{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_5246/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_5246","id":"gutenberg_5246","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/5246","summary":null,"tags":["Category: French Literature","Category: History - European","Category: History - Modern (1750+)","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Philosophy","Philosophy, French","Philosophy, Modern"],"text":"Modern French Philosophy\n\n_A study of the Development since Comte._\n\nby J. Alexander Gunn, M.A., PH.D.\n\n_Fellow of the University of Liverpool; Lecturer in Psychology to the\nLiverpool University Extension Board_\n\nWITH A FOREWORD BY\nHENRI BERGSON\n\n_de l\u2019Academie francaise et de l\u2019Academie des\nSciences morales et politiques_\n\nT. FISHER UNWIN, LTD.\nLONDON: ADELPHI TERRACE\n\n_First published in 1922._\n_(All rights reserved)_\n\nTO\nMY TEACHER\nALEXANDER MAIR\nPROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF LIVERPOOL\nAS A SMALL TOKEN OF ESTEEM\nAND AN ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF HIS INSTRUCTION\n\nContents\n\n FOREWORD BY HENRI BERGSON\n PREFACE\n\n CHAPTER I. ANTECEDENTS\n CHAPTER II. MAIN CURRENTS SINCE 1851\n CHAPTER III. SCIENCE\n CHAPTER IV. FREEDOM\n CHAPTER V. PROGRESS\n CHAPTER VI. ETHICS\n CHAPTER VII. RELIGION\n CONCLUSION\n\n BIBLIOGRAPHY\n COMPARATIVE TABLE\n INDEX\n\n\n\n\n\u201cMais il n\u2019y a pas que cette France, que cette France glorieuse, que\ncette France r\u00e9volutionnaire, cette France \u00e9mancipatrice et initiatrice\ndu genre humain, que cette France d\u2019une activit\u00e9 merveilleuse et comme\non l\u2019a dit, cette France nourrie des id\u00e9es g\u00e9n\u00e9rales du monde, il y a\nune autre France que je n\u2019aime pas moins, une autre France qui m\u2019est\nencore plus ch\u00e8re, c\u2019est la France mis\u00e9rable, c\u2019est la France vaincue\net humili\u00e9e, c\u2019est la France qui est accabl\u00e9e, c\u2019est la France qui\ntra\u00eene son boulet depuis quatorze si\u00e8cles, la France qui crie,\nsuppliante vers la justice et vers la libert\u00e9, la France que les\ndespotes poussent constamment sur les champs de bataille, sous pr\u00e9texte\nde libert\u00e9, pour lui faire verser son sang par toutes les art\u00e8res et\npar toutes les veines, oh! cette France-l\u00e0, je l\u2019aime.\u201d\u2014GAMBETTA,\n_Discours_, 29 _September_, 1872.\n\n\u201cLes jeunes gens de tous les pays du monde qui sont venus dans les\ncampagnes de France combattre pour la civilisation et le droit seront\nsans doute plus dispos\u00e9s \u00e0 y revenir, apres la guerre chercher la\nnourriture intellectuelle. Il importe qu\u2019ils soient assur\u00e9s de l\u2019y\ntrouver, saine, abondante et forte.\u201d\u2014M. D. PARODI, _Inspecteur de\nl\u2019Acad\u00e9mie de Paris, 1919_.\n\n\n\n\nFOREWORD\n\n\n_Je serais heureux que le public anglais s\u00fbt le bien que je pense du\nlivre de M. Gunn, sur la philosophie francaise depuis 1851. Le sujet\nchoisi est neuf, car il n\u2019existe pas, \u00e0 ma connaissance, d\u2019ouvrage\nrelatif \u00e0 toute cette p\u00e9riode de la philosophie fran\u00e7aise. Le beau\nlivre que M. Parodi vient de publier en fran\u00e7ais traite surtout des\nvingt derni\u00e8res ann\u00e9es de notre activit\u00e9 philosophique. M. Gunn,\nremontant jusqu\u2019\u00e0 Auguste Comte, a eu raison de placer ainsi devant\nnous toute le seconde moiti\u00e9 du si\u00e8cle pass\u00e9. Cette p\u00e9riode de\ncinquante ans qui a pr\u00e9c\u00e9d\u00e9e notre vingti\u00e8me si\u00e8cle est d\u2019une\nimportance capitale. Elle constitue r\u00e9ellement notre dix-neuvi\u00e8me\nsi\u00e8cle philosophique, car l\u2019oeuvre m\u00eame de Maine de Biran, qui est\nant\u00e9rieure, n\u2019a \u00e9t\u00e9 bien connue et \u00e9tudi\u00e9e qu\u2019\u00e0 ce moment, et la\nplupart de nos id\u00e9es philosophiques actuelles ont \u00e9t\u00e9 \u00e9labor\u00e9es pendant\nces cinquante ans._\n\n_Le sujet est d\u2019ailleurs d\u2019une complication extr\u00eame, en raison du\nnombre et de la vari\u00e9t\u00e9 des doctrines, en raison surtout de la\ndiversit\u00e9 des questions entre lesquelles se sont partag\u00e9s tant de\npenseurs. Dr. Gunn a su ramener toutes ces questions \u00e0 un petit nombre\nde probl\u00e8mes essentiels : la science, la libert\u00e9, le progr\u00e8s, la\nmorale, la religion. Cette division me para\u00eet heureuse. Elle r\u00e9pond\nbien, ce me semble, aux principales pr\u00e9occupations de la philosophie\nfrancaise. Elle a permis \u00e0 l\u2019auteur d\u2019\u00eatre complet, tout en restant\nsimple, clair, et facile \u00e0 suivre._\n\n_Elle pr\u00e9sente, il est vrai, un inconv\u00e9nient, en ce qu\u2019elle morcelle la\ndoctrine d\u2019un auteur en fragments dont chacun, pris \u00e0 part, perd un peu\nde sa vitalite et de son individualit\u00e9. Elle risque ainsi de pr\u00e9senter\ncomme trop semblable \u00e0 d\u2019autres la solution que tel philosophe a donn\u00e9e\nde tel probl\u00e8me, solution qui, replac\u00e9e dans l\u2019ensemble de la doctrine,\nappara\u00eetrait comme propre \u00e0 ce penseur, originale et plus forte. Mais\ncet inconv\u00e9nient \u00e9tait in\u00e9vitable et l\u2019envers de l\u2019avantage que je\nsignalais plus haut, celui de l\u2019ordre, de la continuit\u00e9 et de la\nclart\u00e9._\n\n_Le travail du Dr. Gunn m\u2019appara\u00eet comme tout \u00e0 fait distingu\u00e9. Il\nt\u00e9moigne d\u2019une information singuli\u00e8rement \u00e9tendue, pr\u00e9cise et s\u00fbre.\nC\u2019est l\u2019oeuvre d\u2019un esprit d\u2019une extr\u00eame souplesse, capable de\ns\u2019assimiler vite et bien la pens\u00e9e des philosophes, de classer les\nid\u00e9es dans leur ordre d\u2019importance, de les exposer m\u00e9thodiquement et\nles appr\u00e9cier \u00e0 leur juste valeur._\n\n H. Bergson\n\n[These pages are a revised extract from the more formal _Rapport_ which\nwas presented by M. Bergson to the University of Liverpool].\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE\n\n\nThis work is the fruit of much reading and research done in Paris at\nthe Sorbonne and Biblioth\u00e8que nationale. It is, substantially, a\nrevised form of the thesis presented by the writer to the University of\nLiverpool for the degree of Doctor in Philosophy, obtained in 1921. The\nauthor is indebted, therefore, to the University for permission to\npublish. More especially must he record his deep gratitude to the\nFrench thinkers who gave both stimulus and encouragement to him during\nhis sojourn in Paris. Foremost among these is M. Henri Bergson, upon\nwhose _rapport_ the Doctorate was conferred, and who has expressed his\nappreciation of the work by contributing a Foreword for publication.\n\nMention must also be made of the encouragement given by the late M.\nEmile Boutroux and by the eminent editor of the well-known _Revue de\nM\u00e9taphysique et de Morale_, M. Xavier L\u00e9on, a leading spirit in the\n_Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 de Philosophie_, whose meetings the writer was privileged to\nattend by invitation. Then MM. Brunschvicg, Levy-Bruhl, Lalande, Rey\nand Lenoir, from time to time discussed the work with him and he must\nrecord his appreciation of their kindness.\n\nTo Professor Mair of Liverpool is due the initial suggestion, and it\nhas been felt a fitting tribute to his supervision, criticism,\nencouragement and sympathy that this book should be respectfully\ndedicated to him by one of his grateful pupils. In the labour of\ndealing with the proofs, the writer has to acknowledge the co-operation\nof Miss M. Linn and Mr. J. E. Turner, M.A.\n\n*    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *\n\n\nThe method adopted in this history has been deliberately chosen for its\nusefulness in emphasising the development of ideas. A purely\nchronological method has not been followed. The biographical system has\nlikewise been rejected. The history of the development of thought\ncentres round problems, and it progresses in relation to these\nproblems. The particular manner in which the main problems presented\nthemselves to the French thinkers of the second half of the nineteenth\ncentury was largely determined by the events and ideas which marked the\nperiod from 1789 to 1851. For this reason a chapter has been devoted to\nAntecedents. Between the Revolution and the _coup d\u2019\u00e9tat_ of Napoleon\nIII., four distinct lines of thought are discernible. Then the main\ncurrents from the year 1851 down to 1921 are described, with special\nreference to the development of the main problems. The reconciliation\nof _science_ and _conscience_ proved to be the main general problem,\nwhich became more definitely that of Freedom. This in itself is\nintimately bound up with the doctrines of progress, of history, of\nethics and religion. These topics are discussed in a manner which shows\ntheir bearing upon each other. The conclusion aims at displaying the\ncharacteristics of French thought which reveal themselves in the study\nof these great problems. Its vitality, concreteness, clearness,\nbrilliance and precision are noted and a comparison made between French\nthought and German philosophy.\n\nFrom a general philosophical standpoint few periods could be so\nfascinating. Few, if any, could show such a complete revolution of\nthought as that witnessed since the year 1851. To bring this out\nclearly is the main object of the present book. It is intended to serve\na double purpose. Primarily, it aims at being a contribution to the\nhistory of thought which will provide a definite knowledge of the best\nthat has been said and thought among philosophers in France during the\nlast seventy years. Further, it is itself an appeal for serious\nattention to be given to French philosophy. This is a field which has\nbeen comparatively neglected by English students, so far as the\nnineteenth century is concerned, and this is especially true of our\nperiod, which is roughly that from Comte to Boutroux (who passed away\nlast month) and Bergson (who has this year resigned his professorship).\nIt is the earnest desire of the writer to draw both philosophical\nstudents and lovers of France and its literature to a closer study and\nappreciation of modern French philosophy. Emotion and sentiment are\ninadequate bases for an _entente_ which is to be really _cordiale_\nbetween any two peoples. An understanding of their deepest thoughts is\nalso necessary and desirable. Such an understanding is, after all, but\na step towards that iternationalisation of thought, that common fund of\nhuman culture and knowledge, which sets itself as an ideal before the\nnations of the world. _La philosophie n\u2019a pas de patrie! Les id\u00e9es sont\nactuellement les forces internationales._\n\nJ. A. G.\n\nTHE UNIVERSITY,\n        LIVERPOOL,\n            _December_, 1921\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I\n(INTRODUCTORY)\nANTECEDENTS\n\n\nHISTORICAL SURVEY OF THE MAIN CURRENTS FROM THE REVOLUTION OF 1789 UP\nTO 1851.\n\nAfter the Revolution\u2014The Traditionalists: Chateaubuand, De Bonald, De\nMaistre, Lamennais, Lacordaire\n\n_Main Currents:_\n\n1. Maine de Biran.\n\n2. The Eclectics: Cousin, Jouffroy.\n\n3. The Socialists: Saint-Simon, Fourier and Cabal, Proudhon and Blanc.\n\n4.Positivism: Auguste Comte.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I\nANTECEDENTS\n\nThis work deals with the great French thinkers since the time of\nAuguste Comte, and treats, under various aspects, the development of\nthought in relation to the main problems which confronted these men. In\nthe commencement of such an undertaking we are obliged to acknowledge\nthe continuity of human thought, to recognise that it tends to\napproximate to an organic whole, and that, consequently, methods\nresembling those of surgical amputation are to be avoided. We cannot\nabsolutely isolate one period of thought. For this reason a brief\nsurvey of the earlier years is necessary in order to orient the\napproach to the period specially placed in the limelight, namely\n1851-1921.\n\nIn the world of speculative thought and in the realm of practical\npolitics we find reflected, at the opening of the century, the work of\nthe French Revolutionaries on the one hand, and that of Immanuel Kant\non the other. Coupled with these great factors was the pervading\ninfluence of the Encyclop\u00e6dists and of the thinkers of the\nEnlightenment. These two groups of influences, the one sudden and in\nthe nature of a shock to political and metaphysical thought, the other\nquieter but no less effective, combined to produce a feeling of\ninstability and of dissatisfaction at the close of the eighteenth\ncentury. A sense of change, indeed of resurrection, filled the minds\nand hearts of those who saw the opening of the nineteenth century. The\nold aristocracy and the monarchy in France had gone, and in philosophy\nthe old metaphysic had received a blow at the hands of the author of\nthe Three Critiques.\n\nNo better expression was given to the psychological state of France at\nthis time than that of Alfred de Musset in his _Confession d\u2019un Enfant\ndu Si\u00e8cle_. _Toute la maladie du si\u00e8cle pr\u00e9sent_ (he wrote) _vient de\ndeux causes; le peuple qui a pass\u00e9 par \u201993 et par 1814 porte au c\u0153ur\ndeux blessures. Tout ce qui \u00e9tait n\u2019est plus; tout ce qui sera n\u2019est\npas encore. Ne cherchez ailleurs le secret de nos maux._[1] De Musset\nwas right, the whole course of the century was marked by conflict\nbetween two forces\u2014on the one hand a tendency to reaction and\nconservatism, on the other an impulse to radicalism and revolution.\n\n [1] The extract is taken from _Premi\u00e8re partie_, ch. 2. The book was\n published in 1836. Somewhat similar sentiments are uttered with\n reference to this time by Michelet. (See his _Histoire du XIXe\n Si\u00e8cle_, vol. i., p. 9).\n\n\nIt is true that one group of thinkers endeavoured, by a perfectly\nnatural reaction, to recall their fellow-countrymen, at this time of\nunrest, back to the doctrines and traditions of the past, and tried to\nfind in the faith of the Christian Church and the practice of the\nCatholic religion a rallying-point. The monarchy and the Church were\neulogised by Chateaubriand, while on the more philosophical side\nefforts on behalf of traditionalism were made very nobly by De Bonald\nand Joseph de Maistre. While they represented the old aristocracy and\nrecalled the theocracy and ecclesiasticism of the past by advocating\nreaction and Ultramontanism, Lamennais attempted to adapt Catholicism\nto the new conditions, only to find, as did Renan later, that \u201cone\ncannot argue with a bar of iron.\u201d Not the brilliant appeals of a\nLacordaire, who thundered from Notre Dame, nor the modernism of a\nLamennais, nor the efforts in religious philosophy made by De Maistre,\nwere, however, sufficient to meet the needs of the time.