconsiderations largely lie at the bottom of the custom of mutual aid\nand charity both in uncivilised and more advanced communities, we may\nassume from the experience of human nature which we have acquired at\nhome. And such motives must be particularly active in a society the\nmembers of which are so dependent on each other's services and\nreturn-services, as is generally the case with a horde of savages.\n\n[Footnote 264: Casalis, _op. cit._ p. 310.]\n\n[Footnote 265: Dorsey, 'Siouan Sociology,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._\nxv. 225 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 266: Man, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xii. 95.]\n\n[Footnote 267: Livingstone, _Missionary Travels_, p. 511.]\n\n[Footnote 268: Nansen, _First Crossing of Greenland_, ii. 304 _sq._\n_Cf._ Cranz, _History of Greenland_, i. 173; Parry, _op. cit._ p. 525.]\n\nMoreover, by niggardliness a person may expose himself {561} to\nsupernatural dangers, whereas liberality may entail supernatural\nreward. In Morocco nobody would like to eat in the presence of other\npeople without sharing his meal with them; otherwise they might poison\nhis food by looking at it with an evil eye. So also, if anybody shows\na great liking for a thing belonging to you, wanting, for instance, to\nbuy your gun or your horse, it is best to let him have it, since\notherwise an accident is likely to happen to the object of his\ndesire.[269] But baneful energy, what the Moors call _l-bas_, is\ntransferable not only by the eye, but by the voice. The poor and the\nneedy have thus in their hands a powerful weapon and means of\nretaliation, the curse. The ancient Greeks believed that the beggar\nhad his Erinys,[270] his avenging demon, which was obviously only a\npersonification of his curse.[271] It is said in the Proverbs, \"He\nthat giveth unto the poor shall not lack: but he that hideth his eyes\nshall have many a curse.\"[272] The same idea is expressed in\nEcclesiasticus:--\"Turn not away thine eye from the needy, and give him\nnone occasion to curse thee: for if he curse thee in the bitterness of\nhis soul, his prayer shall be heard of him that made him. . . . A\nprayer out of a poor man's mouth reacheth to the ears of God, and his\njudgment cometh speedily.\"[273] According to the Zoroastrian Yasts,\nthe poor man who follows the good law, when wronged and deprived of\nhis rights, invokes Mithra for help, with hands uplifted.[274] Mr.\nChapman states that, \"though the Damaras are, generally speaking,\ngreat gluttons, they would not think of eating in the presence of any\nof their tribe without sharing their meal with all comers, for fear of\nbeing visited by a curse from their 'Omu-kuru' [or deity], and\nbecoming impoverished.\"[275] There is all reason {562} to suppose that\nin this case the curse of the deity was originally the curse, or evil\nwish, of an angry man.\n\n[Footnote 269: Similar beliefs prevail in modern Egypt (Klunzinger,\n_Upper Egypt_, p. 391).]\n\n[Footnote 270: _Odyssey_, xvii. 475.]\n\n[Footnote 271: _Supra_, p. 60.]\n\n[Footnote 272: _Proverbs_, xxviii. 27.]\n\n[Footnote 273: _Ecclesiasticus_, iv. 5 _sq._; xxi. 5. _Cf._\n_Deuteronomy_, xv. 9. Rabbi Johanan says that almsgiving \"saves man\nfrom sudden, unnatural death\" (Kohler, in _Jewish Encyclopedia_, i.\n435). _Cf._ _Proverbs_, x. 2.]\n\n[Footnote 274: _Yasts_, x. 84.]\n\n[Footnote 275: Chapman, _Travels in the Interior of South Africa_,\ni. 341.]\n\nA poor man is able not only to punish the uncharitable by means of his\ncurses, but to reward the generous giver by means of his blessings.\nDuring my residence among the Andjra tribe in the mountains of\nNorthern Morocco, our village was visited by a band of ambulant\nscribes who went from house to house, receiving presents and invoking\nblessings in return. When a goat was given them they asked God to\nincrease the flocks of the giver, when money was given they asked God\nto increase his money, and so forth. Some of the villagers told me\nthat it was a profitable bargain, since they would be tenfold repaid\nfor their gifts through the blessings of the scribes. A town Moor who\nstarts for a journey to the country generally likes to give a coin to\none of the beggars who are sitting near the gate, so as to receive his\nblessings. It is said in Ecclesiasticus:--\"Stretch thine hand unto the\npoor, that thy blessing may be perfected. A gift hath grace in the\nsight of every man living.\"[276] Whilst he that withholdeth corn shall\nbe cursed by the people, \"blessing shall be upon the head of him that\nselleth it.\"[277] Among the early Christians those who brought gifts\nfor the poor were specially remembered in the prayers of the\nChurch.[278] Of the Nay[=a]dis of Malabar Mr. Iyer says that the\npurport and object of their prayers are, among other things, \"that all\nthe superior castes, who give them alms, may enjoy long life and\nprosperity.\"[279] In various cases the nature of the rewards promised\nfor charitable acts suggests that they are due to the blessings of the\nrecipient. According to Vasishtha, \"through liberality man obtains all\nhis desires, even longevity.\"[280] In the Yasts it is said that the\nchildren of a charitable man will thrive.[281] According to Talmudic\nideas, men acquire wealth for their children by {563} distributing\nalms among the poor.[282] Considering how widely spread is the belief\nin the efficacy of curses and blessings, there can be little doubt\nthat charity and generosity are connected with this belief in many\ncases where no such connection has been noticed by the European\nvisitor.\n\n[Footnote 276: _Ecclesiasticus_, vii. 32. _Cf._ _Proverbs_, xxii. 9.]\n\n[Footnote 277: _Proverbs_, xi. 26.]\n\n[Footnote 278: Uhlhorn, _op. cit._ i. 141.]\n\n[Footnote 279: Iyer, in the Madras Government Museum's _Bulletin_,\niv. 72.]\n\n[Footnote 280: _Vasishtha_, xxix. 1 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 281: _Yasts_, xxiv. 36.]\n\n[Footnote 282: Kohler, in _Jewish Encyclopedia_, i. 436. _Cf._\n_Proverbs_, xxviii. 27.]\n\nThe curses and blessings of the poor partly account for the fact that\ncharity has come to be regarded as a religious duty. Originally, it is\ntrue, they had not the character of an appeal to a god, but were\nbelieved to possess a purely magical power, independent of any\nsuperhuman will. This belief is rooted in the close association\nbetween the wish, more particularly the spoken wish, and the idea of\nits fulfilment. The wish is looked upon in the light of energy which\nmay be transferred--by material contact, or by the eye, or by means of\nspeech--to the person concerned, and then becomes a fact. This\nprocess, however, is not taken quite as a matter of course; there is\nalways some mystery about it. Hence the words of a holy man, a\nmagician or priest, are considered more efficacious than those of\nordinary mortals. The Australian natives believe that the curse of a\npotent magician will kill at the distance of a hundred miles. Among\nthe Maoris \"the anathema of a priest is regarded as a thunderbolt that\nan enemy cannot escape.\"[283] Among the Gallas no man will under any\ncircumstances slay either a priest or a wizard, from a dread of his\ndying curse.[284] Some of the Rabbis maintained that a curse uttered\nby a scholar is unfailing in its effect, even if undeserved.[285] In\nMuhammedan countries the curses of saints or shereefs are particularly\nfeared. According to the Laws of Manu, a Br\u00e2hmana \"may punish his foes\nby his own power alone,\" speech being his weapon.[286] But though a\ncurse may derive particular potency from the person who utters it,\n{564} it is by no means ineffective even in the mouth of an ordinary\nman.[287] In the Old Testament children are forbidden to curse their\nparents,[288] subjects their rulers,[289] men their god;[290] and\naccording to Talmudic conceptions, a curse should not be regarded\nlightly however ignorant be the person who utters it.[291] All that is\nrequired is that the words should possess that supernatural quality\nwhich alone can bring about the result desired, and this quality may\nbe inherent in the curse quite independently of the person who utters\nit. It is inherent in certain mystic formulas or spells and in the\ninvocations of some spirit or god. The will of the invoked being is\nnot considered at all; his name is simply brought in to give the curse\nthat mystic efficacy which the plain word lacks. Thus both in the Old\nTestament[292] and in the Talmud[293] there are traces of the ancient\nidea that the name of the Lord might be used with advantage in any\ncurse however undeserved. But with the deepening of the religious\nsentiment this idea had to be given up. A righteous and mighty god\ncannot agree to be a mere tool in the hand of a wicked curser. Hence\nthe curse comes to be looked upon in the light of a prayer, which is\nnot fulfilled if undeserved; as it is said in the Proverbs, \"the curse\ncauseless shall not come.\"[294] And the same is the case with the\nblessing. Whilst in ancient days Jacob could take away his brother's\nblessing by deceit,[295] the efficacy of a blessing was later on\nlimited by moral considerations.[296] The Psalmist declares that only\nthe offspring of the righteous can be blessed;[297] and according to\nthe Apostolic Constitutions, \"although a widow who eateth and is\nfilled from the wicked, pray for them, she shall not be heard.\"[298]\n{565} On the other hand, curses and blessings, when well deserved,\ncontinued to draw down calamity or prosperity upon their objects, by\ninducing God to put them into effect; this idea prevails both in\npost-exilic Judaism and in Muhammedanism,[299] and underlies the\nChristian oath and benediction. The final, but not the original view\nwas that, as an uncharitable man deserves to be punished and a\ncharitable man merits reward, the curses and blessings of the poor\nwill naturally be heard by a righteous God. \"The Lord will plead their\ncause.\"[300]\n\n[Footnote 283: Polack, _Manners and Customs of the New Zealanders_,\ni. 248 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 284: Harris, _Highlands of \u00c6thiopia_, iii. 50.]\n\n[Footnote 285: _Makkoth_, fol. 11 A. _Berakhoth_, fol. 56 A.]\n\n[Footnote 286: _Laws of Manu_, xi. 32 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 287: Taylor, _Te Ika a Maui_, p. 204 (Maoris). Wellhausen,\n_Reste arabischen Heidentums_, p. 139.]\n\n[Footnote 288: _Exodus_, xxi. 17. _Leviticus_, xx. 9. _Proverbs_,\nxx. 20; xxx. 11.]\n\n[Footnote 289: _Exodus_, xxii. 28. _Ecclesiastes_, x. 20.]\n\n[Footnote 290: _Exodus_, xxii. 28.]\n\n[Footnote 291: _Meghilla_, fol. 15 A.]\n\n[Footnote 292: _Supra_, p. 564.]\n\n[Footnote 293: _Makkoth_, fol. 11 A. _Berakhoth_, foll. 19 A, 56 A.]\n\n[Footnote 294: _Proverbs_, xxvi. 2.]\n\n[Footnote 295: _Genesis_, xxvii. 23 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 296: _Cf._ Cheyne, 'Blessings and Curses,' in _Encyclop\u00e6dia\nBiblica_, i. 592.]\n\n[Footnote 297: _Psalms_, xxxvii. 26.]\n\n[Footnote 298: _Constitutiones Apostolic\u00e6_, iv. 6. _Cf._ _Jeremiah_,\nvii. 16.]\n\n[Footnote 299: _Cf._ Cheyne, in _Encyclop\u00e6dia Biblica_, i. 592;\nGoldziher, _Abhandlungen zur arabischen Philologie_, i. 29 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 300: _Proverbs_, xxii. 23.]\n\nThe chief cause, however, of the extraordinary stress which the higher\nreligions put on the duty of charity seems to lie in the connection\nbetween almsgiving and sacrifice. When food is offered as a tribute to\na god, the god is supposed to enjoy its spiritual part only, whilst\nthe substance of it is left behind and is eaten by the poor. And when\nthe offering is continued in ceremonial survival in spite of the\ngrowing conviction that, after all, the deity does not need and cannot\nprofit by it,[301] the poor become the natural heirs of the god, and\nthe almsgiver inherits the merit of the sacrificer. The chief virtue\nof the act, then, lies in the self-abnegation of the donor, and its\nefficacy is measured by the \"sacrifice\" which it costs him.\n\n[Footnote 301: For such a survival, see Tylor, _Primitive Culture_,\nii. 396 _sqq._]\n\nMany instances may be quoted of sacrificial food being left for the\npoor or being distributed among them. At Scillus, where Xenophon had\nbuilt an altar and a temple to Artemis and a sacrifice was afterwards\nmade every year, the goddess supplied the poor people living there in\ntents with \"barley-meal, bread, wine, sweetmeats, and a share of the\nvictims offered from the sacred pastures, and of those caught in\nhunting.\"[302] According to Yasna, sacrifices to Mazda were given to\nhis poor.[303] In ancient Arabia the poor were allowed to partake of\nthe meal-offering {566} which was laid before the god Uqai\u00e7ir.[304]\nIn Zinder, in the Soudan, there are some trees, regarded as divine, to\nwhich annual offerings of bullocks, sheep, and so forth, are made,\n\"though the poor of the country get the benefit of them.\"[305] In\nMorocco even animals which are killed as _[(]\u00e2r_--a sacrifice\nembodying a conditional curse--on departed saints or living people,\nwith a view to compelling them to grant a request, are commonly eaten\nby the poor, though nobody else would dare to partake of\nthem.\n\n[Footnote 302: Xenophon, _Anabasis_, v. 3. 9.]\n\n[Footnote 303: _Yasna_, xxxiv. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 304: Wellhausen, _Reste arabischen Heidentums_, p. 64.\nRobertson Smith, _Religion of the Semites_, p. 223.]\n\n[Footnote 305: Richardson, _Mission to Central Africa_, ii. 259.]\n\nIn other cases we find that almsgiving is itself regarded as a form of\nsacrifice, or takes the place of it. In the sacred books of India the\ntwo things are repeatedly mentioned side by side. \"The householder\noffers sacrifices, the householder practises austerities, the\nhouseholder distributes gifts.\"[306] Of a Br\u00e2hmana who has completed\nhis studentship it is said, \"Let him always practise, according to his\nability, with a cheerful heart, the duty of liberality, both by\nsacrifices and by charitable works, if he finds a worthy recipient for\nhis gifts.\"[307] \"In the Krita age the chief virtue is declared to be\nthe performance of austerities, in the Tret\u00e2 divine knowledge, in the\nDv\u00e2para the performance of sacrifices, in the Kali liberality\nalone.\"[308] In the Egyptian 'Book of the Dead' the soul, on\napproaching to the gods who are in the Tuat, pleads:--\"I have done\nthat which man prescribeth and that which pleaseth the gods. I have\npropitiated the god with that which he loveth. I have given bread to\nthe hungry, water to the thirsty, clothes to the naked, a boat to the\nshipwrecked. I have made oblations to the gods and funeral offerings\nto the departed.\"[309] In the Zoroastrian prayer Ahuna-Vairya, to\nwhich great efficacy is ascribed, it is said, \"He who relieves the\npoor makes Ahura king.\"[310] {567} In the Koran almsgiving is often\nmentioned in connection with prayer;[311] and the Zak\u00e2t, or alms\nprescribed by law, is regarded by the Muhammedans as a fundamental\npart of their religion, hence infidels, who cannot perform acceptable\nworship, have nothing to do with these alms.[312] Among the\nMuhammedans of India it is common for men and women to vow \"that when\nwhat they desire shall come to pass, they will, in the name of God,\nthe Prophet, his companions, or some _wullee_, present offerings and\noblations.\" One of these offerings, called \"an offering unto God,\"\nconsists in preparing particular victuals, and in \"distributing them\namong friends and the poor, and giving any sort of grain, a sacrificed\nsheep, clothes, or ready-money in alms to the indigent.\"[313] When the\ndestruction of the Temple with its altar filled the Jews with alarm as\nthey thought of their unatoned sins, Johanan ben Zakkai comforted them\nby saying, \"You have another means of atonement, as powerful as the\naltar, and that is the work of charity, for it is said: 'I desired\nmercy, and not sacrifice.'\"[314] Many other passages show how closely\nthe Jews associated almsgiving with sacrifice. \"He that giveth alms\nsacrificeth praise.\"[315] \"As sin-offering makes atonement for Israel,\nso alms for the Gentiles.\"[316] \"Almsdeeds are more meritorious than\nall sacrifices.\"[317] An orphan is called an \"altar to God.\"[318] And\nas a sacrificer should be a person of a godly character, so it is\nbetter to perish by famine than to receive an oblation from the\nungodly.[319] Alms were systematically collected in the synagogues,\nand officers were appointed to make the collection.[320] So, also,\namong the early Christians the collection of alms for the relief of\nthe poor was an act of the Church life itself. Almsgiving took place\nin public worship, nay formed itself a part of worship. {568} Gifts of\nnatural produce, the so-called oblations, were connected with the\ncelebration of the Lord's Supper. They were offered to God as the\nfirst-fruits of the creatures (_primiti\u00e6 creaturarum_), and a prayer\nwas said:--\"O Lord, accept also the offerings of those who to-day\nbring an offering, as Thou didst accept the offerings of righteous\nAbel, the offering of our father Abraham, the incense of Zachariah,\nthe alms of Cornelius, and the two mites of the widow.\" These\noblations were not only used for the Lord's Supper, but they formed\nthe chief means for the relief of the poor. They were regarded as\nsacrifice in the most special sense; and, as no unclean gift might be\nlaid upon the Lord's altar, profit made from sinful occupations was\nnot accepted as an oblation, neither were the oblations of impenitent\nsinners.[321] The author of the Epistle to the Hebrews speaks of\nalmsgiving as a sacrifice of thanksgiving which continues after the\nJewish altar has been done away with.[322] Like sacrifice, almsgiving\nis connected with prayer, as a means of making the prayer efficacious\nand furnishing it with wings; the angel said to Cornelius, \"Thy\nprayers and thine alms are come up for a memorial before God.\"[323]\nWhen the Christians were reproached for having no sacrifices, Justin\nwrote, \"We have been taught that the only honour that is worthy of Him\nis not to consume by fire what He has brought into being for our\nsustenance, but to use it for ourselves and those who need.\"[324] So,\nalso, Iren\u00e6us observes that sacrifices are not abolished in the New\nTestament, though their form is indeed altered, because they are no\nlonger offered by slaves, but by freemen, of which just the oblations\nare the proof.[325] And God has enjoined on Christians this sacrifice\nof oblations, not because He needs them, but \"in order that themselves\n{569} might be neither unfruitful nor ungrateful.\"[326] St. Augustine\nsays, \"The sacrifice of the Christians is the alms bestowed upon the\npoor.\"[327]\n\n[Footnote 306: _Institutes of Vishnu_, lix. 28.]\n\n[Footnote 307: _Laws of Manu_, iv. 227. _Cf._ _ibid._ iv. 226.]\n\n[Footnote 308: _Ibid._ i. 86.]\n\n[Footnote 309: _Book of the Dead_, 125, Renouf's translation, p. 217.]\n\n[Footnote 310: _Vend\u00eed\u00e2d_, xix, 2.]\n\n[Footnote 311: _Koran_, ii. 40, 104; ix. 54.]\n\n[Footnote 312: Sell, _op. cit._ 284.]\n\n[Footnote 313: Jaffur Shureef, _Qanoon-e-Islam_, p. 179.]\n\n[Footnote 314: Kohler, in _Jewish Encyclopedia_, i. 467. _Hosea_,\nvi. 6.]\n\n[Footnote 315: _Ecclesiasticus_, xxxv. 2.]\n\n[Footnote 316: Quoted by Levy, _Neuhebr\u00e4isches und Chald\u00e4isches\nW\u00f6rterbuch_, iv. 173.]\n\n[Footnote 317: Quoted _ibid._ iv. 173.]\n\n[Footnote 318: _Constitutiones Apostolic\u00e6_, iv. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 319: _Ibid._ iv. 8.]\n\n[Footnote 320: Addis, in _Encyclop\u00e6dia Biblica_, i. 119.]\n\n[Footnote 321: Uhlhorn, _op. cit._ i. 135 _sqq._ Harnack, _History of\nDogma_, i. 205.]\n\n[Footnote 322: _Hebrews_, xiii. 14 _sqq._ _Cf._ Addis, in\n_Encyclop\u00e6dia Biblica_, i. 119.]\n\n[Footnote 323: _Act_, x. 4. Cyprian, _De opere et eleemosynis_, 4. St.\nChrysostom, _Homilia VII., de P[oe]nitentia_, 6 (Migne, _Patrologi\u00e6\ncursus_, Ser. Gr. xlix. _sq._ 332).]\n\n[Footnote 324: Justin, _Apologia I. pro Christianis_, 13.]\n\n[Footnote 325: Iren\u00e6us, _Adversus h\u00e6reses_, iv. 18. 82.]\n\n[Footnote 326: _Ibid._ iv. 17. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 327: St. Augustine, _Sermo XLII._ 1 (Migne, _op. cit._\nxxxviii. 252).]\n\nThe objection will perhaps be raised that I have here tried to trace\nback the most beautiful of all religious virtues to a magical and\nritualistic origin without taking into due account the benevolent\nfeelings attributed to the Deity. But in the present connection I have\nnot had to show why charity, like other human duties, has been\nsanctioned by religious beliefs, but why, in the ethics of the higher\nreligions, it has attained the same supreme importance as is otherwise\nattached only to devotional exercises. And this is certainly a problem\nby itself, for which the belief in a benevolent god affords no\nadequate explanation. That the religious duty of charity is not merely\nan outcome of the altruistic sentiment is well illustrated by the fact\nthat Zoroastrianism, whilst exalting almsgiving to the rank of a\ncardinal virtue, at the same time excludes the sick man from the\ncommunity of the faithful until he has been cured and cleansed\naccording to prescribed rites.[328]\n\n[Footnote 328: Darmesteter, 'Introduction' to the Zend-Avesta, in\n_Sacred Books of the East_, iv. p. lxxx.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXIV\n\nHOSPITALITY\n\nWE have seen that in early society regard for the life and physical\nwell-being of a fellow-creature is, generally speaking, restricted to\nmembers of the social unit, whereas foreigners are subject to a very\ndifferent treatment. But to this rule there are remarkable exceptions.\nSide by side with gross indifference or positive hatred to strangers\nwe find, among the lower races, instances of great kindness displayed\neven towards persons of a foreign race. The Veddahs are ready to help\nany stranger in distress who asks for their assistance, and Sinhalese\nfugitives who have sought refuge in their wilds have always been\nkindly received.[1] Mr. Moffat was deeply affected by the sympathy\nwhich some poor Bushmans showed to him during an illness, although he\nwas an utter stranger to them. Speaking of the mutual affection which\nthe Andaman Islanders display in their social relations, Mr. Man adds\nthat, \"in their dealings with strangers, the same characteristic is\nobservable when once a good understanding has been established.\"[2] We\nhave also to remember the friendly manner in which the aborigines in\nvarious parts of the savage world behaved to the earliest European\nvisitors. Nothing could be more courteous than the reception which\nCook and his party met with in New Caledonia, where the natives guided\nand accompanied them on their {571} excursions. Forster says of the\nSociety Islanders, \"We should indeed be ungrateful if we did not\nacknowledge the kindness with which they always treated us.\"[3] De\nClerque observes with reference to the Papuans on the north coast of\nNew Guinea:--\"The inhabitants seemed always ready to help. . . . On\nour visit to the village all the male and female inhabitants with\ntheir children flocked around me, and offered me cocoanuts and\nsugar-cane; which, for the first contact with Europeans, is certainly\nremarkable.\"[4] On the arrival of white people in various parts of\nAustralia, the natives were not only inoffensive, but disposed to meet\nthem on terms of amity and kindness.[5] \"In a short intercourse,\" says\nEyre, \"they are easily made friends. . . . On many occasions where I\nhave met these wanderers in the wild, far removed from the abodes of\ncivilisation, and when I have been accompanied only by a single native\nboy, I have been received by them in the kindest and most friendly\nmanner, had presents made to me of fish, kangaroo, or fruit, had them\naccompany me for miles to point out where water was to be procured,\nand been assisted by them in getting at it.\"[6] Nor must we forget the\nkind reception which Australian Blacks have given to men cast upon\ntheir mercy,[7] and the tenderness with which the natives of Cooper's\nCreek wept for the death of Burke and Wills, and comforted King, the\nsurvivor.[8] Unfortunately, native races have often received anything\nbut favourable impressions from their earliest interviews with\nEuropeans; and both in Australia and elsewhere prolonged intercourse\nwith white people has, in many instances, induced them to change {572}\ntheir friendly behaviour into unkindness or hostility. The Canadian\ntraders, for instance, when they first appeared among the Beaver and\nRocky Mountain Indians, were treated by these people with the utmost\nhospitality and attention; but by their subsequent conduct they taught\nthe natives to withdraw their respect, and sometimes to treat them\nwith indignity.[9] Harmon writes, \"I have always experienced the\ngreatest hospitality and kindness among those Indians who have had the\nleast intercourse with white people.\"[10] Many facts seem to verify\nthe statement made by a missionary who speaks from forty years'\nexperience among the natives of New Guinea and Polynesia, that our\nconduct towards savages determines their conduct towards\nus.[11]\n\n[Footnote 1: Sarasin, _Ergebnisse naturwissenschaftlicher Forschungen\nauf Ceylon_, iii. 544.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Man, 'Aboriginal Inhabitants of the Andaman Islands,' in\n_Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xii. 93.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Forster, _Voyage Round the World_, ii. 157.]\n\n[Footnote 4: De Clerque, in _Glimpses of the Eastern Archipelago_,\np. 14.]\n\n[Footnote 5: Breton, _Excursions in New South Wales_, p. 218. Curr,\n_The Australian Race_, i. 64. Salvado, _M\u00e9moires historiques sur\nl'Australie_, p. 340. Ridley, _Aborigines of Australia_, p. 24. Eyre,\n_Journals of Expeditions of Discovery into Central Australia_,\nii. 212, 382.]\n\n[Footnote 6: Eyre, _op. cit._ ii. 211.]\n\n[Footnote 7: Mathew, 'Australian Aborigines,' in _Jour. & Proceed.\nRoy. Soc. N. S. Wales_, xxiii. 388. Brough Smyth, _Aborigines of\nVictoria_, ii. 229. Ridley, _Aborigines of Australia_, p. 22.]\n\n[Footnote 8: Jung, 'Aus dem Seelenleben der Australier,' in\n_Mittheilungen des Vereins f\u00fcr Erdkunde zu Leipzig_, 1877, p. 11 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 9: Mackenzie, _Voyage to the Frozen and Pacific Ocean_,\np. 149.]\n\n[Footnote 10: Harmon, _Journal of Voyages and Travels in the Interior\nof North America_, p. 315.]\n\n[Footnote 11: Murray, _Forty Years' Mission Work in Polynesia and New\nGuinea_, p. 499. For other instances of kindness displayed by savages\ntowards white men, see von Kotzebue, _Voyage of Discovery into the\nSouth Sea_, iii. 174 (people of Radack); Yate, _Account of New\nZealand_, p. 102 _sq._; Dieffenbach, _Travels in New Zealand_, ii.\n112; Keate, _Account of the Pelew Islands_, p. 329 _sq._; Earl,\n_Papuans_, p. 79 (natives of Port Dory, New Guinea); Sarytschew,\n'Voyage of ** Discovery to the North-East of Siberia,' in\n_Collection of Modern and Contemporary Voyages and Travels_, vi. 78\n(Aleuts); King and Fitzroy, _Voyages of the \"Adventure\" and \"Beagle,\"_\nii. 168, 174 (Patagonians); Wilson and Felkin, _Uganda_, i.\n225.]\n\nThe friendly reception which white men have met with in savage\ncountries is closely connected with a custom which, as it seems,\nprevails universally among the lower races while in their native\nstate,[12] as also among the {573} peoples of culture at the earlier\nstages of their civilisation[13] {574} --hospitality towards strangers.\nThis custom presents several remarkable characteristics, which, to all\nappearance, ill agree with their tribal or national exclusiveness\ngenerally. The stranger is often welcomed with special marks of\nhonour. The best seat is assigned to him; the best food at the host's\ndisposal is set before {575} him; he takes precedence over all the\nmembers of the household; he enjoys extraordinary privileges. M.\nHyades says of the Fuegians, \"Quelque encombr\u00e9e que soit une hutte, et\nsi r\u00e9duite que soit la quantit\u00e9 d'aliments dont on dispose, le nouvel\narrivant est toujours assur\u00e9 d'avoir une place pr\u00e8s du foyer et une\npart de la nourriture.\"[14] The Mattoal of California, though they are\nsometimes heartlessly indifferent even to their parents, \"will divide\nthe last shred of dried salmon with any casual comer who has not a\nshadow of claim upon them, except the claim of that exaggerated and\nsupererogatory hospitality that savages use.\"[15] A Creek Indian would\nnot only receive into his house a traveller or sojourner of whatever\nnation or colour, but would treat him as a brother or as his own\nchild, divide with him the last grain of corn or piece of flesh, and\noffer him the most valuable things in his possession.[16] Among the\nArawaks, \"when a stranger, and particularly an European, enters the\nhouse of an Indian, every thing is at his command.\"[17]\nNotwithstanding the Karen's suspicious nature, says Mr. Smeaton, his\nhospitality is unbounded. \"He will entertain every stranger that\ncomes, without asking a question. He feels himself disgraced if he\ndoes not receive all comers, and give them the very best cheer he has.\nThe wildest Karen will receive a guest with a grace and dignity and\nentertain him with a lavish hospitality that would become a duke.\nHundreds of their old legends inculcate the duty of receiving\nstrangers without regard to pecuniary circumstances either of host or\nguest.\"[18] Among many uncivilised peoples it is customary for a man\nto offer even his wife, or one of his wives, to the stranger for the\ntime he remains his guest.[19] The Bedouins of Nejd have a {576}\nsaying that \"the guest while in the house is its lord\";[20] and in the\nInstitutes of Vishnu we read that, as the Br\u00e2hmanas are lords over all\nother castes, and as a husband is lord over his wives, so the guest is\nthe lord of his host.[21]\n\n[Footnote 12: Azara, _Voyages dans l'Am\u00e9rique m\u00e9ridionale_, ii. 91\n(Guanas). Southey, _History of Brazil_, i. 247 (Tupis). Davis, _El\nGringo_, p. 421 (Pueblos). Lafitau, _M[oe]urs des sauvages\nam\u00e9riquains_, i. 106; ii. 88. Heriot, _Travels through the Canadas_,\np. 318 _sq._ Buchanan, _North American Indians_, p. 6. Perrot,\n_M\u00e9moire sur les m[oe]urs, coustumes et relligion des sauvages de\nl'Am\u00e9rique septentrionale_, pp. 69, 202. Neighbors, in Schoolcraft,\n_Indian Tribes of the United States_, ii. 132 (Comanches). James,\n_Expedition from Pittsburgh to the Rocky Mountains_, i. 321 _sq._\n(Omahas). Morgan, _League of the Iroquois_, p. 327 _sqq._; Loskiel,\n_History of the Mission of the United Brethren among the Indians in\nNorth America_, i. 15; Colden, in Schoolcraft, _op. cit._ iii. 190\n(Iroquois). Powers, _Tribes of California_, p. 183. Sproat, _Scenes\nand Studies of Savage Life_, p. 56 _sqq._ (Ahts). Boas, 'Report on the\nIndians of British Columbia,' in the _Report read at the Meeting of\nthe British Association_, 1889, p. 36. Keating, _Expedition to the\nSource of St. Peter's River_, i. 101 (Potawatomis); ii. 167\n(Chippewas). Richardson, _Arctic Searching Expedition_, ii. 18 (Crees\nand Chippewas). _Idem_, in Franklin, _Journey to the Shores of the\nPolar Sea_, p. 66; Mackenzie, _Voyages to the Frozen and Pacific\nOceans_, p. xcvi. (Crees). Dall, _Alaska_, p. 397; Sarytschew, _loc.\ncit._ vi. 78; Sauer, _Billing's Expedition to the Northern Parts of\nRussia_, p. 274 (Aleuts). Lyon, _Private Journal_, p. 349 _sq._;\nParry, _Second Voyage for the Discovery of a North-West Passage_, p.\n526 (Eskimo of Igloolik). Egede, _Description of Greenland_, p. 126;\nCranz, _History of Greenland_, i. 172 _sq._; Kane, _Arctic\nExplorations_, ii. 122; Holm, 'Ethnologisk Skizze af Angmagsalikerne,'\nin _Meddelelser om Gr\u00f6nland_, x. 87, 175 _sq._ (Greenlanders).\nBeechey, _Voyage to the Pacific and Behring's Strait_, ii. 571;\nRichardson, _Arctic Searching Expedition_, i. 367; Seemann, _Voyage of\n\"Herald,\"_ ii. 65 (Western Eskimo). Hooper, _Ten Months among the\nTents of the Tuski_, pp. 160, 193, 194, 208; Nordenski\u00f6ld, _Vegas f\u00e4rd\nkring Asien och Europa_, ii. 145 (Chukchi). Dall, _op. cit._ pp. 381\n(Tuski), 517 (Kamchadales), 526 (Ainos). Sarytschew, _loc. cit._ v. 67\n(Kamchadales). Dobell, _Travels in Kamtschatka and Siberia_, i. 63, 82\n_sq._ (Kamchadales); ii. 42 (Jakuts). Sauer, _op. cit._ p. 124\n(Jakuts). V\u00e1mb\u00e9ry, _Das T\u00fcrkenvolk_, pp. 159 (Jakuts), 336 (natives of\nEastern Turkestan), 411 (Turkomans), 451 (Tshuvashes), 509 (Baskirs),\n&c. Krasheninnikoff, _History of Kamschatka_, p. 236 (Kurile\nIslanders). Georgi, _Russia_, i. 113 (Mordvins); iii. 111 (Tunguses),\n167 (Koriaks); iv. 22 (Kalmucks). Bergmann, _Nomadische Streifereien\nunter den Kalm\u00fcken_, ii. 281 _sqq._ Prejevalsky, _Mongolia_, i. 71\n_sq._ Castr\u00e9n, _Nordiska resor och forskningar_, i. 41 (Laplanders),\n319 (Ostyaks). Scott Robertson, _K\u00e1firs of the Hindu-Kush_, p. 187\n_sq._ Fraser, _Tour through the Him[=a]l[=a] Mountains_, pp. 264\n(people of Kunawar), 335 (Butias). Dalton, _Descriptive Ethnology of\nBengal_, pp. 46 (Kukis), 68 (Garos). Hunter, _Annals of Rural Bengal_,\ni. 215 (Santals). Tickell, 'Memoir on the Hod\u00e9sum,' in _Jour. Asiatic\nSoc. Bengal_, ix. (pt. ii.) 807 _sq._ (Hos). Lewin, _Wild Races of\nSouth-Eastern India_, p. 217 (Tipperahs). Colquhoun, _Amongst the\nShans_, pp. 160 _sq._ (Steins), 371 (Shans). Foreman, _Philippine\nIslands_, p. 187. de Crespigny, 'Milanows of Borneo,' in _Jour. Anthr.\nInst._ v, 34. Low, _Sarawak_, pp. 243 (Hill Dyaks), 336 (Kayans).\nBoyle, _Adventures among the Dyaks of Borneo_, p. 215. Ling Roth,\n_Natives of Sarawak_, i. 82 (Sea Dyaks). Marsden, _History of\nSumatra_, p. 208 (natives of the interior of Sumatra). Raffles,\n_History of Java_, i. 249; Crawfurd, _History of the Indian\nArchipelago_, i. 53 (Javanese). Riedel, _De sluik- en kroesharige\nrassen tusschen Selebes en Papua_, p. 41 (natives of Ambon and\nUliase). von Kotzebue, _op. cit._ iii. 165 (natives of Radack), 215\n(Pelew Islanders). Hale, _U.S. Exploring Expedition. Vol.\nVI.--Ethnography and Philology_, p. 95 (Kingsmill Islanders).\nMacdonald, _Oceania_, p. 195 (Efatese). Erskine, _Cruise among the\nIslands of the Western Pacific_, p. 273 _sq._; Williams and Calvert,\n_Fiji and the Fijians_, p. 110; Anderson, _Travel in Fiji and New\nCaledonia_, p. 134 _sq._ (Fijians). Ellis, _Polynesian Researches_, i.\n95. _Idem_, _Tour through Hawaii_, p. 346 _sq._ Forster, _op. cit._\nii. 158 (Tahitians) 364 (natives of Tana), 394 (South Sea Islanders\ngenerally). Cook, _Voyage round the World_, p. 40 (Tahitians).\nTregear, 'Niue,' in _Jour. Polynesian Soc._ ii. 13 (Savage Islanders),\nTurner, _Samoa_, p. 114; Pritchard, _Polynesian Reminiscences_, p.\n132; Brenchley, _Jottings during the Cruise of H.M.S. Cura\u00e7oa among\nthe South Sea Islands_, p. 76 (Samoans). Mariner, _Natives of the\nTonga Islands_, ii. 154. Yate, _op. cit._ p. 100; Dieffenbach, _op.\ncit._ ii. 107 _sq._; Polack, _Manners and Customs of the New\nZealanders_, ii. 155 _sq._; Angas, _Savage Life and Scenes in\nAustralia and New Zealand_, ii. 22 (Maoris). Gason, 'Manners and\nCustoms of the Dieyerie Tribe,' in Woods, _Native Tribes of South\nAustralia_, p. 258; Brough Smyth, _op. cit._ i. 25; Salvado, _op.\ncit._ p. 340 (Australian aborigines). Ellis, _History of Madagascar_,\ni. 198; Sibree, _The Great African Island_, pp. 126, 129; Rochon,\n_Voyage to Madagascar_, p. 62; Little, _Madagascar_, p. 61; Shaw,\n'Betsileo,' in _Antananarivo Annual and Madagascar Magazine_, ii. 82.\nBurchell, _Travels in the Interior of Southern Africa_, ii. 54\n(Bushmans), 345 (Hottentots). Kolben, _Present State of the Cape of\nGood Hope_, i. 166, 337; Le Vaillant, _Travels from the Cape of Good\nHope_, ii. 143 _sq._; Schinz, _Deutsch-S\u00fcdwest-Afrika_, p. 81\n(Hottentots). Lichtenstein, _Travels in Southern Africa_, i. 272;\nLeslie, _Among the Zulus and Amatongas_, p. 203 (Kafirs). Casalis,\n_Basutos_, pp. 209, 224. Andersson, _Lake Ngami_, 198 (Ovambo).\nMacdonald, _Africana_, i. 27, 263 (Eastern Central Africans). Wilson\nand Felkin, _op. cit._ i. 211, 225 (Waganda). Rowley, _Africa\nUnveiled_, p. 47 (natives of Manganja, in the neighbourhood of Lake\nNyassa). New, _Life, Wanderings, and Labours in East Africa_, pp. 102\n(Wanika), 361 (Taveta). Thomson, _Through Masai Land_, p. 64\n(Wa-kwafi, of the Taveta). Tuckey, _Expedition to explore the River\nZaire_, p. 374 (Congo natives), Bosman, _Description of the Coast of\nGuinea_, p. 108. Burton, _Two Trips to Gorilla Land_, i. 106\n(Mpongwe). _Idem_, _Abeokuta_, i. 303 (Yoruba). Cailli\u00e9, _Travels\nthrough Central Africa_, i. 165 (Bagos). Chavanne, _Die Sahara_, p.\n185 (Touareg). Hanoteau and Letourneux, _La Kabylie_, ii. 45 _sqq._\nMunzinger, _Ostafrikanische Studien_, p. 534 (Barea). Lobo, _Voyage to\nAbyssinia_, p. 82 _sq._\n\nFor the deteriorating influence which contact with a \"higher culture\"\nexercises on savage hospitality, see Nansen, _First Crossing of\nGreenland_, ii. 306 _sq._; Ellis, _Tour through Hawaii_, p. 346; von\nKotzebue, _op. cit._ iii. 250 (Hawaiians); Meade, _Ride through the\nDisturbed Districts of New Zealand_, p. 164; Dieffenbach, _op. cit._\nii. 107, 108, 110.]\n\n[Footnote 13: According to a law of the Peruvian Incas, strangers and\ntravellers should be treated as guests, and public houses were\nprovided for them (Garcilasso de la Vega, _First Part of the Royal\nCommentaries of the Yncas_, ii. 34). For Yucatan, see Landa, _Relacion\nde las cosas de Yucatan_, p. 134. Though hospitality, according to Mr.\nWells Williams (_Middle Kingdom_, i. 835), is not a trait of the\ncharacter of the modern Chinese, kindness to strangers and travellers\nis enjoined in their moral and religious books (Chalmers, 'Chinese\nNatural Theology,' in _China Review_, v. 281. Douglas, _Confucianism\nand Taouism_, p. 273. _Indo-Chinese Gleaner_, iii. 160). In Corea it\nwould be a grave and shameful thing to refuse a portion of one's meal\nwith any person, known or unknown, who presents himself at eating-time\n(Griffis, _Corea_, p. 288). For the Hebrews, see _Genesis_, xviii. 2\n_sqq._, xxiv. 31 _sqq._; _Leviticus_, xix. 9 _sq._, xxv. 35;\n_Deuteronomy_, xiv. 29, xvi. 11, 14; _Judges_, xix. 17 _sqq._; _Job_,\nxxxiv. 32; also Bertholet, _Die Stellung der Israeliten und der Juden\nzu den Fremden_, p. 22 _sqq._, and Nowack, _Lehrbuch der hebr\u00e4ischen\nArch\u00e4ologie_, p. 186 _sq._ For Muhammedans, see Lane, _Manners and\nCustoms of the Modern Egyptians_, p. 296 _sq._; Burckhardt, _Notes on\nthe Bedouins and Wah\u00e1bys_, pp. 100-102, 192 _sqq._; Wood, _Journey to\nthe Source of the River Oxus_, p. 148; Hamilton, _Researches in Asia\nMinor_, ii. 379. For ancient India, see Leist, _Alt-arisches Jus\nGentium_, pp. 39, 40, 223 _sqq._ For Greece, see Schmidt, _Ethik der\nalten Griechen_, ii. 325 _sqq._ For Rome, see Leist, _Alt-arisches Jus\nCivile_, i. 355 _sqq._; von Jhering, _Geist des r\u00f6mischen Rechts_, i.\n227 _sq._ For ancient Teutons, see Grimm, _Deutsche Rechtsalterth\u00fcmer_,\np. 399 _sq._; Gummere, _Germanic Origins_, p. 162 _sqq._; Keyser,\n_Efterladte Skrifter_, ii. pt. ii. 93; Weinhold, _Altnordisches\nLeben_, p. 441 _sqq._; Gudmundsson and K\u00e5lund, 'Sitte,' in Paul's\n_Grundriss der germanischen Philologie_, iii. 450 _sq._ For\nSlavonians, see Schrader, _Reallexikon der indogermanischen\nAltertumskunde_, i. 270; Krauss, _Die S\u00fcdslaven_, p. 644\n_sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 14: Hyades and Deniker, _Mission scientifique du Cap Horn_,\nvii. 243.]\n\n[Footnote 15: Powers, _op. cit._ p. 112.]\n\n[Footnote 16: Bartram, 'Creek and Cherokee Indians,' in _Trans.\nAmerican Ethn. Soc._ iii. pt. i. 42.]\n\n[Footnote 17: Hilhouse, in _Jour. Roy. Geo. Soc._ ii. 230. _Idem_,\n_Indian Notices_, p. 14. _Cf._ von Martins, _Beitr\u00e4ge zur Ethnographie\nAmerika's_, i. 692.]\n\n[Footnote 18: Smeaton, _Loyal Karens of Burma_, p. 144 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 19: Westermarck, _History of Human Marriage_, p. 73 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 20: Palgrave, _Journey through Central and Eastern Arabia_,\ni. 345.]\n\n[Footnote 21: _Institutes of Vishnu_, lxvii. 31. For other instances\nof the precedence granted to guests, see Man, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._\nxii. 94, 148 (Andaman Islanders); Buchanan, _North American Indians_,\np. 324 (Indians of Pennsylvania); Lyon, _Private Journal_, p. 350\n(Eskimo of Igloolik); Seemann, _Voyage of \"Herald,\"_ ii. 65 (Western\nEskimo); Krasheninnikoff, _op. cit._ p. 211 (Kamchadales), Georgi,\n_op. cit._ iii. 153 _sq._ (Kamchadales), 183 _sq._ (Chukchi). Ling\nRoth, _Natives of Sarawak_, i. 86 (Sea Dyaks); Mariner, _op. cit._ ii.\n154 (Tonga Islanders); New, _op. cit._ p. 102 (Wanika); Hanoteau and\nLetourneux, _op. cit._ ii. 45 (Kabyles); Wells Williams, _op. cit._ i.\n540 (Chinese): Krauss, _op. cit._ p. 649 _sq._ (Southern Slavs).]\n\nCustom may require that hospitality should be shown even to an enemy.\nCaptain Holm tells us of a Greenlander of bad character who, though he\nhad murdered his step-father, was received, and for a long time\nentertained, when he paid a visit to the nearest kindred of the\nmurdered man; and this, as it seems, was agreeable to old custom.[22]\nAmong the Aeneze Bedouins, says Burckhardt, all means are reckoned\nlawful to avenge the blood of a slain relative, \"provided the homicide\nbe not killed while he is a guest in the tent of a third person, or if\nhe has taken refuge even in the tent of his deadly foe.\"[23] In\nAfghanistan \"a man's bitterest enemy is safe while he is under his\nroof.\"[24] We read in the Hitopadesa:--\"On even an enemy arrived at\nthe house becoming hospitality should be bestowed; the tree does not\nwithdraw its sheltering shadow from the wood-cutter. . . . The guest\nis everyone's superior.\"[25] The old Norsemen considered it a duty to\ntreat a guest hospitably even though it came out that he had killed\nthe brother of his host.[26] A medi\u00e6val {577} knight granted safe\nconduct through his territories to all who required it, including\nthose who asserted pretensions which, if established, would deprive\nhim of his possessions.[27]\n\n[Footnote 22: Nansen, _First Crossing of Greenland_, ii. 305 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 23: Burckhardt, _Bedouins and Wah\u00e1bys_, p. 87. _Cf._ Daumas,\n_La vie Arabe_, p. 317 (Algerian Arabs).]\n\n[Footnote 24: Elphinstone, _Kingdom of Caubul_, i. 296.]\n\n[Footnote 25: _Hitopadesa_, Mitral\u00e2bh\u00e2, 60, 62.]\n\n[Footnote 26: Grimm, _Deutsche Rechtsalterth\u00fcmer_, p. 400. Weinhold,\n_Altnordisches Leben_, p. 441. For other instances of hospitality\ntowards enemies, see James, _Expedition to the Rocky Mountains_, i.\n322 (Omahas); Bartram, in _Trans. American Ethn. Soc._ iii. pt. i. 42\n(Creeks and Cherokees); Lomonaco, 'Sullerazze indigene del Brasile,'\nin _Archivio per l'antropologia e la etnologia_, xix. 57 (Tupis);\nKrauss, _op. cit._ p. 650 (Montenegrines).]\n\n[Footnote 27: Mills, _History of Chivalry_, p. 154.]\n\nTo protect a guest is looked upon as a most stringent duty under all\ncircumstances. \"Le Kabyle qui accorde son _\u00e2na\u00efa_ doit, sous peine\nd'infamie, y faire honneur, d\u00fbt-il s'exposer \u00e0 tous les dangers. . . .\nLa violation de leur _\u00e2na\u00efa_ est la plus grave injure que l'on puisse\ninfliger \u00e0 des Kabyles. Un homme qui viole, ou, suivant l'expression\nconsacr\u00e9e, qui brise l'_\u00e2na\u00efa_ de son village ou de sa tribu, est puni\nde mort et de la confiscation de tous ses biens; sa maison est\nd\u00e9molie.\"[28] Among the Bedouins a breach of the law of _dakheel_\n\"would be considered a disgrace not only upon the individual but upon\nhis family, and even upon his tribe, which never could be wiped out.\nNo greater insult can be offered to a man, or to his clan, than to say\nthat he has broken the _dakheel_.\"[29] Among the Aenezes, according to\nBurckhardt, \"a violation of hospitality, by the betraying of a guest,\nhas not occurred within the memory of man.\"[30] In Egypt, \"most\nBedawees will suffer almost any injury to themselves or their families\nrather than allow their guests to be ill-treated while under their\nprotection.\"[31] Among the Kandhs, \"for the safety of a guest life and\nhonour are pledged; he is to be considered before a child\"; in order\nto save his guest a man is even allowed to speak falsely, which is\notherwise condemned by them as a heinous sin.[32] V\u00e1mb\u00e9ry tells us of\ncases in which the Kara-Kirghiz have preferred being harassed with war\nby the Chinese to surrendering to them such Chinese fugitives as have\nsought and received their hospitality.[33] Among the Ossetes the host\nnot only considers himself responsible for the safety of his guest,\n{578} but \"revenges the murder or wounding of the latter as he would\nthat of a kinsman.\"[34] In Albania it is considered infamous to leave\nan injury inflicted on a guest unavenged.[35] Among the Takue, though\na man would accept compensation for the murder of a relative, he would\nin all cases exact blood-revenge for the murder of his guest.[36] On\nthe other hand, in Sierra Leone a guest \"is scarcely accountable for\nany faults which he may commit, whether through inadvertency or\ndesign, the host being considered as responsible for the actions of\n'his stranger.'\"[37]\n\n[Footnote 28: Hanoteau and Letourneux, _op. cit._ ii. 61 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 29: Layard, _Discoveries in the Ruins of Nineveh and\nBabylon_, p. 317.]\n\n[Footnote 30: Burckhardt, _Bedouins and Wah\u00e1bys_, p. 100. _Cf._\n_ibid._ p. 192.]\n\n[Footnote 31: Lane, _Modern Egyptians_, p. 297.]\n\n[Footnote 32: Macpherson, _Memorials of Service in India_, pp. 65, 94.]\n\n[Footnote 33: V\u00e1mb\u00e9ry, _Das T\u00fcrkenvolk_, p. 268. _Cf._ _ibid._ p. 411\n(Turkomans).]\n\n[Footnote 34: von Haxthausen, _Transcaucasia_, p. 412.]\n\n[Footnote 35: Gop[vc]evi['c], _Oberalbanien und seine Liga_, p. 328.]\n\n[Footnote 36: Munzinger, _Ostafrikanische Studien_, p. 208. Among the\nBarea and Kun\u00e1ma a man avenges the death of his guest by killing the\nguest of the murderer (_ibid._ p. 477).]\n\n[Footnote 37: Winterbottom, _Native Africans in the Neighbourhood of\nSierra Leone_, i. 214.]\n\nHospitality is not only regarded as a duty of the first order, but\nhas, in a remarkable degree, been associated with religion. Among the\ndoctrines held up for acceptance by the religious instructors of the\nIroquois there was the following precept:--\"If a stranger wander about\nyour abode, welcome him to your home, be hospitable towards him, speak\nto him with kind words, and forget not always to mention the Great\nSpirit.\"[38] The natives of Aneiteum, of the New Hebrides, maintained\nthat generous hospitality would receive the highest reward in the Land\nof the Dead.[39] The Kalmucks believe that want of hospitality will be\npunished by angry gods.[40] The Kandhs say that the first duty which\nthe gods have imposed upon man is that of hospitality; and \"persons\nguilty of the neglect of established observances are punished by the\ndivine wrath, either during their current lives, or when they\nafterwards return to animate other bodies,\" the penalties being death,\npoverty, disease, the loss of children, or any other form of\ncalamity.[41] In the sacred books of India hospitality is repeatedly\nspoken of as a most important duty, the discharge of which will be\n{579} amply rewarded. \"The inhospitable man,\" the Vedic singer tell\nus, \"acquires food in vain. I speak the truth--it verily is his death.\n. . . He who eats alone is nothing but a sinner.\"[42] \"He who does not\nfeed these five, the gods, his guests, those whom he is bound to\nmaintain, the manes, and himself, lives not, though he breathes.\"[43]\nAccording to the Vishnu Pur\u00e1na, a person who neglects a poor and\nfriendless stranger in want of hospitality, goes to hell.[44] On the\nother hand, by honouring guests a householder obtains the highest\nreward.[45] \"He who entertains guests for one night obtains earthly\nhappiness, a second night gains the middle air, a third heavenly\nbliss, a fourth the world of unsurpassable bliss; many nights procure\nendless worlds. That has been declared in the Veda.\"[46] It is said in\nthe Mahabharata that \"he who gives food freely to a fatigued wayfarer,\nwhom he has never seen before, obtains great virtuous merit.\"[47]\nAccording to Hesiod, Zeus himself is wrath with him who does evil to a\nsuppliant or a guest, and at last, in requital for his deed, lays on\nhim a bitter penalty.[48] Plato says:--\"In his relations to strangers,\na man should consider that a contract is a most holy thing, and that\nall concerns and wrongs of strangers are more directly dependent on\nthe protection of God, than wrongs done to citizens. . . . He who is\nmost able is the genius and the god of the stranger, who follows in\nthe train of Zeus, the god of strangers. And for this reason, he who\nhas a spark of caution in him, will do his best to pass through life\nwithout sinning against the stranger. And of offences committed,\nwhether against strangers or fellow-country-men, that against\nsuppliants is the greatest.\"[49] Similar opinions prevailed in ancient\nRome. _Jus hospitii_, whilst {580} forming no part of the civil law,\nbelonged to _fas_; the stranger, who enjoyed no legal protection, was,\nas a guest, protected by custom and religion.[50] The _dii hospitales_\nand Jupiter were on guard over him;[51] hence the duties towards a\nguest were even more stringent than those towards a relative.[52]\nC\u00e6sar[53] and Tacitus[54] attest that the Teutons considered it\nimpious to injure a guest or to exclude any human being from the\nshelter of their roof. The God of Israel was a preserver of\nstrangers.[55] In the Talmud hospitality is described as \"the most\nimportant part of divine worship,\"[56] as being equivalent to the duty\nof honouring father and mother,[57] as even more meritorious than\nfrequenting the synagogue.[58] Muhammedanism likewise regards\nhospitality as a religious duty.[59] \"Whoever,\" said the Prophet,\n\"believes in God and the day of resurrection, must respect his\nguest.\"[60] But the idea that a guest enjoys divine protection\nprevailed among the Arabs long before the times of Muhammed.[61] The\nBedouins say that the guests are \"guests of God.\"[62] The Christian\nChurch, again, regarded hospitality as a duty imposed by\nChrist.[63]\n\n[Footnote 38: Morgan, _League of the Iroquois_, p. 172.]\n\n[Footnote 39: Inglis, _In the New Hebrides_, p. 31.]\n\n[Footnote 40: Bergmann, _op. cit._ ii. 281 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 41: Macpherson, 'Religious Opinions and Observances of the\nKhonds,' in _Jour. Roy. Asiatic Soc._ vii. 196.]\n\n[Footnote 42: _Rig-Veda_, x. 117. 6.]\n\n[Footnote 43: _Laws of Manu_, iii. 72. _Cf._ _Institutes of Vishnu_,\nlxvii. 45.]\n\n[Footnote 44: _Vish['n]u Pur\u00e1['n]a_, p. 305.]\n\n[Footnote 45: _Institutes of Vishnu_, lxvii. 28, 32.]\n\n[Footnote 46: _\u00c2pastamba_, ii. 3. 7. 16.]\n\n[Footnote 47: _Mahabharata_, Vana Parva, ii. 61, pt. v. p. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 48: Hesiod, _Opera et dies_, 331 _sq._ (333 _sq._).]\n\n[Footnote 49: Plato, _Leges_, v. 729 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 50: Servius, _In Virgilii \u00c6neidos_, iii. 55: \"Fas omne; et\ncognationis, et iuris hospitii.\" von Jhering, _Geist des r\u00f6mischen\nRechts_, i. 227. Leist, _Alt-arisches Jus Civile_, i. 103, 358 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 51: Servius, _In Virgilii \u00c6neidos_, i. 736. Livy, _Histori\u00e6\nRoman\u00e6_, xxxix. 51. Tacitus, _Annales_, xv. 52. Plautus, _P[oe]nuli_,\nv. 1. 25.]\n\n[Footnote 52: Gellius, _Noctes Attic\u00e6_, v. 13. 5: \"In officiis apud\nmaiores ita observatum est, primum tutelae, deinde hospiti, deinde\nclienti, tum cognato, postea affini.\"]\n\n[Footnote 53: C\u00e6sar, _De bello Gallico_, vi. 23.]\n\n[Footnote 54: Tacitus, _Germania_, 21.]\n\n[Footnote 55: _Psalms_, cxlvi. 9.]\n\n[Footnote 56: Deutsch, _Literary Remains_, p. 57.]\n\n[Footnote 57: _Kiddushin_, fol. 39 B, quoted by Hershon, _Treasures of\nthe Talmud_, p. 145.]\n\n[Footnote 58: _Sabbath_, fol. 127 A, quoted by Katz, _Der wahre\nTalmudjude_, p. 103.]\n\n[Footnote 59: _Koran_, iv. 40 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 60: Lane, _Arabian Society in the Middle Ages_, p. 142.]\n\n[Footnote 61: Wellhausen, _Reste arabischen Heidentums_, p. 223 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 62: Doughty, _Arabia Deserta_, i. 228, 504.]\n\n[Footnote 63: Laurent, _\u00c9tudes sur l'histoire de l'Humanit\u00e9_, vii. 346.]\n\nThat a stranger, who under other circumstances is treated as an\ninferior being or a foe, liable to be robbed and killed with impunity,\nshould enjoy such extraordinary privileges as a guest, is certainly\none of the most curious contrasts which present themselves to a\nstudent of the moral ideas of mankind. It may be asked, why should\n{581} he be received at all? Of course, he stands in need of\nprotection and support, but why should those who do not know him care\nfor that?\n\nOne answer is that his helpless condition may excite pity; facts seem\nto prove that even among savages the altruistic feelings, however\nnarrow, can be stirred by the sight of a suffering and harmless\nstranger. Another answer is that the host himself may expect to reap\nbenefit from his act. And there can be little doubt that the rules of\nhospitality are in the main based on egoistic considerations.\n\nIt has been justly observed that in uncivilised countries, where there\nis no public accommodation for travellers, \"hospitality is so\nnecessary, and so much required by the mutual convenience of all\nparties, as to detract greatly from its merit as a moral quality.\"[64]\nWhen the stranger belongs to a community with which a reciprocity of\nintercourse prevails, it is prudent to give him a hearty reception; he\nwho is the host to-day may be the guest tomorrow. \"If the Red Indians\nare hospitable,\" says Domenech, \"they also look for their hospitality\nbeing returned with the same marks of respect and consideration.\"[65]\nMoreover, the stranger is a bearer of news and tidings, and as such\nmay be a welcome guest where communication between different places is\nslow and rare.[66] During my wanderings in the remote forests of\nNorthern Finland I was constantly welcomed with the phrase, \"What\nnews?\" But the stranger may be supposed to bring with him something\nwhich is valued even more highly, namely, good luck or blessings.\n\n[Footnote 64: Winterbottom, _op. cit._ i. 214.]\n\n[Footnote 65: Domenech, _Seven Years' Residence in the Great Deserts\nof North America_, ii. 319. _Cf._ Dunbar, 'Pawnee Indians.' in\n_Magazine of American History_, viii. 745; Brett, _Indian Tribes of\nGuiana_, p. 347; Bernau, _Missionary Labours in British Guiana_, p.\n51; von den Steinen, _Unter den Naturv\u00f6lkern Zentral-Brasiliens_, p.\n333 _sq._ (Baka\u00efri); Georgi, _op. cit._ iii. 154 (Kamchadales);\nSmeaton, _op. cit._ p. 146 (Karens); Ellis, _Polynesian Researches_,\ni. 95 (Society Islanders); Pritchard, _Polynesian Reminiscences_, p.\n132, and Brenchley, _op. cit._ p. 76 (Samoans); Williams and Calvert,\n_op. cit._ p. 110, and Anderson, _Notes of Travel in Fiji and New\nCaledonia_, p. 135 (Fijians); Chavanne, _Die Sahara_, p. 393 (Arabs of\nthe Sahara).]\n\n[Footnote 66: Wright, _Domestic Manners and Sentiments in England\nduring the Middle Ages_, p. 329.]\n\nDuring the first days of my stay at Demnat, in the Great Atlas, the\nnatives in spite of their hostility towards Europeans, said they were\nquite pleased with my coming to see them, because I had brought with\nme rain and an increase of the import of victuals, which just before\nmy arrival had been very scarce. So, too, whilst residing among the\nAndjra mountaineers in the North of Morocco, I was said to be a person\nwith \"propitious ankles,\" because, since I settled down among them,\nthe village where I stayed was frequently visited by Shereefs--presumed\ndescendants of the Prophet Muhammed--who are always highly valued\nguests on account of the _baraka_, or holiness, with which they are\nsupposed in a smaller or greater degree to be endowed. The stranger\nmay be a source of good fortune either involuntarily, as a bearer of\nluck, or through his good wishes; and there is every reason to hope\nthat he will, if treated hospitably, return the kindness of his host\nwith a blessing. According to the old traveller d'Arvieux, strangers,\nwho come to an Arab village are received by the Sheikh with some such\nwords as these:--\"You are welcome; praised be God that you are in good\nhealth; your arrival draws down the blessing of heaven upon us; the\nhouse and all that is in it is yours, you are masters of it.\"[67] It\nis said in one of the sacred books of India that through a Br\u00e2hmana\nguest the people obtain rain, and food through rain, hence they know\nthat \"the hospitable reception of a guest is a ceremony averting\nevil.\"[68] When we read in the Laws of Manu that \"the hospitable\nreception of guests procures wealth, fame, long life, and heavenly\nbliss,\"[69] it is also reasonable to suppose that this supernatural\nreward is a result of blessings invoked on the host. In the\n'Suppliants' of Aeschylus the Chorus sings:--\"Let us utter for the\nArgives blessings in requital of their blessings. And may Zeus of\nStrangers watch to their fulfilment the rewards that issue from a\nstranger's tongue, that {583} they reach their perfect goal.\"[70] We\ncan now understand the eagerness with which guests are sought for.\nWhen a guest enters the hut of a Kalmuck, \"the host, the hostess, and\neverybody in the hut, rejoice at the arrival of the stranger as at an\nunexpected fortune.\"[71] Among the Arabs of Sinai, \"if a stranger be\nseen from afar coming towards the camp, he is the guest for that night\nof the first person who descries him, and who, whether a grown man or\na child, exclaims, 'There comes my guest.' Such a person has a right\nto entertain the guest that night. Serious quarrels happen on these\noccasions; and the Arabs often have recourse to their great oath--'By\nthe divorce (from my wife) I swear that I shall entertain the guest';\nupon which all opposition ceases.\"[72] It is also very usual in the\nEast to eat before the gate of the house where travellers pass, and\nevery stranger of respectable appearance is invariably requested to\nsit down and partake of the repast.[73] Among the Maoris, \"no sooner\ndoes a stranger appear in sight, than he is welcomed with the usual\ncry of 'Come hither! come hither!' from numerous voices, and is\nimmediately invited to eat of such provisions as the place\naffords.\"[74]\n\n[Footnote 67: d'Arvieux, _Travels in Arabia the Desart_, p. 131 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 68: _Vasishtha_, xi. 13.]\n\n[Footnote 69: _Laws of Manu_, iii. 106.]\n\n[Footnote 70: Aeschylus, _Supplices_, 632 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 71: Bergmann, _op. cit._ ii. 282.]\n\n[Footnote 72: Burckhardt, _Bedouin and Wah\u00e1bys_ p. 198.]\n\n[Footnote 73: _Idem_, _Arabic Proverbs_, p. 218. Chasseb[oe]uf de\nVolney, _Travels through Syria and Egypt_, i. 413.]\n\n[Footnote 74: Yate, _op. cit._ p. 100. _Cf._ Turner, _Nineteen Years\nin Polynesia_, p. 325 (Samoans); Sproat, _op. cit._ p. 57 (Ahts).]\n\nIf efficacy is ascribed to the blessings even of an ordinary man, the\nblessings of a stranger are naturally supposed to be still more\npowerful. For the unknown stranger, like everything unknown and\neverything strange, arouses a feeling of mysterious awe in\nsuperstitious minds. The Ainos say, \"Do not treat strangers\nslightingly, for you never know whom you are entertaining.\"[75]\nAccording to the Hitopadesa, \"a guest consists of all the\ndeities.\"[76] It is significant that in the writings of ancient India,\nGreece, and Rome, guests are mentioned next after gods as due objects\nof regard.[77] Thus Aeschylus speaks of a man's {584} \"impious conduct\nto a god, or a stranger, or to his parents dear.\"[78] According to\nHomeric notions, \"the gods, in the likeness of strangers from far\ncountries, put on all manner of shapes, and wander through the cities,\nbeholding the violence and the righteousness of men.\"[79] The author\nof the Epistle to the Hebrews writes, \"Be not forgetful to entertain\nstrangers: for thereby some have entertained angels unawares.\"[80]\n\n[Footnote 75: Batchelor, _Ainu and their Folk-Lore_, p. 259.]\n\n[Footnote 76: _Hitopadesa_, Mitral\u00e2bh\u00e2, 65.]\n\n[Footnote 77: _Anugit\u00e2_, 3, 31 (_Sacred Books of the East_, viii. 243,\n361). Gellius, _Noctes Attic\u00e6_, v. 13. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 78: Aeschylus, _Eumenides_, 270 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 79: _Odyssey_, xvii. 485 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 80: _Hebrews_, xiii. 2.]\n\nThe visiting stranger, however, is regarded not only as a potential\nbenefactor, but as a potential source of evil. He may bring with him\ndisease or ill-luck. He is commonly believed to be versed in\nmagic;[81] and the evil wishes and curses of a stranger are greatly\nfeared, owing partly to his quasi-supernatural character, partly to\nthe close contact in which he comes with the host and his belongings.\n\n[Footnote 81: Frazer, _Golden Bough_, i. 298 _sqq._]\n\nIn the Mentawey Islands, in the Malay Archipelago, \"if a stranger\nenters a house where there are children, the father or some other\nmember of the family who happens to be present, takes the ornament\nwith which the children decorate their hair, and hands it to the\nstranger, who holds it in his hands for a while, and then gives it\nback\"; this is supposed to protect the child from the evil effect\nwhich the eye of a stranger might have on it.[82] With reference to\nthe Californian Pomo, Mr. Powers states, \"Let a perfect stranger enter\na wigwam and offer the lodge-father a string of beads for any object\nthat takes his fancy--merely pointing to it, but uttering no word--and\nthe owner holds himself bound in savage honour to make the exchange,\nwhether it is a fair one or not.\" When we compare this idea of \"savage\nhonour\" with certain cases mentioned in the last chapter, we cannot\ndoubt that it is based on superstitious fear; indeed, the next day the\nformer owner of the article \"may thrust the stranger through with his\nspear, or crush his forehead with a pebble from his sling, and the\nbystanders will look {585} upon it as only the rectification of a bad\nbargain.\"[83] Among the African Herero \"no curse is regarded as\nheavier than that which one who has been inhospitably treated would\nhurl at those who have driven him from the hearth.\"[84] According to\nGreek ideas, guests and suppliants had their Erinyes[85]\n--personifications of their curses; and it would be difficult to\nattribute any other meaning to \"the genius ([Greek: dai/m\u00f4n]) and the\ngod of the stranger, who follow in the train of Zeus,\" spoken of by\nPlato, and to the Roman _dii hospitales_, in their capacity of avengers\nof injuries done to guests. Aeschylus represents Apollo as saying, \"I\nshall assist him (Orestes), and rescue my own suppliant; for terrible\nboth among men and gods is the wrath of a refugee, when one abandons\nhim with intent.\"[86] It is no doubt the same idea that the Chorus in\nthe 'Suppliants' expresses, in a modified form, when singing:--\"Grievous\nis the wrath of Zeus Petitionary. . . . I must needs hold in awe the\nwrath of Zeus Petitionary, for that is the supremest on earth.\"[87]\n\u00c2pastamba's Aphorisms contain a s\u00fbtra the object of which is to show\nthe absolute necessity of feeding a guest, owing to the fact that, \"if\noffended, he might burn the house with the flames of his anger\";[88]\nfor \"a guest comes to the house resembling a burning fire,\"[89] \"a\nguest rules over the world of Indra.\"[90] According to the Institutes\nof Vishnu, \"one who has arrived as a guest and is obliged to turn home\ndisappointed in his expectations, takes away from the man to whose\nhouse he has come his religious merit, and throws his own guilt upon\nhim\";[91] and the {586} same idea is found in many other ancient books\nof India.[92] That a dissatisfied guest, or a Br\u00e2hmana,[93] thus takes\nwith him the spiritual merit of his churlish host, allows of a quite\nliteral interpretation. In Morocco, a Shereef is generally unwilling\nto let a stranger kiss his hand, for fear lest the stranger should\nextract from him his _baraka_, or holiness; and the Shereefs of\nWazzari are reputed to rob other Shereefs, who visit them, of their\nholiness, should the latter leave behind any remainder of their meals,\neven though it be only a bone.\n\n[Footnote 82: Rosenberg, _Der Malayische Archipel_, p. 198.]\n\n[Footnote 83: Powers, _op. cit._ p. 153. The same privilege as \"the\nperfect stranger\" possesses among the Pomo, was granted by the tribes\nof the Niger Delta to the Ibo girl who was destined to be offered as a\nsacrifice. She \"was allowed to claim any piece of cloth or any\nornament she set her eyes upon, and the native to whom it belonged was\nobliged to present it to her\" (Comte de Cardi, 'Ju-ju Laws and\nCustoms,' in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxix. 54).]\n\n[Footnote 84: Ratzel, _History of Mankind_, 480.]\n\n[Footnote 85: Plato, _Epistol\u00e6_, viii. 357. Apollonius Rhodius,\n_Argonautica_, iv. 1042 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 86: Aeschylus, _Eumenides_, 232 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 87: _Idem_, _Supplices_, 349, 489.]\n\n[Footnote 88: _Sacred Books of the East_ ii. 114, n. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 89: _\u00c2pastamba_, ii. 3. 6. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 90: _Laws of Manu_, iv. 182.]\n\n[Footnote 91: _Institutes of Vishnu_, lxvii. 33.]\n\n[Footnote 92: _Vasishtha_, viii. 6. _Laws of Manu_, ii. 100.\n_Hitopadesa_, Mitral\u00e2bh\u00e2, 64.]\n\n[Footnote 93: _Vasishtha_, viii. 6. _Laws of Manu_, iii. 100.]\n\nThe efficacy of a wish or a curse depends not only upon the potency\nwhich it possesses from the beginning, owing to certain qualities in\nthe person from whom it originates, but also on the vehicle by which\nit is conducted--just as the strength of an electric shock depends\nboth on the original intensity of the current and on the condition of\nthe conductor. As particularly efficient conductors are regarded\nblood, bodily contact, food, and drink. In Morocco, the duties of a\nhost are closely connected with the institution of _l-[(]\u00e2r_, one of\nthe most sacred customs of that country. If a person desires to compel\nanother to help him, or to forgive him, or, generally, to grant some\nrequest, he makes _[(]\u00e2r_ on him. He kills a sheep or a goat or only a\nchicken at the threshold of his house, or at the entrance of his tent;\nor he grasps with his hands either the person whom he invokes, or that\nperson's child, or the horse which he is riding; or he touches him\nwith his turban or a fold of his dress. In short, he establishes some\nkind of contact with the other person, to serve as a conductor of his\nwishes and of his conditional curses. It is universally believed that,\nif the person so appealed to does not grant the request, his own\nwelfare is at stake, and that the danger is particularly great if an\nanimal has been killed at his door, and he steps over the blood or\nonly catches a glimpse of it. As appears from the expression, \"This is\n_[(]\u00e2r_ on you if you do not do this or that,\" the blood, or {587} the\ndirect bodily contact, is supposed to transfer to the other person a\nconditional curse:--If you do not help me, then you will die, or your\nchildren will die, or some other evil will happen to you. So also the\nowner of a house or a tent to which a person has fled for refuge must,\nin his own interest, assist the fugitive, who is in his _[(]\u00e2r_; for,\nby being in his dwelling, the refugee is in close contact with him and\nhis belongings. Again, the restraint which a common meal lays on those\nwho partake of it is conspicuous in the usual practice of sealing a\ncompact of friendship by eating together at the tomb of some saint.\nThe true meaning of this is made perfectly clear by the phrase that\n\"the food will repay\" him who breaks the compact. The sacredness of\nthe place adds to the efficacy of the imprecation, but its vehicle,\nthe real punisher, is the eaten food, because it embodies a\nconditional curse.\n\nNow the idea underlying these customs is certainly not restricted to\nMorocco. As will be shown in subsequent chapters, blood is very\ncommonly used as a conductor of conditional curses; for instance, one\nobject of the practice of sacrifice is to transfer an imprecation to\nthe god by means of the blood of the victim. Bodily contact is another\ncommon means of communicating curses; and this accounts for many\nremarkable cases of compulsory hospitality and protection which have\nbeen noticed in different quarters of the world. In Fiji \"the same\nnative who within a few yards of his house would murder a coming or\ndeparting guest for sake of a knife or a hatchet, will defend him at\nthe risk of his own life as soon as he has passed his threshold.\"[94]\nIn the Pelew Islands \"an enemy may not be killed in a house,\nespecially not in the presence of the host.\"[95] If an Ossetian\nreceives into his house a stranger whom he afterwards discovers to be\na man to whom he owes blood-revenge, this makes no difference in his\nhospitality; but when the guest takes his leave, the {588} host\naccompanies him to the boundary of the village, and on parting from\nhim exclaims, \"Henceforth beware!\"[96] Among the Kandhs, if a man can\nmake his way by any means into the house of his enemy he cannot be\ntouched, even though his life has been forfeited to his involuntary\nhost by the law of blood-revenge.[97] In none of these cases is an\nexplanation given of the extraordinary privilege granted to the\nstranger; but it seems highly probable that it has the same origin as\nthe exactly similar custom prevalent among the Moors. In other words,\nas soon as the stranger has come in touch with a person by entering\nhis house, he is thought to be able to transmit to that person and his\nfamily and his property any evil wishes he pleases. So, also, in the\nEast any stranger may place himself under the protection of an Arab by\nmerely touching his tent or his tent-ropes,[98] and after this is done\n\"it would be reckoned a disgraceful meanness, an indelible shame, to\nsatisfy even a just vengeance at the expense of hospitality.\"[99]\n\"Amongst the Shammar,\" says Layard, \"if a man can seize the end of a\nstring or thread, the other end of which is held by his enemy, he\nimmediately becomes his Dakheel [or _prot\u00e9g\u00e9_]. If he touch the canvas\nof a tent, or can even throw his mace towards it, he is the Dakheel of\nits owner. If he can spit upon a man or touch any article belonging to\nhim with his teeth, he is Dakhal, unless of course, in case of theft,\nit be the person who caught him. . . . The Shammar never plunder a\ncaravan within sight of their encampment, for as long as a stranger\ncan see their tents they consider him their Dakheel.\"[100] But one of\nthe Bedouin tribes described by Lady Anne and Mr. Blunt, whilst ready\nto rob the stranger who comes to their tents, {589} \"count their\nhospitality as beginning only from the moment of his eating with\nthem.\"[101] All Bedouins regard the eating of \"salt\" together as a\nbond of mutual friendship, and there are tribes who quite in\naccordance with the Moorish principle, \"the food will repay\nyou\"--require to renew this bond every twenty-four hours, or after two\nnights and the day between them, since otherwise, as they say, \"the\nsalt is not in their stomachs,\"[102] and can therefore no longer\npunish the person who breaks the contract. The \"salt\" which gives a\nclaim to protection consists in eating even the smallest portion of\nfood belonging to the protector.[103] The Sultan Saladin did not allow\nthe Crusader Renaud de Chatillon, when brought before him as a\nprisoner, to quench his thirst in his tent, for, had he drunk water\nthere, the enemy would have been justified in regarding his life as\nsafe.[104] We find a similar custom among the Omaha Indians: \"should\nan enemy appear in the lodge and receive a mouthful of food or water,\nor put the pipe in his mouth, he cannot be injured by any member of\nthe tribe, as he is bound for the time being by the ties of\nhospitality, and they are compelled to protect him and send him home\nin safety.\"[105] In these and similar cases, where there is no common\nmeal, the guest may nevertheless transmit to his host a curse by the\nexceedingly close contact established between him and the food or\ndrink or tobacco of the host, according to the principle of _pars pro\ntoto_. This is an idea very familiar to the primitive mind. It lies,\nfor instance, at the bottom of the common belief that a person may\nbewitch his enemy by getting hold of some of his spittle or some\nleavings of his food--a belief which has led to the custom of guests\ncarrying away with them all they are unable to eat of the food which\nis placed before them, {590} out of dread lest the residue of their\nmeal should be eaten by somebody else.[106] The magic wire may conduct\nimprecations in either direction. In Morocco, if a person gives to\nanother some food or drink, it is considered dangerous, not only for\nthe recipient to receive it without saying, \"In the name of God,\" but\nalso for the giver to give it without uttering the same formula, by\nway of precaution.[107]\n\n[Footnote 94: Wilkes, _U.S. Exploring Expedition_, iii. 77.]\n\n[Footnote 95: Kubary, 'Die Palau-Inseln in der S\u00fcdsee,' in _Journal\ndes Museum Godeffroy_, iv. 25.]\n\n[Footnote 96: von Haxthausen, _Transcaucasia_, p. 412.]\n\n[Footnote 97: Macpherson, _Memorials of Service in India_, p. 66.]\n\n[Footnote 98: Robertson Smith, _Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia_,\np. 48. Blunt, _Bedouin Tribes of the Euphrates_, ii. 211.]\n\n[Footnote 99: Chasseb[oe]uf de Volney, _op. cit._ i. 412.]\n\n[Footnote 100: Layard, _op. cit._ p. 317 _sq._ Burckhardt says\n(_Bedouins and Wah\u00e1bys_, p. 72) that one of the most common oaths in\nthe domestic life of the Bedouins is \"to take hold with one hand of\nthe _wasat_, or middle tent-pole, and to swear 'by the life of this\ntent and its owners.'\"]\n\n[Footnote 101: Blunt, _op. cit._ ii. 211.]\n\n[Footnote 102: Burton, _Pilgrimage to Al-Madinah and Meccah_, ii. 112.\nDoughty, _op. cit._ i. 228.]\n\n[Footnote 103: Burckhardt, _Bedouins and Wah\u00e1bys_, p. 187. Quatrem\u00e8re,\n'M\u00e9moire sur les asiles chez les Arabes,' in _M\u00e9moires de l'Institut\nde France, Acad\u00e9mie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres_, xv. pt. ii.\n346 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 104: Quatrem\u00e8re, _loc. cit._ p. 346.]\n\n[Footnote 105: Dorsey, 'Omaha Sociology,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._\niii. 271.]\n\n[Footnote 106: Shortland, _Traditions and Superstitions of the New\nZealanders_, pp. 86, 97. _Cf._ Ellis, _Tour through Hawaii_, p. 347;\nHarmon, _op. cit._ p. 361 (Indians on the east side of the Rocky\nMountains).]\n\n[Footnote 107: Isaac also blessed his son by eating of _his_ food\n(_Genesis_, xxvii. 4, 19, 24). The subject of hospitality has been\nincidentally dealt with by Mr. Crawley in his interesting book, _The\nMystic Rose_ (p. 239 _sqq._; _cf._, also, p. 124 _sqq._). I must leave\nthe reader to decide how far the theory I am here advocating, which\nmainly rests upon my researches in Morocco, coincides with his. All\nthrough his book Mr. Crawley lays much emphasis on the principle of\ntransference; but, if I understand him rightly, he also regards\ncommensality as involving a supposed \"exchange of personality\" between\nthe host and the guest, in consequence of which \"injury done to B by A\nis equivalent to injury done by A to himself\" (p. 237). To this\nopinion I cannot subscribe (_cf._ _infra_, on the Origin and\nDevelopment of the Altruistic Sentiment). So far as I can see, the\nmutual obligations arising from eating together are fundamentally\nbased on the idea that the common meal serves as a conductor of\nconditional imprecations.]\n\nThe stranger thus being looked upon as a more or less dangerous\nindividual, it is natural that those who are exposed to the danger\nshould do what they can to avert it. With this end in view certain\nceremonies are often performed immediately on his arrival. Many such\nreception ceremonies have been described by Dr. Frazer,[108] but I\nshall add a few others which seem to serve the object of either\ntransferring to the stranger conditional curses or purifying him from\ndangerous influences. I am told by a native that among some of the\nnomadic Arabs of Morocco, as soon as a stranger appears in the\nvillage, some water, or, if he be a person of distinction, some milk,\nis presented to him. Should he refuse to partake of it, he is not\nallowed to go freely about, but has to stay in the village mosque. On\nasking for an explanation of this custom, I was told that it is a\nprecaution against the stranger; should he steal or otherwise\nmisbehave himself, the drink would cause his knees to swell so that he\ncould not escape. In other words, he has drunk a conditional\ncurse.[109] The {591} Arabs of a tribe in Nejd \"welcome\" a guest by\npouring on his head a cup of melted butter,[110] the South African\nHerero greet him with a vessel of milk.[111] Sir S. W. Baker describes\na reception custom practised by the Arabs on the Abyssinian frontier,\nwhich is exactly similar to one form of _l-[(]\u00e2r_ of the Moors:--\"The\nusual welcome upon the arrival of a traveller, who is well received in\nan Arab camp, is the sacrifice of a fat sheep, that should be\nslaughtered at the door of his hut or tent, so that the blood flows to\nthe threshold.\"[112] Reception sacrifices also occur among the\nShulis,[113] in Liberia,[114] and in Afghanistan.[115] Among the\nIndians of North America, again, it is a common rule that a dish of\nfood should be placed before the new-comer immediately on his arrival,\nthat he should taste of it even though he has just arisen from a\nfeast, and that no word should be spoken to him or no question put to\nhim until he has partaken of the food.[116] Among the Omahas \"the\nmaster of the house is evidently ill at ease, until the food is\nprepared for eating; he will request his squaws to expedite it, and\nwill even stir the fire himself.\"[117] Among many peoples it is\nconsidered necessary that the host should give food to his guest\nbefore he eats himself. This is a rule on which much stress is laid in\nthe literature of ancient India.[118] A Br\u00e2hmana never takes food\n\"without having offered it duly to gods and guests.\"[119] \"He who eats\nbefore his guest consumes the rood, the prosperity, the issue, the\ncattle, the merit which his family acquired by sacrifices and\ncharitable works.\"[120] It is probable that this punishment has\nsomething to do {592} with the evil eye of the neglected guest, for\nthe idea of eating the evil wishes of others was evidently quite\nfamiliar to the ancient Hindus. It is said in \u00c2pastamba's\nAphorisms:--\"A guest who is at enmity with his host shall not eat his\nfood, nor shall he eat the food of a host who hates him or accuses him\nof a crime, or of one who is suspected of a crime. For it is declared\nin the Veda that he who eats the food of such a person eats his\nguilt.\"[121] In Tonga Islands, \"at meals strangers or foreigners are\nalways shewn a preference, and females are helped before men of the\nsame rank\"--according to our informant, \"because they are the weaker\nsex and require attention.\"[122] As to the correctness of this\nexplanation, however, I have some doubts; the Moors, also, at their\nfeasts, allow the women to eat first, and one reason they give for\nthis custom is that otherwise the hungry women might injure the men\nwith their evil eyes. In Hawaii the host and his family do not at all\npartake of the entertainment with which a passing visitor is generally\nprovided on arriving among them;[123] and that their abstinence is due\nto superstitious fear is all the more probable as, among the same\npeople, it is the custom for the guest invariably to carry away with\nhim all that remains of the entertainment.[124]\n\n[Footnote 108: Frazer, _Golden Bough_, i. 299 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 109: _Cf._ the \"trial of jealousy\" in _Numbers_. v. 11\n_sqq._, particularly verse 22: \"This water that causeth the curse\nshall go into thy bowels, to make thy belly to swell, and thy thigh\nto rot.\"]\n\n[Footnote 110: Burckhardt, _Bedouins and Wah\u00e1bys_, p. 102.]\n\n[Footnote 111: Ratzel, _op. cit._ ii. 480.]\n\n[Footnote 112: Baker, _Nile Tributaries of Abyssinia_, p. 94.]\n\n[Footnote 113: _Emin Pasha in Central Africa_, p. 107.]\n\n[Footnote 114: Trumbull, _Threshold Covenant_, p. 9.]\n\n[Footnote 115: Frazer, _Golden Bough_, i. 303.]\n\n[Footnote 116: Lafitau, _op. cit._ ii. 88. James, _Expedition to the\nRocky Mountains_, i. 321 _sq._ Morgan, _League of the Iroquois_, p.\n328. Sproat, _op. cit._ p. 57 (Ahts).]\n\n[Footnote 117: James, _op. cit._ i. 322.]\n\n[Footnote 118: _Gautama_, v. 25.]\n\n[Footnote 119: _Mahabharata_, Shanti Parva, clxxxix. 2 _sq._, pt.\nxxviii. _sq._ p. 281.]\n\n[Footnote 120: _\u00c2pastamba_, ii. 3. 7. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 121: _Ibid._ ii. 3. 6. 19 _sq._ _Cf._ _Proverbs_, xxiii. 6:\n\"Eat not the bread of him that hath an evil eye.\"]\n\n[Footnote 122: Mariner, _op. cit._ ii. 154.]\n\n[Footnote 123: Ellis, _Tour through Hawaii_, p. 347.]\n\n[Footnote 124: _Ibid._ p. 347.]\n\nAmong the precautions taken against the visiting stranger kind and\nrespectful treatment is of particularly great importance. No traveller\namong an Arabic-speaking people can fail to notice the contrast\nbetween the lavish welcome and the plain leave-taking. The profuse\ngreetings mean that the stranger will be treated as a friend and not\nas an enemy; and it is particularly desirable to secure his good-will\nin the beginning, since the first glance of an evil eye is always held\nto be the most dangerous. We can now realise that the extreme regard\nshown to a guest, and the preference given to him in every matter,\nmust, in a {593} large measure, be due to fear of his anger, as well\nas to hope of his blessings. Even the peculiar custom which requires a\nhost to lend his wife to a guest becomes more intelligible when we\nconsider the supposed danger of the stranger's evil eye or his curses,\nas also the benefits which may be supposed to result from his\nlove.[125] And when the guest leaves, it is wise of the host to accept\nno reward; for there maybe misfortune in the stranger's\ngift.\n\n[Footnote 125: Egede informs us (_op. cit._ p. 140) that the native\nwomen of Greenland thought themselves fortunate if an Angekokk, or\n\"prophet,\" honoured them with his caresses; and some husbands even\npaid him for having intercourse with their wives, since they believed\nthat the child of such a holy man could not but be happier and better\nthan others. Some similar belief may be held in regard to intercourse\nwith a guest, though I can adduce no direct evidence for my\nsupposition. _Cf._ also the _jus primae noctis_ accorded to priests\n(Westermarck, _History of Human Marriage_, p. 76 _sq._; _cf._ _ibid._\np. 80).]\n\nThat hospitality should be free of cost is implied in the very meaning\nof the word. Wherever the custom of entertaining guests has been\npreserved pure and genuine, remuneration is neither asked nor\nexpected; indeed, to offer payment would give offence, and to accept\nit would be disgraceful.[126] Such a custom might no doubt result from\nabsence or scarcity of money, as it cannot be expected that the\nwandering stranger shall carry with him heavy presents to all his\nfuture hosts; and where the intercourse is mutual, the hospitable man\nmay hope one day to be paid back in his own coin. But it seems likely\nthat the custom of not receiving payment from a guest is largely due\nto that same dread of strangers which underlies many other rules of\nhospitality. The acceptance of gifts is frequently considered to be\nconnected with some danger. According to rules laid down in the sacred\nbooks of India, he who is about to accept gifts, or he who has\naccepted gifts, must repeatedly recite the four Vedic verses called\nTaratsamand\u00ees;[127] or all gifts are to be preceded by pouring out\n{594} water into the extended palm of the recipient's right hand,[128]\nevidently because the water is supposed to cleanse the gift from the\nbaneful energy with which it may be saturated. On the other hand,\n\"without a full knowledge of the rules prescribed by the sacred law\nfor the acceptance of presents, a wise man should not take anything,\neven though he may pine with hunger. But an ignorant man who accepts\ngold, land, a horse, a cow, food, a dress, sesamum-grains, or\nclarified butter, is reduced to ashes like a piece of wood. . . .\nHence an ignorant man should be afraid of accepting any presents; for\nby reason of a very small gift even a fool sinks into hell as a cow\ninto a morass.\"[129] Moreover, a gift, to be accepted by a Br\u00e2hmana,\nought to be given voluntarily, not to be asked for.[130] So, too,\nHebrew writers are anxious to inculcate the duty of giving alms with\nan ungrudging eye, as also of not giving anything before\nwitnesses--the latter, perhaps, with a view to preventing the evil\ninfluence which is likely to emanate from an envious spectator.[131]\nAn Atlas Berber, who had probably never before had anything to do with\na European, spat on the coin which I gave him for rendering me a\nservice, and my native friends told me that he did so for fear lest\nthe coin, owing to some sorcery on my part, should not only itself\nreturn to me, but at the same time take with it all the money with\nwhich it had been in contact in his bag. Of the Annamites it is said\nthat \"for fear of bringing ill-luck into the place the people even\ndecline presents.\"[132]\n\n[Footnote 126: Veniaminof, quoted by Dall, _op. cit._ p. 397 (Aleuts).\nBartram, in _Trans. American Ethn. Soc._ iii. pt. i. 42. Foreman,\n_Philippine Islands_, p. 187 (Tagalogs). Hunter, _Annals of Rural\nBengal_, i. 216. Bogle, _Narrative of Mission to Tibet_, p. 109 _sq._\nV\u00e1mb\u00e9ry, _Das T\u00fcrkenvolk_, p. 614 (Turks in Asia Minor). Robinson,\n_Biblical Researches in Palestine_, ii. 18 _sq._; Burton, _Pilgrimage\nto Al-Madinah & Meccah_, i. 36; Blunt, _op. cit._ ii. 212; Lane,\n_Modern Egyptians_, p. 297 (Bedouins). Krauss, _Die S\u00fcdslaven_, p. 648.]\n\n[Footnote 127: _Baudh\u00e2yana_, iv. 2. 4.]\n\n[Footnote 128: _\u00c2pastamba_, ii. 4. 9. 8. B\u00fchler, in _Sacred Books of\nthe East_, ii. 122, n. ^8]\n\n[Footnote 129: _Laws of Manu_, iv. 187, 188, 191.]\n\n[Footnote 130: _Ibid._ iv. 247 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 131: _Tobit_, iv. 7. Kohler, in _Jewish Encyclopedia_, i.\n436. _Cf._ _St. Matthew_, vi. 1 _sqq._; Brandt, _Mand\u00e4ische\nSchriften_, pp. 28, 64: \"If you give alms do not do it before\nwitnesses.\" The Mand\u00e6ans were also forbidden to eat food prepared by a\nstranger or to take a meal in his company (Brandt, _Mand\u00e4ische\nReligion_, p. 94).]\n\n[Footnote 132: Ratzel, _op. cit._ iii. 418.]\n\nThe duty of hospitality is probably always limited by time, even\nthough, among some peoples, a guest is said to be entertained as long\nas he pleases to stay.[133] According {595} to Teutonic custom, a\nguest might tarry only up to the third day.[134] The Anglo-Saxon rule\nwas, \"Two nights a guest, the third night one of the household,\" that\nis, a slave.[135] A German proverb says, \"Den ersten Tag ein Gast, den\nzweiten eine Last, den dritten stinkt er fast.\"[136] So, also, the\nSouthern Slavs declare that \"a guest and a fish smell on the third\nday.\"[137] Burckhardt states that, among the Bedouins, if the stranger\nintends to prolong his visit after a lapse of three days and four\nhours from the time of his arrival, it is expected that he should\nassist his host in domestic matters; should he decline this, \"he may\nremain, but will be censured by all the Arabs of the camp.\"[138] The\nMoors say that \"the hospitality of the Prophet lasts for three days\";\nthe first night the guest is entertained most lavishly, for then, but\nonly then, he is \"the guest of God.\" The Prophet laid down the\nfollowing rule: \"Whoever believes in God and the day of resurrection,\nmust respect his guest; and the time of being kind to him is one day\nand one night; and the period of entertaining him is three days; and\nafter that, if he does it longer, he benefits him more; but it is not\nright for a guest to stay in the house of the host so long as to\nincommode him.\"[139] According to Javanese custom, it is a point of\nhonour to supply a stranger with food and accommodation for a day and\na night at least.[140] Among the Kalmucks special honour is paid to a\nstranger for one day only, whereas, if he remains longer, he is\ntreated without ceremonies.[141] Growing familiarity with the stranger\nnaturally tends to dispel the superstitious dread which he inspired at\nfirst, and this, combined with the feeling that it is unfair of him to\nlive at his host's expense longer than necessity requires, seems to\naccount for the {596} rapid decline of his extraordinary privileges\nand for the short duration of his title to hospitable treatment.\n\n[Footnote 133: Veniaminof, quoted by Dall, _op. cit._ p. 397 (Aleuts).\nMorgan, _League of the Iroquois_, p. 328. Bartram, in _Trans. American\nEthn. Soc._ iii. pt. i. 42 (Creeks and Cherokee Indians).]\n\n[Footnote 134: Grimm, _Deutsche Rechtsalterth\u00fcmer_, p. 400. Weinhold,\n_Altnordisches Leben_, p. 447.]\n\n[Footnote 135: Quoted in _Leges Edwardi Confessoris_, 23: \"Tuua nicte\ngeste \u00fee \u00feirdde nicte agen hine.\" _Cf._ _Laws of Cnut_, ii. 28; _Laws\nof Hlothh\u00e6re and Eadric_, 15; _Leges Henrici I._ viii. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 136: Weinhold, _op. cit._ p. 447.]\n\n[Footnote 137: Krauss, _op. cit._ p. 658.]\n\n[Footnote 138: Burckhardt, _Bedouins and Wah\u00e1bys_, p. 101 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 139: Lane, _Arabian Society_, p. 142 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 140: Crawfurd, _op. cit._ i. 53.]\n\n[Footnote 141: Bergmann, _op. cit._ ii. 285.]\n\nContrary to what is the case with other duties which men owe to their\nfellow-creatures, in every progressive society we find hospitality on\nthe wane. In the later days of Greece and Rome it almost dwindled into\na survival.[142] In the Middle Ages hospitality was extensively\npractised by high and low; it was enjoined by the tenets of\nChivalry,[143] and the poorer people, also, considered it disgraceful\nto refuse to share their meals with a needy stranger.[144] However, in\nthe reign of Henry IV., Thomas Occlif complains of the decline of\nhospitality in England; and in the middle of the Elizabethan age,\nArchbishop Sandys says that \"it is come to pass that hospitality\nitself is waxen a stranger.\"[145] The reasons for this decline are not\ndifficult to find. Increasing intercourse between different\ncommunities or different countries not only makes hospitality an\nintolerable burden, but leads to the establishment of inns, and thus\nhospitality becomes superfluous. It habituates the people to the sight\nof strangers, and, in consequence, deprives the stranger of that\nmystery which surrounds the lonely wanderer in an isolated district\nwhose inhabitants have little communication with the outside world.\nAnd, finally, increase of intercourse gives rise to laws which make an\nindividual protector needless, by placing the stranger under the\nprotection of the State.\n\n[Footnote 142: Becker-Goll, _Charikles_, ii. 3 _sqq._ _Idem_,\n_Gallus_, iii. 28 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 143: Sainte-Palaye, _M\u00e9moires sur l'ancienne chevalerie_,\ni. 310.]\n\n[Footnote 144: Wright, _Domestic Manners and Sentiments in England\nduring the Middle Ages_, p. 329 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 145: Sandys, _Sermons_, p. 401.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXV\n\nTHE SUBJECTION OF CHILDREN\n\n\nFROM the modes of conduct which affect the life or bodily welfare of a\nfellow-creature we shall pass to those relating to personal freedom.\nIn its absolute form the right of liberty may be granted to a perfect\nbeing, but has no existence on earth. Ever since the conduct of men\nbecame subject to moral censure, the right of doing what they pleased\nwas _eo ipso_ denied them; and in resisting wrong men have not only in\nvarious ways interfered with the liberty of their fellow-creatures,\nbut have considered such interference to be their right or even their\nduty. As to the question what conduct is wrong opinions have differed,\nand so also as to the proper means of interference; but with neither\nof these questions are we concerned at present. Nor shall I deal with\nthe subject of political liberty, nor with such restrictions as people\nlay on their own freedom by contract. I shall only consider facts\nbearing upon that state of subjection to which large classes of\nindividuals are doomed by custom or law, on account of their birth or\nother circumstances beyond their own control--the subjection of\nchildren, wives, and slaves to their parents, husbands, or masters.\n\nAmong the lower races every family has its head, who exercises more or\nless authority over its members. In some instances where the maternal\nsystem of descent prevails, a man's children are in the power of the\nhead of {598} their mother's family or of their maternal uncle;[1] but\nthis is by no means the rule even among peoples who reckon kinship\nthrough females only. The facts which have been adduced as examples of\nthe so-called \"mother-right\" in most instances imply, chiefly, that\nchildren are named after their mothers, not after their fathers, and\nthat property and rank descend exclusively in the female line;[2] and\nthis is certainly very different from a denial of paternal rights.[3]\nAmong those Australian tribes which have the system of maternal\ndescent the father is distinctly said to be the master of his\nchildren.[4] In Melanesia, where the clan of the children is\ndetermined by that of the mother, she is, to quote Dr. Codrington, \"in\nno way the head of the family. The house of the family is the\nfather's, the garden is his, the rule and government are his.\"[5] As\nregards the Iroquois--among whom, at the death of a man, his property\nis divided between his brothers, sisters, and mother's brothers,\nwhilst the property of a woman is transmitted to her children and\nsisters[6]--we are told that the mother superintends the children, but\nthat the word of the father is law and must be obeyed by the whole\nhousehold.[7] Among the Mpongwe, who reckon kinship through the\nmother, the father has by law unrestricted power over his children.[8]\nAnd in Madagascar, where children generally follow the condition of\nthe mother,[9] the commands of a father or an ancestor are, among all\nthe tribes, \"held as most sacredly binding upon his descendants.\"[10]\nWhatever might have been the case in earlier times, it is a fact\nbeyond dispute that among the great bulk of existing savages children\nare in the power of {599} their father, though he may to some extent\nhave to share his authority with the mother.\n\n[Footnote 1: Westermarck, _History of Human Marriage_, p. 40 _sq._\nGrosse, _Die Formen der Familie_, p. 183 _sq._ Post, _Afrikanische\nJurisprudenz_, i. 51 _sq._ Marsden, _History of Sumatra_, p. 262 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 2: Westermarck, _op. cit._ p. 97.]\n\n[Footnote 3: See von Dargun, _Mutterrecht und Vaterrecht_, p. 3 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 4: Curr, _The Australian Race_, i. 60, 61, 69.]\n\n[Footnote 5: Codrington, _Melanesians_, p. 34.]\n\n[Footnote 6: Westermarck, _op. cit._ p. 110.]\n\n[Footnote 7: Seaver, _Narrative of the Life of Mrs. Mary Jemison_,\np. 165.]\n\n[Footnote 8: H\u00fcbbe-Schleiden, _Ethiopien_, pp. 151, 153.]\n\n[Footnote 9: Westermarck, _op. cit._ p. 103.]\n\n[Footnote 10: Sibree, _The Great African Island_, p. 326.]\n\nThe extent of the father's power, however, is subject to great\nvariations. Among some savage peoples, as we have seen, he may destroy\nhis new-born child; among others infanticide is prohibited by custom.\nAmong some he may sell his children,[11] among others such a right is\nexpressly denied him.[12] Frequently he gives away his daughter in\nmarriage without consulting her wishes; but in other cases her own\nconsent is required, or she is allowed to choose her husband\nherself.[13] Marriage by purchase does not imply that \"a girl is sold\nby her father in the same manner, and with the same authority, with\nwhich he would dispose of a cow.\"[14] It seems that the paternal\nauthority is always in some degree limited by public opinion. Among\nthe K\u00e1firs of the Hindu-Kush, for instance, though the head of the\nhouse is described as an autocrat in his own family, the son, backed\nby public opinion, may, and does, openly quarrel with and threaten his\nfather in cases when the father's actions have been of a particularly\ngross character.[15]\n\n[Footnote 11: Schadenberg, 'Negritos der Philippinen,' in _Zeitschr.\nf. Ethnologie_, xii. 137. Post, _Afrikanische Jurisprudenz_, i. 51\n_sq._ (Bogos, Fantis, Dahomans). Paulitschke, _Ethnographie\nNordost-Afrikas_, p. 189. Leuschner, in Steinmetz, _Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_,\np. 16 _sq._ (Bakwiri). Among the Banaka and Bapuku, in the Cameroons,\nthe father may give his daughter in payment for a debt, but not his\nson (_ibid._ p. 31).]\n\n[Footnote 12: Kraft, in Steinmetz, _Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_, p. 285\n(Wapokomo). Rautanen, _ibid._ p. 329 (Ondonga).]\n\n[Footnote 13: Westermarck, _op. cit._ p. 215 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 14: Leslie, _Among the Zulus and Amatongas_, p. 194.\nWestermarck, _op. cit._ ch. x.]\n\n[Footnote 15: Robertson, _K\u00e1firs of the Hindu-Kush_, p. 474.]\n\nThe essence of dependence lies in obedience and submission. To judge\nfrom what is said about children's behaviour towards their parents,\nthe authority of the father must among some savages be practically\nvery slight.\n\nThe South American Charruas \"ne d\u00e9fendent rien \u00e0 leurs enfans, et\nceux-ci n'ont aucun respect pour leurs p\u00e8res.\"[16] Among the Brazilian\nIndians, according to von Martius, respect and obedience on the part\nof children towards their parents are unknown.[17] {600} Among the\nTarahumares of Mexico \"the children grow up entirely independent, and\nif angry a boy may even strike his father.\"[18] We are told that among\nthe Aleuts parents \"scarcely ever enjoy so much authority as to compel\ntheir own children to shew them the least obedience, or to go a single\nstep in their service\";[19] but this does not seem to hold good of all\nof their tribes.[20] Of the Kamchadales Steller states that the\nchildren insult their parents with all sorts of bad talk, stand in no\nfear of them, obey them in nothing, and are consequently never\ncommanded to do anything, nor punished.[21]\n\n[Footnote 16: Azara, _Voyages dans l'Am\u00e9rique m\u00e9ridionale_, ii. 23.]\n\n[Footnote 17: von Martius, in _Jour. Roy. Geo. Soc._ ii. 199. _Cf._\nSouthey, _History of Brazil_, iii. 387 (Guaycurus).]\n\n[Footnote 18: Lumholtz, _Unknown Mexico_, p. 275.]\n\n[Footnote 19: Georgi, _Russia_, iii. 212.]\n\n[Footnote 20: Veniaminof, quoted by Petroff, 'Report on Alaska,' in\n_Tenth Census of the United States_, pp. 155, 158.]\n\n[Footnote 21: Steller, _Beschreibung von dem Lande Kamtschatka_, p.\n353. _Cf._ Georgi, _op. cit._ iii. 158.]\n\nOther savages, again, are by no means deficient in filial piety.[22]\n\n[Footnote 22: Im Thurn, _Among the Indians of Guiana_, p. 213.\nSchwaner, _Borneo_, i. 162 (Malays of the Barito River in Borneo).\nWorcester, _Philippine Islands_, p. 481. Lewin, _Hill Tracts of\nChittagong_, p. 102 (Kukis). V\u00e1mb\u00e9ry, _T\u00fcrkenvolk_, p. 268\n(Kara-Kirghiz). Macpherson, _Memorials of Service in India_, p. 67;\nHunter, _Annals of Rural Bengal_, iii. 72 (Kandhs). Granville and\nRoth, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxviii. 109 (Jekris of the Warri\nDistrict of the Niger Coast Protectorate). Stuhlmann, _Mit Emin Pascha\nins Herz von Afrika_, p. 801 (Latuka).]\n\nAmong various Eskimo[23] and North American Indian tribes[24]\nchildren are described as very obedient to their parents. Parry says\nof the Eskimo of Winter Island and Igloolik that disobedience is\nscarcely ever known, and that \"a word or even a look from a parent is\nenough.\"[25] The Potawatomis hold the violation of the advice and\ndirections of their parents one of the most atrocious crimes.[26] In\nTonga \"filial duty is a most important duty and appears to be\nuniversally felt.\"[27] One of the chief duties which the Ainos taught\ntheir children was obedience to parents.[28] Among the Central Asiatic\nTurks a son, whilst young, behaves as if he were his father's\nslave.[29] Among the {601} Ossetes \"the authority of the head of the\nfamily, whether grandfather, father, stepfather, uncle, or elder\nbrother, is submitted to unconditionally; the young men never sit in\nhis presence, nor speak with a loud voice, nor contradict him.\"[30]\nAmong the Barea and Kun\u00e1ma \"a father and a mother are respected to the\nutmost degree. A son never dares to contradict his parents nor oppose\ntheir commands, however unjust they be. The mother particularly is\nmuch beloved and tenderly cared for at her old age.\"[31] Among the\nMandingoes children \"have a great veneration for their parents,\" and\n\"would feel extreme reluctance to disobey their father.\"[32] Of the\nBachapins, a Bechuana tribe, it is said that **\"filial obedience is\nstrenuously enforced.\"[33] Among the Kafirs \"any one who should fail\nin respect for his father, or show any neglect of him, would draw on\nhimself the contempt of the whole horde; there have been even\ninstances in which want of filial duty has been punished with infamy\nand banishment.\"[34]\n\n[Footnote 23: Hall, _Arctic Researches_, p. 568. Boas, 'Central\nEskimo,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ vi. 566. Murdoch, 'Ethnol. Results\nof the Point Barrow Expedition,' _ibid._ ix. 417. Turner, 'Ethnology\nof the Ungava District,' _ibid._ xi. 191 (Koksoagmyut).]\n\n[Footnote 24: Turner, in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ xi. 269 (Hudson Bay\nIndians). Heriot, _Travels through the Canadas_, p. 530. Harmon,\n_Journal of Voyages_, p. 347 (Indians on the east side of the Rocky\nMountains).]\n\n[Footnote 25: Parry, _Journal of a Second Voyage for the Discovery of\na North-West Passage_, p. 530.]\n\n[Footnote 26: Keating, _Expedition to the Source of St. Peter's\nRiver_, i. 127.]\n\n[Footnote 27: Mariner, _Natives of the Tonga Islands_, ii. 179.]\n\n[Footnote 28: Batchelor, _Ainu and their Folk-Lore_, p. 254.]\n\n[Footnote 29: V\u00e1mb\u00e9ry, _op. cit._ p. 226.]\n\n[Footnote 30: von Haxthausen, _Transcaucasia_, p. 414 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 31: Munzinger, _Ostafrikanische Studien_, p. 474.]\n\n[Footnote 32: Cailli\u00e9, _Travels through Central Africa_, i. 352 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 33: Burchell, _Travels in the Interior of Southern Africa_,\nii. 557.]\n\n[Footnote 34: Lichtenstein, _Travels in Southern Africa_, i. 265.\nAlberti, _De Kaffers aan de Zuidkust van Afrika_, p. 116 _sqq._\nShooter, _Kafirs of Natal_, p. 98.]\n\nThe period during which the paternal authority lasts varies. The\ndaughter is in her father's power till she marries, and as a rule no\nlonger;[35] but in some instances his authority over her continues\neven after her marriage.[36] This, we have reason to believe, is\nparticularly the case when the husband, on marrying, does not take his\nwife to his own home, but goes himself to live with her in the house\nor community of her father.[37] A father's authority over his son\nfrequently comes to an end as the young man {602} grows up. Among the\nFuegians a son becomes independent of his parents at a very early age,\nbeing allowed to leave their wigwam if he pleases.[38] Among the\nTogiagamutes, an Eskimo tribe, \"the youth, as soon as he is able to\nbuild a kaiak and to support himself, no longer observes any family\nties but goes where his fancy takes him.\"[39] Of the Australian\nnatives it is said that sons become independent when they have gone\nthrough the ceremonies by which they attain to the _status_ of\nmanhood;[40] among the Bangerang tribe of Victoria \"after his twelfth\nyear or so the boy was very little subject to the father, though\nparental affection always endured.\"[41] Among the Bedouins \"the young\nman, as soon as it is in his power, emancipates himself from the\nfather's authority, still paying him some deference as long as he\ncontinues in his tent; but whenever he can become master of a tent\nhimself (to obtain which is his constant endeavour), he listens to no\nadvice, nor obeys any earthly command but that of his own will.\"[42]\nThat a son is emancipated from the father's power by getting\nfull-grown or by leaving the household is probably the rule among the\ngreat majority of the lower races.[43] But here again instances to the\ncontrary are not wanting.[44] In Flores the sons even of rich families\nare dressed like slaves at public feasts, so long as the father lives,\nas also at his funeral. This, our authority adds, is apparently the\nexternal sign of a strict _patria potestas_, which remains in force\ntill the funeral; until then the son is the father's slave.[45]\n\n[Footnote 35: See, _e.g._, Leuschner, in Steinmetz, _Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_,\np. 17 (Bakwiri); Fama Mademba, _ibid._ p. 65 (natives of the\nSansanding States); Nicole, _ibid._ p. 100 (Diakit\u00e9); Lang, _ibid._ p.\n224 (Washambala); Kraft, _ibid._ p. 286 (Wapokomo); Marx, _ibid._ p.\n349 (Amahlubi); Sorge, _ibid._ p. 404 (Nissan Islanders of the\nBismarck Archipelago).]\n\n[Footnote 36: See, _e.g._, Beverley, in Steinmetz, _Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_,\np. 206. What is said, _ibid._ p. 31, concerning the Banaka and Bapuku\ndoes not seem to agree with the statement p. 30, that the husband is\nthe head of his household and the possessor of his wives.]\n\n[Footnote 37: _Cf._ Mazzarella, _La condizione giuridica del marito\nnella famiglia matriarcale_, _passim_; _infra_, on the Subjection of\nWives. The point in question, like the whole subject of the father's\nauthority among the lower races, requires much further investigation.]\n\n[Footnote 38: Bove, _Patagonia, Terra del Fuoco_, p. 133.]\n\n[Footnote 39: Petroff, _loc. cit._ p. 135.]\n\n[Footnote 40: Curr, _The Australian Race_, i. 61.]\n\n[Footnote 41: _Idem_, _Recollections of Squatting in Victoria_, p. 248.]\n\n[Footnote 42: Burckhardt, _Notes on the Bedouins and Wah\u00e1bys_, p. 201.]\n\n[Footnote 43: For other instances, see Munzinger, _Die Sitten und das\nRecht der Bogos_, p. 36; Post, _Afrikanische Jurisprudenz_, i. 51\n(Somals); Leuschner, in Steinmetz, _Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_, p. 17\n(Bakwiri); Nicole, _ibid._ p. 100 (Diakit\u00e9); Beverley, _ibid._ p. 206\n(Wagogo); Marx, _ibid._ p. 349 (Amahlubi); Sorge, _ibid._ p. 404\n(Nissan Islanders).]\n\n[Footnote 44: Sarbah, _Fanti Customary Laws_, p. 5. Stuhlmann, _op.\ncit._ p. 801 (Latuka). Steinmetz, _Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_, p. 31 (Banaka\nand Bapuku). Fama Mademba, _ibid._ p. 65 (natives of the Sansanding\nStates). Kraft, _ibid._ p. 286 (Wapokomo), Abercromby, _Pre- and\nProto-historic Finns_, i. 181 (Mordvins).]\n\n[Footnote 45: von Martens, quoted by Nieboer, _Slavery as an\nIndustrial System_, p. 26, n. 2.]\n\n{603} However, the expiration of the paternal power, in the proper\nsense of the term, does not necessarily imply the loss of all\nauthority over the children. The father, at all events, retains the\nrights incident to his superior age, and among many uncivilised\npeoples these are great. Old age commands respect and gives\nauthority.\n\nAmong the Fuegians \"in each family the word of an old man is\naccepted as law by the young people; they never dispute his\nauthority.\"[46] The Patagonians \"pay respect to old people, taking\ngreat care of them.\"[47] The Caribs \"portent un grand respect aus\nvieillards.\"[48] The same is the case among many of the North American\nIndians.[49] Among the Naudowessies, whilst the advice of a father\nwill seldom meet with any extraordinary attention from the young\nIndians, \"they will tremble before a grandfather, and submit to his\ninjunctions with the utmost alacrity. The words of the ancient part of\ntheir community are esteemed by the young as oracles.\"[50] Among the\nEskimo about Behring Strait the old men are listened to with\nrespect;[51] and among the Point Barrow Eskimo \"respect for the\nopinions of elders is so great that the people may be said to be\npractically under what is called 'simple elder rule.'\"[52] Among the\nVeddahs of Ceylon the oldest man \"is regarded with a sort of\npatriarchal respect when accident or occasion has brought together any\nothers than the members of one family.\"[53] Among the Jakuts an old\nman is implicitly obeyed as a father of a family; \"a young man ever\ngives his opinion with the greatest respect and caution; and even when\nasked, he submits his ideas to the judgment of the old.\"[54] Regard\nfor the aged is found among the Ainos,[55] Kurilians,[56] Mongols,[57]\nOssetes,[58] {604} Kukis,[59] Nicobarese,[60] Negritos of the\nPhilippine Islands,[61] Papuans of New Guinea[62] New Caledonians,[63]\nCaroline Islanders,[64] Tonga Islanders,[65] and, in a remarkable\ndegree, among the Australian aborigines.[66] \"Among the Kurnai,\" says\nMr. Howitt, \"age meets with great reverence. . . . It may be stated as\na general rule that authority attaches to age. It follows from this\nthat there is no hereditary authority and no hereditary chieftain. The\nauthority which is inherent in age attaches not alone to the man, but\nalso to the woman.\" And he justly adds that this principle regulating\nauthority seems to be, not peculiar to the Kurnai, but general to the\nwhole Australian race.[67]\n\n[Footnote 46: King and Fitzroy, _Voyages of the \"Adventure\" and\n\"Beagle,\"_ ii. 179.]\n\n[Footnote 47: _Ibid._ ii. 172.]\n\n[Footnote 48: de Poircy-de Rochefort, _Histoire des Isles Antilles_,\np. 461.]\n\n[Footnote 49: Buchanan, _North American Indians_, p. 7. Prescott, in\nSchoolcraft, _Indian Tribes of the United States_, ii. 196.]\n\n[Footnote 50: Carver, _Travels through the Interior Parts of North\nAmerica_, p. 243.]\n\n[Footnote 51: Nelson, 'Eskimo about Bering Strait,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur.\nEthn._ xviii. 304.]\n\n[Footnote 52: Murdoch, in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ ix. 427.]\n\n[Footnote 53: Hartshorne, 'Weddas,' in _Indian Antiquary_, viii. 320.\n_Cf._ Deschamps, _Carnet d'un voyageur_, p. 395.]\n\n[Footnote 54: Sauer, _Billings' Expedition to the Northern Parts of\nRussia_, p. 124.]\n\n[Footnote 55: Batchelor, _Ainu and their Folk-Lore_, p. 254. von\nSiebold, _Ethnol. Studien \u00fcber die Aino auf der Insel Yesso_, p. 25.]\n\n[Footnote 56: Krasheninnikoff, _History of Kamschatka_, p. 236.]\n\n[Footnote 57: Prejevalsky, _Mongolia_, i. 71.]\n\n[Footnote 58: von Haxthausen, _Transcaucasia_, p. 414. Strabo (xi. 4.\n8) reports the same of the Albanians of the Eastern Caucasus.]\n\n[Footnote 59: Lewin, _Hill Tracts of Chittagong_, p. 102.]\n\n[Footnote 60: Kloss, _In the Andamans and Nicobars_, p. 243.]\n\n[Footnote 61: Schadenberg, in _Zeitschr. f. Ethnol._ xii. 135. Earl,\n_Papuans_, p. 133. Foreman, _Philippine Islands_, p. 209.]\n\n[Footnote 62: Earl, _op. cit._ p. 81.]\n\n[Footnote 63: Atkinson, in _Folk-Lore_, xiv. 248.]\n\n[Footnote 64: Christian, _Caroline Islands_, p. 72. Angas,\n_Polynesia_, p. 382.]\n\n[Footnote 65: Mariner, _op. cit._ ii. 155.]\n\n[Footnote 66: Roth, _North-West-Central Queensland Aborigines_, p.\n141. Fraser, _Aborigines of New South Wales_, p. 5. Schuermann,\n'Aboriginal Tribes of Port Lincoln,' in Woods, _Native Tribes of South\nAustralia_, p. 226. Hale _U.S. Exploring Expedition. Vol. VI.\nEthnography and Philology_, p. 113. Mitchell, _Expeditions into the\nInterior of Eastern Australia_, ii. 346. Brough Smyth, _Aborigines of\nVictoria_, i. 137 _sq._ See also Steinmetz, _Ethnol. Studien zur\nEntwicklungsgeschichte der Strafe_, ii. 26 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 67: Fison and Howitt, _Kamilaroi and Kurnai_, p. 211 _sq._]\n\nTurning to African peoples: among the Danakil the aged of both\nsexes, but especially the males, are held in great veneration, and the\nold men are consulted on every occasion of any importance.[68] \"The\nreal religion of the Barea and Kun\u00e1ma,\" says Munzinger, \"consists in\nan extraordinary reverence for old age. Among these peoples only the\nold, the weak, or the blind command respect.\"[69] The E[(w]e-speaking\npeoples on the Slave Coast have a proverb, \"Respect the elders, they\nare our fathers.\"[70] Winterbottom doubts whether the ancient\nLaced\u00e6monians paid greater regard to old age than do the natives of\nSierra Leone.[71] Mr. Leighton Wilson says of the Mpongwe:--\"There is\nno part of the world where respect and veneration for age is carried\nto a greater length than among this people. . . . All the younger\nmembers of society are early trained to show the utmost deference to\nage. They must never come into the presence of aged persons or pass by\ntheir dwellings without taking off their hats and assuming a crouching\ngait. When seated in their presence {605} it must always be at a\n'respectful distance'--a distance proportioned to the difference in\ntheir ages and position in society. If they come near enough to hand\nan aged man a lighted pipe or a glass of water, the bearer must always\nfall upon one knee. Aged persons must always be addressed as 'father'\n(_rera_) or 'mother' (_ngwe_). Any disrespectful deportment or\nreproachful language toward such persons is regarded as a misdemeanour\nof no ordinary aggravation. A youthful person carefully avoids\ncommunicating any disagreeable intelligence to such persons, and\nalmost always addresses them in terms of flattery and adulation.\"[72]\nAmong the For tribe of Central Africa \"great consideration is shown\ntowards women when they are old, as well as towards aged men.\"[73]\nRegard for old age is, in fact, a very general trait of the African\ncharacter.[74]\n\n[Footnote 68: Scaramucci and Giglioli, 'Notizie sui _Danakil_,' in\n_Archivio per l'antropologia e la etnologia_, xiv. 36.]\n\n[Footnote 69: Munzinger, _Ostafrikanische Studien_, p. 474.]\n\n[Footnote 70: Ellis, _E[(w]e-speaking Peoples_, p. 268.]\n\n[Footnote 71: Winterbottom, _Native Africans in the Neighbourhood of\nSierra Leone_, i. 211.]\n\n[Footnote 72: Wilson, _Western Africa_, p. 392 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 73: Felkin, 'Notes on the For Tribe of Central Africa,' in\n_Proceed. Roy. Soc. Edinburgh_, xiii. 224 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 74: Monrad, _Bidrag til en Skildring af Guinea-Kysten_, p.\n37 (Negroes of Accra). Granville and Roth, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._\nxxviii. 109 (Jekris). Kingsley, _Travels in West Africa_, p. 460\n(Calabar tribes). Cailli\u00e9, _op. cit._ i. 352 (Mandingoes). Stuhlmann,\n_op. cit._ pp. 789, 801 (Latuka). Casati, _Ten Years in Equatoria_, i.\n186. Chanler, _Through Jungle and Desert_, p. 246 (Embe). New, _Life,\nWanderings, and Labours in Eastern Africa_, p. 101 (Wanika). Johnston,\n_Kilima-njaro Expedition_, p. 419 (Masai). Arnot, _Garenganze_, p. 78,\nnote. Lichtenstein, _op. cit._ i. 265; Alberti, _op. cit._ p. 118;\nShooter, _op. cit._ p. 98 (Kafirs). Schinz, _Deutsch-S\u00fcdwest-Afrika_,\np. 82 (Hottentots).]\n\nNot only old age, but superiority of age, gives a certain amount of\npower.\n\nThe Australian natives have a well-regulated order of precedence\nand authority. \"When the individual reaches the full development of\npuberty, he or she undergoes a ceremony which entitles him or her on\nits successful completion to a certain social rank or _status_ in the\ncommunity. As life progresses, other and higher ranks are\nprogressively attainable for each sex, until the highest and most\nhonourable grade, that enjoyed by an old man, or an old woman, is\nreached.\"[75] All North American Indians \"hold that superior age gives\nauthority; and every person is taught from childhood to obey his\nsuperiors and to rule over his inferiors. The superiors are those of\ngreater age; the inferiors, those who are younger.\"[76] The same\ninfluence of age makes itself felt in the relations between elder\n{606} and younger brothers and sisters.[77] Navaho myths indicate that\n\"even among twins, the younger must defer to the elder.\"[78] The\neldest brother comes next to the father in authority, and, in case of\nhis death, succeeds him as the head of the family. The Aleuts\ndescribed by Father Veniaminof maintained that \"if one had no father\nhe should respect his oldest brother and serve him as he would a\nfather.\"[79] Among the Kalmucks \"the elder brother is the despot of\nthe younger ones, and is even allowed to punish them.\"[80] In\nMadagascar so great respect is paid to seniority \"that if two slaves\nwho are brothers are going a journey, any burden must be carried by\nthe younger one, so far at least as his strength will allow.\"[81] In\nTonga custom decrees \"that all persons shall be in the service of\ntheir older and superior relations, if those relations think proper to\nemploy them\"; and every chief shows the greatest regard for his eldest\nsister.[82] Among the Hottentots \"the highest oath a man could take\nand still takes, was to swear by his eldest sister, and if he should\nabuse this name, the sister will walk into his flock and take his\nfinest cows and sheep, and no law could prevent her from doing\nso.\"[83] Among the Point Barrow Eskimo, again, \"seniority gives\nprecedence when there are several women in one hut, and the sway of\nthe elder in the direction of everything connected with her duties\nseems never disputed.\"[84]\n\n[Footnote 75: Roth, _op. cit._ p. 169. _Cf._ _ibid._ p. 65 _sq._;\nEyre, _Journals of Expeditions of Discovery into Central Australia_,\nii. 315.]\n\n[Footnote 76: Powell, 'Sociology,' in _American Anthropologist_, N. S.\ni. 700. _Cf._ _Idem_, in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ iii. p. lviii.]\n\n[Footnote 77: Nachtigal, _Sahara und Sudan_, i. 450 (Ted\u00e2). Chavanne,\n_Die Sahara_, p. 396 (Arabs of the Sahara). Paulitschke, _op. cit._ p.\n192 (Gallas). von Haxthausen, _Transcaucasia_, p. 415 (Ossetes). Bach,\n'Die Wotjaken,' in _Acta Societatis Scientiarum Fennic\u00e6_, xii. 489\n(Votyaks). Sumner, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxxi. 75 (Jakuts).\nBatchelor, _Ainu and their Folk-Lore_, p. 254.]\n\n[Footnote 78: Matthews, 'Study of Ethics among the Lower Races,' in\n_Journal of American Folk-Lore_, xii. 9.]\n\n[Footnote 79: Veniaminof, quoted by Petroff, _loc. cit._ p. 155.]\n\n[Footnote 80: Bergmann, _Nomadische Streifereien unter den Kalm\u00fcken_,\nii. 305.]\n\n[Footnote 81: Sibree, _op. cit._ p. 182.]\n\n[Footnote 82: Mariner, _op. cit._ i. 226; ii. 155.]\n\n[Footnote 83: Hahn, _The Supreme Being of the Khoi-Khoi_, p. 21.]\n\n[Footnote 84: Simpson, quoted by Murdoch, in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._\nix. 427.]\n\nIt must be added, however, that the reverence for old age may cease\nwhen the grey-head gets so old as to be an incumbrance to those around\nhim;[85] and imbecility may put an end to the father's authority over\nhis family.[86] We have previously noticed that parents worn out with\nage {607} and disease are among some peoples killed or abandoned by\ntheir own children.[87]\n\n[Footnote 85: Curr, _Squatting in Victoria_, pp. 254. 245, 265 _sqq._;\nEyre, _op. cit._ ii. 316 (Australian aborigines). Sumner, in _Jour.\nAnthr. Inst._ xxxi. 76 (Jakuts). Nansen, _Eskimo Life_, p. 177 _sq._\n(Greenlanders). _Supra_, p. 534.]\n\n[Footnote 86: Steinmetz, _Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_, p. 31 (Banaka and\nBapuku).]\n\n[Footnote 87: _Supra_, p. 386 _sq._]\n\nWhen passing from the savage and barbarous races of men to those next\nabove them in civilisation, we find paternal, or parental, authority\nand filial reverence at their height. In ancient Mexico \"necessitous\nparents were allowed to dispose of any one of their children, in order\nto relieve their poverty,\" whereas a master could not sell a\nwell-behaved slave without his consent.[88] A youth was seldom\npermitted to choose a wife for himself, but was expected to abide by\nthe selection of his parents;[89] and \"children were bred to stand so\nmuch in awe of their parents that even when grown up and married they\nhardly durst speak before them.\"[90] So, too, in Nicaragua a father\nmight sell his children as slaves in cases of great necessity,[91] and\nmatches were in the larger part of the country arranged by the\nparents.[92] In ancient Peru disobedient children were publicly\nchastised by their own parents;[93] and Inca Pachacutec confirmed the\nlaw that sons should obey and serve their fathers until they reached\nthe age of twenty-five, and that none should marry without the consent\nof the parents and of the parents of the girl.[94]\n\n[Footnote 88: Clavigero, _History of Mexico_, i. 360.]\n\n[Footnote 89: Westermarck, _op. cit._ p. 226.]\n\n[Footnote 90: Clavigero, _op. cit._ i. 331.]\n\n[Footnote 91: Squier, _Nicaragua_, p. 345.]\n\n[Footnote 92: Bancroft, _Native Races of the Pacific States_, ii. 667.]\n\n[Footnote 93: Herrera, _General History of the West Indies_, iv. 339.]\n\n[Footnote 94: Garcilasso de la Vega, _First Part of the Royal\nCommentaries of the Yncas_, ii. 207.]\n\nIn China a house-father reigns almost supreme in his family, and,\naccording to ancient Chinese ideas, not even marriage withdraws the\nson from his power.[95] The law, it is true, prohibits him from\nkilling[96] or selling[97] his children; but it is only in supreme\ncases that the State interferes between the head of a household and\nhis family belongings, and the sale of children is practically\nallowed.[98] No person, of whatever age, can act for himself in\nmatrimonial {608} matters during the lifetime or in the neighbourhood\nof his parents or near senior kinsfolk.[99] The law provides that\ndisobedience to the instructions and commands of parents or paternal\ngrandparents shall be punished with one hundred blows,[100] and that a\nstill greater punishment shall be inflicted on a son accusing his\nfather or mother and on a grandson accusing his paternal grandparent,\neven though the accusation prove true.[101] Indeed, from earliest\nyouth the Chinese lad is imbued with such respect for his parents that\nit becomes at last a religious sentiment, and forms, as he gets older,\nthe basis of his only creed--the worship of ancestors.[102]\nConfucianism itself has been briefly described as \"an expansion of the\nroot idea of filial piety.\"[103] The Master said:--\"filial piety is\nthe root of all virtue, and the stem out of which grows all moral\nteaching. . . . Filial piety is the constant method of Heaven, the\nrighteousness of Earth, and the practical duty of Man. . . . Of all\nthe actions of man there is none greater than filial piety. In filial\npiety there is nothing greater than the reverential awe of one's\nfather. In the reverential awe shown to one's father there is nothing\ngreater than the making him the correlate of Heaven.\"[104] But the\nidea that filial piety is the fundamental duty of man was not\noriginated by Confucius, it had obtained a firm hold of the national\nmind long before his time.[105] It also prevails in Corea[106] and\nJapan,[107] where the authority of a house-father is, or, in the case\nof Japan, until lately has been,[108] as great as in China. \"The\nJapanese maiden, as pure as the purest Christian virgin, will at the\ncommand of her father enter the brothel to-morrow, and prostitute\nherself for life. Not a murmur escapes her lips {609} as she thus\nfilially obeys.\"[109] In Corea, whilst the first thing inculcated in\na child's mind is respect for his father, little respect is felt for\nthe mother; the child soon learns that a mother's authority is next\nto nothing.[110]\n\n[Footnote 95: de Groot, _Religious System of China_ (vol. ii. book)\ni. 507.]\n\n[Footnote 96: _Supra_, p. 393.]\n\n[Footnote 97: _Ta Tsing Leu Lee_, sec. cclxxv. p. 292.]\n\n[Footnote 98: Douglas, _Society in China_, p. 78. Staunton, in his\ntranslation of _Ta Tsing Leu Lee_, p. 292 n. * Doolittle, _Social Life\nof the Chinese_, ii. 209.]\n\n[Footnote 99: Medhurst, 'Marriage, Affinity, and Inheritance in\nChina,' in _Trans. Roy. Asiatic Soc. China Branch_, iv. 11.]\n\n[Footnote 100: _Ta Tsing Leu Lee_, sec. cccxxxviii. p. 374.]\n\n[Footnote 101: _Ibid._ sec. cccxxxvii. p. 371 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 102: Wells Williams, _Middle Kingdom_, i. 646.]\n\n[Footnote 103: Griffis, _Corea_, p. 328 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 104: _Hsi\u00e1o King_, 1, 7, 9 (_Sacred Books of the East_, iii.\n446, 473, 476).]\n\n[Footnote 105: Douglas, _Confucianism and Taouism_, p. 118.]\n\n[Footnote 106: Griffis, _Corea_, pp. 236, 259.]\n\n[Footnote 107: Rein, _Japan_, p. 427. Griffis, _Religions of Japan_,\np. 122 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 108: Griffis, _Religions of Japan_, p. 148.]\n\n[Footnote 109: _Idem_, _Mikado's Empire_, p. 555. _Cf._ Rein, _Japan_,\np. 427.]\n\n[Footnote 110: Griffis, _Corea_, p. 259.]\n\nIt is the general opinion of Assyriologists that in ancient Chald\u00e6a,\nat least in the early period of its history, the father had absolute\nauthority over all the members of his household.[111] Anything\nundertaken by them without his consent was held invalid in the eyes of\nthe law,[112] and a disobedient son might be sold as a slave.[113]\nAccording to the Laws of [Hv]ammurabi, a man might give his son or\ndaughter as a hostage for debts;[114] but he could not disown his\nchildren at discretion. It is said that if he wishes to cut off his\nson he must declare his intention to the judge, whereupon \"the judge\nshall enquire into his reasons, and if the son has not committed a\nheavy crime which cuts off from sonship, the father shall not cut off\nhis son from sonship.\"[115] Professor Hommel believes that the\nmother's authority over her children was as great as the\nfather's,[116] whereas Meissner concludes that it was less, from the\nfact that her children are not seldom found to be at law with her in\nmatters of succession.[117] Among the Hebrews a father might sell his\nchild to relieve his own distress, or offer it to a creditor as a\npledge.[118] He had not only unlimited power to marry his daughters,\nbut even to sell them as maids into concubinage, though not to a\nforeign people.[119] He also chose wives for his sons;[120] and there\nis no indication that the subjection of sons ceased after a certain\nage.[121] How important were the duties of the child to the {610}\nparents is shown in the primitive typical relation of Isaac to\nAbraham, and may be at once learned from the placing of the law on the\nsubject among the Ten Commandments, and from its position there in the\nimmediate proximity to the commands relating to the duties of man\ntowards God.[122] Philo Jud\u00e6us observes that it occupies this position\nbecause parents are something between divine and human nature,\npartaking of both--of human nature inasmuch as it is plain that they\nhave been born and that they will die, and of divine nature because\nthey have engendered other beings, and have brought what did not exist\ninto existence. What God is to the world, that parents are to their\nchildren; they are \"the visible gods.\"[123] In Muhammedan countries\nparents have practically great authority over their children. Should a\nfather exceed the bounds of moderation or justice in chastising his\nson, the idea of prosecuting him would hardly occur to anyone, the\ninjured party being prevented by public opinion, if not by habit and\nfeeling, from appealing against his own father.[124] Disobedience to\nparents is considered by Moslems as one of the greatest of sins, and\nis put, in point of heinousness, on a par with idolatry, murder, and\ndesertion in an expedition against infidels. \"An undutiful child,\"\nsays Mr. Lane, \"is very seldom heard of among the Egyptians or the\nArabs in general. . . . Sons scarcely sit or eat or smoke in the\npresence of the father, unless bidden to do so.\"[125] In Morocco it is\ncurious to see big, grown-up sons sneak away as soon as they hear\ntheir father's steps, or to notice their absolute reticence in his\npresence. Children's deference for their mothers is less formal, but\nalmost equally great.[126]\n\n[Footnote 111: Oppert, in _G\u00f6ttingische gelehrte Anzeigen_, 1879, p.\n1604 _sqq._ Hommel, _Die semitischen V\u00f6lker und Sprachen_, i. 416.\nMeissner, _Beitr\u00e4ge zum altbabylonischen Privatrecht_, p. 14 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 112: Maspero, _Dawn of Civilization_, p. 134.]\n\n[Footnote 113: Hommel, _op. cit._ i. 416. Meissner, _op. cit._ p. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 114: _Laws of [Hv]ammurabi_, 117.]\n\n[Footnote 115: _Ibid._ 168.]\n\n[Footnote 116: Hommel, _op. cit._ i. 416.]\n\n[Footnote 117: Meissner, _op. cit._ p. 15.]\n\n[Footnote 118: Ewald, _Antiquities of Israel_, p. 190. Wellhausen,\n_Prolegomena to the History of Israel_, p. 465.]\n\n[Footnote 119: _Exodus_, xxi. 7 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 120: _Genesis_, xxiv. 4; xxviii. 1 _sq._ _Exodus_, xxxiv.\n16. _Deuteronomy_, vii, 3.]\n\n[Footnote 121: _Cf._ Michaelis, _Commentaries on the Laws of Moses_,\ni. 444.]\n\n[Footnote 122: _Cf._ Ewald, _op. cit._ p. 188; Gans, _Das Erbrecht in\nweltgeschichtlicher Entwickelung_, i. 134.]\n\n[Footnote 123: Philo Jud\u00e6us, _Opera_, i. 759 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 124: Urquhart, _Spirit of the East_, ii. 440 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 125: Lane, _Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians_, p.\n70. _Cf._ Pool, _Studies in Mohammedanism_, p. 171.]\n\n[Footnote 126: _Cf._ Urquhart, _op. cit._ ii. 265 _sq._]\n\nAmong the ancient Romans, in relation to the house-father, \"all in the\nhousehold were destitute of legal rights--the wife and the child no\nless than the bullock or the {611} slave.\"[127] The father not only\nhad judicial authority over his children--implying the right of\ninflicting capital punishment on them[128]--but he could sell them at\ndiscretion.[129] Even the grown-up son and his children were subject\nto the house-father's authority,[130] and in marriage without\n_conventio in manum_ a daughter remained in the power of her father or\ntutor even after marriage.[131] Filial piety, including reverence not\nonly for the father but for the mother also, was regarded as a most\nsacred duty.[132] To the ancient Roman the parents were hardly less\nsacred beings than the gods.[133]\n\n[Footnote 127: Mommsen, _History of Rome_, i. 74.]\n\n[Footnote 128: _Supra_, p. 393.]\n\n[Footnote 129: Dionysius of Halicarnassus, _Antiquitates Roman\u00e6_,\nii. 27.]\n\n[Footnote 130: _Institutiones_, i. 9. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 131: Westermarck, _op. cit._ p. 230.]\n\n[Footnote 132: Leist, _Gr\u00e6co-italische Rechtsgeschichte_, p. 11 _sqq._\n_Idem_, _Alt-arisches Jus Gentium_, p. 185.]\n\n[Footnote 133: Valerius Maximus, i. 1. 13: \"Pari vindicta parentum ac\ndeorum violatio expianda est.\" Servius, _In Virgilii Georgicon_, ii.\n473: \"Sacra deorum sancta apud illos sunt, sancti etiam\nparentes.\"]\n\nIt has been suggested by Sir Henry Maine and others that the _patria\npotestas_ of the Romans was a survival of the paternal authority which\nexisted among the primitive Aryans.[134] But no clear evidence of the\ngeneral prevalence of such unlimited authority among other so-called\nAryan peoples has been adduced. The ancient jurist observed, \"The\npower which we have over our children is peculiar to Roman citizens;\nfor there are no other nations possessing the same power over their\nchildren as we have over ours.\"[135] That among the Greeks and Teutons\nthe father had the right to expose his children in their infancy, to\nsell them, in case of urgency, as long as they remained in his\npower,[136] and to give away his daughters in marriage,[137] does not\nimply the possession of a sovereignty like that which the Roman\nhouse-father exercised over his descendants of all ages. In\nGreece[138] and among all the Teutonic {612} nations[139] the father's\nauthority over his sons came to an end when the son grew up and left\nhis home. But here again we must distinguish between the legal rights\nof parents and the duties of children. There are numerous passages in\nthe Greek writings which put filial piety on a par with the duties\ntowards the gods.[140]\n\n[Footnote 134: Maine, _Ancient Law_, p. 138. Fustel de Coulanges, _La\ncit\u00e9 antique_, p. 96 _sqq._ Hearn, _Aryan Household_, p. 92.]\n\n[Footnote 135: _Institutiones_, i. 9. 2.]\n\n[Footnote 136: Leist, _Gr\u00e6co-italische Rechtsgeschichte_, p. 60 _sq._\nGrimm, _Deutsche Rechtsalterth\u00fcmer_, p. 461 _sq._ Brunner, _Deutsche\nRechtsgeschichte_, i. 76. In France the parents' right of selling\ntheir children gradually disappeared under the kings of the third race\n(de Lauri\u00e8re, in Loysel, _Institutes coutumi\u00e8res_, i. 82).]\n\n[Footnote 137: Westermarck, _op. cit._ p. 232 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 138: Leist, _Gr\u00e6co-italische Rechtsgeschichte_, p. 62 _sq._\nCauvet, 'De l'organisation de la famille \u00e0 Ath\u00e8nes,' in _Revue de\nl\u00e9gislation_, xxiv. 138.]\n\n[Footnote 139: Grimm, _Deutsche Rechtsalterth\u00fcmer_, p. 462. Brunner,\n_Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte_, i. 75 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 140: Schmidt, _Ethik der alten Griechen_, ii. 141 _sq._]\n\nNor is there any evidence that the _patria potestas_ of the Roman type\never prevailed in full in India, great though the father's or parent's\nauthority has been, and still is, among the Hindus.[141] Among the\nVedic people the father seems to have been the head of the family only\nas long as he was able to be its protector and maintainer,[142]\ndecrepit parents being even allowed to die of starvation.[143]\nAccording to some sacred books from a later age, the father and the\nmother have power to give, to sell, and to abandon their son, because\n\"man formed of uterine blood and virile seed proceeds from his mother\nand his father as an effect from its cause\"; however, an only son may\nnot be given or received in adoption, nor is a woman allowed to give\nor receive a son except with her husband's permission.[144] In other\nbooks it is said that \"the gift or acceptance of a child and the right\nto sell or buy a child are not recognised,\"[145] and that he who casts\noff his son--unless the son be guilty of a crime causing loss of\ncaste--shall be fined by the king six hundred _panas_.[146] But\nwhatever be the legal rights of a parent, filial piety is a most\nstringent duty in the child.[147] A man has three Atigurus, or\nspecially venerable superiors: his father, mother, and spiritual\nteacher. To them he must always pay obedience. He must do what is\nagreeable and serviceable to them. He must never do anything without\ntheir leave.[148] \"By honouring these three all that ought to be done\nby man is accomplished; {613} that is clearly the highest duty, every\nother act is a subordinate duty.\"[149] Similar feelings prevail among\nthe modern Hindus.[150] Sir W. H. Sleeman observes, \"There is no part\nof the world, I believe, where parents are so much reverenced by their\nsons as they are in India in all classes of society.\" The duty of\ndaughters is from the day of their marriage transferred entirely to\ntheir husbands and their husbands' parents, but between the son and\nhis parents the reciprocity of rights and duties which have bound\ntogether the parent and child from infancy follows them to the grave.\nThe sons are often actually tyrannised over by their mothers.[151]\n\n[Footnote 141: Westermarck, _op. cit._ p. 231 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 142: _Rig-Veda_, i. 70. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 143: Zimmer, _Altindisches Leben_, p. 328.]\n\n[Footnote 144: _Vasishtha_, xv. 1 _sqq._ _Baudh\u00e2yana Parisishta_, vii.\n5. 2 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 145: _\u00c2pastamba_, ii. 6. 13. 11.]\n\n[Footnote 146: _Laws of Manu_, viii. 389. _Cf._ _ibid._ xi. 60.]\n\n[Footnote 147: _\u00c2pastamba_, i. 4. 14. 6. _Laws of Manu_, ii. 225\n_sqq._; iv. 162; &c.]\n\n[Footnote 148: _Institutes of Vishnu_, ch. 31.]\n\n[Footnote 149: _Laws of Manu_, ii. 237.]\n\n[Footnote 150: Nelson, _View of the Hind[=u] Law_, p. 56 _sq._ Ghani,\n'Social Life and Morality in India,' in _International Journal of\nEthics_, vii. 312.]\n\n[Footnote 151: Sleeman, _Rambles and Recollections of an Indian\nOfficial_, i. 330 _sqq._]\n\nAccording to ancient Russian laws, fathers had great power over their\nchildren;[152] but it is not probable that a son could be sold as a\nslave.[153] Baron von Haxthausen, who wrote before the Emancipation in\n1861, says that \"the patriarchal government, feelings, and\norganisation are in full activity in the life, manners, and customs of\nthe Great Russians. The same unlimited authority which the father\nexercises over all his children is possessed by the mother over her\ndaughters.\"[154] It was a common custom for a father to marry his\nyoung sons to full-grown women; and in Poland also, according to\nNestor, a father used to select a bride for his son.[155] According to\nProfessor Bogi[vs]i['c], the power of the father is not so great among\nthe Southern Slavs as among the Russians;[156] but a son is not\npermitted to make a proposal of marriage to a girl against the will of\nhis parents, whilst a daughter, of course, enjoys still less freedom\nof disposing of her own hand.[157] According to a Slavonian maxim, \"a\nfather is like an earthly god to his son.\"[158]\n\n[Footnote 152: Accurse, quoted by de Lauri\u00e8re, in Loysel, _op. cit._\ni. 82.]\n\n[Footnote 153: Macieiowski, _Slavische Rechtsgeschichte_, iv. 404.]\n\n[Footnote 154: von Haxthausen, _Russian Empire_, ii. 229 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 155: Westermarck, _op. cit._ p. 234. Macieiowski, _op. cit._\nii. 189.]\n\n[Footnote 156: Maine, _Early Law and Custom_, p. 244, note.]\n\n[Footnote 157: Krauss, _Sitte und Brauch der S\u00fcdslaven_, pp. 314, 320.]\n\n[Footnote 158: Maine, _Early Law and Custom_, p. 243.]\n\n{614} Among this group of peoples, also, we meet with reverence for\nthe elder brother, for persons of a superior age generally, and,\nespecially, for the aged.\n\nObedience on the part of the younger to the elder brother is\nstrongly inculcated by Confucianism and Taouism.[159] In ancient China\nthe eldest son of the principal wife held so high a position that even\nhis own father had to mourn for him at his death in the selfsame\ndegree in which the son was bound to mourn for his father;[160] and in\nsome provinces of Japan the elder brother or sister did not even go to\nthe funeral of the younger.[161] In Babylonia the elder brother\noccupied a privileged position in the family in relation to the\nyounger.[162] In one of the Mand\u00e6an writings it is said, \"Honour your\nfather and your mother and your elder brother as your father.\"[163]\nAccording to the sacred books of the Hindus, \"the feet of elder\nbrothers and sisters must be embraced, according to the order of their\nseniority\";[164] \"towards a sister of one's father and of one's\nmother, and towards one's own elder sister, one must behave as towards\none's mother,\" though the mother is more venerable than they.[165]\n\n[Footnote 159: Douglas, _Confucianism and Taouism_, pp. 123, 124, 259.\nGriffis, _Religions of Japan_, p. 125 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 160: de Groot, _op. cit._ (vol. ii. book) i. 509.]\n\n[Footnote 161: Griffis, _Religions of Japan_, p. 127.]\n\n[Footnote 162: Hommel, _op. cit._ i. 417 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 163: Brandt, _Mand\u00e4ische Schriften_, p. 64.]\n\n[Footnote 164: _\u00c2pastamba_, i. 4. 14. 9. _Cf._ _ibid._ i. 4. 14. 14;\n_Laws of Manu_, ii. 225.]\n\n[Footnote 165: _Laws of Manu_, ii. 133.]\n\nAgain, in ancient Mexico respect was paid not only by children to\ntheir parents but by the young to the old.[166] Among the Yucatans\n\"the young reverenced much the aged.\"[167] In China persons of the\nlowest class who have attained to an unusual age have not infrequently\nbeen distinguished by the Emperor,[168] and even criminals with grey\nhairs are treated with regard.[169] \"Respect for elders,\" says\nMencius, \"is the working of righteousness\";[170] and it is said in\nTh\u00e2i Shang that the good man \"will respect the old and cherish the\nyoung.\"[171] A Japanese proverb runs, \"Regard an old man as thy\nfather.\"[172] We read in Leviticus, \"Thou shalt rise up before the\nhoary head, and honour the face of the old man, and fear thy\nGod.\"[173] Veneration {615} for the aged is emphatically inculcated by\nIslam.[174] In the sacred books of India it is represented as a\nvirtue.[175] Herodotus states that the Egyptians resembled the\nLaced\u00e6monians in the reverence the young men paid to their\nelders.[176] Plato says in his 'Laws' that everybody ought to consider\nthat the elder has the precedence of the younger in honour, both among\nthe gods as also among men who would live in security and happiness;\nwherefore it is a foolish thing and hateful to the gods to see an\nelder man assaulted by a younger in the city. Everybody ought to\nregard a person who is twenty years older than himself, whether male\nor female, as his father or mother, and to abstain from laying hands\non any such person \"out of reverence to the gods who preside over\nbirth.\"[177] Regard for old age lies behind such words as _presbyter_\nand the Anglo-Saxon _ealdormonn_; and all travellers among the\nSouthern Slavs have noticed their extraordinary respect for old\npeople.[178]\n\n[Footnote 166: Clavigero, _op. cit._ i. 8l. _Cf._ _ibid._ i. 332.]\n\n[Footnote 167: Landa, _Relacion de las cosas de Yucatan_, p. 178.]\n\n[Footnote 168: Davis, _China_, ii. 97.]\n\n[Footnote 169: Wells Williams, _Middle Empire_, i. 805.]\n\n[Footnote 170: Mencius, vii. 1. 15. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 171: _Th\u00e2i Shang_, 3.]\n\n[Footnote 172: Griffis, _Mikado's Empire_, p. 505.]\n\n[Footnote 173: _Leviticus_, xix. 32. _Cf._ _Job_, xxxii. 1;\n_Proverbs_, xvi. 31, and xx. 29.]\n\n[Footnote 174: Ameer Ali, _Ethics of Isl\u00e2m_, p. 27 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 175: _\u00c2pastamba_, i. 5. 15. _Laws of Manu_, ii. 121.\n_Dhammapada_, 109.]\n\n[Footnote 176: Herodotus, ii. 80.]\n\n[Footnote 177: Plato, _Leges_, ix. 879. _Cf._ _Idem_, _Respublica_,\nv. 465.]\n\n[Footnote 178: Maine, _Early Law and Custom_, p. 243.]\n\nIn Europe the paternal authority of the archaic type which we have\njust considered has gradually yielded to a system under which the\nfather has been divested of the most essential rights he formerly\npossessed over his children--a system the inmost drift of which is\nexpressed in the words of the French Encyclopedist, \"Le pouvoir\npaternel est plut\u00f4t un devoir qu'un pouvoir.\"[179] Already in pagan\ntimes the Roman _patria potestas_ became a shadow of what it had been.\nUnder the Republic the abuses of paternal authority were checked by\nthe censors, and in later times the Emperors reduced the father's\npower within comparatively narrow limits. Not only was the life of the\nchild practically as sacred as that of the parent long before\nChristianity became the religion of Rome,[180] but Alexander Severus\nordained that heavy punishments should be inflicted on members of a\nfamily by the magistrate only. Diocletian and Maximilian took away the\npower of selling freeborn children as slaves. The father's privilege\nof {616} dictating marriage for his sons declined into a conditional\nveto; and it seems that the daughters also, at length, gained a\ncertain amount of freedom in the choice of a husband.[181]\n\n[Footnote 179: _Encyclop\u00e9die m\u00e9thodique_, Jurisprudence, vii. 77, art.\nPuissance paternelle.]\n\n[Footnote 180: _Supra_, p. 393 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 181: Westermarck, _op. cit._ p. 236.]\n\nThe new religion was anything but unfavourable to this process of\nemancipation. The ethical precept of filial piety was changed by\nChrist. His church was a militant church. He had come not to send\npeace but a sword, \"to set a man at variance against his father, and\nthe daughter against her mother.\"[182] Being chiefly addressed to the\nyoung, the new teaching naturally caused much disorder in families.\nFathers disinherited their converted sons,[183] and children thought\nthat they owed no duty to their parents where such a duty was opposed\nto the interests of their souls. According to Gregory the Great, we\nought to ignore our parents, hating them and flying from them when\nthey are an obstacle to us in the way of the Lord;[184] and this\nbecame the accepted theory of the Church.[185] Nay, it was not only in\nsimilar cases of conflict that Christianity exercised a weakening\ninfluence on family ties which had previously been regarded with\nreligious veneration. In all circumstances the relationship between\nchild and parent was put in the shade by the relationship between man\nand God. \"Call no man your father upon the earth: for one is your\nFather, which is in Heaven.\"[186] \"If any man come to me, and hate not\nhis father, and mother, and wife, and children, and brethren, and\nsisters, yea, and his own life also, he cannot be my disciple.\"[187]\nAt the same time the fifth commandment, though modified by\nconsiderations which would never have occurred to the mind of an\northodox Jew, was left formally intact. Obedience to parents was, in\nfact, repeatedly enjoined by St. Paul as a Christian duty.[188] It was\nregarded as a prerequisite {617} for the veneration of God. \"If we do\nnot honour and reverence our parents, whom we ought to love next to\nGod, and whom we have almost continually before our eyes, how can we\nhonour or reverence God, the supreme and best of parents, whom we\ncannot see?\"[189]\n\n[Footnote 182: _St. Matthew_, x. 34 _sq._ _St. Luke_, xii. 51 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 183: Tertullian, _Apologeticus_, 3 (Migne, _Patrologi\u00e6\ncursus_, i. 280 _sq._).]\n\n[Footnote 184: St. Gregory the Great, _Homili\u00e6 in Evangelia_, xxxvii.\n2 (Migne, _op. cit._ lxxvi. 1275).]\n\n[Footnote 185: Thomas Aquinas, _Summa theologica_, ii.-ii. 101. 4.]\n\n[Footnote 186: _St. Matthew_, xxiii. 9.]\n\n[Footnote 187: _St. Luke_, xiv. 26.]\n\n[Footnote 188: _Ephesians_, vi. 1 _sqq._ _Colossians_, iii. 20.]\n\n[Footnote 189: _Catechism of the Council of Trent_, iii. 5. 1.]\n\nAncient, deep-rooted ideas die slowly. Whilst among Teutonic peoples\nthe grown-up child is recognised both by custom and law as independent\nof the parents, and the parental authority over minors is regarded\nmerely in the light of guardianship,[190] the Roman notions of\npaternal rights and filial duties have to some extent survived in\nLatin countries, not only through the Middle Ages, but up to the\npresent time. \"Above the majesty of the feudal baron,\" says M.\nBernard, \"that of the paternal power was held still more sacred and\ninviolable. However powerful the son might be, he would not have dared\nto outrage his father, whose authority was in his eyes always\nconfounded with the sovereignty of command.\"[191] Du Vair remarks,\n\"Nous devons tenir nos p\u00e8res comme des dieux en terre.\"[192] Bodin\nwrote, in the later part of the sixteenth century, that, though the\nmonarch commands his subjects, the master his disciples, the captain\nhis soldiers, there is none to whom nature has given any command\nexcept the father, \"who is the true image of the great sovereign God,\nuniversal father of all things.\"[193] According to edicts of Henry\nIII., Louis XIII., and Louis XIV., sons could not marry before the age\nof thirty, nor daughters before the age of twenty-five, without the\nconsent of the father and mother, on pain of being disinherited.[194]\nAnd even now in France considerable power is accorded to parents, not\nonly by custom and public sentiment, but by law. A child cannot quit\nthe paternal residence without the permission of the father before the\nage of twenty-one, except for enrolment {618} in the army.[195] For\ngrave misconduct by his children the father has strong means of\ncorrection.[196] A son under twenty-five and a daughter under\ntwenty-one could not until 1907 marry without parental consent;[197]\nand even when a man had attained his twenty-fifth year and a woman her\ntwenty-first, both were still bound to ask for it, by a formal\nnotification.[198]\n\n[Footnote 190: Starcke, _La famille dans les diff\u00e9rentes soci\u00e9t\u00e9s_,\np. 213 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 191: Bernard, quoted in Spencer's _Descriptive Sociology_,\nFrance, p. 38.]\n\n[Footnote 192: Du Vair, quoted by de Ribbe, _Les familles et la\nsoci\u00e9t\u00e9 en France avant la R\u00e9volution_, p. 51.]\n\n[Footnote 193: Bodin, _De republica_, i. 4, p. 31.]\n\n[Footnote 194: Koenigswarter, _Histoire de l'organisation de la\nfamille en France_, p. 231.]\n\n[Footnote 195: _Code Civil_, art. 374.]\n\n[Footnote 196: _Ibid._ art. 375 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 197: _Ibid._ art. 148.]\n\n[Footnote 198: _Ibid._ art. 151.]\n\nThe parental authority depends, in the first place, on the natural\nsuperiority of parents over their children when young, and on the\nhelplessness of the latter; and for similar reasons the daughter,\nthough grown-up, still remains in her father's power. Parents are,\nmoreover, considered to possess in some measure proprietary rights\nover their offspring, being their originators and maintainers;[199]\nand in various cases, it seems, the father is also regarded as their\nowner because he is the owner of their mother. Filial duties and\nparental rights to some extent spring from the children's natural\nfeeling of affection for their parents,[200] particularly for their\nmother,[201] and from the debt of gratitude which they are considered\nto owe to those who have brought them into existence and taken care of\nthem whilst young.[202] The authority of parents is much enhanced and\nextended by the sentiment of filial reverence, as distinct from mere\naffection. From their infancy children are used to look up to their\nparents, {619} especially the father, as to beings superior to\nthemselves; and this feeling, which by itself has a tendency to\npersist, is all the more likely to last even when the parents get old,\nas it is based not only on superior strength and bodily skill, but on\nsuperior knowledge, which remains though the physical power be on the\nwane. Among savages, in particular, filial regard is largely regard\nfor one's elders or the aged. The old men represent the wisdom of the\ntribe. \"Long life and wisdom,\" say the Iroquois, \"are always connected\ntogether.\"[203] Throughout all West Africa the aged are \"the knowing\nones.\"[204] In his work on the Algerian natives M. Villot\nobserves:--\"Les vieillards, au milieu des soci\u00e9t\u00e9s barbares,\nrepr\u00e9sentent la tradition qui tient lieu de patrie; la science des\ncoutumes et usages qui remplacent la loi; la connaissance des\ng\u00e9n\u00e9alogies qui fixe les degr\u00e9s de parent\u00e9 et sert de base \u00e0 la\nd\u00e9termination des titres de propri\u00e9t\u00e9. Pour ces causes, aussi bien\nqu'en raison de leur faiblesse et de leurs cheveux blancs, le respect\npour les vieillards est de r\u00e8gle au milieu des indig\u00e8nes.\"[205] Among\npeople who possess no literature the old men are the sole authorities\non religion, as well as on custom. In Australia the deference shown to\nthem is partly due to the superstitious awe of certain mysterious\nrites which are known to them alone, and to the knowledge of which\nyoung persons are only very gradually admitted.[206] Moreover, old age\nitself inspires a feeling of mysterious awe. The Moors say that, when\ngetting old, a man becomes a saint, and a woman a _jinn\u00eda_, or evil\nspirit--there is something supernatural in both. Among the East\nAfrican Embe \"it is only by means of the rankest superstition that the\nold men are able to maintain their supremacy over the hot-blooded\nyouths\"; they convince the warriors, by presenting them {620} with\nsome magic emblem, that in the hands of the sages alone rest the fate\nand fortune of those who fight in a battle. And old women, also, are\noften believed to possess supernatural power, in which case their\ninfluence, in spite of the subservient position of their sex in\ngeneral, is almost as great as that of a medicine-man.[207] According\nto the beliefs of the natives of Western Victoria, witches always\nappear in the form of an old woman.[208] Among the Maoris some of the\naged women exercise the greatest influence over their tribes, being\nsupposed to possess the power of witchcraft and sorcery.[209] Among\nthe Abipones, says Charlevoix, \"the old women take upon them to be\ngreat witches; and it would be no easy matter to convert them.\"[210]\nIn Arabia, as well as in Morocco, old women are always believed to be\nskilled in sorcery.[211]\n\n[Footnote 199: _Cf._ _Vasishtha_, xv. 1 _sq._; _Bandh\u00e1yana\nParisishta_, vii. 5. 2 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 200: For instances of filial affection among savages see\nCatlin, _North American Indians_, ii. 242; Powers, _Tribes of\nCalifornia_, p. 112 (Mattoal); Selenka, _Sonnige Welten_, p. 34\n(Dyaks); Seemann, _Viti_, p. 193; Mathew, 'Australian Aborigines,' in\n_Jour. & Proceed. Roy. Soc. N.S. Wales_, xxiii. 388.]\n\n[Footnote 201: For instances of great affection for the mother, see\nMunzinger, _Ostafrikanische Studien_, p. 474 (Barea and Kun\u00e1ma);\nWinterbottom, _Native Africans in the Neighbourhood of Sierra Leone_, i.\n211; Park, _Travels in the Interior of Africa_, p. 241; New, _op. cit._\np. 101 (Wanika); Fran\u00e7ois, _Nama und Damara, Deutsch-S\u00fcd-West-Afrika_,\np. 251 (Mountain Damaras); Rowley, _Africa Unveiled_, p. 164; Lane,\n_Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians_, p. 70 _sq._; Urquhart,\n_op. cit._ ii. 265 _sq._ (Turks); Schmidt, _Ethik der alten Griechen_,\nii. 146, 155. It is said in the Talmud that the child loves its mother\nmore than its father, whilst it fears its father more than its mother\n(Deutsch, _Literary Remains_, p. 55).]\n\n[Footnote 202: _Hsi\u00e1o King_, 9 (_Sacred Books of the East_, iii. 479).\n_Laws of Manu_, ii. 227. Plato, _Leges_, iv. 717.]\n\n[Footnote 203: Loskiel, _History of the Mission of the United Brethren\namong the Indians in North America_, i. 15.]\n\n[Footnote 204: Kingsley, _West African Studies_, p. 142.]\n\n[Footnote 205: Villot, _M[oe]urs, coutumes et institutions des\nindig\u00e8nes de l'Alg\u00e9rie_, p. 47.]\n\n[Footnote 206: Schuermann, 'Aboriginal Tribes of Port Lincoln,' in\nWoods, _Native Tribes of South Australia_, p. 226. _Cf._ Nelson,\n'Eskimo about Bering Strait,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ xviii.\n304.]\n\n[Footnote 207: Chanler, _op. cit._ pp. 247, 252.]\n\n[Footnote 208: Dawson, _Australian Aborigines_, p. 52.]\n\n[Footnote 209: Angas, _Savage Life and Scenes in Australia and New\nZealand_, i. 317.]\n\n[Footnote 210: Charlevoix, _History of Paraguay_, i. 406.]\n\n[Footnote 211: Niebuhr, _Travels in Arabia_, ii. 216.]\n\nThe beliefs held regarding the dead also influence the treatment of\nthe aged whose lives are drawing to an end. Certain African tribes\ntreat their old people with every kindness in order to secure their\ngoodwill after death.[212] A missionary in East Africa heard a negro\nsay with reference to an old man, \"We will do what he says, because he\nis soon going to die.\"[213] The Omahas \"were afraid to abandon their\naged on the prairie when away from their permanent villages lest\nWakanda should punish them\";[214] and in this case it seems that\nWakanda, at least originally meant the ghost of the dead. The Niase is\nan egoist ever in his respect for the old, because he hopes that they\nwill protect and assist him when they are dead.[215] In China the\ndoctrine that ghosts may interfere at any moment with human business\nand fate, either favourably or unfavourably, \"enforces respect for\nhuman life and a charitable {621} treatment of the infirm, the aged,\nand the sick, especially if they stand on the brink of the\ngrave.\"[216] The regard for the aged and the worship of the dead are\noften mentioned together in a way which suggests that there exists an\nintrinsic connection between them. Of the Dacotahs Prescott observes,\n\"Veneration is very great in some Indians for old age, and they all\nfeel it for the dead.\"[217] The worship of ancestors is a distinguishing\ncharacteristic of the religious system of Southern Guinea; the\n\"profound respect for aged persons, by a very natural operation of the\nmind, is turned into idolatrous regard for them when dead.\"[218] \"The\nBarotse chiefly worship the souls of their ancestors. . . . Cognate to\nthis worship of ancestors is the great respect displayed for parents\nand the old--especially the eldest of a family or tribe.\"[219] Among\nthe Herero \"the tomb of a father is the most important of all holy\nplaces, the soul of a father the oracle most often consulted.\"[220]\nThe Aetas of the Philippine Islands \"have a profound respect for\nold-age and for their dead.\"[221] The Ossetes \"show the greatest love\nand veneration to their parents, to old age generally, and especially\nto the memory of their ancestors.\"[222] In cases like these, however,\nit is impossible accurately to distinguish between cause and effect.\nWhilst the worship of the dead is, in the first place, due to the\nmystery of death, it is evident that the regard in which a person is\nheld during his lifetime also influences the veneration which is\nbestowed on his disembodied soul.\n\n[Footnote 212: Arnot, _op. cit._ p. 78, note.]\n\n[Footnote 213: Lippert, _Kulturgeschichte der Menschheit_, i. 229.]\n\n[Footnote 214: Dorsey, 'Omaha Sociology,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._\niii. 369. _Cf._ _ibid._ p. 275.]\n\n[Footnote 215: Modigliani, _Viaggio a N\u00edas_, p. 467.]\n\n[Footnote 216: de Groot, _op. cit._ (vol. iv. book) ii. 450.]\n\n[Footnote 217: Prescott, in Schoolcraft, _Indian Tribes of the United\nStates_, ii. 196.]\n\n[Footnote 218: Wilson, _Western Africa_, p. 392 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 219: Decle, _Three Years in Savage Africa_, p. 74 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 220: Fran\u00e7ois, _op. cit._ p. 192.]\n\n[Footnote 221: Foreman, _op. cit._ p. 209.]\n\n[Footnote 222: von Haxthausen, _Transcaucasia_, p. 414.]\n\nThere are thus obvious reasons for the connection between filial\nsubmissiveness and religious beliefs; but the chief cause of this\nconnection seems to be the extreme importance frequently attached to\nthe curses and blessings of parents. Among the Nandi in Central\nAfrica, \"if a {622} son refuses to obey his father in any serious\nmatter, the father solemnly strikes the son with his fur mantle. This\nis equivalent to a most serious curse, and is supposed to be fatal to\nthe son unless he obtains forgiveness, which he can only do by\nsacrificing a goat before his father.\"[223] Among the Mpongwe \"there\nis nothing which a young person so much deprecates as the curse of an\naged person, and especially that of a revered father.\"[224] The Barea\nand Kun\u00e1ma are convinced that any undertaking which has not the\nblessing of the old people will fail, that every curse uttered by them\nmust be destructive.[225] Among the Bogos nobody takes an employment\nor gives it up, nobody engages in a business or contracts a marriage,\nbefore he has received the blessing of his father or his master.[226]\nAmong the Herero, \"when a chief feels his dissolution approaching, he\ncalls his sons to the bedside, and gives them his benediction.\"[227]\nThe Moors have a proverb that \"if the saints curse you the parents\nwill cure you, but if the parents curse you the saints will not cure\nyou.\" The ancient Hebrews believed that parents, and especially a\nfather, could by their blessings or curses determine the fate of their\nchildren;[228] indeed, we have reason to assume that the reward which\nin the fifth commandment is held out to respectful children was\noriginally a result of parental blessings. We still meet with the\noriginal idea in Ecclesiasticus, where it is said: \"Honour thy father\nand mother both in word and deed, that a blessing may come upon thee\nfrom them. For the blessing of the father establisheth the houses of\nchildren; but the curse of the mother rooteth out foundations.\"[229]\nThe same notion that the parents' blessings beget prosperity, and that\ntheir curses bring ruin, prevailed in ancient Greece. Plato says {623}\nin his 'Laws':--\"Neither God, nor a man who has understanding, will\never advise any one to neglect his parents. . . . If a man has a\nfather or mother, or their fathers or mothers treasured up in his\nhouse stricken in years, let him consider that no statue can be more\npotent to grant his requests than they are, who are sitting at his\nhearth, if only he knows how to show true service to them. . . .\nOedipus, as tradition says, when dishonoured by his sons, invoked on\nthem curses which every one declares to have been heard and ratified\nby the gods, and Amyntor in his wrath invoked curses on his son\nPhoenix, and Theseus upon Hippolytus, and innumerable others have also\ncalled down wrath upon their children, whence it is clear that the\ngods listen to the imprecations of parents; for the curses of parents\nare, as they ought to be, mighty against their children as no others\nare. And shall we suppose that the prayers of a father or mother who\nis specially dishonoured by his or her children, are heard by the gods\nin accordance with nature; and that if a parent is honoured by them,\nand in the gladness of his heart earnestly entreats the gods in his\nprayers to do them good, he is not equally heard, and that they do not\nminister to his request? . . . Therefore, if a man makes a right use\nof his father and grandfather and other aged relations, he will have\nimages which above all others will win him the favour of the\ngods.\"[230] Originally the efficacy of parents' curses and blessings\nwere ascribed to a magic power immanent in the spoken word itself, and\ntheir Erinyes, who were no less terrible than the Erinyes of neglected\nguests,[231] were only personifications of their curses.[232] But in\nthis, as in other similar cases already noticed, the fulfilment of the\ncurse or the blessing came afterwards to be looked upon as an act of\ndivine justice. According to Plato, \"Nemesis, the messenger of\njustice,\" watches over unbecoming words uttered {624} to a\nparent;[233] and Hesiod says that if anybody reproaches an aged father\nor mother \"Zeus himself is wroth, and at last, in requital for wrong\ndeeds, lays on him a bitter penalty.\"[234] It also seems to be beyond\nall doubt that the _divi parentum_ of the Romans, like their _dii\nhospitales_, were nothing but personified curses. For it is said, \"If\na son beat his parent and he cry out, the son shall be devoted to the\nparental gods for destruction.\"[235] In aristocratic families in\nRussia children used to stand in mortal fear of their fathers'\ncurses;[236] and the country people still believe that a marriage\nwithout the parents' approval will call down the wrath of Heaven on\nthe heads of the young couple.[237] Some of the Southern Slavs\nmaintain that if a son does not fulfil the last will of his father,\nthe soul of the father will curse him from the grave.[238] The\nServians say, \"Without reverence for old men, there is no\nsalvation.\"[239]\n\n[Footnote 223: Johnston, _Uganda Protectorate_, ii. 879.]\n\n[Footnote 224: Wilson, _Western Africa_, p. 393.]\n\n[Footnote 225: Munzinger, _Ostafrikanische Studien_, p. 475.]\n\n[Footnote 226: _Idem_, _Sitten der Bogos_, p. 90 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 227: Andersson, _Lake Ngami_, p. 228.]\n\n[Footnote 228: _Genesis_, ix. 25 _sqq._; xxvii. 4, 19, 23, 25, 27\n_sqq._; xlviii. 9, 14 _sqq._; xlix. 4, 7 _sqq._ _Judges_, xvii. 2.\n_Cf._ Cheyne, 'Blessings and Cursings,' in _Encyclop\u00e6dia Biblica_,\ni. 592; Nowack, 'Blessing and Cursing,' in _Jewish Encyclopedia_,\niii. 244.]\n\n[Footnote 229: _Ecclesiasticus_, iii. 8 _sq._ _Cf._ _ibid._ iii. 16.]\n\n[Footnote 230: Plato, _Leges_, xi. 930 _sq._ _Cf._ _ibid._ iv. 717.]\n\n[Footnote 231: Aeschylus, _Eumenides_, 545 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 232: See _Iliad_, xxi. 412 _sq._; Sophocles, _[OE]dipus\nColoneus_, 1299, 1434; von Lasaulx, _Der Fluch bei Griechen und\nR\u00f6mern_, p. 8; M\u00fcller, _Dissertations on the Eumenides_, p. 155\n_sqq._; Rohde, 'Paralipomena,' in _Rheinisches Museum f\u00fcr Philologie_,\n1895, p. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 233: Plato, _Leges_, iv. 717.]\n\n[Footnote 234: Hesiod, _Opera et dies_, 331 _sqq._ (329 _sqq._).]\n\n[Footnote 235: Servius Tullius, in Bruns, _Fontes Juris Romani\nantiqui_, p. 14, and Festus, _De verborum significatione_, ver.\n_Plorare_: \"Si parentem puer verberit, ast olle plorassit, puer divis\nparentum sacer esto.\" _Cf._ Leist, _Alt-arisches Jus Civile_, i. 184.]\n\n[Footnote 236: I am indebted to Prince Kropotkin for this statement.]\n\n[Footnote 237: Kovalewsky, _Modern Customs and Ancient Laws of\nRussia_, p. 37.]\n\n[Footnote 238: Krauss, _op. cit._ p. 119.]\n\n[Footnote 239: Maine, _Early Law and Custom_, p. 243.]\n\nIn various instances the rewards or punishments attached to the\nbehaviour of children seem to spring from the belief in parental\nblessings and curses, although the cause is not expressly mentioned.\nAccording to ancient Hindu ideas, a father, mother, and spiritual\nteacher are equal to the three Vedas, equal to the three gods,\nBrahman, Vishnu, and Siva.[240] A man who shows no regard for them\nderives no benefit from any religious observance; whereas, \"by\nhonouring his mother, he gains the present world; by honouring his\nfather, the world of gods; and by paying strict obedience to his\nspiritual teacher, the world of Brahman.\"[241] As in Greece a person\nwho had assaulted his parent was regarded as polluted by a curse,[242]\nso according {625} to the sacred law of India, those who quarrel with\ntheir father, and those who have forsaken their father, mother, or\nspiritual teacher, defile a company and must not be entertained at a\nSr\u00e2ddha offering.[243] Those who have struck any of these persons\ncannot be readmitted until they have been purified with water taken\nfrom a sacred lake or river.[244] The stain of disobedience towards\nmother and father is purged away with barley-corns, like food which\nhas been licked at by dogs or pigs, or defiled by crows and impure\nmen.[245] In the Dhammapada it is said that to him who always greets\nand constantly reveres the aged four things will increase, namely,\nlife, beauty, happiness, and power.[246] The Coreans believe that \"the\nrichest rewards on earth and brightest heaven hereafter await the\nfilial child,\" whereas \"curses and disgrace in this life and the\nhottest hell in the world hereafter are the penalties of the\ndisobedient or neglectful child.\"[247] It seems to have been a notion\nof the ancient Egyptians that a son who accepted the word of his\nfather would attain old age on that account.[248] The following is an\nexhortation which an Aztec gave to his son:--\"Guard against imitating\nthe example of those wicked sons who, like brutes that are deprived of\nreason, neither reverence their parents, listen to their instruction,\nnor submit to their correction; because whoever follows their steps\nwill have an unhappy end, will die in a desperate or sudden manner, or\nwill be killed and devoured by wild beasts.\"[249] And if an Aztec\nmarried without the sanction of his parents, the belief was that he\nwould be punished with some misfortune.[250] The Aleuts were of\nopinion that those who were attentive to feeble old men, expecting in\nexchange their good advice only, would be long-lived and fortunate in\nthe chase and in war, and would not be neglected when growing old\n{626} themselves.[251] In the Tonga Islands \"disrespect to one's\nsuperior relations is little short of sacrilege to the gods,\" and to\npay respect to chiefs is \"a superior sacred duty, the non-fulfilment\nof which it is supposed the gods would punish almost as severely as\ndisrespect to themselves.\"[252] In the same islands great efficacy is\nascribed to curses which are uttered by a superior.[253]\n\n[Footnote 240: _Institutes of Vishnu_, xxxi. 7. _Laws of Manu_, ii. 230.]\n\n[Footnote 241: _Institutes of Vishnu_, xxxi. 9 _sq._ _Cf._ _Laws of\nManu_, ii. 233 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 242: Plato, _Leges_, ix. 881.]\n\n[Footnote 243: _Institutes of Vishnu_, lxxxii. 28 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 244: _Vasishtha_, xv. 19 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 245: _Baudh\u00e1yana_, iii. 6. 5. _Institutes of Vishnu_,\nxlviii. 20.]\n\n[Footnote 246: _Dhammapada_, 109.]\n\n[Footnote 247: Griffis, _Corea_, p. 236.]\n\n[Footnote 248: _Precepts of Ptah-Hotep_, 39.]\n\n[Footnote 249: Clavigero, _op. cit._ i. 332. Torquemada, _Monarchia\nIndiana_, ii. 493.]\n\n[Footnote 250: Torquemada, _op. cit._ ii. 415.]\n\n[Footnote 251: Veniaminof, quoted by Petroff, _loc. cit._ p. 155.]\n\n[Footnote 252: Mariner, _op. cit._ ii. 237, 155.]\n\n[Footnote 253: _Ibid._ ii. 238.]\n\nWhy are the blessings and curses of parents supposed to possess such\nan extraordinary power? One reason is no doubt the mystery of old age\nand the nearness of death. As appears from several of the cases\nalready referred to, it is not parents only but old people generally\nthat are held capable of giving due effect to their good and evil\nwishes, and this capacity is believed to increase when life is drawing\nto its close. The Herero \"know really no blessing save that conferred\nby the father on his death-bed.\"[254] According to old Teutonic ideas,\nthe curse of a dying person was the strongest of all curses.[255] A\nsimilar notion prevailed among the ancient Arabs;[256] and among the\nHebrews the father's mystic privilege of determining the weal or woe\nof his children was particularly obvious when his days were manifestly\nnumbered.[257] But, at the same time, parental benedictions and\nimprecations possess a potency of their own owing to the parents'\nsuperior position in the family and the respect in which they are\nnaturally held. The influence which such a superiority has upon the\nefficacy of curses is well brought out by various facts. According to\nthe Greek notion, the Erinyes avenged wrongs done by younger members\nof a family to elder ones, even brothers and sisters, but not _vice\nvers\u00e2_.[258] The Arabs of Morocco say that the curse of a husband is\nas potent as that of a father. The Tonga Islanders believe {627} that\ncurses have no effect \"if the party who curses is considerably lower\nin rank than the party cursed.\"[259] Moreover, where the father was\ninvested with sacerdotal functions--as was the case among the ancient\nnations of culture--his blessings and curses would for that reason\nalso be efficacious in an exceptional degree.[260]\n\n[Footnote 254: Ratzel, _History of Mankind_, ii. 468.]\n\n[Footnote 255: Grimm, _Teutonic Mythology_, iv. 1690.]\n\n[Footnote 256: Wellhausen, _Reste arabischen Heidentums_, pp. 139, 191.]\n\n[Footnote 257: Cheyne, in _Encyclop\u00e6dia Biblica_, i. 592.]\n\n[Footnote 258: _Iliad_, xv. 204: \"Thou knowest how the Erinyes do\nalways follow to aid the elder-born.\" _Cf._ M\u00fcller, _Dissertations on\nthe Eumenides_, p. 155 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 259: Mariner, _op. cit._ ii. 238.]\n\n[Footnote 260: _Cf._ Nowack, in _Jewish Encyclopedia_, iii. 243 _sq._]\n\nHowever, the facts which we have hitherto considered are hardly\nsufficient to account for the extraordinary development of the\npaternal authority in the archaic State. Great though it be, the\ninfluence which magic and religious beliefs exercise upon the paternal\nauthority is, as we have just seen, largely of a reactive character. A\nfather's blessings would not be so eagerly sought for, nor would his\ncurses be so greatly feared, if he were a less important personage in\nthe family. So, too, as Sir Henry Maine aptly remarks, the father's\npower is older than the practice of worshipping him. \"Why should the\ndead father be worshipped more than any other member of the household\nunless he was the most prominent--it may be said, the most\nawful--figure in it during his life?\"[261] We must assume that there\nexists some connection between the organisation of the family and the\npolitical constitution of the society. At the lower stages of\ncivilisation--though hardly at the very lowest--we frequently find\nthat the clan has attained such an overwhelming importance that only a\nvery limited amount of authority could be claimed by the head of each\nseparate family. But, as will be shown in a following chapter, this\nwas changed when clans and tribes were united into a State. The new\nState tended to weaken and destroy the clan-system, whereas at the\nsame time the family-tie grew in strength. In early society there\nseems to be an antagonism between the family and the clan. Where the\nclan-bond is very strong it encroaches upon the family feeling, and\nwhere it is loosened the family gains. Hence Dr. Grosse is probably\nright in his {628} assumption that the father became a patriarch, in\nthe true sense of the word, only as the inheritor of the authority\nwhich formerly belonged to the clan.[262]\n\n[Footnote 261: Maine, _Early Law and Custom_, p. 76.]\n\n[Footnote 262: Grosse, _Die Formen der Familie_, p. 219.]\n\nBut whilst in its early days the State strengthened the family by\nweakening the clan, its later development had a different tendency.\nWhen national life grew more intense, when members of separate\nfamilies drew nearer to one another in pursuit of a common goal, the\nfamily again lost in importance. It has been observed that in England\nand America, where political life is most highly developed, children's\nrespect for their parents is at a particularly low ebb.[263] Other\nfactors also, inherent in progressive civilisation, contributed to the\ndownfall of the paternal power--the extinction of ancestor-worship,\nthe decay of certain superstitious beliefs, the declining influence of\nreligion, and last, but not least, the spread of a keener mutual\nsympathy throughout the State, which could not tolerate that the\nliberty of children should be sacrificed to the despotic rule of their\nfathers.\n\n[Footnote 263: Monier Williams, _Indian Wisdom_, p. 440, n. 1.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXVI\n\nTHE SUBJECTION OF WIVES\n\nAMONG the lower races, as a rule, a woman is always more or less in a\nstate of dependence. When she is emancipated by marriage from the\npower of her father, she generally passes into the power of her\nhusband. But the authority which the latter possesses over his wife\nvaries extremely among different peoples.\n\nFrequently the wife is said to be the property or slave of her\nhusband. In Fiji \"the women are kept in great subjection. . . . Like\nother property, wives may be sold at pleasure, and the usual price is\na musket.\"[1] \"The Carib woman is always in bondage to her male\nrelations. To her father, brother, or husband she is ever a slave, and\nseldom has any power in the disposal of herself.\"[2] Many North\nAmerican Indians are said to treat their wives much as they treat\ntheir dogs.[3] Among the Shoshones \"the man is the sole proprietor of\nhis wives and daughters, and can barter them away, or dispose of them\nin any manner he may think proper.\"[4] Among the East African Wanika a\nwoman \"is a toy, a tool, a slave in the very worst sense; indeed she\nis treated as though she were a {630} mere brute.\"[5] Many other\nstatements to a similar effect are met with in ethnographical\nliterature.[6]\n\n[Footnote 1: Wilkes, _U.S. Exploring Expedition_, iii. 332.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Brett, _Indian Tribes of Guiana_, p. 353.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Harmon, _Journal of Voyages in the Interior of North\nAmerica_, p. 344.]\n\n[Footnote 4: Lewis and Clarke, _Travels to the Source of the Missouri\nRiver_, p. 307.]\n\n[Footnote 5: New, _Life, Wanderings, and Labourings in Eastern\nAfrica_, p. 119.]\n\n[Footnote 6: Gibbs, 'Tribes of Western Washington and Northwestern\nOregon,' in _Contributions to N. American Ethnology_, i. 198. von\nMartius, _Beitr\u00e4ge zur Ethnographie Amerika's_, i. 104 (Brazilian\nIndians). Reade, _Savage Africa_, p. 548 (Negroes of Equatorial\nAfrica). Proyart, 'History of Loango,' in Pinkerton, _Collection of\nVoyages and Travels_, xvi. 570 (Negroes of Loango). Andersson, _Notes\non Travel in South Africa_, p. 236 (Ovambo). Castr\u00e9n, _Nordiska resor\noch forskningar_, i. 310; ii. 56 (Ostyaks). In all these cases women\nare said to be mere articles of commerce, or slaves, or kept in a\nstate of dependence bordering on slavery. In other instances women are\nsaid to be oppressed by their husbands, or treated as inferior beings\n(Waitz [-Gerland], _Anthropologie der Naturv\u00f6lker_, iii. 100 [North\nAmerican Indians]; vi. 626 [Melanesians]. Bancroft, _Native Races of\nthe Pacific States_, i. 121 [Hare and Sheep Indians]. Powers, _Tribes\nof California_, p. 133 [Yuki]. Tuckey, _Expedition to Explore the\nRiver Zaire_, p. 371 [Negroes]. Ling Roth, _Aborigines of Tasmania_,\np. 54).]\n\nYet it seems that even in cases where the husband's power over his\nwife is described as absolute, custom has not left her entirely\ndestitute of rights. Of the Australian aborigines in general it is\nsaid that \"the husband is the absolute owner of his wife (or\nwives)\";[7] of the natives of Central Australia, that \"each father of\na family rules absolutely over his own circle\";[8] of certain tribes\nin West Australia, that the state of slavery in which the women are\nkept is truly deplorable, and that the mere presence of their husbands\nmakes them tremble.[9] But we have reason to believe that there is\nsome exaggeration in these statements, and they certainly do not hold\ngood of the whole Australian race. We have noticed above that custom\ndoes not really allow the Australian husband full liberty to kill his\nwife.[10] For punishing or divorcing her he must sometimes have the\nconsent of the tribe.[11] There are even cases in which a wife whose\nhusband has been unfaithful to her may complain of his conduct to the\nelders of the tribe, and he may have to suffer for it.[12] In\nNorth-West-Central Queensland the women are on one special occasion\n{631} allowed themselves to inflict punishments upon the men: at a\ncertain stage of the initiation ceremony \"each woman can exercise her\nright of punishing any man who may have ill-treated, abused, or\n'hammered' her, and for whom she may have waited months or perhaps\nyears to chastise.\"[13] Of the natives of Central Australia Messrs.\nSpencer and Gillen say that \"the women are certainly not treated\nusually with anything which could be called excessive harshness\";[14]\nand we hear from various authorities that in several Australian tribes\nmarried people are often much attached to each other, and continue to\nbe so even when they grow old.[15] Among the aborigines of New South\nWales, for instance, \"the husbands are as a general rule fond of their\nwives, and the wives loyal and affectionate to their husbands.\"[16]\nNay, white men who have lived among the blacks assure us that there\nare henpecked husbands even in the Australian desert.[17]\n\n[Footnote 7: Curr, _The Australian Race_, i. 109.]\n\n[Footnote 8: Eyre, _Expeditions of Discovery into Central Australia_,\nii. 317.]\n\n[Footnote 9: Salvado, _M\u00e9moires historiques sur l'Australie_, p. 279.\nFor other similar statements referring to the Australian aborigines,\nsee Nieboer, _Slavery as an Industrial System_, p. 11.]\n\n[Footnote 10: _Supra_, p. 418.]\n\n[Footnote 11: Nieboer, _op. cit._ p. 17.]\n\n[Footnote 12: _Ibid._ p. 18.]\n\n[Footnote 13: Roth, _Ethnol. Studies among the North-West-Central\nQueensland Aborigines_, pp. 141, 176.]\n\n[Footnote 14: Spencer and Gillen, _Native Tribes of Central\nAustralia_, p. 50.]\n\n[Footnote 15: Westermarck, _History of Human Marriage_, p. 359.\nStirling, _Report of the Horn Expedition to Central Australia_,\nAnthropology, p. 36.]\n\n[Footnote 16: Hill and Thornton, _Aborigines of New South Wales_, p. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 17: Calvert, _Aborigines of Western Australia_, p. 31.]\n\nOther instances may be added to show that the so-called absolute\nauthority of husbands over their wives is not to be taken too\nliterally. Of the Guiana Indians Sir E. F. Im Thurn observes:--\"The\nwoman is held to be as completely the property of the man as his dog.\nHe may even sell her if he chooses.\"[18] But in another place the same\nauthority admits not only that the women in a quiet way may have a\nconsiderable influence with the men, but that, \"even if the men\nwere--though this is in fact quite contrary to their nature--inclined\nto treat them cruelly, public opinion would prevent this.\"[19] Of the\nPlains Indians of the United States Colonel Dodge writes:--\"The\nhusband owns his wife entirely. He may abuse her, beat her, even kill\nher without question. She is more absolutely a slave than any negro\nbefore the war of rebellion.\" But {632} on the following page we are\ntold that custom gives to every married woman of the tribes \"the\nabsolute right to leave her husband and become the wife of any other\nman, the sole condition being that the new husband must have the means\nto pay for her.\"[20] Among the Chippewyans the women are said to be\n\"as much in the power of the men as any other articles of their\nproperty,\" although, at the same time, \"they are always consulted, and\npossess a very considerable influence in the traffic with Europeans,\nand other important concerns.\"[21] Among the Mongols a woman is\n\"entirely dependent on her husband\"; yet \"in the household the rights\nof the wife are nearly equal to those of the husband.\"[22] Dr.\nPaulitschke tells us that among the Somals, Danakil, and Gallas, a\nwife has no rights whatever in relation to her husband, being merely a\npiece of property; but subsequently we learn that she is his equal,\nand \"a mistress of her own will.\"[23] We must certainly not, like Mr.\nSpencer, conclude that where women are exchangeable for oxen or other\nbeasts they are \"of course\" regarded as equally without personal\nrights.[24] The bride-price is a compensation for the loss sustained\nin the giving up of the girl, and a remuneration for the expenses\nincurred in her maintenance till the time of her marriage;[25] it does\nnot _eo ipso_ confer on the husband absolute rights over her. With\nreference to certain tribes in South-Eastern Africa, the Rev. James\nMacdonald observes:--\"A man obtains a wife by giving her father a\ncertain number of cattle. This, though often called such, is not\npurchase in the usual sense of the word. The woman does not become a\nchattel. She cannot be resold or ill-treated beyond well-defined legal\nlimits. She retains certain rights to property and an interest in the\ncattle paid for her. They are a guarantee for the husband's good {633}\nbehaviour.\"[26] There are even peoples among whom the husband's\nauthority hardly exists, although he has had to pay for his\nwife.[27]\n\n[Footnote 18: Im Thurn, _Indians of Guiana_, p. 223.]\n\n[Footnote 19: _Ibid._ p. 215.]\n\n[Footnote 20: Dodge, _Our Wild Indians_, p. 205 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 21: Mackenzie, _Voyages to the Frozen and Pacific Oceans_,\np. cxxii. _sq._ Schoolcraft, _Archives of Aboriginal Knowledge_, v. 176.]\n\n[Footnote 22: Prejevalsky, _Mongolia_, i. 69 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 23: Paulitschke, _Ethnographie Nordost-Afrikas_, pp. 189,\n190, 244.]\n\n[Footnote 24: Spencer, _Principles of Sociology_, i. 750.]\n\n[Footnote 25: Westermarck, _History of Human Marriage_, p.\n402.]\n\n[Footnote 26: Macdonald, _Light in Africa_, p. 159.]\n\n[Footnote 27: _E.g._, the Navahos and Pelew Islanders (Westermarck,\n_op. cit._ pp. 392, 393, 398 _sq._ For the position of wives among\nthese peoples, see _infra_, pp. 638, 643).]\n\nAmong many peoples the hardest drudgeries of life are said to be\nimposed on the women. Among the Kutchin \"the women are literally\nbeasts of burden to their lords and masters. All the heavy work is\nperformed by them.\"[28] The Californian Karok, while on a journey,\nlays by far the greatest burdens on his wife, whom he regards as a\ndrudge.[29] Among the Kenistenos the life of the women is an\nuninterrupted succession of toil and pain, hence \"they are sometimes\nknown to destroy their female children, to save them from the miseries\nwhich they themselves have suffered.\"[30] \"The condition of the women\namong the Chaymas,\" says von Humboldt, \"like that in all\nsemi-barbarous nations, is a state of privation and suffering. The\nhardest labour is their share.\"[31] Among the Australian aborigines\n\"wives have to undergo all the drudgery of the camp and the march,\nhave the poorest food and the hardest work.\"[32] In Eastern Central\nAfrica \"the women hold an inferior position. They are viewed as beasts\nof burden, which do all the harder work.\"[33] Among the Kakhyens \"the\nmen are averse to labour, but the lot of all women, irrespective of\nrank, is one of drudgery\";[34] and so forth.[35] But it seems that\n{634} these and similar statements, however correct they be, hardly\nexpress the whole truth. In early society each sex has its own\npursuits. The man is responsible for the protection of the family,\nand, ultimately, for its support. His occupations are such as require\nstrength and agility--fighting, hunting, fishing, the construction of\nimplements for the chase and war, and, frequently, the cutting of\ntrees and the building of lodges.[36] The woman may accompany him as a\nhelpmate on his expeditions, sometimes even participating in the\nbattle,[37] and when they travel she generally carries the baggage.\nBut her principal occupations are universally of a domestic kind: she\nprocures wood and water, prepares the food, dresses skins, makes\nclothes, takes care of the children. She, moreover, supplies the\nhousehold with vegetable food, gathers roots, berries, acorns, and so\nforth, and among agricultural peoples very frequently cultivates the\nsoil. Whilst cattle-rearing, having developed out of the chase, is\nlargely a masculine pursuit,[38] agriculture, having developed out of\ncollecting seeds and plants, originally devolves on the\nwomen.[39]\n\n[Footnote 28: Hardisty, 'Loucheux Indians,' in _Smithsonian Report_,\n1866, p. 312.]\n\n[Footnote 29: Powers, _op. cit._ p. 23 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 30: Schoolcraft, _Archives of Aboriginal Knowledge_, v. 167.]\n\n[Footnote 31: von Humboldt, _Personal Narrative of Travels_, iii. 238.]\n\n[Footnote 32: Curr, _The Australian Race_, i. 110.]\n\n[Footnote 33: Macdonald, _Africana_, i. 35.]\n\n[Footnote 34: Anderson, _Mandalay to Momien_, p. 137.]\n\n[Footnote 35: For other instances, see Mackenzie, _Voyages to the\nFrozen and Pacific Oceans_, p. 147 (Rocky Mountain Indians); Parker,\nin Schoolcraft, _Archives_, v. 684 (Comanches); Im Thurn, _op. cit._\np. 215 (Guiana Indians); Keane, 'Botocudos,' in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._\nxiii. 206; Weddell, _Voyage towards the South Pole_, p. 156, Darwin,\n_Journal of Researches_, p. 216, and Bove, _Patagonia_, p. 131\n(Fuegians); Nieboer, _op. cit._ p. 13 _sqq._ (Australian aborigines);\nWilliams and Calvert, _Fiji_, p. 145; Forster, _Voyage round the\nWorld_, ii. 324 (natives of Tana, of the New Hebrides); Zimmermann,\n_Inseln des indischen und stillen Meeres_, ii. 17 (New Caledonians),\n105 (New Irelanders); Lewin, _Wild Races of South-Eastern India_, pp.\n192 (Toungtha), 254 _sq._ (Kukis); Rowney, _Wild Tribes of India_, p.\n214 (most of the wild tribes of India); Reade, _op. cit._ pp. 51, 259,\n545 (various African peoples); Waitz, _Anthropologie der Naturv\u00f6lker_,\nii. 117 (Negroes); Valdau, 'Om Ba-Kwileh folket,' in _Ymer_, v. 167,\n169.]\n\n[Footnote 36: See Spencer, _Principles of Sociology_, i. 750 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 37: For women taking part in battles, see Schoolcraft,\n_Indian Tribes of the United States_, i. 236 (Comanches); Powers, _op.\ncit._ pp. 246 (Shastika Indians of California), 253 (Modok Indians of\nCalifornia); Waitz [-Gerland], _op. cit._ iii. 375 (Caribs), vi. 121\n(Maoris); Wilkes, _op. cit._ v. 93 (Kingsmill Islanders); Kotzebue,\n_Voyage of Discovery into the South Sea_, iii. 171 (natives of\nRadack).]\n\n[Footnote 38: Grosse, _Die Formen der Familie_, p. 92 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 39: _Ibid._ p. 159. Hildebrand, _Recht und Sitte auf den\nverschiedenen wirthschaftlichen Kulturstufen_, p. 44 _sqq._ Dargun,\n'Ursprung und Entwicklungsgeschichte des Eigenthums,' in _Zeitschr. f.\nvergl. Rechtswiss._ v. 39, 110. B\u00fccher, _Die Entstehung der\nVolkswirthschaft_, p. 36 _sqq._ Schurtz, _Das afrikanische Gewerbe_,\np. 7. Ling Roth, 'Origin of Agriculture,' in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xvi.\n119 _sq._ Mason, _Woman's Share in Primitive Culture_, pp. 15 _sqq._,\n146 _sqq._, 277 _sq._ Havelock Ellis, _Man and Woman_, p. 5. von den\nSteinen, _Unter den Naturv\u00f6lkern Zentral-Brasiliens_, p. 214. von\nSchuetz-Holzhausen, _Der Amazonas_, p. 67 (Peruvian Indians). Waitz,\n_op. cit._ iii. 376 (Caribs). Prescott, in Schoolcraft, _Indian Tribes\nof the United States_, i. 235 (Dacotahs). Colden, _ibid._ iii. 191;\nSeaver, _Narrative of the Life of Mrs. Mary Jemison_, p. 168\n(Iroquois). 'Die Baluga-Negritos der Provinz Pampanga (Luzon),' in\n**_Globus_, xli. 238. Z\u00f6ller, _Kamerun_, iii. 58 (Banaka and Bapuku).\nM\u00f6ller, Pagels, and Gleerup, _Tre \u00e5r i Kongo_, i. 129, 137 (Kuilu\nNegroes), 270 (Bakongo). Valdau, in _Ymer_, v. 165 (Bakwileh).\nBurrows, 'Natives of the Upper Welle District,' in _Jour. Anthr.\nInst._ xxviii. 41 (Niam-Niam). New, _op. cit._ pp. 114 (Wanika), 359\n(Wataveta). Stuhlmann, _Mit Emin Pascha ins Herz von Afrika_, p. 182\n(Waganda). Pogge, _Im Reiche des Muata Jamwo_, p. 243 (Kalunda of\nMussumba). Decle, _Three Years in Savage Africa_, pp. 78, 79, 85\n(Barotse), 160 (Matabele). von Weber, _Vier Jahre in Afrika_, ii. 195\n(Zulus). There are, however, exceptions to the rule. Among the Creeks\nand Cherokee Indians not a third part as many women as men are seen at\nwork in their plantations (Bartram, in _Trans. American Ethn. Soc._\niii. pt i. 31). Among the Wakamba both sexes work in the fields, all\nheavy work, such as clearing and breaking new ground, being done by\nmen (Decle, _op. cit._ p. 493). Among various peoples, indeed, such\nagricultural work as requires considerable strength devolves on the\nmale sex (Hildebrand, _op. cit._ p. 44 _sqq._ Havelock Ellis, _Man and\nWoman_, p. 5). In the Malay Archipelago the men are chiefly engaged in\nthe field-work (Ratzel, _History of Mankind_, i. 441). In the\nKingsmill Islands (Wilkes, _op. cit._ v. 91), Tonga (Cook, _Voyage to\nthe Pacific Ocean_, i. 390 _sqq._), and the Caroline Group (Cantova,\nquoted _ibid._ i. 392, note) the soil is cultivated by the men. Among\nthe Gallas, \"whilst the women tend the sheep and oxen in the field,\nand manage the hives of bees, the men plough, sow, and reap\" (Harris,\n_Highlands of Aethiopia_, iii. 47).]\n\n{635} The various occupations of life are thus divided between the\nsexes according to rules; and, though the formation of these rules no\ndoubt has been more or less influenced by the egoism of the stronger\nsex, the essential principle from which they spring lies deeper. They\nare on the whole in conformity with the indications which nature\nherself has given. Take, for instance, the apparently cruel custom of\nusing the women as beasts of burden. To the superficial observer, as\nM. Pinart remarks--with special reference to the Panama Indians,--it\nmay indeed seem strange that the woman should be charged with a heavy\nload, while the man walking before her carries nothing but his\nweapons. But a little reflection will make it plain that the man has\ngood reason for keeping himself free and mobile. The little caravan is\nsurrounded with dangers: when traversing a savannah or a forest a\nhostile Indian may appear at any moment, or a tiger or a snake may lie\nin wait for the travellers. Hence the man must be on the alert, and\nready in an instant to catch his arms to defend himself and his family\nagainst the aggressor.[40] Dobrizhoffer writes, \"The luggage being all\ncommitted to the women, the Abipones travel armed {636} with a spear\nalone, that they may be disengaged to fight or hunt, if occasion\nrequire.\"[41]\n\n[Footnote 40: Pinart, quoted by Nieboer, _op. cit._ p. 21.]\n\n[Footnote 41: Dobrizhoffer, _Account of the Abipones_, ii. 118. _Cf._\nWied-Neuwied _Reise nach Brasilien_, ii. 17, 37 (Botocudos); Giddings,\n_Principles of Sociology_, p. 266 _sq._]\n\nMoreover, whatever may have been the original reason for allotting a\ncertain occupation to the one sex to the exclusion of the other, any\nsuch restriction has subsequently been much emphasised by custom, and\nin many cases by superstition as well.[42] In Africa it is a common\nbelief that the cattle get ill if women have anything to do with\nthem.[43] Hence among most Negro races milking is only permitted to\nmen.[44] In South-Eastern Africa \"a woman must not enter the cattle\nfold.\"[45] The Bechuanas never allow women to touch their cattle,\nhence the men have to plough themselves.[46] In North America Indian\ncustom and superstition ordain that the wife must carefully keep away\nfrom all that belongs to her husband's sphere of action.[47] On the\nother hand, among the Dacotahs \"the men do not often interfere with\nthe work of the women; neither will they help them if they can avoid\nit, for fear of being laughed at and called a woman.\"[48] In Abyssinia\n\"it is infamy for a man to go to market to buy anything. He cannot\ncarry water or bake bread; but he must wash the clothes belonging to\nboth sexes, and, in this function, the women cannot help him.\"[49]\nAmong the Beni A[h.]sen tribe in Morocco the women of the village\nwhere I was staying were quite horrified when one of my native\nservants set out to fetch water; they would on no account allow him to\ndo what they said was a woman's business. The Greenlander regards it\nas scandalous for a man to interfere with any occupation which belongs\nto the women. When he has brought his booty to land, he troubles\nhimself no further about it; \"for it would be a stigma on his\ncharacter, {637} if he so much as drew a seal out of the water.\"[50]\nAmong the Bakongo a man would be much ridiculed by the women\nthemselves, if he wanted to help them in their work in the field.[51]\nSometimes agriculture is supposed to be dependent for success on a\nmagic quality in woman, intimately connected with child-bearing.[52]\nSome Orinoco Indians said to Father Gumilla:--\"When the women plant\nmaize the stalk produces two or three ears; when they set the manioc\nthe plant produces two or three baskets of root; and thus everything\nis multiplied. Why? Because women know how to produce children, and\nknow how to plant the corn so as to ensure its germinating. Then, let\nthem plant it; we do not know so much as they do.\"[53]\n\n[Footnote 42: See Crawley, _Mystic Rose_, p. 49 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 43: Schurtz, _Das afrikanische Gewerbe_, p. 10.]\n\n[Footnote 44: Ratzel, _op. cit._ ii. 419.]\n\n[Footnote 45: Macdonald, _Life in Africa_, p. 221.]\n\n[Footnote 46: Holub, 'Central South African Tribes,' in _Jour. Anthr.\nInst._ x. 11.]\n\n[Footnote 47: Waitz, _op. cit._ iii. 100.]\n\n[Footnote 48: Prescott, in Schoolcraft, _Indian Tribes of the United\nStates_, iii. 235.]\n\n[Footnote 49: Bruce, _Travels to Discover the Source of the Nile_\niv. 474.]\n\n[Footnote 50: Nansen, _First Crossing of Greenland_, ii. 313. Cranz,\n_History of Greenland_, i. 138, 154.]\n\n[Footnote 51: M\u00f6ller, Pagels, and Gleerup, _op. cit._ i. 270.]\n\n[Footnote 52: See Payne, _History of the New World_, ii. 8.]\n\n[Footnote 53: Gumilla, _El Orinoco ilustrado_, ii. 274 _sq._]\n\nIt is obvious that this strict division of labour is apt to mislead\nthe travelling stranger. He sees the women hard at work, and the men\nidly looking on; and it escapes him that the latter will have to be\nbusy in their turn, within their own sphere of action. What is largely\ndue to the force of custom is taken to be sheer tyranny on the part of\nthe men; and the wife is pronounced to be an abject slave of her\nhusband, destitute of all rights. And yet the strong differentiation\nof work, however burdensome it may be to the wife, is itself a source\nof rights, giving her authority within the circle which is exclusively\nher own. Among the Banaka and Bapuku the wife, though said to be her\nhusband's property and slave, is nevertheless an autocrat in her own\nhouse, strong enough to bid defiance to her lord and master.[54] Among\nthe North American Indians, Schoolcraft observes, \"the lodge itself,\nwith all its arrangements, is the precinct of the rule and government\nof the wife. . . . The husband has no voice in this matter.\"[55] Many\nother statements to a similar effect will be quoted below.\n\n[Footnote 54: Steinmetz, _Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_, p. 29 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 55: Schoolcraft, _Indian in his Wigwam_, p. 73.]\n\n{638} We have reason, then, to believe that the authority which savage\nhusbands possess over their wives is not always quite so great as it\nis said to be. And we must distinctly reject as erroneous the broad\nstatement that the lower races in general hold their women in a state\nof almost complete subjection.[56] Among many of them the married\nwoman, though in the power of her husband, is known to enjoy a\nremarkable degree of independence, to be treated by him with\nconsideration, and to exercise no small influence upon him. In several\ncases she is stated to be his equal, and in a few his superior.\n\n[Footnote 56: Thus Meiners says (_History of the Female Sex_, i. 2),\n\"Among savage nations, the entrance into the married state is for the\nfemale the commencement of the most cruel and abject slavery; for\nwhich reason many women dread matrimony more than death.\" In a recent\nwork on the primitive family an Italian writer regards it as perhaps\nthe most fundamental fact in the family institution that the woman is\nalways and everywhere \"sottoposta al pi\u00f9 gravoso _mundium_ maritale\"\n(Amadori-Virgilj, _L'istituto famigliare nelle societ\u00e0 primordiali_,\np. 138).]\n\nAmong many of the South American Indians the women have been\nnoticed to occupy a respected position in the family or community.[57]\nThus, among the Goajiros of Colombia, \"in a quarrel or drunken brawl,\nwomen often save bloodshed by stepping in and tearing the weapons out\nof their husband's or brother's hand. Travelling with women is\nconsequently perfectly safe, and in case of danger, if one undertakes\nto protect a stranger, he may rely upon coming out all right.\"[58]\nAmong the Tarahumares of Mexico--in spite of their saying that one man\nis as good as five women--the woman \"occupies a comparatively high\nposition in the family, and no bargain is ever concluded until the\nhusband has consulted his wife in the matter.\"[59] Among the Navahos\nof New Mexico the women \"exert a great deal of influence\";[60] they\n\"are very independent of menial duties, and leave their husbands upon\nthe slightest pretext of dislike\";[61] \"by common consent the house\nand all the domestic gear belongs entirely to the wife.\"[62] In {639}\nhis description of North American Indians Mr. Grinnell observes:--\"The\nIndian woman, it is usually thought, is a mere drudge and slave, but,\nso far as my observations extend, this notion is wholly an erroneous\none. It is true that the women were the labourers of the camp; that\nthey did all the hard work, about which there was no excitement . . . .\nbut they were not mere servants. On the contrary, their position was\nvery respectable. They were consulted on many subjects, not only in\nconnection with family affairs, but in more important and general\nmatters. Sometimes women were even admitted to the councils and spoke\nthere, giving their advice. . . . In ordinary family conversation\nwomen did not hesitate to interrupt and correct their husbands when\nthe latter made statements with which they did not agree, and the men\nlistened to them with respectful attention, though of course this\ndepended on the standing of the woman, her intelligence, etc.\"[63]\nAnother competent observer, Ten Kate, strongly protests against the\nstatement that, among the North American Indians, women are treated as\nbeasts of burden, and affirms that their condition, as compared with\nthat of the women of the lower classes in civilised countries, is\nrather better than worse.[64] Among the Omahas the women had an equal\nstanding in society with the men; both the husband and wife were at\nthe head of the family and the joint owners of the lodge, robes, and\nso forth, so that the man could not give away anything if his wife was\nunwilling.[65] Among the Senecas, \"usually, the female portion ruled\nthe house, and were doubtless clannish enough about it. The stores\nwere in common; but woe to the luckless husband or lover who was too\nshiftless to do his share of the providing. No matter how many\nchildren, or whatever goods he might have in the house, he might at\nany time be ordered to pick up his blanket and budge.\"[66] \"From\ndocumentary references,\" says Mr. Mooney, \"it is apparent that there\nexisted among the Cherokee a custom analogous to that found among the\nIroquois and probably other Eastern tribes, by which the decision of\nimportant questions relating to peace and war was left to a vote of\nthe women.\"[67] Among the Salish, or Flatheads, \"although the women\nare required to do much hard labour, they are {640} by no means\ntreated as slaves, but, on the contrary, have much consideration and\nauthority.\"[68] Among the Nootkas \"wives are consulted in matters of\ntrade, and in fact seem to be nearly on terms of equality with their\nhusbands, except that they are excluded from some public feasts and\nceremonies.\"[69] Among the Indians about Puget Sound, also, women \"are\nalways consulted in matters of trade before a bargain is closed,\" and\n\"acquire great influence in the tribe.\"[70] The Thlinket woman is not\nthe slave of her husband; she has determinate rights, and her\ninfluence is considerable.[71] Among the natives of Cross Cape she\neven possesses \"acknowledged superiority over the other sex.\"[72]\nAmong the Western Tinneh \"the women do only a fair share of the work\nand have a powerful voice in most affairs.\"[73] In Kadiak they were\nheld in much respect, and enjoyed great liberties.[74] Among the\nKamchadales they had the command of everything, and the husbands were\ntheir obedient slaves.[75] Nordenski\u00f6ld says of the Chukchi:--\"The\npower of the woman appears to be very great. In making the more\nimportant bargains, even about weapons and hunting implements, she is,\nas a rule, consulted, and her advice is taken. A number of things\nwhich form women's tools she can barter away on her own\nresponsibility, or in any other way employ as she pleases.\"[76] Mr.\nBancroft's statement concerning the Western Eskimo, that \"the lot of\nthe women is but little better than slavery,\"[77] must be understood\nas chiefly involving the fact that they have much hard work to do.\nAccording to Dr. Seemann they \"are treated, although not as equals, at\nleast with more consideration than is customary among barbarous\nnations\"; nay, \"it not infrequently happens that the woman is the\nchief authority of the house,\" and \"the man {641} never makes a\nbargain without consulting his wife, and if she does not approve, it\nis rejected.\"[78] Among the Point Barrow Eskimo \"the women appear to\nstand on a footing of perfect equality with the men both in the family\nand in the community. The wife is the constant and trusted companion\nof the man in everything except the hunt, and her opinion is sought in\nevery bargain or other important undertaking.\"[79] In Greenland, also,\nthough the woman is considered much inferior to the man, she is in no\nway oppressed,[80] and her husband consults with her on important\nmatters.[81]\n\n[Footnote 57: Waitz, _Anthropologie der Naturv\u00f6lker_, iii. 472\n(Guaycurus), 530 (Morotocos). von den Steinen, _Unter den Naturv\u00f6lkern\nZentral-Brasiliens_, p. 332 (Baka\u00efri).]\n\n[Footnote 58: Simons, 'Exploration of the Goajira Peninsula,' in\n_Proceed. Roy. Geo. Soc._ N.S. vii. 792. See also Candelier,\n_Rio-Hacha_, p. 256.]\n\n[Footnote 59: Lumholtz, _Unknown Mexico_, i. 265.]\n\n[Footnote 60: Letherman, in _Ann. Rep. Smithsonian Inst._ 1855, p. 294.]\n\n[Footnote 61: Eaton, in Schoolcraft, _Archives_, iv. 217.]\n\n[Footnote 62: Stephen, in _American Anthropologist_, vi. 354.]\n\n[Footnote 63: Grinnell, _Story of the Indian_, p. 46. _Cf._ Waitz,\n_op. cit._ iii. 101 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 64: Ten Kate, _Reizen en ondersoekingen Noord-Amerika_, p.\n365. _Cf._ _ibid._ 9.]\n\n[Footnote 65: Dorsey, 'Omaha Sociology,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._\niii. 266, 366.]\n\n[Footnote 66: Morgan, _Houses and House-Life of the American\nAborigines_, p. 65 _sq._ See also Dixon, _New America_, p. 46.]\n\n[Footnote 67: Mooney, 'Myths of the Cherokee,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur.\nEthn._ xix. 489.]\n\n[Footnote 68: Hale, _U.S. Exploring Expedition. Vol. VI. Ethnography\nand Philology_, p. 207.]\n\n[Footnote 69: Bancroft, _op. cit._ i. 196. _Cf._ Sproat, _Scenes and\nStudies of Savage Life_, pp. 93, 95 (Ahts).]\n\n[Footnote 70: Bancroft, _op. cit._ i. 218.]\n\n[Footnote 71: Krause, _Tlinkit-Indianer_, p. 161.]\n\n[Footnote 72: Meares, _Voyages to the North-West Coast of America_,\np. 323.]\n\n[Footnote 73: Dall, _Alaska_, p. 431.]\n\n[Footnote 74: Holmberg, 'Ethnographische Skizzen \u00fcber die V\u00f6lker des\nrussischen Amerika,' in _Acta Soc. Scient. Fennic\u00e6_, iv. 399.]\n\n[Footnote 75: Steller, _Beschreibung von dem Lande Kamtschatka_,\np. 287.]\n\n[Footnote 76: Nordenski\u00f6ld, _Vegas f\u00e4rd kring Asien och Europa_,\nii. 144.]\n\n[Footnote 77: Bancroft, _op. cit._ i. 65 _sq._ Mr. Bancroft's\nauthority is probably Armstrong, who says that the women are, to all\nintents and purposes, the slaves of the men, and do the greater part\nof the outdoor work, except hunting and fishing; but he adds that they\nnevertheless enjoy a higher position and more consideration than is\nusual amongst savages (Armstrong, _Personal Narrative of the Discovery\nof the North-West Passage_, p. 195).]\n\n[Footnote 78: Seemann, _Narrative of the Voyage of \"Herald,\"_ ii. 66.]\n\n[Footnote 79: Murdoch, 'Ethnological Results of the Point Barrow\nExpedition,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ ix. 413.]\n\n[Footnote 80: Nansen, _First Crossing of Greenland_, ii. 312.]\n\n[Footnote 81: Nordenski\u00f6ld, _Den andra Dicksonska expeditionen till\nGr\u00f6nland_, p. 509.]\n\nAmong the nomadic Tangutans the women's rights in the household\nseemed to Prejevalsky to be equal to those of the men.[82] Of the\nTodas of India it is said that their women \"hold a position in the\nfamily quite unlike what is ordinarily witnessed among Oriental\nnations. They are treated with respect, and are permitted a remarkable\namount of freedom.\"[83] Among the Kandhs women \"are uniformly treated\nwith respect; the mothers of families generally with much honour.\nNothing is done either in public or in private affairs without\nconsulting them, and they generally exert upon the councils of their\ntribes a powerful influence.\" A wife may quit her husband at any time,\nexcept within a year of her marriage, or when she expects offspring,\nor within a year after the birth of a child, though, when she quits\nhim, he has a right to reclaim immediately from her father the whole\nsum paid for her.[84] Among the peasants of the North-Western\nProvinces of India the wife is an influential personage in the\nhousehold, not a mere drudge. Little is done without her knowledge and\nadvice. If she is badly wronged the tribal council will protect her,\nand on the whole her position is, perhaps, not worse than that of her\nsisters in a similar grade of life in other parts of the world.[85]\nAmong the K\u00e1ttis the men are much under the authority of their\nwives.[86] Among the Bheels women \"have much influence in the\nsociety,\" and married men have always had the credit of allowing their\nwives to domineer over them.[87] \"A Kol or Ho,\" says Dr. Hayes, \"makes\na regular companion {642} of his wife. She is consulted in all\ndifficulties, and receives the fullest consideration due to her\nsex\";[88] and Colonel Dalton adds, \"As a rule, in no country in the\nworld are wives better treated.\"[89] The Garos are \"kind husbands, and\ntheir conduct generally towards the weaker sex is marked by\nconsideration and respect.\"[90] The B\u00f3do and Dhim\u00e1ls \"use their wives\nand daughters well, treating them with confidence and kindness.\"[91]\nThe Santal \"treats the female members of his family with respect.\"[92]\nAmong the Kukis women are generally held in consideration; \"their\nadvice is taken, and they have much influence.\"[93] Mr. Colquhoun\nobserves that among the Indo-Chinese races equality of the sexes\nprevails, and prevailed long before Buddhism took any hold upon the\ncountry.[94]\n\n[Footnote 82: Prejevalsky, _Mongolia_, ii. 121.]\n\n[Footnote 83: Marshall, _A Phrenologist amongst the Todas_, p. 43.]\n\n[Footnote 84: Macpherson, _Memorials of Service in India_, pp. 69,\n132 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 85: Crooke, _North-Western Provinces of India_, p. 230 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 86: Rowney, _Wild Tribes of India_, p. 47.]\n\n[Footnote 87: Malcolm, _Memoir of Central India_, ii. 180. Rowney,\n_op. cit._ p. 38.]\n\n[Footnote 88: Hayes, quoted by Dalton, _Descriptive Ethnology of\nBengal_, p. 194. _Cf._ Bradley-Birt, _Chota-Nagpore_, p. 100 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 89: Dalton, _op. cit._ p. 194.]\n\n[Footnote 90: _Ibid._ p. 68.]\n\n[Footnote 91: Hodgson, _Miscellaneous Essays_, i. 150.]\n\n[Footnote 92: Hunter, _Annals of Rural Bengal_, i. 217. _Cf._ _Ymer_,\nv. p. xxiv.]\n\n[Footnote 93: Lewin, _Wild Races of South-Eastern India_, p. 254.]\n\n[Footnote 94: Colquhoun, _Amongst the Shans_, p. 234. _Cf._ Fytche,\n_Burma_, ii. 72.]\n\nAmong the Nicobarese \"the position of women is, and always has\nbeen, in no way inferior to that of the other sex. They take their\nfull share in the formation of public opinion, discuss publicly with\nthe men matters of general interest to the village, and their opinions\nreceive due attention before a decision is arrived at. In fact, they\nare consulted on every matter, and the henpecked husband is of no\nextraordinary rarity in the Nicobars.\"[95] Mr. Crawfurd thinks that in\nthe Malay Archipelago \"the lot of women may, on the whole, be\nconsidered as more fortunate than in any other country of the East\";\nthey associate with the men \"in all respects on terms of such equality\nas surprise us in such a condition of society.\"[96] In Bali they are\non a perfect equality with the men.[97] The Dyak shows great respect\nfor his wife, and always asks her opinion;[98] he regards her \"not as\na slave, but as a companion.\"[99] Among the Bataks the married women\noften have a great influence over their families.[100] In Serang they\nhave in all matters equal rights with the men, and are, consequently,\ntreated well.[101] The women of Sulu \"have the reputation of ruling\ntheir {643} lords, and possess much weight in the government by the\ninfluence they exert over their husbands.\"[102]\n\n[Footnote 95: Kloss, _In the Andamans and Nicobars_, p. 242.]\n\n[Footnote 96: Crawfurd, _History of the Indian Archipelago_, i. 73.]\n\n[Footnote 97: Raffles, _History of Java_, ii. p. ccxxxi.]\n\n[Footnote 98: Bock, _Head-Hunters of Borneo_, p. 210 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 99: Selenka, _Sonnige Welten_, p. 33. _Cf._ Wilkes, _op.\ncit._ v. 363.]\n\n[Footnote 100: Steinmetz, _Ethnol. Studien zur ersten Entwicklung der\nStrafe_, ii. 299.]\n\n[Footnote 101: Riedel, _De sluik- en kroesharige rassen tusschen\nSelebes en Papua_, p. 97.]\n\n[Footnote 102: Wilkes, _op. cit._ v. 343.]\n\nIn Melanesia the women generally have to work hard, supplying the\nplace of slaves;[103] but at least in various islands their condition\nis otherwise fairly good. In the Western islands of Torres Straits\n\"the women appear to have had a good deal to say on most questions and\nwere by no means downtrodden or ill-used.\"[104] In some parts of New\nGuinea their position is described as one of high esteem.[105] \"They\nhave a large voice in domestic affairs, and occasionally lord it over\ntheir masters\"; and their influence is felt not only in domestic\nmatters, but also in affairs of state.[106] In Erromanga, of the New\nHebrides, although the women did all of the hard plantation work, they\nwere on the whole well treated by their husbands.[107] The same is\nsaid to be the case in the Solomon Islands;[108] in the eastern part\nof New Georgia they do not even seem to do much work.[109] In\nMicronesia the position of woman is decidedly good. In the Marianne\nGroup \"the wife is absolute mistress in her house, the husband not\ndaring to dispose of anything without her consent\"; nay, the men are\nsaid to be actually governed by their wives, \"the women assuming those\nprerogatives which in most other countries are invested in the other\nsex.\"[110] In the Pelew Islands the women are in every respect the\nequals of the men; the oldest man, or Obokul, of a family can do\nnothing without taking advice with its oldest female members.[111] In\nthe Caroline Group the weaker sex \"enjoys a perfect equality in public\nestimation with the other.\"[112] Among the Mortlock Islanders the wife\nis quite independent of her husband.[113] In the Kingsmill Islands\nvery great consideration is awarded to the women: \"they seem to have\nexclusive control over the house,\" whilst all the hard labour is\nperformed by the {644} men.[114] Among the Line Islanders \"no\ndifference is made in the sexes; a woman can vote and speak as well as\na man, and in general the women decide the question, unless it is one\nof war against another island.\"[115] In many Polynesian islands, also,\ntheir position is by no means bad.[116] In Tonga \"women have\nconsiderable respect shown to them on account of their sex,\nindependent of the rank they might otherwise hold as nobles\"; they are\nnot subjected to hard labour or any very menial work,[117] and their\n_status_ in society is not inferior to that of men.[118] In Samoa they\n\"are held in much consideration, . . . treated with great attention,\nand not suffered to do anything but what rightfully belongs to\nthem.\"[119] In the valley of Typee, in the Marquesas Group, the women\nare allowed every possible indulgence, the religious restrictions of\nthe taboo alone excepted; they are exempt from toil, and \"nowhere are\nthey more sensible of their power.\"[120] Rochon wrote of the\nMalagasy:--\"Man here never commands as a despot; nor does the woman\never obey as a slave. The balance of power inclines even in favour of\nthe women.\"[121] At the present day, in Madagascar, the woman \"is not\nscorned as essentially inferior to man,\" but enters into her husband's\ncares and joys, and shares his life, much in the same way as a wife\ndoes amongst ourselves.[122]\n\n[Footnote 103: Nieboer, _op. cit._ p. 392 _sqq._ Waitz-Gerland, _op.\ncit._ vi. 626.]\n\n[Footnote 104: Haddon, in _Reports of the Cambridge Anthropological\nExpedition to Torres Straits_, v. 229.]\n\n[Footnote 105: Ratzel, _op. cit._ i. 274.]\n\n[Footnote 106: Pitcairn, _Two Years among the Savages of New Guinea_,\np. 6l. _Cf._ Bink, in _Bulletin Soc. d'Anthrop. de Paris_, xi. 392;\nHagen, _Unter den Papua's_, pp. 226, 243.]\n\n[Footnote 107: Robertson, _Erromanga_, p. 397.]\n\n[Footnote 108: Parkinson, _Zur Ethnographie der nordwestlichen Salomo\nInseln_, p. 4.]\n\n[Footnote 109: Somerville, 'Ethnogr. Notes in New Georgia,' in _Jour.\nAnthr. Inst._ xxvi. 405 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 110: Moore, _Marriage Customs_, p. 187. Waitz, _op. cit._ v.\npt. i. p. 107 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 111: Kubary, _Die socialen Einrichtungen der Pelauer_, p. 38\n_sq._ _Cf._ _Idem_, 'Die Palau-Inseln,' in _Journal des Museum\nGodeffroy_, iv. 43; Keate, _Account of the Pelew Islands_, p. 331.]\n\n[Footnote 112: Hale, _op. cit._ p. 73.]\n\n[Footnote 113: Kubary, 'Die Bewohner der Mortlock Inseln,' in\n_Mittheilungen der Geograph. Gesellsch. in Hamburg_, 1878-9, p. 261.]\n\n[Footnote 114: Wilkes, _op. cit._ v. 91.]\n\n[Footnote 115: Tutuila, in _Jour. Polynesian Soc._ i. 269.]\n\n[Footnote 116: See Waitz-Gerland, _op. cit._ vi. 120 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 117: Mariner, _Natives of the Tonga Islands_, ii. 97.]\n\n[Footnote 118: Erskine, _Cruise among the Islands of the Western\nPacific_, p. 158.]\n\n[Footnote 119: Wilkes, _op. cit._ ii. 148. _Cf._ Waitz-Gerland, _op.\ncit._ vi. 121.]\n\n[Footnote 120: Melville, _Typee_, p. 299.]\n\n[Footnote 121: Rochon, 'Voyage to Madagascar,' in Pinkerton,\n_Collection of Voyages and Travels_, xvi 747. _Cf._ Waitz, _op. cit._\nii. 438.]\n\n[Footnote 122: Little, _Madagascar_, p. 63.]\n\nTurning, finally, to the African continent, we find that among the\nNegro races the woman, though often heavily burdened and more or less\nsubservient to her husband, is by no means without influence.[123]\n\"When we become more closely acquainted with family conditions,\" Herr\nB\u00fcttner observes, \"we notice that there, as elsewhere, husbands are\nunder petticoat government, and those most of all who like to pose\nbefore the outer world as masters of their house. The women, including\nthe aunts, have on all occasions, important and unimportant alike, a\nweighty {645} word to contribute.\"[124] The Monbuttu women, according\nto Dr. Schweinfurth, exhibit towards their husbands the highest degree\nof independence; \"the position in the household occupied by the men\nwas illustrated by the reply which would be made if they were\nsolicited to sell anything as a curiosity, 'Oh, ask my wife: it is\nhers.'\"[125] Among the Momvus \"the women are on a footing of equality\nwith the men, and go hunting with them, and accompany them to the\nwars, taking their part in the combat.\"[126] Among the Madi or Moru\ntribe of Central Africa \"women are treated with respect and politeness\nby the men, who always show them preference, resigning to their use\nthe best places, and paying them such like courtesies.\" The women\nassociate with the men on equal terms, being consulted and honoured;\nand any insult to a woman is revenged, nay is frequently the cause of\nwar.[127] In a Hottentot's house the woman is the supreme ruler, and\nthe husband has nothing at all to say. \"While in public the men take\nthe prominent part, at home they have not so much power even as to\ntake a mouthful of sour milk out of the tub, without the wife's\npermission. If a man ever should try to do it, his nearest female\nrelations will put a fine on him, consisting in cows and sheep, which\nis to be added to the stock of the wife.\"[128] Among the peoples of\nBerber race the women exercise considerable influence over the men.\nAmong the Guanches of the Canary Islands they were much\nrespected.[129] Among the Touareg \"la femme est l'\u00e9gale de l'homme, si\nm\u00eame, par certains c\u00f4t\u00e9s, elle n'est dans une condition\nmeilleure.\"[130] Among the Beni Amer a husband undertakes nothing\nbefore consulting his wife, on whose goodwill he largely depends.[131]\nOf the Aul\u00e2d Sol\u00eem\u00e2n, an Arab tribe in the Sahara, Dr. Nachtigal\nobserves that it was curious to see how powerless those much feared\nrobbers and cut-throats were in their own houses.[132] Both in the\nSahara[133] and in the East[134] the Bedouin women {646} enjoy a\nconsiderable degree of freedom, and sometimes actually rule over their\nhusbands.\n\n[Footnote 123: Waitz, _op. cit._ ii. 117. Ratzel, _op. cit._ ii. 332.\nBuchner, _Kamerun_, p. 32 _sq._ M\u00f6ller, Pagels, and Gleerup, _op.\ncit._ i. 171 (Lukungu). Steinmetz, _Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_, p. 29 (Banaka\nand Bapuku). Lang, _ibid._ p. 225 (Washambala). Burrows, _Land of the\nPigmies_, p. 62 (Niam-Niam). Chanler, _Through Jungle and Desert_, p.\n485 (Wakamba).]\n\n[Footnote 124: B\u00fcttner, quoted by Ratzel, _op. cit._ ii. 334.]\n\n[Footnote 125: Schweinfurth, _Heart of Africa_, ii. 91.]\n\n[Footnote 126: Burrows, _op. cit._ p. 128.]\n\n[Footnote 127: Felkin, 'Notes on the Madi or Moru Tribe,' in _Proceed.\nRoy. Soc. Edinburgh_, xii. 329.]\n\n[Footnote 128: Hahn, _The Supreme Being of the Khoi-Khoi_, p. 19.]\n\n[Footnote 129: Bory de St. Vincent, _Essais sur les Isles Fortun\u00e9es_,\np. 105. Mantegazza, _Rio de la Plata e Tenerife_ p. 630.]\n\n[Footnote 130: Dyveyrier, _Exploration du Sahara_, p. 339. _Cf._\nChavanne, _Die Sahara_, p. 181; Hourst, _Sur le Niger et au pays des\nTouaregs_, p. 209.]\n\n[Footnote 131: Munzinger, _Ostafrikanische Studien_, p. 325.]\n\n[Footnote 132: Nachtigal, _Sahara und Sudan_, ii. 93.]\n\n[Footnote 133: Chavanne, _op. cit._ p. 397.]\n\n[Footnote 134: Wallin, _Reseanteckningar fr\u00e5n Orienten_, iii. 151,\n152, 269. Blunt, _Bedouin Tribes of the Euphrates_, ii. 214, 226, 228.]\n\nAll these statements certainly do not imply that the husband has no\nrecognised power over his wife, but they prove that his power is by no\nmeans unlimited. It is true that many of our authorities speak rather\nof liberties that the woman takes herself than of privileges granted\nher by custom; but, as we have seen before, customary rights are\nalways more or less influenced by habitual practice. It should be\nadded that among many savage peoples the husband has a right to\ndivorce his wife only under certain conditions;[135] and among a very\nconsiderable number custom or law permits the wife to separate either\nfor some special cause or, simply, at will.[136] In certain parts of\nEastern Central Africa divorce may be effected if the husband neglects\nto sew his wife's clothes, or if the partners do not please each\nother.[137] Among the Shans of Burma the woman has a right to turn\nadrift a husband who takes to drinking or otherwise misconducts\nhimself, and to retain all the goods and money of the partnership.[138]\nAmong the Irulas of the Neilgherries the option of remaining in union,\nor of separating, rests principally with the woman.[139] Among the\nSavaras, an aboriginal hill people of the Madras Presidency, \"a woman\nmay leave her husband _whenever she pleases_.\"[140] This is surely\nsomething very different from that absolute dominion which hasty\ngeneralisers have attributed to savage husbands in general.\n\n[Footnote 135: Westermarck. _op. cit._ p. 523 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 136: _Ibid._ p. 526 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 137: Macdonald, _Africana_, i. 140.]\n\n[Footnote 138: Colquhoun, _Amongst the Shans_, p. 295.]\n\n[Footnote 139: Harkness, _Description of a Singular Aboriginal Race\ninhabiting the Neilgherry Hills_, p. 92.]\n\n[Footnote 140: Fawcett, in _Jour. Anthrop. Soc. Bombay_, i. 28.]\n\nIt is often said that a people's civilisation may be measured by the\nposition held by its women. But at least so far as the earlier stages\nof culture are concerned, this opinion is not supported by facts.\nAmong several of the lowest races, including peoples like the Veddahs,\nAndaman Islanders, and Bushmans, the female sex is {647} treated with\nfar greater consideration than among many of the higher savages and\nbarbarians. Travellers have not seldom noticed that of two\nneighbouring tribes the less cultured one sets in this respect an\nexample to the other. \"Among the Bushmans,\" says Dr. Fritsch, \"the\nfemale sex makes life-companions, among the A-bantu beasts of\nburden.\"[141] Lewis and Clarke affirm that the _status_ of woman in a\nsavage tribe has no necessary relation even to its moral qualities in\ngeneral. \"The Indians,\" they say, \"whose treatment of the females is\nmildest, and who pay most deference to their opinions, are by no means\nthe most distinguished for their virtues. . . . On the other hand, the\ntribes among whom the women are very much debased, possess the\nloftiest sense of honour, the greatest liberality, and all the good\nqualities of which their situation demands the exercise.\"[142] That\nthe condition of woman, or her relative independence, is no safe gauge\nof the general culture of a nation, also appears from a comparison\nbetween many of the lower races and the peoples of archaic civilisation.\n\n[Footnote 141: Fritsch, _Die Eingeborenen S\u00fcd-Afrika's_, p. 444.]\n\n[Footnote 142: Lewis and Clarke, _op. cit._ p. 441.]\n\nIn China the condition of woman has always been inferior to that of\nman, and no generous sentiment tending to the amelioration of her\nsocial position has ever come from the Chinese sages.[143] Her\nchildren must pay her respect, but she in her turn owes to her husband\nthe subjection of a child;[144] a wife is an infinitely less important\npersonage than a mother in the Chinese social scale.[145] The husband\nhas certainly not absolute power over his wife: he may not kill her,\nnor sell her without her consent,[146] nor even divorce her, except\nfor certain causes specified by law.[147] But these causes are very\nelastic; {648} it is said that \"when a woman has any quality that is\nnot good, it is but just and reasonable to turn her out of\ndoors.\"[148] And in a book containing the cream of all the moral\nwritings of the Chinese, and intended chiefly for children, we\nread:--\"Brothers are like hands and feet. A wife is like one's\nclothes. When clothes are worn out, we can substitute those that are\nnew. When hands and feet are cut off, it is difficult to obtain\nsubstitutes for them.\"[149] A woman, on the other hand, cannot obtain\nlegal separation on any account.[150] Confucius says that \"man is the\nrepresentative of Heaven, and is supreme over all things. Woman yields\nobedience to the instructions of man, and helps to carry out his\nprinciples. On this account she can determine nothing of herself, and\nis subject to the rule of the three obediences. When young, she must\nobey her father and elder brother; when married, she must obey her\nhusband; when her husband is dead, she must obey her son.\"[151] In\nJapan, also, a woman was formerly, in the eye of the law, a chattel\nrather than a person. \"Having all her life under her father's roof\nreverenced her superiors, she is expected to bring reverence to her\nnew domicile, but not love. She must always obey but never be jealous.\nShe must not be angry, no matter whom her husband may introduce into\nhis household. She must wait upon him at his meals and must walk\nbehind him, but not with him. When she dies her children go to her\nfuneral, but not her husband.\"[152] In Japan a man might repudiate his\nwife for the same reasons as in China,[153] and till the year 1873 a\nwife could not obtain separation according to law.[154] However,\nthough the Japanese wife is \"the first servant of the household,\"\ntraining and public opinion require that she should be treated with\nrespect, if the marriage be blessed {649} with children.[155] She is\naddressed as \"the honourable lady of the house,\" and her position is\nsaid to be higher than in any other Oriental country.[156]\n\n[Footnote 143: Legge, _Religions of China_, pp. 107, 108, 111.]\n\n[Footnote 144: de Groot, _Religious System of China_, (vol. ii. Book)\ni. 550.]\n\n[Footnote 145: Giles, _Strange Stories from a Chinese Studio_,\ni. 315, n. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 146: Doolittle, _Social Life of the Chinese_, ii. 209.]\n\n[Footnote 147: Medhurst, 'Marriage, Affinity, and Inheritance in\nChina,' in _Trans. Roy. As. Soc. China Branch_, iv. 25 _sq._ Gray,\n_China_, i. 219. M\u00fcller, _Reise der Fregatte Novara_, Ethnographie,\np. 164.]\n\n[Footnote 148: Navarette, 'Account of the Empire of China,' in Awnsham\nand Churchill, _Collection of Voyages and Travels_, i. 73.]\n\n[Footnote 149: _Indo-Chinese Gleaner_, i. 164.]\n\n[Footnote 150: Gray, _op. cit._ i. 219.]\n\n[Footnote 151: Legge, _Chinese Classics_, i. 103 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 152: Griffis, _Religions of Japan_, p. 124 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 153: Westermarck, _op. cit._ p. 525.]\n\n[Footnote 154: Rein, _Japan_, p. 424 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 155: _Ibid._ p. 425.]\n\n[Footnote 156: Norman, _The Real Japan_, p. 184. Griffis, _Religions\nof Japan_, p. 318.]\n\nFrom various quarters of the ancient world we hear of the rule that\nthe husband shall command and the wife obey. The Lord said to the\nwoman, \"Thy desire shall be to thy husband, and he shall rule over\nthee.\"[157] How great the husband's power was among the Hebrews we do\nnot know exactly. He could divorce his wife if she did not please him\nbecause he had \"found some uncleanness in her,\"[158] whereas a wife\ncould not legally separate from her husband.[159] In later times her\ncondition evidently improved.[160] From the old Jewish point of view\nit is surely surprising to find Sirach putting the companionship of a\nwife not only above that of a friend, but even above children.[161] In\nthe Talmud a husband is admonished to love his wife like himself and\nto honour her more than himself,[162] though he should take care not\nto be ruled by her;[163] and the wife also is authorised to demand a\ndivorce under certain circumstances, namely, if the husband refuses to\nperform his conjugal duty, if he continues to lead a disorderly life\nafter marriage, if he proves impotent during ten years, if he suffers\nfrom an insupportable disease, or if he leaves the country for ever.[164]\n\n[Footnote 157: **_Genesis_, iii. 16.]\n\n[Footnote 158: _Deuteronomy_, xxiv. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 159: Josephus, _Antiquitates Roman\u00e6_, xv. 7, 10. Keil,\n_Manual of Biblical Arch\u00e6ology_, ii. 175.]\n\n[Footnote 160: _Cf._ Klugmann, _Die Frau im Talmud_, p. 63 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 161: _Ecclesiasticus_, xl. 19, 23. _Cf._ Montefiore,\n_Hibbert Lectures on the Religion of the Ancient Hebrews_, p. 491.]\n\n[Footnote 162: Deutsch, _Literary Remains_, p. 56.]\n\n[Footnote 163: _Beza_, fol. 32 B, quoted by Katz, _Der wahre\nTalmudjude_, p. 114.]\n\n[Footnote 164: Glasson, _Le mariage civil et le divorce_, p. 149 _sq._]\n\nIn the Zoroastrian Yasts a holy woman is defined as one who is \"rich\nin good thoughts, good words, and good deeds, well-principled, and\nobedient to her husband,\" whereas the fiendish woman is\n\"ill-principled and disobedient to her husband.\"[165] According to\nBrahmanic law, a woman must in childhood be subject to her father, in\nyouth {650} to her husband, when her lord is dead to her sons; \"a\nwoman must never be independent.\"[166] Not even in her own house is\nshe allowed to do anything independently.[167] Him to whom her father\nmay give her, or her brother with the father's permission, she shall\nobey as long as he lives.[168] She must never do anything that might\ndisplease him;[169] even though he be destitute of virtue, or\nunfaithful to her, \"a husband must be constantly worshipped as a god\nby a faithful wife.\"[170] A wife who shows disrespect to a husband who\nis addicted to some evil passion, is a drunkard, or diseased, shall be\ndeserted for three months, and be deprived of her ornaments and\nfurniture.[171] If a wife obeys her husband, she will for that reason\nalone be exalted in heaven;[172] but by violating her duty towards\nhim, she is disgraced in this world, and after death she enters the\nwomb of a jackal, and is punished with disease for her sin.[173] There\nis no indication that a woman can obtain legal separation on any\naccount, though she may with impunity \"show aversion\" towards a mad or\noutcast husband, a eunuch, one destitute of manly strength, or one\nafflicted with such diseases as punish crimes.[174] Again, if she is\nsold or repudiated by her husband, she can never become the legitimate\nwife of another who may have bought or received her after she was\nrepudiated.[175] But the husband is not allowed to divorce her\nindiscriminately. A wife who drinks spirituous liquor, is of bad\nconduct, rebellious, quarrelsome, diseased, mischievous, or wasteful,\nmay at any time be superseded by another wife; a barren one may be\nsuperseded in the eighth year; one whose children all die, in the\ntenth; one who bears daughters only, in the eleventh; whereas a sick\nwife who is kind to her husband and virtuous in her conduct, may be\nsuperseded only with her own consent, and must never be {651}\ndisgraced.[176] The rule, \"Let mutual fidelity continue until death,\"\nmay be considered the summary of the highest law for husband and\nwife;[177] women must be honoured and adorned by husbands who desire\ntheir own welfare.[178] Various passages in the Mahabharata and\nRamayana indicate that women in India were subjected to less social\nrestraints in former days than they are at present according to the\nrules of Brahmanism, and even enjoyed considerable liberty;[179] and\nthe Vedic singers know no more tender relation than that between the\nhusband and his willing, loving wife, who is praised as \"his home, the\ndarling abode and bliss in his house.\"[180] Yet it is noteworthy that\ngoddesses play a very insignificant part in the Veda.[181] In this\nrespect the Pantheon of the Vedic people essentially differs from that\nof the ancient Egyptians,[182] a difference which may be due to the\nremarkably high position which woman seems to have occupied in Egypt.[183]\n\n[Footnote 165: _Yasts_, xxii. 18, 36. _Cf._ _D\u00een\u00e2-\u00ee Ma\u00een\u00f4g-\u00ee Khirad_,\nxxxix. 38 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 166: _Laws of Manu_, v. 148. _Cf._ _ibid._ ix. 2 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 167: _Ibid._ v. 147.]\n\n[Footnote 168: _Ibid._ v. 151.]\n\n[Footnote 169: _Ibid._ v. 156.]\n\n[Footnote 170: _Ibid._ v. 154.]\n\n[Footnote 171: _Ibid._ ix. 78.]\n\n[Footnote 172: _Ibid._ v. 155. _Cf._ _ibid._ ix. 29.]\n\n[Footnote 173: _Ibid._ v. 164; ix. 30.]\n\n[Footnote 174: _Ibid._ ix. 79.]\n\n[Footnote 175: _Ibid._ ix. 46. See also the note in B\u00fchler's\ntranslation, _Sacred Books of the East_, xxv. 335.]\n\n[Footnote 176: _Laws of Manu_, ix. 80 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 177: _Ibid._ ix. 101.]\n\n[Footnote 178: _Ibid._ iii. 55 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 179: Zimmer, _Altindisches Leben_, p. 316 _sqq._ Monier\nWilliams, _Indian Wisdom_, p. 437 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 180: Kaegi, _Rigveda_, p. 15.]\n\n[Footnote 181: Macdonell, _Vedic Mythology_, p. 124 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 182: Maspero, _Dawn of Civilisation_, p. 101 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 183: _Ibid._ p. 52. Maspero, _Life in Ancient Egypt and\nAssyria_, p. 11. Am\u00e9lineau _L'\u00e9volution des id\u00e9es morales dans\nl'\u00c9gypte Ancienne_, p. 68 _sqq._ Flinders Petrie, _Religion and\nConscience in Ancient Egypt_, p. 131 _sq._ Brugsch, _Aegyptologie_,\np. 61 _sq._]\n\nIn Greece, also, a wife appears to have been a more influential and\nindependent personage in ancient times, in Homeric society, than she\nbecame afterwards.[184] In the historic age her position was simply\nthat of the domestic drudge; her virtues were reduced to the\nmaintenance of good order in her household and obedience to her\nhusband; her greatest ornament was silence.[185] Aristotle, always a\nfaithful exponent of the most enlightened opinion of his age, gives\nthe following description of what he considers to be the ideal\nrelation of a woman to her husband:--\"A good and perfect wife ought to\nbe mistress {652} of everything within the house. . . . But the\nwell-ordered wife will justly consider the behaviour of her husband as\na model of her own life, and a law to herself, invested with a divine\nsanction by means of the marriage tie and the community of life. . . .\nThe wife ought to show herself even more obedient to the rein than if\nshe had entered the house as a purchased slave. For she has been\nbought at a high price, for the sake of sharing life and bearing\nchildren, than which no higher or holier tie can possibly exist.\"[186]\nSo also, according to Plutarch, the husband ought to rule his wife,\nbut by sympathy and goodwill, as the soul governs the body, not as a\nmaster does a chattel.[187] The law invalidated whatever a husband did\nby the counsel, or at the request, of his wife, whereas the wife, on\nher part, could transact no business of importance in her own favour,\nnor by will dispose of more than the value of a bushel of barley.[188]\nYet whatever may have been the exact compass of the husband's power in\nGreece, it was not unlimited. At Athens a woman could demand divorce\nif she was ill-treated by her husband, in which case she merely had to\nannounce her wishes before the archon.[189]\n\n[Footnote 184: Hermann-Bl\u00fcmner, _Lehrbuch der griechischen\nPrivatalterth\u00fcmer_, p. 64 _sqq._ Mahaffy, _Social Life in Greece_, p. 53.]\n\n[Footnote 185: Dickinson, _Greek View of Life_, p. 161. D\u00f6llinger,\n_The Gentile and the Jew_, ii. 234. 'State of Female Society in\nGreece,' in _Quarterly Review_, xxii. 172 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 186: Aristotle, _[OE]conomica_, i. 7. _Cf._ _Idem_, _De\nanimalibus historia_, ix. 1. 2 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 187: Plutarch, _Conjugalia pr\u00e6cepta_, 33.]\n\n[Footnote 188: Isaeus, _Oratio de Aristarchi hereditate_, 10, p. 259.\nD\u00f6llinger, _op. cit._ ii. 234.]\n\n[Footnote 189: Glasson, _Le mariage civil et le divorce_, p. 152 _sq._\nMeier and Sch\u00f6mann, _Der attische Process_, p. 512.]\n\nIn Rome, in ancient times, the power which the father possessed over\nhis daughter was generally, if not always,[190] by marriage\ntransferred to the husband.[191] When marrying a woman passed in\n_manum viri_, as a wife she was _fili\u00e6 loco_, that is, in law she was\nher husband's daughter.[192] And since the Roman house-father\noriginally had the _jus vit\u00e6 necisque_ over his children, the husband\nnaturally had the same power over his wife. But from her being\ndestitute of all legal rights we must not conclude that she was {653}\ntreated with indignity. On the contrary, she generally had a respected\nand influential position in the family;[193] and though the husband\ncould repudiate her at will, it was said that for five hundred and\ntwenty years _a condita urbe_ there was no such thing as a divorce in\nRome.[194] As Mr. Bryce points out, we cannot doubt that the wide\npower which the law gave to the husband \"was in point of fact\nrestrained within narrow limits, not only by affection, but also by\nthe vigilant public opinion of a comparatively small community.\"[195]\nGradually, however, marriage with _manus_ fell into disuse, and was,\nunder the Empire, generally superseded by marriage without _manus_, a\nform of wedlock which conferred on the husband hardly any authority at\nall over his wife. Instead of passing into his power, she remained in\nthe power of her father; and since the tendency of the later law, as\nwe have seen, was to reduce the old _patria potestas_ to a nullity,\nshe became practically independent.[196]\n\n[Footnote 190: Rossbach, _R\u00f6mische Ehe_, p. 64. Maine, _Ancient Law_,\np. 155.]\n\n[Footnote 191: Or, properly speaking, to the husband's father, if he\nwas still alive (Rossbach, _op. cit._ p. 11).]\n\n[Footnote 192: Leist, _Alt-arische Juris Civile_, i. 175. Maine, _op.\ncit._ p. 155.]\n\n[Footnote 193: Rossbach, _op. cit._ pp. 36, 117.]\n\n[Footnote 194: Valerius Maximus, ii. 1 (_De matrimoniorum ritu_),\nAulus Gellius, _Noctes Attic\u00e6_, iv. 3. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 195: Bryce, _Studies in History and Jurisprudence_, ii. 389.]\n\n[Footnote 196: Rossbach, _op. cit._ pp. 30, 42. Maine, _op. cit._ p.\n155 _sq._ Friedlaender, _Darstellungen aus der Sittengeschichte Roms_,\ni. 252 _sqq._]\n\nThis remarkable liberty granted to married women, however, was only a\npassing incident in the history of the family in Europe. From the very\nfirst Christianity tended to narrow it. Already the latest Roman law,\nso far as it is touched by the Constitutions of the Christian\nEmperors, bears some marks of a reaction against the liberal doctrines\nof the great Antonine jurisconsults, who assumed the equality of the\nsexes as a principle of their code of equity.[197] And this tendency\nwas in a formidable degree supported by Teutonic custom and law. Among\nthe Teutons a husband's authority over his wife was the same as a\nfather's over his unmarried daughter.[198] This power, which under\ncertain circumstances gave the husband a right to kill, sell, or\nrepudiate his wife,[199] undoubtedly {654} contained much more than\nthe Church could approve of, and so far she has helped to ameliorate\nthe condition of married women in Teutonic countries. But at the same\ntime the Church is largely responsible for those heavy disabilities\nwith regard to personal liberty, as well as with regard to property,\nfrom which they have suffered up to recent times. The systems, says\nSir Henry Maine, \"which are least indulgent to married women are\ninvariably those which have followed the Canon Law exclusively, or\nthose which, from the lateness of their contact with European\ncivilisation, have never had their archaisms weeded out.\"[200]\n\n[Footnote 197: Maine, _op. cit._ pp. 156, 154.]\n\n[Footnote 198: Brunner, _Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte_, i. 75. Stemann,\n_Den danske Retshistorie indtil Christian V.'s Lov_, p. 323.]\n\n[Footnote 199: Grimm, _Deutsche Rechtsalterth\u00fcmer_, p. 450 _sq._\nBrunner, _op. cit._ i. 75. Schr\u00f6der, _Lehrbuch der deutschen\nRechtsgeschichte_, p. 303.]\n\n[Footnote 200: Maine, _op. cit._ p. 159.]\n\nChristianity enjoins a husband to love his wife as his own body,[201]\nto do honour unto her as unto the weaker vessel.[202] However, \"man is\nnot of the woman; but the woman of the man. Neither was the man\ncreated for the woman; but the woman for the man. For this cause ought\nthe woman to have power on her head.\"[203] The husband is the head of\nthe wife, as Christ is the head of the church; hence, \"as the church\nis subject unto Christ, so let the wives be to their own husbands in\nevery thing.\"[204] It is difficult to exaggerate the influence\nexercised by a doctrine, so agreeable to the selfishness of men, and\nso readily lending itself to be used as a sacred weapon against almost\nany attempt to extend the rights of married women, as was this dictum\nof St. Paul's. In an essay on the position of women among the early\nChristians Principal Donaldson writes, \"In the first three centuries I\nhave not been able to see that Christianity had any favourable effect\non the position of women, but, on the contrary, that it tended to\nlower their character and contract the range of their activity.\"[205]\nAnd in more modern times Christian orthodoxy has constantly been\nopposed to the doctrine which once sprang up in pagan {655} Rome and\nis nowadays supported by a steadily growing number of enlightened men\nand women, that marriage should be a contract on the footing of\nperfect equality between husband and wife.\n\n[Footnote 201: _Ephesians_, v. 28.]\n\n[Footnote 202: _1 Peter_, iii. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 203: _1 Corinthians_, xi. 8 _sqq._ _Cf._ _Timothy_,\nii. 11 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 204: _Ephesians_, v. 23 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 205: Donaldson, 'Position of Women among the Early\nChristians,' in _Contemporary Review_, lvi. 433.]\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe position of married women among the various peoples on earth\ndepends on such a variety of circumstances that it would be impossible\nto enumerate them all. We shall here consider only the most\nimportant.\n\nA few words must first be said about the hypothesis that the social\n_status_ of women is connected with the system of tracing descent. Dr.\nSteinmetz has tried to show that the husband's authority over his wife\nis, broadly speaking, greater among those peoples who reckon kinship\nthrough the father than among those who reckon kinship through the\nmother only.[206] The cases examined by Dr. Steinmetz, however, are\ntoo few to allow of any general conclusions, and the statements\nconcerning the husband's rights are commonly so indefinite and so\nincomplete that I think the evidence would be difficult to produce,\neven if the investigation were based on a larger number of facts.\nBesides, the paternal and maternal systems of descent are often so\ninterwoven with each other among one and the same people, that it may\nequally well be referred to the one class as to the other[207]--a\ndifficulty which Dr. Steinmetz must surely have felt in his attempt to\ntreat the subject statistically. There is, moreover, the weak point of\nthe statistical method generally, the question of selecting\nethnographical units, which I have discussed in another place.[208]\nHow, for instance, are we to deal with the various tribes of\nAustralia? They can certainly not, all in a lump, be counted as one\nsingle unit; among some of them the maternal system prevails, among\nothers the paternal. But then, shall we reckon each tribe as one {656}\nunit by itself, or, if not, into how many groups shall we divide them?\nWhen I compare with each other peoples of the same race, at the same\nstage of culture, living in the same neighbourhood, under similar\nconditions of life, but differing from one another in their method of\nreckoning kinship, I do not find that the prevalence of the one or the\nother line of descent conspicuously affects the husband's authority.\nNothing of the kind has been noticed in Australia, nor, so far as I\nknow, in India, where the paternal system among many of the aboriginal\ntribes is combined with great, or even extraordinary, rights on the\npart of the wife. Among the West African Negroes the position of women\nis, to all appearance, no less honourable in tribes like the Ibos,\namong whom inheritance runs through males, than in tribes which admit\ninheritance through females only;[209] and of the Fulah, among whom\nsuccession goes from father to son,[210] Mr. Winwood Reade observes\nthat their women are \"the most tyrannical wives in Africa,\" knowing\n\"how to make their husbands kneel before their charms, and how to\nplace their little feet upon them.\"[211] But we have reason to believe\nthat when the man, on marrying, quits his home and goes to live with\nhis wife in the house or community of her father, his authority over\nhis wife is commonly more or less impaired by the presence of her\nfather or kinsfolk.[212] In Sumatra, in the mode of marriage called\n_ambel anak_, he lives with his father-in-law in a state between that\nof a son and that of a debtor.[213] But it should be noticed that\nneither his living with the family of his wife, nor even his\ndependence on her father, necessarily implies a total absence of\nmarital power. Among the Californian Yokuts, though the husband takes\nup his abode in his {657} wife's or father-in-law's house, he is\nexpressly stated to have the power of life and death over her.[214]\nSo, also, in the Western islands of Torres Straits, though a man after\nmarriage usually left his own people and went to live with those of\nhis wife, he had complete control over her. \"In spite of the wife\nhaving asked her husband to marry her, he could kill her should she\ncause trouble in the house, and that without any penal consequence to\nhimself. The payment of a husband to his wife's father gave him all\nrights over her, and at the same time annulled those of her father or\nher family.\"[215]\n\n[Footnote 206: Steinmetz, _Ethnologische Studien zur ersten\nEntwicklung der Strafe_, ii. ch. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 207: _Cf._ Westermarck, _op. cit._ p. 99 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 208: _Idem_, 'M\u00e9thode pour la recherche des institutions\npr\u00e9historiques \u00e0 propos d'un ouvrage du professeur Kohler,' in _Revue\nInternationale de Sociologie_, v. 451.]\n\n[Footnote 209: Ratzel, _op. cit._ iii. 124.]\n\n[Footnote 210: Waitz, _op. cit._ ii, 469.]\n\n[Footnote 211: Reade, _Savage Africa_, p. 452.]\n\n[Footnote 212: See Mazzarella, _La condizione giuridica del marito\nnella famiglia matriarcale_, _passim_; Grosse, _Die Formen der\nFamilie_, p. 76; Wilkes, _U.S. Exploring Expedition_, iv. 447 (Spokane\nIndians). It seems, however, that Dr. Mazzarella in several cases\ninfers the husband's complete subjection to his father-in-law from\nstatements in which such a subjection is not really implied.]\n\n[Footnote 213: Marsden, _History of Sumatra_, p. 262.]\n\n[Footnote 214: Powers, _Tribes of California_, p. 382.]\n\n[Footnote 215: Haddon, _Head-Hunters_, p. 160 _sq._]\n\nIn the first place, wives' subjection to their husbands is due to the\nmen's instinctive desire to exert power and to the natural inferiority\nof women in such qualities of body and mind as are essential for\npersonal independence. Generally speaking, the men are their superiors\nin strength and courage. They are therefore not only the protectors of\ntheir wives, but also their masters.\n\nIn the sexual impulse itself there are elements which lead to\ndomination on the part of the man and to submission on the part of the\nwoman. In courtship, animal and human alike, the male plays the more\nactive, the female the more passive part. During the season of love\nthe males even of the most timid animal species engage in desperate\ncombats with each other for the possession of the female, and there\ncan be no doubt that our primeval human ancestors had, in the same\nway, to fight for their wives; even now this kind of courtship is far\nfrom being unknown among savages.[216] Moreover, the male pursues and\ntries to capture the female, and she, after some resistance, finally\nsurrenders herself to him. The sexual impulse of the male is thus\nconnected with a desire to win the female, and the sexual impulse of\nthe female with a desire to be pursued and won by the male. In the\nfemale sex there is consequently an instinctive appreciation of manly\nstrength and courage; this is found in most {658} women, and\nespecially in the women of savage races, who, like the females of the\nlower Vertebrates, commonly give the preference to \"the most vigorous,\ndefiant, and mettlesome male.\"[217] And woman enjoys the display of\nmanly force even when it turns against herself. It is said that among\nthe Slavs of the lower class the wives feel hurt if they are not\nbeaten by their husbands; that the peasant women in some parts of\nHungary do not think they are loved by their husbands until they have\nreceived the first box on the ear; that among the Italian Camorrists a\nwife who is not beaten by her husband regards him as a fool.[218] Dr.\nHavelock Ellis believes that the majority of women would probably be\nprepared to echo the remark made by a woman in front of Rubens's 'Rape\nof the Sabines,' \"I think the Sabine women enjoyed being carried off\nlike that.\"[219] The same judicious student of the psychology of sex\nobserves:--\"While in men it is possible to trace a tendency to inflict\npain, or the simulacrum of pain, on the women they love, it is still\neasier to trace in women a delight in experiencing physical pain when\ninflicted by a lover, and an eagerness to accept subjection to his\nwill. Such a tendency is certainly normal. To abandon herself to her\nlover, to be able to rely on his physical strength and mental\nresourcefulness, to be swept out of herself and beyond the control of\nher own will, to drift idly in delicious submission to another and\nstronger will--this is one of the commonest aspirations in a young\nwoman's intimate love-dreams.\"[220]\n\n[Footnote 216: Westermarck, _op. cit._ p. 159 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 217: Westermarck, _op. cit._ p. 255 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 218: Havelock Ellis, _Studies in the Psychology of Sex_,\n'Analysis of the Sexual Impulse,' &c. p. 66 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 219: _Ibid._ p. 75.]\n\n[Footnote 220: _Ibid._ p. 74.]\n\nBut although a certain degree of submissiveness comes within the\nnormal limits of female love, though \"a woman may desire to be forced,\nto be roughly forced, to be ravished away beyond her own will.\" she\nall the time only desires to be forced towards those things which are\nessentially agreeable to her.[221] If the man's domination is carried\nbeyond those limits, it is no longer enjoyed by the {659} woman, but\nis felt as a burden, and may call forth resistance. In extreme cases\nof oppression, at any rate, the community at large would sympathise\nwith her, and the public resentment against the oppressor would\ngradually result in customs or laws limiting the husband's rights. Yet\nperfect impartiality is hardly to be expected from the community. The\nmen are the leaders of public opinion, and they have a tendency to\nfavour their own sex. On the other hand, the offended woman may count\nupon the support of her fellow-sisters, and thus the women combined\nmay influence tribal habits and, ultimately, the rules of custom.\nAmong the Papuans of Port Moresby, for instance, \"it is a rare\noccurrence for a man to beat his wife, and he does not like to be\nreminded of the fact if hasty temper has led him into this mistake.\nThe other women generally make a song about it, and sing it whenever\nhe appears; and as no one is so sensitive of ridicule as a New Guinean\nsavage, he will endure a great deal, even from a shrew wife, before he\nattempts to lift his hand.\"[222] Among the West African Fulah, if a\nman repudiates his wife, the women of the village attack him _en\nmasse_; \"like the members of a priesthood, they hate but protect each\nother.\"[223] We have, moreover, to consider that the children's\naffection and regard for their mother gives her a power which is no\nless real because it is not definitely expressed in custom or law. In\nOriental countries, for example, the mother is always an important\npersonage in the family. Children are afraid of their father but love\ntheir mother, and when grown-up would certainly be ready to protect\nher against a cruel husband.[224]\n\n[Footnote 221: _Ibid._ p. 85.]\n\n[Footnote 222: Nisbet, _A Colonial Tramp_, ii. 181 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 223: Reade, _Savage Africa_, p. 452. See also M\u00f6ller,\nPagels, and Gleerup, _op. cit._ i. 171 (Lukungu); Munzinger,\n_Ostafrikanische Studien_, p. 324 (Beni Amer).]\n\n[Footnote 224: _Cf._ Burton, _Sindh Revisited_, i. 293; Urquhart,\n_Spirit of the East_, ii. 265 _sq._; Doughty, _Arabia Deserta_, i.\n239; Westermarck, 'Position of Woman in Early Civilisation,' in\n_Sociological Papers_, [1.] p. 160.]\n\nIt has often been said that the position of women and the degree of\ntheir dependence among a certain people are largely influenced by\neconomic conditions. Thus Mr. {660} Hale maintains that the condition\nof women is \"a question of physical comfort, and mainly of the\nabundance or lack of food. . . . When men in their full strength\nsuffer from lack of the necessaries of existence, and are themselves\nslaves to the rigours of the elements, their better feelings are\nbenumbed or perverted, like those of shipwrecked people famishing on a\nraft. Under such circumstances the weaker members of the\ncommunity--women, children, the old, the sick--are naturally the chief\nsufferers.\"[225] With reference to the North American Indians the\nobservation has been made that, where the women can aid in procuring\nsubsistence for the tribe, they are treated with more equality, and\ntheir importance is proportioned to the share which they take in that\nlabour; whereas in places where subsistence is chiefly procured by the\nexertions of the men, the women are considered and treated as burdens.\nThus, the position of women is exceptionally good in tribes living\nupon fish and roots, which the women procure with the same expertness\nas the men, whereas it is among tribes living by the chase, or by\nother means in which women can be of little service, that we find the\nsex most oppressed.[226] Dr. Grosse, again, emphasises the low\n_status_ of women not only among hunters, but among pastoral tribes as\nwell. \"The women,\" he says, \"not being permitted to take part in the\nrearing of cattle, and not being able to take part in war, possess\nnothing which could command respect with the rude shepherd and\nrobber.\"[227] Among the lower agricultural tribes, on the other hand,\nDr. Grosse adds, the position of the female sex is often higher. The\ncultivation of the ground mostly devolves on the woman, and among\npeoples who chiefly subsist by agriculture it is not an occupation\nwhich is looked down upon, as it is among nomadic tribes. This gives\nthe woman a {661} certain standing, owing to her importance as a\nfood-provider.[228]\n\n[Footnote 225: Hale, 'Language as a Test of Mental Capacity,' in\n_Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxi. 427.]\n\n[Footnote 226: Lewis and Clarke, _Travels to the Source of the\nMissouri River_, p. 441. Waitz, _op. cit._ iii. 343. Bancroft, _Native\nRaces of the Pacific States_, i. 242 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 227: Grosse, _op. cit._ pp. 48, 49, 74, 75, 109 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 228: _Ibid._ p. 182.]\n\nIn these generalisations there is no doubt a great deal of truth; but\nthey do not hold good universally or without modifications. Among\nseveral peoples who subsist chiefly by the chase or the rearing of\ncattle, the position of women is exceedingly good. To mention only one\ninstance out of many, Professor V\u00e1mb\u00e9ry observes that among the\nnomadic Kara-Kirghiz the female sex is treated with greater respect\nthan among those Turks who lead a stationary life and practise\nagriculture.[229] Indeed, the general theory that women are more\noppressed in proportion as they are less useful, is open to doubt.\nCommonly they are said to be oppressed by their savage husbands just\nby being compelled to work too hard; and that work does not\nnecessarily give authority is obvious from the institution of slavery.\nBut at the same time the notion, prevalent in early civilisation, that\nthe one sex must not in any way interfere with the pursuits of the\nother sex, may certainly, especially when applied to an occupation of\nsuch importance as agriculture, increase the influence of those who\nare engaged in it. Considering further that the cultivated soil is not\ninfrequently regarded as the property of the women who till it,[230]\nit is probable that, in certain cases at least, the agricultural\nhabits of a people have had a favourable effect upon the general\ncondition of the female sex, and at the same time on the wife's\nposition in the family.\n\n[Footnote 229: V\u00e1mb\u00e9ry, _Das T\u00fcrkenvolk_, p. 268.]\n\n[Footnote 230: Grosse, _op. cit._ p. 159 _sq._]\n\nThe _status_ of wives is in various respects connected with the ideas\nheld about the female sex in general. Woman is commonly looked upon as\na slight, dainty, and relatively feeble creature, destitute of all\nnobler qualities.[231] Especially among nations more advanced in\nculture she is regarded as intellectually and morally vastly inferior\nto man. In Greece, in the historic age, the latter recognised {662} in\nher no other end than to minister to his pleasure or to become the\nmother of his children. There was also a general notion that she was\nnaturally more vicious, more addicted to envy, discontent,\nevil-speaking, and wantonness, than the man.[232] Plato classes women\ntogether with children and servants,[233] and states generally that in\nall the pursuits of mankind the female sex is inferior to the\nmale.[234] Euripides puts into the mouth of his Medea the remark that\n\"women are impotent for good, but clever contrivers of all evil.\"[235]\nAccording to the Vedic singer, again, \"woman's mind is hard to direct\naright, and her judgment is small.\"[236] To the Buddhist, women are of\nall the snares which the tempter has spread for men the most\ndangerous; in women are embodied all the powers of infatuation which\nbind the mind of the world.[237] The Chinese have a saying to the\neffect that the best girls are not equal to the worst boys.[238] Islam\npronounces the general depravity of women to be much greater than that\nof men.[239] According to Muhammedan tradition, the Prophet said:--\"I\nhave not left any calamity more hurtful to man than woman. . . . O\nassembly of women, give alms, although it be of your gold and silver\nornaments; for verily ye are mostly of Hell on the Day of\nResurrection.\"[240] The Hebrews represented woman as the source of\nevil and death on earth:--\"Of the woman came the beginning of sin, and\nthrough her we all die.\"[241] This notion passed into Christianity.\nSays St. Paul, \"Adam was not deceived, but the woman being deceived\nwas in the transgression.\"[242] Tertullian maintains that a woman\nshould go about in humble garb, mourning and repentant, in order to\nexpiate that which she derives from Eve, the ignominy {663} of the\nfirst sin, and the odium attaching to her as the cause of human\nperdition. \"Do you not know,\" he exclaims, \"that you are each an Eve?\nThe sentence of God on this sex of yours lives in this age; the guilt\nmust of necessity live too. You are the devil's gateway; you are the\nunsealer of that [forbidden] tree; you are the first deserter of the\ndivine law; you are she who persuaded him whom the devil was not\nvaliant enough to attack. You destroyed so easily God's image, man. On\naccount of your desert--that is, death--even the Son of God had to\ndie.\"[243] At the Council of M\u00e2con, towards the end of the sixth\ncentury, a bishop even raised the question whether woman really was a\nhuman being. He answered the question in the negative; but the\nmajority of the assembly considered it to be proved by Scripture that\nwoman, in spite of all her defects, yet was a member of the human\nrace.[244] However, some of the Fathers of the Church were careful to\nemphasise that womanhood only belongs to this earthly existence, and\nthat on the day of resurrection all women will appear in the shape of\nsexless beings.[245]\n\n[Footnote 231: Crawley, _The Mystic Rose_, p. 204 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 232: Dickinson, _op. cit._ p. 159. D\u00f6llinger, _op. cit._\nii. 234.]\n\n[Footnote 233: Plato, _Respublica_, iv. 431.]\n\n[Footnote 234: _Ibid._ v. 455.]\n\n[Footnote 235: Euripides, _Medea_, 406 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 236: _Rig-Veda_, viii. 33. 17.]\n\n[Footnote 237: Oldenburg, _Buddha_, p. 165. _Cf._ Kern, _Manual of\nIndian Buddhism_, p. 69.]\n\n[Footnote 238: Smith, _Proverbs of the Chinese_, p. 265.]\n\n[Footnote 239: Lane, _Arabian Society_, p. 219. _Cf._ Doughty, _Arabia\nDeserta_, i. 238.]\n\n[Footnote 240: Lane-Poole, _Speeches of Mohammad_, pp. 161, 163.]\n\n[Footnote 241: _Ecclesiasticus_, xxv. 24.]\n\n[Footnote 242: _1 Timothy_, ii. 14.]\n\n[Footnote 243: Tertullian, _De cultu f[oe]minarum_, i. 1 (Migne,\n_Patrologi\u00e6 cursus_, i. 1305). See also Laurent, _\u00c9tudes sur\nl'histoire de l'humanit\u00e9_, iv. 113.]\n\n[Footnote 244: Gregory of Tours, _Historia Francorum_, viii. 20.]\n\n[Footnote 245: St. Hilar., _Commentarius in Matth\u00e6um_, xxiii. 4\n(Migne, _op. cit._ ix. 1045 _sq._). St. Basil, _Homilia in Psalmum\ncxiv._ 5 (Migne, _op. cit._ Ser. Graeca, xxix. 488).]\n\nProgress in civilisation has exercised an unfavourable influence on\nthe position of woman by widening the gulf between the sexes, as the\nhigher culture was almost exclusively the prerogative of the men.\nMoreover, religion, and especially the great religions in the world,\nhave contributed to the degradation of the female sex by regarding\nwoman as unclean. During menstruation, or when with child, or at\nchild-birth, she is considered to be polluted, to be charged with\nmysterious baneful energy, which is a danger to all around her.[246]\nThe cause of this notion seems to lie in the {664} superstitious dread\nof those marvellous processes which then take place, and it reaches\nits height where there is appearance of blood.[247] On such occasions\nwoman is shunned not only by men, but in an even higher degree by\ngods, for the obvious reason that contact with the unclean woman would\ninjure or destroy their holiness. Indeed, the danger is considered so\ngreat, that many religions regard women as defiled not only\ntemporarily, but permanently, and on that ground exclude them from\nreligious worship.\n\n[Footnote 246: Ploss-Bartels, _Das Weib_, i. 420 _sqq._; ii. 10\n_sqq._, 402 _sqq._ Frazer, _Golden Bough_, i. 325 _sqq._; iii. 222\n_sqq._ Crawley, _op. cit._ p. 165 _sqq._; Mathew, _Eaglehawk and\nCrow_, p. 144 (Australian aborigines), de Rochas, _Nouvelle\nCal\u00e9donie_, p. 283. Mooney, 'Myths of the Cherokee,' in _Ann. Rep.\nBur. Ethn._ xix. 469. Sumner, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxxi. 96\n(Jakuts). Georgi, _Russia_, iii. 25 _sq._ (Samoyedes), 245, _sq._\n(Shamanists of Siberia generally); &c.]\n\n[Footnote 247: Professor Durkheim maintains ('La prohibition de\nl'inceste et ses origines,' in _L'ann\u00e9e sociologique_, i. especially\np. 48 _sqq._) that the origin of the occult powers attributed to the\nfeminine organism is to be found in primitive ideas concerning blood,\nany kind of blood, not only menstrual, being the object of similar\nfeelings among savages and barbarians. Mr. Crawley justly remarks\n(_op. cit._ p. 212) that there is no flux of blood during pregnancy,\nwhen woman is regularly taboo; that her hair, nail-parings, and\noccupations can hardly be avoided from a fear of her blood; and that\nthere is also the female side of the question to be taken into\naccount.]\n\nIn the Society Islands a woman was forbidden to touch whatever was\npresented as an offering to the gods, so as not to pollute it.[248] In\nMelanesia women are generally excluded from religious rites.[249]\nAmong the Shamanists of Siberia women \"are interdicted the worship of\nthe deities, and dare not pass round the common hearth of their\nhabitations, because fire is sacred to the gods.\"[250] The women of\nthe Voguls are generally prohibited from approaching idols or holy\nplaces.[251] A Votyak woman may not be present at the sacrifices made\nto the _lud_, or evil spirit.[252] Among the Lapps a woman was not\nallowed to touch a _noaid_'s, or wizard's, drum; nor, as a rule, to\ntake part in sacrificial rites; nor even to look in the direction of a\nplace where sacrifices were offered.[253] Among the Ainos of Japan,\n\"though a woman may prepare a divine offering, she may not offer it. . . .\nAccordingly, women are never allowed to pray, or to take any part\nin any religious {665} exercise.\"[254] In China women are not allowed\nto go and worship in the temples.[255]\n\n[Footnote 248: Ellis, _Polynesian Researches_, i. 129. _Cf._ Wegener,\n_Geschichte der christlichen Kirche auf dem Gesellschafts-Archipel_,\np. 181.]\n\n[Footnote 249: Codrington, _Melanesians_, p. 127.]\n\n[Footnote 250: Georgi, _op. cit._ iii. 245. _Cf._ _ibid._ iii. 25.]\n\n[Footnote 251: Abercromby, _Pre- and Proto-historic Finns_, i. 181.]\n\n[Footnote 252: Wichmann, _Tietoja Votjaakkien Mytologiiasta_, p. 17.\nSee also _ibid._ p. 27.]\n\n[Footnote 253: von D\u00fcben, _Lappland och Lapparne_, p. 276. Friis,\n_Lappisk Mythologi_, p. 147.]\n\n[Footnote 254: Howard, _op. cit._ p. 195.]\n\n[Footnote 255: _Indo-Chinese Gleaner_, iii. 156.]\n\nIn ancient Nicaragua women were held unworthy to perform any duty\nin connection with the temples, and were immolated outside the temple\nground of the large sanctuaries, and even their flesh was unclean food\nfor the high priest, who accordingly ate only the flesh of males.[256]\nIn Mexico, although some women were employed in the immediate service\nof the temples, they were entirely excluded from the office of\nsacrificing, and the higher dignities of the priesthood.[257]\n\n[Footnote 256: Bancroft, _op. cit._ iii. 494.]\n\n[Footnote 257: Clavigero, _History of Mexico_, i. 274 _sq._]\n\nAccording to the sacred books of India, \"women are considered to\nhave no business with the sacred texts\";[258] and, being destitute of\nthe knowledge of Vedic texts, they \"are as impure as falsehood itself,\nthat is a fixed rule.\"[259] Although, according to a Vedic ordinance\nmentioned in the Laws of Manu, husband and wife ought to perform\nreligious rites together,[260] they have, among the present Hindus, no\nreligious life in common; the women are not allowed to repeat the\nVeda, or to go through the morning and evening Sandhy[=a]\nservices.[261] If a woman, a dog, or a S\u00fbdra, touch a consecrated\nimage, its godship is destroyed; the ceremonies of deification must\ntherefore be performed afresh, whilst a clay image, if thus defiled,\nmust be thrown away. If women should worship before a consecrated\nimage, they must keep at a respectful distance from the idol.[262]\n\n[Footnote 258: _Baudh\u00e2yana_, i. 5. 11. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 259: _Laws of Manu_, ix. 18. _Cf._ _ibid._ ii. 66; iii. 121.]\n\n[Footnote 260: _Ibid._ ix. 96.]\n\n[Footnote 261: Monier Williams, _Br[=a]hmanism and Hind[=u]ism_,\np. 398.]\n\n[Footnote 262: Ward, _View of the History, &c., of the Hindoos_, ii.\n13, 36.]\n\nIslam is chiefly a religion for men. Though Muhammed did not forbid\nwomen to attend public prayers in a mosque, he pronounced it better\nfor them to pray in private, as the presence of females might inspire\nin the men a different kind of devotion from that which is requisite\nin a place dedicated to the worship of God.[263] Women are absolutely\nexcluded from many Muhammedan places of worship, and are frowned upon\nif they venture to appear in others, at any rate while men are\nthere.[264]\n\n[Footnote 263: Lane, _Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians_,\np. 94.]\n\n[Footnote 264: Pool, _Studies in Mohammedanism_, p. 39 _sq._]\n\nIn Christian Europe, as ascetic ideas advanced, the women sat or\nstood in the church apart from the men, and entered by a separate\ndoor.[265] They were excluded from sacred functions. {666} In the\nearly Church, it is true, there were \"deaconesses\" and clerical\n\"widows,\" but their offices were merely to perform some inferior\nservices of the church;[266] and even these very modest posts were\nopen only to virgins or widows of a considerable age.[267] Whilst a\nlayman could in case of necessity administer baptism, a woman could\nnever, as it seems, perform such an act.[268] Nor was a woman allowed\nto preach publicly in the church, either by the Apostle's rules or\nthose of succeeding ages;[269] and it was a serious complaint against\ncertain heretics that they allowed such a practice. \"The heretic\nwomen,\" Tertullian exclaims, \"how wanton are they! they who dare to\nteach, to dispute, to practise exorcisms, to promise cures, perchance,\nalso, to baptise!\"[270] A Council held at Auxerre at the end of the\nsixth century forbade women to receive the Eucharist into their naked\nhands;[271] and in various Canons women were enjoined not to come near\nto the altar while mass was celebrating.[272] To such an extent was\nthis opposition against women carried that the Church of the Middle\nAges did not hesitate to provide itself with eunuchs in order to\nsupply cathedral choirs with the soprano tones inhering by nature in\nwomen alone.[273]\n\n[Footnote 265: Donaldson, in _Contemporary Review_, lvi. 438.]\n\n[Footnote 266: Zscharnack, _Der Dienst der Frau in den ersten\nJahrhunderten der christlichen Kirche_, p. 99 _sqq._ Robinson,\n_Ministry of Deaconesses_, _passim_.]\n\n[Footnote 267: _Ibid._ pp. 113, 114, 125.]\n\n[Footnote 268: Bingham, _Works_, iv. 45. Zscharnack, _op. cit._ p. 93.]\n\n[Footnote 269: Bingham, _op. cit._ v. 107 _sqq._ Zscharnack, _op.\ncit._ p. 73 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 270: Tertullian, _De pr\u00e6scriptionibus adversus h\u00e6reticos_,\n41 (Migne, _op. cit._ ii. 56). _Cf._ Tertullian, _De baptismo_, 17\n(Migne, _op. cit._ i. 1219).]\n\n[Footnote 271: _Concilium Autisiodorense_, A.D. 578, can. 36\n(Labbe-Mansi, _Sacrorum Conciliorum collectio_, ix. 915).]\n\n[Footnote 272: _Canones Concilii Laodiceni_, 44 (Labbe-Mansi, _op.\ncit._ ii. 581, 589). 'Epitome canonum, quam Hadrianus I. Carolo Magno\nobtulit, A.D. DCCLXXIII.,' in Labbe-Mansi, _op. cit._ xii. 868.\n_Canons enacted under King Edgar_, 44 (_Ancient Laws and Institutes of\nEngland_, p. 399).]\n\n[Footnote 273: _Cf._ Gage, _Woman, Church and State_, p. 57.]\n\nBut the notion that woman is either temporarily or permanently\nunclean, that she is a mysterious being charged with supernatural\nenergy, is not only a cause of her degradation; it also gives her a\nsecret power over her husband, which may be very considerable. During\nmy stay among the country people of Morocco, Arabs and Berbers alike,\nI was often struck by the superstitious fear with which the women\nimbued the men. They are supposed to be much better versed in magic,\nand have also splendid opportunities to practise it to the detriment\n{667} of their husbands, as they may easily bewitch the food they\nprepare for them. For instance, the wife only needs to cut off a\nlittle piece of a donkey's ear and put it into the husband's food.\nWhat happens? By eating that little piece the husband will, in his\nrelations to his wife, become just like a donkey; he will always\nlisten to what she says, and the wife will become the ruler of the\nhouse. I also believe that the men on purpose abstain from teaching\nthe women prayers, so as not to increase their supernatural\npower.[274] In the Arabian Desert men are likewise afraid of their\nwomen \"with their sly philters and maleficent drinks.\"[275] In Dahomey\n\"the husband may not chastise or interfere with his wife whilst the\nfetish is 'upon' her, and even at other times the use of the rod might\nbe dangerous.\"[276] Women, and especially old ones, are very\nfrequently regarded as experts in magic. [277] Among the ancient\nArabs,[278] Babylonians,[279] and Peruvians,[280] as in Europe during\nthe Middle Ages and later, the witch appeared more frequently than the\nmale sorcerer. So, also, in the Government of Tomsk in Southern\nSiberia, native sorceresses are much more numerous than wizards;[281]\nand among the Californian Shastika all, or nearly all, of the {668}\nshamans are women.[282] The curses of women are greatly feared. In\nMorocco it is considered even a greater calamity to be cursed by a\nShereefa, or female descendant of the Prophet, than to be cursed by a\nShereef. According to the Talmud, the anger of a wife destroys the\nhouse;[283] but, on the other hand, it is also through woman that\nGod's blessings are vouchsafed to it.[284] We read in the Laws of\nManu:--\"Women must be honoured and adorned by their fathers, brothers,\nhusbands, and brothers-in-law, who desire their own welfare. Where\nwomen are honoured, there the gods are pleased; but where they are not\nhonoured, no sacred rite yields rewards. Where the female relations\nlive in grief, the family soon wholly perishes; but that family where\nthey are not unhappy ever prospers. The houses on which female\nrelations, not being duly honoured, pronounce a curse, perish\ncompletely as if destroyed by magic. Hence men who seek their own\nwelfare should always honour women on holidays and festivals with\ngifts of ornaments, clothes, and dainty food.\"[285] A Gaelic proverb\nsays, \"A wicked woman will get her wish, though her soul may not see\nsalvation.\"[286] Closely connected with the belief in the magic power\nof women, and especially, I think, in the great efficacy of their\ncurses, is the custom according to which a woman may serve as an\nasylum.[287] In various tribes of Morocco, especially among the\nBerbers and Jb\u00e2la, a person who takes refuge with a woman by touching\nher is safe from his persecutor. Among the Arabs of the plains this\ncustom is dying out, probably owing to their subjection under the\nSultan's government; but amongst certain Asiatic Bedouins, the tribe\nof Shammar, \"a woman can protect any number of persons, or even of\ntents.\"[288] {669} Among the Circassians \"a stranger who intrusts\nhimself to the patronage of a woman, or is able to touch with his\nmouth the breast of a wife, is spared and protected as a relation of\nthe blood, though he were the enemy, nay even the murderer of a\nsimilar relative.\"[289] The inhabitants of Bareges in Bigorre have, up\nto recent times, preserved the old custom of pardoning a criminal who\nhas sought refuge with a woman.[290]\n\n[Footnote 274: We are told that among the Ainos of Japan women are\nforbidden to pray, not only in conformity with ancestral custom, but\nbecause the men are afraid of the prayers of the women in general, and\nof their wives in particular. An old man said to Mr. Batchelor:--\"The\nwomen as well as the men used to be allowed to worship the gods and\ntake part in all religious exercises; but our wise honoured ancestors\nforbade them to do so, because it was thought they might use their\nprayers against the men, and more particularly against their husbands.\nWe therefore think that it is wiser to keep them from praying\"\n(Batchelor, _Ainu and their Folk-Lore_, p. 550 _sq._ Howard, _op.\ncit._ p. 195). Among the Santals the men are careful not to divulge\nthe names of their household gods to their wives, for fear lest the\nlatter should acquire undue influence with the gods, become witches,\nand \"eat up the family with impunity when the protection of its gods\nhas been withdrawn\" (Risley, _Tribes and Castes of Bengal_,\n_Ethnographic Glossary_, ii. 232).]\n\n[Footnote 275: Doughty, _Arabia Deserta_, ii. 384.]\n\n[Footnote 276: Burton, _Mission to Gelele_, ii. 155.]\n\n[Footnote 277: Ploss-Bartels, _op. cit._ ii. 664, 666 _sqq._ Mason,\n_op. cit._ p. 255 _sqq._ Landtman, _Origin of Priesthood_, p. 198\n_sq._ Angas, _Savage Life and Scenes in Australia and New Zealand_, i.\n317 (Maoris). Connolly, 'Social Life in Fanti-land,' in _Jour. Anthr.\nInst._ xxvi. 150.]\n\n[Footnote 278: Wellhausen, _Reste arabischen Heidentums_, p. 159.]\n\n[Footnote 279: Jastrow, _Religion of Babylonia_, pp. 267, 342.]\n\n[Footnote 280: Garcilasso de la Vega, _First Part of the Royal\nCommentaries of the Yncas_, i. 60.]\n\n[Footnote 281: Kostroff, quoted by Landtman, _op. cit._ p. 199.]\n\n[Footnote 282: Powers, _Tribes of California_, p. 246.]\n\n[Footnote 283: _Sota_, fol. 3 B, quoted by Katz, _Der wahre\nTalmudjude_, p. 110 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 284: _Baba Meziah_, fol. 59 A, quoted _ibid._ p. 112.\nDeutsch, _Literary Remains_, p. 56.]\n\n[Footnote 285: _Laws of Manu_, iii. 55 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 286: Carmichael, _Carmina Gadelica_, ii. 317.]\n\n[Footnote 287: For some instances of this custom see Andree, 'Die\nAsyle,' in _Globus_, xxxviii. 302; Bachofen, _Das Mutterrecht_, p. 420\n(Basques).]\n\n[Footnote 288: Layard, _Discoveries in the Ruins of Nineveh and\nBabylon_, p. 318.]\n\n[Footnote 289: Pallas, _Travels through the Southern Provinces of the\nRussian Empire_, i. 404.]\n\n[Footnote 290: Fischer, _Bergreisen_, i. 60.]\n\nYet another factor remains to be mentioned as a cause of the\nsubjection in which married women are held by many peoples of culture.\nWe have noticed that in archaic civilisation the father's power over\nhis children is extreme, that the State whilst weakening or destroying\nthe clan-tie strengthened the family-tie, and that the father was\ninvested with some part of the power which formerly belonged to the\nclan.[291] This process must also have affected the _status_ of\nmarried women. The husband's power over his wife is closely connected\nwith the father's power over his daughter; for, by giving her in\nmarriage, he generally transfers to the husband the authority which he\nhimself previously possessed over her as a paternal right.\n\n[Footnote 291: _Supra_, ch. xxv. especially p. 627 _sq._]\n\nIn modern civilisation, on the other hand, we find, hand in hand with\nthe decrease of the father's power, a decrease of the husband's\nauthority over his wife. But the causes of the gradual emancipation of\nmarried women are manifold. Life has become more complicated; the\noccupations of women have become much more extensive; their influence\nhas expanded correspondingly, from the home and household to public\nlife. Their widened interests have interfered with that submissiveness\nwhich is an original characteristic of their sex. Their greater\neducation has made them more respected, and has increased their\nindependence. Finally, the decline of the influence exercised by\nantiquated religious ideas is removing what has probably been the most\npersistent cause of the wife's subjection to her husband's\nrule.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXVII\n\nSLAVERY\n\nSLAVERY is essentially an industrial institution, which implies\ncompulsory labour beyond the limits of family relations. The master\nhas a right to avail himself of the working power of his slave,\nwithout previous agreement on the part of the latter. This I take to\nbe the essence of slavery; but connected with such a right there are\nothers which hardly admit of a strict definition, or which belong to\nthe master in some cases though not in all. He is entitled to claim\nobedience and to enforce this claim with more or less severity, but\nhis authority is not necessarily absolute, and the restrictions\nimposed on it are not everywhere the same. According to a common\ndefinition of slavery, the slave is the property of his master,[1] but\nthis definition is hardly accurate. It is true that even in the case\nof inanimate property the notion of ownership does not involve that\nthe owner of a thing is always entitled to do with it whatever he\nlikes; a person may own a thing and yet be prohibited by law from\ndestroying it. But it seems that the owner's right over his property,\neven when not absolute, is at all events exclusive, that is, that\nnobody but the owner has a right to the disposal of it. Now the\nmaster's right of disposing of his slave is not necessarily {671}\nexclusive; custom or law may grant the latter a certain amount of\nliberty, and in such a case his condition differs essentially from\nthat of a piece of property. The chief characteristic of slavery is\nthe compulsory nature of the slave's relation to his master. Voluntary\nslavery, as when a person sells himself as a slave, is only an\nimitation of slavery true and proper; the person who gives up his\nliberty confers upon another, by contract, either for a limited period\nor for ever, the same rights over himself as a master possesses over\nhis slave. If slavery proper could be based upon a contract between\nthe parties concerned, I fail to see how to distinguish between a\nservant and a slave.\n\n[Footnote 1: Nieboer, _Slavery as an Industrial System_, p. 4 _sqq._\nDr. Nieboer himself defines slavery as \"the fact, that one man is the\nproperty or possession of another beyond the limits of the family\nproper\" (_ibid._ p. 29).]\n\nDr. Nieboer has recently with much minuteness examined the\ndistribution of slavery and its causes among savage races. It appears\nfrom his work that slavery is unknown in Australia, and in Oceania\nrestricted to certain islands. In the Malay Archipelago, on the other\nhand, it prevails very extensively. Among the aboriginal tribes of\nIndia and the Indo-Chinese Peninsula it is fairly common, whereas no\ncertain traces of it are found among the lower races of Central Asia\nand Siberia, with the exception of the Kamchadales. In North America\nit exists along the Pacific Coast from Behring Strait to the northern\nboundary of California, but beyond this district it seems to be\nunknown. In Central and South America there are at any rate several\nscattered cases of it, and if our knowledge of the South American\nIndians were less fragmentary, many other instances might perhaps be\nadded. In savage Africa there are only one or two districts where no\ncertain cases of slavery are encountered, whilst large agglomerations\nof slave-keeping tribes occur on the Coast of Guinea and in the\ndistrict formed by Lower Guinea and the territories bordering the\nCongo.[2]\n\n[Footnote 2: Nieboer, _op. cit._ p. 47 _sqq._]\n\nSlaves are kept only where there is employment for them, and where the\ncircumstances are otherwise favourable to the growth of slavery. Its\nexistence or non-existence {672} in a tribe largely depends on the\nmanner in which that tribe lives. Among hunters it hardly occurs at\nall. Mr. Spencer justly observes that, \"in the absence of industrial\nactivity, slaves are almost useless; and, indeed, where game is\nscarce, are not worth their food.\"[3] Moreover, they would have to be\nprocured from foreign tribes, and to prevent such slaves from running\naway would be almost impossible for hunters who roam over vast tracts\nof land in pursuit of game, especially if the slaves also were engaged\nin hunting. For a small community of hunters--and their communities\ngenerally are small[4]--it might even be dangerous to keep foreign\nslaves in their midst.[5] Among fishing tribes, on the other hand,\nslavery is much more common, attaining a special importance among\nthose who live on or near the Pacific Coast of North-Western America.\nThese tribes have an abundance of food, they have fixed habitations,\nthey live in comparatively large groups, and trade and industry,\nproperty and wealth, are well developed among them. In consequence,\nthey find the services of slaves useful, and, at the same time, the\nslaves have little chance of making their escape.[6]\n\n[Footnote 3: Spencer, _Principles of Sociology_, iii. 459.]\n\n[Footnote 4: Westermarck, _History of Human Marriage_, p. 43 _sqq._\nHildebrand, _Recht und Sitte_, p. 1 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 5: Nieboer, _op. cit._, p. 191 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 6: _Ibid._ p. 199 _sqq._]\n\nOf the pastoral tribes referred to in Dr. Nieboer's list only one half\nkeep slaves, and among some of these slave-keeping is said to be a\nmere luxury. To pastoral peoples, as such, slave labour is of little\nmoment. Among them subsistence depends much more on capital than on\nlabour, and for the small amount of work which is required free\nlabourers are easily procured. As Dr. Nieboer observes, \"among people\nwho live upon the produce of their cattle, a man who owns no cattle,\n_i.e._ no capital, has no means of subsistence. Accordingly, among\npastoral tribes we find rich and poor men; and the poor often offer\nthemselves as labourers to the rich.\"[7] Pastoral peoples have thus no\nstrong motives for making slaves, but at the same {673} time \"there\nare no causes preventing them from keeping slaves. These tribes are,\nso to speak, in a state of equilibrium; a small additional cause on\neither side turns the balance. One such additional cause is the\nslave-trade; another is the neighbourhood of inferior races.\" All\nthose pastoral peoples who keep slaves live in districts where an\nextensive slave-trade has for a long time been carried on. The slaves\nare often purchased from slave-traders, and in several cases they\nbelong to an inferior race.[8]\n\n[Footnote 7: See also Hildebrand, _op. cit._ p. 38 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 8: Nieboer, _op. cit._ p. 261 _sqq._]\n\nAmong agricultural peoples slavery prevails more extensively; further,\nit is more common among such tribes as subsist chiefly by agriculture\nthan among incipient agriculturists, who still depend on hunting or\nfishing for a large portion of their food. In primitive agricultural\ncommunities nobody voluntarily serves another, because subsistence is\nindependent of capital and easy to procure. \"All freemen in new\ncountries,\" says Mr. Bagehot, \"must be pretty equal; every one has\nlabour, and every one has land; capital, at least in agricultural\ncountries (for pastoral countries are very different), is of little\nuse; it cannot hire labour; the labourers go and work for\nthemselves.\"[9] Hence in such countries, if a man wants another to\nwork for him, he must compel him to do it--that is, he must make him\nhis slave. This holds true of most savage countries, namely, of all\nthose in which there is much more fertile land than is required to be\ncultivated for the support of the actual population; but it does not\nhold true of all. Where every piece of land fit for cultivation has\nbeen appropriated, a man who owns no land cannot earn his subsistence\nindependently of a landlord; hence free labourers are available,\nslaves are not wanted, and slavery is not likely to exist. And even\nwhere there are no poor persons, but everybody has a share in the\nresources of the country, the use of slaves cannot be great, since a\nman who owns a limited capital, or a limited quantity of land, can\nonly employ a limited number of labourers. {674} For instance, the\nabsence of slavery in many Oceanic islands may be accounted for by the\nfact that all land had been appropriated, which led to a state of\nthings inconsistent with slavery as a social system.[10]\n\n[Footnote 9: Bagehot, _Physics and Politics_, p. 72.]\n\n[Footnote 10: Nieboer, _op. cit._ pp. 294-347, 420 _sq._]\n\nThese are the main conclusions at which Dr. Nieboer has arrived by\nmeans of much admirable and painstaking research. Most of them, I\nthink, are undoubtedly correct; yet it seems to me that the influence\nof economic conditions upon the institution of slavery has perhaps\nbeen emphasised too much at the cost of other factors. The prevalence\nof slavery in a savage tribe and the extent to which it is practised\nmust also depend upon the ability of the tribe to procure slaves from\nforeign communities and upon its willingness to allow its own members\nto be kept as slaves within the tribe. It may be very useful for a\ngroup of savages to have a certain number of slaves, and yet they may\nnot have them, for the reason that no slaves are to be had. It is only\nin extraordinary cases that a person is allowed to enslave a member of\nhis own community. Intra-tribal slavery is a question not only of\neconomic but of moral concern, whilst extra-tribal slavery originally\ndepends upon success in war.\n\nWe have reason to believe that the earliest source of slavery was war\nor conquest, and that slavery in many cases was a substitution for\nputting prisoners of war to death.[11] Savages, who have little mercy\non their enemies, naturally make no scruple in reducing them to\nslavery whenever they find their advantage in doing so. Among existing\nsavages, in fact, prisoners of war are very frequently enslaved.[12]\nThey and their descendants, together {675} with persons kidnapped or\npurchased from foreign tribes, seem generally to form by far the\nmajority of the slave population in uncivilised countries.\n\n[Footnote 11: _Cf._ Millar, _Origin of the Distinction of Ranks_, p.\n245; Jacob, _Historical Inquiry into the Production and Consumption of\nthe Precious Metals_, i. 136; Buckle, _Miscellaneous and Posthumous\nWorks_, iii. 413; Comte, _Cours de philosophie positive_, v. 186\n_sqq._; Cibrario, _Della schiavit\u00f9 e del servaggio_, i. 16.]\n\n[Footnote 12: Rink, _Eskimo Tribes_, p. 28 (Western Eskimo). Petroff,\n'Report on Alaska,' in _Tenth Census of the United States_, pp. 152\n(Aleuts), 165 (Thlinkets). Richardson, _Arctic Searching Expedition_,\ni. 412 (Kutchin). Gibbs, 'Tribes of Western Washington and\nNorthwestern Oregon,' in _Contributions to North American Ethnology_,\ni. 188. von Martius _Beitr\u00e4ge zur Ethnographie Amerika's_, i. 232\n(Guaycurus), 298 (Caraj\u00e1s). Azara, _Voyages dans l'Am\u00e9rique\nm\u00e9tridionale_, ii. 109 _sq._ (Mbayas). Lewin, _Hill Tracts of\nChittagong_, p. 35. _Idem_, _Wild Races of South-Eastern India_, p.\n194 (Toungtha). Modigliani, _Viaggio a N\u00edas_, p. 521. Kohler, 'Recht\nder Papuas auf Neu-Guinea,' in _Zeitschr. f. vergl. Rechtswiss._ vii.\n370. Williams and Calvert, _Fiji_, p. 25. Polack, _Manners and Customs\nof the New Zealanders_, ii. 52; Hale, _U.S. Exploring Expedition. Vol.\nVI.--Ethnography and Philology_, p. 33 (New Zealanders). Ellis,\n_History of Madagascar_, i. 192. Andersson, _Lake Ngami_, p. 231;\nKohler, in _Zeitschr. f. vergl. Rechtswiss._ xiv. 311 (Herero).\nVelten, _Sitten und Gebr\u00e4uche der Suaheli_, p. 305. Baumann,\n_Usambara_, p. 141 (Wabondei). Felkin, 'Notes on the Waganda Tribe,'\nin _Proceed. Roy. Soc. Edinburgh_, xiii. 746. Mungo Park, _Travels in\nthe Interior of Africa_, p. 19 (Mandingoes). Rowley, _Africa\nUnveiled_, p. 176. Tuckey, _Expedition to Explore the River Zaire_, p.\n367 (Negroes of Congo). Sarbah, _Fanti Customary Laws_, p. 6. Burton,\n_Abeokuta_, i. 301. Ellis, _Tshi-speaking Peoples of the Gold Coast_,\np. 289. Munzinger, _Ostafrikanische Studien_, p. 309 _sq._ (Beni\nAmer). Mademba, in Steinmetz, _Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse von eingeborenen\nV\u00f6lkern in Afrika und Ozeanien_, p. 83 (natives of the Sansanding\nStates). Nicole, _ibid._ p. 118 _sq._ (Diakit\u00e9-Sarracolese). Tellier,\n_ibid._ pp. 168, 171 (Kreis Kita of the French Soudan). Beverley,\n_ibid._ p. 213 (Wagogo). Lang, _ibid._ p. 241 (Washambala).\nDesoignies, _ibid._ p. 278 (Msalala). Nieboer _op. cit._ pp. 49, 52,\n73-76, 78, 100.]\n\nWhilst little regard is paid to the liberty of strangers, custom\neverywhere, as a rule, forbids the enslaving of tribesmen. Yet\nsometimes a father's power over his children,[13] as also a husband's\npower over his wife,[14] involves the right of selling them as slaves;\nand among various peoples a person may be reduced to slavery for\ncommitting a crime,[15] or for insolvency.[16] Among the tribes of\nWestern {676} Washington and North-Western Oregon, if an Indian has\nwronged another and failed to make compensation, he may be taken as a\nslave.[17] The Papuans of Dorey had a law according to which an\nincendiary with his family became the slave of the late proprietor of\nthe burned house.[18] Among the Line Islanders of Micronesia, if a man\nof low class stole some food from a person belonging to the \"gentry,\"\nhe became the slave of the latter and lost all his property.[19]\nSometimes a man is induced by great poverty to sell himself as a\nslave.[20] But most intra-tribal slaves are born unfree, being the\noffspring of parents one or both of whom are slaves.[21]\n\n[Footnote 13: _Supra_, p. 599.]\n\n[Footnote 14: _Supra_, p. 629 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 15: Butler, _Travels and Adventures in Assam_, p. 94\n(Kukis). Mason, 'Dwellings, &c., of the Karens,' in _Jour. Asiatic\nSoc. Bengal_, xxxvii. pt. ii. p. 146 _sq._; Smeaton, _Loyal Karens of\nBurma_, p. 86. Wilken, 'Het strafrecht bij de volken van het maleische\nras,' in _Bijdragen tot de taal- land- en volkenkunde van\nNederlandsch-Indi\u00eb_, 1883, Land- en volkenkunde, p. 108 _sq._\nJunghuhn, _Die Battalander auf Sumatra_, ii. 145 _sq._ (Bataks).\nRaffles, _History of Java_, ii. p. ccxxxv. (people of Bali). Forbes,\n_A Naturalist's Wanderings in the Eastern Archipelago_, p. 320 (people\nof Timor-laut). von Rosenberg, _Der malayische Archipel_, p. 166\n(Niase). Hickson, _A Naturalist in North Celebes_, p. 194 (Sangirese).\nPost, _Afrikanische Jurisprudenz_, ii. 87. Paulitschke, _Ethnographie\nNordost-Afrikas_, p. 261. Munzinger, _Ostafrikanische Studien_, p. 244\n_sq._ (Marca). Petherick, _Travels in Central Africa_, ii. 3 (Shilluk\nof the White Nile). Bowdich, _Mission to Ashantee_, p. 258 n. *\n(Fantis). H\u00fcbbe-Schleiden, _Ethiopien_, p. 152 (Mpongwe). Burton,\n_Abeokuta_, i. 301. Tuckey, _op. cit._ p. 367 (Negroes of Congo).\nMungo Park, _op. cit._ p. 19 (Mandingoes). Tellier, in Steinmetz,\n_Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_, p. 171 (Kreis Kita of the French Soudan). Lang,\n_ibid._ p. 241 (Washambala). Dale, 'Customs of the Natives inhabiting\nthe Bondei Country,' in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxv. 230, Ellis, _History\nof Madagascar_, i. 193. Velten, _op. cit._ p. 305 _sq._ (Waswahili).]\n\n[Footnote 16: Gibbs, _loc. cit._ p. 188 (Indians of Western Washington\nand North-western Oregon), Lewin, _Hill Tracts of Chittagong_, p. 34.\n_Idem_, _Wild Races of South-Eastern India_, pp. 194 (Khyoungtha), 235\n(Mr\u00fas). Mason, 'Religion, &c., of the Karens,' in _Jour. Asiatic Soc.\nBengal_, xxxiv. pt. ii. 216. Blumentritt, 'Die Sitten und Br\u00e4uche der\nalten Tagalen,' in _Zeitschr. f. Ethnol._ xxv. 13 _sqq._ Lala,\n_Philippine Islands_, p. 111 (natives of Sulu). Low, _Sarawak_, p.\n301. Bock, _Head-Hunters of Borneo_, p. 210 (Dyak tribes). Junghuhn,\n_op. cit._ ii. 151 _sq._ Raffles, _op. cit._ i. 353 n. (Javanese); ii.\np. ccxxxv. (people of Bali). Nieboer, _op. cit._ pp. 110, 111, 114,\n119 _sq._ (various peoples in the Malay Archipelago). Munzinger,\n_Ostafrikanische Studien_, pp. 207 (Takue), 245 (Marea). Kingsley,\n_West African Studies_, p. 370, H\u00fcbbe-Schleiden, _op. cit._ p. 152\n(Mpongwe). Burton, _Abeokuta_, i. 301. Mungo Park, _op. cit._ p. 19\n(Mandingoes). Dale, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxv. 230 (Wabondei).\nBaskerville, in Steinmetz, _Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_, p. 193 _sq._\n(Waganda), Lang, _ibid._ p. 240 (Washambala). Walter, _ibid._ p. 381\n(Natives of Nossi-B\u00e9 and Mayotte, Madagascar). Post, _Afrikanische\nJurisprudenz_, i. 90 _sq._ _Idem_, _Grundriss der ethnologischen\nJurisprudenz_, i. 363 _sqq._; ii. 564 _sqq._ Kohler, _Shakespeare vor\ndem Forum der Jurisprudenz_, p. 14 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 17: Gibbs, _loc. cit._ p. 188.]\n\n[Footnote 18: Earl, _Papuans_, p. 83.]\n\n[Footnote 19: Tutuila, in _Jour. Polynesian Soc._ i. 268 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 20: Azara, _op. cit._ ii. 109 (Mbayas). Hale, _op. cit._ p.\n96 (Kingsmill Islanders). Burton, _Abeokuta_, i. 301. Andersson, _Lake\nNgami_, p. 231 (Herero). Ellis, _History of Madagascar_, i. 192 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 21: _Cf._ Post, _Afrikanische Jurisprudenz_, i. 89 _sq._;\nMademba, in Steinmetz, _Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_, p. 83 (natives of the\nSansanding States); Nicole, _ibid._ p. 119 (Diakit\u00e9-Sarracolese);\nBaskerville, _ibid._ p. 194 (Waganda); Desoignies, _ibid._ p. 278\n(Malala); Dale, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxv. 230 (Wabondei); Ellis,\n_History of Madagascar_, i. 193.]\n\nIn descriptions of slave-holding savages it is often said that a\nmaster has absolute power over his slave. But even in such instances,\nwhen details are scrutinised, it frequently appears that custom or\npublic opinion does not allow a person to treat his slave just as he\npleases. We have noticed above that in many cases the master is\nexpressly denied the right of killing him at his own discretion.[22]\nMore commonly than one would imagine the master has not {677} even an\nunlimited right to sell his slave. Among some peoples he may sell at\nwill such slaves only as have been captured in war or purchased, not\nsuch as have been born in the house.[23] In several instances a slave,\nand especially a domestic slave, cannot be sold unless he has been\nguilty of some crime or misdemeanour.[24] Among the Banaka and Bapuku\nin the Cameroons the master may chastise or send away a slave who has\nbehaved badly, but is not allowed to sell him.[25] There are,\nmoreover, instances in which the master is entitled not to all the\nservices of his slave, but only to a limited portion of them. In some\nparts of Africa the slave is obliged to work for his master on certain\ndays of the week or a certain number of hours, but has the rest of his\ntime free.[26] In the highlands of Palembang, Sumatra, a slave may\ncarry on trade and hire himself out as a day labourer on his own\nbehalf, and when he works in the field one-half of his harvesting\nbelongs to him and the other half to his master.[27] Where the slave\nis allowed to possess property of his own he may in some cases,[28]\nthough not in all,[29] buy his freedom; and debtor-slaves are as a\nrule entitled to regain their liberty by paying off the debt.[30] Many\npeoples even permit a dissatisfied slave to change his master. Among\nthe Washambala, if a person does not fulfil his duties towards any of\nhis slaves, the latter has a right to complain of him to the chief,\nand should the accusation prove true the chief buys the slave of his\nmaster for an ox and two cows, and keeps {678} him for himself.[31]\nAmong other peoples a slave, in order to get a new master, has only to\ncause a slight damage to somebody's property, or to commit some other\ntrifling offence, in which case he must be given up to the person he\n\"injured.\"[32] It is astonishing to notice how readily, in many\nAfrican countries, slaves are allowed by custom to rid themselves of\ntyrannical or neglectful masters.[33] The Barea and Bazes have a law\naccording to which a slave becomes free by simply leaving his\nlord.[34] Among the Manipuris, in Further India, if a slave flies from\none master and selects for himself another, it is presumed that he has\nbeen badly treated by the first one, and the fugitive can consequently\nnot be reclaimed.[35]\n\n[Footnote 22: _Supra_, p. 422 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 23: Post, _Afrikanische Jurisprudenz_, i. 95 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 24: _Ibid._ i. 96 _sq._ Tellier, in Steinmetz,\n_Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_, p. 169 (Kreis Kita). Lang, _ibid._ p. 241\n(Washambala).]\n\n[Footnote 25: Steinmetz, _Rechtsversh\u00e4ltnisse_, p. 43.]\n\n[Footnote 26: Post, _Afrikanische Jurisprudenz_, i. 101. Mademba, in\nSteinmetz, _Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_, p. 83 (natives of the Sansanding\nStates). Nicole, _ibid._ p. 118 (Diakit\u00e9-Sarracolese). Tellier,\n_ibid._ p. 169 _sqq._ (Kreis Kita).]\n\n[Footnote 27: _Glimpses of the Eastern Archipelago_, p. 106.]\n\n[Footnote 28: Post, _Afrikanische Jurisprudenz_, i. 111 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 29: _Ibid._ i. 111 _sq._ Tellier, in Steinmetz,\n_Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_, p. 170 (Kreis Kita), Senfft, _ibid._ p. 442\n(Marshall Islanders).]\n\n[Footnote 30: Post, _Grundriss der ethnologischen Jurisprudenz_, i.\n366. Nieboer, _op. cit._ pp. 38, 432. Nicole, in Steinmetz,\n_Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_, p. 118 (Diakit\u00e9-Sarracolese). Baskervilie,\n_ibid._ p. 194 (Waganda). Lang, _ibid._ p. 240 _sqq._ (Washambala).]\n\n[Footnote 31: Lang, in Steinmetz, _Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_, p. 242.]\n\n[Footnote 32: Post, _Afrikanische Jurisprudenz_, i. 102 _sqq._ _Idem_,\n_Grundriss der ethnologischen Jurisprudenz_, i. 377. Steinmetz,\n_Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_, p. 168. Pechuel-Loesche, 'Aus dem Leben der\nLoango-Neger,' in _Globus_, xxxii. 238.]\n\n[Footnote 33: See also Post, _Afrikanische Jurisprudenz_, i. 102\n_sqq._; Munzinger, _Ostafrikanische Studien_, p. 309 (Beni Amer);\n_Idem_, _Die Sitten und das Recht der Bogos_, p. 43.]\n\n[Footnote 34: Munzinger, _Ostafrikanische Studien_, p. 484.]\n\n[Footnote 35: Dalton, _Descriptive Ethnology of Bengal_, p. 51.]\n\nA slave among the lower races can thus by no means be described as a\nbeing destitute of all rights. As a rule, it seems, he is treated\nkindly, very commonly as an inferior member of the family.[36] Among\nthe Aleuts a slave suffering want would bring dishonour upon his\nmaster.[37] The South American Mbay\u00e1s, says Azara, {679} \"aiment\nextraordinairement tous leurs esclaves; jamais ils ne leur commandent\nd'un ton imperieux; jamais ils ne les reprimandent, ni ne les\nch\u00e2tient, ni ne les vendent, quand m\u00eame ce seraient des prisonniers de\nguerre. . . . Quel contraste avec le traitement que les europ\u00e9ens font\n\u00e9prouver aux africains!\"[38] In West Africa \"the condition of slavery\nis not regarded as degrading, and a slave is not considered an\ninferior being.\"[39] On the Gold Coast, with the exception of the\nunpleasant liability of being sent at any moment to serve his master\nin the other world, the lot of a slave is not generally one of\nhardship, but is on the whole far better than that of the agricultural\nlabourer in England. The slave is generally considered a member of the\nfamily, and if native-born succeeds in some cases in default of an\nheir to the property of his master.[40] In the Yoruba country it was\nquite common for a slave to be named by his master in his last will to\nbe the factor or general manager of the estate, and to be left to take\ncare of the entire establishment.[41] Among the Kreis Kita, of the\nFrench Soudan, the master calls his domestic slaves his sons, and they\ncall him their father; nay, the natural guardian of an heir who is not\nyet of age is not his mother, but the eldest domestic slave of the\nhousehold.[42] Speaking of the natives in the region of Lake Nyassa,\nMr. Macdonald remarks that most Africans like to see their slaves\nbecome rich; \"Are they not,\" they say, \"our own children?\"[43] Among\nthe Wabondei, \"if a man buys a slave, he calls his own children and\nsays, 'Behold your brother.' The slave is treated as a son, and is\nneither beaten nor tied.\"[44] In Madagascar the slaves \"are kindly\ntreated by their masters, they are considered as a kind of inferior\nmembers of the family to whom they belong, and many of the slaves have\na {680} practical freedom of action to which the free population are\nquite strangers.\"[45] The slavery prevalent among the native races of\nthe Malay Archipelago is generally mild. In Borneo, says Mr. Boyle,\n\"we always found a difficulty in distinguishing the servile portion of\na household from the freeborn population, and the honours and\ndistinctions open to the latter class are likewise accessible to the\nformer.\"[46] The slave-debtors of the Dyaks are \"just as happy in this\nstate--living in their creditors' houses and working on their\nfarms--as if perfectly free, enjoying all the liberty of their\nmasters.\"[47] Among the Chittagong Hill tribes the debtor-slaves were\ntreated as members of the creditor's family, and were never exposed to\nharsh usage.[48] Among the K\u00e1firs of the Hindu-Kush slaves are\nsometimes chosen among the annually elected magistracy, and Sir Scott\nRobertson knew of a case in which a master and his slave went through\nthe ceremony of brotherhood together.[49]\n\n[Footnote 36: _Ibid._ pp. 51 (Manipuris), 58 (Garos). Lewin, _Hill\nTracts of Chittagong_, p. 34 _sq._ _Idem_, _Wild Races of\nSouth-Eastern India_, p. 90 (Chittagong Hill tribes). Colquhoun,\n_Amongst the Shans_, p. 267. Mouhot, _Travels in the Central Parts of\nIndo-China_, i. 250 (Sti\u00eans). Riedel, _De sluik- en kroesharige rassen\ntusschen Selebes en Papua_, pp. 194 (Watubela Islanders), 293 (people\nof Tenimber and Timor-laut), 434 (people of Wetter). Earl, _op. cit._\np. 81 (Papuans of Dorey). New, _Life, Wanderings, and Labours in\nEastern Africa_, p. 128 (Wanika). Chanler, _Through Jungle and\nDesert_, p. 404 (Eastern Africans). Baumann, _Usambara_, p. 141\n(Wabondei). Felkin, in _Proceed. Roy. Soc. Edinburgh_, xiii. 746;\nBaskerville, in Steinmetz, _Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_, p. 194 (Waganda).\n_Ibid._ p. 43 (Banaka and Bapuku). Mademba, _ibid._ p. 84 (natives of\nthe Sansanding States). Nicole, _ibid._ p. 118 (Diakit\u00e9-Sarracolese).\nLang, _ibid._ p. 242 (Washambala). Desoignies, _ibid._ p. 278\n(Msalala). Kraft, _ibid._ p. 291 (Wapokomo). Reade, _Savage Africa_,\np. 582. Rowley, _Africa Unveiled_, pp. 174, 176. Steinmetz,\n_Ethnologische Studien zur ersten Entwicklung der Strafe_, i. 313.\nNieboer, _op. cit._ pp. 52, 78, 79, 81, 141-143, 305, 439, _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 37: Veniaminof, quoted by Petroff, _loc. cit._ p. 152.]\n\n[Footnote 38: Azara, _op. cit._ ii. 110.]\n\n[Footnote 39: Ellis, _E[(w]e-speaking Peoples of the Slave Coast_,\np. 219. See also Wilson, _Western Africa_, pp. 179, 180, 271 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 40: Ellis, _Tshi-speaking Peoples of the Gold Coast_, p. 290.]\n\n[Footnote 41: MacGregor, 'Lagos, Abeokuta, and the Alake,' in _Jour.\nAfrican Soc._ 1904, p. 473.]\n\n[Footnote 42: Tellier, in Steinmetz, _Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_, p. 169.]\n\n[Footnote 43: Macdonald, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxii. 102.]\n\n[Footnote 44: Dale, _ibid._ xxv. 230.]\n\n[Footnote 45: Sibree, _The Great African Island_, p. 181. See also\nLittle, _Madagascar_, p. 77; Ellis, _History of Madagascar_, i. 196.]\n\n[Footnote 46: Boyle, _Adventures among the Dyaks of Borneo_, p. 284.]\n\n[Footnote 47: Low, _Sarawak_, p. 302. See also St. John, _Life in the\nForests of the Far East_, i. 83; Bock, _Head-Hunters of Borneo_, p.\n210; K\u00fckenthal, _Ergebnisse einer zoologischen Forschungsreise in den\nMolukken und Borneo_, i. 276 (Kyans); Crawford, _History of the Indian\nArchipelago_, i. 52; Raffles, _op. cit._ i. 352; Marsden, _History of\nSumatra_, p. 253; Junghuhn, _op. cit._ ii. 150 (Bataks).]\n\n[Footnote 48: Lewin, _Hill Tracts of Chittagong_, p. 34.]\n\n[Footnote 49: Scott Robertson, _K\u00e1firs of the Hindu-Kush_, p. 100 _sq._]\n\nIt appears that intra-tribal slaves, especially such as are born in\nthe house, are generally treated better than extra-tribal or purchased\nslaves,[50] and that slaves are most oppressed by their masters when\nthey belong to a different race.[51] We are told that among the South\nAmerican Guaycurus the two causes of slavery, captivity and birth,\nimply a certain difference of caste, which is maintained {681} with\ngreat rigour.[52] Mungo Park observes that in Africa the domestic\nslaves or such as are born in their master's house are treated more\nleniently than those who are purchased.[53] \"I was told,\" he says,\n\"that the Mandingo master can neither deprive his slave of life, nor\nsell him to a stranger, without first calling a palaver on his\nconduct, or, in other words, bringing him to a public trial; but this\ndegree of protection is extended only to the native or domestic\nslave.\"[54] Tuckey makes exactly the same observation as regards the\nnatives of Congo.[55] On the Gold Coast slaves are of three\nkinds--native-born, imported, and prisoners of war; and \"a distinction\nis always made between the first and the two latter, who are treated\nwith far less consideration.\"[56] Speaking of the Central African\ntribes generally, Mr. Rowley states that slavery assumes a much\nseverer character among the pastoral than among the agricultural\ntribes, because the slaves of the former are for the most part\ncaptives of war, whereas those of the latter have rarely been acquired\nby conquest but mostly by inheritance. Among the agricultural tribes,\nhe adds, persons who are in bondage are not called slaves but\nchildren, and those to whom they are in bondage are not called masters\nbut fathers.[57] Among the K\u00e1firs of the Hindu-Kush all slaves \"are\nnot of the same social position, for the house slave is said to be\nmuch higher in grade than the artisan slave. . . . The domestic slaves\nlive with their masters.\"[58]\n\n[Footnote 50: Munzinger, _Ostafrikanische Studien_, p. 484 _sq._\n(Barea and Kun\u00e1ma). New, _op. cit._ p. 56 (Waswahili). Baumann,\n_Usambara_, p. 61 (natives of the Tanga Coast). Sarbah, _op. cit._ p.\n6 _sq._ (Fantis). Nicole, in Steinmetz, _Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_ p. 118\n_sq._ (Diakit\u00e9-Sarracolese). Tellier, _ibid._ p. 169 (Kreis Kita).\nBeverley, _ibid._ p. 213 (Wagogo). Sibree, _op. cit._ p. 256 _sq._\n(natives of Madagascar). Post, _Afrikanische Jurisprudenz_, i. 88 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 51: Mademba, in Steinmetz, _Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_, p. 84\n(natives of the Sansanding States). Sibree, _op. cit._ p. 181 (natives\nof Madagascar).]\n\n[Footnote 52: von Spix and von Martius, _Travels in Brazil_, ii. 74.]\n\n[Footnote 53: Mungo Park, _op. cit._ p. 262.]\n\n[Footnote 54: _Ibid._ p. 19.]\n\n[Footnote 55: Tuckey, _op. cit._ p. 367.]\n\n[Footnote 56: Ellis, _Tshi-speaking Peoples_, p. 289.]\n\n[Footnote 57: Rowley, _Africa Unveiled_, p. 174 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 58: Scott Robertson, _op. cit._ p. 99 _sq._]\n\nAmong the nations of archaic civilisation slavery presents essentially\nthe same characteristics as among the lower races. In ancient Mexico\nthere were various classes of slaves--prisoners of war, criminals\ncondemned to lose their freedom, children sold by their parents, and\npersons who had sold themselves. The relations between master and\nslave are represented as friendly.[59] \"Slavery {682} in Mexico.\" says\nMr. Bancroft, \"was, according to all accounts, a moderate subjection,\nconsisting merely of an obligation to render personal service, nor\ncould that be exacted without allowing the slave a certain amount of\ntime to labour for his own advantage.\"[60] Masters could not sell\ntheir slaves without their consent, unless they were slaves with a\ncollar, that is, runaway, rebellious, or vicious slaves, who in spite\nof two or three warnings did not mend their behaviour.[61] Their\nchildren were invariably born free;[62] and when their masters died\nthey generally became free themselves.[63]\n\n[Footnote 59: Bancroft, _Native Races of the Pacific States_, ii. 217,\n221.]\n\n[Footnote 60: Bancroft, _Native Races of the Pacific States_, ii. 220\n_sq._]\n\n[Footnote 61: Clavigero, _History of Mexico_, i. 360.]\n\n[Footnote 62: Bancroft, _op. cit._ ii. 221.]\n\n[Footnote 63: Clavigero, _op. cit._ i. 360.]