\n\nThe old traditions and the old dogmas did not offer the salvation they\nprofessed to do. Consequently various groups of thinkers worked out\nsolutions satisfactory to themselves and which they offered to others.\nWe can distinguish clearly four main currents, the method of\nintrospection and investigation of the inner life of the soul, the\nadoption of a spiritualist philosophy upon an eclectic basis, the\nsearch for a new society after the manner of the socialists and,\nlastly, a positive philosophy and religion of humanity. These four\ncurrents form the historical antecedents of our period and to a brief\nsurvey of them we now turn.\n\n*    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *\n\nI\n\nTo find the origin of many of the tendencies which appear prominently\nin the thought of the second half of the nineteenth century,\nparticularly those displayed by the new spiritualistic philosophy\n(which marked the last thirty years of the century), we must go back to\nthe period of the Revolution, to Maine de Biran (1766-1824)\u2014a unique\nand original thinker who laid the foundations of modern French\npsychology and who was, we may note in passing, a contemporary of\nChateaubriand. A certain tone of romanticism marks the work of both the\nliterary man and the philosopher. Maine de Biran was not a thinker who\nreflected upon his own experiences in retreat from the world. Born a\nCount, a Lifeguardsman to Louis XVI. at the Revolution, and faithful to\nthe old aristocracy, he was appointed, at the Restoration, to an\nimportant administrative position, and later became a deputy and a\nmember of the State Council. His writings were much greater in extent\nthan is generally thought, but only one important work appeared in\npublication during his lifetime. This was his treatise, or _m\u00e9moire_,\nentitled _Habitude_, which appeared in 1803. This work well illustrates\nMaine de Biran\u2019s historical position in the development of French\nphilosophy. It came at a tome when attention and interest, so far as\nphilosophical problems were concerned, centred round two \u201cfoci.\u201d These\nrespective centres are indicated by Destutt de Tracy,[2] the disciple\nof Condillac on the one hand, and by Cabanis[3] on the other. Both were\n\u201cideologues\u201d and were ridiculed by Napoleon who endeavoured to lay much\nblame upon the philosophers. We must notice, however, this difference.\nWhile the school of Condillac,[4] influenced by Locke, endeavoured to\nwork out a psychology in terms of abstractions, Cabanis, anxious to be\nmore concrete, attempted to interpret the life of the mind by reference\nto physical and physiological phenomena.\n\n [2] Destutt de Tracy, 1754-1836. His _Elements of Ideology_ appeared\n in 1801. He succeeded Cabanis in the Acad\u00e9mie in 1808, and in a\n complimentary _Discours_ pronounced upon his predecessor claimed that\n Cabanis had introduced medicine into philosophy and philosophy into\n medicine. This remark might well have been applied later to Claude\n Bernard.\n\n\n [3] Cabanis, 1757-1808, _Rapports du Physique et du Morale de\n l\u2019Homme_, 1802. He was a friend of De Biran, as also was Amp\u00e8re, the\n celebrated physicist and a man of considerable philosophical power. A\n group used to meet _chez Cabanis_ at Auteuil, comprising De Biran,\n Cabanis, Amp\u00e8re, Royard-Collard, Guizot, and Cousin.\n\n\n [4] Condillac belongs to the eighteenth century. He died in 1780. His\n _Trait\u00e9 des Sensations_ is dated 1754.\n\n\nIt is the special merit of De Biran that he endeavoured, and that\nsuccessfully, to establish both the concreteness and the essential\nspirituality of the inner life. The attitude and method which he\nadopted became a force in freeing psychology, and indeed philosophy in\ngeneral, from mere play with abstractions. His doctrines proved\nvaluable, too, in establishing the reality and irreducibility of the\nmental or spiritual nature of man.\n\nMaine de Biran took as his starting-point a psychological fact, the\nreality of conscious effort. The self is active rather than\nspeculative; the self is action or effort\u2014that is to say, the self is,\nfundamentally and primarily, will. For the Cartesian formula _Cogito,\nergo sum,_ De Biran proposed to substitute that of _Volo, ergo sum_. He\nwent on to maintain that we have an internal and immediate perception\nof this effort of will through which we realise, at one and the same\ntime, our self in its fullest activity and the resistance to its\noperations. In such effort we realise ourselves as free causes and, in\nspite of the doctrine of physical determinism, we realise in ourselves\nthe self as a cause of its own volitions. The greater the resistance or\nthe greater the effort, the more do we realise ourselves as being free\nand not the absolute victims of habit. Of this freedom we have an\nimmediate consciousness, it is _une donn\u00e9e imm\u00e9diate de la conscience._\n\nThis freedom is not always realised, for over against the tendency to\naction we must set the counter-tendency to passivity. Between these two\nexists, in varying degrees of approach to the two extremes, _habitude_.\nOur inner life is seen by the psychologist as a field of conflict\nbetween the sensitive and the reflective side of our nature. It is this\nwhich gives to the life of this _homo duplex_ all the elements of\nstruggle and tragedy. In the desires and the passions, says Maine de\nBiran, the true self is not seen. The true self appears in memory,\nreasoning and, above all, in will.\n\nSuch, in brief, is the outline of De Biran\u2019s psychology. To his two\nstages, _vie sensitive_ and _vie active_ (_ou r\u00e9flexive_), he added a\nthird, _la vie divine_. In his religious psychology he upheld the great\nChristian doctrines of divine love and grace as against the less human\nattitude of the Stoics. He still insists upon the power of will and\naction and is an enemy of the religious vice of quietism. In his\nclosing years De Biran penned his ideas upon our realisation of the\ndivine love by intuition. His intense interest in the inner life of the\nspirit gives De Biran\u2019s _Journal Intime_ a rank among the illuminating\nwritings upon religious psychology.\n\nMaine de Biran was nothing if not a psychologist. The most absurd\nstatement ever made about him was that he was \u201cthe French Kant.\u201d This\nis very misleading, for De Biran\u2019s genius showed itself in his\npsychological power and not in critical metaphysics. The importance of\nhis work and his tremendous influence upon our period, especially upon\nthe new spiritualism, will be apparent. Indeed he himself foresaw the\ngreat possibilities which lay open to philosophy along the lines he\nlaid down. \u201c_Qui sait,_\u201d he remarked,[5] \u201c_tout ce que peut la\nr\u00e9flection concentr\u00e9e et s\u2019il n\u2019y a pas un nouveau monde int\u00e9rieur qui\npourra \u00eatre d\u00e9couvert un jour par quelque \u2018Colomb m\u00e9taphysicien.\u2019_\u201d\nWith Maine de Biran began the movement in French philosophy which\nworked through the writings of Ravaisson, Lachelier, Guyau, Boutroux\nand particularly Bergson. A careful examination of the philosophy of\nthis last thinker shows how great is his debt to Maine de Biran, whose\ninspiration he warmly acknowledges.\n\n [5] Pens\u00e9es, p. 213.\n\n\nBut it is only comparatively recently that Maine de Biran has come to\nhis own and that his real power and influence have been recognised.\nThere are two reasons for this, firstly the lack of publication of his\nwritings, and secondly his being known for long only through the work\nof Cousin and the Eclectics, who were imperfectly acquainted with his\nwork. Upon this school of thought he had some little influence which\nwas immediate and personal, but Cousin, although he edited some of his\nunpublished work, failed to appreciate its originality and value.\n\nSo for a time De Biran\u2019s influence waned when that of Cousin himself\nfaded. Maine de Biran stands quite in a different category from the\nEclectics, as a unique figure at a transition period, the herald of the\nbest that was to be in the thought of the century. Cousin and the\nEclectic school, however, gained the official favour, and eclecticism\nwas for many years the \u201cofficial philosophy.\u201d\n\nII\n\nThis Eclectic School was due to the work of various thinkers, of whom\nwe may cite Laromigui\u00e8re (1756-1837), who marks the transition from\nCondillac, Royer-Collard (1763-1845), who, abandoning Condillac, turned\nfor inspiration to the Scottish School (particularly to Reid), Victor\nCousin (1792-1867), Jouffroy (1796-1842) and Paul Janet (1823-1899),\nthe last of the notable eclectics. Of these \u201cthe chief\u201d was Cousin. His\npersonality dominated this whole school of thought, his _ipse dixit_\nwas the criterion of orthodoxy, an orthodoxy which we must note was\nsupported by the powers of officialdom.\n\nHe rose from the Ecole Normale Sup\u00e9rieure to a professorship at the\nSorbonne, which he held from the Restoration (1815 to 1830), with a\nbreak of a few years during which his course was suspended. These years\nhe spent in Germany, to which country attention had been attracted by\nthe work of Madame de Sta\u00ebl, _De l\u2019Allemagne_ (1813). From 1830 to the\nbeginning of our period (1851) Cousin, as director of the Ecole Normale\nSup\u00e9rieure, as a _pair de France_ and a minister of state, organised\nand controlled the education of his country. He thus exercised a very\ngreat influence over an entire generation of Frenchmen, to whom he\npropounded the doctrines of his spiritualism.\n\nHis teaching was marked by a strong reaction against the doctrines of\nthe previous century, which had given such value to the data of sense.\nCousin abhorred the materialism involved in these doctrines, which he\nstyled _une doctrine d\u00e9solante_, and he endeavoured to raise the\ndignity and conception of man as a spiritual being. In the Preface to\nhis Lectures of 1818, _Du Vrai, du Beau et du Bien_ (Edition of 1853),\npublished first in 1846, he lays stress upon the elements of his\nphilosophy, which he presents as a true spiritualism, for it\nsubordinates the sensory and sensual to the spiritual. He upholds the\nessentially spiritual nature of man, his liberty, moral responsibility\nand obligation, the dignity of human virtue, disinterestedness,\ncharity, justice and beauty. These fruits of the spirit reveal, Cousin\nclaimed, a God who is both the author and the ideal type of humanity, a\nBeing who is not indifferent to the welfare and happiness of his\ncreatures. There is a vein of romanticism about Cousin, and in him may\nbe seen the same spirit which, on the literary side, was at work in\nHugo, Lamartine and De Vigny.\n\nCousin\u2019s philosophy attached itself rather to the Scottish school of\n\u201ccommon sense\u201d than to the analytic type of doctrine which had\nprevailed in his own country in the previous century. To this he added\nmuch from various sources, such as Schelling and Hegel among the\nmoderns, Plato and the Alexandrians among the ancients. In viewing the\nhistory of philosophy, Cousin advocated a division of systems into four\nclasses\u2014sensualism, idealism, scepticism and mysticism. Owing to the\ninsufficiency of his _v\u00e9rit\u00e9s de sens commun_ he was prone to confuse\nthe history of philosophy with philosophy itself. There is perhaps no\nbranch of science or art so intimately bound up with its own history as\nis philosophy, but we must beware of substituting an historical survey\nof problems for an actual handling of those problems themselves.\nCousin, however, did much to establish in his native land the teaching\nof the history of philosophy.\n\nHis own aim was to found a metaphysic spiritual in character, based\nupon psychology. While he did not agree with the system of Kant, he\nrejected the doctrines of the empiricists and set his influence against\nthe materialistic and sceptical tendencies of his time. Yet he cannot\nbe excused from \u201copportunism\u201d not only in politics but in thought. In\norder to retain his personal influence he endeavoured to present his\nphilosophy as a sum of doctrines perfectly consistent with the Catholic\nfaith. This was partly, no doubt, to counteract the work and influence\nof that group of thinkers already referred to as Traditionalists, De\nBonald, De Maistre and Lamennais. Cousin\u2019s efforts in this direction,\nhowever, dissatisfied both churchmen and philosophers and gave rise to\nthe remark that his teaching was but _une philosophie de convenance_.\nWe must add too that the vagueness of his spiritual teaching was\nlargely responsible for the welcome accorded by many minds to the\npositivist teaching of Auguste Comte.\n\nWhile Maine de Biran had a real influence upon the thought of our\nperiod 1851-1921, Cousin stands in a different relation to subsequent\nthought, for that thought is largely characterised by its being a\nreaction against eclecticism. Positivism rose as a direct revolt\nagainst it, the neo-critical philosophy dealt blows at both, while\nRavaisson, the initiator of the neo-spiritualism, upon whom Cousin did\nnot look very favourably, endeavoured to reorganise upon a different\nfooting, and on sounder principles, free from the deficiencies which\nmust always accompany eclectic thought, those ideas and ideals to which\nCousin in his spiritualism had vaguely indicated his loyalty. It is\ninteresting to note that Cousin\u2019s death coincides in date with the\nfoundation of the neo-spiritual philosophy by Ravaisson\u2019s celebrated\nmanifesto to idealists, for such, as we shall see, was his _Rapport sur\nla Philosophie au Dix-neuvi\u00e8me Si\u00e8cle_ (1867). Cousin\u2019s spiritualism\nhad a notable influence upon several important men\u2014e.g., Michelet and\nhis friend Edgar Quinet, and more indirectly upon Renan. The latter\nspoke of him in warm terms as un _excitateur de ma pens\u00e9e_.[6]\n\n [6] It is worth noting that two of the big currents of opposition,\n those of Comte and Renouvier, arose outside the professional and\n official teaching, free from the University which was entirely\n dominated by Cousin. This explains much of the slowness with which\n Comte and Renouvier were appreciated.\n\n\nAmong Cousin\u2019s disciples one of the most prominent was Jouffroy of the\nColl\u00e8ge de France. The psychological interest was keen in his work, but\nhis _M\u00e9langes philosophiques_ (1883) showed him to be occupied with the\nproblem of human destiny. Paul Janet was a noble upholder of the\neclectic doctrine or older spiritualism, while among associates and\ntardy followers must be mentioned Gamier, Damiron, Franke, Caro and\nJules Simon.\n\nIII\n\nWe have seen how, as a consequence of the Revolution and of the cold,\ndestructive, criticism of the eighteenth century, there was a demand\nfor constructive thought. This was a desire common not only to the\nTraditionalists but to De Biran and Cousin. They aimed at intellectual\nreconstruction. While, however, there were some who combated the\nprinciples of the Revolution, as did the Traditionalists, while some\ntried to correct and to steady those principles (as De Biran and\nCousin), there were others who endeavoured to complete them and to\ncarry out a more rigorous application of the Revolutionary watchwords,\n_Libert\u00e9_, _Egalit\u00e9_, _Fraternit\u00e9_. The Socialists (and later Comte)\naimed at not merely intellectual, but social reconstruction.\n\nThe Revolution and the War had shown men that many changes could be\nproduced in society in a comparatively short time. This encouraged bold\nand imaginative spirits. Endeavours after better things, after new\nsystems and a new order of society, showed themselves. The work of\npolitical philosophers attempted to give expression to the socialist\nidea of society. For long there had been maintained the ecclesiastical\nconception of a perfect social order in another world. It was now\nthought that humanity would be better employed, not in imagining the\nglories of a \u201chereafter,\u201d but in \u201ctilling its garden,\u201d in striving to\nrealise here on earth something of that blessed fellowship and happy\nsocial order treasured up in heaven. This is the dominant note of\nsocialism, which is closely bound up at its origin, not only with\npolitical thought, but with humanitarianism and a feeling essentially\nreligious. Its progress is a feature of the whole century.\n\nThe most notable expression of the new socialistic idea was that of\nCount Henri de Saint-Simon (1760-1825), a relative of the celebrated\nDuke. He had great confidence in the power of science as an instrument\nfor social reconstruction, and he took over from a medical man, Dr.\nBurdin, the notions which, later on, Auguste Comte was to formulate\ninto the doctrines of Positivism. Saint-Simon\u2019s influence showed itself\nwhile the century was young, his first work _Lettres d\u2019un Habitant de\nGen\u00e8ve_ appearing in 1803. In this he outlined a scheme for placing the\nauthoritative power of the community, not in the hands of Church and\nState, but in a freely elected body of thinkers and _artistes_. He then\nendeavoured to urge the importance of order in society, as a\ncounterpart to the order erected by science in the world of knowledge.\nTo this end was directed his _Introduction aux Travaux scientifiques du\nDix-neuvi\u00e8me Si\u00e8cle_ (1807-8). He also indicated the importance for\nsocial welfare of abandoning the preoccupation with an imaginary\nheaven, and pointed out that the more social and political theory could\nbe emancipated from the influence of theological dogmas the better. At\nthe same time he quite recognised the importance of religious beliefs\nto a community, and his sociological view of religion foreshadowed\nGuyau\u2019s study, an important work which will claim our attention in due\ncourse.\n\nIn 1813, Saint-Simon published his _M\u00e9moire sur la Science de l\u2019Homme_,\nin which he laid down notions which were the germ of Auguste Comte\u2019s\n_Law of the Three Stages_. With the peace which followed the Battle of\nWaterloo, a tremendous stimulus was given in France to industrial\nactivity, and Saint-Simon formulated his motto \u201cAll by industry and all\nfor industry.\u201d Real power, he showed, lay not in the hands of\ngovernments or government agents, but with the industrial class.\nSociety therefore should be organised in the manner most favourable to\nthe working class. Ultimate economic and political power rests with\nthem. These ideas he set forth in _L\u2019Industrie_, 1817-18, _La\nPolitique_, 1819, _L\u2019Organisateur_, 1819-30, _Le Syst\u00e8me industriel_,\n1821-22, _Le Cat\u00e9chisme des Industriels_, 1822-24. Since 1817 among his\nfellow- workers were now Augustin Thierry and young Auguste Comte, his\nsecretary, the most important figure in the history of the first half\nof the century.\n\nFinding that exposition and reasoned demonstration of his ideas were\nnot sufficient, Saint-Simon made appeal to sentiment by his _Appel aux\nPhilanthropes_, a treatise on human brotherhood and solidarity. This he\nfollowed up in 1825 by his last book, published the year of his death,\n_Le Nouveau Christianisme_. This book endeavoured to outline a religion\nwhich should prove itself capable of reorganising society by\ninculcating the brotherhood of man in a more effective manner than that\nof the Christian Church. _Fraternit\u00e9_ was the watchword he stressed,\nand he placed women on an equal political and social footing with men.\nHe set forth the grave deficiencies of the Christian doctrines as\nproclaimed by Catholic and Protestant alike. Both are cursed by the sin\nof individualism, the virtue of saving one\u2019s own soul, while no attempt\nat social salvation is made. Both Catholics and Protestants he labelled\nvile heretics, inasmuch as they have turned aside from the social\nteaching of Christianity. If we are to love our neighbour as ourselves\nwe must as a whole community work for the betterment of our fellows\nsocially, by erecting a form of society more in accord with Christian\nprinciples. We must strive to do it here and now, and not sit piously\ngetting ready for the next world. We must not think it religious to\ndespise the body or material welfare. God manifests Himself as matter\nand spirit, so Religion must not despise economics but rather unite\nindustry and science as Love unites spirit and matter. Eternal Life, of\nwhich Christianity makes so much, is not to be sought, argued\nSaint-Simon, in another world, but here and now in the love and service\nof our brothers, in the uplift of humanity as a whole.\n\nSaint-Simon believed in a fated progress and an inevitable betterment\nof the condition of the working classes. The influence of Hegel\u2019s view\nof history and Condorcet\u2019s social theories is apparent in some of his\nwritings. His insistence upon organisation, social authority and the\ndepreciative view of liberty which he held show well how he was the\nreal father of many later doctrines and of applications of these\ndoctrines, as for example by Lenin in the Soviet system of Bolshevik\nRussia. Saint-Simon foreshadowed the dictatorship of the proletariat,\nalthough his scheme of social organisation involved a triple division\nof humanity into intellectuals, artists and industrials. Many of his\ndoctrines had a definite communistic tendency. Among them we find\nindicated the abolition of all hereditary rights of inheritance and the\ndistribution of property is placed, as in the communist programme, in\nthe hands of the organising authority. Saint-Simon had a keen insight\ninto modern social conditions and problems. He stressed the economic\ninter-relationships and insisted that the world must be regarded as\n\u201cone workshop.\u201d A statement of the principles of the Saint- Simonist\nSchool, among whom was the curious character Enfantin, was presented to\nthe _Chambre des D\u00e9put\u00e9s_ in the critical year 1830. The disciples seem\nto have shown a more definite communism than their master. The\ninfluence of Saint-Simon, precursor of both socialism and positivism,\nhad considerable influence upon the social philosophy of the whole\ncentury. It only diminished when the newer type of socialist doctrine\nappeared, the so-called \u201cscientific\u201d socialism of Marx and Engels.\nSaint-Simon\u2019s impulse, however, acted powerfully upon the minds of most\nof the thinkers of the century, especially in their youth. Renouvier\nand Renan were fired with some of his ideas. The spirit of Saint-Simon\nexpressed itself in our period by promoting an intense interest in\nphilosophy as applied to social problems.\n\nSaint-Simon was not, however, the only thinker at this time with a\nsocial programme to offer. In contrast to his scheme we have that of\nFourier (1772-1837) who endeavoured to avoid the suppression of liberty\ninvolved in the organisation proposed by Saint-Simon.\n\nThe psychology of Fourier was peculiar and it coloured his ethical and\nsocial doctrine. He believed that the evils of the world were due to\nthe repression of human passions. These in themselves, if given liberty\nof expression, would prove harmonious. As Newton had propounded the law\nof the universal attraction of matter, Fourier endeavoured to propound\nthe law of attraction between human beings. Passion and desire lead to\nmutual attraction; the basis of society is free association.\n\nFourier\u2019s _Trait\u00e9 de l\u2019Association domestique et agricole_ (1822),\nwhich followed his _Th\u00e9orie des Quatre Mouvements_ (1808), proposed the\nformation of associations or groups, _phalanges_, in which workers\nunite with capital for the self-government of industry. He, like Saint-\nSimon, attacks idlers, but the two thinkers look upon the capitalist\nmanager as a worker. The intense class- antagonism of capitalist and\nlabourer had not yet formulated itself and was not felt strongly until\nvoiced on behalf of the proletariat by Proudhon and Marx. Fourier\u2019s\nproposals were those of a _bourgeois_ business man who knew the\ncommercial world intimately, who criticised it and condemned the\nexisting system of civilisation. Various experiments were made to\norganise communities based upon his _phalanges_.\n\nCabet, the author of _Icaria_ (1840) and _Le nouveau Christianisme_,\nwas a further power in the promotion of socialism and owed not a little\nof his inspiration to Robert Owen.\n\nThe most interesting and powerful of the early socialist philosophers\nis undoubtedly Proudhon (1809- 1865), a striking personality, much\nmisunderstood.\n\nWhile Saint-Simon, a count, came from the aristocracy, Fourier from the\n_bourgeoisie_, Proudhon was a real son of the people, a mouthpiece of\nthe proletariat. He was a man of admirable mental energy and learning,\nwhich he had obtained solely by his own efforts and by a struggle with\npoverty and misery. Earnest and passionate by nature, he yet formulated\nhis doctrines with more sanity and moderation than is usually supposed.\nLabels of \u201catheist\u201d and \u201canarchist\u201d have served well to misrepresent\nhim. Certainly two of his watchwords were likely enough to raise\nhostility in many quarters. \u201cGod,\u201d he said, \u201cis evil,\u201d \u201cProperty is\ntheft.\u201d This last maxim was the subject of his book, published in 1840,\n_Qu\u2019est-ce que la propri\u00e9t\u00e9_? (_ou, Recherches sur le principe du droit\net du gouvernement_) to which his answer was \u201c_C\u2019est le vol!_\u201d Proudhon\ntook up the great watchword of _Egalit\u00e9_, and had a passion for social\njustice which he based on \u201cthe right to the whole product of labour.\u201d\nThis could only come by mutual exchange, fairly and freely. He\ndistinguished between private \u201cproperty\u201d and individual \u201cpossession.\u201d\nThe latter is an admitted fact and is not to be abolished; what he is\nanxious to overthrow is private \u201cproperty,\u201d which is a toll upon the\nlabour of others and is therefore ultimately and morally theft. He\nhated the State for its support of the \u201cthieves,\u201d and his doctrines are\na philosophy of anarchy. He further enunciated them in _Syst\u00e8me des\nContradictions \u00e9conomiques_ (1846) and _De la Justice_ (1858). In 1848\nhe was elected a _d\u00e9put\u00e9_ and, together with Louis Blanc and Pierre\nLeroux, figured in the Revolution of 1848. Blanc was a man of action,\nwho had a concrete scheme for transition from the capitalist r\u00e9gime to\nthe socialist state. He believed in the organisation of labour,\nuniversal suffrage and a new distribution of wealth, but he disapproved\nstrongly of the dictatorship of the proletariat and of violent\nrevolution. Proudhon expressed his great admiration for Blanc.\n\nThe work of both of these men is a contradiction to the assertion put\nforward by the Marxian school that socialist doctrine was merely\nsentimental, utopian and \u201cunscientific\u201d prior to Marx. Many of the\nviews of Proudhon and Blanc were far more \u201cscientific\u201d than those of\nMarx, because they were closer to facts. Proudhon differed profoundly\nfrom Marx in his view of history in which he saw the influence of ideas\nand ideals, as well as the operation of purely economic factors. To the\ndoctrine of a materialistic determination of history Proudhon rightly\nopposes that of a spiritual determination, by the thoughts and ideals\nof men.[7] The true revolution Proudhon and Blanc maintained can come\nonly through the power of ideas.\n\n [7] Indeed, it is highly probable that with the growing\n dissatisfaction with Marxian theories the work of Proudhon will come\n into greater prominence, replacing largely that of Marx.\n    On the personal relations of Proudhon with Marx (1818-1883), who\n    was nine years younger than the Frenchman, see the interesting\n    volume by Marx\u2019s descendant, M. Jean Longuet (D\u00e9put\u00e9 de la Seine),\n    _La Politique internationale du Marxisme_ (_Karl Marx et la\n    France_) (Alcan).\n    On the debt of Marx to the French social thinkers see the account\n    given by Professor Charles Andler in his special edition of the\n    Communist Manifesto, _Le Manifeste Communiste_ (_avec introduction\n    historique et commentaire_), (Rieder), also the last section of\n    Renouvier\u2019s Philosophie analytique de l\u2019Histoire, vol. iv.\n\n\nAll these early socialist thinkers had this in common: they agreed that\npurely economic solutions would not soothe the ills of society, but\nthat moral, religious and philosophic teaching must accompany, or\nrather precede, all efforts towards social reform. The earliest of\nthem, Saint-Simon, had asserted that no society, no system of\ncivilisation, can endure if its spiritual principles and its economic\norganisation are in direct contradiction. When brotherly love on the\none hand and merciless competition on the other are equally extolled,\nthen hypocrisy, unrest and conflict are inevitable.\n\nIV\n\nThe rise of positivism ranks with the rise of socialism as a movement\nof primary importance. Both were in origin nearer to one another than\nthey now appear to be. We have seen how Saint-Simon was imbued with a\nspirit of social reform, a desire to reorganise human society. This\ndesire Auguste Comte (1798-1857) shared; he felt himself called to it\nas a sacred work, and he extolled his \u201cincomparable mission.