\n\nIn China the slave class is composed of prisoners of war, of persons\nwho sell themselves or are sold by others, and of the children of\nslaves;[64] and in former days public slavery was a punishment for\ncrime.[65] It is true that the penal code forbids the sale of free\npersons; according to the letter of the text even the father of a\nfamily must not sell his children,[66] and persons who voluntarily\nsubmit themselves to be sold are punished by law.[67] But these\nregulations are frequently transgressed; in times of distress children\nare often sold by their parents, and the kidnapping of children is an\neven more common source from which the supply of slaves is kept\nup.[68] The master's power over his slave is not quite absolute,[69]\nbut it seems to be fully as great as the father's power over his\nchild.[70] A master who falsely accuses his slave suffers no\npunishment for it; on the other hand, a slave cannot complain in a\ncourt of justice of ill-treatment from his master.[71] Yet the\ncondition of slaves in China is generally easy enough.[72] \"In all\nChinese families of 'the upper ten {683} thousand,' an intimacy exists\nbetween masters and men-servants on the one hand, and mistresses and\nfemale servants on the other. Servants not unfrequently make\nsuggestions in reference to the well-being of the family, and in many\ninstances, domestic matters of a grave nature are discussed before\nthem.\"[73] In Chinese novels the servant is the confidant of his\nmaster, and harsh behaviour towards slaves is only attributed to\nvicious persons;[74] according to the Divine Panorama, he who beats or\ninjures his slave without estimating the punishment by the fault is\ntormented in hell.[75] Many travellers have pointed out the difference\nbetween the comparatively happy condition of slaves in China and the\ndegraded position of the former negro slaves in European colonies and\nthe United States of America.[76] \"In China,\" it is observed, \"the\nidentity of blood, colour, race, and habit between master and servant,\noperates as a restraint on the avarice, vices, and cruelty of the\nformer, which would not be the case if they were of different races as\nin America.\"[77]\n\n[Footnote 64: Biot, 'M\u00e9moire sur la condition des esclaves et des\nserviteurs gag\u00e9s en Chine,' in _Journal Asiatique_, ser. iii. vol.\niii. 257 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 65: _Ibid._ p. 249 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 66: _Supra_, p. 607.]\n\n[Footnote 67: _Ta Tsing Leu Lee_, sec. cclxxv. p. 201.]\n\n[Footnote 68: Biot, _loc. cit._ p. 260. Giles, _Strange Stories from a\nChinese Studio_, p. 211, n. 8. Gray, _China_, i. 241, 242, 246.]\n\n[Footnote 69: _Supra_, p. 424.]\n\n[Footnote 70: Gray, _op. cit._ i. 243 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 71: Biot, _op. cit._ p. 292. _Ta Tsing Leu Lee_, sec.\ncccxxxvii. p. 373.]\n\n[Footnote 72: Biot, _loc. cit._ p. 296 _sq._ Giles, _op. cit._ i. 211\n_sq._ n. 8. Gray, _op. cit._ i. 245. Wells Williams, _The Middle\nKingdom_, i. 413. Douglas, _Society in China_, p. 349.]\n\n[Footnote 73: Gray, _op. cit._ i. 247.]\n\n[Footnote 74: Biot, _loc. cit._ p. 296.]\n\n[Footnote 75: Giles, _op. cit._ ii. 377.]\n\n[Footnote 76: Biot, _loc. cit._ p. 297 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 77: _Chinese Repository_, xviii. 362.]\n\nIt has been suggested that in ancient Egypt the aboriginal inhabitants\nof the country were made slaves by the conquering race. \"Si nous\nconsultons les monuments,\" says M. Am\u00e9lineau, \"nous remarquons dans\nles peintures qui ornent les parois des tombeaux de Saqqarah une\ncertaine race d'hommes sur laquelle Mariette avait d\u00e9j\u00e0 appel\u00e9\nl'attention. . . . Je crois que ce sont l\u00e0 des esclaves, vieux restes\ndes populations primitives soumises par les conqu\u00e9rants nouvellement\narriv\u00e9s dans la vall\u00e9e du Nil, descendants des premi\u00e8res tribus\nhumaines qui s'\u00e9taient install\u00e9es en \u00c9gypt.\"[78] During the eighteenth\nand nineteenth dynasties, which form the chief period of Egypt's\nforeign conquests, mention is frequently made of the employment of\nprisoners of war as slaves. Every Pharao of these dynasties recounts\nhow he filled the god Amon's storehouses with male and female slaves\nfrom his {684} spoil. These slaves are occasionally represented in\ntombs; thus in the tomb of Rekhmere some slaves who are making bricks\nand building a wall are designated as \"the spoil which his Majesty\nbrought for the construction of the temple of Amon.\"[79] M. Am\u00e9lineau\nbelieves that slavery was in Egypt milder than in Greece and Rome.[80]\nAccording to the Book of the Dead, the pity of the god extends to\nslaves; not only does he command that no one should ill-treat them\nhimself, but he forbids that their masters should be led to ill-treat\nthem.[81]\n\n[Footnote 78: Am\u00e9lineau, _Essai sur l'\u00e9volution des id\u00e9es morales dans\nl'\u00c9gypt Ancienne_, p. 78.]\n\n[Footnote 79: For these statements I am indebted to my friend Dr. Alan\nGardiner.]\n\n[Footnote 80: Am\u00e9lineau, _op. cit._ p. 349.]\n\n[Footnote 81: _Book of the Dead_, ch. 125. _Cf._ Maspero, _Dawn of\nCivilization_, p. 191.]\n\nIn ancient Chald\u00e6a, beneath the free Semite and Sumerian population,\nthere was a class of slaves largely consisting of captives from\nforeign races and their descendants, but continually reinforced by\nindividuals of the native race such as foundlings, women sold by their\nhusbands, children sold by their fathers, and probably debtors whom\ntheir creditors had deprived of their liberty.[82] Their position was\nevidently not one of excessive hardship.[83] As a rule, they were\npermitted to marry and bring up a family; and it seems that masters,\nwhen selling their slaves, as much as possible avoided separating\nparents and children.[84] The master often apprenticed the children of\nhis slaves, and as soon as they knew a trade he set them up in\nbusiness in his own name, allowing them a share in the profits.[85] A\nslave could hire himself out for wages, and could himself acquire\nslaves to work for him.[86] He was even entitled to purchase his\nfreedom.[87] \"La loi babylonienne,\" says M. Oppert, \"lassait aux\nesclaves sur quelques points {685} plus de pr\u00e9rogatives que le Code\nfran\u00e7ais n'en accorde \u00e0 nos \u00e9pouses.\"[88]\n\n[Footnote 82: Meissner, _Beitr\u00e4ge zur altbabylonischen Privatrecht_,\np. 6. Oppert, 'La condition des esclaves \u00e0 Babylone,' in _Acad\u00e9mie des\nInscriptions et Belles-Lettres--Comptes rendus des s\u00e9ances de l'ann\u00e9e_\n1888, ser. iv. vol. xvi. 122. Maspero, _op. cit._ p. 743.]\n\n[Footnote 83: Meissner, _op. cit._ p. 7. Oppert, _loc. cit._ p. 121\n_sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 84: Oppert, _loc. cit._ p. 125 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 85: Kohler and Peiser, _Aus dem babylonischen Rechtsleben_,\nii, 52 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 86: Oppert, _loc. cit._ pp. 122, 128.]\n\n[Footnote 87: Meissner, _op. cit._ p. 7. Oppert, _loc. cit._ p. 122.\nOppert and M\u00e9nant, _Documents juridiques de l'Assyrie et de la\nChald\u00e9e_, p. 14.]\n\n[Footnote 88: Oppert, _loc. cit._ p. 121.]\n\nAmong the Hebrews the slave class consisted of captives taken in\nwar;[89] of persons bought with money from neighbouring nations or\nfrom foreign residents in the land;[90] of children of slaves born in\nthe house;[91] of native Hebrews who had been sold by their\nfathers,[92] or who either alone or with their wives and children had\nfallen into slavery in consequence of poverty,[93] or who had been\nsold by the authorities as slaves on account of theft when unable to\npay compensation for the stolen property.[94] To deprive an Israelite\nof his freedom for any other reason, to steal him, use him as a slave,\nor sell him, was a crime punishable with death.[95] And even the\nIsraelite who lost his liberty because he had become poor on account\nof poverty was not to be treated in the same way as the slave of\nforeign origin. He could not be compelled to serve as a bondservant,\nonly as a hired servant.[96] He should not be ruled over with\nrigour.[97] He might not only be redeemed at any time by his\nrelatives, but if not redeemed he was bound to receive his freedom\nwithout payment in the seventh year, and then the master should not\nlet him go away empty, but furnish him liberally out of his flock, his\nfloor, and his wine-press.[98] Slaves of foreign extraction, on the\nother hand, were not to be emancipated, but should remain slaves for\never, descending to children and children's children.[99] But in no\ncase had the master absolute power over his slave. Whether the latter\nwas an Israelite or a foreigner, his life, and to some extent his\nbody, were protected by law;[100] and if a slave escaped from a hard\nmaster, he {686} should not be given up, but be allowed to live\nunmolested in the place which he should choose in one of the cities of\nIsrael.[101] From everything that we read about slaves among the\nHebrews it appears that they were regarded as inferior members of the\nfamily, and that the house-father cared for their well-being hardly\nless than for that of his own children.[102] In the Talmud masters are\nrepeatedly admonished to treat their slaves with kindness;[103]\ntraffic in human beings is regarded as an occupation which\nincapacitates the dealer to sit as judge;[104] and emancipation of\nslaves is practically encouraged in various ways,[105] in spite of the\ndictum of certain rabbis that he who emancipates his slave\ntransgresses the positive precept of Leviticus xxv. 46, \"They shall be\nyour bondmen for ever.\"[106]\n\n[Footnote 89: _Deuteronomy_, xx. 14.]\n\n[Footnote 90: _Leviticus_, xxv. 44 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 91: _Genesis_, xiv. 14.]\n\n[Footnote 92: _Exodus_, xxi. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 93: _Ibid._ xxi. 2 _sq._ _Leviticus_, xxv. 39, 47.]\n\n[Footnote 94: _Exodus_, xxii. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 95: _Ibid._ xxi. 16. _Deuteronomy_, xxiv. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 96: _Leviticus_, xxv. 39, 40, 53.]\n\n[Footnote 97: _Ibid._ xxv. 43, 46, 53.]\n\n[Footnote 98: _Exodus_, xxi. 2. _Leviticus_, xxv. 40, 41, 48 _sqq._\n_Deuteronomy_, xv. 12 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 99: _Leviticus_, xxv. 44 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 100: _Supra_, pp. 424, 516.]\n\n[Footnote 101: _Deuteronomy_, xxiii. 15 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 102: See Mielziner, _Die Verh\u00e4ltnisse der Sklaven bei den\nalten Hebr\u00e4ern_, p. 61 _sqq._; Andr\u00e9, _L'esclavage chez les anciens\nH\u00e9breux_, p. 149 _sqq._; Benzinger, 'Slavery,' in Cheyne and Black,\n_Encyclop\u00e6dia Biblica_, iv. 4657 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 103: Katz, _Der wahre Talmudjude_, p. 59 _sqq._ See also\n_Ecclesiasticus_, xxxiii. 31:--\"If thou have a servant, entreat him as\na brother: for thou hast need of him as of thine own soul.\"]\n\n[Footnote 104: Benny, _Criminal Code of the Jews according to the\nTalmud Massecheth Synhedrin_, p. 36.]\n\n[Footnote 105: Winter, _Die Stellung der Sklaven bei den Juden_, p. 41.]\n\n[Footnote 106: _Berakhoth_, fol. 47 B, quoted by Hershon, _Treasures\nof the Talmud_, p. 81. _R. Samuel_, quoted by Andr\u00e9, _op. cit._ p. 180\n_sq._]\n\nAccording to Islam, a Muhammedan who is born free can never become a\nslave. \"The slave,\" says Mr. Lane, \"is either a person taken captive\nin war or carried off by force from a foreign country, and being at\nthe time of capture an infidel; or the offspring of a female slave by\nanother slave, or by any man who is not her owner, or by her owner if\nhe do not acknowledge himself to be the father.\"[107] The slave should\nbe treated with kindness; the Prophet said, \"A man who behaves ill to\nhis slave will not enter into Paradise.\"[108] The master should give\nto his slaves of the food which he eats himself, and of the clothes\nwith which he clothes himself.[109] He should not {687} order them to\ndo anything beyond their power, and in the hot season, during the\nhottest hours of the day, he should let them rest.[110] He may marry\nthem to whom he will, but he may not separate them when married.[111]\nHe may, generally, give them away or sell them as he pleases, but he\nmust not separate a mother from her child. The Prophet said, \"Whoever\nis the cause of separation between mother and child, by selling or\ngiving, God will separate him from his friends on the day of\nresurrection.\"[112] Nor is a master allowed to alienate a female slave\nwho has borne to him a child which he recognises as his own; and at\nhis death the mother is entitled to emancipation.[113] To liberate a\nslave is regarded as an act highly acceptable to God, and as an\nexpiation for certain sins.[114] These rules, it should be added, are\nnot only recognised in theory, but derive additional support from\ngeneral usage. In the Muhammedan world the slave generally lives on\neasy terms with his master. He is often treated as a member of the\nfamily, and occasionally exercises much influence upon its\naffairs.[115] In certain countries at least, it is held disreputable\nor disgraceful for a person to sell his slave, except perhaps in case\nof absolute necessity or in consequence of intolerable behaviour on\nthe part of the slave.[116] In Persia custom demands that on certain\nfestive occasions, such as the birth of a child or a wedding, one\n{688} or several of the slaves of the family should be set free;[117]\nand both there and in other Muhammedan countries testamentary\nmanumissions are of frequent occurrence.[118] In Morocco a slave is\nsometimes allowed a certain amount of liberty that he may earn enough\nto buy his freedom;[119] whilst among the Bedouins of the Arabian\nDesert described by Burckhardt, slaves are always emancipated after a\ncertain lapse of time.[120] No stigma attaches to the emancipated\nslave. It has been truly said that in Islam slavery is regarded as an\naccident, not as a \"constitution of nature,\"[121] hence the freedman\nis socially on an equal footing with a free-born citizen. He may\nwithout discredit marry his former master's daughter, and become the\nhead of the family. Emancipated slaves have repeatedly risen to the\nhighest offices, they have ruled kingdoms and founded dynasties.[122]\n\n[Footnote 107: Lane, _Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians_,\np. 116. _Cf._ Munzinger, _Ostafrikanische Studien_, p. 245 _sq._;\nAmeer Ali, _Life and Teachings of Mohammed_, p. 376 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 108: Lane, _Arabian Society in the Middle Ages_, p. 255.\nLane-Poole, _Speeches and Table-Talk of the Prophet Mohammad_, p. 163.]\n\n[Footnote 109: Lane, _Arabian Society_, p. 254. Lane-Poole,\n_Speeches_, p. 163.]\n\n[Footnote 110: Lane, _Arabian Society_, p. 254. Lane-Poole,\n_Speeches_, p. 163. Sachau, _Muhammedanisches Recht_, pp. 18, 102.]\n\n[Footnote 111: Lane, _Modern Egyptians_, p. 115.]\n\n[Footnote 112: _Ibid._ p. 115. Lane, _Arabian Society_, p. 255. Ameer\nAll, _Life of Mohammed_, p. 374 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 113: Lane, _Modern Egyptians_, p. 116.]\n\n[Footnote 114: _Koran_, xxiv. 33. Ameer Ali, _Life of Mohammed_, pp.\n373, 377. Beltrame, _Il S\u00e8nnaar e lo Sciang\u00e0llah_, i. 46. Lane,\n_Modern Egyptians_, p. 119.]\n\n[Footnote 115: Lane, _Arabian Society_, p. 253 _sqq._ Polak,\n_Persien_, i. 251, 255. Urquhart, _Spirit of the East_, ii. 403.\nBurton, _Pilgrimage to Al-Madinah & Mecca_, i. 61. Munzinger,\n_Ostafrikanische Studien_, p. 155. Beltrame, _Il S\u00e8nnaar_, i. 46\n_sqq._ Loir, 'L'esclavage en Tunisie,' in _Revue scientifique_, ser.\niv. vol. xii. 592 _sq._ Villot, _M[oe]urs, coutumes et institutions\ndes indig\u00e8nes de l'Alg\u00e9rie_, p. 250. Meakin, _Moors_, p. 133.\nChavanne, _Die Sahara_, p. 389 (Arabs of the Sahara). Pommerol, _Among\nthe Women of the Sahara_, p. 161 _sqq._ Dyveyrier, _Exploration du\nSahara_, p. 339. Hourst, _Sur le Niger et au pays des Touaregs_, p.\n206 (Touareg). Hanoteau and Letourneux, _La Kabylie_, ii. 143. Reade,\n_Savage Africa_, p. 582.]\n\n[Footnote 116: Polak, _Persien_, i. 250. Beltrame, _Il S\u00e8nnaar_, i.\n47, 248. Munzinger, _Ostafrikanische Studien_, p. 155.]\n\n[Footnote 117: Polak, _op. cit._ i. 250.]\n\n[Footnote 118: _Ibid._ i. 250. Meakin, _op. cit._ p. 139.]\n\n[Footnote 119: Meakin, _op. cit._ p. 139.]\n\n[Footnote 120: Burckhardt, _Notes on the Bedouins and Wah\u00e1bys_,\np. 202.]\n\n[Footnote 121: Ameer Ali, _Life of Mohammed_, p. 375.]\n\n[Footnote 122: _Ibid._ p. 375 _sq._ Bosworth Smith, _Mohammed and\nMohammedanism_, pp. 206, 211 _sq._]\n\nAccording to the Laws of Manu, the mythical legislator of ancient\nIndia, there are slaves of seven kinds, namely, \"he who is made a\ncaptive under a standard, he who serves for his daily food, he who is\nborn in the house, he who is bought and he who is given, he who is\ninherited from ancestors, and he who is enslaved by way of\npunishment.\"[123] The last mentioned class consists of persons who\nhave lost their freedom because they have been unable to pay a debt or\na fine, or because they have left a religious order.[124] The slave is\nnot necessarily a S\u00fbdra, or member of the lowest of the four Indian\ncastes, but Kshatriyas may become the slaves of Br\u00e2hmanas and Vaisyas\nof Br\u00e2hmanas and Kshatriyas.[125] On the other hand, the S\u00fbdras as\nsuch were not slaves, though it was their duty to serve the other\ncastes; they chose the persons to whom they would offer service, and\nclaimed adequate compensation.[126] {689} The power which a\nhouse-holder in India possessed over his slaves is not exactly\ndefined; but he is admonished not to have quarrels with them, and if\noffended by any of them, to bear it without resentment.[127] In\n\u00c2pastamba's Aphorisms it is said that a person may at his pleasure\nstint himself, his wife, or his children, \"but by no means a slave who\ndoes his work.\"[128] Elphinstone wrote in 1839 in his 'History of\nIndia':--\"Domestic slaves are treated exactly like servants, except\nthat they are more regarded as belonging to the family. I doubt if\nthey are ever sold; and they attract little observation, as there is\nnothing apparent to distinguish them from freemen.\"[129] The\npriesthood of modern Buddhism teach that there are five ways in which\na master ought to assist his slave:--\"He must not appoint the work of\nchildren to men, or of men to children, but to each according to his\nstrength; he must give each one his food and wages, according as they\nare required; when sick, he must free him from work, and provide him\nwith proper medicine; when the master has any agreeable and savoury\nfood, he must not consume the whole himself, but must impart a portion\nto others, even to his slaves; and if they work properly for a long\nperiod, or for a given period, they must be set free.\"[130]\n\n[Footnote 123: _Laws of Manu_, viii. 415.]\n\n[Footnote 124: B\u00fchler, in his translation of the Laws of Manu, in\n_Sacred Books of the East_, xxv. 326, n. 415.]\n\n[Footnote 125: _Ibid._ p. 326, n. 415.]\n\n[Footnote 126: Ingram, _History of Slavery and Serfdom_, p. 272.]\n\n[Footnote 127: _Laws of Manu_, iv. 180, 185.]\n\n[Footnote 128: _\u00c2pastamba_, ii. 4. 9. 11.]\n\n[Footnote 129: Elphinstone, _History of India_, p. 203.]\n\n[Footnote 130: Hardy, _Manual of Budhism_, p. 500.]\n\nIn Greece, especially in earlier times, capture in war, piracy, and\nkidnapping were common causes of slavery,[131] and the condition was\nhereditary. Other legitimate sources were exposure of infants, except\nat Thebes,[132] and sale of children by their parents.[133] At Athens\ninsolvent debtors became the slaves of their creditors up to the time\nof Solon;[134] and metics--that is, resident aliens--who did not\ndischarge the obligations imposed on them by the State, {690} were\nsold as slaves, as were also foreigners who had fraudulently possessed\nthemselves of the rights of citizens.[135] At least in a later age the\nmajority of slaves seem to have been of barbarian origin;[136] indeed,\nafter the Peloponnesian war the principle that captives taken in wars\nbetween Greek states should be ransomed and not enslaved was commonly\nrecognised, though not always followed in practice.[137] As we have\nseen, the master had not the power of life and death over his\nslave.[138] At sanctuaries the latter found a refuge from cruel\noppression.[139] If maltreated he could demand to be sold; and he\ncould purchase his liberty with his _peculium_ by agreement with his\nmaster.[140] But by manumission he only entered into an intermediate\ncondition between slavery and complete freedom; thus, at Athens the\nfreedman was in relation to the State a metic and in relation to his\nmaster a client.[141] Domestic slaves often lived on terms of intimacy\nwith their masters,[142] but as a class slaves were regarded with\ncontempt even by men like Plato and Aristotle. The former, whilst\nwarning his hearers against insolent and unjust behaviour towards\nslaves, observes that they should be treated with severity, not\nadmonished as if they were freemen, but punished, and only addressed\nin words of command.[143] Aristotle compares the relation of the\nmaster to his slave with that of the soul to the body and of the\ncraftsman to his tool, and adds that there can be friendship between\nthem only in so far as the slave is regarded not as a slave but as a\nfellow human being.[144] But whilst the state of slavery always\nentailed disgrace, the question was raised whether the master's power\nover his slave was based on justice or {691} on force, and in Greece,\nfor the first time, we meet with the opinion that the institution of\nslavery is contrary to Nature, and that it is the law which, unjustly,\nmakes one man a slave and another free.[145] However, Aristotle was no\ndoubt in general agreement with his age when he declared that the\nbarbarians, on account of their inferiority, are intended by Nature to\nbe the slaves of the Greeks.[146]\n\n[Footnote 131: Wallon, _Histoire de l'esclavage dans l'antiquit\u00e9_, i.\n161 _sqq._ Richter, _Die Sklaverei im griechischen Altertume_, p. 39\n_sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 132: Aelian, _Historia varia_, ii. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 133: Wallon. _op. cit._ i. 159 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 134: Plutarch, _Vita Solonis_, xiii. 4.]\n\n[Footnote 135: Wallon, _op. cit._ i. 160 _sq._ Richter, _op. cit._\np. 46.]\n\n[Footnote 136: Hermann-Bl\u00fcmner, _Lehrbuch der griechischen\nPrivatalterth\u00fcmer_, p. 86. Richter, _op. cit._ p. 48.]\n\n[Footnote 137: Schmidt, _Ethik der alten Griechen_, ii. 204, 205, 283.\nHermann-Bl\u00fcmner, _op. cit._ p. 86 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 138: _Supra_, p. 425.]\n\n[Footnote 139: Wallon, _op. cit._ i. 310 _sq._ Schmidt, _op. cit._ ii.\n218 _sq._ Richter, _op. cit._ p. 140 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 140: Ingram, _op. cit._ p. 27 _sq._ Wallon, _op. cit._ i. 335\n_sq._ Richter, _op. cit._ p. 151.]\n\n[Footnote 141: Richter, _op. cit._ p. 157. Wallon, _op. cit._ i. 346\n_sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 142: Schmidt, _op. cit._ ii. 212. Richter, _op. cit._ p. 151.]\n\n[Footnote 143: Plato, _Leges_, vi. 777 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 144: Aristotle, _Ethica Nicomachea_, viii. 11. 6 _sq._\n_Idem_, _Politica_, i. 5, p. 1254.]\n\n[Footnote 145: _Idem_, _Politica_, i. 3, p. 1253 b.]\n\n[Footnote 146: _Ibid._ i. 2, 6, pp. 1252 b, 1255 a. See Euripides,\n_Iphigenia in Aulide_, 1400 _sq._]\n\nThe Roman jurists held up slavery as a mitigation of the horrors of\nwar: the capture and preservation of enemies, they said, was its sole\nand exclusive origin in the past.[147] But in Rome as elsewhere, when\nonce established, it contained in itself the germ of extension; all\nthe children of a female slave followed the condition of the mother,\naccording to the principle applicable to the offspring of the lower\nanimals--\"Partus sequitur ventrem.\" And sooner or later, when these\nsources proved insufficient to maintain the supply, a regular commerce\nin slaves was established, which was based on the systematically\nprosecuted hunting of men in foreign lands.[148] To a much smaller\nextent the slave class was recruited by Roman citizens--by children\nsold by their fathers, by insolvent debtors, or by criminals condemned\nto servitude as a punishment for some heinous offence.[149] The idea\nof a Roman becoming the slave of a fellow-citizen was never quite\nagreeable to the Roman mind. According to an ancient law the debtor,\nafter being made over to the creditor, should be sold abroad or _trans\nTiberim_.[150] Subsequently, in 326 B.C., the creditor's lien was\nrestricted to the goods of his debtor, if the latter was a Roman\ncitizen;[151] and during the Pagan Empire the sale of freeborn {692}\nchildren by their fathers was prohibited.[152] The power, originally\nunlimited, which the master had over his slave was also, in the course\nof time, subjected to limitations. We have seen that since the days of\nClaudius and Antoninus Pius legal check was put on the master's right\nof killing his slave.[153] The Lex Petronia, A.D. 61, forbade masters\nto compel their slaves to fight with wild beasts.[154] In the time of\nNero an official was appointed to hear complaints of the wrongs done\nby masters to their slaves.[155] Antoninus Pius directed that slaves\ntreated with excessive cruelty, who had taken refuge at an altar or\nimperial image, should be sold; and this provision was extended to\ncases in which the master had employed a slave in a way degrading to\nhim or beneath his character.[156] In public auctions of slaves regard\nwas paid to the claims of relationship,[157] and in the interpretation\nof testaments it was assumed that members of the same family were not\nto be separated by the division of the succession.[158] In those days\nwhen Roman slavery had lost its original patriarchal and, to speak\nwith Mommsen,[159] \"in some measure innocent\" character, when the\nvictories of Rome and the increasing slave trade had introduced into\nthe city innumerable slaves, when those simpler habits of life which\nin early times somewhat mitigated the rigour of the law had\nchanged--the lot of the Roman slave was often extremely hard, and\nnumerous acts of shocking cruelty were committed.[160] But we also\nhear, from the early days of the Empire, that masters who had been\ncruel to their slaves were pointed at with disgust in all parts of the\ncity, and were hated and loathed.[161] And with a fervour which can\nhardly be surpassed Seneca and other Stoics argued that the slave is a\nbeing with human dignity and human rights, born of the same race as\nourselves, living the same life, {693} and dying the same death--in\nshort, that our slaves \"are also men, and friends, and our\nfellow-servants.\"[162] Epictetus even went so far as to condemn\naltogether the keeping of slaves, a radicalism explicable from the\nhistory of his own life. \"What you avoid suffering yourself,\" he says,\n\"seek not to impose on others. You avoid slavery, for instance; take\ncare not to enslave. For if you can bear to exact slavery from others,\nyou appear to have been yourself a slave.\"[163] These teachings could\nnot fail to influence both legislation and public sentiment. Imbued\nwith the Stoic philosophy, the jurists of the classical period\ndeclared that all men are originally free by the law of Nature, and\nthat slavery is only \"an institution of the Law of Nations, by which\none man is made the property of another, in opposition to natural\nright.\"[164]\n\n[Footnote 147: Hunter, _Exposition of Roman Law_, p. 160 _sq._\n_Institutiones_, i. 3. 3:--\"Slaves are called _servi_, because\ngenerals are wont to sell their captives, and so to preserve\n(_servare_), and not to destroy them. They are also called _mancipia_,\nbecause they are taken from the enemy with the strong hand (_manu\ncapiuntur_).\"]\n\n[Footnote 148: Mommsen, _History of Rome_, iii. 305 _sq._ Wallon, _op.\ncit._ ii. 46 _sqq._ Ingram, _op. cit._ p. 38.]\n\n[Footnote 149: Wallon, _op. cit._ ii. 18 _sqq._ Ingram, _op. cit._ p.\n39. _Institutiones_, i. 12. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 150: Mackenzie, _Studies in Roman Law_, p. 94.]\n\n[Footnote 151: Livy, _Histori\u00e6 Roman\u00e6_, viii. 28. Wallon, _op. cit._\nii. 29, n. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 152: _Supra_, p. 615.]\n\n[Footnote 153: _Supra_, p. 425 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 154: _Digesta_, xlviii. 8. 11. 2.]\n\n[Footnote 155: Seneca, _De beneficiis_, iii. 22. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 156: Wallon, _op. cit._ iii. 57 _sq._ Ingram, p. 63.]\n\n[Footnote 157: Hunter, _Exposition of Roman Law_, p. 159.]\n\n[Footnote 158: Wallon, _op. cit._ iii. 53.]\n\n[Footnote 159: Mommsen, _History of Rome_, iii. 305.]\n\n[Footnote 160: See Lecky, _History of Morals_, i. 302 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 161: Seneca, _De clementia_, i. 18. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 162: _Idem_, _Epistol\u00e6_, 47. _Idem_, _De beneficiis_, iii.\n28. Epictetus, _Dissertationes_, i. 13. See also the collection of\nstatements referring to slavery made by Holland, _Reign of the\nStoics_, p. 186 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 163: Epictetus, _Fragmenta_, 42.]\n\n[Footnote 164: _Institutiones_, i. 3. 2.]\n\nConsidering that Christianity has commonly been represented as almost\nthe sole cause of the mitigation and final abolishment of slavery in\nEurope, it deserves special notice that the chief improvement in the\ncondition of slaves at Rome took place at so early a period that\nChristianity could have absolutely no share in it. Nay, for about two\nhundred years after it was made the official religion of the Empire\nthere was an almost complete pause in the legislation on the\nsubject.[165] Under Justinian certain reforms were introduced:\n--enfranchisement was facilitated in various ways;[166] the rights of\nRoman citizens were granted to emancipated slaves, who had previously\noccupied an intermediate position between slavery and perfect\nfreedom;[167] and though the law still refused to recognise the\nmarriages of slaves, Justinian gave them a legal value after\nemancipation in establishing rights of succession.[168] But the inferior\nposition of the slave was asserted as sternly as ever. He belonged to\nthe {694} \"corporeal\" property of his master, he was reckoned among\nthings which are tangible by their nature, like land, raiment, gold, and\nsilver.[169] The constitution of Antoninus Pius restraining excessive\nseverity on the part of masters was enforced, but the motive for this\nwas not evangelic humanity.[170] It is said in the Institutes of\nJustinian, \"This decision is a just one; for it greatly concerns the\npublic weal, that no one be permitted to misuse even his own\nproperty.\"[171]\n\n[Footnote 165: _Cf._ Lecky, _History of European Morals_, ii. 64.]\n\n[Footnote 166: _Institutiones_, i. 5 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 167: _Ibid._ i. 5. 3; iii. 7. 4.]\n\n[Footnote 168: _Ibid._ iii. 7 pr.]\n\n[Footnote 169: _Institutiones_, ii. 2. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 170: _Cf._ Milman, _History of Latin Christianity_, ii. 14.]\n\n[Footnote 171: _Institutiones_, i. 8. 2.]\n\nIt is curious to note that the inconsistency of slavery with the\ntenet, \"Do to others as you would be done by,\" though emphasised by a\npagan philosopher, never seems to have occurred to any of the early\nChristian writers. Christianity recognised slavery from the beginning.\nThe principle that all men are spiritually equal in Christ does not\nimply that they should be socially equal in the world. Slavery does\nnot prevent anybody from performing the duties incumbent on a\nChristian, it does not bar the way to heaven, it is an external affair\nonly, nothing but a name. He only is really a slave who commits\nsin.[172] Slavery is of course a burden, but a burden which has been\nlaid upon the back of transgression. Man when created by God was free,\nand nobody was the slave of another until that just man Noah cursed\nHam, his offending son; slavery, then, is a punishment sent by Him who\nbest knows how to proportionate punishment to offence.[173] The slave\nhimself ought not to desire to become free,[174] nay, if the master\noffers him freedom he ought not to accept it.[175] Not one of the\nFathers even {695} hints that slavery is unlawful or improper.[176] In\nthe early age martyrs possessed slaves, and so did abbots, bishops,\npopes, monasteries, and churches;[177] Jews and pagans only were\nprohibited from acquiring Christian slaves.[178] So little was the\nabolition of slavery thought of that a Council at Orleans, in the\nmiddle of the sixth century, expressly decreed the perpetuity of\nservitude among the descendants of slaves.[179] On the other hand, the\nChurch showed a zeal to prevent accessions to slavery from capture,\nbut her exertions were restricted to Christian prisoners of war.[180]\nAs late as the nineteenth century the right of enslaving captives was\ndefended by Bishop Bouvier.[181]\n\n[Footnote 172: Gregory Nazianzen, _Orationes_, xiv. 25 (Migne,\n_Patrologi\u00e6 cursus_, Ser. Graeca, xxxv. 891 _sq._). _Idem_, _Carmina_,\ni. 2. 26. 29 (_ibid._ xxxvii. 853); i. 2. 33. 133 _sqq._ (_ibid._\nxxxvii. 937 _sq._). St. Chrysostom, _In cap. IX. Genes. Homilia XXIX._\n7 (_ibid._ liii. 270). _Idem_, _In Epist. I. ad Cor. Homilia XIX._ 5\n(_ibid._ lxi. 158). St. Ambrose, _In Epistolam ad Colossenses_, 3\n(Migne, _op. cit._ Ser. Lat. xvii. 439).]\n\n[Footnote 173: St. Augustine, _De civitate Dei_, xix. 15 (Migne, _op.\ncit._ xli. 643 _sq._).]\n\n[Footnote 174: St. Ignatius, _Epistola ad Polycarpum_, 4 (Migne, _op.\ncit._ Ser. Graeca, v. 723 _sq._). St. Augustine, _Ennaratio in Psalmum\nCXXIV._ 7 (Migne, _op. cit._ xxxvii. 1653).]\n\n[Footnote 175: Laurent, _\u00c9tudes sur l'histoire de l'humanit\u00e9_, iv. 117.]\n\n[Footnote 176: _Cf._ Babington, _Influence of Christianity in\nPromoting the Abolition of Slavery in Europe_, p. 29.]\n\n[Footnote 177: _Ibid._ p. 22. Potgiesser, _Commentarii juris Germanici\nde statu servorum_, i. 4. 8, p. 176. Muratori, _Dissertazioni sopra le\nantichit\u00e0 italiane_, i. 244.]\n\n[Footnote 178: _Concilium Toletanum IV._ A.D. 633, can. 66\n(Labbe-Mansi, _Sacrorum Conciliorum collectio_, x. 635). Blakey,\n_Temporal Benefits of Christianity_, p. 397. Digby, _Mores Catholici_,\nii. 341. Cibrano, _Della schiavit\u00f9 e del servaggio_, i. 272. Rivi\u00e8re,\n_L'\u00c9glise et l'esclavage_, p. 350.]\n\n[Footnote 179: _Concilium Aurelianense IV._ about A.D. 545, can. 32\n(Labbe-Mansi, _op. cit._ ix. 118 _sq._).]\n\n[Footnote 180: _Concilium Rhemense_, about A.D. 630, can. 22\n(Labbe-Mansi, _op. cit._ x. 597). Gratian, _Decretum_, ii. 12. 2. 13\n_sqq._ Baronius, _Annales Ecclesiastici_, A.D. 1263, ch. 74 vol. xxii.\n124. Le Blant, _Inscriptions chr\u00e9tiennes de la Gaule_, ii. 284 _sqq._\nBabington, _op. cit._ pp. 51 _sqq._, 94 _sq._ Nys, _Le droit de la\nguerre et les pr\u00e9curseurs de Grotius_, p. 114.]\n\n[Footnote 181: Bouvier, _Institutiones philosophic\u00e6_, p. 566.]\n\nThe Apostles reminded slaves of their duties towards their masters and\nmasters of their duties towards their slaves.[182] The same was done\nby Councils and Popes. The Council of Gangra, about the year 324,\npronounced its anathema on anyone who should teach a slave to despise\nhis master on pretence of religion;[183] and so much importance was\nattached to this decree that it was inserted in the epitome of canons\nwhich Hadrian I. in 773 presented to Charlemagne in Rome.[184] But\nthere are also many instances in which masters are recommended to show\nhumanity to their slaves.[185] According to Gregory IX. {696} \"the\nslaves who were washed in the fountain of holy baptism should be more\nliberally treated in consideration of their having received so great a\nbenefit.\"[186] Slaves who had taken refuge from their masters in\nchurches or monasteries were not to be given up until the master had\nsworn not to punish the fugitive;[187] or they were never given up,\nbut became slaves to the sanctuary.[188] The Church, as we have seen,\nprotected the life of the slave by excommunicating for a couple of\nyears masters who killed their slaves.[189] She prohibited the sale of\nChristian slaves to Jews and heathen nations.[190] The Council of\nChalons, in the middle of the seventh century, ordered that no\nChristians should be sold outside the kingdom of Clovis, so that they\nmight not get into captivity or become the slaves of Jewish\nmasters;[191] and some Anglo-Saxon laws similarly forbade the sale of\nChristians out of the country, and especially into bondage to heathen,\n\"that those souls perish not that Christ bought with his own\nlife.\"[192] The clergy sometimes remonstrated against slave markets;\nbut their indignation never reached the trade in heathen slaves,[193]\nnor was the master's right of selling any of his slaves whenever he\npleased called in question at all. The assertion made by many writers\nthat the Church exercised an extremely favourable influence upon\nslavery[194] surely involves a great exaggeration. As late as the\nthirteenth century the master practically had the power of life and\ndeath over his slave.[195] Throughout Christendom the purchase and\n{697} the sale of men, as property transferred from vendor to buyer,\nwas recognised as a legal transaction of the same validity with the\nsale of other merchandise, land or cattle.[196] Slaves had a title to\nnothing but subsistence and clothes from their masters, all the\nprofits of their labour accruing to the latter; and if a master from\nindulgence gave his slaves any _peculium_, or fixed allowance for\ntheir subsistence, they had no right of property in what they saved\nout of that, but all that they accumulated belonged to their\nmaster.[197] A slave or a freedman was not allowed to bring a criminal\ncharge against a free person, except in the case of a _crimen l\u00e6s\u00e6\nmajestatis_,[198] and slaves were incapable of being received as\nwitnesses against freemen.[199] The old distinction between the\nmarriage of the freeman and the concubinage of the slave was long\nrecognised by the Church: slaves could not marry, but had only a right\nof _contubernium_, and their unions did not receive the nuptial\nbenediction of a priest.[200] Subsequently, when conjunction between\nslaves came to be considered a lawful marriage, they were not\npermitted to marry without the consent of their master, and such as\ntransgressed this rule were punished very severely, sometimes even\nwith death.[201]\n\n[Footnote 182: _Ephesians_, vi. 5 _sqq._ _Colossians_, iii. 22 _sqq._;\niv. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 183: _Concilium Gangrense_, about A.D. 324, can. 3\n(Labbe-Mansi, _op. cit._ ii. 1102, 1106, 1110).]\n\n[Footnote 184: 'Epitome canonum, quam Hadrianus I. Carolo magno\nobtulit, A.D. DCCLXXIII.' in Labbe-Mansi, _op. cit._ xii. 863.]\n\n[Footnote 185: Babington, _op. cit._ p. 58 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 186: Baronius, _Annales Ecclesiastici_, A.D. 1238, ch. 62,\nvol. xxi. 204.]\n\n[Footnote 187: Milman, _op. cit._ ii. 51. Rivi\u00e8re, _op. cit._ p. 306.\nDu Boys, _Histoire du droit criminel des peuples modernes_, ii. 246,\nn. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 188: 'Concilium Kingesburiense sub Bertulpho,' in Wilkins,\n_Concilia Magn\u00e6 Britanni\u00e6 et Hiberni\u00e6_, i. 181.]\n\n[Footnote 189: _Supra_, p. 426.]\n\n[Footnote 190: _Concilium Rhemense_, about A.D. 630, can. 11\n(Labbe-Mansi, _op. cit._ x. 596). _Concilium Liptinense_, A.D. 743,\ncan. 3 (_ibid._ xii. 371). Hefele, _Beitr\u00e4ge zur Kirchengeschichte_,\ni. 218. _Idem_, _History of the Councils of the Church_, v. 211.]\n\n[Footnote 191: _Concilium Cabilonense_, about A.D. 650, can. 9\n(Labbe-Mansi, _op. cit._ x. 1191).]\n\n[Footnote 192: _Laws of Ethelred_, v. 2; vi. 9. _Laws of Cnut_, ii. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 193: H\u00fcllmann, _St\u00e6dtewesen des Mittelalters_, i. 80 _sq._\nLoring Brace, _Gesta Christi_, p. 229. Rivi\u00e8re, _op. cit._ p. 325.]\n\n[Footnote 194: Yanoski, _De l'abolition de l'esclavage ancien au moyen\nage_, p. 74 _sq._ Allard, _Les esclaves chr\u00e9tiens depuis les premiers\ntemps de l'\u00c9glise_, p. 487; &c.]\n\n[Footnote 195: _Supra_, p. 427 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 196: Potgiesser, _op. cit._ ii. 4. 5, p. 429. Milman, _op.\ncit._ ii. 16.]\n\n[Footnote 197: Potgiesser, _op. cit._ ii. 10, p. 528 _sqq._ Du Cange,\n_Glossarium ad scriptores medi\u00e6 et infim\u00e6 Latinitatis_, vi. 451.\nRobertson, _History of the Reign of the Emperor Charles V._ i. 274.]\n\n[Footnote 198: Potgiesser, _op. cit._ iii. 3. 2, p. 612.]\n\n[Footnote 199: Beaumanoir, _Coutumes du Beauvoisis_, xxxix. 32, vol.\nii, 103. Du Cange, _op. cit._ vi. 452. Potgiesser, _op. cit._ iii. 3.\n1, p. 611.]\n\n[Footnote 200: Potgiesser, _op. cit._ ii. 2. 10 _sq._, p. 354 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 201: _Ibid._ ii. 2. 12, p. 355 _sq._]\n\nThe gradual disappearance of slavery in Europe during the latter part\nof the Middle Ages has also commonly been in the main attributed to\nthe influence of the Church.[202] But this opinion is hardly supported\nby facts. It is true that the Church in some degree encouraged the\nmanumission of slaves. Though slavery was considered a {698} perfectly\nlawful institution, the enfranchisement of a fellow-Christian was\ndeemed a meritorious act, and was sometimes strongly recommended on\nChristian principles. At the close of the sixth century it was\naffirmed that, as Christ had come to break the chain of our servitude\nand restore our primitive liberty, so it was well for us to imitate\nHim by making free those whom the law of nations had reduced to\nslavery;[203] and the same doctrine was again proclaimed at various\ntimes down to the sixteenth century.[204] In the Carlovingian period\nthe abbot Smaragdus expressed the opinion that among other good and\nsalutary works each one ought to let slaves go free, considering that\nnot nature but sin had subjected them to their masters.[205] In the\nlatter part of the twelfth century the prelates of France, and in\nparticular the Archbishop of Sens, pretended that it was an obligation\nof conscience to accord liberty to all Christians, relying on a decree\nof a Council held at Rome by Pope Alexander III.[206] And in one of\nthe later compilations of German medi\u00e6val law it was said that the\nLord Jesus, by his injunction to render unto C\u00e6sar the things which\nare C\u00e6sar's and unto God the things that are God's, indicated that no\nman is the property of another, but that every man belongs to\nGod.[207] Slaves were liberated \"for God's love,\" or \"for the remedy\"\nor \"ransom of the soul.\"[208] In the formularies of manumission given\nby the monk Marculfus in the seventh century we read, for\ninstance:--\"He that releases his slave who is bound to him, may trust\nthat God will recompense him in the next world\";[209] \"For the\nremission of my sins, I absolve thee\";[210] \"For the glory {699} of\nGod's name and for my eternal retribution,\" &c.[211] Too much\nimportance, however, has often been attached to these phrases; the\nmost trivial occurrences, such as giving a book to a monastery, are\ncommonly accompanied by similar expressions,[212] and it appears from\ncertain formulas that slaves were not only liberated, but also bought\nand sold, \"in the name of God.\"[213] Nor can we suppose that it was\nfrom religious motives only that manumissions were encouraged by the\nclergy. It has been pointed out that, \"as dying persons were\nfrequently inclined to make considerable donations for pious uses, it\nwas more immediately for the interest of churchmen, that people of\ninferior condition should be rendered capable of acquiring property,\nand should have the free disposal of what they had acquired.\" It also\nseems that those who obtained their liberty by the influence of the\nclergy had to reward their benefactors, and that the manumission\nshould for this reason be confirmed by the Church.[214] And whilst the\nChurch favoured liberation of the slaves of laymen, she took care to\nprevent liberation of her own slaves; like a physician she did not\nherself swallow the medicine which she prescribed to others. She\nallowed alienation of such slaves only as showed a disposition to run\naway.[215] The Council of Agatho, in 506, considered it unfair to\nenfranchise the slaves of monasteries, seeing that the monks\nthemselves were daily compelled to labour;[216] and, as a matter of\nfact, the slaves of monasteries were everywhere among the last who\nwere manumitted.[217] In the seventh century a Council at Toledo\nthreatened with damnation any bishop who should liberate a slave\nbelonging to the Church, without giving {700} due compensation from\nhis own property, as it was thought impious to inflict a loss on the\nChurch of Christ;[218] and according to several ecclesiastical\nregulations no bishop or priest was allowed to manumit a slave in the\npatrimony of the Church unless he put in his place two slaves of equal\nvalue.[219] Nay, the Church was anxious not only to prevent a\nreduction of her slaves, but to increase their number. She zealously\nencouraged people to give up themselves and their posterity to be the\nslaves of churches and monasteries, to enslave their bodies--as some\nof the charters put it--in order to procure the liberty of their\nsouls.[220] And in the middle of the seventh century a Council decreed\nthat the children of incontinent priests should become the slaves of\nthe churches where their fathers officiated.[221]\n\n[Footnote 202: Clarkson, _Essay on Slavery_, p. 19, _sq._ Biot, _De\nl'abolition de l'esclavage ancien en Occident_, p. xi. Th\u00e9rou, _Le\nChristianisme et l'esclavage_, p. 147. Martin, _Histoire de France\njusqu'en_ 1789, iii. 11, n. 2. Balmes, _El Protestantismo comparado\ncon el Catolicismo_, i. 285. Blakey, _op. cit._ p. 170. Yanoski, _op.\ncit._ p. 75. Cochin, _L'abolition de l'esclavage_, ii. 349, 458.\nLittr\u00e9, _\u00c9tudes sur les Barbares et le Moyen Age_, p. 230 _sq._\nAllard, _op. cit._ p. 490. Tedeschi, _La schiavit\u00f9_, p. 68. Lecky,\n_History of Rationalism in Europe_, ii. 216, 236 _sqq._ Maine,\n_International Law_, p. 160. Kidd, _Social Evolution_, p. 168.]\n\n[Footnote 203: St. Gregory the Great, _Epistol\u00e6_, vi. 12 (Migne,\n_Patrologi\u00e6 cursus_, lxxvii. 803 _sq._). Gratian, _op. cit._ ii. 12.\n2. 68. Potgiesser, _op. cit._ iv. 1. 3, p. 666 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 204: Babington, _op. cit._ p. 180.]\n\n[Footnote 205: Smaragdus, _Via Regia_, 30 (d'Achery, _Spicilegium_,\ni. 253).]\n\n[Footnote 206: de Boulainvilliers, _Histoire de l'ancien gouvernement\nde la France_, i. 312.]\n\n[Footnote 207: _Speculum Saxonum_, iii. 42 (Goldast, _Collectio\nconsuetudinum et legum imperialium_, p. 158).]\n\n[Footnote 208: Du Cange, _op. cit._ iv. 460 _sqq._ Potgiesser, _op.\ncit._ iv. 12. 5, p. 751 _sqq._ Muratori, _op. cit._ i. 249. Robertson,\n_op. cit._ i. 323. Milman, _op. cit._ ii. 51 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 209: Marculfus, _Formul\u00e6_, ii. 32 (Migne, _op. cit._\nlxxxvii. 747).]\n\n[Footnote 210: _Ibid._ ii. 33 (Migne, _op. cit._ lxxxvii. 748).]\n\n[Footnote 211: Marculfus, _Formul\u00e6_, ii. 34 (Migne, _op. cit._\nlxxxvii. 748).]\n\n[Footnote 212: Babington, _op. cit._ p. 61, n. 6.]\n\n[Footnote 213: _Formul\u00e6 Bignonian\u00e6_, 2, 'Venditio de servo' (Baluze,\n_Capitularia regum Francorum_, ii. 497):--\"Domino magnifico fratri\nilli emptori, ego in Dei nomine ille venditor.\"]\n\n[Footnote 214: Millar, _Origin of the Distinction of Ranks_, p. 274\n_sq._]\n\n[Footnote 215: Gratian, _op. cit._ ii. 12. 2. 54.]\n\n[Footnote 216: _Concilium Agathense_, A.D. 506, can. 56 (Labbe-Mansi,\n_op. cit._ viii. 334).]\n\n[Footnote 217: Hallam, _View of the State of Europe during the Middle\nAges_ (ed. 1837), i. 221.]\n\n[Footnote 218: _Concilium Toletanum IV._ A.D. 633, can. 67\n(Labbe-Mansi, _op. cit._ x. 635).]\n\n[Footnote 219: Gratian, _op. cit._ ii. 12. 2. 58. Potgiesser, _op.\ncit._ iv. 2. 4, p. 673.]\n\n[Footnote 220: Du Cange, _op. cit._ iv. 1286. Potgiesser, _op. cit._\ni. 1. 6 _sq._, p. 5 _sqq._ Muratori, _op. cit._ i. 234 _sqq._\nRobertson, _op. cit._ i. 326.]\n\n[Footnote 221: _Concilium Toletanum IX._ A.D. 655, can. 10\n(Labbe-Mansi, _op. cit._ xi. 29).]\n\nThe disappearance of medi\u00e6val slavery has further, to some extent,\nbeen attributed to the efforts of kings to weaken the power of the\nnobles.[222] Thus Louis X. and Philip the Long of France issued\nordinances declaring that, as all men were by nature free, and as\ntheir kingdom was called the kingdom of the Franks, they would have\nthe fact to correspond with the name, and emancipated all persons in\nthe royal domains upon paying a just compensation, as an example for\nother lords to follow.[223] Muratori believes that in Italy the wars\nduring the twelfth and following centuries contributed more than\nanything else to the decline of slavery, as there was a need of\nsoldiers and soldiers must be freemen.[224] According to others the\ndisappearance of slavery was largely effected by the great famines and\nepidemics with which Europe was visited during the tenth, eleventh,\nand twelfth {701} centuries.[225] The number of slaves was also\nconsiderably reduced by the ancient usage of enslaving prisoners of\nwar being replaced by the more humane practice of accepting ransom for\nthem, which became the general rule in the later part of the Middle\nAges, at least in the case of Christian captives.[226] But it seems\nthat the chief cause of the extinction of slavery in Europe was its\ntransformation into serfdom.\n\n[Footnote 222: Robertson, _op. cit._ i. 47 _sq._ Millar, _op. cit._\np. 276 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 223: Decrusy, Isambert, and Jourdan, _Recueil g\u00e9n\u00e9ral des\nanciennes lois fran\u00e7aises_, iii. 102 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 224: Muratori, _op. cit._ i. 234 _sq._ _Idem_, _Rerum\nItalicarum scriptores_, xviii. 268, 292.]\n\n[Footnote 225: Biot, _op. cit._ p. 318 _sqq._ Saco, _Historia de la\nesclavitud_, iii. 241 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 226: Ward, _Enquiry into the Foundation and History of the\nLaw of Nations in Europe_, i. 298 _sq._ Babington, _op. cit._ p. 147.\nAyala, _De jure et officiis bellicis_, i. 5. 19. In the sixteenth\ncentury the statutes of some Italian towns make mention of the sale of\nslaves, who probably were Turkish captives (Nys, _Le droit de la\nguerre et les pr\u00e9curseurs de Grotius_, p. 140).]\n\nThis transformation has been traced to the diminished supply of\nslaves, which made it the interest of each family to preserve\nindefinitely its own hereditary slaves, and to keep up their number by\nthe method of propagation. The existence and physical well-being of\nthe slave became consequently an object of greater value to his\nmaster, and the latter found it most profitable to attach his slaves\nto certain pieces of land.[227] Moreover, the cultivation of the\nground required that the slaves should have a fixed residence in\ndifferent parts of the master's estate, and when a slave had thus been\nfor a long time engaged in a particular farm, he was so much the\nbetter qualified to continue in the management of it for the future.\nBy degrees he therefore came to be regarded as belonging to the stock\nupon the ground, and was disposed of as a part of the estate which he\nhad been accustomed to cultivate.[228]\n\n[Footnote 227: Storch, _Cours d'\u00e9conomie politique_, iv. 260. Ingram,\n_op. cit._ p. 72.]\n\n[Footnote 228: Millar, _op. cit._ p. 263 _sqq._]\n\nBut serfdom itself was merely a transitory condition destined to lead\nup to a state of entire liberty. As the proprietor of a large estate\ncould not oversee the behaviour of his villeins, scattered over a wide\narea of land, the only means of exciting their industry would be to\noffer them a reward for the work which they performed. Thus, besides\nthe ordinary maintenance allotted {702} to them, they frequently\nobtained a part of the profits, and became capable of having separate\nproperty.[229] In many cases this no doubt enabled the serf to\npurchase his liberty out of his earnings;[230] whilst in others the\nmaster would have an interest in allowing him to pay a fixed rent and\nto retain the surplus for himself. The landlord was then freed from\nthe hazard of accidental losses, and obtained not only a certain, but\nfrequently an additional, revenue from his land, owing to the greater\nexertions of cultivators who worked for their own benefit;[231] and at\nthe same time the personal subjection of the peasants naturally came\nto an end, as it was of no consequence to the landlord how they\nconducted themselves provided that they punctually paid the rents. Nor\nwas there any reason to insist that they should remain in the farm\nlonger than they pleased; for the profits it afforded made them\ncommonly not more willing to leave it than the proprietor was to put\nthem away.[232] Another factor which led to the disappearance of\nserfdom was the encouragement which Sovereigns, always jealous of the\ngreat lords, gave to the villeins to encroach upon their\nauthority.[233] We have convincing proof that in England, before the\nend of Edward III.'s reign, the villeins found themselves sufficiently\npowerful to protect one another, and to withhold their ancient and\naccustomed services from their lord.[234] In Germany, again, the\nlandlords sometimes furnished their villeins with arms to defend the\ncause of their master, and this undoubtedly tended to their\nenfranchisement, as persons who are taught to use and allowed to\npossess weapons will soon make {703} themselves respected.[235] A\ngreat number of villeins also shook off the fetters of their servitude\nby fleeing for refuge to some chartered town,[236] where they became\nfree at once,[237] or, more commonly, after a certain stipulated\nperiod--a year and a day,[238] or more;[239] and it seems, besides,\nthat the rapid disappearance of serfdom in the prospering free towns\nindirectly, by way of example, promoted the enfranchisement of rural\nserfs.[240] There are, further, instances of lords liberating their\nvilleins at the intercession of their spiritual confessors, the clergy\navailing themselves of every opportunity to lessen the formidable\npower of their great rivals, the temporal nobility.[241] But the\ninfluence which the Church exercised in favour of the enfranchisement\nof serfs was even less than her share in the abolition of slavery\nproper.[242] She represented serfdom as a divine institution,[243] as\na school of humility, as a road to future glory.[244] She was herself\nthe greatest {704} serf-holder;[245] and so strenuously did she\npersist in retaining her villeins, that after Voltaire had raised his\npowerful outcry in favour of liberty and Louis XVI. himself had been\ninduced to abolish \"the right of servitude\" in consideration of \"the\nlove of humanity,\" the Church still refused to emancipate her\nserfs.[246] But whilst the cause of freedom owes little to the\nChristian Church, it owes so much the more to the feelings of humanity\nand justice in some of her opponents.\n\n[Footnote 229: Millar, _op. cit._ p. 264. Simonde de Sismondi,\n_Histoire des r\u00e9publiques italiennes du moyen \u00e2ge_, xvi. 365 _sq._\nGu\u00e9rard, _Cartulaire de l'Abbaye de Saint-P\u00e8re de Chartres_, i. p.\nxli. Dunham, _History of the Germanic Empire_, i. 230.]\n\n[Footnote 230: See Vinogradoff, _Villainage in England_, p. 87;\nPollock and Maitland, _History of English Law before the Time of\nEdward I._ i. 36, 427.]\n\n[Footnote 231: Adam Smith, _Wealth of Nations_, p. 173. Millar, _op.\ncit._ p. 267 _sqq._ Mill, _Principles of Political Economy_, i. 309,\n311. Dunham, _op. cit._ i. 228 _sq._ On the inefficiency of slave\nlabour, see also Storch, _op. cit._ iv. 275 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 232: Millar, _op. cit._ p. 269 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 233: Adam Smith, _Wealth of Nations_, p. 173.]\n\n[Footnote 234: Eden, _State of the Poor_, i. 30.]\n\n[Footnote 235: Dunham, _op. cit._ i. 229.]\n\n[Footnote 236: Guibertus de Novigento, 'De vita sua,' in Bouquet,\n_Rerum Gallicarum et Franciarum scriptores_, xii. 257. 'Fragmentum\nhistoricum vitam Ludovici VII. summatim complectens,' _ibid._ xii.\n286. Beaumanoir, _op. cit._ xlv. 36, vol. ii. 237. Eden, _op. cit._ i.\n30. Laurent, _op. cit._ vii. 531 _sq._ Saco, _op. cit._ iii. 252.]\n\n[Footnote 237: Laurent, _op. cit._ vii. 532.]\n\n[Footnote 238: Glanville, _Tractates de Legibus et Consuetudinibus\nRegni Angli\u00e6_, v. 5. Bracton, _De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angli\u00e6_,\nfol. 198 b, vol. iii. 292 _sq._ Beaumanoir, _op. cit._ xlv. 36, vol.\nii. 237. Pollock and Maitland, _op. cit._ i. 429, 648 _sq._ Grimm,\n_Deutsche Rechtsalterth\u00fcmer_, p. 337 _sq._ Laurent, _op. cit._ vii.\n532.]\n\n[Footnote 239: Laurent, _op. cit._ vii. 532.]\n\n[Footnote 240: _Ibid._ vii. 533 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 241: Thomas Smith, _Common-wealth of England_, p. 250. Eden,\n_op. cit._ i. 10. Sugenheim, _Geschichte der Aufhebung der\nLeibeigenschaft und H\u00f6rigkeit in Europa_, p. 109.]\n\n[Footnote 242: _Cf._ Rivi\u00e8re, _op. cit._ p. 511. Babington says (_op.\ncit._ p. 148 _sq._) that in the five-hundred pages of Wilkins'\n_Concilia_, which comprise the ecclesiastical documents of the British\nchurches in the thirteenth century, we only find the following\nregulations concerning the unfree population:--that neither freemen\nnor villeins are to be impeded in making their wills when death\napproaches; that monks are not to alienate their less useful slaves\n(_famulos_); that Jews are not allowed to possess Christian\nslaves.--It was said that \"he puts a disgrace on God who raises a\nvillein above his station\" (_ibid._ p. 150).]\n\n[Footnote 243: Adalbero, _Carmen ad Rotbertum regem Francorum_, 291,\n292, 297 _sqq._ (Bouquet, _op. cit._ x. 70):--\"Thesaurus, vestis,\ncunctis sunt pascua servi. Nam valet ingenuus sine servis vivere\nnullus. . . . Triplex ergo Dei domus est, qu\u00e6 creditur una. Nunc orant\nalii; pugnant; aliique laborant: Qu\u00e6 tria sunt simul, et scissuram non\npatiuntur.\" St. Bonaventura, quoted by Laurent, _op. cit._ vii.\n522:--\"Non solum secundum humanam institutionem, sed etiam secundum\ndivinam dispensationem, inter Christianos sunt domini et servi.\"]\n\n[Footnote 244: Laurent, _op. cit._ vii. 523.]\n\n[Footnote 245: Laurent, _op. cit._ vii. 524.]\n\n[Footnote 246: Hettner, _Geschichte der franz\u00f6sischen Literatur im\nachtzehnten Jahrhundert_, p. 169. Babington, _op. cit._ p. 108.\nSugenheim, _op. cit._ p. 156 _sqq._ Laurent, _op. cit._ vii. 537\n_sq._]\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nNot long after serfdom had begun to disappear in the most advanced\ncommunities of Christendom a new kind of slavery was established in\nthe colonies of European states. It grew up under circumstances\nparticularly favourable to the employment of slaves. Whether slave\nlabour or free labour is more profitable to the employer depends on\nthe wages of the free labourer, and these again depend on the numbers\nof the labouring population compared with the capital and the land. In\nthe rich and underpeopled soil of the West Indies and in the Southern\nStates of America the balance of the profits between free and slave\nlabour was on the side of slavery. Hence slavery was introduced there,\nand flourished, and could be abolished only with the greatest\ndifficulty.[247]\n\n[Footnote 247: Mill, _Principles of of Political Economy_, i. 311.]\n\nFrom a moral point of view negro slavery is interesting chiefly\nbecause it existed in the midst of a highly developed Christian\ncivilisation, and nevertheless, at least in the British colonies and\nthe United States, was the most brutal form of slavery ever known. It\nmay be worth while to consider more closely some points of the\nlegislation relating to it.\n\nIn America, as elsewhere, the state of slavery was hereditary. The\nchild of a female slave was itself a slave and belonged to the owner\nof its mother even if its father was a freeman, whereas the child of a\nfree woman was {705} free even if its father was a slave.[248] When\nthe slave-trade was prohibited, heredity remained the only legitimate\nsource of slavery; but even then a freeborn negro was far from safe.\nIn the British colonies and in all the Slave States except one, every\nnegro was presumed to be a slave until he could prove the\nreverse.[249] A man who, within the limits of a slave-holding State,\ncould exhibit a person of African extraction in his custody was\nexempted from all necessity of making proof how he had obtained him or\nby what authority he claimed him as a slave. Nay more, through the\ndirect action of Congress it became law that persons known to be free\nshould be sold as slaves in order to cover the costs of imprisonment\nwhich they had suffered on account of the false suspicion that they\nwere runaway slaves. This law was repeatedly put into effect. \"How\nmany crowned despots,\" says Professor von Hoist, \"can be mentioned in\nthe history of the old world who have done things which compare in\naccursedness with this law to which the democratic republic gave\nbirth?\"[250]\n\n[Footnote 248: Stroud, _Laws relating to Slavery in the United States\nof America_, p. 16 _sqq._ Cobb, _Inquiry into the Law of Negro Slavery\nin the United States of America_, p. 68. Stephen, _Slavery of the\nBritish West India Colonies_, i. 122. _Code Noir_, \u00c9dit du mois de\nMars 1685, art. 13, p. 35 _sq._; \u00c9dit donn\u00e9 au mois de Mars 1724, art.\n10, p. 288 _sq._ In Maryland, according to an early enactment, which\nobtained till the year 1699 or 1700, all the children born of a slave\nwere slaves \"as their fathers were\" (Stroud, _op. cit._ p. 14 _sqq._).\nIn Cuba the nobler parent determined the rank of the offspring\n(Newman, _Anglo-Saxon Abolition of Negro Slavery_, p. 17).]\n\n[Footnote 249: Stephen, _op. cit._ i. 369 _sq._ Stroud, _op. cit._ pp.\n125, 126, 130. Cobb, _op. cit._ p. 67. Wheeler, _Treatise on the Law\nof Slavery_, p. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 250: von Holst, _Constitutional and Political History of the\nUnited States_, i. 305.]\n\nSlaves were defined as \"chattels personal in the hands of their\nrespective owners or possessors, and their executors, administrators,\nand assigns, to all intents and purposes whatsoever.\"[251] In the\nBritish colonies and the American Slave States they were at all times\nliable to be sold or otherwise alienated at the will of their masters,\nas absolutely as cattle, or any other personal effects. They were\n{706} also liable to be sold by process of law for satisfaction of the\ndebts of a living, or the debts or bequests of a deceased master, at\nthe suit of creditors or legatees. They were transmitted by\ninheritance or by will to heirs at law or to legatees, and in the\ndistribution of estates they were distributed like other\nproperty.[252] No regard was paid to family ties. Except in Louisiana,\nwhere children under ten years of age could not be sold separately\nfrom their mothers,[253] no law existed to prevent the violent\nseparation of parents from their children or from each other.[254] And\nwhat the law did not prevent, the slave-owners did not omit doing;\nthus Virginia was known as a breeding place out of which the members\nof one household were sold into every part of the country.[255] All\nthis, however, holds true of the British colonies and Slave States\nonly. In the Spanish, Portuguese, and French colonies plantation\nslaves were real estate, attached to the soil they cultivated. They\npartook therewith of all the restraints upon voluntary alienation to\nwhich the possessor of the land was there liable, and they could not\nbe seized or sold by creditors, for satisfaction of the debts of the\nowner.[256] As regards the sale of members of the same family the Code\nNoir expressly says, \"Ne pourront \u00eatre saisis et vendus s\u00e9par\u00e9ment, le\nmari et la femme, et leurs enfans impub\u00e9res, s'ils sont tous sous la\npuissance du m\u00eame Ma\u00eetre.\"[257] A slave could make no contract; he\ncould not even contract marriage, in the juridical sense of the word.\nThe association which took place among slaves and was called marriage\nwas virtually the same as the Roman _contubernium_, a relation which\nhad no sanctity and to which no civil rights were attached.[258] The\nmaster could whenever {707} he liked separate the \"husband\" and\n\"wife\"; he could, if he pleased, commit \"adultery\" with the \"wife,\"\nand was the absolute owner of all the children born by her. A slave\nhad \"no more legal authority over his child than a cow has over her\ncalf.\" On the other hand, the common rules of sexual morality were not\nenforced on the slaves. They were not admonished for incontinence, nor\npunished for adultery, nor prosecuted for bigamy. Incontinence was\nrather thought a matter of course in the slave. We are told that even\nin Puritan New England female slaves in ministers' and magistrates'\nfamilies bore children, black or yellow, without marriage, that no one\ninquired who their fathers were, and that nothing more was thought of\nit than of the breeding of sheep or swine. And concerning the\n\"slave-quarters\" connected with the plantations the universal\ntestimony was that the sexes were there \"herded together\npromiscuously, like beasts.\"[259]\n\n[Footnote 251: Brevard, _Digest of the Public Statute Law of\nSouth-Carolina_, p. 229. Prince, _Digest of the Laws of Georgia_,\np. 777. In the French _Code Noir_ (\u00c9dit du mois de Mars 1685, art.\n44, p. 49; \u00c9dit donn\u00e9 au mois de Mars 1724, art. 40, p. 305)\nslaves are declared to be \"meubles.\"]\n\n[Footnote 252: Stephen, _op. cit._ i. 62. Stroud, _op. cit._ p. 84.\nGoodell, _American Slave Code in Theory and Practice_, p. 63 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 253: Peirce, Taylor, and King, _Consolidation and Revision\nof the Statutes of the State_ [_Louisiana_], pp. 523, 550 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 254: Stephen, _op. cit._ i. 62 _sq._ Stroud, _op. cit._\np. 82.]\n\n[Footnote 255: Pearson, _National Life and Character_, p. 210.]\n\n[Footnote 256: Stephen, _op. cit._ i. 69.]\n\n[Footnote 257: _Code Noir_, \u00c9dit du mois de Mars 1685, art. 47, p. 51;\n\u00c9dit donn\u00e9 au mois de Mars 1724, art. 43, p. 306.]\n\n[Footnote 258: Cobb, _op. cit._ p. 240 _sqq._ Stroud, _op. cit._ p.\n99. Goodell, _American Slave Code_, p. 105 _sqq._ Wheeler, _op. cit._\np. 199. According to the Civil Code of Louisiana, \"slaves cannot marry\nwithout the consent of their masters, and their marriages do not\nproduce any of the civil effects which result from such contract\"\n(Morgan, _Civil Code of Louisiana_, art. 182, p. 29).]\n\n[Footnote 259: Goodell, _American Slave Code_, p. 111. In 1835 the\nquery was presented to a Baptist Association of ministers, \"whether,\nin case of involuntary separation of such a character as to preclude\nall future intercourse, the parties may be allowed to marry again?\"\nThe answer was, \"that such separation among persons situated as our\nslaves are, is civilly a separation by death, and they believe that,\nin the sight of God, it would be so viewed. To forbid second marriages\nin such cases would be to expose the parties not only to greater\nhardships and stronger temptations, but to church censure for acting\n_in obedience to their masters_.\" Incidentally here the fact leaks out\nthat slave cohabitation is enforced by the authority of the masters\nfor the increase of their human chattels (Goodell, _Slavery and\nAnti-Slavery_, p. 185).]\n\nYet though slaves were regarded as chattels, the master could not do\nwith his slave exactly what he pleased. We have noticed that the life\nof the slave was in some degree, though very insufficiently, protected\nby law,[260] and that a master who mutilated his slave was subject to\na slight penalty.[261] The law also took care to prohibit the master\nfrom doing things which were considered injurious to the community or\nthe State. There was a great fear of teaching negroes to read and\nwrite. William Knox, in a tract addressed to \"the venerable Society\nfor propagation {708} of the Gospel in foreign parts\" in the year\n1768, remarks that \"instruction renders them less fit or less willing\nto labour,\" and that, if they were universally taught to read, there\nwould undoubtedly be a general insurrection of the negroes leading to\nthe massacre of their owners.[262] A similar fear underlies the laws\non the subject which we meet with in the codes of some of the Slave\nStates. According to the Negro Act of 1740 for South Carolina, any\nperson who instructed a slave in writing was subject to a fine of one\nhundred pounds;[263] but this enactment was later on considered too\nliberal. A law of 1834 placed under the ban all efforts to teach the\ncoloured race either reading or writing, and the punishment was no\nlonger a pecuniary fine only, but, besides, imprisonment for six\nmonths or a shorter time or, if the offender was a free person of\ncolour, whipping not exceeding fifty lashes.[264] In Georgia a law of\n1770, which prohibited the instruction of slaves in reading and\nwriting, was in 1833 followed by an act which extended the prohibition\nto free persons of colour.[265] In Louisiana the teaching of slaves\nwas punished with imprisonment for not less than one month nor more\nthan twelve months.[266] North Carolina allowed slaves to be made\nacquainted with arithmetical calculations, but sternly interdicted\ninstruction in reading and writing;[267] whilst Alabama warred with\nthe rudiments of reading, forbidding any coloured persons, bond or\nfree, to be taught not only reading and writing, but spelling.[268] In\nall these States the prohibitions referred to the master of the slave\nas well as to other persons. In Virginia, on the other hand, the\nmaster might teach his slave whatever he liked, but others might\nnot.[269]\n\n[Footnote 260: _Supra_, p. 428 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 261: _Supra_, p. 517.]\n\n[Footnote 262: Knox, _Three Tracts respecting the Conversion and\nInstruction of the Free Indians and Negroe Slaves in the Colonies_,\np. 15 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 263: Brevard, _op. cit._ ii. 243.]\n\n[Footnote 264: McCord, _Statutes at large of South Carolina_, vii.\n468.]\n\n[Footnote 265: Prince, _op. cit._ pp. 785, 658.]\n\n[Footnote 266: Peirce, Taylor, and King, _op. cit._ p. 552.]\n\n[Footnote 267: _Revised Statutes of North Carolina passed by the\nGeneral Assembly at the Session of_ 1836-7, xxxiv. 74, cxi. 27, vol.\ni. 209, 578.]\n\n[Footnote 268: Clay, _Digest of the Laws of Alabama_, p. 543.]\n\n[Footnote 269: _Code of Virginia_, cxcviii. 31 _sq._ Stroud, _op.\ncit._ p. 142.]\n\n{709} There is yet another point in which the master's power was\nrestricted in a most unusual way: in many cases he was not allowed to\nliberate his slave, or formidable obstacles were put in the way of\nmanumission. Thus, in North Carolina a slave could formerly not be\nenfranchised except for meritorious services;[270] but this enactment\nwas altered by the Revised Statutes of 1836-1837, according to which\nany emancipation granted to any slave \"shall be upon the express\ncondition, that he, she or they will leave the State, within ninety\ndays from the granting thereof, and never will return within the State\nafterwards.\"[271] The Civil Code of Louisiana required that a slave,\nto be emancipated, should have attained the age of thirty years and\nbehaved well at least for four years preceding the emancipation,\nunless, indeed, the slave had saved the life of his master or of one\nof his children, in which case he might be set free at any age;[272]\nand, according to a statute of 1852, the emancipated slave should be\nsent out of the United States within twelve months after his\nemancipation.[273] In several other States manumission was likewise\nhampered by various regulations;[274] and throughout the British West\nIndies there were restraints on manumission prior to the Emancipation\nAct.[275] By an act passed in Saint Christopher in the year 1802, a\ntax of \u00a31,000 was imposed on the manumission of any slave who was not\na native of, or had not resided for two years within, the island,\nwhilst natives or residents might be enfranchised at half that price.\nBut the authors of this act went further still. They considered that a\nmaster, though unwilling to pay \u00a3500 or \u00a31,000 for the legal\nenfranchisement of a slave, might, during his own life, make him or\nher practically free by not exercising his own rights as master. Hence\n{710} they enacted \"that if any proprietor of a slave should, by any\ncontract in writing or otherwise, dispense with the slave's service,\nor should be proved before a justice of peace not to have exercised\nany right of ownership over such slave, and maintained him or her at\nhis own expense, within a month, the slave should be publicly sold at\nvendue by the provost marshall; and should become the property of the\npurchaser, and the purchase-money should be paid into the colonial\ntreasury.\"[276] In St. Vincents one hundred pounds sterling was\nrequired to be paid into the treasury for each slave sought to be\nmanumitted,[277] whilst in Barbados a person minded to manumit a slave\nshould pay \u00a350 to the churchwarden of the parish in which he\nresided.[278] Very different were the Spanish laws on the subject of\nmanumission. According to a law of 1528 a negro slave who had served a\ncertain length of time was entitled to his liberty upon the payment of\na certain sum, not less than twenty marks of gold, the exact amount to\nbe settled by the royal authorities.[279] In 1540 a law was issued to\nthe effect that \"if any negro, or negress, or any other persons\nreputed slaves, should publicly demand their liberty, they should be\nheard, and justice be done to them, and care be taken that they should\nnot on that account be maltreated by their masters.\"[280] Nay, a slave\nwho wished to change his master and could prevail on any other person\nto buy him by appraisement, could demand and compel such a\ntransfer,[281] and a master who treated his slaves inhumanly could be\nby the judge deprived of them.[282] In most of the British colonies\nand American Slave States, on the other hand, the slave had no legal\nright to obtain a change of master when cruel treatment made it\nnecessary for his relief or preservation.[283] {711} The exceptions to\nthis rule[284] were few and of little practical value.\n\n[Footnote 270: Stroud, _op. cit._ p. 233.]\n\n[Footnote 271: _Revised Statutes of North Carolina_, cxi. 58, vol. i.\n585.]\n\n[Footnote 272: Morgan, _Civil Code of Louisiana_, art. 185 _sq._, p.\n30 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 273: _Ibid._ Stat. 18th March, 1852, \u00a71, p. 29.]\n\n[Footnote 274: Brevard, _op. cit._ ii. 255 _sq._ (South Carolina).\nPrince, _op. cit._ p. 787 (Georgia). Stroud, _op. cit._ p. 231\n(Alabama). Alden and van Hoesen, _Digest of the Laws of Mississippi_,\np. 761. Haywood and Cobbs, _Statute Laws of the State of Tennessee_,\ni. 327 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 275: Cobb, _op. cit._ p. 282.]\n\n[Footnote 276: Stephen, _op. cit._ i. 401 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 277: Cobb, _op. cit._ p. 282 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 278: Moore, _Public Acts passed by the Legislature of\nBarbados_, p. 224 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 279: Helps, _Spanish Conquest in America_, iv. 373.]\n\n[Footnote 280: _Recopilacion de leyes de los reinos de las Indias_,\nvii. 5. 8, vol. ii. 321.]\n\n[Footnote 281: Barre Saint Venant, quoted by Stephen, _op. cit._ i.\n119 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 282: Edwards, _History of the British West Indies_, iv.\n451.]\n\n[Footnote 283: Stephen, _op. cit._ i. 106. Stroud, _op. cit._ p. 93.]\n\n[Footnote 284: Morgan, _Civil Code of Louisiana_, art. 192, p. 33.\nMorehead and Brown, _Digest of the Statute Laws of Kentucky_, ii.\n1481. Edwards, _op. cit._ ii. 192 (Jamaica). Stephen, _op. cit._ i.\n106 (some other British colonies). In the French islands a negro who\nhad been cruelly treated, contrary to royal ordinances, was forfeited\nto the crown, and acquired, if not freedom, at least deliverance from\na tyrannical master (_Code Noir_, \u00c9dit du mois de Mars 1685, art. 42,\np. 48 _sq._; \u00c9dit donn\u00e9 au mois de Mars 1724, art. 38, p. 303 _sq._);\nbut the Court which adjudged the offence might also decree the\nsufferer to be manumitted (Stephen, _op. cit._ i. 119).]\n\nThis system of slavery, which at least in the British colonies and the\nSlave States surpassed in cruelty the slavery of any pagan country\nancient or modern, was not only recognised by Christian governments,\nbut was supported by the large bulk of the clergy, Catholic[285] and\nProtestant alike. In the beginning of the abolitionist movement the\nChurches acknowledged slavery to be a great evil, but with the making\nof this acknowledgment they believed that they had done their share,\nand denied that there was any obligation on them, or even that they\nhad any right, to proceed against the slave-holders. But things did\nnot stop here. The lamentations of resignation were gradually changed\ninto excuses, and the excuses into justifications.[286] The Bible, it\nwas said, contains no prohibition of slavery; on the contrary, slavery\nis recognised both in the Old and New Testaments. Abraham, the father\nof the faithful and the friend of God, had slaves; the Hebrews were\ndirected to make slaves of the surrounding nations; St. Paul and St.\nPeter approved of the {712} relation of master and slave when they\ngave admonitions to both as to their reciprocal behaviour; the Saviour\nHimself said nothing in condemnation of slavery, although it existed\nin great aggravation while He was upon earth. If slavery were sinful,\nwould it have been too much to expect that the Almighty had directed\nat least one little word against it in the last revelation of His\nwill?[287] Nay, God not only permitted slavery, but absolutely\nprovided for its perpetuity;[288] it is the very legislation of Heaven\nitself;[289] it is an institution which it is a religious duty to\nmaintain,[290] and which cannot be abolished, because \"God is pledged\nto sustain it.\"[291] According to some, slavery was founded on the\njudgment of God on a damned race, the descendants of Ham; according to\nothers, it was only in this way that the African could be raised to a\nparticipation in the blessings of Christianity and civilisation.[292]\nWith the name of \"abolitionist\" was thus associated the idea of\ninfidelity, and the emancipation movement was branded as an attempt to\nspread the evils of scepticism through the land.[293] According to\nGovernor Macduffie, of South Carolina, no human institution is more\nmanifestly consistent with the will of God than slavery, and every\ncommunity ought to punish the interference of abolitionists with\ndeath, without the benefit of clergy, \"regarding the authors of it as\nenemies of the human race.\"[294] It is true that religious arguments\nwere also adduced in favour of abolition. To hold men in bondage was\nsaid to be utterly inconsistent with the inalienable rights which the\nCreator had granted mankind, and still more obviously {713} at\nvariance with the dictates of Christian love.[295] Many clergymen also\njoined the abolitionists. But it seems that in the middle of the\nnineteenth century the Quakers and the United Brethren were the only\nreligious bodies that regarded slave-holding and slave-dealing as\necclesiastical offences.[296] The American Churches were justly said\nto be \"the bulwarks of American slavery.\"[297]\n\n[Footnote 285: The attempts to represent the Roman Catholic clergy as\nardent abolitionists (Cochin, _L'abolition de l'esclavage_, ii. 443;\nde Locqueneuille, _L'esclavage, ses promoteurs et ses adversaires_, p.\n193) are certainly not justified by facts. Among the Catholics of the\nUnited States there were some advocates of emancipation, but their\nnumber was not large (Goodell, _Slavery and Anti-Slavery_, 195 _sq._;\nParker, _Collected Works_, vi. 127 _sq._). Dr. England, the Catholic\nbishop of Charleston, South Carolina, undertook in public to prove\nthat the Catholic Church had always been the uncompromising friend of\nslave-holding (Parker, _op. cit._ v. 57). In Brazil it was common for\nclergymen not only to possess slaves, but to buy and sell them with as\nlittle scruple as other merchandises (da Fonseca, _A esravid\u00e3o, o\nclero e o abolicionismo_, pp. 28, 33). Bishop Bouvier wrote (_op.\ncit._ p. 568):--\"Servi autem dominis suis obedire, sortem suam\npatienter tolerare et officia sibi imposita fideliter exsequi debent,\nquoadusque libertas ipsis concedatur. Meminerint pr\u00e6sentem vitam esse\nmomentaneam, futuram vero \u00e6ternam.\"]\n\n[Footnote 286: von Holst, _op. cit._ ii. 231 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 287: Barnes, _The Church and Slavery_, p. 15. Birney,\n_Letter to the Churches_, p. 3 _sq._ Bledsoe, _Essay on Liberty and\nSlavery_, p. 138 _sqq._ Gerrit Smith, _Letter to Rev. James Smylie_,\np. 3. Cobb, _op. cit._ p. 54 _sqq._ Goodell, _Slavery and\nAnti-Slavery_, pp. 154-156, 167, 176, 181, 184, 186, &c. Parker,\n_Collected Works_, v. 157.]\n\n[Footnote 288: Thornton, quoted by Goodell, _Slavery and\nAnti-Slavery_, p. 147. Fisk, quoted _ibid._ p. 147.]\n\n[Footnote 289: Bledsoe, _op. cit._ p. 138.]\n\n[Footnote 290: Smylie, quoted by Gerrit Smith, _op. cit._ p. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 291: Quoted by Goodell, _Slavery and Anti-Slavery_, p. 347.]\n\n[Footnote 292: Barnes, _op. cit._ p. 16.]\n\n[Footnote 293: _Ibid._ p. 18. Newman, _Anglo-Saxon Abolition of Negro\nSlavery_, p. 56. Bledsoe, _op. cit._ p. 223.]\n\n[Footnote 294: Newman, _op. cit._ p. 53. von Holst, _op. cit._ ii.\n118, n. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 295: Gurney, _Views and Practices of the Society of\nFriends_, p. 390. 'Anti-Slavery Declaration of 1833,' quoted by\nGoodell, _Slavery and Anti-Slavery_, p. 398. Birney, _Second Letter_,\np. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 296: Parker, _op. cit._ v. 56.]\n\n[Footnote 297: von Holst, _op. cit._ ii. 230.]\n\nNobody would suppose that this attitude towards slavery was due to\nreligious zeal. It was one of those cases, only too frequent in the\nhistory of morals, in which religion is called in to lend its sanction\nto a social institution agreeable to the leaders of religious opinion.\nMany clergymen and missionaries were themselves slave-holders,[298]\nthe chapel funds largely rested on slave property,[299] and the\nministers naturally desired to be on friendly terms with the more\nimportant members of their respective congregations, who were commonly\nowners of slaves. Adam Smith observes that the resolution of the\nQuakers in Pennsylvania to set at liberty all their slaves, was due to\nthe fact that the principal produce there was corn, the raising of\nwhich cannot afford the expense of slave cultivation; had the slaves\n\"made any considerable part of their property, such a resolution could\nnever have been agreed to.\"[300]\n\n[Footnote 298: Barnes, _op. cit._ p. 13. Goodell, _Slavery and\nAnti-Slavery_, pp. 151, 186 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 299: Newman, _op. cit._ p. 53.]\n\n[Footnote 300: Adam Smith, _Wealth of Nations_, p. 172.]\n\nTo explain the establishment of colonial slavery, the difficulties in\nthe way of its abolition, and the laws relating to it, it is necessary\nto consider not only economic conditions and the motive of\nself-interest, but, as a factor of equal importance, the want of\nsympathy for, or positive antipathy to, the coloured race. The negro\nwas looked upon almost as an animal, according to some he was a being\nwithout a soul.[301] Even when free he was a pariah, subject to\nspecial laws and regulations. In the Code of {714} Louisiana it is\nsaid:--\"Free people of colour ought never to insult or strike white\npeople, nor presume to conceive themselves equal to the whites; but,\non the contrary, they ought to yield to them on every occasion, and\nnever speak or answer them but with respect, under the penalty of\nimprisonment, according to the nature of the offence.\"[302] The Code\nNoir prohibited white men and women from marrying negroes, \"\u00e0 peine de\npunition et d'amende arbitraire\";[303] and in the Revised Statutes of\nNorth Carolina we read:--\"If any white man or woman, being free, shall\nintermarry with an Indian, negro, mustee or mulatto man or woman, or\nany person of mixed blood to the third generation, bond or free, he\nshall, by judgment of the county court, forfeit and pay the sum of one\nhundred dollars to the use of the county.\"[304] In Mississippi a free\nnegro or mulatto was legally punished with thirty-nine lashes if he\nexercised the functions of a minister of the Gospel.[305] Coloured men\nin the North were excluded from colleges and high schools, from\ntheological seminaries and from respectable churches, as also from the\ntown hall, the ballot, and the cemetery where white people were\ninterred.[306] The Anglo-Saxon aversion to the black race is thus\nexpressed by an English writer:--\"We hate slavery, but we hate the\nnegroes still more.\"[307] Among the Spaniards and Portuguese racial\nantipathies were not so strong, and their slaves were consequently\nbetter treated.[308]\n\n[Footnote 301: von Holst, _op. cit._ i. 279. Malloch, 'How the Church\ndealt with Slavery,' in _The Month_, xxvii. 454.]\n\n[Footnote 302: Quoted by Stroud, _op. cit._ p. 157.]\n\n[Footnote 303: _Code Noir_, \u00c9dit donn\u00e9 au mois de Mars 1724, art. 6,\np. 286.]\n\n[Footnote 304: _Revised Statutes of North Carolina_, lxxi. 5, vol. i.\n386 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 305: Alden and van Hoesen, _op. cit._ p. 771.]\n\n[Footnote 306: Parker, _op. cit._ v. 58. Goodell _Slavery and\nAnti-Slavery_, p. 200.]\n\n[Footnote 307: Seward, quoted by Newman, _Abolition of Negro Slavery_,\np. 54.]\n\n[Footnote 308: Couty, _L'esclavage au Br\u00e9sil_, p. 8 _sqq_.]\n\nThus we notice in the opinions regarding slavery throughout the same\ndistinction as in the judgments on other matters of moral concern. A\nperson is, as a rule, allowed to enslave or to keep as slaves only\npersons belonging to a different community or a different race from\nhis own, or their descendants. To deprive anybody of his liberty is to\ninflict an injury on him, and is regarded as {715} wrong whenever the\nact gives rise to sympathetic resentment, whereas nothing is thought\nof it where no sympathy is felt for its victim. Thus, whilst slavery\ngrows up only under economic conditions favourable to slave labour, it\nis always limited by feelings of an altruistic character, and where\nthese feelings are sufficiently broad and powerful it is not tolerated\nat all. The same factor also influences the condition of the slaves\nwhere slavery exists. We have seen that native slaves are better\ntreated than foreign ones and slaves born in the household better than\nthose who have been captured or purchased. The advancement of a\nnation, again, is frequently attended with greater severity in the\ntreatment of the slaves, because, whilst the simplicity of early ages\nadmits of little distinction between the master and his servants in\ntheir employments and manner of living, the introduction of wealth and\nluxury gradually destroys the equality. Besides, the number of slaves\nmaintained in a wealthy nation makes them formidable both to their\nowners and to the State, hence it is necessary that they should be\nstrictly watched and kept in the utmost subjection.[309]\n\n[Footnote 309: Millar, _op. cit._ p. 256 _sqq._]\n\nThe condition of slaves is in various respects influenced by the\nselfish considerations of their masters. Stuart Mill observes:--\"When,\nas among the ancients, the slave-market could only be supplied by\ncaptives either taken in war, or kidnapped from thinly scattered\ntribes on the remote confines of the human world, it was generally\nmore profitable to keep up the number by breeding, which necessitates\na far better treatment of them, and for this reason, joined with\nseveral others, the condition of slaves . . . was probably much less\nbad in the ancient world, than in the colonies of modern\nnations.\"[310] Among the Bedouins, says Burckhardt, \"the slaves are\ntreated with kindness, and seldom beaten, as severity might induce\nthem to run away.\"[311] Superstition may also help to {716} improve\nthe lot of the slave. In West Africa \"the authority which a master\nexercises over a slave is very much modified by his constitutional\ndread of witchcraft. If he treats his slave unkindly, or inflicts\nunmerited punishment upon him, he exposes himself to all the\nmachinations of witchcraft which that slave may be able to\ncommand.\"[312] It is said in the Proverbs, \"Accuse not a servant unto\nhis master, lest he curse thee, and thou be found guilty.\"[313] The\nsame danger threatens the cruel master. We read in the Apostolic\nConstitutions, \"Thy man-servant or thy maid-servant who trust in the\nsame God, thou shalt not command with bitterness of spirit; lest they\ngroan against thee, and wrath be upon thee from God.\"[314]\n\n[Footnote 310: Mill, _Principles of Political Economy_, i. 307. _Cf._\n_supra_, p. 701.]\n\n[Footnote 311: Burckhardt, _Bedouins and Wah\u00e1bys_, p. 103.]\n\n[Footnote 312: Wilson, _Western Africa_, p. 271. See also _ibid._ p.\n179; Cruickshank, _Eighteen Years on the Gold Coast_, ii. 180 _sqq._;\nDu Chaillu, _Explorations and Adventures in Equatorial Africa_, p.\n331; Landtman, _Origin of Priesthood_, p. 198, n. 2.]\n\n[Footnote 313: _Proverbs_, xxx. 10.]\n\n[Footnote 314: _Constitutiones Apostolic\u00e6_, vii. 13.]\n\n\n\n\nEND OF VOL. I\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\n_Printed by_ LOWE & BRYDONE (PRINTERS) LTD., _London, N.W. 1._\n\n\n\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\n\nTHE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT\nOF THE MORAL IDEAS\n\n[Macmillan icon]\n\nMACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED\nLONDON . BOMBAY . CALCUTTA\nMELBOURNE\n\nTHE MACMILLAN COMPANY\nNEW YORK . BOSTON . CHICAGO\nDALLAS . SAN FRANCISCO\n\n\nTHE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, LTD.\nTORONTO\n\n\n\nTHE ORIGIN\nAND DEVELOPMENT\n\nOF THE\n\nMORAL IDEAS\n\n\nBY\n\nEDWARD WESTERMARCK\n\n_Ph.D., LL.D._ (_Aberdeen_)\n\nMARTIN WHITE PROFESSOR OF SOCIOLOGY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF\nLONDON\nPROFESSOR OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY AT THE UNIVERSITY OF FINLAND,\nHELSINFORS\nAUTHOR OF \"THE HISTORY OF HUMAN MARRIAGE,\" \"MARRIAGE CEREMONIES\nIN MOROCCO,\" ETC\n\nIN TWO VOLUMES\n\nVOL. II\n\n_SECOND EDITION_\n\nMACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED\nST. MARTIN'S STREET, LONDON\n\n1917\n\n\n_COPYRIGHT_\n\n_First Edition_, 1908\n_Second Edition_, 1917\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE\nTO THE SECOND EDITION OF VOL. II\n\nWHILE the text of the first edition has been left almost\nunchanged, some notes have been added at the end of it.\n\nE. W.\n\nLONDON,\n\n_September_, 1916.\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n\nCHAPTER XXVIII\n\nTHE RIGHT OF PROPERTY\n\nThe meaning of the term \"property,\" p. 1.--Savages accused of\nthievishness, p. 2.--Theft condemned by savages, pp. 2-13.--The\ncondemnation of theft influenced by the value of the goods stolen,\npp. 13-15.--The stealing of objects of a certain kind\npunished with particular severity, p. 14.--The appropriation of a\nsmall quantity of food not punished at all, p. 14 _sq._--Exceptions\nto the rule that the punishment of theft is influenced by the\nworth or nature of the appropriated property, p. 15.--The degree\nof criminality attached to theft influenced by the place where it\nis committed, p. 15 _sq._--A theft committed by night punished\nmore heavily than one committed by day, p. 16.--Distinction made\nbetween ordinary theft and robbery, p. 16 _sq._--Distinction made\nbetween manifest and non-manifest theft, p. 17.--Successful\nthieves not disapproved of but rather admired, pp. 17-19.--The\nmoral valuation of theft influenced by the social position of the\nthief and of the person robbed, p. 19 _sq._--Varies according as\nthe victim is a tribesman or fellow-countryman or a stranger,\npp. 20-25.--The treatment of ship-wrecked people in Europe,\np. 25.--The destruction of property held legitimate in warfare,\np. 25 _sq._--The seizure of private property in war, p. 26\n_sq._--Military contributions and requisitions levied upon the\ninhabitants of the hostile territory, p. 27.--Proprietary\nincapacities of children, p. 27 _sq._--Of women, pp. 28-31.--Of\nslaves, pp. 31-33.--The theory that nobody but the chief or king\nhas proprietary rights, p. 33.\n\n\nCHAPTER XXIX\n\nTHE RIGHT OF PROPERTY (_concluded_)\n\nAcquisition of property by occupation, pp. 35-39.--By keeping\npossession of a thing, pp. 39-41.--By labour, pp. 41-43.--By a\ntransfer of property by its owner, p. 43.--By inheritance, pp.\n44-49.--By the fact that ownership in a thing directly follows\nfrom ownership in another thing, p. 49 _sq._--By the custom which\nprescribes community of goods, p. 50.--The origin of proprietary\nrights and of the various modes of acquisition, pp. 51-57.\n--Explanation of the incapacity of children, wives, and\nslaves to acquire property, p. 57.--Why the moral judgments vary\nwith regard to different acts of theft, pp. 57-59.--Theft {viii}\nsupposed to be avenged by supernatural powers, pp. 59-69.--The\nremoving of landmarks regarded as sacrilegious, p. 60 _sq._\n--Cursing as a method of punishing thieves or compelling\nthem to restore what they have stolen, p. 62 _sq._--Cursing as a\nmeans of preventing theft, pp. 63-67.--Spirits or gods invoked in\ncurses referring to theft, p. 66 _sq._--Why gods take notice of\noffences against property, pp. 67-69.--The belief that thieves\nwill be punished after death, p. 69.--The opposition against the\nestablished principles of ownership, pp. 69-71.\n\n\nCHAPTER XXX\n\nTHE REGARD FOR TRUTH AND GOOD FAITH\n\nDefinition of lying, p. 72.--Of good faith, _ibid._--The regard\nfor truth and good faith among uncivilised races, pp. 72-88.\n--Foreigners visiting a savage tribe apt to underrate its\nveracity, pp. 86-88.--The regard for truth varies according as\nthe person concerned is a foreigner or a tribesman, p. 87\n_sq._--The regard for truth and good faith among the Chinese,\np. 88 _sq._--Among the Japanese, Burmese, and Siamese, p. 89.\n--Among the Hindus, pp. 89-92.--In Buddhism, p. 92.--Among the\nancient Persians, p. 93 _sq._--Among Muhammedan peoples, p. 94.\n--In ancient Greece, pp. 94-96.--In ancient Rome, p. 96.--Among\nthe ancient Scandinavians, p. 96 _sq._--Among the ancient Irish,\np. 97.--Among the ancient Hebrews, pp. 97-99.--In Christianity,\npp. 99-101.--In the code of Chivalry, p. 101 _sq._--In the Middle\nAges and later, p. 102 _sq._--In modern Europe, pp. 103-106.--The\nviews of philosophers, _ibid._--Deceit in the relations between\ndifferent states, in peace and war, pp. 106-108.\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXI\n\nTHE REGARD FOR TRUTH AND GOOD FAITH (_concluded_)\n\nExplanation of the moral ideas concerning truthfulness and good\nfaith, pp. 109-131.--When detected a deception implies a conflict\nbetween two irreconcilable ideas, which causes pain, p. 109.--Men\nlike to know the truth, p. 109 _sq._--The importance of knowing\nthe truth, p. 110.--Deception humiliating, _ibid._--A lie or\nbreach of faith held more condemnable in proportion to the\nmagnitude of the harm caused by it, _ibid._--The importance of\ntruthfulness and fidelity even in apparently trifling cases, p.\n110 _sq._--Deceit held permissible or obligatory when promoting\nthe true interest of the person subject to it, p. 111.--The moral\nvaluation of an act of falsehood influenced by its motive, p. 111\n_sq._--The opinion that no motive can justify an act of\nfalsehood, p. 112.--Why falsehood is held permissible, or\npraiseworthy, or obligatory, when directed against a stranger,\n_ibid._--Deceit condemned as cowardly, p. 113.--A clever lie\nadmired or approved of, p. 114.--The duties of sincerity and good\nfaith to some extent founded on prudential considerations, pp.\n114-124.--Lying attended with supernatural danger, _ibid._--A\nmystic efficacy ascribed to the untrue word, pp. 116-118.--The\nefficacy of oaths and the methods of charging them with\nsupernatural energy, pp. 118-122.--Oaths containing appeals to\nsupernatural beings, pp. 120-122.--By being frequently appealed\nto in oaths a god may come to be looked upon as a guardian of\nveracity and good faith, p. 123.--The influence of oath-taking\nupon veracity, p. 123 _sq._--The influence of education upon the\nregard for truth, p. 124.--The influence {ix} of habit upon the\nregard for truth, p. 125.--Natural to speak the truth, p. 125\n_sq._--Intercourse with strangers destructive to savage veracity,\npp. 126-129.--Social incoherence apt to lead to deceitful habits,\np. 129.--Social differentiation a cause of deception, p. 129\n_sq._--Oppression an inducement to falsehood, p. 130 _sq._--The\nduty of informing other persons of the truth, p. 131.--The regard\nfor knowledge, pp. 131-136.\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXII\n\nTHE RESPECT FOR OTHER MEN'S HONOUR AND SELF-REGARDING\nPRIDE--POLITENESS\n\nDefinition of \"honour,\" p. 137.--The feeling of self-regarding\npride in animals, p. 137 _sq._--In savages, pp. 138-140.--The\nmoral disapproval of insults, pp. 140-142.--The condemnation of\nan insult influenced by the _status_ of, or the relations\nbetween, the parties concerned, p. 142 _sq._--Pride disapproved\nof and humility praised as a virtue or enjoined as a duty, p. 144\n_sq._--Humility an object of censure, p. 145 _sq._--Deviation\nfrom what is usual arouses a suspicion of arrogance, p. 146.\n--Politeness a duty rather than a virtue, _ibid._--Many\nsavages conspicuous for their civility, p. 146 _sq._--Politeness\na characteristic of all the great nations of the East, p. 147\n_sq._--The courtesies of Chivalry, p. 148.--The demands of\npoliteness refer to all sorts of social intercourse and vary\nindefinitely in detail, p. 148 _sq._--Salutations, pp. 149-151.\n--The rule of politeness most exacting in relation to superiors,\np. 151 _sq._--Politeness shown by men to women, p. 152.\n--Politeness shown to strangers, _ibid._\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXIII\n\nREGARD FOR OTHER PERSONS' HAPPINESS IN GENERAL--GRATITUDE--PATRIOTISM\nAND COSMOPOLITANISM\n\nThe regard for other persons' happiness in general, p. 153\n_sq._--The moral ideas concerning conduct which affects other\npersons' welfare influenced by the relationship between the\nparties, pp. 154-166.--The feeling of gratitude said to be\nlacking in many uncivilised races, pp. 155-157.--Criticism of\nstatements to this effect, pp. 157-161.--Savages described as\ngrateful for benefits bestowed on them, pp. 161-165.--Gratitude\nrepresented as an object of praise or its absence as an object of\ndisapproval, p. 165 _sq._--Why ungratefulness is disapproved of,\np. 166.--The patriotic sentiment defined, p. 167.--Though hardly\nto be found among the lower savages, it seems to be far from\nunknown among uncultured peoples of a higher type, p. 167\n_sq._--Many of the elements out of which patriotism proper has\ngrown clearly distinguishable among savages, even the lowest, pp.\n168-172.--National conceit, pp. 170-174.--The relation between\nthe national feeling and the religious feeling, p. 174 _sq._--The\npatriotism of ancient Greece and Rome, p. 175 _sq._--The moral\nvaluation of patriotism, p. 176.--Duties to mankind at large, pp.\n176-179.--The ideal of patriotism rejected by Greek and Roman\nphilosophers, p. 177 _sq._--By Christianity, p. 178 _sq._--The\nlack of patriotism and national feeling during the Middle Ages,\npp. 179-181.--The development of the national feeling in England,\np. 181 _sq._--In France, p. 182.--The cosmopolitanism of the\neighteenth century, p. 182 _sq._--European patriotism after the\nFrench revolution, p. 183 _sq._--The theory cf nationalism,\np. 184.--The cosmopolitan spirit, p. 184 _sq._\n\n\n{x} CHAPTER XXXIV\n\nTHE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE ALTRUISTIC SENTIMENT\n\nMaternal affection, pp. 186-189.--Prof. Espinas's theory, p. 186\n_sq._--Prof. Bain's theory, p. 187 _sq._--Mr. Spencer's theory,\np. 188.--Distinction between maternal love and the mere love of\nthe helpless, p. 188 _sq._--The paternal instinct, p. 189\n_sq._--Conjugal attachment, pp. 190-192.--The duration of\nconjugal attachment, p. 192 _sq._--The duration of parental\naffection, p. 193.--Filial affection, p. 194.--Man originally, as\nit seems, not a gregarious animal, p. 195 _sq._--How he became\ngregarious, p. 196 _sq._--The gregarious instinct, p. 197.\n--Social affection, p. 197 _sq._--The evolution of social\naggregates influenced by economic conditions, pp. 198-201.--The\nsocial aggregates of savages who know neither cattle-rearing nor\nagriculture, pp. 198-200.--Of pastoral peoples, p. 201.--Of\npeoples subsisting on agriculture, _ibid._--Social units based on\nmarriage or a common descent, p. 201 _sq._--The social force in\nkinship, pp. 202-204.--Mr. Hartland's theory, pp. 204-206.--The\nblood-covenant, pp. 206-209.--The social influence of a common\ncult among savages, pp. 209-213.--The \"four generations\" of the\nChinese, p. 213.--Traces of a clan organisation in China, p. 213\n_sq._--The joint family among so-called Aryan peoples, pp.\n214-216.--Village communities, clans, phratries, and tribes among\nthese peoples, pp. 216-220.--The prevalence of the paternal\nsystem of descent among the peoples of archaic culture, p.\n220.--Associations of tribes among uncivilised races, p. 220\n_sq._--Civilisation only thrives in states, p. 221 _sq._--The\norigin of states p. 222.--The influence of the State upon the\nsmaller units of which it is composed, p. 222 _sq._--The State\nand the notion of a common descent, pp. 223-225.--The archaic\nState not only a political but a religious community, p. 225\n_sq._--The national importance of a common religion, p. 226.--The\ninfluence of social development upon the altruistic sentiment, p.\n226 _sq._--The altruistic sentiment has not necessarily reference\nonly to individuals belonging to the same social unit, p. 227\n_sq._--The expansion of altruism in mankind, p. 228.\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXV\n\nSUICIDE\n\nSuicide and civilisation, p. 229.--Suicide said to be unknown\namong several uncivilised races, p. 229 _sq._--The prevalence of\nsuicide among savages and barbarians, pp. 230-232.--The causes of\nsuicide among savages, pp 232-235.--The moral valuation of\nsuicide among savages, pp. 235-241.--The fate of self-murderers\nafter death, pp. 235-239.--The treatment of the bodies of\nsuicides among uncivilised races, pp. 238-240.--The opinions as\nto suicide in China, pp. 241-243.--In Japan, p. 243 _sq._--Among\nthe Hindus, pp. 244-246.--Among Buddhists, p. 246.--Among the\nHebrews, p. 246 _sq._--Among Muhammedans, p. 247.--In ancient\nGreece, pp. 247-249.--Among classical philosophers, pp.\n248-250.--In ancient Rome, p. 250 _sq._--Among the Christians,\npp. 251-254.--Why suicide was condemned by the Church, pp.\n252-254.--The secular legislation influenced by the doctrine of\nthe Church, p. 254.--The treatment of suicides' bodies in Europe,\npp. 254-257.--More humane feelings towards suicides in the Middle\nAges, p. 257 _sq._--Attacks upon the views of the Church and upon\nthe laws of the State concerning suicide, pp. 258-260.--Modern\nphilosophers' arguments against suicide, {xi} p. 260 _sq._--The\nlegislation on the subject changed, p. 261.--Explanation of the\nmoral ideas concerning suicide, pp. 261-263.--Criticism of Prof.\nDurkheim's opinion as to the moral valuation of suicide in the\nfuture, p. 263 _sq._\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXVI\n\nSELF-REGARDING DUTIES AND VIRTUES--INDUSTRY--REST\n\nGeneral statements referring to the nature and origin of\nself-regarding duties and virtues, pp. 265-268.--Man naturally\ninclined to idleness, pp. 268-271.--Among savages either\nnecessity or compulsion almost the sole inducement to industry,\n_ibid._--Savages who enjoin work as a duty or regard industry as\na virtue, p. 271 _sq._--Industrial activity looked down upon as\ndisreputable for a free man, p. 272 _sq._--Contempt for trade, p.\n274. Progress in civilisation implies an increase of industry and\nleads to condemnation of idleness, _ibid._--Idleness prohibited\nby law in ancient Peru p. 274 _sq._--Industry enjoined in ancient\nPersia, p. 275 _sq._--In ancient Egypt, p. 276.--In ancient\nGreece, p. 276 _sq._--Greek views on agriculture, p. 277.--On\ntrade and handicrafts, p. 278 _sq._--Roman views on labour, p.\n279 _sq._--The Christian doctrine on the subject, pp. 280-282.\n--Not applicable to laymen, p. 282.--Modern views on labour,\np. 282 _sq._--Rest regarded as a duty, p. 283.--Work suspended\nafter a death, p. 283 _sq._--On certain other occasions,\nespecially in connection with changes in the moon, pp. 284-286.\n--Tabooed days among the peoples of Semitic stock, pp. 286-288.\n--The Jewish Sabbath, p. 286 _sq._--The seventh day among\nthe Assyrians and Babylonians, p. 287 _sq._--The Christian\nSunday, p. 288 _sq._\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXVII\n\nRESTRICTIONS IN DIET\n\nThe gluttony of savages and their views on it, p. 290 _sq._--At\nhigher stages of culture intemperance often subject to censure,\np. 291.--Views on pleasures of the table, p. 291 _sq._--Fasting\nas a means of having supernatural converse or acquiring\nsupernatural powers, p. 292 _sq._--Abstinence from food before or\nin connection with the performance of a magical or religious\nceremony, pp. 293-298.--Fasting prevents pollution, pp. 294-296.\n--Sacrificial victims should be clean, and may therefore\nhave to fast, p. 295 _sq._--Fasting before the performance of a\nsacrifice may be due to the idea that it is dangerous or improper\nfor the worshipper to partake of food before the god has had his\nshare, pp 296-298.--Fasting after a death, pp. 298-308.--Observed\nonly in the daytime, p. 299 _sq._--Abstinence from certain\nvictuals only, pp. 300-302.--Various attempts to explain the\ncustom of fasting after a death, p. 302 _sq._--Mourners fast for\nfear of being polluted by the food, pp. 303-306.--Or because\nthey, by eating a piece of food, might pollute all victuals\nbelonging to the same species, p. 306 _sq._--Or because they are\nsupposed to be in a delicate condition imposing upon them\nrestrictions in their diet, p. 307 _sq._--Or because grief is\naccompanied by a loss of appetite, p. 308.--The Lent fast, p. 308\n_sq._--Fasts connected with astronomical changes, pp. 309-315.\n--Among the Jews, pp. 310-312.--Among the Harranians and\nManich\u00e6ans, p. 312 _sq._--The Muhammedan {xii} fast of\nRama[d.]\u00e2n, pp. 313-315.--Fasting as a form of penance,\npp. 315-318.--As a survival of an expiatory sacrifice, pp. 316-318.\n--Fasting and almsgiving, _ibid._--Fasting \"the beginning\nof chastity,\" p. 318.\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXVIII\n\nRESTRICTIONS IN DIET (_concluded_)\n\nCertain kinds of food forbidden to certain classes of persons,\npp. 319-324.--To young persons, p. 319 _sq._--To women, p. 320\n_sq._--To men, p. 321 _sq._--To priests or magicians, p. 322.\n--Restrictions in diet connected with totemism, p. 323 _sq._\n--Abstinence from animals which excite disgust by their\nappearance, p. 324 _sq._--From reptiles, p. 324.--From fish,\np. 324 _sq._--From fowl, p. 325.--From eggs, p. 325 _sq._--From\nmilk, _ibid._--From animals which are regarded with disgust on\naccount of their filthy habits or the nasty food on which they\nlive, pp. 326-328.--From pork, _ibid._--From foreign animals,\np. 327.--From animals which are supposed to be metamorphosed\nancestors or which resemble men, p. 328 _sq._--From animals which\nexcite sympathy, pp. 329-331.--From beef, p. 330 _sq._--Restrictions\nin diet due to the disinclination to kill certain animals for\nfood or, generally, to reduce the supply of a certain kind of\nvictuals, pp. 330-332.--Abstinence from domestic animals which\nare regarded as sacred, p. 331 _sq._--From food which is believed\nto injure him who partakes of it, pp. 332-334.--The sources to\nwhich the general avoidance of certain kinds of food may be\ntraced, p. 334 _sq._--The moral disapproval of eating certain\nkinds of food, p. 335. The moral prohibition sanctioned by\nreligion, _ibid._--Vegetarianism, pp. 335-338.--Among many\npeoples drunkenness so common that it can hardly be looked upon\nas a vice, pp. 338-341.--Sobriety or total abstinence from\nintoxicating liquors insisted upon by Eastern religions, p. 341\n_sq._--Explanation of the moral ideas concerning drunkenness and\nthe use of alcoholic drink, pp. 342-345.--Wine or spirituous\nliquor inspires mysterious fear, p. 344 _sq._--The Muhammedan\nprohibition of wine, p. 345.\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXIX\n\nCLEANLINESS AND UNCLEANLINESS--ASCETICISM IN GENERAL\n\nMan naturally feeling some aversion to filth, p. 346.--Savages\nwho are praised for their cleanliness, pp. 346-348.--Savages who\nare clean in certain respects but dirty in others, p. 348.\n--Savages who are described as generally filthy in their\nhabits, p. 348 _sq._--Various circumstances which may account for\nthe prevalence of cleanly or dirty habits among a certain people,\npp. 349-351.--The moral valuation of cleanliness, p. 351\n_sq._--Cleanliness practised and enjoined from religious or\nsuperstitious motives, pp. 352-354.--In other instances religious\nor superstitious beliefs have led to uncleanliness, pp. 354-356.\n--Uncleanliness as a form of asceticism, p. 355 _sq._--Ascetic\npractices, p. 356 _sq._--The idea underlying religious asceticism\nderived from several different sources, pp. 357-363.--Certain\nascetic practices originally performed for another purpose,\np. 358 _sq._--An ascetic practice may be the survival of an earlier\nsacrifice, p. 359.--Ascetic practices due to the idea of expiation,\npp. 359-361.--Self-mortification intended to excite divine\ncompassion, p. 361.--Suffering voluntarily endured with a view to\npreventing the commission of sin, pp. 361-363.--The gratification\nof earthly desires deemed sinful or disapproved of, _ibid._\n\n\n{xiii} CHAPTER XL\n\nMARRIAGE\n\nDefinition of the term \"marriage,\" p. 364.--The horror of incest\nwell-nigh universal in the human race, pp. 364-366.--The\nprohibited degrees as a rule more numerous among peoples\nunaffected by modern civilisation than in more advanced\ncommunities, p. 366.--The violation of the prohibitory rules\nregarded by savages as a most heinous crime, p. 366 _sq._--The\nhorror of incest among nations that have passed beyond savagery\nand barbarism, p. 367 _sq._--Attempt to explain the prohibition\nof marriage between near kin, pp. 368-371.--Refutation of various\nobjections raised against the author's theory, pp. 371-378.--\nIncestuous unions stigmatised by religion, p. 375 _sq._--Endogamous\nrules of various kinds, pp. 378-382.--Marriage by capture, p. 382.\n--Marriage by purchase, pp. 382-384.--The disappearance of marriage\nby purchase, p. 384 _sq._--The morning gift, p. 385.--The marriage\nportion, p. 385 _sq._--The form of marriage influenced by the\nnumerical proportion between the sexes, p. 387 _sq._--Polyandry,\np. 387.--Group marriage of the Toda type, _ibid._--The causes of\npolygyny, pp. 387-389.--Of monogamy, p. 389. Polygyny less prevalent\nat the lowest stages of civilisation than at somewhat higher stages,\npp. 389-391.--Civilisation in its higher forms leads to monogamy,\np. 391.--The moral valuation of the various forms of marriage,\np. 392.--The assumed prevalence of group marriage in Australia,\npp. 392-396.--The duration of marriage and the laws of divorce,\npp. 396-398.\n\n\nCHAPTER XLI\n\nCELIBACY\n\nMarriage considered indispensable among savage and barbarous\nraces of men, p. 399.--Celibacy a great exception and marriage\nregarded as a duty among peoples of archaic culture, pp. 399-403.\n--Why celibacy is disapproved of, p. 403 _sq._--Modern views on\ncelibacy, p. 404 _sq._--Celibacy of persons whose function it is\nto perform religious or magical rites, pp. 405-412.--Marriage\nlooked down upon by the Essenes, p. 410.--By the Christians,\npp. 410-412.--Religious celibacy due to the idea that the priestess\nis married to the god whom she is serving, pp. 412-414.--Goddesses\njealous of the chastity of their priests, p. 414.--Religious\ncelibacy connected with the idea that sexual intercourse is\ndefiling, pp. 414-420.--Holiness easily destroyed by pollution,\npp. 417-419.--Causes of religious celibacy among the Christians,\np. 420 _sq._--Religious celibacy enjoined or commended as a means\nof self-mortification, p. 421.\n\n\nCHAPTER XLII\n\nFREE LOVE--ADULTERY\n\nUncivilised peoples among whom both sexes enjoy perfect freedom\nprevious to marriage, pp. 422-424.--Among whom unchastity before\nmarriage is looked upon as a disgrace or a crime for a woman, p.\n424.--The wantonness of savages in several cases due to foreign\ninfluence, _ibid._--In many tribes the free intercourse which\nprevails between unmarried people not of a promiscuous nature,\np. 424 _sq._--Uncivilised peoples among {xiv} whom the man who\nseduces a girl is subject to punishment or censure, pp. 425-427.\n--Moral opinions as to sexual intercourse between unmarried people\namong the Chinese, p. 427.--Among the ancient Hebrews, p. 427 _sq._\n--Among Muhammedan peoples, p. 428.--Among the Hindus, _ibid._--In\nZoroastrianism, _ibid._--Among the ancient Teutons, p. 429.--In\nancient Greece and Rome, pp. 429-431.--In Christianity, p. 431 _sq._\n--During the Middle Ages, p. 432 _sq._--After the Reformation,\np. 433.--In present Europe, p. 433 _sq._--Explanation of the moral\nideas concerning sexual intercourse between unmarried people,\npp. 434-443.--Prostitution, pp. 441-443.--Religious prostitution,\nconnected with religious celibacy, p. 443 _sq._--Of the Babylonian\ntype, pp. 444-446.--Moral opinions as to the seduction of a married\nwoman, pp. 447-450.--As to unfaithfulness in a wife, p. 450 _sq._\n--As to the remarriages of widows, _ibid._--As to unfaithfulness\nin a husband, pp. 451-455.\n\n\nCHAPTER XLIII\n\nHOMOSEXUAL LOVE\n\nHomosexual practices among the lower animals, p. 456.--Among\nvarious races of men, pp. 456-464.--Between women, p. 464\n_sq._--The causes of homosexual practices, pp. 465-471.--Congenital\nsexual inversion, p. 465 _sq._--Absence of the other sex or lack\nof accessible women, p. 466 _sq._--Acquired inversion, pp.\n467-470.--Homosexuality in ancient Greece partly due to the\nmethods of training the youth, p. 469 _sq._--Partly due to the\ngreat gulf which mentally separated the sexes, p. 470\n_sq._--Causes of pederasty in China and Morocco, p. 471.--Moral\nideas concerning homosexual practices, pp. 471-489.--Among\nuncivilised peoples, pp. 471-475.--Among the ancient Peruvians,\np. 473 _sq._--Among the ancient Mexicans, Mayas, and Chibchas,\np. 474.--Among Muhammedans, p. 475 _sq._--Among the Hindus,\np. 476.--In China, p. 476 _sq._--In Japan, p. 477.--Among the\nancient Scandinavians, p. 477 _sq._--In ancient Greece, p. 478\n_sq._--In Zoroastrianism, p. 479 _sq._--Among the ancient\nHebrews, p. 480.--In early Christianity, p. 480 _sq._--In Pagan\nRome, _ibid._--In Christian Rome, p. 481.--European legislation\nregarding homosexual practices during the Middle Ages and later,\np. 481 _sq._--Modern legislation on the subject, p. 482\n_sq._--Moral ideas concerning it in present Europe, p. 483.--Why\nhomosexual practices are frequently subject to censure, p. 483\n_sq._--Criticism of Dr. Havelock Ellis's suggestion as to the\npopular attitude towards homosexuality, pp. 484-486.--The\nexcessive sinfulness attached to homosexual practices by\nZoroastrianism, Hebrewism, and Christianity, due to the fact that\nsuch practices were intimately associated with unbelief,\nidolatry, or heresy, pp. 486-489.\n\n\nCHAPTER XLIV\n\nREGARD FOR THE LOWER ANIMALS\n\nAnimals treated with deference for superstitious reasons, pp.\n490-493.--Butchers regarded as unclean, p. 493.--Many peoples\naverse from killing their cattle from economic motives, p. 493\n_sq._--Domestic animals treated kindly by savages out of\nsympathy, pp. 494-496.--Savages who are said to be lacking in\nsympathy for the brute creation, {xv} p. 496.--Moral valuation of\nmen's conduct towards the lower animals among savages, p. 496\n_sq._--In Brahmanism, p. 497.--In Buddhism, pp. 497, 498,\n500.--In Jainism, p. 498 _sq._--In Taouism, p. 499.--In China,\np. 499 _sq._--In Japan, p. 500.--In Zoroastrianism, p. 501 _sq._\n--In Muhammedanism, p. 502 _sq._--In ancient Greece and Rome,\npp. 503-505.--In Hebrewism, p. 505 _sq._--In Christianity,\npp. 506-508.--The views of modern philosophers, p. 508.--Of\nlegislators, p. 508 _sq._--Indifference to animal suffering a\ncharacteristic of public opinion in European countries up to\nquite modern times, p. 509 _sq._--Laws against cruelty to\nanimals, p. 510.--Humane feelings towards animals in Europe, pp.\n510-512.--The crusade against vivisection, pp. 512-514.--Explanation\nof the increasing sympathy with animal suffering in Europe,\np. 512 _sq._--The influence of human thoughtlessness upon the\ntreatment of the lower animals and upon the moral ideas relating\nto it, pp. 512-514.\n\n\nCHAPTER XLV\n\nREGARD FOR THE DEAD\n\nThe belief in a future life, p. 515 _sq._--Notions as regards the\ndisembodied soul, p. 516.--The dead considered to have rights\nvery similar to those they had whilst alive, pp. 516-520.--The\nsoul must not be killed or injured, p. 516 _sq._--Its living\nfriends must positively contribute to its comfort and\nsubsistence, p. 517 _sq._--The right of ownership does not cease\nwith death, p. 518 _sq._--Robbery or violation committed at a\ntomb severely condemned, _ibid._--Respect must be shown for the\nhonour and self-regarding pride of the dead, p. 519.--The dead\ndemand obedience, p. 519 _sq._--The sacredness attached to a\nwill, p. 519.--The rigidity of ancestral custom, p. 519\n_sq._--Duties to the dead that arise from the fact of death\nitself, pp. 520-524.--The funeral, the rites connected with it,\nand the mourning customs, largely regarded as duties to the dead,\n_ibid._--The duties to the dead influenced by the relationship\nbetween the parties, p. 524 _sq._--By the age and sex of the\ndeparted, pp. 525-527.--By class distinctions, p. 527.--By moral\ndistinctions, p. 527 _sq._--The causes from which the duties to\nthe dead have sprung, pp 528-549.--These duties partly based on\nsympathetic resentment, p. 528.--The dead regarded as guardians\nof their descendants, p. 529 _sq._--But the ancestral guardian\nspirit does not bestow his favours for nothing, p. 530 _sq._--The\ndead more commonly regarded as enemies than friends, pp. 531-534.\n--Explanation of the belief in the irritable or malevolent\ncharacter of the dead, p. 534 _sq._--The fear of death and the\nfear of the dead, pp. 535-538.--The conduct of the survivors\ninfluenced by their beliefs regarding the character, activity,\nand polluting influence of the dead, pp. 538-546.--The origin of\nfuneral and mourning customs, pp. 541-547.--Why practices\nconnected with death which originally sprang from\nself-regarding motives have come to be enjoined as duties, p. 547\n_sq._--Why the duties to the dead are rarely extended to\nstrangers, p. 548 _sq._--Explanation of the differences in the\ntreatment of the dead which depend upon age, sex, social\nposition, and moral distinctions, p. 549.--The duties to the\ndeparted become less stringent as time goes on, p. 549 _sq._--The\nduties to the dead affected by progress in intellectual culture,\npp. 550-552.--The funeral sacrifice continued as a mark of\nrespect or affection, p. 550.--Offerings made to the dead become\nalms given to the poor, pp. 550-552.\n\n\n{xvi} CHAPTER XLVI\n\nCANNIBALISM\n\nThe prevalence of cannibalism, p. 553.--Various forms of it,\np. 554.--Cannibalism due to scarcity or lack of animal food,\np. 555.--To _gourmandise_ pp. 555-557.--To revenge, pp. 557-559.\n--The practice of eating criminals, p. 558 _sq._--Cannibalism\na method of making a dangerous individual harmless after death,\np. 559 _sq._--Due to the idea that the cannibal, by eating the\nsupposed seat of a certain quality in a person, incorporates it\nwith his own system, pp. 560-562.--Cannibalism in connection with\nhuman sacrifice, p. 562 _sq._--The eating of man-gods, p. 563\n_sq._--Other instances in which a supernatural or medicinal effect\nis ascribed to human flesh or blood, pp. 564-566.--Cannibalism as\na covenant rite, p. 566 _sq._--Special reasons given for the\npractice of eating relatives or friends, pp. 567-569.--The\ncannibalism of modern savages represented as the survival of an\nancient practice which was once universal in the human race,\np. 569 _sq._--Criticism of this theory pp. 570-580.--Savages who\nfeel the greatest dislike of cannibalism, p. 570 _sq._--Cannibals\noften anxious to deny that they are addicted to this practice,\np. 572.--The rapid extinction of it among certain savages p. 572\n_sq._--Even among peoples very notorious for cannibalism there\nare individuals who abhor it, p. 573.--The aversion to cannibalism\nmay be due to sympathy for the dead, p. 574.--In the first instance\nit is probably an instinctive feeling akin to those feelings which\nregulate the diet of the various animal species, _ibid._--The eating\nof human flesh regarded with superstitious dread, pp. 574-576.--The\nfeeling of reluctance may be overcome by other motives and may be\nsucceeded by a taste for human flesh, p. 577 _sq._--Early man\nprobably not addicted to cannibalism, pp. 578-580.--Cannibalism\nmuch less prevalent among the lowest savages than among races\nsomewhat more advanced in culture, p. 578 _sq._--Among some\nsavages cannibalism known to be of modern origin or to have\nspread in recent times, p. 579 _sq._--The moral valuation of\ncannibalism, p. 580 _sq._\n\n\nCHAPTER XLVII\n\nTHE BELIEF IN SUPERNATURAL BEINGS\n\nDistinction between \"natural\" and \"supernatural\" phenomena, p. 582\n_sq._--Supernatural mechanical energy, p. 583 _sq._--Supernatural\nqualities attributed to the mental constitution of animate\nbeings, especially to their will, p. 584.--The difference between\nreligion and magic, _ibid._--The meaning of the word _religio_,\npp. 584-586.--That mystery is the essential characteristic of\nsupernatural beings is testified by language, p. 586 _sq._--This\ntestimony corroborated by facts referring to the nature of such\nobjects or individuals as are most commonly worshipped, pp.\n587-593.--Startling events ascribed to the activity of invisible\nsupernatural agents, p. 593 _sq._--The origin of animism, p. 594\n_sq._--A mind presupposes a body, p. 595 _sq._--The animist who\nendows an inanimate object with a soul regards the visible thing\nitself as its body, p. 596 _sq._--The origin of anthropomorphism,\np. 597 _sq._--The difference between men and gods, p. 599.\n--Materiality at last considered a quality not becoming to a\ngod, pp. 599-601.\n\n\n{xvii} CHAPTER XLVIII\n\nDUTIES TO GODS\n\nDefinition of the term \"god,\" p. 602.--Gods have the rights to\nlife and bodily integrity, pp. 602-604.--Not necessarily\nconsidered immortal, p. 602 _sq._--The killing of totemic\nanimals, p. 603 _sq._--Divine animals killed as a religious or\nmagical ceremony, pp. 604-606.--The killing of man-gods or divine\nkings, pp. 606-610.--The right to bodily integrity granted to\ngods occasionally suspended, p. 610.--Supernatural beings\nbelieved to be subject to human needs, p. 610 _sq._--To require\nofferings, p. 611 _sq._--Sacrificial gifts offered to\nsupernatural beings with a view to averting evils, pp. 612-614.\n--With a view to securing positive benefits, pp. 614-616.\n--Thank-offerings, p. 615 _sq._--Sacrificial victims\nintended to serve as substitutes for other individuals, whose\nlives are in danger, pp. 616-618.--Occasionally regarded as\nmessengers, p. 618.--Sacrifices offered for the purpose of\ntransferring curses, pp. 618-624.--The covenant sacrifice,\npp. 622-624.--The sacrificial victim or offered article a vehicle\nfor transferring benign virtue to him who offered it or to other\npersons, p. 624 _sq._--Sacrifice becomes a symbol of humility and\nreverence, p. 625 _sq._--Sacrifice as a duty, p. 626.--Supernatural\nbeings possess property, and this must not be interfered with,\np. 626 _sq._--Sacred objects must not be appropriated for ordinary\npurposes, p. 627 _sq._--The right of sanctuary, pp. 628-638.--Its\nprevalence, pp. 628-634.--Explanation of this right, pp. 634-638.\n\n\nCHAPTER XLIX\n\nDUTIES TO GODS (_concluded_)\n\nSupernatural beings sensitive to insults and disrespect, p. 639\n_sq._--Irreverence to gods punished by men, _ibid._--The names of\nsupernatural beings tabooed, pp. 640-643.--Explanation of these\ntaboos, p. 642 _sq._--Atheism, p. 643 _sq._--Unbelief, pp.\n644-646.--Heresy, p. 646 _sq._--Polytheism by nature tolerant,\npp. 647-649.--The difference in toleration between monotheistic\nand polytheistic religions shows itself in their different\nattitudes towards witchcraft, pp. 649-652.--The highest stage of\nreligion free from intolerance, p. 652 _sq._--Prayer a tribute to\nthe self-regarding pride of the god to whom it is addressed, pp.\n653-655.--Prayers connected with offerings, p. 655 _sq._--Magic\nefficacy ascribed to prayer, pp. 656-659.--Gods demand obedience,\np. 659.--The influence of this demand upon the history of morals,\np. 659 _sq._--Explanation of the obligatory character attached to\nmen's conduct towards their gods, pp. 660-662.\n\n\nCHAPTER L\n\nGODS AS GUARDIANS OF MORALITY\n\nThe supernatural beings of savage belief frequently described as\nutterly indifferent to all questions of worldly morality, pp.\n663-665.--The gods of many savages mostly intent on doing harm to\nmankind, pp. 665-667.--Adoration of supernatural beings which are\nconsidered at least occasionally beneficent also very prevalent\namong uncivilised peoples, {xviii} pp. 667-669.--Their\nbenevolence, however, does not prove that they take an active\ninterest in morality at large, p. 669.--Instances in which savage\ngods are supposed to punish the transgression of rules relating\nto worldly morality, pp. 669-687.--Savages represented as\nbelieving in the existence of a supreme being who is a moral\nlaw-giver or judge, pp. 670-687.--The prevalence of such a belief\nin Australia, pp. 670-675.--In Polynesia and Melanesia,\np. 675.--In the Malay Archipelago, p. 675 _sq._--In the Andaman\nIslands, p. 676.--Among the Karens of Burma, p. 677.--In India,\np. 677 _sq._--Among the Ainu of Japan, p. 678.--Among the\nSamoyedes, _ibid._--Among the Greenlanders, _ibid._--Among the\nNorth American Indians, pp. 679-681.--Among the South American\nIndians, p. 681 _sq._--In Africa, pp. 682-685.--Explanation of\nthis belief, pp. 685-687.--The supreme beings of savages invoked\nin curses or oaths, p. 686 _sq._--The oath and ordeal do not\ninvolve a belief in the gods as vindicators of truth and justice,\npp. 687-690.--The ordeal essentially a magical ceremony,\n_ibid._--Ordeals which have a different origin, p. 690.--The\nbelief in a moral retribution after death among savages,\npp. 690-695.--The sources to which it may be traced, pp. 691-695.\n--The influence of religion upon the moral consciousness\nof savages, p. 695 _sq._\n\n\nCHAPTER LI\n\nGODS AS GUARDIANS OF MORALITY (_continued_)\n\nThe attitude of religion towards matters of worldly morality in\nancient Mexico, p. 697 _sq._--In ancient Peru, p. 698.--In\nancient Egypt, pp. 698-701.--In ancient Chaldea, pp. 701-704.--In\nZoroastrianism, pp. 704-706.--Among the Vedic people, pp.\n706-709.--In post-Vedic times in India, pp. 709-711.--In\nBuddhism, p. 711 _sq._--In China, p. 712 _sq._--In ancient\nGreece, pp. 713-716.--In ancient Rome, p. 716 _sq._--Among the\nHebrews, p. 717 _sq._--Christian doctrines of salvation and the\nfuture life, pp. 718-725.--The attitude of Muhammedanism towards\nmatters of worldly morality and its doctrine of the future life,\npp. 725-727.\n\n\nCHAPTER LII\n\nGODS AS GUARDIANS OF MORALITY (_concluded_)\n\nExplanation of the malevolence of savage gods, p. 728 _sq._--Of\nthe growing tendency to attribute more amiable qualities to the\ngods, pp. 729-731.--Men selecting their gods, p. 729 _sq._--The\ngood qualities of gods magnified by their worshippers, p. 730\n_sq._--How various departments of social morality have come to be\nplaced under the supervision of gods, p. 731 _sq._--How the\nguardianship of gods has been extended to the whole sphere of\njustice, p. 732.--How gods have become guardians of morality at\nlarge, p. 733 _sq._--The influence of the religious sanction of\nmorality, p. 734 _sq._--Religious devotion frequently accompanied\nby great laxity of morals, pp. 735-737.--Greater importance\nattached to ceremonies or the niceties of belief than to good\nbehaviour towards fellow men, p. 736 _sq._--The religious\nsanction of moral rules often leads to an external observance of\nthese rules from purely selfish motives, p. 737.--The moral\ninfluence of Christianity, _ibid._\n\n\n{xix} CHAPTER LIII\n\nCONCLUSION\n\nRecapitulation of the theory of the moral consciousness set forth\nin vol. I., pp. 738-741.--This theory supported by the fact that\nnot only moral emotions but non-moral retributive emotions are\nfelt with reference to phenomena exactly similar in their general\nnature to those on which moral judgments are passed, p.\n741.--As also by the circumstance that the very acts, forbearances,\nand omissions which are condemned as wrong are also apt to call\nforth anger and revenge, and that the acts and forbearances which\nare praised as morally good are apt to call forth gratitude, p. 741\n_sq._--The variations of the moral ideas partly due to different\nexternal conditions, p. 742.--But chiefly to psychical causes,\npp. 742-746.--The duties to neighbours have gradually become more\nexpansive owing to the expansion of the altruistic sentiment,\np. 743 _sq._--The influence of reflection upon moral judgments has\nbeen increasing, p. 744 _sq._--The influence of sentimental\nantipathies and likings has been decreasing, _ibid._--The\ninfluence which the belief in supernatural forces or beings or in\na future state has exercised upon the moral ideas of mankind,\np. 745 _sq._--Remarks as to the future development of the moral\nideas, p. 746.\n\n\nADDITIONAL NOTES . . . pp. 747-754\n\n\nAUTHORITIES QUOTED . . pp. 755-835\n\n\nSUBJECT INDEX . . .  . pp. 837-865\n\n\n\n\nTHE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE MORAL IDEAS\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXVIII\n\nTHE RIGHT OF PROPERTY\n\n\nTHE right of property implies that a certain person or certain\npersons are recognised as having a right to the exclusive\ndisposal of a certain thing. The owner is not necessarily allowed\nto do with his property whatever he likes; but whether absolute\nor limited, his right to disposal is not shared by anybody else,\nsave under very exceptional circumstances, as in the case of\n\"compulsion by necessity.\"[1] Property in a thing thus means not\nonly that the owner of it is allowed, at least within certain\nlimits, to use or deal with it at his discretion, but also that\nother persons are forbidden to prevent him from using or dealing\nwith it in any manner he is entitled to.\n\n[Footnote 1: _Supra_, i. 285 _sqq._]\n\nThe most common offence against property is illicit appropriation\nof other persons' belongings. Not the mere fact that individuals\nare in actual possession of certain objects, but the public\ndisapproval of acts by which they are deprived of such\npossession, shows that they have proprietary rights over those\nobjects. Hence the universal condemnation of what we call theft\nor robbery proves that the right of property exists among all\nraces of men known to us.\n\n{2} Travellers often accuse savages of thievishness.[2] But then\ntheir judgments are commonly based upon the treatment to which\nthey have been subject themselves, and from this no conclusions\nmust be drawn as regards intra-tribal morality. Nor can races who\nhave had much to do with foreigners be taken as fair\nrepresentatives of savage honesty, as such contact has proved the\norigin of thievish propensities.[3] In the majority of cases\nuncivilised peoples seem to respect proprietary rights within\ntheir own communities, and not infrequently even in their\ndealings {3} with strangers. Many of them are expressly said to\ncondemn or abhor theft, at any rate when committed among\nthemselves. And that all of them disapprove of it may be inferred\nfrom the universal custom of subjecting a detected thief to\npunishment or revenge, or, at the very least, of compelling him\nto restore the stolen property to its owner.\n\n[Footnote 2: Beni, 'Notizie sopra gli indigeni di Mexico,' in\n_Archivio per l'antropologia e la etnologia_, xii. 15 (Apaches).\nBurton, _City of the Saints_, p. 125 (Dacotahs and Prairie\nIndians). Powers, _Tribes of California_, p. 127 (Yuki). Macfie,\n_Vancouver Island and British Columbia_, p. 468. Heriot, _Travels\nthrough the Canadas_, p. 22 (Newfoundland Eskimo). Coxe, _Russian\nDiscoveries between Asia and America_, p. 300 (Kinaighi). Georgi,\n_Russia_, iv. 22 (Kalmucks), 133 (Buriats). Scott Robertson,\n_K\u00e1firs of the Hindu-Kush_, p. 193 _sq._ Modigliani, _Viaggio a\nN\u00edas_, p. 468. Powell, _Wanderings in a Wild Country_, p. 23\n(South Sea Islanders). Romilly, _From my Verandah in New Guinea_,\np. 50; Comrie, 'Anthropological Notes on New Guinea,' in _Jour.\nAnthr. Inst._ vi. 109 _sq._ de Labillardi\u00e8re, _Voyage in Search\nof La P\u00e9rouse_, i. 275; Moseley, _Notes by a Naturalist on the\n\"Challenger,\"_ p. 391 (Admiralty Islanders). Brenchley, _Jottings\nduring the Cruise of H.M.S. Cura\u00e7oa_, p. 58 (natives of Tutuila).\nLisiansky, _Voyage round the World_, p. 88 _sq._ (Nukahivans).\nWilliams, _Missionary Enterprises in the South Sea Islands_, p.\n126 (natives of Rarotonga). Cooke, _Journal of a Voyage round the\nWorld_, p. 40; Montgomery, _Journal of Voyages and Travels by\nTyerman and Bennet_, ii. 11 (Society Islanders). Barrington,\n_History of New South Wales_, p. 22; Breton, _Excursions in New\nSouth Wales_, p. 221; Collins, _Account of the English Colony in\nNew South Wales_, i. 599 _sq._; Hodgson, _Reminiscences of\nAustralia_, p. 79; Mitchell, _Expeditions into the Interior of\nEastern Australia_, i. 264, 304; Lumholtz, _Among Cannibals_,\np. 71 _sq._ (Australian tribes). Reade, _Savage Africa_, p. 579\n(West African Negroes). Bosman, _Description of the Coast of\nGuinea_, p. 324 _sq._ (Negroes of Fida and the Gold Coast).\nCailli\u00e9, _Travels through Central Africa_, i. 353 (Mandingoes).\nBeltrame, _Il Fiume Bianco_, p. 83 (Shilluk). Wilson and Felkin,\n_Uganda and the Egyptian Soudan_, ii. 310 (Gowane people of\nKordofan). Krapf, _Travels, Researches and Missionary Labours in\nEastern Africa_, p. 355 (Wakamba). Burton, _Zanzibar_, ii. 92\n(Wanika). Bonfanti, 'L'incivilimento dei negri nell' Africa\nintertropicale,' in _Archivio per l'antropologia e la etnologia_,\nxv. 133 (Bantu races). Arbousset and Daumas, _Exploratory Tour to\nthe North-East of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope_, p. 323\n(Bechuanas). Andersson, _Lake Ngami_, pp. 468 _sq._ (Bechuanas),\n499 (Bayeye). Leslie, _Among the Zulus and Amatongas_, p. 256.\nFritsch, _Die Eingeborenen S\u00fcd-Afrika's_, pp. 53 (Kafirs), 372,\n419 (Hottentots and Bushmans).]\n\n[Footnote 3: Domenech, _Great Deserts of North America_, ii. 321.\nMackenzie, _Voyages to the Frozen and Pacific Oceans_, p. xcvi.\nnote (Crees). Burton, _Highlands of the Brazil_, i. 403 _sq._\nMoorcroft and Trebeck, _Travels in the Himalayan Provinces_, i.\n321 (Ladakhis). Anderson, _Mandalay to Momien_, p. 151\n(Kakhyens). Earl, _Papuans_, p. 80. Tyler, _Forty Years among the\nZulus_, p. 192.]\n\nThe Fuegians have shown themselves enterprising thieves on board\nEuropean vessels visiting their shores;[4] but, when presents\nwere given to them, a traveller noticed that \"if any present was\ndesigned for one canoe, and it fell near another, it was\ninvariably given to the right owner.\"[5] The boys are taught by\ntheir fathers not to steal;[6] and in case a theft has been\ncommitted, \"quand le coupable est d\u00e9couvert et chati\u00e9, l'opinion\npublique est satisfaite.\"[7] In his dealings with the Tehuelches\nLieutenant Musters was always treated with fairness, and the\ngreatest care was taken of his belongings, though they were\nborrowed at times. He gives the following advice to the\ntraveller:--\"Never show distrust of the Indians; be as free with\nyour goods and chattels as they are to each other. . . . As you\ntreat them so they will treat you.\"[8] Among the Abipones doors,\nlocks, and other things with which civilised men protect their\npossessions from thieves, were as unnecessary as they were\nunknown; and if children pilfered melons grown in the gardens of\nthe missionaries or chickens reared in their houses, \"they\nfalsely imagined that these things were free to all, or might be\ntaken not much against the will of the owner.\"[9] Among the\nBrazilian Indians theft and robbery were extremely rare, and are\nso still in places where strangers have not settled.[10] We are\ntold that the greatest insult which could be offered to an Indian\nwas to accuse him of stealing, and that the wild women preferred\nthe epithet of a prostitute to that of a {4} thief.[11] When\ndetected a thief was not only obliged to restore the property he\nhad stolen, but was punished with stripes and wounds, the chief\noften acting as executioner.[12] Among the Indians of British\nGuiana theft and pilfering rarely occur; \"if they happen to take\nanything, they do it before one's eyes, under the notion of\nhaving some claim to it, which, when called to an account, they\nare always prepared to substantiate.\"[13] If anything is stolen\nfrom his house during his absence, the Guiana Indian thinks that\nthe missing article has been carried off by people of some other\nrace than his own.[14] Formerly, when the Caribs lost anything,\nthey used to say, \"The Christians have been here.\"[15] In Hayti\nthe punishment of a thief was to be eaten.[16]\n\n[Footnote 4: Weddell, _Voyage towards the South Pole_, pp. 151,\n154, 182. King and Fitzroy, _Voyages of the \"Adventure\" and\n\"Beagle,\"_ i. 128; ii. 188.]\n\n[Footnote 5: Darwin, _Journal of Researches_, p. 242. See also\nSnow, 'Wild Tribes of Tierra del Fuego,' in _Jour. Ethn. Soc.\nLondon_, N.S. i. 264.]\n\n[Footnote 6: Bridges, in _A Voice for South America_, xiii.\n204.]\n\n[Footnote 7: Hyades and Deniker, _Mission scientifique du Cap\nHorn_, vii. 243.]\n\n[Footnote 8: Musters, _At Home with the Patagonians_, pp. 195,\n197 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 9: Dobrizhoffer, _Account of the Abipones_, ii. 148\n_sq._]\n\n[Footnote 10: von Martius, _Beitr\u00e4ge zur Ethnographie Amerika's_,\ni. 85, 87 _sq._ _Idem_, in _Jour. Roy. Geo. Soc._ ii. 196. von\nSpix and von Martius, _Travels in Brazil_, ii. 242. Southey,\n_History of Brazil_, i. 247. von den Steinen, _Unter den\nNaturv\u00f6lkern Zentral-Brasiliens_, p. 332. Burton, _Highlands of\nthe Brazil_, i. 403 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 11: Burton, _Highlands of the Brazil_, i. 404.]\n\n[Footnote 12: von Martius, _Beitr\u00e4ge_, i. 88. _Idem_, in _Jour.\nRoy. Geo. Soc._ ii. 196.]\n\n[Footnote 13: Bernau, _Missionary Labours in British Guiana_,\np. 51.]\n\n[Footnote 14: Brett, _Indian Tribes of Guiana_, p. 348.]\n\n[Footnote 15: Kames, _Sketches of the History of Man_, iv. 133\n_sq._]\n\n[Footnote 16: von Martius, _Beitr\u00e4ge_, i. 88, n.*]\n\nIt is known that many North American tribes had a very high\nstandard of honesty among themselves. Domenech wrote:--\"The\nIndians who do not come in contact with the Palefaces never\nappropriate what belongs to others; they have no law against\ntheft, as it is a crime unknown among them. They never close\ntheir doors.\"[17] According to Colonel Dodge, theft was the sole\nunpardonable crime amongst them; a man found guilty of stealing\neven the most trifling article from a member of his own band was\nwhipped almost to death, deprived of his property, and together\nwith his wives and children driven away from the band to starve\nor live as best he could.[18] Among the Rocky Mountains Indians\nvisited by Harmon theft was frequently punished with death.[19]\nAmong the Omahas, \"when the suspected thief did not confess his\noffence, some of his property was taken from him until he told\nthe truth. When he restored what he had stolen, one-half of his\nown property was returned to him, and the rest was given to the\nman from whom he had stolen. Sometimes all of the policemen\nwhipped the thief. But when the thief fled from the tribe, and\nremained away for a year or two, the offence was not\nremembered.\"[20] Among the Wyandots the punishment for theft is\ntwofold restitution.[21] The Iroquois looked down upon {5} theft\nwith the greatest disdain, although the lash of public\nindignation was the only penalty attached to it.[22] The\nPotawatomis considered it one of the most atrocious crimes.[23]\nAmong the Chippewas Keating found a few individuals who were\naddicted to thieving, but these were held in disrepute.[24]\nRichardson praises the Chippewyans for their honesty, no\nprecautions for the safety of his and his companions property\nbeing required during their stay among  them.[25] Mackenzie was\nstruck by the remarkable honesty of the Beaver Indians; \"in the\nwhole tribe there were only two women and a man who had been known\nto have swerved from that virtue, and they were considered as\nobjects of disregard and reprobation.\"[26] Among the Ahts\n\"larceny of a fellow-tribesman's property is rarely heard of,\nand the aggravation of taking it from the house or person is\nalmost unknown\"; nay, \"anything left under an Indian's charge,\nin reliance on his good faith, is perfectly safe.\"[27] The\nThlinkets generally respect the property of their fellow-tribesmen;\nbut although they admit that theft is wrong they do not regard it\nas a very serious offence, which disgraces the perpetrator, and\nif a thief is caught he is only required to return the stolen\narticle or to pay its value.[28] Among the Aleuts \"theft was not\nonly a crime but a disgrace\"; for the first offence of this kind\ncorporal punishment was inflicted, for the fourth the penalty was\ndeath.[29] According to Egede, the Greenlanders had as great an\nabhorrence of stealing among themselves as any nation upon\nearth;[30] according to Cranz, they considered such an act\n\"excessively disgraceful.\"[31] Similar views still prevail among\nthem, as also among other Eskimo tribes.[32] A Greenlander never\ntouches driftwood which another {6} has placed above high-water\nmark, though it would often be easy to appropriate it without\nfear of detection.[33] Parry states that, during his stay at\nIgloolik and Winter Island, a great many instances occurred in\nwhich the Eskimo scrupulously returned articles that did not\nbelong to them, even though detection of a theft, or at least\nof the offender, would have been next to impossible.[34]\n\n[Footnote 17: Domenech, _op. cit._ ii. 320.]\n\n[Footnote 18: Dodge, _Our Wild Indians_, pp. 64, 79. _Cf._\nCharlevoix, _Journal of a Voyage to North America_, ii. 26, 28\n(Hurons).]\n\n[Footnote 19: Harmon, _Voyages and Travels in the Interior of\nNorth America_, p. 348.]\n\n[Footnote 20: Dorsey, 'Omaha Sociology,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur.\nEthn._ iii. 367.]\n\n[Footnote 21: Powell, 'Wyandot Government,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur.\nEthn._ i. 66.]\n\n[Footnote 22: Colden, in Schoolcraft, _Indian Tribes of the\nUnited States_, iii. 191. Morgan, _League of the Iroquois_, p.\n333 _sq._ Loskiel, _History of the Mission of the United Brethren\namong the Indians_, i. 16.]\n\n[Footnote 23: Keating, _Expedition to the Source of St. Peter's\nRiver_, i. 127.]\n\n[Footnote 24: _Ibid._ ii. 168.]\n\n[Footnote 25: Richardson, _Arctic Searching Expedition_, ii. 19 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 26: Mackenzie, _Voyages to the Frozen and Pacific\nOceans_, p. 148.]\n\n[Footnote 27: Sproat, _Scenes and Studies of Savage Life_, p. 159.]\n\n[Footnote 28: Krause, _Die Tlinkit-Indianer_, p. 167. Holmberg,\n'Ethnographische Skizzen \u00fcber die V\u00f6lker des russischen Amerika,'\nin _Acta Soc. Scient. Fennic\u00e6_, iv. 322. Petroff, _Report on\nAlaska_, p. 170. Dall, _Alaska_, p. 416.]\n\n[Footnote 29: Veniaminof, quoted by Petroff, _op. cit._ pp. 155, 152.]\n\n[Footnote 30: Egede, _Description of Greenland_, p. 124. See also\nDalager, _Gr\u00f8nlandske Relationer_, p. 69.]\n\n[Footnote 31: Cranz, _History of Greenland_, 160.]\n\n[Footnote 32: Nansen, _First Crossing of Greenland_, ii. 335. _Idem_,\n_Eskimo Life_, p. 158. Rink, _Danish Greenland_, p. 224. Hall,\n_Arctic Researches_, pp. 567, 571. Richardson, _Arctic Searching\nExpedition_, i. 352. Parry, _Second Voyage for the Discovery of a\nNorth-West Passage_, p. 522; Lyon, _Private Journal_, p. 347 (Eskimo of\nIgloolik). Seemann, _Voyage of \"Herald,\"_ ii. 65 (Western Eskimo).\nNelson, 'Eskimo about Bering Strait,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ xviii. 293.\nAmong the Point Barrow Eskimo, however, \"men who were said to be thieves\ndid not appear to lose any social consideration\" (Murdoch, 'Ethnological\nResults of the Point Barrow Expedition,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._\nix. 41).]\n\n[Footnote 33: Nansen, _Eskimo Life_, p. 162.]\n\n[Footnote 34: Parry, _op. cit._ p. 521.]\n\nAmong the Chukchi it is held criminal to thieve \"in the family and race to\nwhich a person belongs\";[35] and incorrigible thieves are sometimes\nbanished from the village.[36] In Kamchatka, if anybody was found to be a\nthief he was beaten by the person from whom he had stolen, without being\nallowed to make resistance, and no one would ever after be friends with\nhim.[37] The three principal precepts of the Ainu are to honour old age,\nnot to steal, not to lie;[38] theft is also uncommon among them, and is\nseverely punished.[39] Among the Kirghiz \"whoever commits a robbery on\nany of the nation must make restitution to nine times the value.\"[40]\nAmong the Tunguses a thief is punished by a certain number of strokes;\nhe is besidesobliged to restore the things stolen, and remains covered\nwith ignominy all the rest of his life.[41] The Jakuts,[42]\nOstyaks,[43] Mordvins[44] Samoyedes,[45] and Lapps,[46] are\npraised for their honesty, at least among their own people; and\nso are the Butias,[47] Kukis,[48] Santals,[49] the hill people in\nthe Central Provinces of India,[50] and the Chittagong Hill\ntribes.[51] The Kurubars of the Dekhan are of such known honesty,\nthat on all occasions they are entrusted with the custody of\nproduce by the farmers, who know that they would rather starve\nthan take one grain of what was given them in {7} charge.[52]\n\"Honest as a Pahari,\" is a proverbial expression. In fact, among\nthese mountaineers theft is almost unknown, and the men \"carry\ntreasures, which to them would be priceless, for days and days,\nalong wild mountain tracks, whence at any moment they might\ndiverge, and never be traced. Even money is safely entrusted to\nthem, and is invariably delivered into the right hands.\"[53]\nHarkness says of the Tod\u00e1s:--\"I never saw a people, civilised or\nuncivilised, who seemed to have a more religious respect for the\nrights of _meum et tuum_. This feeling is taught to their\nchildren from the tenderest age.\"[54] Among the Chukmas \"theft is\nunknown.\"[55] Among the Karens habitual thieves are sold into\nslavery.[56] Among the Shans theft of valuable property is\npunishable with death, though it may be expiated by a money\npayment; but in cases of culprits who cannot pay, or whose\nrelatives cannot pay, death is looked upon as a fitting\npunishment even for petty thefts.[57] At Zimm\u00e9, \"if a theft is\nproved, three times the value of the article is decreed to the\nowner; and if not paid, the offender, after suffering\nimprisonment in irons, is made over with his family, to be dealt\nwith as in cases of debt.\"[58] Among the hill tribes of North\nAracan a person who commits theft is bound to return the property\nor its value and pay a fine not exceeding Rs. 30.[59] Among the\nKandhs, on the other hand, the restitution of the property\nabstracted or the substitution of an equivalent is alone required\nby ancient usage; but this leniency extends to the first offence\nonly, a repetition of it being followed by expulsion from the\ncommunity.[60] The Andaman Islanders call theft a _y[=u]bda_, or\nsin.[61] Among those Veddahs who live in their natural state,\ntheft and robbery are not known at all.[62] They think it\nperfectly inconceivable that any person should ever take that\nwhich does not belong to him,[63] and death only would, in their\nopinion, be the punishment for such an offence.[64]\n\n[Footnote 35: Georgi, _op. cit._ iii. 183.]\n\n[Footnote 36: Dall, _op. cit._ p. 382.]\n\n[Footnote 37: Steller, _Beschreibung von Kamtschatka_, p. 356.\nSee also _supra_, i. 311 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 38: von Siebold, _Die Aino auf der Insel Yesso_, p. 25.]\n\n[Footnote 39: _Ibid._ pp. 11, 34 _sq._ See also _supra_, i. 312.]\n\n[Footnote 40: Georgi, _op. cit._ ii. 262.]\n\n[Footnote 41: _Ibid._ iii. 83 _sq._ _Cf._ _ibid._ iii. 78.]\n\n[Footnote 42: _Ibid._ ii. 397. Sauer, _Expedition to the Northern\nParts of Russia_, p. 122.]\n\n[Footnote 43: Castr\u00e9n, _Nordiska resor och forskningar_, i. 319.]\n\n[Footnote 44: Georgi, _op. cit._ i. 113.]\n\n[Footnote 45: _Ibid._ iii. 13. von Struve, in _Das Ausland_,\n1880, p. 796.]\n\n[Footnote 46: Jessen, _Afhandling om de Norske Finners og Lappers\nHedenske Religion_, p. 72. Castr\u00e9n, _op. cit._ i. 118 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 47: Fraser, _Tour through the Him[=a]l[=a] Mountains_,\np. 335.]\n\n[Footnote 48: Lewin, _Wild Races of South-Eastern India_, p. 256.\n_Cf._ Butler, _Travels in Assam_, p. 94.]\n\n[Footnote 49: Man, _Sonthalia_, p. 20.]\n\n[Footnote 50: Hislop, _Papers relating to the Aboriginal Tribes\nof the Central Provinces_, p. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 51: Lewin, _Wild Races of South-Eastern India_, p. 341.]\n\n[Footnote 52: Buchanan, quoted by Elliot, 'Characteristics of the\nPopulation of Central and Southern India,' in _Jour. Ethn. Soc.\nLondon_, N.S. i. 105.]\n\n[Footnote 53: Cumming, _In the Himalayas_, p. 356.]\n\n[Footnote 54: Harkness, _Description of a Singular Aboriginal\nRace inhabiting the Neilgherry Hills_, p. 17 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 55: Lewin, _Wild Races of South-Eastern India_, p. 188.]\n\n[Footnote 56: Mason, 'Dwellings, &c., of the Karens,' in _Jour.\nAsiatic Soc. Bengal_, xxxvii. pt. ii. p. 146 _sq._ Smeaton,\n_Loyal Karens of Burma_, p. 86.]\n\n[Footnote 57: Woodthorpe, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxvi. 21.]\n\n[Footnote 58: Colquhoun, _Amongst the Shans_, p. 131.]\n\n[Footnote 59: St. John, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ ii. 241.]\n\n[Footnote 60: Macpherson, _Memorials of Service in India_, p.  82.]\n\n[Footnote 61: Man, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xii. 112.]\n\n[Footnote 62: Sarasin, _Ergebnisse naturwissenschaftlicher\nForschungen auf Ceylon_, iii. 548. Deschamps, _Carnet d'un\nvoyageur_, p. 385. Nevill, 'Vaeddas of Ceylon,' in _Taprobanian_,\ni. 192.]\n\n[Footnote 63: Hartshorne, 'Weddas,' in _Indian Antiquary_, viii. 320.]\n\n[Footnote 64: Sarasin, _op. cit._ iii. 549.]\n\n{8} In the Malay Archipelago native custom punishes theft with a\nfine, most frequently equivalent to twice the value of the stolen\narticle,[65] or with slavery,[66] mutilation,[67] or even\ndeath;[68] and in many islands it was lawful to kill a thief\ncaught in the act.[69] Among the Malays of Perak,[70] Dyaks,[71]\nKyans,[72] Bataks,[73] and the natives of Ambon and Uliase,[74]\ntheft is said to be unknown or almost so, at least within their\nown communities.\n\n[Footnote 65: Wilken, 'Het strafrecht bij de volken van het\nmaleische ras,' in _Bijdragen tot de taal- land- en volkenkunde\nvan Nederlandsch-Indi\u00eb_, 1883, Land- en volkenkunde, p. 109 _sq._\nCrawfurd, _History of the Indian Archipelago_, iii. 117. Marsden,\n_History of Sumatra_, pp. 221 (Rejangs), 389 (Bataks). von\nBrenner, _Besuch bei den Kannibalen Sumatras_, p. 213 (Bataks).\nJunghuhn, _Die Battal\u00e4nder auf Sumatra_, ii. 145 (Bataks), 308\n(natives of Passumah in Central Sumatra), 317 (Timorese), 339\n(natives of Bali and Lombok). Modigliani, _op. cit._ p. 496; von\nRosenberg, _Der malayische Archipel_, p. 166 (Niase). Worcester,\n_Philippine Islands_, p. 108 (Tagbanuas of Palawan).]\n\n[Footnote 66: Wilken, _loc. cit._ p. 108 _sq._ Junghuhn, _op.\ncit._ ii. 145 _sq._ (Bataks). Raffles, _History of Java_, ii. p.\nccxxxv. (people of Bali). Forbes, _A Naturalist's Wanderings in\nthe Eastern Archipelago_, p. 320 (people of Timor-laut). von\nRosenberg, _op. cit._ p. 166 (Niase).]\n\n[Footnote 67: St. John, _Life in the Forests of the Far East_,\nii. 297 (natives of the kingdom of Borneo, formerly). Low,\n_Sarawak_, p. 133. Marsden, _op. cit._ p. 404 (Achinese of\nSumatra). Hickson, _A Naturalist in North Celebes_, p. 198\n(Sangirese). Crawfurd, _op. cit._ iii. 107, 115. Crawfurd thinks\n(_ibid._ iii. 107) that the punishment of mutilation was\nintroduced by Muhammedanism.]\n\n[Footnote 68: Crawfurd, _op. cit._ iii. 115 (Javanese) K\u00fckenthal,\n_Ergebnisse einer zoologischen Forschungsreise in den Molukken\nund Borneo_, i. 188 (Alfura of Halmahera). Marsden, _op. cit._ p.\n471 (Poggi Islanders). Among the Bataks (von Brenner, _op. cit._\np. 212) and Achinese of Sumatra (Marsden, _op. cit._ p. 404)\nrobbery is punished with death.]\n\n[Footnote 69: Wilken, _loc. cit._ p. 88 _sqq._ von Rosenberg,\n_op. cit._ p. 166; Modigliani, _op. cit._ p. 496 (Niase).]\n\n[Footnote 70: McNair, _Perak and the Malays_, p. 204.]\n\n[Footnote 71: Boyle, _Adventures among the Dyaks of Borneo_, p.\n235. Bock, _Head-Hunters of Borneo_, p. 209. Selenka, _Sonnige\nWelten_, p. 19. Ling Roth, _Natives of Sarawak_, i. 81, 82, 92.]\n\n[Footnote 72: Low, _op. cit._ p. 336.]\n\n[Footnote 73: Marsden, _op. cit._ p. 389. Junghuhn, _op. cit._\nii. 148.]\n\n[Footnote 74: Martin, _Reisen in den Molukken_, p. 63.]\n\nMany of the South Sea Islanders have been described as honest\namong themselves, and some of them as honest even towards\nEuropeans.[75] In the opinion of Captain Cook the light-coloured\nPolynesians have thievish propensities, but the dark-coloured\nnot.[76] In the Tonga Islands theft was considered {9} an act of\nmeanness rather than a crime,[77] whereas in many other islands\nit was regarded as a very grave offence.[78] Sometimes the\ndelinquent was subject to private retaliation,[79] sometimes to a\nfine,[80] or blows,[81] or the loss of a finger,[82] or the\npenalty of death.[83]\n\n[Footnote 75: Earl, _Papuans_, pp. 49, 80, 105. Seemann, _Viti_,\np. 46 _sq._; Anderson, _Travel in Fiji_, p. 130. Hale, _U.S.\nExploring Expedition. Vol. VI. Ethnography and Philology_, p. 73\n(Micronesians). Melville, _Typee_, pp. 294 (Marquesas Islanders),\n295 n. 1 (various Polynesians). Williams, _Missionary Enterprises\nin the South Sea Islands_, p. 530 (Samoans). von Kotzebue,\n_Voyage of Discovery into the South Sea_, iii. 164 (people of\nRadack), 255 (Sandwich Islanders). Lisiansky, _op. cit._ p. 125\n(Sandwich Islanders). Dieffenbach, _Travels in New Zealand_, ii.\n105; Meade, _Ride through the disturbed Districts of New\nZealand_, p. 162 _sq._; Thomson, _Story of New Zealand_, i. 86;\nColenso, _Maori Races_, p. 43. Bonwick, _Daily Life and Origin of\nthe Tasmanians_, p. 9.]\n\n[Footnote 76: Seemann, _Viti_, p. 47.]\n\n[Footnote 77: Mariner, _Natives of the Tonga Islands_, ii. 162.\nIn Ponap\u00e9 (Christian, _Caroline Islands_, p. 72) and among the\nMaoris (Meade, _op. cit._ p. 162) thieves are said to be despised.]\n\n[Footnote 78: Earl, _op. cit._ p. 80 (Papuans of Dorey). Ellis,\n_Tour through Hawaii_, p. 429; &c.]\n\n[Footnote 79: Turner, _Samoa_, pp. 278 (natives of Humphrey's\nIsland), 343 (New Caledonians). Lisiansky, _op. cit._ p. 80 _sq._\n(Nukahivans). Williams, _Missionary Enterprises_, p. 127 (natives\nof Rarotonga). Ellis, _Polynesian Researches_, iv. 420 (Sandwich\nIslanders).]\n\n[Footnote 80: Earl, _op. cit._ p. 83 (Papuans of Dorey). Sorge,\nin Steinmetz, _Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse von eingeborenen V\u00f6lkern in\nAfrika und Ozeanien_, p. 421 (Nissan Islanders of the Bismarck\nArchipelago). Williams and Calvert, _Fiji_, p. 22. Turner,\n_Samoa_, p. 281 (natives of the Mitchell Group).]\n\n[Footnote 81: Cook, _Journal of a Voyage round the World_, p. 42\n(Tahitians). Yate, _Account of New Zealand_, p. 104.]\n\n[Footnote 82: Williams and Calvert, _Fiji_, p. 23.]\n\n[Footnote 83: Gill, _Life in the Southern Isles_, p. 47. Turner,\n_Samoa_, pp. 290 (natives of Hudson's Island), 295 (natives of\nArorae), 297 (natives of Nikumau of the Gilbert Group), 300\n(natives of Francis Island), 337 (Efatese, of the New Hebrides).\nTutuila, in _Jour. Polynesian Soc._ i. 268 (Line Islanders).\nEllis, _Polynesian Researches_, iv. 421 (Sandwich Islanders).\nCook, _Journal of a Voyage round the World_, p. 41 _sq._\n(Tahitians).]\n\nAmong the natives of Herbert River, Northern Queensland, there is\n\"considerable respect for the right of property, and they do not\nsteal from one another to any great extent. . . . If they hunt\nthey will not take another person's game, all the members of the\nsame tribe having apparently full confidence in each other.\"[84]\nWhen a theft does occur, \"the thief is challenged by his victim\nto a duel with wooden swords and shields; and the matter is\nsettled sometimes privately, the relatives of both parties\nserving as witnesses, sometimes publicly at the borboby, where\ntwo hundred to three hundred meet from various tribes to decide\nall their disputes. The victor in the duel wins in the\ndispute.\"[85] So also among the Dieyerie tribe, \"should any\nnative steal from another, and the offender be known, he is\nchallenged to fight by the person he has robbed, and this settles\nthe matter.\"[86] Of the Bangerang tribe of Victoria we are told\nthat, amongst themselves, they were scrupulously honest;[87] and,\nspeaking of West Australian natives, Mr. Chauncy expresses his\nbelief that \"the members of a tribe never pilfer from each\nother.\"[88] In their relations to Europeans, again, Australian\nblacks have been sometimes accused of thievishness,[89]\nsometimes praised for their {10} honesty.[90] From his own\nobservation Mr. Curr has no doubt that they feel that theft is\nwrong.[91] Of the aborigines of West Australia we are told that\nthey occasionally speared the sheep and robbed the potato gardens\nof the early settlers simply because they did not understand the\nsettlers' views regarding property, having themselves no separate\nproperty in any living animal except their dogs or in any produce\nof the soil. But \"only entrust a native with property, and he\nwill invariably be faithful to the trust. Lend him your gun to\nshoot game, and he will bring you the result of his day's sport;\nsend him a long journey with provisions for your shepherd, and he\nwill certainly deliver them safely. Entrust him with a flock of\nsheep through a rugged country to a distant run, and he and his\nwife will take them generally more safely than a white man\nwould.\"[92]\n\n[Footnote 84: Lumholtz, _Among Cannibals_, p. 147.]\n\n[Footnote 85: _Ibid._ p. 126.]\n\n[Footnote 86: Gason, in Woods, _Native Tribes of South\nAustralia_, p. 266.]\n\n[Footnote 87: Curr, _Recollections of Squatting in Victoria_,\np. 298.]\n\n[Footnote 88: Chauncy, in Brough Smyth, _Aborigines of Victoria_,\nii. 278.]\n\n[Footnote 89: _Supra_, ii. 2, n. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 90: Howitt, in Brought Smyth, _op. cit._ ii. 306.\nFraser, _Aborigines of New South Wales_, p. 90.]\n\n[Footnote 91: Curr, _The Australian Race_, i. 100.]\n\n[Footnote 92: Chauncy, in Brough Smyth, _op. cit._ ii. 278.]\n\n\"The Arab,\" says Burckhardt, \"robs his enemies, his friends, and\nhis neighbours, provided that they are not actually in his own\ntent, where their property is sacred. To rob in the camp, or\namong friendly tribes, is not reckoned creditable to a man; yet\nno stain remains upon him for such an action, which, in fact, is\nof daily occurrence. But the Arab chiefly prides himself on\nrobbing his enemies.\"[93] This, however, seems to hold true only\nof Bedouin tribes inhabiting rich pasture plains, who are much\nexposed to attacks from others, whereas in more sheltered\nterritories a person who \"attempts to steal in the tents of his\nown tribe, is for ever dishonoured among his friends.\" Thus among\nthe Arabs of Sinai robberies are wholly unknown; any articles of\ndress or of furniture may be left upon a rock without the least\nrisk of their being taken away.[94] According to Wah\u00e1by law, a\nrobber is obliged to return the stolen goods or their value, but\nif the offence is not attended with circumstances of violence he\nescapes without further punishment, except a fine to the\ntreasury.[95] Among some Bedouins of [H.]adhramaut theft from a\ntribesman is punished with banishment from the tribe.[96] Lady\nAnne and Mr. Blunt state that, with regard to honesty, the pure\nBedouin stands in marked contrast to his half-bred brethren.\nWhilst the Kurdish and semi-Kurdish tribes of Upper Mesopotamia\nmake it almost a point of honour to steal, the genuine Arab\naccounts theft disgraceful, although he holds {11} highway\nrobbery to be a right. In the large tribes persons of known\ndishonesty are not tolerated.[97]\n\n[Footnote 93: Burckhardt, _Notes on the Bedouins and Wah\u00e1bys_,\np. 90.]\n\n[Footnote 94: _Ibid._ p. 184 _sq._ Wallin, _F\u00f6rsta resa fr\u00e5n\nCairo till Arabiska \u00f6knen_, p. 64.]\n\n[Footnote 95: Burckhardt, _op. cit._ p. 301.]\n\n[Footnote 96: von Wrede, _Reise in [H.]adhramaut_, p. 51.]\n\n[Footnote 97: Blunt, _Bedouin Tribes of the Euphrates_, ii. 204,\n225.]\n\nIn Africa honesty between members of the same tribe is no\nuncommon characteristic of the native races, and some of them\nhave displayed the same quality in their dealings with European\ntravellers.[98] Andersson, for instance, tells us that the\nOvambo, so far as they came under his observation, were strictly\nhonest and appeared to entertain great horror of theft. \"Without\npermission,\" he says, \"the natives would not even touch anything;\nand we could leave our camp free from the least apprehension of\nbeing plundered. As a proof of their honesty, I may mention,\nthat, when we left the Ovambo country, the servants forgot some\ntrifles; and such was the integrity of the people, that\nmessengers actually came after us a very considerable distance to\nrestore the articles left behind.\"[99] A few African peoples are\nsaid to look upon petty larceny almost with indifference.[100]\nAmong others thieves are only compelled to restore stolen\nproperty, or to return an equivalent for it,[101] but at the same\ntime they are disgraced or laughed at.[102] In Africa, as\nelsewhere, theft is frequently punished with a fine.[103] Thus\n{12} among the Bahima,[104] Wadshagga,[105] and Tanala of\nMadagascar,[106] thieves are made to pay twice the value of the\nstolen goods; among the Takue,[107] Rendile,[108] and\nHerero,[109] three times their value; among the Bechuanas double\nor fourfold.[110] Among the Taveta, if a man commits a theft, he\nhas to refund what he has robbed, and five times the value of the\nstolen property can be claimed by the person who has suffered the\nloss.[111] Among the Kafirs, \"in cases of cattle stealing, the\nlaw allows a fine of ten head, though but one may have been\nstolen, provided the animal has been slaughtered, or cannot be\nrestored.\"[112] Among the Masai, according to Herr Merker, the\nfine for stealing cattle is likewise a tenfold one;[113] whilst,\naccording to another authority, \"if a man steals one cow, or more\nthan one cow, all his property is given to the man from whom he\nhas stolen.\"[114] Among the Basukuma all thieves, it seems, are\npunished with the confiscation of everything they possess.[115]\nOther punishments for theft are imprisonment,[116]\nbanishment,[117] slavery,[118] flogging,[119] mutilation,[120]\nand, especially under aggravating circumstances, death.[121] {13}\nIn some African countries a thief caught in the act may be killed\nwith impunity.[122]\n\n[Footnote 98: St. John, _Village Life in Egypt_, ii. 198.\nTristram, _The Great Sahara_, p. 193 _sq._ (Beni Mzab).\nNachtigal, _Sahara und Sudan_, i. 188 (inhabitants of Fezz\u00e2n).\nDyveyrier, _Exploration du Sahara_, p. 385 (Touareg); _cf._\nChavanne, _Die Sahara_, p. 188. Munzinger, _Ostafrikanische\nStudien_, p. 531 _sq._ (Barea and Kun\u00e1ma). Scaramucci and\nGiglioli, 'Notizie sui Danakil,' in _Archivio per l'antropologia\ne la etnologia_ xiv. 25. Baumann, _Durch Massailand zur\nNilquelle_, pp. 165 (Masai), 179 (Wafiomi). Thomson, _Through\nMasai Land_, p. 64 (Wakwafi of the Taveta). Baker, _Ismail\u00efa_, p.\n56; Petherick, _Travels in Central Africa_, ii. 3 (Shilluk).\nMacdonald, _Africana_, i. 182 (Eastern Central Africans). Mungo\nPark, _Travels in the Interior of Africa_, p. 239; Cailli\u00e9,\n_Travels through Central Africa to Timbuctoo_, i. 353\n(Mandingoes). Ward, _Five Years with the Congo Cannibals_, p. 93;\nTuckey, _Expedition to explore the River Zaire_, p. 374.\nJohnston, _Uganda Protectorate_, ii. 590 (Wanyoro). Kolben,\n_Present State of the Cape of Good Hope_, i. 326; Hahn, _The\nSupreme Being of the Khoi-Khoi_, p. 32 (Hottentots); _cf._\nFritsch, _Die Eingeborenen S\u00fcd-Afrika's_, p. 307. Tyler, _Forty\nYears among the Zulus_, p. 191 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 99: Andersson, _Lake Ngami_, p. 197. _Cf._ _Idem_,\n_Notes on Travel in South Africa_, p. 236.]\n\n[Footnote 100: Monrad, _Skildring af Guinea-Kysten_, p. 6, n.*;\nReade, _Savage Africa_, p. 580 (West African Negroes). Ellis,\n_History of Madagascar_, i. 144.]\n\n[Footnote 101: Munzinger, _Ostafrikanische Studien_, pp. 389\n(inhabitants of Sara\u00eb), 494 (Barea and Kun\u00e1ma). Arbousset and\nDaumas, _op. cit._ p. 66 (Mantetis). Cunningham, _Uganda_, p. 293\n(Baziba). Rautanen, in Steinmetz, _Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_, p. 343\n(Ondonga). Warner, in Maclean, _Compendium of Kafir Laws and\nCustoms_, pp. 65, 67. Post, _Afrikanische Jurisprudenz_, ii.\n84.]\n\n[Footnote 102: Munzinger, _Ostafrikanische Studien_, pp. 386\n(inhabitants of Sara\u00eb), 531 (Barea and Kun\u00e1ma). Arbousset and\nDaumas, _op. cit._ p. 66 (Mantetis).]\n\n[Footnote 103: Scaramucci and Giglioli, in _Archivio per\nl'antropologia e la etnologia_, xiv. 39 (Danakil). Nachtigal,\n_op. cit._ i. 449 (Ted\u00e2). Bosman, _Description of the Coast of\nGuinea_, p. 142 (Negroes of Axim, on the Gold Coast). Ellis,\n_Tshi-speaking Peoples of the Gold Coast_, p. 303. _Idem_,\n_E[(w]e-speaking Peoples of the Slave Coast_, p. 225. _Emin Pasha\nin Central Africa_, p. 86 (Wanyoro). Cunningham, _Uganda_, p. 322\n(Manyema). Steinmetz, _Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_, p. 52 (Banaka and\nBapuku). Beverley, _ibid._ p. 215 (Wagogo). Lang, _ibid._ p. 259\n(Washambala). Wandrer, _ibid._ p. 325 (Hottentots). Post,\n_Afrikanische Jurisprudenz_, ii. 85 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 104: Cunningham, _Uganda_, p. 20.]\n\n[Footnote 105: Volkens, _Der Kilimandscharo_, p. 250.]\n\n[Footnote 106: Richardson, 'Tanala Customs,' in _Antananarivo\nAnnual_, ii. 95 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 107: Munzinger, _Ostafrikanische Studien_, p. 208.]\n\n[Footnote 108: Chanler, _Through Jungle and Desert_, p. 317.]\n\n[Footnote 109: Fran\u00e7ois, _Nama und Damara_, p. 174.]\n\n[Footnote 110: Holub, _Seven Years in South Africa_, i. 395.\nCasalis, _Basutos_, p. 228.]\n\n[Footnote 111: Hollis, in _Jour. African Soc._ i. 123.]\n\n[Footnote 112: Dugmore, in Maclean, _Compendium of Kafir Laws and\nCustoms_, p. 36. _Cf._ _ibid._ pp. 112, 143.]\n\n[Footnote 113: Merker, _Die Masai_, p. 208.]\n\n[Footnote 114: Hinde, _The Last of the Masai_, p. 107.]\n\n[Footnote 115: Cunningham, _Uganda_, p. 304.]\n\n[Footnote 116: Mademba, in Steinmetz, _Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_, p. 90\n(inhabitants of the Sansanding States).]\n\n[Footnote 117: Chavanne, _Die Sahara_, p. 315 (Beni Mzab).]\n\n[Footnote 118: Bowdich, _Mission to Ashantee_, p. 258, n.*\n(Fantis). Petherick, _op. cit._ ii. 3 (Shilluk of the White\nNile). Post, _Afrikanische Jurisprudenz_, ii. 87.]\n\n[Footnote 119: Reade, _Savage Africa_, p. 261 (West Equatorial\nAfricans). Ellis, _Yoruba-speaking Peoples of the Slave Coast_,\np. 191. Volkens, _op. cit._ p. 250 (Wadshagga). Velten, _Sitten\nund Gebr\u00e4uche der Suaheli_, p. 363. Campbell, _Travels in South\nAfrica_, p. 519. Post, _Afrikanische Jurisprudenz_, ii. 88.]\n\n[Footnote 120: de Abreu, _Discovery and Conquest of the Canary\nIslands_, p. 27 (aborigines of Ferro). Ellis, _Yoruba-speaking\nPeoples_, p. 191. Beltrame, _Il Fiume Bianco_, p. 280 (Dinka).\nCasati, _Ten Years in Equatoria_, i. 163 (Mambettu and Wanyoro).\nWilson and Felkin, _Uganda and the Egyptian Soudan_, i. 201\n(Waganda). Holub, _op. cit._ i. 395 _sq._ (Bechuanas). Post,\n_Afrikanische Jurisprudenz_, ii. 87 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 121: Ellis, _Yoruba-speaking Peoples_, p. 191; Burton,\n_Abeokuta_, i. 304 (Yoruba). Ellis, _Tshi-speaking Peoples_,\np. 303. Bosman, _op. cit._ p. 143 (Negroes of Axim). Cunningham,\n_Uganda_, pp. 69 (Banabuddu), 102 (Bakoki), 346 (Karamojo).\nFran\u00e7ois, _op. cit._ p. 175 (Herero). Andersson, _Lake Ngami_,\np. 197 (Ovambo). Casalis, _op. cit._ p. 228 (Basutos). Shooter,\n_Kafirs of Natal_, p. 155. Tyler, _op. cit._ p. 192 (Zulus).\nKolben, _op. cit._ i. 158 (Hottentots). Post, _Afrikanische\nJurisprudenz_, ii. 88 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 122: H\u00fcbbe-Schleiden, _Ethiopien_, p. 143 (Mpongwe).\nCunningham, _Uganda_, p. 333 (Lendu). Burton, _Zanzibar_, ii. 94\n(Wanika). Macdonald, _Africana_, i. 162, 183 (Eastern Central\nAfricans). Macdonald, 'East Central African Customs,' in _Jour.\nAnthr. Inst._ xxii. 109. _Supra_, i. 289.]\n\nThe condemnation of theft, in one and the same people, varies in\ndegree according to a variety of circumstances. It is influenced\nby the value of the goods stolen, as appears from the different\npunishments inflicted in cases where the value differs.[123]\nThus, when the penalty consists of a fine, its amount is often\nstrictly proportioned to the loss suffered by the owner, the\nthief being compelled to pay twice, or three, or four, or five,\nor ten times the worth of the appropriated article.[124] Among\nthe Aztecs a petty thief became the slave of the person from whom\nhe had stolen, whilst theft of a large amount was almost\ninvariably punished with death.[125] According to the Koran,\ntheft is to be punished by cutting off the offender's right hand\nfor the first offence; but a Sunneh law ordains that this\npunishment shall not be inflicted if the value of the stolen\nproperty is less than a quarter of a deen\u00e1r.[126] Ancient Scotch\nlaw proportioned the punishment of theft to the value of the\ngoods stolen, heightening it gradually from a slight corporal to\na capital punishment, if the value {14} amounted to thirty-two\npennies Scots, which in the reign of David I. was the price of\ntwo sheep.[127] In England a distinction was made between \"grand\"\nand \"petty larceny,\" the line between them being drawn at twelve\npence, and grand larceny was capital at least as early as the\ntime of Edward I.[128] Among various peoples custom or law\npunishes with particular severity the stealing of objects of a\ncertain kind, such as cattle, horses, agricultural implements,\ncorn, precious metals, or arms.[129] The Negroes of Axim, says\nBosman, \"will rather put a man to death for stealing a sheep,\nthan killing a man.\"[130] The Kalmucks regard horse-stealing as\nthe greatest of all crimes.[131] The ancient Teutons held\ncattle-lifting and robbery of crops to be particularly\ndisgraceful.[132] According to Roman law, people who stole an ox\nor horse from the pastures or from a stable, or ten sheep, or\nfour or five swine, might be punished even with death.[133] The\nnatives of Danger Island, in the South Seas, punished with\ndrowning anyone who was caught stealing food, \"the most valuable\nproperty they knew of.\"[134] In Tahiti, on the other hand, those\nwho stole clothes or arms were commonly put to death, whereas\nthose who stole provisions were bastinadoed.[135] Among other\npeoples the appropriation of a small quantity of food belonging\nto somebody else is not punished at all.[136] The Masai do not\npunish a person for stealing milk or meat.[137] Among the Bakoki\n\"it was not a crime to steal bananas.\"[138] In ancient Mexico\n\"every poor traveller was permitted to {15} take of the maize, or\nthe fruit-bearing trees, which were planted by the side of the\nhighway, as much as was sufficient to satisfy immediate\nhunger.\"[139] Among the Hebrews a person was allowed to go into\nhis neighbour's vineyard and eat grapes at his own pleasure, or\nto pluck ears in his field, but the visitor was forbidden to put\nany grapes in his vessel or to move a sickle into the standing\ncorn.[140] It is said in the Laws of Manu that \"a twice-born man,\nwho is travelling and whose provisions are exhausted, shall not\nbe fined, if he takes two stalks of sugar-cane or two esculent\nroots from the field of another man.\"[141] According to ancient\nSwedish laws, a passer-by could take a handful of peas, beans,\nturnips, and so forth, from another person's field, and a\ntraveller could give to his fatigued horse some hay from any barn\nhe found in the wood.[142] However, whilst the punishment of\ntheft is commonly, to some extent, influenced by the worth or\nnature of the appropriated property, there are peoples who punish\nthieves with the same severity whether they have stolen little or\nmuch. Among the North American Indians described by Colonel Dodge\n\"the value of the article stolen is not considered. The crime is\nthe theft.\"[143] Among the Yleou, a Manchurian tribe mentioned by\nancient Chinese chroniclers, theft of any kind was punished with\ndeath.[144] The Beni Mzab in the Sahara sentence a thief to two\nyears banishment and the payment of fifty francs, independently\nof the value of the thing he has stolen.[145]\n\n[Footnote 123: Steinmetz, _Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_, p. 52 (Banaka and\nBapuku). Nicole, _ibid._ p. 133 (Diakit\u00e9-Sarracolese). Beverley,\n_ibid._ p. 215 (Wagogo). Bosman, _op. cit._ p. 142 (Negroes of\nAxim). Hinde, _op. cit._ p. 107 (Masai). Post, _Afrikanische\nJurisprudenz_, ii. 91. _Idem_, _Grundriss der ethnologischen\nJurisprudenz_, ii. 420. _Ta Tsing Leu Lee_, sec. cclxix. _sqq._\np. 284 _sqq._ (Chinese). Keil, _Manual of Biblical Arch\u00e6ology_,\nii. 366. _Laws of Manu_, viii. 320 _sqq._ Wilda, _Das Strafrecht\nder Germanen_, p. 870 _sqq._; Nordstr\u00f6m, _Bidrag till den svenska\nsamh\u00e4lls-f\u00f6rfattningens historia_, ii. 296 _sqq._; Stemann, _Den\ndanske Retshistorie indtil Christian V.'s Lov_, pp. 621, 677\n_sq._; Brunner, _Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte_, ii. 639 _sqq._\n(ancient Teutons). Du Boys, _Histoire du droit criminel de\nl'Espagne_, p. 721.]\n\n[Footnote 124: _Supra_, ii. 4, 6-8, 12.]\n\n[Footnote 125: Bancroft, _Native Races of the Pacific States_,\nii. 456.]\n\n[Footnote 126: _Koran_, v. 42. Lane, _Manners and Customs of the\nModern Egyptians_, p. 120 _sq._ _Idem_, _Arabian Society in the\nMiddle Ages_, p. 20. Sachau, _Muhammedanisches Recht_, pp. 810,\n811, 825 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 127: Erskine, _Principles of the Law of Scotland_, p.\n568. Innes, _Scotland in the Middle Ages_, p. 190. Mackintosh,\n_History of Civilisation in Scotland_, 231.]\n\n[Footnote 128: Pollock and Maitland, _History of English Law\nbefore the Time of Edward I._ ii. 495 _sq._ Brunner, _Deutsche\nRechtsgeschichte_, ii. 640. Stephen, _History of the Criminal Law\nof England_, iii. 129.]\n\n[Footnote 129: Post, _Grundriss der ethnologischen Jurisprudenz_,\nii. 421 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 130: Bosman, _op. cit._ p. 143.]\n\n[Footnote 131: Bergmann, _Nomadische Streifereien unter den\nKalm\u00fcken_, ii. 297.]\n\n[Footnote 132: Grimm, _Deutsche Rechtsalterth\u00fcmer_, p. 636 _sq._\nWilda, _op. cit._ p. 875 _sq._ Nordstr\u00f6m, _op. cit._ ii. 307.\nBrunner, _Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte_, ii. 645 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 133: _Digesta_, xlvii. 14. 1. pr., 1, 3; xlvii. 14.\n3.]\n\n[Footnote 134: Gill, _Life in the Southern Isles_, p. 47.]\n\n[Footnote 135: Cook, _Journal of a Voyage round the World_, p. 41\n_sq._]\n\n[Footnote 136: _Supra_, i. 286 _sq._ Post, _Grundriss der ethnol.\nJurisprudenz_, ii. 426. Ellis, _History of Madagascar_, i. 385.]\n\n[Footnote 137: Hollis, _Masai_, p. 310.]\n\n[Footnote 138: Cunningham, _Uganda_, p. 102 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 139: Clavigero, _History of Mexico_, i. 358.]\n\n[Footnote 140: _Deuteronomy_, xxiii. 24 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 141: _Laws of Manu_, viii. 341. _Cf._ _ibid._ viii. 339.]\n\n[Footnote 142: Nordstr\u00f6m, _op. cit._ ii. 297.]\n\n[Footnote 143: Dodge, _op. cit._ p. 64.]\n\n[Footnote 144: Castr\u00e9n, _op. cit._ iv. 27.]\n\n[Footnote 145: Chavanne, _Die Sahara_, p. 315.]\n\nThe degree of criminality attached to theft also depends on the\nplace where it is committed. To steal from a house, especially\nafter breaking the door, is frequently regarded as an aggravated\nform of theft.[146] According to Muhammedan {16} law, the\npunishment of cutting off the right hand of the thief is\ninflicted on him only if the stolen property was deposited in a\nplace to which he had not ordinary or easy access; hence a man\nwho steals in the house of a near relative is not subject to this\npunishment, nor a slave who robs the house of his master.[147]\nAmong some peoples a theft committed by night is punished more\nheavily than one committed by day.[148]\n\n[Footnote 146: Post, _Grundriss der ethnol. Jurisprudenz_, ii.\n423 _sq._ von Rosenberg, _Der malayische Archipel_, p. 166\n(Niase). Riedel, _De sluik- en kroesharige rassen tusschen\nSelebes en Papua_, p. 103 (Serangese). Lang, in Steinmetz,\n_Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_, p. 259. (Washambala). Wilda, _op. cit._ p.\n878 _sq._; Brunner, _Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte_, ii. 646 (ancient\nTeutonic law). _Digesta_, xlvii. 11. 7; xlvii. 18. 2.]\n\n[Footnote 147: Lane, _Modern Egyptians_, p. 121. _Cf._\nBurckhardt, _Bedouins and Wah\u00e1bys_, p. 301.]\n\n[Footnote 148: Wilken, _loc. cit._ p. 109 (people of Bali).\n_Digesta_, xlvii. 17. 1. _Lex Saxonum_, 32, 34; Wilda, _op. cit._\np. 877; Grimm, _Deutsche Rechtsalterth\u00fcmer_, p. 637; Brunner,\n_Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte_, ii. 646 (ancient Teutonic law).]\n\nA distinction is further made between ordinary theft and robbery.\nThe robber is treated sometimes more severely,[149] sometimes\nmore leniently than the thief, and is not infrequently regarded\nwith admiration. Among the Wanyamwezi thieves are despised, but\nrobbers are honoured, especially by the women, on account of\ntheir courage.[150] In Uganda robbery is not thought shameful,\nalthough it is rigorously punished.[151] In Sindh no disgrace is\nattached to larceny when the perpetrators are armed.[152] Among\nthe Ossetes, \"where open robbery has been committed outside a\nvillage, the court merely requires the stolen article or an\nequivalent to be restored; but in cases of secret theft, five\ntimes the value must be paid. Robbery and theft within the\nboundaries of a village are rated much higher. A proverb says,\n'What a man finds on the high-road is God's gift'; and in fact\nhighway robbery is hardly regarded as a crime.\"[153] The Kazak\nKirghiz go so far as to consider it almost dishonourable for\na man never to have taken part in a _baranta_, or cattle-lifting\nexploit.[154] According to {17} Bedouin notions, there is a clear\ndistinction between \"taking and stealing.\" To steal is to\nabstract clandestinely, \"whereas to take, in the sense of\ndepriving another of his property, generally implies to take\nfrom him openly, by right of superior force.\"[155] The Arabian\nrobber, says Burckhardt, considers his profession honourable,\nand \"the term _har\u00e0my_ (robber) is one of the most flattering\ntitles that could be conferred on a youthful hero.\"[156] In\nancient Teutonic law theft and robbery were kept apart; the one\nwas the secret, the other the open crime. In most law-books\nrobbery was subject to a milder punishment than theft,\nand was undoubtedly regarded as far less dishonourable. Indeed,\nhowever illegal the mode of acquiring property may have been,\npublicity was looked upon as a palliation of the offence, if not\nas a species of justification, even though the injured party was\na fellow-countryman.[157] This difference between theft and\nrobbery seems still to have been felt in the thirteenth century,\nwhen Bracton had to argue that the robber is a thief.[158] But in\nlater times robbery was regarded by the law of England as an\naggravated kind of theft.[159]\n\n[Footnote 149: _Ta Tsing Leu Lee_, sec. cclxviii. p. 283 (Chinese\nlaw). _Digesta_, xlviii. 19. 28. 10. Erskine, _Principles of the\nLaw of Scotland_, p. 566. Post, _Grundriss der ethnologischen\nJurisprudenz_, ii. 455 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 150: Reichardt, quoted by Steinmetz, _Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_,\np. 281.]\n\n[Footnote 151: Ashe, _Two Kings of Uganda_, p. 294.]\n\n[Footnote 152: Burton, _Sindh_, p. 195.]\n\n[Footnote 153: von Haxthausen, _Transcaucasia_, p. 411. _Cf._\nKovalewsky, _Coutume contemporaine_, p. 342.]\n\n[Footnote 154: V\u00e1mb\u00e9ry, _Das T\u00fcrkenvolk_, p. 306. _Cf._ Georgi,\n_op. cit._ ii. 270 _sq._ (Kirghiz).]\n\n[Footnote 155: Ayrton, in Wallin, _Notes taken during a Journey\nthrough Part of Northern Arabia_, p. 29, n. [double dagger] (in\n_Jour. Roy. Geo. Soc._ xx. 317, n. [double dagger]).]\n\n[Footnote 156: Burckhardt, _Bedouins and Wah\u00e1bys_, p. 90. _Cf._\nBurton, _Pilgrimage to Al-Madinah & Meccah_, ii. 101; Blunt, _op.\ncit._ ii. 204 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 157: Wilda, _op. cit._ pp. 860, 911, 914. Grimm,\n_Deutsche Rechtsalterth\u00fcmer_, p. 634 _sq._ Nordstr\u00f6m, _op. cit._\nii. 314 _sq._ Maurer, _Bekehrung des Norwegischen Stammes_, ii.\n173 _sq._ Brunner, _Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte_, ii. 647 _sq._\nThrupp, _The Anglo-Saxon Home_, p. 288. Pollock and Maitland,\n_op. cit._ ii. 493 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 158: Bracton, _De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angli\u00e6_,\nfol. 150 b, vol. ii. 508 _sqq._ Pollock and Maitland, _op. cit._\nii. 494.]\n\n[Footnote 159: Coke, _Third Part of the Institutes of the Laws of\nEngland_, p. 68. Blackstone, _Commentaries on the Laws of\nEngland_, iv. 252. Stephen, _History of the Criminal Law of\nEngland_, iii. 149. Pollock and Maitland, _op. cit._ ii. 493.\n_Cf._ Wilda, _op. cit._ p. 914.]\n\nA line has been drawn between manifest and non-manifest theft.\nAmong many peoples thieves who are caught in the act may be\nkilled with impunity,[160] or are punished much more heavily than\nother thieves, frequently with death.[161] We also hear that the\nworst part of the offence {18} consists in being detected, and\nthat a successful thief is admired rather than disapproved of.\n\n[Footnote 160: _Supra_, i. 293; ii. 8, 13. Brunner, _Deutsche\nRechtsgeschichte_, ii. 642. Post, _Grundriss der ethnologischen\nJurisprudenz_, ii. 441 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 161: Mommsen, _R\u00f6misches Strafrecht_, p. 750 _sq._ Du\nBoys, _Histoire du droit criminel de l'Espagne_, p. 378. Brunner,\n_Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte_, ii. 642 _sq._; Dareste, _\u00c9tudes\nd'histoire du droit_, p. 299 _sq._ Pollock and Maitland, _op.\ncit._ ii. 495 (ancient Teutonic law). Post, _Grundriss der\nethnologischen Jurisprudenz_, ii. 443.]\n\nIt is said of the Navahos that \"the time is evidently not long\ngone by when with them, as among the Spartans, adroit theft was\ndeemed honourable.\"[162] Among the Californian Yuki \"thieving is\na virtue . . . , provided the thief is sly enough not to get\ncaught.\"[163] The Ahts \"have a tendency to sympathise with some\nforms of theft, in which dexterity is required.\"[164] Among the\nThlinkets \"theft does not seem to be considered a disgrace; the\ndetected thief is at most ashamed of his want of skill.\"[165] The\nChukchi \"have but a bad opinion of a young girl who has never\nacquitted herself cleverly in some theft; and without such\ntestimony of her dexterity and address she will scarcely find a\nhusband.\"[166] In Mongolia \"known thieves are treated as\nrespectable members of society. As long as they manage well and\nare successful, little or no odium seems to attach to them; and\nit is no uncommon thing to hear them spoken of in terms of high\npraise. Success seems to be regarded as a kind of palliation of\ntheir crimes.\"[167] Among the Kukis, according to early notices,\nthe accomplishment most esteemed was dexterity in thieving,\nwhilst the most contemptible person was a thief caught in the\nact.[168] The Persians say that \"it is no shame to steal, only to\nbe found out.\"[169] The same view seems to be held by the Motu\ntribe of New Guinea,[170] the natives of Tana (New\nHebrides),[171] the Maoris,[172] and several African\npeoples.[173] In Fiji \"success, without discovery, is deemed\nquite enough to make thieving virtuous, and a participation in\nthe ill-gotten gain honourable.\"[174] Among the Matabele {19} \"the\nthief is not despised because he has stolen, but because he has\nallowed himself to be caught, and if his crime remains undetected\nhe is admired by all.\"[175] Among the aborigines of Palma, in the\nCanary Islands, \"he was esteemed the cleverest fellow who could\nsteal with such address as not to be discovered.\"[176]\n\n[Footnote 162: Matthews, 'Study of Ethics among the Lower Races,'\nin _Journal of American Folk-Lore_, xii. 4.]\n\n[Footnote 163: Powers, _Tribes of California_, p. 133.]\n\n[Footnote 164: Sproat, _op. cit._ p. 158 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 165: Krause, _op. cit._ p. 167.]\n\n[Footnote 166: Georgi, _op. cit._ iii. 183. Krasheninnikoff,\n_History of Kamschatka_, p. 232.]\n\n[Footnote 167: Gilmour, _Among the Mongols_, p. 291.]\n\n[Footnote 168: Dalton, _Descriptive Ethnology of Bengal_, p. 45.]\n\n[Footnote 169: Polak, _Persien_, ii. 81.]\n\n[Footnote 170: Stone, _A few Months in New Guinea_, p. 95.]\n\n[Footnote 171: Brenchley, _op. cit._ p. 208.]\n\n[Footnote 172: Shortland, _Traditions and Superstitions of the\nNew Zealanders_, p. 224. Waitz-Gerland, _Anthropologie der\nNaturv\u00f6lker_, vi. 224. Dieffenbach _Travels in New Zealand_,\nii. 111.]\n\n[Footnote 173: Z\u00f6ller, _Forschungsreisen in der deutschen Colonie\nKamerun_, ii. 64 (Dualla). Wilson and Felkin, _op. cit._ i. 224\n(Waganda). Leslie, _op. cit._ p. 256 (Amatongas).]\n\n[Footnote 174: Williams and Calvert, _op. cit._ p. 110.]\n\n[Footnote 175: Decle, _Three Years in Savage Africa_, p. 165.]\n\n[Footnote 176: de Abreu, _op. cit._ p. 138.]\n\nThe moral valuation of theft varies according to the social\nposition of the thief and of the person robbed. Among the Marea\na nobleman who commits theft is only obliged to restore the\nappropriated article; but if a commoner steals from another\ncommoner, the whole of his property may be confiscated by the\nlatter's master, and if he steals from a nobleman he becomes the\nnobleman's serf.[177] Among the K\u00e1firs of the Hindu-Kush the\npenalty for theft is theoretically a fine of seven or eight times\nthe value of the thing stolen; \"but such a punishment in ordinary\ncases would only be inflicted on a man of inferior mark, unless\nit were accompanied by circumstances which aggravated the\noriginal offence.\"[178] In Rome, according to an old law, a\nfreeman caught in the act of thieving was scourged and delivered\nover to the party aggrieved, whereas a slave in similar\ncircumstances was scourged and then hurled from the Tarpeian\nrock;[179] and according to an enactment of Hadrian, the\npunishment for stealing an ox or horse from the pastures or from\na stable was only relegation if the offender was a person of\nrank, though ordinary persons might have to suffer death for the\nsame offence.[180] In ancient India, on the other hand, the\npunishment increased with the rank of the criminal. According to\nthe Laws of Manu, \"in a case of theft the guilt of a S\u00fbdra shall\nbe eightfold, that of a Vaisya sixteenfold, that of a Kshatriya\ntwo-and-thirtyfold, that of a Br\u00e2hmana sixty-fourfold, or quite\na hundredfold, or even twice four-and-sixtyfold; each of them\nknowing the nature {20} of the offence.\"[181] In other cases,\nagain, the degree of guilt is determined by the station of the\nperson robbed.[182] Among the Gaika tribe of the Kafirs, for\ninstance, the fine by which a theft is punished \"is fixed\naccording to the rank of the person against whom the offence is\ncommitted, confiscation of property being the general punishment\nimposed for offences against chiefs.\"[183] Among many other\npeoples theft or robbery committed on the property of a chief or\nking is treated with exceptional severity.[184] Sometimes\ndifference in religion affects the criminality of the thief.\nAccording to modern Buddhism, \"to take that which belongs to a\nsceptic is an inferior crime, and the guilt rises in magnitude in\nproportion to the merit of the individual upon whom the theft is\nperpetrated. To take that which belongs to the associated\npriesthood, or to a supreme Buddha, is the highest crime.\"[185]\nBut the commonest and most important personal distinction\ninfluencing the moral valuation of theft and robbery is that\nbetween a tribesman or fellow-countryman and a stranger.\n\n[Footnote 177: Munzinger, _Ostafrikanische Studien_, p. 243 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 178: Scott Robertson, _K\u00e1firs of the Hindu-Kush_, p. 440.]\n\n[Footnote 179: Mommsen, _R\u00f6misches Strafrecht_, p. 751.]\n\n[Footnote 180: _Digesta_, xlvii. 14. 1. pr., 3.]\n\n[Footnote 181: _Laws of Manu_, viii. 337 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 182: Crawfurd, _op. cit._ iii. 115 (Javanese).\nDesoignies, in Steinmetz, _Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_, p. 281 (Msalala).\nMaclean, _Compendium of Kafir Laws and Customs_, p. 143.]\n\n[Footnote 183: Brownlee, in Maclean, _op. cit._ p. 112.]\n\n[Footnote 184: Ellis, _Tour through Hawaii_, p. 429 _sq._ Ellis,\n_E[(w]e-speaking Peoples of the Slave Coast_, p. 225 (Dahomans).\nDecle, _Three Years in Savage Africa_, p. 73. Post, _Afrikanische\nJurisprudenz_, ii. 91. _Laws of \u00c6thelbirht_, 4, 9 (Anglo-Saxons).]\n\n[Footnote 185: Hardy, _Manual of Budhism_, p. 483.]\n\nAmong uncivilised races intra-tribal theft is carefully\ndistinguished from extra-tribal theft. Whilst the former is\nforbidden, the latter is commonly allowed, and robbery committed\non a stranger is an object of praise.[186]\n\n[Footnote 186: _Cf._ Tylor, 'Primitive Society,' in _Contemporary\nReview_, xxi. 715 _sq._; _Anthropology_, p. 413 _sq._]\n\nThe Tehuelches of Patagonia, \"although honest enough as regards\neach other, will, nevertheless, not scruple to steal from any one\nnot belonging to their party.\"[187] The Abipones, who never took\nanything from their own countrymen, \"used to rob and murder the\nSpaniards whilst they thought them their enemies.\"[188] Among the\nMbay\u00e1s the law, Thou shalt not steal, \"applies only to tribesmen\nand {21} allies, not to strangers and enemies.\"[189] The high\nstandard of honesty which prevailed among the North American\nIndians did not refer to foreigners, especially white men, whom\nthey thought it no shame to rob or cheat.[190] \"A theft from an\nindividual of another band,\" says Colonel Dodge, \"is no crime. A\ntheft from one of the same band is the greatest of all\ncrimes.\"[191] Among the Californian Indians, for instance, who\nare proverbially honest in their own neighbourhood, \"a stranger\nin the gates who seems to be friendless may lose the very\nblankets off him in the night.\"[192] Among the Ahts thieving \"is\na common vice where the property of other tribes, or white men,\nis concerned.\"[193] Of the Dacotahs we read that, though the men\nthink it undignified for them to steal even from white people,\n\"they send their wives thus unlawfully to procure what they\nwant.\"[194] Of the Greenlanders the old missionary Egede\nwrites:--\"If they can lay hands upon any thing belonging to us\nforeigners, they make no great scruple of conscience about it.\nBut, as we now have lived some time in the country amongst them,\nand are look'd upon as true inhabitants of the land, they at last\nhave forborne to molest us any more that way.\"[195] Another early\nauthority states, \"If they can purloin or even forcibly seize the\nproperty of a foreigner, it is a feather in their cap\";[196] and,\naccording to Dr. Nansen, it is still held by the Greenlanders \"to\nbe far less objectionable to rob Europeans than their own\nfellow-countrymen.\"[197] Many travellers have complained of the\npilfering tendencies of Eskimo tribes with whom they have come\ninto contact.[198] Richardson believes that, in the opinion of an\nEskimo, \"to steal boldly and adroitly from a stranger is an act\nof heroism.\"[199] Of the Eskimo about Behring Strait Mr. Nelson\nwrites:--\"Stealing from people of the same village or tribe is\nregarded as wrong. . . . To steal from a stranger or from people\nof another tribe is not considered wrong so long as it does not\nbring trouble on the community.\"[200]\n\n[Footnote 187: Musters, _op. cit._ p. 195.]\n\n[Footnote 188: Dobrizhoffer, _op. cit._ ii. 148.]\n\n[Footnote 189: Tylor, in _Contemporary Review_, xxi. 716.]\n\n[Footnote 190: _Ibid._ p. 716.]\n\n[Footnote 191: Dodge, _op. cit._ p. 79.]\n\n[Footnote 192: Powers, _Tribes of California_, p. 410 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 193: Sproat, _op. cit._ p. 159. _Cf._ Macfie,\n_Vancouver Island and British Columbia_, p. 468.]\n\n[Footnote 194: Eastman, _Dacotah_, p. xvii.]\n\n[Footnote 195: Egede, _op. cit._ p. 124 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 196: Cranz, _op. cit._ i. 175. See also Dalager, _op.\ncit._ p. 69.]\n\n[Footnote 197: Nansen, _First Crossing of Greenland_, ii. 335\n_sq._ _Cf._ _Idem_, _Eskimo Life_, p. 159 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 198: Murdoch, 'Ethnological Results of the Point Barrow\nExpedition,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ ix. 41. Seemann, _Voyage\nof \"Herald,\"_ ii. 65; Armstrong, _Discovery of the North-West\nPassage_, p. 196 (Western Eskimo).]\n\n[Footnote 199: Richardson, _Arctic Searching Expedition_, i. 352.]\n\n[Footnote 200: Nelson, in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ xviii. 293.]\n\n{22} The Chukchi[201] and Koriaks[202] consider theft reputable or\nglorious if committed on a stranger, though criminal if committed\nin their own communities. The hill people of the Central\nProvinces of India, whilst observant of the rights of property\namong themselves, do not scruple to plunder those to whom they\nare under no obligation of fidelity.[203] The Bataks of Sumatra,\nwho hardly ever steal among themselves, are expert at pilfering\nfrom strangers when not restrained by the laws of hospitality,\nand think it no moral offence to do so.[204] Other tribes in the\nMalay Archipelago likewise hold it allowable to plunder the same\nstranger or traveller who, when forlorn and destitute, would find\na hospitable reception among them.[205] \"The strict honesty,\"\nsays Mr. Melville, \"which the inhabitants of nearly all the\nPolynesian Islands manifest towards each other is in striking\ncontrast with the thieving propensities some of them evince in\ntheir intercourse with foreigners. It would almost seem that,\naccording to their peculiar code of morals, the pilfering of a\nhatchet or a wrought nail from a European is looked upon as a\npraiseworthy action. Or rather, it may be presumed, that, bearing\nin mind the wholesale forays made upon them by their nautical\nvisitors, they consider the property of the latter as a fair\nobject of reprisal.\"[206] In Fiji theft is regarded as no offence\nat all when practised on a foreigner.[207] The Savage Islanders\nconsider theft from a tribesman a vice, but theft from a member\nof another tribe a virtue.[208] Of the Sandwich Islanders, again,\nwe are told that they stole from rich strangers on board well\nloaded ships, whereas Europeans settled among them left their\ndoors and shops unlocked without apprehension.[209] Speaking of\nthe honesty of the Herbert River natives, Northern Queensland,\nMr. Lumholtz adds:--\"It is, of course, solely among members of\nthe same tribe that there is so great a difference between mine\nand thine; strange tribes look upon each other as wild\nbeasts.\"[210] The aborigines of West Australia \"would not\nconsider the act of pillaging base when practised on another\npeople, or carried on beyond the limits of their own tribe.\"[211]\n\n[Footnote 201: Georgi, _op. cit._ iii. 183.]\n\n[Footnote 202: _Ibid._ iii. 170. Krasheninnikoff, _op. cit._ p. 232.]\n\n[Footnote 203: Hislop, _op. cit._ p. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 204: Marsden, _op. cit._ p. 389.]\n\n[Footnote 205: Crawfurd, _op. cit._ i. 72.]\n\n[Footnote 206: Melville, _Typee_, p. 295, n. 1. See also\nWilliams, _Missionary Enterprises_, p. 530 (Samoans); Hale, _op.\ncit._ p. 73 (Micronesians).]\n\n[Footnote 207: Williams and Calvert, _op. cit._ p. 110.]\n\n[Footnote 208: Thomson, _Savage Island_, p. 94.]\n\n[Footnote 209: von Kotzebue, _op. cit._ iii. 255.]\n\n[Footnote 210: Lumholtz, _Among Cannibals_, p. 148.]\n\n[Footnote 211: Chauncy, in Brough Smyth, _op. cit._ ii. 278 _sq._]\n\nAmong the For tribe of Central Africa \"it is not considered {23}\nright to rob strangers, but the chiefs wink at this offence, and\nthe stranger runs but a poor chance of obtaining justice.\"[212]\nOf the Mandingoes Cailli\u00e9 observes that, while they do not steal\nfrom each other, \"their probity with respect to others is very\nequivocal and in particular towards strangers, who would be very\nimprudent to shew them any thing that might tempt their\ncupidity.\"[213] When an Eastern Central African is plundered by a\ncompanion, he may be heard exclaiming, \"If you had stolen from a\nwhite man, then I could have understood it, but to steal from a\nblack man----.\"[214] Among the Masai the warriors and old men\nhave a profound contempt for a thief, but \"cattle-raiding from\nneighbouring tribes they do not consider stealing.\"[215] The\nWafiomi[216] and Shilluk[217] regard theft or robbery committed\non a stranger as a praiseworthy action, though they never or rarely\npractise it on members of their own people. The Barea and Kun\u00e1ma[218]\nand the inhabitants of Sara\u00eb[219] consider it honourable for a man\nto rob an enemy of his tribe. The Kabyles of Djurdjura, who demand\nstrict mutual honesty from members of the same village, see nothing\nwrong in stealing from a stranger.[220] Among the Bedouins \"travellers\npassing without proper escort from or introduction to the tribes,\nmay expect to lose their beasts, goods, clothes, and all they\npossess. There is no kind of shame attached to such acts of\nrapine. . . . By desert law, the act of passing through the\ndesert entails forfeiture of goods to whoever can seize\nthem.\"[221] Indeed, the Arab is proud of robbing his enemies, and\nof bringing away by stealth what he could not have taken by open\nforce.[222] The Ossetes \"distinguent . . . le vol commis au\npr\u00e9judice d'une personne \u00e9trang\u00e8re \u00e0 la famille, et le vol commis\nau pr\u00e9judice d'un parent. Le premier, \u00e0 proprement parler, n'est\npas un acte criminel; le second, au contraire, est tenu pour un\nd\u00e9lit.\"[223]\n\n[Footnote 212: Felkin, 'Notes on the For Tribe of Central\nAfrica,' in _Proceed. Roy. Soc. Edinburgh_, xiii. 234.]\n\n[Footnote 213: Cailli\u00e9, _op. cit._ i. 353. _Cf._ Mungo Park, _op.\ncit._ p. 239 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 214: Macdonald, _Africana_, i. 182.]\n\n[Footnote 215: Hinde, _op. cit._ p. 104. _Cf._ Johnston,\n_Kilima-njaro Expedition_, p. 419.]\n\n[Footnote 216: Baumann, _Durch Massailand_, p. 179.]\n\n[Footnote 217: Petherick, _Travels in Central Africa_, ii. 3.\nBeltrame, _Il Fiume Bianco_, p. 83.]\n\n[Footnote 218: Munzinger, _Ostafrikanische Studien_, p. 531.]\n\n[Footnote 219: _Ibid._ p. 386.]\n\n[Footnote 220: Kobelt, _Reiseerinnerungen aus Algerien und\nTunis_, p. 223.]\n\n[Footnote 221: Blunt, _op. cit._ ii. 204 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 222: Burckhardt, _Bedouins and Wah\u00e1bys_, p. 90.]\n\n[Footnote 223: Kovalewsky, _Coutume contemporaine_, p. 343.]\n\nSimilar views prevailed among the ancient Teutons. \"Robberies,\"\nsays Caesar, \"which are committed beyond {24} the boundaries of\neach state bear no infamy, and they avow that these are committed\nfor the purpose of disciplining their youth and of preventing\nsloth.\"[224] The same was the case with the Highlanders of\nScotland until they were brought into subjection after the\nrebellion of 1745.[225] \"Regarding every Lowlander as an alien,\nand his cattle as fair spoil of war,\" says Major-General Stewart,\n\"they considered no law for his protection as binding. . . . Yet,\nexcept against the Lowlanders or a hostile clan, these\nfreebooters maintained, in general, the strictest honesty towards\none another, and inspired confidence in their integrity. . . . In\nthe interior of their own society all property was safe, without\nthe usual security of bolts, bars, and locks.\"[226] In the\nCommentary to the Irish Senchus M\u00f3r it is stated that, whilst an\nordinary thief loses his full honour-price at once, committing\ntheft in another territory deprives a person of only half his\nhonour-price, until it is committed the third time.[227]\nThroughout the Middle Ages all Europe seems to have tacitly\nagreed that foreigners were created for the purpose of being\nrobbed.[228] In the thirteenth century there were still several\nplaces in France in which a stranger who fixed his residence for\na year and a day became the serf of the lord of the manor.[229]\nIn England, till upwards of two centuries after the Conquest,\nforeign merchants were considered only as sojourners coming to a\nfair or market, and were obliged to employ their landlords as\nbrokers to buy and sell their commodities; and one stranger was\noften arrested for the debt, or punished for the misdemeanour, of\nanother.[230] In a later age the old habit of oppression was\nstill so strong that, when the State suddenly wanted a sum of\nmoney, it seemed quite natural that foreigners should be called\nupon to {25} provide a part of it.[231] The custom of seizing the\ngoods of persons who had been shipwrecked, and of confiscating\nthem as the property of the lord on whose manor they were thrown,\nseems to have been universal;[232] and in some European countries\nthe laws even permitted the inhabitants of maritime provinces to\nreduce to servitude people who were shipwrecked on their\ncoast.[233] The sea laws of Ol\u00e9ron, which probably date from the\ntwelfth century, tell us that in many places shipwrecked sailors\nmeet with people more inhuman, barbarous, and cruel than mad\ndogs, who slaughter those unhappy mariners in order to obtain\npossession of their money, clothes, and other property.[234] In\nthe latter part of the Middle Ages attempts were incessantly made\nby sovereigns and councils to abolish this ancient right, so far\nas Christian sailors were concerned,[235] whereas the robbing of\nshipwrecked infidels was not prohibited.[236] But for a long time\nthese endeavours were far from being successful;[237] and it was\neven argued that, as shipwrecks were punishments sent by God, it\nwas impious to be merciful to the victims.[238]\n\n[Footnote 224: Caesar, _De bello Gallico_, vi. 23.]\n\n[Footnote 225: Tylor, in _Contemporary Review_, xxi. 716.]\n\n[Footnote 226: Stewart, _Sketches of the Character, &c., of the\nHighlanders of Scotland_, p. 42 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 227: _Ancient Laws of Ireland_, i. 57.]\n\n[Footnote 228: _Cf._ Marshall, _International Vanities_, p. 285.]\n\n[Footnote 229: Beaumanoir, _Les coutumes du Beauvoisis_, xlv. 19,\nvol. ii. p. 226.]\n\n[Footnote 230: Chitty, _Treatise on the Laws of Commerce and\nManufactures_, i. 131 _Cf._ Cibrario, _Della economia politica\ndel medio eve_, i. 192.]\n\n[Footnote 231: See Marshall, _International Vanities_, p. 291 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 232: Du Cange, _Glossarium ad scriptores medi\u00e6 et\ninfim\u00e6 Latinitatis_, iv. 22 _sq._ Robertson, _History of the\nReign of Charles V._ i. 395.]\n\n[Footnote 233: Du Cange, _op. cit._ iv. 23 _sq._ Cleffelius,\n_Antiquitates Germanorum potissimum septentrionalium_, x. 4, p.\n362. Dreyer, _Specimen juris publici Lubecensis_, p. cxcii.\nPotgiesser, _Commentarii juris Germanici de statu servorum_, i.\ni. 17, p. 18 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 234: _Ancient Sea-Laws of Oleron_, art. 30, p. 11.]\n\n[Footnote 235: Du Cange, _op. cit._ iv. 24 _sqq._ Pardessus,\n_Collection de lois maritimes_, ii. p. cxv. _sqq._; iii. p.\nclxxix. von Eicken, _Geschichte und System der mittelalterlichen\nWeltanschauung_, p. 569 _sqq._ _Constitutiones Neapolitan\u00e6 sive\nSicul\u00e6_, i. 28. _Concilium Romanum IV._ A.D. 1078 (Labbe-Mansi,\n_Sacrorum Conciliorum collectio_, xx. 505 _sq._).]\n\n[Footnote 236: Laurent, _\u00c9tudes sur l'histoire de l'humanit\u00e9_,\nvii. 323, 413 n. 3. von Eicken, _op. cit._ p. 570.]\n\n[Footnote 237: Pardessus, _op. cit._ ii. p. cxv. Laurent, _op.\ncit._ vii. 314. Marshall, _International Vanities_, pp. 287,\n295.]\n\n[Footnote 238: von Eicken, _op. cit._ p. 570 _sq._]\n\nThe readiness with which wars are waged, and the destruction of\nproperty held legitimate in warfare, are other instances of the\nlittle regard felt for the proprietary rights of foreigners.\nGrotius maintained that \"such ravage is tolerable as in a short\ntime reduces the enemy to seek peace\";[239] and in the practice\nof his time devastation was {26} constantly used independently of\nany immediate military advantage accruing from it.[240] In the\neighteenth century the alliance of devastation with strategical\nobjects became more close, but it was still regarded as an\nindependent means of attack by Wolff,[241] Vattel,[242] and\nothers;[243] and even at the beginning of the nineteenth century\ninstances of devastation of a not necessary kind occasionally\noccurred.[244] In later days opinion has decisively laid down\nthat the measure of permissible devastation is to be found in the\nstrict necessities of war.[245] Yet there is an exception to this\nrule: during the siege of a fortified town custom still permits\nthe houses of the town itself to be bombarded, with a view to\ninducing the commandant to surrender on account of the misery\nsuffered by the inhabitants.[246] Under the old customs of war a\nbelligerent possessed a right to seize and appropriate all\nproperty belonging to a hostile state or its subjects, of\nwhatever kind it might be and in any place where acts of war were\npermissible.[247] Subsequently this extreme right has been\ntempered by usage, and in a few directions it has disappeared.[248]\nThus the principle proclaimed, but not always acted on, by the\nRevolutionary Government of France, that private property should\nbe respected on a hostile as on a friendly soil,[249] is favoured\nby present opinion and usage,[250] and pillage by the soldiers of\nan invading army is expressly forbidden.[251] At the same time\nthere is unfortunately no {27} doubt that in all wars pillage\ndoes continue with impunity;[252] and we sometimes hear of a\ncaptured town being sacked, and the houses of the inhabitants\nbeing plundered, on the plea that it was impossible for the\ngeneral to restrain his soldiers.[253] Moreover, private property\ntaken from the enemy on the field of battle, in the operations of\na siege, or in the storming of a place which refuses to\ncapitulate, is usually regarded as legitimate spoils of war.[254]\nMilitary contributions and requisitions are levied upon the\ninhabitants of the hostile territory.[255] And whilst the\nprogress of civilisation has slowly tended to soften the extreme\nseverity of the operations of war by land, it still remains\nunrelaxed in respect to maritime warfare, the private property of\nthe enemy taken at sea or afloat in port being indiscriminately\nliable to capture and confiscation. In justification of this it\nis said that the object of maritime wars is the destruction of\nthe enemy's commerce and navigation, and that this object can\nonly be attained by the seizure of private property.[256]\n\n[Footnote 239: Grotius, _De jure belli et pacis_, iii. 12. 1. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 240: Hall, _Treatise on International Law_, p. 533.]\n\n[Footnote 241: Wolff, _Jus Gentium_, \u00a7823, p. 300.]\n\n[Footnote 242: Vattel, _Le droit des gens_, iii. 9. 167, vol. ii.\n76 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 243: Hall, _op. cit._ p. 533 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 244: _Ibid._ p. 534 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 245: _Ibid._ p. 535. Bluntschli, _Le droit\ninternational_, \u00a7663, p. 385. Heffter, _Das europ\u00e4ische\nV\u00f6lkerrecht_, \u00a7125, p. 262. Wheaton, _Elements of International\nLaw_, p. 473. _Conf\u00e9rence de Bruxelles_, art. 13, _g_.\n_Conf\u00e9rence internationale de la paix, La Haye_ 1899, 'R\u00e8glement\nconcernant les lois et coutumes de la guerre sur terre,' art. 23\n_g_, pt. i. 245.]\n\n[Footnote 246: Hall, _op. cit._ p. 536 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 247: Grotius, _op. cit._ iii. 6. 2. Hall, _op. cit._\npp. 417, 438.]\n\n[Footnote 248: Hall, _op. cit._ p. 419 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 249: Bernard, 'Growth of Laws and Usages of War,' in\n_Oxford Essays_, 1856, p. 109.]\n\n[Footnote 250: _Conf\u00e9rence de Bruxelles_, art. 38. _Instructions\nfor the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field_,\nart. 37. _Conf\u00e9rence de La Haye_, 'R\u00e8glement concernant la guerre\nsur terre,' art. 46, pt. i. 248. Hall, _op. cit._ p. 441.\nGeffken, in Heffter, _op. cit._ \u00a7140, p. 297, n. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 251: _Conf\u00e9rence de Bruxelles_, art. 39. _Instructions\nof the United States_, art. 44. _Conf\u00e9rence de La Haye_,\n'R\u00e8glement concernant la guerre sur terre,' art. 28, 47, pt. i.\n246, 248.]\n\n[Footnote 252: Maine, _International Law_, p. 199. Halleck,\n_International Law_, ii. 73, note.]\n\n[Footnote 253: Halleck, _op. cit._ ii. 32. If we may believe\nGarcilasso de la Vega (_First Part of the Royal Commentaries of\nthe Yncas_, i. 151) the officers of the Incas in ancient Peru\nwere more humane, never allowing the pillage of a captured town.]\n\n[Footnote 254: Halleck, _op. cit._ ii. 73 _sq._ Wheaton, _op.\ncit._ p. 467.]\n\n[Footnote 255: Wheaton, _op. cit._ p. 467. Hall, _op. cit._ p.\n427 _sqq._ _Conf\u00e9rence de La Haye_, 'R\u00e8glement concernant la\nguerre sur terre,' art. 49, 52, pt. i. 248.]\n\n[Footnote 256: Wheaton, _op. cit._ p. 483. Twiss, _Law of\nNations_, p. 141. Heffter, _op. cit._ \u00a7137, p. 287. Hall, _op.\ncit._ p. 443 _sqq._]\n\nNot only does the respect in which the right of property is held\nvary according to the _status_ of the owner, but in many\ninstances certain persons are deemed incapable of possessing such\na right.\n\nThe father's power over his children may imply that the latter,\neven when grown-up, have no property of their own, the father\nhaving a right to the disposal of their earnings. This is the\ncase among some African peoples,[257] and the {28} Kandhs of\nIndia.[258] In the Laws of Manu, the mythical legislator of the\nHindus, it is said, \"A wife, a son, and a slave, these three are\ndeclared to have no property; the wealth they earn is acquired\nfor him to whom they belong.\"[259] But according to the standard\ncommentators this only means that the persons mentioned are\nunable to dispose of their property independently;[260] and it is\nexpressly stipulated that property acquired by learning belongs\nexclusively to the person to whom it was given, and so also the\ngift of a friend.[261] In Rome the _peculium_, or separate\nproperty, allowed to a son was originally subject to the\nauthority of the house-father, should he choose to exercise such\nauthority; and it was only by very late legislation that sons\nwere secured the independent holding of their _peculium_.[262]\nEven now it is the law in many European countries that, during\nthe minority of a child, the father or mother has the usufruct of\nits property, with the exception of certain kinds of property\nexpressly specified.[263]\n\n[Footnote 257: Sarbah, _Fanti Customary Laws_, p. 51. Kraft, in\nSteinmetz, _Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_, p. 285 (Wapokomo). Munzinger,\n_Ueber die Sitten und das Recht der Bogos_, p. 36. Among the\nBarea and Kun\u00e1ma a man's earnings belong to his father until he\nbuilds a house for himself, that is, until he marries (Munzinger,\n_Ostafrikanische Studien_, p. 477). Among the Basutos parents can\ndeprive their sons of their earnings at pleasure (Endemann,\n'Mittheilungen \u00fcber die Sotho-Neger,' in _Zeitschr. f. Ethnol._\nvi. 39).]\n\n[Footnote 258: Macpherson, _Memorials of Service in India_, p. 62.]\n\n[Footnote 259: _Laws of Manu_, viii. 416. See also _N\u00e1rada_, v. 41.]\n\n[Footnote 260: Buehler, in his translation of the Laws of Manu,\n_Sacred Books of the East_, xxv. 326, n. 416.]\n\n[Footnote 261: _Laws of Manu_, ix. 206.]\n\n[Footnote 262: Hunter, _Exposition of Roman Law_, p. 292 _sqq._\nMaine, _Dissertations on Early Law and Custom_, p. 252. Girard,\n_Manuel \u00e9l\u00e9mentaire de droit romain_, pp. 135, 138 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 263: Bridel, _Le droit des femmes et le mariage_, p. 156.]\n\nAmong some uncivilised peoples women are said to be incapable of\nholding property;[264] but this is certainly not the rule among\nsavage tribes, not even among the very lowest. When Mr. Snow\nwished to buy a canoe from some Fuegians, his request was refused\non the ground that the object in question belonged to an old\nwoman, who would not part with it;[265] and among the blacks of\nAustralia Mr. Curr has often heard husbands ask permission of\ntheir wives to take something out of their bags.[266] There are\ninstances in which the property owned by a {29} woman is by\nmarriage transferred to her husband;[267] but more commonly, it\nseems, the wife remains mistress of her own property during the\nexistence of the marriage relation.[268] Among many savages\nconsiderable proprietary privileges are granted to the female\nsex. We have seen that the household goods are frequently\nregarded as the special property of the wife.[269] Among the\nNavahos of New Mexico everything, except horses and cattle,\npractically belongs to the married women.[270] Among the Kafirs\nof Natal, \"when a man takes his first wife, all the cows he\npossesses are regarded as her property,\" and the husband can,\ntheoretically, neither sell nor otherwise dispose of them without\nhis wife's consent.[271] The Mandans of North America have a\ncustom that all the horses which a young man steals or captures\nin war belong to his sisters.[272] Among the Koch of India, we\nare told, \"the men are so gallant as to have made over all\nproperty to the women.\"[273] As regards woman's right of\nownership, nations of a higher culture compare unfavourably with\nmany savages. In Japan the husband formerly had full rights over\nthe property of his wife.[274] We have already noticed the\ndisabilities in point of ownership to which women were once\nsubject in India; but the development of _str[=i]dhana_, or\n_peculium_ of the female members of a family, shows that they\ngradually became less dependent on their husbands in {30} matters\nrelating to property.[275] Among the ancient Hebrews women appear\nto have been in every respect regarded as minors so far as\nproprietary rights were concerned.[276] In Rome a marriage with\n_conventio in manum_, which was the regular form of marriage in\nearly times, gave the husband a right to all the property which\nthe wife had when she married, and entitled him to all she might\nacquire afterwards whether by gift or by her own labour.[277]\nLater on marriage without _manus_ became the ordinary Roman\nmarriage, and this, together with the downfall of the ancient\n_patria potestas_, led to the result that finally all the wife's\nproperty was practically under her own control, save when a part\nof it had been converted by settlement into a fund for\ncontributing to the expenses of the conjugal household.[278] But,\nas we have noticed in another place, the new religion was not\nfavourable to the remarkable liberty granted to married women\nduring the pagan Empire;[279] and the combined influence of\nTeutonic custom and Canon law led to those proprietary\nincapacities of wives which up to quite recent times have\ndisfigured the lawbooks of Christian Europe.[280] In England,\nbefore 1857, even a man who had abandoned his wife and left her\nunaided to support his family might at any time return to\nappropriate her earnings and to sell everything she had acquired,\nand he might again and again desert her, and again and again\nrepeat the process of spoliation. In 1870 a law was passed\nsecuring to women the legal control of their own earnings, but\nall other female property, with some insignificant exceptions,\nwas left absolutely unprotected. And it was not until the Married\nWomen's {31} Property Act of 1882 that a full right to their own\nproperty was given to English wives.[281]\n\n[Footnote 264: Nassau, _Fetichism in West Africa_, p. 13 (tribes\nof the Cameroons). Marshall, _A Phrenologist amongst the Todas_,\np. 206. Waitz, _Anthropologie der Naturv\u00f6lker_, iii. 129 (some\nIndian tribes of North America).]\n\n[Footnote 265: Snow, 'Wild Tribes of Tierra del Fuego,' in _Jour.\nEthn. Soc. London_, N.S. i. 264.]\n\n[Footnote 266: Curr, _The Australian Race_, i. 66.]\n\n[Footnote 267: Mason, in _Jour. Asiatic Soc. Bengal_, xxxvii. pt.\nii. 142 (Karens). Sumner, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxxi. 94\n(Jakuts). Post, _Studien zur Entwicklungsgeschichte des\nFamilienrechts_, p. 291.]\n\n[Footnote 268: von den Steinen, _Unter den Naturv\u00f6lkern\nZentral-Brasiliens_, p. 330 (Baka\u00efri). Morgan, _League of the\nIroquois_, p. 326. Lala, _Philippine Islands_, p. 91. Hagen,\n_Unter den Papua's_, pp. 226, 243 (Papuans of Bogadjim, Kaiser\nWilhelm Land). Kubary, 'Die Palau-Inseln in der S\u00fcdsee,' in\n_Jour. des Museum Godeffroy_, iv. 54. Ratzel, _History of\nMankind_, i. 279 (various South Sea Islanders). Kingsley, _West\nAfrican Studies_, p. 373. Bosman, _op. cit._ p. 172 (Gold Coast\nnatives). Ellis, _Tshi-speaking Peoples of the Gold Coast_, p.\n298. Sarbah, _Fanti Customary Laws_, p. 5. Lang, in Steinmetz,\n_Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_, p. 223 (Washambala). Burton, _Lake Regions\nof Central Africa_, ii. 25 (Wanyamwezi). Post, _Entwicklungsgeschichte\ndes Familienrechts_, p. 292 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 269: _Supra_, i. 637 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 270: Mindeleff, 'Navaho Houses,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur.\nEthn._ xvii. 485.]\n\n[Footnote 271: Shooter, _Kafirs of Natal_, p. 84.]\n\n[Footnote 272: Wied-Neuwied, _Travels in the Interior of North\nAmerica_, p. 350.]\n\n[Footnote 273: Buchanan, quoted by Hodgson, _Miscellaneous\nEssays_, i. 110.]\n\n[Footnote 274: Rein, _Japan_, p. 424.]\n\n[Footnote 275: Jolly, 'Recht und Sitte,' in Buehler, _Grundriss\nder indo-arischen Philologie_, ii. 78, 79, 87 _sqq._ Kohler,\n'Indisches Ehe- und Familienrecht,' in _Zeitschr. f. vergl.\nRechtswiss._ iii. 424 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 276: Benzinger, 'Law and Justice,' in Cheyne and Black,\n_Encyclop\u00e6dia Biblica_, iii. 2724.]\n\n[Footnote 277: Hunter, _Roman Law_, p. 295. Maine, _Early History\nof Institutions_, p. 312. Bryce, _Studies in History and\nJurisprudence_, ii. 387. Girard, _op. cit._ p. 163.]\n\n[Footnote 278: Hunter, _Roman Law_, p. 295 _sqq._ Maine, _Early\nHistory of Institutions_, p. 317 _sqq._ Friedlaender,\n_Darstellungen aus der Sittengeschichte Roms_, i. 252. Girard,\n_op. cit._ p. 164.]\n\n[Footnote 279: _Supra_, i. 653 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 280: Maine, _Ancient Law_, p. 157 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 281: Lecky, _Democracy and Liberty_, ii. 536 _sq._\nCleveland, _Woman under the English Law_, p. 279 _sqq._ For the\nlaws of other European countries see Bridel, _op. cit._ p. 61\n_sqq._, and for the history of the subject see Gide. _\u00c9tude sur\nla condition de la femme_, _passim_.]\n\nA third class of persons who in many cases are considered\nincapable of holding property of their own is the slave\nclass.[282] It may indeed be asked whether a slave ever has the\nright of ownership in the full sense of the term. Yet slaves are\nfrequently said to be owners of property; and though this\n\"ownership\" may have originally been a mere privilege granted to\nthem by their masters and subject to withdrawal at the discretion\nof the latter,[283] it is undoubtedly in several cases a genuine\nright guaranteed by custom. Among the K\u00e1firs of the Hindu-Kush,\nif the slaves work for others, they do not hand the wages over to\ntheir masters, but keep the pay themselves.[284] In Africa, in\nparticular, it is a common thing for slaves to have private\nproperty;[285] in Southern Guinea there are slaves who are\nwealthier than their masters.[286] In some African countries, as\nwe have seen, the slave is obliged to work for his master only on\ncertain days of the week or a certain number of hours, and has\nthe rest of his time free.[287] So also in ancient Mexico the\nslave was allowed a certain amount of time to labour for his own\nadvantage.[288] A Babylonian slave had his _peculium_, of which,\nat least under normal circumstances, he was in safe\npossession.[289] In Rome anything {32} a slave acquired was\nlegally his master's; but he was in practice permitted to enjoy\nand accumulate chance earnings or savings or a share of what he\nproduced, which was regarded not as his property in the full\nsense of the term, but as his _peculium_.[290] In the Middle Ages\nslaves, and in many instances serfs also, were, strictly\nspeaking, destitute of proprietary rights.[291] In England it was\nheld that whatever was acquired by a villein was acquired by his\nlord. At the same time his chattels did not _eo ipso_ lapse into\nthe lord's possession, but only if the latter actually seized\nthem; and if he for some reason or other refrained from doing so\nthe villein was practically their owner in respect of all persons\nbut his lord.[292] In the British and French colonies and the\nAmerican Slave States the negro slaves had no legal rights of\nproperty in things real or personal.[293] According to the laws\nof Georgia, masters must not permit their slaves to labour for\ntheir own benefit, at a penalty of thirty dollars for every such\nweekly offence;[294] and in other States they were expressly\nforbidden to suffer their slaves to hire out themselves.[295] In\nsome places, however, negro slaves might hold a _peculium_. In\nArkansas a statute was passed granting masters the right of\nallowing their slaves to do work on their own behalf on\nSundays;[296] and in the British colonies Sunday was made a\nmarketing day for the slaves so as to encourage them to labour\nfor themselves.[297] In the Civil Code of Louisiana {33} it is\nsaid that the slave \"possesses nothing of his own, except his\n_peculium_, that is to say, the sum of money, or movable estate,\nwhich his master chooses he should possess.\"[298] The Spanish and\nPortuguese slave laws were more humane. According to them the\nmoney and effects which a slave acquired by his labour at times\nset apart for his own use or by any other means, were legally his\nown and could not be seized by the master.[299]\n\n[Footnote 282: Post, _Grundriss der ethnol. Jurisprudenz_, i.\n370, 381. Holmberg, in _Acta Soc. Scientiarum Fennic\u00e6_, iv. 330\n_sq._ (Thlinkets). Kohler, 'Recht der Marschallinsulaner,' in\n_Zeitschr. f. vergl. Rechtswiss._ xiv. 428 _sq._ Volkens, _op.\ncit._ p. 249 (Wadshagga). Lang, in Steinmetz, _Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_,\np. 241 (Washambala).]\n\n[Footnote 283: Nicole, in Steinmetz, _Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_, p. 119\n(Diakit\u00e9-Sarracolese). Senfft, _ibid._ p. 442 (Marshall\nIslanders).]\n\n[Footnote 284: Scott Robertson, _op. cit._ p. 100.]\n\n[Footnote 285: Kingsley, _West African Studies_, p. 366. Ellis,\n_E[(w]e-speaking Peoples of the Slave Coast_, p. 219. Steinmetz,\n_Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_, p. 43 (Banaka and Bapuku). Tellier, _ibid._\npp. 169, 171 (Kreis Kita). Baskerville, _ibid._ p. 193 (Waganda).\nBeverley, _ibid._ p. 213 (Wagogo). Dale, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._\nxxv. 230 (Wabondei). Munzinger, _Die Sitten und das Recht der\nBogos_, p. 43. _Idem_, _Ostafrikanische Studien_, p. 309 _sq._\n(Beni Amer).]\n\n[Footnote 286: Wilson, _Western Africa_, p. 271.]\n\n[Footnote 287: _Supra_, i. 677.]\n\n[Footnote 288: Bancroft, _op. cit._ ii. 221.]\n\n[Footnote 289: Kohler and Peiser, _Aus dem babylonischen\nRechtsleben_, i. i. See also _supra_, i. 684.]\n\n[Footnote 290: _Digesta_, xv. 1. 39. Wallon, _Histoire de\nl'esclavage dans l'antiquit\u00e9_, ii. 181 _sq._ Ingrain, _History of\nSlavery_, p. 44. Hunter, _Roman Law_, pp. 157, 290 _sq._ Girard,\n_op. cit._ p. 95.]\n\n[Footnote 291: _Supra_, i. 697. Gu\u00e9rard, _Cartulaire de l'Abbaye\nde Saint-P\u00e8re de Chartres_, i. p. xlvii.]\n\n[Footnote 292: Vinogradoff, _Villainage in England_, p.67 _sq._\nPollock and Maitland, _op. cit._ i. 416, 419.]\n\n[Footnote 293: Stephen, _Slavery of the British West India\nColonies_, i. 58. _Code Noir_, \u00c9dit du mois de Mars 1685, art.\n28, p. 42 _sq._; \u00c9dit donn\u00e9 au mois de Mars 1724, art. 22, p. 295\n_sq._ Stroud, _Sketch of the Laws relating to Slavery in the\nseveral States of the United States of America_, p. 74. Goodell,\n_American Slave Code_, p. 89 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 294: Prince, _Digest of the Laws of Georgia_, p. 788.]\n\n[Footnote 295: Caruthers and Nicholson, _Compilation of the\nStatutes of Tennessee_, 675. Alden and van Hoesen, _Digest of the\nLaws of Mississippi_, p. 751. Morehead and Brown, _Digest of the\nStatute Laws of Kentucky_, ii. 1480 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 296: Ball and Roane, _Revised Statutes of Arkansas_,\nxliv. 7. 2. 8, p. 276 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 297: Edwards, _History of the British West Indies_, ii. 181.]\n\n[Footnote 298: Morgan, _Civil Code of Louisiana_, art. 175.]\n\n[Footnote 299: Stephen, _op. cit._ i. 60. Couty, _L'esclavage au\nBr\u00e9sil_, p. 9.]\n\nAmong many peoples, finally, we find the theory that nobody but\nthe chief or king has proprietary rights, and that it is only by\nhis sufferance that his subjects hold their possessions.[300] The\nsoil, in particular, is regarded as his.[301] But even autocrats\nare tied by custom,[302] and in practice the right of ownership\nis not denied to their subjects.\n\n[Footnote 300: Butler, _Travels in Assam_, p. 94 (Kukis).\nBeecham, _Ashantee_, p. 96. Spencer, _Descriptive Sociology_,\nAfrican Races, p. 12 (Abyssinians). Decle, _op. cit._ p. 70\n_sqq._ (Barotse). Kidd, _The Essential Kafir_, p. 353. Ellis,\n_History of Madagascar_, i. 342. Post, _Afrikanische\nJurisprudenz_, ii. 171. Percy Smith, 'Uea, Western Pacific,' in\n_Jour. Polynesian Soc._ i. 112. Tregear, 'Easter Island,' _ibid._\ni. 99. In Samoa it is a maxim that a chief cannot steal; he is\nmerely considered to \"take\" the thing which he covets (Pritchard,\n_Polynesian Reminiscences_, p. 104). In Uea, when a chief enters\na house, he enjoys the right to take all in it that he pleases\n(Percy Smith, in _Jour. Polynesian Soc._ i. 113). Among the Kafirs\nno case can be brought against a chief for theft, except if it be\ncommitted on the property of a person belonging to another tribe;\nand even the children of chiefs are permitted to steal from their\nown people (Brownlee, in Maclean, _Compendium of Kafir Laws and\nCustoms_, p. 112 _sq._ Trollope, _South Africa_, ii. 303. Holden,\n_Past and Future of the Kaffir Races_, p. 338).]\n\n[Footnote 301: Waitz, _op. cit._ iii. 128 (Indian tribes of North\nAmerica); v. pt. i. 153 (Malays). Ellis, _Polynesian Researches_,\niii. 115 (Sandwich Islanders). Bory de St. Vincent, _Essais sur\nles Isles Fortun\u00e9es_, p. 64 (Guanches). Nicole, in Steinmetz,\n_Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_, p. 136 (Diakit\u00e9-Sarracolese). Baskerville,\n_ibid._ p. 201 (Waganda). Beverley, _ibid._ p. 216 (Wagogo).\nLang, _ibid._ p. 262 (Washambala). Rautanen, _ibid._ p. 343\n(Ondonga). Stuhlmann, _Mit Emin Pasha ins Herz von Africa_, p. 75\n(Wanyamwezi). Post, _Afrikanische Jurisprudenz_, ii. 170 _sq._;\nRatzel, _op. cit._ i. 126; de Laveleye-B\u00fccher, _Das Ureigenthum_,\np. 275 (various African peoples). Kohler, _Rechtsvergleichende\nStudien_, p. 235 (Kandian law). Giles, _Strange Stories from a\nChinese Studio_, ii. 369, n. 21 (Chinese).]\n\n[Footnote 302: _Supra_, i. 162.]\n\nIn the next chapter we shall try to explain all these facts:--the\nexistence of proprietary rights, the refusal of such rights to\ncertain classes of persons, the different {34} degrees of\ncondemnation attending theft under different circumstances. But\nbefore we can understand the psychological origin of the right of\nownership and the regard in which it is held, it is necessary to\nexamine the methods by which it is acquired, the external facts\nwhich give to certain individuals a right to the exclusive\ndisposal of certain things.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXIX\n\nTHE RIGHT OF PROPERTY (_concluded_)\n\n\nACCORDING to an old theory set forth by Roman jurists, and\nafterwards much emphasised by Grotius,[1] the original mode of\nacquisition is occupation, that is, a person's taking possession\nof that which at the moment belongs to nobody (_res nullius_),\nwith the intention of keeping it as his property. That occupation\nvery largely, though by no means exclusively, is at the bottom of\nthe right of ownership seems obvious enough, and it is only by\nmeans of strained constructions that Locke and others have been\nable to trace the origin of this right to labour alone.[2] The\nprinciple of occupation is illustrated by innumerable facts from\nall quarters of the world--by the hunter's right to the game\nwhich he has killed or captured;[3] by the nomad's or settler's\nright to the previously unoccupied place where {36} he has\npitched his tent or built his dwelling;[4] by the agriculturist's\nright to the land of which he has taken possession by cultivating\nthe soil;[5] by a tribe's or community's right to the territory\nwhich it has occupied.[6] Among the Kandhs of India \"the right of\npossession of land is simply founded in the case of tribes upon\npriority of appropriation, and in the case of individuals upon\npriority of culture.\"[7] Among the Herero, \"notwithstanding the\nloose notions generally entertained by them as to _meum_ and\n_tuum_, there is an understanding that he who arrives first at\nany given locality is the master of it as long as he chooses to\nremain there, and no one will intrude upon him without having\npreviously asked and obtained his permission. The same,\" our\nauthority adds, \"is observed even with regard to strangers.\"[8]\nAgain, among some of the Australian natives a man who had found a\nbees' nest and did not wish to rob it for some time, would mark\nthe tree in some way or other, and \"it was a crime to rob a nest\nthus indicated.\"[9] In Greenland anyone picking up pieces {37} of\ndriftwood or goods lost at sea or on land was considered the\nrightful owner of them; and to make good his possession he had\nonly to carry them up above high-water mark and put stones upon\nthem, no matter where his homestead might be.[10] But the\nfinder's right to the discovered article is not always restricted\nto objects which have no owner or the owner of which is unknown:\nin some instances his occupation of it makes it his property in\nall circumstances,[11] whilst in other cases he at any rate has a\nclaim to part of its value.[12] Among the Hurons \"every thing\nfound, tho' it had been lost but a moment, belonged to the person\nthat found it, provided the loser had not claimed it before.\"[13]\nThe Kafirs \"are not bound by their law to give up anything they\nmay have found, which has been lost by some one else. The loser\nshould have taken better care of his property, is their moral\ntheory.\"[14] Among the Chippewyans any unsuccessful hunter\npassing by a trap where a deer is caught may take the animal, if\nonly he leaves the head, skin, and saddle for the owner;[15] and\namong the Tunguses whoever finds a beast in another man's trap\nmay take half the meat.[16] Among the Maoris boats or canoes\nwhich were cast adrift became the property of the captors. \"Even\na canoe . . . of friends and relatives upsetting off a village,\nand drifting on shore where a village was, became the property of\nthe people of that village; although it might be that the people\nin the canoe had all got safely to land or were coming by special\ninvitation to visit that very {38} village.\"[17] We have\npreviously noticed the customary treatment of shipwrecked\nmariners in medi\u00e6val Europe. And another instance of occupation\nestablishing a right of property in things which already have an\nowner is conquest or capture made in war. The Romans regarded\nspoils taken from an enemy as the most excellent kind of\nproperty.[18]\n\n[Footnote 1: Grotius, _De jure belli et pacis_, ii. 3. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Locke, _Treatises of Government_, ii. 5. 27 _sqq._,\np. 200 _sqq._ Thiers, _De la propri\u00e9t\u00e9_, p. 94 _sqq._ Hume\nremarks (_Treatise of Human Nature_, ii. 3 [_Philosophical\nWorks_, ii. 276, n. 1]):--\"There are several kinds of occupation,\nwhere we cannot be said to join our labour to the object we\nacquire; as when we possess a meadow by grazing our cattle upon it.\"]\n\n[Footnote 3: Curr, _Recollections of Squatting in Victoria_, p.\n265 (Bangerang tribe). Murdoch, 'Ethnol. Results of the Point\nBarrow Expedition,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ ix. 428 (Point\nBarrow Eskimo). Ahlqvist, 'Unter Wogulen und Ostjaken,' in _Acta\nSoc. Scientiarum Fennic\u00e6_, xiv. 166 (Voguls). Steinmetz,\n_Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_, p. 53 (Banaka and Bapuku). Post,\n_Afrikanische Jurisprudenz_, ii. 162 _sq._ Andree, 'Ethnogr.\nBemerkungen zu einigen Rechtsgebr\u00e4uchen,' in _Globus_, xxxviii.\n287. Among some Indian **tribes of North America it was customary\nfor individuals to mark their arrows, in order that the stricken\ngame might fall to the man by whose arrow it had been despatched\n(Powell, in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ iii. p. lvii.).]\n\n[Footnote 4: von Martius, _Von dem Rechtszustande unter den\nUreinwohnern Brasiliens_, p. 34 (Brazilian aborigines). Dalager,\n_Gr\u00f8nlandske Relationer_, p. 15; Nansen, _Eskimo Life_, p. 109\n(Greenlanders). Marsden, _History of Sumatra_, pp. 68, 244\n(Rejangs). Steinmetz, _Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_, p. 53 (Banaka and\nBapuku). Kraft, _ibid._ p. 293 (Wapokomo). Decle, _Three Years in\nSavage Africa_, p. 487 (Wakamba). Robertson Smith, _Religion of\nthe Semites_, pp. 95, 96, 143 (ancient Semitic custom and\nMuhammedan law).]\n\n[Footnote 5: Thomson, _Savage Island_, p. 137. Polack, _Manners\nand Customs of the New Zealanders_, ii. 69; Thomson, _Story of\nNew Zealand_, i. 97. Munzinger, _Die Sitten und das Recht der\nBogos_, p. 69. Cruickshank, _Eighteen Years on the Gold Coast_,\nii. 277. Leuschner, in Steinmetz, _Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_, p. 24\n(Bakwiri). _Ibid._ p. 53 (Banaka and Bapuku). Tellier, _ibid._ p.\n178 (Kreis Kita). Dale, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxv. 230\n(Wabondei). _Laws of Manu_, ix. 44. Wellhausen, _Reste arabischen\nHeidentums_, p. 108. Robertson Smith, _Religion of the Semites_,\npp. 95, 96, 143 (ancient Semitic custom and Muhammedan law).\nWaitz, _Anthropologie der Naturv\u00f6lker_, i. 440. Dargun, 'Ursprung\nund Entwicklungs-Geschichte des Eigenthums,' in _Zeitschr. f.\nvergl. Rechtswiss._ v. 71 _sqq._ Post, _Entwicklungsgeschichte\ndes Familienrechts_, p. 283 _sqq._ _Idem_, _Grundriss der ethnol.\nJurisprudenz_, i. 342 _sqq._ See also _infra_, p. 39 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 6: Thomson, _Story of New Zealand_, i. 96; Polack, _op.\ncit._ ii. 71 (Maoris), Mademba, in Steinmetz, _Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_,\np. 90 (natives of the Sansanding States).]\n\n[Footnote 7: Macpherson, _Memorials of Service in India_, p. 62.]\n\n[Footnote 8: Andersson, _Lake Ngami_, p. 115. See also Viehe, in\nSteinmetz, _Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_, p. 310.\n\n 12: Merker, _Die Masai_, p. 204. Desoignies, in Steinmetz,\n_Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_, p. 281 (Msalala). Post, _Grundriss der\nethnol. Jurisprudenz_, ii. 605.]\n\n[Footnote 13: Charlevoix, _Voyage to North-America_, ii. 26 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 14: Leslie, _Among the Zulus and Amatongas_, p. 202.]\n\n[Footnote 15: Schoolcraft, _Archives of Aboriginal Knowledge_,\nv. 177.]\n\n[Footnote 16: Ratzel, _History of Mankind_, ii. 226.]\n\n[Footnote 17: Colenso, _Maori Races of New Zealand_, p. 34.\nPolack, _op. cit._ p. 68 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 18: \"Maxima sua esse credebant quae ab hostibus\ncepissent\" (quoted by Ahrens, _Naturrecht_, ii. 137).]\n\nThe occupation of a thing may take place in various ways. Hegel\nsays that \"taking possession is partly the simple bodily grasp,\npartly the forming and partly the marking or designating of the\nobject.\"[19] But there are still other methods of occupation, in\nwhich the bodily contact with the object is involuntary, or in\nwhich there is no bodily contact at all. Among the Maoris a man\nacquired a peculiar right to land \"by having been born on it (or,\nin their expressive language, 'where his navel-string was cut'),\nas his first blood (ever sacred in their eyes) had been shed\nthere\";[20] or, generally, \"by having had his blood shed upon\nit\"; or \"by having had the body, or bones, of his deceased\nfather, or mother, or uterine brother or sister, deposited or\nresting on it\"; or \"by having had a near relative killed, or\nroasted on it, or a portion of his body stuck up or thrown away\nupon it.\"[21] Among many peoples an animal belongs entirely or\nchiefly to the person who first wounded it, {39} however\nslightly,[22] or who first saw it,[23] even though it was killed\nby somebody else. Thus among the Greenlanders, if a seal or some\nother sea-animal escapes with the javelin sticking in it, and is\nafterwards killed, it belongs to him who threw the first\ndart;[24] if a bear is killed, it belongs to him who first\ndiscovered it;[25] and when a whale is taken, the very spectators\nhave an equal right to it with the harpooners.[26]\n\n[Footnote 19: Hegel, _Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts_,\n\u00a7 54, p. 54; English translation, p. 59.]\n\n[Footnote 20: Of certain tribes of Western Victoria we are\nlikewise told that, \"should a child of another family have been\nborn on the estate, it is looked upon as one of the family, and\nit has an equal right with them to a share of the land, if it has\nattained the age of six months at the death of the proprietor\"\n(Dawson, _Australian Aborigines_, p. 7). The Rev. John Bulmer\n(quoted by Brough Smyth, _Aborigines of Victoria_, i. 146)\ntestifies the prevalence of such a birth-right among the Murray\ntribes, and suspects it is common to most of the tribes of\nAustralia:--\"The fact that an aboriginal is born in a certain\nlocality constitutes a right to that part, and it would be\nconsidered a breach of privilege for any one to hunt over it\nwithout his permission. Should another black have been born in\nthe same place, he, with the former, would have a joint right to\nthe land. Otherwise, no native seems to have made a claim to any\nparticular portion of the territory of his tribe.\" _Cf._ Schurtz,\n_Die Anf\u00e4nge des Landbesitzes_, in _Zeitschr. f. Socialwissenschaft_,\niii. 357 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 21: Colenso, _op. cit._ p. 31. See also Polack, _op.\ncit._ ii. 82.]\n\n[Footnote 22: Dalager, _op. cit._ p. 24 _sq._ (Greenlanders).\nBoas, 'Central Eskimo,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ vi. 582. Dall,\n_Alaska_, p. 394 (Aleuts). Ratzel, _op. cit._ Bourke,\n_Snake-Dance of the Moquis_, ii. 227 (Asiatic Hyperboreans).\nCampbell, _Second Journey in the Interior of South Africa_, ii.\n212 (Bechuanas). Livingstone, _Missionary Travels_, p. 599\n(natives of South Africa), von Heuglin, _Reise nach Abessinien_,\np. 290 _sq._ (Woitos). _Laws of Manu_, ix. 44. Post,\n_Afrikanische Jurisprudenz_, ii. 163. _Idem_, _Grundriss der\nethnol. Jurisprudenz_, ii. 707 _sq._ Andree, in _Globus_,\nxxxviii. 287 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 23: Boas, 'Central Eskimo,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._\nvi. 582. Ratzel, _op. cit._ ii. 227 (Asiatic Hyperboreans). See\nalso Semper, _Die Palau-Inseln_, p. 86.]\n\n[Footnote 24: Dalager, _op. cit._ p. 24.]\n\n[Footnote 25: Rink, _Tales and Traditions of the Eskimo_, p. 29.]\n\n[Footnote 26: Dalager, _op. cit._ p. 25.]\n\nBesides occupation, or the taking possession of a thing, the\nkeeping possession of it may establish a right of ownership. That\nthese principles, though closely connected with each other, are\nnot identical is obvious from two groups of facts. First, a\nproprietary right which is based on occupation may disappear if\nthe object has ceased to remain in the possession of the person\nwho had appropriated it. The place occupied by a nomad is his\nonly so long as he continues to stay there;[27] and among\nagricultural savages the cultivator frequently loses his right to\nthe field when he makes no more use of it[28]--though, on the\nother hand, instances are not wanting in which cultivation gives\nproprietary {40} rights of a more lasting nature.[29] Loss of\npossession may, indeed, annul or weaken ownership gained by any\nmethod of acquisition. In the Hindu work Panchatantra it is said\nthat the property in \"tanks, wells, ponds, temples, and\nchoultries\" will no longer rest with persons who once have left\nthem.[30] Among the natives of the Sansanding States the right to\na house is lost by its being abandoned.[31] In Greenland, if a\nman makes a fox trap and neglects it for some time, another may\nset it and claim the captured animal.[32] So also the finder's\ntitle to the discovered article springs from the fact that the\noriginal owner's right has been relaxed by his losing the\npossession of it. Secondly, the retaining possession of an object\nfor a certain length of time may make it the property of the\npossessor, even though the occupation of that object conferred on\nhim no such right, nay though the acquisition of it was actually\nwrongful.[33] According to the Roman Law of the Twelve Tables,\ncommodities which had been uninterruptedly possessed for a\ncertain period--movables for a year, and land or houses for two\nyears--became the property of the person possessing them.[34]\nThis principle, known to the Romans as _usucapio_, has descended\nto modern jurisprudence under the name of \"prescription.\" It also\nprevailed in India since ancient times. The older law-books laid\ndown the rule that, if the owner of a thing is neither an idiot\nnor a minor and if his chattel is enjoyed {41} by another before\nhis eyes during ten years and he says nothing, it is lost to him,\nand the adverse possessor shall retain it as his own property;[35]\nbut it seems that later on the period of prescription was extended\nto thirty years or even more.[36] In this connection it should\nalso be noticed that the division of labour, implying the use of\ncertain articles, often confers proprietary rights to those\narticles upon the persons who make habitual use of them, as in\nthe case of women becoming the owners of the household goods.[37]\n\n[Footnote 27: _Cf._ Post, _Afrikanische Jurisprudenz_, ii. 167.]\n\n[Footnote 28: Morgan, _League of the Iroquois_, p. 326. Dorsey,\n'Omaha Sociology,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ iii. 366. Bourke,\n_Snake-Dance of the Moquis_, p. 261. Shooter, _Kafirs of Natal_,\np. 16; Lichtenstein, _Travels in Southern Africa_, i. 271 (Kafirs).\nMacGregor, in _Jour. African Soc._ 1904, p. 474 (Yoruba). Leuschner,\nin Steinmetz, _Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_, p. 25. Lang, _ibid._ p. 264.\n(Washambala). Marx, _ibid._ p. 358 (Amahlubi). Sorge, _ibid._ p. 422\n(Nissan Islanders). Waitz, _op. cit._ i. 440. Dargun, in _Zeitschr.\nf. vergl. Rechtswiss._ v. 71 _sqq._ Post, _Entwicklungsgeschichte des\nFamilienrechts_, p. 283 _sqq._ _Idem_, _Grundriss der ethnol.\nJurisprudenz_, i. 343 _sq._ de Laveleye-B\u00fccher, _Das Ureigenthum_,\nch. xiv. p. 270 _sqq._ Among the Rejangs of Sumatra a planter of\nfruit-trees or his descendants may claim the ground as long as any\nof the trees subsist, but when they disappear \"the land reverts to\nthe public\" (Marsden, op. cit. p. 245).]\n\n[Footnote 29: von Martius, Von dem Rechtszustande unter den\nUreinwohnern Brasiliens_, p. 35 _sq._ (Brazilian aborigines).\nSteinmetz, _Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_, p. 53 (Banaka and Bapuku).\nKohler, 'Banturecht in Ostafrika,' in _Zeitschr. f. vergl.\nRechtswiss._ xv. 48 (natives of Lindi). Trollope, _op. cit._ ii.\n302 (Kafirs). Post, _Afrikanische Jurisprudenz_, ii. 169. _Idem_,\n_Entwicklungsgeschichte des Familienrechts_, p. 285 _sq._\nSchurtz, in _Zeitschrift f\u00fcr Socialwissenschaft_, iii. 255. Among\nthe Angami Nagas any member of a village \"may choose to leave his\nfields untilled for one year and cannot be compelled to grow his\ncrops during the next, but after that, if illness or idleness\nprevent him from overtaking the work, his village insists on the\nfields being let\" (Prain, 'Angami Nagas,' in _Revue coloniale\ninternationale_, v. 484).]\n\n[Footnote 30: _Panchatantram_, iii. p. 15.]\n\n[Footnote 31: Mademba, in Steinmetz, _Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_, p. 91.]\n\n[Footnote 32: Dalager, _op. cit._ p. 27.]\n\n[Footnote 33: See Mill, _Principles of Political Economy_, i.\n272; Thiers, _op. cit._ p. 108; Waitz-Gerland, _op. cit._ vi. 228\n(Maoris).]\n\n[Footnote 34: Hunter, _Roman Law_, p. 265 _sqq._ Maine, _Ancient\nLaw_, p. 284. Girard, _Manuel \u00e9l\u00e9mentaire de droit romain_, p.\n296 _sqq._ Puchta, _Cursus der Institutionen_, ii. 202 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 35: _Gautama_, xii. 39. _Vasishtha_, xvi. 16 _sq._\n_Laws of Manu_, viii. 147 _sq._ See also _Panchatantram_, iii. p.\n15; Benfey's translation, vol. ii. 233.]\n\n[Footnote 36: _Brihaspati_, ix. 7. Jolly, 'Recht und Sitte,' in\nBuehler, _Grundriss der indo-arischen Philologie_, ii. 92. For\nthe rules of prescription in ancient India see also Jolly, p. 91\n_sqq._, and Kohler, _Altindisches Prozessrecht_, p. 55 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 37: _Supra_, i. 637 _sqq._]\n\nA further source of ownership lies in the principle that a person\nhas a title to the products of his own labour. Grotius--in\ncriticising the Roman jurist Paulus, who long before Locke had\nmade labour a justification of property,--[38]argues that this is\nno special mode of acquisition, but that the labourer's claim to\nwhat he produces is based on occupation. \"Since in the course of\nnature,\" Grotius says, \"nothing can be made except but of\npre-existing matter, if that matter was ours, the ownership\ncontinues when it assumes a new form; if the matter was no one's\nproperty, this acquisition comes under occupation; if the matter\nbelonged to another, the thing made is not ours alone.\"[39] This\nargument contains its own refutation. If a thing which we make of\nmatter belonging to another person is not \"ours alone,\" our\npartial right to it can be due only to our labour. Again, if we\nmake a thing of materials belonging to ourselves, our right to it\nis certainly held to be increased by our exertions in producing\nit. It should, moreover, be remembered that there is ownership in\nthe products not only of manual but of mental labour, and in the\nlatter case the ownership can hardly be considered to be due to\noccupation at all. We may say with Mr. Spencer that from the\nbeginning things identified as products of a man's labour are\nrecognised as his. Even {42} among the rudest peoples there is\nproperty in weapons, implements, dress, decorations, and other\nthings in which the value given by labour bears a specially large\nproportion to the value of the raw material.[40] If a Greenlander\nfinds a dead seal with a harpoon in it, he keeps the seal, but\nrestores the harpoon to its owner.[41] Among the same people,\nwhen somebody has built dams across salmon-rivers to catch the\nfish, it is not considered proper for strangers to come and\nmeddle with them.[42] In various parts of Africa he who has dug a\nwell has a right to the exclusive disposal of it.[43] In West\nAfrica, according to Miss Kingsley, that which is acquired or\nmade by a man or woman by their personal exertions is regarded as\nhis or her private property.[44] The Moquis of Arizona \"are\nco-operative in all their labours, whether as hunters, herders,\nor tillers of the soil; but each man gathers the spoils of his\nindividual skill and daring, or the fruits of his own\nindustry.\"[45] In the Nicobars, whilst everything which the\nvillage as a whole makes or purchases is common property, the\nresult of individual work belongs to the individual.[46] In old\nHindu law-books the performance of labour is specified as one of\nthe lawful modes of acquiring property.[47] According to N\u00e2rada,\nwhen the owner of a field is unable to cultivate it, or dead, or\ngone no one knows whither, any stranger who undertakes its\ncultivation unchecked by the owner shall be allowed to keep the\nproduce; and if the owner returns while the stranger is engaged\nin cultivation, the owner, in order to recover his field, has to\npay to the cultivator the whole expense incurred in tilling the\nwaste.[48] Thus, though cultivation does not give a right to the\nland, it gives a right to the produce {43} of the labour\nperformed. Among uncivilised races we frequently find that the\nland itself and the crops or trees growing on it have different\nowners, the latter belonging to the person who planted them.[49]\n\n[Footnote 38: _Cf._ Girard, _op. cit._ p. 316.]\n\n[Footnote 39: Grotius, _op. cit._ ii. 3. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 40: Spencer, _Principles of Sociology_, ii. 646.\n_Idem_, _Principles of Ethics_, ii. 98. _Cf._ Waitz, _op. cit._\ni. 440 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 41: Dalager, _op. cit._ p. 25.]\n\n[Footnote 42: Nansen, _First Crossing of Greenland_, ii. 299.]\n\n[Footnote 43: Munzinger, _Die Sitten und das Recht der Bogos_, p.\n70. Lang, in Steinmetz, _Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_, p. 264\n(Washambala). von Fran\u00e7ois, _Nama und Damara_, p. 175 (Herero).]\n\n[Footnote 44: Kingsley, _West African Studies_, p. 366.]\n\n[Footnote 45: Bourke, _Snake-dance of the Moquis_, p. 260 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 46: Kloss, _In the Andamans and Nicobars_, p. 240.]\n\n[Footnote 47: _Gautama_, x. 42. _Laws of Manu_, x. 115.]\n\n[Footnote 48: _N\u00e2rada_, xi. 32 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 49: Colenso, _op. cit._ p. 31 (Maoris). Leuschner, in\nSteinmetz, _Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_, p. 25 (Bakwiri). Lang, _ibid._\np. 264 (Washambala). Munzinger, _Die Sitten und das Recht der\nBogos_, p. 69. Hanoteau and Letourneux, _La Kabylie_, ii. 230;\nKobelt, _Reiseerinnerungen aus Algerien und Tunis_, p. 293\n(Kabyles of Jurjura). Hyde Clarke, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xix.\n199 _sqq._ Post, _Afrikanische Jurisprudenz_, ii. 172. Schurtz,\nin _Zeitschr. f. Socialwissenschaft_, iii. 250 _sq._]\n\nThe right of ownership may, further, be established by a transfer\nof property by its owner, either by way of gift or by sale or\nexchange or some other form of contract. The conditions necessary\nfor this method of acquisition are, that the owner shall have a\nright to alienate the article in question, and that the other\nparty shall be capable of owning such property. As has been said\nbefore, ownership does not necessarily imply an unrestricted\npower of disposition. Property in land, for instance, is\nfrequently considered inalienable;[50] and, to take another\nexample, the power of testation, if recognised at all, is often\nsubject to restrictions.[51] The customary law of the Fantis of\nWest Africa does not permit any person to bequeath to an outsider\na greater portion of his property than is left for his\nfamily.[52] Among the Maoris land obtained by purchase or\nconquest may be given away or willed by the owner to anybody he\nthinks fit, but the case is different with patrimony.[53] With\nregard to the so-called Aryan peoples Sir Henry Maine thinks \"it\nis doubtful whether a true power of testation was known to any\noriginal society except the Roman.\"[54] Even in Rome bequest\nseems not to have been permitted in pre-historic times, and\nafterwards a _legitima portio_ was compulsorily reserved for each\nchild.[55] Such is still the law of some continental nations.\n\n[Footnote 50: Post, _Entwicklungsgeschichte des Familienrechts_,\np. 286 _sqq_. Avebury, _Origin of Civilisation_, p. 483 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 51: Post, _Grundriss der ethnol. Jurisprudenz_, ii. 200\n_sqq._ _Idem_, _Afrikanische Jurisprudenz_, ii. 19.]\n\n[Footnote 52: Sarbah, _op. cit._ p. 85.]\n\n[Footnote 53: Polack,  _op. cit._ ii. 69.]\n\n[Footnote 54: Maine, _Ancient Law_, p. 196. See also Fustel\nde Coulanges, _La cit\u00e9 antique_, p. 95.]\n\n[Footnote 55: Fustel de Coulanges,  _op. cit._ p. 96. Hunter, _Roman\nLaw_, p. 780 _sqq._ Girard,  _op. cit._ p. 854 _sqq._]\n\n{44} Closely connected with the restrictions imposed on a proprietor's\npower of testation is the rule of inheritance, one of the most common\nmethods of acquiring property. At the earlier stages of civilisation the\nproperty of a deceased person is not in every case subject to this rule.\nApart from the practice of testation, which, though hardly primitive,\nis not infrequently found among savages,[56] there are other ways of\ndealing with it besides inheritance. The private belongings of the dead,\nor part of them, are destroyed or buried with him, or his dwelling\nis burned or abandoned;[57] but Dr. Dargun goes too far when saying\nthat among rude savages this custom is generally practised to such an\nextent as to exclude heirship in property altogether.[58] Nor must we\ninfer the general prevalence of a stage where there were no definite\nrules of inheritance[59] from the fact that among some North American\ntribes, when a man dies leaving young children who are unable to defend\nthemselves, grown-up relatives or other persons come in and seize\nwhatever they please.[60] The ordinary custom of savages is that the dead\nman's property is inherited either by his own children, if kinship is\nreckoned through the father, or by his sister's children or other\nrelatives on the mother's side, if kinship is reckoned through females\nonly.[61] Sometimes the rules of inheritance make little or no\ndistinction between men and women;[62] sometimes a decided preference\nis given to the {45} men[;63] sometimes the women inherit nothing;[64]\nwhereas in a few exceptional cases the women are the only inheritors.[65]\nAmong various savages the widow also has a share in the inheritance, or\nat any rate has the usufruct of property left by her deceased husband.[66]\nVery frequently the eldest son,[67] or, where the maternal system of\ndescent prevails in {46} full, the eldest uterine brother[68] or the\neldest son of the eldest uterine sister,[69] is the chief or even the\nonly heir. But there are also several instances in which this privilege\nis granted to the youngest son.[70] Thus, among the Hos of India he\napparently inherits all the property of his father;[71] among the Limbus\nof Nepal, though an extra share is set apart for the eldest son, the\nyoungest one is allowed to choose his share first;[72] among the Eskimo\nof Behring Strait, \"if there are several sons the eldest gets the least,\nthe most valuable things being given to the youngest.\"[73]\nIn Greenland a foster-son inherits all the property of his\nfoster-father, if the latter dies without offspring or if his\nsons are still young children;[74] and of the West African Fulah\nwe are told that, though they have sons and daughters, the\nadopted child becomes heir to all that they leave behind.[75]\nAmong the Kukis, in default of legitimate issue, a natural son\nsucceeds to his father's property before all other male\nrelations;[76] among the B\u00f3do and Dhim\u00e1ls sons by concubinage or\nadoption get equal shares with sons born in wedlock;[77] the\nWanyamwezi of Eastern Africa have the habit of leaving property\nto their illegitimate children by slave girls or concubines even\nto the exclusion of their issue by wives.[78] Among other\nuncivilised peoples, {47} again, slaves cannot inherit at\nall,[79] and where they are allowed to possess property the\nmaster is sometimes the legitimate heir of his slave.[80]\n\n[Footnote 56: Ellis, _Polynesian Researches_, iii. 115 _sq._\n(Tahitians). Wilkin, in _Reports of the Cambridge Expedition to\nTorres Straits_, v. 286 (natives of Mabuiag). Kingsley, _West\nAfrican Studies_, p. 373. Lang, in Steinmetz, _Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_,\np. 238 (Washambala). Desoignies, _ibid._ p. 277 (Msalala).\nRautanen, _ibid._ p. 336 (Ondonga). Dale, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._\nxxv. 224. Post, _Grundriss der ethnol. Jurisprudenz_, ii. 199.]\n\n[Footnote 57: See _infra_, on Regard for the Dead.]\n\n[Footnote 58: Dargun, in _Zeitschr. f. vergl. Rechtswiss._ v. 99\n_sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 59: _Ibid._ p. 102 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 60: Prescott, in Schoolcraft, _Indian Tribes of the\nUnited States_, ii. 194 _sq._ (Dacotahs). Hale, _U.S. Exploring\nExpedition. Vol. VI. Ethnography and Philology_, p. 208 (Salish).\nDalager, _op. cit._ p. 30 _sq._; Cranz, _op. cit._ i. 176\n(Greenlanders).]\n\n[Footnote 61: See Westermarck, _op. cit._ p. 97 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 62: Kloss, _op. cit._ p. 241 (Nicobarese). Wilkin, in\n_Rep. Cambridge Anthr. Exped._ v. 285 _sq._ (natives of Mabuiag).\nWilkes, _U.S. Exploring Expedition_, v. 85 (Kingsmill Islanders).\nSenfft, in Steinmetz, _Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_, p. 441 (Marshall\nIslanders). Dawson, _op. cit._ p. 7 (certain tribes of Western\nVictoria). Post, _Afrikanische Jurisprudenz_, ii. 14. _Idem_,\n_Entwicklungsgeschichte des Familienrechts_, p. 299. _Idem_,\n_Grundriss der ethnol. Jurisprudenz_, i. 225.]\n\n[Footnote 63: Sarbah, _Fanti Customary Laws_, p. 87. Post,\n_Afrikanische Jurisprudenz_, ii. 13 _sq._ _Idem_, _Entwicklungsgeschichte\ndes Familienrechts_, p. 298 _sq._ _Idem_, _Grundriss der ethnol.\nJurisprudenz_, i. 222 _sqq._ Among several uncivilised peoples\nlanded property descends exclusively (Macpherson, _Memorials of\nService in India_, p. 62 [Kandhs]; Sumner, in _Jour. Anthr.\nInst._ xxxi. 79 [Jakuts]; Curr, _The Australian Race_, i. 64;\nJohnston, _Uganda Protectorate_, ii. 694; Post, _Entwicklungsgeschichte\ndes Familienrechts_, p. 298 _sq._; _Idem_, _Grundriss der ethnol.\nJurisprudenz_, i. 224) or by preference (Thomson, _Story of New\nZealand_, i. 96; Post, _Grundriss der ethnol. Jurisprudenz_, i.\n224 sq.) to men.]\n\n[Footnote 64: Castr\u00e9n, _Nordiska resor och forskningar_, i. 312\n(Ostyaks). Marshall, _A Phrenologist amongst the Todas_, p. 206.\nHodgson, _Miscellaneous Essays_, i. 122 (B\u00f3do and Dhim\u00e1ls).\nHislop, _Papers relating to the Aboriginal Tribes of the Central\nProvinces_, p. 12, n. [dagger] (Gonds). Soppitt, _Account of the\nKuki-Lushai Tribes_, p. 16; Stewart, 'Notes on Northern Cachar,'\nin _Jour. Asiatic Soc. Bengal_, xxiv. 640 (Kukis). Risley,\n_Census of India_, 1901, vol. i. Ethnographic Appendices, pp. 146\n(Santals), 156 (Mundas), 209 (most of the Angami Nagas). Fryer,\n_Khyeng People of the Sandoway District_, p. 6. Marsden, _op.\ncit._ p. 244 (Rejangs). Eyre, _Expeditions of Discovery into\nCentral Australia_, ii. 297. Munzinger, _Die Sitten und das Recht\nder Bogos_, p. 73. Hinde, _Last of the Masai_, p. 105; Johnston,\n_Uganda Protectorate_, ii. 828 (Masai). Dale, in _Jour. Anthr.\nInst._ xxv. 224 (Wabondei). Kingsley, _Travels in West Africa_,\np. 485 (some West African tribes). Nassau, _Fetichism in West\nAfrica_, p. 13 (natives of the Cameroons). Leuschner, in\nSteinmetz, _Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_, p. 20 (Bakwiri). Mademba,\n_ibid._ p. 81 (pagan Bambara). Lang, _ibid._ p. 238 (Washambala).\nKraft, _ibid._ p. 289 (Wapokomo). Rautanen, _ibid._ p. 335\n(Ondonga). Decle, _op. cit._ p. 486 (Wakamba). Campbell, _Travels\nin South Africa_, p. 520 (Kafirs). Post, _Afrikanische\nJurisprudenz_, ii. 5. _Idem_, _Entwicklungsgeschichte des\nFamilienrechts_, p. 296 _sqq._ _Idem_, _Grundriss der ethnol.\nJurisprudenz_, i. 218 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 65: Hamy, in _Bull. Soc. d'Anthr. Paris_, ser. ii. vol.\nxii. (1877), 535 (Penong Pi\u00e2k of Cambodia). Buchanan, quoted by\nHodgson, _Miscellaneous Essays_, i. 110 (K\u00f3cch). Post, _Grundriss\nder ethnol. Jurisprudenz_, i. 213.]\n\n[Footnote 66: Nelson, 'Eskimo about Bering Strait,' in _Ann. Rep.\nBur. Ethn._ xviii. 307. Dawson, _Australian Aborigines_, p. 7\n(certain tribes of Western Victoria). Hunt, 'Ethnogr. Notes on\nthe Murray Islands, Torres Straits,' in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._\nxxviii. 7. Grange, 'Journal of an Expedition into the Naga\nHills,' in _Jour. Asiatic Soc. Bengal_, ix. pt. ii. 964. Mason,\n_ibid._ xxxvii. pt. ii. 142 (Karens). Post, _Entwicklungsgeschichte\ndes Familienrechts_, p. 303 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 67: Dalager, _op. cit._ pp. 29, 31; Cranz, _op. cit._\ni. 176 (Greenlanders). Risley, _op. cit._ p. 203 (Limbus of\nNepal). Macpherson, _op. cit._ p. 62 (Kandhs). Soppitt, _op.\ncit._ p. 16 (Kukis). Fryer, _op. cit._ p. 6 (Khyens). Junghuhn,\n_op. cit._ ii. 147 (Bataks). Gill, _Life in the Southern Isles_,\np. 46. Polack, _op. cit._ ii. 69; Colenso, _op. cit._ p. 33\n(Maoris). Munzinger, _Die Sitten und das Recht der Bogos_, pp.\n69, 73 _sq._ Paulitschke, _op. cit._ p. 192 (Gallas). Hollis,\n_Masai_, p. 309; Hinde, _op. cit._ pp. 51, 105 (Masai). Volkens,\n_Der Kilimandscharo_, p. 253 (Wadshagga). Kingsley, _Travels in\nWest Africa_, p. 485 (some West African tribes). Bosman, _op.\ncit._ pp. 173 (natives of the Gold Coast), 322 (natives of the\nSlave Coast). Leuschner, in Steinmetz, _Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_, p.\n20 (Bakwiri). Mademba, _ibid._ p. 81 (pagan Bambara). Desoignies,\n_ibid._ p. 276 (Msalala). Marx, _ibid._ p. 355 (Amahlubi),\nChanler, _Through Jungle and Desert_, p. 316 (Rendile), Post,\n_Afrikanische Jurisprudenz_, ii. 12 _sqq._ _Idem_, _Grundriss der\nethnol. Jurisprudenz_, i. 217, 218, 220 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 68: Proyart, 'History of Loango,' in Pinkerton,\n_Collection of Voyages and Travels_, xvi. 571.]\n\n[Footnote 69: Kingsley, _West African Studies_, p. 373 _sq._\n(some West African tribes). Sorge, in Steinmetz, _Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_,\np. 413 (Nissan Islanders).]\n\n[Footnote 70: Risley, _op. cit._ p. 227 (Lusheis). Avebury,\n_Origin of Civilisation_, p. 493 _sqq._ Post, _Grundriss, der\nethnol. Jurisprudenz_, i. 218, 221 _sq._ Liebrecht, _Zur\nVolkskunde_, p. 432.]\n\n[Footnote 71: Tickell, 'Memoir on the Hod\u00e9sum,' in _Jour. Asiatic\nSoc. Bengal_, ix. pt. ii. 794, n.*]\n\n[Footnote 72: Risley, _op. cit._ p. 203. _Cf._ Mason, in _Jour.\nAsiatic Soc. Bengal_, xxxvii. pt. ii. 142 (Karens).]\n\n[Footnote 73: Nelson, in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ xviii. 307.]\n\n[Footnote 74: Dalager, _op. cit._ p. 33.]\n\n[Footnote 75: Denham and Clapperton, quoted in Spencer's\n_Descriptive Sociology_, African Races, p. 8.]\n\n[Footnote 76: Stewart, in _Jour. Asiatic Soc. Bengal_, xxiv. 640.]\n\n[Footnote 77: Hodgson, _Miscellaneous Essays_, i. 122.]\n\n[Footnote 78: Burton, _Lake Regions of Central Africa_, ii. 23\n_sq._ _Cf._ Post, _Afrikanische Jurisprudenz_, ii. 6.]\n\n[Footnote 79: Nicole, in Steinmetz, _Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_, pp.\n115, 119 (Diakit\u00e9-Sarracolese). Lang, _ibid._ pp. 238, 242\n(Washambala). Kraft, _ibid._ pp. 289, 291 (Wapokomo). Rautanen,\n_ibid._ p. 335 (Ondonga). Post, _Grundriss der ethnol.\nJurisprudenz_, i. 383.]\n\n[Footnote 80: Munzinger, _Die Sitten und das Recht der Bogos_,\np. 73. Steinmetz, _Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_, p. 43 (Banaka and Bapuku).\nMademba, _ibid._ p. 83 (natives of the Sansanding States). Post,\n_Grundriss der ethnol. Jurisprudenz_, i. 383.]\n\nAt higher stages of civilisation the rules of inheritance present\nthe same characteristics as among many savages. During historic\ntimes, at least, the nations of culture have reckoned kinship\nthrough the father, and succession has been agnatic.[81] In China\nwomen only inherit in the very last resort, failing all male\nrelatives.[82] Among the Hebrews, in ancient times, only sons,\nnot daughters, still less wives, could inherit;[83] but the later\nlaw conferred on daughters the right of heirship in the absence\nof sons.[84] The Muhammedan law of inheritance in most cases\nawards to a female a share equal to half that of a male of the\nsame degree of relationship to the deceased;[85] but according to\nthe old law of Medina women could not inherit at all.[86] Of all\nthe ancient nations with whose rules of inheritance we are\nacquainted, the Romans seem to have been the only one who gave\ndaughters the same right of inheritance as sons.[87] In India\nwomen had originally no such right at all, but in this, as in\nother matters relating to property, their position subsequently\nimproved.[88] In Attic law sons excluded {48} daughters from\nsuccession,[89] and the same was the case among the Scandinavian\npeoples still in the later Middle Ages.[90] In England women are\neven to this day postponed to men in the order of succession to\nreal property.[91] Special privileges in the division of the\nfather's property were granted to the eldest son by the Hebrews[92]\nand Hindus,[93] and traces of primogeniture are met with in ancient\nGreek legislation.[94] In the history of English law we find not\nonly primogeniture, but ultimogeniture as well.[95] As regards the\nquestion of legitimacy, we notice that in China all sons born in the\nhousehold have an equal share in the inheritance, whether born of\nthe principal wife or a concubine or a domestic slave.[96] Among\nthe Hebrews the sons of concubines had a right of inheritance,[97]\nbut whether on an equality with the other sons we do not\nknow.[98] According to Muhammedan law no distinction in point of\ninheritance is made between the child of a wife and that borne by\na slave to her master, if the master acknowledge the child to be\nhis own.[99] In Hindu legislation the legitimate {49} sons have\nthe nearest right to the inheritance of their father, but a son\nbegotten by a S\u00fbdra on a female slave may, if permitted by his\nfather, take a share of it.[100] The Roman law on the subject may\nbe summed up thus:--With regard to its father a natural child has\nno right at all, and differs in no respect from a stranger; with\nregard to its mother it has the same right as a legitimate\nchild.[101] In Teutonic countries the position of illegitimate\nchildren as to succession was much more favourable in earlier\ntimes than later on when Christianity made its influence felt,\ndepriving them of all title to inheritance.[102] Strangers were\nformerly unable both to inherit and to transmit property. For a\nlong time it was the custom in Europe to confiscate their effects\non their death; and not only persons who were born in a foreign\ncountry were subject to this _droit d'aubaine_, as it was called\nin France, but in some countries it was applied even to persons\nwho removed from one diocese to another, or from the lands of one\nbaron to another.[103] Indeed, it is only in recent times that\nforeigners have been placed on a footing of equality with\ncitizens with regard to inheritance. In 1790 the French National\nAssembly abolished the right of _aubaine_ as being contrary to\nthe principle of a human brotherhood.[104] Later on, when the\nCode Napol\u00e9on was drawn up, a backward step was taken by\nrestricting the abolition of this right to nations who acted with\nreciprocity; but this limitation only lasted till 1819, when all\ninequalities were finally removed in France.[105] In England it\nwas not until 1870 that foreigners were authorised to inherit and\nbequeath like British subjects.[106]\n\n[Footnote 81: See Westermarck, _op. cit._ p. 104.]\n\n[Footnote 82: Alabaster, 'Law of Inheritance,' in _China Review_,\nv. 193. 'Inheritance and \"Patria Potestas\" in China,' _ibid._\nv. 406.]\n\n[Footnote 83: _Genesis_, xxxi. 14 _sq._ _Numbers_, xxvii. 4.\nGans, _Das Erbrecht in weltgeschichtlicher Entwickelung_, i. 147.\nBenzinger, 'Law and Justice,' in Cheyne and Black, _Encyclop\u00e6dia\nBiblica_, iii. 2728.]\n\n[Footnote 84: _Numbers_, xxvii. 8. Gans, _op. cit._ i. 147.\nBenzinger, _loc. cit._ p. 2729. It is only by exceptional favour\nthat the daughters inherit along with the sons (_Job_, xlii. 15).]\n\n[Footnote 85: _Koran_, iv. 12, 175. Lane, _Manners and Customs of\nthe Modern Egyptians_, p. 116 _sq._ Kohler, _Rechtsvergleichende\nStudien_, p. 102 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 86: Robertson Smith, _Kinship and Marriage in Early\nArabia_, pp. 65, 117.]\n\n[Footnote 87: Gans, _op. cit._ ii. 367 _sq._ Gide, _\u00c9tude sur la\ncondition priv\u00e9e de la femme_, p. 102.]\n\n[Footnote 88: Jolly, _loc. cit._ pp. 83, 86. Kohler, 'Indisches\nEhe- und Familienrecht,' in _Zeitschr. f. vergl. Rechtswiss._\niii. 424 _sqq._ Leist, _Alt-arisches Jus Civile_, ii.\n48.]\n\n[Footnote 89: Gans, _op. cit._ i. 338, 341. Gide, _op. cit._ p. 79.]\n\n[Footnote 90: Nordstr\u00f6m, _Bidrag till den svenska\nsamh\u00e4lls-f\u00f6rfattningens historia_, ii. 95, 190. Stemann, _Den danske\nRetshistorie indtil Christian V.'s Lov_, p. 311 _sq._ Keyser,\n_Efterladte Skrifter_, ii. pt. i. 330, 339.]\n\n[Footnote 91: Renton, _Encyclop\u00e6dia of the Laws of England_, xi. 75.]\n\n[Footnote 92: _Deuteronomy_, xxi. 17. Gans, _op. cit._ i. 148.\nBenzinger, in Cheyne and Black, _Encyclop\u00e6dia Biblica_, iii.\n2729. Mr. Jacobs suggests (_Studies in Biblical Arch\u00e6ology_, p.\n49 _sqq._) that ultimogeniture was once the rule in early Hebrew\nsociety, and was succeeded by primogeniture only when the\nIsraelites exchanged their roving life for one in which sons\nbecame more stay-at-home.]\n\n[Footnote 93: _\u00c2pastamba_, ii. 6. 14. 6, 12. _Laws of Manu_, ix.\n114. Jolly, _loc. cit._ pp. 77, 82. Maine, _Dissertations on\nEarly Law and Custom_, p. 89 _sq._ In China, though sons inherit\nin equal shares, \"it is not uncommon for the brothers to\ntemporarily yield up their share to the elder brother, either in\nwhole or in part, for the glory of the House\" ('Inheritance and\n\"Patria Potestas\" in China,' in _China Review_, v. 406; _cf._\nDoolittle, _Social Life of the Chinese_, ii. 224; Davis, _China_,\ni. 343).]\n\n[Footnote 94: Fustel de Coulanges, _op. cit._ p. 99.]\n\n[Footnote 95: Elton, _Origins of English History_, p. 178 _sqq._\nPollock and Maitland, _History of English Law till the Time of\nEdward I._ ii. 263 _sqq._ The custom of ultimogeniture has also\nbeen traced in Wales, parts of France, Germany, Friesland,\nScandinavia, Russia, and Hungary (Elton, _op. cit._ p. 180\n_sqq._; Liebrecht, _op. cit._ p. 431 _sq._).]\n\n[Footnote 96: Parker, 'Comparative Chinese Family Law,' in _China\nReview_, viii. 79. 'Inheritance and \"Patria Potestas\" in China,'\n_ibid._ v. 406. Medhurst, 'Marriage, Affinity, and Inheritance in\nChina,' in _Trans. Roy. Asiatic Soc. China Branch_, iv. 31.\nSimcox, _Primitive Civilizations_, ii. 351.]\n\n[Footnote 97: _Genesis_, xxi. 10 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 98: Benzinger, in Cheyne and Black, _Encyclop\u00e6dia\nBiblica_, iii. 2729.]\n\n[Footnote 99: Lane, _Modern Egyptians_, p. 118.]\n\n[Footnote 100: Jolly, _loc. cit._ p. 85. _Laws of Manu_, ix. 179.]\n\n[Footnote 101: Gide, _op. cit._ p. 567 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 102: Nordstr\u00f6m, _op. cit._ ii. 67, 200 _sqq._ See also\nAlard, _Condition et droits des enfants naturels_, pp. 9, 11;\n_supra_, i. 47.]\n\n[Footnote 103: Brussel, _Nouvel examen de l'usage g\u00e9n\u00e9ral des\nfiefs en France_, ii. 944 _sqq._ de Lauri\u00e8re, _Glossaire du droit\nfran\u00e7ois_, p. 47 _sq._ Demangeat, _Histoire de la condition\ncivile des \u00e9trangers en France_, p. 107 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 104: Demangeat, _op. cit._ p. 239.]\n\n[Footnote 105: _Ibid._ p. 250 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 106: _Naturalisation Act_, 1870, \u00a7 2.]\n\nBesides acquisition by occupation, possession for a certain\nlength of time, labour, voluntary transfer, and inheritance,\nthere are instances in which ownership in a {50} thing directly\nfollows from ownership in another thing. It is a general rule\nthat the owner of an object also owns what develops from or is\nproduced by it.[107] The owner of a cow owns her calf, the owner\nof a tree its fruits, the owner of a piece of land anything\ngrowing on it, at least if no labour has been necessary for its\nproduction. Ownership in land also gives a certain right to the\nwild animals which are found there. Among the Fantis, for\ninstance, if anybody kills game on another person's land, its\nproprietor is entitled to the shoulder or a quarter of such\ngame.[108] In this connection we have further to notice the mode\nof acquisition which the Roman jurists called _accessio_. When\nthat which belongs to one person is so intermixed with the\nproperty of another, that either it cannot be separated at all,\nor cannot be separated without inflicting damage out of\nproportion to the gain, the owner of the principal becomes the\nowner of the accessory, though, as a rule, he would have to pay\ncompensation for it.[109]\n\n[Footnote 107: See Post, _Grundriss der ethnol. Jurisprudenz_,\nii. 612; Goos, _Forel\u00e6sninger over den almindelige Retsl\u00e6re_,\nii. 159 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 108: Sarbah, _op. cit._ p. 48.]\n\n[Footnote 109: Hunter, _Roman Law_, p. 247 _sq._]\n\nAll these methods of acquisition apply not only to individual\nproperty, but to common property as well. Occupation may\nestablish ownership whether there be many occupants or only one;\njoint labour may lead to joint ownership in the produce; property\nmay be transferred to a body of persons as well as to a single\nindividual. But the custom which prescribes community of goods\nmay also itself be an independent method of acquisition: by\nbelonging to an association of people who hold property in common\na person may be part owner of a thing which has been occupied or\nproduced by some other member of the association. Communism of\none kind or another is undoubtedly a very ancient institution,[110]\nthough its prevalence at the lower stages of civilisation has\noften been exaggerated.[111] But the whole question of {51}\ncommon ownership is too complicated and lies too much apart from\nour special subject to admit of a detailed treatment.\n\n[Footnote 110: _Cf._ Kovalewsky, _Tableau des origines et de\nl'\u00e9volution de la famille et de la propri\u00e9t\u00e9_, p. 51 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 111: Dr. Dargun (in _Zeitschr. f. vergl. Rechtswiss._\nv. 76, &c.) even goes so far as to say that savages know of no\nother property but such as belongs to individuals; but this\nstatement is hardly justified by facts.]\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nFrom the statement of facts we shall now proceed to an\nexplanation of these facts. First, why do men recognise\nproprietary rights at all? Why do the moral feelings of mankind\ngrant to certain persons a right to the exclusive disposal of\ncertain things, in other words, why does the disposal of an\nobject without the consent of the person called its owner give\nrise to moral disapproval? The \"right of property,\" it is true,\nis generally used as a term for a legal right. But in this, as in\nso many other cases, the legal right is essentially a formulated\nexpression of moral feelings.\n\nAs Mr. Spencer observes, the desire to appropriate, and to keep\nthat which has been appropriated, lies deep not only in human but\nin animal nature, being, indeed, a condition of survival.[112]\nSticklebacks show obvious signs of anger when their territory is\ninvaded by other sticklebacks.[113] Birds defend their nests\nagainst the attacks of intruders.[114] The dog fights for his\nkennel or for the prey he has caught. A monkey in the Zoological\nGardens of London, which made use of a stone to open nuts, always\nhid it in the straw after using it, and would not allow any other\nmonkey to touch it.[115] We find the same propensity in man from\nhis earliest years. At the age of two, Tiedemann's son did not\nlet his sister sit on his chair or take any of his clothes,\nthough he had no scruples against appropriating things which\nbelonged to her.[116] Owing to this tendency to keep an\nappropriated object, and to resist its abstraction, it is\ndangerous for an individual to try to seize anything held by\nanother of about equal strength; {52} and in human societies this\nnaturally led to the habit of leaving each in possession of\nwhatever he had attained, especially in early times when the\nobjects possessed were of little value, and there was no great\ninequality of wealth.[117] This habit was further strengthened by\nvarious circumstances, all of which tended to make interference\nwith other persons' possessions the subject of moral censure.\nFrom both prudential and altruistic motives parents taught their\nchildren to abstain from such interference, and this, by itself,\nwould readily give rise to the notion of theft as a moral wrong.\nSociety at large also tried to prevent acts of this kind, partly\nin order to preserve peace and order, partly out of sympathy with\nthe possessor. Resentment is felt not only by him who is deprived\nof his possession, but by others on his behalf. This is seen even\namong some of the lower animals. The Pomeranian dogs of German\ncarters watch the goods of their masters;[118] Mr. Romanes's\nterrier protected meat from other terriers, his offspring, which\nlived in the same house with him, and with which he was on the\nvery best of terms;[119] Captain Gordon Stables's cat, which had\nher place on the table at meals, never allowed any unauthorised\ninterference with the viands.[120] In men such sympathetic\nresentment naturally develops into genuine moral disapproval.\n\n[Footnote 112: Spencer, _Principles of Sociology_, ii. 644.]\n\n[Footnote 113: _Supra_, i. 22.]\n\n[Footnote 114: Perty, _Das Seelenleben der Thiere_, p. 68.]\n\n[Footnote 115: Darwin, _Descent of Man_, i. 125. See also\nFischer, 'Notes sur l'intelligence des singes,' in _Revue\nscientifique_, xxxiii. 618.]\n\n[Footnote 116: Compayr\u00e9, _L'\u00e9volution intellectuelle et morale de\nl'enfant_, p. 312.]\n\n[Footnote 117: _Cf._ Spencer, _Principles of Sociology_, ii. 634,\n644; Dargun, in _Zeitschr. f. vergl. Rechtswiss._ v. 79 _sq._;\nvon Martius, _Beitr\u00e4ge zur Ethnographie Amerika's_, i. 88, 90.]\n\n[Footnote 118: Peschel, _Races of Man_, p. 240.]\n\n[Footnote 119: Romanes, 'Conscience in Animals,' in _Quarterly\nJournal of Science_, xiii. 156, n.*]\n\n[Footnote 120: 'Studies in Animal Life,' in _Chambers's Journal_,\n1884, p. 824.]\n\nAll this applies not only to proprietary rights based on\noccupation, but also to the principle of continued possession as\na ground of ownership. Indeed, the longer a person is in\npossession of a certain object, the more apt are both he and\nother individuals to resent its alienation; whereas the loss or\nabandonment of a thing has a tendency to loosen the connection\nbetween the thing and its owner.[121] This is undoubtedly the\nchief source of the rule of prescription, {53} though there may be\nother circumstances as well which help to justify it. Thus it has\nbeen said that it is necessary to the security of rightful\npossessors that they should not be molested by charges of\nwrongful acquisition when by the lapse of time witnesses must\nhave perished or been lost sight of, and the real character of\nthe transaction can no longer be cleared up;[122] whilst another\nargument adduced in favour of prescription is, that long\npossession generally implies labour and that labour gives\nownership.[123] The reason why property is gained by labour is\nobvious enough. Not only do exertions in producing an object make\nthe producer desirous to keep it and to have the exclusive\ndisposal of it, but an encroachment upon the fruit of his labour\narouses sympathetic resentment in outsiders, who feel that an\neffort deserves its reward.\n\n[Footnote 121: _Cf._ Hume, _Treatise of Human Nature_, ii. 3\n(_Philosophical Works_, ii. 274):--\"What has long lain under our\neye, and has often been employed to our advantage, _that_ we are\nalways the most unwilling to part with.\"]\n\n[Footnote 122: Mill, _Principles of Political Economy_, i. 272.]\n\n[Footnote 123: Thiers, _op. cit._ p. 103 _sqq._]\n\nAs the recognition of ownership thus ultimately springs from a\ndesire in the owner to keep and dispose of what he has\nappropriated or produced, it is evident that, in ordinary\ncircumstances, there would be no moral disapproval of a voluntary\ntransfer of property to another person. But the case is different\nif such a transfer is injurious to the interests of persons who\nhave a special claim to consideration. Thus testation is\nfrequently held to be inconsistent with the duties which parents\nowe to their children or other near relatives to one another. The\nfather, though the lord of the family's possessions, may indeed\nbe regarded only as the first magistrate of an association, and\nin such a case his share in the division naturally devolves on\nthe member of the family who succeeds to his authority.[124] The\nright of inheritance, then, may be intimately connected with the\nidea that the heir was, in a manner, joint owner of the deceased\nperson's property already during his lifetime.[125] But there are\n{54} various other facts which account for the existence of this\nright. In early civilisation the rule of succession is part of a\ncomprehensive system of rights and duties which unite persons of\nthe same kin. Professor Robertson Smith observes that in ancient\nArabia all persons on whom the duty of blood-revenge lay\noriginally had the right of inheritance;[126] and a similar\nconnection between inheritance and blood-revenge is found among\nother peoples. This system of mutual rights and duties is\ngenerally one-sided, it has reference either to paternal or to\nmaternal relatives, but not to both at once. Now, whatever be the\nreason why the one or the other method of reckoning kinship\nprevails among a certain people, it is in the present place\nsufficient to point out the influence which the idea of a common\ndescent exercises upon the right of inheritance owing to its\npower of knitting together the persons to whom it refers.\nBesides, the duty connected with this right may also be of such a\nnature as to require a certain amount of wealth for its\nperformance; among the Hindus, Greeks, and Romans, the right to\ninherit a dead man's property was exactly co-extensive with the\nduty of performing his obsequies and offering sacrifices to his\nspirit.[127] A further cause of children inheriting their\nfather's property may be that they, to some extent, have\npreviously been in joint possession of it; for, as we know,\npossession readily leads to ownership. They would have an\nadditional claim to succeed to his property when it had been\ngathered by their labour, as well as his, or when they stood in\nneed of the support which it had been the father's duty to give\nthem had he been alive. Moreover, where a person's children are\npresent on the spot at his death, they are apt to be the first\noccupants of his {55} property;[128] and we have noticed the\nimportance of first occupancy as a means of establishing\nproprietary rights. The influence of these latter considerations,\nwhich are independent of the method of tracing descent, is\napparent from the fact that among several peoples inheritance\nruns in the male line even though children take the mother's name\nand are considered to belong to her clan.[129] It may be added\nthat a reason which modern writers often have assigned for giving\nthe property of a person who dies intestate to his children or\nother near relatives is the supposition that in so disposing of\nit the law is only likely to do what the proprietor himself would\nhave done, if he had done anything.[130]\n\n[Footnote 124: Plato, _Leges_, xi. 923. Maine, _Ancient Law_, p.\n184. Fustel de Coulanges, _op. cit._ p. 85. Leist, _Alt-arisches\nJus Civile_, ii. 48. Mill, _op. cit._ i. 274. Kovalewsky,\n_Coutume contemporaine et loi ancienne_, p. 198 (Ossetes).]\n\n[Footnote 125: It is interesting to note that in the Chinese\npenal code stealing from a relative is punished less severely\nthan other cases of theft, and that the mitigation of the\npunishment is proportionate to the nearness of the relationship\n(_Ta Tsing Leu Lee_, sec. cclxxii. p. 287). The reason for this\nis that, \"according to the Chinese patriarchal system, a theft is\nnot in this case a violation of an exclusive right, but only of\nthe qualified interest which each individual has in his share of\nthe family property\" (Staunton, _ibid._ p. 287, n.*).]\n\n[Footnote 126: Robertson Smith, _Kinship and Marriage in Early\nArabia_, pp. 55, 56, 66 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 127: _Laws of Manu_, ix. 186 _sq._ Isaeus, _Oratio de\nPhiloctemonis hereditate_, 51. Cicero, _De legibus_, ii. 19 _sq._\nFustel de Coulanges, _op. cit._ p. 84. Maine, _Ancient Law_, p.\n191 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 128: _Cf._ Mill, _op. cit._ i. 274.]\n\n[Footnote 129: Westermarck, _History of Human Marriage_,\npp. 104, 111.]\n\n[Footnote 130: Hume, _Treatise of Human Nature_, ii. 3\n(_Philosophical Works_, ii. 280). Godwin, _Enquiry concerning\nPolitical Justice_, ii. 438. Mill, _op. cit._ i. 275.]\n\nIn details the rules of succession are influenced by a variety of\ncircumstances. Women may be excluded from inheritance or receive\na smaller share than the men because the latter, being the\nstronger party, appropriate everything or the larger portion of\nthe property for themselves;[131] or because the women are less\nin need of property, being supported by their male relatives or\nhusbands;[132] or because they are exempt from the heaviest\nduties connected with kinship, as the duty of blood-revenge;[133]\nor, as was the case in the feudal system, because a female tenant\nis naturally unable to attend the lord in his wars;[134] or for\nthe purpose of preventing the estate from passing to another\nfamily or tribe.[135] The idea of keeping together the property\nof the house also largely is at the bottom of the rule of\nprimogeniture. {56} Besides, the eldest son is the most respected\namong the children, sometimes he is regarded quite as a sacred\nbeing.[136] On the death of the head of the family he is\ngenerally better suited than anybody else to take his place; and\nhis privileged position with regard to inheritance is justified\nby the duties connected with it, especially the duty of looking\nafter and supporting the other members of the household.[137] In\nfeudalism, where tenancy implied duties as well as rights, it was\nalso, from the lord's point of view, the simplest arrangement\nthat when a tenant died a single person should fill the vacant\nplace.[138] But there are many other points of view which may\ndetermine the rules of succession. It may be thought just that\neach child should have an equal share in the inheritance, and\nthat something should be given also to the widow, whose\nmaintenance devolved on the husband and who, whilst he was alive,\nhad been in joint possession of many of his belongings. Or the\nyoungest son may be the chief or the exclusive heir, partly\nperhaps for the sake of preventing a division of the property, or\nbecause the lord would have but one tenant,[139] but partly also\nbecause he had remained with his father till his death,[140] or\n\"on the plea of his being less able to help himself on the death\nof the parents than his elder brethren, who have had their\nfather's assistance in settling themselves in the world during\nhis lifetime.\"[141] The Wanyamwezi, again, justify the practice\nof leaving property {57} to their illegitimate children by slave\ngirls or concubines, to the exclusion of their legitimate\noffspring, \"by the fact of the former requiring their assistance\nmore than the latter, who have friends and relatives to aid\nthem.\"[142] Generally there seems to be a close connection\nbetween illegitimate children's right to inheritance and the\nlegal recognition of polygamous practices. This is indicated by a\ncomparison between Oriental and Roman legislation on the subject,\nand, in Teutonic countries, between ancient custom and the later\nlaw, which was influenced by Christianity's horror of sexual acts\nfalling outside the monogamous marriage relation. The privileges\nwhich Hindu law grants to the illegitimate children of S\u00fbdras are\ndue to the notion that the marriage of a member of this caste is\nitself considered to be of so low a nature as to be on a par with\nirregular connections.[143]\n\n[Footnote 131: _Cf._ Campbell, _Travels in South Africa_, p. 520\n(Kafirs).]\n\n[Footnote 132: _Cf._ Cranz, _op. cit._ i. 176 (Greenlanders);\nMacpherson, _Memorials of Service in India_, p. 62 (Kandhs);\nHinde, _op. cit._ p. 51 (Masai); 'Inheritance and \"Patria\nPotestas\" in China,' in _China Review_, v. 406; Jolly, _loc.\ncit._ p. 83 (ancient Hindus); Post, _Entwicklungsgeschichte des\nFamilienrechts_, p. 296 _sq._; _Idem_, _Grundriss der ethnol.\nJurisprudenz_, i. 218 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 133: _Cf._ Robertson Smith, _Kinship and Marriage in\nEarly Arabia_, p. 65 _sq._; Stemann, _Den danske Retshistorie\nindtil Christian V.'s Lov_, p. 311 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 134: _Cf._ Cleveland, _Woman under the English Law_,\np. 83.]\n\n[Footnote 135: Shortland, _Traditions and Superstitions of the\nNew Zealanders_, p. 256. Kingsley, _Travels in West Africa_, p.\n485. Post, _Grundriss der ethnol. Jurisprudenz_, i. 214. _Cf._\n_Numbers_, xxxvi. 1 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 136: _Supra_, i. 605, 606, 614. Gill, _Life in the\nSouthern Isles_, p. 46 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 137: Dalager, _op. cit._ pp. 29, 31; Cranz, _op. cit._\ni. 176 (Greenlanders). Munzinger, _Die Sitten und das Recht der\nBogos_, p. 74. Hinde, _op. cit._ p. 51 (Masai). Of the B[=a]gdis\nof Bengal Mr. Risley expressly says (_op. cit._ p. 183) that the\nextra share which is given to the eldest son \"seems to be\nintended to enable him to support the female members of the\nfamily, who remain under his care.\"]\n\n[Footnote 138: Pollock and Maitland, _op. cit._ ii. 274.]\n\n[Footnote 139: _Ibid._ ii. 280.]\n\n[Footnote 140: Risley, _op. cit._ p. 227 (Lusheis). Among the\nAngami Nagas the youngest son nearly always inherits his father's\nhouse, because sons, when marrying, leave the paternal mansion\nand build houses of their own (_ibid._ p. 209). It has been\nsuggested that the custom of ultimogeniture \"would naturally\narise during the latter stages of the pastoral period, when the\nelder sons would in the ordinary course of events have 'set up\nfor themselves' by the time of the father's death\" (Jacobs,\n_Studies in Biblical Arch\u00e6ology_, p. 47; Gomme, quoted _ibid._ p.\n47, n. 1; Blackstone, _Commentaries on the Laws of England_,\nii. 70 _sq._).]\n\n[Footnote 141: Tickell, in _Jour. Asiatic Soc. Bengal_, ix. pt.\nii. 794, n.*]\n\n[Footnote 142: Burton, _Lake Regions of Central Africa_,\nii. 23 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 143: Jolly, _loc. cit._ p. 85.]\n\nOf the incapacity of children, wives, and slaves to acquire\nproperty for themselves little needs to be said, in the present\nconnection, by way of explanation. Their exclusion from the right\nof independent ownership is an incident of their subjection to\ntheir parents, husbands, or masters. But we must remember that,\nwhilst the latter have a right to dispose of the earnings of\ntheir subordinates, they also have the duty of supporting them,\nand that in early civilisation the child and the wife, sometimes\neven the slave,[144] are practically, as it were, joint owners of\ngoods which in theory belong to the head of the family alone.\n\n[Footnote 144: Volkens, _op. cit._ p. 249 (Wadshagga).]\n\nWe have still to explain the variations of moral judgments with\nregard to different acts of theft. That the condemnation of the\noffence varies in degree according to the value of the stolen\ngoods follows from the fact that theft is disapproved of on\naccount of the injury done to the owner. But in many cases, when\nthe injury is very slight, the appropriation of another person's\nproperty is {58} justified by the needs of him who took it. And\nfrequently, also, the condemnation of the thief is more concerned\nwith his encroachment upon a neighbour's right than with\nmeasuring the exact amount of harm inflicted. Among the Basutos,\nsays Casalis, \"the idea of theft is expressed by a generic word\nwhich refers to the violation of right, much more than to the\ndamage caused.\"[145] Burglary is regarded as an aggravated form\nof theft partly because it adds a fresh offence, the illicit\nentering into another person's house, to that against property,\npartly because it proves great premeditation in the\noffender.[146] Robbery is likewise a double offence, implying, as\nit does, an act of violence, and may on that account be more\nseverely censured than ordinary theft; but in other cases the\ncourage and strength displayed by the robber is looked upon as a\nmitigating circumstance, and sometimes substitutes admiration for\ndisapproval, whereas the secret offender is despised as a coward.\nSo, too, the secrecy of nocturnal theft may aggravate the crime,\nwhilst at the same time the difficulty in providing against it\nmay induce society to increase the punishment. But men are apt to\nadmire not only bravery and force, but also dexterity and pluck,\nhence the appreciation of adroit theft. The same tendency in some\nmeasure accounts for the distinction between manifest and\nnon-manifest theft; but here we have in the first place to\nremember that strong emotions are more easily aroused by the\nsight of an act than by the mere knowledge of its commission.[147]\nThat the moral valuation of theft varies according to the station\nof the thief and the person robbed is due to the same causes as\nare similar variations with regard to other injuries; and\nso is the distinction between offences against the property of a\ntribesman or fellow-countryman and offences against the property\nof a stranger. The theory of the Roman jurists according to which\nthe property of an enemy in war belongs to nobody as long as the\nhostilities last, and therefore becomes the property of the {59}\ncaptor by the right of occupation,[148] is only a play with words\nintended to give a reasonable justification to a practice which\nis really due to lack of regard for the feelings of strangers.\nWhen men at an early stage of civilisation respect a stranger's\nproperty the motive is undoubtedly in the main prudential.\nSavages may be anxious to prevent theft from a neighbouring tribe\nin order to avoid disagreeable consequences.[149] And I venture\nto think that the honesty they often display with regard to\nobjects belonging to strangers who visit them, and especially\nwith regard to things left in their charge,[150] largely springs\nfrom superstitious fear. We have noticed before that even the\nacceptance of gifts is supposed to be connected with supernatural\ndanger, owing to the baneful magic energy with which the gift is\nsuspected to be saturated.[151] Would not the same apply to the\nillicit appropriation of a stranger's belongings, and especially\nto trusts, which naturally call for great precaution on the part\nof the owner? This leads us to a subject of considerable\nimportance in the history of property, namely, the influence\nwhich magic and religious beliefs have exercised on the regard\nfor proprietary rights.\n\n[Footnote 145: Casalis, _Basutos_, p. 304.]\n\n[Footnote 146: _Cf._ Wilda, _op. cit._ p. 878 (ancient Teutons).]\n\n[Footnote 147: _Supra_, i. 294.]\n\n[Footnote 148: Hunter, _Roman Law_, p. 257. Puchta, _op. cit._\nii. 220.]\n\n[Footnote 149: Sproat, _Scenes and Studies of Savage Life_,\np. 159 (Ahts). Scott Robertson, _K\u00e1firs of the Hindu-Kush_, p. 440.]\n\n[Footnote 150: See, besides statements referred to above,\nLumholtz, _Unknown Mexico_, i. 420, and ii. 477; Nordenski\u00f6ld,\n_Vegas f\u00e4rd kring Asien och Europa_, ii. 140 _sq._ (Chukchi);\nWorcester, _Philippine Islands_, p. 413 (Mangyans); Colenso, _op.\ncit._ p. 43 (Maoris); Macdonald, _Light in Africa_, p. 212\n(Bantu); Campbell, _Travels in South Africa_, p. 517, and Leslie,\n_Among the Zulus and Amatongas_, p. 201 (Kafirs).]\n\n[Footnote 151: _Supra_, i. 593 _sq._]\n\nTheft is not only punished by men, but is supposed to be avenged\nby supernatural powers. The Alfura of Halmahera are said to be\nhonest only because they fear that they otherwise would be\nsubject to the punishment of spirits.[152] The natives of Efate,\nin the New Hebrides, maintained that theft was condemned by their\ngods.[153] In Aneiteum, another island belonging to the same\ngroup, thieves were supposed to be punished after death.[154] In\nNetherland Island they {60} were said to go to a prison of\ndarkness under the earth;[155] according to the beliefs of the\nBanks Islanders they were excluded from the true Panoi or\nParadise.[156] On the Gold Coast, \"if a man had property stolen\nfrom his house, he might go to the priest of the local deity he\nwas accustomed to worship, state the loss that had befallen him,\nmake an offering of a fowl, rum, and eggs, and ask the priest to\nsupplicate the god to punish the thief.\"[157] In Southern Guinea\nfetishes are inaugurated to detect and punish certain kinds of\ntheft, and persons who are cognisant of such crimes and do not\ngive information about them are also liable to be punished by the\nfetish.[158] The Bechuanas speak of an unknown being, vaguely\ncalled by the name of Lord and Master of things (Mongalinto), who\npunishes theft. One of them said: \"When it thunders every one\ntrembles; if there are several together, one asks the other with\nuneasiness, Is there any one amongst us who devours the wealth of\nothers? All then spit on the ground saying, We do not devour the\nwealth of others. If a thunderbolt strikes and kills one of them,\nno one complains, no one weeps; instead of being grieved, all\nunite in saying that the Lord is delighted (that is to say, he\nhas done right) with killing that man; we also say that the thief\neats thunderbolts, that is to say, does things which draw down\nupon men such judgments.\"[159]\n\n[Footnote 152: K\u00fckenthal, _Forschungsreise in den Molukken_, p. 188.]\n\n[Footnote 153: Macdonald, _Oceania_, p. 208.]\n\n[Footnote 154: Turner, _Samoa_, p. 326.]\n\n[Footnote 155: _Ibid._ p. 301.]\n\n[Footnote 156: Codrington, _Melanesians_, p. 274.]\n\n[Footnote 157: Ellis, _Tshi-speaking Peoples of the Gold Coast_,\np. 75. See also Cruickshank, _op. cit._ ii. 152, 160, 184;\nSchultze, _Der Fetischismus_, p. 91.]\n\n[Footnote 158: Wilson, _Western Africa_, p. 275.]\n\n[Footnote 159: Arbousset and Daumas, _Exploratory Tour to the\nNorth-East of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope_, p. 322 _sq._]\n\nAccording to the Zoroastrian Yasts, Rashnu Razista was \"the best\nkiller, smiter, destroyer of thieves and bandits.\"[160] In Greece\nZeus [Greek: kt\u00ea/sios] was a guardian of the family\nproperty;[161] and according to a Roman tradition the domestic\ngod repulsed the robber and kept off the enemy.[162] The removing\nof landmarks {61} has frequently been regarded as sacrilegious.[163]\nIt was strictly prohibited by the religious law of the\nHebrews.[164] In Greece boundaries were protected by Zeus [Greek:\no(/rios]. Plato says in his 'Laws':--\"Let no one shift the\nboundary line either of a fellow-citizen who is a neighbour, or,\nif he dwells at the extremity of the land, of any stranger who is\nconterminous with him. . . . Every one should be more willing to\nmove the largest rock which is not a land mark, than the least\nstone which is the sworn mark of friendship and hatred between\nneighbours; for Zeus, the god of kindred, is the witness of the\ncitizen, and Zeus, the god of strangers, of the stranger, and\nwhen aroused terrible are the wars which they stir up. He who\nobeys the law will never know the fatal consequences of\ndisobedience, but he who despises the law shall be liable to a\ndouble penalty, the first coming from the Gods, and the second\nfrom the law.\"[165] The Romans worshipped Terminus or Jupiter\nTerminalis as the god of boundaries.[166] According to an old\ntradition, Numa directed that every one should mark the bounds of\nhis landed property by stones consecrated to Jupiter, that yearly\nsacrifices should be offered to them at the festival of the\nTerminalia, and that, \"if any person demolished or displaced\nthese bound-stones, he should be looked upon as devoted to this\ngod, to the end that anybody might kill him as a sacrilegious\nperson with impunity and without being defiled with guilt.\"[167]\nIn the higher religions theft of any kind is frequently condemned\nas a sin.\n\n[Footnote 160: _Yasts_, xii. 8.]\n\n[Footnote 161: Aeschylus, _Supplices_, 445. Farnell, _Cults of\nthe Greek States_, i. 55.]\n\n[Footnote 162: Ovid, _Fasti_, v. 141.]\n\n[Footnote 163: Trumbull, _The Threshold Covenant_, p. 166 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 164: _Deuteronomy_, xix. 14; xxvii. 17. _Proverbs_,\nxxii. 28; xxiii. 10 _sq._ _Hosea_, v. 10. _Cf._ _Job_, xxiv. 2.]\n\n[Footnote 165: Plato, _Leges_, viii. 842 _sq._ Demosthenes,\n_Oratio de Halonneso_, 39, p. 86. See also Hermann, _Disputatio\nde terminis eorumque religione apud Gr\u00e6cos_, _passim_.]\n\n[Footnote 166: Ovid, _Fasti_, ii. 639 _sqq._ Festus, _De verborum\nsignificatione_ 'Termino.' Lactantius, _Divin\u00e6 Institutiones_, i.\n10 (Migne, _Patrologi\u00e6 cursus_, vi. 227 _sqq._). Pauly,\n_Real-Encyclop\u00e4die der classischen Alterthumswissenschaft_, vi.\npt. ii. 1707 _sqq._ Fowler, _Roman Festivals of the Period of the\nRepublic_, p. 324 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 167: Dionysius of Halicarnassus, _Antiquitates Roman\u00e6_,\nii. 74. Plutarch, _Numa_, xvi. i. Festus, _op. cit._ 'Termino.']\n\nThis religious sanction given to ownership is no doubt in some\nmeasure due to the same circumstances as, in certain cases, make\nmorality in general a matter of divine {62} concern--a subject\nwhich will be dealt with in a future chapter. But there are also\nspecial reasons which account for it. Partly it has its origin in\nmagic practices, particularly in the curse.\n\nCursing is a frequent method of punishing criminals who cannot be\nreached in any other way.[168] In the Book of Judges we read of\nMicah's mother who had pronounced a curse with reference to the\nmoney stolen from her, and afterwards, when her son had confessed\nhis guilt, hastened to render it ineffective by a blessing.[169]\nIn early Arabia the owner of stolen property had recourse to\ncursing in order to recover what he had lost.[170] In Samoa \"the\nparty from whom anything had been stolen, if he knew not the\nthief, would seek satisfaction in sitting down and deliberately\ncursing him.\"[171] The Kamchadales \"think they can punish an\nundiscovered theft by burning the sinews of the stonebuck in a\npublick meeting with great ceremonies of conjuration, believing\nthat as these sinews are contracted by the fire so the thief will\nhave all his limbs contracted.\"[172] Among the Ossetes, if an\nobject has been secretly stolen, its owner secures the assistance\nof a sorcerer. They proceed together to the house of any person\nwhom they suspect, the sorcerer carrying under his arm a cat,\nwhich is regarded as a particularly enchanted animal. He\nexclaims, \"If thou hast stolen the article and dost not restore\nit to its owner, may this cat torment the souls of thy\nancestors!\" And such an imprecation is generally followed by a\nspeedy restitution of the stolen property. Again, if their\nsuspicions rest upon no particular individual, they proceed in the\nsame manner from house to house, and the thief then, knowing that his\nturn must come, frequently confesses his guilt at once.[173] A common\nmode of detecting the perpetrator of a theft is to compel the\nsuspected individual to make oath, {63} that is to say, to pronounce\na conditional curse upon himself.[174]\n\n[Footnote 168: See, _e.g._, Mason, in _Jour. Asiatic Soc.\nBengal_, xxxvii. pt. ii. 149 (Karens).]\n\n[Footnote 169: _Judges_, xvii. 2.]\n\n[Footnote 170: Wellhausen, _Reste arabischen Heidentums_, p. 192.]\n\n[Footnote 171: Turner, _Nineteen Years in Polynesia_, p. 318.]\n\n[Footnote 172: Krasheninnikoff, _History of Kamschatka_, p. 179 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 173: von Haxthausen, _Transcaucasia_, p. 398 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 174: von Struve, in _Das Ausland_, 1880, p. 796\n(Samoyedes). Worcester, _Philippine Islands_, p. 412 (Mangyans of\nMindoro). Turner, _Nineteen Years in Polynesia_, p. 292 _sq._\n(Samoans). Bosman, _op. cit._ p. 125 (Negroes of the Gold Coast).\nBowdich, _Mission to Ashantee_, p. 267; &c.]\n\nCursing is resorted to not only for the purpose of punishing\nthieves or compelling them to restore what they have stolen, but\nalso as a means of preventing theft. In the South Sea Islands it\nis a common practice to protect property by making it _taboo_,\nand the tabooing of an object is, as Dr. Codrington puts it, \"a\nprohibition with a curse expressed or implied.\"[175] The curse is\nthen, in many cases, deposited in some article which is attached\nto the thing or place it is intended to protect. The mark of\ntaboo, in Polynesia called _rahui_ or _raui_, sometimes consists\nof a cocoa-nut leaf plaited in a particular way,[176] sometimes\nof a wooden image of a man or a carved post stuck in the\nground,[177] sometimes of a bunch of human hair or a piece of an\nold mat,[178] and so forth. In Samoa there were various forms of\ntaboo which formed a powerful check on stealing, especially from\nplantations and fruit-trees, and each was known by a special name\nindicating the sort of curse which the owner wished would fall on\nthe thief. Thus, if a man desired that a sea-pike should run into\nthe body of the person who attempted to steal, say, his\nbread-fruits, he would plait some cocoa-nut leaflets in the form\nof a sea-pike, and suspend it from one or more of the trees which\nhe wanted to protect. This was called the \"sea-pike taboo\"; and\nany ordinary thief would be terrified to touch a tree from which\nthis was suspended, believing that, if he did so, a fish of the\nsaid description would dart up and mortally wound him the next\ntime he went to the sea. The \"white shark taboo\" was done by\nplaiting a cocoa-nut leaf in the form of a shark, and was\ntantamount to an {64} expressed imprecation that the thief might\nbe devoured by the white shark when he went to fish. The\n\"cross-stick taboo,\" again, consisted of a stick suspended\nhorizontally from the tree, and meant that any thief touching the\ntree would have a disease running right across his body and\nremaining fixed there till he died.[179] Exactly equivalent to\nthe taboo of the Pacific Islanders is the _pomali_ of the natives\nof Timor; \"a few palm leaves stuck outside a garden as a sign of\nthe _pomali_ will preserve its produce from thieves as\neffectually as the threatening notice of man-traps, spring-guns,\nor a savage dog, would do with us.\"[180] Among the Santals,\nwhenever a person \"is desirous of protecting a patch of jungle\nfrom the axes of the villagers, or a patch of grass from being\ngrazed over, or a newly sown field from being trespassed upon, he\nerects a bamboo in his patch of grass or field, to which is\naffixed a tuft of straw, or in the case of jungle some prominent\nand lofty tree has the same prohibitory mark attached, which mark\nis well understood and strictly observed by all parties\ninterested.\"[181] So also in Madagascar \"on rencontre sur les\nchemins, on voit dans les champs de longs b\u00e2tons munis \u00e0 leur\nsommet d'un paquet d'herbes et qui sont plant\u00e9s en terre soit\npour interdire le passage du terrain soit pour indiquer que les\nr\u00e9coltes sont r\u00e9serv\u00e9es \u00e0 l'usage d'individus d\u00e9termin\u00e9s.\"[182]\nAmong the Washambala the owner of a field sometimes puts a stick\nwound round with a banana leaf on the road to it, believing that\nanybody who without permission enters the field \"will be subject\nto the curse of this charm.\"[183] The Wadshagga protect a\ndoorless hut against burglars by placing a banana leaf over the\nthreshold, and any maliciously inclined person who dares to step\nover it is supposed to get ill or die.[184] The Akka \"stick an\narrow in a bunch of bananas still on the stalk to mark it as\ntheir own {65} when ripe,\" and then not even the owner of the\ntree would think of touching the fruit so claimed by others.[185]\nOf the Barotse we are told that \"when they do not want a thing\ntouched they spit on straws and stick them all about the\nobject.\"[186] When a Balonda has placed a beehive on a tree, he\nties a \"piece of medicine\" round the trunk, and this will prove\nsufficient protection against thieves.[187] Jacob of Edessa tells\nus of a Syrian priest who wrote a curse and hung it on a tree,\nthat nobody might eat the fruit.[188] In the early days of Islam\na masterful man reserved water for his own use by hanging pieces\nof fringe of his red blanket on a tree beside it, or by throwing\nthem into the pool;[189] and in modern Palestine nobody dares to\ntouch the piles of stones which are placed on the boundaries of\nlanded property.[190] The old inhabitants of Cuman\u00e1 on the\nCaribbean Sea used to mark off their plantations by a single\ncotton thread, in the belief that anybody tampering with these\nboundary marks would speedily die.[191] A similar idea seems\nstill to prevail among the Indians of the Amazon. Among the Jur\u00eds\na traveller noticed that in places where the hedge surrounding a\nfield was broken, it was replaced by a cotton string; and when\nBrazilian Indians leave their huts they often wind a piece of the\nsame material round the latch of the door.[192] Sometimes they\nalso hang baskets, rags, or flaps of bark on their\nlandmarks.[193] In these and in various other instances just\nreferred to it is not expressly stated that the taboo mark\nembodies a curse, but their similarity to cases in which it does\nso is striking enough to {66} preclude much doubt about their\nreal meaning. It is true that an object which is sacred by itself\nmay, on that account, protect everything in its neighbourhood;[194]\nin Morocco any article deposited in the _[h.]orm_ of a saint is\nsafe, and among pagan Africans the same effect is produced by\nusing fetishes as protectors of fields or houses.[195] But a\nthing of inherent holiness may also be chosen for taboo purposes\nfor the reason that its sanctity is supposed to give particular\nefficacy to any curse with which it may be loaded.\n\n[Footnote 175: Codrington, _Melanesians_, p. 215.]\n\n[Footnote 176: Taylor White, in _Jour. Polynesian Soc._ i. 275.]\n\n[Footnote 177: Hamilton, _Maori Art_, p. 102; Thomson, _Story of\nNew Zealand_, i. 102; Polack, _op. cit._ ii. 70 (Maoris). Ellis,\n_Polynesian Researches_, iii. 116 (Tahitians).]\n\n[Footnote 178: Thomson, _op. cit._ i. 102 (Maoris). See also\nColenso, _op. cit._ p. 34 (Maoris); Ellis, _Polynesian\nResearches_, iii. 201 (Tahitians).]\n\n[Footnote 179: Turner, _Nineteen Years in Polynesia_, p. 294 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 180: Wallace, _Malay Archipelago_, p. 149 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 181: Sherwill, 'Tour through the R\u00e1jmahal Hills,' in\n_Jour. Asiatic Soc. Bengal_, xx. 568.]\n\n[Footnote 182: van Gennep, _Tabou et tot\u00e9misme \u00e0 Madagascar_,\np. 184 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 183: Lang, in Steinmetz, _Rechtverh\u00e4ltnisse_, p. 263.]\n\n[Footnote 184: Volkens, _op. cit._ p. 254.]\n\n[Footnote 185: Junker, _Travels in Africa during the Years\n1882-1886_, p. 86.]\n\n[Footnote 186: Decle, _op. cit._ p. 77.]\n\n[Footnote 187: Livingstone, _Missionary Travels_, p. 285.]\n\n[Footnote 188: Robertson Smith, _Religion of the Semites_,\np. 164, n. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 189: _Ibid._ p. 336, n. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 190: Pierotti, _Customs and Traditions of Palestine_,\np. 95 _sq._ According to Roman sources (_Digesta_, xlvii. 11. 