\u201d He\nlamented the anarchical state of the world and contrasted it with the\nworld of the ancients and that of the Middle Ages. The harmony and\nstability of mediaeval society were due, Comte urged, to the spiritual\npower and unity of the Catholic Church and faith. The liberty of the\nReformation offers no real basis for society, it is the spirit of\ncriticism and of revolution. The modern world needs a new spiritual\npower. Such was Comte\u2019s judgment upon the world of his time. Where in\nthe modern world could such a new organising power be found? To this\nquestion Comte gave an answer similar to that of Saint-Simon: he turned\nto science. The influence of Saint-Simon is here apparent, and we must\nnote the personal relations between the two men. In 1817 Comte became\nsecretary to Saint-Simon, and became intimately associated with his\nideas and his work. Comte recognised, with his master, the supreme\nimportance of establishing, at the outset, the relations actually\nobtaining and the relations possible between science and political\norganisation. This led to the publication, in 1822, of a treatise,\n_Plan des Travaux scientifiques n\u00e9cessaires pour r\u00e9organiser la\nSoci\u00e9t\u00e9_, which unfortunately led to a quarrel between the two friends,\nand finally, in 1824, to a definite rupture by which Comte seems to\nhave been embittered and made rather hostile to his old master and to\nhave assumed an ungenerous attitude.[8] Comte, however, being a proud\nand ambitious spirit, was perhaps better left alone to hew out his own\npath. In him we have one of the greatest minds of modern France, and\nhis doctrine of positivism is one of the dominating features of the\nfirst half of the century.\n\n [8] In considering the relations between Saint-Simon and Comte we may\n usefully compare those between Schelling and Hegel in Germany.\n\n\nHis break with Saint-Simon showed his own resources; he had undoubtedly\na finer sense of the difficulties of his reforming task than had\nSaint-Simon; moreover, he possessed a scientific knowledge which his\nmaster lacked. Such equipment he needed in his ambitious task, and it\nis one of the chief merits of Comte that he _attempted_ so large a\nproject as the Positive Philosophy endeavoured to be.\n\nThis philosophy was contained in his _Cours de Philosophie positive_\n(1830-1842), which he regarded as the theoretic basis of a reforming\npolitical philosophy. One of the most interesting aspects of this work,\nhowever, is its claim to be a positive _philosophy_. Had not Comte\naccepted the Saint-Simonist doctrine of a belief in science as the\ngreat future power in society? How then comes it that he gives us a\n\u201c_philosophie_ positive\u201d in the first place and not, as we might\nexpect, a \u201c_science_ positive\u201d? Comte\u2019s answer to this is that science,\nno less than society itself, is disordered and stands in need of\norganisation. The sciences have proceeded to work in a piecemeal\nfashion and are unable to present us with _une vue d\u2019ensemble_. It is\nthe r\u00f4le of philosophy to work upon the data presented by the various\nsciences and, without going beyond these data, to arrange them and give\nus an organic unity of thought, a synthesis, which shall produce order\nin the mind of man and subsequently in human society.\n\nThe precise part to be played by philosophy is determined by the\nexisting state of scientific knowledge in the various departments and\nso depends upon the general stage of intelligence which humanity has\nreached. The intellectual development of humanity was formulated\ngenerally by Comte in what is known as \u201cThe Law of the Three Stages,\u201d\nprobably that part of his doctrine which is best known and which is\nmost obvious. \u201cThe Law of the Three Stages\u201d merely sets down the fact\nthat in the race and in the individual we find three successive stages,\nunder which conceptions are formed differently. The first is the\ntheological or fictitious stage, in which the explanation of things is\nreferred to the operations of divine agency. The second is the\nmetaphysical or abstract stage when, for divinities, abstract\nprinciples are substituted. In the third, the scientific or positive\nstage, the human mind has passed beyond a belief in divine agencies or\nmetaphysical abstractions to a rational study of the effective laws of\nphenomena. The human spirit here encounters the real, but it abstains\nfrom pretensions to absolute knowledge; it does not theorise about the\nbeginning or the end of the universe or, indeed, its absolute nature;\nit takes only into consideration facts within human knowledge. Comte\nlaid great emphasis upon the necessity of recognising the relativity of\nall things. All is relative; this is the one absolute principle. Our\nknowledge, he insisted (especially in his _Discours sur l\u2019Esprit\npositif_, 1844, which forms a valuable introduction to his thought as\nexpressed in his larger works), is entirely relative to our\norganisation and our situation. Relativity, however, does not imply\nuncertainty. Our knowledge is indeed relative and never absolute, but\nit grows to a greater accord with reality. It is this passion for\n\u201caccord with reality\u201d which is characteristic of the scientific or\npositivist spirit.\n\nThe sciences are themselves relative and much attention is given by\nComte to the proper classification of the sciences. He determines his\nhierarchy by arranging them in the order in which they have themselves\ncompleted the three stages and arrived at positivity. Mathematics,\nastronomy, physics, chemistry, biology and sociology are his\narrangement. This last named has not yet arrived at the final stage; it\nis but a science in the making. Comte, indeed, himself gives it its\nname and founds it as the science of society, science applied to\npolitics, as was first indicated in his scheme of work and early ideas\nof reform.\n\nComte strongly insists upon the social aspect of all knowledge and all\naction. He even goes to the extent of regarding the individual man as\nan abstraction; for him the real being is the social being, Humanity.\nThe study of human society has a double aspect, which is also a feature\nof the other sciences. As in biology there is the study of anatomy on\nthe one hand and of physiology on the other, so in sociology we must\ninvestigate both the laws which govern the existence of a society and\nthose which control its movements. The distinction is, in short, that\nof the static and the dynamic, and it embraces in sociological study\nthe important conceptions of order and of progress. Comte very rightly\nstressed the idea of progress as characteristic of modern times, but he\nlamented its being divorced from that of order. He blamed the\nconservative view of order as responsible for promoting among\n\u201cprogressives\u201d the spirit of anarchy and revolution. A positive\nsociology would, Comte maintained, reconcile a true order, which does\nnot exclude change, with real progress, a movement which is neither\ndestructive nor capricious. Comte here owes a debt in part to\nMontesquieu and largely to Condorcet, whose _Esquisse d\u2019un Tableau\nhistorique des Progr\u00e8s de l\u2019Esprit humain_ (1795) did much to promote\nserious reflection upon the question of progress.\n\nWe have already noted Comte\u2019s intense valuation of Humanity as a whole\nas a Supreme Being. In his later years, notably after 1845, when he met\nhis \u201cBeatrice\u201d in the person of Clotilde de Vaux, he gave to his\ndoctrines a sentimental expression of which the Religion of Humanity\nwith its ritualism was the outcome. This positivist religion\nendeavoured to substitute for the traditional God the Supreme Being of\nHumanity\u2014a Being capable, according to Comte, of sustaining our\ncourage, becoming the end of our actions and the object of our love. To\nthis he attached a morality calculated to combat the egoism which tends\nto dominate and to destroy mankind and intended to strengthen the\naltruistic motives in man and to raise them to the service of Humanity.\n\nWe find Comte, at the opening of our period, restating his doctrines in\nhis _Syst\u00e8me de Politique positive_ (1851-54), to which his first work\nwas meant to serve as an Introduction. In 1856 he began his _Synth\u00e8se\nsubjective_, but he died in 1857. Comte is a singularly desolate\nfigure; the powers of officialdom were against him, and he existed\nmainly by what he could gain from teaching mathematics and by a pension\nraised by his admirers in England and his own land.\n\nThe influence of his philosophy has been great and far- reaching, but\nit is the _spirit_ of positivism which has survived, not its content.\nSubsequent developments in science have rendered much of his work\nobsolete, while his Religion has never made a great appeal. Comte\u2019s\nmost noted disciple, Littr\u00e9 (1801-1881), regarded this latter as a\nretrograde step and confined himself to the early part of his master\u2019s\nwork. Most important for us in the present work is Comte\u2019s influence\nupon subsequent thinkers in France, notably Taine, and we may add,\nRenan, Cournot, and even Renouvier, although these last two promoted a\nvigorous reaction against his philosophy in general. He influenced his\nadversaries, a notable testimony. Actually, however, the positivist\nphilosophy found a greater welcome on the English side of the Channel\nfrom John Stuart Mill, Spencer and Lewes. The empiricism of the English\nschool proved a more fruitful soil for positivism than the vague\nspiritualism of Cousin to which it offered strong opposition.\nPositivism, or rather the positivist standpoint in philosophy, turned\nat a later date to reseek its fatherland and after a sojourn in England\nreappears as an influence in the work of French thinkers near the end\nof the century\u2014e.g., Fouill\u00e9e, Guyau, Lachelier, Boutroux and Bergson\nexpress elements of positivism.\n\nWe have now passed in review the four main currents of the first half\nof the century, in a manner intended to orient the approach to our\nperiod, 1851-1921. Without such an orientation much of the subsequent\nthought would lose its correct colouring and perspective. There is a\ncontinuity, even if it be partly a continuity marked by reactions, and\nthis will be seen when we now examine the three general currents into\nwhich the thought of the subsequent period is divided.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II\nMAIN CURRENTS SINCE 1851\n\n\nIntroductory: Influence of events of 1848-1851\u2014Reactionary character of\nSecond Empire\u2014Disgust of many thinkers (e.g., Vacherot, Taine, Renan,\nRenouvier, Hugo, Quinet)\u2014Effects of 1870, the War, the Commune, and the\nThird Republic.\n\nGeneral character of the Philosophy of the Period\u2014Reaction against both\nEclecticism and Positivism.\n\nTHE THREE MAIN CURRENTS.\n\n\nI. Positivist and naturalist current turning upon itself, seen in\nVacherot, Taine, and Renan.\n\nII. Cournot, Renouvier, and the neo-critical philosophy.\n\nIII. The New Spiritual Philosophy, to which the main contributors were\nRavaisson, Lachelier, Boutroux, Fouill\u00e9e, Guyau, Bergson, Blondel, and\nWeber.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II\nMAIN CURRENTS\n\nThe year 1851 was one of remarkable importance for France; a crisis\nthen occurred in its political and intellectual life. The hopes and\naspirations to which the Revolution of 1848 had given rise were\nshattered by the _coup d\u2019\u00e9tat_ of Louis Napoleon in the month of\nDecember. The proclamation of the Second Empire heralded the revival of\nan era of imperialism and reaction in politics, accompanied by a\ndecline in liberty and a diminution of idealism in the world of\nthought. A censorship of books was established, the press was deprived\nof its liberty, and the teaching of philosophy forbidden in\n_lyc\u00e9es_.[1]\n\n [1] The revival of philosophy in the _lyc\u00e9es_ began when Victor Drury\n reintroduced the study of Logic.\n\n\nVarious ardent and thoughtful spirits, whose minds and hearts had been\nuplifted by the events of 1848, hoping to see the dawn of an era\nexpressing in action the ideals of the first Revolution, _Libert\u00e9_,\n_Egalit\u00e9_, _Fraternit\u00e9_, were bitterly disappointed. Social ideals such\nas had been created by Saint-Simon and his school received a rude\nrebuff from force, militarism and imperialism. So great was the mingled\ndisappointment and disgust of many that they left for ever the realm of\npractical politics to apply themselves to the arts, letters or\nsciences. Interesting examples of this state of mind are to be found in\nVacherot, Taine, Renan and Renouvier, and, we may add, in Michelet,\nVictor Hugo and Edgar Quinet. The first of these, Vacherot, who had\nsucceeded Cousin as Professor of Philosophy at the Sorbonne, lost his\nchair, as did Quinet and also Michelet, who was further deprived of his\nposition as Archivist. Hugo and Quinet, having taken active political\npart in the events of 1848, were driven into exile. Disgust,\ndisappointment, disillusionment and pessimism characterise the attitude\nof all this group of thinkers to political events, and this reacted not\nonly upon their careers but upon their entire philosophy. \u201cWith regard\nto the Second Empire,\u201d we find Renan saying,[2] \u201cif the last ten years\nof its duration in some measure repaired the mischief done in the first\neight, it must never be forgotten how strong this Government was when\nit was a question of crushing the intelligence, and how feeble when it\ncame to raising it up.\u201d\n\n [2] In his Preface to _Souvenirs d\u2019Enfance et de Jeunesse._\n\n\nThe disheartening end of the Empire in moral degeneracy and military\ndefeat only added to the gloominess, against which the Red Flag and the\nred fires of the Commune cast a lurid and pathetic glow, upon which the\nPrussians could look down with a grim smile from the heights of Paris.\nOnly with the establishment of the Third Republic in 1871, and its\nratification a few years later, does a feeling of cheerfulness make\nitself felt in the thought of the time. The years from 1880 onwards\nhave been remarkable for their fruitfulness in the philosophic field\u2014to\nsuch an extent do political and social events react upon the most\nphilosophical minds. This is a healthy sign; it shows that those minds\nhave not detached themselves from contact with the world, that the\nspirit of philosophy is a living spirit and not merely an academic or\nprofessional product divorced from the fierce realities of history.\n\nWe have already indicated, in the treatment of the \u201cAntecedents\u201d of our\nperiod, the dominance of Eclecticism, supported by the powers of\nofficialdom, and have remarked how Positivism arose as a reaction\nagainst Cousin\u2019s vague spiritualism. In approaching the second half of\nthe century we may in general characterise its thought as a reaction\nagainst both eclecticism and positivism. A transitional current can be\ndistinguished where positivism turns, as it were, against itself in the\nwork of Vacherot, Taine and Renan. The works of Cournot and the\nindefatigable Renouvier with his neo-criticism mark another main\ncurrent. Ultimately there came to triumph towards the close of the\ncentury a new spiritualism, owing much inspiration to De Biran, but\nwhich, unlike Cousin\u2019s doctrines, had suffered the discipline of the\npositivist spirit. The main contributors to this current are Ravaisson,\nLachelier, Fouill\u00e9e and Guyau, Boutroux, Bergson, Blondel and Weber.\nOur study deals with the significance of these three currents, and\nhaving made this clear we shall then discuss the development of thought\nin connection with the various problems and ideas in which the\nphilosophy of the period found its expression.\n\nIn his _Critique of Pure Reason_ Kant endeavoured, at a time when\nspeculation of a dogmatic and uncritical kind was current, to call\nattention to the necessity for examining the instrument of knowledge\nitself, and thereby discovering its fitness or inadequacy, as the case\nmight be, for dealing with the problems which philosophy proposes to\ninvestigate. This was a word spoken in due season and, however much\nsubsequent philosophy has deviated from the conclusions of Kant, it has\nat least remembered the significance of his advice. The result has been\nthat the attitude adopted by philosophers to the problems before them\nhas been determined largely by the kind of answer which they offer to\nthe problems of knowledge itself. Obviously a mind which asserts that\nwe can never be sure of knowing anything (or as in some cases, that\nthis assertion is itself uncertain) will see all questions through the\ngreen-glasses of scepticism. On the other hand, a thinker who believes\nthat we do have knowledge of certain things and can be certain of\nthiss, whether by objective proof or a subjective intuition, is sure to\nhave, not only a different conclusion about problems, but, what is\nprobably more important for the philosophic spirit, a different means\nof approaching them.\n\nWriting in 1860 on the general state of philosophy, Renan pointed out,\nin his Essay _La M\u00e9taphysique el son Avenir_[3] that metaphysical\nspeculation, strictly so-called, had been in abeyance for thirty years,\nand did not seem inclined to continue the traditions of Kant, Hegel,\nHamilton and Cousin. The reasons which he gave for this depression of\nthe philosophical market were, firstly, the feeling of the\nimpossibility of ultimate knowledge, a scepticism of the instrument, so\nfar as the human mind was concerned, and secondly, the rather\ndisdainful attitude adopted by many minds towards philosophy owing to\nthe growing importance of science\u2014in short, the question, \u201cIs there any\nplace left for philosophy; has it any _raison d\u2019\u00eatre_?\u201d\n\n [3] Essay published later (1876) in his _Dialogues et Fragments\n philosophiques_. Cf. especially pp. 265-266.\n\n\nThe progress of the positive sciences, and the assertions of many that\nphilosophy was futile and treacherous, led philosophy to give an\naccount of itself by a kind of _apologia pro vita sua_. In the face of\nremarks akin to that of Newton\u2019s \u201cPhysics beware of metaphysics,\u201d the\nlatter had to bestir itself or pass out of existence. It was, indeed,\nthis extinction which the more ardent and devoted scientific spirits\nheralded, re-iterating the war-cry of Auguste Comte.\n\nIt was a crisis, in fact, for philosophy. Was it to become merely a\nuniversal science? Was it to abandon the task of solving the problems\nof the universe by rapid intuitions and a _priori_ constructions and\nundertake the construction of a science of the whole, built up from the\ndata and results of the science of the parts\u2014_i.e._, the separate\nsciences of nature? Was there, then, to be no place for metaphysics in\nthis classification of the sciences to which the current of thought was\ntending with increasing impetuosity? Was a science of primary or\nultimate truths a useless chimera, to be rejected entirely by the human\nmind in favour of an all-sufficing belief in positive science? These\nwere the questions which perplexed the thoughtful minds of that time.\n\nWe shall do well, therefore, in our survey of the half century before\nus, to investigate the two problems which were stressed by Renan in the\nessay we have quoted, for his acute mind possessed a unique power of\nsensing the feeling and thought of his time. Our preliminary task will\nbe the examination of the general attitude to knowledge adopted by the\nvarious thinkers and schools of thought, following this by an inquiry\ninto the attitude adopted to science itself and its relation to\nphilosophy.\n\nI\n\nWith these considerations in mind, let us examine the three currents of\nthought in our period beginning with that which is at once a\nprolongation of positivism and a transformation of it, a current\nexpressed in the work of Vacherot, Taine and Renan.\n\nEtienne Vacherot (1809-1897) was partially a disciple of Victor Cousin\nand a representative also of the positivist attitude to knowledge. His\nwork, however, passed beyond the bounds indicated by these names. He\nremained a convinced naturalist and believer in positive science, but,\nunlike Comte, he did not despise metaphysical inquiry, and he sought to\nfind a place for it in thought. Vacherot, who had won a reputation for\nhimself by an historical work on the Alexandrian School, became tne\ndirector of the Ecole Normale Sup\u00e9rieure, an important position in the\nintellectual world. He here advocated the doctrines by which he sought\nto give a to metaphysics. His most important book, _La M\u00e9taphysique et\nla Science_, in three volumes, appeared in 1858. He suffered\nimprisonment the following year for His liberal principles under the\nEmpire which had already deprived him of his position at the Sorbonne.\n\nThe general attitude to knowledge adopted by Vacherot recalls in some\nrespects the metaphysical doctrines of Spinoza, and he endeavours to\ncombine the purely naturalistic view of the world with a metaphysical\nconception. The result is a profound and, for Vacherot, irreconcilable\ndualism, in which the real and the ideal are set against one another in\nrigorous contrast, and the gap between them is not bridged or even\nattempted to be filled up, as, at a later date, was the task assumed by\nFouillee in his philosophy of _id\u00e9es-forces_. For Vacherot the world is\na unity, eternal and infinite, but lacking perfection. Perfection, the\nideal, is incompatible with reality. The real is not at all ideal, and\nthe ideal has no reality.[4] In this unsatisfactory dualism Vacherot\nleaves us. His doctrine, although making a superficial appeal by its\nseeming positivism on the one hand, and its maintenance of the notion\nof the ideal or perfection on the other, is actually far more\nparadoxical than that which asserts that ultimately it is the ideal\nonly which is real. While St. Anselm had endeavoured to establish by\nhis proof of the existence of God the reality of perfection, Vacherot,\nby a reversal of this proof, arrives at the opposite conclusion, and at\na point where it seems that it would be for the ideal an imperfection\nto exist. The absolute existence of all things is thus separated from\nthe ideal, and no attempt is made to relate the two, as Spinoza had so\nrigorously done, by maintaining that reality _is_ perfection.[5]\n\n [4] It is interesting to contrast this with the attitude of the new\n spiritualists, especially Fouill\u00e9e\u2019s conception of idees-forces, of\n ideas and ideals realising themselves. See also Guyau\u2019s attitude.\n                    \u201c_L\u2019id\u00e9al n\u2019est-il pas, sur la terre o\u00f9 nous sommes\n                    Plus f\u00e9cond et plus beau que la r\u00e9alit\u00e9?\u201d\n                                        \u2014Illusion f\u00e9conde_.\n\n\n [5] Vacherot contributed further to the thought of his time, notably\n by a book on religion, 1869, and later in life seems to have become\n sympathetic to the New Spiritualism, on which he also wrote a book in\n 1884.\n\n\nThe influence of Vacherot was in some measure continued in that of his\npupil, Hippolyte Taine (1828-1893), a thinker who had considerable\ninfluence upon the development of thought in our period. His ability as\na critic of art and literature was perhaps more marked than his purely\nphilosophical influence, but this is, nevertheless, important, and\ncannot be overlooked.\n\nTaine was a student of the Ecole Normale, and in 1851 was appointed to\nteach philosophy at Nevers. The _coup d\u2019\u00e9tat_, however, changed his\ncareer, and he turned to literature as his main field, writing a work\non La Fontaine for his doctorate in 1853. In the year of Comte\u2019s death\n(1857) Taine published his book, _Les Philosophes fran\u00e7ais du XIXe\nSi\u00e8cle_, in which he turned his powerful batteries of criticism upon\nthe vague spiritualism professed by Cousin and officially favoured in\nFrance at that time.[6] By his adverse criticism of Cousin and the\nEclectic School, Taine placed his influence upon the side of the\npositivist followers of Comte. It would, however, be erroneous to\nregard him as a mere disciple of Comte, as Taine\u2019s positivism was in\nits general form a wider doctrine, yet more rigorously scientific in\nsome respects than that of Comte. There was also an important\ndifference in their attitude to metaphysics. Taine upheld strongly the\nvalue, and, indeed, the necessity, of a metaphysical doctrine. He never\nmade much of any debt or allegiance to Comte.\n\n [6] See his chapter xii. on \u201cThe Success of Eclecticism,\u201d pp. 283-307.\n Cousin, he criticises at length; De Biran, Royer-Collard and Jouffroy\n are included in his censures. We might mention that this book was\n first issued in the form of articles in the _Revue de l\u2019Instruction\n publique_ during the years 1855, 1856.\n\n\nIn 1860 a volume dealing with the _Philosophy of Art_ appeared from his\npen, in which he not only endeavoured to relate the art of a period to\nthe general environment in which it arose, but, in addition, he dealt\nwith certain psychological aspects of the problem. Largely as a result\nof the talent displayed in this work, he was appointed in 1864 to tne\nchair of the History of Art and \u00c6sthetics in the Ecole des Beaux-Arts.\n\nTaine\u2019s interest in philosophy, and especially in psychological\nproblems, was more prominently demon strated in his book _De\nl\u2019Intelligence_, the two volumes of which appeared in 1870. In this\nwork he takes a strict view of the human intelligence as a mechanism,\nthe workings of which he sets forth in a precise and cold manner. His\ntreatment of knowledge is akin, in some respects, to the doctrines of\nthe English Utilitarian and Evolutionary School as represented by John\nStuart Mill, Bain and Spencer. The main feature of the Darwinian\ndoctrine is set by Taine in the foreground of epistemology. There is,\naccording to him, \u201ca struggle for existence\u201d in the realm of the\nindividual consciousness no less than in the external world. This inner\nconflict is between psychical elements which, when victorious, result\nin sense-perception. This awareness, or _hallucination vraie_, is not\nknowledge of a purely speculative character; it is (as, at a later\ndate, Bergson was to maintain in his doctrine of perception)\nessentially bound up with action, with the instinct and mechanism of\nmovement.\n\nOne of the most notable features of Taine\u2019s work is his attitude to\npsychology. He rejects absolutely the rather scornful attitude adopted\nwith regard to this science by Comte; at the same time he shatters the\nflimsy edifice of the eclectics in order to lay the foundation of a\nscientific psychology. \u201cThe true and independent psychology is,\u201d he\nremarks, \u201ca magnificent science which lays the foundation of the\nphilosophy of history, which gives life to physiology and opens up the\npathway to metaphysics.\u201d[7] Our debt to Taine is immense, for he\ninitiated the great current of experimental psychology for which his\ncountry has since become famous. It is not our intention in this\npresent work to follow out in any detail the purely psychological work\nof the period. Psychology has more and more become differentiated from,\nand to a large degree, independent of, philosophy in a strictly\nmetaphysical meaning of that word. Yet we shall do well in passing to\nnote that through Taine\u2019s work the scientific attitude to psychologv\nand its many problems was taken up and developed by Ribot, whose study\nof English Psychology appeared in the same year as Taine\u2019s\n_Intelligence_. Particularly by his frequent illustrations drawn from\nabnormal psychology, Taine \u201cset the tone\u201d for contemporary and later\nstudy of mental activity of this type. Ribot\u2019s later books have been\nmainly devoted to the study of \u201cthe abnormal,\u201dand his efforts are\ncharacteristic of the labours of the Paris School, comprising Charcot,\nPaulhan, Binet and Janet.[8] French psychology has in consequence\nbecome a clearly defined \u201cschool,\u201d with characteristics peculiar to\nitself which distinguish it at once from the psychophysical research of\nGerman workers and from the analytic labours of English psychologists.\nIts debt to Taine at the outset must not be forgotten.\n\n [7] De l\u2019Intelligence, Conclusion.\n\n\n [8] By Charcot (1825-1893), _Le\u00e7ons sur les Maladies du Syst\u00e8me\n nerveux faites \u00e0 la Salp\u00eatri\u00e8re_ and _Localisation dans les Maladies\n du Cerveau et de la Moelle \u00e9pini\u00e8re_, 1880.\n    By Ribot (1839-1916), _H\u00e9r\u00e9dit\u00e9, Etude psychologique_, 1873, Eng.\n    trans., 1875; _Les Maladies de la M\u00e9moire, Essai dans la\n    Psychologie positive_, 1881, Eng. trans., 1882; _Maladies de la\n    Volont\u00e9_, 1883, Eng. trans., 1884; _Maladies de la Personnalit\u00e9_,\n    1885, Eng. trans., 1895. Ribot expressed regret at the way in which\n    abnormal psychology has been neglected in England. See his critique\n    of Bain in his _Psychologie anglaise contemporaine_. In 1870 Ribot\n    declared the independence of psychology as a study, separate from\n    philosophy. Ribot had very wide interests beyond pure psychology, a\n    fact which is stressed by his commencing in 1876 the periodical _La\n    Revue philosophique de la France et de l\u2019Etranger_.\n    By Binet (1857-191!), _Magn\u00e9tisme animal_, 1886; _Les Alt\u00e9rations\n    de la personnalit\u00e9_, 1892; _L\u2019Introduction \u00e0 la Psychologie\n    exp\u00e9rimentale_, 1894. He founded the review _L\u2019Ann\u00e9e psychologique\n    in 1895_.\n\nBy Janet (Pierre), born 1859 now Professeur at the Coll\u00e8ge de France,\n_L\u2019Automatisme psychologique_, 1889; _Etat mental des Hyst\u00e9riques_,\n1894; and _Neuroses et Id\u00e9es-fixes_, 1898. He founded the _Journal de\nPsychologie_.\n\nBy Paulhan, _Ph\u00e9nomenes affectifs and L\u2019Activit\u00e9 mentale_.\n\nTo the fame of the Paris School of Psychology must now be added that of\nthe Nancy School embracing the work of Cou\u00e9.\n\n\nThe War and the subsequent course of events in France seemed to deepen\nthe sadness and pessimism of Taine\u2019s character. He described himself as\n_naturellement triste_, and finally his severe positivism developed\ninto a rigorous stoicism akin to that of Marcus Aurelius and Spinoza.