9),\nthere was in the province of Arabia an offence called [Greek:\nskopelismo/s], which consisted in laying stones on an enemy's\nground as a threat that if the owner cultivated the land \"malo\nleto periturus esset insidiis eorum, qui scopulos posuissent\";\nand so great was the fear of such stones that nobody would go\nnear a field where they had been put.]\n\n[Footnote 191: Gomara, _Primera parte de la historia general de\nlas Indias_, ch. 79 (_Biblioteca de autores espa\u00f1oles_, xxii. 206).]\n\n[Footnote 192: von Martius, _Von dem Rechtszustande unter den\nUreinwohnern Brasiliens_, p. 37 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 193: _Ibid._ p. 34.]\n\n[Footnote 194: _Cf._ van Gennep, _op. cit._ p. 185 (natives of\nMadagascar). It was an ancient Roman usage to inter the dead in\nthe field belonging to the family, and in the works of the elder\nCato there is a formula according to which the Italian labourer\nprayed the manes to take good care against thieves (Fustel de\nCoulanges, _op. cit._ p. 75). Cicero says (_Pro domo_, 41) that\nthe house of each citizen was sacred because his household gods\nwere there.]\n\n[Footnote 195: Rowley, _Africa Unveiled_, p. 174. Bastian,\n_Afrikanische Reisen_, p. 78 _sq._ 3 Nassau, _Fetichism in West\nAfrica_, p. 85. _Cf._ Schneider, _Die Religion der afrikanischen\nNaturv\u00f6lker_, p. 230. If we knew the ceremonies with which\nmagicians transform ordinary material objects into fetishes,\nwe might perhaps find that they charge them with curses.\nDr. Nassau says (_op. cit._ p. 85):--\"For every human passion\nor desire of every part of our nature, for our thousand\nnecessities or wishes, a fetich can be made, its operation being\ndirected to the attainment of one specified wish.\" See also\nSchultze, _Der Fetischismus_, p. 109.]\n\nWe have previously noticed another method of charging a curse\nwith magic energy, namely, by giving it the form of an appeal to\na supernatural being.[196] So also spirits or gods are frequently\ninvoked in curses referring to theft. On the Gold Coast, \"when\nthe owner of land sees that some one has been making a clearing\non his land, he cuts the young inner branches of the palm tree\nand hangs them about the place where the trespass has been\ncommitted. As he hangs each leaf he says something to the\nfollowing effect: 'The person who did this and did not make it\nknown to me before he did it, if he comes here to do any other\nthing, may fetish Katawere (or Tanor or Fofie or other fetish)\nkill him and all his family.'\"[197] In Samoa, in the case of a\ntheft, the suspected persons had to swear before the chiefs, each\none invoking the village god to send swift destruction if he had\ncommitted the crime; and if all had sworn and the culprit was\nstill undiscovered, the chiefs solemnly made a similar invocation\non behalf of the {67} thief.[198] The Hawaiians seem likewise to\nhave appealed to an avenging deity in certain cursing ceremonies,\nwhich they performed for the purpose of detecting or punishing\nthieves.[199] In ancient Greece it was a custom to dedicate a\nlost article to a deity, with a curse for those who kept it.[200]\nOf the Melanesian taboo, again, Dr. Codrington observes that the\npower at the back of it \"is that of the ghost or spirit in whose\nname, or in reliance upon whom, it is pronounced.\"[201] In\nCeylon, \"to prevent fruit being stolen, the people hang up\ncertain grotesque figures around the orchard and dedicate it to\nthe devils, after which none of the native Ceylonese will dare\neven to touch the fruit on any account. Even the owner will not\nventure to use it till it be first liberated from the\ndedication.\"[202] On the landmarks of the ancient Babylonians,\ngenerally consisting of stone pillars in the form of a phallus,\nimprecations were inscribed with appeals to various deities. One\nof these boundary stones contains the following curse directed\nagainst the violator of its sacredness:--\"Upon this man may the\ngreat gods Anu, B\u00eal, Ea, and Nusku, look wrathfully, uproot his\nfoundation, and destroy his offspring\"; and similar invocations\nare then made to many other gods.[203]\n\n[Footnote 196: _Supra_, i. 564.]\n\n[Footnote 197: _Jour. African Soc._ 110 xviii. January, 1906, p. 203.]\n\n[Footnote 198: Turner, _Samoa_, p. 19. _Idem_, _Nineteen Years in\nPolynesia_, p. 292 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 199: Jarves, _History of the Hawaiian Islands_, p. 20.]\n\n[Footnote 200: Rouse, _Greek Votive Offerings_, p. 339.]\n\n[Footnote 201: Codrington, _op. cit._ p. 215.]\n\n[Footnote 202: Percival, _Account of the Island of Ceylon_, p. 198.]\n\n[Footnote 203: Trumbull, _The Threshold Covenant_, p. 166 _sq._\nHilprecht, quoted _ibid._ p. 167 _sqq._]\n\nNow we can understand why gods so frequently take notice of\noffences against property. They are invoked in curses uttered\nagainst thieves; the invocation in a curse easily develops into a\ngenuine prayer, and where this is the case the god is supposed to\npunish the offender of his own free will. Besides, he may be\ninduced to do so by offerings. And when often appealed to in\nconnection with theft, a supernatural being may finally come to\nbe looked upon as a guardian of property. This, for instance, I\ntake to be the explanation of the belief prevalent among the\nBerbers {68} of [H.]a[h.]a, in Southern Morocco, that some of the\nlocal saints punish thieves who approach their sanctuaries, even\nthough the theft was committed elsewhere; being constantly\nappealed to in oaths taken by persons suspected of theft, they\nhave become the permanent enemies of thieves. We can, further,\nunderstand why in some cases certain offences against property\nhave actually assumed the character of a sacrilege, even apart\nfrom such as are committed in the proximity of a supernatural\nbeing. Curses are sometimes personified and elevated to the rank\nof divine agents; this, as we have seen, is the origin of the\nErinyes of parents, beggars, and strangers, and of the Roman\n_divi parentum_ and _dii hospitales_; and this is also in all\nprobability the origin of the god Terminus.[204] Or the curse may\nbe transformed into an attribute of the chief god, not only\nbecause he is frequently appealed to in connection with offences\nof a certain kind, but also because such a god has a tendency to\nattract supernatural forces which are in harmony with his general\nnature. This explains the origin of conceptions such as Zeus\n[Greek: o(/rios] and Jupiter Terminalis, as well as the extreme\nseverity with which Yahweh treated the removal of landmarks. In\nall these cases there are indications of a connection between the\ngod and a curse. Apart from other evidence to be found in Semitic\nantiquities, there is the anathema of _Deuteronomy_, \"Cursed be\nhe that removeth his neighbour's landmark.\"[205] That the\nboundary stones dedicated to Zeus [Greek: o(/rios] were\noriginally charged with imprecations appears from a passage in\nPlato's 'Laws' quoted above,[206] as also from inscriptions made\non them.[207] The Etruscans cursed anyone who should touch or\ndisplace a boundary mark:--Such a person shall be condemned by\nthe gods; his house shall disappear; his race shall be\nextinguished; his limbs shall be covered with ulcers and waste\naway; his land shall no longer produce {69} fruits; hail, rust,\nand the fires of the dog-star shall destroy his harvests.[208]\nConsidering the important part played by blood as a conductor of\nimprecations, it is not improbable that the Roman ceremony of\nletting the blood of a sacrificial animal flow into the hole\nwhere the landmark was to be placed[209] was intended to give\nefficacy to a curse. In some parts of England a custom of\nannually \"beating the bounds\" of a parish has survived up to the\npresent time, and this ceremony was formerly accompanied by\nreligious services, in which a clergyman invoked curses on him\nwho should transgress the bounds of his neighbour, and blessings\non him who should regard the landmarks.[210]\n\n[Footnote 204: _Cf._ Festus, _op. cit._ 'Termino':--\"Numa\nPompilius statuit eum, qui terminum exarasset, et ipsum, et boves\nsacros esse.\"]\n\n[Footnote 205: _Deuteronomy_, xxvii. 17. _Cf._ _Genesis_,\nxxxi. 44 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 206: Plato, _Leges_, viii. 843: \". . . [Greek: \u00ea)\\n smikron\nli/thon o(ri/zonta philai/n kai\\ e)/chthran e)/norkon\npara\\ the\u00f4=n.]\"]\n\n[Footnote 207: Xenophon, _Anabasis_, v. 3. 13. Hermann,\n_Disputatio de terminis apud Gr\u00e6cos_, p. 11.]\n\n[Footnote 208: _Rei agrari\u00e6 auctores legesque vari\u00e6_, edited by\nG[oe]sius, p. 258 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 209: Siculus Flaccus, 'De conditionibus agrorum,' in\n_Rei agrari\u00e6 auctores_, p. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 210: Dibbs, 'Beating the Bounds,' in _Chambers's\nEdinburgh Journal_, N.S. xx. (1853) 49 _sqq._ Trumbull, _The\nThreshold Covenant_, p. 174 _sq._]\n\nThe practice of cursing a thief may possibly even be at the\nbottom of the belief of some savages that such a person will be\npunished after death. In a following chapter we shall notice\ninstances where the efficacy of a curse is supposed to extend\nbeyond the grave. But we shall also find other reasons for savage\ndoctrines of retribution in the world to come. In the cases\nreferred to above it is not expressly said that the _post mortem_\npunishment of the thief is inflicted by a god.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nI have here only dealt with rules relating to property which have\nbeen recognised by custom or law. But the established principles\nof ownership have not always been admitted to be just: in the\ncivilised countries of the West they have called forth an\nopposition which is rapidly gaining in strength. The limited\nscope of the present work does not allow me to attempt a detailed\naccount of this movement, with its variety of arguments and its\nmultitudinous schemes of reform. The main reasons for complaint\nare:--first, that our actual law of property does not ensure to\nevery labourer the whole produce of his labour; secondly, that it\ndoes not provide for every want {70} a satisfaction proportionate\nto the available means. However much the opinions of the\ndifferent schools of socialists may vary, every socialist\norganisation of property aims either at guaranteeing to the\nworking-classes the entire product of their industry, or at\nreducing to just proportions individual needs and existing means\nof satisfaction by recognising the claim of every member of\nsociety to the commodities and services necessary to support\nexistence, in preference to the satisfaction of the less pressing\nwants of others.[211] These aims are greatly hampered by the\npresent system, in which land and capital are the property of\nprivate individuals freely struggling for increase of wealth, and\nespecially by the legally recognised existence of unearned\nincome[212]--the \"rent\" of the Saint-Simonians, the \"surplus\nvalue\" (_Mehrwert_) of Thompson and Marx,--for which the favoured\nrecipient returns no personal equivalent to society, and which he\nis able to pocket because the wage labourer receives in\nmoney-wages less than the full value of the produce of his work.\nWe have here a conflict between different principles of\nacquisition. Both the rule that the owner of a thing also owns\nwhat results from it, and the law of inheritance, leading as they\ndo to unearned income, are intruding upon the principle of labour\nas a source of property. They, moreover, interfere with the right\nto subsistence, which in some measure, though often insufficiently,\nis recognised in all human societies;[213] for, as Marx observed,\nthe accumulation of wealth at one pole means the accumulation of\nmisery at the opposite pole.[214] This conflict between different\nprinciples or rights, all of which have deep foundations in human\nnature and the conditions of social life, has been brought about\nby certain {71} facts inherent in progressive civilisation. In\nsimple societies the unearned income is small, because no fortunes\nexist, and the wants of those who are incapable of earning their\nown livelihood are provided for by the system of mutual aid.\nProgress in culture, on the other hand, has been accompanied by\na more unequal distribution of wealth, and also by a decrease of\nsocial solidarity as a result of the increase and greater\ndifferentiation of the social unit. The unearned income has grown\nlarger, the disproportion between the returns on capital and the\nreward for labour has in many cases become enormous, and hand in\nhand with the opulence of some goes the destitution of others. At\nthe same time the injustice of prerogatives based on birth or\nfortune is keenly felt, the dignity of labour is recognised, and\nthe working-classes are every day becoming more conscious both of\ntheir power and their rights. All this has resulted in a strong\nand wide-spread conviction that the actual law of property\ngreatly differs from the ideal law. But much struggle will no\ndoubt be required to bring them in harmony with one another. The\npresent rights of property are supported not only by personal\ninterests, but also by a deep-rooted feeling, trained in the\nschool of tradition, that it would be iniquitous of the State to\ninterfere with individuals' long-established claims to use at\ntheir pleasure the objects of wealth. The new scheme, on the\nother hand, derives strength from the fact that it aims at\nrectifying legal rights in accordance with existing needs, and\nthat it lays stress on a method of acquisition which more than\nany other seems to appeal to the natural sense of justice in man.\nWe are utterly unable to foresee in detail the issue of this\nstruggle. But that the law of property will sooner or later\nundergo a radical change must be obvious to every one who\nrealises that, though ideas of right and wrong may for some time\noutlive the conditions from which they sprang, they cannot do so\nfor ever.\n\n[Footnote 211: See Menger, _Right to the whole Produce of\nLabour_, p. 5 _sqq._, Goos, _op. cit._ ii. 61.]\n\n[Footnote 212: The term \"unearned income\" (_arbeitsloses\nEinkommen_) has been proposed by Menger (_op. cit._ p. 3).]\n\n[Footnote 213: See _supra_, ch. xxiii., vol. i. 526 _sqq._ Among\nthe Eskimo about Behring Strait (Nelson, in _Ann. Rep. Bur.\nEthn._ xviii. 294) and the Greenlanders (Rink, _Eskimo Tales_, p.\n29 _sq._), if a man borrows an article from another and fails to\nreturn it, the owner is not entitled to claim it back, as they\nconsider that when a person has enough property to enable him to\nlend some of it he has more than he needs.]\n\n[Footnote 214: Marx, _Capital_, p. 661.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXX\n\nTHE REGARD FOR TRUTH AND GOOD FAITH\n\n\nTHE regard for truth implies in the first place that we ought to\nabstain from lying, that is, a wilful misrepresentation of facts,\nby word or deed, with the intention of producing a false belief.\nClosely connected with this duty is that of good faith or\nfidelity to promises, which requires that we should make facts\ncorrespond with our emphatic assertions as to our conduct in the\nfuture. Within certain limits these duties seem to be universally\nrecognised, though the censure passed on the transgressor varies\nextremely in degree. But there are also many cases in which\nuntruthfulness and bad faith are looked upon with indifference,\nor even held laudable or obligatory.\n\nVarious uncivilised races are conspicuous for their great regard\nfor truth; of some savages it is said that not even the most\ntrying circumstances can induce them to tell a lie. Among others,\nagain, falsehood is found to be a prevailing vice and the\nsuccessful lie a matter of popular admiration.\n\nAll authorities agree that the Veddahs of Ceylon are models of\nveracity. They \"are proverbially truthful and honest.\"[1] They\nthink it perfectly inconceivable that any person should say\nanything which is not true.[2] Mr. Nevill writes, \"I never knew a\ntrue Vaedda to tell a lie, and the Sinhalese give them the same\ncharacter.\"[3] Messrs. Sarasin had a similar experience:{73}--\"The\ngenuine Wood-Wedda always speaks the truth; we never heard a lie\nfrom any of them; all their statements are short and true.\"[4] A\nVeddah who had committed murder and was tried for it, instead of\ntelling a lie in order to escape punishment, said simply nothing.[5]\n\n[Footnote 1: Bailey, 'Wild Tribes of the Veddahs of Ceylon,' in\n_Trans. Ethn. Soc._ N.S. ii. 291.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Hartshorne, in _Indian Antiquary_, viii. 320.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Nevill, in _Taprobanian_, i. 193.]\n\n[Footnote 4: Sarasin, _Forschungen auf Ceylon_, iii. 541. _Cf._\n_ibid._ iii. 542 _sq._; Schmidt, _Ceylon_, p. 276.]\n\n[Footnote 5: Sarasin, _op. cit._ iii. 543.]\n\nOther instances of extreme truthfulness are provided by various\nuncivilised tribes in India. The Saoras of the province of\nMadras, \"like most of the hill people, . . . are not inclined to\nlying. If one Saora kill another he admits it at once and tells\nwhy he killed him.\"[6] The highlander of Central India is\ndescribed as \"the most truthful of beings, and rarely denies\neither a money obligation or a crime really chargeable against\nhim.\"[7] A true Gond \"will commit a murder, but he will not tell\na lie.\"[8] The Kandhs, says Macpherson, \"are, I believe, inferior\nin veracity to no people in the world. . . . It is in all cases\nimperative to tell the truth, except when deception is necessary\nto save the life of a guest.\"[9] And to break a solemn pledge of\nfriendship is, in their opinion, one of the greatest sins a man\ncan commit.[10] The Korw\u00e1s inhabiting the highlands of\nSirg\u00faja--though they show great cruelty in committing robberies,\nputting to death the whole of the party attacked, even when\nunresisting--\"have what one might call the savage virtue of\ntruthfulness to an extraordinary degree, and, rightly accused,\nwill at once confess and give you every required detail of the\ncrime.\"[11] The Santals are noted for veracity and fidelity to\ntheir word even in the most trying circumstances.[12] A Kurubar\n\"always speaks the truth.\"[13] Among the Hos \"a reflection on a\nman's honesty or veracity may be sufficient to send him to\nself-destruction.\"[14] Among the Angami Nagas simple truth is\nhighly regarded; it is rare for a statement to be made on oath,\nand rarer still for it to be false.[15] In the Chittagong Hills\nthe Tipperahs are the only people among whom Captain Lewin {74}\nhas met with meanness and lying;[16] and they, too, have\npreviously been said to be, \"as a rule, truthful and\nsimple-minded.**\"[17] The Karens of Burma have the following\ntraditional precept:--\"Do not speak falsehood. What you do not\nknow, do not speak. Liars shall have their tongues cut out.\"[18]\nAmong the Bannavs of Cambodia \"severe penalties, such as slavery\nor exile, are imposed for lying.\"[19]\n\n[Footnote 6: Fawcett, _Saoras_, p. 17.]\n\n[Footnote 7: Forsyth, _Highlands of Central India_, p. 164. _Cf._\n_ibid._ p. 361; Sleeman, _Rambles and Recollections of an Indian\nOfficial_, ii. 109; Hislop, _Aboriginal Tribes of the Central\nProvinces_, p. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 8: Dalton, _Ethnology of Bengal_, p. 284. _Cf._\nForsyth, _op. cit._ p. 155.]\n\n[Footnote 9: Macpherson, 'Religious Opinions and Observances of\nthe Khonds,' in _Jour. Roy. Asiatic Soc._ vii. 196.]\n\n[Footnote 10: Macpherson, _Memorials of Service in India_, p. 94.]\n\n[Footnote 11: Dalton, _op. cit._ p. 230.]\n\n[Footnote 12: Elliot, 'Characteristics of the Population of\nCentral and Southern India,' in _Jour. Ethn. Soc. London_, N.S.\ni. 106 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 13: _Ibid._ i. 105.]\n\n[Footnote 14: Dalton, _op. cit._ p. 206. _Cf._ _ibid._ p. 204\n_sq._; Bradley-Birt, _Chota Nagpore_, p. 103.]\n\n[Footnote 15: Prain, 'Angami Nagas,' in _Revue coloniale\ninternationale_, v. 490.]\n\n[Footnote 16: Lewin, _Wild Races of South-Eastern India_, p. 191.]\n\n[Footnote 17: Browne, quoted by Dalton, _op. cit._ p. 110.]\n\n[Footnote 18: Smeaton, _Loyal Karens of India_, p. 254.]\n\n[Footnote 19: Comte, quoted by Mouhot, _Travels in Indo-China,\nCambodia, and Laos_, ii. 27. For the truthfulness of the\nuncivilised races of India see also Sleeman, _op. cit._ ii. 110\n_sqq._; Dalton, _op. cit._ p. 256 (Oraons); Crooke, _Tribes and\nCastes of the North-Western Provinces_, ii. 478 (H\u00e2b\u00fbra); Fraser,\n_Tour through the Him[=a]l[=a] Mountains_, pp. 264 (inhabitants\nof Kunawur), 335 (Bhoteas); Iyer, in the Madras Government\nMuseum's _Bulletin_, iv. 73 (Nay[=a]dis of Malabar); Walhouse,\n'Account of a Leaf-wearing Tribe on the Western Coast of India,'\nin _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ iv. 370 (Koragars).]\n\nThe Andaman Islanders call falsehood _y[=u]bda_, that is, sin or\nwrong-doing.[20] The natives of Car Nicobar are not only very\nhonest,[21] but \"the accusation of untruthfulness brings them up\nin arms immediately.\"[22] The Dyaks of Borneo are praised for\ntheir honesty and great regard for truth.[23] Mr. Bock states that\nif they could not satisfactorily reply to his questions they\nhesitated to answer at all, and that if he did not always get the\nwhole truth he always got at least nothing but the truth from\nthem.[24] Veracity is a characteristic of the Alfura of\nHalmahera[25] and the Bataks of Sumatra, who only in cases of\nurgent necessity have recourse to a lie.[26] The Javanese, says\nCrawfurd, \"are honourably distinguished from all the civilised\nnations of Asia by a regard for truth.\"[27] \"In their intercourse\nwith society,\" Raffles observes, \"they display, in a high degree,\nthe virtues of honesty, plain dealing, and candour. Their\ningenuousness is such that, as the first Dutch authorities have\nacknowledged, prisoners brought to the bar on criminal charges,\nif really guilty, nine times out of ten confess, without disguise\nor equivocation, the full extent and exact circumstances of their\noffences, and communicate, when required, more information on the\nmatter at issue than all the rest of the evidence.\"[28] Among the\nnatives {75} of the Malay Archipelago there are some further\ninstances of trustworthy and truthful peoples;[29] whereas others\nare described as distrustful and regardless of truth.[30] Thus\nthe natives of Timor-laut lie without compunction when they think\nthey can escape detection,[31] and of the Niase it is said that\n\"truth is their bitter enemy.\"[32]\n\n[Footnote 20: Man, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xii. 112.]\n\n[Footnote 21: Distant, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ iii. 4.]\n\n[Footnote 22: Kloss, _In the Andamans and Nicobars_, p. 227 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 23: Ling Roth, _Natives of Sarawak_, i. 66-68, 82.\nBoyle, _Adventures among the Dyaks of Borneo_, p. 215. Selenka,\n_Sonnige Welten_, p. 47.]\n\n[Footnote 24: Bock, _Head-Hunters of Borneo_, p. 209.]\n\n[Footnote 25: K\u00fckenthal, _Forschungsreise in den Molukken_, p. 188.]\n\n[Footnote 26: Junghuhn, _Battal\u00e4nder auf Sumatra_, ii. 239.]\n\n[Footnote 27: Crawfurd, _History of the Indian Archipelago_, i. 50.]\n\n[Footnote 28: Raffles, _History of Java_, i. 248.]\n\n[Footnote 29: Riedel, _De sluik- en kroesharige rassen tusschen\nSelebes en Papua_, p. 96 (Serangese). St. John, _Life in the\nForests of the Far East_, ii. 322 (Malays of Sarawak).]\n\n[Footnote 30: Marsden, _History of Sumatra_, p. 209 (natives of\nthe interior of Sumatra). Riedel, _op. cit._ p. 314 (natives of\nthe Luang-Sermata group). Steller, _De Sangi-Archipel_, p. 23.]\n\n[Footnote 31: Forbes, _A Naturalist's Wanderings in the Eastern\nArchipelago_, p. 320.]\n\n[Footnote 32: Modigliani, _Viaggio a N\u00edas_, p. 467.]\n\nVeracity and probity were conspicuous virtues among various\nuncivilised peoples belonging to the Russian Empire. Georgi,\nwhose work dates from the eighteenth century, says of the\nChuvashes that they \"content themselves with a simple affirmation\nor denial, and always keep their word\";[33] of the Barabinzes,\nthat \"lying, duplicity, and fraud, are unknown among them\";[34]\nof the Tunguses, that they \"always appear to be what they really\nare,\" and that \"lying seems to them the absurdest thing in the\nworld, which prevents them being either suspicious or\nnecessitated to accompany their affirmations by oaths or solemn\nprotestations\";[35] of the Kurilians, that they always speak the\ntruth \"with the most scrupulous fidelity.\"[36] Castr\u00e9n states\nthat the Zyrians, like the Finnish tribes generally, are\ntrustworthy and honest,[37] and that the Ostyaks have no other\noaths but those of purgation. Among them \"witnesses never take\nthe oath, but their words are unconditionally believed in, and\neverybody, with the exception of lunatics, is allowed to give\nevidence. Children may witness against their parents, brothers\nagainst brothers, a husband against his wife, and a wife against\nher husband.\"[38]\n\n[Footnote 33: Georgi, _Russia_, i. 110.]\n\n[Footnote 34: _Ibid._ ii. 229.]\n\n[Footnote 35: _Ibid._ iii. 78. _Cf._ _ibid._ iii. 109.]\n\n[Footnote 36: _Ibid._ iii. 192. _Cf._ Krasheninnikoff, _History\nof Kamschatka_, p. 236.]\n\n[Footnote 37: Castr\u00e9n, _Nordiska resor och forskningar_, i. 257.]\n\n[Footnote 38: _Ibid._ i. 309 _sq._]\n\nThe Aleuts were highly praised by Father Veniaminof for their\ntruthfulness:--\"These people detest lying, and never spread false\nrumours. . . . They are very much offended if any one doubts\ntheir word.\" They \"despise hypocrisy in every respect,\" and \"do\nnot flatter nor make empty promises, even in order to escape\nreproof.\"[39] The regard in which truth is held by the Eskimo\nseems to vary among different tribes. Armstrong blames the\nWestern Eskimo for being much {76} addicted to falsehood, and for\nseldom telling the truth, if there be anything to gain by a\nlie.[40] The Point Barrow Eskimo \"are in the main truthful,\nthough a detected lie is hardly considered more than a good joke,\nand considerable trickery is practised in trading.\"[41] Of the\nEskimo at Igloolik, an island near Melville Peninsula, we are\ntold that \"their lies consist only of vilifying each other's\ncharacter, with false accusations of theft or ill behaviour. When\nasking questions of an individual, it is but rarely that he will\neither advance or persist in an untruth. . . . Lying among them\nis almost exclusively confined to the ladies.\"[42] In his\ndescription of the Eskimo on the western side of Davis Strait and\nin the region of Frobisher Bay, Mr. Hall says that they despise\nand shun one who will _shag-la-voo_, that is, \"tell a lie,\" and\nthat they are rarely troubled by any of this class.[43] The\nGreenlanders are generally truthful towards each other, at least\nthe men.[44] But if he can help it, a Greenlander will not tell a\ntruth which he thinks may be unpleasant to the hearer, as he is\nanxious to stand on as good a footing as possible with his\nfellow-men.[45]\n\n[Footnote 39: Veniaminof, quoted by Dall, _Alaska_, pp. 396, 395.]\n\n[Footnote 40: Armstrong, _Discovery of the North-West Passage_,\np. 196 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 41: Murdoch, 'Ethnological Results of the Point Barrow\nExpedition,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ ix. 41.]\n\n[Footnote 42: Lyon, _Private Journal during the Voyage of\nDiscovery under Captain Parry_, p. 349.]\n\n[Footnote 43: Hall, _Arctic Researches_, p. 567.]\n\n[Footnote 44: Dalager, _Gr\u00f8nlandske Relationer_, p. 69. Cranz,\n_History of Greenland_, i. 171, 175. Nansen, _Eskimo Life_, p. 158.]\n\n[Footnote 45: Nansen, _Eskimo Life_, p. 101. _Idem_, _First\nCrossing of Greenland_, ii. 334 _sq._]\n\nThe Thompson River Indians of British Columbia maintain that it\nis bad to lie, that if you do so people will laugh at you and\ncall you a \"liar.\"[46] Speaking of the Iroquois, Mr. Morgan says\nthat the love of truth was a marked trait of the Indian\ncharacter. \"This inborn sentiment flourished in the period of\ntheir highest prosperity, in all the freshness of its primeval\npurity. On all occasions and at whatever peril, the Iroquois\nspoke the truth without fear and without hesitation.\nDissimulation was not an Indian habit. . . . The Iroquois prided\nthemselves upon their sacred regard for the public faith, and\npunished the want of it with severity when an occasion presented\nitself.\"[47] Loskiel likewise states that they considered lying\nand cheating heinous and scandalous offences.[48] Among the\nChippewas there were a few persons addicted to lying, but these\n{77} were held in disrepute.[49] The Shoshones, a tribe of the\nSnake Indians, were frank and communicative in their intercourse\nwith strangers, and perfectly fair in their dealings.[50] The\nSeminole Indians of Florida are commended for their\ntruthfulness.[51] With special reference to the Navahos, Mr.\nMatthews observes, \"As the result of over thirty years'\nexperience among Indians, I must say that I have not found them\nless truthful than the average of our own race.\"[52] Among the\nDacotahs lying \"is considered very bad\"; yet in this respect\n\"every one sees the mote in his brother's eye, but does not\ndiscover the beam that is in his own,\"[53] want of truthfulness\nand habitual dishonesty in little things being prevalent traits\nin their character.[54] So, also, the Thlinkets admit that\nfalsehood is criminal, although they have recourse to it without\nhesitation whenever it suits their purpose.[55] Of the\nChippewyans, again, it is said that they carry the habit of lying\nto such an extent, even among themselves, that they can scarcely\nbe said to esteem truth a virtue.[56] The Crees are \"not very\nstrict in their adherence to truth, being great boasters.\"[57]\nHeriot[58] and Adair[59] speak of the treacherous or deceitful\ndisposition of the North American Indians; but the latter adds\nthat, though \"privately dishonest,\" they are \"very faithful\nindeed to their own tribe.\"\n\n[Footnote 46: Teit, 'Thompson Indians of British Columbia,' in\n_Memoirs of the American Museum of Natural History_,\nAnthropology, i. 366.]\n\n[Footnote 47: Morgan, _League of the Iroquois_, pp. 335, 338.]\n\n[Footnote 48: Loskiel, _History of the Mission of the United\nBrethren among the Indians in North America_, i. 16.]\n\n[Footnote 49: Keating, _Expedition to the Source of St. Peter's\nRiver_, ii. 168.]\n\n[Footnote 50: Lewis and Clarke, _Travels to the Source of the\nMissouri River_, p. 306.]\n\n[Footnote 51: Maccauley, 'Seminole Indians of Florida,' in _Ann.\nRep. Bur. Ethn._ v. 491.]\n\n[Footnote 52: Matthews, 'Study of Ethics among the Lower Races,'\nin _Jour. of American Folk-Lore_, xii. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 53: Schoolcraft, _Indian Tribes of the United States_,\nii. 196.]\n\n[Footnote 54: Eastman, _Dacotah_, p. xvii.]\n\n[Footnote 55: Douglas, quoted by Petroff, _Report on Alaska_,\np. 177.]\n\n[Footnote 56: Richardson, _Arctic Searching Expedition_, ii. 18.\n_Cf._ _ibid._ ii. 19.]\n\n[Footnote 57: Richardson, in Franklin, _Journey to the Shores of\nthe Polar Sea_, p. 63.]\n\n[Footnote 58: Heriot, _Travels through the Canadas_, p. 319.]\n\n[Footnote 59: Adair, _History of the American Indians_, p. 4.]\n\nOf the regard in which truth is held by the Indians of South\nAmerica the authorities I have consulted have little to say. The\nCoroados are not deceitful.[60] The Tehuelches of Patagonia\nnearly always lie in minor affairs, and will invent stories for\nsheer amusement. \"In anything of importance, however, such as\nguaranteeing the safety of a person, they were very truthful, as\nlong as faith was kept with them. After a time,\" Lieutenant\nMusters adds, \"when they ascertained that I invariably avoided\ndeviating in any way from the truth, they left off lying to me\neven in minor matters. This will serve to show that they are not\nof the treacherous nature assigned to {78} them by some ignorant\nwriters.\"[61] Among the Fuegians, according to Mr. Bridge, no one\ncan trust another, lying tales of slander are very common, great\nexaggeration is used, and it is not even considered wrong to tell\na lie.[62] Snow, however, speaks of \"the honesty they undoubtedly\nevince in many of their transactions\";[63] and Darwin states that\nthe Fuegian boy on board the Beagle \"showed, by going into the\nmost violent passion, that he quite understood the reproach of\nbeing called a liar, which in truth he was.\"[64]\n\n[Footnote 60: von Spix and von Martius, _Travels in Brazil_,\nii. 242.]\n\n[Footnote 61: Musters, _At Home with the Patagonians_, p. 195 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 62: Bridges, in _A Voice for South America_, xiii. 202\n_sq._ _Cf._ Hyades and Deniker, _Mission scientifique du Cap\nHorn_, vii. 242; King and Fitzroy, _Voyages of the \"Adventure\"\nand \"Beagle,\"_ ii. 188.]\n\n[Footnote 63: Snow, _Two Years Cruise off Tierra del Fuego_, i. 347.]\n\n[Footnote 64: Darwin, _Journal of Researches_, p. 227.]\n\nOf the Australian aborigines we are told that some tribes and\nfamilies display on nearly all occasions honesty and\ntruthfulness, whereas others \"seem almost destitute of the better\nqualities.\"[65] According to Mr. Mathew, they are not wantonly\nuntruthful, although one can rely on them being faithful to a\ntrust only on condition that they are exempt from strong\ntemptation.[66] Mr. Curr admits that under some circumstances\nthey are treacherous, and that it costs them little pain to lie;\nbut from his own observations he has no doubt that the black\nfeels, in the commencement of his career at least, that lying is\nwrong.[67] Mr. Howitt has found the South Australian Kurnai \"to\ncompare not unfavourably with our own people in their narration\nof occurrences, or as witnesses in courts of justice as to facts.\nAmong them a person known to disregard truth is branded as a liar\n(_jet-bolan_).\"[68] Among the aborigines of New South Wales\npeople who cause strife by lying are punished, and \"liars are\nmuch disliked\"; Dr. Fraser was assured by a person who had had\nmuch intercourse with them for thirty years that he never knew\nthem to tell a lie.[69] Among the tribes of Western Victoria\ndescribed by Mr. Dawson liars are detested; should any man,\nthrough lying, get others into trouble, he is punished with the\nboomerang, whilst women and young people, for the same fault, are\nbeaten with a stick.[70] In his description of his expeditions\ninto Central Australia Eyre writes, \"In their intercourse with\neach other I {79} have generally found the natives to speak the\ntruth and act with honesty, and they will usually do the same\nwith Europeans if on friendly terms with them.\"[71] With regard\nto West Australian tribes Mr. Chauncy states that they are\ncertainly not remarkable for their treachery, and that he has\nvery seldom known any of them accused of it. He adds that they\nare \"habitually honest among themselves, if not truthful,\" and\nthat, during his many years' acquaintance with them, he does not\nremember ever hearing a native utter a falsehood with a definite\nidea of gaining anything by it. \"If questioned on any subject, he\nwould form his reply rather with the view of pleasing the\nenquirer than of its being true; but this was attributable to his\npoliteness.\"[72] According to a late Advocate-General of West\nAustralia, \"when a native is accused of any crime, he often\nacknowledges his share in the transaction with perfect\ncandour.\"[73] Very different from these accounts is Mr. Gason's\nstatement concerning the Dieyerie in South Australia. \"A more\ntreacherous race,\" he says, \"I do not believe exists. They imbibe\ntreachery in infancy, and practise it until death, and have no\nsense of wrong in it. . . . They seem to take a delight in lying,\nespecially if they think it will please you. Should you ask them\nany question, be prepared for a falsehood, as a matter of course.\nThey not only lie to the white man, but to each other, and do not\nappear to see any wrong in it.\"[74] The natives of Botany Bay and\nPort Jackson in New South Wales are by older writers described as\nno strangers to falsehood.[75] And speaking of a tribe in North\nQueensland, Mr. Lumholtz observed that \"an Australian native can\nbetray anybody,\" and that \"there is not one among them who will\nnot lie if it is to his advantage.\"[76]\n\n[Footnote 65: Brough Smyth, _Aborigines of Victoria_, i. 25.]\n\n[Footnote 66: Mathew, 'Australian Aborigines,' in _Jour. and\nProceed. Roy. Soc. N.S. Wales_, xxiii. 387.]\n\n[Footnote 67: Curr, _Australian Race_, i. 43, 100.]\n\n[Footnote 68: Fison and Howitt, _Kamilaroi and Kurnai_, p. 256.]\n\n[Footnote 69: Fraser, _Aborigines of New South Wales_, pp. 41, 90.]\n\n[Footnote 70: Dawson, _Australian Aborigines_, p. 76.]\n\n[Footnote 71: Eyre, _Expeditions of Discovery into Central\nAustralia_, ii. 385.]\n\n[Footnote 72: Chauncy, quoted by Brough Smyth, _op. cit._ ii.\n275, 281. _Cf._ Oldfield, 'Aborigines of Australia,' in _Trans.\nEthn. Soc._ N.S. iii. 255.]\n\n[Footnote 73: Moore, quoted by Brough Smyth, _op. cit._ ii. 278.]\n\n[Footnote 74: Gason, 'Dieyerie Tribe of Australian Aborigines,'\nin Woods, _Native Tribes of South Australia_, p. 257 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 75: Collins, _English Colony in New South Wales_, i.\n600. Barrington, _History of New South Wales_, p. 22.]\n\n[Footnote 76: Lumholtz, _Among Cannibals_, p. 100.]\n\nAccording to Mr. Hale, the Polynesians are not naturally\ntreacherous, by no means from a horror of deception, but\napparently from a mere inaptitude at dissembling; and it is said\nthat the word of a Micronesian may generally be relied upon.[77]\nTo the Tonga Islanders a false accusation appeared more horrible\nthan deliberate murder does to us, and they also put this {80}\nprinciple into practice.[78] We are told by Polack that among the\nMaoris of New Zealand lying is universally practised by all\nclasses, and that an accomplished liar is accounted a man of\nconsummate ability.[79] But Dieffenbach found that, if treated\nwith honesty, they were always ready to reciprocate such\ntreatment;[80] and, according to another authority, they believed\nin an evil spirit whom they said was \"a liar and the father of\nlies.\"[81] The broad statement made by von Jhering, that among\nthe South Sea Islanders lying is regarded as a harmless and\ninnocent play of the imagination,[82] is certainly not correct.\nThe treacherous disposition attributed to the Caroline\nIslanders[83] and the natives of New Britain[84] does not imply\nso much as that. The New Caledonians are, comparatively speaking,\n\"not naturally dishonest.\"[85] The Solomon Islanders are praised\nas faithful and reliable workmen and servants,[86] though\ncheating in trade is nowadays very common among some of them.[87]\nOf the people of Erromanga, in the New Hebrides, the Rev. H. A.\nRobertson states that \"truth, in heathenism, was told only when\nit suited best, but,\" he adds, \"it is not that natives are always\nreckless about the truth so much as that they seem utterly\nincapable of stating anything definitely, or stating a thing just\nas it really occurred.\"[88] In the opinion of some authorities,\nthe Fijians are very untruthful and regard adroit lying as an\naccomplishment.[89] Their propensity to lie, says the missionary\nWilliams, \"is so strong that they seem to have no wish to deny\nits existence, or very little shame when convicted of a\nfalsehood.\" The universal prevalence of the habit of lying is so\nthoroughly taken for granted, \"that it is common to hear, after\nthe most ordinary statement, the rejoinder, 'That's a lie,' or\nsomething to the same effect, at which the accused person does\nnot think of taking offence.\" But the same writer adds:--\"Natives\nhave often told me lies, manifestly without any ill-will, and\nwhen it would have been far more to their advantage to have\nspoken the truth. The Fijians hail as agreeable companions those\nwho are {81} skilful in making tales, but, under some\ncircumstances, strongly condemn the practice of falsehood. . . .\nOn matters most lied about by civilised people, the native is the\nreadiest to speak the truth. Thus, when convicted of some\noffence, he rarely attempts to deny it, but will generally\nconfess all to any one he esteems. . . . The following incident\nshows that lying _per se_ is condemned and considered\ndisreputable. A white man, notorious for falsehood, had\ndispleased a powerful chief, and wrote asking me to intercede for\nhim. I did so; when the chief dismissed the case briefly, saying,\n'Tell--that no one hates a foreigner; but tell him that every one\nhates a liar!'\"[90] Other writers even deny that the Fijians were\nhabitual liars;[91] and Erskine found that those chiefs with whom\nhe had to deal were so open to appeals to their good faith as to\nconvince him \"that they had a due appreciation of the virtue of\ntruth.\"[92]\n\n[Footnote 77: Hale, _U.S. Exploring Expedition, Vol. VI.\nEthnography and Philology_, pp. 16, 73.]\n\n[Footnote 78: Mariner, _Natives of the Tonga Islands_, ii. 163\n_sq._]\n\n[Footnote 79: Polack, _Manners and Customs of the New\nZealanders_, ii. 102 _sq._ See also Colenso, _Maori Races of New\nZealand_, pp. 44, 46.]\n\n[Footnote 80: Dieffenbach, _Travels in New Zealand_, ii. 109.]\n\n[Footnote 81: Yate, _Account of New Zealand_, p. 145.]\n\n[Footnote 82: von Jhering, _Der Zweck im Recht_, ii. 606.]\n\n[Footnote 83: Angas, _Polynesia_, p. 386.]\n\n[Footnote 84: Powell, _Wanderings in a Wild Country_, p. 262.]\n\n[Footnote 85: Anderson, _Travel in Fiji and New Caledonia_, p. 233.]\n\n[Footnote 86: Parkinson, _Zur Ethnographie der nordwestlichen\nSalomo Inseln_, p. 4.]\n\n[Footnote 87: Sommerville, 'Ethnogr. Notes in New Georgia,' in\n_Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxvi. 393.]\n\n[Footnote 88: Robertson, _Erromanga_, p. 384 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 89: Wilkes, _U.S. Exploring Expedition_, iii. 76.]\n\n[Footnote 90: Williams and Calvert, _Fiji_, p. 107 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 91: Erskine, _Cruise among the Islands of the Western\nPacific_, p. 264. Anderson, _Travel in Fiji and New Caledonia_,\np. 130.]\n\n[Footnote 92: Erskine, _op. cit._ p. 264.]\n\nNowhere in the savage world is truth held in less estimation than\namong many of the African races. The Negroes are described as\ncunning and liars by nature.[93] They \"tell a lie more readily\nthan they tell the truth,\" and falsehood \"is not recognised\namongst them as a fault.\"[94] They lie not only for the sake of\ngaining some advantage by it, or in order to please or amuse, but\ntheir lies are often said to be absolutely without purpose.[95]\nOf the natives of the Gold Coast the old traveller Bosman says,\n\"The Negroes are all, without exception, crafty, villainous and\nfraudulent, and very seldom to be trusted, being sure to slip no\nopportunity of cheating an European, nor indeed one another.\"[96]\nAmong all the Bakalai tribes \"lying is thought an enviable\naccomplishment.\"[97] The Bakongo, in their answers, \"will\ngenerally try and tell the questioner what they think will please\nhim most, quite ignoring the truthfulness we consider it\nnecessary to observe in our replies.\"[98] Miss Kingsley's\nexperience of West African natives is likewise that they \"will\nsay 'Yes' to any mortal thing, if they think you want them\nto.\"[99] The Wakamba are described as great liars.[100] {82}\nAmong the Waganda \"truth is held in very low estimation, and it\nis never considered wrong to tell lies; indeed, a successful liar\nis considered a smart, clever fellow, and rather admired.\"[101]\nUntruthfulness is said to be \"a national characteristic\" of the\ntribes inhabiting the region of Lake Nyassa.[102] From his\nexperience of the Eastern Central Africans, the Rev. D. Macdonald\nwrites: \"'Telling lies' is much practised and is seldom\nconsidered a fault. . . . The negro often thinks that he is\nflattered by being accused of falsehood. So, when natives wish to\npay a high compliment to a European who has told them an\ninteresting story, they look into his face and say, 'O father,\nyou are a great liar.'\"[103] To the Wanika, says Mr. New, lying\nis \"almost as the very breath of their nostrils, and all classes,\nyoung and old, male and female, indulge in it. A great deal of\ntheir lying is without cause or object; it is lying for lying's\nsake. You ask a man his name, his tribe, where he lives, or any\nother simple question of like nature, and the answer he gives you\nwill, as a rule, be the very opposite to the truth; yet he has\nnothing to evade or gain by so doing. Lying seems to be more\nnatural to him than speaking the truth. He lies when detection is\nevident, and laughs at it as though he thought it a good joke. He\nhears himself called a _mulongo_ (liar) a score of times a day,\nbut he notices it not, for there is no opprobrium in the term to\nhim. To hide a fault he lies with the most barefaced audacity and\nblindest obstinacy. . . . When his object is gain, he will invent\nfalsehoods wholesale. . . . He boasts that _ulongo_ (lying) is\nhis _pesa_ (piece, ha'pence), and holds bare truth to be the most\nunprofitable commodity in the world. But while he lies\ncauselessly, objectlessly, recklessly in self-defence or for\nself-interest, he is not a malicious liar. He does not lie with\nexpress intent to do others harm; this he would consider immoral,\nand he has sufficient goodness of heart to avoid indulging\ntherein. . . . I have often been struck with the manner in which\nhe has controlled his tongue when the character and interest of\nothers have been at stake.\"[104] If a Bantu of South-Eastern\nAfrica \"undertakes the charge of any form of property, he\naccounts for it with as great fidelity as if he were the Keeper\nof the Great Seal. But, on the other hand, there are many\ncircumstances in which falsehood is not reckoned even a disgrace,\nand if a man could {83} extricate himself from difficulties by\nlying and did not do so, he would be simply thought a fool.\"[105]\nAndersson speaks of the \"lying habits\" of the Herero.[106] Of the\nBachapins, a Bechuana tribe, Burchell observes that among their\nvices a universal disregard for truth and a want of honourable\nadherence to their promise stand high above the rest, the\nconsequence of this habitual practice of lying being \"the absence\nof shame, even on being detected.\"[107] Among the Kafirs\n\"deception is a practised art from early childhood; even the\nchildren will not answer a plain question.\"[108] It is considered\na smart thing to deceive so long as a person is not found out,\nbut it is awkward to be detected; hence a native father will\nenjoy seeing his children deceive people cleverly.[109] \"In\ntrading with them, you may make up your mind that all they tell\nyou is untrue, and act accordingly. . . . Your own natives, on\nthe other hand, if they like you, will lie for your benefit as\nstrongly as the opposite party against you; and both sides think\nit all fair trade.\"[110] And in a Kafir lawsuit \"defendant,\nplaintiff, and witnesses are allowed to tell as many lies as they\nlike, in order to make the best of their case.\"[111] But we also\nhear that Kafirs do not tell lies to their chiefs, and that there\nare many among them who would never deceive a white man whom they\nare fond of or respect.[112] Among the Bushmans veracity is said\nto be too often, yet not always, disregarded, \"and the neglect of\nit considered a mere venial offence.\"[113] \"The first version of\nwhat a Bushman or any native has to say can never be relied on;\nwhatever you ask him about, he invariably says first, 'I don't\nknow,' and then promises to tell you all he does know. Ask him\nfor news, and he says, 'No; we have got no news,' and shortly\nafterwards he will tell you news of perhaps great interest.\"[114]\nIn Madagascar there was no stigma attached to deceit or fraud;\nthey \"were rather admired as proofs of superior cunning, as\nthings to be imitated, so far at least as they would not bring\nthe offender within the penalties of the native laws.\"[115] Ellis\nsays that \"the best sign of genius in children is esteemed a\nquickness to deceive, {84} overreach and cheat. The people\ndelight in fabulous tales, but in none so much or universally as\nin those that relate instances of successful deceit or fraud. . . .\nTheir constant aim is, in business to swindle, in professed\nfriendship to extort, and in mere conversation to exaggerate and\nfabricate.\"[116] These statements refer to the Hovas; but among\nthe Betsileo, inhabiting the same island, lying and cheating are\nequally rife, and \"neither appears to have been thought a sin, so\nlong as it remained undiscovered.\"[117] At the same time many of\nthe Madagascar proverbs are designed to put down lying, and to\nshow that truth is always best.[118]\n\n[Footnote 93: Baker, _Albert N'yanza_, i. 289. Burton, _Mission\nto Gelele_, ii. 199.]\n\n[Footnote 94: Reade, _Savage Africa_, p. 580.]\n\n[Footnote 95: H\u00fcbbe-Schleiden, _Ethiopien, Studien \u00fcber\nWest-Afrika_, p. 186 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 96: Bosman, _New Description of the Coast of Guinea_,\np. 100.]\n\n[Footnote 97: Du Chaillu, _Explorations and Adventures in\nEquatorial Africa_, p. 390. _Cf._ _ibid._ p. 331.]\n\n[Footnote 98: Ward, _Five Years with the Congo Cannibals_, p. 47.]\n\n[Footnote 99: Kingsley, _Travels in West Africa_, p. 525.]\n\n[Footnote 100: Krapf, _Travels in Eastern Africa_, p. 355.]\n\n[Footnote 101: Wilson and Felkin, _Uganda_, i. 224. _Cf._ Felkin,\n'Notes on the Waganda Tribe,' in _Proceed. Roy. Soc. Edinburgh_,\nxiii. 722; Ashe, _Two Kings of Uganda_, p. 295.]\n\n[Footnote 102: Macdonald, 'East Central African Customs,' in\n_Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxii. 119.]\n\n[Footnote 103: Macdonald, _Africana_, i. 262 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 104: New, _Life, Wanderings, and Labours in Eastern\nAfrica_, p. 96 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 105: Macdonald, _Light in Africa_, p. 211.]\n\n[Footnote 106: Andersson, _Lake Ngami_, p. 217. _Cf._ _ibid._\np. 499 (Bayeye).]\n\n[Footnote 107: Burchell, _Travels in the Interior of Southern\nAfrica_, ii. 553 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 108: Holden, _The Past and Future of the Kaffir Races_,\np. 179.]\n\n[Footnote 109: Kidd, _The Essential Kafir_, p. 285.]\n\n[Footnote 110: Leslie, _Among the Zulus and Amatongas_, p. 199.\n_Cf._ _ibid._ p. 202.]\n\n[Footnote 111: Maclean, _Compendium of Kafir Laws and Customs_,\np. 58.]\n\n[Footnote 112: Kidd, _The Essential Kafir_, p. 286.]\n\n[Footnote 113: Burchell, _op. cit._ ii. 54.]\n\n[Footnote 114: Chapman, _Travels in the Interior of South\nAfrica_, i. 76 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 115: Sibree, _The Great African Island_, p. 338.]\n\n[Footnote 116: Ellis, _History of Madagascar_, i. 143 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 117: Sibree, _op. cit._ p. 125. Shaw, 'Betsileo,' in\n_Antananarivo Annual_, iii. 79.]\n\n[Footnote 118: Clemes, 'Malagasy Proverbs,' _ibid._ iv. 29.]\n\nBut in Africa, also, there are many peoples who have been\ndescribed as regardful of truth and hostile to falsehood. Early\ntravellers speak very highly of the sincerity of the Hottentots.\nFather Tachart says that they have more honesty than is almost\nanywhere found among Christians;[119] and Kolben agrees with him,\nasserting that the word of a Hottentot is sacred, and that there\nis hardly anything upon earth which he looks upon as a fouler\ncrime than breach of engagement.[120] According to Barrow, the\nHottentots are perfectly honest and faithful, and, \"if accused of\ncrimes of which they have been guilty, they generally divulge the\ntruth.\"[121] Of the Manansas Dr. Holub states that, so far as his\nexperience goes, they are beyond the average for honesty and\nfidelity, and are consequently laughed at by the more powerful\ntribes as \"the simpletons of the North.\"[122] The Bahima in the\nUganda Protectorate are usually very honest and truthful, and\nmost of the Nandi think it very wicked to tell a lie.[123] Among\nthe For tribe of Central Africa \"lying is held to be a great\ncrime; even the youngest children are severely beaten for it, and\nany one over fifteen or sixteen who is an habitual liar suffers\nthe loss of one lip as a penalty.\"[124] Speaking of the natives\nof Sierra Leone, Winterbottom remarks that, in proportion as we\nadvance into the interior of the country, the people are found to\nbe more devoid of art and more free from suspicion.[125] \"Those\nwho have dealings with the F\u00e1n universally {85} prefer them in\npoint of honesty and manliness to the Mpongwe and Coast races,\"\nand it is an insult to call one of them a liar or coward.[126]\nMonrad, who wrote in the beginning of the nineteenth century,\nasserts that among the Negroes of Accra lying is by no means\ncommon and that they are as a rule honest towards their own\npeople.[127] According to an early authority, the people of Great\nBenin were very straightforward and did not cheat each\nother.[128] Mr. and Mrs. Hinde write that the Masai are as a race\ntruthful, and that a grown-up person among them will not lie; \"he\nmay refuse to answer a question, but, once given, his word can be\ndepended on.\"[129] Dr. Baumann, on the other hand, says that they\noften lie, but that they regard lying as a great fault.[130] The\nGuanches of the Canary Islands are stated to have been \"slaves to\ntheir word.\"[131] Of the Berbers of Morocco Leo Africanus\nwrites:--\"Most honest people they are, and destitute of all fraud\nand guile. . . . They keep their couenant most faithfully;\ninsomuch that they had rather die than breake promise.\"[132] M.\nDyveyrier found the same virtue among the Touareg, another Berber\npeople:--\"La fid\u00e9lit\u00e9 aux promesses, aux trait\u00e9s, est pouss\u00e9e si\nloin par les Touareg, qu il est difficile d'obtenir d'eux des\nengagements. . . . Il est de maxime chez les Tou\u00e2reg, en mati\u00e8re\nde contrat, de ne s'engager que pour la moiti\u00e9 de ce qu'on peut\ntenir, afin de ne pas s'exposer au reproche d'infid\u00e9lit\u00e9. . . .\nLe mensonge, le vol domestique et l'abus de confiance sont\ninconnus des Tou\u00e2reg.\"[133] As regards the truthfulness of the\nAfrican Arabs opinions vary. Parkyns asks, \"Who is more\ntrustworthy than the desert Arab?\"[134] According to Rohlfs and\nChavanne, on the other hand, the Arabs of the Sahara are much\naddicted to lying;[135] and of the Arabs of Egypt Mr. St. John\nobserves:--\"There is no general appreciation of a man's word. . . .\n'Liar' is a playful appellative scarcely reproachful; and 'I\nhave told a lie' a confession that may be made without a\nblush.\"[136] Herodotus' statement that \"the Arabs observe pledges\nas religiously as any people,\"[137] is true of the Bedouins of\nArabia in the {86} present day. \"No vice or crime is more\ndeservedly stigmatised as infamous among Bedouins than treachery.\nAn individual in the great Arabian Desert will be forgiven if he\nshould kill a stranger on the road, but eternal disgrace would be\nattached to his name, if it were known that he had robbed his\ncompanion, or his protected guest, even of a handkerchief.\"[138]\nWallin affirms that you may put perfect trust in the promise of a\nBedouin, as soon as you have eaten salt and bread with him.[139]\nBut whilst faithfulness to a tacit or express promise is thus\nregarded by him as a sacred duty, lying and cheating are as\nprevalent in the desert as in the market-towns of Syria.[140]\nSpeaking of the Bedouins of the Euphrates, Mr. Blunt\nobserves:--\"Truth, in ordinary matters, is not regarded as a\nvirtue by the Bedouins, nor is lying held shameful. Every man,\nthey say, has a right to conceal his own thought. In matters of\nimportance, the simple affirmation is confirmed by an oath, and\nthen the fact stated may be relied on. There is only one\nexception to the general rule of lying among them. The Bedouin,\nif questioned on the breed of his mare, will not give a false\nanswer. He may refuse to say, or he may answer that he does not\nknow; but he will not name another breed than that to which she\nreally belongs. . . . The rule, however, does not hold good on\nany other point of horse dealing. The age, the qualities, and the\nownership of the horse may be all falsely stated.\"[141]\n\n[Footnote 119: Tachart, quoted by Kolben, _Present State of the\nCape of Good Hope_, i. 167.]\n\n[Footnote 120: _Ibid._ i. 59.]\n\n[Footnote 121: Barrow, _Travels into the Interior of Southern\nAfrica_, i. 151 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 122: Holub, _Seven Years in South Africa_, ii. 209.]\n\n[Footnote 123: Johnston, _Uganda Protectorate_, ii. 630, 879.]\n\n[Footnote 124: Felkin, in _Proceed. Roy. Soc. Edinburgh_,\nxiii. 232.]\n\n[Footnote 125: Winterbottom, _Account of the Native Africans in\nthe Neighbourhood of Sierra Leone_, i. 206 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 126: Burton, _Two Trips to Gorilla Land_, i. 225 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 127: Monrad, _Guinea-Kysten og dens Indbyggere_, p. 6.]\n\n[Footnote 128: Quoted by Ling Roth, _Great Benin_, p. 45.]\n\n[Footnote 129: Hinde, _The Last of the Masai_, p. 34.]\n\n[Footnote 130: Baumann, _Durch Massailand_, p. 165.]\n\n[Footnote 131: Bory de St. Vincent, _Essais sur les Isles\nFortun\u00e9es_, p. 70.]\n\n[Footnote 132: Leo Africanus, _History and Description of\nAfrica_, i. 183.]\n\n[Footnote 133: Dyveyrier, _Exploration du Sahara_, p. 384 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 134: Parkyns, _Life in Abyssinia_, ii. 182.]\n\n[Footnote 135: Chavanne, _Die Sahara_, p. 392.]\n\n[Footnote 136: St. John, _Adventures in the Lybian Desert_, p. 31.]\n\n[Footnote 137: Herodotus, iii. 8.]\n\n[Footnote 138: Burckhardt, _Notes on the Bedouins and Wah\u00e1bys_,\np. 190 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 139: Wallin, _Reseanteckningar fr\u00e5n Orienten_, iii. 116.]\n\n[Footnote 140: Burckhardt, _op. cit._ p. 104 _sq._ _Cf._ Wallin,\n_op. cit._ iv. 89 _sq._; Doughty, _Arabia Deserta_, i. 241.]\n\n[Footnote 141: Blunt, _Bedouin Tribes of the Euphrates_, ii. 203\n_sq._ _Cf._ Niebuhr, _Travels through Arabia_, ii. 302:--\"There\nis no instance of false testimony given in respect to the descent\nof a horse. Every Arabian is persuaded that himself and his whole\nfamily would be ruined, if he should prevaricate in giving his\noath in an affair of such consequence.\"]\n\nVarious statements of travellers thus directly contradict the\ncommon opinion that want of truthfulness is mostly a\ncharacteristic of uncivilised races.[142] And we have much reason\nto assume that a foreigner visiting a savage tribe is apt rather\nto underrate than to overestimate its veracity. Mr. Savage Landor\ngives us a curious insight into an explorer's method of testing\nit. \"If you were to say to an Ainu, 'You are old, are you not?'\nhe would answer {87}'Yes'; but if you asked the same man, 'You\nare not old, are you?' he would equally answer 'Yes.'\" And then\ncomes the conclusion:--\"Knowingly speaking the truth is not one\nof their characteristics; indeed, they do not know the difference\nbetween falsehood and truth.\"[143] It is hardly surprising to\nhear from other authorities that the Ainu are remarkably honest,\nand regard veracity as one of the most imperative duties.[144]\nSpeaking of the Uaup\u00e9s and other Brazilian tribes, Mr. Wallace\nobserves:--\"In my communications and inquiries among the Indians\non various matters, I have always found the greatest caution\nnecessary, to prevent one's arriving at wrong conclusions. They\nare always apt to affirm that which they see you wish to believe,\nand, when they do not at all comprehend your question, will\nunhesitatingly answer, 'Yes.'\"[145] Savages who are inclined to\ngive inaccurate answers to questions made by strangers, may\nnevertheless be truthful towards each other. As the regard for\nlife and property, so the regard for truth varies according as\nthe person concerned is a foreigner or a tribesman. \"Perfidy and\nfaithlessness,\" says Crawfurd, \"are vices of the Indian\nislanders, and those vices of which they have been most\nfrequently accused by strangers. This sentence against them must,\nhowever, be understood with some allowances. In their domestic\nand social intercourse, they are far from being a deceitful\npeople, but in reality possess more integrity than it is\nreasonable to look for with so much misgovernment and barbarity.\nIt is in their intercourse with strangers and with enemies that,\nlike other barbarians, the treachery of their character is\ndisplayed.\"[146] The natives of the interior of Sumatra are\n\"dishonest in their dealings with strangers, which they esteem no\nmoral defect.\"[147] Dalager states that the same Greenlanders\nwho, among themselves, in the sale of an object {88} which, the\nbuyer had not seen, would depreciate it rather than overpraise\nit--even though the seller was anxious to get rid of it--told\nfrightful lies in their transactions with Danish traders.[148]\nThe Touareg, whilst scrupulously faithful to a promise given to\none of their own people, do not regard as binding a promise given\nto a Christian;[149] and their Arab neighbours say that their\nword, \"like water fallen on the sand, is never to be found\nagain.\"[150] The Masai, according to Herr Merker, hold any kind\nof deceit to be allowable in their relations with persons of\nanother race.[151] The Hovas of Madagascar even considered it a\nduty for anyone speaking with foreigners on political matters to\nstate the exact opposite to the truth, and punished him who did\notherwise.[152]\n\n[Footnote 142: Burton, _City of the Saints_, p. 130. Vierkandt,\n_Naturv\u00f6lker und Kulturv\u00f6lker_, p. 273. von Jhering, _Der Zweck\nim Recht_, ii. 606.]\n\n[Footnote 143: Landor, _Alone with the Hairy Ainu_, p. 283.]\n\n[Footnote 144: Holland, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ iii. 237. von\nSiebold, _Aino auf der Insel Yesso_, p. 25.]\n\n[Footnote 145: Wallace, _Travels on the Amazon_, p. 494 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 146: Crawfurd, _op. cit._ i. 71 _sq._ _Cf._ Christian,\n_Caroline Islands_, p. 71 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 147: Marsden, _op. cit._ p. 208.]\n\n[Footnote 148: Dalager, _op. cit._ p. 60 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 149: von Bary, quoted by Chavanne, _Die Sahara_, p. 186.]\n\n[Footnote 150: Dubois, _Timbuctoo_, p. 231.]\n\n[Footnote 151: Merker, _Die Masai_, p. 115.]\n\n[Footnote 152: Ellis, _History of Madagascar_, i. 144. Professor\nStanley Hall observes ('Children's Lies,' in _American Journal of\nPsychology_, iii. 62) that \"truth for our friends and lies for\nour enemies is a practical, though not distinctly conscious rule\nwidely current with children.\"]\n\nIn point of truthfulness savages are in many cases superior to\nnations more advanced in culture. \"A Chinese,\" says Mr. Wells\nWilliams, \"requires but little motive to falsify, and he is\nconstantly sharpening his wits to cozen his customer--wheedle him\nby promises and cheat him in goods or work.\"[153] His ordinary\nspeech is said to be so full of insincerity that it is very\ndifficult to learn the truth in almost any case.[154] He feels no\nshame at being detected in a lie, nor does he fear any punishment\nfrom his gods for it;[155] if you call him a liar, \"you arouse in\nhim no sense of outrage, no sentiment of degradation.\"[156] Yet\nthe moral teachings of the Chinese inculcate truthfulness as a\nstringent duty. One of their injunctions is, \"Let children always\nbe taught to speak the simple truth.\"[157] Many sayings may be\nquoted from Confucius in which sincerity is celebrated as highly\nand demanded as urgently as it ever was by any {89} Christian\nmoralist. Faithfulness and sincerity, he said, should be held as\nfirst principles. Sincerity is the way of Heaven, the end and\nbeginning of things, without which there would be nothing. It is\nas necessary to truly virtuous conduct as a boat is to a man\nwishing to cross a river, or as oars are to a boat. The superior\nman ought to feel shame when his conduct is not in accord with\nhis words.[158] But there are instances in which sincerity has to\nyield to family duties: a father should conceal the misconduct of\nhis son, and a son that of his father.[159] Moreover, the great\nmoralists themselves did not always act up to their lofty\nprinciples. Confucius and Mencius sometimes did not hesitate to\ntell a lie for the sake of convenience.[160] The former could\nexcuse himself from seeing an unwelcome visitor on the ground\nthat he was sick, when there was nothing the matter with\nhim;[161] and he deliberately broke an oath which he had sworn,\nbecause it had been forced from him.[162] In Japan, Burma, and\nSiam, truth is more respected than in China. \"In love of truth,\"\nsays Professor Rein, \"the Japanese, so far as my experience goes,\nare not inferior to us Europeans.\" [163] The Burmese, though\npartial to much exaggeration, are generally truthful.[164] And\n\"the mendacity so characteristic of Orientals is not a national\ndefect among the Siamese. Lying, no doubt, is often resorted to\nas a protection against injustice and oppression, but the chances\nare greatly in favour of truth when evidence is sought.\"[165]\n\n[Footnote 153: Wells Williams, _The Middle Kingdom_, i. 834.]\n\n[Footnote 154: Smith, _Chinese Characteristics_, p. 271.]\n\n[Footnote 155: Cooke, _China_, p. 414. Edkins, _Religion in\nChina_, p. 122. Bowring, _Siam_, i. 106. Wells Williams, _op.\ncit._ i. 834.]\n\n[Footnote 156: Smith, _Chinese Characteristics_, p. 271.]\n\n[Footnote 157: Wells Williams, _op. cit._ i. 522.]\n\n[Footnote 158: _Lun Y\u00fc_, i. 8. 2; vii. 24; ix. 24; xii. 10. 1;\nxv. 5. 2. _Chung Yung_, xx. 18. Douglas, _Confucianism and\nTaouism_, pp. 103, 114, 146. Legge, _Chinese Classics_, i. 100.]\n\n[Footnote 159: _Lun Y\u00fc_, xiii. 18. 2.]\n\n[Footnote 160: Legge, _Chinese Classics_, i. 100. Smith, _Chinese\nCharacteristics_, p. 267.]\n\n[Footnote 161: _Lun Y\u00fc_, vi. 13.]\n\n[Footnote 162: _Lun Y\u00fc_, xvii. 20.]\n\n[Footnote 163: Rein, _Japan_, p. 393.]\n\n[Footnote 164: MacMahon, _Far Cathay and Farther India_, p. 62.\nForbes, _British Burma_, p. 45. Fytche, _Burma Past and Present_,\nii. 67.]\n\n[Footnote 165: Bowring, _Siam_, i. 105.]\n\nLying has been called the national vice of the Hindus.[166] \"It\nis not too much to assert that the mass of Bengalis have no\nnotion of truth and falsehood.\"[167] A gentleman {90} who has\nbeen brought into the closest intimacy with natives of all\nclasses, declares \"that when a question is asked, the full\nbearing of which on themselves or those connected with them they\ncannot see, you may rely upon it that the first answer you\nreceive is false; but that, when they see that the truth cannot\ninjure themselves or any one they care for, they will speak the\ntruth.\"[168] The testimony of a Hindu is not generally regarded\nas evidence.[169] Forgery is frequently resorted to, cheating is\nrife. \"In almost all business transactions of the smallest kind a\nwritten agreement must be made on both sides, and this must be\nstamped and registered, because it is believed that a man's word\nis not binding.\"[170] Nor is a lie held disreputable, especially\nif not found out.[171] But in India, as elsewhere, the question\nwhether truth or falsehood is to be spoken depends on the\nrelationship between the speaker and the party addressed. In\ntheir relations with each other, says Sir W. H. Sleeman, members\nof a village community spoke as much truth as those of any other\ncommunity in the world, but in their relations with the\ngovernment they told as many lies; \"if a man had told a lie to\n_cheat_ his neighbour, he would have become an object of hatred\nand contempt--if he had told a lie to _save_ his neighbour's\nfields from an increase of rent or tax, he would have become an\nobject of esteem and respect.\"[172] Of the S\u00fbdra inhabitants of\nCentral India Sir John Malcolm likewise observes that \"they may\nbe said, in their intercourse with strangers and with officers of\ngovernment, to evade the truth, and often to assert positive\nfalsehoods\"; whereas, \"in their intercourse with each other,\nfalsehood is not common, and many (particularly some of the\ncultivators) are distinguished by their adherence to truth.\"[173]\nThe ancient Hindus were praised for their veracity and good\nfaith; {91} in his History of India, written in the second\ncentury of the Christian era, Arrian states that no Indian was\never known to tell an untruth.[174] In the sacred books of India\ntruthfulness is highly celebrated. \"If veracity and a thousand\nhorse-sacrifices are weighed against each other, it is found that\ntruth ranks even higher than a thousand horse-sacrifices.\"[175]\n\"Verily the gods are the truth, and man is the untruth.\"[176]\n\"There is one law which the gods do keep, namely, the truth. It\nis through this that their conquest, their glory is unassailable:\nand so, forsooth, is his conquest, his glory unassailable\nwhosoever, knowing this, speaks the truth.\"[177] Attendance on,\nor the worship of, the sacred fire means speaking the\ntruth:--\"Whosoever speaks the truth, acts as if he sprinkled that\nlighted fire with ghee; for even so does he enkindle it: and ever\nthe more increases his own vital energy, and day by day does he\nbecome better. And whosoever speaks the untruth, acts as if he\nsprinkled that lighted fire with water; for even so does he\nenfeeble it: and ever the less becomes his own vital energy, and\nday by day does he become more wicked. Let him, therefore, speak\nnothing but the truth.\"[178] Fearful denunciations are\nparticularly pronounced against those who deliver false testimony\nin a court of justice.[179] By giving false evidence concerning\nsmall cattle, a witness commits the sin of killing ten men; by\nfalse evidence concerning cows, horses, and men, he commits the\nsin of killing a hundred, a thousand, and ten thousand men\nrespectively; but by false evidence concerning land, he commits\nthe sin of killing the whole human race.[180] The sin of\nfalsehood thus admits of different degrees according to the\nmagnitude of the injury inflicted by it. Indeed, \"in some cases a\nman who, though knowing the facts to be different, gives such\nfalse evidence from a pious motive, does not lose heaven; such\nevidence they call the speech of the gods.\"[181] {92} Moreover,\n\"whenever the death of a S\u00fbdra, of a Vaisya, of a Kshatriya, or\nof a Br\u00e2hmana would be caused by a declaration of the truth, a\nfalsehood may be spoken; for such falsehood is preferable to the\ntruth.\"[182] According to Buddhist conceptions of lying, \"the\nmagnitude of the crime increases in proportion to the value of\nthe article, or the importance of the matter, about which the lie\nis told.\"[183] And it is a lesser wrong to lie in self-defence\nthan to lie with a view to procuring an advantage by injuring\none's neighbour. Thus, to deny the possession of any article, in\norder to retain it, is not a lie of a heinous description,\nwhereas to bear false witness in order that the proper owner may\nbe deprived of that which he possesses, is a lie to which a\ngreater degree of culpability is attached.[184] The Buddhist\nprecept of truthfulness is more restricted than that laid down by\nBrahmanism:--\"It is said by the Brahmans that it is not a crime\nto tell a lie on behalf of the guru, or on account of cattle, or\nto save the person's own life, or to gain the victory in any\ncontest; but this is contrary to the precept.\"[185] One of the\nconditions that make a Buddha is, never, under the influence of\ndesire and other passions, to utter a conscious lie, for the sake\nof wealth or any other advantage.[186] From the time that Gautama\nbecame a Bodhisattva, or claimant for the Buddhaship, through all\nhis births until the attainment of the Buddhaship, he never told\na lie; and \"it were easier for the sakwala [or system of worlds]\nto be blown away than for a supreme Buddha to utter an\nuntruth.\"[187] His followers are not equally scrupulous. The\nBuddhists of Ceylon, we are told, lie without compunction, and\nare not ashamed to be detected in a lie.[188] And religious\nMongols \"do not hesitate to tell lies even when saying their\nprayers.\"[189]\n\n[Footnote 166: Caldwell, _Tinnevelly Shanars_, p. 38. _Cf._\nKearns, _Tribes of South India_, pp. 64 (Reddies and Hindus\ngenerally), 68 (Reddies and Naickers); Burton, _Sindh_, pp. 197,\n284; _Idem_, _Sind Revisited_, i. 314.]\n\n[Footnote 167: Trevelyan, quoted by Wilkins, _Modern Hinduism_,\np. 401.]\n\n[Footnote 168: Wilkins, _Modern Hinduism_, p. 399 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 169: Percival, _Land of the Veda_, p. 288.]\n\n[Footnote 170: Wilkins, _op. cit._ p. 407 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 171: _Ibid._ p. 400. Caldwell, _op. cit._ p. 40.]\n\n[Footnote 172: Sleeman, _op. cit._ ii. 123. _Cf._ _ibid._ ii.\n118, 129 _sq._; Crooke, _Tribes and Castes of the North-Western\nProvinces and Oudh_, ii. 478 (H\u00e2b\u00fbra).]\n\n[Footnote 173: Malcolm, _Memoir of Central India_, ii. 171. _Cf._\nHislop, _op. cit._ p. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 174: Arrian, _Historia Indica_, xii. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 175: _Institutes of Vishnu_, viii. 36.]\n\n[Footnote 176: _Satapatha-Br\u00e2hmana_, i. 1. 1. 4; iii. 3. 2. 2.]\n\n[Footnote 177: _Ibid._ iii. 4. 2. 8. _Cf._ _ibid._ i. 1. 1. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 178: _Ibid._ ii. 2. 2. 19.]\n\n[Footnote 179: _Laws of Manu_, viii. 82.]\n\n[Footnote 180: _Gautama_, xiii. 14 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 181: _Laws of Manu_, viii. 103.]\n\n[Footnote 182: _Laws of Manu_, viii. 104.]\n\n[Footnote 183: Hardy, _Manual of Budhism_, p. 486.]\n\n[Footnote 184: _Ibid._ p. 485.]\n\n[Footnote 185: _Ibid._ p. 486.]\n\n[Footnote 186: _J\u00e2taka Tales_, p. 23.]\n\n[Footnote 187: Hardy, _op. cit._ p. 486.]\n\n[Footnote 188: Knox, quoted by Schmidt, _Ceylon_, p. 239.]\n\n[Footnote 189: Gilmour, _Among the Mongols_, p. 259.]\n\n{93} According to Zoroastrianism, truthfulness is a most sacred\nduty. Lying is a creation of the evil spirits, and the most\nefficacious weapon against it is the holy religion revealed to\nman by Zarathustra.[190] In one of the Pahlavi texts it is said\nthat when the Spirit of Wisdom was asked, \"Through how many ways\nand motives and good works do people arrive most at heaven?\" he\nanswered thus: \"The first good work is liberality, the second\ntruth.\"[191] Contracts are inviolable, both those which are\npledged with hand or pawn, and those by a mere word.[192] It is a\nduty to keep faith even with an unbeliever:--\"Break not the\ncontract, O Spitama, neither the one that thou hadst entered into\nwith one of the unfaithful, nor the one that thou hadst entered\ninto with one of the faithful who is one of thy own faith.\"[193]\nGreek historians and cuneiform inscriptions also bear witness to\nthe great detestation in which falsehood was held by the ancient\nPersians. Herodotus writes:--\"Their sons are carefully instructed\nfrom their fifth to their twentieth year in three things\nalone--to ride, to draw the bow, and to speak the truth. . . .\nThe most disgraceful thing in the world, they think, is to tell a\nlie; the next worse, to owe a debt: because, among other reasons,\nthe debtor is obliged to tell lies.\"[194] In the inscriptions of\nDarius lying is taken as representative of all evil. He is\nfavoured by Ormuzd \"because he was not a heretic, nor a liar, nor\na tyrant.\" His great fear is lest it may be thought that any part\nof the record which he has set up has been falsely related; and\nhe even abstains from narrating certain events of his reign \"lest\nto him who may hereafter peruse the tablet, the many deeds that\nhave been done by him may seem to be falsely recorded.\"[195]\nProfessor Spiegel tries to prove that {94} falsehood, not\ntruthfulness, was a national characteristic of the ancient\nEranians, to which their noblest men offered fruitless\nresistance;[196] but the facts he quotes in support of his\nopinion refer to their dealings with foreign nations, and have\nconsequently little bearing on the subject. The modern Persians\nare notorious liars, who do not even claim to be believed, and\nsmile when detected in a lie.[197] The nomad alone is faithful to\nhis word; the expression, \"I am a nomad,\" means, \"You may trust\nme.\"[198]\n\n[Footnote 190: _Bundahis_, i. 24; xxviii. 14, 16. _D\u00een\u00e2-\u00ee\nMa\u00een\u00f4g-\u00ee Khirad_, xix. 4, 6; xxx. 5; xxxvi. 29. Darmesteter, in\n_Sacred Books of the East_, iv. p. lxii. Spiegel, _Er\u00e2nische\nAlterthumskunde_, iii. 684 _sq._ Geiger, _Civilization of the\nEastern Ir[=a]nians_, i. 164 _sq._ Meyer, _Geschichte des\nAlterthums_, i. 534, 536.]\n\n[Footnote 191: _D\u00een\u00e2-\u00ee Ma\u00een\u00f4g-\u00ee Khirad_, xxxvii. 2 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 192: _Vend\u00eed\u00e2d_, iv. 5 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 193: _Yasts_, x. 2.]\n\n[Footnote 194: Herodotus, i. 136, 138. _Cf._ Stob\u00e6us,\n_Florilegium_, 44, vol. ii. 227; Xenophon, _Cyri Institutio_,\ni. 6. 33.]\n\n[Footnote 195: Rawlinson, in his translation of Herodotus, i. 262\n_sq._ n. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 196: Spiegel, _op. cit._ iii. 686.]\n\n[Footnote 197: Polak, _Persien_, i. 10. Wallin, _Reseanteckningar\nfr\u00e5n Orienten_, iv. 192, 247. Wilson, _Persian Life and Customs_,\np. 229 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 198: Polak, _op. cit._ ii. 95.]\n\nFalsehood is a prevailing vice in other Muhammedan countries\nalso. \"Constant veracity,\" says Mr. Lane, \"is a virtue extremely\nrare in modern Egypt\"; and a deceitful disposition in commercial\ntransactions is one of the most notorious faults of the\nEgyptian.[199] Mr. Lane partly ascribes this habit to the\ninfluence of Islam, which allows, and even commands, falsehood in\ncertain cases. The common Moslem doctrine is, that a lie is\npermissible when told in order to save one's own life, or to\nreconcile persons at variance with each other, or to please or\npersuade one's wife, or to obtain any advantage in a war with the\nenemies of the faith.[200] But in other cases lying was highly\nreprobated by the Prophet; and that the people have not forgotten\nits sinfulness appears from the phrase, \"No, I beg forgiveness of\nGod, it was so and so,\" which they seldom omit when retracting an\nunintentional mis-statement.[201] I think it is erroneous to\nregard the want of truthfulness among Muhammedan nations as a\nresult of their religion. The Eastern Christians and Buddhists\nare no less addicted to falsehood than the Muhammedans.[202]\n\n[Footnote 199: Lane, _Manners and Customs of the Modern\nEgyptians_, i. 382 _sq._ _Cf._ Burckhardt, _Arabic Proverbs_,\np. 100.]\n\n[Footnote 200: Lane, _Modern Egyptians_, i. 383. Muir, _Life of\nMahomet_, i. p. lxxiii. _sq._ n. [dagger].]\n\n[Footnote 201: Lane, _Modern Egyptians_, i. 383 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 202: V\u00e1mb\u00e9ry, _Der Islam im neunzehnten Jahrhundert_,\np. 232.]\n\nThe Homeric poems make us acquainted with gods and men who have\nrecourse to fraud and lying whenever it suits their purpose.[203]\nThe great Zeus makes no difficulty {95} in sending a lying dream\nto Agamemnon. Pallas Athene is guilty of gross deceit and\ntreachery to Hector; she expressly recommends dissimulation, and\nloves Odysseus on account of his deceitful character.[204] No man\ndeals more in feigned stories than this master of cunning, who\nmakes a boast of his falsehood.[205] In the period which lies\nbetween the Homeric age and the Persian wars veracity made\nperhaps some progress among the Greeks,[206] but it never became\none of their national virtues.[207] Yet in the Greek literature\ndeceit is frequently condemned as a vice, and truthfulness\npraised as a virtue.[208] Achilles expresses his horror of\nlying.[209] \"Not to tell a lie,\" was one of the maxims of\nSolon.[210] Pindar strongly censures a character like that of\nOdysseus,[211] and ends up his eulogy on Psaumis by the assurance\nthat he never would contaminate his speech with a lie.[212]\nAccording to Pythagoras, men become like gods when they speak the\ntruth.[213] According to Plato, the habit of lying makes the soul\nugly[214]; \"truth is the beginning of every good thing, both to\ngods and men.\"[215] Yet a distinction should be made between\ndifferent kinds of untruth. Though the many are too fond of\nsaying that at proper times and places falsehood may often be\nright,[216] it must be admitted that a lie is in certain cases\nuseful and not hateful, as in dealing with enemies, or when those\nwhom we call our friends in a fit of madness or illusion are\ngoing to do some harm.[217] Moreover, the rulers of the State are\nallowed to lie for the public good, just as physicians make use\nof medicines; and they will find a considerable dose of falsehood\nand deceit necessary for this purpose.[218] On the other hand, if\nthe ruler catches anybody besides himself lying in the {96}\nState, lie will punish him for introducing a practice \"which is\nequally subversive and destructive of ships or State.\"[219] Next\nto him who takes a false oath, he who tells a falsehood in the\npresence of his superiors--elders, parents, or rulers--is most\nhateful to the gods.[220]\n\n[Footnote 203: _Cf._ Kames, _Sketches of the History of Man_, iv.\n150 _sq._; Mahaffy, _Social Life in Greece_, p. 26 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 204: _Odyssey_, xiii. 331 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 205: _Ibid._ ix. 19 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 206: Schmidt, _Die Ethik der alten Griechen_, ii. 413.]\n\n[Footnote 207: _Cf._ Thucydides, iii. 83.]\n\n[Footnote 208: See Schmidt, _op. cit._ ii. 403 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 209: _Iliad_, ix. 312 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 210: Diogenes Laertius, _Vit\u00e6 philosophorum_, i. 2 (60).]\n\n[Footnote 211: Pindar, _Nemea_, viii. 26.]\n\n[Footnote 212: _Idem_, _Olympia_, iv. 17.]\n\n[Footnote 213: Stob\u00e6us, _op. cit._ xi. 25, vol. i. 312.]\n\n[Footnote 214: Plato, _Gorgias_, p. 524 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 215: _Idem_, _Leges_, v. 730.]\n\n[Footnote 216: _Ibid._ xi. 916.]\n\n[Footnote 217: Plato, _Respublica_, ii. 382.]\n\n[Footnote 218: _Ibid._ iii. 389; v. 459.]\n\n[Footnote 219: Plato, _Respublica_, iii. 389.]\n\n[Footnote 220: _Idem_, _Leges_, xi. 917. _Idem_, _Respublica_,\niii. 389.]\n\nNot without reason did the Romans of the republican age contrast\ntheir own _fides_ with the mendacity of the Greeks and the\nperfidy of the Ph[oe]nicians. \"The goddess of faith (of human and\nsocial faith),\" says Gibbon, \"was worshipped, not only in her\ntemples, but in the lives of the Romans; and if that nation was\ndeficient in the more amiable qualities of benevolence and\ngenerosity, they astonished the Greeks by their sincere and\nsimple performance of the most burdensome engagements.\"[221]\nTheir annals are adorned with signal examples of uprightness,\nwhich, though to a great extent fictitious, yet bear testimony to\nthe estimation in which that quality was held.[222] The Greeks\nhad no Regulus who \"chose to deliver himself up to a cruel death\nrather than to falsify his word to the enemy.\"[223] The basest\nforms of falsehood were severely punished by law. According to\nthe Twelve Tables, any one who had slandered or libelled another\nby imputing to him a wrongful or immoral act, was to be scourged\nto death,[224] and capital punishment was also inflicted on false\nwitnesses[225] and corrupt judges.[226] However, already before\nthe end of the Republic dishonesty, perjuries, and forgeries\nbecame common in Rome.[227]\n\n[Footnote 221: Gibbon, _History of the Decline and Fall of the\nRoman Empire_, v. 311.]\n\n[Footnote 222: _Cf._ Inge, _Society in Rome under the C\u00e6sars_,\np. 33 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 223: Cicero, _De officiis_, i. 13.]\n\n[Footnote 224: _Lex Duodecim Tabularum_, viii. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 225: _Ibid._ viii. 23. Aulus Gellius, _Noctes Attic\u00e6_,\nxx. i. 53.]\n\n[Footnote 226: _Lex Duodecim Tabularum_, ix. 3. Aulus Gellius,\n_op. cit._ xx. i. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 227: Inge, _op. cit._ p. 35.]\n\nThe ancient Scandinavians considered it disgraceful for a man to\ntell a lie, to break a promise, or to commit a treacherous\nact.[228] To kill or rob openly was a pardonable offence, if an\noffence at all; but he who did it secretly was a _nithinger_, a\n\"hateful man,\" unless indeed he afterwards {97} openly declared\nhis deed.[229] In the Irish Senchus M\u00f3r it is said that not only\nfalse witness, but lying in general, deprives the guilty person\nof \"half his honour-price up to the third time\";[230] and,\naccording to the commentary to the Book of Aicill, the double of\nhis own full honour-price is due from each person who commits the\ncrime of secret murder.[231]\n\n[Footnote 228: Maurer, _Bekehrung des Norwegischen Stammes_, ii.\n154, 183 _sq._ Rosenberg, _Nordboernes Aandsliv_, i. 487.]\n\n[Footnote 229: Wilda, _Strafrecht der Germanen_, p. 569.\nNordstr\u00f6m, _Bidrag till den svenska samh\u00e4lls-f\u00f6rfattningens\nhistoria_, ii. 320 _sqq._ Keyser, _Efterladte Skrifter_, ii. pt.\ni. 361. Rosenberg, _Nordboernes Aandsliv_, i. 487. von Amira,\n'Recht,' in Paul's _Grundriss der germanischen Philologie_, ii.\npt. ii. 173.]\n\n[Footnote 230: _Ancient Laws of Ireland_, i. 57.]\n\n[Footnote 231: _Ibid._ iii. 99.]\n\nIn the Old Testament there are recorded, from the patriarchal\nage, some cases of lying, which, far from being condemned, in no\nway prevented the liar being a special object of divine favour.\nIt must be admitted, however, that undue importance has been\nattached to some of these acts of falsehood,[232] which were\ncommitted among foreigners with a view to escaping an impending\ndanger.[233] For instance, when Isaac, dwelling in Gerar, said of\nhis wife that she was his sister, for fear lest the men of the\nplace should kill him,[234] he did a thing which few\nconscientious men under similar circumstances would hesitate to\ndo. As for Jacob's long course of double-dealing with his\nfather-in-law, who was equally greedy and unscrupulous, it should\nbe remembered that they were natives of different lands.[235]\nAgain, when Jacob, at the instigation of his mother, grossly\ndeceived his own blind father, the intriguers, as has been pointed\nout,[236] manifestly felt that the blessing extorted from Isaac\nought to descend upon Jacob rather than upon Esau, and inasmuch as\nthe word of the father was held to carry with it divine validity\nand potency, the securing of it by fair means or foul was deemed an\nurgent necessity. It is obvious that the ancient Hebrews did not\ncondemn deceit as wrong in the abstract, and that they were very\nunscrupulous in the use of means. Whenever {98} David was\nthreatened by any danger, he immediately employed a falsehood\nwhich served his turn; though not incapable of generosity, he\ndeceived enemies and friends indifferently, and there is probably\nno record of treachery and lying consistently pursued which\nsurpasses in baseness his affair with his faithful servant Uriah\nthe Hittite.[237] It is true that his conduct towards Uriah was\ncondemned; \"the thing that David had done displeased the\nLord.\"[238] But it is significant that Yahveh himself\noccasionally had recourse to deceit for the purpose of carrying\nout his plans. In order to ruin Ahab he commissioned a lying\nspirit to deceive his prophets;[239] and once he threatened to\nuse deception as a means of taking revenge upon idolaters.[240]\nBut to bear false witness against a neighbour was strictly\nprohibited;[241] the false witness should suffer the punishment\nwhich he was minded to bring upon the person whom he\ncalumniated.[242] In Ecclesiasticus lying is severely\ncensured:--\"A lie is a foul blot in a man, yet it is continually\nin the mouth of the untaught. A thief is better than a man that\nis accustomed to lie: but they both shall have destruction to\nheritage. The disposition of a liar is dishonourable, and his\nshame is ever with him.\"[243] \"Lying lips are abomination to the\nLord: but they that deal truly are his delight.\"[244] According\nto the Talmud, \"four shall not enter Paradise: the scoffer, the\nliar, the hypocrite, and the slanderer.\"[245] Only for the sake\nof peace, and especially domestic peace, may a man tell a lie\nwithout sinning;[246] but he who changes his word commits as\nheavy a sin as he who worships idols.[247] The duty of\ntruthfulness was particularly emphasised by the Essenes.[248] He\nwho entered their sect had to pledge himself always to love {99}\ntruth and strive to reclaim all liars.[249] \"They are eminent for\nfidelity,\" says Josephus. \"Whatsoever they say also is firmer\nthan an oath; but swearing is avoided by them, and they esteem it\nworse than perjury; for they say that he who cannot be believed\nwithout [swearing by] God is already condemned.\"[250]\n\n[Footnote 232: _E.g._, by McCurdy, 'Moral Evolution of the Old\nTestament,' in _American Journal of Theology_, i. 665 _sq._; von\nJhering, _Zweck im Recht_, ii. 606 _sq._; Spencer, _Principles of\nEthics_, i. 402.]\n\n[Footnote 233: _Genesis_, xii. 12 _sq._; xx. 2.]\n\n[Footnote 234: _Ibid._ xxvi. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 235: _Ibid._ ch. xxix. _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 236: McCurdy, _loc. cit._ p. 666.]\n\n[Footnote 237: _Cf._ Kuenen, _Religion of Israel_, i. 327;\nMcCurdy, _loc. cit._ p. 681.]\n\n[Footnote 238: _2 Samuel_, xi. 27; xii. 1 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 239: _1 Kings_, xxii. 20 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 240: _Ezekiel_, xiv. 7 _sqq._ _Cf._ Spencer,\n_Principles of Ethics_, i. 402.]\n\n[Footnote 241: _Deuteronomy_, v. 20.]\n\n[Footnote 242: _Ibid._ xix. 1 6 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 243: _Ecclesiasticus_, xx. 24 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 244: _Proverbs_, xii. 22.]\n\n[Footnote 245: Deutsch, _Literary Remains_, p. 57.]\n\n[Footnote 246: Hershon, _Treasures of the Talmud_, p. 69 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 247: _Sanhedrin_, fol. 92 A, quoted by Montefiore,\n_Hibbert Lectures on the Religion of the Ancient Hebrews_,\np. 558.]\n\n[Footnote 248: Philo Jud\u00e6us, _Quod liber sit quisque virtuti\nstudet_, p. 877 (_Opera_, ii. 458).]\n\n[Footnote 249: Josephus, _De bello Judaico_, ii. 8. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 250: _Ibid._ ii. 8. 6.]\\\n\n\"Speak every man truth with his neighbour,\"[251] was from early\ntimes regarded as one of the most imperative of Christian\nmaxims.[252] According to St. Augustine, a lie is not permissible\neven when told with a view to saving the life of a neighbour;\n\"since by lying eternal life is lost, never for any man's\ntemporal life must a lie be told.\"[253] Yet all lies are not\nequally sinful; the degree of sinfulness depends on the mind of\nthe liar and on the nature of the subject on which the lie is\ntold.[254] This became the authorised doctrine of the\nChurch.[255] Thomas Aquinas says that, although lying is always\nsinful, it is not a mortal sin if the end intended be not\ncontrary to charity, \"as appears in a jocose lie, that is\nintended to create some slight amusement, and in an officious\nlie, in which is intended even the advantage of our\nneighbour.\"[256] Yet from early times we meet within the\nChristian Church a much less rigorous doctrine, which soon came\nto exercise a more powerful influence on the practice and\nfeelings of men than did St. Augustine's uncompromising love of\ntruth. The Greek Fathers maintained that an untruth is not a lie\nwhen there is a \"just cause\" {100} for it; and as a just cause\nthey regarded not only self-defence, but also zeal for God's\nhonour.[257] This zeal, together with an indiscriminate devotion\nto the Church, led to those \"pious frauds,\" those innumerable\nfalsifications of documents, inventions of legends, and forgeries\nof every description, which made the Catholic Church a veritable\nseat of lying, and most seriously impaired the sense of truth in\nthe minds of Christians.[258] By a fiction, Papacy, as a divine\ninstitution, was traced back to the age of the Apostles, and in\nvirtue of another fiction Constantine was alleged to have\nabdicated his imperial authority in Italy in favour of the\nsuccessor of St. Peter.[259] The Bishop of Rome assumed the\nprivilege of disengaging men from their oaths and promises. An\noath which was contrary to the good of the Church was declared\nnot to be binding.[260] The theory was laid down that, as faith\nwas not to be kept with a tyrant, pirate, or robber, who kills\nthe body, it was still less to be kept with an heretic, who kills\nthe soul.[261] Private protestations were thought sufficient to\nrelieve men in conscience from being bound by a solemn treaty or\nfrom the duty of speaking the truth; and an equivocation, or play\nupon words in which one sense is taken by the speaker and another\nsense intended by him for the hearer, was in some cases held\npermissible.[262] According to Alfonso de' Liguori--who lived in\nthe eighteenth century and was beatified in the nineteenth, and\nwhose writings were declared by high authority not to contain a\nword that could be justly found fault with,[263]-- {101} there\nare three sorts of equivocation which may be employed for a good\nreason, even with the addition of a solemn oath. We are allowed\nto use ambiguously words having two senses, as the word _volo_,\nwhich means both to \"wish\" and to \"fly\"; sentences bearing two\nmain meanings, as \"This book is Peter's,\" which may mean either\nthat the book belongs to Peter or that Peter is the author of it;\nwords having two senses, one more common than the other or one\nliteral and the other metaphorical--for instance, if a man is\nasked about something which it is in his interest to conceal,\nhe may answer, \"No, I say,\" that is \"I say the word 'no'\"[264]\nAs for mental restrictions, again, such as are \"purely mental,\"\nand on that account cannot in any manner be discovered by other\npersons, are not permissible; but we may, for a good reason,\nmake use of a \"non-pure mental restriction,\" which, in the\nnature of things, is discoverable, although it is not discovered\nby the person with whom we are dealing.[265] Thus it would be\nwrong secretly to insert the word \"no\" in an affirmative oath\nwithout any external sign; but it would not be wrong to insert\nit in a whispering voice or under the cover of a cough. The\n\"good reason\" for which equivocations and non-pure mental\nrestrictions may be employed is defined as \"any honest object,\nsuch as keeping our goods spiritual or temporal.\"[266] In\nsupport of this casuistry it is uniformly said by Catholic\napologists that each man has a right to act upon the defensive,\nthat he has a right to keep guard over the knowledge which he\npossesses in the same way as he may defend his goods; and as for\nthere being any deceit in the matter--why, soldiers use\nstratagems in war, and opponents use feints in fencing.[267]\n\n[Footnote 251: _Ephesians_, iv. 25.]\n\n[Footnote 252: Gass, _Geschichte der christlichen Ethik_, i. 90.]\n\n[Footnote 253: St. Augustine, _De mendacio_, 6 (Migne,\n_Patrologi\u00e6 cursus_, xl. 494 _sq._).]\n\n[Footnote 254: _Idem_, _Enchiridion_, 18 (Migne, _op. cit._ xl.\n240); _Idem_, _De mendacio_, 21 (Migne, xl. 516). For St.\nAugustine's views on lying see also his treatise _Contra\nmendacium_, addressed to Consentius (Migne, xl. 517 _sqq._), and\nBindemann, _Der heilige Augustinus_, ii. 465 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 255: Gratian, _Decretum_, ii. 22. 2. 12, 17. _Catechism\nof the Council of Trent_, iii. 9. 23.]\n\n[Footnote 256: Thomas Aquinas, _Summa theologica_, ii.-ii. **110.\n3 _sq._ St. Augustine says (_De mendacio_, 2 [Migne, _op. cit._\nxl. 487 _sq._]; _Qu\u00e6stiones in Genesim_, 145, _ad Gen._ xliv. 15\n[Migne, xxxiv. 587]) that jokes which \"bear with them in the tone\nof voice, and in the very mood of the joker a most evident\nindication that he means no deceit,\" are not accounted lies,\nthough the thing he utters be not true. This statement is also\nincorporated in Gratian's _Decretum_ (ii. 22. 2. 18).]\n\n[Footnote 257: Gass, _op. cit._ i. 91, 92, 236 _sqq._ Newman,\n_Apologia pro vita sua_, p. 349 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 258: von Mosheim, _Institutes of Ecclesiastical\nHistory_, i. 275. Middleton, _Free Inquiry into the Miraculous\nPowers, which are supposed to have subsisted in the Christian\nChurch_, _passim_. Lecky, _Rise, and Influence of Rationalism in\nEurope_, i. 396 _sqq._ Gass, _op. cit._ i. 91, 235. von Eicken,\n_System der mittelalterlichen Weltanschauung_, pp. 654-656, 663.]\n\n[Footnote 259: von Eicken, _op. cit._ p. 656. Poole,\n_Illustrations of the History of Medieval Thought_, p. 249.]\n\n[Footnote 260: Gregory IX. _Decretales_, ii. 24. 27.]\n\n[Footnote 261: Simancas, _De catholicis institutionibus_, xlvi.\n52 _sq._ p. 365 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 262: Alagona, _Compendium manualis D. Navarri_, xii.\n88, p. 94 _sq._:--\"Fur, qui est furatus aliquid, si interrogetur\na judice non competenti, vel non juridice, an sit furatus tale\nquid, potest secura conscientia respondere simpliciter, non sum\nfuratus, intelligendo intra se in tali die, vel anno.\" See also\nKames, _op. cit._ iv. 158 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 263: Meyrick, _Moral and Devotional Theology of the\nChurch of Rome_, i. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 264: Alfonso de' Liguori, _Theologia moralis_, iii.\n151, vol. i. 249.]\n\n[Footnote 265: _Ibid._ iii. 152, vol. i. 249.]\n\n[Footnote 266: _Ibid._ iii. 151, vol. i. 249.]\n\n[Footnote 267: Meyrick, _op. cit._ i. 25]\n\nAdherence to truth and especially perfect fidelity to a promise\nwere strongly insisted upon by the code of Chivalry.[268] However\nexacting or absurd the vow might {102} be, a knight was compelled\nto perform it in all the strictness of the letter. A man\nfrequently promised to grant whatever another should ask, and he\nwould have lost the honour of his knighthood if he had declined\nfrom his word.[269] We are told by Lancelot du Lac that when King\nArtus had given his word to a knight to make him a present of his\nwife, he would neither listen to the lamentations of the\nunfortunate woman, nor to any representations which could be made\nhim; he replied that a king must not go from his word, and the\nqueen was accordingly delivered to the knight.[270] The knights\ntaken in war were readily allowed liberty for the time they\nasked, on their word of honour that they would return of their\nown accord, whenever it should be required.[271] So great, it is\nsaid, was the knight's respect for an oath, a promise, or a vow,\nthat when they lay under any of these restrictions, they appeared\neverywhere with little chains attached to their arms or habits to\nshow all the world that they were slaves to their word; nor were\nthese chains taken off till their promise had been performed,\nwhich sometimes extended to a term of four or five years.[272] It\ncannot be expected, of course, that reality should have always\ncome up to the ideal. In the thirteenth century the Count of\nChampagne declared that he confided more in the lowest of his\nsubjects than in his knights.[273] Moreover, the knightly duty of\nsincerity seems to have gone little beyond the formal fulfilment\nof an engagement. \"The age of Chivalry was an age of chicane, and\nfraud, and trickery, which were not least conspicuous among the\nknightly classes.\"[274] It is significant that the English law of\nthe thirteenth century, though quite willing to admit in vague\nphrase that no one should be suffered to gain anything by fraud,\nwas inclined to hold that a man has himself to thank if he is\nmisled by deceit, the king's court generally providing no remedy\nfor him who to {103} his disadvantage had trusted the word of a\nliar.[275] Towards the end of the Middle Ages and later, crimes\nagainst the Mint and the offence of counterfeiting seals, usually\naccompanied by that of forging letters or official documents,\nwere extremely common in England;[276] and false weights, false\nmeasures, and false pretences of all kinds were ordinary\ninstruments of commerce.[277]\n\n[Footnote 268: _Book of the Ordre of Chyualry_, foll. 18 b, 31 b,\n34 b. Robertson, _History of the Reign of Charles V._ i. 84.\nSainte-Palaye, _M\u00e9moires sur l'ancienne chevalerie_, i. 76 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 269: Mills, _History of Chivalry_, p. 152.]\n\n[Footnote 270: Lancelot du Lac, vol. ii. fol. 2 a.]\n\n[Footnote 271: Sainte-Palaye, _op. cit._ i. 135.]\n\n[Footnote 272: _Ibid._ i. 236 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 273: _Ibid._ ii. 47. _Cf._ Kames, _op. cit._ iv. 157.]\n\n[Footnote 274: Pike, _History of Crime in England_, i. 283.]\n\n[Footnote 275: Pollock and Maitland, _History of English Law\nbefore the Time of Edward I._ ii. 535 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 276: Pike, _op. cit._ i. 265, 269; ii. 392.]\n\n[Footnote 277: _Ibid._ i. 142; ii. 238.]\n\nIn modern times, according to Mr. Pike, the Public Records\ntestify a decrease of deception in England.[278] Commercial\nhonesty has improved, and those mean arts to which, during the\nreigns of the Tudors, even men in the highest positions\nfrequently had recourse, have now, at any rate, descended to a\nlower grade of society.[279] At present, in the civilised\ncountries of the West, opinion as to what the duty of sincerity\nimplies varies not only in different individuals, but among\ndifferent classes or groups of people, as also among different\nnations. Duplicity is held more reprehensible in a gentleman than\nin a shopkeeper or a peasant. The notion which seems to be common\nin England, that an advocate is over-scrupulous who refuses to\nsay what he knows to be false if he is instructed to say it,[280]\nappears strange at least to some foreigners;[281] and in certain\ncountries it is commonly regarded as blamable if a person\nostensibly professes a religion in which he does not believe,\nsay, by going to church. The Quakers deem all complimentary modes\nof speech, for instance in addressing people, to be objectionable\nas being inconsistent with truth.[282] Certain philosophers have\nexpressed the opinion that veracity is an unconditional duty,\nwhich is not to be limited by any expediency, but must be\nrespected in all circumstances. According to Kant, it would be a\ncrime to tell a falsehood to a murderer who asked us whether\n{104} our friend, of whom he was in pursuit, had taken refuge in\nour house.[283] Fichte maintains that the defence of so-called\nnecessary lies is \"the most wicked argument possible amongst\nmen.\"[284] Dymond says, \"If I may tell a falsehood to a robber in\norder to save my property, I may commit parricide for the same\npurpose.\"[285] But this rigorous view is not shared by common\nsense, nor by orthodox Protestant theology.[286] Jeremy Taylor\nasks, \"Who will not tell a harmless lie to save the life of his\nfriend, of his child, of himself, of a good and brave man?\"[287]\nWhere deception is designed to benefit the person deceived, says\nProfessor Sidgwick, \"common sense seems to concede that it may\nsometimes be right: for example, most persons would not hesitate\nto speak falsely to an invalid, if this seemed the only way of\nconcealing facts that might produce a dangerous shock: nor do I\nperceive that any one shrinks from telling fictions to children,\non matters upon which it is thought well that they should not\nknow the truth.\"[288] In the case of grown-up people, however,\nthis principle seems to require the modification made by\nHutcheson, that there is no wrong in false speech when the party\ndeceived himself does not consider it an injury to be\ndeceived.[289] Otherwise it might easily be supposed to give\nsupport to \"pious fraud,\" which in its crudest form is nowadays\ngenerally disapproved of, but which in subtle disguise still has\nmany advocates among religious partisans. It is argued that the\nmost important truths of religion cannot be conveyed into the\nminds of ordinary men, except by being enclosed, as it were, in a\nshell of fiction, and that by relating such fictions as if they\nwere facts we are really performing an act of substantial\nveracity.[290] But this argument seems chiefly to have been\ninvented for the {105} purpose of supporting a dilapidated\nstructure of theological teaching, and can hardly be accepted by\nany person unprejudiced by religious bias. As a means of\nself-defence deviation from truth has been justified not only in\nthe case of grosser injuries, but in the case of illegitimate\ncuriosity, as it seems unreasonable that a person should be\nobliged to supply another with information which he has no right\nto exact.[291] The obligation of keeping a promise, again, is\nqualified in various ways. Thoughtful persons would commonly\nadmit that such an obligation is relative to the promisee, and\nmay be annulled by him.[292] A promise to do an immoral act is\nheld not to be binding, because the prior obligation not to do\nthe act is paramount.[293] If, before the time comes to fulfil a\npromise, circumstances have altered so much that the effects of\nkeeping it are quite different from those which were foreseen\nwhen it was made, all would agree that the promisee ought to\nrelease the promiser; but if he declines to do so, some would say\nthat the latter is in every case bound by his promise, whilst\nothers would maintain that a considerable alteration of\ncircumstances has removed the obligation.[294] How far promises\nobtained by force or fraud are binding is a much disputed\nquestion.[295] According to Hutcheson, for instance, no regard is\ndue to a promise which has been extorted by unjust violence.[296]\nAdam Smith, on the other hand, considers that whenever such a\npromise is violated, though for the most necessary reason, it is\nalways with some degree of dishonour to the person who made\nit, and that \"a brave man ought to die rather than make a promise\n{106} which he can neither keep without folly nor violate without\nignominy.\"[297]\n\n[Footnote 278: _Ibid._ i. 264. _Cf._ _ibid._ ii. 474.]\n\n[Footnote 279: _Ibid._ ii. 14 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 280: Sidgwick, _Methods of Ethics_, p. 316. Paley,\n_Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy_, iii. 15\n(_Complete Works_, ii. 117). The same view was expressed by\nCicero (_De officiis_, ii. 14).]\n\n[Footnote 281: See also Dymond, _Essays on the Principles of\nMorals_, ii. 5, p. 50 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 282: Gurney, _Views and Practices of the Society of\nFriends_, p. 401.]\n\n[Footnote 283: Kant, 'Ueber ein vermeintes Recht, aus\nMenschenliebe zu L\u00fcgen,' in _S\u00e4mmtliche Werke_, vii.\n309.]\n\n[Footnote 284: Fichte, _Das System der Sittenlehre_, p. 371;\nEnglish translation, p. 303 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 285: Dymond, _op. cit._ ii. 6, p. 57.]\n\n[Footnote 286: Reinhard, _System der Christlichen Moral_, iii.\n193 _sqq._ Martensen, _Christian Ethics_, 'Individual Ethics,'\np. 216 _sqq._ Newman, _Apologia pro vita sua_, p. 274.]\n\n[Footnote 287: Taylor, _Whole Works_, xii. 162.]\n\n[Footnote 288: Sidgwick, _op. cit._ p. 316.]\n\n[Footnote 289: Hutcheson, _System of Moral Philosophy_, ii. 32.]\n\n[Footnote 290: Sidgwick, _op. cit._ p. 316.]\n\n[Footnote 291: Schopenhauer, _Die Grundlage der Moral_, \u00a7 17\n(_S\u00e4mmtliche Werke_, vi. 247 _sqq._).]\n\n[Footnote 292: Whewell, _Elements of Morality_, p. 156. Sidgwick,\n_op. cit._ p. 305.]\n\n[Footnote 293: Dymond, _op. cit._ ii. 6, p. 55. Whewell, _op.\ncit._ p. 156 _sq._ Sidgwick, _op. cit._ p. 305. This is also the\nopinion of Thomas Aquinas (_op. cit._ ii.-ii. 110. 3. 5).]\n\n[Footnote 294: Sidgwick, _op. cit._ p. 306 _sq._ Thomas Aquinas\nsays (_op. cit._ ii.-ii. 110. 3. 5) that a person who does not do\nwhat he has promised is excused \"if the conditions of persons and\nthings are changed.\"]\n\n[Footnote 295: Dymond, _op. cit._ ii. 6, p. 55 _sq._ Whewell,\n_op. cit._ pp. 155, 159 _sqq._ Sidgwick, _op. cit._ p. 305 _sq._\nAdam Smith, _Theory of Moral Sentiments_, p. 486 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 296: Hutcheson, _System of Moral Philosophy_, ii. 34.]\n\n[Footnote 297: Adam Smith, _op. cit._ p. 489.]\n\nIn point of veracity and good faith the old distinction between\nduties which we owe to our fellow-countrymen and such as we owe\nto foreigners is still preserved in various cases. It is\nparticularly conspicuous in the relations between different\nstates, in peace or war. Stratagems and the employment of\ndeceptive means necessary to procure intelligence respecting the\nenemy or the country are held allowable in warfare, independently\nof the question whether the war is defensive or aggressive.[298]\nDeceit has, in fact, often constituted a great share of the glory\nof the most celebrated commanders; and particularly in the\neighteenth century it was a common opinion that successes gained\nthrough a spy are more creditable to the skill of a general than\nsuccesses in regular battles.[299] Lord Wolseley writes:--\"As a\nnation we are bred up to feel it a disgrace even to succeed by\nfalsehood; the word spy conveys something as repulsive as slave;\nwe will keep hammering along with the conviction that honesty is\nthe best policy, and that truth always wins in the long run.\nThese pretty little sentences do well for a child's copy-book,\nbut the man who acts upon them in war had better sheathe his\nsword for ever.\"[300] At the same time, there are some exceptions\nto the general rule that deceit is permitted against an enemy.\nUnder the customs of war it has been agreed that particular acts\nand signs shall have a specific meaning in order that\nbelligerents {107} may carry on certain necessary intercourse,\nand it is forbidden to employ such acts or signs in deceiving an\nenemy. Thus information must not be surreptitiously obtained\nunder the shelter of a flag of truce; buildings not used as\nhospitals must not be marked with an hospital flag; and persons\nnot covered by the provisions of the Geneva Convention must not\nbe protected by its cross.[301] A curious arbitrary rule affects\none class of stratagems by forbidding certain permitted means of\ndeception from the moment at which they cease to deceive. It is\nperfectly legitimate to use the distinctive emblems of an enemy\nin order to escape from him or to draw his forces into action;\nbut it is held that soldiers clothed in the uniforms of their\nenemy must put on a conspicuous mark by which they can be\nrecognised before attacking, and that a vessel using the enemy's\nflag must hoist its own flag before firing with shot or\nshell.[302] Disobedience to this rule is considered to entail\ngrave dishonour; for \"in actual battle enemies are bound to\ncombat loyally, and are not free to ensure victory by putting on\na mask of friendship.\"[303] But, as Mr. Hall observes, it is not\neasy to see why it is more disloyal to wear a disguise when it is\nobviously useless, than when it serves its purpose.[304] Finally,\nit is universally agreed that promises given to the enemy ought\nto be kept;[305] this was admitted even by Machiavelli[306] and\nBynkershoek,[307] who did not in general burden belligerents with\nparticularly heavy duties. But the restrictions which\n\"international law\" {108} lays on deceit against enemies do not\nseem to be taken very seriously. Treaties between nations and\npromises given by one state to another, either in war or peace,\nare hardly meant to be kept longer than it is convenient to keep\nthem. And when an excuse for the breach of faith is felt\nnecessary, that excuse itself is generally a lie.\n\n[Footnote 298: _Conf\u00e9rence de Bruxelles_, art. 14. _Instructions\nfor the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field_,\nart. 16, 101. _Conf\u00e9rence internationale de la paix, La Haye_,\n1899, 'R\u00e8glement concernant les lois de la guerre sur terre,'\nart. 24, pt. i. p. 245. Roman Catholicism admits the employment\nof stratagems in wars which are just (Gratian, _op. cit._ ii. 23.\n2. 2; Ayala, _De jure et officiis bellicis et disciplina\nmilitari_, i. 8. 1 _sq._; Ferraris, quoted by Adds, _Catholic\nDictionary_, p. 945; Nys, _Le droit de la guerre et les\npr\u00e9curseurs de Grotius_, p. 128 _sq._), on the authority of St.\nAugustine, the great advocate of general truthfulness\n(_Qu\u00e6stiones in Jesum Nave_, 10, _ad Jos._ viii. 2 [Migne, _op.\ncit._ xxxiv. 781]:--\"Cum autem justum bellum susceperit, utrum\naperta pugna utrum insidiis vincat, nihil ad justitiam interest\").]\n\n[Footnote 299: Halleck, _International Law_, i. 567. Maine,\n_International Law_, p. 149 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 300: Wolseley, _Soldier's Pocket-Book for Field\nService_, p. 169.]\n\n[Footnote 301: _Conf\u00e9rence de Bruxelles_, art. 13 _sq._\n_Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States\nin the Field_, art. 101, 114, 117. _Manual of the Laws of War on\nLand, prepared by the Institute of International Law_, (art. 8\n(_d_). Hall, _Treatise on International Law_, p. 537 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 302: Hall, _op. cit._ p. 538 _sq._ Bluntschli, _Droit\ninternational_, \u00a7 565, p. 328 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 303: Bluntschli, _op. cit._ \u00a7 565, p. 329.]\n\n[Footnote 304: Hall, _op. cit._ p. 539.]\n\n[Footnote 305: Heffter, _Das Europ\u00e4ische V\u00f6lkerrecht der\nGegenwart_, \u00a7 125, p. 262.]\n\n[Footnote 306: Machiavelli, _Discorsi_, iii. 40 (_Opere_,\niii. 164).]\n\n[Footnote 307: Bynkershoek, _Qu\u00e6stiones juris publici_, i. 1,\np. 4. The maxim of Canon Law, \"Fides servanda hosti\" (Gratian,\n_Decretum_, ii. 23. i. 3), however, was greatly impaired by the\nprinciple, \"Juramentum contra utilitatem ecclesiasticam\npraestitum non tenet\" (Gregory IX. _Decretales_, ii. 24, 27. See\nNys, _Le droit de la guerre et les pr\u00e9curseurs de Grotius_,\np. 126 _sq._).]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXI\n\nTHE REGARD FOR TRUTH AND GOOD FAITH (_concluded_)\n\n\nTHE condemnation of untruthfulness and bad faith springs from a\nvariety of sources. In the first place, he who tells a lie, or\nwho breaks a promise, generally commits an injury against another\nperson. His act consequently calls forth sympathetic resentment,\nand becomes an object of moral censure.\n\nMen have a natural disposition to believe what they are told.\nThis disposition is particularly obvious in young children; it is\nacquired wisdom and experience only that teach incredulity, and,\nas Adam Smith observes, they very seldom teach it enough.[1] Even\npeople who are themselves pre-eminent liars are often deceived by\nthe falsehoods of others.[2] When detected a deception always\nimplies a conflict between two irreconcilable ideas; and such a\nconflict gives rise to a feeling of pain,[3] which may call forth\nresentment against its volitional cause, the deceiver.\n\n[Footnote 1: Reid, _Inquiry into the Human Mind_, vi. 24, p. 430\n_sqq._ Adam Smith, _Theory of Moral Sentiments_, p. 494 _sq._\nDugald Stewart, _Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers of\nMan_, ii. 340 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 2: Burton, _Two Trips to Gorilla Land_, i. 106 (Mpongwe).]\n\n[Footnote 3: Lehmann, _Hovedlovene for det menneskelige\nF\u00f8lelseliv_, p. 181. _Cf._ Bain, _Emotions and the Will_, p. 218.]\n\nBut men are not only ready to believe what they are told, they\nalso like to know the truth. Curiosity, or the love of truth, is\ncoeval with the first operations of the intellect; it seems to be\nan ultimate fact in the human {110} frame.[4] In our endeavour to\nlearn the truth we are frustrated by him who deceives us, and he\nbecomes an object of our resentment.\n\n[Footnote 4: Dugald Stewart, _op. cit._ ii. 334, 340.]\n\nNor are we injured by a deception merely because we like to know\nthe truth, but, chiefly, because it is of much importance for us\nthat we should know it. Our conduct is based upon our ideas;\nhence the erroneous notion as regards some fact in the past,\npresent, or future, which is produced by a lie or false promise,\nmay lead to unforeseen events detrimental to our interests.\nMoreover, on discovering that we have been deceived, we have the\nhumiliating feeling that another person has impertinently made\nour conduct subject to his will. This is a wound on our pride, a\nblot on our honour. Francis I. of France laid down as a\nprinciple, \"that the lie was never to be put up with without\nsatisfaction, but by a base-born fellow.\"[5] \"The lie,\" says\nSainte-Palaye, \"has always been considered the most fatal and\nirreparable affront that a man of honour could receive.\"[6]\n\n[Footnote 5: Millingen, _History of Duelling_, i. 71.]\n\n[Footnote 6: Sainte-Palaye, _M\u00e9moires sur l'ancienne chevalerie_,\ni. 78.]\n\nHow largely the condemnation of falsehood and bad faith is due to\nthe harm suffered by the victim appears from the fact that a lie\nor breach of faith is held more condemnable in proportion to the\nmagnitude of the harm caused by it. But even in apparently\ntrifling cases the reflective mind strongly insists upon the\nnecessity of truthfulness and fidelity to a given word. Every lie\nand every unfulfilled promise has a tendency to lessen mutual\nconfidence, to predispose the perpetrator to commit a similar\noffence in the future, and to serve as a bad example for others.\n\"The importance of truth,\" says Bentham, \"is so great, that the\nleast violation of its laws, even in frivolous matters, is always\nattended with a certain degree of danger. The slightest deviation\nfrom it is an attack upon the respect we owe to it. It is a first\ntransgression which facilitates a second, and familiarises the\nodious ideal {111} of falsehood.\"[7] Contrariwise, as Aristotle\nobserves, he who is truthful in unimportant matters will be all\nthe more so in important ones.[8] Similar considerations,\nhowever, require a certain amount of reflection and\nfarsightedness; hence intellectual development tends to increase\nthe emphasis laid on the duties of sincerity and good faith. At\nthe earlier stages of civilisation it is frequently considered\ngood form to tell an untruth to a person in order to please him,\nand ill-mannered to contradict him, however much he be\nmistaken,[9] for the reason that farther consequences are left\nout of account. The utilitarian basis of the duty of truthfulness\nalso accounts for those extreme cases in which a deception is\nheld permissible or even a duty, when promoting the true\ninterests of the person subject to it.\n\n[Footnote 7: Bentham, _Theory of Legislation_, p. 260.]\n\n[Footnote 8: Aristotle, _Ethica Nicomachea_, iv. 7. 8.]\n\n[Footnote 9: Besides statements referred to above, see\nDobrizhoffer, _Account of the Abipones_, ii. 137; Hennepin, _New\nDiscovery of a Vast Country in America between New France and New\nMexico_, ii. 70; Dall, _Alaska_, p. 398 (Aleuts); Oldfield, in\n_Trans. Ethn. Soc._ N.S. iii. 255 (West Australian natives). \"The\nnatives of Africa,\" says Livingstone (_Expedition to the\nZambesi_, p. 309), \"have an amiable of desire to please, and\noften tell what they imagine will be gratifying, rather than the\nuninteresting naked truth.\" An English sportsman, after firing at\nan antelope, inquired of his dark attendant, \"Is it wounded?\" The\nanswer was, \"Yes! the ball went right into his heart.\" These\nmortal wounds never proving fatal, he asked a friend, who\nunderstood the language, to explain to the man that he preferred\nthe truth in every case. \"He is my father,\" replied the native,\n\"and I thought he would be displeased if I told him that he never\nhits at all.\" The wish to please is likewise a fertile source of\nuntruth in children, especially girls (Sully, _Studies of\nChildhood_, p. 256).]\n\nThe detestation of falsehood is in a very large measure due to\nthe motive which commonly is at the bottom of a lie. It is\ndoubtful whether a lie ever is told simply from love of\nfalsehood.[10] The intention to produce a wrong belief has a\ndeeper motive than the mere desire to produce such a belief; and\nin most cases this motive is the deceiver's hope of benefiting\nhimself at the expense of the person deceived. A better motive\nmakes the act less detestable, or may even serve as a\njustification. But the broad doctrine that the end sanctifies the\nmeans is generally rejected; and the principle which sometimes\nallows {112} deceit from a benevolent motive has been restricted\nwithin very narrow limits by a higher conception of individual\nfreedom and individual rights. Thus the emancipation of morality\nfrom theology has brought discredit on the old theory that\nreligious deception is permissible when it serves the object of\nsaving human souls from eternal perdition. The opinion that no\nmotive whatsoever can justify an act of falsehood has been\nadvocated not only by intuitional moralists, but on utilitarian\ngrounds.[11] But it certainly seems absurd to the common sense of\nmankind that we should be allowed to save our own life or the\nlife of a fellow-man by killing the person who wants to take it,\nbut not by deceiving him.\n\n[Footnote 10: Dugald Stewart, _op. cit._ ii. 342.]\n\n[Footnote 11: Macmillan, _Promotion of General Happiness_,\np. 166 _sq._]\n\nIt is easy to see why falsehood is so frequently held\npermissible, praiseworthy, or even obligatory, when directed\nagainst a stranger. In early society an injury inflicted on a\nstranger calls forth no sympathetic resentment. On the contrary,\nbeing looked upon with suspicion or hated as an enemy, he is\nconsidered a proper object of deception. Among the Bushmans \"no\none dare give any information in the absence of the chief or\nfather of the clan.\"[12] \"A Bedouin,\" says Burckhardt, \"who does\nnot know the person interrogating him, will seldom answer with\ntruth to questions concerning his family or tribe. The children\nare taught never to answer similar questions, lest the\ninterrogator may be a secret enemy and come for purposes of\nrevenge.\"[13] Among the Beni Amer a stranger can never trust a\nman's word on account of \"their contempt for everything\nforeign.\"[14] That even civilised nations allow stratagem in\nwarfare is the natural consequence of war itself being allowed;\nand if good faith is to be preserved between enemies, that is\nbecause only thereby useless cruelty can be avoided and an end be\nput to hostilities.\n\n[Footnote 12: Chapman, _Travels in the Interior of South Africa_,\ni. 76.]\n\n[Footnote 13: Burckhardt, _Notes on the Bedouins and Wah\u00e1bys_,\np. 210.]\n\n[Footnote 14: Munzinger, _Ostafrikanische Studien_, p. 337.]\n\nHowever, deceit is not condemned merely because it is {113} an\ninjury to the party deceived and as such apt to arouse\nsympathetic resentment, but it is an object of disinterested,\nmoral resentment also because it is intrinsically antipathetic.\nLying is a cheap and cowardly method of gaining an undue\nadvantage, and is consequently despised where courage is\nrespected.[15] It is the weapon of the weak, the woman,[16] and\nthe slave.[17] Fraud, says Cicero, is the property of a fox,\nforce that of a lion; \"both are utterly repugnant to society, but\nfraud is the more detestable.\"[18] \"To lie is servile,\" says\nPlutarch, \"and most hateful in all men, hardly to be pardoned\neven in poor slaves.\"[19] On account of its cowardliness, lying\nwas incompatible with Teutonic and knightly notions of manly\nhonour; and among ourselves the epithets \"liar\" and \"coward\" are\nequally disgraceful to a man. \"All . . . in the rank and station\nof gentlemen,\" Sir Walter Scott observes, \"are forcibly called\nupon to remember that they must resent the imputation of a\nvoluntary falsehood as the most gross injury.\"[20] Fichte asks,\n\"Whence comes that internal shame for one's self which manifests\nitself even stronger in the case of a lie than in the case of any\nother violation of conscience?\" And his answer is, that the lie\nis accompanied by cowardice, and that nothing so much dishonours\nus in our own eyes as want of courage.[21] According to Kant,\n\"a lie is the abandonment, and, as it were, the annihilation,\nof the dignity of a man.\"[22]\n\n[Footnote 15: _Cf._ Schopenhauer, _Die Grundlage der Moral_, \u00a7 17\n(_S\u00e4mmtliche Werke_, vi. 250); Grote, _Treatise on the Moral\nIdeals_, p. 254.]\n\n[Footnote 16: Women are commonly said to be particularly addicted\nto falsehood (Schopenhauer, _Parerga und Paralipomena_, ii. 497\n_sq._ Galton, _Inquiries into Human Faculty_, p. 56 _sq._ Krauss,\n_Sitte und Brauch der S\u00fcdslaven_, pp. 508, 514. Maurer,\n_Bekehrung des Norwegischen Stammmes_, ii. 159 [ancient\nScandinavians]. D\u00f6llinger, _The Gentile and the Jew_, ii. 234\n[ancient Greeks]. Lane, _Arabian Society in the Middle Ages_,\np. 219. Le Bon, _La civilisation des Arabes_, p. 433. Loskiel,\n_History of the Mission of the United Brethren_, i. 16\n[Iroquois]. Hearne, _Journey to the Northern Ocean_, p. 307 _sq._\n[Northern Indians]. Lyon, _Private Journal_, p. 349 [Eskimo of\nIgloolik]. Dalager, _Gr\u00f8nlandske Relationer_, p. 69; Cranz,\n_History of Greenland_, i. 175).]\n\n[Footnote 17: See _infra_, p. 129 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 18: Cicero, _De officiis_, i. 13.]\n\n[Footnote 19: Plutarch, _De educatione puerorum_, 14.]\n\n[Footnote 20: Scott, 'Essay on Chivalry,' in _Miscellaneous Prose\nWorks_, vi. 58.]\n\n[Footnote 21: Fichte, _Das System der Sittenlehre_, p. 370;\nEnglish translation, p. 302 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 22: Kant, _Metaphysische Anfangungsgr\u00fcnde der\nTugendlehre_, p. 84.]\n\n{114} But a lie may also be judged of from a very different point\nof view. It may be not only a sign of cowardice, but a sign of\ncleverness. Hence a successful lie may excite admiration, a\ndisinterested kindly feeling towards the liar, genuine moral\napproval; whereas to be detected in a lie is considered shameful.\nAnd not only is the clever liar an object of admiration, but the\nperson whom he deceives is an object of ridicule. To the mind of\na West African native, Miss Kingsley observes, there is no\nintrinsic harm in lying, \"because a man is a fool who believes\nanother man on an important matter unless he puts on the\noath.\"[23] A Syrian proverb says, \"Lying is the salt (goodness)\nof men, and shameful only to one who believes.\"[24]\n\n[Footnote 23: Kingsley, _West African Studies_, p. 414. _Cf._\nSommerville, 'Ethnogr. Notes in New Georgia,' _Jour. Anthr.\nInst._ xxvi. 394.]\n\n[Footnote 24: Burton and Drake, _Unexplored Syria_, i. 275. See\nalso Burckhardt, _Arabic Proverbs_, p. 44 _sq._]\n\nThe duties of sincerity and good faith are also to some extent,\nand in certain cases principally, founded on prudential\nconsiderations. Although, as the _M\u00e4rchen_ tells us, it happens\nevery day in the world that the fraudulent is successful,[25]\nthere is a widespread notion that, after all, \"honesty is the\nbest policy.\" \"Nothing that is false can be lasting,\" says\nCicero.[26] \"The liar is short-lived\" (that is, soon detected),\nsay the Arabs.[27] According to a Wolof proverb, \"lies, however\nnumerous, will be caught by truth when it rises up.\"[28] The\nBasutos have a saying that \"cunning devours its master.\"[29] It\nhas been remarked that \"if there were no such thing as honesty,\nit would be a good speculation to invent it, as a means of making\none's fortune.\"[30]\n\n[Footnote 25: Grimm, _Kinder und Hausm\u00e4rchen_, 'Katze und Maus in\nGesellschaft,' 'Die drei Spinnerinnen,' 'Das tapfere\nSchneiderlein,' &c.]\n\n[Footnote 26: Cicero, _De officiis_, ii. 12.]\n\n[Footnote 27: Burckhardt, _Arabic Proverbs_, p. 119.]\n\n[Footnote 28: Burton, _Wit and Wisdom from West Africa_, p. 15.]\n\n[Footnote 29: Casalis, _Basutos_, p. 307.]\n\n[Footnote 30: Quoted by Bentham, _Theory of Legislation_, p. 64.]\n\nMoreover, lying is attended not only with social disadvantages,\nbut with supernatural danger. The West African Fjort have a tale\nabout a fisherman who every day used to catch and smuggle into\nhis house great quantities of fish, {115} but denied to his\nbrother and relatives that he had caught anything. All this time\nthe fetish Sunga was watching, and was grieved to hear him lie\nthus. The fetish punished him by depriving him of the power of\nspeech, that he might lie no more, and so for the future he could\nonly make his wants known by signs.[31] In another instance, the\nFjort tell us, the earth-spirit turned into a pillar of clay a\nwoman who said that she had no peas for sale, when she had her\nbasket full of them.[32] The Nandi of the Uganda Protectorate\nbelieve that \"God punishes lying by striking the untruthful\nperson with lightning.\"[33] The Dyaks of Borneo think that the\nlightning god is made angry even by the most nonsensical untruth,\nsuch as the statement that a man has a cat for his mother or that\nvermin can dance.[34] In Aneiteum, of the New Hebrides, the\nbelief prevailed that liars would be punished in the life to\ncome;[35] according to the Banks Islanders, they were excluded\nfrom the true Panoi or Paradise after death.[36] We have already\nnoticed the emphasis which some of the higher religions lay on\nveracity and good faith, and other statements maybe added\ntestifying the interest which gods of a more civilised type take\nin the fulfilment of these duties. In ancient Egypt Amon Ra, \"the\nchief of all the gods,\" was invoked as \"Lord of Truth\";[37] and\nMa[=a], or Maat, represented as his daughter, was the goddess of\ntruth and righteousness.[38] In a Babylonian hymn the moon god is\nappealed to as the guardian of truth.[39] The Vedic gods are\ndescribed as \"true\" and \"not deceitful,\" as friends of honesty\nand righteousness;[40] and Agni was the lord of vows.[41] The\n{116} Zoroastrian Mithra was a protector of truth, fidelity, and\ncovenants;[42] and Rashnu Razista, \"the truest true,\" was the\ngenius of truth.[43] According to the Iliad, Zeus is \"no abettor\nof falsehoods\";[44] according to Plato, a lie is hateful not only\nto men but to gods.[45] Among the Romans Jupiter and Dius Fidius\nwere gods of treaties,[46] and Fides was worshipped as the deity\nof faithfulness.[47] How shall we explain this connection between\nreligious beliefs and the duties of veracity and fidelity to\npromises?\n\n[Footnote 31: Dennett, _Folklore of the Fjort_, p. 88 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 32: _Ibid._ p. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 33: Johnston, _Uganda Protectorate_, ii. 879.]\n\n[Footnote 34: Selenka, _Sonnige Welten_, p. 47.]\n\n[Footnote 35: Turner, _Samoa_, p. 326.]\n\n[Footnote 36: Codrington, _Melanesians_, p. 274.]\n\n[Footnote 37: Wiedemann, _Religion of the Ancient Egyptians_,\np. 112. _Cf._ Brugsch, _Die Aegyptologie_, pp. 49, 91, 92, 97;\nAm\u00e9lineau, _Essai sur l'\u00e9volution des id\u00e9es morales dans l'\u00c9gypte\nAncienne_, pp. 182, 188, 251.]\n\n[Footnote 38: Wiedemann, 'Ma[=a], d\u00e9esse de la v\u00e9rit\u00e9,' in\n_Annales du Mus\u00e9e Guimet_, x. 561 _sqq._ Am\u00e9lineau, _op. cit._\np. 187. _Infra_, p. 699.]\n\n[Footnote 39: M\u00fcrdter-Delitzsch, _Geschichte Babyloniens und\nAssyriens_, p. 37.]\n\n[Footnote 40: Bergaigne, _La religion v\u00e9dique_, iii. 199.\nMacdonell, _Vedic Mythology_, p. 18.]\n\n[Footnote 41: _Satapatha-Br\u00e2hmana_, iii. 2. 2. 24.]\n\n[Footnote 42: Darmesteter, _Ormazd et Ahriman_, p. 78. Geiger,\n_Civilization of the Eastern Ir[=a]nians_, pp. lvii., 164.\nSpiegel, _Er\u00e2nische Alterthumskunde_, iii. 685.]\n\n[Footnote 43: Darmesteter, in _Sacred Books of the East_, xxiii.\n168.]\n\n[Footnote 44: _Iliad_, iv. 235.]\n\n[Footnote 45: Plato, _Respublica_, ii. 382.]\n\n[Footnote 46: Fowler, _Roman Festivals of the Period of the\nRepublic_, pp. 141, 229 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 47: Cicero, _De officiis_, iii. 29. _Idem_, _De natura\ndeorum_, ii. 23; iii. 18. _Idem_, _De legibus_, ii. 8, 11.\nDionysius of Halicarnassus, _Antiquitates Roman\u00e6_, ii. 75.]\n\nApart from the circumstances which in some cases make gods\nvindicators of the moral law in general, as conceived of by their\nworshippers, there are quite special reasons for their\ndisapproval of insincerity and bad faith. Here again we notice\nthe influence of magic beliefs on the religious sanction of\nmorality.\n\nThere is something uncanny in the untrue word itself. As\nProfessor Stanley Hall points out, children not in frequently\nregard every deviation from the most painfully literal truth as\nalike heinous, with no perspective or degrees of difference\nbetween the most barefaced intended and unintended lies. In some\nchildren this fear of telling an untruth becomes so neurotic that\nto every statement, even to yes or no, a \"perhaps\" or \"I think\"\nis added mentally, whispered, or aloud. One boy had a long period\nof fear that, like Ananias and Sapphira, he might some moment\ndrop down dead for a chance and perhaps unconscious lie.[48] On\nthe other hand, an acted lie is felt to be much less harmful than\na spoken one; to point the wrong way when asked where some one is\ngone is less objectionable than to speak wrongly, to nod is less\nsinful than to say yes. Indeed, acted lies are for the most {117}\npart easily gotten away with, whereas some mysterious baneful\nenergy seems to be attributed to the spoken untruth. That its\nevil influence is looked upon as quite mechanical appears from\nthe palliatives used for it. Many American children are of\nopinion that a lie may be reversed by putting the left hand on\nthe right shoulder and that even an oath may be neutralised or\ntaken in an opposite sense by raising the left instead of the\nright hand.[49] Among children in New York \"it was sufficient to\ncross the fingers, elbows, or legs, though the act might not be\nnoticed by the companion accosted, and under such circumstances\nno blame attached to a falsehood.\"[50] To think \"I do not mean\nit,\" or to attach to a statement a meaning quite different from\nthe current one, is a form of reservation which is repeatedly\nfound in children.[51] Nor are feelings and ideas of this kind\nrestricted to the young; they are fairly common among grown-up\npeople, and have even found expression in ethical doctrines.\nThey lie at the root of the Jesuit theory of mental reservations.\nAccording to Thomas Aquinas, again, though it is wrong to tell a\nlie for the purpose of delivering another from any danger\nwhatever, it is lawful \"to hide the truth prudently under some\ndissimulation, as Augustine says.\"[52] It is not uncommonly\nargued that in defence of a secret we may not \"lie,\" that is,\nproduce directly beliefs contrary to facts; but that we may\n\"turn a question aside,\" that is, produce indirectly, by\nnatural inference from our answer, a negatively false belief; or\nthat we may \"throw the inquirer on a wrong scent,\" that is,\nproduce similarly a positively false belief.[53] This extreme\nformalism may no doubt to some extent be traced to the influence\nof early training. From the day we learned to speak, the duty of\ntelling the truth has been strenuously enjoined upon us, and the\nword \"lie\" has been associated with sin of the {118} blackest\nhue; whereas other forms of falsehood, being less frequent, less\nobvious, and less easy to define, have also been less emphasised.\nBut after full allowance is made for this influence, the fact\nstill remains that a mystic efficacy is very commonly ascribed to\nthe spoken word. Even among ourselves many persons would not dare\nto praise their health or fortune for fear lest some evil should\nresult from their speech; and among less civilised peoples much\ngreater significance is given to a word than among us. Herodotus,\nafter mentioning the extreme importance which the ancient\nPersians attached to the duty of speaking the truth, adds that\nthey held it unlawful even \"to talk of anything which it is\nunlawful to do.\"[54] I think, then, we may assume that, if for\nsome reason or other, falsehood is stigmatised, the mysterious\ntendency inherent in the word easily develops into an avenging\npower which, as often happens in similar cases, is associated\nwith the activity of a god.\n\n[Footnote 48: Stanley Hall, 'Children's Lies,' in _American\nJournal of Psychology_, iii. 59 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 49: Stanley Hall, 'Children's Lies,' in _American\nJournal of Psychology_, iii. 68 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 50: Bergen and Newell, 'Current Superstitions,' in\n_Journal of American Folk-lore_, ii. 111.]\n\n[Footnote 51: Stanley Hall, _loc. cit._ p. 68.]\n\n[Footnote 52: Thomas Aquinas, _Summa theologica_, ii.-ii. 110.\n3. 4.]\n\n[Footnote 53: See Sidgwick, _Methods of Ethics_, p. 317.]\n\n[Footnote 54: Herodotus, i. 139.]\n\nThe punishing power of a word is particularly conspicuous in the\ncase of an oath. But the evil attending perjury does not come\nfrom the lie as such: it is in the first place a result of the\ncurse which constitutes the oath. An oath is essentially a\nconditional self-imprecation, a curse by which a person calls\ndown upon himself some evil in the event of what he says not\nbeing true. The efficacy of the oath is originally entirely\nmagical, it is due to the magic power inherent in the cursing\nwords. In order to charge them with supernatural energy various\nmethods are adopted. Sometimes the person who takes the oath puts\nhimself in contact with some object which represents the state\nreferred to in the oath, so that the oath may absorb, as it were,\nits quality and communicate it to the perjurer. Thus the Kandhs\nswear upon the lizard's skin, \"whose scaliness they pray may be\ntheir lot if forsworn,\" or upon the earth of an ant-hill, \"like\nwhich they desire that, if false, they may be reduced to\npowder.\"[55] The Tunguses regard it as the most dreadful {119} of\nall their oaths when an accused person is compelled to drink some\nof the blood of a dog which, after its throat has been cut, is\nimpaled near a fire and burnt, or has its flesh scattered about\npiece-meal, and to swear:--\"I speak the truth, and that is as\ntrue as it is that I drink this blood. If I lie, let me perish,\nburn, or be dried up like this dog.\"[56] In other cases the\nperson who is to swear takes hold of a certain object and calls\nit to inflict on him some injury if he perjure himself. The\nKandhs frequently take oath upon the skin of a tiger, \"from which\nanimal destruction to the perjured is invoked.\"[57] The Angami\nNagas, when they swear to keep the peace, or to perform any\npromise, \"place the barrel of a gun, or a spear, between their\nteeth, signifying by this ceremony that, if they do not act up to\ntheir agreement, they are prepared to fall by either of the two\nweapons.\"[58] The Chuvashes, again, put a piece of bread and a\nlittle salt in the mouth and swear, \"May I be in want of these,\nif I say not true!\" or \"if I do not keep my word!\"[59] Another\nmethod of charging an oath with supernatural energy is to touch,\nor to establish some kind of contact with, a holy object on the\noccasion when the oath is taken. The Iowa have a mysterious iron\nor stone, wrapped in seven skins, by which they make men swear to\nspeak the truth.[60] The people of Kesam, in the highlands of\nPalembang, swear by an old sacred knife,[61] the Bataks of South\nT\u00f3ba on their village idols,[62] the Ostyaks on the nose of a\nbear, which is regarded by them as an animal endowed with\nsupernatural power.[63] Among the Tunguses a criminal may be\ncompelled to climb one {120} of their sacred mountains, repeating\nas he mounts, \"May I die if I am guilty,\" or, \"May I lose my\nchildren and my cattle,\" or, \"I renounce for ever all success in\nhunting and fishing if I am guilty.\"[64] In Tibetan law-courts,\nwhen the great oath is taken, \"it is done by the person placing a\nholy scripture on his head, and sitting on the reeking hide of an\nox and eating part of the ox's heart.\"[65] Hindus swear on a copy\nof the Sanskrit _haribans_, or with Ganges water in their hands,\nor touch the legs of a Br\u00e2hmana in taking an oath.[66]\nMuhammedans swear on the Koran, as Christians do on the Bible. In\nMorocco an oath derives efficacy from contact with, or the\npresence of, any lifeless object, animal, or person endowed with\n_baraka_, or holiness, such as a saint-house or a mosque, corn or\nwool, a flock of sheep or a horse, or a shereef. In medi\u00e6val\nChristendom sacred relics were generally adopted as the most\neffective means of adding security to oaths, and \"so little\nrespect was felt for the simple oath that, ere long, the adjuncts\ncame to be looked upon as the essential feature, and the\nimprecation itself to be divested of binding force without\nthem.\"[67]\n\n[Footnote 55: Macpherson, _Memorials of Service in India_, p. 83.]\n\n[Footnote 56: Georgi, _Russia_, iii. 86.]\n\n[Footnote 57: Macpherson, _op. cit._ p. 83. _Cf._ Hose, 'Natives\nof Borneo,' in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxiii. 165 (Kayans).]\n\n[Footnote 58: Butler, _Travels in Assam_, p. 154. Mac Mahon, _Far\nCathay_, p. 253. Prain, 'Angami Nagas,' in _Revue coloniale\ninternationale_, v. 490. _Cf._ Lewin, _Wild Races of\nSouth-Eastern India_, pp. 193 (Toungtha), 244 _sq._ (Pankhos and\nBunjogees); St. John, 'Hill Tribes of North Aracan,' in _Jour.\nAnthr. Inst._ ii. 242.]\n\n[Footnote 59: Georgi, _op. cit._ i. 110.]\n\n[Footnote 60: Hamilton, quoted by Dorsey, 'Siouan Cults,' in\n_Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ xi. 427.]\n\n[Footnote 61: _Glimpses of the Eastern Archipelago_, p. 104.]\n\n[Footnote 62: von Brenner, _Besuch bei den Kannibalen Sumatras_,\np. 213.]\n\n[Footnote 63: Castr\u00e9n, _Nordiska resor och forskningar_, i. 307,\n309; iv. 123 _sq._ _Cf._ Ahlqvist, 'Unter Wogulen und Ostjaken,'\nin _Acta Societatis Scientiarum Fennic\u00e6_, xiv. 298.]\n\n[Footnote 64: Georgi, _op. cit._ iii. 86.]\n\n[Footnote 65: Waddell, _Buddhism of Tibet_, p. 569, n. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 66: Grierson, _Bih[=a]r Peasant Life_, p. 401. Sleeman,\n_Rambles and Recollections of an Indian Official_, ii. 116.]\n\n[Footnote 67: Lea, _Superstition and Force_, p. 29. See also\nKaufmann, _Deutsche Geschichte_, ii. 297; Ellinger, _Das\nVerh\u00e4ltniss der \u00f6ffentlichen Meinung zu Wahrheit und L\u00fcge im 10.\n11. und 12. Jahrhundert_, pp. 30, 111.]\n\nFinally, as an ordinary curse, so an oath is made efficacious by\nbringing in the name of a supernatural being, to whom an appeal\nis made. When the Comanches of Texas make a sacred pledge or\npromise, \"they call upon the great spirit as their father, and\nthe earth as their mother, to testify to the truth of their\nasseverations.\"[68] Of the Chukchi we are told that \"as often as\nthey would certify the truth of any thing by oath or solemn\nprotestations they take the sun for their guarantee and\nsecurity.\"[69] Among the Tunguses an accused person takes a knife\nin his hand, brandishes it towards the sun, and says, \"If I {121}\nam guilty, may the sun send diseases into my bowels as mortal as\na stab with this knife would be!\"[70] An Arab from the province\nof Dukk\u00e2la in Morocco presses a dagger against his chest, saying,\n\"By this poison, may God thrust it into my heart if I did so or\nso!\" If a Masai is accused of having done something wrong, he\ndrinks some blood, which is given him by the spokesman, and says,\n\"If I have done this deed may God kill me\"; and it is believed\nthat if he has committed the crime he dies, whereas no harm\nbefalls him if he is innocent.[71] Among the Tshi-speaking peoples\nof the Gold Coast, \"to make an oath binding on the person who\ntakes it, it is usual to give him something to eat or to drink\nwhich in some way appertains to a deity, who is then invoked to\nvisit a breach of faith with punishment.\"[72] Among the Shekani\nand Bakele people of Southern Guinea, when a covenant between\ndifferent tribes is about to be formed, their great spirit,\nMwetyi, \"is always invoked as a witness, and is commissioned with\nthe duty of visiting vengeance upon the party who shall violate\nthe engagement.\"[73] It seems to be a common practice in certain\nparts of Africa to swear by some fetish.[74] The Efatese, of the\nNew Hebrides, invoked punishment from the gods in their oaths.[75]\nIn Florida, of the Solomon Group, a man will deny an accusation by\nsome _tindalo_ (that is, the disembodied spirit of some man who\nalready in his lifetime was supposed to be endowed with\nsupernatural power), or by the ghostly frigate-bird, or by the\nghostly shark.[76] When an ancient Egyptian wished to give\nassurance of his honesty and good faith, he called Thoth to\nwitness, the advocate in the heavenly court of justice, without\nwhose justification no soul could stand in the day of judgment.[77]\nThe Eranians swore by Mithra,[78] the Greeks by Zeus,[79] the {122}\nRomans by Jupiter and Dius Fidius.[80] A god is more able than\nordinary mortals to master the processes of nature, and he may\nalso better know whether the sworn word be true or false.[81]\nIt is undoubtedly on account of their superior knowledge that\nsun or moon or light gods are so frequently appealed to in oaths.\nThe Egyptian god Ra is a solar,[82] and Thoth a lunar[83] deity.\nThe Zoroastrian Mithra, who \"has a thousand senses, and sees\nevery man that tells a lie,\"[84] is closely connected with the\nsun;[85] and Rashnu Razista, according to M. Darmesteter, is an\noffshoot either of Mithra or Ahura Mazda himself.[86] Dius Fidius\nseems originally to have been a spirit of the heaven, and a wielder\nof the lightning, closely allied to the great Jupiter.[87] Zeus is\nall-seeing, the infallible spy of both gods and men.[88] Now,\neven though the oath has the form of an appeal to a god, it may\nnevertheless be of a chiefly magic character, being an\nimprecation rather than a prayer. The oaths which the Moors swear\nby Allah are otherwise exactly similar in nature to those in\nwhich he is not mentioned at all. But the more the belief in\nmagic was shaken, the more the spoken word was divested of that\nmysterious power which had been attributed to it by minds too apt\nto confound words with facts, the more prominent became the\nreligious element in the oath. The fulfilment of the\nself-imprecation was made dependent upon the free will of the\ndeity appealed to, and was regarded as the punishment for an\noffence committed by the perjurer against the god himself.[89]\n\n[Footnote 68: Neighbors, in Schoolcraft, _Indian Tribes of the\nUnited States_, i. 132.]\n\n[Footnote 69: Georgi, _op. cit._ iii. 183.]\n\n[Footnote 70: Georgi, _op. cit._ iii. 85 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 71: Hollis, _Masai_, p. 345.]\n\n[Footnote 72: Ellis, _Tshi-speaking Peoples of the Gold Coast_,\np. 196.]\n\n[Footnote 73: Wilson, _Western Africa_, p. 392.]\n\n[Footnote 74: Schultze, _Der Fetischismus_, p. 111.]\n\n[Footnote 75: Turner, _Samoa_, p. 334.]\n\n[Footnote 76: Codrington, _op. cit._ p. 217.]\n\n[Footnote 77: Tiele, _History of the Egyptian Religion_, p. 229.\nAm\u00e9lineau, _op. cit._ p. 251.]\n\n[Footnote 78: _Yasts_, x.]\n\n[Footnote 79: _Iliad_, iii. 276 _sqq._ Farnell, _Cults of the\nGreek States_, i. 70.]\n\n[Footnote 80: von Lasaulx, _Der Eid bei den R\u00f6mern_, p. 9.]\n\n[Footnote 81: _Cf._ James, _Expedition from Pittsburg to the\nRocky Mountains_, i. 267 (Omahas); Tylor, _Primitive Culture_,\nii. 231 (Ostyaks).]\n\n[Footnote 82: Maspero, _Dawn of Civilization_, p. 87 _sq._\nWiedemann, _Religion of the Ancient Egyptians_, p. 14. Erman,\n_Handbook of Egyptian Religion_, p. 10.]\n\n[Footnote 83: Maspero, _op. cit._ p. 145. Erman, _op. cit._ p. 11.]\n\n[Footnote 84: _Yasts_, x. 107.]\n\n[Footnote 85: Darmesteter, in _Sacred Books of the East_, xxiii.\n122, n. 4. Meyer, _Geschichte des Alterthums_, i. 541 _sq._\nGeiger, _op. cit._ i. p. lvi.]\n\n[Footnote 86: Darmesteter, in _Sacred Books of the East_, xxiii. 168.]\n\n[Footnote 87: Fowler, _Roman Festivals_, p. 141.]\n\n[Footnote 88: _Cf._ _Iliad_, iii. 277; Ovid, _Metamorphoses_, iv.\n172; Darmesteter, _Essais orientaux_, p. 107; Usener,\n_G\u00f6tternamen_, p. 177 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 89: Grotius says (_De jure belli et pacis_, ii. 13. 12)\nthat even he who swears by false gods is bound, \"because, though\nunder false notions, he refers to the general idea of Godhead,\nand therefore the true God will interpret it as a wrong to\nhimself if perjury be committed.\"]\n\n{123} Owing to its invocation of supernatural sanction, perjury\nis considered the most heinous of all acts of falsehood.[90] But\nit has a tendency to make even the ordinary lie or breach of\nfaith a matter of religious concern. If a god is frequently\nappealed to in oaths, a general hatred of lying and\nunfaithfulness may become one of his attributes, as is suggested\nby various facts quoted above. There is every reason to believe\nthat a god is not, in the first place, appealed to because he is\nlooked upon as a guardian of veracity and good faith, but that he\nhas come to be looked upon as a guardian of these duties because\nhe has been frequently appealed to in connection with them.\n\n[Footnote 90: Among various peoples perjury is punished even by\ncustom or law. Thus among the Gaika tribe of the Kafirs a person\nmay be fined for taking a false oath in a law case (Brownlee, in\nMaclean, _Compendium of Kafir Laws and Customs_, p. 124). In\nAbyssinia a man convicted of perjury \"would not only lose his\nreputation, and be for ever incapacitated from being witness even\non the most trivial question, but he would likewise in all\nprobability be bound and severely fined, and might indeed think\nhimself fortunate if he got off with all his limbs in their\nproper places, or without his hide being scored\" (Parkyns, _Life\nin Abyssinia_, ii. 258 _sq._). The laws of the Malays punish\nperjury (Crawfurd, _History of the Indian Archipelago_, iii. 90).\nIn India, according to the Laws of Manu (viii. 219 _sq._), he who\nbroke an agreement after swearing to it was to be banished,\nimprisoned, and fined. Medi\u00e6val law-books punished perjurers with\nthe loss of the right hand, by which the oath was sworn (Wilda,\n_Das Strafrecht der Germanen_, p. 983 _sq._; Pollock and\nMaitland, _History of English Law before the Time of Edward I._\nii. 541). In a Danish law of 1537 it is said that the perjurer\nshall lose the two offending fingers so as to appease the wrath\nof God (Stemann, _Den danske Retshistorie indtil Christian V.'s\nLov_, p. 645). In other cases, again, no civil punishment is\naffixed to a false oath--for instance, among the Rejangs\n(Marsden, _History of Sumatra_, p. 240) and Bataks of Sumatra\n(_Glimpses of the Eastern Archipelago_, p. 86), the Ossetes\n(Kovalewsky, _Coutume contemporaine_, p. 324), Persians (Polak,\n_Persien_, ii. 83), and, as it seems, the ancient Hebrews (Keil,\n_Manual of Biblical Arch\u00e6ology_, ii. 348; Greenstone, 'Perjury,'\nin _Jewish Encyclopedia_, ix. 640), Greeks (Rohde, _Psyche_, p.\n245, note), and Teutons in early times (Wilda, _op. cit._ p. 982;\nBrunner, _Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte_, ii. 681). Cicero says (_De\nlegibus_, ii. 9) that \"the divine punishment of perjury is\ndestruction, the human punishment infamy\"; but though perjury\n_per se_ was not punished in Rome, the law appears from very\nearly times to have contained provisions for punishing false\ntestimony (Hunter, _Roman Law_, p. 1063; see also Mommsen,\n_R\u00f6misches Strafrecht_, p. 681). However, the fact that perjury\nis not treated as a crime by no means implies that it is not\nregarded as a sin. The punishment of it is left to the offended\ndeity (Marsden, _op. cit._ p. 219; _Glimpses of the Eastern\nArchipelago_, p. 86; Crawfurd, _op. cit._ iii. 90 [Javanese]).]\n\nIt seems that sometimes the habit of oath-taking has, in another\nrespect also, made it prudential for men to speak the simple\ntruth in all circumstances. Sir W. H. Sleeman {124} observes that\namong the woods and hills of India the cotton and other trees are\nsupposed by the natives to be occupied by deities who are vested\nwith a local superintendence over the affairs of a district, or\nperhaps of a single village. \"These,\" he says, \"are always in the\nview of the people, and every man knows that he is every moment\nliable to be taken to their court, and to be made to invoke their\nvengeance upon himself or those dear to him, if he has told a\nfalsehood in what he has stated, or tells one in what he is about\nto state. Men so situated adhere habitually, and I may say\nreligiously, to the truth; and I have had before me hundreds of\ncases in which a man's property, liberty, or life, has depended\nupon his telling a lie, and he has refused to tell it to save\neither.\"[91] On the other hand, there are peoples among whom a\nperson's word can hardly be trusted unless confirmed by an\noath.[92] And one of the arguments adduced by the Quakers against\nthe taking of oaths is that, if on any particular occasion a man\nswear in addition to his yea or nay, in order to make it more\nobligatory or convincing, its force becomes comparatively weak at\nother times when it receives no such confirmation.[93]\n\n[Footnote 91: Sleeman, _op. cit._ ii. 111 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 92: See, besides _supra_, Kingsley, _West African\nStudies_, p. 414; Chanler, _Through Jungle and Desert_, p. 186\n_sq._ (Wamsara).]\n\n[Footnote 93: Gurney, _Views and Practices of the Society of\nFriends_, p. 327.]\n\nModes of conduct which are recommended by prudence tend on that\naccount in various ways to be regarded as morally compulsory or\npraiseworthy. This subject will be discussed in connection with\nduties and virtues which are called \"self-regarding,\" but in the\npresent place it is necessary to remind ourselves of the share\nwhich early education has in making prudence a matter of moral\nconsideration. Few duties owe so much to the training of parents\nand teachers as does veracity. Children easily resort to\nfalsehood, in self-defence or otherwise, and truthfulness is\ntherefore enjoined on them with particular emphasis.[94]\n\n[Footnote 94: _Cf._ Priestley, in 'Essay III.' introductory to\nHartley's _Theory of the Human Mind_, p. xlix. _sq._]\n\n{125} The moral ideas referring to truthfulness are, finally,\nmuch influenced by the force of habit. Where lying is frequent it\nis, other things being equal, less strenuously condemned, if\ncondemned at all, than in communities which are strictly\ntruthful. It is natural to speak the truth. Von Jhering's\nsuggestion that man was originally a liar, and that veracity is\nthe result of human progress,[95] is not consistent with facts.\nLanguage was not invented to disguise the truth, but to express\nit. As Hutcheson remarked long ago, \"truth is the natural\nproduction of the mind when it gets the capacity of communicating\nit, dissimulation and disguise are plainly artificial effects of\ndesign and reflection.\"[96] It may be doubted whether there are\nany other mendacious creatures in the world than men.[97] It is\nsaid that \"lies are told, if not in speech yet in acts, by\ndogs\";[98] but the instances reported of canine deceitfulness[99]\nare hardly conclusive. As a cautious writer observes, the\nquestion is not whether there may be \"objective deceitfulness\" in\nthe dog's conduct, but whether the motive is deceit: and \"the\ndeceitful intent is a piece, not of the observed fact, but of the\nobserver's inference.\"[100] Nor is the child, strictly speaking,\na born liar. M. Compayr\u00e9 even goes so far as to say that, if the\nchild has not been subjected to bad influences, or if a\ndiscipline of repression and constraint has not driven him to\nseek a refuge in dissimulation, he is usually frankness and\nsincerity itself.[101] Montaigne remarked that the falsehood of a\nchild grows with its growth.[102] According to M. Perez, useful\ndissimulations are practised by children already at the age of\ntwo years, but generally it is only after they are three or four\nyears old that fear of being scolded or punished will lead {126}\nthem into falsehood.[103] We are even told that certain savages\nare too stupid or too ignorant to tell lies. A Hindu gentleman of\nthe plains, in the valley of the Nerbudda, when asked what made\nthe uncultured people of the woods to the north and south so\ntruthful, replied, \"They have not yet learned the value of a\nlie.\"[104] But as we know how readily truthful savages become\nliars when their social conditions change, we may conclude that\ntheir veracity was due rather to absence of temptation than to\nlack of intelligence. In a small community of savages living by\nthemselves, there is no need for lying, nor much opportunity to\npractise it. There is little scope for those motives which most\ncommonly induce people to practise falsehood--fear and love of\ngain, combined with a hope of success.[105] Harmony and sympathy\ngenerally prevail between the members of the group, and deception\nis hardly possible since secrets do not exist.\n\n[Footnote 95: von Jhering, _Zweck im Recht_, ii. 606.]\n\n[Footnote 96: Hutcheson, _System of Moral Philosophy_, ii. 28.\n_Cf._ Reid, _op. cit._ vi. 24, p. 428 _sqq._; Dugald Stewart,\n_op. cit._ ii. 333.]\n\n[Footnote 97: _Cf._ Schopenhauer, _Essays_, p. 145.]\n\n[Footnote 98: Spencer, _Principles of Ethics_, i. 405.]\n\n[Footnote 99: Romanes, _Animal Intelligence_, pp. 443, 444, 451.]\n\n[Footnote 100: Lloyd Morgan, _Animal Life and Intelligence_,\np. 400.]\n\n[Footnote 101: Compayr\u00e9, _L'\u00e9volution intellectuelle et morale de\nl'enfant_, p. 309. See also Sully, _Studies of Childhood_, p. 263\n_sq._]\n\n[Footnote 102: Montaigne, _Essais_, i. 9 (_[OE]uvres_, p. 16).]\n\n[Footnote 103: Perez, _First Three Years of Childhood_, pp. 87, 89.]\n\n[Footnote 104: Sleeman, _op. cit._ ii. 110.]\n\n[Footnote 105: _Cf._ Sarasin, _Forschungen auf Ceylon_, iii. 543\n(Veddahs).]\n\nThe case is different when savages come into frequent contact\nwith foreigners. To deceive a stranger is easy, and no scruple is\nmade of doing so. On the contrary, as we have seen, he is\nregarded as a proper object of deception, and this opinion is\nonly too often justified by his own behaviour. But when commonly\npractised in relation to strangers, falsehood easily becomes a\nhabit which affects the general conduct of the man. Hamz\u00e9, the\nteacher of the Druses, said, \"When a man once gets into the way\nof speaking falsely, it is to be apprehended that, in spite of\nhimself, and by the mere force of habit, he will get to speak\nfalsely towards the brethren\"; hence it is advisable to speak the\ntruth at all times and before all men.[106] There is indeed\nabundant evidence that intercourse with strangers, and especially\nwith people of a different race, has had a destructive influence\non savage veracity.\n\n[Footnote 106: Churchill, _Mount Lebanon_, iii. 225 _sq._]\n\nThis has been noticed among many of the uncivilised tribes of\nIndia. \"Formerly,\" says Mr. Man, \"a Sonthal, as a rule, {127}\ndisdained to tell a falsehood, but the influences of\ncivilisation, transfused through the contagious ethics of his\nBengali neighbours, have somewhat impaired his truthfulness. In\nthe last four or five years a great change for the worse has\nbecome evident, although even now, as a people, they are glorious\nexceptions to the prevailing idiosyncrasy of the lower class of\nnatives in Bengal. With the latter, speaking the truth has been\nalways an accident; with the Sonthal it was a characteristic\nprinciple.\"[107] Indeed, the Santals in Singbh\u00fam, who live much\nto themselves, are still described by Colonel Dalton as \"a very\nsimple-minded people, almost incapable of deception.\"[108] The\nTipperah, \"where he is brought into contact with, or under the\ninfluence of the Bengallee, easily acquires their worst vices and\nsuperstitions, losing at the same time the leading characteristic\nof the primitive man--the love of truth.\"[109] Other tribes, like\nthe Garos and Bh\u00famij, have likewise been partly contaminated by\ntheir intercourse with Bengalis, and acquired from them a\npropensity to lie, which, in former days, was altogether foreign\nto them.[110] The Kakhyens are at the present time lazy,\nthievish, and untrustworthy, \"whether their character has been\ndeteriorated by knavish injustice on the part of Chinese traders,\nor high-handed extortion and wrong on the part of Burmese.\"[111]\nThe Ladakhis are, in general, \"frank, honest, and moral when not\ncorrupted by communication with the dissolute Kashmiris.\"[112] Of\nthe Pah\u00e1rias, who according to an earlier authority would sooner\ndie than lie,[113] it is now reported that \"those who have most\nto do with them say they cannot rely on their word, and that they\nnot only lie without scruple, but are scarcely annoyed at being\ndetected.\"[114] The Todas, whilst they call falsehood one of the\nworst vices and have a temple dedicated to Truth, seem nowadays\nonly too often to forget both the temple and its object;[115] and\nwe are told that the dissimulation they practise in their\ndealings with Europeans has been brought about by the habit of\npaying them for every insignificant item of information.[116]\nAccording to an {128} Indian civil servant quoted by Mr. Spencer,\nvarious other hill tribes, originally distinguished by their\nveracity, have afterwards been rendered less veracious by contact\nwith the whites.[117]\n\n[Footnote 107: Man, _Sonthalia_, p. 14. _Cf._ _ibid._ p. 20.]\n\n[Footnote 108: Dalton, _Ethnology of Bengal_, _op. cit._ p. 217.]\n\n[Footnote 109: Lewin, _Wild Races of South-Eastern India_, p. 216.]\n\n[Footnote 110: Dalton, _op. cit._ pp. 68, 177.]\n\n[Footnote 111: Anderson, _Mandalay to Momien_, p. 151.]\n\n[Footnote 112: Moorcroft and Trebeck, _Travels in the Himalayan\nProvinces of Hindustan_, i. 321.]\n\n[Footnote 113: Shaw, quoted by Dalton, _op. cit._ p. 274.]\n\n[Footnote 114: Cumming, _In the Himalayas_, p. 404 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 115: Harkness, _A Singular Aboriginal Race inhabiting\nthe Neilgherry Hills_, p. 18.]\n\n[Footnote 116: Metz, _Tribes inhabiting the Neilgherry Hills_,\np. 13.]\n\n[Footnote 117: Spencer, _Principles of Sociology_, ii. 234. See\nalso Hodgson, _Miscellaneous Essays_, i. 152. (B\u00f3do and Dhim\u00e1ls);\nDalton, _op. cit._ p. 206 (M\u00fandas).]\n\nOf the Andaman Islanders Mr. Man observes:--\"It has been remarked\nwith regret by all interested in the race, that intercourse with\nthe alien population has, generally speaking, prejudicially\naffected their morals; and that the candour, veracity, and\nself-reliance they manifest in their savage and untutored state\nare, when they become associated with foreigners, to a great\nextent lost, and habits of untruthfulness, dependence, and sloth\nengendered.\"[118] Riedel makes a similar remark with reference to\nthe natives of Ambon and Uliase.[119] Mr. Sommerville believes\nthat the natives of New Georgia, in the Solomon Islands, learned\ntheir practice of cheating from European traders.[120]\n\n[Footnote 118: Man, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xii. 92.]\n\n[Footnote 119: Riedel, _De sluik- en kroesharige rassen tusschen\nSelebes en Papua_, p. 41.]\n\n[Footnote 120: Sommerville, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxvi. 394.]\n\nAmong the Ostyaks increasing civilisation has proved injurious to\ntheir ancient honesty, and those who live in the neighbourhood of\ntowns or large villages have become even more deceitful than the\ncolonists.[121] A similar change has taken place with other\ntribes belonging to the Russian Empire, for instance the\nTunguses[122] and Kamchadales.[123]\n\n[Footnote 121: Castr\u00e9n, _op. cit._ ii. 121.]\n\n[Footnote 122: Dall, _Alaska_, p. 518.]\n\n[Footnote 123: Steller, _Beschreibung von dem Lande Kamtschatka_,\np. 285. Sarytchew, 'Voyage of Discovery to the North-East of\nSiberia,' in _Collection of Modern and Contemporary Voyages_, v. 67.]\n\nWe hear the same story from America.[124] Among the Omahas\n\"formerly only two or three were notorious liars; but now, there\nare about twenty who do not lie.\"[125] The old men of the Ojibwas\nall agree in saying that before the white man came and resided\namong them there was less lying than there is now.[126] The\nIndians of Mexico, Lumholtz writes, \"do not tell the truth unless\nit suits them.\"[127] But with reference to some of them, the\nTarahumares, he adds that, where they have had little or nothing\nto do with the whites, they are trustworthy, and profit is no\ninducement to them, as they believe {129} that their gods would\nbe angry with them for charging an undue price.[128]\n\n[Footnote 124: Domenech, _Seven Years Residence in the Great\nDeserts of North America_, ii. 69. _Cf._ Hearne, _Journey to the\nNorthern Ocean_, pp. 307, 308, 310 (Chippewyans); Morgan, _League\nof the Iroquois_, p. 335 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 125: Dorsey, 'Omaha Sociology' in _Ann. Rep. Bur.\nEthn._ iii. 370.]\n\n[Footnote 126: Schoolcraft, _Indian Tribes of the United States_,\nii. 139.]\n\n[Footnote 127: Lumholtz, _Unknown Mexico_, ii. 477.]\n\n[Footnote 128: Lumholtz, _Unknown Mexico_, i. 244, 418.]\n\nThe deceitfulness of many African peoples is undoubtedly in some\ndegree a result of their intercourse with foreigners. In Sierra\nLeone, says Winterbottom, the natives on the sea coast, who are\nchiefly engaged in commerce, \"are in general shrewd and artful,\nsometimes malevolent and perfidious. Their long connection with\nEuropean slave traders has tutored them in the arts of\ndeceit.\"[129] The Yorubas, according to Burton, are eminently\ndishonest only \"in and around the cities.\"[130] Among the Kalunda\nthose who live near the great caravan roads and have had much to\ndo with foreign traders are suspicious and false.[131] And the\nHottentots, of whose truthfulness earlier writers spoke very\nhighly, are nowadays said to be addicted to lying.[132]\n\n[Footnote 129: Winterbottom, _Native Africans in the\nNeighbourhood of Sierra Leone_, i. 206.]\n\n[Footnote 130: Burton, _Abeokuta_, i. 303.]\n\n[Footnote 131: Pogge, _Im Reiche des Muata Jamwo_, p. 236.]\n\n[Footnote 132: Fritsch, _Die Eingeborenen S\u00fcd-Afrika's_,\np. 307 _sq._]\n\nIt has also been noticed that mendacity is favoured among\nchildren by much intercourse with strangers, when \"first\nimpressions\" are consciously made, as also by frequent change of\nenvironment, or of school or residence, as such changes give rise\nto a feeling that \"new leaves\" can be easily turned.[133]\n\n[Footnote 133: Stanley Hall, in _American Journal of Psychology_,\niii. 70.]\n\nWhen a social unit is composed of loosely connected sub-groups,\nthe intercourse between members of different sub-groups resembles\nin many respects that between foreigners. Social incoherence is\nthus apt to lead to deceitful habits, as was the case in the\nMiddle Ages. The same phenomenon is to be observed in the East;\nperhaps also among the Desert Arabs and the Fuegians, who live in\nsmall parties which only occasionally meet and soon again separate.\n\nAnother factor which has favoured deception is social\ndifferentiation. The different classes of society have often\nlittle sympathy for each other, their interests are not\ninfrequently conflicting, deceit is a means of procuring\nadvantages, and, for the inferior classes especially, a means of\nself-protection. As Euripides observes, slaves are in {130} the\nhabit of concealing the truth.[134] In Eastern Africa, says\nLivingstone, falsehood is a vice prevailing among the free, but\nstill more among the slaves; \"one can scarcely induce a slave to\ntranslate anything truly: he is so intent on thinking of what\nwill please.\"[135]\n\n[Footnote 134: Euripides, _Ph[oe]niss\u00e6_, 392. _Cf._ Burton,\n_Arabian Nights_, i. 176, n. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 135: Livingstone, _Expedition to the Zambesi_, p. 309.\nSee also Polack, _Manners and Customs of the New Zealanders_,\nii. 59.]\n\nHardly anything has been a greater inducement to falsehood than\noppression. Whilst the old Makololo were truthful, this is not\nthe case with their sons, \"who, having been brought up among the\nsubjected tribes, have acquired some of the vices peculiar to a\nmenial and degraded race.\"[136] The Wanyoro, who are described as\n\"splendid liars,\" exercised deception chiefly to evade the\nintolerable exactions of their own chiefs, whereas they are\nfairly truthful in contact with Europeans who attempt to treat\nthem justly.[137] The duplicity and cunning of the Malagasy are\n\"the natural result of centuries of superstition, ignorance, and\nsubmission to the rule of tyrannical despots, with whom the spy\nsystem has always been a necessity.\"[138] In Morocco the\nindependent Jb\u00e2la, or mountaineers of the North, are more to be\ntrusted than the Arabs of the plains, who have long been\nsuffering from the extortions of rapacious officials. The\nduplicity of Orientals is very largely due to their despotic form\nof government.[139] In India, Mr. Percival observes, \"despotism\nin one form or other that has so long prevailed, and the\nconsequent oppression attendant thereon, must have rendered it\ndifficult to make way without fraud. Deception and arts of\ncunning, under such circumstances, being the only means at the\ncommand of the inferior portions of the community for gaining\ntheir ends, and securing the plainest rights, they would resort\nto them as the only way of avoiding certain ruin.\"[140] The\nChinese habit of lying has {131} been attributed partly to the\ntruckling fear of officers.[141] In China and many other parts of\nthe East, says Sir J. Bowring, \"there is a fear of truth _as_\ntruth, lest its discovery should lead to consequences of which\nthe inquirer never dreams, but which are present to the mind of\nthe person under interrogation.\"[142]\n\n[Footnote 136: Livingstone, _Expedition to the Zambesi_, p. 283.]\n\n[Footnote 137: Johnston, _Uganda Protectorate_, ii. 591.]\n\n[Footnote 138: Little, _Madagascar_, p. 72.]\n\n[Footnote 139: V\u00e1mb\u00e9ry, _Der Islam im neunzehnten Jahrhundert_,\np. 231.]\n\n[Footnote 140: Percival, _Land of the Veda_, p. 288. _Cf._\nMalcolm, _Memoir of Central India_, ii. 171; Hodgson,\n_Miscellaneous Essays_, i. 152.]\n\n[Footnote 141: Wells Williams, _The Middle Kingdom_, i. 835.]\n\n[Footnote 142: Bowring, _Siam_, i. 105 _sq._]\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe regard for truth displays itself not only in the condemnation\nof falsehood, but in the idea that, under certain circumstances,\nit is a person's duty to inform others of the truth, although\nthere is no deception in withholding it. This duty is limited by\nutilitarian considerations, and it is less insisted on than the\nduty of refraining from falsehood; positive commandments, as we\nhave seen, are generally less stringent than the corresponding\nnegative commandments.[143] But to disclose the truth for the\nbenefit of others, when it is attended with injurious\nconsequences for the person who discloses it, can hardly fail to\nevoke moral approval, and may be deemed a merit of the highest\norder.\n\n[Footnote 143: _Supra_, i. 303 _sqq._]\n\nThe regard for truth goes a step further still. It may be\nobligatory or praiseworthy not only to spread the knowledge of\ntruth, but to seek for it. The possession of knowledge, of some\nkind or other, is universally respected. A Wolof proverb says,\n\"Not to know is bad, not to wish to know is worse.\"[144] In the\nmoral and religious systems of the East knowledge is one of the\nchief pursuits of man. Confucius described virtue as consisting\nof knowledge, magnanimity, and valour.[145] The ancients, he\nsays, \"wishing to rectify their hearts, . . . first desired to be\nsincere in their thoughts. Wishing to be sincere in their\nthoughts, they first extended to the utmost their knowledge. Such\nextension of knowledge lay in the investigation of things.\"[146]\nKnowledge is to be pursued not for theoretical, but for {132}\nmoral purposes; the Master said, \"It is not easy to find a man\nwho has learned for three years without coming to be good.\"[147]\nThe Hindus maintain that ignorance is the greatest of evils, and\nthat the sole and ultimate object of life should be to give and\nreceive instruction.[148] It is said in the Laws of Manu, \"A man\nis not therefore considered venerable because his head is gray;\nhim who, though young, has learned the Veda, the gods consider to\nbe venerable.\"[149] According to the Mahabharata, it is by\nknowledge that a creature is liberated, by knowledge that he\nbecomes the Eternal, Imperceptible, and Undecaying.[150] Buddhism\nregards sin as folly and delusion as the cause of crime;[151]\n\"the unwise man cannot discover the difference between that which\nis evil and that which is good, as a child knows not the value of\na coin that is placed before him.\"[152] And the highest of all\ngifts, the source of abiding salvation, is the knowledge of the\nidentity between the individual and God, in whom and by whom the\nindividual lives, and moves, and has his being.[153] According to\none of the Pahlavi texts, wisdom is better than wealth of any\nkind;[154] through the power of wisdom it is possible to do every\nduty and good work;[155] the religion of the Mazda-worshippers is\napprehended more fully by means of the most perfect wisdom, and\n\"even the struggle and warfare of Ir\u00e2n with foreigners, and the\nsmiting of Aharman and the demons it is possible to effect\nthrough the power of wisdom.\"[156] A strong dash of\nintellectualism is a prominent feature in the Rabbinic religion.\nThe highest virtue lies not only in the fulfilment but in the\nstudy of the law. There is a special merit bound up in it that\nwill assist man both in this world and in the world to come; and\nit is said that even a bastard who is learned in {133} the law is\nmore honoured than a high-priest who is not.[157] Among\nMuhammedans, also, great respect is shown to men of\nlearning.[158] Knowledge, the Prophet said, \"lights the way to\nHeaven\"--\"He dies not who gives life to learning\"--\"With\nknowledge the servant of God rises to the heights of goodness and\nto a noble position\"--\"The ink of the scholar is more holy than\nthe blood of the martyr.\"[159]\n\n[Footnote 144: Burton, _Wit and Wisdom from West Africa_, p. 6.]\n\n[Footnote 145: _Chung Yung_, xx. 8. Douglas, _Confucianism and\nTaouism_, p. 105.]\n\n[Footnote 146: _T\u00e2 Hsio_, 4.]\n\n[Footnote 147: _Lun Y\u00fc_, viii. 12. _Cf._ Faber, _Digest of the\nDoctrines of Confucius_, p. 60; de Lanessan, _La morale des\nphilosophes chinois_, p. 27.]\n\n[Footnote 148: Percival, _Land of the Veda_, p. 263.]\n\n[Footnote 149: _Laws of Manu_, ii. 156.]\n\n[Footnote 150: Muir, _Original Sanskrit Texts_, v. 327.]\n\n[Footnote 151: Rhys Davids, _Hibbert Lectures on the History of\nBuddhism_, p. 208.]\n\n[Footnote 152: Hardy, _Manual of Budhism_, p. 505.]\n\n[Footnote 153: Rhys Davids, _op. cit._ p. 209.]\n\n[Footnote 154: _Din\u00e2-\u00ee Ma\u00een\u00f4g-\u00ee Khirad_, xlvii. 6.]\n\n[Footnote 155: _Ibid._ i. 54.]\n\n[Footnote 156: _Ibid._ lvii. 15 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 157: Montefiore, _Hibbert Lectures on the Religion of\nthe Ancient Hebrews_, p. 495. Deutsch, _Literary Remains_, p. 35.]\n\n[Footnote 158: Lane, _Manners and Customs of the Modern\nEgyptians_, p. 301 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 159: Ameer Ali, _Ethics of Isl\u00e2m_, pp. 47, 49.]\n\nIn Christianity the knowledge of truth became a necessary\nrequirement of salvation. But here, as in the East, the truth\nwhich alone was valued was religious truth. All knowledge that\nwas not useful to salvation was, indeed, despised, and science\nwas regarded not only as valueless, but as sinful.[160] \"The\nwisdom of this world is foolishness with God.\"[161] If it\nhappened that any one gave himself to letters, or lifted up his\nmind to the contemplation of the heavenly bodies, he passed\ninstantly for a magician or a heretic.[162] So also every mental\ndisposition which is essential to scientific research was for\ncenturies stigmatised as offensive to the Almighty; it was a sin\nto doubt the opinions which had been instilled in childhood\nbefore they had been examined, to notice any objection to those\nopinions, to resolve to follow the light of evidence wherever it\nmight lead.[163] Yet we are told, even by highly respectable\nwriters, that the modern world owes its scientific spirit to the\nextreme importance which Christianity {134} assigned to the\npossession of truth, of _the_ truth.[164] According to M.\nR\u00e9ville, \"it was the orthodox intolerance of the Church in the\nMiddle Ages which impressed on Christian society this disposition\nto seek truth at any price, of which the modern scientific spirit\nis only the application. The more importance the Church attached\nto the profession of the truth--to the extent even of considering\ninvoluntary error as in the highest degree a damnable crime--so\nmuch the more the sentiment of the immense value of this truth\narose in the general persuasion, along with a resolve to conquer\nit wherever it was felt not to be possessed. How otherwise,\" M.\nR\u00e9ville asks, \"can we explain that science was not developed and\nhas not been pursued with constancy, except in the midst of\nChristian societies?\"[165] This statement is characteristic of\nthe common tendency to attribute to the influence of the\nChristian religion almost anything good which may be found among\nChristian nations. But, surely, the patient and impartial search\nafter hidden truth, for the sake of truth, which constitutes the\nessence of scientific research, is not congenial to, but the very\nopposite of, that ready acceptance of a revealed truth for the\nsake of eternal salvation, which was insisted upon by the Church.\nAnd what about that singular love of abstract knowledge which\nflourished in ancient Athens, where Aristotle declared it a\nsacred duty to prefer truth to everything else,[166] and Socrates\nsacrificed his life on its altar? It seems that the modern\nscientific spirit is only a revival and development of a mental\ndisposition which was for ages suppressed by the persecuting\ntendencies of the Church and the extreme contempt for learning\ndisplayed by the barbarian invaders and their descendants. Even\nwhen they had settled in the countries which they had conquered,\nthe {135} Teutons would not permit their children to be\ninstructed in any science, for fear lest they should become\neffeminate and averse from war;[167] and long afterwards it was\nheld that a nobleman ought not to know letters, and that to write\nand read was a shame to gentry.[168]\n\n[Footnote 160: Gibbon, _Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire_,\nii. 185. von Eicken, _Geschichte der mittelalterlichen\nWeltanschauung_, pp. 128-130, 589 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 161: _1 Corinthians_, iii. 19. _Cf._ Lactantius,\n_Divines Institutiones_, iii. 3 (Migne, _Patrologi\u00e6 cursus_, vi.\n354 _sqq._); St. Augustine, _De Civitate Dei_, viii. 10 (Migne,\nxli. 234).]\n\n[Footnote 162: Chapelain, _De la lecture des vieux romans_, p.\n20. As late as the middle of the seventeenth century a powerful\nparty was rising in England who said that all learning was\nunfavourable to religion, and that it was sufficient for everyone\nto be acquainted with his mother-tongue alone (Twells, _Life of\nPocock_, p. 176). The Duke de Saint Simon, who in 1721 and 1722\nwas the French ambassador in Madrid, states (_M\u00e9moires_, xxxv.\n209) that in Spain science was a crime, and ignorance and\nstupidity the chief virtues.]\n\n[Footnote 163: Lecky, _Rationalism in Europe_, ii. 87 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 164: Ritchie, _Natural Rights_, p. 172. _Cf._ Kuenen,\n_Hibbert Lectures on National Religions and Universal Religions_,\np. 290.]\n\n[Footnote 165: R\u00e9ville, _Prolegomena of the History of\nReligions_, p. 226.]\n\n[Footnote 166: Aristotle, _Ethica Nicomachea_, i. 6. 1. Prof.\nRitchie argues (_op. cit._ p. 172 _sq._) that a devotion to truth\nas such was in the ancient world known only to a few\nphilosophers. Prof. Fowler is probably more correct in saying\n(_Principles of Morals_, ii. 45, 220 _sq._; _Progressive\nMorality_, p. 114) that it was more common amongst the Greeks\nthan amongst ourselves.]\n\n[Footnote 167: Procopius, _De bello Gothorum_, i. 2. Robertson,\n_History of the Reign of Charles V._ i. 234. Millingen, _op.\ncit._ i. 22 _sq._ n. [dagger]]\n\n[Footnote 168: Alain Chartier, quoted by Sainte-Palaye, _op.\ncit._ ii. 104. See also De la Nou\u00eb, _Discours politiques et\nmilitaires_, p. 238; Lyttleton, _Life of Henry II._ ii. 246 _sq._\nThe ignorance of the medi\u00e6val clergy has been somewhat\nexaggerated by Robertson (_op. cit._ pp. 21, 22, 278 _sq._). Even\nin the dark ages it was not a very uncommon thing for the clergy\nto be able to read and write (Maitland, _The Dark Ages_, p. 16\n_sqq._).]\n\nThe regard for knowledge springs in the first instance from the\nlove of it. As Aristotle said, \"all men are by nature desirous of\nknowledge.\"[169] But this feeling is not equally strong, nor\nequally deep, in all. The curiosity of savages, however great it\noften may be,[170] has chiefly reference to objects or events\nwhich immediately concern their welfare or appear to them\nalarming, or to trifles which attract attention on account of\ntheir novelty. If their curiosity were more penetrating, they\nwould no longer remain savages; an extended desire of knowledge\nleads to civilisation. But curiosity or love of knowledge,\nwhether in savage or civilised men, is not resolvable merely into\nviews of utility; as Dr. Brown observed, we feel it without\nreflecting on the pleasure which we are to enjoy or the pain\nwhich we are to suffer.[171] When highly developed, it drives men\nto scientific investigations even though no practical benefits\nare expected from the results. This devotion to truth for its own\nsake, pure and disinterested as it is, has a singular tendency to\nexcite regard and admiration in everyone who has come under its\ninfluence. From the utilitarian point of view it has been\ndefended on {136} the ground that, on the whole, every truth is\nin the long run useful and every error harmful, and that we can\nnever exactly tell in advance what benefits may accrue even from\na knowledge which is apparently fruitless. But it seems that our\nlove of truth is somewhat apt to mislead our moral judgment. When\nduly reflecting on the matter, we cannot help making a moral\ndistinction between him who pursues his studies merely from an\ninstinctive craving for knowledge, and him who devotes his life\nto the search of truth from a conviction that he may thereby\npromote human welfare.\n\n[Footnote 169: Aristotle, _Metaphysica_, i. 1. 1, p. 980. _Cf._\nCicero, _De officiis_, i. 4.]\n\n[Footnote 170: Murdoch, 'Ethnological Results of the Point Barrow\nExpedition,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ ix. 42 (Eskimo).\nKrasheninnikoff, _History of Kamschatka_, p. 177. Anderson,\n_Mandalay to Momien_, p. 151 (Kakhyens). Foreman, _Philippine\nIslands_, p. 188 (Tag\u00e1log natives of the North). Bock, _Head\nHunters of Borneo_, p. 209 (Dyaks). Forbes, _A Naturalist's\nWanderings in the Eastern Archipelago_, p. 320 (natives of\nTimor-laut). Dieffenbach, _Travels in New Zealand_, ii. 108.]\n\n[Footnote 171: Dugald Stewart, _op. cit._ ii. 336. Brown,\n_Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind_, lec. 67, p. 451.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXII\n\nTHE RESPECT FOR OTHER MEN'S HONOUR AND SELF-REGARDING\nPRIDE--POLITENESS\n\n\nTHERE are many acts, forbearances, and omissions, the\noffensiveness of which mainly or exclusively springs from men's\ndesire to be respected by their fellow-men and their dislike of\nbeing looked down upon. Foremost among these are attacks upon\npeople's honour and good name. A man's honour may be defined as\nthe moral worth he possesses in the eyes of the society of which\nhe is a member, and it behoves other persons to acknowledge this\nworth and, especially, not to detract from it by imputing to him,\non insufficient grounds, such behaviour as is generally\nconsidered degrading.\n\n The censure to which he is subject or the contempt in which he\nis held may no doubt affect his welfare in various ways, but it\nis chiefly painful as a violation of his personal dignity. Hence\nthe duty of respecting a man's honour is on the whole contained\nin the more comprehensive obligation of showing deference, in\nwords and deeds, for his feeling of self-regarding pride.\n\nThis feeling, or at least the germ of it, is found already in\nsome of the lower animals. Among \"high-life\" dogs, says Professor\nRomanes, \"wounded sensibilities and loss of esteem are capable of\nproducing much keener suffering than is mere physical pain.\" A\nreproachful word or look from any of his friends made a {138}\nSkye terrier miserable for a whole day; and another terrier, who\nwhen in good humour used to perform various tricks, was never so\npleased as when his joke was duly appreciated, whereas \"nothing\ndispleased him so much as being laughed at when he did not intend\nto be ridiculous.\"[1] Monkeys also, according to Dr. Brehm, are\n\"very sensitive to every kind of treatment they may receive, to\nlove and dislike, to encouraging praise and chilling blame, to\npleasant flattery and wounding ridicule, to caresses and\nchastisement.\"[2]\n\n[Footnote 1: Romanes, _Animal Intelligence_, pp. 439, 444.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Brehm, _From North Pole to Equator_, p. 299. _Cf._\n_ibid._ pp. 304-306, Brehm, _Thierleben_, i. 75, 157; Schultze,\n_Vergleichende Seelenkunde_, i. pt. i. 110; Perty, _Das\nSeelenleben der Thiere_, p. 66.]\n\nAmong the savage races of men, as among civilised peoples,\nself-regarding pride is universal, and in many of them it is a\nvery conspicuous trait of character.[3] The Veddah of Ceylon,\nsays Mr. Nevill, \"is proud in the extreme, and considers himself\nno man's inferior. Hence he is keenly sensitive to ridicule,\ncontempt, and even patronage. There is nothing he dreads more\nthan being laughed at as a savage, because he dislikes clothes\nand cultivation.\"[4] Australian aborigines are described as\n\"extravagantly proud,\"[5] as \"vain and fond of approbation.\"[6]\nIn Fiji \"anything like a slight deeply offends a native, and is\nnot soon forgotten.\"[7] The Negroes of Sierra Leone \"possess a\ngreat share of pride, and are easily affected by an insult: they\ncannot hear even a harsh expression, or a raised tone of voice,\nwithout shewing that {139} they feel it.\"[8] The Araucanians,\ninhabiting parts of Chili, \"are naturally fond of honourable\ndistinction, and there is nothing they can endure with less\npatience than contempt or inattention.\"[9] The North American\nIndians, says Perrot, \"ont g\u00e9n\u00e9ralement touts beaucoup de vaine\ngloire dans leurs actions bonnes ou mauvaises. . . . L'ambition\nest en un mot une des plus fortes passions qui les anime.\"[10]\nThe Indian of British Columbia, for instance, \"watches that he\nmay receive his proper share of honour at festivals; he cannot\nendure to be ridiculed for even the slightest mistake; he\ncarefully guards all his actions, and looks for due honour to be\npaid to him by friends, strangers, and subordinates. This\npeculiarity appears most clearly in great festivals.\"[11] Thus,\nin numerous instances, \"persons who have been hoarding up\nproperty for ten, fifteen, or twenty years (at the same time\nalmost starving themselves for want of clothing), have given it\nall away to make a show for a few hours, and to be thought of\nconsequence.\"[12] Speaking of the Eskimo about Behring Strait,\nMr. Nelson observes, \"As with all savages, the Eskimo are\nextremely sensitive to ridicule and are very quick to take\noffence at real or seeming slights.\"[13] Among the Atkha Aleuts\nit has happened that men have committed suicide from\ndisappointment at the failure of an undertaking, fearing that\nthey would become the laughing-stock of the village.[14] Among\nmany other savages shame or wounded pride is not uncommonly a\ncause of suicide.[15] The Hos of Chota Nagpore have a saying that\nfor a wife who has been reproved by her husband {140}\"nothing\nremains but the water at the bottom of the well\";[16] and in New\nZealand native women sometimes killed themselves because they had\nbeen rebuked for negligence in cooking or for want of care\ntowards a child.[17]\n\n[Footnote 3: Dieffenbach, _Travels in New Zealand_, ii. 107;\nColenso, _Maori Races of New Zealand_, p. 56. Crawfurd, _History\nof the Indian Archipelago_, i. 54. Raffles, _History of Java_, i.\n249. St. John, _Life in the Forests of the Far East_, ii. 323\n(Malays of Sarawak). Man, 'Aboriginal Inhabitants of the Andaman\nIslands,' in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xii. 94. Stewart, 'Notes on\nNorthern Cachar,' in _Jour. Asiatic Soc. Bengal_, xxiv. 609\n(Nagas). Bergmann, _Nomadische Streifereien unter den Kalm\u00fcken_,\nii. 290, 295, 296, 312. H\u00f6gstr\u00f6m, _Beskrifning \u00f6fver de til\nSveriges Krona lydande Lapmarker_, p. 152 (Lapps). Dall,\n_Alaska_, p. 392 _sq._ (Aleuts). Brett, _Indian Tribes of\nGuiana_, p. 103.]\n\n[Footnote 4: Nevill, 'Vaeddas of Ceylon,' in _Taprobanian_, i.\n192. _Cf._ Sarasin, _Ergebnisse naturwissenschaftlicher\nForschungen auf Ceylon_, iii. 537.]\n\n[Footnote 5: Hale, _U.S. Exploring Expedition. Vol. VI.\nEthnography and Philology_, p. 109.]\n\n[Footnote 6: Mathew, in Curr, _The Australian Race_, iii. 155.]\n\n[Footnote 7: Williams and Calvert, _Fiji_, p. 105. _Cf._ _ibid._\np. 103 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 8: Winterbottom, _Native Africans in the Neighbourhood\nof Sierra Leone_, i. 211.]\n\n[Footnote 9: Molina, _History of Chili_, ii. 113.]\n\n[Footnote 10: Perrot, _Memoire sur les m[oe]urs, coustumes et\nrelligion des sauvages de l'Amerique septentrionale_, p. 76.\n_Cf._ Buchanan, _Sketches of the History, Manners, and Customs of\nthe North American Indians_, p. 165; Matthews, _Ethnography and\nPhilology of the Hidatsa Indians_, p. 41.]\n\n[Footnote 11: Boas, in _Fifth Report on the North-Western Tribes\nof Canada_, p. 19.]\n\n[Footnote 12: Duncan, quoted by Mayne, _Four Years in British\nColumbia_, p. 295.]\n\n[Footnote 13: Nelson, 'Eskimo about Bering Strait,' in _Ann. Rep.\nBur. Ethn._ xviii. 300.]\n\n[Footnote 14: Yakof, quoted by Petroff, _Report on Alaska_,\np. 158. _Cf._ Dall, _op. cit._ p. 391 (Aleuts).]\n\n[Footnote 15: See _infra_, on Suicide; Lasch, 'Besitzen die\nNaturv\u00f6lker ein pers\u00f6nliches Ehrgef\u00fchl?' in _Zeitschr. f.\nSocialwissenschaft_, iii. 837 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 16: Bradley-Birt, _Chota Nagpore_, p. 104. _Cf._\nDalton, _Descriptive Ethnology of Bengal_, p. 206.]\n\n[Footnote 17: Colenso, _op. cit._ p. 57.]\n\nLike other injuries, an insult not only affects the feelings of\nthe victim, but arouses sympathetic resentment in outsiders, and\nis consequently disapproved of as wrong. Among the Maoris, if\nanybody wantonly tried to hurt another's feelings, it was\nimmediately repressed, and \"such a person was spoken of as having\nhad no parents, or, as having been born (laid) by a bird.\"[18] In\nthe Malay Archipelago, \"among some of the tribes, abusive\nlanguage cannot with impunity be used even to a slave. Blows are\nstill more intolerable, and considered such grievous affronts,\nthat, by law, the person who receives them is considered\njustified in putting the offender to death.\"[19] The natives of\nthe Tonga Islands hold no bad moral habit to be more \"ridiculous,\ndepraved, and unjust, than publishing the faults of one's\nacquaintances and friends . . . . ; and as to downright calumny\nor false accusation, it appears to them more horrible than\ndeliberate murder does to us: for it is better, they think, to\nassassinate a man's person than to attack his reputation.\"[20]\nAccording to the customary laws of the Fantis in West Africa,\n\"where a person has been found guilty of using slanderous words,\nhe is bound to retract his words publicly, in addition to paying\na small fine by way of compensation to the aggrieved party. Words\nimputing witchcraft, adultery, immoral conduct, crime, and all\nwords which sound to the disreputation of a person of whom they\nare spoken are actionable.\"[21]\n\n[Footnote 18: _Ibid._ p. 53.]\n\n[Footnote 19: Crawfurd, _op. cit._ iii. 119 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 20: Mariner, _Natives of the Tonga Islands_, ii. 163 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 21: Sarbah, _Fanti Customary Laws_, p. 94.]\n\nAmong the Aztecs of ancient Mexico he who wilfully calumniated\nanother, thereby seriously injuring his {141} reputation, was\ncondemned to have his lips cut off, and sometimes his ears also;\nwhilst in Tezcuco the slanderer suffered death.[22] In the\nChinese penal code a special book is provided for the prevention\nand punishment of opprobrious and insulting language, as \"having\nnaturally a tendency to produce quarrels and affrays.\"[23] Among\nArabs all insulting expressions have their respective fines\nascertained in the _[k.]ady_'s court.[24] It is said in the\nTalmud:--\"Let the honour of thy neighbour be to thee like thine\nown. Rather be thrown into a fiery furnace than bring any one to\npublic shame.\"[25]\n\n[Footnote 22: Bancroft, _Native Races of the Pacific States_,\nii. 463.]\n\n[Footnote 23: _Ta Tsing Leu Lee_, p. 354 n.*]\n\n[Footnote 24: Burckhardt, _Notes on the Bedouins and Wah\u00e1bys_,\np. 70 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 25: Deutsch, _Literary Remains_, p. 57.]\n\nThe Roman Law of the Twelve Tables contained provisions against\nlibellers,[26] and throughout the whole history of Roman law an\nattack upon honour or reputation was deemed a serious crime.[27]\nAs for wrongful prosecution, which may be regarded as an\naggravated form of defamation, the law of the later Empire\nrequired that any one bringing a criminal charge should bind\nhimself to suffer in case of failure the penalty that he had\nendeavoured to call down upon his adversary.[28] Among Teutonic\npeoples defamatory words and libelling were already at an early\ndate punished with a fine.[29] The Salic Law decrees that a\nperson who calls a freeborn man a \"fox\" or a \"hare\" or a \"dirty\nfellow,\" or says that he has thrown away his shield, must pay him\nthree solidi;[30] whilst, according to one text of the same law,\nit cost 188 solidi (or nearly as much as was paid for the murder\nof a Frankish freeman)[31] to call a freeborn woman a witch or a\nharlot, in case the truth of the charge could not be proved.[32]\n{142} The oldest English laws exacted _b\u00f3t_ and _w\u00edte_ from\npersons who attacked others with abusive words.[33] In the\nthirteenth century, in almost every action before an English\nlocal court, the plaintiff claimed compensation not only for the\n\"damage,\" but also for the \"shame\" which had been done him.[34]\nWe further find that regular actions for defamation were common\nin the local courts; whereas in later days the ecclesiastical\nprocedure against defamatory speech seems to have been regarded\nas the usual, if not the only, engine which could be brought to\nbear upon cases of libel and slander.[35] In England, as in Rome,\nthere was a strong feeling that men should not make charges which\nthey could not prove: before the Conquest a person might lose his\ntongue, or have to redeem it with his full _wer_, if he brought a\nfalse and scandalous accusation; and under Edward I. a statute\ndecreed that if the appellee was acquitted his accuser should lie\nin prison for a year and pay damages by way of recompense for the\nimprisonment and infamy which he had brought upon the innocent.[36]\n\n[Footnote 26: _Lex Duodecim Tabularum_, viii. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 27: _Digesta_, xlvii. 10. 15. 25. _Codex Justinianus_,\nix. 36. Hunter, _Exposition of Roman Law_, p. 1069 _sq._ Mommsen,\n_R\u00f6misches Strafrecht_, p. 794 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 28: G\u00fcnther, _Die Idee der Wiedervergeltung_, i. 141\n_sqq._ Mommsen, _op. cit._ p. 496 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 29: Wilda, _Strafrecht der Germanen_, p. 776 _sqq._\nNordstr\u00f6m, _Bidrag till den svenska samh\u00e4lls-f\u00f6rfattningens\nhistoria_, ii. 293 _sqq._ Stemann, _Den danske Retshistorie\nindtil Christian V.'s Lov_, p. 686 _sq._ Brunner, _Deutsche\nRechtsgeschichte_, ii. 672 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 30: _Lex Salica_, xxx. 4, 5, 2; Hessel's edition, col.\n181 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 31: _Ibid._ xv. col. 91 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 32: _Ibid._ lxvii. 2, col. 403.]\n\n[Footnote 33: _Laws of Hlothhaere and Eadric_, 11.]\n\n[Footnote 34: Pollock and Maitland, _History of English Law till\nthe Time of Edward I._ ii. 537.]\n\n[Footnote 35: _Ibid._ ii. 538. Stephen, _History of the Criminal\nLaw of England_, ii. 409.]\n\n[Footnote 36: Pollock and Maitland, _op. cit._ ii. 539.]\n\nThe condemnation of an insult is greatly influenced by the\n_status_ of, or the relations between, the parties concerned.\nAmong the Goajiro Indians of Colombia a poor man may be insulted\nwith impunity, when the same treatment to a rich man would cause\ncertain bloodshed.[37] In Nias an affront is punished with a\nfine, which varies according to the rank of the parties.[38] The\nChinese penal code lays down that a person who is guilty of\naddressing abusive language to his or her father or mother, or\nfather's parents, or a wife who rails at her husband's parents or\ngrandparents, shall be strangled;[39] and the same punishment is\nprescribed for a slave who abuses his master.[40] {143} According\nto the Laws of Manu, a Kshatriya shall be fined one hundred\n_panas_ for defaming a Br\u00e2hmana, a Vaisya shall be fined one\nhundred and fifty or two hundred _panas_, and a S\u00fbdra shall\nsuffer corporal punishment; whereas a Br\u00e2hmana shall pay only\nfifty _panas_ for defaming a Kshatriya, twenty-five for defaming\na Vaisya, and twelve for defaming a S\u00fbdra.[41] In ancient\nTeutonic law the fines for insulting behaviour were graduated\naccording to the rank of the person offended.[42] The\nstarting-point of the Roman law was that an _injuria_--which was\npre-eminently an affront to the dignity of the person--could not\nbe done to a slave as such, only to the master through the medium\nof his slave;[43] and even in later times, in the case of\ntrifling injuries, such as mere verbal insults, the master had no\naction, unless by leave of the Praetor, or unless the insult were\nmeant for the master himself.[44] These and similar variations\nspring from the same causes as do corresponding variations in the\ncase of other injuries dealt with above. But there are also\nspecial reasons why social superiority or inferiority influences\nmoral opinions concerning offences against persons self-regarding\npride. The respect due to a man is closely connected with his\nstation, and in the case of defamation the injury suffered by the\nloss of honour or reputation is naturally proportionate to the\nesteem in which the offended party is held. At the same time the\nharmfulness of an insult also depends upon the reputation of the\nperson who offers it. According to the Gotlands Lag, one of the\nancient provincial laws of Sweden, a slave can not only be\ninsulted with impunity, but has himself to pay no fine for\ninsulting another person[45]--obviously because he was too\ndegraded a being to be able to detract from anybody's honour or\ngood name.\n\n[Footnote 37: Simons, 'Exploration of the Goajira Peninsula,' in\n_Proceed. Roy. Geo. Soc._ N.S. vii. 786.]\n\n[Footnote 38: von Rosenberg, _Der malayische Archipel_, p. 167.]\n\n[Footnote 39: _Ta Tsing Leu Lee_, sec. cccxxix. p. 357.]\n\n[Footnote 40: _Ibid._ sec. cccxxvii. p. 356.]\n\n[Footnote 41: _Laws of Manu_, viii. 267 _sq._ _Cf._ _Gautama_,\nxii. 8 _sqq._ It is also said that \"a once-born man (a S\u00fbdra),\nwho insults a twice-born man with gross invective, shall have his\ntongue cut out; for he is of low origin\" (_ibid._ viii. 270. See\nalso _Institutes of Vishnu_, v. 23; _Gautama_, xii. 1;\n_\u00c2pastamba_, ii. 10. 27. 14).]\n\n[Footnote 42: Keyser, _Efterladte Skrifter_, ii. pt. i. 295.]\n\n[Footnote 43: Hunter, _Exposition of Roman Law_, p. 164. Mommsen,\n_R\u00f6misches Strafrecht_, p. 786, n. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 44: _Digesta_, xlvii. 10. 15. 35. Hunter, _op. cit._\np. 165.]\n\n[Footnote 45: _Gotlands-Lagen_, i. 19. 37.]\n\n{144} The condemnation of such conduct as is offensive to other\npersons' self-regarding pride includes condemnation of pride\nitself, when displayed in an excessive degree; whereas the\nopposite disposition--modesty--which implies regard for other\npeople's \"self-feeling,\" is praised as a virtue. The Fijians say\nof a boasting person, \"You are like the _kaka_ (parrot); you only\nspeak to shout your own name.\"[46] On the other hand, among the\nTonga Islanders \"a modest opinion of oneself is esteemed a great\nvirtue, and is also put in practice.\"[47] Confucius taught that\nhumility belongs to the characteristics of a superior man.[48]\nSuch a man, he said, is modest in his speech, though he exceeds\nin his actions;[49] he has dignified ease without pride, whereas\nthe mean man has pride without a dignified ease;[50] he prefers\nthe concealment of his virtue, when it daily becomes more\nillustrious, whereas the mean man seeks notoriety when he daily\ngoes more and more to ruin.[51] So also humility has a\ndistinguished place in the teachings of Lao-tsze:--\"I have three\nprecious things which I hold fast and prize, namely, compassion,\neconomy, and humility\"; \"He who knows the glory, and at the same\ntime keeps to shame, will be the whole world's valley . . . ,\neternal virtue will fill him, and he will return home to\nTaou.\"[52] In the Book of the Dead the soul of the ancient\nEgyptian pleads, \"I am not swollen with pride.\"[53] According to\nZoroastrianism, the sin of pride has been created by Ahriman.[54]\nOverbearingness was censured in ancient Scandinavia,[55]\nGreece,[56] and Rome. During our prosperity, says Cicero, \"we\nought with great care to {145} avoid pride and arrogance.\"[57]\nThe Hebrew prophets condemned not only pride but eminence,\nbecause an eminent man is apt to be proud.[58] We read in the\nTalmud:--\"He who humiliates himself will be lifted up; he who\nraises himself up will be humiliated. Whosoever runs after\ngreatness, greatness runs away from him; he who runs from\ngreatness, greatness follows him.\"[59] Christianity enjoined\nhumility as a cardinal duty in every man.[60] In the Koran it is\nsaid, \"God loves not him who is proud, and boastful.\"[61] Pride\nhas thus come to be stigmatised not only as a vice, but as a sin\nof great magnitude. One reason for this is that it is regarded as\neven more offensive to the \"self-feeling\" of a great god or the\nSupreme Being than it is to that of a man. But pride must also\nappear as irreligious arrogance to those who maintain that man is\nby nature altogether corrupt, and that everything good in him is\na gift of God.[62]\n\n[Footnote 46: Williams and Calvert, _op. cit._ p. 107.]\n\n[Footnote 47: Mariner, _op. cit._ ii. 164.]\n\n[Footnote 48: _Lun Y\u00fc_, v. 15. _Chung Yung_, xxvii. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 49: _Lun Y\u00fc_, xiv. 29.]\n\n[Footnote 50: _Ibid._ xiii. 26. _Cf._ _ibid._ xx. 2. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 51: _Chung Yung_, xxxiii. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 52: Douglas, _Confucianism and Taouism_, p. 194 _sq._\n_T\u00e2o Teh King_, xxviii. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 53: _Book of the Dead_, ch. 125, p. 216. _Cf._\nAm\u00e9lineau, _Essai sur l'\u00e9volution des id\u00e9es morales dans l'\u00c9gypt\nAncienne_, p. 353.]\n\n[Footnote 54: _Vend\u00eed\u00e2d_, i. 11.]\n\n[Footnote 55: Maurer, _Die Bekehrung des Norwegischen Stammes\nzum Christenthume_, ii. 150.]\n\n[Footnote 56: Schmidt, _Die Ethik der alten Griechen_, i. 253.\nHermann, _Lehrbuch der Griechischen Antiquit\u00e4ten_, ii. pt. i. 34\n_sq._ Bl\u00fcmner, _Ueber die Idee des Schicksals in den Trag\u00f6dien\ndes Aischylos_, p. 131.]\n\n[Footnote 57: Cicero, _De officiis_, i. 26.]\n\n[Footnote 58: _Cf._ Kuenen, _Religion of Israel_, i. 62\n_sq._]\n\n[Footnote 59: Deutsch, _Literary Remains_, p. 58.]\n\n[Footnote 60: _St. Matthew_, v. 11, 12, 39; vi. 25, 26, 30\n_sqq._; xviii. 4; &c.]\n\n[Footnote 61: _Koran_, iv. 40. _Cf._ Ameer Ali, _Ethics of\nIsl\u00e2m_, p. 44.]\n\n[Footnote 62: Manzoni, _Osservazioni sulla morale cattolica_, p.\n182 _sqq._]\n\nAt the same time, whilst pride is held blamable, humility may\nalso go too far to be approved of, and may even be an object of\ncensure. In early ethics, as we have noticed above, revenge is\nenjoined as a duty and forgiveness of enemies is despised; and\nthis is the case not only among savages.[63] The device of\nChivalry was, \"It is better to die than to be avenged by\nshame\";[64] and side by side with the nominal acceptance of the\nChristian doctrine of absolute placability the idea still\nprevails, in many European countries, that an assault upon honour\nshall be followed by a challenge to mortal combat. Too great\nhumility is regarded as a sign of weakness, cowardice, hypocrisy,\nor a defective sense of honour. We are not allowed to be\nindifferent to the estimation in which we are held by our\nneighbours. Such indifference springs either from a feeble moral\nconstitution and absence of moral shame, or from {146} a\ndepreciation of other people's opinions in comparison with our\nown, and this is offensive to their _amour-propre_. Outward\nhumility may thus suggest inward pride and appear arrogant.\n\n[Footnote 63: _Supra_, i. 73 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 64: Laurent, _\u00c9tudes sur l'histoire de l'Humanit\u00e9_,\nvii. 184.]\n\nA person's \"self-feeling\" may be violated in innumerable ways, by\nwords and deeds. Almost any deviation from what is usual may\narouse a suspicion of arrogance. This largely accounts for the\nfact mentioned in a previous chapter that habits have a tendency\nto become true customs, that is, rules of duty. Transgressions of\nthe established forms of social intercourse are particularly apt\nto be offensive to people's self-regarding pride. Many of these\nforms originated in a desire to please, but by becoming habitual\nthey at the same time became obligatory. Politeness is a duty\nrather than a virtue.\n\nThere is probably no people on earth which does not recognise\nsome rules of politeness. Many savages are conspicuous for their\ncivility.[65] It has been observed that Christian missionaries\nworking among uncivilised races often are in manners much\ninferior to those they are teaching, and thus lower the native\nstandard of refinement.[66] The Samoans, we are told, \"are a\nnation of gentlemen,\" and contrast most favourably with the\ngenerality of Europeans who come amongst them.[67] On their first\nintercourse with Europeans, the Maoris \"always manifest a degree\nof politeness which would do honour to a more civilised people\";\nbut by continued intercourse they lose a great part of this\ncharacteristic.[68] Among the Fijians \"the rules of politeness\nare minute, and receive scrupulous attention. They affect the\nlanguage, and are seen in forms of salutation, in attention to\nstrangers, at meals, in dress, and, indeed, influence their\nmanners in-doors and {147} out. None but the very lowest are\nill-behaved, and their confusion on committing themselves shows\nthat they are not impudently so.\"[69] The Malagasy \"are a very\npolite people, and look with contempt upon those who neglect the\nordinary usages and salutations\";[70] \"even the most ragged and\ntattered slave possesses a natural dignity and ease of manner,\nwhich contrasts favourably with the rude conduct and boorish\nmanners of the lower class at home.\"[71] Of the Point Barrow\nEskimo Mr. Murdoch observes that \"many of them show a grace of\nmanner and a natural delicacy and politeness which is quite\nsurprising\"; and he mentions the instance of a young Eskimo being\nso polite in conversing with an American officer that \"he would\ntake pains to mispronounce his words in the same way as the\nlatter did, so as not to hurt his feelings by correcting him\nbluntly.\"[72] The forms of Kafir politeness \"are very strictly\nadhered to, and are many.\"[73] Of the Negroes of Fida Bosman\nwrote, \"They are so civil to each other and the inferior so\nrespectful to the superior, that at first I was very much\nsurprised at it.\"[74] Monrad found the Negroes of Accra surpass\nmany civilised people in politeness.[75] So also in Morocco even\ncountry-folks are much more civil in their general behaviour than\nthe large majority of Europeans. \"The conversations of the\nArabs,\" says d'Arvieux, \"are full of civilities; one never hears\nanything there that they think rude and unbecoming.\"[76]\nPoliteness is a characteristic of all the great nations of the\nEast. The Chinese have brought the practice of it \"to a pitch of\nperfection which is not only unknown in Western lands, but,\nprevious to experience, is unthought of and almost unimaginable.\nThe rules of ceremony, we are reminded in the Classics, are three\n{148} hundred, and the rules of behaviour three thousand.\"[77] In\nEurope courtesy was recommended as the most amiable of knightly\nqualities; and from \"the wild and overstrained courtesies of\nChivalry\" has been derived our present system of manners.[78]\n\n[Footnote 65: Waitz-Gerland, _Anthropologie der Naturv\u00f6lker_, vi.\n143 _sqq._ (Polynesians). Macdonald, _Oceania_, p. 195 (Efatese).\nCranz, _History of Greenland_, i. 157. MacGregor, 'Lagos,\nAbeokuta and the Alake,' in _Jour. African Soc._ July, 1904,\np. 466 (Yorubas).]\n\n[Footnote 66: Brenchley, _Jottings during the Cruise of H.M.S.\n'Cura\u00e7oa' among the South Sea Islands_, p. 349.]\n\n[Footnote 67: Hood, _Cruise in H.M.S. 'Fawn' in the Western\nPacific_, p. 59 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 68: Dieffenbach, _op. cit._ ii. 108 _sqq._ See also\nColenso, _op. cit._ p. 53 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 69: Williams and Calvert, _op. cit._ p. 129. _Cf._\n_ibid._ pp. 128, 131 _sq._; Anderson, _Notes of Travel in Fiji_,\np. 135.]\n\n[Footnote 70: Sibree, _The Great African Island_, p. 325.]\n\n[Footnote 71: Little, _Madagascar_, p. 71.]\n\n[Footnote 72: Murdoch, 'Ethn. Results of the Point Barrow\nExpedition,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ ix. 42.]\n\n[Footnote 73: Leslie, _Among the Zulus and Amatongas_, p. 203.]\n\n[Footnote 74: Bosman, _Description of the Coast of Guinea_,\np. 317.]\n\n[Footnote 75: Monrad, _Skildring af Guinea-Kysten_, p. 9.]\n\n[Footnote 76: d'Arvieux, _Travels in Arabia the Desart_, p. 141.]\n\n[Footnote 77: Smith, _Chinese Characteristics_, p. 35.]\n\n[Footnote 78: _Ordre of Chyualry_, fol. 46. Robertson, _History\nof the Reign of Charles V._ i. 84. Milman, _History of Latin\nChristianity_, iv. 211. Turner, _History of England_, iii. 473.\nMills, _History of Chivalry_, i. 161 _sq._ Scott, 'Essay on\nChivalry,' in _Miscellaneous Prose Works_, vi. 58.]\n\nThe rules of politeness and good manners refer to all sorts of\nsocial intercourse and vary indefinitely in detail. They tell\npeople how to sit or stand in each other's presence, or how to\npass through a door; a Zulu would be fined for going out of a hut\nback first.[79] They prescribe how to behave at a meal; the\nIndians of British Columbia consider it improper to talk on such\nan occasion,[80] and it appears that in England also, in the\nfifteenth century, \"people did not hold conversation while\neating, but that the talk and mirth began with the liquor.\"[81]\nPoliteness demands that a person should never interrupt another\nwhile speaking;[82] or that he should avoid contradicting a\nstatement;[83] or, not infrequently, that he should rather tell a\npleasant untruth than an unpleasant truth.[84] At times it\nrequires the use of certain phrases, words of thanks, flattery,\nor expressions of self-humiliation. In Chinese there is \"a whole\nvocabulary of words which are indispensable to one who wishes to\npose as a 'polite' person, words in which whatever belongs to the\nspeaker is treated with scorn and contempt, and whatever relates\nto the person addressed is honourable. The 'polite' Chinese will\nrefer to his wife, if driven to the extremity of referring {149}\nto her at all, as his 'dull thorn,' or in some similar elegant\nfigure of speech.\"[85]\n\n[Footnote 79: Tyler, _Forty Years among the Zulus_, p. 190 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 80: Woldt, _Kaptein Jacobsens Reiser til Nordamerikas\nNordvestkyst_, p. 99.]\n\n[Footnote 81: Wright, _Domestic Manners and Sentiments in England\nduring the Middle Ages_, p. 396.]\n\n[Footnote 82: Domenech, _Seven Years Residence in the Great\nDeserts of North America_, ii. 72. Richardson, _Arctic Searching\nExpedition_, i. 385 (Kutchin). Cranz, _History of Greenland_, i.\n157. Dobrizhoffer, _Account of the Abipones_, ii. 136 _sq._\nd'Arvieux, _op. cit._ p. 139 _sq._; Wallin, _Reseanteckningar\nfr\u00e5n Orienten_, iii. 259 (Bedouins).]\n\n[Footnote 83: Nansen, _First Crossing of Greenland_, ii. 334\n_sq._; Cranz, _op. cit._ i. 157 (Greenlanders). Dobrizhofifer,\n_op. cit._ ii. 137 (Abipones). d'Arvieux, _op. cit._ p. 141\n(Bedouins).]\n\n[Footnote 84: _Supra_, ii. 111.]\n\n[Footnote 85: Smith, _Chinese Characteristics_, p. 274.]\n\nPoliteness enjoins the performance of certain ceremonies upon\npersons who meet or part. The custom of salutation is of\nworld-wide prevalence, though there are certain savages who are\nsaid to have no greetings except when they have learnt the\npractice from the whites.[86] As a ceremony prescribed by public\nopinion it is an obligatory tribute paid to another person's\n\"self-feeling,\" whatever be the original nature of the act which\nhas been adopted for the purpose. The form of salutation has\nsometimes been borrowed from questions springing from curiosity\nor suspicion. Among the Californian Miwok, when anybody meets a\nstranger he generally salutes him, \"Whence do you come? What are\nyou at?\"[87] The Abipones \"would think it quite contrary to the\nlaws of good-breeding, were they to meet any one and not ask him\nwhere he was going\";[88] and a similar question is also a very\ncommon mode of greeting among the Berbers of Southern Morocco.\nVery frequently a salutation consists of some phrase which is\nexpressive of goodwill. It may be an inquiry about the other\nperson's health or welfare, as the English \"How are you?\" \"How do\nyou do?\" Among the Burmese two relatives or friends who meet\nbegin a conversation by the expressions, \"Are you well? I am\nwell,\" if they have been some time separated; whereas those who\nare daily accustomed to meet say, \"Where are you going?\"[89] The\nMoors ask, \"What is your news?\" or, \"Is nothing wrong?\" The\nordinary salutation of the Zulus is, \"I see you, are you well?\"\nafter which the snuffbox, the token of friendship, is passed\nround.[90] Among several tribes of California, again, a person\nwhen greeting another {150} simply utters a word which means\n\"friendship.\"[91] The goodwill is often directly expressed in the\nform of a wish, like our \"Good day!\" \"Good night!\" Among the\nHebrews the salutation at meeting or entering another's house\nseems at first to have consisted most commonly in an inquiry\nafter mutual welfare,[92] but in later times \"Health!\" or \"Peace\nto thee!\" became the current greeting.[93] According to the Laws\nof Manu, a Br\u00e2hmana should be saluted, \"May thou be long-lived, O\ngentle one!\"[94] The Greeks said [Greek: chai=re] (\"Be joyful!\");\nthe Romans, _Salve!_ (\"Be in health!\") especially on meeting, and\n_Vale!_ (\"Be well!\") on parting. The good wish may have the form\nof a prayer. The Moors say, \"May God give thee peace!\" \"May God\ngive thee a good night!\" and the English \"Good-bye\" and the\nFrench _Adieu_ are prayers curtailed by the progress of time. But\nthere is no foundation for Professor Wundt's assertion that \"the\nwords employed in greeting are one and all prayer formul\u00e6 in a\nmore or less rudimentary state.\"[95] A salutation may, finally,\nbe a verbal profession of subjection, as the Swedish \"\u00d6dmjukaste\ntj\u00e4nare,\" that is, (I am your) \"most humble servant.\"\n\n[Footnote 86: Krasheninnikoff, _History of Kamschatka_, p. 177.\nDall, _op. cit._ p. 397 (Aleuts). Egede, _Description of\nGreenland_, p. 125; Rink, _Danish Greenland_, p. 223; Cranz, _op.\ncit._ i. 157 (Greenlanders). Prescott, in Schoolcraft, _Indian\nTribes of the United States_, iii. 244 (Dacotahs). Lewin, _Wild\nRaces of South-Eastern India_, pp. 230 (Kumi), 256 (Kukis).]\n\n[Footnote 87: Powers, _Tribes of California_, p. 347.]\n\n[Footnote 88: Dobrizhoffer, _op. cit._ ii. 138.]\n\n[Footnote 89: Forbes, _British Burma_, p. 69.]\n\n[Footnote 90: Tyler, _op. cit._ p. 190.]\n\n[Footnote 91: Powers, _op. cit._ p. 58.]\n\n[Footnote 92: _Genesis_, xliii. 27. _Exodus_, xviii. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 93: _Judges_, xix. 20. _1 Chronicles_, xii. 18. _Cf._\nKeil, _Manual of Biblical Arch\u00e6ology_, ii. 183.]\n\n[Footnote 94: _Laws of Manu_, ii. 125.]\n\n[Footnote 95: Wundt, _Ethik_, p. 179.]\n\nSalutations may consist not only in words spoken, but in\nconventional gestures, either accompanied by some verbal\nexpression or performed silently.[96] They may be tokens of\nsubmission or reverence, as cowering, crouching, and bowing. Or\nthey may originally have been signs of disarming or\ndefencelessness, as uncovering some particular portion of the\nbody. Von Jhering suggests that the offering of the hand belongs\nto the same group of salutations, its object being to indicate\nthat the other person has nothing to fear;[97] but in many cases\nat least handshaking seems to have the same origin as other\nceremonies consisting {151} in bodily contact. Salutatory\ngestures may express not only absence of evil intentions but\npositive friendliness; among respectable Moors it is a common\nmode of greeting that each party places his right hand on his\nheart to indicate, as Jackson puts it, \"that part to be the\nresidence of the friend.\"[98] Various forms of salutation by\ncontact, such as clasping, embracing, kissing, and sniffing, are\nobviously direct expressions of affection;[99] and we can hardly\ndoubt that the joining of hands serves a similar object when we\nfind it combined with other tokens of goodwill. Among some of the\nAustralian natives, friends, on meeting after an absence, \"will\nkiss, shake hands, and sometimes cry over one another.\"[100] In\nMorocco equals salute each other by joining their hands with a\nquick motion, separating them immediately, and kissing each his\nown hand. The Soolimas, again, place the palms of the right hands\ntogether, carry them then to the forehead, and from thence to the\nleft side of the chest.[101] But bodily union is also employed as\na method of transferring either blessings or conditional curses,\nand it seems probable that certain salutatory acts have vaguely\nor distinctly such transference in view. Among the Masai, who\nspit on each other both when they meet and when they part,\nspitting \"expresses the greatest goodwill and the best of\nwishes\";[102] and in a previous chapter I have endeavoured to\nshow that the object of certain reception ceremonies is to\ntransfer a conditional curse to the stranger who is received as a\nguest.[103] On the same principle as underlies these ceremonies,\nhandshaking may be a means of joining in compact, analogous to a\ncommon meal[104] and the blood-covenant.[105]\n\n[Footnote 96: See Tylor, 'Salutations,' in _Encyclop\u00e6dia\nBritannica_, xxi. 235 _sqq._; Ling Roth, 'Salutations,' in _Jour.\nAnthr. Inst._ xix. 166 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 97: von Jhering, _Der Zweck im Recht_, ii. 649 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 98: Jackson, _Account of Timbuctoo, &c._ p. 235.]\n\n[Footnote 99: See _infra_, on the Origin and Development of the\nAltruistic Sentiment.]\n\n[Footnote 100: Hackett, 'Ballardong or Ballerdokking Tribe,' in\nCurr, _The Australian Race_, i. 343.]\n\n[Footnote 101: Laing, _Travels in the Timannee, Kooranko, and\nSoolima Countries_, p. 368.]\n\n[Footnote 102: Thomson, _Through Masai Land_, p. 166.]\n\n[Footnote 103: _Supra_, i. 590 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 104: _Supra_, i. 587.]\n\n[Footnote 105: See _infra_, on the Origin and Development of the\nAltruistic Sentiment.]\n\nBeing an homage rendered to other persons self-regarding {152}\npride, the rule of politeness is naturally most exacting in\nrelation to superiors. Many of its forms have, in fact,\noriginated in humble or respectful behaviour towards rulers,\nmasters, or elders, and, often in a modified shape, become common\nbetween equals after they have lost their original meaning.[106]\nIt has been noticed that the cruelty of despots always engenders\npoliteness, whereas the freest nations are generally the rudest\nin manners.[107] Politeness is further in a special degree shown\nby men to women, not only among ourselves, but even among many\nsavages;[108] in this case courtesy is connected with courtship.\nStrangers or remote acquaintances, also, have particular claims\nto be treated with civility, whereas politeness is of little\nmoment in the intercourse of friends; it imitates kindness, and\nis resorted to where the genuine feeling is wanting.[109] And in\nthe capacity of guest, the stranger is often for the time being\nflattered with exquisite marks of honour, for reasons which have\nbeen stated in another connection.\n\n[Footnote 106: See Spencer, _Principles of Sociology_, ii.\n'Ceremonial Institutions,' _passim_.]\n\n[Footnote 107: Johnston, _Uganda_, ii. 685.]\n\n[Footnote 108: Dorsey, 'Omaha Sociology,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur\nEthn._ iii. 270. Chanler, _Through Jungle and Desert_, p. 485\n(Wakamba). See also _supra_, i. ch. xxvi.]\n\n[Footnote 109: _Cf._ Tucker, _Light of Nature_, ii. 599 _sqq._;\nJoubert, _Pens\u00e9es_, i. 243.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXIII\n\nREGARD FOR OTHER PERSONS' HAPPINESS IN GENERAL--GRATITUDE--PATRIOTISM\nAND COSMOPOLITANISM\n\n\nIN previous chapters we have dealt with moral ideas concerning\nvarious modes of conduct which have reference to other men's\nwelfare--to their life or bodily comfort, their liberty,\nproperty, knowledge of truth, or self-regarding pride. But the\nlist of duties which we owe to our fellow-creatures is as yet by\nno means complete. Any act, forbearance, or omission, which in\nsome way or other diminishes or increases their happiness may on\nthat account become a subject of moral blame or praise, being apt\nto call forth sympathetic retributive emotions.\n\nTo do good to others is a rule which has been inculcated by all\nthe great teachers of morality. According to Confucius,\nbenevolence is the root of righteousness and a leading\ncharacteristic of perfect virtue.[1] In the Taouist 'Book of\nSecret Blessings' men are enjoined to be compassionate and\nloving, and to devote their wealth to the good of their\nfellow-men.[2] The moralists of ancient India teach that we\nshould with our life, means, understanding, and speech, seek to\nadvance the welfare of other creatures in this world; that we\nshould do so without expecting reciprocity; and that we should\nenjoy the prosperity of others even though ourselves unprosperous.[3]\nThe writers {154} of classical antiquity repeatedly give expression\nto the idea that man is not born for himself alone, but should assist\nhis fellow-men to the best of his ability.[4] In the Old\nTestament we meet with the injunction, \"Thou shalt love thy\nneighbour as thyself\";[5] and this was declared by Christ to be\nof equal importance with the commandment, \"Thou shalt love the\nLord thy God.\"[6]\n\n[Footnote 1: _Lun Y\u00fc_, xvii. 6. Douglas, _Confucianism and\nTaouism_, p. 108.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Douglas, _op. cit._ p. 272 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 3: Muir, _Religious and Moral Sentiments rendered from\nSanskrit Writers_, p. 107 _sq._ Monier Williams, _Indian Wisdom_,\np. 448.]\n\n[Footnote 4: Schmidt, _Die Ethik der alten Griechen_, ii. 275\n_sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 5: _Leviticus_, xix. 18.]\n\n[Footnote 6: _St. Matthew_, xxii. 39.]\n\nTo a reflecting mind it is obvious that the moral value of\nbeneficence exclusively lies in the benevolent motive, and that\nthere is nothing praiseworthy in promoting the happiness of\nothers from selfish considerations. Confucius taught that self\nmust be conquered before a man can be perfectly virtuous.[7]\nAccording to Lao-tsze, self-abnegation is the cardinal rule for\nboth the sovereign and the people.[8] Self-denial is the chief\ndemand of the Gospel, and is emphasised as a supreme duty by\nIslam.[9] Generally speaking, the merit attached to a good action\nis proportionate to the self-denial which it costs the agent.\nThis follows from the nature of moral approval in its capacity of\na retributive emotion, as is proved by the fact that the degree\nof gratitude felt towards a benefactor is in a similar way\ninfluenced by the deprivation to which he subjects himself. On\nthe other hand, there is considerable variety of opinion, even\namong ourselves, as to the dictates of duty, in cases where our\nown interests conflict with those of our fellow-men. To Professor\nSidgwick it is a moral axiom that \"I ought not to prefer my own\nlesser good to the greater good of another.\"[10] According to\nHutcheson, we do not condemn those as evil who will not sacrifice\ntheir private interest to the advancement of the positive good of\nothers, \"unless the private interest be very small, and the\npublick good very great.\"[11]\n\n[Footnote 7: _Lun Y\u00fc_, xii. i. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 8: Douglas, _Confucianism and Taouism_, p. 192.]\n\n[Footnote 9: Ameer Ali, _Ethics of Isl\u00e2m_, p. 32.]\n\n[Footnote 10: Sidgwick, _Methods of Ethics_, p. 383.]\n\n[Footnote 11: Hutcheson, _Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the\nPassions, &c._ p. 312.]\n\nThe idea that it is bad to cause harm to others and {155} good or\nobligatory to promote their happiness, is in different ways\ninfluenced by the relationship between the parties; and to many\ncases it does not apply at all. We have previously noticed that\naccording to early ethics an enemy is a proper object of hatred,\nnot of love;[12] and according to more advanced ideas a person\nwho treats us badly has at all events little claim upon our\nkindness. The very opposite is the case with a benefactor or\nfriend. To requite a benefit, or to be grateful to him who\nbestows it, is probably everywhere, at least under certain\ncircumstances, regarded as a duty. This is a subject which in the\npresent connection calls for special consideration.\n\n[Footnote 12: _Supra_, i. p. 73 _sq._]\n\nThe duty of gratefulness presupposes a disposition for\ngratitude.[13] According to travellers' accounts, this feeling is\nlacking in many uncivilised races.[14] Lyon writes of the Eskimo\nof Igloolik:--\"Gratitude is not only rare, but absolutely unknown\namongst them, either by action, word, or look, beyond the first\noutcry of satisfaction. Nursing their sick, burying the dead,\nclothing and feeding the whole tribe, furnishing the men with\nweapons, and the women and children with ornaments, are\ninsufficient to awaken a grateful feeling, and the very people\nwho relieved their distresses when starving are laughed at in\ntime of plenty for the quantity and quality of the food which was\nbestowed in charity.\"[15] Various other tribes in {156} North\nAmerica have been accused of ingratitude;[16] and of some South\nAmerican savages we are told that they evinced no thankfulness\nfor the presents which were given them.[17] The Fijians are\ndescribed as utterly indifferent to their benefactors. The Rev.\nTh. Williams writes:--\"If one of them, when sick, obtained\nmedicine from me, he thought me bound to give him food; the\nreception of food he considered as giving him a claim on me for\ncovering; and, that being secured, he deemed himself at liberty\nto beg anything he wanted, and abuse me if I refused his\nunreasonable request.\"[18] Mr. Lumholtz had a similar experience\nwith regard to the natives of Herbert River, Northern\nQueensland:--\"If you give one thing to a black man, he finds ten\nother things to ask for, and he is not ashamed to ask for all\nthat you have, and more too. He is never satisfied. Gratitude\ndoes not exist in his breast.\"[19] In several languages there is\nno word expressive of what we term gratitude or no phrase\ncorresponding to our \"thank you\";[20] and on this fact much\nstress has been {157} laid, the deficiency of language being\nregarded as an indication of a corresponding deficiency in feelings.\n\n[Footnote 13: For the definition of gratitude, see _supra_, i. 93.]\n\n[Footnote 14:  Steller, _Beschreibung von Kamischatka_, p. 292.\nBergmann, _Nomadische Streifereien unter den Kalm\u00fcken_, ii. 310,\n316. Foreman, _Philippine Islands_, p. 183. Modigliani, _Viaggio\na N\u00edas_, p. 467. Selenka, _Sonnige Welten_, p. 286 (Malays).\nMarsden, _History of Sumatra_, p. 207 (Malays of Sumatra).\nForbes, _A Naturalist's Wanderings in the Eastern Archipelago_,\np. 320 (natives of Timor-laut). Mrs. Forbes, _Insulinde_, p. 178\n(natives of Ritabel). Hagen, _Unter den Papua's_, p. 266 (Papuans\nof Bogadjim). Romilly, _Western Pacific and New Guinea_, p. 239.\nLa P\u00e9rouse, _Voyage round the World_, ii. 109 (Samoans). Colenso,\n_Maori Races of New Zealand_, p. 48; Dieffenbach, _Travels in New\nZealand_, ii. 110. Ling Roth, _Aborigines of Tasmania_, p. 63.\nGason, 'Manners and Customs of the Dieyerie Tribe,' in Woods,\n_Native Tribes of South Australia_, p. 258. Baker, _Albert\nN'yanza_, i. 242 (Latukas), 289 (Negroes), von Fran\u00e7ois, _Nama\nund Damara_, p. 191 (Herero).]\n\n[Footnote 15: Lyon, _Private Journal during the Voyage of\nDiscovery under Captain Parry_, p. 348 _sq._ See also Parry,\n_Journal of a Second Voyage for the Discovery of a North-West\nPassage_, p. 524 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 16: Cranz, _History of Greenland_, i. 174. Sarytschew,\n'Voyage of Discovery to the North-East of Siberia,' in\n_Collection of Modern Voyages_, vi. 78 (Aleuts). Harmon, _Voyages\nand Travels in the Interior of North America_, p. 291\n(Tacullies). Heriot, _Travels through the Canadas_, p. 319.\nLafitau, _M[oe]urs des sauvages ameriquains_, i. 106. Burton,\n_City of the Saints_, p. 125 (Sioux and prairie tribes generally).]\n\n[Footnote 17: von Spix and von Martius, _Travels in Brazil_, ii.\n228, 241 _sq._ (Coroados). Stokes, quoted by King and Fitzroy,\n_Voyages of the 'Adventure' and 'Beagle,'_ i. 77 (Fuegians).]\n\n[Footnote 18: Williams and Calvert, _Fiji_, p. 111. See also\nAnderson, _Notes of Travel in Fiji and New Caledonia_,\npp. 124, 131.]\n\n[Footnote 19: Lumholtz, _Among Cannibals_, p. 100.]\n\n[Footnote 20: Southey, _History of Brazil_, iii. 399 (Abipones,\nGuaranies). Hearne, _Journey to the Northern Ocean_, p. 307\n(Northern Indians). Lewin, _Wild Races of South-Eastern India_,\np. 192 (Toungtha). Foreman, _op. cit._ p. 182 _sq._ (Bisayans).\nModigliani, _Viaggio a N\u00edas_, p. 467. Ling Roth, _Natives of\nSarawak_, i. 74 (Dyaks). Chalmers, _Pioneering in New Guinea_,\np. 187; Romilly, _Western Pacific and New Guinea_, p. 239 _sq._\n(However, Mr Romilly's statement that \"in all the known New\nGuinea languages there is not even a word for 'thank you,'\" is\nnot quite correct, as appears from Chalmers _op. cit._ p. 187.)\nWilson, _Missionary Voyage to the Southern Pacific Ocean_,\np. 365; Waitz-Gerland, _Anthropologie der Naturv\u00f6lker_, vi. 116\n(Tahitians). Colenso, _op. cit._ p. 48 (Maoris). New, _Life and\nLabours in Eastern Africa_, p. 100 (Wanika). von Fran\u00e7ois, _op.\ncit._ p. 191 (Herero). In the Vedic language, also, there was no\nword for \"thanks\" (Oldenberg, _Die Religion des Veda_, p. 305);\nand many Eastern languages of the present day lack an equivalent\nfor \"thank you\" (Ward, _View of the History, &c. of the Hindoos_,\nii. 81, n. _a_.; Pool, _Studies in Muhammedanism_, p. 176; Polak,\n_Persien_, i. 9). When one of the missionaries in India was\nengaged in the translation of the Scriptures into Bengali, he\nfound no common word in that language suitable to express the\nidea of gratitude (Wilkins, _Modern Hinduism_, p. 397).]\n\nHere again we must distinguish between a traveller's actual\nexperience and the conclusions which he draws from it; and it\nseems that in many cases our authorities have been too ready to\ncharge savages with a total lack of grateful feelings, because\nthey have been wanting in gratitude on certain occasions. It is\ntoo much to expect that a savage should show himself thankful to\nany stranger who gives him a present. Speaking of the Ahts of\nBritish Columbia, Mr Sproat remarks that the Indian's suspicion\nprevents a ready gratitude, as he is prone to see, in apparent\nkindness extended to him, some under-current of selfish motive.\n\"He is accustomed, among his own people, to gifts made for\npurposes of guile, and also to presents made merely to show the\ngreatness and richness of the giver; but, I imagine,\" our author\nadds, \"when the Aht ceases to suspect such motives--when he does\nnot detect pride, craft, or carelessness--he is grateful, and\nprobably grateful in proportion to the trouble taken to serve\nhim.\"[21] As for the ingratitude of the Northern Queensland\nnatives, Mr. Lumholtz himself admits that \"they assume that the\ngift is bestowed out of fear\";[22] and of the New Zealanders we\nare told that their total want of gratitude was particularly due\nto the fact that \"no New Zealander ever did any kindness, or gave\nanything, to another, without mainly having an eye to himself in\nthe transaction.\"[23] Moreover, gratitude often requires not only\nthe absence of a selfish motive in the benefactor, but some\ndegree of self-sacrifice. \"A person,\" says Mr. Sproat, \"may keep\nan Indian from starving all the winter through, yet, when summer\ncomes, very likely he will not walk a yard for his preserver\nwithout payment. The savage does not, in this instance, {158}\nrecognise any obligation; but thinks that a person who had so\nmuch more than he could himself consume might well, and without\nany claim for after services, part with some of it for the\nadvantage of another in want.\"[24] Mr. Powers makes a similar\nobservation with reference to the aborigines of California:--\"White\nmen,\" he says, \"who have had dealings with Indians, in\nconversation with me have often bitterly accused them of\ningratitude. 'Do everything in your power for an Indian,' they\nsay, 'and he will accept it all as a matter of course; but for\nthe slightest service you require of him he will demand pay.'\nThese men do not enter into the Indian's ideas. This\n'ingratitude' is really an unconscious compliment to our power.\nThe savage feels, vaguely, the unapproachable elevation on which\nthe American stands above him. He feels that we had much and he\nhad little, and we took away from him even his little. In his\nview giving does not impoverish us, nor withholding enrich us.\nGratitude is a sentiment not in place between master and slave;\nit is a sentiment for equals. The Indians are grateful to one\nanother.\"[25] Nor are men very apt to feel grateful for benefits\nto which they consider themselves to have a right. Thus,\naccording to Mr. Howitt, the want of gratitude among the South\nAustralian Kurnai for kindnesses shown them by the whites is due\nto the principle of community, which is so strong a feature of\nthe domestic and social life of these aborigines. \"For a supply\nof food, or for nursing when sick, the Kurnai would not feel\ngrateful to his family group. There would be a common obligation\nupon all to share food, and to afford personal aid and succour.\nThis principle would also come into play as regards the simple\npersonal property they possess, and would extend to the\nbefore-unknown articles procured from the whites. The food, the\nclothes, the medical attendance which the Kurnai receive from the\nwhites, they take in the accustomed manner; and, in addition to\n{159} this, we must remember that the donors are regarded as\nhaving unlimited resources. They cannot be supposed by the Kurnai\nto be doing anything but giving out of their abundance.\"[26] Mr.\nGuppy found the same principle at work among the Solomon\nIslanders:--\"Often when during my excursions I have come upon\nsome man who was preparing a meal for himself and his family, I\nhave been surprised at the open-handed way in which he dispensed\nthe food to my party of hungry natives. No gratitude was shown\ntowards the giver, who apparently expected none.\"[27] It has also\nbeen observed that the want of gratitude with which Arabs have\noften been charged by Europeans has arisen \"from the very common\npractice of hospitality and generosity, and from the prevailing\nopinion that these virtues are absolute duties which it would be\ndisgraceful and sinful to neglect.\"[28]\n\n[Footnote 21: Sproat, _Scenes and Studies of Savage Life_,\np. 165 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 22: Lumholtz, _Among Cannibals_, p. 159.]\n\n[Footnote 23: Colenso, _op. cit._ p. 48.]\n\n[Footnote 24: Sproat, _op. cit._ p. 165 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 25: Powers, _Tribes of California_, p. 411.]\n\n[Footnote 26: Fison and Howitt, _Kamilaroi and Kurnai_, p. 257.]\n\n[Footnote 27: Guppy, _Solomon Islands_, p. 127.]\n\n[Footnote 28: Lane, _Manners and Customs of the Modern\nEgyptians_, p. 298. See also Burton, _Pilgrimage to Al-Madinah\nand Meccah_, i. 51.]\n\nWe should further remember that savages often take care not to\ndisplay their emotions. Among the Melanesians, according to Dr.\nCodrington, \"it is not the custom to say anything by way of\nthanks; it is rather improper to show emotion when anything is\ngiven, or when friends meet again; silence with the eyes cast\ndown is the sign of the inward trembling or shyness which they\nfeel, or think they ought to feel, under these circumstances.\nThere is no lack of a word which may be fairly translated\n'thank'; and certainly no one who has given cause for it will say\nthat Melanesians have no gratitude; others probably are ready\nenough to say it.\"[29] Of the North American Chippewas Major\nStrickland writes:--\"If an Indian makes a present, it is always\nexpected that one equally valuable should be given in return. No\nmatter what you give them, or how valuable or rich the present,\nthey seldom betray the least emotion or appearance of gratitude,\nit being considered beneath the dignity of a red man to betray\nhis feelings. For all this seeming indifference, {160} they are\nin reality as grateful, and, I believe, even more so than our own\npeasantry.\"[30] The Aleuts also, although they are chary of\nexpressions of thanks, \"do not forget kindness, and endeavour to\nexpress their thankfulness by deeds. If anyone assists an Aleut,\nand afterwards offends him, he does not forget the former favour,\nand in his mind it often cancels the offence.\"[31] From the want\nof a word for a feeling we must not conclude that the feeling\nitself is wanting. Mr. Sproat observes:--\"The Ahts have, it is\ntrue, no word for gratitude, but a defect in language does not\nabsolutely imply defect in heart; and the Indian who, in return\nfor a benefit received, says, with glistening eyes, that his\nheart is good towards his benefactor, expresses his gratitude\nquite as well perhaps as the English man who says 'Thank you.'\"[32]\n\n[Footnote 29: Codrington, _Melanesians_, p. 354.]\n\n[Footnote 30: Strickland, _Twenty-seven Years in Canada West_,\nii. 58.]\n\n[Footnote 31: Veniaminof, quoted by Dall, _Alaska_, p. 395.]\n\n[Footnote 32: Sproat, _op. cit._ p. 165. See also Ling Roth,\n_Natives of Sarawak_, i. 74 (Dyaks).]\n\nIt is not surprising, then, that in various cases a people which\nto one traveller appears to be quite destitute of gratitude is by\nanother described as being by no means lacking in this\nfeeling;[33] and sometimes contradictory statements are made even\nby the same writer. Thus Mr. Lumholtz, who gives such a gloomy\npicture of the character of the Northern Queensland natives,\nnevertheless tells us of a native who, though himself very\nhungry, threw the animals which the traveller had shot for him to\nan old man--his wife's uncle--whom they met, in order to give\nsome proof of the gratitude he owed the person from whom he had\nreceived his wife;[34] and regarding the Fijians Mr. Williams\nhimself states that thanks for presents \"are always expressed\naloud, and generally with a kind wish for the giver.\"[35] As we\nhave noticed before, retributive kindly emotions, of which\ngratitude is only the most developed form, are commonly found\namong gregarious animals, social affection being not only a\nfriendly {161} sentiment towards another individual, but towards\nan individual who is conceived of as a friend.[36] And it is all\nthe more difficult to believe in the absolute want of gratitude\nin some savage races, as the majority of them--to judge from my\ncollection of facts--are expressly acquitted of such a defect,\nand several are described as remarkably grateful for benefits\nbestowed upon them.\n\n[Footnote 33: _E.g._, the Fuegians, Sioux, Ahts, Aleuts,\nKamchadales, Tasmanians, Zulus (see _supra_ and _infra_).]\n\n[Footnote 34: Lumholtz, _Among Cannibals_, p. 221.]\n\n[Footnote 35: Williams and Calvert, _op. cit._ p. 132.]\n\n[Footnote 36: _Supra_, i. 94.]\n\nThe Fuegians use the word _chapakouta_, which means glad,\nsatisfied, affectionate, grateful, to express thanks.[37] Jemmy\nButton, the young Fuegian who was brought to England on board the\n_Beagle_, gave proofs of sincere gratitude;[38] and Admiral\nFitzroy also mentions a Patagonian boy who appeared thankful for\nkindness shown to him.[39] Of the Mapuch\u00e9s of Chili Mr. E. R.\nSmith observes:--\"Whatever present is made, or favour conferred,\nis considered as something to be returned; and the Indian never\nfails, though months and years may intervene, to repay what he\nconscientiously thinks an exact equivalent for the thing\nreceived.\"[40] The Botocudos do not readily forget kind\ntreatment;[41] and the Tupis \"were a grateful race, and\nremembered that they had received gifts, after the giver had\nforgotten it.\"[42] The Guiana Indians \"are grateful for any\nkindness.\"[43] The Navahos of New Mexico have a word for thanks,\nand employ it on all occasions which we would consider\nappropriate.[44] The Sioux \"evinced the warmest gratitude to any\nwho had ever displayed kind feelings towards them.\"[45] In his\n'Voyages from Montreal to the Frozen and Pacific Oceans,'\nMackenzie mentions the gratitude shown him by a young Indian whom\nhe had cured of a bad wound. When well enough to engage in a\nhunting party, the young man brought to his physician the tongue\nof an elk, and when they parted both he and his relatives\nexpressed the heartiest acknowledgment for the care bestowed on\nhim.[46] If an Aleut receives a gift he accepts it, saying _Akh!_\nwhich means \"thanks.\"[47] Some of the Point Barrow Eskimo visited\nby Mr. Murdoch \"seem to feel truly {162} grateful for the\nbenefits and gifts received, and endeavoured by their general\nbehaviour, as well as in more substantial ways, to make some\nadequate return\"; whereas others appeared to think only of what\nthey might receive.[48]\n\n[Footnote 37: Hyades and Deniker, _Mission scientifique du Cap\nHorn_, vii. 314.]\n\n[Footnote 38: King and Fitzroy, _op. cit._ ii. 327.]\n\n[Footnote 39: _Ibid._ ii. 173.]\n\n[Footnote 40: Smith, _Araucanians_, p. 258.]\n\n[Footnote 41: Wied-Neuwied, _Reise nach Brasilien_, ii. 16.]\n\n[Footnote 42: Southey, _op. cit._ i. 247.]\n\n[Footnote 43: Im Thurn, _Among the Indians of Guiana_, p. 213.]\n\n[Footnote 44: Matthews, 'Study of Ethics among the Lower Races,'\nin _Journal of American Folk-Lore_, xii. 9.]\n\n[Footnote 45: Eastman, _Dacotah_, p. ix.]\n\n[Footnote 46: Mackenzie, _Voyages from Montreal to the Frozen and\nPacific Oceans_, p. 137 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 47: Veniaminof, quoted by Dall, _op. cit._ p. 395.]\n\n[Footnote 48: Murdoch, 'Ethnol. Results of the Point Barrow\nExpedition,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ ix. 42. See also Seemann,\n_Voyage of 'Herald,'_ ii. 67 (Western Eskimo).]\n\nOf the Tunguses it is said, \"If you make them a present, they\nhardly thank you; but though so unpolite, they are exceedingly\ngrateful.\"[49] The Jakuts never forget a benefit received; \"for\nthey not only make restitution, but recommend to their offspring\nthe ties of friendship and gratitude to their benefactors.\"[50]\nThe Veddah of Ceylon is described as very grateful for attention\nor assistance.[51] \"A little kindly sympathy makes him an\nattached friend, and for his friend . . . . he will readily give\nhis life.\"[52] Mr. Bennett once had an interview with two village\nVeddahs, and on that occasion gave them presents. Two months\nafter a couple of elephant's tusks found their way into his front\nverandah at night, but the Veddahs who had brought them never\ngave him an opportunity to reward them. \"What a lesson in\ngratitude and delicacy,\" he exclaims, \"even a Veddah may teach!\"[53]\n\n[Footnote 49: Georgi, _Russia_, iii. 111.]\n\n[Footnote 50: Sauer, _Expedition to the Northern Parts of Russia,\nperformed by Billings_, p. 124.]\n\n[Footnote 51: Tennent, _Ceylon_, ii. 445. Sarasin, _Forschungen auf\nCeylon_, iii. 546.]\n\n[Footnote 52: Nevill, 'Vaeddas of Ceylon,' in _Taprobanian_, i. 192.]\n\n[Footnote 53: Pridham, _Account of Ceylon_, i. 460 _sq._]\n\nThe Alfura of Halmahera,[54] the Bataks of Sumatra,[55] and the\nDyaks of Borneo[56] are praised for their grateful disposition of\nmind. Of the Hill Dyaks Mr. Low observes that gratitude\n\"eminently adorns the character of these simple people, and the\nsmallest benefit conferred upon them calls forth its vigorous and\ncontinued exercise.\"[57] The Motu people of New Guinea are\n\"capable of appreciating kindness,\"[58] and have words for\nexpressing thanks.[59] Chamisso speaks highly of the gratitude\nevinced by the natives of Ulea, Caroline Islands:--\"Any thing, a\nuseful instrument, for example, which they have received as a\ngift from a friend, retains and bears among them as a lasting\nmemorial the name of the friend who bestowed it.\"[60] When\nProfessor Moseley at Dentrecasteaux Island, of the Admiralty\nGroup, gave a hatchet as pay to his guide, according {163} to\npromise, the guide seemed grateful, and presented him with his\nown shell adze in return.[61] Though the Tahitians never return\nthanks nor seem to have a word in their language expressive of\ngratitude, they are not devoid of the feeling itself.[62]\nBackhouse tells us of a Tasmanian native who, having been nursed\nthrough an illness, showed many demonstrations of gratitude; and\nhe adds that this virtue was often exhibited among these\npeople--a statement which is corroborated by the accounts of\nother travellers.[63] Of the Australian aborigines Mr. Ridley\nwrites:--\"I believe they are as a people remarkably susceptible\nof impressions from kind treatment. They recognised me as one who\nsought their good, and were evidently pleased and thankful to see\nthat I thought them worth looking after.\"[64] The Adelaide and\nEncounter Bay blacks are said to display attachment to persons\nwho are kind to them.[65] Speaking of the Central Australian\ntribes, Messrs. Spencer and Gillen observe that, though they are\nnot in the habit of showing anything like excessive gratitude on\nreceiving gifts from the white man, they are in reality by no\nmeans incapable of that feeling;[66] and other writers report\ninstances of gratitude displayed by natives of West Australia[67]\nand Queensland.[68]\n\n[Footnote 54: K\u00fckenthal, _Forschungsreise in den Molukken und\nBorneo_, i. 188.]\n\n[Footnote 55: Junghuhn, _Die Battal\u00e4nder auf Sumatra_, ii. 239.]\n\n[Footnote 56: Ling Roth, _Natives of Sarawak_, i. 74, 76.]\n\n[Footnote 57: Low, _Sarawak_, p. 246.]\n\n[Footnote 58: Stone, _A Few Months in New Guinea_, p. 95.]\n\n[Footnote 59: Chalmers, _Pioneering in New Guinea_, p. 187.]\n\n[Footnote 60: von Kotzebue, _Voyage of Discovery into the South\nSea_, iii. 214.]\n\n[Footnote 61: Moseley, 'Inhabitants of the Admiralty Islands,' in\n_Jour. Anthr. Inst._ vi. 416.]\n\n[Footnote 62: Waitz-Gerland, _op. cit._ vi. 116.]\n\n[Footnote 63: Ling Roth, _Aborigines of Tasmania_, pp. 47, 62, 64.]\n\n[Footnote 64: Ridley, _Aborigines of Australia_, p. 24. See also\n_ibid._ p. 20 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 65: Wyatt, 'Manners and Superstitions of the Adelaide\nand Encounter Bay Aboriginal Tribes,' in Woods, _Native Tribes of\nSouth Australia_, p. 162.]\n\n[Footnote 66: Spencer and Gillen, _Native Tribes of Central\nAustralia_, p. 48 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 67: Salvado, _M\u00e9moires historiques sur l'Australie_,\np. 146.]\n\n[Footnote 68: Fraser, _Aborigines of New South Wales_, p. 44.]\n\nConcerning the people of Madagascar the missionary Ellis\nwrites:--\"Whether the noble and generous feeling of gratitude has\nmuch place amongst the Malagasy has been questioned. Though often\ncharacterised by extreme apathy, they are certainly susceptible\nof tenderness of feeling, and their customs furnish various modes\nof testifying their sense of any acts of kindness shewn them, and\ntheir language contains many forms of speech expressive of\nthankfulness. The following are among those in most general use:\n'May you live to grow old--may you live long--may you live\nsacred--may you see, or obtain, justice from the sovereign.'\"\nMoreover, with all their expressions of thankfulness,\nconsiderable action is used: sometimes the two hands are extended\nopen as if to make a present; or the party stoops down to the\nground, and clasps the legs, or touches the knee and the feet of\nthe person he is thanking.[69] Ingratitude, {164} again, is\nexpressed by many strong metaphors, such as \"son of a\nthunderbolt,\" or \"offspring of a wild boar.\"[70] The Bushmans,\naccording to Burchell, are not incapable of gratitude.[71] The\nstatement made by certain travellers or colonists that the Zulus\nare devoid of this feeling, is contradicted by Mr. Tyler, who\nasserts that \"many instances might be related in which a thankful\nspirit has been manifested, and gifts bestowed for favours\nreceived.\"[72] The Basutos have words to express gratitude.[73]\nAmong the Bakongo, says Mr. Ward, \"evidences of gratitude are\nrare indeed, although occasionally one meets with this sentiment\nin odd guises. Once, by a happy chance, I saved a baby's life.\nThe child was brought to me by its mother in convulsions, and I\nwas fortunate enough to find in my medicine chest a drug that\neffected an almost immediate cure. Yet the service I rendered to\nthis woman, instead of meeting with any appreciation, only\nprocured for me the whispered reputation of being a witch.\" But\ntwenty months afterwards, at midnight when all the people were\nsleeping, the same woman came to Mr. Ward and gave him some\nfowl's eggs in payment. \"I come,\" she said, \"in the darkness that\nmy people may not know, for they would jeer at me if they knew of\nthis gift.\"[74] A traveller tells us that the inhabitants of\nGreat Benin \"if given any trifles expressed their thanks.\"[75]\nWriting on the natives of Accra, Monrad states that gratitude is\namong the virtues of the Negroes, and induces them even to give\ntheir lives in return for benefits conferred on them.[76] The\nFeloops, bordering on the Gambia, \"display the utmost gratitude\nand affection towards their benefactors.\"[77] As regards the\nEastern Central Africans, Mr. Macdonald affirms without any\nhesitation that they have gratitude, \"even though we define\ngratitude as being much more than an 'acute sense of favours to\ncome.'\"[78] The Masai and Wadshagga have \"a curious habit of\nspitting on things or people as a compliment or sign of\ngratitude\"[79]--originally, I presume, with a view to\ntransferring to them a blessing. The Barea are said to be\nthankful for benefits.[80] According to Palgrave, \"gratitude is\nno {165} less an Arab than a European virtue, whatever the\nignorance or the prejudices of some foreigners may have affirmed\nto the contrary\";[81] and Burckhardt says that an Arab never\nforgets the generosity shown to him even by an enemy.[82]\n\n[Footnote 69: Ellis, _History of Madagascar_, i. 258. See also\nRochon, _Voyage to Madagascar_, p. 56.]\n\n[Footnote 70: Ellis, _op. cit._ i. 139 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 71: Burchell, _Travels in the Interior of Southern\nAfrica_, ii. 68, 86, 447.]\n\n[Footnote 72: Tyler, _Forty Years among the Zulus_, p. 194.]\n\n[Footnote 73: Casalis, _Basutos_, p. 306.]\n\n[Footnote 74: Ward, _Five Years with the Congo Cannibals_, p. 47\n_sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 75: Punch, quoted by Ling Roth, _Great Benin_, p. 45.]\n\n[Footnote 76: Monrad, _Skildring af Guinea-Kysten_, p. 8.]\n\n[Footnote 77: Mungo Park, _Travels in the Interior of Africa_,\np. 14.]\n\n[Footnote 78: Macdonald, _Africana_, i. 10.]\n\n[Footnote 79: Johnston, _Kilima-njaro Expedition_, p. 438.]\n\n[Footnote 80: Munzinger, _Ostafrikanische Studien_, p. 533.]\n\n[Footnote 81: Palgrave, quoted in Spencer's _Descriptive\nSociology_, 'Asiatic Races,' p. 31.]\n\n[Footnote 82: Burckhardt, _Notes on the Bedouins and Wah\u00e1bys_,\np. 105.]\n\nIn other statements gratitude is directly represented as an\nobject of praise, or its absence as an object of disapproval.\nAmong the Atkha Aleuts, according to Father Yakof, gratitude to\nbenefactors was considered a virtue.[83] Among the Omahas, if a\nman receives a favour and does not manifest his thankfulness, the\npeople exclaim:--\"He does not appreciate the gift! He has no\nmanners.\"[84] The Kamchadales \"are not only grateful for favours,\nbut they think it absolutely necessary to make some return for a\npresent.\"[85] The Chinese say that \"kindness is more binding than\na loan.\"[86] According to the 'Divine Panorama,' a well-known\nTaouist work, those who forget kindness and are guilty of\ningratitude shall be tormented after death and \"shall not escape\none jot of their punishments.\"[87] In one of the Pahlavi texts\ngratitude is represented as a means of arriving at heaven, whilst\ningratitude is stigmatised as a heinous sin;[88] and according to\nAmmian ungrateful persons were even punished by law in ancient\nPersia.[89] The same, we are told, was the case in Macedonia.[90]\nThe duty of gratitude was strongly inculcated by Greek and Roman\nmoralists.[91] Aristotle observes that we ought, as a general\nrule, rather to return a kindness to our benefactor than to\nconfer a gratuitous favour upon a brother in arms, just as we\nought rather to repay a loan to a creditor than to spend the same\nsum upon a present to a friend.[92] According to {166} Xenophon\nthe requital of benefits is enjoined by a divine law.[93] \"There\nis no duty more indispensable than that of returning a kindness,\"\nsays Cicero; \"all men detest one forgetful of a benefit.\"[94]\nSeneca calls ingratitude a most odious vice, which it is difficult\nto punish by law, but which we refer for judgment to the gods.[95]\nThe ancient Scandinavians considered it dishonourable for a man to\nkill even an enemy in blood-revenge if he had received a benefit\nfrom him.[96]\n\n[Footnote 83: Yakof, quoted by Petroff, _Report on the\nPopulation, &c. of Alaska_, p. 158.]\n\n[Footnote 84: Dorsey, 'Omaha Sociology,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur.\nEthn._ iii. 270.]\n\n[Footnote 85: Dobell, _Travels in Kamtschatka_, i. 75.]\n\n[Footnote 86: Davis, _China_, ii. 123.]\n\n[Footnote 87:  Giles, _Strange Stories from a Chinese Studio_,\nii. 374 _sq._ See also _Th\u00e2i-Shang_, 4.]\n\n[Footnote 88: _D\u00een\u00e2-\u00ee Ma\u00een\u00f4g-\u00ee Khirad_, xxxvi. 28; xxxvii. 6;\nxliii. 9.]\n\n[Footnote 89: Ammianus Marcellinus, xxiii. 6. 81.]\n\n[Footnote 90: Seneca, _De beneficiis_, iii. 6. 2.]\n\n[Footnote 91: See Schmidt, _Die Ethik der alten Griechen_, ii.\n305 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 92: Aristotle, _Ethica Nicomachea_, x. 2. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 93: Xenophon, _Memorabilia_, iv. 4. 24.]\n\n[Footnote 94: Cicero, _De officiis_, i. 15 (47); ii. 18 (63).]\n\n[Footnote 95: Seneca, _De beneficiis_, iii. 6. 1 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 96: Maurer, _Die Bekehrung des Norwegischen Stammes_,\nii. 174.]\n\nWe may assume that among beings capable of feeling moral emotions\nthe general disposition to be kind to a benefactor will\ninevitably lead to the notion that ungrateful behaviour is wrong.\nSuch behaviour is offensive to the benefactor; as Spinoza\nobserves, \"he who has conferred a benefit on anyone from motives\nof love or honour will feel pain, if he sees that the benefit is\nreceived without gratitude.\"[97] This by itself tends to evoke in\nthe bystander sympathetic resentment towards the offender; but\nhis resentment is much increased by the retributive kindliness\nwhich he is apt to feel, sympathetically, towards the benefactor.\nHe wants to see the latter's kindness rewarded; and he is shocked\nby the absence of a similar desire in the very person who may be\nnaturally expected to feel it more strongly than anybody else**.\n\n[Footnote 97: Spinoza, _Ethica_, iii. 42. A Japanese proverb says\nthat \"thankless labour brings fatigue\" (Reed, _Japan_, ii. 109).]\n\nThe moral ideas concerning conduct which affects other persons'\nwelfare vary according as the parties are members of the same or\ndifferent families, or of the same or different communities. For\nreasons which have been stated in previous chapters parents have\nin this respect special duties towards their children, and\nchildren towards their parents; and a tribesman or a\nfellow-countryman has claims which are not shared by a foreigner.\nBut there are duties not only to particular individuals, but also\nto {167} whole social aggregates. Foremost among these is the\nduty of patriotism.\n\nThe duty of patriotism is rooted in the patriotic sentiment, in a\nperson's love of the social body of which he is himself a member,\nand which is attached to the territory he calls his country. It\ninvolves a desire to promote its welfare, a wish that it may\nprosper for the time being and for all future. This desire is the\noutcome of a variety of sentiments: of men's affection for the\npeople among whom they live, of attachment to the places where\nthey have grown up or spent part of their lives, of devotion to\ntheir race and language, and to the traditions, customs, laws,\nand institutions of the society in which they were born and to\nwhich they belong.\n\nGenuine patriotism presupposes a power of abstraction which the\nlower savages can hardly be supposed to possess. But it seems to\nbe far from unknown among uncultured peoples of a higher type.\nNorth American Indians are praised for their truly patriotic\nspirit, for their strong attachment to their tribe and their\ncountry.[98] Carver says of the Naudowessies:--\"The honour of\ntheir tribe, and the welfare of their nation, is the first and\nmost predominant emotion of their hearts; and from hence proceed\nin a great measure all their virtues and their vices. Actuated by\nthis, they brave every danger, endure the most exquisite\ntorments, and expire triumphing in their fortitude, not as a\npersonal qualification, but as a national characteristic.\"[99]\nPatriotism and public spirit were often strongly manifested by\nthe Tahitians.[100] The Maori \"loves his country and the rights\nof his ancestors, and he will fight for his children's\nland.\"[101] Of the Guanches of Teneriffe we are told that\npatriotism was {168} their chief virtue.[102] The same quality\ndistinguishes the Yorubas of West Africa; \"no race of men,\" says\nMr. MacGregor, \"could be more devoted to their country.\"[103]\nBurckhardt writes:--\"As to the attachment which a Bedouin\nentertains for his own tribe, the deep-felt interest he takes in\nits power and fame, and the sacrifices of every kind he is ready\nto make for its prosperity--these are feelings rarely operating\nwith equal force in any other nation; and it is with an exulting\npride of conscious patriotism, not inferior to any which ennobled\nthe history of Grecian or Helvetian republics, that an Aeneze,\nshould he be suddenly attacked, seizes his lance, and waving it\nover his head exclaims, 'I am an Aeneze.'\"[104]\n\n[Footnote 98: Adair, _History of the American Indians_, p. 378\n_sq._ Heriot, _Travels through the Canadas_, p. 317. Loskiel,\n_History of the Mission of the United Brethren among the\nIndians_, i. 17 (Iroquois).]\n\n[Footnote 99: Carver, _Travels through the Interior Parts of\nNorth America_, p. 412.]\n\n[Footnote 100: Ellis, _Polynesian Researches_, i. 128.]\n\n[Footnote 101: Angas, _Savage Life and Scenes in Australia and\nNew Zealand_, i. 338. See also Travers, 'Life and Times of Te\nRauparaha,' in _Trans. and Proceed. New Zealand Institute_,\nv. 22.]\n\n[Footnote 102: Bory de St. Vincent, _Essais sur les Isles\nFortun\u00e9es_, p. 70.]\n\n[Footnote 103: MacGregor, 'Lagos, Abeokuta, and the Alake,' in\n_Jour. African Soc._ 1904, p. 466.]\n\n[Footnote 104: Burckhardt, _Notes on the Bedouins and Wah\u00e1bys_,\np. 205.]\n\nMany of the elements out of which patriotism proper has grown are\nclearly distinguishable among savages, even the very lowest. We\nhave previously noticed the savage's attachment to members of his\nown community or tribe. Combined with this is his love of his\nnative place, and of the mode of life to which he is habituated.\nThere is a touching illustration of this feeling in the behaviour\nof the wild boy who had been found in the woods near\nAveyron--where he had spent most part of his young life in\nperfect isolation from all human beings--when he, after being\nremoved to Paris, was once taken back to the country, to the vale\nof Montmorence. Joy was painted in his eyes, in all the motions\nand postures of his body, at the view of the hills and the woods\nof the charming valley; he appeared more than ever restless and\nsavage, and \"in spite of the most assiduous attention that was\npaid to his wishes, and the most affectionate regard that was\nexpressed for him, he seemed to be occupied only with an anxious\ndesire of taking his flight.\"[105] How much greater must not the\nlove of home be in him who has there his relatives and friends!\nMr. Howitt tells us of {169} an Australian native who, on leaving\nhis camp with him for a trip of about a week, burst into tears,\nsaying to himself once and again, \"My country, my people, I shall\nnot see them.\"[106] The Veddahs of Ceylon \"would exchange their\nwild forest life for none other, and it was with the utmost\ndifficulty that they could be induced to quit even for a short\ntime their favourite solitude.\"[107] The Sti\u00eans of Cambodia are\nso strongly attached to their forests and mountains that to leave\nthem seems almost like death.[108] Solomon Islanders not seldom\ndie from home-sickness on their way to the Fiji or Queensland\nplantations.[109] The Hovas of Madagascar, when setting out on a\njourney, often take with them a small portion of their native\nearth, on which they gaze during their absence, invoking their\ngod that they may be permitted to return to restore it to the\nplace from which it was taken.[110] Mr. Crawfurd observes that in\nthe Malay Archipelago the attachment to the native spot is\nstrongest with the agricultural tribes;[111] but, though a\nsettled life is naturally most favourable to its development,\nthis feeling is not inconsistent with nomadism. The Nishinam, who\nare the most nomadic of all the Californian tribes, have very\ngreat attachment for the valley or flat which they count their\nhome.[112]\n\n[Footnote 105: Itard, _Account of the Discovery and Education of\na Savage Man_, p. 70 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 106: Brough Smyth, _Aborigines of Victoria_, ii. 305.]\n\n[Footnote 107: Hartshorne, 'Weddas,' in _Indian Antiquary_,\nviii. 317.]\n\n[Footnote 108: Mouhot, _Travels in the Central Parts of\nIndo-China_, i. 243.]\n\n[Footnote 109: Guppy, _op. cit._ p. 167.]\n\n[Footnote 110: Ellis, _History of Madagascar_, i. 141.]\n\n[Footnote 111: Crawfurd, _History of the Indian Archipelago_,\ni. 84.]\n\n[Footnote 112: Powers, _op. cit._ p. 318 _sq._ For other\ninstances of love of home among uncivilised races see von Spix\nand von Martius, _op. cit._ ii. 242, note (Coroados); von\nKotzebue, _op. cit._ iii. 45 (Indians of California); Gibbs,\n_Tribes of Western Washington and North-Western Oregon_, p. 187;\nElliott, _Report of the Seal Islands of Alaska_, p. 240; Hooper,\n_Ten Months among the Tents of the Tuski_, p. 209; von Siebold,\n_Aino auf der Insel Yesso_, p. 11; Mallat, _Les Philippines_, ii.\n95 (Negritos); von Brenner, _Besuch bei den Kannibalen Sumatras_,\np. 194 (Bataks); Earl, _Papuans_, p. 126 (natives of Rotti, near\nTimor); Ling Roth, _Aborigines of Tasmania_, p. 46; Dieffenbach,\n_Travels in New Zealand_, ii. 174; Cumming, _In the Himalayas_,\np. 404 (Paharis); Lane, _Manners and Customs of the Modern\nEgyptians_, p. 302 (Bedawees); Tristram, _Great Sahara_, p. 193\n_sq._ (Beni M'zab); Burton, _Zanzibar_, ii. 96 (Wanika); _Emin\nPasha in Central Africa_, p. 315 (Monbuttu); Andersson, _Lake\nNgami_, p. 198 (Ovambo); Rowley, _Africa Unveiled_, p. 63 _sq._\n(Kroos of the Grain Coast below Liberia); Price, 'Quissama\nTribe,' in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ i. 187.]\n\n{170} Moreover, as we have noticed above, savages have the\ngreatest regard for their native customs and institutions.[113]\nMany of them have displayed that love of national independence\nwhich gives to patriotism its highest fervour.[114] And among\nsome uncivilised peoples, at least, the force of racial and\nlinguistic unity shows itself even outside the social or\npolitical unit. Burckhardt observes that the Bedouins are not\nonly solicitous for the honour of their own respective tribes,\nbut consider the interests of all other tribes as more or less\nattached to their own, and frequently evince a general _esprit de\ncorps_, lamenting \"the losses of any of their tribes occasioned\nby attacks from settlers or foreign troops, even though at war\nwith those tribes.\"[115] A Tongan \"loves the island on which he\nwas born, in particular, and all the Tonga islands generally, as\nbeing one country, and speaking one language.\"[116] Travellers\nhave noticed how gratifying it is, when visiting an uncultured\npeople, to know a little of their language; there is at once a\nsympathetic link between the native and the stranger.[117] Even\nthe almost inaccessible Berber of the Great Atlas, in spite of\nhis excessive hatred of the European, will at once give you a\nkindly glance as soon as you, to his astonishment, utter to him a\nfew words in his own tongue.\n\n[Footnote 113: See _supra_, i. 118 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 114: _Cf._ Dobrizhoffer, _Account of the Abipones_, ii.\n95, 105; Lomonaco, 'Sulle razze indigene del Brasile,' in\n_Archivio per l'antropologia e la etnologia_, xix. 57 (Tupis);\nBrett, _Indian Tribes of Guiana_, p. 348; Schoolcraft, _Indian\nTribes of the United States_, iii. 189 (Iroquois); Nansen,\n_Eskimo Life_, p. 323 (Greenlanders); Macpherson, _Memorials of\nService in India_, p. 81 (Kandhs); Sarasin, _op. cit._ iii. 530\n(Veddahs); Casati, _Ten Years in Equatoria_, i. 188, 304 (Negroes\nof Central Africa); Fritsch, _Die Eingeborenen S\u00fcd-Afrika's_, p.\n422 _sq._ (Bushmans).]\n\n[Footnote 115: Burckhardt, _Bedouins and Wah\u00e1bys_, p. 205.]\n\n[Footnote 116: Mariner, _Natives of the Tonga Islands_, ii. 156.]\n\n[Footnote 117: See Stokes, _Discoveries in Australia_, ii. 25.]\n\nLike other species of the altruistic sentiment, patriotism is apt\nto overestimate the qualities of the object for which it is felt;\nand it does so all the more readily as love of one's country is\nalmost inseparably intermingled with love of one's self. The\nordinary, typical patriot has a strong will to believe that his\nnation is the best. If, as many {171} people nowadays seem to\nmaintain, such a will to believe is an essential characteristic\nof true patriotism, savages are as good patriots as anybody. In\ntheir intercourse with white men they have often with\nastonishment noticed the arrogant air of superiority adopted by\nthe latter; in their own opinion they are themselves vastly\nsuperior to the whites. According to Eskimo beliefs, the first\nman, though made by the Great Being, was a failure, and was\nconsequently cast aside and called _kob-lu-na_, which means\n\"white man\"; but a second attempt of the Great Being resulted in\nthe formation of a perfect man, and he was called _in-nu_, the\nname which the Eskimo give to themselves.[118] Australian\nnatives, on being asked to work, have often replied, \"White\nfellow works, not black fellow; black fellow gentleman.\"[119]\nWhen anything foolish is done, the Chippewas use an expression\nwhich means \"as stupid as a white man.\"[120] If a South Sea\nIslander sees a very awkward person, he says, \"How stupid you\nare; perhaps you are an Englishman.\"[121] Mr. Williams tells us\nof a Fijian who, having been to the United States, was ordered by\nhis chiefs to say whether the country of the white man was better\nthan Fiji, and in what respects. He had not, however, gone far in\ntelling the truth, when one cried out, \"He is a prating fellow\";\nanother, \"He is impudent\"; and some said, \"Kill him.\"[122] The\nKoriaks are more argumentative; in order to prove that the\naccounts they hear of the advantages of other countries are so\nmany lies, they say to the stranger, \"If you could enjoy these\nadvantages at home, what made you take so much trouble to come to\nus?\"[123] But the Koriaks, in their turn are looked down upon by\ntheir neighbours, the Chukchi, who call the surrounding peoples\nold women, only fit to guard their flocks, and to be their\nattendants.[124] The Ainu despise the Japanese {172} just as much\nas the Japanese despise them, and are convinced of \"the\nsuperiority of their own blood and descent over that of all other\npeoples in the world.\"[125] Even the miserable Veddah of Ceylon\nhas a very high opinion of himself, and regards his civilised\nneighbours with contempt.[126] As is often the case with\ncivilised men, savages attribute to their own people all kinds of\nvirtue in perfection. The South American Mbay\u00e1s, according to\nAzara, \"se croient la nation la plus noble du monde, la plus\ng\u00e9n\u00e9reuse, la plus exacte \u00e0 tenir sa parole avec loyaut\u00e9, et la\nplus vaillante.\"[127] The Eskimo of Norton Sound speak of\nthemselves as _yu'-p[)i]k_, meaning fine or complete people,\nwhereas an Indian is termed _i\u00f1-k[)i]-l[)i]k_, from a word which\nmeans \"a louse egg.\"[128] When a Greenlander saw a foreigner of\ngentle and modest manners, his usual remark was, \"He is almost as\nwell-bred as we,\" or, \"He begins to be a man,\" that is, a\nGreenlander.[129] The savage regards his people as the people, as\nthe root of all others, and as occupying the middle of the earth.\nThe Hottentots love to call themselves \"the men of men.\"[130] The\nIndians of the Ungava district, Hudson Bay, give themselves the\nname _nenenot_, that is, true or ideal red men.[131] In the\nlanguage of the Illinois Indians the word _illinois_ means\n\"men\"--\"as if they looked upon all other Indians as beasts.\"[132]\nThe aborigines of Hayti believed that their island was the first\nof all things, that the sun and moon issued from one of its\ncaverns, and men from another.[133] Each Australian tribe, says\nMr. Curr, regards its country as the centre of the earth, which\nin most cases is believed not to extend more than a couple of\nhundred miles or so in any direction.[134]\n\n[Footnote 118: Hall, _Arctic Researches_, p. 566 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 119: Hale, _U.S. Exploring Expedition. Vol. VI.\nEthnography and Philology_, p. 109.]\n\n[Footnote 120: Keating, _Expedition to the Source of St. Peter's\nRiver_, ii. 168. See also Boller, _Among the Indians_, p. 54 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 121: Williams, _Missionary Enterprises in the South Sea\nIslands_, p. 514.]\n\n[Footnote 122: Williams and Calvert, _Fiji_, p. 105.]\n\n[Footnote 123: Krasheninnikoff, _History of Kamschatka_, p. 224.]\n\n[Footnote 124: Sauer, _op. cit._ p. 255.]\n\n[Footnote 125: Batchelor, 'Notes on the Ainu,' in _Trans. Asiatic\nSoc. Japan_, x. 211 _sq._ Howard, _Life with Trans-Siberian\nSavages_, p. 182.]\n\n[Footnote 126: Nevill, in _Taprobanian_, i. 192. Sarasin, _op.\ncit._ iii. 530, 534. 553.]\n\n[Footnote 127: Azara, _Voyages dans l'Am\u00e9rique m\u00e9ridionale_,\nii. 107.]\n\n[Footnote 128: Nelson, 'Eskimo about Bering Strait,' in _Ann.\nRep. Bur. Ethn._ xviii. 306 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 129: Cranz, _History of Greenland_, i. 126.]\n\n[Footnote 130: Kidd, _The Essential Kafir_, p. 92.]\n\n[Footnote 131: Turner, 'Ethnology of the Ungava District,' in\n_Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ xi. 267.]\n\n[Footnote 132: Marquette, _Recit des voyages_, p. 47 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 133: Brett, _Indian Tribes of Guiana_, p. 376.]\n\n[Footnote 134: Curr, _The Australian Race_, i. 50. For other\ninstances of national conceit or pride among savages see Darwin,\n_Journal of Researches_, p. 207 (Fuegians); von den Steinen,\n_Unter den Naturv\u00f6lkern Zentral-Brasiliens_, p. 332 (Baka\u00efri);\nvon Humboldt, _Personal Narrative of Travels to the Equinoctial\nRegions of the New Continent_, v. 423, and Brett, _op. cit._\np. 128 (Guiana Indians); James, _Expedition to the Rocky Mountains_,\ni. 320 (Omahas); Murdoch, in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ ix. 42 (Point\nBarrow Eskimo); Krasheninnikoff, _op. cit._ p. 180 (Kamchadales);\nBrough Smyth, _op. cit._ ii. 284 (Australian natives);\nMacpherson, _op. cit._ p. 67 (Kandhs); Munzinger, _Ueber die\nSitten und das Recht der Bogos_, p. 94; Andersson, _Lake Ngami_,\np. 198 (Ovambo).]\n\n{173} We meet with similar feelings and ideas among the nations\nof archaic culture. The Chinese are taught to think themselves\nsuperior to all other peoples. In their writings, ancient and\nmodern, the word \"foreigner\" is regularly joined with some\ndisrespectful epithet, implying or expressing the ignorance,\nbrutality, obstinacy, or meanness of alien nations, and their\nobligations to or dependence upon China.[135] To Confucius\nhimself China was \"the middle kingdom,\" \"the multitude of great\nstates,\" \"all under heaven,\" beyond which were only rude and\nbarbarous tribes.[136] According to Japanese ideas, Nippon was\nthe first country created, and the centre of the world.[137]\nThe ancient Egyptians considered themselves as the peculiar\npeople, specially loved by the gods. They alone were termed\n\"men\" (_romet_); other nations were negroes, Asiatics, or\nLibyans, but not men; and according to the myth these nations\nwere descended from the enemies of the gods.[138] The national\npride of the Assyrians, so often referred to by the Hebrew\nprophets,[139] is conspicuous everywhere in their cuneiform\ninscriptions: they are the wise, the brave, the powerful, who,\nlike the deluge, carry away all resistance; their kings are the\n\"matchless, irresistible\"; and their gods are much exalted above\nthe gods of all other nations.[140] To the Hebrews their own\nland was \"an exceeding good land,\" \"flowing with milk and honey,\"\n\"the glory of all lands\";[141] and its inhabitants were a holy\n{174} people which the Lord had chosen \"to be a special people\nunto Himself, above all people that are upon the face of the\nearth.\"[142] Concerning the ancient Persians, Herodotus\nwrites:--\"They look upon themselves as very greatly superior in\nall respects to the rest of mankind, regarding others as\napproaching to excellence in proportion as they dwell nearer\nto them; whence it comes to pass that those who are the farthest\noff must be the most degraded of mankind.\"[143] To this day the\nmonarch of Persia retains the title of \"the Centre of the\nUniverse\"; and it is not easy to persuade a native of Isfahan\nthat any European capital can be superior to his native\ncity.[144] The Greeks called Delphi--or rather the round stone in\nthe Delphic temple--\"the navel\" or \"middle point of the\nearth\";[145] and they considered the natural relation between\nthemselves and barbarians to be that between master and slave.[146]\n\n[Footnote 135: Philip, _Life and Opinions of the Rev. W. Milne_,\np. 257. _Cf._ Staunton, in _Narrative of the Chinese Embassy to\nthe Khan of the Tourgouth Tartars_, p. viii.]\n\n[Footnote 136: Legge, _Chinese Classics_, i. 107. See also Giles,\n_op. cit._ ii. 116, n. 2.]\n\n[Footnote 137: Griffis, _Religions of Japan_, p. 207.]\n\n[Footnote 138: Erman, _Life in Ancient Egypt_, p. 32.]\n\n[Footnote 139: _Isaiah_, x. 7 _sqq._; xxxvii. 24 _sqq._\n_Ezekiel_, xxxi. 10 _sq._ _Zephaniah_, ii. 15.]\n\n[Footnote 140: M\u00fcrdter-Delitzsch, _Geschichte Babyloniens und\nAssyriens_, p. 104.]\n\n[Footnote 141: _Numbers_, xiii. 27; xiv. 7. _Ezekiel_, xx. 6, 15.]\n\n[Footnote 142: _Deuteronomy_, vii. 6.]\n\n[Footnote 143: Herodotus, i. 134.]\n\n[Footnote 144: Rawlinson, in his translation of Herodotus, i. 260\n_sq._ n. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 145: Pindar, _Pythia_, vi. 3 _sq._ _Idem_, _Nemea_,\nvii. 33 _sq._ Aeschylus, _Eumenides_, 40, 166. Sophocles,\n_[OE]dipus Tyrannus_, 480, 898. Livy, xxxviii. 48. _Cf._\nHerodotus' theory of \"extremities\" (iii. 115 _sq._), and\nRawlinson's commentary, in his translation of Herodotus, i. 260\n_sq._ n. 6.]\n\n[Footnote 146: Euripides, _Iphigenia in Aulide_, 1400 _sq._\nAristotle, _Politica_, i. 2, 6, pp. 1252 b, 1255 a.]\n\nIn the archaic State the national feeling is in some cases\ngreatly strengthened by the religious feeling; whilst in other\ninstances religion inspires devotion to the family, clan, or\ncaste rather than to the nation, or constitutes a tie not only\nbetween compatriots but between members of different political\ncommunities. The ancestor-worship of the Chinese has hardly been\nconducive to genuine patriotism. Whatever devotion to the common\nweal may have prevailed among the Vedic Aryans, it has certainly\npassed away beneath the influence of Brahmanism, or been narrowed\ndown to the caste, the village, or the family.[147] The\nZoroastrian Ahura-Mazda was not a national god, but \"the god of\nthe Aryans,\" that is, of all the peoples who inhabited ancient\nIran; and these were constantly at war {175} with one\nanother.[148] Muhammedans, whilst animated with a common hatred\ntowards the Christians, show little public spirit in relation to\ntheir respective countries,[149] composed as they are of a\nvariety of loosely connected, often very heterogeneous elements,\nruled over by a monarch whose power is in many districts more\nnominal than real. In ancient Greece and Rome patriotism no doubt\ncontained a religious element--each state and town had its\ntutelary gods and heroes, who were considered its proper\nmasters;[150] but in the first place it was free citizens' love\nof their native institutions, a civic virtue which grew up on the\nsoil of liberty. When the two Spartans who were sent to Xerxes to\nbe put to death were advised by one of his governors to surrender\nthemselves to the king, their answer was, \"Had you known what\nfreedom is, you would have bidden us fight for it, not with the\nspear only, but with the battle-axe.\"[151] And of the Athenians\nwho lived at the time of the Persian wars, Demosthenes said that\nthey were ready to die for their country rather than to see it\nenslaved, and that they considered the outrages and insults which\nbefell him who lived in a subjugated city to be more terrible\nthan death.[152] In classical antiquity \"the influence of\npatriotism thrilled through every fibre of moral and intellectual\nlife.\"[153] In some Greek cities emigration was prohibited by\nlaw, at Argos even on penalty of death.[154] Plato, in the\nRepublic, sacrificed the family to the interests of the State.\nCicero placed our duty to our country next after our duty to the\nimmortal gods and before our duty to our parents.[155] \"Of all\nconnections,\" he says, \"none is more weighty, none is more dear,\nthan that between every individual and his country. Our parents\nare dear to us; {176} our children, our kinsmen, our friends, are\ndear to us; but our country comprehends alone all the endearments\nof us all. What good man would hesitate to die for her if he\ncould do her service?\"[156]\n\n[Footnote 147: Wheeler, _History of India_, ii. 586 _sq._ See\nalso Leist, _Alt-arisches Jus Gentium_, p. 529.]\n\n[Footnote 148: Meyer, _Geschichte des Alterthums_, i. 540.\nSpiegel, _Er\u00e2nische Alterthumskunde_, iii. 687 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 149: Polak, _Persien_, i. 12. Urquhart, _Spirit of the\nEast_, ii. 427, 439 (Turks). Burckhardt, _Bedouins and Wah\u00e1bys_,\np. 204 _sq._ (Turks and Arab settlers).]\n\n[Footnote 150: Leist, _Alt-arisches Jus Gentium_, p. 529.\nSchmidt, _Die Ethik der alten Griechen_, ii. 221.]\n\n[Footnote 151: Herodotus, vii. 134 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 152: Demosthenes, _De Corona_, 205, p. 296.]\n\n[Footnote 153: Lecky, _History of European Morals_, i. 200.]\n\n[Footnote 154: Plutarch, _Lycurgus_, xxvii. 5. Ovid,\n_Metamorphoses_, xv. 29.]\n\n[Footnote 155: Cicero, _De officiis_, i. 45 (160). _Cf._ _ibid._\niii. 23 (90).]\n\n[Footnote 156: _Ibid._ i. 17 (57). _Cf._ Cicero, _De legibus_,\nii. 2, (5).]\n\nThe duty of patriotism springs, in the first instance, from the\npatriotic feeling; when the love of country is common in a nation\npublic resentment is felt towards him who does not act as that\nsentiment requires him to act. Moreover, lack of patriotism in a\nperson may also be resented by his fellow-countrymen as an injury\ndone to themselves; and as we have seen before, anger, and\nespecially anger felt by a whole community, has a tendency to\nlead to moral disapproval. For analogous reasons deeds of\npatriotism are apt to evoke moral praise. However, in benefiting\nhis own people the patriot may cause harm to other people; and\nwhere the altruistic sentiment is broad enough to extend beyond\nthe limits of the State and strong enough to make its voice heard\neven in competition with the love of country and the love of\nself, his conduct may consequently be an object of reproach. At\nthe lower stages of civilisation the interests of foreigners are\nnot regarded at all, except when sheltered by the rule of\nhospitality; but gradually, owing to circumstances which will be\ndiscussed in the following chapter, altruism tends to expand, and\nmen are at last considered to have duties to mankind at large.\nThe Chinese moralists inculcated benevolence to all men without\nmaking any reference to national distinctions.[157] Mih-tsze, who\nlived in the interval between Confucius and Mencius, even taught\nthat we ought to love all men equally; but this doctrine called\nforth protests as abnegating the peculiar devotion due to\nrelatives.[158] In Th\u00e2i-Shang it is said that a good man will\nfeel kindly towards every creature, and should not hurt even the\ninsect tribes, grass, and trees.[159] Buddhism {177} enjoins the\nduty of universal love:--\"As a mother, even at the risk of her\nown life, protects her son, her only son, so let a man cultivate\ngoodwill without measure toward all beings, . . . unhindered love\nand friendliness toward the whole world, above, below,\naround.\"[160] According to the Hindu work Panchatantra it is the\nthought of little-minded persons to consider whether a man is one\nof ourselves or an alien, the whole earth being of kin to him who\nis generously disposed.[161] In Greece and Rome philosophers\narose who opposed national narrowness and prejudice. Democritus\nof Abdera said that every country is accessible to a wise man,\nand that a good soul's fatherland is the whole earth.[162] The\nsame view was expressed by Theodorus, one of the later Cyrenaics,\nwho denounced devotion to country as ridiculous.[163] The Cynics,\nin particular, attached slight value to the citizenship of any\nspecial state, declaring themselves to be citizens of the\nworld.[164] But, as Zeller observes, in the mouth of the Cynic\nthis doctrine was meant to express not so much the essential\noneness of all mankind, as the philosopher's independence of\ncountry and home.[165] It was the Stoic philosophy that first\ngave to the idea of a world-citizenship a definite positive\nmeaning, and raised it to historical importance. The citizen of\nAlexander's huge empire had in a way become a citizen of the\nworld; and national dislikes were so much more readily overcome\nas the various nationalities comprised in it were united not only\nunder a common government but also in a common culture.[166]\nIndeed, the founder of Stoicism was himself only half a Greek.\nBut there is also an obvious connection between the cosmopolitan\nidea and the Stoic {178} system in general.[167] According to the\nStoics, human society has for its basis the identity of reason in\nindividuals; hence we have no ground for limiting this society to\na single nation. We are all, says Seneca, members of one great\nbody, the universe; \"we are all akin by Nature, who has formed us\nof the same elements, and placed us here together for the same\nend.\"[168] \"If our reason is common,\" says Marcus Aurelius,\n\"there is a common law, as reason commands us what to do and what\nnot to do; and if there is a common law we are fellow-citizens;\nif this is so, we are members of some political community--the\nworld is in a manner a state.\"[169] To this great state, which\nincludes all rational beings, the individual states are related\nas the houses of a city are to the city collectively;[170] and\nthe wise man will esteem it far above any particular community in\nwhich the accident of birth has placed him.[171]\n\n[Footnote 157: _Lun Y\u00fc_, xii. 22. Mencius, vii. 1. 45. Douglas,\n_Confucianism and Taouism_, pp. 108, 205.]\n\n[Footnote 158: Edkins, _Religion in China_, p. 119. Legge,\n_Chinese Classics_, ii. 476, n. 45. de Groot, _Religious System\nof China_, (vol. ii. book) i. 684.]\n\n[Footnote 159: _Th\u00e2i-Shang_, 3.]\n\n[Footnote 160: Quoted by Rhys Davids, _Hibbert Lectures on the\nHistory of Buddhism_, p. 111.]\n\n[Footnote 161: Muir, _Religious and Moral Sentiments rendered\nfrom Sanskrit Writers_, p. 109.]\n\n[Footnote 162: Stob\u00e6us, _Florilegium_, xl. 7, vol. ii. 80. _Cf._\nNatorp, _Die Ethika des Demokritos_, p. 117, n. 41.]\n\n[Footnote 163: Diogenes Laertius, _Vit\u00e6 philosophorum_, ii. 98\n_sq._]\n\n[Footnote 164: _Ibid._ vi. 12, 63, 72, 98. Epictetus,\n_Dissertationes_, iii. 24. 66. Stob\u00e6us, xlv. 28, vol. ii.\n252.]\n\n[Footnote 165: Zeller, _Socrates and the Socratic Schools_,\np. 326 _sq._ _Idem_, _Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics_,\np. 327.]\n\n[Footnote 166: _Cf._ Plutarch, _De Alexandri Magni fortuna aut\nvirtute_, i. 6, p. 329.]\n\n[Footnote 167: See Zeller, _Stoics, &c._ p. 327 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 168: Seneca, _Epistul\u00e6_, xcv. 52.]\n\n[Footnote 169: Marcus Aurelius, _Commentarii_, iv. 4. _Cf._\n_ibid._ vi. 44, and ix. 9; Cicero, _De legibus_, i. 7 (23);\nEpictetus, _Dissertationes_, i. 13. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 170: Marcus Aurelius, iii. 11.]\n\n[Footnote 171: Seneca, _De otio_, iv. 1. _Idem_, _Epistul\u00e6_,\nlxviii. 2. Epictetus, _Dissertationes_, iii. 22. 83 _sqq._]\n\nBut the Roman ideal of patriotism, with its utter disregard for\nforeign nations,[172] was not opposed by philosophy alone: it met\nwith an even more formidable antagonist in the new religion. The\nChristian and the Stoic rejected it on different grounds: whilst\nthe Stoic felt himself as a citizen of the world, the Christian\nfelt himself as a citizen of heaven, to whom this planet was only\na place of exile. Christianity was not hostile to the State.[173]\nAt the very time when Nero committed his worst atrocities, St.\nPaul declared that there is no power but of God, and that\nwhosoever resists the power resists the ordinance of God and\nshall be condemned;[174] and Tertullian says that all Christians\nsend up their prayers for the life of the emperors, for their\nministers, for magistrates, for the good of the {179} State and\nthe peace of the Empire.[175] But the emperor should be obeyed\nonly so long as his commands do not conflict with the law of\nGod--a Christian ought rather to suffer like Daniel in the lions'\nden than sin against his religion;[176] and nothing is more\nentirely foreign to him than affairs of State.[177] Indeed, in\nthe whole Roman Empire there were no men who so entirely lacked\npatriotism as the early Christians. They had no affection for\nJudea, they soon forgot Galilee, they cared nothing for the glory\nof Greece and Rome.[178] When the judges asked them which was\ntheir country they said in answer, \"I am a Christian.\"[179] And\nlong after Christianity had become the religion of the Empire,\nSt. Augustine declared that it matters not, in respect of this\nshort and transitory life, under whose dominion a mortal man\nlives, if only he be not compelled to acts of impiety or\ninjustice.[180] Later on, when the Church grew into a political\npower independent of the State, she became a positive enemy of\nnational interests. In the seventeenth century a Jesuit general\ncalled patriotism \"a plague and the most certain death of\nChristian love.\"[181]\n\n[Footnote 172: _Cf._ Lactantius, _Divin\u00e6 Institutiones_, vi. ('De\nvero cultu'), 6 (Migne, _Patrologi\u00e6 cursus_, vi. 655).]\n\n[Footnote 173: _St. Matthew_, xxii. 21. _1 Peter_, ii. 13 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 174: _Romans_, xiii. 1 _sq._ See also _Titus_, iii. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 175: Tertullian, _Apologeticus_, 39 (Migne, _op. cit._\ni. 468). See also Ludwig, _Tertullian's Ethik_, p. 98 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 176: Tertullian, _De idololatria_, 15 (Migne, _op.\ncit._ i. 684).]\n\n[Footnote 177: Tertullian, _Apologeticus_, 38 (Migne, _op. cit._\ni. 465):--\"Nec ulla magis res aliena, quam publica.\"]\n\n[Footnote 178: See Renan, _Hibbert Lectures on the Influence of\nRome on Christianity_, p. 28.]\n\n[Footnote 179: Le Blant, _Inscriptions chr\u00e9tiennes_, i. 128.]\n\n[Footnote 180: St. Augustine, _De Civitate Dei_, v. 17.]\n\n[Footnote 181: von Eicken, _Geschichte und System der\nmittelalterlichen Weltanschauung_, p. 809.]\n\nWith the fall of the Roman Empire patriotism died out in Europe,\nand remained extinct for centuries. It was a feeling hardly\ncompatible either with the migratory life of the Teutonic tribes\nor with the feudal system, which grew up wherever they fixed\ntheir residence. The knights, it is true, were not destitute of\nthe natural affection for home. When Aliaumes is mortally wounded\nby G\u00e9ri li Sors he exclaims, \"Holy Virgin, I shall never more see\nSaint-Quentin nor N\u00e9\u00e8le\";[182] and the troubadour Bernard de\nVentadour touchingly sings, \"Quan la doussa aura venta--Deves\nnostre pa\u00efs,--M'es veiaire que senta--Odor de {180}\nParadis.\"[183] But to a man of the Middle Ages \"his country\"\nmeant little more than the neighbourhood in which he lived.[184]\nKingdoms existed, but no nations. The first duty of a vassal was\nto be loyal to his lord;[185] but no national spirit bound\ntogether the various barons of one country. A man might be the\nvassal of the king of France and of the king of England at the\nsame time; and often, from caprice, passion, or sordid interest,\nthe barons sold their services to the enemies of the kingdom.\nThe character of his knighthood was also perpetually pressing\nthe knight to a course of conduct distinct from all national\nobjects.[186] The cause of a distressed lady was in many\ninstances preferable to that of the country to which he belonged\n--as when the Captal de Bouche, though an English subject, did\nnot hesitate to unite his troops with those of the Compte de\nFoix to relieve the ladies in a French town, where they were\nbesieged and threatened with violence by the insurgent\npeasantry.[187] When a knight's duties towards his country are\nmentioned in the rules of Chivalry they are spoken of as duties\ntowards his lord:--\"The wicked knight,\" it is said, \"that aids\nnot his earthly lord and natural country against another prince,\nis a knight without office.\"[188] Far from being, as M. Gautier\nasserts,[189] the object of an express command in the code of\nChivalry, true patriotism had there no place at all. It was not\nknown as an ideal, still less did it exist as a reality, among\neither knights or commoners. As a duke of Orleans could bind\nhimself by a fraternity of arms and alliance to a duke of\nLancaster,[190] so English merchants were in the habit of\nsupplying nations at war against England with provisions bought\nat English fairs, and weapons wrought by English hands.[191] If,\nas M. Gaston Paris maintains, a {181} deep feeling of national\nunion had inspired the Chanson de Roland,[192] it is a strange,\nyet undeniable, fact that no distinct trace of this feeling\ndisplayed itself in the medi\u00e6val history of France before the\nEnglish wars.\n\n[Footnote 182: _Li Romans de Raoul de Cambrai_, 210, p. 185.]\n\n[Footnote 183: Quoted by Gautier, _La Chevalerie_, p. 64.]\n\n[Footnote 184: See Cibrario, _Della economia politica del medio\neve_, i. 263; de Crozals, _Histoire de la civilization_, ii. 287.]\n\n[Footnote 185: _Ordre of Chyualry_, foll. 13 b. 32 b.]\n\n[Footnote 186: See Mills, _History of Chivalry_, i. 140 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 187: Scott, _Essay on Chivalry_, p. 31.]\n\n[Footnote 188: _Ordre of Chyualry_, fol. 14 b.]\n\n[Footnote 189: Gautier, _op. cit._ p. 33.]\n\n[Footnote 190: Sainte-Palaye, _M\u00e9moires sur l'ancienne\nChevalerie_, ii. 72.]\n\n[Footnote 191: Pike, _History of Crime in England_, i. 264 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 192: Paris, _La po\u00e9sie du moyen age_, p. 107. M.\nGautier says (_op. cit._ p. 61) that Roland is \"la France faite\nhomme.\"]\n\nBesides feudalism and the want of political cohesion, there were\nother factors that contributed to hinder the development of\nnational personality and patriotic devotion. This sentiment\npresupposes not only that the various parts of which a country is\ncomposed shall have a vivid feeling of their unity, but also that\nthey, united, shall feel themselves as a nation clearly distinct\nfrom other nations. In the Middle Ages national differences were\nlargely obscured by the preponderance of the Universal Church, by\nthe creation of the Holy Roman Empire, by the prevalence of a\ncommon language as the sole vehicle of mental culture, and by the\nundeveloped state of the vernacular tongues. To make use of the\nnative dialect was a sign of ignorance, and to place worldly\ninterests above the claims of the Church was impious. When\nMacchiavelli declared that he preferred his country to the safety\nof his soul, people considered him guilty of blasphemy; and when\nthe Venetians defied the Papal thunders by averring that they\nwere Venetians in the first place, and only Christians in the\nsecond, the world heard them with amazement.[193]\n\n[Footnote 193: 'National Personality,' in _Edinburgh Review_,\ncxciv. 133.]\n\nIn England the national feeling developed earlier than on the\nContinent, no doubt owing to her insular position and freer\ninstitutions; as Montesquieu observes, patriotism thrives best in\ndemocracies.[194] At the time of the English Reformation the\nsense of corporate national life had evidently gained\nconsiderable strength, and the love of England has never been\nexpressed in more exquisite form than it was by Shakespeare. At\nthe same time the sense of patriotism was often grossly perverted\nby religious {182} bigotry and party spirit.[195] Even champions\nof liberty, like Lord Russell and Algernon Sidney, accepted\nFrench gold in the hope of embarrassing the King; and Sidney went\nso far as to try to instigate De Witt to invade England.\nLoyalism, in particular, proved a much stronger incentive than\nlove of country. A loyalist like Strafford would have employed\nhalf-savage Irish troops against his own countrymen, and the\nScotch Jacobites invited a French invasion.\n\n[Footnote 194: Montesquieu, _De l'esprit des Lois_, iv. 5\n(_[OE]uvres_, p. 206 _sq._).]\n\n[Footnote 195: See _Edinburgh Review_, cxciv. 133, 136 _sq._;\nPearson, _National Life and Character_, p. 190.]\n\nIn France the development of the national feeling was closely\nconnected with the strengthening of the royal power and its\ngradual victory over feudalism. The word _patrie_ was for the\nfirst time used by Charles VII.'s chronicler, Jean Chartier, and\nhe also condemned as _ren\u00e9gats_ those Frenchmen who, at the end\nof the hundred years war, fought on the side of the English.[196]\nBut patriotism was for a long time inseparably confounded with\nloyalty to the sovereign. According to Bossuet \"tout l'\u00c9tat est\nen la personne du prince\";[197] and Abb\u00e9 Coyer observes that\nColbert believed _royaume_ and _patrie_ to signify one and the\nsame thing.[198] In the eighteenth century the spirit of\nrebellion succeeded that of devotion to the king; but the\nkey-note of the great movement which led to the Revolution was\nthe liberty and equality of the individual, not the glory or\nwelfare of the nation. Men were looked upon as members of the\nhuman race, rather than as citizens of any particular country. To\nbe a citizen of every nation, and not to belong to one's native\ncountry alone, was the dream of French writers in the eighteenth\ncentury.[199] \"The true sage is a cosmopolitan,\" says a writer of\ncomedy.[200] Diderot asks which is the greater merit, to\nenlighten the human race, which remains for ever, or to save\none's fatherland, which is {183} perishable.[201] According to\nVoltaire patriotism is composed of self-love and prejudice,[202]\nand only too often makes us the enemies of our fellow-men:--\"Il\nest clair qu'un pays ne peut gagner sans qu'un autre perde, et\nqu'il ne peut vaincre sans faire des malheureux. Telle est donc\nla condition humaine, que souhaiter la grandeur de son pays,\nc'est souhaiter du mal \u00e0 ses voisins.\"[203] In Germany, Lessing,\nGoethe, and Schiller felt themselves as citizens of the world,\nnot of the German Empire, still less as Saxons or Suabians; and\nKlopstock, with his enthusiasm for German nationality and\nlanguage, almost appeared eccentric.[204] Lessing writes\npoint-blank:--\"The praise of being an ardent patriot is to my\nmind the very last thing that I should covet; . . . I have no\nidea at all of love of the Fatherland, and it seems to me at best\nbut an heroical weakness, which I can very readily dispense\nwith.\"[205]\n\n[Footnote 196: Guibal, _Histoire du sentiment national en France\npendant la guerre de Cent ans_, p. 526 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 197: Legrand, _L'id\u00e9e de patrie_, p. 20.]\n\n[Footnote 198: Block, _Dictionnaire g\u00e9n\u00e9ral de la politique_,\nii. 518.]\n\n[Footnote 199: Texte, _Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the Cosmopolitan\nSpirit in Literature_, p. 79.]\n\n[Footnote 200: Palissot de Montenoy, _Les philosophes_, iii. 4,\np. 75.]\n\n[Footnote 201: Diderot, _Essai sur les r\u00e8gnes de Claude et de\nN\u00e9ron_, ii. 75 (_[OE]uvres_, vi. 244).]\n\n[Footnote 202: Voltaire, _Pens\u00e9es sur l'administration publique_,\n14 (_[OE]uvres compl\u00e8tes_, v. 351).]\n\n[Footnote 203: _Idem_, _Dictionnaire philosophique_, art. Patrie\n(_[OE]uvres compl\u00e8tes_, viii. 118).]\n\n[Footnote 204: See Strauss, _Der alte und der neue Glaube_,\np. 259 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 205: Lessing, quoted by Ziegler, _Social Ethics_,\np. 121.]\n\nThe first French revolution marks the beginning of a new era in\nthe history of patriotism. It inspired the masses with passion\nfor the unity of the fatherland, the Republic \"one and\nindivisible.\" At the same time it declared all nations to be\nbrothers, and when it made war on foreign nations the object was\nonly to deliver them from their oppressors.[206] But gradually\nthe interest in the affairs of other countries grew more and more\nselfish, the attempt to emancipate was absorbed in the desire to\nsubjugate; and this awoke throughout Europe a feeling which was\ndestined to become the most powerful force in the history of the\nnineteenth century, the feeling of nationality. When Napoleon\nintroduced French administration in the countries whose\nsovereigns he had deposed or degraded, the people resisted the\nchange. The resistance was popular, as the rulers were absent or\nhelpless, and it was national, being directed against foreign\ninstitutions.{184} It was stirred by the feeling of national\nrather than political unity, it was a protest against the\ndominion of race over race. The national element in this movement\nhad in a manner been anticipated by the French Revolution itself.\nThe French people was regarded by it as an ethnological, not as\nan historic, unit; descent was put in the place of tradition; the\nidea of the sovereignty of the people uncontrolled by the past\ngave birth to the idea of nationality independent of the political\ninfluence of history. But, as has been truly remarked, men were\nmade conscious of the national element of the revolution by its\nconquests, not in its rise.[207]\n\n[Footnote 206: Block, _op. cit._ ii. 376.]\n\n[Footnote 207: See 'Nationality,' in _Home and Foreign Review_,\ni. 6 _sqq._]\n\nEver since, the racial feeling has been the most vigorous force\nin European patriotism, and has gradually become a true danger to\nhumanity. Beginning as a protest against the dominion of one race\nover another, this feeling led to a condemnation of every state\nwhich included different races, and finally developed into the\ncomplete doctrine that state and nationality should so far as\npossible be coextensive.[208] According to this theory the\ndominant nationality cannot admit the inferior nationalities\ndwelling within the boundaries of the state to an equality with\nitself, because, if it did, the state would cease to be national,\nand this would be contrary to the principle of its existence; or\nthe weaker nationalities are compelled to change their language,\ninstitutions, and individuality, so as to be absorbed in the\ndominant race. And not only does the leading nationality assert\nits superiority in relation to all others within the body\npolitic, but it also wants to assert itself at the expense of\nforeign nations and races. To the nationalist all this is true\npatriotism; love of country often stands for a feeling which has\nbeen well described as love of more country.[209] But at the same\ntime opposite ideals are at work. The fervour of nineteenth\ncentury nationalism has not been able to quench the {185}\ncosmopolitan spirit. In spite of loud appeals made to racial\ninstincts and the sense of national solidarity, the idea has been\ngaining ground that the aims of a nation must not conflict with\nthe interests of humanity at large; that our love of country\nshould be controlled by other countries' right to prosper and to\ndevelop their own individuality; and that the oppression of\nweaker nationalities inside the state and aggressiveness towards\nforeign nations, being mainly the outcome of vainglory and greed,\nare inconsistent with the aspirations of a good patriot, as well\nas of a good man.\n\n[Footnote 208: _Ibid._ p. 13 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 209: Robertson, _Patriotism and Empire_, p. 138.]\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nOur long discussion of moral ideas regarding such modes of\nconduct as directly concern other men's welfare has at last come\nto an end. We have seen that they may be ultimately traced to a\nvariety of sources: to the influence of habit or education, to\negoistic considerations of some kind or other which have given\nrise to moral feelings, to notions of social expediency, to\ndisinterested likings or dislikes, and, above all, to sympathetic\nresentment or sympathetic approval springing from an altruistic\ndisposition of mind. But how to account for this disposition? Our\nexplanation of that group of moral ideas which we have been\nhitherto investigating is not complete until we have found an\nanswer to this important question. I shall therefore in the next\nchapter examine the origin and development of the altruistic\nsentiment.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXIV\n\nTHE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE ALTRUISTIC SENTIMENT\n\n\nTHERE is one form of the altruistic sentiment which man shares\nwith all mammals and many other animals, namely, maternal affection.\nAs regards its origin various theories have been set forth.\n\nAccording to Aristotle, parents love their children as being\nportions of themselves.[1] A similar explanation of maternal\naffection has been given by some modern writers.[2] Thus\nProfessor Espinas regards this sentiment as modified self-love\nand love of property. The female, he says, at the moment when she\ngives birth to little ones resembling herself, has no difficulty\nin recognising them as the flesh of her flesh; the feeling she\nexperiences towards them is made up of sympathy and pity, but we\ncannot exclude from it an idea of property which is the most\nsolid support of sympathy. She feels and understands up to a\ncertain point that these young ones which are herself at the same\ntime belong to her; the love of herself, extended to those who\nhave gone out from her, changes egoism into sympathy and the\nproprietary instinct into an affectionate impulse.[3] This\nhypothesis, however, seems to me to be very inadequate. It does\nnot explain why, for instance, a bird takes more care of her eggs\nthan of other matter segregated from {187} her body, which may\nequally well be regarded as a part of herself. Nor does it\naccount for a foster-mother's affection for her adopted\noffspring.[4] Of this many instances have been noticed in the\nlower animals; and among some savage peoples adopted children are\nsaid to be treated by their foster-parents with the same\naffection as if they were their own flesh and blood.[5]\n\n[Footnote 1: Aristotle, _Ethica Nicomachea_, viii. 12. 2 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 2: Hartley, _Observations on Man_, i. 496 _sq._ Fichte,\n_Das System der Sittenlehre_, p. 433.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Espinas, _Des soci\u00e9t\u00e9s animales_ (2nd ed.), p. 444\n_sq._, quoted by Ribot, _Psychology of the Emotions_, p. 280.]\n\n[Footnote 4: _Cf._ Spencer, _Principles of Psychology_, ii. 624.]\n\n[Footnote 5: Murdoch, 'Ethnol. Results of the Point Barrow\nExpedition,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ ix. 419 (Point Barrow\nEskimo). Thomson, _Savage Island_, p. 135.]\n\nA very different explanation of maternal love has been given by\nProfessor Bain. He derives parental affection from the \"intense\npleasure in the embrace of the young.\" He observes that \"such a\npleasure once created would associate itself with the prevailing\nfeatures and aspects of the young, and give to all of these their\nvery great interest. For the sake of the pleasure, the parent\ndiscovers the necessity of nourishing the subject of it, and\ncomes to regard the ministering function as a part or condition\nof the delight.\"[6] But if the satisfaction in animal contact\nwere at the bottom of the maternal feeling, conjugal affection\nought by far to surpass it in intensity; and yet, among the lower\nraces at least, the case is exactly the reverse, conjugal\naffection being vastly inferior in degree to a mother's love of\nher child. It may indeed be fairly doubted whether there is any\n\"intense pleasure\" at all in embracing a new-born baby--unless it\nbe one's own. It seems much more likely that parents like to\ntouch their children because they love them, than that they love\nthem because they like to touch them. Attraction, showing itself\neither by elementary movements of approach, or by contact, or by\nthe embrace, is the outward _expression_ of tenderness.[7]\nProfessor Bain himself observes that as anger reaches a\nsatisfying term by knocking some one down, love is completed and\nsatisfied with an embrace.[8] But this by no means implies that\nthe embrace is the cause of love; it {188} only means that love\nhas a tendency to express itself outwardly in an act of embrace.\n\n[Footnote 6: Bain, _Emotions and the Will_, p. 140.]\n\n[Footnote 7: Ribot, _op. cit._ p. 234.]\n\n[Footnote 8: Bain, _op. cit._ p. 126.]\n\nIn the opinion of Mr. Spencer, again, parental love is\nessentially love of the weak or helpless. This instinct, he\nremarks, is not adequately defined as that which attaches a\ncreature to its young. Though most frequently and most strongly\ndisplayed in this relation, the so-called parental feeling is\nreally excitable apart from parenthood; and the common trait of\nthe objects which arouse it is always relative weakness or\nhelplessness.[9] This hypothesis undoubtedly contains part of the\ntruth. That the maternal instinct is in some degree love of the\nhelpless is obvious from the fact that, among those of the lower\nanimals which are not gregarious, mother and young separate as\nsoon as the latter are able to shift for themselves; nay, in many\ncases they are actually driven away by her. Moreover, in species\nwhich are so constituted that the young from the very outset can\nhelp themselves there is no maternal love. These facts indicate\nwhere we have to look for the source of this sentiment. When the\nyoung are born in a state of utter helplessness somebody must\ntake care of them, or the species cannot survive, or, rather,\nsuch a species could never have come into existence. The maternal\ninstinct may thus be assumed to owe its origin to the survival of\nthe fittest, to the natural selection of useful spontaneous\nvariations.\n\n[Footnote 9: Spencer, _Principles of Psychology_, ii. 623 _sq._\nSee also Hartley, _op. cit._ i. 497.]\n\nThis is also recognised by Mr. Spencer;[10] but his theory fails\nto explain the indisputable fact that there is a difference\nbetween maternal love and the mere love of the helpless. Even in\na gregarious species mothers make a distinction between their own\noffspring and other young. During my stay among the mountaineers\nof Morocco I was often struck by the extreme eagerness with which\nin the evening, when the flock of ewes and the flock of lambs\nwere reunited, each mother sought for her own lamb, and each lamb\nfor its own mother. A similar {189} discrimination has been\nnoticed even in cases of conscious adoption. Brehm tells us of a\nfemale baboon which had so capacious a heart that she not only\nadopted young monkeys of other species, but stole young dogs and\ncats which she continually carried about; yet her kindness did\nnot go so far as to share food with her adopted offspring,\nalthough she divided everything quite fairly with her own young\nones.[11] To account for the maternal sentiment we must therefore\nassume the existence of some other stimulus besides the signs of\nhelplessness, which produces, or at least strengthens, the\ninstinctive motor response in the mother. This stimulus, so far\nas I can see, is rooted in the external relationship in which the\noffspring from the beginning stand to the mother. She is in close\nproximity to her helpless young from their tenderest age; and she\nloves them because they are to her a cause of pleasure.\n\n[Footnote 10: Spencer, _op. cit._ ii. 623.]\n\n[Footnote 11: Darwin, _Descent of Man_, p. 70.]\n\nIn various animal species the young are cared for not only by the\nmother, but by the father as well. This is the general rule among\nbirds: whilst the hatching of the eggs and the chief part of the\nrearing-duties belong to the mother, the father acts as a\nprotector, and provides food for the family. Among most of the\nmammals, on the other hand, the connections between the sexes are\nrestricted to the time of the rut, hence the father may not even\nsee his young. But there are also some mammalian species in which\nmale and female remain together even after the birth of the\noffspring and the father defends his family against enemies.[12]\nAmong the Quadrumana this seems to be the rule.[13] All the best\nauthorities agree that the Gorilla and the Chimpanzee live in\nfamilies. When the female is pregnant the male builds a rude nest\nin a tree, where she is delivered; and he spends the night\ncrouching at the foot of the tree, protecting the female and\ntheir young one, which are in the nest above, from the nocturnal\nattacks of leopards. Passing from the {190} highest monkeys to\nthe savage and barbarous races of men, we meet with the same\nphenomenon. In the human race the family consisting of father,\nmother, and offspring is probably a universal institution,\nwhether founded on a monogamous, polygynous, or polyandrous\nmarriage. And, as among the lower animals having the same habit,\nwhilst the immediate care of the children chiefly belongs to the\nmother, the father is the guardian of the family.[14]\n\n[Footnote 12: Westermarck, _History of Human Marriage_, p. 11\n_sq._]\n\n[Footnote 13: _Ibid._ p. 12 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 14: Westermarck, _History of Human Marriage_, p. 14\n_sqq._]\n\nThe stimuli to which the paternal instinct responds are\napparently derived from the same circumstances as those which\ncall into activity the maternal instinct, that is, the\nhelplessness and the nearness of the offspring. Wherever this\ninstinct exists, the father is near his young from the beginning,\nliving together with the mother. And here again the sentimental\nresponse is in all probability the result of a process of natural\nselection, which has preserved a mental disposition necessary for\nthe existence of the species. Among birds paternal care is\nindispensable. Equal and continual warmth is the first\nrequirement for the development of the embryo and the\npreservation of the young ones; and for this the mother almost\nalways wants the assistance of the father, who provides her with\nnecessaries, and sometimes relieves her of the brooding. Among\nmammals, again, whilst the young at their tenderest age can never\ndo without the mother, the father's aid is generally not\nrequired. That the Primates form an exception to this rule is\nprobably due to the small number of young, the female bringing\nforth but one at a time, and besides, among the highest apes and\nin man, to the long period of infancy.[15] If this is true we may\nassume that the paternal instinct occurred in primitive man, as\nit occurs, more or less strongly developed, among the anthropoid\napes and among existing savages.\n\n[Footnote 15: See _ibid._ p. 20 _sqq._ Fiske, _Outlines of Cosmic\nPhilosophy_, ii. 342 _sq._]\n\nBy origin closely allied to the paternal feeling is the\nattachment between individuals of different sex, which {191}\ninduces male and female to remain with one another beyond the\nmere act of propagation till after the birth of the offspring. It\nis obvious that, where the generative power is restricted to a\ncertain season--a peculiarity which primitive man seems to have\nshared with other mammals[16]--it cannot be the sexual instinct\nthat causes the prolonged union of the sexes, nor can I conceive\nany other egoistic motive that could account for this habit.\nConsidering that the union lasts till after the birth of the\noffspring and that it is accompanied with parental care, I\nconclude that it is for the benefit of the young that male and\nfemale continue to live together. The tie which joins them seems\ntherefore, like parental affection, to be an instinct developed\nthrough natural selection. The tendency to feel some attachment\nto a being which has been the cause of pleasure--in this case\nsexual pleasure--is undoubtedly at the bottom of this instinct.\nSuch a feeling may originally have induced the sexes to remain\nunited and the male to protect the female even after the sexual\ndesire was gratified; and if procuring great advantage to the\nspecies in the struggle for existence, conjugal attachment would\nnaturally have developed into a specific characteristic.\n\n[Footnote 16: Westermarck, _op. cit._ ch. ii.]\n\nWe have reason to believe that the germ of this sentiment\noccurred already in our earliest human ancestors, that marriage,\nin the natural history sense of the term, is a habit transmitted\nto man from some ape-like progenitor.[17] In the course of\nevolution conjugal affection has increased both in intensity and\ncomplexity; but advancement in civilisation has not at every step\nbeen favourable to its development. When restricted to men only,\na higher culture on the contrary tends to alienate husband and\nwife, as is the case in Eastern countries and as was the case in\nancient Greece. Another fact leading to conjugal apathy is the\ncustom which compels the women before marriage to live strictly\napart from the men. In China it often happens that the parties\nhave not even seen each {192} other till the wedding day;[18] and\nin Greece Plato urged in vain that young men and women should be\nmore frequently permitted to meet one another, so that there\nshould be less enmity and indifference in the married life.[19]\nConjugal love is both a cause and an effect of monogamy; but, as\nwe shall see subsequently, the course of civilisation does not\ninvolve a steady progress towards stricter monogamy. The notions\nabout women also influence the emotions felt towards them; and we\nhave noticed that the great religions of the world have generally\nheld them in little regard.[20] In its fully developed form the\npassion which unites the sexes is perhaps the most compound of\nall human feelings. Mr. Spencer thus sums up the masterly\nanalysis he has given of it:--\"Round the physical feeling forming\nthe nucleus of the whole, are gathered the feelings produced by\npersonal beauty, that constituting simple attachment, those of\nreverence, of love, of approbation, of self-esteem, of property,\nof love of freedom, of sympathy. These, all greatly exalted, and\nseverally tending to reflect their excitements on one another,\nunite to form the mental state we call love.\"[21]\n\n[Footnote 17: _Ibid._ _op. cit._ chs. i., iii.]\n\n[Footnote 18: Katscher, _Bilder aus dem chinesischen Leben_, pp.\n71, 84.]\n\n[Footnote 19: Plato, _Leges_, vi. 771 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 20: _Supra_, i. 662 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 21: Spencer, _Principles of Psychology_, i. 488.]\n\nThe duration of conjugal and parental feelings varies extremely.\nMost birds, with the exception of those belonging to the\nGallinaceous family, when pairing do so once for all till either\none or the other dies;[22] whereas among the mammals man and\npossibly some apes[23] are the only species whose conjugal unions\nlast any considerable time after the birth of the offspring.\nAmong many of the lower races of men lifelong marriages seem to\nbe the rule, and among a few separation is said to be entirely\nunknown; but there is abundant evidence that marriage has, upon\nthe whole, become more durable with advancing civilisation.[24]\nOne cause of this is that conjugal affection has become more\nlasting. And the greater duration of this sentiment may be\nexplained partly from the refinement {193} of the uniting\npassion, involving appreciation of mental qualities which last\nlong after youth and beauty have passed away, and partly also\nfrom the greater durability of parental feelings, which form a\ntie not only between parents and children, but between husband\nand wife.\n\n[Footnote 22: Westermarck, _op. cit._ p. 11.]\n\n[Footnote 23: _Ibid._ pp. 13, 14, 535.]\n\n[Footnote 24: _Ibid._ ch. xxiii.]\n\nThe parental feelings originally only last as long as the young\nare unable to shift for themselves--the paternal feeling possibly\nless. As Mr. Fiske observes, \"where the infancy is very short,\nthe parental feeling, though intense while it lasts, presently\ndisappears, and the offspring cease to be distinguished from\nstrangers of the same species. And in general the duration of the\nfeelings which insure the protection of the offspring is\ndetermined by the duration of the infancy.\"[25] Among certain\nsavages parental love is still said to be restricted to the age\nof helplessness. We are told that the affection of a Fuegian\nmother for her child gradually decreases in proportion as the\nchild grows older, and ceases entirely when it reaches the age of\nseven or eight; thenceforth the parents in no way meddle with the\naffairs of their son, who may leave them if he likes.[26] When\nthe parental feelings became more complex, through the\nassociation of other feelings, as those of property and pride,\nthey naturally tended to extend themselves beyond the limits of\ninfancy and childhood. But the chief cause of this extension\nseems to lie in the same circumstances as made man a gregarious\nanimal. Where the grown-up children continued to stay with their\nparents, parental affection naturally tended to be prolonged, not\nonly by the infusion into it of new elements, but by the direct\ninfluence of close living together. It was, moreover, extended to\nmore distant descendants. The same stimuli as call forth kindly\nemotions towards a person's own children evoke similar emotions\ntowards his grand- and great-grandchildren.\n\n[Footnote 25: Fiske, _op. cit._ ii. 343.]\n\n[Footnote 26: Bove, _Patagonia, Terra del Fuoco_, p. 133. See\nalso Wied-Neuwied, _Reise nach Brasilien_, ii. 40 (Botocudos), Im\nThurn, _Among the Indians of Guiana_, p. 219; Scaramucci and\nGiglioli, 'Notizie sui Danakil,' in _Archivio per l'antropologia\ne la etnologia_, xiv. 35.]\n\n{194} It is an old truth that children's love of their parents is\ngenerally much weaker than the parents' love of their children.\nThe latter is absolutely necessary for the subsistence of the\nspecies, the former is not;[27] though, when a richer food-supply\nfavoured the formation of larger communities, filial attachment\nmust have been of advantage to the race.[28] No individual is\nborn with filial love. However, Aristotle goes too far when\nsaying that, whilst parents love their children from their birth\nupward, \"children do not begin to love their parents until they\nare of a considerable age, and have got full possession of their\nwits and faculties.\"[29] Under normal circumstances the infant\nfrom an early age displays some attachment to its parents.\nProfessor Sully tells us of a girl, about seventeen months old,\nwho received her father after a few days absence with special\nmarks of affection, \"rushing up to him, smoothing and stroking\nhis face and giving him all the toys in the room.\"[30] Filial\nlove is retributive; the agreeable feeling produced by benefits\nreceived makes the individual look with pleasure and kindliness\nupon the giver. And here again the affection is strengthened by\nclose living together, as appears from the cooling effect of long\nseparation of children from their parents. But the filial feeling\nis not affection pure and simple, it is affection mingled with\nregard for the physical and mental superiority of the parent.[31]\nAs the parental feeling is partly love of the weak and young, so\nthe filial feeling is partly regard for the strong and\n(comparatively) old.\n\n[Footnote 27: This observation was made already by Hutcheson\n(_Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue_,\np. 219) and Adam Smith (_Theory of Moral Sentiments_, p. 199).\nThe latter wrote, a hundred years before the publication of 'The\nOrigin of Species,' that parental tenderness is a much stronger\naffection than filial piety, because \"the continuance and\npropagation of the species depend altogether upon the former, and\nnot upon the latter.\"]\n\n[Footnote 28: Darwin maintains (_Descent of Man_, p. 105) that\nthe filial affections have been to a large extent gained through\nnatural selection.]\n\n[Footnote 29: Aristotle, _Ethica Nicomachea_, viii. 12. 2.]\n\n[Footnote 30: Sully, _Studies of Childhood_, p. 243.]\n\n[Footnote 31: See _supra_, i. 618 _sq._]\n\nBesides parental, conjugal, and filial attachment we find among\nall existing races of men altruism of the fraternal {195} type,\nbinding together children of the same parents, relatives more\nremotely allied, and, generally, members of the same social unit.\nBut I am inclined to suppose that man was not originally a\ngregarious animal, in the proper sense of the word, that he\noriginally lived in families rather than in tribes, and that the\ntribe arose as the result of increasing food-supply, allowing the\nformation of larger communities, combined with the advantages\nwhich under such circumstances accrued from a gregarious life.\nThe man-like apes are not gregarious; and considering that some\nof them are reported to be encountered in greater numbers in the\nseason when most fruits come to maturity,[32] we may infer that\nthe solitary life generally led by them is due chiefly to the\ndifficulty they experience in getting food at other times of the\nyear. That our earliest human or half-human ancestors lived on\nthe same kind of food, and required about the same quantities of\nit as the man-like apes, seems to me a fairly legitimate\nsupposition; and from this I conclude that they were probably not\nmore gregarious than these apes. Subsequently man became\ncarnivorous; but even when getting his living by fishing or\nhunting, he may still have continued as a rule this solitary kind\nof life, or gregariousness may have become his habit only in\npart. \"An animal of a predatory kind,\" Mr. Spencer observes,\n\"which has prey that can be caught and killed without help,\nprofits by living alone: especially if its prey is much\nscattered, and is secured by stealthy approach or by lying in\nambush. Gregariousness would here be a positive disadvantage.\nHence the tendency of large carnivores, and also of small\ncarnivores that have feeble and widely-distributed prey, to lead\nsolitary lives.\"[33] It is certainly a noteworthy fact that even\nnow there are rude savages who live rather in separate families\nthan in tribes; and that their solitary life is due to want of\n{196} sufficient food is obvious from several facts which I have\nstated in full in another place.[34] These facts, as it seems to\nme, give much support to the supposition that the kind of food\nman subsisted upon, together with the large quantities of it\nwhich he wanted, formed in olden times a hindrance to a true\ngregarious manner of living, except perhaps in some unusually\nrich places.\n\n[Footnote 32: Savage, 'Observations on the External Characters\nand Habits of the _Troglodytes Niger_, in _Boston Journal of\nNatural History_, iv. 384. _Cf._ von Koppenfels, 'Meine Jagden\nauf Gorillas,' in _Die Gartenlaube_, 1877, p. 419.]\n\n[Footnote 33: Spencer, _Principles of Psychology_, ii. 558.]\n\n[Footnote 34: Westermarck, _op. cit._ p. 43 _sqq._]\n\nBut man finally overcame this obstacle. \"He has,\" to quote\nDarwin, \"invented and is able to use various weapons, tools,\ntraps, &c., with which he defends himself, kills or catches prey,\nand otherwise obtains food. He has made rafts or canoes for\nfishing or crossing over to neighbouring fertile islands. He has\ndiscovered the art of making fire, by which hard and stringy\nroots can be rendered digestible, and poisonous roots or herbs\ninnocuous.\"[35] In short, man gradually found out new ways of\nearning his living and more and more emancipated himself from\ndirect dependence on surrounding nature. The chief obstacle to a\ngregarious life was by this means surmounted, and the advantages\nof such a life were considerable. Living together in larger\ngroups, men could resist the dangers of life and defend\nthemselves much better than when solitary--all the more so as the\nphysical strength of man, and especially savage man, is\ncomparatively slight. The extension of the small family group may\nhave taken place in two different ways: either by adhesion, or by\nnatural growth and cohesion. In other words, new elements whether\nother family groups or single individuals may have united with it\nfrom without, or the children, instead of separating from their\nparents, may have remained with them and increased the group by\nforming new families themselves. There can be little doubt that\nthe latter was the normal mode of extension. When gregariousness\nbecame an advantage to man, he would feel inclined to remain with\nthose with whom he was living even after the family had fulfilled\nits object--the preservation of {197} the helpless offspring. And\nhe would be induced to do so not only from egoistic\nconsiderations, but by an instinct which, owing to its\nusefulness, would gradually develop, practically within the\nlimits of kinship--the gregarious instinct.\n\n[Footnote 35: Darwin, _Descent of Man_, p. 48 _sq._]\n\nBy the gregarious instinct I understand an animal's proneness to\nlive together with other members of its own species, apart from\nparental, conjugal, and filial attachment. It involves, or leads\nto, pleasure in the consciousness of their presence. The members\nof a herd are at ease in each other's company, suffer when they\nare separated, and rejoice when they are reunited. By actual\nliving together the instinct is individualised,[36] and it is\nstrengthened by habit. The pleasure with which one individual\nlooks upon another is further increased by the solidarity of\ninterests. Not only have they enjoyments in common, but they have\nthe same enemies to resist, the same dangers to encounter, the\nsame difficulties to overcome. Hence acts which are beneficial to\nthe agent are at the same time beneficial to his companions, and\nthe distinction between _ego_ and _alter_ loses much of its\nimportance.\n\n[Footnote 36: In mankind we very early recognise the child's\ntendency to sympathise with persons who are familiar to it\n(Compayr\u00e9, _L'\u00e9volution intellectuelle et morale de l'enfant_,\np. 288).]\n\nBut the members of the group do not merely take pleasure in each\nother's company. Associated animals very frequently display a\nfeeling of affection for each other--defend each other, help each\nother in distress and danger, perform various other services for\neach other.[37] Considering that the very object of the\ngregarious instinct is the preservation of the species, I think\nwe are obliged to regard the mutual affection of associated\nanimals as a development of this instinct. With the pleasure they\ntake in each other's company is intimately connected kindliness\ntowards its cause, the companion himself. In this explanation of\nsocial affection I believe no further step can be made. Professor\nBain asks why a more lively feeling should grow up towards a\nfellow-being than towards an {198} inanimate source of pleasure;\nand to account for this he suggests, curiously enough, \"the\nprimary and independent pleasure of the animal embrace\"[38]--although\nembrace even as an outward expression of affection plays a very\ninsignificant part in the social relations of gregarious animals.\nIt might as well be asked why there should be a more lively\nfeeling towards a sentient creature which inflicts pain than\ntowards an inanimate cause of pain. Both cases call for a similar\nexplanation. The animal distinguishes between a living being and\na lifeless thing, and affection proper, like anger proper, is\naccording to its very nature felt towards the former only. The\nobject of anger is normally an enemy, the object of social\naffection is normally a friend. Social affection is not only\ngreatly increased by reciprocity of feeling, but could never have\ncome into existence without such reciprocity. The being to which\nan animal attaches itself is conceived of as kindly disposed\ntowards it; hence among wild animals social affection is found\nonly in connection with the gregarious instinct, which is\nreciprocal in nature.\n\n[Footnote 37: Darwin, _op. cit._ p. 100 _sqq._ Kropotkin, _Mutual\nAid_, ch. i. _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 38: Bain, _op. cit._ p. 132.]\n\nAmong men the members of the same social unit are tied to each\nother with various bonds of a distinctly human character--the\nsame customs, laws, institutions, magic or religious ceremonies\nand beliefs, or notions of a common descent. As men generally are\nfond of that to which they are used or which is their own, they\nare also naturally apt to have likings for other individuals\nwhose habits or ideas are similar to theirs. The intensity and\nextensiveness of social affection thus in the first place depend\nupon the coherence and size of the social aggregate, and its\ndevelopment must consequently be studied in connection with the\nevolution of such aggregates.\n\nThis evolution is largely influenced by economic conditions.\nSavages who know neither cattle-rearing nor agriculture, but\nsubsist on what nature gives them--game, fish, fruit, roots, and\nso forth--mostly live in single families consisting of parents\nand children, or in larger {199} family groups including in\naddition a few other individuals closely allied.[39] But even\namong these savages the isolation of the families is not\ncomplete. Persons of the same stock inhabiting neighbouring\ndistricts hold friendly relations with one another, and unite for\nthe purpose of common defence. When the younger branches of a\nfamily are obliged to disperse in search of food, at least some\nof them remain in the neighbourhood of the parent family,\npreserve their language, and never quite lose the idea of\nbelonging to one and the same social group. And in some cases we\nfind that people in the hunting or fishing stage actually live in\nlarger communities, and have a well-developed social\norganisation. This is the case with many or most of the\nAustralian aborigines. Though in Australia, also, isolated\nfamilies are often met with,[40] the rule seems to be that the\nblacks live in hordes. Thus the Arunta of Central Australia are\ndistributed in a large number of small local groups, each of\nwhich occupies a given area of country and has its own\nheadman.[41] Every family, consisting of a man and one or more\nwives and children, has a separate lean-to of shrubs;[42] but\nclusters of these shelters are always found in spots where food\nis more or less easily obtainable,[43] and the members of each\ngroup are bound together by a strong \"local feeling.\"[44] The\nlocal influence makes itself felt even outside the horde.\n\"Without belonging to the same group,\" say Messrs. Spencer and\nGillen, \"men who inhabit localities close to one another are more\nclosely associated than men living at a distance from one\nanother, and, as a matter of fact, this local bond is strongly\nmarked. . . . Groups which are contiguous locally are constantly\nmeeting to perform ceremonies.\"[45] At the time when the series\nof initiation ceremonies called the _Engwura_ are performed, men\nand women gather together from all parts of the tribe, councils\nof the elder {200} men are held day by day, the old traditions of\nthe tribe are repeated and discussed, and \"it is by means of\nmeetings such as this, that a knowledge of the unwritten history\nof the tribe and of its leading members is passed on from\ngeneration to generation.\"[46] Nay, even members of different\ntribes often have friendly intercourse with each other; in\nCentral Australia, when two tribes come into contact with one\nanother on the border-land of their respective territories, the\nsame amicable feelings as prevail within the tribe are maintained\nbetween the members of the two.[47] Now it seems extremely\nprobable that Australian blacks are so much more sociable than\nmost other hunting people because the food-supply of their\ncountry is naturally more plentiful, or, partly thanks to their\nboomerangs, more easily attainable. A Central Australian native\nis, as a general rule, well nourished; \"kangaroo, rock-wallabies,\nemus, and other forms of game are not scarce, and often fall a\nprey to his spear and boomerang, while smaller animals, such as\nrats and lizards, are constantly caught without any difficulty by\nthe women.\"[48] Circumstances of an economic character also\naccount for the gregariousness of the various peoples on the\nnorth-west coast of North America who are neither pastoral nor\nagricultural--the Thlinkets, Haidas, Nootkas, and others. On the\nshore of the sea or some river they have permanent houses, each\nof which is inhabited by a number of families;[49] the houses are\ngrouped in villages, some of which are very populous;[50] and\nthough the tribal bond is not conspicuous for its strength, there\nare councils which discuss and decide all important questions\nconcerning the tribe.[51] The territory inhabited by these\npeoples, with its bays, sounds, and rivers, supplies them with\nfood in abundance; \"its enormous wealth of fish allows its\ninhabitants to enjoy a pampered existence.\"[52]\n\n[Footnote 39: Westermarck, _op. cit._ p. 43 _sqq._ Hildebrand,\n_Recht und Sitte_, p. 1 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 40: Westermarck, _op. cit._ p. 45.]\n\n[Footnote 41: Spencer and Gillen, _Native Tribes of Central\nAustralia_, p. 8 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 42: _Ibid._ p. 18.]\n\n[Footnote 43: _Ibid._ p. 31.]\n\n[Footnote 44: _Ibid._ p. 544.]\n\n[Footnote 45: _Ibid._ p. 14.]\n\n[Footnote 46: Spencer and Gillen, _Native Tribes of Central\nAustralia_, p. 272.]\n\n[Footnote 47: _Ibid._ p. 32.]\n\n[Footnote 48: _Ibid._ pp. 7, 44.]\n\n[Footnote 49: Boas, in _Fifth Report on the North-Western Tribes\nof Canada_, p. 22.]\n\n[Footnote 50: Krause (_Die Tlinkit-Indianer_, p. 100) speaks of a\nThlinket village which consisted of sixty-five houses and five or\nsix hundred inhabitants.]\n\n[Footnote 51: Boas, _loc. cit._ p. 36 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 52: Ratzel, _History of Mankind_, ii. 92.]\n\n{201} To pastoral people sociality, up to a certain degree, is of\ngreat importance. They have not only to defend their own persons\nagainst their enemies, but they have also to protect valuable\nproperty, their cattle. Moreover, they are often anxious to\nincrease their wealth by robbing their neighbours of cattle, and\nthis is best done in company. But at the same time a pastoral\ncommunity is never large, and, though cohesive so long as it\nexists, it is liable to break up into sections. The reason for\nthis is that a certain spot can pasture only a limited stock of\ncattle. The thirteenth chapter of Genesis well illustrates the\nsocial difficulties experienced by pastoral peoples. Abraham went\nup out of Egypt together with his wife and all that he had, and\nLot went with him. Abraham was very rich in cattle, and Lot also\nhad flocks, and herds, and tents. But \"the land was not able to\nbear them, that they might dwell together: for their substance\nwas great, so that they could not dwell together\"; they were\nobliged to separate.[53]\n\n[Footnote 53: _Genesis_, xiii. 1 _sqq._ See Hildebrand, _op.\ncit._ p. 29 _sq._; Grosse, _Die Formen der Familie_, pp. 99, 100,\n124 _sq._]\n\nThe case is different with people subsisting on agriculture. A\ncertain piece of land can support a much larger number of persons\nwhen it is cultivated than when it consists merely of pasture\nground. Its resources largely depend on the labour bestowed on\nit, and the more people the more labour. The soil also\nconstitutes a tie which cannot be loosened. It is a kind of\nproperty which, unlike cattle, is immovable; hence even where\nindividual ownership in land prevails, the heirs to an estate\nhave to remain together. As a matter of fact, the social union of\nagricultural communities is very close, and the households are\noften enormous.[54]\n\n[Footnote 54: See Grosse, _op. cit._ p. 136 _sqq._]\n\nBut living together is not the only factor which, among savages,\nestablishes a social unit. Such a unit may be based not only on\nlocal proximity, but on marriage or a common descent; it may\nconsist not only of persons who live together in the same\ndistrict, but of persons who are of the same family, or who are,\nor consider themselves to be, {202} of the same kin. These\ndifferent modes of organisation often, in a large measure,\ncoincide. The family is a social unit made up of persons who are\neither married or related by blood, and at the same time, in\nnormal cases, live together. The tribe is a social unit, though\noften a very incoherent one,[55] consisting of persons who\ninhabit the same district and also, at least in many cases,\nregard themselves as descendants of some common ancestor. The\nclan, which is essentially a body of kindred having a common\nname, may likewise on the whole coincide with the population of a\ncertain territory, with the members of one or more hordes or\nvillages. This is the case where the husband takes his wife to\nhis own community and descent is reckoned through the father, or\nwhere he goes to live in his wife's community and descent is\nreckoned through the mother. But frequently the system of\nmaternal descent is combined with the custom of the husband\ntaking his wife to his own home, and this, in connection with the\nrule of clan-exogamy, occasions a great discrepancy between the\nhorde and the clan. The local group is then by no means a group\nof clansmen; the children, live in their father's community, but\nbelong to their mother's clan, whilst the next generation of\nchildren within the community must belong to another clan.[56]\n\n[Footnote 55: See Cunow, _Die Verwandtschafts-Organisationen der\nAustralneger_, p. 121, n. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 56: _Cf._ Giddings, _Principles of Sociology_, p. 259.]\n\nKinship certainly gives rise to special rights and duties, but\nwhen unsupported by local proximity it loses much of its social\nforce. Among the Australian natives, for instance, the clan rules\nseem generally to be concerned with little or nothing else than\nmarriage, sexual intercourse, and, perhaps, blood-revenge.[57]\n\"The object of caste\" (clan), says Mr. Curr, \"is not to create or\ndefine a bond of union, but to secure the absence of any blood\nrelationship between {203} persons proposed to marry. So far from\nbeing a bond of friendship, no Black ever hesitates to kill one\nof another tribe because he happens to bear the same caste- (clan-)\nname as himself.\"[58] It appears that the system of descent itself\nis largely influenced by local connections.[59] Sir E. B. Tylor has\nfound by means of his statistical method that the number of\ncoincidences between peoples among whom the husband lives with the\nwife's family and peoples who reckon kinship through the mother only,\nis proportionally large, and that the full maternal system never\nappears among peoples whose exclusive custom is for the husband to\ntake his wife to his own home;[60] and I have myself drawn attention\nto the fact that where the two customs, the woman receiving her husband\nin her own hut and the man taking his wife to his, occur side by side\namong the same people, descent in the former case is traced through the\nmother, in the latter through the father.[61] Nay, even where kinship\nconstitutes a tie between persons belonging to different local\ngroups, its social force is ultimately derived not merely from\nthe idea of a common origin, but from near relatives' habit of\nliving together. Men became gregarious by remaining in the circle\nwhere they were born; if, instead of keeping together with their\nkindred, they had preferred to isolate themselves or to unite\nwith strangers, there would certainly be no blood-bond at all.\nThe mutual attachment and the social rights and duties which\nresulted from this gregarious condition were associated with the\nrelation in which members of the group stood to one another--the\nrelation of kinship as expressed by a common name,--and these\nassociations might last even after the local tie was broken. By\nmeans of the name former connections were kept up. Even we\nourselves are generally more disposed to count kin with distant\nrelatives who have our own surname than with relatives who have a\ndifferent name; and still greater is the influence which language\nin this respect exercises on the mind of a savage, {204} to whom\na person's name is part of his personality. The derivative origin\nof the social force in kinship accounts for its formal character,\nwhen personal intercourse is wanting; it may enjoin duties, but\nhardly inspires much affection. If in modern society much less\nimportance is attached to kinship than at earlier stages of\ncivilisation, this is largely due to the fact that relatives,\nexcept the nearest, have little communication with each other.\nAnd if, as Aristotle observes, friendship between kinsfolk varies\naccording to the degree of relationship,[62] it does so in the\nfirst instance on account of the varying intimacy of their mutual\nintercourse.\n\n[Footnote 57: Cunow, _op. cit._ pp. 97, 136. Dr. Stirling says\n(_Report of the Horn Expedition to Central Australia_,\n'Anthropology,' p. 43) that the laws arising out of the \"class\"\n(clan) divisions \"have extraordinary force and are, in general,\nimplicitly obeyed whether in respect of actual marriage, illicit\nconnections, or social relations\"; but I find no further\nreference to these \"social relations.\"]\n\n[Footnote 58: Curr, _The Australian Race_, i. 69.]\n\n[Footnote 59: Westermarck, _op. cit._ p. 107 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 60: Tylor, 'Method of Investigating the Development of\nInstitutions,' in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xviii. 258.]\n\n[Footnote 61: Westermarck, _op. cit._ p. 110.]\n\n[Footnote 62: Aristotle, _Ethica Nicomachea_, viii. 12. 7.]\n\nA very different explanation of the social influence of kinship\nhas been given by Mr. Hartland. He connects it with primitive\nsuperstition. A clan, he says, \"is regarded as an unity,\nliterally and not metaphorically one body, the individual members\nof which are as truly portions as the fingers or the legs are\nportions of the external, visible body of each of them.\" Now, a\nsevered limb or lock of hair is believed by the savage to remain\nin some invisible but real union with the body whereof it once,\nin outward appearance also, formed a part, and any injury done to\nit is supposed to affect the organism to which it belonged. \"The\nindividual member of a clan was in exactly the same position as a\nlock of hair cut from the head, or an amputated limb. He had no\nseparate significance, no value apart from his kin. . . . Injury\ninflicted on him was inflicted on, and was felt by, the whole\nkin, just as an injury inflicted on the severed lock or limb was\nfelt by the bulk.\"[63] Mr. Hartland insists upon a literal\ninterpretation of his words;[64] and this implies that the\nmembers of a clan are in their behaviour influenced by the idea\nthat what happens to one of them reacts upon all.\n\n[Footnote 63: Hartland, _Legend of Perseus_, ii. 277.]\n\n[Footnote 64: _Ibid._ ii. 236, 398, 444.]\n\nIn support of his theory Mr. Hartland makes reference to the\nbelief of some savages, that charms may be made from dead bodies\nagainst the surviving relatives of the deceased,[65] and to\ncertain rites of healing in which, besides the patient himself,\n\"other members of his tribe, presumably kinsmen,\" take part.[66]\nBut the former belief is a superstition connected with the wonder\nof death, from which no conclusion must be drawn as {205} to\nrelations between the living; and in the ceremonies of healing\nthe medicine-man plays a much more prominent part than the other\nbystanders--whose relationship to the patient, besides, is so\nlittle marked that Mr. Hartland only presumes them to be kindred.\nHe further observes that in the wide-spread custom of the Couvade\nwe meet with the idea that the child, being a part of the father,\nis liable to be affected by various acts committed by him.[67]\nAnd from Sir J. G. Frazer's 'Golden Bough' might be quoted many\ninstances of a belief in some mysterious bond of sympathy\nknitting together absent friends and relations--especially at\ncritical times of life--which has, in particular, led to rules\nregulating the conduct of persons left at home while a party of\ntheir friends is out fishing or hunting or on the war path.[68]\nBut all these rules are taboo restrictions of a definite and\naltogether special kind, generally, it seems, referring to\nmembers of the same family, and frequently to wives in their\nhusbands' absence. In order to make his hypothesis acceptable,\nMr. Hartland ought to have produced a fair number of facts\nproving that the members of the same clan really are believed to\nbe connected with each other in such a manner, that whatever\naffects one of them at the same time in a mysterious way affects\nthe rest. But we look in vain for a single well-established\ninstance of such a belief.\n\n[Footnote 65: _Ibid._ ii. 437 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 66: _Ibid._ ii. 432 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 67: Hartland, _Legend of Perseus_, ii. 406.]\n\n[Footnote 68: Frazer, _Golden Bough_, i. 27 _sqq._ See also\nHaddon, _Magic and Fetishism_, p. 11 _sq._]\n\nIt seems that the importance which savages attach to a common\nblood has been much exaggerated. Clanship is based on a method of\ncounting descent by means of names, either through the father or\nthrough the mother, but not through both at once. This, however,\nby no means implies that the other line is not recognised as a\nline of blood-relationship. The paternal system of descent is not\nnecessarily associated with the idea that the mother has no share\nin parentage, nor is the maternal system necessarily associated\nwith unconsciousness of the child's relation to its father;[69]\neven the Couvade, which assumes the recognition of a most\nintimate relationship between the child and its father, has been\nfound to prevail among some peoples who regard the child as a\nmember of the mother's clan.[70] Nay, there are instances in\nwhich the clan-bond is obviously {206} not regarded as a\nblood-bond at all, in the strict sense of the word. Of some\ntribes in New South Wales Mr. Cameron tells us that, although a\ndaughter belongs not to her father's clan but to that of her\nmother's brother, they believe that she emanates from her father\nsolely, being only nurtured by her mother;[71] and the Arunta of\nCentral Australia, who have the paternal system of descent,\nmaintain that a child really descends neither from its father nor\nfrom its mother, but is the reincarnation of a mythical\ntotem-ancestor.[72] Their theory is \"that the child is not the\ndirect result of intercourse, that it may come without this,\nwhich merely, as it were, prepares the mother for the reception\nand birth also of an already-formed spirit child who inhabits one\nof the local totem centres\";[73] and its totem-name, which is\nderived from the spot where it is supposed to have been\nconceived,[74] is different from its clan-name. It is useful to\nscrutinise Mr. Hartland's theory in the light of this class of\nfacts. They evidently prove that clanship and what we are used to\ncall the system of counting \"descent,\" is not necessarily based\non the notion of actual blood-relationship, but on kinship as a\nfact combined with a name; whereas Mr. Hartland's hypothesis\npresupposes, not that the members of a clan really are, but that\nthey consider themselves to be all of one blood.\n\n[Footnote 69: Mr. Swan informs me that the Waguha of West\nTanganyika, among whom children are generally named after their\nfather, recognise the part taken by both parents in generation;\nand Archdeacon Hodgson writes the same concerning certain other\ntribes of Eastern Central Africa, who trace descent through the\nmother.]\n\n[Footnote 70: Ling Roth, 'Signification of Couvade,' in _Jour.\nAnthr. Inst._ xxii. 227, 238.]\n\n[Footnote 71: Cameron, 'Notes on some Tribes of New South Wales,'\nin _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xiv. 352.]\n\n[Footnote 72: Spencer and Gillen, _Native Tribes of Central\nAustralia_, ch. iv. especially pp. 121, 124.]\n\n[Footnote 73: _Ibid._ p. 265.]\n\n[Footnote 74: _Ibid._ p. 124 _sqq._]\n\nYet another practice has been adduced as evidence of the supreme\nimportance which the primitive clan is supposed to attach to\nunity in blood--the so-called blood-covenant. The members of a\nclan, Mr. Hartland observes, may not be all descended from a\ncommon ancestry. Though descent is the normal, the typical cause\nof kinship and a common blood, kinship may also be acquired. \"To\nacquire kinship, the blood of the candidate for admission into\nthe kin must be mingled with that of the kin. In this way he\nenters into the brotherhood, is reckoned as of the same stock,\nobtains the full privileges of a kinsman.\"[75] As Professor\nRobertson Smith puts it, \"he who has drunk a clansman's blood is\nno longer a stranger but a brother, and included in the mystic\ncircle of those who have a share in the life-blood that is common\nto all the clan.\"[76] Mr. Hartland gives us a short account of\nthe rite:--\"It is sufficient that an incision be made in the\nneophyte's arm and the flowing blood sucked from it by one of the\nclansmen, upon whom the {207} operation is repeated in turn by\nthe neophyte. Originally, perhaps, the clansmen all assembled and\npartook of the rite; but if so, the necessity has ceased to be\nrecognised almost everywhere. The form, indeed, has undergone\nnumberless variations. . . . But, whatever may be the exact form\nadopted, the essence of the rite is the same, and its range is\nworld-wide.\" Then there follows a list of peoples from various\nquarters of the world among whom it is said to prevail.[77]\n\n[Footnote 75: Hartland, _op. cit._ ii. 237.]\n\n[Footnote 76: Robertson Smith, _Religion of the Semites_, p. 315.]\n\n[Footnote 77: Hartland, _op. cit._ 237 _sqq._]\n\nFrom this the reader undoubtedly gets the impression that the\nmingling of blood is a frequently practised ceremony of adoption,\nby which a person is admitted into a strange clan. But the facts\nstated by the chief authorities on the subject, to whom Mr.\nHartland refers, prove nothing of the kind. In most cases with\nwhich we are acquainted the mingling of blood is a form of\ncovenant between individuals, although an engagement with a chief\nor king naturally embraces his subjects also; and sometimes the\ncovenanters are tribes or kingdoms. But of the \"world-wide\"\nadoption rite there is hardly a single instance which corresponds\nto Mr. Hartland's description. He admits himself that \"in the\nsame measure as the clan relaxed its hold upon the individual\nmembers, blood-brotherhood assumed a personal aspect, until,\nhaving no longer any social force, it came to be regarded as\nmerely the most solemn and binding form of covenant between man\nand man.\"[78] His account of the blood-covenant is, in fact, only\nan inference based on the assumption that the existing rite is a\nsurvival from times when the clan was literally one body and the\nindividual nothing but an amputated limb. But to regard the\npresent blood-covenant as a survival of a previous rite of\nadoption into the clan is not justified by facts. So far as I\nknow, there is no record of a blood-covenant among savages of the\nlowest type, unless the aborigines of Australia be included among\nthem; and in Australia it is certainly not a ceremony of\nadoption. Among the Arunta it is intended to prevent treachery:\n\"if, for example, an Alice Springs party wanted to go on an\navenging expedition to the Burt country, and they had with them\nin camp a man of that locality, he would be forced to drink blood\nwith them, and, having partaken of it, would be bound not to aid\nhis friends by giving them warning of their danger.\"[79] This\ninstance is instructive. The Australian native is obliged to help\nthose with whom he has drunk blood against his own relatives,\nnay, against members of his own totem group. So also \"the tie\n{208} of blood-covenanting is reckoned in the East even a closer\ntie than that of natural descent,\"[80] and the same was the case\namong the ancient Scandinavians.[81] I do not see how Mr.\nHartland's theory can account for this.\n\n[Footnote 78: _Ibid._ ii. 240.]\n\n[Footnote 79: Spencer and Gillen, _Native Tribes of Central\nAustralia_, p. 461.]\n\n[Footnote 80: Trumbull, _Blood Covenant_, p. 10.]\n\n[Footnote 81: Maurer, _Bekehrung des Norwegischen Stammes_,\nii. 171.]\n\nMingling of blood is sometimes supposed to be a direct cause of\nmutual sympathy and agreement, in accordance with the principle\nof transmission of properties by contact;[82] even in Europe\nthere are traces of the belief that a few drops of blood\ntransferred from one person to another inspire the recipient with\nfriendly feelings towards him with whose blood he is\ninoculated.[83] But the genuine blood-covenant imposes duties on\nboth parties, and also contains the potential punishment for\ntheir transgression. It involves a promise, and the transference\nof blood is vaguely or distinctly supposed to convey to the\nperson who drinks it, or who is inoculated with it, a conditional\ncurse which will injure or destroy him should he break his\npromise. That this is the main idea underlying the blood-covenant\nappears from the fact that it is regularly accompanied by curses\nor self-imprecations.[84] In Madagascar, for instance, when two\nor more persons have agreed on forming the bond of fraternity, a\nfowl is procured, its head is nearly cut off, and it is left in\nthis state to continue bleeding during the ceremony. The parties\nthen pronounce a long imprecation and mutual vow over the blood,\nsaying, _inter alia_ \"O this miserable fowl weltering in its\nblood! thy liver do we eat, thy liver do we eat; and should\neither of us retract from the terms of this oath, let him\ninstantly become a fool, let him instantly become blind, let this\ncovenant prove a curse to him.\" A small portion of blood is then\ndrawn from each individual and drunk by the covenanting parties\nwith execrations of vengeance on each other in case of either\nviolating the sacred oath.[85] According to another description\nthe parties, after they have drunk each other's blood, drink a\nmixture from the same bowl, praying that it may turn into {209}\npoison for him who fails to keep the oath.[86] As we have seen\nbefore, blood is commonly regarded as a particularly efficient\nconductor of curses, and what could in this respect be more\nexcellent than the blood of the very person who utters the curse?\nBut the blood of a victim sacrificed on the occasion may serve\nthe same purpose, or some other suitable vehicle may be chosen to\ntransfer the imprecation. The Masai in the old days \"spat at a\nman with whom they swore eternal friendship\";[87] and the meaning\nof this seems clear when we hear that they spit copiously when\ncursing, and that \"if a man while cursing spits in his enemy's\neyes, blindness is supposed to follow.\"[88] The ancient Arabs,\nbesides swearing alliance and protection by dipping their hands\nin a pan of blood and tasting the contents, had a covenant known\nas the _[h.]ilf al-fo[d.]\u00fbl_, which was made by taking Zemzem\nwater and washing the corners of the Ka[(]ba with it, whereafter\nit was drunk by the parties concerned.[89] The blood-covenant is\nessentially based on the same idea as underlies the Moorish\ncustom of sealing a compact of friendship by a common meal at the\ntomb of some saint, the meaning of which is obvious from the\nphrase that \"the food will repay\" him who breaks the compact.[90]\n\n[Footnote 82: _Cf._ Crawley, _Mystic Rose_, p. 236 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 83: von Wlislocki, 'Menschenblut im Glauben der\nZigeuner,' in _Am Ur-Quell_, iii. 64. D\u00f6rfler, 'Das Blut im\nmagyarischen Volkglauben,' _ibid._ iii. 269 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 84: Forbes, _A Naturalist's Wanderings in the Eastern\nArchipelago_, p. 452 (natives of Timor). Burns, 'Kayans of the\nNorth-West of Borneo,' in _Jour. of the Indian Archipelago_, iii.\n146 _sq._ New, _Life, Wanderings, and Labours in Eastern Africa_,\np. 364 (Taveta). Decle, _Three Years in Savage Africa_, p. 494\n(Wakamba). Trumbull, _op. cit._ pp. 9, 20, 31, 42, 45-47, 53, 61\n_sq._ For the practice of sealing an agreement by transference of\nblood accompanied by an oath, see also Partridge, _Cross River\nNatives_, p. 191 (pagans of Obubura Hill district in Southern\nNigeria).]\n\n[Footnote 85: Ellis, _History of Madagascar_, 187 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 86: Dumont d'Urville, _Voyage pittoresque autour du\nmonde_, i. 81.]\n\n[Footnote 87: Hinde, _Last of the Masai_, p. 47. See also\nJohnston, _Uganda_, ii. 833.]\n\n[Footnote 88: Hinde, _op. cit._ p. 48.]\n\n[Footnote 89: Robertson Smith, _Marriage and Kinship in Early\nArabia_, p. 56 _sqq._ _Cf._ Herodotus, iii. 8.]\n\n[Footnote 90: See _supra_, i. 587. According to another theory\nthe inoculated blood is regarded as a pledge or deposit, which\ncompels the person from whom it was drawn to be faithful to the\nperson to whom it was transferred. Suppose that two individuals,\nA and B, become \"blood-brothers\" by mutual inoculation. Each,\nthen, Mr. Crawley argues (_Mystic Rose_, p. 236 _sq._), has a\npart of the other in his keeping, each has \"given himself away\"\nto the other in a very real sense; and the possibility of mutual\ntreachery or wrong is prevented both by the fact that injury done\nto B by A is considered equivalent to injury done by A to\nhimself, and also by the belief that if B is wronged he may work\nvengeance by injuring the part of A which he possesses. To this\nexplanation, however, serious objections may be raised. The\nbelief in sympathetic magic does not imply that injury done to B\nby A is _eo ipso_ supposed to affect A himself through that part\nof him which has been deposited in B; it does not imply that two\nthings which have once been conjoined remain, when quite\ndissevered from each other, in such a relation that \"whatever is\ndone to the one must similarly affect the other\" (Frazer, _Golden\nBough_, i. 49), unless there is an intention to this effect in\nthe agent. The severed part then serves as a medium by which\nmagic influence is transferred to the whole. Again, it is\ndifficult to see how B could injure A through the part of him\nwhich he possesses when that part has been absorbed into his own\nsystem, as must be the case with those few drops of A's blood\nwith which he was inoculated.]\n\nBesides marriage, local proximity, and a common descent, a common\nworship may tie people together into {210} social union. But\namong savages a religious community generally coincides with a\ncommunity of some other kind. There are tutelary gods of\nfamilies, clans, and tribes;[91] and a purely local group may\nalso form a religious community by itself. Major Ellis observes\nthat with some two or three exceptions all the gods worshipped by\nthe Tshi-speaking tribes on the Gold Coast are exclusively local\nand have a limited area of worship. If they are nature-gods they\nare bound up with the natural objects they animate, if they are\nghost-gods they are localised by the place of sepulture, and if\nthey are tutelary deities whose origin has been forgotten their\nposition is necessarily fixed by that of the town, village, or\nfamily they protect; in any case they are worshipped only by\nthose who live in the neighbourhood, the only exceptions being\nthe sky-god, the earthquake-god, and the goddess of the\nsilkcotton trees, who are worshipped everywhere.[92]\n\n[Footnote 91: See _infra_, ch. l.]\n\n[Footnote 92: Ellis, _Yoruba-speaking Peoples of the Slave\nCoast_, p. 284 _sq._ For various instances of village gods see\nTurner, _Samoa_, p. 18; Crozet, _Voyage to Tasmania, &c._ p. 45\n(Maoris); Christian, _Caroline Islands_, p. 75 (natives of\nPonape); Grierson, _Bih[=a]r Peasant Life_, p. 403 _sqq._]\n\nWhen the religious community is thus at the same time a family,\nclan, village, or tribe, it is of course impossible exactly to\ndistinguish the social influence of the common religion from that\nexercised by marriage, local proximity, or a common descent. It\nseems, however, that the importance of the religious bond, or at\nleast of the totem bond, has been somewhat exaggerated by a\ncertain school of anthropologists. We are told that in early\nsociety \"each member of the kin testifies and renews his union\nwith the rest\" by taking part in a sacrificial meal in which the\ntotem god is eaten by his worshippers.[93] But no satisfactory\nevidence has ever been given in support of this theory. Sir J. G.\nFrazer knows only one certain case of a totem sacrament, namely,\nthat prevalent among the Arunta and some other tribes in Central\nAustralia,[94] who at the time of Intichiuma are in the habit of\nkilling and eating totem animals; and this practice has nothing\nwhatever {211} to do with the mutual relations between kindred.\nIts object is only to multiply in a magic manner the animals of\ncertain species for the purpose of increasing the food-supply for\nother totemic groups.[95] In his book on Totemism Frazer\nwrites:--\"The totem bond is stronger than the bond of blood or\nfamily in the modern sense. This is expressly stated of the clans\nof western Australia and of north-western America, and is\nprobably true of all societies where totemism exists in full\nforce. Hence in totem tribes every local group, being necessarily\ncomposed (owing to exogamy) of members of at least two totem\nclans, is liable to be dissolved at any moment into its totem\nelements by the outbreak of a blood feud, in which husband and\nwife must always (if the feud is between their clans) be arrayed\non opposite sides, and in which the children will be arrayed\nagainst either their father or their mother, according as descent\nis traced through the mother, or through the father.\"[96] In the\ntwo or three cases which Frazer quotes in support of his\nstatement[97] the totemic group is identical with the clan; hence\nit is impossible to decide whether the strength of the tie which\nunites its members is due to the totem relationship or to the\ncommon descent. But even the combined clan and totem systems seem\nat most only in exceptional cases to lead to such consequences as\nare indicated by Frazer's authorities. With reference to the\nAustralian aborigines Mr. Curr observes:--\"Of the children of one\nfather being at war with him, or with each other, on the ground\nof maternal relationship, or any other ground, my inquiries and\nexperience supply no instances. To Captain Grey's statements,\nindeed, there are several objections.\"[98]\n\n[Footnote 93: Hartland, _op. cit._ ii. 236.]\n\n[Footnote 94: Frazer, _Golden Bough_, i. p. xix. _Cf._ _Idem_,\n_Totemism and Exogamy_, iv. 230 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 95: Spencer and Gillen, _Native Tribes of Central\nAustralia_, ch. vi. _Iidem_, _Northern Tribes of Central\nAustralia_, ch. ix. _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 96: Frazer, _Totemism_, p. 57.]\n\n[Footnote 97: Grey, _Journals of Expeditions in North-West and\nWestern Australia_, ii. 230. Petroff, _Report on Alaska_, p. 165.\nHardisty, 'Loucheux Indians,' in _Smithsonian Report_, 1866, p. 315.]\n\n[Footnote 98: Curr, _The Australian Race_, i. 67. In Hardisty's\nstatement, referring to the Loucheux Indians, there is a\nconspicuous lack of definiteness. He says:--\"In war it was not\ntribe against tribe, but division against division, and as the\nchildren were never of the same caste (clan) as the father, the\nchildren would, of course, be against the father and the father\nagainst the children. . . . This, however, was not likely to\noccur very often, as the worst of parents would have naturally\npreferred peace to war with his own children.\" Petroff's passage\nconcerning the Thlinkets, referred to by Sir J. G. Frazer, simply\nruns:--\"The ties of the totem or clanship are considered far\nstronger than those of blood relationship.\"]\n\n{212} Among the Arunta and some other Central Australian tribes\nwe have fortunately an opportunity of studying the social\ninfluence of totemism apart from that of clanship, the division\ninto totems being quite independent of the clan system. The whole\ndistrict of a tribe may be mapped out into a large number of\nareas of various sizes, each of which centres in one or more\nspots where, in the dim past, certain mythical ancestors are said\nto have originated or camped during their wanderings, and where\ntheir spirits are still supposed to remain, associated with\nsacred stones, which the ancestors used to carry about with them.\nFrom these spirits have sprung, and still continue to spring,\nactual men and women, the members of the various totems being\ntheir reincarnations. At the spots where they remained, the\nancestral spirits enter the bodies of women, and in consequence a\nchild must belong to the totem of the spot at which the mother\nbelieves that it was conceived. A result of this is that no one\ntotem is confined to the members of a particular clan or\nsub-clan,[99] and that though most members of a given horde or\nlocal group belong to the same totemic group, there is no\nabsolute coincidence between these two kinds of organisation.[100]\nHow, then, does the fact that two persons belong to the same\ntotem influence their social relationships? \"In these tribes,\"\nsay Messrs. Spencer and Gillen, \"there is no such thing as the\nmembers of one totem being bound together in such a way that they\nmust combine to fight on behalf of a member of the totem to which\nthey belong. . . . The men to assist a particular man in a\nquarrel are those of his locality, and not of necessity those of\nthe same totem as himself, indeed the latter consideration does\nnot enter into account and in this as in other matters we see the\nstrong {213} development of what we have called the 'local\ninfluence.' . . . The men who assist him are his brothers, blood\nand tribal, the sons of his mother's brothers, blood and tribal.\nThat is, if he be a Panunga man he will have the assistance of\nthe Panunga and Ungalla men of his locality, while if it comes to\na general fight he will have the help of the whole of his local\ngroup. . . . It is only indeed during the performance of certain\nceremonies that the existence of a mutual relationship,\nconsequent upon the possession of a common totemic name, stands\nout at all prominently. In fact, it is perfectly easy to spend a\nconsiderable time amongst the Arunta tribe without even being\naware that each individual has a totemic name.\"[101]\n\n[Footnote 99: Spencer and Gillen, _Native Tribes of Central\nAustralia_, ch. iv.]\n\n[Footnote 100: _Ibid._ pp. 9, 32, 34.]\n\n[Footnote 101: Spencer and Gillen, _Native Tribes of Central\nAustralia_, pp. 34, 544.]\n\nWhen from the savage and barbarous races of men we pass to\npeoples of a higher culture, as they first appear to us in the\nlight of history, we meet among them social units similar in kind\nto those prevalent at lower stages of civilisation: the family,\nclan, village, tribe. We also find among them, side by side with\nthe family consisting of parents and children, a larger family\norganisation, which, though not unknown among the lower races,\nassumes particular prominence in the archaic State.\n\nIn China the family generally remains undivided till the children\nof the younger sons are beginning to grow up. Then the younger\nbranches of the family separate, and form their own households.\nBut the new householders continue to take part in the ancestral\nworship of the old home; and mourning is worn in theory for four\ngenerations of ascendants and descendants in the direct line, and\nfor contemporaries descended in the same fifth generation from\nthe \"honoured head\" of the family.[102] At the same time we find\nin China at least traces of a clan organisation. Large bodies of\npersons bear the same surname, and a penalty is inflicted on\nanyone who marries a person with the same surname as his own,\nwhilst a man is strictly forbidden to nominate as his heir {214}\nan individual of a different surname.[103] Moreover, there are\nwhole villages composed of relatives all bearing the same\nancestral name. \"In many cases,\" says Mr. Doolittle, \"for a long\nperiod of time no division of inherited property is made in rural\ndistricts, the descendants of a common ancestor living or working\ntogether, enjoying and sharing the profits of their labours under\nthe general direction and supervision of the head of the clan and\nthe heads of the family branches. . . . There may be only one\nhead of the clan. Under him there are several heads of\nfamilies.\"[104]\n\n[Footnote 102: Simcox, _Primitive Civilizations_, ii. 303, 493, 69.]\n\n[Footnote 103: Medhurst, 'Marriage, Affinity, and Inheritance in\nChina,' in _Trans. Roy. Asiatic Soc. China Branch_, iv. 21, 22, 29.]\n\n[Footnote 104: Doolittle, _Social Life of the Chinese_, ii. 225\n_sqq._]\n\nThe \"four generations\" of the Chinese, comprising those who are\nregarded as near relatives, have their counterpart in the family\norganisation of most so-called Aryan peoples. The Roman\nPropinqui--that is, parents and children, brothers and sisters,\nuncles and aunts, nephews and nieces, first cousins\n(_consobrini_) and second cousins (_sobrini_)--exactly\ncorresponded to the Anchisteis of the Greeks, the Sapindas of the\nHindus,[105] and the \"Syngeneis\" of the Persians.[106] The\npersons belonging to these four generations stood in a\nparticularly close relationship to each other. They had mutual\nrights and duties of various kinds. In early times, if one of\nthem was killed, the survivors had to avenge his death. They were\nexpected to assist each other whenever it was needed, especially\nbefore the court. They celebrated in common feasts of rejoicing\nand feasts for the dead. They had a common cult and common\nmourning. In short, they formed an enlarged family unit of which\nthe individual families were merely sub-branches, even though\n{215} they did not necessarily live in the same house.[107] In\nIndia we still meet with a perishable survival of this\norganisation. \"In the Joint Family of the Hindus,\" says Sir Henry\nMaine, \". . . . the agnatic group of the Romans absolutely\nsurvives--or rather, but for the English law and English courts,\nit would survive. Here there is a real, thoroughly ascertained\ncommon ancestor, a genuine consanguinity, a common fund of\nproperty, a common dwelling.\"[108] The Gwentian, Dimetian, and\nVenedotian codes likewise represent the homestead and land of the\nfree Welshman as a family holding. \"So long as the head of the\nfamily lived,\" says Mr. Seebohm, \"all his descendants lived with\nhim, apparently in the same homestead, unless new ones had\nalready been built for them on the family land. In any case, they\nstill formed part of the joint household of which he was the\nhead. When a free tribesman, the head of a household, died, his\nholding was not broken up. It was held by his heirs for three\ngenerations as one joint holding.\"[109] So also among the\nsubdivisions of ancient Irish society there was one which\ncomprised the \"near relatives,\" the Propinqui of the Romans.[110]\nMany of the South Slavonians to this day live in house\ncommunities each consisting of a body of from ten to sixty\nmembers or even more, who are blood-relations to the second or\nthird degree on the male side, and who associate in a common\ndwelling or group of dwellings, having their land in common,\nfollowing a common occupation, and being governed by a common\nchief.[111] Among the Russians, {216} too, there are households\nof this kind, containing the representatives of three\ngenerations; and previous to the emancipation of the serfs in\n1861 such households were much more common than they are\nnow.[112] The ancient Teutons are the only \"Aryan\" race among\nwhom the joint family organisation cannot be proved to have\nprevailed.[113]\n\n[Footnote 105: _Baudh\u00e2yana_, i. 5. 11. 9:--\"The great-grandfather,\nthe grandfather, the father, oneself, the uterine brothers, the\nson by a wife of equal caste, the grandson, and the\ngreat-grandson--these they call Sapindas, but not the\ngreat-grandson's son.\" _Laws of Manu_, ix. 186:--\"To three\nancestors water must be offered, to three the funeral cake is\ngiven, the fourth descendant is the giver of these oblations, the\nfifth has no connection with them.\" _Cf._ Jolly, 'Recht und\nSitte,' in B\u00fchler, _Grundriss der indo-arischen Philologie_,\nii. 85.]\n\n[Footnote 106: Brissonius, _De regio Persarum principatu_, i.\n207, p. 279. Leist, _Alt-arisches Jus Civile_, i. 47 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 107: Klenze, 'Die Cognaten und Affinen nach R\u00f6mischem\nRechte in Vergleichung mit andern verwandten Rechten,' in\n_Zeitschr. f. geschichtliche Rechtswiss._ vi. 5 _sqq._ Leist,\n_Alt-arisches Jus Civile_, i. 231 _sqq._ Rivier, _Pr\u00e9cis du droit\nde famille romain_, p. 34 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 108: Maine, _Dissertations on Early Law and Custom_,\np. 240.]\n\n[Footnote 109: Seebohm, _English Village Community_, p. 193.\n_Idem_, _Tribal System in Wales_, p. 89 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 110: Maine, _Early History of Institutions_, p. 90\n_sq._ Leist, _Alt-arisches Jus Civile_, i. Anhang i.]\n\n[Footnote 111: Krauss, _Sitte und Brauch der S\u00fcdslaven_, pp. 75,\n79 _sqq._ Maine, _Dissertations on Early Law and Custom_, p. 241\n_sqq._ Utie[vs]enovi['c], _Die Hauskommunionen der S\u00fcdslaven_, p. 20\n_sqq._ Miler, 'Die Hauskommunion der S\u00fcdslaven,' in _Jahrbuch d.\ninternat. Vereinigung f. vergl. Rechtswiss._ iii. 199 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 112: Mackenzie Wallace, _Russia_, i. 134. von Hellwald,\n_Die menschliche Familie_, p. 506 _sq._ Kovalewsky, _Modern\nCustoms and Ancient Laws of Russia_, p. 53 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 113: See Leist, _Alt-arisches Jus Civile_, i. Anhang i.]\n\nAmong all these peoples a number of kindred families or joint\nfamilies were united into a larger social group forming a village\ncommunity or a cluster of households. The Vedic people called\nsuch a body of kindred _janman[=a]_ or simply _gr[=a]ma_, which\nmeans \"village\";[114] and the same organisation still survives in\nIndia, though in a modified form. The type of Indian village\ncommunities which has been described by Sir Henry Maine is at\nonce an assemblage of co-proprietors and an organised patriarchal\nsociety, providing for the management of the common fund and\ngenerally also for internal government, police, the\nadministration of justice, and the apportionment of taxes and\npublic duties. Unlike the joint family, the related families of\nthe village community no longer hold their land as an\nindistinguishable common fund: they have portioned it out, at\nmost they redistribute it periodically, and are thus on the high\nroad to modern landed proprietorship. And whilst the joint family\nis a narrow circle of persons actually related to each other, the\nvillage community has very generally been adulterated by the\nadmission of strangers, especially purchasers of shares, who have\nfrom time to time been engrafted on the original stock of\nblood-relatives. Yet in all such cases there is the assumption of\nan original common parentage; hence the Hindu village community\nof the type indicated, whenever it is not actually an association\nof kinsmen, is always a body of co-proprietors formed on the\nmodel of such an association.[115]\n\n[Footnote 114: Zimmer, _Altindisches Leben_, p. 159 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 115: Maine, _Ancient Law_, p. 260 _sqq._ _Idem_,\n_Dissertations on Early Law and Custom_, p. 240. Elphinstone,\n_History of India_, p. 68 _sqq._ Mr. Baden-Powell (_Indian\nVillage Community_, p. 3 _sqq._) has shown that Sir Henry Maine's\ngeneral description of Indian village communities holds true only\nof a certain class of villages in India.]\n\n{217} Corresponding to the Vedic _gr[=a]ma_ there were the\nIranian _vi\u00e7_, the Greek _genos_, and the Roman _gens_; and as\namong the Vedic people several _gr[=a]mas_ formed a _vi\u00e7_ and\nseveral _vi\u00e7s_ a _jana_,[116] so the Iranian _vi\u00e7_, the Greek\n_genos_, and the Roman _gens_ were, respectively, subdivisions of\na _zantu_, _phratria_, and _curia_; and these again were\nsubdivisions of a still more comprehensive unit, a _daqyu_,\n_phyle_, and _tribus_.[117] The Roman territory was in earliest\ntimes divided into a number of clan-districts, each inhabited by\na particular _gens_, which was thus a group associated at once by\nlocality and by a common descent. Whilst each household had its\nown portion of land, the clan-household or village had a\nclan-land belonging to it, and this clan-land was managed up to a\ncomparatively late period after the analogy of household-land,\nthat is, on the system of joint-possession, each clan tilling its\nown land and thereafter distributing the produce among the\nseveral households belonging to it. Even the traditions of Roman\nlaw furnish the information that wealth consisted at first in\ncattle and the usufruct of the soil, and that it was not till\nlater that land came to be distributed among the burgesses as\ntheir own special property.[118] Still in historical times, if a\nperson left no sons or agnates living at his death, the\ninheritance escheated to the _gentiles_, or entire body of Roman\ncitizens bearing the same name with the deceased, whereas no part\nof it was given to any relative united, however closely, with the\ndead man through female descent.[119] But as the Hindu village\ncommunity, so also the Roman _gens_, though originally a group of\nblood-relatives inhabiting a common district, was already in\nearly times recruited from men of alien extraction who were\nassumed to be descended from a common ancestor. And it is\ndifficult to believe {218} that either in Rome or Greece even the\nfiction of a common origin could be preserved for long when the\norganisation of the people into gentes, phratries, and tribes was\nadopted by the State as a system of political division and their\nnumbers were fixed.[120] When the _genos_ and _gens_ first appear\nto us in history they were mere dwindling survivals, except in\none respect: they remained, as they had been from the\noutset,[121] religious communities long after they had lost all\nother practical importance. This was especially the case at\nAthens, where certain reputed gentes for centuries continued to\nplay a prominent part in the religious cult;[122] and the Romans\nseem to have preserved their _gentilicia sacra_ still in Cicero's\ntime.[123]\n\n[Footnote 116: Zimmer, _op. cit._ p. 159 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 117: Leist, _Gr\u00e6co-italische Rechtsgeschichte_, p. 104\n_sq._]\n\n[Footnote 118: Mommsen, _History of Rome_, i. 45, 46, 238.]\n\n[Footnote 119: Maine, _Ancient Law_, p. 220 _sq._ Fustel de\nCoulanges, _La Cit\u00e9 antique_, p. 126.]\n\n[Footnote 120: Leist, _Gr\u00e6co-italische Rechtsgeschichte_, p. 150\n_sqq._ It is expressly said that at Athens the members of the\nsame [Greek: ge/nos] were not necessarily regarded as\nblood-relations (see Bunsen, _De jure hereditario Atheniensium_,\np. 104, n. 28).]\n\n[Footnote 121: Schoemann, _Griechische Alterth\u00fcmer_, ii. 548\n_sqq._ Marquardt, _R\u00f6mische Staatsverwaltung_, iii. 126, 130.\nFustel de Coulanges, _op. cit._ p. 124 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 122: Leist, _Gr\u00e6co-italische Rechtsgeschichte_, p. 159\n_sq._]\n\n[Footnote 123: Cicero, _Pro domo_, 13 (34).]\n\nIn ancient Wales districts were occupied by tribes under their\npetty kings or chiefs, and the tribe (_cenedl_) was a bundle of\nkindreds \"bound together and interlocked by common interests and\nfrequent intermarriages, as well as by the necessity of mutual\nprotection against foreign foes.\"[124] A group of households,\nagain, corresponding to the Roman _gens_ formed a _trev_, which\nwas a cluster of scattered households, \"not necessarily a village\nin the modern sense.\"[125] The same seems to have been the case\nwith the Teutonic _vici_, spoken of by Tacitus;[126] but that\namong the Teutons, also, the people of the same neighbourhood\nwere blood-relatives may be directly inferred from a statement\nmade by C\u00e6sar.[127] They were not much addicted to\nagriculture,[128] and \"the dreary world\" they inhabited, with its\ndesert aspect, its harsh climate, its lack of cultivation, was\nnot {219} favourable to the formation of permanent large social\nbodies of great cohesiveness. However, we meet among them social\nunits which C\u00e6sar calls _regiones_ or _pagi_[129] of which the\n_vici_ may be assumed to have been subdivisions. Among the highly\nagricultural Slavonians, on the other hand, we find even in the\npresent time a social organisation very similar to that of the\nHindus. The South Slavonians, as we have seen, live in house\ncommunities corresponding to the joint families in India. Now,\nwhen the members of a house community, or _zadruga_--as it is\noften called--become too numerous, a separation takes place, and\nthe emigrants form new households by themselves. A _zadruga_ is\nthus gradually expanded into a _bratstvo_, or brotherhood--a\ngroup of related house communities which not only feel themselves\nas branches of the same stock, but still have certain practical\ninterests in common and a common chief. Several _bratstva_,\nfinally, form a _pleme_, or tribe.[130] Among the Russians,\nagain, the family, or joint family, has developed into a _mir_,\nor village community, composed of an assemblage of separate\nhouses each ruled by its own head, but with a common village\nchief elected by the heads of the various households. The Russian\n_mir_ is an institution very similar to the Hindu village\ncommunity described above. The land belongs to the community, and\nin earlier days it was probably cultivated in common. At present\nit is divided between the component families, the lots shifting\namong them periodically, or perhaps vesting in them as their\nproperty, but always subject to a power in the collective body of\nvillagers to veto its sale. Originally the _mir_ was also a group\nof kindred; but, as in the Hindu village community, the tie of\nblood has been greatly weakened by all sorts of fictions and the\nadmission of so many strangers that the tradition of a common\norigin is dim or lost.[131]\n\n[Footnote 124: Seebohm, _English Village Community_, p. 190.\n_Idem_, _Tribal System in Wales_, p. 61.]\n\n[Footnote 125: _Idem_, _English Village Community_, p. 343.]\n\n[Footnote 126: Tacitus, _Germania_, 16. _Cf._ Hildebrand, _op.\ncit._ p. 105 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 127: C\u00e6sar, _De bello Gallico_, vi. 22:--\"Magistratus\nac princeps in annos singulos gentibus cognationibusque hominum,\nqui una coierint, quantum, et quo loco visum est, agri attribuunt.\"]\n\n[Footnote 128: _Ibid._ vi. 22.]\n\n[Footnote 129: C\u00e6sar, _De bello Gallico_, vi. 23.]\n\n[Footnote 130: Krauss, _op. cit._ pp. 2, 32 _sqq._ von Hellwald,\n_op. cit._ p. 502 _sq._ Grosse, _op. cit._ p. 204 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 131: de Laveleye, _De la propri\u00e9t\u00e9_, p. 12 _sqq._\nMaine, _Dissertations on Early Law and Custom_, p. 261 _sq._]\n\nIn the social organisation of all these peoples there is {220}\nthus originally a general congruity between the principle of\nlocal proximity and the principle of descent. On the one hand,\nall freemen, all true members of the society, who belong to the\nsame local group, are at the same time kinsmen; on the other\nhand, all persons who are united by the tie of a common descent\nbelong to the same or neighbouring local groups. The cause of\nthis congruity is the universal prevalence of the paternal system\nof descent. Whether the case was different in prehistoric times\nis an open question. That the ancient Chinese reckoned kinship\nthrough the mother, not through the father, has been conjectured\non philological grounds,[132] as to the plausibility of which I\ncan express no opinion. Several writers have also endeavoured to\nprove that the uterine line of descent prevailed among the\nprimitive Aryans, but the evidence is far from being conclusive.\nI agree with Professor Leist that all so-called survivals of a\nsystem of maternal descent in the prehistoric antiquity of the\n\"Aryan\" races are doubtful, if not false.[133] As regards the\nTeutons, much importance has been attributed to the specially\nclose connection which, according to Tacitus, existed between a\nsister's children and their mother's brothers;[134] but, as\nProfessor Schrader remarks, in spite of the prominent position of\nthe maternal uncle among Teutonic peoples, the _patruus_\ndistinctly came before the _avunculus_, the agnates before the\ncognates, in testamentary succession.[135] The existence of a\ncustom which in some respect recognises uterine relationship does\nnot prove the earlier prevalence of the full maternal system of\ndescent, to the exclusion of the paternal.\n\n[Footnote 132: Puini, quoted by Grosse, _op. cit._ p. 193.]\n\n[Footnote 133: Leist, _Alt-arisches Jus Gentium_, p. 58. _Idem_,\n_Alt-arisches Jus Civile_, i. 490.]\n\n[Footnote 134: Tacitus, _Germania_, 20.]\n\n[Footnote 135: Schrader, _Prehistoric Antiquities of the Aryan\nPeoples_, p. 395.]\n\nProgress in civilisation is up to a certain point connected with\nsocial expansion. Among savages the largest permanent social unit\nis generally the tribe, and even the tribal bond is often very\nloose, if not entirely wanting. It is true that associations of\ntribes occur even among so {221} low a race as the Australian\naborigines, but unaccompanied by any kind of political\norganisation.[136] At a somewhat higher stage we meet with the\nfamous league of the Iroquois--a federation on republican\nprinciples of five distinct tribes, which could point to three\ncenturies of uninterrupted domestic unity and peace[137]--and the\nkingdoms of various African potentates. Civilisation only thrives\nin states. From small beginnings round the lake of Mexico the\nAztecs gradually succeeded, through conquest, in forming an\nempire which covered probably almost sixteen thousand square\nleagues. However, between the various tribes lay broad belts of\nuninhabited territory, which enabled them to keep up a shy and\nexclusive attitude towards each other; and at the time of the\nSpanish conquest the empire of Mexico was, in fact, little more\nthan \"a chain of intimidated Indian tribes, who, kept apart from\neach other under the influence of mutual timidity, were held down\nby dread of attacks from an unassailable robber-stronghold in\ntheir midst.\"[138] In South America, in a long course of ages,\nsix nations inhabited the region which extends from the\nwater-parting between the basins of the Huallaga and Ucayali to\nthat between the basins of the Ucayali and Lake Titicaca. When\nincreasing population brought them in contact with each other, a\nstruggle for supremacy ended in the mastery of the fittest--the\nIncas; and the empire of the latter was subsequently extended by\nthe subjugation of a variety of other nations or tribes.[139] The\nextent of territory claimed for ancient China by the earliest\nrecords is more than double the size of modern France, and,\nthough it was often divided into different states, the great\ndynasties ruled over the whole of it.[140] The two crowns of\nUpper and Lower Egypt were united at a {222} very early date; and\nno less imposing was the great kingdom of Babylon and Assur. We\nmay assume that all these empires were formed by an association,\neither voluntary or forcible, of different tribes, as was the\ncase with those states with whose origin and early growth we are\nsomewhat better acquainted. As late as the time of the Judges the\ntribes of Israel either stood each entirely alone or formed\nsmaller groups, and there was no such thing as an Israelitish\nnation in a political sense until the unity of the people came\ninto being under Samuel and the first kings.[141] The Vedic\npeople consisted of a great number of independent tribes, between\nwhich only temporary alliances were made for the sake of defence\nor attack. But gradually the alliances grew more permanent;\nwar-kings united several tribes, surrounded themselves with a\nmilitary nobility, and founded great kingdoms.[142] In Greece and\nItaly the states grew out of forts which had been built on\nelevated places to serve as common strongholds or places of\nrefuge in case of war. Several tribes united so as to be better\nable to resist dangerous enemies, and one of the fortified towns\nin time gained supremacy over all others in the neighbourhood, as\nAthens did in Attica and Alba Longa in Latium. Similar districts,\nruled by a town, were called _poleis_ or _civitates_.[143] In\nhistorical times attempts were made to carry this process further\nby joining several of the small states under the rule of one. In\nthis Sparta and Athens failed, whereas the efforts of Rome met\nwith unequalled success.\n\n[Footnote 136: Curr, _The Australian Race_, i. 62 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 137: Morgan, _League of the Iroquois_, p. 141.]\n\n[Footnote 138: Scheppig, 'Ancient Mexicans,' &c. p. 6, in\nSpencer's _Descriptive Sociology_. Prescott, _History of the\nConquest of Mexico_, p. 4. Ratzel, _History of Mankind_,\nii. 199, 202.]\n\n[Footnote 139: Markham, 'Geographical Positions of the Tribes\nwhich formed the Empire of the Yncas,' in _Jour. Roy. Geo. Soc._\nxli. 287 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 140: Simcox, _op. cit._ ii. 10, 13.]\n\n[Footnote 141: Kuenen, _Religion of Israel_, i. 133.]\n\n[Footnote 142: Zimmer, _Altindisches Leben_, pp. 158, 192 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 143: Leist, _Gr\u00e6co-italische Rechtsgeschichte_, p. 109\n_sqq._]\n\nThe development of the State tended to weaken or destroy the\nsmaller units of which it was composed. The central power,\nhostile to separatism, naturally endeavoured to appropriate the\nauthority invested in the latter, and in a well-governed state\nthese on their part had little reason to resist. The main object\nof the clan, phratry, and tribe was to protect their respective\nmembers; hence they became superfluous in the presence of a\npowerful national {223} government which unselfishly and\nimpartially looked after the interests of its various subjects.\nAdam Smith contrasts the strong clan-feeling which still in the\neighteenth century prevailed among the Scotch Highlanders with\nthe little regard felt for remote relatives by the English, and\nobserves that in countries where the authority of the law is not\nsufficiently strong to give security to every member of the State\nthe different branches of the same family choose to live in the\nneighbourhood of one another, their association being frequently\nnecessary for their common defence; whereas in a country like\nEngland, where the authority of the law was well established,\n\"the descendants of the same family, having no such motive for\nkeeping together, naturally separate and disperse, as interest or\ninclination may direct.\"[144] It seems also probable that the\npersistency of the village community or the gentile system among\nthe Hindus and Slavs has been largely due to the weakness of the\nState or to the badness of the government.\n\n[Footnote 144: Smith, _Theory of Moral Sentiments_, p. 326 _sq._]\n\nAs the larger units, so the family also was influenced by the\nrise of the State, but originally in quite the opposite\ndirection. Whilst the former dwindled away, the family grew in\nimportance. Nowhere do we find the family-tie stronger, nowhere\ndoes the father or eldest male ascendant possess greater power\nthan in the archaic State. In a previous chapter I have already\ntried to explain this singular fact. I pointed out that in early\nsociety there seems to be a certain antagonism between the family\nand the clan, that the family was strengthened because the clan\nwas weakened, that the father became a patriarch only as the\ninheritor of the authority which formerly belonged to the clan.\nBut we have also noticed that at a higher stage the family again\nlost in importance.[145]\n\n[Footnote 145: _Supra_, i. 627 _sq._]\n\nIt seems that the tribes which united into one nation or state\nwere normally, in the first instance, branches of the same stock,\nliving in the same neighbourhood and speaking {224} the same\nlanguage, though with dialectic differences. Like the smaller\nunits, such a state was no doubt frequently adulterated by the\namalgamation of aliens, but here again fictions were substituted\nfor realities, and the foreign extraction was forgotten. The case\nwas different, however, when the commonwealth was formed or\naggrandised by the subjugation of a strange race. Instead of\nbeing adopted into the circle of the conquerors, the subdued\npeople were treated as their inferiors in blood, civic rights\nwere denied to them, and in many cases they were kept in\nservitude; thus even here the principle of a common origin as the\nbase of citizenship was preserved, the conquerors being the only\ncitizens in the full sense of the term. But however strong and\ndurable similar barriers may be, they are not imperishable. The\ndifferent races inhabiting the same country under the same\ngovernment tend to draw nearer each other, the inferior race is\nincorporated with the nation, and local proximity instead of\ndescent at last becomes the basis of community in political\nfunctions. This change, however, was neither so radical nor so\nstartling as it has been represented to be;[146] fictions on a\nlarge scale still formed a bridge between ancient and modern\nideas. Sir Henry Maine says that we cannot now hope to understand\nthe good faith of the fiction by which in early times the\nincoming population were assumed to be descended from the same\nstock as the people on whom they were engrafted.[147] But is this\ngood faith more astonishing than the readiness with which a\ncommon language, in spite of the most obvious facts to the\ncontrary, is even now constantly taken as the sign of a common\norigin? Though identity of language, even in the case of whole\npeoples, proves nothing more than contact or neighbourhood, a\nperson's mother-tongue popularly decides his race, and language\nand nationality are regarded almost as synonymous. Genealogical\nfictions, then, are not merely a thing of the past, nor have they\nceased to influence political ideas. The modern theory of {225}\nnationalism vindicates the right of the strongest nationality to\nabsorb the other nationalities living within the same state by a\nmethod of compulsory engraftment, and this can be effected only\nby their accepting its language. But this theory is not so much\nconcerned with language as such, as with language as an emblem of\nnationality. At the bottom of it is the narrow feeling of racial\nintolerance, quite ready however to be appeased by a fiction. The\ndoctrine of nationalism is the spectre of the same political\nprinciple--the principle of a common descent, either real or\nfictitious--on which states were founded and governed when\ncivilisation was in its cradle.\n\n[Footnote 146: Maine, _Ancient Law_, p. 129.]\n\n[Footnote 147: _Ibid._ p. 131.]\n\nLike the smaller units, the archaic State was not only a\npolitical but at the same time a religious community. Over and\nabove all separate cults there was one religion common to all its\ncitizens. In ancient Mexico and Peru it was the religion of the\ndominant people, the worship of the god of war or of the sun; and\nthe sovereigns themselves were regarded as incarnations or\nchildren of this god.[148] In other cases the state religion\narose by a fusion of different cults. The gods of the communities\nwhich united into a state not only continued to receive the\nworship of their old believers, but were elevated to the rank of\nnational deities, and formed together a heavenly commonwealth to\nwhich the earthly commonwealth jointly paid its homage. In this\nway, it seems, the Roman,[149] Egyptian,[150] Assyrian, and\nBabylonian[151] pantheons were recruited; whilst the Greeks went\na step further and, already in prehistoric times, constructed a\nPan-Hellenic Olympus.[152] Sometimes also, as Professor Robertson\nSmith points out, different gods were themselves fused into one,\nas when the mass of the Israelites in their local worship of\nYahveh identified him with the Baalim of the Canaanite high\nplaces, and carried {226} over into his worship the ritual of the\nCanaanite shrines, not deeming that in so doing they were less\ntruly Yahveh-worshippers than before.[153]\n\n[Footnote 148: Ratzel, _op. cit._ ii. 199 _sq._ Markham, _History\nof Peru_, p. 23.]\n\n[Footnote 149: _Cf._ von Jhering, _Geist des r\u00f6mischen Rechts_,\ni. 269.]\n\n[Footnote 150: Wiedemann, _Religion of the Ancient Egyptians_,\np. 148.]\n\n[Footnote 151: M\u00fcrdter-Delitzsch, _Geschichte Babyloniens und\nAssyriens_, p. 24. Robertson Smith, _Religion of the Semites_,\np. 39.]\n\n[Footnote 152: _Cf._ Rohde, _Psyche_, p. 36.]\n\n[Footnote 153: Robertson Smith, _op. cit._ p. 38.]\n\nNobody will deny that the common religion added strength to the\nState, but it seems that its national importance has often been\noverrated. On the one hand, the political fusion between\ndifferent communities took place before the religious fusion and\nwas obviously the cause of it; on the other hand, the mere tie of\na common religion has never proved sufficient to bind together\nneighbouring tribes or peoples so as to form one nation. The\nGreek states had both the same religion and the same language,\nbut nevertheless remained distinct states. Professor Seeley's\nassertion that \"in the East to this day nationality and religion\nare almost convertible terms,\"[154] is very far from the truth.\nWallin, who had exceptional opportunities to study the feelings\nof different Muhammedan nationalities, observes that \"every\nOriental people has a certain national aversion to every other,\nand even the inhabitants of one province to those of another. The\nTurk does not readily tolerate the Arab, nor the Persian, and\nthese feel similarly towards the Turk; the Arab does not get on\nwell with the Persian, nor the Persian with the Arab; the Syrian\ndoes not like the Egyptian, whom he calls inhuman, and the latter\ndoes not willingly associate with the Syrian, whom he calls\nsimple-minded and stupid; and the son of the desert condemns\nboth.\"[155] It sometimes seems as if the national spirit of a\npeople rather influenced its religion than was influenced by it.\nPatriotism has even succeeded in nationalising the greatest enemy\nof nationalities, Christianity, and has well nigh revived the old\nnotion of a national god, whose chief business is to look after\nhis own people and, especially, to fight its battles.\n\n[Footnote 154: Seeley, _Natural Religion_, p. 229.]\n\n[Footnote 155: Wallin, _Anteckningar fr\u00e5n Orienten_, iv. 181 _sq._]\n\nIt is obvious that the various aspects of social development\n{227} which we have now considered have exercised much influence\nupon the altruistic sentiment. The combination of local proximity\nand political unity, the notion of a common descent, and the\nfellowship of a common religion, tend to engender friendly\nfeelings between the members of each respective group. Hence,\nwhen the political unit grew larger, when the idea of kinship\ndeveloped into that of racial affinity, and when the same\nreligion became common to all the citizens of the State, or, as\nhappened in several cases, extended beyond the limits of any\nparticular country or nation, the altruistic sentiment underwent\na corresponding expansion--unless, of course, it was checked by\nsome rival influence. The increasing coherence of the political\naggregate, again, added to the strength of this sentiment; and so\ndid the antagonism towards foreign communities and the natural\nantipathy or hatred to their members. As people like that to\nwhich they are used or which is their own, they dislike that\nwhich is strange or unfamiliar. Among ourselves we notice this\nparticularly in children[156] and uneducated persons, whose anger\nmay be aroused by the sight of a black skin or an oriental dress\nor the sounds of a strange language. Antipathies of this kind\nhave directly influenced the moral valuation of conduct towards\nforeigners; but at the same time they have also strengthened the\nfeelings of mutual goodwill between tribesmen or compatriots. For\nlikes and dislikes are increased by the contrast; to hate a thing\nmakes us better love its opposite. So also the competition and\nenmity which prevail between different communities tend within\neach community to intensify its members' devotion to the common\ngoal and their friendly feelings towards one another.\n\n[Footnote 156: Compayr\u00e9, _op. cit._ p. 100:--\"Tout ce qui est\ninattendu, impr\u00e9vu, est insupportable \u00e0 l'enfant, et provoque\nsoit la peur, soit plus tard la col\u00e8re. J'ai vu un de mes fils, \u00e0\nquatre ans et demi, entrer dans de v\u00e9ritables rages, toutes les\nfois que je lui parlais dans le patois de mon pays.\"]\n\nBut the altruistic sentiment has not necessarily reference only\nto individuals belonging to the same social unit. {228}\nGregarious animals may be kindly disposed to any member of their\nspecies which is not an object of their anger or their fear.\nSavages have shown themselves capable of tender feelings towards\nsuffering and harmless strangers.[157] The sensibility of little\nchildren sometimes goes beyond the circle of the family; Madame\nManac\u00e9ine tells us of a girl two years old who, in the Zoological\nGardens at St. Petersburg, began to cry bitterly when she saw an\nelephant walking over the keeper's body, although the other\nspectators were quietly watching the trick.[158] In mankind\naltruism has been narrowed by social isolation, by differences in\nrace, language, habits, and customs, by enmity and suspicion. But\nincreased intercourse has gradually led to conditions favourable\nto its expansion. As Buckle remarks, ignorance is the most\npowerful of all the causes of national hatred; \"when you increase\nthe contact, you remove the ignorance, and thus you diminish the\nhatred.\"[159] People of different nationalities feel that in\nspite of all dissimilarities between them there is much that they\nhave in common; and frequent intercourse makes the differences\nless marked, or obliterates many of them altogether. There can be\nno doubt that this process will go on in the future. And equally\ncertain it is that similar causes will produce similar\neffects--that altruism will continue to expand, and that the\nnotion of a human brotherhood will receive more support from the\nactual feelings of mankind than it does at present.\n\n[Footnote 157: See _supra_, i. 570-572, 581.]\n\n[Footnote 158: Manac\u00e9ine, _Le surmenage mental dans la\ncivilisation moderne_, p. 248. See also Compayr\u00e9, _op. cit._\np. 323.]\n\n[Footnote 159: Buckle, _History of Civilization in England_,\ni. 222.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXV\n\nSUICIDE\n\n\nIN previous chapters we have discussed the moral valuation of\nacts, forbearances, and omissions, which directly concern the\ninterests of other men; we shall now proceed to consider moral\nideas regarding such modes of conduct as chiefly concern a man's\nown welfare. Among these we notice, in the first place, acts\naffecting his existence.\n\nSuicide, or intentional self-destruction, has often been\nrepresented as a fruit of a higher civilisation; Dr. Steinmetz,\non the other hand, in his essay on 'Suicide among Primitive\nPeoples,' thinks it probable that \"there is a greater propensity\nto suicide among savage than among civilised peoples.\"[1] The\nformer view is obviously erroneous; the latter probably holds\ngood of certain savages as compared with certain peoples of\nculture, but cannot claim general validity.\n\n[Footnote 1: Steinmetz, 'Suicide among Primitive Peoples,' in\n_American Anthropologist_, vii. 60.]\n\nAmong several uncivilised races suicide is said to be unknown.[2]\nTo these belong some of the lower savages--the Yahgans of Tierra\ndel Fuego,[3] the Andaman Islanders,[4] {230} and various\nAustralian tribes;[5] whilst as regards most other tribes at\nabout the same stage of culture information seems to be wanting.\nOf the natives in Western and Central Australia Sir G. Grey\nwrites, \"Whenever I have interrogated them on this point, they\nhave invariably laughed at me, and treated my question as a\njoke.\"[6] When a Caroline Islander was told of suicides committed\nby Europeans, he thought that he had not grasped what was said to\nhim, as he never in his life had heard of anything so\nridiculous.[7] The K\u00e1firs of the Hindu-Kush, though they have no\nintense fear of death, cannot understand suicide; \"the idea of a\nman killing himself strikes them as inexplicable.\"[8]\n\n[Footnote 2: Paulitschke, _Ethnographie Nord-ost-Afrikas_, p. 205\n(Danakil and Galla). Munzinger, _Ostafrikanische Studien_, p. 532\n(Barea and Kun\u00e1ma). New, _Life, Wanderings, and Labours in\nEastern Africa_, p. 99 (Wanika). Felkin, 'Notes on the For Tribe\nof Central Africa,' in _Proceed. Roy. Soc. Edinburgh_, xiii. 231.\nLumholtz (_Unknown Mexico_, i. 243) thinks it is doubtful whether\na pagan Tarahumare ever killed himself.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Bridge, in _South American Missionary Magazine_,\nxiii. 211.]\n\n[Footnote 4: Man, _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xii. 111.]\n\n[Footnote 5: Grey, _Expeditions of Discovery in North-West and\nWestern Australia_, ii. 248. Curr, _Recollections of Squatting in\nVictoria_, p. 277 (Bangerang). Among the tribes of Western\nVictoria described by Mr. Dawson (_Australian Aborigines_, p. 62)\nsuicide is not unknown, though it is uncommon; \"if a native\nwishes to die, and cannot get any one to kill him, he will\nsometimes put himself in the way of a venomous snake, that he may\nbe bitten by it.\"]\n\n[Footnote 6: Grey, _op. cit._ ii. 248.]\n\n[Footnote 7: von Kotzebue, _Voyage of Discovery into the South\nSea_, iii. 195.]\n\n[Footnote 8: Scott Robertson, _K\u00e1firs of the Hindu-Kush_, p. 381.]\n\nAmong many savages and barbarians suicide is stated to be very\nrare,[9] or to occur only occasionally;[10] whereas {231} among\nothers it is represented as either common or extremely\nprevalent.[11] Of the Kamchadales we are told that the least\napprehension of danger drives them to despair, and that they fly\nto suicide as a relief, not only from present, but even from\nimaginary evil; \"not only those who are confined for some\noffence, but such as are discontented with their lot, prefer a\nvoluntary death to an uneasy life, and the pains of disease.\"[12]\nAmong the Hos, an Indian hill tribe, suicide is reported to be so\nfrightfully prevalent as to afford no parallel in any known\ncountry:--\"If a girl appears mortified by anything that has been\nsaid, it is not safe to let her go away till she is soothed. A\nreflection on a man's honesty or veracity may be sufficient to\nsend him to self-destruction. In a recent case, a young woman\nattempted to poison herself because her uncle would not partake\nof the food she had cooked for him.\"[13] Among the Karens of\nBurma suicide is likewise very common where Christianity has not\nbeen introduced. If a man has some incurable or painful disease,\nhe says in a matter-of-fact way that he will hang himself, and he\ndoes as he says; if a girl's parents compel her to marry the man\nshe does not love, she hangs herself; wives sometimes hang\nthemselves through jealousy, sometimes because they quarrel with\ntheir husbands, and sometimes out of mere {232} chagrin, because\nthey are subject to depreciating comparisons; and it is a\nfavourite threat with a wife or daughter, when not allowed to\nhave her own way, that she will hang herself.[14] Among some\nuncivilised peoples suicide is frequently practised by women,\nthough rarely by men.[15]\n\n[Footnote 9: Nansen, _Eskimo Life_, p. 267 (Greenlanders).\nMurdoch, 'Ethnol. Results of the Point Barrow Expedition,' in\n_Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ ix. 41 (Point Barrow Eskimo), von Siebold,\n_Die Aino auf der Insel Yesso_, p. 35. von Stenin, 'Die Kirgisen\ndes Kreises Saissansk im Gebiete von Ssemipalatinsk,' in\n_Globus_, lxix. 230. Beltrame, _Il Fiume Bianco_, p. 51 (Arabs).\nFelkin, 'Waganda Tribe of Central Africa,' in _Proceed. Roy. Soc.\nEdinburgh_, xiii. 723. Schwarz, quoted by Steinmetz,\n_Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_, p. 24 (Bakwiri). _Ibid._ p. 52 (Banaka and\nBapuku). Wandrer, _ibid._ p. 325 (Hottentots). Fritsch, _Die\nEingeborenen S\u00fcd-Afrika's_, p. 221 (Bantu race). Sorge, in\nSteinmetz, _Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_, p. 421 (Nissan Islanders in the\nBismarck Archipelago). Kubary, 'Die Verbrechen und das\nStrafverfahren auf den Pelau-Inseln,' in _Original-Mittheilungen\naus der ethnol. Abtheil. d. k\u00f6nigl. Museen zu Berlin_, i. 78\n(Pelew Islanders). Among the Malays suicide is reported to be\nextremely rare (Brooke, _Ten Years in Sar\u00e1wak_, i. 56; Ellis,\n'The Amok of the Malays,' in _Journal of Mental Science_, xxxix.\n331); but Dr. Gilmore Ellis has been told by many Malays that\nthey consider Amok a kind of suicide. If a man wishes to die, he\n\"amoks\" in the hope of being killed, rather than kills himself,\nsuicide being a most heinous sin according to the ethics of\nMuhammedanism (_ibid._ p. 331). In Siam suicide is rare (Bowring,\n_Siam_, i. 106). Of the Western Islanders of Torres Straits Dr.\nHaddon says (in _Reports of the Cambridge Anthrop. Expedition to\nTorres Straits_, v. 278) that he does not remember to have heard\nof a case of suicide in real life, though there are some\ninstances of it in their folk-tales.]\n\n[Footnote 10: Comte, quoted by Mouhot, _Travels in the Central\nParts of Indo-China_, ii. 27 _sq._ (Bannavs in Cambodia). Kloss,\n_In the Andamans and Nicobars_, p. 316 (Nicobarese). Among the\nBakongo cases of suicide occur, \"although much less frequently\nthan in civilised countries\" (Ward, _Five Years with the Congo\nCannibals_, p. 45).]\n\n[Footnote 11: Veniaminof, quoted by Petroff, _Report on Alaska_,\np. 158 (Atkha Aleuts). Steller, _Beschreibung von Kamtschatka_,\np. 293 _sq._, Krasheninnikoff, _History of Kamschatka_, pp. 176,\n200. Georgi, _Russia_, iii. 133 _sq._ (Kamchadales), 184\n(Chukchi), 205 (Aleuts). Brooke, _op. cit._ i. 55 (Sea Dyaks).\nWilliams and Calvert, _Fiji_, p. 106. Turner, _Samoa_, p. 305;\nTregear, 'Niue,' in _Jour. Polynesian Soc._ ii. 14; Thomson,\n_Savage Island_, p. 109; Hood, _Cruise in the Western Pacific_,\np. 22 (Savage Islanders). Dieffenbach, _Travels in New Zealand_,\nii. 111 _sq._; Collins, _English Colony in New South Wales_, i.\n524 (Maoris). Reade, _Savage Africa_, p. 553 _sq._; _Idem_,\nquoted by Darwin, _Descent of Man_, p. 117, n. 33 (West African\nNegroes). Monrad, _Skildring af Guinea-Kysten_, p. 23. Decle,\n_Three Years in Savage Africa_, p. 74 (Barotse). In Tana, of the\nNew Hebrides (Gray, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxviii. 132) and Nias\n(Rosenberg, _Der malayische Archipel_, p. 146) suicides are said\nto be not infrequent.]\n\n[Footnote 12: Georgi, _op. cit._ iii. 133 _sq._ _Cf._\nKrasheninnikoff, _op. cit._ p. 176.]\n\n[Footnote 13: Tickell, 'Memoir on the Hod\u00e9sum,' in _Jour. Asiatic\nSoc. Bengal_, ix. 807. Dalton, _Descriptive Ethnology of Bengal_,\np. 206.]\n\n[Footnote 14: Mason, 'Dwellings, &c., of the Karens,' in _Jour.\nAsiatic Soc. Bengal_, xxxvii. pt. ii. 141.]\n\n[Footnote 15: Keating, _Expedition to the Source of St. Peter's\nRiver_, i. 394 (Dacotahs); ii. 171 _sq._ (Chippewas). Bradbury,\n_Travels in the Interior of America_, p. 87 (Dacotahs). Brooke\nLow, quoted by Ling Roth, _Natives of Sarawak_, i. 117 (Sea\nDyaks). Munzinger, _Die Sitten und das Recht der Bogos_, p. 93.]\n\nThe causes which, among savages, lead to suicide are\nmanifold:--disappointed love or jealousy;[16] illness[17] or old\nage;[18] grief over the death of a child,[19] a husband,[20] or a\n{233} wife;[21] fear of punishment;[22] slavery[23] or brutal\ntreatment by a husband;[24] remorse,[25] shame or wounded pride,\nanger or revenge.[26] In various cases an offended person kills\nhimself for the express purpose of taking revenge upon the\noffender.[27] Thus among the Tshi-speaking peoples of the Gold\nCoast, \"should a person commit suicide, and before so doing\nattribute the act to the conduct of another person, that other\nperson is required by native law to undergo a like fate. The\npractice is termed killing oneself upon the head of another, and\nthe person whose conduct is supposed to have driven the suicide\nto commit the rash act is visited with a death of an exactly\nsimilar nature\"--unless, indeed, the family of the suicide be\npacified with a money compensation.[28] With reference to the\nSavage Islanders, who especially in heathen {234} times were much\naddicted to suicide, we are told that, \"like angry children, they\nare tempted to avenge themselves by picturing the trouble that\nthey will bring upon the friends who have offended them.\"[29]\nAmong the Thlinkets an offended person who is unable to take\nrevenge in any other way commits suicide in order to expose the\nperson who gave the offence to the vengeance of his surviving\nrelatives and friends.[30] Among the Chuvashes it was formerly\nthe custom for enraged persons to hang themselves at the doors of\ntheir enemies.[31] A similar method of taking revenge is still\nnot infrequently resorted to by the Votyaks, who believe that the\nghost of the deceased will then persecute the offender.[32]\nSometimes a suicide has the character of a human sacrifice.[33]\nIn the times of epidemics or great calamities the Chukchi\nsacrifice their own lives in order to appease evil spirits and\nthe souls of departed relatives.[34] Among some savages it is\ncommon for a woman, especially if married to a man of importance,\nto commit suicide on the death of her husband,[35] or to demand\nto be buried with him;[36] and many Brazilian Indians killed\nthemselves on the graves of their chiefs.[37]\n\n[Footnote 16: Lasch, 'Der Selbstmord aus erotischen Motiven bei\nden primitiven V\u00f6lkern,' in _Zeitschrift f\u00fcr Socialwissenschaft_,\nii. 579 _sqq._ Westermarck, _History of Human Marriage_, p. 503.\nKeating, _op. cit._ ii. 172 (Chippewas). Eastman, _Dacotah_,\npp. 89 _sqq._, 168 _sq._; Dodge, _Our Wild Indians_, p. 321 _sq._\n(Dacotahs). Turner, 'Ethnology of the Ungava District, Hudson Bay\nTerritory,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ xi. 187 (Koksoagmyut).\nMason, in _Jour. Asiatic Soc. Bengal_, xxxvii. pt. ii. 141\n(Karens). Brooke Low, quoted by Ling Roth, _Natives of Sarawak_,\ni. 115 (Sea Dyaks). Kubary, 'Religion der Pelauer,' in Bastian,\n_Allerlei aus Volks- und Menschenkunde_, i. 3 (Pelew Islanders).\nSenfft, in Steinmetz, _Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_, p. 452 (Marshall\nIslanders). Codrington, _Melanesians_, p. 243 _sq._ (natives of\nthe Banks' Islands and Northern New Hebrides). Waitz,\n_Anthropologie der Naturv\u00f6lker_, vi. 115; Malone, _Three Years'\nCruise in the Australasian Colonies_, p. 72 _sq._ (Maoris).\nReade, _Savage Africa_, p. 554 (West African Negroes). Munzinger,\n_Die Sitten und das Recht der Bogos_, p. 93 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 17: Dodge, _op. cit._ p. 321 _sq._ (North American\nIndians) Holm, 'Ethnologisk Skizze af Angmagsalikerne,' in\n_Meddelelser om Gr\u00f6nland_, x. 181 (Angmagsaliks of Eastern\nGreenland). Georgi, _op. cit._ iii. 134 (Kamchadales). Mason, in\n_Jour. Asiatic Soc. Bengal_, xxxvii. pt. ii. 141 (Karens). Gray,\nin _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxviii. 132 (natives of Tana, New\nHebrides). Sartori, 'Die Sitte der Alten- und Krankent\u00f6tung,' in\n_Globus_, lxvii. 109 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 18: Perrin du Lac, _Voyage dans les deux Louisianes_,\np. 346. Nansen, _First Crossing of Greenland_, ii. 331; _Idem_,\n_Eskimo Life_, pp. 170, 267 (Greenlanders). Steller,\n_Beschreibung von Kamtschatka_, p. 294. Wilkes, _U.S. Exploring\nExpedition_, iii. 96; Hale, _U.S. Exploring Expedition. Vol. VI.\nEthnography and Philology_, p. 65 (Fijians). Diodorus Siculus,\n_Bibliotheca historica_, iii. 33.5 (Troglodytes). Pomponius Mela,\n_De situ orbis_, iii. 7 (Seres). Hartknoch, _Alt- und Neues\nPreussen_, i. 181 (ancient Prussians). Mareschalcus, _Annales\nHerulorum ac Vandalorum_, i. 8 (_Monumenta inedita rerum\nGermanicarum_, i. 191); Procopius, _De bello Gothico_, ii. 14\n(Heruli). Maurer, _Die Bekehrung des Norwegischen Stammes zum\nChristenthume_, ii. 79, n. 48 (ancient Scandinavians).]\n\n[Footnote 19: Veniaminof, quoted by Petroff, _op. cit._ p. 158\n(Atkha Aleuts). Keating, _op. cit._ ii. 172 (Chippewas). Colenso,\n_Maori Races_, pp. 46, 57; Dieffenbach, _op. cit._ ii. 112\n(Maoris).]\n\n[Footnote 20: Veniaminof, quoted by Petroff, _op. cit._ p. 158\n(Atkha Aleuts). Haddon, in _Rep. Cambridge Anthr. Exped. to\nTorres Straits_, v. 17 (Western Islanders, according to a\nKauralaig folk-tale). Colenso, _op. cit._ pp. 46, 57;\nDieffenbach, _op. cit._ ii. 112 (Maoris).]\n\n[Footnote 21: Veniaminof, quoted by Petroff, _op. cit._ p. 158\n(Atkha Aleuts). Fawcett, _Saoras_, p. 17. Dieffenbach, _op. cit._\nii. 112 (Maoris).]\n\n[Footnote 22: Steller, _Beschreibung von Kamtschatka_, p. 293.\nDieffenbach, _op. cit._ ii. 112 (Maoris).]\n\n[Footnote 23: Modigliani, _Viaggio a N\u00edas_, p. 473. Decle, _op.\ncit._ p. 74 (Barotse). Monrad, _op. cit._ p. 25 (Negroes of\nAccra). Donne, _Biathanatos_, p. 56 (American Indians).]\n\n[Footnote 24: Wied-Neuwied, _Travels in the Interior of North\nAmerica_, p. 349 (Mandans).]\n\n[Footnote 25: Turner, in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ xi. 187\n(Koksoagmyut). Mr. Dawson (_Australian Aborigines_, p. 62 _sq._)\ntells us of a native of Western Victoria who decided to commit\nsuicide because, being intoxicated, he had killed his wife, and\nwas so sorry for it. He besought the tribe to kill him, and\nseeing his determination to starve himself to death, his friends\nat last sent for the tribal executioner, who pushed a spear\nthrough him.]\n\n[Footnote 26: Veniaminof, quoted by Petroff, _op. cit._ p. 158\n(Atkha Aleuts). Keating, _op. cit._ ii. 171 (Chippewas). Dalton,\n_op. cit._ p. 206; Jickell, in _Jour. Asiatic Soc. Bengal_, ix.\n807 (Hos). Colquhoun, _Amongst the Shans_, p. 76 _sq._ (Lethtas).\nMac Mahon, _Far Cathay_, p. 241 (Tarus, one of the Chino-Burmese\nborder tribes). Brooke, _op. cit._ i. 55 (Sea Dyaks). Chalmers,\n_Pioneer Life and Work in New Guinea_, p. 227 (a woman at Port\nMoresby; Mr. Abel [_Savage Life in New Guinea_, p. 102] speaks of\na New Guinea woman who was so annoyed because her old village\nfriends had not visited her during her illness that she attempted\nto commit suicide). Codrington, _op. cit._ p. 243 _sq._ (natives\nof the Banks' Islands and Northern New Hebrides). Williams and\nCalvert, _op. cit._ p. 106 (Fijians). Tregear, in _Jour.\nPolynesian Soc._ ii. 14 (Savage Islanders). Dieffenbach, _op.\ncit._ ii. 111 _sq._; Collins, _op. cit._ i. 524; Angas, _Savage\nLife in Australia and New Zealand_, ii. 45; Colenso, _op. cit._\np. 56 _sq._ (Maoris). Ward, _Five Years with the Congo\nCannibals_, p. 45 (Bakongo). Lasch, 'Besitzen die Naturv\u00f6lker ein\npers\u00f6nliches Ehrgef\u00fchl?' in _Zeitschr. f. Socialwissenschaft_,\niii. 837 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 27: See Lasch, 'Rache als Selbstmordmotiv,' in\n_Globus_, lxxiv. 37 _sqq._; Steinmetz, 'Gli antichi scongiuri\ngiuridici contro i creditori,' in _Rivista italiana di\nsociologia_, ii. 49 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 28: Ellis, _Tshi-speaking Peoples of the Gold Coast_,\np. 302. The same custom is mentioned by Monrad (_op. cit._ p. 23\n_sq._), Bowdich (_Mission to Ashantee_, pp. 256, 257, 259 n. [double\ndagger]), and Reade (_Savage Africa_, p. 554).]\n\n[Footnote 29: Thomson, _Savage Island_, p. 109.]\n\n[Footnote 30: Krause, _Die Tlinkit-Indianer_, p. 222.]\n\n[Footnote 31: Lebedew, 'Die simbirskischen Tschuwaschen,' in\nErman's _Archiv f\u00fcr wissenschaftliche Kunde von Russland_, ix.\n586 n. **]\n\n[Footnote 32: Buch, 'Die Wotjaken,' in _Acta Soc. Scient.\nFennic\u00e6_, xii. 611 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 33: See Lasch, 'Religi\u00f6ser Selbstmord und seine\nBeziehung zum Menschenopfer.' in _Globus_, lxxv. 69 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 34: Skrzyncki, 'Der Selbstmord bei den Tschuktschen,'\nin _Am Ur-Quell_, v. 207 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 35: Ashe, _Two Kings of Uganda_, p. 342 (Wahuma).\nJohnston, _Uganda Protectorate_, ii. 610 (Bairo). Junghuhn, _Die\nBattal\u00e4nder auf Sumatra_, ii. 340 (natives of Bali and Lombok).]\n\n[Footnote 36: Westermarck, _History of Human Marriage_, p. 125\n(Fijians). Codrington, _op. cit._ p. 289 (natives of Aurora\nIsland, New Hebrides).]\n\n[Footnote 37: Dorman, _Origin of Primitive Superstitions_, p.\n211. _Cf._ _ibid._ p. 209. Of the Niger Delta tribes M. le Comte\nde Cardi writes (in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxix. 55):--\"On the\ndeportation of a king or a chief by the British or other European\ngovernment for some offence I have seen the wives of the deported\nman throw themselves into the river and fight like mad women with\nthe people who went to their rescue; I have also seen some of the\nmale retainers both free and slaves of a deported chief attempt\ntheir own lives at the moment when the vessel carrying away their\nchief disappeared from their sight.\"]\n\nIn various other cases, besides the voluntary sacrifices of\nwidows or slaves, the suicides of savages are connected with\ntheir notions of a future life.[38] The belief in the new {235}\nhuman birth of the departed soul has led West African negroes to\ntake their own lives when in distant slavery, that they may\nawaken in their native land.[39] Among the Chukchi there are\npersons who kill themselves for the purpose of effecting an\nearlier reunion with their deceased relatives.[40] Among the\nSamoyedes it happens that a young girl who is sold to an old man\nstrangles herself in the hope of getting a more suitable\nbridegroom in the other world.[41] We are told that the\nKamchadales inflict death on themselves with the utmost coolness\nbecause they maintain that \"the future life is a continuation of\nthe present, but much better and more perfect, where they expect\nto have all their desires more completely satisfied than\nhere.\"[42] The suicides of old people, again, are in some cases\ndue to the belief that a man enters into the other world in the\nsame condition in which he left this one, and that it consequently\nis best for him to die before he grows too old and feeble.[43]\n\n[Footnote 38: _Cf._ Steinmetz, in _American Anthropologist_, vii.\n60; Vierkandt, _Naturv\u00f6lker und Kulturv\u00f6lker_, p. 284; Lasch, in\n_Zeitschrift f\u00fcr Socialwissenschaft_, ii. 585.]\n\n[Footnote 39: Tylor, _Primitive Culture_, ii. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 40: Skrzyncki, in _Am Ur-Quell_, v. 207.]\n\n[Footnote 41: von Struve, 'Die Samojeden im Norden von Sibirien,'\nin _Ausland_, 1880, p. 777.]\n\n[Footnote 42:  Georgi, _op. cit._ iii. 265. _Cf._ Steller,\n_Beschreibung von Kamtschatka_, p. 294.]\n\n[Footnote 43: Hale, _op. cit._ p. 65 (Fijians). _Cf._ _supra_,\ni. 390.]\n\nThe notions of savages concerning life after death also influence\ntheir moral valuation of suicide. Where men are supposed to\nrequire wives not only during their lifetime, but after their\ndeath, it may be a praiseworthy thing, or even a duty, for a\nwidow to accompany her husband to the land of souls. According to\nFijian beliefs, the woman who at the funeral of her husband met\ndeath with the greatest devotedness would become the favourite\nwife in the abode of spirits, whereas a widow who did not permit\nherself to be killed was considered an adulteress.[44] Among the\nCentral African Bairo those women who refrained from destroying\nthemselves over their husbands' graves were regarded as\noutcasts.[45] On the Gold Coast a man of low rank who has married\none of the king's sisters is {236} expected to make away with\nhimself when his wife dies, or upon the death of an only male\nchild; and \"should he outrage native custom and neglect to do so,\na hint is conveyed to him that he will be put to death, which\nusually produces the desired effect.\"[46] The customary suicides\nof the Chukchi are solemnly performed in the presence and with\nthe assistance of relatives and neighbours.[47] The Samoyedes\nmaintain that suicide by strangulation \"is pleasing to God, who\nlooks upon it as a voluntary sacrifice, which deserves\nreward.\"[48] The opinion of the Kamchadales that it is \"allowable\nand praiseworthy\" for a man to take his own life,[49] was\nprobably connected with their optimistic notions about their fate\nafter death. And that the habitual suicides of old persons have\nthe sanction of public opinion is particularly obvious where they\nmay choose between killing themselves and being killed.[50]\n\n[Footnote 44: Westermarck, _op. cit._ p. 125 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 45: Johnston, _Uganda Protectorate_, i. 610.]\n\n[Footnote 46: Ellis, _Tshi-speaking Peoples of the Gold Coast_,\np. 287.]\n\n[Footnote 47: Skrzyncki, in _Am Ur-Quell_, v. 208.]\n\n[Footnote 48: von Struve, in _Ausland_, 1880, p. 777.]\n\n[Footnote 49: Steller, _op. cit._ p. 269. _Cf._ Krasheninnikoff,\n_op. cit._ p. 204.]\n\n[Footnote 50: _Supra_, i. 389 _sq._ (Fijians). Nansen, _First\nCrossing of Greenland_, ii. 331. Steller, _op. cit._ p. 294\n(Kamchadales).]\n\nWhilst in some cases suicide opens the door to a happy land\nbeyond the grave, it in other cases entails consequences of a\nvery different kind. The Omahas believe that a self-murderer\nceases to exist.[51] According to the Thompson Indians in British\nColumbia, \"the souls of people who commit suicide do not go to\nthe land of souls. The shamans declare they never saw such people\nthere; and some say that they have looked for the souls of such\npeople, but could not find their tracks. Some shamans say they\ncannot locate the place where the souls of suicides go, but think\nthey must be lost, because they seem to disappear altogether.\nOthers say that these souls die, and cease to exist. Still others\nclaim that the souls never leave the earth, but wander around\naimlessly.\"[52] So also the Jakuts believe that the ghost of a\nself-murderer never {237} comes to rest.[53] Sometimes the fate\nof suicides after death is represented as a punishment which they\nsuffer for their deed. Thus the Dacotahs, among whom women not\ninfrequently put an end to their existence by hanging themselves,\nare of opinion that suicide is displeasing to the \"Father of\nLife,\" and will be punished in the land of spirits by the ghost\nbeing doomed for ever to drag the tree on which the person hanged\nherself; hence the women always suspend themselves to as small a\ntree as can possibly sustain their weight.[54] The Pah\u00e1rias of\nthe R\u00e1jmahal Hills, in India, say that \"suicide is a crime in\nGod's eyes,\" and that \"the soul of one who so offends shall not\nbe admitted into heaven, but must hover eternally as a ghost\nbetween heaven and earth,\"[55] The Kayans of Borneo maintain that\nself-murderers are sent to a place called _Tan Tekkan_, where\nthey will be very poor and wretched, subsisting on leaves, roots,\nor anything they can pick up in the forests, and being easily\ndistinguished by their miserable appearance.[56] According to\nDyak beliefs, they go to a special place, where those who have\ndrowned themselves must thenceforth live up to their waists in\nwater, and those who have poisoned themselves must live in houses\nbuilt of poisonous woods and surrounded by noxious plants, the\nexhalations of which are painful to the spirits.[57] In other\ninstances we are simply told that the souls of suicides, together\nwith those of persons who have been killed in war,[58] or who\nhave died a violent death,[59] are not permitted to live with the\nrest of the souls, to whom their presence would cause uneasiness.\nAmong the Hidatsa Indians some people say that the ghosts of men\n{238} who have made away with themselves occupy a separate part\nof the village of the dead, but that their condition in no other\nwise differs from that of the other ghosts.[60]\n\n[Footnote 51: La Flesche, 'Death and Funeral Customs among the\nOmahas,' in _Jour. of American Folk-Lore_, ii. 11.]\n\n[Footnote 52: Teit, 'Thompson Indians of British Columbia,' in\n_Memoirs of the American Museum of Natural History_,\nAnthropology, i. 358 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 53: Sumner, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxxi. 101.]\n\n[Footnote 54: Bradbury, _Travels in the Interior of America_, p.\n89. _Cf._ Keating, _op. cit._ i. 394.]\n\n[Footnote 55: Dalton, _Descriptive Ethnology of Bengal_, p. 268.\n_Cf._ Sherwill, 'Tour through the R\u00e1jmahal Hills,' in _Jour.\nAsiatic Soc. Bengal_, xx. 556.]\n\n[Footnote 56: Hose, 'Journey up the Baram River to Mount Dulit\nand the Highlands of Borneo,' in _Geographical Journal_, i. 199.]\n\n[Footnote 57: Wilken, _Het animisme bij de volken van den\nIndischen Archipel_, i. 44.]\n\n[Footnote 58: Brebeuf, 'Relation de ce qui s'est pass\u00e9 dans le\npays des Hurons,' in _Relations des J\u00e9suites_, 1636, p. 104 _sq._\nHewitt, 'The Iroquoian Concept of the Soul,' in _Jour. of\nAmerican Folk-Lore_, viii. 109.]\n\n[Footnote 59: Steinmetz, in _American Anthropologist_, vii. 58\n(Niase).]\n\n[Footnote 60: Matthews, _Ethnography and Philology of the Hidatsa\nIndians_, p. 49.]\n\nIt is, however, hard to believe that the fate of the\nself-murderer, whether it be annihilation, a vagrant existence on\nearth, or separation in the other world, was originally meant as\na punishment; for a similar lot is assigned to the souls of\npersons who have been drowned,[61] or who have died by accident\nor violence.[62] It seems that the suicide's future state is in\nthe first place supposed to depend upon the treatment of his\ncorpse. Frequently he is denied burial, or at least the ordinary\nfuneral rites,[63] and this may give rise to the notion that his\nsoul never comes to rest or, possibly, even ceases to exist. Or\nhe is buried by himself, apart from the other dead,[64] in which\ncase his soul must naturally remain equally isolated. Among the\nAlabama Indians, for instance, \"when a man kills himself, either\nin despair or in a sickness, he is deprived of burial, and thrown\ninto the river.\"[65] In Dahomey \"the body of any person\ncommitting suicide is not allowed to be buried, but thrown out\ninto the fields to be devoured by wild beasts.\"[66] Among the\nFantis of the Gold Coast \"il y a des places r\u00e9serv\u00e9es aux\nsuicides et \u00e0 ceux qui sont morts de la petite v\u00e9role. Ils sont\nenterr\u00e9s \u00e0 l'\u00e9cart loin de toute {239} habitation et de tout\nchemin public.\"[67] In the Pelew Islands a self-murderer is\nburied not with his own deceased relatives, but in the place\nwhere he ended his life, as are also the corpses of those who\nfall in war.[68] Among the Bannavs of Cambodia \"anyone who\nperishes by his own hand is buried in a corner of the forest far\nfrom the graves of his brethren.\"[69] Among the Sea Dyaks \"those\nwho commit suicide are buried in different places from others, as\nit is supposed that they will not be allowed to mix in the\nseven-storied heaven with such of their fellow-country men as\ncome by their death in a natural manner or from the influence of\nthe spirits.\"[70] The motive for thus treating self-murderers'\nbodies is superstitious fear. Their ghosts, as the ghosts of\npersons who have died by any other violent means or by accident,\nare supposed to be particularly malevolent,[71] owing to their\nunnatural mode of death[72] or to the desperate or angry state of\nmind in which they left this life. If they are not buried at all,\nor if they are buried in the spot where they died or in a\nseparate place, that is either because nobody dares to interfere\nwith them, or in order to prevent them from mixing with the other\ndead. So also murdered persons are sometimes left unburied,[73]\nand people who are supposed to have been killed by evil spirits\nare buried apart;[74] whilst those struck with lightning are\neither denied interment,[75] or buried where they fell and in the\nposition in which they died.[76] We sometimes hear of a\nconnection between the way in which a suicide's body is treated\nand the moral opinion as regards his deed. Among the Alabama\nIndians his corpse {240} is said to be thrown into the river\n\"because he is looked upon as a coward\";[77] and of the Ossetes\nM. Kovalewsky states that they bury suicides far away from other\ndead persons because they regard their act as sinful.[78] But we\nmay be sure that moral condemnation is not the original cause of\nthese practices.\n\n[Footnote 61: Teit, _loc. cit._ p. 359 (Thompson Indians).]\n\n[Footnote 62: Soppitt, _Kuki-Lushai Tribes_, p. 12. Anderson,\n_Mandalay to Momien_, p. 146 (Kakhyens). M\u00fcller, _Geschichte der\nAmerikanischen Urreligionen_, p. 287 (Brazilian Indians).\n_Supra_, ii. 237. The Central Eskimo believe that all who die by\naccident or by violence, and women who die in childbirth, are\ntaken to the upper, happier world (Boas, 'Central Eskimo,' in\n_Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ vi. 590). According to the belief of the\nBehring Strait Eskimo, the shades of shamans, or persons who die\nby accident, violence, or starvation, go to a land of plenty in\nthe sky, where there is light, food, and water in abundance,\nwhereas the shades of people who die from natural causes go to\nthe underground land of the dead (Nelson, 'Eskimo about Bering\nStrait,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ xviii. 423).]\n\n[Footnote 63: See Lasch, 'Die Behandlung der Leiche des\nSelbstmorders,' in _Globus_, lxxvi. 63 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 64: _Ibid._ p. 65.]\n\n[Footnote 65: Bossu, _Travels through Louisiana_, i. 258.]\n\n[Footnote 66: M'Leod, _Voyage to Africa_, p. 48 _sq._ I am\nindebted to Mr. N. W. Thomas for drawing my attention to this and\na few other statements in the present chapter.]\n\n[Footnote 67: Gallaud, 'A la C\u00f4te d'Or,' in _Les missions\ncatholiques_, xxv. 347.]\n\n[Footnote 68: Kubary, in _Original-Mittheil. aus der ethnol.\nAbtheil. d. k\u00f6nigl. Museen zu Berlin_, i. 78.]\n\n[Footnote 69: Comte, quoted by Mouhot, _op. cit._ ii. 28. See\nalso 'Das Volk der Bannar,' in _Mittheil. d. Geogr. Ges. zu\nJena_, iii. 9.]\n\n[Footnote 70: St. John, _Life in the Forests of the Far East_,\ni. 69.]\n\n[Footnote 71: Lasch, in _Globus_, lxxvi. 65. _Cf._ Liebrecht,\n_Zur Volkskunde_, p. 414 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 72: Lippert, _Der Seelencult_, p. 11. Kubary, in\n_Original-Mittheil. aus der ethnol. Abtheil. d. k\u00f6nigl. Museen zu\nBerlin_, i. 78.]\n\n[Footnote 73: Rosenberg, _Der malayische Archipel_, p. 461\n(Papuans of Dorey).]\n\n[Footnote 74: Hodson, 'Native Tribes of Manipur,' in _Jour.\nAnthr. Inst._ xxxi. 305 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 75: Burton, _Mission to Gelele_, ii. 142 _sq._\n(Dahomans).]\n\n[Footnote 76: La Flesche, in _Jour. American Folk-Lore_, ii. 11\n(Omahas).]\n\n[Footnote 77: Bossu, _op. cit._ i. 258.]\n\n[Footnote 78: Kovalewsky, _Coutume contemporaine et loi\nancienne_, p. 327.]\n\nIt is comparatively seldom that savages are reported to attach\nany stigma to suicide. To the instances mentioned above a few\nothers may be added. The Waganda, we are told, greatly condemn\nthe act.[79] Among the Bogos \"a man never despairs, never gives\nhimself up, and considers suicide as the greatest indignity.\"[80]\nThe Karens of Burma deem it an act of cowardice; but at the same\ntime they have no command against it, they \"seem to see little or\nno guilt in it,\" and \"we are nowhere told that it is displeasing\nto the God of heaven and earth.\"[81] The Dacotahs said of a girl\nwho had destroyed herself because her parents had turned her\nbeloved from the wigwam, and would force her to marry a man she\nhated, that her spirit did not watch over her earthly remains,\nbeing offended when she brought trouble upon her aged mother and\nfather.[82] In Dahomey \"it is criminal to attempt to commit\nsuicide, because every man is the property of the king. The\nbodies of suicides are exposed to public execration, and the head\nis always struck off and sent to Agbomi; at the expense of the\nfamily if the suicide were a free man, at that of his master if\nhe were a slave.\"[83] On the other hand, it is expressly stated\nof various savages that they do not punish attempts to commit\nsuicide.[84] The negroes of Accra see nothing wrong in the act.\n\"Why,\" they would ask, \"should a person not be {241} allowed to\ndie, when he no longer desires to live?\" But they inflict cruel\npunishments upon slaves who try to put an end to themselves, in\norder to deter other slaves from doing the same.[85] Among the\nPelew Islanders suicide \"is neither praised nor blamed.\"[86] The\nEskimo around Northumberland Inlet and Davis Strait believe that\nany one who has been killed by accident, or who has taken his own\nlife, certainly goes to the happy place after death.[87] The\nChippewas hold suicide \"to be a foolish, not a reprehensible\naction,\" and do not believe it to entail any punishment in the\nother world.[88] In his sketches of the manners and customs of\nthe North American Indians, Buchanan writes:--\"Suicide is not\nconsidered by the Indians either as an act of heroism or of\ncowardice, nor is it with them a subject of praise or blame. They\nview this desperate act as the consequence of mental derangement,\nand the person who destroys himself is to them an object of\npity.\"[89]\n\n[Footnote 79: Felkin, in _Proceed. Roy. Soc. Edinburgh_, xiii. 723.]\n\n[Footnote 80: Munzinger, _Die Sitten und das Recht der Bogos_,\np. 93.]\n\n[Footnote 81: Mason, in _Jour. Asiatic Soc. Bengal_, xxxvii. pt.\nii. 141.]\n\n[Footnote 82: Eastman, _op. cit._ p. 169.]\n\n[Footnote 83: Ellis, _E[(w]e-speaking Peoples_, p. 224.]\n\n[Footnote 84: Leuschner, in Steinmetz, _Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_, p.\n24 (Bakwiri). Nicole, _ibid._ p. 135 (Diakit\u00e9-Sarracolese). Lang,\n_ibid._ p. 262 (Washambala). Rautanen, _ibid._ p. 343 (Ondonga).\nSorge, _ibid._ p. 421 (Nissan Islanders). Senfft, _ibid._ p. 452\n(Marshall Islanders).]\n\n[Footnote 85: Monrad, _op. cit._ pp. 23, 25.]\n\n[Footnote 86: Kubary, in _Original-Mittheil. aus der ethnol.\nAbtheil. d. k\u00f6nigl. Museen zu Berlin_, i. 78.]\n\n[Footnote 87: Hall, _Arctic Researches_, p. 572. _Cf._ _supra_,\nii. 238, n. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 88: Keating, _op. cit._ ii. 172.]\n\n[Footnote 89: Buchanan, _Sketches of the History, &c. of the\nNorth American Indians_, p. 184.]\n\nFrom the opinions on suicide held by uncivilised races we shall\npass to those prevalent among peoples of a higher culture. In\nChina suicide is extremely common among all classes and among\npersons of all ages.[90] For those who have been impelled to this\ncourse by a sense of honour the gates of heaven open wide, and\ntablets bearing their names are erected in the temples in honour\nof virtuous men or women. As honourable self-murderers are\nregarded servants or officers of state who choose not to survive\na defeat in battle or an insult offered to the sovereign of their\ncountry; young men who, when an insult has been paid to their\nparents which they are unable to avenge, prefer not to survive\nit; and women who kill {242} themselves on the death of their\nhusbands or _fianc\u00e9s_.[91] In spite of imperial prohibitions,\nsutteeism of widowed wives and brides has continued to flourish\nin China down to this day, and meets with the same public\napplause as ever;[92] whilst those widowed wives and brides who\nhave lost their lives in preserving their chastity, are entitled\nboth to an honorary gate and to a place in a temple of the State\nas an object of worship.[93] Another common form of suicide which\nis admired as heroic in China is that committed for the purpose\nof taking revenge upon an enemy who is otherwise out of\nreach--according to Chinese ideas a most effective mode of\nrevenge, not only because the law throws the responsibility of\nthe deed on him who occasioned it, but also because the\ndisembodied soul is supposed to be better able than the living\nman to persecute the enemy.[94] The Chinese have a firm belief in\nthe wandering spirits of persons who have died by violence; thus\nself-murderers are supposed to haunt the places where they\ncommitted the fatal deed and endeavour to persuade others to\nfollow their example, at times even attempting to play\nexecutioner by strangling those who reject their advances.[95]\n\"Violent deaths,\" says Mr. Giles, \"are regarded with horror by\nthe Chinese\";[96] and suicides committed from meaner motives are\nreprobated.[97] It is said in the Y\u00fc Li, or \"Divine Panorama\"--a\nTaouist work which is very popular all over the Chinese\nEmpire--that whilst persons who kill themselves out of loyalty,\nfilial piety, chastity, or friendship, will go to heaven, those\nwho do so \"in a trivial burst of rage, or fearing the\nconsequences of a crime which would not amount to death, or in\nthe hope of falsely injuring a {243} fellow-creature,\" will be\nseverely punished in the infernal regions.[98] No pardon will be\ngranted them; they are not, like other sinners, allowed to claim\ntheir good works as a set-off against evil, whereby they might\npartly escape the agonies of hell and receive some reward for\ntheir virtuous deeds.[99] Sometimes suicide is classified by the\nChinese as an offence against religion, on the ground that a\nperson owes his being to Heaven, and is therefore responsible to\nHeaven for due care of the gift.[100]\n\n[Footnote 90: Gray, _China_, i. 329. Huc, _The Chinese Empire_,\np. 181. Matignon, 'Le suicide en Chine,' in _Archives\nd'anthropologie criminelle_, xii. 367 _sqq._ Cathonay, 'Aux\nenvirons de Foutch\u00e9on,' in _Les missions catholiques_, xxxi. 341\n_sq._ Ball, _Things Chinese_, p. 564 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 91: Gray, _op. cit._ i. 337 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 92: de Groot, _Religious System of China_, (vol. ii.\nbook) i. 748. Ball, _op. cit._ p. 565. Cathonay, in _Les missions\ncatholiques_, xxxi. 341.]\n\n[Footnote 93: de Groot, _op. cit._ (vol. ii. book) i. 792.]\n\n[Footnote 94: Huc, _op. cit._ p. 181. Matignon, in _Archives\nd'anthropologie criminelle_, xii. 371 _sqq._ de Groot, _op. cit._\n(vol. iv. book) ii. 450 _sq._ Cathonay, in _Les missions\ncatholiques_, xxxi. 341 _sq._ Ball, _op. cit._ p. 566 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 95: Davis, _China_, ii. 94. Dennys, _Folk-Lore of\nChina_, p. 74 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 96: Giles, _Strange Stories from a Chinese Studio_,\nii. 363, n. 9.]\n\n[Footnote 97: Gray, _op. cit._ i. 337.]\n\n[Footnote 98: Giles, _op. cit._ ii. 365.]\n\n[Footnote 99: _Ibid._ ii. 363.]\n\n[Footnote 100: Alabaster, _Notes and Commentaries on Chinese\nCriminal Law_, p. 304.]\n\n\"The Japanese calendar of saints,\" says Mr. Griffis, \"is not\nfilled with reformers, alms-givers, and founders of hospitals or\norphanages, but is overcrowded with canonised suicides and\ncommitters of _harakiri_. Even to-day, no man more . . . surely\ndraws homage to his tomb, securing even apotheosis, than the\nsuicide, though he may have committed a crime.\"[101] There were\ntwo kinds of _harakiri_, or \"belly-cutting,\" one obligatory and\nthe other voluntary. The former was a boon granted by government,\nwho graciously permitted criminals of the Samurai, or military,\nclass thus to destroy themselves instead of being handed over to\nthe common executioner; but this custom is now quite extinct.\nVoluntary _harakiri_, again, was practised out of loyalty to a\ndead superior, or in order to protest, when other protests might\nbe unavailing, against the erroneous conduct of a living\nsuperior, or to avoid beheading by the enemy in a lost battle, or\nto restore injured honour if revenge was impossible. Under any\ncircumstances _harakiri_ cleansed from every stain, and ensured\nan honourable interment and a respected memory.[102] It is said\nin a Japanese manuscript, \"To slay his enemy against whom he has\ncause of hatred, and then to kill himself, is the part of a noble\nSamurai, and it is sheer nonsense to look upon the place where he\nhas disembowelled {244} himself as polluted.\"[103] In old days\nthe ceremony used to be performed in a temple.[104]\n\n[Footnote 101: Griffis, _Religions of Japan_, p. 112.]\n\n[Footnote 102: Chamberlain, _Things Japanese_, p. 219 _sqq._\nRein, _Japan_, p. 328. K\u00fchne, in _Globus_, lxxiv. 166 _sq._ A\nvery full account of the ceremony of _harakiri_ is given in\nMitford's _Tales of Old Japan_, ii. 193 _sqq._, from a rare\nJapanese manuscript.]\n\n[Footnote 103: Mitford, _op. cit._ ii. 201.]\n\n[Footnote 104: _Ibid._ ii. 196.]\n\nAmong the Hindus we meet with the practice of self-immolation of\nwidows--until recently very prevalent in many parts of\nIndia[105]--and various forms of self-destruction for religious\npurposes. Suicide has always been considered by the Hindus to be\none of the most acceptable rites that can be offered to their\ndeities. According to the Ayen Akbery, there were five kinds of\nsuicide held to be meritorious in the Hindu, namely:--starving;\ncovering himself with cow-dung and setting it on fire and\nconsuming himself therein; burying himself in snow; immersing\nhimself in the water at the extremity of Bengal, where the Ganges\ndischarges itself into the sea through a thousand channels,\nenumerating his sins, and praying till the alligators come and\ndevour him; cutting his throat at Allahabad, at the confluence of\nthe Ganges and Jumna.[106] To these might be added drowning at\nHurdwar, Allahabad, and Saugor; perishing in the cold of the\nHimalayas; the practice of dying under the wheels of Juggurnath's\ncar;[107] and the custom of men throwing themselves down from\ncertain rocks to fulfil the vows of their mothers, or to receive\nforgiveness for sins, or to be re-born rajas in their next state\nof transmigration.[108] It is also common for persons who are\nafflicted with leprosy or any other incurable disease to bury or\ndrown themselves with due ceremonies, by which they are\nconsidered acceptable sacrifices to the deity,[109] or to roll\nthemselves into fires with the notion that thus purified they\nwill receive a happy transmigration into a healthy body.[110]\nSuicide was further {245} resorted to by Br\u00e2hmans for the purpose\nof avenging an injury, as it was believed that the ghost of the\ndeceased would persecute the offender, and, presumably, also\nbecause of the great efficacy which was attributed to the curse\nof a dying Br\u00e2hman.[111] When one of the Rajput rajas once levied\na war-subsidy on the Br\u00e2hmans, some of the wealthiest, having\nexpostulated in vain, poniarded themselves in his presence,\npouring maledictions on his head with their last breath; and thus\ncursed, the raja laboured under a ban of excommunication even\namongst his personal friends.[112] We are told of a Br\u00e2hman girl\nwho, having been seduced by a certain raja, burned herself to\ndeath, and in dying imprecated the most fearful curses on the\nraja's kindred, after which they were visited with such a\nsuccession of disasters that they abandoned their family\nsettlement at Baliya, where the woman's tomb is worshipped to\nthis day.[113] Once when a raja ordered the house of a Br\u00e2hman to\nbe demolished and resumed the lands which had been conferred upon\nhim, the latter fasted till he died at the palace gate, and\nbecame thus a Brahm, or malignant Br\u00e2hman ghost, who avenged the\ninjury he had suffered by destroying the raja and his house.[114]\nAt Azimghur, in 1835, a Br\u00e2hman \"threw himself down a well, that\nhis ghost might haunt his neighbour.\"[115] The same idea\nundoubtedly underlies the custom of \"sitting _dharna_\" which was\npractised by creditors who sat down before the doors of their\ndebtors threatening to starve themselves to death if their claims\nwere not paid;[116] and the sin attached to causing the death of\na Br\u00e2hman would further increase the efficacy of the creditor's\nthreats.[117] At the same time religious suicide is said to be a\ncrime in a Br\u00e2hman.[118] And in the sacred books we read that for\nhim who destroys {246} himself by means of wood, water, clods of\nearth, stones, weapons, poison, or a rope, no funeral rites shall\nbe performed by his relatives;[119] that he who resolves to die\nby his own hand shall fast for three days; and that he who\nattempts suicide, but remains alive, shall perform severe\npenance.[120] The Buddhists allow a man under certain\ncircumstances to take his own life, but maintain that generally\ndire miseries are in store for the self-murderer, and look upon\nhim as one who must have sinned deeply in a former state of\nexistence.[121] It should be added that in India, as elsewhere,\nthe souls of those who have killed themselves or met death by any\nother violent means are regarded as particularly malevolent and\ntroublesome.[122]\n\n[Footnote 105: Malcolm, _Memoir of Central India_, ii. 206 _sqq._\nChevers, _Manual of Medical Jurisprudence for India_, p. 665.\n_Cf._ _supra_, i. 473 _sq._ Sir John Malcolm observes (_op. cit._\nii. 206, n. [double dagger]) that the practice of suttee was not\nalways confined to widows, but that sometimes mothers burned\nthemselves on the death of their only sons.]\n\n[Footnote 106: Chevers, _op. cit._ p. 664. _Cf._ _Laws of Manu_,\nvi. 31.]\n\n[Footnote 107: _Ibid._ p. 664. Ward, _View of the History, &c. of\nthe Hindoos_, ii. 115 _sqq._ R\u00e1jendral\u00e1la Mitra, _Indo-Aryans_,\nii. 70.]\n\n[Footnote 108: Sleeman, _Rambles and Recollections of an Indian\nOfficial_, i. 132 _sq._ Malcolm, _Memoir of Central India_, ii.\n209 _sqq._ Forsyth, _Highlands of Central India_, p. 172 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 109: Sleeman, _op. cit._ ii. 344 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 110: Ward, _op. cit._ ii. 119.]\n\n[Footnote 111: Chevers, _op. cit._ p. 659 _sqq._ Crooke, _Popular\nReligion and Folk-Lore of Northern India_, i. 191 _sqq._ van\nM\u00f6kern, _Ostindien_, i. 319 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 112: Tod, quoted by Chevers, _op. cit._ p. 659 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 113: Crooke, _op. cit._ i. 193.]\n\n[Footnote 114: _Ibid._ i. 191 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 115: Chevers, _op. cit._ p. 663.]\n\n[Footnote 116: _Cf._ Steinmetz, 'Gli antichi scongiuri giuridici\ncontro i creditori,' in _Rivista italiana di sociologia_, ii. 58.\nFor the practice of _dharna_ see _ibid._ p. 37 _sqq._; Balfour,\n_Cyclop\u00e6dia of India_, i. 934 _sq._; van M\u00f6kern, _op. cit._\ni. 322 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 117: _Cf._ Jones, quoted by Balfour, _op. cit._ i. 935.]\n\n[Footnote 118: Ward, _op. cit._ ii. 115. Forsyth, _op. cit._\np. 173.]\n\n[Footnote 119: _Vasishtha_, xxiii. 14 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 120: _Ibid._ xxiii. 18 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 121: Hardy, _Manual of Budhism_, p. 479.]\n\n[Footnote 122: Crooke, _Popular Religion and Folk-Lore of\nNorthern India_, i. 269. Fawcett, 'N\u00e2yars of Malabar,' in the\nMadras Government Museum's _Bulletin_, iii. 253.]\n\nThe Old Testament mentions a few cases of suicide.[123] In none\nof them is any censure passed on the perpetrator of the deed, nor\nis there any text which expressly forbids a man to die by his own\nhand; and of Ahithophel it is said that he was buried in the\nsepulchre of his father.[124] It seems, however, that according\nto Jewish custom persons who had killed themselves should be left\nunburied till sunset,[125] perhaps for fear lest the spirit of\nthe deceased otherwise might find its way back to the old\nhome.[126] Josephus, who mentions this custom, denounces suicide\nas an act of cowardice, as a crime most remote from the common\nnature of all animals, as impiety against the Creator; and he\nmaintains that the souls of those who have thus acted madly\nagainst themselves will go to the darkest place in Hades.[127]\nThe Talmud considers suicide justifiable, if not meritorious, in\nthe case of the chief of a vanquished army who is sure of\ndisgrace and death at the hands of the exulting conqueror,[128]\nor when a person has {247} reason to fear being forced to\nrenounce his religion.[129] In all other circumstances the Rabbis\nconsider it criminal for a person to shorten his own life, even\nwhen he is undergoing tortures which must soon end his earthly\ncareer;[130] and they forbid all marks of mourning for a\nself-murderer, such as wearing sombre apparel and eulogising\nhim.[131] Islam prohibits suicide, as an act which interferes\nwith the decrees of God.[132] Muhammedans say that it is a\ngreater sin for a person to kill himself than to kill a\nfellow-man;[133] and, as a matter of fact, suicide is very rare\nin the Moslem world.[134]\n\n[Footnote 123: _1 Samuel_, xxxi. 4 _sq._ _2 Samuel_, xvii. 23. _1\nKings_, xvi. 18. _2 Maccabees_, xiv. 4 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 124: _2 Samuel_, xvii. 23.]\n\n[Footnote 125: Josephus, _De bello Judaico_, iii. 8. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 126: _Cf._ Frazer, 'Burial Customs as illustrative of\nthe Primitive Theory of the Soul,' in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xv. 72.]\n\n[Footnote 127: Josephus, _op. cit._ iii. 8. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 128: _Cf._ _1 Samuel_, xxxi. 4.]\n\n[Footnote 129: _Guittin_, 57 B, quoted by Mendelsohn, _Criminal\nJurisprudence of the Ancient Hebrews_, p. 77, n. 163. _Cf._ _2\nMaccabees_, xiv. 37 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 130: _Ab Zara_, 18 A, quoted by Mendelsohn, _op. cit._\np. 78, n. 163.]\n\n[Footnote 131: Mendelsohn, _op. cit._ p. 77.]\n\n[Footnote 132: _Koran_, iv. 33.]\n\n[Footnote 133: I have often heard this myself. _Cf._ Westcott,\n_Suicide_, p. 12.]\n\n[Footnote 134: Lisle, _Du suicide_, pp. 305, 345 _sq._ Legoyt,\n_Le suicide ancien et moderne_, p. 7. Morselli, _Il suicidio_, p.\n33. Westcott, _op. cit._ p. 12.]\n\nAncient Greece had its honourable suicides. The Milesian and\nCorinthian women, who by a voluntary death escaped from falling\ninto the hands of the enemy, were praised in epigrams.[135] The\nstory that Themistocles preferred death to bearing arms against\nhis native country was circulated with a view to doing honour to\nhis memory.[136] The tragedians frequently give expression to the\nidea that suicide is in certain circumstances becoming to a noble\nmind.[137] Hecuba blames Helena for not putting an end to her\nlife by a rope or a sword.[138] Phaedra[139] and Leda[140] kill\nthemselves out of shame, Haemon from violent remorse.[141] Ajax\ndecides to die after having in vain attempted to kill the\nAtreidae, maintaining that \"one of generous strain should nobly\nlive, or forthwith nobly die.\"[142] Instances are, moreover,\nmentioned of women killing themselves on the death of their\nhusbands;[143] and in Cheos it was the custom to prevent {248}\nthe decrepitude of old age by a voluntary death.[144] At Athens\nthe right hand of a person who had taken his own life was struck\noff and buried apart from the rest of the body,[145] evidently in\norder to make him harmless after death.[146] Plato says in his\n'Laws,' probably in agreement with Attic custom, that those who\ninflict death upon themselves \"from sloth or want of manliness,\"\nshall be buried alone in such places as are uncultivated and\nnameless, and that no column or inscription shall mark the spot\nwhere they are interred.[147] At Thebes self-murderers were\ndeprived of the accustomed funeral ceremonies,[148] and in Cyprus\nthey were left unburied.[149] The objections which philosophers\nraised against the commission of suicide were no doubt to some\nextent shared by popular sentiments. Pythagoras is represented as\nsaying that we should not abandon our station in life without the\norders of our commander, that is, God.[150] According to the\nPlatonic Socrates, the gods are our guardians and we are a\npossession of theirs, hence \"there may be reason in saying that a\nman should wait, and not take his own life until God summons\nhim.\"[151] Aristotle, again, maintains that he who from rage\nkills himself commits a wrong against the State, and that\ntherefore the State punishes him and civil infamy is attached to\nhim.[152] The religious argument could not be foreign to a people\nwho regarded it as impious interference in the order of nature to\nmake a bridge over the Hellespont and to separate a landscape\nfrom the continent;[153] and the idea that suicide is a matter of\npublic concern evidently prevailed in Massilia, where no man was\nallowed to make away with himself unless the magistrates had\ngiven him permission to do so.[154] But the {249} opinions of the\nphilosophers were anything but unanimous.[155] Plato himself, in\nhis 'Laws,' has no word of censure for him who deprives himself\nby violence of his appointed share of life under the compulsion\nof some painful and inevitable misfortune, or out of irremediable\nand intolerable shame.[156] Hegesias, surnamed the\n\"death-persuader,\" who belonged to the Cyrenaic school, tried to\nprove the utter worthlessness and unprofitableness of life.[157]\nAccording to Epicurus we ought to consider \"whether it be better\nthat death should come to us, or we go to him.\"[158] The Stoics,\nespecially, advocated suicide as a relief from all kinds of\nmisery.[159] Seneca remarks that it is a man's own fault if he\nsuffers, as, by putting an end to himself, he can put an end to\nhis misery:--\"As I would choose a ship to sail in, or a house to\nlive in, so would I choose the most tolerable death when about to\ndie. . . . Human affairs are in such a happy situation, that no\none need be wretched but by choice. Do you like to be wretched?\nLive. Do you like it not? It is in your power to return from\nwhence you came.\"[160] The Stoics did not deny that it is wrong\nto commit suicide in cases where the act would be an injury to\nsociety;[161] Seneca himself points out that Socrates lived\nthirty days in prison in expectation of death, so as to submit to\nthe laws of his country, and to give his friends the enjoyment of\nhis conversation to the last.[162] Epictetus opposes\nindiscriminate suicide on religious grounds:--\"Friends, wait for\nGod; when he shall give the signal and release you from this\nservice, then go to him; but for the present endure to dwell in\nthe place where he has put you.\"[163] Such a signal, however, is\ngiven often enough: it may consist in incurable disease,\nintolerable pain, or misery of any kind. \"Remember this: the door\nis open; be not more timid {250} than little children, but as\nthey say, when the thing does not please them, 'I will play no\nlonger,' so do you, when things seem to you of such a kind, say I\nwill no longer play, and be gone: but if you stay, do not\ncomplain.\"[164] Pliny says that the power of dying when you\nplease is the best thing that God has given to man amidst all the\nsufferings of life.[165]\n\n[Footnote 135: Schmidt, _Die Ethik der alten Griechen_, ii. 443.]\n\n[Footnote 136: Diodorus Siculus, _Bibliotheca historica_, xi. 58.\n2 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 137: See Schmidt, _op. cit._ ii. 442 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 138: Euripides, _Troades_, 1012 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 139: _Idem_, _Hippolytus_, 715 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 140: _Idem_, _Helena_, 134 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 141: Sophocles, _Antigone_, 1234 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 142: _Idem_, _Ajax_, 470 _sqq._ _Cf._ _ibid._ 654 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 143: Euripides, _Supplices_, 1000 _sqq._ Pausanias,\niv. 2. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 144: Strabo, _Geographica_, x. 5. 6, p. 486. Aelian,\n_Varia historia_, iii. 37. _Cf._ Boeckh, _Gesammelte kleine\nSchriften_, vii. 345 _sqq._; Welcker, _Kleine Schriften_,\nii. 502 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 145: Aeschines, _In Ctesiphontem_, 244.]\n\n[Footnote 146: Some Australian natives cut off the thumb of the\nright hand of a dead foe in order to make his spirit unable to\nthrow the spear efficiently (Oldfield, in _Trans. Ethn. Soc._\nN.S. iii. 287).]\n\n[Footnote 147: Plato, _Leges_, ix. 873.]\n\n[Footnote 148: Schmidt, _op. cit._ ii. 104.]\n\n[Footnote 149: Dio Chrysostom, _Orationes_, lxiv. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 150: Cicero, _Cato Major_, 20 (73).]\n\n[Footnote 151: Plato, _**Ph\u00e6do_, p. 62.]\n\n[Footnote 152: Aristotle, _Ethica Nicomachea_, v. 11. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 153: See Schmidt, _op. cit._ ii. 83, 441; Rohde,\n_Psyche_, p. 202, n. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 154: Valerius Maximus, _Factorum dictorumque\nmemorabilia_, ii. 6. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 155: See Geiger, _Der Selbstmord im klassischen\nAltertum_, p. 5 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 156: Plato, _Leges_, ix. 873.]\n\n[Footnote 157: Cicero, _Tusculan\u00e6 qu\u00e6stiones_, i. 34 (83 _sq._).\nValerius Maximus, viii. 9. Externa 3.]\n\n[Footnote 158: Epicurus, quoted by Seneca, _Epistul\u00e6_, 26.]\n\n[Footnote 159: See Geiger, _op. cit._ p. 15 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 160: Seneca, _Epistul\u00e6_, 70. See also _Idem_, _De ira_,\niii. 15; _Idem_, _Consolatia ad Marciam_, 20.]\n\n[Footnote 161: Lecky, _History of European Morals_, i. 214, n. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 162: Seneca, _Epistul\u00e6_, 70.]\n\n[Footnote 163: Epictetus, _Dissertationes_, i. 9. 16.]\n\n[Footnote 164: _Ibid._ i. 24. 20; i. 25. 20 _sq._; ii. 16. 37\n_sqq._; iii. 13. 14; iii. 24. 95 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 165: Pliny, _Historia naturalis_, ii. 5 (7).]\n\nIt seems that the Roman people, before the influence of\nChristianity made itself felt, regarded suicide with considerable\nmoral indifference. According to Servius, it was provided by the\nPontifical laws that whoever hanged himself should be cast out\nunburied;[166] but from what has been said before it is probable\nthat this practice only owed its origin to fear of the dead man's\nghost. Vergil enumerates self-murderers not among the guilty, but\namong the unfortunate, confounding them with infants who have\ndied prematurely and persons who have been condemned to die on a\nfalse charge.[167] Throughout the whole history of pagan Rome\nthere was no statute declaring it to be a crime for an ordinary\ncitizen to take his own life. The self-murderer's rights were in\nno way affected by his deed, his memory was no less honoured than\nif he had died a natural death, his will was recognised by law,\nand the regular order of succession was not interfered with.[168]\nIn Roman law there are only two noteworthy exceptions to the rule\nthat suicide is a matter with which the State has nothing to do:\nit was prohibited in the case of soldiers,[169] and the enactment\nwas made that the suicide of an accused person should entail the\nsame consequences as his condemnation; but in the latter instance\nthe deed was admitted as a confession of guilt.[170] On the other\n{251} hand, it seems to have been the general opinion in Rome\nthat suicide under certain circumstances is an heroic and\npraiseworthy act.[171] Even Cicero, who professed the doctrine of\nPythagoras,[172] approved of the death of Cato.[173]\n\n[Footnote 166: Servius, _Commentarii in Virgilii \u00c6neidos_,\nxii. 603.]\n\n[Footnote 167: Vergil, _\u00c6neis_, vi. 426 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 168: Bourquelot, 'Recherches sur les opinions et la\nl\u00e9gislation en mati\u00e8re de mort volontaire pendant le moyen age,'\nin _Biblioth\u00e8que de l'\u00c9cole des Chartes_, iii. 544. Geiger, _op.\ncit._ p. 64 _sqq._ Bynkershoek, _Observationes Juris Romani_, iv.\n4, p. 350.]\n\n[Footnote 169: _Digesta_, xlix. 16. 6. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 170: _Ibid._ xlviii. 21. 3 pr. _Cf._ Bourquelot, _op.\ncit._ iii. 543 sq.; Gibbon, _Decline and Fall of the Roman\nEmpire_, v. 326; Lecky, _History of European Morals_, i. 219.]\n\n[Footnote 171: St\u00e4udlin, _Geschichte der Vorstellungen und Lehren\nvom Selbstmorde_, p. 62 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 172: Cicero, _Cato Major_, 20 (72 _sq._).]\n\n[Footnote 173: _Idem_, _De officiis_, i. 31 (112).]\n\nIn no question of morality was there a greater difference between\nclassical and Christian doctrines than in regard to suicide. The\nearlier Fathers of the Church still allowed, or even approved of,\nsuicide in certain cases, namely, when committed in order to\nprocure martyrdom,[174] or to avoid apostacy, or to retain the\ncrown of virginity. To bring death upon ourselves voluntarily,\nsays Lactantius, is a wicked and impious deed; \"but when urged to\nthe alternative, either of forsaking God and relinquishing faith,\nor of expecting all torture and death, then it is that undaunted\nin spirit we defy that death with all its previous threats and\nterrors which others fear.\"[175] Eusebius and other\necclesiastical writers mention several instances of Christian\nwomen putting an end to their lives when their chastity was in\ndanger, and their acts are spoken of with tenderness, if not\napprobation; indeed, some of them were admitted into the calendar\nof saints.[176] This admission was due to the extreme honour in\nwhich virginity was held by the Fathers; St. Jerome, who denied\nthat it was lawful in times of persecution to die by one's own\nhands, made an exception for cases in which a person's chastity\nwas at stake.[177] But even this exception was abolished by St.\nAugustine. He allows that the virgins who laid violent hands upon\nthemselves are worthy of compassion, but declares that there was\nno necessity for their doing so, since chastity is a virtue of\n{252} the mind which is not lost by the body being in captivity\nto the will and superior force of another. He argues that there\nis no passage in the canonical Scriptures which permits us to\ndestroy ourselves either with a view to obtaining immortality or\nto avoiding calamity. On the contrary, suicide is prohibited in\nthe commandment, \"Thou shalt not kill,\" namely, \"neither thyself\nnor another\"; for he who kills himself kills no other but a\nman.[178] This doctrine, which assimilates suicide with murder,\nwas adopted by the Church.[179] Nay, self-murder was declared to\nbe the worst form of murder, \"the most grievous thing of\nall\";[180] already St. Chrysostom had declared that \"if it is\nbase to destroy others, much more is it to destroy one's\nself.\"[181] The self-murderer was deprived of rights which were\ngranted to all other criminals. In the sixth century a Council at\nOrleans enjoined that \"the oblations of those who were killed in\nthe commission of any crime may be received, except of such as\nlaid violent hands on themselves\";[182] and a subsequent Council\ndenied self-murderers the usual rites of Christian burial.[183]\nIt was even said that Judas committed a greater sin in killing\nhimself than in betraying his master Christ to a certain death.[184]\n\n[Footnote 174: See Barbeyrac, _Trait\u00e9 de la morale des P\u00e8res de\nl'\u00c9glise_, pp. 18, 122 _sq._; Buonafede, _Istoria critica e\nfilosofica del suicidio_, p. 135 _sqq._; Lecky, _op. cit._\nii. 45 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 175: Lactantius, _Divines Institutiones_, vi. ('De vero\ncultu') 17 (Migne, _Patrologi\u00e6 cursus_, vi. 697).]\n\n[Footnote 176: Eusebius, _Historia ecclesiastica_, viii. 12\n(Migne, _op. cit._ Ser. Graeca, xx. 769 _sqq._), 14 (_ibid._ col.\n785 _sqq._). St. Ambrose, _De virginibus_, xiii. 7 (Migne, _op.\ncit._ xvi. 229 _sqq._). St. Chrysostom, _Homilia encomiastica in\nS. Martyrem Pelagiam_ (Migne, _op. cit._ Ser. Graeca, l. 579 sqq.).]\n\n[Footnote 177: St. Jerome, _Commentarii in Jonam_, i. 12 (Migne,\n_op. cit._ xxv. 1129).]\n\n[Footnote 178: St. Augustine, _De Civitate Dei_, i. 16 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 179: Gratian, _Decretum_, ii. 23. 5. 9. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 180: Thomas Aquinas, _Summa theologica_, ii.-ii. 64. 5. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 181: St. Chrysostom, _In Epistolam ad Galatas\ncommentarius_, i. 4 (Migne, _op. cit._ Ser. Graeca, lxi. 618 _sq._).]\n\n[Footnote 182: _Concilium Aurelianense II._ A.D. 533, can. 15\n(Labbe-Mansi, _Sacrorum Conciliorum collectio_, viii. 837). See\nalso _Concilium Autisiodorense_, A.D. 578, can. 17 (Labbe-Mansi,\nix. 913).]\n\n[Footnote 183: _Concilium Bracarense II._ A.D. 563, cap. 16\n(Labbe-Mansi, _op. cit._ ix. 779).]\n\n[Footnote 184: Damhouder, _Praxis rerum criminalium_, lviii. 2\n_sq._, p. 258. See Gratian, _op. cit._ ii. 33. 3. 3. 38. At the\ntrial of the Marquise de Brinvilliers in 1676, the presiding\njudge said to the prisoner that \"the greatest of all her crimes,\nhorrible as they were, was, not the poisoning of her father and\nbrothers, but her attempt to poison herself\" (Ives,\n_Classification of Crimes_, p. 36).]\n\nAccording to the Christian doctrine, as formulated by Thomas\nAquinas, suicide is utterly unlawful for three reasons. First,\neverything naturally loves itself and preserves itself in being;\nsuicide is against a natural inclination and contrary to the\ncharity which a man ought to bear towards himself, and\nconsequently a mortal sin. {253} Secondly, by killing himself a\nperson does an injury to the community of which he is a part.\nThirdly, \"life is a gift divinely bestowed on man, and subject to\nHis power who 'killeth and maketh alive'; and therefore he who\ntakes his own life sins against God, as he who kills another\nman's slave sins against the master to whom the slave belongs,\nand as he sins who usurps the office of judge on a point not\nreferred to him; for to God alone belongs judgment of life and\ndeath.\"[185] The second of these arguments is borrowed from\nAristotle, and is entirely foreign to the spirit of early\nChristianity. The notion of patriotism being a moral duty was\nhabitually discouraged by it, and, as Mr. Lecky observes, \"it was\nimpossible to urge the civic argument against suicide without at\nthe same time condemning the hermit life, which in the third\ncentury became the ideal of the Church.\"[186] But the other\narguments are deeply rooted in some of the fundamental doctrines\nof Christianity--in the sacredness of human life, in the duty of\nabsolute submission to God's will, and in the extreme importance\nattached to the moment of death. The earthly life is a\npreparation for eternity; sufferings which are sent by God are\nnot to be evaded, but to be endured.[187] The man who\ndeliberately takes away the life which was given him by the\nCreator displays the utmost disregard for the will and authority\nof his Master; and, worst of all, he does so in the very last\nminute of his life, when his doom is sealed for ever. His deed,\nas Thomas Aquinas says, is \"the most dangerous thing of all,\nbecause no time is left to expiate it by repentance.\"[188] He who\nkills a fellow-creature does not in the same degree renounce the\nprotection of God; he kills only the body, whereas the\nself-murderer kills both the body and the soul.[189] By denying\nthe latter the right of Christian {254} burial the Church\nrecognises that he has placed himself outside her pale.\n\n[Footnote 185: Thomas Aquinas, _op. cit._ ii.-ii. 64. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 186: Lecky, _History of European Morals_, ii. 44.]\n\n[Footnote 187: _Cf._ St. Augustine, _De Civitate Dei_, i. 23.]\n\n[Footnote 188: Thomas Aquinas, _op. cit._ ii.-ii. 64. 5. 3. _Cf._\nSt. Augustine, _De Civitate Dei_, i. 25.]\n\n[Footnote 189: Damhouder, _op. cit._ lxxxviii. 1 _sq._, p. 258.]\n\nThe condemnation of the Church influenced the secular\nlegislation. The provisions of the Councils were introduced into\nthe law-books. In France Louis IX. enforced the penalty of\nconfiscating the self-murderer's property,[190] and laws to the\nsame effect were passed in other European countries.[191] Louis\nXIV. assimilated the crime of suicide to that of _l\u00e8ze\nmajest\u00e9_.[192] According to the law of Scotland, \"self-murder is\nas highly criminal as the killing our neighbour.\"[193] In England\nsuicide is still regarded by the law as murder committed by a man\non himself;[194] and, unless declared insane, the self-murderer\nforfeited his property as late as the year 1870, when forfeitures\nfor felony were abolished.[195] In Russia, to this day, the\ntestamentary dispositions of a suicide are deemed void by the\nlaw.[196]\n\n[Footnote 190: _Les \u00c9tablissements de Saint Louis_, i. 92, vol.\nii. 150.]\n\n[Footnote 191: Bourquelot, _op. cit._ iv. 263. Morselli, _op.\ncit._ p. 196 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 192: Louis XIV., 'Ordonnance criminelle,' A.D. 1670,\nxxii. 1, in Isambert, Decrusy, and Taillandier, _Recueil g\u00e9n\u00e9ral\ndes anciennes lois fran\u00e7aises_, xviii. 414.]\n\n[Footnote 193: Erskine-Rankine, _Principles of the Law of\nScotland_, p. 559.]\n\n[Footnote 194: Stephen, _History of the Criminal Law of England_,\niii. 104. For earlier times see Bracton, _De Legibus et\nConsuetudinibus Angli\u00e6_, fol. 150, vol. ii. 504 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 195: Stephen, _op. cit._ iii. 105.]\n\n[Footnote 196: Foinitzki, in von Liszt, _La l\u00e9gislation p\u00e9nale\ncompar\u00e9e_, p. 548.]\n\nThe horror of suicide also found a vent in outrages committed on\nthe dead body. Of a woman who drowned herself in Edinburgh in\n1598, we are told that her body was \"harled through the town\nbackwards, and thereafter hanged on the gallows.\"[197] In France,\nas late as the middle of the eighteenth century, self-murderers\nwere dragged upon a hurdle through the streets with the face\nturned to the ground; they were then hanged up with the head\ndownwards, and finally thrown into the common sewer.[198]\nHowever, in most cases the treatment to which suicides bodies\nwere subject was not originally meant as a punishment, but was\nintended to prevent their spirits {255} from causing mischief.\nAll over Europe wandering tendencies have been ascribed to their\nghosts.[199] In some countries the corpse of a suicide is\nsupposed to make barren the earth with which it comes in\ncontact,[200] or to produce hailstorms or tempests[201] or\ndrought.[202] At Lochbroom, in the North-West of Scotland, the\npeople believe that if the remains of a self-murderer be taken to\nany burying-ground which is within sight of the sea or of\ncultivated land, this would prove disastrous both to fishing and\nagriculture, or, in the words of the people, would cause \"famine\n(or dearth) on sea and land\"; hence the custom has been to inter\nsuicides in out-of-the-way places among the lonely solitudes of\nthe mountains.[203] The practice of burying them apart from other\ndead has been very wide-spread in Europe, and in many cases there\nare obvious indications that it arose from fear.[204] In the\nNorth-East of Scotland a suicide was buried outside a churchyard,\nclose beneath the wall, and the grave was marked by a single\nlarge stone, or by a small cairn, to which the passing traveller\nwas bound to cast a stone; and afterwards, when the suicide's\nbody was allowed to rest in the churchyard, it was laid below the\nwall in such a position that no one could walk over the grave, as\nthe people believed that if a woman enceinte stepped over such a\n{256} grave, her child would quit this earth by its own act.[205]\nIn England persons against whom a coroner's jury had found a\nverdict of _felo de se_ were buried at cross-roads, with a stake\ndriven through the body so as to prevent their ghosts from\nwalking.[206] For the same purpose the bodies of {257} suicides\nwere in many cases burned.[207] And when removed from the house\nwhere the act had been committed, they were commonly carried out,\nnot by the door, but by a window,[208] or through a perforation\nspecially made for the occasion in the door,[209] or through a\nhole under the threshold,[210] in order that the ghost should not\nfind its way back into the house, or perhaps with a view to\nkeeping the entrance of the house free from dangerous infection.[211]\n\n[Footnote 197: Ross, 'Superstitions as to burying Suicides in the\nHighlands,' in _Celtic Magazine_, xii. 354.]\n\n[Footnote 198: Serpillon, _Code Criminel_, ii. 223. _Cf._ Louis\nXIV., 'Ordonnance criminelle,' A.D. 1670, xxii. 1, in Isambert,\nDecrusy, and Taillandier, _op. cit._ xviii. 414.]\n\n[Footnote 199: Ross, in _Celtic Magazine_, xii. 352 (Highlanders\nof Scotland). Atkinson, _Forty Years in a Moorland Parish_,\np. 217. Hylt\u00e9n-Cavallius, _W\u00e4rend och Wirdarne_, i. 472 _sq._\n(Swedes). Allardt, 'Nyl\u00e4ndska folkseder och bruk,' in _Nyland_,\niv. 114 (Swedish Finlanders). Wuttke, _Der deutsche\nVolksaberglaube der Gegenwart_, \u00a7756, p. 474 _sq._ Schiffer,\n'Totenfetische bei den Polen,' in _Am Ur-Quell_, iii. 50\n(Polanders), 52 (Lithuanians). Volkov, 'Der Selbstm\u00f6rder in\nLithauen,' _ibid._ v. 87. von Wlislocki, 'Tod und Totenfetische\nim Volkglauben der Siebenb\u00fcrger Sachsen,' _ibid._ iv. 53.\nLippert, _Christenthum, Volksglaube und Volksbrauch_, p. 391.\nDyer, _The Ghost World_, pp. 53, 151. Gaidoz, 'Le suicide,' in\n_M\u00e9lusine_, iv. 12.]\n\n[Footnote 200: Schiffer, in _Am Ur-Quell_, iii. 52 (Lithuanians).]\n\n[Footnote 201: _Ibid._ pp. 50 (Polanders), 53 (Lithuanians). von\nWlislocki, _Volksglaube und religi\u00f6ser Brauch der Magyaren_, p.\n61. Strausz, _Die Bulgaren_, p. 455. Prexl, 'Geburts- und\nTodtengebr\u00e4uche der Rum\u00e4nen in Siebenb\u00fcrgen,' in _Globus_, lvii. 30.]\n\n[Footnote 202: Strausz, _op. cit._ p. 455 (Bulgarians).]\n\n[Footnote 203: Ross, in _Celtic Magazine_, xii. 350 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 204: Gaidoz, in _M\u00e9lusine_, iv. 12. Frank, _System\neiner vollst\u00e4ndigen medicinischen Polizey_, iv. 499. Moore, _op.\ncit._ i. 310 (Danes). Schiffer, in _Am Ur-Quell_, iii. 50\n(Polanders), 53 (Lithuanians). Volkov, _ibid._ v. 87\n(Lithuanians). Strausz, _op. cit._ p. 455 (Bulgarians).]\n\n[Footnote 205: Gregor, _Folk-Lore of the North-East of Scotland_,\np. 213 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 206: Stephen, _History of the Criminal Law of England_,\niii. 105. Atkinson, _op. cit._ p. 217. This custom was formally\nabolished in 1823 by 4 Geo. IV. c. 52 (Stephen, _op. cit._ iii.\n105). Why were suicides buried at cross-roads? Possibly because\nthe cross was supposed to disperse the evil energy ascribed to\ntheir bodies. Both in Europe and India the cross-road has, since\nancient times, been a favourite place to divest oneself of\ndiseases or other influences (Wuttke, _Der deutsche\nVolksaberglaube der Gegenwart_, \u00a7\u00a7 483, 484, 492, 508, 514, 522,\n545, pp. 325, 326, 331, 341, 345, 349, 361. _Hymns of the\nAtharva-Veda_, pp. 272, 473, 519. Oldenberg, _Die Religion des\nVeda_, pp. 267, 268 n. 1). In the sacred books of India it is\nsaid that \"a student who has broken the vow of chastity shall\noffer an ass to Nirriti on a cross-road\" (_Gautama_, xxiii. 17),\nand that a person who has previously undergone certain other\npurification ceremonies \"is freed from all crimes, even mortal\nsins, after looking on a cross-road at a pot filled with water,\nand reciting the text, 'Simhe me manyuh'\" (_Baudh\u00e2yana_, iv. 7.\n7). In the hills of Northern India and as far as Madras, an\napproved charm for getting rid of a disease of demoniacal origin\nis to plant a stake where four roads meet, and to bury grains\nunderneath, which crows disinter and eat (_North Indian Notes and\nQueries_, i. \u00a7 652, p. 100; Madden, 'The Turaee and Outer\nMountains of Kumaoon,' in _Jour. Asiatic Soc. Bengal_, xvii. pt.\ni. 583; Crooke, _Popular Religion and Folk-Lore of Northern\nIndia_, i. 290). In the Province of Bih[=a]r, \"in cases of\nsickness various articles are exposed in a saucer at a\ncross-road\" (Grierson, _Bih[=a]r Peasant Life_, p. 407).\nAccording to a Bulgarian tale, Lot was enjoined by the priest to\nplant on a cross-road three charred twigs in order to free\nhimself from his sin (Strausz, _op. cit._ p. 115). The Gypsies of\nServia believe that a thief may divert from himself all\nsuspicions by painting with blood a cross and a dot above it on\nthe spot where he committed the theft (von Wlislocki,\n'Menschenblut im Glauben der Zigeuner,' in _Am Ur-Quell_, iii. 64\n_sq._). In Morocco the cross is used as a charm against the evil\neye, and the chief reason for this is, I believe, that it is\nregarded as a conductor of the baneful energy emanating from the\neye, dispersing it in all the quarters of the wind and thus\npreventing it from injuring the person or object looked at\n(Westermarck, 'Magic Origin of Moorish Designs,' in _Jour. Anthr.\nInst._ xxxiv. 214). In Japan, if a criminal belonging to one of\nthe lower classes commits suicide, his body is crucified\n(_Globus_, xviii. 197). When, under Tarquinius Priscus (or\nTarquinius Superbus), many Romans preferred voluntary death to\ncompulsory labour in the _cloaca_, or artificial canals by which\nthe sewage was carried into the Tiber, the king ordered that\ntheir bodies should be crucified and abandoned to birds and\nbeasts of prey (Pliny, _Historia naturalis_, xxxvi. 24; Servius,\n_Commentarii in Virgilii \u00c6neidos_, xii. 603). The reason for thus\ncrucifying the bodies of self-murderers is not stated; but it is\ninteresting to notice, in this connection, the idea expressed by\nsome Christian writers that the cross of the Saviour symbolised\nthe distribution of his benign influence in all directions\n(d'Ancona, _Origini del teatro italiano_, i. 646; Tauler, quoted\nby Peltzer, _Deutsche Mystik und deutsche Kunst_, p. 191. I am\nindebted to my friend Dr. Yrj\u00f6 Hirn for drawing my attention to\nthis idea). With reference to persons who had killed a father,\nmother, brother, or child, Plato says in his 'Laws' (ix.\n873):--\"If he be convicted, the servants of the judges and the\nmagistrates shall slay him at an appointed place without the city\nwhere three ways meet, and there expose his body naked, and each\nof the magistrates on behalf of the whole city shall take a stone\nand cast it upon the head of the dead man, and so deliver the\ncity from pollution; after that, they shall bear him to the\nborders of the land, and cast him forth unburied, according to\nlaw.\" The duels by which the ancient Swedes were legally\ncompelled to repair their wounded honour were to be fought on a\nplace where three roads met (Leffler, _Om den fornsvenska\nhednalagen_, p. 40 _sq._; _supra_, i. 502). In various countries\nit has been the custom to bury the dead at cross-roads (Grimm,\n'Ueber das Verbrennen der Leichen,' in _Kleinere Schriften_, ii.\n288 (Bohemians). Lippert, _Die Religionen der europ\u00e4ischen\nCulturv\u00f6lker_, p. 310 (Slavonians); Winternitz, _Das altindische\nHochzeitsrituell_, p. 68; Oldenberg, _Die Religion des Veda_,\npp. 267, 268, 562 n. 3)--a custom which may have given rise to the\nidea that cross-roads are haunted (Winternitz, _op. cit._ p. 68;\nOldenberg, _op. cit._ p. 267 _sq._; _cf._ Wuttke, _op. cit._\n\u00a7 108, p. 89 _sq._).]\n\n[Footnote 207: Bourquelot, _loc. cit._ iv. 263. Hylt\u00e9n-Cavallius,\n_op. cit._ i. 459; Nordstr\u00f6m, _Bidrag till den svenska\nsamh\u00e4lls-f\u00f6rfattningens historia_, ii. 331 (Swedes), von\nWlislocki, 'Tod und Totenfetische im Volkglauben der Siebenb\u00fcrger\nSachsen,' in _Am Ur-Quell_, iv. 53.]\n\n[Footnote 208: Wuttke, _op. cit._ \u00a7 756, p. 474; Frank, _op.\ncit._ iv. 498 _sq._; Lippert, _Der Seelencult_, p. 11 (people in\nvarious parts of Germany). Schiffer, in _Am Ur-Quell_, iii. 50\n(Polanders).]\n\n[Footnote 209: Bourquelot, _loc. cit._ iv. 264 (at Abbeville).]\n\n[Footnote 210: Grimm, _Deutsche Rechtsalterth\u00fcmer_, p. 726 _sqq._\nHylt\u00e9n-Cavallius, _op. cit._ i. 472 _sq._ (Swedes).]\n\n[Footnote 211: See _infra_, on Regard for the Dead. Contact with\na self-murderer's body is considered polluting (Prexl, 'Geburts- und\nTodtengebr\u00e4uche der Rum\u00e4nen in Siebenb\u00fcrgen,' in _Globus_,\nlvii. 30; Hylt\u00e9n-Cavallius, _W\u00e4rend och Wirdarne_, i. 459, 460,\nand ii. 412). We are told that in the eighteenth century people\ndid not dare to cut down a person who had hanged himself, though\nhe was found still alive (Frank, _op. cit._ iv. 499). Among the\nBannavs of Cambodia **everybody who takes part in the burial of a\nself-murderer is obliged to undergo a certain ceremony of\npurification, whereas no such ceremony is prescribed in the case\nof other burials (_Mittheil. d. Geogr. Ges. zu Jena_, iii. 9).]\n\nHowever, side by side with the extreme seventy with which suicide\nis viewed by the Christian Church, we find, even in the Middle\nAges, instances of more humane feelings towards its perpetrator.\nIn medi\u00e6val tales and ballads true lovers die together and are\nburied in the same grave; two roses spring through the turf and\ntwine lovingly together.[212] In the later Middle Ages, says M.\n{258} Bourquelot, \"on voit qu'\u00e0 mesure qu'on avance,\nl'antagonisme devient plus prononc\u00e9 entre l'esprit religieux et\nles id\u00e9es mondaines relativement \u00e0 la mort volontaire. Le clerg\u00e9\ncontinue \u00e0 suivre la route qui a \u00e9t\u00e9 trac\u00e9e par Saint Augustin et\n\u00e0 d\u00e9clarer le suicide criminel et impie; mais la tristesse et le\nd\u00e9sespoir n'entendent pas sa voix, ne se souviennent pas de ses\nprescriptions.\"[213] The revival of classical learning,\naccompanied as it was by admiration for antiquity and a desire to\nimitate its great men, not only increased the number of suicides,\nbut influenced popular sentiments on the subject.[214] Even the\nCatholic casuists, and later on philosophers of the school of\nGrotius and others, began to distinguish certain cases of\nlegitimate suicide, such as that committed to avoid dishonour or\nprobable sin, or that of a condemned person saving himself from\ntorture by anticipating an inevitable death, or that of a man\noffering himself to death for the sake of his friend.[215] Sir\nThomas More, in his Utopia, permits a person who is suffering\nfrom an incurable and painful disease to take his own life,\nprovided that he does so with the agreement of the priests and\nmagistrates; nay, he even maintains that these should exhort such\na man to put an end to a life which is only a burden to himself\nand others.[216] Donne, the well-known Dean of St. Paul's, wrote\nin his younger days a book in defence of suicide, \"a\nDeclaration,\" as he called it, \"of that paradoxe, or thesis, that\nSelf-homicide is not so naturally sin, that it may never be\notherwise.\" He there pointed out the fact--which ought never to\nbe overlooked by those who derive their arguments from\n\"nature\"--that some things may be natural to the species, and yet\nnot natural to every individual member of it.[217] In one of his\nessays Montaigne pictures classical cases of suicide with colours\nof unmistakable sympathy. \"La plus volontaire mort,\" he {259}\nobserves, \"c'est la plus belle. La vie despend de la volont\u00e9\nd'aultruy; la mort, de la nostre.\"[218] The rationalism of the\neighteenth century led to numerous attacks both upon the views of\nthe Church and upon the laws of the State concerning suicide.\nMontesquieu advocated its legitimacy:--\"La soci\u00e9t\u00e9 est fond\u00e9e sur\nun avantage mutuel; mais lorsqu'elle me devient on\u00e9reuse, qui\nm'emp\u00eache d'y renoncer? La vie m'a \u00e9t\u00e9 donn\u00e9e comme une faveur;\nje puis donc la rendre lorsqu'elle ne l'est plus: la cause cesse,\nl'effet doit donc cesser aussi.\"[219] Voltaire strongly opposed\nthe cruel laws which subjected a suicide's body to outrage and\ndeprived his children of their heritage.[220] If his act is a\nwrong against society, what is to be said of the voluntary\nhomicides committed in war, which are permitted by the laws of\nall countries? Are they not much more harmful to the human race\nthan self-murder, which nature prevents from ever being practised\nby any large number of men?[221] Beccaria pointed out that the\nState is more wronged by the emigrant than by the suicide, since\nthe former takes his property with him, whereas the latter leaves\nhis behind.[222] According to Holbach, he who kills himself is\nguilty of no outrage on nature or its author; on the contrary, he\nfollows an indication given by nature when he parts from his\nsufferings through the only door which has been left open. Nor\nhas his country or his family any right to complain of a member\nwhom it has no means of rendering happy, and from whom it\nconsequently has nothing more to hope.[223] Others eulogised\nsuicide when committed for a noble end,[224] or recommended it on\ncertain occasions. \"Suppose,\" says Hume, \"that it is no longer in\nmy {260} power to promote the interest of society; suppose that I\nam a burthen to it; suppose that my life hinders some person from\nbeing much more useful to society. In such cases my resignation\nof life must not only be innocent but laudable.\"[225] Hume also\nattacks the doctrine that suicide is a transgression of our duty\nto God. \"If it would be no crime in me to divert the Nile from\nits course, were I able to do so, how could it be a crime to turn\na few ounces of blood from their natural channel? Were the\ndisposal of human life so much reserved as the peculiar province\nof the Almighty that it were an encroachment on his right for men\nto dispose of their own lives, would it not be equally wrong of\nthem to lengthen out their lives beyond the period which by the\ngeneral laws of nature he had assigned to it? My death, however\nvoluntary, does not happen without the consent of Providence;\nwhen I fall upon my own sword, I receive my death equally from\nthe hands of the Deity as if it had proceeded from a lion, a\nprecipice, or a fever.\"[226]\n\n[Footnote 212: See Bourquelot, _loc. cit._ iv. 248; Gummere,\n_Germanic Origins_, p. 322.]\n\n[Footnote 213: Bourquelot, _loc. cit._ iv. 253.]\n\n[Footnote 214: _Ibid._ iv. 464. Morselli, _op. cit._ p. 35.]\n\n[Footnote 215: Buonafede, _op. cit._ p. 148 _sqq._ Lecky, _op.\ncit._ ii. 55.]\n\n[Footnote 216: More, _Utopia_, p. 122.]\n\n[Footnote 217: Donne, _Biathanatos_, p. 45. Donne's book was\nfirst committed to the press in 1644, by his son.]\n\n[Footnote 218: Montaigne, _Essais_, ii. 3 (_[OE]uvres_, p. 187).]\n\n[Footnote 219: Montesquieu, _Lettres Persanes_, 76 (_[OE]uvres_,\np. 53).]\n\n[Footnote 220: Voltaire, _Commentaire sur le livre Des d\u00e9lits et\ndes peines_, 19 (_[OE]uvres compl\u00e8tes_, v. 416). _Idem_, _Prix de\nla justice et de l'humanit\u00e9_, 5 (_ibid._ v. 424).]\n\n[Footnote 221: _Idem_, _Note to Olympie acte v. sc\u00e8ne_ 7\n(_[OE]uvres compl\u00e8tes_, i. 826, n. _b_). _Idem_, _Dictionnaire\nPhilosophique_, art. Suicide (_ibid._ viii. 236).]\n\n[Footnote 222: Beccaria, _Dei delitti e delle pene_, \u00a7 35\n(_Opere_, i. 101).]\n\n[Footnote 223: Holbach, _Syst\u00e8me de la nature_, i. 369.]\n\n[Footnote 224: In the early part of the nineteenth century this\nwas done by Fries, _Neue oder anthropologische Kritik der\nVernunft_, iii. 197.]\n\n[Footnote 225: Hume, 'Suicide,'in _Philosophical Works_, iv. 413.]\n\n[Footnote 226: _Ibid._ p. 407 _sqq._]\n\nThus the main arguments against suicide which had been set forth\nby pagan philosophers and Christian theologians were scrutinised\nand found unsatisfactory or at least insufficient to justify that\nsevere and wholesale censure which was passed on it by the Church\nand the State. But a doctrine which has for ages been inculcated\nby the leading authorities on morals is not easily overthrown;\nand when the old arguments are found fault with new ones are\ninvented. Kant maintained that a person who disposes of his own\nlife degrades the humanity subsisting in his person and entrusted\nto him to the end that he might uphold it.[227] Fichte argued\nthat it is our duty to preserve our life and to will to live, not\nfor the sake of life, but because our life is the exclusive\ncondition of the realisation of the moral law through us.[228]\nAccording to Hegel it is a contradiction to speak of a person's\nright over his life, since this would {261} imply a right of a\nperson over himself, and no one can stand above and execute\nhimself.[229] Paley, again, feared that if religion and morality\nallowed us to kill ourselves in any case, mankind would have to\nlive in continual alarm for the fate of their friends and dearest\nrelations[230]--just as if there were a very strong temptation\nfor men to shorten their lives. But common sense is neither a\nmetaphysician nor a sophist. When not restrained by the yoke of a\nnarrow theology, it is inclined in most cases to regard the\nself-murderer as a proper object of compassion rather than of\ncondemnation, and in some instances to admire him as a hero. The\nlegislation on the subject therefore changed as soon as the\nreligious influence was weakened. The laws against suicide were\nabolished in France by the Revolution,[231] and afterwards in\nvarious other continental countries;[232] whilst in England it\nbecame the custom of jurymen to presume absence of a sound mind\nin the self-murderer--perjury, as Bentham said, being the penance\nwhich prevented an outrage on humanity.[233] These measures\nundoubtedly indicate not only a greater regard for the innocent\nrelatives of the self-murderer, but also a change in the moral\nideas concerning the act itself**.\n\n[Footnote 227: Kant, _Metaphysische Anfangungsgr\u00fcnde der\nTugendlehre_, p. 73.]\n\n[Footnote 228: Fichte, _Das System der Sittenlehre_, p. 339\n_sqq._ See also _ibid._ pp. 360, 391.]\n\n[Footnote 229: Hegel, _Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts_,\n\u00a7 70, Zusatz, p. 72.]\n\n[Footnote 230: Paley, _Principles of Moral and Political\nPhilosophy_, iv. 3 (_Complete Works_, ii. 230).]\n\n[Footnote 231: Legoyt, _op. cit._ p. 109.]\n\n[Footnote 232: Bourquelot, _loc. cit._ iv. 475.]\n\n[Footnote 233: Bentham, _Principles of Penal Law_, ii. 4. 4\n(_Works_, i. 479 _sq._).]\n\nAs appears from this survey of facts, the moral valuation of\nsuicide varies to an extreme degree. It depends partly on the\ncircumstances in which the act is committed, partly on the point\nof view from which it is regarded and the notions held about the\nfuture life. When a person sacrifices his life for the benefit of\na fellow-man or for the sake of his country or to gratify the\nsupposed desire of a god, his deed may be an object of the\nhighest praise. It may, further, call forth approval or\nadmiration as indicating a keen sense of honour or as a test of\ncourage; in Japan, says Professor Chamberlain, \"the courage to\ntake {262} life--be it one's own or that of others--ranks\nextraordinarily high in public esteem.\"[234] In other cases\nsuicide is regarded with indifference as an act which concerns\nthe agent alone. But for various reasons it is also apt to give\nrise to moral disapproval. The injury which the person committing\nit inflicts upon himself may excite sympathetic resentment\ntowards him; he may be looked upon as injurer and injured at the\nsame time. Plato asks in his 'Laws':--\"What ought he to suffer\nwho murders his nearest and so-called dearest friend? I mean, he\nwho kills himself.\"[235] And the same point of view is\nconspicuous in St. Augustine's argument, that the more innocent\nthe self-murderer was before he committed his deed the greater is\nhis guilt in taking his life[236]--an argument of particular\nforce in connection with a theology which condemns suicides to\neverlasting torments and which regards it as a man's first duty\nto save his soul. The condemnation of killing others may by an\nassociation of ideas lead to a condemnation of killing one's\nself,[237] as is suggested by the Christian doctrine that suicide\nis prohibited in the commandment, \"Thou shalt not kill.\" The\nhorror which the act inspires, the fear of the malignant ghost,\nand the defiling effect attributed to the shedding of blood, also\ntend to make suicide an object of moral reprobation or to\nincrease the disapproval of it;[238] and the same is the case\nwith the exceptional treatment to which the self-murderer's body\nis subject and his supposed annihilation or miserable existence\nafter death, which easily come to be looked upon in the light of\na punishment.[239] Suicide is, moreover, blamed as an act of\nmoral cowardice,[240] and, especially, as an injury inflicted\nupon other persons, to whom the agent {263} owed duties from\nwhich he withdrew by shortening his life.[241] Even among savages\nwe meet with the notion that a person is not entitled to treat\nhimself just as he pleases. Among the Goajiro Indians of\nColombia, if anybody accidentally cuts himself, say with his own\nknife, or breaks a limb, or otherwise does himself an injury, his\nfamily on the mother's side immediately demands blood-money,\nsince, being of their blood, he is not allowed to spill it\nwithout paying for it; the father's relatives demand tear-money,\nand friends present claim compensation to repay their sorrow at\nseeing a friend in pain.[242] That a similar view is sometimes\ntaken by savages with regard to suicide appears from a few\nstatements quoted above.[243] The opinion that suicide is an\noffence against society at large is particularly likely to\nprevail in communities where the interests of the individual are\nconsidered entirely subordinate to the interests of the State.\nThe religious argument, again, that suicide is a sin against the\nCreator, an illegitimate interference with his work and decrees,\ncomes to prominence in proportion as the moral consciousness is\ninfluenced by theological considerations. In Europe this\ninfluence is certainly becoming less and less. And considering\nthat the religious view of suicide has been the chief cause of\nthe extreme severity with which it has been treated in Christian\ncountries, I am unable to subscribe to the opinion expressed by\nProfessor Durkheim, that the more lenient judgment passed on it\nby the public conscience of the present time is merely accidental\nand transient. The argument adduced in support of this opinion\nleaves out of account the real causes to which the valuation of\nsuicide is due: it is said that the moral evolution is not likely\nto be retrogressive in this particular point after it has\nfollowed {264} a certain course for centuries.[244] It is true\nthat moral progress has a tendency to increase our sense of duty\ntowards our fellow-men. But at the same time it also makes us\nmore considerate as regards the motives of conduct; and--not to\nspeak of suicides committed for the benefit of others--the\ndespair of the self-murderer will largely serve as a palliation\nof the wrong which he may possibly inflict upon his neighbour.\n\n[Footnote 234: Chamberlain, _Things Japanese_, p. 221.]\n\n[Footnote 235: Plato, _Leges_, ix. 873.]\n\n[Footnote 236: St. Augustine, _De Civitate Dei_, i. 17.]\n\n[Footnote 237: See Simmel, _Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaft_,\ni. 187.]\n\n[Footnote 238: _Cf._ _supra_, i. 377.]\n\n[Footnote 239: See _supra_, ii. 237 _sqq._; Josephus, _De bello\nJudaico_, iii. 8. 5; Plato, _Leges_, ix. 873; Aristotle, _Ethica\nNicomachea_, v. 11. 2 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 240: Hegel, _Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts_, \u00a7\n70, Zusatz, p. 72; Fowler, _Progressive Morality_, p. 151; &c.]\n\n[Footnote 241: English lawyers have represented suicide as an\noffence both against God and against the sovereign, who \"has an\ninterest in the preservation of all his subjects\" (Plowden,\n_Commentaries_, i. 261; Blackstone, _Commentaries on the Laws of\nEngland_, iv. 190. _Cf._ Ives, _op. cit._ p. 40 _sq._).]\n\n[Footnote 242: Simons, 'Exploration of the Goajira Peninsula,' in\n_Proceed. Roy. Geo. Soc._ N. Ser. vii. 790.]\n\n[Footnote 243: _Supra_, ii. 240 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 244: Durkheim, _Le suicide_, p. 377.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXVI\n\nSELF-REGARDING DUTIES AND VIRTUES--INDUSTRY--REST\n\n\nACCORDING to current ideas men owe to themselves a variety of\nduties similar in kind to those which they owe to their\nfellow-creatures. They are not only forbidden to take their own\nlives, but are also in some measure considered to be under an\nobligation to support their existence, to take care of their\nbodies, to preserve a certain amount of personal freedom, not to\nwaste their property, to exhibit self-respect, and, in general,\nto promote their own happiness. And closely related to these\nself-regarding duties there are self-regarding virtues, such as\ndiligence, thrift, temperance. In all these cases, however, the\nmoral judgment is greatly influenced by the question whether the\nact, forbearance, or omission, which increases the person's own\nwelfare, conflicts or not with the interests of other people. If\nit does conflict, opinions vary as to the degree of selfishness\nwhich is recognised as allowable. But judgments containing moral\npraise or the inculcation of duty are most commonly passed upon\nconduct which involves some degree of self-sacrifice, not on such\nas involves self-indulgence.\n\nMoreover, the duties which we owe to ourselves are generally much\nless emphasised than those which we owe to others. \"Nature,\" says\nButler, \"has not given us so sensible a disapprobation of\nimprudence and folly, either in ourselves or others, as of\nfalsehood, injustice, and {266} cruelty.\"[1] Nor does a\nprudential virtue receive the same praise as one springing from a\ndesire to promote the happiness of a fellow-man. Many moralists\neven maintain that, properly speaking, there are no\nself-regarding duties and virtues at all; that useful action\nwhich is useful to ourselves alone is not matter for moral\nnotice; that in every case duties towards one's self may be\nreduced into duties towards others; that intemperance and\nextravagant luxury, for instance, are blamable only because they\ntend to the public detriment, and that prudence is a virtue only\nin so far as it is employed in promoting public interest.[2] But\nthis opinion is hardly in agreement with the ordinary moral\nconsciousness.\n\n[Footnote 1: Butler, 'Dissertation on the Nature of Virtue,' in\n_Analogy of Religion, &c._ p. 339.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Hutcheson, _Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas\nof Beauty and Virtue_, pp. 133, 201. Grote, _Treatise on the\nMoral Ideals_, p. 77 _sqq._ Clifford, _Lectures and Essays_,\npp. 298, 335. von Jhering, _Der Zweck im Recht_, ii. 225.]\n\nIt is undoubtedly true that no mode of conduct is exclusively\nself-regarding. No man is an entirely isolated being, hence\nanything which immediately affects a person's own welfare affects\nat the same time, in some degree, the welfare of other\nindividuals. It is also true that the moral ideas concerning such\nconduct as is called self-regarding are more or less influenced\nby considerations as to its bearing upon others. But this is\ncertainly not the only factor which determines the judgment\npassed on it. In the education of children various modes of\nself-regarding conduct are strenuously insisted upon by parents\nand teachers. What they censure or punish is regarded as wrong,\nwhat they praise or reward is regarded as good; for, as we have\nnoticed above, men have a tendency to sympathise with the\nretributive emotions of persons for whom they feel regard.[3]\nMoreover, as in the case of suicide,[4] so also in other\ninstances of self-inflicted harm, the injury committed may excite\nsympathetic resentment towards the agent, although the victim of\nit is his own self. Disinterested likes or dislikes often give\nrise to moral {267} approval or disapproval of conduct which is\nessentially self-regarding.[5] It has also been argued that no\nman has a right to trifle with his own well-being even where\nother persons interests are not visibly affected by it, for the\nreason that he is not entitled wantonly to waste \"what is not at\nhis unconditional disposal.\"[6] And in various other ways--as\nwill be seen directly--religious, as well as magical, ideas have\ninfluenced moral opinions relating to self-regarding conduct. But\nat the same time it is not difficult to see why self-regarding\nduties and virtues only occupy a subordinate place in our moral\nconsciousness. The influence they exercise upon other persons'\nwelfare is generally too remote to attract much attention. In\neducation there is no need to emphasise any other self-regarding\nduties and virtues but those which, for the sake of the\nindividual's general welfare, require some sacrifice of his\nimmediate comfort or happiness. The compassion which we are apt\nto feel for the victim of an injury is naturally lessened by the\nfact that it is self-inflicted. And, on the other hand,\nindignation against the offender is disarmed by pity, imprudence\ncommonly carrying its own punishment along with it.[7]\n\n[Footnote 3: _Supra_, i. 114 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 4: _Supra_, ii. 262.]\n\n[Footnote 5: _Cf._ _supra_, i. 116 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 6: Martineau, _Types of Ethical Theory_, ii. 126.]\n\n[Footnote 7: _Cf._ Butler, _op. cit._ p. 339 _sq._; Dugald\nStewart, _Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers of Man_,\nii. 346 _sq._]\n\nBeing so little noticed by custom and public opinion, and still\nless by law, most self-regarding duties hardly admit of a\ndetailed treatment. In a general way it may be said that progress\nin intellectual culture has, in some respects, been favourable to\ntheir evolution; Darwin even maintains that, with a few\nexceptions, self-regarding virtues are not esteemed by\nsavages.[8] The less developed the intellect, the less apt it is\nto recognise the remoter consequences of men's behaviour; hence\nmore reflection than that exercised by the savage may be needed\nto see that modes of conduct which immediately concern a person's\nown welfare at the same time affect the well-being {268} of his\nneighbours or the whole community of which he is a member. So\nalso, owing to his want of foresight, the savage would often fail\nto notice how important it may be to subject one's self to some\ntemporary deprivation or discomfort in order to attain greater\nhappiness in the future. We have noticed above that many savages\nhardly ever correct their children,[9] and this means that one of\nthe chief sources from which the notions of self-regarding duties\nspring is almost absent among them. But on the other hand it must\nalso be remembered that disinterested antipathies, another cause\nof such notions, exercise more influence upon the unreflecting\nthan upon the reflecting moral consciousness, and that many\nmagical and religious ideas which at the lower stages of\ncivilisation give rise to duties of a self-regarding character\nare no longer held by people more advanced in culture.\n\n[Footnote 8: Darwin, _Descent of Man_, p. 118 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 9: _Supra_, i. 513 _sq._]\n\nThese general statements referring to the nature and origin of\nself-regarding duties and virtues I shall now illustrate by a\nshort survey of moral ideas concerning some representative modes\nof self-regarding conduct:--industry and rest; temperance,\nfasting, and abstinence from certain kinds of food and drink;\ncleanliness and uncleanliness; and ascetic practices generally.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nMan is naturally inclined to idleness, not because he is averse\nfrom muscular activity as such, but because he dislikes the\nmonotony of regular labour and the mental exertion it\nimplies.[10] In general he is induced to work only by some\nspecial motive which makes him think the trouble worth his while.\nAmong savages, who have little care for the morrow,[11] who have\nfew comforts of life to provide for, and whose property is often\nof such a kind as to prevent any great accumulation of it, almost\nthe sole inducement to industry is either necessity or\ncompulsion. Men are lazy or industrious according as the\nnecessaries of life are easy {269} or difficult to procure, and\nthey prefer being idle if they can compel other persons to work\nfor them as their servants or slaves.\n\n[Footnote 10: _Cf._ Ferrero, 'Les formes primitives du travail,'\nin _Revue scientifique_, ser. iv. vol. v. 331 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 11: Buecher, _Die Entstehung der Volkswirtschaft_,\np. 21 _sqq._]\n\nAustralian natives \"can exert themselves vigorously when hunting\nor fishing or fighting or dancing, or at any time when there is a\nprospect of an immediate reward; but prolonged labour with the\nobject of securing ultimate gain is distasteful to them.\"[12]\nWith reference to the Polynesians Mr. Hale observes that in those\nislands which are situated nearest the equator, where the heat\nwith little or no aid from human labour calls into existence\nfruits serving to support human life, the inhabitants are an\nindolent and listless race; whilst \"a severer clime and ruder\nsoil are favourable to industry, foresight, and a hardy\ntemperament. These opposite effects are manifested in the\nSamoans, Nukahivans, and Tahitians, on the one side, and the\nSandwich Islanders and New Zealanders on the other.\"[13] Mr. Yate\nlikewise contrasts the industry of the Maoris with the proverbial\nidleness of the Tonga Islanders: the former \"are obliged to work,\nif they would eat,\" whereas \"in the luxurious climate of the\nFriendly Islands, there is scarcely any need of labour, to obtain\nthe necessaries, and even many of the luxuries, of life.\"[14] The\nMalays are described as fond of a life of slothful ease, because\n\"persevering toil is unnecessary, or would bring them no\nadditional enjoyments.\"[15] The natives of Sumatra, says Marsden,\n\"are careless and improvident of the future, because their wants\nare few; for though poor {270} they are not necessitous, nature\nsupplying, with extraordinary facility, whatever she has made\nrequisite for their existence.\"[16] The Toda of the Neilgherry\nHills will not \"work one iota more than circumstances compel him\nto do\";[17] and indolence seems to be a characteristic of most\npeoples of India,[18] though there are exceptions to the\nrule.[19] Burckhardt observes that it is not the southern sun, as\nMontesquieu imagined, but the luxuriance of the southern soil and\nthe abundance of provisions that relax the exertions of the\ninhabitants and cause apathy:--\"By the fertility of Egypt,\nMesopotamia, and India, which yield their produce almost\nspontaneously, the people are lulled into indolence; while in\nneighbouring countries, of a temperature equally warm, as among\nthe mountains of Yemen and Syria, where hard labour is necessary\nto ensure a good harvest, we find a race as superior in industry\nto the former as the inhabitants of Northern Europe are to those\nof Spain or Italy.\"[20] Indolence is a common,[21] though not\nuniversal,[22] trait of the African character. Of the Negroes on\nthe Gold Coast Bosman says that \"nothing {271} but the utmost\nnecessity can force them to labour.\"[23] The Waganda are\nrepresented as excessively indolent, in consequence of the ease\nwith which they can obtain all the necessaries of life.[24] Of\nthe Namaquas we are told that \"they may be seen basking in the\nsun for days together, in listless inactivity, frequently almost\nperishing from thirst or hunger, when with very little exertion\nthey may have it in their power to satisfy the cravings of\nnature. If urged to work, they have been heard to say: 'Why\nshould we resemble the worms of the ground?'\"[25] Most of the\nAmerican Indians are said to have a slothful disposition, because\nthey can procure a livelihood with but little labour.[26] But the\ncase is different with the Greenlanders and other Eskimo, who\nhave to struggle hard for their existence.[27]\n\n[Footnote 12: Brough Smyth, _Aborigines of Victoria_, i. 29 _sq._\nSee also _ibid._ ii. 248; Collins, _English Colony in New South\nWales_, i. 601; Fison and Howitt, _Kamilaroi and Kurnai_,\np. 259 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 13: Hale, _U.S. Exploring Expedition. Vol. VI.\nEthnography and Philology_, p. 17. See also Williams, _Missionary\nEnterprises in the South Sea Islands_, p. 534 (Samoans); Ellis,\n_Polynesian Researches_, i. 130 _sq._ (Tahitians); Brenchley,\n_Cruise of H.M.S. Cura\u00e7oa among the South Sea Islands_, p. 58\n(natives of Tutuila); Melville, _Typee_, p. 287 (some Marquesas\nIslanders); Anderson, _Notes of Travel in Fiji and New\nCaledonia_, p. 236 (New Caledonians); Penny, _Ten Years in\nMelanesia_, p. 74 (Solomon Islanders).]\n\n[Footnote 14: Yate, _Account of New Zealand_, p. 105 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 15: McNair, _Perak and the Malays_, p. 201. Bock,\n_Head-Hunters of Borneo_, p. 275. Raffles, _History of Java_, i.\n251. St. John, _Life in the Forests of the Far East_, ii. 323.]\n\n[Footnote 16: Marsden, _History of Sumatra_, p. 209. See also\n_Glimpses of the Eastern Archipelago_, pp. 76, 87 (Bataks).]\n\n[Footnote 17: Marshall, _A Phrenologist amongst the Todas_, p.\n88. See also _ibid._ p. 86; Shortt, 'Hill Tribes of the\nNeilgherries,' in _Trans. Ethn. Soc._ N.S. vii. 241; Mantegazza,\n'Studii sull' etnologia dell' India,' in _Archivio per\nl'antropologia e la etnologia_, xiii. 406.]\n\n[Footnote 18: Cooper, _Mishmee Hills_, p. 100 (Assamese).\nTickell, 'Memoir on the Hod\u00e9sum,' in _Jour. Asiatic Soc. Bengal_,\nix. 808 (Hos). Dalton, _Ethnology of Bengal_, pp. 57 (Jyntias and\nKasias), 101 (Lepchas). Burton, _Sindh_, p. 284. Moorcroft and\nTrebeck, _Travels in the Himalayan Provinces of Hindustan_, i.\n321 (Ladakhis). Caldwell, _Tinnevelly Shanars_, p. 58.]\n\n[Footnote 19: Man, _Sonthalia_, p. 19. Hodgson, _Miscellaneous\nEssays_, i. 152 (B\u00f3do and Dhim\u00e1ls). Macpherson, _Memorials of\nService in India_, p. 81 (Kandhs).]\n\n[Footnote 20: Burckhardt, _Arabic Proverbs_, p. 219.]\n\n[Footnote 21: Beltrame, _Il S\u00e9nnaar_, i. 166. Tuckey, _Expedition\nto Explore the River Zaire_, p. 369. Johnston, _The River Congo_,\np. 402 (Bakongo). Casati, _Ten Years in Equatoria_, i. 85 (Abaka\nNegroes). Wilson and Felkin, _Uganda_, ii. 310 (Gowane people).\nBurton, _Zanzibar_, ii. 96 (Wanika). Bonfanti, 'L'incivilimento\ndei negri nell' Africa intertropicale,' in _Archivio per\nl'antropologia e la etnologia_, xv. 133 (Bantu). Andersson, _Lake\nNgami_, p. 231 (Herero). Magyar, _Reisen in S\u00fcd-Afrika_, p. 290\n(Kimbunda). Kropf, _Das Volk der Xosa-Kaffern_, p. 89. Tyler,\n_Forty Years among the Zulus_, p. 194. Ellis, _History of\nMadagascar_, i. 140. Shaw, 'Betsileo Country and People,' in\n_Antananarivo Annual_, iii. 81.]\n\n[Footnote 22: Baker, _Ismail\u00efa_, p. 56 (Shilluk). Baumann,\n_Usambara_, p. 244 (Wapare). Bosman, _Description of the Coast of\nGuinea_, p. 318 (Negroes of Fida). Andersson, _Notes on Travel in\nSouth Africa_, p. 235 (Ovambo). See also _infra_, p. 272.]\n\n[Footnote 23: Bosman, _op. cit._ p. 101.]\n\n[Footnote 24: Wilson and Felkin, _op. cit._ i. 225.]\n\n[Footnote 25: Andersson, _Lake Ngami_, p. 335. See also Kolben,\n_Present State of the Cape of Good-Hope_, i. 46, 324; Barrow,\n_Travels into the Interior of Southern Africa_, i. 152; Fritsch,\n_Die Eingeborenen S\u00fcd-Afrika's_, p. 324 (Hottentots).]\n\n[Footnote 26: Bridges, 'Manners and Customs of the Firelanders,'\nin _A Voice for South America_, xiii. 203 (Fuegians).\nDobrizhoffer, _Account of the Abipones_, ii. 151; but he praises\nthe Abiponian women for their unwearied industry (_ibid._ ii. 151\n_sq._). Brett, _Indian Tribes of Guiana_, p. 343; Kirke,\n_Twenty-five Years in British Guiana_, p. 150. Domenech, _Seven\nYears' Residence in the Great Deserts of North America_, ii. 190.\nBurton, _City of the Saints_, p. 126 (Sioux). Harmon, _Voyages\nand Travels in the Interior of North America_, p. 285\n(Tacullies). Meares, _Voyages to the North-West Coast of\nAmerica_, p. 265 (Nootkas).]\n\n[Footnote 27: Cranz, _History of Greenland_, i. 126. Armstrong,\n_Narrative of the Discovery of the North-West Passage_, p. 196\n(Western Eskimo).]\n\nWe have seen that savages consider it a duty for a married man to\nsupport his family,[28] and this in most cases implies that he is\nunder an obligation to do a certain amount of work. We have also\nseen that the various occupations of life are divided between the\nsexes according to rules fixed by custom,[29] and this means that\nabsolute idleness is not generally tolerated in either men or\nwomen, though the drudgeries of life are often imposed upon the\nlatter. Of some uncivilised peoples we are directly told that\nthey enjoin work as a duty or regard industry as a virtue. The\nGreenlanders esteem addiction to labour as the chief of virtues\nand believe that the industrious man {272} will have a very happy\nexistence after death.[30] The Atkha Aleuts prohibited\nlaziness.[31] Mr. Batchelor relates an Ainu fable which\nencourages diligence and discourages idleness in young\npeople.[32] The Karens of Burma have a traditional precept which\nruns, \"Be not idle, but labour diligently, that you may not\nbecome slaves.\"[33] The Maoris say, \"Let industry be rewarded,\nlest idleness gets the advantage.\"[34] The Malagasy likewise\ninculcate industry in many of their proverbs.[35] The Basutos\nhave a saying that \"perseverance always triumphs.\"[36] Among the\nBachapins, a Bechuana tribe conspicuous for its activity, \"a\nman's merit is estimated principally by his industry, and the\nwords _m\u00fan[)o]n[)a] usin\u00e1ach[)a]_ (an industrious man) are an\nexpression of high approbation and praise; while he who is seldom\nseen to hunt, to prepare skins for clothing, or to sew koboes, is\naccounted a worthless and disgraceful member of society.\"[37]\nAmong the Beni M'zab in the Sahara--an industrious people\ninhabiting a sterile country--boys are already at the age of six\nyears compelled by law to begin to work, either in driving a\ncamel or ass, or in drawing water for the gardens.[38] We may\nexpect to find industry especially insisted upon by uncivilised\npeoples who are habitually addicted to it, partly because it is a\nnecessity among them, partly owing to the influence of habit.\n\n[Footnote 28: _Supra_, i. 526 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 29: _Supra_, i. 634 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 30: Cranz, _op. cit._ i. 186.]\n\n[Footnote 31: Yakof, quoted by Petroff, _Report on Alaska_,\np. 158.]\n\n[Footnote 32: Batchelor, _Ainu of Japan_, p. 111.]\n\n[Footnote 33: Smeaton, _Loyal Karens of Burma_, p. 255.]\n\n[Footnote 34: Taylor, _Te Ika a Maui_, p. 293. See also Johnston,\n_Maoria_, p. 43.]\n\n[Footnote 35: Clemes, 'Malagasy Proverbs,' in _Antananarivo\nAnnual_, iv. 29.]\n\n[Footnote 36: Casalis, _Basutos_, p. 310.]\n\n[Footnote 37: Burchell, _Travels in the Interior of Southern\nAfrica_, ii. 557.]\n\n[Footnote 38: Tristram, _The Great Sahara_, p. 207 _sq._]\n\nBut instead of being regarded as a duty, industrial activity is\nnot infrequently looked down upon as disreputable for a free man.\nThis is especially the case among warlike nations, nomadic\ntribes, and peoples who have many slaves. In Uganda, for\ninstance, the prevalence of slavery \"causes all manual labour to\nbe looked upon as derogatory to the dignity of a free man.\"[39]\nThe {273} Masai[40] and Matabele[41] consider that the only\noccupation which becomes a man is warfare. The Arabs of the\ndesert hold labour humiliating to anybody but a slave.[42]\nSpeaking of the Turkomans, V\u00e1mb\u00e9ry observes that \"in his domestic\ncircle, the nomad presents us a picture of the most absolute\nindolence. In his eyes it is the greatest shame for a man to\napply his hand to any domestic occupation.\"[43] The Chippewas\n\"have ever looked upon agricultural and mechanical labours as\ndegrading,\" and \"have regarded the use of the bow and arrow, the\nwar-club and spear, as the noblest employments of man.\"[44] Among\nthe Iroquois \"the warrior despised the toil of husbandry, and\nheld all labour beneath him.\"[45] Though an industrious race, the\nMaoris considered it more honourable, as well as more desirable,\nto acquire property by war and plunder than by labour.[46] Among\nthe Line Islanders it is undignified for a landholder to do work\nof any kind, except to make weapons, hence he employs persons of\nthe lower class to work for him.[47] In Nukahiva the people of\ndistinction \"suffer the nails on the fingers to grow very long,\nthat it may be evident they are not accustomed to hard\nlabour.\"[48] This contempt for industrial activity is easy to\nexplain. A man who earns his livelihood by labour is considered\nto be lacking in those qualities which are alone admired--courage\nand strength;--or work is associated with the idea of servile\nsubjection. It is also universally held degrading for a man to\nengage in any occupation which belongs to the women.[49] Thus\namong hunting and pastoral peoples it would be quite out of place\nfor him to supply the household with vegetable food.[50] On the\nother hand, when agriculture became an {274} indispensable means\nto maintenance of life it at the same time became respectable.\nBut trade was scorned, probably, as Mr. Spencer suggests, because\nit was carried on chiefly by unsettled persons, who were\ndetached, untrustworthy members of a community in which most men\nhad fixed positions.[51] The Kandhs \"consider it beneath their\ndignity to barter or traffic, and . . . . regard as base and\nplebeian all who are not either warriors or tillers of the\nsoil.\"[52] The Javans \"have a contempt for trade, and those of\nhigher rank esteem it disgraceful to be engaged in it; but the\ncommon people are ever ready to engage in the labours of\nagriculture, and the chiefs to honour and encourage agricultural\nindustry.\"[53]\n\n[Footnote 39: Wilson and Felkin, _op. cit._ i. 186.]\n\n[Footnote 40: Merker, _Die Masai_, p. 117.]\n\n[Footnote 41: Holub, 'Die Ma-Atabele,' in _Zeitschr. f. Ethnol._\nxxv. 198.]\n\n[Footnote 42: Burton, _Pilgrimage to Al-Madinah & Meccah_,\nii. 10.]\n\n[Footnote 43: V\u00e1mb\u00e9ry, _Travels in Central Asia_, p. 320.]\n\n[Footnote 44: Schoolcraft, _Archives of Aboriginal Knowledge_,\nv. 150.]\n\n[Footnote 45: Morgan, _League of the Iroquois_, p. 329.]\n\n[Footnote 46: Travers, 'Life and Times of Te Rauparaha,' in\n_Trans. New Zealand Inst._ v. 29.]\n\n[Footnote 47: Tutuila, 'Line Islanders,' in _Jour. Polynesian\nSoc._ i. 266.]\n\n[Footnote 48: von Langsdorf, _Voyages and Travels_, i. 174.]\n\n[Footnote 49: _Supra_, i. 636 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 50: _Supra_, i. 634.]\n\n[Footnote 51: Spencer, _Principles of Ethics_, i. 429.]\n\n[Footnote 52: Campbell, _Wild Tribes of Khondistan_, p. 50.]\n\n[Footnote 53: Raffles, _op. cit._ i. 246 _sq._]\n\nProgress in civilisation implies an increase of industry. Both\nthe necessities and the comforts of life grow more numerous;\nhence more labour is required to provide for them, and at the\nsame time there is more inducement to accumulate wealth. The\nadvantages, both private and public, accruing from diligence are\nmore clearly recognised, and the government, in particular, is\nanxious that the people should work so as to be able to pay their\ntaxes. All this leads to condemnation of idleness and approbation\nof industry; and the influence of habit must operate in the same\ndirection among a nation whose industrial propensities have been\nthe cause of its civilisation. But in the archaic State war is\nstill regarded as a nobler occupation than labour; and whilst\nagriculture is held in honour, trade and handicraft are\nfrequently despised.\n\nIn the kingdom of the Peruvian Incas there was a law that no one\nshould be idle. \"Children of five years old were employed at very\nlight work, suitable to their age. Even the blind and lame, if\nthey had no other infirmity, were provided with certain kinds of\nwork. The rest of the people, while they were healthy, were\noccupied each at his own labour, and it was a most infamous and\ndegrading {275} thing among these people to be chastised in\npublic for idleness.\"[54] If any of them was slothful, or slept\nin the day, he was whipped or had to carry the stone.[55] The\nreason for these measures was that the whole duty of defraying\nthe expenses of the government belonged to the people, and that,\nwithout money and with little property, they paid their taxes in\nlabour; hence to be idle was, in a manner, to rob the\nexchequer.[56]\n\n[Footnote 54: Blas Valera, quoted by Garcilasso de la Vega,\n_First Part of the Royal Commentaries of the Yncas_, ii. 34. See\nalso _ibid._ ii. 14; Acosta, _Natural and Moral History of the\nIndies_, ii. 413.]\n\n[Footnote 55: Herrera, _General History of the West Indies_,\niv. 339.]\n\n[Footnote 56: Prescott, _History of the Conquest of Peru_, i. 57.]\n\nOne of the characteristics of Zoroastrianism is its appreciation\nof labour.[57] The faithful man must be vigilant, alert, and\nactive; sleep itself is merely a concession to the demons, and\nshould therefore be kept within the limits of necessity.[58] The\nlazy man is the most unworthy of men, because he eats his food\nthrough impropriety and injustice.[59] And of all kinds of labour\nthe most necessary is husbandry.[60] Man has been placed upon\nearth to preserve Ahura Mazda's good creation, and this can only\nbe done by careful tilling of the soil, eradication of thorns and\nweeds, and reclamation of the tracks over which Angra Mainyu has\nspread the curse of barrenness. Zoroaster asked, \"What is the\nfood that fills the Religion of Mazda?\" and Ahura Mazda answered,\n\"It is sowing corn again and again, O Spitama Zarathustra! He who\nsows corn sows righteousness.\"[61] According to Xenophon, the\nking of the Persians considered the art of agriculture and that\nof war to be the most honourable and necessary occupations, and\npaid the greatest attention to both.[62] He appointed officers to\noverlook the tillers of the ground, as well as to collect tribute\nfrom them; for \"those who {276} cultivate the ground\ninefficiently will neither maintain the garrisons, nor be able to\npay their tribute.\"[63]\n\n[Footnote 57: See Darmesteter, in _Sacred Books of the East_, iv.\np. lxvii.; Geiger, _Civilization of the Eastern Ir[=a]nians_, i.\n70; Rawlinson, _Religions of the Ancient World_, p. 108; _D\u00een\u00e2-\u00ee\nMa\u00een\u00f4g-\u00ee Khirad_, ii. 29, xxxvi. 15, xxxvii. 14, &c.]\n\n[Footnote 58: _Vend\u00eed\u00e2d_, xviii. 16.]\n\n[Footnote 59: _D\u00een\u00e2-\u00ee Ma\u00een\u00f4g-\u00ee Khirad_, xxi. 27.]\n\n[Footnote 60: See _Vend\u00eed\u00e2d_, iii. 23 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 61: _Ibid._ iii. 30 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 62: Xenophon, _[OE]conomicus_, iv. 4, 8 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 63: Xenophon, _[OE]conomicus_, iv. 9, 11.]\n\nIn his description of ancient Egypt Herodotus tells us that one\nof its kings made a law to the effect that every Egyptian should\nannually declare to the governor of his district by what means he\nmaintained himself, and that, if he failed to do this, or did not\nshow that he lived by honest means, he should be punished with\ndeath.[64] Whether this statement be correct or not,[65] it seems\ncertain that the Egyptians were anxious to encourage\nindustry.[66] An ostracon which has often been quoted contains\nthe maxim, \"Do not spare thy body whilst thou art young, for food\ncometh by the arms and provisions by the legs.\"[67]\n\n[Footnote 64:  Herodotus, ii. 177. _Cf._ Diodorus Siculus,\n_Bibliotheca historica_, i. 77. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 65: _Cf._ Wiedemann, _Herodots zweites Buch_, p. 605.]\n\n[Footnote 66: See Am\u00e9lineau, _Essai sur l'\u00e9volution des id\u00e9es\nmorales dans l'\u00c9gypte Ancienne_, p. 329.]\n\n[Footnote 67: Gardiner, 'Egyptian Ethics,' in Hastings'\n_Encyclop\u00e6dia of Religion and Ethics_, v. 484.]\n\nA law against idleness resembling that which is reported to have\nexisted in Egypt was established at Athens, according to some\nwriters by Draco or Pisistratus,[68] according to others by\nSolon, who is said to have borrowed it from the Egyptians.[69]\nPlutarch states that, as the city was filled with persons who\nassembled from all parts on account of the great security which\nprevailed in Attica and the country withal was poor and barren,\nSolon turned the attention of the citizens to manufactures. For\nthis purpose he ordered that trades should be accounted\nhonourable, that the council of the Areopagus should examine into\nevery man's means of subsisting and chastise the idle, and that\nno son should be obliged to maintain his father if the father had\nnot taught him a trade.[70] Thucydides puts the following words\nin the mouth of Pericles:--\"To avow poverty with us is no\ndisgrace; the true disgrace is in doing nothing to avoid it. An\nAthenian citizen does not neglect the State because he takes care\nof his own household;{277} and even those of us who are engaged\nin business have a very fair idea of politics.\"[71] In Xenophon's\n'Memorabilia' Socrates recommends industry as a means of\nsupporting life, of maintaining the health and strength of the\nbody, of promoting temperance and honesty.[72] According to Plato\nidleness is the mother of wantonness, whereas by labour the\naliment of passion is diverted into other parts of the body.[73]\nAgriculture was highly praised. It is the best of all the\noccupations and arts by which men procure the means of\nliving.[74] Where it flourishes all other pursuits are in full\nvigour, but when the ground is allowed to lie barren other\noccupations are almost stopped.[75] It is an exercise for the\nbody, and strengthens it for discharging the duties that become a\nman of honourable birth.[76] It requires people to accustom\nthemselves to endure the colds of winter and the heats of\nsummer.[77] It renders them fit for running, throwing,\nleaping.[78] It gives them the greatest gratification for their\nlabour, it is the most attractive of all employments.[79] It\nreceives strangers with the richest hospitality.[80] It offers\nthe most pleasing first-fruits to the gods, and the richest\nbanquets on festival days.[81] It teaches men justice, for it is\nthose who treat the earth best that she recompenses with the most\nnumerous benefits.[82] It instructs people to assist one another,\nfor it cannot be conducted without the aid of other men.[83] It\ndoes not give such constant occupation to a person's mind as to\nprevent him from attending to the interests of his friends or his\nnative land.[84] The possession of an estate stimulates men to\ndefend their country in arms.[85] In short, agriculture renders\ncitizens most useful, most virtuous, and best affected towards\nthe commonwealth.[86]\n\n[Footnote 68: Pollux, _Onomasticum_, viii. 42. Diogenes Laertius,\n_Vit\u00e6 philosophorum_, i. 55. Plutarch, _Solon_, xxxi. 6.]\n\n[Footnote 69: Herodotus, ii. 177. Diodorus Siculus, i. 77. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 70: Plutarch, _Solon_, xxii. 1, 3 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 71: Thucydides, _Historia belli Peloponnesiaci_,\nii. 40. 1 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 72: Xenophon, _Memorabilia_, ii. 7. 7 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 73: Plato, _Leges_, viii. 835, 841.]\n\n[Footnote 74: Xenophon, _[OE]conomicus_, vi. 8.]\n\n[Footnote 75: _Ibid._ v. 17.]\n\n[Footnote 76: _Ibid._ v. 1; vi. 9.]\n\n[Footnote 77: _Ibid._ v. 4.]\n\n[Footnote 78: _Ibid._ v. 8.]\n\n[Footnote 79: _Ibid._ v. 8, 11.]\n\n[Footnote 80: _Ibid._ v. 8.]\n\n[Footnote 81: _Ibid._ v. 10.]\n\n[Footnote 82: _Ibid._ v. 12.]\n\n[Footnote 83: _Ibid._ v. 14.]\n\n[Footnote 84: _Ibid._ vi. 9.]\n\n[Footnote 85: _Ibid._ v. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 86: _Ibid._ vi. 10.]\n\n{278} The argumentative manner in which these views were\nexpressed by the philosophers indicates, however, that industrial\noccupations were deficient in public appreciation.[87] Herodotus\nsays that not only among most barbarians but also throughout\nGreece those who are given wholly to war are honoured above\nothers.[88] This was especially the case at Sparta, where a\nfreeman was forbidden to engage in any industrial occupation.[89]\nContrasting Lycurgus' legislation with that of Solon, Plutarch\nobserves that in a state where the earth was sufficient to\nsupport twice the number of inhabitants and where there were a\nmultitude of Helots to be worn out by servitude, it was right to\nset the citizens free from laborious and mechanic arts and to\nemploy them in arms as the only art fit for them to learn and\nexercise.[90] At Thebes there was a law that no man could hold\noffice who had not retired from business for ten years, because\nit was looked upon as a mean employment.[91] Even at Athens, in\nspite of its democratic institutions and its laws against\nidleness, trade and handicrafts were despised, both by the\ngeneral public and by the philosophers. Xenophon's Socrates said\nthat the industrial arts are objectionable and justly held in\nlittle repute in communities, because they weaken the bodies of\nthose who work at them by compelling them to sit and to live\nindoors and in some cases to pass whole days by the fire; for\nwhen the body becomes effeminate the mind loses its strength.[92]\nMoreover, mechanical occupations leave those who practise them no\nleisure to attend to the interests of their friends or the\ncommonwealth, hence men of that class seem unsuited alike to be\nof advantage to their connections and to be defenders of their\ncountry.[93] Plato maintains that manual arts are a reproach\nbecause they \"imply a natural weakness of the higher\nprinciple\";[94] by {279} their meanness they maim and disfigure\nthe souls as well as the bodies of those who are employed in\nthem.[95] When Hesiod said that \"work is no disgrace,\"[96] he\ncould certainly not have meant that there was no disgrace for\nexample in the manufacture of shoes or in selling pickles.[97]\nAnd in his 'Laws' Plato lays down the regulation that no citizen\nor servant of a citizen should be occupied in handicraft arts;\n\"for he who is to secure and preserve the public order of the\nState has an art which requires much study and many kinds of\nknowledge, and does not admit of being made a secondary\noccupation.\"[98] Aristotle, again, observes that in a community\nwhich has an aristocratic form of government the mechanic and the\nlabourer will not be citizens, because honours are there given\naccording to virtue and merit, and \"no man can practise virtue\nwho is living the life of a mechanic or labourer.\"[99] Corinth\nwas the place in Greece where the mechanic's occupation was least\ndespised[100]--no doubt because its situation naturally led to\nextensive trade and thence to that splendour of living by which\nthe useful and ornamental arts are most encouraged.[101]\n\n[Footnote 87: _Cf._ Schmidt, _Die Ethik der alten Griechen_,\nii. 435 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 88: Herodotus, ii. 167.]\n\n[Footnote 89: _Ibid._ ii. 167. Xenophon, _Laced\u00e6moniorum\nrespublica_, vii. 2. Plutarch, _Lycurgus_, xxiv. 2. _Idem_,\n_Agesilaus_, xxvi. 6. Aelian, _Varia historia_, vi. 6.]\n\n[Footnote 90: Plutarch, _Solon_, xxii. 2.]\n\n[Footnote 91: Aristotle, _Politica_, iii. 5. 7, p. 1278 a; vi. 7.\n4, p. 1321 a.]\n\n[Footnote 92: Xenophon, _[OE]conomicus_, iv. 2.]\n\n[Footnote 93: _Ibid._ iv. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 94: Plato, _Respublica_, ix. 590.]\n\n[Footnote 95: _Ibid._ vi. 495.]\n\n[Footnote 96: Hesiod, _Opera et dies_, 311.]\n\n[Footnote 97: Plato, _Charmides_, p. 163.]\n\n[Footnote 98: _Idem_, _Leges_, viii. 846.]\n\n[Footnote 99: Aristotle, _Politica_, iii. 5. 5, p. 1278 a. See\nalso _ibid._ vi. 4. 12, p. 1319 a; vii. 8. 3, p. 1328 b; viii. 2.\n4 _sq._ p. 1337 b.]\n\n[Footnote 100: Herodotus, ii. 167.]\n\n[Footnote 101: See Rawlinson's note in his translation of\nHerodotus, ii. 252, n. 7.]\n\nThe Roman views on the subject were very similar to those of the\nGreeks. With regard to what arts and means of acquiring wealth\nare to be regarded as worthy and what disreputable, says Cicero,\nwe have been taught as follows. In the first place, those sources\nof emolument which incur public hatred, such as those of\ntax-gatherers and usurers, are condemned. We are likewise to\naccount as mean the gains of hired workmen, whose source of\nprofit is not their art but their labour; for their very wages\nare the consideration of their servitude. We are further to\ndespise all who retail from merchants goods for prompt sale; for\nthey never can succeed unless they lie most abominably, {280} and\nnothing is more disgraceful than insincerity. All mechanical\nlabourers are by their profession mean; for a workshop can\ncontain nothing befitting a gentleman. Least of all are those\ntrades to be approved that serve the purposes of sensuality, such\nas the occupations of butchers, cooks, and fishermen. But those\nprofessions that involve a higher degree of intelligence or a\ngreater amount of utility, such as medicine, architecture, and\nthe teaching of the liberal arts, are honourable in those to\nwhose rank in life they are suited. As to merchandising, if on a\nsmall scale it is mean, but if it is extensive and rich, if it\nbrings numerous commodities from all parts of the world, and\ngives bread to a multitude of people without fraud, it is not so\ndespicable. However, if a merchant, satisfied with his profits,\nsteps from the harbour into an estate, such a man seems most\njustly deserving of praise. For of all gainful professions\nnothing is better, nothing is more pleasing and more delightful,\nnothing is more befitting a well-bred man than agriculture.[102]\n\n[Footnote 102: Cicero, _De officiis_, i. 42. See also _Idem_,\n_Cato Major_, ch. 15 _sqq._]\n\nThe contempt in which manual labour was held by the ancient\npagans could hardly be shared by early Christianity. Christ had\nbeen born in a carpenter's family, his apostles belonged to the\nworking class, and so did originally most of his followers.\nOrigen accepts with pride the reproach of Celsus, when he accuses\nChristians of worshipping the son of a poor workwoman, who had\nearned her bread by spinning,[103] and contrasts with the wisdom\nof Plato that of Paul, the tent-maker, of Peter, the fisherman,\nof John, who had abandoned his father's nets.[104] St. Paul\npresses on the Thessalonians the duty of personal industry; \"if\nany one would not work, neither should he eat.\"[105] But at the\nsame time the spirit of Christianity was not consistent with much\nanxiety about earthly matters. The aim of a true disciple of\nChrist was not to prosper in the world but {281} to seek the\nkingdom of God, not to lay up for himself treasures upon earth\nbut to lay up for himself treasures in heaven.[106] Poverty\nbecame an ideal, in conformity with both the example and\nteachings of Christ. It was associated with godliness, whilst\nwealth was associated with godlessness.[107] \"The love of money,\"\nsays St. Paul, \"is the root of all evil\";[108] and the same idea\nwas over and again expressed by Christian moralists.[109] In the\noriginal sinless state of mankind property was unknown, and so\nwas labour. It was to punish man for his disobedience that God\ncaused him to eat daily bread in the sweat of his face.[110]\nSince then work is a necessity; but the contemplative life is\nbetter than the active life.[111] Bonaventura points out that\nJesus preferred the meditating Mary to the busy Martha,[112] and\nthat he himself seems to have done no work till his thirtieth\nyear.[113] Work is of no value by itself; its highest object is\nto further contemplation, to macerate the body, to curb\nconcupiscence.[114] For this purpose, indeed, it was strongly\ninsisted upon by several founders of religious orders. According\nto St. Benedict, \"idleness is an enemy to the soul; and hence at\ncertain seasons the brethren ought to occupy themselves in the\nlabour of their hands, and at others in holy reading.\"[115] St.\nBernard writes:--\"The handmaid of Christ ought always to pray, to\nread, to work, lest haply the spirit of uncleanness should lead\nastray the slothful mind. The delight of the flesh is overcome by\nlabour. . . . The body tired by work is less delighted with\nvice.\"[116] But the active life must not be pursued to such an\nextent as to hinder what it is intended to promote; {282} for it\nis impossible for any man to be at once occupied with exterior\nactions and at the same time apply himself to divine\ncontemplation.[117] And whilst he who has nothing else to live\nupon is bound to work, it is a sin to try to acquire riches\nbeyond the limit which necessity has fixed.[118]\n\n[Footnote 103: Origen, _Contra Celsum_, i. 28 _sq._ (Migne,\n_Patrologi\u00e6 cursus_, Ser. Graeca, xi. 714 _sq._).]\n\n[Footnote 104: _Ibid._ vi. 7 (Migne, Ser. Gr. xi. 1298 _sq_.).]\n\n[Footnote 105: _1 Thessalonians_, iv. 11; _2 <Thessalonians_,\niii. 10.]\n\n[Footnote 106: _St. Luke_, xii. 22 _sqq._ _St. Matthew_,\nvi. 19 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 107: _St. Luke_, xvi. 19 _sqq._ _St. Matthew_, xix. 24.]\n\n[Footnote 108: _1 Timothy_, vi. 10.]\n\n[Footnote 109: von Eicken, _Geschichte der mittelalterlichen\nWeltanschauung_, p. 498 _sqq._ Thomas Aquinas, _Summa\ntheologica_, ii.-ii. 186. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 110: _Genesis_, iii. 19.]\n\n[Footnote 111: Thomas Aquinas, _op. cit._ ii.-ii. 182. 1 _sq._\nvon Eicken, _op. cit._ p. 488 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 112: Bonaventura, _Meditationes vit\u00e6 Christi_, ch. 45\n(_Opera_, xii. 452).]\n\n[Footnote 113: _Ibid._ ch. 15 (_Opera_, xii. 405).]\n\n[Footnote 114: Guigo, _Epistola ad Fratres de Monte-Dei_, i. 8\n(in St. Bernard, _Opera omnia_, ii. 214):--\"Non spiritualia\nexercitia sunt propter corporalia, sed corporalia propter\nspiritualia.\" von Eicken, _op. cit._ p. 491 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 115: St. Benedict, _Regula Monachorum_, 48.]\n\n[Footnote 116: St. Bernard, _De modo bene vivendi_, ch. 51\n(_Opera omnia_, ii. 883 _sq._).]\n\n[Footnote 117: _Speculum Monachorum_, in St. Bernard, _Opera\nomnia_, ii. 818. von Eicken, _op. cit._ p. 494 _sq._ _Cf._ Thomas\nAquinas, _op. cit._ ii.-ii. 182. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 118: Thomas Aquinas, _op. cit._ ii.-ii. 187. 3; 118. 1.]\n\nThis doctrine was more or less realised in the monastic life, but\nwas hardly held applicable to laymen. The medi\u00e6val baron and\nknight resembled the Teutonic warrior described by Tacitus, who\nregarded it as \"a dull and stupid thing to accumulate painfully\nby the sweat of the brow what might be won by a little\nblood.\"[119] In England, after the Conquest, the aristocracy in\ngeneral lived a life of idleness but indulged eagerly in hunting,\nand its members continually sallied forth in parties to\nplunder.[120] For a long time the lower classes, constituting the\nmass of society, existed only for the benefit of the upper class.\nIt was considered honourable to live in sloth supported by the\nexertions of others, it was held degrading to depend on the gains\nof industry. The degradation really attached to the gains of\nlabour rather than labour itself; for labour ceased to be\ndegrading if not prosecuted for gain. \"Louis XVI. may make locks,\nthe ladies of his court may make butter and cheese, provided it\nis only for amusement. Lord Rosse may build a telescope as an\namateur in the interest of science, and still be noble. But if\nthe locks, the butter, or the telescope are sold, the makers are\ndegraded to the level of the tradesman.\"[121] However, as Mr.\nSpencer observes, trade, while at first relatively unessential\n(since essential things were mostly made at home) and\nconsequently lacking the sanction of necessity and of ancestral\ncustom, ceased to be despised when it grew in importance.[122]\nAmong ourselves the respect in which a certain occupation is held\nis {283} largely determined by the degree of mental power implied\nin it; hence manual labour, and especially unskilled labour, is\nstill in some degree looked down upon. But we do not regard as\ndishonourable any kind of work which is not opposed to the\nordinary rules of morality. We distinguish more clearly than the\nancients did between social and moral inferiority. Our moral\njudgments are less influenced by class antipathies. We recognise\nthat a high standard of duty is compatible even with the humblest\nstation in life. And when we duly reflect upon the matter, we\nadmit that the moral value of industry depends, not on the\noccupation in which it is displayed, but on the purpose of the\nlabourer.\n\n[Footnote 119: Tacitus, _Germania_, 14.]\n\n[Footnote 120: Wright, _Domestic Manners and Sentiments in\nEngland during the Middle Ages_, p. 102.]\n\n[Footnote 121: Harris, 'The Christian Doctrine of Labor,' in _New\nEnglander_, xxiv. 245.]\n\n[Footnote 122: Spencer, _Principles of Ethics_, i. 429.]\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nBut though industry is applauded or insisted on, rest is also in\ncertain circumstances regarded as a duty. By doing too much work\na person may injure himself and indirectly other persons as well.\nIn early society there is little inducement to overwork, but the\ncase is very different in modern civilisation. This accounts for\nthe persistence and general popularity of an institution which\noriginally sprang from quite different sources, namely, the\nSunday rest.\n\nAmong various peoples it is the custom to abstain from work, or\nfrom some special kind of work, on certain occasions or days\nwhich are regarded as defiling or inauspicious. Work is often\nsuspended after a death, partly perhaps because inactivity is a\nnatural accompaniment of sorrow,[123] or because a mourner is\nsupposed to be in a delicate state requiring rest,[124] but\nchiefly, I presume, from fear lest the work done should be\ncontaminated by the pollution of death. Among the Arabs of\nMorocco no work must be performed in the village till the dead is\nburied. In Greenland everyone who had lived in the same house\nwith the deceased was obliged to be idle for a certain period,\naccording to the directions of the priests or wizards.[125] Among\nthe Eskimo of Behring Strait none of the relatives of the dead\nmust do any work during the time in which the shade is {284}\nbelieved to remain with the body, that is, for four or five\ndays.[126] Among the Seminole Indians of Florida the relatives\nremained at home and refrained from work during the day of the\nburial and for three days thereafter, when the dead was supposed\nto stay in his grave.[127] The Kar Nicobarese abstain from work\nas a sign of mourning.[128] In Samoa all labour was suspended in\nthe settlement on the death of a chief.[129] So also the Basutos\ndo no work on the day when an influential person dies. They,\nmoreover, refrain from going to their fields, or hasten to leave\nthem, at the approach of clouds which give promise of rain, \"in\norder quietly to await the desired benediction, fearing to\ndisturb Nature in her operations. This idea is carried to such an\nextent, that most of the natives believe that, if they\nobstinately persist in their labour at such a moment, the clouds\nare irritated and retire, or send hail instead of rain. Days of\nsacrifice, or great purification, are also holidays. Hence it is\nthat the law relative to the repose of the seventh day, so far\nfrom finding any objection in the minds of the natives, appears\nto them very natural, and perhaps even more fundamental, than it\nseems to certain Christians.\"[130]\n\n[Footnote 123: _Cf._ _infra_, p. 308.]\n\n[Footnote 124: _Cf._ _infra_, p. 307.]\n\n[Footnote 125: Egede, _Description of Greenland_, p. 149 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 126: Nelson, 'Eskimo about Bering Strait,' in _Ann.\nRep. Bur. Ethn._ xviii. 319.]\n\n[Footnote 127: Maccauley, 'Seminole Indians of Florida,' in _Ann.\nRep. Bur. Ethn._ v. 52.]\n\n[Footnote 128: Kloss, _In the Andamans and Nicobars_, p. 305.]\n\n[Footnote 129: Turner, _Nineteen Years in Polynesia_, p. 229.\n_Idem_, _Samoa_, p. 146.]\n\n[Footnote 130: Casalis, _Basutos_, p. 260 _sq._]\n\nChanges in the moon are frequently considered unfavourable for\nwork. Among the Bechuanas, \"when the new moon appears, all must\ncease from work, and keep what is called in England a\nholiday.\"[131] The people of Thermia, in the Cyclades, maintain\nthat all work, so far as possible, should be suspended on the\ndays immediately preceding the full moon.[132] In the Vishnu\nPurana it is said that one who attends to secular affairs on the\ndays of the full or new moon goes to the Rudhir\u00e1ndha hell, whose\nwells are blood.[133] In Northern India it is considered bad to\nundertake any business of importance at the new moon {285} or at\nan eclipse.[134] According to the 'Laws of Manu,' a Br\u00e2hmana is\nnot allowed to study \"on the new-moon day, nor on the fourteenth\nand the eighth days of each half-month, nor on the full-moon\nday.\" It is said that \"the new-moon day destroys the teacher, the\nfourteenth day the pupil, the eighth and the full-moon days\ndestroy all remembrance of the Veda; let him therefore avoid\nreading on those days.\"[135] The Buddhists have their Sabbath, or\n_Uposatha_, which occurs four times in the month, namely, on the\nday of full moon, on the day when there is no moon, and on the\ntwo days which are eighth from the full and new moon. On these\ndays selling and buying, work and business, hunting and fishing,\nare forbidden, and all schools and law-courts are closed.[136] In\nAshantee and neighbouring districts, where the people reckon time\nby moons, there is a weekly \"fetish-day\" or sabbath, which seems\nto be of native origin. \"In all the countries along the coast,\nthe regular fetish-day is Tuesday, the day which is observed by\nthe king of Ashantee. Other days in the week are held sacred in\nthe bush. On this weekly sabbath, or fetish-day, the people\ngenerally dress themselves in white garments, and mark their\nfaces, and sometimes their arms, with white clay. They also rest\nfrom labour. The fishermen would expect, that were they to go out\non that day, the fetish would be angry, and spoil their\nfishing.\"[137] The natives of Coomassie, on the Gold Coast, have\na law according to which no agricultural work may be done on a\nThursday.[138] In Hawaii, where each month contained thirty\nnights and the different days and nights derived their names from\nthe varying aspects of the moon according to her age, there were\nduring every month four periods lasting from two to four nights\nin which the nights were consecrated or made taboo. So also there\nwere tabooed seasons on certain other {286} occasions, as when a\nhigh chief was ill, or preparations were made for war, or on the\napproach of important religious ceremonies. These taboos were\neither \"common\" or \"strict.\" In the case of the former men were\nonly required to abstain from their common pursuits and to attend\nprayers morning and evening, whereas when the season of strict\ntaboo was in force a general gloom and silence pervaded the whole\ndistrict or island. \"Not a fire or light was to be seen, or canoe\nlaunched; none bathed; the mouths of dogs were tied up, and fowls\nput under calabashes, or their heads enveloped in cloth; for no\nnoise of man or animal must be heard. No persons, excepting those\nwho officiated at the temple, were allowed to leave the shelter\nof their roofs. Were but one of these rules broken, the taboo\nwould fail and the gods be displeased.\"[139]\n\n[Footnote 131: Campbell, _Second Journey in the Interior of South\nAfrica_, ii. 205.]\n\n[Footnote 132: Bent, _Cyclades_, p. 438.]\n\n[Footnote 133: _Vish['n]u Pur\u00e1['n]a_, p. 209.]\n\n[Footnote 134: Crooke, _Popular Religion of Northern India_, i. 23.]\n\n[Footnote 135: _Laws of Manu_, iv. 113 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 136: Childers, _Dictionary of the Pali Language_, p.\n535. Kern, _Der Buddhismus_, ii. 258.]\n\n[Footnote 137: Beecham, _Ashantee_, p. 185 _sq._ _Cf._ Bosman,\n_op. cit._ p. 131 (Gold Coast natives).]\n\n[Footnote 138: Ellis, _Tshi-speaking Peoples of the Gold Coast_,\np. 304.]\n\n[Footnote 139: Jarves, _History of the Hawaiian Islands_, pp. 40,\n28. The word _tapua'i_ means \"to abstain from all work, games,\n&c.\" (Tregear, _Maori-Polynesian Dictionary_, p. 472).]\n\nThe peoples of Semitic stock or with Semitic culture also have\ntheir tabooed days. In Morocco work, or certain kinds of work,\nare avoided on holy days or in holy periods, as being\nunsuccessful or, in some cases, even dangerous to him who\nperforms it; there is a saying that \"work at a feast are like the\nstab of a dagger.\" Nobody likes to start on a journey on a Friday\nbefore the midday prayer has been said, and it is considered bad\nto commence any work on that day.[140] I was also told that\nclothes will not remain clean if they are washed on a Saturday.\nAmong the modern Egyptians Saturday is held to be the most\nunfortunate of days, and particularly unfavourable for shaving,\ncutting the nails, and starting on a journey.[141] At Kheybar, in\nArabia, again, Sunday is considered an unlucky day for beginning\nany kind of work.[142] There can be little doubt that the Jewish\nSabbath originated in the belief that it was inauspicious or\ndangerous to work on the seventh day, and that the reason for\nthis belief was the mystic connection which in {287} the opinion\nof the ancient Hebrews, as of so many other peoples, existed\nbetween human activity and the changes in the moon.[143] It has\nbeen sufficiently demonstrated that the Sabbath originally\ndepended upon the new moon, and this carries with it the\nassumption that the Hebrews must at one time have observed a\nSabbath at intervals of seven days corresponding with the moon's\nphases.[144] In the Old Testament the new moon and Sabbath are\nrepeatedly mentioned side by side;[145] thus the oppressors of\nthe poor are represented as saying, \"When will the new moon be\ngone, that we may sell corn? and the Sabbath, that we may set\nforth wheat?\"[146] Among modern Jews, at the feast of the New\nMoon, which is held every month on the first or on the first and\nsecond days of the month, the women are obliged to suspend all\nservile work, though the men are not required to interrupt their\nsecular employments.[147] That the superstitious fear of doing\nwork on the seventh day developed into a religious prohibition,\nis only another instance of a tendency which we have noticed\noften before--the tendency of magic forces to be transformed into\ndivine volitions.[148] Like the ancient Hebrews, the Assyrians\nand Babylonians looked upon the seventh day as an \"evil day\"; and\nthough they do not seem generally to have abstained from work on\nthat day, there were various royal taboos connected with it. The\n{288} King was not to show himself in his chariot, not to hold\ncourt, not to bring sacrifices, not to change his clothes, not to\neat a good dinner, and not even to curse his enemies.[149]\n\n[Footnote 140: See Westermarck, _The Moorish Conception of\nHoliness (Baraka)_, p. 140 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 141: Lane, _Modern Egyptians_, p. 272.]\n\n[Footnote 142: Doughty, _Arabia Deserta_, ii. 197 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 143: See Jastrow, 'Original Character of the Hebrew\nSabbath,' in _American Journal of Theology_, ii. 321 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 144: Wellhausen, _Prolegomena to the History of\nIsrael_, p. 112 _sqq._ Jastrow, _loc. cit._ pp. 314, 327.]\n\n[Footnote 145: _2 Kings_, iv. 23. _Isaiah_, i. 13. _Hosea_,\nii. 11.]\n\n[Footnote 146: _Amos_, viii. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 147: Allen, _Modern Judaism_, p. 390 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 148: Prof. Jastrow seems to have failed to see this\nwhen he says (_loc. cit._ p. 323) that \"if the Sabbath was\noriginally an 'unfavourable' day on which one must avoid showing\none's self before Yahwe, it would naturally be regarded as\ndangerous to provoke his anger by endeavouring to secure on that\nday personal benefits through the usual forms of activity.\"\nWellhausen, again, suggests (_op. cit._ p. 114) that the rest on\nthe Sabbath was originally the consequence of that day being the\nfestal and sacrificial day of the week, and only gradually became\nits essential attribute on account of the regularity with which\nit every eighth day interrupted the round of everyday work. He\nargues that the Sabbath as a day of rest cannot be very\nprimitive, because such a day \"presupposes agriculture and a\ntolerably hard-pressed working-day life.\" But this argument\nappears very futile when we consider how commonly changes in the\nmoon are believed to exercise an unfavourable influence upon work\nof any kind. See _infra_, Additional Notes.]\n\n[Footnote 149: Schrader, _Die Keilinschriften und das Alte\nTestament_, p. 592 _sq._ Hirschfeld, 'Remarks on the Etymology of\n[vS]abb[)a]th,' in _Jour. Roy. Asiatic Soc._ 1896, p. 358. Jastrow,\n_loc. cit._ pp. 320, 328.]\n\nThe Jewish Sabbath was abolished by Christ. \"The Sabbath was made\nfor man, and not man for the Sabbath\";[150] \"My father worketh\n[on it] hitherto, and I work.\"[151] Jewish converts no doubt\ncontinued to observe the Sabbath, but this met with disapproval.\nIn one of the Epistles of Ignatius we find the exhortation not to\n\"sabbatise,\" which was expanded by the subsequent paraphraser of\nthese compositions into a warning against keeping the Sabbath,\nafter the manner of the Jews, \"as if delighting in\nidleness.\"[152] And in the fourth century a Council of the Church\nenacted \"that the Christians ought not to judaise, and rest on\nthe Sabbath, but ought to work on that day.\"[153] On the other\nhand, it was from early times a recognised custom among the\nChristians to celebrate the first day of the week in memory of\nChrist's resurrection, by holding a form of religious service;\nbut there was no sabbatic regard for it, and it was chiefly\nlooked upon as a day of rejoicing.[154] Tertullian is the first\nwriter who speaks of abstinence from secular care and labour on\nSunday as a duty incumbent upon Christians, lest they should\n\"give place to the devil.\"[155] But it is extremely doubtful\nwhether the earliest Sunday law really had a Christian origin. In\n321 the Emperor Constantine issued an edict to the effect that\nall judges and all city people and tradesmen should rest on \"the\nvenerable Day of the Sun,\" whereas those living in the country\nshould have full liberty to attend to the culture of their\nfields, \"since it frequently happens {289} that no other day is\nso fit for the sowing of grain or the planting of vines.\"[156] In\nthis rescript nothing is said of any relation to Christianity,\nnor do we know that it in any way was due to Christian\ninfluence.[157] It seems that Constantine, in his capacity of\nPontifex Maximus, only added the day of the sun--whose worship\nwas the characteristic of the new paganism--to those inauspicious\ndays, _religiosi dies_, which the Romans of old regarded as\nunsuitable for worldly business and especially for judicial\nproceedings.[158] But though the obligatory Sunday rest in no\ncase was a continuance of the Jewish Sabbath, it gradually was\nconfounded with it, owing to the recognition of the decalogue,\nwith its injunction of a weekly day of rest, as the code of\ndivine morality. From the sixth century upwards vexatious\nrestrictions were made by civil rulers, councils, and\necclesiastical writers;[159] until in Puritanism the Christian\nSunday became a perfect image of the pharisaic Sabbath, or even\nexcelled it in the rigour with which abstinence from every kind\nof worldly activity was insisted upon. The theory that the\nkeeping holy of one day out of seven is the essence of the Fourth\nCommandment reconciled people to the fact that the Jewish Sabbath\nwas the seventh day and Sunday the first. In England, in the\nseventeenth century, persons were punished for carrying coal on\nSunday, for hanging out clothes to dry, for travelling on\nhorseback, for rural strolls and walking about.[160] And Scotch\nclergymen taught their congregations that on that day it was\nsinful to save a vessel in distress, and that it was proof of\nreligion to leave ship and crew to perish.[161]\n\n[Footnote 150: _St. Mark_, ii. 27.]\n\n[Footnote 151: _St. John_, v. 17.]\n\n[Footnote 152: Ignatius, _Epistola ad Magnesios_, 9 (Migne, _op.\ncit._ Ser. Graeca, v. 768). Neale, _Feasts and Fasts_, p. 89.]\n\n[Footnote 153: _Concilium Laodicenum_, can. 29 (Labbe-Mansi,\n_Sacrorum Conciliorum collectio_, ii. 580).]\n\n[Footnote 154: Justin Martyr, _Apologia I. pro Christianis_, 67\n(Migne, _op. cit._ Ser. Graeca, vi. 429). Schaff, _History of the\nChristian Church_, 'Ante-Nicene Christianity,' p. 202 _sqq._\nHessey, _Sunday_, p. 29 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 155: Tertullian, _De oratione_, 23 (Migne, _op. cit._\ni. 1191).]\n\n[Footnote 156: _Codex Justinianus_, iii. 12. 2 (3).]\n\n[Footnote 157: _Cf._ Lewis, _Critical History of Sunday\nLegislation_, p. 18 _sqq._; Milman, _History of Christianity_,\nii. 291 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 158: Gellius, _Noctes Attic\u00e6_, iv. 9. 5; vi. 9. 10.\nVarro, _De lingua Latina_, vi. 30. Neale, _op. cit._ pp. 5, 6,\n86, 87, 206. Fowler, _Roman Festivals of the Period of the\nRepublic_, p. 8 _sq._ The Greeks, also, had \"unblest and\ninauspicious\" days, when no court or assembly was to be held, and\nwork was to be abstained from (Plato, _Leges_, vii. 800; Karsten,\n_Studies in Primitive Greek Religion_, p. 90).]\n\n[Footnote 159: Hessey, _op. cit._ p. 87 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 160: Roberts, _Social History of the People of the\nSouthern Counties of England_, p. 244 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 161: Buckle, _History of Civilization in England_,\niii. 76.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXVII\n\nRESTRICTIONS IN DIET\n\n\nTRAVELLERS have often noticed with astonishment the immense\nquantities of food which uncivilised people are able to consume.\nSir George Grey has described the orgies which follow the\nstranding of a whale in Australia, when the natives remain by the\ncarcase for many days, fairly eating their way into it.[1] The\nRocky Mountain Indians, though they often subsist for a great\nlength of time on a very little food, will at their feasts \"gorge\ndown an incredible quantity.\"[2] A Mongol \"will eat more than ten\npounds of meat at one sitting, but some have been known to devour\nan average-sized sheep in the course of twenty-four hours.\"[3]\nThe Waganda in Central Africa \"sometimes gorge themselves to such\nan extent that they are unable to move, and appear just as if\nintoxicated.\"[4] It has been justly observed that what would\namong ourselves be condemned as disgusting gluttony is, under the\nconditions to which certain races of men are exposed, quite\nnormal and in fact necessary. As Mr. Spencer observes, \"where the\nhabitat is such as at one time to supply very little food and at\nanother time food in great abundance, survival depends on the\nability to consume immense quantities when the opportunities\noccur.\"[5] When this is the case gluttony can hardly be {291}\nstigmatised as a vice; and I find no direct evidence that it is\nso even among savages who are described as generally moderate in\ntheir diet. The lack of foresight, which is a characteristic of\nuncivilised peoples, must prevent them from attaching much moral\nvalue to temperance. On the other hand, gluttony is sometimes\nsaid to be regarded with admiration. Mr. Torday informs me that\nthe Bambala in South-Western Congo, when praising a man for his\nstrength, are in the habit of saying, \"He eats a whole goat with\nits skin.\"\n\n[Footnote 1: Grey, _Journals of Expeditions in North-West and\nWestern Australia_, ii. 277 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 2: Harmon, _Journal of Voyages in the Interior of North\nAmerica_, p. 329.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Prejevalsky, _Mongolia_, i. 55.]\n\n[Footnote 4: Wilson and Felkin, _Uganda_, i. 185.]\n\n[Footnote 5: Spencer, _Principles of Ethics_, i. 436.]\n\nAt higher stages of culture intemperance is often subject to\ncensure--because it is detrimental to health or prosperity, or\nbecause it calls forth an instinctive feeling of disgust, or\nbecause indulgence in sensual pleasures is considered degrading,\nor, generally, because it is inconsistent with an ascetic ideal\nof life. It is said in the Proverbs that \"the glutton shall come\nto poverty.\"[6] According to the Laws of Manu, \"excessive eating\nis prejudicial to health, to fame, and to bliss in heaven; it\nprevents the acquisition of spiritual merit, and is odious among\nmen; one ought, for these reasons, to avoid it carefully.\"[7]\nAristotle maintains that the pleasure with which intemperance is\nconcerned is justly held in disgrace, \"since it belongs to us in\nthat we are animals, not in that we are men.\"[8] Cicero observes\nthat, as mere corporeal pleasure is unworthy the excellency of\nman's nature, the nourishment of our bodies \"should be with a\nview not to our pleasure, but to our health and our strength.\"[9]\nThe same opinion is at least nominally shared by many among\nourselves; whereas others, though denying that the gratification\nof appetite is to be sought for its own sake, admit as legitimate\nends for it not only the maintenance of health and strength but\nalso \"cheerfulness and the cultivation of the social\naffections.\"[10] But most of us are undoubtedly less exacting, if\nnot in theory at least in practice, and really find nothing\nblamable in pleasures of the {292} table which neither impair\nhealth, nor involve a perceptible loss of some greater\ngratification, nor interfere with duties towards neighbours.[11]\n\n[Footnote 6: _Proverbs_, xxiii. 21.]\n\n[Footnote 7: _Laws of Manu_, ii. 57.]\n\n[Footnote 8: Aristotle, _Ethica Nicomachea_, iii. 10. 10.]\n\n[Footnote 9: Cicero, _De officiis_, i. 30.]\n\n[Footnote 10: Whewell, _Elements of Morality_, p. 124 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 11: See Sidgwick, _Methods of Ethics_, p. 328 _sq._]\n\nSometimes temperance has been inculcated on grounds which in\nother cases lead to the duty of fasting, that is, abstinence from\nall food and drink, or at least (in a looser sense of the word)\nfrom certain kinds of food, for a determined period. The custom\nof fasting is wide-spread, and deserves special attention in a\nstudy of moral ideas.\n\nFasting is practised or enjoined for a variety of purposes. It is\nfrequently adopted as a means of having supernatural converse, or\nacquiring supernatural powers.[12] He who fasts sees in dreams or\nvisions things that no ordinary eye can see. The Hudson Bay\nEskimo \"discovered that a period of fasting and abstinence from\ncontact with other people endowed a person with supernatural\npowers and enabled him to learn the secrets of Tung ak [the great\nspirit]. This is accomplished by repairing to some lonely spot,\nwhere, for a greater or less period, the hermit abstains from\nfood or water until the imagination is so worked upon that he\nbelieves himself imbued with the power to heal the sick and\ncontrol all the destinies of life. Tung ak is supposed to stand\nnear and reveal those things while the person is undergoing the\ntest.\"[13] The Naudowessies totally abstain from every kind of\neither victuals or drink before a hunting expedition, because\nthey think that \"it enables them freely to dream, in which dreams\nthey are informed where they shall find the greatest plenty of\ngame.\"[14] The Tsimshian of British Columbia, if a special object\nis to be attained, {293} believe they can compel the deity to\ngrant it by a rigid fasting.[15] The Amazulu have a saying that\n\"the continually stuffed body cannot see secret things,\" and, in\naccordance with this belief, put no faith in a fat diviner.[16] A\nTungus shaman, who is summoned to treat a sick person, will for\nseveral days abstain from food and maintain silence till he\nbecomes inspired.[17] Among the Santals the person or persons who\nhave to offer sacrifices at their feasts prepare themselves for\nthis duty by fasting and prayer and by placing themselves for\nsome time in a position of apparent mental absorption.[18] The\nsavage, as Sir E. B. Tylor remarks, has many a time, for days and\nweeks together, to try involuntarily the effects of fasting,\naccompanied with other privations and with prolonged solitary\ncontemplation in the desert or the forest. Under these\ncircumstances he soon comes to see and talk with phantoms, which\nare to him visible personal spirits, and, having thus learnt the\nsecret of spiritual intercourse, he thenceforth reproduces the\ncause in order to renew the effects.[19] The Hindus believe that\na fasting person will ascend to the heaven of that god in whose\nname he observes the fast.[20] The Hebrews associated fasting\nwith divine revelations.[21] St. Chrysostom says that fasting\n\"makes the soul brighter, and gives it wings to mount up and soar\non high.\"[22]\n\n[Footnote 12: Tylor, _Primitive Culture_, ii. 410 _sqq._ Spencer,\n_Principles of Sociology_, i. 261. Avebury, _Origin of\nCivilisation_, p. 266 _sqq._ Landtman, _Origin of Priesthood_,\npp. 118-123, 158 _sqq._ M\u00fcller, _Geschichte der Amerikanischen\nUrreligionen_, pp. 285, 651. Dorsey, 'Siouan Cults,' in _Ann.\nRep. Bur. Ethn._ xi. 390. Mooney, 'Myths of the Cherokee,'\n_ibid._ xix. 480. Herrera, _General History of the West Indies_,\n1. 165 (ancient natives of Hispaniola). Niebuhr, _Travels through\nArabia_, ii. 282.]\n\n[Footnote 13: Turner, 'Ethnology of the Ungava District,' in\n_Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ xi. 195.]\n\n[Footnote 14: Carver, _Travels through the Interior Parts of\nNorth America_, p. 285.]\n\n[Footnote 15: Boas, in _Fifth Report on the North-Western Tribes\nof Canada_, p. 50.]\n\n[Footnote 16: Callaway, _Religious System of the Amazulu_,\np. 387, n. 41.]\n\n[Footnote 17: Krivoshapkin, quoted by Landtman, _op. cit._\np. 159.]\n\n[Footnote 18: Dalton, _Ethnology of Bengal_, p. 213. See also\nRowney, _Wild Tribes of India_, p. 77.]\n\n[Footnote 19: Tylor, _Primitive Culture_, ii. 410.]\n\n[Footnote 20: Ward, _View of the History, &c. of the Hindoos_,\nii. 77.]\n\n[Footnote 21: _Exodus_, xxxiv. 28. _Deuteronomy_, ix. 9.\n_Daniel_, ix. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 22: St. Chrysostom, _In Cap. I. Genes. Homil. X._\n(Migne, _Patrologi\u00e6 cursus_, Ser. Graeca, liii. 83). _Cf._\nTertullian, _De jejuniis_, 6 _sqq._ (Migne, ii. 960, 961, 963);\nHaug, _Alterth\u00fcmmer der Christen_, pp. 476, 482.]\n\nIdeas of this kind partly underlie the common practice of\nabstaining from food before or in connection with the performance\nof a magical or religious ceremony;[23] but there {294} is yet\nanother ground for this practice. The effect attributed to\nfasting is not merely psychical, but it also prevents pollution.\nFood may cause defilement, and, like other polluting matter, be\ndetrimental to sanctity. Among the Maoris \"no food is permitted\nto touch the head or hair of a chief, which is sacred; and if\nfood is mentioned in connection with anything sacred (or 'tapu')\nit is considered as an insult, and revenged as such.\"[24] So also\na full stomach may be polluting.[25] This is obviously the reason\nwhy in Morocco and elsewhere[26] certain magical practices, in\norder to be efficacious, have to be performed before breakfast.\nThe Masai use strong purges before they venture to eat holy\nmeat.[27] The Caribs purified their bodies by purging,\nbloodletting, and fasting; and the natives of the Antilles, at\ncertain religious festivals, cleansed themselves by vomiting\nbefore they approached the sanctuary.[28] The true object of\nfasting often appears from the fact that it is practised hand in\nhand with other ceremonies of a purificatory character. A Lappish\n_noaide_, or wizard, prepares himself for the offering of a\nsacrifice by abstinence from food and ablutions.[29] Herodotus\ntells us that the ancient Egyptians fasted before making a\nsacrifice to Isis, and beat their bodies while the victims were\nburnt.[30] When a Hindu resolves to visit a sacred place, he has\nhis head shaved two days preceding the commencement of his\njourney, and fasts the next day; on the last day of his journey\nhe fasts again, and on his {295} arrival at the sacred spot he\nhas his whole body shaved, after which he bathes.[31] In\nChristianity we likewise meet with fasting as a rite of\npurification. At least as early as the time of Tertullian it was\nusual for communicants to prepare themselves by fasting for\nreceiving the Eucharist;[32] and to this day Roman Catholicism\nregards it as unlawful to consecrate or partake of it after food\nor drink.[33] The Lent fast itself was partly interpreted as a\npurifying preparation for the holy table.[34] And in the early\nChurch catechumens were accustomed to fast before baptism.[35]\n\n[Footnote 23: Bossu, _Travels through Louisiana_, i. 38\n(Natchez). Clavigero, _History of Mexico_, i. 285 _sq._;\nBancroft, _Native Races of the Pacific States_, iii. 440 _sq._\n(ancient Mexicans). Landa, _Relacion de las cosas de Yucatan_, p.\n156. Junghuhn, _Die Battal\u00e4nder auf Sumatra_, ii. 311 _sq._\n(natives of Tjumba). Beauchamp, in the Madras Government Museum's\n_Bulletin_, iv. 56 (Hindus of Southern India). Ward, _op. cit._\nii. 76 _sq._ (Hindus). Wassiljew, quoted by Haberland, 'Gebr\u00e4uche\nund Aberglauben beim Essen,' in _Zeitschrift f\u00fcr V\u00f6lkerpsychologie_,\nxviii. 30 (Buddhists). Porphyry, _De abstinentia ab esu\nanimalium_, ii. 44; Wachsmuth, _Hellenische Alterthumskunde_, ii.\n560, 576; Hermann-Stark, _Lehrbuch der gottesdienstlichen\nAlterth\u00fcmer der Griechen_, p. 381; Anrich, _Das antike\nMysterienwesen_, p. 25; Diels, 'Ein orphischer Demeterhymnus,' in\n_Festschrift Theodor Gomperz dargebracht_, p. 6 _sqq._ Chwolsohn,\n_Die Ssabier und der Ssabismus_, ii. 23, 74.]\n\n[Footnote 24: Angas, _Polynesia_, p. 149.]\n\n[Footnote 25: See Robertson Smith, _Religion of the Semites_,\np. 434 _sq._; Westermarck, _The Moorish Conception of Holiness_,\np. 127.]\n\n[Footnote 26: Wuttke, _Der deutsche Volksaberglaube der\ngegenwart_, \u00a7 219, p. 161.]\n\n[Footnote 27: Thomson, _Masai Land_, p. 430.]\n\n[Footnote 28: Waitz, _Anthropologie der Naturv\u00f6lker_, iv. 330;\niii. 384.]\n\n[Footnote 29: von D\u00fcben, _Lappland_, p. 256. Friis, _Lappisk\nMythologi_, p. 145 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 30: Herodotus, ii. 40.]\n\n[Footnote 31: Ward, _op. cit._ ii. 130 _sq._ _Cf._ _Institutes of\nVishnu_, xlvi. 17, 24 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 32: Tertullian, _De oratione_, 19 (Migne, _op. cit._\ni. 1182).]\n\n[Footnote 33: _Catechism of the Council of Trent_, ii. 4. 6.]\n\n[Footnote 34: St. Jerome, _In Jonam_, 3 (Migne, _op. cit._\nxxv. 1140).]\n\n[Footnote 35: Justin Martyr, _Apologia I. pro Christianis_, 61\n(Migne, _op. cit._ Ser. Graeca, vi. 420). St. Augustine, _De fide\net operibus_, vi. 8 (Migne, xl. 202).]\n\nIn the case of a sacrifice it is considered necessary not only\nthat he who offers it, but that the victim also, should be free\nfrom pollution. In ancient Egypt a sacrificial animal had to be\nperfectly clean.[36] According to Hindu notions the gods enjoy\npure sacrifices only.[37] In the Kalika-Purana, a work supposed\nto have been written under the direction of Siva, it is said that\nif a man is offered he must be free from corporal defect and\nunstained with great crimes, and that if an animal is offered it\nmust have exceeded its third year and be without blemish or\ndisease; and in no case must the victim be a woman or a she\nanimal, because, as it seems, females are regarded as naturally\nunclean.[38] According to the religious law of the Hebrews, no\nleaven or honey should be used in connection with vegetable\nofferings, on the ground that these articles have the effect of\nproducing fermentation and tend to acidify and spoil anything\nwith which they are mixed;[39] and the animal which was intended\nfor sacrifice should be absolutely free from blemish[40] and at\nleast eight days old,[41] that is, untainted with the impurity of\nbirth. Quite in harmony with these prescriptions is the notion\nthat human or {296} animal victims have to abstain from food for\nsome time before they are offered up. Among the Kandhs the man\nwho was destined to be sacrificed was kept fasting from the\npreceding evening, but on the day of the sacrifice he was\nrefreshed with a little milk and palm-sago; and before he was led\nforth from the village in solemn procession he was carefully\nwashed and dressed in a new garment.[42] In Morocco it is not\nonly considered meritorious for the people to fast on the day\nprevious to the celebration of the yearly sacrificial feast,\n_l-[(][)a]\u00eed l-kb\u00eer_, but in several parts of the country the\nsheep which is going to be sacrificed has to fast on that day or\nat least on the following morning, till some food is given it\nimmediately before it is slaughtered. The Jewish custom which\ncompels the firstborn to fast on the eve of Passover[43] may also\nperhaps be a survival from a time when all the firstborn belonged\nto the Lord.[44]\n\n[Footnote 36: Herodotus, ii. 38.]\n\n[Footnote 37: _Baudh\u00e2yana_, i. 6. 13. 1 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 38: Dubois, _Description of the Character, &c. of the\nPeople of India_, p. 491.]\n\n[Footnote 39: Keil, _Manual of Biblical Arch\u00e6ology_, i. 262.]\n\n[Footnote 40: _Leviticus_, xxii. 19 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 41: _Ibid._ xxii. 27.]\n\n[Footnote 42:  Macpherson, _Memorials of Service in India_, p. 118.]\n\n[Footnote 43: Greenstone, 'Fasting,' in _Jewish Encyclopedia_, v.\n348. Allen, _Modern Judaism_, p. 394.]\n\n[Footnote 44: _Supra_, i. 459.]\n\nIn some cases the custom of fasting before the performance of a\nsacrifice may be due to the idea that it is dangerous or improper\nfor the worshipper to partake of food before the god has had his\nshare.[45] In India a regular performance of two half-monthly\nsacrifices is enjoined on the Brahmanical householder for a\nperiod of thirty years from the time when he has set up a fire of\nhis own--according to some authorities even for the rest of his\nlife. The ceremony usually occupies two consecutive days, the\nfirst of which is chiefly taken up with preparatory rites and the\nvow of abstinence (_vrata_) by the sacrificer and his wife,\nwhilst the second day is reserved for the main performance of the\nsacrifice. The _vrata_ includes the abstention from certain kinds\nof food, especially meat, which will be offered to the gods on\nthe following day, as also from other carnal pleasures. The\nSatapatha-Br\u00e2hmana gives the following explanation of it:--\"The\ngods see through the mind of man; they know that, when {297} he\nenters on this vow, he means to sacrifice to them the next\nmorning. Therefore all the gods betake themselves to his house,\nand abide by him or the fires (_upa-vas_) in his house; whence\nthis day is called _upa-vasatha_. Now, as it would even be\nunbecoming for him to take food before men who are staying with\nhim as his guests have eaten; how much more would it be so, if he\nwere to take food before the gods who are staying with him have\neaten: let him therefore take no food at all.\"[46] It is hardly\nprobable, however, that this is the original meaning of the\nabstinence in question. It occurs about the time of new moon and\nfull moon; according to some native authorities the abstinence\nand sacrifice take place on the last two days of each half of the\nlunar month, whilst the generality of ritualistic writers\nconsider the first day of the half-month that is, the first and\nsixteenth days of the month to be the proper time for the\nsacrifice.[47] We shall presently see how frequently fasting is\nobserved on these occasions, presumably for fear of eating food\nwhich is supposed to have been polluted by the moon; hence it\nseems to me by no means improbable that the _vrata_ has a similar\norigin, instead of being merely a rite preparatory to the\nsacrifice which follows it. But at the same time the idea that\nspirits or gods should have the first share of a meal is\ncertainly very ancient, and may lead to actual fasting in case\nthe offering for some reason or other is to be delayed. A\nPolynesian legend tells us that a man by name Maui once caught an\nimmense fish. Then he left his brothers, saying to them:--\"After\nI am gone, be courageous and patient; do not eat food until I\nreturn, and do not let our fish be cut up, but rather leave it\nuntil I have carried an offering to the gods from this great haul\nof fish, and until I have found a priest, that fitting prayers\nand sacrifices may be offered to the god, and the necessary rites\nbe completed in order. We shall thus all be purified. I will then\n{298} return, and we can cut up this fish in safety, and it shall\nbe fairly portioned out to this one, and to that one, and to that\nother.\" But as soon as Maui had gone, his brothers began at once\nto eat food, and to cut up the fish. Had Maui previously reached\nthe sacred place, the heart of the deity would have been appeased\nwith the offering of a portion of the fish which had been caught\nby his disciples, and all the male and female deities would have\npartaken of their portions of the sacrifice. But now the gods\nturned with wrath upon them, on account of the fish which they\nhad thus cut up without having made a fitting sacrifice.[48]\n\n[Footnote 45: _Cf._ Oldenberg, _Die Religion des Veda_, p. 414.]\n\n[Footnote 46: _Satapatha-Br\u00e2hmana_, i. 1. 1. 7 _sq._ Eggeling, in\n_Sacred Books of the East_, xii. 1 _sq._ Oldenberg, _op. cit._\np. 413, n. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 47: Eggeling, in _Sacred Books of the East_, xii. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 48: Grey, _Polynesian Mythology_, p. 26 _sq._]\n\nAmong many peoples custom prescribes fasting after a death.\nLucian says that at the funeral feast the parents of the deceased\nare prevailed upon by their relatives to take food, being almost\nprostrated by a three days' fast.[49] We are told that among the\nHindus children fast three days after the death of a parent, and\na wife the same period after the death of her husband;[50] but\naccording to a more recent statement, to be quoted presently,\nthey do not altogether abstain from food. In one of the sacred\nbooks of India it is said that mourners shall fast during three\ndays, and that, if they are unable to do so, they shall subsist\non food bought in the market or given unasked.[51] Among the\nNay[=a]dis of Malabar \"from the time of death until the funeral\nis over, all the relations must fast.\"[52] Among the Irulas of\nthe Neilgherries \"the relatives of the deceased fast during the\nfirst day, that is, if . . . . the death occur after the morning\nmeal, they refrain from the evening one, and eat nothing till the\nnext morning. If it occur during the night, or before the morning\nmeal, they refrain from all food till the evening. Similar\nfasting is observed on every return of the same day of the week,\ntill the obsequies take place.\"[53] Among {299} the Bogos of\nEastern Africa a son must fast three days after the death of his\nfather.[54] On the Gold Coast it is the custom for the near\nrelatives of the deceased to perform a long and painful fast, and\nsometimes they can only with difficulty be induced to have\nrecourse to food again.[55] So also in Dahomey they must fast\nduring the \"corpse time,\" or mourning.[56] Among the Brazilian\nParess\u00ed the relatives of a dead person remain for six days at his\ngrave, carefully refraining from taking food.[57] Among the\naborigines of the Antilles children used to fast after the death\nof a parent, a husband after the death of his wife, and a wife\nafter the death of her husband.[58] In some Indian tribes of\nNorth America it is the custom for the relatives of the deceased\nto fast till the funeral is over.[59] Among the Snanaimuq, a\ntribe of the Coast Salish, after the death of a husband or wife\nthe surviving partner must not eat anything for three or four\ndays.[60] In one of the interior divisions of the Salish of\nBritish Columbia, the Stlatlumh, the next four days after a\nfuneral feast are spent by the members of the household of the\ndeceased person in fasting, lamenting and ceremonial\nablutions.[61] Among the Upper Thompson Indians in British\nColumbia, again, those who handled the dead body and who dug the\ngrave had to fast until the corpse was buried.[62]\n\n[Footnote 49: Lucian, _De luctu_, 24.]\n\n[Footnote 50: Ward, _View of the History, &c. of the Hindoos_,\nii. 76 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 51: _Vasishtha_, iv. 14 _sq._ _Cf._ _Institutes of\nVishnu_, xix. 14.]\n\n[Footnote 52: Thurston, in the Madras Government Museum's\n_Bulletin_, iv. 76.]\n\n[Footnote 53: Harkness, _Description of a Singular Race\ninhabiting the Neilgherry Hills_, p. 97.]\n\n[Footnote 54: Munzinger, _Die Sitten und das Recht der Bogos_,\np. 29.]\n\n[Footnote 55: Cruickshank, _Eighteen Years on the Gold Coast_,\nii. 218.]\n\n[Footnote 56: Burton, _Mission to Gelele_, ii. 163.]\n\n[Footnote 57: von den Steinen, _Unter den Naturv\u00f6lkern\nZentral-Brasiliens_, p. 435. _Cf._ _ibid._ p. 339 (Baka\u00efri).]\n\n[Footnote 58: Du Tertre, _Histoire g\u00e9n\u00e9rale des Antilles_, ii. 371.]\n\n[Footnote 59: Charlevoix, _Voyage to North-America_, ii. 187.]\n\n[Footnote 60: Boas, in _Fifth Report on the North-Western Tribes\nof Canada_, p. 45.]\n\n[Footnote 61: Tout, 'Ethnology of the Stlatlumh of British\nColumbia,' in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxxv. 138.]\n\n[Footnote 62: Teit, 'Thompson Indians of British Columbia,' in\n_Memoirs of the American Museum of Natural History_,\nAnthropology, i. 331.]\n\nIn several instances fasting after a death is observed only in\nthe daytime.\n\nDavid and his people fasted for Saul and Jonathan until even on\nthe day when the news of their death arrived.[63] Among the Arabs\nof Morocco it is the custom that if a death takes place in the\nmorning everyone in the village refrains from food until {300}\nthe deceased is buried in the afternoon or evening; but if a\nperson dies so late that he cannot be buried till the next\nmorning the people eat at night. In the Pelew Islands, as long as\nthe dead is unburied, fasting is observed in the daytime but not\nin the evening.[64] In Fiji after a burial the _kana-bogi_, or\nfasting till evening, is practised for ten or twenty days.[65] In\nSamoa it was common for those who attended the deceased to eat\nnothing during the day, but to have a meal at night.[66] In the\nTuhoe tribe of the Maoris, \"when a chief of distinction died his\nwidow and children would remain for some time within the _whare\npotae_ [that is, mourning house], eating food during the night\ntime only, never during the day.\"[67] The Sacs and Foxes in\nNebraska formerly required that children should fast for three\nmonths after the death of a parent, except that they every day\nabout sunset were allowed to partake of a meal made entirely of\nhominy.[68] Among the Kansas a man who loses his wife must fast\nfrom sunrise to sunset for a year and a half, and a woman who\nloses her husband must observe a similar fast for a year.[69] In\nsome tribes of British Columbia and among the Thlinkets, until\nthe dead body is buried the relatives of the deceased may eat a\nlittle at night but have to fast during the day.[70] Among the\nUpper Thompson Indians a different custom prevailed: \"nobody was\nallowed to eat, drink, or smoke in the open air after sunset\n(others say after dusk) before the burial, else the ghost would\nharm them.\"[71]\n\n[Footnote 63: _2 Samuel_, i. 12. _Cf._ _ibid._ iii. 35.]\n\n[Footnote 64: Waitz, _op. cit._ v. 153.]\n\n[Footnote 65: Williams and Calvert, _Fiji_, p. 169.]\n\n[Footnote 66: Turner, _Nineteen Years in Polynesia_, p. 228.\n_Idem_, _Samoa_, p. 145.]\n\n[Footnote 67: Best, 'Tuhoe Land,' in _Trans. and Proceed. of the\nNew Zealand Institute_, xxx. 38.]\n\n[Footnote 68: Yarrow, 'Mortuary Customs of the North American\nIndians,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ i. 95.]\n\n[Footnote 69: Dorsey, 'Mourning and War Customs of the Kansas,'\nin _American Naturalist_, xix. 679 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 70: Boas, _loc. cit._ p. 41.]\n\n[Footnote 71: Teit, _loc. cit._ p. 328.]\n\nVery frequently mourners have to abstain from certain victuals\nonly, especially flesh or fish, or some other staple or favourite\nfood.\n\nIn Greenland everybody who had lived in the same house with the\ndead, or who had touched his corpse, was for some time forbidden\nto partake of certain kinds of food.[72] Among the Upper Thompson\nIndians \"parents bereft of a child did not eat fresh meat for\nseveral months.\"[73] Among the Stlatlumh of {301} British\nColumbia a widow might eat no fresh food for a whole year, whilst\nthe other members of the deceased person's family abstained from\nsuch food for a period of from four days to as many months. A\nwidower was likewise forbidden to eat fresh meats for a certain\nperiod, the length of which varied with the age of the\nperson--the younger the man, the longer his abstention.[74] In\nsome of the Goajiro clans of Colombia a person is prohibited from\neating flesh during the mourning time, which lasts nine days.[75]\nAmong the Abipones, when a chief died, the whole tribe abstained\nfor a month from eating fish, their principal dainty.[76] While\nin mourning, the Northern Queensland aborigines carefully avoid\ncertain victuals, believing that the forbidden food, if eaten,\nwould burn up their bowels.[77] In Easter Island the nearest\nrelatives of the dead are for a year or even longer obliged to\nabstain from eating potatoes, their chief article of food, or\nsome other victuals of which they are particularly fond.[78]\nCertain Papuans and various tribes in the Malay Archipelago\nprohibit persons in mourning from eating rice or sago.[79] In the\nAndaman Islands mourners refuse to partake of their favourite\nviands.[80] After the death of a relative the Tipperahs abstain\nfrom flesh for a week.[81] The same is the case with the Arakh, a\ntribe in Oudh, during the fifteen days in the month of Ku\u00e2r which\nare sacred to the worship of the dead.[82] Among the Nay[=a]dis\nof Malabar the relatives of the deceased are not allowed to eat\nmeat for ten days after his death.[83] According to Toda custom\nthe near relatives must not eat rice, milk, honey, or gram until\nthe funeral is over.[84] Among the Hindus described by Mr.\nChunder Bose a widow is restricted to one scanty meal a day, and\nthis is of the coarsest description and always devoid of fish,\nthe most esteemed article of food in a Hindu lady's bill of fare.\nThe son, again, from {302} the hour of his father's death to the\nconclusion of the funeral ceremony, is allowed to take only a\nmeal consisting of _atab_ rice, a sort of inferior pulse, milk,\nghee, sugar, and a few fruits, and at night a little milk, sugar,\nand fruits--a _r\u00e9gime_ which lasts ten days in the case of a\nBrahmin and thirty-one days in the case of a S\u00fbdra.[85] In some\nof the sacred books of India it is said that, during the period\nof impurity, all the mourners shall abstain from eating meat.[86]\nIn China \"meat, must, and spirits were forbidden even in the last\nmonth of the deepest mourning, when other sorts of food had long\nbeen allowed already.\"[87]\n\n[Footnote 72: Egede, _Description of Greenland_, p. 149 _sq._\nCranz, _History of Greenland_, i. 218.]\n\n[Footnote 73: Teit, _loc. cit._ p. 332.]\n\n[Footnote 74: Tout, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxxv. 138 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 75: Candelier, _Rio-Hacha_, p. 220.]\n\n[Footnote 76: Charlevoix, _History of Paraguay_, i. 405.]\n\n[Footnote 77: Lumholtz, _Among Cannibals_, p. 203.]\n\n[Footnote 78: Geiseler, _Die Oster-Insel_, pp. 28, 30.]\n\n[Footnote 79: Wilken, 'Ueber das Haaropfer, und einige andere\nTrauergebr\u00e4uche bei den V\u00f6lkern Indonesien's,' in _Revue\ncoloniale internationale_, iv. 348 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 80: Man, 'Aboriginal Inhabitants of the Andaman\nIslands,' in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xii. 142**, 353.]\n\n[Footnote 81: Browne, quoted by Dalton, _op. cit._ p. 110.]\n\n[Footnote 82: Crooke, _Tribes and Castes of the North-Western\nProvinces and Oudh_, i. 84.]\n\n[Footnote 83: Thurston, in the Madras Government Museum's\n_Bulletin_, iv. 76.]\n\n[Footnote 84: _Idem_, _ibid._ i. 174. Dr. Rivers says (_Todas_,\np. 370) that, among the Todas, a widower is not allowed to eat\nrice nor drink milk, and that on every return of the day of the\nweek on which his wife died he takes no food in the morning but\nonly has his evening meal. The same holds good for a widow.]\n\n[Footnote 85: Bose, _The Hindoos as they are_, pp. 244, 254 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 86: _Gautama_, xiv. 39. _Institutes of Vishnu_, xix. 15.]\n\n[Footnote 87: de Groot, _Religious System of China_, (vol. ii.\nbook) i. 651.]\n\nThe custom of fasting after a death has been ascribed to\ndifferent causes by different writers. Mr. Spencer believes that\nit has resulted from the habit of making excessive provision for\nthe dead.[88] But although among some peoples the funeral\nofferings no doubt are so extensive as to reduce the survivors to\npoverty and starvation,[89] I have met with no statement to the\neffect that they are anxious to give to the deceased all the\neatables which they possess, or that the mourning fast is a\nmatter of actual necessity. It is always restricted to some fixed\nperiod, often to a few days only, and it prevails among many\npeoples who have never been known to be profuse in their\nsacrifices to the dead. With reference to the Chinese, Dr. de\nGroot maintains that the mourners originally fasted with a view\nto being able to sacrifice so much the more at the tomb; and he\nbases this conclusion on the fact that the articles of food which\nwere forbidden till the end of the deepest mourning were the very\nsame as those which in ancient China played the principal part at\nevery burial sacrifice.[90] But this prohibition may also perhaps\nbe due to a belief that the offering of certain victuals to the\ndead pollutes all food belonging to the same species.\n\n[Footnote 88: Spencer, _Principles of Sociology_, i. 261 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 89: _Ibid._ i. 262.]\n\n[Footnote 90: de Groot, _op. cit._, (vol. ii. book) i. 652.]\n\nProfessor Wilken, again, suggests that the mourners abstain from\nfood till they have given the dead his due, in {303} order to\nshow that they do not wish to keep him waiting longer than is\nnecessary and thus make him kindly disposed towards them.[91]\nThis explanation presupposes that the fast is immediately\nfollowed by offerings or a feast for the dead. In some instances\nthis is expressly said to be the case;[92] the ancient Chinese,\nfor instance, observed a special fast as an introductory rite to\nthe sacrifices which they offered to the manes at regular periods\nafter the demise and even after the close of the mourning.[93]\nBut generally there is no indication of the mourning fast being\nan essential preliminary to a sacrifice to the dead, and in an\ninstance mentioned above the funeral feast regularly precedes it.[94]\n\n[Footnote 91: Wilken, in _Revue colonials internationale_, iv.\n347, 348, 350 _sq._ n. 32.]\n\n[Footnote 92: Selenka, _Sonnige Welten_, p. 90 (Dyaks). Black,\n'Fasting,' in _Encyclop\u00e6dia Britannica_, ix. 44.]\n\n[Footnote 93: de Groot, _op. cit._ (vol. ii. book) i. 656.]\n\n[Footnote 94: _Supra_, ii. 299.]\n\nIt seems that Sir J. G. Frazer comes much nearer the truth when\nhe observes that people originally fasted after a death \"just in\nthose circumstances in which they considered that they might\npossibly in eating devour a ghost.\"[95] Yet I think it would\ngenerally be more correct to say that they were afraid of\nswallowing, not the ghost, but food polluted with the contagion\nof death. The dead body is regarded as a seat of infection, which\ndefiles anything in its immediate neighbourhood, and this\ninfection is of course considered particularly dangerous if it is\nallowed to enter into the bowels. In certain cases the length of\nthe mourning fast is obviously determined by the belief in the\npolluting presence of the ghost. The six days' fast of the\nParess\u00ed coincides with the period after which the dead is\nsupposed to have arrived in heaven no longer to return; and they\nsay that anybody who should fail to observe this fast would \"eat\nthe mouth of the dead\" and die himself.[96] Frequently the\nfasting lasts till the corpse is buried; and burial is a common\nsafeguard against the return of the ghost.[97] The custom {304}\nof restricting the fast to the daytime probably springs from the\nidea that a ghost cannot see in the dark, and is consequently\nunable to come and pollute the food at night. That the object of\nthe fast is to prevent pollution is also suggested by its\nresemblance to some other practices, which are evidently intended\nto serve this purpose. The Maoris were not allowed to eat on or\nnear any spot where a dead body had been buried, or to take a\nmeal in a canoe while passing opposite to such a place.[98] In\nSamoa, while a dead body is in the house, no food is eaten under\nthe same roof; hence the family have their meals outside, or in\nanother house.[99] The Todas, who fast on the day when a death\nhas taken place, have on the following day their meals served in\nanother hut.[100] In one of the sacred books of India it is said\nthat a Br\u00e2hmana \"shall not eat in the house of a relation within\nsix degrees where a person has died, before the ten days of\nimpurity have elapsed\"; in a house \"where a lying-in woman has\nnot yet come out of the lying-in chamber\"; nor in a house where a\ncorpse lies;[101] and in connection with this last injunction we\nare told that, when a person who is not a relation has died, it\nis customary to place at the distance of \"one hundred bows\" a\nlamp and water-vessel, and to eat beyond that distance.[102] In\none of the Zoroastrian books Ormuzd is represented as saying, \"In\na house when a person shall die, until three nights are completed\n. . . nothing whatever of meat is to be eaten by his\nrelations\";[103] and the obvious reason for this rule was the\nbelief that the soul of the dead was hovering about the body for\nthe first three nights after death.[104] Closely related to this\ncustom is that of the modern Parsis, which forbids for three days\nall cooking under a roof where a death has occurred, but allows\nthe inmates to obtain food from their neighbours {305} and\nfriends.[105] Among the Agariya, a Dravidian tribe in the hilly\nparts of Mirz\u00e1pur, no fire is lit and no cooking is done in the\nhouse of a dead person on the day when he is cremated, the food\nbeing cooked in the house of the brother-in-law of the\ndeceased.[106] In Mykonos, one of the Cyclades, it is considered\nwrong to cook in the house of mourning; hence friends and\nrelatives come laden with food, and lay the \"bitter table.\"[107]\nAmong the Albanians there is no cooking in the house for three\ndays after a death, and the family are fed by friends.[108] So\nalso the Maronites of Syria \"dress no victuals for some time in\nthe house of the deceased, but their relations and friends supply\nthem.\"[109] When a Jew dies all the water in the same and\nadjoining houses is instantly thrown away;[110] nobody may eat in\nthe same room with the corpse, unless there is only one room in\nthe house, in which case the inhabitants may take food in it if\nthey interpose a screen, so that in eating they do not see the\ncorpse; they must abstain from flesh and wine so long as the dead\nbody is in the house;[111] and on the evening of mourning the\nmembers of the family may not eat their own food, but are\nsupplied with food by their friends.[112] Among the Arabs of\nMorocco, if a person has died in the morning, no fire is made in\nthe whole village until he is buried, and in some parts of the\ncountry the inmates of a house or tent where a death has\noccurred, abstain from making fire for two or three days. In\nAlgeria \"d\u00e8s que quelqu'un est mort, on ne doit pas allumer de\nfeu dans la maison pendant trois jours, et il est d\u00e9fendu de\ntoucher \u00e0 de la viande r\u00f4tie, grill\u00e9e ou bouillie, \u00e0 moins\nqu'elle ne vienne de quelqu'un de dehors.\"[113] In China, for\nseven days after a death \"no food is cooked in the house, and\nfriends {306} and neighbours are trusted to supply the common\nnecessaries of life.\"[114] There is no sufficient reason to\nassume that this practice of abstaining from cooking food after a\ndeath is a survival of a previous mourning fast, but the two\ncustoms seem partly to have a similar origin. The cooking may\ncontaminate the food if done in a polluted house, or by a\npolluted individual. The relatives of the dead, or persons who\nhave handled the corpse, are regarded as defiled; hence they have\nto abstain from cooking food, as they have to abstain from any\nkind of work,[115] and from sexual intercourse.[116] Hence, also,\nthey are often prohibited from touching food; and this may in\nsome cases have led to fasting, whilst in other instances they\nhave to be fed by their neighbours.[117]\n\n[Footnote 95: Frazer, 'Certain Burial Customs as illustrative of\nthe Primitive Theory of the Soul,' in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xv.\n94. See also Oldenberg, _Die Religion des Veda_, pp. 270, 590.]\n\n[Footnote 96: von den Steinen, _op. cit._ p. 434 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 97: _Infra_, on Regard for the Dead.]\n\n[Footnote 98: Polack, _Manners ani Customs of the New\nZealanders_, i. 239.]\n\n[Footnote 99: Turner, _Nineteen Years in Polynesia_, p. 228.\n_Idem_, _Samoa_, p. 145.]\n\n[Footnote 100: Thurston, in the Madras Government Museum's\n_Bulletin_, i. 174.]\n\n[Footnote 101: _\u00c2pastamba_, i. 5. 16. 18 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 102: Haradatta, quoted by B\u00fchler, in _Sacred Books of\nthe East_, ii. 59, n. 20.]\n\n[Footnote 103: _Sh\u00e2yast L\u00e2-Sh\u00e2yast_, xvii. 2.]\n\n[Footnote 104: West, in _Sacred Books of the East_, v. 382, n. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 105: West, _ibid._ v. 382, n. 2.]\n\n[Footnote 106: Crooke, _Tribes and Castes of the North-Western\nProvinces_, i. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 107: Bent, _Cyclades_, p. 221.]\n\n[Footnote 108: von Hahn, _Albanesische Studien_, p. 151.]\n\n[Footnote 109: Dandini, 'Voyage to Mount Libanus,' in Pinkerton,\n_Collection of Voyages_, x. 290.]\n\n[Footnote 110: Allen, _Modern Judaism_, p. 435.]\n\n[Footnote 111: Bodenschatz, _Kirchliche Verfassung der heutigen\nJuden_, iv. 177.]\n\n[Footnote 112: Buxtorf, _Synagoga Judaica_, p. 707.]\n\n[Footnote 113: Certeux and Carnoy, _L'Alg\u00e9rie traditionelle_,\np. 220.]\n\n[Footnote 114:  Gray, _China_, i. 287 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 115: _Supra_, ii. 283 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 116: Teit, _loc. cit._ p. 331 (Upper Thompson Indians).\nTout, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxxv. 139 (Stlatlumh of British\nColumbia). Oldenberg, _Die Religion des Veda_, pp. 578, 590;\nCaland, _Die Altindischen Todten- und Bestattungsgebr\u00e4uche_, p.\n81. de Groot, _op. cit._ (vol. ii. book) i. 609 (Chinese).\nWilken, in _Revue internationale coloniale_, iv. 352, n. 41.]\n\n[Footnote 117: Turner, _Samoa_, p. 145; _Idem_, _Nineteen Years\nin Polynesia_, p. 228 (Samoans). Ellis, _Polynesian Researches_,\ni. 403 (Tahitians). Frazer, _Golden Bough_, i. 323 (Maoris).\nWilliams and Calvert, _Fiji_, p. 169. Among the Upper Thompson\nIndians the persons who handled the dead body would not touch the\nfood with their hands, but must put it into their mouths with\nsharp-pointed sticks (Teit, _loc. cit._ p. 331).]\n\nHowever, an unclean individual may be supposed to pollute a piece\nof food not only by touching it with his hand, but in some cases\nby eating it; and, in accordance with the principle of _pars pro\ntoto_, the pollution may then spread to all victuals belonging to\nthe same species. Ideas of this kind are sometimes conspicuous in\nconnection with the restrictions in diet after a death. Thus the\nSiciatl of British Columbia believe that a dead body, or anything\nconnected with the dead, is inimical to the salmon, and therefore\nthe relatives of a deceased person must abstain from eating\nsalmon in the early stages of the run, as also from entering a\ncreek where salmon are found.[118] Among the Stlatlumh, a\nneighbouring people, not even elderly widowers, for whom the\nperiod of abstention is comparatively {307} short, are allowed to\neat fresh salmon till the first of the run is over and the fish\nhave arrived in such numbers that there is no danger of their\nbeing driven away.[119] It is not unlikely that if the motives\nfor the restrictions in diet after a death were sufficiently\nknown in each case, a similar fear lest the unclean mourner\nshould pollute the whole species by polluting some individual\nmember of it would be found to be a common cause of those rules\nwhich prohibit the eating of staple or favourite food.[120] But\nit would seem that such rules also may spring from the idea that\nthis kind of food is particularly sought for by the dead and\ntherefore defiled.\n\n[Footnote 118: Tout, 'Ethnology of the Siciatl of British\nColumbia,' in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxxiv. 33.]\n\n[Footnote 119: Tout, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxxv. 139.]\n\n[Footnote 120: In the Arunta tribe, Central Australia, no\nmenstruous woman is allowed to gather the Irriakura bulbs, which\nform a staple article of diet for both men and women, the idea\nbeing that any infringement of the restriction would result in\nthe failure of the supply of the bulb (Spencer and Gillen,\n_Northern Tribes of Central Australia_, p. 615).]\n\nMoreover, unclean individuals are not only a danger to others,\nbut are themselves in danger. As Sir J. G. Frazer has shown, they\nare supposed to be in a delicate condition, which imposes upon\nthem various precautions;[121] and one of these may be\nrestrictions in their diet. Among the Thlinkets and some peoples\nin British Columbia the relatives of the deceased not only fast\ntill the body is buried, but have their faces blackened, cover\ntheir heads with ragged mats, and must speak but little,\nconfining themselves to answering questions, as it is believed\nthat they would else become chatterboxes.[122] According to early\nideas, mourners are in a state very similar to that of girls at\npuberty, who also, among various peoples, are obliged to fast or\nabstain from certain kinds of food on account of their\nuncleanness.[123] Among the Stlatlumh, for instance, {308} when a\ngirl reaches puberty, she fasts for the first four days and\nabstains from fresh meats of any kind throughout the whole period\nof her seclusion. \"There was a two-fold object in this\nabstention. First, the girl, it was thought, would be harmed by\nthe fresh meat in her peculiar condition; and second, the game\nanimals would take offence if she partook of their meat in these\ncircumstances,\" and would not permit her father to kill them.[124]\n\n[Footnote 121: Frazer, _Golden Bough_, i. 343, &c.]\n\n[Footnote 122: Boas, _loc. cit._ p. 41.]\n\n[Footnote 123: Boas, _loc. cit._ p. 40 _sqq._ (various tribes in\nBritish Columbia). Tout, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxxiv. 33\n(Siciatl). Sproat, _Scenes and Studies of Savage Life_, p. 93\n_sq._ (Ahts). Bourke, 'Medicine-Men of the Apache,' in _Ann. Rep.\nBur. Ethn._ ix. 501. Du Tertre, _Histoire g\u00e9n\u00e9rale des Antilles_,\nii. 371. Schomburgk, 'Natives of Guiana,' in _Jour. Ethn. Soc.\nLondon_, i. 269 _sq._ von Martius, _Beitr\u00e4ge zur Ethnographie\nAmerika's_, i. 644 (Macusis). Seligmann, in _Reports of the\nCambridge Expedition to Torres Straits_, v. 200 _sqq._ (Western\nIslanders). Man, 'Aboriginal Inhabitants of the Andaman Islands,'\nin _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xii. 94. See Frazer, _op. cit._ iii. 205\n_sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 124: Tout, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxxv. 136.]\n\nIt should finally be noticed that, though the custom of fasting\nafter a death in the main has a superstitious origin, there may\nat the same time be a physiological motive for it.[125] Even the\nrudest savage feels afflicted at the death of a friend, and grief\nis accompanied by a loss of appetite. This natural disinclination\nto partake of food may, combined with superstitious fear, have\ngiven rise to prohibitory rules, nay, may even in the first\ninstance have suggested the idea that there is danger in taking\nfood. The mourning observances so commonly coincide with the\nnatural expressions of sorrow, that we are almost bound to assume\nthe existence of some connection between them, even though in\ntheir developed forms the superstitious motive be the most prominent.\n\n[Footnote 125: _Cf._ Mallery, 'Manners and Meals,' in _American\nAnthropologist_, i. 202; Brinton, _Religions of Primitive\nPeoples_, p. 213; Schurtz, _Urgeschichte der Kultur_, p. 587.]\n\nAn important survival of the mourning fast is the Lent fast. It\noriginally lasted for forty hours only, that is, the time when\nChrist lay in the grave.[126] Irenaeus speaks of the fast of\nforty hours before Easter,[127] and Tertullian, when a Montanist\ndisputing against the Catholics, says that the only legitimate\ndays for Christian fasting were those in which the Bridegroom was\ntaken away.[128] Subsequently, however, the forty hours were\nextended to forty {309} days, in imitation of the forty days'\nfasts of Moses, Elijah, and Christ.[129]\n\n[Footnote 126: _Cf._ _St. Matthew_, ix. 15; _St. Mark_, ii. 20;\n_St. Luke_, v. 35.]\n\n[Footnote 127: Irenaeus, quoted by Eusebius, _Historia\necclesiastica_, v. 24 (Migne, _Patrologi\u00e6 cursus_, Ser. Graeca,\nxx. 501). _Cf._ Funk, 'Die Entwicklung des Osterfastens,' in\n_Theologische Quartalschrift_, lxxv. 181 _sqq._; Duchesne,\n_Christian Worship_, p. 241.]\n\n[Footnote 128: Tertullian, _De jejuniis_, 2 (Migne, _op. cit._\nii. 956).]\n\n[Footnote 129: St. Jerome, _Commentarii in Jonam_, 3 (Migne, _op.\ncit._ xxv. 1140). St. Augustine, _Epistola LV (alias CXIX)_, 'Ad\ninquisitiones Januarii,' 15 (Migne, xxxiii. 217 _sq._). Funk,\n_loc. cit._ p. 209.]\n\nNot only on a death, but on certain other occasions, food is\nsupposed to pollute or injure him who partakes of it, and is\ntherefore to be avoided. In Pfalz the people maintain that no\nfood should be taken at an eclipse of the sun;[130] and all over\nGermany there is a popular belief that anybody who eats during a\nthunderstorm will be struck by the lightning.[131] When the Todas\nknow that there is going to be an eclipse of the sun or the moon,\nthey abstain from food.[132] Among the Hindus, while an eclipse\nis going on, \"drinking water, eating food, and all household\nbusiness, as well as the worship of the gods, are all\nprohibited\"; high-caste Hindus do not even eat food which has\nremained in the house during an eclipse, but give it away, and\nall earthen vessels in use in their houses at the time must be\nbroken.[133] Among the rules laid down for Sn\u00e2takas, that is,\nBr\u00e2hmanas who have completed their studentship, there is one\nwhich forbids them to eat, travel, and sleep during the\ntwilight;[134] and in one of the Zoroastrian Pahlavi texts it is\nsaid that \"in the dark it is not allowable to eat food, for the\ndemons and fiends seize upon one-third of the wisdom and glory of\nhim who eats food in the dark.\"[135] Many Hindus who revere the\nsun do not break their fast in the morning till they catch a\nclear view of it, and do not eat at all on days when it is\nobscured by clouds[136]--a custom to which there is a parallel\namong some North American sun-worshippers, the Snanaimuq Indians\nbelonging to the Coast Salish, who must not partake of any food\nuntil the sun is well up in the sky.[137] Brahmins {310} fast at\nthe equinoxes, solstices, conjunctions of planets, and on the\ndays of the new and full moon.[138] The Buddhist Sabbath, or\n_Uposatha_, which, as we have noticed above, occurs on the day of\nfull moon, on the day when there is no moon, and on the two days\nwhich are eighth from the full and new moon, is not only a day of\nrest, but has also from ancient times been a fast-day. He who\nkeeps the Sabbath rigorously abstains from all food between\nsunrise and sunset, and, as no cooking must be done during the\n_Uposatha_, he prepares his evening meal in the early morning\nbefore the rise of the sun.[139]\n\n[Footnote 130: Sch\u00f6nwerth, _Aus der Oberpfalz_, iii. 55.]\n\n[Footnote 131: Haberland, in _Zeitschr. f. V\u00f6lkerpsychologie_,\nxviii. 258.]\n\n[Footnote 132: Rivers, _op. cit._ p. 592 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 133: Crooke, _Popular Religion of Northern India_, i.\n21 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 134: _Laws of Manu_, iv. 55.]\n\n[Footnote 135: _Sh\u00e2yast L\u00e2-Sh\u00e2yast_, ix. 8.]\n\n[Footnote 136: Wilson, _Works_, i. 266. Hunter, _Annals of Rural\nBengal_, ii. 285. Crooke, _Things Indian_, p. 214.]\n\n[Footnote 137: Boas, _loc. cit._ p. 51.]\n\n[Footnote 138: Dubois, _Description of the People of India_, p.\n160. See also _supra_, ii. 297.]\n\n[Footnote 139: Childers, _Dictionary of the Pali Language_, p.\n535. Kern, _Der Buddhismus_, ii. 258.]\n\nAmong the Jews there are many who abstain from food on the day of\nan eclipse of the moon, which they regard as an evil omen.[140]\nWe have also reason to believe that the Jews were once in the\nhabit of observing the new moons and Sabbaths not only as days of\nrest, but as fast-days; and the Hebrew Sabbath, as we have seen,\nin all probability owes its origin to superstitious fear of the\nchanges in the moon.[141] Or how shall we explain the curious\nrule which forbids fasting on a new moon and on the seventh\nday,[142] if not as a protest against a fast once in vogue among\nthe Jews on these occasions, but afterwards regarded as an\nillegitimate rite?[143] This theory is not new, for Hooker in his\n'Ecclesiastical Polity' observes that \"it may be a question,\nwhether in some sort they did not always fast on the Sabbath.\" He\nrefers to a statement of Josephus, according to which the sixth\nhour \"was wont on the Sabbath always to call them home unto\nmeat,\" and to certain pagan writers who upbraided them with\nfasting on that day.[144] In Nehemiah there is an indication that\nit was a custom to fast on the first day of the seventh\nmonth,[145] {311} which is \"holy unto the Lord\";[146] and on the\ntenth day of the same month there was the great fast of\natonement, combined with abstinence from every kind of work.[147]\nI venture to think that all these fasts may be ultimately traced\nto a belief that the changes in the moon not only are\nunfavourable for work, but also make it dangerous to partake of\nfood. The fact of the seventh day being a day of rest established\nthe number seven as a sabbatical number. In the seventh month\nthere are several days, besides Saturdays, which are to be\nobserved as days of rest,[148] and in the seventh year there\nshall be \"a sabbath of rest unto the land.\"[149] In these\nSabbatarian regulations the day of atonement plays a particularly\nprominent part. The severest punishment is prescribed for him who\ndoes not rest and fast on that day \"from even unto even\";[150]\nand it is on the same day that, after the lapse of seven times\nseven years, the trumpet of the jubilee shall be caused to sound\nthroughout the land.[151] Most of the rules concerning the day of\natonement are undoubtedly post-exilic. But the fact that no other\nregular days of fasting but those mentioned by Zechariah are\nreferred to by the prophets or in earlier books, hardly justifies\nthe conclusion drawn by many scholars that no such fast existed.\nIt is extremely probable that the fast of the tenth day of the\nseventh month _as a fast of atonement_ is of a comparatively\nmodern date; but it is perhaps not too bold to suggest that the\nidea of atonement is a later interpretation of a previously\nexisting fast, which was originally observed for fear of the\ndangerous quality attributed to the number seven. Why this fast\nwas enjoined on the tenth day of the seventh month remains\nobscure; but it seems that the order of the month was considered\nmore important than that of the day. Nehemiah speaks of a fast\nwhich {312} was kept on the twenty-fourth day of the seventh\nmonth.[152]\n\n[Footnote 140: Buxtorf, _op. cit._ p. 477.]\n\n[Footnote 141: _Supra_, ii. 286 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 142: _Judith_, viii. 6. _Schulchan Aruch_, i. 91, 117.]\n\n[Footnote 143: See Jastrow, 'Original Character of the Hebrew\nSabbath,' in _American Journal of Theology_, ii. 325.]\n\n[Footnote 144: Hooker, _Ecclesiastical Polity_, v. 72, vol. ii. 338.]\n\n[Footnote 145: _Nehemiah_, viii. 2, 10:--\"Then he said unto them,\nGo your way, eat the fat, and drink the sweet, and send portions\nunto them _for whom nothing is prepared_.\"]\n\n[Footnote 146: _Nehemiah_, viii. 9 _sqq._ See also _Leviticus_,\nxxiii. 24 _sq._; _Numbers_, xxix. 1. Among the Babylonians, too,\nthe seventh month had a sacred character (]astrow, _Religion of\nBabylonia and Assyria_, pp. 681, 683, 686).]\n\n[Footnote 147: _Leviticus_, xvi. 29, 31; xxiii. 27 _sqq._\n_Numbers_, xxix. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 148: _Leviticus_, xxiii. 24, 25, 35, 36, 39. _Numbers_,\nxxix. 1, 12, 35.]\n\n[Footnote 149: _Leviticus_, xxv. 4. See also _Exodus_,\nxxiii. 10 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 150: _Leviticus_, xxiii. 29 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 151: _Ibid._ xxv. 9.]\n\n[Footnote 152: _Nehemiah_, ix. 1.]\n\nIn other Semitic religions we meet with various fasts which are\nin some way or other connected with astronomical changes.\nAccording to En-Ned\u00eem, the Harranians, or \"Sabians,\" observed a\nthirty days' fast in honour of the moon, commencing on the eighth\nday after the new moon of Ads\u00e2r (March); a nine days' fast in\nhonour of \"the Lord of Good Luck\" (probably Jupiter),[153]\ncommencing on the ninth day before the new moon of the first\nK\u00e2n\u00fbn (December); and a seven days' fast in honour of the sun,\ncommencing on the eighth or ninth day after the new moon of\nShob\u00e2th (February).[154] The thirty days' fast seems to have\nimplied abstinence from every kind of food and drink between\nsunrise and sunset,[155] whereas the seven days' fast is\nexpressly said to have consisted in abstinence from fat and\nwine.[156] In Manich\u00e6ism--which is essentially based upon the\nancient nature religion of Babylonia, though modified by\nChristian and Persian elements and elevated into a\ngnosis[157]--we meet with a great number of fasts. There is a\ncontinuous fast for two days when the sun is in Sagittarius\n(which it enters about the 22nd November) and the moon has its\nfull light; another fast when the sun has entered Capricornus\n(which it does about the 21st December) and the moon first\nbecomes visible; and a thirty days' fast between sunrise and\nsunset commencing on the day \"when the new moon begins to shine,\nthe sun is in Aquarius (where it is from about the 20th January),\nand eight days of the month have passed,\" which seems to imply\nthat the fast cannot begin until eight days after the sun has\nentered Aquarius and that consequently, if the new moon {313}\nappears during that period, the commencement of the fast has to\nbe postponed till the following new moon. The Manichaeans also\nfasted for two days at every new moon; and our chief authority on\nthe subject, En-Ned\u00eem, states that they had seven fast-days in\neach month. They fasted on Sundays, and some of them, the\n_electi_ or \"perfect ones,\" on Mondays also.[158] We are told by\nLeo the Great that they observed these weekly fasts in honour of\nthe sun and the moon;[159] but according to the Armenian Bishop\nEbedjesu their abstinence on Sunday was occasioned by their\nbelief that the destruction of the world was going to take place\non that day.[160] There can be little doubt that the Harranian\nand Manich\u00e6an fasts were originally due, not to reverence, but to\nfear of evil influences; reverence can never be the primitive\nmotive for a customary rite of fasting. The thirty days' fast\nwhich the Harranians observed in the month of Ads\u00e2r finds perhaps\nits explanation in the fact that, according to Babylonian\nbeliefs, the month Adar was presided over by the seven evil\nspirits, who knew neither compassion nor mercy, who heard no\nprayer or supplication, and to whose baneful influence the\npopular faith attributed the eclipse of the moon.[161] But it may\nalso be worth noticing that the Harranian fast took place about\nthe vernal equinox--a time at which, as we have seen, the\nBrahmins of India are wont to fast, though only for a day or two.\n\n[Footnote 153: Chwolsohn, _Die Ssabier_, ii. 226, n. 247.]\n\n[Footnote 154: En-Ned\u00eem, _Fihrist_, (book ix. ch. i.) i. 4; v. 8,\n11 _sq._ (Chwolsohn, _op. cit._ ii. 6, 7, 32, 35 _sq._). See also\nChwolsohn, i. 533 _sqq._; ii. 75 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 155: Chwolsohn, _op. cit._ ii. 71 _sq._ _Cf._ Ab\u00fblfed\u00e2,\n6 (_ibid._ ii. 500).]\n\n[Footnote 156: En-Ned\u00eem, _op. cit._ v. 11 (Chwolsohn, _op. cit._\nii. 36).]\n\n[Footnote 157: Kessler, 'Mani, Manich\u00e4er,' in Herzog-Hauck,\n_Realencyclop\u00e4die f. protestantische Theologie_, xii. 198 _sq._\nHarnack, _History of Dogma_, iii. 330. _Idem_, 'Manich\u00e6ism,' in\n_Encyclop\u00e6dia Britannica_, xv. 485.]\n\n[Footnote 158: En-Ned\u00eem, _Fihrist_, in Fl\u00fcgel, _Mani_, pp. 95,\n97. Fl\u00fcgel, p. 311 _sqq._ Kessler, _loc. cit._ p. 212 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 159: Leo the Great, _Sermo XLII. (al. XLI.)_ 5 (Migne,\n_op. cit._ liv. 279).]\n\n[Footnote 160: Fl\u00fcgel, _op. cit._ p. 312 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 161: Jastrow, _Religion of Babylonia and Assyria_,\npp. 263, 276, 463.]\n\nIt is highly probable that the thirty days' fast of the\nHarranians and Manich\u00e6ans is the prototype of the Muhammedan fast\nof Rama[d.]\u00e2n. During the whole ninth month of the Muhammedan\nyear the complete abstinence from food, drink and cohabitation\nfrom sunrise till sunset is enjoined upon every Moslem, with the\nexception of young children and idiots, as also sick persons and\ntravellers, who are allowed to postpone the {314} fast to another\ntime.[162] This fast is said to be a fourth part of Faith, the\nother cardinal duties of religious practice being prayer,\nalmsgiving, and pilgrimage. But, as a matter of fact, modern\nMuhammedans regard the fast of Rama[d.]\u00e2n as of more importance\nthan any other religious observance;[163] many of them neglect\ntheir prayers, but anybody who should openly disregard the rule\nof fasting would be subject to a very severe punishment.[164]\nEven the privilege granted to travellers and sick persons is not\nreadily taken advantage of. During their marches in the middle of\nsummer nothing but the apprehension of death can induce the\nAeneze to interrupt the fast;[165] and when Burton, in the\ndisguise of a Muhammedan doctor, was in Cairo making preparations\nfor his pilgrimage to Mecca, he found among all those who\nsuffered severely from such total abstinence only one patient who\nwould eat even to save his life.[166] There is no evidence that\nthe fast of Rama[d.]\u00e2n was an ancient, pre-Muhammedan\ncustom.[167] On the other hand, its similarity with the Harranian\nand Manich\u00e6an fasts is so striking that we are almost compelled\nto regard them all as fundamentally the same institution; and if\nthis assumption is correct, Muhammed must have borrowed his fast\nfrom the Harranians or Manich\u00e6ans or both. {315} Indeed, Dr.\nJacob has shown that in the year 623, when this fast seems to\nhave been instituted, Rama[d.]\u00e2n exactly coincided with the\nHarranian fast-month.[168] In its Muhammedan form the fast\nextending over a whole month is looked upon as a means of\nexpiation. It is said that by the observance of it a person will\nbe pardoned all his past venial sins, and that only those who\nkeep it will be allowed to enter through the gate of heaven\ncalled Rayy\u00e2n.[169] But this is only another instance of the\ncommon fact that customs often for an incalculable period survive\nthe motives from which they sprang.\n\n[Footnote 162: _Koran_, ii. 180, 181, 183.]\n\n[Footnote 163: _Cf._ Lane, _Modern Egyptians_, p. 106.]\n\n[Footnote 164: von Kremer, _Culturgeschichte des Orients_, i. 460.]\n\n[Footnote 165: Burckhardt, _Bedouins and Wah\u00e1bys_, p. 57.]\n\n[Footnote 166: Burton, _Pilgrimage to Al-Madinah and Meccah_, i. 74.]\n\n[Footnote 167: We can hardly regard as such the passage in the\nKoran (ii. 179) where it is said, \"O ye who believe! There is\nprescribed for you the fast as it was prescribed for those before\nyou; haply ye may fear.\" The traditionists say that Muhammed was\nin the habit of spending the month of Rama[d.]\u00e2n every year in\nthe cave at Hir\u00e2, meditating and feeding all the poor who\nresorted to him, and that he did so in accordance with a\nreligious practice which the Koreish used to perform in the days\nof their heathenism. Others add that [(]Abd al-Mu[t.][t.]alib\ncommenced the practice, saying \"that it was the worship of God\nwhich that patriarch used to begin with the new moon of\nRama[d.]