\nThis attitude of mind coloured his unfinished historical work, _Les\nOrigines de la France contemporaine_, upon which he was engaged for the\nlast years of his life (1876-1894). It may be noticed for its bearing\nupon the study of sociological problems which it indirectly encouraged.\nJust as Taine had regarded a work of art as the product of social\nenvironment, so he looks upon historical events. This history bears all\nthe marks of Taine\u2019s rigid, positive philosophy, intensified by his\nlater stoicism. The Revolution of 1789 is treated in a cold and stern\nmanner devoid of enthusiasm of any sort. He could not make historical\nnarrative live like Michelet, and from his own record the Revolution\nitself is almost unintelligible. For Taine, however, we must remember,\nhuman nature is absolutely the product of race, environment and\nhistory.[9]\n\n [9] Michelet (1798-1874), mentioned here as an historian of a type\n entirely different from Taine, influenced philosophic thought by his\n volumes _Le Peuple_, 1846; _L\u2019Amour_, 1858; _Le Pr\u00eatre, La Femme et la\n Famille_, 1859; and _La Bible de l\u2019Humanit\u00e9_, 1864. He and his friend\n Quinet (1803-1875), who was also a Professor at the College de France,\n and was the author of _G\u00e9nie des Religions_, 1842, had considerable\n influence prior to 1848 of a political and religious character. They\n were in strong opposition to the Roman Catholic Church and had keen\n controversies with the Jesuits and Ultramontanists.\n\n\nIn the philosophy of Taine various influences are seen at work\ninteracting. The spirit of the French thinkers of the previous\ncentury\u2014sensualists and ideologists\u2014reappears in him. While in a\nmeasure he fluctuates between naturalism and idealism, the\npredominating tone of his work is clearly positivist. He was a great\nstudent of Spinoza and of Hegel, and the influence of both these\nthinkers appears in his work. Like Spinoza, he believes in a universal\ndetermination; like Hegel, he asserts the real and the rational to be\nidentical. In his general attitude to the problems of knowledge Taine\ncriticises and passes beyond the standpoints of both Hume and Kant. He\nopposes the purely empiricist schools of both France and England. The\npurely empirical attitude which looks upon the world as fragmentary and\nphenomenal is deficient, according to Taine, and is, moreover,\nincompatible with the notion of necessity. This notion of necessity is\ncharacteristic of Taine\u2019s whole work, and his strict adherence to it\nwas mainly due to his absolute belief in science and its methods, which\nis a mark of all the positivist type of thought.\n\nWhile he rejected Hume\u2019s empiricism he also opposed the doctrines of\nKant and the neo-critical school which found its inspiration in Kant\nand Hume. Taine asserted that it is possible to have a knowledge of\nthings in their objective reality, and he appears to have based his\nepistemology upon the doctrine of analysis proposed by Condillac. Taine\ndisagreed with the theory of the relativity of human knowledge and with\nthe phenomenal basis of the neo-critical teaching, its rejection of\n\u201cthe thing in itself.\u201d He believed we had knowledge not merely relative\nbut absolute, and he claimed that we can pass from phenomena and their\nlaws to comprehend the essence of things in themselves. He endeavours\nto avoid the difficulties of Hume by dogmatism. While clinging to a\nsemi-Hegelian view of rationality he avoids Kant\u2019s critical attitude to\nreason itself. We have in Taine not a critical rationalist but a\ndogmatic rationalist. While the rational aspect of his thought commands\na certain respect and has had in many directions a very wholesome\ninfluence, notably, as we have remarked, upon psychology, yet it proves\nitself in the last analysis self-contradictory, for a true rationalism\nis critical in character rather than dogmatic.\n\nIn Taine\u2019a great contemporary, Ernest Renan (1823-1892), a very\ndifferent temper is seen. The two thinkers both possessed popularity as\nmen of letters, and resembled one another in being devoted to literary\nand historical pursuits rather than to philosophy itself.\n\nRenan was trained for the priesthood of the Roman Catholic Church. He\nhas left us a record of his early life in _Souvenirs d\u2019Enfance et de\nJeunesse_. We there have an autobiography of a sincere and sensitive\nsoul, encouraged in his priestly career by his family and his teachers\nto such a degree that he had conceived of no other career for himself,\nuntil at the age of twenty, under the influence of modern scientific\ndoctrines and the criticism of the Biblical records, he found himself\nan unbeliever, certainly not a Roman Catholic, and not, in the ordinary\ninterpretation of that rather vague term, a Christian. The harsh,\nunrelenting dogmatism of the Roman Church drove Renan from\nChristianity. We find him remarking that had he lived in a Protestant.\ncountry he might not have been faced with the dilemma.[10] A _via\nmedia_ might have presented itself in one of the very numerous forms\ninto which Protestant Christianity, is divided. He might have exercised\nin such a sphere, his priestly functions as did Schleiermacher. Renan\u2019s\nbreak with Rome emphasises the clear-cut division which exists in\nFrance between the Christian faith (represented, almost entirely by the\nRoman Church) and _libre-pens\u00e9e_, a point which will claim our\nattention later, when we come to treat of the Philosophy of Religion.\n\n [10] Cf. his _Souvenirs d\u2019Enfance et de Jeunesse_, p. 292.\n\n\nHaving abandoned the seminary and the Church, Renan worked for his\nuniversity degrees. The events of 1848-49 inspired his young heart with\ngreat enthusiasm, under the influence of which he wrote his _Avenir de\nla Science_. This book was not published, however, until 1890, when he\nhad lost his early hopes and illusions. In 1849 he went away upon a\nmission to Italy. \u201cThe reaction of 1850-51 and the _coup d\u2019\u00e9tat_\ninstilled into me a pessimism of which I am not yet cured,\u201d so he wrote\nin the preface to his _Dialogues et Fragments philosophiques_.[11] Some\nyears after the _coup d\u2019\u00e9tat_ he published a volume of essays (_Essais\nde Morale et de Critique_), and he showed his acquaintance with Arabic\nphilosophy by an excellent treatise on _Averroes et l\u2019Averroisme_\n(1859). The following year he visited Syria and, in 1861, was appointed\nProfessor of Hebrew at the Coll\u00e8ge de France. He then began his\nmonumental work on _Les Origines du Christianisme_, of which the first\nvolume, _La Vie de J\u00e9sus_, appeared in 1863. Its importance for\nreligious thought we shall consider in our last chapter; here it must\nsuffice to observe its immediate consequences. These were terrific\nonslaughts from the clergy upon its author, which, although they\nbrought the attention of his countrymen and of the world upon Renan,\nresulted in the Imperial Government suspending his tenure of the chair.\nAfter the fall of the Empire, however, he returned to it, and under the\nThird Republic became Director of the Coll\u00e8ge de France.\n\n [11] Published only in 1895. The preface referred to is dated 1871.\n\n\nRenan, although he broke off his career in the Church and his\nconnection with organised religion, retained, nevertheless, much of the\npriestly character all his life, and he himself confesses this: \u201cI have\nlearned several things, but I have changed in nowise as to the general\nsystem of intellectual and moral life. My habitation has become more\nspacious, but it still stands on the same ground. I look upon my\nestrangement from orthodoxy as only a change of opinion concerning an\nimportant historical question, a change which does not prevent me from\ndwelling on the same foundations as before.\u201d He indeed found it\nimpossible to reconcile the Catholic faith with free and honest\nthought. His break with the Church made him an enemy of all\nsuperstition, and his writings raised against him the hatred of the\nCatholic clergy, who regarded him as a deserter. In the customary terms\nof heated theological debate he was styled an atheist. This was grossly\nunfair or meaningless. Which word we use here depends upon our\ndefinition of theism. As a matter of fact, Renan was one of the most\ndeeply religious minds of his time. His early religious sentiments\nremained, in essence if not in form, with him throughout his life.\nThese were always associated with the tender memories he had of his\nmother and beloved sister and his virtuous teachers, the priests in the\nlittle town of Brittany, whence he came. Much of the Breton mysticism\nclung to his soul, and much of his philosophy is a restated,\nrationalised form of his early beliefs.\n\nAs a figure in the intellectual life of the time, Renan is difficult to\nestimate. The very subtilty of his intellect betrayed him into an\noscillation which was far from admirable, and prevented his countrymen\nin his own day from \u201cgetting to grips\u201d with his ideas. These were\nkaleidoscopic. Renan seems a type, reflecting many tendencies of the\ntime, useful as an illustration to the historian of the ideas of the\nperiod; but for philosophy in the special sense he has none of the\nclearly defined importance of men like Renouvier, Lachelier, Guyau,\nFouill\u00e9e, Bergson or Blondel. His humanism keeps him free from\ndogmatism, but his mind fluctuates so that his general attitude to the\nultimate problems is one of reserve, of scepticism and of frequent\nparadox and contradiction. Renan seems to combine the positivist scorn\nof metaphysics with the Kantian idealism. At times, however, his\nattitude is rather Hegelian, and he believes in universal change which\nis an evolving of spirit, the ideal or God, call it what we will. We\nneed not be too particular about names or forms of thought, for, after\nall, everything \u201cmay be only a dream.\u201d That is Renan\u2019s attitude, to\ntemper enthusiasm by irony, to assert a duty of doubt, and often,\nperhaps, to gain a literary brilliance by contradictory statements.\n\u201cThe survey of human affairs is not complete,\u201d he reminds us, \u201cunless\nwe allot a place for irony beside that of tears, a place for pity\nbeside that of rage, and a place for a smile alongside respect.\u201d[12]\n\n [12] Preface to his _Drames philosophiques_, 1888.\n\n\nIt was this versatility which made Renan a lover of the philosophic\ndialogue. This literary and dramatic form naturally appealed strongly\nto a mind who was so very conscious of the fact that the truths with\nwhich philosophy deals cannot be directly denied or directly affirmed,\nas they are not subject to demonstration. All the high problems of\nhumanity Renan recognised as being of this kind, as involving finally a\nrational faith; and he claimed that the best we can do is to present\nthe problems of life from different points of view. This is due\nentirely to the peculiar character of philosophy itself, and to the\ndistinction, which must never be overlooked, between knowledge and\nbelief, between certitude and opinion. Geometry, for example, is not a\nsubject for dialogues but for demonstration, as it involves knowledge\nand certitude. The problems of philosophy, on the contrary, involve\n\u201c_une nuance de foi_,\u201d as Renan styles it. They involve willed\nadhesion, acceptance or choice; they provoke sympathy or hate, and call\ninto play human personality with its varying shades of colour.\n\nThis state of _nuance_ Renan asserts to be the one of the hour for\nphilosophy. It is not the time, he thinks, to attempt to strengthen by\nabstract reasoning the \u201cproofs\u201d of God\u2019s existence or of the reality of\na future life. \u201cMen see just now that they can never know anything of\nthe supreme cause of the universe or of their own destiny. Nevertheless\nthey are anxious to listen to those who will speak to them about\neither.\u201d[13]\n\n [13] From his Preface to _Drames philosophiques_.\n\n\nKnowledge, Renan maintained, lies somewhere between the two schools\ninto which the majority of men are divided. \u201cWhat you are looking for\nhas long since been discovered and made clear,\u201d say the orthodox. \u201cWhat\nyou are looking for is impossible to find,\u201d say the practical\npositivists, the political \u201craillers\u201d and the atheists. It is true that\nwe shall never know the ultimate secret of all being, but we shall\nnever prevent man from desiring more and more knowledge or from\ncreating for himself working hypotheses or beliefs.\n\nYet although Renan admits this truth he never approaches even the\npragmatist position of supporting \u201ccreative beliefs.\u201d He rather urges a\ncertain passivity towards problems and opinions. We should, he argues\nin his _Examen de Conscience philosophique_,[14] let them work\nthemselves out in us. Like a spectator we must let them modify our\n\u201cintellectual retina\u201d; we must let reality reflect itself in us. By\nthis he does not mean to assert that the truth about that reality is a\nmatter of pure indifference to us-far from it. Precisely because he is\nso conscious of the importance of true knowledge, he is anxious that we\nshould approach the study of reality without previous prejudices. \u201cWe\nhave no right,\u201d he remarks, \u201cto have a desire when reason speaks; we\nmust listen and nothing more.\u201d[15]\n\n [14] In his _Feuilles detach\u00e9es_, pp. 401-443.\n\n\n [15] _Feuilles d\u00e9tach\u00e9es_, p. 402.\n\n\nIt must be admitted, however, that Renan\u2019s attitude to the problems of\nknowledge was largely sceptical. While, as we shall see in the\nfollowing chapter, he extolled science, his attitude to belief and to\nknowledge was irritating in its vagueness and changeableness. He\nappeared to pose too much as a _dilettante_ making a show of subtle\nintellect, rather than a serious thinker of the first rank. His\neminence and genius are unquestioned, but he played in a bewitching and\nfrequently bewildering manner with great and serious problems, and one\ncannot help wishing that this great intellect of his\u2014and it was\nunquestionably great\u2014was not more steady and was not applied by its\nowner more steadfastly and courageously to ultimate problems. His\nwritings reflect a bewildering variety of contradictory moods, playful,\nscathing, serious and mocking. Indeed, he replied in his _Feuilles\ndetach\u00e9es_ (1892) to the accusations of Amiel by insisting that irony\nis the philosopher\u2019s last word. For him as for his brilliant\nfellow-countryman, Anatole France, ironical scepticism is the ultimate\nproduct of his reflection upon life. His _Examen de Conscience_\nphilosophique is his Confession of Faith, written four years before his\ndeath, in which he tries to defend his sceptical attitude and to put\nforward scepticism as an apology for his own uncertainty and his\nparadoxical changes of view. Irony intermingles with his doubt here\ntoo. We do not know, he says, ultimate reality; we do not know whether\nthere be any purpose or end in the universe at all. There may be, but\non the other hand it may be a farce and fiasco. By refusing to believe\nin anything, rejecting both alternatives, Renan argues, with a kind of\nmental cowardice, we avoid the consequence of being absolutely\ndeceived. He recommended an adoption of mixed belief and doubt,\noptimism and irony.