\u00e2n, and continue during the whole of the month\" (Muir,\n_Life of Mahomet_, ii. 56, n.* Sell, _Faith of Isl\u00e1m_, p. 316).\nBut, as Muir remarks (_op. cit._ ii. 56, n.*), it is the tendency\nof the traditionists to foreshadow the customs and precepts of\nIslam as if some of them had existed prior to Muhammed, and\nconstituted part of \"the religion of Abraham.\" See Jacob, 'Der\nmuslimische Fastenmonat Rama[d.]\u00e2n,' in _VI. Jahresbericht der\nGeographischen Gesellsch. zu Greifswald_, pt. i. 1893-96, p. 2,\n_sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 168: Jacob, _loc. cit._ p. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 169: Sell, _op. cit._ p. 317.]\n\nIn various religions we meet with fasting as a form of penance,\nas a means of appeasing an angry or indignant God, as an\nexpiation for sin.[170] The voluntary suffering involved in it is\nregarded as an expression of sorrow and repentance pleasing to\nGod, as a substitute for the punishment which He otherwise would\ninflict upon the sinner; and at the same time it may be thought\nto excite His compassion, an idea noticeable in many Jewish\nfasts.[171] Among the Jews individuals fasted in cases of private\ndistress or danger: Ahab, for instance, when Elijah predicted his\ndownfall,[172] Ezra and his companions before their journey to\nPalestine,[173] the pious Israelite when his friends were\nsick.[174] Moreover, fasts were instituted for the whole\ncommunity when it believed itself to be under divine displeasure,\nwhen danger threatened, when a great calamity befell the land,\nwhen pestilence raged or drought set in, or there was a reverse\nin war.[175] Four {316} regular fast-days were established in\ncommemoration of various sad events that had befallen Israel\nduring the captivity;[176] and in the course of time many other\nfasts were added, in memory of certain national troubles, though\nthey were not regarded as obligatory.[177] The law itself\nenjoined fasting for the great day of atonement only.\n\n[Footnote 170: Wasserschleben, _Die Bussordnungen der\nabendl\u00e4ndischen Kirche_, _passim_ (Christianity). _Koran_, ii.\n192; iv. 94; v. 91, 96; lviii. 5. Jolly, 'Recht und Sitte,' in\nB\u00fchler, _Grundriss der indo-arischen Philologie_, p. 117; Dubois,\n_Description of the Character, &c. of the People of India_, p.\n160 (Brahmanism). Clavigero, _History of Mexico_, i. 285. On the\noccasion of any public calamity the Mexican high-priest retired\nto a wood, where he constructed a hut for himself, and shut up in\nthis hut he passed nine or ten months in constant prayer and\nfrequent effusions of blood, eating only raw maize and water\n(Torquemada, _Monarchia Indiana_, ix. 25, vol. ii. 212 _sq._).]\n\n[Footnote 171: _Cf._ Benzinger, 'Fasting,' in _Encyclop\u00e6dia\nBiblica_, ii. 1508; Schwally, _Das Leben nach dem Tode nach den\nVorstellungen des alten Israel_, p. 26.]\n\n[Footnote 172: _1 Kings_, xxi. 27.]\n\n[Footnote 173: _Ezra_, viii. 21.]\n\n[Footnote 174: _Psalms_, xxxv. 13.]\n\n[Footnote 175: _Judges_, xx. 26. _1 Samuel_, vii. 6. _2\nChronicles_, xx. 3. _Nehemiah_, ix. 1. _Jeremiah_, xxxvi. 9.\n_Joel_, i. 14; ii. 12.]\n\n[Footnote 176: _Zechariah_, viii. 19.]\n\n[Footnote 177: Greenstone, in _Jewish Encyclopedia_, v. 347.]\n\nIt may be asked why this particular kind of self-mortification\nbecame such a frequent and popular form of penance as it did both\nin Judaism and in several other religions. One reason is, no\ndoubt, that fasting is a natural expression of contrition, owing\nto the depressing effect which sorrow has upon the appetite.\nAnother reason is that the idea of penitence, as we have just\nobserved, may be a later interpretation put upon a fast which\noriginally sprang from fear of contamination. Nay, even when\nfasting is resorted to as a cure in the case of distress or\ndanger, as also when it is practised in commemoration of a\ncalamity, there may be a vague belief that the food is polluted\nand should therefore be avoided. But in several cases fasting is\ndistinctly a survival of an expiatory sacrifice. The sacrifice of\nfood offered to the deity was changed into the \"sacrifice\"\ninvolved in the abstinence from food on the part of the\nworshipper. We find that among the Jews the decay of sacrifice\nwas accompanied by a greater frequency of fasts. It was only in\nthe period immediately before the exile that fasting began to\nacquire special importance; and the popular estimation of it went\non increasing during and after the exile, partly at least from a\nfeeling of the need of religious exercises to take the place of\nthe suspended temple services.[178] Like sacrifice, fasting was a\nregular appendage to prayer, as a means of giving special\nefficacy to the supplication;[179] fasting and praying became in\nfact a constant combination of words.[180] And equally close is\nthe {317} connection between fasting and almsgiving--a\ncircumstance which deserves special notice where almsgiving is\nregarded as a form of sacrifice or has taken the place of\nit.[181] In the penitential regulations of Brahmanism we\nrepeatedly meet with the combination \"sacrifice, fasting, giving\ngifts\";[182] or also fasting and giving gifts, without mention\nbeing made of sacrifice.[183] Among the Jews each fast-day was\nvirtually an occasion for almsgiving,[184] in accordance with the\nrabbinic saying that \"the reward of the fast-day is in the amount\nof charity distributed\";[185] but fasting was sometimes declared\nto be even more meritorious than charity, because the former\naffects the body and the latter the purse only.[186] And from\nJudaism this combination of fasting and almsgiving passed over\ninto Christianity and Muhammedanism. According to Islam, it is a\nreligious duty to give alms after a fast;[187] if a person\nthrough the infirmity of old age is not able to keep the fast, he\nmust feed a poor person;[188] and the violation of an\ninconsiderate oath may be expiated either by once feeding or\nclothing ten poor men, or liberating a Muhammedan slave or\ncaptive, or fasting three days.[189] In the Christian Church\nfasting was not only looked upon as a necessary accompaniment of\nprayer, but whatever a person saved by means of it was to be\ngiven to the poor.[190] St. Augustine says that man's\nrighteousness in this life consists in fasting, alms, and prayer,\nthat alms and fasting are the two wings which enable his prayer\nto fly upward to God.[191] But fasting without almsgiving \"is not\n{318} so much as counted for fasting\";[192] that which is gained\nby the fast at dinner ought not to be turned into a feast at\nsupper, but should be expended on the bellies of the poor.[193]\nAnd if a person was too weak to fast without injuring his health\nhe was admonished to give the more plentiful alms.[194]\nTertullian expressly calls fastings \"sacrifices which are\nacceptable to God.\"[195] They assumed the character of reverence\nofferings, they were said to be works of reverence towards\nGod.[196] But fasting, as well as temperance, has also from early\ntimes been advocated by Christian writers on the ground that it\nis \"the beginning of chastity,\"[197] whereas \"through love of\neating love of impurity finds passage.\"[198]\n\n[Footnote 178: Benzinger, in _Encyclop\u00e6dia Biblica_, ii. 1508.\nNowack, _Lehrbuch der hebr\u00e4ischen Arch\u00e4ologie_, ii. 271.]\n\n[Footnote 179: L\u00f6w, _Gesammelte Schriften_, i. 108. Nowack, _op.\ncit._ ii. 271. Benzinger, in _Encyclop\u00e6dia Biblica_, ii. 1507.]\n\n[Footnote 180: _Judith_, iv. 9, 11. _Tobit_, xii. 8.\n_Ecclesiasticus_, xxxiv. 26. _St. Luke_, ii. 37.]\n\n[Footnote 181: _Supra_, i. 565 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 182: _Gautama_, xix. 11. _Vasishtha_, xxii. 8.\n_Baudh\u00e2yana_, iii. 10. 9.]\n\n[Footnote 183: _Vasishtha_, xx. 47.]\n\n[Footnote 184: Kohler, 'Alms,' in _Jewish Encyclopedia_, i. 435.\nL\u00f6w, _op. cit._ i. 108. _Cf._ _Tobit_, xii. 8; Katz, _Der wahre\nTalmudjude_, p. 43.]\n\n[Footnote 185: _Ibid._ fol. 6 b, quoted by Greenstone, in _Jewish\nEncyclopedia_, v. 349.]\n\n[Footnote 186: _Berakhoth_, fol. 32 b, quoted by Hershon,\n_Treasures of the Talmud_, p. 124.]\n\n[Footnote 187: Sell, _op. cit._ p. 251.]\n\n[Footnote 188: _Ibid._ p. 281. This opinion is based on a\nsentence in the Koran (ii. 180) which has caused a great deal of\ndispute. It is said there that \"those who are fit to fast may\nredeem it by feeding a poor man.\" But the expression \"those who\nare fit to fast\" has been understood to mean those who can do so\nonly with great difficulty.]\n\n[Footnote 189: _Koran_, v. 91. Lane, _Modern Egyptians_, p. 313\n_sq._ See also _Koran_, ii. 192; iv. 94; v. 96; lviii. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 190: Harnack, _History of Dogma_, i. 205, n. 5. L\u00f6w,\n_op. cit._ i. 108.]\n\n[Footnote 191: St. Augustine, _Enarratio in Psalmum XLII._ 8\n(Migne, _Patrologi\u00e6 cursus_, xxxvi. 482).]\n\n[Footnote 192: St. Chrysostom, _In Matth\u00e6um Homil. LXXVII. (al.\nLXXVIII.)_ 6 (Migne, _op. cit._ Ser. Graeca, lviii. 710). St.\nAugustine, _Sermones supposititii_, cxlii. 2, 6 (Migne, xxxix.\n2023 _sq._).]\n\n[Footnote 193: St. Augustine, _Sermones supposititii_, cxli. 4\n(Migne, _op. cit._ xxxix. 2021). See also _Canons enacted under\nKing Edgar_, 'Of Powerful Men,' 3 (_Ancient Laws of England_, p.\n415); _Ecclesiastical Institutes_, 38 (_ibid._ p. 486).]\n\n[Footnote 194: St. Chrysostom, _In Cap. I. Genes. Homil. X._ 2\n(Migne, _op. cit._ Ser. Graeca, liii. 83). St. Augustine,\n_Sermones supposititii_, cxlii. 1 (Migne, xxxix. 2022 _sq._).]\n\n[Footnote 195: Tertullian, _De resurrectione carnis_, 8 (Migne,\n_op. cit._ ii. 806).]\n\n[Footnote 196: Hooker, _Ecclesiastical Polity_, v. 72, vol. ii. 334.]\n\n[Footnote 197: St. Chrysostom, _In Epist. II. ad Thessal. Cap. I.\nHomil. I._ 2 (Migne, _op. cit._ Ser. Gr. lxii. 470).]\n\n[Footnote 198: Tertullian, _De jejuniis_, 1 (Migne, _op. cit._\nii. 953). See also Manzoni, _Osservazioni sulla morale\ncattolica_, p. 175.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXVIII\n\nRESTRICTIONS IN DIET (_concluded_)\n\n\nBESIDES the occasional abstinence from certain victuals, which\nwas noticed in the last chapter, there are restrictions in diet\nof a more durable character.\n\nThus among the Australian aborigines the younger members of a\ntribe are, as it seems universally, subject to a variety of such\nrestrictions, from which they are only gradually released as they\ngrow older.[1] In the Wotjobaluk tribe in South-Eastern\nAustralia, for instance, boys are forbidden to eat of the\nkangaroo and the padi-melon, being told that if they transgress\nthese rules they will fall sick, break out all over with\neruptions, and perhaps die. If a man under forty eats the tail\npart of the emu or bustard, he will turn grey, and if he eats the\nfreshwater turtle he will be killed by lightning. If young men or\nwomen of the Wakelbura tribe eat emu, black-headed snake, or\nporcupine, they will become sick and probably die, uttering the\nsounds peculiar to the creature in question, the spirit of which\nis believed to have entered into their bodies.[2] In the\nWarramunga tribe in Central Australia a man is usually well in\nthe middle age before he {320} is allowed to eat wild turkey,\nrabbit-bandicoot, and emu.[3] According to certain writers, the\nobject of these restrictions is to reserve the best things for\nthe use of the elders, and, more especially, of the older men;[4]\nbut, on the other hand, it has been remarked that, in looking\nover the list of animals prohibited, one fails to see any good\nreasons for the selection, unless they may be assumed to have\nchiefly sprung from superstitious beliefs.[5] Among the Land\nDyaks the young men and warriors are debarred from venison for\nfear it should render them as timid as the hind.[6] The Moors\nbelieve that if a young person before the age of puberty eats\nwolf's flesh he will have troubles afterwards.\n\n[Footnote 1: Curr, _The Australian Race_, i. 81. Fraser,\n_Aborigines of New South Wales_, p. 53. Howitt, _Native Tribes of\nSouth-East Australia_, p. 769 _sq._ Brough Smyth, _Aborigines of\nVictoria_, i. p. xxxv. Taplin, 'Narrinyeri,' in Woods, _Native\nTribes of South Australia_, p. 137. Jung, 'Die M\u00fcndungsgegend des\nMurray und ihre Bewohner,' in _Mittheil. d. Vereins f. Erdkunde\nzu Halle_, 1877, p. 32. Spencer and Gillen, _Native Tribes of\nCentral Australia_, p. 470 _sqq._ _Iidem_, _Northern Tribes of\nCentral Australia_, p. 611 _sq._ Eyre, _Expeditions of Discovery\ninto Central Australia_, ii. 293.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Howitt, _op. cit._ p. 769.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Spencer and Gillen, _Northern Tribes of Central\nAustralia_, p. 612.]\n\n[Footnote 4: _Iidem_, _Native Tribes of Central Australia_, p.\n470 _sq._ _Iidem_, _Northern Tribes of Central Australia_, p.\n613. Jung, in _Mittheil. d. Vereins f. Erdkunde zu Halle_, 1877,\np. 32.]\n\n[Footnote 5: Brough Smyth, _op. cit._ i. 234.]\n\n[Footnote 6: St. John, _Life in the Forests of the Far East_,\ni. 186.]\n\nThere are, further, numerous instances of certain kinds of food\nbeing permanently forbidden to certain individuals. In Unyamwezi,\nsouth of Victoria Nyanza, women are not permitted to eat fowl, a\nfood which is reserved for the men.[7] Among the Mandingoes of\nTeesee no woman is allowed to eat an egg, and this prohibition is\nso rigidly adhered to that \"nothing will more affront a woman of\nTeesee than to offer her an egg\"; the men, on the other hand, eat\neggs without scruple, even in the presence of their wives.[8]\nAmong the Bayaka, a Bantu people in the Congo Free State, both\nfowls and eggs are forbidden to women; \"if a woman eats an egg\nshe is supposed to become mad, tear off her clothes and run away\ninto the bush.\"[9] The Bahima of Enkole, in the Uganda\nProtectorate, allow men to eat beef and the meat of certain\nantelopes and of buffalo, whereas women are generally allowed to\neat beef only.[10] The people of Darfur, in Central Africa,\nprohibit their women from eating an animal's liver, because they\nthink {321} that a person may increase his soul by partaking of\nit, and women are believed to have no souls.[11] The Miris of\nNorthern India prize tiger's flesh as food for men, but consider\nit unsuitable for women, as \"it would make them too\nstrong-minded.\"[12] In the Australian tribes some articles of\nfood are entirely interdicted to females.[13] The natives\ninhabiting the neighbourhood of Cape York forbid women to eat\nvarious kinds of fish, including some of the best, \"on the\npretence of causing disease in women, although not injurious to\nthe men.\"[14] In the Sandwich Islands, again, women were not\nallowed to eat hog's flesh, turtle, and certain kinds of fruit,\nas cocoa and banana.[15] Many of these prohibitions have been\nrepresented as signs of the low condition of the female sex; but\na more intimate knowledge of the facts connected with them would\nperhaps show that they have some other foundation than the mere\nselfishness of the men. For sometimes the latter also are subject\nto very similar restrictions. Among the Bahuana, in the Congo\nFree State, \"women are forbidden to eat owls or other birds of\nprey, but are permitted to eat frogs, from which men are obliged\nto abstain under penalty of becoming ill.\"[16] With reference to\nthe natives of New Britain, Mr. Powell states that, whilst in one\nplace the women are prohibited from eating pigs or tortoises, the\nmen are, in another place, prohibited from eating anything but\nhuman flesh, fowls, or fish.[17] In the Caroline Islands the men\nare forbidden to eat a common blackbird, _Lamprothornis_--which\nis a favourite food of the women--because it is believed that\nanyone who did so, and afterwards climbed a cocoa-tree, would\nfall down and perish.[18] In some Dyak tribes on the Western\nbranch {322} of the river of Sarawak, goats, fowls, and the fine\nkind of fern (_paku_), which forms an excellent vegetable, are\nforbidden food to the men, though the women and boys are allowed\nto partake of them.[19]\n\n[Footnote 7: Reichard, 'Die Wanjamuesi,' in _Zeitschr. d.\nGesellsch. f. Erdkunde zu Berlin_, xxiv. 321.]\n\n[Footnote 8: Park, _Travels in the Interior of Africa_, i. 114.]\n\n[Footnote 9: Torday and Joyce, 'Ethnography of the Ba-Yaka,' in\n_Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxxvi. 41, 42, 51.]\n\n[Footnote 10: Roscoe, 'Bahima,' in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxxvii. 101.]\n\n[Footnote 11: Felkin, 'Notes on the For Tribe,' in _Proceed. Roy.\nSoc. Edinburgh_, xiii. 218.]\n\n[Footnote 12: Dalton, _Ethnology of Bengal_, p. 33.]\n\n[Footnote 13: Curr, _The Australian Race_, i. 81. Brough Smyth,\n_op. cit._ i. xxxv.]\n\n[Footnote 14: Macgillivray, _Voyage of Rattlesnake_, ii. 10.]\n\n[Footnote 15: von Kotzebue, _Voyage of Discovery into the South\nSea_, iii. 249, note. Cook, quoted by Buckle, _Miscellaneous and\nPosthumous Works_, iii. 355.]\n\n[Footnote 16: Torday and Joyce, 'Ethnography of the Ba-Huana,' in\n_Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxxvi. 279.]\n\n[Footnote 17: Powell, _Wanderings in a Wild Country_, p. 173.]\n\n[Footnote 18: von Kittlitz, _Reise nach dem russischen Amerika,\n&c._ ii. 103 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 19: Low, _Sarawak_, p. 266.]\n\nAmong various peoples certain foods are forbidden to priests or\nmagicians. The priests of the ancient Egyptians were not allowed\nto eat fish,[20] nor to meddle with the esculent or potable\nsubstances which were produced out of Egypt;[21] and, according\nto Plutarch, they so greatly disliked the nature of\nexcrementitious things that they not only rejected most kinds of\npulse, but also the flesh of sheep and swine, because it produced\nmuch superfluity of nutriment.[22] The lamas of Mongolia will\ntouch no meat of goats, horses, or camels.[23] Among the Semang\nof the Malay Peninsula the medicine-men will not eat goat or\nbuffalo flesh and but rarely that of fowl.[24] The dairymen of\nthe Todas may drink milk from certain buffaloes only, and are\naltogether forbidden to eat chillies.[25] These and similar\nrestraints laid upon priests or wizards are probably connected\nwith the idea that holiness is a delicate quality which calls for\nspecial precautions.[26] Schomburgk states that the conjurers of\nthe British Guiana Indians partake but seldom of the native hog,\nbecause they consider the eating of it injurious to the efficacy\nof their skill.[27] And the Ul\u00e1d Bu [(]Az\u00eez in Morocco believe\nthat if a scribe or a saint eats wolf's flesh the charms he\nwrites will have no effect, and the saliva of the saint will lose\nits curative power.\n\n[Footnote 20: Herodotus, ii. 37. Plutarch, _De Iside et Osiride_,\n7. Porphyry, _De abstinentia ab esu animalium_, iv. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 21: Porphyry, _op. cit._ iv. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 22: Plutarch, _De Iside et Osiride_, 5.]\n\n[Footnote 23: Prejevalsky, _Mongolia_, i. 56.]\n\n[Footnote 24: Skeat and Blagden, _Pagan Races of the Malay\nPeninsula_, ii. 226.]\n\n[Footnote 25: Rivers, _Todas_, p. 102 _sq._ For some other\ninstances see Landtman, _Origin of Priesthood_, p. 161 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 26: _Cf._ Frazer, _Golden Bough_, i. 391.]\n\n[Footnote 27: Schomburgk, 'Expedition to the Upper Corentyne,' in\n_Jour. Roy. Geograph. Soc. London_, xv. 30.]\n\nThere are still other cases in which certain persons are\npermanently required to abstain from certain kinds of food. Thus\nin the Andaman Islands every man and woman \"is prohibited all\nthrough life from eating some {323} one (or more) fish or animal:\nin most cases the forbidden dainty is one which in childhood was\nobserved (or imagined) by the mother to occasion some functional\nderangement; when of an age to understand it the circumstance is\nexplained, and cause and effect being clearly demonstrated, the\nindividual, in question thence forth considers that particular\nmeat his _y\u00e2t-t[=u]b_, and avoids it carefully. In cases where no\nevil consequences have resulted from partaking of any kind of\nfood, the fortunate person is privileged to select his own\n_y\u00e2t-t[=u]b_, and is, of course, shrewd enough to decide upon\nsome fish, such as shark or skate, which is little relished, and\nto abstain from which consequently entails no exercise of\nself-denial.\" It is believed that the god P[=u]luga would punish\nseverely any person who might be guilty of eating his\n_y\u00e2t-t[=u]b_, either by causing his skin to peel off, or by\nturning his hair white, and flaying him alive.[28] In Samoa each\nman had generally his god in the shape of some species of animal;\nand if he ate one of these divine animals it was supposed that\nthe god avenged the insult by taking up his abode in the eater's\nbody and there generating an animal of the same kind until it\ncaused his death.[29] The members of a totem clan are usually\nforbidden to eat the particular animal or plant whose name they\nbear.[30] Thus among the Omaha Indians men whose totem is the elk\nbelieve that if they ate the flesh of the male elk they would\nbreak out in boils and white spots in different parts of their\nbodies; and men whose totem is the red corn think that if they\nate red corn they would have running sores all round their\nmouths.[31] Yet, however general, prohibitions of this kind\ncannot be said to be a universal characteristic of totemism.[32]\nSir J. G. Frazer even suggests that the original custom was\nperhaps to eat the totem and the {324} latter custom to abstain\nfrom it.[33] But this is hardly more than a guess.\n\n[Footnote 28: Man, 'Aboriginal Inhabitants of the Andaman\nIslands.' in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xii. 354.]\n\n[Footnote 29: Turner, _Samoa_, p. 17 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 30: Frazer, _Totemism_, p. 7 _sqq._ _Idem_, _Totemism\nand Exogamy_, iv. 6.]\n\n[Footnote 31: Dorsey, 'Omaha Sociology,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur.\nEthn._ iii. 225, 231. _Idem_, 'Siouan Folk-Lore,' in _American\nAntiquarian_, vii. 107.]\n\n[Footnote 32: Frazer, _Totemism_, p. 19. _Idem_, _Totemism and\nExogamy_, iv. 6. _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 33: Frazer, _Totemism and Exogamy_, iv. 6 _sq._]\n\nThere are, finally, restrictions in eating which refer to the\nwhole people or tribe. In early society certain things which\nmight serve as food are often not only universally abstained\nfrom, but actually prohibited by custom or law. The majority of\nthese prohibitions have reference to animals or animal products,\nwhich are naturally more apt to cause disgust than is vegetable\nfood--probably because our ancestors in early days, by instinct,\nsubsisted chiefly on a vegetable diet, and only subsequently\nacquired a more general taste for animal nourishment.[34] Certain\nanimals excite a feeling of disgust by their very appearance, and\nare therefore abstained from. This I take to be a reason for the\naversion to eating reptiles. It is said that snakes are avoided\nas food because their flesh is supposed to be as poisonous as\ntheir bite;[35] but this explanation is hardly relevant to\nharmless reptiles, which are likewise in some cases forbidden\nfood.[36] The abstinence from fish seems generally to have a\nsimilar origin, though some peoples say that they refuse to eat\ncertain species because the soul of a relative might be in the\nfish.[37] The Navahoes of New Mexico \"must never touch fish, and\nnothing will induce them to taste one.\"[38] The Mongols consider\nthem unclean animals.[39] The South Siberian Kachinzes are said\nto refrain from them because they believe that \"the evil\nprinciple lives in the water and eats fish.\"[40] The K\u00e1firs on\nthe North-Western frontier of India \"detest fish, though their\nrivers abound in them.\"[41] The same aversion is common in the\nSouth {325} African tribes[42] and among most Hamitic peoples of\nEast Africa;[43] when asked for an explanation of it, they say\nthat fish are akin to snakes. Fish, or at least certain species\nof fish, were forbidden to the ancient Syrians;[44] and the\nHebrews were prohibited from eating all fish that have not fins\nand scales.[45] It is curious to note that various peoples who\ndetest fish also abstain from fowl.[46] The Navahoes are strictly\nforbidden to eat the wild turkey with which their forests\nabound;[47] and the Mongols dislike of fowl is so great that one\nof Prejevalsky's guides nearly turned sick on seeing him eat\nboiled duck.[48] Some peoples have a great aversion to eggs,[49]\nwhich are said to be excrements, and therefore unfit for\nfood.[50] There may be a similar reason for the abstinence from\nmilk among peoples who have domesticated animals able to supply\nthem with it.[51] The Dravidian aborigines of the hills of {326}\nCentral India, who never use milk, are expressly said to regard\nit as an excrement.[52] The ancient Caribs had a horror of eggs\nand never drank milk.[53] The Ashantees are \"forbidden eggs by\nthe fetish, and cannot be persuaded to taste milk.\"[54] The\nKimbunda in South-Western Africa detest milk, and consider it\ninconceivable how a grown-up person can enjoy it; they believe\nthat the Kilulu, or spirit, would punish him who partook of\nit.[55] The Dyaks of Borneo, the Javanese, and the Malays abstain\nfrom milk.[56] To the Chinese milk and butter are insupportably\nodious.[57]\n\n[Footnote 34: _Cf._ Schurtz, _Die Speiseverbote_, p. 17.]\n\n[Footnote 35: Skeat and Blagden, _Pagan Races of the Malay\nPeninsula_, i. 130 (Berembun). Schurtz, _op. cit._ p. 22.]\n\n[Footnote 36: _Leviticus_, xi. 29 _sq._ Sayce, _Hibbert Lectures\non the Religion of the Ancient Babylonians_, p. 83.]\n\n[Footnote 37: Frazer, _Golden Bough_, ii. 430, 432.]\n\n[Footnote 38: Stephen, 'Navajo,' in _American Anthropologist_,\nvi. 357.]\n\n[Footnote 39: Prejevalsky, _op. cit._ i. 56.]\n\n[Footnote 40: von Str\u00fcmpell, 'Der Volksstamm der Katschinzen,' in\n_Mittheil. d. Vereins f. Erdkunde zu Leipzig_, 1875, p. 23.]\n\n[Footnote 41: Fosberry, 'Some of the Mountain Tribes of the N.W.\nFrontier of India,' in _Jour. Ethn. Soc. London_, N.S. i. 192.]\n\n[Footnote 42: Fritsch, _Drei Jahre in S\u00fcd-Afrika_, p. 338.\nShooter, _Kafirs of Natal and the Zulu Country_, p. 215 (Zulus).\nKropf, _Das Volk der Xosa-Kaffern_, p. 102. Campbell, _Second\nJourney in the Interior of South Africa_, ii. 203 (Bechuanas).\nThe Hottentots, however, eat fish (Fritsch, p. 339).]\n\n[Footnote 43: Hildebrandt, 'Wakamba und ihre Nachbarn,' in\n_Zeitschr. f. Ethnol._ x. 378. Paulitschke, _Ethnographie\nNordost-Afrikas_, i. 155 (Somals, Gallas). Schurtz, _op. cit._\np. 23.]\n\n[Footnote 44: Porphyry, _op. cit._ iv. 15. Plutarch, _De\nsuperstitione_, 10.]\n\n[Footnote 45: _Leviticus_, xi. 10 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 46: Hildebrandt, in _Zeitschr. f. Ethnol._ x. 378\n(Gallas, Wadshagga, Waikuyu, &c.). Paulitschke, _op. cit._ i. 153\n_sqq._ (Gallas, Somals). Burton, _Two Trips to Gorilla Land_, i.\n95 (Somals). Meldon, 'Bahima of Ankole,' in _Jour. African Soc._\nvi. 146; Ashe, _Two Kings of Uganda_, p. 303 (Bahima). Kropf,\n_Das Volk der Xosa-Kaffern_, p. 102. Among the Zulus domestic\nfowls are eaten by none except young persons and old (Shooter,\n_op. cit._ p. 215). For other peoples who abstain from fowl, see\nBastian, _Die deutsche Expedition an der Loango-K\u00fcste_, i. 185;\nCasati, _Ten Years in Equatoria_, i. 165 (Monbuttu); Salt,\n_Voyage to Abyssinia_, p. 179 (Danakil); Skeat and Blagden,\n_Pagan Races of the Malay Peninsula_, i. 135 (Sabimba), 136\n(Orang Muka Kuning); _Globus_, l. 330 (inhabitants of Hainan);\nEhrenreich, quoted by Schurtz, _op. cit._ p. 20 (Karaya of\nGoyaz); von den Steinen, _Durch Central-Brasilien_, p. 262\n(Yuruna); C\u00e6sar, _De bello Gallico_, v. 12 (ancient Britons).]\n\n[Footnote 47: Stephen, in _American Anthropologist_, vi. 357.]\n\n[Footnote 48: Prejevalsky, _op. cit._ i. 56.]\n\n[Footnote 49: The Kafirs formerly abstained from eggs (Kropf,\n_op. cit._ p. 102). Among the Zulus eggs are eaten by young and\nold persons only (Shooter, _op. cit._ p. 215). The Bahima refuse\nthis kind of food (Ashe, _op. cit._ p. 303), and so do generally\nthe Waganda, especially the women (Felkin, 'Notes on the Waganda\nTribe,' in _Proceed. Roy. Soc. Edinburgh_, xiii. 716; Ashe,\np. 303). See also Andree, _Ethnographische Parallelen_, p. 126\n_sq._; Schurtz, _op. cit._ p. 23 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 50: Reichard, 'Die Wanjamuesi,' in _Zeitschr. d.\nGesellsch. f. Erdkunde zu Berlin_, xxiv. 321. Hildebrandt,\n'Wakamba und ihre Nachbarn,' in _Zeitschr. f. Ethnol._ x. 378.]\n\n[Footnote 51: See Westermarck, _History of Human Marriage_,\np. 484.]\n\n[Footnote 52: Crooke, _Things Indian_, p. 92.]\n\n[Footnote 53: Du Tertre, _Histoire g\u00e9n\u00e9rale des Antilles_,\nii. 389.]\n\n[Footnote 54: Bowdich, _Mission to Ashantee_, p. 319.]\n\n[Footnote 55: Magyar, _Reisen in S\u00fcd-Afrika_, i. 303, 321.]\n\n[Footnote 56: Low, _op. cit._ p. 267.]\n\n[Footnote 57: Huc, _Travels in Tartary_, i. 281. Westermarck,\n_op. cit._ p. 484.]\n\nThe meat of certain animals may also be regarded with disgust on\naccount of their filthy habits or the nasty food on which they\nlive. In the Warramunga tribe, in Central Australia, there is a\ngeneral restriction applying to eagle-hawks, and the reason\nassigned for it is that this bird feeds on the bodies of dead\nnatives.[58] It seems that the abstinence from swine's flesh, at\nleast in part, belongs to the same group of facts. Various tribes\nin South Africa hold it in abomination.[59] In some districts of\nMadagascar, according to Drury, the eating of pork was accounted\na very contemptible thing.[60] It is, or was, abstained from by\nthe Jakuts of Siberia, the Votyaks of the Government of\nVologda,[61] and the Lapps.[62] The disgust for pork has likewise\nbeen met with in many American tribes. The Koniagas will eat\nalmost any digestible substance except pork.[63] The Navahoes of\nNew Mexico abominate it \"as if they were the devoutest of\nHebrews\";[64] it is not forbidden by their religion, but \"they\nsay they will not eat the flesh of the hog simply because the\nanimal is filthy in {327} its habits, because it is the scavenger\nof the town.\"[65] In his description of the Indians of the\nSouth-Eastern States Adair writes:--\"They reckon all those animals\nto be unclean that are either carnivorous, or live on nasty food,\nas hogs, wolves, panthers, foxes, cats, mice, rats. . . . When\nswine were first brought among them, they deemed it such a\nhorrid abomination in any of their people to eat that filthy\nand impure food, that they excluded the criminal from all\nreligious communion in their circular town-house. . . . They\nstill affix vicious and contemptible ideas to the eating of\nswine's flesh; insomuch that _Sh\u00fak\u00e0pa_, 'swine eater,' is the\nmost opprobrious epithet that they can use to brand us with; they\ncommonly subjoin _Akang-g\u00e0pa_, 'eater of dunghill fowls.' Both\ntogether signify 'filthy, helpless animals.'\"[66] So also those\nIndians in British Guiana who have kept aloof from intercourse\nwith the colonists reject pork with the greatest loathing.\nSchomburgk tells us that an old Indian permitted his children to\naccompany him on a journey only on the condition that they were\nnever to eat any viands prepared by his cook, for fear lest pork\nshould have been used in their preparation. But this objection\ndoes not extend to the native hog, which, though generally\nabstained from by wizards, is eaten by the laity indiscriminately,\nwith the exception of women who are pregnant or who have just\ngiven birth to a child.[67] This suggests that the aversion to\nthe domestic pig partly springs from the fact that it is a\nforeign animal. Indeed, the Guiana Indians refuse to eat the\nflesh of all animals that are not indigenous to their country,\nbut were introduced from abroad, such as oxen, sheep, and fowls,\napparently on the principle \"that any strange and abnormal object\nis especially likely to be possessed of a harmful spirit.\"[68]\nThe Kafirs, also, abstain {328} from the domestic swine, though\nthey eat the wild hog.[69] Some writers maintain that pork has\nbeen prohibited on the ground that it is prejudicial to health in\nhot countries;[70] but, as we have seen, this prohibition is\nfound among various northern peoples as well, and it seems\nbesides that the unwholesomeness of pork in good condition has\nbeen rather assumed than proved. Sir J. G. Frazer, again,\nbelieves that the ancient Egyptians, Semites, and some of the\nGreeks abstained from this food not because the pig was looked\nupon simply as a filthy and disgusting creature, but because it\nwas considered to be endowed with high supernatural powers.[71]\nIn Greece the pig was used in purificatory ceremonies.[72] Lucian\nsays that the worshippers of the Syrian goddess abstained from\neating pigs, some because they held them in abomination, others\nbecause they thought them holy.[73] The heathen Harranians\nsacrificed the swine and ate swine's flesh once a year.[74]\nAccording to Greek writers, the Egyptians abhorred the pig as a\nfoul and loathsome animal, and to drink its milk was believed to\ncause leprosy and itchy eruptions;[75] but once a year they\nsacrificed pigs to the moon and to Osiris and ate of the flesh of\nthe victims, though at any other time they would not so much as\ntaste pork.[76]\n\n[Footnote 58: Spencer and Gillen, _Northern Tribes of Central\nAustralia_, p. 612.]\n\n[Footnote 59: Fritsch, _Drei Jahre in S\u00fcd-Afrika_, p. 339. Kropf,\n_op. cit._ p. 102 (Kafirs).]\n\n[Footnote 60: Drury, _Madagascar_, p. 143.]\n\n[Footnote 61: Latham, _Descriptive Ethnology_, i. 363.]\n\n[Footnote 62: Leem, _Beskrivelse over Finmarkens Lapper_, p. 501.]\n\n[Footnote 63: Bancroft, _Native Races of the Pacific States_, i. 75.]\n\n[Footnote 64: Stephen, in _American Anthropologist_, vi. 357.]\n\n[Footnote 65: Matthews, 'Study of Ethics among the Lower Races,'\nin _Jour. American Folk-Lore_, xii. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 66: Adair, _History of the American Indians_, p. 132 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 67: Schomburgk, in _Jour. Roy. Geograph. Soc. London_,\nxv. 29 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 68: Im Thurn, _Indians of Guiana_, p. 368. Dr. Schurtz\nsuggests (_op. cit._ p. 19 _sqq._) that some other peoples, as\nthe Indians of Brazil, abstain from fowls because they are not\nindigenous to their country.]\n\n[Footnote 69: M\u00fcller, _Allgemeine Ethnographie_, p. 189.]\n\n[Footnote 70: Ramsay, _Historical Geography of Asia Minor_, p.\n32. Wiener, 'Die alttestamentarischen Speiseverbote,' in\n_Zeitschr. f. Ethnol._ viii. 103. See also Buckle, _Miscellaneous\nand Posthumous Works_, iii. 354 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 71: Frazer, _Golden Bough_, ii. 304 _sqq._ _Idem_,\n_Pausanias's Description of Greece_, iv. 137 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 72: Ramsay, _op. cit._ p. 31 _sq._ Frazer, _Pausanias's\nDescription of Greece_, iii. 277, 593.]\n\n[Footnote 73: Lucian, _De dea Syria_, 54.]\n\n[Footnote 74: Robertson Smith, _Religion of the Semites_, p. 290.\n_Cf._ _Isaiah_, lxv. 4, and lxvi. 3, 17, where this sacrifice is\nalluded to as a heathen abomination.]\n\n[Footnote 75: Herodotus, ii. 47. Plutarch, _De Iside et Osiride_,\n8. Aelian, _De natura animalium_, x. 16.]\n\n[Footnote 76: Herodotus, ii. 47. Plutarch, _De Iside et Osiride_, 8.]\n\nOf the abhorrence of cannibalism I shall speak in a separate\nchapter, but in this connection it is worth noticing that the\neating of certain animals is regarded with horror or disgust\neither because they are supposed to be metamorphosed\nancestors[77] or on account of their resemblance to men. Various\npeoples refrain from {329} monkey's flesh;[78] and European\ntravellers mention their own instinctive repugnance to it and\ntheir aversion to shooting monkeys.[79] The Indians of Lower\nCalifornia will eat any animal, except men and monkeys, \"the\nlatter because they so much resemble the former.\"[80] According\nto an ancient writer quoted by Porphyry, the Egyptian priests\nrejected those animals which \"verged to a similitude to the human\nform.\"[81] The Kafirs say that elephants are forbidden food\nbecause their intelligence resembles that of men.[82]\n\n[Footnote 77: Frazer, _Golden Bough_, ii. 430 _sqq._ St. John,\n_op. cit._ i. 186 (Land Dyaks).]\n\n[Footnote 78: Shooter, _op. cit._ p. 215 (Zulus). Schurtz, _op.\ncit._ p. 28 (Abyssinians). Skeat and Blagden, _op. cit._ i. 134\n(Orang Sletar). In the _Institutes of Vishnu_ (li. 3) the eating\nof apes is particularly stigmatised.]\n\n[Footnote 79: Schurtz, _op. cit._ p. 28. _Infra_, on Regard for\nthe Lower Animals.]\n\n[Footnote 80: Bancroft, _op. cit._ i. 560.]\n\n[Footnote 81: Porphyry, _op. cit._ iv. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 82: M\u00fcller, _Ethnographie_, p. 189.]\n\nMoreover, intimacy with an animal easily takes away the appetite\nfor its flesh. Among ourselves, as Mandeville observes, \"some\npeople are not to be persuaded to taste of any creatures they\nhave daily seen and been acquainted with, whilst they were alive;\nothers extend their scruple no further than to their own poultry,\nand refuse to eat what they fed and took care of themselves; yet\nall of them will feed heartily and without remorse on beef,\nmutton, and fowls, when they are bought in the market.\"[83] Among\nother races we meet with feelings no less refined. Mencius, the\nChinese moralist, said:--\"So is the superior man affected towards\nanimals, that, having seen them alive, he cannot bear to see them\ndie; having heard their dying cries, he cannot bear to eat their\nflesh. Therefore he keeps away from his slaughter house and\ncook-room.\"[84] The abstinence from domestic fowls and their\neggs, as also from the tame pig, may occasionally have sprung\nfrom sympathy. Dr. von den Steinen states that the Brazilian\nYuruna cannot be induced to eat any animal which they have bred\nthemselves, and that they apparently considered it very immoral\nwhen he and his party ate hen-eggs.[85] In the {330} sacred books\nof India it is represented as a particularly bad action to eat\ncertain domestic animals, including village pigs and tame cocks;\na twice-born man who does so knowingly will become an\noutcast.[86] Among the Bechuanas in South Africa dogs and tame\ncats are not eaten, though wild cats are.[87] The Arabs of\nDukk\u00e2la in Morocco eat their neighbours' cats but not their own.\nAmong the Dinka only such cows as die naturally or by an accident\nare used for food; but a dead cow is never eaten by the bereaved\nowner himself, who is too much afflicted at the loss to be able\nto touch a morsel of the carcase of his departed beast.[88]\nHerodotus says that the Libyans would not taste the flesh of the\ncow, though they ate oxen;[89] and the same rule prevailed among\nthe Egyptians and Ph[oe]nicians, who would sooner have partaken\nof human flesh than of the meat of a cow.[90] The eating of cow's\nflesh is prohibited by the law of Brahmanism.[91] According to\nDr. R\u00e1jendral\u00e1la Mitra, the idea of beef as an article of food\n\"is so shocking to the Hindus, that thousands over thousands of\nthe more orthodox among them never repeat the counterpart of the\nword in their vernaculars, and many and dire have been the\nsanguinary conflicts which the shedding of the blood of cows has\ncaused.\"[92] In China \"the slaughter of buffaloes for food is\nunlawful, according to the assertions of the people, and the\nabstaining from the eating of beef is regarded as very\nmeritorious.\"[93] It is said in the 'Divine Panorama' that he who\npartakes of beef or dog's flesh will be punished by the\ndeity.[94] In Japan neither cattle nor sheep were in former days\nkilled for food;[95] and in the rural districts many people still\nthink it wrong to eat beef.[96] In Rome the slaughter of {331} a\nlabouring ox was in olden days punished with excommunication;[97]\nand at Athens and in Peloponnesus it was prohibited even on\npenalty of death.[98] Indeed, the ancient idea has survived up to\nmodern times in Greece, where it has been held as a maxim that\nthe animal which tills the ground ought not to be used for\nfood.[99] These prohibitions are no doubt to some extent\nexpressions of kindly feelings towards the animals to which they\nrefer.[100] A Dinka is said to be fonder of his cattle than of\nhis wife and children;[101] and according to classical writers,\nthe ploughing ox is not allowed to be slaughtered because he is\nhimself an agriculturist, the servant of Ceres, and a companion\nto the labourer in his work.[102] But at the same time the\nrestrictions in question are very largely due to prudential\nmotives. Peoples who live chiefly on the products of their cattle\nshow a strong disinclination to reduce their herds, especially by\nkilling cows or calves;[103] and agricultural races are naturally\nanxious to preserve the animal which is used for work on the\nfield. With reference to the Egyptian and Ph[oe]nician custom of\neating bulls but abstaining from cows, Porphyry observes that\n\"for the sake of utility in one and the same species of animals\ndistinction is made between that which is pious and that which is\nimpious,\" cows being spared on account of their progeny.[104]\nUntil quite recently in Egypt no one was allowed to kill a calf,\nand permission from the government was required for the slaughter\nof a bull.[105] Moreover, domestic animals are frequently\nregarded as sacred in consequence of their utility, and for that\nreason also abstained from. The Dinka pay a {332} kind of\nreverence to their cattle.[106] In Egypt, according to Herodotus,\nthe cow was sacred to Isis.[107] In India she has been the object\nof a special worship.[108]\n\n[Footnote 83: Mandeville, _Fable of the Bees_, p. 188.]\n\n[Footnote 84: Mencius, i. 1. 7. 8.]\n\n[Footnote 85: von den Steinen, _Durch Central-Brasilien_, p. 262.\nSee also Juan and Ulloa, _Voyage to South America_, i. 426\n(Indians of Quito).]\n\n[Footnote 86: _Institutes of Vishnu_, li. 3. _Laws of Manu_, v. 19.]\n\n[Footnote 87: Campbell, _Second Journey in the Interior of South\nAfrica_, ii. 203.]\n\n[Footnote 88: Schweinfurth, _Heart of Africa_, i. 163 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 89: Herodotus, iv. 186.]\n\n[Footnote 90: _Ibid._ ii. 41. Porphyry, _op. cit._ ii. 11.]\n\n[Footnote 91: _Institutes of Vishnu_, li. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 92: R\u00e1jendral\u00e1la Mitra, _Indo-Aryans_, i. 354.]\n\n[Footnote 93: Doolittle, _Social Life of the Chinese_, ii. 187.]\n\n[Footnote 94: Giles, _Strange Stories from a Chinese Studio_, ii. 376.]\n\n[Footnote 95: Reed, _Japan_, i. 61.]\n\n[Footnote 96: Griffis, _Mikado's Empire_, p. 472.]\n\n[Footnote 97: Pliny, _Historia naturalis_, viii. 70.]\n\n[Footnote 98: Varro, _De re rustica_, ii. 5. 3. _sq._ Aelian,\n_Varia historia_, v. 14.]\n\n[Footnote 99: Mariti, _Travels through Cyprus_, i. 35.]\n\n[Footnote 100: See _infra_, on Regard for the Lower Animals.]\n\n[Footnote 101: Schweinfurth, _op. cit._ i. 164.]\n\n[Footnote 102: Aelian, _Varia historia_, v. 14. Varro, _De re\nrustica_, ii. 5. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 103: Fritsch, _Die Eingeborenen S\u00fcd-Afrika's_, p. 86;\nKropf, _op. cit._ p. 102 (Kafirs). Merker, _Die Masai_, p. 169.\nPaulitschke, _Ethnographie Nordost-Afrikas_, i. 153. Ratzel,\n_History of Mankind_, ii. 411 (pastoral races of Africa). Erman,\n_Reise um die Erde_, i. 515 (Kirghiz). Andree, _Ethnographische\nParallelen_, p. 122 _sq._ Robertson Smith, _Religion of the\nSemites_, p. 297. Schurtz, _op. cit._ p. 30 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 104: Porphyry, _op. cit._ ii. 11.]\n\n[Footnote 105: Wilkinson, in Rawlinson's translation of\nHerodotus, ii. 72 _sq._ n. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 106: Schweinfurth, _op. cit._ i. 163.]\n\n[Footnote 107: Herodotus, ii. 41.]\n\n[Footnote 108: Barth, _Religions of India_, p. 264.]\n\nCertain foods, then, are generally abjured, not merely because\nthey excite disgust, or as the case may be, because they have a\ndisagreeable taste, but also from utilitarian considerations. To\nthe instances just mentioned may be added the custom prevalent\namong the Tonga Islanders of setting a temporary prohibition or\ntaboo on certain eatables in order to prevent them from growing\nscarce.[109] But the most important prudential motive underlying\nthe general restrictions in diet is no doubt fear lest the food\nshould have an injurious effect upon him who partakes of it. The\nharm caused by it may only be imaginary; indeed, forbidden food\nis commonly regarded as unwholesome, whatever be the original\nground on which it was prohibited.[110] The Negroes of the Loango\nCoast say that they abstain from goat-flesh because otherwise\ntheir skin would scale off, and from fowl so as not to lose their\nhair.[111] Some tribes of the Malay Peninsula refuse to eat the\nflesh of elephants under the pretext that it would occasion\nsickness.[112] The tribes inhabiting the hills of Assam think\nthat \"the penalty for eating the flesh of a cat is loss of\nspeech, while those who infringe a special rule forbidding the\nflesh of a dog are believed to die of boils.\"[113] The\nworshippers of the Syrian goddess maintained that the eating of\nsprats or anchovies would fill the body with ulcers and wither up\nthe liver.[114] In Russia veal is considered by many to be very\nunwholesome food, and is entirely rejected by pious people.[115]\nIt is not probable that these ideas are in the first instance\nderived from experience; but there can be no doubt that fear of\nevil consequences is in many cases a {333} primary motive for the\nabstinence from a certain kind of food. Mr. Im Thurn supposes\nthat the Guiana Indian avoids eating the flesh of various animals\nbecause he thinks they are particularly malignant.[116] Animals\nthat present some unusual or uncanny peculiarity are rejected\nbecause they are objects of superstitious fear. The Egyptian\npriests, we are told, did not eat oxen which were twins or which\nwere speckled, nor animals that had only one eye.[117] The North\nAmerican Indians of the South-Eastern States abstained from all\nbirds of night, believing that if they ate them they would fall\nill.[118] Another cause of rejecting the flesh of certain animals\nis the idea that anybody who partook of it would at the same time\nacquire some undesirable quality inherent in the animal.[119] The\nZ\u00e1paro Indians of Ecuador \"will, unless from necessity, in most\ncases not eat any heavy meats such as tapir and peccary, but\nconfine themselves to birds, monkeys, deer, fish, &c.,\nprincipally because they argue that the heavier meats make them\nalso unwieldy, like the animals who supply the flesh, impeding\ntheir agility and unfitting them for the chase.\"[120] For a\nsimilar reason the ancient Caribs are said to have refrained from\nturtles;[121] and some North American Indians state that in\nformer days their greatest chieftains \"seldom ate of any animal\nof gross quality, or heavy motion of body, fancying it conveyed a\ndullness through the whole system, and disabled them from\nexerting themselves with proper vigour in their martial, civil,\nand religious duties.\"[122] The Namaquas of South Africa, again,\npretend not to eat the flesh of the hare, because they think it\nwould make them as faint-hearted as that animal.[123] Among the\nKafirs only children may eat hares, whereas the men partake of\nthe flesh of the {334} leopard in order to get its strength.[124]\nAmong some other peoples the hare is forbidden food,[125]\npossibly owing to a similar superstition. The blood of an animal\nis avoided because it is believed to contain its life or soul. We\nmeet with this custom in several North American tribes,[126] as\nwell as in the Old Testament;[127] and from the Jews it passed\ninto early Christianity.[128]\n\n[Footnote 109: Mariner, _Natives of the Tonga Islands_, ii. 233.]\n\n[Footnote 110: _Cf._ Schurtz, _op. cit._ p. 23.]\n\n[Footnote 111: Bastian, _Die deutsche Expedition an der\nLoango-K\u00fcste_, i. 185.]\n\n[Footnote 112: Skeat and Blagden, _op. cit._ i. 132.]\n\n[Footnote 113: Hodson, 'The \"Genna\" amongst the Tribes of Assam,'\nin _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxxvi. 98.]\n\n[Footnote 114: Plutarch, _De superstitione_, 10.]\n\n[Footnote 115: Erman, _Reise um die Erde_, i. 515.]\n\n[Footnote 116: Im Thurn, _op. cit._ p. 368.]\n\n[Footnote 117: Porphyry, _op. cit._ iv. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 118: Adair, _op. cit._ p. 130 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 119: See Frazer, _Golden Bough_, ii. 353 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 120: Simson, _Travels in the Wilds of Ecuador_, p. 168.]\n\n[Footnote 121: Waitz, _Anthropologie der Naturv\u00f6lker_, iii. 384.]\n\n[Footnote 122: Adair, _op. cit._ p. 133.]\n\n[Footnote 123: Hahn, _Supreme Being of the Khoi-Khoi_, p. 106.]\n\n[Footnote 124: Kropf, _op. cit._ p. 102.]\n\n[Footnote 125: _Leviticus_, xi. 6, 8. C\u00e6sar, _De bello Gallico_,\nv. 12 (ancient Britons). The Chinese have a deep-rooted prejudice\nagainst eating the flesh of the hare, which they have always\nregarded as an animal endowed with mysterious properties (Dennis,\n_Folk-Lore of China_, p. 64). With reference to the Biblical\nprohibition of eating camel's flesh, old exegetes observed that\nthe camel is a very revengeful animal, and that its\nvindictiveness would be transferred to him who partook of its\nmeat (Wiener, in _Zeitschr. f. Ethnol._ viii. 104); but whether\nthe prohibition in question originated in such a belief is open\nto doubt.]\n\n[Footnote 126: Adair, _op. cit._ p. 134. Frazer, _Golden Bough_,\ni. 353.]\n\n[Footnote 127: _Leviticus_, iii. 17; vii. 25 _sqq._; xvii. 10\n_sqq._; xix. 26. _Deuteronomy_, xii. 16, 23 _sqq._; xv. 23.]\n\n[Footnote 128: Haberland, 'Gebr\u00e4uche und Aberglauben beim Essen,'\nin _Zeitschr. f. V\u00f6lkerpsychologie_, xvii. 363 _sq._]\n\nThe general abstinence from certain kinds of food has thus sprung\nfrom a great variety of causes. Of these I have been able to\npoint out only some of the more general and obvious. As Sir J. G.\nFrazer justly remarks, to explain the ultimate reason why any\nparticular food is prohibited to a whole tribe or to certain of\nits members would commonly require a far more intimate knowledge\nof the history and beliefs of the tribe than we possess.[129]\nEven explanations given by the natives themselves may be\nmisleading, since the original motive for a custom may have been\nforgotten, while the custom itself is still preserved. But I\nthink that, broadly speaking, the general avoidance of a certain\nfood may be traced to one or several of the following sources:\nits disagreeable taste; disgust caused, in the case of animal\nfood, either by the external appearance of the animal, or by its\nunclean habits, or by sympathy, or by associations of some kind\nor other, or even by the mere fact that it is commonly abstained\nfrom; the disinclination to kill an animal for food, or,\ngenerally, to reduce the supply of a certain kind of victuals;\nthe idea, whether correct or false, that the food would injure\n{335} him who partook of it. From what has been said in previous\nchapters it is obvious that any of these factors, if influencing\nthe manners of a whole community and especially when supported by\nthe force of habit, may lead not only to actual abstinence but to\nprohibitory rules the transgression of which is apt to call forth\nmoral disapproval. This is particularly the case at the earlier\nstages of culture, where a people's tastes and habits are most\nuniform, where the sway of custom is most powerful, where\ninstinctive aversion most readily develops into moral\nindignation, and where man in almost every branch of action\nthinks he has to be on his guard against supernatural dangers.\nAnd in this, as in other cases of moral concern, the prohibition\nmay easily be sanctioned by religion, especially when the\nabstinence is due to fear of some mysterious force or quality in\nthe thing avoided. The religious aspect assumed particular\nprominence in Hebrewism and Brahmanism. It is said in the\n'Institutes of Vishnu' that the eating of pure food is more\nessential than all external means of purification; \"he who eats\npure food only is truly pure, not he who is only purified with\nearth and water.\"[130] The Koran forbids the eating of \"what is\ndead, and blood, and flesh of swine, and whatsoever has been\nconsecrated to other than God.\"[131] Medi\u00e6val Christianity\nprohibited the eating of various animals, especially horses,\nwhich were not used as food in the South of Europe, but which the\npagan Teutons sacrificed and ate at their religious feasts.[132]\nThe idea that it is \"unchristian\" to eat horseflesh has survived\neven to the present day, and has, together with the aversion to\nfeeding on a pet animal, been responsible for the loss of\nenormous quantities of nourishing food. Among ourselves the only\neatable thing the partaking of which is generally condemned as\nimmoral is human flesh. But there are a considerable number of\npeople who think {336} that we ought to abstain from all animal\nmeat, not only for sanitary reasons, but because man is held to\nhave no right to subject any living being to suffering and death\nfor the purpose of gratifying his appetite.\n\n[Footnote 129: Frazer, _Golden Bough_, i. 391 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 130: _Institutes of Vishnu_, xxii. 89.]\n\n[Footnote 131: _Koran_, ii. 168.]\n\n[Footnote 132: Langkavel, 'Pferde und Naturv\u00f6lker,' in\n_Internationales Archiv f\u00fcr Ethnographie_, i. 53. Schurtz, _op.\ncit._ p. 32 _sq._ Maurer, _Die Bekehrung des Norwegischen Stammes\nzum Christenthume_, ii. 198.]\n\nOn similar grounds vegetarianism has been advocated as a moral\nduty among Eastern races, as also in classical antiquity. The\nregard for life in general, which is characteristic of Taouism,\nBuddhism, Jainism, and Brahmanism,[133] led to the condemnation\nof the use of animals as food. It is a very common feeling among\nthe Chinese of all classes that the eating of flesh is sensual\nand sinful, or at least quite incompatible with the highest\ndegree of sincerity and purity.[134] In Japan many persons\nabstain from meat, owing to Buddhistic influence.[135] In India\nanimal food was not avoided in early times; the epic characters\nshoot deer and eat cows.[136] Even in the sacred law-books the\neating of meat is permitted in certain circumstances:--\"On\noffering the honey-mixture to a guest, at a sacrifice and at the\nrites in honour of the manes, but on these occasions only, may an\nanimal be slain.\"[137] Nay, some particular animals are expressly\ndeclared eatable.[138] The total abstinence from meat is in fact\nrepresented as something meritorious rather than as a strict\nduty;[139] it is said that \"by avoiding the use of flesh one\ngains a greater reward than by subsisting on pure fruit and\nroots, and by eating food fit for ascetics in the forest.\"[140]\nBut on the other hand we also read that \"there is no greater\nsinner than that man who, though not worshipping the gods or the\nmanes, seeks to increase the bulk of his own flesh by the flesh\nof other beings.\"[141] As a matter of fact, meat is nowadays\ncommonly, though by no means universally, abstained from by high\ncaste Hindus, whereas {337} most low caste natives are only\nvegetarian when flesh food is not within their reach;[142] and we\nare told that the views which many Hindus entertain of people who\nindulge in such food are not very unlike the opinions which\nEuropeans have about cannibals.[143] The immediate origin of\nthese restrictions seems obvious enough. They were not\nintroduced--as has been supposed--either as mere sumptuary\nmeasures,[144] or because meat was found to be an aliment too\nrich and heavy in a warm climate,[145] but they were the natural\noutcome of a system which enjoins regard for life in general and\nkindness towards all living beings. In the 'Laws of Manu' it is\nexpressly said that the use of meat should be shunned for the\nreason that \"meat can never be obtained without injury to living\ncreatures, and injury to sentient beings is detrimental to the\nattainment of heavenly bliss.\"[146] That the prohibition of\neating animals resulted from the prohibition of killing them is\nalso suggested by other facts. If Hindu Pariahs eat the flesh of\nanimals which have died naturally, it \"is not visited upon them\nas a crime, but they are considered to be wretches as filthy and\ndisgusting as their food is revolting.\"[147] Buddhism allows the\neating of fish and meat if it is pure in three respects, to\nwit--if one has not seen, nor heard, nor suspected that it has\nbeen procured for the purpose;[148] and among the Buddhists of\nBurma even the most strictly religious have no scruples in eating\nthe flesh of an animal killed by another person, \"as then, they\nconsider, the sin of its destruction does not rest upon them, but\non the person who actually caused it.\"[149]\n\n[Footnote 133: See _infra_, on Regard for the Lower Animals.]\n\n[Footnote 134: Doolittle, _op. cit._ ii. 183.]\n\n[Footnote 135: Chamberlain, _Things Japanese_, p. 175 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 136: Hopkins, _Religions of India_, p. 200.]\n\n[Footnote 137: _Laws of Manu_, v. 41. See also _Vasishtha_, iv. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 138: _Institutes of Vishnu_, li. 6. _Laws of Manu_, v. 18.]\n\n[Footnote 139: See Jolly, 'Recht und Sitte,' in B\u00fchler,\n_Grundriss der indo-arischen Philologie_, ii. 157.]\n\n[Footnote 140: _Laws of Manu_, v. 54. See also _ibid._ v. 53, 56.]\n\n[Footnote 141: _Ibid._ v. 52.]\n\n[Footnote 142: Kipling, _Beast and Man in India_, p. 6. Crooke,\n_Things Indian_, p. 228.]\n\n[Footnote 143: Percival, _Land of the Veda_, p. 272.]\n\n[Footnote 144: Hopkins, _op. cit._ p. 200.]\n\n[Footnote 145: Dubois, _Description of the Character, &c. of the\nPeople of India_, p. 120.]\n\n[Footnote 146: _Laws of Manu_, v. 48. See also _ibid._ v. 45, 49.]\n\n[Footnote 147: Dubois, _op. cit._ p. 121.]\n\n[Footnote 148: Kern, _Manual of Indian Buddhism_, p. 71, n. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 149: Fytche, _Burma Past and Present_, ii. 78.]\n\nVegetarianism is, further, said to have been practised by the\nfirst and most learned class of the Persian Magi, who, according\nto Eubulus, neither slew nor ate anything {338} animated;[150]\nand many of the Egyptian priests are reported to have abstained\nentirely from animal food.[151] In ancient legends we are told\nthat the earliest men, who were pure and free from sin, killed no\nanimal but lived exclusively on the fruits of the earth.[152] In\nGreece the Pythagoreans opposed the killing and eating of\nanimals, \"as having a right to live in common with mankind,\"[153]\nor in consequence of their theory that the souls of men after\ndeath transmigrate into animals.[154] According to Porphyry, a\nfleshless diet not only contributes to the health of the body and\nto the preservation of the power and purity of the mind, but is\nrequired by justice. Animals, he said, are allied to men, and he\nmust be considered an impious person who does not abstain from\nacting unjustly towards his kindred.[155]\n\n[Footnote 150: Porphyry, _op. cit._ iv. 16.]\n\n[Footnote 151: _Ibid._ iv. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 152: _Genesis_, i. 29. _Bundahis_, xv. 6 _sqq._; _cf._\nWindischmann, _Zoroastrische Studien_, p. 212. Hesiod, _Opera et\ndies_, 109 _sqq._ Plato, _Politicus_, p. 272. Porphyry, _op.\ncit._ iv. 2.]\n\n[Footnote 153: Diogenes Laertius, _Vit\u00e6 philosophorum_, viii. 1.\n12 (13). Plutarch, _De carnium esu oratio I._ 1.]\n\n[Footnote 154: Seneca, _Epistul\u00e6_, cviii. 19.]\n\n[Footnote 155: Porphyry, _op. cit._ i. 2; iii. 26 _sq._]\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThere still remains a group of restrictions in diet which call\nfor our consideration, namely, such as refer to the use of\nintoxicating drinks, either only prohibiting immoderation or also\ndemanding total abstinence.\n\nAmong a large number of peoples drunkenness is so common that it\ncan hardly be looked upon as a vice by the community; on the\ncontrary, it is sometimes an object of pride, or is regarded\nalmost as a religious duty. An old traveller on the West African\nGold Coast says that the natives teach their children drunkenness\nat the age of three or four years, \"as if it were a virtue.\"[156]\nThe Negroes of Accra, according to Monrad, take a pride in\ngetting drunk, and praise the happiness of a person who is so\nintoxicated that he can hardly walk.[157] In ancient Yucatan he\nwho dropped down senseless from drink in a banquet was allowed to\nremain where he fell, {339} and was regarded by his companions\nwith feelings of envy.[158] Among the Pueblo Indians in New\nMexico, who are otherwise a sober people, drunkenness forms a\npart of their religious festivals.[159] So also in the hill\ntribes of the Central Provinces of India a large quantity of\nliquor is an essential element in their religious rites, and\ntheir acts of worship invariably end in intoxication.[160] Of the\nAinu in Japan we are told that \"to drink for the god\" is their\nchief act of worship; the more _sak\u00e9_ they drink the more devout\nthey are, whereas the gods will be angry with a person who\nabstains from the intoxicating drink.[161] The ancient\nScandinavians regularly concluded their religious ceremonies with\nfilling and emptying stoops in honour of their gods; and even\nafter their conversion to Christianity they were allowed to\ncontinue this practice at the end of their services, with the\ndifference that they were now required in their toast-drinking to\nsubstitute for the names of their false deities those of the true\nGod and his saints.[162] Of the Germans Tacitus states that \"to\npass an entire day and night in drinking disgraces no one\";[163]\nand this habit of intoxication the Anglo-Saxons brought with them\nto England, where it was nourished by a damp climate and a marshy\nsoil. In the seventh and eighth centuries some efforts were made\nto check drunkenness on the initiative of Theodore, archbishop of\nCanterbury, and Egbert, archbishop of York, and these exertions\nwere supported by the kings from a political desire to prevent\nriots and bloodshed.[164] The Penitentials tell us the tale of\nuniversal intemperance more effectively than any description of\nit could do. A bishop who was so drunk as to vomit while\nadministering the holy sacrament was condemned to eighty or\nninety days penance, a presbyter to {340} seventy, a deacon or\nmonk to sixty, a clerk to forty;[165] and if a person was so\nintoxicated that, pending the rite, he dropped the sacred\nelements into the fire or into a river, he was required to chant\na hundred psalms.[166] A bishop or priest who persevered in the\nhabit of drunkenness was to be degraded from his office;[167]\nwhilst single cases of intoxication, if accompanied by vomiting,\nincurred penance for a certain number of days--forty for a\npresbyter or deacon,[168] thirty for a monk,[169] fifteen for a\nlayman.[170] However, these rules admitted of exceptions: if\nanybody in joy and glory of our Saviour's natal day, or of\nEaster, or in honour of any saint, vomited through being drunk,\nand in so doing had taken no more than he was ordered by his\nelders, it mattered nothing; and if a bishop had commanded him to\nbe drunk he was likewise innocent, unless indeed the bishop was\nin the same state himself.[171] If these attempts to encourage\nsoberness produced any change for the better, it could only have\nbeen temporary; for some time afterwards intemperance was carried\nto its greatest excess through the practice and example of the\nDanes.[172] Under the influence of the Normans, who were a more\ntemperate race, drunkenness, for a time decreased in England; but\nafter a few reigns the Saxons seem rather to have corrupted their\nconquerors than to have been benefited by their example.[173] As\nlate as the eighteenth century drunkenness was universal among\nall classes in England. It was then as uncommon for a party to\nseparate while any member of it remained sober {341} as it is now\nfor any one in such a party to degrade himself through\nintoxication. No loss of character was incurred by habitual\nexcess. Men in the position of gentlemen congratulated each other\nupon the number of bottles emptied; and it would have been\nconsidered a very frivolous objection to a citizen who aspired to\nthe dignity of Alderman or Mayor that he was an habitual\ndrunkard.[174]\n\n[Footnote 156: Bosman, _Description of the Coast of Guinea_, p. 107.]\n\n[Footnote 157: Monrad, _Skildring af Guinea-Kysten_, p. 242.]\n\n[Footnote 158: Bancroft, _op. cit._ ii. 725.]\n\n[Footnote 159: _Ibid._ i. 555.]\n\n[Footnote 160: Hislop, _Aboriginal Tribes of the Central\nProvinces_, p. 1. Campbell, _Wild Tribes of Khondistan_, p. 164\n_sq._ (Kandhs).]\n\n[Footnote 161: Bird, _Unbeaten Tracks in Japan_, ii. 68, 96.\n_Cf._ Batchelor, _Ainu of Japan_, p. 31.]\n\n[Footnote 162: Maurer, _op. cit._ ii. 200. Bartholinus,\n_Antiquitates Danic\u00e6_, i. 8, p. 128 _sqq._ Mallet, _Northern\nAntiquities_, p. 196.]\n\n[Footnote 163: Tacitus, _Germania_, 22.]\n\n[Footnote 164: _Laws of Hlothh\u00e6re and Eadric_, 12 _sq._ Thrupp,\n_The Anglo-Saxon Home_, p. 297.]\n\n[Footnote 165: _P[oe]nitentiale Pseudo-Theodori_, xxvi. 4\n(Wasserschleben, _Die Bussordnungen der abendl\u00e4ndischen Kirche_,\np. 594). _P[oe]nitentiale Egberti_, xi. 7 (Wasserschleben, p. 242).]\n\n[Footnote 166: _P[oe]nitentiale Pseudo-Theodori_, xxvi. 5\n(Wasserschleben, _op. cit._ p. 594). _P[oe]nitentiale Egberti_,\nxi. 9 (Wasserschleben, p. 242).]\n\n[Footnote 167: _P[oe]nitentiale Theodori_, i. 1. 1\n(Wasserschleben, _op. cit._ p. 184). _P[oe]nitentiale Egberti_,\nxi. 1 (Wasserschleben, p. 242).]\n\n[Footnote 168: _P[oe]nitentiale Theodori_, i. 1. 3\n(Wasserschleben, _op. cit._ p. 184). _P[oe]nitentiale Egberti_,\nxi. 3 (Wasserschleben, p. 242).]\n\n[Footnote 169: _P[oe]nitentiale Theodori_, i. 1. 2\n(Wasserschleben, _op. cit._ p. 184). _P[oe]nitentiale Egberti_,\nxi. 2 (Wasserschleben, p. 242).]\n\n[Footnote 170: _P[oe]nitentiale Theodori_, i. 1. 5\n(Wasserschleben, _op. cit._ p. 184).]\n\n[Footnote 171: _P[oe]nitentiale Theodori_, i. 1. 4\n(Wasserschleben, _op. cit._ p. 184).]\n\n[Footnote 172: Thrupp, _op. cit._ p. 299 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 173: _Ibid._ p. 301 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 174: Porter, _Progress of the Nation_, p. 239. Pike,\n_History of Crime in England_, ii. 587. Massey, _History of\nEngland during the Reign of George III._ ii. 60.]\n\nThough of late years drunkenness has been decreasing among those\nEuropean nations who have been most addicted to it, and is\nnowadays generally recognised as a vice, our civilisation is\nstill, as it has always been, the great source from which the\npoison of intoxication is pouring over the earth in all\ndirections, infecting or killing races who previously knew\nnothing of alcohol or looked upon it with abhorrence. Eastern\nreligions have emphatically insisted upon sobriety or even total\nabstinence from intoxicating liquors. In the sacred law-books of\nBrahmanism thirteen different kinds of alcoholic drinks are\nmentioned, all of which are forbidden to Br\u00e2hmanas and three to\nKshatriyas and Vaisyas;[175] yet, though there be no sin in\ndrinking spirituous liquor, \"abstention brings greater\nreward.\"[176] A twice-born man who drinks the liquor called Sur\u00e2\ncommits a mortal sin, which will be punished both in this life\nand in the life to come;[177] the most proper penalty for such a\nperson is to drink that liquor boiling-hot, and only when his\nbody has been completely scalded by it is he freed from his\nguilt.[178] Among the modern Hindus drunkenness is said to be\ndetested by all but the very lowest castes in the agricultural\ndistricts and some high caste people residing in the great towns,\nwho have learned it from Europeans; it is supposed to be\ndestructive of caste purity; hence a notorious drunkard is, or at\nleast {342} used to be, expelled from his caste.[179] Buddhism\ninterdicts altogether the use of alcohol;[180] \"of the five\ncrimes, the taking of life, theft, adultery, lying, and drinking,\nthe last is the worst.\"[181] Taouism condemns the love of\nwine.[182] In Zoroastrianism the holy Sraosha is represented as\nfighting against the demon of drunkenness,[183] and it is said\nthat the sacred beings are not pleased with him who drinks wine\nmore than moderately;[184] but it seems that the ancient Persians\nnevertheless were much addicted to intoxication.[185] According\nto classical writers, some of the Egyptian priests abstained\nentirely from wine, whilst others drank very little of it;[186]\nand before the reign of Psammetichus the kings neither drank\nwine, nor made libation of it as a thing acceptable to the\ngods.[187] The use of wine and other inebriating drinks is\nforbidden by Islam,[188] and was punished by Muhammed with\nflogging.[189] It may also be said of his followers that they for\nthe most part have obeyed this command, at least in country\ndistricts,[190] and that the exceptions to the rule are directly\nor indirectly attributable to the influence of Christians.\n\n[Footnote 175: _Institutes of Vishnu_, xxii. 82, 84. _Gautama_,\nii. 20. _Laws of Manu_, xi. 94 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 176: _Laws of Manu_, v. 56.]\n\n[Footnote 177: _Ibid._ ix. 235, 237; xi. 49, 55; xii. 56.]\n\n[Footnote 178: _Ibid._ xi. 91.]\n\n[Footnote 179: Caldwell, _Tinnevelly Shanars_, p. 38. Dubois,\n_op. cit._ p. 116. Samuelson, _History of Drink_, p. 46.]\n\n[Footnote 180: Oldenberg, _Buddha_, p. 290. Monier-Williams,\n_Buddhism_, p. 126.]\n\n[Footnote 181: Hardy, _Manual of Budhism_, p. 491.]\n\n[Footnote 182: Douglas, _Confucianism and Taouism_, p. 266.]\n\n[Footnote 183: _Vend\u00eed\u00e2d_, xix. 41.]\n\n[Footnote 184: _D\u00een\u00e2-\u00ee Ma\u00een\u00f4g-\u00ee Khirad_, xvi. 62.]\n\n[Footnote 185: Herodotus, i. 133.]\n\n[Footnote 186: Porphyry, _op. cit._ iv. 6. Plutarch, _De Iside et\nOsiride_, 6.]\n\n[Footnote 187: Plutarch, _De Iside et Osiride_, 6.]\n\n[Footnote 188: _Koran_, ii. 216.]\n\n[Footnote 189: Lane, _Modern Egyptians_, p. 122.]\n\n[Footnote 190: Burton, _Pilgrimage to Al-Madinah and Meccah_, ii.\n118. Blunt, _Bedouin Tribes of the Euphrates_, ii. 213. Polak,\n_Persien_, ii. 268. Lane, _Modern Egyptians_, p. 298 _sq._ Pool,\n_Studies in Mohammedanism_, p. 283.]\n\nThe condemnation of drunkenness is, of course, in the first place\ndue to its injurious consequences. The Basutos of South Africa\nsay that \"there is blood in the dregs\"--that is, intoxication\nends in bloody quarrels.[191] The Omaha Indians made drunkenness\na crime punishable with flogging and loss of property, because it\noften led to murders.[192] Sahagun tells us of a Mexican king who\nseverely admonished his people to abstain from intoxication, as\nbeing the cause of troubles and disorders in villages and {343}\nkingdoms, of misery, sorrow, and poverty.[193] Of him who drinks\nimmoderately it is said in one of the Pahlavi texts that infamy\ncomes to his body and wickedness to his soul.[194] According to\nEcclesiasticus, \"drunkenness increaseth the rage of a fool till\nhe offend: it diminisheth strength and maketh wounds.\"[195] We\nread in the Talmud, \"Drink not, and you will not sin.\"[196]\nMuhammed said that in wine there is both sin and profit, but that\nthe sin is greater than the profit.[197] Buddhism stigmatises\ndrinking as the worst of crimes because it leads to all other\nsins; from the continued use of intoxicating drink six evil\nconsequences are said to follow--namely, the loss of wealth; the\narising of disputes that lead to blows and battles; the\nproduction of various diseases, as soreness of the eyes and\nothers; the bringing of disgrace, from the rebuke of parents and\nsuperiors; the exposure to shame, from going hither and thither\nunclothed; the loss of the judgment required for the carrying on\nof the affairs of the world.[198] That drunkenness, in spite of\nthe evils resulting from it, nevertheless so frequently escapes\ncensure, is due partly to the pleasures connected with it, partly\nto lack of foresight,[199] and in a large measure to the\ninfluence of intemperate habits. Why such habits should have\ngrown up in one country and not in another we are often unable to\ntell. The climate has no doubt something to do with it, although\nit is impossible to agree with the statement made by Montesquieu\nthat the prevalence of intoxication in different parts of the\nearth is proportionate to the coldness and humidity of the\nair.[200] A gloomy temperament and a cheerless life are apt to\ninduce people to resort to the artificial pleasures produced by\ndrink. The dreariness of the Puritan Sunday has much to answer\nfor; the evidence given by a spirit merchant before the\nCommission on the Forbes Mackenzie Act was \"that there is a great\n{344} demand for drink on Sunday,\" and that \"this demand _must_\nbe supplied.\"[201] _Ennui_ was probably a cause of the prevailing\ninebriety in Europe in former days, when there was difficulty in\npassing the time not occupied in fighting or hunting;[202] and\nthe monotony of life in the lower ranks of an industrial\ncommunity still tends to produce a similar effect. Other causes\nof drunkenness are miserable homes and wretched cooking. Mr.\nLecky is of opinion that if the wives of the poor in Great\nBritain and Ireland could cook as they can cook in France and in\nHolland, a much smaller proportion of the husbands would seek a\nrefuge in the public-house.[203]\n\n[Footnote 191: Casalis, _Basutos_, p. 307.]\n\n[Footnote 192: Dorsey, 'Omaha Sociology,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur.\nEthn._ iii. 370.]\n\n[Footnote 193: Sahagun, _Historia general de las cosas de Nueva\nEspa\u00f1a_, ii. 94 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 194: _D\u00een\u00e2-\u00ee Ma\u00een\u00f4g-\u00ee Khirad_, xvi. 63.]\n\n[Footnote 195: _Ecclesiasticus_, xxxi. 30.]\n\n[Footnote 196: Deutsch, _Literary Remains_, p. 58.]\n\n[Footnote 197: _Koran_, ii. 216.]\n\n[Footnote 198: Hardy, _op. cit._ p. 491 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 199: _Cf._ _supra_, i. 281, 309 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 200: Montesquieu, _De l'esprit des lois_, xiv. 10\n(_[OE]uvres_, p. 303 _sq._).]\n\n[Footnote 201: Hessey, _Sunday_, p. 378.]\n\n[Footnote 202: _Cf._ Spencer, _Principles of Ethics_, i. 445.]\n\n[Footnote 203: Lecky, _Democracy and Liberty_, ii. 138.]\n\nThe evil consequences of intoxication have led not only to the\ncondemnation of an immoderate use of alcoholic drink, but also to\nthe demand for total abstinence, in consideration of the\ndifficulty many people have in avoiding excess. But this hardly\naccounts in full for the religious prohibition of drink which we\nmeet with in the East. Wine or spirituous liquor inspires\nmysterious fear. The abnormal mental state which it produces\nsuggests the idea that there is something supernatural in it,\nthat it contains a spirit, or is perhaps itself a spirit.[204]\nMoreover, the juice of the grape is conceived as the blood of the\nvine[205]--in Ecclesiasticus the wine which was poured out at the\nfoot of the altar is even called \"the blood of the grape\";[206]\nand in the blood is the soul. The law of Brahmanism not only\nprohibits the drinking of wine, but also commands that \"one\nshould carefully avoid red exudations from trees and juices\nflowing from incisions.\"[207] That spirituous liquor is believed\nto contain baneful mysterious energy is obvious from the\nstatement that if the Brahman (the Veda) which dwells in the body\nof a Br\u00e2hmana is even once deluged with it, his Brahmanhood\nforsakes him, and he becomes a S\u00fbdra;[208] holy persons are, of\n{345} course, most easily affected by the mysterious drink, owing\nto the delicate nature of holiness. Muhammedans likewise regard\nwine as \"unclean\" and polluting;[209] some of them dread it so\nmuch that if a single drop were to fall upon a clean garment it\nwould be rendered unfit to wear until washed.[210] In Morocco it\nis said that by drinking alcohol a Muhammedan loses the _baraka_,\nor holiness, of \"the faith\" and a scribe the memory of the Koran,\nand that if a person who drinks alcohol has a charm on him, its\n_baraka_ is spoiled. The fact that wine was forbidden by the\nProphet might perhaps by itself be a sufficient reason for the\nnotion that it is unclean. But already in pre-Muhammedan times it\nseems to have been scrupulously avoided by some of the\nArabs,[211] though among others it was much in use and was highly\npraised by their poets.[212]\n\n[Footnote 204:  See _supra_, i. 278, 281; _infra_, on the Belief\nin Supernatural Beings; Frazer, _Golden Bough_, i. 359.]\n\n[Footnote 205: Frazer, _op. cit._ i. 358 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 206: _Ecclesiasticus_, l. 15.]\n\n[Footnote 207: _Laws of Manu_, v. 6.]\n\n[Footnote 208: _Ibid._ xi. 98.]\n\n[Footnote 209: Lane, _Modern Egyptians_, p. 299.]\n\n[Footnote 210: Winterbottom, _Native Africans in the\nNeighbourhood of Sierra Leone_, i. 72.]\n\n[Footnote 211: Diodorus Siculus, _Bibliotheca historica_, xix.\n94. 3. Z\u00f6ckler, _Askese und M\u00f6nchtum_, i. 93.]\n\n[Footnote 212: Goldziher, _Muhammedanische Studien_, i. 21 _sqq._]\n\nAs for the Muhammedan prohibition of wine, the suggestion has\nbeen made by Palgrave that it mainly arose from the Prophet's\nantipathy to Christianity and his desire to broaden the line of\ndemarcation between his followers and those of Christ. Wine was\nraised by the founder of Christianity to a dignity of the highest\nreligious import. It became well-nigh typical of Christianity and\nin a manner its badge. To declare it \"unclean,\" an \"abomination,\"\nand \"the work of the devil,\" was to set up for the Faithful a\ncounter-badge.[213] This view derives much probability from the\nfact that there are several unequivocal indications of the same\nbent of policy in Muhammed's system, showing a distinct tendency\nto oppose Islam to other religions. But at the same time both a\ndesire to prevent intoxication and the notion that wine is\npolluting may very well have been co-operating motives for the\nprohibition.\n\n[Footnote 213: Palgrave, _Journey through Central and Eastern\nArabia_, i. 428 _sqq._]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXIX\n\nCLEANLINESS AND UNCLEANLINESS--ASCETICISM IN GENERAL\n\n\nIT seems that man, like many other animals, is naturally endowed\nwith a certain tendency to cleanliness or aversion to filth. Of\nCaspar Hauser--the boy who had been kept in a dungeon separated\nfrom all communication with the world from early childhood to\nabout the age of seventeen--Feuerbach tells us that\n\"uncleanliness, or whatever he considered as such, whether in his\nown person or in others, was an abomination to him.\"[1] And the\nsavage boy of Aveyron, though filthy at first, soon became so\nscrupulously clean in his habits that \"he constantly threw away,\nin a pet, the contents of his plate, if any particle of dirt or\ndust had fallen upon it; and, after he had broken his walnuts\nunder his feet, he took pains to clean them in the nicest and\nmost delicate manner.\"[2]\n\n[Footnote 1: Feuerbach, _Caspar Hauser_, p. 62.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Itard, _Account of the Discovery and Education of a\nSavage Man_, p. 58.]\n\nMany savages are praised for their cleanliness.[3] The Veddahs of\nCeylon wash their bodies every few days, as opportunity\noccurs.[4] Among the South Sea Islanders {347} bathing is a very\ncommon practice; the Tahitians bathe in fresh water once or twice\na day,[5] and the natives of Ni-afu, in the Tonga Islands, are\nsaid to spend half their life in the water.[6] So, also, many\nIndian tribes both in North, Central, and South America are very\nfond of bathing.[7] The Omahas generally bathe every day in warm\nweather, early in the morning and at night, and some of them also\nat noon.[8] Among the Guiana Indians it is a custom for men and\nwomen to troop down together to the nearest water early in the\nmorning and many times during the day.[9] The Tehuelches of\nPatagonia not only make morning ablutions and, when encamped near\na river, enjoy bathing for hours, but are also scrupulously\ncareful as to the cleanliness of their houses and utensils, and\nwill, if they can obtain soap, wash up everything they may be\npossessed of.[10] The Moquis and Pueblos of New Mexico are\nremarkable both for their personal cleanliness and the neatness\nof their dwellings.[11] Cleanliness is a common characteristic of\nmany natives of Africa.[12] The Negroes of the Gold Coast wash\ntheir whole persons once, if not oftener, during the day.[13] The\nMeg\u00e9, a people subject to the Monbuttu, wash two or three times a\nday, and when engaged in work constantly adjourn to a\nneighbouring stream to cleanse themselves.[14] The\nMarutse-Mabundas, rather than lose their bath, are always ready\n{348} to run the risk of being snapped up by crocodiles, and they\nare in the habit of keeping their materials in well-washed wooden\nor earthenware bowls or in suitable baskets or calabashes.[15]\nThe cleanliness of the Dinka in every thing that concerns the\npreparation of food is said to be absolutely exemplary.[16] Among\nthe Bari tribes the dwellings \"are the perfection of\ncleanliness.\"[17] So also the Bachapins, a Bechuana tribe, are\nremarkable for the cleanliness of their dwellings, showing the\ngreatest carefulness to remove all rubbish and everything\nunsightly; but at the same time they are lacking in personal\ncleanliness.[18]\n\n[Footnote 3: Colquhoun, _Amongst the Shans_, p. 298 _sq._ Man,\n_Sonthalia and the Sonthals_, p. 84. Foreman, _Philippine\nIslands_, p. 189 (domesticated natives). Boyle, _Dyaks of\nBorneo_, p. 242. Erskine, _Cruise among the Islands of the\nWestern Pacific_, pp. 110 (Samoans; _cf._ Turner, _Nineteen Years\nin Polynesia_, p. 205), 262, 264 (Fijians). Percy Smith,\n'Futuna,' in _Jour. Polynesian Soc._ i. 35. Markham, _Cruise of\nthe \"Rosario,\"_ p. 136 (Polynesians).]\n\n[Footnote 4: Nevill, 'Vaeddas of Ceylon,' in _Taprobanian_,\ni. 187.]\n\n[Footnote 5: Ellis, _Polynesian Researches_ (ed. 1829),\nii. 113 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 6: Romilly, _Western Pacific_, p. 145.]\n\n[Footnote 7: Bancroft, _Native Races of the Pacific States_, i.\n83, 696, 722, 760. Domenech, _Seven Years Residence in the Great\nDeserts of North America_, ii. 337. von Humboldt, _Personal\nNarrative of Travels to the Equinoctial Regions of the New\nContinent_, iii. 237 (Chaymas). von Martius, _Beitr\u00e4ge zur\nEthnographie Amerika's_, i. 600 (Uaup\u00e9s), 643 (Macus\u00eds). Molina,\n_History of Chili_, ii. 118; Smith, _Araucanians_, p. 184.\nDobrizhoffer, _Account of the Abipones_, ii. 53.]\n\n[Footnote 8: Dorsey, 'Omaha Sociology,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._\niii. 269.]\n\n[Footnote 9: Im Thurn, _Among the Indians of Guiana_, p. 191.]\n\n[Footnote 10: Musters, _At Home with the Patagonians_, p. 173.]\n\n[Footnote 11: Bancroft, _op. cit._ i. 540. See also _ibid._\ni. 267 (some Inland Columbians).]\n\n[Footnote 12: Waitz, _Anthropologie der Naturv\u00f6lker_, ii. 86\n(Negroes of Accra, Krus), 464 (Western Fulahs). Torday and Joyce,\n'Ethnography of the Ba-Huana,' in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxxvi.\n292. Rowley, _Africa Unveiled_, p. 153. Ashe, _Two Kings of\nUganda_, p. 305; Wilson and Felkin, _Uganda_, i. 184. Casati,\n_Ten Years in Equatoria_, i. 122 (Monbuttu). Holub, _Seven Years\nin South Africa_, ii. 208 (Manansas).]\n\n[Footnote 13: Cruickshank, _Eighteen Years on the Gold Coast_,\nii. 283 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 14: Burrows, _Land of the Pigmies_, p. 119.]\n\n[Footnote 15: Holub, _op. cit._ ii. 309.]\n\n[Footnote 16: Casati, _op. cit._ i. 44.]\n\n[Footnote 17: Baker, _Albert N'yanza_, i. 89.]\n\n[Footnote 18: Burchell, _Travels in the Interior of Southern\nAfrica_, ii. 521, 553.]\n\nWe commonly find that savages who are clean in certain respects\nare dirty in others. The Wanyoro bathe frequently and always wash\ntheir hands before and after eating, but their dwellings are very\nfilthy and swarm with vermin.[19] The Nagas of India[20] and the\nnatives of the interior of Sumatra,[21] though cleanly in their\npersons, are very dirty in their apparel. The Mayas of Central\nAmerica make frequent use of cold water, but neither in their\npersons nor in their dwellings do they present an appearance of\ncleanliness.[22] So also the Californian Indians, whilst\nexceedingly fond of bathing, are unclean about their lodges and\nclothing.[23] The Aleuts, though they wash daily, allow dirt to\nbe piled up close to their dwellings, prepare their food very\ncarelessly, and never wash their household utensils.[24] The New\nZealander, again, whilst not over-clean in his person, is very\nparticular respecting his food and also keeps his dwelling in as\nmuch order as possible.[25] On the other hand there are very many\nuncivilised peoples who are described as generally filthy in\ntheir habits--for instance, the Fuegians,[26] many {349} Indian\ntribes in the Pacific States,[27] several Eskimo tribes,[28]\nvarious Siberian peoples,[29] the Ainu of Japan,[30] most hill\ntribes in India,[31] many Australian tribes,[32] the\nBushmans,[33] and, generally, the dwarf races of Africa.[34] But\nalthough these peoples never or hardly ever wash their bodies, or\ndo not change their dress until it is worn to pieces, or eat out\nof the same vessels as their dogs without cleaning them, or feed\non disgusting substances, or regard vermin as a delicacy--we may\nassume that their toleration of filth is not absolutely boundless.\n\n[Footnote 19: Wilson and Felkin, _op. cit._ ii. 46. Baker,\n_Albert N'yanza_, ii. 58.]\n\n[Footnote 20: Stewart, 'Northern Cachar,' in _Jour. Asiatic Soc.\nBengal_, xxiv. 616.]\n\n[Footnote 21: Marsden, _History of Sumatra_, p. 209**.]\n\n[Footnote 22: Bancroft, _op. cit._ i. 654.]\n\n[Footnote 23: Powers, _Tribes of California_, p. 403. Bancroft,\n_op. cit._ i. 377, 407.]\n\n[Footnote 24: Veniaminof, quoted by Dall, _Alaska_, p. 398. See\nalso Bancroft, _op. cit._ i. 267 (Flatheads).]\n\n[Footnote 25: Dieffenbach, _Travels in New Zealand_, ii. 58.]\n\n[Footnote 26: Snow, _Two Years' Cruise off Tierra del Fuego_,\ni. 345.]\n\n[Footnote 27: Bancroft, _op. cit._ i. 83, 102, 184, 231, 492, 626.]\n\n[Footnote 28: _Ibid._ i. 51. Seemann, _Voyage of \"Herald,\"_ ii.\n61 _sq._ (Western Eskimo). Kane, _Arctic Explorations_, ii. 116\n(Eskimo of Etah). Cranz, _History of Greenland_, i. 155.]\n\n[Footnote 29: Sarytschew, 'Voyage of Discovery to the North-East\nof Siberia,' in _Collection of Modern and Contemporary Voyages_,\nv. 67 (Kamchadales). Krasheninnikoff, _History of Kamschatka_,\npp. 176 (Kamchadales), 226 (Koriaks). Sauer, _Expedition to the\nNorthern Parts of Russia performed by Billings_, p. 125 (Jakuts).\nGeorgi, _Russia_, ii. 398 (Jakuts); iii. 59 (Kotoftzes), 112\n(Tunguses); iv. 37 (Kalmucks), 134 (Burats). Liadov, in _Jour.\nAnthr. Inst._ i. 401; Bergmann, _Nomadische Streifereien unter\nden Kalm\u00fcken_, ii. 102, 123 _sq._; Pallas, quoted in Spencer's\n_Descriptive Sociology_, 'Asiatic Races,' p. 29 (Kalmucks).]\n\n[Footnote 30: Batchelor, _Ainu of Japan_, p. 24 _sqq._ Mac\nRitchie, _Ainos_, p. 12 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 31: Spencer, _Descriptive Sociology_, 'Asiatic Races,'\np. 29. Grange, 'Expedition into the Naga Hills,' in _Jour.\nAsiatic Soc. Bengal_, ix. 962. Stewart, _ibid._ xxiv. 637\n(Kukis). Mason, 'Physical Character of the Karens,' _ibid._ xxxv.\npt. ii. 25. Butler, _Travels in Assam_, p. 98. Anderson,\n_Mandalay to Momien_, p. 131 (Kakhyens). Moorcroft and Trebeck,\n_Travels in the Himalayan Provinces_, i. 321 (Ladakhis).]\n\n[Footnote 32: Breton, _Excursions in New South Wales_, p. 197.\nBarrington, _History of New South Wales_, p. 19 (natives of\nBotany Bay). Angas, _Savage Life in Australia_, i. 80 (South\nAustralian aborigines). Chauncy, in Brough Smyth, _Aborigines of\nVictoria_, ii. 284 (West Australian aborigines).]\n\n[Footnote 33: Moffat, _Missionary Labours in Southern Africa_,\np. 15. Barrow, _Travels into the Interior of Southern Africa_,\ni. 288.]\n\n[Footnote 34: Stuhlmann, _Mit Emin Pascha ins Herz von Afrika_,\np. 451. For other instances of uncleanliness in savages see\nCrawfurd, _History of the Indian Archipelago_, i. 39; St. John,\n_Life in the Forests of the Far East_, i. 147 (some of the Land\nDyaks); Andersson, _Lake Ngami_, pp. 50 (Herero), 470 (Bechuanas).]\n\nThe prevalence of cleanly or dirty habits among a certain people\nmay depend on a variety of circumstances: the occupations of\nlife, sufficiency or want of water, climatic conditions, industry\nor laziness, wealth or poverty, religious or superstitious\nbeliefs. Castr\u00e9n observes that filthiness is a characteristic of\nfishing peoples; among the Ostyaks only those who live by fishing\nare conspicuous for their uncleanliness, whereas the nomads and\nowners of {350} reindeer are not.[35] It has been observed that\nthe inland negro is clean when he dwells in the neighbourhood of\nrivers.[36] In West Australia those tribes only which live by\nlarge rivers or near the sea are said to have an idea of\ncleanliness.[37] Concerning the filthy habits of the Kukis and\nother hill peoples in India, Major Butler remarks that they may\nprobably be accounted for by the scarcity of water in the\nneighbourhood of the villages, as also by the coldness of the\nclimate.[38] Dr. Kane believes that the indifference of many\nEskimo to dirt or filth is largely due to the extreme cold, which\nby rapid freezing resists putrefaction and thus prevents the\nhousehold, with its numerous dogs, from being intolerable.[39]\nTheir well-known habit of washing themselves with freshly passed\nurine arises partly from scarcity of water and the difficulty of\nheating it, but partly also from the fact that the ammonia of the\nurine is an excellent substitute for soap in removing the grease\nwith which the skin necessarily becomes soiled.[40] A cold\nclimate, moreover, leads to uncleanliness because it makes\ngarments necessary;[41] and among some savages the practice of\ngreasing their bodies to protect the skin from the effects of a\nparching air produces a similar result.[42] Lord Kames maintains\nthat the greatest promoter of cleanliness is industry, whereas\nits greatest antagonist is indolence. In Holland, he observes,\nthe people were cleaner than all their neighbours because they\nwere more industrious, at a time when in England industry was as\ngreat a stranger as cleanliness.[43] Kolben says that the general\nlaziness of the Hottentots accounts for the fact that \"they are\nin the matter of diet {351} the filthiest people in the\nworld.\"[44] Of the Siberian Burats Georgi writes that \"from their\nlaziness they are as dirty as swine\";[45] and the Kamchadales are\ndescribed as a \"dirty, lazy race.\"[46] Poverty, also, is for\nobvious reasons a cause of uncleanliness;[47] \"a starving vulture\nneglects to polish his feathers, and a famished dog has a ragged\ncoat.\"[48] Very commonly cleanliness is a class distinction.[49]\nThus among the Point Barrow Eskimo the poorer people are often\ncareless about their clothes and persons, whereas most of the\nwealthier individuals appear to take pride in being well clad,\nand, except when actually engaged in some dirty work, always have\ntheir faces and hands scrupulously clean and their hair neatly\ncombed.[50] Dr. Schweinfurth maintains that domestic cleanliness\nand care in the preparation of food are everywhere signs of a\nhigher grade of external culture and answer to a certain degree\nof intellectual superiority.[51] But already Lord Kames pointed\nout the fact indicated above, that \"cleanness is remarkable in\nseveral nations which have made little progress in the arts of\nlife.\"[52]\n\n[Footnote 35: Castr\u00e9n, _Nordiska resor och forskningar_,\ni. 319 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 36: Bastian, _Der Mensch in der Geschichte_, iii. 75.\nMr. Torday, who speaks from extensive experience, tells me the same.]\n\n[Footnote 37: Chauncy, quoted by Brough Smyth, _op. cit._ ii. 284.]\n\n[Footnote 38: Butler, _Travels in Assam_, p. 98 _sq._ _Cf._\nStewart, in _Jour. Asiatic Soc. Bengal_, xxiv. 616.]\n\n[Footnote 39: Kane, _Arctic Explorations_, ii. 116.]\n\n[Footnote 40: Murdoch, 'Ethnol. Results of the Point Barrow\nExpedition,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ ix. 421. Dall, _op. cit._\np. 20.]\n\n[Footnote 41: _Cf._ von Humboldt, _op. cit._ iii. 237.]\n\n[Footnote 42: Burchell, _op. cit._ ii. 553 (Bachapins of Litakun).]\n\n[Footnote 43: Kames, _Sketches of the History of Man_, i. 323,\n327 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 44: Kolben, _Present State of the Cape of Good Hope_,\ni. 47.]\n\n[Footnote 45: Georgi, _op. cit._ iv. 134.]\n\n[Footnote 46: _Ibid._ iii. 152. See also Sarytschew, in\n_Collection of Modern and Contemporary Voyages_, v. 67.]\n\n[Footnote 47: See Marshall, _A Phrenologist amongst the Todas_,\np. 50; Veniaminof, quoted by Dall, _op. cit._ p. 398 (Aleuts).]\n\n[Footnote 48: St. John, _Village Life in Egypt_, i. 187.]\n\n[Footnote 49: Tickell, 'Memoir on the Hod\u00e9sum,' in _Jour. Asiatic\nSoc. Bengal_, ix. 808 (Hos). Rowlatt, 'Expedition into the\nMishmee Hills,' _ibid._ xiv. 489. Williams and Calvert, _Fiji_,\np. 117. Waitz, _op. cit._ ii. 86 (Ashantees). Arnot,\n_Garenganze_, p. 76 (Barotse). Lane, _Modern Egyptians_, p. 299.]\n\n[Footnote 50: Murdoch, in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ ix. 421.]\n\n[Footnote 51: Schweinfurth, _Heart of Africa_, i. 156.]\n\n[Footnote 52: Kames, _op. cit._ i. 321.]\n\nThe factors which determine the cleanliness of a people also\nnaturally influence the moral valuation of it. Aversion to dirt\nnot only leads to cleanly habits, but makes a filthy person an\nobject of disgust and disapprobation; indeed, this aversion is\ngenerally stronger with reference to other individuals than with\nreference to one's own person. But where for some reason or other\ndirtiness becomes habitual, it at the same time ceases to be\ndisgusting; and it is often astonishing how soon {352} people get\nused to filthy surroundings. Thus, when cleanliness is insisted\nupon it is so in the first instance because dirt is directly\ndisagreeable to other persons, and when uncleanness is tolerated\nit is so because it gives no offence to the senses of the public.\nBut at the higher stages of civilisation, at least, cleanliness\nis besides inculcated on hygienic grounds.\n\nIn many cases cleanliness, either temporary or habitual, is also\npractised and enjoined from religious or superstitious motives. A\nLappish _noaide_, or wizard, had to wash all his body before he\noffered a sacrifice.[53] The Siberian shamans have compulsory\nwater purifications once a year, sometimes every month, as also\non special occasions when they feel themselves defiled by contact\nwith unclean things.[54] The Shinto priests in Japan bathed and\nput on clean garments before making the sacred offerings or\nchanting the liturgies.[55] Herodotus speaks of the cleanliness\nobserved by the Egyptian priests when engaged in the service of\nthe gods.[56] As a preliminary to an act of worship the ancient\nGreeks washed their hands or bathed and put on clean clothes.[57]\nOne of the legal maxims of the Romans required that men should\napproach the deity in a state of purity.[58] According to\nZoroastrianism it is the great business of life to avoid\nimpurity, and, when it is involuntarily contracted, to remove it\nin the correct manner as quickly as possible; and by impurity is\nthen understood not an inward state of the soul, but mainly a\nphysical state of the body, everything going out of the human\nbody being considered polluting.[59] For a Brahmin bathing is the\nchief part of the minute ceremonial of daily worship, whilst\nfurther washings and aspersions enter into more solemn religious\nacts;[60] and not only Brahmins but most Hindus regard {353} it\nas a religious duty to bathe daily if this is at all\nconvenient.[61] Lamaism enjoins personal ablution as a sacerdotal\nrite preparatory to worship, though the ceremony seldom extends\nto more than dipping the tips of the fingers in water.[62] Jewish\nRabbis are compelled to wash their hands before they begin to\npray.[63] Tertullian mentions that a similar ablution was\npractised by the Christians before prayer.[64] According to\nIslam, the clothes and person of the worshipper should be clean,\nand so also the ground, mat, carpet, or whatever else it be, upon\nwhich he prays; and every act of worship must be preceded by an\nablution, though, where water cannot be got, sand may be used as\na substitute.[65] But a polluting influence is not ascribed to\neverything which we regard as dirt. For instance, Muhammedans\nconsider the excrements of men and dogs defiling, but not the\ndung of cows and sheep; cow-dung is even used as a means of\npurification.\n\n[Footnote 53: Friis, _Lappisk Mythologie_, p. 145 _sq._ von\nD\u00fcben, _Lappland_, p. 256.]\n\n[Footnote 54: _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxiv. 88.]\n\n[Footnote 55: Griffis, _Religions of Japan_, p. 85.]\n\n[Footnote 56: Herodotus, ii. 37. _Cf._ Wiedemann, _Herodots\nzweites Buch_, p. 154.]\n\n[Footnote 57: _Iliad_, i. 449; iii. 270; vi. 266; ix. 171, 174;\nxvi. 229 _sq._; xxiii. 41; xxiv. 302 _sqq._ _Odyssey_, ii. 261;\niv. 750; xvii. 58. Keller, _Homeric Society_, p. 141. Stengel,\n_Die griechischen Kultusaltert\u00fcmer_, p. 106.]\n\n[Footnote 58: Cicero, _De legibus_, ii. 10.]\n\n[Footnote 59: Darmesteter, in _Sacred Books of the East_, iv.\np. lxxii. _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 60: Ward, _View of the History, &c. of the Hindoos_,\nii. 61 _sq._ Colebrooke, _Miscellaneous Essays_, ii. 142 _sqq._\nDubois, _People of India_, p. 113 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 61: Wilkins, _Modern Hinduism_, p. 201.]\n\n[Footnote 62: Waddell, _Buddhism of Tibet_, p. 423.]\n\n[Footnote 63: Chwolsohn, _Die Ssabier_, ii. 71.]\n\n[Footnote 64: Tertullian, _De Oratione_, 13 (Migne, _Patrologi\u00e6\ncursus_, ii. 1167 _sq._).]\n\n[Footnote 65: Sell, _Faith of Islam_, p. 252 _sqq._ Lane, _Modern\nEgyptians_, i. 84 _sqq._]\n\nThese practices and rules spring from the idea that the contact\nof a polluting substance with anything holy is followed by\ninjurious consequences--an idea which will be more fully\ndiscussed in connection with sexual abstinences. Such contact is\nsupposed to deprive a deity or holy being of its holiness, or\notherwise be detrimental to it, and therefore to excite its anger\nagainst him who causes the defilement. So also a sacred act is\nbelieved to lose its sacredness by being performed by an unclean\nindividual. Moreover, as a polluting substance is itself held to\ncontain mysterious energy of a baneful kind, it is looked upon as\na direct danger even to persons who are not engaged in religious\nworship. We have previously noticed the rites of purification\nwhich a manslayer has to undergo in order to get rid of the\nblood-pollution.[66] We have also seen that ablutions and other\npurificatory ceremonies {354} are performed for the purpose of\nremoving sins and misfortunes.[67] And bathing or sprinkling with\nwater is a common method of clearing mourners or persons who have\ncome in contact with a corpse from the contagion of death.[68]\n\n[Footnote 66: _Supra_, i. 375 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 67: _Supra_, i. 54 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 68: Teit, 'Thompson Indians of British Columbia,' in\n_Memoirs of the American Museum of Natural History_,\n'Anthropology,' i. 331. Cruickshank, _op. cit._ ii. 218 (Negroes\nof the Gold Coast). Ellis, _E[(w]e-speaking Peoples of the Slave\nCoast_, p. 160. Turner, _Samoa_, p. 145; _Idem_, _Nineteen Years\nin Polynesia_, p. 228 (Samoans). Ellis, _Polynesian Researches_,\ni. 403 (Society Islanders). Kloss, _In the Andamans and\nNicobars_, p. 305 (Kar Nicobarese). Joinville, 'Religion and\nManners of the People of Ceylon,' in _Asiatick Researches_, vii.\n437 (Sinhalese). Iyer, 'Nay[=a]dis of Malabar,' in the Madras\nGovernment Museum's _Bulletin_, iv. 71; Thurston, _ibid._ iv. 76\n_sq._ (Nay[=a]dis). Crooke, _Tribes and Castes of the\nNorth-Western Provinces and Oudh_, i. 83 (Arakh, a tribe in\nOudh). Ward, _View of the History, &c. of the Hindoos_, ii. 147,\niii. 275; Dubois, _Manners and Customs of the People of India_,\np. 108 _sq._; Bose, _Hindoos as they are_, p. 257. Caland, _Die\nAltindischen Todten- und Bestattungsgebr\u00e4uche_, p. 79 _sq._]\n\nBut whilst religious or superstitious beliefs have thus led to\nablutions and cleanliness, they have in other instances had the\nvery opposite effect. Among Arabs young children are often left\ndirty and ill-dressed purposely, to preserve them from the evil\neye.[69] The Obbo natives in Central Africa declare that if they\ndo not wash their hands with cow's urine before milking, the cow\nwill lose her milk; and with the same fluid they wash the\nmilk-bowl, and even mix some of it with the milk.[70] The Jakuts\n\"never wash any of their eating or drinking utensils; but, as\nsoon as a dish is emptied, they clean it with the fore and middle\nfinger; for they think it a great sin to wash away any part of\ntheir food, and apprehend that the consequence will be a\nscarcity.\"[71] A similar custom prevails among the Kirghiz[72]\nand Kalmucks. The latter \"are forbidden by the laws of their\nfaith\" to wash their vessels in river-water, and therefore \"do no\nmore than wipe them with a piece of an old sheep-skin shube,\nwhich they use also for cleaning their hands upon when\ndirty.\"[73] They, moreover, abstain from washing their {355}\nclothes; and so did the Huns and Mongols.[74] The ancient Turks\nnever washed themselves, because they believed that their gods\npunished ablutions with thunder and lightning; and the same\nbelief still prevails among kindred peoples in Central Asia.[75]\nAmong the Bahima of Enkole, in the Uganda Protectorate, a man may\nsmear his body with butter or clay as often as he wishes, but \"to\nwash with water is bad for him, and is a sure way of bringing\nsickness into his family and amongst his cattle.\"[76] The dread\nof water may be due partly to ill effects experienced after using\nit, partly to superstition. The Moors dare not wash their bodies\nwith cold water in the afternoon and evening after the\n_[(]\u00e2[s.]ar_, because all such water is then supposed to be\nhaunted by _jn\u00fbn_, or evil spirits. In various religions the\nodour of sanctity is associated with filth. Muhammedan dervishes\nare recognised by their appearance of untidiness and uncleanness.\nAmong the rules laid down for Buddhist monks there is one which\nprescribes that their dress shall be made of rags taken from a\ndust or refuse heap.[77] In the early days of Christian\nmonasticism \"the cleanliness of the body was regarded as a\npollution of the soul.\" The saints who were most admired were\nthose who had become one hideous mass of clotted filth. St.\nAthanasius relates with enthusiasm how St. Antony, the patriarch\nof monachism, had never, to extreme old age, been guilty of\nwashing his feet. A famous virgin, though bodily sickness was a\nconsequence of her habits, resolutely refused, on religious\nprinciples, to wash any part of her body except her fingers. And\nSt. Simeon Stylites, who was generally pronounced to be the\nhighest model of a Christian saint, bound a rope round himself so\nthat it became imbedded in his flesh and caused putrefaction; and\nit is said that \"a horrible stench, intolerable {356} to the\nbystanders, exhaled from his body, and worms dropped from him\nwhenever he moved, and they filled his bed.\"[78] In medi\u00e6val\nChristianity abstinence from every species of cleanliness was\nalso enjoined as a penance, the penitent being required to go\nwith foul mouth, filthy hands and neck, undressed hair and beard,\nunpared nails, and clothes as dirty as his person. In these cases\nuncleanliness is a form of asceticism, a subject which we have\nalready touched upon in dealing with industry and fasting, but\nthe principles of which still call for our consideration.\n\n[Footnote 69: Blunt, _Bedouin Tribes of the Euphrates_, ii. 214.\nKlunzinger, _Upper Egypt_, p. 391.]\n\n[Footnote 70: Baker, _Albert N'yanza_, i. 381.]\n\n[Footnote 71: Sauer, _op. cit._ p. 125.]\n\n[Footnote 72: Valikhanof, &c., _Russians in Central Asia_, p. 80.]\n\n[Footnote 73: Georgi, _op. cit._ iv. 37. Bergmann, _op. cit._\nii. 123.]\n\n[Footnote 74: Neumann, _Die V\u00f6lker des s\u00fcdlichen Russlands_, p.\n27. For the excessive dirtiness of the present Mongols, see\nPrejevalsky, _Mongolia_, i. 51 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 75: Castr\u00e9n, _op. cit._ iv. 61.]\n\n[Footnote 76: Roscoe, 'Bahima,' in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._\nxxxvii. 111.]\n\n[Footnote 77: Kern, _Manual of Indian Buddhism_, p. 75.]\n\n[Footnote 78: Lecky, _History of European Morals_, ii. 109\n_sqq._]\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIn various religions we meet with the idea that a person appeases\nor gives pleasure to the deity by subjecting himself to suffering\nor deprivation. This belief finds expression in all sorts of\nascetic practices. We read of Christian ascetics who lived in\ndeserted dens of wild beasts, or in dried-up wells, or in tombs;\nwho disdained all clothes, and crawled abroad like animals\ncovered only by their matted hair; who ate nothing but corn which\nhad become rotten by remaining for a month in water; who spent\nforty days and nights in the middle of thorn-bushes, and for\nforty years never lay down.[79] Hindu ascetics remain in\nimmovable attitudes with their faces or their arms raised to\nheaven, until the sinews shrink and the posture assumed stiffens\ninto rigidity; or they expose themselves to the inclemency of the\nweather in a state of absolute nudity, or tear their bodies with\nknives, or feed on carrion and excrement.[80] Among the\nMuhammedans of India there are fakirs who have been seen dragging\nheavy chains or cannon balls, or crawling upon their hands and\nknees for years; others have been found lying upon iron spikes\nfor a bed; and others, again, have been swinging for months\nbefore a slow fire with a {357} tropical sun blazing\noverhead.[81] Among modern Jews some of the more sanctimonious\nmembers of the synagogue have been known to undergo the penance\nof voluntary flagellation before the commencement of the fast of\natonement, two persons successively inflicting upon each other\nthirty-nine stripes or thirteen lashes with a triple scourge.[82]\nAccording to the Zoroastrian Yasts, thirty strokes with the\nSraosh\u00f4-karana is an expiation which purges people from their\nsins, and makes them fit for offering a sacrifice.[83] Herodotus\ntells us that the ancient Egyptians beat themselves while the\nthings offered by them as sacrifices were being burned, and that\nthe Carian dwellers in Egypt on such occasions cut their faces\nwith knives.[84] Among the ancient Mexicans blood-drawing was a\nfavourite and most common mode of expiating sin and showing\ndevotion. \"It makes one shudder,\" says Clavigero, \"to read the\nausterities which they exercised upon themselves, either in\natonement of their transgressions or in preparation for their\nfestivals. They mangled their flesh as if it had been insensible,\nand let their blood run in such profusion, that it appeared to be\na superfluous fluid of the body.\"[85] Self-mortification also\nformed part of the religious cult in many uncivilised tribes in\nNorth America.[86] \"The Indian,\" Colonel Dodge observes,\n\"believes, with many Christians, that self-torture is an act most\nacceptable to God, and the extent of pleasure that he can give\nhis god is exactly measured by the amount of suffering that he\ncan bear without flinching.\"[87]\n\n[Footnote 79: _Ibid._ ii. 108 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 80: Barth, _Religions of India_, p. 214 _sq._ Hopkins,\n_Religions of India_, p. 352. Monier-Williams, _Br[=a]hmanism and\nHind[=u]ism_, p. 395.]\n\n[Footnote 81: Pool, _Studies in Mohammedanism_, p. 305. For\nsimilar practices among the modern Egyptians, see Lane, _Modern\nEgyptians_, p. 244.]\n\n[Footnote 82: Allen, _Modern Judaism_, p. 407.]\n\n[Footnote 83: _Yasts_, x. 122. Darmesteter, in _Sacred Books of\nthe East_, xxiii. 151, n. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 84: Herodotus, ii. 40, 61.]\n\n[Footnote 85: Clavigero, _History of Mexico_, i. 284. See also\nBancroft, _op. cit._ iii. 441 _sq._; R\u00e9ville, _Hibbert Lectures\non the Native Religions of Mexico and Peru_, p. 100.]\n\n[Footnote 86: Domenech, _Seven Years Residence in the Great\nDeserts of North America_, ii. 380. Catlin, _North American\nIndians_, ii. 243. James, _Expedition to the Rocky Mountains_, i.\n276 _sqq._ (Omahas). McGee, 'Siouan Indians,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur.\nEthn._ xv. 184.]\n\n[Footnote 87: Dodge, _Our Wild Indians_, p. 149.]\n\nThe idea underlying religious asceticism has no doubt {358} been\nderived from several different sources. It should first be\nnoticed that certain ascetic practices have originally been\nperformed for another purpose, and only afterwards come to be\nregarded as means of propitiating or pleasing the deity through\nthe suffering involved in them. This, as we have seen, is the\ncase with certain fasts, and also with sexual asceticism.[88]\nWhen an act is supposed to be connected with supernatural danger,\nthe evil (real or imaginary) resulting from it is readily\ninterpreted as a sign of divine anger and the act itself is\nregarded as being forbidden by a god. If then the abstinence from\nit implies suffering, as is in some degree the case with fasting\nand sexual continence, the conclusion is drawn that the god\ndelights in such suffering. The same inference is, moreover, made\nfrom the fact that such abstinences are enjoined in connection\nwith religious worship, though the primary motive for this\ninjunction was fear of pollution. Beating or scourging, again,\nwas in certain cases originally a mode of purification, intended\nto wipe off and drive away a dangerous contagion either\npersonified as demoniacal or otherwise of a magical character.\nAnd although the pain inflicted on the person beaten was at first\nnot the object of the act but only incidental to it, it became\nsubsequently the chief purpose of the ceremony, which was now\nregarded as a mortification well pleasing to the god.[89] This\nchange of ideas seems likewise to be due both to the tendency of\nthe supernatural contagion to develop into a divine punishment in\ncase it is not removed by the painful rite, and also to the\ncircumstance that purification is held to be a necessary\naccompaniment of acts of religious worship. The Egyptian\nsacrifice described by Herodotus was combined with purificatory\nfasting as well as beating.[90] Among the Jews, before the\ncommencement of the fast of atonement, whilst a few very\nreligious persons undergo the penance of flagellation, \"some\npurify themselves by {359} ablutions.\"[91] And that the original\nobject of the scourging mentioned in the Yasts was to purify the\nworshipper is suggested by the fact that he on the same occasion\nhad to wash his body three days and three nights.[92] But it\nshould also be remembered that religious exaltation, when it has\nreached its highest stage, may express itself in self-laceration;[93]\nand the deity is naturally supposed to be pleased with the\noutward expression of such an emotion in his devotees.\n\n[Footnote 88: See _infra_, p. 420 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 89: Frazer, _Golden Bough_, iii. 217 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 90: Herodotus, ii. 40.]\n\n[Footnote 91: Allen, _op. cit._ p. 407.]\n\n[Footnote 92: _Yasts_, x. 122.]\n\n[Footnote 93: See Hirn, _Origins of Art_, p. 64.]\n\nAn ascetic practice may also be the survival of an earlier\nsacrifice. We have seen that this is frequently the case with\nfasting and almsgiving, and the same may hold true of other forms\nof asceticism.[94] The essence of the act then no longer lies in\nthe benefit which the god derives from it, but in the self-denial\nor self-mortification which it costs the worshipper. In the\nsacred books of India \"austerity\" is mentioned as a means of\nexpiation side by side with sacrifice, fasting, and giving\ngifts.[95]\n\n[Footnote 94: _Cf._ Tertullian, _De resurrectione carnis_, 8\n(Migne, _op. cit._ ii. 806).]\n\n[Footnote 95: _Gautama_, xix. 11. _Vasishtha_, xx. 47; xxii. 8.\n_Baudh\u00e1yana_, iii. 10. 9.]\n\nWhen an ascetic practice develops out of a previous custom of a\ndifferent origin, it may be combined with an idea which by itself\nhas been a frequent source of self-inflicted pain, to wit, the\nbelief that such pain is an expiation for sin, that it may serve\nas a substitute for a punishment which would otherwise be\ninflicted by the offended god; and almost inseparably connected\nwith this belief there may be that desire to suffer which is so\noften, vaguely or distinctly, involved in genuine repentance.[96]\nThe idea of expiation very largely underlies the penitential\ndiscipline of the Christian Church and the asceticism of its\nsaints. From the days of Tertullian and Cyprian the Latins were\nfamiliar with the notion that the Christian has to propitiate\nGod, that cries of pain, sufferings, and deprivations are means\nof appeasing his anger, that God takes strict account of the\nquantity of {360} the atonement, and that, where there is no\nguilt to have blotted out, those very means are regarded as\nmerits.[97] According to the doctrine of the Church, penance\nshould in all grave cases be preceded by sorrow for the sin and\nalso by confession, either public or private; repentance, as we\nhave noticed above, is the only ground on which pardon can be\ngiven by a scrupulous judge.[98] But the notion was only too\noften adopted that the penitential practice itself was a\ncompensation for sin, that a man was at liberty to do whatever he\npleased provided he was prepared to do penance afterwards, and\nthat a person who, conscious of his frailty, had laid in a large\nstock of vicarious penance in anticipation of future necessity,\nhad a right \"to work it out,\" and spend it in sins.[99] The idea\nthat sins may be expiated by certain acts of self-mortification\nis familiar both to Muhammedans[100] and Jews.[101] According to\nZoroastrian beliefs, it is possible to wipe out by peculiarly\nsevere atonements not only the special sin on account of which\nthe atonement is performed, but also other offences committed in\nformer times or unconsciously.[102] In the sacred books of the\nHindus we meet with a strong conviction that pain suffered in\nthis life will redeem the sufferer from punishment in a future\nexistence. It is said that \"men who have committed crimes and\nhave been punished by the king go to heaven, being pure like\nthose who performed meritorious deeds\";[103] and the same idea is\nat the bottom of their penitential system.[104] But in\nBrahmanism, as in Catholicism, the effect of ascetic practices is\nsupposed to go beyond mere expiation. They are regarded as means\nof accumulating religious merit or attaining superhuman powers.\nBrahmanical poems tell of marvellous self-mortifications {361} by\nwhich sages of the past obtained influence over the gods\nthemselves; nay, even the power wielded by certain archdemons\nover men and gods is supposed to have been acquired by the\npractice of religious austerities.[105] How largely ascetic\npractices are due to the idea of expiation is indicated by the\nfact that they hardly occur among nations who have no vivid sense\nof sin, like the Chinese before the introduction of Taouism and\nBuddhism,[106] and the ancient Greeks, Romans, and Scandinavians.\nIn Greece, however, people sometimes voluntarily sacrificed a\npart of their happiness in order to avoid the envy of the gods,\nwho would not allow to man more than a moderate share of good\nfortune.[107]\n\n[Footnote 96: See _supra_, i. 105 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 97: Tertullian, _De jejuniis_, 7 (Migne, _op. cit._ ii.\n962). _Idem_, _De resurrectione carnis_, 8 (Migne, ii. 806\n_sq._). Harnack, _History of Dogma_, ii. 110, 132; iii. 311.]\n\n[Footnote 98: _Supra_, i. 85.]\n\n[Footnote 99: See Thrupp, _The Anglo-Saxon Home_, p. 259.]\n\n[Footnote 100: _Supra_, ii. 315, 317. Pool, _op. cit._ p. 264.]\n\n[Footnote 101: _Supra_, ii. 315 _sqq._ Allen, _op. cit._ p. 130.]\n\n[Footnote 102: Geiger, _Civilization of the Eastern Ir[=a]nians_,\ni. 163.]\n\n[Footnote 103: _Laws of Manu_, viii. 318.]\n\n[Footnote 104: _Ibid._ xi. 228.]\n\n[Footnote 105: Monier-Williams, _Br[=a]hmanism and Hind[=u]ism_,\npp. 231, 427. Oldenberg, _Buddha_, p. 302.]\n\n[Footnote 106: R\u00e9ville, _La religion Chinoise_, p. 221.]\n\n[Footnote 107: Aeschylus, _Agamemnon_, 1008 _sqq._ Schmidt,\n_Die Ethik der alten Griechen_, i. 82.]\n\nSelf-mortification is also sometimes resorted to not so much to\nappease the anger of a god as rather to excite his compassion. In\nsome of the Jewish fasts, as we have seen before, these two\nobjects are closely interwoven.[108] The Jewish custom of fasting\nin the case of a drought is in a way parallel to the Moorish\npractice of tying holy men and throwing them into a pond in order\nthat their pitiful condition may induce God to send rain. Mr.\nWilliams tells us of a Fijian priest who, \"after supplicating his\ngod for rain in the usual way without success, slept for several\nsuccessive nights exposed on the top of a rock, without mat or\npillow, hoping thus to move the obdurate deity to send a shower.\"[109]\n\n[Footnote 108: _Supra_, ii. 315.]\n\n[Footnote 109: Williams and Calvert, _Fiji_, p. 196.]\n\nNot only is suffering voluntarily sought as a means of wiping off\nsins committed, but it is also endured with a view to preventing\nthe commission of sin. This is the second or, in importance, the\nfirst great idea upon which Christian asceticism rests. The\ngratification of every worldly desire is sinful, the flesh should\nbe the abject slave of the spirit intent upon unearthly things.\nMan was created for a life in spiritual communion with God, {362}\nbut he yielded to the seduction of evil demons, who availed\nthemselves of the sensuous side of his nature to draw him away\nfrom the contemplation of the divine and lead him to the earthly.\nMoral goodness, therefore, consists in renouncing all sensuous\npleasures, in separating from the world, in living solely after\nthe spirit, in imitating the perfection and purity of God. The\ncontrast between good and evil is the contrast between God and\nthe world, and the conception of the world includes not only the\nobjects of bodily appetites but all human institutions, as well\nas science and art.[110] And still more than any theoretical\ndoctrine, the personal example of Christ led to the glorification\nof spiritual joy and bodily suffering.\n\n[Footnote 110: Harnack, _op. cit._ ii. 214 _sqq._, iii. 258\n_sqq._ von Eicken, _Geschichte der mittelalterlichen\nWeltanschauung_, p. 313 _sqq._]\n\nThe antithesis of spirit and body was not peculiar to\nChristianity. It was an old Platonic conception, which was\nregarded by the Fathers of the Church as the contrast between\nthat which was precious and that which was to be mortified. The\ndoctrine that bodily enjoyments are low and degrading was taught\nby many pagan philosophers; even a man like Cicero says that all\ncorporeal pleasure is opposed to virtue and ought to be\nrejected.[111] And in the Neo-Platonic and Neo-Pythagorean\nschools of Alexandria an ascetic ideal of life was the natural\noutcome of their theory that God alone is pure and good, and\nmatter impure and evil. Renunciation of the world was taught and\npractised by the Jewish sects of the Essenes and Therapeut\u00e6. In\nIndia, Professor Kern observes, \"climate, institutions, the\ncontemplative bent of the native mind, all tended to facilitate\nthe growth of a persuasion that the highest aims of human life\nand real felicity cannot be obtained but by the seclusion from\nthe busy world, by undisturbed pious exercises, and by a certain\namount of mortification.\"[112] We read in the Hitopadesa,\n\"Subjection to the senses has been called the road to ruin, and\n{363} their subjugation the path to fortune.\"[113] The Jain\nregards pleasure in itself as sinful:--\"What is discontent, and\nwhat is pleasure? One should live subject to neither. Giving up\nall gaiety, circumspect, restrained, one should lead a religious\nlife.\"[114] According to Buddhism, there are two causes of the\nmisery with which life is inseparably bound up--lust and\nignorance; and so there are two cures--the suppression of lust\nand desire and the removal of ignorance.[115] It is said in the\nDhammapada, \"There is no satisfying lusts, even by a shower of\ngold pieces; he who knows that lusts have a short taste and cause\npain, he is wise.\"[116] Penances, as they were practised among\nthe ascetics of India, were discarded by Buddha as vexatious,\nunworthy, unprofitable. \"Not nakedness, not platted hair, not\ndirt, not fasting, or lying on the earth, not rubbing with dust,\nnot sitting motionless, can purify a mortal who has not overcome\ndesires.\"[117] Where all contact with the earthly ceases, there,\nand there only, are deliverance and freedom.\n\n[Footnote 111: Cicero, _De officiis_, i. 30; iii. 33.]\n\n[Footnote 112: Kern, _Manual of Indian Buddhism_, p. 73.]\n\n[Footnote 113: Hitopadesa, quoted by Monier-Williams, _Indian\nWisdom_, p. 538.]\n\n[Footnote 114: Hopkins, _op. cit._ p. 291.]\n\n[Footnote 115: Oldenberg, _op. cit._ p. 212 _sq._ Monier-Williams,\n_Buddhism_, p. 99.]\n\n[Footnote 116: _Dhammapada_, 186 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 117: _Ibid._ 141. See also Oldenberg, _op. cit._\np. 301 _sq._]\n\nThe idea that man ought to liberate himself from the bondage of\nearthly desires is the conclusion of a contemplative mind\nreflecting upon the short duration and emptiness of all bodily\npleasures and the allurements by which they lead men into misery\nand sin. And separation from the material world is the ideal of\nthe religious enthusiast whose highest aspiration is union with\nGod conceived as an immaterial being, as pure spirit.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XL\n\nMARRIAGE\n\n\nMAN'S sexual nature gives rise to various modes of conduct on\nwhich moral judgments are passed. We shall first consider such\nrelations between the sexes as are comprised under the heading\nMarriage.\n\nIn a previous work I have endeavoured to show that in all\nprobability there has been no stage in the social history of\nmankind where marriage has not existed, human marriage apparently\nbeing an inheritance from some ape-like progenitor.[1] I then\ndefined marriage as a more or less durable connection between\nmale and female, lasting beyond the mere act of propagation till\nafter the birth of the offspring. This is marriage in the natural\nhistory sense of the term. As a social institution, on the other\nhand, it has a somewhat different meaning: it is a union\nregulated by custom or law.[2] Society lays down rules relating\nto the selection of partners, to the mode of contracting\nmarriage, to its form, and to its duration. These rules are\nessentially expressions of moral feelings.\n\n[Footnote 1: Westermarck, _History of Human Marriage_, ch. iii.\n_sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 2: The best definition of marriage as a social\ninstitution which I have met with is the following one given by\nDr. Friedrichs ('Einzeluntersuchungen zur vergleichenden\nRechtswissenschaft,' in _Zeitschr. f. vergl. Rechtswiss._ x.\n255):--\"Eine von der Rechtsordnung anerkannte und privilegirte\nVereinigung geschlechtsdifferenter Personen, entweder zur F\u00fchrung\neines gemeinsamen Hausstandes und zum Geschlechtsverkehr, oder\nzum ausschliesslichen Geschlechtsverkehr.\"]\n\nThere is, first, a circle of persons within which marriage is\nprohibited. It seems that the horror of incest is well-nigh\nuniversal in the human race, and that the few cases in which this\nfeeling is said to be absent can only be regarded {365} as\nabnormalities. But the degrees of kinship within which marriage\nis forbidden are by no means the same everywhere. It is most, and\nalmost universally, abominated between parents and children. It\nis also held in general abhorrence between brothers and sisters\nwho are children of the same mother as well as of the same\nfather. Most of the exceptions to this rule refer to royal\npersons, for whom it is considered improper to contract marriage\nwith individuals of less exalted birth; but among a few peoples\nincestuous unions are practised on a larger scale on account of\nextreme isolation or as a result of vitiated instincts.[3] It\nseems, however, that habitual marriages between brothers and\nsisters have been imputed to certain peoples without sufficient\nreason.[4] This is obviously true of the Veddahs of Ceylon, who\nhave long been supposed to regard the marriage of a man with his\nyounger sister as _the_ proper marriage.[5] \"Such incest,\" says\nMr. Nevill, \"never was allowed, and never could be, while the\nVaedda {366} customs lingered. Incest is regarded as worse than\nmurder. So positive is this feeling, that the Tamils have based a\nlegend upon the instant murder of his sister by a Vaedda to whom\nshe had made undue advances. The mistake arose from gross\nignorance of Vaedda usages. The title of a cousin with whom\nmarriage ought to be contracted, that is, mother's brother's\ndaughter, or father's sister's daughter, is _nag\u00e2_ or _nang\u00ee_.\nThis, in Sinhalese, is applied to a younger sister. Hence if you\nask a Vaedda, 'Do you marry your sisters?' the Sinhalese\ninterpreter is apt to say, 'Do you marry your nag\u00e2?' The reply is\n(I have often tested it), 'Yes--we always did formerly, but now\nit is not always observed.' You say then, 'What? marry your\nown-sister-nag\u00e2?' and the reply is an angry and insulted denial,\nthe very question appearing a gross insult.\" The same writer\nadds:--\"In no case did a person marry one of the same family,\neven though the relationship was lost in remote antiquity. Such a\nmarriage is incest. The penalty for incest was death.\"[6]\n\n[Footnote 3: Westermarck, _op. cit._ ch. xiv. _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 4: This is apparently the case with various peoples\nmentioned by Sir J. G. Frazer (_Pausanias's Description of\nGreece_, ii. 84 _sq._) as being addicted to incestuous unions.\nMr. Turner's short statement (_Samoa_, p. 341) that among the New\nCaledonians no laws of consanguinity were observed in their\nmarriages, and that even the nearest relatives united, radically\ndiffers from M. de Rochas' description of the same people. \"Les\nN\u00e9o-Cal\u00e9doniens,\" he says (_Nouvelle Cal\u00e9donie_, p. 232), \"ne se\nmarient pas entre proches parents du c\u00f4t\u00e9 paternel; mais du c\u00f4t\u00e9\nmaternel, ils se marient \u00e0 tous les degr\u00e9s de cousinage.\"\nBrothers and sisters, after they have reached years of maturity,\nare no longer permitted to entertain any social intercourse with\neach other; they are prohibited from keeping each other company\neven in the presence of a third person; and if they casually meet\nthey must instantly go out of the way or, if that is impossible,\nthe sister must throw herself on the ground with her face\ndownwards. \"Cet \u00e9loignement,\" M. de Rochas adds (_ibid._ p. 239),\n\"qui n'est certes l'effet ni du m\u00e9pris ni de l'inimiti\u00e9, me\nparait n\u00e9 d'une exag\u00e9ration d\u00e9raisonnable d'un sentiment naturel,\nl'horreur de l'inceste.\" Sir J. G. Frazer says that, according to\nMr. Thomson, the marriage of brothers with sisters has been\npractised among the Masai; but a later and, as it seems, better\ninformed authority tells us that \"the Masai do not marry their\nnear relations\" and that \"incest is unknown among them\" (Hinde,\n_The Last of the Masai_, p. 76). Again, the statement that among\nthe Obongos, a dwarf race in West Africa, sisters marry with\nbrothers, is only based on information derived from another\npeople, the Ashangos, who have a strong antipathy to them (Du\nChaillu, _Journey to Ashango-Land_, p. 320). Liebich's assertion\n(_Die Zigeuner_, p. 49) that the Gypsies allow a brother to marry\nhis sister is certainly not true of the Gypsies of Finland, who\ngreatly abhor incest (Thesleff, 'Zigenarlif i Finland,' in _Nya\nPressen_, 1897, no. 331 B).]\n\n[Footnote 5: Bailey, 'Wild Tribes of the Veddahs of Ceylon,' in\n_Trans. Ethn. Soc._ N.S. ii. 294 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 6: Nevill, 'Vaeddas of Ceylon,' in _Taprobanian_, i. 178.]\n\nAs a rule, the prohibited degrees are more numerous among peoples\nunaffected by modern civilisation than they are in more advanced\ncommunities, the prohibitions in a great many cases referring\neven to all the members of the tribe or clan; and the violation\nof these rules is regarded as a most heinous crime.[7]\n\n[Footnote 7: Westermarck, _op. cit._ p. 297 _sqq._]\n\nThe Algonquins speak of cases where men have been put to death by\ntheir nearest kinsfolk for marrying women of their own clan.[8]\nAmong the Asiniboin, a Siouan tribe, a chief can commit murder\nwith impunity if the murdered person be without friends, but if\nhe married within his _gens_ he would be dismissed, on account of\nthe general disgust which such a union would arouse.[9] The\nHottentots used to punish alliances between first or second\ncousins with death.[10] A Bantu of the coast region considers\nsimilar unions to be \"something horrible, something unutterably\ndisgraceful.\"[11] The Busoga of the Uganda {367} Protectorate\nheld in great abhorrence anything like incest even amongst\ndomestic animals.[12] Among the Kandhs of India \"intermarriage\nbetween persons of the same tribe, however large or scattered, is\nconsidered incestuous and punishable with death.\"[13] In the\nMalay Archipelago submersion is a common punishment for\nincest,[14] but among certain tribes the guilty parties are\nkilled and eaten[15] or buried alive.[16] In Efate, of the New\nHebrides, it would be a crime punishable with death for a man or\nwoman to marry a person belonging to his or her mother's\nclan;[17] and the Mortlock Islanders are said to inflict the same\npunishment upon anybody who has sexual intercourse with a\nrelative belonging to his own \"tribe.\"[18] Nowhere has marriage\nbeen bound by more severe laws than among the Australian\naborigines. Their tribes are grouped in exogamous subdivisions,\nthe number of which varies; and at least before the occupation of\nthe country by the whites the regular punishment for marriage or\nsexual intercourse with a person belonging to a forbidden\ndivision was death.[19]\n\n[Footnote 8: Frazer, _Totemism_, p. 59.]\n\n[Footnote 9: Dorsey, 'Siouan Sociology,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur.\nEthn._ xv. 224.]\n\n[Footnote 10: Kolben, _Present State of the Cape of Good Hope_,\ni. 155 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 11: Theal, _History of the Boers in South Africa_, p. 16.]\n\n[Footnote 12: Johnston, _Uganda Protectorate_, ii. 719.]\n\n[Footnote 13: Macpherson, quoted by Percival, _Land of the Veda_,\np. 345. _Cf._ Hunter, _Annals of Rural Bengal_, iii. 81.]\n\n[Footnote 14: Wilken, _Huwelijken tusschen bloedverwanten_, p. 26\n_sq._ Riedel, _De sluik- en kroesharige rassen tusschen Selebes\nen Papua_, p. 460.]\n\n[Footnote 15: Wilken, _Over de verwantschap en het huwelijks- en\nerfrecht bij de volken van het maleische ras_, p. 18.]\n\n[Footnote 16: _Glimpses of the Eastern Archipelago_, p. 105.]\n\n[Footnote 17: Macdonald, _Oceania_, p. 181 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 18: Kubary, 'Die Bewohner der Mortlock Inseln,' in\n_Mittheil. d. Geogr. Gesellsch. in Hamburg_, 1878-9, p. 251.]\n\n[Footnote 19: Westermarck, _op. cit._ p. 299 _sq._ See, besides\nthe authorities quoted there, Roth, _Ethnol. Studies among the\nNorth-West-Central Queensland Aborigines_, p. 182; Spencer and\nGillen, _Native Tribes of Central Australia_, p. 15.]\n\nNot less intense is the horror of incest among nations that have\npassed beyond savagery and barbarism. Among the Chinese incest\nwith a grand-uncle, a father's first cousin, a brother, or a\nnephew, is punishable by death, and a man who marries his\nmother's sister is strangled; nay, punishment is inflicted even\non him who marries a person with the same surname as his own,\nsixty blows being the penalty.[20] So also incest was held in the\nutmost horror by the so-called Aryan peoples in ancient\ntimes.[21] In the 'Institutes of Vishnu' it is said that sexual\nintercourse {368} with one's mother or daughter or\ndaughter-in-law is a crime of the highest degree, for which there\nis no other atonement than to proceed into the flames.[22]\n\n[Footnote 20: Medhurst, 'Marriage, Affinity, and Inheritance in\nChina,' in _Trans. Roy. Asiatic Soc. China Branch_, iv. 21 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 21: Leist, _Alt-arisches Jus Gentium_, p. 394 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 22: _Institutes of Vishnu_, xxxiv. 1 _sq._]\n\nVarious theories have been set forth to account for the\nprohibition of marriage between near kin. I criticised some of\nthem in my book on the 'History of Human Marriage,' and ventured\nat the same time on an explanation of my own.[23] I pointed out\nthat there is an innate aversion to sexual intercourse between\npersons living very closely together from early youth, and that,\nas such persons are in most cases related by blood, this feeling\nwould naturally display itself in custom and law as a horror of\nintercourse between near kin. Indeed, an abundance of\nethnographical facts seem to indicate that it is not in the first\nplace by the degree of consanguinity, but by the close living\ntogether, that prohibitory laws against intermarriage are\ndetermined. Thus many peoples have a rule of \"exogamy\" which does\nnot depend on kinship at all, but on purely local considerations,\nall the members of a horde or village, though not related by\nblood, being forbidden to intermarry.[24] The prohibited degrees\nare very differently defined in the customs or laws of different\nnations, and it appears that the extent to which relatives are\nprohibited from intermarrying is nearly connected with their\nclose living together. Very often the prohibitions against incest\nare more or less one-sided, applying more extensively either to\nthe relatives on the father's side or to those on the mother's,\naccording as descent is reckoned through men or women. Now, since\n{369} the line of descent is largely connected with local\nrelationships, we may reasonably infer that the same local\nrelationships exercise a considerable influence on the table of\nprohibited degrees. However, in a large number of cases\nprohibitions of intermarriage are only indirectly influenced by\nthe close living together.[25] Aversion to the intermarriage of\npersons who live in intimate connection with one another has\ncalled forth prohibitions of the intermarriage of relations; and,\nas kinship is traced by means of a system of names, the name\ncomes to be considered identical with relationship. This system\nis necessarily one-sided. Though it will keep up the record of\ndescent either on the male or female side, it cannot do both at\nonce;[26] and the line which has not been kept up by such means\nof record, even where it is recognised as a line of relationship,\nis naturally more or less neglected and soon forgotten. Hence the\nprohibited degrees frequently extend very far on the one side--to\nthe whole clan--but not on the other. It should also be\nremembered that, according to primitive ideas, the name itself\nconstitutes a mystic link between those who have it in common.\n\"In Greenland, as everywhere else,\" says Dr. Nansen, \"the name is\nof great importance; it is believed that there is a spiritual\naffinity between two people of the same name.\"[27] Generally\nspeaking, the feeling that two persons are intimately connected\nin some way or other may, through an association of ideas, give\nrise to the notion that marriage or sexual intercourse between\nthem is incestuous. Hence the prohibitions of marriage between\nrelations by alliance and by adoption. Hence, too, the\nprohibitions of the Roman and Greek Churches on the ground of\nwhat is called \"spiritual relationship.\"\n\n[Footnote 23: Westermarck, _op. cit._ p. 310 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 24: Herr Cunow (_Die Verwandtschafts-Organisationen der\nAustralneger_, p. 187) finds this argument \"rather peculiar,\" and\noffers himself a different explanation of the rule in question.\nHe writes:--\"In der Wirklichkeit erkl\u00e4rt sich das Verbot einfach\ndaraus, dass sehr oft die Lokalgruppe mit dem Geschlechtsverband\nbeziehungsweise dem Totemverband kongruirt, und demnach das was\nf\u00fcr die Gens gilt, zugleich auch f\u00fcr die Lokalgruppe Geltung\nhat.\" This, however, is only Herr Cunow's own inference. And it\nmay be asked why it is more \"peculiar\" to suppose that the\nprohibition of marriage between near kin has sprung from aversion\nto sexual intercourse between persons living closely together,\nthan to assume that the rule which forbids marriage between\nunrelated persons living in the same community has sprung from\nthe prohibition of marriage between kindred.]\n\n[Footnote 25: I do not understand how any reader of my book can,\nlike Herr Cunow (_op. cit._ p. 186 _sqq._), attribute to me the\nstatement that the group within which intermarriage is prohibited\nis identical with the group of people who live closely together.\nIf he had read a little more carefully what I have said, he might\nhave saved himself the trouble he has taken to prove my great\nignorance of early social organisations.]\n\n[Footnote 26: _Cf._ Tylor, _Early History of Mankind_, p. 285 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 27: Nansen, _Eskimo Life_, p. 230.]\n\n{370} The question arises:--How has this instinctive aversion to\nmarriage and sexual intercourse in general between persons living\nclosely together from early youth originated? I have suggested\nthat it may be the result of natural selection. Darwin's careful\nstudies of the effects of cross- and self-fertilisation in the\nvegetable kingdom, the consensus of opinion among eminent\nbreeders, and experiments made with rats, rabbits, and other\nanimals, seem to have proved that self-fertilisation of plants\nand close inter-breeding of animals are more or less injurious to\nthe species; and it is probable that the evil chiefly results\nfrom the fact that the uniting sexual elements were not\nsufficiently differentiated. Now it is impossible to believe that\na physiological law which holds good of the rest of the animal\nkingdom, as also of plants, would not apply to man as well. But\nit is difficult to adduce direct evidence for the evil effects of\nconsanguineous marriages. We cannot expect very conspicuous\nresults from other alliances than those between the nearest\nrelatives--between brothers and sisters, parents and\nchildren,--and the injurious results even of such unions would\nnot necessarily appear at once. The closest kind of intermarriage\nwhich we have opportunities of studying is that between first\ncousins. Unfortunately, the observations hitherto made on the\nsubject are far from decisive. Yet it is noteworthy that of all\nthe writers who have discussed it the majority, and certainly not\nthe least able of them, have expressed their belief in marriages\nbetween first cousins being more or less unfavourable to the\noffspring; and no evidence which can stand the test of scientific\ninvestigation has hitherto been adduced against this view.\nMoreover, we have reason to believe that consanguineous marriages\nare much more injurious in savage regions, where the struggle for\nexistence is often very severe, than they have proved to be in\ncivilised societies, especially as it is among the well-to-do\nclasses that such marriages occur most frequently.\n\nTaking all these facts into consideration, I am inclined to think\nthat consanguineous marriages are in some way or {371} other\ndetrimental to the species. And here I find a quite sufficient\nexplanation of the horror of incest; not because man at an early\nstage recognised the injurious influence of close intermarriage,\nbut because the law of natural selection must inevitably have\noperated. Among the ancestors of man, as among other animals,\nthere was no doubt a time, when blood-relationship was no bar to\nsexual intercourse. But variations, here as elsewhere, would\nnaturally present themselves--we know how extremely liable to\nvariations the sexual instinct is; and those of our ancestors who\navoided in-and-in breeding would survive, while the others would\ngradually decay and ultimately perish. Thus a sentiment would be\ndeveloped which would be powerful enough, as a rule, to prevent\ninjurious unions. Of course it would display itself, not as an\ninnate aversion to sexual connections with near relatives as\nsuch, but as an aversion on the part of individuals to union with\nothers with whom they lived; but these, as a matter of fact,\nwould be blood-relations, so that the result would be the\nsurvival of the fittest. Whether man inherited this sentiment\nfrom the predecessors from whom he sprang, or whether it was\ndeveloped after the evolution of distinctly human qualities, we\ncannot know. It must have arisen at a stage when family ties\nbecame comparatively strong, and children remained with their\nparents until the age of puberty or even longer. And exogamy,\nresulting from a natural extension of this sentiment to a larger\ngroup, would arise when single families united into hordes.\n\nThis attempt to explain the prohibition of marriage between\nkindred and exogamy has not lacked sympathetic support,[28] but\nmore commonly, I think, it has been rejected. Yet after a careful\nconsideration of the various objections raised against it I find\nno reason to alter my opinion. Some of my opponents have\nevidently failed to grasp the {372} argument on which the theory\nis based. Thus Professor Robertson Smith argued that it begins by\npresupposing the very custom which it professes to explain, the\ncustom of exogamy; that \"it postulates the existence of groups\nwhich through many generations (for the survival of the fittest\nimplies this) avoided wiving within the group.\"[29] But what my\ntheory postulates is not the existence of exogamous groups, but\nthe spontaneous appearance of individual sentiments of aversion.\nAnd if, as Mr. Andrew Lang maintains, my whole argument is a\n\"vicious circle,\"[30] then the theory of natural selection itself\nis a vicious circle, since there never could be a selection of\nqualities that did not exist before.\n\n[Footnote 28: A. R. Wallace, in his 'Introductory Note' to my\n_History of Human Marriage_, p. vi. Giddings, _Principles of\nSociology_, p. 267. Howard, _History of Matrimonial\nInstitutions_, i. 125 _sqq._ Sir E. B. Tylor (in _Academy_, xl.\n289) says with regard to my theory that, at any rate, I am \"well\non the track.\" See also Crooke, _Tribes and Castes of the\nNorth-Western Provinces and Oudh_, i. pp. clxxix, clxxx, ccii.]\n\n[Footnote 29: Robertson Smith, in _Nature_, xliv. 271.]\n\n[Footnote 30: Lang, _Social Origins_, p. 33.]\n\nIt has been argued that if close living together calls forth\naversion to sexual intercourse, such aversion ought to display\nitself between husband and wife as well as between near\nrelatives.[31] But these cases are certainly not identical. The\nfeeling of which I have spoken is aversion associated with the\nidea of sexual intercourse between persons who have lived in a\nlong-continued intimate relationship from a period of life when\nthe action of sexual desire is naturally out of the question.[32]\nOn the other hand, when a man marries a woman his feeling towards\nher is of a very different kind, and his love impulse may remain,\nnay increase, during the conjugal union; though even in this case\nlong living together has undoubtedly a tendency to lead to sexual\nindifference and sometimes to positive aversion. The opinion that\nthe home is kept free from incestuous intercourse only by law,\ncustom, and education,[33]{373} shows lack of discrimination. Law\nmay forbid a son to marry his mother, a brother to marry his\nsister, but it could not prevent him from _desiring_ such a\nunion. Have the most draconic codes ever been able to suppress,\nsay, homosexual love? As Plato observed, an unwritten law defends\nas sufficiently as possible parents from incestuous intercourse\nwith their children, brothers from intercourse with their\nsisters; \"nor does the thought of such a thing ever enter at all\ninto the minds of most of them.\"[34] Considering the extreme\nvariability to which the sexual impulse is subject, it is not\nastonishing that cases of what we consider incestuous intercourse\nsometimes do occur. It seems to me more remarkable that the\nabhorrence of incest should be so general, and the exceptions to\nthe rule so few.\n\n[Footnote 31: Durkheim, 'La prohibition de l'inceste et ses\norigines,' in _L'ann\u00e9e sociologique_, i. 64. Professor Durkheim\nrefers in this connection to an article by Dr. Simmel, 'Die\nVerwandtenehe,' in _Vossische Zeitung_, June 3rd and 10th, 1894.\nBut I cannot find that Dr. Simmel is really opposed to my view.\nHe only says, \"Das intime Beisammenleben wirkt keineswegs nur\nabstumpfend, sondern in vielen F\u00e4llen gerade anreizend, sonst\nw\u00fcrde die alte Erfahrung nicht gelten, dass die Liebe, wo sie\nbeim Eingehen der Ehe fehlte, oft im Laufe derselben entsteht.\"]\n\n[Footnote 32: _Cf._ Bentham, _Theory of Legislation_, p.\n220:--\"Individuals accustomed to see each other and to know each\nother, from an age which is neither capable of conceiving the\ndesire nor of inspiring it, will see each other with the same\neyes to the end of life.\"]\n\n[Footnote 33: For advocates of such a view see Westermarck, _op.\ncit._ p. 310 _sqq._ More recently it has been expressed by\nKrauss, in _Am Ur-Quell_, iv. 151, and Finck, _Primitive Love_,\np. 49.]\n\n[Footnote 34: Plato, _Leges_, viii. 838. Among the Maoris of New\nZealand, according to Mr. Colenso (_Maori Races_, p. 47 _sq._),\nadult brothers and sisters slept together, as they had always\ndone from their birth, \"not only without sin, but without thought\nof it.\"]\n\nDr. Havelock Ellis, again, objects that my theory assumes the\nexistence of a kind of instinct which can with difficulty be\naccepted. \"An innate tendency,\" he says, \"at once so specific and\nso merely negative, involving at the same time deliberate\nintellectual processes, can only with a certain force be\nintroduced into the accepted class of instincts. It is as awkward\nand artificial an instinct as would be, let us say, an instinct\nto avoid eating the apples that grew in one's own orchard. The\nexplanation of the abhorrence of incest is really, however,\nexceedingly simple. . . . The normal failure of the pairing\ninstinct to manifest itself in the case of brothers and sisters,\nor of boys and girls brought up together from infancy, is a\nmerely negative phenomenon due to the inevitable absence under\nthose circumstances of the conditions which evoke the pairing\nimpulse. . . . Between those who have been brought up together\nfrom childhood all the sensory stimuli of vision, hearing, and\ntouch have been dulled by use, trained to the calm level of\naffection, and deprived of their potency to {374} arouse the\nerethistic excitement which produces sexual tumescence.\"[35] I\nthink that Dr. Ellis has considerably exaggerated the difference\nbetween my theory and his own. The \"instinct\" of which I have\nspoken is simply aversion to sexual intercourse with certain\npersons, and this is a no more complicated mental phenomenon\nthan, for instance, an animal's aversion to eating certain kinds\nof substances. Indeed, Dr. Ellis himself, in his excellent\n'Studies in the Psychology of Sex,' gives us many instances not\nonly of sexual indifference, but of sexual aversion, quite\ninstinctive in character.[36] Thus the largest proportion of male\ninverts described by him experience what is called _horror\nfemin\u00e6_, that is to say, \"woman as an object of sexual desire is\ndisgusting\" (not merely indifferent) to them.[37] And Dr. Ellis\nalso repeatedly speaks of the \"abhorrence\" of incest.\n\n[Footnote 35: Havelock Ellis, _Studies in the Psychology of Sex_,\n'Sexual Selection in Man,' p. 205 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 36: I have been blamed for making an illegitimate use\nof the word \"instinct\" (Crawley, _The Mystic Rose_ p. 446). But\nif, as Dr. Ellis says, \"an instinct is fundamentally a more or\nless complicated series of reflexes set in action by a definite\nstimulus,\" or as Mr. Crawley puts it (_op. cit._ p. 446),\ninstinct \"has nothing in its content except response of function\nto environment,\" then the aversion I speak of may certainly be\ncalled an instinct.]\n\n[Footnote 37: Havelock Ellis, _op. cit._ p. 164.]\n\nThe objection has been raised that, if my explanation of the\nprohibition of incest were correct, connections between unrelated\npersons who have been brought up together should be as repulsive\nas connections between near kin; whereas, as a matter of fact,\nthe two cases are regarded in a very different light, the latter,\nonly, being held incestuous.[38] Much, of course, depends on the\ncloseness of the union, and Dr. Steinmetz's argument that \"the\nvery sensual Frenchmen often seem to marry the lady friends of\ntheir earliest youth,\"[39] is certainly not to the point. I\nbelieve that sexual love between a man and his foster-daughter is\nalmost as great an abnormality as sexual love between a father\nand his daughter; and among some peoples marriages between\npersons who have been brought up together in the same family or\nwho {375} belong to the same local group, without being related\nto each other by blood, are held blamable or are actually\nprohibited.[40] Even between lads and girls who have been\neducated in the same school there is a remarkable absence of\nerotic feelings, as appears from an interesting communication by\na person who has for many years been the head-mistress of such a\nschool in Finland. One youth assured her that neither he nor any\nof his friends would ever think of marrying a girl who had been\ntheir school fellow;[41] and I heard of a lad who made a great\ndistinction between girls of his own school and other, \"real,\"\ngirls, as he called them. Yet however objectionable and unnatural\nunions between foster-parents and foster-children or between\nfoster-brothers and foster-sisters may appear to us, I do not\ndeny that unions between the nearest blood-relatives inspire a\nhorror of their own; and it seems natural that they should do so\nconsidering that from earliest times the aversion to sexual\nintercourse between persons living closely together has been\nexpressed in prohibitions against unions between kindred. Such\nunions have been stigmatised by custom, law, and religion, whilst\nmuch less notice has been taken of intercourse between unrelated\npersons who may occasionally have grown up in the same household.\nThe belief in the supernatural, especially, has played a very\nimportant part in the ideas referring to incest, as in other\npoints of sexual morality, owing to the mystery which surrounds\neverything connected with the function of reproduction.[42] The\nAleuts in early times believed that incest, which they considered\nthe gravest crime, was always followed by the birth of monsters\nwith walrus tusks, beards, and other disfigurations.[43] The\nKafirs {376} likewise maintain that the offspring of an\nincestuous union will be a monster, as \"a punishment inflicted by\nthe ancestral spirit.\"[44] The Bataks of Sumatra regard a long\ndrought as a decisive proof that two cousins have had criminal\nintercourse with each other.[45] The Galelarese think that incest\ncalls forth alarming natural phenomena, such as earthquakes, the\neruption of a volcano, or torrents of rain.[46] So also the\nhigher religions have branded incest as a heinous sin. As for\nChristianity's views on the subject, it is sufficient to notice\nthat the prohibited degrees were extended by the Church,[47] and\nthat the jurisdiction over incest, as over all sexual offences,\nwas exercised by the ecclesiastical courts.[48]\n\n[Footnote 38: Steinmetz, 'Die neueren Forschungen zur Geschichte\nder menschlichen Familie,' in _Zeitschr. f. Socialwiss._\nii. 818 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 39: _Ibid._ ii. 818.]\n\n[Footnote 40: Westermarck, _op. cit._ p. 321 _sqq._ Among the\nWestern Islanders of Torres Straits marriage was forbidden, \"with\na remarkable delicacy of feeling, to the sister of a man's\nparticular friend\" (Haddon, 'Ethnology of the Western Tribe of\nTorres Straits,' in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xix. 315).]\n\n[Footnote 41: Lucina Hagman, 'Fr\u00e5n samskolan,' in _Humanitas_,\nii. 188 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 42: For the connection between religious feelings and\nthe sexual impulse, see Vallon and Marie, 'Des psychoses\nreligieuses,' in _Archives de Neurologie_, ser. ii. vol. iii. 184\n_sq._; Gadelius, _Om tv\u00e5ngstankar_, p. 120 _sq._; Starbuck,\n_Psychology of Religion_, p. 401 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 43: Veniammof, quoted by Petroff, _Report on Alaska_,\np. 155.]\n\n[Footnote 44: Shooter, _Kafirs of Natal_, p. 45.]\n\n[Footnote 45: von Brenner, _Besuch bei den Kannibalen Sumatras_,\np. 212.]\n\n[Footnote 46: van Baarda, 'Fabelen, verhalen en overleveringen\nder Galelareezen,' in _Bijdragen tot de taal-, land- en\nvolkenkunde van Nederlandsch-Indi\u00eb_, xlv. (ser. vi. vol. 1.)\np. 514. See also Frazer, _Golden Bough_, ii. 212 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 47: Westermarck, _op. cit._ p. 308. Katz, _Grundriss\ndes kanonischen Strafrechts_, p. 116 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 48: Stephen, _History of the Criminal Law of England_,\nii. 411.]\n\nIt has, finally, been argued that my theory utterly fails to\nexplain the fact that prohibitions of intermarriage frequently\nrefer to all the members of a clan, even those who live in\ndifferent localities.[49] In addition to what I have previously\nobserved on this point, I desire to emphasise that every\nhypothesis pretending to give a full explanation of prohibitions\nof incest must assume the operation of the very same mental\nlaw--that of association--which in my opinion accounts for\nclan-exogamy. Thus Professor Durkheim, while maintaining that my\ntheory as regards the horror of incest could not apply to exogamy\nbecause the members of the same totem do not live together, is\nhimself quite ready to resort to analogy to explain prohibitions\nextending outside the totem clan. He tries to show that\nclan-exogamy is the source of all other prohibitions against\nincest, and that clan-exogamy itself springs from totemism.[50]\nAccording {377} to him the rule of clan-exogamy has been extended\nto near relatives belonging to different clans, because they are\nin no less intimate contact with each other than are the members\nof the same clan. According to my own theory, again, the\nprohibition of marriage between near relatives living closely\ntogether has been extended to all the members of the clan on\naccount of the notion of intimacy connected with the idea of a\ncommon descent and with a common name. If I consider Professor\nDurkheim's hypothesis extremely unsatisfactory,[51] it is\ncertainly not because he has called in the law of association to\nexplain the rules against incest. How could anybody deny the\noperation of this law for instance in the Roman Catholic\nprohibition of marriage between co-sponsors, or in the rule\nprevalent in Eastern Europe according to which the groomsman at\nthe wedding is forbidden to intermarry with the family of the\nbride,[52] or in laws prohibiting marriage between relatives by\nalliance? And why might not the {378} same law be applied to\nother relationships also, such as those constituted by a common\ndescent or a common name?\n\n[Footnote 49: Cunow, _op. cit._ p. 185. Durkheim, in _L'ann\u00e9e\nsociologique_, i. 39, n. 2. Steinmetz, in _Zeitschr. f.\nSocialwiss._ ii. 819.]\n\n[Footnote 50: Prof. Durkheim says (_L'ann\u00e9e sociologique_, i.\n50):--\"Le sang est tabou d'une mani\u00e8re g\u00e9n\u00e9rale et il taboue tout\nce qui entre en rapports avec lui. . . . La femme est, d'une\nmani\u00e8re chronique, le th\u00e9\u00e2tre de manifestations sanglantes. . . .\nLa femme est donc, elle aussi, et d'une mani\u00e8re \u00e9galement\nchronique, tabou pour les autres membres du clan.\" However, the\ntaboo is not restricted to the members of the clan, but refers\nalso to near relatives belonging to different clans, and this has\nto be explained. M. Durkheim writes (_ibid._ p. 19):--\"Quand on a\npris l'habitude de regarder comme incestueux et abominables les\nrapports conjugaux de sujets qui sont nominalement du m\u00eame clan,\nles rapports similaires d'individus qui, tout en ressortissant\nverbalement \u00e0 des clans diff\u00e9rents, sont pourtant en contact\naussi ou plus intime que les pr\u00e9c\u00e9dents, ne peuvent manquer de\nprendre le m\u00eame caract\u00e8re.\" And further (_ibid._ p. 58):--\"Quand\nle tot\u00e9misme dispara\u00eet, et avec lui la parent\u00e9 sp\u00e9ciale au clan,\nl'exogamie devient solidaire des nouveaux types de famille qui se\nconstituent et qui reposent sur d'autres bases, et comme ces\nfamilies sont plus restreintes que n'\u00e9tait le clan, elle se\ncirconscrit, elle aussi, dans un cercle moins \u00e9tendu; le nombre\ndes individus entre lesquels le mariage est prohib\u00e9 diminue.\nC'est ainsi que, par une \u00e9volution graduelle, elle en est arriv\u00e9e\n\u00e0 l'\u00e9tat actuel o\u00f9 les mariages entre ascendants et descendants,\nentre fr\u00e8res et s[oe]urs, sont \u00e0 peu pr\u00e8s les seuls qui soient\nradicalement interdits.\"]\n\n[Footnote 51: Professor Durkheim tries to explain a phenomenon of\nuniversal prevalence through an institution which has been proved\nto exist among certain peoples only. How does Professor Durkheim\nknow that totem clans once prevailed among all peoples who now\nprohibit the intermarriage of near relatives? If the rules which\nprevent parents from marrying their children and brothers from\nmarrying their sisters are survivals of ancient totemism, how\nshall we explain the normal aversion to such unions? Ancient\ntotemism can certainly not account for this. But then the\ncoincidence between these two facts--the legal prohibition of\nincest and the psychical aversion to it--is merely accidental;\nand this seems to me a preposterous supposition. See _infra_,\nAdditional Notes.]\n\n[Footnote 52: Maine, _Dissertations_, p. 257 _sq._]\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThere is not only an inner circle within which no marriage is\nallowed, but also an outer circle outside of which marriage is\neither prohibited or at least disapproved of. Like the inner\ncircle, the outer one varies greatly in extent.[53] Probably\nevery people considers it a disgrace, if not a crime, for its\nmen, and even more so for its women, to marry within a race very\ndifferent from its own, especially if it be an inferior race. The\nRomans were prohibited from marrying barbarians--the emperor\nValentinian inflicted the penalty of death for such unions;[54]\nand a modern European girl who married an Australian native would\nno doubt be regarded as an outcast by her own society. Among many\npeoples marriage very seldom or never takes place outside the\nlimits of the tribe or community. In India there are several\ninstances of this. The Tipperahs and Abors view with abhorrence\nthe idea of their girls marrying out of their clan;[55] and\nColonel Dalton was gravely assured that, \"when one of the\ndaughters of P\u00e1dam so demeans herself, the sun and moon refuse to\nshine, and there is such a strife in the elements that all labour\nis necessarily suspended, till by sacrifice and oblation the\nstain is washed away.\"[56] In ancient Peru it was not lawful for\nthe natives of one province or village to intermarry with those\nof another.[57] Marriage with foreign women was unlawful at\nSparta and Athens.[58] At Rome any marriage of a citizen with a\nwoman who was not herself a Roman citizen, or did not belong to a\ncommunity possessing the privilege of _connubium_ with Rome, was\ninvalid, and no legitimate children could be born of such a union.[59]\n\n[Footnote 53: Westermarck, _op. cit._ p. 363 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 54: Rossbach, _R\u00f6mische Ehe_, p. 465.]\n\n[Footnote 55: Lewin, _Wild Races of South-Eastern India_, p. 201.]\n\n[Footnote 56: Dalton, _Ethnology of Bengal_, p. 28.]\n\n[Footnote 57: Garcilasso de la Vega, _First Part of the Royal\nCommentaries of the Yncas_, i. 308.]\n\n[Footnote 58: M\u00fcller, _History of the Doric Race_, ii. 302.\nHearn, _The Aryan Household_, p. 156 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 59: Gaius, _Institutiones_, i. 56.]\n\n{379} Prohibitions of intermarriage also very often relate to\npersons belonging to different classes or castes of the same\ncommunity.[60] To mention a few instances. The wild tribes of\nBrazil consider alliances between slaves and freemen highly\ndisgraceful.[61] In Tahiti, if a woman of condition chose an\ninferior person as her husband, the children he had by her were\nkilled.[62] In the Malay Archipelago marriages between persons of\ndifferent rank are, as a rule, disapproved of, and in some places\nprohibited.[63] In India intermarriage between different castes,\nthough formerly permissible, is now altogether prohibited.[64] In\nRome plebeians and patricians could not intermarry till the year\n445 B.C., nor were marriages allowed between patricians and\nclients; and Cicero himself disapproved of intermarriages of\n_ingenui_ and freedmen.[65] Among the Teutonic peoples in ancient\ntimes any freeman who married a slave became a slave himself.[66]\nAs late as the thirteenth century a German woman who had\nintercourse with a serf lost her liberty;[67] and both in Germany\nand Scandinavia, when the nobility emerged as a distinct order\nfrom the class of freemen, marriages between persons of noble\nbirth and persons who, although free, were not noble came to be\nconsidered misalliances.[68] Even in modern Europe there survive\ntraces of the former class endogamy. According to German Civil\nLaw, the marriage of a man belonging to the high nobility with a\nwoman of inferior birth is still regarded as a _disparagium_, and\nthe woman is not entitled to the rank of her husband, nor is the\nfull right of inheritance possessed by her or her children.[69]\nAlthough in no way prevented by law, marriages out of {380} the\nclass are generally avoided by custom. As Sir Henry Maine\nobserves, \"the outer or endogamous limit, within which a man or\nwoman must marry, has been mostly taken under the shelter of\nfashion or prejudice. It is but faintly traced in England, though\nnot wholly obscured. It is (or perhaps was) rather more\ndistinctly marked in the United States, through prejudices\nagainst the blending of white and coloured blood. But in Germany\ncertain hereditary dignities are still forfeited by a marriage\nbeyond the forbidden limits; and in France, in spite of all\nformal institutions, marriages between a person belonging to the\nnoblesse and a person belonging to the _bourgeoisie_\n(distinguished roughly from one another by the particle 'de') are\nwonderfully rare, though they are not unknown.\"[70]\n\n[Footnote 60: Westermarck, _op. cit._ p. 368 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 61: von Martius, _Beitr\u00e4ge zur Ethnographie Amerika's_,\ni. 71. von Spix and von Martius, _Travels in Brazil_, ii. 74.]\n\n[Footnote 62: Ellis, _Polynesian Researches_, i. 256. Cook,\n_Voyage to the Pacific Ocean_, ii. 171 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 63: Westermarck, _op. cit._ p. 371.]\n\n[Footnote 64: Monier-Williams, _Hinduism_, p. 155.]\n\n[Footnote 65: Mommsen, _History of Rome_, i. 371. Rossbach,\n_op. cit._ pp. 249, 456 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 66: Winroth, _\u00c4ktenskapshindren_, p. 227.]\n\n[Footnote 67: _Ibid._ p. 230 _sq._ Weinhold, _Deutsche Frauen in\ndem Mittelalter_, i. 349, 353 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 68: Weinhold, _op. cit._ i. 349 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 69: Behrend, in von Holtzendorff, _Encyclop\u00e4die der\nRechtswissenschaft_, i. 478.]\n\n[Footnote 70: Maine, _Dissertations on Early Law and Custom_,\np. 224 _sq._]\n\nReligion, also, has formed a great bar to intermarriage. Among\nMuhammedans a marriage between a Christian man and a Muhammedan\nwoman is not permitted under any circumstances, whereas it is\nheld lawful for a Muhammedan to marry a Christian or a Jewish,\nbut not a heathen, woman, if induced to do so by excessive love\nof her, or if he cannot obtain a wife of his own religion.[71]\nThe Jewish law does not recognise marriage with a person of\nanother belief;[72] and during the Middle Ages marriage between\nJews and Christians was prohibited by the Christians also.[73]\nSt. Paul indicates that a Christian was not allowed to marry a\nheathen.[74] Tertullian calls such an alliance fornication;[75]\nand in the fourth century the Council of Elvira forbade Christian\nparents to give their daughters in marriage to heathens.[76] Even\nthe adherents of different Christian confessions have been\nprohibited from intermarrying. In {381} the Roman Catholic Church\nthe prohibition of marriage with heathens and Jews was soon\nfollowed by the prohibition of \"mixed marriages,\" and Protestants\nlikewise forbade such unions.[77] Mixed marriages are not now\ncontrary to the civil law either among Roman Catholic or\nProtestant nations, but in countries belonging to the Orthodox\nGreek Church ecclesiastical restrictions have been adopted, and\nare still recognised, by the State.[78]\n\n[Footnote 71: Lane, _Manners and Customs of the Modern\nEgyptians_, i. 123. d'Escayrac de Lauture, _Die afrikanische\nW\u00fcste_, p. 68.]\n\n[Footnote 72: Frankel, _Grundlinien des mosaisch-talmudischen\nEherechts_, p. xx. Ritter, _Philo und die Halacha_, p. 71.]\n\n[Footnote 73: Andree, _Zur Volkskunde der Juden_, p. 48.\nNeubauer, 'Notes on the Race-Types of the Jews,' in _Jour. Anthr.\nInst._ xv. 19.]\n\n[Footnote 74: _1 Corinthians_, vii. 39.]\n\n[Footnote 75: Tertullian, _Ad uxorem_, ii. 3 (Migne, _Patrologi\u00e6\ncursus_, i. 1292 _sq._).]\n\n[Footnote 76: _Concilium Eliberitanum_, cap. 15 _sq._\n(Labbe-Mansi, _Sacrorum Conciliorum collectio_, ii. 8). See also\nM\u00fcller, _Das sexuelle Leben der christlichen Kulturv\u00f6lker_, p. 54.]\n\n[Footnote 77: Winroth, _op. cit._ p. 213 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 78: _Ibid._ p. 220 _sq._]\n\nThe endogamous rules are in the first place due to the proud\nantipathy people feel to races, nations, classes, or religions\ndifferent from their own. He who breaks such a rule is regarded\nas an offender against the circle to which he belongs. He hurts\nits feelings, he disgraces it at the same time as he disgraces\nhimself. Irregular connections outside the endogamous circle are\noften looked upon with less intolerance than marriage, which\nplaces the parties on a more equal footing. A traveller relates\nthat at Djidda, where sexual morality is held in little respect,\na Bedouin woman may yield herself for money to a Turk or\nEuropean, but would think herself for ever dishonoured if she\nwere joined to him in lawful wedlock.[79] In Rome _contubernium_,\nbut not marriage, could take place between freemen and\nslaves.[80] And among ourselves public opinion regards it as a\nmuch more lenient offence if a royal person keeps a woman of\ninferior rank as his concubine than if he marries her.\n\n[Footnote 79: de Gobineau, _Moral and Intellectual Diversity of\nRaces_, p. 174, n. 1. _Cf._ d'Escayrac de Lauture, _op. cit._\np. 155.]\n\n[Footnote 80: Westermarck, _op. cit._ p. 372.]\n\nModern civilisation tends more or less to pull down the barriers\nwhich separate races, nations, the various classes of society,\nand the adherents of different religions. The endogamous rules\nhave thus become less stringent and less restricted. Whilst\ncivilisation has narrowed the inner limit within which a man or\nwoman must not marry, it has widened the outer limit within which\na man or woman may marry, and generally marries. The latter of\nthese processes has been one of vast importance in man's history.\n{382} Originating in race- or class-pride, or in religious\nintolerance, the endogamous rules have in their turn helped to\nkeep up and to strengthen these feelings. Frequent intermarriages,\non the other hand, must have the very opposite effect.\n\nLike the rules referring to the choice of partners, so the modes\nof contracting marriage and the ideas as to what in this respect\nis right and proper have undergone successive changes. The\npractice of capturing wives prevails in certain parts of the\nworld, and traces of it are met with in the marriage ceremonies\nof several peoples, indicating that it occurred more frequently\nin past ages.[81] This practice, as it seems to me, has chiefly\nsprung from the aversion to close intermarriage, together with\nthe difficulty a savage man may have in procuring a wife in a\nfriendly manner, without giving compensation for the loss he\ninflicts on her family. We may imagine that it chiefly occurred\nat a stage of social growth where family ties had become\nstronger, and man lived in small groups of nearly related\npersons, but where the idea of barter had scarcely presented\nitself to his mind. Yet there is no reason to think that capture\nwas at any period the exclusive form of contracting marriage; its\nprevalence seems to have been much exaggerated by McLennan and\nhis school.[82] It is impossible to believe that there ever was a\ntime when friendly negotiations between families who could\nintermarry were altogether unknown. The custom prevalent among\nmany savage tribes of a husband taking up his abode in his wife's\nfamily seems to have arisen very early in man's history.\n\n[Footnote 81: Westermarck, _op. cit._ ch. xvii.]\n\n[Footnote 82: Dr. Grosse (_Die Formen der Familie_, p. 105) goes\nso far as to believe that marriage by capture has never been a\nform of marriage recognised by custom or law, but only an\noccasional and punishable act of violence. But, as Dr. Havelock\nEllis justly observes (_Studies in the Psychology of Sex_,\n'Analysis of the Sexual Impulse,' p. 62, n. 2), this position is\ntoo extreme.]\n\nAmong most uncivilised peoples now existing a man has, in some\nway or other, to give compensation for his bride.[83] The\nsimplest way of purchasing a wife is to give a kinswoman in\nexchange for her--a practice prevalent among {383} Australian\ntribes. Much more common is the custom of obtaining a wife by\nservices rendered to her father, the man taking up his abode with\nthe family of the girl for a certain time, during which he works\nas a servant. But the ordinary compensation for a girl is\nproperty paid to her father, or in some cases to her uncle, or to\nsome other relatives as well as to the father. Marriage by\nexchange or purchase is not only general among existing lower\nraces; it occurs, or formerly occurred, among semi-civilised\nnations of a higher culture as well--in Central America and Peru,\nin China and Japan, in the various branches of the Semitic race,\nin the past history of all so-called Aryan peoples. We have no\nevidence that it is a stage through which every race has passed;\nwe notice its absence among some of the rudest races with whom we\nare acquainted. Yet with much more reason than marriage by\ncapture, purchase of wives may be said to form a general stage in\nthe social history of mankind. Although the two practices may\noccur simultaneously, the former seems more often to have\nsucceeded the latter, as barter in general has followed upon\nrobbery. It has been suggested that the transition from marriage\nby capture to marriage by purchase was brought about in the\nfollowing way: abduction, in spite of parents, was the primary\nform; then there came the offering of compensation to escape\nvengeance; and this grew eventually into the making of presents\nor paying a sum beforehand.[84] The price was a compensation for\nthe loss sustained in the giving up of the girl and a\nremuneration for the expenses incurred in her maintenance till\nthe time of her marriage. The girl was regarded more or less in\nthe light of property, to take her away from her owner without\nhis consent was theft. To claim a compensation for her was his\nright, or even his duty. The Indians in Columbia consider it in\nthe highest degree disgraceful to the girl's family if she is\ngiven away without a price;[85] and in certain tribes of\nCalifornia {384}\"the children of a woman for whom no money was\npaid are accounted no better than bastards, and the whole family\nare condemned.\"[86]\n\n[Footnote 83: Westermarck, _op. cit._ p. 390 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 84: Koenigswarter, _\u00c9tudes historiques sur le\ndeveloppement de la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 humaine_, p. 53. Spencer, _Principles\nof Sociology_, i. 625.]\n\n[Footnote 85: Bancroft, _Native Races of the Pacific States_, i.\n277. _Cf._ von Weber, _Vier Jahre in Afrika_, ii. 215 _sq._\n(Kafirs).]\n\n[Footnote 86: Powers, _Tribes of California_, pp. 22, 56.]\n\nWith progressing civilisation, however, the practice of\npurchasing wives has been gradually abandoned, and come to be\nlooked upon as infamous. The wealthier classes took the first\nstep, and poorer and ruder persons subsequently followed their\nexamples. Thus in India, in ancient times, the \u00c2sura form, or\nmarriage by purchase, was lawful for all the four castes.\nAfterwards it fell into disrepute, and was prohibited among the\nBr\u00e2hmanas and Kshatriyas, whereas it was still approved of in the\ncase of a Vaisya and a S\u00fbdra. But in the 'Laws of Manu' it is\nforbidden altogether.[87] It is said there, \"No father who knows\nthe law must take even the smallest gratuity for his daughter;\nfor a man who, through avarice, takes a gratuity, is a seller of\nhis offspring.\"[88] The Greeks of the historical age had ceased\nto buy their wives. In Rome _confarreatio_, which suggested no\nidea of purchase, was in the very earliest known time the form of\nmarriage in force among the patricians; and among clients and\nplebeians, also, the purchase of wives came to an end in remote\nantiquity, surviving as a mere symbol in their _co\u00ebmptio_.[89]\nAmong the Germans marriage by purchase was abolished only after\ntheir conversion to Christianity.[90] In the Talmudic law the\npurchase of wives appears as merely symbolical, the bride-price\nbeing fixed at a nominal amount.[91] In China, although marriage\npresents correspond exactly to purchase-money in a contract of\nsale, the people will not hear of their being called a\n\"price\";[92] which shows that here, too, some feeling of shame is\nattached to the idea of selling a daughter.\n\n[Footnote 87: _Laws of Manu_, iii. 23 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 88: _Ibid._ iii. 51. _Cf._ _ibid._ ix. 93, 98.]\n\n[Footnote 89: Rossbach, _op. cit._ pp. 92, 146, 248, 250, &c.]\n\n[Footnote 90: Grimm, _Deutsche Rechtsalterth\u00fcmer_, p. 424.]\n\n[Footnote 91: Gans, _Erbrecht_, i. 138.]\n\n[Footnote 92: Jamieson, 'Marriage Laws,' in _China Review_,\nx. 78 n.*]\n\nWe may discern two different ways in which this {385} gradual\ndisappearance of marriage by purchase has taken place. On the one\nhand, the purchase became a symbol, appearing as a sham sale in\nthe marriage ceremonies or as an exchange of presents; on the\nother hand, the purchase sum was transformed into the morning\ngift and the dotal portion, a part--afterwards the whole--being\ngiven to the bride either directly by the bridegroom or by her\nfather. These transformations of marriage by purchase have taken\nplace not only in the history of the civilised nations, but among\nseveral peoples who are still in a savage or semi-civilised\nstate; and of a few of them it is expressly stated that they\nconsider marriage by purchase a disgraceful practice.[93]\n\n[Footnote 93: Westermarck, _op. cit._ p. 405 _sqq._]\n\nFrom marriage by purchase we have thus come to the practice of\ndower, which is apparently the very reverse of it. But whilst the\nmarriage portion partly derives its origin from the purchase of\nwives, it does not do so in every case. It serves different ends,\noften indissolubly mixed up together. It may have the meaning of\na return gift. It may imply that the wife as well as the husband\nis expected to contribute to the expenses of the joint household.\nIt is also very often intended to be a settlement for the wife in\ncase the marriage be dissolved through the husband's death or\notherwise.[94] In the social history of the civilised races the\nmarriage portion has played so prominent a part, that, as we have\nspoken of a stage of marriage by purchase, we may speak of\nanother and later stage where fathers are bound by custom or law\nto portion their daughters. The Jews[95] and Muhammedans[96]\nconsider it a religious duty for a man to give a dower to his\ndaughter. In Greece the dowry came to be thought almost necessary\nto make the distinction between a wife and a concubine.[97]\nIsaeus says that no decent man would give his legitimate daughter\nless than a tenth of his {386} property;[98] indeed, so great\nwere the dowers given that in the time of Aristotle nearly two\nfifths of the whole territory of Sparta were supposed to belong\nto women.[99] In Rome, even more than in Greece, the marriage\nportion became a mark of distinction for a legitimate wife;[100]\nand though later on Justinian in several of his constitutions\ndeclares that _dos_ is obligatory for persons of high rank\nonly,[101] the old custom did not fall into desuetude.[102] The\nPrussian 'Landrecht' still prescribes that the father, or\neventually the mother, shall arrange about the wedding and fit up\nthe house of the newly-married couple.[103] According to the\n'Code Napol\u00e9on,' on the other hand, parents are not bound to give\na dower to their daughters,[104] and the same principle is\ngenerally adopted by modern legislation. It is true that\nespecially in the so-called Latin countries there is still a\nstrong tendency to dotation,[105] but another feeling, in some\nmeasure opposed to it, is gaining ground everywhere. In a society\nwhere monogamy is prescribed by law, where the adult women\noutnumber the adult men, where many men never marry, and where\nmarried women too often lead an indolent life--in such a society\nthe marriage portion in many cases becomes a purchase-sum by\nmeans of which a father buys a husband for his daughter, as\nformerly a man bought a wife from her father. But, as Mr.\nSutherland observes, \"that pecuniary interests, either on one\nside or on the other, should conspicuously enter into the motives\nwhich lead to marriage, becomes repulsive to the increasing\ndelicacy of feeling; and so we find that in cultured communities\nthe dowry dies out, just as the purchase-money declined in the\ncivilised stages.\"[106]\n\n[Footnote 94: _Ibid._ p. 411 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 95: Mayer, _Rechte der Israeliten_, ii. 344.]\n\n[Footnote 96: _Koran_, iv. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 97: Cauvet, 'L'organisation de la famille \u00e0 Ath\u00e8nes,'\nin _Revue de l\u00e9gislation et de jurisprudence_, xxiv. 152. Potter,\n_Arch\u00e6ologia Gr\u00e6ca_, ii. 268. _Cf._ Meier and Sch\u00f6mann, _Der\nattische Process_, p. 513 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 98: Isaeus, _Oratio de Pyrrhi hereditate_, 51, p. 43.]\n\n[Footnote 99: Aristotle, _Politica_, ii. 9, p. 1270 a.]\n\n[Footnote 100: Laboulaye, _Recherches sur la condition civile et\npolitique des femmes_, p. 38 _sq._ Ginoulhiac, _Histoire du\nr\u00e9gime dotal_, p. 66. Meier and Sch\u00f6mann, _op. cit._ p. 513 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 101: Ginoulhiac, _op. cit._ p. 103.]\n\n[Footnote 102: For _dos necessaria_ in Germany during the Middle\nAges, see Mittermaier, _Grunds\u00e4tze des gemeinen deutschen\nPrivatrechts_, ii. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 103: Eccius, in von Holtzendorff, _Encyclop\u00e4die der\nRechtswissenschaft_, ii. 414.]\n\n[Footnote 104: _Code Napol\u00e9on_, art. 204.]\n\n[Footnote 105: See Maine, _Early History of Institutions_, p. 339.]\n\n[Footnote 106: Sutherland, _Origin and Growth of the Moral\nInstinct_, i. 243.]\n\n{387} Whilst most of the lower animal species are by instinct\neither monogamous or polygynous, with man every possible form of\nmarriage occurs. There are marriages of one man with one woman\n(monogamy), of one man with many women (polygyny), of many men\nwith one woman (polyandry), and, in a few exceptional cases, of\nmany men with many women.[107]\n\n[Footnote 107: Westermarck, _op. cit._ ch. xx.]\n\nAmong the causes by which the forms of marriage are influenced\nthe numerical proportion between the sexes plays an important\npart. Polyandry seems to be due chiefly to a surplus of men,\nthough it prevails only where the circumstances are otherwise in\nfavour of it.[108] It presupposes an abnormally feeble\ndisposition to jealousy, and has probably at all times been\nexceptional in the human race. There is no solid evidence for the\ntheory set forth by McLennan that it was the rule in early\ntimes.[109] On the contrary, this form of marriage seems to\nrequire a certain degree of civilisation; we have no trustworthy\naccount of its occurrence among the lowest savages. In\npolyandrous families the husbands are most frequently brothers,\nand the eldest brother, at least in many cases, has the\nsuperiority. It seems a fair conclusion that in such instances\npolyandry was originally an expression of fraternal benevolence\non the part of the eldest brother, or of urgent demands on the\npart of the younger ones, who otherwise, on account of the\nscarcity of women, would have to live unmarried. If additional\nwives were afterwards acquired, they would naturally be\nconsidered the common property of all the brothers; and in this\nway the group marriage of the Toda type seems to have\nevolved.[110] Polygyny, also, is to some extent dependent upon\nthe proportion between the sexes. It has been observed in India\nthat polyandry occurs in those parts of the country where the\nmales outnumber the females, polygyny in those {388} where the\nreverse is the case.[111] Indeed, in countries unaffected by\nEuropean civilisation polygyny is likely to prevail wherever\nthere is a majority of women. But the proportion between the\nsexes is only one cause out of many to which polygyny is due.\n\n[Footnote 108: _Ibid._ p. 482.]\n\n[Footnote 109: McLennan, 'The Levirate and Polyandry,' in\n_Fortnightly Review_, N.S. xxi. 703 _sqq._ _Idem_, _Studies in\nAncient History_, p. 112 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 110: Westermarck, _op. cit._ p. 510 _sqq._ See also\nRivers, _Todas_, pp. 515, 519, 521.]\n\n[Footnote 111: Goehlert, 'Die Geschlechtsverschiedenheit der\nKinder in den Ehen,' in _Zeitschr. f. Ethnologie_, xiii. 127.]\n\nThere are several reasons why a man may desire to possess more\nthan one wife.[112] Monogamy requires from him periodical\ncontinence, not only for a certain time every month, but among\nmany peoples during the pregnancy of his wife, and as long as she\nsuckles her child. One of the chief causes of polygyny is the\nattraction which female youth and beauty exercise upon a man; and\nat the lower stages of civilisation women generally become old\nmuch sooner than in more advanced communities. The liking of men\nfor variety is also a potent factor; the Negroes of Angola\nasserted that they \"were not able to eat always of the same\ndish.\"[113] We must further take into account men's desire for\noffspring, wealth, and authority. The barrenness of a wife is a\nvery common reason for the choice of a new partner; the polygyny\nof the ancient Hindus seems to have been due chiefly to the fact\nthat men dreaded the idea of dying childless, and even now in the\nEast the desire for offspring is one of the principal causes of\npolygyny.[114] The more wives, the more children; and the more\nchildren, the greater power. In early civilisation a man's\nrelations and connections are often his only friends; and where\nslavery does not prevail, next to a man's wives the real servant,\nthe only to be counted upon, is the child. Moreover, a man's\nfortune is increased by a multitude of wives not only through\ntheir children, but through their work. Manual labour among\nsavages is undertaken largely by women; and when neither slaves\nnor persons who will work for hire can be procured, {389} it\nbecomes necessary for any man who requires many servants to have\nmany wives.\n\n[Footnote 112: Westermarck, _op. cit._ p. 483 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 113: Merolla da Sorrento, 'Voyage to Congo,' in\nPinkerton, _Collection of Voyages_, xvi. 299.]\n\n[Footnote 114: Wallin, _Reseanteckningar fr\u00e5n Orienten_, iii.\n267. Le Bon, _La civilisation des Arabes_, p. 424. Gray, _China_,\ni. 184.]\n\nNevertheless, however desirable polygyny may be from the man's\npoint of view, it is altogether prohibited among many peoples,\nand in countries where it is an established institution it is\npractised--as a rule to which there are few exceptions--only by a\ncomparatively small class.[115] The proportion between the sexes\npartly accounts for this, but there are other causes of no less\nimportance.[116] Where the amount of female labour is limited and\nno accumulated property exists, it may be very difficult for a\nman to keep a plurality of wives. Again, where female labour is\nof considerable value, the necessity of paying the purchase-sum\nfor a wife is a hindrance to polygyny which can be overcome only\nby the wealthier men. There are, moreover, certain factors of a\npsychical character which are unfavourable to polygyny. When love\ndepends on external attractions only, it is necessarily fickle;\nbut when it implies sympathy arising from mental qualities, there\nis a tie between husband and wife which lasts long after youth\nand beauty are gone. As another obstacle to polygyny we have to\nnote the true monogamous sentiment, the absorbing passion for\none, which is not unknown even among savage races. Polygyny is\nfinally checked by the respect in which women are held by men.\nJealousy is not exclusively a masculine passion, and it is the\nambition of every wife to be the mistress of her husband's house.\nHence where women have succeeded in obtaining some power over\ntheir husbands, or where the altruistic feelings of men have\nbecome refined enough to lead them to respect the feelings of\nthose weaker than themselves, monogamy is frequently the result.\n\n[Footnote 115: Westermarck, _op. cit._ p. 435 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 116: _Ibid._ p. 493 _sqq._]\n\nIt is certain that polygyny has been less prevalent at the lowest\nstages of civilisation--where wars do not seriously disturb the\nproportion of the sexes, where life is chiefly supported by\nhunting and female labour is consequently of slight value, and\nwhere there is no accumulation of wealth {390} and no distinction\nof class--than it is at somewhat higher stages.[117] The more\nadvanced savages and barbarians seem to indulge in this practice\nto a greater extent than the lower ones, many, or most, of whom\nare either little addicted to polygyny or strictly monogamous.\nVarious forest tribes in Brazil are monogamous,[118] and so are\nseveral of the Californian tribes--\"a humble and a lowly race, . . .\none of the lowest on earth.\"[119] Thus the Karok do not allow\nbigamy even to a chief; and though a man may own as many women\nfor slaves as he can purchase, he brings obloquy on himself if he\ncohabits with more than one.[120] Among the Veddahs[121] and\nAndaman Islanders[122] monogamy is as rigidly insisted upon as\nany where in Europe. The natives of Kar Nicobar \"have but one\nwife, and look upon unchastity as a very deadly sin.\"[123] Among\nthe Koch and Old Kukis polygyny and concubinage are\nforbidden;[124] whilst among some other aboriginal tribes in\nIndia a man, though not expressly forbidden to have many wives,\nis blamed if he has more than one.[125] Among the Karens of\nBurma[126] and certain tribes of Indo-China, the Malay Peninsula,\nand the Indian Archipelago, polygyny is said either to be\nprohibited or unknown.[127] The Hill Dyaks marry but one wife,\nand a chief who once broke through this custom lost all his\ninfluence.[128] In Australia there are said to be some truly\nmonogamous tribes;[129] in the Birria tribe, for instance, \"the\npossession of more than one wife is absolutely forbidden, or was\nso before the coming of the whites.\"[130] {391} Monogamy is all\nthe more likely to have been the general rule among our earliest\nhuman ancestors as it seems to be so among the man-like apes.\nDarwin certainly mentions the gorilla as a polygamist;[131] but\nthe majority of statements we have regarding this animal are to\nthe opposite effect. Relying on the most trustworthy authorities,\nProfessor Hartmann says, \"The gorilla lives in a society\nconsisting of male and female and their young of varying ages.\"[132]\n\n[Footnote 117: Westermarck, _op. cit._ p. 505 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 118: von Martius, _op. cit._ i. 274, 298. Wallace,\n_Travels on the Amazon_, pp. 509, 515 _sqq._ Waitz,\n_Anthropologie der Naturv\u00f6lker_, iii. 472.]\n\n[Footnote 119: Powers, _op. cit._ pp. 5, 56, 406. Wilkes, _U. S.\nExploring Expedition_, v. 188.]\n\n[Footnote 120: Powers, _op. cit._ p. 22.]\n\n[Footnote 121: Bailey, in _Trans. Ethn. Soc._ N.S. ii. 291 _sq._\nHartshorne, in _Indian Antiquary_, viii. 320.]\n\n[Footnote 122: Man, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xii. 135.]\n\n[Footnote 123: Distant, _ibid._ iii. 4.]\n\n[Footnote 124: Dalton, _op. cit._ p. 91. Stewart, 'Notes on\nNorthern Cachar,' in _Jour. As. Soc. Bengal_, xxiv. 621.]\n\n[Footnote 125: Dalton, _op. cit._ pp. 28, 54. Jellinghaus,\n'Munda-Kolhs in Chota Nagpore,' in _Zeitschr. f. Ethnol._\niii. 370.]\n\n[Footnote 126: Smeaton, _Loyal Karens of Burma_, p. 81.]\n\n[Footnote 127: Westermarck, _op. cit._ p. 436 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 128: Low, _Sarawak_, p. 300.]\n\n[Footnote 129: Curr, _Australian Race_, i. 402; ii. 371.]\n\n[Footnote 130: _Ibid._ ii. 378.]\n\n[Footnote 131: Darwin, _Descent of Man_, pp. 217, 590 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 132: Hartmann, _Die menschen\u00e4hnlichen Affen_, p. 214.]\n\nWhilst civilisation is thus up to a certain point favourable to\npolygyny, it leads in its higher forms to monogamy. Owing to the\ndecrease of wars, the death-rate of the men becomes less, and the\nconsiderable disproportion between the sexes which among many\nwarlike peoples makes polygyny almost a law of nature no longer\nexists among the most advanced nations. No superstitious belief\nkeeps the civilised man apart from his wife during her pregnancy\nand while she suckles her child; and the suckling time has become\nmuch shorter since the introduction of domesticated animals and\nthe use of milk. To a cultivated mind youth and beauty are by no\nmeans the only attractions of a woman; and civilisation has made\nfemale beauty more durable. The desire for offspring becomes less\nintense. A large family, instead of being a help in the struggle\nfor existence, is often considered an insufferable burden. A\nman's kinsfolk are no longer his only friends, and his wealth and\npower do not depend upon the number of his wives and children. A\nwife ceases to be a mere labourer, and manual labour is to a\nlarge extent replaced by the work of domesticated animals and the\nuse of implements and machines. Moreover, the sentiment of love\nbecomes more refined, the passion for one more absorbing. The\nfeelings of the weaker sex are frequently held in higher regard.\nAnd the better education bestowed on women enables them to live\ncomfortably without the support of a husband.\n\n{392} As for the moral valuation of the various forms of\nmarriage, it should be noticed that even among polygynous and\npolyandrous peoples monogamy is permitted by custom or law,\nalthough in some instances it is associated with poverty and\nconsidered mean, whereas polygyny, as associated with greatness,\nis thought praiseworthy.[133] Again, the notion that monogamy is\nthe only proper form of marriage, and that any other form is\nimmoral, is due either to the mere force of habit; or, possibly,\nto the notion that it is wrong of some men to appropriate a\nplurality of wives when others in consequence can get none; or to\nthe feeling that polygyny is an offence against the female sex;\nor to the condemnation of lust. As regards the obligatory\nmonogamy of Christian nations, we have to remember that monogamy\nwas the only recognised form of marriage in the societies on\nwhich Christianity was first engrafted, and that it was the only\nform that could be tolerated by a religion which regarded every\ngratification of the sexual impulse with suspicion and\nincontinence as the gravest sin. In its early days the Church\nshowed little respect for women but its horror of sensuality was\nimmense.\n\n[Footnote 133: Spencer, _Principles of Sociology_, i. 657.]\n\nA few words still remain to be said of a form of marriage which\nhas of late been the subject of much discussion in connection\nwith Australian ethnology. Many years ago attention was drawn to\nthe fact that the Kamilaroi tribes in South Australia are divided\ninto four classes, in which brothers and sisters are respectively\nIpai and Ip[=a]tha, K[)u]bi and Kub[)i]tha, M[)u]ri and M[=a]tha,\nKumbu and B[=u]tha; and that the members of one class are\nforbidden to marry among themselves, but bound to marry into a\ncertain other class. Thus Ipai may only marry Kub[)i]tha;\nK[)u]bi, Ip[=a]tha; Kumbu, M[=a]tha; and M[)u]ri, B[=u]tha. In a\ncertain sense, we were told, every Ipai is regarded as married,\nnot by any individual contract, but by organic law, to every\nKub[)i]tha; every K[)u]bi to every Ip[=a]tha, and so forth. If,\nfor instance, a K[)u]bi meet a stranger Ip[=a]tha, they address\n{393} each other as \"spouse\"; and \"a K[)u]bi thus meeting an\nIp[=a]tha, though she were of another tribe, would treat her as\nhis wife, and his right to do so would be recognised by her\ntribe.\"[134] The institution according to which the men of one\ndivision have as wives the women of another division, the Rev. L.\nFison called \"group marriage.\" He contends that among the natives\nof South Australia it has given way in later times, in some\nmeasure, to individual marriage. But theoretically, he says,\nmarriage is still communal: \"it is based upon the marriage of all\nthe males in one division of a tribe to all the females of the\nsame generation in another division.\" The chief argument advanced\nby Mr. Fison in support of his theory is grounded on the terms of\nrelationship in use in the tribes. These terms belong to the\n\"classificatory system\" of Mr. Morgan;[135] but he admits that he\nis not aware of any tribe in which the actual practice is to its\nfull extent what the terms of relationship imply. \"Present\nusage,\" he says, \"is everywhere in advance of the system so\nimplied, and the terms are survivals of an ancient right, not\nprecise indications of custom as it is.\"[136] The same is granted\nby Mr. Howitt.[137] Yet I have pointed out, in my criticism of\nthe classificatory system, to what absurd results we must be led\nif, guided by such terms, we begin to speculate upon early\nmarriage.[138] Moreover, as I have said, \"if a K[)u]bi and an\nIp[=a]tha address each other as spouse, this does not imply that\nin former times every K[)u]bi was married to every Ip[=a]tha\nindiscriminately. On the contrary, the application of such a\nfamiliar term might be explained from the fact that the women who\nmay be a man's wives, and those who cannot possibly be so, stand\nin a widely different relation to him.\"[139] This suggestion\nderives support from the following statement made by Dr.\nCodrington with reference to the Melanesians:--\"Speaking {394}\ngenerally, it may be said that to a Melanesian man all women, of\nhis own generation at least, are either sisters or wives, to the\nMelanesian woman all men are either brothers or husbands. . . .\nIt must not be understood that a Melanesian regards all women who\nare not of his own division as, in fact, his wives, or conceives\nhimself to have rights which he may exercise in regard to those\nwomen of them who are unmarried; but the women who may be his\nwives by marriage and those who cannot possibly be so, stand in a\nwidely different relation to him.\"[140]\n\n[Footnote 134: Ridley, _K\u00e1milar\u00f3i_, p. 161 _sq._ (edit. 1866, p. 35\n_sqq._). Fison and Howitt, _Kamilaroi and Kurnai_, pp. 36, 51, 53.]\n\n[Footnote 135: Fison and Howitt, _op. cit._ p. 60.]\n\n[Footnote 136: _Ibid._ p. 159 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 137: Howitt, 'Australian Group Relations,' in\n_Smithsonian Report_, 1883, p. 817.]\n\n[Footnote 138: Westermarck, _op. cit._ ch. v.]\n\n[Footnote 139: _Ibid._ p. 56.]\n\n[Footnote 140: Codrington, _Melanesians_, p. 22 _sq._]\n\nMore recently Messrs. Spencer and Gillen have shown that a\nmarriage system essentially similar to that of the South\nAustralian natives prevails in Central Australia; and they, also,\nregard it as a later modification of genuine group marriage.\nNowadays, they say, the system of individual wives\nprevails--\"modified, however, by the practice of customs\naccording to which, at certain times, much wider marital\nrelations are allowed.\" But to this rule there is one\nexception:--\"In the Urabunna tribe group marriage actually exists\nat the present day, a group of men of a certain designation\nhaving, not merely nominally but in actual reality, and under\nnormal conditions, marital relations with a group of women of\nanother special designation\"; here \"individual marriage does not\nexist either in name or in practice.\"[141] But, after all, it\nappears that even among the Urabunna every woman is the special\n_Nupa_ of one man, and that certain other men, her _Piraungaru_\nonly have a secondary right to her. Thus, if the Nupa man (the\nreal, or at all events the chief, husband) be present, the\nPiraungaru (accessory husbands) are allowed to have intercourse\nwith her only in case the Nupa man consents.[142] Is this\nmodification of the Urabunna group marriage a later development\nfrom a previous system according to which all the men of a\ncertain group had an equal right to all the {395} women of\nanother group? Here we are on dangerous ground; nothing is more\ndifficult than to decide whether certain customs are survivals or\nnot. We find modifications resembling those connected with the\ngroup marriage of the Urabunna both in polyandry and in polygyny;\nthe first husband in a polyandrous family is usually the chief\nhusband, and the first wife in a polygynous family is very\nfrequently the chief wife. We must certainly not conclude that\nthese restrictions have been preceded by an earlier custom which\ngave equal rights to all the husbands or all the wives; on the\ncontrary, it is more likely that the higher position granted to\nthe first husband or to the first wife is due to the fact that\nmonogamy was the usual form of marriage.[143] Similarly the\nUrabunna custom may very well have developed out of ordinary\nindividual marriage,[144] and the cause of it may perhaps be, as\nMr. N. W. Thomas has suggested,[145] the difficulties which an\nAustralian native often experiences in getting a wife.[146] As\nfor other facts which have been adduced as evidence of Australian\ngroup marriage in the past, such as the _jus prim\u00e6 noctis_, &c.,\nI only desire to emphasise the circumstance that extra-matrimonial\nintercourse is practised by the Australian natives in a variety\nof cases the real meaning of which seems obscure. In some\ninstances at least, a magic significance appears to be attributed\nto it;[147] and that it is a survival of group marriage, in the\nstrict sense of the term, is again only a conjecture.\n\n[Footnote 141: Spencer and Gillen, _Northern Tribes of Central\nAustralia_, p. 140. _Iidem_, _Native Tribes of Central\nAustralia_, p. 62 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 142: _Iidem_, _Native Tribes_, p. 110.]\n\n[Footnote 143: Westermarck, _op. cit._ pp. 443-448, 457, 458, 508.]\n\n[Footnote 144: _Cf._ Crawley, _op. cit._ p. 482; Lang, _Social\nOrigins_, p. 105 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 145: Thomas, in a paper read before the Anthropological\nInstitute in 1905. _Cf._ _Idem_, _Kinship and Marriage in\nAustralia_, p. 138.]\n\n[Footnote 146: See Westermarck, _op. cit._ p. 132 _sq._; _infra_,\np. 460.]\n\n[Footnote 147: See, _e.g._, Spencer and Gillen, _Northern\nTribes_, p. 137 _sq._]\n\nI must admit, therefore, that the facts produced by Messrs.\nSpencer and Gillen, and the severe criticism which they have\npassed on my sceptical attitude towards Mr. Fison's group\nmarriage theory have not been able to convince me that among the\nAustralian aborigines individual marriage has evolved out of a\nprevious system of marriage between groups of men and women. Nor\nhas Mr. Howitt, {396} in his recent work on the 'Native Tribes of\nSouth-East Australia,' in my opinion, sufficiently proved that\nsuch an evolution has taken place.[148] He blames certain\n\"ethnologists of the study\" for not being willing \"to take the\nopinion of men who have first-hand knowledge of the\nnatives\";[149] but I think we do well in distinguishing between\nstatements based on direct observation and the observer's\ninterpretation of the stated facts. Even suppose, however, that\ngroup marriage really was once common in Australia, would that\nprove that it was once common among mankind at large? Mr.\nHewitt's supposition that the practice of group marriage \"will be\nultimately accepted as one of the primitive conditions of\nmankind\"[150] is no doubt shared by a host of anthropologists.\nThe group marriage theory will probably for some time to come\nremain the residuary legatee of the old theory of promiscuity;\nthe important works which have lately been published on the\nAustralian aborigines have made people inclined to view the early\nhistory of mankind through Australian spectacles. But even the\nmost ardent advocate of Australian group marriage should remember\nthat the existence of kangurus in Australia does not prove that\nthere were once kangurus in England.\n\n[Footnote 148: Mr. Thomas has come to the same result in his book\non 'Kinship and Marriage in Australia,' which appeared when the\npresent chapter was already in type. A detailed examination of\nthe facts which have been adduced as evidence of Australian group\nmarriage (p. 127 _sqq._) has led him to the conclusion (p. 147)\nthat prevailing customs in Australia, far from proving the\npresent or former existence of group marriage in that continent,\ndo not even render it probable, and that on the terms of\nrelationship no argument of any sort can be founded which assumes\nthem to refer to consanguinity, kinship, or affinity. \"It is\ntherefore not rash to say that the case for group marriage, so\nfar as Australia is concerned, falls to the ground.\" See _infra_,\nAddit. Notes.]\n\n[Footnote 149: Howitt, 'Native Tribes of South-East Australia,'\nin _Folk-Lore_, xvii. 185.]\n\n[Footnote 150: _Idem_, _Native Tribes of South-East Australia_, p. 281.]\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe time during which marriage lasts varies extremely in the\nhuman race.[151] There are unions which, though legally\nrecognised as marriages, do not endure long enough to deserve to\nbe so called in the natural history sense of the term; there are\nothers which are dissolved only by {397} death. As has already\nbeen pointed out, it is probable that among primitive men the\nunion of the sexes lasted till after the birth of the offspring,\nand we have perhaps some reason to believe that the connection\nlasted for years. On the whole, progress in civilisation has\ntended to make marriage more durable. It is evident that at the\nearly stage of development at which women first became valuable\nas labourers, a wife was united with her husband by a new bond\nmore lasting than youth and beauty. The tie was strengthened by\nthe bride-price and the marriage portion. And a higher\ndevelopment of the paternal feeling, better forethought for the\nchildren's welfare, in some instances greater consideration for\nwomen, and a more refined love passion have gradually made it\nstronger, until it has become in many cases indissoluble. Yet we\nmust not conclude that divorce will in the future be less\nfrequent and more restricted by law than it is now in European\ncountries. It should be remembered that the laws of divorce in\nChristian Europe owe their origin to an idealistic religious\ncommandment which, interpreted in its literal sense, gave rise to\nlegal prescriptions far from harmonising with the mental and\nsocial life of the mass of the people. The powerful authority of\nthe Roman Church was necessary to enforce the dogma that marriage\nis indissoluble. The Reformation introduced somewhat greater\nliberty in this respect, and modern legislation has gone further\nin the same direction. In those Christian states of Europe where\nabsolute divorce is permitted the grounds on which it may be sued\nfor are nearly the same for the man and the woman, except in\nEngland, where the husband must be accused of one or other of\nseveral offences besides adultery. In Italy, Spain, and Portugal,\na judicial separation may always be decreed on the ground of the\nadultery of the wife, but, on the ground of the adultery of the\nhusband, only if it has been committed under certain aggravating\ncircumstances.[152] These laws imply that marriage is not yet a\ncontract on the footing of perfect equality between the sexes;\nbut there is {398} a growing opinion that, where it is not, it\nought to be so. Again, when both husband and wife desire to\nseparate, it seems to many enlightened minds that the State has\nno right to prevent them from dissolving the marriage contract,\nprovided the children are properly cared for; and that for the\nchildren, also, it is better to have the supervision of one\nparent only than of two who cannot agree.\n\n[Footnote 151: Westermarck, _op. cit._ ch. xxiii.]\n\n[Footnote 152: Glasson, _Le mariage civil et le divorce_, pp.\n291, 298, 304.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XLI\n\nCELIBACY\n\n\nAMONG savage and barbarous races of men nearly every individual\nendeavours to marry as soon as he, or she, reaches the age of\npuberty.[1] Marriage seems to them indispensable, and a person\nwho abstains from it is looked upon as an unnatural being and is\ndisdained. Among the Santals a man who remains single \"is at once\ndespised by both sexes, and is classed next to a thief, or a\nwitch: they term the unhappy wretch 'No man.'\"[2] Among the\nKafirs a bachelor has no voice in the kraal.[3] In the Tupi\ntribes of Brazil no man was suffered to partake in the\ndrinking-feast while he remained single.[4] The natives of Futuna\nin the Western Pacific maintained that it was necessary to be\nmarried in order to hold a part in the happy future life, and\nthat the celibates, both men and women, had to submit to a\nchastisement of their own before entering the _fale-mate_, or\n\"home of the dead.\"[5] According to Fijian beliefs, he who died\nwifeless was stopped by the god Nangganangga on the road to\nParadise, and smashed to atoms.[6]\n\n[Footnote 1: Westermarck, _History of Human Marriage_, p. 134\n_sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 2: Man, _Sonthalia_, p. 101.]\n\n[Footnote 3: von Weber, _Vier Jahre in Afrika_, ii. 215.]\n\n[Footnote 4: Southey, _History of Brazil_, i. 240.]\n\n[Footnote 5: Percy Smith, 'Futuna.' in _Jour. Polynesian Soc._\ni. 39 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 6: Pritchard, _Polynesian Reminiscences_, pp. 368, 372.\nSeemann, _Viti_, p. 399 _sq._ Fison, 'Fijian Burial Customs,' in\n_Jour. Anthr. Inst._ x. 139. Williams and Calvert, _Fiji_, p.\n206. For other instances see Westermarck, _op. cit._ p. 136, n. 10.]\n\nAmong peoples of archaic culture celibacy is likewise a great\nexception and marriage regarded as a duty. In {400} ancient Peru\nmarriage was compulsory at a certain age.[7] Among the Aztecs no\nyoung man lived single till his twenty-second year, unless he\nintended to become a priest, and for girls the customary\nmarrying-age was from eleven to eighteen. In Tlascala, we are\ntold, the unmarried state was so despised that a grown-up man who\nwould not marry had his hair cut off for shame.[8]\n\n[Footnote 7: Garcilasso de la Vega, _First Part of the Royal\nCommentaries of the Yncas_, i. 306 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 8: Klemm, _Allgemeine Cultur-Geschichte der\nMenschheit_, v. 46 _sq._ Bancroft, _Native Races of the Pacific\nStates_, ii. 251 _sq._]\n\n\"Almost all Chinese,\" says Dr. Gray, \"robust or infirm,\nwell-formed or deformed, are called upon by their parents to\nmarry as soon as they have attained the age of puberty. Were a\ngrown-up son or daughter to die unmarried, the parents would\nregard it as most deplorable.\" Hence a young man of marriageable\nage, whom consumption or any other lingering disease had marked\nfor its own, would be compelled by his parents or guardians to\nmarry at once.[9] So indispensable is marriage considered by the\nChinese, that even the dead are married, the spirits of all males\nwho die in infancy or in boyhood being in due time married to the\nspirits of females who have been cut off at a like early age.[10]\nThere is a maxim by Mencius, re-echoed by the whole nation, that\nit is a heavy sin to have no sons, as this would doom father,\nmother, and the whole ancestry in the Nether-world to a pitiable\nexistence without descendants enough to serve them properly, to\nworship at the ancestral tombs, to take care of the ancestral\ntablets, and duly to perform all rites and ceremonies connected\nwith the departed dead. For a man whose wife has reached her\nfortieth year without bringing him a son, it is an imperative\nduty to take a concubine.[11] In Corea \"the male human being who\nis unmarried is never called a man, whatever his age, but goes by\nthe name of 'yatow,' a name given by the Chinese to unmarriageable\nyoung girls; and the man of thirteen or fourteen has a {401}\nperfect right to strike, abuse, order about the 'yatow' of thirty,\nwho dares not as much as open his lips to complain.\"[12]\n\n[Footnote 9: Gray, _China_, i. 186.]\n\n[Footnote 10: _Ibid._ i. 216 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 11: Giles, _Strange Stories from a Chinese Studio_, i.\n64, n. 10. de Groot, _Religious System of China_, (vol. ii. book)\ni. 617. _Indo-Chinese Gleaner_, iii. 58.]\n\n[Footnote 12: Ross, _History of Corea_, p. 313.]\n\nAmong the Semites, also, we meet with the idea that a dead man\nwho has no children will miss something in Sh[)e]ol through not\nreceiving that kind of worship which ancestors in early times\nappear to have received.[13] The Hebrews looked upon marriage as\na religious duty.[14] According to the Shulchan Aruch, he who\nabstains from marrying is guilty of bloodshed, diminishes the\nimage of God, and causes the divine presence to withdraw from\nIsrael; hence a single man past twenty may be compelled by the\ncourt to take a wife.[15] Muhammedanism likewise regards marriage\nas a duty for men and women; to neglect it without a sufficient\nexcuse subjects a man to severe reproach.[16] \"When a servant [of\nGod] marries,\" said the Prophet, \"verily he perfects half his\nreligion.\"[17]\n\n[Footnote 13: Cheyne, 'Harlot,' in Cheyne and Black,\n_Encyclop\u00e6dia Biblica_, ii. 1964.]\n\n[Footnote 14: Mayer, _Rechte der Israeliten_, pp. 286, 353.\nLichtschein, _Ehe nach mosaisch-talmudischer Auffassung_, p. 5\n_sqq._ Klugmann, _Die Frau im Talmud_, p. 39 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 15: _Schulchan Aruch_, iv. ('Eben haezer') i. 1, 3. See\nalso _Yebamoth_, fol. 63 b _sq._, quoted by Margolis, 'Celibacy,'\nin _Jewish Encyclopedia_, iii. 636.]\n\n[Footnote 16: Lane, _Manners and Customs of the Modern\nEgyptians_, i. 197.]\n\n[Footnote 17: _Idem_, _Arabian Society in the Middle Ages_, p. 221.]\n\nThe so-called Aryan nations in ancient times, as M. Fustel de\nCoulanges and others have pointed out, regarded celibacy as an\nimpiety and a misfortune: \"an impiety, because one who did not\nmarry put the happiness of the manes of the family in peril; a\nmisfortune, because he himself would receive no worship after his\ndeath.\" A man's happiness in the next world depended upon his\nhaving a continuous line of male descendants, whose duty it would\nbe to make the periodical offerings for the repose of his\nsoul.[18] According to the 'Laws of Manu,' marriage is the\ntwelfth Sansk[=a]ra, and as such a religious duty incumbent upon\nall.[19] Among the Hindus of the present day a {402} man who is\nnot married is generally considered to be almost a useless member\nof the community, and is indeed looked upon as beyond the pale of\nnature;[20] and the spirits of young men who have died without\nbecoming fathers are believed to wander about in a restless\nmiserable manner, like people burdened with an enormous debt\nwhich they are quite unable to discharge.[21] Similar views are\nexpressed in Zoroastrianism. Ahura Mazda said to Zoroaster:--\"The\nman who has a wife is far above him who lives in continence; he\nwho keeps a house is far above him who has none; he who has\nchildren is far above the childless man.\"[22] The greatest\nmisfortune which could befall an ancient Persian was to be\nchildless.[23] To him who has no child the bridge of Paradise\nshall be barred; the first question the angels there will ask him\nis, whether he has left in this world a substitute for himself,\nand if the answer be \"No\" they will pass by and he will stay at\nthe head of the bridge, full of grief. The primitive meaning of\nthis is plain: the man without a son cannot enter Paradise\nbecause there is nobody to pay him the family worship.[24] Ashi\nVanguhi, a feminine impersonification of piety, and the source of\nall the good and riches that are connected with piety, rejects\nthe offerings of barren people--old men, courtesans, and\nchildren.[25] It is said in the Yasts, \"This is the worst deed\nthat men and tyrants do, namely, when they deprive maids that\nhave been barren for a long time of marrying and bringing forth\nchildren.\"[26] And in the eyes of all good Parsis of the present\nday, as in the time of king Darius and the contemporaries of\nHerodotus, the two greatest merits of a citizen are the begetting\nand rearing of a numerous family, and the fruitful tilling of the\nsoil.[27]\n\n[Footnote 18: Fustel de Coulanges, _La cit\u00e9 antique_, p. 54 _sq._\nHearn, _The Aryan Household_, pp. 69, 71. Mayne, _Treatise on\nHindu Law and Usage_, p. 68 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 19: _Laws of Manu_, ii. 66 _sq._ Monier-Williams,\n_Indian Wisdom_, p. 246. _Cf._ Mayne, _op. cit._ p. 69.]\n\n[Footnote 20: Dubois, _Description of the Character, &c. of the\nPeople of India_, p. 132.]\n\n[Footnote 21: Monier-Williams, _Br[=a]hmanism and Hind[=u]ism_,\np. 243 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 22: _Vend\u00eed\u00e2d_, iv. 47.]\n\n[Footnote 23: Rawlinson, in his translation of Herodotus, i. 262,\nn. 1. _Cf._ Herodotus, i. 133, 136; _D\u00een\u00e2-\u00ee Ma\u00een\u00f4g-\u00ee Khirad_,\nxxxv. 19.]\n\n[Footnote 24: Darmesteter, in _Sacred Books of the East_, iv. 47.\n_Cf._ _Idem_, _Ormazd et Ahriman_, p. 294.]\n\n[Footnote 25: _Yasts_, xvii. 54.]\n\n[Footnote 26: _Ibid._ xvii. 59.]\n\n[Footnote 27: Darmesteter, in _Sacred Books of the East_, iv. p.\nlxii. _Cf._ Ploss-Bartels, _Das Weib_, i. 173.]\n\n{403} The ancient Greeks regarded marriage as a matter both of\npublic and private importance.[28] In various places criminal\nproceedings might be taken against celibates.[29] Plato remarks\nthat every individual is bound to provide for a continuance of\nrepresentatives to succeed himself as ministers of the\nDivinity;[30] and Isaeus says, \"All those who think their end\napproaching look forward with a prudent care that their houses\nmay not become desolate, but that there may be some person to\nattend to their funeral rites and to perform the legal ceremonies\nat their tombs.\"[31] So also the conviction that the founding of\na house and the begetting of children constituted a moral\nnecessity and a public duty had a deep hold of the Roman mind in\nearly times.[32] Cicero's treatise 'De Legibus'--which generally\nreproduces in a philosophical form the ancient laws of\nRome--contains a law according to which the Censors had to impose\na tax upon unmarried men.[33] But in later periods, when sexual\nmorality reached a very low ebb in Rome, celibacy--as to which\ngrave complaints were made as early as 520 B.C.--naturally\nincreased in proportion, especially among the upper classes.\nAmong these marriage came to be regarded as a burden which people\ntook upon themselves at the best in the public interest. Indeed,\nhow it fared with marriage and the rearing of children is shown\nby the Gracchan agrarian laws, which first placed a premium\nthereon;[34] and later the Lex Julia et Papia Poppaea imposed\nvarious penalties on those who lived in a state of celibacy after\na certain age,[35] though with little or no result.[36]\n\n[Footnote 28: M\u00fcller, _History and Antiquities of the Doric\nRace_, ii. 300 _sq._ Fustel de Coulanges, _op. cit._ p. 55.\nHearn, _op. cit._ p. 72. D\u00f6llinger, _The Gentile and the Jew_,\nii. 234 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 29: Pollux, _Onomasticum_, iii. 48.]\n\n[Footnote 30: Plato, _Leges_, vi. 773.]\n\n[Footnote 31: Isaeus, _Oratio de Apollodori hereditate_, 30, p.\n66. Rohde observes (_Psyche_, p. 228), however, that such a\nbelief did not exist in the Homeric age, when the departed souls\nin Hades were supposed to be in no way dependent upon the survivors.]\n\n[Footnote 32: Mommsen, _History of Rome_, i. 74.]\n\n[Footnote 33: Cicero, _De legibus_, iii. 3. Fustel de Coulanges,\n_op. cit._ p. 55.]\n\n[Footnote 34: Mommsen, _op. cit._ iii. 121; iv. 186 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 35: Rossbach, _R\u00f6mische Ehe_, p. 418.]\n\n[Footnote 36: Mackenzie, _Studies in Roman Law_, p. 104.]\n\nCelibacy is thus disapproved of for various reasons. It {404}\nappears unnatural. It is taken as an indication of licentious\nhabits. Where ancestors are worshipped after their death it\ninspires religious horror: the man who leaves himself without\noffspring shows reckless indifference to the religion of his\npeople, to his own fate after death, and to the duties he owes\nthe dead, whose spirits depend upon the offerings of their\ndescendants for their comfort. The last point of view, as we have\nseen, is particularly prominent among peoples of archaic culture,\nbut it is not unknown at a lower stage of civilisation. Thus the\nEskimo about Behring Strait \"appear to have great dread of dying\nwithout being assured that their shades will be remembered during\nthe festivals, fearing if neglected that they would thereby\nsuffer destitution in the future life\"; hence a pair of childless\nEskimo frequently adopt a child, so that when they die there will\nbe some one left whose duty it will be to make the customary\nfeast and offerings to their shades at the festival of the\ndead.[37] Finally, in communities with a keen public spirit,\nespecially in ambitious states frequently engaged in war,\ncelibacy is regarded as a wrong committed against the State.\n\n[Footnote 37: Nelson, 'Eskimo about Bering Strait,' in _Ann. Rep.\nBur. Ethn._ xviii. 290.]\n\nModern civilisation looks upon celibacy in a different light. The\nreligious motive for marriage has ceased to exist, the lot of the\ndead being no longer supposed to depend upon the devotion of the\nliving. It is said, in a general way, that marriage is a duty to\nthe nation or the race, but this argument is hardly applied to\nindividual cases. According to modern ideas the union between man\nand woman is too much a matter of sentiment to be properly\nclassified among civic duties. Nor does the unmarried state\nstrike us as particularly unnatural. The proportion of unmarried\npeople is gradually growing larger and the age at which people\nmarry is rising.[38] The chief causes of this increasing celibacy\nare the difficulty of supporting a family under present\nconditions of life, and the luxurious {405} habits of living in\nthe upper classes of society. Another reason is that the domestic\ncircle does not fill so large a place in life as it did formerly;\nthe married state has in some measure lost its advantage over the\nsingle state, and there are many more pleasures now that can be\nenjoyed as well or even better in celibacy. Moreover, by the\ndiffusion of a finer culture throughout the community, men and\nwomen can less easily find any one whom they are willing to take\nas a partner for life; their requirements are more exacting, they\nhave a livelier sense of the serious character of the marriage\nunion, and they are less willing to contract it from any lower\nmotives.[39]\n\n[Footnote 38: Westermarck, _op. cit._ p. 146.]\n\n[Footnote 39: _Ibid._ p. 147 _sqq._ 'Why is Single Life becoming\nmore General?' in _The Nation_, vi. 190 _sq._]\n\nNay, far from enjoining marriage as a duty incumbent upon all,\nenlightened opinion seems to agree that it is a duty for many\npeople never to marry. In some European countries the marriages\nof persons in receipt of poor-law relief have been legally\nprohibited, and in certain cases the legislators have gone\nfurther still and prohibited all marriages until the contracting\nparties can prove that they possess the means of supporting a\nfamily.[40] The opinion has also been expressed that the State\nought to forbid the unions of persons suffering from certain\nkinds of disease, which in all probability would be transmitted\nto the offspring. People are beginning to feel that it entails a\nheavy responsibility to bring a new being into existence, and\nthat many persons are wholly unfit for such a task.[41] Future\ngenerations will probably with a kind of horror look back at a\nperiod when the most important, and in its consequences the most\nfar-reaching, function which has fallen to the lot of man was\nentirely left to individual caprice and lust.\n\n[Footnote 40: Lecky, _Democracy and Liberty_, ii. 181.]\n\n[Footnote 41: See Mr. Galton's papers on \"Eugenics\" and the\ndiscussions of the subject in _Sociological Papers_, vols. i.\nand ii.]\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nSide by side with the opinion that marriage is a duty for all\nordinary men and women we find among many peoples {406} the\nnotion that persons whose function it is to perform religious or\nmagical rites must be celibates.[42] The Thlinkets believe that\nif a shaman does not observe continuous chastity his own guardian\nspirits will kill him.[43] In Patagonia the male wizards were not\nallowed to marry.[44] In some tribes of the Guaranies of Paraguay\n\"the female Payes were bound to chastity, or they no longer\nobtained credit.\"[45] Celibacy was compulsory on the priests of\nthe Chibchas in Bogota.[46] The Tohil priests in Guatemala were\nvowed to perpetual continence.[47] In Ichcatlan the high-priest\nwas obliged to live constantly within the temple, and to abstain\nfrom commerce with any woman whatsoever; and if he failed in this\nduty he was cut in pieces, and the bloody limbs were given as a\nwarning to his successor.[48] Of the women who held positions in\nthe temples of ancient Mexico we are told that their chastity was\nmost zealously guarded; during the performance of their duties\nthey were required to keep at a proper distance from the male\nassistants, at whom they did not even dare to glance. The\npunishment to be inflicted upon those who violated their vow of\nchastity was death; whilst, if their trespass remained entirely\nsecret, they endeavoured to appease the anger of the gods by\nfasting and austerity of life, dreading that in punishment of\ntheir crime their flesh would rot.[49] In Yucatan there was,\nconnected with the worship of the sun, an order of vestals the\nmembers of which generally enrolled themselves for a certain\ntime, but were afterwards allowed to leave and enter the married\nstate. Some of them, however, remained for ever in the service of\nthe temple and were apotheosised. Their duty was to attend to the\nsacred fire, and to keep strictly chaste, {407} those who broke\ntheir vows being shot to death with arrows.[50] In Peru there\nwere likewise virgins dedicated to the sun, who lived in\nperpetual seclusion to the end of their lives, who preserved\ntheir virginity and were forbidden to converse or have sexual\nintercourse with or to see any man, or even any woman who was not\none of themselves.[51] And besides the virgins who thus professed\nperpetual virginity in the monasteries, there were other women,\nof the blood royal, who led the same life in their own houses,\nhaving taken a vow of continence. These women \"were held in great\nveneration for their chastity and purity, and, as a mark of\nworship and respect, they were called _Ocllo_, which was a name\nheld sacred in their idolatry\"; but if they lost their virtue,\nthey were burnt alive or cast into \"the lake of lions.\"[52]\n\n[Footnote 42: Some instances of this are stated by Landtman,\n_Origin of Priesthood_, p. 156 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 43: Veniaminof, quoted by Landtman, _op. cit._ p. 156.]\n\n[Footnote 44: Falkner, _Description of Patagonia_, p. 117.]\n\n[Footnote 45: Southey, _History of Brazil_, ii. 371.]\n\n[Footnote 46: Simon, quoted by Dorman, _Origin of Primitive\nSuperstitions_, p. 384.]\n\n[Footnote 47: Bancroft, _op. cit._ iii. 489.]\n\n[Footnote 48: Clavigero, _History of Mexico_, i. 274.]\n\n[Footnote 49: _Ibid._ i. 275 _sq._ Torquemada, _Monarchia\nIndiana_, ii. 188 _sqq._ Bancroft, _op. cit._ iii. 435 _sq._\n_Cf._ Acosta, _History of the Indies_, ii. 333 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 50: Bancroft, _op. cit._ iii. 473. Lopez Cogolludo,\n_Historia de Yucathan_, p. 198.]\n\n[Footnote 51: Garcilasso de la Vega, _op. cit._ i. 291 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 52: _Ibid._ i. 305.]\n\nAmong the Guanches of the Canary Islands there were virgins,\ncalled Magades or Harimagades, who presided over the cult under\nthe direction of the high-priest, and there were other virgins,\nhighly respected, whose function was to pour water over the heads\nof newborn children, and who could abandon their office and marry\nwhenever they pleased.[53] The priestesses of the Tshi- and\nE[(w]e-speaking peoples on the West Coast of Africa are forbidden\nto marry.[54] In a wood near Cape Padron, in Lower Guinea, lives\na priestly king who is allowed neither to leave his house nor to\ntouch a woman.[55]\n\n[Footnote 53: Bory de St. Vincent, _Essais sur les Isles\nFortun\u00e9es_, p. 96 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 54: Ellis, _Tshi-speaking Peoples_, p. 121. _Idem_,\n_E[(w]e-speaking Peoples_, p. 142.]\n\n[Footnote 55: Bastian, _Die deutsche Expedition an der\nLoango-K\u00fcste_, i. 287 _sq._]\n\nIn ancient Persia there were sun priestesses who were obliged to\nrefrain from intercourse with men.[56] The nine priestesses of\nthe oracle of a Gallic deity in Sena were devoted to perpetual\nvirginity.[57] The Romans had their Vestal virgins, whose office,\naccording to tradition, was instituted by Numa. They were\ncompelled to continue {408} unmarried during thirty years, which\ntime they employed in offering sacrifices and performing other\nrites ordained by the law; and if they suffered themselves to be\ndebauched they were delivered up to the most miserable death,\nbeing placed in a subterraneous cell, in their funeral attire,\nwithout any sepulchral column, funeral rites, or other customary\nsolemnities.[58] After the expiration of the term of thirty years\nthey might marry on quitting the ensigns of their priesthood; but\nwe are told that very few did this, as those who did suffered\ncalamities which were regarded as ominous by the rest, and\ninduced them to remain virgins in the temple of the goddess till\ntheir death.[59] In Greece priestesses were not infrequently\nrequired to be virgins, if not for their whole life, at any rate\nfor the duration of their priesthood.[60] Tertullian writes:--\"To\nthe Achaean Juno, at the town Aegium, a virgin is allotted; and\nthe priestesses who rave at Delphi know not marriage. We know\nthat widows minister to the African Ceres; they not only withdraw\nfrom their still living husbands, but they even introduce other\nwives to them in their own room, all contact with males, even as\nfar as the kiss of their sons, being forbidden them. . . . We\nhave heard, too, of continent men, and among others the priests\nof the famous Egyptian bull.\"[61] There were eunuch priests\nconnected with the cults of the Ephesian Artemis,[62] the\nPhrygian Cybele,[63] and the Syrian Astarte.[64]\n\n[Footnote 56: Justin, quoted by Justi, 'Die Weltgeschichte des\nTabari,' in _Das Ausland_, 1875, p. 307.]\n\n[Footnote 57: Pomponius Mela, _De situ orbis_, iii. 6.]\n\n[Footnote 58: Dionysius of Halicarnassus, _Antiquitates Roman\u00e6_,\nii. 64 _sqq._ Plutarch, _Numa_, x. 7 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 59: Dionysius of Halicarnassus, ii. 67.]\n\n[Footnote 60: Strabo, xiv. i. 23. M\u00fcller, _Das sexuelle Leben der\nalten Kulturv\u00f6lker_, p. 44 _sqq._ Bl\u00fcmner, _Home Life of the\nAncient Greeks_, p. 325. G\u00f6tte, _Das Delphische Orakel_, p. 78\n_sq._]\n\n[Footnote 61: Tertullian, _Ad uxorem_, i. 6 (Migne, _Patrologi\u00e6\ncursus_, i. 1284). _Idem_, _De exhortatione castitatis_, 13\n(Migne, ii. 928 _sq._). _Cf._ _Idem_, _De monogamia_, 17 (Migne,\nii. 953).]\n\n[Footnote 62: Strabo, xiv. 1. 23.]\n\n[Footnote 63: Arnobius, _Adversus gentes_, v. 7 (Migne, _op.\ncit._ v. 1095 _sqq._). Farnell, 'Sociological Hypotheses\nconcerning the Position of Women in Ancient Religion,' in _Archiv\nf. Religionswiss._ vii. 78.]\n\n[Footnote 64: Lucian, _De dea Syria_, 15, 27, 50 _sqq._]\n\nAmong the Todas of the Neilgherry Hills the \"dairy man\" or priest\nis bound to a celibate existence;[65] and {409} among the Hindus,\nin spite of the great honour in which marriage is held, celibacy\nhas always commanded respect in instances of extraordinary\nsanctity.[66] Those of the Sanny[=a]sis who are known to lead\ntheir lives in perfect celibacy receive on that account marks of\ndistinguished honour and respect.[67] Already the time-honoured\nIndian institution of the four [=A]['s]ramas contained the germ\nof monastic celibacy, the Brahmac[=a]rin, or student, being\nobliged to observe absolute chastity during the whole course of\nhis study.[68] The idea was further developed in Jainism and\nBuddhism. The Jain monk was to renounce all sexual pleasures,\n\"either with gods, or men, or animals\"; not to give way to\nsensuality; not to discuss topics relating to women; not to\ncontemplate the forms of women.[69] Buddhism regards sensuality\nas altogether incompatible with wisdom and holiness; it is said\nthat \"a wise man should avoid married life as if it were a\nburning pit of live coals.\"[70] According to the legend, Buddha's\nmother, who was the best and purest of the daughters of men, had\nno other sons, and her conception was due to supernatural\ncauses.[71] One of the fundamental duties of monastic life, by an\ninfringement of which the guilty person brings about his\ninevitable expulsion from Buddha's order, is that \"an ordained\nmonk may not have sexual intercourse, not even with an\nanimal.\"[72] In Tibet some sects of the Lamas are allowed to\nmarry, but those who do not are considered more holy; and in\nevery sect the nuns must take a vow of absolute continence.[73]\nThe Buddhist priests of Ceylon are totally debarred from\nwomen.[74] Chinese law enjoins celibacy on all priests, Buddhist\nor Taouist.[75] And among the immortals of {410} Taouism there\nare some women also, who have led an extraordinarily ascetic\nlife.[76]\n\n[Footnote 65: Thurston, 'Anthropology of the Todas and Kotas,' in\nthe Madras Government Museum's _Bulletin_, i. 169, 170, 193.\nRivers, _Todas_, pp. 80, 99, 236.]\n\n[Footnote 66: Monier-Williams, _Buddhism_, p. 88.]\n\n[Footnote 67: Dubois, _op. cit._ p. 133. _Cf._ Monier-Williams,\n_Br[=a]hmanism and Hind[=u]ism_, p. 261.]\n\n[Footnote 68: Kern, _Manual of Indian Buddhism_, p. 73.]\n\n[Footnote 69: Hopkins, _Religions of India_, p. 294.]\n\n[Footnote 70: Dhammika-Sutta, 21, quoted by Monier-Williams,\n_Buddhism_, p. 88.]\n\n[Footnote 71: Rhys Davids, _Hibbert Lectures on Buddhism_, p. 148.]\n\n[Footnote 72: Oldenberg, _Buddha_, p. 350 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 73: Wilson, _Abode of Snow_, p. 213.]\n\n[Footnote 74: Percival, _Account of the Island of Ceylon_, p. 202.]\n\n[Footnote 75: _Ta Tsing Leu Lee_, sec. cxiv. p. 118. Medhurst,\n'Marriage in China,' in _Trans. Roy. Asiatic Soc. China Branch_,\niv. 18. Davis, _China_, ii. 53.]\n\n[Footnote 76: R\u00e9ville, _La Religion Chinoise_, p. 451 _sq._]\n\nA small class of Hebrews held the idea that marriage is impure.\nThe Essenes, says Josephus, \"reject pleasure as an evil, but\nesteem continence and the conquest over our passions to be\nvirtue. They neglect wedlock.\"[77] This doctrine exercised no\ninfluence on Judaism, but probably much upon Christianity. St.\nPaul considered celibacy to be preferable to marriage. \"He that\ngiveth her (his virgin) in marriage doeth well; but he that\ngiveth her not in marriage doeth better.\"[78] \"It is good for a\nman not to touch a woman. Nevertheless, to avoid fornication, let\neach man have his own wife, and let each woman have her own\nhusband.\"[79] If the unmarried and widows cannot contain let them\nmarry, \"for it is better to marry than to burn.\"[80] These and\nother passages[81] in the New Testament inspired a general\nenthusiasm for virginity. Commenting on the words of the Apostle,\nTertullian points out that what is better is not necessarily\ngood. It is better to lose one eye than two, but neither is good;\nso also, though it is better to marry than to burn, it is far\nbetter neither to marry nor to burn.[82] Marriage \"consists of\nthat which is the essence of fornication\";[83] whereas continence\n\"is a means whereby a man will traffic in a mighty substance of\nsanctity.\"[84] The body which our Lord wore and in which He\ncarried on the conflict of life in this world He put on from a\nholy virgin; and John the Baptist, Paul, and all the others\n\"whose names are in the book of life\"[85] cherished and loved\nvirginity.[86] Virginity works miracles: Mary, the sister of\nMoses, leading the female band, passed on {411} foot over the\nstraits of the sea, and by the same grace Thecla was reverenced\neven by lions, so that the unfed beasts, lying at the feet of\ntheir prey, underwent a holy fast, neither with wanton look nor\nsharp claw venturing to harm the virgin.[87] Virginity is like a\nspring flower, always softly exhaling immortality from its white\npetals.[88] The Lord himself opens the kingdoms of the heavens to\neunuchs.[89] If Adam had preserved his obedience to the Creator\nhe would have lived for ever in a state of virgin purity, and\nsome harmless mode of vegetation would have peopled paradise with\na race of innocent and immortal beings.[90] It is true that,\nthough virginity is the shortest way to the camp of the faithful,\nthe way of matrimony also arrives there, by a longer circuit.[91]\nTertullian himself opposed the Marcionites, who prohibited\nmarriage among themselves and compelled those who were married to\nseparate before they were received by baptism into the\ncommunity.[92] And in the earlier part of the fourth century the\nCouncil of Gangra expressly condemned anyone who maintained that\nmarriage prevented a Christian from entering the kingdom of\nGod.[93] But, at the end of the same century, a council also\nexcommunicated the monk Jovinian because he denied that virginity\nwas more meritorious than marriage.[94] The use of marriage was\npermitted to man only as a necessary expedient for the\ncontinuance of the human species, and as a restraint, {412}\nhowever imperfect, on the natural licentiousness of desire.[95]\nThe procreation of children is the measure of a Christian's\nindulgence in appetite, just as the husbandman throwing the seed\ninto the ground awaits the harvest, not sowing more upon it.[96]\n\n[Footnote 77: Josephus, _De bello Judaico_, ii. 8. 2. See also\nSolinus, _Collectanea rerum memorabilium_, xxxv. 9 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 78: _1 Corinthians_, vii. 38.]\n\n[Footnote 79: _Ibid._ vii. 1 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 80: _Ibid._ vii. 9.]\n\n[Footnote 81: _St. Matthew_, xix. 12. _Revelation_, xiv. 4; &c.]\n\n[Footnote 82: Tertullian, _Ad uxorem_, i. 3 (Migne, _op. cit._ i.\n1278 _sq._). _Idem_, _De monogamia_, 3 (Migne, ii. 932 _sq._).]\n\n[Footnote 83: _Idem_, _De exhortatione castitatis_, 9 (Migne,\n_op. cit._ ii. 925).]\n\n[Footnote 84: _Idem_, _De exhortatione castitatis_, 10 (Migne,\n_op. cit._ ii. 925).]\n\n[Footnote 85: _Philippians_, iv. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 86: St. Clement of Rome, _Epistola I. ad virgines_, 6\n(Migne, _op. cit._ Ser. Gr\u00e6ca, i. 392).]\n\n[Footnote 87: St. Ambrose, _Epistola LXIII._ 34 (Migne, _op.\ncit._ xvi. 1198 _sq._).]\n\n[Footnote 88: Methodius, _Convivium decem virginum_, vii. 1\n(Migne, _op. cit._ Ser. Gr\u00e6ca, xviii. 125).]\n\n[Footnote 89: Tertullian, _De monogamia_, 3 (Migne, _op. cit._\nii. 932).]\n\n[Footnote 90: This opinion was held by Gregory of Nyssa and, in a\nlater time, by John of Damascus. It was opposed by Thomas\nAquinas, who maintained that the human race was from the\nbeginning propagated by means of sexual intercourse, but that\nsuch intercourse was originally free from all carnal desire (von\nEicken, _Geschichte der mittelalterlichen Weltanschauung_, p. 437\n_sq._; see also Gibbon, _History of the Decline and Fall of the\nRoman Empire_, ii. 186).]\n\n[Footnote 91: St. Ambrose, _Epistola LXIII._ 40 (Migne, _op.\ncit._ xvi. 1200).]\n\n[Footnote 92: Tertullian, _Adversus Marcionem_, i. 1, 29; iv. 11;\n&c. (Migne, _op. cit._ ii. 247, 280 _sqq._, 382). _Idem_, _De\nmonogamia_, 1, 15 (Migne, ii. 931, 950). _Cf._ Irenaeus, _Contra\nH\u00e6reses_, i. 28. 1 (Migne, _op. cit._ Ser. Gr\u00e6ca, vii. 690\n_sq._); Clement of Alexandria, _Stromata_, iii. 3 (Migne, _op.\ncit._ Ser. Gr\u00e6ca, viii. 1113 _sqq._).]\n\n[Footnote 93: _Concilium Gangrense_, can. 1 (Labbe-Mansi,\n_Sacrorum Conciliorum collectio_, ii. 1106).]\n\n[Footnote 94: _Concilium Mediolanense_, A.D. 390 (Labbe-Mansi,\n_op. cit._ iii. 689 _sq._).]\n\n[Footnote 95: St. Justin, _Apologia I. pro Christianis_, 29\n(Migne, _op. cit._ Ser. Gr\u00e6ca, vi. 373). Clement of Alexandria,\n_Stromata_, ii. 23 (Migne, _op. cit._ Ser. Gr\u00e6ca, viii. 1089).\nGibbon, _op. cit._ ii. 186.]\n\n[Footnote 96: Athenagoras, _Legatio pro Christianis_, 33 (Migne,\n_op. cit._ Ser. Gr\u00e6ca, vi. 966).]\n\nThese opinions led by degrees to the obligatory celibacy of the\nsecular and regular clergy. The conviction that a second marriage\nof a priest, or the marriage of a priest with a widow, is\nunlawful, seems to have existed from the earliest period of the\nChurch;[97] and as early as the beginning of the fourth century a\nsynod held in Elvira in Spain insisted on the absolute continence\nof the higher ecclesiastics.[98] The celibacy of the clergy in\ngeneral was prescribed by Gregory VII., who \"looked with\nabhorrence on the contamination of the holy sacerdotal character,\neven in its lowest degree, by any sexual connection.\" But in many\ncountries this prescription was so strenuously resisted, that it\ncould not be carried through till late in the thirteenth century.[99]\n\n[Footnote 97: Lea, _Sacerdotal Celibacy in the Christian Church_,\np. 37. Lecky, _History of European Morals_, ii. 328 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 98: _Concilium Eliberitanum_, A.D. 305, ch. 33\n(Labbe-Mansi, _op. cit._ ii. 11):--\"Placuit in totum prohiberi\nepiscopis, presbyteris, et diaconibus, vel omnibus clericis\npositis in ministerio, abstinere se a conjugibus suis, et non\ngenerare filios: quicumque vero fecerit, ab honore clericatus\nexterminetur.\"]\n\n[Footnote 99: Gieseler, _Text-Book of Ecclesiastical History_,\nii. 275. Milman, _History of Latin Christianity_, ii. 150.]\n\nThe practice of religious celibacy may be traced to several\nsources. In many cases the priestess is obviously regarded as\nmarried to the god whom she is serving, and is therefore\nforbidden to marry anybody else. In ancient Peru the Sun was the\nhusband of the virgins dedicated to him.[100] They were obliged\nto be of the same blood as their consort, that is to say,\ndaughters of the Incas. \"For though they imagined that the Sun\nhad children, they considered that they ought not to be bastards,\nwith mixed divine and human blood. So the {413} virgins were of\nnecessity legitimate and of the blood royal, which was the same\nas being of the family of the Sun.\"[101] And the crime of\nviolating the virgins dedicated to the Sun was the same and\npunished in the same severe manner as the crime of violating the\nwomen of the Inca.[102] Concerning the priestesses of the\nTshi-speaking peoples of the Gold Coast, Major Ellis remarks that\nthe reason for their celibacy appears to be that \"a priestess\nbelongs to the god she serves, and therefore cannot become the\nproperty of a man, as would be the case if she married one.\"[103]\nSo also the E[(w]e-speaking peoples of the Slave Coast regard the\nwomen dedicated to a god as his wives.[104] In the great temple\nof Jupiter Belus, we are told, a single woman used to sleep, whom\nthe god had chosen for himself out of all the women of the land;\nand it was believed that he came down in person to sleep with\nher. \"This,\" Herodotus says, \"is like the story told by the\nEgyptians of what takes place in their city of Thebes, where a\nwoman always passes the night in the temple of the Theban\nJupiter. In each case the woman is said to be debarred all\nintercourse with men.\"[105] In the Egyptian texts there are\nfrequent references to \"the divine consort,\" _neter [h.]emt_, a\nposition which was generally occupied by the ruling queen, and\nthe king was believed to be the offspring of such a union.[106]\nAs Plutarch states, the Egyptians thought it quite possible for a\nwoman to be impregnated by the approach of some divine spirit,\nthough they denied that a man could have corporeal intercourse\nwith a goddess.[107] Nor was the idea of a nuptial relation\nbetween a woman and the deity foreign to the early Christians.\nSt. Cyprian speaks of women who had no husband and lord but\nChrist, with whom they lived in a spiritual matrimony--who had\n\"dedicated themselves to Christ, and, retiring from carnal {414}\nlust, vowed themselves to God in flesh and spirit.\"[108] In the\nfollowing words he condemns the cohabitation of such virgins with\nunmarried ecclesiastics, under the pretence of a purely spiritual\nconnection:--\"If a husband come and see his wife lying with\nanother man, is he not indignant and maddened, and does he not in\nthe violence of his jealousy perhaps even seize the sword? What?\nHow indignant and angered then must Christ our Lord and Judge be,\nwhen He sees a virgin, dedicated to Himself, and consecrated to\nHis holiness, lying with a man! and what punishments does He\nthreaten against such impure connections. . . . She who has been\nguilty of this crime is an adulteress, not against a husband, but\nChrist.\"[109] According to the gospel of Pseudo-Matthew, the\nVirgin Mary had in a similar manner dedicated herself as a virgin\nto God.[110] The idea that the deity is jealous of the chastity\nof his or her servants may also perhaps be at the bottom of the\nGreek custom according to which the hierophant and the other\npriests of Demeter were restrained from conjugal intercourse and\nwashed their bodies with hemlock-juice in order to kill their\npassions,[111] as also of the rule which required the priests of\ncertain goddesses to be eunuchs.[112]\n\n[Footnote 100: Garcilasso de la Vega, _op. cit._ i. 297.]\n\n[Footnote 101: _Ibid._ i. 292.]\n\n[Footnote 102: _Ibid._ i. 300.]\n\n[Footnote 103: Ellis, _Tshi-speaking Peoples_, p. 121.]\n\n[Footnote 104: _Idem_, _E[(w]e-speaking Peoples_, pp. 140, 142.]\n\n[Footnote 105: Herodotus, i. 181 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 106: Wiedemann, _Herodots zweites Buch_, p. 268. _Cf._\nErman, _Life in Ancient Egypt_, p. 295 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 107: Plutarch, _Numa_, iv. 5. _Idem_, _Symposiaca\nproblemata_, viii. 1. 6 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 108: St. Cyprian, _De habitu virginum_, 4, 22 (Migne,\n_op. cit._ iv. 443, 462). _Cf._ Methodius, _Convivium decent\nvirginum_, vii. 1 (Migne, _op. cit._ Ser. Gr\u00e6ca, xviii. 125).]\n\n[Footnote 109: St. Cyprian, _Epistola LXII., ad Pomponium de\nvirginibus_, 3 _sq._ (Migne, _op. cit._ iv. 368 _sqq._). See also\nNeander, _General History of the Christian Religion and Church_,\ni. 378. The Council of Elvira decreed that such fallen virgins,\nif they refused to return back to their former condition, should\nbe denied communion even at the moment of death (_Concilium\nEliberitanum_, A.D. 305, ch. 13 [Labbe-Mansi, _op. cit._ ii. 8]).]\n\n[Footnote 110: _Gospel of Pseudo-Matthew_, 8 (_Ante-Nicene\nChristian Library_, xvi. 25). See also _Gospel of the Nativity of\nMary_, 7 (_ibid._ xvi. 57 _sq._).]\n\n[Footnote 111: Wachsmuth, _Hellenische Alterthumskunde_, ii. 560.]\n\n[Footnote 112: _Cf._ Lactantius, _Divin\u00e6 Institutiones_, i. 17\n(Migne, _op. cit._ vi. 206):--\"Deum mater et amavit formosum\nadolescentem, et eumdem cum pellice deprehensum exsectis\nvirilibus semivirum reddidit; et ideo nunc sacra ejus a Gallis\nsacerdotibus celebrantur.\"]\n\nReligious celibacy is further connected with the idea that sexual\nintercourse is defiling. In Efate, of the New Hebrides, it is\nregarded as something unclean.[113] The Tahitians believed that\nif a man refrained from all connections with women some months\nbefore death, he passed {415} immediately into his eternal\nmansion without any purification.[114] Herodotus writes:--\"As\noften as a Babylonian has had intercourse with his wife, he sits\ndown before a censer of burning incense, and the woman sits\nopposite to him. At dawn of day they wash; for till they are\nwashed they will not touch any of their common vessels. This\npractice is also observed by the Arabs.\"[115] Among the Hebrews\nboth the man and woman had to bathe themselves in water, and were\n\"unclean until the even.\"[116] The idea that sexual intercourse\nis unclean implies that some degree of supernatural danger is\nconnected with it;[117] and, as Mr. Crawley has pointed out, the\nnotion of danger may develop into that of sinfulness.[118] Where\nwoman is regarded as an unclean being[119] it is obvious that\nintercourse with her should be considered polluting, but this is\nnot a sufficient explanation of the idea of sexual uncleanness. A\npolluting effect is ascribed to any discharge of sexual\nmatter[120]--originally no doubt on account of its mysterious\npropensities and the veil of mystery which surrounds the whole\nsexual nature of man.\n\n[Footnote 113: Macdonald, _Oceania_, p. 181.]\n\n[Footnote 114: Cook, _Voyage to the Pacific Ocean_, ii. 164.]\n\n[Footnote 115: Herodotus, i. 198.]\n\n[Footnote 116: _Leviticus_, xv. 18.]\n\n[Footnote 117: The danger attributed to sexual intercourse has\nbeen much emphasised by Mr. Crawley in _The Mystic Rose_. See\nalso Westermarck, _Marriage Ceremonies in Morocco_.]\n\n[Footnote 118: Crawley, _op. cit._ p. 214.]\n\n[Footnote 119: See _supra_, i. 663 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 120: Gregory III., _Judicia congrua p[oe]nitentibus_,\nch. 24 (Labbe-Mansi, _op. cit._ xii. 293):--\"In somno peccans, si\nex cogitatione pollutus, viginti duos psalmos cantet: si in somno\npeccans sine cogitatione, duodecim psalmos cantet.\"\n_P[oe]nitentiale Pseudo-Theodori_, xxviii. 25 (Wasserschleben,\n_Bussordnungen der abendl\u00e4ndischen Kirche_, p. 600):--\"Qui in\nsomno, non voluntate, pollutus sit, surgat, cantetque vii.\npsalmos p[oe]nitentiales.\" _Cf._ _ibid._ xxviii. 6, 33\n(Wasserschleben, p. 559 _sq._).]\n\nThe idea of sexual defilement is particularly conspicuous in\nconnection with religious observances. It is a common rule that\nhe who performs a sacred act or enters a holy place must be\nceremonially clean,[121] and no kind of uncleanness is to be\navoided more carefully than sexual pollution. Among the\nChippewyans, \"if a chief is anxious to know the disposition of\nhis people towards him, or if he wishes to settle any difference\nbetween them, he announces his intention of opening his\nmedicine-bag and smoking in his {416} sacred stem. . . . No one\ncan avoid attending on these occasions; but a person may attend\nand be excused from assisting at the ceremonies, by acknowledging\nthat he has not undergone the necessary purification. The having\ncohabited with his wife, or any other woman, within twenty-four\nhours preceding the ceremony, renders him unclean, and,\nconsequently, disqualifies him from performing any part of\nit.\"[122] Herodotus tells us that the Egyptians, like the Greeks,\n\"made it a point of religion to have no converse with women in\nthe sacred places, and not to enter them without washing, after\nsuch converse.\"[123] This statement is corroborated by a passage\nin the 'Book of the Dead.'[124] In Greece[125] and India[126]\nthose who took part in certain religious festivals were obliged\nto be continent for some time previously. Before entering the\nsanctuary of M\u00ean Tyrannos, whose worship was extended over the\nwhole of Asia Minor, the worshipper had to abstain from garlic,\npork, and women, and had to wash his head.[127] Among the Hebrews\nit was a duty incumbent upon all to be ritually clean before\nentering the temple--to be free from sexual defilement,[128]\nleprosy,[129] and the pollution produced by the association with\ncorpses of human beings, of all animals not permitted for food,\nand of those permitted animals which had died a natural death or\nbeen killed by wild beasts;[130] and eating of the consecrated\nbread was interdicted to persons who had not been continent for\nsome time previously.[131] A Muhammedan would remove any defiled\ngarment before he commences his prayer, or otherwise abstain from\npraying altogether; he would not dare to approach the sanctuary\nof a saint in a state of sexual uncleanness; and sexual\nintercourse is forbidden for those who make the pilgrimage to\nMecca.[132] {417} The Christians prescribed strict continence as\na preparation for baptism[133] and the partaking of the\nEucharist.[134] They further enjoined that no married persons\nshould participate in any of the great festivals of the Church if\nthe night before they had lain together;[135] and in the 'Vision'\nof Alberic, dating from the twelfth century, a special place of\ntorture, consisting of a lake of mingled lead, pitch, and resin,\nis represented as existing in hell for the punishment of married\npeople who have had intercourse on Sundays, church festivals, or\nfast-days.[136] They abstained from the marriage-bed at other\ntimes also, when they were disposed more freely to give\nthemselves to prayer.[137] Newly married couples were admonished\nto practise continence during the wedding day and the night\nfollowing, out of reverence for the sacrament; and in some\ninstances their abstinence lasted even for two or three days.[138]\n\n[Footnote 121: See _supra_, ii. 294, 295, 352 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 122: Mackenzie, _Voyages to the Frozen and Pacific\nOceans_, p. cii. _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 123: Herodotus, ii. 64.]\n\n[Footnote 124: Wiedemann, _Herodots zweites Buch_, p. 269 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 125: Wachsmuth, _op. cit._ ii. 560.]\n\n[Footnote 126: Oldenberg, _Die Religion des Veda_, p. 411.]\n\n[Footnote 127: Foucart, _Des associations religieuses chez les\nGrecs_, pp. 119, 123 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 128: _Leviticus_, chs. xii., xv.]\n\n[Footnote 129: _Ibid._ ch. xiii. _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 130: _Ibid._ xi. 24 _sqq._; xvii. 15. _Numbers_, xix.\n14 _sqq._ Montefiore, _Hibbert Lectures on the Religion of the\nAncient Hebrews_, p. 476.]\n\n[Footnote 131: _1 Samuel_, xxi. 4 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 132: _Koran_, ii. 193.]\n\n[Footnote 133: St. Augustine, _De fide et operibus_, vi. 8\n(Migne, _op. cit._ xl. 202).]\n\n[Footnote 134: St. Jerome, _Epistola XLVIII._ 15 (Migne, _op.\ncit._ xxii. 505 _sq._).]\n\n[Footnote 135: Lecky, _History of European Morals_, ii. 324. St.\nGregory the Great, _Dialogi_, i. 10 (Migne, _op. cit._ lxxvii.\n200 _sq._).]\n\n[Footnote 136: Albericus, _Visio_, ch. 5, p. 17. Delepierre,\n_L'enfer d\u00e9crit par ceux qui l'ont vu_, p. 57 _sq._ On this\nsubject see also M\u00fcller, _Das sexuelle Leben der christlichen\nKulturv\u00f6lker_, pp. 52, 53, 120 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 137: St. Jerome, _Epistola XLVIII._ 15 (Migne, _op.\ncit._ xxii. 505). Fleury, _Manners and Behaviour of the\nChristians_, p. 75.]\n\n[Footnote 138: Muratori, _Dissertazioni sopra le antichit\u00e0\nitaliane_, 20, vol. i. 347.]\n\nHoliness is a delicate quality which is easily destroyed if\nanything polluting is brought into contact with the holy object\nor person. The Moors believe that if anybody who is sexually\nunclean enters a granary the grain will lose its _baraka_, or\nholiness. A similar idea probably underlies the belief prevalent\namong various peoples that incontinence, and especially illicit\nlove, injures the harvest.[139] In Efate, _namim_, or\nuncleanness, supposed to be contracted in various emergencies,\nwas especially avoided {418} by the sacred men, because it was\nbelieved to destroy their sacredness.[140] The priestly taboos,\nof which Sir J. G. Frazer has given such an exhaustive account in\n'The Golden Bough,' have undoubtedly in a large measure a similar\norigin. Nay, it seems that pollution not only deprives the holy\nperson of his holiness, but is also supposed to injure him in a\nmore positive way. When the supreme pontiff in the kingdom of\nCongo left his residence to visit other places within his\njurisdiction, all married people had to observe strict continence\nthe whole time he was out, as it was believed that any act of\nincontinence would prove fatal to him.[141] In self-defence,\ntherefore, gods and holy persons try to prevent polluted\nindividuals from approaching them, and their worshippers are\nnaturally anxious to do the same. But apart from the resentment\nwhich the sacred being would feel against the defiler, it appears\nthat holiness is supposed to react quite mechanically against\npollution, to the destruction or discomfort of the polluted\nindividual. All Moors are convinced that anyone who in a state of\nsexual uncleanness dared to visit a saint's tomb would be struck\nby the saint; but the Arabs of Dukk\u00e2la, in Southern Morocco, also\nbelieve that if an unclean person rides a horse some accident\nwill happen to him on account of the _baraka_ with which the\nhorse is endowed. It should further be noticed that, owing to the\ninjurious effect of pollution upon holiness, an act generally\nregarded as sacred would, if performed by an unclean individual,\nlack that magic efficacy which otherwise would be ascribed to it.\nMuhammed represented ceremonial cleanliness as \"one-half of the\nfaith and the key of prayer.\"[142] The Moors say that a scribe is\nafraid of evil spirits only when he is sexually unclean, because\nthen his reciting of passages of the Koran--the most powerful\nweapon against such spirits--would be of no avail. The Syrian\nphilosopher Jamblichus {419} speaks of the belief that \"the gods\ndo not hear him who invokes them, if he is impure from venereal\nconnections.\"[143] A similar notion prevailed among the early\nChristians; with reference to a passage in the First Epistle of\nthe Corinthians,[144] Tertullian remarks that the Apostle added\nthe recommendation of a temporary abstinence for the sake of\nadding an efficacy to prayers.[145] To the same class of beliefs\nbelongs the notion that a sacrificial victim should be clean and\nwithout blemish.[146] The Chibchas of Bogota considered that the\nmost valuable sacrifice they could offer was that of a youth who\nhad never had intercourse with a woman.[147]\n\n[Footnote 139: Frazer, _Golden Bough_, ii. 209 _sqq._ This is in\nmy opinion a more natural explanation than the one suggested by\nSir J. G. Frazer, namely, that uncivilised man imagines \"that the\nvigour which he refuses to expend in reproducing his own kind,\nwill form as it were a store of energy whereby other creatures,\nwhether vegetable or animal, will somehow benefit in propagating\ntheir species.\" This theory entirely fails to account for the\nfact that illicit love, by preference, is supposed to mar the\nfertility of the earth and to blight the crops--a belief which is\nin full accordance with my own explanation, in so far as such\nlove is considered particularly polluting.]\n\n[Footnote 140: Macdonald, _Oceania_, p. 181.]\n\n[Footnote 141: Labat, _Relation historique de l'Ethiopie\noccidentale_, i. 259 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 142: Pool, _Studies in Mohammedanism_, p. 27.]\n\n[Footnote 143: Jamblichus, _De mysteriis_, iv. 11.]\n\n[Footnote 144: _1 Corinthians_, vii. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 145: Tertullian, _De exhortatione castitatis_, 10\n(Migne, _op. cit._ ii. 926).]\n\n[Footnote 146: See _supra_, ii. 295 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 147: Simon, quoted by Waitz, _Anthropologie der\nNaturv\u00f6lker_, iv. 363. See _infra_, Additional Notes.]\n\nIf ceremonial cleanliness is required even of the ordinary\nworshipper it is all the more indispensable in the case of a\npriest;[148] and of all kinds of uncleanness none is to be more\ncarefully avoided than sexual pollution. Sometimes admission into\nthe priesthood is to be preceded by a period of continence.[149]\nIn the Marquesas Islands no one could become a priest without\nhaving lived chastely for several years previously.[150] Among\nthe Tshi-speaking peoples of the Gold Coast men and women, in\norder to become members of the priesthood, have to pass through a\nlong novitiate, generally from two to three years, during which\nthey live in retirement and are instructed by the priests in the\nsecrets of the craft; and \"the people believe that, during this\nperiod of retirement and study, the novices must keep their\nbodies pure, and refrain from all commerce with the other\nsex.\"[151] The Huichols of Mexico, again, are of opinion that a\nman who wishes to become a shaman must be faithful to his wife\nfor five years, and that, if he violates this rule, he is sure to\nbe taken ill and will lose the power of healing.[152] In ancient\nMexico the priests, all {420} the time that they were employed in\nthe service of the temple, abstained from all other women but\ntheir wives, and \"even affected so much modesty and reserve, that\nwhen they met a woman they fixed their eyes on the ground that\nthey might not see her. Any incontinence amongst the priests was\nseverely punished. The priest who, at Teohuacan, was convicted of\nhaving violated his chastity, was delivered up by the priests to\nthe people, who at night killed him by the bastinado.\"[153] Among\nthe Kotas of the Neilgherry Hills the priests--who, unlike the\n\"dairymen\" of their Toda neighbours are not celibates--are at the\ngreat festival in honour of K[=a]matar[=a]ya forbidden to live or\nhold intercourse with their wives for fear of pollution, and are\nthen even obliged to cook their meals themselves.[154] It seems\nthat, according to the Anatolian religion, married _hieroi_ had\nto separate from their wives during the period they were serving\nat the temple.[155] The Hebrew priest should avoid all\nunchastity; he was not allowed to marry a harlot, or a profane,\nor a divorced wife,[156] and the high-priest was also forbidden\nto marry a widow.[157] Nay, even in a priest's daughter\nunchastity was punished with excessive severity, because she had\nprofaned her father; she was to be burned.[158]\n\n[Footnote 148: _Cf._ _supra_, ii. 352 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 149: _Cf._ Landtman, _op. cit._ p. 118 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 150: Waitz-Gerland, _Anthropologie der Naturv\u00f6lker_,\nvi. 387.]\n\n[Footnote 151: Ellis, _Tshi-speaking Peoples_, p. 120.]\n\n[Footnote 152: Lumholtz, _Unknown Mexico_, ii. 236.]\n\n[Footnote 153: Clavigero, _op. cit._ i. 274.]\n\n[Footnote 154: Thurston, in the Madras Government Museum's\n_Bulletin_, i. 193.]\n\n[Footnote 155: Ramsay, _Cities and Bishoprics of Phrygia_, i.\n136, 137, 150 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 156: _Leviticus_, xxi. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 157: _Ibid._ xxi. 14.]\n\n[Footnote 158: _Ibid._ xxi. 9.]\n\nCarried further, the idea underlying all these rules and\npractices led to the notions that celibacy is more pleasing to\nGod than marriage,[159] and that it is a religious duty for those\nmembers of the community whose special office is to attend to the\nsacred cult. For a nation like the Jews, whose ambition was to\nlive and to multiply, celibacy could never become an ideal;\nwhereas the Christians, who professed the most perfect\nindifference to all earthly matters, found no difficulty in\nglorifying a state which, however opposed it was to the interests\nof the race and the nation, made men pre-eminently fit to\napproach their god. Indeed, {421} far from being a benefit to the\nkingdom of God by propagating the species, sexual intercourse was\non the contrary detrimental to it by being the great transmitter\nof the sin of our first parents. This argument, however, was of a\ncomparatively late origin. Pelagius himself almost rivalled St.\nAugustine in his praise of virginity, which he considered the\ngreat test of that strength of free-will which he asserted to be\nat most only weakened by the fall of Adam.[160]\n\n[Footnote 159: _Cf._ _supra_, ii. 358.]\n\n[Footnote 160: Milman, _op. cit._ i. 151, 153.]\n\nReligious celibacy is, moreover, enjoined or commended as a means\nof self-mortification supposed to appease an angry god, or with a\nview to raising the spiritual nature of man by suppressing one of\nthe strongest of all sensual appetites. Thus we find in various\nreligions celibacy side by side with other ascetic observances\npractised for similar purposes. Among the early Christians those\nyoung women who took a vow of chastity \"did not look upon\nvirginity as any thing if it were not attended with great\nmortification, with silence, retirement, poverty, labour,\nfastings, watchings, and continual praying. They were not\nesteemed as virgins who would not deny themselves the common\ndiversions of the world, even the most innocent.\"[161] Tertullian\nenumerates virginity, widowhood, and the modest restraint in\nsecret on the marriage-bed among those fragrant offerings\nacceptable to God which the flesh performs to its own especial\nsuffering.[162] Finally, it was argued that marriage prevents a\nperson from serving God perfectly, because it induces him to\noccupy himself too much with worldly things.[163] Though not\ncontrary to the act of charity or the love of God, says Thomas\nAquinas, it is nevertheless an obstacle to it.[164] This was one,\nbut certainly not the only, cause of the obligatory celibacy\nwhich the Christian Church imposed upon her clergy.\n\n[Footnote 161: Fleury, _op. cit._ p. 128 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 162: Tertullian, _De resurrectione carnis_, 8 (Migne,\n_op. cit._ ii. 806).]\n\n[Footnote 163: Vincentius Bellovacensis, _Speculum naturale_,\nxxx. 43. See also von Eicken, _op. cit._ p. 445.]\n\n[Footnote 164: Thomas Aquinas, _Summa theologica_, ii.-ii. 184. 3.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XLII\n\nFREE LOVE--ADULTERY\n\n\nHARDLY less variable than the moral ideas relating to marriage\nare those concerning sexual relations of a non-matrimonial\ncharacter.\n\nAmong many uncivilised peoples both sexes enjoy perfect freedom\nprevious to marriage, and in some cases it is considered almost\ndishonourable for a girl to have no lover.\n\nThe East African Barea and Kun\u00e1ma do not regard it as in the\nleast disreputable for a girl to become pregnant, nor do they\npunish nor censure the seducer.[1] Among the Wanyoro \"it\nconstantly happens that young girls spend the night with their\nlovers, only returning to their father's house in the morning,\nand this is not considered scandalous.**\"[2] The Wadigo regard it\nas disgraceful, or at least as ridiculous, for a girl to enter\ninto marriage as a virgin.[3] Among the Bakongo, \"womanly\nchastity is unknown, and a woman's honour is measured by the\nprice she costs.\"[4] Over nearly the whole of British Central\nAfrica, says Sir H. Johnston, \"before a girl is become a woman\n(that is to say before she is able to conceive) it is a matter of\nabsolute indifference what she does, and scarcely any girl\nremains a virgin after about five years of age.\"[5] Among the\nBaronga \"l'opinion publique se moque des gens continents plus\nqu'elle ne les admire.\"[6] According to Mr. Warner, \"seduction of\nvirgins, and cohabiting with unmarried women and {423} widows,\nare not punishable by Kafir law, neither does any disgrace attach\nto either sex by committing such acts.\"[7] In Madagascar\n\"continence is not supposed to exist in either sex before\nmarriage, . . . and its absence is not regarded as a vice.\"[8]\nAmong the Maoris of New Zealand \"girls were at perfect liberty to\nact as they pleased until married,\" and chastity in single women\nwas held of little account.[9] In the Tonga Islands unmarried\nwomen might bestow their favours upon whomsoever they pleased\nwithout any opprobrium, although it was thought shameful for a\nwoman frequently to change her lover.[10] In the Solomon Islands\n\"female chastity is a virtue that would sound strangely in the\near of the native\"; and in St. Christoval and the adjacent\nislands, \"for two or three years after a girl has become eligible\nfor marriage she distributes her favours amongst all the young\nmen of the village.\"[11] In the Malay Archipelago intercourse\nbetween unmarried people is very commonly considered neither a\ncrime nor a disgrace;[12] and the same is perhaps even more\ngenerally the case among the uncivilised races of India and\nIndo-China.[13] Among the Angami Nagas, for instance, \"girls\nconsider short hair, the symbol of virginity, a disgrace, and are\nanxious to become entitled to wear it long; men are desirous\nbefore marriage to have proof that their wives will not be\nbarren. . . . Chastity begins with marriage.\"[14] The Jakuts see\nnothing immoral in free love, provided only that nobody suffers\nmaterial loss by it.[15] Among the Votyaks it is disgraceful for\na girl to be little sought after by the young men, and it is\nhonourable for her to have children; she then gets a wealthier\nhusband, and a higher price is paid for her to her father.[16]\nThe Kamchadales set no great value on the virginity of their\nbrides.[17] Of the Point Barrow Eskimo Mr. Murdoch writes:--\"As\nto the relations between the sexes there seems to be the most\ncomplete absence of what we consider moral feelings. Promiscuous\nsexual {424} intercourse between married or unmarried people, or\neven among children, appears to be looked upon simply as a matter\nfor amusement. As far as we could learn, unchastity in a girl was\nconsidered nothing against her. The immorality of these people\namong themselves, as we witnessed it, seems too purely animal and\nnatural to be of recent growth or the result of foreign\ninfluence. Moreover, a similar state of affairs has been observed\namong Eskimo elsewhere.\"[18]\n\n[Footnote 1: Munzinger, _Ostafrikanische Studien_, p. 524.]\n\n[Footnote 2: _Emin Pasha in Central Africa_, p. 82. _Cf._ _ibid._\np. 208 (Monbuttu).]\n\n[Footnote 3: Baumann, _Usambara_, p. 152.]\n\n[Footnote 4: Johnston, _British Central Africa_, p. 405.]\n\n[Footnote 5: _Ibid._ p. 409, note.]\n\n[Footnote 6: Junod, _Les Ba-Ronga_, p. 29.]\n\n[Footnote 7: Warner, in Maclean, _Compendium of Kafir Laws_, p. 63.]\n\n[Footnote 8: Ellis, _History of Madagascar_, i. 137 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 9: Taylor, _Te Ika a Maui_, p. 33. Gisborne, _Colony of\nNew Zealand_, p. 27.]\n\n[Footnote 10: Mariner, _Natives of the Tonga Islands_, ii. 174.]\n\n[Footnote 11: Guppy, _Solomon Islands_, p. 43.]\n\n[Footnote 12: Wilken, 'Plechtigheden en gebruiken bij verlovingen\nen huwelijken bij de volken van den Indischen Archipel,' in\n_Bijdragen tot de taal- land- en volkenkunde van Nederlandsch-Indi\u00eb_,\nser. v. vol. iv. 434 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 13: Westermarck, _History of Human Marriage_, p. 71.\nCrooke, _Tribes and Castes of the North-Western Provinces and\nOudh_, i. p. clxxxiv.]\n\n[Footnote 14: Prain, 'Angami Nagas,' in _Revue coloniale\ninternationale_, v. 491 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 15: Sumner, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxxi. 96.]\n\n[Footnote 16: Buch, 'Die Wotj\u00e4ken,' in _Acta Soc. Scientiarum\nFennic\u00e6_, xii. 509.]\n\n[Footnote 17: Georgi, _Russia_, iii. 156.]\n\n[Footnote 18: Murdoch, 'Ethnological Results of the Point Barrow\nExpedition,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ ix. 419 _sq._ See also\nTurner, 'Ethnology of the the Ungava District,' in _Ann. Rep.\nBur. Ethn._ xi. 189 (Koksoagmyut); Parry, _Second Voyage for the\nDiscovery of a North-West Passage_, p. 529 (Eskimo of Igloolik\nand Winter Island).]\n\nYet however commonly chastity is disregarded in the savage world,\nwe must not suppose that such disregard is anything like a\nuniversal characteristic of the lower races. In a previous work I\nhave given a list of numerous savage and barbarous peoples among\nwhom unchastity before marriage is looked upon as a disgrace or a\ncrime for a woman, sometimes punishable with banishment from the\ncommunity or even with death;[19] and it is noteworthy that to\nthis group of peoples belong savages of so low a type as the\nVeddahs of Ceylon,[20] the Igorrotes of Luzon,[21] and certain\nAustralian tribes.[22] I have also called attention to facts\nwhich seem to prove that in several cases the wantonness of\nsavages is largely due to foreign influence. The pioneers of a\n\"higher civilisation\" are very frequently unmarried men who go\nout to make their living in uncivilised lands, and, though\nunwilling to contract regular marriages with native women, they\nhave no objection to corrupting their morals.[23] Moreover, in\nmany tribes the {425} free intercourse which prevails between\nunmarried people is not of a promiscuous nature, and leads\nnecessarily to marriage should the girl prove with child.[24]\nNay, among various uncivilised races not only the girl, but the\nman who seduces her is subject to punishment or censure.\n\n[Footnote 19: Westermarck, _op. cit._ p. 61 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 20: Nevill, 'Vaeddas of Ceylon,' in _Taprobanian_, i. 178.]\n\n[Footnote 21: Meyer, 'Igorrotes von Luzon,' in _Verhandl.\nBerliner Gesellsch. f. Anthrop._ 1883, p. 384 _sq._ Blumentritt,\n_Ethnographie der Philippinen_, p. 27.]\n\n[Footnote 22: Westermarck, _op. cit._ p. 64 _sq._ Holden, in\nTaplin, _Folklore of the South Australian Aborigines_, p. 19.]\n\n[Footnote 23: It is strange to hear from a modern student of\nanthropology, and especially from an Australian writer, that in\nsexual licence the savage has never anything to learn and that\n\"all that the lower fringe of civilised men can do to harm the\nuncivilised is to stoop to the level of the latter instead of\nteaching them a better way\" (Sutherland, _Origin and Growth of\nthe Moral Instinct_, i. 186). Mr. Edward Stephens ('Aborigines of\nAustralia,' in _Jour. & Proceed. Royal Soc. N. S. Wales_, xxiii.\n480) has a very different story to tell with reference to the\ntribes which once inhabited the Adelaide Plains in South Australia\nand whose acquaintance he made more than half a century ago.]\n\n[Footnote 24: Westermarck, _op. cit._ pp. 23, 24, 71.]\n\nAmong the East African Takue a seducer may have to pay the same\nsum as if he had killed the girl, although the fine is generally\nreduced to fifty cows.[25] Among the Beni Amer and Marea he is\nkilled, together with the girl and the child.[26] In Tessaua a\nfine of 100,000 kurdi is imposed on the father of a bastard\nchild.[27] Among the Beni Mzab a man who seduces a girl has to\npay two hundred francs and is banished for four years.[28] Among\nthe Ted\u00e2 he is exposed to the revenge of her father.[29] The\nBaziba look upon illegitimate intercourse between the sexes as\nthe most serious offence, though no action is taken until the\nbirth of a child; \"then the man and woman are bound hand and foot\nand thrown into Lake Victoria.\"[30] Among the Bakoki, whilst the\ngirl was driven from home and remained for ever after an outcast,\nthe man was fined three cows to her father and one to the\nchief.[31] Certain West African savages described by Mr. Winwood\nReade, who banish from the clan a girl guilty of wantonness,\ninflict severe flogging on the seducer.[32] In Dahomey a man who\nseduces a girl is compelled by law to marry her and to pay eighty\ncowries to the parent or master.[33] Among some Kafir tribes the\nfather or guardian of a woman who becomes pregnant can demand a\nfine of one head of cattle from the father of the child;[34]\nwhilst in the Gaika tribe the mere seduction of a virgin incurs\nthe fine of three or four head of cattle.[35] Casalis mentions an\ninteresting custom prevalent among the Basutos, which on the one\nhand illustrates the belief that sexual intercourse in certain\ncircumstances exposes a person to supernatural danger, and on the\nother hand indicates that unchastity in unmarried men is not\nlooked upon with perfect indifference:--Immediately after the\nbirth of a child the fire of the dwelling was kindled afresh.\n\"For this purpose it was necessary that a young man of chaste\nhabits should rub two {426} pieces of wood quickly one against\nanother, until a flame sprung up, pure as himself. It was firmly\nbelieved that a premature death awaited him who should dare to\ntake upon himself this office, after having lost his innocence.\nAs soon, therefore, as a birth was proclaimed in the village, the\nfathers took their sons to undergo the ordeal. Those who felt\nthemselves guilty confessed their crime, and submitted to be\nscourged rather than expose themselves to the consequences of a\nfatal temerity.\"[36] Livingstone, speaking of the good name which\nwas given to him by the Bakwains, observes:--\"No one ever gains\nmuch influence in this country without purity and uprightness.\nThe acts of a stranger are keenly scrutinised by both young and\nold, and seldom is the judgment pronounced, even by the heathen,\nunfair or uncharitable. I have heard women speaking in admiration\nof a white man, because he was pure, and never was guilty of any\nsecret immorality. Had he been, they would have known it, and,\nuntutored heathen though they be, would have despised him in\nconsequence.\"[37]\n\n[Footnote 25: Munzinger, _Ostafrikanische Studien_, p. 208.]\n\n[Footnote 26: _Ibid._ p. 322.]\n\n[Footnote 27: Barth, _Reisen in Nord- und Central-Afrika_, ii. 18.]\n\n[Footnote 28: Chavanne, _Die Sahara_, p. 315.]\n\n[Footnote 29: Nachtigal, _Sahara und Sudan_, i. 449.]\n\n[Footnote 30: Cunningham, _Uganda_, p. 290.]\n\n[Footnote 31: _Ibid._ p. 102.]\n\n[Footnote 32: Reade, _Savage Africa_, p. 261.]\n\n[Footnote 33: Forbes, _Dahomey_, i. 26.]\n\n[Footnote 34: Warner, in Maclean, _op. cit._ p. 64.]\n\n[Footnote 35: Brownlee, _ibid._ p. 112.]\n\n[Footnote 36: Casalis, _Basutos_, p. 267 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 37: Livingstone, _Missionary Travels_, p. 513.]\n\nOf the Australian Maroura tribe, Lower Darling, we are told that\nbefore the advent of the whites \"their laws were strict,\nespecially those regarding young men and young women. It was\nalmost death to a young lad or man who had sexual intercourse\ntill married.\"[38] Among various tribes in Western Victoria\n\"illegitimacy is rare, and is looked upon with such abhorrence\nthat the mother is always severely beaten by her relatives, and\nsometimes put to death and burned. Her child is occasionally\nkilled and burned with her. The father of the child is also\npunished with the greatest severity, and occasionally killed.\"[39]\n\n[Footnote 38: Holden, in Taplin, _Folklore of the South\nAustralian Aborigines_, p. 19.]\n\n[Footnote 39: Dawson, _Australian Aborigines_, p. 28.]\n\nIn Nias the pregnancy of an unmarried girl is punished with\ndeath, inflicted not only upon her but upon the seducer as\nwell.[40] Among the B\u00f3do and Dhim\u00e1ls of India chastity is prized\nin man and woman, married and unmarried.[41] Among the Tunguses\n\"in irregular amours only the men are punished,\" the seducer\nbeing obliged either to purchase the girl at a certain price or,\nif he refuses, to submit to corporal punishment.[42] Among the\nThlinkets, \"if unmarried women prove frail the partner of their\nguilt, if discovered, is bound to make reparation to the parents,\nsoothing their wounded honour with handsome {427} presents.\"[43]\nIn certain North American tribes the seducer is said to be viewed\nwith even more contempt than the girl whom he has dishonoured.[44]\n\n[Footnote 40: Wilken, in _Bijdragen tot de taal- land- en\nvolkenkunde van Nederlandsch-Indi\u00eb_, ser. v. vol. iv. 444.]\n\n[Footnote 41: Hodgson, _Miscellaneous Essays_, i. 123.]\n\n[Footnote 42: Georgi, _op. cit._ iii. 84.]\n\n[Footnote 43: Douglas, quoted by Petroff, _Report on Alaska_,\np. 177.]\n\n[Footnote 44: Westermarck, _op. cit._ p. 66.]\n\nPassing to more advanced races, we find that chastity is regarded\nas a duty for unmarried women, whilst a different standard of\nmorality is generally applied to men. \"Confucianism,\" says Mr.\nGriffis, \"virtually admits two standards of morality, one for\nman, another for woman. . . . Chastity is a female virtue, it is\na part of womanly duty, it has little or no relation to man\npersonally.\"[45] Yet it is held up as an ideal even to men. It is\nsaid that in youth, when the physical powers are not yet settled,\nthe superior man guards against lust.[46] Though licentious in\ntheir habits, the Chinese exalt and dignify chastity as a means\nof bringing the soul and body nearer to the highest\nexcellence;[47] one of their proverbs even maintains that \"of the\nmyriad vices, lust is the worst.\"[48] Chastity for its own sake,\nwhen defended by a woman at the expense of her life, meets with a\nreward at the hands of the Government. \"If a woman\"--so the\nOrdinances run--\"be compelled by her husband to prostitute\nherself for money, and takes her own life in order to preserve\nher chastity, or if an unmarried virgin loses her life in\ndefending herself against violation, an honorary gate shall be\nerected in each case near the door of the paternal dwelling.\"[49]\nAccording to the Chinese Penal Code, \"criminal intercourse by\nmutual consent with an unmarried woman shall be punished with\nseventy blows,\" whilst the punishment for such intercourse with a\nmarried woman is eighty blows.[50]\n\n[Footnote 45: Griffis, _Religions of Japan_, p. 149.]\n\n[Footnote 46: _Lun Y\u00fc_, xvi. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 47: Wells Williams, _Middle Kingdom_, ii. 193.]\n\n[Footnote 48: Smith, _Proverbs of the Chinese_, p. 256.]\n\n[Footnote 49: de Groot, _Religious System of China_, (vol. ii.\nbook) i. 752 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 50: _Ta Tsing Leu Lee_, sec. ccclxvi. p. 404.]\n\nAmong the ancient Hebrews fornication was forbidden to women[51]\nbut not to men. The action of Judah towards the supposed harlot\non the way to Timnath is mentioned {428} as the most natural\nthing in the world,[52] even though the perpetrator was a man of\nwealth and position, a man whom his brethren \"shall praise\" and\nbefore whom his \"father's children shall bow down.\"[53]\nThroughout the Muhammedan world chastity is regarded as an\nessential duty for a woman.[54] In Persia an unmarried girl who\ngave birth to a child would surely be killed.[55] Among the\nFellaheen of Egypt a father or brother in most instances punishes\nan unmarried daughter or sister who has been guilty of\nincontinence by throwing her into the Nile with a stone tied to\nher neck, or cutting her to pieces, and then throwing her remains\ninto the river.[56] Among the Jb\u00e2la and Rif Berbers of Morocco\nshe is also frequently killed. For unmarried men, on the other\nhand, chastity is by Muhammedans at most looked upon as an ideal,\nalmost out of reach. The Caliph Ali said that \"with a man who is\nmodest and chaste nobody should find fault.\"[57] We are told that\nthe Muhammedans of India consider it inconceivable that a Moslem\nshould have illicit intercourse with a free Muhammedan woman;[58]\nbut connections with slave girls are regarded in a different light.\n\n[Footnote 51: _Leviticus_, xix. 29. _Deuteronomy_, xxiii. 18.]\n\n[Footnote 52: _Genesis_, xxxviii. 15 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 53: _Ibid._ xlix. 8.]\n\n[Footnote 54: Burton, _Sindh_, p. 295.]\n\n[Footnote 55: Polak, _Persien_, i. 217.]\n\n[Footnote 56: Lane, _Manners and Customs of the Modern\nEgyptians_, p. 209.]\n\n[Footnote 57: Ameer Ali, _Ethics of Isl\u00e2m_, p. 30.]\n\n[Footnote 58: Lane-Poole, _Studies in a Mosque_, p. 106.]\n\nAmong the Hindus sexual impurity is scarcely considered a sin in\nthe men, but \"in females nothing is held more execrable or\nabominable. The unhappy inhabitants of houses of ill fame are\nlooked upon as the most degraded of the human species.\"[59] In\none of the Pahlavi texts continence is recommended from the point\nof view of prudence:--\"Commit no lustfulness, so that harm and\nregret may not reach thee from thine own actions.\"[60] But in\nZoroastrianism, also, chastity is chiefly a female duty. It is\nwritten in the Avesta, \"Any woman that has given up her body to\ntwo men in one day is sooner to be killed than a wolf, a lion, or\na snake.\"[61]\n\n[Footnote 59: _Calcutta Review_, ii. 23. Dubois, _Description of\nthe Character, &c. of the People of India_, p. 193. _Cf._ _Laws\nof Manu_, ix. 51 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 60: _D\u00een\u00e2-\u00ee Ma\u00een\u00f4g-\u00ee Khirad_, ii. 23 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 61: Darmesteter, in _Sacred Books of the East_, iv.\n206, n. 1.]\n\n{429} Among the ancient Teutons an unmarried woman who belonged\nto an honourable family was severely punished for going wrong,\nand the seducer was exposed to the revenge of her family, or had\nto pay compensation for his deed.[62] The yet un-Romanised\nSaxons, down to the days of St. Boniface, compelled a maiden who\nhad dishonoured her father's house, as well as an adulteress, to\nhang herself, after which her body was burned and her paramour\nhung over the blazing pile; or she was scourged or cut with\nknives by all the women of the village till she was dead.[63]\n\n[Footnote 62: Brunner, _Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte_, ii. 659\n_sqq._ Wilda, _Strafrecht der Germanen_, p. 799 _sqq._ Nordstr\u00f6m,\n_Bidrag till den svenska samh\u00e4lls-f\u00f6rfattningens historia_, ii.\n67. Maurer, _Bekehrung des Norwegischen Stammes_, ii. 154.]\n\n[Footnote 63: Milman, _History of Latin Christianity_, ii. 54.]\n\nIn Greece the chastity of an unmarried girl was anxiously\nguarded.[64] According to Athenian law, the relatives of a maiden\nwho had lost her virtue could with impunity kill the seducer on\nthe spot.[65] Virginity was an object of worship. Chastity was\nthe pre-eminent attribute of sanctity ascribed to Athene and\nArtemis, and the Parthenon, or virgin's temple, was the noblest\nreligious edifice of Athens.[66] It is true that a certain class\nof courtesans occupied a remarkably high position in the social\nlife of Greece, being admired and sought after even by the\nprincipal men. But they did so on account of their extraordinary\nbeauty or their intellectual superiority; to the Greek mind the\nmoral standard was by no means the only standard of excellence.\nThe Romans, on the other hand, regarded the courtesan class with\nmuch contempt.[67] In A.D. 19 the profligacy of women was checked\nby stringent enactments, and it was provided that no woman whose\ngrandfather, father, or husband had been a Roman knight should\nget money by prostitution. [68] The names of prostitutes had to\nbe published on the aedile's list, as Tacitus says, \"according to\na recognised custom {430} of our ancestors, who considered it a\nsufficient punishment on unchaste women to have to profess their\nshame.\"[69] But both in Rome and Greece pre-nuptial unchastity in\nmen, when it was not excessive[70] or did not take some\nespecially offensive form, was hardly censured by public\nopinion.[71] The elder Cato expressly justified it.[72] Cicero\nsays:--\"If there be any one who thinks that youth is to be wholly\ninterdicted from amours with courtesans, he certainly is very\nstrict indeed. I cannot deny what he says; but still he is at\nvariance not only with the licence of the present age, but even\nwith the habits of our ancestors, and with what they used to\nconsider allowable. For when was the time that men were not used\nto act in this manner? When was such conduct found fault with?\nWhen was it not permitted? When, in short, was the time when that\nwhich is lawful was not lawful?\"[73] Epictetus only went a little\nstep further. He said to his disciples:--\"Concerning sexual\npleasures, it is right to be pure before marriage, as much as in\nyou lies. But if you indulge in them, let it be according to what\nis lawful. But do not in any case make yourself disagreeable to\nthose who use such pleasures, nor be fond of reproving them, nor\nof putting yourself forward as not using them.\"[74] Here chastity\nin men is at all events recognised as an ideal. But even in pagan\nantiquity there were a few who enjoined it as a duty.[75]\nMusonius Rufus emphatically asserted that no union of the sexes\nother than marriage was permissible,[76] and Dio Chrysostom\ndesired prostitution to be suppressed by law.[77] Similar\nopinions grew up in connection with the Neo-Platonic and\nNeo-Pythagorean philosophies, and may be traced back to the\nancient masters themselves. We are told that Pythagoras\ninculcated the virtue of {431} chastity so successfully that when\nten of his disciples, being attacked, might have escaped by\ncrossing a bean-field, they died to a man rather than tread down\nthe beans, which were supposed to have a mystic affinity with the\nseat of impure desires.[78] Plato, again, is in favour of a law\nto the effect that \"no one shall venture to touch any person of\nthe freeborn or noble class except his wedded wife, or sow the\nunconsecrated and bastard seed among harlots, or in barren and\nunnatural lusts.\" Our citizens, he says, ought not to be worse\nthan birds and beasts, which live without intercourse, pure and\nchaste, until the age for procreation, and afterwards, when they\nhave arrived at that period and the male has paired with the\nfemale and the female with the male, \"live the rest of their\nlives in holiness and innocence, abiding firmly in their original\ncompact.\"[79]\n\n[Footnote 64: See Denis, _Histoire des th\u00e9ories et des id\u00e9es\nmorales dans l'antiquit\u00e9_, i. 69 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 65: Schmidt, _Die Ethik der alten Griechen_, ii. 193.]\n\n[Footnote 66: See Lecky, _History of European Morals_, i. 105.]\n\n[Footnote 67: _Ibid._ ii. 300.]\n\n[Footnote 68: Tacitus, _Annales_, ii. 85.]\n\n[Footnote 69: Tacitus, _Annales_, ii. 85.]\n\n[Footnote 70: Valerius Maximus (_Facta dictaque memorabilia_, ii.\n5. 6) praises \"frugalitas\" as \"immoderato Veneris usu aversa.\"]\n\n[Footnote 71: Lecky, _op. cit._ ii. 314.]\n\n[Footnote 72: Horace, _Satir\u00e6_, i. 2. 31 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 73: Cicero, _Pro C[oe]lio_, 20 (48).]\n\n[Footnote 74: Epictetus, _Enchiridion_, xxxiii. 8.]\n\n[Footnote 75: Denis, _op. cit._ ii. 133 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 76: Musonius Rufus, quoted by Stob\u00e6us, _Florilegium_,\nvi. 61.]\n\n[Footnote 77: Denis, _op. cit._ ii. 149 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 78: Jamblichus, _De Pythagorica vita_, 31 (191). _Cf._\nJevons, in Plutarch's _Romane Questions_, p. lxxxviii. _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 79: Plato, _Leges_, viii. 840 _sq._ _Cf._ Xenophon,\n_Memorabilia_, i. 3. 8.]\n\nMuch stronger was the censure which Christianity passed on\npre-nuptial connections. While looking with suspicion even on the\nlife-long union of one man with one woman, the Church pronounced\nall other forms of sexual intercourse to be mortal sins. In its\nPenitentials sins of unchastity were the favourite topic; and its\nhorror of them finds an echo in the secular legislation of the\nfirst Christian emperors. Panders were condemned to have molten\nlead poured down their throats.[80] In the case of forcible\nseduction both the man and woman, if she consented to the act,\nwere put to death.[81] Even the innocent offspring of illicit\nintercourse were punished for their parents' sins with ignominy\nand loss of certain rights which belonged to other, more\nrespectable, members of the Church and the State.[82] Persons of\ndifferent sex {432} who were not united in wedlock were forbidden\nby the Church to kiss each other; nay, the sexual desire itself,\nthough unaccompanied by any external act, was regarded as sinful\nin the unmarried.[83] In this standard of purity no difference of\nsex was recognised, the same obligations being imposed upon man\nand woman.[84]\n\n[Footnote 80: Lecky, _op. cit._ ii. 316.]\n\n[Footnote 81: _Codex Theodosianus_, ix. 24. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 82: _Concilium Claromontanum_, A.D. 1095, can. 11\n(Labbe-Mansi, _Sacrorum Conciliorum collectio_, xx. 817):--\"Ut\nnulli filii concubinarum ad ordines vel aliquos honores\necclesiasticos promoveantur, nisi monchaliter vel canonice\nvixerint in ecclesia.\" See also _supra_, i. 47.]\n\n[Footnote 83: \"Perit ergo et ipsa mente virginitas.\" Katz,\n_Grundriss des kanonischen Strafrechts_, p. 114 _sq._ For the\nsubject of kissing see also Thomas Aquinas, _Summa theologica_,\nii.-ii. 154. 4.]\n\n[Footnote 84: Laurent, _\u00c9tudes sur l'histoire de l'Humanit\u00e9_,\niv. 114.]\n\nIn this, as in so many other points of morals, however, there is\na considerable discrepancy between Christian doctrine and public\nopinion in Christian countries. The gross and open immorality of\nthe Middle Ages indicates how little the idea of sexual purity\nentered into the manners and opinions of the people. The\ninfluence of the ascetic doctrine of the Church was in fact quite\ncontrary to its aspirations. The institution of clerical celibacy\nlowered the estimation of virtue by promoting vice. During the\nMiddle Ages unchastity was regarded as an object of ridicule\nrather than censure, and in the comic literature of that period\nthe clergy are universally represented as the great corrupters of\ndomestic virtue.[85] Whether the tenet of chastity laid down by\nthe code of Chivalry was taken more seriously may be fairly\ndoubted. A knight, it was said, should be abstinent and\nchaste;[86] he should love only the virtues, talents, and graces\nof his lady;[87] and love was defined as the \"chaste union of two\nhearts by virtue wrought.\"[88] But whilst the knight had certain\nclaims as regards the virtue of his lady, whilst he probably was\ninclined to draw his sword only for a woman of fair reputation,\nand whilst he himself professed to aspire only to her lip or\nhand, we have reason to believe that the amours in which he\nindulged with her were of a far less delicate kind. Sainte-Palaye\nobserves, \"Jamais {433} on ne vit les m[oe]urs plus corrompues\nque du temps de nos Chevaliers, et jamais le r\u00e8gne de la d\u00e9bauche\nne fut plus universel.\"[89] For a medi\u00e6val knight the chief\nobject of life was love. He who did not understand how to win a\nlady was but half a man; and the difference between a lover and a\nseducer was apparently slight. The character of the seducer, as\nMr. Lecky remarks, and especially of the passionless seducer who\npursues his career simply as a kind of sport, and under the\ninfluence of no stronger motive than vanity or a spirit of\nadventure, has for many centuries been glorified and idealised in\nthe popular literature of Christendom in a manner to which there\nis no parallel in antiquity.[90]\n\n[Footnote 85: Wright, _Essays on Arch\u00e6ological Subjects_, ii.\n238. _Cf._ _Idem_, _History of Domestic Manners and Sentiments in\nEngland during the Middle Ages_, pp. 54, 281, 420.]\n\n[Footnote 86: _Book of the Ordre of Chyualry_, fol. 40.]\n\n[Footnote 87: Sainte-Palaye, _M\u00e9moires sur l'ancienne\nChevalerie_, ii. 17.]\n\n[Footnote 88: Mills, _History of Chivalry_, i. 214 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 89: Sainte-Palaye, _op. cit._ ii. 19. _Cf._ Walter\nScott, 'Essay on Chivalry,' in _Miscellaneous Prose Works_, vi.\n48 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 90: Lecky, _op. cit._ ii. 346. _Cf._ Del\u00e9cluze, _Roland\nou la Chevalerie_, i. 356.]\n\nThe Reformation brought about some change for the better, if in\nno other respect at least by making marriage lawful for a large\nclass of people to whom illicit love had previously been the only\nmeans of gratifying a natural desire, and by abolishing the\nmonasteries. In fits of religious enthusiasm even the secular\nlegislators busied themselves with acts of incontinence in which\ntwo unmarried adults of different sex were consenting parties. In\nthe days of the Commonwealth, according to an act of 1650, in\ncases of less serious breach of chastity than adultery and\nincest, each man or woman was for each offence to be committed to\nthe common gaol for three months, and to find sureties for good\nbehaviour during a whole year afterwards.[91] In Scotland, after\nthe Reformation, fornication was punished with a severity nearly\nequal to that which attended the infraction of the marriage\nvow.[92] But the fate of these and similar laws has been either\nto be repealed or to become inactive.[93] For ordinary acts of\nincontinence public opinion is, practically at least, the only\njudge. In the case of female unchastity its sentence is {434}\nsevere enough among the upper ranks of society, whilst, so far as\nthe lower classes are concerned, it varies considerably even in\ndifferent parts of the same country, and is in many cases\nregarded as venial. As to similar acts committed by unmarried\nmen, the words which Cicero uttered on behalf of C[oe]lius might\nbe repeated by any modern advocate who, in defending his client,\nventured frankly to express the popular opinion on the subject.\nIt seems to me that with regard to sexual relations between\nunmarried men and women Christianity has done little more than\nestablish a standard which, though accepted perhaps in theory, is\nhardly recognised by the feelings of the large majority of\npeople--or at least of men--in Christian communities, and has\nintroduced the vice of hypocrisy, which apparently was little\nknown in sexual matters by pagan antiquity.\n\n[Footnote 91: Pike, _History of Crime in England_, ii. 182.]\n\n[Footnote 92: Rogers, _Social Life in Scotland_, ii. 242.]\n\n[Footnote 93: See Pike, _op. cit._ ii. 582; Hume, _Commentaries\non the Law of Scotland_, ii. 333.]\n\nWhy has sexual intercourse between unmarried people, if both\nparties consent, come to be regarded as wrong? Why are the moral\nopinions relating to it subject to so great variations? Why is\nthe standard commonly so different for man and woman? We shall\nnow try to find an answer to these questions.\n\nIf marriage, as I am inclined to suppose, is based on an instinct\nderived from some ape-like progenitor, it would from the\nbeginning be regarded as the natural form of sexual intercourse\nin the human race, whilst other more transitory connections would\nappear abnormal and consequently be disapproved of. I am not\ncertain whether some feeling of this sort, however vague, is not\nstill very general in the race. But it has been more or less or\nalmost totally suppressed by social conditions which make it in\nmost cases impossible for men to marry at the first outbreak of\nthe sexual passion. We have thus to seek for some other\nexplanation of the severe censure passed on pre-nuptial connections.\n\nIt seems to me obvious that this censure is chiefly due to the\npreference which a man gives to a virgin bride. As I have shown\nin another place, such a preference is a {435} fact of very\ncommon occurrence.[94] It partly springs from a feeling akin to\njealousy towards women who have had previous connections with\nother men, partly from the warm response a man expects from a\nwoman whose appetites he is the first to gratify, and largely\nfrom an instinctive appreciation of female coyness. Each sex is\nattracted by the distinctive characteristics of the opposite sex,\nand coyness is a female quality. In mankind, as among other\nmammals, the female requires to be courted, often endeavouring\nfor a long time to escape from the male. Not only in civilised\ncountries may courtship mean a prolonged making of love to the\nwoman. Mariner's words with reference to the women of Tonga hold\ntrue of a great many, if not all, savage and barbarous races of\nmen. \"It must not be supposed,\" he says, \"that these women are\nalways easily won; the greatest attentions and most fervent\nsolicitations are sometimes requisite, even though there be no\nother lover in the way.\"[95] The marriage ceremonies of many\npeoples bear testimony to the same fact. One origin of the form\nof capture is the resistance of the pursued woman, due to\ncoyness, partly real and partly assumed.[96] On the East Coast of\nGreenland, for instance, the only method of contracting a\nmarriage is for a man to go to the girl's tent, catch her by her\nhair or anything else which offers a hold, and drag her off to\nhis dwelling without further ado; violent scenes are often the\nresult, as single women always affect the utmost bashfulness and\naversion to any proposal of marriage, lest they should lose their\nreputation for modesty.[97] It is certainly not the woman who\nmost readily yields to the desires of a man that is most\nattractive to him; as an ancient writer puts it, all men love\nseasoned dishes, not plain meats, or plainly dressed {436} fish,\nand it is modesty that gives the bloom to beauty.[98] Conspicuous\neagerness in a woman appears to a man unwomanly, repulsive,\ncontemptible. His ideal is the virgin; the libertine he despises.\n\n[Footnote 94: Westermarck, _op. cit._ p. 123 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 95: Mariner, _op. cit._ ii. 174. _Cf._ Fritsch, _Die\nEingeborenen S\u00fcd-Afrika's_, p. 445 (Bushmans).]\n\n[Footnote 96: _Cf._ Spencer, _Principles of Sociology_, i. 623\n_sq._; _Idem_, in _Fortnightly Review_, xxi. 897 _sq._;\nWestermarck, _op. cit._ p. 388; Grosse, _Die Formen der Familie_,\np. 107; Crawley, _The Mystic Rose_, p. 305 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 97: Nansen, _First Crossing of Greenland_, i. 316 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 98: Athen\u00e6us, _Deipnosophist\u00e6_, xiii. 16.]\n\nWhere marriage is the customary form of sexual intercourse\npre-nuptial incontinence in a woman, as suggesting lack of\ncoyness and modesty, is therefore apt to disgrace her. At the\nsame time it is a disgrace to, and consequently an offence\nagainst, her family, especially where the ties of kinship are\nstrong. Moreover, where wives are purchased the unchaste girl, by\nlowering her market value, deprives her father or parents of part\nof their property. Among the Tshi-speaking peoples of the Gold\nCoast, says Major Ellis, \"chastity _per se_ is not understood. An\nunmarried girl is expected to be chaste because virginity\npossesses a marketable value, and were she to be unchaste her\nparents would receive little and perhaps no head-money for\nher.\"[99] Among the Rendile of Eastern Africa, we are told, the\nunchastity of unmarried girls meets with severe retribution, the\ngirl invariably being driven out from her home, for the sole and\nsimple reason that her market value to her parents has been\ndecreased.[100] The same commercial point of view is expressed in\nthe Mosaic rule:--\"If a man entice a maid that is not betrothed,\nand lie with her, he shall surely endow her to be his wife. If\nher father utterly refuse to give her unto him, he shall pay\nmoney according to the dowry of virgins.\"[101] But the girl is\nnot the only offender. Whilst the disgrace of incontinence falls\non her alone, the offence against her relatives is divided\nbetween her and the seducer. Speaking of the presents which,\namong the Thlinkets, a man is bound to give to the parents of the\ngirl whom he has seduced, Sir James Douglas observes, \"The\noffender is simply regarded as a robber, who has committed\ndepredation on their merchandise, their only anxiety being to\nmake the {437} damages exacted as heavy as possible.\"[102]\nMarriage by purchase has thus raised the standard of female\nchastity, and also, to some extent, checked the incontinence of\nthe men. But it can certainly not be regarded as the sole cause\nof the duty of chastity where such a duty is recognised by\nsavages. Among the Veddahs, who do not make their daughters\nobjects of traffic,[103] the unmarried girls are nevertheless\nprotected by their natural guardians \"with the keenest sense of\nhonour.\"[104] In many of the instances quoted above where a\nseduction is followed by more or less serious consequences for\nthe seducer, the penalty he has to pay is evidently something\nelse than the mere market value of the girl.\n\n[Footnote 99: Ellis, _Tshi-speaking Peoples_, p. 286.]\n\n[Footnote 100: Chanler, _Through Jungle and Desert_, p. 317.]\n\n[Footnote 101: _Exodus_, xxii. 16 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 102: Douglas, quoted by Petroff, _op. cit._ p. 177.]\n\n[Footnote 103: Le Mesurier, 'Vedd\u00e1s of Ceylon,' in _Jour. Roy.\nAsiatic Soc. Ceylon Branch_, ix. 340. Hartshorne, 'Weddas,' in\n_Indian Antiquary_, viii. 320.]\n\n[Footnote 104: Nevill, 'Vaeddas of Ceylon,' in _Taprobanian_,\ni. 178.]\n\nThus the men, by demanding that the women whom they marry shall\nbe virgins, indirectly give rise to the demand that they\nthemselves shall abstain from certain forms of incontinence. From\nmy collection of facts relating to savages I find that in the\nmajority of cases where chastity is required of unmarried girls\nthe seducer also is considered guilty of a crime. But, as was\njust pointed out, his act is judged from a more limited point of\nview. It is chiefly, if not exclusively, regarded as an offence\nagainst the parents or family of the girl; chastity _per se_ is\nhardly required of savage men. Where prostitution exists they may\nwithout censure gratify their passions among its victims. Now, to\nanybody who duly reflects upon the matter it is clear that the\nseducer does a wrong to the woman also; but I find no indication\nthat this idea occurs at all to the savage mind. Where the\nseducer is censured the girl also is censured, being regarded not\nas the injured party but as an injurer. Even in the case of rape\nthe harm done to the girl herself is little thought of. Among the\nTonga Islanders \"rape, providing it be not upon a married woman\nor one to whom respect is due on the score of {438} superior rank\nfrom the perpetrator, is considered not as a crime but as a\nmatter of indifference.\"[105] The same is the case in the Pelew\nIslands.[106] In the laws of the Rejangs of Sumatra referring to\nthis offence, \"there is hardly anything considered but the value\nof the girl's person to her relations, as a mere vendible\ncommodity.\"[107] Among the Asiniboin, a Siouan tribe, the\npunishment for rape is based on the principle that the price of\nthe woman has been depreciated, that the chances of marriage have\nbeen lessened, and that the act is an insult to her kindred, as\nimplying contempt of their feelings and their power of\nprotection.[108] Even the Teutons in early days hardly severed\nrape from abduction, the kinsmen of the woman feeling themselves\nequally wronged in either case.[109] If the girl's feelings are\nthus disregarded when she is an unwilling victim of violence, it\ncan hardly be expected that she should be an object of pity when\nshe is a consenting partner. Does not public opinion in the midst\nof civilisation turn against the dishonoured rather than the\ndishonourer?\n\n[Footnote 105: Mariner, _op. cit._ ii. 107.]\n\n[Footnote 106: Kubary, 'Die Verbrechen und das Strafverfahren auf\nden Pelau-Inseln,' in _Original-Mittheil. aus der ethnol.\nAbtheil. der k\u00f6nigl. Museen Berlin_, i. 78.]\n\n[Footnote 107: Crawfurd, _History of the Indian Archipelago_,\niii. 130.]\n\n[Footnote 108: Dorsey, 'Siouan Sociology,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur.\nEthn._ xv. 226.]\n\n[Footnote 109: Brunner, _Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte_ ii. 666.\nPollock and Maitland, _History of English Law before the Time of\nEdward I._ ii. 490. According to Salic law, the fine for the rape\nof an _ingenua puella_ was 62\u00bd solidi, or only a little higher\nthan the fine for a connection with her to which she herself\nconsented (_Lex Salica_, Herold's text, xiv. 4; xv. 3); whereas\nthe fine for adultery with a free woman was 200 solidi (_ibid._\nxv. 1).]\n\nThere is yet another party to be considered, namely, the\noffspring. One would imagine that to every thinking mind, not\naltogether destitute of sympathetic feelings, the question what\nis likely to happen to the child if the woman becomes pregnant\nshould present itself as one of the greatest gravity. But in\njudging of matters relating to sexual morality men have generally\nmade little use of their reason and been guilty of much\nthoughtless cruelty. Although marriage has come into existence\nsolely for the sake of the offspring, it rarely happens that in\nsexual relations much unselfish thought is bestowed upon unborn\n{439} individuals. Legal provisions in favour of illegitimate\nchildren have made men somewhat more careful, for their own sake,\nbut they have also nourished the idea that the responsibility of\nfatherhood may be bought off by the small sum the man has to pay\nfor the support of his natural child. Custom or law may exempt\nhim even from this duty. We are told that in Tahiti the father\nmight kill a bastard child, but that, if he suffered it to live,\nhe was _eo ipso_ considered to be married to its mother.[110]\nThis custom, it would seem, is hardly more inhuman than the\nfamous law according to which \"la recherche de la paternit\u00e9 est\ninterdite.\"[111]\n\n[Footnote 110: Cook, _Voyage to the Pacific Ocean_, ii. 157.]\n\n[Footnote 111: _Code Napol\u00e9on_, \u00a7 340.]\n\nThe great authority on the ethics of Roman Catholicism tries to\nprove that simple fornication is a mortal sin chiefly because it\n\"tends to the hurt of the life of the child who is to be born of\nsuch intercourse,\" or more generally, because \"it is contrary to\nthe good of the offspring.\"[112] But this tender care for the\nwelfare of illegitimate children seems strange when we consider\nthe manner in which such children have been treated by the Roman\nCatholic Church herself. It is obvious that the extreme horror of\nfornication which is expressed in the Christian doctrine is in\nthe main a result of the same ascetic principle which declared\ncelibacy superior to marriage and tolerated marriage only because\nit could not be suppressed.\n\n[Footnote 112: Thomas Aquinas, _Summa theologica_, ii.-ii. 154. 2.]\n\nMoral ideas concerning unchastity have also been influenced by\nthe close association which exists in a refined mind between the\nsexual impulse and a sentiment of affection which lasts long\nafter the gratification of the bodily desire. We find the germ of\nthis feeling in the abhorrence with which prostitution is\nregarded by savage tribes who have no objection to ordinary\nsexual intercourse previous to marriage,[113] and in the\ndistinction which among ourselves is drawn between the prostitute\nand the woman {440} who yields to temptation because she loves.\nTo indulge in mere sexual pleasure, unaccompanied by higher\nfeelings, appears brutal and disgusting in the case of a man, and\nstill more so in the case of a woman. After all, love is\ngenerally only an episode in a man's life, whereas for a woman it\nis the whole of her life.[114] The Greek orator said that in the\nmoment when a woman loses her chastity her mind is changed.[115]\nOn the other hand, when a man and a woman, tied to each other by\ndeep and genuine affection, decide to live together as husband\nand wife, though not joined in legal wedlock, the censure which\npublic opinion passes upon their conduct seems to an unprejudiced\nmind justifiable at most only in so far as it may be considered\nto have been their duty to comply with the laws of their country\nand to submit to a rule of some social importance.\n\n[Footnote 113: _E.g._, the Chittagong Hill tribes (Lewin, _Wild\nRaces of South-Eastern India_, p. 348). _Cf._ Westermarck, _op.\ncit._ p. 70 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 114: _Cf._ Simmel, _Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaft_,\ni. 201; Paulsen, _System der Ethik_, ii. 274.]\n\n[Footnote 115: Lysias, quoted by Schmidt, _Die Ethik der alten\nGriechen_, i. 273.]\n\nSexual intercourse between unmarried persons of opposite sex is\nthus regarded as wrong from different points of view under\ndifferent conditions, social or psychical, and all of these\nconditions are not in any considerable degree combined at any\nspecial stage of civilisation. Sometimes the opinions on the\nsubject are greatly influenced by the institution of marriage by\npurchase, sometimes they are influenced by the refinement of\nlove; and between such causes there can be no co-operation. This\nis one reason for the singular complexity which characterises the\nevolution of the duty of chastity; but there is another reason\nperhaps even more important. The causes to which this duty may be\ntraced are frequently checked by circumstances operating in an\nopposite direction. Thus the preference which a man is naturally\ndisposed to give to a virgin bride may be overcome by his desire\nfor offspring, inducing him to marry a woman who has proved\ncapable of gratifying this desire.[116] It may also be\nineffective for the simple reason that no virgin bride is to be\nfound. Nothing has more generally prevented chastity {441} from\nbeing recognised as a duty than social conditions promoting\nlicentious habits. Even in savage society, where almost every man\nand every woman marry and most of them marry early in life, there\nare always a great number of unmarried people of both sexes above\nthe age of puberty; and, generally speaking, the number of the\nunmarried increases along with the progress of civilisation. This\nstate of things easily leads to incontinence in men and women,\nand where such incontinence becomes habitual it can hardly incur\nmuch censure. Again, where the general standard of female\nchastity is high, the standard of male chastity may nevertheless\nbe the lowest possible. This is the case where there is a class\nof women who can no longer be dishonoured, because they have\nalready been dishonoured, whose virtue is of no value either to\nthemselves or their families because they have lost their virtue,\nand who make incontinence their livelihood. Prostitution, being a\nsafeguard of female chastity, has facilitated the enforcement of\nthe rule which enjoins it as a duty, but at the same time it has\nincreased the inequality of obligations imposed on men and women.\nIt has begun to exercise this influence already at the lower\nstages of culture. Prostitution is by no means unknown in the\nsavage world.[117] It is a recognised institution in many of the\nMelanesian islands; \"at Santa Cruz,\" says Dr. Codrington, \"where\nthe separation of the sexes is so carefully maintained, there are\ncertainly public courtesans.\"[118] Prostitution prevails in many\nor most Negro countries;[119] and so favourably, we are told, is\nthis institution sometimes regarded, that rich Negro ladies on\ntheir death-beds buy female slaves and present them to the\npublic, \"in the same manner as in England they would have left a\nlegacy to some public charity.\"[120] The Wanyoro even have a\n{442} definite system of prostitution, governed by stringent laws\nwhich seem to be very old.[121] In Greenland, where it was\n\"reckoned the greatest of infamies\" for an unmarried woman to\nbecome pregnant,[122] there were professional harlots already in\nearly times;[123] and the same was the case among many of the\nNorth American Indians.[124] Thus among the Omahas\nextra-matrimonial intercourse is, as a rule, practised only with\npublic women, called _minckeda_; and \"so strict are the Omahas\nabout these matters, that a young girl or even a married woman\nwalking or riding alone, would be ruined in character, being\nliable to be taken for a _minckeda_, and addressed as such.\"[125]\nPublic prostitution was tolerated, if not encouraged, among all\nthe Maya nations, whilst intercourse with other unmarried women\nwas punished with a fine or, if the affronted relatives insisted,\nwith death.[126] \"In order to avoid greater evils,\" the Incas of\nPeru permitted public prostitutes, who were treated with extreme\ncontempt;[127] but, with this exception, \"to be lewd with single\nwomen was capital.\"[128] Among all the civilised nations of the\nOld World prostitution has existed, and still exists, as a\ntolerated institution, even where legislators have endeavoured to\nsuppress it.[129] Its prevalence in our modern society greatly\nincreases the perplexity of public opinion in regard to sexual\nmorality. Its victims are degraded and despised beyond\ndescription. At the same time their male customers {443} are\ntacitly allowed to support the trade. That the demand for a\nmerchandise increases the production of it is in this case seldom\nthought of. But secrecy must be observed. In sexual matters\nopenness is indecent, and the chief crime is to be found out.