\n\nThis is a surprising attitude in a philosopher and is not\ncharacteristic of great modern thinkers, most of whom prefer belief\n(hypothetical although that be) to non-belief. Doubtless Renan\u2019s early\ntraining had a psychological effect which operated perhaps largely\nunconsciously throughout his life, and his literary and linguistic\nability seems to have given him a reputation which was rather that of a\nman of letters than a philosopher. He had not the mental strength or\nfrankness to face alternatives squarely and to decide to adopt one.\nConsequently he merited the application of the old proverb about being\nbetween two stools. This application was actually made to Renan\u2019s\nattitude in a critical remark by Renouvier in his _Esquisse d\u2019une\nClassification des Doctrines philosphiques_.[16] Renouvier had no\ndifficulty in pointing out that the man who hesitates deprives himself\nof that great reality, the exercise of his own power of free choice, in\nitself valuable and more akin to reality (whatever be the choice) than\na mere \u201csitting on the fence,\u201d an attitude which, so far from assuring\none of getting the advantages of both possibilities as Renan claims,\nmay more justly seem to deprive one of the advantages in both\ndirections. The needs of life demand that we construct beliefs of some\nsort. We may be wrong and err, but pure scepticism such as Renan\nadvocated is untenable. Life, if it is to be real and earnest, demands\nof us that we have faith in _some_ values, that we construct _some_\nbeliefs, _some_ hypotheses, by which we may work.\n\n [16] Vol. ii., p. 395.\n\n\nBoth Renan and Taine exercised a considerable influence upon French\nthought. While inheriting the positivist outlook they, to a great\ndegree, perhaps unconsciously, undermined the positive position, both\nby their interest in the humanities, in art, letters and religion and\nin their metaphysical attitude. Taine, beginning with a rigid\nnaturalism, came gradually to approach an idealistic standpoint in many\nrespects, while Renan, beginning with a dogmatic idealism, came to\nacute doubt, hypotheses, \u201cdreams\u201d and scepticism. Taine kept his\nthoughts in too rigid a mould, solidified, while those of Renan seem\nfinally to have existed only in a gaseous state, intangible, vague and\nhazy. We have observed how the positivist current from Comte was\ncarried over by Vacherot to Taine. In Renan we find that current\npresent also, but it has begun to turn against itself. While we may say\nthat his work reflects in a very remarkable manner the spirit of his\ntime, especially the positivist faith in science, yet we are also able\nto find in it, in spite of his immense scepticism, the indications of a\nspiritualist or idealist movement, groping and shaping itself as the\ncentury grows older.\n\nII\n\nWhile the positivist current of thought was working itself out through\nVacherot, Taine and Renan to a position which forms a connecting link\nbetween Comte and the new spiritualism in which the reaction against\npositivism and eclecticism finally culminated, another influence was\nmaking itself felt independently in the neo-critical philosophy of\nRenouvier.\n\nWe must here note the work and influence of Cournot (1801-1877), which\nform a very definite link between the doctrines of Comte and those of\nRenouvier. He owed much to positivism, and he contributed to the\nformation of neo-criticism by his influence upon Renouvier. Cournot\u2019s\n_Essai sur le Fondement de nos Connaissances_ appeared in 1851, three\nyears before Renouvier gave to the world the first volume of his\n_Essais de Critique g\u00e9n\u00e9rale_. In 1861 Cournot published his _Trait\u00e9 de\nl\u2019Encha\u00eenement des Id\u00e9es_, which was followed by his _Considerations\nsur le Marche des Id\u00e9es_ (1872) and _Mat\u00e9rialisme_, _Vitalisme_,\n_Rationalisme_ (1875). These volumes form his contribution to\nphilosophical thought, his remaining works being mainly concerned with\npolitical economy and mathematics, a science in which he won\ndistinction.\n\nLike Comte, Cournot opposed the spiritualism, the eclecticism and the\npsychology of Cousin, but he was possessed of a more philosophic mind\nthan Comte; he certainly had greater philosophical knowledge, was\nbetter equipped in the history of philosophy and had much greater\nrespect for metaphysical theory. He shared with Comte, however, an\ninterest in social problems and biology; he also adopted his general\nattitude to knowledge, but the spirit of Cournot\u2019s work is much less\ndogmatic than that of the great positivist, and he made no pretensions\nto be a \u201cpontiff\u201d such as Comte aspired to be. Indeed his lack of\npretensions may account partly for the lack of attention with which his\nwork (which is shrewd, thoughtful and reserved) has been treated. He\naimed at indicating the foundations of a sound philosophy rather than\nat offering a system of thought to the public. This temper was the\nproduct of his scientific attitude. It was by an examination of the\nsciences and particularly of the principles upon which they depend that\nhe formulated his group of fundamental doctrines.\n\nHe avoided hasty generalisations or a _priori_ constructions and, true\nto the scientific spirit, based his thought upon the data afforded by\nexperience. He agreed heartily with Comte regarding the relativity of\nour knowledge. An investigation of this knowledge shows it to be based\non three principles\u2014order, chance, and probability. We find order\nexisting in the universe and by scientific methods we try to grasp this\norder. This involves induction, a method which cannot give us absolute\ncertainty, although it approximates to it. It gives us probability\nonly. There is therefore a reality of chances, and contingency or\nchance must be admitted as a factor in evolution and in human history.\n\nCournot foreshadows many of the doctrines of the new spiritualists as\nwell as those of the neo-critical school. Much in his work heralds a\nBergson as well as a Renouvier. This is noticeable in his attitude to\nscience and to the problem of contingency or freedom. It is further\nseen in his doctrine that the _vivant_ is incapable of demonstration,\nin his view of the soul or higher instinct which he distinguished from\nthe intelligence, in the biological interest displayed in his work (due\npartly to the work of Bichat[17]), and in his idea of a _Travail de\nCr\u00e9ation_. Unlike Bergson, however, he admits a teleology, for he\nbelieved this inseparable from living beings, but he regards it as a\nhazardous finality, not rigid or inconsistent with freedom.\n\n [17] Bichat (1771-1802) was a noted physiologist and anatomist. In\n 1800 appeared his _Recherches physiologiques sur la Vie et la Mort_,\n followed in 1801 by _Anatomie g\u00e9n\u00e9rale, appliqu\u00e9e \u00e0 la Physiologie et\n \u00e0 la M\u00e9decine_.\n\n\nThe immediate influence of Cournot was felt by only a small circle, and\nhis most notable affinity was with Renouvier, although Cournot was less\nstrictly an intellectualist. Like Renouvier he looked upon philosophy\nas a \u201c_Critique g\u00e9n\u00e9rale_.\u201d He was also concerned with the problem of\nthe categories and with the compatibility of science and freedom, a\nproblem which was now assuming a very central position in the thought\nof the period.\n\nRenouvier, in the construction of his philosophy, was partly influenced\nby the work of Cournot. In this lone, stern, indefatigable worker we\nhave one of the most powerful minds of the century. Charles Renouvier\nshares with Auguste Comte the first honours of the century in France so\nfar as philosophical work is concerned. Curiously enough he came from\nComte\u2019s birth-place, Montpellier. When Renouvier was born in 1815,\nseventeen years later than Comte, the great positivist was in his\nsecond year of study at the Ecole Polytechnique in Paris. To this great\nscientific and mathematical institution came Renouvier, to find Comte\nas _R\u00e9p\u00e9titeur_ of Higher Mathematics. He was not only a keen student\nof the mathematical sciences but also an ardent follower of\nSaint-Simon, and although in later life he lost many of the hopes of\nhis youth the Saint-Simon spirit remained with him, and he retained a\nkeen interest in social ethics and particularly in the ideas of\nFourier, Proudhon and Blanc. At the Ecole he met as fellow-pupils Jules\nLequier and Felix Ravaisson.\n\nInstead of entering the civil service Renouvier then applied himself to\nphilosophy and political science, influenced undoubtedly by Comte\u2019s\nwork. The year 1848, which saw the second attempt to establish a\nrepublic, gave Renouvier, now a zealous republican, an opportunity, and\nhe issued his _Manuel r\u00e9publicain de l\u2019Homme et du Citoyen_. This\nvolume, intended for schoolmasters, had the approval of Carnot,\nMinister of Education to the Provisionary Government. Its socialist\ndoctrines were so criticised by the Chamber of 1849 that Carnot, and\nwith him the Government, fell from power. Renouvier went further in his\n_Gouvernement direct et Organisation communale et centrale de la\nR\u00e9publique_, in which he collaborated with his socialist friends in\noutlining a scheme of communism, making the canton a local power, a\nscheme which contained the germ-idea of the Soviet of Bolshevik Russia.\nSuch ideas were, however, far too advanced for the France of that date\nand their proposal did more harm than good to the progressive party by\nproducing a reaction in wavering minds. Renouvier, through the paper\n_Libert\u00e9 de penser_, launched attacks upon the policy of the\nPresidency, and began in the _Revue philosophique_ a serial _Uchronie_,\na novel of a political and philosophical character. It was never\nfinished. Suddenly, like a bolt from the blue, came, on December and,\nthe _coup d\u2019\u00e9tat_. The effect of this upon Renouvier was profound.\nDisgusted at the power of the monarchy, the shattering of the\nrepublican hopes, the suppression of liberty and the general reaction,\nhe abandoned political life entirely. What politics lost, however,\nphilosophy has gained, for he turned his acute mind with its tremendous\nenergy to the study of the problems of the universe.\n\nThree years after the _coup d\u2019\u00e9tat_, in the same year in which Comte\ncompleted his _Syst\u00e8me de Politique_ positive, 1854, Renouvier\npublished the first volume of his _magnum opus_, the _Essais de\nCritique g\u00e9n\u00e9rale_.[18] The appearance of this work is a notable date\nin the development of modern French philosophy. The problems therein\ndiscussed will concern us in later chapters. Here we must point out the\nindefatigable labour given to this work by Renouvier. The writing and\nrevision of these essays covered almost the whole of the half century,\nconcluding in 1897. In their first, briefer form they occupied the\ndecade 1854-64, and consisted of four volumes only, which on revision\nbecame finally thirteen.[19] These Essays range over Logic, Psychology,\nthe Philosophy of the Sciences and the Philosophy of History.\n\n [18] It is interesting for the comparative study of the thought of the\n century to observe that the great work of Lotze in Germany,\n _Mikrocosmos_, was contemporaneous with the _Essais_ of Renouvier.\n Lotze\u2019s three volumes appeared in 1856, 1858 and 1864. The _Logik_ and\n _Metaphysik_ of Lotze should also be compared with Renouvier\u2019s\n _Essais_. Further comparison or contrast may be made with reference to\n the _Logic_ of both Bradley and Bosanquet in England.\n\n\n [19] Since 1912 the _Essais de Critique g\u00e9n\u00e9rale_ are available in ten\n volumes, owing to the publications of new editions of the first three\n Essays by A. Colin in five volumes. For details of the original and\n revised publication of the work, see our Bibliography, under Renouvier\n (pp. 334-335).\n\n\nHaving thus laid the foundations of his own throught, Renouvier, in\nconjunction with his scholarly friend Pillon, undertook the publication\nof a monthly periodical, _L\u2019Ann\u00e9e philosophique_, to encourage\nphilosophic thought in France. This appeared first in 1867, the same\nyear in which Ravaisson laid the foundations of the new spiritualism by\nhis celebrated _Rapport_. In 1869 Renouvier published his noteworthy\ntreatise upon Ethics, in two volumes, _La Science de la Morale_.\n\nThe war of 1870 brought his monthly periodical to an untimely end. The\nconclusion of the war in 1871 resulted in the establishment, for the\nthird time, of a republic, which in spite of many vicissitudes has\ncontinued even to this day. With the restoration of peace and of a\nrepublic, Renouvier felt encouraged to undertake the ambitious scheme\nof publishing a weekly paper, not only philosophical in character but\npolitical, literary and religious. He desired ardently to address his\ncountrymen at a time when they were rather intellectually and morally\nbewildered. He felt he had something constructive to offer, and hoped\nthat the \u201cnew criticism,\u201d as he called it, might become the philosophy\nof the new republic. Thus was founded, in 1872, the famous _Critique\nphilosophique_, which aimed primarily at the consolidation of the\nrepublic politically and morally,[20] This paper appeared as a weekly\nfrom its commencement until 1884,then continued for a further five\nyears as a monthly. Renouvier and his friend Pillon were assisted by\nother contributors, A. Sabatier, L. Dauriac, R. Allier, who were more\nor less disciples of the neo-critical school. Various articles were\ncontributed by William James, who had a great admiration for Renouvier.\nThe two men, although widely different in temperament and method, had\ncertain affinities in their doctrine of truth and certitude.[21]\n\n [20] In the early numbers, political articles, as was natural in the\n years following 1871, were prominent. Among these early articles we\n may cite the one, \u201cIs France morally obliged to carry out the terms of\n the Treaty imposed upon her by Prussia?\u201d\n\n\n [21] On this relationship see James\u2019s _Will to Believe_, p. 143, 1897,\n and the dedications in his _Some Problems of Philosophy_ (to\n Renouvier), and his _Principles of Psychology_ (to Pillon), also\n _Letters of William James_, September i8th, 1892.