\n\n[Footnote 116: See _supra_, ii. 423.]\n\n[Footnote 117: See, _e.g._, Tutuila, 'Line Islanders,' in _Jour.\nPolynesian Soc._ i. 270; Powell, _Wanderings in a Wild Country_,\np. 261 (natives of New Britain); Davis, _El Gringo_, p. 221\n(Indians of New Mexico); Ploss-Bartels, _Das Weib_, i. 536, 540\n_sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 118: Codrington, _Melanesians_, p. 234 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 119: _Emin Pasha in Central Africa_, p. 88.]\n\n[Footnote 120: Reade, _Savage Africa_, p. 547 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 121: _Emin Pasha in Central Africa_, p. 87. Wilson and\nFelkin, _Uganda_, ii. 49.]\n\n[Footnote 122: Egede, _Description of Greenland_, p. 141.]\n\n[Footnote 123: Cranz, _History of Greenland_, i. 176.]\n\n[Footnote 124: Carver, _Travels through the Interior Parts of\nNorth America_, p. 375.]\n\n[Footnote 125: Dorsey, 'Omaha Sociology,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur.\nEthn._ iii. 365.]\n\n[Footnote 126: Bancroft, _Native Races of the Pacific States_,\nii. 676, 659.]\n\n[Footnote 127: Garcilasso de la Vega, _First Part of the Royal\nCommentaries of the Yncas_, i. 321 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 128: Herrera, _General History of the West Indies_,\niv. 340.]\n\n[Footnote 129: Dufour, _Histoire de la prostitution_, _passim_.\nDoolittle, _Social Life of the Chinese_, i. 348. Wilkins, _Modern\nHinduism_, p. 412. Polak, 'Die Prostitution in Persien,' in\n_Wiener Medizinische Wochenschrift_, xi. 516, 517, 563 _sqq._\nLane, _Modern Egyptians_, i. 150. Weinhold, _Altnordisches\nLeben_, p. 259 (ancient Scandinavians). Desmaze, _Les p\u00e9nalit\u00e9s\nanciennes_, p. 61 _sq._ n. 4; Mackintosh, _History of\nCivilisation in Scotland_, i. 428 (Middle Ages); &c. Since the\nthirteenth century even the Church tolerated the establishment of\nbrothels in the larger cities (M\u00fcller, _Das sexuelle Leben der\nchristlichen Kulturv\u00f6lker_, p. 149).]\n\nThere is, moreover, a form of religious prostitution, just as\nthere is religious celibacy. In fact, the two customs are\nsometimes very closely connected with one another. Among the\nE[(w]e-speaking peoples of the Slave Coast the chief business of\nthe female _kosi_, or wife of the god to whom she is dedicated,\nis prostitution. \"In every town there is at least one institution\nin which the best-looking girls, between ten and twelve years of\nage, are received. Here they remain for three years, learning the\nchants and dances peculiar to the worship of the gods, and\nprostituting themselves to the priests and the inmates of the\nmale seminaries; and at the termination of their novitiate they\nbecome public prostitutes. This condition, however, is not\nregarded as one for reproach; they are considered to be married\nto the god, and their excesses are supposed to be caused and\ndirected by him. Properly speaking, their libertinage should be\nconfined to the male worshippers at the temple of the god, but\npractically it is indiscriminate. Children who are born from such\nunions belong to the god.\"[130] So also the priestesses on the\nGold Coast, though not allowed to marry, are by no means debarred\nfrom sexual intercourse. They \"are ordinarily most licentious,\nand custom allows them to gratify their passions with any man who\nmay chance to take their fancy. A priestess who is favourably\nimpressed by a man sends for him to her house, and this command\nhe is sure to obey, through fear of the consequences of exciting\nher anger. She then tells him that the god she serves has\ndirected her to love him, and the man thereupon lives with her\nuntil she grows tired of him, or a new object takes her fancy.\nSome priestesses have as many as half a dozen men in their train\nat one time, and may on great occasions be seen walking {444} in\nstate, followed by them. Their life is one continual record of\ndebauchery and sensuality, and when excited by the dance they\nfrequently abandon themselves to the wildest excesses.\"[131] It\nseems that the \"wife\" of the Egyptian god at Thebes also in time\nbecame a libertine; Strabo tells us that the beautiful woman who\nwas dedicated to him had sexual intercourse with any man she\nchose \"till the natural purification of her body took place,\"\nafter which she was given to a man.[132] In India every Hindu\ntemple of any importance has its dancing girls, whose position is\ninferior only to that of the sacrificers.[133] Thus at\nJ[)u]g[)u]nnat'h[)u]-ksh[)u]tr[)u] in Orissa a number of women of\ninfamous character are employed to dance and sing before the god.\nThey live in separate houses, not at the temple. The Brahmins who\nofficiate there continually have adulterous connections with\nthem, and these women also prostitute themselves to\nvisitors.[134] In the Canaanitish cults there were women, called\n_[k.]ed[=e]sh[=o]th_, who were consecrated to the deity with\nwhose temple they were associated, and who at the same time acted\nas prostitutes.[135] At the local shrines of North Israel the\nworship of Yahveh itself was deeply affected by these\npractices;[136] but they were forbidden in the Deuteronomic\ncode.[137] Perhaps this temple prostitution may be accounted for\nby a belief that it bestowed blessings upon the worshippers.\nAccording to notions which prevail to this day in countries with\nSemitic culture, sexual intercourse with a holy person is\nregarded as beneficial to him or her who indulges in it.[138]\n\n[Footnote 130: Ellis, _E[(w]e-speaking Peoples_, p. 141.]\n\n[Footnote 131: Ellis, _Tshi-speaking Peoples_, p. 121 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 132: Strabo, _Geographica_, xvii. i. 46. _Cf._\nWiedemann, _Herodots zweites Buch_, p. 269.]\n\n[Footnote 133: Warneck, quoted by Ploss-Bartels, _op. cit._ i. 534.]\n\n[Footnote 134: Ward, _View of the History, &c. of the Hindoos_,\nii. 134.]\n\n[Footnote 135: Driver, _Commentary on Deuteronomy_, p. 264.\nCheyne, 'Harlot,' in Cheyne and Black, _Encyclop\u00e6dia Biblica_,\nii. 1965.]\n\n[Footnote 136: _Hosea_, iv. 14. _Cf._ Cheyne, in _Encyclop\u00e6dia\nBiblica_, ii. 1965.]\n\n[Footnote 137: _Deuteronomy_, xxiii. 17 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 138: See Westermarck, _The Moorish Conception of\nHoliness (Baraka)_, p. 85.]\n\nOf a somewhat different character was the religious prostitution\nwhich prevailed in ancient Babylonia, in connection with the\nworship of Ishtar. Herodotus says that every woman born in that\ncountry was obliged once in her {445} life to go and sit down in\nthe precinct of Aphrodite, and there consort with a stranger. A\nwoman who had once taken her seat was not allowed to return home\ntill one of the strangers threw a silver coin into her lap, and\ntook her with him beyond the holy ground. The silver coin could\nnot be refused because, since once thrown, it was sacred. The\nwoman went with the first man who threw her money, rejecting no\none. When she had gone with him, and so satisfied the goddess,\nshe returned home, and from that time forth no gift, however\ngreat, would prevail with her.[139] Several allusions in\ncuneiform literature to the sacred prostitution carried on at\nBabylonian temples confirm Herodotus' statement in general.[140]\nA cult very similar to this was also found in certain parts of\nthe island of Cyprus,[141] at Heliopolis in Syria,[142] and at\nByblus.[143] In the worship of Anaitis the Armenians even of the\nhighest families prostituted their own daughters at least once in\ntheir lives, nor was this regarded as any bar to an honourable\nmarriage afterwards.[144] Although such practices were generally\nexcluded from the ordinary Greek worships of Aphrodite,\nunchastity in the temple cult of that goddess is reported to have\noccurred at Corinth[145] and in the city of the Locri\nEpizephyrii, who, according to the story, vowed to consecrate\ntheir daughters to this service in order to gain the goddess's\naid in a war.[146]\n\n[Footnote 139: Herodotus, i. 199.]\n\n[Footnote 140: Jeremias, _Izdubar-Nimrod_, p. 59 _sq._ Jastrow,\n_Religion of Babylonia and Assyria_, p. 475 _sq._ M\u00fcrdter-Delitzsch,\n_Geschichte Babyloniens_, p. 41.]\n\n[Footnote 141: Herodotus, i. 199. Athen\u00e6us, _Deipnosophist\u00e6_,\nxii. 11, p. 516 a.]\n\n[Footnote 142: Socrates, _Historia ecclesiastica_, 18 (Migne,\n_op. cit._ Ser. Gr\u00e6ca, lxvii. 123). Sozomen, _Historia\necclesiastica_, v. 10 (Migne, Ser. Gr\u00e6ca, lxvii. 1243). Eusebius,\n_Vita Constantini_, iii. 58 (Migne, Ser. Gr\u00e6ca, xx. 1124).]\n\n[Footnote 143: Lucian, _De Syria Dea_, 6.]\n\n[Footnote 144: Strabo, xi. 14. 16.]\n\n[Footnote 145: _Ibid._ viii. 6. 20.]\n\n[Footnote 146: Farnell, _Cults of the Greek States_, ii. 636.\nAthen\u00e6us, xii. 11, p. 516 a.]\n\nVarious theories have been set forth to explain the religious\nprostitution of the Babylonian type. It has been interpreted as\nan expiation for individual marriage, as a temporary recognition\nof pre-existing communal rights at a time when \"communal\nmarriage\" in the full sense of the term had already ceased to\nexist.[147] It {446} has been supposed to be nothing but ordinary\nimmorality practised under the cloak of religion.[148] It has\nbeen represented as a form of sacrifice, either as a first-fruit\noffering[149] or as an act by which a worshipper sacrifices her\nmost precious possession to the deity.[150] To Dr. Farnell it\nseems to be \"a special modification of a wide-spread custom, the\ncustom of destroying virginity before marriage so that the\nbridegroom's intercourse should be safe from a peril that is much\ndreaded by men in a certain stage of culture; and here, as in\nother ritual,\" he adds, \"it is the stranger that takes the peril\nupon himself.\"[151] But why should the stranger have been more\nwilling than the bridegroom to expose himself to this danger?\nConsidering that the act was performed at the temple of the\ngoddess of fecundity, I think its object most probably was to\nensure fertility in the woman; this, in fact, is directly\nindicated by the words which the stranger, according to\nHerodotus, uttered when he threw the silver coin into her\nlap:--\"The goddess Mylitta prosper thee!\"[152] And from what has\nbeen said in a previous chapter about the semi-supernatural\ncharacter ascribed to strangers, about the efficacy of their\nblessings and the benefits expected from their love,[153] we can\nsee why a stranger was appointed to confer the blessing upon the\ngirl.[154]\n\n[Footnote 147: Avebury, _Origin of Civilisation_, p. 559.]\n\n[Footnote 148: Jeremias, _Izdubar-Nimrod_, p. 60.]\n\n[Footnote 149: Wiedemann, _Herodots zweites Buch_, p. 267 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 150: Curtiss, _Primitive Semitic Religion To-day_,\np. 155.]\n\n[Footnote 151: Farnell, 'Sociological Hypotheses concerning the\nPosition of Women in Ancient Religion,' in _Archiv f.\nReligionswiss._ vii. 88.]\n\n[Footnote 152: Herodotus, i. 199.]\n\n[Footnote 153: _Supra_, i. ch. xxiv.]\n\n[Footnote 154: Since the present chapter was in type, some fresh\nattempts have been made to explain this religious prostitution.\nSir J. G. Frazer (_Adonis Attis Osiris_, p. 23 _sq._) regards it\nas a rite intended to ensure the fruitfulness of the ground and\nthe increase of man and beast on the principle of hom[oe]opathic\nmagic. A very similar opinion has been expressed by Dr. Havelock\nEllis ('Ursprung und Entwicklung der Prostitution,' in\n_Mutterschutz_, iii. fasc. 1 _sq._). According to Mr. Hartland,\nagain ('Concerning the Rite at the Temple of Mylitta,' in\n_Anthropological Essays presented to E. B. Tylor_, p. 189\n_sqq._), it was a puberty rite involving a sacrifice of virginity\nto which every woman was subjected. [My own theory has\nsubsequently been accepted by van Gennep, _Les rites de passage_,\np. 242 _sq._]]\n\nAmong ourselves an act of incontinence assumes a {447} different\naspect if one of the parties, either the man or the woman, is\nmarried. Involving a breach of faith, adultery is an offence\nagainst him or her to whom faith is due, and at the same time the\nseducer commits an offence against the husband of the adulteress.\nBut here again our own views are not universally shared.\n\nAlthough it is hard to understand that the seducer could ever be\nregarded as guiltless, we are told that among a few peoples\nadultery is not held to be wrong;[155] and Mr. Morgan states that\namong the Iroquois \"punishment was inflicted upon the woman\nalone, who was supposed to be the only offender.\"[156] But these\ncases are certainly quite exceptional. In a savage tribe a\nseducer may be thankful if he escapes by paying to the injured\nhusband the value of the bride or some other fine, or if the\npenalty is reduced to a flogging, to his head being shaved, his\nears cut off, one of his eyes destroyed, or his legs speared.\nVery commonly he has to pay with his life. We have seen that even\namong many peoples who generally prohibit self-redress an\nadulterer may be put to death by the aggrieved husband,\nespecially if he be caught _flagrante delicto_;[157] and in other\ncases he may be subject to capital punishment, in the proper\nsense of the word.[158] In Albania, even in our days, custom not\nonly allows, but compels, the injured husband to kill the\nadulterer.[159] Hebrew law enjoined the man who committed\nadultery with another man's wife to be put to death;[160] and\nChristian legislators followed the example. Constantine\ncelebrated his new zeal for the sacramental idea of marriage by\nestablishing the punishment of death for the seducer;[161]\nadultery was in point of {448} heinousness assimilated to murder,\nidolatry, and sorcery.[162] Various medi\u00e6val law-books punished\nthe seducer with death;[163] whilst in Scotland notorious and\nmanifest adultery was made capital as late as 1563.[164] This\nextreme severity, however, has been followed by extreme leniency.\nIn Scotland, though adultery kept its place in the statute-book\nas a heinous and in some cases a capital crime, prosecution for\nit had ceased for many years before the time of Baron Hume;[165]\nand in England it is no crime at all in the eyes of the law, only\nan ecclesiastical offence.\n\n[Footnote 155: Davis, _El Gringo_, p. 221 _sq._ (Indians of New\nMexico). Adair, _History of the American Indians_, p. 146\n(Cherokees). Krasheninnikoff, _History of Kamschatka_, p. 204.\nPrejevalsky, _Mongolia_, i. 70 (Mongols). Colquhoun, _Amongst the\nShans_, p. 75 (Yendalines, one of the Karen tribes). Chanler,\n_op. cit._ p. 317 (Rendile in Eastern Africa). Lichtenstein,\n_Travels in Southern Africa_, ii. 48 (Bushmans).]\n\n[Footnote 156: Morgan, _League of the Iroquois_, p. 331.]\n\n[Footnote 157: _Supra_, i. 290 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 158: _Supra_, i. 189.]\n\n[Footnote 159: Hahn, _Albanesische Studien_, i. 177.]\n\n[Footnote 160: _Leviticus_, xx. 10. _Deuteronomy_, xxii. 22.]\n\n[Footnote 161: _Codex Justinianus_, ix. 9. 29. 4.]\n\n[Footnote 162: _Codex Theodosianus_, xi. 36. i. St. Basil, quoted\nby Bingham, _Works_, vi. 432 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 163: Du Boys, _Histoire du droit criminel des peuples\nmodernes_, ii. 606. _Idem_, _Histoire du droit criminel de\nl'Espagne_, p. 391.]\n\n[Footnote 164: Erskine-Rankine, _Principles of the Law of\nScotland_, p. 563.]\n\n[Footnote 165: Hume, _Commentaries on the Law of Scotland_, ii. 302.]\n\nThe punishment of the seducer often varies according to his rank,\nor according to that of the husband, or according to the relative\nrank of both, or according to the rank of the adulteress. Among\nthe Monbuttu, if the guilty woman belongs to the royal household,\nthe adulterer is put to death, whereas otherwise he is only\ncompelled to pay an indemnity to the offended husband.[166] Among\nthe E[(w]e-speaking peoples of the Slave Coast the fine imposed\nfor adultery depends on the rank of the injured husband;[167] and\nthe same principle is found in Anglo-Saxon law.[168] Among the\nBakongo, again, the penalties for adultery \"vary from capital\npunishment to a trifling fine, according to the station of the\noffender or the district he lives in.\"[169] Drury tells us that\nin the country of Anterndroea in Madagascar, \"if a man lies with\nanother man's wife who is superior to him, he forfeits thirty\nhead of cattle besides beads and shovels a great number,\" whereas\n\"if the men are of an equal rank, then twenty beasts are the\nfine.\"[170] According to the Chinese Penal Code, a slave who is\nguilty of criminal intercourse with the wife or daughter of a\nfreeman, shall be punished at the least one degree more {449}\nseverely than a freeman would have been under the same\ncircumstances.[171] In India a man of one of the first three\ncastes who committed adultery with a S\u00fbdra woman was banished,\nbut a S\u00fbdra who committed adultery with a woman of one of the\nfirst three castes suffered capital punishment;[172] and an\nopinion is also quoted that for a Br\u00e2hmana who once was guilty of\nadultery with a married woman of equal class, the penance was\none-fourth of that prescribed for an outcast.[173] In ancient\nPeru \"an adulterer was punish'd with death, if the woman was of\nnote, or else with the rack.\"[174]\n\n[Footnote 166: Casati, _Ten Years in Equatoria_, i. 163.]\n\n[Footnote 167: Ellis, _E[(w]e-speaking Peoples_, p. 202.]\n\n[Footnote 168: _Laws of Alfred_, ii. 10.]\n\n[Footnote 169: Johnston, _River Congo_, p. 404.]\n\n[Footnote 170: Drury, _Journal_, p. 183.]\n\n[Footnote 171: _Ta Tsing Leu Lee_, sec. ccclxxiii. p. 409.]\n\n[Footnote 172: _\u00c2pastamba_, ii. 10. 27. 8 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 173: _Ibid._ ii. 10. 27. 11.]\n\n[Footnote 174: Herrera, _op. cit._ iv. 338.]\n\nWe find no difficulty in explaining all these facts. In early\ncivilisation a husband has often extreme rights over his wife.\nThe seducer encroaches upon a right of which he is most jealous,\nand with regard to which his passions are most easily inflamed.\nAdultery is regarded as an illegitimate appropriation of the\nexclusive claims which the husband has acquired by the purchase\nof his wife, as an offence against property.[175] It is said in\nthe 'Laws of Manu' that \"seed must not be sown by any man on that\nwhich belongs to another.\"[176] How closely the seducer is\nassociated with a thief is illustrated by the fact that among\nsome peoples he is punished as such, having his hands, or one of\nthem, cut off.[177] Yet even among savages the offence is\nsomething more than a mere infringement of the right of\nownership. The Kurile Islanders, says Krasheninnikoff, have an\nextraordinary way of punishing adultery: the husband of the\nadulteress challenges the adulterer to a combat. The result is\ngenerally the death of both the combatants; but it is held to be\n\"as great dishonour to refuse this combat as to refuse an\ninvitation to a duel among the people of Europe.\"[178] The\npassion of jealousy, the feeling of ownership, and the sense of\nhonour, {450} thus combine to make the seducer's act an offence,\nand often a heinous offence, in the eyes of custom or law; and\nfor the same reasons as in other offences the magnitude of guilt\nis here also influenced by the rank of the parties concerned.\nModern legislation, on the other hand, does not to the same\nextent as early law and custom allow a man to give free vent to\nhis angry passion; it regards the dishonour of the aggrieved\nhusband as a matter of too private a character to be publicly\navenged; and the faithfulness which a wife owes her husband is no\nlonger connected with any idea of ownership. Moreover, the\nseverity of earlier European laws against adultery was closely\nconnected with Christianity's abhorrence of all kinds of\nirregular sexual intercourse; and secular legislation has more\nand more freed itself from the bondage of religious doctrine.\n\n[Footnote 175: See, _e.g._, Casalis, _Basutos_, p. 225; Burton,\n_Two Trips to Gorilla Land_, i. 77; Monrad, _Skildring af\nGuinea-Kysten_, p. 5; Letourneau, _L'\u00e9volution de la morale_,\np. 154 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 176: _Laws of Manu_, ix. 42.]\n\n[Footnote 177: Westermarck, _History of Human Marriage_, p. 130.]\n\n[Footnote 178: Krasheninnikoff, _History of Kamschatka_, p. 238.]\n\nAmong some savage peoples it is the seducer only who suffers,\nwhilst the unfaithful wife escapes without punishment.[179]\nJealousy, in the first place, turns against the rival, and the\nseducer is the dishonourer and the thief. But, as a general rule,\nthe unfaithful wife is also looked upon as an offender, and the\npunishment falls on both. She is discarded, beaten, or\nill-treated in some way or other, and not infrequently she is\nkilled. Often, too, she is disfigured by her enraged husband, so\nthat no man may fall in love with her ever after.[180] Indeed, so\nstrong is the idea that a wife belongs exclusively to her\nhusband, that among several peoples she has to die with him;[181]\nand frequently a widow is prohibited from remarrying either for\never or for a certain period after the husband's death.[182] In\nancient Peru widows generally continued to live single, as \"this\nvirtue was much commended in their laws and ordinances.\"[183] Nor\nis it in China considered proper {451} for a woman to contract a\nsecond marriage after her husband's death, and a lady of rank, by\ndoing so, exposes herself to a penalty of eighty blows.[184] \"As\na faithful minister does not serve two lords, neither may a\nfaithful woman marry a second husband\"--this is to the Chinese a\nprinciple of life, a maxim generally received as gospel.[185]\nAmong so-called Aryan peoples the ancient custom which ordained\nsacrifice of widows survived in the prohibitions issued against\ntheir marrying a second time.[186] Even now the bare mention of a\nsecond marriage for a Hindu woman would be considered the\ngreatest of insults, and, if she married again, \"she would be\nhunted out of society, and no decent person would venture at any\ntime to have the slightest intercourse with her.\"[187] In\nGreece[188] and Rome[189] a widow's remarriage was regarded as an\ninsult to her former husband; and so it is still regarded among\nthe Southern Slavs.[190] The early Christians, especially the\nMontanists and Novatians, strongly disapproved of second\nmarriages by persons of either sex;[191] a second marriage was\ndescribed by them as a \"kind of fornication,\"[192] or as a\n\"specious adultery.\"[193] It was looked upon as a manifest sign\nof incontinence, and also as inconsistent with the doctrine that\nmarriage is an emblem of the union of Christ with the Church.[194]\n\n[Footnote 179: Westermarck, _op. cit._ p. 122. Macpherson,\n_Memorials of Service in India_, p. 133 (Kandhs). Batchelor,\n_Ainu of Japan_, p. 189 _sq._ Scaramucci and Giglioli, 'Notizie\nsui Danakil,' in _Archivio per l'antropologia e la etnologia_,\nxiv. 26.]\n\n[Footnote 180: Westermarck, _op. cit._ p. 122.]\n\n[Footnote 181: _Ibid._ p. 125 _sq._ _Supra_, i. 472 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 182: Westermarck, _History of Human Marriage_, p. 127\n_sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 183: Garcilasso de la Vega, _op. cit._ i. 305.]\n\n[Footnote 184: Gray, _China_, i. 215.]\n\n[Footnote 185: de Groot, _Religious System of China_, (vol. ii.\nbook) i. 745.]\n\n[Footnote 186: Schrader, _Prehistoric Antiquities of the Aryan\nPeoples_, p. 391.]\n\n[Footnote 187: Dubois, _People of India_, p. 132.]\n\n[Footnote 188: Pausanias, ii. 21. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 189: Rossbach, _R\u00f6mische Ehe_, p. 262.]\n\n[Footnote 190: Krauss, _Sitte und Brauch der S\u00fcdslaven_, p. 578.\n_Cf._ Ralston, _Songs of the Russian People_, p. 115 (Bulgarians).]\n\n[Footnote 191: Mayer, _Die Rechte der Israeliten, Athener und\nR\u00f6mer_, ii. 290. Bingham, _op. cit._ vi. 427 _sq._; viii. 13 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 192: Tertullian, _De exhortatione castitatis_, 9\n(Migne, _Patrologi\u00e6 cursus_, ii. 924).]\n\n[Footnote 193: Athenagoras, _Legatio pro Christianis_, 33 (Migne,\n_op. cit._ Ser. Graeca, vi. 967).]\n\n[Footnote 194: Gibbon, _History of the Decline and Fall of the\nRoman Empire_, ii. 187. Lecky, _History of European Morals_, ii. 326.]\n\nConjugal fidelity, whilst considered a stringent duty in the\nwife, is not generally considered so in the husband. This is\nobviously the rule among savage and barbarous tribes; but there\nare interesting exceptions to the rule. The Igorrotes of Luzon\nare so strictly monogamous that {452} in case of adultery the\nguilty party can be compelled to leave the hut and the family for\never,[195] and among various other monogamous savages adultery is\nsaid to be unknown.[196] The Dyak husband \"preserves his vow of\nfidelity with a rectitude which makes jealousy a farce.\"[197] The\nToungtha, who marry only one wife, do not consider it right for a\nmaster to take advantage of his position even with regard to the\nfemale slaves in his house.[198] Nay, the duty of fidelity in the\nhusband has been recognised even by some savage peoples who allow\npolygamy. The Abipones, we are told, thought it both wicked and\ndisgraceful to have any illicit intercourse with other women than\ntheir wives; hence adultery was almost unheard of among\nthem.[199] Among the Omaha Indians, \"if a woman's husband be\nguilty of adultery with another woman she may strike him or the\nguilty female in her anger,\" though she cannot claim\ndamages.[200] In several tribes of Western Victoria a wife whose\nhusband has been unfaithful to her \"may make a complaint to the\nchief, who can punish the man by sending him away from his tribe\nfor two or three moons\";[201] and among some aborigines in New\nSouth Wales similar complaints may be made to the elders of the\ntribe, with the result that the adulterous husband may have to\nsuffer for his conduct.[202] The Kandhs of India deny the married\nman certain prerogatives which are granted to his wife: whilst\nconstancy to her husband is so far from being required in a wife,\n\"that her pretensions do not, at least, suffer diminution in the\neyes of either sex when fines are levied on her convicted\nlovers,\" infidelity in a married man is held to be highly\ndishonourable, and {453} is often punished with deprivation of\nmany social privileges.[203]\n\n[Footnote 195: Meyer, in _Verhandl. Berliner Gesellsch. f.\nAnthrop._ 1883, p. 385.]\n\n[Footnote 196: Bailey, in _Trans. Ethn. Soc._ N. S. ii. 291 _sq._\nHartshorne, in _Indian Antiquary_, viii. 320 (Veddahs). Finsch,\n_Neu-Guinea_, p. 101; Earl, _Papuans_, p. 81 (Papuans of Dorey).]\n\n[Footnote 197: Boyle, _Adventures among the Dyaks of Borneo_,\np. 236. See also Low, _Sarawak_, p. 300 (Hill Dyaks).]\n\n[Footnote 198: Lewin, _Wild Races of South-Eastern India_, p. 193\n_sq._]\n\n[Footnote 199: Dobrizhoffer, _Account of the Abipones_, ii. 138.]\n\n[Footnote 200: Dorsey, 'Omaha Sociology,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur.\nEthn._ iii. 364.]\n\n[Footnote 201: Dawson, _Australian Aborigines_, p. 33.]\n\n[Footnote 202: Nieboer, _Slavery as an Industrial System_, p. 18.]\n\n[Footnote 203: Macpherson, _Memorials of Service in India_, p. 133.]\n\nThe duty which savages thus in certain instances have imposed on\nthe husband is hardly at all recognised in the archaic State. The\nMexicans \"did not consider, nor did they punish, as adultery the\ntrespass of a husband with any woman who was free, or not joined\nin matrimony; wherefore the husband was not bound to so much\nfidelity as was exacted from the wife,\" adultery in her being\ninevitably punished with death.[204] In China, where adultery in\na woman is branded as one of the vilest crimes and the guilty\nwife is oftentimes \"cut into small pieces,\" concubinage is a\nrecognised institution of the country.[205] In Corea \"conjugal\nfidelity--obligatory on the woman--is not required of the\nhusband. . . . Among the nobles, the young bridegroom spends\nthree or four days with his bride, and then absents himself from\nher for a considerable time, to prove that he does not esteem her\ntoo highly. Etiquette dooms her to a species of widowhood, while\nhe spends his hours of relaxation in the society of his\nconcubines. To act otherwise would be considered in very bad\ntaste, and highly unfashionable.\"[206] In Japan, \"while the man\nis allowed a loose foot, the woman is expected not only to be\nabsolutely spotless, but also never to show any jealousy, however\nwide the husband may roam, or however numerous may be the\nconcubines in his family.\"[207] According to Hebrew law adultery\nwas a capital offence, but it presupposed that the guilty woman\nwas another man's wife.[208] The \"Aryan\" nations in early times\ngenerally saw nothing objectionable in the unfaithfulness of a\nmarried man, whereas an adulterous wife was subject to the\nseverest penalties.[209] Until some time after the introduction\nof Christianity among the Teutons their {454} law-books made no\nmention of the infidelity of husbands, because it was permitted\nby custom.[210] The Romans defined adultery as sexual intercourse\nwith another man's wife; on the other hand, the intercourse of a\nmarried man with an unmarried woman was not regarded as\nadultery.[211] The ordinary Greek feeling on the subject is\nexpressed in the oration against Ne\u00e6ra, ascribed to Demosthenes,\nwhere the licence accorded to husbands is spoken of as a matter\nof course:--\"We keep mistresses for our pleasures, concubines for\nconstant attendance, and wives to bear us legitimate children and\nto be our faithful house-keepers.\"[212]\n\n[Footnote 204: Clavigero, _History of Mexico_, i. 356.]\n\n[Footnote 205: Doolittle, _op. cit._ i. 339. Griffis, _Religions\nof Japan_, p. 149.]\n\n[Footnote 206: Griffis, _Corea_, p. 251 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 207: _Idem_, _Religions of Japan_, p. 320.]\n\n[Footnote 208: _Leviticus_, xx. 10. _Deuteronomy_, xxii. 22.]\n\n[Footnote 209: Schrader, _Prehistoric Antiquities of the Aryan\nPeoples_, p. 388.]\n\n[Footnote 210: Wilda, _Strafrecht der Germanen_, p. 821.\nNordstr\u00f6m, _op. cit._ ii. 67 _sq._ Stemann, _Den danske\nRetshistorie indtil Christian V.'s Lov_, pp. 324, 633. Keyser,\n_Efterladte Skrifter_, vol. ii. pt. ii. 32 _sq._ Brunner,\n_Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte_, ii. 662.]\n\n[Footnote 211: Vinnius, _In quatuor libros institutionum\nimperialium commentarius_, iv. 18. 4, p. 993. _Cf._ _Digesta_, l.\n16. 101. 1; Mommsen, _R\u00f6misches Strafrecht_, p. 688 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 212: _Oratio in Ne\u00e6ram_, p. 1386. _Cf._ Schmidt, _Die\nEthik der alten Griechen_, ii. 196 _sq._]\n\nAt the same time the idea that fidelity in marriage ought to be\nreciprocal was not altogether unknown in classical\nantiquity.[213] In a lost chapter of his 'Economics,' which has\ncome to us only through a Latin translation, Aristotle points out\nthat it for various reasons is prudent for a man to be faithful\nto his wife, but that nothing is so peculiarly the property of a\nwife as a chaste and hallowed intercourse.[214] Plutarch condemns\nthe man who, lustful and dissolute, goes astray with a courtesan\nor maid-servant; though at the same time he admonishes the wife\nnot to be vexed or impatient, considering that \"it is out of\nrespect to her that he bestows upon another all his wanton\ndepravity.\"[215] Plautus argues that it is unjust of a husband to\nexact a fidelity which he does not keep himself.[216]\n\n[Footnote 213: Lecky, _op. cit._ ii. 312 _sq._ Schmidt, _op.\ncit._ ii. 195 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 214: Aristotle, _[OE]conomica_, p. 341, vol. ii. 679.\n_Cf._ Isocrates, _Nicocles sive Cyprii_, 40.]\n\n[Footnote 215: Plutarch, _Conjugalia pr\u00e6cepta_, 16.]\n\n[Footnote 216: Plautus, _Mercator_, iv. 5.]\n\nIn its condemnation of adultery Christianity made no distinction\nbetween husband and wife.[217] If continence is a stringent duty\nfor unmarried persons independently of {455} their sex, the\nobservance of the sacred marriage vow must be so in a still\nhigher degree. But here again there is a considerable discrepancy\nbetween the actual feelings of Christian peoples and the standard\nof their religion. Even in the laws of various European countries\nrelating to divorce or judicial separation we find an echo of the\npopular notion that adultery is a smaller offence in a husband\nthan in a wife.[218]\n\n[Footnote 217: Laurent, _op. cit._ iv. 114. Gratian, _Decretum_,\nii. 35. 5. 23.]\n\n[Footnote 218: See _supra_, ii. 397.]\n\nThe judgment pronounced upon an unfaithful husband is of course\ninfluenced by the opinion about extra-matrimonial connections in\ngeneral. Where it is considered wrong for a man to have\nintercourse with either an unmarried woman or another man's wife,\nadultery in a husband is _eo ipso_ condemned. But whether, or how\nfar, infidelity on his part is stigmatised as an offence against\nhis wife, chiefly depends upon the degree of regard which is paid\nto the feelings of women. That a married man generally enjoys\nmore liberty than a married woman is largely due to the same\ncauses as make him the more privileged partner in other respects;\nbut there are also special reasons for this inequality between\nthe sexes. It was a doctrine of the Roman jurists that adultery\nis a crime in the wife, and in the wife only, on account of the\ndanger of introducing strange children to the husband.[219]\nMoreover, the temptation to infidelity and the facility in\nindulging in it are commonly greater in the case of the husband\nthan in that of the wife; and, as we have often noticed before,\nactual practice is always apt to influence moral opinion. And a\nstill more important reason for the inequality in question is\nundoubtedly the general notion that unchastity of any kind is\nmore discreditable for a woman than for a man.\n\n[Footnote 219: Hunter, _Exposition of Roman Law_, p. 1071.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XLIII\n\nHOMOSEXUAL LOVE\n\n\nOUR review of the moral ideas concerning sexual relations has not\nyet come to an end. The gratification of the sexual instinct\nassumes forms which fall outside the ordinary pale of nature. Of\nthese there is one which, on account of the _r\u00f4le_ which it has\nplayed in the moral history of mankind, cannot be passed over in\nsilence, namely, intercourse between individuals of the same sex,\nwhat is nowadays commonly called homosexual love.\n\nIt is frequently met with among the lower animals.[1] It probably\noccurs, at least sporadically, among every race of mankind.[2]\nAnd among some peoples it has assumed such proportions as to form\na true national habit.\n\n[Footnote 1: Karsch, 'P\u00e4derastie und Tribadie bei den Tieren,' in\n_Jahrbuch f\u00fcr sexuelle Zwischenstufen_, ii. 126 _sqq._ Havelock\nEllis, _Studies in the Psychology of Sex_, 'Sexual Inversion,' p.\n2 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 2: Ives, _Classification of Crimes_, p. 49. The\nstatement that it is unknown among a certain people cannot\nreasonably mean that it may not be practised in secret.]\n\nIn America homosexual customs have been observed among a great\nnumber of the native tribes. In nearly every part of the\ncontinent there seem to have been, since ancient times, men\ndressing themselves in the clothes and performing the functions\nof women, and living with other men as their concubines or\nwives.[3] Moreover, between {457} young men who are comrades in\narms there are _liaisons d'amiti\u00e9_, which, according to Lafitau,\n\"ne laissent aucun soup\u00e7on de vice apparent, quoiqu'il y ait, ou\nqu'il puisse y avoir, beaucoup de vice r\u00e9el.\"[4]\n\n[Footnote 3: von Spix and von Martius, _Travels in Brazil_, ii.\n246; von Martius, _Von dem Rechtszustande unter den Ureinwohnern\nBrasiliens_, p. 27 _sq._; Lomonaco, 'Sulle razze indigene del\nBrasile,' in _Archivio per l'antropologia e la etnologia_, xix.\n46; Burton, _Arabian Nights_, x. 246 (Brazilian Indians).\nGarcilasso de la Vega, _First Part of the Royal Commentaries of\nthe Yncas_, ii. 441 _sqq._; Cieza de Leon, 'La cr\u00f3nica del Per\u00fa\n[primera parte],' ch. 49, in _Biblioteca de autores espa\u00f1oles_,\nxxvi. 403 (Peruvian Indians at the time of the Spanish conquest).\nOviedo y Vald\u00e9s, 'Sumario de la natural historia de las Indias,'\nch. 81, in _Biblioteca de autores espa\u00f1oles_, xxii. 508\n(Isthmians). Bancroft, _Native Races of the Pacific States_, i.\n585 (Indians of New Mexico); ii. 467 _sq._ (ancient Mexicans).\nDiaz del Castillo, 'Conquista de Nueva-Espa\u00f1a,' ch. 208, in\n_Biblioteca de autores espa\u00f1oles_, xxvi. 309 (ancient Mexicans).\nLanda, _Relacion de las cosas de Yucatan_, p. 178 (ancient\nYucatans). Nu\u00f1ez Cabeza de Vaca, 'Naufragios y relacion de la\njornada que hizo a la Florida,' ch. 26, in _Biblioteca de autores\nespa\u00f1oles_, xxii. 538; Coreal, _Voyages aux Indes Occidentales_,\ni. 33 _sq._ (Indians of Florida). Perrin du Lac, _Voyage dans les\ndeux Louisianes et chez les nations sauvages du Missouri_, p.\n352; Bossu, _Travels through Louisiana_, i. 303. Hennepin,\n_Nouvelle D\u00e9couverte d'un tr\u00e8s Grand Pays Situ\u00e9 dans l'Amerique_,\np. 219 _sq._; 'La Salle's Last Expedition and Discoveries in\nNorth America,' in _Collections of the New-York Historical\nSociety_, ii. 237 _sq._; de Lahontan, _M\u00e9moires de l'Am\u00e9rique\nseptentrionale_, p. 142 (Illinois). Marquette, _Recit des\nvoyages_, p. 52 _sq._ (Illinois and Naudowessies). Wied-Neuwied,\n_Travels in the Interior of North America_, p. 351 (Manitaries,\nMandans, &c.). McCoy, _History of Baptist Indian Missions_,\np. 360 _sq._ (Osages). Heriot, _Travels through the Canadas_,\np. 278; Catlin, _North American Indians_, ii. 214 _sq._ (Sioux).\nDorsey, 'Omaha Sociology,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ iii. 365;\nJames, _Expedition from Pittsburgh to the Rocky Mountains_,\ni. 267 (Omahas). Loskiel, _History of the Mission of the United\nBrethren among the Indians_, 1.14 (Iroquois). Richardson, _Arctic\nSearching Expedition_, ii. 42 (Crees). Oswald, quoted by Bastian,\n_Der Mensch in der Geschichte_, iii. 314 (Indians of California).\nHolder, in _New York Medical Journal_, December 7th, 1889, quoted\nby Havelock Ellis, _op. cit._ p. 9 _sq._ (Indians of Washington\nand other tribes in the North-Western United States). See also\nKarsch, 'Uranismus oder P\u00e4derastie und Tribadie bei den Naturv\u00f6lkern,'\nin _Jahrbuch f\u00fcr sexuelle Zwischenstufen_, iii. 112 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 4: Lafitau, _Moeurs des sauvages ameriquains_, i. 603,\n607 _sqq._]\n\nHomosexual practices are, or have been, very prominent among the\npeoples in the neighbourhood of Behring Sea.[5] In Kadiak it was\nthe custom for parents who had a girl-like son to dress and rear\nhim as a girl, teaching him only domestic duties, keeping him at\nwoman's work, and letting him associate only with women and\ngirls. Arriving at the age of ten or fifteen years, he was\nmarried to some wealthy man and was then called an _achnuchik_ or\n_shoopan_.[6] Dr. Bogoraz gives the following account of a {458}\nsimilar practice prevalent among the Chukchi:--\"It happens\nfrequently that, under the supernatural influence of one of their\nshamans, or priests, a Chukchi lad at sixteen years of age will\nsuddenly relinquish his sex and imagine himself to be a woman. He\nadopts a woman's attire, lets his hair grow, and devotes himself\naltogether to female occupation. Furthermore, this disowner of\nhis sex takes a husband into the _yurt_ and does all the work\nwhich is usually incumbent on the wife in most unnatural and\nvoluntary subjection. Thus it frequently happens in a _yurt_ that\nthe husband is a woman, while the wife is a man! These abnormal\nchanges of sex imply the most abject immorality in the community,\nand appear to be strongly encouraged by the shamans, who\ninterpret such cases as an injunction of their individual deity.\"\nThe change of sex was usually accompanied by future shamanship;\nindeed, nearly all the shamans were former delinquents of their\nsex.[7] Among the Chukchi male shamans who are clothed in woman's\nattire and are believed to be transformed physically into women\nare still quite common; and traces of the change of a shaman's\nsex into that of a woman may be found among many other Siberian\ntribes.[8] In some cases at least there can be no doubt that\nthese transformations were connected with homosexual practices.\nIn his description of the Koriaks, Krasheninnikoff makes mention\nof the _ke'yev_, that is, men occupying the position of\nconcubines; and he compares them with the Kamchadale _koe'k[vc]u[vc]_,\nas he calls them, that is, men transformed into women. Every\n_koe'k[vc]u[vc]_, he says, is regarded as a magician and interpreter\nof dreams; but from his confused description Mr. Jochelson thinks it\nmay be inferred that the most important feature of the\ninstitution of the _koe'k[vc]u[vc]_ lay, not in their shamanistic\npower, but in their position with regard to the satisfaction of\nthe {459} unnatural inclinations of the Kamchadales. The\n_koe'k[vc]u[vc]_ wore women's clothes, did women's work, and were in\nthe position of wives or concubines.[9]\n\n[Footnote 5: Dall, _Alaska_, p. 402; Bancroft, _op. cit._ i. 92;\nWaitz, _Anthropologie der Naturv\u00f6lker_, iii. 314 (Aleuts), von\nLangsdorf, _Voyages and Travels_, ii. 48 (natives of Oonalaska).\nSteller, _Kamtschatka_, p. 289, n. _a_; Georgi, _Russia_, iii.\n132 _sq._ (Kamchadales).]\n\n[Footnote 6: Davydow, quoted by Holmberg, 'Ethnographische\nSkizzen \u00fcber die V\u00f6lker des russischen Amerika,' in _Acta Soc.\nScientiarum Fennic\u00e6_, iv. 400 _sq._ Lisiansky, _Voyage Round the\nWorld_, p. 199. von Langsdorf**, _op. cit._ ii. 64. Sauer,\n_Billing's Expedition to the Northern Parts of Russia_, p. 176.\nSarytschew, 'Voyage of Discovery to the North-East of Siberia,'\nin _Collection of Modern and Contemporary Voyages_, vi. 16.]\n\n[Footnote 7: Bogoraz, quoted by Demidoff, _Shooting Trip to\nKamchatka_, p. 74 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 8: Jochelson, _Koryak Religion and Myth_, pp. 52, 53 n. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 9: Jochelson, _op. cit._ p. 52 _sq._]\n\nIn the Malay Archipelago homosexual love is common,[10] though\nnot in all of the islands.[11] It is widely spread among the\nBataks of Sumatra.[12] In Bali it is practised openly, and there\nare persons who make it a profession.[13] The _basir_ of the\nDyaks are men who make their living by witchcraft and debauchery.\nThey \"are dressed as women, they are made use of at idolatrous\nfeasts and for sodomitic abominations, and many of them are\nformally married to other men.\"[14] Dr. Haddon says that he never\nheard of any unnatural offences in Torres Straits;[15] but in the\nRigo district of British New Guinea several instances of\npederasty have been met with,[16] and at Mowat in Daudai it is\nregularly indulged in.[17] Homosexual love is reported as common\namong the Marshall Islanders[18] and in Hawaii.[19] From Tahiti\nwe hear of a set of men called by the natives _mahoos_, who\n\"assume the dress, attitude, and manners, of women, and affect\nall the fantastic oddities and coquetries of the vainest of\nfemales. They mostly associate with the women, who court their\nacquaintance. With the manners of the women, they adopt their\npeculiar employments. . . . The encouragement of this abomination\nis almost solely {460} confined to the chiefs.\"[20] Of the New\nCaledonians M. Foley writes:--\"La plus grande fraternit\u00e9 n'est\npas chez eux la fraternit\u00e9 uterine, mais la fraternit\u00e9 des armes.\nIl en est ainsi surtout au village de Poepo. Il est vrai que\ncette fraternit\u00e9 des armes est compliqu\u00e9e de p\u00e9d\u00e9rastie.\"[21]\n\n[Footnote 10: Wilken, 'Plechtigheden en gebruiken bij verlovingen\nen huwelijken bij de volken van den Indischen Archipel,' in\n_Bijdragen tot de taal- land- en volkenkunde van Nederlandsch-Indi\u00eb_,\nxxxiii. (ser. v. vol. iv.) p. 457 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 11: Crawfurd, _History of the Indian Archipelago_,\niii. 139. Marsden, _History of Sumatra_, p. 261.]\n\n[Footnote 12: Junghuhn, _Die Battal\u00e4nder auf Sumatra_, ii. 157, n.*]\n\n[Footnote 13: Jacobs, _Eenigen tijd onder de Bali\u00ebrs_, pp. 14,\n134 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 14: Hardeland, _Dajacksch-deutsches W\u00f6rterbuch_, p. 53\n_sq._ Schwaner, _Borneo_, i. 186. Perelaer, _Ethnographische\nbeschrijving der Dajaks_, p. 32.]\n\n[Footnote 15: Haddon, 'Ethnography of the Western Tribe of Torres\nStraits,' in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xix. 315.]\n\n[Footnote 16: Seligmann, 'Sexual Inversion among Primitive\nRaces,' in _The Alienist and Neurologist_, xxiii. 3 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 17: Beardmore, 'Natives of Mowat, Daudai, New Guinea,'\nin _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xix. 464. Haddon, _ibid._ xix. 315.]\n\n[Footnote 18: Hernsheim, _Beitrag zur Sprache der Marshall-Inseln_,\np. 40. A different opinion is expressed by Senfft, in Steinmetz,\n_Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse von eingeborenen V\u00f6lkern in Afrika und\nOzeanien_, p. 437.]\n\n[Footnote 19: Remy, _Ka Mooolelo Hawaii_, p. xliii.]\n\n[Footnote 20: Turnbull, _Voyage Round the World_, p. 382. See\nalso Wilson, _Missionary Voyage to the Southern Pacific_, pp.\n333, 361; Ellis, _Polynesian Researches_, i. 246, 258.]\n\n[Footnote 21: Foley, 'Sur les habitations et les m[oe]urs des\nN\u00e9o-Cal\u00e9doniens,' in _Bull. Soc. d'Anthrop. Paris_, ser. iii.\nvol. ii. 606. See also de Rochas, _Nouvelle Cal\u00e9donie_, p. 235.]\n\nAmong the natives of the Kimberley District in West Australia, if\na young man on reaching a marriageable age can find no wife, he\nis presented with a boy-wife, known as _chookadoo_. In this case,\nalso, the ordinary exogamic rules are observed, and the \"husband\"\nhas to avoid his \"mother-in-law,\" just as if he were married to a\nwoman. The _chookadoo_ is a boy of five years to about ten, when\nhe is initiated. \"The relations which exist between him and his\nprotecting _billalu_\" says Mr. Hardman, \"are somewhat doubtful.\nThere is no doubt they have connection, but the natives repudiate\nwith horror and disgust the idea of sodomy.\"[22] Such marriages\nare evidently exceedingly common. As the women are generally\nmonopolised by the older and more influential men of the tribe,\nit is rare to find a man under thirty or forty who has a wife;\nhence it is the rule that, when a boy becomes five years old, he\nis given as a boy-wife to one of the young men.[23] According to\nMr. Purcell's description of the natives of the same district,\n\"every useless member of the tribe\" gets a boy, about five or\nseven years old; and these boys, who are called _mullawongahs_,\nare used for sexual purposes.[24] Among the Chingalee of South\nAustralia, Northern Territory, old men are often noticed with no\nwives but accompanied by one or two boys, whom they jealously\nguard and with whom they have sodomitic intercourse.[25] {461}\nThat homosexual practices are not unknown among other Australian\ntribes may be inferred from Mr. Hewitt's statement relating to\nSouth-Eastern natives, that unnatural offences are forbidden to\nthe novices by the old men and guardians after leaving the\ninitiation camp.[26]\n\n[Footnote 22: Hardman, 'Notes on some Habits and Customs of the\nNatives of the Kimberley District,' in _Proceed. Roy. Irish\nAcademy_, ser. iii. vol. i. 74.]\n\n[Footnote 23: _Ibid._ pp. 71, 73.]\n\n[Footnote 24: Purcell, 'Rites and Customs of Australian\nAborigines,' in _Verhandl. Berliner Gesellsch. Anthrop._ 1893,\np. 287.]\n\n[Footnote 25: Ravenscroft, 'Some Habits and Customs of the\nChingalee Tribe,' in _Trans. Roy. Soc. South Australia_, xv. 122.\nI am indebted to Mr. N. W. Thomas for drawing my attention to\nthese statements.]\n\n[Footnote 26: Howitt, 'Some Australian Ceremonies of Initiation,'\nin _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xiii. 450.]\n\nIn Madagascar there are certain boys who live like women and have\nintercourse with men, paying those men who please them.[27] In an\nold account of that island, dating from the seventeenth century,\nit is said: \"II y a . . . quelques hommes qu'ils appellent\nTsecats, qui sont hommes effeminez et impuissans, qui recherchent\nles gar\u00e7ons, et font mine d'en estre amoureux, en contrefaisans\nles filles et se vestans ainsi qu'elles leurs font des presents\npour dormir auec eux, et mesmes se donnent des noms de filles, en\nfaisant les honteuses et les modestes. . . . Ils ha\u00efssent les\nfemmes et ne les veulent point hanter.\"[28] Men behaving like\nwomen have also been observed among the Ondonga in German\nSouth-West Africa[29] and the Diakit\u00e9-Sarracolese in the French\nSoudan,[30] but as regards their sexual habits details are\nwanting. Homosexual practices are common among the Banaka and\nBapuku in the Cameroons.[31] But among the natives of Africa\ngenerally such practices seem to be comparatively rare,[32]\nexcept among Arabic-speaking {462} peoples and in countries like\nZanzibar,[33] where there has been a strong Arab influence. In\nNorth Africa they are not restricted to the inhabitants of towns;\nthey are frequent among the peasants of Egypt[34] and universal\namong the Jb\u00e2la inhabiting the Northern mountains of Morocco. On\nthe other hand, they are much less common or even rare among the\nBerbers and the nomadic Bedouins,[35] and it is reported that the\nBedouins of Arabia are quite exempt from them.[36]\n\n[Footnote 27: Lasnet, in _Annales d'hygi\u00e8ne et de m\u00e9decine\ncoloniales_, 1899, p. 494, quoted by Havelock Ellis, _op. cit._\np. 10. _Cf._ Rencurel, in _Annales d'hygi\u00e8ne_, 1900, p. 562,\nquoted _ibid._ p. 11 _sq._ See also Legu\u00e9vel de Lacombe, _Voyage\n\u00e0 Madagascar_, i. 97 _sq._ Pederasty prevails to some extent in\nthe island of Nossi-B\u00e9, close to Madagascar, and is very common\nat Ankisimane, opposite to it, on Jassandava Bay (Walter, in\nSteinmetz, _Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_, p. 376).]\n\n[Footnote 28: de Flacourt, _Histoire de la grande isle\nMadagascar_, p. 86.]\n\n[Footnote 29: Rautanen, in Steinmetz, _Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_, p. 333.]\n\n[Footnote 30: Nicole, _ibid._ p. 111.]\n\n[Footnote 31: _Ibid._ p. 38.]\n\n[Footnote 32: Munzinger, _Ostafrikanische Studien_, p. 525 (Barea\nand Kun\u00e1ma). Baumann, 'Contr\u00e4re Sexual-Erscheinungen bei der\nNeger-Bev\u00f6lkerung Zanzibars,' in _Verhandl. der Berliner\nGesellsch. f\u00fcr Anthropologie_, 1899, p. 668. Felkin, 'Notes on\nthe Waganda Tribe of Central Africa,' in _Proceed. Roy. Soc.\nEdinburgh_, xiii. 723. Johnston, _British Central Africa_, p. 404\n(Bakongo). Monrad, _Skildring af Guinea-Kysten_, p. 57 (Negroes\nof Accra). Torday and Joyce, 'Ethnography of the Ba-Mbala,' in\n_Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxxv. 410. Nicole, in Steinmetz,\n_Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_, p. 111 (Muhammedan Negroes). Tellier,\n_ibid._ p. 159 (Kreis Kita in the French Soudan). Beverley,\n_ibid._ p. 210 (Wagogo). Kraft, _ibid._ p. 288 (Wapokomo).]\n\n[Footnote 33: Baumann, in _Verhandl. Berliner Gesellsch.\nAnthrop._ 1899, p. 668 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 34: Burckhardt, _Travels in Nubia_, p. 135.]\n\n[Footnote 35: d'Escayrac de Lauture, _Afrikanische W\u00fcste_, p. 93.]\n\n[Footnote 36: Burckhardt, _Travels in Arabia_, i. 364. See also\nvon Kremer, _Culturgeschichte des Orients_, ii. 269.]\n\nHomosexual love is spread over Asia Minor and Mesopotamia.[37] It\nis very prevalent among the Tartars and Karatchai of the\nCaucasus,[38] the Persians,[39] Sikhs,[40] and Afghans; in Kaubul\na bazaar or street is set apart for it.[41] Old travellers make\nreference to its enormous frequency among the Muhammedans of\nIndia,[42] and in this respect time seems to have produced no\nchange.[43] In China, where it is also extremely common, there\nare special houses devoted to male prostitution, and boys are\nsold by their parents about the age of four, to be trained for\nthis occupation.[44] In Japan pederasty is said by some to have\nprevailed from the most ancient times, whereas others are of\nopinion that it was introduced by Buddhism about the sixth\ncentury of our era. The monks used to live with handsome youths,\nto whom they were often passionately devoted; and in feudal times\nnearly every knight had as {463} his favourite a young man with\nwhom he entertained relations of the most intimate kind, and on\nbehalf of whom he was always ready to fight a duel when occasion\noccurred. Tea-houses with male _gheishas_ were found in Japan\ntill the middle of the nineteenth century. Nowadays pederasty\nseems to be more prevalent in the Southern than in the Northern\nprovinces of the country, but there are also districts where it\nis hardly known.[45]\n\n[Footnote 37: Burton, _Arabian Nights_, x. 232.]\n\n[Footnote 38: Kovalewsky, _Coutume contemporaine_, p. 340.]\n\n[Footnote 39: Polak, 'Die Prostitution in Persien,' in _Wiener\nMedizinische Wochenschrift_, xi. 627 _sqq._ _Idem_, _Persien_, i.\n237. Burton, _Arabian Nights_, x. 233 _sq._ Wilson, _Persian Life\nand Customs_, p. 229.]\n\n[Footnote 40: Malcolm, _Sketch of the Sikhs_, p. 140. Havelock\nEllis, _op. cit._ p. 5, n. 2. Burton, _Arabian Nights_, x. 236.]\n\n[Footnote 41: Wilson, _Abode of Snow_, p. 420. Burton, _Arabian\nNights_, x. 236.]\n\n[Footnote 42: Stavorinus, _Voyages to the East-Indies_, i. 456.\nFryer, _New Account of East-India_, p. 97. Chevers, _Manual of\nMedical Jurisprudence for India_, p. 705.]\n\n[Footnote 43: Chevers, _op. cit._ p. 708.]\n\n[Footnote 44: _Indo-Chinese Gleaner_, iii. 193. Wells Williams,\n_The Middle Kingdom_, i. 836. Matignon, 'Deux mots sur la\np\u00e9d\u00e9rastie en Chine,' in _Archives d'anthropologie criminelle_,\nxiv. 38 _sqq._ Karsch, _Das gleichgeschlechtliche Leben der\nOstasiaten_, p. 6 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 45: Jwaya, 'Nan sho k,' in _Jahrbuch f\u00fcr sexuelle\nZwischenstufen_, iv. 266, 268, 270. Karsch, _op. cit._ p. 71 _sqq._]\n\nNo reference is made to pederasty either in the Homeric poems or\nby Hesiod, but later on we meet with it almost as a national\ninstitution in Greece. It was known in Rome and other parts of\nItaly at an early period;[46] but here also it became much more\nfrequent in the course of time. At the close of the sixth\ncentury, Polybius tells us, many Romans paid a talent for the\npossession of a beautiful youth.[47] During the Empire \"il \u00e9tait\nd'usage, dans les families patriciennes, de donner au jeune homme\npub\u00e8re un esclave du m\u00eame \u00e2ge comme compagnon de lit, afin qu'il\np\u00fbt satisfaire . . . 'ses premiers \u00e9lans' g\u00e9n\u00e9siques\";[48] and\nformal marriages between men were introduced with all the\nsolemnities of ordinary nuptials.[49] Homosexual practices\noccurred among the Celts,[50] and were by no means unknown to the\nancient Scandinavians, who had a whole nomenclature on the\nsubject.[51]\n\n[Footnote 46:  Dionysius of Halicarnassus, _Antiquitates Roman\u00e6_,\nvii. 2. Athen\u00e6us, _Deipnosophist\u00e6_, xii. 14, p. 518 (Etruscans).\nRein, _Criminalrecht der R\u00f6mer_, p. 863.]\n\n[Footnote 47: Polybius, _Histori\u00e6_, xxxii. 11. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 48: Buret, _La syphilis aujourd'hui et chez les\nanciens_, p. 197 _sqq._ Catullus, _Carmina_, lxi. ('In Nuptias\nJuli\u00e6 et Manlii'), 128 _sqq._ _Cf._ Martial, _Epigrammata_, viii.\n44. 16 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 49: Juvenal, _Satir\u00e6_, ii. 117 _sqq._ Martial, _op.\ncit._ xii. 42.]\n\n[Footnote 50: Diodorus Siculus, _Bibliotheca historica_, v. 32.\n7. Aristotle, _Politica_, ii. 9, p. 1269 b.]\n\n[Footnote 51: 'Spuren von Kontr\u00e4rsexualit\u00e4t bei den alten\nSkandinaviern,' in _Jahrbuch f\u00fcr sexuelle Zwischenstufen_, iv.\n244 _sqq._]\n\nOf late years a voluminous and constantly increasing literature\non homosexuality[52] has revealed its frequency in modern Europe.\nNo country and no class of society is free from it. In certain\nparts of Albania it even exists as a popular custom, the young\nmen from the age of sixteen {464} upwards regularly having boy\nfavourites of between twelve and seventeen.[53]\n\n[Footnote 52: See _infra_, Additional Notes.]\n\n[Footnote 53: Hahn, _Albanesische Studien_, i. 168.]\n\nThe above statements chiefly refer to homosexual practices\nbetween men, but similar practices also occur between women.[54]\nAmong the American aborigines there are not only men who behave\nlike women, but women who behave like men. Thus in certain\nBrazilian tribes women are found who abstain from every womanly\noccupation and imitate the men in everything, who wear their hair\nin a masculine fashion, who go to war with a bow and arrows, who\nhunt together with the men, and who would rather allow themselves\nto be killed than have sexual intercourse with a man. \"Each of\nthese women has a woman who serves her and with whom she says she\nis married; they live together as husband and wife.\"[55] So also\nthere are among the Eastern Eskimo some women who refuse to\naccept husbands, preferring to adopt masculine manners, following\nthe deer on the mountains, trapping and fishing for\nthemselves.[56] Homosexual practices are said to be common among\nHottentot[57] and Herero[58] women. In Zanzibar there are women\nwho wear men's clothes in private, show a preference for\nmasculine occupations, and seek sexual satisfaction among women\nwho have the same inclination, or else among normal women who are\nwon over by presents or other means.[59] In Egyptian harems every\nwoman is said to have a \"friend.\"[60] In Bali homosexuality is\nalmost as common among women as among men, though it is exercised\nmore secretly;[61] and the same seems to be the case in\nIndia.[62] From Greek antiquity we {465} hear of \"Lesbian\" love.\nThe fact that homosexuality has been much more frequently noticed\nin men than in women does not imply that the latter are less\naddicted to it. For various reasons the sexual abnormalities of\nwomen have attracted much less attention,[63] and moral opinion\nhas generally taken little notice of them.\n\n[Footnote 54: Karsch, in _Jahrbuch f\u00fcr sexuelle Zwischenstufen_,\niii. 85 _sqq._ Ploss-Bartels, _Das Weib_, i. 517 _sqq._ von\nKrafft-Ebing, _Psychopathia sexualis_, p. 278 _sqq._ Moll, _Die\nContr\u00e4re Sexualempfindung_, p. 247 _sqq._ Havelock Ellis, _op.\ncit._ p. 118 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 55: Magalhanes de Gandavo, _Histoire de la Province de\nSancta-Cruz_, p. 116 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 56: Dall, _op. cit._ p. 139.]\n\n[Footnote 57: Fritsch, quoted by Karsch, in _Jahrbuch f\u00fcr\nsexuelle Zwischenstufen_, iii. 87 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 58: Fritsch, _Die Eingeborenen S\u00fcd-Afrika's_, p. 227.\n_Cf._ Schinz, _Deutsch-S\u00fcdwest-Afrika_, pp. 173, 177.]\n\n[Footnote 59: Baumann, in _Verhandl. Berliner Gesellsch.\nAnthrop._ 1899, p. 668 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 60: Havelock Ellis, _op. cit._ p. 123.]\n\n[Footnote 61: Jacobs, _Eenigen tijd onder de Bali\u00ebrs_, p. 134 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 62: Havelock Ellis, _op. cit._ p. 124 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 63: See _ibid._ p. 121 _sq._]\n\nHomosexual practices are due sometimes to instinctive preference,\nsometimes to external conditions unfavourable to normal\nintercourse.[64] A frequent cause is congenital sexual inversion,\nthat is, \"sexual instinct turned by inborn constitutional\nabnormality toward persons of the same sex.\"[65] It seems likely\nthat the feminine men and the masculine women referred to above\nare, at least in many instances, sexual inverts; though, in the\ncase of shamans, the change of sex may also result from the\nbelief that such transformed shamans, like their female\ncolleagues, are particularly powerful.[66] Dr. Holder affirms the\nexistence of congenital inversion among the North-Western tribes\nof the United States,[67] Dr. Baumann among the people of\nZanzibar;[68] and in Morocco, also, I believe it is common\nenough. But as regards its prevalence among non-European peoples\nwe have mostly to resort to mere conjectures; our real knowledge\nof congenital inversion is derived from the voluntary confessions\nof inverts. The large majority of travellers are totally ignorant\nof the psychological side of the subject, and even to an expert\nit must very often be impossible to decide whether a certain case\nof inversion is congenital or acquired. Indeed, acquired\ninversion itself presupposes an innate disposition which under\ncertain circumstances develops into actual inversion.[69] Even\nbetween inversion and normal sexuality {466} there seem to be all\nshades of variation. Professor James thinks that inversion is \"a\nkind of sexual appetite, of which very likely most men possess\nthe germinal possibility.\"[70] This is certainly the case in\nearly puberty.[71]\n\n[Footnote 64: Another reason for such practices is given by Mr.\nBeardmore (in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xix. 464), with reference to\nthe Papuans of Mowat. He says that they indulge in sodomy because\ntoo great increase of population is undesired amongst the younger\nportion of the married people. _Cf._ _infra_, p. 484 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 65: Havelock Ellis, _op. cit._ p. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 66: Jochelson, _op. cit._ p. 52 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 67: Holder, quoted by Havelock Ellis, _op. cit._ p. 9 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 68: Baumann, in _Verhandl. Berliner Gesellsch.\nAnthrop._ 1899, p. 668 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 69: F\u00e9r\u00e9, _L'instinct sexuel_, quoted by Havelock\nEllis, _op. cit._ p. 41.]\n\n[Footnote 70: James, _Principles of Psychology_, ii. 439. See\nalso Ives, _op. cit._ p. 56 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 71: Dr. Dessoir ('Zur Psychologie der Vita sexualis,'\nin _Allgemeine Zeitschrift f\u00fcr Psychiatrie_, l. 942) even goes so\nfar as to conclude that \"an undifferentiated sexual feeling is\nnormal, on the average, during the first years of puberty.\" But\nthis is certainly an exaggeration (_cf._ Havelock Ellis, _op.\ncit._ p. 47 _sq._).]\n\nA very important cause of homosexual practices is absence of the\nother sex. There are many instances of this among the lower\nanimals.[72] Buffon long ago observed that, if male or female\nbirds of various species were shut up together, they would soon\nbegin to have sexual relations among themselves, the males sooner\nthan the females.[73] The West Australian boy-marriage is a\nsubstitute for ordinary marriage in cases when women are not\nobtainable. Among the Boror\u00f3 of Brazil homosexual intercourse is\nsaid to occur in their men-houses only when the scarcity of\naccessible girls is unusually great.[74] Its prevalence in Tahiti\nmay perhaps be connected with the fact that there was only one\nwoman to four or five men, owing to the habit of female\ninfanticide.[75] Among the Chinese in certain regions, for\ninstance Java, the lack of accessible women is the principal\ncause of homosexual practices.[76] According to some writers such\npractices are the results of polygamy.[77] In Muhammedan\ncountries they are no doubt largely due to the seclusion of\nwomen, preventing free intercourse between the sexes and\ncompelling the unmarried people to associate almost exclusively\nwith members of their own sex. Among the mountaineers of Northern\nMorocco the excessive indulgence in pederasty thus goes hand in\nhand with great isolation of the women {467} and a very high\nstandard of female chastity, whereas among the Arabs of the\nplains, who are little addicted to boy-love, the unmarried girls\nenjoy considerable freedom. Both in Asia[78] and Europe[79] the\nobligatory celibacy of the monks and priests has been a cause of\nhomosexual practices, though it must not be forgotten that a\nprofession which imposes abstinence from marriage is likely to\nattract a comparatively large number of congenital inverts. The\ntemporary separation of the sexes involved in a military mode of\nlife no doubt accounts for the extreme prevalence of homosexual\nlove among warlike races,[80] like the Sikhs, Afghans, Dorians,\nand Normans.[81] In Persia[82] and Morocco it is particularly\ncommon among soldiers. In Japan it was an incident of knighthood,\nin New Caledonia and North America of brotherhood in arms. At\nleast in some of the North American tribes men who were dressed\nas women accompanied the other men as servants in war and the\nchase.[83] Among the Banaka and Bapuku in the Cameroons pederasty\nis practised especially by men who are long absent from their\nwives.[84] In Morocco I have heard it advocated on account of the\nconvenience it affords to persons who are travelling.\n\n[Footnote 72: Karsch, in _Jahrbuch f\u00fcr sexuelle Zwischenstufen_,\nii. 126 _sqq._ Havelock Ellis, _op. cit._ p. 2 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 73: Havelock Ellis, _op. cit._ p. 2.]\n\n[Footnote 74: von den Steinen, _Unter den Naturv\u00f6lkern\nZentral-Brasiliens_, p. 502.]\n\n[Footnote 75: Ellis, _Polynesian Researches_, i. 257 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 76: Matignon, in _Archives d'anthropologie criminelle_,\nxiv. 42. Karsch, _op. cit._ p. 32 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 77: Waitz, _Anthropologie der Naturv\u00f6lker_, iii. 113.\nBastian, _Der Mensch in der Geschichte_, iii. 305 (Dahomans).]\n\n[Footnote 78: _Supra_, ii. 462. Karsch. _op. cit._ pp. 7.\n(China), 76 _sqq._ (Japan), 132 (Corea).]\n\n[Footnote 79: See Voltaire, _Dictionnaire philosophique_, 'Amour\nSocratique' (_[OE]uvres_, vii. 82); Buret, _Syphilis in the\nMiddle Ages and in Modern Times_, p. 88 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 80: _Cf._ Havelock Ellis, _op. cit._ p. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 81: Freeman, _Reign of William Rufus_, i. 159.]\n\n[Footnote 82: Polak, in _Wiener Medizinische Wochenschrift_,\nxi. 628.]\n\n[Footnote 83: Marquette, _op. cit._ p. 53 (Illinois). Perrin du\nLac, _Voyage dans les deux Louisianes et chez les nations\nsauvages du Missouri_, p. 352. _Cf._ Nu\u00f1ez Cabeza de Vaca, _loc.\ncit._ p. 538 (concerning the Indians of Florida):--\" . . . tiran\narco y llevan muy gran carga.\"]\n\n[Footnote 84: Steinmetz, _Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_, p. 38.]\n\nDr. Havelock Ellis justly observes that when homosexual\nattraction is due simply to the absence of the other sex we are\nnot concerned with sexual inversion, but merely with the\naccidental turning of the sexual instinct into an abnormal\nchannel, the instinct being called out by an approximate\nsubstitute, or even by diffused emotional excitement, in the\nabsence of the normal object.[85] But it seems to me probable\nthat in such cases the homosexual {468} attraction in the course\nof time quite easily develops into genuine inversion. I cannot\nbut think that our chief authorities on homosexuality have\nunderestimated the modifying influence which habit may exercise\non the sexual instinct. Professor Krafft-Ebing[86] and Dr.\nMoll[87] deny the existence of acquired inversion except in\noccasional instances; and Dr. Havelock Ellis takes a similar\nview, if putting aside those cases of a more or less morbid\ncharacter in which old men with failing sexual powers, or younger\nmen exhausted by heterosexual debauchery, are attracted to\nmembers of their own sex.[88] But how is it that in some parts of\nMorocco such a very large proportion of the men are distinctly\nsexual inverts, in the sense in which this word is used by Dr.\nHavelock Ellis,[89] that is, persons who for the gratification of\ntheir sexual desire prefer their own sex to the opposite one? It\nmay be that in Morocco and in Oriental countries generally, where\nalmost every individual marries, congenital inversion, through\nthe influence of heredity, is more frequent than in Europe, where\ninverts so commonly abstain from marrying. But that this could\nnot be an adequate explanation of the fact in question becomes at\nonce apparent when we consider the extremely unequal distribution\nof inverts among different neighbouring tribes of the same stock,\nsome of which are very little or hardly at all addicted to\npederasty. I take the case to be, that homosexual practices in\nearly youth have had a lasting effect on the sexual instinct,\nwhich at its first appearance, being somewhat indefinite, is\neasily turned into a homosexual direction.[90] In Morocco\ninversion is most prevalent among the scribes, who from childhood\nhave lived in very close association with their fellow-students.\nOf course, influences of this kind \"require a favourable organic\npredisposition to act on\";[91] but this predisposition is\nprobably no abnormality at all, only a {469} feature in the\nordinary sexual constitution of man.[92] It should be noticed\nthat the most common form of inversion, at least in Muhammedan\ncountries, is love of boys or youths not yet in the age of\npuberty, that is, of male individuals who are physically very\nlike girls. Voltaire observes:--\"Souvent un jeune gar\u00e7on, par la\nfra\u00eecheur de son teint, par l'\u00e9clat de ses couleurs, et par la\ndouceur de ses yeux, ressemble pendant deux ou trois ans \u00e0 une\nbelle fille; si on l'aime, c'est parce que la nature se\nm\u00e9prend.\"[93] Moreover, in normal cases sexual attraction depends\nnot only on sex, but on a youthful appearance as well; and there\nare persons so constituted that to them the latter factor is of\nchief importance, whilst the question of sex is almost a matter\nof indifference.\n\n[Footnote 85: Havelock Ellis, _op. cit._ p. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 86: Krafft-Ebing, _op. cit._ p. 211 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 87: Moll, _op. cit._ p. 157 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 88: Havelock Ellis, _op. cit._ p. 50 _sq._ _Cf._\n_ibid._ p. 181 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 89: _Ibid._ p. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 90: _Cf._ Norman, 'Sexual Perversion,' in Tuke's\n_Dictionary of Psychological Medicine_, ii. 1156.]\n\n[Footnote 91: Havelock Ellis, _op. cit._ p. 191.]\n\n[Footnote 92: Dr. Havelock Ellis also admits (_op. cit._ p. 190)\nthat, if in early life the sexual instincts are less definitely\ndetermined than when adolescence is complete, \"it is conceivable,\nthough unproved, that a very strong impression, acting even on a\nnormal organism, may cause arrest of sexual development on the\npsychic side. It is a question,\" he adds, \"I am not in a position\nto settle.\"]\n\n[Footnote 93: Voltaire, _Dictionnaire Philosophique_, art. 'Amour\nSocratique,' (_[OE]uvres_, vii. 81). _Cf._ Ovid, _Metamorphoses_,\nx. 84 _sq._]\n\nIn ancient Greece, also, not only homosexual intercourse but\nactual inversion, seems to have been very common; and although\nthis, like every form of love, must have contained a congenital\nelement, there can be little doubt, I think, that it was largely\ndue to external circumstances of a social character. It may, in\nthe first place, be traced to the methods of training the youth.\nIn Sparta it seems to have been the practice for every youth of\ngood character to have his lover, or \"inspirator,\"[94] and for\nevery well-educated man to be the lover of some youth.[95] The\nrelations between the \"inspirator\" and the \"listener\" were\nextremely intimate: at home the youth was constantly under the\neyes of his lover, who was supposed to be to him a model and\npattern of life;[96] in battle they stood near one another and\ntheir fidelity and affection were often shown till death;[97] if\nhis relatives were absent, the youth {470} might be represented\nin the public assembly by his lover;[98] and for many faults,\nparticularly want of ambition, the lover could be punished\ninstead of the \"listener.\"[99] This ancient custom prevailed with\nstill greater force in Crete, which island was hence by many\npersons considered to be the place of its birth.[100] Whatever\nmay have been the case originally, there can be no doubt that in\nlater times the relations between the youth and his lover implied\nunchaste intercourse.[101] And in other Greek states the\neducation of the youth was accompanied by similar consequences.\nAt an early age the boy was taken away from his mother, and spent\nthenceforth all his time in the company of men, until he reached\nthe age when marriage became for him a civic duty.[102] According\nto Plato, the gymnasia and common meals among the youth \"seem\nalways to have had a tendency to degrade the ancient and natural\ncustom of love below the level, not only of man, but of the\nbeasts.\"[103] Plato also mentions the effect which these habits\nhad on the sexual instincts of the men: when they reached manhood\nthey were lovers of youths and not naturally inclined to marry or\nbeget children, but, if at all, they did so only in obedience to\nthe law.[104] Is not this, in all probability, an instance of\nacquired inversion? But besides the influence of education there\nwas another factor which, co-operating with it, favoured the\ndevelopment of homosexual tendencies, namely, the great gulf\nwhich mentally separated the sexes. Nowhere else has the\ndifference in culture between men and women been so immense as in\nthe fully developed Greek civilisation. The lot of a wife in\nGreece was retirement and ignorance. She lived in almost absolute\nseclusion, in a separate part of the house, together with her\nfemale slaves, deprived of all the educating influence of male\nsociety, and having no place at those public spectacles {471}\nwhich were the chief means of culture.[105] In such circumstances\nit is not difficult to understand that men so highly intellectual\nas those of Athens regarded the love of women as the offspring of\nthe common Aphrodite, who \"is of the body rather than of the\nsoul.\"[106] They had reached a stage of mental culture at which\nthe sexual instinct normally has a craving for refinement, at\nwhich the gratification of mere physical lust appears brutal. In\nthe eyes of the most refined among them those who were inspired\nby the heavenly Aphrodite loved neither women nor boys, but\nintelligent beings whose reason was beginning to be developed,\nmuch about the time at which their beards began to grow.[107] In\npresent China we meet with a parallel case. Dr. Matignon\nobserves:--\"Il y a tout lieu de supposer que certains Chinois,\nraffin\u00e9s au point de vue intellectuel, recherchent dans la\np\u00e9d\u00e9rastie la satisfaction des sens et de l'esprit. La femme\nchinoise est peu cultiv\u00e9e, ignorante m\u00eame, quelle que soit sa\ncondition, honn\u00eate femme ou prostitu\u00e9e. Or le Chinois a souvent\nl'\u00e2me po\u00e9tique: il aime les vers, la musique, les belles\nsentences des philosophes, autant de choses qu'il ne peut trouver\nchez le beau sexe de l'Empire du Milieu.\"[108] So also it seems\nthat the ignorance and dullness of Muhammedan women, which is a\nresult of their total lack of education and their secluded life,\nis a cause of homosexual practices; Moors are sometimes heard to\ndefend pederasty on the plea that the company of boys, who have\nalways news to tell, is so much more entertaining than the\ncompany of women.\n\n[Footnote 94: Servius, _In Vergilii \u00c6neidos_, x. 325. For the\nwhole subject of pederasty among the Dorians see Mueller,\n_History and Antiquities of the Doric Race_, ii. 307 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 95: Aelian, _Varia historia_, iii. 10.]\n\n[Footnote 96: Mueller, _op. cit._ ii. 308.]\n\n[Footnote 97: Xenophon, _Historia Gr\u00e6ca_, iv. 8. 39.]\n\n[Footnote 98: Plutarch, _Lycurgus_, xxv. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 99: _Ibid._ xviii. 8. Aelian, _op. cit._ iii. 10.]\n\n[Footnote 100: Aelian, _op. cit._ iii. 9. Athenaeus,\n_Deipnosophist\u00e6_, xiii. 77, p. 601.]\n\n[Footnote 101: _Cf._ Symonds, 'Die Homosexualit\u00e4t in\nGriechenland,' in Havelock Ellis and Symonds, _Das kontr\u00e4re\nGeschlechtsgef\u00fchl_, p. 55.]\n\n[Footnote 102: _Ibid._ p. 116. D\u00f6llinger, _The Gentile and the\nJew_, ii. 244.]\n\n[Footnote 103: Plato, _Leges_, i. 636. _Cf._ Plutarch,\n_Amatorius_, v. 9.]\n\n[Footnote 104: Plato, _Symposium_, p. 192.]\n\n[Footnote 105: 'State of Female Society in Greece,' in _Quarterly\nReview_, xxii. 172 _sqq._ Lecky, _History of European Morals_,\nii. 287. D\u00f6llinger, _op. cit._ ii. 234.]\n\n[Footnote 106: Plato, _Symposium_, p. 181. That the low state of\nthe Greek women was instrumental to pederasty has been pointed\nout by D\u00f6llinger (_op. cit._ ii. 244) and Symonds (_loc. cit._\npp. 77, 100, 101, 116 _sqq._).]\n\n[Footnote 107: Plato, _Symposium_, p. 181.]\n\n[Footnote 108: Matignon, in _Archives d'anthropologie\ncriminelle_, xiv. 41.]\n\nWe have hitherto dealt with homosexual love as a fact; we shall\nnow pass to the moral valuation to which it is subject. Where it\noccurs as a national habit we may assume that no censure, or no\nsevere censure, is passed on it. Among the Bataks of Sumatra\nthere is no punishment {472} for it.[109] Of the _bazirs_ among\nthe Ngajus of Pula Patak, in Borneo, Dr. Schwaner says that \"in\nspite of their loathsome calling they escape well-merited\ncontempt.\"[110] The Society Islanders had for their homosexual\npractices \"not only the sanction of their priests, but the direct\nexample of their respective deities.\"[111] The _tsekats_ of\nMadagascar maintained that they were serving the deity by leading\na feminine life;[112] but we are told that at Ankisimane and in\nNossi-B\u00e9, opposite to it, pederasts are objects of public\ncontempt.[113] Father Veniaminof says of the Atkha Aleuts that\n\"sodomy and too early cohabitation with a betrothed or intended\nwife are called among them grave sins\";[114] but apart from the\nfact that his account of these natives in general gives the\nimpression of being somewhat eulogistic, the details stated by\nhim only show that the acts in question were considered to\nrequire a simple ceremony of purification.[115] There is no\nindication that the North American aborigines attached any\nopprobrium to men who had intercourse with those members of their\nown sex who had assumed the dress and habits of women. In Kadiak\nsuch a companion was on the contrary regarded as a great\nacquisition; and the effeminate men themselves, far from being\ndespised, were held in repute by the people, most of them being\nwizards.[116] We have previously noticed the connection between\nhomosexual practices and shamanism among various Siberian\npeoples; and it is said that such shamans as had changed their\nsex were greatly feared by the people, being regarded as very\npowerful.[117] Among the Illinois and Naudowessies the {473}\neffeminate men assist in all the juggleries and the solemn dance\nin honour of the _calumet_, or sacred tobacco pipe, for which the\nIndians have such a deference that one may call it \"the god of\npeace and war, and the arbiter of life and death\"; but they are\nnot permitted either to dance or sing. They are called into the\ncouncils of the Indians, and nothing can be decided upon without\ntheir advice; for because of their extraordinary manner of living\nthey are looked upon as _manitous_, or supernatural beings, and\npersons of consequence.[118] The Sioux, Sacs, and Fox Indians\ngive once a year, or oftener if they choose, a feast to the\n_Berdashe_, or _I-coo-coo-a_, who is a man dressed in woman's\nclothes, as he has been all his life. \"For extraordinary\nprivileges which he is known to possess, he is driven to the most\nservile and degrading duties, which he is not allowed to escape;\nand he being the only one of the tribe submitting to this\ndisgraceful degradation, is looked upon as 'medicine' and sacred,\nand a feast is given to him annually; and initiatory to it, a\ndance by those few young men of the tribe who can . . . . dance\nforward and publicly make their boast (without the denial of the\nBerdashe) . . . . Such, and such only, are allowed to enter the\ndance and partake of the feast.\"[119] Among some American tribes,\nhowever, these effeminate men are said to be despised, especially\nby the women.[120] In ancient Peru, also, homosexual practices\nseem to have entered in the religious cult. In some particular\nplaces, says Cieza de Leon, boys were kept as priests in the\ntemples, with whom it was rumoured that the lords joined in\ncompany on days of festivity. They did not meditate, he adds, the\ncommitting of such sin, but only the offering of sacrifice to the\ndemon. If the Incas by chance had some knowledge of such\nproceedings in the temple, they might have {474} ignored them out\nof religious tolerance.[121] But the Incas themselves were not\nonly free from such practices in their own persons, they would\nnot even permit any one who was guilty of them to remain in the\nroyal houses or palaces. And Cieza heard it related that, if it\ncame to their knowledge that somebody had committed an offence of\nthat kind, they punished it with such a severity that it was\nknown to all.[122] Las Casas tells us that in several of the more\nremote provinces of Mexico sodomy was tolerated, if not actually\npermitted, because the people believed that their gods were\naddicted to it; and it is not improbable that in earlier times\nthe same was the case in the entire empire.[123] But in a later\nage severe measures were adopted by legislators in order to\nsuppress the practice. In Mexico people found guilty of it were\nkilled.[124] In Nicaragua it was punished capitally by\nstoning,[125] and none of the Maya nations was without strict\nlaws against it.[126] Among the Chibchas of Bogota the punishment\nfor it was the infliction of a painful death.[127] However, it\nshould be remembered that the ancient culture nations of America\nwere generally extravagant in their punishments, and that their\npenal codes in the first place expressed rather the will of their\nrulers than the feelings of the people at large.[128]\n\n[Footnote 109: Junghuhn, _op. cit._ ii. 157, n.]\n\n[Footnote 110: Schwaner, _op. cit._ i. 186.]\n\n[Footnote 111: Ellis, _Polynesian Researches_, i. 258. _Cf._\nMoerenhout, _Voyages aux \u00eeles du Grand Oc\u00e9an_, ii. 167 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 112: de Flacourt, _op. cit._ p. 86.]\n\n[Footnote 113: Walter, in Steinmetz, _Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_, p. 376.]\n\n[Footnote 114: Veniaminof, quoted by Petroff, _Report on Alaska_,\np. 158.]\n\n[Footnote 115: _Ibid._ p. 158:--\"The offender desirous of\nunburdening himself selected a time when the sun was clear and\nunobscured; he picked up certain weeds and carried them about his\nperson; then deposited them and threw his sin upon them, calling\nthe sun as a witness, and, when he had eased his heart of all\nthat had weighed upon it, he threw the grass or weeds into the\nfire, and after that considered himself cleansed of his sin.\"]\n\n[Footnote 116: Davydow, quoted by Holmberg, _loc. cit._ p. 400\n_sq._ Lisianski, _op. cit._ p. 199.]\n\n[Footnote 117: Bogoraz, quoted by Demidoff, _op. cit._ p. 75.\nJochelson, _op. cit._ p. 52 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 118: Marquette, _op. cit._ p. 53 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 119: Catlin, _North American Indians_, ii. 214 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 120: 'La Salle's Last Expedition in North America,' in\n_Collections of the New-York Historical Society_, ii. 238\n(Illinois). Perrin du Lac, _Voyage dans les deux Louisianes et\nchez les nations sauvages du Missouri_, p. 352. Bossu, _op. cit._\ni. 303 (Chactaws). Oviedo y Vald\u00e9s, _loc. cit._ p. 508\n(Isthmians). von Martius, _Von dem Rechtszustande unter den\nUreinwohnern Brasiliens_, p. 28 (Guaycur\u00fas).]\n\n[Footnote 121: Cieza de Leon, _Segunda parte de Cr\u00f3nica del\nPer\u00fa_, ch. 25, p. 99. See also _Idem_, _Cr\u00f3nica del Per\u00fa [primera\nparte]_, ch. 64 (_Biblioteca de autores espa\u00f1oles_, xxvi. 416 _sq._).]\n\n[Footnote 122: _Idem_, _Segunda parte de Cr\u00f3nica del Per\u00fa_, ch.\n25, p. 98. See also Garcilasso de la Vega, _op. cit._ ii. 132.]\n\n[Footnote 123: Las Casas, quoted by Bancroft, _op. cit._ ii. 467\n_sq._ _Cf._ _ibid._ ii. 677.]\n\n[Footnote 124: Clavigero, _History of Mexico_, i. 357.]\n\n[Footnote 125: Squier, 'Arch\u00e6ology and Ethnology of Nicaragua,'\nin _Trans. American Ethn. Soc._ iii. pt. i. 128.]\n\n[Footnote 126: Bancroft, _op. cit._ ii. 677.]\n\n[Footnote 127: Piedrahita, _Historia general de las conquistas\ndel nuevo reyno de Granada_, p. 46.]\n\n[Footnote 128: See _supra_, i. 186, 195.]\n\nHomosexual practices are said to be taken little notice of even\nby some uncivilised peoples who are not addicted to them. In the\nPelew Islands, where such practices occur only sporadically, they\nare not punished, although, if I understand Herr Kubary rightly,\nthe persons committing them may be put to shame.[129] The Ossetes\nof the Caucasus, {475} among whom pederasty is very rare, do not\ngenerally prosecute persons for committing it, but ignore the\nact.[130] The East African Masai do not punish sodomy.[131] But\nwe also meet with statements of a contrary nature. In a Kafir\ntribe Mr. Warner heard of a case of it--the only one during a\nresidence of twenty-five years--which was punished with a fine of\nsome cattle claimed by the chief.[132] Among the Ondonga\npederasts are hated, and the men who behave like women are\ndetested, most of them being wizards.[133] The Washambala\nconsider pederasty a grave moral aberration and subject it to\nsevere punishment.[134] Among the Waganda homosexual practices,\nwhich have been introduced by the Arabs and are of rare\noccurrence, \"are intensely abhorred,\" the stake being the\npunishment.[135] The Negroes of Accra, who are not addicted to\nsuch practices, are said to detest them.[136] In Nubia pederasty\nis held in abhorrence, except by the Kashefs and their relations,\nwho endeavour to imitate the Mamelukes in everything.[137]\n\n[Footnote 129: Kubary, 'Die Verbrechen und das Strafverfahren auf\nden Pelau-Inseln,' in _Original-Mittheilungen aus der\nethnologischen Abtheilung der k\u00f6niglichen Museen zu Berlin_, i. 84.]\n\n[Footnote 130: Kovalewsky, _Coutume contemporaine_, p. 340.]\n\n[Footnote 131: Merker, _Die Masai_, p. 208. The Masai, however,\nslaughter at once any bullock or he-goat which is noticed to\npractise unnatural intercourse, for fear lest otherwise their\nherds should be visited by a plague as a divine punishment\n(_ibid._ p. 159).]\n\n[Footnote 132: Warner, in Maclean, _Compendium of Kafir Laws_,\np. 62.]\n\n[Footnote 133: Rautanen, in Steinmetz, _Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_,\np. 333 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 134: Lang, _ibid._ p. 232.]\n\n[Footnote 135: Felkin, in _Proceed. Roy. Soc. Edinburgh_, xiii. 723.]\n\n[Footnote 136: Monrad, _op. cit._ p. 57.]\n\n[Footnote 137: Burckhardt, _Travels in Nubia_, p. 135.]\n\nMuhammed forbade sodomy,[138] and the general opinion of his\nfollowers is that it should be punished like fornication--for\nwhich the punishment is, theoretically, severe enough[139]--unless\nthe offenders make a public act of penitence. In order to\nconvict, however, the law requires that four reliable persons\nshall swear to have been eye-witnesses,[140] and this alone would\nmake the law a dead letter, even if it had the support of popular\nfeelings; but such support is certainly wanting. In Morocco\nactive {476} pederasty is regarded with almost complete\nindifference, whilst the passive sodomite, if a grown-up\nindividual, is spoken of with scorn. Dr. Polak says the same of\nthe Persians.[141] In Zanzibar a clear distinction is made\nbetween male congenital inverts and male prostitutes; the latter\nare looked upon with contempt, whereas the former, as being what\nthey are \"by the will of God,\" are tolerated.[142] The\nMuhammedans of India and other Asiatic countries regard\npederasty, at most, as a mere peccadillo.[143] Among the Hindus\nit is said to be held in abhorrence,[144] but their sacred books\ndeal with it leniently. According to the 'Laws of Manu,' \"a\ntwice-born man who commits an unnatural offence with a male, or\nhas intercourse with a female in a cart drawn by oxen, in water,\nor in the day-time, shall bathe, dressed in his clothes\"; and all\nthese are reckoned as minor offences.[145]\n\n[Footnote 138: _Koran_, iv. 20.]\n\n[Footnote 139: Sachau, _Muhammedanisches Recht nach\nSchafiitischer Lehre_, pp. 809, 818:--\"Sodomita si _mu[h.][s.]an_\n(that is, a married person in possession of full civic rights)\nest punitur lapidatione, si non est _mu[h.][s.]an_ punitur et\nflagellatione et exsilio.\"]\n\n[Footnote 140: Burton, _Arabian Nights_, x. 224.]\n\n[Footnote 141: Polak, in _Wiener Medizinische Wochenschrift_,\nxi. 628 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 142: Baumann, in _Verhandl. Berliner Gesellsch.\nAnthrop._ 1899, p. 669.]\n\n[Footnote 143: Chevers, _op. cit._ p. 708. Burton, _Arabian\nNights_, x. 222 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 144: Burton, _Arabian Nights_, x. 237.]\n\n[Footnote 145: _Laws of Manu_, xi. 175. _Cf._ _Institutes of\nVishnu_, liii. 4; _\u00c2pastamba_, i. 9. 26. 7; _Gautama_, xxv. 7.]\n\nChinese law makes little distinction between unnatural and other\nsexual offences. An unnatural offence is variously considered\naccording to the age of the patient, and whether or not consent\nwas given. If the patient be an adult, or a boy over the age of\ntwelve, and consent, the case is treated as a slightly aggravated\nform of fornication, both parties being punished with a hundred\nblows and one month's cangue, whilst ordinary fornication is\npunished with eighty blows. If the adult or boy over twelve\nresist, the offence is considered as rape; and if the boy be\nunder twelve, the offence is rape irrespective of consent or\nresistance, unless the boy has previously gone astray.[146] But,\nas a matter of fact, unnatural offences are regarded as less\nhurtful to the community than ordinary immorality,[147] and\npederasty is not looked down upon. \"L'opinion publique reste tout\n\u00e0 fait indiff\u00e9rente \u00e0 ce genre de distraction et la {477} morale\nne s'en \u00e9meut en rien: puisque cela pla\u00eet \u00e0 l'op\u00e9rateur et que\nl'op\u00e9r\u00e9 est consentant, tout est pour le mieux; la loi chinoise\nn'aime gu\u00e8re \u00e0 s'occuper des affaires trop intimes. La p\u00e9d\u00e9rastie\nest m\u00eame consid\u00e9r\u00e9e comme une chose de bon ton, une fantaisie\ndispendieuse et partout un plaisir \u00e9l\u00e9gant. . . . La p\u00e9d\u00e9rastie a\nune cons\u00e9cration officielle en Chine. Il existe, en effet, des\np\u00e9d\u00e9r\u00e9s pour l'Empereur.\"[148] Indeed, the only objection which\nDr. Matignon has heard to be raised to pederasty by public\nopinion in China is that it has a bad influence on the\neyesight.[149] In Japan there was no law against homosexual\nintercourse till the revolution of 1868.[150] In the period of\nJapanese chivalry it was considered more heroic if a man loved a\nperson of his own sex than if he loved a woman; and nowadays\npeople are heard to say that in those provinces of the country\nwhere pederasty is widely spread the men are more manly and\nrobust than in those where it does not prevail.[151]\n\n[Footnote 146: Alabaster, _Notes and Commentaries on Chinese\nCriminal Law_, p. 367 _sqq._ _Ta Tsing Leu Lee_, Appendix, no.\nxxxii. p. 570.]\n\n[Footnote 147: Alabaster, _op. cit._ p. 369.]\n\n[Footnote 148: Matignon, in _Archives d'anthropologie\ncriminelle_, xiv. 42, 43, 52.]\n\n[Footnote 149: _Ibid._ p. 44.]\n\n[Footnote 150: Karsch, _op. cit._ p. 99.]\n\n[Footnote 151: Jwaya, in _Jahrbuch f\u00fcr sexuelle Zwischenstufen_,\niv. 266, 270 _sq._]\n\nThe laws of the ancient Scandinavians ignored homosexual\npractices; but passive pederasts were much despised by them. They\nwere identified with cowards and regarded as sorcerers. The\nepithets applied to them--_argr_, _ragr_, _blandr_, and others\nassumed the meaning of \"poltroon\" in general, and there are\ninstances of the word _arg_ being used in the sense of\n\"practising witchcraft.\" This connection between pederasty and\nsorcery, as a Norwegian scholar justly points out, helps us to\nunderstand Tacitus' statement that among the ancient Teutons\nindividuals whom he describes as _corpore infames_ were buried\nalive in a morass.[152] Considering that drowning was a common\npenalty for sorcery, it seems probable that this punishment was\ninflicted upon them not, in the first place, on account of their\nsexual practices, but in their capacity of wizards. It is certain\nthat the opprobrium which the pagan Scandinavians attached to\nhomosexual love was chiefly restricted to him who played the\nwoman's part. In one of the poems {478} the hero even boasts of\nbeing the father of offspring borne by another man.[153]\n\n[Footnote 152: Tacitus, _Germania_, 12.]\n\n[Footnote 153: 'Spuren von Kontr\u00e4rsexualit\u00e4t bei den alten\nSkandinaviern (Mitteilungen eines norwegischen Gelehrten),' in\n_Jahrbuch f\u00fcr sexuelle Zwischenstufen_, iv. 245, 256 _sqq._]\n\nIn Greece pederasty in its baser forms was censured, though\ngenerally, it seems, with no great severity, and in some states\nit was legally prohibited.[154] According to an Athenian law, a\nyouth who prostituted himself for money lost his rights as a free\ncitizen and was liable to the punishment of death if he took part\nin a public feast or entered the _agora_.[155] In Sparta it was\nnecessary that the \"listener\" should accept the \"inspirator\" from\nreal affection; he who did so out of pecuniary considerations was\npunished by the ephors.[156] We are even told that among the\nSpartans the relations between the lover and his friend were\ntruly innocent, and that if anything unlawful happened both must\nforsake either their country or their lives.[157] But the\nuniversal rule in Greece seems to have been that when decorum was\nobserved in the friendship between a man and a youth, no\ninquiries were made into the details of the relationship.[158]\nAnd this attachment was not only regarded as permissible, but was\npraised as the highest and purest form of love, as the offspring\nof the heavenly Aphrodite, as a path leading to virtue, as a\nweapon against tyranny, as a safeguard of civic liberty, as a\nsource of national greatness and glory. Phaedrus said that he\nknew no greater blessing to a young man who is beginning life\nthan a virtuous lover, or to the lover than a beloved youth; for\nthe principle which ought to be the guide of men who would lead a\nnoble life cannot be implanted by any other motive so well as by\nlove.[159] The Platonic Pausanias argued that if love of youths\nis held in ill repute it is so only because it is inimical to\ntyranny; \"the interests of rulers require that their subjects\nshould {479} be poor in spirit, and that there should be no\nstrong bond of friendship or society among them, which love,\nabove all other motives, is likely to inspire.\"[160] The power of\nthe Athenian tyrants was broken by the love of Aristogeiton and\nthe constancy of Harmodius; at Agrigentum in Sicily the mutual\nlove of Chariton and Melanippus produced a similar result; and\nthe greatness of Thebes was due to the Sacred Band established by\nEpaminondas. For \"in the presence of his favourite, a man would\nchoose to do anything rather than to get the character of a\ncoward.\"[161] It was pointed out that the greatest heroes and the\nmost warlike nations were those who were most addicted to the\nlove of youths;[162] and it was said that an army consisting of\nlovers and their beloved ones, fighting at each other's side,\nalthough a mere handful, would overcome the whole world.[163]\n\n[Footnote 154: Xenophon, _Laced\u00e6moniorum respublica_, ii. 13.\nMaximus Tyrius, _Dissertationes_, xxv. 4; xxvi. 9.]\n\n[Footnote 155: Aeschines, _Contra Timarchum_, 21.]\n\n[Footnote 156: Aelian, _Varia historia_, iii. 10. _Cf._ Plato,\n_Leges_, viii. 910.]\n\n[Footnote 157: Aelian, _op. cit._ iii. 12. _Cf._ Maximus Tyrius,\n_op. cit._ xxvi. 8.]\n\n[Footnote 158: _Cf._ Symonds, _loc. cit._ p. 92 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 159: Plato, _Symposium_, p. 178.]\n\n[Footnote 160: Plato, _Symposium_, p. 182.]\n\n[Footnote 161: Hieronymus, the Peripatetic, referred to by\nAthenaeus, _op. cit._ xiii. 78, p. 602. See also Maximus Tyrius,\n_op. cit._ xxiv. 2.]\n\n[Footnote 162: Plutarch, _Amatorius_, xvii. 14.]\n\n[Footnote 163: Plato, _Symposium_, p. 178.]\n\nHerodotus asserts that the love of boys was introduced from\nGreece into Persia.[164] Whether his statement be correct or not,\nsuch love could certainly not have been a habit of the Mazda\nworshippers.[165] In the Zoroastrian books \"unnatural sin\" is\ntreated with a severity to which there is a parallel only in\nHebrewism and Christianity. According to the Vend\u00eed\u00e2d, there is\nno atonement for it.[166] It is punished with torments in the\nother world, and is capital here below.[167] Even he who\ncommitted it involuntarily, by force, is subject to corporal\npunishment.[168] Indeed, it is a more heinous sin than the\nslaying of a righteous man.[169] \"There is no worse sin than this\nin the good religion, and it is proper to call those who commit\nit worthy of death in reality. If any one comes forth to them,\nand shall see {480} them in the act, and is working with an axe,\nit is requisite for him to cut off the heads or to rip up the\nbellies of both, and it is no sin for him. But it is not proper\nto kill any person without the authority of high-priests and\nkings, except on account of committing or permitting unnatural\nintercourse.\"[170]\n\n[Footnote 164: Herodotus, i. 135.]\n\n[Footnote 165: Ammianus Marcellinus says (xxiii. 76) that the\ninhabitants of Persia were free from pederasty. But see also\nSextus Empiricus, _Pyrrhoni\u00e6 hypotyposes_, i. 152.]\n\n[Footnote 166: _Vend\u00eed\u00e2d_, i. 12; viii. 27.]\n\n[Footnote 167: Darmesteter, in _Sacred Books of the East_,\niv. p. lxxxvi.]\n\n[Footnote 168: _Vend\u00eed\u00e2d_, viii. 26.]\n\n[Footnote 169: _D\u00een\u00e2-\u00ee Ma\u00een\u00f4g-\u00ee Khirad_, xxxvi. 1 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 170: _Sad Dar_, ix. 2, _sqq._]\n\nNor are unnatural sins allowed to defile the land of the Lord.\nWhosoever shall commit such abominations, be he Israelite or\nstranger dwelling among the Israelites, shall be put to death,\nthe souls that do them shall be cut off from their people. By\nunnatural sins of lust the Canaanites polluted their land, so\nthat God visited their guilt, and the land spued out its\ninhabitants.[171]\n\n[Footnote 171: _Leviticus_, xviii. 22, 24 _sqq._; xx. 13.]\n\nThis horror of homosexual practices was shared by Christianity.\nAccording to St. Paul, they form the climax of the moral\ncorruption to which God gave over the heathen because of their\napostasy from him.[172] Tertullian says that they are banished\n\"not only from the threshold, but from all shelter of the church,\nbecause they are not sins, but monstrosities.\"[173] St. Basil\nmaintains that they deserve the same punishment as murder,\nidolatry, and witchcraft.[174] According to a decree of the\nCouncil of Elvira, those who abuse boys to satisfy their lusts\nare denied communion even at their last hour.[175] In no other\npoint of morals was the contrast between the teachings of\nChristianity and the habits and opinions of the world over which\nit spread more radical than in this. In Rome there was an old law\nof unknown date, called Lex Scantinia (or Scatinia), which\nimposed a mulct on him who committed pederasty with a free\nperson;[176] but this law, of which {481} very little is known,\nhad lain dormant for ages, and the subject of ordinary homosexual\nintercourse had never afterwards attracted the attention of the\npagan legislators.[177] But when Christianity became the religion\nof the Roman Empire, a veritable crusade was opened against it.\nConstantius and Constans made it a capital crime, punishable with\nthe sword.[178] Valentinian went further still and ordered that\nthose who were found guilty of it should be burned alive in the\npresence of all the people.[179] Justinian, terrified by certain\nfamines, earthquakes, and pestilences, issued an edict which\nagain condemned persons guilty of unnatural offences to the\nsword, \"lest, as the result of these impious acts, whole cities\nshould perish together with their inhabitants,\" as we are taught\nby Holy Scripture that through such acts cities have perished\nwith the men in them.[180] \"A sentence of death and infamy,\" says\nGibbon, \"was often founded on the slight and suspicious evidence\nof a child or a servant, . . . and pederasty became the crime of\nthose to whom no crime could be imputed.\"[181]\n\n[Footnote 172: _Romans_, i. 26 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 173: Tertullian, _De pudicitia_, 4 (Migne, _Patrologi\u00e6\ncursus_, ii. 987).]\n\n[Footnote 174: St. Basil, quoted by Bingham, _Works_, vi. 432 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 175: _Concilium Eliberitanum_, ch. 71 (Labbe-Mansi,\n_Sacrorum Conciliorum collectio_, ii. 17).]\n\n[Footnote 176: Juvenal, _Satir\u00e6_, ii. 43 _sq._ Valerius Maximus,\n_Facta dictaque memorabilia_, vi. 1. 7. Quintilian, _Institutio\noratoria_, iv. 2. 69:--\"Decem milia, quae poena stupratori\nconstituta est, dabit.\" Christ, _Hist. Legis Scatini\u00e6_, quoted by\nD\u00f6llinger, _op. cit._ ii. 274. Rein, _Criminalrecht der R\u00f6mer_,\np. 865 _sq._ Bingham, _op. cit._ vi. 433 _sqq._ Mommsen,\n_R\u00f6misches Strafrecht_, p. 703 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 177: Mommsen, _op. cit._ p. 704. Rein, _op. cit._ p.\n866. The passage in _Digesta_, xlviii. 5. 35. 1, refers to\n_stuprum_ independently of the sex of the victim.]\n\n[Footnote 178: _Codex Theodosianus_, ix. 7. 3. _Codex\nJustinianus_, ix. 9. 30.]\n\n[Footnote 179: _Codex Theodosianus_, ix. 7. 6.]\n\n[Footnote 180: _Novell\u00e6_, 77. See also _ibid._ 141, and\n_Institutiones_, iv. 18. 4.]\n\n[Footnote 181: Gibbon, _History of the Decline and Fall of the\nRoman Empire_, v. 323.]\n\nThis attitude towards homosexual practices had a profound and\nlasting influence on European legislation. Throughout the Middle\nAges and later, Christian lawgivers thought that nothing but a\npainful death in the flames could atone for the sinful act.[182]\nIn England Fleta {482} speaks of the offender being buried\nalive;[183] but we are elsewhere told that burning was the due\npunishment.[184] As unnatural intercourse, however, was a subject\nfor ecclesiastical cognizance, capital punishment could not be\ninflicted on the criminal unless the Church relinquished him to\nthe secular arm; and it seems very doubtful whether she did\nrelinquish him. Sir Frederick Pollock and Professor Maitland\nconsider that the statute of 1533, which makes sodomy felony,\naffords an almost sufficient proof that the temporal courts had\nnot punished it, and that no one had been put to death for it for\na very long time past.[185] It was said that the punishment for\nthis crime--which the English law, in its very indictments,\ntreats as a crime not fit to be named[186]--was determined to be\ncapital by \"the voice of nature and of reason, and the express\nlaw of God\";[187] and it remained so till 1861,[188] although in\npractice the extreme punishment was not inflicted.[189] In France\npersons were actually burned for this crime in the middle and\nlatter part of the eighteenth century.[190] But in this, as in so\nmany other respects, the rationalistic movement of that age\nbrought about a change.[191] To punish sodomy with death, it was\nsaid, is atrocious; when unconnected with violence, the law ought\nto take no notice of it at all. It does not violate any other\nperson's right, its influence on society is merely indirect, like\nthat of drunkenness and free love; it is a disgusting vice, but\nits only proper punishment is contempt.[192] This view was\nadopted by the French 'Code p\u00e9nal,' according to which homosexual\npractices in private, between two consenting adult parties,\nwhether men or women, are absolutely {483} unpunished. The\nhomosexual act is treated as a crime only when it implies an\noutrage on public decency, or when there is violence or absence\nof consent, or when one of the parties is under age or unable to\ngive valid consent.[193] This method of dealing with\nhomosexuality has been followed by the legislators of various\nEuropean countries,[194] and in those where the law still treats\nthe act in question _per se_ as a penal offence, notably in\nGermany, a propaganda in favour of its alteration is carried on\nwith the support of many men of scientific eminence. This changed\nattitude of the law towards homosexual intercourse undoubtedly\nindicates a change of moral opinions. Though it is impossible to\nmeasure exactly the degree of moral condemnation, I suppose that\nfew persons nowadays attach to it the same enormity of guilt as\ndid our forefathers. And the question has even been put whether\nmorality has anything at all to do with a sexual act, committed\nby the mutual consent of two adult individuals, which is\nproductive of no offspring, and which on the whole concerns the\nwelfare of nobody but the parties themselves.[195]\n\n[Footnote 182: Du Boys, _Histoire du droit criminel de\nl'Espagne_, pp. 93, 403. _Les \u00c9tablissements de Saint Louis_, i.\n90, vol. ii. 147. Beaumanoir, _Coutumes du Beauvoisis_, xxx. 11,\nvol. i. 413. Montesquieu, _De l'esprit des lois_, xii. 6\n(_[OE]uvres_, p. 283). Hume, _Commentaries on the Law of\nScotland_, ii. 335; Pitcairn, _Criminal Trials in Scotland_, ii.\n491, n. 2. Clarus, _Practica criminalis_, book v. \u00a7 Sodomia, 4\n(_Opera omnia_, ii. 151). Jarcke, _Handbuch des gemeinen\ndeutschen Strafrechts_, iii. 172 _sqq._ Charles V.'s _Peinliche\nGerichtsordnung_, art. 116. Henke, _Geschichte des deutschen\npeinlichen Rechts_, i. 289. Numa Praetorius, 'Die strafrechtlichen\nBestimmungen gegen den gleichgeschlechtlichen Verkehr,' in\n_Jahrbuch f\u00fcr sexuelle Zwischenstufen_, i. 124 _sqq._ In the\nbeginning of the nineteenth century sodomy was still nominally\nsubject to capital punishment by burning in Bavaria (von\nFeuerbach, _Kritik des Kleinschrodischen Entwurfs zu einem\npeinlichen Gesetzbuche f\u00fcr die Chur-Pfalz-Bayrischen Staaten_,\nii. 13), and in Spain as late as 1843 (Du Boys, _op. cit._ p. 721).]\n\n[Footnote 183: Fleta, i. 37. 3, p. 84.]\n\n[Footnote 184: Britton, i. 10, vol. i. 42.]\n\n[Footnote 185: Pollock and Maitland, _History of English Law\nbefore the Time of Edward I._ ii. 556 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 186: Coke, _Third Part of the Institutes of the Laws of\nEngland_, p. 58 _sq._ Blackstone, _Commentaries on the Laws of\nEngland_, iv. 218.]\n\n[Footnote 187: Blackstone, _op. cit._ iv. 218.]\n\n[Footnote 188: Stephen, _History of the Criminal Law of England_,\ni. 475.]\n\n[Footnote 189: Blackstone, _op. cit._ iv. 218.]\n\n[Footnote 190: Desmaze, _P\u00e9nalit\u00e9s anciennes_, p. 211. Havelock\nEllis, _op. cit._ p. 207.]\n\n[Footnote 191: Numa Praetorius, _loc. cit._ p. 121 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 192: Note of the editors of Kehl's edition of\nVoltaire's 'Prix de la justice et de l'humanit\u00e9,' in _[OE]uvres\ncompl\u00e8tes_, v. 437, n. 2.]\n\n[Footnote 193: _Code p\u00e9nal_, 330 _sqq._ _Cf._ Chevalier,\n_L'inversion sexuelle_, p. 431 _sqq._; Havelock Ellis, _op. cit._\np. 207 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 194: Numa Praetorius, _loc. cit._ pp. 131-133, 143 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 195: See, _e.g._, Bax, _Ethics of Socialism_, p. 126.]\n\nFrom this review of the moral ideas on the subject, incomplete\nthough it be, it appears that homosexual practices are very\nfrequently subject to some degree of censure, though the degree\nvaries extremely. This censure is no doubt, in the first place,\ndue to that feeling of aversion or disgust which the idea of\nhomosexual intercourse tends to call forth in normally\nconstituted adult individuals whose sexual instincts have\ndeveloped under normal conditions. I presume that nobody will\ndeny the general prevalence of such a tendency. It corresponds to\nthat instinctive repugnance to sexual connections with women\nwhich is so frequently found in congenital inverts; whilst that\nparticular form of it with which legislators have chiefly busied\nthemselves evokes, in addition, a physical disgust of its own.\nAnd in a society where the {484} large majority of people are\nendowed with normal sexual desires their aversion to\nhomosexuality easily develops into moral censure and finds a\nlasting expression in custom, law, or religious tenets. On the\nother hand, where special circumstances have given rise to widely\nspread homosexual practices, there will be no general feeling of\ndisgust even in the adults, and the moral opinion of the society\nwill be modified accordingly. The act may still be condemned, in\nconsequence of a moral doctrine formed under different\nconditions, or of the vain attempts of legislators to check\nsexual irregularities, or out of utilitarian considerations; but\nsuch a condemnation would in most people be rather theoretical\nthan genuine. At the same time the baser forms of homosexual love\nmay be strongly disapproved of for the same reasons as the baser\nforms of intercourse between men and women; and the passive\npederast may be an object of contempt on account of the feminine\npractices to which he lends himself, as also an object of hatred\non account of his reputation for sorcery. We have seen that the\neffeminate men are frequently believed to be versed in\nmagic;[196] their abnormalities readily suggest that they are\nendowed with supernatural power, and they may resort to\nwitchcraft as a substitute for their lack of manliness and\nphysical strength. But the supernatural qualities or skill in\nmagic ascribed to men who behave like women may also, instead of\ncausing hatred, make them honoured or reverenced.\n\n[Footnote 196: See also Bastian, in _Zeitschr. f. Ethnol._ i. 88\n_sq._ Speaking of the witches of Fez, Leo Africanus says\n(_History and Description of Africa_, ii. 458) that \"they haue a\ndamnable custome to commit vnlawfull Venerie among themselues.\"\nAmong the Patagonians, according to Falkner (_Description of\nPatagonia_, p. 117), the male wizards are chosen for their office\nwhen they are children, and \"a preference is always shown to\nthose who at that early time of life discover an effeminate\ndisposition.\" They are obliged, as it were, to leave their sex,\nand to dress themselves in female apparel.]\n\nIt has been suggested that the popular attitude towards\nhomosexuality was originally an aspect of economics, a question\nof under- or over-population, and that it was forbidden or\nallowed accordingly. Dr. Havelock Ellis thinks it probable that\nthere is a certain relationship {485} between the social reaction\nagainst homosexuality and against infanticide:--\"Where the one is\nregarded leniently and favourably, there generally the other is\nalso; where the one is stamped out, the other is usually stamped\nout.\"[197] But our defective knowledge of the opinions of the\nvarious savage races concerning homosexuality hardly warrants\nsuch a conclusion; and if a connection really does exist between\nhomosexual practices and infanticide it may be simply due to the\nnumerical disproportion between the sexes resulting from the\ndestruction of a multitude of female infants.[198] On the other\nhand we are acquainted with several facts which are quite at\nvariance with Dr. Ellis's suggestion. Among many Hindu castes\nfemale infanticide has for ages been a genuine custom,[199] and\nyet pederasty is remarkably rare among the Hindus. The ancient\nArabs were addicted to infanticide,[200] but not to homosexual\nlove,[201] whereas among modern Arabs the case is exactly the\nreverse. And if the early Christians deemed infanticide and\npederasty equally heinous sins, they did so certainly not because\nthey were anxious that the population should increase; if this\nhad been their motive they would hardly have glorified celibacy.\nIt is true that in a few cases the unproductiveness of homosexual\nlove has been given by indigenous writers as a reason for its\nencouragement or condemnation. It was said that the Cretan law on\nthe subject had in view to check the growth of population; but,\nlike D\u00f6llinger,[202] I do not believe that this assertion touches\nthe real root of the matter. More importance may be attached to\nthe following passage in one of the Pahlavi texts:--\"He who is\nwasting seed makes a practice of causing the death of progeny;\nwhen the custom is completely continuous, which produces an evil\nstoppage of the progress of the race, the creatures have become\nannihilated; and certainly, that action, from which, when it is\nuniversally proceeding, the depopulation {486} of the world must\narise, has become and furthered the greatest wish of\nAharman.\"[203] I am, however, of opinion that considerations of\nthis kind have generally played only a subordinate, if any, part\nin the formation of the moral opinions concerning homosexual\npractices. And it can certainly not be admitted that the severe\nJewish law against sodomy was simply due to the fact that the\nenlargement of the population was a strongly felt social need\namong the Jews.[204] However much they condemned celibacy, they\ndid not put it on a par with the abominations of Sodom. The\nexcessive sinfulness which was attached to homosexual love by\nZoroastrianism, Hebrewism, and Christianity, had quite a special\nfoundation. It cannot be sufficiently accounted for either by\nutilitarian considerations or instinctive disgust. The abhorrence\nof incest is generally a much stronger feeling than the aversion\nto homosexuality. Yet in the very same chapter of Genesis which\ndescribes the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah we read of the\nincest committed by the daughters of Lot with their father; [205]\nand, according to the Roman Catholic doctrine, unnatural\nintercourse is an even more heinous sin than incest and\nadultery.[206] The fact is that homosexual practices were\nintimately associated with the gravest of all sins: unbelief,\nidolatry, or heresy.\n\n[Footnote 197: Havelock Ellis, _op. cit._ p. 206. See Additional\nNotes.]\n\n[Footnote 198: _Cf._ _supra_, ii. 466 (Tahitians).]\n\n[Footnote 199: _Supra_, i. 407.]\n\n[Footnote 200: _Supra_, i. 406 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 201: von Kremer, _Culturgeschichte des Orients_, ii. 129.]\n\n[Footnote 202: D\u00f6llinger, _op. cit._ ii. 239.]\n\n[Footnote 203: _D\u00e2dist\u00e2n-\u00ee D\u00een\u00eek_, lxxvii. 11.]\n\n[Footnote 204: Havelock Ellis, _op. cit._ p. 206.]\n\n[Footnote 205: _Genesis_, xix. 31 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 206: Thomas Aquinas, _Summa theologica_, ii.-ii. 154.\n12. Katz, _Grundriss des kanonischen Strafrechts_, pp. 104, 118,\n120. Clarus, _Practica criminalis_, book v. \u00a7 Sodomia,\nAdditiones, 1 (_Opera omnia_, ii. 152):--\"Hoc vitium est majus,\nquam si quis propriam matrem cognosceret.\"]\n\nAccording to Zoroastrianism, unnatural sin had been created by\nAngra Mainyu.[207] \"Aharman, the wicked, miscreated the demons\nand fiends, and also the remaining corrupted ones, by his own\nunnatural intercourse.\"[208] Such intercourse is on a par with\nAfr\u00e2siy\u00e2b, a Turanian king who conquered the Iranians for twelve\nyears;[209] with Dah\u00e2k, a king or dynasty who is said to have\nconquered Yim and reigned for a thousand years;[210] with T\u00fbr-i\nBr\u00e2dar-vakhsh, {487} a heterodox wizard by whom the best men were\nput to death.[211] He who commits unnatural sin is \"in his whole\nbeing a Da\u00eava\";[212] and a Da\u00eava-worshipper is not a bad\nZoroastrian, but a man who does not belong to the Zoroastrian\nsystem, a foreigner, a non-Aryan.[213] In the Vend\u00eed\u00e2d, after the\nstatement that the voluntary commission of unnatural sin is a\ntrespass for which there is no atonement for ever and ever, the\nquestion is put, When is it so? And the answer given is:--If the\nsinner be a professor of the religion of Mazda, or one who has\nbeen taught in it. If not, his sin is taken from him, in case he\nmakes confession of the religion of Mazda and resolves never to\ncommit again such forbidden deeds.[214] This is to say, the sin\nis inexpiable if it involves a downright defiance of the true\nreligion, it is forgiven if it is committed in ignorance of it\nand is followed by submission. From all this it appears that\nZoroastrianism stigmatised unnatural intercourse as a practice of\ninfidels, as a sign of unbelief. And I think that certain facts\nreferred to above help us to understand why it did so. Not only\nhave homosexual practices been commonly associated with sorcery,\nbut such an association has formed, and partly still forms, an\nincident of the shamanistic system prevalent among the Asiatic\npeoples of Turanian stock, and that it did so already in remote\nantiquity is made extremely probable by statements which I have\njust quoted from Zoroastrian texts. To this system Zoroastrianism\nwas naturally furiously opposed, and the \"change of sex\" therefore\nappeared to the Mazda worshipper as a devilish abomination.\n\n[Footnote 207: _Vend\u00eed\u00e2d_, i. 12.]\n\n[Footnote 208: _D\u00een\u00e2-\u00ee Ma\u00een\u00f4g-\u00ee Khirad_, viii. 10.]\n\n[Footnote 209: _Sad Dar_, ix. 5. West's note to _D\u00een\u00e2-\u00ee Ma\u00een\u00f4g-\u00ee\nKhirad_, viii. 29 (**_Sacred Books of the East_, xxiv. 35, n. 4.)]\n\n[Footnote 210: _Sad Dar_, ix. 5. West's note to _D\u00een\u00e2-\u00ee Ma\u00een\u00f4g-\u00ee\nKhirad_, viii. 29 (_Sacred Books of the East_, xxiv. 35, n. 3).]\n\n[Footnote 211: _Sad Dar_, ix. 5. West's note to _D\u00e2dist\u00e2n-\u00ee\nD\u00een\u00eek_, lxxii. 8 (_Sacred Books of the East_, xviii. 218).]\n\n[Footnote 212: _Vend\u00eed\u00e2d_, viii. 32.]\n\n[Footnote 213: Darmesteter, in _Sacred Books of the East_, iv. p. li.]\n\n[Footnote 214: _Vend\u00eed\u00e2d_, viii. 27 _sq._]\n\nSo also the Hebrews abhorrence of sodomy was largely due to their\nhatred of a foreign cult. According to Genesis, unnatural vice\nwas the sin of a people who were not the Lord's people, and the\nLevitical legislation represents Canaanitish abominations as the\nchief reason {488} why the Canaanites were exterminated.[215] Now\nwe know that sodomy entered as an element in their religion.\nBesides _[k.]ed[=e]sh[=o]th_, or female prostitutes, there were\n_[k.]ed[=e]sh[=i]m_, or male prostitutes, attached to their\ntemples.[216] The word _[k.]ad[=e]sh_, translated \"sodomite,\"\nproperly denotes a man dedicated to a deity;[217] and it appears\nthat such men were consecrated to the mother of the gods, the\nfamous Dea Syria, whose priests or devotees they were considered\nto be.[218] The male devotees of this and other goddesses were\nprobably in a position analogous to that occupied by the female\ndevotees of certain gods, who also, as we have seen, have\ndeveloped into libertines; and the sodomitic acts committed with\nthese temple prostitutes may, like the connections with\npriestesses, have had in view to transfer blessings to the\nworshippers.[219] In Morocco supernatural benefits are expected\nnot only from heterosexual, but also from homosexual intercourse\nwith a holy person.[220] The _[k.]ed[=e]sh[=i]m_ are frequently\nalluded to in the Old Testament, especially in the period of the\nmonarchy, when rites of foreign origin made their way into both\nIsrael and Judah.[221] And it is natural that the Yahveh\nworshipper should regard their practices with the utmost horror\nas forming part of an idolatrous cult.\n\n[Footnote 215: _Leviticus_, xx. 23.]\n\n[Footnote 216: _Deuteronomy_, xxiii. 17. Driver, _Commentary on\nDeuteronomy_, p. 264.]\n\n[Footnote 217: Driver, _op. cit._ p. 264 _sq._ Selbie,\n'Sodomite,' in Hastings, _Dictionary of the Bible_, iv. 559.]\n\n[Footnote 218: St. Jerome, _In Osee_, i. 4. 14 (Migne, _op. cit._\nxxv. 851). Cook's note to _1 Kings_, xiv. 24, in his edition of\n_The Holy Bible_, ii. 571. See also Lucian, _Lucius_, 38.]\n\n[Footnote 219: Rosenbaum suggests (_Geschichte der Lustseuche im\nAlterthume_, p. 120) that the eunuch priests connected with the\ncult of the Ephesian Artemis and the Phrygian worship of Cybele\nlikewise were sodomites.]\n\n[Footnote 220: See Westermarck, _The Moorish Conception of\nHoliness_, p. 85.]\n\n[Footnote 221: _1 Kings_, xiv. 24; xv. 12; xxii. 46. _2 Kings_,\nxxiii. 7. _Job_, xxxvi. 14. Driver, _op. cit._ p. 265.]\n\nThe Hebrew conception of homosexual love to some extent affected\nMuhammedanism, and passed into Christianity. The notion that it\nis a form of sacrilege was here strengthened by the habits of the\ngentiles. St. Paul found the abominations of Sodom prevalent\namong nations who had \"changed the truth of God into a lie, and\nworshipped and served the creature more than the {489}\nCreator.\"[222] During the Middle Ages heretics were accused of\nunnatural vice as a matter of course.[223] Indeed, so closely was\nsodomy associated with heresy that the same name was applied to\nboth. In 'La Coutume de Touraine-Anjou' the word _herite_, which\nis the ancient form of _h\u00e9r\u00e9tique_,[224] seems to be used in the\nsense of \"sodomite\";[225] and the French _bougre_ (from the Latin\n_Bulgarus_, Bulgarian), as also its English synonym, was\noriginally a name given to a sect of heretics who came from\nBulgaria in the eleventh century, and was afterwards applied to\nother heretics, but at the same time it became the regular\nexpression for a person guilty of unnatural intercourse.[226] In\nmedi\u00e6val laws sodomy was also repeatedly mentioned together with\nheresy, and the punishment was the same for both.[227] It thus\nremained a religious offence of the first order. It was not only\na \"vitium nefandum et super omnia detestandum,\"[228] but it was\none of the four \"clamantia peccata,\" or crying sins,[229] a\n\"crime de Majestie, vers le Roy celestre.\"[230] Very naturally,\ntherefore, it has come to be regarded with somewhat greater\nleniency by law and public opinion in proportion as they have\nemancipated themselves from theological doctrines. And the fresh\nlight which the scientific study of the sexual impulse has lately\nthrown upon the subject of homosexuality must also necessarily\ninfluence the moral ideas relating to it, in so far as no\nscrutinising judge can fail to take into account the pressure\nwhich a powerful non-volitional desire exercises upon an agent's\nwill.\n\n[Footnote 222: _Romans_, i. 25 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 223: Littr\u00e9, _Dictionnaire de la langue fran\u00e7aise_, i.\n386, 'Bougre.' Haynes, _Religious Persecution_, p. 54.]\n\n[Footnote 224: Littr\u00e9, _op. cit._ i. 2010, 'H\u00e9r\u00e9tique.']\n\n[Footnote 225: _Les \u00c9tablissements de Saint Louis_, i. 90, vol.\nii. 147. Viollet, in his Introduction to the same work, i. 254.]\n\n[Footnote 226: Littr\u00e9, _op. cit._ i. 386, 'Bougre.' Murray, _New\nEnglish Dictionary_, i. 1160, 'Bugger.' Lea, _History of the\nInquisition of the Middle Ages_, i. 115, note.]\n\n[Footnote 227: Beaumanoir, _Coutumes du Beauvoisis_, xxx. 11,\nvol. i. 413:--\"Qui erre contre le foi, comme en mescreance, de le\nquele il ne veut venir \u00e0 voie de verit\u00e9, ou qui fet sodomiterie,\nil doit estre ars, et forfet tout le sien en le maniere dessus.\"\nBritton, i. 10, vol. i. 42. Montesquieu, _De l'esprit des lois_,\nxii. 6 (_[OE]uvres_, p. 283). Du Boys, _Histoire du droit\ncriminel de l'Espagne_, pp. 486, 721.]\n\n[Footnote 228: Clarus, _Practica criminalis_, book v. \u00a7 Sodomia,\n1 (_Opera omnia_, ii. 151).]\n\n[Footnote 229: Coke, _Third Part of the Institutes of the Laws of\nEngland_, p. 59.]\n\n[Footnote 230: _Mirror_, quoted _ibid._ p. 58.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XLIV\n\nREGARD FOR THE LOWER ANIMALS\n\n\nMEN'S conduct towards the lower animals is frequently a subject\nof moral valuation.\n\nTotem animals must be treated with deference by those who bear\ntheir names, and animals generally regarded as divine must be\nrespected by all; of this more will be said in a subsequent\nchapter.[1] Among various peoples the members of certain animal\nspecies must not be killed, because they are considered to be\nreceptacles for the souls of departed men,[2] or because the\nspecies is believed to have originated through a transformation\nof men into animals.[3] The Dyaks of Borneo have a superstitious\ndread of killing orang-utans, being of opinion that these apes\nare men who went to live in the forest and abstain from speaking\nmerely in order to be exempt from paying taxes.[4] The Moors\nconsider it wrong to kill a monkey, because the monkey was once a\nman whom God changed into his present shape as a punishment for\nthe sin he committed by performing his ablutions with milk; and\nthey would never do harm to a stork, because, as they say, the\nstork was originally a judge, who passed unjust sentences upon\nhis fellow creatures and therefore became what he is. They also\naccount it a sin to kill a swallow or a pigeon, a white spider or\na bee, because they regard them as holy. Other creatures, again,\nare spared by the Moors because they {491} appear uncanny or are\nsuspected of being evil spirits in disguise. It is believed that\nanybody who kills a raven easily goes mad and that he who kills a\ntoad will get fever or die; and no Moor would dare to hit a cat\nor a dog in the dark, since it seems very doubtful what kind of\nbeing it really is. Superstitions of this sort are world-wide.]\n\n[Footnote 1: _Infra_, on Duties to Gods.]\n\n[Footnote 2: _Infra_, p. 516 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 3: See Meiners, _Allgemeine Geschichte der Religionen_,\ni. 213 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 4: Selenka, _Sonnige Welten_, p. 57.]\n\nIt is a common belief among uncultured peoples that a person who\nslays an animal is exposed to the vengeance either of its\ndisembodied spirit or of all the other creatures belonging to the\nsame species.[5] Hence, as Sir J. G. Frazer has shown, the savage\noften makes it a rule to spare the lives of those animals which\nhe has no pressing motive for killing, at least such fierce and\ndangerous ones as are likely to exact a bloody revenge for the\nslaughter of any of their kind; and when, for some reason or\nother, he overcomes his superstitious scruples and takes the life\nof the beast, he is anxious to appease the victim and its kindred\nby testifying his respect for them, or making apologies, or\ntrying to conceal his share in procuring the death of the animal,\nor promising that its remains will be honourably treated.[6] The\nSti\u00eans of Cambodia, for instance, who believe that animals have\nsouls which wander about after death, ask pardon when they have\nkilled one, lest its soul should visit and torment them; and they\nalso offer it sacrifices proportioned to the strength and size of\nthe animal.[7] When a party of Koriaks have killed a bear or a\nwolf, they skin the beast, dress one of their family in the skin,\nand dance round the skin-clad man, saying that it was not they\nwho killed the animal but someone else, by preference a\nRussian.[8] The Eskimo about Behring Strait maintain that the\ndead bodies of various animals must be treated very carefully by\nthe hunter who obtains them, so that their shades may not be\noffended and bring bad luck or even death upon him or his people.[9]\n\n[Footnote 5: _Supra_, i. 258.]\n\n[Footnote 6: Frazer, _Golden Bough_, ii. 389 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 7: Mouhot, _Travels in the Central Parts of\nIndo-China_, i. 252.]\n\n[Footnote 8: Bastian, _Der Mensch in der Geschichte_, iii. 26.]\n\n[Footnote 9: Nelson, 'Eskimo about Bering Strait,' in _Ann. Rep.\nBur. Ethn._ xviii. 438.]\n\n{492} The savage, moreover, desires to keep on good terms with\nanimals which, without being feared, are either eaten or valued\nfor their skins. Hence, when he captures one, he shows such\ndeference for it as may be necessary for inducing its fellows to\ncome and be killed also.[10] Alaskan hunters preserve the bones\nof sables and beavers out of reach of the dogs for a year and\nthen bury them carefully, lest the spirits which look after these\nspecies should consider that \"they are regarded with contempt and\nhence no more should be killed or trapped.\"[11] The Thompson\nRiver Indians of British Columbia said that when a deer was\nkilled its fellows would be well pleased if the hunters butchered\nthe animal nicely and cleanly.[12] The Hurons refrained from\nthrowing fish bones into the fire, lest the souls of the fish\nshould go and warn the other fish not to let themselves be\ncaught, since, if they were, their own bones would also be\nburned.[13] Some savages respect the bones of the animals which\nthey eat because they believe that the bones, if preserved, will,\nin the course of time, be reclothed with flesh and the animal\nthus come to life again.[14]\n\n[Footnote 10: Frazer, _op. cit._ ii. 403 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 11: Dall, _Alaska_, p. 89.]\n\n[Footnote 12: Teit, 'Thompson Indians of British Columbia,' in\n_Memoirs of the American Museum of Natural History_,\n'Anthropology,' i. 346.]\n\n[Footnote 13: Sagard, _Le grand voyage du pays des Hurons_, p. 255.]\n\n[Footnote 14: Frazer, _op. cit._ ii. 415 _sqq._]\n\nBesides the creatures which primitive man treats with respect\nbecause he dreads their strength and ferocity or on account of\nthe benefits he expects from them, there is yet a third class of\nanimate beings which he sometimes deems it necessary to\nconciliate, namely, vermin that infest the crops.[15] Among the\nSaxons of Transylvania, in order to keep sparrows from the corn,\nthe sower begins by throwing the first handful of seed backwards\nover his head, saying, \"That is for you, sparrows.\"[16] And of\nthe Dr\u00e2vidian tribes of Mirzapur we are told that, when locusts\nthreaten to eat up the fruits of the earth, the people catch one,\ndecorate its head with a spot of red {493} lead, salaam to it,\nand let it go; after which civilities the whole flight\nimmediately departs.[17]\n\n[Footnote 15: _Ibid._ ii. 422 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 16: Heinrich, quoted _ibid._ ii. 423.]\n\n[Footnote 17:  Crooke, _Popular Religion and Folk-lore of\nNorthern India_, ii. 303.]\n\nDomestic animals are frequently objects of superstitious\nreverence.[18] They are expected to reward masters who treat them\nwell, whereas those who harm them are believed to expose\nthemselves to their revenge. Among the Eskimo about Behring\nStrait dogs are never beaten for biting people, lest the _inua_\nor shade of the dog should become angry and prevent the wound\nfrom healing.[19] Butchers are often regarded as unclean, and the\noriginal reason for this was in all probability the idea that\nthey were haunted by the spirits of the animals they had slain.\nAmong the Guanches of the Canary Islands it was unlawful for\nanybody but professional butchers to kill cattle, and a butcher\nwas forbidden to enter other persons' houses, to touch their\nproperty, and to keep company with any one not of his own\ntrade.[20] In Morocco a butcher, like a manslayer, is thought to\nbe haunted by _jn\u00fbn_ (_jinn_), and it seems that in this case\nalso the notion of haunting _jn\u00fbn_ has replaced an earlier belief\nin troublesome ghosts.[21] So, too, the ancient Troglodytes of\nEast Africa, who derived their whole sustenance from their flocks\nand herds, are said to have looked upon butchers as unclean.[22]\nIn the rural districts of Japan it is believed that a butcher\nwill have a cripple among his descendants.[23]\n\n[Footnote 18: See Robertson Smith, _Religion of the Semites_,\np. 296 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 19: Nelson, in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ xviii. 435.]\n\n[Footnote 20: Abreu de Galindo, _History of the Discovery and\nConquest of the Canary Islands_, p. 71 _sq._ Bory de St. Vincent,\n_Essais sur les Isles Fortun\u00e9es_, p. 103 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 21: _Cf._ _supra_, i. 378.]\n\n[Footnote 22: Robertson Smith, _op. cit._ p. 296 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 23: Griffis, _Mikado's Empire_, p. 472.]\n\nHow far ideas of this sort may account for the great\ndisinclination of many peoples to kill their cattle, it is\nimpossible to say; but they certainly do not constitute the only\nmotive. We have noticed above that pastoral tribes are unwilling\nto reduce their herds and agricultural peoples to kill the\nploughing ox, because this would imply {494} loss of valuable\nproperty.[24] And apart from economic considerations, we may\nassume that feelings of genuine sympathy also induce them to\ntreat their animals with kindness. The altruistic sentiment has\nnot necessarily reference to members of the same species only; of\nthis we find instances even among animals in confinement and\ndomesticated animals, which frequently become attached to\nindividuals of a different species with whom they live\ntogether.[25] And the savage feels himself much more closely\nrelated to the animal world than does his civilised fellow\ncreature; indeed, as we have seen, he habitually obliterates the\nboundaries between man and beast and regards all animals as\npractically on a footing of equality with himself.[26] Among the\npastoral races of Africa the men delight in attending their\ncattle, and spend much time in ornamenting and adorning them; the\nherdsman knows every beast in his herd, calls it by its name, and\naffectionately observes all its peculiarities.[27] Of the Bahima,\na cow tribe in Uganda, the Rev. J. Roscoe tells us that the men\nform warm attachments for their cattle; some of them love the\nanimals like children, pet and coax them, talk to them, and weep\nover their ailments, and should a favourite die their grief is so\nextreme that it sometimes leads to suicide.[28] The mythical\nfounder of the kingdom of Uganda, Kintu, is said to have been so\nhumane and averse from the sight of blood, that \"even cattle\nkilled for necessary food were slaughtered at some distance from\nhis dwelling.\"[29] But cattle are not the only dumb creatures\nthat excite tender feelings in the bosom of a savage. The For\ntribe of Central Africa regard it as a characteristic of a good\nman to be kind to animals in general, and consider it wicked to\nbe otherwise.[30] Concerning the Eastern Central Africans Mr.\n{495} Macdonald writes that if they appear destitute of pity,\nsay, for their fowls in their methods of carrying them, it is\nbecause they do not reflect that it gives them pain--\"all would\nadmit that it was a cruel thing to pain the fowl\"; and they have\nfables in their language which show a desire to enter minutely\ninto the feelings of dumb creatures, representing, for instance,\nfowls as reasoning on their hard fate in being killed for their\nmaster's supper.[31] Among the Indians of the province of Quito,\naccording to Juan and Ulloa, the women are so fond of their fowls\nthat they will not sell them, much less kill them with their own\nhands; \"so that if a stranger, who is obliged to pass the night\nin one of their cottages, offers ever so much money for a fowl,\nthey refuse to part with it, and he finds himself under a\nnecessity of killing the fowl himself. At this his landlady\nshrieks, dissolves in tears, and wrings her hands, as if it had\nbeen an only son; till seeing the mischief past remedy she wipes\nher eyes, and quietly takes what the traveller offers her.\"[32]\nNorth American Indians, again, are very fond of their hunting\ndogs. Those on the west side of the Rocky Mountains \"appear to\nhave the same affection for them that they have for their\nchildren; and they will discourse with them, as if they were\nrational beings. They frequently call them their sons or\ndaughters; and when describing an Indian, they will speak of him\nas father of a particular dog which belongs to him. When these\ndogs die, it is not unusual to see their masters or mistresses\nplace them on a pile of wood, and burn them in the same manner as\nthey do the dead bodies of their relations; and they appear to\nlament their deaths, by crying and howling, fully as much as if\nthey were their kindred.\"[33] So also the natives of Australia\noften display much affection for their dogs; Mr. Gason has seen\nwomen crying over a dog when bitten by a snake as if it had been\none of their own children, and if a puppy has lost its mother the\n{496} women suckle and nurse it.[34] Of the Maoris of New Zealand\nwe read that their extreme love of offspring \"was also carried\nout to excess towards the young of brutes--especially of their\ndogs, and, afterwards, of cats and pigs introduced. Hence it was\nby no means an unusual sight to see a woman carrying her child at\nher back, and a pet dog, or pig, in her bosom.\"[35] The Chukchi\nof North-Eastern Siberia believe that if a person is cruel to\nbrutes his soul will after his death migrate into some domestic\nanimal--a dog, a horse, or a reindeer.[36] Even the miserable\nVeddahs of Ceylon are said to be indignant at the needless\nkilling of a beast.[37]\n\n[Footnote 24: _Supra_, ii. 331.]\n\n[Footnote 25: See _supra_, i. 112.]\n\n[Footnote 26: _Supra_, i. 258.]\n\n[Footnote 27: Ratzel, _History of Mankind_, ii. 415.]\n\n[Footnote 28: Roscoe, 'Bahima,' in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxxvii.\n94 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 29: Felkin, 'Notes on the Waganda Tribe,' in _Proceed.\nRoy. Soc. Edinburgh_, xiii. 764.]\n\n[Footnote 30: Felkin, 'Notes on the For Tribe,' in _Proceed. Roy.\nSoc. Edinburgh_, xiii. 232 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 31: Macdonald, _Africana_, i. 10 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 32: Juan and Ulloa, _Voyage to South America_, i. 426\n_sq._]\n\n[Footnote 33: Harmon, _Journal of Voyages in the Interior of\nNorth America_, p. 335 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 34: Gason, 'Dieyerie Tribe,' in Woods, _Native Tribes\nof South Australia_, p. 259. Fraser, _Aborigines of New South\nWales_, p. 5. Williams, 'Yircla Meening Tribe,' in Curr, _The\nAustralian Race_, i. 402.]\n\n[Footnote 35: Colenso, _Maori Races of New Zealand_, p. 43.]\n\n[Footnote 36: Ratzel, _op. cit._ ii. 231.]\n\n[Footnote 37: Sarasin, _Ergebnisse naturwissenschaftlicher\nForschungen auf Ceylon_, iii. 539.]\n\nOn the other hand we also hear of savages who are greatly lacking\nin sympathy for the brute creation. Darwin says that humanity to\nthe lower animals is apparently unfelt by savages, except towards\ntheir pets.[38] Mr. Atkinson charges the New Caledonians with\ngreat cruelty to animals.[39] The Tasmanians appeared much to\nenjoy the tortures of a wounded bird or beast.[40] It is not to\nbe expected that people whose kindly feelings towards men hardly\nextend beyond the borders of their own communities should be\ncompassionate to wild animals. They may also appear wantonly\ncruel because they do not realise the pain which they inflict.\nAnd, like children, they may enjoy the agony of a suffering beast\nor bird because it excites their curiosity.\n\n[Footnote 38: Darwin, _Descent of Man_, p. 123.]\n\n[Footnote 39: Atkinson, 'Natives of New Caledonia,' in\n_Folk-lore_, xiv. 248.]\n\n[Footnote 40: Davies, quoted by Ling Roth, _Tasmanians_, p. 66.]\n\nIt is obvious from what has been said above that already at the\nsavage stage men's conduct towards the lower animals must in some\ncases be a matter of moral concern. For hand in hand with the\naltruistic sentiment we always find the feeling of sympathetic\nresentment whenever there is an occasion for its outburst.\nMoreover, {497} acts which are, or are believed to be, injurious\nto the agent, by exposing him to an animal's revenge or\notherwise, are prohibited because they are imprudent; and, as we\nhave often noticed, such prohibitions are apt to assume a moral\ncharacter. Finally, if a certain mode of conduct is considered to\nbe productive of public harm, as is the case with any act or\nomission which reduces, or is supposed to reduce, the supply of\nfood or animal clothing, it is naturally looked upon as a wrong\nagainst the community.\n\nSimilar facts have, among peoples of a higher culture, led to\nmoral rules inculcating regard for animals--rules which have\noften assumed a definite shape in their laws or religious books.\n\nAccording to Brahmanism tenderness towards all creatures is a\nduty incumbent upon the four castes. It is said that \"he who\ninjures innoxious beings from a wish to give himself pleasure,\nnever finds happiness, neither living nor dead.\"[41] If a blow is\nstruck against animals in order to give them pain, the judge\nshall inflict a fine in proportion to the amount of pain caused,\njust as if the blow had been struck against a man.[42] The\nkilling of various creatures, including fish and snakes, reduces\nthe offender to a mixed caste;[43] and, according to 'Vishnu\nPurana,' fishermen go after death to the same hell as awaits\nprisoners, incendiaries, and treacherous friends.[44] To kill a\ncow is a great crime;[45] whereas he who unhesitatingly abandons\nlife for the sake of a cow is freed even from the guilt of the\nmurder of a Br\u00e2hmana, and so is he who saves the life of a\ncow.[46] Among many of the Hindus the slaughter of a cow excites\nmore horror than the killing of a man, and is punished with great\nseverity, even with death.[47]\n\n[Footnote 41: _Laws of Manu_, v. 45.]\n\n[Footnote 42: _Ibid._ viii. 286.]\n\n[Footnote 43: _Ibid._ xi. 69.]\n\n[Footnote 44: _Vish['n]u Pur\u00e1['n]a_, p. 208 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 45: _Institutes of Vishnu_, l. 16 _sqq._ _Gautama_,\nxxii. 18. _\u00c2pastamba_, i. 26. 1. _Laws of Manu_, xi. 109 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 46: _Laws of Manu_, xi. 80.]\n\n[Footnote 47: Barth, _Religions of India_, p. 264. Kipling,\n_Beast and Man in India_, p. 118 _sq._ Crooke, _Things Indian_,\np. 91.]\n\nIn Buddhism, Jainism, and Taouism the respect for animal life is\nextreme. A disciple of Buddha may not {498} knowingly deprive any\ncreature of life, not even a worm or an ant. He may not drink\nwater in which animal life of any kind whatever is contained, and\nmust not even pour it out on grass or clay.[48] And the doctrine\nwhich forbids the killing of animate beings is not only\nprofessed, but in a large measure followed, by the great majority\nof people in Buddhistic countries. In Siam the tameness of many\nliving creatures which in Europe fly from the presence of man is\nvery striking. Instances have been known in which natives have\nquitted the service of Europeans on account of their\nunwillingness to destroy reptiles and vermin, and it is a not\nuncommon practice for rich Siamese to buy live fish to have the\nmerit of restoring them to the sea.[49] In Burma, though fish is\none of the staple foods of the people, the fisherman is despised;\nnot so much, perhaps, as if he killed other living things, but he\nis still an outcast from decent society, and \"will have to suffer\ngreat and terrible punishment before he can be cleansed from the\nsins that he daily commits.\"[50] The Buddhists of Ceylon are more\nforbearing: they excuse the fisherman by saying that he does not\nkill the fish, but only removes it from the water.[51] In Tibet\nall dumb creatures are treated with humanity, and the taking of\nanimal life is rather strictly prohibited, except in the case of\nyaks and sheep needed for food. Owing to the coldness of the\nclimate, flesh forms an essential staple of diet; but the\nbutchers are regarded as professional sinners and are therefore\nthe most despised of all classes in Tibet. Wild animals and even\nsmall birds and fish are seldom or never killed, on account of\nthe religious penalties attached to this crime.[52]\n\n[Footnote 48: Oldenberg, _Buddha_, pp. 290 **n. *, 351.]\n\n[Footnote 49: Bowring, _Siam_, i. 107.]\n\n[Footnote 50: Fielding Hall, _The Soul of a People_, p. 230.]\n\n[Footnote 51: Schmidt, _Ceylon_, p. 316 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 52: Waddell, _Buddhism of Tibet_, p. 567 _sq._]\n\nThe Jain is stricter still in his regard for animal life. He\nsweeps the ground before him as he goes, lest animate things be\ndestroyed; he walks veiled, lest he inhale a living organism; he\nconsiders that the evening and night are {499} not times for\neating, since one might then swallow a live thing by mistake; and\nhe rejects not only meat but even honey, together with various\nfruits that are supposed to contain worms, not because of his\ndistaste for worms but because of his regard for life.[53] Some\ntowns in Western India in which Jains are found have their beast\nhospitals, where animals are kept and fed. At Surat there was\nquite recently an establishment of this sort with a house where a\nhost of noxious and offensive vermin, dense as the sands on the\nsea-shore, were bred and nurtured; and at Anj\u00e1r, in Kutch, about\nfive thousand rats were kept in a certain temple and daily fed\nwith flour, which was procured by a tax on the inhabitants of the\ntown.[54]\n\n[Footnote 53:  Hopkins, _Religions of India_, p. 288. Barth, _op.\ncit._ p. 145. Kipling, _op. cit._ p. 10 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 54: Burnes, 'Notice of a remarkable Hospital for\nAnimals at Surat,' in _Jour. Roy. Asiatic Soc._ i. 96 _sq._]\n\nAccording to 'Th\u00e2i-Shang,' one of the books of Taouism, a good\nman will feel kindly towards all creatures, and refrain from\nhurting even the insect tribes, grass, and trees; and he is a bad\nman who \"shoots birds and hunts beasts, unearths the burrowing\ninsects and frightens roosting birds, blocks up the dens of\nanimals and overturns nests, hurts the pregnant womb and breaks\neggs.\"[55] In the book called 'Merits and Errors Scrutinised,'\nwhich enjoys great popularity in China, it is said to be\nmeritorious to save animals from death--even insects if the\nnumber amounts to a hundred,--to relieve a brute that is greatly\nwearied with work, to purchase and set at liberty animals\nintended to be slaughtered. On the other hand, to confine birds\nin a cage, to kill ten insects, to be unsparing of the strength\nof tired animals, to disturb insects in their holes, to destroy\nthe nests of birds, without great reason to kill and dress\nanimals for food, are all errors of various degrees. And \"to be\nthe foremost to encourage the slaughter of animals, or to hinder\npersons from setting them at liberty,\" is regarded as an error of\nthe same magnitude as the crime of devising a person's death or\nof drowning or murdering a child.[56] Kindness {500} to animals\nis conspicuous in the writings of Confucius and Mencius;[57] the\nMaster angled but did not use a net, he shot but not at birds\nperching.[58] Throughout Japan, according to Sir Edward Reed,\n\"the life of animals has always been held more or less sacred. . . .,\nneither Shintoism nor Buddhism requiring or justifying the\ntaking of the life of any creature for sacrifice.\"[59]\n\n[Footnote 55: _Th\u00e2i-Shang_, 3 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 56: _Indo-Chinese Gleaner_, iii. 164, 205 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 57: Mencius, i. 1. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 58: _Lun Y\u00fc_, vii. 26.]\n\n[Footnote 59: Reed, _Japan_, i. 61.]\n\nThe regard for the lower animals which is shown by these Eastern\nreligions and their adherents is to some extent due to\nsuperstitious ideas, similar to those which we found prevalent\namong many savages. Dr. de Groot observes that in China the\nvirtues of benevolence and humanity are extended to animals\nbecause these, also, have souls which may work vengeance or bring\nreward.[60] The conduct of Orientals towards the brute creation\nhas further been explained by their belief in the transmigration\nof souls. But it seems that the connection between their theory\nof metempsychosis and their rules relating to the treatment of\nanimals is not exclusively, nor even chiefly, one of cause and\neffect, but rather one of a common origin. This theory itself may\nin some measure be regarded as a result of that intimacy which\nprevails in the East between animals and men. Buddhism recognises\nno fundamental distinction between them, only an accidental or\nphenomenal difference;[61] and the step is not long from this\nattitude to the doctrine of metempsychosis. Captain Forbes\nmaintains that the humanity with which the Burmans treat dumb\nanimals comes \"more from the innate good nature and easiness of\ntheir dispositions than from any effect over them of this\npeculiar doctrine\";[62] and they laugh at the suggestion made by\nEuropeans that Buddhists abstain from taking life because they\nbelieve in the transmigration of souls, having never heard of it\nbefore. Their motive, says Mr. Fielding Hall, is compassion and\n_noblesse oblige_.[63] But by its punishments {501} and rewards,\nreligion has greatly increased the natural regard for animal life\nand welfare, and introduced a new motive for conduct which\noriginally sprang in the main from kindly feeling.\n\n[Footnote 60: de Groot, _Religious System of China_, (vol. iv.\nbook) ii. 450.]\n\n[Footnote 61: Rhys Davids, _Hibbert Lectures on Buddhism_, p. 214.]\n\n[Footnote 62: Forbes, _British Burma_, p. 321.]\n\n[Footnote 63: Fielding Hall, _op. cit._ p. 237 _sq._]\n\nIn Zoroastrianism we meet with a different attitude towards the\nlower animal world. A fundamental distinction is made between the\nanimals of Ormuzd and those of Ahriman. To kill one of the former\nis a heinous sin, to kill one of the latter is a pious deed.[64]\nSacred above all other animals is the dog. The ill-feeding and\nmaltreatment of dogs are prosecuted as criminal, and extreme\npenalties are inflicted on those who venture to kill them.[65]\nNay, if there be in the house of a worshipper of Mazda a mad dog\nwho has no scent, the worshippers of Mazda \"shall attend him to\nheal him, in the same manner as they would do for one of the\nfaithful.\"[66] In the eyes of the Parsis, animals are enlisted\nunder the standards of either Ormuzd or Ahriman according as they\nare useful or hurtful to man; but M. Darmesteter is of opinion\nthat they originally belonged to the one or the other not on\naccount of any such qualities, but according as they chanced to\nhave lent their forms to either the god or the fiend in the storm\ntales. \"It was not animal psychology,\" he says, \"that disguised\ngods and fiends as dogs, otters, hedge-hogs, and cocks, or as\nsnakes, tortoises, frogs, and ants, but the accidents of physical\nqualities and the caprice of popular fancy, as both the god and\nthe fiend might be compared with, and transformed into, any\nobject, the idea of which was suggested by the uproar of the\nstorm, the blazing of the lightning, the streaming of the water,\nor the hue and shape of the clouds.\"[67] This hypothesis,\nhowever, seems to attach undue importance to mythical fancies,\nand it presupposes an almost unbounded and capricious allegorism,\nfor which there is apparently little foundation {502} in facts.\nThe suggestion that the animals are referred to either the one or\nthe other category according as they are useful or obnoxious to\nman, is at all events borne out by a few salient features,\nalthough in many details the matter remains obscure.\n\n[Footnote 64: Darmesteter, _Ormazd et Ahriman_, p. 283.]\n\n[Footnote 65: _Vend\u00eed\u00e2d_, xiii. _sq._ Geiger, _Civilization of\nthe Eastern Iranians_, ii. 36.]\n\n[Footnote 66: _Vend\u00eed\u00e2d_, xiii. 35.]\n\n[Footnote 67: Darmesteter, in _Sacred Books of the East_, iv.\n(1st edit.) p. lxxii. _sq._ See also _Idem_, _Ormazd et Ahriman_,\np. 283 _sqq._]\n\nIt appears that among the Zoroastrians, also, the respect for the\nlife of animals is partly due to superstitious ideas about their\nsouls and fear of their revenge. According to the 'Yasts,' \"the\nsouls of the wild beasts and of the tame\" are objects of\nworship;[68] and in one of the Pahlavi texts it is said that\npeople should abstain from unlawfully slaughtering any species of\nanimals, since otherwise, in punishment for such an act, each\nhair of the animal killed becomes like a sharp dagger, and he who\nis unlawfully a slaughterer is slain.[69] But here again we may\nassume the co-operating influence of the feeling of sympathy.\nVarious passages in the Zoroastrian 'Gathas' which enjoin\nkindness to domestic animals[70] suggest as their motives not\nonly considerations of utility but genuine tenderness. In a later\nage Firdausi sang, \"Ah! spare yon emmet rich in hoarded grain: He\nlives with pleasure, and he dies with pain.\"[71] And of the\nmodern Persian Dr. Polak says that, \"naturally not cruel, he\ntreats animals with more consideration than men.\"[72] His present\nreligion, too, enjoins kindness to animals as a duty.\n\n[Footnote 68: _Yasts_, xiii. 154.]\n\n[Footnote 69: _Sh\u00e2yast L\u00e2-Sh\u00e2yast_, x. 8.]\n\n[Footnote 70: Darmesteter, in _Le Zend-Avesta_, i. p. cvi.]\n\n[Footnote 71: Firdausi, quoted by Jones, 'Tenth Anniversary\nDiscourse,' in _Asiatick Researches_, iv. 12.]\n\n[Footnote 72: Polak, _Persien_, i. 12.]\n\nAccording to Muhammedanism, beasts, birds, fish, insects, are\nall, like man, the slaves of God, the tools of His will. There is\nno intrinsic distinction between them and the human species,\nexcept what accidental diversity God may have been pleased to\nmake.[73] Muhammed said to his followers:--\"There is not a beast\nupon the earth nor a bird that flies with both its wings, but is\na nation like to you; . . . to their Lord shall they be\ngathered.\"[74] Muhammedan law prescribes that domestic animals\nshall {503} be treated with consideration and not be\noverworked;[75] and in various Muhammedan countries this law has\nalso been habitually put into practice. The Moslems of India are\nkind to animals.[76] In his earlier intercourse with the people\nof Egypt, Mr. Lane noticed much humanity to beasts.[77] Montaigne\nsaid that the Turks gave alms to brutes and had hospitals for\nthem;[78] and Mr. Bosworth Smith is of opinion that beasts of\nburden and domestic animals are nowhere in Christendom with the\none exception, perhaps, of Norway treated with such unvarying\nkindness and consideration as they are in Turkey. \"In the East,\"\nhe adds, \"so far as it has not been hardened by the West, there\nis a real sympathy between man and the domestic animals; they\nunderstand one another.\"[79]\n\n[Footnote 73: _Cf._ Palgrave, _Journey through Central and\nEastern Arabia_, i. 368.]\n\n[Footnote 74: _Koran_, vi. 38.]\n\n[Footnote 75: Sachau, _Muhammedanisches Recht_, pp. 18, 103.]\n\n[Footnote 76: Pool, _Studies in Mohammedanism_, pp. 176, 177,\n247. _Cf._ Heber, _Journey through the Upper Provinces of India_,\nii. 131.]\n\n[Footnote 77: Lane, _Modern Egyptians_, p. 293.]\n\n[Footnote 78: Montaigne, _Essais_, ii. 11.]\n\n[Footnote 79: Bosworth Smith, _Mohammed and Mohammedanism_, pp.\n180, 217.]\n\nSo also the ancient Greeks were on familiar terms with the animal\nworld. This appears from the frequency with which their poets\nillustrate human qualities by metaphors drawn from it. And as men\nwere compared with animals, so animals were believed to possess\nhuman peculiarities. When a beast was going to be sacrificed it\nhad to give its consent to the act by a nod of the head before it\nwas killed.[80] Animals were held in some measure responsible for\ntheir deeds; they were tried for manslaughter, sentenced, and\nexecuted.[81] On the other hand, honours were bestowed upon\nbeasts which had rendered signal services to their masters. The\ngraves of Cimon's mares with which he three times conquered at\nthe Olympic games were still in the days of Plutarch to be seen\nnear his own tomb;[82] and a certain Xanthippus honoured his dog\nby burying it on a promontory, since then called \"the dog's\ngrave,\" because when the Athenians were compelled to abandon\ntheir city it swam by the side of his galley to Salamis.[83]\nAccording to Xenocrates, there were in existence {504} at Eleusis\nthree laws which had been made by an ancient legislator,\nnamely:--\"Honour your parents; Sacrifice to the gods from the\nfruits of the earth; Injure not animals.\"[84] At Athens a man was\npunished for flaying a living ram.[85] The Areopagites once\ncondemned a boy to death because he had picked out the eyes of\nsome quails.[86] As we have noticed before, the life of the\nploughing ox was sacred;[87] and young animals in particular were\nbelieved to be under the protection of the gods.[88] An ancient\nproverb says that \"there are Erinyes even for dogs.\"[89] This\nseems to indicate that the Greeks, also, were influenced by the\ncommon notion that the soul of an animal may take revenge upon\nhim who killed it, the Erinys of the slain animal being\noriginally its persecuting ghost. Among the Pythagoreans, again,\nthe rule that animals which are not obnoxious to the human race\nshould be neither injured nor killed[90] was connected with their\ntheory of metempsychosis;[91] and in some cases the prohibition\nof slaying useful animals may be traced to utilitarian\nmotives.[92] But both in Greece and Rome kindness to brutes was\nalso inculcated for their own sake, on purely humanitarian\ngrounds. Porphyry says that, as justice pertains to rational\nbeings and animals have been proved to be possessed of reason, it\nis necessary that we should act justly towards them.[93] He adds\nthat \"he who does not restrict harmless conduct to man alone, but\nextends it to other animals, most closely approaches to divinity;\nand if it were possible to extend it to plants, he would preserve\nthis image in a still greater degree.\"[94] According to Plutarch\nkindness and beneficence to creatures of every species flow from\nthe breast of a well-natured man as {505} streams that issue from\nthe living fountain. We ought to take care of our dogs and horses\nnot only when they are young, but when they are old and past\nservice.[95] We ought not to violate or kill anything whatsoever\nthat has life, unless it hurt us first.[96] And if we cannot live\nunblamably we should at least sin with discretion: when we kill\nan animal in order to satisfy our hunger we should do so with\nsorrow and pity, without abusing and tormenting it.[97] Cicero\nsays it is a crime to injure an animal.[98] And Marcus Aurelius\nenjoins man to make use of brutes with a generous and liberal\nspirit, since he has reason and they have not.[99]\n\n[Footnote 80: Schmidt, _Die Ethik der alten Griechen_, ii. 96\n_sq._]\n\n[Footnote 81: _Supra_, i. 254.]\n\n[Footnote 82: Plutarch, _Cato Major_, v. 6.]\n\n[Footnote 83: _Ibid._ v. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 84: Porphyry, _De abstinentia ab esu animalium_, iv. 22.]\n\n[Footnote 85: Plutarch, _De carnium esu oratio I._ vii. 2.]\n\n[Footnote 86: Quintilian, _De institutione oratoria_, v. 9. 13.]\n\n[Footnote 87: _Supra_, ii. 331.]\n\n[Footnote 88: Aeschylus, _Agamemnon_, 48 _sqq._ Xenophon,\n_Cynegeticus_, v. 14.]\n\n[Footnote 89: Schmidt, _op. cit._ ii. 96.]\n\n[Footnote 90: Jamblichus, _De Pythagorica vita_, 21 (98).]\n\n[Footnote 91: Diogenes Laertius, _Vit\u00e6 philosophorum_, viii. 2.\n12 (77). Aristotle, _Rhetorica_, i. 13. 2, p. 1373 b. Schmidt,\n_op. cit._ ii. 94.]\n\n[Footnote 92: Porphyry, _op. cit._ iv. 22. _Supra_, ii. 331.]\n\n[Footnote 93: Porphyry, _op. cit._ iii. 18.]\n\n[Footnote 94: _Ibid._ iii. 28.]\n\n[Footnote 95: Plutarch, _Cato Major_, v. 3 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 96: _Idem_, _Questiones Roman\u00e6_, 75.]\n\n[Footnote 97: _Idem_, _De carnium esu oratio II._ i. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 98: Cicero, _De republica_, iii. 11.]\n\n[Footnote 99: Marcus Aurelius, _Commentarii_, vi. 23.]\n\nIn the Old Testament we meet with several instances of kindly\nfeeling towards animals.[100] God watches over and controls the\nsustenance of their life. He sends springs into the valleys which\nwill give drink to every beast of the field. He gives nests to\nthe birds of the heaven, which sing among the branches. He causes\ngrass to grow for the cattle; and the young lions, roaring after\ntheir prey, seek their food from God.[101] Whilst the Jews, as\nProfessor Toy observes, found it hard to conceive of the God of\nIsrael as thinking kindly of its enemies, they had no such\nfeeling of hostility towards beasts and birds.[102] But at the\nsame time man is the centre of the creation, a being set apart\nfrom all other sentient creatures as God's special favourite, for\nwhose sake everything else was brought into existence. The sun,\nthe moon, and the stars were placed in the firmament of the\nheaven to give light upon the estate of man.[103] For his\nsustenance the fruits of the earth were made to grow, and to him\nwas given dominion over the fish of the sea, {506} and over the\nfowl of the air, and over every living thing that moves upon the\nearth.[104] And when the earth is to be replenished after the\ndeluge, the same privileges are again granted to him. The fear of\nman and the dread of man shall be upon all living creatures, into\nhis hand are they all delivered, they shall all be meat for\nhim.[105] And they are given over to his supreme and\nirresponsible control without the slightest injunction of\nkindness or the faintest suggestion of any duties towards them.\nThey are to be regarded by him simply as food.[106]\n\n[Footnote 100: See Bertholet, _Die Stellung der Israeliten zu den\nFremden_, p. 14. Various passages, however, which are often\nquoted as instances of tenderness towards animals allow of\nanother and more natural interpretation. This is especially the\ncase with the Sabbatarian injunctions referring to domestic\nanimals.]\n\n[Footnote 101: _Psalms_, civ. 10-12, 14, 17, 21.]\n\n[Footnote 102: Toy, _Judaism and Christianity_, p. 81.]\n\n[Footnote 103: _Genesis_, i. 16 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 104: _Genesis_, i. 28.]\n\n[Footnote 105: _Ibid._ ix. 2 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 106: _Cf._ Evans, 'Ethical Relations between Man and\nBeast,' in _Popular Science Monthly_, xlv. 637 _sq._]\n\nAmong the Hebrews the harshness of this anthropocentric doctrine\nwas somewhat mitigated by the sympathy which a simple pastoral\nand agricultural people naturally feels for its domestic animals.\nIn Christianity, on the other hand, it was further strengthened\nby the exclusive importance which was attached to the spiritual\nsalvation of man. He was now more than ever separated from the\nrest of sentient beings. Even his own animal nature was regarded\nwith contempt, the immortality of his soul being the only object\nof religious interest. \"It would seem,\" says Dr. Arnold, \"as if\nthe primitive Christian, by laying so much stress upon a future\nlife in contradistinction to this life, and placing the lower\ncreatures out of the pale of hope, placed them at the same time\nout of the pale of sympathy, and thus laid the foundation for\nthis utter disregard of animals in the light of our\nfellow-creatures.\"[107] St. Paul asks with scorn, \"Doth God take\ncare for oxen?\"[108] No creed in Christendom teaches kindness to\nanimals as a dogma of religion.[109] In the Middle Ages various\ncouncils of the Church declared hunting unlawful for the\nclergy;[110] but the obvious reason for this prohibition was its\nhorror of bloodshed,[111] not any consideration {507} for the\nanimals. Mr. Mauleverer in Sir Arthur Helps' 'Talk about Animals\nand their Masters,' says, \"Upon a moderate calculation, I think I\nhave heard, in my time, 1320 sermons; and I do not recollect that\nin any one of them I ever heard the slightest allusion made to\nthe conduct of men towards animals.\"[112] Nor is there any such\nallusion in most treatises on Ethics which base their teachings\nupon distinctly Christian tenets. The kindest words, I think,\nwhich from a Christian point of view have been said about animals\nhave generally come from Protestant sectarians, Quakers and\nMethodists,[113] whereas Roman Catholic writers--with a few\nexceptions[114]--when they deal with the subject at all, chiefly\ntake pains to show that animals are entirely destitute of rights.\nBrute beasts, says Father Rickaby, cannot have any rights for the\nreason that they have no understanding and therefore are not\npersons. We have no duties of any kind to them, as neither to\nstocks and stones; we only have duties _about_ them. We must not\nharm them when they are our neighbour's property, we must not vex\nand annoy them _for_ sport, because it disposes him who does so\nto inhumanity towards his own species. But there is no shadow of\nevil resting on the practice of causing pain to brutes _in_\nsport, where the pain is not the sport itself, but an incidental\nconcomitant of it. Much more in all that conduces to the\nsustenance of man may we give pain to animals, and we are not\n\"bound to any anxious care to make this pain as little as may be.\nBrutes are as _things_ in our regard: so far as they are useful\nto us, they exist for us, not for themselves; and we do right in\nusing them unsparingly for our need and convenience, though not\nfor our wantonness.\"[115] According to another {508} modern\nCatholic writer the infliction of suffering upon an animal is not\nonly justifiable, but a duty, \"when it confers a certain, a solid\ngood, however small, on the spiritual nature of man.\"[116] Pope\nPius IX. refused a request for permission to form in Rome a\nSociety for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals on the professed\nground that it was a theological error to suppose that man owes\nany duty to an animal.[117]\n\n[Footnote 107: Arnold, quoted by Evans, in _Popular Science\nMonthly_, xlv. 639.]\n\n[Footnote 108: _1 Corinthians_, ix. 9.]\n\n[Footnote 109: The Manich\u00e6ans prohibited all killing of animals\n(Baur, _Das Manich\u00e4ische Religionssystem_, p. 252 _sqq._); but\nManich\u00e6ism did not originate on Christian ground (Harnack,\n'Manich\u00e6ism,' in _Encyclop\u00e6dia Britannica_, xv. 485; _supra_,\nii. 312).]\n\n[Footnote 110: Le Grand d'Aussy, _Histoire de la vie priv\u00e9e des\nFran\u00e7ois_, i. 394 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 111: _Supra_, i. 381 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 112: Helps, _Some Talk about Animals and their\nMasters_, p. 20. _Cf._ Mrs. Jameson, _Common-Place Book of\nThoughts_, p. 212.]\n\n[Footnote 113: See Gurney, _Views and Practices of the Society of\nFriends_, p. 392 _sq._ n. 8; Richmond, 'Sermon on the Sin of\nCruelty to the Brute Creation,' in _Methodist Magazine_ (London),\nxxx. 490 _sqq._; Chalmers, 'Cruelty to Animals,' in _Methodist\nMagazine_ (New York), ix. 259 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 114: See de la Roche-Fontenelles, _L'\u00c9glise et la piti\u00e9\nenvers animaux_, _passim_.]\n\n[Footnote 115: Rickaby, _Moral Philosophy_, p. 248 _sqq._ See\nalso Addis and Arnold, _Catholic Dictionary_, p. 33; Clarke,\n'Cruelty to Animals,' in _The Month and Catholic Review_, xxv.\n401 _sqq._; Hedley, 'Dr. Mivart on Faith and Science,' in _Dublin\nReview_, ser. iii. vol. xviii. 418.]\n\n[Footnote 116: Clarke, in _The Month and Catholic Review_,\nxxv. 406.]\n\n[Footnote 117: Cobbe, _Modern Rack_, p. 6.]\n\nIt is not only theological moralists that maintain that animals\ncan have no rights and that abstinence from wanton cruelty is a\nduty not to the animal but to man. This view has been shared by\nKant[118] and by many later philosophers.[119] So also the legal\nprotection of animals has often been vindicated merely on the\nground that cruelty to animals might breed cruelty to men or\nshows a cruel disposition of mind,[120] or that it wounds the\nsensibilities of other people.[121] In 'Parliamentary History and\nReview' for 1825-1826 it is stated that no reason can be\nassigned for the interference of the legislator in the protection\nof animals unless their protection be connected, either directly\nor remotely, with some advantage to man.[122] The Bill for the\nabolition of bear-baiting and other cruel practices was expressly\npropounded on the ground that nothing was more conducive to crime\nthan such sports, that they led the lower orders to gambling,\nthat they educated them for thieves, that they gradually trained\nthem up to bloodshed and murder.[123] The criminal code of the\nGerman Empire, again, imposes a fine upon any person \"who\nspitefully tortures or cruelly ill-treats beasts, {509} either\npublicly or in a manner to create scandal\"[124]--in other words,\nhe is punished, not because he puts the animal to pain, but\nbecause his conduct is offensive to his fellow men.\n\n[Footnote 118: Kant, _Metaphysische Anfangungsgr\u00fcnde der\nTugendlehre_, \u00a7 16 _sq._, pp. 106, 108.]\n\n[Footnote 119: _E.g._, Alexander, _Moral Order and Progress_,\np. 281; Ritchie, _Natural Rights_, p. 110 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 120: Hommel, quoted by von Hippel, _Die Thielqu\u00e4lerei\nin der Strafgesetzgebung_, p. 110. Tissot, _Le droit p\u00e9nal_, i.\n17. Lasson, _System der Rechtsphilosophie_, p. 548\n_sq._]\n\n[Footnote 121: Lasson, _op. cit._ p. 548. von Hippel, _op. cit._\np. 125.]\n\n[Footnote 122: _Parliamentary History and Review_, 1825-6, p. 761.]\n\n[Footnote 123: _Ibid._ p. 546.]\n\n[Footnote 124: _Strafgesetzbuch_, \u00a7 360 (13).]\n\nIndifference to animal suffering has been a characteristic of\npublic opinion in European countries up to quite modern times.\nOnly a little more than a hundred years ago Thomas Young declared\nin his 'Essay on Humanity to Animals' that he was sensible of\nlaying himself open to no small portion of ridicule in offering\nto the public a book on such a subject.[125] Till the end of the\neighteenth century and even later cock-fighting was a very\ngeneral amusement among the English and Scotch, entering into the\noccupations of both the old and young. Travellers agreed with\ncoachmen that they were to wait a night if there was a cock-fight\nin any town through which they passed. Schools had their\ncock-fights; on Shrove Tuesday every youth took to the village\nschoolroom a cock reared for his special use, and the\nschoolmaster presided at the conflict.[126] Those who felt that\nthe practice required some excuse found it in the idea that the\nrace was to suffer this annual barbarity by way of punishment for\nSt. Peter's crime;[127] but the number of people who had any\nscruples about the game cannot have been great considering that\neven such a strong advocate of humanity to animals as Lawrence\nhad no decided antipathy to it.[128] Other pastimes indulged in\nwere dog-fighting, bull-baiting and badger-baiting; and in the\nmiddle of the eighteenth century the bear-garden was described by\nLord Kames as one of the chief entertainments of the English,\nthough it was held in abhorrence by the French and \"other polite\nnations,\" being too savage an amusement to be relished {510} by\nthose of a refined taste.[129] As late as 1824 Sir Robert (then\nMr.) Peel argued strongly against the legal prohibition of\nbull-baiting.[130]\n\n[Footnote 125: Young, _Essay on Humanity to Animals_, p. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 126: Roberts, _Social History of the People of the\nSouthern Counties of England_, p. 421 _sqq._ Rogers, _Social Life\nin Scotland_, ii. 340. In 1856, when Roberts wrote his book,\ncock-penance was still paid in some English grammar schools to\nthe master as a perquisite on Shrove Tuesday (Roberts, p. 423).]\n\n[Footnote 127: Roberts, _op. cit._ p. 422.]\n\n[Footnote 128: Lawrence, _Philosophical and Practical Treatise on\nHorses_, ii. 12.]\n\n[Footnote 129: Kames, _Essays on the Principles of Morality_, p. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 130: Hansard, _Parliamentary Debates_, New Series,\nx. 491 _sqq._]\n\nAbout two years previously, however, humanity to animals had, for\nthe first time, become a subject of English legislation by the\nAct which prevented cruel and improper treatment of cattle.[131]\nThis Act was afterwards followed by others which prohibited\nbear-baiting, cock-fighting, and similar pastimes, as also\ncruelty to domestic animals in general. In 1876 vivisection for\nmedical or scientific purposes was subjected to a variety of\nrestrictions, and since 1900 cases of ill-treatment of wild\nanimals in captivity may be dealt with under the Wild Animals in\nCaptivity Protection Act.[132] On the Continent cruelty to\nanimals was first prohibited by criminal law in Saxony, in\n1838,[133] and subsequently in most other European states. But in\nthe South of Europe there are still countries in which the law is\nentirely silent on the subject.[134]\n\n[Footnote 131: _Statutes of Great Britain and Ireland_, lxii. 403\n_sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 132: Stephen, _New Commentaries on the Laws of England_,\niv. 213 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 133: von Hippel, _op. cit._ p. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 134: _Ibid._ p. 90 _sq._]\n\nWhatever be the professed motives of legislators for preventing\ncruelty to animals, there can be no doubt that the laws against\nit are chiefly due to a keener and more generally felt sympathy\nwith their sufferings. The actual feelings of men have commonly\nbeen somewhat more tender than the theories of law, philosophy,\nand religion. The anthropocentric exclusiveness of Christianity\nwas from ancient times to some extent counterbalanced by popular\nsentiments and beliefs. In the folk-tales of Europe man is not\nplaced in an isolated and unique position in the universe. He\nlives in intimate and friendly intercourse with the animals round\nhim, attributes to them human qualities, and regards them with\nmercy.[135] Tender feelings towards the brute creation are also\ndisplayed in many legends of saints.[136] St. Francis of Assisi\n{511} talked with the birds and called them \"brother birds\" or\n\"little sister swallows,\" and was seen employed in removing worms\nfrom the road that they might not be trampled by travellers.[137]\nJohn Moschus speaks of a certain abbot who early in the morning\nnot only used to give food to all the dogs in the monastery, but\nwould bring corn to the ants and to the birds on the roof.[138]\nIn the 'Revelations of St. Bridget' we read, \"Let a man fear,\nabove all, me, his God, and so much the gentler will he become\ntowards my creatures and animals, on whom, on account of me,\ntheir Creator, he ought to have compassion.\"[139] Many kind words\nabout animals have come from poets and thinkers. Montaigne says\nthat he has never been able to see without affliction an innocent\nbeast, which is without defence and from which we receive no\noffence, pursued and killed.[140] Shakespeare points out that\n\"the poor beetle that we tread upon, in corporal sufferance finds\na pang as great as when a giant dies.\"[141] Mandeville thinks\nthat if it was not for that tyranny which custom usurps over us,\nno men of any tolerable good-nature could ever be reconciled to\nthe killing of so many animals for their daily food, as long as\nthe bountiful earth so plentifully provides them with varieties\nof vegetable dainties.[142] Towards the end of the eighteenth\ncentury Bentham wrote:--\"Men must be permitted to kill animals;\nbut they should be forbidden to torment them. Artificial death\nmay be rendered less painful than natural death by simple\nprocesses, well worth the trouble of being studied, and of\nbecoming an object of police. Why should the law refuse its\nprotection to any sensitive being? A time will come when humanity\nwill spread its mantle over everything that breathes. The lot of\nslaves has begun to {512} excite pity; we shall end by softening\nthe lot of the animals which labour for us and supply our\nwants.\"[143] Some years later Thomas Young pronounced hunting,\nshooting, and fishing for sport to be \"unlawful, cruel, and\nsinful.\"[144] And in the course of the nineteenth century\nhumanity to animals, from being conspicuous in a few individuals\nonly, became the keynote of a movement gradually increasing in\nstrength. Humanitarians, says Mr. Salt, \"insist that the\ndifference between human and non-human is one of degree only and\nnot of kind, and that we owe duties, the same in kind though not\nin degree, to all our sentient fellow-beings.\"[145] Some people\nmaintain that it is wrong to kill animals for food or in sport;\nbut the most vigorous attacks concerning the treatment of the\nbrute creation are at present directed against the practice of\nvivisection. The claim is made that this practice should be, not\nmerely restricted, but entirely prohibited by law. And while the\nantivivisectionists generally endeavour to deny or minimise the\nscientific importance of experiments on living animals, their cry\nfor the abolition of such experiments is mainly based on the\nargument that humanity at large has no right to purchase relief\nfrom its own suffering by torturing helpless brutes.\n\n[Footnote 135: _Supra_, i. 259. Schwarz, _Pr\u00e4historisch-anthropologische\nStudien_, p. 203.]\n\n[Footnote 136: Lecky, _History of European Morals_, ii. 168\n_sqq._ Joyce, _Social History of Ancient Ireland_, ii. 517 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 137: Sabatier, _Life of St. Francis of Assisi_, p. 176\n_sq._ Digby, _Mores Catholici_, ii. 291.]\n\n[Footnote 138: Moschus, _Pratum spirituale_, 184 (Migne,\n_Patrologi\u00e6 cursus_, Ser. Gr\u00e6ca, lxxxvii. 3056).]\n\n[Footnote 139: St. Bridget, quoted by Helps, _op. cit._ p. 124.]\n\n[Footnote 140: Montaigne, _Essais_, ii. 11.]\n\n[Footnote 141: Shakespeare, _Measure for Measure_, iii. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 142: Mandeville, _Fable of the Bees_, p. 187.]\n\n[Footnote 143: Bentham, _Theory of Legislation_, p. 428 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 144: Young, _op. cit._ p. 75 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 145: Salt, _Animals' Rights_, p. v.]\n\nThis rapidly increasing sympathy with animal suffering is no\ndoubt to a considerable extent due to the decline of the\nanthropocentric doctrine and the influence of another theory,\nwhich regards man, not as an image of the deity separated from\nthe lower animals by a special act of creation, but as a being\ngenerally akin to them, and only representing a higher stage in\nthe scale of mental evolution. Through this doctrine the orthodox\ncontempt for dumb creatures was succeeded by feelings of affinity\nand kindly interest. But apart from any theory as regards human\norigins, growing reflection has also taught men to be more\nconsiderate in their treatment of animals by producing a more\nvivid idea of their sufferings. Human thoughtlessness {513} has\nbeen responsible for much needless pain to which they have been\nmade subject. In spite of some improvement it is so still;\nwhilst, at the same time, the movement advocating greater\nhumanity to animals is itself not altogether free from\ninconsistencies and a certain lack of discrimination.\n\nIt has been observed that the Neapolitan would not act so cruelly\nas he does to almost all animals except the cat if he could bring\nhimself to conceive their capacity for joy and pain.[146] So also\nwe ourselves should often behave differently if we realised the\ntortures we thoughtlessly cause to creatures whose sufferings\nescape our notice from want of obvious outward expression. While\nthe practice of whipping young pigs to death to make them tender,\nwhich occurred in England not much more than a century ago,[147]\nwould nowadays be regarded with general horror, cruelties\ninflicted for gastronomic purposes upon creatures of a lower type\nare little thought of. Cray-fish, oysters, and fish in general,\nas Mandeville observed, excite hardly any compassion at all,\nbecause \"they express themselves unintelligibly to us; they are\nmute, and their inward formation, as well as outward figure,\nvastly different from ours.\"[148] On the other hand, even\npassionate sportsmen describe the hunting of monkeys as repulsive\non account of their resemblance to man; Rajah Brooke thought it\nalmost barbarous to kill an orang-utan, unless for the sake of\nscientific research.[149] Buddhism itself declares that \"he who\ntakes away the life of a large animal will have greater demerit\nthan he who takes away the life of a small one. . . . The crime\nis not great when an ant is killed; its magnitude increases in\nthis progression--a lizard, a guana, a hare, a deer, a bull, a\nhorse, and an elephant.\"[150] How little the feelings which\nunderlie men's opinions concerning conduct {514} towards the\nlower animals are influenced by reflection is also apparent in\nthe present crusade against vivisection, when compared with the\npublic indifference to the sufferings inflicted on wild animals\nin sport. The vivisector who in cold blood torments his helpless\nvictim in the interest of science and for the benefit of mankind\nis called a coward, and is a much more common object of hatred\nthan the sportsman who causes agonies to the creature he pursues\nfor sheer amusement. The pursued animal, it is argued, has \"free\nchances of escape.\"[151] This is an excellent argument--provided\nwe share the North American Indian's conviction that an animal\ncan never be killed without its own permission.\n\n[Footnote 146: 'Cruelty to Animals in Naples,' in _Saturday\nReview_, lix. 854.]\n\n[Footnote 147: _The World_, 1756, nr. 190, p. 1142. Young, _op.\ncit._ p. 129.]\n\n[Footnote 148: Mandeville, _op. cit._ p. 187.]\n\n[Footnote 149: Brooke, _Ten Years in Sar\u00e1wak_, i. 100. _Cf._\nRengger, _Naturgeschichte in der S\u00e4ugethiere von Paraguay_, p. 26.]\n\n[Footnote 150: Hardy, _Manual of Budhism_, pp. 478, 480.]\n\n[Footnote 151: Cobbe, _op. cit._ p. 10.]\n\nAt present there is among ourselves no topic of moral concern\nwhich presents a greater variety of opinion than the question how\nfar the happiness of the lower animals may be justly sacrificed\nfor the benefit of man. The extreme views on this subject might,\nno doubt, be somewhat modified, on the one hand by a more vivid\nrepresentation of animal suffering, on the other hand by the\nrecognition of certain facts, often overlooked, which make it\nunreasonable to regard conduct towards dumb creatures in exactly\nthe same light as conduct towards men. It should especially be\nremembered that the former have none of those long-protracted\nanticipations of future misery or death which we have.[152] If\nthey are destined to serve as meat they are not aware of it;\nwhereas many domestic animals would never have come into\nexistence, and been able to enjoy what appears a very happy life,\nbut for the purpose of being used as food. But though greater\nintellectual discrimination may somewhat lessen the divergencies\nof moral opinion on the subject, nothing like unanimity can be\nexpected, for the simple reason that moral judgments are\nultimately based upon emotions, and sympathy with the animal\nworld is a feeling which varies extremely in different individuals.\n\n[Footnote 152: _Cf._ Bentham, _Introduction to the Principles of\nMorals and Legislation_, p. 311, n.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XLV\n\nREGARD FOR THE DEAD\n\n\nMORALITY takes notice not only of men's conduct towards the\nliving but of their conduct towards the dead.\n\nThere is a general tendency in the human mind to assume that what\nhas existed still exists and will exist. When a person dies it is\ndifficult for those around him to conceive that he is really\ndead, and when the cold motionless body bears sad testimony to\nthe change which has taken place, there is a natural inclination\nto believe that the soul has only changed its abode. In the\nsavage the tendency to assume the continued existence of the soul\nafter death is strongly supported by dreams and visions of his\ndeceased friends. What else could these mean but visits of their\nsouls?\n\nThere are, it is true, some savages who are reported to believe\nin the annihilation of the soul at the moment of death, or to\nhave no notion whatever of a future state.[1] But the accuracy of\nthese statements is hardly beyond suspicion. We sometimes hear\nthat the very people who are said to deny any belief in an\nafter-life are afraid of ghosts.[2] A native of Madagascar will\nalmost in the same {516} breath declare that when he dies he\nceases altogether to exist and yet confess the fact that he is in\nthe habit of praying to his dead ancestors.[3] Of the Masai in\nEastern Africa some writers state that they believe in\nannihilation,[4] others that they attribute a future existence to\ntheir chiefs, medicine men, or influential people.[5] The ideas\non this subject are often exceedingly vague, and inconsistencies\nare only to be expected.\n\n[Footnote 1: Powers, _Tribes of California_, p. 348 _sq._\n(Miwok). Brinton, _Myths of the New World_, p. 233 _sq._ (some\nOregon Indians). Lumholtz, _Among Cannibals_, p. 101 (natives of\nthe Herbert River, Northern Queensland). Martin, _Reisen in den\nMolukken_, p. 155 (Alfura). Worcester, _Philippine Islands_, p.\n412 (Mangyans). Colquhoun, _Amongst the Shans_, p. 76 (Lethtas).\nDalton, _Ethnology of Bengal_, p. 257 (Or\u00e1ons). Petherick,\n_Travels in Central Africa_, i. 321 (Nouaer tribes). Du Chaillu,\n_Explorations in Equatorial Africa_, p. 385.]\n\n[Footnote 2: New, _Life in Eastern Africa_, p. 105.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Ellis, _History of Madagascar_, 393.]\n\n[Footnote 4: Thomson, _Through Masai Land_, p. 259. Hinde, _The\nLast of the Masai_, p. 99.]\n\n[Footnote 5: Johnston, _Uganda_, ii. 832. Hollis, _Masai_, pp.\n304, 305, 307. Eliot, _ibid._ p. xx.]\n\nThe disembodied soul is commonly supposed to have the shape of a\nsmall unsubstantial human image, and to be in its nature a sort\nof vapour, film, or shadow.[6] It is believed to have the same\nbodily wants and to possess the same mental capacities as its\nowner possessed during his lifetime. It is not regarded as\ninvulnerable or immortal--it may be hurt and killed. It feels\nhunger and thirst, heat and cold. It can see and hear and think,\nit has human passions and a human will, and it has the power to\ninfluence the living for evil or for good. These notions as\nregards the disembodied soul determine the relations between the\nliving and the dead.\n\n[Footnote 6: Tylor, _Primitive Culture_, i. 429.]\n\nThe dead are supposed to have rights very similar to those they\nhad whilst alive. The soul must not be killed or injured. The\nSouth Australian Dieyerie, for instance, show great reverence for\ncertain trees, which are believed to be their fathers\ntransformed; they will not cut them down and protest against the\nsettlers doing so.[7] So also some of the Philippine Islanders\nmaintain that the souls of their forefathers are in trees, which\nthey therefore spare.[8] The North American Powhatans refrained\nfrom doing harm to some small wood-birds, which were supposed to\nreceive the souls of their chiefs.[9] In Lifu, {517} when a\nfather was about to die, surrounded by members of his family, he\nmight say what animal he would be, for instance a butterfly or\nsome kind of bird, and that creature would be sacred to his\nfamily, who would neither injure nor kill it.[10] The Rejangs of\nSumatra imagine that tigers in general contain the spirits of\ndeparted men, and \"no consideration will prevail on a countryman\nto catch or to wound one, but in self-defence, or immediately\nafter the act of destroying a friend or relation.\"[11] Among\nother peoples monkeys, crocodiles, or snakes, being thought men\nin metempsychosis, are held sacred and must not be hurt.[12] Some\nCongo Negroes, again, abstain for a whole year after a death from\nsweeping the house, lest the dust should injure the delicate\nsubstance of the ghost.[13] In China, for seven days after a\nman's death his widow and children avoid the use of knives and\nneedles, and even of chopsticks, eating their food with their\nfingers, so as not to wound the ghost.[14] And to this day it\nremains a German peasants' belief that it is wrong to slam a\ndoor, lest one should pinch a soul in it.[15]\n\n[Footnote 7: Gason, 'Dieyerie Tribe,' in Woods' _Native Tribes of\nSouth Australia_, p. 280.]\n\n[Footnote 8: Blumentritt, 'Der Ahnencultus der Malaien des\nPhilippinen-Archipels,' in _Mittheil. d. kais. u. k\u00f6n. Geograph.\nGesellsch. in Wien_, xxv. 164 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 9: Brinton, _Myths of the New World_, p. 102.]\n\n[Footnote 10: Codrington, quoted by Tylor, 'Remarks on Totemism,'\nin _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxviii. 147.]\n\n[Footnote 11: Marsden, _History of Sumatra_, p. 292. The same\nbelief prevails among the natives of the Malay Peninsula\n(Newbold, _British Settlements in the Straits of Malacca_, ii. 192).]\n\n[Footnote 12: Meiners, _Geschichte der Religionen_, i. 212.\nTylor, _Primitive Culture_, ii. 8.]\n\n[Footnote 13: Bastian, _Der Mensch in der Geschichte_, ii. 323.]\n\n[Footnote 14: Gray, _China_, i. 288.]\n\n[Footnote 15: Wuttke, _Der deutsche Volksaberglaube der\nGegenwart_, \u00a7 609, p. 396 _sq._]\n\nBut the survivors must not only avoid doing anything which might\nhurt the soul, they must also positively contribute to its\ncomfort and subsistence. They often provide it with a dwelling,\neither burying the deceased in his own house, or erecting a tent\nor hut on his grave. Some Australian natives kindle a fire at a\nfew yards' distance from the tomb, and repeat this until the soul\nis supposed to have gone somewhere else;[16] others, again, are\nin the habit of wrapping the body up in a rug, professedly for\nthe purpose of keeping it warm.[17] In the Saxon district of\nVoigtland people have been known to {518} put into the coffin an\numbrella and a pair of galoshes.[18] An extremely prevalent\ncustom is to place provisions in or upon the grave, and very\ncommonly feasts are given for the dead.[19] Weapons, implements,\nand other movables are deposited in the tomb; domestic animals\nare buried or slaughtered at the funeral;[20] and, as we have\nseen before, even human beings are sacrificed to the dead to\nserve them as companions or attendants, or to vivify their\nspirits with their blood, or to gratify their craving for revenge.[21]\n\n[Footnote 16: Roth, _North-West-Central Queensland Aborigines_,\np. 165.]\n\n[Footnote 17: Fraser, _Aborigines of New South Wales_, p. 79 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 18: Kohler, _Volksbrauch im Voigtlande_, p. 441.]\n\n[Footnote 19: See Tylor. _op. cit._ ch. xi. _sq._; Spencer,\n_Principles of Sociology_, i. 155 _sqq._, 257 _sqq._; Frazer,\n_Adonis Attis Osiris_, p. 242 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 20: See Spencer, _op. cit._ i. 184 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 21: _Supra_, i. 472 _sqq._]\n\nThe offerings made to the dead may be gifts presented to them by\nthe survivors, but the regular funeral sacrifice consists of the\ndeceased person's own individual property. Among savages the\nwhole, or a large part, of it is often consigned to the grave or\ndestroyed.[22] The right of ownership does not cease with death\nwhere the belief prevails that the dead stand in need of earthly\nchattels. The recognition of this right is also apparent in the\nsevere condemnation of robbery or violation committed at a tomb.\nAmong various North American tribes such an act was regarded as\nan offence of the first magnitude and provoked cruel revenge.[23]\nOf the Chippewa Indians it is said that however bad a person may\nbe or however much inclined to steal, the things left at a grave,\nvaluable or not, are never touched, being sacred to the spirit of\nthe {519} dead.[24] Among the Maoris \"the least violation of any\nportion of the precincts of the dead is accounted the greatest\ncrime that a human being can commit, and is visited with the\ndirest revenge of a surviving tribe.\"[25] The laws of Athens[26]\nand Rome[27] and the ancient Teutonic law-books[28] punished with\ngreat severity the plunder of a corpse or a tomb. In Rome the\npunishment was death if the offence was committed by force,\notherwise condemnation to the mines.\n\n[Footnote 22: Boas, 'Central Eskimo,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._\nvi. 580. Murdoch, 'Ethn. Results of the Point Barrow Expedition,'\n_ibid._ ix. 424 _sq._ (Point Barrow Eskimo). Powell, _ibid._ iii.\np. lvii. (North American Indians). Yarrow, 'Mortuary Customs of\nthe North American Indians,' _ibid._ i. 98 (Pimas), 100\n(Comanches). McGee, 'Siouan Indians,' _ibid._ xv. 178. Roth, _op.\ncit._ p. 164 (certain Queensland tribes). Colenso, _Maori Races\nof New Zealand_, p. 57. Kolff, _Voyages of the Dourga_, p. 166\n_sq._ (Arru Islanders). Kloss, _In the Andamans and Nicobars_,\np. 304 (Kar Nicobarese). Batchelor, _Ainu and their Folk-Lore_,\np. 560 _sq._ Georgi, _Russia_, iv. 152 (Burats). Cailli\u00e9, _Travels\nthrough Central Africa_, i. 164 (Bagos). Burrows, _Land of the\nPigmies_, p. 107 (Monbuttu). Decle, _Three Years in Savage\nAfrica_, p. 79 (Barotse). Strabo, xi. 4. 8 (Albanians of the\nEastern Caucasus). See also Spencer, _Principles of Sociology_,\ni. 185 _sq._; Post, _Entwicklungsgeschichte des Familienrechts_,\np. 295 _sq._; _Idem_, _Grundriss der ethnologischen\nJurisprudenz_, ii. 173 _sq._; _infra_, p. 514 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 23: Sagard, _Voyage du Pays des Hurons_, p. 288. Gibbs,\n'Tribes of Western Washington and North-western Oregon,' in\n_Contributions to North American Ethnology_, i. 204.]\n\n[Footnote 24: Reid, 'Religious Belief of the Ojibois,' in _Jour.\nAnthr. Inst._ iii. 112.]\n\n[Footnote 25: Polack, _Manners and Customs of the New\nZealanders_, i. 111 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 26: Cicero, _De legibus_, ii. 26. See also Schmidt,\n_Die Ethik der alten Griechen_, ii. 105 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 27: _Digesta_, xlvii. 12, 'De sepulchro violato.']\n\n[Footnote 28: Wilda, _Das Strafrecht der Germanen_, p. 975 _sqq._]\n\nLike living men the dead are sensitive to insults and fond of\npraise; hence respect must be shown for their honour and\nself-regarding pride. _De mortuis nil nisi bonum;_ [Greek: ou)\nga\\r e)sthla\\ katthanou=si kertomei=n e)p' a)ndra/sin].[29] In\nGreece custom required that at the funeral meal the virtues of\nthe deceased should be enumerated and extolled,[30] and calumny\nagainst a dead person was punished by law.[31] The same was the\ncase in ancient Egypt.[32] In Greenland, after the interment, the\nnearest male relative of the dead commemorated in a loud\nplaintive voice all the excellent qualities of the departed.[33]\nAmong the Iroquois the near relatives and friends approached the\nbody in turn and addressed it in a laudatory speech.[34]\n\n[Footnote 29: Archilochus, _Reliqui\u00e6_, 40.]\n\n[Footnote 30: Schmidt, _Die Ethik der alten Griechen_, ii. 122 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 31: Rohde, _Psyche_, p. 224.]\n\n[Footnote 32: Diodorus Siculus, i. 92. 5. Erman, _Life in Ancient\nEgypt_, p. 322.]\n\n[Footnote 33: Cranz, _History of Greenland_, i. 218.]\n\n[Footnote 34: Morgan, _League of the Iroquois_, p. 175, n. 2.]\n\nThe dead also demand obedience and are anxious that the rules\nthey laid down while alive should be followed by the survivors.\nHence the sacredness which is attached to a will;[35] hence also,\nin a large measure, the rigidity of ancestral custom. The\ngreatest dread of the natives of South-Eastern Africa \"is to\noffend their ancestors and the only way to avoid this is to do\neverything according to {520} traditional usage.\"[36] Among the\nBasutos \"the anger of the deified generations could not be more\ndirectly provoked than by a departure from the precepts and\nexamples they have left behind them.\"[37] The E[(w]e-speaking\npeoples of the Slave Coast have a proverb which runs:--\"Follow\nthe customs of your father. What he did not do, avoid doing, or\nyou will harm yourself.\"[38] Among the Aleuts the old men always\nimpress upon the native youth the great importance of strictly\nobserving the customs of their forefathers in conducting the\nchase and other matters, as any neglect in this respect would be\nsure to bring upon them disaster and punishment.[39] The\nKamchadales, says Steller, consider it a sin to do anything which\nis contrary to the precepts of their ancestors.[40] The Papuans\nof the Motu district, in New Guinea, believe that when men and\nwomen are bad--adulterers, thieves, quarrellers, and the\nlike--the spirits of the dead are angry with them.[41] One of the\nmost powerful sentiments in the mind of a Chinese is his\nreverence for ancestral custom; and in a large sense Japan also\nis still a country governed by the voices that are hushed.[42]\nThe life of the ancient Roman was beset with a society of\ndeparted kinsmen whose displeasure he provoked if he varied from\nthe practice handed down from his fathers. The expression _mos\nmajorum_, \"the custom of the elders,\" was used by him as a charm\nagainst innovation.[43]\n\n[Footnote 35: Ellis, _Polynesian Researches_, iii. 116\n(Tahitians). Shortland, _Traditions and Superstitions of the New\nZealanders_, p. 257. Sarbah, _Fanti Customary Laws_, p. 82.\nSchmidt, _Die Ethik der alten Griechen_, ii. 124 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 36: Macdonald, _Light in Africa_, p. 192.]\n\n[Footnote 37: Casalis, _Basutos_, p. 254.]\n\n[Footnote 38: Ellis, _E[(w]e-speaking Peoples of the Slave\nCoast_, p. 263.]\n\n[Footnote 39: Elliott, _Alaska and the Seal Islands_, p. 170.\nVeniaminof, quoted by Petroff, _Report on the Population, &c. of\nAlaska_, p. 156.]\n\n[Footnote 40: Steller, _Beschreibung von Kamtschatka_, p. 274.]\n\n[Footnote 41: Chalmers, _Pioneering in New Guinea_, p. 169.]\n\n[Footnote 42: Griffis, _Religions of Japan_, p. 308. Hozumi,\n_Ancestor-Worship and Japanese Law_, p. 1, &c.]\n\n[Footnote 43: Granger, 'Moral Life of the Early Romans,' in\n_Internal. Jour. of Ethics_, vii. 287. _Idem_, _Worship of the\nRomans_, pp. 65, 66, 138.]\n\nBesides such duties to the dead as are similar in nature to those\nwhich men owe to their living fellow men or superiors, there are\nobligations of a different character arising from the fact of\ndeath itself. The funeral, the rites connected with it, and the\nmourning customs are largely regarded as duties to the dead.\n\n{521} The grave is represented as a place where the deceased\nfinds his desired rest, and if denied proper burial he is\nbelieved not only to walk but to suffer. The Iroquois considered\nthat unless the rites of burial were performed, the spirits of\nthe dead had to wander for a time upon the earth in a state of\ngreat unhappiness; hence their extreme solicitude to recover the\nbodies of their slain in battle.[44] The Abipones regard it as\nthe greatest misfortune for the dead to be left to rot in the\nopen air, and they therefore inter even the smallest bone of a\ndeparted friend.[45] In Ashantee the spirits of those who for\nsome reason or other have been deprived of the customary funeral\nrites are doomed, in the imagination of the people, to haunt the\ngloom of the forest, stealing occasionally to their former abodes\nin rare but lingering visits, troubling and bewitching their\nneglectful relatives.[46] The Negroes of Accra believe that\nhappiness in a future life depends not only upon courage, power,\nand wealth in this world, but also upon a proper burial.[47] In\nsome Australian tribes the souls of those whose bodies have been\nleft to lie unburied are supposed to have to prowl on the face of\nthe earth and about the place of death, with no gratification but\nto harm the living;[48] or there is said to be no future\nexistence for them, as their bodies will be devoured by crows and\nnative dogs.[49] Among the Bataks of Sumatra nothing is\nconsidered to be a greater disgrace to a person than to be denied\na grave; for by not being held worthy of burial he is declared to\nbe spiritually dead.[50] The Samoans believed that the souls of\nunburied friends, for instance such as had been drowned or had\nfallen in war, haunted them everywhere, crying out in a pitiful\ntone, \"Oh, how cold! Oh, how cold!\"[51] According to Karen ideas\nthe {522} spirits of those who die a natural death and are\ndecently buried go to a beautiful country and renew their earthly\nlife, whereas the ghosts of persons who by accident are left\nuninterred will wander about the earth, occasionally showing\nthemselves to mankind.[52] Confucius connected the disposal of\nthe dead immediately with the great virtue of submission and\ndevotion to superiors.[53] No act is in China recognised more\nworthy a virtuous man than that of interring stray bones and\ncovering up exposed coffins,[54] and to bury a person who is\nwithout friends is considered to be as great a merit as to save\nlife.[55] It is also held highly important to provide the proper\nplace for a grave; the Taouists maintain that \"if a coffin be\ninterred in an improper spot, the spirit of the dead is made\nunhappy, and avenges itself by causing sickness and other\ncalamities to the relatives who have not taken sufficient care\nfor its repose.\"[56] The ancient Chaldeans believed that the\nspirits of the unburied dead, having neither place of repose nor\nmeans of subsistence, wandered through the town and country,\noccupied with no other thought than that of attacking and robbing\nthe living.[57] In classical antiquity it was the most sacred of\nduties to give the body its funeral rites,[58] and the Greeks\nreferred the right of sepulture to the gods as its authors.[59]\n\n[Footnote 44: Morgan, _League of the Iroquois_, p. 175.]\n\n[Footnote 45: Dobrizhoffer, _Account of the Abipones_, ii. 284.]\n\n[Footnote 46: Bowdich, _Mission to Ashantee_, p. 262 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 47: Monrad, _Skildring af Guinea-Kysten_, p. 4.]\n\n[Footnote 48: Oldfield, 'Aborigines of Australia,' in _Trans.\nEthn. Soc._ N.S. iii. 228, 236 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 49: Chauncy, in Brough Smyth, _Aborigines of Victoria_,\nii. 280.]\n\n[Footnote 50: Buning, in _Glimpses of the Eastern Archipelago_,\np. 75.]\n\n[Footnote 51: Turner, _Nineteen Years in Polynesia_, p. 233.\nHood, _Cruise in H.M.S. \"Fawn\" in the Western Pacific_, p. 142.]\n\n[Footnote 52: Cross, quoted by Mac Mahon, _Far Cathay_, p. 202\n_sq._ Mason, 'Religion, &c. among the Karens,' in _Jour. Asiatic\nSoc. Bengal_, xxxiv. pt. ii. 203.]\n\n[Footnote 53: de Groot, _Religious System of China_, (vol. ii.\nbook) i. 659.]\n\n[Footnote 54: Giles, _Strange Stories from a Chinese Studio_, ii.\n147, n. 11.]\n\n[Footnote 55: _Indo-Chinese Gleaner_, iii. 161.]\n\n[Footnote 56: Legge, _Religions of China_, p. 200.]\n\n[Footnote 57: Maspero, _Dawn of Civilization_, p. 689. Jeremias,\n_Die babylonisch-assyrischen Vorstellungen vom Leben nach dem\nTode_, p. 54 _sqq._ Hal\u00e9vy, _M\u00e9langes de critique et d'histoire\nrelatifs aux peuples s\u00e9mitiques_, p. 368.]\n\n[Footnote 58: See Schmidt, _Die Ethik der alten Griechen_, ii. 97\n_sqq._; Granger, _Worship of the Romans_, p. 37 _sqq._; Aust,\n_Die Religion der R\u00f6mer_, p. 226 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 59: Sophocles, _Antigone_, 454 _sq._ Euripides,\n_Supplices_, 563.]\n\nSo also among peoples who practise cremation the dead themselves\nare considered to be benefited by being burned. The N\u00e2yars of\nMalabar are of opinion that no time should be lost in setting\nabout the funeral, as the disposal of a corpse either by\ncremation or burial as soon {523} as possible after death is\nconducive to the happiness of the spirit of the departed; they\nsay that \"the collection and careful disposal of the ashes of the\ndead gives peace to his spirit.\"[60] The Thlinkets maintain that\nthose whose bodies are burned will be warm and comfortable in the\nother world, whereas others will have to suffer from cold. \"Burn\nmy body! Burn me!\" pleaded a dying Thlinket; \"I fear the cold.\nWhy should I go shivering through all the ages and the distances\nof the next world?\"[61] The ancient Persians, on the other hand,\nconsidered both cremation and burial to be sins for which there\nwas no atonement, and exposed their dead on the summits of\nmountains, thinking it a great misfortune if neither birds nor\nbeasts devoured their carcases.[62] So also the Samoyedes and\nMongols held it to be good for the deceased if his corpse was\nsoon devoured by beasts,[63] and the Kamchadales regarded it as a\ngreat blessing to be eaten by a beautiful dog.[64] The East\nAfrican Masai, who likewise, as a rule, expose their dead to the\nwild beasts, say that if the corpse is eaten by the hy\u00e6nas the\nfirst night, the deceased must have been a good man, as the\nhy\u00e6nas are supposed to act by the command of 'Ng ais, or God.[65]\n\n[Footnote 60: Fawcett, 'N\u00e2yars of Malabar,' in the Madras\nGovernment Museum's _Bulletin_, iii. 245, 251.]\n\n[Footnote 61: Dall, _Alaska_, p. 423. Petroff, _op. cit._ p. 175.\nMcNair Wright, _Among the Alaskans_, p. 333.]\n\n[Footnote 62: _Vend\u00eed\u00e2d_, i. 13, 17; vi. 45 _sqq._; viii. 10.\nDarmesteter, in _Sacred Books of the East_, iv. p. lxxv. _sqq._\nAgathias, _Histori\u00e6_, ii. 22 _sq._ (Migne, _Patrologi\u00e6 cursus_,\nSer. Graeca, lxxxviii. 1377). Herodotus, i. 140; iii.\n16.]\n\n[Footnote 63: Preuss, _Die Begr\u00e4bnisarten der Amerikaner und\nNordostasiaten_, p. 272. _Cf._ Yarrow, in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._\ni. 103 (Caddoes or Timber Indians).]\n\n[Footnote 64: Steller, _op. cit._ p. 273.]\n\n[Footnote 65: Merker, _Die Masai_, p. 193.]\n\nCertain ceremonies are professedly performed for the purpose of\npreventing evil spirits from doing harm to the dead.[66] This is\nsometimes the case with cremation; we are told that among some\nSiberian peoples the dead are burned so as to be \"effectually\nremoved from the machinations of spirits.\"[67] The Teleutes\nbelieve that the {524} spirits of the earth do much mischief to\nthe departed; hence their shamans drive them off at the funeral\nby striking the air several times with an axe.[68] In Christian\ncountries the passing-bell has likewise been supposed to repel\nevil spirits.[69]\n\n[Footnote 66: See Frazer, 'Certain Burial Customs as illustrative\nof the Primitive Theory of the Soul,' in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xv.\n87 _sq._; Hertz, 'La repr\u00e9sentation collective de la mort,' in\n_L'ann\u00e9e sociologique_, x., 1905-1906, p. 56 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 67: Georgi, _op. cit._ iii. 264.]\n\n[Footnote 68: Georgi, _op. cit._ iii. 264.]\n\n[Footnote 69: Frazer, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xv. 87.]\n\nFasting after a death is regarded as a dutiful tribute to the\ndead; the Chinese say that it is \"a means of raising the mind up\nto the soul, a means to enable the sacrificer to perform in a\nmore perfect way the acts of worship incumbent upon him, by\nbringing about a closer contact between himself and the\nsoul.\"[70] The self-mutilations performed by the relatives of the\ndead are supposed to be pleasing to him as tokens of\naffliction;[71] and the same is of course the case with the\nlamentations at funerals. In some Central Australian tribes the\ncustom of painting the body of a mourner is said to have as its\nobject \"to render him or her more conspicuous, and so to allow\nthe spirit to see that it is being properly mourned for.\"[72] The\nmourning dress is a sign of regard for the dead. Nay, even the\ncustom of not mentioning his name is looked upon in the same\nlight. Some peoples maintain that to name him would be to disturb\nhis rest,[73] or that he would take it as an indication that his\nrelatives are not properly mourning for him, and would feel it as\nan insult.[74]\n\n[Footnote 70: de Groot, _op. cit._ (vol. ii. book) i. 657.]\n\n[Footnote 71: Dorman, _Origin of Primitive Superstitions_, p. 216\n_sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 72: Spencer and Gillen, _Native Tribes of Central\nAustralia_, p. 511.]\n\n[Footnote 73: Nansen, _Eskimo Life_, p. 233 (Greenlanders). Tout,\n'Ethnology of the Stlatlumh of British Columbia,' in _Jour.\nAnthr. Inst._ xxxv. 138. Georgi, _op. cit._ iii. 27 (Samoyedes).]\n\n[Footnote 74: Spencer and Gillen, _Native Tribes of Central\nAustralia_, p. 498.]\n\nAs the duties to the living, so the duties to the dead are\ngreatly influenced by the relationship between the parties.\nEverywhere the obligation to satisfy the wants of the deceased is\nincumbent upon those who were nearest to him whilst alive. In the\narchaic State, as we have seen, it is considered the greatest\nmisfortune which can befall a person to die without descendants,\nsince in such a case there would be nobody to attend to his\nsoul.[75] Confucius {525} said, \"For a man to sacrifice to a\nspirit which does not belong to him is flattery.\"[76] The\ndistinction between a tribesman or fellow countryman and a\nstranger also applies to the dead. In Greenland a stranger\nwithout relatives or friends was generally suffered to lie\nunburied.[77] Among North American Indians it is permitted to\nscalp warriors of a hostile tribe, whereas \"there is no example\nof an Indian having taken the scalp of a man of his own tribe, or\nof one belonging to a nation in alliance with his own, and whom\nhe may have killed in a quarrel or a fit of anger\";[78] and an\nIndian who would never think of desecrating the grave of a\ntribesman may have \"no such scruple in regard to the graves of\nanother tribe.\"[79] Yet already from early times we hear of the\nrecognition of certain duties even to strangers and enemies. The\nGreeks of the post-Homeric age made it a rule to deliver up a\nslain enemy so that he should receive the proper funeral\nrites.[80] It was considered a disgraceful act of Lysander not to\naccord burial to Philocles, the Athenian general at Aegospotami,\ntogether with about four thousand prisoners whom he put to the\nsword;[81] and the Athenians themselves boasted that their\nancestors had with their own hands buried the Persians who had\nfallen in the battle of Marathon, holding it to be \"a sacred and\nimperative duty to cover with earth a human corpse.\"[82]\nAccording to the Chinese penal code, \"destroying, mutilating, or\nthrowing into the water the unenclosed and unburied corpse of a\nstranger,\" though a much less serious crime than the same injury\ninflicted upon the corpse of a relative, is yet an offence\npunishable with 100 blows, and perpetual banishment to the\ndistance of 3,000 _lee_.[83]\n\n[Footnote 75: _Supra_, ii. 400 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 76: _Lun Y\u00fc_, ii. 24. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 77: Cranz, _op. cit._ i. 218.]\n\n[Footnote 78: Domenech, _Seven Years' Residence in the Great\nDeserts of North America_, ii. 357.]\n\n[Footnote 79: Dodge, _Our Wild Indians_, p. 162.]\n\n[Footnote 80: Schmidt, _Die Ethik der alten Griechen_, ii. 100\n_sqq._ Rohde, _op. cit._ p. 200 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 81: Pausanias, ix. 32. 9.]\n\n[Footnote 82: _Ibid._ i. 32. 5; ix. 32. 9.]\n\n[Footnote 83: _Ta Tsing Leu Lee_, sec. cclxxvi. p. 295.]\n\nThe duties to the dead also vary according to the age, {526} sex,\nand social position of the departed. Among the natives of\nAustralia children and women are interred with but scant\nceremony.[84] In the tribes of North-West-Central Queensland\nnobody paints his body in mourning for a young child.[85] In\nEastern Central Africa the spirit of a child which dies when\nabout four or five days of age gets nothing of the attention\nusually bestowed on the dead.[86] Among the Wadshagga married\npersons are buried in their huts, whilst the bodies of unmarried\nones and especially children are put in some hidden place, where\nthey are left to rot or be devoured by beasts.[87] Some Siberian\ntribes were formerly accustomed to inhume adults only, whereas\nthe corpses of children were exposed on trees.[88] The natives of\nPort Jackson, in New South Wales, consigned their young people to\nthe grave, but burned those who had passed middle age.[89] The\nKondayamkottai Maravars, a Dravidian tribe of Tinnevelly in\nSouthern India, bury the corpses of unmarried persons, whilst\nthose of married ones are cremated.[90] In some other tribes in\nIndia burial is practised in the case of young children only,[91]\nand this has long been a rule of Brahmanism.[92] Among the\nAndaman Islanders, again, infants are buried within the\nencampment, whereas all other dead are carried to some distant\nand secluded spot in the jungle.[93] We meet with a kindred\ncustom in the neighbourhood of Victoria Nyanza in Central Africa:\nin Karagwe and Nkole \"children are buried in the huts themselves,\ngrown-up people outside, generally in cultivated fields, or in\nsuch as are going to be cultivated.\"[94] The bodies of women are\nsometimes disposed of in a {527} different way from those of men.\nThus among the Blackfeet Indians the latter were fastened in the\nbranches of trees so high as to be beyond the reach of wolves,\nand then left to waste in the dry winds; whilst the body of a\nwoman or child was thrown into the underbush or jungle, where it\nsoon became the prey of the wild animals.[95] Among the Tuski\n(Chukchi), who cremate or rather boil the bodies of good men,\nwomen are not usually burned, on account of the scarcity of wood.[96]\n\n[Footnote 84: Curr, _The Australian Race_, i. 89.]\n\n[Footnote 85: Roth, _op. cit._ p. 164.]\n\n[Footnote 86: Macdonald, _Africana_, i. 59.]\n\n[Footnote 87: Volkens, _Der Kilimandscharo_, p. 253.]\n\n[Footnote 88: Georgi, _op. cit._ iii. 31 (Koibales).]\n\n[Footnote 89: Collins, _English Colony of New South Wales_, i. 601.]\n\n[Footnote 90: Fawcett, 'Kondayamkottai Maravars,' in _Jour.\nAnthr. Inst._ xxiii. 64.]\n\n[Footnote 91: Thurston, in the Madras Government Museum's\n_Bulletin_, i. 198 (Kotas). Fawcett, 'N\u00e2yars of Malabar,' _ibid._\niii. 245.]\n\n[Footnote 92: Hopkins, _Religions of India_, p. 273.]\n\n[Footnote 93: Man, 'Aboriginal Inhabitants of the Andaman\nIslands,' in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xii. 144.]\n\n[Footnote 94: Kollmann, _Victoria Nyanza_, p. 63 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 95: Yarrow, _Introduction to the Study of Mortuary\nCustoms among the North American Indians_, p. 67.]\n\n[Footnote 96: Dall, _op. cit._ p. 382.]\n\nClass distinctions likewise influence the disposal of the dead.\nIn some American tribes cremation seems to be reserved for\npersons of higher rank.[97] Among the pagans of Obubura Hill\ndistrict in Southern Nigeria \"the bodies of ordinary people are\nburied in the bush, sometimes being merely thrown on the ground,\nbut those of chiefs and important men and women are buried in\ntheir huts or in the adjoining verandah.\"[98] The Masai throw\naway the corpses of ordinary persons to be eaten by hy\u00e6nas,\nwhereas medicine-men and influential people are buried.[99] The\nNandi do not bury their dead unless they have been very important\npersons.[100] Among the Waganda, when a chief dies, he is buried\nin a wooden coffin, whilst the bodies of slaves are thrown into\nthe jungle.[101] Some other African peoples throw the corpses of\nslaves into a morass or the nearest pool of water.[102] The\nThlinkets committed them to the tender mercies of the sea.[103]\nAmong the Maoris a slave would not be greatly bewailed after\ndeath, nor have his bones ceremonially scraped.[104] The Roman\n'Law of the Twelve Tables' prohibited the bodies of slaves from\nbeing embalmed.[105] Moral distinctions, also, are noticeable in\n{528} the treatment of the dead. In some parts of Central America\nthe bodies of men of high standing who had committed a crime\nwere, like those of the common people, exposed to be devoured by\nwild beasts.[106] Among the Tuski the corpses of bad men were\nsimply left to rot.[107] In Greenland the body of a dead\nmalefactor was dismembered, and the separate limbs were thrown\napart.[108] To the same class of facts belong the punishments\nwhich were inflicted upon the corpses of criminals in classical\nantiquity and formerly in Christian Europe.[109]\n\n[Footnote 97: Preuss, _op. cit._ p. 301.]\n\n[Footnote 98: Partridge, _Cross River Natives_, p. 237.]\n\n[Footnote 99: Hollis, _op. cit._ pp. 304, 305, 307; Eliot,\n_ibid._ p. xx.]\n\n[Footnote 100: Johnston, _Uganda_, ii. 880.]\n\n[Footnote 101: Wilson and Felkin, _Uganda_, i. 188.]\n\n[Footnote 102: Denham and Clapperton, _Travels in Northern and\nCentral Africa_, ii. 64 (natives of Kano). Pogge, _Im Reiche des\nMuata Jamwo_, p. 243 (Kalunda).]\n\n[Footnote 103: Holmberg, 'Ethnographische Skizzen \u00fcber die V\u00f6lker\ndes russischen Amerika,' in _Acta Soc. Scient. Fennic\u00e6_, iv. 323.\nDall, _op. cit._ pp. 417, 420.]\n\n[Footnote 104: Colenso, _op. cit._ p. 30.]\n\n[Footnote 105: _Lex Duodecim Tabularum_, x. 6.]\n\n[Footnote 106: Preuss, _op. cit._ p. 301.]\n\n[Footnote 107: Dall, _op. cit._ p. 382.]\n\n[Footnote 108: Rink, _Tales and Traditions of the Eskimo_, p. 64.]\n\n[Footnote 109: Ayrault, _Des procez faicts au cadaver_, p. 5\n_sqq._ Trummer, _Vortr\u00e4ge \u00fcber Tortur, &c._ i. 455 _sqq._\n_Supra_, ii. 254.]\n\nFrom this survey of facts we shall now pass to a consideration of\nthe causes from which the duties to the dead have sprung. In the\nfirst place, there can be no doubt that these duties to a\nconsiderable extent are based upon the feeling of sympathetic\nresentment, in the same way as is the case with duties to living\npersons. Death does not entirely extinguish the affection which\nwas felt for a person whilst he was alive. The rites and customs\nconnected with a death are very largely similar to or identical\nwith natural expressions of grief, and in spite of their\nceremonial character it is impossible to believe that they are\naltogether counterfeit. We are told by trustworthy eye-witnesses\nthat, although the self-inflicted pain and the loud lamentations\nwhich form part of a funeral among the Australian blacks are not\nto be taken as a measure of the grief actually felt, this\nexpression of despair \"is not all artificial or professional\";[110]\nand Mr. Man believes that among the Andaman Islanders \"in the\nmajority of cases the display of grief is thoroughly\nsincere.\"[111] But the dead also inspire other feelings than\nsympathy and sorrow, and the duties towards them have\nconsequently a complex origin.\n\n[Footnote 110: Fraser, _Aborigines of New South Wales_, p. 44.\nSpencer and Gillen, _Native Tribes of Central Australia_, p. 510\n_sq._]\n\n[Footnote 111: Man, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xii. 145.]\n\nThe souls of the dead are not generally supposed to lead a merely\npassive existence. They are conceived as {529} capable of acting\nupon the living, of conferring upon them benefits, or at all\nevents of inflicting upon them harm. Death has in some respects\nenhanced their powers. They know what is going on upon earth,\nwhat those whom they have left behind are doing. Their power of\nacting, also, is greater than that which they possessed when they\nwere tied to the flesh. They are raised to a higher sphere of\ninfluence; magic properties are ascribed even to their corpses.\nTheir character may remain on the whole unchanged, and so, too,\ntheir affection for their surviving friends. Hence they often\nbecome guardians of their descendants. Among the Amazulu the head\nof each house is worshipped by his children; remembering his\nkindness to them while he was living, they say, \"He will still\ntreat us in the same way now he is dead.\"[112] The Herero invoke\nthe blessings of their deceased friends or relatives, praying for\nsuccess against their enemies, an abundance of cattle, numerous\nwives, and prosperity in their undertakings.[113] On the West\nAfrican Slave Coast the head of a family, after death, often\nbecomes its protector, and is sometimes regarded as the guardian\nof a whole community or village.[114] The Mpongwe teach the child\n\"to look up to the parent not only as its earthly protector, but\nas a friend in the spirit-land.\"[115] The Gournditch-mara in\nAustralia believed that \"the spirit of the deceased father or\ngrandfather occasionally visited the male descendant in dreams,\nand imparted to him charms (songs) against disease or against\nwitchcraft.\"[116] The Veddah of Ceylon invokes the spirits of his\ndeparted relatives \"as sympathetic and kindred, though higher\npowers than man, to direct him to a life pleasing to the gods,\nthrough which he may gain their protection or favour.\"[117] The\nNay[=a]dis of Malabar, on certain ceremonial occasions, offer\nsolemn prayers that the souls of the {530} departed may protect\nthem from the ravages of wild beasts and snakes.[118] The Vedic\npeople called upon the aid of their dead:--\"O Fathers, may the\nsky-people grant us life; may we follow the course of the\nliving.\"[119] So also the Zoroastrian Fravashis, who corresponded\nto the Vedic \"Fathers,\" helped their own kindred, borough, town,\nor country.[120] Aeschylus, in his 'Eumenides,' represents\nOrestes as saying, \"My father will send me aid from the\ntomb.\"[121] The Lar Familiaris, the spirit guardian of the Roman\nfamily, was undoubtedly the spirit of a deceased ancestor.[122]\nThe old Slavonians believed that the souls of fathers watched\nover their children and their children's children. In Galicia the\npeople still think that their hearths are haunted by the souls of\nthe dead, who make themselves useful to the family; and among the\nCzechs, it is a common belief that departed ancestors look after\nthe fields and herds of their descendants and assist them in\nhunting and fishing.[123]\n\n[Footnote 112: Callaway, _Religious System of the Amazulu_,\np. 144 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 113: Andersson, _Lake Ngami_, p. 222.]\n\n[Footnote 114: Ellis, _E[(w]e-speaking Peoples_, p. 104. See also\n_ibid._ p. 24 (Slave and Gold Coast natives).]\n\n[Footnote 115: Wilson, _Western Africa_, p. 394.]\n\n[Footnote 116: Fison and Howitt, _Kamilaroi and Kurnai_, p. 278.]\n\n[Footnote 117: Nevill, 'Vaeddas of Ceylon,' in _Taprobanian_, i. 194.]\n\n[Footnote 118: Iyer, 'Nay[=a]dis of Malabar,' in the Madras\nGovernment Museum's _Bulletin_, iv. 72.]\n\n[Footnote 119: _Rig-Veda_, x. 57. 5. _Cf._ Hopkins, _op. cit._\np. 143 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 120: _Yasts_, xiii. 66 _sqq._; &c.]\n\n[Footnote 121: Aeschylus, _Eumenides_, 598.]\n\n[Footnote 122: Jevons, in Plutarch's _Romane Questions_, p. xli.\nRohde, _op. cit._ p. 232.]\n\n[Footnote 123: Ralston, _Songs of the Russian People_, pp. 119,\n121. For other instances of a similar kind see Shooter, _Kafirs\nof Natal_, p. 161; Arbousset and Daumas, _Tour to the North-East\nof the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope_, p. 340 (Bechuanas);\nCasalis, _Basutos_, p. 248; Wilken, _Het animisme bij de volken\nvan den Indischen Archipel_, p. 194 _sqq._; Nansen, _Eskimo\nLife_, p. 290 (Greenlanders); Jessen, _Afhandling over de Norske\nFinners og Lappers Hedenske Religion_, p. 27; Friis, _Lappisk\nMythologi_, p. 115 _sq._; von D\u00fcben, _Lappland_, p. 249;\nAbercromby, _Pre- and Proto-historic Finns_, i. 178 (Mordvins);\nvon Wlislocki, _Volksglaube der Zigeuner_, p. 43 _sqq._ (Gypsies).]\n\nBut the ancestral guardian spirit does not bestow his favours for\nnothing. He must be properly attended to,[124] and if neglected\nhe easily becomes positively dangerous to his living relatives.\nThe same Africans who invoke the dead in adversity think them\n\"capable of wreaking their vengeance on those who do not\nliberally minister to their wants and enjoyments.\"[125] The\nChaldeans believed that {531} the departed who otherwise\ncarefully watched over the welfare of his children, if abandoned\nand forgotten, avenged himself for their neglect by returning to\ntorment them in their homes, by letting sickness attack them, and\nby ruining them with his imprecations.[126] The Vedic poet prays\nto the Fathers, \"May ye not injure us for whatever impiety we\nhave as men committed.\"[127] The Fravashis come to the help of\nthose only who treat them well, and are \"dreadful unto those who\nvex them.\"[128] In Rome, according to Ovid, once upon a time when\nthe great festival of the dead was not observed, and the manes\nfailed to receive the customary gifts, the injured spirits\nrevenged themselves on the living, and the city \"became heated by\nthe suburban funeral pyres.\"[129] So also, according to Slavonic\nbeliefs, the dead \"might be induced, if proper respect was not\npaid to them, to revenge themselves on their forgetful survivors.\"[130]\n\n[Footnote 124: Wilken, _op. cit._ p. 194 _sq._ (peoples in the\nMalay Archipelago). Abercromby, _op. cit._ i. 178 (Mordvins).\nJessen, _op. cit._ p. 27; Friis, _op. cit._ p. 116 _sq._ (Laplanders).]\n\n[Footnote 125: Rowley, _Religion of the Africans_, p. 90.]\n\n[Footnote 126: Halevy, _op. cit._ p. 368.]\n\n[Footnote 127: _Rig-Veda_, x. 15. 6.]\n\n[Footnote 128: _Yasts_, xiii. 31, 42, 51, 70, &c.]\n\n[Footnote 129: Ovid, _Fasti_, ii. 549 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 130: Ralston, _op. cit._ p. 335.]\n\nMoreover, we must not conclude that wherever the spirits of\ndeceased ancestors are invoked as guardians they are necessarily\nlooked upon as essentially benevolent to their descendants.[131]\nConcerning the ancient Babylonians and Assyrians Professor\nJastrow writes:--\"In general the dead were not favorably disposed\ntowards the living, and they were inclined to use what power they\nhad to work evil rather than for good. In this respect they\nresembled the demons, and it is noticeable that an important\nclass of demons was known by the name _ekimmu_, which is one of\nthe common terms for the shades of the dead.\"[132] The Greeks\nwere much afraid of their dead, and regarded their \"heroes\" as\nextremely irritable, in later times as exclusively\nmalicious.[133] It appears from Ovid's 'Fasti' that fear was the\npredominant feeling of the Romans with reference to the spirits\nof the departed, who were supposed {532} to wander about by\nnight, causing men to pine away or bewitching them into\nmadness.[134] Even in China, where the souls of the dead are\nsupposed effectually to control the destiny of the living,[135]\nmalevolent rather than benevolent inclinations are ascribed to\nthem by the popular belief, as appears from the fact that the\nwords for \"ghost\" and \"devil\" are the same and form a portion of\nthe objectionable epithets applied to foreigners.[136] Generally\nspeaking, my collection of facts has led me to the conclusion\nthat the dead are more commonly regarded as enemies than\nfriends,[137] and that Professor Jevons[138] and Mr. Grant\nAllen[139] are mistaken in their assertion that, according to\nearly beliefs, the malevolence of the dead is for the most part\ndirected against strangers only, whereas they exercise a fatherly\ncare over the lives and fortunes of their descendants and fellow\nclansmen.\n\n[Footnote 131: _Cf._ Karsten, _Origin of Worship_, p. 122 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 132: Jastrow, _op. cit._ p. 581.]\n\n[Footnote 133: Rohde, _op. cit._ pp. 177 _sqq._, 225 n. 4.\nSchmidt, _Die Ethik der alten Griechen_, ii. 130.]\n\n[Footnote 134: Ovid, _Fasti_, v. 429 _sqq._ Granger, _Worship of\nthe Romans_, p. 67.]\n\n[Footnote 135: de Groot, _op. cit._ (vol. v. book) ii. 464.]\n\n[Footnote 136: Dennys, _Folk-Lore of China_, p. 73. See also\nLegge, _Religions of China_, pp. 13, 201.]\n\n[Footnote 137: Dr. Steinmetz (_Ethnol. Studien zur ersten\nEntwicklung der Strafe_, i. 283) has arrived at the same\nconclusion. See also Meiners, _Geschichte der Religionen_, i. 301\n_sqq._; Karsten, _op. cit._ p. 115 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 138: Jevons, _Introduction to the History of Religion_,\np. 53 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 139: Grant Allen, _Evolution of the Idea of God_,\np. 347 _sq._]\n\nThus the Bondeis in East Africa apparently make little difference\nbetween a devil and a departed ancestor.[140] Among the Fjort of\nLoango the good people who have left this life \"are generally\nconsidered the enemies of mankind.\"[141] Other Africans maintain\nthat the spirits of the dead hover in the air, \"watching the\ndestiny of friends, haunting houses, killing children, injuring\ncattle, and causing disease and destruction,\" all being\nmalevolent to the living.[142] Of the Savage Islanders in\nPolynesia we are told that \"no effort of the missionary can avail\nto break them of their belief in the malevolence of ghosts, even\nof those who loved them best in life; the spirits of the dead\nseem compelled to work ill to the living without their own\nvolition.\"[143] In Tahiti the spirits of parents and children,\nsisters and brothers, \"seemed to have been regarded as a sort of\n{533} demons.\"[144] Among the Maoris \"the nearest and most\nbeloved relatives were supposed to have their natures changed by\ndeath, and to become malignant, even towards those they formerly\nloved.\"[145] The natives of Erromanga, in the New Hebrides,\nmaintained that all the spirits of their departed ancestors were\nevil, and roamed the earth doing harm to men.[146] In the tribes\ninhabiting the mouth of the Wanigela River, in New Guinea, all\ndead ancestors are supposed to be constantly on the watch to deal\nout sickness or death to anyone who may displease them; hence the\nnatives are most particular to do nothing that should raise their\nanger.[147] Australian natives believe that a deceased person is\nmalevolent for a long time after death, and the more nearly\nrelated the more he is feared.[148] The _anitos_ or ghosts, of\nthe Tagales in the Philippine Islands are likewise perpetually\nanxious to do harm to their descendants, trying to kill people,\nespecially shortly after death, and being the causes of nearly\nall diseases.[149] The Saora of the Madras Presidency only know\nthe existence of the departed souls by the mischief they do, and\nthink that all ills are occasioned either by ancestral spirits or\ngods.[150] In the North-Western Provinces of India the _d\u00edw\u00e1rs_,\nor _genii loci_, are oftentimes \"the spirits of good men,\nBrahmans, or village heroes, who manage, when they become objects\nof worship, to be generally considered very malicious\ndevils\";[151] and the ghosts of all low caste natives are\nnotoriously malignant.[152] The Tibetans are of opinion that a\nghost is always malicious, and that it returns and gives troubles\neither on account of its malevolence or its desire to see how its\nformer property is being disposed of.[153] The Finns and other\npeoples of the same stock believed that the souls of the dead\nwere generally intent to do harm to the living, their nearest\nrelatives included.[154] Thus, according to Votyak ideas, even a\nmother may become {534} the enemy of her own child from the\nmoment of her death.[155] Among the Ainu of Japan, \"if a man is\nat a loss for the authorship of any particular calamity, which\nhas befallen him, he is very apt to refer it to the ghost of a\ndead wife, mother, grandmother, or, still more certainly, to that\nof a dead mother-in-law\";[156] an Ainu who accompanied Mr.\nBatchelor would on no account come within twenty-five or thirty\nyards of the spot where his own mother was burned.[157] The\nKoniagas believe that after death every man becomes a devil.[158]\nAccording to ideas prevalent among the Central Eskimo, the dead\nare at first malevolent spirits who frequently roam around the\nvillages, causing sickness and mischief and killing men by their\ntouch; but subsequently they are supposed to attain to rest and\nare no longer feared.[159] The Tarahumares of Mexico are afraid\nof their dead; a mother asks her deceased infant to go away and\nnot to come back, and the weeping widow implores her husband not\nto carry off, or do harm to, his own sons or daughters.[160] Mr.\nBridges informs us that the Fuegian word for a ghost, _c\u00fashpich_,\nis also an adjective signifying \"frightful, dreadful, awful.\"[161]\n\n[Footnote 140: Dale, 'Natives inhabiting the Bondei Country,' in\n_Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxv. 233.]\n\n[Footnote 141: Dennett, _Folklore of the Fjort_, p. 11 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 142: Burton, _Lake Regions of Central Africa_, ii. 344.]\n\n[Footnote 143: Thomson, _Savage Island_, p. 94.]\n\n[Footnote 144: Ellis, _Polynesian Researches_, i. 334 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 145: Taylor, _Te Ika a Maui_, p. 18. See also _ibid._\npp. 137, 221; Polack, _op. cit._ i. 242.]\n\n[Footnote 146: Robertson, _Erromanga_, p. 389.]\n\n[Footnote 147: Guise, 'Tribes inhabiting the Mouth of the\nWanigela River,' in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxviii. 216.]\n\n[Footnote 148: Fraser, _Aborigines of New South Wales_, p. 80.\nCurr, _The Australian Race_, i. 87.]\n\n[Footnote 149: Blumentritt, in _Mittheil. d. kais. u. k\u00f6n.\nGeograph. Gesellsch. in Wien_, p. 166 _sqq._ de Mas, _Informe\nsobre el estado de las Islas Filipinas en_ 1842, 'Orijen de los\nhabitantes de la Oceania,' p. 15; 'Poblacion,' p. 29. _Cf._\n_ibid._ 'Poblacion,' p. 17; Blumentritt, p. 168 (Igorrotes).]\n\n[Footnote 150: Fawcett, _Saoras_, pp. 43, 51.]\n\n[Footnote 151: Elliot, _Races of the North Western Provinces of\nIndia_, p. 243.]\n\n[Footnote 152: Crooke, _Popular Religion of Northern India_, i. 269.]\n\n[Footnote 153: Waddell, _Buddhism of Tibet_, p. 498.]\n\n[Footnote 154: Castr\u00e9n, _Nordiska resor och forskningar_, iii.\n121 _sqq._ Waronen, _Vainajainpalvelus muinaisilla\nSuomalaisilla_, p. 23.]\n\n[Footnote 155: Buch, 'Die Wotj\u00e4ken,' in _Acta Soc. Scient.\nFennic\u00e6_, xii. 607.]\n\n[Footnote 156: Howard, _Life with Trans-Siberian Savages_, p. 196.]\n\n[Footnote 157: Batchelor, _Ainu of Japan_, p. 220 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 158: Holmberg, in _Acta Soc. Scient. Fennic\u00e6_, iv. 402.]\n\n[Footnote 159: Boas, in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ vi. 591.]\n\n[Footnote 160: Lumholtz, _Unknown Mexico_, i. 380, 382.]\n\n[Footnote 161: Bridges, 'Manners and Customs of the Firelanders,'\nin _A Voice for South America_, xiii. 211.]\n\nThe belief in the irritable or malevolent character of the dead\nis easily explained. As Bishop Butler observed, we presume that a\nthing will remain as it is except when we have some reason to\nthink that it will be altered.[162] And in the case of the souls\nof departed friends men may have reason to suppose that they\nundergo a change. Death is commonly regarded as the gravest of\nall misfortunes; hence the dead are believed to be exceedingly\ndissatisfied with their fate. According to primitive ideas a\nperson only dies if he is killed--by magic if not by force,--and\nsuch a death naturally tends to make the soul revengeful and\nill-tempered. It is envious of the living and is longing for the\ncompany of its old friends; no wonder, then, that it sends them\ndiseases to cause their {535} death. The Basutos maintain that\ntheir dead ancestors are continually endeavouring to draw them to\nthemselves, and therefore attribute to them every disease;[163]\nand the Tarahumares in Mexico suppose that the dead make their\nrelatives ill from a feeling of loneliness, that they, too, may\ndie and join the departed.[164] But the notion that the\ndisembodied soul is on the whole a malicious being constantly\nwatching for an opportunity to do harm to the living is also, no\ndoubt, intimately connected with the instinctive fear of the\ndead, which is in its turn the outcome of the fear of death.\n\n[Footnote 162: Butler, _Analogy of Religion_, i. 1, p. 82.]\n\n[Footnote 163: Casalis, _op. cit._ p. 249.]\n\n[Footnote 164: Lumholtz, _Unknown Mexico_, i. 380.]\n\nWe are told, it is true, that many savages meet death with much\nindifference, or regard it as no great evil, but merely as a\nchange to a life very similar to this.[165] But it is a fact\noften noticed among ourselves, that a person on the verge of\ndeath may resign himself to his fate with the greatest calmness,\nalthough he has been afraid to die throughout his life. Moreover,\nthe fear of death may be disguised by thoughtlessness, checked by\nexcitement, or mitigated by dying in company. There are peoples\nwho are conspicuous for their bravery, and yet have a great dread\nof death.[166] Nobody is entirely free from this feeling, though\nit varies greatly in strength among different races and in\ndifferent individuals. In many savages it is so strongly\ndeveloped, that they cannot bear to hear death mentioned.[167]\nAnd inseparably mingled with {536} this fear of death is the fear\nof the dead. The place in which a death occurs is abandoned,[168]\nor the hut is destroyed,[169] or the corpse is carried out from\nit as speedily as possible.[170] The survivors endeavour to\nfrighten away the ghost by firing off guns,[171] or shooting into\nthe grave,[172] or throwing sticks and stones behind themselves\nafter they have interred the corpse.[173] To prevent the return\nof the ghost the body is buried face downwards,[174] or its limbs\nare firmly tied,[175] or, in extreme cases, it is fixed in the\nground with a stake driven through it.[176] We may assume that\nthese and many other funeral ceremonies are very closely\nconnected with the fear of the pollution of death; for even when\ntheir immediate object is to keep the ghost at {537} a distance,\nit is likely that they are largely due to dread of its presence\nfor the reason that it is conceived as a seat of deadly\ncontagion.[177] It seems to me that certain anthropologists, in\ntheir explanations of funeral ceremonies, have too much\naccentuated the volitional activity of ghosts. To take an\ninstance. The common custom of carrying the dead body away\nthrough some aperture other than the door,[178] has generally\nbeen interpreted as a means of preventing the ghost from finding\nits way back to the old home; but various facts indicate that it\nalso may have sprung from a desire to keep the ordinary exit free\nfrom pollution. According to the Vend\u00eed\u00e2d a spirit of death is\nbreathing all along the way which a corpse has passed; hence no\nman, no flock, no being whatever that belongs to the world of\nAhura Mazda is allowed to go that way until the deadly breath has\nbeen blown away to hell.[179] In the capital of Corea there is a\nsmall gate in the city-wall known as the \"Gate of the Dead,\"\nthrough which alone a dead body can be carried out, and no one is\never allowed to enter through that passage-way.[180] In China\neven a messenger who delivers tidings of death strictly abstains\nfrom passing the threshold of the houses at which he knocks,\nunless urgently requested by the inmates to walk in.[181] Among\nthe Kwakiutl Indians of British Columbia a mourner, who is\nregarded as unclean, \"must not use the house door, but a separate\ndoor is cut for his use\"; girls at puberty, whilst in a state of\nuncleanness, may leave {538} and enter their room only through a\nhole made in the floor;[182] and men who have polluted themselves\nby partaking of human flesh are for four months allowed to go out\nonly by the secret door in the rear of the house.[183] Even the\nwater and fire ceremonies performed in connection with a death\nhave been represented as methods of preventing the ghost from\nattacking the living by placing a physical barrier of water or\nfire between them.[184] But I see no reason whatever to assume,\nwith Sir J. G. Frazer, that \"the conceptions of pollution and\npurification are merely the fictions of a later age, invented to\nexplain the purpose of a ceremony of which the original intention\nwas forgotten.\"[185]\n\n[Footnote 165: Turner, 'Ethnology of the Ungava District,' in\n_Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ xi. 192 (Hudson Bay Eskimo), 269 _sq._\n(Hudson Bay Indians). de Brebeuf, 'Relation de ce qui s'est pass\u00e9\ndans le pays des Hurons,' in _Relations des J\u00e9suites_, i. 1636,\np. 129. Roth, _North-West-Central Queensland Aborigines_, p. 161.\nTregear, 'Niue,' in _Jour. Polynesian Soc._ ii. 14 (Savage\nIslanders). Williams and Calvert, _Fiji_, p. 204 _sq._ Romilly,\n_From my Verandah in New Guinea_, p. 45 (Solomon Islanders).\nGeorgi, _op. cit._ iii. 266 (Siberian shamans).  Monrad, _op.\ncit._ p. 23 (Negroes of Accra). Brinton, _Religions of Primitive\nPeoples_, p. 72.]\n\n[Footnote 166: _E.g._, the Kalmucks (Bergmann, _Nomadische\nStreifereien unter den Kalm\u00fcken_, ii. 318 _sqq._) and the ancient\nCaribs (M\u00fcller, _Geschichte der Amerikanischen Urreligionen_,\np. 215).]\n\n[Footnote 167: Dunbar, 'Pawnee Indians,' in _Magazine of American\nHistory_, viii. 742. Batchelor, _Ainu of Japan_, p. 203.\nBergmann, _op. cit._ ii. 318. Bosman, _Description of the Coast\nof Guinea_, p. 327 (Negroes of Fida). Du Chaillu, _Explorations\nin Equatorial Africa_, p. 338. Kropf, _Das Volk der\nXosa-Kaffern_, p. 155. For other instances of savages' great fear\nof death, see Bridges, in _A Voice for South America_, xiii. 211\n(Fuegians); M\u00fcller, _Geschichte der Amerikanischen Urreligionen_,\np. 215 (Caribs); Dunbar, in _Magazine of American History_, v.\n334 (various North American tribes); Brinton, _Myths of the New\nWorld_, p. 238; Georgi, _op. cit._ ii. 400 (Jakuts); Bosman, _op.\ncit._ p. 130 (Gold Coast natives).]\n\n[Footnote 168: Dorman, _op. cit._ p. 22 (North American Indians).\nvon den Steinen, _Unter den Naturv\u00f6lkern Zentral-Brasiliens_,\np. 502 (Boror\u00f3). Hyades and Deniker, _Mission scientifique du Cap\nHorn_, vii. 379 (Fuegians). Curr, _The Australian Race_, i. 44.\nFraser, _Aborigines of New South Wales_, p. 82. Spencer and\nGillen, _Native Tribes of Central Australia_, p. 498. Worcester,\n_Philippine Islands_, p. 496 (Tagbanuas of Busuanga). Bailey,\n'Veddahs of Ceylon,' in _Trans. Ethn. Soc._ N. S. ii. 296;\nDeschamps, _Carnet d'un voyageur_, p. 383 (Veddahs). Decle, _op.\ncit._ p. 79 (Barotse). von D\u00fcben, _Lappland_, pp. 241, 249.]\n\n[Footnote 169: Hyades and Deniker, _op. cit._ vii. 379\n(Fuegians). Batchelor, _Ainu of Japan_, p. 222 _sq._ Worcester,\n_op. cit._ p. 108 _sq._ (Tagbanuas of Palawan). Butler, _Travels\nin Assam_, p. 228. Fawcett, _Saoras_, p. 50 _sq._ Cunningham,\n_Uganda_, p. 130 (Bavuma).]\n\n[Footnote 170: Howard, _op. cit._ p. 197 (Ainu). Selenka,\n_Sonnige Welten_, p. 89 (Dyaks). The rapid pace of the funeral\nprocession among the Bataks (von Brenner, _Besuch bei den\nKannibalen Sumatras_, p. 235) probably belongs to the same class\nof facts.]\n\n[Footnote 171: von Brenner, _op. cit._ p. 235 (Bataks). Fawcett,\n_Saoras_, p. 46 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 172: von Brenner, _op. cit._ p. 235 (Bataks). von\nWlislocki, _Volksglaube der Magyaren_, p. 134.]\n\n[Footnote 173: Crooke, _Tribes and Castes of the North-Western\nProvinces_, i. 45 (Aheriya, in Du\u00e2b), 287 (Bhangi, the sweeper\ntribe of Hindustan). Ralston, _op. cit._ p. 320 (ancient\nBohemians).]\n\n[Footnote 174: Dorsey, in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ xi. 420\n(Omahas). Crooke, _op. cit._ i. 44 (Aheriya, in Du\u00e2b).]\n\n[Footnote 175: Zimmer, _Altindisches Leben_, p. 402 (Vedic\npeople). Turner, in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ xi. 191 (Hudson Bay\nEskimo). Yarrow, _ibid._ i. 98 (Pimas of Arizona). Southey,\n_History of Brazil_, i. 248 (Tupinambas). Of the trussing and\ntying of the dead body which is practised in various Australian\ntribes the blacks themselves say that it is done \"to prevent the\nspirit of the deceased from wandering in the night from its bed,\nand disturbing the living and doing them harm\" (Fraser,\n_Aborigines of New South Wales_, p. 79 _sq._; see also Curr, _The\nAustralian Race_, i. 44, 87).]\n\n[Footnote 176: _Supra_, ii. 256. Hylt\u00e9n-Cavallius, _W\u00e4rend och\nWirdarne_, i. 472 (Middle Ages).]\n\n[Footnote 177: _Cf._ _supra_, ii. 303. For the contagion of death\nsee also Crawley, _The Mystic Rose_, p. 95 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 178: Tylor, _Primitive Culture_, ii. 26 _sq._ Frazer,\nin _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xv. 69 _sq._ Trumbull, _Threshold\nCovenant_, p. 23 _sqq._ Liebrecht, _Zur Volkskunde_, pp. 372,\n373, 414 _sq._ Lippert, _Christenthum, Volksglaube und\nVolksbrauch_, p. 391 _sq._ Egede, _Description of Greenland_,\np. 152 _sq._; Nansen, _Eskimo Life_, p. 245 _sq._ (Greenlanders).\nTurner, in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ xi. 191 (Hudson Bay Eskimo).\nMcNair Wright, _Among the Alaskans_, p. 313. Jochelson, 'Koryak\nReligion', in _Jesup North Pacific Expedition_, vi. 110 _sq._\nGeorgi, _op. cit._ iii. 26 _sq._; Jackson, in _Jour. Anthr.\nInst._ xxiv. 406 (Samoyedes). Ramseyer and K\u00fchne, _Four Years in\nAshantee_, p. 50. K\u00e5lund, 'Skandinavische Verh\u00e4ltnisse,' in Paul,\n_Grundriss der germanischen Philologie_, ii. pt. ii. 227 (ancient\nScandinavians).]\n\n[Footnote 179: _Vend\u00eed\u00e2d_, viii. 14 _sqq._ Darmesteter, in\n_Sacred Books of the East_, iv. p. lxxiv. _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 180: Trumbull, _op. cit._ p. 24.]\n\n[Footnote 181: de Groot, _op. cit._ (vol. ii. book) i. 644.]\n\n[Footnote 182: Boas, in _Fifth Report on the North-Western Tribes\nof Canada_, p. 42 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 183: _Idem_, quoted by Frazer, _Golden Bough_, i. 341\n_sq._ Among the Bhuiy\u00e2r, a Dravidian tribe in South Mirzapur,\neach house has two doors, one of which is only used by menstruous\nwomen; and when such a woman has to quit the house \"she is\nobliged to creep out on her hands and knees so as to avoid\npolluting the house thatch by her touch\" (Crooke, _Tribes and\nCastes of the North-Western Provinces_, ii. 87). Among the\nThompson River Indians of British Columbia meat was only taken\ninto the hunting lodge through a hole in the back of the\nstructure, because the common door was used by women and women\nwere regarded as unclean (Teit, 'Thompson Indians,' in _Memoirs\nof the American Museum of Natural History_, 'Anthropology,' i.\n347). In other instances ordinary people are prohibited from\nusing a door through which a sacred person has passed, obviously\nbecause contact with his sanctity is looked upon as dangerous. In\nsome of the South Sea Islands, where the first-born, whether male\nor female, was especially sacred, no one else was allowed to pass\nby the door through which he or she entered the paternal dwelling\n(Gill, _Life in the Southern Isles_, p. 46). \"In some parts of\nthe Pacific, the door through which the king or queen passed in\nopening a temple was shut up, and ever after made sacred\"\n(Turner, _Nineteen Years in Polynesia_, p. 328). Ezekiel (xliv. 2\n_sq._) represents the Lord as saying:--\"This gate shall be shut,\nit shall not be opened, and no man shall enter in by it; because\nthe Lord, the God of Israel, hath entered in by it, therefore it\nshall be shut. It is for the prince; . . . he shall enter by the\nway of the porch of that gate, and shall go out by the way of the\nsame.\" Among the Arabs in olden days those who returned from a\npilgrimage to Mecca entered their houses not by the door but by a\nhole made in the back wall (Palmer, in _Sacred Books of the\nEast_, vi. 27, n. 1). This practice was forbidden by Muhammed\n(_Koran_, ii. 185).]\n\n[Footnote 184: Frazer, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xv. 76 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 185: It should be added, however, that. Sir J. G.\nFrazer's important essay on 'Burial Customs' was published many\nyears ago and therefore perhaps does not exactly represent the\nauthor's present views on the subject.]\n\nIt is obvious that the beliefs held as regards the character,\nactivity, and polluting influence of the dead greatly affect the\nconduct of the survivors. They are {539} naturally anxious to\ngain the favour of the disembodied soul, to avert its ill-will,\nto keep it at a distance, and to avoid the defilement of death.\nSelf-interest is often a conspicuous motive for acts and\nomissions which are regarded as duties to the dead, and prudence\nalso has a very large share in their being enjoined as\nobligatory. This is obviously true of the offerings made to the\ndead. The Thompson River Indians of British Columbia threw some\nfood on the ground near the grave of the deceased, \"that he might\nnot visit the house in search of food, causing sickness to the\npeople.\"[186] Among the Iroquois, \"on the death of a nursing\nchild two pieces of cloth are saturated with the mother's milk\nand placed in the hands of the dead child so that its spirit may\nnot return to haunt the bereaved mother.\"[187] The Negroes of\nAccra, when asked why they slaughtered animals at the tombs of\ntheir departed friends, answered that they did so in order to\nprevent the ghosts from walking.[188] The Monbuttu place some oil\nand other victuals in the little hut which is erected for the\ndead in the forest, so that his spirit shall not return to his\nold home in search of food.[189] For the same reason the Bataks\nof Sumatra put various things into the graves of their deceased\nfriends, ask the dead to be quiet and not to long for the company\nof the living, and finish their address with the words, \"Here you\nhave still some _sirih_ and tobacco, and every year, at harvest\ntime, we shall give you some rice.\"[190] Among the Chuvashes the\nson says to his departed father, \"We remember you with a feast,\nhere are bread and different kinds of food for you, everything\nyou have before you, do not come to us.\"[191] It is considered\nparticularly dangerous to keep back and make use of articles\nwhich belonged to the dead. The Gypsies burn on the grave all\nthose chattels which the deceased was in the habit of using\nduring his lifetime, \"because his soul would otherwise {540}\nreturn to torment his relatives and claim back his\nproperty.\"[192] A Saora gave the following reason for the custom\nof burning all the belongings of a dead person:--\"If we do not\nburn these things with the body, the Kulba (soul) will come and\nask us for them and trouble us.\"[193] The Kafirs believe that,\nafter his death, \"a man's personality haunts his possessions.\"[194]\nAmong the Brazilian Tupinambas \"whoever happened to have any\nthing which had belonged to the dead produced it, that it might\nbe buried with him, lest he should come and claim it.\"[195] When\na Navaho Indian dies within a house the rafters are pulled down\nover the remains and the place is usually set on fire; after that\nnothing would induce a Navaho to touch a piece of the wood or\neven approach the immediate vicinity of the place, the shades of\nthe dead being regarded \"as inclined to resent any intrusion or\nthe taking of any liberties with them or their belongings.\"[196]\nThe Greenlanders, as soon as a man is dead, \"throw out every\nthing which has belonged to him; otherwise they would be\npolluted, and their lives rendered unfortunate. The house is\ncleared of all its movables till evening, when the smell of the\ncorpse has passed away.\"[197]\n\n[Footnote 186: Teit, _loc. cit._ p. 329.]\n\n[Footnote 187: Smith, _Myths of the Iroquois_, in _Ann. Rep. Bur.\nEthn._ ii. 69.]\n\n[Footnote 188: Monrad, _op. cit._ p. 26.]\n\n[Footnote 189: Burrows, _op. cit._ p. 103.]\n\n[Footnote 190: von Brenner, _op. cit._ p. 234 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 191: Castr\u00e9n, _op. cit._ iii. 123 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 192: von Wlislocki, _Volksglaube der Zigeuner_, p. 100.]\n\n[Footnote 193: Fawcett, _op. cit._ p. 47.]\n\n[Footnote 194: Kidd, _The Essential Kafir_, p. 83.]\n\n[Footnote 195: Southey, _op. cit._ i. 248. _Cf._ von den Steinen,\n_Unter den Naturv\u00f6lkern Zentral-Brasiliens_, p. 502 (Boror\u00f3).]\n\n[Footnote 196: Mindeleff, 'Navaho Houses,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur.\nEthn._ xvii. 487.]\n\n[Footnote 197: Cranz, _op. cit._ i. 217.]\n\nThe fear of the dead has also taught men to abstain from robbing\nor violating their tombs. The Omahas believe that, if anybody\ntouched an article of food exposed at a grave, \"the ghost would\nsnatch away the food and paralyse the mouth of the thief, and\ntwist his face out of shape for the rest of his life; or else he\nwould be pursued by the ghost, and food would lose its taste, and\nhunger ever after haunt the offender.\"[198] The Brazilian\nCoroados \"avoid disturbing the repository of the dead, for fear\nthey should appear to them and torment them.\"[199] {541} The\nMaoris suppose that the violation of a burial place would bring\ndisease and death on the criminal.[200] The extreme dislike of\nthe Chinese to disturbing a grave is based on the supposition\nthat the spirit of the person buried will haunt and cause\nill-luck or death to the disturber.[201] According to the popular\nbeliefs of the Magyars, he who seizes upon anything belonging to\na tomb, even if it were only a flower, will be unhappy for the\nrest of his life.[202] The Rumanians of Transylvania think that a\nperson who picks a flower which grows on a grave will die in\nconsequence, and that he who smells at such a flower will lose\nhis sense of smell.[203]\n\n[Footnote 198: La Flesche, 'Death and Funeral Customs among the\nOmahas,' in _Jour. American Folk-Lore_, ii. 11. _Cf._ Reid, in\n_Jour. Anthr. Inst._ iii. 112 (Chippewas).]\n\n[Footnote 199: von Spix and von Martius, _Travels in Brazil_,\nii. 251.]\n\n[Footnote 200: Polack, _op. cit._ i. 112.]\n\n[Footnote 201: Dennys, _op. cit._ p. 26. de Groot, _op. cit._\n(vol. iv. book) ii. 446 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 202: von Wlislocki, _Volksglaube der Magyaren_, p. 135.\n_Cf._ _Idem_, _Volksglaube der Zigeuner_, p. 96 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 203: Prexl, 'Geburts- und Todtengebr\u00e4uche der Rum\u00e4nen\nin Siebenb\u00fcrgen,' in _Globus_, lvii. 30.]\n\nThe transgression of ancestral custom, as we have already seen,\nis supposed to be punished by the spirits of the dead; and the\nsacredness of a will largely springs from superstitious fear. The\nSouth Slavonian belief that, if a son does not fulfil the last\nwill of his father the soul of the father will curse him from the\ngrave,[204] has its counterpart in the denunciatory clause in\nAnglo-Saxon landbooks, which usually curses all and singular who\nattack the donee's title.[205]\n\n[Footnote 204: _Supra_, i. 624.]\n\n[Footnote 205: Pollock and Maitland, _History of English Law\nbefore the Time of Edward I._ ii. 251 _sq._]\n\nThe custom of praising the dead, again, is mainly flattery, and\nthe lamentations over them are not altogether sincere.[206] By\ntheir excessive demonstrations of grief the Andaman Islanders\nhope to conciliate the spirits of the departed, and to be\npreserved from many misfortunes which might otherwise befall\nthem.[207] The Central Australian native fears \"that, unless a\nsufficient amount of grief be displayed, he will be harmed by the\noffended _Ulthana_ or spirit of the dead man.\"[208] The\nAngmagsaliks {542} on the East Coast of Greenland say that they\ncry and groan and perform other mourning rites \"in order to\nprevent the dead from getting angry.\"[209] But the loud wailing\nof mourners may also, like the shouting after a death,[210] be\nintended to drive away the ghost, or perhaps death itself.\n\n[Footnote 206: See Gibbs, _loc. cit._ p. 205 (tribes of Western\nWashington and North-western Oregon); Wied-Neuwied, _Reise nach\nBrasilien_, ii. 56 (Botocudos).]\n\n[Footnote 207: Man, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xii. 145.]\n\n[Footnote 208: Spencer and Gillen, _Native Tribes of Central\nAustralia_, p. 510.]\n\n[Footnote 209: Holm, 'Ethnologisk Skizze af Angmagsalikerne,' in\n_Meddelelser om Gr\u00f8nland_, x. 107.]\n\n[Footnote 210: Spencer and Gillen, _op. cit._ p. 506. _Cf._\nRobertson Smith, _Religion of the Semites_, p. 432, n. 2.]\n\nFear is certainly a very common motive for funeral and mourning\nrites which have been interpreted as duties to the dead. This is\nthe case with the various methods of disposing of the corpse.\nThus the custom of leaving it as food for beasts of prey[211] is,\nin some instances at least, deliberately practised for the\npurpose of preventing the ghost from walking. The Herero who\naccompanied Chapman said of two of their sick comrades who formed\npart of the company, \"You must throw them away, and let the\nwolves eat them; then they won't come and bother us.\"[212]\nCremation, also, has frequently been resorted to as a means of\nprotecting the living from unwelcome visits of the dead, or, as\nthe case may be, of effectually getting rid of the contagion of\ndeath.[213] The Vedic people, while burning the corpses of their\ndead, cried aloud, \"Away, go away, O Death! injure not our sons\nand our men.\"[214] In Northern India the corpses of all low caste\npeople are either cremated or buried face downwards, in order to\nprevent the evil spirit from escaping and troubling its\nneighbours.[215] The N\u00e2yars of Malabar not only believe that the\ncollection and careful disposal of the ashes of the dead man\ngives peace to his spirit, but, \"what is more important, the\npacified spirit will not thereafter injure the living members of\nthe Tarav\u00e2d (house or family), cause miscarriage {543} to the\nwomen, possess the men, as with an evil spirit, and so on.\"[216]\nIn Tibet a ghost which makes its presence felt in dreams or by\ncausing deliriousness or temporary insanity is disposed of by\ncremation.[217] In his description of the Savage Islanders, Mr.\nThomson tells us of a mother who destroyed her own daughter's\ngrave by fire in order to burn the spirit which was afflicting\nher.[218] Among the ancient Scandinavians the bodies of persons\nwho were believed to walk after death were dug up from their\ngraves and burned.[219] And exactly the same is done in Albania\nto this day.[220]\n\n[Footnote 211: For this custom see also Murdoch, in _Ann. Rep.\nBur. Ethn._ ix. 424 _sq._ (Point Barrow Eskimo); Nordenski\u00f6ld,\n_Vegas f\u00e4rd kring Asien och Europa_, ii. 93 (Chukchi); Andersson,\n_Notes on Travel in South Africa_, p. 234 (Ovambo).]\n\n[Footnote 212: Chapman, _Travels in the Interior of South\nAfrica_, ii. 282.]\n\n[Footnote 213: _Cf._ Rohde, _op. cit._ p. 28 _sqq._ (ancient\nGreeks); Preuss, _op. cit._ p. 294.]\n\n[Footnote 214: _Rig-Veda_, x. 18. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 215: Crooke, _Popular Religion of Northern India_, i. 269.]\n\n[Footnote 216: Fawcett, in the Madras Government Museum's _Bulletin_,\niii. 251. See also Iyer, 'Nay[=a]dis of Malabar,'_ibid._ iv. 71.]\n\n[Footnote 217: Waddell, _op. cit._ p. 498.]\n\n[Footnote 218: Thomson, _Savage Island_, p. 134.]\n\n[Footnote 219: K\u00e5lund, _loc. cit._ p. 227.]\n\n[Footnote 220: von Hahn, _Albanesische Studien_, i. 163.]\n\nBurial itself has served a similar purpose.[221] According to the\nDanish traveller Monrad, the Negroes of Accra expressly believe\nthat by covering the body of a dead person with earth they keep\nthe ghost from walking and causing trouble to the survivors; and\nhe adds that exactly the same superstition prevails in Jutland in\nDenmark.[222] This belief is also preserved in the Swedish word\nfor committing a corpse to the earth, _jordf\u00e4sta_, which\nliterally means \"to fasten to the earth.\" In Gothland, in Sweden,\nthere was an old tradition of a man called Takstein who in his\nlifetime was overbearing and cruel and after his death haunted\nthe living, in consequence of which \"a wizard finally\nearth-fastened him in such a manner that he afterwards lay\nquiet.\"[223] But burial has often been supplemented by other\nprecautions against the return of the ghost. H\u00f6gstr\u00f6m says that\nthe Laplanders carefully wrapped up their dead in cloth so as to\nprevent the soul from slipping away.[224] The practice of placing\nlogs or stones immediately over the corpse may have a similar\norigin; in some Queensland tribes, when an individual has been\nkilled by the whole tribe in punishment for some {544} serious\ncrime, boomerangs are substituted for the ordinary logs,\nevidently for fear of the ghost.[225] The Chuvashes, again, put\ntwo stakes across the coffin of a dead man for the purpose of\npreventing him from lifting up the cover.[226] Graves are often\nprovided with mounds, tombstones, or enclosures in order to keep\nthe dead from walking.[227] The Omahas raise no mound over a man\nwho has been killed by lightning, but bury him face downwards and\nwith the soles of his feet split, in the belief that he will then\ngo to the spirit-land without giving further trouble to the\nliving.[228] The Savage Islanders pile heavy stones upon the\ngrave to keep the ghost down.[229] The Cheremises believe that\nthe ghosts cannot step over the fence-poles with which they\nsurround the graves.[230] When ceremonies like that of striking\nthe air at a funeral or the ringing of bells are represented as\nmeans of keeping off evil spirits from the dead, we have reason\nto suspect that their original object was to keep off the ghost\nfrom the living. At Central Australian funerals women beat the\nair with the palms of their hands for the express purpose of\ndriving the spirit away from the old camp which it is supposed to\nhaunt, and the men beat the air with their spear-throwers.[231]\nThe Bondeis of East Africa frighten the ghosts by beating\ndrums.[232] And at Port Moresby, in New Guinea, when the church\nbell was first used, the natives thanked the missionaries for\nhaving driven off numerous bands of ghosts.[233]\n\n[Footnote 221: _Cf._ Frazer, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xv. 64\n_sq._; Preuss, _op. cit._ p. 292 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 222: Monrad, _op. cit._ p. 13.]\n\n[Footnote 223: L\u00e4ffler, _Den gottl\u00e4ndska Taksteinar-s\u00e4gnen_, p. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 224: H\u00f6gstr\u00f6m, _Beskrifning \u00f6fver de til Sveriges Krona\nlydande Lapmarker_, p. 207.]\n\n[Footnote 225: Roth, _op. cit._ p. 165.]\n\n[Footnote 226: Castr\u00e9n, _op. cit._ iii. 121.]\n\n[Footnote 227: _Cf._ Frazer, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xv. 65\n_sq._; Preuss, _op. cit._ p. 293.]\n\n[Footnote 228: Dorsey, in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ xi. 420. La\nFlesche, in _Jour. American Folk-Lore_, ii. 11.]\n\n[Footnote 229: Thomson, _Savage Island_, p. 52.]\n\n[Footnote 230: Castr\u00e9n, _op. cit._ iii. 122.]\n\n[Footnote 231: Spencer and Gillen, _Native Tribes of Central\nAustralia_, p. 506.]\n\n[Footnote 232: Dale, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxv. 238.]\n\n[Footnote 233: Chalmers and Gill, _Work and Adventure in New\nGuinea_, p. 260.]\n\nThat the mourning fast is essentially a precaution taken by the\nsurvivors, and not a tribute to the dead, is obvious from what\nhas been said in a previous chapter.[234] When mourners mutilate,\ncut, or beat themselves, the original object of their doing so\nseems often to be to ward off the {545} contagion of death.[235]\nAmong the Bedouins of Morocco women at funerals not only scratch\ntheir faces, but also rub the wounds with cow-dung, and cow-dung\nis regarded as a means of purification. The mourning customs of\npainting the body and of assuming a special costume have been\nexplained as attempts on the part of the survivors to disguise\nthemselves;[236] but the latter custom may also have originated\nin the idea that a mourner is more or less polluted for a certain\nperiod and that therefore a dress worn by him then, being a seat\nof contagion, could not be used afterwards. Egede writes of the\nGreenlanders, \"If they have happened to touch a corpse, they\nimmediately cast away the clothes they have then on; and for this\nreason they always put on their old clothes when they go to a\nburying, in which they agree with the Jews.\"[237] There can,\nfinally, be no doubt that the widespread prohibition of\nmentioning the name of a dead person[238] does not in the first\ninstance arise from respect for the departed, but from fear. To\nname him is to summon him; the Indians of Washington Territory\neven change their own names when a relative dies, because \"they\nthink the spirits of the dead will come back if they hear the\nsame name called that they were accustomed to hear {546} before\ndeath.\"[239] But apart from this, a dead man's name itself is\nprobably felt to be defiling, or at all events produces an\nuncanny association of thought, which even among ourselves makes\nmany people reluctant to mention it.[240] And to do so may also\nbe a wrong to other persons who would be endangered thereby.\nAmong the Goajiro Indians of Colombia, to mention a dead man\nbefore his relatives is a dreadful offence, which is often\npunished even with death.[241]\n\n[Footnote 234: _Supra_, ii. 302 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 235: _Cf._ Frazer, _Golden Bough_, i. 302.]\n\n[Footnote 236: Frazer, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ 73. _Idem_,\n'Folk-Lore in the Old Testament,' in _Anthropological Essays\npresented to E. B. Tylor_, p. 110.]\n\n[Footnote 237: Egede, _op. cit._ p. 197.]\n\n[Footnote 238: Tylor, _Researches into the Early History of\nMankind_, p. 144. Nyrop, 'Navnets magt,' in _Mindre afhandlinger\nudgivne af det philologisk-historiske samfund_, pp. 147-151, 190\n_sq._ and _passim_. Frazer, _Golden Bough_, i. 421 _sqq._ Clodd,\n_Tom Tit Tot_, p. 166 _sqq._ Nansen, _Eskimo Life_, p. 230 _sq._\n(Greenlanders). M\u00fcller, _Geschichte der Amerikanischen\nUrreligionen_, p. 84 (North American Indians). Bourke,\n'Medicine-Men of the Apache,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ ix. 462.\nBatchelor, _Ainu and their Folk-Lore_, p. 242. Georgi, _op. cit._\niii. 27, 28, 262 _sq._ (Samoyedes and shamanistic peoples in\nSiberia). Jackson, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxiv. 406 (Samoyedes).\nRivers, _Todas_, p. 625 _sqq._ Crooke, _Tribes and Castes of the\nNorth-Western Provinces_, i. 11 (Agariya, a Dravidian tribe), von\nWlislocki, _Volksglaube der Zigeuner_, p. 96 (Gypsies). Yseldijk,\nin _Glimpses of the Eastern Archipelago_, p. 42. (Kotting, in the\nisland of Flores). Roth, _North-West-Central Queensland\nAborigines_, p. 164. Spencer and Gillen, _Native Tribes of\nCentral Australia_, p. 498. Fraser, _Aborigines of New South\nWales_, p. 82. Thornton, in Hill and Thornton, _Aborigines of New\nSouth Wales_, p. 7. Fison and Howitt, _op. cit._ p. 249 (Kurnai).\nCurr, _Squatting in Victoria_, p. 272 (Bangerang). Hinde, _op.\ncit._ p. 50 (Masai). Duveyrier, _Exploration du Sahara_, p. 415\n(Touareg). Werner, 'Custom of  \"Hlonipa,\"' in _Jour. African\nSoc._ 1905, April, p. 346 (Zulus).]\n\n[Footnote 239: Swan, _Residence in Washington Territory_, p. 189.]\n\n[Footnote 240: I had much difficulty in inducing my teacher in\nShel[h.]a, a Berber from the Great Atlas Mountains, to tell me\nthe equivalent for \"illness\" in his own language; and when he\nfinally did so, he spat immediately afterwards. Among the Central\nAustralian Arunta the older men will not look at the photograph\nof a deceased person (Gillen, 'Aborigines of the McDonnell\nRanges,' in _Report of the Horn Expedition_, iv. 'Anthropology,'\np. 168).]\n\n[Footnote 241: Simons, 'Exploration of the Goajira Peninsula,' in\n_Proceed. Roy. Geograph. Soc._ N. S. vii. 791.]\n\nBy all this I certainly do not mean to assert that the funeral\nand mourning customs to which I have just referred have\nexclusively or in every case originated in fear of the dead or of\nthe pollution of death. Burial may also be genuinely intended to\nprotect the body from beasts or birds; and the same may be the\ncase with mounds, tombstones, and enclosures.[242] Some savages\nare reported to burn the dead in order to prevent their bodies\nfrom falling into the hands of enemies,[243] which might be bad\nboth for the dead and for their friends, as charms might be made\nfrom the corpses.[244] Moreover, cremation does away with the\nslow process of transformation to which a dead body is naturally\nsubject, and this process is regarded not only as a danger to the\nliving but also as painful to the deceased himself.[245] The same\nobject may be achieved by exposing the corpse to wild animals.\nAnd we should also remember that the putrefactive process {547}\nitself, whether accompanied by any superstitious ideas or not, is\na sufficient motive for disposing of the dead body in some way or\nother--either by burial or cremation or exposure; and if one\nmethod is held objectionable another will be resorted to. Among\nthe Masai the custom of throwing away corpses is said to spring\nfrom the notion that to bury them would be to poison the\nsoil;[246] and the Zoroastrian law enjoining the exposure of the\ndead was closely connected with the sacredness ascribed to fire\nand earth and the consequent dread of polluting them.\n\n[Footnote 242: Cranz, _op. cit._ i. 217 (Greenlanders). Turner,\nin _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ xi. 192 (Hudson Bay Eskimo). Yarrow,\n_ibid._ i. 102 (Wichita Indians). Dunbar, in _Magazine of\nAmerican History_, viii. 734 (Pawnee Indians). Curr, _The\nAustralian Race_, i. 87.]\n\n[Footnote 243: Hyades and Deniker, _op. cit._ vii. 379\n(Fuegians). Preuss, _op. cit._ p. 310 (Seminole Indians of\nFlorida).]\n\n[Footnote 244: Ralph, quoted by Hartland, _Legend of Perseus_,\nii. 437 (Haidahs of British Columbia).]\n\n[Footnote 245: See Hertz, _loc. cit._ p. 71.]\n\n[Footnote 246: Thomson, _Through Masai Land_, p. 259.]\n\nAgain, as for the mutilations and self-inflicted wounds which\naccompany funerals, I have suggested in a previous chapter that\nthey may be partly practised for the purpose of refreshing the\ndeparted soul with human blood;[247] or, as Dr. Hirn observes,\nthey may be instinctive efforts to procure that relief from\noverpowering feelings which is afforded by pain and the\nsubsequent exhaustion.[248] The reluctance to name the dead may,\nin some measure, be traced to a natural unwillingness in his old\nfriends to revive past sorrows.[249] And with reference to the\nmourning apparel, Dr. de Groot believes--if rightly or wrongly I\nam not in a position to decide--that, so far as China is\nconcerned, it originated in the custom of sacrificing to the dead\nthe clothes on one's own back. He thinks that this explanation is\nconfirmed by the fact that in the age of Confucius it was\ncustomary for the mourners to throw off their clothes as far as\ndecency allowed when the corpse was being dressed.[250]\n\n[Footnote 247: _Supra_, i. 476.]\n\n[Footnote 248: Hirn, _Origins of Art_, p. 66 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 249: Fison and Howitt, _op. cit._ p. 249 (Kurnai).\nFrazer, _Golden Bough_, i. 422.]\n\n[Footnote 250: de Groot, _op. cit._ (vol. ii. book) i. 475 _sq._]\n\nThere are several reasons why practices connected with death\nwhich originally sprang from self-regarding motives have come to\nbe enjoined as duties. We have first to remember the various\nfactors mentioned above[251] which tend to make self-regarding\nconduct a matter of moral concern. {548} But in this case the\ntransition from the prudential to the obligatory has been much\nfacilitated by the circumstance that all the acts which a\nperson's self-interest induces him to perform or to abstain from\nhave direct reference to another individual, and, indeed, to an\nindividual who is supposed to reward benefits bestowed upon him\nor at all events to resent injuries and neglect. These\npunishments and rewards sent by the departed soul are all the\nmore readily recognised to be well deserved, as the claims of the\ndead are similar in nature to those of the living and are at the\nsame time in some degree supported by sympathetic feelings in the\nsurvivors. Nor is it difficult to explain why even such practices\nas are not originally supposed to comfort the dead have assumed\nthe character of duties towards them. The dead are not only\nbeings whom it is dangerous to offend and useful to please, but\nthey are also very easily duped. No wonder therefore that the\nliving are anxious to put the most amiable interpretation upon\ntheir conduct, trying to persuade the ghost, as also one another,\nthat they do what they do for _his_ benefit, not for their own.\nIt is better for him to have rest in his grave than to wander\nabout on earth unhappy and homeless. It is better for him to\nenjoy the heat of the flames than to suffer from the cold of an\narctic climate. It is better for him to be eaten by an\nanimal--say, a beautiful dog or a hy\u00e6na sent by God--than to lie\nand rot in the open air. And all the mourning customs, what are\nthey if not tokens of grief? Moreover, if the corpse is not\nproperly disposed of or any funeral or mourning rite calculated\nto keep off the ghost is not observed, the dead man will easily\ndo harm to the survivors. And does not this indicate that they\nhave been neglectful of their duties to him?\n\n[Footnote 251: _Supra_, ii. 266 _sq._]\n\nThe mixture of sympathy and fear which is at the bottom of the\nduties to the dead accounts for the fact that these duties are\nrarely extended to strangers. A departed stranger is not\ngenerally an object of either pity or fear. He expects attention\nfrom his own people only, he haunts his own home. But he may of\ncourse be dangerous to {549} anybody who directly offends him,\nfor instance by inflicting an injury upon his body, or to people\nwho live in the vicinity of his grave. We are told that the\nAngami Nagas bestow as much care on the tombs of foes who have\nfallen near their villages as on those of their own\nwarriors.[252] So also the differences in the treatment of the\ndead which depend upon age, sex, and social position are no doubt\nclosely connected with variations in the feelings of sympathy,\nrespect, or fear,[253] although in many cases we are unable to\nexplain those differences in detail. Among the Australian natives\nwomen and children are said to be interred with little ceremony\nbecause they are held to be very inferior to men while alive and\nconsequently are not much feared after death;[254] and if in\nEastern Central Africa the attention usually bestowed upon the\ndead is not extended to children which die when four or five days\nold, the reason seems to be that such children are hardly\nsupposed to possess a soul.[255] We may assume that the special\ntreatment to which the bodies of criminals are subject is due not\nonly to indignation but, in some instances at least, to fear of\ntheir ghosts. And we have noticed above that suicides, murdered\npersons, and those struck with lightning are sometimes left\nunburied because no one dares to interfere with their bodies, or\nperhaps in order to prevent them from mixing with the other dead.[256]\n\n[Footnote 252: Prain, 'Angami Nagas,' in _Revue coloniale\ninternationale_, v. 493.]\n\n[Footnote 253: _Cf._ Hertz, _loc. cit._ pp. 122, 132 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 254: Curr, _The Australian Race_, i. 89.]\n\n[Footnote 255: Macdonald, _Africana_, i. 68.]\n\n[Footnote 256: _Supra_, ii. 238 _sq._]\n\nIt should finally be noticed that the duties to the departed\nbecome less stringent as time goes on. As Dr. Hertz has recently\nshown, the fear of the dead is greatest as long as the process of\ndecomposition lasts and till the second funeral is performed, and\nthis ceremony brings the period of mourning to an end.[257]\nMoreover, the dead are gradually less and less thought of, they\nappear less frequently in dreams and visions, the affection for\nthem fades away, and, being forgotten, they are no longer feared.\nThe Chinese say that ghosts are much more {550} liable to appear\nvery shortly after death, than at any other period.[258] The\nnatives of Australia are only afraid of the spirits of men who\nhave lately died.[259] In the course of time savages also become\nmore willing to speak of their dead.[260] But whilst the large\nbulk of disembodied souls sooner or later lose their\nindividuality and dwindle into insignificance or sink into the\nlimbo of All Souls, it may be that some of them escape this fate,\nand, instead of being ignored, are raised to the rank of gods.\n\n[Footnote 257: Hertz, _loc. cit._ _passim_.]\n\n[Footnote 258: Dennys, _op. cit._ p. 76.]\n\n[Footnote 259: Curr, _The Australian Race_, i. 44, 87. Lumholtz,\n_Among Cannibals_, p. 279 (Northern Queensland aborigines).]\n\n[Footnote 260: Tout, 'Ethnology of the Stlatlumh of British\nColumbia,' in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxxv. 138. Bourke,\n'Medicine-Men of the Apache,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ ix. 462.\nFrazer, _Golden Bough_, i. 431 _sqq._]\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nProgress in intellectual culture has a tendency to affect the\nnotions of death. The change involved in it appears greater. The\nsoul, if still thought to survive the death of the body, is more\ndistinctly separated from it; it is rid of all sensuous desires,\nas also of all earthly interests. Duties to the dead which arose\nfrom the old ideas may still be maintained, but their meaning is\nchanged.\n\nThus the funeral sacrifice may be continued as a mark of respect\nor affection. In Melanesia, for instance, at the death-meals\nwhich follow upon funerals or begin before them, and which still\nform one of the principal institutions of the natives, a piece of\nfood is put aside for the dead. \"It is readily denied now,\" says\nDr. Codrington, \"that the dead . . . are thought to come and eat\nthe food, which they say is given as a friendly remembrance only,\nand in the way of associating together those whom death has\nseparated.\"[261] In many cases the offerings made to the dead\nhave become alms given to the poor, just as has been the case\nwith sacrifices offered to gods;[262] and this almsgiving is\nundoubtedly looked upon as a duty to the dead. Among the Omahas\ngoods are collected from the kindred of the dead between the\ndeath and the funeral, and when the body has been deposited in\nthe grave they {551} are brought forth and equally divided among\nthe poor who are assembled on the spot.[263] At a Hindu funeral\nin Sindh, on the road to the burning place, the relatives of the\ndead throw dry dates into the air over the corpse; these are\nconsidered as a kind of alms and are left to the poor.[264] Among\nsome peoples of Malabar, at the _\u00e7r\u00e1ddha_, or yearly anniversary\nof a death, not less than three Brahmins are well fed and\npresented with money and cloth;[265] and according to Brahmanism\nthe _\u00e7r\u00e1ddha_ is \"a debt which is transferred from one generation\nto another, and on the payment of which depends the happiness of\nthe dead in the next life.\"[266] Among Muhammedans alms,\ngenerally consisting of food, are distributed in connection with\na death in order to confer merits upon the deceased.[267] Thus in\nMorocco bread or dried fruits are given to the poor who are\nassembled at the grave-side on the day of the funeral, as also on\nthe third and sometimes on the fortieth day after it, on the\ntenth day of Mu[h.]arram, and in many parts of the country on\nother feast-days as well, when the graves are visited by\nrelatives of the dead. These alms are obviously survivals of\nofferings to the dead themselves. While residing among the\nBedouins of Dukk\u00e2la, I was told that if the funeral meal were\nomitted the dead man's mouth would be filled with earth; and it\nis a common custom among the Moors that, if a dead person appears\nin a dream complaining of hunger or thirst, food or drink is at\nonce given to some poor people. Among the Christians, in former\ndays, alms were distributed in the church when, soon after a\ndeath or on the anniversary of a death, the sacrifice of the mass\nwas offered; and alms were also given at funerals and at graves,\nin the hope that their merit might be of advantage to the\ndeceased.[268] At Mykonos, in the Cyclades, on some fixed days\nafter the {552} burial a dish consisting of boiled wheat adorned\nwith sugar plums or other delicacy is put on the tomb, and\nfinally distributed to the poor at the church door;[269] and in\nsome parts of Russia the people still believe that if the usual\nalms are not given at a funeral the dead man's soul will reveal\nitself to his relatives in the form of a moth flying about the\nflame of a candle.[270] The supposed conferring of merits upon\nthe dead and the prayers on their behalf, so common both in\nChristianity and Muhammedanism, are the last remains of a series\nof customs by means of which the living have endeavoured to\nbenefit their departed friends.\n\n[Footnote 261: Codrington, _Melanesians_, p. 271 _sq._ _Cf._\n_ibid._ p. 128.]\n\n[Footnote 262: _Supra_, i. 565 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 263: La Flesche, in _Jour. American Folk-Lore_,\nii. 8 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 264: Burton, _Sindh_, p. 350.]\n\n[Footnote 265: Fawcett, 'Notes on some of the People of Malabar,'\nin the Madras Government Museum's _Bulletin_, iii. 71.]\n\n[Footnote 266: Barth, _Religions of India_, p. 52.]\n\n[Footnote 267: Garnett, _Women of Turkey_, ii. 496. Lane, _Modern\nEgyptians_, p. 530. Certeux and Carnoy, _L'Alg\u00e9rie\ntraditionelle_, p. 220.]\n\n[Footnote 268: Uhlhorn, _Die christliche Liebesth\u00e4tigkeit_,\ni. 281.]\n\n[Footnote 269: Bent, _Cyclades_, p. 221 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 270: Ralston, _op. cit._ p. 117.]\n\nBut even when the dead are no longer believed to be in need of\nhuman care, nay, though death be thought to put an end to\nexistence, there are still duties, if not to the dead, at all\nevents to those who were once alive. A person may be wronged by\nan act which he can no longer feel. There are rights that are in\nforce not only during his lifetime but after his death. A given\npromise is not buried with him to whom it was made. A dead man's\nwill is binding. His memory is protected against calumny. These\nrights have the same foundation as all other rights: the feelings\nof the person himself and the claims of others that his feelings\nshall be respected. We have wishes with regard to the future when\nwe live no more. We take an interest in persons and things that\nsurvive us. We desire to leave behind a spotless name. And the\nsympathy felt for us by our fellow men will last when we\nourselves are gone.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XLVI\n\nCANNIBALISM\n\n\nBEFORE we take leave of the dead we have still to consider the\npractice of eating them.\n\nHabitual cannibalism, permitted or in some cases enjoined by\ncustom, has been met with in a large number of savage tribes and,\nas a religious or magical rite, among several peoples of culture.\nIt is, or has been, particularly prevalent in the South Sea\nIslands, Australia, Central Africa, and South and Central\nAmerica. But it has also been found among various North American\nIndians, in certain tribes of the Malay Archipelago, and among a\nfew peoples on the Asiatic continent. And it is proved to have\noccurred in many parts of Europe.[1]\n\n[Footnote 1: For the prevalence and extenson of cannibalism**,\nsee Andree, _Die Anthropophagie_, p. 1 _sqq._; Bergemann, _Die\nVerbreitung der Anthropophagie_, p. 5 _sqq._; Steinmetz,\n_Endokannibalismus_, p. 2 _sqq._; Schneider, _Die Naturv\u00f6lker_,\ni. 121 _sqq._; Letourneau, _L'\u00e9volution de la morale_, p. 82\n_sqq._; Ritson, _Abstinence from Animal Food_, p. 125 _sqq._;\nHartland, _Legend of Perseus_, ii. 279 _sqq._; Schaafhausen, 'Die\nMenschenfresserei und das Menschenopfer,' in _Archiv f.\nAnthropologie_, iv. 248 _sqq._; Henkenius, 'Verbreitung der\nAnthropophagie,' in _Deutsche Rundschau f. Geographie u.\nStatistik_, xv. 348 _sqq._; de Nadaillac, 'L'Anthropophagie et\nles sacrifices humains,' in _Revue des Deux Mondes_, lxvi. 406\n_sqq._; _Idem_, in _Bulletins de la Soc. d'Anthrop. de Paris_,\n1888, p. 27 _sqq._; Dorman, _Origin of Primitive Superstitions_,\np. 145 _sqq._ (American aborigines); Koch, 'Die Anthropophagie\nder s\u00fcdamerikanischen Indianer,' in _Internationales Archiv f.\nEthnographie_, xii. 84 _sqq._; Preuss, _Die Begr\u00e4bnisarten der\nAmerikaner und Nordostasiaten_, p. 217 _sqq._; Vos, 'Die\nVerbreitung der Anthropophagie auf dem asiatischen Festlande,' in\n_Intern. Archiv f. Ethnogr._ iii. 69 _sqq._; de Groot, _Religious\nSystem of China_, (vol. iv. book) ii. 363 _sqq._; H\u00fcbbe-Schleiden,\n_Ethiopien_, p. 209 _sqq._; Matiegka, 'Anthropophagie in der\npr\u00e4historischen Ansiedlung bei Knovize und in der pr\u00e4historischen\nZeit \u00fcberhaupt,' in _Mittheil. d. Anthrop. Gesellsch. in Wien_,\nxxvi. 129 _sqq._; Wood-Martin, _Traces of the Elder Faiths of\nIreland_, ii. 286 _sqq._]\n\n{554} Sometimes the whole body is eaten, with the exception of\nthe bones, sometimes only a part of it, as the liver or the\nheart. Frequently the victim is an enemy or a member of a foreign\ntribe, but he may also be a relative or fellow tribesman. Among\nvarious savages exo- and endo-anthropophagy prevail\nsimultaneously; but many cannibals restrict themselves to eating\nstrangers, slain enemies, or captives taken in war, whereas\nothers eat their own people in preference to strangers, or are\nexclusively endo-anthropophagous. Thus the Birhors of the Central\nProvinces of India are said to eat their aged relatives, but to\nabhor any other form of cannibalism;[2] and in certain Australian\ntribes it is not the dead bodies of slain enemies that are eaten,\nbut the bodies of friends, the former being left where they\nfell.[3] Sometimes people feed on the corpses of such kinsmen as\nhave happened to die, sometimes they kill and eat their old\nfolks, sometimes parents eat their children, sometimes criminals\nare eaten by the other members of their own community. The\nAustralian Dieyerie have a fixed order in which they partake of\ntheir dead relatives:--\"The mother eats of her children. The\nchildren eat of their mother. Brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law\neat of each other. Uncles, aunts, nephews, nieces, grandchildren,\ngrandfathers, and grandmothers eat of each other. But the father\ndoes not eat of his offspring, or the offspring of the sire.\"[4]\nAmong some peoples cannibalism is an exclusively masculine\ncustom, the women being forbidden to eat human flesh, except\nperhaps in quite exceptional circumstances.[5]\n\n[Footnote 2: Dalton, _Ethnology of Bengal_, p. 220 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 3: Palmer, 'Some Australian Tribes,' in _Jour. Anthr.\nInst._ xiii. 283; Fraser, _Aborigines of New South Wales_, p. 56;\nHowitt, _Native Tribes of South-East Australia_, p. 753\n(Queensland aborigines). Dawson, _Australian Aborigines_, p. 67\n(tribes of Western Victoria).]\n\n[Footnote 4: Gason, 'Dieyerie Tribe,' in Woods, _Native Tribes of\nSouth Australia_, p. 274.]\n\n[Footnote 5: Coquilhat, _Sur le Haut-Congo_, p. 274 (Bangala).\nTorday and Joyce, 'Ethnography of the Ba-Mbala,' in _Jour. Anthr.\nInst._ xxxv. 403 _sq._ _Iidem_, 'Ethnography of the Ba-Huana,'\n_ibid._ xxxvi. 279. Reade, _Savage Africa_, p. 158 (West\nEquatorial Africans). Thomson, _Story of New Zealand_, i. 145;\nBest, 'Art of War, as conducted by the Maori,' in _Jour.\nPolynesian Soc._ xi. 71 (some of the Maoris). von Langsdorf, _op.\ncit._ i. 134 (Nukahivans). Erskine, _Cruise among the Islands of\nWestern Pacific_, p. 260 (Fijians). Spencer and Gillen, _Northern\nTribes of Central Australia_, p. 548. With reference to the\nnatives of Australia Mr. Curr says (_The Australian Race_, i. 77)\nthat \"human flesh seems to have been entirely forbidden to\nfemales\"; but this certainly does not hold true of all the\nAustralian tribes.]\n\n{555} The practice of cannibalism may be traced to many different\nsources. **It often springs from scarcity or lack of animal\nfood.[6] In the South Sea Islands, according to Ellis, \"the\ncravings of nature, and the pangs of famine, often led to this\nunnatural crime.\"[7] The Nukahivans, who were in the habit of\neating their enemies slain in battle, also killed and ate their\nwives and children in times of scarcity, but not unless forced to\nit by the utmost necessity.[8] Hunger has been represented as the\nmotive for cannibalism in some North and West Australian tribes,\nparents sometimes consuming even their own children when food is\nscarce.[9] The Indians north of Lake Superior often resorted to\nthe eating of human flesh when hard pressed by their enemies or\nduring a famine.[10] Among the Hudson Bay Eskimo \"instances are\nreported where, in times of great scarcity, families have been\ndriven to cannibalism after eating their dogs and the clothing\nand other articles made of skins.\"[11]\n\n[Footnote 6: Bergemann, _op. cit._ p. 48. de Nadaillac, in _Bull.\nSoc. d'Anthr._ 1888, p. 27 _sqq._ _Idem_, in _Revue des Deux\nMondes_, lxvi. 428 _sq._ Steinmetz, _Endokannibalismus_, p. 25\n_sqq._ Lippert, _Kulturgeschichte der Menschheit_, ii. 281 _sqq._\nHenkenius, _loc. cit._ p. 348 _sq._ Letourneau, _L'\u00e9volution de\nla Morale_, p. 97. Matiegka, _loc. cit._ p. 136. H\u00fcbbe-Schleiden,\n_Ethiopien_, p. 216 _sq._ Rochas, _La Nouvelle Cal\u00e9donie_, p. 304\n_sq._]\n\n[Footnote 7: Ellis, _Polynesian Researches_, i. 359.]\n\n[Footnote 8: von Langsdorf, _op. cit._ i. 144.]\n\n[Footnote 9: Lumholtz, _Among Cannibals_, p. 134. Nisbet, _A\nColonial Tramp_, ii. 143. Oldfield, 'Aborigines of Australia,' in\n_Trans. Ethn. Soc._ N.S. iii. 285. In hard summers the new-born\nbabies were all eaten by the Kaura tribe in the neighbourhood of\nAdelaide (Howitt, _op. cit._ p. 749).]\n\n[Footnote 10: Warren, in Schoolcraft, _Indian Tribes of the\nUnited States_, ii. 146.]\n\n[Footnote 11: Turner, 'Ethnology of the Ungava District,' in\n_Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ xi. 187.]\n\nBut whilst among some peoples starvation is the only inducement\nto cannibalism, there are others who can plead no such motive for\ntheir anthropophagous habits. The Fijians, until lately some of\nthe greatest man-eaters on earth, inhabit a country where food of\nevery kind abounds.[12] The Brazilian cannibals generally have a\ngreat {556} plenty of game or fish.[13] In Africa cannibalism\nprevails in many countries which are well supplied with food.[14]\nThus the Bangala of the Upper Congo have been known to make frequent\nwarlike expeditions against adjoining tribes seemingly for the\nsole object of obtaining human flesh to eat, although their land\nis well provided with a variety of vegetable food and domestic\nanimals, to say nothing of the incredible abundance of fish in\nits lakes and rivers.[15] Of the cave-cannibals in the\nTrans-Gariep Country, in South Africa, a traveller remarks with\nsome surprise:--\"They were inhabiting a fine agricultural tract\nof country, which also abounded in game. Notwithstanding this,\nthey were not contented with hunting and feeding upon their\nenemies, but preyed much upon each other also, for many of their\ncaptures were made from amongst the people of their own\ntribe.\"[16] Far from being an article of food resorted to in\nemergency only, human flesh is not seldom sought for as a\ndelicacy.[17] The highest praise which the Fijians could bestow\non a dainty was to say that it was \"tender as a dead man.\"[18] In\nvarious other islands of the South Seas human flesh is spoken of\nas a delicious food, far superior to pork.[19] The {557}\nAustralian Kurnai said that it tasted better than beef.[20] In\nsome tribes in Australia a plump child is considered \"a sweet\nmouthful, and, in the absence of the mother, clubs in the hands\nof a few wilful men will soon lay it low.\"[21] Of certain natives\nof Northern Queensland we are told that the greatest incentive to\ntaking life is their appetite for human flesh, as they know no\ngreater luxury than the flesh of a black man.[22]\n\n[Footnote 12: Williams and Calvert, _Fiji_, p. 182. Erskine. _op.\ncit._ p. 262.]\n\n[Footnote 13: von Martius, _Beitr\u00e4ge zur Ethnographie Amerika's_,\ni. 538. Koch, _loc. cit._ p. 87. de Nadaillac, in _Bull. Soc.\nd'Anthr._ 1888, p. 30 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 14: Johnston, 'Ethics of Cannibalism,' in _Fortnightly\nReview_, N.S. xlv. 20 _sqq._ H\u00fcbbe-Schleiden, _Ethiopien_, p. 212.\nde Nadaillac, in _Bull. Soc. d'Anthr._ 1888, p. 32 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 15: Coquilhat, _op. cit._ pp. 271, 273. Johnston, in\n_Fortnightly Review_, N.S. xlv. 20.]\n\n[Footnote 16: Layland, quoted by Burton, _Two Trips to Gorilla\nLand_, i. 216.]\n\n[Footnote 17: Bergemann, _op. cit._ p. 49 _sq._ von Langsdorf,\n_op. cit._ i. 141. H\u00fcbbe-Schleiden, _Ethiopien_, p. 218.\nJohnston, in _Fortnightly Review_, N.S. xlv. 20 _sqq._ (various\nAfrican peoples). Kingsley, _Travels in West Africa_, p. 330\n(Fans). Reade, _op. cit._ p. 158 (West Equatorial Africans).\nCoquilhat, _op. cit._ p. 271 (Bangala). Torday and Joyce,\n'Ba-Mbala,' in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxxv. 404. _Iidem_,\n'Ba-Huana,' _ibid._ xxxvi. 279.]\n\n[Footnote 18: Wilkes, _U. S. Exploring Expedition_, iii. 101.\n_Cf._ Williams and Calvert, _op. cit._ pp. 175, 178, 195.]\n\n[Footnote 19: Romilly, _Western Pacific_, p. 59 (New Irelanders).\n_Idem_, _From my Verandah in New Guinea_, p. 65. Brenchley,\n_Cruise of H.M.S. Cura\u00e7oa_, p. 209; Turner, _Samoa_, p. 313\n(natives of Tana, in the New Hebrides). _Cf._ _ibid._ p. 344 (New\nCaledonians); Hale, _U. S. Exploring Expedition. Vol. VI.\nEthnography and Philology_, p. 39 (Polynesians). The Bataks of\nSumatra likewise consider human flesh even better than pork\n(Junghuhn, _Die Battal\u00e4nder auf Sumatra_, ii. 160 _sq._). For the\nhigh appreciation of its taste see also Marco Polo, _Book\nconcerning the Kingdoms and Marvels of the East_, ii. 179 (hill\npeople in Fokien), 209 (Islanders in the Seas of China);\nSchaafhausen, _loc. cit._ p. 247 _sq._; Matiegka, _loc. cit._\np. 136, n. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 20: Howitt, _op. cit._ p. 752.]\n\n[Footnote 21: Fraser, _Aborigines of New South Wales_, pp. 3, 57.]\n\n[Footnote 22: Lumholtz, _op. cit._ pp. 101, 271.]\n\nHowever, bodily appetites, whether hunger or _gourmandise_, are\nby no means the sole motives for cannibalism. Very frequently it\nis described as an act of revenge.[23] The Typees of the\nMarquesas Islands, according to Melville, are cannibals only when\nthey seek to gratify the passion of revenge upon their foes.[24]\nThe cannibalism of the Solomon Islanders seems mainly to have\nbeen an expression of the deepest humiliation to which they could\nmake a person subject.[25] The Samoans affirmed that, when in\nsome of their wars a body was occasionally cooked, \"it was always\nsome one of the enemy who had been notorious for provocation or\ncruelty, and that eating a part of his body was considered the\nclimax of hatred and revenge, and was not occasioned by the mere\nrelish for human flesh.\" To speak of roasting {558} him is the\nvery worst language that can be addressed to a Samoan, and if\napplied to a chief of importance, he may raise war to avenge the\ninsult.[26] Among the Maoris human flesh was frequently eaten\nfrom motives of revenge and hatred, to cast disgrace on the\nperson eaten, and to strike terror. \"It was such a disgrace for a\nNew Zealander to have his body eaten, that if crews of Englishmen\nand New Zealanders, all friends, were dying of starvation in\nseparate ships, the English might resort to cannibalism, but the\nNew Zealanders never would.\"[27] Even in Fiji, where cannibalism\nwas largely indulged in for the mere pleasure of eating human\nflesh as food, revenge is said to have been the chief motive for\nit.[28] Thus, \"in any transaction where the national honour had\nto be avenged, it was incumbent upon the king and principal\nchiefs--in fact, a duty they owed to their exalted station--to\navenge the insult offered to the country by eating the\nperpetrators of it.\"[29]\n\n[Footnote 23: Ellis, _Polynesian Researches_, i. 310 (Tahitians).\nvon Langsdorf, _op. cit._ i. 149 (Nukahivans). Forster, _Voyage\nround the World_, ii. 315 (natives of Tana and generally).\nPowell, _Wanderings in a Wild Country_, p. 248 (natives of New\nBritain and New Ireland). Howitt, _Natives of South-East\nAustralia_, pp. 247, 751. Marsden, _History of Sumatra_, p. 391;\nBuning, in _Glimpses of the Eastern Archipelago_, p. 74 _sq._;\nJunghuhn. _op. cit._ ii. 156, 160 (Bataks). de Groot, _op. cit._\n(vol. iv. book) ii. 369 _sqq._ (ancient Chinese). Schneider, _Die\nReligion der afrikanischen Naturv\u00f6lker_, p. 208 _sq._ (Negroes).\nBurton, _Two Trips to Gorilla Land_, i. 216 (natives of Bonny and\nNew Calabar). M\u00fcller, _Geschichte der Amerikanischen\nUrreligionen_, p. 145 _sq._ Carver, _Travels through the Interior\nParts of North America_, p. 303 _sq._ (Naudowessies). Keating,\n_Expedition to the Source of St. Peter's River_, i. 104\n(Potawatomis). Koch, _loc. cit._ pp. 87, 89 _sqq._ (South\nAmerican tribes). von Humboldt, _Travels to the Equinoctial\nRegions of the New Continent_, v. 421 (Indians of Guyana).\nWied-Neuwied, _Reise nach Brasilien_, ii. 50 (Botocudos and some\nother Brazilian tribes). Lomonaco, 'Sulle razze indigene del\nBrasile,' in _Archivio per l'antropologia e la etnologia_, xix.\n58 (Tupis). Andree, _op. cit._ p. 102 _sq._ and _passim_.]\n\n[Footnote 24: Melville, _Typee_, p. 181.]\n\n[Footnote 25: Parkinson, _Zur Ethnographie der nordwestlichen\nSalomo Inseln_, p. 14.]\n\n[Footnote 26: Turner, _Nineteen Years in Polynesia_, p. 194.\n_Cf._ Pritchard, _Polynesian Reminiscences_, p. 125 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 27: Thomson, _Story of New Zealand_, i. 141 _sqq._\nYate, _Account of New Zealand_, p. 129. Dieffenbach, _Travels in\nNew Zealand_, ii. 128. Taylor, _Te Ika a Maui_, p. 353. Best, in\n_Jour. Polynesian Soc._ xi. 71 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 28: Wilkes, _op. cit._ iii. 101. Williams and Calvert,\n_op. cit._ p. 178.]\n\n[Footnote 29: Seemann, _Viti_, p. 181.]\n\nThe practice of eating criminals, which is quite a common form of\ncannibalism, seems to be largely due to revenge or\nindignation.[30] In Lepers' Island, in the New Hebrides, the\nvictims of it were not generally enemies who had been killed in\nfighting, but \"it was a murderer or particularly detested enemy\nwho was eaten, in anger and to treat him ill.\"[31] Among the\nBataks of Sumatra offenders condemned for certain capital crimes,\nsuch as atrocious murder, treason, and adultery, were usually\neaten by the injured persons and their friends with all the signs\nof angry passion.[32] But this form of cannibalism may also have\nanother foundation.[33] If for any reason there is a desire to\neat human flesh, an unsympathetic being like a criminal is apt to\nbe chosen as a victim. {559} It is said that some of the Line\nIslanders in the South Seas began their cannibalism by eating\nthieves and slaves.[34] In Melanesia, where human sacrifices were\ncombined with the eating of bits of the victim, \"advantage was\ntaken of a crime, or imputed crime, to take a life and offer the\nman to some _tindalo_.\"[35]\n\n[Footnote 30: _Cf._ Matiegka, _loc. cit._ p. 137.]\n\n[Footnote 31: Codrington, _Melanesians_, p. 344.]\n\n[Footnote 32: Marsden, _op. cit._ p. 391. Junghuhn, _op. cit._\nii. 156 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 33: See Steinmetz, _op. cit._ p. 55 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 34: Tutuila, 'Line Islanders,' in _Jour. Polynesian\nSoc._ i. 270.]\n\n[Footnote 35: Codrington, _op. cit._ p. 135.]\n\nIt has been questioned whether cannibalism can be a direct\nexpression of hatred;[36] but for no good reason. To eat a person\nis, according to primitive ideas, to annihilate him as an\nindividual,[37] and we can readily imagine the triumphant\nfeelings of a savage who has his enemy between his jaws. The\nFijian eats in revenge even the vermin which bite him, and when a\nthorn pricks him he picks it out of his flesh and eats it.[38]\nThe Cochin-Chinese express their deepest hatred of a person by\nsaying, \"I wish I could eat his liver or his flesh.\"[39] Other\npeople want to \"drink the blood\" of their enemies.\n\n[Footnote 36: Steinmetz, _op. cit._ p. 33.]\n\n[Footnote 37: Dieffenbach, _op. cit._ ii. 118 (Maoris). Johnston,\nin _Fortnightly Review_, N. S. xlv. 27 (Negroes of the Niger\nDelta). Koch, _loc. cit._ pp. 87, 109. Lippert, _Der Seelencult_,\np. 69. _Idem_, _Kulturgeschichte der Menschheit_, ii. 282 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 38: Pritchard, _op. cit._ p. 371.]\n\n[Footnote 39: von Langsdorf, _op. cit._ i. 148.]\n\nThe idea that a person is annihilated or loses his individuality\nby being eaten has led to cannibalism not only in revenge but as\nan act of protection, as a method of making a dangerous\nindividual harmless after death.[40] Among the Botocudos warriors\ndevoured the bodies of their fallen enemies in the belief that\nthey would thus be safe from the revengeful hatred of the\ndead.[41] In Ashantee \"several of the hearts of the enemy are cut\nout by the fetish men who follow the army, and the blood and\nsmall pieces being mixed (with much ceremony and incantation)\nwith various consecrated herbs, all those who have never killed\nan enemy before eat a portion, for it is believed that if they\ndid not, their vigour and courage would be secretly wasted by the\nhaunting spirit of the {560} deceased.\"[42] In Greenland \"a slain\nman is said to have the power to avenge himself upon the murderer\nby rushing into him, which can only be prevented by eating a\npiece of his liver.\"[43] Many cannibals are in the habit of\nconsuming that part of a slain enemy which is supposed to contain\nhis soul or courage or strength, and one reason for this practice\nmay be the wish to render him incapable of doing further harm.\nQueensland natives eat the kidneys of the persons whom they have\nkilled, believing that \"the kidneys are the centre of life.\"[44]\nAmong the Maoris a chief was often satisfied with the left eye of\nhis enemy, which they considered to be the seat of the soul; or\nthey drank the blood from a corresponding belief;[45] or in the\ncase of a blood feud the heart of the enemy, representing the\nvital essence of him, was eaten \"to fix or make firm the victory\nand the courage of the victor.\"[46] Other peoples likewise eat\nthe hearts or suck the brains of their foes.\n\n[Footnote 40: _Cf._ Lippert, _Kulturgeschichte der Menschheit_,\nii. 282; Koch, _loc. cit._ pp. 87, 109.]\n\n[Footnote 41: Featherman, _Social History of Mankind_,\n'Chiapo- and Guarano-Maranonians,' p. 355.]\n\n[Footnote 42: Bowdich, _Mission to Ashantee_, p. 300.]\n\n[Footnote 43: Rink, _Tales and Traditions of the Eskimo_, p. 45.]\n\n[Footnote 44: Lumholtz, _op. cit._ p. 272.]\n\n[Footnote 45: Dieffenbach, _op. cit._ ii. 128 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 46: Best, in _Jour. Polynesian Soc._ xii. 83, 147.]\n\nMoreover, by eating the supposed seat of a certain quality in his\nenemy the cannibal thinks not only that he deprives his victim of\nthat quality, but also that he incorporates it with his own\nsystem.[47] In many cases this is the chief or the only reason\nfor the practice of cannibalism. The Shoshone Indians supposed\nthat they became animated by the heroic spirit of a fallen foe if\nthey partook of his flesh.[48] Among the Hurons, if an enemy had\nshown courage, his heart, roasted and cut into small pieces,\n{561} was given to the young men and boys to eat.[49] The\nE[(w]e-speaking peoples of the Slave Coast used to eat the hearts\nof foes remarkable for sagacity, holding that the heart is the\nseat of the intellect as well as of courage.[50] Among the\nKimbunda of South-Western Africa, when a new king succeeds to the\nthrone, a brave prisoner of war is killed in order that the king\nand nobles may eat his flesh, and so acquire his strength and\ncourage.[51] The idea of transference very largely underlies\nAustralian cannibalism.[52] In some tribes enemies are consumed\nwith a view to acquiring some part of their qualities and\ncourage.[53] The Dieyerie devour the fatty portions of their foes\nbecause they think it will impart strength to them.[54] And\nsimilar motives are often given for the practice of eating\nrelatives or friends. When a man is killed in one of the\nceremonial fights in the tribes about Maryborough, in Queensland,\nhis friends skin and eat him in the hope that his virtues as a\nwarrior may go into those who partake of him.[55] Among the\nnatives of the River Darling, in New South Wales, a piece of\nflesh is cut from the dead body and taken to the camp, and after\nbeing sun-dried is cut up into small pieces, which are\ndistributed among the relatives and friends of the deceased. Some\nof them use the piece in making a charm, or throw it into the\nriver to bring a flood and fish, but others suck it to get\nstrength and courage.[56] In certain Central Australian tribes,\nwhen a party starts on an avenging expedition, every man of it\ndrinks some blood and also has some spurted over his body, so as\nto make him lithe and active; the elder men {562} indicate from\nwhom the blood is to be drawn, and the persons thus selected must\nnot decline.[57] In certain South Australian tribes cannibalism\nis only practised by old men and women, who eat a baby in order\nto get the youngster's strength.[58] Among other natives of the\nsame continent, as we have noticed above, a mother used to kill\nand eat her first child, as this was believed to strengthen her\nfor later births.[59] And in various Australian tribes it is, or\nhas been, the custom when a child is weak or sickly to kill its\ninfant brother or sister and feed it with the flesh to make it\nstrong.[60] Many of the Brazilian Indians are in the habit of\nburning the bones of their departed relatives, and mix the ashes\nwith a drink of which they partake for the purpose of absorbing\ntheir spirits or virtues.[61] Dr. Couto de Magalh\u00e3es was informed\nthat the savage Chavantes \"eat their children who die, in the\nhope of gathering again to their body the soul of the child.\"[62]\n\n[Footnote 47: Blumentritt, 'Der Ahnencultus der Malaien des\nPhilippinen-Archipels,' in _Mittheil. d. kais. u. k\u00f6nig.\nGeograph. Gesellsch. in Wien_, xxv. 154 (Italones). Lewin, _Wild\nRaces of South-Eastern India_, p. 269 (Kukis). de Groot, _op.\ncit._ (vol. iv. book) ii. 373 _sqq._ (ancient Chinese).\nSchneider, _Die Religion der afrikanischen Naturv\u00f6lker_, p. 209\n_sq._ (Negroes). Dorman, _op. cit._ p. 145 _sq._ (North American\nIndians). Keating, _op. cit._ i. 104 (Potawatomis). Koch, _loc.\ncit._ pp. 87, 89 _sqq._, 109 (South American Indians). Andree,\n_op. cit._ p. 101 _sq._ and _passim_. Lippert, _Der Seelencult_,\np. 70 _sqq._ _Idem_, _Kulturgeschichte_, ii. 282. Trumbull,\n_Blood Covenant_, p. 128 _sqq._ Frazer, _Golden Bough_, ii. 357\n_sqq._ Gomme, _Ethnology in Folklore_, p. 151 _sqq._ Crawley,\n_Mystic Rose_, p. 101 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 48: Featherman, _op. cit._ 'Aoneo-Maranonians,' p. 206.]\n\n[Footnote 49: Parkman, _Jesuits in North America_, p. xxxix.]\n\n[Footnote 50: Ellis, _E[(w]e-speaking Peoples of the Slave\nCoast_, p. 100.]\n\n[Footnote 51: Magyar, _Reisen in S\u00fcd-Afrika_, p. 273.]\n\n[Footnote 52: Fraser, _Aborigines of New South Wales_, pp. 56,\n81. Brough Smyth, _Aborigines of Victoria_, i. p. xxxviii.\nHowitt, 'Australian Medicine Men,' in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xvi.\n30. Langloh Parker, _Euahlayi Tribe_, p. 38. Gason, 'Dieyerie\nTribe,' in Curr, _op. cit._ ii. 52.]\n\n[Footnote 53: Howitt, _Native Tribes of South-East Australia_, p. 752.]\n\n[Footnote 54: Gason, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxiv. 172.]\n\n[Footnote 55: Howitt, _op. cit._ p. 753. McDonald,'Mode of\nPreparing the Dead among the Natives of the Upper Mary River,\nQueensland,' in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ ii. 179.]\n\n[Footnote 56: Bonney, 'Aborigines of the River Darling,' in\n_Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xiii. 135.]\n\n[Footnote 57: Spencer and Gillen, _Native Tribes of Central\nAustralia_, p. 461.]\n\n[Footnote 58: Crauford, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxiv. 182.]\n\n[Footnote 59: _Supra_, i. 458.]\n\n[Footnote 60: Howitt, _Native Tribes of South-East Australia_, p.\n749 _sq._ (all the tribes of the Wotjo nation, and the Tatathi\nand other tribes on the Murray River frontage). Stanbridge,\n'Tribes in the Central Part of Victoria,' in _Trans. Ethn. Soc.\nLondon_, N.S. i. 289. Spencer and Gillen, _Native Tribes of\nCentral Australia_, pp. 52, 475 (Luritcha tribe).]\n\n[Footnote 61: Wallace, _Travels on the Amazon_, p. 498 (Tari\u00e1nas,\nTuc\u00e1nos, and some other tribes of the Uaup\u00e9s). Coudreau, _La\nFrance \u00e9quinoxiale_, ii. 173 (Cobb\u00e9os, of the Uaup\u00e9s). Monteiro,\nquoted by von Spix and von Martius, _Reise in Brasilien_, iii.\n1207, n. * (Jum\u00e1nas). Koch, _loc. cit._ p. 83 _sq._ Dorman, _op.\ncit._ p. 151.]\n\n[Footnote 62: Couto de Magalh\u00e3es, _Trabalho preparatorio para\naproveitamento do selvagem e do solo por elle occupado no\nBrazil--O selvagem_, p. 132. _Cf._ de Castelnau, _Exp\u00e9dition dans\nles parties centrales de l'Am\u00e9rique du Sud_, iv. 382 (Camacas).]\n\nThe belief in the principle of transference has also led to\ncannibalism in connection with human sacrifice and to the eating\nof man-gods. At Florida, in the Solomon Islands, human flesh was\neaten in sacrifice only.[63] In Hawaii, \"apr\u00e8s le sacrifice, le\npeuple, qui d'ailleurs ne fut jamais anthropophage, pratiquait\nune sorte de communion en mangeant certaines parties de la\nvictime.\"[64] In West Equatorial Africa, according to Mr. Winwood\nReade, there are two kinds of cannibalism--the one is simply an\n{563} act of _gourmandise_, the other is sacrificial and is\nperformed by the priests, whose office it is to eat a portion of\nthe victims, whether men, goats, or fowls.[65] And this\nsacrificial cannibalism is not restricted to the priests. In\nBritish Nigeria \"no great human sacrifice offered for the purpose\nof appeasing the gods and averting sickness or misfortune is\nconsidered to be complete unless either the priests or the people\neat the bodies of the victims\";[66] and among the Aro people in\nSouthern Nigeria the human victims offered to the god were eaten\nby all the people, the flesh being distributed throughout their\ncountry.[67] The inhabitants of the province of Caranque, in\nancient Peru, likewise consumed the flesh of those whom they\nsacrificed to their gods.[68] The Aztecs ate parts of the human\nbodies whose blood had been poured out on the altar of\nsacrifice,[69] and so did the Mayas.[70] In Nicaragua the\nhigh-priests received the heart, the king the feet and hands, he\nwho captured the victim took the thighs, the entrails were given\nto the trumpeters, and the rest was divided among the people.[71]\nIn ancient India it was a prevalent opinion that he who offered a\nhuman victim in sacrifice should partake of its flesh; though, in\nopposition to this view, it was also said that a man cannot be\nallowed, much less required, to eat human flesh.[72] The\nsacrificial form of cannibalism obviously springs from the idea\nthat a victim offered to a supernatural being participates in his\nsanctity[73] and from the wish of the worshipper to transfer to\nhimself something of its benign virtue. So also the divine\nqualities of a man-god are supposed to be assimilated by the\nperson {564} who eats his flesh or drinks his blood.[74] This was\nthe idea of the early Christians concerning the Eucharist. In the\nholy food they assumed a real bestowal of heavenly gifts, a\nbodily self-communication of Christ, a miraculous implanting of\ndivine life. The partaking of the consecrated elements had no\nspecial relation to the forgiveness of sins; but it strengthened\nfaith and knowledge, and, especially, it was the guarantee of\neternal life, because the body of Christ was eternal. The holy\nfood was described as the \"medicine of immortality.\"[75]\n\n[Footnote 63: Codrington, _op. cit._ p. 343. See also Geiseler,\n_Die Oster-Insel_, p. 30 _sq._ (Easter Islanders).]\n\n[Footnote 64: Remy, _Ka Mooolelo Hawaii_, p. xl.]\n\n[Footnote 65: Reade, _op. cit._ p. 158. See also Schneider, _Die\nReligion der afrikanischen Naturv\u00f6lker_, p. 209 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 66: Mockler-Ferryman, _British Nigeria_, p. 261.]\n\n[Footnote 67: Partridge, _Cross River Natives_, p. 59.]\n\n[Footnote 68: Ranking, _Researches on the Conquest of Peru_, p. 89.]\n\n[Footnote 69: Prescott, _History of the Conquest of Mexico_, p. 41.\nR\u00e9ville, _Hibbert Lectures on the Religions of Mexico and Peru_,\np. 89. Bancroft, _Native Races of the Pacific States_, ii. 176;\niii. 443 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 70: Bancroft, _op. cit._ ii. 725.]\n\n[Footnote 71: _Ibid._ ii. 725.]\n\n[Footnote 72: Weber, 'Ueber Menschenopfer bei den Indern der\nvedischen Zeit,' in _Indische Streifen_, i. 72 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 73: See _supra_, i. 445 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 74: See Frazer, _Golden Bough_, ii. 352, 353. 366.]\n\n[Footnote 75: Harnack, _History of Dogma_, i. 211; ii. 144\n_sqq._; iv. 286, 291, 294, 296, 297, 299 _sq._]\n\nIn various other instances human flesh or blood is supposed to\nhave a supernatural or medicinal effect upon him who partakes of\nit. The Banks Islanders in Melanesia believe that a man or woman\nmay obtain a power like that of Vampires by stealing and eating a\nmorsel of a corpse; the ghost of the dead man would then \"join in\na close friendship with the person who had eaten, and would\ngratify him by afflicting any one against whom his ghostly power\nmight be directed.\"[76] Australian sorcerers are said to acquire\ntheir magic influence by eating human flesh.[77] The Egyptian\nnatives who accompanied Baker on one of his expeditions imagined\nthat the rite of consuming an enemy's liver would give a fatal\ndirection to a random bullet.[78] Among the aborigines of\nTasmania a man's blood was often administered as a healing\ndraught.[79] In China the heart, the liver, the gall, and the\nblood of executed criminals are used for life-strengthening\npurposes;[80] thus at Peking, when a person has been executed by\nthe sword, certain large pith balls are steeped in the blood and,\nunder the name of \"blood-bread,\" sold as a medicine for\nconsumption.[81] Tertullian speaks of those \"who at the\ngladiatorial shows, for the cure of epilepsy, {565} quaff with\ngreedy thirst the blood of criminals slain in the arena, as it\nflows fresh from the wound.\"[82] So also in Christian Europe the\nblood of criminals has been drunk as a remedy against epilepsy,\nfever, and other diseases.[83] In these cases the ascription of a\nhealing effect to the blood of the dead may perhaps have been\nderived from a belief in the transference of some quality which\nthey possessed in their lifetime; the blood or life of a sound\nand strong individual might impart health to the sickly. But the\nmystery of death would also give to the corpse a miraculous power\nof its own, especially when combined with the horror or awe\ninspired by an executed felon.\n\n[Footnote 76: Codrington, _op. cit._ p. 221 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 77: Eyre, _Expeditions of Discovery into Central\nAustralia_, ii. 255.]\n\n[Footnote 78: Baker, _Ismail\u00efa_, p. 393.]\n\n[Footnote 79: Bonwick, _Daily Life and Origin of the Tasmanians_,\np. 89.]\n\n[Footnote 80: de Groot, _op. cit._ (vol. iv. book) ii. 377.]\n\n[Footnote 81: Rennie, quoted by Yule, in his translation of Marco\nPolo, i. 275, n. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 82: Tertullian, _Apologeticus_, 9 (Migne, _Patrologi\u00e6\ncursus_, i. 321 _sq._).]\n\n[Footnote 83: Strack, _Der Blutaberglaube in der Menschheit_, p.\n27 _sqq._ Wuttke, _Der deutsche Volksaberglaube der Gegenwart_, \u00a7\n189 _sqq._, p. 137 _sq._ Jahn, 'Ueber den Zauber mit Menschenblut,'\nin _Verhandl. d. Berliner Gesellsch. f. Anthrop._ 1888, p. 134 _sqq._\nHavelock Ellis, _The Criminal_, p. 284. Peacock, 'Executed Criminals\nand Folk-Medicine,' in _Folk-Lore_, vii. 270 _sq._]\n\nIn other instances, again, the belief in the wonderful effects of\ncannibal practices may have originated in the notion that, if a\nperson or the essential part of him is eaten, he ceases to exist\neven as a spirit, or at all events loses his power of doing\nmischief. Among the Indians of British Guiana, when a man is\npointed out as the secret murderer of a relative who has died,\nthe avenger will shoot him through the back; and if he happens to\nfall dead to the ground, his corpse is dragged aside and buried\nin a shallow grave. The third night the avenger goes to the grave\nand presses a pointed stick through the corpse; and if on\nwithdrawing the stick he finds blood on the end of it, he tastes\nthe blood in order to ward off any evil effects that might follow\nfrom the murder, returning home appeased and apparently at ease.\nBut if it happens that the wounded individual is able to escape,\nhe charges his relatives to bury him after his death in some\nplace where he cannot be found. This is to punish the murderer\nfor his deed, \"inasmuch as the belief prevails that if he taste\nnot the blood he must perish by madness.\"[84] In Prussia it was a\npopular superstition that {566} if a murderer cut off, roasted,\nand ate a piece of his victim's body, he would never after think\nof his deed.[85] But by eating a part of the corpse a homicide\nmay also protect himself against the vengeance of the survivors,\npresumably because he has now absorbed their relative into his\nown system.[86] The natives of New Britain eat their enemies and\nfix the leg and arm bones of the victims at the butt end of their\nspears, believing that this not only gives them the strength of\nthe man whose bones they carry but also makes them invulnerable\nby his relatives.[87] The Botocudos thought that by devouring\ntheir fallen enemies they both protected themselves from the\nhatred of the dead and at the same time prevented the arrows of\nthe hostile tribe from hitting them.[88] In Greenland the\nrelatives of a murdered person, when highly enraged, will cut to\npieces the body of the murderer and devour part of the heart or\nliver, \"thinking thereby to disarm his relatives of all courage\nto attack them.\"[89] In the South of Italy there is a popular\nbelief that a murderer will not be able to escape unless he taste\nor bedaub himself with his victim's blood.[90] Sometimes, we are\ntold, cannibalism is even supposed to have a positively injurious\neffect upon the victim's relatives, in accordance, as it seems,\nwith the principle of sympathetic magic. Among the Chukchi, in\nthe case of revenge for blood, the slayers eat a little bit of\nthe enemy's heart or liver, supposing that they in this way cause\nthe hearts of his kinsfolk to sicken.[91]\n\n[Footnote 84: Bernau, _Missionary Labours in British Guiana_,\np. 57 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 85: von Tettau and Temme, _Die Volkssagen\nOstpreussens_, p. 267.]\n\n[Footnote 86: _Cf._ Hartland, _op. cit._ ii. 245 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 87: Powell, _Wanderings in a Wild Country_, p. 92.]\n\n[Footnote 88: Castelnau, _Exp\u00e9dition dans les parties centrales\nde l'Am\u00e9rique du Sud_, iv. 382.]\n\n[Footnote 89: Cranz, _History of Greenland_, i. 178.]\n\n[Footnote 90: Pasquarelli, quoted by Hartland, _op. cit._ ii. 246.]\n\n[Footnote 91: Ratzel, _History of Mankind_, ii. 212.]\n\nHuman flesh or blood is not only believed to impart certain\nqualities or beneficial magic energy to him who partakes of it,\nbut also serves as a means of transferring conditional curses\nfrom one person to another. This I take to be the explanation of\ncannibalism as a covenant rite; in a previous chapter I have\ntried to show that the {567} main principle underlying the\nblood-covenant is the idea that the transference of blood conveys\nto the person who drinks it, or is inoculated with it, a\nconditional curse which will injure or destroy him should he\nbreak his promise.[92] The drinking of human blood, or of wine\nmixed with such blood, has been a form of covenant among various\nancient and medi\u00e6val peoples, as well as among certain\nsavages.[93] In some South Slavonic districts compacts between\ndifferent clans are even now made by their representatives\nsucking blood from each other's right hands and swearing fidelity\ntill the grave.[94] In certain parts of Africa, again, the\npartaking of human flesh, generally prepared in a kind of paste\nmixed with condiments and kept in a quaintly-carved wooden box\nand eaten with round spoons of human bone, constitutes a bond of\nunion between strangers who are suspicious of one another or\nbetween former enemies, or accompanies the making of a solemn\ndeclaration or the taking of an oath.[95] Among the Bambala, a\nBantu tribe in the Kasai, south of the River Congo, cannibalism\naccompanies the ceremony by which a kind of alliance is\nestablished between chiefs of the same region. The most powerful\nchief will invite the other chiefs of the neighbourhood to a\nmeeting held on his territory, in order to make a compact against\nbloodshed. \"A slave is fattened for the occasion and killed by\nthe host, and the invited chiefs and their followers partake of\nthe flesh. Participation in this banquet is taken as a pledge to\nprevent murder. Supposing that a chief, after attending an\nassembly of this kind, kills a slave, every village which took\npart in the bond has the right to claim compensation, and the\nmurderer is sure to be completely ruined.\"[96]\n\n[Footnote 92: _Supra_, ii. 208.]\n\n[Footnote 93: Strack, _op. cit._ p. 9 _sqq._ R\u00fchs, _Handbuch der\nGeschichte des Mittelalters_, p. 323. _Supra_, ii. 207 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 94: Krauss, 'S\u00fchnung der Blutrache im Herz\u00f6gischen,' in\n_Am Ur-Quell_, N.F. i. 196.]\n\n[Footnote 95: Johnston, in _Fortnightly Review_, N.S. xlv. 28.]\n\n[Footnote 96: Torday and Joyce, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxxv.\n404, 409.]\n\nFor the practice of eating relatives or friends, finally, some\nspecial reasons are given besides those already mentioned.{568}\nIt is represented as a mark of affection or respect for the\ndead,[97] as an act which benefits not only the person who eats\nbut also him who is eaten. The reason which the Australian\nDieyerie assign for their endo-anthropophagy is, that should they\nnot eat their relatives they would be perpetually crying and\nbecome a nuisance to the camp.[98] The natives of the Boulia\ndistrict, Queensland, among whom children that die suddenly are\npartly eaten by the parents and their blood brothers and sisters,\nsay that \"putting them along hole\" would make them think too much\nabout their beloved little ones.[99] In the Turrbal tribe in\nSouthern Queensland a man who happened to be killed in one of the\nceremonial combats which followed the initiation rites was eaten\nby those members of the tribe who were present; and the motive\nstated is that they ate him because \"they knew him and were fond\nof him, and they now knew where he was, and his flesh would not\nstink.\"[100] The Bataks of Sumatra declared that they frequently\nate their own relatives when aged and infirm, \"not so much to\ngratify their appetite, as to perform a pious ceremony.\"[101]\nAmong the Samoyedes old and decrepit persons who were no longer\nable to work let their children kill and eat them in the hope\nthat they thereby might fare better after death.[102] The Indian\nof Hayti \"would think he was wanting to the memory of a relation,\nif he had not thrown into his drink a small portion of the body\nof the deceased, after having dried it . . . and reduced it to\npowder.\"[103] Among the Botocudos old men who were unable to keep\nup in the march were at their own request eaten up by their sons\nso that their {569} enemies should be prevented from digging up\nand injuring their bodies;[104] whilst mothers not infrequently\nconsumed their dead children out of love.[105] The Mayorunas\nconsidered it more desirable for the departed to be eaten by\nrelatives than by worms;[106] and the Cocomas, a tribe of the\nMara\u00f1on and Lower Huallaga, said it was better to be inside a\nfriend than to be swallowed up by the cold earth.[107] It is\nimpossible to decide how far these statements represent original\nmotives for the custom of eating dead relatives. They may be\nlater interpretations of a habit which in the first place sprang\nfrom selfishness rather than love.\n\n[Footnote 97: Dawson, _op. cit._ p. 67 (tribes of Western\nVictoria). McDonald, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ ii. 179 (natives of\nthe Upper Mary River, Queensland). Featherman, _op. cit._\n'Oceano-Melanesians,' p. 243 (Hawaiians). Southey, _History of\nBrazil_, i. 379 (Tapuyas). Marcgravius de Liebstad, _Historia\nrerum naturalium Brasili\u00e6_, viii. 12, p. 282 (ancient Tupis).]\n\n[Footnote 98: Gason, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxiv. 172. _Idem_,\nin Woods, _op. cit._ p. 274.]\n\n[Footnote 99: Roth, _North-West-Central Queensland Aborigines_,\np. 166.]\n\n[Footnote 100: Howitt, _op. cit._ p. 753.]\n\n[Footnote 101: Leyden, 'Languages and Literature of the\nIndo-Chinese Nations,' in _Asiatick Researches_, x. 202.]\n\n[Footnote 102: Preuss, _op. cit._ p. 218.]\n\n[Footnote 103: Bembo, quoted by von Humboldt, _op. cit._ v. 248.]\n\n[Footnote 104: Voss, in _Verhandl. Berliner Geellsch. Anthr._\n1891, p. 26.]\n\n[Footnote 105: Waitz, _Anthropologie der Naturv\u00f6lker_, iii. 446.]\n\n[Footnote 106: von Sch\u00fctz-Holzhausen, _Der Amazonas_, p. 209.]\n\n[Footnote 107: Markham, 'List of the Tribes in the Valley of the\nAmazon,' in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxiv. 253.]\n\nThe cannibalism of modern savages has often been represented as\nthe survival of an ancient practice which was once universal in\nthe human race.[108] The advocates of this theory, however, have\nnot generally made any serious attempts to prove it. I have in\nanother place put the question how ethnographical facts can give\nus information regarding the early history of mankind, and my\nanswer was:--We have first to find out the causes of the social\nphenomena; we may then from the prevalence of the causes infer\nthe prevalence of the phenomena themselves, if the former must be\nassumed to have operated without being checked by other\ncauses.[109] This seems a very obvious method; but, so far as I\nknow, Dr. Steinmetz is the only one who has strictly applied it\nto the question of cannibalism. He has arrived at the conclusion\nthat primitive man most probably was in the habit of eating the\nbodies of his dead kinsmen as also of slain enemies. His argument\nis briefly as follows:--{570} The chief impulse of primitive man\nwas his desire for food. He fed not only on fruits and\nvegetables, but on flesh. His taste for animal food was not\nlimited by any sufficient esthetic horror of human corpses. Nor\nwas he kept back from eating them by fear of exposing himself to\nthe revenge of the disembodied soul of his victim, nor by any\nfantastic sympathy for the dead body. Consequently, he was an\nhabitual cannibal.[110] If I cannot accept Dr. Steinmetz's\nconclusion it is certainly not because I find fault with his\nmethod, but because I consider his chief premise exceedingly\ndoubtful.\n\n[Footnote 108: Andree, _op. cit._ p. 98 _sq._ Lippert,\n_Kulturgeschichte der Menschheit_, ii. 279. Schurtz,\n_Speiseverbote_, p. 25. R\u00e9ville, _Hibbert Lectures on the\nReligions of Mexico and Peru_, p. 87. Johnston, in _Fortnightly\nReview_, N.S. xlv. 28. M. Letourneau (_L'\u00e9volution de la morale_,\np. 76) calls cannibalism \"le p\u00e9ch\u00e9 originel de toutes les races\nhumaines.\"]\n\n[Footnote 109: Westermarck, _History of Human Marriage_, p. 3 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 110: Steinmetz, _Endokannibalismus_, p. 34 _sqq._]\n\nIt is quite likely that early man preferred cannibalism to death\nfrom starvation, and that he occasionally practised it from the\nsame motive as has induced many shipwrecked men even among\ncivilised peoples to have recourse to the bodies of their\ncomrades in order to save their lives. But we are here concerned\nwith habitual cannibalism only. Although I consider it highly\nprobable that man was originally in the main frugivorous, there\ncan be no doubt that he has from very early times fed largely on\nanimal food. We may further take for granted that he has\nhabitually eaten the flesh of whatever animals he could get for\nwhich he had a taste and from the eating of which no\nsuperstitious or sentimental motive held him back. But that he at\nfirst had no aversion to human flesh seems to me a very\nprecarious assumption.\n\nA large number of savage tribes have never been known to be\naddicted to cannibalism, but are, on the contrary, said to feel\nthe greatest dislike of it. In times of scarcity the Eskimo will\neat their clothing sooner than touch human flesh. The Fuegians\nhave been reported to devour their old women in cases of extreme\ndistress;[111] but Mr. Bridges, who has spent most part of his\nlife among them, emphatically affirms that cannibalism is unknown\namongst the natives of Cape Horn and that {571} they abhor\nit.[112] Concerning the natives of South Andaman Mr. Man\nobserves:--\"Not a trace could be discovered of the existence of\nsuch a practice in their midst, even in far-off times. . . . They\nexpress the greatest horror of the custom, and indignantly deny\nthat it ever held a place among their institutions.\"[113] We meet\nwith similar statements with reference to many African tribes.\nThe editor of Livingstone's 'Last Journals' says that it was\ncommon on the River Shir\u00e9 to hear Manganja and Ajawa people speak\nof tribes far away to the north who eat human bodies, and that on\nevery occasion the fact was related with the utmost abhorrence\nand disgust.[114] Amongst the Dinka the accounts of the\ncannibalism of the Niam-Niam excites as much horror as amongst\nourselves.[115] The Bakongo \"shudder with repugnance at the mere\nmention of eating human flesh.\"[116] Among the Bayaka, in the\nCongo Free State, \"cannibalism is never found, and is regarded as\nsomething quite abhorrent.\"[117] No intermarriage takes place\nbetween the Fans and their non-cannibal neighbours, as \"their\npeculiar practices are held in too great abhorrence.\"[118]\nAccording to Burton, cannibalism \"is execrated by the Efiks of\nOld Calabar, who punish any attempts of the kind with extreme\nseverity.\"[119] Even amongst the South Sea Islanders there are\ntribes which have been known to view cannibalism with great\nrepugnance.[120]\n\n[Footnote 111: Darwin, _Journal of Researches_, p. 214. King and\nFitzroy, _Voyages of the \"Adventure\" and \"Beagle,\"_ ii. 183, 189.]\n\n[Footnote 112: Bridges, 'Manners and Customs of the Firelanders,'\nin _A Voice for South America_, xiii. 207. _Idem_, quoted by\nHyades and Deniker, _Mission scientifique du Cap Horn_, vii. 259.]\n\n[Footnote 113: Man, 'Aboriginal Inhabitants of the Andaman\nIslands,' in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xii. 113.]\n\n[Footnote 114: Livingstone, _Last Journals_, ii. 39.]\n\n[Footnote 115: Schweinfurth, _Heart of Africa_, i. 158.]\n\n[Footnote 116: Ward, _Five Years with the Congo Cannibals_, p. 37.]\n\n[Footnote 117: Torday and Joyce, 'Ethnography of the Ba-Yaka,' in\n_Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxxvi. 42.]\n\n[Footnote 118: Du Chaillu, _Explorations in Equatorial Africa_, p. 97.]\n\n[Footnote 119: Burton, _Two Trips to Gorilla Land_, i. 216 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 120: Nisbet, _op. cit._ ii. 136. Turner, _Samoa_, p.\n305 (Savage Islanders). Angas, _Polynesia_, p. 385 (natives of\nBornabi, in the Caroline Islands). Powell, _Wanderings in a Wild\nCountry_, p. 247 (some of the tribes in New Guinea). Calder,\n'Native Tribes of Tasmania,' in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ iii. 23;\nLing Roth, _Aborigines of Tasmania_, p. 111.]\n\nIt is true that the information which a traveller visiting a\nsavage tribe receives as regards its attitude towards {572}\ncannibalism is often apt to be misleading. There is nothing as to\nwhich many savages are so reticent or the practice of which they\nwill deny so readily as cannibalism, though at the same time they\nare much inclined to accuse other peoples of it.[121] The reason\nwhy they are so anxious to conceal its prevalence among\nthemselves is of course their knowledge of the detestation in\nwhich it is held by the visiting stranger; but not infrequently\nthey really seem to feel that it is something to be ashamed of.\nIt has been said of some Australian natives that, \"unlike many\nother offences with which they are justly charged, . . . this one\nin general they knew to be wrong,\" their behaviour when they were\nquestioned on the subject showing that \"they erred knowingly and\nwilfully.\"[122] At all events the reproaches of the whites have\nbeen taken to heart with remarkable readiness. Even among peoples\nwho have been extremely addicted to it, cannibalism has\ndisappeared with a rapidity to which, I think, there is hardly\nany parallel in the history of morals. Erskine wrote in the\nmiddle of the last century:--\"Our experience in New Zealand has\nproved that this unnatural propensity can be eradicated from the\nhabits of a whole savage nation, in the course of a single\ngeneration. I have heard it asserted that there did not exist in\n1845 many New Zealand males of twenty years of age who had not,\nin their childhood, tasted of human flesh; yet it is perfectly\nwell known that at the present time the occurrence of a single\ncase of cannibalism, in any part of those islands, would attract\nas much notice as in any country of Europe; and that, when a\nnative can be induced to talk on the subject, his information is\ngiven reluctantly, and with an unmistakable consciousness of\ndegradation, and a feeling of shame that he and his {573}\ncountrymen should ever have been liable to such a reproach.\"[123]\nOf the Bataks it was said some time ago that the rising\ngeneration began to refrain from cannibalism, and that those of\nthem who had submitted to European rule thought with horror of\nthe wild times when they or their ancestors were addicted to\nit.[124] Cieza de Leon remarks with some astonishment that, as\nsoon as the Peruvian Incas began to put a stop to this practice\namong all the peoples with whom they came in contact, it was in a\nshort time forgotten throughout their empire even by those who\nhad previously held it in high estimation.[125] Moreover, the\nextinction of cannibalism has not always been due to the\nintervention of superior races.[126]\n\n[Footnote 121: Curr, _The Australian Race_, i. 77; Brough Smyth,\n_Aborigines of Victoria_, i. p. xxxvii. _sq._; Fraser,\n_Aborigines of New South Wales_, p. 56. Romilly, _Western\nPacific_, p. 59 _sqq._ _Idem_, _From my Verandah in New Guinea_,\np. 68. Powell, _op. cit._ pp. 52, 59 (natives of the Duke of York\nGroup). Erskine, _op. cit._ p. 190 _sq._ (Fijians). Melville,\n_op. cit._ p. 341 (Polynesians). Reade, _op. cit._ p. 159;\nKingsley, _Travels in West Africa_, p. 330 (Fans). At the same\ntime there are many cannibals who make no attempts to conceal the\npractice.]\n\n[Footnote 122: Brough Smyth, _op. cit._ i. p. xxxviii.]\n\n[Footnote 123: Erskine, _op. cit._ p. 275 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 124: Buning, in _Glimpses of the Eastern Archipelago_,\np. 74.]\n\n[Footnote 125: Cieza de Leon, _Segunda parte de la Cr\u00f3nica del\nPer\u00fa_, ch. 25, p. 100.]\n\n[Footnote 126: Waitz-Gerland, _Anthropologie der Naturv\u00f6lker_,\nvi. 158 _sqq._ (Polynesians). Casalis, _Basutos_, p. 303. Ribot,\n_Psychology of the Emotions_, p. 295 _sq._ Schurtz,\n_Speiseverbote_, p. 26. _Cf._ Spencer and Gillen, _Native Tribes\nof Central Australia_, p. 324.]\n\nEven among peoples very notorious for cannibalism there are\nindividuals who abhor the practice. Dr. Schweinfurth asserts that\nsome of the Niam-Niam \"turn with such aversion from any\nconsumption of human flesh that they would peremptorily refuse to\neat out of the same dish with any one who was a cannibal.\"[127]\nWith reference to Fijian cannibalism Dr. Seemann observes:--\"It\nwould be a mistake to suppose that all Fijians, not converted to\nChristianity, are cannibals. There were whole towns, as for\ninstance Nakelo, on the Rewa river, which made a bold stand\nagainst this practice, declaring that it was _tabu_ forbidden to\nthem by their gods, to indulge in it. The common people\nthroughout the group, as well as women of all classes, were by\ncustom debarred from it. Cannibalism was thus restricted to the\nchiefs and gentry, and again amongst them there is a number . . .\nwho never eat human flesh, nor go near the biers when any dead\nbodies have been brought in, and who abominate the practice as\nmuch as any white man does.\"[128] {574} It should also be\nremembered that many cannibals eat human flesh not as ordinary\nfood, but only in special circumstances, and that their\ncannibalism is often restricted to the devouring of some small\npart of the victim's body.\n\n[Footnote 127: Schweinfurth, _op. cit._ ii. 18 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 128: Seemann, _Viti_, p. 179 _sq._ _Cf._ Williams and\nCalvert, _op. cit._ p. 179.]\n\nThe dislike of cannibalism may be a complex feeling. In many\ninstances sympathy for the dead is undoubtedly one of its\ningredients. It is true that endo-anthropophagy is frequently\ndescribed as a mark of affection, but on the other hand there are\nmany cannibals who never eat their dead friends though they eat\nstrangers or foes. Some cannibals exchange their own dead for\nthose of another tribe so as to avoid feeding on their\nkinsmen;[129] the natives of Tana, in the New Hebrides, are said\nto do so \"when they happen to have a particular regard for the\ndeceased.\"[130] But neither affection nor regard can be the\nreason why savages abstain from eating their enemies. I think\nthat aversion to cannibalism is most likely, in the first\ninstance, an instinctive feeling akin to those feelings which\nregulate the diet of the various animal species. Although our\nknowledge of their habits in this respect is defective, there can\nbe little doubt that carnivorous animals as a rule refuse to eat\nmembers of their own species; and this reluctance is easy to\nunderstand considering its race-preserving tendency.\n\n[Footnote 129: Arbousset and Daumas, _Exploratory Tour to the\nCape of Good Hope_, p. 123. Steinmetz, _Endokannibalismus_,\npp. 22, 47.]\n\n[Footnote 130: Brenchley, _op. cit._ p. 209.]\n\nMoreover, the eating of human flesh is regarded with some degree\nof superstitious dread. This is not seldom the case even among\npeoples who are themselves cannibals. In Lepers' Island, in the\nNew Hebrides, where cannibalism still prevails, the natives say\nthat \"to eat human flesh is a dreadful thing,\" and that a\nman-eater is a person who is afraid of nothing; hence \"men will\nbuy flesh when some one has been killed, that they may get the\nname of valiant men by eating it.\"[131] In those parts of Fiji\nwhere cannibalism was a national institution, only the select\nfew, the taboo-class, the priests, chiefs, and higher orders,\nwere deemed fit to indulge in it; and {575} whilst every other\nkind of food was eaten with the fingers, human flesh was eaten\nwith forks, which were handed down as heirlooms from generation\nto generation, and with which the natives would not part even for\na handsome equivalent.[132] The Fijians of Nakelo, again, who did\nnot practise cannibalism, attributed to it those fearful skin\ndiseases with which children are so often visited in Fiji.[133]\nThe New Caledonians, who are exo-anthropophagous, believe that if\na man eats a tribes-fellow he will break out into sores and\ndie.[134] Among the Maoris no men but sacred chiefs could partake\nof human flesh without becoming _tapu_, in which state they could\nnot return to their usual occupations without having the _tapu_\nremoved from their bodies.[135] So also among the Kwakiutl\nIndians of British Columbia a man who has eaten human flesh as a\nceremonial rite is for a long time afterwards subject to a\nvariety of restrictions, being considered unclean. For sixteen\ndays he must not eat any warm food. For four months he is not\nallowed to blow hot food in order to cool it. For the same period\nhe uses a spoon, dish, and kettle of his own, which are thrown\naway after the lapse of the prescribed time. He must stay alone\nin his bedroom, and is not allowed to go out of the house door\nbut must use the secret door in the rear of the house. And for a\nwhole year he must not touch his wife, nor is he allowed to\ngamble or to work.[136] Among the West African Fans, before a\ncannibal meal, the corpse is carried to a hut built on the\noutskirts of the settlement. There \"it is eaten secretly by the\nwarriors, women and children not being allowed to be present, or\neven to look upon man's flesh; and the cooking pots used for the\nbanquet must all be broken. A joint of 'black brother' is never\nseen in the villages.\"[137] So also {576} among the Bambala,\nsouth of the River Congo, vessels in which human flesh has been\ncooked are broken and the pieces thrown away.[138] In Eastern\nCentral Africa the person who eats a human being is believed to\nrun a great risk; Mr. Macdonald knew a headman whose success in\nwar was attributed to the fact that he had eaten the whole body\nof a strong young man, but it was supposed that if he had not\nbeen protected by powerful charms, such cannibalism might have\nbeen dangerous to him.[139]\n\n[Footnote 131: Codrington, _op. cit._ p. 344.]\n\n[Footnote 132: Seemann, _Viti_, pp. 179, 181 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 133: _Ibid._ p. 179 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 134: Atkinson, 'Natives of New Caledonia,' in\n_Folk-Lore_, xiv. 253.]\n\n[Footnote 135: Thomson, _op. cit._ i. 147 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 136: Boas, 'Social Organization of the Kwakiutl\nIndians,' in _Report of the U.S. National Museum_, 1895, p. 537\n_sq._ _Cf._ Woldt, _Kaptein Jacobsens Reiser til Nordamerikas\nNordvestkyst_, p. 44 _sqq._; Mayne, _Four Years in British\nColumbia_, p. 256 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 137: Burton, _Two Trips to Gorilla Land_, i. 212.]\n\n[Footnote 138: Torday and Joyce, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxxv. 404.]\n\n[Footnote 139: Macdonald, _Africana_, i. 170.]\n\nOne reason for this superstitious dread of cannibalism is\nundoubtedly fear of the dead man's spirit, which is then supposed\nnot to be annihilated by the act, but to become a danger to him\nwho partakes of the corpse. The Fijian cannibals avowed \"that\nthey were always frightened at night lest the spirit of the man\nthey had eaten should haunt them.\"[140] In the Luritcha tribe in\nCentral Australia care is invariably taken to destroy the bones\nof those enemies who have been eaten, \"as the natives believe\nthat unless this is done the victims will arise from the coming\ntogether of the bones, and will follow and harm those who have\nkilled and eaten them.\"[141] And among the Kwakiutl Indians the\ntaboos imposed upon a cannibal are more obligatory when he has\ndevoured a corpse than when he has contented himself with taking\nbites out of a living man.[142] But it may also be that the\nsuperstitious fear of cannibalism is to some extent an outcome of\nthe natural reluctance to partake of human flesh, just as the\naversion to eating certain animals may give rise to the idea that\ntheir meat is unwholesome food,[143] and as the supernatural\ndangers attributed to incest spring from the instinctive horror\nof it.[144]\n\n[Footnote 140: Pritchard, _op. cit._ p. 372.]\n\n[Footnote 141: Spencer and Gillen, _Native Tribes of Central\nAustralia_, p. 475.]\n\n[Footnote 142: Boas, _loc. cit._ p. 537 _sq._ _Cf._ Frazer,\n_Golden Bough_, i. 342.]\n\n[Footnote 143: _Supra_, ii. 332.]\n\n[Footnote 144: _Supra_, ii. 375 _sq._]\n\nThe fact that so many peoples partake or are known to have\npartaken of human flesh without repugnance, or even with the\ngreatest eagerness, by no means proves {577} that there was no\noriginal aversion to it in the human race. It is easy to imagine\nthat the feeling of reluctance may have been overcome by other\nmotives, such as hunger, revenge, the desire to acquire another\nperson's courage or strength, the hope of making an enemy\nharmless, or of gaining supernatural benefits. And everybody\nknows that men and even many animals, when once induced to taste\na certain food which they have previously avoided, often conceive\na great liking for it. There is evidence that this also applies\nto cannibalism. In 1200 Egypt was afflicted with a terrible\nfamine, in consequence of which the poor fed even upon human\ncorpses and fell to devouring children. An eyewitness, the\nArabian physician [(]Abd-Allatif, writes that, when the poor\nbegan to eat human flesh, the wonder and horror excited were\nsuch, that these crimes were in every mouth, and people were\nnever weary of the extraordinary topic. But by degrees custom\noperated, and produced even a taste for such detestable repasts.\nMany men made children their ordinary food, eating them from pure\ngluttony and laying up stores of their flesh. Various modes of\ncooking and seasoning this kind of food were invented; and the\npractice soon spread through the provinces, so that there was not\na single district in which cannibalism became not common. By this\ntime it caused no longer either surprise or horror, and the\nmatter was discussed with indifference. Diverse rich people, who\ncould have procured other food, seemed to become infatuated, and\npractised cannibalism as a luxury, using murderers as their\npurveyors and inviting their friends to dinner, without taking\ntoo much trouble to conceal the truth.[145] There is a similar\nstory from Polynesia. Cannibalism, we are told, was introduced\ninto Futuna by king Veliteki in consequence of a great tempest\nwhich brought on a disastrous famine; but in time it became a\ndreadful scourge, which threatened to depopulate the island. The\ndesire to eat human flesh arrived at such a point that wars no\nlonger sufficed to {578} furnish victims in sufficient numbers,\nhence the people took to hunting down members of their own\ntribes.[146] It has been suggested that in other islands of the\nSouth Seas cannibalism likewise arose in times of great famine,\nand that the inhabitants, becoming used to it, acquired a taste\nfor human flesh.[147] In Western Equatorial Africa, again,\ngastronomic cannibalism has been supposed to be a practical\nextension of the sacrificial ceremony, neither the women nor the\nyoung men being allowed to touch the dainty.[148] That such a\npractice may easily grow up when the beginning has been made, is\nwell illustrated by the words of a cannibal chief who declared\nthat he who has once indulged in a repast of human flesh will\nfind it very difficult to abstain from it in the future.[149]\n\n[Footnote 145: [(]Abd-Allatif, _Relation de l'\u00c9gypte_, p. 360\n_sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 146: Percy Smith, 'Futuna,' in _Jour. Polynesian Soc._\ni. 37.]\n\n[Footnote 147: Macdonald, _Oceania_, p. 196 _sq._ Powell,\n_Wanderings in a Wild Country_, p. 248.]\n\n[Footnote 148: Reade, _op. cit._ p. 158.]\n\n[Footnote 149: Powell, _op. cit._ p. 248.]\n\nThe question whether early man was in the habit of eating human\nflesh may thus, I think, be resolved into the question whether\nhis natural shrinking from it may be assumed to have been subdued\nby any of those factors which in certain circumstances have\ninduced men to become habitual cannibals. For such an assumption\nI find no sufficient grounds. On the contrary, I maintain that it\nis made highly improbable by the fact that cannibalism is much\nless prevalent among the lowest savages than among races somewhat\nmore advanced in culture.[150] In America, instead of being\nconfined to savage peoples, it was practised \"to a greater extent\nand with more horrible rites among the most civilised. Its\nreligious inception,\" Mr. Dorman adds, \"was the cause of\nthis.\"[151] Humboldt observed long ago:--\"The nations who hold it\na point of honour to devour their prisoners are not always the\nrudest and most ferocious . . . . The Cabres, the Guipunavis, and\nthe Caribees, have {579} always been more powerful and more\ncivilised than the other hordes of the Oroonoko; and yet the\nformer are as much addicted to anthropophagy, as the last are\nrepugnant to it.\"[152] In Brazil, Martius found the cannibalism\nof the Central Tupis to form a strange contrast to their\nrelatively high state of culture.[153] Cannibals like the Fijians\nand Maoris were on the verge of semi-civilisation, and the Bataks\nof Sumatra were already in early times so advanced as to frame an\nalphabet of their own, though after the Indian model. Among the\nAfrican Niam-Niam and Monbuttu a great predilection for human\nflesh coexists with a remarkable degree of culture; whereas in\nthe dwarf tribes of Central Africa, which are of a very low type,\nMr. Burrows never heard of a single case of cannibalism.[154]\n\n[Footnote 150: See Peschel, _Races of Man_, p. 162 _sq._;\nSchneider, _Die Naturv\u00f6lker_, i. 186; Bergemann, _op. cit._\np. 53; Ratzel, _op. cit._ ii. 352; Sutherland, _Origin and\nGrowth of the Moral Instinct_, i. 372.]\n\n[Footnote 151: Dorman, _op. cit._ p. 152.]\n\n[Footnote 152: von Humboldt, _op. cit._ v. 424 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 153: von Martius, _op. cit._ i. 199 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 154: Burrows, _Land of the Pigmies_, p. 149.]\n\nIt would be very instructive to follow the history of cannibalism\namong those peoples who are, or have lately been, addicted to it,\nif we were able to do so; but the subject is mostly obscure. The\nmost common change which we have had an opportunity to notice is\nthe decline and final disappearance of the practice under\nEuropean influence; but we must not assume that every change has\nbeen in the direction towards extinction. Among the East African\nWadoe and Wabembe cannibalism is, according to their own account,\nof modern origin.[155] Mr. Torday informs me that among some of\nthe Congo natives it is spreading in the present day. In the\nSolomon Islands it has recently extended itself; it is asserted\nby the elder natives of Florida that man's flesh was formerly\nnever eaten except in sacrifice, and that human sacrifice is an\ninnovation introduced from further west.[156] Erskine maintains\nthat in Fiji cannibalism, though a very ancient custom, did not\nprevail in earlier times to the same extent as it did more\nrecently;[157] and Mr. Fornander has arrived {580} at the\nconclusion that among the Polynesians this practice was not an\noriginal heirloom brought with them from their primitive homes in\nthe Far West, but was adopted subsequently by a few of the tribes\nunder conditions and circumstances now unknown.[158] For various\nreasons, then, it is an illegitimate supposition to regard the\ncannibalism of modern savages as a survival from the first\ninfancy of mankind, or, more generally, from a stage through\nwhich the whole human race has passed.\n\n[Footnote 155: Burton, _Two Trips to Gorilla Land_, i. 214.]\n\n[Footnote 156: Codrington, _op. cit._ p. 343.]\n\n[Footnote 157: Erskine, _op. cit._ p. 272.]\n\n[Footnote 158: Fornander, _Account of the Polynesian Race_, i. 132.]\n\nAs for the moral opinions about cannibalism, we may assume that\npeoples who abstain from it also generally disapprove of it, or\nwould do so if they were aware of its being practised. Aversion,\nas we have often noticed, leads to moral indignation, especially\nwhere the moral judgment is little influenced by reflection.\nAnother source of the condemnation of cannibalism may be\nsympathetic resentment resulting from the idea that the dead is\nannihilated or otherwise injured by the act, or from the feeling\nthat it is an insult to him to use his body as an article of\nfood; but this could certainly not be the origin of savages\ndisapproval of eating their foes. Among civilised races, as well\nas among non-anthropophagous savages, horror or disgust is\nundoubtedly the chief reason why cannibalism is condemned as\nwrong. This emotion is often so intense that the same people\nwhose moral feelings are little affected by a conquest, with all\nits horrors, made for the purpose of gain, shudder at the stories\nof wars waged by famished savages for the purpose of procuring\nhuman flesh for food. On the other hand, where the natural\naversion to such food is for some reason or other overcome, the\ndisapproval of cannibalism is in consequence no longer felt. But\nan attitude of moral indifference towards this practice has also\nbeen advocated on a totally different ground, by persons whose\nmoral emotions are too much tempered by thought to allow them to\npronounce an act as wrong simply because it creates in them {581}\ndisgust. Thus, Montaigne argued that it is more barbarous to\ntorture a man to death under colour of piety and religion than to\nroast and eat him after he is dead.[159] And he quotes with\napparent agreement the opinion of some Stoic philosophers that\nthere is no harm in feeding upon human carcases to avoid\nstarvation.[160]\n\n[Footnote 159: Montaigne, _Essais_, i. 30.]\n\n[Footnote 160: Diogenes Laertius, _Vit\u00e6 philosophorum_, vii. 1.\n64 (121); vii. 7. 12 (188). Zeller, _Stoics_, p. 307.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XLVII\n\nTHE BELIEF IN SUPERNATURAL BEINGS\n\n\nWE now come to the last of those six groups of moral ideas into\nwhich we have divided our subject--ideas concerning conduct\ntowards beings, real or imaginary, that are regarded as\nsupernatural. But before we enter upon a discussion of human\nbehaviour in relation to such beings, it is necessary to say some\nwords about man's belief in their existence and the general\nqualities attributed to them.\n\nMen distinguish between two classes of phenomena--\"natural\" and\n\"supernatural,\"[1] between phenomena which they are familiar with\nand, in consequence, ascribe to \"natural causes,\" and other\nphenomena which seem to them unfamiliar, mysterious, and are\ntherefore supposed to spring from causes of a \"supernatural\"\ncharacter. We meet with this distinction at the lowest stages of\nculture known to us, as well as at higher stages. It may be that\nin the mind of a savage the natural and supernatural are often\nconfused, and that no definite limit can be drawn between the\nphenomena which he refers to the one class and those which he\nrefers to the other; but he certainly sees a difference between\nevents of everyday occurrence or ordinary objects of nature and\nother events or objects which fill him with mysterious awe. The\ngerm of such a {583} distinction is found even in the lower\nanimal world. The horse fears the whip but it does not make him\nshy; on the other hand, he may shy when he sees an umbrella\nopened before him or a paper moving on the ground. The whip is\nwell known to the horse, whereas the moving paper or umbrella is\nstrange and uncanny. Dogs and cats are alarmed by an unusual\nnoise or appearance, and remain uneasy till they have by\nexamination satisfied themselves of the nature of its cause.[2]\nProfessor Romanes frightened a dog by attaching a fine thread to\na bone and surreptitiously drawing it from the animal, giving to\nthe bone the appearance of self-movement; and the same dog was\nfrightened by soap-bubbles.[3] Even a lion is scared by an\nunexpected noise or the sight of an unfamiliar object; a horse,\nthe lion's favourite prey, has been known to wander for days in\nthe vicinity of a troop of these animals and be left unmolested\nsimply because it was blanketed and knee-haltered.[4] And we are\ntold of a tiger which stood trembling and roaring in an ecstasy\nof fear when a mouse tied by a string to a stick had been\ninserted into its cage.[5] Little children are apt to be\nterrified by the strange and irregular behaviour of a feather as\nit glides along the floor or lifts itself into the air.[6]\n\n[Footnote 1: I do not share the objections raised by various\nwriters to the term \"supernatural.\" It has the sanction of common\nusage; and I consider it preferable to the word \"superhuman,\"\nwhen applied to inanimate things or animals which are objects of\nworship.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Morgan, _Animal Life and Intelligence_, p. 339.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Romanes, _Animal Intelligence_, 455 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 4: Gillmore, quoted by King, _The Supernatural_, p. 80.]\n\n[Footnote 5: Basil Hall, quoted _ibid._ p. 81. See also _ibid._\np. 78 _sqq._; Vignioli, _Myth and Science_, p. 58 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 6: Sully, _Studies of Childhood_, p. 205 _sq._]\n\nBut the primitive mind not only distinguishes between the natural\nand the supernatural, it makes, practically, yet a further\ndistinction. The supernatural, like the natural, may be looked\nupon in the light of mechanical energy, which discharges itself\nwithout the aid of any volitional activity. This is, for\ninstance, the case with the supernatural force inherent in a\ntabooed object; mere contact with such an object communicates the\ntaboo infection. So also the baneful energy in a curse is\noriginally conceived as a kind of supernatural miasma, which\ninjures or destroys anybody to whom it cleaves; in fact, to {584}\ntaboo a certain thing commonly consists in charging it with a\ncurse. On the other hand, supernatural qualities may also be\nattributed to the mental constitution of animate beings,\nespecially to their will. Such an attribution makes them\nsupernatural beings, as distinct from any ordinary individuals\nwho, without being endowed with special miraculous gifts, may\nmake use of supernatural mechanical energy in magical practices.\nThis distinction is in many cases vague; a wizard may be looked\nupon as a god and a god as a wizard. But it is nevertheless\nessential, and is at the bottom of the difference between\nreligion and magic. Religion may be defined as a belief in and a\nregardful[7] attitude towards a supernatural being on whom man\nfeels himself dependent and to whose will he makes an appeal in\nhis worship. Supernatural mechanical power, on the other hand, is\napplied in magic. He who performs a purely magical act utilises\nsuch power without making any appeal at all to the will of a\nsupernatural being.[8]\n\n[Footnote 7: Though somewhat indefinite, the epithet \"regardful\"\nseems a necessary attribute of a religious act. We do not call it\nreligion when a savage flogs his fetish to make it submissive.]\n\n[Footnote 8: See _infra_, Additional Notes.]\n\nThis, I think, is what we generally understand by religion and\nmagic. But in the Latin word _religio_ there seems to be no\nindication of such a distinction. _Religio_ is probably related\nto _religare_, which means \"to tie.\" It is commonly assumed that\nthe relationship between these words implies that in religion man\nwas supposed to be tied by his god. But I venture to believe that\nthe connection between them allows of another and more natural\ninterpretation--that it was not the man who was tied by the god,\nbut the god who was tied by the man. This interpretation was\nsuggested to me by certain ideas and practices prevalent in\nMorocco. The Moors are in the habit of tying rags to objects\nbelonging to a _s\u00edyid_, that is, a place where a saint has, or is\nsupposed to have, his grave, or where such a person is said to\nhave sat or camped. In very many cases, at least, this tying of\nrags is _[(]\u00e2r_ upon the {585} saint, and _l-[(]\u00e2r_ implies the\ntransference of a conditional curse.[9] Thus, in the Great Atlas\nMountains I found a large number of rags tied to a pole which was\nstuck in a cairn dedicated to the great saint M\u00fblai\n[(]Abd-[)u]l-[k.]\u00e2der, and when I asked for an explanation\nthe answer was that petitioners generally fasten a strip of their\nclothes to the pole muttering some words like these:--\"O saint,\nbehold! I promised thee an offering, and I will not release\n(literally 'open') thee until thou attendest to my business.\" If\nthe petitioner's wish is fulfilled he goes back to the place,\noffers the sacrifice which he promised, and unties the knot which\nhe made. A Berber servant of mine from Aglu in S\u00fbs told me that\nonce when in prison he invoked L\u00e4lla R[)a][h.]ma Yusf, a great\nfemale saint whose tomb is in a neighbouring district, and tied\nhis turban, saying, \"I am tying thee, L\u00e4lla R[)a][h.]ma Yusf, and\nI am not going to open the knot till thou hast helped me.\" Or a\nperson in distress will go to her grave and knot the leaves of\nsome palmetto growing in its vicinity, with the words, \"I tied\nthee here, O saint, and I shall not release thee unless thou\nreleasest me from the toils in which I am at present.\" All this\nis what we should call magic, but the Romans would probably have\ncalled it _religio_. They were much more addicted to magic than\nto true religion; they wanted to compel the gods rather than to\nbe compelled by them. Their _religio_ was probably nearly akin to\nthe Greek [Greek: kata/desmos], which meant not only an ordinary\ntie, but also a magic tie or knot or a bewitching thereby.[10]\nPlato speaks of persons who with magical arts and incantations\nbound the gods, as they said, to execute their will.[11] That\n_religio_, however, from having originally a magical\nsignificance, {586} has come to be used in the sense which we\nattribute to the term \"religion,\" is not difficult to explain.\nMen make use of magic not only in relation to their fellow men,\nbut in relation to their gods. Magical and religious elements are\noften almost inseparably intermingled in one and the same act;\nand, as we shall soon see, the magical means of constraining a\ngod are often externally very similar to the chief forms of\nreligious worship, prayer and sacrifice.\n\n[Footnote 9: See Westermarck, '_L-[(]\u00e2r_, or the Transference of\nConditional Curses in Morocco,' in _Anthropological Essays\npresented to E. B. Tylor_, p. 361 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 10: I am indebted to my friend Mr. R. R. Marett for\ndrawing my attention to this meaning of the word [Greek:\nkata/desmos]. So also the verb [Greek: katade/\u00f4] means not only\n\"to tie\" but \"to bind by magic knots\" (Athenaeus, _Deipnosophist\u00e6_,\nxv. 9, p. 670; Dio Cassius, _Historia Romana_, l. 5), and [Greek:\nkata/desis] is used to denote \"a binding by magic knots\" (Plato,\n_Leges_, xi. 933). See Liddell-Scott, _Greek-English Lexicon_,\np. 754; Harrison, _Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion_,\np. 138 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 11: Plato, _Respublica_, ii. 364.]\n\nThat mystery is the essential characteristic of supernatural\nbeings is proved by innumerable facts. It is testified by\nlanguage. The most prominent belief in the religion of the North\nAmerican Indians was their theory of _manitou_, that is, of \"a\nspiritual and mysterious power thought to reside in some material\nform.\" The word is Algonkin, but all the tribes had some\nequivalent for it.[12] Thus the Dacotahs express the essential\nattribute of their deities by the term _wakan_, which signifies\nanything which they cannot comprehend, \"whatever is wonderful,\nmysterious, superhuman, or supernatural.\"[13] The Navaho word\n_d[)i]g[)i]'n_ likewise means \"sacred, divine, mysterious, or\nholy\";[14] and so does the Hidatsa term _mahopa_.[15] In Fiji\n\"the native word expressive of divinity is _kalou_, which, while\nused to denote the people's highest notion of a god, is also\nconstantly heard as a qualification of anything great or\nmarvellous.\"[16] The Maoris of New Zealand applied the word\n_atua_, which is generally translated as \"god,\" not only to\nspirits of every description, but to various phenomena not\nunderstood, such as menstruation and foreign marvels, a compass\nfor instance, or a barometer.[17] The natives of Madagascar,\n{587} says Ellis, designate by the term _ndriamanitra_, or god,\neverything that exceeds the capacity of their understanding.\n\"Whatever is new and useful and extraordinary, is called god. . . .\nRice, money, thunder and lightning, and earthquakes, are all\ncalled god. . . . _Taratasy_, or book, they call god, from its\nwonderful capacity of speaking by merely looking at it.\"[18] The\nMonbuttu use the word _kilima_ for anything they do not\nunderstand--the thunder, a shadow, the reflection in water, as\nwell as the supreme being in which they vaguely believe.[19] The\nMasai conception of the deity (_ng[)a]i_), says Dr. Thomson,\n\"seems to be marvellously vague. I was Ng[)a]i. My language was\nNg[)a]i. Ng[)a]i was in the steaming holes. . . . In fact,\nwhatever struck them as strange or incomprehensible, that they at\nonce assumed had some connection with Ng[)a]i.\"[20] Mr. and Mrs.\nHinde use \"the Unknown\" as their equivalent of the word _ng[)a]i_.[21]\n\n[Footnote 12: Dorman, _Origin of Primitive Superstitions_, p.\n226. Parkman, _Jesuits in North America_, p. lxxix. Brinton,\n_Religions of Primitive Peoples_, p. 102. Hoffman, 'Menomini\nIndians,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ xiv. 39, n. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 13: Schoolcraft, _Archives of Aboriginal Knowledge_,\niv. 642. Dorsey, 'Siouan Cults,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ xi.\n366. McGee, 'Siouan Indians,' _ibid._ xv. 182 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 14: Matthews, _Navaho Legends_, p. 37.]\n\n[Footnote 15: _Idem_, _Hidatsa Indians_, p. 47 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 16: Williams and Calvert, _Fiji_, p. 183.]\n\n[Footnote 17: Best, 'Lore of the Whare-Kohanga,' in _Jour.\nPolynesian Soc._ xiv. 210. Dieffenbach, _Travels in New Zealand_,\nii. 116, 118. The word _tupua_ (or _tipua_) is used in a very\nsimilar way (Tregear, _Maori-Polynesian Comparative Dictionary_,\np. 557).]\n\n[Footnote 18: Ellis, _History of Madagascar_, i. 390 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 19: Burrows, _Land of the Pigmies_, p. 100.]\n\n[Footnote 20: Thomson, _Through Masai Land_, p. 260.]\n\n[Footnote 21: Hinde, _Last of the Masai_, p. 99.]\n\nThe testimony of language is corroborated by kindred facts\nreferring to the nature of those objects which are most commonly\nworshipped.[22] Among all the American tribes, says Mr. Dorman,\n\"any remarkable features in natural scenery or dangerous places\nbecame objects of superstitious dread and veneration, because\nthey were supposed to be abodes of gods.\"[23] A great cataract, a\ndifficult and dangerous ford in a river, a spring bubbling up\nfrom the ground, a volcano, a high mountain, an isolated rock, a\ncurious or unusually large tree, the bones of the mastodon or of\nsome other immense animal--all were looked upon by the Indians\nwith superstitious respect {588} or were propitiated by\nofferings.[24] In Fiji \"every object that is specially fearful,\nor vicious, or injurious, or novel,\" is eligible for admission to\nthe native Pantheon.[25] It is said that when the A\u00ebtas of the\nPhilippines saw the first locomotive passing through their\ncountry \"they all fell upon their knees in abject terror,\nworshipping the strange monster as some new and powerful\ndeity.\"[26] Of the shamanistic peoples in Siberia Georgi writes,\n\"All the celestial bodies, and all terrestrial objects of a\nconsiderable magnitude, all the phenomena of nature that can do\ngood or harm, every appearance capable of conveying terror into a\nweak and superstitious mind, are so many gods to whom they direct\na particular adoration.\"[27] Among the Samoyedes \"a curiously\ntwisted tree, a stone with an uncommon shape would receive, and\nin some quarters still receives, not only veneration but actual\nceremonial worship.\"[28] Castr\u00e9n states that the Ostyaks\nworshipped no other objects of nature but such as were very\nunusual and peculiar either in shape or quality.[29] The Lapps\nmade offerings not only to large and strange-looking objects, but\nto places which were difficult to pass, or where some accident\nhad occurred, or where they had been either exceptionally unlucky\nor exceptionally lucky in fishing or the chase.[30] The Ainu of\nJapan deify all objects and phenomena which seem to them\nextraordinary or dreadful.[31] In China \"a steep mountain, or any\nmountain at all remarkable, is supposed to have a special local\nspirit, who acts as guardian.\"[32] The average middle-class\nHindu, according to Sir Alfred Lyall, worships stocks or stones\nwhich are unusual or grotesque in size, shape, or position; or\ninanimate things which are gifted with mysterious {589} motion;\nor animals which he fears; or visible things, animate or\ninanimate, which are directly or indirectly useful and profitable\nor which possess any incomprehensible function or property.[33]\nFrom all parts of Africa we hear of similar cults.[34] The\nNegroes of Sierra Leone dedicate to their spirits places which\n\"inspire the spectator with awe, or are remarkable for their\nappearance, as immensely large trees rendered venerable by age,\nrocks appearing in the midst of rivers, and having something\npeculiar in their form, in short, whatever appears to them\nstrange or uncommon.\"[35] When Tshi-speaking natives of the Gold\nCoast take up their abode near any remarkable natural feature or\nobject, they worship and seek to propitiate its indwelling\nspirit; whereas they do not worship any of the heavenly bodies,\nthe regularity of whose appearance makes little impression upon\ntheir minds.[36] Throughout East Africa the people seem to attach\nreligious sanctity to anything of extraordinary size; in the\nisland of Zanzibar, where the hills are low, they reverence the\nbaobab tree, which is the largest growing there, and in all parts\nof the country where hills are not found they worship some great\nstone or tall tree.[37] In Morocco places of striking appearance\nare generally supposed to be haunted by _jn\u00fbn_ (_jinn_) or are\nassociated with some dead saint.[38] As I have elsewhere tried to\nshow, the Arabic _jinn_ were probably \"beings invented to explain\nwhat seems to fall outside the ordinary pale of nature, the\nwonderful and unexpected, the superstitious imaginations of men\nwho fear\";[39] and the saint was in many cases only the successor\nof the _jinn_. Indeed, the superstitious dread of unusual objects\nis not altogether dead even among ourselves.{590} It survives in\nEngland to this day in the habit of ascribing grotesque and\nstriking landmarks or puzzling antiquities to the Devil, who\nbecame the residuary legatee of obsolete pagan superstitions in\nChristian countries.[40]\n\n[Footnote 22: See, besides the instances referred to below,\nKarsten, _Origin of Worship_, p. 14 _sqq._; von Brenner, _Besuch\nbei den Kannibalen Sumatras_, p. 220 (Bataks); _Mitteil. d.\nGeograph. Gesellsch. zu Jena_, iii. 14 (Bannavs, between Siam and\nAnnam). In Lord Kames's _Essays on the Principles of Morality and\nReligion_ there is (p. 309 _sqq._) an interesting discussion on\nthe dread of unknown objects.]\n\n[Footnote 23: Dorman, _op. cit._ p. 300. See also M\u00fcller,\n_Geschichte der Amerikanischen Urreligionen_, i. 52; Harmon,\n_Voyages and Travels in the Interior of North America_, p. 363\n_sq._; Smith, 'Myths of the Iroquois,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._\nii. 51.]\n\n[Footnote 24: Dorman, _op. cit._ pp. 279, 290, 291, 302, 303,\n308, 313-315, 319. Chamberlain, in _Jour. American Folk-Lore_,\ni. 157 (Mississagua Indians). Georgi, _Russia_, iii. 237 _sq._\n(Aleuts.)]\n\n[Footnote 25: Williams and Calvert, _op. cit._ p. 183.]\n\n[Footnote 26: Lala, _Philippine Islands_, p. 96.]\n\n[Footnote 27: Georgi, _op. cit._ iii. 256.]\n\n[Footnote 28: Jackson, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxiv. 398. _Cf._\nCastr\u00e9n, _Nordiska resor och forskningar_, iii. 230.]\n\n[Footnote 29: Castr\u00e9n, _op. cit._ iii. 227.]\n\n[Footnote 30: _Ibid._ iii. 210. H\u00f6gstr\u00f6m, _Beskrifning \u00f6fver de\ntil Sveriges Krona lydande Lapmarker_, p. 182. Leem, _Beskrivelse\nover Finmarkens Lapper_, p. 442 _sq._ Friis, _Lappish Mythologi_,\np. 133 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 31: Sugamata, quoted in _L'Anthropologie_, x. 98.]\n\n[Footnote 32: Edkins, _Religion in China_, p. 221.]\n\n[Footnote 33: Lyall, _Asiatic Studies_, p. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 34: Wilson, _Western Africa_, p. 388 (Mpongwe).\nMockler-Ferryman, _British Nigeria_, p. 255. Fritsch, _Die\nEingeborenen S\u00fcd-Afrika's_, p. 340 (Hottentots).]\n\n[Footnote 35: Winterbottom, _Native Africans of Sierra Leone_,\ni. 223.]\n\n[Footnote 36: Ellis, _Yoruba-speaking Peoples of the Slave\nCoast_, p. 282. _Idem_, _Tshi-speaking Peoples of the Gold\nCoast_, p. 21.]\n\n[Footnote 37: Chanler, _Through Jungle and Desert_, p. 188.]\n\n[Footnote 38: See Westermarck, _The Moorish Conception of\nHoliness (Baraka)_, _passim_.]\n\n[Footnote 39: _Idem_, 'Nature of the Arab _[vG]inn_,' in _Jour.\nAnthr. Inst._ xxix. 268.]\n\n[Footnote 40: Lyall, _op. cit._ p. 9.]\n\nThe common prevalence of animal worship is no doubt due to the\nmysteriousness of the animal world; the most uncanny of all\ncreatures, the serpent, is also the one most generally\nworshipped. Throughout India we meet with the veneration of\nanimals which by their appearance or habits startle human\nbeings.[41] In the Indian tribes of North America animals of an\nunusual size were objects of some kind of adoration.[42] In\ncertain parts of Africa a cock crowing in the evening or a crane\nalighting on a house-top is regarded as supernatural.[43] White\nmen have often been taken for spirits by red, yellow, or black\nsavages, when seen by them for the first time.[44] Religious\nveneration is among various races bestowed on persons suffering\nfrom some abnormality, such as deformity, albinoism, or\nmadness.[45] Some South American Indians \"regard as divinities\nall phenomenal children, principally such as are born with a\nlarger number of fingers or toes than is natural.\"[46] The Hindus\nvenerate persons remarkable for any extraordinary qualities great\nvalour, virtue, or even vice.[47] By performing miracles men\ndirectly prove that they are supernatural beings. The Muhammedan\nsaints, like the Christian in olden days, are believed to perform\nall kinds of wonders, such as flying in the air, passing unhurt\n{591} through fire, walking upon water, transporting themselves\nin a moment of time to immense distances, or supporting\nthemselves and others with food in desert places.[48] When\nMuhammed first claimed to be the Prophet of Allah, he was urged\nto give proof of his calling by working some miracle; and though\nhe uniformly denied that he possessed such power, it was\nnevertheless ascribed to him even by his contemporaries.[49]\n\n[Footnote 41: _Ibid._ p. 13.]\n\n[Footnote 42: Dorman, _op. cit._ p. 258. Harmon, _op. cit._ p. 364.]\n\n[Footnote 43: Macdonald, _Religion and Myth_, p. 39.]\n\n[Footnote 44: Avebury, _Origin of Civilisation_, pp. 272, 273,\n375. Goblet d'Alviella, _Hibbert Lectures on the Origin and\nGrowth of the Conception of God_, p. 67. Schultze,\n_Fetischismus_, p. 224. In Australia and elsewhere white people\nwere taken for ghosts by the natives (Fison and Howitt,\n_Kamilaroi and Kurnai_, p. 248; Brough Smyth, _Aborigines of\nVictoria_, ii. 269 _sq._; Tylor, _Primitive Culture_, ii. 5\n_sq._; Spencer, _Principles of Sociology_, i. 170 _sq._).]\n\n[Footnote 45: Schultze, _op. cit._ p. 222. _Supra_, i. 270 _sq._\n\"Among many savage or barbarous peoples of the world albinos have\nbeen reserved for the priestly office\" (Bourke, 'Medicine-Men of\nthe Apache,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ ix. 460).]\n\n[Footnote 46: Guinnard, _Three Years' Slavery among the\nPatagonians_, p. 144.]\n\n[Footnote 47: Monier-Williams, _Br[=a]hmanism and Hind[=u]ism_,\np. 350. For criminal-worship in Sicily, see Peacock, 'Executed\nCriminals and Folk-Medicine,' in _Folk-Lore_, vii. 275.]\n\n[Footnote 48: Lane, _Arabian Society in the Middle Ages_, p. 49.\nWestermarck, 'Sul culto del santi nel Marocco,' in _Actes du XII.\nCongr\u00e8s International des Orientalistes_, iii. 153 _sqq._ _Idem_,\n_The Moorish Conception of Holiness_, p. 77 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 49: Muir, _Life of Mahomet_, i. p. lxv. _sq._ Bosworth\nSmith, _Mohammed and Mohammedanism_, p. 19. Sell, _Faith of\nIsl\u00e1m_, p. 218.]\n\nThe dead are objects of worship much more commonly than are the\nliving. Whilst the human individual consisting of body and soul\nis as a rule well-known, the disembodied soul, seen only in\ndreams or visions, is a mysterious being which inspires the\nsurvivors with awe. Mr. Spencer and Mr. Grant Allen even regard\nthe worship of the dead as \"the root of every religion.\"[50] But\nthis is to carry the ghost theory to an extreme for which there\nis no justification in facts. The spirits of the dead are\nworshipped because they are held capable of influencing, in a\nmysterious manner, the welfare of the living; but there is no\nreason to assume that they were originally conceived as the only\nsupernatural agents existing. We have noticed that even the lower\nanimals show signs of the same feeling as underlies the belief in\nsupernatural beings; and we can hardly suppose that they are\nbelievers in ghosts.\n\n[Footnote 50: Spencer, _Principles of Sociology_, i. 411. Grant\nAllen, _The Evolution of the Idea of God_, pp. 91, 433, 438, &c.]\n\nOn account of their wonderful effects medicines, intoxicants, and\nstimulants, are frequently objects of veneration. Most of the\nplants for which the American Indians had superstitious feelings\nwere such as have medical qualities;[51] tobacco was generally\nheld sacred by them,[52] and so was cocoa in Peru.[53] The Vedic\ndeification {592} of the drink _soma_ was due to its exhilarating\nand invigorating effects.[54]\n\n[Footnote 51: Dorman, _op. cit._ p. 298 _sq._ Dorsey, 'Siouan\nCults,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ xi. 428.]\n\n[Footnote 52: Mooney, 'Myths of the Cherokee,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur.\nEthn._ xix. 439. Dorman, _op. cit._ p. 295.]\n\n[Footnote 53: Dorman, _op. cit._ p. 295.]\n\n[Footnote 54: Whitney, 'Vedic Researches in Germany,' in _Jour.\nAmerican Oriental Soc._ iii. 299. Macdonell, _Vedic Mythology_,\np. 108.]\n\nAmong all the phenomena of nature none is more wonderful,\nimpressive, awe-inspiring than thunder, and none seems more\ngenerally to have given rise to religious veneration. But with\ngrowing reflection man finds a mystery even in events of daily\noccurrence. The Vedic poet, when he sees the sun moving freely\nthrough the heavens, asks how it comes that it does not fall\ndownward, although \"unpropped beneath, not fastened firm, and\ndownward turned\";[55] and it seems to him a miracle that the\nsparkling waters of all rivers flow into one ocean without ever\nfilling it.[56] \"Verily,\" says the Koran, \"in the creation of the\nheavens and the earth, and in the succession of night and day,\nare signs to those possessed of minds.\"[57]\n\n[Footnote 55: _Rig-Veda_, iv. 13. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 56: _Ibid._ v. 85. 6.]\n\n[Footnote 57: _Koran_, iii. 87.]\n\nThe attribution of miraculous power to a certain object or being\nmay be due to direct experience of some effect produced by it, as\nin the case of a medical plant, or a poisonous snake, or a\nmiracle-working spring, or a Christian or Muhammedan saint. Or it\nmay be based on the inference that objects with a strange and\nmysterious appearance also possess strange and mysterious powers.\nThis inference, too, is in a way supported by facts. The unusual\nappearance of the object makes an impression on the person who\nsees it, and predisposes him to the belief that the object is\nendowed with secret powers. If then anything unusual actually\nhappens in its neighbourhood or shortly after it has been seen,\nthe strange event is attributed to the influence of the strange\nobject. Thus a Siberian tribe came to regard the camel as the\nsmall-pox demon because, just when the animal had appeared among\nthem for the first time with a passing caravan, the small-pox\nbroke out.[58] Of the British Guiana Indian we are {593} told by\nSir E. F. Im Thurn that if his eye falls upon a rock in any way\nabnormal or curious, and if shortly after any evil happens to\nhim, he regards rock and evil as cause and effect, and perceives\na spirit in the rock.[59] With the lapse of time the data of\nexperience readily increase. If a certain object has gained the\nreputation of being supernatural, it is looked upon as the cause\nof all kinds of unusual events which may possibly be associated\nwith it. When I visited the large cave Imi-nta[k.][k.]\u00e1ndut in\nthe Great Atlas Mountains, the interior of which is said to\ncontain a whole spirit city, my horse happened to stumble on my\nway back to my camp, and fell upon one of my servants who was\ncarrying a gun. The gun was broken and the man became lame for\nsome days. I was told that the accident was caused by the cave\nspirits, because they were displeased at my visit. When the\nfollowing day I again passed the cave with my little caravan,\nheavy rain began to fall; and now the rain was attributed to the\nill-temper of the spirits.\n\n[Footnote 58: Tiele, _Elements of the Science of Religion_, i. 70.]\n\n[Footnote 59: Im Thurn, _Indians of Guiana_, p. 354.]\n\nStartling events are ascribed to the activity not only of\nvisible, but of invisible supernatural agents. Thus sudden or\nstrange diseases are, at the lower stages of civilisation,\ncommonly supposed to be occasioned by a supernatural being, which\nhas taken up its abode in the sick person's body, or otherwise\nsent the disease.[60] Among the Maoris, for instance, \"each\ndisease was supposed to be occasioned by a different god, who\nresided in the part affected.\"[61] The Australian Kurnai maintain\nthat phthisis, pneumonia, bowel complaints, and insanity are\nproduced by an evil spirit, \"who is like the wind.\"[62] According\nto Moorish beliefs convulsions, epileptic or paralytic fits,\nrheumatic or neuralgic pains, and certain rare and violent\nepidemics, like the cholera, are caused by spirits, which either\nstrike their victim, or enter his body, or sometimes, in the case\nof an epidemic, shoot at the {594} people with poisonous arrows.\nIndeed, unexpected events of every kind are readily ascribed to\nsupernatural influence, in Morocco and elsewhere. Among the North\nAmerican Indians \"the storms and tempests were generally thought\nto be produced by a\u00ebrial spirits from hostile lands.\"[63] Among\nthe Hudson Bay Indians \"everything not understood is attributed\nto the working of one of the numerous spirits.\"[64] \"Dans toute\nl'Afrique,\" says M. Duveyrier in his description of the Touareg,\n\"il n'y a pas un individu, \u00e9clair\u00e9 ou ignare, instruit ou\nillettr\u00e9, qui n'attribue aux g\u00e9nies tout ce qui arrive\nd'extraordinaire sur la terre.\"[65] Of the South African natives\nLivingstone writes, \"Everything not to be accounted for by common\ncauses, whether of good or evil, is ascribed to the Deity.\"[66]\nWith the progress of science the chain of natural causes is\nextended, and, as Livy puts it, it is left to superstition alone\nto see the interference of the deity in trifling matters. Among\nourselves the ordinary truths of science are so generally\nrecognised that in this domain God is seldom supposed to\ninterfere. On the other hand, with regard to social events, the\ncauses of which are often hidden, the idea of Providence is still\nconstantly needed to fill up the gap of human ignorance.\n\n[Footnote 60: Tylor, _Primitive Culture_, ii. 146 _sqq._\nSchneider, _Die Naturv\u00f6lker_, i. 217. Bartels, _Die Medicin der\nNaturv\u00f6lker_, p. 27 _sqq._ H\u00f6fler, 'Krankheits-D\u00e4monen,' in\n_Archiv f\u00fcr Religionswissenschaft_, ii. 86 _sqq._ Karsten, _op.\ncit._ p. 27 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 61: Taylor, _Te Ika a Maui_, p. 137.]\n\n[Footnote 62: Fison and Howitt, _op. cit._ p. 250.]\n\n[Footnote 63: Dorman, _op. cit._ p. 350.]\n\n[Footnote 64: Turner, 'Ethnology of the Ungava District,' in\n_Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ xi. 272.]\n\n[Footnote 65: Duveyrier, _Exploration du Sahara_, p. 418. See\nalso Schneider, _Religion der afrikanischen Naturv\u00f6lker_, p. 103.]\n\n[Footnote 66: Livingstone, _Expedition to the Zambesi_, p. 521\n_sq._]\n\nMan's belief in supernatural agents, then, is an attempt to\nexplain strange and mysterious phenomena which suggest a\nvolitional cause.[67] The assumed cause is the will of a\nsupernatural being. Such beings are thus, in the first place,\nconceived as volitional. But a being which has a will must have a\nmind, with emotions, desires, and a certain amount of\nintelligence. Neither the savage nor ourselves can imagine a\nvolitional being {595} which has nothing but a will. If an object\nof nature, therefore, is looked upon as a supernatural agent,\nmentality and life are at the same time attributed to it as a\nmatter of course. This I take to be the real origin of animism.\nIt is not correct to say that \"as the objects of the visible\nworld are conceived as animated, volitional, and emotional, they\nmay be deemed the originators of those misfortunes of which the\ntrue cause is unknown.\"[68] This is to reverse the actual order\nof ideas. Inanimate things are conceived as volitional,\nemotional, and animate, _because_ they are deemed the originators\nof startling events. The savage does not speculate upon the\nnature of things unless he has an interest in doing so. He is not\ngenerally inquisitive as to causes.[69] The natives of West\nAustralia, says Eyre, \"are not naturally a reasoning people, and\nby no means given to the investigation of causes or their\neffects.\"[70] In matters not concerning the common wants of life\nthe mind of the Brazilian Indian is a blank.[71] When Mungo Park\nasked some negroes, what became of the sun during the night? they\nconsidered his question a very childish one; \"they had never\nindulged a conjecture, nor formed any hypothesis, about the\nmatter.\"[72] I often found the Beduins of Morocco extremely\ncurious, but their curiosity consisted in the question, What?\nrather than in the question, Why?\n\n[Footnote 67: Already Hobbes (_Leviathan_, i. 12, p. 79) traced,\nin part, the origin of religion to the fact that when man cannot\nassure himself of the true causes of things, he supposes causes\nof them. See also Meiners, _Geschichte der Religionen_, i. 16.]\n\n[Footnote 68: Peschel, _Races of Man_, p. 245.]\n\n[Footnote 69: _Cf._ Spencer, _Principles of Sociology_, i. 86\n_sq._; Karsten, _op. cit._ p. 43 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 70: Eyre, _Expeditions of Discovery into Central\nAustralia_, ii. 355.]\n\n[Footnote 71: Bates, _The Naturalist on the River  Amazons_, ii. 163.]\n\n[Footnote 72: Mungo Park, _Travels in the Interior of Africa_, i. 413.]\n\nWhilst belief in supernatural agents endowed with a will made the\nsavage an animist, the idea that a mind presupposes a body, when\nthought out, led to anthropomorphism. Impossible as it is to\nimagine a will without a mind, it is hardly less impossible to\nimagine a mind without a body. The immaterial soul is an\nabstraction to which has been attributed a metaphysical reality,\nbut of which no clear conception can be formed. As Hobbes\nobserved, the opinion that spirits are incorporeal or immaterial,\n\"could {596} never enter into the mind of any man by nature;\nbecause, though men may put together words . . . . as _Spirit_\nand _Incorporeall_; yet they can never have the imagination of\nanything answering to them.\"[73] Descartes himself frankly\nconfessed, \"What the soul itself was I either did not stay to\nconsider, or, if I did, I imagined that it was something\nextremely rare and subtile, like wind, or flame, or ether, spread\nthrough my grosser parts.\"[74] The supernatural agents were\nconsequently of necessity considered to possess a more or less\nmaterial constitution. The disembodied human soul which the\nsavage saw in dreams or visions, in the shadow or the reflection,\nwas only the least material being which he could imagine; and\nwhen raised to the dignity of an ancestor-god, it by no means\nlost its materiality, but, on the contrary, tended to acquire a\nmore substantial body.\n\n[Footnote 73: Hobbes, _op. cit._ i. 12, p. 80.]\n\n[Footnote 74: Descartes, _Meditationes_, 2, p. 10.]\n\nOf a grosser substantiality and very unlike the human shape are\nthe inanimate objects of nature which receive divine veneration.\nIt has been said of savages that they do not worship the thing\nitself, only the spirit dwelling in it. But such a distinction\ncannot be primitive. The natural object is worshipped because it\nis believed to possess supernatural power, but it is nevertheless\nthe object itself that is worshipped.[75] Castr\u00e9n, who combined\ngreat personal experience with unusual acuteness of judgment,\nstates that the Samoyedes do not know of any spirits attached to\nobjects of nature, but worship the objects as such; \"in other\nwords, they do not separate the spirit from the matter, but adore\nthe thing in its totality as a divine being.\"[76] Of the\ndeification of the Nerbudda river Sir W. H. Sleeman likewise\nobserves, \"As in the case of the Ganges, it is the river itself\nto whom they address themselves, and not to any deity residing in\nit, or presiding over it--the stream itself is the deity which\nfills their imaginations, and receives their {597} homage.\"[77]\nThe animist who endows an inanimate object with a soul regards\nthe visible thing itself as its body.[78] How a being with such a\nbody, like a tree or a stone, can hear the words of men, can see\ntheir doings, and can partake of the food they offer, might be\ndifficult to explain--if it had to be explained. But, as I have\nsaid, the inquisitiveness of savage curiosity does not go to the\nroots of things, and religion is in its essence mystery.\n\n[Footnote 75: _Cf._ Tiele, _Max M\u00fcller und Fritz Schultze \u00fcber\nein Problem der Religionswissenschaft_, p. 35; Parkman, _op.\ncit._ p. lxvii. (North American Indians).]\n\n[Footnote 76: Castr\u00e9n, _op. cit._ iii. 192. _Cf._ _ibid._ iii.\n161, 200 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 77: Sleeman, _Rambles and Recollections of an Indian\nOfficial_, i. 20.]\n\n[Footnote 78: Castr\u00e9n, _op. cit._ iii. 164 _sq._]\n\nHowever, in proportion as a supernatural being comes more and\nmore to occupy the thoughts of its worshippers and to stir their\nimagination, a more distinct personality is attributed to it; and\nat length neither the ethereal or vaporous materiality of a\ndeparted human soul, nor the crude substantiality of an inanimate\nobject is considered a satisfactory body for such a being. It is\nhumanised also with regard to its essential shape. The Koriaks of\nSiberia believe \"that objects and phenomena of nature conceal an\nanthropomorphic substance underneath their outer forms\"; but they\nalso show the first signs of a belief in spiritual owners or\nmasters ruling over certain classes of things or over large\nobjects.[79] The supernatural being which is originally embodied\nin a natural phenomenon is gradually placed behind it. In the\nVedic hymns we may study this anthropomorphism as a process in\ngrowth. The true gods of the Veda are almost without exception\nthe deified representatives of the phenomena or forces of\nnature,[80] which are personified, though in varying degrees.\nWhen the name of the god is the same as that of his natural\nbasis, the personification has not yet advanced beyond the\nrudimentary stage; names like Dyaus (\"heaven\"), P[r.]thiv[=i]\n(\"earth\"), S[=u]rya (\"sun\"), U[s.]as (\"dawn\"), represent the\ndouble character of natural phenomena and of the personalities\npresiding over them. Speaking of the nature of the gods, the\nancient Vedic interpreter Y[=a]ska remarks that \"what is seen of\nthe gods is certainly not {598} anthropomorphic, for example the\nsun, the earth, and so forth.\"[81] Again, when the name of the\ngod is different from that of the physical substance he is\nsupposed to inhabit, the anthropomorphism is more developed,\nthough never very distinct. The Vedic people always recognised\nbehind its gods the natural forces of which they were the\nexpression, and their physical appearance often only represents\naspects of their natural bases figuratively described to\nillustrate their activities. The sun is spoken of as the eye with\nwhich Varuna observes mankind;[82] or it is said that the\nall-seeing sun, rising from his abode, goes to the dwellings of\nMitra and Varuna to report the deeds of men.[83] Even to this day\nthe Hindu, to whatever sect he may belong, does homage to the\nrising sun every morning of his life by repeating a text of the\nVeda.[84] The god does not very readily change his old solid body\nfor another which, though more respectable, has the disadvantage\nof being invisible. The simple unreflecting mind finds it easier\nto worship a material thing which may be seen, than a hidden god,\nhowever perfect in shape. To the common Japanese the sun is still\nthe god to whom he prays morning and evening.[85] Whilst Chinese\nscholars declare that the sacrifice offered to Heaven \"is\nassuredly not addressed to the material and sensible heaven,\nwhich our eyes see, but to the Master of heaven, earth, and all\nthings,\"[86] the people are less metaphysical; and the Russian\npeasant to this day makes an appeal to the Svarog of the old\nreligion when crying, \"Dost thou hear, O Sky? dost thou see, O\nSky?\"[87] That the worship of animals survives at comparatively\nlate stages of civilisation is probably due to the double\nadvantage of their bodies being both visible and animate.\n\n[Footnote 79:  Jochelson, 'Koryak Religion and Myth,' in _Jesup\nNorth Pacific Expedition_, vi. 115, 118.]\n\n[Footnote 80: Oldenberg, _Religion des Veda_, p. 591 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 81: _Nirukta_, vii. 4, quoted by Hopkins, _Religions of\nIndia_, p. 209.]\n\n[Footnote 82: _Rig-Veda_, i. 50. 6. Hopkins, _op. cit._ p. 67.\n_Cf._ _Rig-Veda_, i. 25. 10 _sq._; i. 136. 2.]\n\n[Footnote 83: _Rig-Veda_, vii. 60. 1 _sq._ See Macdonell, _op.\ncit._ pp. 2, 15, 17, 23; Muir, _Original Sanskrit Texts_, v. 6;\nBarth, _Religions of India_, p. 178; Oldenberg, _Religion des\nVeda_, p. 591 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 84: Monier-Williams, _Br[=a]hmanism and Hind[=u]ism_,\np. 342.]\n\n[Footnote 85: Griffis, _Religions of Japan_, p. 87.]\n\n[Footnote 86: Legge, _Notions of the Chinese concerning God and\nSpirits_, p. 38.]\n\n[Footnote 87: Ralston, _Songs of the Russian People_, p. 362.]\n\n{599} But though man created his gods in his own image and\nlikeness, endowing them with a mind and a body modelled after his\nown, he never lost sight of the difference between him and them.\nHe always ascribed to them a superior power of action; otherwise\nthey would have been no gods at all. In many cases, at least, he\nalso attributed to them a superior knowledge. The Bechuanas\nmaintain that their gods are much wiser than they are\nthemselves.[88] In the admonitions of an Aztek mother to her\ndaughter reference is made to a god who \"sees every secret\nfault.\"[89] The gods of the Greeks and Romans were possessed of\nsuperhuman wisdom,[90] and so was Yahveh. It is true that the\nanthropomorphic god acquires knowledge of the affairs of men\nthrough his senses. When hearing the cry of Sodom and Gomorrah,\nYahveh said, \"I will go down now, and see whether they have done\naltogether according to the cry of it, which is come unto me; and\nif not, I will know.\"[91] But the senses of a god are generally\nsuperior to those of a man. \"A god,\" says Orestes, \"can hear even\nfrom a distance.\"[92] Varuna has an all-seeing eye, and the\nZoroastrian Mithra has a thousand ears and ten thousand eyes.[93]\nIn other respects, also, the bodies of gods excel the bodies of\nmen. Sometimes they are more beautiful, sometimes they have a\ngigantic shape. When Ares is felled to the ground by the stone\nflung by Athene, his body covers seven roods of land. [94] When\nHere takes a solemn oath, she grasps the earth with one hand and\nthe sea with the other.[95] In three steps Poseidon goes an\nimmense distance;[96] in three paces Vishnu traverses earth, air,\nand sky.[97]\n\n[Footnote 88: Arbousset and Daumas, _Exploratory Tour to the\nNorth-East of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope_, p. 341.]\n\n[Footnote 89: Sahagun, _Historia general de las cosas de Nueva\nEspa\u00f1a_, vi. 19, vol. ii. 131.]\n\n[Footnote 90: _Cf._ Westcott, _Essays in the History of Religious\nThought_, p. 101.]\n\n[Footnote 91: _Genesis_, xviii. 20 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 92: Aeschylus, _Eumenides_, 297.]\n\n[Footnote 93: _Yasts_, x. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 94: _Iliad_, xxi. 407.]\n\n[Footnote 95: _Ibid._ xiv. 272 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 96: _Ibid._ xiii. 20.]\n\n[Footnote 97: Grimm, _Teutonic Mythology_, i. 325.]\n\nHowever, the tendency to make gods more and more {600}\nperfect--of which I shall say more in a following chapter--gradually\nled to the notion that materiality is a quality which is not\nbecoming to a god; hence men endeavoured, to the best of their\nability, to grasp the idea of a purely spiritual being, endowed\nwith a will and even with human emotions, but without a material\nbody. Like Xenophanes in Greece, the Inca Yupangui in Peru\nprotested against the prevailing anthropomorphism, declaring that\npurely spiritual service was befitting the almighty creator, not\ntributes or sacrifices.[98] In the Bible we notice a successive\ntransformation of the nature of the deity, from crude\nsensuousness to pure spirituality. According to the oldest\ntraditions, Yahveh works and rests, he plants the garden of Eden,\nhe walks in it in the cool of the day, and Adam and Eve hear his\nvoice. In a great part of the Old Testament he is expressly bound\nby conditions of time and space. He is attached in an especial\nmanner to the Jerusalem temple or some other shrine, and his\nfavour is gained by definite modes of sacrifice. At the time of\nthe Prophets the cruder anthropomorphisms of the earlier religion\nhave been overcome; Yahveh is no longer seen in person, and by a\nprophet like Isaiah his residence in Zion is almost wholly\ndematerialised. Yet, as Professor Robertson Smith observes, not\neven Isaiah has risen to the full height of the New Testament\nconception that God, who is spirit and who is to be worshipped\nspiritually, makes no distinction of spot with regard to worship,\nand is equally near to receive men's prayers in every place.[99]\nMoslem theologians take pains to point out that God neither is\nbegotten nor begets, and that he is without figure, form, colour,\nand parts. He hears all sounds, whether low or loud; but he hears\nwithout an ear. He sees all things, even the steps of a black ant\non a black stone in a dark night; {601} but he has no eyes, as\nmen have. He speaks; but not with a tongue, as men do.[100] He is\nendowed with knowledge, feelings, and a will.[101] Thus the\ndematerialised god still retains a mental constitution modelled\nupon the human soul, with all its bodily desires and imperfections\nremoved, with its higher qualities indefinitely increased, and,\nabove all, endowed with a supernatural power of action.\n\n[Footnote 98: Brinton, _American Hero-Myths_, p. 236.]\n\n[Footnote 99: Goblet d'Alviella, _op. cit._ p. 216. Toy, _Judaism\nand Christianity_, p. 87. Montefiore, _op. cit._ p. 424.\nRobertson Smith, _Religion of the Semites_, p. 117.]\n\n[Footnote 100: Ris\u00e1lah-i-Berkevi, quoted by Sell, _op. cit._\np. 166 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 101: Sell, _op. cit._ p. 185.]\n\nIn following chapters we shall see how the moral ideas of men\nhave been influenced by the attributes they ascribe to\nsupernatural beings.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XLVIII\n\nDUTIES TO GODS\n\n\nMEN not only believe in the existence of supernatural beings, but\nenter into frequent relations with them. In every religion we may\ndistinguish between two elements: a belief, and a regardful\nattitude towards the object of this belief. At the same time the\nassumption that supernatural beings exist is not necessarily\nconnected with religious veneration of them. Relations may be\nestablished with some of them to the exclusion of others. If the\nrelations between man and a certain supernatural being are of a\nmore or less permanent character, the latter is generally called\nhis god.\n\nAs man attributes to his gods a variety of human qualities, his\nconduct towards them is in many respects determined by\nconsiderations similar to those which regulate his conduct\ntowards his fellow men. He endows them with rights quite after\nhuman fashion, and imposes on himself corresponding duties.\n\nGods have the rights to life and bodily integrity. They are not\nnecessarily either invulnerable or immortal.[1] According to\nancient Egyptian beliefs, the life of a god is indeed longer than\nthat of a man, but death puts an end to the one as well as to the\nother.[2] The Vedic gods were mortal at first; immortality was\nonly bestowed upon them by Savitr or by Agni, or they obtained it\nby drinking {603} _soma_, or by practising continence and\nausterity, or by the performance of certain ceremonies.[3] Nor\nwere the Greek gods eternal by nature; they secured immortality\nby feasting on nectar and ambrosia.[4] The Scandinavian gods had\nin Idun's apples a means of preserving perpetual freshness and\nyouth; but for all that they were subject to the encroachments of\nage, and their death is spoken of without disguise.[5]\n\n[Footnote 1: See Frazer, _Golden Bough_, ii. 1 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 2: Wiedemann, _Religion of the Ancient Egyptians_, p.\n173. _Cf._ Maspero, _Dawn of Civilization_, p. 111; Erman, _Life\nin Ancient Egypt_, p. 265.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Macdonell, _Vedic Mythology_, p. 17. Oldenberg,\n_Religion des Veda_, p. 176.]\n\n[Footnote 4: _Iliad_, v. 339 _sqq._ _Odyssey_, v. 199. _Cf._\nGrimm, _Teutonic Mythology_, i. 317 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 5: Grimm, _op. cit._ i. 318 _sqq._]\n\nThough liable to death, the invisible anthropomorphic gods\ngenerally run little risk of being killed by men. But the case is\ndifferent with such supernatural beings as live on earth in a\nvisible and destructible shape. They may be, and occasionally\nare, slain by human hands, although in this case killing hardly\nmeans absolute destruction, the soul surviving the death of the\nbody. But to kill such a being is in ordinary circumstances\nlooked upon as a dangerous act. We have noticed above that people\nare often reluctant to slay animals of certain species for fear\nlest either the disembodied spirit of the slain animal or others\nof its kind should avenge the injury;[6] and the danger is\nnaturally increased when the victim and its whole species are\nregarded as divine. Savages as a rule avoid killing animals of\ntheir own totem, and various statements imply that the act is\ndisapproved of.[7]\n\n[Footnote 6: _Supra_, ii. 491.]\n\n[Footnote 7: Frazer, _Totemism_, p. 7 _sqq._; _Idem_, _Totemism\nand Exogamy_, iv. 6 _sq._]\n\nIt has been suggested that this regard for the life of a totemic\nanimal is due to the notion that a man is akin to his totem.[8]\nBut the various taboos imposed upon him with reference to it, and\nthe nature of the penalties incurred by the taboo-breaker,[9]\nindicate that the relation between a human individual and the\nanimal members of his totem are after all somewhat different from\nthat between cousins. It seems that the totemic animal is in\n{604} the first place looked upon as a supernatural being, and\nthat a person's attitude towards it depends on the degree of\ndread or veneration which he feels for it. Such sacred animals as\nare not conceived to be of one stock with their devotees are\nequally tabooed; in ancient Egypt, we are told, offences against\nholy animals were punished even with death.[10] On the other\nhand, so little respect is not seldom felt for the totem that it\nis treated in a way to which there is no parallel in the\ntreatment of human relatives. Speaking of the native tribes of\nCentral Australia, Messrs. Spencer and Gillen observe, \"That the\ntotemic animal or plant is not regarded exactly as a close\nrelative, whom it would be wrong to kill, or to assist any one\nelse to kill, is very evident; on the contrary, the members of\none totem not only, as it were, give their permission to those\nwho are not of the totem to kill and eat the totemic animal or\nplant, but . . . they will actually help in the destruction of\ntheir totems.\"[11] The South Australian Narrinyeri kill their\ntotemic animals if they are good for food.[12] A Bechuana will\nkill his totem if it be a hurtful animal, for instance a lion;\nthe slayer then only makes an apology to the beast and goes\nthrough a form of purification for the sacrilege.[13] Among the\nMenomini Indians a man belonging to the Bear clan may kill a\nbear, although he must first address himself to his victim and\napologise for depriving it of life.[14] The Indian tribes in the\nSouth-Eastern States had no respect for their totems and would\nkill them when they got the chance.[15] Among the Thlinkets a\nWolf man will hunt wolves without hesitation, although he calls\nthem his relatives when praying them not to hurt him.[16]\n\n[Footnote 8: Robertson Smith, _Religion of the Semites_, p. 285.\n_Cf._ Frazer, _Totemism_, p. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 9: See Frazer, _Totemism_, p. 11 _sqq._; Spencer and\nGillen, _Northern Tribes of Central Australia_, pp. 322, 324 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 10: Wiedemann, _Herodots zweites Buch_, p. 279.]\n\n[Footnote 11: Spencer and Gillen, _Native Tribes of Central\nAustralia_, p. 207.]\n\n[Footnote 12: Taplin, 'Narrinyeri,' in Woods, _Native Tribes of\nSouth Australia_, p. 63.]\n\n[Footnote 13: Casalis, _Basutos_, p. 211.]\n\n[Footnote 14: Hoffman, 'Menomini Indians,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur.\nEthn._ xiv. 44.]\n\n[Footnote 15: Adair, _History of the American Indians_, p. 16.]\n\n[Footnote 16: Boas, in _Fifth Report on the North-Western Tribes\nof Canada_, p. 23. For some other instances see Frazer,\n_Totemism_, p. 19.]\n\nIn certain cases divine animals are killed as a religious {605}\nor magical ceremony. Several instances of this have been pointed\nout by Sir J. G. Frazer.[17] Sometimes, when the revered animal\nis habitually spared, it is nevertheless killed on rare and\nsolemn occasions. In other cases, when the revered animal is\nhabitually killed, there is a special annual atonement, at which\na select individual of the species is slain with extraordinary\nmarks of respect and devotion. Frazer has offered ingenious\nexplanations of both customs. As regards the former one he argues\nthat the savage apparently thinks that a species left to itself\nwill grow old and die like an individual, and that the only means\nhe can think of to avert the catastrophe is to kill a member of\nthe species in whose veins the tide of life is still running\nstrong and has not yet stagnated among the fens of old age; \"the\nlife thus diverted from one channel will flow, he fancies, more\nfreshly and freely in a new one.\"[18] The latter custom, again,\nis explained by Frazer as a kind of atonement; by showing marked\ndeference to a few chosen individuals of a species the savage\nthinks himself entitled to exterminate with impunity all the\nremainder upon which he can lay hands.[19] These explanations, as\nFrazer himself is the first to admit, are only hypothetical, but,\nso far as I know, they are the only ones yet offered. However, it\nis worth noticing that certain acts accompanying the slaughter of\ndivine animals sometimes clearly indicate a desire in the\nworshippers to transfer to themselves supernatural benefits--as\nwhen they eat the flesh of the animal, or sprinkle themselves\nwith its blood, or by other means place themselves in contact\nwith it; and it may be that in such cases the animal is killed\nfor the express purpose of communicating to the people the\nsanctity, or beneficial magic energy, with which it is endowed.\nThe Madi or Moru tribe of Central Africa furnish an instructive\nexample. Once a year, as it seems, a very choice lamb is killed\nby a man belonging to a kind of priestly order, who {606}\nsprinkles some of the blood four times over the assembled people\nand then smears each individual with the same fluid. But this\nceremony is also observed on a small scale at other times--if a\nfamily is in any great trouble, through illness or bereavement,\ntheir friends and neighbours come together and a lamb is killed\nwith a view to averting further evil.[20] Among the Arunta and\nsome other tribes in Central Australia, as we have noticed above,\nat the time of Intichiuma, totemic animals are killed with the\nobject of being eaten. But here the sacramental meal is a magical\nceremony intended to multiply the species, so as to increase the\nfood supply for other totemic groups; the fundamental idea being\nthat the members of each totemic group are responsible for\nproviding other individuals with a supply of their totem.[21]\n\n[Footnote 17: Frazer, _Golden Bough_, ii. 366 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 18: _Ibid._ ii. 368.]\n\n[Footnote 19: _Ibid._ ii. 435.]\n\n[Footnote 20: Felkin, 'Madi or Moru Tribe of Central Africa,' in\n_Proceed. Roy. Soc. Edinburgh_, xii. 336 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 21: _Supra_, ii. 210 _sq._ Spencer and Gillen, _Native\nTribes of Central Australia_, ch. vi. _Iidem_, _Northern Tribes\nof Central Australia_, ch. ix. _sq._]\n\nFrazer has also called attention to various instances in which a\nman-god or divine king is put to death by his worshippers, and\nhas suggested the following explanation of this custom:--Primitive\npeople sometimes believe that their own safety and even that of\nthe world is bound up with the life of one of these god-men or\nhuman incarnations of the divinity. They therefore take the\nutmost care of his life, out of a regard for their own. But no\namount of care and precaution will prevent the divine king from\ngrowing old and feeble and at last dying. And in order to avert\nthe catastrophes which may be expected from the enfeeblement of\nhis powers and their final extinction in death, they kill him as\nsoon as he shows symptoms of weakness, and his soul is\ntransferred to a vigorous successor before it has been seriously\nimpaired by the threatened decay. But some peoples appear to have\nthought it unsafe to wait for even the slightest symptom of decay\nand have preferred to kill the divine king while he is still in\nthe full vigour of life. Accordingly, they have fixed a term\nbeyond which he {607} may not reign, and at the close of which he\nmust die, the term fixed upon being short enough to exclude the\nprobability of his degenerating physically in the interval. Thus\nit appears that in some places the people could not trust the\nking to remain in full bodily and mental vigour for more than a\nyear; whilst in Ngoio, a province of the ancient kingdom of\nCongo, the rule obtains that the chief who assumes the cap of\nsovereignty one day shall be put to death on the next.[22]\n\n[Footnote 22: Frazer, _Golden Bough_, ii. 5 _sqq._]\n\nEvery reader of _The Golden Bough_ must admire the ingenuity,\nskill, and learning with which its author has worked out his\ntheory, even though he may fail to find the argument in every\npoint convincing. It is obvious that the supernatural power of\ndivine kings is frequently supposed to be influenced by the\ncondition of their bodies. In some cases it is also obvious that\nthey are killed on account of some illness, corporal defect, or\nsymptom of old age, and that the ultimate reason for this lies in\nthe supposed connection between physical deterioration and waning\ndivinity. But, as Frazer himself observes, in the chain of his\nevidence a link is wanting: he can produce no direct proof of the\nidea that the soul of the slain man-god is transmitted to his\nroyal successor.[23] In the absence of such evidence I venture to\nsuggest a some what different explanation, which seems to me more\nin accordance with known facts--to wit, that the new king is\nsupposed to inherit, not the predecessor's soul, but his divinity\nor holiness, which is looked upon in the light of a mysterious\nentity, temporarily seated in the ruling sovereign, but separable\nfrom him and transferable to another individual.\n\n[Footnote 23: _Ibid._ ii. 56.]\n\nThis modification of Frazer's theory is suggested by certain\nbeliefs prevalent among the Moors. The Sultan of Morocco, who is\nregarded by the people as \"the vicegerent of God,\" appoints\nbefore his death some member of his family--by preference one of\nhis sons--as his successor, and this implies that his _baraka_,\nor holiness, will {608} be transferred to the new sovereign. But\nhis holiness may also be appropriated by a pretender during his\nlifetime, which proves that it is regarded as something quite\ndistinct from his soul. Thus the people told me that the\npretender Bu[h.]am\u00e2ra had come into possession of the Sultan's\n_baraka_, and that he would subsequently hand it over to one of\nthe Sultan's brothers, who was then denied his liberty. Like the\nsultans of Morocco, the divine Kafir kings of Sofala, who were\nput to death if afflicted with some disease, nominated their\nsuccessors.[24] In ancient Bengal, again, whoever killed the king\nand succeeded in placing himself on the royal throne, was\nimmediately acknowledged as king; the people said, \"We are\nfaithful to the throne, whoever fills the throne we are obedient\nand true to it.\"[25] In the kingdom of Passier, on the northern\ncoast of Sumatra, whose sacred monarch was not allowed by his\nsubjects to live long, \"the man who struck the fatal blow was of\nthe royal lineage, and as soon as he had done the deed of blood\nand seated himself on the throne he was regarded as the\nlegitimate king, provided that he contrived to maintain his seat\npeaceably for a single day.\"[26] In these cases, it seems, the\nsanctity was considered to be inherent in the throne and to be\npartly communicated to persons who came into close contact with it.[27]\n\n[Footnote 24: Frazer, _Golden Bough_, ii. 10.]\n\n[Footnote 25: _Ibid._ ii. 16.]\n\n[Footnote 26: _Ibid._ ii. 16.]\n\n[Footnote 27: Since the above was written, Sir J. G. Frazer\nhimself has kindly drawn my attention to some statements in his\n_Lectures on the Early History of the Kingship_ (p. 121 _sqq._)\nfrom which it appears that in some parts of the Malay region the\nregalia are regarded as wonder-working talismans or fetishes, the\npossession of which carries with it the right to the throne.\nAmong the Yorubas of West Africa, a miraculous virtue seems to be\nattributed to the royal crown, and the king sometimes sacrifices\nsheep to it (_ibid._ p. 124, n. 1). See _infra_, Additional Notes.]\n\nNow, as we have noticed before, holiness is generally held to be\nexceedingly susceptible to any polluting influence,[28] and this\nwould naturally suggest the idea that, in order to remain\nunimpaired, it has to be removed from a body which is defiled by\ndisease or blemish. Such an idea may be supposed to underlie\nthose cases in which {609} even the slightest bodily defect is a\nsufficient motive for putting the divine king to death. It is of\nthe greatest importance for the community that the holiness on\nwhich its welfare depends should not be attached to an individual\nwhose organism is no longer a fit receptacle for it, and who is\nconsequently unable to fulfil the duties incumbent upon a divine\nmonarch; and it may be thought that the only way of removing the\nholiness from him is to kill him. The same explanation would seem\nto apply to the killing of kings or magicians who have actually\nproved incapable of bringing about the benefits expected from\nthem, such as rain or good crops,[29] although in these instances\nthe murderous act may also be a precaution against the revenge\nthey might otherwise take for being deposed, or it may be a\npunishment for their failure,[30] or have the character of a\nsacrifice to a god.[31] Moreover, the disease, weakness, or\nphysical deterioration of the king might cause his death; and,\nowing to the extremely polluting effect ascribed to natural\ndeath, this would be the greatest catastrophe which could happen\nto the holiness seated in him. The people of Congo believed that\nif their pontiff, the Chitom\u00e9, were to die a natural death, the\nworld would perish, and the earth, which he alone sustained by\nhis power and merit, would immediately be annihilated; hence,\nwhen he fell ill and seemed likely to die, the man who was\ndestined to be his successor entered the pontiff's house with a\nrope or a club and strangled or clubbed him to death.[32] Similar\nmotives may also have induced people to kill their divine king\nafter a certain period, as everybody is sooner or later liable to\nfall ill or grow weak and die. But I can also imagine another\npossible reason for this custom. Supernatural {610} energy is\nsometimes considered so sensitive to external influences that it\nappears to wear away almost by itself in the course of time. I\nhave heard from Arabs in Morocco that a pretender's holiness\nusually lasts only for half a year. And it may be that some of\nthe divine kings mentioned by Frazer were exposed to a similar\nfatality and therefore had to be slain in time.\n\n[Footnote 28: See especially _supra_, ii. 294-296, 352, 353, 415\n_sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 29: Frazer, _Golden Bough_, i. 158 _sq._ Landtman,\n_Origin of Priesthood_, p. 144 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 30: Landtman, _op. cit._ p. 144. Divine animals are\nsometimes treated in a similar way. In ancient Egypt, if the\nsacred beasts could not, or would not, help in emergency, they\nwere beaten; and if this measure failed to prove efficacious,\nthen the creatures were punished with death (Wiedemann, _Religion\nof the Ancient Egyptians_, p. 178; _Idem_, _Herodots zweites\nBuch_, p. 428 _sq._).]\n\n[Footnote 31: _Supra_, i. 443.]\n\n[Footnote 32: Frazer, _Golden Bough_, ii. 8.]\n\nAs the right to life, generally granted to gods, is thus in\ncertain circumstances abrogated for the benefit of their\nworshippers, so their right to bodily integrity may be suspended\nif their behaviour does not answer the expectations of their\ndevotees. Men punish their gods as they punish their fellow men.\nAmong the Amazulu, when it thunders or, as they say, \"the heaven\nis coming badly,\" the doctors go out and scold it; \"they take a\nstick and say they are going to beat the lightning of heaven.\"[33]\nThe negro cudgels his fetish unmercifully to make it submissive.[34]\nThe Samoyede flogs his idol or throws it away if he does not succeed\nin his doings.[35] The idols of the Typees, in the Marquesas Islands,\n\"received more hard knocks than supplications.\"[36] When his guardian\nspirit proves stubborn, the Hudson Bay Eskimo deprives it of food,\nor strips it of its garments.[37]\n\n[Footnote 33: Callaway, _Religious System of the Amazulu_, p. 404.]\n\n[Footnote 34: Bastian, _Afrikanische Reisen_, p. 61.]\n\n[Footnote 35: von Struve, in _Ausland_, 1880 p. 795.]\n\n[Footnote 36: Melville, _Typee_, p. 261.]\n\n[Footnote 37: Turner, 'Ethnology of the Ungava District,' in\n_Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ xi. 194.]\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIn normal circumstances men regard it as a duty, not only to\nrefrain from killing or injuring their gods, but positively to\npromote their existence and comfort. According to early beliefs,\nsupernatural beings are subject to human needs. The gods of the\nheathen Siberians laboured for their subsistence, engaged in\nhunting and fishing, and laid up provisions of roots against\ntimes of dearth.[38] When the heavens appear checkered with white\nclouds on a blue surface, the Maoris of New Zealand say that the\ngod is planting his potatoes and {611} other divine edibles.[39]\nThe Fijian gods are described as enormous eaters.[40] The Vedic\ngods wore clothes, were great drunkards, and suffered from\nconstant hunger;[41] I need only refer to the numerous passages\nin the Rig-Veda where mention is made of the appetite or thirst\nof Indra and the pleasure he has in filling his belly.[42] An\nEgyptian god cannot be conceived without his house in which he\nlives, in which his festivals are solemnised, and which he never\nleaves except on professional days. His dwelling has to be\ncleaned, and he is assisted at his toilet by his attendants; the\npriest has to dress and serve his god, and places every day on\nhis table offerings of food and drink.[43] So also the Chaldean\ngods had to be nourished, clothed, and amused; and the stone or\nwooden statues erected to them in the sanctuaries furnished them\nwith bodies which they animated with their breath.[44]\n\n[Footnote 38: Georgi, _Russia_, iii. 259.]\n\n[Footnote 39: Polack, _Manners and Customs of the New\nZealanders_, i. 244.]\n\n[Footnote 40: Williams and Calvert, _Fiji_, pp. 184, 195.]\n\n[Footnote 41: Oldenberg, _Religion des Veda_, pp. 304, 366 _sqq._\nBarth, _Religions of India_, p. 36, n. 2.]\n\n[Footnote 42: _Rig-Veda_, ii. 11. 11; viii. 4. 10; viii. 17. 4;\nviii. 78. 7; x. 86. 13 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 43: Erman, _op. cit._ pp. 273, 275, 279. Maspero, _op.\ncit._ p. 110.]\n\n[Footnote 44: Ball, 'Glimpses of Babylonian Religion,' in\n_Proceed. Soc. Biblical Arch\u00e6ology_, xiv. 153 _sqq._ Maspero,\n_op. cit._ p. 679.]\n\nThe idea that supernatural beings have human appetites and human\nwants leads to the practice of sacrifice. Whatever means they may\nhave of earning their livelihood, they are certainly not\nindifferent to gifts offered by men. If such offerings fail them\nthey may even suffer want and become feeble and powerless. The\nEgyptian gods, says M. Maspero, \"were dependent upon the gifts of\nmortals, and the resources of each individual deity, and\nconsequently his power, depended on the wealth and number of his\nworshippers.\"[45] We meet with the same idea at every step in the\nVedic hymns.[46] Should sacrifices cease for an instant to be\noffered, the gods would cease to send rain, {612} to bring back\nat the appointed hour Aurora and the sun, to raise and ripen\nharvests--not only because they would be unwilling, but because\nthey would be unable to do so.[47] It was by sacrifice that the\ngods delivered the world from chaos, and it is by sacrifice that\nman prevents it from lapsing back into the same state;[48] in the\n'Laws of Manu' it is said that sacrifices support \"both the\nmovable and the immovable creation.\"[49] The Zoroastrian books\nlikewise represent the sacrifice as an act of assistance to the\ngods, by which they become victorious in their combats with the\ndemons.[50] When not strengthened by offerings they fly helpless\nbefore their foes. Overcome by the demon Apaosha, the bright and\nglorious Tistrya cries out in distress:--\"Woe is me, O Ahura\nMazda! . . . Men do not worship me with a sacrifice in which I am\ninvoked by my own name. . . . If men had worshipped me with a\nsacrifice in which I had been invoked by my own name, as they\nworship the other Yazatas with sacrifices in which they are\ninvoked by their own names, I should have taken to me the strength\nof ten horses, the strength of ten camels, the strength of ten bulls,\nthe strength of ten mountains, the strength of ten rivers.\"[51]\n\n[Footnote 45: Maspero, _op. cit._ p. 302. _Cf._ Wiedemann,\n_Ancient Egyptian Doctrine of the Immortality of the Soul_, p. 19.]\n\n[Footnote 46: _Rig-Veda_, ii. 15. 2; x. 52. 5 _sq._; x. 121. 7.\n_Cf._ _Atharva-Veda_, xi. 7. 14 _sq._; Hopkins, _Religions of\nIndia_, p. 149; Kaegi, _Rigveda_, p. 31; Darmesteter, _Ormazd et\nAhriman_, p. 329.]\n\n[Footnote 47: Barth, _op. cit._ p. 36.]\n\n[Footnote 48: _Rig-Veda_, x. 130. Barth, _op. cit._ p. 37.]\n\n[Footnote 49: _Laws of Manu_, iii. 75 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 50: See Darmesteter, _Ormazd et Ahriman_, p. 327;\n_Idem_, in _Sacred Books of the East_ (1st edit.), iv. p. lxviii.]\n\n[Footnote 51: _Yasts_, viii. 23 _sq._]\n\nMen are induced by various motives to offer sacrificial gifts to\nsupernatural beings. In early religion the most common motive is\nundoubtedly a desire to avert evils; and we have reason to\nbelieve that such a desire was the first source of religious\nworship. In spite of recent assertions to the contrary, the old\nsaying holds true that religion was born of fear. Those who\nmaintain that the savage is little susceptible to this\nemotion,[52] and that he for the most part takes his gods\njoyously,[53] show ignorance {613} of facts. One of his\ncharacteristics is great nervous susceptibility,[54] and he lives\nin constant apprehension of danger from supernatural powers. We\nare told of the Samoyedes that a sudden blow on the outside of a\ntent will sometimes throw the occupants into spasms. \"The\nIndian,\" says Parkman, \"lived in perpetual fear. The turning of a\nleaf, the crawling of an insect, the cry of a bird, the creaking\nof a bough, might be to him the mystic signal of weal or\nwoe.\"[55] From all quarters of the uncivilised world we hear that\nterror or fear is the predominant element in the religious\nsentiment, that savages are more inclined to ascribe evil than\ngood to the influence of supernatural agents, that their\nsacrifices and other acts of worship more frequently have in view\nto avert misfortunes than to procure positive benefits, or that,\neven though benevolent deities are believed in, much more\nattention is paid to malignant ones.[56] And even among peoples\nwho have passed beyond the stage of {614} savagery fear still\nremains a prominent factor in their religion. The great bulk of\nHomeric cult-operations lay in propitiatory rites in avoidance of\nevil.[57] \"No one,\" says Sir Monier-Williams, \"who has ever been\nbrought into close contact with the Hind[=u]s in their own\ncountry can doubt the fact that the worship of at least ninety\nper cent. of the people of India in the present day is a worship\nof fear.\"[58] In one of the Pahlavi texts we read that \"he is not\nto be considered as faithful who has no fear of the sacred\nbeings.\"[59] The Egyptian Amon R\u00e2, who is praised as \"the\nbeautiful and beloved god, who giveth life by all manner of\nwarmth, by all manner of fair cattle,\" is at the same time styled\n\"Lord of fear, great one of terror.\"[60] The Psalmist says that\n\"the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom,\"[61] and, as\nN\u00f6ldeke points out, \"the fear of God\" was used in its literal\nsense.[62] Although the Koran has much to tell about the loving\nkindness of God, the god of Islam evokes much more fear than\nlove. Faith is said by Muhammedan theologians to \"stand midway\nbetween hope and fear.\"[63]\n\n[Footnote 52: Gruppe, _Die griechischen Culte und Mythen_, p. 244\n_sq._]\n\n[Footnote 53: Grant Allen, _Evolution of the Idea of God_, p. 347.]\n\n[Footnote 54: See Brinton, _Religions of Primitive Peoples_, p. 14.]\n\n[Footnote 55: Parkman, _Jesuits in North America_, p. lxxxiv.]\n\n[Footnote 56: Dorman, _Origin of Primitive Superstitions_, p. 391\n(American Indians generally). M\u00fcller, _Geschichte der\nAmerikanischen Urreligionen_, pp. 84, 171, 214, 260. von Spix and\nvon Martius, _Travels in Brazil_, ii. 243 (Coroados). Brett,\n_Indian Tribes of Guiana_, p. 361 _sq._; Im Thurn, _Among the\nIndians of Guiana_, p. 367 _sq._ Dunbar, 'Pawnee Indians,' in\n_Magazine of American History_, viii. 736. McGee, 'Siouan\nIndians,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ xv. 184. Murdoch, 'Ethn.\nResults of the Point Barrow Expedition,' _ibid._ ix. 432 (Point\nBarrow Eskimo). Ross, 'Eastern Tinneh,' in _Smithsonian Report_,\n1866, p. 306. Radloff, _Schamanenthum_, p. 15 (Turkish tribes of\nthe Altai). Fawcett, _Saoras_, p. 57. Campbell, _Wild Tribes of\nKhondistan_, p. 163 _sq._ Hunter, _Annals of Rural Bengal_,\ni. 181 _sq._ (Santals). Mouhot, _Travels in the Central Parts of\nIndo-China_, ii. 29 (Bannavs of Cambodia). Man, 'Aboriginal\nInhabitants of the Andaman Islands,' in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._\nxii. 157. Wilken, _Het animisme bij de volken van den Indischen\nArchipel_, p. 207 _sq._ St. John, _Life in the Forests of the Far\nEast_, i. 69, 70, 178; Low, _Sarawak_, p. 253; Selenka, _Sonnige\nWelten_, p. in (Dyaks). von Brenner, _Besuch bei den Kannibalen\nSumatras_, p. 216. Kubary, 'Die Palau-Inseln,' in _Jour. des\nMuseum Godeffroy_, iv. 44 (Pelew Islanders). Williams and\nCalvert, _Fiji_, p. 189. Percy Smith, 'Uea,' in _Jour. Polynesian\nSoc._ i. 114. Turner, _Samoa_, p. 21. Ellis, _Polynesian\nResearches_, i. 336 (Tahitians). Taylor, _Te Ika a Maui_,\npp. 104, 148; Yate, _Account of New Zealand_, p. 141; Polack, _op.\ncit._ i. 244 (Maoris). Fritsch, _Die Eingeborenen S\u00fcd-Afrika's_,\npp. 338, 339, 341 (Hottentots). Decle, _Three Years in Savage\nAfrica_, p. 153 (Matabele). Livingstone, _Missionary Travels_,\np. 435 (peoples inhabiting the country north of the Zambesi).\nMonrad, _Skildring af Guinea-Kysten_, p. 2 (Negroes of Accra).\nSee also Karsten, _Origin of Worship_, p. 44 _sqq._; _infra_,\np. 665 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 57: _Cf._ Keller, _Homeric Society_, p. 115 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 58: Monier-Williams, _Br[=a]hmanism and Hind[=u]ism_,\np. 230.]\n\n[Footnote 59: _D\u00een\u00e2-\u00ee Ma\u00een\u00f4g-\u00ee Khirad_, xxxix. 33.]\n\n[Footnote 60: Wiedemann, _Religion of the Ancient Egyptians_, p.\n111 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 61: _Psalms_, cxi. 10.]\n\n[Footnote 62: N\u00f6ldeke, in _Archiv f\u00fcr Religionswissenschaft_, i. 362.]\n\n[Footnote 63: Sell, _Faith of Isl\u00e1m_, p. 165.]\n\nHope, indeed, forms an element in every religion, even the\nlowest. The assumed authors of painful or alarming events became\nobjects of worship because they were conceived, not as mechanical\ncauses, but as personal agencies which might be influenced by the\nregardful attitude of the worshipper. The savage is not so\nirrational as to make offerings to beings from whom he expects no\nbenefits in return. And in proportion as the deities grew more\nbenignant and their sphere of action was extended, their\nworshippers became more confident, expecting from them not only\nmercy but positive assistance.\n\nWe may suppose that already at an early stage of {615} culture\nman, occasionally, was struck by some unexpected fortunate event\nand ascribed it to the influence of a friendly spirit with which\nhe was anxious to keep on amicable terms. Among the Tshi-speaking\npeoples of the Gold Coast worship is the result not only of fear,\nbut also of the hope of obtaining some direct advantage or\nprotection.[64] The pagans of Siberia accompanied their\nsacrifices with words like these:--\"Behold what I bring you to\neat; bring me then in return children, cattle, and a long\nlife.\"[65] The Point Barrow Eskimo, when he arrives at a river,\nthrows into the air a small piece of tobacco, crying out,\n\"Spirits, spirits, I give you tobacco, give me plenty of\nfish!\"[66] Of the Sia Indians (Pueblos) Mrs. Stevenson writes\nthat their religion is not mainly one of propitiation, but rather\nof supplication for favours and payment for the same--they \"do\nthe will of and thereby please the beings to whom they pray.\"[67]\nWe even hear of savages making thank-offerings to their gods. In\nFiji, after successful fishing for turtle, or remarkable\ndeliverance from danger in war or at sea, or recovery from\nsickness, a kind of thank-offering was sometimes presented to the\ndeities.[68] When certain natives of Eastern Central Africa,\nafter they have prayed for a successful hunting expedition,\nreturn home laden with venison or ivory, they know that they are\nindebted to \"their old relative\" for their good fortune, and give\nhim a thank-offering.[69] We are told that in Northern Guinea,\nwhen a person has been repeatedly fortunate through the agency of\na fetish, \"he contracts a feeling of attachment and gratitude to\nit.\"[70] Yet we have reason to suspect that the gratitude of the\nsacrificer is commonly {616} of the kind which La Rochefoucauld\ndefined as \"a secret desire to receive greater benefits in the\nfuture.\"[71] Sometimes the thank-offering, if it may be called\nso, is expressly preceded by a vow. Among the Kansas the warrior,\nwhen going to war says, facing the East, \"I wish to pass along\nthe road to the foe! O Wakanda! I promise you a blanket if I\nsucceed\"; and turning to the West, \"O Wakanda! I promise you a\nfeast if I succeed.\"[72] Even in religions of a higher type the\noffering of sacrificial gifts is mainly a sort of bargain with\nthe god to whom they are offered. In the Vedic hymns the gods are\naddressed by phrases like these, \"If you give me this, I shall\ngive you that,\" or, \"As you have given me this, I shall give you\nthat.\"[73] The singer na\u00efvely confesses, \"I looked forth in\nspirit, seeking good, O Indra and Agni, to relations and kinsmen;\nbut I have no other helper than you; therefore I have made you a\npowerful song.\"[74] The Greeks expressed the idea connected with\ntheir sacrifices in the proverbial saying, [Greek: d\u00f4=ra theou\\s\npei/thei].[75] The ancient Hebrew view on the subject is\nillustrated by the vow of Jacob:--\"If God will be with me, and\nwill keep me in this way that I go, and will give me bread to\neat, and raiment to put on, so that I come again to my father's\nhouse in peace; then shall the Lord be my God: And this stone,\nwhich I have set for a pillar, shall be God's house: and of all\nthat thou shalt give me I will surely give the tenth unto thee.\"[76]\n\n[Footnote 64: Ellis, _Tshi-speaking Peoples of the Gold Coast_,\np. 17. _Cf._ _Idem_, _Yoruba-speaking Peoples of the Slave\nCoast_, p. 277.]\n\n[Footnote 65: Georgi, _Russia_, iii. 284.]\n\n[Footnote 66: Murdoch, in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ ix. 433.]\n\n[Footnote 67: Stevenson, 'Sia,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ xi. 67.]\n\n[Footnote 68: Williams and Calvert, _op. cit._ p. 195.]\n\n[Footnote 69: Macdonald, _Africana_, i. 61. For other instances\nof thank-offerings see Shooter, _Kafirs of Natal_, p. 165; Smith,\n'Myths of the Iroquois,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ ii. 51.\nJochelson, 'Koryak Religion and Myth,' in _Jesup North Pacific\nExpedition_, vi. 25, 92. Leem, _Beskrivelse over Finmarkens\nLapper_, p. 431 (Lapps).]\n\n[Footnote 70: Wilson, _Western Africa_, p. 212.]\n\n[Footnote 71: La Rochefoucauld, _Maximes_, 298.]\n\n[Footnote 72: Dorsey, 'Mourning and War Customs of the Kansas,'\nin _American Naturalist_, xix. 678.]\n\n[Footnote 73: M\u00fcller, _Physical Religion_, p. 100. Oldenberg,\n_Religion des Veda_, pp. 302-326, 430 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 74: _Rig-Veda_, i. 109. 1. _Cf._ _ibid._ i. 71. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 75: Plato, _Respublica_, iii. 390.]\n\n[Footnote 76: _Genesis_, xxviii. 20 _sqq._]\n\nIn many cases the sacrificial victims are intended to serve as\nsubstitutes for other individuals, whose lives are in danger. We\nhave previously noticed that the practice of human sacrifice is\nmainly based on the idea of substitution.[77] We have also seen\nthat a growing reluctance to this practice often led to the\noffering of animals instead of {617} men.[78] But we have no\nright to assume that the sacrifice of an animal for the purpose\nof saving the life of a man is in every case a later modification\nof a previous human sacrifice. The idea that spirits which\nthreaten the lives of men are appeased by other than human blood\nmay in some instances be primary though in others it is\nderivative. The Moors invariably sacrifice an animal at the\nfoundation of a new building; and though this is said to be\n_[(]\u00e2r_ upon the spirit owners of the place some idea of\nsubstitution seems also to be connected with the act, as they\nmaintain that if no animal were killed the inmates of the house\nwould die or remain childless. A similar practice prevails in\nSyria, where the people believe that \"every house must have its\ndeath, either man, woman, child, or animal.\"[79] Among the Jews\nit is or has been the custom for the master of each house to kill\na cock on the eve of the fast of atonement. Before doing so he\nstrikes his head with the cock three times, saying at each\nstroke, \"Let this cock be a commutation for me, let him be\nsubstituted for me\"; and when he strangles his victim by\ncompressing the neck with his hand, he at the same time reflects\nthat he himself deserves to be strangled.[80] These customs can\ncertainly not be regarded as survivals of an earlier practice of\nkilling a human being. Moreover an animal is sometimes sacrificed\nfor the purpose of saving the lives of other animals. Thus in a\nplace in Scotland, in 1767, a young heifer was offered in the\nholy fire during a cattle-plague.[81] And in Great Benin, in West\nAfrica, on the anniversary of the death of Adolo, king Overami's\nfather, not only twelve men, but twelve cows, twelve goats,\ntwelve sheep, and twelve fowls were offered, and Overami,\naddressing his father, asked him to look after the \"cows, goats,\nand fowls, and everything in the farms,\" as well as the\npeople.[82] Sacrifices which are {618} substitutional in\ncharacter may or may not be intended to satisfy the material\nneeds of supernatural beings. In some cases, as we have seen,\ntheir object is to appease a resentful god by the mere death of\nthe victim.[83]\n\n[Footnote 77: _Supra_, ch. xix.]\n\n[Footnote 78: _Supra_, i. 469 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 79: Curtiss, _Primitive Semitic Religion To-day_,\np. 224 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 80: Allen, _Modern Judaism_, p. 406.]\n\n[Footnote 81: Grimm, _Teutonic Mythology_, ii. 608.]\n\n[Footnote 82: Moor and Roupell, quoted by Read and Dalton,\n_Antiquities from the City of Benin_, p. 6, and by Ling Roth,\n_Great Benin_, p. 70 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 83: _Supra_, i. 438 _sqq._]\n\nWe have further noticed that, in the case of human sacrifice, the\nvictim is occasionally regarded as a messenger between the\nworshippers and their god even though the primary object of the\nrite be a different one.[84] The same is sometimes true of other\nofferings as well.[85] The Iroquois sacrifice of the white\ndog[86] was, according to Mr. Morgan, intended \"to send up the\nspirit of the dog as a messenger to the Great Spirit, to announce\ntheir continued fidelity to his service, and, also, to convey to\nhim their united thanks for the blessings of the year\"; and in\ntheir thanksgiving addresses they were in the habit of throwing\nleaves of tobacco into the fire from time to time that their\nwords might ascend to the dwelling of the Great Spirit in the\nsmoke of their offerings.[87] The Huichols of Mexico often use\nthe arrows which they sacrifice to their gods as carriers of\nspecial prayers.[88]\n\n[Footnote 84: _Supra_, i. 465 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 85: _Cf._ Hubert and Mauss, 'Essai sur la nature et la\nfonction du sacrifice,' in _L'ann\u00e9e sociologique_, ii. 106, n. **1.]\n\n[Footnote 86: See _supra_, i. 53, 64.]\n\n[Footnote 87: Morgan, _League of the Iroquois_, p. 216 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 88: Lumholtz, _Unknown Mexico_, ii. 205.]\n\nNot only are sacrifices used as bearers of prayers, but they are\nalso frequently offered for the purpose of transferring curses.\nIn Morocco every _s\u00edyid_[89] of any importance is constantly\nvisited by persons who desire to invoke the saint to whom it is\ndedicated with a view to being cured of some illness, or being\nblessed with children, or getting a suitable husband or wife, or\nreceiving help against an enemy, or deriving some other benefit\nfrom the saint. To secure his assistance the visitor makes\n_[(]\u00e2r_ upon him; and the Moorish _[(]\u00e2r_, of which I have\nspoken above,[90] implies the transference of a conditional\ncurse, whether it be made upon an ordinary man or a saint, living\nor dead. The _[(]\u00e2r_ put upon a saint may consist in throwing\nstones upon a cairn connected with his sanctuary, or making a\npile of {619} stones to him, or tying a piece of cloth at the\n_s\u00edyid_, or knotting the leaves of some palmetto or the stalks of\nwhite broom growing in its vicinity, or offering an animal\nsacrifice to the saint.[91] This making of _[(]\u00e2r_ is\naccompanied by a promise to reward the saint if he grants the\nrequest; but the sacrifice offered in fulfilment of such a\npromise (_l-w\u00e2[(]da_) is totally distinct from that offered as\n_[(]\u00e2r_. It is a genuine gift, whereas the _[(]\u00e2r_-sacrifice is\na means of constraining the saint. When an animal is killed as\n_[(]\u00e2r_ the usual phrase _bismill\u00e2h_, \"In the name of God,\" is\nnot used, and the animal may not be eaten, except by poor\npeople.[92] On the other hand, the animal which is sacrificed as\n_w\u00e2[(]da_ is always killed \"in the name of God,\" and is offered\nfor the very purpose of being eaten by the saint's earthly\nrepresentatives. Nothing can better show than the Moorish\ndistinction between _l-[(]\u00e2r_ and _l-w\u00e2[(]da_ how futile it\nwould be to try to explain every kind of sacrifice by one and the\nsame principle. The distinction between them is fundamental: the\nformer is a threat, the latter is a promised reward.[93] But at\nthe same time it is not improbable that the idea of transferring\ncurses to a supernatural being by means of a sacrifice was\noriginally suggested by the previous existence of sacrifice as a\nreligious act, combined with the ascription of mysterious\npropensities to blood, and especially to sacrificial blood,\nwhich, according to primitive ideas, made it a most efficient\nconductor of curses.\n\n[Footnote 89: For the meaning of this word see _supra_, ii. 584.]\n\n[Footnote 90: _Supra_, i. 586 _sq._; ii. 584 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 91: Westermarck, '_L-[(]\u00e2r_, or the Transference of\nConditional Curses in Morocco,' in _Anthropological Essays\npresented to E. B. Tylor_, p. 368 _sqq._ _Idem_, _The Moorish\nConception of Holiness (Baraka)_, p. 90 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 92: However, if the _s\u00edyid_ has a _m[K.]\u00e1ddem_, or\nregular attendant, the petitioner often hands the animal over to\nhim alive, so that he may himself kill it \"in the name of God,\"\nand thus make it eatable. Then the descendants of the saint, if\nhe has any, and the _m[K.]\u00e1ddem_ himself, have no hesitation\nin eating the animal, _bismill\u00e2h_ being a holy word which removes\nthe curse or evil energy inherent in _l-[(]\u00e2r_.]\n\n[Footnote 93: When I have asked how it is that a saint, although\ninvoked with _l-[(]\u00e2r_, does not always grant the request made\nto him, the answer has been that he can, but that he is not\nall-powerful and the failure is due to the fact that God does not\nlisten to his prayer. But it also occurs that a person who has in\nvain made _[(]\u00e2r_ upon a saint goes to another _s\u00edyid_ to\ncomplain of him. There is a general belief that saints do not\nhelp unless _[(]\u00e2r_ is made on them--an idea which is not very\nflattering to their character.]\n\n{620} There are obvious indications that the _[(]\u00e2r_-sacrifice\nof the Moors is not unique of its kind, but has its counterpart\namong certain other peoples. In ancient religions sacrifice is\noften supposed to exercise a constraining influence on the god to\nwhom it is offered. We meet with this idea in Zoroastrianism,[94]\nin many of the Vedic hymns,[95] and especially in Brahmanism.\n\"Here,\" says Barth, \"the rites of religion are the real deities,\nor at any rate they constitute together a sort of independent and\nsuperior power, before which the divine personalities disappear,\nand which almost holds the place allotted to destiny in other\nsystems. The ancient belief, which is already prominent in the\nHymns, that sacrifice conditionates the regular course of things,\nis met with here in the rank of a commonplace, and is at times\naccompanied with incredible details.\"[96] Now, there can be\nlittle doubt that this ascription of a magic power to the\nsacrifice, by means of which it could control the actions of the\ngods, was due to the idea that it served as a conductor of\nimprecations; for it was invariably accompanied by a formula\nwhich was considered to possess irresistible force. In the\ninvocation lies the hidden energy which gives the efficacy to the\nsacrifice; without Brahma[n.]aspati, the lord of prayer,\nsacrifice does not succeed.[97] The Greeks actually offered\nanathemata, or curses, to their gods.[98] The ancient Arabs,\nagain, after killing the sacrificial animal, threw its hair on a\nholy tree as a curse.[99] But so little has the true import of\nsuch sacrifices been understood even by eminent scholars, that\nthey have been represented as votive offerings or gifts to the\ndeity.[100]\n\n[Footnote 94: Darmesteter, _Ormazd et Ahriman_, p. 330.]\n\n[Footnote 95: _Rig-Veda_, iii. 45. 1; iv. 15. 5; vi. 51. 8; viii.\n2. 6. Oldenberg, _Religion des Veda_, p. 311 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 96: Barth, _Religions of India_, p. 47 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 97: _Rig-Veda_, i. 18. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 98: Rouse, _Greek Votive Offerings_, p. 337 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 99: Wellhausen, _Reste arabischen Heidentums_, p. 124.]\n\n[Footnote 100: Rouse, _op. cit._ p. 337. Wellhausen, _op. cit._\np. 124.]\n\nConsidering that the idea of sacrifice being a conductor of\nimprecations has hitherto almost entirely escaped the notice of\nstudents of early religion, it is impossible to say {621} how\nwidely it prevails and whether it also occurs in the savage\nworld. We know that the practice of cursing a god not only was\nfamiliar to the ancient nations of culture, including the\nEgyptians,[101] Hebrews, and other Semites,[102] but is common\namong peoples like the South African Bechuanas[103] and the Nagas\nof India.[104] And that the shedding of blood is frequently\napplied as a means of transferring curses is suggested by various\ncases in which, however, the object of the imprecation is not a\ngod but a man. We have previously noticed the reception\nsacrifices offered to visiting strangers, presumably for the\npurpose of transmitting to them conditional curses;[105] and a\nvery similar idea seems to underlie certain cases of oath-taking.\nSometimes the oath is taken in connection with a sacrifice made\nto a god, and then the sanctity of the sacrificial animal\nnaturally increases the efficacy of the self-imprecation. In\nother instances the oath is taken on the blood of an animal which\nis killed for the purpose, apparently without being sacrificed to\na god. But in either case, I believe, the blood of the animal is\nthought not only to add supernatural energy to the oath, but to\ntransfer, as it were, the self-imprecation to the very person who\npronounces it. The Mr\u00fas, a Chittagong hill tribe, \"will swear by\none of their gods, to whom, at the same time, a sacrifice must be\noffered.\"[106] Among the ancient Norsemen both the accused and\nthe accuser grasped the holy ring kept for that purpose on the\naltar, stained with the blood of a sacrificial bull, and made\noath by invoking Freyr, Niordr, and the almighty among the\nAsas.[107] At Athens a person who charged another with murder\nmade an oath with imprecations upon himself and his family and\nhis house, standing upon the entrails of a boar, a ram, and a\nbull, {622} which had been sacrificed by special persons on the\nappointed days.[108] Tyndareus \"sacrificed a horse and swore the\nsuitors of Helen, making them stand on the pieces of the horse,\"\nthe oath being to defend Helen and him who might be chosen to\nmarry her if ever they should be wronged.[109] One of the three\nbinding forms of oath prevalent among the S\u00e2nsiya in India is to\n\"kill a cock and pouring its blood on the ground swear over\nit.\"[110] When the Annamese swear by heaven and earth, they often\nkill a buffalo or he-goat and drink its blood.[111] Among the\nancient Arabs comrades in arms swore fidelity to each other by\ndipping their hands in the blood of a camel killed for the\npurpose.[112]\n\n[Footnote 101: _Book of the Dead_, ch. 125.]\n\n[Footnote 102: _Exodus_, xxii. 28. _1 Samuel_, xvii. 43.\n_Isaiah_, viii. 21.]\n\n[Footnote 103: Chapman, _Travels in the Interior of South\nAfrica_, i. 45 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 104: Woodthorpe, 'Wild Tribes inhabiting the so-called\nNaga Hills,' in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xi. 70.]\n\n[Footnote 105: _Supra_, i. 590 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 106: Lewin, _Wild Races of South-Eastern India_,\np. 233. _Cf._ _ibid._ p. 244 (Pankhos and Bunjogees).]\n\n[Footnote 107: _Landn\u00e1mab\u00f3k_, iv. 7 (_Islend\u00ednga S\u00f6gur_, i. 258).\nLea, _Superstition and Force_, p. 27. Keyser, _Efterladte\nSkrifter_, ii. pt. i. 388. Gummere, _Germanic Origins_, p. 301.]\n\n[Footnote 108: Demosthenes, _Oratio (xxiii.) contra\nAristocratem_, 67 _sq._, p. 642.]\n\n[Footnote 109: Pausanias, iii. 20. 9. For Homeric oath sacrifices\nsee _Iliad_, iii. 260 _sqq._; xix. 250 _sqq._; Keller, _Homeric\nSociety_, p. 176 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 110: Crooke, _Tribes and Castes of the North-Western\nProvinces_, iv. 281.]\n\n[Footnote 111: Kohler, _Rechtsvergleichende Studien_, p. 208.]\n\n[Footnote 112: Wellhausen, _Reste arabischen Heidentums_, p. 128.]\n\nThe last mentioned case, which implies shedding of blood as a\nmeans of sealing a compact, leads us to a special class of\nsacrifices offered to gods, namely, the covenant sacrifice, known\nto us from Semitic antiquity. The Hebrews, as Professor Robertson\nSmith observes,[113] thought of the national religion as\nconstituted by a formal covenant sacrifice at Mount Sinai, where\nhalf of the blood of the sacrificed oxen was sprinkled on the\naltar and the other half on the people,[114] or even by a still\nearlier covenant rite in which the parties were Yahve and\nAbraham;[115] and the idea of sacrifice establishing a covenant\nbetween God and man is also apparent in the Psalms.[116] In\nvarious cases recorded in the Old Testament sacrifice is\naccompanied by a sacrificial meal;[117] \"the god and his\nworshippers are wont to eat and drink together, and by this token\ntheir fellowship is declared {623} and sealed.\"[118] Robertson\nSmith and his followers have represented this as an act of\ncommunion, as a sacrament in which the whole kin--the god with\nhis clansmen--unite, and in partaking of which each member renews\nhis union with the god and with the rest of the clan. At first,\nwe are told, the god--that is, the totem god--himself was eaten,\nwhilst at a later stage the practice of eating the god was\nsuperseded by the practice of eating with the god. Communion\nstill remains the core of sacrifice; and it is said that only\nsubsequently the practice of offering gifts to the deity develops\nout of the sacrificial union between the worshippers and their\ngod.[119] But I venture to think that the whole of this theory is\nbased upon a misunderstanding of the Semitic evidence, and that\nexisting beliefs in Morocco throw new light upon the covenant\nsacrifice.\n\n[Footnote 113: Robertson Smith, _Religion of the Semites_, p. 318\n_sq._]\n\n[Footnote 114: _Exodus_, xxiv. 4 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 115: _Genesis_, xv. 8 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 116: _Psalms_, l. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 117: _Genesis_, xxxi. 54. _Exodus_, xxiv. 11. _1\nSamuel_, xi. 15. Wellhausen says (_Prolegomena to the History of\nIsrael_, p. 71) that, according to the practice of the older\nperiod, a meal was nearly always connected with a sacrifice.]\n\n[Footnote 118: Robertson Smith, _op. cit._ p. 271.]\n\n[Footnote 119: _Ibid._ lec. ix. _sqq._ Hartland, _Legend of\nPerseus_, ii. 236. Jevons, _Introduction to the History of\nReligion_, p. 225.]\n\nThe Moorish covenant (_l-[(]ahd_) is closely connected with the\nMoorish _[(]\u00e2r_. Whilst _l-[(]\u00e2r_ is one-sided, _l-[(]ahd_ is\nmutual, both parties transferring conditional curses to one\nanother. And here again the transference requires a material\nconductor. Among the Arabs of the plains and the Berbers of\nCentral Morocco chiefs, in times of rebellion, exchange their\ncloaks or turbans, and it is believed that if any of them should\nbreak the covenant he would be punished with some grave\nmisfortune. Among the Ul\u00e1d Bu [(]Az\u00eez, in the province of\nDukk\u00e2la, it is a common custom for persons who wish to be\nreconciled after a quarrel to go to a holy man and in his\npresence join their right hands so that the fingers of the one go\nbetween the fingers of the other, after which the saint throws\nhis cloak over the united hands, saying, \"This is _[(]ahd_\nbetween you.\" Or they may in a similar manner join their hands at\na saint's tomb over the head of the box under which the saint is\nburied, or they may perform the same ceremony simply in the\npresence of some friends. In either case the joining of hands is\nusually {624} accompanied by a common meal, and frequently the\nhands are joined over the dish after eating. If a person who has\nthus made a compact with another is afterwards guilty of a breach\nof faith, it is said that \"God and the food will repay him\"; in\nother words, the conditional curse embodied in the food which he\nate will be realised. All over Morocco the usual method of\nsealing a compact of friendship is by eating together, especially\nat the tomb of some saint. As we have noticed above,[120] the\nsacredness of the place adds to the efficacy of the imprecation,\nbut its vehicle, the real punisher, is the eaten food, because it\ncontains a conditional curse.\n\n[Footnote 120: _Supra_, i. 587.]\n\nThe _[(]ahd_ of the Moors helps us to understand the covenant\nsacrifice of the ancient Semites. The only difference between\nthem is that the former is a method of establishing a compact\nbetween men and men, whilst the latter established a compact\nbetween men and their god. The idea of a mutual transference of\nconditional curses undoubtedly underlies both. It should be\nnoticed that in the Old Testament also, as among the Moors, we\nmeet with human covenants made by the parties eating\ntogether.[121] Thus the Israelites entered into alliance with the\nGibeonites by taking of their victuals, without consulting Yahve,\nand the meal was expressly followed by an oath.[122] In other\ninstances, again, the common dish consisted of sacrificial food,\neither because the sacredness of such food was supposed to make\nthe conditional curse embodied in it more efficacious, or because\nthe deity was included as a third party to the covenant.\n\n[Footnote 121: _Genesis_, xxvi. 30; xxxi. 46. _2 Samuel_, iii. 20\n_sq._ Robertson Smith, _op. cit._ p. 271. Nowack, _Lehrbuch der\nhebr\u00e4ischen Arch\u00e4ologie_, i. 359.]\n\n[Footnote 122: _Joshua_, ix. 14 _sq._]\n\nWhilst in some cases the object of a sacrifice is to transfer\nconditional curses either to the god to whom it is made, or to\nboth the god and the worshipper, the victim or article offered\nmay in other instances be used as a vehicle for transferring\nbenign virtue to him who offered it or to other persons. As we\nhave noticed {625} above, a sacrifice is very frequently believed\nto be endowed with beneficial magic energy in consequence of its\ncontact or communion with the supernatural being to which it is\noffered, and this energy is then supposed to have a salutary\neffect upon the person who comes in touch with it. I have said\nbefore that in Morocco magic virtue is ascribed to various parts\nof the sheep which is sacrificed at the \"Great Feast,\" and that\nevery offering to a holy person, especially a dead saint, is\nconsidered to participate to some extent in his sanctity.[123]\nThe Vedic people regarded sacrificial food as a kind of\nmedicine.[124] The Siberian Kachinzes blessed their huts with\nsacrificial milk.[125] The Lapps strewed the ashes of their\nburnt-offerings upon their heads.[125] It is quite possible that\nin some instances a desire to receive the benefit of the\nsupernatural energy with which the sacrifice is endowed is by\nitself a sufficient motive for offering it to a god.\n\n[Footnote 123: _Supra_, i. 445 _sq._ See also Westermarck, 'The\nPopular Ritual of the Great Feast in Morocco,' in _Folk-Lore_,\nxxii. 145 _sqq._; Hubert and Mauss, _loc. cit._ p. 133.]\n\n[Footnote 124: Oldenberg, _Die Religion des Veda_, p. 328 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 125: Georgi, _op. cit._ iii. 275.]\n\n[Footnote 126: von D\u00fcben, _Lappland och Lapparne_, p. 258.]\n\nAs is the case with other rites, sacrifices also have a strong\ntendency to survive the ideas from which they sprang. Thus when\nthe materialistic conception of the nature of gods faded away,\nofferings continued to be made to them, though their meaning was\nchanged. As Sir E. B. Tylor observes, \"the idea of practical\nacceptableness of the food or valuables presented to the deity,\nbegins early to shade into the sentiment of divine gratification\nor propitiation by a reverent offering, though in itself of not\nmuch account to so mighty a divine personage,\"[127] Sacrifice\nthen becomes mainly, or exclusively, a symbol of humility and\nreverence. Even in the Rig-Veda, in spite of its crude\nmaterialism, we meet with indications of the idea that the value\nof a sacrifice lies in the feelings of the worshipper; if unable\nto offer an ox or cow, the singer hopes that a small gift from\nthe heart, a fagot, a libation, a bundle of grass, offered with\nreverence, {626} will be more acceptable to the god than butter\nor honey.[128] In Greece, though the sacrificial ritual remained\nunchanged till the end of paganism, we frequently come upon the\nadvanced reflection that righteousness is the best sacrifice,\nthat the poor man's slight offering avails more with the deity\nthan hecatombs of oxen.[129] According to Porphyry, the gods have\nno need of banquets and magnificent sacrifices, but we should\nwith the greatest alacrity make a moderate oblation to them of\nour own property, as \"the honours which we pay to the gods should\nbe accompanied by the same promptitude as that with which we give\nthe first seat to worthy men.\"[130] It is said in the Talmud that\n\"he who offers humility unto God and man, shall be rewarded with\na reward as if he had offered all the sacrifices in the world.\"[131]\n\n[Footnote 127: Tylor, _Primitive Culture_, ii. 394.]\n\n[Footnote 128: _Rig-Veda_, viii. 19. 5. Kaegi, _op. cit._ p. 30.]\n\n[Footnote 129: Farnell, _Cults of the Greek States_, i. 101.\nSchmidt, _Die Ethik der alten Griechen_, ii. 43. Westcott,\n_Essays in the History of Religious Thought_, p. 116.]\n\n[Footnote 130: Porphyry, _De abstinentia ab esu animalium_, ii. 60.]\n\n[Footnote 131: Deutsch, _Literary Remains_, p. 55.]\n\nI have here spoken of the _practice_ of sacrifice and the ideas\non which it is based. But sacrifice has also a moral value\nattached to it. Though no doubt in many cases optional, it is\nunder various circumstances regarded as a stringent duty. This is\nparticularly the case with the offerings regularly made by the\ncommunity at large on special occasions fixed by custom.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nAs supernatural beings have material needs like men, they also\npossess property like men, and this must not be interfered with.\nThe Fjort of West Africa believe that the spirits of the rivers\nkill those who drink their waters and sometimes punish those who\nfish in them for greediness, by making them deaf and dumb.[132]\nWhen their chief god \"played\" by thundering, the Amazulu said to\nhim who was frightened, \"Why do you start, because the lord\nplays? What have you taken which belongs to him?\"[133] The\nFijians speak of a deluge {627} the cause of which was the\nkilling of a favourite bird belonging to the god Ndengei by two\nmischievous lads, his grandsons.[134] In Efate, of the New\nHebrides, to steal cocoanuts which are consecrated to the worship\nof the gods at some forthcoming festival \"would be regarded as a\nmuch greater offence than common stealing.\"[135] So, too, the\npillaging of a temple has commonly been looked upon as the worst\nkind of robbery.[136] Among the Hebrews any trespass upon ground\nwhich was hallowed by the localised presence of Yahveh was\nvisited with extreme punishment.[137] In Arabia people were\nforbidden to cut fodder, fell trees, or hunt game within the\nprecincts of a sacred place.[138] The Moors believe that a person\nwould incur a very great risk indeed by cutting the branch of a\ntree or shooting a bird in the _[h.]orm_ of a _s\u00edyid_, or dead\nsaint. The _[h.]orm_ is the homestead and domain of the saint,\nand he is the owner of everything within its borders. But the\noffence is not exclusively one against property, and it may be\ndoubted whether originally any clear idea of ownership at all was\nconnected with it. In a holy place all objects are endowed with\nsupernatural energy, and may therefore themselves, as it were,\navenge injuries committed against them. This is true of the\n_[h.]orm_ of a saint, as well as of any other sanctuary, all his\nbelongings being considered to partake of his sanctity. But, as a\nmatter of fact, the so-called tomb of a saint is frequently a\nplace which was at first regarded as holy by itself, on account\nof its natural appearance, and was only afterwards traditionally\nassociated with a holy person, when the need was felt of giving\nan anthropomorphous interpretation of its holiness.[139]\nAccording to early ideas a {628} sacred object cannot with\nimpunity be appropriated for ordinary purposes;[140] but, on the\nother hand, visitors are allowed to take a handful of earth from\nthe tomb of the saint or in certain cases to cut a small piece of\nwood from some tree growing in his _[h.]orm_, to be used as a\ncharm.[141] It also deserves notice that the saint protects not\nonly his own property, but any goods left in his care; hence the\ncountry Arabs of Morocco often have their granaries in the\n_[h.]\u00f3r[)u]mat_ of saints.\n\n[Footnote 132: Dennett, _Folklore of the Fjort_, p. 5 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 133: Callaway, _Religious System of the Amazulu_, p. 57.]\n\n[Footnote 134: Williams and Calvert, _op. cit._p. 212.]\n\n[Footnote 135: Macdonald, _Oceania_, p. 208.]\n\n[Footnote 136: Schmidt, _Ethik der alten Griechen_, ii. 19 _sq._\nCicero, _De legibus_, ii. 9, 16; Mommsen, _R\u00f6misches Strafrecht_,\np. 458. Wilda, _Strafrecht der Germanen_, p. 950; Dahn,\n_Bausteine_, ii. 106 (Teutons). Du Boys, _Histoire du droit\ncriminel des peuples modernes_, ii. 605 _sq._ Filangieri, _La\nscienza della legislazione_, iv. 205 (laws of Christian countries).]\n\n[Footnote 137: Montefiore, _Hibbert Lectures on the Religion of\nthe Ancient Hebrews_, p. 38.]\n\n[Footnote 138: Wellhausen, _Reste arabischen Heidentums_, p. 106.]\n\n[Footnote 139: Westermarck, 'Sul culto dei santi nel Marocco,' in\n_Actes du XII. Congr\u00e8s International des Orientalistes_, iii.\n175. _Cf._ Goldziher, _Muhammedanische Studien_, ii. 344 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 140: See Robertson Smith, _op. cit._ lec. iv. and\nAdditional Note B.]\n\n[Footnote 141: Westermarck, in _Actes du XII. Congr\u00e8s des\nOrientalistes_, iii. 167 _sq._]\n\nMoreover, anybody who takes refuge at a _s\u00edyid_ is for the moment\nsafe. The right of sanctuary is regarded as very sacred in\nMorocco, especially in those parts of the country where the\nSultan's government has no power. To violate it is an outrage\nwhich the saint is sure to punish. I saw a madman whose insanity\nwas attributed to the fact that he once had forcibly removed a\nfugitive from a saint's tomb; and of a late Grand-Vizier it is\nsaid that he was killed by two powerful saints of Dukk\u00e2la, on\nwhose refugees he had laid violent hands. Even the descendants of\nthe saint or his manager (_m[k.]\u00e1ddem_) can only by persuasion\nand by promising to mediate between the suppliant and his pursuer\ninduce the former to leave the place.[142] As is well known, this\nis not a custom restricted to Morocco. Among many peoples, at\ndifferent stages of civilisation, sacred places give shelter to\nrefugees.[143]\n\n[Footnote 142: See Westermarck, _The Moorish Conception of\nHoliness_, p. 116 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 143: See Andree, 'Die Asyle,' in _Globus_, xxxviii. 301\n_sq._; Frazer, 'Origin of Totemism,' in _Fortnightly Review_, N.\nS. lxv. 650 _sqq._; Hellwig, _Das Asylrecht_, _passim_;\nBulmerincq, _Das Asylrecht_, _passim_. Fuld, 'Das Asylrecht im\nAlterthum und Mittelalter,' in _Zeitschr. f. vergl. Rechtswiss._\nvii. p. 103 _sqq._]\n\nAmong the Central Australian Arunta there is in each local totem\ncentre a spot called _ertnatulunga_, in the immediate\nneighbourhood of which everything is sacred and must on no\naccount be hurt. The plants growing there are never interfered\nwith in any way; animals which come there are safe {629} from the\nspear of the hunter; and a man who was being pursued by others\nwould not be touched so long as he remained at this spot.[144] In\nUpolu, one of the Samoan Islands, a certain god, Vave, had his\nresidence in an old tree, which served as an asylum for murderers\nand other great offenders; if that tree was reached by the\ncriminal he was safe, and the avenger could pursue no farther,\nbut had to wait for investigation and trial.[145] In the island\nof Hawaii there were two _puhonuas_, or cities of refuge, which\nafforded an inviolable sanctuary even to the vilest criminal who\nentered their precincts, and during war offered safe retreat to\nall the non-combatants of the neighbouring districts who flocked\ninto them, as well as to the vanquished. As soon as the fugitive\nhad entered, he repaired to the presence of the idol and made a\nshort ejaculatory address, expressive of his obligations to him\nin reaching the place with security. The priests and their\nadherents would immediately put to death anyone who should have\nthe temerity to follow or molest those who were once within the\npale of the _pahu tabu_, and, as they put it, under the shade or\nprotection of the spirit of Keave, the tutelary deity of the\nplace. After a short period, probably not more than two or three\ndays, the refugee was permitted to return unmolested to his home,\nthe divine protection being supposed still to abide with\nhim.[146] In Tahiti the _morais_, or holy places, likewise gave\nshelter to criminals of every kind.[147] At Maiva, in the\nSouth-Eastern part of New Guinea, \"should a man be pursued by an\nenemy and take refuge in the _dubu_ [or temple], he is perfectly\nsafe inside. Any one smiting another inside the _dubu_ would have\nhis arms and legs shrivelled up, and he could do nothing but wish\nto die.\"[148]\n\n[Footnote 144: Spencer and Gillen, _Native Tribes of Central\nAustralia_, p. 133 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 145: Turner, _Samoa_, p. 64 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 146: Ellis, _Tour through Hawaii_, p. 155 _sqq._\nJarves, _History of the Hawaiian Islands_, p. 28 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 147: Turnbull, _Voyage round the World_, p. 366.\nWilson, _Missionary Voyage to the Southern Pacific Ocean_, p. 351.]\n\n[Footnote 148: Chalmers and Gill, _Work and Adventure in New\nGuinea_, p. 186.]\n\nIn many North American tribes certain sacred places or whole\nvillages served as asylums, in which those who were pursued by\nthe tribe or even an enemy were safe as soon as they had obtained\nadmission.[149] Among the Acagchemem Indians, in the valley and\nneighbourhood of San Juan Capistrano in California, a criminal\nwho had fled to a _vanquech_, or place of worship, was secure not\nonly as long as he remained there, but {630} also after he had\nleft the sanctuary. It was not even lawful to mention his crime,\nbut all that the avenger could do to him was to point at him and\nderide him, saying, \"Lo, a coward, who has been forced to flee to\nChinigchinich!\" This flight, however, turned the punishment from\nthe head of the criminal upon that of some of his relatives.[150]\n\n[Footnote 149: Adair, _History of the American Indians_, pp. 158,\n159, 416. Bradbury, _Travels in the Interior of America_, p. 165\n_sq._ (Aricaras of the Missouri). Bourke, 'Medicine-Men of the\nApache,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ ix. 453. Kohl, _Kitchi-Gami_,\np. 271 (Chippewas).]\n\n[Footnote 150: Bancroft, _Native Races of the Pacific States_,\niii. 167. Boscana, in [Robinson,] _Life in California_, p. 262 _sq._]\n\nThe South-Central African Barotse have a city of refuge. \"Anyone\nincurring the king's wrath, or committing a crime, may find\nsafety by fleeing to this town. The man in charge of it is\nexpected to plead for him before the chief, and he can then\nreturn to his house in peace.\"[151] Among the same people the\ntombs of chiefs are sanctuaries or places of refuge,[152] and\nthis is also the case among the Kafirs.[153] So, too, in the\nmonarchical states of the Gallas homicides enjoy a legal right of\nasylum if they have succeeded in taking refuge in a hut near the\nburial-place of the king.[154] Among the Ovambo in South-Western\nAfrica the village of a great chief is abandoned at his death,\nexcept by the members of a certain family, who remain there to\nprevent it from falling into utter decay. Condemned criminals who\ncontrive to escape to one of these deserted villages are safe, at\nleast for a time; for not even the chief himself may pursue a\nfugitive into the sacred place.[155] In Congo Fran\u00e7ais there are\nseveral sanctuaries:--\"The great one in the Calabar district is\nat Omon. Thither mothers of twins, widows, thieves, and slaves\nfly, and if they reach it are safe.\"[156] In Ashantee a slave who\nflies to a temple and dashes himself against the fetish cannot\neasily be brought back to his master.[157] Among the Negroes of\nAccra criminals used to \"seat themselves upon the fetish,\" that\nis, place themselves under its protection; but murderers who\nsought refuge with the fetish were always liable to be delivered\nup to their pursuers.[158] A traveller in the seventeenth century\ntells us that in Fetu, on the Gold Coast, a criminal who deserved\ndeath was pardoned by taking refuge in the hut of the\nhigh-priest.[159] Among the Krumen of the Grain Coast the house\nof the high-priest (_bodio_) \"is a sanctum to which culprits\n{631} may betake themselves without the danger of being removed\nby anyone except by the _bodio_ himself.\"[160] In Usambara a\nmurderer cannot be arrested at any of the four places where the\ngreat wizards of the country reside.[161]\n\n[Footnote 151: Arnot, _Garenganze_, p. 77.]\n\n[Footnote 152: Decle, _Three Years in Savage Africa_, p. 75.]\n\n[Footnote 153: Rehme, 'Das Recht der Amaxosa,' in _Zeitschr. f.\nvergl. Rechtswiss._ x. 51.]\n\n[Footnote 154: Paulitschke, _Ethnographie Nordost-Afrikas, Die\ngeistige Cultur der Dan\u00e2kil, &c._ p. 157.]\n\n[Footnote 155: Schinz, _Deutsch-S\u00fcdwest-Afrika_, p. 312.]\n\n[Footnote 156: Kingsley, _Travels in West Africa_, p. 466.]\n\n[Footnote 157: Bowdich, _Mission to Ashantee_, p. 265. _Cf._\nMonrad, _op. cit._ p. 42.]\n\n[Footnote 158: Monrad, _op. cit._ p. 89.]\n\n[Footnote 159: M\u00fcller, _Die Africanische Landschafft Fetu_,\np. 75.]\n\n[Footnote 160: Wilson, _Western Africa_, p. 129.]\n\n[Footnote 161: Krapf, _Reisen in Ost-Afrika_, ii. 132.]\n\nIn other Muhammedan countries besides Morocco the tombs of\nsaints, as also the mosques, are or have been places of\nrefuge.[162] In Persia the great number of such asylums proved so\ninjurious to public safety, that about the middle of the\nnineteenth century only three mosques were left which were\nrecognised by the government as affording protection to criminals\nof every description.[163] Among the Hebrews the right of asylum\noriginally belonged to all altars,[164] but on the abolition of\nthe local altars it was limited to certain cities of refuge.[165]\nAccording to the Old Testament manslayers could find shelter\nthere only in the case of involuntary homicide; but this was\nundoubtedly a narrowing of the ancient custom. Many heathen\nsanctuaries of the Ph[oe]nicians and Syrians retained even in\nRoman times what seems to have been an unlimited right of\nasylum;[166] and at certain Arabian shrines the god likewise gave\nshelter to all fugitives without distinction, and even stray or\nstolen cattle that reached the holy ground could not be reclaimed\nby their owners.[167]\n\n[Footnote 162: Goldziher, _Muhammedanische Studien_, i. 237 _sq._\nQuatrem\u00e8re, 'M\u00e9moire sur les asiles chez les Arabes,' in\n_M\u00e9moires de l'Institut de France, Acad\u00e9mie des Inscriptions et\nBelles-Lettres_, xv. pt. ii. 313 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 163: Polak, _Persien_, ii. 83 _sqq._ Brugsch, _Im Lande\nder Sonne_, p. 246.]\n\n[Footnote 164: _Exodus_, xxi. 13 _sq._ _Cf._ Robertson Smith,\n_Religion of the Semites_, p. 148, n. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 165: _Numbers_, xxxv. 11 _sqq._ _Deuteronomy_, iv. 41\n_sqq._; xix. 2 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 166: Robertson Smith, _op. cit._ p. 148.]\n\n[Footnote 167: _Ibid._ p. 148 _sq._]\n\nOn the Coast of Malabar a certain temple situated to the\nsouth-east of Calicut affords protection to thieves and\nadulterous women belonging to the Brahmin caste, but this\nprivilege is reckoned among the sixty-four _anatcharams_, or\n\"abuses,\" which were introduced by Brahmanism.[168] Among the\nK\u00e1firs of the Hindu-Kush there are several \"cities of refuge,\"\nthe largest being the village of Mergrom, which is almost\nentirely peopled by _chiles_, or descendants of persons who have\nslain some fellow tribesman.[169] In the Caucasus holy groves\noffer refuge to criminals, as also to animals, which cannot be\nshot there.[170]\n\n[Footnote 168: Graul, _Reise nach Ostindien_, iii. 332, 335.]\n\n[Footnote 169: Scott Robertson, _K\u00e1firs of the Hindu-Kush_, p. 441.]\n\n[Footnote 170: Hahn, _Kaukasische Reisen_, p. 122.]\n\nIn Greece many sanctuaries possessed the right of asylum down to\nthe end of paganism, and any violation of this right {632} was\nsupposed to be severely punished by the deity.[171] According to\nan old tradition, Romulus established a sanctuary, dedicated to\nsome unknown god or spirit, on the slope of the Capitoline Hill,\nproclaiming that all who resorted to it, whether bond or free,\nshould be safe.[172] This tradition, and also some other\nstatements made by Latin writers,[173] seem to indicate that from\nancient times certain sacred places in Rome gave shelter to\nrefugees; but it was only in a comparatively late period of Roman\nhistory that the right of sanctuary, under Greek influence,\nbecame a recognised institution of some importance.[174] This\nright was expressly conferred upon the temple which in the year\n42 B.C. was built in honour of C\u00e6sar;[175] and other imperial\ntemples, as also the statues of emperors, laid claim to the same\nprivilege.[176] When Christianity became the religion of the\nState a similar claim was made by the churches; but a legal right\nof asylum was only granted to them by Honorius in the West and\nTheodosius in the East.[177] Subsequently it was restricted by\nJustinian, who decreed that all manslayers, adulterers, and\nkidnappers of women who fled to a church should be taken out of\nit.[178]\n\n[Footnote 171: Tacitus, _Annales_, iii. 60 _sqq._ Farnell, _op.\ncit._ i. 73. Westcott, _op. cit._ p. 115. Schmidt, _Die Ethik der\nalten Griechen_, ii. 285. Bulmerincq, _op. cit._ p. 35 _sqq._\nFuld, _loc. cit._ p. 118 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 172: Dionysius of Halicarnassus, _Antiquitates Roman\u00e6_,\nii. 15. Livy, i. 8. 5 _sq._ Plutarch, _Romulus_, ix. 5. Strabo,\nv. 3. 2, p. 230.]\n\n[Footnote 173: Valerius Maximus, _Facta dictaque memorabilia_,\nviii. 9. 1. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, _Antiquitates Roman\u00e6_,\nvi. 45. Cicero, _De lege agraria oratio secunda_, 14 (36). See\nalso Hartung, _Die Religion der R\u00f6mer_, ii. 58 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 174: See Tacitus, _Annales_, iii. 36; Plautus,\n_Rudens_, 723; Dio Cassius, _Historia Romana_, xlvii. 19;\nBulmerincq, _op. cit._ p. 58 _sqq._; Mommsen, _R\u00f6misches\nStrafrecht_, p. 458 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 175: Dio Cassius, xlvii. 19.]\n\n[Footnote 176: Tacitus, _Annales_, iv. 67. Suetonius, _Tiberius_,\n53. Mommsen, _op. cit._ p. 460.]\n\n[Footnote 177: Mommsen, _op. cit._ p. 461 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 178: _Novell\u00e6_, xvii. 7.]\n\nThe right of sanctuary existed among the pagan Slavs, or some of\nthem,[179] and probably also among the ancient Teutons.[180]\nAfter their conversion to Christianity the privilege of asylum\nwithin the church was recognised in most of their codes. In the\nMiddle Ages and later, persons who fled to a church or to certain\nboundaries surrounding it were, for a time at least, safe from\nall persecution, it being considered treason against God, an\noffence beyond compensation, to force even the most flagrant\ncriminal from His altar. The ordinary of the sacred place, or\n{633} his official, was the only one who could try to induce him\nto leave it, but if he failed, the utmost that could be done was\nto deny the refugee victuals so that he might go forth\nvoluntarily.[181] In the 'Lex Baiuwariorum' it is asserted in the\nstrongest terms that there is no crime which may not be pardoned\nfrom the fear of God and reverence for the saints.[182] But the\nright of sanctuary was gradually subjected to various\nrestrictions both by secular legislation and by the Church.[183]\nInnocentius III. enjoined that refuge should not be given to a\nhighway robber or to anybody who devastated cultivated fields at\nnight;[184] and according to Beaumanoir's 'Coutumes du\nBeauvoisis,' dating from the thirteenth century, it was also\ndenied to persons guilty of sacrilege or arson.[185] The\nParliament of Scotland enacted that whoever took the protection\nof the Church for homicide should be required to come out and\nundergo an assize, that it might be found whether it was\ncommitted of \"forethought felony\" or in \"chaudemelle\"; and only\nin the latter case was he to be restored to the sanctuary, the\nsheriff being directed to give him security to that effect before\nrequiring him to leave it.[186] In England, in the reign of Henry\nVIII., there were certain places which were allowed to be \"places\nof tuition and privilege,\" in addition to churches and their\nprecincts. They were in fact cities of permanent refuge for\npersons who should, according to ancient usage, have abjured the\nrealm, after they had fled in the ordinary way to a church. There\nwas a governor in each of these privileged places, charged with\nthe duty of mustering every day his men, who were not to exceed\ntwenty in each town and who had to wear a badge whenever they\nappeared out of doors. But when these regulations were made, the\nprotection of sanctuary was taken away from persons guilty of\nmurder, rape, burglary, highway robbery, or arson. The law of\nsanctuary was then left unchanged till the reign of James I.,\nwhen, in theory, the privilege in question was altogether denied\nto criminals.[187] Yet {634} as a matter of fact, asylums\ncontinued to exist in England so late as the reign of George I.,\nwhen that of St. Peter's at Westminster was demolished.[188] In\nthe legislation of Sweden the last reference to the privilege of\nsanctuary is found in an enactment of 1528.[189] In France it was\nabolished by an _ordonnance_ of 1539.[190] In Spain it existed\neven in the nineteenth century.[191] Not long ago the most\nimportant churches in Abyssinia,[192] the monastery of Affaf\nWoira in the same country,[193] and the quarter in Gondar where\nthe head of the Abyssinian clergy has his residence,[194] were\nreported to be asylums for criminals. And the same is the case\nwith the old Christian churches among the Suanetians of the\nCaucasus.[195]\n\n[Footnote 179: Helmold, _Chronik der Slaven_, i. 83, p. 170.]\n\n[Footnote 180: Wilda, _Das Strafrecht der Germanen_, p. 248 _sq._\nStemann, _Den danske Retshistorie indtil Christian V.'s Lov_, p.\n578. Brunner, _Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte_, ii. 610. Fuld, _loc.\ncit._ p. 138 _sq._ Frauenst\u00e4dt, _Blutrache und Todtschlags\u00fchne im\nDeutschen Mittelalter_, p. 51.]\n\n[Footnote 181: Milman, _History of Latin Christianity_, ii. 59.\nBulmerincq, _op. cit._ p. 73 _sqq._ Fuld, _loc. cit._ p. 136\n_sqq._ Bracton, _De legibus et consuetudinibus Angli\u00e6_, fol. 136\nb, vol. ii. 392 _sq._ R\u00e9ville, 'L'abjuratio regni,' in _Revue\nhistorique_, l. 14 _sqq._ Pollock and Maitland, _History of\nEnglish Law before the Time of Edward I._ ii. 590 _sq._ Innes,\n_Scotland in the Middle Ages_, p. 195 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 182: _Lex Baiuwariorum_, i. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 183: Brunner, _op. cit._ ii. 611 _sq._ Bulmerincq, _op.\ncit._ p. 91 _sqq._ Fuld, _loc. cit._ p. 140 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 184: Gregory IX. _Decretales_, iii. 49. 6.]\n\n[Footnote 185: Beaumanoir, _Coutumes du Beauvoisis_, xi. 15\n_sqq._, vol. i. 164 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 186: Innes, _op. cit._ p. 198.]\n\n[Footnote 187: Pike, _History of Crime in England_, ii. 253.\nBlackstone, _Commentaries on the Laws of England_, iv. 347, n. a.]\n\n[Footnote 188: Jusserand, _English Wayfaring Life in the Middle\nAges_, p. 166.]\n\n[Footnote 189: Nordstr\u00f6m, _Bidrag till den svenska\nsamh\u00e4lls-f\u00f6rfattningens historia_, ii. 405.]\n\n[Footnote 190: Du Boys, _Histoire du droit criminel des peuples\nmodernes_, ii. 246.]\n\n[Footnote 191: _Idem_, _Histoire du droit criminel de l'Espagne_,\np. 227 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 192: Hellwig, _op. cit._ p. 52.]\n\n[Footnote 193: Harris, _Highlands of \u00c6thiopia_, ii. 93.]\n\n[Footnote 194: R\u00fcppell, _Reise in Abyssinien_, ii. 74, 81. von\nHeuglin, _Reise nach Abessinien_, p. 213.]\n\n[Footnote 195: von Haxthausen, _Transcaucasia_, p. 160, n. *]\n\nThe right of sanctuary has been ascribed to various causes.\nObviously erroneous is the suggestion that places of refuge were\nestablished with a view to protecting unintentional offenders\nfrom punishment or revenge.[196] The restriction of the privilege\nof sanctuary to cases of accidental injuries is not at all\ngeneral, and where it occurs it is undoubtedly an innovation due\nto moral or social considerations. Very frequently this privilege\nhas been attributed to a desire to give time for the first heat\nof resentment to pass over before the injured party could seek\nredress.[197] But although I admit that such a desire may have\nhelped to preserve the right of asylum where it has once come\ninto existence, I do not believe that it could account for the\norigin of this right. We should remember that the privilege of\nsanctuary not only affords {635} temporary protection to the\nrefugee, but in many cases altogether exempts him from punishment\nor retaliation, and that shelter is given even to animals which\nhave fled to a sacred place. And, if the theory referred to were\ncorrect, how could we explain the fact that the right of asylum\nis particularly attached to sanctuaries?\n\n[Footnote 196: Hegel, _Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts_,\n\u00a7 117, p. 108. Powell, 'Outlines of Sociology,' in _Saturday\nLectures_, p. 82.]\n\n[Footnote 197: Meiners, _Geschichte der Menschheit_, p. 189.\nNordstr\u00f6m, _op. cit._ ii. 401. Pardessus, _Loi Salique_, p. 656.\nBulmerincq, _op. cit._ pp. 34, 47. Fuld, _loc. cit._ pp. 102,\n118, 119, 294 _sqq._ Kohler, _Shakespeare vor dem Forum der\nJurisprudenz_, p. 185. Quatrem\u00e8re, _loc. cit._ p. 314. Mr.\nMallery (_Israelite and Indian_, p. 33 _sq._), also, thinks that\nthe original object of the right of sanctuary was to restrict\nvengeance and maintain peace, and that this right only\nsubsequently appeared as a prerogative of religion.]\n\nIt has been said that the right of sanctuary bears testimony to\nthe power of certain places to transmit their virtues to those\nwho entered them.[198] But we have no evidence that the fugitive\nis supposed to partake of the sanctity of the place which\nshelters him. In Morocco persons who are permanently attached to\nmosques or the shrines of saints are generally regarded as more\nor less holy, but this is never the case with casual visitors or\nsuppliants; hence it is hardly for fear of the refugee that his\npursuer refrains from laying hands on him. Professor Robertson\nSmith has stated part of the truth in saying that \"the assertion\nof a man's undoubted rights as against a fugitive at the\nsanctuary is regarded as an encroachment on its holiness.\"[199]\nThere is an almost instinctive fear not only of shedding\nblood,[200] but of disturbing the peace in a holy place; and if\nit is improper to commit any act of violence in the house of\nanother man,[201] it is naturally considered equally offensive,\nand also infinitely more dangerous, to do so in the homestead of\na supernatural being. In the Tonga Islands, for instance, \"it is\nforbidden {636} to quarrel or fight upon consecrated\nground.\"[202] But this is only one aspect of the matter; another,\nequally important, still calls for an explanation. Why should the\ngods or saints themselves be so anxious to protect criminals who\nhave sought refuge in their sanctuaries? Why do they not deliver\nthem up to justice through their earthly representatives?\n\n[Footnote 198: Granger, _Worship of the Romans_, p. 223 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 199: Robertson Smith, _Religion of the Semites_, p. 148.]\n\n[Footnote 200: _Supra_, i. 380.]\n\n[Footnote 201: Among the Barea and Kun\u00e1ma in Eastern Africa a\nmurderer who finds time to flee into another person's house\ncannot be seized, and it is considered a point of honour for the\ncommunity to help him to escape abroad (Munzinger,\n_Ostafrikanische Studien_, p. 503). In the Pelew Islands \"no\nenemy may be killed in a house, especially in the presence of the\nhost\" (Kubary, 'Die Palau-Inseln in der S\u00fcdsee,' in _Jour. d.\nMuseum Godeffroy_, iv. 25). In Europe the privilege of asylum\nwent hand in hand with the sanctity of the homestead (Wilda, _op.\ncit._ pp. 242, 243, 538, 543; Nordstr\u00f6m, _op. cit._ ii. 435;\nFuld, _loc. cit._ p. 152; Frauenst\u00e4dt, _op. cit._ p. 63 _sqq._);\nand the breach of a man's peace was proportionate to his rank.\nWhilst every man was entitled to peace in his own house, the\ngreat man's peace was of more importance than the common man's,\nthe king's peace of more importance than the baron's, and in the\nspiritual order the peace of the Church commanded yet greater\nreverence (Pollock, 'The King's Peace,' in _Law Quarterly\nReview_, i. 40 _sq._).]\n\n[Footnote 202: Mariner, _Natives of the Tonga Islands_, ii. 232.\n_Cf._ _ibid._ i. 227.]\n\nThe answer lies in certain ideas which refer to human as well as\ndivine protectors of refugees. The god or saint is in exactly the\nsame position as a man to whose house a person has fled for\nshelter. Among various peoples the domicile of the chief or king\nis an asylum for criminals;[203] nobody dares to attack a man who\nis sheltered by so mighty a personage, and from what has been\nsaid above, in connection with the rules of hospitality, it is\nalso evident why the chief or king feels himself compelled to\nprotect him. By being in close contact with his host, the\nsuppliant is able to transfer to him a dangerous curse. Sometimes\na criminal can in a similar way be a danger to the king even from\na distance, or by meeting him, and must in consequence be\npardoned. In Madagascar an offender escaped punishment if he\ncould obtain sight of the sovereign, whether before or after\nconviction; hence criminals at work on the highroad were ordered\nto withdraw when the sovereign was known to be coming by.[204]\nAmong the Bambaras \"une fois la sentence prononc\u00e9e, si le\ncondamn\u00e9 parvient \u00e0 cracher sur un {637} prince, non-seulement sa\npersonne est sacr\u00e9e, mais elle est nourrie, log\u00e9e, etc., par le\ngrand seigneur qui a eu l'imprudence de se tenir \u00e0 port\u00e9e de cet\n\u00e9trange projectile.\"[205] In Usambara even a murderer is safe as\nsoon as he has touched the person of the king.[206] Among the\nMarutse and neighbouring tribes a person who is accused of any\ncrime receives pardon if he lays a _cupa_--the fossilised base of\na conical shell, which is the most highly valued of all their\ninstruments--at the feet of his chief; and a miscreant likewise\nescapes punishment if he reaches and throws himself on the king's\ndrums.[207] On the Slave Coast \"criminals who are doomed to death\nare always gagged, because if a man should speak to the king he\nmust be pardoned.\"[208] In Ashantee, if an offender should\nsucceed in swearing on the king's life, he must be pardoned,\nbecause such an oath is believed to involve danger to the king;\nhence knives are driven through the cheeks from opposite sides,\nover the tongue, to prevent him from speaking.[209] So also among\nthe Romans, according to an old Jewish writer, a person condemned\nto death was gagged to prevent him from cursing the king.[210]\nFear of the curses pronounced by a dissatisfied refugee likewise,\nin all probability, underlay certain other customs which\nprevailed in Rome. A servant or slave who came and fell down at\nthe feet of Jupiter's high-priest, taking hold of his knees, was\nfor that day freed from the whip; and if a prisoner with irons\nand bolts at his feet succeeded in approaching the high-priest in\nhis house, he was let loose and his fetters were thrown into the\nroad, not through the door, but from the roof.[211] Moreover, if\na criminal who had been sentenced to death accidentally met a\nVestal virgin on his way to the place of execution, his {638}\nlife was saved.[212] So sensitive to imprecations were both\nJupiter's high-priest and the priestesses of Vesta, that the\nPraetor was never allowed to compel them to take an oath.[213]\nNow, as a refugee may by his curse force a king or a priest or\nany other man with whom he establishes some kind of contact to\nprotect him, so he may in a similar manner constrain a god or\nsaint as soon as he has entered his sanctuary. According to the\nMoorish expression he is then in the _[(]\u00e2r_ of the saint, and\nthe saint is bound to protect him, just as a host is bound to\nprotect his guest. It is not only men that have to fear the\ncurses of dissatisfied refugees. Let us once more remember the\nwords which Aeschylus puts into the mouth of Apollo, when he\ndeclares his intention to assist his suppliant, Orestes:--\"Terrible\nboth among men _and gods_ is the wrath of a refugee, when one\nabandons him with intent.\"[214]\n\n[Footnote 203: Harmon, _Voyages and Travels in the Interior of\nNorth America_, p. 297 (Tacullies). Lewin, _Hill Tracts of\nChittagong_, p. 100 (Kukis). Junghuhn, _Die Battal\u00e4nder auf\nSumatra_, (Macassars and Bugis of Celebes). Tromp, 'Uit de\nSalasila van Koetei,' in _Bijdragen tot de taal- land- en\nvolkenkunde van Nederlandsch-Indi\u00eb_, xxxvii. 84 (natives of\nKoetei, a district of Borneo). Jung, quoted by Kohler, 'Recht der\nMarschallinsulaner,' in _Zeitschr. f. vergl. Rechtswiss._ xiv.\n447 (natives of Nauru in the Marshall Group). Turner, _Nineteen\nYears in Polynesia_, p. 334 (Samoans). Rautanen, in Steinmetz,\n_Rechtsverh\u00e4ltnisse_, p. 342 (Ondonga). Schinz, _op. cit._ p. 312\n(Ovambo). Rehme, 'Das Recht der Amaxosa,' in _Zeitschr. f. vergl.\nRechtswiss._ x. 50. Merker, quoted by Kohler, 'Banturecht in\nOstafrika,' _ibid._ xv. 55 (Wadshagga). Merker, _Die Masai_, p.\n206. Among the Barotse the residences of the Queen and the Prime\nMinister are places of refuge (Decle, _op. cit._ p. 75).]\n\n[Footnote 204: Ellis, _History of Madagascar_, i. 376.]\n\n[Footnote 205: Raffenel, _Nouveau voyage dans le pays des\nn\u00e8gres_, i. 385.]\n\n[Footnote 206: Krapf, _Reisen in Ost-Afrika_, ii. 132, n. * See\nalso Schinz, _op. cit._ p. 312 (Ovambo).]\n\n[Footnote 207: Gibbons, _Exploration in Central Africa_, p. 129.\nI am indebted to Mr. N. W. Thomas for drawing my attention to\nthis statement.]\n\n[Footnote 208: Ellis, _E[(w]e-speaking Peoples of the Slave\nCoast_, p. 224.]\n\n[Footnote 209: _Ibid._ p. 224.]\n\n[Footnote 210: Quoted by Levias, 'Cursing,' in _Jewish\nEncyclopedia_, iv. 390.]\n\n[Footnote 211: Plutarch, _Questiones Roman\u00e6_, 111. Aulus Gellius,\n_Noctes Attic\u00e6_, x. 15. 8, 10.]\n\n[Footnote 212: Plutarch, _Numa_, x. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 213: Aulus Gellius, _op. cit._ x. 15. 31.]\n\n[Footnote 214: Aeschylus, _Eumenides_, 232 _sqq._]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XLIX\n\nDUTIES TO GODS (_concluded_)\n\n\nSUPERNATURAL beings are widely believed to have a feeling of\ntheir worth and dignity. They are sensitive to insults and\ndisrespect, they demand submissiveness and homage.\n\n\"The gods of the Gold Coast,\" says Major Ellis, \"are jealous\ngods, jealous of their dignity, jealous of the adulation and\nofferings paid to them; and there is nothing they resent so much\nas any slight, whether intentional or accidental, which may be\noffered them. . . . There is nothing that offends them so deeply\nas to ignore them, or question their power, or laugh at them.\"[1]\nThe wrath of Yahveh burst forth with vehemence whenever his\nhonour or sanctity was in the least violated, however\nunintentionally.[2] Many peoples consider it insulting and\ndangerous merely to point at one of the celestial bodies;[3] and\namong the North American Indians it is a widespread belief that,\nif anybody points at the rainbow, the finger will wither or\nbecome misshapen.[4]\n\n[Footnote 1: Ellis, _Tshi-speaking Peoples of the Gold Coast_, p. 11.]\n\n[Footnote 2: _Cf._ Montefiore, _Hibbert Lectures on the Religion\nof the Ancient Hebrews_, pp. 38, 102.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Liebrecht, _Zur Volkskunde_, p. 341, Dorman, _Origin\nof Primitive Superstitions_, p. 344 (Chippewas). Wuttke, _Der\ndeutsche Volksaberglaube der Gegenwart_, \u00a7 11, p. 13 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 4: Mooney, 'Myths of the Cherokee,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur.\nEthn._ xix. 257, 442.]\n\nNor is it to supernatural danger only that a person exposes\nhimself by irreverence to a god, but in many cases he is also\npunished by his fellow men. On the Slave Coast insults to a god\n\"are always resented and punished by the {640} priests and\nworshippers of that god, it being their duty to guard his\nhonour.\"[5] Among the ancient Peruvians[6] and Hebrews,[7] as\nalso among Christian nations up to comparatively recent times,\nblasphemy was a capital offence. In England, in the reign of\nHenry VIII., a boy of fifteen was burned because he had spoken,\nmuch after the fashion of a parrot, some idle words affecting the\nsacrament of the altar, which he had chanced to hear but of which\nhe could not have understood the meaning.[8] According to\nMuhammedan law a person guilty of blasphemy is to be put to death\nwithout delay, even though he profess himself repentant, as\nadequate repentance for such a sin is deemed impossible.[9] These\nand similar laws are rooted in the idea that the god is\npersonally offended by the insult. It was the Lord himself who\nmade the law that he who blasphemed His name should be stoned to\ndeath by all the congregation.[10] \"Blasphemy,\" says Thomas\nAquinas, \"as being an offence directly against God, outweighs\nmurder, which is an offence against our neighbour . . . . The\nblasphemer intends to wound the honour of God.\"[11] That\nblasphemy is, or should be, punished not as a sin against the\ndeity but as an offence against the religious feelings of men, is\nan idea of quite modern origin.\n\n[Footnote 5: Ellis, _E[(w]e-speaking Peoples of the Slave Coast_,\np. 81.]\n\n[Footnote 6: Prescott, _History of the Conquest of Peru_, i. 42.]\n\n[Footnote 7: _Leviticus_, xxiv. 14 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 8: Pike, _History of Crime in England_, ii. 56.]\n\n[Footnote 9: Lane, _Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians_,\np. 123.]\n\n[Footnote 10: _Leviticus_, xxiv. 16.]\n\n[Footnote 11: Thomas Aquinas, _Summa theologica_, ii.-ii. 13. 3. 1.]\n\nIn many cases it is considered offensive to a supernatural being\nmerely to mention his name. Sometimes the name is tabooed on\ncertain occasions only or in ordinary conversation, sometimes it\nis not to be pronounced at all.\n\nIn Morocco the _jn\u00fbn_ (_jinn_) must not be referred to by name in\nthe afternoon and evening after the _[(]\u00e2[s.]ar_. If speaking of\nthem at all, the people then make use of some circumlocution; the\nBerbers of Southern Morocco call them _w[=i]d-i\u00e1[d.]nin_, \"those\nothers,\" or _w[=i]d-ur[d.]-h[)e]r'nin_, \"those unseen,\" or\n_w[=i]d-tntl-t\u00edsnt_, \"those who shun salt.\" The Greenlanders dare\nnot pronounce the name of a glacier {641} as they row past it,\nfor fear lest it should be offended and throw off an iceberg.[12]\nSome North American Indians believe that if, when travelling,\nthey mention the names of rocks or islands or rivers, they will\nhave much rain or be wrecked or be devoured by some monster in\nthe river.[13] The Omahas, again, \"are very careful not to use\nnames which they regard as sacred on ordinary occasions; and no\none dares to sing sacred songs except the chiefs and old men at\nthe proper times.\"[14] Some other Indians considered it a\nprofanation to mention the name of their highest divinity.[15]\nAmong certain Australian natives the elders of the tribe impart\nto the youth, on his initiation, the name of the god\nTharam[=u]l[)u]n; but there is such a disinclination to pronounce\nhis name that, in speaking of him, they generally use elliptical\nexpressions, such as \"He,\" \"the man,\" or \"the name I told you\nof,\" and the women only know him by the name of Papang\n(father).[16] The Marutse and allied tribes along the Zambesi\nshrink from mentioning the real name of their chief god Nyambe\nand therefore substitute for it the word _molemo_, which has a\nvery comprehensive meaning, denoting, besides God, all kinds of\ngood and evil spirits, medicines, poisons, and amulets.[17]\nAccording to Cicero, there was a god, a son of Nilus, whose name\nthe Egyptians considered it a crime to pronounce;[18] and\nHerodotus is unwilling to mention the name of Osiris on two\noccasions when he is speaking of him.[19] The divine name of\nIndra was secret, the real name of Agni was unknown.[20] The gods\nof Brahmanism have mystic names, which nobody dares to speak.[21]\nThe real name of Confucius is so sacred that it is a statutable\noffence in China to {642} pronounce it; and the name of the\nsupreme god of the Chinese is equally tabooed. \"_Tien_,\" they\nsay, \"means properly only the material heaven, but it also means\nShang-Te (supreme ruler, God); for, as it is not lawful to use\nhis name lightly, we name him by his residence, which is in\n_tien_.\"[22] The \"great name\" of Allah is a secret name, known\nonly to prophets, and possibly to some great saints.[23] Yahveh\nsaid, \"Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain;\nfor the Lord will not hold him guiltless that taketh his name in\nvain\";[24] and orthodox Jews avoid mentioning the word Yahveh\naltogether.[25] Among Christian nations, as Professor Nyrop\nobserves, there is a common disinclination to use the word \"God\"\nor its equivalents in everyday speech. The English say _good_\ninstead of God (\"good gracious,\" \"my goodness,\" \"thank\ngoodness\"); the Germans, _Potz_ instead of _Gotts_ (\"Potz Welt,\"\n\"Potz Wetter,\" \"Potz Blitz\"); the French, _bleu_ instead of\n_Dieu_ (\"corbleu,\" \"morbleu,\" \"sambleu\"); the Spaniards, _brios_\nor _diez_ instead of _Dios_ (\"voto \u00e1 brios,\" \"juro \u00e1 brios,\" \"par\ndiez\").[26]\n\n[Footnote 12: Nansen, _Eskimo Life_, p. 233.]\n\n[Footnote 13: Nyrop, 'Navnets magt,' in _Mindre Afhandlinger\nudgivne af det philologisk-historiske Samfund_, 1887, p. 28.]\n\n[Footnote 14: Dorsey, 'Omaha Sociology,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur.\nEthn._ iii. 370.]\n\n[Footnote 15: Adair, _History of the American Indians_, p. 54.]\n\n[Footnote 16: Howitt, 'Some Australian Beliefs,' in _Jour. Anthr.\nInst._ xiii. 192. See also _Idem_, _Native Tribes of South-East\nAustralia_, pp. 489, 495.]\n\n[Footnote 17: Holub, _Seven Years in South Africa_, ii. 301.]\n\n[Footnote 18: Cicero, _De natura deorum_, iii. 22 (56).]\n\n[Footnote 19: Herodotus, ii. 132, 171.]\n\n[Footnote 20: Hopkins, _Religions of India_, pp. 93, 111.]\n\n[Footnote 21: _Ibid._ p. 184.]\n\n[Footnote 22: Friend, 'Euphemism and Tabu in China,' in\n_Folk-Lore Record_, iv. 76. _Cf._ Edkins, _Religion in China_, p. 72.]\n\n[Footnote 23: Sell, _Faith of Isl\u00e1m_, p. 185. Lane, _Modern\nEgyptians_, p. 273.]\n\n[Footnote 24: _Exodus_, xx. 7.]\n\n[Footnote 25: Herzog-Plitt, _Real-Encyklop\u00e4die f\u00fcr\nprotestantische Theologie_, vi. 501 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 26: Nyrop, _loc. cit._ p. 155 _sqq._]\n\nThese taboos have sprung from fear. There is, first, something\nuncanny in mentioning the name of a supernatural being, even\napart from any definite ideas connected with the act. But to do\nso is also supposed to summon him or to attract his attention,\nand this may be considered dangerous, especially if he is looked\nupon as malevolent or irritable, as is generally the case with\nthe Moorish _jn\u00fbn_. The uncanny feeling or the notion of danger\nreadily leads to the belief that the supernatural being feels\noffended if his name is pronounced; we have noticed a similar\nassociation of thought in connection with the names of the dead.\nBut a god may also have good reason for wishing that his name\nshould not be used lightly or taken in vain. According {643} to\nprimitive ideas a person's name is a part of his personality,\nhence the holiness of a god may be polluted by his name being\nmentioned in profane conversation. Moreover, it may be of great\nimportance for him to prevent his name from being divulged, as\nmagic may be wrought on a person through his name just as easily\nas through any part of his body. In early civilisation there is a\ncommon tendency to keep the real name of a human individual\nsecret so that sorcerers may not make an evil use of it;[27] and\nit is similarly believed that gods must conceal their true names\nlest other gods or men should be able to conjure with them.[28]\nThe great Egyptian god R\u00e2 declared that the name which his father\nand mother had given him remained hidden in his body since his\nbirth, so that no magician might have magic power over him.[29]\nThe list of divine names possessed by the Roman pontiffs in their\n_indigitamenta_ was a magical instrument which laid at their\nmercy all the forces of the spirit world;[30] and we are told\nthat the Romans kept the name of their tutelary god secret in\norder to prevent their enemies from drawing him away by pronouncing\nit.[31] There is a Muhammedan tradition that whosoever calls upon\nAllah by his \"great name\" will obtain all his desires, being able\nmerely by mentioning it to raise the dead to life, to kill the\nliving, in fact to perform any miracle he pleases.[32]\n\n[Footnote 27: Tylor, _Early History of Mankind_, p. 139 _sqq._\nAndree, _Ethnographische Parallelen_, p. 179 _sqq._ Frazer,\n_Golden Bough_, i. 403 _sqq._ Clodd, _Tom Tit Tot_, pp. 53-55, 81\n_sqq._ Haddon, _Magic and Fetishism_, p. 22 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 28: Tylor, _op. cit._ p. 124 _sq._ Frazer, _op. cit._\ni. 443. Clodd, _op. cit._ p. 173. Haddon, _op. cit._ p. 23 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 29: Frazer, _op. cit._ i. 444.]\n\n[Footnote 30: Granger, _Worship of the Romans_, pp. 212, 277.\n_Cf._ Jevons, in Plutarch's _Romane Questions_, p. lvii.]\n\n[Footnote 31: Plutarch, _Questiones Roman\u00e6_, 61. Pliny, _Historia\nnaturalis_, xxviii. 4. Macrobius, _Saturnalia_, iii. 9.]\n\n[Footnote 32: Sell, _op. cit._ p. 185. Lane, _Modern Egyptians_,\np. 273.]\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nOne of the greatest insults which can be offered a god is to deny\nhis existence. Plutarch was astonished at people's saying that\natheism is impiety, while at the same time they attribute to gods\nall kinds of less creditable qualities. \"I for my part,\" he adds,\n\"would much rather have men to say of me that there never was a\n{644} Plutarch, at all, nor is now, than to say that Plutarch is\na man inconstant, fickle, easily moved to anger, revengeful for\ntrifling provocations, vexed at small things.\"[33] But Plutarch\nseems to have forgotten that a person is always most sensitive on\nhis weak points, and that the weakest point in a god is his\nexistence. Religious intolerance is in a large measure the result\nof that feeling of uncertainty which can hardly be eradicated\neven by the strongest will to believe. It is a means of\nself-persuasion in a case where such persuasion is sorely needed.\nMoreover, a god who is not believed to exist can be no object of\nworship, and to be worshipped is commonly held to be the chief\nambition of a god. But atheism is a sin of civilisation.\nUncultured people are ready to believe that all supernatural\nbeings they hear of also exist.\n\n[Footnote 33: Plutarch, _De superstitione_, 10.]\n\nSome gods are extremely ungenerous towards all those who do not\nrecognise them, and only them, as _their_ gods. To believe in\nAhura Mazda was the first duty which Zoroastrianism required of a\nman; it was Angra Mainyu, the evil spirit, that had\ncountercreated the sin of unbelief.[34] Doubt destroyed even the\neffects of good actions;[35] indeed, only the true believer was\nto be regarded as a man.[36] The faithful were summoned to a war\nto the death against the opposing spirits, the Daevas, and their\nfollowers.[37] And to judge from ancient writers, the Persians,\nwhen they came into contact with nations of another religion,\nalso carried into practice the intolerant spirit of their\nown.[38] Yahveh said:--\"Thou shalt have no other gods before me.\n. . . Thou shalt not bow down thyself to them, nor serve them:\nfor I the Lord thy God am a jealous God.\"[39] In the\npre-prophetic period the existence of other gods was\nrecognised,[40] but they were not {645} to be worshipped by\nYahveh's people. Nor was any mercy to be shown to their\nfollowers, for Yahveh was \"a man of war.\"[41] The God of\nChristianity inherited his jealousy. In the name of Christ wars\nwere waged, not, it is true, for the purpose of exterminating\nunbelievers, but with a view to converting them to a faith which\nalone could save their souls from eternal perdition. So far as\nthe aim of the persecution is concerned we can thus notice a\ndistinct progress in humanity. But whilst the punishment which\nYahveh inflicted upon the devotees of other gods was merely\ntemporal and restricted to a comparatively small number of\npeople--he took notice of such foreign nations only which came\nwithin his sphere of interests,--Christianity was a proselytising\nreligion on a large scale, anxious to save but equally ready to\ncondemn to everlasting torments all those who refused to accept\nit, nay even the milliards of men who had never heard of it. In\nthis point Christianity was even more intolerant than the Koran\nitself, which does not absolutely confine salvation to the\nbelievers in Allah and his Prophet, but leaves some hope of it to\nJews, Christians, and Sab\u00e6ans, though all other infidels are\nhopelessly lost.[42]\n\n[Footnote 34: _Vend\u00eed\u00e2d_, i. 8. 16.]\n\n[Footnote 35: Darmesteter, _Ormazd et Ahriman_, p. 330, n. 4.]\n\n[Footnote 36: _D\u00een\u00e2-\u00ee Ma\u00een\u00f4g-\u00ee Khirad_, xlii. 6 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 37: See Darmesteter, in _Sacred Books of the East_, iv.\np. lii.; Spiegel, _Er\u00e2nische Alterthumskunde_, iii. 692.]\n\n[Footnote 38: Spiegel, _op. cit._ iii. 708.]\n\n[Footnote 39: _Exodus_, xx. 3, 5.]\n\n[Footnote 40: Kuenen, _Hibbert Lectures on National Religions and\nUniversal Religions_, p. 119. Baudissin, _Studien zur semitischen\nReligionsgeschichte_, i. 49 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 41: _Exodus_, xv. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 42: _Koran_, v. 73.]\n\nThat Muhammedanism has in course of time become the most\nfanatical of existing religions is due to political rather than\nreligious causes. For a thousand years the Christian and\nMuhammedan world were engaged in a deadly contest, in which the\nformer came off victorious. Most nations confessing Islam have\neither lost their independence or are on the verge of losing it.\nThe memory of past defeats and cruelties, the present state of\nsubjection or national weakness, the fear of the future--are all\nfactors which must be taken into account when we judge of Moslem\nfanaticism. In its younger days Islam was undoubtedly, not only\nin theory but in practice, less intolerant than its great rival,\nChristian subjects of Muhammedan rulers being on the whole\ntreated with {646} consideration.[43] Earlier travellers in\nArabia also speak favourably of the tolerance of its inhabitants.\nNiebuhr was able to write:--\"I never saw that the Arabs have any\nhatred for those of a different religion. They, however, regard\nthem with much the same contempt with which Christians look upon\nthe Jews in Europe . . . . The Mahometans in India appear to be\neven more tolerant than those of Arabia . . . . The Mussulmans in\ngeneral do not persecute men of other religions, when they have\nnothing to fear from them, unless in the case of an intercourse\nof gallantry with a Mahometan woman.\"[44] In China the\nMuhammedans live amicably with the infidel, regarding their\nBuddhist neighbours \"with a kindly feeling which it would be hard\nto find in a mixed community of Catholics and Evangelicals.\"[45]\nMuhammedanism looks upon the founder of Christianity with\nprofound reverence, as one of the apostles of God, as the only\nman without sin. Christian writers, on the other hand, till the\nmiddle of the eighteenth century universally treated Muhammed as\na false prophet and rank impostor. Luther called him \"a devil,\nand a first-born child of Satan,\" whilst Melanchthon was inclined\nto see in him both Gog and Magog.[46]\n\n[Footnote 43: See von Kremer, _Culturgeschichte des Orients_,\nii. 166 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 44: Niebuhr, _Travels through Arabia_, ii. 192, 189\n_sq._ _Cf._ d'Arvieux, _Travels in Arabia the Desart_, p. 123;\nWallin, _Notes taken during a Journey through Northern Arabia_,\np. 21.]\n\n[Footnote 45: Lane-Poole, _Studies in a Mosque_, p. 298 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 46: [Deutsch,] 'Islam,' in _Quarterly Review_, cxxvii.\n295 _sq._ Bosworth Smith, _Mohammed and Mohammedanism_, pp. 67,\n69. Pool, _Studies in Mohammedanism_, p. 406.]\n\nEqual in enormity with the sin of not believing in a certain god\nis sometimes the sin of having a false belief about him. It seems\nstrange that a god should be so easily offended as to punish with\nthe utmost severity those who hold erroneous notions regarding\nsome attribute of his which in no way affects his honour or\nglory, or regarding some detail of ritual. Thomas Aquinas himself\nadmits that the heretic _intends_ to take the word of Christ,\nalthough he fails \"in the election of articles whereon to take\nthat word.\" But it is in this election that his sin consists.\n{647} Instead of choosing those articles which are truly taught\nby Christ, he chooses those which his own mind suggests to him.\nThus he perverts the doctrines of Christ, and in consequence\ndeserves not only to be separated from the Church by\nexcommunication, but to be banished from the world by death.[47]\nMoreover, the heretic is an apostate, a traitor who may be forced\nto pay the vow which he has once taken.[48] The extreme rigour of\nthis sophistical argumentation can only be understood in\nconnection with its historical surroundings. It presupposes a\nChurch which not only regards itself as the sole possessor of\ndivine truth, but whose cohesion and power depend upon a strict\nadherence to its doctrines.[49] Nor was it a religious motive\nonly that induced Christian sovereigns to persecute heretics.\nCertain heresies, as Manich\u00e6ism and Donatism, were expressly\ndeclared to affect the common welfare;[50] and the Frankish kings\ntreated heretics not only as rebels against the Church, but as\ntraitors to the State, as confederates of hostile Visigoths or\nBurgundians or Lombards.[51]\n\n[Footnote 47: Thomas Aquinas, _op. cit._ ii.-ii. 11. 1, 3.]\n\n[Footnote 48: _Ibid._ ii.-ii. 10. 8.]\n\n[Footnote 49: _Cf._ Ritchie, _Natural Rights_, p. 183.]\n\n[Footnote 50: Milman, _History of Latin Christianity_, ii. 33.]\n\n[Footnote 51: _Ibid._ ii. 61.]\n\nWhilst intolerance is a characteristic of all monotheistic\nreligions which attribute human passions and emotions to their\ngodhead, polytheism is by nature tolerant. A god who is always\nused to share with other gods the worship of his believers cannot\nbe a very jealous god. The pious Hennepin was struck by the fact\nthat Red Indians were \"incapable of taking away any person's life\nout of hatred to his religion.\"[52] Among the natives of the\nAfrican Gold and Slave Coasts, though a man must show outward\nrespect for the gods so as not to provoke calamities, he may\nworship many gods or none, just as he pleases. \"There is perfect\nliberty of thought in matters of religion. . . . At this stage,\nman tolerates any form of religion that tolerates others; and as\nhe thinks it perfectly {648} natural that different people should\nworship different gods, he does not attempt to force his own\npersonal opinions upon anyone, or to establish conformity of\nideas.\"[53] On the Slave Coast even a sacrilege committed by a\nEuropean is usually regarded with indifference, as the gods of a\ncountry are supposed to be concerned about the actions of the\npeople of that country only.[54] \"The characteristics of Natural\nReligion,\" says Sir Alfred Lyall, \"the conditions of its\nexistence as we see it in India, are complete liberty and\nmaterial tolerance; there is no monopoly either of divine powers\nor even of sacerdotal privilege.\"[55] In China the hatred of\nforeigners has not its root in religion. The Catholics residing\nthere were left undisturbed until they began to meddle with the\ncivil and social institutions of the country;[56] and the\ndifficulty in persuading the Chinese to embrace Christianity is\nsaid by a missionary to be due to their notion that one religion\nis as good as another provided that it has a good moral code.[57]\nAmong the early Greeks and Romans it was a principle that the\nreligion of the State should be the religion of the people, as\nits welfare was supposed to depend upon a strict observance of\nthe established cult; but the gods cared for external worship\nrather than for the beliefs of their worshippers, and evidently\ntook little notice even of expressed opinions. Philosophers\nopenly despised the very rites which they both defended and\npractised; and religion was more a pretext than a real motive for\nthe persecutions of men like Anaxagoras, Protagoras, Socrates,\nand Aristotle.[58] So also the measures by which the Romans in\nearlier times repressed the introduction of new religions were\nlargely suggested by worldly considerations; \"they grew out of\nthat intense national spirit which sacrificed every {649} other\ninterest to the State, and resisted every form of innovation,\nwhether secular or religious, that could impair the unity of the\nnational type, and dissolve the discipline which the predominance\nof the military spirit and the stern government of the Republic\nhad formed.\"[59] It has also been sufficiently proved that the\npersecutions of the Christians during the pagan Empire sprang\nfrom motives quite different from religious intolerance. Liberty\nof worship was a general principle of the Imperial rule. That it\nwas denied the Christians was due to their own aggressiveness, as\nalso to political suspicion. They grossly insulted the pagan\ncult, denouncing it as the worship of demons, and every calamity\nwhich fell upon the Empire was in consequence regarded by the\npopulace as the righteous vengeance of the offended gods. Their\nproselytism disturbed the peace of families and towns. Their\nsecret meetings aroused suspicion of political danger; and this\nsuspicion was increased by the doctrines they professed. They\nconsidered the Roman Empire a manifestation of Antichrist, they\nlooked forward with longing to its destruction, and many of them\nrefused to take part in its defence. The greatest and best among\nthe pagans spoke of the Christians as \"enemies,\" or \"haters of\nthe human race.\"[60]\n\n[Footnote 52: Hennepin, _New Discovery of a Vast Country in\nAmerica_, ii. 70.]\n\n[Footnote 53: Ellis, _Yoruba-speaking Peoples of the Slave\nCoast_, p. 295. See also _Idem_, _E[(w]e-speaking Peoples of the\nSlave Coast_, p. 81; Monrad, _Skildring af Guinea-Kysten_, p. 28;\nKubary, 'Die Verbrechen und das Strafverfahren auf den\nPelau-Inseln,' in _Original-Mittheil. aus d. ethnol. Abtheil. d.\nk\u00f6nigl. Museen zu Berlin_, i. 90.]\n\n[Footnote 54: Ellis, _E[(w]e-speaking Peoples_, p. 81.]\n\n[Footnote 55: Lyall, _Natural Religion in India_, p. 52.]\n\n[Footnote 56: Davis, _China_, ii. 7. _Cf._ Edkins, _op. cit._\np. 178.]\n\n[Footnote 57: Edkins, _op. cit._ p. 75.]\n\n[Footnote 58: See Schmidt, _Die Ethik der alten Griechen_, ii. 24\n_sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 59: Lecky, _History of European Morals_, i. 493. _Cf._\nDio Cassius, _Historia Romana_, lii. 36.]\n\n[Footnote 60: Lecky, _op. cit._ i. 408 _sqq._ Ramsay, _The Church\nin the Roman Empire_, p. 346 _sqq._ See also _supra_, i. 345\n_sq._; ii. 178 _sq._]\n\nThe same difference in toleration between monotheistic and\npolytheistic religions shows itself in their different attitudes\ntowards witchcraft. A monotheistic religion is not necessarily\naverse from magic; its god may be supposed to have created\nmagical as well as natural energy, and also to have given mankind\npermission to utilise it in a proper manner. Both Christianity in\nits earlier phases and Muhammedanism are full of magical\npractices expressly sanctioned by their theology--for instance,\nthe use made of sacred words and of the relics of saints. But\nbesides this sort of magic there is another kind--witchcraft, in\nthe narrow sense of the term,--which is ascribed to the {650}\nassistance of exorcised spirits, regarded not as the willing\nagents but as the adversaries of God; and this practice is\nnaturally looked upon as highly offensive to His feelings. In\nChristianity witchcraft was esteemed the most horrible form of\nimpiety.[61] The religious law of the Hebrews--which generally\nprohibited all practices that savoured of idolatry, such as\nsoothsaying and oracles--punished witches and wizards with\ndeath.[62] Islam disapproves of all magic which is practised with\nthe assistance of evil spirits, or _jinn_, although such magic is\nvery prevalent and popularly tolerated in Muhammedan\ncountries.[63] Among polytheistic peoples, again, witchcraft is\ncertainly in many cases treated with great severity; a large\nnumber of uncivilised races punish it with death,[64] and among\nsome of them it is the only offence which is capital.[65] But\nthen witchcraft is punished because it is considered destructive\nto human life or welfare.[66] \"In Africa,\" says Mr. Rowley,\n\"there is what is regarded as lawful as well as unlawful\nwitchcraft, the lawful being practised professedly for the\nwelfare of mankind, and in opposition to the unlawful, which is\nresorted to for man's injury.\" But \"the purposes of witchcraft\n{651} are now generally wicked; its processes generally involve\nmoral guilt; the spirits invoked are, for the most part, avowedly\nevil and maleficent.\"[67] Among the Gaika tribe of the Kafirs\n\"witchcraft is supposed to be an influence for evil, possessed by\none individual over another, or others.\"[68] Among the Bondeis\n\"the meaning of witchcraft is simply murder.\"[69] That\nwitchcraft, as a malicious practice, must be a grave and at the\nsame time frequent offence among savages, is obvious from the\ncommon belief that death, disease, and misfortunes of every\ndescription are caused by it. From a similar point of view it is\ncondemned by polytheistic nations of a higher type. Among the\nAztecs of ancient Mexico anybody who employed sorcery or\nincantations for the purpose of doing harm to the community or to\nindividuals was sacrificed to the gods.[70] The Chinese Penal\nCode punishes with death those who have been convicted of writing\nand editing books of sorcery, or of employing spells and\nincantations, \"in order to agitate and influence the minds of the\npeople.\"[71] But, according to Mr. Dennys, the hatred of witches\nand wizards cherished in the West does not seem to exist in\nChina; \"those reputed to possess magic powers are regarded with\ndread, but it is rare to hear of any of them coming to untimely\nend by mob violence.\"[72] The Laws of [Hv]ammurabi, the\nancient Babylonian legislator, enjoin that \"if a man weave a\nspell and put a ban upon a man, and has not justified himself, he\nthat wove the spell upon him shall be put to death.\"[73] It is\nsaid in 'Vishnu Pur\u00e2na' that he who practises magical rites \"for\nthe harm of others\" is punished in the hell called Krim\u00eesa.[74]\nAmong the ancient Teutons not every kind of magic but only such\nas was considered of injurious nature was criminal.[75] {652} In\nRome, also, what was deemed harmless magic was left undisturbed,\nwhereas, according to the 'Law of the Twelve Tables,' \"he who\naffects another by magical arts or with poisonous drugs\" is to be\nput to death;[76] and during the Empire persons were severely\npersecuted for political astrology or divination practised with a\nview to discovering the successors to the throne.[77] Plato,\nwrites in his 'Laws':--\"He who seems to be the sort of man who\ninjures others by magic knots or enchantments or incantations or\nany of the like practices, if he be a prophet or divine, let him\ndie; and, if not being a prophet, he be convicted of witchcraft,\nas in the previous case, let the court fix what he ought to pay\nor suffer.\"[78] As Mr. Lecky justly remarks, both in Greece and\nRome the measures taken against witchcraft seem to have been\nalmost entirely free from religious fanaticism, the magician\nbeing punished because he injured man and not because he offended\nGod.[79] Sometimes we find even among a polytheistic people that\nsorcery is particularly opposed by its priesthood;[80] but the\nreason for this is no doubt hatred of rivals rather than\nreligious zeal. Miss Kingsley, however, does not think that the\ndislike of witchcraft in West Africa at large has originally\nanything to do with the priesthood.[81]\n\n[Footnote 61: Lea, _History of the Inquisition_, iii. 422, 453.\nPollock and Maitland, _History of English Law before the Time\nof Edward I._ ii. 552 _sqq._ Milman, _op. cit._ ix. 69.\nLecky, _Rise and Influence of Rationalism in Europe_, i. 26.\nKeary, _Outlines of Primitive Belief among the Indo-European\nRaces_, p. 511 _sqq._ Rogers, _Social Life in Scotland_, iii.\n265, 268. Ralston, _Songs of the Russian People_, pp. 386, 416\n_sq._]\n\n[Footnote 62: _Exodus_, xxii. 18. _Leviticus_, xix. 26, 31; xx.\n6, 27. _Deuteronomy_, xviii. 10 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 63: Polak, _Persien_, i. 348. Lane, _Modern Egyptians_,\ni. 333.]\n\n[Footnote 64: _Supra_, i. 189 _sq._ Cruickshank, _Eighteen Years\non the Gold Coast_, ii. 179. Bowdich, _Mission to Ashantee_,\np. 260. Johnston, _British Central Africa_, p. 403 (Bakongo).\nCunningham, _Uganda_, pp. 35 (Banyoro), 140 (Bavuma), 305\n(Basukuma), Arnot, _Garenganze_, p. 75. Decle, _Three Years in\nSavage Africa_, p. 76 (Barotse). Casalis, _Basutos_, p. 229.\nKidd, _The Essential Kafir_, p. 148 _sq._ Sibree, _The Great\nAfrican Island_, p. 292 (Malagasy). Swettenham, _Malay Sketches_,\np. 196 (Malays of Perak). Dalton, _Ethnology of Bengal_,\n(Oraons). Egede, _Description of Greenland_, p. 123 _sq._ Krause,\n_Die Tlinkit-Indianer_, p. 293 _sq._ Jones, quoted by Kohler,\n'Die Rechte der Urv\u00f6lker Nordamerikas,' in _Zeitschr. f. vergl.\nRechtswiss._ xii. 412 (Chippewas). Morgan, _League of the\nIroquois_, p. 330; Seaver, _Life of Mrs. Jemison_, p. 167\n(Iroquois). Powell, 'Wyandot Government,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur.\nEthn._ i. 67. Stevenson, 'Sia,' _ibid._ xi. 19. Lumholtz,\n_Unknown Mexico_, i. 325 (Tarahumares). Forbes, 'Aymara Indians\nof Bolivia and Peru,' in _Jour. Ethn. Soc._ N. S. ii. 236, n. *]\n\n[Footnote 65: _Supra_, i. 189.]\n\n[Footnote 66: _Cf._ Dorsey, 'Omaha Sociology,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur.\nEthn._ iii. 364.]\n\n[Footnote 67: Rowley, _Religion of the Africans_, p. 125 _sq._\nSee also Kidd, _The Essential Kafir_, p. 148.]\n\n[Footnote 68: Maclean, _Compendium of Kafir Laws_, p. 123.]\n\n[Footnote 69: Dale, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxv. 223.]\n\n[Footnote 70: Bancroft, _Native Races of the Pacific States_,\nii. 462.]\n\n[Footnote 71: _Ta Tsing Leu Lee_, sec. cclvi. p. 273.]\n\n[Footnote 72: Dennys, _Folk-Lore of China_, p. 80.]\n\n[Footnote 73: _Laws of [Hv]ammurabi_, 1.]\n\n[Footnote 74: _Vish['n]u Pur\u00e1['n]a_, p. 208.]\n\n[Footnote 75: Brunner, _Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte_, ii. 678.]\n\n[Footnote 76: _Lex Duodecim Tabularum_, viii. 25.]\n\n[Footnote 77: Lecky, _History of European Morals_, i. 420.]\n\n[Footnote 78: Plato, _Leges_, xi. 933.]\n\n[Footnote 79: Lecky, _Rationalism in Europe_, i. 18.]\n\n[Footnote 80: Kingsley, _West African Studies_, p. 137. Rink,\n_Greenland_, p. 201.]\n\n[Footnote 81: Kingsley, _West African Studies_, p. 135 _sq._]\n\nThe religious intolerance which has accompanied the rise of\nmonotheism is, as we have just observed, the result of the nature\nattributed to its godhead. But the evolution of religion does not\nend with the triumph of a jealous and irritable heavenly despot.\nThere is a later stage where men believe in a god or supernatural\npower which is absolutely free from all human weakness, and in\nsuch a religion intolerance has no place. It has been said that\nthe tolerant spirit of Buddhism[82] is due to religious {653}\nindifference,[83] but the original cause of it seems to be the\nabsence of a personal god; and the increasing tolerance of modern\nChristianity is undoubtedly connected with the more ethical view\nit takes of the Deity when compared with the opinions of earlier\nages. It should be remembered, however, that religious toleration\ndoes not mean passive indifference with regard to dissenting\nreligious ideas. The tolerant man may be a great propagandist. He\nmay do his utmost to eradicate, by means of persuasion, what he\nconsiders to be a false belief. He may even resort to stronger\nmeasures against those who do mischief in the name of their\nreligion. But he does not persecute anybody for the sake of his\nfaith; nor does he believe in an intolerant and persecuting god.\n\n[Footnote 82: Hardy, _Eastern Monachism_, p. 412. Monier-Williams,\n_Buddhism_, p. 126. Waddell, _Buddhism of Tibet_, p. 568. Edkins,\n_Religion in China_, p. 127. Gutzlaff, _Sketch of Chinese\nHistory_, i. 70. Forbes, _British Burma_, p. 322 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 83: Forbes, _op. cit._ p. 322. _Cf._ Kuenen, _Hibbert\nLectures on National and Universal Religions_, p. 290.]\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nSupernatural beings, according to the belief of many races,\ndesire to be worshipped not only because they depend upon human\ncare for their subsistence or comfort, but because worship is an\nact of homage. We have seen that sacrifice, after losing its\noriginal significance, still survives as a reverent offering. So\nalso prayer is frequently a tribute to the self-regarding pride\nof the god to whom it is addressed. A supplication is an act of\nhumility, more or less flattering to the person appealed to and\nespecially gratifying where, as in the case of a god, the\ngranting of the request entails no deprivation or loss, but on\nthe contrary is rewarded by the worshipper. Moreover, the request\nis very commonly accompanied by reverential epithets or words of\neulogy; and praise, nay even flattery, is just as pleasant to\nsuperhuman as to human ears. Gods are addressed as great or\nmighty, as lords or kings, as fathers or grandfathers.[84] A\nprayer of the ancient Peruvians began with the following\nwords:--\"O conquering Viracocha! Ever present Viracocha! Thou art\nin the ends of the earth without equal!\"[85] {654} The ancient\nEgyptians flattered their gods,[86] the Vedic and Zoroastrian\nhymns are full of praise. Muhammedans invoke Allah by sentences\nsuch as, \"God is great,\" \"God is merciful,\" \"God is he who seeth\nand heareth.\" Words of praise, as well as words of thanks,\naddressed to a god, may certainly be the expressions of\nunreflecting admiration or gratitude, free from all thought of\npleasing him; but where laudation is demanded by the god as a\nprice for good services, it is simply a tribute to his vanity.\nThere is a Chinese story which amusingly illustrates this little\nweakness of so many gods:--At the hottest season of the year\nthere was a heavy fall of snow at Soochow. The people, in their\nconsternation, went to the temple of the Great Prince to pray.\nThen the spirit moved one of them to say, \"You now address me as\nYour Honour. Make it Your Excellency, and, though I am but a\nlesser deity, it may be well worth your while to do so.\"\nThereupon the people began to use the latter term, and the snow\nstopped at once.[87] The Hindus say that by praise a person may\nobtain from the gods whatever he desires.[88]\n\n[Footnote 84: See Brinton, _Religions of Primitive Peoples_, p. 105.]\n\n[Footnote 85: de Molina, 'Fables and Rites of the Yncas,' in\n_Narratives of the Rites and Laws of the Yncas_, p. 33.]\n\n[Footnote 86: Am\u00e9lineau, _L'\u00e9volution des id\u00e9es morales dans\nl'\u00c9gypte ancienne_, p. 214.]\n\n[Footnote 87: Giles, _Strange Stories from a Chinese Studio_,\nii. 294.]\n\n[Footnote 88: Ward, _View of the History, Literature, and\nReligion of the Hindoos_, ii. 69.]\n\nWe have different means of gratifying a person's self-regarding\npride: one is to praise him, another is to humiliate ourselves.\nBoth have been adopted by men with reference to their gods.\nBesides hymns of praise there are hymns of penitence, the object\nof which is largely to appease the angry feelings of offended\ngods. Prayers for remission of sins form a whole literature among\npeoples like that of the Vedic age, the Chaldeans,[89] and the\nHebrews, who commonly regarded calamities to which men were\nsubject not as the result of an inexorable fate nor as the\nmachinations of evil spirits, but as divine punishments.\nAccording to early ideas, as we have seen, sin is a substance\ncharged with injurious {655} energy, from which the infected\nperson tries to rid himself by mechanical means.[90] But at the\nsame time the effect of sin is conceived as a divine punishment,\nand this suggests atonement. In the Rig-Veda we not only hear of\nthe removal of sins by magical operations, but the gods are\nrequested to free the sufferer from his sin.[91]\n\n[Footnote 89: Zimmern, _Babylonische Busspsalmen_, _passim_.\nM\u00fcrdter-Delitzsch, _Geschichte Babyloniens und Assyriens_, p. 38\n_sq._ Delitzsch, _Wo lag das Paradies?_ p. 86. Hommel, _Die\nsemitischen V\u00f6lker und Sprachen_, p. 315 _sqq._ Meyer,\n_Geschichte des Alterthums_, i. 178.]\n\n[Footnote 90: _Supra_, i. 52 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 91: See Oldenberg, _Die Religion des Veda_, pp. 292,\n296, 317 _sq._]\n\nGods are fond of prayers not only as expressions of humility or\nrepentance but for other reasons as well. In early religion a\nprayer is commonly connected with an offering, since the god is\nnot supposed to bestow his favours gratuitously.[92] By the call\ncontained in it he is invited to partake of the offering, or his\nattention is drawn to it.[93] \"Compassionate father!\" says the\nTanna priest when he offers first-fruits to a deified ancestor;\n\"here is some food for you, eat it, and be kind to us on account\nof it!\"[94] In one of the Pahlavi texts it is said that when the\nguardian spirits of the righteous are invited they accept the\nsacrifice, whereas if they are not invited \"they go up the height\nof a spear and will remain.\"[95] Throughout the Yasts we hear of\nthe claims of deities to be worshipped with sacrifices in which\nthey are invoked by their own names and with the proper\nwords.[96] Mithra complains, \"If men would worship me with a\nsacrifice in which I were invoked by my own name, as they worship\nthe other Yazatas with sacrifices in which they are invoked by\ntheir own names, then I would come to the faithful at the\nappointed time.\"[97] {656} According to Vedic and Zoroastrian\ntexts the gods were purified, strengthened, and encouraged not\nonly by offerings but by prayers, although it is difficult in\nthis respect to distinguish between two elements in one and the\nsame rite which are so closely interwoven with each other.[98] By\nhis invocations man assists the gods in their combats with evil\ndemons, he sends his prayer between the earth and the heavens\nthere to smite the fiends.[99] In a Vedic hymn the people are\nexhorted to \"sing to Indra a song very destructive to the\ndemons.\"[100] By pronouncing the praise of Asha, Zarathustra\nbrings the Daevas to naught;[101] by mentioning the name of Ahura\nMazda their malice is most effectually destroyed.[102] Thus\nprayer may be a religious duty also on account of the magic\nefficacy ascribed to it, and the same is the case with\nincantations directed against evil spirits.\n\n[Footnote 92: Tylor, _Primitive Culture_, ii. 364 _sqq._ Georgi,\n_Russia_, iii. 272 (shamanistic peoples of Siberia). Maspero,\n_\u00c9tudes de mythologie et d'arch\u00e9ologie \u00e9gyptiennes_, i. 163;\n_Idem_, _Dawn of Civilization_, p. 124, n. 5 (ancient Egyptians).\nDarmesteter, in _Sacred Books of the East_, iv. (1st ed.) p.\nlxix. (Zoroastrians). Oldenberg, _op. cit._ p. 430 _sqq._; Barth,\n_Religions of India_, p. 34 (Vedic people). Donaldson, 'Expiatory\nand Substitutionary Sacrifices of the Greeks,' in _Trans. Roy.\nSoc. Edinburgh_, xxvii. 430. Grimm, _Teutonic Mythology_, i. 29.\nAmong the Kafirs of Natal \"a soldier wounded in battle would only\npray if his hurt were slight; but if it were serious, he would\nvow a sacrifice on his return, naming perhaps the particular\nbeast\" (Shooter, _Kafirs of Natal_, p. 164).]\n\n[Footnote 93: _Cf._ Brinton, _Religions of Primitive Peoples_,\np. 104.]\n\n[Footnote 94: Turner, _Nineteen Years in Polynesia_, p. 88.]\n\n[Footnote 95: _Sh\u00e2yast L\u00e2-Sh\u00e2yast_, ix. 12.]\n\n[Footnote 96: _Yasts_, viii. 23 _sqq._; x. 30.]\n\n[Footnote 97: _Ibid._ x. 55. _Cf._ _ibid._ x. 74.]\n\n[Footnote 98: See Bergaigne, _La religion v\u00e9dique_, ii. 237, 250,\n273 _sqq._; Zimmer, _Altindisches Leben_, p. 337 _sqq._;\nOldenberg, _Religion des Veda_, p. 437; Macdonell, _Vedic\nMythology_, p. 60; Meyer, _Geschichte des Alterthums_, i. 534\n_sq._ (Zoroastrianism).]\n\n[Footnote 99: _Yasna_, xxviii. 7. _Yasts_, iii. 5. _Vend\u00eed\u00e2d_,\nxix. 1, 2, 8 _sqq._ Darmesteter, _Ormazd et Ahriman_, pp. 101,\n119, 131, 193. _Idem_, in _Sacred Books of the East_, iv. (1st\ned.) p. lxix.]\n\n[Footnote 100: _Rig-Veda_, viii. 78. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 101: _Yasts_, xiii. 89. _Cf._ _ibid._ xiii. 90.]\n\n[Footnote 102: _Ibid._ i. 3, 4, 10, 11, 19.]\n\nIn earlier chapters we have often noticed how curses gradually\ndevelop into genuine prayers, and _vice versa_ may a prayer\ndevelop into a curse or spell. Dr. Rivers observes that the\nformul\u00e6 used in Toda magic have the form of prayers.[103] So also\nAssyrian incantations are often dressed in the robe of\nsupplication, and end with the formula, \"Do so and so, and I\nshall gladden thine heart and worship thee in humility.\"[104]\nVedic texts which were not originally meant as charms became so\nafterwards. Incantations are comparatively rare in the Rig-Veda,\nand seem even to be looked upon as objectionable, but towards the\nend of the Vedic period the reign of Brahma, the power of prayer,\nas the supreme god in the Indian Pantheon began to dawn.[105]\n{657}_Brahma_ is a force by which the gods act, by which they are\nborn, and by which the world has been formed;[106] but it is also\nthe prayer which ascends from the altar to heaven and by means of\nwhich man wrests from the gods the boon he demands[107]--\"the\nprayer governs them.\"[108] This omnipresent force is personified\nin Brahma[n.]aspati, the lord of prayer, who resides in the\nhighest heaven but of whom not only every separate god but the\npriest himself becomes a manifestation at the moment he\npronounces the mantras or sacred texts.[109] It is a current\nsaying in India that the whole universe is subject to the gods,\nthat the gods are subject to the mantras, that the mantras are\nsubject to the Brahmans, and that therefore the Brahmans are the\nreal gods.[110] In Zoroastrianism prayers are not made\nefficacious by devotion and fervency, but to the words themselves\nbelongs a mysterious power and the mere recitation of them, if\ncorrect and faultless, brings that power into action;[111] in the\nYasts prayer is regarded as a goddess, as the daughter of Ahura\nMazda.[112] In ancient Egypt, M. Maspero observes, \"la pri\u00e8re\nn'\u00e9tait pas comme chez nous une petition que l'homme pr\u00e9sente au\ndieu, et que le dieu est libre d'accepter ou de refuser \u00e0 son\ngr\u00e9: c'\u00e9tait une formule dont les terms ont une valeur\nimp\u00e9rative, et dont l'\u00e9nonciation exacte oblige le dieu \u00e0\nconc\u00e9der ce qu'on lui demande.\"[113] Greek literature supplies\nother instances of men conjuring their gods by incantations;[114]\nthe word [Greek: a)ra/] means both prayer and curse.[115] And \"in\nthe Roman, as in the majority of the old Italian cults, prayer is\na magic formula, producing its effect by its own inherent\nquality.\"[116]\n\n[Footnote 103: Rivers, _Todas_, pp. 450, 453.]\n\n[Footnote 104: Tallqvist, 'Die assyrische Beschw\u00f6rungsserie\nMaql\u00fb,' in _Acta Soc. Scient. Fennic\u00e6_, xx. 22.]\n\n[Footnote 105: Oldenberg, _op. cit._ p. 311 _sqq._ Hopkins, _op.\ncit._ p. 149. Roth, 'Brahma und die Brahmanen,' in _Zeitschr. d.\nDeutschen Morgenl\u00e4ndischen Gesellsch._ i. 67, 71. Darmesteter,\n_Essais orientaux_, p. 132.]\n\n[Footnote 106: _Atharva-Veda_, xi. 5. 5. Barth, _op. cit._ p. 38.]\n\n[Footnote 107: Roth, _loc. cit._ p. 66 _sqq._ Barth, _op. cit._\np. 38. Darmesteter, _Ormazd et Ahriman_, p. 101.]\n\n[Footnote 108: _Rig-Veda_, vi. 51. 8.]\n\n[Footnote 109: Barth, _op. cit._ p. 15 _sq._ Roth, _loc. cit._\np. 71.]\n\n[Footnote 110: Monier-Williams, _Br[=a]hmanism and Hind[=u]ism_,\np. 201 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 111: See Geiger, _Civilization of the Eastern\nIr[=a]nians_, i. 71.]\n\n[Footnote 112: _Yasts_, xiii. 92; xvii. 16.]\n\n[Footnote 113: Maspero, _\u00c9tudes de mythologie et arch\u00e9ologie\n\u00e9gyptiennes_, i. 163.]\n\n[Footnote 114: See Usener, _G\u00f6tternamen_, p. 335 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 115: _Cf._ von Lasaulx, _Der Fluch bei Griechen und\nR\u00f6mern_, p. 6. So also the Manx word _gwee_ means both prayer and\ncurse (Rhys, _Celtic Folklore_, i. 349).]\n\n[Footnote 116: Renan, _Hibbert Lectures on the Influence of the\nInstitutions, &c. of Rome on Christianity_, p. 10 _sq._ _Cf._\nJevons, in Plutarch's _Romane Questions_, p. xxviii.; Granger,\n_Worship of the Romans_, p. 158.]\n\n{658} Whilst an ordinary curse readily develops into a prayer\nwhen the name of a god is brought in for the purpose of giving\nmagic efficacy to the curse, a prayer may contrariwise assume a\nmagic character by being addressed to a god--just as a sacrifice\nbecomes endowed with magic energy in consequence of its contact\nor communion with the supernatural being to which it is offered;\nand the constraining force in the prayer or sacrifice may then be\ndirected even against the god himself. But there can be little\ndoubt that the extreme importance which the magic element in the\ncult attained among the nations of ancient civilisation was\nchiefly due to the prevalence of a powerful priesthood or class\nof persons well versed in sacred texts. A successful incantation\npresupposes a certain knowledge in him who utters it. The words\nof the formul\u00e6 are fixed and may not suffer the slightest\nmodification under penalty of losing their potency. Right\nintonation is equally important.[117] The Brahmanic mantras \"must\nbe pronounced according to certain mystic forms and with absolute\naccuracy, or their efficacy is destroyed\"; nay, if in the\nrepetition of a mantra the slightest mistake is made, either by\nomission of a syllable or defective pronunciation, the calamity\nwhich it was intended to bring down on an enemy will inevitably\nrecoil on the head of the repeater.[118] The potency of the\nincantation largely lies in the voice, which is the magical\ninstrument _par excellence_.[119] A Buddhist priest who was asked\nwhat advantage he could expect to derive from merely repeating a\nnumber of words with the sense of which he was entirely\nunacquainted, gave the answer that the advantage of often\nrepeating the sounds was incalculable, infinite;[120] and a\nMuhammedan writer argues that prayers which are offered in any\nother language than {659} Arabic are profane and useless, because\n\"the sounds of this language\"--whether understood or\nnot--\"illuminate the darkness of men\" and \"purify the hearts of\nthe faithful.\"[121] Ideas of this sort are of course most\nstrongly advocated by those who derive the greatest profit from\nthem--priests or scribes. And it is easy to understand that with\ntheir increasing influence among a superstitious and credulous\npeople the magic significance which is so readily ascribed to a\nreligious act also has a tendency to grow in importance.\n\n[Footnote 117: Maspero, _\u00c9tudes_, i. 109; _Idem_, _Dawn of\nCivilization_, pp. 146, 213 (ancient Egyptians). Sayce, _Hibbert\nLectures on the Religion of the Andent Babylonians_, p. 319.\nDarmesteter, _Ormazd et Ahriman_, p. 9. Sell, _Faith of Isl\u00e1m_,\npp. 53, 79, 334, 341.]\n\n[Footnote 118: Monier-Williams, _Br[=a]hmanism and Hind[=u]ism_,\np. 199.]\n\n[Footnote 119: _Yasts_, iv. 5. Maspero, _\u00c9tudes_, ii. 373 _sq._;\n_Idem_, _Dawn of Civilization_, p. 146 (ancient Egyptians). Sell,\n_op. cit._ p. 318 (Muhammedans).]\n\n[Footnote 120: _Indo-Chinese Gleaner_, iii. 145.]\n\n[Footnote 121: _Indo-Chinese Gleaner_, iii. 146.]\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nAmong all sins there is none which gods resent more severely than\ndisobedience to their commandments. Mr. Macdonald says of the\nEfatese, in the New Hebrides, that no people under the sun is\nmore obedient to what they regard as divine mandates than these\nsavages, who believe that an offence against a spiritual being\nmeans calamity and death.[122] The Chaldeans had a lively sense\nof the risks entailed upon the sinner by disobedience to the\ngods.[123] According to the Bible disobedience was the first sin\ncommitted by man, and death was introduced into the world as its\npunishment. \"Rebellion is as the sin of witchcraft, and\nstubbornness is as iniquity and idolatry.\"[124] On the history of\nmorals this demand of obedience has exercised considerable\ninfluence. It gives emphasis to moral rules which are looked upon\nas divine injunctions, and it helps to preserve such rules after\nthe conditions from which they sprang have ceased to exist. The\nfact that they have become meaningless does not render them less\nbinding; on the contrary, the mystery surrounding them often\nincreases their sanctity. The commandments of a god must be\nobeyed independently of their contents, simply because\ndisobedience to him is a sin. Acts totally different in\ncharacter, crimes of the worst description and {660} practices by\nthemselves perfectly harmless, are grouped together as almost\nequally offensive to the deity because they have been forbidden\nby him.[125] And moral progress is hampered by a number of\nprecepts which, though rooted in obsolete superstitions or\nantiquated ideas about right and wrong, have an obstinate\ntendency to persist on account of their supposed divine\norigin.[126]\n\n[Footnote 122: Macdonald, _Oceania_, p. 201.]\n\n[Footnote 123: Maspero, _Dawn of Civilization_, p. 682.\nDelitzsch, _Wo lag das Paradies?_ p. 86.]\n\n[Footnote 124: _1 Samuel_, xv. 23. Schultz, _Old Testament\nTheology_, ii. 286. For other instances see _Rig-Veda_, vii. 89.\n5; Geiger, _Civilization of the Eastern Ir[=a]nians_, i. p. li.;\nSchmidt, _Die Ethik der alten Griechen_, ii. 51 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 125: _Cf._ _supra_, i. 193 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 126: _Cf._ Pollock, _Essays on Jurisprudence and\nEthics_, p. 306 _sq._]\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nDuties to gods are in the first place based on prudential\nconsiderations. Supernatural beings, even when on the whole of a\nbenevolent disposition, are no less resentful than men, and,\nowing to their superhuman power, much more dangerous. On the\nother hand, they may also bestow wonderful benefits upon those\nwho please them. The general rule that prudence readily assumes a\nmoral value holds particularly true of religious matters, where\ngreat individual interests are at stake. Waterland says in his\nSermon on Self-love:--\"The wisest course for any man to take is\nto secure an interest in the life to come. . . . He may love\nhimself, in this instance, as highly and as tenderly as he\npleases. There can be no excess of fondness, or self-indulgence,\nin respect of eternal happiness. This is loving himself in the\nbest manner, and to the best purposes. All virtue and piety are\nthus resolvable into a principle of self-love. . . . It is with\nreference to ourselves, and for our own sakes, that we love even\nGod himself.\"[127]\n\n[Footnote 127: Waterland, 'On Self-Love,' in _The English\nPreacher_, i. 101 sq._ Cf._ Paley's definition of virtue in his\n_Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy_, i. 7 (_Complete\nWorks_, ii. 38; _supra_, i. 300).]\n\nAt the same time it may be not only in people's own interests,\nbut in the interests of their fellow men as well, for them to be\non friendly terms with supernatural beings. These beings often\nvisit the iniquity of fathers or forefathers upon children or\ndescendants, or punish the community for the sins of one of its\nmembers;[128] and, on the other hand, they reward the whole\nfamily or group for the virtues of a single individual.[129] So\nalso, when the {661} members of a community join in common acts\nof worship, each worshipper promotes not only his own welfare,\nbut the welfare of his people. In early religion it is of the\nutmost importance for the tribe or nation that the established\ncult should be strictly observed. This is a fact which cannot be\ntoo much emphasised when we have to explain how conduct which is\npleasing to a god has come to be regarded as a moral duty; for,\nif the latest stages of religious development be excepted, the\nrelations between men and their gods are communal rather than\nindividual in character. Ahura Mazda said, \"If men sacrifice unto\nVerethraghna, made by Ahura, if the due sacrifice and prayer is\noffered unto him just as it ought to be performed in the\nperfection of holiness, never will a hostile horde enter the\nAryan countries, nor any plague, nor leprosy, nor venomous\nplants, nor the chariot of a foe, nor the uplifted spear of a\nfoe!\"[130] Thus the duties to gods are at the same time social\nduties of the first order, owing to the intensely social\ncharacter of religious relationships.\n\n[Footnote 128: _Supra_, i. 48 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 129: _Supra_, i. 96 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 130: _Yasts_, xiv. 48.]\n\nAnother circumstance which has contributed to the moral\ncondemnation of offences against gods is that people are anxious\nto punish such offences in order to prevent the divine wrath from\nturning against themselves;[131] for punishment, as we have seen,\neasily leads to moral disapproval. But although prudential\nconsiderations of some kind or other be the chief cause of the\nobligatory character attached to men's conduct towards their\ngods, they are not the only cause. We must also remember that\ngods are regarded with genuine reverence by their worshippers;\nand where this is the case offences against religion naturally\nexcite sympathetic resentment in the latter, whilst great piety\ncalls forth sympathetic approval and is praised as a virtue.\n\n[Footnote 131: _Supra_, i. 194.]\n\nI have here spoken of duties which men consider they owe to their\ngods, not of duties to supernatural beings in general. This\ndistinction, though not always easy to {662} follow in detail, is\nyet of vital importance. People may no doubt be afraid to offend\nand even anxious to please other spirits besides their gods, but\nreligious duties chiefly arise where there are established\nrelationships between men and supernatural beings; indeed, it may\neven be a duty to refrain from worshipping or actually to\npersecute other spirits, as is the case in monotheistic\nreligions. Men depend for their welfare on their gods more than\non any other members of the spiritual world. They select as their\ngods those supernatural beings from whom they think they have\nmost to fear or most to hope. Hence it is generally in the\nrelations to them only that those factors, prudential and\nreverential, are to be found which lead to the establishment of\nreligious duties.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER L\n\nGODS AS GUARDIANS OF MORALITY\n\n\nAS men are concerned about the conduct of their fellow men\ntowards their gods, so gods are in many cases concerned about\nmen's conduct towards one another--disapproving of vice and\npunishing the wicked, approving of virtue and rewarding the good.\nBut this is by no means a universal characteristic of gods. It is\na quality attributed to certain deities only and, as it seems, in\nmost instances slowly acquired.\n\nWe are told by competent observers that the supernatural beings\nof savage belief frequently display the utmost indifference to\nall questions of worldly morality. According to Messrs. Spencer\nand Gillen, the Central Australian natives, though they assume\nthe existence of both friendly and mischievous spirits, \"have not\nthe vaguest idea of a personal individual other than an actual\nliving member of the tribe who approves or disapproves of their\nconduct, so far as anything like what we call morality is\nconcerned.\"[1] The Society Islanders maintained that \"the only\ncrimes that were visited by the displeasure of their deities were\nthe neglect of some rite or ceremony.\"[2] The religious belief of\nthe Gonds of Central India is said to be wholly unconnected with\nany idea of morality; a moral deity demanding righteous conduct\nfrom his creatures, our informant adds, is a religious {664}\nconception far beyond the present capacity either of the Indian\nsavage or the ordinary Hindu.[3] Of the E[(w]e-, Yoruba-, and\nTshi-speaking peoples of the West African Slave and Gold Coasts\nMajor Ellis writes:--\"Religion, at the stage of growth in which\nwe find it among these three groups of tribes, has no connection\nwith morals, or the relations of men to one another. It consists\nsolely of ceremonial worship, and the gods are only offended when\nsome rite or ceremony has been neglected or omitted. . . .\nMurder, theft, and all offences against the person or against\nproperty, are matters in which the gods have no immediate\nconcern, and in which they take no interest, except in the case\nwhen, bribed by a valuable offering, they take up the quarrel in\nthe interests of some faithful worshipper.\"[4] So also among the\nBambala, a Bantu tribe in the Kasai, south of the River Congo,\n\"there is no belief that the gods or spirits punish wrong-doing\nby afflicting the criminal or his family, nor are the acts of a\nman supposed to affect his condition after death.\"[5] The Indians\nof Guiana, says Sir E. F. Im Thurn, observe an admirable code of\nmorality, which exists side by side with a simple animistic form\nof religion, but the two have absolutely no connection with one\nanother.[6] With reference to the Tarahumares of Mexico Dr.\nLumholtz states that the only wrong towards the gods of which an\nIndian may consider himself guilty is that he does not dance\nenough. \"For this offence he asks pardon. Whatever bad thoughts\nor actions toward man he may have on his conscience are settled\nbetween himself and the person offended.\"[7] In the primitive\nIndian's conception of a god,\" Mr. Parkman observes, \"the idea of\nmoral good {665} has no part. His deity does not dispense justice\nfor this world or the next.\"[8]\n\n[Footnote 1: Spencer and Gillen, _Northern Tribes of Central\nAustralia_, p. 491.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Ellis, _Polynesian Researches_, i. 397.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Forsyth, _Highlands of Central India_, p. 145. See\nalso Hodgson, _Miscellaneous Essays_, i. 124 (B\u00f3do and Dhim\u00e1ls);\nCaldwell, _Tinnevelly Shanars_, p. 36; Lyall, _Asiatic Studies_,\np. 45; Radloff, _Das Schamanenthum_, p. 13 (Turkish tribes of the\nAltai).]\n\n[Footnote 4: Ellis, _Yoruba-speaking Peoples of the Slave Coast_,\np. 293. _Idem_, _Tshi-speaking Peoples of the Gold Coast_, p. 10.\nThe E[(w]e god Mawu is represented as an exception to this rule\n(_infra_, p. 686).]\n\n[Footnote 5: Torday and Joyce, 'Ethnography of the Ba-Mbala,' in\n_Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxxv. 415.]\n\n[Footnote 6: Im Thurn, _Indians of Guiana_, p. 342.]\n\n[Footnote 7: Lumholtz, _Unknown Mexico_, i. 332.]\n[Footnote 8: Parkman, _Jesuits in North America_, p. lxxviii. See\nalso Eastman, _Dacotah_, p. xx.; Schoolcraft, _Indian Tribes of\nthe United States_, ii. 195 (Dacotahs).]\n\nThat many savage gods are so thoroughly selfish as to care about\nnothing else than what concerns their own interests, may also be\ninferred from the character attributed to them. We have seen that\nthe altruistic sentiment is the chief source from which moral\nemotions spring, and of the gods of various uncivilised peoples\nwe hear not only that they are totally destitute of benevolent\nfeelings, but that they are of a malicious nature and mostly\nintent on doing harm to mankind.[9]\n\n[Footnote 9: See Meiners, _Geschichte der Religionen_, i. 405;\nTylor, _Primitive Culture_, ii. 329; Avebury, _Origin of\nCivilisation_, p. 232 _sqq._; Roskoff, _Geschichte des Teufels_,\ni. 20 _sq._; Frazer, _Golden Bough_, iii. 40 _sqq._; Karsten,\n_Origin of Worship_, p. 46 _sqq._]\n\nThe Maoris of New Zealand regarded their deities as the causes of\npain, misery, and death, as mighty enemies from whom nobody ever\nthought of getting any aid or good, but who were to be rendered\nharmless by means of charms or spells or by sacrifices offered to\nappease their wrath.[10] The Tahitians \"supposed their gods were\npowerful spiritual beings, in some degree acquainted with the\nevents of this world, and generally governing its affairs; never\nexercising any thing like benevolence towards even their most\ndevoted followers, but requiring homage and obedience, with\nconstant offerings; denouncing their anger, and dispensing\ndestruction on all who either refused or hesitated to\ncomply.\"[11] The Fijians \"formed no idea of any voluntary\nkindness on the part of their gods, except the planting of wild\nyams, and the wrecking of strange canoes and foreign vessels on\ntheir coast\";[12] and that some of these beings were conceived as\npositively wicked is indicated by the names given them--\"the\nadulterer,\" \"the rioter,\" \"the murderer,\" and so forth.[13] The\npeople of Aneiteum, in the New Hebrides, maintained that \"earth\nand air and ocean were filled with natmasses, spiritual beings,\nbut all malignant, who ruled over everything that affected the\nhuman race. . . . Their deities, like themselves, were {666} all\nselfish and malignant; they breathed no spirit of benevolence.\"[14]\n\n[Footnote 10: Taylor, _Te Ika a Maui_, pp. 104, 148. Colenso,\n_Maori Races of New Zealand_, p. 62. _Cf._ Dieffenbach, _Travels\nin New Zealand_, ii. 118.]\n\n[Footnote 11: Ellis, _Polynesian Researches_, i. 336.]\n\n[Footnote 12: Williams and Calvert, _Fiji_, p. 195.]\n\n[Footnote 13: _Ibid._ p. 185.]\n\n[Footnote 14: Inglis, _In the New Hebrides_, pp. 30, 32.]\n\nThe Santal of India believes in no god from whose benignity he\nmay expect favour, but in \"a multitude of demons and evil\nspirits, whose spite he endeavours by supplications to avert.\"\nEven his family god \"represents the secret principle of evil,\nwhich no bolts can shut out, and which dwells in unseen but\neternally malignant presence beside every hearth.\"[15] The\nKamchadales do not seem to have hoped for anything good from\ntheir deities; Kutka himself, the creator of the universe and the\ngreatest of the gods, was once caught in adultery and\ncastrated.[16]\n\n[Footnote 15: Hunter, _Annals of Rural Bengal_, i. 181 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 16: Klemm, _Cultur-Geschichte der Menschheit_, ii. 318\n_sq._ Steller, _Beschreibung von Kamtschatka_, p. 264.]\n\nAccording to the beliefs of the Koksoagmyut, or Hudson Bay\nEskimo, all the minor spirits are under the control of the great\nspirit whose name is Tung ak, and this being \"is nothing more or\nless than death, which ever seeks to torment and harass the lives\nof people that their spirits may go to dwell with him.\"[17] Nay,\neven the special guardian spirit by which each person is supposed\nto be attended is malignant in character and ever ready to seize\nupon the least occasion to work harm upon the individual whom it\naccompanies; its good offices can be obtained by propitiation\nonly.[18] Among the Nenenot, or Indians of Hudson Bay, \"the rule\nseems to be that all spirits are by nature bad, and must be\npropitiated to secure their favour.\"[19] Of various Brazilian\ntribes we are likewise told that they do not believe in the\nexistence of any benevolent spirits. Thus the Coroado Indian\nacknowledges only an evil principle, which sometimes meets him in\nthe form of a lizard or a crocodile or an ounce or a man with the\nfeet of a stag, sometimes transforms itself into a swamp, and\nleads him astray, vexes him, brings him into difficulty and\ndanger, and even kills him.[20] The Mundrucus of the Cupar\u00ed have\nno notion of a good supreme being, but believe in an evil spirit,\nregarded merely as a kind of hobgoblin, who is at the bottom of\nall their little failures and gives them troubles in fishing,\nhunting, and so forth.[21] The Uaup\u00e9s, says Mr. Wallace, \"appear\nto have no definite idea of a God. . . . They have much more\ndefinite ideas of a bad spirit, 'Jurupar\u00ed,' or Devil, whom they\nfear and {667} endeavour through their _pag\u00e9s_ [or medicine men]\nto propitiate. When it thunders, they say the 'Jurupar\u00ed' is\nangry, and their idea of natural death is that the 'Jurupar\u00ed'\nkills them.\"[22]\n\n[Footnote 17: Turner, 'Ethnology of the Ungava District,' in\n_Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ xi. 272.]\n\n[Footnote 18: _Ibid._ p. 194.]\n\n[Footnote 19: _Ibid._ p. 193 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 20: von Spix and von Martius, _Travels in Brazil_, ii. 243.]\n\n[Footnote 21: Bates, _The Naturalist on the River Amazons_, ii. 137.]\n\n[Footnote 22: Wallace, _Travels on the Amazon_, p. 500.]\n\nIn Eastern Africa, according to Burton, \"the sentiment generally\nelicited by a discourse upon the subject of the existence of a\nDeity is a desire to see him, in order to revenge upon him the\ndeaths of relatives, friends, and cattle.\"[23] The only quality\nof a moral character which the Wanika are said to ascribe to the\nsupreme being, Mulungu, is that of vindictiveness and\ncruelty.[24] To the Matabele the idea of a benevolent deity is\nutterly foreign, but they have a vague notion of a number of evil\nspirits always ready to do harm, and the chief among these are\nthe spirits of their ancestors.[25] All the good the Bechuanas\nenjoy they ascribe to rainmakers, but \"all the evil that comes\nthey attribute to a supernatural being\";[26] of their principal\ngod, Morimo, Mr. Moffat never once, in the course of twenty-five\nyears spent in missionary labour, heard that he did good or was\ncapable of doing so.[27] Among various other African peoples,\ntravellers assure us, supernatural beings are supposed to\nexercise a potent influence for evil rather than for good, or\nbeneficent spirits are, at any rate, almost unknown.[28] On the\nGold Coast, according to Major Ellis, the majority of spirits are\nmalignant, and every misfortune is ascribed to their action. \"I\nbelieve,\" he adds, \"that originally all were conceived as\nmalignant, and that the indifference, or the beneficence (when\npropitiated by sacrifice and flattery), which are now believed to\nbe characteristics of some of these beings, are later\nmodifications of the original idea.\"[29]\n\n[Footnote 23: Burton, _Lake Regions of Central Africa_, ii. 348.]\n\n[Footnote 24: New, _Life, Wanderings, and Labours in Eastern\nAfrica_, p. 103 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 25: Decle, _Three Years in Savage Africa_, p. 153.]\n\n[Footnote 26: Campbell, _Second Journey in the Interior of South\nAfrica_, ii. 204.]\n\n[Footnote 27: Moffat, _Missionary Labours in Southern Africa_\n(ed. 1842), p. 262.]\n\n[Footnote 28: Rowley, _Religion of the Africans_, p. 55.\nKingsley, _Travels in West Africa_, p. 443. Mockler-Ferryman,\n_British Nigeria_, p. 255 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 29: Ellis, _Tshi-speaking Peoples_, pp. 12, 18, 20.\n_Cf._ Cruickshank, _Eighteen Years on the Gold Coast_, ii. 134.]\n\nOf many savages it is reported that they have notions of good, as\nwell as of evil spirits, but that they chiefly or exclusively\nworship the evil ones, since the others are supposed to be so\ngood that they require no offerings or homage.[30] But adoration\nof supernatural beings which are {668} considered at least\noccasionally beneficent is also very prevalent among uncivilised\npeoples.[31] The gods of the pagan Lapps were all good, although\nthey took revenge upon those who offended them.[32] Among the\nNavaho Indians of New Mexico \"the gods who are supposed to love\nand help men the most receive the greatest honour\"; whereas the\nevil spirits are not worshipped except, rumour says, by the\nwitches.[33] The belief in guardian or tutelary spirits of\ntribes, clans, villages, families, or individuals, is extremely\nwidespread.[34] These spirits may be exacting enough--they are\noften greatly feared by their own worshippers, and sometimes\ndescribed as distinctly malignant {669} by nature;[35] but their\ngeneral function is nevertheless to afford assistance to the\nperson or persons with whom they are associated. At the same time\nit should be noticed that the goodness of many savage gods only\nconsists in their readiness to help those who please them by\nofferings or adoration; and in no case does their benevolence\nprove that they take an active interest in morality at large. A\nfriendly supernatural being is not necessarily a guardian of\nmen's behaviour towards their fellow men. In Morocco the patron\nsaint of a town, village, or tribe is not in the least concerned\nabout any kind of conduct which has not immediate reference to\nhimself.[36] It is believed that even the robber may, by invoking\na dead saint, secure his assistance in an unlawful enterprise.\n\n[Footnote 30: Wilken, _Het Animisme bij de volken van den\nIndischen Archipel_, p. 207 _sq._ Perham, 'Sea Dyak Religion,' in\n_Jour. Straits Branch Roy. Asiatic Soc._ no. 10, p. 220; St.\nJohn, _Life in the Forests of the Far East_, i. 69 _sq._ (Sea\nDyaks). Blumentritt, 'Der Ahnencultus und die religi\u00f6sen\nAnschauungen der Malaien des Philippinen-Archipels,' in\n_Mittheil. d. kais. u. k\u00f6n. Geograph. Gesellsch. in Wien_, xxv.\n166 _sqq._ Prain, 'Angami Nagas,' in _Revue coloniale\ninternationale_, v. 489. Forsyth, _op. cit._ pp. 141, 143\n(Gonds). Hooker, _Himalayan Journals_, i. 126 (Lepchas).\nRobertson, _History of America_, i. 383; M\u00fcller, _Geschichte der\nAmerikanischen Urreligionen_, pp. 150, 151, 232, 260; Dorman,\n_Origin of Primitive Superstition_, p. 30 (American Indians).\nSproat, _Scenes and Studies of Savage Life_, p. 212 (Ahts).\nFalkner, _Description of Patagonia_, p. 116; Prichard, _Through\nthe Heart of Patagonia_, p. 97.]\n\n[Footnote 31: See _supra_, ii. 615 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 32: von D\u00fcben, _Lappland_, pp. 227, 285. Friis,\n_Lappisk Mythologi_, p. 106. Jessen, _Norske Finners og Lappers\nHedenske Religion_, p. 33.]\n\n[Footnote 33: Matthews, _Navaho Legends_, p. 40. See also _ibid._\np. 33.]\n\n[Footnote 34: Ellis, _Tshi-speaking Peoples of the Gold Coast_,\npp. 17, 18, 77, 92. _Idem_, _E[(w]e-speaking Peoples of the Slave\nCoast_, p. 75. Wilson, _Western Africa_, p. 387 (Mpongwe).\nTuckey, _River Zaire_, p. 375. Ellis, _History of Madagascar_,\ni. 395 _sq._ Ratzel, _History of Mankind_, i. 321 (various South Sea\nIslanders). Turner, _Samoa_, p. 17 _sq._ Williams and Calvert,\n_Fiji_, p. 185 _sq._ Inglis, _op. cit._ p. 30 (people of\nAneiteum). Christian, _Caroline Islands_, p. 75. Wilken, _Het\nAnimisme_, pp. 231 _sqq._ (Minahassers, Macassars, and Bugis of\nCelebes), 243 (Javanese). Selenka, _Sonnige Welten_, p. 103 _sq._\n(Dyaks). Forbes, _Insulinde_, p. 203 (natives of Tenimber). von\nBrenner, _Besuch bei den Kannibalen Sumatras_, p. 221 (Bataks).\nMason, 'Religion, &c. among the Karens,' in _Jour. Asiatic Soc.\nBengal_, xxxiv. 196. Hunter, _Annals of Rural Bengal_, i. 182,\n186 _sq._ (Santals). Hodgson, _Miscellaneous Essays_, i. 128\n(B\u00f3do and Dhim\u00e1ls). Bailey, 'Veddahs of Ceylon,' in _Trans. Ethn.\nSoc._ N.S. ii. 301; Nevill, 'Vaeddas of Ceylon,' in\n_Taprobanian_, i. 194. Schmidt, _Ceylon_, p. 291 _sq._ (Tamils).\nBergmann, _Nomadische Streifereien unter den Kalm\u00fcken_, iii. 182\n_sq._ Abercromby, _Pre- and Proto-historic Finns_, i. 160\n(Ostiaks). Buch, 'Die Wotjaken,' in _Acta Soc. Scient. Fennic\u00e6_,\nxii. 595 _sq._ Castr\u00e9n, _Nordiska resor och forskningar_, iii.\n106, 107, 174 _sq._ (Finnish tribes). Boas, 'Central Eskimo,' in\n_Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ vi. 591. Turner, _ibid._ xi. 193 _sq._\n(Hudson Bay Eskimo), 272 (Hudson Bay Indians). Hoffman, 'Menomini\nIndians,' _ibid._ xiv. 65. McGee, 'Siouan Indians,' _ibid._ xv.\n179; Parkman, _op. cit._ p. lxx; Dorman, _op. cit._ p. 227 (North\nAmerican Indians). M\u00fcller, _Geschichte der Amerikanischen\nUrreligionen_, pp. 72 (North American Indians), 171 (Indians of\nthe Great Antilles). Couto de Magalh\u00e3es, _Trabalho preparatorio\npara aproveitamento do selvagem no Brazil--O selvagem_, p. 128\n_sqq._ Tylor, _op. cit._ ii. 199 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 35: Schmidt, _Ceylon_, p. 291 _sq._ (Tamils). Turner,\nin _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ xi. 193 _sq._ (Hudson Bay Eskimo), 272\n(Hudson Bay Indians). McGee, _ibid._ xv. 179; M\u00fcller, _op. cit._\np. 72 (North American Indians).]\n\n[Footnote 36: For a singular exception to this rule see _supra_,\nii. 67 _sq._]\n\nOn the other hand, instances are not wanting in which savage gods\nare supposed to punish the transgression of rules relating to\nworldly morality. Occasionally, as we have noticed above, such\ngods are represented as avengers of some special kind of\nwrong-doing--murder,[37] theft,[38] niggardliness,[39] want of\nhospitality,[40] or lying.[41] Of certain Negro tribes we are\ntold that, \"when a man is about to commit a crime, or do that\nwhich his conscience tells him he ought not to do, he lays aside\nhis fetiche, and covers up his deity, that he may not be privy to\nthe deed.\"[42] The Tonga Islanders \"firmly believe that the gods\napprove of virtue, and are displeased with vice; that every man\nhas his tutelar deity, who will protect him as long as he\nconducts himself as he ought to do; but, if he does not, will\nleave him to the approaches of misfortune, disease, and death. . . .\nAll rewards for virtue or punishments for vice happen to men\nin this world only, {670} and come immediately from the\ngods.\"[43] The Ainu of Japan are heard to say, \"We could not go\ncontrary to the customs of our ancestors without bringing down\nupon us the wrath of the gods.\"[44] And of various savages we are\ntold that they believe in the existence of a supreme being who is\na moral lawgiver or judge.\n\n[Footnote 37: _Supra_, i. 378 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 38: _Supra_, ii. 59 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 39: _Supra_, i. 561 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 40: _Supra_, i. 578.]\n\n[Footnote 41: _Supra_, ii. 114 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 42: Tuckey, _op. cit._ p. 377. _Cf._ Monrad, _Skildring\naf Guinea-Kysten_, p. 27, n. *]\n\n[Footnote 43: Mariner, _Natives of the Tonga Islands_, ii. 149, 107.]\n\n[Footnote 44: Batchelor, _Ainu of Japan_, p. 243 _sq._]\n\nIn Australia, especially in New South Wales and Victoria but also\nin other parts of the continent, many of the native tribes have\nthe notion of an \"All-father,\" called Baiame, Daramulun,\nMungan-ngalla, Bunjil, Nurelli, Nurundere, or by some other\nname.[45] He is represented as an anthropomorphic, supernatural\nbeing and as the father of the race or the maker of everything,\nwho at one time dwelt on the earth but afterwards ascended to a\nland beyond the sky, where he still remains. He is of a kindly\ndisposition, and requires no worship; in a very few cases only we\nmeet with some faint traces of a cult offered him.[46] {671} He\nis frequently believed to have instituted the initiation\nceremonies,[47] and to have given the people their laws.[48] Thus\nNurundere is said to have taught the Narrinyeri all the rites and\nceremonies whether connected with life or death; on inquiry why\nthey adhere to any custom, the reply is that Nurundere commanded\nit.[49] At the _boorah_, or initiation, of the Euahlayi tribe,\nByamee is proclaimed as \"Father of All, whose laws the tribes are\nnow obeying\"; and in one of their myths he is described as the\noriginal source of all the totems and of the law that persons of\nthe same totem may not intermarry.[50] Bunjil taught the Kulin\nthe arts of life, and told them to divide themselves into two\nintermarrying classes so as to prevent marriages between\nkindred.[51] Daramulun instructed the Yuin what to do and gave\nthem laws which the old people have handed down from father to\nson to the present time.[52] And in several instances the\nAustralian \"All-father\" is represented as a guardian of morality\nwho punishes the wicked and rewards the good. Bunjil \"very\nfrequently sent his sons to destroy bad men and bad women . . .\nwho had killed and eaten blacks.\"[53] Daramulun, or Tharamulun,\nwho from his residence in the sky watches the actions of men, \"is\nvery angry when they do things that they ought not to do, as when\nthey eat forbidden food.\"[54] The natives of the Herbert River,\nin Queensland, believe that anybody who takes a wife from the\nprohibited sub-class, or who does not wear the morning necklace\nfor the prescribed period, or who eats forbidden food, will\nsooner or later die in consequence, since his behaviour is\noffensive to Kohin, a supernatural being who is supposed to have\nhis dwelling in the Milky Way but to roam about at night on earth\nas a gigantic warrior killing those whom he meets.[55] Most\ncommonly, however, the retribution is said to come after death.\n{672} The tribes about Maryborough, in Queensland, maintain that\nthe ghosts of those who are good or those who have a high degree\nof excellence in any particular line--fishing, hunting, fighting,\ndancing, and so forth--are directed by Birral to an island in the\nFar North, where he resides.[56] Among the Cape River tribes,\n\"when a Blackfellow dies whose actions during life have been what\nthey hold to be good, he is said to ascend to Boorala (_i.e._, to\nthe Creator, literally 'good'), where he lives much as he did on\nearth, less the usual terrestrial discomforts\"; whereas to the\nman who has led a bad life death is thought to be simple\nannihilation.[57] The Kulin said that when they die they will be\nsubjected to a sort of trial by Binbeal, \"the good being rewarded\nin a better land, the bad driven away, but where they seemed to\nhave no idea.\"[58] According to another account, again, Binbeal,\nafter he has subjected the spirits of the deceased to an ordeal\nof fire to try whether they are good or bad, liberates the good\nat once, whereas the bad are confined and punished.[59] The\nIllawarra, who lived from thirty to a hundred miles south of\nSidney, believed that when people die they are brought up to a\nlarge tree where Mirirul, the supreme ruler, examines and judges\nthem. The good he takes up to the sky, the bad he sends to\nanother place to be punished. The women said to their children\nwhen they were naughty, \"Mirirul will not allow it.\"[60] Among\nthe Wathiwathi, in New South Wales, the belief prevails that if\nthe spirit of a bad man escapes the traps which are set for it on\nits course in the sky, it is sure to fall into the hell of fire.\nThe good spirit, on the other hand, is received by two old women\nwho take care of it till it becomes accustomed to its new abode;\nand after a time the great God, Tha-tha-puli, comes with a host\nof spirits to see the newcomer and try his strength.[61]\nAccording to a report written by Archdeacon G\u00fcnther in 1839,\nBaiame is supposed to like the blacks who are good; and \"there is\nalso an idea entertained by the more thoughtful that good natives\nwill go to Baiame when they die.\"[62] Later authorities state\nthat Baiame is believed not only to reward the good after death,\nbut also to punish the wicked--that is, persons who tell lies or\nkill men by striking them secretly or who are unkind towards the\nold and sick or, generally, who break his laws.[63] A very\nelaborate {673} theory of retribution is communicated by Mr.\nManning, whose notes date from 1844 or 1845. Boyma (Baiame) is\nsaid to be seated far away in the north-east on an immense throne\nmade of transparent crystal and standing in a great lake. He has\na son, Grogoragally, equal with him in omniscience, who acts as\nmediator for the souls to the Great God. His office is to watch\nover the actions of mankind and to bring to life the dead to\nappear before the judgment-seat of his Father, who alone\npronounces the judgment of eternal happiness in heaven or eternal\nmisery in a hell of everlasting fire. Women and boys dying before\nthe initiation, however, do not go to heaven; the men have a\nvague idea that another world is reserved for them. There is also\na third person, half human, half divine, called Moodgeegally, who\nmakes Boyma's will known to mankind and is the avowed enemy of\nall wicked people, transmitting their misdeeds to Grogoragally.[64]\n\n[Footnote 45: Henderson, _Colonies of New South Wales_, p. 147.\nde Strzelecki, _New South Wales_, p. 339. Manning, 'Aborigines of\nNew Holland,' in _Jour. and Proceed. Roy. Soc. N.S. Wales_, xvi.\n157 _sqq._ Ridley, _K\u00e1milar\u00f3i_, p. 135 _sqq._ Cameron, 'Some\nTribes of New South Wales,' in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xiv. 364\n_sq._ Langloh Parker, _Euahlayi Tribe_, p. 4 _sqq._ Threlkeld,\n_An Australian Language as spoken by the Awabakal_, p. 47.\nMathews, _Aboriginal Tribes of New South Wales and Victoria_,\np. 138 _sqq._ Mathew, _Eagle-hawk and Crow_, p. 146 _sqq._ Fountain\nand Ward, _Rambles of an Australian Naturalist_, p. 296.\n_Missions-Blatt aus der Br\u00fcdergemeine_, xvi. 101, 143; Parker,\n_Aborigines of Australia_, p. 24; Dawson, _Australian\nAborigines_, p. 49 (tribes in Victoria). Brough Smyth,\n_Aborigines of Victoria_, i. 423 _sqq._ Taplin, 'Narrinyeri,' in\nWoods, _Native Tribes of South Australia_, p. 55 _sqq._ Howitt,\n_Native Tribes of South-East Australia_, p. 489 _sqq._ Spencer\nand Gillen, _Northern Tribes of Central Australia_, p. 498 _sq._\n(Kaitish). Strehlow, quoted by Thomas, 'Religious Ideas of the\nArunta,' in _Folk-Lore_, xvi. 429 _sq._ _Idem_, quoted by von\nLeonhardi, 'Religi\u00f6se und totemistische Vorstellungen der Aranda\nund Loritja in Zentralaustralien,' in _Globus_, xci. 286 _sq._\nCurr, _The Australian Race_, i. 253 (Larrak[=i]a); ii. 465, 475\n(some Cape River natives). Lang, _Cooksland_, p. 459 _sq._;\n_Idem_, _Queensland_, p. 379 _sq._ Roth, _Ethnol. Studies among\nthe North-West-Central Queensland Aborigines_, pp. 16, 153. 158.\nSalvado, _M\u00e9moires historiques sur l'Australie_, p. 258 (natives\nof West Australia).]\n\n[Footnote 46: When the natives of Cooksland, in North-Eastern\nAustralia, rob a wild bees' hive they generally leave a little of\nthe honey for Buddai, the supernatural ancestor of their race\n(Lang, _Cooksland_, p. 460; _Idem_, _Queensland_, p. 380). Mrs.\nLangloh Parker (_op. cit._ pp. 8, 9, 79, 89) was told that in the\nEuahlayi tribe prayers are addressed to Byamee at funerals for\nthe souls of the dead, and that at some initiatory rites the\noldest medicine-man present addresses a prayer to him asking him\nto give the people long life as they have kept his law; but they\ndo not profess to pray or to have prayed to Byamee on any other\noccasions (_cf._ Manning, _loc. cit._ p. 164). The natives\ninhabiting the neighbourhood of Lake Boga in Victoria have to\nplacate Pei-a-mei by dances (_Missions-Blatt aus der\nBr\u00fcdergemeine_, xvi. 143). Of the South-Eastern Australian\nDaramulun Mr. Howitt says (_op. cit._ p. 507 _sq._) that,\nalthough there is no worship of him, \"the dances round the figure\nof clay and the invocating of his name by the medicine-men\ncertainly might have led up to it.\"]\n\n[Footnote 47: Manning, _loc. cit._ p. 165; Ridley, _op. cit._\npp. 141, 155; Langloh Parker, _op. cit._ p. 7 (Boyma, Baiame,\nByamee). Howitt, _op. cit._ p. 495 (Daramulun). M'Kinlay, quoted\n_ibid._ p. 496. Mr. Threlkeld says (_op. cit._ p. 47) that Koin,\nan imaginary male being who has the appearance of a black, is\nsupposed to precede the coming of the natives from distant parts\nwhen they assemble to celebrate certain of their ceremonies.]\n\n[Footnote 48: Howitt, _op. cit._ p. 489 (Nurelli of the\nWiimbaio). M'Kinlay, quoted _ibid._ p. 496.]\n\n[Footnote 49: Taplin, in Woods, _op. cit._ p. 55.]\n\n[Footnote 50: Langloh Parker, _op. cit._ p. 7 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 51: Howitt, _op. cit._ p. 491.]\n\n[Footnote 52: _Ibid._ p. 495.]\n\n[Footnote 53: Brough Smyth, _op. cit._ i. 423.]\n\n[Footnote 54: Howitt, _op. cit._ p. 495.]\n\n[Footnote 55: _Ibid._ p. 499.]\n\n[Footnote 56: Howitt, _op. cit._ p. 498.]\n\n[Footnote 57: Curr, _op. cit._ ii. 475.]\n\n[Footnote 58: Parker, _Aborigines of Australia_, p. 24.]\n\n[Footnote 59: Ridley, _op. cit._ p. 137.]\n\n[Footnote 60: _Ibid._ p. 137.]\n\n[Footnote 61: Cameron, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xiv. 364 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 62: G\u00fcnther, quoted by Thomas, in _Man_, 1905, p. 51.]\n\n[Footnote 63: Ridley, _op. cit._ pp. 135, 136, 140. Langloh\nParker, _op. cit._ p. 70.]\n\n[Footnote 64: Manning, _loc. cit._ p. 159 _sqq._]\n\nIt seems probable that these statements represent a mixture of\nChristian ideas and genuine aboriginal beliefs. There is reason\nto believe that the Australian notion of an \"All-father\" is not\nin the first instance due to missionary influence;[65] we have\nrecords of it from a comparatively early date, it is spread over\na wide area, it has been found among natives who live in a state\nof great isolation, and the multitude of different names by which\nthe \"All-father\" is called in different tribes does not suggest a\nrecent origin from a common source. He may very well be a\nmythical ancestor. Mr. Howitt observes that the master in the\nsky-country represents the Australian idea of a headman--\"a man\nwho is skilful in the use of weapons of offence and defence,\nall-powerful in magic, but generous and liberal to his people,\nwho does no injury or violence to any one, yet treats with\nseverity any breaches of custom or morality.\"[66] But he may also\nbe a personification of supernatural force in general, or a being\nwho has been invented to account for all kinds of marvellous\nphenomena. The word _altjira_, by which the Arunta call their\ngreat god, is apparently not a proper name; according to Kempe,\nit is applied to five gods, whose names he gives, as also to the\nsun, moon, and remarkable things generally.[67] And Mulkari, who\nfigures in the beliefs of some Queensland tribes, is described\nnot only as \"a benevolent, omnipresent, supernatural being,\" but\nas \"anything incomprehensible,\" as {674} the supernatural power\nwho makes everything which the blacks cannot otherwise account\nfor.[68] On the other hand, it is hardly possible to doubt that\nin various instances Christian conceptions have been infused into\nthe aboriginal belief either by the natives themselves or by our\ninformants.[69] Biblical traits are conspicuous in some of the\nlegends. Bishop Salvado tells us that, according to West\nAustralian beliefs, the Creator, Motogon, \"employa ces paroles:\n'Terre, parais dehors': et il souffla, et la terre fut cr\u00e9\u00e9e.\n'Eau, parais dehors'; et il souffla, et l'eau fut cr\u00e9\u00e9e.\"[70] The\nbelievers in Nourelle give the following account of the origin of\ndeath:--The first created man and woman were told not to go near\na certain tree in which a bat was living, as the bat was not to\nbe disturbed. But one day the woman, while gathering firewood,\nwent near the forbidden tree; the bat flew away and after that\ncame death.[71] And the same natives also believe that Nourelle\ncreated a great serpent, to which he gave power over all created\nthings.[72] So also the doctrine of a hell with everlasting fire\nhas almost certainly a foreign origin; and in some other points\nthe genuineness of the Australian theories of retribution is at\nleast open to doubt, even though the function of a judge cannot\nbe regarded as incompatible with the notion of a mythical headman\nin the sky. Messrs. Spencer and Gillen observe that it would be a\nvery easy matter indeed to form, as the result of a general\nstatement such as might be made by any individual native in reply\nto a question, a perfectly wrong impression with regard to the\nnative's idea as to the existence of anything like a supreme\nbeing inculcating moral rules.[73] Of the Central Australian\naborigines they say:--\"Any such idea as that of a future life of\nhappiness or the reverse, as a reward for meritorious or as a\npunishment for blameworthy conduct, is quite foreign to them. . . .\nWe know of no tribe in which there is a belief of any kind in a\nsupreme being who rewards or punishes the individual according to\nhis moral behaviour, using the word moral in the native\nsense.\"[74] So far as the Arunta are concerned, this statement is\nconfirmed by Mr. Strehlow. He writes that their god Altjira, who\nlives in the sky and shows himself to man in the lightning, is a\n{675} good god who never inflicts any punishments on human beings.[75]\n\n[Footnote 65: See especially Howitt, _op. cit._ p. 504 _sqq._;\nLang, _Magic and Religion_, p. 25 _sqq._; Thomas, in _Man_, p. 50\n_sqq._; von Leonhardi, in _Globus_, xci. 287.]\n\n[Footnote 66: Howitt, _op. cit._ p. 507. See also _ibid._ p. 501.]\n\n[Footnote 67: Thomas, in _Folk-Lore_, xvi. 431.]\n\n[Footnote 68: Roth, _op. cit._ pp. 36, 153.]\n\n[Footnote 69: Mr. J. D. Lang (_Queensland_, p. 379 _sq._;\n_Cooksland_, p. 459 _sq._) even suspects Asiatic influence in the\ncase of Buddai, or Budjah, the mythical ancestor of certain\nQueensland aborigines. Not only does his name remind of Buddha,\nbut a story told of him is remarkably similar to an Eastern legend.]\n\n[Footnote 70: Salvado, _op. cit._ p. 258.]\n\n[Footnote 71: Brough Smyth, _op. cit._ i. 428.]\n\n[Footnote 72: _Ibid._ i. 423.]\n\n[Footnote 73: Spencer and Gillen, _Northern Tribes of Central\nAustralia_, p. 492 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 74: _Ibid._ p. 491.]\n\n[Footnote 75: Strehlow, quoted by Thomas, in _Folk-Lore_, xvi.\n429 _sq._ _Idem_, quoted by von Leonhardi, in _Globus_, xci. 287.]\n\nFrom various Polynesian and Melanesian islands we hear of a\nsupreme being--called Io by the Maoris,[76] Tangaroa by the\nSamoans,[77] Taaroa by the Society Islanders,[78] and so\nforth[79]--who has made everything, but who is too remote and\nindistinct to be an object of worship and takes no interest in\nthe morals of men. In some instances at least he seems to be a\nvery shadowy deification of the forces of nature. Thus Io is\ndescribed as \"the great originator, the All-Father, who pervades\nspace, has no residence, and cannot be localised\"; and the\nconception of Tangaroa is equally abstract.[80] Mr. Guppy learned\nthat the natives of Treasury Island and the Shortlands, in the\nSolomon Group, believe in a Good Spirit who lives in a pleasant\nland, whither all men who have led good lives go after death;\nwhereas all bad people are transported to the crater of Bagana,\nthe burning volcano of Bougainville, which is the home of the\nEvil Spirit and his companion spirits.[81] But this belief\nsavours too much of a Christian hell to be accepted as genuine\nwithout further evidence.\n\n[Footnote 76: Gudgeon, 'Maori Religion,' in _Jour. Polynesian\nSoc._ xiv. 108 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 77: _Ibid._ p. 108 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 78: Ellis, _Polynesian Researches_, i. 323 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 79: Tylor, _op. cit._ ii. 344 _sqq._ Hoffmann, _La\nnotion de l'\u00catre supr\u00eame chez les peuples non civilis\u00e9s_, p. 70\n_sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 80: Gudgeon, in _Jour. Polynesian Soc._ xiv. 108.]\n\n[Footnote 81: Guppy, _Solomon Islands_, p. 53.]\n\nThe Sea Dyaks of Borneo have a great good god called Batara, or\nPetara, who created the world and rules over it, and is the cause\nof every blessing. He is not susceptible to human influence, and\ntherefore receives no worship. But he approves of industry,\nhonesty, purity of speech, and skill in word and work. He\npunishes theft, injustice, disrespect for old persons, and\nadultery; and immorality among the unmarried is supposed to bring\na plague of rain upon the earth as a punishment inflicted by\nPetara. In general, says Mr. Perham, he is against man's sin; but\nover and above moral offences many sins have been invented which\nare simply the infringement of _pemate_, or _tabu_.[82] Like many\nother great gods of savages, Petara is lacking in individuality.\nHe is at all events not now supposed to be one supreme god, but\nthe general belief is that there are many Petaras--in fact as\nmany Petaras as men. Each man, the people say, has his own\npeculiar Petara, his own tutelary deity, and if a {676} person is\nmiserable it is because his Petara is miserable.[83] This\naccount, however, loses much of its interest when we find that\nthe name Batara or Petara has obviously been borrowed from\nSanscrit, where the word _bha[t.][t.]\u00e2ra_ means \"lord\" or\n\"master.\"[84] The great gods of some other peoples in the Malay\nArchipelago, again, have names which are derived from\nArabic--Lahatala, Latala, or Hatalla, from _Allah ta[(]\u00e2la_.\nHence when the Alfura of Bura are heard to say that their highest\ngod, Opo-geba-snulat or Lahatala, writes down in a book the\nactions of men so as to be able to reward the virtuous and punish\nthe wicked as they deserve, there is every reason to think of\ninfluence from Muhammedanism.[85]\n\n[Footnote 82: Perham, 'Petara,' in _Jour. Straits Branch Roy.\nAsiatic Soc._ no. 8, p. 149 _sq._ St. John, _Life in the Forests\nof the Far East_, i. 69 _sq._ Selenka, _op. cit._ p. 97 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 83: Perham, in _Jour. Straits Branch Roy. Asiatic Soc._\nno. 8, p. 134 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 84: _Ibid._ p. 133. Wilken, _Het Animisme_, p. 162.]\n\n[Footnote 85: Wilken, _op. cit._ pp. 162, 240 _sq._]\n\nThe Andaman Islanders are reported to believe in a supreme being,\nP[=u]luga, who was never born and is immortal, who has created\nthe world and all its objects, who is omniscient when it is day,\nknowing even the thoughts of their hearts. Whilst pitiful to\nthose in distress, he is angered by the commission of certain\nsins--falsehood, theft, grave assault, murder, adultery, and\nburning wax. He is the judge from whom each soul receives its\nsentence after death. The \"spirits\" of the departed are sent by\nhim to a place comprising the whole area under the earth, to\nawait the resurrection. The \"souls\" of the departed, again, pass\neither into paradise or to another place which might be described\nas purgatory, a place of punishment for those who have been\nguilty of heinous sins, such as murder. At the resurrection the\nsoul (from which evil emanates) and the spirit (from which all\ngood emanates) will be reunited and will henceforth live\npermanently on the new earth, since the souls of the wicked will\nthen have been reformed by the punishments inflicted on them\nduring their residence in the \"purgatory.\"[86] Mr. Man, who has\ngiven us this account, thinks it is extremely improbable that the\nlegends about P[=u]luga, about the powers of good and evil, and\nabout a world beyond the grave, are the result of the teaching of\nmissionaries or others.[87] But his assumption that they are\nindigenous seems hardly justified by the very scanty knowledge we\npossess of the past history of these islanders. Considering their\nlow state of culture, the metaphysical subtlety in some of the\nnotions recorded by Mr. Man would certainly be more astonishing\nif India were not so near.\n\n[Footnote 86: Man, 'Aboriginal Inhabitants of the Andaman\nIslands,' in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xii. 112, 157, 158, 161 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 87: _Ibid._ p. 156.]\n\n{677}Among the Karens of Burma the belief is held that Hades has\na king or judge who stands at the door to admit or reject those\nwho apply for admission into his kingdom. He decides the future\nof each. Those who have performed meritorious works are sent to\nthe regions of happiness above; those who have done wickedness,\nsuch as striking father or mother, are delivered over to the king\nof hell who is in waiting; whilst those who have neither\nperformed deeds of merit nor are guilty of great crimes are\nallotted a place in Hades.[88] At the same time the Karens' ideas\nof a future state are described as confused, indefinite, and\ncontradictory. Mr. Mason writes:--\"They seem to be a melee of\ndifferent systems. That which appears to me indigenous Karen . . .\nrepresents the future world as a counterpart of this, located\nunder the earth, where the inhabitants are employed precisely as\nthey are here.\"[89] The Pah\u00e1rias of the R\u00e1jmahal Hills believe\nthat the souls of those who have been disobedient to the commands\nof Bedo Gosain will be condemned either to inhabit some portion\nof the vegetable kingdom for a certain number of years, or to be\ncast into a pit of fire, where the offender will suffer eternal\npunishment or be regenerated in the shape of a dog or a cat.\nThose who have led a good life, on the other hand, will be\nrewarded, first by enjoying a short but happy residence with Bedo\nGosain in heaven, and subsequently by being born a second time on\nearth of women and being exalted to posts of great honour, as\nalso by possessing an abundance of worldly goods.[90] In these\nnotions our chief informant, Lieutenant Shaw, sees traces of\nHinduism.[91] Lack of detailed information makes it impossible to\ndecide whether the belief in a creator and heavenly judge which\nhas been found in some other uncivilised tribes in India might be\ntraced to a similar influence. The Munda Kols in Central Bengal\nmaintain that the good and almighty Singbonga, who lives in the\nsky and is connected with the sun, has made everything. Being so\nfar away he occupies himself very little with earthly matters,\nand is only in exceptional cases an object of worship; but he\nsees everything which happens, and is said to punish theft and\ninsincerity.[92] So also the Kukis recognise a benevolent and\nall-powerful god {678} and creator, called Puth\u00e9n, who is the\njudge of all mortals and awards punishments to the wicked both in\nthis world and in the next.[93]\n\n[Footnote 88: Mason, in _Jour. Asiatic Soc. Bengal_, xxxiv. 196.]\n\n[Footnote 89: _Ibid._ p. 195.]\n\n[Footnote 90: Shaw, 'Inhabitants of the Hills near R\u00e1jamahall,'\nin _Asiatick Researches_, iv. 48 _sqq._ Sherwill, 'Tour through\nthe R\u00e1jmahal Hills,' in _Jour. Asiatic Soc. Bengal_, xx. 556.]\n\n[Footnote 91: Shaw, in _Asiatick Researches_, iv. 46.]\n\n[Footnote 92: Jellinghaus, 'Sagen, Sitten und Gebr\u00e4uche der\nMunda-Kolhs in Chota Nagpore,' in _Zeitschr. f. Ethnologie_,\niii. 330 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 93: Stewart, 'Northern Cachar,' in _Jour. Asiatic Soc.\nBengal_, xxiv. 628.]\n\nThe Ainu of Japan believe in a great god or creator who bestows\nblessings upon the good and visits the bad with disease, unless\nthey repent. They also say that good people go after death to the\n\"island of the Great Spirit,\" or to the \"kingdom of God,\" to lead\na happy life; whereas bad people go to the \"bad island,\" or to\nthe \"wet underground world,\" in which they suffer discomfort or,\naccording to some, are burned in everlasting fires.[94] Of the\npagan Samoyedes we are told that they regard the great Num as the\ncreator of the universe, as an all-powerful and omniscient being,\nwho protects the innocent, rewards the virtuous, and punishes the\nwicked.[95] But the primitive Num, who was simply the sky, was\ntoo far removed from the nomads who wandered across the frozen\nplain, to interfere to prevent catastrophe or accomplish their\nwell-being; and in the provident actions and overseeing which\nsome of the Samoyedes now ascribe to him, \"we can clearly enough\ntrace the influence of the missionary and the suggestion of the\nChristian faith.\"[96]\n\n[Footnote 94: von Siebold, _Die Aino auf der Insel Yesso_, p. 24.\nBatchelor, _Ainu of Japan_, pp. 199, 235 _sqq._ Howard, _Life\nwith Trans-Siberian Savages_, p. 193.]\n\n[Footnote 95: Castr\u00e9n, _op. cit._ iii. 14.]\n\n[Footnote 96: Jackson, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxiv. 398. See\nalso Castr\u00e9n, _op. cit._ iii. 14-16, 182 _sqq._]\n\nDr. Rink asserts that the Greenlanders considered Tornarsuk as\nthe supreme being on whom they were dependent for any\nsupernatural aid, and in whose abodes in the depth of the earth\nall such persons as had striven and suffered for the benefit of\ntheir fellow men should find a happy existence after death.[97]\nDr. Nansen, however, is of opinion that Tornarsuk owes a great\ndeal to missionary influence.[98] That he was not so superior a\nbeing as is commonly stated is evident from Captain Holm's\ndescription of the Angmagsaliks in Eastern Greenland, where he is\nrepresented as a monster living in the sea, of about the same\nlength as a big seal, but thicker.[99] And to judge from Egede's\ndescription dating from the earlier part of the eighteenth\ncentury, Tornarsuk's notions of justice, if he had any, must in\nolden times have been very limited, as he took to his\nsubterranean paradise only women that died in labour and men that\nperished at sea.[100]\n\n[Footnote 97: Rink, _Greenland_, p. 141.]\n\n[Footnote 98: Nansen, _Eskimo Life_, p. 242.]\n\n[Footnote 99: Holm, 'Ethnologisk Skizze af Angmagsalikerne,' in\n_Meddelelser om Gr\u00f6nland_, x. 115.]\n\n[Footnote 100: Egede, _Description of Greenland_, p. 197.]\n\n{679} The \"Great Spirit\" so often referred to in accounts of North\nAmerican Indians, is described as a being too elevated and remote\nto take much interest in the destinies and actions of men and too\nbenevolent by nature to require propitiation or worship.\nSchoolcraft asserts that in their oral traditions there is no\nattempt \"to make man accountable to him, here or hereafter, for\naberrations from virtue, good will, truth, or any form of moral\nright. With benevolence and pity as prime attributes the Great\nTranscendental Spirit of the Indian does not take upon himself a\nrighteous administration of the world's affairs, but, on the\ncontrary, leaves it to be filled, and its affairs, in reality,\ngoverned, by demons and fiends in human form.\"[101] Yet there are\ninstances in which he is represented in a different light. The\nmost essential moral precepts of the Iroquois \"were taught as the\nwill of the Great Spirit, and obedience to their requirements as\nacceptable in his sight\";[102] but whilst highly gratified with\ntheir virtues, he detested their vices, and punished them for\ntheir bad conduct not only in this world but in a future state of\nexistence.[103] The Potawatomis considered that rape was visited\nby the anger of the Great Spirit.[104] Ti-ra'-wa, the supreme\nbeing of the Pawnees, applauds valour, abhors theft, and punishes\nthe wicked by annihilation, whilst the good dwell with him in his\nheavenly home.[105] The Indians of Alabama told Bossu that those\nwho behave themselves foolishly and disregard the supreme being\nwill after death go to a barren land full of thorns and briars,\nwith no hunting and no wives, whereas those who neither rob nor\nkill nor take other men's wives will occupy a very fertile\ncountry and live there a happy life.[106] Keating states that,\naccording to the beliefs of the Dacotahs, men go to the residence\nof the Great Spirit if they have been good and peaceable, or if\nthey died by the hand of their enemy, but that their souls are\ndoomed to the residence of the Evil Spirit if they perish in a\nbroil with their own countrymen.[107] This statement, however, is\nnot supported by other authorities. Prescott writes of the same\nIndians:--\"They have very little notion of punishment for crime\nhereafter in eternity: indeed, they know very little about\nwhether the Great Spirit has anything to do with their affairs,\npresent or future.\"[108] {680} And among the Omaha and Ponka, who\nare branches of the same people, the old men used to say to their\nfellow tribesmen, \"If you are good, you will go to the good\nghosts; if you are bad you will go to the bad ghosts.\" But\nnothing was ever said of going to dwell with Wakanda, or with\ndemons.[109] As regards the origin of the North American notion\nof the Great Spirit different opinions have been expressed. On\nthe one hand we are told that it is essentially only \"the\nIndian's conception of the white man's god,\" which belongs not to\nthe untutored but to the tutored mind of the savage.[110] On the\nother hand it is argued that the belief in the Great Spirit must\nbe a native product, since it is reported to have occurred\nalready before the arrival of the earliest Jesuit missionaries.[111]\nUnfortunately, however, we cannot be sure that our informants\nhave accurately interpreted the beliefs of the Indians. Mr.\nDorsey has pointed out that a fruitful source of error has been a\nmisunderstanding of their terms and phrases.[112] The Dacotah\nword _wakanda_, which has been rendered into \"Great Spirit,\"\nsimply means \"mystery,\" or \"mysterious,\" and signifies rather a\nquality than a definite entity. Among many tribes the sun is\nwakanda, among the same tribes the moon is wakanda, and so are\nthunder, lightning, the stars, the winds, as also various\nanimals, trees, and inanimate objects or places of a striking\ncharacter; even a man, especially a medicine-man, may be\nconsidered wakanda.[113] So, too, the Menomini term _mash\u00e4' ma'\nnid[=o]_, or \"great unknown,\" is not to be understood as implying\na belief in one supreme being; there are several manidos, each\nsupreme in his own realm, as well as many lesser mysteries, or\ndeities, or spirits.[114] Mr. Dorsey also observes that in many\ncases Indians have been quick to adopt the phrases of\ncivilisation in communicating with white people, whilst in\nspeaking to one another they use their own terms.[115] At the\nsame time it seems to me that if the notion of a Great Spirit had\naltogether a Christian origin we might expect to find an idea of\nmoral retribution more commonly associated with it than the {681}\nstatements imply. It may be that among the North American Indians\nalso, as among some other peoples, a vague conception of\nsomething like a supreme being has arisen through a\npersonification of the mysteries in nature.[116] But if this be\nthe case the interest which the Great Spirit in rare instances\ntakes in human conduct may all the same be due to missionary\ninfluence. It is certainly not an original characteristic of his\nnature. Among the Iroquois and Pawnees, who attribute to their\ngreat god the function of a moral judge, he also receives\nofferings--[117] a circumstance which indicates that he cannot be\nregarded as a typical representative of his class.\n\n[Footnote 101: Schoolcraft, _op. cit._ i. 35.]\n\n[Footnote 102: Morgan, _League of the Iroquois_, p. 172.]\n\n[Footnote 103: Seaver, _Narrative of the Life of Mrs. Jemison_,\np. 155.]\n\n[Footnote 104: Keating, _Expedition to the Source of St. Peter's\nRiver_, i. 127.]\n\n[Footnote 105: Grinnell, _Pawnee Hero Stories_, p. 355. Lang,\n_Making of Religion_, p. 257.]\n\n[Footnote 106: Bossu, _Travels through Louisiana_, i. 256 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 107: Keating, _op. cit._ i. 393 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 108: Schoolcraft, _op. cit._ ii. 195. _Cf._ _ibid._\niii. 229.]\n\n[Footnote 109: Dorsey, 'Siouan Cults,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._\nxi. 419.]\n\n[Footnote 110: Smith, 'Myths of the Iroquois,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur.\nEthn._ ii. 112. Tylor, 'Limits of Savage Religion,' in _Jour.\nAnthr. Inst._ xxi. 284. Boyle, 'Paganism of the Civilised\nIroquois,' _ibid._ xxx. 266.]\n\n[Footnote 111: Lang, _Making of Religion_, p. 251 _sqq._ _Idem_,\n_Magic and Religion_, p. 19 _sqq._ Hoffmann, _op. cit._ p. 86 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 112: Dorsey, in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ xi. 365 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 113: _Ibid._ p. 366. McGee, in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._\nxv. 181 _sqq._ _Cf._ James, _Expedition to the Rocky Mountains_,\ni. 268; Tylor, _op. cit._ ii. 343.]\n\n[Footnote 114: Hoffman, 'Menomini Indians,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur.\nEthn._ xiv. 39, n. 1. _Cf._ Parkman, _Jesuits in North America_,\np. lxxix.]\n\n[Footnote 115: Dorsey, in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ xi. 365. See\nalso Smith, _ibid._ ii. 112.]\n\n[Footnote 116: The Great Spirit is represented by Schoolcraft\n(_op. cit._ i. 15) as a \"Soul of the Universe which inhabits and\nanimates every thing,\" and is supposed to exist under every\npossible form in the world, animate and inanimate. Of Ti-ra'-wa\nit is said that he \"is in and of everything\" (_supra_, i. 448).]\n\n[Footnote 117: Seaver, _op. cit._ p. 155. _Supra_ i. 448.]\n\nIn South America, too, several tribes have been found to believe\nin a benevolent Great Spirit, who is indifferent to men's\nbehaviour and is not worshipped by them.[118] Of the Pass\u00e9s,\nhowever, we are told by a Portuguese official who travelled in\nBrazil in 1774-75 that they have the idea of a creator who\nrewards good people by allowing their souls to stay with him and\npunishes the wicked by turning their souls into evil\nspirits.[119] But according to Mr. Bates \"these notions are so\nfar in advance of the ideas of all other tribes of Indians . . .\nthat we must suppose them to have been derived by the docile\nPass\u00e9s from some early missionary or traveller.\"[120] Of the\nFuegians, again, Admiral Fitzroy writes:--\"A great black man is\nsupposed to be always wandering about the woods and mountains,\nwho is certain of knowing every word and every action; who cannot\nbe escaped, and who influences the weather according to men's\nconduct.\" Of this influence our informant gives the following\ninstance. A native related a story of his brother who once killed\na man--one of those very wild men who wander about in the woods\nsupporting themselves by theft--because he stole from him a bird.\nAfterwards he was very sorry for what he had done, particularly\nwhen it began to blow hard. In telling the story, the brother\nsaid:--\"Rain come down--snow come down--hail come down--wind\nblow--blow--very much blow. Very bad to kill man. Big man in woods\nno like it, he very angry.\" The same native also reproached the\nsurgeon {682} of the Beagle for shooting some young ducks with\nthe old bird:--\"Very bad to shoot little duck--come wind--come\nrain--blow--very much blow.\"[121] In the latter case, however, no\nmention was made of the black man in the woods. From Admiral\nFitzroy's account Mr. Andrew Lang draws the conclusion that the\nFuegians have evolved the idea of a high deity, an ethical judge,\nwho \"makes for righteousness,\" who searches the heart, who almost\nliterally \"marks the sparrow's fall,\" and whose morality is so\nmuch above the ordinary savage standard that he regards the\nslaying of a stranger and an enemy, caught redhanded in robbery,\nas a sin.[122] This statement may serve as a specimen of the\nspirit in which its author deals with the subject of supreme\nbeings in savage beliefs. There is after all some difference\nbetween a high moral god and a mythical weather doctor who lives\nin the woods and sends bad weather if a wild man, who also lives\nin the woods, is killed. Mr. Bridges, our most trustworthy\nauthority on the Fuegians, says nothing of the black man, but\nstates that nearly all the old men among the Fuegians are\nmedicine-men, and that these wizards make frequent incantations\nin which they seem to address themselves to a mysterious being\ncalled A\u00efapakal. And they also believe in another spirit, named\nHoakils, from whom they pretend to obtain a supernatural power\nover life and death.[123]\n\n[Footnote 118: Bernau, _Missionary Labours in British Guiana_, p.\n49. Hoffmann, _op. cit._ p. 90 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 119: Ribeiro de Sampaio, _Diario da viagem_, p. 79.]\n\n[Footnote 120: Bates, _The Naturalist on the River Amazons_, ii.\n244. _Cf._ _ibid._ ii. 162; Dobrizhofter, _Account of the\nAbipones_, ii. 57 _sq._; M\u00fcller, _Geschichte der Amerikanischen\nUrreligionen_, p. 289.]\n\n[Footnote 121: King and Fitzroy, _Voyages of the \"Adventure\" and\n\"Beagle,\"_ ii. 180.]\n\n[Footnote 122: Lang, _Making of Religion_, pp. 188, 198. The same\ndescription of the Fuegian black man is repeated by M. Hoffmann\n(_op. cit._ p. 40).]\n\n[Footnote 123: Bridges, quoted by Hyades and Deniker, _Mission\nscientifique du Cap Horn_, vii. 256.]\n\nThe South African Bushmans, another very backward people, are\nlikewise represented by Mr. Lang and M. Hoffmann as believers in\na supreme being.[124] A native said to Mr. Orpen that Cagn made\nall things, and that the people prayed to him:--\"O Cagn! O Cagn!\nare we not your children, do you not see our hunger? Give us\nfood.\" And he gave them what they asked for both hands full. But\nalthough he was at first very good and nice, he afterwards \"got\nspoilt through fighting so many things.\"[125] However, according\nto another statement, made by a person who from childhood had\nmuch intercourse with Bushmans and knew their language, they did\nnot believe in a God or the great father of men, but in a devil\nwho made everything with his left hand.[126] The Hottentots spoke\nof Tsui-goab as \"the giver of all blessings, the Father on high,\nAll-father, the {683} avenger, who fought daily the battle for\nhis people.\" They thus identified him with the ancestor of the\ntribe, but Tsui-goab was also the name by which they called the\nInfinite.[127] Among the pagans of Africa there is, in fact, a\nvery widespread belief in a benevolent supreme deity, a creator\nor maker of things, who lives in or above the sky, who generally\ntakes no concern whatever in the affairs of mankind, who mostly\nreceives no worship, and is, as a rule, totally indifferent to\ngood or evil.[128] In some rare instances only he is described as\na judge of human conduct. Thus some of the Bechuanas believe that\na being who is vaguely called by the name of Lord and Master of\nthings, Mongalinto, punishes thieves by striking them with the\nlightning.[129] According to an old writer, Father Santos, the\nnatives of Sofala in South-Eastern Africa acknowledge a god,\ncalled Molungo, \"who both in this and the world to come they\nfancy measures retribution for the good and evil done in this.\"\nThey believe in the existence of twenty-seven paradises, where\neveryone enjoys a pleasure proportionate to the merits of his\nlife; while those who have passed their lives in wickedness are\nsupposed to be condemned to a privation from the sight of the\nholy presence of Molungo, and to suffer torments in one of the\nthirteen hells they assume to exist, each according to the evil\nhe has done.[130] The Baluba, a Bantu people of Equatorial\nAfrica, have the notion of a creator, named Fidi-Mukullu, who\npunishes the souls of the wicked before they are reborn on earth,\nwhereas the good return to life again, in the shape of chiefs or\nother important persons, immediately after they have died.[131]\nThe Awemba, {684} another Bantu people, who inhabit the stretch\nof country lying between Lake Tanganyika and Lake Bangweolo,\nacknowledge a supreme being, Leza, who \"is the Judge of the dead,\nand condemns thieves, adulterers and murderers to the state of\nVibanda, or Viwa (evil spirits), exalting the good to the rank of\n_mipashi_, or benevolent spirits.\"[132] Other natives in the\nneighbourhood of Lake Tanganyika recognise a creator called\nKabesa, who lives in the sky and admits to his abode the souls of\ngood people after death, but turns away the souls of the\nwicked.[133] The Akikuyu of British East Africa recognise three\ngods all of whom are called Ngai. One of them, however, is\nconsidered the supreme deity. \"If a man is good this Ngai can\ngive him much property. If he does wrong the same power can\nstrike him down with disease and cause his livestock to dwindle\naway. . . . The sudden death of a man, for instance by lightning,\nis ascribed to some evil act of his life being punished by\nNgai.\"[134] Proyart tells us that the Negroes of Loango believed\nin a supreme being, Zambi, who had created all that is good in\nthe world, who was himself good and loved justice in others, and\nwho severely punished fraud and perjury.[135] It is of course\nimpossible to say exactly how far the statements referring to\nAfrican supreme beings represent unadulterated native beliefs. In\ncriticising Kolb's account of the supreme and perfect god of the\nHottentots, Bishop Callaway observes, \"Nothing is more easy than\nto enquire of heathen savages the character of their creed, and\nduring the conversation to impart to them . . . ideas which they\nnever heard before, and presently to have these come back again\nas articles of their own original faith, when in reality they are\nbut the echoes of one's own thoughts.\"[136] With reference to the\nWest African native Miss Kingsley likewise remarks that he has a\nwonderful power of assimilating foreign forms of belief, and that\nwhen he once has got hold of a new idea it remains in his mind\nlong after the missionaries who put it there have passed\naway.[137] And besides the teaching of missionaries there are in\nAfrica several factors which for centuries have tended to\nintroduce foreign conceptions, namely, intercourse with European\nsettlers, the operations of the slave trade, and the influence of\nMuhammedanism.[138] But at the same {685} time it seems\nexceedingly probable that the African belief in a supreme being\nhas a native substratum. In many cases he is apparently the\nheaven god;[139] but he may also be a mythical ancestor, as the\nHottentot god Tsui-goab and the Zulu god Unkulunkulu; or a\npersonification of the supernatural, as is suggested by such\nnames as the Masai Ng[)a]i, the Monbuttu Kilima, and the Malagasy\nAndriamanitra;[140] or the assumed cause of anything which\nparticularly fills the savage mind with wonder or awe. Among the\nnatives of Northern Guinea, according to Mr. Wilson, \"every thing\nwhich transpires in the natural world beyond the power of man, or\nof spirits, who are supposed to occupy a place somewhat higher\nthan man, is at once and spontaneously ascribed to the agency of\nGod.\"[141] Nay, for reasons which will be stated immediately, I\nam even of opinion that the function of a moral judge,\noccasionally attributed to the great god of African pagans, has\nin some instances an independent origin.\n\n[Footnote 124: Lang, _Making of Religion_, p. 210. Hoffmann, _op.\ncit._ p. 40 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 125: Orpen, 'Glimpse into the Mythology of the Maluti\nBushmen,' in _The Cape Monthly Magazine_, N.S. ix. 2.]\n\n[Footnote 126: Campbell, _Second Journey in the Interior of South\nAfrica_, i. 29.]\n\n[Footnote 127: Hahn, _The Supreme Being of the Khoi-Khoi_,\npp. 122, 126 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 128: Livingstone, _Missionary Travels_, p. 641 (tribes\nof the Zambesi). Rattray, _Stories and Songs in Chinyanja_,\np. 198 (natives of Central Angoniland). Stigand, 'Natives of\nNyassaland,' in _Jour. Roy. Anthr. Inst._ xxxvii. 130. Roscoe,\n'Bahima,' _ibid._ xxxvii. 108 _sq._ Wilson and Felkin, _Uganda_,\ni. 206. Beltrame, _Il Fiume Bianco e i D\u00e9nka_, pp. 191, 192, 276\n_sq._ Kingsley, 'Fetish View of the Human Soul,' in _Folk-Lore_,\nviii. 142 _sq._; _Idem_, _Travels in West Africa_, pp. 442, 508.\nParkinson, 'Asaba People of the Niger,' in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._\nxxxvi. 312. Bosman, _Description of the Coast of Guinea_, pp. 121\n_sq._ (Gold Coast natives), 348 (Slave Coast natives).\nCruickshank, _Eighteen Years on the Gold Coast_, ii. 126 _sq._\nEllis, _Tshi-speaking Peoples of the Gold Coast_, p. 26 _sqq._\n_Idem_, _E[(w]e-speaking Peoples of the Slave Coast_, p. 33 _sq._\nWinterbottom, _Native Africans in the Neighbourhood of Sierra\nLeone_, i. 222. Wilson, _Western Africa_, p. 209 (natives of\nNorthern Guinea). Rowley, _Religion of the Africans_, pp. 15, 16,\n54. Tylor, _op. cit._ ii. 347 _sqq._ Lang, _Making of Religion_,\np. 230 _sqq._ Hoffmann, _op. cit._ p. 45 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 129: Arbousset and Daumas, _Exploratory Tour to the\nNorth-East of the Colony of Good Hope_, p. 322 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 130: Santos, 'History of Eastern Ethiopia,' in\nPinkerton, _Collection of Voyages and Travels_, xvi.\n687.]\n\n[Footnote 131: Wissmann, Wolf, &c., _Im Innern Afrikas_, p. 158.\nWissmann, _Quer durch Afrika_, p. 379.]\n\n[Footnote 132: Sheane, 'Awemba Religion,' in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._\nxxxvi. 150 _sq._ ]\n\n[Footnote 133: Schneider, _Die Religion der afrikanischen\nNaturv\u00f6lker_, p. 84.]\n\n[Footnote 134: Tate, 'Kikuyu Tribe,' in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._\nxxxiv. 263.]\n\n[Footnote 135: Proyart, 'History of Loango,' in Pinkerton,\n_Collection of Voyages and Travels_, xvi. 594.]\n\n[Footnote 136: Callaway, _Religious System of the Amazulu_,\np. 105 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 137: Kingsley, in _Folk-Lore_, viii. 150.]\n\n[Footnote 138: _Cf._ Rowley, _Religion of the Africans_, pp. 28,\n90; Wilson, _Western Africa_, p. 229 _sq._; Cruickshank, _op.\ncit._ ii. 126.]\n\n[Footnote 139: See Tylor, _op. cit._ ii. 347 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 140: See _supra_, ii. 586 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 141: Wilson, _op. cit._ p. 209. See also Livingstone,\n_Expedition to the Zambesi_, p. 521 _sq._, quoted _supra_, ii. 594.]\n\nGenerally speaking, then, it seems that the All-father, supreme\nbeing, or high god of savage belief may be traced to several\ndifferent sources. When not a \"loan-god\" of foreign extraction,\nhe may be a mythical ancestor or headman; or a deification of the\nsky or some large and remote object of nature, like the sun; or a\npersonification or personified cause of the mysteries or forces\nof nature. The argument that the belief in such a being is\n\"irreducible\" because it prevails among savages who worship\nneither ancestors nor nature,[142] can carry no weight in\nconsideration of the fact that he himself, as a general rule, is\nno object of worship. In various instances we have reason to\nsuppose that even though the notion of a supreme being is\nfundamentally of native origin, foreign conceptions have been\nengrafted upon it; and to these belongs in particular the idea of\na heavenly judge who in the after-life punishes the wicked and\nrewards the good. But we are not entitled to assume that the idea\nof moral retribution as a function of the great god has in every\ncase been adopted {686} from people of a higher culture. A\nmythical ancestor or headman may of his own accord approve of\nvirtue and disapprove of vice; and, besides, justice readily\nbecomes the attribute of a god who is habitually appealed to in\ncurses or oaths. That the supreme being of savages is thus\ninvoked, is in some cases directly stated by our authorities. In\nmaking solemn treatises, the Hurons called on Oki, the heaven\ngod.[143] The Negroes of Loango, who believed that Zambi, the\nsupreme being, punished fraud and perjury, took his name in\ntestimony of the truth.[144] Among the Awemba the supreme god\nLeza, who is believed to reward the good and to punish thieves,\nadulterers, and murderers, is invoked both in blessings and\ncurses, the injured man praying that Leza will send a lion to\ndevour the evildoer.[145] In the E[(w]e-speaking Ho tribe on the\nSlave Coast the great god Mawu, who is said to inflict punishment\non the wicked, is frequently appealed to in law-cases, by the\njudge as well as by the plaintiff and the accused.[146] In\nNorthern Guinea the name of the supreme being is solemnly called\non three times at the ratification of an important treaty, or\nwhen a person is condemned to undergo the \"red-water\nordeal.\"[147] Of the Mpongwe we are told that \"when a covenant is\nabout to be formed among the different tribes, Mwetyi [the\nsupreme being] is always invoked as a witness, and is\ncommissioned with the duty of visiting vengeance upon the party\nwho shall violate the engagement. Without this their national\ntreaties would have little or no force. When a law is passed\nwhich the people wish to be especially binding, they invoke the\nvengeance of Mwetyi upon every transgressor, and this, as a\ngeneral thing, is ample guarantee for its observance.\"[148] Among\nthe East African Wakamba, when the supposed criminal is to\nundergo the ordeal of the hatchet, a magician makes him repeat\nthe following words:--\"If I have stolen the property of so and\nso, or committed this crime, let {687} Mulungu respond for me;\nbut if I have not stolen, nor done this wickedness, may he save\nme.\" The magician then passes the red-hot iron four times over\nthe flat hand of the accused; and the people believe that if he\nis guilty, his hand will be burned, but that, if innocent, he\nwill suffer no injury.[149] Among the Masai a person who is\naccused of cattle-lifting and on that account subjected to the\nordeal of drinking a mixture of blood and milk, has first to\nswear, \"O God, I drink this blood, if I have stolen the cattle\nthis blood will kill me.\" Should he not die within a fortnight he\nis considered innocent.[150] The Madi of Central Africa have\nvarious means of trial by ordeal, through which it is believed\nthat the guilt of a suspected individual can be detected; and\n\"before any of these trials the men look up and solemnly invoke\nsome invisible being to punish him if guilty, or help him if\ninnocent.\"[151] Of the natives of the Zambesi, all of whom have\nan idea of a supreme being, Livingstone states that, when\nundergoing an ordeal, \"they hold up their hands to the Ruler of\nHeaven, as if appealing to him to assert their innocence.\"[152]\n\n[Footnote 142: Lang, _Magic and Religion_, p. 42. Hoffmann, _op.\ncit._ pp. 122, 126, 131.]\n\n[Footnote 143: Tylor, _op. cit._ ii. 342.]\n\n[Footnote 144: Proyart, _loc. cit._ p. 594.]\n\n[Footnote 145: Sheane, in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxxvi. 151.]\n\n[Footnote 146: Spieth, _Die E[(w]e-St\u00e4mme_, p. 415.]\n\n[Footnote 147: Wilson, _Western Africa_, p. 210.]\n\n[Footnote 148: _Ibid._ p. 392.]\n\n[Footnote 149: Krapf, _Travels in Eastern Africa_, p. 173.]\n\n[Footnote 150: Marker, _Die Masai_, p. 211.]\n\n[Footnote 151: Felkin, 'Notes on the Madi,' in _Proceed. Roy.\nSoc. Edinburgh_, xii. 334.]\n\n[Footnote 152: Livingstone, _Missionary Travels_, p. 641 _sq._]\n\nIt has often been said that the oath and ordeal involve a belief\nin the gods as vindicators of truth and justice, that they are\n\"appeals to the moral nature of the Divinity.\"[153] If this were\ntrue, moral retribution would certainly be an exceedingly common\nfunction of savage gods. But, as we have noticed before,[154] the\nefficacy ascribed to an oath is originally of a magic character,\nand if it contains an appeal to a god he is, according to\nprimitive notions, a mere tool in the hand of the person invoking\nhim. So also the ordeal is essentially a magical ceremony. In\nmany cases at least, it contains a curse or an oath which has\nreference to the guilt or innocence of a suspected person, and\nthe {688} proper object of the ordeal is then to give reality to\nthe imprecation for the purpose of establishing the validity or\ninvalidity of the suspicion.\n\n[Footnote 153: Tiele, _Elements of the Science of Religion_, i.\n86. R\u00e9ville, _Les religions des peuples non-civilis\u00e9s_, i. 103.\nBrinton, _Religions of Primitive Peoples_, p. 225. Schneider,\n_Religion der afrikanischen Naturv\u00f6lker_, p. 255. Hodgson,\n_Miscellaneous Essays_, i. 126. Dahn, _Bausteine_, ii. 21, 24.\nGummere, _Germanic Origins_, p. 183.]\n\n[Footnote 154: _Supra_, ii. 118 _sqq._]\n\nThus in West Africa the common ordeal which consists in drinking\na certain draught or \"eating the fetish\" is regularly accompanied\nby an oath or a curse.[155] In the Calabar the accused person,\nbefore swallowing the ju-ju drink _mbiam_, which is made of filth\nand blood, recites an oath beginning with the words, \"If I have\nbeen guilty of this crime,\" and ending with the words, \"Then,\nMbiam, Thou deal with me!\" And whenever this ordeal is used the\ngreatest care is taken that the oath shall be recited in\nfull.[156] Of the Negroes of the Gold Coast Bosman states that\n\"if any person is suspected of thievery, and the indictment is\nnot clearly made out, he is obliged to clear himself by drinking\nthe oath-draught, and to use the imprecation, that the Fetiche\nmay kill him if he be guilty of thievery.\"[157] In Ashantee,\n\"when any one denies a theft, an aggry bead is placed in a small\nvessel, with some water, the person holding it puts his right\nfoot against the right foot of the accused, who invokes the power\nof the bead to kill him if he is guilty, and then takes it into\nhis mouth with a little of the water.\"[158] Among the Negroes of\nNorthern Guinea, in the case of the \"red-water ordeal,\" the\naccused \"invokes the name of God three times, and imprecates his\nwrath in case he is guilty of the particular crime laid to his\ncharge.\" He then steps forward and drinks freely of the \"red\nwater\"--that is, a decoction made from the inner bark of a tree\nof the mimosa family. If it nauseates and makes him vomit freely,\nhe is at once pronounced innocent, whereas, if it causes vertigo\nand he loses self-control, it is regarded as evidence of\nguilt.[159] According to an old account, the Negroes of Sierra\nLeone have a \"water of cursing,\" boiled of barks and herbs. The\nwitch-doctor puts his divining-staff into the pot and drops or\npresses the water out of it upon the arm or leg of the suspected\nperson, muttering over it these words:--\"Is he guilty of this, or\nhath he done this or that; if yea, then let it scald or burn him,\ntill the very skin come off.\" If the person remains unhurt they\nhold him innocent, and proceed to {689} the trial of another,\ntill the guilty is discovered.[160] Among the Wadshagga of\nEastern Africa the medicine-man gives to the accused a poisonous\ndraught with the words, \"If you fall down, you have committed the\ncrime and told a lie, if you remain standing we recognise that\nyou have spoken the truth.\"[161]\n\n[Footnote 155: See, besides the references below, Monrad,\n_Skildring af Guinea-Kysten_, p. 35 _sq._ (Negroes of Accra);\nBeecham, _Ashantee_, p. 215 _sqq._; Ratzel, _op. cit._ iii. 130.]\n\n[Footnote 156: Kingsley, _Travels in West Africa_, p. 465.]\n\n[Footnote 157: Bosman, _op. cit._ p. 125.]\n\n[Footnote 158: Bowdich, _Mission to Ashantee_, p. 267.]\n\n[Footnote 159: Wilson, _Western Africa_, p. 225 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 160: Dapper, _Africa_, p. 405.]\n\n[Footnote 161: Volkens, _Der Kilimandscharo_, p. 249.]\n\nAmong the Hawaiians, in the ordeal called _wai haalulu_, \"prayer\nwas offered by the priest\" while a large dish of water was placed\nbefore the culprit, who was required to hold his hands over the\nfluid; and if it shook, his fate was sealed.[162] Among the\nTinguianes in the district of El Abra in Luzon, if a man is\naccused of a crime and denies it, the headman of the village, who\nis also the judge, causes a handful of straw to be burned in his\npresence. The accused then holds up an earthern pot and says,\n\"May my belly be changed to a pot like this if I am guilty of the\ncrime of which I am accused.\" If he remains unchanged in body,\nthe judge declares him innocent.[163] The following ordeal is in\nuse among the Tunguses of Siberia. A fire is made and a scaffold\nerected near the hut of the accused. A dog's throat is then cut\nand the blood received in a vessel. The body is put on the wood\nof the fire, but in such a position that it does not burn. The\naccused passes over the fire, and drinks two mouthfuls of the\nblood, the rest whereof is thrown into the fire; and the body of\nthe dog is placed on the scaffold. Then the accused says:--\"As\nthe dog's blood burns in the fire, so may what I have drunk burn\nin my body; and as the dog put on the scaffold will be consumed,\nso may I be consumed at the same time if I be guilty.\"[164]\n\n[Footnote 162: Jarves, _History of the Hawaiian Islands_, p. 20.]\n\n[Footnote 163: Lala, _Philippine Islands_, p. 100.]\n\n[Footnote 164: Hartland, _Legend of Perseus_, ii. 85 _sq._]\n\nThe \"trial of jealousy\" mentioned in the Old Testament involved a\ncurse pronounced by the priest to the effect that the holy water\nwhich the woman suspected of adultery had to drink should cause\nher belly to swell and her thigh to rot.[165] In India the ordeal\nwas expressly regarded as a form of the oath, the same word,\n_[s.]apatha_, being used to denote both.[166] We have seen above\nthat in the Middle Ages every judicial combat was necessarily\npreceded by an oath, which essentially decided the issue of the\nfight and the question of guilt.[167] So also at the moment when\nthe hot iron was raised and the accused took {690} it into his\nhand, the Deity was invoked to manifest the truth.[168] The\nordeal of the Eucharist involved the following formula recited by\nthe victim:--\"Et si aliter est quam dixi et juravi, tunc hoc\nDomini nostri Jesu Christi corpus non pertranseat gutur meum, sed\nh\u00e6reat in faucibus meis, strangulet me suffocet me ac interficiat\nme statim in momento.\"[169]\n\n[Footnote 165: _Numbers_, v. 20 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 166: Jolly, 'Beitr\u00e4ge zur indischen Rechtsgeschichte,'\nin _Zeitschr. d. Deutschen Morgenl\u00e4ndischen Gesellsch._ xliv.\n346. Oldenberg, _Die Religion des Veda_, p. 510, n. 1. See also\nPatetta, _Le ordalie_, p. 14.]\n\n[Footnote 167: _Supra_, i. 505.]\n\n[Footnote 168: Beames, in his _Translation of Glanville_, p. 351\n_sq._]\n\n[Footnote 169: Dahn, _op. cit._ ii. 16.]\n\nTo the list of ordeals which contain an oath or a curse as their\ngoverning element many other instances might probably be added in\nwhich no imprecation has been expressly mentioned by our\nauthorities in their short descriptions of the ceremonies. This\nis all the more likely to be the case as magical practices often\nimply imprecations which are not formally expressed.[170] But\nthere may also be ordeals which have a different origin. Thus the\ncustom of swimming witches seems to have arisen from the notion\nthat everything unholy is repelled by water and unable to sink\ninto its depths;[171] and the ordeal of touching the corpse of a\nmurdered person no doubt originated in the belief that the soul\nof such a person lingered about the body until appeased by the\nshedding of the murderer's blood and that \"by the murderer's\napproach, and especially by his polluted touch, the soul was\nexcited to an instant manifestation of its indignation, by\nappearing in the form in which it was supposed to subsist, viz.\nin that of blood.\"[172] However, even though all ordeals have not\nthe same foundation, it seems highly improbable that any people,\nin the first instance, resorted to this method of discovering\ninnocence and guilt from a belief in a god who is by his nature a\nguardian of truth and justice.\n\n[Footnote 170: See, for instance, Westermarck, '_L-[(]\u00e2r_, or\nthe Transference of Conditional Curses in Morocco,' in\n_Anthropological Essays presented to E. B. Tylor_, p. 361 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 171: Binsfeldius, _Tractatus de confessionibus\nmaleficorum et sagarum_, p. 315. In the North-East of Scotland it\nwas believed that, if a person committed suicide by drowning, the\nbody did not sink, but floated on the surface (Gregor, _Folk-Lore\nof the North-East of Scotland_, p. 208).]\n\n[Footnote 172: Pitcairn, _Criminal Trials in Scotland_, iii. 187.]\n\nNor must we make any inference as to the moral character of gods\nfrom the mere prevalence of a belief in {691} a future world\nwhere men are in some way or other punished or rewarded for their\nconduct during their life. Such a belief is said to be fairly\ncommon among uncivilised races;[173] and, although in several\ncases it is undoubtedly due to Christian or other foreign\ninfluence,[174] I agree with Dr. Steinmetz that we are not\nentitled to {692} assume that it is so in all.[175] It seems that\nthe savage mind may by itself, in various ways, come to the idea\nof some kind of moral retribution after death. First, the\ncondition of the dead man is often supposed to depend upon the\nattentions bestowed on him by the survivors. Mr. Turner was told\nthat, in the belief of the St. Augustine Islanders in Polynesia,\nthe souls of the departed \"if good\" went to a land of brightness\nand clear weather in the heavens, but \"if bad\" were sent to mud\nand darkness; and the answer to his next question informed him\nthat in this case \"goodness\" meant that the friends of the\ndeceased had given him a good funeral feast, and that \"badness\"\nmeant that his stingy friends had provided nothing at all.[176]\nAlthough Mr. Turner sees no moral distinction in these terms,\nthere may be one nevertheless. Speaking of the Efatese, in the\nNew Hebrides, Mr. Macdonald observes:--\"A man's condition in the\nfuture would be, to some extent, happy or miserable according to\nhis life here. Supposing he were a worthless fellow, very scanty\nworship would be rendered to him at his death and few animals\nslain to accompany him to the spirit world; and thus he would\noccupy an inferior position there corresponding to his social\nworthlessness here. This belief,\" our informant adds, \"has\nundoubtedly great influence in making men strive to live so as to\nobtain the good opinion of their fellows, and leave an honourable\nmemory behind them at death.\"[177] The Bushmans, who maintain\nthat the dead will ultimately go to a land abounding in excellent\nfood, put a spear by the side of a departed friend in order that,\nwhen he arises, he may have something to defend himself with and\nprocure a living; but, if they hate the person, they deposit no\nspear, so that on his resurrection he may either be murdered or\nstarved.[178] The dead may also have to suffer from the curses of\nthose whom they injured while alive. At Motlav, in the {693}\nBanks Islands, relatives \"watch the grave of a man whose life was\nbad, lest some man wronged by him should come at night and beat\nwith a stone upon the grave, cursing him.\"[179] At Gaua, in the\nsame group, \"when a great man died his friends would not make it\nknown, lest those whom he had oppressed should come and spit at\nhim after his death, or _govgov_ him, stand bickering at him with\ncrooked fingers and drawing in the lips, by way of curse.\"[180]\nThe Maoris were careful to prevent the bones of their dead\nrelatives from falling into the hands of their enemies, \"who\nwould dreadfully desecrate and ill-use them, with many bitter\njeers and curses.\"[181] A person may, moreover, himself during\nhis lifetime directly provide for his comfort in the life to\ncome, and if the act by which he does so is apt to call forth\napproval its result is easily interpreted as its reward. Thus the\nKukis of India believe that all enemies whom a person has killed\nwill in his future abode be in attendance on him as slaves;[182]\nand this belief probably accounts for their opinion that nothing\nmore certainly ensures future happiness than destroying a number\nof enemies.[183] We have further to notice the common idea that a\nperson's character after his death remains more or less as it was\nduring his life. Hence the souls of bad people are supposed to\nreappear in the shape of obnoxious animals[184] or become evil\nspirits,[185] and this may lead to the notion that they have to\ndo so as a punishment for their wickedness.[186] And as the\nrevengeful feelings of men likewise are believed to last beyond\ndeath, offenders may in the {694} other world have to suffer from\nthe hands of those whom they injured in this.[187] Some of the\nNagas of Central India maintain that \"a murdered man's soul\nreceives that of his murderer in the spirit world and makes him\nhis slave.\"[188] The Chippewas think that in the land of the dead\n\"the souls of bad men are haunted by the phantoms of the persons\nor things they have injured.\"[189] In Aurora, in the New\nHebrides, the belief prevails that the ghosts of those whom a man\nhas wronged in this world take a full revenge upon him after\ndeath.[190] According to the Banks Islanders, if a person has\nkilled a good man without cause, the good man's ghost withstands\nhis murderer, when the latter after death wants to enter into\nPanoi, the good place; but if one man has killed another in fair\nfight he will not be withstood by the person whom he slew.[191]\nAnd not only the offended party but the other dead as well may,\nfrom dislike or fear, be anxious to refuse the souls of bad\npeople admittance to their company. In the belief of the\nPentecost Islanders, when the soul of a murdered man comes to the\nland of ghosts with the instrument of death upon him, he tells\nwho killed him, and when the murderer arrives the ghostly people\nwill not receive him, but he has to stay apart with other\nmurderers.[192] The Iroquois allot separate villages even to the\nsouls of those who have died in war and of those who have\ncommitted suicide, because the other dead are afraid of their\npresence.[193] Among the Negroes of Northern Guinea, according to\nMr. Wilson, \"the only idea of a future state of retribution is\nimplied in the use of a separate burial-place for those who have\ndied 'by the red-water ordeal' or who have been guilty of grossly\nwicked deeds\";[194] and if a person's body is buried apart, his\nsoul will naturally remain equally isolated.[195] That the\nfrequent idea of the bad being separated {695} from the good\nafter death is largely due to the assumed unwillingness of the\nlatter to associate with dangerous or disreputable souls, seems\nprobable from the fact that, in the beliefs of the lower races,\nparadise generally plays a much more prominent part than hell,\nthe lot of the wicked being to suffer want rather than to be\nsubjected to torments.[196] But, finally, it must also be\nremembered that the other world is a creation of men's fancy, and\nmay therefore be formed in accordance with their hopes and\nwishes. Beyond the gloom of death they imagine a paradise where\nlife is much happier than here on earth.[197] Why, then, might\nnot their moral feelings, only too often ungratified in the\nreality of the present, occasionally seek satisfaction in the\ndreams of the future?\n\n[Footnote 173: Thomson, _Savage Island_, p. 94. Percy Smith,\n'Futuna,' in _Jour. Polynesian Soc._ i. 39. Seemann, _Viti_,\np. 400; Williams and Calvert, _Fiji_, p. 208. Codrington,\n_Melanesians_, p. 274 _sq._ (Banks' Islanders). Inglis, _New\nHebrides_, p. 31; Turner, _Samoa_, p. 326 (people of Aneiteum).\nCampbell, _A Year in the New Hebrides_, p. 169 (people of Tana).\nSchwaner, _Borneo_, i. 183 (natives of the Barito district).\nSelenka, _op. cit._ pp. 88, 94, 112 (Dyaks). von Brenner, _op.\ncit._ p. 240 (Bataks of Sumatra), de Mas, _Informe sobre el\nestado de las Islas Filipinas_, 'Orijen, &c.' p. 14. Best,\n'Prehistoric Civilisation in the Philippines,' in _Jour.\nPolynesian Soc._ i. 200 (Tagalo-Bisaya tribes). Worcester,\n_Philippine Islands_, p. 110 (Tagbanuas of Palawan). Smeaton,\n_Loyal Karens of Burma_, p. 186 _sq._ Anderson, _Mandalay to\nMomien_, p. 146 (Kakhyens). Lewin, _Wild Races of South-Eastern\nIndia_, p. 243 _sq._ (Pankhos and Bunjogees). Hunter, _Rural\nBengal_, i. 210 (Santals). Macrae, 'Account of the Kookies,' in\n_Asiatick Researches_, vii. 195; Butler, _Travels in Assam_,\np. 88 (Kukis). Stewart, 'Notes on Northern Cachar,' in _Jour.\nAsiatic Soc. Bengal_, xxiv. 620 (Old Kukis), 632 (Nagas).\nMacpherson, _Memorials of Service in India_, p. 92 _sqq._\n(Kandhs). Thurston, 'Todas of the Nilgiris,' in the Madras\nGovernment Museum's _Bulletin_, i. 166 _sq._ Breeks, _Tribes and\nMonuments of the N[=i]lagiris_, p. 28 (Todas and Badagas).\nRadloff, _op. cit._ p. 11 _sq._ (Turkish tribes of the Altai).\nGeorgi, _Russia_, i. 106 (Chuvashes). Cranz, _History of\nGreenland_, i. 186. Hall, _Arctic Researches among the\nEsquimaux_, p. 571 _sq._ Lyon, _Private Journal_, p. 372 _sqq._\n(Eskimo of Igloolik). Boas, 'Central Eskimo,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur.\nEthn._ vi. 590. Nelson, 'Eskimo about Bering Strait,' _ibid._\nxviii. 423. Douglas, quoted by Petroff, _Report on Alaska_,\np. 177 (Thlinkets). Harrison, 'Religion and Family among the\nHaidas,' in _Jour. Anthr. Inst._ xxi. 17 _sqq._ Duncan, quoted by\nMayne, _Four Years in British Columbia_, p. 293 _sq._ (Coast\nIndians of British Columbia). Mackenzie, _Voyages to the Frozen\nand Pacific Oceans_, p. cxix. (Chippewyans). Morgan, _League of\nthe Iroquois_, p. 168 _sqq._ Harmon, _Journal of Voyages in the\nInterior of North America_, p. 364 _sq._ (Indians on the East\nside of the Rocky Mountains). Keating, _op. cit._ i. 110 _sq._\n(Potawatomis); ii. 158 _sq._ (Chippewas). Say, quoted by Dorsey,\n'Siouan Cults,' in _Ann. Rep. Bur. Ethn._ xi. 422 (Kansas).\nStevenson, 'Sia,' _ibid._ xi. 145 _sq._ Bartram, in _Trans.\nAmerican Ethn. Soc._ iii. pt. i. 27 (Creek and Cherokee Indians).\nPowers, _Tribes of California_, pp. 34, 58, 59, 91, 110, 144,\n155, 161. Buchanan, _North American Indians_, p. 235 _sqq._;\nHeriot, _Travels through the Canadas_, pp. 362, 536; Catlin,\n_North American Indians_, i. 156, and ii. 243; Domenech, _Great\nDeserts of North America_, ii. 380 (various Indian tribes of\nNorth America), von Martius, _Beitr\u00e4ge zur Ethnographie\nAmerika's_, i. 247 (Guat\u00f3s). von den Steinen, _Unter den\nNaturv\u00f6lkern Zentral-Brasiliens_, p. 435 (Paressi). de Azara,\n_Voyages dans l'Am\u00e9rique m\u00e9ridionale_, ii. 138 (Payagu\u00e1s).\nBosman, _op. cit._ p. 424 (people of Benin). Wilson, _Western\nAfrica_, p. 217 (Negroes of Northern Guinea). Reade, _Savage\nAfrica_, p. 539 (Ibos). Mungo Park, _Travels in the Interior of\nAfrica_, p. 250 (Mandingoes). Tylor, _op. cit._ ii. 83 _sqq._\nMarillier, _La survivance de l'\u00e2me et l'id\u00e9e de justice chez les\npeuples non civilis\u00e9s_, p. 33 _sqq._ Steinmetz, _Ethnologische\nStudien zur ersten Entwicklung der Strafe_, ii. 368 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 174: _Cf._ Tylor, _op. cit._ ii. 84, 91 _sqq._;\nMarillier, _loc. cit._ p. 32 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 175: Steinmetz, _Studien_, ii. 366 _sqq._ _Idem_,\n'Continuit\u00e4t oder Lohn und Strafe im Jenseits der Wilden,' in\n_Archiv f. Anthropologie_, xxiv. 577 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 176: Turner, _Samoa_, p. 292 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 177: Macdonald, _Oceania_, p. 209.]\n\n[Footnote 178: Campbell, _Second Journey in the Interior of South\nAfrica_, i. 29.]\n\n[Footnote 179: Codrington, _op. cit._ p. 269.]\n\n[Footnote 180: _Ibid._ p. 269.]\n\n[Footnote 181: Colenso, _Maori Races_, p. 28.]\n\n[Footnote 182: Dalton, _Ethnology of Bengal_, p. 46.]\n\n[Footnote 183: Macrae, 'Account of the Kookies,' in _Asiatick\nResearches_, vii. 195.]\n\n[Footnote 184: Hill and Thornton, _Aborigines of New South\nWales_, p. 4. Ratzel, _op. cit._ i. 317 (Solomon Islanders).\nJunghuhn, _Die Battal\u00e4nder auf Sumatra_, ii. 338 (natives of Bali\nand Lombok). Cross, quoted by Mac Mahon, _Far Cathay and Farther\nIndia_, p. 203 (Karens). Waitz, _Anthropologie der Naturv\u00f6lker_,\nii. 419 (Maravi). Southey, _History of Brazil_, iii. 392\n(Guaycurus). Powers, _Tribes of California_, pp. 144 (Tatu), 155\n(Kato Pomo).]\n\n[Footnote 185: Bailey, 'Wild Tribes of the Veddahs,' in _Trans.\nEthn. Soc._ N.S. ii. 302, n. [double dagger] (Sinhalese), von den\nSteinen, _Unter den Naturv\u00f6lkern Zentral-Brasiliens_, p. 349\n(Baka\u00efri).]\n\n[Footnote 186: See Steinmetz, _Studien_, ii. 376; _Idem_, in\n_Archiv f\u00fcr Anthropologie_, xxiv. 603 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 187: _Cf._ Marillier, _loc. cit._ p. 44 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 188: Fytche, _Burma_, i. 354.]\n\n[Footnote 189: Keating, _op. cit._ ii. 158 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 190: Codrington, _op. cit._ p. 279 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 191: _Ibid._ p. 274.]\n\n[Footnote 192: _Ibid._ p. 288.]\n\n[Footnote 193: Brebeuf, 'Relation de ce qui s'est pass\u00e9 dans le\npays des Hurons,' in _Relations des J\u00e9suites_, 1636, p. 104 _sq._\nHewitt, 'The Iroquoian Concept of the Soul,' in _Jour. of\nAmerican Folk-Lore_, viii. 109.]\n\n[Footnote 194: Wilson, _Western Africa_, p. 210.]\n\n[Footnote 195: See _supra_, ii. 236 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 196: This is especially the case among the Indians of\nNorth America (_cf._ Brinton, _Myths of the New World_, p. 242\n_sq._; Dorman, _op. cit._ p. 33; Steinmetz, in _Archiv f.\nAnthrop._ xxiv. 591). See also Codrington, _op. cit._ p. 274\n_sq._ (Banks' Islanders).]\n\n[Footnote 197: Dove, 'Aborigines of Tasmania.' in _Tasmanian\nJour. Natural Science_, i. 253. Polack, _Manners and Customs (of\nthe New Zealanders_, i. 254; Dieffenbach, _Travels in New\nZealand_, ii. 118. Percy Smith, 'Futuna,' in _Jour. Polynesian\nSoc._ i. 39. Batchelor, _Ainu of Japan_, p. 225. Steller, _op.\ncit._ p. 269 (Kamchadales). Cranz, _op. cit._ i. 186\n(Greenlanders). Robertson, _History of America_, ii. 202.\nArbousset and Daumas, _op. cit._ p. 343 (Bechuanas).]\n\nThe belief in a moral retribution after death may thus originate\nin various ways, quite independently of any notion of a god who\nacts as a judge of human conduct. When such a belief is said to\nprevail among a savage people it is by no means the rule that the\nrewards or punishments are associated with the activity of a\ndivine being. And when, as is sometimes the case, the fate of the\ndead is supposed to depend upon the will of a high god, the\nnotions held about the other world, and especially about the\nplace reserved for the wicked, in several instances suggest\ninfluence from a more advanced religion. But on the other hand it\nis not an idea which seems incompatible with genuine savage\nthought that, in cases where the souls of men are believed to go\nto live with gods, the latter select their companions and, like\nthe human inhabitants of the other world, refuse admittance to\nundesirable individuals.\n\nReligious ideas have no doubt already at the savage {696} stage\nbegun to influence the moral consciousness even in points which\nhave no direct bearing upon the personal interests of gods; but\nthis influence is not known to have been so great as it has often\nbeen represented to be. I can find no solid foundation for the\nstatements made by recent writers, that \"the historical beginning\nof all morality is to be found in religion\";[198] that even in\nthe earliest period of human history \"religion and morality are\nnecessary correlates of each other\";[199] that \"all moral\ncommandments originally have the character of religious\ncommandments\";[200] that in ancient society \"all morality--as\nmorality was then understood--was consecrated and enforced by\nreligious motives and sanctions\";[201] that the clan-god was the\nguardian of the tribal morality.[202] From various facts stated\nin this and earlier chapters I have been led to the conclusion\nthat among uncivilised races the moral ideas relating to men's\nconduct towards one another have been much more influenced by the\nbelief in magic forces which may be utilised by man, than by the\nbelief in the free activity of gods.\n\n[Footnote 198: Pfleiderer, _Philosophy and Development of\nReligion_, iv. 230.]\n\n[Footnote 199: Caird, _Evolution of Religion_, i. 237.]\n\n[Footnote 200: Wundt, _Ethik_, p. 99.]\n\n[Footnote 201: Robertson Smith, _Religion of the Semites_, p.\n267. _Cf._ _ibid._ p. 53.]\n\n[Footnote 202: Jevons, _Introduction to the History of Religion_,\npp. 112. 177.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LI\n\nGODS AS GUARDIANS OF MORALITY (_continued_)\n\n\nFROM the gods of savage races we shall now pass to consider the\nattitudes of more civilised gods towards matters of worldly\nmorality.\n\nThe deities of ancient Mexico were generally clothed with terror,\nand delighted in vengeance and human sacrifices. But there was\nalso the god Quetzalcoatl, generous of gifts, mild and gentle,\nand so averse from such sacrifices that he shut his ears with\nboth hands when they were mentioned.[1] The god Tezcatlipoca,\nagain, was looked upon as the austere guardian of law and morals;\nbut, as Sir E. B. Tylor observes, the remarkable Aztec formulas\ncollected by Sahagun, in which this deity is so prominent a\nfigure, show traces of Christian admixture in their material, as\nwell as of Christian influence in their style.[2] It seems that\nthe Mexicans had reached no fixed or systematic conclusions as to\nthe relation of the moral to the religious life.[3] They held\nthat departed souls attained different degrees of felicity or of\nwretchedness according to their different modes of death.\nWarriors who died on the battle-field or in the hands of the\nenemy's priests, and merchants who died on their journey, went to\nthe house of the sun; those who were killed by lightning, who\nwere drowned, {698} or who died from some incurable disease went\nto a terrestrial paradise; and those who died of old age or any\nordinary disease went to a land of darkness and desolation, where\nthey after a time sunk in a sleep which knew no waking.[4]\n\n[Footnote 1: Brinton, _Myths of the New World_, p. 294 _sq._\nBancroft, _Native Races of the Pacific States_, iii. 259.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Tylor, _Primitive Culture_, ii. 344.]\n\n[Footnote 3: R\u00e9ville, _Hibbert Lectures on the Native Religions\nof Mexico and Peru_, p. 104 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 4: Bancroft, _op. cit._ iii. 532 _sqq._ Clavigero,\n_History of Mexico_, i. 242 _sq._]\n\nAmong the ancient Peruvians morality obtained a religious\nsanction through the divinity ascribed to their rulers. \"They\nconsidered every mere order of the king to be a divine decree,\"\nsays Garcilasso de la Vega; \"how much more would they venerate\nthe special laws instituted for the common good. They said that\nthe sun had ordered these laws to be made, and had revealed them\nto his child the Ynca; and hence a man who broke them was held to\nbe guilty of sacrilege.\"[5] According to the beliefs of the\nhigher classes the Incas were after death transported to the\nmansion of the Sun, their father, where they still lived together\nas his family. The nobles would either follow them there or would\nlive beneath the earth under the sceptre of Supay, the god of the\ndead. There was no idea of positive suffering inflicted on the\nwicked under his direction, but the subterranean abode was gloomy\nand dismal. Exceptional considerations of birth, rank, or valour\nin war determined the passage of chosen souls to heaven, where\ntheir lot would be far happier than that of the souls who\nremained in the regions below. The common people, on the other\nhand, thought of the future life as a continuation, pure and\nsimple, of the present existence.[6]\n\n[Footnote 5: Garcilasso de la Vega, _Royal Commentaries of the\nYncas_, i. 148.]\n\n[Footnote 6: R\u00e9ville, _op. cit._ p. 236 _sqq._]\n\nThe great gods of ancient Egypt were mostly conceived as friendly\nbeings.[7] Amon R\u00e2, \"the king of the gods,\" was, in his character\nof the sun god, the creator, preserver, and supporter of all\nliving things. He it is who makes pasture for the herds and fruit\ntrees for men, on his account the Nile comes and mankind lives.\nHe is verily {699} of kindly heart: \"when men call to him he\ndelivers the fearful from the insolent.\" He is \"the vizier of the\npoor, who takes no bribes,\" and who does not corrupt witnesses;\nand to him officials pray for promotion.[8] Thoth, the moon god,\nwas also the god of all wisdom and learning, who gave men \"speech\nand writing,\" who discovered the written characters, and by his\narithmetic enabled gods and men to keep account of their\npossessions.[9] Osiris ruled over the whole of Egypt as king, and\ninstructed its inhabitants in all that was good--in agriculture\nas well as in the true religion--and gave them laws.[10] After a\nlong and blessed reign, however, he fell a prey to the\nmachinations of his brother Set, and, having been slain, was\nconstrained to descend into the Underworld, where he evermore\nlived and reigned as judge and king of the dead. But the wicked\ngod Set was also an object of worship; for he was strong and\nmighty, a terror to gods and men, and kings were anxious to\nsecure his favour.[11] We have noticed above that certain\nEgyptian gods were believed to be guardians of truth;[12] and\nclosely connected with this function was their love of justice.\nThoth, who was called to witness by him who wished to give\nassurance of his honesty and good faith,[13] was styled \"the\njudge in heaven\";[14] while his wife Ma[=a], or Maat, was the\ngoddess of both truth and justice, and her priests were the\nsupreme judges.[15] But it seems that the Egyptian gods after all\nchiefly took notice of such acts as concerned their own\nwellbeing. {700} This is true even of Osiris, \"the great god, the\nlord of justice,\"[16] in whose presence the judgment of the dead\nwas given which decided upon their admission into his kingdom. In\nthousands upon thousands of funerary inscriptions we read words\nlike these:--\"May a royal offering be given to Osiris, that he\nmay grant all manner of good things, food and drink to the soul\nof the deceased.\"[17] And whilst the living paid him his dues in\nsacrifices repeated from year to year at regular intervals, the\ndead were not allowed to receive directly the sepulchral meals or\nofferings of kindred on feast-days, but all that was addressed to\nthem must first pass through the hands of the god.[18] In the\n\"Negative Confession,\" which the worshippers of Osiris taught to\ntheir dead, great importance was attached to religious offences,\nsuch as to snare the birds of the gods, to catch the fish in\ntheir lakes, to injure the herds in the temple domains, to\ndiminish the food in the temples, to revile the god. At the same\ntime the list of offences which excluded the dead from Osiris'\nkingdom contained very many of a social character--murder,\noppression, stealing, robbing minors, fraud, lying, slander,\nreviling, adultery.[19] But the meaning of this seems to have\nbeen not so much that the god was animated by a righteous desire\nto punish the wicked and reward the good, as, rather, that he did\nnot like to have any rascals among his vassals. As to the fate of\nthe non-justified dead very little is said, and the punishment\ndevised for them seems to have been a comparatively modern\ninvention.[20] Nay, the virtuous dead themselves depended for\ntheir welfare  {701} upon their knowledge of magic words and\nformulas, upon amulets laid in their tombs, and upon the\nofferings made to them by their kindred. Ignorant souls, or those\nill prepared for the struggle, were overcome by hunger and\nthirst, were attacked by demons and poisonous animals in\ntraversing the regions of the Underworld, and, when in Osiris'\nkingdom, had to work and till the land and earn their own living\nif the offerings ceased.[21] The Book of the Dead is itself\nessentially a collection of spells intended to secure to the dead\nvictory over evil demons and protection from the gods; and the\n\"Negative Confession\" is a later addition, which shows that\noriginally the conduct of earthly life was not considered at\nall.[22] So also in the book of Am D\u00fbat the whole doctrine of a\nfuture life is based upon a belief in the power of magic, with\nthe single exception that nobody can look forward to possessing\nfields in D\u00fbat who in life has been an enemy of the god R\u00e2.[23]\n\n[Footnote 7: On Egyptian gods as guardians of morality see,\ngenerally, Gardiner, 'Egyptian Ethics and Morality,' in Hastings,\n_Encyclop\u00e6dia of Religion and Ethics_, v. 479 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 8: Erman, _Handbook of Egyptian Religion_, pp. 58-60,\n83. Wiedemann, _Religion of the Ancient Egyptians_, p. 114.]\n\n[Footnote 9: Erman, _op. cit._ p. 11. Maspero, _Dawn of\nCivilization_, p. 220.]\n\n[Footnote 10: Erman, _op. cit._ p. 32. _Idem_, _Life in Ancient\nEgypt_, p. 270. Maspero, _op. cit._ p. 174. Plutarch, _De Iside\net Osiride_, 13. Diodorus Siculus, _Bibliotheca historica_, i.\n14, 15, 25. Kaibel, _Epigrammata Gr\u00e6ca_, p. xxi.]\n\n[Footnote 11: It is probable that Set originally was the divine\nprotector of the kings of Upper Egypt, while Osiris' son Horus,\nwho defeated him, was the protector of the kings of Lower Egypt\n(Erman, _Egyptian Religion_, p. 19 _sq._).]\n\n[Footnote 12: _Supra_, ii. 115.]\n\n[Footnote 13: _Supra_, ii. 121.]\n\n[Footnote 14: Erman, _Egyptian Religion_, p. 11.]\n\n[Footnote 15: _Supra_, ii. 115. Wiedemann, _op. cit._ p. 142.\nAm\u00e9lineau, _L'\u00e9volution des id\u00e9es morales dans l'\u00c9gypte\nancienne_, pp. 182, 187. Erman, _Egyptian Religion_, p. 21.]\n\n[Footnote 16: Erman, _Egyptian Religion_, p. 101.]\n\n[Footnote 17: Wiedemann, _op. cit._ p. 217.]\n\n[Footnote 18: Maspero, _op. cit._ p. 117.]\n\n[Footnote 19: Erman, _Egyptian Religion_, p. 103 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 20: Wiedemann, _op. cit._ p. 95 _sq._ _Idem_, _Egyptian\nDoctrine of the Immortality of the Soul_, p. 55. Erman, _Egyptian\nReligion_, p. 105. In the Pyramid texts we read that, if among\nthe deceased there is one of whom it can be said, \"There is no\nevil which he hath done,\" the saying penetrates to the sun god,\nand he receives him kindly in heaven. The deceased also profits\nwith regard to his reception there if he has never spoken evil of\nthe king nor slighted the gods. But, as a rule, it is rather\nbodily cleanliness which the gods demand of their new companion\nin heaven, and they themselves help to purify him (Erman, p. 94).]\n\n[Footnote 21: Erman, _Life in Ancient Egypt_, p. 315 _sqq._\n_Idem_, _Egyptian Religion_, p. 99 _sq._ Maspero, _op. cit._ p.\n185 _sq._ _Idem_, _\u00c9tudes de mythologie et d'arch\u00e9ologie\n\u00e9gyptiennes_, i. 347. Wiedemann, _Religion of the Ancient\nEgyptians_, pp. 279, 296. _Idem_, _Egyptian Doctrine of the\nImmortality of the Soul_, p. 60 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 22: Maspero, _\u00c9tudes_, i. 348. Am\u00e9lineau, _op. cit._ p.\n243. Renouf, in _Book of the Dead_, p. 220. Erman, _Egyptian\nReligion_, p. 101.]\n\n[Footnote 23: Wiedemann, _Religion of the Ancient Egyptians_, p.\n94 _sq._ Maspero, _\u00c9tudes_, ii. 163.]\n\nThe religion of the Chaldeans was a religion of dread. Everywhere\nthey felt themselves surrounded by hostile demons; feared above\nall were the seven evil spirits, who were everywhere and yet\ninvisible, who slipped through bolts and doorposts and sockets,\nand who had power even to bewitch the gods.[24] In their\nincessant warfare against these fiends men were assisted by the\nmore propitious among the deities: by Marduk, the \"merciful\" god,\nthe god of the youthful sun of spring and early morning;[25]\n{702} by Ea, the \"good\" god, the god of the waters of the deep\nand the source of wisdom;[26] by Gibil-Nusku, the lord of fire,\nwho put to flight the demons of night when the fire was kindled\non the household hearth, and who in the flame carried to the\nother gods the sacrifices offered them;[27] as also by the\ntutelary deities of each individual, household, and city.[28] The\ngods were on the whole favourably disposed towards man. But they\nhelped only those who piously observed the prescribed rites, who\nrecited the conventional prayers and offered them sacrifices; on\nsuch persons they bestowed a happy old age and a numerous\nposterity. On the other hand, he who did not fear his god would\nbe cut down like a reed; and by neglecting the slightest\nceremonial detail the king excited the anger of the deities\nagainst himself and his subjects.[29] During the whole of their\nlives the Chaldeans were haunted by the dread of offending their\ngods, and they continually implored pardon for their sins.[30]\nBut the sinner became conscious of his guilt only as a conclusion\ndrawn from the fact that he was suffering from some misfortune,\nwhich he interpreted as a punishment sent by an offended god. It\nmattered little what had called forth the wrath of the god or\nwhether the deity was acting in accordance with just ideas;[31]\nand in none of the penitential psalms known to us is there any\nindication that the notion of sin comprised offences against\nfellow men. It is true that in the incantation series 'Shurpu'\nnot only offences against gods and ceremonial transgressions, but\na large number of wrongs of a social character, are included in\nthe list of possible causes of the suffering which the\nincantation is intended to remove. On behalf of the afflicted\nindividual the exorciser asks:--\"Has he sinned against a god, Is\nhis {703} guilt against a goddess, Is it a wrongful deed against\nhis master, Hatred towards his elder brother, Has he despised\nfather or mother, Insulted his elder sister, Has he given too\nlittle,[32] Has he withheld too much, For 'no' said 'yes,' For\n'yes' said 'no'? . . . Has he fixed a false boundary, Not fixed a\njust boundary, Has he removed a boundary, a limit, or a\nterritory, Has he possessed himself of his neighbour's house, Has\nhe approached his neighbour's wife, Has he shed the blood of his\nneighbour, Robbed his neighbour's dress?\" and so forth.[33] But I\nfail to see any legitimate ground for the conclusion which\nSchrader and Zimmern have drawn from these passages, to wit, that\nthe gods were believed to be angry with persons guilty of any of\nthe offences enumerated.[34] It seems to me quite obvious that\nthe evils which were hypothetically associated with injuries\ninflicted upon fellow men were ascribed, not to the avenging\nactivity of a god, but to the curses of the injured party. The\ngods are expressly invoked to relieve the unhappy individual from\nthe curses under which he is suffering, whether he has been\ncursed by his father, mother, elder brother, elder sister,\nfriend, master, king, or god, or has approached an accursed\nperson, or slept in such a person's bed, or sat on his chair, or\neaten from his dish or drunk from his cup.[35] In these\nincantations there is no plea for forgiveness; the possible\ncauses for the suffering are enumerated simply because the\nmention of the real cause is supposed to go a long way towards\nexpelling the evil.[36] Some of the gods, however, are invoked as\njudges. This is frequently the case with Shamash, the sun god,\n\"the supreme judge of heaven and earth,\" who, seated on a throne\nin the chamber of judgment, receives the supplications of\nmen.[37] Of the moon god Sin it is said in a hymn {704} dedicated\nto him that his \"word produces truth and justice, so that men\nspeak the truth.\"[38] And the lord of fire is addressed as a\njudge, who burns the evildoers and annihilates the bad,[39] and\nis exhorted by the conjurer to help him to his right;[40] but\nthis probably means little more than the invocation, \"Eat my\nenemies, destroy those who have done harm to me.\"[41] Of a moral\nretribution after death there is no trace in the Chaldean\nreligion. Those who have obtained the goodwill of the gods\nreceive their reward in this world, by a life of happiness and of\ngood health, but the moment that death ensues the control of the\ngods comes to an end. All mankind, kings and subjects, virtuous\nand wicked, go to Aral\u00fb, the gloomy subterranean realm presided\nover by Allatu and her consort Nergal, where the dead are doomed\nto everlasting sojourn or imprisonment in a state of joyless\ninactivity. A kind of judgment is spoken of, but nothing\nindicates that it is based on moral considerations.[42] According\nto the Gilgamesh epic, however, the fortunes awaiting those who\ndie are not all alike. Those who fall in battle seem to enjoy\nspecial privileges, provided that they are properly buried and\nthere is someone to make them comfortable in their last hour and\nto look after them when dead. But he whose corpse remains in the\nfield has no rest in the earth, and he whose spirit is not cared\nfor by any one is consumed by gnawing hunger.[43]\n\n[Footnote 24: Jastrow, _Religion of Babylonia and Assyria_, p.\n260 _sqq._ Smith, _Chaldean Account of Genesis_, pp. 87, 88, 106\n_sq._ _Idem_, _Chald\u00e4ische Genesis_, edited by Delitzsch, pp. 83,\n306 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 25: M\u00fcrdter-Delitzsch, _Geschichte Babyloniens und\nAssyriens_, p. 31. Sayce, _Hibbert Lectures on the Religion of\nthe Ancient Babylonians_, p. 98. King, _Babylonian Magic and\nSorcery_, p. 52 _sqq._ Jensen, _Die Kosmologie der Babylonier_,\npp. 87, 88, 249 _sq._ Schrader-Zimmern, _Die Keilinschriften und\ndas Alte Testament_, p. 372 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 26: Hommel, _Die semitischen V\u00f6lker und Sprachen_, i.\n374 _sqq._ M\u00fcrdter-Delitzsch, _op. cit._ p. 27. Sayce, _op. cit._\npp. 131, 140.]\n\n[Footnote 27: Tallqvist, 'Die assyrische Beschw\u00f6rungsserie\nMaql\u00fb,' in _Acta Soc. Scient. Fennic\u00e6_, xx. 25, 28 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 28: M\u00fcrdter-Delitzsch, _op. cit._ p. 37 _sq._ Maspero,\n_Dawn of Civilization_, pp. 643, 674, 682 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 29: Jeremias, _Die babylonisch-assyrischen\nVorstellungen vom Leben nach dem Tode_, p. 46 _sq._ Maspero,\n_Dawn of Civilization_, pp. 697, 705.]\n\n[Footnote 30: See Zimmern, _Babylonische Busspsalmen_, _passim_.]\n\n[Footnote 31: _Cf._ Jastrow, _op. cit._ p. 313 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 32: In mercantile transactions (Jastrow, _op. cit._\np. 291, n. 2).]\n\n[Footnote 33: Zimmern, _Beitr\u00e4ge zur Kenntnis der babylonischen\nReligion_, 'Die Beschw\u00f6rungstafeln [vS]urpu,' p. 3 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 34: _Idem_, in Schrader, _Die Keilinschriften und das\nAlte Testament_, p. 612.]\n\n[Footnote 35: Zimmern, _Die Beschw\u00f6rungstafeln [vS]urpu_, ii. 89-93,\n99-104, pp. 7, 23.]\n\n[Footnote 36: See Jastrow, _op. cit._ p. 292.]\n\n[Footnote 37: Tallqvist, _Maql\u00fb_, ii. 94. Zimmern, _[vS]urpu_, ii.\n130, p. 9. _Idem_, _Babylonische Hymnen und Gebete_, p. 13.\nM\u00fcrdter-Delitzsch, _op. cit._ p. 28. Schrader-Zimmern, _op.\ncit._ p. 368. Jastrow, _op. cit._ pp. 71, 120, 209 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 38: Zimmern, _Babylonische Hymnen und Gebete_, p. 12.]\n\n[Footnote 39: Tallqvist, _Maql\u00fb_, i. 95; ii. 70, 89, 116, 130,\n131, 184.]\n\n[Footnote 40: _Ibid._ i. 114.]\n\n[Footnote 41: _Ibid._ i. 116; ii. 120.]\n\n[Footnote 42: Jeremias, _op. cit._ _passim_. Schrader-Zimmern,\n_op. cit._ p. 636 _sq._ Jastrow, _op. cit._ p. 565 _sqq._ Jensen,\n_op. cit._ p. 217 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 43: Haupt, 'Die zw\u00f6lfte Tafel des babylonischen\nNimrod-Epos,' in _Beitr\u00e4ge zur Assyriologie_, i. 69 _sq._ Jensen,\n'Das Gilgam\u00ed[vs] (Nimrod)-Epos,' xii. 6, in _Assyrisch-Babylonische\nMythen und Epen_, p. 265.]\n\nIn a still higher degree than the Chaldean religion\nZoroastrianism represents an incessant struggle against evil\nspirits. Here everything in heaven and on earth is engaged in the\nconflict; it is a war between two mighty sovereigns, Ahura Mazda\nand Angra Mainyu, and their respective forces.[44] Whatever works\nfor the good of man comes from {705} and strives for Ahura Mazda,\nwhatever works for the harm of man comes from and strives for\nAngra Mainyu. There can be no doubt that the powers of goodness\nwill absolutely triumph in the end; but though Angra Mainyu and\nhis band have been defeated, the battle is still raging. Ahura\nMazda, being the originator of everything good in the world, is\nalso the founder of the order of the universe, \"the creator of\nthe righteous order.\"[45] In the Vend\u00eed\u00e2d he is asked about the\nrules of life, and he is pleased to answer;[46] M. Darmesteter\nobserves that the Avesta and the Pentateuch are the only two\nreligious books known in which legislation descends from the\nheavens to the earth in a series of conversations between the\nlawgiver and his god.[47] The sacred law of Zoroastrianism\nenjoins charity[48] and industry,[49] it condemns the murder of a\nbeliever,[50] abortion,[51] theft,[52] non-payment of debts,[53]\nand, with special emphasis, falsehood and breach of faith,[54]\nand unnatural intercourse.[55] But the \"good thoughts, words, and\ndeeds\" most urgently insisted upon are orthodoxy, prayer, and\nsacrifice; whilst the greatest sins are apostasy, transgressions\nof the rules of ceremonial cleanliness, and offences against\nsacred beings. It is less criminal to kill a man than to serve\nbad food to a shepherd's dog; for the manslayer gets off with\nninety stripes, whereas the bad master will receive two\nhundred.[56] And the killing of a water dog is punished with ten\nthousand stripes.[57] Offenders will be liable to penalties not\nonly here below, but in the next world as well, where Ahura\nMazda, \"the discerning arbiter,\"[58] establishes \"evil for the\nevil, and happy blessings for the good.\"[59] The views accepted\nin regard to the future life, {706} whilst incomplete in the\nGathas, are expanded in the Younger Avesta, and fully given in\nthe Pahlavi books.[60] The man who has lived for Ahura Mazda will\nhave a seat near him in heaven, and there he remains undecaying\nand immortal, unalarmed and undistressed, full of glory and\ndelight; whereas the wicked soul will be tormented in the\ndarkness of hell, \"the dwelling of the demons.\"[61] The good\ndeeds of the virtuous and the bad deeds of the wicked, in the\nform of maidens, come to meet them on their roads to paradise or\nhell.[62] But the fate of the dead is not merely influenced by\ntheir conduct towards their fellow men while alive. It is said\nthat \"he who wishes to seize the heavenly reward, will seize it\nby giving gifts to him who holds up the Law.\"[63] And the soul of\nhim who recites the prayer Ahuna Vairya in the manner prescribed\ncrosses over the bridge which separates this world from the next,\nand reaches the highest paradise.[64]\n\n[Footnote 44: According to the _Vend\u00eed\u00e2d_ (i. 3 _sqq._) Angra\nMainyu constantly countercreated the creations of Ahura Mazda.\nBut this idea is not yet to be found in the Gathas, where the\nwickedness of Ako Mainyu is only represented as an attempt to\ndestroy the good creation (see Lehmann, _Zarathustra_, ii. 75, 165).]\n\n[Footnote 45: _Yasna_, xxxi. 7. Darmesteter, _Ormazd et Ahriman_,\npp. 19, 24, 88, &c.]\n\n[Footnote 46: _Vend\u00eed\u00e2d_, xviii. 13 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 47: Darmesteter, in _Sacred Books of the East_, iv.\n(2nd edit.) p. lviii.]\n\n[Footnote 48: _Supra_, i. 551.]\n\n[Footnote 49: _Supra_, ii. 275.]\n\n[Footnote 50: _Vend\u00eed\u00e2d_, iii. 41; v. 14.]\n\n[Footnote 51: _Ibid._ xv. 9 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 52: _Supra_, ii. 60. _Yasna_, xi. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 53: _Vend\u00eed\u00e2d_, iv. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 54: _Supra_, ii. 93.]\n\n[Footnote 55: _Supra_, ii. 479 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 56: _Vend\u00eed\u00e2d_, iv. 40; xiii. 24; xv. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 57: _Ibid._ xiv. 1 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 58: _Yasna_, xxix. 4.]\n\n[Footnote 59: _Ibid._ xliii. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 60: _Cf._ Jackson, _Avesta Grammar_, i. p. xxviii.]\n\n[Footnote 61: _Vend\u00eed\u00e2d_, xix. 28 _sqq._ _Yasts_, xxii.\n_Bundahis_, ch. xxx. _D\u00een\u00e2-\u00ee Ma\u00een\u00f4g-\u00ee Khirad_ ii. 123 _sqq._ ch.\nvii. _Ard\u00e2 V\u00eer\u00e2f_, ch. xvii. _Cf._ Geiger, _Civilization of the\nEastern Ir[=a]nians_, i. 101.]\n\n[Footnote 62: _D\u00een\u00e2-\u00ee Ma\u00een\u00f4g-\u00ee Khirad_, ii. 125, 167 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 63: _Yasts_, xxiv. 30.]\n\n[Footnote 64: Geiger, _op. cit._ i. 73. See also _Yasts_, xii.\n335; xxiv. 39, 47 _sq._; Darmesteter, _Ormazd et Ahriman_, p. 28.]\n\nIn Vedic religion we likewise meet with a conflict between gods\nand demons, but the struggle is too unequal to result in anything\nlike the Zoroastrian dualism.[65] Various misfortunes are\nattributed to the ill-will of evil spirits, but their power is\ncomparatively slight, and the greater demons, like V[r.]tra,\nare represented as defeated or destroyed by the gods.[66] On the\nother hand there is among the great gods themselves one who has a\ndistinctly malevolent character, namely Rudra, a god of\nstorm,[67] \"terrible like a wild beast\";[68] but though the hymns\n{707} addressed to him chiefly express fear of his dreadful\nshafts and deprecations of his wrath, he is also sometimes\nsupplicated to confer blessings upon man and beast.[69] With this\nexception the great gods are all beneficent beings,[70] though of\ncourse liable to punish those who offend them. Varuna has\nestablished heaven and earth,[71] has made the celestial bodies\nto shine[72] and the rivers to flow.[73] He rules over nature by\nlaws which are fixed and immutable, and which must be followed by\nthe gods themselves.[74] He sees and knows everything, because he\nis the infinite light and the sun is his eye;[75] and in\nconnection with Mithra he is said to dispel and punish\nfalsehood.[76] Varuna has even been represented as \"the supreme\nmoral ruler,\" but it seems to me that scholars have generally\ncredited him with a somewhat more comprehensive sense of justice\nthan the hymns imply.[77] Every hymn to Varuna contains a prayer\nfor forgiveness, but there is no indication that the sins which\nexcite his wrath include ordinary moral wrongdoing. That sin and\nmoral guilt are not identical conceptions in the Rig-Veda is\nfairly obvious from the fact that forgiveness of sin is also\nsought from Indra,[78] whose favour is only won by those who\ncontribute to his wellbeing or who destroy persons neglectful of\nhis worship.[79] The Vedic religion is pre-emiently ritualistic.\nThe pious man _par pr\u00e9f\u00e9rence_ is he who makes the _soma_ flow in\nabundance and whose hands are always full of butter, the\nreprobate man is he who is penurious towards the gods;[80] and\njust like the other gods, {708} Varuna visits with disease those\nwho neglect him,[81] and is appeased by sacrifices and\nprayers.[82] After death the souls of those who have practised\nrigorous penance,[83] of those who have risked their lives in\nbattle,[84] and above all of those who have bestowed liberal\nsacrificial gifts,[85] go with the smoke arising from the funeral\npile to the heavenly world, where the Fathers dwell with\nYama--the first man who died[86]--and Varuna, the two kings who\nreign in bliss.[87] There they enjoy an endless felicity among\nthe gods, clothed in glorious bodies and drinking the celestial\n_soma_, which renders them immortal.[88] Yet there are different\ndegrees of happiness in this heavenly mansion. The performance of\nrites in honour of the manes causes the souls to ascend from a\nlower to a higher state; indeed, if no such offerings are made\nthey do not go to heaven at all.[89] Another source of happiness\nfor the dead is their own pious conduct during their lifetime;\nfor in the abode of bliss they are united with what they have\nsacrificed and given, especially reaping the reward of their\ngifts to priests.[90] Unworthy souls, on the other hand, are kept\nout of this abode by Yama's dogs, which guard the road to his\nkingdom.[91] As to the destiny in store for those who are not\nadmitted to heaven, the hymns have little to tell. Zimmer and\nothers erroneously argue that a race who believe in future\nrewards for the good must logically believe in future punishments\nfor the wicked.[92] So far as I can see, all the traces of such a\nbelief which are to be found in the Vedic literature are requests\nmade to gods, {709} or simply curses, to the effect that\nevil-doers may be thrown into deep and dismal pits under the\nearth.[93] They do not imply that gods of their own accord punish\nwicked people after death.\n\n[Footnote 65: _Cf._ Barth, _Religions of India_, p. 13.]\n\n[Footnote 66: Oldenberg, _Die Religion des Veda_, p. 281.\nMacdonell, _Vedic Mythology_, p. 18.]\n\n[Footnote 67: Muir, _Original Sanskrit Texts_, v. 147. Barth,\n_op. cit._ p. 14. Macdonell, _op. cit._ p. 77.]\n\n[Footnote 68: Oldenberg, _op. cit._ pp. 63, 281, 284. Macdonell,\n_op. cit._ p. 18. Bergaigne, _La religion v\u00e9dique_, iii. 152 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 69: Macdonell, _op. cit._ p. 75 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 70: Oldenberg, _op. cit._ pp. 60, 281. Macdonell, _op.\ncit._ p. 18.]\n\n[Footnote 71: _Rig-Veda_, viii. 42. 1.]\n\n[Footnote 72: _Ibid._ i. 24. 10; vii. 87. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 73: _Ibid._ ii. 28. 4.]\n\n[Footnote 74: _Ibid._ viii. 41. 7. Macdonell, _op. cit._ p. 26.\nBohnenberger, _Der altindische Gott Varu[n.]a_, p. 38 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 75: _Supra_, ii. 598. Darmesteter, _Essais orientaux_,\np. 126.]\n\n[Footnote 76: Macdonell, _op. cit._ p. 26.]\n\n[Footnote 77: Macdonell, _op. cit._ pp. 20, 26. Whitney, 'On the\nmain Results of the later Vedic Researches in Germany,' in _Jour.\nAmerican Oriental Soc._ iii. 326. Roth, 'On the Morality of the\nVeda,' _ibid._ iii. 340 _sq._ Bergaigne, _op. cit._ iii. 156.\nDarmesteter, _Essais orientaux_, p. 111. Bohnenberger, _op. cit._\np. 49 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 78: Oldenberg, _op. cit._ p. 299.]\n\n[Footnote 79: _Ibid._ pp. 282, 283, 300.]\n\n[Footnote 80: _Rig-Veda_, viii. 31. See Barth, _op. cit._ p. 34;\nKaegi, _Rigveda_, p. 29; Muir, _op. cit._ v. 20; Macdonell, _op.\ncit._ p. 18.]\n\n[Footnote 81: _Rig-Veda_, i. 122. 9.]\n\n[Footnote 82: _Ibid._ i. 24. 14.]\n\n[Footnote 83: _Ibid._ x. 154. 2.]\n\n[Footnote 84: _Ibid._ x. 154. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 85: _Ibid._ i. 125. 5 _sq._; x. 107. 2; x. 154. 3.\nMuir, _op. cit._ v. 285. Oldenberg, _op. cit._ p. 536. Macdonell,\n_op. cit._ p. 167.]\n\n[Footnote 86: Muir, _op. cit._ v. 301.]\n\n[Footnote 87: _Rig-Veda_, x. 14. 7 _sq._ Barth, _op. cit._ p. 22\n_sq._ Macdonell, _op. cit._ p. 165 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 88: Zimmer, _Altindisches Leben_, p. 410 _sqq._ Barth,\n_op. cit._ p. 23. Macdonell, _op. cit._ p. 167 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 89: Hopkins, _Religions of India_, p. 155. Oldenberg,\n_op. cit._ p. 535.]\n\n[Footnote 90: _Rig-Veda_, x. 14. 8; x. 154. 3. Oldenberg, _op.\ncit._ p. 535. Macdonell, _op. cit._ p. 168.]\n\n[Footnote 91: _Rig-Veda_, x. 14. 10 _sqq._ _Cf._ Zimmer, _op.\ncit._ p. 421; Hopkins, _op. cit._ p. 147.]\n\n[Footnote 92: Zimmer, _op. cit._ p. 418. Scherman, _Indische\nVisionslitteratur_, p. 123. _Idem_, 'Eine Art vision\u00e4rer\nH\u00f6llenschilderung aus dem indischen Mittelalter,' in _Romanische\nForschungen_, v. 569. Oldenberg, _op. cit._ p. 537.]\n\n[Footnote 93: _Rig-Veda_, iv. 5. 5; vii. 104. 3, 11, 17.\n_Atharva-Veda_, v. 19. 3, 12 _sqq._; xii. 4. 3, 36.]\n\nIn post-Vedic times ritualism grew more important still.\nSometimes the gods are represented as beings indifferent to every\nmoral distinction, and the most indelicate stories are\nunscrupulously related of them.[94] In the Taittir\u00eeya Samhit\u00e2 of\nthe Yajur Veda we are told that if anybody wishes to injure\nanother, he need only say to S\u00fbrya, one of the most important\namong the solar deities,[95] \"Smite such a one, and I will give\nyou an offering,\" and S\u00fbrya, to get the offering, will smite\nhim.[96] \u00c7iva, who is connected with the Vedic god Rudra, is in\nthe Mahabharata clothed in terrible \"forms,\" being armed with the\ntrident and wearing a necklace of skulls; he exacts a bloody\ncultus, and is the chief of the mischievous spirits and vampires\nthat frequent places of execution and burial grounds.[97] Vishnu,\nthe other great god of Hinduism, though less fierce than \u00c7iva, is\nnevertheless, on one side of his character, an inexorable\ngod;[98] and Krishna, as accepted by Vishnuism, is a crafty hero\nof a singularly doubtful moral character.[99] In Brahmanism\nreligion is largely replaced by magic, the rites themselves are\nraised to the rank of divinities, the priests become the gods of\ngods.[100] And the point of view from which these man-gods look\nupon human conduct is expressed in the Satapatha Br\u00e2hmana, where\nit is said that fees paid to priests are like sacrifices offered\nto other gods--those who gratify them are placed in a state of\nbliss.[101] Ritual observances are essential for a man's\nwellbeing both in this life and in the life to come, where\nparadise, hell, or transmigration {710} awaits the dead. In the\nBr\u00e2hmanas immortality, or at least longevity, is promised to\nthose who rightly understand and practise the rites of sacrifice,\nwhilst those who are deficient in this respect depart before\ntheir natural term of life to the next world, where they are\nweighed in a balance and receive good or evil according to their\ndeeds.[102] To repeat sacred texts a certain number of times is\nalso laid down as a condition of salvation,[103] and the doctrine\nis gradually developed that a single invocation of the divine\nname cancels a whole life of iniquity and crime. Hence the\nimportance attached--as early as the Bhagavad G\u00eet\u00e2--to the last\nthought before death, and the idea of attaining complete\npossession of this thought by an act of suicide.[104] According\nto the Pur\u00e2nas it is sufficient even in the case of the vilest\ncriminal, when at the point of death, to pronounce by chance some\nsyllables of the names Vishnu or \u00c7iva in order to obtain\nsalvation;[105] and in the preface to the Prem S\u00e2gar, which\ndisplays the religion of the Hindus at the present day, it is\nsaid that those who even ignorantly sing the praises of the\ngreatness of Krishn Chand are rewarded with final beatitude, just\nas a person would acquire eternal life by partaking of the drink\nof immortality though he did not know what he was drinking.[106]\nOn the other hand, \"according to the Hindu Scriptures, whatever a\nman's life may have been, if he do not die near some holy stream,\nif his body is not burned on its banks, or at any rate near some\nwater as a representative of the stream; or where this is\nimpracticable, if some portion of his body be not thrown into\nit--his spirit must wander in misery, unable to obtain the bliss\nfor which he has done and suffered so much in life.\"[107] At the\nsame time we also find a great variety of social duties {711}\ninculcated in the sacred books of India--humanity even to\nenemies[108] and slaves,[109] filial piety,[110] charity,[111]\nhospitality,[112] veracity;[113] and in the S\u00fbtras the doctrine\nappears that in order to obtain the chief fruit of sacrifice it\nis necessary to practise the moral virtues in addition to the\nrite.[114] But this doctrine is singularly free from any\nreference to the justice of gods. In the Upanishads and\nBuddhistic books it is distinctly formulated in the idea of\n_karma_, according to which each act of the soul, good or bad,\ninevitably and naturally works out its full effect to the sweet\nor bitter end without the intervention of any deity to apportion\nthe reward or punishment.[115]\n\n[Footnote 94: Barth, _op. cit._ p. 46 _sq._ Macdonell, _op. cit._\np. 76.]\n\n[Footnote 95: Barth, _op. cit._ p. 20.]\n\n[Footnote 96: _Taittir\u00eeya Samhit\u00e2_, vi. 4 _sqq._, quoted by\nGoblet d'Alviella, _Hibbert Lectures on the Origin and Growth of\nthe Conception of God_, p. 85.]\n\n[Footnote 97: Barth, _op. cit._ pp. 159, 164.]\n\n[Footnote 98: _Ibid._ p. 174.]\n\n[Footnote 99: _Ibid._ p. 172.]\n\n[Footnote 100: _Supra_, ii. 657.]\n\n[Footnote 101: _Satapatha Br\u00e2hmana_, ii. 2. 2. 6.]\n\n[Footnote 102: Weber, 'Eine Legende des \u00c7atapatha-Br\u00e2hma[n.]a\n\u00fcber die strafende Vergeltung nach dem Tode,' in _Zeitschr. d.\nDeutschen Morgenl\u00e4ndischen Gesellsch._ ix. 238 _sq._ See also\nMacdonell, _op. cit._ p. 168; Hopkins, _op. cit._ pp. 190, 193;\n_Vish['n]u Pur\u00e1['n]a_, p. 44.]\n\n[Footnote 103: _Aitareya Brahmanam_, ii. 17.]\n\n[Footnote 104: _Bhagavad G\u00eet\u00e2_, ch. 8. Barth, _op. cit._ p. 228.]\n\n[Footnote 105: Barth, _op. cit._ p. 228.]\n\n[Footnote 106: _Prem S\u00e1gar_, p. 56. _Cf._ Wilson, in _Vish['n]u\nPur\u00e1['n]a_, p. 210, n. 13; _Idem_, 'Religious Sects of the\nHindus,' in _Asiatic Researches_, xvi. 115.]\n\n[Footnote 107: Wilkins, _Modern Hinduism_, p. 439 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 108: _Supra_, i. 342.]\n\n[Footnote 109: _Supra_, i. 689.]\n\n[Footnote 110: _Supra_, i. 612.]\n\n[Footnote 111: _Supra_, i. 550 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 112: _Supra_, i. 578 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 113: _Supra_, ii. 91.]\n\n[Footnote 114: Barth, _op. cit._ p. 49. See, _e.g._, _\u00c2pastamba_,\ni. 7. 20. 1 _sqq._; i. 8. 23. 6.]\n\n[Footnote 115: Barth, _op. cit._ pp. 77, 78, 115 _sq._ M\u00fcller,\n_Anthropological Religion_, p. 301. _Dhammapada_, i. 1 _sq._ Rhys\nDavids, _Hibbert Lectures on the History of Buddhism_, p. 85.\nOldenberg, _Buddha_, p. 289. Hopkins, _op. cit._ p. 319 _sq._]\n\nBuddha did not base his system on any belief in gods, hence there\nis no place in it for a ritual nor for sin in the sense of\noffending a supernatural being. He that is pure in heart is the\ntrue priest, not he that knows the Vedas; the Vedas are nothing,\nthe priests are of no account, save as they be morally of\nrepute.[116] If the genuine Buddhist can be said to worship any\nhigher power, it is the moral order which never fails to assert\nitself in the law of cause and effect. But Buddha's followers\nwere less metaphysical, and \"the clouds returned after the rain.\"\nThe old gods of Brahmanism came back, Buddha himself was deified\nas an omniscient and everlasting god, and Buddhism incorporated\nmost of the local deities and demons of those nations it sought\nto convert.[117] From being originally a metaphysical and ethical\ndoctrine, it was thus transformed into a religion full of\nritualism, and, it should be added, profusely mixed with magic.\nIn Lamaism, especially, {712} ritual is elevated to the front\nrank of importance; we find there pompous services closely\nresembling those of the Church of Rome, litanies and chants,\nofferings and sacrifice.[118] And the muttering of certain mystic\nformulas and short prayers is alleged to be far more efficacious\nthan mere moral virtue as a means of gaining the glorious heaven\nof eternal bliss, the paradise of the fabulous Buddha of\nboundless light.[119] So also in China the teachers of Buddhism\n\"were by no means rigorous in enforcing the obligations of men to\nmorality. To expiate sins, offerings to the idols and to the\npriests were sufficient. A temple built in honour of F[)o], and\nrichly endowed, would suffice to blot out every stain of guilt,\nand serve as a portal to the blessed mansions of Buddha.\"[120]\n\n[Footnote 116: Hopkins, _op. cit._ p. 319.]\n\n[Footnote 117: Waddell, _Buddhism in Tibet_, pp. 126, 325 _sq._\nGriffis, _Religions of Japan_, pp. 187, 207. Davis, _China_, ii. 51.]\n\n[Footnote 118: Waddell, _op. cit._ 421, 476.]\n\n[Footnote 119: _Ibid._ pp. 142, 148, 573.]\n\n[Footnote 120: Gutzlaff, quoted by Davis, _op. cit._ ii. 51.\n_Cf._ Edkins, _Religion in China_, p. 150.]\n\nIn the national religion of China the heaven god, Shang-te, is\nthe supreme being, the creator and sovereign ruler of the\nuniverse, whose power knows no bounds, and whose sight equally\ncomprehends the past, the present, and the future, penetrating\neven to the remotest recesses of the heart.[121] He is the author\nand upholder not only of the physical but of the moral order of\nthe world, watching over the conduct of men, rewarding the good,\nand punishing the wicked.[122] Sometimes he appears to array\nhimself in terrors, as in the case of public calamities and the\nirregularity of the seasons; but these are only salutary warnings\nintended to call men to repentance.[123] The cult which is\noffered Shang-te is frigid and ceremonial. The rules of ceremony\nhave their origin in heaven, and the movement of them {713}\nreaches to earth; their abandonment leads to \"the ruin of states,\nthe destruction of families, and the perishing of individuals.\"[124]\nThe Chinese are inclined to place ritualism on an equality with\nsocial morality. Confucius himself humbly submitted to the rules\nof ceremony, although he denounced hypocrisy. But to him morality\nwas infinitely more important than religion. He altogether\navoided the personal term God, and made only use of the abstract\nterm Heaven. He admitted that spiritual beings exist, and even\nsacrificed to them,[125] but when questioned about matters\nrelating to religion he was systematically silent.[126] Religious\nduties occupy a very insignificant place in his system. \"To give\none's self earnestly to the duties due to men, and, while\nrespecting spiritual beings, to keep aloof from them, may be\ncalled wisdom.\"[127] Prayer is unnecessary because Heaven does\nnot actively interfere with the soul of man; it has endowed him\nat his birth with goodness, which, if he will, may become his\nnature, and the reward or punishment is only the natural or\nprovidential result of his conduct.[128] Of punishments in a\nfuture life Confucius says nothing, though he maintains that\nthere are rewards and dignity for the good after death.[129] The\nbelief of the Chinese in _post mortem_ punishments comes from\nBuddhism.[130]\n\n[Footnote 121: Legge, _Notions of the Chinese concerning God_,\npp. 33, 34, 100 _sq._ _Idem_, _Chinese Classics_, i. 98.\nStaunton, _Inquiry into the proper Mode of rendering the Word\n\"God\" in translating the Sacred Scriptures into the Chinese\nLanguage_, p. 8 _sq._ Douglas, _Confucianism and Taouism_,\npp. 77, 82.]\n\n[Footnote 122: Doolittle, _Social Life of the Chinese_, ii. 272.\nLegge, _Chinese Classics_, i. 98; iii. 46. Smith, _Proverbs of\nthe Chinese_, p. 40. Boone, _Essay on the proper rendering of the\nWords Elohim and [Greek: The/os] into the Chinese Language_,\np. 55. _Indo-Chinese Gleaner_, i. 162. Davis, _op. cit._ ii. 26, 34.\nDouglas, _op. cit._ pp. 77, 78, 83.]\n\n[Footnote 123: Staunton, _op. cit._ p. 9. Legge, _Chinese\nClassics_, iii. 46 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 124: _L\u00ee K\u00ee_, vii. 4. 5 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 125: _Lun Y\u00fc_, iii. 12. 1; x. 8. 10.]\n\n[Footnote 126: _Ibid._ vii. 20. _Cf._ R\u00e9ville, _La religion\nchinoise_, p. 326.]\n\n[Footnote 127: _Lun Y\u00fc_, vi. 20.]\n\n[Footnote 128: Douglas, _op. cit._ p. 78. Legge, _Religions of\nChina_, p. 300. R\u00e9ville, _op. cit._ p. 645.]\n\n[Footnote 129: Legge, _Religions of China_, pp. 115, 299 _sq._\nR\u00e9ville, _op. cit._ p. 345.]\n\n[Footnote 130: _Indo-Chinese Gleaner_, iii. 288. Edkins, _op.\ncit._ pp. 83, 87 _sqq._ Smith, _Proverbs of the Chinese_, p. 227.]\n\nThe gods of ancient Greece were on the whole beneficent beings,\nwho conferred blessings upon those who secured their goodwill.\nZeus protects the life of the family, city, and nation; he is a\ngod of victory and victorious peace, who gathers the hosts\nagainst Troy, and saves Greece from Persia; he brings the ships\nto land; he is \"the warder off of evil.\"[131] But neither he nor\nthe other gods bestow their {714} favours for nothing; Xenophon\nsays that they assist with good advice those who worship them\nregularly,[132] but take revenge on those who neglect them.[133]\nThey punish severely even offences committed against them\naccidentally,[134] and not infrequently they display actual\nmalevolence towards men by seducing them into sin[135] or\ninflicting harm upon them out of sheer envy.[136] In other\nrespects, also, they are by no means models of morality; but this\ndoes not prevent them from acting as administrators of justice\nany more than, among men, a judge is supposed to lose all regard\nfor justice because he himself transgresses the rules of morality\nin some particular of private life.[137] \"For great crimes,\" says\nHerodotus, \"great punishments at the hands of the gods are in\nstore.\"[138] Dike, or Justice, the terrible virgin \"who breathes\nagainst her enemies a destructive wrath,\"[139] is represented\nsometimes as the daughter, sometimes as the companion of the\nall-seeing Zeus;[140] and, as Welcker observes, Zeus was not only\na god among other gods, but also the deity solely and\nabstractedly.[141] We have noticed above that from ancient times\nthe murder of a kinsman was an offence against Zeus and under the\nban of the Erinyes, and that later on all bloodshed, if the\nvictim had any rights at all within the city, became a sin which\nneeded purification.[142] Zeus protected guests and\nsuppliants,[143] he punished children who reproached their aged\nparents,[144] he was a guardian of the family property,[145] he\nprotected boundaries,[146] he was no friend of falsehood,[147] he\npunished perjury.[148] According to earlier beliefs retribution\nwas exclusively restricted {715} to this earthly existence, and\nif the guilty person himself escaped the punishment for his deed\nit fell on some of his descendants.[149] The transference of\nMenelaus to the Elysian plain, spoken of in the Odyssey,[150] was\nnot a reward for his virtue--indeed, he was not particularly\nconspicuous for any of the Homeric virtues--but a privilege\nresulting from his being married to Zeus' daughter Helena;[151]\nand if the perjurer was tortured in Hades[152] the simple reason\nwas that he had called down upon himself such torture in his\noath.[153] In later times we meet with the doctrine of\nretribution after death, not only in the speculations of isolated\nphilosophers, but as a popular belief;[154] but this belief seems\nto have been quite unconnected with any notion of Olympian\njustice.[155] The souls in the world beyond the grave are\nsentenced by special judges;[156] Aeschylus expressly says that\nit is another Zeus that administers justice there.[157] For him\nHades with the powers by which it is governed exists only as a\nplace where the guilty are punished, whereas for the virtuous he\nhas no word of true hope;[158] and other writers also have much\nmore to tell about future punishments than about future\nrewards.[159] Particularly prominent among the offences which are\npunished in Hades are, besides perjury,[160] injuries to\nparents[161] and guests,[162] that is, offences which in this\nworld are visited with the most powerful curses.[163] According\nto Aeschylus, the retribution which the Erinyes--personifications\nof curses--have begun on earth is completed in the nether world,\nand according to Pythagoras unpurified souls are kept chained\nthere by the Erinyes without any hope of escape.[164] We are,\nmoreover, told that painters used to represent \"allegorical\nfigures of curses in connection with their {716} images of wicked\ndead.[165] From all these facts I conclude that the notion of\npunishments in Hades did not arise from a belief in the justice\nof gods, but from the idea that the efficacy of a curse may\nextend beyond the grave--an idea which we have already met with\nboth in Vedic texts and among certain savages, and of which the\nsupposed punishment of perjury in Hades is only a particular\ninstance.[166] As for the gods it should be added that the vulgar\nopinion of their character was not shared by all. Euripides\naffirms that the legends about them which tend to confuse human\nideas as to right and wrong are not literally true.[167] \"I\nthink,\" he says, \"that none of the gods is bad\";[168] \"if the\ngods do aught that is base, they are not gods.\"[169] Plato\nopposes the popular views that the deity induces men to commit\ncrimes,[170] that he is capable of feeling envy,[171] and that\nevil-doers may avert divine punishments by sacrifices offered to\nthe gods as bribes.[172] God is good, he is never the author of\nevil to any one, and if the wicked are miserable the reason is\nthat they require to be punished and are benefited by receiving\npunishment from God.[173] Plutarch likewise asserts in the\nstrongest terms that God is perfectly good and least of all\nwanting in justice and love, \"the most beautiful of virtues and\nthe best befitting the Godhead.\"[174]\n\n[Footnote 131: Farnell, _Cults of the Greek States_, i. 59-61,\n83, 107. Vischer, _Kleine Schriften_, ii. 352 _sq._ Preller,\n_Griechische Mythologie_, i. 146 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 132: Xenophon, _Hipparchicus_, ix. 9. _Idem_,\n_Cyrop\u00e6dia_, i. 6. 46.]\n\n[Footnote 133: _Idem_, _Anabasis_, v. 3. 13; vii. 8. 4.]\n\n[Footnote 134: N\u00e4gelsbach, _Die nachhomerische Theologie des\ngriechischen Volksglaubens_, p. 331 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 135: Schmidt, _Die Ethik der alten Griechen_, i. 231\n_sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 136: _Ibid._ i. 79 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 137: _Cf._ N\u00e4gelsbach, _Homerische Theologie_, pp. 288,\n317 _sqq._; Schmidt, _op. cit._ i. 48 _sqq._; Maury, _Histoire\ndes religions de la Gr\u00e8ce antique_, i. 342; Gladstone, _Studies\non Homer_, ii. 384.]\n\n[Footnote 138: Herodotus, ii. 120.]\n\n[Footnote 139: Aeschylus, _Choephor[oe]_, 949 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 140: _Ibid._ 949. Hesiod, _Opera et dies_, 256 (254).\nUsener, _G\u00f6tternamen_, p. 197. Farnell, _op. cit._ i. 71,\nDarmesteter, _Essais orientaux_, p. 106 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 141: Welcker, _Griechische G\u00f6tterlehre_, i. 181.]\n\n[Footnote 142: _Supra_, i. 379.]\n\n[Footnote 143: _Supra_, i. 579, 585.]\n\n[Footnote 144: _Supra_, i. 624.]\n\n[Footnote 145: _Supra_, ii. 60.]\n\n[Footnote 146: _Supra_, ii. 61.]\n\n[Footnote 147: _Supra_, ii. 116.]\n\n[Footnote 148: _Supra_, ii. 121.]\n\n[Footnote 149: _Supra_, i. 49 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 150: _Odyssey_, iv. 561 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 151: _Cf._ Rohde, _Psyche_, p. 74.]\n\n[Footnote 152: _Iliad_, iii. 278 _sq._; xix. 259 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 153: _Cf._ Rohde, _op. cit._ p. 60.]\n\n[Footnote 154: Schmidt, _op. cit._ i. 99 _sqq._ N\u00e4gelsbach,\n_Nachhomerische Theologie_, p. 35 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 155: _Cf._ Schmidt, _op. cit._ i. 104.]\n\n[Footnote 156: _Ibid._ i. 101.]\n\n[Footnote 157: Aeschylus, _Supplices_, 230 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 158: _Cf._ Westcott, _Essays in the History of\nReligious Thought_, p. 87.]\n\n[Footnote 159: Schmidt, _op. cit._ i. 101 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 160: Aristophanes, _Ran\u00e6_, 150, 275.]\n\n[Footnote 161: Aeschylus, _Eumenides_, 175, 267 _sqq._, 335 _sqq._\nPausanias, x. 28. 4 _sq._ Aristophanes, _Ran\u00e6_, 147-150, 274.]\n\n[Footnote 162: Aeschylus, _Eumenides_, 269 _sq._ Aristophanes,\n_Ran\u00e6_, 147 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 163: See _supra_, i. 584 _sqq._, 621 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 164: Diogenes Laertius, _De vitis philosophorum_, viii.\n1. 31.]\n\n[Footnote 165: Demosthenes (?), _Contra Aristogitonem oratio I._ 52.]\n\n[Footnote 166: The Arabs of the Ul\u00e1d Bu [(]Az\u00eez in Southern\nMorocco maintain that there are three classes of persons who are\ninfallibly doomed to hell, namely, those who have been cursed by\ntheir parents, those who have been guilty of unlawful homicide,\nand those who have burned corn. They say that every grain curses\nhim who burns it.]\n\n[Footnote 167: _Cf._ Westcott, _op. cit._ p. 104.]\n\n[Footnote 168: Euripides, _Iphigenia in Tauris_, 391.]\n\n[Footnote 169: _Idem_, _Bellerophon_, 17 (_Fragmenta_, 300).]\n\n[Footnote 170: Plato, _Respublica_, ii. 379 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 171: _Idem_, _Ph\u00e6drus_, p. 247. _Idem_, _Tim\u00e6us_, p. 29.]\n\n[Footnote 172: _Idem_, _Respublica_, ii. 364 _sqq._ _Idem_,\n_Leges_, x. 905 _sqq._; xii. 948.]\n\n[Footnote 173: _Idem_, _Respublica_, ii. 379 _sq._ _Cf._\nAeschylus, _Agamemnon_, 176 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 174: Plutarch, _De defectu oraculorum_, See also\n_Idem_, _De adulatore et amico_, 22.]\n\nThe gods of the Romans were on the whole unsympathetic and\nlifeless beings, some of them even actually pernicious, as the\ngod of Fever, who had a temple on the Palatine hill, and the god\nof Ill-Fortune, who had an altar on the Esquiline hill.[175] The\nrelations between the gods {717} and their worshippers were cold,\nceremonial, legal. The chief thing was not to break \"the peace of\nthe gods,\" or, when it was broken, to restore it.[176] They were\nrendered propitious by \"sanctity\" and \"piety.\"[177] But sanctity\nwas defined as \"the knowledge of how we ought to worship them,\"\nand piety was only \"justice towards the gods,\" the return for\nbenefits received; Cicero asks, \"What piety is due to a being\nfrom whom you receive nothing?\"[178] The divine law, _fas_, was\ndistinguished from the human law, _jus_. To the former belonged\nnot only the religious rites but the duties to the dead, as also\nthe duties to certain living individuals.[179] Offences against\nparents were avenged by the _divi parentum_;[180] the duty of\nhospitality was enforced by the _dii hospitales_ and\nJupiter;[181] boundaries were protected by Jupiter Terminalis and\nTerminus;[182] and Jupiter, Dius Fidius, and Fides, were the\nguardians of sworn faith.[183]\n\n[Footnote 175: Cicero, _De natura deorum_, iii. 25.]\n\n[Footnote 176: Leist, _Gr\u00e6co-italische Rechtsgeschichte_, p. 219\n_sqq._ Granger, _Worship of the Romans_, p. 217.]\n\n[Footnote 177: Cicero, _De officiis_, ii. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 178: _Idem_, _De natura deorum_, i. 41.]\n\n[Footnote 179: On the distinction between _fas_ and _jus_ see von\nJhering, _Geist des r\u00f6mischen Rechts_, i. 258.]\n\n[Footnote 180: _Supra_, i. 624.]\n\n[Footnote 181: _Supra_, i. 580.]\n\n[Footnote 182: _Supra_, ii. 61.]\n\n[Footnote 183: _Supra_, ii. 96, 121 _sq._ Wissowa, _Religion und\nKultus der R\u00f6mer_, pp. 48, 103, 104, 123 _sq._]\n\nThe god of Israel was a powerful protector of his chosen people,\nbut he was a severe master who inspired more fear than love. In\nthe pre-prophetic period at least, he was no model of goodness.\nHe had unaccountable moods, his wrath often resembled \"rather the\ninsensate violence of angered nature, than the reasonable\nindignation of a moralised personality\"[184]--as appears, for\ninstance, from the suggestion of David that Saul's undeserved\nenmity might be due to the incitement of God.[185] At the same\ntime his severity was also a guardian of human relationships. It\nturned against children who were disrespectful to their parents,\nagainst murderers, adulterers, thieves, false witnesses--indeed,\nthe whole criminal law was a revelation of the Lord. He was\nmoreover a protector of {718} the poor and needy,[186] and a\npreserver of strangers.[187] But offences against God were, in\nthe Ten Commandments, mentioned before offences against man;\nreligious rites were put on the same level with the rules of\nsocial morality; neglect of circumcision, or disregard of the\nprecepts of ceremonial cleanliness, or sabbath-breaking, was\npunished with the same severity as the greatest crimes.[188] \"To\nthe ordinary man,\" says Wellhausen, \"it was not moral but\nliturgical acts that seemed to be truly religious.\"[189] A\ndifferent opinion, however, was expressed by the Prophets. They\nopposed the vice of the heart to the outward service of the\nritual.[190] God was said by them to desire not sacrifice but\nmercy,[191] and to hate the hypocritical service of Israel with\nits feast-days and solemn assemblies;[192] and the true fast was\ndeclared to consist in moral welldoing.[193] To them\nrighteousness was the fundamental virtue of Yahveh, and if he\npunished Israel his anger was no longer a merely fitful outburst,\nunrelated to Israel's own wrongdoing, but an essential element of\nhis righteousness.[194] However, as M. Hal\u00e9vy observes, the truly\nnational conceptions of the Hebrews were not those which the\nProphets maintained, but those which they opposed.[195] The\nimportance of ritual was more than ever emphasised in the\npost-prophetic priestly code.\n\n[Footnote 184: Montefiore, _Hibbert Lectures on the Religion of\nthe Ancient Hebrews_, p. 38.]\n\n[Footnote 185: _1 Samuel_, xxvi. 19.]\n\n[Footnote 186: _Supra_, i. 552, 565.]\n\n[Footnote 187: _Supra_, i. 580.]\n\n[Footnote 188: Montefiore, _op. cit._ pp. 327, 470. Kuenen,\n_Religion of Israel_, ii. 276.]\n\n[Footnote 189: Wellhausen, _Prolegomena to the History of\nIsrael_, p. 468.]\n\n[Footnote 190: _Cf._ Caird, _Evolution of Religion_, ii. 119.]\n\n[Footnote 191: _Hosea_, vi. 6.]\n\n[Footnote 192: _Amos_, v. 21 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 193: _Isaiah_, lviii. 6 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 194: _Cf._ Montefiore, _op. cit._ p. 122 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 195: Hal\u00e9vy, _M\u00e9langes de critique et d'histoire\nrelatifs aux peuples s\u00e9mitiques_, p. 371.]\n\nThe opposition against ritualism which was started by the\nProphets reached its height in Christ. Men are defiled not by\nexternal uncleanness, but by evil thoughts and evil deeds.[196]\n\"It is lawful to do well on the sabbath days.\"[197] Those whose\nrighteousness does not exceed that of the scribes and Pharisees\nshall not enter into the kingdom of heaven.[198] The first and\ngreat commandment is that which {719} enjoins love to God, but\nthe second, according to which a man shall love his neighbour as\nhimself, \"is like unto it.\"[199] At the same time there are in\nthe New Testament passages in which God's judgment of men seems\nto be represented as determined by theological dogma.[200] The\nonly sin which can never be forgiven either in this world or in\nthe world to come, is blasphemy against the Holy Ghost;[201] and\nthe belief in Jesus is laid down as indispensable for\nsalvation.[202] According to St. Paul, a man is justified by\nfaith alone, without the deeds of the law.[203] This doctrine,\nwhich makes man's salvation dependent upon his acceptance of the\nMessiahship of Jesus, has had a lasting influence upon Christian\ntheology, and has, together with certain other dogmas, led to\nthat singular discrepancy between the notions of divine and human\njustice which has up to the present day characterised the chief\nbranches of the Christian Church.\n\n[Footnote 196: _St. Matthew_, xv. 19 _sq._ _St. Mark_, vii. 6 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 197: _St. Matthew_, xii. 12.]\n\n[Footnote 198: _Ibid._ v. 20.]\n\n[Footnote 199: _St. Matthew_, xxii. 37 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 200: Toy, _Judaism and Christianity_, p. 82 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 201: _St. Matthew_, xii. 31 _sq._ _St. Mark_, iii. 28 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 202: _St. Mark_, xvi. 16. _St. John_, iii. 18, 36;\nviii. 24.]\n\n[Footnote 203: _Romans_, iii. 28.]\n\nSome of the early Fathers maintained that the interference and\nsuffering of Christ, in itself, unconditionally saved all souls\nand emptied hell for ever;[204] but this theory never became\npopular. According to St. Augustine and, subsequently, Calvinian\ntheology, the benefits of the atonement are limited to those whom\nGod, of his sovereign pleasure, has from eternity arbitrarily\nelected, the effect of faith and conversion being not to save the\nsoul, but simply to convince the soul that it is saved. A third\ntheory--that of Pelagius, Armenius, and Luther--attributes to the\nsufferings of Christ a conditional efficacy, depending upon\npersonal faith in his vicarious atonement, whereas those who for\nsome reason or other do not possess such faith are excluded from\nsalvation. A fourth doctrine, which early began to be constructed\nby the Fathers and was adopted by the Roman Catholic and the\nconsistent portion of the Episcopalian Church, declares that by\nChrist's vicarious {720} suffering power is given to the Church,\na priestly hierarchy, to save those who confess her authority and\nobserve her rites, whilst all others are lost. Certain\nsectarians, like the Unitarians, or those \"liberal Christians\"\nwho do not feel themselves tied by the dogmas of any special\ncreed, are the only ones among whom we meet with the opinion that\na free soul, who by the immutable laws which the Creator has\nestablished may choose between good and evil, is saved or lost\njust so far and so long as it partakes of either the former or\nthe latter.[205]\n\n[Footnote 204: Alger, _History of the Doctrine of a Future Life_,\npp. 550-552, 563. Farrar, _Mercy and Judgment_, p. 58 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 205: Alger, _op. cit._ p. 553 _sqq._]\n\nAccording to the leading doctrines of Christianity, then, the\nfates of men beyond the grave are determined by quite other\ncircumstances than what the moral consciousness by itself\nrecognises as virtue or vice. They are all doomed to death and\nhell in consequence of Adam's sin, and their salvation, if not\nabsolutely predestined, can only be effected by sincere faith in\nthe atonement of Christ or by valid reception of sacramental\ngrace at the hands of a priest. Persons who on intellectual or\nmoral grounds are unable to accept the dogma of atonement or to\nacknowledge the authority of an exacting hierarchy, are subject\nto the most awful penalties for a sin committed by their earliest\nancestor, and so are the countless millions of heathen who never\neven had an opportunity to embrace the Christian religion. Luther\nwas considered to have shown an exceptional boldness when he\nexpressed the hope that \"our dear God would be merciful to\nCicero, and to others like him.\"[206] In the Westminster\nConfession of Faith the Divines declared the opinion that men not\nprofessing Christianity may be saved to be \"very pernicious, and\nto be detested\";[207] and in their Larger Catechism they\nexpressly said that \"they who, having never heard the gospel,\nknow not Jesus Christ, and believe not in him, cannot be saved,\nbe they never so diligent to frame their lives according to the\nlight of nature, or the laws of that religion which they\nprofess.\"[208] This doctrine has had many {721} adherents up to\nthe present time,[209] although a more liberal view in favour of\nvirtuous heathen has obviously been gaining ground.[210] Even in\nthe case of Christians errors in belief on such subjects as\nchurch government, the Trinity, transubstantiation, original sin,\nand predestination, have been declared to expose the guilty to\neternal damnation.[211] In the seventeenth century it was a\ncommon theme of certain Roman Catholic writers that \"Protestancy\nunrepented destroys salvation,\"[212] while the Protestants on\ntheir part taxed Du Moulin with culpable laxity for admitting\nthat some Roman Catholics might escape the torments of hell.[213]\nNathanael Emmons, the sage of Franklin, tells us that \"it is\nabsolutely necessary to approve of the doctrine of reprobation in\norder to be saved.\"[214]\n\n[Footnote 206: Farrar, _op. cit._ p. 146.]\n\n[Footnote 207: _Confession of Faith_, x. 4.]\n\n[Footnote 208: _Larger Catechism_, Answer to Question 60.]\n\n[Footnote 209: Farrar, _op. cit._ p. 146 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 210: Prentiss, 'Infant Salvation,' in _Presbyterian\nReview_, iv. 576. For earlier instances of this opinion see\nAbbot, 'Literature of the Doctrine of a Future Life,' forming an\nAppendix to Alger's _History of the Doctrine of a Future Life_,\npp. 859, 863, 865.]\n\n[Footnote 211: Abbot, _loc. cit._ p. 863.]\n\n[Footnote 212: Wilson, _Charity Mistaken, with the Want whereof\nCatholickes are unjustly charged, for affirming . . . that\nProtestancy unrepented destroys Salvation_.]\n\n[Footnote 213: Abbot, _loc. cit._ p. 860.]\n\n[Footnote 214: Emmons, _Works_, iv. 336.]\n\nBesides the heathen there is another large class of people whom\nChristian theology has condemned to hell for no fault of theirs,\nnamely, infants who have died unbaptised. From a very early age\nthe water of baptism was believed by the Christians to possess a\nmagic power to wipe away sin,[215] and since the days of St.\nAugustine it was deemed so indispensable for salvation that any\nchild dying without \"the bath of regeneration\" was regarded as\nlost for ever.[216] St. Augustine admitted that the punishment of\nsuch children was of the mildest sort,[217] but other writers\nwere more severe; St. Fulgentius condemned to \"everlasting\npunishment in eternal fire\" even infants who died in their\nmother's womb.[218] However, {722} the notion that unbaptised\nchildren will be tormented, gradually gave way to a more humane\nopinion. In the middle of the twelfth century Peter Lombard\ndetermined that the proper punishment of original sin, when no\nactual sin is added to it, is \"the punishment of loss,\" that is,\nloss of heaven and the sight of God, but not \"the punishment of\nsense,\" that is, positive torment. This doctrine was confirmed by\nInnocentius III. and shared by the large majority of the\nschoolmen, who assumed the existence of a place called _limbus_,\nor _infernus puerorum_, where unbaptised infants will dwell\nwithout being subject to torture.[219] But the older view was\nagain set up by the Protestants, who generally maintained that\nthe due punishment of original sin is, in strictness, damnation\nin hell, although many of them were inclined to think that if a\nchild dies by misfortune before it is baptised the parents'\nsincere intention of baptising it, together with their prayers,\nwill be accepted with God for the deed.[220] In the Confession of\nAugsburg the Anabaptistic doctrine is emphatically\ncondemned;[221] and although Zwingli rejected the dogma that\ninfants dying without baptism are lost, and Calvin, in harmony\nwith his theory of election, refused to tie the salvation of\ninfants to an outward rite, the necessity of baptism as the\nordinary channel of receiving grace appears to have been a\ngeneral belief in the Reformed churches throughout the sixteenth\nand seventeenth centuries.[222] The damnation of infants was in\nfact an acknowledged doctrine of Calvinism,[223] though an\nexception was made for the children of pious parents.[224] But in\nthe latter part of the eighteenth century Toplady, who was a\nvehement Calvinist, avowed {723} his belief in the universal\nsalvation of all departed infants, whether baptised or\nunbaptised.[225] And a hundred years later Dr. Hodge thought he\nwas justified in stating that the common opinion of evangelical\nProtestants was that \"all who die in infancy are saved.\"[226] The\naccuracy of this statement, however, seems somewhat doubtful. In\n1883 Mr. Prentiss wrote of the doctrine of infant salvation\nindependently of baptism:--\"My own impression is that, had it\nbeen taught as unequivocally in the Presbyterian Church even a\nthird of a century ago, by a theologian less eminent than Dr.\nHodge for orthodoxy, piety, and weight of character, it would\nhave called forth an immediate protest from some of the more\nconservative, old-fashioned Calvinists.\"[227]\n\n[Footnote 215: Tertullian, _De baptismo_, 1 _sqq._ (Migne,\n_Patrologi\u00e6 cursus_, i. 1197 _sqq._). Harnack, _History of\nDogma_, i. 206 _sq._; ii. 227. Stanley, _Christian Institutions_,\np. 16. Lewis, _Paganism surviving in Christianity_, pp. 72, 73,\n129, 144 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 216: Bingham, _Works_, iii. 488 _sqq._ Prentiss, _loc.\ncit._ p. 549.]\n\n[Footnote 217: St. Augustine, _De peccatorum meritis et\nremissione_, i. 16 (Migne, _op. cit._ xliv. 16).]\n\n[Footnote 218: St. Fulgentius, _De fide_, 27 (Migne, _op. cit._\nlxv. 701).]\n\n[Footnote 219: Wall, _History of Infant-Baptism_, i. 460 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 220: _Ibid._ i. 462, 468. Luther and his followers,\nhowever, speak more doubtfully about the efficacy of the parents'\nunrealised intention, and lay much stress on actual baptism\n(_ibid._ i. 469).]\n\n[Footnote 221: _Augsburg Confession_, i. 9.]\n\n[Footnote 222: Prentiss, _loc. cit._ p. 550.]\n\n[Footnote 223: Calvin, _Institutio Christiana religionis_, iv.\n15. 10, vol. ii. 371. Norton, _Tracts concerning Christianity_,\np. 179 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 224: Calvin, _op. cit._ iv. 16. 9, vol. ii. 383 _sq._\nWall, _op. cit._ i. 469. Anderson, 'Introductory Essay,' to\nLogan's _Words of Comfort for Parents bereaved of Little\nChildren_, p. xxi.]\n\n[Footnote 225: Toplady, _Works_, p. 645 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 226: Hodge, _Systematic Theology_, i. 26 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 227: Prentiss, _loc. cit._ p. 559. See also Anderson,\n_loc. cit._ p. xxiii.]\n\nIn order fully to realise the true import of the dogma of\ndamnation it is necessary to consider the punishment in store for\nthe condemned. The immense bulk of the Christians have always\nregarded hell and its agonies as material facts.[228] Origen, who\nwas a Platonist and an heretic on many points, was severely\ncensured for saying that the fire of hell was inward and of the\nconscience rather than outward and of the body;[229] and in the\nlater Middle Ages Scotus Erigena showed unusual audacity in\nquestioning the locality of hell and the material tortures of the\ncondemned.[230] The punishment is burning--a penalty which even\nin the most barbaric codes is reserved for the very gravest\ncrimes; and some great divines, like Jeremy Taylor and Jonathan\nEdwards, have been anxious to point out that the fire of hell is\ninfinitely more painful than any fire on earth, being \"fierce\nenough to melt the very rocks and elements.\"[231] This awful\npunishment also exceeds in dreadfulness anything which even the\nmost vivid imagination can conceive, because it will last not for\na passing moment, {724} nor for a year or a hundred, thousand,\nmillion, or milliard years, but for ever and ever. In case any\ndoubt should arise as regards the physical capacity of the damned\nto withstand the heat, we are assured by some modern theologians\nthat their bodies will be annealed like glass or asbestos-like or\nof the nature of salamanders.[232] This, then, is the future\nstate of the large majority of men, quite independently of any\nfault of their own, or of the degree of their \"guilt.\"[233] It\nwould seem that even the felicity of the few who are saved must\nbe seriously impaired by their contemplation of this endless and\nundescribable misery, but we are told that the case is just the\nreverse. They become as merciless as their god. Thomas Aquinas\nsays that a perfect sight of the punishment of the damned is\ngranted to them that they \"may enjoy their beatitude and the\ngrace of God more richly.\"[234] And the Puritans, especially,\nhave revelled in the idea that \"the sight of hell torments will\nexalt the happiness of the saints for ever,\" as a sense of the\nopposite misery always increases the relish of any pleasure.[235]\n\n[Footnote 228: Alger, _op. cit._ p. 516.]\n\n[Footnote 229: _Ibid._ p. 516.]\n\n[Footnote 230: Milman, _History of Latin Christianity_, ix. 88,\nn. k.]\n\n[Footnote 231: Alger, _op. cit._ p. 516 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 232: Alger, _op. cit._ pp. 518, 520. _Cf._ St.\nAugustine, _De Civitate Dei_, xxi. 2 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 233: For the numbers of souls supposed to be lost see\nAlger, _op. cit._ p. 530 _sqq._ St. Chrysostom (_In Acta\nApostolorum Homil. XXIV._ 4 (Migne, _op. cit._ Ser. Graeca, lx.\n189]) doubted whether out of the many thousands of souls\nconstituting the Christian population of Antioch in his day one\nhundred would be saved. And at the end of the seventeenth century\na History Professor at Oxford published a book to prove \"that not\none in a hundred thousand (nay probably not one in a million)\nfrom Adam down to our times, shall be saved\" (Du-Moulin, _Moral\nReflections upon the Number of the Elect_, title page).]\n\n[Footnote 234: Thomas Aquinas, _Summa theologica_, iii.\nSupplementum, qu. xciv. 1. 2 (Migne, _op. cit._ Ser. Secunda,\niv. 1393).]\n\n[Footnote 235: Jonathan Edwards, _Works_, vii. 480. Alger,\n_op. cit._ p. 541.]\n\nIn the present times there is a distinct tendency among Christian\ntheologians to humanise somewhat the doctrines of the future\nlife.[236] But if Christianity is to be judged from the dogmas\nwhich almost from its beginning until quite recent times have\nbeen recognised by the immense majority of its adherents, it must\nbe admitted that its {725} conception of a heavenly Father and\nJudge has been utterly inconsistent with all ordinary notions of\ngoodness and justice. Calvin himself avowed that the decree\naccording to which the fall of Adam involved, without remedy, in\neternal death so many nations together with their infant\nchildren, was a \"horrible\" one. \"But,\" he adds, \"no one can deny\nthat God foreknew the future final fate of man before he created\nhim, and that he did foreknow it because it was appointed by his\nown decree.\"[237]\n\n[Footnote 236: Thus the doctrine of endless torments is opposed\nby a considerable number of theologians (Alger, _op. cit._ p.\n546), and, \"if held, is not practically taught by the vast\nmajority of the English clergy\" (Stanley, _op. cit._ p. 94).]\n\n[Footnote 237: Calvin, _op. cit._ iii. 23. 7, vol. ii. 151.]\n\nLike Christianity, Muhammedanism adorns its godhead with the\nhighest moral attributes and at the same time ascribes to him\ndecrees and actions which flatly contradict even the most\nelementary notions of human justice. The god of Islam is\naddressed as the compassionate and merciful; but his love is\nrestricted to \"those who fear,\"[238] and his mercy can only be\ngained by that submissiveness or self-surrender which is\nindicated by the very name of Islam. He demands a righteous life,\nhe punishes the wrongdoer and rewards the charitable.[239]\nThrough his Prophet he has revealed to mankind both the rules of\nmorality and the elements of a social system containing minute\nregulations for a man's conduct in various circumstances of life,\nwith due rewards or penalties according to his fulfilment of\nthese regulations.[240] The whole constitution of the State has\non it a divine stamp; as an Arab proverb says, \"country and\nreligion are twins.\"[241] But foremost among duties is to believe\nin God and his Prophet. \"God,\" it is said, \"does not pardon\npolytheism and infidelity, but He can, if He willeth, pardon\nother crimes.\"[242] And the \"pillars of religion\" are the five\nduties of reciting the Kalimah or creed, of performing the five\nstated daily prayers, of fasting--especially in the month of\nRama[d.]\u00e2n,--of giving the legal alms, and of making the\npilgrimage to Mecca.[243] These duties are based on clear {726}\nsentences of the Koran, but the traditions have raised the most\ntrivial ceremonial observances into duties of the greatest\nimportance. It is true that hypocrisy and formalism without\ndevotion were strongly condemned by Muhammed. \"Righteousness,\" he\nsaid, \"is not that ye turn your faces towards the East or the\nWest, but righteousness is, one who believes in God, and the last\nday, and the angels, and the Book, and the prophets, and who\ngives wealth for His love to kindred, and orphans, and the poor,\nand the son of the road, and beggars, and those in captivity; and\nwho is steadfast in prayer, and gives alms; and those who are\nsure of their covenant when they make a covenant; and the patient\nin poverty, and distress, and in time of violence; these are they\nwho are true, and these are those who fear.\"[244] Yet in\nMuhammedanism, as in other ritualistic religions, the chief\nimportance is practically attached to the punctual performance of\noutward ceremonies, and the virtue of prayer is made dependent\nupon an ablution.[245] In the future life the felicity or\nsuffering of each person will be proportionate to his merits or\ndemerits,[246] but the admittance into paradise depends in the\nfirst place on faith. \"Those who believe, and act righteously,\nand are steadfast in prayer, and give alms, theirs is their hire\nwith their Lord.\"[247] Those who have acknowledged the faith of\nIslam and yet acted wickedly will be punished in hell for a\ncertain period, but will finally enter paradise.[248] As regards\nthe future state of certain infidels the Koran contains\ncontradictory statements. In one place it is said, \"Verily,\nwhether it be of those who believe, or those who are Jews or\nChristians or Sabaeans, whosoever believe in God and {727} the\nlast day and act aright, they have their reward at their Lord's\nhand, and there is no fear for them, nor shall they grieve.\"[249]\nBut this passage is considered to have been abrogated by another\nwhere it is stated that whoso desires any other religion than\nIslam shall in the next world be among the lost.[250] The\npunishments inflicted upon unbelievers are no less horrible than\nthe torments of the Christian hell. Yet in one point the\nMuhammedan doctrine of the future life is more merciful than the\ndogmas of Christianity. The children of believers will all go to\nparadise, and the children of unbelievers are generally supposed\nto escape hell. Some think they will be in A[(]r\u00e1f, a place\nsituated between heaven and hell; whilst others maintain that\nthey will be servants to the true believers in paradise.[251]\n\n[Footnote 238: _Koran_, iii. 70.]\n\n[Footnote 239: _Supra_, i. 553.]\n\n[Footnote 240: _Cf._ Muir, _Life of Mahomet_, iii. 295 _sq._;\nLane-Poole, _Studies in a Mosque_, p. 101.]\n\n[Footnote 241: Sell, _Faith of Isl\u00e1m_, pp. 19, 39.]\n\n[Footnote 242: _Ibid._ p. 241.]\n\n[Footnote 243: _Ibid._ p. 251.]\n\n[Footnote 244: _Koran_, ii. 172.]\n\n[Footnote 245: _Cf._ Polak, _Persien_, i. 9; Wallin,\n_Reseanteckningar fr\u00e5n Orienten_, iv. 284 _sq._; Sell, _op. cit._\np. 256.]\n\n[Footnote 246: Lane, _Manners and Customs of the Modern\nEgyptians_, i. 95 _sq._ Sell, _op. cit._ p. 231. Lane-Poole,\n_Studies in a Mosque_, p. 319.]\n\n[Footnote 247: _Koran_, ii. 277.]\n\n[Footnote 248: Lane, _op. cit._ i. 95. Sell, _op. cit._ p. 228.\nThe Mu[(]tazilas, however, teach that the Muslim who enters hell\nwill remain there for ever. They maintain that the person who,\nhaving committed great sins, dies unrepentant, though not an\ninfidel, ceases to be a believer, and hence suffers as the\ninfidels do, though the punishment is lighter than that which an\ninfidel receives (Sell, _op. cit._ pp. 229, 241).]\n\n[Footnote 249: _Koran_, ii. 59.]\n\n[Footnote 250: _Ibid._ iii. 79. Sell, _op. cit._ p. 359\n_sq._]\n\n[Footnote 251: Sell, _op. cit._ p. 204 _sq._]\n\nThe formalism of Muhammedan orthodoxy has from time to time\ncalled forth protests from minds with deeper aspirations. The\nearlier Muhammedan mystics sought to impart life to the rigid\nritual;[252] and in the nineteenth century B\u00e1b\u00edism revolted\nagainst orthodox Islam, opposing bigotry and enjoining friendly\nintercourse with persons of all religions.[253] At present there\nare some liberal Muhammedans who set aside the scholastic\ntradition, maintain the right of private interpretation of the\nKoran, and warmly uphold the adaptability of Islam to the most\nadvanced ideas of civilisation.[254] To them Muhammed's mission\nwas chiefly that of a moral reformer. \"In Islam,\" says Syed Ameer\nAli, \"the service of man and the good of humanity constitute\npre-eminently the service and worship of God.\"[255]\n\n[Footnote 252: _Ibid._ p. 110.]\n\n[Footnote 253: _Ibid._ p. 136 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 254: Ameer Ali, _Life and Teachings of Mohammed_,\n_passim_. _Idem_, _Ethics of Isl\u00e2m_, _passim_. _Cf._ Lane-Poole,\n_Studies in a Mosque_, p. 324; Sell, _op. cit._ p. 198\n_sq._]\n\n[Footnote 255: Ameer Ali, _Ethics of Isl\u00e2m_, p. 3 _sq._ _Idem_,\n_Life and Teachings of Mohammed_, p. 274.]\n\nIn the next chapter I shall try to explain the chief facts now\nset forth relating to gods as guardians of **worldly morality.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LII\n\nGODS AS GUARDIANS OF MORALITY (_concluded_)\n\n\nWE have seen that the gods of uncivilised races are to a very\nlarge extent of a malevolent character, that they as a rule take\nlittle interest in any kind of human conduct which does not\naffect their own welfare, and that, if they show any signs of\nmoral feelings, they may be guardians either of tribal customs in\ngeneral or only of some special branch of morality. Among peoples\nof a higher culture, again, the gods are on the whole benevolent\nto mankind, when duly propitiated. They by preference resent\noffences committed against themselves personally; but they also\navenge social wrongs of various kinds, they are superintendents\nof human justice, and are even represented as the originators and\nsustainers of the whole moral order of the world. The gods have\nthus experienced a gradual change for the better; until at last\nthey are described as ideals of moral perfection, even though,\nwhen more closely scrutinised, their goodness and notions of\njustice are found to differ materially from what is deemed good\nand just in the case of men.\n\nThe malevolence of savage gods is in accordance with the theory\nthat religion is born of fear. The assumed originators of\nmisfortunes were naturally regarded as enemies to be propitiated,\nwhilst fortunate events, if attracting sufficient attention and\nappearing sufficiently marvellous to suggest a supernatural\ncause, were commonly ascribed to beings who were too good to\nrequire {729} worship. But growing reflection has a tendency to\nattribute more amiable qualities to the gods. The religious\nconsciousness of men becomes less exclusively occupied with the\nhurts they suffer, and comes more and more to reflect upon the\nbenefits they enjoy. The activity of a god which displays itself\nin a certain phenomenon, or group of phenomena, appears to them\non some occasions as a source of evil, but on other occasions as\na source of good; hence the god is regarded as partly malevolent,\npartly benevolent, and in all circumstances as a being who must\nnot be neglected. Moreover, a god who is by nature harmless or\ngood may by proper worship be induced to assist man in his\nstruggle against evil spirits.[1] This protective function of\ngods becomes particularly important when the god is more or less\ndisassociated from the natural phenomenon in which he originally\nmanifested himself. Nothing, indeed, seems to have contributed\nmore towards the improvement of nature gods than the expansion of\ntheir sphere of activity. When supernatural beings can exert\ntheir power in the various departments of life, men naturally\nchoose for their gods those among them who with great power\ncombine the greatest benevolence. Men have selected their gods\naccording to their usefulness. Among the Maoris \"a mere trifle,\nor natural casualty, will induce a native (or a whole tribe) to\nchange his Atua.\"[2] The negro, when disappointed in some of his\nspeculations, or overtaken by some sad calamity, throws away his\nfetish, and selects a new one.[3] When hard-pressed, the\nSamoyede, after invoking his own deities in vain, addresses\nhimself to the Russian god, promising to become his worshipper if\nhe relieves him from his distress; and in most cases he is said\nto be faithful to his promise, though he may still try to keep on\ngood terms with his former gods by occasionally {730} offering\nthem a sacrifice in secret.[4] North American Indians attribute\nall their good or bad luck to their Manitou, and \"if the Manitou\nhas not been favourable to them, they quit him without any\nceremony, and take another.\"[5] Among many of the ancient Indians\nof Central America there was a regular and systematical selection\nof gods. Father Blas Valera says that their gods had annual\nrotations and were changed each year in accordance with the\nsuperstitions of the people. \"The old gods were forsaken as\ninfamous, or because they had been of no use, and other gods and\ndemons were elected. . . . Sons when they inherited, either\naccepted or repudiated the gods of their fathers, for they were\nnot allowed to hold their pre-eminence against the will of the\nheir. Old men worshipped other greater deities, but they likewise\ndethroned them, and set up others in their places when the year\nwas over, or the age of the world, as the Indians had it. Such\nwere the gods which all the nations of Mexico, Chiapa, and\nGuatemala worshipped, as well as those of Vera Paz, and many\nother Indians. They thought that the gods selected by themselves\nwere the greatest and most powerful of all the gods.\"[6] These\nare crude instances of a process which in some form or other must\nhave been an important motive force in religious evolution by\nmaking the gods better suited to meet the wants of their believers.\n\n[Footnote 1: von Rosenberg, _Der malayische Archipel_, p. 162\n(Niase). Howard, _Life with Trans-Siberian Savages_, p. 192\n(Ainu). Georgi, _Russia_, iii. 273 _sq._ (shamanistic peoples of\nSiberia). Buch, 'Die Wotjaken,' in _Acta Soc. Scient. Fennic\u00e6_,\nxii. 633. _Supra_, ii. 701, 702, 704 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 2: Polack, _Manners and Customs of the New Zealanders_,\ni. 233.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Wilson, _Western Africa_, p. 212.]\n\n[Footnote 4: Ahlqvist, 'Unter Wogulen und Ostjaken,' in _Acta\nSoc. Scient. Fennic\u00e6_, xiv. 240.]\n\n[Footnote 5: Bossu, _Travels through Louisiana_, p. 103. Frazer,\n_Totemism_, p. 55.]\n\n[Footnote 6: Blas Valera, quoted by Garcilasso de la Vega, _First\nPart of the Royal Commentaries of the Yncas_, i. 124 _sq._]\n\nBut men not only select as their gods such supernatural beings as\nmay be most useful to them in their struggle for life, they also\nmagnify their good qualities in worshipping them. Praise and\nexaggerating eulogy are common in the mouth of a devout\nworshipper. In ancient Egypt the god of each petty state was\nwithin it held to be the ruler of the gods, the creator of the\nworld, and the giver of all good things.[7] So also in Chaldea\nthe god of {731} a town was addressed by its inhabitants with the\nmost exalted epithets, as the master or king of all the gods.[8]\nThe Vedic poets were engrossed in the praise of the particular\ndeity they happened to be invoking, exaggerating his attributes\nto the point of inconsistency.[9] \"Every virtue, every\nexcellence,\" says Hume, \"must be ascribed to the divinity, and no\nexaggeration will be deemed sufficient to reach those perfections\nwith which he is endowed.\"[10] The tendency of the worshipper to\nextol his god beyond all measure is largely due to the idea that\nthe god is fond of praise,[11] but it may also be rooted in a\nsincere will to believe or in genuine admiration. That nations of\na higher culture have especially a strong faith in the power and\nbenevolence of their gods is easy to understand when we consider\nthat these are exactly the peoples who have been most successful\nin their national endeavours.[12] As the Greeks attributed their\nvictory over the Persians to the assistance of Zeus,[13] so the\nRomans maintained that the grandeur of their city was the work of\nthe gods whom they had propitiated by sacrifices.[14]\n\n[Footnote 7: Wiedemann, _Religion of the Ancient Egyptians_, p. 11.]\n\n[Footnote 8: M\u00fcrdter-Delitzsch, _Geschichte Babyloniens und\nAssyriens_, p. 24.]\n\n[Footnote 9: Macdonell, _Vedic Mythology_, p. 16 _sq._ Barth,\n_Religions of India_, p. 26. Hopkins, _Religions of India_, p. 139.]\n\n[Footnote 10: Hume, _Philosophical Works_, iv. 353.]\n\n[Footnote 11: See _supra_, ii. 653 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 12: _Cf._ Oldenberg, _Die Religion des Veda_, p. 281;\nMacdonell, _op. cit._ p. 18.]\n\n[Footnote 13: _Supra_, ii. 713.]\n\n[Footnote 14: Cicero, _De natura deorum_, iii. 2.]\n\nThe benevolence of a god, however, does not imply that he acts as\na moral judge. A friendly god is not generally supposed to bestow\nhis favours gratuitously; it is hardly probable, then, that he\nshould meddle with matters of social morality out of sheer\nkindliness and of his own accord. But by an invocation he may be\ninduced to reward virtue and punish vice. We have often noticed\nhow closely the retributive activity of gods is connected with\nthe blessings and curses of men. In order to give efficacy to\ntheir good or evil wishes men appeal to some god, or simply bring\nin his name when they pronounce a blessing or a curse; and if\nthis is regularly done in connection with some particular kind of\nconduct, the idea may grow up that the god rewards or punishes it\neven independently of {732} any human invocation. Moreover,\npowerful curses, as those uttered by parents or strangers, may be\npersonified as supernatural beings, like the Greek Erinyes; or\nthe magic energy inherent in a blessing or a curse may become an\nattribute of the chief god, owing to the tendency of such a god\nto attract supernatural forces which are in harmony with his\ngeneral nature.[15] So also, the notion of a persecuting ghost\nmay be changed into the notion of an avenging god.[16] Various\ndepartments of social morality have thus come to be placed under\nthe supervision of gods: the rights of life[17] and property,[18]\ncharity[19] and hospitality,[20] the submissiveness of\nchildren,[21] truthspeaking and fidelity to a given promise.[22]\nThat gods are so frequently looked upon as guardians of truth and\ngood faith is, as we have seen, mainly a result of the common\npractice of confirming a statement or promise by an oath; and\nwhere the oath is an essential element in the judicial\nproceedings, as was the case in the archaic State,[23] the\nconsequence is that the guardianship of gods is extended to the\nwhole sphere of justice. Truth and justice are repeatedly\nmentioned hand in hand as matters of divine concern. We have seen\nhow frequently the same gods as are appealed to in oaths or\nordeals are described as judges of human conduct.[24] \"En\n\u00c9gypte,\" says M. Am\u00e9lineau, \"la v\u00e9rit\u00e9 et la justice n'avaient\nqu'un seul et m\u00eame nom, _M\u00e2t_, qui veut aussi bien dire v\u00e9rit\u00e9\nque justice, et justice que v\u00e9rit\u00e9.\"[25] Zeus presided over\nassemblies and trials;[26] according to a law of Solon, the\njudges of Athens had to swear by him.[27] And the Erinyes, the\npersonifications of oaths and curses, are sometimes represented\nby poets and philosophers as guardians of right in general.[28]\n\n[Footnote 15: See _supra_, ii. 68.]\n\n[Footnote 16: _Supra_, i. 378 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 17: _Supra_, i. 379 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 18: _Supra_, ii. 59 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 19: _Supra_, i. 561 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 20: _Supra_, i. 578 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 21: _Supra_, i. 621 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 22: _Supra_, ii. 114 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 23: Leist, _Gr\u00e6co-italische Rechtsgeschichte_, p. 228.]\n\n[Footnote 24: _Supra_, ii. 115, 116, 121, 122, 686, 687, 699.]\n\n[Footnote 25: Am\u00e9lineau, _L'\u00e9volution des id\u00e9es morales dans\nl'\u00c9gypte ancienne_, p. 187. See also _supra_, ii. 115, 699.]\n\n[Footnote 26: Farnell, _Cults of the Greek States_, i. 58.]\n\n[Footnote 27: Pollux, _Onomasticum_, viii. 12. 142.]\n\n[Footnote 28: Rohde, _Psyche_, p. 246.]\n\n{733} It has been said that when men ascribe to their gods a\nmental constitution similar to their own they also _eo ipso_\nconsider them to approve of virtue and disapprove of vice.[29]\nBut this conclusion is certainly not true in general. Malevolent\ngods cannot be supposed to feel emotions which essentially\npresuppose altruistic sentiments; and, as we have just noticed,\nan invocation is frequently required to induce benevolent gods to\ninterfere with the worldly affairs of men. Moreover, where the\nsystem of private retaliation prevails, not even the extension of\nhuman analogies to the world of supernatural beings would lead to\nthe idea of a god who of his own accord punishes social wrongs.\nBut it is quite probable that such analogies have in some cases\nmade gods guardians of morality at large, especially ancestor\ngods who may readily be supposed not only to preserve their old\nfeelings with regard to virtue and vice but also to take a more\nactive interest in the morals of the living, and who are\nnotoriously opposed to any deviation from ancient custom.[30] I\nalso admit that the conception of a great or supreme god may\nperhaps, independently of his origin, involve retributive justice\nas a natural consequence of his power and benevolence towards his\npeople. Yet it is obvious that even a god like Zeus was more\ninfluenced by the invocation of a suppliant than by his sense of\njustice. Dr. Farnell points out that the epithets which designate\nhim as the god to whom those stricken with guilt can appeal are\nfar more in vogue in actual Greek cult than those which attribute\nto him the function of vengeance and retribution.[31] Hermes was\naddressed by thieves as their patron.[32] According to the Talmud\n\"the thief invokes God while he breaks into the house.\"[33] And\nthe Italian bandit begs the Virgin herself to bless his endeavours.\n\n[Footnote 29: Adam Smith, _Theory of Moral Sentiments_, p. 232\n_sq._ Darwin, _Descent of Man_, p. 95. Tiele, _Elements of the\nScience of Religion_, i. 92 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 30: See _supra_, ii. 519 _sq._ _Cf._ Tylor,\n_Anthropology_, p. 369; Macdonald, _Religion and Myth_, p. 229.]\n\n[Footnote 31: Farnell, _op. cit._ i. 66 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 32: Schmidt, _Die Ethik der alten Griechen_, i.\n136.]\n\n[Footnote 33: Deutsch, _Literary Remains_, p. 57.]\n\nAt the same time we must again remember that men {734} ascribe to\ntheir gods not only ordinary human qualities but excellences of\nvarious kinds, and among these may also be a strong desire to\npunish wickedness and to reward virtue. The gods of monotheistic\nreligions in particular have such a multitude of the most\nelevated attributes that it would be highly astonishing if they\nhad remained unconcerned about the morals of mankind. If flattery\nand admiration make the deity all-wise, all-powerful, all-good,\nthey also make him the supreme judge of human conduct. And there\nis yet another reason for investing him with the moral government\nof the world. The claims of justice are not fully satisfied on\nthis earth, where it only too often happens that virtue is left\nunrewarded and vice escapes unpunished, that right succumbs and\nwrong triumphs; hence persons with deep moral feelings and a\nreligious or philosophical bent of mind are apt to look for a\nfuture adjustment through the intervention of the deity, who\nalone can repair the evils and injustices of the present. This\ndemand of final retribution is sometimes so strongly developed\nthat it even leads to the belief in a deity when no other proof\nof his existence is found convincing. Kant maintained that we\nmust postulate a future life in which everybody's happiness is\nproportionate to his virtue, and that such a postulate involves\nthe belief in a God of infinite power, wisdom, and goodness who\ngoverns the moral as well as the physical world. Not even\nVoltaire could rid himself of the notion of a rewarding and\navenging deity, whom, if he did not exist, \"it would be necessary\nto invent.\"\n\nThe belief in a god who acts as a guardian of **worldly morality\nundoubtedly gives emphasis to its rules. To the social and legal\nsanctions a new one is added, which derives particular strength\nfrom the supernatural power and knowledge of the deity. The\ndivine avenger can punish those who are beyond the reach of human\njustice and those whose secret wrongs even escape the censure of\ntheir fellow men. But on the other hand there are also certain\ncircumstances which considerably detract from the {735} influence\nof the religious sanction when compared with other sanctions of\nmorality. The supposed punishments and rewards of the future life\nhave the disadvantage of being conceived as very remote; and fear\nand hope decrease in inverse ratio to the distance of their\nobjects. Men commonly live in the happy illusion that death is\nfar off, even though it in reality is very near, hence also the\nretribution after death appears distant and unreal and is\ncomparatively little thought of by the majority of people who\nbelieve in it. Moreover, there seems always to be time left for\npenance and repentance. Manzoni himself admitted, in his defence\nof Roman Catholicism, that many people think it an easy matter to\nprocure that feeling of contrition by which, according to the\ndoctrine of the Church, sins may be cancelled, and therefore\nencourage themselves in the commission of crime through the\nfacility of pardon. The frequent assumption that the moral law\nwould hardly command obedience without the belief in retribution\nbeyond the grave is contradicted by an overwhelming array of\nfacts. We hear from trustworthy witnesses that unadulterated\nsavages follow their own rules of morality no less strictly, or\nperhaps more strictly, than civilised people follow theirs. Nay,\nit is a common experience that contact with a higher civilisation\nexercises a deteriorating influence upon the conduct of\nuncultured races, although we may be sure that Christian\nmissionaries do not fail to impart the doctrine of hell to their\nsavage converts.\n\nIt has also been noticed that a high degree of religious devotion\nis frequently accompanied by great laxity of morals. Of the\nBedouins Mr. Blunt writes that, with one or two exceptions, \"the\npractice of religion may be taken as the sure index of low\nmorality in a tribe.\"[34] Wallin, who had an intimate and\nextensive knowledge of Muhammedan peoples, often found that those\nMuslims who attended to their prayers most regularly were the\ngreatest scoundrels.[35] \"One of the most remarkable traits {736}\nin the character of the Copts,\" says Lane, \"is their bigotry\";\nand at the same time they are represented as \"deceitful,\nfaithless, and abandoned to the pursuit of worldly gain, and to\nindulgence in sensual pleasure.\"[36] Among two hundred Italian\nmurderers Ferri did not find one who was irreligious; and Naples,\nwhich has the worst record of any European city for crimes\nagainst the person, is also the most religious city in\nEurope.[37] On the other hand, according to Dr. Havelock Ellis,\n\"it seems extremely rare to find intelligently irreligious men in\nprison\";[38] and Laing, who himself was anything but sceptical,\nobserved that there was no country in Europe where there was so\nmuch morality and so little religion as Switzerland.[39] Most\nreligions contain an element which constitutes a real peril to\nthe morality of their votaries. They have introduced a new kind\nof duties--duties towards gods;--and, as we have noticed above,\neven where religion has entered into close union with worldly\nmorality, much greater importance has been attached to ceremonies\nor worship or the niceties of belief than to good behaviour\ntowards fellow men. People think that they may make up for lack\nof the latter by orthodoxy or pious performances. A Christian\nbishop of the seventh century, who was canonised by the Church of\nRome, described a good Christian as a man \"who comes frequently\nto church; who presents the oblation which is offered to God upon\nthe altar; who doth not taste of the fruits of his own industry\nuntil he has consecrated a part of them to God; who, when the\nholy festivals approach, lives chastely even with his own wife\nduring several days, that with a safe conscience he may draw near\nthe altar of God; and who, in the last place, can repeat the\nCreed and the Lord's Prayer.\"[40] A scrupulous observance of\nexternal ceremonies--that is all which in this description is\nrequired {737} of a good Christian. And since then popular ideas\non the subject have undergone but little change. Smollett\nobserves in his 'Travels into Italy' that it is held more\ninfamous to transgress the slightest ceremonial institution of\nthe Church of Rome than to transgress any moral duty; that a\nmurderer or adulterer will be easily absolved by the Church, and\neven maintain his character in society; but that a man who eats a\npigeon on a Saturday is abhorred as a monster of reprobation.[41]\nIn the nineteenth century Simonde de Sismondi could write:--\"Plus\nchaque homme vicieux a \u00e9t\u00e9 r\u00e9gulier \u00e0 observer les commandemens\nde l'\u00c9glise, plus il se sent dans son c[oe]ur dispens\u00e9 de\nl'observation de cette morale c\u00e9leste, \u00e0 laquelle il faudroit\nsacrifier ses penchans d\u00e9prav\u00e9s.\"[42] And how many a Protestant\ndoes not imagine that by going to church on Sundays he can sin\nmore freely on the six days between.\n\n[Footnote 34: Mr. Blunt, in Lady Anne Blunt's _Bedouin Tribes of\nthe Euphrates_, ii. 217.]\n\n[Footnote 35: Wallin, _Reseanteckningar fr\u00e5n Orienten_, iii. 166.]\n\n[Footnote 36: Lane, _Manners and Customs of the Modern\nEgyptians_, p. 551.]\n\n[Footnote 37: Havelock Ellis, _The Criminal_, p. 156.]\n\n[Footnote 38: _Ibid._ p. 159.]\n\n[Footnote 39: Laing, _Notes of a Traveller_, pp. 323, 324, 333.]\n\n[Footnote 40: Robertson, _History of the Reign of the Emperor\nCharles V._ i. 282 _sq._]\n\n[Footnote 41:  Smollett, quoted by Kames, _Sketches of the\nHistory of Man_, iv. 380.]\n\n[Footnote 42: Simonde de Sismondi, _Histoire des r\u00e9publiques\nitaliennes du moyen-\u00e2ge_, xvi. 419.]\n\nIt should also be remembered that the religious sanction of moral\nrules only too often leads to an external observance of these\nrules from purely selfish motives. Christianity itself has,\nessentially, been regarded as a means of gaining a blessed\nhereafter. As for its influence upon the moral life of its\nadherents I agree with Professor Hobhouse that its chief strength\nlies not in its abstract doctrines but in the simple personal\nfollowing of Christ.[43] In moral education example plays a more\nimportant part than precept. But even in this respect\nChristianity has unfortunately little reason to boast of its\nachievements.\n\n[Footnote 43: Hobhouse, _Morals in Evolution_, ii. 159.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LIII\n\nCONCLUSION\n\n\nWE have completed our task. Only a few words will be added to\nemphasise the leading features of our theory of the moral\nconsciousness and to point out some general conclusions which may\nbe drawn as regards its evolution.\n\nOur study of the origin and development of the moral ideas was\ndivided into three main sections. As moral ideas are expressed in\nmoral judgments, we had to examine the general nature of both the\npredicates and the subjects of such judgments, as well as the\nmoral valuation of the chief branches of conduct with which the\nmoral consciousness of mankind concerns itself. And in each case\nour aim was not only to describe or analyse but also to explain\nthe phenomena which came under our observation.\n\nThe theory was laid down that the moral concepts, which form the\npredicates of moral judgments, are ultimately based on moral\nemotions, that they are essentially generalisations of tendencies\nin certain phenomena to call forth either indignation or\napproval. It was therefore necessary for us to investigate the\nnature and origin of these emotions, and subsequently to consider\ntheir relations to the various moral concepts.\n\nWe found that the moral emotions belong to a wider class of\nemotions, which may be described as retributive; that moral\ndisapproval is a kind of resentment, akin to {739} anger and\nrevenge, and that moral approval is a kind of retributive kindly\nemotion, akin to gratitude. At the same time they differ from\nkindred non-moral emotions by their disinterestedness, apparent\nimpartiality, and flavour of generality. As for the origin of the\nretributive emotions, we may assume that they have been acquired\nby means of natural selection in the struggle for existence; both\nresentment and retributive kindly emotion are states of mind\nwhich have a tendency to promote the interests of the individuals\nwho feel them. This explanation also applies to the moral\nemotions in so far as they are retributive: it accounts for the\nhostile attitude of moral disapproval towards the cause of pain,\nand for the friendly attitude of moral approval towards the cause\nof pleasure. Our retributive emotions are always reactions\nagainst pain or pleasure felt by ourselves; this holds true of\nthe moral emotions as well as of revenge and gratitude. But how\nshall we explain those elements in the moral emotions by which\nthey are distinguished from other, non-moral retributive\nemotions? First, why should we, quite disinterestedly, feel pain\nevoking indignation because our neighbour is hurt, and pleasure\ncalling forth approval because he is benefited?\n\nWe noticed that sympathy aided by the altruistic sentiment--sympathy\nin the common sense of the word--tends to produce disinterested\nretributive emotions. In all animal species which possess the\naltruistic sentiment in some form or other we may be sure to find\nsympathetic resentment as its accompaniment. And this sentiment\nmay also give rise to disinterested retributive kindly emotion,\neven though it is more readily moved by the sight of pain than by\nthe sight of pleasure and though sympathetic retributive\nkindliness has a powerful rival in the feeling of envy. Moreover,\nsympathetic retributive emotions may not only be reactions\nagainst sympathetic pain or pleasure, but may also be directly\nproduced by the cognition of the signs of resentment or of the\nsigns of retributive kindliness. Punishments and {740} rewards\ntend to reproduce the emotions from which they sprang, and\nlanguage communicates retributive emotions by terms of\ncondemnation and by terms of praise. Finally, there are cases of\ndisinterested retributive emotions into which sympathy does not\nenter at all--sentimental antipathies and likings quite\ndisinterested in character.\n\nThere are thus various ways in which disinterested retributive\nemotions may originate. But how shall we explain the fact that\ndisinterestedness together with apparent impartiality and the\nflavour of generality have become characteristics by which the\nso-called moral emotions are distinguished from other retributive\nemotions? To this question the following answer was\ngiven:--Society is the birthplace of the moral consciousness. The\nfirst moral judgments expressed not the private emotions of\nisolated individuals but emotions which were felt by the\ncommunity at large. Public indignation is the prototype of moral\ndisapproval and public approval the prototype of moral\napprobation. And these public emotions are characterised by\ngenerality, individual disinterestedness, and apparent\nimpartiality.\n\nThe moral emotions give rise to a variety of moral concepts,\nwhich are in different ways connected with the emotions from\nwhich they were derived. Thus moral disapproval is at the bottom\nof the concepts bad, vice, and wrong, ought and duty, right and\nrights, justice and injustice; whilst moral approval has led to\nthe concepts good, virtue, and merit. It has, in particular, been\nof fundamental importance for the whole of our investigation to\nrecognise the true contents of the notions of ought and duty. If\nthese concepts were unanalysable, as they have often been\nrepresented to be, any attempt to explain the origin and\ndevelopment of the moral ideas would, in my opinion, be a\nhopeless failure.\n\nFrom the predicates of moral judgments we proceeded to consider\ntheir subjects. Generally speaking, such judgments are passed on\nconduct or character, and {741} allowance is made for the various\nelements of which conduct and character are composed in\nproportion as the moral judgment is scrutinising and enlightened.\nIt is only owing to ignorance or lack of due reflection if, as is\noften the case, moral estimates are influenced by external events\nwhich are entirely independent of the agent's will; if\nindividuals who are incapable of recognising any act of theirs as\nright or wrong are treated as responsible beings; if motives are\ncompletely or partially disregarded; if little cognisance is\ntaken of forbearances in comparison with acts; if want of\nforesight or want of self-restraint is overlooked when the effect\nproduced by it is sufficiently remote. We were also able to\nexplain _why_ moral judgments are passed on conduct and\ncharacter. This is due to the facts that moral judgments spring\nfrom moral emotions; that the moral emotions are retributive\nemotions; that a retributive emotion is a reactive attitude of\nmind, either kindly or hostile, towards a living being (or\nsomething looked upon in the light of a living being), regarded\nas a cause of pleasure or as a cause of pain; and that a living\nbeing is regarded as a true cause of pleasure or pain only in so\nfar as this feeling is assumed to be caused by its will. It is a\ncircumstance of the greatest importance that not only moral\nemotions but non-moral retributive emotions are felt with\nreference to phenomena exactly similar in their general nature to\nthose on which moral judgments are passed. How could we account\nfor this remarkable coincidence unless the moral judgments were\nbased on emotions and the moral emotions were retributive\nemotions akin to gratitude and revenge?\n\nOur theory as to the nature of the moral concepts and emotions is\nfurther supported by another and very comprehensive set of facts.\nIn our discussion of the particular modes of conduct which are\nsubject to moral valuation and of the judgments passed on them by\ndifferent peoples and in different ages, this theory has\nconstantly been called in to explain the data before us. It is\nnoteworthy that the very acts, forbearances, and omissions {742}\nwhich are condemned as wrong are also apt to call forth anger and\nrevenge, and that the acts and forbearances which are praised as\nmorally good are apt to call forth gratitude. This coincidence,\nagain, undoubtedly bears testimony both to the emotional basis of\nthe moral concepts and to the retributive character of the moral\nemotions. Thus the conclusions arrived at in the first section of\nthe work, while helping to explain the facts mentioned in the two\nother sections, are at the same time greatly strengthened by\nthese facts. Any attempt to discover the nature and origin of the\nmoral consciousness must necessarily take into account the moral\nideas of mankind at large. And though painfully conscious of the\nincompleteness of the present treatise, I think I may confidently\nask, with reference to its fundamental thesis, whether any other\ntheory of the moral consciousness has ever been subjected to an\nequally comprehensive test.\n\nThe general uniformity of human nature accounts for the great\nsimilarities which characterise the moral ideas of mankind. But\nat the same time these ideas also present radical differences. A\nmode of conduct which among one people is condemned as wrong is\namong another people viewed with indifference or regarded as\npraiseworthy or enjoined as a duty. One reason for these\nvariations lies in different external conditions. Hardships of\nlife may lead to the killing of infants or abandoning of aged\nparents or eating of human bodies; and necessity and the force of\nhabit may deprive these actions of the stigma which would\notherwise be attached to them. Economic conditions have\ninfluenced moral ideas relating, for instance, to slavery,\nlabour, and cleanliness; whilst the form of marriage and the\nopinions concerning it have been largely determined by such a\nfactor as the numerical proportion between the sexes. But the\nmost common differences of moral estimates have undoubtedly a\npsychical origin.\n\nWhen we examine the moral rules of uncivilised races we find that\nthey in a very large measure resemble those prevalent among\nnations of culture. In every savage {743} community homicide is\nprohibited by custom, and so is theft. Savages also regard\ncharity as a duty and praise generosity as a virtue--indeed,\ntheir customs concerning mutual aid are often much more stringent\nthan our own; and many uncivilised peoples are conspicuous for\ntheir aversion to telling lies. But at the same time there is a\nconsiderable difference between the regard for life, property,\ntruth, and the general wellbeing of a neighbour, which displays\nitself in primitive rules of morality and that which is found\namong ourselves. Savages' prohibitions of murder, theft, and\ndeceit, as also their injunctions of charity and kind behaviour,\nhave, broadly speaking, reference only to members of the same\ncommunity or tribe. They carefully distinguish between an act of\nhomicide committed among their own people and one where the\nvictim is a stranger; whilst the former is in ordinary\ncircumstances disapproved of, the latter is in most cases allowed\nand often considered worthy of praise. And the same thing holds\ntrue of theft and lying and other injuries. Apart from the\nprivileges which are granted to guests, and which are always of\nvery short duration, a stranger is in early society devoid of all\nrights. This is the case not only among savages but among nations\nof archaic culture as well. When we from the lower races pass to\npeoples more advanced in civilisation we find that the social\nunit has grown larger, that the nation has taken the place of the\ntribe, and that the circle of persons within which the infliction\nof injuries is prohibited has extended accordingly. But the old\ndistinction between offences against compatriots and harm done to\nforeigners remains. Nay, it survives to some extent even among\nourselves, as appears from the prevailing attitude towards war\nand the readiness with which wars are waged. But although the\ndifference between a fellow countryman and a foreigner has not\nceased to affect the moral feelings of men even in the midst of\nmodern civilisation, its influence has certainly been decreasing.\nThe doctrine has been set forth, and has been gradually gaining\nground, that our duties towards our {744} fellow men are\nuniversal duties, not restricted by the limits of country or\nrace. Those who recognise the emotional origin of the rules of\nduty find no difficulty in explaining all these facts. The\nexpansion of the commandments relating to neighbours coincides\nwith the expansion of the altruistic sentiment. And the cause of\nthis coincidence at once becomes clear when we consider that such\ncommandments mainly spring from the emotion of sympathetic\nresentment, and that sympathetic resentment is rooted in the\naltruistic sentiment.\n\nBesides the extension of duties towards neighbours so as to\nembrace wider and wider circles of men, there is another point in\nwhich the moral ideas of mankind have undergone an important\nchange on the upward path from savagery and barbarism to\ncivilisation. They have become more enlightened. Though moral\nideas are based upon emotions, though all moral concepts are\nessentially generalisations of tendencies in certain phenomena to\ncall forth moral approval or disapproval, the influence of\nintellectual considerations upon moral judgments is naturally\nvery great. All higher emotions are determined by cognitions--sensations\nor ideas; they therefore vary according as the cognitions vary,\nand the nature of a cognition may very largely depend upon\nreflection or insight. If a person tells us an untruth we are apt\nto feel indignant; but if, on due reflection, we find that his\nmotive was benevolent, for instance a desire to save the life of\nthe person to whom the untruth was told, our indignation ceases,\nand may even be succeeded by approval. The change of cognitions,\nor ideas, has thus produced a change of emotions. Now, the\nevolution of the moral consciousness partly consists in its\ndevelopment from the unreflecting to the reflecting stage, from\nthe unenlightened to the enlightened. This appears from the\ndecreasing influence of external events upon moral judgments and\nfrom the growing discrimination with reference to motives,\nnegligence, and other factors in conduct which are carefully\nconsidered by a scrupulous judge. More penetrating reflection has\nalso reduced {745} the part played by disinterested likes and\ndislikes in the formation of moral ideas. When we clearly realise\nthat a certain act is productive of no real harm but is condemned\nsimply because it causes aversion or disgust, we can hardly look\nupon it as a proper object of moral censure--unless, indeed, its\ncommission is considered to imply a blamable disregard for other\npersons' sensibilities. Deliberate resentment, whether moral or\nnon-moral, is too much concerned with the will of the agent to be\nfelt towards a person who obviously neither intends to offend\nanybody nor is guilty of culpable oversight. Nay, even when the\nagent knows that his behaviour is repulsive to others, he may be\nconsidered justified in acting as he does. Some degree of\nreflection easily leads to the notion that sentimental\nantipathies are no sufficient ground for interfering with other\nindividuals' liberty of action either by punishing them or by\nsubjecting them to moral censure, provided of course that they do\nnot in an indelicate manner shock their neighbours' feelings.\nHence many persons have recourse to utilitarian pretexts to\nsupport moral opinions or legal enactments which have originated\nin mere aversions; thus making futile attempts to reconcile old\nideas with the requirements of a moral consciousness which is\nduly influenced by reflection.\n\nIn innumerable cases the variations of moral estimates are due to\ndifferences of beliefs. Almost every chapter of this work has\nborne witness to the enormous influence which the belief in\nsupernatural forces or beings or in a future state has exercised\nupon the moral ideas of mankind, and has at the same time shown\nhow exceedingly varied this influence has been. Religion, or\nsuperstition (as the case may be), has on the one hand\nstigmatised murder and suicide, on the other hand it has\ncommended human sacrifice and certain cases of voluntary\nself-destruction. It has inculcated humanity and charity, but has\nalso led to cruel persecutions of persons embracing another\ncreed. It has emphasised the duty of truthspeaking, and has\nitself been a cause of pious fraud. It has promoted {746} both\ncleanly habits and filthiness. It has enjoined labour and\nabstinence from labour, sobriety and drunkenness, marriage and\ncelibacy, chastity and temple prostitution. It has introduced a\ngreat variety of new duties and virtues, quite different from\nthose which are recognised by the moral consciousness when left\nto itself, but nevertheless in many cases considered more\nimportant than any other duties or virtues. It seems that the\nmoral ideas of uncivilised men are more affected by magic than by\nreligion, and that the religious influence has reached its\ngreatest extension at certain stages of culture which, though\ncomparatively advanced, do not include the highest stage.\nIncreasing knowledge lessens the sphere of the supernatural, and\nthe ascription of a perfectly ethical character to the godhead\ndoes away with moral estimates which have sprung from less\nelevated religious conceptions.\n\nI have here pointed out only the most general changes to which\nthe moral ideas have been subject in the course of progressive\ncivilisation; the details have been dealt with each in their\nseparate place. There can be no doubt that changes also will take\nplace in the future, and that similar causes will produce similar\neffects. We have every reason to believe that the altruistic\nsentiment will continue to expand, and that those moral\ncommandments which are based on it will undergo a corresponding\nexpansion; that the influence of reflection upon moral judgments\nwill steadily increase; that the influence of sentimental\nantipathies and likings will diminish; and that in its relation\nto morality religion will be increasingly restricted to\nemphasising ordinary moral rules, and less preoccupied with\ninculcating special duties to the deity.\n\n\n\n\nADDITIONAL NOTES TO VOL. II\n\n\nP. 287, _n._ 6.--The connection between the Hebrew Sabbath and\nthe moon has been fully discussed by Professor Webster in his\nrecent book, _Rest Days_, ch. viii.\n\nP. 377, _n._ 1.--In his book, _Totemism and Exogamy_, Sir J. G.\nFrazer has definitely separated exogamy from totemism and\nthereby, it is to be hoped, saved us from further speculations\nabout the totemic origin of the exogamous rules. Like myself,\nFrazer thinks (iv. 105 _sqq._) that these rules have sprung from\nan aversion to the marriages of near kin. But whilst my own\nbelief is that the aversion to such marriages through an\nassociation of ideas led to the prohibitions of marriage between\nmembers of the same clan on account of the notion of intimacy\nconnected with a common descent and a common name, Frazer is of\nopinion that exogamy was deliberately instituted for the purpose\nof preventing the sexual unions of near kin. To me it seems\nalmost inconceivable that the extensive, cumbersome, and\nsometimes very complicated institution of exogamy should have\nbeen invented simply as a precaution against unions between the\nnearest relatives.\n\nGranting the prevalence of an aversion to the marriages of near\nkin, Frazer is confronted with the question how it has\noriginated. His answer is, \"We do not know and it is difficult\neven to guess.\" Yet he makes a cautious attempt to solve the\nriddle. He observes (iv. 156 _sqq._) that the great severity with\nwhich incest is generally punished by savages seems to show that\nthey believe it to be a crime which endangers the whole\ncommunity. It may have been thought to render the women of the\ntribe sterile and to prevent animals and plants from multiplying;\nsuch beliefs, Frazer remarks, appear in point of fact to have\nbeen held by many races in different parts of the world. But he\nadmits himself that all the peoples who are known to hold them\nseem to be agricultural, and that incest is in particular\nsupposed to have a sterilising effect on the crops. It is indeed\na poor argument to conjecture that a careful search among the\nmost primitive exogamous peoples now surviving, especially among\nthe Australian aborigines, might still reveal the existence of a\nbelief in the sterilising or injurious effects of incest \"upon\nwomen generally and particularly upon edible animals and plants.\"\nIt may also be asked if it really is reasonable to presume that\nan aversion which had originated in the superstition mentioned\ncould have remained unimpaired among all the civilised nations of\nthe world. Moreover, if this superstition were the root of the\naversion to incest, we should still have to explain the origin of\nthe superstition itself, and this Frazer has not even attempted\nto do. If, on the other hand, the abhorrence of incest has\noriginated in the way I have suggested, the superstition which he\nis inclined to regard as the cause of that feeling is a very\nnatural result of it or of the prohibition to which it gave rise.\nThat this is the case is all the more probable because the same\ninjurious effects as are attributed to incest are supposed to\nresult from other sexual irregularities as well, such as adultery\nand fornication (_cf._ _supra_, ii. 417).\n\nSir J. G. Frazer also subjects my theory to a detailed criticism\n(iv. 96 _sqq._). He admits that there seems to be some ground for\nbelieving in the existence of \"a natural aversion to, or at least\na want of inclination for, sexual intercourse between persons who\nhave been brought up closely together {748} from early youth\";\nbut he finds it difficult to understand how this could have been\nchanged into an aversion to sexual intercourse with persons near\nof kin, and maintains that, till I explain this satisfactorily,\nthe chain of reasoning by which I support my theory breaks down\nentirely at the crucial point. For my own part I think that the\ntransition which Frazer finds so difficult to understand is not\nonly possible and natural, but well-nigh proved by an exactly\nanalogous case of equally world-wide occurrence and of still\ngreater social importance, namely, the process which has led to\nthe association of all kinds of social rights and duties with\nkinship. As I have pointed out above (ch. xxxiv.), the maternal\nand paternal sentiments, which largely are at the bottom of\nparental duties and rights, cannot in their simplest forms be\nbased on a knowledge of blood relationship, but respond to\nstimuli derived from other circumstances, notably the proximity\nof the helpless young, that is, the external relationship in\nwhich the offspring from the beginning stand to the parents. Nor\nis the so-called filial love in the first instance rooted in\nconsiderations of kinship; it is essentially retributive, the\nagreeable feeling produced by benefits received making the\nindividual look with pleasure and kindliness upon the giver. Here\nagain the affection is ultimately due to close living together,\nand is further strengthened by it, as appears from the cooling\neffect of long separation of children from their parents. So also\nfraternal love and the duties and rights which have sprung from\nit depend in the first place on other circumstances than the idea\nof a common blood; and the same may be said of the tie which\nbinds together relatives more remotely allied. Its social force\nis ultimately derived from near relatives' habit of living\ntogether. \"Men became gregarious by remaining in the circle where\nthey were born; if, instead of keeping together with their\nkindred, they had preferred to isolate themselves or to unite\nwith strangers, there would certainly be no blood-bond at all.\nThe mutual attachment and the social rights and duties which\nresulted from this gregarious condition were associated with the\nrelation in which members of the group stood to one another--the\nrelation of kinship as expressed by a common name--and these\nassociations might last even after the local tie was broken,\"\nbeing kept up by the common name (_supra_, ii. 203).\n\nHere we have an immense group of facts which, though ultimately\ndepending upon close living together, have been interpreted in\nterms of kinship. Why, then, could not the same have been the\ncase with the aversion to incest and the prohibitory rules\nresulting from it? They really present a most striking analogy to\nthe instances just mentioned. They have been associated with\nkinship because near relatives normally live together. They have\ncome to include relatives more remotely allied who do not live\ntogether, owing to an association of ideas, especially through\nthe influence of a common name; clan exogamy has its counterpart,\nfor instance, in the blood feud as a duty incumbent on the whole\nclan. But there are also cases in which marriages between\nunrelated persons who have been brought up together in the same\nfamily, or who belong to the same local group, are held blamable\nor are actually prohibited; and so there are, even in early\nsociety, social rights and duties which are associated not with a\ncommon descent but with close living together. Frazer asks: \"If\nthe root of the whole matter is a horror of marriage between\npersons who have always lived with each other, how comes it that\nat the present day that horror has been weakened into a mere\ngeneral preference for marriage with persons whose attractions\nhave not been blunted by long familiarity? . . . Why should the\nmarriage of a brother with a sister, or of a mother with a son,\nexcite the deepest detestation, . . . while the origin of it all,\nthe marriage between housemates, should excite at most a mild\nsurprise too slight probably to suggest even a subject for a\nfarce, and should be as legitimate in the eye of the law among\nall civilised nations as any other marriage?\" For my own part, I\nbelieve that marriage between a man and his foster-daughter or\nbetween a foster-brother {749} and a foster-sister, in case the\nsocial relations between them have been exactly similar to those\nof blood-relatives of corresponding degrees, would cause more\nthan a mild surprise, and appear unnatural and objectionable. As\nI have said above (ii. 375), I do not deny that unions between\nthe nearest blood-relatives inspire a horror of their own, but it\nseems quite natural that they should do so considering that from\nearliest times the aversion to sexual intercourse between persons\nliving closely together has been expressed in prohibitions\nagainst unions between kindred. Nor can it be a matter of\nsurprise that the prohibitory rules so commonly refer to\nmarriages of kindred alone. Law only takes into account general\nand well-defined cases, and hence relationships of some kind or\nother between persons who are nearly always kindred are defined\nin terms of blood-relationship. This is true not only of the\nprohibitions of incest, but of many duties and rights inside the\nfamily circle.\n\nSir J. G. Frazer raises another objection to my theory. He argues\nthat, if exogamy resulted from a natural instinct, there would be\nno need to reinforce that instinct by legal pains and penalties;\nthe law only forbids men to do what their instincts incline them\nto do, and hence we may always safely assume that crimes\nforbidden by law are crimes which many men have a natural\npropensity to commit. I must confess that this argument greatly\nsurprises me. Of course, where there is no transgression there is\nno law. But Frazer cannot be ignorant of the variability of\ninstincts and of the great variability of the sexual instinct;\nnor should he forget that there are circumstances in which a\nnatural sentiment may be blunted and overcome. Would he maintain\nthat there can be no deep natural aversion to bestiality because\nbestiality is forbidden by law, and that the exceptional severity\nwith which parricide is treated by many law books proves that a\nlarge number of men have a natural propensity to kill their\nparents? The law expresses the feelings of the majority and\npunishes acts that shock them.\n\nSir J. G. Frazer accuses me of having extended Darwin's methods\nto subjects which only partially admit of such treatment, because\nmy theory of the origin of exogamy attempts to explain the growth\nof a human institution \"too exclusively from physical and\nbiological causes without taking into account the factors of\nintelligence, deliberation, and will.\" This, he adds, is \"not\nscience, but a bastard imitation of it.\" What have I done to\nincur so severe an accusation? I have suggested that the\ninstinctive aversion to sexual intercourse between persons who\nhave been living very closely together from early youth may be\nthe result of natural selection. I am inclined to think--and so\nis Frazer--that consanguineous marriages are in some way or other\ndetrimental to the species. This fact would lead to the\ndevelopment of a sentiment which would be powerful enough, as a\nrule, to prevent injurious unions--a sentiment which would not,\nof course, show itself as an innate aversion to sexual\nconnections with near relatives as such, but as an aversion on\nthe part of individuals to union with others with whom they lived\nclosely together from early childhood. These, as a matter of\nfact, would be blood-relations, and the result would consequently\nbe the survival of the fittest. All that I have done, then, is to\nappeal to natural selection to explain the origin of a primeval\ninstinctive sentiment; and I can never believe that this is to\ntransgress the legitimate boundaries of Darwinism.\n\nSir J. G. Frazer himself thinks that \"we may safely conclude that\ninfertility is an inevitable consequence of inbreeding continued\nthrough many generations in the same place and under the same\nconditions,\" and in support of this view he quotes the valuable\nopinions of Mr. Walter Heape and Mr. F. H. A. Marshall. He thus\nfinds that the principles of exogamy present \"a curious\nresemblance\" to the principles of scientific breeding, but he\nrightly assumes that this analogy cannot be due to any exact\nknowledge or farseeing care on the part of its savage founders.\nHow then shall we explain this analogy? Frazer's answer is that\n\"it must be an accidental {750} result of a superstition, an\nunconscious mimicry of science.\" In prohibiting incest the poor\nsavages \"blindly obeyed the impulse of the great evolutionary\nforces which in the physical world are constantly educing higher\nout of lower forms of existence and in the moral world\ncivilisation out of savagery. If that is so, exogamy has been an\ninstrument in the hands of that unknown power, the masked wizard\nof history, who by some mysterious process, some subtle alchemy,\nso often transmutes in the crucible of suffering the dross of\nfolly and evil into the fine gold of wisdom and good.\" I hope it\nwill not be considered uncalled-for impertinence on my part to\nask if this reasoning is a specimen of what Frazer regards as\nscience proper in contradistinction to my own \"bastard imitation\nof it\"?\n\nIn any attempt to explain the origin of exogamy there are, in my\nopinion, three parallel groups of facts of general occurrence\nwhich necessarily must be taken into consideration:--Firstly, the\nprohibitions of incest and rules of exogamy themselves; secondly,\nthe aversion to sexual intercourse between persons living\ntogether from early youth; thirdly, the injurious consequences of\ninbreeding. As for the facts of the first group, Frazer and I\nagree that they all have the same root, exogamy being in some way\nor other derived from an aversion to the marriages of near kin.\nAs for the facts of the second group, Frazer at all events admits\nthat \"there seems to be some ground\" for believing in them. As\nfor the facts of the third group, there is complete agreement\nbetween us. I ask: Is it reasonable to think that there is no\ncausal connection between these three groups of facts? Is it\nright to ignore the second group altogether, as does Frazer, and\nto look upon the coincidence of the first and the third as\naccidental? I gratefully acknowledge that Frazer's chapter on the\nOrigin of Exogamy has only strengthened my belief in my own theory.\n\nOther objections to my theory have recently been made by Messrs.\nHose and McDougall in their work on _The Pagan Tribes of Borneo_,\nvol. ii., p. 197, note. They observe that intercourse between a\nyouth and his sister-by-adoption is not regarded as incest in\nthese tribes, and that they know at least one instance of\nmarriage between two young Kenyahs brought up together as adopted\nbrother and sister. \"This occurrence of incest between couples\nbrought up in the same household,\" they say, \"is, of course,\ndifficult to reconcile with Professor Westermarck's well-known\ntheory of the ground of the almost universal feeling against\nincest, namely, that it depends upon sexual aversion or\nindifference engendered by close proximity during childhood.\"\nThey moreover maintain that \"the occurrence of incest between\nbrothers and sisters, and the strong feeling of the Sea Dyaks\nagainst incest between nephew and aunt (who often are members of\ndistinct communities),\" are facts which are fatal to this theory.\n\nIn my attempt to explain the rules against incest I certainly did\nnot overlook the fact that these rules very frequently have\nreference to persons who are, or may be, members of different\ncommunities, and I found no difficulty in accounting for it (see\n_supra_, ii. 369; _History of Human Marriage_, p. 330 _sq._).\nCuriously enough Messrs. Hose and McDougall's own attempt to\nsolve the problem is, if I understand them rightly, based on the\nsupposition that the prohibitions of intermarriage originally\nreferred to persons who belonged to the same community. They\nwrite:--\"If we accept some such view of the constitution of\nprimitive society as has been suggested by Messrs. Atkinson and\nLang (_Primal Law_), namely, that the social group consisted of a\nsingle patriarch and a group of wives and daughters, over all of\nwhom he exercised unrestricted power or rights; we shall see that\nthe first step towards the constitution of a higher form of\nsociety must have been the strict limitation of his rights over\ncertain of the women, in order that younger males might be\nincorporated in the society and enjoy the undisputed possession\nof them. The patriarch, having accepted this limitation of his\nrights over his daughters for the sake of the greater security\nand strength of the band given by the inclusion of a {751}\ncertain number of young males, would enforce all the more\nstrictly upon them his prohibition against any tampering with the\nfemales of the senior generation. Thus very strict prohibitions\nand severe penalties against the consorting of the patriarch with\nthe younger generation of females, _i.e._ his daughters, and\nagainst intercourse between the young males admitted to\nmembership of the group and the wives of the patriarch, would be\nthe essential conditions of advance of social organisation. The\nenforcement of these penalties would engender a traditional\nsentiment against such unions, and these would be the unions\nprimitively regarded as incestuous. The persistency of the\ntendency of the patriarch's jealousy to drive his sons out of the\nfamily group as they attained puberty would render the extension\nof this sentiment to brother-and-sister unions easy and almost\ninevitable. For the young male admitted to the group would be one\nwho came with a price in his hand to offer in return for the\nbride he sought. Such a price could only be exacted by the\npatriarch on the condition that he maintained an absolute\nprohibition on sexual relations between his offspring so long as\nthe young sons remained under his roof.\" I should like to know\nhow Messrs. Hose and McDougall, on the basis of this theory,\nwould explain \"the strong feeling of the Sea Dyaks against incest\nbetween nephew and aunt (who often are members of distinct\ncommunities),\" and, generally speaking, the rules prohibiting the\nintermarriage of persons belonging to different local groups. For\nthe rest, I must confess that the assumptions on which their\nwhole theory rests seem to me extremely arbitrary. Brothers are\nprohibited from marrying their sisters because the old patriarch\ndrove away his grown-up sons out of jealousy; but his jealousy\nwas not strong enough to prevent other young males from joining\nthe band. On the contrary, he allowed them to be incorporated in\nit, because they added to its strength; nay, he gave them his own\ndaughters in marriage, and refrained henceforth himself from\nintercourse with these young women so rigorously that ever since\na father has been prohibited from marrying his daughter. But the\nyoung men had to pay a price for their wives. It may be asked:\nWhy did not the old patriarch accept a price from his own sons or\nlet them work for him, instead of mercilessly turning them out of\ntheir old home, although they would have been just as good\nprotectors of it as anybody else? And why did he give the young\nmen his _daughters_? He might have kept the young women for\nhimself and let the young men have the old ones. This is what is\ndone by the old men in Australia, where the young girls are, as a\nrule, allotted to old men, and the boys, whenever they are\nallowed to marry, get old _lubras_ as wives (Malinowski, _The\nFamily among the Australian Aborigines_, p. 259 _sqq._). Yet, in\nspite of this custom, there is no country where incest has been\nmore strictly prohibited than in Australia.\n\nMessrs. Hose and McDougall maintain that the occurrence of incest\nbetween brothers and sisters and the feeling of the Sea Dyaks\nagainst incest between nephew and aunt are facts which seem \"to\npoint strongly to the view that the sentiment has a purely\nconventional or customary source.\" I ask: Is it reasonable to\nsuppose that, if this were the case, the feeling against sexual\nintercourse between the nearest relatives could have so long\nsurvived the conditions from which it sprang without showing any\nsigns of decay? As I have pointed out above, the prohibited\ndegrees are very differently defined in the customs or laws of\ndifferent peoples, generally being more numerous among peoples\nunaffected by modern civilisation than they are in more advanced\ncommunities; and it appears that the extent to which relatives\nare prohibited from intermarrying is closely connected with the\nintimacy of their social relations. Whilst among ourselves\ncousins are allowed to intermarry, there is still a strong\nsentiment against intercourse between parents and children and\nbetween brothers and sisters, who in normal cases belong to the\nsame family circle. Why should the feeling against incest have\nsurvived in this case but not in others, if it had a purely\nconventional origin? And how could any law {752} based on\nconvention alone account for the normal absence of erotic\nfeelings in the relation between parents and children and\nbrothers and sisters? It is true that cases of intercourse\nbetween the nearest relatives do occur, but they are certainly\nquite exceptional. Messrs. Hose and McDougall say themselves (p.\n198) that \"incest of any form is very infrequent\" among the\ntribes of Borneo, and they seem to know of only one instance of\nmarriage between young Kenyahs brought up together as adopted\nbrother and sister, although such marriages are allowed. To\nmaintain that cases of this kind are fatal to my theory seems to\nme as illogical as it would be to assume that the occurrence of a\n_horror femin\u00e6_ in many men disproves the general prevalence of a\nfeeling of love between the sexes.\n\nP. 396, _n._ 1.--In his recent work, _The Family among the\nAustralian Aborigines_, Dr. Malinowski has come to the same\nconclusion. He observes that the individual family plays a\nforemost part in the social life of those aborigines; it has a\nvery firm basis in their customs and ideas, and \"by no means\nbears the features of anything like recent innovation, or a\nsubordinate form subservient to the idea of group marriage.\" The\nAustralian husband had generally a definite sexual \"over-right\"\nover his wife, which secured to him the privilege of disposing of\nher, or at least of exercising a certain control over her conduct\nin sexual matters, even though this \"over-right\" did not, as a\nrule, amount to an exclusive right. There were customs like\nwife-lending, exchange of wives, ceremonial defloration of girls\nby old men, the different forms of licence practised at large\ntribal gatherings, and especially the _Pirrauru_ relationship\nfound in several of the southern central tribes. But all this\ndoes not constitute group _marriage_, the complete content of\nwhich does not consist in sexual relations alone. Dr. Malinowski\nemphasises the fact that marriage cannot be detached from family\nlife; \"it is defined in all its aspects by the problems of the\neconomic unity of the family, of the bonds created by common life\nin one wurley, through the common rearing of, and affection\ntowards, the offspring.\" In nearly all these respects even the\n_Pirrauru_ relationship essentially differs from marriage, and\ncannot, therefore, seriously encroach upon the individual family.\nNor can we regard this relationship as a survival of previous\ngroup marriage. Dr. Malinowski also points out (p. 89 _sq._) how\nhighly objectionable it is that \"our best informants (especially\nHowitt and Spencer and Gillen) describe the facts of sexual life\nof to-day in terms of their hypothetical assumptions.\"\n\nP. 419, _n._ 5.--For Moorish beliefs relating to contact between\nsexual uncleanness and holiness see my essays, _The Moorish\nConception of Holiness (Baraka)_, p. 123 _sqq._, and _Ceremonies\nand Beliefs connected with Agriculture, certain Dates of the\nSolar Year, and the Weather in Morocco_, pp. 17, 22, 23, 28, 46,\n47, 54.\n\nP. 463, _n._ 8.--During the years that have passed since the\nfirst edition of this book was issued, the study of homosexuality\nhas been carried on with remarkable activity. The following books\nare exclusively devoted to this subject:--_Das gleichgeschlechtliche\nLeben der Naturv\u00f6lker_, by F. Karsch-Haack (1911), _Intermediate\nTypes among Primitive Folk_, by Edward Carpenter (1914), and _Die\nHomosexualit\u00e4t des Mannes und des Weibes_, by Magnus Hirschfeld\n(1914). Carpenter's book chiefly deals with the invert in early\nreligion and in warfare. Hirschfeld's work is a veritable\nencyclop\u00e6dia of homosexuality--according to Dr. Havelock Ellis,\n\"not only the largest but the most precise, detailed, and\ncomprehensive--even the most condensed--work which has yet\nappeared on the subject.\" In 1915 Dr. Havelock Ellis issued a\nthird, revised and enlarged, edition of his _Sexual Inversion_.\n\nP. 485, _n._ 1.--This passage and, generally, the suggestion that\nthere is a certain relationship between the social reaction\nagainst homosexuality {753} and against infanticide, have been\nexcluded from the last edition of Dr. Havelock Ellis's book.\n\nP. 584, _n._ 1.--There is hardly any subject which during the\nlast four or five years has been more eagerly discussed by\nstudents of social anthropology than the relation between\nreligion and magic. It has been dealt with, _e.g._, by Sir J. G.\nFrazer in _The Magic Art_, by Professor Durkheim in _Les formes\n\u00e9l\u00e9mentaires de la vie religieuse_, by Dr. Marett in _The\nThreshold of Religion_ and other writings, by Dr. Irving King in\n_The Development of Religion_, by Professor Leuba in _A\nPsychological Study of Religion_, by Mr. Sidney Hartland in\n_Ritual and Belief_, and by the present Archbishop of Sweden,\nNathan S\u00f6derblom, in his book _Gudstrons uppkomst_. According to\nthe French school of sociologists, religion is social in its aims\nand magic antisocial; and this distinction has lately been\naccepted by Dr. Marett, who writes (_Anthropology_, p. 209\n_sq._): \"Magic I take to include all bad ways, and religion all\ngood ways, of dealing with the supernormal--bad and good, of\ncourse, not as we may happen to judge them, but as the society\nconcerned judges them.\" But this use of the terms is neither in\nagreement with traditional usage nor, in my opinion, suitable for\nthe purpose of scientific classification. Besides black magic, or\nwitchcraft, there is also white magic; even a medieval theologian\nlike Albertus Magnus asserts that \"magical science is not evil,\nsince through knowledge of it evil can be avoided and good\nattained.\" The French distinction between magic and religion\nimplies that a prayer to a god for the destruction of an enemy\nmust be classified as religion if it is offered in a cause which\nis considered just by the community, but as magic if it is\ndisapproved of. If a man makes a girl drink a love-potion in\norder to gain her favour, it is religion if their union is\ndesirable from the society's point of view, but if he gives the\nsame drink to another man's wife it is magic. The best part of\nwhat has been hitherto called imitative or hom[oe]opathic magic\nno longer remains magic at all; if water is poured out for the\npurpose of producing rain it is hom[oe]opathic magic only in case\nrain is not wanted by the community, but if it is done during a\ndrought it is religion. Thus the very same practices are\nqualified as religious or magical according as they have social\nor antisocial ends; and, as Mr. Hartland rightly asks (_Ritual\nand Belief_, p. 76): \"How shall we define these ends?\"\n\nIt should be added, however, that the definition of religion\nwhich I have given in the text has reference only to religion in\nthe abstract, not to the various religions. In the popular sense\nof the word, a religion may include many practices which are what\nI have called magical. As I have said above (p. 649), \"both\nChristianity in its earlier phases and Muhammedanism are full of\nmagical practices expressly sanctioned by their theology.\"\nAlthough the magical and the strictly religious attitude differ\nfrom each other, they are not irreconcilable, and may therefore\nvery well form parts of one and the same religion; there is no\nsuch thing as a magic being opposed to a religion. By a religion\nis generally understood a system of beliefs and rules of\nbehaviour which have reference to men's relations to one or\nseveral supernatural beings whom they call their god or gods,\nthat is, supernatural beings who are the objects of a regular\ncult and between whom and their worshippers there are established\nand permanent relationships. If it be admitted that the word\nreligion may be thus legitimately used in two different senses, I\nthink there is little ground left for further controversy on the\nsubject. After all, sociologists may more profitably occupy their\ntime than by continuous quarrelling about the meaning of terms.\n\nP. 608, _n._ 4.--In _The Dying God_, p. 204, _n._ 1, Sir J. G.\nFrazer writes: \"There is a good deal to be said in favour of Dr.\nWestermarck's theory, which is supported in particular by the\nsanctity attributed to the regalia. But on the whole I see no\nsufficient reason to abandon the view adopted {754} in the text,\nand I am confirmed in it by the Shilluk evidence, which was\nunknown to Dr. Westermarck when he propounded his theory.\"\n\nAccording to Professor C. G. Seligman to whom Frazer is indebted\nfor detailed information on the subject (_op. cit._ p. 17 _sqq._)\nit is a fundamental article of the Shilluk creed that the spirit\nof Nyakang, the divine or semi-divine hero who settled the\nShilluk in their present territory and founded the dynasty of\ntheir kings, is incarnate in the reigning king, who is\naccordingly himself invested to some extent with the character of\na divinity. But while the Shilluk hold their kings in high,\nindeed religious, reverence and take every precaution against\ntheir accidental death, nevertheless they cherish the conviction\nthat the king must not be allowed to become ill or senile, lest\nwith his diminishing vigour the cattle should sicken and fail to\nbear their increase, the crops should rot in the fields, and man,\nstricken with disease, should die in ever-increasing numbers. To\nprevent these calamities it used to be the regular custom with\nthe Shilluk to put the king to death whenever he showed signs of\nill-health or failing strength. Nay, from Dr. Seligman's\nenquiries it appears that even while the king was yet in the\nprime of health and strength he might at any time be attacked by\na rival and have to defend his crown in a combat to the death.\nAccording to the common Shilluk tradition any son of a king had\nthe right thus to fight the king in possession and, if he\nsucceeded in killing him, to reign in his stead. Now \"an\nimportant part of the solemnities attending the accession of a\nShilluk king appears to be intended to convey to the new monarch\nthe divine spirit of Nyakang, which has been transmitted from the\nfounder of the dynasty to all his successors on the throne. For\nthis purpose a sacred four-legged stool and a mysterious object\nwhich bears the name of Nyakang himself are brought with much\nsolemnity from the shrine of Nyakang at Akurwa to the small\nvillage of Kwom near Fashoda, where the king elect and the chiefs\nawait their arrival. The thing called Nyakang is said to be of\ncylindrical shape, some two or three feet long by six inches\nbroad. The chief of Akurwa informed Dr. Seligman that the object\nin question is a rude wooden figure of a man, which was fashioned\nlong ago at the command of Nyakang in person. We may suppose that\nit represents the divine king himself and that it is, or was\nformerly, supposed to house his spirit, though the chief of\nAkurwa denied to Dr. Seligman that it does so now. . . . The\nimage of Nyakang is placed on the stool; the king elect holds one\nleg of the stool and an important chief holds another. . . . A\nbullock is killed and its flesh eaten by the men of certain\nfamilies called _ororo_, who are said to be descended from the\nthird of the Shilluk kings. Then the Akurwa men carry the image\nof Nyakang into the shrine, and the _ororo_ men place the king\nelect on the sacred stool, where he remains seated for some time,\napparently till sunset. When he rises, the Akurwa men carry the\nstool back into the shrine, and the king is escorted to three new\nhuts, where he stays in seclusion for three days. On the fourth\nnight he is conducted quietly, almost stealthily, to his royal\nresidence at Fashoda, and next day he shows himself publicly to\nhis subjects.\"\n\nAs regards this so-called evidence it should, first, be noticed\nthat it is only Dr. Seligman's own conjecture that the mysterious\nobject called Nyakang is or has been supposed to contain the\nspirit of the holy founder of the dynasty, and that this\nconjecture is expressly said to be opposed to the present beliefs\nof the natives. On the other hand it is obvious that the object\nin question is regarded as a holy object, and that its holiness,\nor a particle of it, is supposed to be transmitted to the new\nking through material contact--an idea which well agrees with my\nown theory. But even if the Shilluk had once believed that their\nking was a reincarnation of the spirit of Nyakang, that belief\ncould hardly be regarded as a direct proof of the idea that the\nsoul of the slain man-god is transmitted to his royal successor.\nThe Shilluk believe that Nyakang, unlike his royal descendants of\nmore recent times, did not die but simply disappeared.\n\n\n\n\nAUTHORITIES QUOTED[1]\n\n\n[Footnote 1: Of articles in periodicals only some of the more\nimportant have been included in this list.]\n\n_A Voice for South America_. London.\n\nAas (Einar), _Sjaeleliv og intelligens hos dyr_. Kristiania, 1893.\n\nAbbot (Ezra), 'Literature of the Doctrine of a Future Life'; in\nAlger, _A Critical History of the Doctrine of a Future Life_.\nPhiladelphia, 1864.\n\n[(]Abd-Allatif, _Relation de l'\u00c9gypte_. Trans. by S. de Sacy.\nParis, 1810.\n\n[(]Abd-es-Sal\u00e2m Shabeeny, _An Account of Timbuctoo and Housa_.\nEd. by J. G. Jackson. London, 1820.\n\nAbegg (J. F. H.), _Die verschiedenen Strafrechtstheorieen_.\nNeustadt a.d.O., 1835.\n\nAbel (Charles W.), _Savage Life in New Guinea_. London, [1901].\n\nAbercromby (John), _The Pre- and Proto-Historic Finns_. 2 vols.\nLondon, 1898.\n\nAbreu de Galindo (Juan de), _The History of the Discovery and\nConquest of the Canary Islands_. Trans. London, 1764.\n\n_Academy (The)_. London.\n\nAchelis (Th.), 'Animal Worship'; in _The Open Court_, vol. xi.\nChicago, 1897.\n\n---- _Moderne V\u00f6lkerkunde_. Stuttgart, 1896.\n\nAchery (L. d'), _Spicilegium sive collectio veterum aliquot\nscriptorum qui in Galli\u00e6 bibliothecis delituerant_. 3 vols.\nParisiis, 1723.\n\nAcosta (Joseph de), _The Natural and Moral History of the\nIndies_. Trans. ed. by C. R. Markham. 2 vols. London, 1880.\n\n_Acta Societatis Scientiarum Fennic\u00e6_. Helsingfors.\n\nAdair (James), _The History of the American Indians_. London,\n1775.\n\nAdalbero, 'Carmen ad Rotbertum regem Francorum'; in Bouquet,\n_Recueil des historiens des Gaules et de la France_, vol. x.\nParis, 1760.\n\nAdam of Bremen, 'Gesta Hammaburgensis ecclesi\u00e6 pontificum'; in\nMigne, _Patrologi\u00e6 cursus completus_, vol. cxlvi. Parisiis, 1853.\n\nAdams (John), _Sketches taken during Ten Voyages to Africa,\nBetween the Years 1786 and 1800_. London, [1825].\n\nAddis (W. E.) and Arnold (Thomas), _A Catholic Dictionary_.\nLondon, 1903.\n\nAddosio (Carlo d'), _Bestie delinquenti_. Napoli, 1892.\n\nAelian, _De natura animalium, Varia historia, &c._ Ed. by R.\nHercher. Parisiis, 1858.\n\nAeschines, 'Orationes'; in _Oratores Attici_, ed. by C. M\u00fcller,\nvol. ii. Parisiis, 1858.\n\nAeschylus, _Trag[oe]di\u00e6 et fragmenta_. Ed. by E. A. J. Ahrens.\nParisiis, 1842.\n\nAethelbirht (_King_), 'The Laws of'; in _Ancient Laws and\nInstitutes of England_. London, 1840.\n\n{756} Aethelstan (_King_), 'The Laws of'; in _Ancient Laws and\nInstitutes of England_. London, 1840.\n\nAfzelius (A. A.), _Swenska Folkets Sago-H\u00e4fder_. 11 vols.\nStockholm, 1839-70.\n\nAgathias, 'Historiarum libri quinque'; in Migne, _Patrologi\u00e6\ncursus_, Ser. Graeca, vol. lxxxviii. Parisiis, 1860.\n\nAhlqvist (A.), 'Unter Wogulen und Ostjaken'; in _Acta Societatis\nScientiarum Fennic\u00e6_, vol. xiv. Helsingfors, 1885.\n\nAhrens (Heinrich), _Naturrecht_. 2 vols. Wien, 1870-71.\n\n_Aitareya Brahmanam of the Rigveda (The)_. Ed. and trans. by M.\nHaug. 2 vols. Bombay, 1863.\n\nAlabaster (Chal.), 'The Law of Inheritance'; in _The China\nReview_, vol. v. Hongkong, 1876-77.\n\nAlabaster (Ernest), _Notes and Commentaries on Chinese Criminal\nLaw_. London, 1899.\n\nAlabaster (Henry), _The Wheel of the Law_. London, 1871.\n\nAlagona (Petrus), _Compendium manualis D. Navarri_. Lugduni, 1603.\n\nAlard (Paul), _Condition et droits des enfants naturels_. Paris, 1896.\n\nAlbericus, _Visio_. Ed. by Catello de Vivo. Ariano, 1899.\n\nAlberti (L.), _De Kaffers aan de Zuidkust van Afrika_. Amsterdam, 1810.\n\nAlden (T. J. Fox) and Hoesen (J. A. van), _A Digest of the Laws\nof Mississippi_. New York, 1839.\n\nAlexander (S.), _Moral Order and Progress_. London, 1896.\n\nAlfonso de' Liguori, _Theologia moralis_. 3 vols. Bassani, 1822.\n\nAlfred (_King_), 'The Laws of'; in _Ancient Laws and Institutes\nof England_. London, 1840.\n\nAlger (W. R.), _A Critical History of the Doctrine of a Future\nLife_. Philadelphia, 1864.\n\n_Alienist and Neurologist (The)_. St. Louis.\n\nAllard (Paul), _Les esclaves chr\u00e9tiens depuis les premiers temps\nde l'\u00c9glise jusqu'\u00e0 la fin de la domination romaine en Occident_.\nParis, 1876.\n\nAllardt (Anders), _Nyl\u00e4ndska folkseder och bruk_. (_Nyland_, vol.\niv.) Helsingfors, 1889.\n\nAllen (Grant), _The Evolution of the Idea of God_. London, 1897.\n\nAllen (John), _Modern Judaism._ London, 1830.\n\nAllen (W.) and Thomson (T. R. H.), _A Narrative of the Expedition\nsent by Her Majesty's Government to the River Niger, in 1841_. 2\nvols. London, 1848.\n\n_Am Ur-Quell. Monatsschrift f\u00fcr Volkskunde_. Ed. by F. S. Krauss.\nLunden.\n\nAmadori-Virgilj (Giovanni), _L'Istituto famigliare nelle Societ\u00e0\nprimordiali_. Bari, 1903.\n\nAmbrose (_Saint_), _Opera omnia_. (Migne, _Patrologi\u00e6 cursus_,\nvols. xiv.-xvii.) Parisiis, 1845.\n\nAmeer Ali (Syed), _The Ethics of Isl\u00e2m_. Calcutta, 1893.\n\n---- _The Life and Teachings of Mohammed or the Spirit of Isl\u00e2m_.\nLondon, 1891.\n\nAm\u00e9lineau (E.), _Essai sur l'\u00e9volution historique et\nphilosophique des id\u00e9es morales dans l'\u00c9gypte ancienne_. Paris,\n1895.\n\n_American Anthropologist (The)_. Washington.\n\n_American Antiquarian and Oriental Journal (The)_. Chicago.\n\n_American Journal of Psychology (The)_. Worcester.\n\n_American Journal of Theology (The)_. Chicago.\n\n_American Naturalist (The)_. Philadelphia.\n\n{757} Amira (Karl von), _Nordgermanisches Obligationenrecht_. 2\nvols. Leipzig, 1882-95.\n\n---- 'Recht'; in Paul, _Grundriss der germanischen Philologie_,\nvol. ii. Strassburg, 1893.\n\n---- _Thierstrafen und Thierprocesse_. Innsbruck, 1891.\n\nAmmianus Marcellinus. See Marcellinus (A.).\n\nAmos (Andrew), _Ruins of Time exemplified in Sir Matthew Hale's\nHistory of the Pleas of the Crown_. London, 1856.\n\n'Ancien Coutumier de Bourgogne,' ed. by A.-J. Marnier; in _Revue\nhistorique de droit fran\u00e7ais et \u00e9tranger_, vol. iii. Paris, 1857.\n\n_Ancient Laws and Institutes of England_. London, 1840.\n\n_Ancient Laws and Institutes of Ireland_. 4 vols. Dublin &\nLondon, 1865-79.\n\n_Ancient Laws and Institutes of Wales_. London, 1841.\n\n_Ancient Sea-Laws of Oleron, Wisby, and the Hanse-Towns (The)_.\nTrans. London, 1686.\n\nAncona (A. d'), _Origini del teatro italiano_. 2 vols. Torino,\n1891.\n\nAnderson (John), _Mandalay to Momien_. London, 1876.\n\nAnderson (John W.), _Notes of Travel in Fiji and New Caledonia_.\nLondon, 1880.\n\nAndersson (C. J.), _Lake Ngami_. London, 1856.\n\n---- _Notes on Travel in South Africa_. London, 1875.\n\nAndr\u00e9 (Tony), _L'esclavage chez les anciens H\u00e9breux_. Paris, 1892.\n\nAndree (Richard), _Die Anthropophagie_. Leipzig, 1887.\n\n---- 'Ethnographische Bemerkungen zu einigen Rechtsgebr\u00e4uchen. I.\nJagdrecht. II. Die Asyle'; in _Globus_, vol. xxxviii.\nBraunschweig, 1880.\n\n---- _Ethnographische Parallelen und Vergleiche_. 2 vols.\nStuttgart, 1878-89.\n\n---- _Zur Volkskunde der Juden_. Bielefeld & Leipzig, 1881.\n\nAndrews (William), _Old-Time Punishments_. Hull & London, 1890.\n\nAngas (G. F.), _Polynesia_. London, [1866].\n\n---- _Savage Life and Scenes in Australia and New Zealand_.\nLondon, 1850.\n\n_Annales du Mus\u00e9e Guimet_. Paris.\n\n_Ann\u00e9e sociologique (L')_. Ed. by \u00c9. Durkheim. Paris.\n\n_Annual Reports of the Board of Regents of the Smithsonian\nInstitution_, Washington.\n\n_Annual Reports of the Bureau of Ethnology_. Washington.\n\nAnrich (G.), _Das antike Mysterienwesen in seinem Einfluss auf\ndas Christentum_. G\u00f6ttingen, 1894.\n\n_Antananarivo Annual and Madagascar Magazine_. Antananarivo.\n\n_Ante-Nicene Christian Library_. Ed. by A. Roberts and J.\nDonaldson. 24 vols. Edinburgh, 1867-72.\n\n_Anthropological Essays presented to E. B. Tylor_. Oxford, 1907.\n\n_Anthropologie (L')_. Paris.\n\n_Antiquary (The)_. London.\n\n'Anugit\u00e2 (The),' trans. by K. T. Telang; in _The Sacred Books of\nthe East_, vol. viii. Oxford, 1898.\n\n'\u00c2pastamba,' trans. by G. B\u00fchler; in _The Sacred Books of the\nEast_, vol. ii. Oxford, 1897.\n\n_Apocryphal Books (The)_. Trans. London, 1880.\n\nApollodorus Atheniensis, _Bibliotheca_. Lipsiae, 1854.\n\nApollonius Rhodius, _Argonautica_. Ed. by F. S. Lehrs. Parisiis,\n1840.\n\n{758} Apuleius (L.), _Opera omnia_. 7 vols. Londini, 1825.\n\nArbois de Jubainville (H. d'), 'Des attributions judiciaires de\nl'autorit\u00e9 publique chez les Celtes'; in _Revue Celtique_, vol.\nvii. Paris, 1886.\n\n---- _La civilisation des Celtes et celle de l'\u00e9pop\u00e9e Hom\u00e9rique_.\nParis, 1899.\n\nArbousset (T.) and Daumas (F.), _Narrative of an Exploratory Tour\nto the North-East of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope_. Trans.\nLondon, 1852.\n\nArchilochus, _Reliqui\u00e6_. Ed. by I. Liebel. Lipsiae, 1818.\n\n_Archiv f\u00fcr Anthropologie_. Braunschweig.\n\n---- _f\u00fcr Religionswissenschaft_. Leipzig.\n\n---- _f\u00fcr wissenschaftliche Kunde von Russland_. Ed. by A. Erman.\nBerlin.\n\n_Archives d'anthropologie criminelle_. Paris.\n\n_Archives de Neurologie_. Paris.\n\n_Archivio per l'antropologia e la etnologia_. Firenze.\n\n_Archivio per lo studio delle tradizioni popolari_. Palermo.\n\n_Arda Viraf_. Ed. and trans. by M. Haug and E. W. West. Bombay &\nLondon, 1872.\n\nArgentr\u00e9 (Bertrand d'), _L'histoire de Bretaigne_. Paris, 1618.\n\nAristophanes, _Com[oe]di\u00e6_. Parisiis, 1838.\n\nAristotle, _De republica Atheniensium_. Ed. by J. E. Sandys.\nLondon, 1893.\n\n---- The same work. Trans. by E. Poste. London, 1891.\n\n---- _Opera omnia_. 5 vols. Parisiis, 1848-74.\n\n---- _Politica et [OE]conomica_. 2 vols. Oxonii, 1810.\n\n---- _The Politics_. Trans. by B. Jowett. 2 vols. Oxford, 1885.\n\nArmstrong (Alex.), _A Personal Narrative of the Discovery of the\nNorth-West Passage_. London, 1857.\n\nArnesen (John), _Historisk Indledning til den gamle og nye\nIslandske R\u00e6ttergang_. Ki\u00f6benhavn, 1762.\n\nArnobius, 'Disputationum adversus gentes libri septem'; in Migne,\n_Patrologi\u00e6 cursus_, vol. v. Parisiis, 1844.\n\nArnold (Thomas), _Fragment on the Church_. London, 1845.\n\nArnold (Wilhelm), _Deutsche Urzeit_. Gotha, 1879.\n\nArnot (Fred.), _Garenganze; or, Seven Years' Pioneer Mission Work\nin Central Africa_. London, [1889].\n\nArrian, _Anabasis et Indica_. Ed. by Fr. D\u00fcbner. Parisiis, 1846.\n\nArvieux (_Chevalier_ d'), _Travels in Arabia the Desart_. Trans.\nLondon, 1718.\n\nAshe (R. P.), _Two Kings of Uganda_. London, 1889.\n\n_Asiatic(k) Researches_. Calcutta.\n\n_Atharva-Veda, Hymns of the_. Trans. by M. Bloomfield. (_The\nSacred Books of the East_, vol. xlii.). Oxford, 1897.\n\nAthenaeus, _Dipnosophistarum libri quindecim_. Ed. by G. Kaibel.\n3 vols. Lipsiae, 1887-90.\n\nAthenagoras, 'Legatio pro Christianis'; in Migne, _Patrologi\u00e6\ncursus_, Ser. Graeca, vol. vi. Parisiis, 1857.\n\nAtkinson (E. T.), 'Notes on the History of Religion in the\nHim\u00e1laya of the N.W. Provinces'; in _Journal of the Asiatic\nSociety of Bengal_, vol. liii. pt. i. Calcutta, 1884.\n\nAtkinson (J. C.), _Forty Years in a Moorland Parish_. London, 1891.\n\nAtkinson (J. J.), 'The Natives of New Caledonia'; in _Folk-Lore_,\nvol. xiv. London, 1903.\n\n---- _Primal Law_. London, 1903.\n\n_Augustana Confessio_. Lipsiae, 1730.\n\n{759} Augustine (_Saint_), _Opera omnia_. 16 vols. (Migne,\n_Patrologi\u00e6 cursus_, vols. xxxii.-xlvii.) Parisiis, 1845-49.\n\nAurelius Victor (Sextus), _Libri de Roman\u00e6 gentis origine, Viris\nillustribus, Imperatoribus, Epitome_. Lipsiae & Francofurti, 1704.\n\n_Ausland (Das)_. Stuttgart & Augsburg.\n\nAust (Emil), _Die Religion der R\u00f6mer_. M\u00fcnster i. W., 1899.\n\nAustin (John), _Lectures on Jurisprudence_. 2 vols. London, 1873.\n\nAvebury (_Lord_), _The Origin of Civilisation_. London, 1902.\n\nAyala (Balthazar), _De jure et officiis bellicis et disciplina\nmilitari, libri III._ Duaci, 1582.\n\nAyrault (Pierre), _Des procez faicts au cadaver, aux cendres, a\nla m\u00e9moire, aux bestes brutes, &c._ Angers, 1591.\n\nAzara (F. de), _Voyages dans l'Am\u00e9rique m\u00e9ridionale_. 4 vols.\nParis, 1809.\n\n\nBaarda (M. J. van), 'Fabelen, verhalen en overleveringen der\nGalelareezen'; in _Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde\nvan Nederlandsch-Indi\u00eb_, vol. xlv. (ser. vi. vol. i.).\n's-Gravenhage, 1895.\n\nBabington (Churchill), _The Influence of Christianity in\npromoting the Abolition of Slavery in Europe_. Cambridge, 1846.\n\nBachofen (J. J.), _Das Mutterrecht_. Stuttgart, 1861.\n\nBacon (_Lord_), _Works_. Ed. by J. Spedding, R. L. Ellis, and D.\nD. Heath. 14 vols. London, 1857-74.\n\nBaden-Powell (B. H.), _The Indian Village Community_. London, 1896.\n\nBagehot (Walter), _Physics and Politics_. London, 1873.\n\nBailey (John), 'An Account of the Wild Tribes of the Veddahs of\nCeylon'; in _Trans. Ethn. Soc._ new ser. vol. ii. London, 1863.\n\nBain (Alex.), _The Emotions and the Will_. London, 1880.\n\nBaker (_Sir_ S. W.), _The Albert N'yanza_. 2 vols. London, 1866.\n\n---- _Ismail\u00efa_. London, 1879.\n\n---- _The Nile Tributaries of Abyssinia_. London, 1871.\n\nBaldwin (J. M.), _Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental\nDevelopment_. New York, 1897.\n\nBalfour (A. J.), _The Foundations of Belief_. London, 1895.\n\nBalfour (Edward), _The Cyclop\u00e6dia of India, and Eastern and\nSouthern Asia_. 3 vols. London, 1885.\n\nBall (C. J.), 'Glimpses of Babylonian Religion'; in _Proceed.\nSoc. Biblical Arch\u00e6ology_, vol. xiv. London, 1892.\n\nBall (J. Dyer), _Things Chinese_. London, 1900.\n\nBall (W. McK.) and Roane (S. C.), _Revised Statutes of the State\nof Arkansas_. Boston, 1838.\n\nBalmes (_Don_ Jaime), _El Protestantismo comparado con el\nCatolicismo en sus relaciones con la civilizacion Europea_. 4\nvols. Barcelona, 1844-45.\n\nBaluze (Stephen), _Capitularia Regum Francorum_. 2 vols.\nParisiis, 1677.\n\nBancroft (H. H.), _The Native Races of the Pacific States of\nNorth America_. 5 vols. New York, 1875-76.\n\nBar (L. von), _Die Grundlagen des Strafrechts_. Leipzig, 1869.\n\nBarbeyrac (Jean), _Trait\u00e9 de la morale des P\u00e8res de l'\u00c9glise_.\nAmsterdam, 1728.\n\nBaring-Gould (S.), _The Origin and Development of Religious\nBelief_. 2 vols. London, 1892.\n\n---- _Strange Survivals_. London, 1892.\n\n{760} Barnes (Albert), _The Church and Slavery_. Philadelphia,\n1857.\n\nBaronius (C.), _Annales Ecclesiastici_. 38 vols. Lucae, 1738-59.\n\nBarrington (George), _The History of New South Wales_. London,\n1810.\n\nBarrow (John), _An Account of Travels into the Interior of\nSouthern Africa, in the Years 1797 and 1798_. 2 vols. London,\n1801-04.\n\nBartels (Max), _Die Medicin der Naturv\u00f6lker_. Leipzig, 1893.\n\nBarth (A.), _The Religions of India_. Trans. London, 1882.\n\nBarth (Heinrich), _Reisen und Entdeckungen in Nord- und\nCentral-Afrika_. 5 vols. Gotha, 1857-58.\n\nBartholinus (Thomas), _Antiquitates Danic\u00e6_. Hafniae, 1690.\n\nBartram (William), 'Observations on the Creek and Cherokee\nIndians'; in _Trans. American Ethn. Soc._ vol. iii. pt. i. New\nYork, 1853.\n\nBasil (_Saint_), _Opera_. 4 vols. (Migne, _Patrologi\u00e6 cursus_,\nSer. Graeca, vols. xxix.-xxxii.) Parisiis, 1857.\n\nBastian (A.), _Afrikanische Reisen. Ein Besuch in San Salvador_.\nBremen, 1859.\n\n---- _Allerlei aus Volks- und Menschenkunde_. 2 vols. Berlin, 1888.\n\n---- _Die deutsche Expedition an der Loango-K\u00fcste_. 2 vols. Jena,\n1874-75.\n\n---- _Der Mensch in der Geschichte_. 3 vols. Leipzig, 1860.\n\nBatchelor (John), _The Ainu and their Folk-Lore_. London, 1901.\n\n---- _The Ainu of Japan_. London, 1892.\n\n---- 'Notes on the Ainu'; in _Trans. Asiatic Soc. Japan_, vol. x.\nYokohama, 1882.\n\nBates (H. W.), _The Naturalist on the River Amazons_. 2 vols.\nLondon, 1863.\n\n'Baudh\u00e2yana,' trans. by G. B\u00fchler; in _The Sacred Books of the\nEast_, vol. xiv. Oxford, 1882.\n\nBaudissin (W. W.), _Studien zur semitischen Religionsgeschichte_.\n2 vols. Leipzig, 1876-78.\n\nBaumann (Oscar), 'Contr\u00e4re Sexual-Erscheinungen bei der\nNeger-Bev\u00f6lkerung Zanzibars'; in _Verhandl. der Berliner\nGesellsch. f\u00fcr Anthropologie_, 1899.\n\n---- _Durch Massailand zur Nilquelle_. Berlin, 1894.\n\n---- _Usambara_. Berlin, 1891.\n\nBaur (F. Chr.), _Das Manich\u00e4ische Religionssystem_. T\u00fcbingen,\n1831.\n\nBax (E. B.), _The Ethics of Socialism_. London, 1893.\n\nBayle (P.), _Dictionnaire historique et critique_. 16 vols.\nParis, 1820.\n\nBaynes (Herbert), _The Idea of God and the Moral Sense in the\nLight of Language_. London, 1895.\n\nBeardmore (E.), 'The Natives of Mowat, Daudai, New Guinea'; in\n_Jour. Anthr. Inst._ vol. xix. London, 1890.\n\nBeauchamp (W. M.), 'The Iroquois White Dog Feast'; in _The\nAmerican Antiquarian and Oriental Journal_, vol. vii. Chicago,\n1885.\n\nBeaumanoir (Philippe de), _Les coutumes du Beauvoisis_. 2 vols.\nParis, 1842.\n\nBeccaria Bonesana (Cesare), _Opere_. 2 vols. Milano, 1821-22.\n\nBecker (W. A.), _Charikles_. Ed. by H. G\u00f6ll. 3 vols. Berlin,\n1877-78.\n\nBeecham (John), _Ashantee and the Gold Coast_. London, 1841.\n\nBeechey (F. W.), _Narrative of a Voyage to the Pacific and\nBehring's Strait_. 2 vols. London, 1831.\n\nBeltrame (A. G.), _Il Fiume Bianco e i D\u00e9nka_. Verona, 1881.\n\n---- _Il S\u00e9nnaar e lo Sciang\u00e0llah_. 2 vols. Verona & Padova,\n1879.\n\nBenedict (_Saint_), _Regula monachorum_. Ed. by E. Woelfflin.\nLipsiae, 1895.\n\n{761} Benny (Ph. Berger), _The Criminal Code of the Jews\naccording to the Talmud Massecheth Synhedrin_. London, 1880.\n\nBent (J. Theodore), _The Cyclades_. London, 1885.\n\nBentham (Jeremy), _Deontology_. Ed. by J. Bowring. 2 vols. London\n& Edinburgh, 1834.\n\n---- _An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and\nLegislation_. Oxford, 1879.\n\n---- _The Rationale of Punishment_. London, 1830.\n\n---- _Theory of Legislation_. Trans. from the French of E.\nDumont. London 1882.\n\n---- _The Works of_. 11 vols. Edinburgh, 1838-43.\n\n'Berakhoth'; in _Le Talmud de J\u00e9rusalem_, trans. by M. Schwab,\nvol. i. Paris, 1871.\n\nBergaigne (Abel), _La religion v\u00e9dique_. 3 vols. Paris,\n1878-83.\n\nBergemann (P.), _Die Verbreitung der Anthropophagie \u00fcber die\nErde_. Bunzlau, 1893.\n\nBergmann (B.), _Nomadische Streifereien unter den Kalm\u00fcken_. 4\nvols. Riga, 1804-05.\n\nBernard (_Saint_), _Opera omnia_. 2 vols. Parisiis, 1719.\n\nBernard (Montague), 'The Growth of Laws and Usages of War'; in\n_Oxford Essays, 1856_. London, [1856].\n\nBernau (J. 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G\u00f6ttingen, 1902.\n\n\n\n\nSUBJECT INDEX\n\n\nABLUTIONS, i. 53-56, ii. 294, 295, 352-354, 358-359, 415, 416, 726\n\nAbortion, i. 378, 408, 409, 413-417, ii. 705\n\n_Accessio_, ii. 50\n\nAccident, injuries due to, i. 217-240, 315, 316, 319, ii. 714;\n  benefits due to, i. 318 _sq._;\n  the future state of persons who have died by, ii. 238, 239, 241\n\nActs, i. 203-206\n\nAdopted children, rules of inheritance relating to, ii. 46;\n  maternal affection for, ii. 187-189\n\nAdoption, of prisoners of war, i. 336;\n  of unintentional manslayers, i. 484;\n  the blood-covenant represented as a rite of, ii. 206 _sq._;\n  marriage between relations by, ii. 369, 374, 375, 748-750, 752\n\nAdultery, ii. 447-455;\n  punishment of, i. 189, 311, 492, 521, 630, ii. 447-45. 452,\n  453, 558;\n  self-redress in case of, i. 290-293, 491 _sq._, ii. 447;\n  as a ground for divorce or judicial separation, ii. 397, 455;\n  supposed to injure the harvest, ii. 417, 747;\n  stigmatised by religion, ii. 447, 448, 450, 453-455, 675, 676,\n  684, 686, 700, 717;\n  refuge denied to persons guilty of, ii. 632 _sq._\n\nAesthetic emotions, i. 326\n\n---- judgments, i. 8\n\nAffection. See Altruistic sentiment;\n  Conjugal, Filial, Fraternal, Marital, Maternal, Paternal,\n  Social affection\n\nAge, restrictions in diet depending on, ii. 319 _sq._ See\nChildren, Old age, Old persons, Seniority\n\nAgricultural tribes, the position of women among, i. 660 _sq._;\n  slavery among, i. 673, 674, 681;\n  social aggregates of, ii. 201;\n  sympathy for domestic animals among, ii. 506, see Oxen\n\nAgriculture, originally a feminine pursuit, i. 634, 635 n. ^4, 637;\n  moral valuation of, ii. 273-277, 280, 402\n\nAlbinos, religious veneration of, ii. 590\n\nAll Souls, ii. 550\n\nAll-father. See Supreme beings\n\nAlliance, prohibition of marriage between relations by, ii. 369, 377\n\nAlms, connection between sacrifices offered to gods and, i. 565-569;\n  between fasting and the giving of, ii. 316-318;\n  between offerings to the dead and, ii. 550-552;\n  to be given with an ungrudging eye, and not before witnesses,\n  i. 594.\n  See Charity\n\nAltruistic sentiment, the, its origin and development, ch. xxxiv.\n(ii. 186-228);\n  i. 94, 95, 110-114, 129, 373, 468, 559, ii. 494-506, 510-514.\n  See Conjugal, Filial, Fraternal, Marital, Maternal, Paternal,\n  Social affection\n\nAncestors. See Dead\n\nAnger, the nature and origin of, i. 21-23, 30, 38-42;\n  in animals, i. 22, ii. 51;\n  in children, i. 22 _sq._;\n  towards inanimate things, i. 26, 27, 260-263, 315;\n  appeased by repentance, i. 87;\n  sympathetic resentment produced by the cognition of the signs\n  of, i. 114 _sq._;\n  injuries inflicted in, i. 290-298, 311, 316 _sq._;\n  a cause of suicide, ii. 233\n\nAnimals, regard for the lower, ch. xliv. (ii. 490-514), i. 11 _sq._;\n  anger in, i. 22, ii. 51;\n  revenge taken upon, i. 26, 27, 251-253, 255, 256, 258;\n  revenge taken by, i. 37 _sq._;\n  self-regarding pride in, i. 39, ii. 137 _sq._;\n  retributive kindly emotion in, i. 94;\n  sympathetic resentment in, i. 112, ii. 52;\n  killing of sacred, i. 227, ii. 603-606, 609;\n  of totemic, ii. 210, 603, 604, 606;\n  {838} of various kinds of, see Killing;\n  eating of totemic, i. 227, ii. 210, 211, 323, 324, 606;\n  credited with a conscience, i. 249-251;\n  not responsible for their acts, i. 249-251;\n  treated as responsible agents, i. 251-260, 264, 308;\n  believed to take vengeance upon men, i. 252, 258, ii. 491, 497,\n  500, 502, 504, 603;\n  subject to regular punishment, ii. 253-260, 264, 308;\n  sexual intercourse between men and, i. 253 _sq._, ii. 409, 749;\n  believed to be rewarded or punished after death, i. 258 _sq._;\n  regarded as on a footing of equality with man, i. 258-260, ii.\n  494, 510;\n  non-moral resentment in the case of injuries inflicted by, i. 316;\n  sacrificed instead of human victims, i. 469 _sq._;\n  sacrificed for the purpose of saving the lives of men or of\n  other animals, i. 469 _sq._, ii. 616 _sq._;\n  their desire to appropriate and to keep that which has been\n  appropriated, ii. 51;\n  maternal affection among, ii. 186-190, 193;\n  paternal affection among, ii. 189, 190, 193;\n  conjugal attachment among, ii. 191 _sq._;\n  abstinence from eating various kinds of, ii. 319-335;\n  from eating any kind of, ii. 335-338, 499;\n  belief in the transmigration of human souls into, ii. 324, 328,\n  338, 490, 496, 500, 504, 516, 517, 693, 709 _sq._;\n  homosexual intercourse among, ii. 456, 466, 475 n. ^2;\n  their fear of strange phenomena, ii. 582 _sq._;\n  worship of, ii. 590, 598;\n  sheltered by sacred places, ii. 627-629, 631, 635\n\nAnimism, ii. 595-597\n\nAnnihilation of the soul, belief in the, ii. 236, 515, 516, 559,\n565, 580, 679\n\nAnthropomorphism, ii. 595, 597-600\n\nAntipathies, disinterested, i. 116, 117, 533, 713 _sq._, ii. 113,\n166, 185, 227, 262, 266-268, 291, 334, 335, 351, 368, 372-375,\n381, 382, 403, 404, 434, 439, 440, 483, 484, 744-746\n\nAntivivisectionists, ii. 512, 514\n\nApes, the man-like, paternal care among, ii. 189 _sq._;\n  the duration of their conjugal unions, ii. 192;\n  not gregarious, ii. 195;\n  chiefly monogamous, ii. 391.\n  See Monkeys\n\nArbitration, i. 368 _sq._\n\nArms, stealing of, i. 287, ii. 14;\n  regarded with superstitious veneration, i. 506;\n  oaths taken upon, i. 506, ii. 119-121\n\nArson, i. 187, 188, 293, 676, ii. 633\n\nAsceticism, ii. 281, 315-318, 355-363, 421\n\nAstronomical changes, abstinence from work connected with, ii.\n284-288, 747;\n  fasting connected with, ii. 309-315\n\nAsylums, ii. 628-638;\n  i. 221, 224, 295-297, 307, 308, 380, 427, 579, 580, 585, 668,\n  669, 690, 692, 696\n\nAtheism, ii. 643 _sq._\n\nAtonement. See Expiation, Expiatory sacrifice\n\n---- the day (fast) of, i. 65, ii. 311, 312, 316, 357-359. 617\n\nAttempts to commit crimes, i. 200, 241-247, 374\n\n\n\"BAD,\" analysis of the concept, i. 134\n\nBadger-baiting, ii. 509\n\nBananas, abstinence from, ii. 321\n\nBanishment, as a punishment, i. 46, 58, 172, 173, 224, 225, 227,\n228, 267, 287, 312, 424, 601, ii. 4, 6, 7, 10, 12, 74, 123 n. ^1,\n331, 424, 425, 452, 475 n. ^10, 478, 525\n\nBaptism, i. 55, 411, 416, 417, 666, ii. 295, 417, 721-723\n\nBarrenness of a wife, human sacrifices offered in cases of, i.\n457 _sq._;\n  a cause of polygyny, ii. 388\n\nBear-baiting, ii. 508-510\n\nBeating, as a religious rite, ii. 294, 357-359\n\nBeef, abstinence from, ii. 327, 330\n\nBees, prohibition of killing, ii. 490\n\nBeliefs, as subjects of moral judgments, i. 215 _sq._\n\nBenefit of Clergy, i. 491\n\nBenevolence, ch. xxxiii. (ii. 153-185). See Charity, Hospitality\n\nBestiality, i. 253 _sq._, ii. 409, 749\n\nBirds, defending their nests, ii. 51;\n  paternal care among, ii. 189 _sq._;\n  the duration of conjugal unions among, ii. 192\n\n---- of night, abstinence from eating, ii. 333\n\n---- of prey, prohibition of eating, ii. 321\n\nBlasphemy, ii. 639, 640, 719\n\nBlessings, materialistic conception of, i. 98, 562;\n  pronounced by {839} recipients of gifts, i. 561-565;\n  gods appealed to in, i. 562, 564 _sq._, ii. 686, 731;\n  of strangers, i. 581-584, ii. 446;\n  of parents, i. 621-627;\n  of old persons, i. 626;\n  in salutations, ii. 151\n\nBlood, effusion of, at funerals, i. 26, 27, 476, ii. 544, 545, 547;\n  abstinence from, i. 187, ii. 334 _sq._;\n  as a religious rite, i. 470 _sq._, ii. 294, 557;\n  pollution of, i. 225, 232, 233, 375-382, ii. 256 _sq._ n. ^2,\n  262, 714;\n  shedding of, prohibited in sacred places, i. 380, ii. 635;\n  offered to the dead, i. 475 _sq._;\n  drunk or licked in blood-revenge, i. 483 _sq._;\n  as a conductor of curses, i. 586, 587, 591, ii. 69, 118-121,\n  208, 209, 566, 567, 618-622, 687-689;\n  primitive ideas concerning, i. 664 n. ^1;\n  oaths taken upon, ii. 118-121, 621, 622, 687-689;\n  supernatural or medicinal effect ascribed to the partaking of\n  human, ii. 564 _sq._\n  See Cannibalism\n\n---- -covenant, the, ii. 206-209, 566 _sq._\n\n---- -money. See Compensation for homicide\n\n---- -revenge, i. 477-492, ii. 748;\n  collective responsibility in, i. 24, 25, 30-36, 43;\n  vow of, i. 58;\n  restricted to the actual culprit, i. 71;\n  a cause of social disturbance, i. 182 _sq._;\n  in cases of accidental injury, i. 217, 218, 231 _sq._;\n  taken upon animals, i. 251-253, 255 256, 258;\n  upon lunatics, i. 271;\n  connection between inheritance and, ii. 54 _sq._;\n  between the system of tracing descent and, ii. 211\n\nBodily integrity, the right to, ch. xxii. (i. 511-525);\n  of the dead, ii. 516 _sq._;\n  of gods, ii. 602, 610\n\nBoundaries. See Landmarks\n\nBrother, killing of a, ii. 256 _sq._ n. ^2.\n  See Fraternal affection, duties\n\n---- the elder, allowed to inflict corporal punishment upon the\nyounger one, i. 515;\n  respect for, i. 605, 606, 614;\n  curses of, i. 626, ii. 703\n\nBuffaloes, abstinence from the flesh of, ii. 320, 322;\n  prohibition of killing, for food, ii. 330\n\nBuildings, human sacrifices offered at the foundation of, i. 447\nn. ^5, 461-465;\n  animals sacrificed at the foundation of, ii. 617\n\nBull-baiting, ii. 509 _sq._\n\nBurglary, i. 187, 312, ii. 58, 633\n\nBurial, ii. 521-523, 525-527. 542, 543, 546-548, 704;\n  depending on the mode of death, i. 26, ii. 238-240, 246, 248,\n  252, 255 _sq._;\n  denied to suicides, ii. 238, 250, 549;\n  to murdered persons, ii. 239, 549;\n  to persons struck by lightning, ii. 2 39, 549;\n  to persons who have killed a parent, brother, or child, ii. 256\n  _sq._ n. ^2;\n  of criminals, ii. 694\n\nButchers, regarded as unclean, ii. 493;\n  despised, ii. 498\n\nButter, abstinence from, ii. 326\n\n\nCALUMNY, ii. 140-142;\n  against dead persons, ii. 519, 552\n\nCalves, abstinence from slaughtering, ii. 331\n\nCamels, revenge in, i. 37 _sq._;\n  abstinence from the flesh of, ii. 332, 334 n. ^2\n\nCannibalism, ch. xlvi. (ii. 553-581);\n  old persons victims of, i. 390, ii. 554, 568 _sq._;\n  practised for medicinal purposes, i. 401, ii. 562, 564 _sq._;\n  the firstborn a victim of, i. 458 _sq._, ii. 562;\n  as a punishment, ii. 4, 367, 554, 558 _sq._;\n  considered polluting, ii. 538, 575 _sq._\n\nCarelessness, i. 210-212, 305-310, 317 _sq._\n\nCastes, intermarriage between different, ii. 379. See Rank\n\nCasuistry, ii. 100, 101, 117\n\nCats, sympathetic resentment in, ii. 52;\n  abstinence from eating, ii. 327, 330, 332;\n  taken for spirits in disguise, ii. 491;\n  their fear of strange phenomena, ii. 583\n\nCattle, stealing of, i. 187 _sq._, ii. 14;\n  abstinence from killing, ii. 330, 493 _sq._;\n  reverence for, ii. 331 _sq._;\n  affection for, ii. 331, 494.\n  See Beef, Calves, Cows, Oxen\n\n---- -rearing, largely a masculine pursuit, i. 634, 636.\n  See Pastoral peoples\n\nCelibacy, ch. xli. (ii. 399-421);\n  a cause of unchastity, ii. 432;\n  of homosexual practices, ii. 467\n\nCharacter, i. 214, 215, 310-314, 318 _sq._;\n  the innate, i. 325 _sq._\n\nCharity, ch. xxiii. (i. 526-569);\n  as a duty emphasised by religion, i. {840}549-558, 561-569, ii.\n  669, 672, 699, 705, 711, 717, 718, 725, 726, 732.\n  See Alms\n\nCharms, made from dead bodies, ii. 204, 546;\n  against the evil eye, ii. 256 n. ^2;\n  put in tombs, ii. 701\n\nChastity, ch. xlii. (ii. 422-455);\n  suicide as a means of preserving, ii. 242, 251 _sq._;\n  fasting the beginning of, ii. 318;\n  required in connection with the religious cult, ii. 406-421, 736\n\nChiefs, tied by custom, i. 161 _sq._;\n  justice administered by, i. 173-176, 180-184, 490 _sq._;\n  protecting foreigners and persons who have no relations, i. 180;\n  killing of, i. 43;\n  human sacrifices offered for the purpose of saving the lives\n  of, i. 454-456, 466;\n  sacrificed, i. 466;\n  the practice of compensation encouraged by, i. 490 _sq._;\n  disrespect for, punished by gods, i. 626;\n  proprietary rights of, ii. 33;\n  suicide committed on the graves of, ii. 234;\n  labour suspended on the death of, ii. 284;\n  abstinence from fish after the death of, ii. 301;\n  treatment of the dead bodies of, ii. 527;\n  cannibalism practised by, ii. 558, 574;\n  their tombs asylums, ii. 630;\n  their houses asylums, ii. 636;\n  their persons asylums, ii. 636 _sq._\n  See King.\n\nChildren, the subjection of, ch. xxv. (i. 597-628);\n  cursed or blessed by their parents, i. 58, 538, 621-627, ii.\n  703, 715. 716 n. ^2, 732;\n  punished if convicted of a design to kill their father or\n  mother, i. 245;\n  parents killing their infant, i. 378 394-413, 633, ii. 562, 752 _sq._;\n  killing their parents, i. 383-386, 522, ii. 256 _sq._ n. ^2;\n  killing or abandoning their aged parents, i. 386-390, 606, 607,\n  612, 620;\n  eating their parents, i. 390, ii. 554, 568 _sq._;\n  parents killing their grown-up, i. 393 _sq._, ii. 256 _sq._ n. ^2;\n  a father's affection for his, i. 401, 402, 405, 529-533, ii.\n  187-190, 193, 397, 748;\n  a mother's affection for her, i. 405, 529-531, ii. 186-190,\n  193, 748;\n  eaten by their parents or others, i. 401, 458 _sq._, ii. 554,\n  555, 562, 568 _sq._;\n  parents exposing their new-born, i. 406-412, 689;\n  sacrificed to save the lives of their parents, i. 455, 456,\n  459-461;\n  sacrificed by their parents, i. 455-461;\n  committing suicide on the death of their parents, i. 473;\n  parents inflicting corporal punishment upon their, i. 513-515,\n  607, 610;\n  using violence against their parents, i. 513 624 _sq._, ii. 677;\n  parents' duty of taking care of their, i. 526-533;\n  their duty of taking care of their parents, i. 533-538;\n  their respect for their parents, i. 534-538, 600, 601, 607-613,\n  616-628, ii. 194;\n  their affection for their parents i. 534-538, 618, ii. 194, 748;\n  for their mothers, i. 618, 659;\n  their duties to their parents emphasised by religion, i. 536,\n  537, 608, 610, 612, 613, 616, 617, 620-627, ii. 711, 714, 715,\n  716 n. ^2, 717 732;\n  cursing their parents, i. 564;\n  sold as slaves by their parents, i. 599, 607, 609, 611, 612,\n  615, 675, 681, 682, 684, 685, 689, 691 _sq._;\n  proprietary incapacities of, ii. 27, 28, 57;\n  rules of inheritance relating to, ii. 44-49, 53-57;\n  telling a falsehood in the presence of their parents, ii. 96;\n  addressing abusive language to their parents, ii. 142;\n  their duties to their parents, ii. 166, 748;\n  parents' duties to their, ii. 166, 748;\n  parents committing suicide on the death of their, ii. 232, 244\n  n. ^3;\n  parents fasting after the death of their, ii. 298-300;\n  fasting after the death of their parents, ii. 298-301;\n  punished after death for inflicting injuries upon their\n  parents, ii. 715;\n  adopted, see Adopted children;\n  illegitimate, see Illegitimate children\n\nChildren, young, the anger of, i. 22 _sq._;\n  sympathetic resentment in, i. 112;\n  their ideas of right and wrong, i. 115;\n  their respect for the customary, i. 159;\n  injuries committed by, i. 217, 218, 264-269, 316;\n  treatment of, in war i. 335, 336, 342, 343, 369 _sq._;\n  sacrificed, i. 454-461;\n  their desire to appropriate and to keep that which has been\n  appropriated, ii. 51;\n  truthfulness and mendacity of, ii. 88 n. ^5, 111 n. ^3, 116,\n  117, 124-126, 129;\n  disposed to believe what they are told, ii. 109;\n  their {841} dislike of that which is strange or unfamiliar, ii. 227;\n  the altruistic sentiment in, i. 228;\n  treatment of the dead bodies of, ii. 526, 527, 549;\n  their fear of strange phenomena, ii. 583;\n  the future state of, ii. 673, 727;\n  the future state of unbaptised, ii. 721-723\n\nChivalry, i. 352-355\n\nClan, the, i. 627 _sq._, ii. 202, 213, 214, 216-220, 222 _sq._\n\nClass distinction, cleanliness a, ii. 351\n\nClasses, intermarriage between different, ii. 379-382. See Rank\n\n\"Classificatory system,\" the, ii. 393\n\nCleanliness, ii. 346-356;\n  ceremonial, ii. 294, 295, 352-354, 358, 359, 415-420, 700 n.\n  ^5, 705, 718, 726, 752\n\nClimate, connection between industry and, ii. 269-271;\n  between cleanliness and, ii. 349 _sq._\n\nCock-fighting, ii. 509 _sq._\n\nCocks, prohibition of eating tame, ii. 330\n\nCocoa, abstinence from, ii. 321;\n  religious veneration of, ii. 591\n\nCommon enjoyment of merits, i. 96-99\n\n---- responsibility, in blood-revenge, i. 24, 25, 30-36, 43, 71;\n  in the case of punishment, i. 43-48, 69-72;\n  in the case of sin, i. 48-57, 61-72\n\n\"Communal marriage,\" ii. 445\n\nCommunity of goods, ii. 50 _sq._\n\nCompacts, sealing of, i. 587, ii. 622-624\n\nCompensation, the relation between punishment and, i. 168 _sq._;\n  for involuntary destruction of property, i. 222-225, 38 _sq._;\n  for bodily injuries, i. 511-513, 517-520, 524 n. ^3, ii. 263;\n  for the seduction of an unmarried woman, ii. 425, 426, 436 _sq._;\n  for rape, ii. 438;\n  for adultery, ii. 447 _sq._\n\n---- for homicide, i. 183, 484-491;\n  if committed accidentally, i. 217, 219-221, 224, 226;\n  if committed by a child, i. 268;\n  by an idiot, i. 272;\n  if the victim is a woman, i. 420 _sq._;\n  if the victim is a slave, i. 423;\n  influenced by the rank of the victim, i. 430 _sq._\n\n---- for sin, i. 86 _sq._\n\nCompulsion, injuries committed under, i. 284, 285, 316, 319;\n  confounded with causation, i. 322-326\n\n\"Compulsion by necessity,\" i. 285-287, ii. 1\n\nConduct, i. 202, 203, 214, 215, 314\n\nConfession, i. 84 _sq._, ii. 360\n\nConjugal affection, i. 113, 532 _sq._, ii. 190-193;\n  its influence on the form of marriage, ii. 192, 389, 391;\n  on the duration of marriage, ii. 397;\n  on moral ideas concerning unchastity, ii. 439 _sq._\n\nConscience, i. 105-107, 123-125;\n  an unjust retributer, i. 15 _sq._;\n  animals credited with a, i. 249-251\n\nContributions, military, ii. 27\n\n_Contubernium_, of slaves, i. 693, 697, 706 _sq._;\n  between freemen and slaves, ii. 381\n\nCooking, abstained from after a death, ii. 304-306\n\nCorporal punishment, ii. 520-525\n\nCosmopolitanism, ii. 176-179, 182-185\n\nCourage, admiration of, i. 16, 117, ii. 16, 58, 273, 590;\n  the duel regarded as a test of, i. 509;\n  suicide regarded as a test of, ii. 251, 261 _sq._;\n  approved of by the supreme being, ii. 679;\n  the future state of a warrior supposed to be determined by his,\n  ii. 698\n\nCouvade, the, ii. 205\n\nCovenanting rites, i. 334 _sq._, ii. 622-624, 686.\n  See Blood-covenant\n\nCowardice, forgiveness of enemies regarded as a sign of, i. 73,\n74, 485, ii. 145;\n  the secret commission of offences despised as, ii. 58, 96 _sq._;\n  lying a sign of, ii. 113;\n  suicide regarded as an act of, ii. 240, 262\n\nCow-dung, a means of purification, i. 54, ii. 353, 545;\n  suicide committed in, ii. 244\n\nCows, contact with, regarded as purifying, i. 54;\n  prohibition of eating the flesh of, ii. 327, 330;\n  the killing of, abstained from or prohibited, ii. 330, 331, 497;\n  reverence for, ii. 332.\n  See Cattle\n\nCoyness, female, ii. 435\n\nCremation, i. 476, ii. 522, 523, 526, 527, 542, 543, 546-548;\n  of suicides, ii. 256 _sq._\n\nCriminals, absence of remorse in, i. 90 n. ^1;\n  punished in public, i. 191 {842}_sq._;\n  detection of, i. 193;\n  sacrificed, i. 439, 440, 467, 471 _sq._, ii. 651;\n  enslaved, i. 518, 675, 676, 681, 682, 685, 688-691, ii. 7, 8,\n  12, 13, 74;\n  eaten, ii. 4, 367, 554, 558 _sq._;\n  their blood partaken of, ii. 464 _sq._;\n  treatment of the bodies of, ii. 527, 528, 549.\n  See Asylums, Punishment\n\nCrops, robbery of, i. 287, ii. 14 _sq._;\n  human sacrifices offered for the purpose of securing good, i.\n  443-451;\n  unchastity supposed to injure the, ii. 417, 747\n\nCross, the, ii. 256 n. ^2\n\nCross-roads, i. 502, ii. 256, 256 _sq._ n. ^2\n\nCrown, miraculous virtue attributed to the royal, ii. 608 n. ^4, 753\n\nCrucifixion, ii. 256 n. ^2\n\nCruelty to animals, ii. 496, 508-510\n\nCuriosity, ii. 109, 110, 135, 149, 595, 597\n\nCurses, materialistic conception of, i. 57-61, 70, 233 _sq._, ii.\n583. 584, 703;\n  holiness not allowed to be defiled by, i. 58, 625, ii. 638;\n  of parents, i. 58, 538, 621-627, ii. 703, 715, 716 n. ^2, 732;\n  of the poor, i. 561-565;\n  of magicians and priests, i. 563;\n  of saints, i. 563, 622;\n  of dying persons, i. 563, 626, ii. 245;\n  of dissatisfied guests, i. 584-594, ii. 715, 732;\n  of dissatisfied refugees, i. 585, 587 _sq._, ii. 636-638;\n  of old persons, i. 622, 626;\n  of husbands, i. 626;\n  of elder brothers and sisters, i. 626, ii. 703;\n  of superiors, i. 626 _sq._, ii. 703;\n  of women, i. 668;\n  of slaves, i. 716;\n  of their masters, ii. 703;\n  of kings, ii. 703;\n  personified and elevated to the rank of supernatural beings, i.\n  60, 379, 482, 561, 585, 623, 624, 626, ii. 68, 116, 715, 732;\n  transformed into attributes of gods, i. 379, 561, 562, 585,\n  624, ii. 68, 116, 715;\n  supernatural beings appealed to in, i. 561, 564 _sq._, ii.\n  66-68, 120-123, 658, 686-690, 699, 731;\n  supernatural beings exposed to men's, i. 564, 566, 585, ii.\n  584, 585, 618-624, 636, 638, 656-659, 700;\n  conducted by various vehicles, i. 586-594, ii. 121, 151, 208,\n  209, 567, 622-624, 687-690;\n  by blood, i. 586, 587, 591, ii. 69, 118-121, 208, 209, 618-622,\n  687-689;\n  by human blood or flesh, ii. 566 _sq._;\n  in reception ceremonies and salutations, i. 590 _sq._, ii. 151;\n  pronounced on thieves or as a means of protecting property, ii.\n  62-69, 703;\n  sacrifices to gods as a means of transferring, ii. 618-624, 658;\n  method of protecting the king against criminals, ii. 637;\n  prayers assuming the character of, ii. 656-659;\n  contained in ordeals, ii. 687-690;\n  influencing men's state in the future life, ii. 692, 693, 708,\n  709, 715 _sq._\n  See _L-[(]\u00e2r_\n\nCustoms, and laws as expressions of moral ideas, ch. vii. (i.\n158-201);\n  rules of duty, i. 118-122, 159-162;\n  their relations to laws, i. 163-166;\n  stronger than law and religion combined, i. 164;\n  the variety of, i. 327 _sq._;\n  the rigidity of ancestral, ii. 519, 520, 541;\n  transgressions of, punished by gods, ii. 670, 728;\n  instituted by the supreme being, ii. 671\n\n\nDARK, prohibition of eating in the, ii. 309\n\nDaughters, committing suicide on the death of their parents,\ni. 473.\n  See Children\n\nDays, tabooed, ii. 283-289, 747\n\nDead, regard for the, ch. xlv. (ii. **515-552);\n  human sacrifices to the, i. 26-28, 472-476, 486, ii. 234, 450,\n  451, 518;\n  vindictiveness of murdered, i. 232, 372, 375, 376, 378, 379,\n  406, 476, 481 _sq._, ii. 559 _sq._;\n  the property of the, i. 399, ii. 44, 518, 539 _sq._, see\n  Inheritance, Wills;\n  the treatment of old persons influenced by beliefs regarding\n  the, i. 620 _sq._;\n  interred in the field belonging to the family, ii. 66 n. ^1;\n  charms made from the bodies of the, ii. 204, 546;\n  offerings to the, ii. 302, 303, 400-404, 517, 518, 524, 539,\n  547 550, 692, 700, 701, 704, 708, _cf._ Alms;\n  polluting influence attributed to the, ii. 303, 537 _sq._;\n  marriages of the, ii. 400;\n  self-regarding pride attributed to the, ii. 519;\n  beliefs as regards the character and activity of the, ii.\n  528-535, 693;\n  fear of the, ii. 535-546, 548-550, 576;\n  believed to be easily duped, ii. 548;\n  worship of the, ii. 591, 596;\n  revenge taken by the living upon {843} the, ii. 692 _sq._;\n  supposed to be taken by the dead upon other, ii. 693 _sq._\n  See Annihilation, Burial, Cannibalism, Cremation, Funeral rites,\n  Future life, Future state, Mourning, Scalping, Suicide,\n  Transmigration, Vampires\n\nDeath, attributed to the influence of magic, i. 24, 29, ii. 534, 651;\n  self-mutilation after a, i. 26, 27, 476, ii. 524, 528, 544,\n  545, 547;\n  work suspended after a, ii. 283, 284, 306;\n  polluting influence ascribed to, ii. 283, 302-307, 416,\n  536-539, 544 _sq._;\n  to self-inflicted, ii. 257 n. ^5, 262;\n  to natural, ii. 416, 609;\n  fasting after a, ii. 298-308, 524, 544;\n  abstinence from cooking after a, ii. 304-306;\n  abstinence from sexual intercourse after a, ii. 306;\n  fear of, ii. 535 _sq._\n\nDebtors, enslaved, i. 422, 675, 677, 680, 684, 688, 689, 691;\n  creditors starving themselves to death before the doors of\n  their, ii. 245\n\nDebts, the owing of, ii. 93, 705\n\nDeceit. See Truth, regard for\n\nDeformed persons, religious veneration of, ii. 590\n\nDeodand, i. 262-264, 308\n\nDescent, the social influence of a common, ii. 198, 201-206, 220,\n224, 227, 748;\n  congruity or discrepancy between the principle of local\n  proximity and the principle of, ii. 202, 219 _sq._\n  See Kinship\n\n----, the system of tracing, connection between the authority\nover children and, i. 597 _sq._;\n  supposed connection between the position of women and, i. 655 _sq._;\n  the rules of inheritance influenced by, ii. 44-47, 54;\n  the influence of local connections on, ii. 203, 368 _sq._;\n  difference between the notion of actual blood-relationship and,\n  ii. 205 _sq._;\n  connection between the blood-feud and, ii. 211, 748\n\nDespotism, a cause of the severity of criminal codes, i. 193-196, 198;\n  a cause of deceitful habits, ii. 89, 130 _sq._;\n  politeness engendered by, ii. 152;\n  love of youths considered inimical to, ii. 478 _sq._\n\nDeterminism, i. 320-322, 325 _sq._\n\n_Dharna_, the custom of sitting, ii. 245\n\nDiet, restrictions in, ch. xxxvii, _sq._ (ii. 290-345).\n  See Food\n\nDisease, cured by contact with a saint, i. 63;\n  transference of, i. 64 _sq._;\n  supposed to be caused by supernatural beings, i. 392 _sq._, ii.\n  592-594;\n  by the dead, ii. 535;\n  the future state of persons who have died of, i. 392, ii. 238\n  n. ^3, 698;\n  human flesh or blood partaken of as a remedy against, i. 401,\n  ii. 562, 564 _sq._;\n  human sacrifices offered for the purpose of curing, i. 446,\n  447, 454-457;\n  cured at cross-roads, ii. 256 n. ^2.\n  See Epidemics, Sick persons\n\nDisinterested antipathies. See Antipathies\n\n---- likings. See Likings\n\nDisinterestedness, a characteristic of moral concepts, i. 101;\n  of the moral emotions, i. 102, 103, 107-122\n\nDivorce, i. 514, 528, 630, 632, 638, 641, 646-654, ii. 192,\n396-398, 455\n\nDog-fighting, ii. 509\n\nDogs, self-regarding pride in, i. 39, ii. 137 _sq._;\n  sympathetic resentment in, i. 112, ii. 52;\n  credited with a conscience, i. 249-251;\n  the killing of, considered polluting, i. 381 n. ^6;\n  fighting for their kennels or their prey, ii. 51;\n  supposed deceitfulness of, ii. 125;\n  abstinence from eating, ii. 330, 332;\n  taken for spirits in disguise, ii. 491;\n  regard for, ii. 493, 501, 705;\n  affection for, ii. 495 _sq._;\n  Erinyes of, ii. 504;\n  their fear of strange phenomena, ii. 583\n\nDrink, as a conductor of curses, i. 586, 589-591, ii. 121, 208,\n209, 567, 687-689\n\n---- , intoxicating, prohibition of, i. 228, ii. 341-345;\n  abstained from after a death, ii. 302.\n  See Drunkenness, Intoxicants, Wine\n\n_Droit d'aubaine_, ii. 49\n\nDrowned persons, the future state of, ii. 238, 521, 678, 697 _sq._\n\nDrunkenness, i. 310, ii. 338-344;\n  injuries committed in, i. 277-282, 306;\n  attributed to possession by a god or spirit, i. 278, 281, ii. 344\n\nDuel, the, ch. xxi. (i. 497-510); i. 163, 306, ii. 9, 145, 449\n\n\"Duty,\" analysis of the concept, i. 134-137;\n  corresponding to a \"right,\" i. 140 _sq._;\n  the relation between \"virtue\" and, i. 149 _sq._;\n  between \"merit\" and, i. 151\n\n{844} Duty, the feeling of, as a motive, i. 283 _sq._\n\n\nEAGLEHAWKS, abstinence from eating, ii. 326, 332\n\nEarthly desires, sinfulness of, ii. 361-363\n\nEclipses, supposed connection between human activity and, ii. 284 _sq._;\n  fasting in connection with, ii. 309 _sq._;\n  of the moon, attributed to the influence of evil spirits, ii. 313\n\nEducation, a means of communicating resentment, i. 114 _sq._;\n  its influence on the regard for truth, ii. 124;\n  on moral ideas relating to self-regarding conduct, ii. 266-268;\n  leading to homosexual practices, ii. 468-470\n\nEggs, abstinence from, ii. 320, 325, 326, 329\n\nElection, divine, the future state of men determined by, ii. 719 _sq._\n\nElephants, the feeling of revenge in, i. 37 _sq._;\n  abstinence from eating, ii. 329\n\nEmasculation, as a punishment, i. 45, 521.\n  See Eunuch priests\n\nEmigration, punished by law, ii. 175;\n  more injurious to the State than suicide, ii. 259\n\nEmotions, moral judgments referring to, i. 215\n\nEndogamy, ii. 378-382\n\nEnemies, killing of, regarded as praiseworthy, i. 331-333;\n  the future state influence by the killing of, i. 332, 373, ii. 693;\n  hospitality towards, i. 576, 577, 587 _sq._\n  See Blood-revenge, Forgiveness, Revenge, War\n\nEnvy, a hindrance to sympathetic retributive kindliness, i. 129;\n  of gods, ii. 361, 714, 716\n\nEpidemics, supposed to be caused by supernatural beings, i. 27,\nii. 592-594;\n  human sacrifices offered for the purpose of stopping or\n  preventing, i. 66, 441, 442, 449;\n  fasting during, ii. 315\n\nEquinoxes, fasting at, ii. 309, 310, 312 _sq._\n\nEquivalence, the rule of, i. 177-180;\n  i. 34, 35, 200, 217-219, 494, 496, 501, 511, 519 _sq._, ii. 233\n\nEquivocation, ii. 100, 101, 117\n\nErinyes, i. 60, 379, 482, 561, 585, 623, 626, ii. 68, 504, 714,\n715, 732\n\nEthics, the object of scientific, i. 18\n\nEucharist, the, i. 666, ii. 295, 415 n. **^8, 417, 480, 564;\n  the ordeal of, ii. 690\n\nEunuch priests, ii. 408, 414, 488 n. ^6\n\nEvil, materialistic conception of, i. 56, 57, 457;\n  transference of, combined with a sacrifice, i. 62-65\n\n---- eye, the, i. 561, 563, 584, 591-594, ii. 256 n. ^2, 354\n\n---- spirits, lunatics supposed to be possessed with, i. 270,\n274, 275, ii. 593;\n  intoxicated persons supposed to be possessed with, i. 281, ii. 344;\n  persecuting ghosts replaced by, i. 378 _sq._, ii. 493;\n  disease supposed to be caused by, i. 392 _sq._, ii. 592-594;\n  old women regarded as, i. 619;\n  burying apart of persons supposed to have been killed by, ii. 239;\n  eclipses of the moon attributed to the influence of, ii. 313;\n  water regarded as haunted by, ii. 355;\n  scourging as a means of driving away, ii. 358;\n  sacred words as a weapon against, ii. 418;\n  certain animals taken for, ii. 491;\n  butchers regarded as haunted by, ii. 493;\n  prevented from doing harm to the dead, ii. 523, 524, 544;\n  the ghosts of dead persons regarded as, ii. 531-534, 693;\n  places of striking appearance supposed to be haunted by, ii. 589;\n  unexpected events ascribed to the influence of, ii. 594;\n  taboos imposed upon the names of, ii. 640, 642;\n  magic practised with the assistance of, ii. 649 _sq._;\n  struggle of men and gods against, ii. 701, 702, 704-706, 729\n\nExecutioner, tribal, i. 174 _sq._;\n  the injured party acting as, i. 184 _sq._\n\nExogamy. See Incest\n\nExpiation, ii. 356-361;\n  fasting as a means of, ii. 315-318;\n  vicarious, ii. 719 _sq._\n\nExpiatory sacrifice, vicarious, i. 65-70, 438-440\n\nExposure of infants, i. 406-412;\n  a source of slavery, i. 689\n\n\nFAITH, considered necessary for salvation, ii. 719-721, 725-727.\n  See Unbelief\n\nFaithfulness. See Good faith\n\nFalse accusation, i. 522, ii. 79, 80, 140-142\n\n{845} False testimony, ii. 86 n. ^4, 91, 92, 96-98, 123 n. ^1, 717\n\nFalsehood. See Truth, regard for\n\nFamily, the, i. 113, 533, 627 _sq._, ii. 195, 196, 198, 199, 202, 223;\n  the joint, i. 539 _sq._, ii. 213-216\n\nFamines, human sacrifices offered in connection with, i. 442 _sq._;\n  cannibalism caused by, ii. 555, 577 _sq._\n  See Crops\n\n_Fas_, i. 579 _sq._, ii. 717\n\nFasting, ii. 292-318;\n  enjoined by religion, i. 271, ii. 246, 292-298, 308-318, 358,\n  406, 725;\n  as a means of purification, i. 375, ii. 294-296, 358;\n  as a penance, ii. 246, 315-318, 406;\n  after a death, ii. 298-308, 524, 544\n\nFat, abstinence from, i. 187, 229, ii. 312\n\nFatalism, i. 323-326\n\nFather, the, his authority over his children, ch. xxv. (i. 597-628);\n  permitted to punish his children with death, i. 393 _sq._;\n  to kill or expose his new-born children, i. 394-411;\n  to inflict corporal punishment upon his children, i. 513-515,\n  607, 610;\n  to sell his children, i. 599, 607, 609, 611, 612, 615, 675,\n  681, 682, 684, 685, 689, 691;\n  his affection for his children, i. 401, 402, 405, 529-533. ii.\n  187-190, 193, 397, 748;\n  obliged to protect and support his family, i. 526-533;\n  descent traced through, i. 655 _sq._, ii. 44-47, 54, 202, 203,\n  205, 206, 211, 220;\n  the son allowed to eat only certain foods after the death of,\n  ii. 301 _sq._\n  See Parents\n\nFear, i. 40 _sq._;\n  of death, ii. 535 _sq._;\n  as an element in the religious sentiment, ii. 612-614, 725;\n  of punishment in the future life, ii. 735\n\nFemales, the sexual impulse of, i. 657 _sq._, ii. 435\n\nFeticide, i. 378, 408, 409, 413-417, ii. 705\n\nFilial affection, i. 534-538, 618, 659, ii. 194, 748\n\n---- reverence, i. 533-538, 600, 601, 607-613, 616-628, ii. 194\n\nFirstborn child, the, all children killed except, i. 398;\n  killed, i. 458-460, ii. 562;\n  eaten, i. 458, ii. 562;\n  regarded as sacred, ii. 538 n. ^2\n\nFirstborn son, the, sacrifice of, i. 457-461;\n  eaten, i. 458 _sq._;\n  considered identical with his father, i. 460;\n  fasting on the eve of Passover, ii. 296.\n  See Primogeniture\n\nFish, anger shown by, i. 22, ii. 51;\n  abstinence from eating, ii. 321, 322, 324 _sq._;\n  after a death, ii. 301;\n  deference shown for, ii. 492;\n  killing of, ii. 497 _sq._\n\nFishing peoples, the position of women among, i. 660;\n  slavery among, i. 672;\n  social aggregates of, ii. 198-200;\n  filthiness a characteristic of, ii. 349\n\nFlagellation, ii. 294, 357-359\n\n_Flagrante delicto_, offenders caught, i. 290-294, ii. 8, 13, 17,\n18, 58, 429, 447\n\nFood, prohibitory rules relating to, ch. xxxvii. _sq._ (ii.\n290-345);\n  stealing of, i. 286, 287, 676, ii. 14, 15, 57 _sq._;\n  as a conductor of curses, i. 586-592, ii. 622-624;\n  detrimental to holiness, ii. 294-296;\n  the eating of certain kinds of, forbidden by gods, ii. 326, 33,\n  335, 671\n\nForbearances, i. 209, 210, 303-305\n\nForeigners, protected by the chief or king, i. 180, 181, 338;\n  killing of, i. 331-334, 337-34, 370, 371, 373;\n  sacrifice of, i. 467 _sq._;\n  infliction of bodily injuries upon, i. 519;\n  kindness to, i. 545, 556-558, 570-572, 581;\n  enslaving of, i. 674, 675, 689, 690, 691, 714 _sq._;\n  respect for the proprietary rights of, ii. 2, 11, 59;\n  demoralising influence of, ii. 2, 126-129, see White men;\n  robbery committed upon, ii. 20-25, 58 _sq._;\n  reduced to serfdom, ii. 24;\n  rules of inheritance relating to, ii. 49;\n  deceiving of, ii. 87, 88, 90, 94, 97, 112, 126-129;\n  duties to, ii. 166;\n  despised, ii. 171-174, 532;\n  disregard of their interests, ii. 176;\n  antipathy to, ii. 227;\n  marriages with, ii. 378, 381 _sq._;\n  eaten, ii. 554;\n  sacrilege committed by, ii. 648.\n  See Strangers\n\nForgery, punished with death, i. 187 _sq._;\n  with mutilation, i. 521\n\nForgiveness, i. 73-79, 84-88, 99, 311, 318, ii. 145, 360\n\nFoundation sacrifices. See Buildings\n\nFowls, abstinence from eating, ii. 320-322, 325, 327, 329, 332;\n  affection for, ii. 495\n\n{846} Foxes, abstinence from eating, ii. 327\n\nFraternal affection, ii. 194, 195, 748\n\n---- duties, i. 538, ii. 748\n\nFraud. See Truth, regard for\n\nFree love, ch. xlii. (ii. 422-455). See Unchastity\n\nFreedmen, marriages with, i. 688, ii. 379;\n  not allowed to bring criminal charges against freeborn persons,\n  i. 697\n\nFreedom, personal, i. 597, ii. 265\n\nFree-will, moral valuation and, i. 320-326\n\nFrogs, prohibition of eating, ii. 321\n\nFuneral rites, ii. 519-528, 536-552;\n  the ordinary, denied to suicides, ii. 238, 248, 250, 252-254,\n  549.\n  See Blood (effusion of, at funerals; offered to the dead),\n  Burial, Cremation, Dead (human sacrifices to the; offerings to\n  the), Self-mutilation (after a death)\n\nFuture life, belief in retribution in a, among civilised races,\ni. 258, 259, 519, 550-553, 555, 556, 579, 580, 625, 650, 683,\n687, ii. 165, 284, 341, 417, 479, 497, 700, 705, 706, 708-713,\n715, 716, 718-720, 725, 734 _sq._;\n  among uncivilised peoples, i. 403, 542-544, 578, ii. 59, 60,\n  69, 115, 271, 272, 671-681, 683-685, 690-695;\n  the belief in a, ii. 515 _sq._;\n  its influence on the notions concerning homicide, i. 382;\n  concerning the killing of old or sick persons, i. 390, 392;\n  concerning infanticide, i. 411 _sq._;\n  concerning feticide, i. 416 _sq._;\n  concerning suicide, ii. 235-237, 244, 253, 262.\n  See Dead\n\n---- state, the, of persons who have been struck by lightning, i.\n26, ii. 544, 549, 697 _sq._;\n  who have not slain any enemies, i. 332;\n  who have slain enemies, i. 373, ii. 693;\n  who have died of old age, i. 390, ii. 235, 238 n. ^3, 698;\n  of disease, i. 392, ii. 238 n. ^3, 698;\n  by violence, i. 481 _sq._, ii. 237-239, 242;\n  by accident, ii. 238, 239, 241;\n  by starvation, ii. 238 n. ^3;\n  who have committed suicide, ii. 235-239, 242-244, 246, 253,\n  262, 694, 710;\n  who have been killed in war, ii. 237, 521, 694, 697, 704, 708;\n  who have been drowned, ii. 238, 521, 678, 697 _sq._;\n  who have suffered pain in this life, ii. 360;\n  who have died unmarried and childless, ii. 399-404;\n  who have refrained from connections with women, ii. 414 _sq._;\n  who have committed perjury, ii. 715 _sq._;\n  of women, i. 662 _sq._, ii. 673;\n  of women who have died in childbirth, ii. 238 n. ^3, 678;\n  of children, ii. 673, 727;\n  of unbaptised children, i. 411, 412, 416 _sq._, ii.\n  721-723;\n  of the heathen, ii. 720 _sq._;\n  influenced by human sacrifices offered to the dead, i. 472-476,\n  ii. 518;\n  by the mutilations and self-bleedings of mourners, i. 476, ii. 547;\n  by knowledge of religious truth, ii. 132-134, 719-721,\n  725-727;\n  by the treatment of the dead person's corpse, ii. 238, 521-523,\n  546, 548, 694, 704;\n  by offerings made to the dead, ii. 400-404, 517, 518, 524, 539,\n  692, 700, 701, 704, 708;\n  by alms given on behalf of the dead, ii. 550-552;\n  by prayer on behalf of the dead, ii. 552;\n  by curses, ii. 692, 693, 708, 709, 715 _sq._;\n  by rank, ii. 698;\n  by magical practices, ii. 700, 701, 706, 709, 710, 712;\n  by vicarious expiation, ii. 719 _sq._;\n  by divine election, ii. 719 _sq._;\n  by faith, ii. 719-721, 725-727;\n  by sacramental grace, ii. 719 _sq._, by baptism, ii. 721-723\n\n\nGENERALITY, the moral emotions characterised by a flavour of, i.\n104, 105, 107, 117-123\n\nGenerosity, charity and, ch. xxiii. (i. 526-569)\n\nGifts, blessings pronounced by recipients of, i. 561-565;\n  the danger of accepting, i. 593 _sq._\n\nGirls, at puberty, ii. 307 _sq._\n\nGluttony, ii. 290 _sq._\n\nGoat-dung, a means of purification, i. 376\n\n-----flesh, abstinence from, ii. 322, 332\n\n\"God,\" definition of the term, ii. 602\n\nGoddesses, jealous of the chastity of their priests, ii. 414\n\nGods, duties to, ch. xlviii. _sq._ (ii. 602-662);\n  as guardians of morality, chs. l.-lii. (ii. 663-737);\n  punish innocent persons in consequence of the sins of the\n  guilty, i. 48-72, ii. 660;\n  punish unchastity, i. 49, ii. 675;\n  curses personified {847} and elevated to the rank of\n  supernatural agents or, i. 60, 379, 482, 561, 585, 623, 624, 626,\n  ii. 68, 116, 715, 732;\n  human sacrifices offered to, i. 62, 63, 65, 66, 339, 434-472,\n  ii. 295, 296, 419, 559, 562, 563, 579, 651, 697;\n  reward undeserving persons in consequence of the merits of\n  others, i. 96-99, ii. 660;\n  connection between the severity of punishment and the belief\n  in, i. 193-198;\n  disobedience to, i. 194-198, ii. 659 _sq._;\n  revengeful feelings attributed to, i. 194, 198, 438-440, 471\n  _sq._, ii. 660, 661, 667, 668, 702, 714;\n  attach undue importance to the outward aspect of conduct, i.\n  227-231, 233-235, ii. 714;\n  judge upon human actions without much regard to their motives,\n  i. 299-302;\n  punish homicide, i. 378-380, ii. 669, 672, 676, 684, 686, 700,\n  714, 717, 732;\n  curses transformed into attributes of, i. 379, 561, 562, 585,\n  624, ii. 68, 116, 715;\n  blood pollution shunned by, i. 380-382;\n  enjoin or approve of charity, i. 549-558. 561-569, ii. 669,\n  672, 699, 705, 711, 717, 718, 725, 726, 732;\n  appealed to in curses or oaths, i. 561, 564 _sq._, ii. 66, 67,\n  120-123, 658, 686-690, 699, 731 _sq._;\n  in blessings, i. 562, 564 _sq._, ii. 686, 731;\n  enjoin hospitality, i. 578-580, ii. 669, 711, 714, 717, 718,\n  726, 732;\n  exposed to the curses of men, i. 585, ii. 618-624, 636, 638,\n  656-659, 700;\n  protect refugees, i. 585, ii. 629-633, 636, 638, 714;\n  enjoin regard for parents, i. 610, 624, ii. 711, 714, 717, 732;\n  punish abandoning of old persons, i. 620;\n  punish disrespect for chiefs, i. 626;\n  women shunned by, i. 664-666;\n  guardians of property, ii. 59-69, 669, 675-677, 679, 684, 686,\n  699, 700, 705, 714, 717, 732;\n  guilty of falsehood, ii. 94, 95, 98;\n  guardians of truth and good faith, ii. 96, 114-123, 128, 129,\n  669, 672, 675-677, 684, 686, 699, 700, 703-705, 707, 711, 714,\n  717, 726, 732;\n  perjury regarded as an offence against, ii. 122, 122 _sq._ n. ^10;\n  perjury punished by, ii. 123 n. ^1, 684, 686, 714;\n  condemn pride, ii. 144 _sq._;\n  different, fused into one, ii. 225 _sq._;\n  approve of suicide, ii. 236, 244, 261;\n  suicide offensive to, ii. 237, 243, 245-249, 251-254, 260, 263;\n  agriculture pleasing to, ii. 275, 277;\n  commend industry, ii. 275, 280, 281, 675, 705;\n  require pure sacrifices, ii. 295 _sq._;\n  prohibit the eating of certain foods, ii. 326, 330, 335 671;\n  disapprove of abstinence from intoxicating drink, ii. 339;\n  disapprove of drunkenness, ii. 342;\n  demand ceremonial cleanliness, ii. 352, 353, 700 n. ^5, 705,\n  718, 726;\n  punish ablutions, ii. 355;\n  self-mortification pleasing to, ii. 356-361, 421;\n  exciting the compassion of, ii. 361;\n  envious of men, ii. 361, 714, 716;\n  punish incest, ii. 375, 376, 671;\n  women married to, ii. 412-414;\n  sexual **pollution shunned by, ii. 418;\n  addicted to homosexual practices, ii. 472, 474;\n  eating of, ii. 563 _sq._, see Totem;\n  the tendency to make them more and more perfect, ii. 599, 600,\n  730, 731, 733 _sq._;\n  not necessarily immortal, ii. 602 _sq._;\n  killing of, ii. 602-610, 753 _sq._, see Totem;\n  punished by men, ii. 610;\n  subject to human needs, ii. 610 _sq._;\n  sacrifices to, ii. 611-626, see Sacrifice;\n  fear of, ii. 612-614, 725;\n  malevolent, ii. 613, 665-667, 706, 707, 709, 714, 716, 728,\n  729, 733;\n  benevolent, ii. 613-615, 667-669, 697-708, 712, 713, 716, 725,\n  728, 729, 731;\n  assistance expected from, ii. 614-616;\n  gratitude to, ii. 615 _sq._;\n  property of, ii. 626 _sq._;\n  self-regarding pride of, ii. 639-655;\n  blasphemy against, ii. 639, 640, 719;\n  taboos imposed upon the names of, ii. 640-643;\n  intolerance of, ii. 643-647, 649, 650, 652;\n  tolerance of, ii. 647-649, 652 _sq._;\n  free from human weaknesses, ii. 652;\n  prayers to, ii. 653-659, see Prayer;\n  priests regarded as manifestations of, ii. 657, 709;\n  the communal character of the relations between men and their,\n  ii. 661;\n  selection of, ii. 662, 729 _sq._;\n  punish transgressions of custom, ii. 670, 728;\n  punish bad behaviour towards old and sick persons, ii. 672, 675;\n  punish adultery, ii. 675, 676, 684, 686, 700, 717;\n  love justice, ii. 675, 684, 686, 699, 700, 703, 704, 732;\n  approve of valour, ii. 679;\n  fighting against evil {848} spirits, ii. 701, 702, 704-706, 729;\n  invoked by thieves, ii. 733.\n  See Guardian spirits, Religion, Supernatural beings, Supreme\n  beings, Totem\n\n\"Golden rule, the,\" i. 102 _sq._\n\n\"Good,\" analysis of the concept, i. 145-147\n\n\"---- deeds,\" i. 299-302\n\nGood faith, regard for truth and, ch. xxx. _sq._ (ii. 72-131)\n\nGratitude, i. 21, 42, 43, 93, 94, 318, 319, 538, 618, ii. 154-166;\n  to gods, ii. 615 _sq._\n\nGreetings, i. 590-592, ii. 146, 147, 149-151\n\nGregarious instinct, the, ii. 197 _sq._\n\nGregariousness, i. 94, 95, 113, ii. 195-197. 748\n\nGrief, expressions of, ii. 283, 308, 316, 528\n\nGroup marriage, ii. 387, 392-396, 752\n\nGuardian spirits, i. 373, 464 _sq._, ii. 210, 406, 528-531, 588,\n666, 668, 669, 675, 676, 702\n\n\nHABIT, the influence of, on moral ideas, i. 159, 160, 402, 533,\n559, 646, ii. 52, 125-131, 146, 185, 272, 335, 343, 351, 392,\n440, 441, 455, 471, 484, 509, 577, 578, 580;\n  on the authority of the law, i. 163 _sq._\n\nHair, conditional curses seated in the, i. 57 _sq._\n\nHandicraft, moral valuation of, ii. 273, 274, 278-280, 282 _sq._\n\nHandshaking, ii. 150, 151, 623 _sq._\n\nHappiness, regard for other persons' ch. xxxiii. (ii. 153-185);\n  for one's own, ii. 265\n\nHares, abstinence from eating, ii. 333 _sq._\n\nHead-hunting, i. 333, 373, 544\n\nHeedlessness, i. 211, 305-310\n\nHell, notions about, ii. 60, 284, 417, 672, 674, 675, 677, 678,\n683, 692, 706, 723, 724, 727\n\nHeresy, ii. 646 _sq._;\n  punishment of, i. 47, 50, 245, 493;\n  considered a legitimate cause of war, i. 349-352, 359;\n  judicial torture in cases of, i. 523;\n  a bar to intermarriage, ii. 380 _sq._;\n  homosexual practices associated with, ii. 486-489;\n  the future state influenced by, ii. 721\n\nHoliness, must not be defiled by curses or oaths, i. 58, 625, ii. 638;\n  by blood, i. 380-382;\n  by women, i. 664-666;\n  by food, ii. 294-296;\n  by certain kinds of food, ii. 322;\n  by intoxicating drink, ii. 344 _sq._;\n  by sexual pollution, ii. 415-420, 752;\n  very susceptible to any polluting influence, ii. 352, 353,\n  608-610;\n  objects endowed with, must not be appropriated for ordinary\n  purposes, ii. 627 _sq._;\n  a god's, polluted by his name being mentioned in profane\n  conversation, ii. 643;\n  attributed to sacrificial victims, i. 63, 65, 69, 444-447, ii.\n  563, 625, 658;\n  its magic virtue transferred by contact, i. 63-65, 69, 444-446,\n  ii. 605, 606, 625, 754;\n  by eating, i. 446, ii. 562-564, 605, 625;\n  by sexual intercourse, i. 593, ii. 444-446, 488;\n  looked upon as a transferable entity, i. 586, ii. 607-610, 754;\n  contact with, regarded as dangerous, ii. 538 n. ^2\n  See Sacred places\n\nHome, love of, ii. 167-169, 179 _sq._\n\nHomestead, sanctity of the, i. 587, ii. 635 n. ^4\n\nHomicide, in general, chs. xiv-xvi. (i. 327-382);\n  punished with death i. 171, 172, 187, 189, 491, 492;\n  considered polluting, i. 225, 232, 233, 375-382, ii. 256 _sq._\n  n. ^2, 262, 714;\n  stigmatised by religion, i. 345, 346, 378-380, 382, ii. 669,\n  672, 676, 684, 686, 700, 705, 714, 716 n. ^2, 717, 732;\n  the influence of rank on the criminality of, i. 430-433;\n  duels in cases of, i. 501 _sq._\n  See Blood-revenge, Compensation for homicide, Duel, Head\n  hunting, Human sacrifice, Killing, Manslaughter, Manslayers,\n  Punishment of Death, War\n\nHomosexual love, ch. xliii. (ii. 456-489), 752 _sq._\n\nHoney, abstained from after a death, ii. 301\n\nHonour, duels of, i. 498-503, 507-510;\n  respect for other men's, ii. 137-143\n\nHope, as an element in religion, ii. 614, 735;\n  in rewards after death, ii. 735\n\nHorses, stealing of, i. 187 _sq._, ii. 14;\n  abstinence from the flesh of, ii. 322, 335\n\nHospitality, ch. xxiv. (i. 570-596); i. 333, 340, 540, 542, 543,\n545, 548, 549, 555;\n  enjoined by religion, i. {849} 578-580, ii. 669, 711, 714, 715,\n  717, 718, 726, 732\n\nHouses, stealing from, i. 187 _sq._, ii. 15, 16, 58, see\nBurglary;\n  asylums, i. 587, ii. 630, 635 n. ^4, 636 _sq._\n\nHuman effigies, sacrifice of, i. 468-470, 475\n\n---- sacrifice, ch. xix. (i. 434-476); i. 26-28, 62, 63, 65-67,\n339, 486, ii. 234, 295, 296, 419, 450, 451, 518, 579, 651, 697;\n  the execution of blood-revenge a kind of, i. 476, 481 _sq._;\n  suicide as a kind of, ii. 234-236;\n  combined with cannibalism, ii. 559, 562 _sq._\n\nHumility, ii. 144-146;\n  sacrifice as a symbol of, ii. 625 _sq._\n\nHunting peoples, vegetable food provided by the women among, i.\n634, ii. 273;\n  the position of women among, i. 660 _sq._;\n  slavery hardly known among, i. 672;\n  social aggregates of, ii. 198-200;\n  the form of marriage among, ii. 389 _sq._\n\nHusbands, their power over their wives, ch. xxvi. (i. 629-669);\n  wives punished if convicted of a design to kill their, i. 245;\n  crimes committed by wives in the presence of their, i. 284;\n  killing their wives, i. 418, 419, 631;\n  wives killing their, i. 419 _sq._;\n  wives sacrificed on the death of their, i. 472-474, ii. 450 _sq._;\n  wives committing suicide on the death of their, i. 473 _sq._,\n  ii. 232, 234, 235, 241, 242, 244, 247;\n  inflicting bodily injuries upon their wives, i. 514-516, 631;\n  their duty to protect and support their wives, i. 526-529, 532 _sq._;\n  lending their wives to guests, i. 575, 593;\n  living with their fathers-in-law, i. 601, 656 _sq._, ii. 202, 203;\n  curses of, i. 626;\n  selling their wives as slaves, i. 675. 684;\n  belief in a mysterious bond of sympathy between wives and, ii. 205;\n  wives fasting on the death of their, ii. 298-301;\n  adultery committed by, ii. 397, 451-455;\n  eating their wives, ii. 555.\n  See Marital affection, Marriage, Widowers\n\n\nIDIOTS, injuries committed by, i. 269-273, 275;\n  objects of religious reverence, i. 270 _sq._;\n  kindness to, i. 547\n\nIdleness, ii. 268-277, 281 _sq._;\n  a cause of uncleanliness, ii. 350 _sq._\n\nIllegitimate children, rules of inheritance relating to, i. 47,\nii. 46, 48, 49, 56 _sq._;\n  treatment of, i. 47, ii. 431, 439;\n  sacrifice of, i. 467\n\nImpartiality, apparent, a characteristic of the moral emotions,\ni. 103, 104, 107, 117-122\n\nInanimate things, revenged upon or punished, i. 26, 27, 260-264, 308;\n  retributive emotions evoked by, i. 26, 27, 260-264, 315, 318;\n  conceived as animate, i. 27, 263, ii. 595;\n  moral praise and blame not applied to, i. 319\n\nIncantations, ii. 656-659\n\nIncest, prohibition and horror of, i. 174. 175, 177, 197. 492,\nii. 364-378, 747-752;\n  stigmatised by religion, ii. 375, 376, 671\n\nIndemnification, i. 168, 169, 308 _sq._ See Compensation\n\nIndependence, love of national, ii. 170, 175\n\n\"Indifferent, the morally,\" i. 154-157\n\nIndustry, ii. 268-282;\n  commended by religion, ii. 275, 280, 281, 675, 705;\n  cleanliness promoted by, ii. 35\n\nInfanticide, i. 378, 394-413, 633, ii. 562;\n  supposed relationship between the social reaction against\n  homosexuality and against, ii. 484, 485, 752 _sq._\n\nInfants, exposure of, i. 406-412;\n  a source of slavery, i. 689.\n  See Infanticide\n\nInheritance, rules of, ii. 44-49, 53-57\n\nInitiation ceremonies, instituted by the All-father, ii. 671\n\n\"Injustice,\" analysis of the concept, i. 141-145\n\nInjustice, punished by the supreme being, ii. 675\n\n\"Instinct,\" the meaning of the word, ii. 374 n. ^2\n\nInsults, i. 39, 502, 503, 509, 510, 524 _sq._, ii. 110,\n138-143;\n  to the dead, ii. 519;\n  to gods, ii. 639-652\n\nIntellectual disability, agents under, ch. x. (i. 249-282)\n\nIntemperance, ii. 290 _sq._\n\nIntentions, i. 204-206, 212 _sq._;\n  punishment of bare, i. 244 _sq._\n\nIntolerance, religious, ii. 643-653\n\n{850} Intoxicants, religious, veneration of, ii. 591 _sq._\n  See Drink, intoxicating; Drunkenness; Wine\n\nInversion, sexual, ii. 465-470, 752 _sq._\n\n\nJEALOUSY, ii. 387, 389, 449, 450, 751\n\n_Jinn_ (_jn\u00fbn_), i. 378, 379, 619, ii. 355, 493. 589, 593-594,\n640, 642, 650\n\nJoint family, the, i. 539 _sq._, ii. 213-216\n\n\"Judgment of God,\" war looked upon as a, i. 358, 360;\n  the duel as a, i. 504-507.\n  See Ordeals\n\n_Jus prim\u00e6 noctis_, ii. 395, 752\n\n\"Justice,\" analysis of the concept, i. 141-145\n\nJustice, the sense of, among savages, i. 124, 126-129;\n  loved by gods, ii. 675, 684, 686, 699, 700, 703, 704. 732\n\n\n_Karma_, ii. 711\n\nKilling, in self-defence, i. 288-290;\n  of foreigners, i. 331-334, 337-34, 370, 371, 373;\n  of enemies, i. 331-333, 373, ii. 693;\n  of slaves, i. 378, 421-429, 696, 707;\n  of infants by their parents, i. 378, 394-413, 633, ii. 562;\n  of human embryos, i. 378, 408, 409, 413-417, ii. 705;\n  of parents by their children, i. 383-386, 522, ii. 256 _sq._ n. ^2;\n  or abandoning of aged parents, i. 386-390, 606, 607, 612, 620;\n  or abandoning of sick persons, i. 391-393, ii. 542;\n  of grown-up children by their parents, i. 393 _sq._, ii. 256\n  _sq._ n. ^2;\n  of wives by their husbands, i. 418, 419, 631;\n  of women, i. 418-421;\n  of husbands by their wives, i. 419 _sq._;\n  of freemen by slaves, i. 429, 430, 491 n. ^5;\n  of chiefs, i. 430;\n  of the firstborn child, i. 458-460, ii. 562;\n  of the firstborn son, i. 458-461;\n  of departed souls, ii. 516 _sq._;\n  of divine beings, ii. 602-610, 753 sq.;\n  of disappointing magicians, ii. 609.\n  See Blood-revenge, Compensation for homicide, Duel, Head\n  hunting, Homicide, Human sacrifice, Manslaughter, Manslayers,\n  Punishment of death, Suicide, War\n\nKilling of animals, ch. xliv. (ii. 490-514);\n  in consequence of harm done by them, i. 26, 27, 251-260;\n  of sacred animals, i. 227, ii. 603-606, 609;\n  of totem animals, ii. 210, 603, 604, 606;\n  of vermin, i. 26, 27, 251;\n  dogs, i. 381 n. ^6, ii. 501;\n  monkeys, ii. 329, 490, 513;\n  buffaloes, ii. 330;\n  sheep, ii. 330;\n  cattle, ii. 330, 493 _sq._;\n  cows, ii. 330, 331, 497;\n  the ploughing ox, **ii. 330, 331, 493. 494, 504;\n  calves, ii. 331;\n  bees, ii. 490;\n  pigeons, ii. 490;\n  storks, ii. 490;\n  swallows, ii. 490;\n  ravens, ii. 491;\n  toads, ii. 491;\n  fish, ii. 497 _sq._\n  See Sacrifice\n\nKing, the, tied by custom, i. 161 _sq._;\n  the poor and the weak protected by, i. 180 _sq._;\n  the right of pardon a prerogative of, i. 192, 196, 226;\n  an object of religious veneration, i. 194, ii. 606-610, 754;\n  homicide committed by the command of, i. 285;\n  strangers protected by, i. 338;\n  homicide regarded as an injury inflicted upon, i. 374;\n  sacrificed, i. 443, 466;\n  human sacrifices offered for the purpose of saving the life of,\n  i. 454-457, 466;\n  proprietary rights of, ii. 33;\n  loyalty to, ii. 180, 182;\n  suicide regarded as an offence against, ii. 240, 263 n. ^1;\n  taboos imposed upon, ii. 287 _sq._, 407, 418;\n  the custom of shutting up doors used by, ii. 538 n. ^2;\n  cannibalism as a duty incumbent upon, ii. 558;\n  killing of, ii. 606-610, 753 _sq._;\n  his burial place an asylum, ii. 630;\n  his house an asylum, ii. 636;\n  his person an asylum, ii. 636 _sq._;\n  swearing on the life of, ii. 637;\n  criminals prevented from cursing, ii. 637;\n  curses pronounced by, ii. 703\n\nKinship, mutual assistance imposed as a duty by, i. 538-540;\n  the social influence of, ii. 198, 201-206, 220, 224, 227, 748.\n  See Descent\n\nKnots, magic, ii. 585, 619, 652\n\nKnowledge, regard for, ii. 131-136;\n  of religious truth, influencing the future state, ii. 132-134,\n  719-721, 725-727\n\nKnown concomitants of acts, i. 212-214, 249\n\n\nLABOUR, ii. 268-283;\n  the division of, between the sexes i. 633-637, ii. 271;\n  property acquired by, ii. 41-43, 53, 69-71;\n  suspension of, {851} on various occasions, ii. 283-289;\n  temporarily forbidden to men who have eaten human flesh, ii. 575\n\n_L-[(]ahd_, ii. 623 _sq._\n\nLamentations at funerals, ii. 524, 528, 541 _sq._\n\nLandmarks, removing of, i. 186, ii. 60, 61, 67-69, 703, 714, 717\n\nLanguage, as a communicator of moral emotions, i. 115-117;\n  as an expression of moral concepts, i. 131-133;\n  the influence of a common, ii. 167, 170, 181;\n  as an emblem of nationality, ii. 224 _sq._\n\n_L-[(]\u00e2r_, i. 57, 58, 566, 586, 587, 591, ii. 584-586, 618-620,\n623, 638\n\nLaws, customs and, as expressions of moral ideas, ch. vii. (i.\n158-201);\n  their relations to customs, i. 163-166\n\nLent fast, ii. 295, 308 _sq._\n\nLevirate, the, i. 528\n\n_Lex talionis_. See Equivalence, the rule of\n\nLibel, i. 522, ii. 96, 141\n\nLightning, persons struck by, i. 26, ii. 239, 544, 549, 697 _sq._\n\nLikings, disinterested, i. 117, ii. 16, 58, 185, 227, 261, 262,\n266, 267, 744-746\n\n_Limbus_, ii. 722\n\nLions, their fear of strange phenomena, ii. 583\n\nLove. See Affection, Free love, Homosexual love\n\nLoyalty, ii. 180, 182\n\nLunacy, attributed to demoniacal possession, i. 270, 274 _sq._,\nii. 593;\n  to malignant magical agency, i. 317, ii. 531 _sq._;\n  regarded as a divine punishment, i. 274 _sq._;\n  as a punishment inflicted by a saint, ii. 628\n\nLunatics, injuries committed by, i. 189, 269-277, 298, 299, 316,\n317, 319;\n  objects of religious reverence, i. 270 _sq._, ii. 590;\n  burned as witches, i. 273\n\nLuxury, ii. 266\n\nLying. See Truth, regard for\n\nLynching, i. 91\n\n\nMADNESS. See Lunacy\n\nMagic, regarded as a cause of death, i. 24, 29, ii. 534, 651;\n  as a cause of lunacy, i. 317, ii. 531 _sq._;\n  expertness in, attributed to strangers, i. 584;\n  to old persons, i. 619 _sq._;\n  to women, i. 620, 666-668;\n  the position of slaves influenced by the dread of, i. 716;\n  fasting in connection with, ii. 293 _sq._;\n  definitions of, ii. 584, 753;\n  attitude of religion towards, ii. 649, 650, 652, 753;\n  its influence on moral ideas, ii. 696;\n  supposed to influence the future state of men, ii. 700, 701,\n  706, 709, 710, 712.\n  See Blessings, Blood, Charms, Cross, Cross-roads, Curses,\n  Evil eye, Knots, _L-[(]ahd_, _L-[(]\u00e2r_, Magicians, Oaths,\n  Ordeals, Prayer, Purificatory ceremonies, Sacrifice, Sexual\n  intercourse (as a magical or religious rite), Spitting,\n  Transference, Witchcraft\n\n----, hom[oe]opathic, ii. 446 n. ^7, 753\n\n----, sympathetic, i. 589 _sq._, ii. 204, 205, 209 n. ^5, 546,\n566, 643\n\nMagicians, curses of, i. 563;\n  sexual intercourse with, i. 593 n. ^1;\n  abstain from certain foods, ii. 322, 327;\n  purificatory ceremonies of, ii. 352;\n  celibacy compulsory on, ii. 405 _sq._;\n  conjugal faithfulness compulsory on persons who wish to become,\n  ii. 419;\n  addicted to homosexual practices, ii. 458, 459, 465, 472, 477,\n  484, 486 _sq._;\n  treatment of the dead bodies of, ii. 527;\n  cannibalism of, ii. 564;\n  killing of disappointing, ii. 609;\n  their residences asylums, ii. 631.\n  See Witches; _cf._ Priests\n\nMales, the sexual impulse of, i. 657\n\nMammals, paternal care among, ii. 189 _sq._;\n  maternal care among, ii. 190;\n  the duration of conjugal unions among, ii. 192\n\nMan-gods, eating of, ii. 563 _sq._;\n  killing of, ii. 606-610, 753 _sq._\n\nMankind at large, duties to. See Cosmopolitanism\n\nManslaughter, distinguished from murder, i. 294-298, ii. 633\n\nManslayers, regarded as unclean, i. 225, 232, 233, 375-382, ii.\n256 _sq._ n. ^2;\n  adoption of unintentional, i. 484;\n  refuge denied to, ii. 632 _sq._\n\nMarital affection, i. 113, 532 _sq._, ii. 190-193.\n  See Conjugal affection\n\nMarriage, ch. xl. (ii. 364-398);\n  as a compensation for homicide, i. 484;\n  the father's consent required for a daughter's, i. 599, 609,\n  611, 613, 615 _sq._, ii. 383;\n  for a son's, i. 609, 613, 615 _sq._;\n  the parents' {852} consent required for a child's, i. 607, 608,\n  617, 618, 624 _sq._;\n  slaves prohibited from contracting a legal, i. 693, 697, 706 _sq._;\n  prohibition of, between white and coloured persons, i. 714;\n  between relations by adoption, ii. 369, 374, 375, 748-750, 752;\n  regarded as a duty, ii. 399-405;\n  enjoined by religion, ii. 399-404;\n  between dead persons, ii. 400;\n  forbidden to persons whose function it is to perform religious\n  or magical rites, ii. 405-409, 412-414, 418-421;\n  considered impure, ii. 410-412;\n  between a god and a woman, ii. 412-414;\n  avoidance of, between cannibals and their non-cannibal\n  neighbours, ii. 571;\n  the contracting of a second, forbidden to widows, i. 475, ii. 450 _sq._;\n  to priests, ii. 412;\n  considered improper for widowers, ii. 451.\n  See Divorce, Group marriage, Incest, Levirate\n\nMarriage by capture, ii. 382 _sq._\n\n---- by purchase, i. 421, 599, 632 _sq._, ii. 382-385, 751;\n  a hindrance to polygyny, ii. 389;\n  the marriage tie strengthened by, ii. 397;\n  the standard of female chastity raised by, ii. 436, 437, 440\n\n---- portion, ii. 385 _sq._;\n  the marriage tie strengthened by the, ii. 397\n\nMaternal affection, i. 405, 529-531, ii. 186-190, 193, 748\n\n---- duties, i. 526, 533, **ii. 748\n\n---- rights, ch. xxv. (i. 597-628), **ii. 748\n\nMatter, regarded as impure, ii. 362 _sq._\n\nMeat, manslayers prohibited from eating, i. 375;\n  abstained from before the offering of a sacrifice, ii. 296;\n  after a death, ii. 301, 302, 304 _sq._\n  See Vegetarianism\n\n----, fresh, abstained from after a death, ii. 300 _sq._;\n  by girls at puberty, ii. 307 _sq._\n\nMedicines, religious veneration of, ii. 591, 641\n\nMen, the occupations of, i. 633-637;\n  the sexual impulse of, i. 657;\n  forbidden to eat certain foods, ii. 321 _sq._;\n  extra-matrimonial intercourse of, ii. 422-434, 436-455;\n  the preference given to virgin brides by, ii. 434-437, 440;\n  homosexual practices between, ch. xliii. (ii. 456-489), ii. 752 _sq._\n\n\"Merit,\" analysis of the concept, i. 150-152\n\nMerits, i. 86, ii. 360 _sq._, common enjoyment of, i. 96-99;\n  the conferring of, upon the dead, ii. 550-552\n\nMidsummer customs, i. 56 _sq._\n\nMilk, prohibition of boiling, i. 197;\n  offered to strangers, i. 590 _sq._;\n  abstinence from, ii. 325 _sq._;\n  after a death, ii. 301\n\nMiracles, ii. 590 _sq._\n\nModesty, ii. 144 _sq._\n\nMonkeys, the feeling of revenge in, i. 37 _sq._;\n  self-regarding pride in, i. 39, ii. 138;\n  sympathetic resentment in, i. 112;\n  credited with a conscience, i. 249;\n  adoption of young among, ii. 189;\n  abstinence from eating, ii. 328 _sq._;\n  aversion to killing, ii. 329, 490, 513. See Apes\n\nMonks, sexual intercourse forbidden to, ii. 409, 412;\n  addicted to homosexual practices, ii. 462, 467\n\nMonogamy, ii. 192, 387-392\n\nMonotheism, intolerance of, ii. 644-647, 649, 650, 652;\n  its tendency to attribute the most exalted qualities to the\n  deity, ii. 734\n\nMoon, abstinence from work in connection with changes in the, ii.\n284-287, 747;\n  fasting in connection with changes in the, ii. 296, 297.\n  309-313\n\n---- gods, appealed to in oaths, ii. 121, 122, 699;\n  regarded as judges, ii. 699, 703 _sq._\n\nMoral approval, the nature of, i. 21, 93-107;\n  the origin of, i. 108-111, 117-123, 129 _sq._;\n  moral concepts springing from, i. 145-154;\n  only indirectly expressed in custom, i. 160;\n  hardly at all expressed in law, i. 166 _sq._;\n  the resemblance between the phenomena which give rise to\n  gratitude and those which call forth, i. 318 _sq._\n\n\"---- axioms,\" i. 12\n\n---- concepts, based on moral emotions, ch. i. (i.\n4-20);\n  analysis of the principal, ch. vi (i. 131-157);\n  among non-European peoples, i. 131-133\n\n---- disapproval, the nature of, i. 21-93, 100-107;\n  the origin of, i. {853}108-129;\n  moral concepts springing from, i. 134-145;\n  expressed in customs and laws, ch. vii. (i. 158-201);\n  the resemblance between the phenomena which give rise to\n  non-moral resentment and those which call forth, i. 315-319\n\nMoral emotions, the moral concepts based on, chs. i. (i. 4-20),\nvi. (i. 131-157);\n  the nature of the, chs. ii.-iv. (i. 21-107);\n  the origin of the, ch. v. (i. 108-130);\n  expressed in customs and laws, ch. vii. (i. 158-201);\n  the resemblance between the phenomena which give rise to\n  non-moral retributive emotions and those which call forth, i.\n  314-319;\n  not determined by the cognition of free-will, i. 321-326\n\n---- evolution, general characteristics of, ii. 743-746\n\n---- ideals, i. 153 _sq._\n\n---- judgments, the emotional origin of, ch. i. (i. 4-20);\n  the assumed objectivity of, i. 6-20, 104 _sq._;\n  the general nature of the subjects of, chs. viii.-xii. (i.\n  202-313);\n  why conduct and character form the subjects of, i. 314-320;\n  the relation between free-will and, i. 320-326;\n  the innate character the proper subject of, i. 326\n\n---- law, the authoritativeness attributed to the, i. 14-17\n\n\"---- reason,\" i. 7 _sq._\n\n\"---- truth,\" i. 17 _sq._\n\nMorbid impulses, injuries committed under the influence of, i.\n298 _sq._\n\nMorning gift, ii. 385\n\n_Mos_, i. 119, 122\n\nMother, children's affection for their, i. 534-538, 618, 659, ii.\n194, 748;\n  descent traced through the, i. 597 598, 655 _sq._, ii. 44-46,\n  54, 202, 203, 205, 206, 211, 220;\n  committing suicide on the death of her only son, ii. 244 n. ^3.\n  See Maternal affection, duties, rights; Parents\n\nMotives, ch. xi. (i. 283-302); i. 207-209, 316, 318\n\nMourners, delicate state of, ii. 283, 307;\n  considered polluted, ii. 306, 307, 545;\n  purificatory ceremonies of, ii. 354\n\nMourning costume, ii. 524, 545, 547\n\n---- customs, ii. 283, 284, 298-308, 520, 524, 526, 528, 541,\n542, 544-548;\n  forbidden in the case of suicide, ii. 247.\n  See Death\n\nMurder, manslaughter distinguished from, i. 294-298, ii. 633.\n  See Homicide\n\nMutilation, as a punishment, i. 192, 195. 311, 312, 513, 518-523.\nii. 8, 9, 12, 13, 74, 84, 123 n. ^1, 143 n. ^1, 447, 449 _sq._\n\nMutton, abstinence from, ii. 322, 327\n\nMutual aid, i. 538-569\n\n\nNAMES, certain superstitions relating to, i. 460, ii. 369;\n  social influence of, ii. 203 _sq._;\n  their influence on exogamy, ii. 369, 748;\n  prohibition of mentioning dead persons', ii. 524, 545-547, 550;\n  of mentioning supernatural beings', ii. 640-643\n\nNational conceit, ii. 170-174\n\nNationalism, i. 367-369, ii. 184, 185, 224 _sq._\n\nNationality, the feeling of, ii. 183-185.\n  See Patriotism\n\nNegative commandments, why more prominent than positive\ncommandments, i. 303\n\nNegligence, i. 210, 211, 303-305\n\nNegro slavery, i. 428, 429, 516-518, 683, 704-714, ii. 32 _sq._\n\nNegroes, not accepted as witnesses against white persons, i. 429;\n  antipathy to, i. 713 _sq._;\n  injuries inflicted upon white persons by, i. 713 _sq._;\n  white persons prohibited from marrying, i. 714\n\nNew, fear of anything, i. 462 _sq._\n\nNuns, sexual intercourse forbidden to, ii. 409, 412\n\n\nOATHS, materialistic conception of, i. 58-61, 233 _sq._;\n  the taking of, forbidden to the high priest, i. 58, ii. 638;\n  to priestesses, ii. 638;\n  contained in ordeals, i. 505 _sq._, ii. 687-690;\n  taken upon arms, i. 506, ii. 119-121;\n  upon tent-poles, i. 588 n. ^5;\n  in connection with theft, ii. 62, 63, 66, 68;\n  sworn by the eldest sister, i. 606;\n  on the life of the king, ii. 637;\n  supernatural beings appealed to in, ii. 67, 68, 120-123,\n  686-690, 699, 731 _sq._;\n  prohibition of taking, ii. 99, 124;\n  not considered binding if contrary to the good of the Church,\n  ii. 100;\n  methods of adding supernatural {854} energy to, ii.\n  118-122;\n  taken upon blood, ii. 118-121, 621, 622, 687-689;\n  blood-covenants accompanied by, ii. 208, 209, 567.\n  See Perjury\n\nObedience, to parents, ch. xxv. (i. 597-628);\n  to husbands, ch. xxvi. (i. 629-669);\n  slaves, to their masters, ch. xxvii (i. 670-716);\n  to rulers, i. 194-196;\n  to gods, i. 194-198, ii. 659 _sq._;\n  to the dead, ii. 519, 520, 541\n\nOccupation, acquisition of property by, ii. 35-39, 51, 52, 54 _sq._\n\nOccupations of life, divided between the sexes, i. 633-637, ii. 271\n\nOfferings to the dead, ii. 302, 303, 400-404, 517, 518, 524, 539,\n547, 550, 692, 700, 701, 704, 708;\n  connection between almsgiving and, ii. 550-552\n\n---- to gods. See Sacrifice\n\nOffspring, man's desire for, i. 533, ii. 388, 391, 400-404, 423, 440;\n  the future state of persons who have died without, ii. 400-404\n\nOld age, criminal responsibility affected by, i. 266 _sq._;\n  the future state of persons who have died of, i. 390, ii. 235,\n  238 n. ^3, 698\n\n---- persons, killing or abandoning of, i. 386-390, 606, 607,\n612, 620;\n  eaten by their relatives, i. 390, ii. 554, 568 _sq._;\n  kind treatment of, i. 540, 546, 625 _sq._, ii. 672;\n  respect for, i. 603-605, 614, 615, 619-621, ii. 194, 675;\n  supposed to be versed in magic, i. 619 _sq._;\n  curses and blessings of, i. 622, 626;\n  suicide committed by, ii. 232, 235, 236, 247 _sq._\n\nOmissions, i. 210-212, 303-305, 317\n\n_Opera supererogativa_, i. 86, 98 _sq._ See Merits\n\nOpinions, moral judgments relating to, i. 215 _sq._\n\nOrdeals, ii. 686-690, 732;\n  duels as, i. 504-507\n\n\"Ought,\" analysis of the concept, i. 134-137\n\nOutlawry, i. 46, 47, 172, 173, 311\n\nOwls, prohibition of eating, ii. 321\n\nOxen, prohibition of killing ploughing, ii. 330, 331, 493, 494, 504\n\n\nPARDON, the right of, as a prerogative of the Crown, i. 192, 196, 226\n\nParental affection. See Maternal, Paternal affection\n\nParents, their authority over their children, ch. xxv. (i. 597-628);\n  curses or blessings of, i. 58, 538, 621-627, ii. 703, 715, 716\n  n. ^2, 732;\n  children punished if convicted of a design to kill their, i. 245;\n  killing their infant children, i. 378, 394-413, 633, ii. 562,\n  752 _sq._;\n  children killing their, i. 383-386, 522, ii. 256 _sq._ n. ^2, 749;\n  children killing or abandoning their aged, i. 386-390, 606,\n  607, 612, 620;\n  eaten by their children, i. 390, ii. 554, 568 _sq._;\n  killing their grown up children, i. 393 _sq._, ii. 256 _sq._ n. ^2;\n  exposing their new-born children, i. 406-412, 689;\n  children sacrificed to save the lives of their, i. 455, 456,\n  459-461;\n  sacrificing their children, i. 455-461;\n  eating their children, i. 458 _sq._, ii. 554, 555. 562, 568 _sq._;\n  daughters committing suicide on the death of their, i. 473;\n  inflicting corporal punishment upon their children, i. 513-515,\n  607, 610;\n  children using violence against their, i. 513, 624 _sq._, ii. 677;\n  their duty of taking care of their children, i. 526-533;\n  children's duty of taking care of their, i. 533-538;\n  children's respect for their, i. 534-538, 600, 601, 607-613,\n  616-628, ii. 194;\n  children's affection for their, i. 534-538, 618, 659, ii. 194, 748;\n  religion emphasising children's duties to their, i. 536, 537,\n  608, 610, 612, 613, 616, 617, 620-627, ii. 711, 714, 715, 716 n.\n  ^2, 717, 732;\n  children cursing their, i. 564;\n  selling their children as slaves, i. 599, 607, 609, 611, 612,\n  615, 675, 681, 682, 684, 685, 689, 691 _sq._;\n  children telling a falsehood in the presence of their, ii. 96;\n  children addressing abusive language to their, ii. 142;\n  their duties to their children, ii. 166, 748;\n  children's duties to their, ii. 166, 748;\n  committing suicide on the death of their children, ii. 232, 244\n  n. ^3;\n  fasting after the death of their children, ii. 298-300;\n  children fasting after the death of their, ii. 298-301;\n  children punished after death for {855} inflicting injuries\n  upon their, ii. 715.\n  See Maternal, Paternal affection\n\nParricide. See Parents\n\n_Parricidium_, i. 384 _sq._\n\nPastoral life, supposed connection between the custom of\nultimogeniture and a, ii. 48 n. ^4, 56 n. ^5\n\n---- peoples, vegetable food provided by the women among, i. 634,\nii. 273;\n  the position of women among, i. 660 _sq._;\n  slavery among, i. 672, 673, 681;\n  social aggregates of, ii. 201;\n  their sympathy for their domestic animals, ii. 506\n\nPassing-bell, the, ii. 524, 544\n\nPassover, the, i. 459, 470, ii. 296\n\nPaternal affection, i. 401, 402, 405, 529-533. ii. 187-190, 193, 748;\n  its influence on the duration of marriage, ii. 397\n\nPatriotism, ii. 167-185\n\nPeace, perpetual, i. 334, 337, 367\n\n---- Societies, i. 369\n\n_Peculium_, of slaves, i. 690, 697, ii. 31-33;\n  of sons, ii. 28;\n  of women, ii. 29\n\nPederasty. See Homosexual love\n\nPenance, ii. 356-361, 363, 708, 735;\n  fasting as a form of, ii. 246, 315-318, 406\n\nPerjury, considered contagious, i. 58-61;\n  considered sinful though committed unconsciously, i. 229, 231,\n  233 _sq._;\n  punished by custom or law, i. 505, 521 _sq._, ii. 123 n. ^1;\n  regarded as an offence against the deity, i. 507, ii. 122, 122\n  _sq._ n. ^10;\n  no civil punishment affixed to, ii. 123 n. ^1;\n  believed to incur divine punishment, ii. 123 n. ^1, 684, 686, 714;\n  to cause misery after death, ii. 715 _sq._\n\nPhratry, the, ii. 217, 218, 222 _sq._\n\nPigeons, prohibition of killing, ii. 490;\n  eating of, ii. 737\n\nPilgrimage, ii. 314, 416, 538 n. ^2, 725\n\n\"Pious fraud,\" ii. 100, 104, 112\n\nPocket-picking, i. 187, 243\n\nPoliteness, i. 160, ii. 146-152\n\nPollution, of sin, i. 52-57, 61-65, 70, 71, 85, 86, 407, ii. 256\nn. ^2, 654 _sq._;\n  of curses, i. 57-61, 70, 233, 234, 624 _sq._, ii. 583, 584, 703;\n  of blood, i. 225, 232, 233, 375-382, ii. 256 _sq._ n. ^2, 262, 714;\n  of women, i. 663-666, ii. 538 n. ^2;\n  of self-inflicted death, ii. 257 n. ^5 262;\n  of death, ii. 283, 302-307, 416, 536-539, 544 _sq._;\n  of natural death, ii. 416, 609;\n  of food, ii. 294-296;\n  of wine, ii. 344 _sq._;\n  sexual, ii. 414-420, 752;\n  caused by partaking of human flesh, ii. 538, 575 _sq._;\n  holiness very susceptible to, i. 58, 380-382, 625, ii. 294-296,\n  322, 344, 345. 352, 353, 415-420, 608-610, 638, 643, 752\n\nPolyandry, ii. 387, 395\n\nPolygyny, ii. 387-392, 395;\n  connection between illegitimate children's right to inheritance\n  and, ii. 57;\n  a cause of homosexual practices, ii. 466\n\nPolytheism, tolerance of, ii. 647-652\n\nPork, abstinence from, ii. 321, 322, 326-330, 335\n\nPositive commandments, i. 303-305, 310\n\nPossession, acquisition of property by continued, ii. 39-41, 52\n\nPotatoes, abstinence from, after a death, ii. 301\n\nPoverty, estimation of, i. 556, ii. 280 _sq._;\n  a cause of uncleanliness, ii. 351;\n  monogamy associated with, ii. 392\n\nPrayer, ii. 653-659;\n  for remission of sin, i. 49, 54, 55, 228 _sq._, ii. 654, 655.\n  72, 707;\n  purification preparatory to, i. 380 _sq._, ii. 352, 353, 358,\n  359, 415. 416, 418 _sq._;\n  development of a curse or a blessing into a, i. 564 _sq._, ii.\n  66-68, 120-123, 658, 686-690, 731;\n  almsgiving connected with, i. 567 _sq._;\n  forbidden to women, i. 664, 667 n. ^1;\n  used as greeting, ii. 150;\n  fasting an appendage to, ii. 316 _sq._;\n  magic efficacy ascribed to, ii. 353, 418, 419, 656-659, 706, 712;\n  continence a preparation for, ii. 417-419\n\nPreparation, acts of, i. 243-246\n\nPrescription, ii. 40, 41, 52 _sq._\n\nPride, condemnation of, ii. 144 _sq._\n  See Self-regarding pride\n\nPriestesses, forbidden to marry or to have intercourse with men,\nii. 406-408, 412-414, 420;\n  continence compulsory on women who wish to become, ii. 419;\n  prostitution of, ii. 443 _sq._;\n  asylums, ii. 637 _sq._;\n  prohibited from taking an oath, ii. 638\n\nPriests, forbidden to take an oath, i. 58, ii. 638;\n  to engage in warfare, {856} i. 348, 381;\n  to shed human blood, i. 381 _sq._;\n  to take part in a capital charge, i. 381, 382, 493;\n  to engage in hunting, ii. 506;\n  the law of torture relating to, i. 523 _sq._;\n  curses of, i. 563;\n  enslaving of children of incontinent, i. 700;\n  certain foods forbidden to, or rejected by, ii. 322, 329, 333, 338;\n  forbidden to marry and to have intercourse with women, ii.\n  405-409, 412, 414, 418-421;\n  eunuch, ii. 408, 414, 488 n. ^6;\n  forbidden to contract a second marriage, ii. 412;\n  to marry widows, ii. 412, 420;\n  to marry harlots or divorced wives, ii. 420;\n  taboos imposed upon, ii. 417 _sq._;\n  continence compulsory on persons who wish to become, ii. 419;\n  temporary continence compulsory on, ii. 419 _sq._;\n  the punishment of unchastity in the daughters of, ii. 420;\n  represented as corrupters of domestic virtue, ii. 432;\n  their celibacy a cause of homosexual practices, ii. 467;\n  boys kept as, ii. 473;\n  used as temple prostitutes, ii. 473, 488;\n  cannibalism of, ii. 563, 574;\n  their residences asylums, ii. 630, 634, 637;\n  opposing sorcery, ii. 652;\n  regarded as manifestations of gods, ii. 657, 709;\n  encouraging the belief in the magic efficacy of prayer, ii. 658\n  _sq._\n  See Benefit of Clergy; _cf._ Magicians\n\nPrimogeniture, ii. 45, 46, 48, 55 _sq._\n\nPromiscuity, the theory of, ii. 396\n\nPromises. See Good faith\n\nProperty, the right of, ch. xxviii. _sq._ (ii. 1-71);\n  forfeiture of, as a punishment, i. 47, ii. 254;\n  acquired by a successful duel, i. 498, 503, ii. 9;\n  of wives, i. 632, 637-641, 643, 645, 661, ii. 28-31, 41;\n  of women, i. 661, ii. 28-30, 41;\n  of slaves, i. 677, 684, 688, _cf._ _Peculium_ of slaves;\n  of the dead, i. 399, ii. 44, 518, 539 _sq._, see Inheritance, Wills;\n  of supernatural beings, ii. 626 _sq._;\n  supernatural beings as guardians of, ii. 59-69, 669, 675-677,\n  679, 684, 686, 699, 700, 705, 714, 717, 732\n\nProstitution, i. 608, ii. 428-431, 437, 439-446;\n  religious, ii. 443-446, 488;\n  of men, ii. 459-462, 463, 476, 478, 488\n\nProvocation, i. 290-298, 311, 316 _sq._\n\nPrudence, i. 560, 581, 715, ii. 52, 59, 114, 124, 176, 185,\n265-268, 331, 332, 334. 335, 342, 428, 497, 539, 547, 548, 660\n\nPuberty, girls at, ii. 307 _sq._\n\nPublic approval, the prototype of moral approval, i. 9, 122, 129\n\n---- disapproval, the prototype of moral disapproval, i. 9, 119-122\n\nPulse, abstinence from, ii. 322, _cf._ ii. 430 _sq._\n\nPunishment, inflicted on others than the culprit, i. 43-48, 69 _sq._;\n  restricted to the culprit, i. 70-72;\n  essentially an expression of the moral indignation of the\n  society which inflicts it, i. 79, 89-91, 169, 185, 198-201;\n  theories as to the proper object of, i. 79-91;\n  regarded as a means of eliminating the criminal, i. 80-82;\n  as a deterrent, i. 80-84, 88-91;\n  as a means of reforming the criminal, i. 80-91;\n  defined, i. 82, 169 _sq._;\n  the limited efficiency of, as a deterrent, i. 90 n. ^1;\n  a source of moral disapproval, i. 115;\n  the relation between indemnification and, i. 168 _sq._;\n  among savages, i. 170-177;\n  transition from revenge to, i. 180-185;\n  the opinion that determent actually is or has been the chief\n  object of, i. 185-200;\n  the increasing severity of, i. 186-198;\n  inflicted on criminals in public, i. 191 _sq._;\n  of unintentional injuries, i. 219, 221-226, 231, 232, 235-240;\n  of attempts to commit crimes, i. 241-247, 374;\n  of acts of preparation, i. 243-246;\n  of bare intentions, i. 245;\n  inflicted on animals, i. 253-260, 264, 308;\n  on inanimate things, i. 261-264, 308;\n  of injuries committed by children, i. 265-269;\n  by old persons, i. 266 _sq._;\n  by lunatics, i. 271-277, 298 _sq._;\n  by idiots, i. 273;\n  in drunkenness, i. 279-282;\n  inflicted upon the offending member, i. 311, 312, 513, 518,\n  519, 521 _sq._, ii. 9, 13, 74, 84, 123 n. ^1, 143 n. ^1;\n  from a deterministic point of view, i. 320 _sq._;\n  influenced by rank, i. 430-433, 491, 518, 519, 524, ii. 19, 20,\n  58, 142, 143, 448-450;\n  corporal, i. 520-525;\n  suicide committed out of fear of, ii. 233;\n  redeems the sufferer from {857} punishment in a future\n  existence, ii. 360;\n  inflicted on gods, ii. 610.\n  For various kinds of punishment see Banishment, Cannibalism\n  (as a punishment), Emasculation, Mutilation, Outlawry, Property\n  (forfeiture of), Serfdom (as a punishment), Shame (putting\n  offenders to), Slavery (as a punishment)\n\nPunishment in a future existence. See Future life\n\n---- of death, i. 491-496;\n  among savages, i. 188-190, 195-197;\n  as a kind of human sacrifice, i. 440, 471 _sq._;\n  suicide as an alternative to, ii. 243;\n  inflicted for a variety of crimes, i. 44-46, 171, 172, 174,\n  177, 186-197, 253, 254, 287, 306, 311, 312, 331, 383-386, 404,\n  407, 409, 412, 416, 419, 420, 423, 424, 429-433, 439, 440, 491,\n  492, 495, 496, 508, 509, 513, 516, 518, 685, ii. 4, 5, 7-9,\n  12-15, 19, 96, 140-142, 256 n. ^2, 276, 331, 366-368, 378,\n  406-408, 420, 424-426, 428, 429, 431, 442, 447-450, 453, 474, 475\n  n. ^10, 477-482, 497, 558, 640, 647, 650-652\n\nPurificatory ceremonies, i. 53-57, 69, 233, 375-377, 379-381,\n625, ii. 256 _sq._ n. ^2, 257 n. ^5, 294, 295, 328, 352-354, 358,\n359, 415, 416, 472 n. ^7, 476, 538, 545, 726\n\n\nRAIN, human sacrifices offered for the purpose of producing, i.\n449-451;\n  certain other methods of procuring, ii. 315, 361\n\nRama[d.]\u00e2n, the fast of, i. 271, ii. 313-315, 725\n\nRank, influencing customs or laws relating to homicide, i. 34,\n35, 178, 430-433, 491;\n  to capital punishment, i. 491;\n  to bodily injuries, i. 518, 519, 524;\n  to corporal punishment, i. 522-524;\n  to torture, i. 523 _sq._;\n  to theft, ii. 19, 20, 58;\n  to sincerity, ii. 103;\n  to insults, i. 142 _sq._;\n  to politeness, i. 151 _sq._;\n  to suicide, i. 243;\n  to marriage, ii. 379, 380, 384;\n  to chastity, ii. 428, 433 _sq._;\n  to rape, ii. 437 _sq._;\n  to adultery, ii. 448-450;\n  to the disposal of the dead, ii. 527, 549;\n  to cannibalism, ii. 573 _sq._;\n  supposed to influence the efficacy of curses, i. 626 _sq._;\n  to influence men's state in the other world, ii. 698\n\nRape, i. 187, 188, 311, 521, ii. 437, 438, 476, 633, 679;\n  self-defence in the case of, i. 290\n\nRashness, i. 211, 305-310\n\nRavens, fear of killing, ii. 491\n\nReason, the theory according to which moral judgments are\nultimately based on, i. 7-17\n\nReception ceremonies, i. 590-592\n\nReflection, its influence on moral estimates, i. 10, 11, 70, 216,\n237, 247, 248, 251, 283, 303, 310, 312-314, ii. 111, 136, 267,\n268, 274, 283, 405, 512-514, 580, 581, 744-746;\n  on non-moral resentment, i. 315, 316, 318\n\nReflex action, i. 22\n\nRegalia, regarded as wonder-working talismans, ii. 608 n. ^4, 753 _sq._\n\nRegret, the similarity between remorse and, i. 123 _sq._\n\n_Religio_, the meaning of the word, ii. 584-586\n\nReligion, belief in supernatural being an essential element in,\nch. xlvii., (ii. 582-601);\n  duties to gods inculcated by, ch. xlviii. _sq._ (ii. 602-662);\n  relations between morality and, chs. l.-lii. (ii. 663-737), 745 _sq._;\n  custom stronger than, i. 164;\n  enjoins abstinence from work on certain days, i. 187, ii. 284-289, 718;\n  the severity of punishment increased by, i. 193-198;\n  enjoins fasting, i. 271, ii. 246, 292-298, 308-318, 358, 406, 725;\n  a source of war, i. 339, 349-352, 359;\n  attitude of, towards war, i. 339, 341, 342, 345-366, 369\n  _sq._, ii. 711;\n  condemns homicide, i. 345, 346, 378-380, 382, ii. 669, 672,\n  676, 684, 686, 700, 705, 714, 716 n. ^2, 717, 732;\n  condemns the killing or exposure of infants, i. 407, 411 _sq._;\n  condemns feticide, i. 414-417, ii. 705;\n  attitude of, towards slavery, i. 424, 426, 516, 683-689,\n  693-700, 711-713, ii. 711;\n  gives support to capital punishment, i. 496;\n  influences the right to bodily integrity, i. 520;\n  inculcates filial duties, i. 536, 537, 608, 610, 612, 613, 616,\n  617, 620-627, ii. 711, 714, 715, 716 n. ^2, 717, 732;\n  enjoins charity, i. 549-558, 561-569, ii. 669, 672, 699, 705,\n  711, 717, 718, 725, 726, 732;\n  enjoins hospitality, i. 578-580, ii. 669, 711, 714, {858} 715,\n  717, 718, 726, 732;\n  influences the treatment of old persons, i. 620 _sq._, ii. 672, 675;\n  influences the position of women, i. 663;\n  regards women as unclean, i. 663-666;\n  attitude of, towards serfdom, i. 703 _sq._;\n  the right of property sanctioned by, ii. 59-69, 669, 675-677,\n  679, 684, 686, 699, 700, 705, 714, 717, 732;\n  the regard for truth and good faith sanctioned by, ii. 96,\n  114-124, 128, 129, 669, 672, 675-677, 684, 686, 699, 700,\n  703-705, 707. 711, 714, 717, 726, 732;\n  leads to \"pious fraud,\" ii. 100, 104, 112;\n  condemns pride, ii. 144 _sq._, its relation to national feeling\n  and patriotism, ii. 174, 175, 178 _sq._;\n  as a social tie, ii. 209-213, 225-227, 725;\n  the opinions as regards suicide influenced by, ii. 234, 236,\n  237, 242-254, 260, 261, 263;\n  the moral ideas relating to self-regarding conduct influenced\n  by, ii. 267 _sq._;\n  commends agriculture, ii. 275;\n  attitude of, towards labour, ii. 275, 280-289, 675, 705, 747;\n  commends poverty, ii. 280-282;\n  requires ceremonial cleanliness, ii. 294, 295, 352-354, 358,\n  359, 415-420, 700 n. ^5, 705, 718, 726;\n  enjoins pilgrimage, ii. 314, 725;\n  imposes various restrictions in diet, ii. 322-338, 671;\n  encourages drunkenness, ii. 339;\n  enjoins sobriety or total abstinence from intoxicating liquors,\n  ii. 341-345;\n  a cause of uncleanliness, ii. 354-356;\n  leads to various forms of asceticism, ii. 355-363;\n  stigmatises incest, ii. 375, 376, 671;\n  enjoins various forms of endogamy, ii. 378-382;\n  a bar to inter-marriage, ii. 380-382;\n  enjoins monogamy, ii. 392;\n  prohibits divorce, ii. 397;\n  enjoins marriage, ii. 399-404;\n  enjoins celibacy or continence, ii. 406-421;\n  regards marriage as impure, ii. 410-412;\n  condemns second marriages, ii. 412, 451;\n  enjoins sexual cleanliness, ii. 415-420, 736, 752;\n  requires chastity of unmarried women, i. 49, ii. 427 _sq._;\n  condemns extra-matrimonial intercourse, ii. 431-433, 439, 675;\n  prostitution connected with, ii. 443-446, 488;\n  condemns adultery, ii. 447, 448, 450, 453-455, 675, 676, 684,\n  686, 700, 717;\n  homosexual practices connected with, ii. 458, 459, 472-474,\n  484, 486-489, 752;\n  stigmatised by, ii. 475, 476, 479-482, 485-489, 705;\n  inculcates regard for the lower animals, ii. 497-504, 705;\n  looks down upon the lower animals, ii. 505-508;\n  cannibalism in connection with, ii. 562 _sq._;\n  definitions of, ii. 584, 753;\n  born of fear, ii. 612-614;\n  hope an element in every, ii. 614-616;\n  attitude of, towards magic, ii. 649, 650, 652, 753;\n  the communal character of, ii. 661.\n  See Asylums, Atheism, Baptism, Blasphemy, Blood (effusion of,\n  as a religious rite), Eucharist, Flagellation, Future life, Future\n  state, \"God,\" Goddesses, Gods, Guardian spirits, Hell, Heresy,\n  Holiness, Human sacrifice, Intolerance, Monotheism, Oaths, Ordeals,\n  Penance, Perjury, Pilgrimage, Polytheism, Prayer, Priestesses,\n  Priests, Purificatory ceremonies, Sacred places, Sacrifice,\n  Sacrilege, Saints, Self-mortification, Self-mutilation (as a\n  religious rite), Sin, Supreme beings, Tolerance, Totem, Totemism,\n  Unbelief\n\nRemorse, i. 105-107, 123-125, 136;\n  absence of, in criminals, i. 90 n. ^1;\n  a cause of suicide, i. 106, ii. 233\n\nRepentance, i. 105-107, 123-125;\n  as a ground for forgiveness, i. 84-88, 99, 311, 318, ii. 360, 735;\n  adequate, deemed impossible in the case of blasphemy, ii. 640\n\nRepetition of an offence, i. 186, 187, 189, 257, 306, 311, 312,\n318, ii. 7\n\nReptiles, aversion to eating, ii. 324\n\nRequisitions, military, ii. 27\n\nResentment, i. 21-93;\n  towards animals, i. 26, 27, 251-260, 264, 308, 316;\n  towards inanimate things, i. 26, 27, 260-264, 315;\n  the phenomena which call forth, i. 315-318\n\n----, sympathetic, i. 111-116, 169, 179, 180, 185, 372, 373, 429,\n433, 524, 533, 559, 560, 659, 714 _sq._, ii. 52, 109, 112, 113,\n140, 166, 176, 185, 262, 266, 496, 528, 580, 661;\n  in animals, i. 112, ii. 52\n\nRest, ii. 283-289, 747\n\nRetaliation, moral valuation of, i. 73-79. See Punishment, Revenge\n\nRetributive emotions, i. 21-99;\n  the phenomena which call forth, i. {859} 314-319;\n  not determined by the cognition of free-will, i. 322, 326\n\nRetributive kindly emotion, i. 21, 93-99;\n  in animals, i. 94;\n  the phenomena which call forth, i. 318 _sq._;\n  sympathetic, i. 117, 129\n\nRevenge, taken upon animals, i. 26, 27, 251-253, 255, 256, 258;\n  upon inanimate things, i. 26, 27, 260-263;\n  regarded as a duty, i. 73 _sq._;\n  condemned, i. 73-79;\n  demanded by public opinion, i. 176 _sq._;\n  regulated by the rule of equivalence, i. 177-180;\n  succeeded by punishment, i. 180-185;\n  believed to be taken by animals upon men, i. 252, 258, ii. 491,\n  497. 500, 502, 504, 603;\n  taken upon offenders caught _flagrante delicto_, i. 290-294,\n  ii. 8, 13, 17, 429, 447;\n  not to be taken upon a guest, i. 576, 587 _sq._;\n  taken for injuries inflicted upon guests, i. 577 _sq._;\n  suicide as a method of taking, ii. 233, 234, 242-245;\n  supposed to be taken by the dead upon the living, ii. 530, 531,\n  548, 576;\n  taken by the living upon the dead, ii. 692 _sq._;\n  supposed to be taken by ghosts upon other ghosts, ii. 693 _sq._\n  See Blood-revenge\n\n----, the feeling of, its nature and origin, i. 21-42;\n  in animals, i. 37 _sq._;\n  appeased by repentance, i. 87, 88, 318;\n  attributed to gods, i. 194, 198, 438-440, 471 _sq._, ii. 660,\n  661, 667, 668, 702, 714;\n  to the souls of murdered persons, i. 232, 372, 375, 376, 378\n  379, 406, 476, 481 _sq._, ii. 559 _sq._;\n  to the dead, ii. 530, 531, 534;\n  a motive for committing suicide, ii. 233, 234, 242-245;\n  a motive for cannibalism, ii. 557-559\n\nRewards, vicarious, i. 96-99;\n  a source of moral approval, i. 117;\n  public, i. 166 _sq._;\n  in a future existence, see Future life\n\nRice, abstinence from, after a death, ii. 301\n\n\"Right,\" analysis of the concept, i. 137-139;\n  the relation between \"good\" and, i. 146 _sq._\n\n\"Rights,\" analysis of the concept, i. 139-141\n\nRivers, human sacrifices offered to, i. 452-454\n\nRobbery, i. 187-189, ii. 1-27, 57-69;\n  distinguished from theft, ii. 16, 17, 58;\n  of tombs, ii. 518, 519, 540 _sq._;\n  of temples, ii. 627;\n  refuge denied to persons guilty of, ii. 633.\n  See Stealing\n\n\nSABBATH, the Jewish, i. 187, ii. 286-289, 718, 747;\n  originally a fast-day, ii. 310 _sq._\n\nSacramental grace, considered necessary for salvation, ii. 719 _sq._\n\nSacred places, polluted persons prohibited from entering, i. 58,\nii. 294, 415 _sq._;\n  shedding of human blood prohibited in, i. 380, ii. 635;\n  women excluded from, i. 664 _sq._;\n  sexual intercourse prohibited in, ii. 416, 752;\n  fear of disturbing the peace in, ii. 635 _sq._\n  See Asylums\n\nSacrifice, ii. 611-626;\n  transference of evil combined with a, i. 62-65;\n  vicarious expiatory, i. 65-70, 438-440;\n  purification preparatory to, i. 380, ii. 294, 352, 353, 358,\n  359, 415;\n  connection between alms giving and, i. 565-569, ii. 550-552;\n  as a means of transferring curses, i. 586 _sq._, ii. 618-624, 658;\n  as a reception ceremony, i. 591, ii. 621;\n  women prohibited from offering a, i. 664 _sq._;\n  fasting in connection with, ii. 294-298;\n  fasting the survival of an expiatory, ii. 316-318;\n  asceticism in some other instances the survival of an earlier,\n  ii. 359;\n  oaths taken in connection with a, ii. 621 _sq._;\n  connected with prayer, ii. 655 _sq._;\n  importance of, ii. 705, 707-712, 714, 716, 718.\n  See Human sacrifice, Offerings to the dead\n\nSacrificial victims, magic virtue ascribed to, i. 63, 65, 69,\n444-447, ii. 563, 625, 658;\n  looked upon as guardian spirits, i. 464 _sq._;\n  as messengers, i. 465 _sq._, ii. 618;\n  privilege granted to, i. 585 n. ^1;\n  must be free from pollution, ii. 295, 296, 419\n\nSacrilege, punished with death, i. 188, 197, 439, 492;\n  refuge denied to persons guilty of, ii. 633;\n  if committed by foreigners, ii. 648\n\nSago, abstinence from, after a death, ii. 301\n\nSaints, oaths taken at the shrines of, i. 59 _sq._, ii. 120;\n  diseases cured by contact with, i. 63;\n  lunatics regarded as, i. 270 _sq._;\n  curses pronounced by, i. 563, 622;\n  _l-[(]\u00e2r_ (implying {860} the transference of a conditional curse)\n  made upon, i. 566, ii. 584, 585, 618, 619, 636, 638;\n  robbed of their holiness, i. 586, ii. 608;\n  compacts made at the shrines of, i. 587, ii. 623 _sq._;\n  old men regarded as, i. 619;\n  looked upon as guardians of property, ii. 67 _sq._;\n  the saliva of, ii. 322;\n  ceremonial cleanliness required of those who approach the\n  shrines of, ii. 416, 418, 752;\n  sexual intercourse with, ii. 444, 488;\n  places of striking appearance associated with, ii. 589, 627;\n  miracles performed by, ii. 590-592;\n  gifts offered to, ii. 619;\n  offerings to, participate in their sanctity, i. 445 _sq._, ii. 625;\n  sacredness of the shrines of, ii. 627, 628, 635;\n  lunacy attributed to the resentment of, ii. 628;\n  their shrines asylums, ii. 628, 635, 636, 638;\n  persons attached to the shrines of, ii. 635;\n  unconcerned about the worldly morality of their devotees, ii. 669;\n  invoked by thieves, ii. 669\n\nSalmon, abstinence from eating, after a death, ii. 306 _sq._\n\nSalutations, i. 590-592, ii. 146, 147, 149-151\n\nSanctuary, the right of. See Asylums\n\nScalping, i. 333, 375, ii. 525\n\nScape-goats, i. 53-55, 61-65\n\nScientific research, ii. 133-136\n\nScourging, as a religious rite, ii. 294, 357-359\n\nSea, human sacrifices offered to the, i. 452-454\n\nSelf-approval, i. 105-107, 123\n\n-----defence, i. 288-290;\n  lying in, ii. 92, 94, 97-101, 103-106, 112\n\n-----mortification, ii. 281, 315-318, 355-363, 421\n\n-----mutilation, after a death, i. 26, 27, 476, ii. 524, 528,\n544, 545, 547;\n  as a religious rite, i. 470 _sq._, ii. 357\n\nSelf-regarding duties and virtues, ii. 265-268\n\n-----regarding pride, respect for other men's, ch. xxxii. (ii.\n137-152);\n  in men, i. 23, 24, 30, 38-40, 94, 179, 315, ii. 110, 137-140;\n  a cause of suicide, ii. 73, 139, 140, 231-233, 243;\n  in animals, i. 39, ii. 137 _sq._;\n  attributed to the dead, ii. 519;\n  to gods, ii. 639-655\n\n-----reproach, i. 105-107, 123-125\n\n-----respect, ii. 265\n\nSelf-sacrifice, i. 213, 214, 565, ii. 154, 265, 359\n\nSeniority, respect for, i. 605, 606, 614, 615, 619, 626, ii. 703\n\nSensuous pleasures, condemnation of, ii. 291, 292, 361-363\n\nSentiment, i. 110 n. ^3\n\nSeparation, judicial, ii. 397, 455\n\nSerfdom, i. 701-704;\n  as a punishment, ii. 19;\n  strangers reduced to, ii. 24;\n  shipwrecked persons reduced to, ii. 25\n\nSerfs, bodily injuries inflicted upon, i. 524 n. ^3;\n  proprietary rights or in capacities of, i. 701 _sq._, ii. 32;\n  intermarriage between freewomen and, ii. 379\n\nSerpents, worship of, ii. 590.\n  See Snakes\n\nSeven, the number, ii. 311 _sq._\n\nSeventh day, the, ii. 286-289. See Sabbath\n\nSexual impulse, the, in males, i. 657, ii. 435 _sq._;\n  in females, i. 657 _sq._, ii. 435;\n  connection between religious feelings and, ii. 375 n. ^3;\n  regarded as sinful in the unmarried, ii. 432;\n  associated with affection, ii. 439 _sq._, see Conjugal affection\n\n---- intercourse, between man and beast, i. 253 _sq._, ii. 409, 749;\n  manslayers temporarily prohibited from, i. 375, 377;\n  abstinence from, with women who are pregnant or who suckle a\n  child, i. 399, ii. 388, 391;\n  with strangers, i. 575, 593, ii. 444-446;\n  with holy persons, i. 593 n. ^1, ii. 444, 488;\n  abstained from after a death, ii. 306;\n  abstained from during the month of Rama[d.]\u00e2n, ii. 313;\n  abstinence from, a means of propitiating or pleasing the deity,\n  ii. 358, 420 _sq._;\n  as a magical or religious rite, ii. 395, 443-446, 488;\n  between a man and a married woman, ii. 397, 447-455;\n  between a married man and a woman, ii. 397, 451-455;\n  forbidden to priests and priestesses, ii. 405-409, 412-414, 418-421;\n  to monks and nuns, ii. 409, 412;\n  considered impure, ii. 410, 411, 414-420, 752;\n  regarded as a consequence of Adam's sin, ii. 411;\n  supposed to have been originally free from all carnal desire,\n  ii. 411 n. ^4;\n  supposed to take place between gods and women, ii. 412 _sq._;\n  the future state of persons {861} who have refrained from, ii.\n  414 _sq._;\n  danger attributed to, ii. 415, 446;\n  prohibited in sacred places, ii. 416, 752;\n  abstained from in connection with religious observances, ii.\n  416-420, 736, 752;\n  admission into priesthood preceded by abstinence from, ii. 419;\n  regarded as a transmitter of hereditary sin, ii. 421;\n  between unmarried persons, ii. 422-446, 675, 747;\n  between persons of the same sex, ch. xliii. (ii. 456-489), 752 _sq._;\n  between animals of the same sex, ii. 456, 466, 475 n. ^2;\n  temporarily forbidden to men who have eaten human flesh, ii. 575.\n  See Adultery, Incest, _Jus prim\u00e6 noctis_, Sodomy\n\nSexual inversion, congenital, ii. 465-467;\n  acquired, ii. 467-470\n\nShame, putting offenders to, i. 170;\n  a cause of suicide, ii. 233\n\nShaving, as a means of purification, ii. 294 _sq._\n\nSheep, stealing of, i. 187 _sq._, ii. 14;\n  abstinence from killing, for food, ii. 330.\n  See Mutton\n\nShipwrecked persons, sacrifice of, i. 467;\n  treatment of, ii. 25, 37 _sq._\n\nSick persons, killing or abandoning of, i. 391-393, ii. 542;\n  kind treatment of, i. 546-548;\n  suicide committed by, ii. 232;\n  unkindness to, punished by the supreme being, ii. 672.\n  See Disease\n\nSin, collective responsibility in the case of, i. 48-57, 61-72;\n  prayers for remission of, i. 49, 54, 55, 228 _sq._, ii. 654,\n  655, 702, 707;\n  materialistic conception and transference of, i. 52-57, 61-65,\n  70, 71, 85, 86, 407, ii. 256 n. ^2, 654 _sq._;\n  committed accidentally or unknowingly, i. 227-231, 233-235;\n  the sense of, ii. 361;\n  sexual intercourse regarded as a transmitter of hereditary, ii. 421\n\nSister, the elder, respect for, i. 605, 606, 614;\n  swearing by, i. 606;\n  curses of, i. 626, ii. 703\n\nSlander, ii. 96, 98, 140-142, 700\n\nSlavery, ch. xxvii. (i. 670-716);\n  as a punishment for crime, i. 45, 46, 494, 518, 675, 676, 681,\n  682, 685, 688-691, ii. 7, 8, 12, 13, 74;\n  a cause of suicide, ii. 233, 235, 241;\n  produces contempt for manual labour, ii. 272, 273, 278\n\nSlaves, sacrificed to gods, i. 66, 452, 455, 456, 467 _sq._;\n  to dead persons, i. 472, 474, 486, ii. 234;\n  killing of, i. 378, 421-429, 696, 707;\n  of free men by, i. 429, 430, 491 n. ^5;\n  refuge denied to, i. 427;\n  granted to, i. 690, 692, 696, ii. 637;\n  not allowed as witnesses, i. 429, 697;\n  bodily injuries inflicted upon, i. 515-518, 524, 677, 707;\n  upon freemen by, i. 516-518;\n  corporal punishment inflicted upon, i. 522-524;\n  children sold as, by their parents, i. 599, 607, 609, 611, 612,\n  615, 675, 681, 682, 684, 685, 689, 691 _sq._;\n  curses of, i. 716;\n  proprietary rights and incapacities of, i. 677, 684, 688, 690,\n  697, ii. 28, 31-33, 57;\n  rules of inheritance relating to, i. 679, ii. 46 _sq._;\n  addicted to falsehood, ii. 113, 129 _sq._;\n  insults offered by, ii. 142 _sq._;\n  offered to, ii. 143;\n  marriages between free men and, ii. 379;\n  treatment of the dead bodies of, ii. 527, 549;\n  eaten, ii. 559 567;\n  cursed by their masters, ii. 703\n\nSnakes, abstinence from eating, ii. 324.\n  See Serpents\n\nSocial affection, i. 94, 95, 112-114, 559, ii. 197, 198, 226-228\n\n---- aggregates, the evolution of, ii. 198-226\n\nSocialism, ii. 69-71\n\nSociety, the birthplace of the moral consciousness, i. 117-123\n\nSodomy, i. 188, ii. 460, 465 n. ^2, 474-476, 479-483, 486-489.\n  See Homosexual love\n\nSolstices, fasting at, ii. 309 _sq._\n  See Midsummer customs\n\n_Soma_, ii. 591, 592, 707 _sq._\n\nSon, sacrificed to save the life of his father, i. 455 _sq._;\n  the parents' or father's consent required for the marriage of\n  the, i. 607-609, 613, 615-618, 624 _sq._;\n  mother committing suicide on the death of her only, ii. 244 n. ^3;\n  allowed to eat only certain foods after the death of his\n  father, ii. 301 _sq._\n  See Children, Firstborn, Primogeniture, Ultimogeniture\n\nSorrow expressions of, ii. 283, 308, 316, 528\n\nSoul, the immateriality of the, ii. 595 _sq._\n  See Annihilation, Dead, Future Life, Future state, Transmigration\n\n{862} Spiders, prohibition of killing white, ii. 490\n\nSpirits, evil. See Evil spirits\n\n\"Spiritual relationship,\" a bar to inter-marriage, ii. 369, 377\n\nSpitting, superstitions relating to, i. 588, 594, ii. 65, 151,\n209, 322, 546 n. ^2, 636 _sq._\n\nState, the, as a social unit, ii. 221-226;\n  its influence on the smaller units of which it was composed, i.\n  627 _sq._, ii. 222 _sq._;\n  suicide regarded as a wrong against, ii. 248, 253, 259, 263;\n  celibacy regarded as a wrong against, ii. 404\n\nStealing, ii. 1-27, 57-69;\n  of horses**, cattle, or sheep, i. 187 _sq._, ii. 14;\n  from houses, i. 187 _sq._, ii. 15, 16, 58, see Burglary;\n  of letters, i. 188;\n  of food, i. 286, 287, 676, ii. 14, 15, 57 _sq._;\n  at night, i. 289, ii. 16, 58;\n  self-defence in the case of, i. 289 _sq._;\n  persons who are caught, i. 293. 294. 311, ii. 8, 13, 17-19, 58;\n  punishment inflicted on the offending member in the case of, i.\n  311, 312, 521 n. ^1, ii. 9, 13;\n  from relatives, ii. 53 _sq._ n. ^4;\n  punished by supernatural beings, ii. 59-69, 669, 675-677, 679,\n  684, 686, 699, 700, 705, 714, 717, 732;\n  curses pronounced to punish or prevent, ii. 62-69, 703;\n  adultery regarded as a form of, ii. 449 _sq._;\n  from tombs, ii. 518, 519, 540 _sq._;\n  of property belonging to gods, ii. 626 _sq._\n\nStimulants, religious veneration of, ii. 591\n\nStorks, abstinence from killing, ii. 490\n\nStrangers, protected by the chief or king, i. 180, 181, 338;\n  killing of, i. 331-334, 337-34, 370, 371, 373;\n  sacrificed, i. 467 _sq._;\n  infliction of bodily injuries upon, i. 519;\n  kindness to, i. 556-558, see Hospitality;\n  blessings of, i. 581-584, ii. 446;\n  regarded as semi-supernatural beings, i. 583 _sq._;\n  supposed to be versed in magic, i. 584;\n  the evil eye of, i. 584, 591-593;\n  curses of, i. 584-594, ii. 715, 732;\n  reception of, i. 590-592, ii. 621;\n  gifts of, i. 593 _sq._;\n  sexual intercourse with, i. 593, ii. 444-446;\n  enslaving of, i. 674, 675, 689, 690, 691, 714 _sq._;\n  respect for the proprietary rights of, ii. 2, 11, 59;\n  robbery committed upon, ii. 20-25, 58 _sq._;\n  reduced to serfdom, ii. 24;\n  rules of inheritance relating to, ii. 49;\n  deceiving of, ii. 87, 88, 90, 94, 97, 112, 126-129;\n  politeness to, ii. 152;\n  duties to, ii. 166;\n  despised, ii. 171-174, 532;\n  disregard of their interests, ii. 176;\n  antipathy to, ii. 227;\n  marriages with, ii. 378, 381 _sq._;\n  treatment of departed, ii. 525, 548 _sq._;\n  eaten, ii. 554;\n  sacrilege committed by, ii. 648.\n  See Hospitality\n\nStratagems, ii. 106, 107, 112\n\nSuicide, ch. xxxv. (**ii. 229-264);\n  punished with forfeiture of property, i. 47, ii. 254;\n  prompted by remorse, i. 106, ii. 233;\n  of daughters, i. 473;\n  of widows, i. 473 _sq._, ii. 232, 234, 235, 241, 242, 244, 247;\n  caused by wounded pride, ii. 73, 139, 140, 231-233,\n  243;\n  the future state of persons who have committed, ii. 235-239,\n  242-244, 246, 253, 262, 694, 710\n\nSun, fasting in connection with the, ii. 309, 310, 312 _sq._\n\n---- gods, appealed to in oaths, ii. 121 _sq._;\n  regarded as judges, ii. 698, 699, 703\n\nSunday, as a day of rest, ii. 288 _sq._;\n  a cause of drunkenness, ii. 343 _sq._\n\nSupernatural, the, ii. 582-584\n\n---- beings, the belief in, ch. xlvii. (ii. 582-601);\n  disease supposed to be caused by, i. 392 _sq._, ii. 593;\n  curses personified and elevated to the rank of, i. 60, 379,\n  482, 561, 585, 623, 624, 626, ii. 68, 116, 715, 732;\n  fear of mentioning the names of, ii. 640-642;\n  distinction between offences committed against gods and\n  offences against other, ii. 661 _sq._\n  See Animals (killing of sacred), Erinyes, Evil spirits,\n  Goddesses, Gods, Guardian spirits, _Jinn_, Saints, Supreme beings,\n  Totem\n\n\"Superobligatory, the,\" i. 151-154\n\nSuppliants. See Asylums, _L-[(]\u00e2r_\n\nSupreme beings in savage beliefs, ii. 670-687\n\nSwallows, prohibition of killing, ii. 490\n\nSympathetic feelings springing from association, i. 109 _sq._\n\n---- magic. See Magic, sympathetic\n\n{863} Sympathetic resentment. See Resentment, sympathetic\n\n---- retributive kindly emotion. See Retributive kindly emotion,\nsympathetic\n\nSympathy, i. 109-111;\n  for animals, ii. 494-506, 510-514.\n  See Affection, Altruistic sentiment\n\n\nTABOO, i. 197, 233, ii. 63-66, 583, 584, 675\n\nTalion. See Equivalence, the rule of\n\nTestation, ii. 43, 53. See Wills\n\nThank offerings, i. 441, ii. 615 _sq._\n\nTheft. See Stealing\n\nThrift, ii. 265\n\nThrone, the Royal, regarded as holy, ii. 608, 754\n\nThunder, religious veneration of, ii. 587, 592\n\nTigers, abstinence from the flesh of, ii. 321;\n  their fear of strange phenomena, ii. 583\n\nToads, fear of killing, ii. 491\n\nTobacco, religious veneration of, ii. 591\n\nTolerance, religious, ii. 647-653\n\nTombs, theft or violation committed at, ii. 518, 519, 525, 540 _sq._;\n  places of refuge, ii. 630\n\nTomb-stones, ii. 544, 546\n\nTortoises, prohibition of eating, ii. 321\n\nTorture, infliction of death by, i. 186-188, 190;\n  judicial, i. 523 _sq._\n\nTotem, eating of the, i. 227, ii. 210, 211, 323, 324, 606;\n  killing of the, ii. 210, 603, 604, 606;\n  regardful treatment of the, ii. 490\n\nTotemism, as a social tie, ii. 210-213;\n  represented as the source of the prohibition of incest, ii.\n  376, 376 _sq._ n. ^7, 377 n. ^1, 747;\n  believed to be instituted by the All-father, ii. 671\n\nTournaments, i. 354 _sq._\n\nTrade, moral valuation of, ii. 274, 276, 278-280, 282\n\nTransference, of blessings, see Blessings;\n  of curses, see Curses;\n  of disease, see Disease;\n  of evil, see Evil;\n  of holiness, see Holiness;\n  of the holiness temporarily seated in the ruling sovereign, ii.\n  607-610, 753 _sq._;\n  of magic virtue ascribed to sacrificial victims, i. 69,\n  444-447, ii. 563, 624 _sq._;\n  of magic virtue, by sexual intercourse, i. 593, ii. 444-446, 488;\n  by eating or by contact, ii. 562-564, 605, 606, 625;\n  of merits, see Merits;\n  of qualities inherent in animals, men, or man-gods, by eating\n  their flesh or drinking their blood, ii. 320, 333, 334, 560-564;\n  of sin, see Sin;\n  of the souls of divine kings, ii. 606, 607, 753 _sq._;\n  of virtue, see Virtue\n\nTransmigration of human souls, into animals, ii. 324, 328, 338,\n490, 496, 500, 504, 516, 517, 693, 709 _sq._;\n  into trees, ii. 516\n\nTreason, punishment of, i. 45-48, 187-189, 492, ii. 558;\n  judicial torture in cases of, i. 523\n\nTrees, revenge taken upon, i. 26, 27, 260-263;\n  transmigration of human souls into, ii. 516\n\nTribe, the, ii. 202, 217-219, 222 _sq._\n\nTribes, associations of, ii. 220 _sq._\n\nTribunals among savages, i. 173-175\n\nTruce of God, the, i. 356 _sq._\n\nTruth and good faith, regard for, ch. xxx. _sq._ (ii. 72-136);\n  gods as guardians of, ii. 96, 114-123, 128, 129, 669, 672,\n  675-677, 684, 686, 699, 700, 703-705, 707, 711, 714, 717, 726, 732\n\nTurtle, abstinence from eating, ii. 319, 333\n\nTwilight, prohibition of eating, travelling, and sleeping during,\nii. 309\n\nTwins, i. 395, 396, 408, 460\n\n\nULTIMOGENITURE, ii. 46, 48, 56\n\nUnbelief, ii. 644-646, 705;\n  as a subject of moral judgment, i. 216;\n  considered a legitimate cause of war, i. 339, 349-352, 359;\n  the right to bodily integrity influenced by, i. 520;\n  a cause of uncharitableness, i. 557, 696;\n  a ground for enslaving captives, i. 686, 695;\n  the valuation of theft or robbery influenced by, ii. 20, 25;\n  does not justify breach of faith, ii. 93;\n  a legitimate ground for deceiving an enemy, ii. 94;\n  a bar to intermarriage, ii. 380 _sq._;\n  homosexual practices associated with, ii. 486-489;\n  the right to life influenced by, ii. 705;\n  the future state influenced by, ii. 719-721, 725-727\n\nUnchastity, ch. xlii. _sq._ (ii. 422-489);\n  of unmarried persons, supposed to incur divine punishment, i.\n  49, ii. 675;\n  forbidden to priests and priestesses, ii. 406-409, 412-414, 419 _sq._;\n  to monks and nuns, ii. {864} 409, 412;\n  to persons who wish to become priests or priestesses, ii. 419;\n  supposed to injure the harvest, ii. 417, 747;\n  celibacy a cause of, ii. 432\n\nUncle, children in the power of their maternal, i. 597 _sq._\n\nUncleanliness, ii. 348-356\n\nUncleanness. See Pollution\n\nUnearned income, ii. 70 _sq._\n\nUnintentional injuries, i. 217-240, 315, 316, 319, ii. 714;\n  benefits, i. 318 _sq._\n\nUnnatural love. See Homosexual love\n\n_Usucapio_, ii. 40\n\n\nVAMPIRES, i. 476, ii. 564, 709\n\nVeal, considered unwholesome, ii. 332\n\nVegetarianism, ii. 335-338, 499\n\nVenison, abstinence from, ii. 320\n\nVeracity. See Truth, regard for\n\nVermin, revenge taken upon, i. 26, 27, 251;\n  regard for, ii. 492, 493, 498 _sq._\n\nVestal virgins, i. 439, 453, ii. 407, 408, 637 _sq._\n\n\"Vice,\" analysis of the concept, i. 134\n\nVillage communities, ii. 200-202, 213, 214, 216, 219\n\nViolent death, the future state of persons who have died a, i.\n481 _sq._, ii. 237-239, 242\n\nVirginity, required of priestesses, ii. 406-408;\n  religious veneration of, 409-411, 429;\n  not required of a bride, ii. 422-424, 440, 441, 444-446;\n  required of unmarried women, ii. 424-442;\n  the preference given by men to, ii. 434-437, 440\n\n\"Virtue,\" analysis of the concept, i. 147-150\n\nVirtue, transference of, i. 98\n\nVivisection, ii. 510, 512, 514\n\nVolitions, as subjects of moral judgments, i. 202-210;\n  as a source of non-moral retributive emotions, i. 314-319\n\n---- absence of, a subject of moral judgment, i. 210-214;\n  a cause of non-moral retributive emotions, i. 317-319\n\n\nWAGER of battle, i. 306, 504-507\n\nWar, i. 331-382;\n  provoked by a homicide, i. 33;\n  humanity towards enemies in, i. 335, 336, 342-344, 369, 370,\n  558, ii. 711;\n  private, i. 355-358;\n  human sacrifices offered in, i. 440, 441, 447 n. ^5, 449;\n  ending in a duel, i. 497 _sq._;\n  destruction of property in, ii. 25 _sq._;\n  seizure of property in, ii. 26, 27, 38, 58 _sq._;\n  deceit in, ii. 94, 106-108, 112;\n  the future state of persons who have fallen in, ii. 237, 521,\n  694, 697, 704, 708;\n  burial of persons who have fallen in, ii. 239;\n  considered a nobler occupation than labour, ii. 272-274, 278, 282;\n  fasting after a reverse in, ii. 315;\n  a cause of polygyny, ii. 389, 391;\n  prevalence of homosexual love among peoples addicted to, ii.\n  467, 479, 752\n\nWar, prisoners of, treatment of, i. 336, 343, 422;\n  sacrificed to gods, i. 339, 441, 450, 452, 467;\n  to the dead, i. 472, 474;\n  bodily injuries inflicted upon, i. 519 _sq._;\n  enslaved, i. 674, 675, 677, 681-686, 688-691, 695, 701, 715;\n  ransom accepted for, i. 701;\n  eaten, ii. 554, 561, 578\n\nWater, human sacrifices offered for the purpose of getting\ndrinking, i. 451 _sq._\n\nWhite men, atrocities committed by, among coloured peoples, i.\n370 _sq._;\n  coloured persons not accepted as witnesses against, i. 429;\n  their demoralising influence upon savages, i. 548, 549, 571\n  _sq._, ii. 2, 126-129, 424, 735;\n  injuries inflicted by coloured persons upon, i. 713 _sq._;\n  prohibited from marrying coloured persons, i. 714;\n  looked down upon by savages, ii. 171 _sq._;\n  taken for spirits, ii. 590\n\nWidowers, suicide committed by, ii. 232, 233, 235 _sq._;\n  fasting of, ii. 299-301;\n  second marriages of, prohibited or condemned, ii. 412, 451\n\nWidows, sacrifice of, i. 472-474, ii. 450 _sq._;\n  suicide committed by, i. 473 _sq._, ii. 232, 234, 235, 241,\n  242, 244, 247;\n  prohibited from remarrying, i. 475, ii. 450 _sq._;\n  rules of inheritance relating to, ii. 45, 47 55 _sq._;\n  fasting of, ii. 298-301;\n  priests forbidden to marry, ii. 412, 420\n\nWill, the, as the subject of moral judgment, ch. ix. (i.\n217-248), i. 214-216, 310-314;\n  as a cause of non-moral retributive emotions, i. 315, 319.\n  See Free-will\n\n{865} Wills, ii. 43, 53;\n  the sacredness attached to, ii. 519, 541, 552\n\nWine, superstitious notions concerning, i. 278, 281, ii. 344,\n345, 591 _sq._;\n  prohibition of, ii. 341-345;\n  after a death, ii. 302, 305;\n  in honour of the sun, ii. 312\n\nWishes, deliberate, as subjects of moral judgments, i. 206 _sq._\n\nWitchcraft, ii. 649-652;\n  punishment of, i. 45, 189, 190, 492, ii. 650-652.\n  See Magic\n\nWitches, lunatics burned as, i. 273;\n  old women regarded as, i. 620;\n  addicted to homosexual practices, ii. 484 n. ^1;\n  the custom of swimming, ii. 690.\n  See Witchcraft\n\nWives, the subjection of, ch. xxvi. (i. 629-669);\n  punished if convicted of a design to kill their husbands, i. 245;\n  crimes committed by, in the presence of their husbands, i. 284;\n  husbands killing their, i. 418, 419, 631;\n  killing their husbands, i. 419 _sq._;\n  acquired by duels, i. 499, 500, 503;\n  husbands inflicting bodily injuries upon their, i. 514-516, 631;\n  the duty of husbands to protect and support their, i. 526-529,\n  532 _sq._;\n  lending of, to guests or others, i. 575, 593, ii. 752;\n  cursed by their husbands, i. 626;\n  sold as slaves by their husbands, i. 675, 684;\n  proprietary rights and incapacities of, i. 632, 637-641, 643,\n  645, 661, ii. 28-31, 41, 57;\n  belief in a mysterious bond of sympathy between husbands and,\n  ii. 205;\n  suicide committed by husbands on the death of their, ii. 232,\n  233, 235 _sq._;\n  fasting of husbands on the death of their, ii. 299-301;\n  adultery committed by, ii. 397, 447-455;\n  of gods, ii. 412-414;\n  priests forbidden to marry divorced, ii. 420;\n  exchange of, ii. 752;\n  eaten by their husbands, ii. 555.\n  See Conjugal affection, Marriage, Widows\n\nWizards. See Magicians\n\nWolf's flesh, abstinence from, ii. 320, 322, 327\n\nWomen, the position of, ch. xxvi. (i. 629-669);\n  rape committed upon, i. 187, 188, 290, 311, 521, ii. 437, 438,\n  633, 679;\n  punished by being burned alive, i. 188;\n  treatment of, in war, i. 335, 336, 342, 343, 369 _sq._;\n  killing of, i. 418-421;\n  not allowed to be beaten, i. 514;\n  the evil eye of, i. 592;\n  regarded as versed in magic, especially when old, i. 620, 666-668;\n  the occupations of, i. 633-637;\n  the sexual impulse of, i. 657 _sq._, ii. 435;\n  ideas held about, i. 661-669, ii. 192;\n  the future state of, i. 662 _sq._, ii. 673;\n  of such as have died in child-birth, ii. 238 n. ^3, 678;\n  menstruous, i. 663; ii. 307 n. ^2, 538 n. ^2, 586;\n  regarded as unclean, i. 663-666, ii. 538 n. ^2;\n  forbidden to enter sacred places, i. 664, 665, **ii. 752;\n  to offer sacrifices, i. 664 _sq._;\n  to pray, i. 664, 667 n. ^1;\n  curses of, i. 668;\n  serving as asylums, i. 668 _sq._;\n  proprietary rights and incapacities of, i. 661, ii. 28-30, 41, 57;\n  rules of inheritance relating to, ii. 44, 45, 47, 48, 55;\n  addicted to falsehood, ii. 76, 113;\n  to suicide, ii. 232;\n  politeness to, ii. 152;\n  certain foods forbidden to, ii. 320 sq.;\n  celibacy and continence of religious, ii. 406-414, 419-421;\n  married to gods, ii. 412-414;\n  chastity of unmarried, i. 49, ii. 422-446, 675;\n  coyness of, ii. 435 _sq._;\n  homosexual practices between, ii. 464, 465, 752;\n  the lack of accessible women a cause of homosexual practices\n  between men, ii. 466 _sq._;\n  their mental inferiority a cause of pederasty, ii. 470 _sq._;\n  treatment of the dead bodies of, ii. 526, 527, 549;\n  forbidden to eat human flesh, ii. 554, 555 n., 573, 575;\n  refuge denied to kidnappers of, ii. 633.\n  See Daughters, Mother, Wives, Widows\n\nWork. See Labour\n\nWorld, renunciation of the, ii. 361-363\n\n\"Wrong,\" analysis of the concept, i. 134\n\n\nYOUNG PERSONS, certain foods forbidden to, ii. 319 _sq._\n  See Children, young\n\n\nTHE END\n\n\nPRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY R. CLAY AND SONS, LTD.,\nBRUNSWICK STREET, STAMFORD STREET, S.E., AND BUNGAY,\nSUFFOLK.\n\n\n\n\nThe Origin and Development\nof the\nMoral Ideas\n\nBY EDWARD WESTERMARCK, PH.D., LL.D.\n\n\n_SOME PRESS OPINIONS ON VOL. I._\n\nATHEN\u00c6UM.--\n\n\"The first attempt to deal with the subject of the evolution of\nhuman morality in the concrete on a scale at all corresponding to\nits complexity and sheer bulk. . . . This book remains an\nachievement unsurpassed in its own kind, a perpetual monument of\nthe courage, the versatility, and the amazing industry of its\nauthor.\"\n\n\nR. R. Marett, in MIND.--\n\n\"Dr. Westermarck's work fills me with profound admiration. . . .\nThere is no book in any language that deals concretely with the\nevolution of morality on so grand a scale or in so authoritative\na way.\"\n\n\nHavelock Ellis, in THE JOURNAL OF MENTAL SCIENCE.--\n\n\"Throughout marked by an extraordinary degree of erudition which\nnever becomes pedantic, by an invariably fair-minded and\nwell-balanced attitude towards difficult problems, and by a power\nof broad and lucid presentation which recalls Buckle.\"\n\n\nQ. C. Wheeler, in REVUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL.--\n\n\"Une des contributions les plus importantes \u00e0 la sociologie qui\naient \u00e9t\u00e9 produites pendant les derni\u00e8res ann\u00e9es. . . . Cet\nouvrage aura pour effet de rendre presque impossible toute \u00e9tude\nscientifique de la morale sur les anciennes bases.\"\n\n\nFranz Oppenheimer, in DAS BLAUBUCH.--\n\n\"Ein neues Buch von Edward Westermarck bedeutet ein\nsoziologisches Ereignis. Westermarck, das heisst: profundestes\nethnographisches Wissen, meisterhaft beherrscht durch ordnenden\nVerstand und durchleuchtet von sch\u00fcrfster Kritik und\nsp\u00fcrkr\u00e4ftigster Psychologie. Wie seine 'Geschichte der Ehe' ein\n_standard work_ der Gesellschaftslehre bleiben wird, als\ndasjenige Buch, das zum erstenmal eines der schwierigsten Gebiete\ndes menschlichen Zusammenlebens auf brietester Grundlage\nschilderte und erkl\u00e4rte, so wird auch dieses zweite m\u00e4chtige\nWerk, dessen erster Band uns jetzt vorliegt, auf lange Zeit\nhinaus zu den Grundsteinen der werdenden Wissenschaft von\nMenschen geh\u00f6ren.\"\n\n\nPHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.--\n\n\"Altogether it is perhaps safe to say that the work is the most\nimportant contribution to ethical literature within recent years.\"\n\n\nW. R. Sorley, in THE BOOKMAN.--\n\n\"Dr. Westermarck is the only writer who can claim to have\nsystematically examined the whole of the evidence, and to have\nproduced a comprehensive treatise on the development of men's\nideas of good and evil. . . . He is to be congratulated on having\nproduced a standard work on a subject of first-rate importance.\nIt is distinguished alike by breadth of view and mastery of\ndetail, by skilful marshalling of evidence and by sound judgment.\"\n\n\nNATURE.--\n\n\"The readers of his 'History of Human Marriage'--all of them his\ndebtors--were doubtless prepared for the vast array of footnotes,\nthe excellent way in which long series of facts are arranged, the\nclearness of the style, the sanity and reasonableness of a work\nwhich certainly was needed to keep ethical theory abreast of\nanthropological research, and which will add greatly to its\nauthor's reputation. . . . The account of the moral emotions, the\ntreatment of punishment (in which subtle arguments are offered\nagainst determent as a sufficient guiding principle), the\ndiscussion of the various distinctions suggested by terms like\nact, agent, motive, intention, the detailed examination of the\nfacts advanced by such authorities as Lord Avebury, Dr. J. G.\nFrazer, Dr. Steinmetz, are all excellent.\"\n\n\nNORTHERN WHIG.--\n\n\"For learning and research the book is simply a marvel. . . . It\nwill be an authoritative book for many a day on the subjects with\nwhich it deals.\"\n\n\nL. T. Hobhouse, in TRIBUNE.--\n\n\"It has remained for Dr. Westermarck, a Finn writing in English,\nto give to the English-speaking world the first comprehensive and\nsystematic account of the genesis of moral ideas on the basis of\na detailed survey of the customs of mankind. . . . It is not too\nmuch to predict that it will mark the beginning of a new era in\nthe study of general sociology.\"\n\n\nGUARDIAN.--\n\n\"This work, by the author of 'The History of Human Marriage,'\nwill undoubtedly take its place, and that a foremost place,\namongst the standard works on the subject of ethics. . . . The\nwidth and depth of his learning will be recognised by every\nreader, and will be utilised by many generations of\nstudents.\"\n\n\nDAILY NEWS.--\n\n\"A perfect graveyard of the hasty generalisations of his\npredecessors.\"\n\n\nCAMBRIDGE REVIEW.--\n\n\"The purpose of the present work is to arrange and examine all\nthe available evidence regarding the nature of men's moral\njudgments and the kind of objects which they approve or condemn.\nNo one could be found more competent than Dr. Westermarck to\ncarry this great undertaking to a successful issue.\"\n\n\nEXPOSITORY TIMES.--\n\n\"One of the greatest contributions of recent years to the study\nof Comparative Religion.\"\n\n\nS. Alexander, in THE SPEAKER.--\n\n\"Dr. Westermarck's book is without doubt of the first importance,\nwhether it be regarded as a philosophical treatise on ethics or\nas a history of moral institutions. Neither of these descriptions\nsingly does justice to it, for its merit lies in its blending of\nthe analytical with the historical method, so that the long\nhistory which begins in the second half of this volume and is to\nbe completed in the next volume, constitutes a continuous\nverification of his main ethical thesis that moral disapprovals\nund approvals arise from and express social indignation and\nsocial gratitude. . . . I conclude by expressing my unqualified\nadmiration of Dr. Westermarck's work, which is worthy of the\nyears of labour he has bestowed upon it. Besides its scientific\nimportance it is recommended to readers by the unfailing interest\nand lucidity of its manner.\"\n\n\nUNIVERSITY REVIEW.--\n\n\"Dr. Westermarck belongs to no accepted school of moralists. He\nendorses neither the humanist nor the religious views of society.\nHe is neither a utilitarian nor an intuitionalist. He is both an\nanthropologist and a historian; he is also a sociologist and a\ntraveller. In neglected lands where he might escape from European\nprejudices he has lived and studied the problems of the human\nheart and mind, accumulating at first hand a mass of material\nwhich throws much light on the origin and development of peculiar\ncustoms and beliefs. This, added to a remark able erudition, a\nscientific temper, a felicity and abundance of illustration, and\na clear and vigorous style, gives us a contribution to ethics,\npsychology, and sociology which is undoubtedly of the first rank,\nand, in our opinion, the most comprehensive and luminous work\nwhich has yet been written on the subject.\"\n\n\nGLOBE.--\n\n\"Both by the clarity and the philosophical insight of its\narguments, and the wide range of its investigations and\nillustrative details, it will claim securely to rank among those\nepoch-marking works which define the steady progress of mankind\nin the study and understanding of its sociological developments.\"\n\n\nPALL MALL GAZETTE.--\n\n\"The fuller consideration of Dr. Westermarck's book as a\nphilosophic treatise must wait; meanwhile we can only\ncongratulate him and the Duchy, of which he is so conspicuous an\nornament, on the production of a book that is really epoch-marking.\"\n\n\nSCOTSMAN.--\n\n\"One of its prime characteristics is the skill with which it\ntraces out the historical connection between moral opinions and\nmagic and religious beliefs.\"\n\n\nYORKSHIRE POST.--\n\n\"In Dr. Westermarck's hands a subject which might be impossibly\nabstruse becomes almost as attractive as a romance. . . . In pure\nphilosophy he is to some extent a pioneer, and will have the\nnoble satisfaction of the pioneer in arousing doubt, interest,\nand admiration.\"\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\nLONDON: MACMILLAN & CO., LTD.\n\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nTranscriber's Note\n\nThis text combines the two separate volumes of Westermarck's\nbook into one file.\n\nFootnotes have been renumbered sequentially through each chapter\nand placed below the paragraph in which they occur.\n\nConventions for transcription of foreign languages, etc.\n\nPage numbers\n\nPage numbers are preserved in the text, and are placed inside curly\nbrackets with a space on each side, even if that means breaking some\nother PG transcription guideline. Pages without a printed number (such\nas initial pages of chapters) are left unmarked, even though the table\nof contents etc. may refer to those particular pages.\n\nGreek alphabet\n\nGreek expressions are transliterated in normal PG style (upsilon always\nas \"u\"), except that accents are marked thus, with symbols following\nthe Greek letter:\n  acute /\n  grave \\\n  circumflex ^\n\nBreathings are marked thus, with symbols following the Greek letter:\n  rough (\n  smooth )\n\nOther Non-English alphabetic symbols\n\nThe oe-ligature is written [oe].\n\nAgain, other non-standard symbols not in the basic ASCII range are\nmarked as usual in PG: the transcription is placed in square brackets;\nmarks above the basic letter are symbolised with a character preceding\nthe basic character, those beneath the letter with a character\nfollowing the basic character:\n  Acute accent (or a similar mark on consonants) is marked with '\n  Circumflex with ^\n  Macron (long mark) with =\n  Breve above a vowel (short mark) with )\n  Inverted circumflex/breve below with v\n  Dot with .\n\nWestermarck uses some other unusual letters: this text uses \"(\" for the\ntranscription left half ring for Arabic ayin and for something like a\nrough breathing above \"w\" in the name \"E[(w]e\".\n\nCorrected text\n\nCorrected text is marked with \"**\" preceding the correction (except for\nvolume 2, p. 234, footnote 31 where ** is the original text).\n\nCorrections to the text:\n\nPage                  Text of 2nd edition        Correction\nch. 2, p. 32 n. 57    Obaralbanien               Oberalbanien\nch. 7, p. 181 n. 89   _Du Boys_                  Du Boys\nch. 7, p. 195 n. 186  slove                      slave\nch. 9, p. 232         neglected                  neglectful\nch. 10, p. 260 n. 60  pr[oe]mio                  pr\u00e6mio\nch. 10, p. 262 text for n. 81 has no initial \"\nch. 16, p. 381        has                        hast\nch. 18, p. 427 n. 65  Communtarii                Commentarii\nch. 18, p. 432        larcency                   larceny\nch. 19, p. 437 text for n. 28 has no final \"\nch. 19, p. 451        Anthenians                 Athenians\nch. 19, p. 468 text for n. 251 has no final \"\nch. 21, p. 502 text for n. 21 has no final \"\nch  22, p. 517 n. 45  abuse                      abused\nch. 22, p. 521        memtioned                  mentioned\nch. 23, p. 531 n. 42  Magazin                    Magazine\nch. 23, p. 558 n. 254 Law is not italicised\nch. 24, p. 572 n. 11  the Discovery              Discovery\nch. 25, p. 601 text for n. 33 has no initial \"\nch. 26, p. 634 n. 39  Globus is not italicised\nch. 29, p. 35 n. 3    tibes                      tribes\nch. 30, p. 74         text for n. 6 has no final \"\nch. 30, p. 99 n. 256  100                        110\nch. 33, p. 166        m-dash                     .\nch. 35, p. 248 n. 151 Ph\u00e6dro                     Ph\u00e6do\nch. 35, p. 257 n. 211 everbody                   everybody\nch. 35, p. 261        m-dash                     .\nch. 37, p. 301, n. 80 .                          ,\nch. 39, p. 349, n. 21 ,                          .\nch. 42, p. 422        text for n. 2 has no final \"\nch. 43, p. 459 n. 6.  .                          ,\nch. 43, p. 487 n. 209 italics omitted from Sacred Books etc.\nch. 44, p. 498        n.,*                       n. *,\nch. 46, p. 553 n. 1                              ,\nch. 46, p. 555        If                         It\nch. 48, p. 618 n. 85  i                          1\nch. 51, p. 727        wordly                     worldly\nch. 52, p. 734        wordly                     worldly\nAuthorities, p. 786   Indan                      Indian\nAuthorities, p. 798   mosaich                    mosaisch\nAuthorities, p. 800   Reisin                     Reisen\nAuthorities, p. 826   Museun                     Museum\nAuthorities, p. 828   Soceity                    Society\nIndex, p. 828         London 1839                London, 1839\nIndex, p. 842         514                        515\nIndex, p. 844         n. ^2                      n. ^8\nIndex, p. 847         polution                   pollution\nIndex, p. 850         i.                         ii.\nIndex, p. 852 (twice)                            ii.\nIndex, p. 862         ;                          ,\nIndex, p. 862         i.                         ii.\nIndex, p. 865                                    ii.","title":"The origin and development of the moral ideas","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":657811}