\n\n\nRenouvier\u2019s enthusiasm for his periodical did not, however, abate his\nenergy or ardour for more lasting work. He undertook the task of\nrevising and augmenting his great work, the _Essais de Critique\ng\u00e9n\u00e9rale_, and added to the series another (fifth) Essay, in four\nvolumes. He also issued in 1876 the curious work _Uchronie_, a history\nof \u201cwhat might have been\u201d (in his view) the development of European\ncivilisation. Together with Pillon he translated _Hume\u2019s Treatise on\nHuman Nature_.\n\nMeanwhile the _Critique philosophique_ continued to combat any symptoms\nof a further _coup d\u2019\u00e9tat_, and \u201cto uphold strictly republican\nprinciples and to fight all that savoured of Caesar or imperialism.\u201d In\n1878 a quarterly supplement _La Critique religieuse_ was added to\nattack the Roman Catholic Church and to diminish its power in\nFrance.[22]\n\n [22] The significance of this effort is more fully dealt with in our\n last chapter.\n\n\nArticles which had appeared in this quarterly were published as\n_Esquisse d\u2019une Classification syst\u00e9matique des Doctrines\nphilosophiques_ in 1885 in two volumes, the second of which contained\nthe important Confession of Faith of Renouvier, entitled, _How I\narrived at this Conclusion_.\n\nHis thought assumed a slightly new form towards the close of the\ncentury, at the end of which he published, in conjunction with his\ndisciple Prat, a remarkable volume, which took a prize at the _Acad\u00e9mie\ndes Sciences morales et politiques_, to which rather late in the day he\nwas admitted as a member at the age of eighty-five. In its title _La\nNouvelle Monadologie_, and method it reveals the influence of Leibnitz.\n\nThe close of the century shows us Renouvier as an old man, still an\nenormous worker, celebrating his eighty-sixth birthday by planning and\nwriting further volumes (_Les Dilemmes de la M\u00e9taphysique pure_ and its\nsequel, _Histoire et Solution des Probl\u00e8mes m\u00e9taphysiques_). This\n\u201cgrand old man\u201d of modern French philosophy lived on into the early\nyears of the twentieth century, still publishing, still writing to the\nlast. His final volume, _Le Personnalisme_, was a restatement of his\nphilosophy, issued when he was in his eighty-ninth year. He died \u201cin\nharness\u201d in 1903, dictating to his friend Prat a _r\u00e9sum\u00e9_ of his\nthought on important points and leaving an unpublished work on the\nphilosophy of Kant.[23]\n\n [23] The _r\u00e9sum\u00e9_ was published by Prat a couple of years later as\n _Derniers Entretiens_, the volume on the _Doctrine de Kant_, followed\n in 1906.\n\n\nRenouvier\u2019s career is a striking one and we have sketched it somewhat\nfully here because of its showing more distinctly than that of Taine or\nRenan the reflections of contemporary history upon the thinking minds\nwho lived through the years 1848-51 and 1870-71. Renouvier was a young\nspirit in the year of the revolution, 1848, and lived right on through\nthe _coup d\u2019\u00e9tat_, the Second Empire, the Franco-Prussian War, the\nCommune, the Third Republic, and he foresaw and perhaps influenced the\nRepublic\u2019s attitude to the Roman Church. His career is the most\nsignificant and enlightening one to follow of all the thinkers who come\nwithin our period. Let us note that he never held any academic or\npublic teaching appointment. His life was in the main a secluded one\nand, like Comte, he found the University a limited preserve closed\nagainst him and his philosophy, dominated by the declining eclecticism\nwhich drew its inspiration from Cousin. Only gradually did his\ninfluence make itself felt to such a degree that the University was\ncompelled to take notice of it. Now his work is more appreciated, but\nnot as much as it might be, and outside his own country he is little\nknown. The student finds his writings somewhat difficult owing to the\nauthor\u2019s heavy style. He has none of the literary ease and brilliance\nof a Renan. But his work was great and noble, animated by a passion for\ntruth and a hatred of philosophical \u201cshams\u201d and a current of deep moral\nearnestness colours all his work. He had considerable power as a\ncritic, for the training of the Ecole Polytechnique produced a strictly\nlogical temper in his work, which is that of a true philosopher, not\nthat of a merely brilliant _litterateur_ or _dilettante_, and he must\nbe regarded as one of the intellectual giants of the century.\n\nWhile we see in Positivism a system of thought which opposed itself to\nEclecticism, we find in the philosophy of Renouvier a system of\ndoctrine which is opposed to both Eclecticism and Positivism. Indeed\nRenouvier puts up a strong mental fight against both of these systems;\nthe latter he regarded as an ambitious conceit. He agreed, however,\nwith Comte and with Cournot upon the relativity of our knowledge. \u201cI\naccept,\u201d he says, \u201cone fundamental principle of the Positivist\nSchool\u2014namely, the reduction of knowledge to the laws of\nphenomena.\u201d[24] The author of the _Essais de Critique g\u00e9n\u00e9rale_\nconsidered himself, however, to be the apostolic successor, not of\nComte, but of Kant. The title of _neo-criticisme_[25] which he gave to\nhis philosophy shows his affinity with the author of the _Kritik der\nreinen Vernunft_. This is very noticeable in his method of treating the\nproblem of knowledge by criticising the human mind and especially in\nhis giving a preference to moral considerations.[26] It would be,\nhowever, very erroneous to regard Renouvier as a disciple of Kant, for\nhe amends and rejects many of the doctrines of the German philosopher.\nWe have noted the fact that he translated Hume; we must observe also\nthat Hume\u2019s influence is very strongly marked in Renouvier\u2019s\n\u201cphenomenalism.\u201d[27] \u201cRenouvier is connected with Hume,\u201d says Pillon,\nin the preface he contributed to the translation,[28] \u201cas much as with\nKant. . . . He reconciles Hume and Kant. . . . Something is lacking in\nHume, the notion of law; something is superfluous in Kant, the notion\nof substance. It was necessary to unite the phenomenalism of Hume with\nthe a _priori_ teaching of Kant. This was the work accomplished by\nRenouvier.\u201d\n\n [24] Preface to _Essais de Critique g\u00e9n\u00e9rale_.\n\n\n [25] The English word \u201c_criticism_\u201d is, it should be noted, translated\n in French by \u201c_critique_\u201d and not by the word \u201c_criticisme_,\u201d a term\n which is used for the philosophy of the _Kritik_ of Kant.\n\n\n [26] In recognising the primacy of the moral or practical reason in\n Kant, Renouvier resembles Fichte.\n\n\n [27] Renouvier\u2019s phenomenalism should be compared with that of\n Shadworth Hodgson, as set forth in the volumes of his large work on\n _The Metaphysic of Experience_, 1899. Hodgson has given his estimate\n of Renouvier and his relationship to him in _Mind_ (volume for 1881).\n\n\n [28] _Psychologie de Hume : Trait\u00e9 de la Nature humaine_, Renouvier\n Pr\u00e9face par Pillon, p. lxviii.\n\n\nIt may be doubted whether Pillon\u2019s eulogy is altogether sound in its\napproval of the \u201creconciliation\u201d of Hume and Kant, for such a\nreconciliation of opposites may well appear impossible. Renouvier\nhimself faced this problem of the reconciliation of opposites when at\nan early age he inclined to follow the Hegelian philosophy, a doctrine\nwhich may very well be described as a \u201creconciliation of opposites,\u201d\n_par excellence_. Dissatisfied, however, with such a scheme Renouvier\ncame round to the Kantian standpoint and then passed beyond it to a\nposition absolutely contrary to that of Hegel. This position is frankly\nthat opposites cannot be reconciled, one or the other must be rejected.\nRenouvier thus made the law of contradiction the basis of his\nphilosophy, as it is the basis of our principles of thought or logic.\n\nHe rigorously applied this principle to that very interesting part of\nKant\u2019s work, the antinomies, which he held should never have been\nformulated. The reasons put forward for this statement were two: the\nprinciple of contradiction and the law of number. Renouvier did not\nbelieve in what mathematicians call an \u201cinfinite number.\u201d He held it to\nbe an absurd and contradictory notion, for to be a number at all it\nmust be numerical and therefore not infinite. The application of this\nto the Kantian antinomies, as for example to the questions, \u201cIs space\ninfinite or finite? Had the world a beginning or not?\u201d is interesting\nbecause it treats them as Alexander did the Gordian knot. The admission\nthat space is infinite, or that the world had no beginning, involves\nthe admission of an \u201cinfinite number,\u201d a contradiction and an\nabsurdity. Since, therefore, such a number is a pure fiction we _must_\nlogically conclude that space is finite,[29] that the world had a\nbeginning and that the ascending series of causes has a first term,\nwhich admission involves freedom at the heart of things.\n\n [29] It is interesting to observe how the stress laid by Renouvier\n upon the finiteness of space and upon relativity has found expression\n in the scientific world by Einstein, long after it had been expressed\n philosophically.\n\n\nAs Renouvier had treated the antinomies of Kant, so he makes short work\nof the Kantian conception of a world of noumena (_Dinge an sich_) of\nwhich we know nothing, but which is the foundation of the phenomena we\nknow. Like Hume, he rejects all notion of substance, of which Kant\u2019s\nnoumenon is a survival from ancient times. The idea of substance he\nabhors as leading to pantheism and to fatalism, doctrines which\nRenouvier energetically opposes, to uphold man\u2019s freedom and the\ndignity of human personality.\n\nIn the philosophy of Kant personality was not included among the\ncategories. Renouvier draws up for himself a new list of categories\ndiffering from those of Kant. Beginning with Relation they culminate in\nPersonality. These two categories indicate two of the strongholds of\nRenouvier\u2019s philosophy. Beginning from his fundamental thesis \u201cAll is\nrelative,\u201d Renouvier points out that as nothing can possibly be known\nsave by or in a relation of some sort it is evident that the most\ngeneral law of all is that of Relation itself. Relation is therefore\nthe first and fundamental category embracing all the others. Then\nfollow, Number, Position, Succession, Quality. To these are added the\nimportant ones, Becoming, Causality, Finality proceeding from the\nsimple to the composite, from the abstract to the concrete, from the\nelements most easily selected from our experience to that which\nembraces the experience itself, Renouvier comes to the final category\nin which they all find their consummation-Personality. The importance\nwhich he attaches to this category colours his entire thought and\nparticularly determines his attitude to the various problems which we\nshall discuss in our following chapters.\n\nAs we can think of nothing save in relation to consciousness and\nconsequently we cannot conceive the universe apart from personality,\nour knowledge of the universe, our philosophies, our beliefs are\n\u201cpersonal\u201d constructions. But they need not be on that account merely\nsubjective and individualistic in character, for they refer to\npersonality in its wide sense, a sense shared by other persons. This\nhas important consequences for the problem of certitude in knowledge\nand Renouvier has here certain affinities to the pragmatist standpoint.\n\nHis discussion of certitude is very closely bound up with his treatment\nof the problem of freedom, but we may indicate here Renouvier\u2019s\nattitude to Belief and Knowledge, a problem in which he was aided by\nthe work of his friend Jules Lequier,[30] whom he quotes in his second\n_Essai de Critique g\u00e9n\u00e9rale_. Renouvier considers it advisable to\napproach the problem of certitude by considering its opposite, doubt.\nIn a famous passage in his second _Essai_ he states the circumstances\nunder which we do not doubt\u2014namely, \u201cwhen we see, when we know, when we\nbelieve.\u201d Owing to our liability to error (even seeing is not\nbelieving, and we frequently change our minds even about our \u201cseeing\u201d),\nit appears that belief is always involved, and more correctly \u201cwe\nbelieve that we see, we believe that we know.\u201d Belief is a state of\nconsciousness involved in a certain affirmation of which the motives\nshow themselves as adequate. Certitude arises when the possibility of\nan affirmation of the contrary is entirely rejected by the mind.\nCertitude thus appears as a kind of belief. All knowledge, Renouvier\nmaintains, involves an affirmation of will. It is here we see the\ncontrast so strongly marked between him and Renan, who wished us to\n\u201clet things think themselves out in us.\u201d \u201cEvery affirmation in which\nconsciousness is reflective is subordinated, in consciousness, to the\ndetermination to affirm.\u201d Our knowledge, our certitude, our belief,\nwhatever we prefer to call it, is a construction not purely\nintellectual but involving elements of feeling and, above all, of will.\nEven the most logically incontrovertible truth are sometimes\nunconvincing. This is because certitude is not purely intellectual; it\nis _une affaire passionnelle_.[31] Renouvier here not only approaches\nthe pragmatist position, but he recalls the attitude to will, assumed\nby Maine de Biran. For the Cartesian formula De Biran had suggested the\nsubstitution of _Volo, ergo sum_. The inadequacy of the the _Cogito,\nergo sum_ is remarked upon by Lequier, whose treatment of the question\nof certainty Renouvier follows. As all demonstration is deductive in\ncharacter and so requires existing premises, we cannot expect the\n_premi\u00e8re v\u00e9rit\u00e9_ to be demonstrable. If, from the or certainty, we\nmust turn to the will to create belief, or certainty, we must turn to\nthe will to create beliefs, for no evidence or previous truths exist\nfor us. The _Cogito, ergo sum_ really does not give us a starting\npoint, as Descartes claimed for it, since there is no proper sequence\nfrom _cogito_ to _sum_. Here we have merely two selves, _moi-pens\u00e9e_\nand _moi-objet_. We need a live spark to bridge this gap to unite the\ntwo into one complete living self; this is found in _moi-volont\u00e9_, in a\nfree act of will. This free act of will affirms the existence of the\nself by uniting in a synthetic judgment the thinking-self to the\nobject-self. \u201cI refuse,\u201d says Renouvier, quoting Lequier, \u201cto follow\nthe work of a knowledge which would not be mine. I accept the certainty\nof which I am the author.\u201d The _premi\u00e8re v\u00e9rit\u00e9_ is a free personal act\nof faith. Certainty in philosophy or in science reposes ultimately upon\nfreedom and the consciousness of freedom.\n\n [30] Jules Lequier was born in 1814 and entered the Ecole\n polytechnique in 1834, leaving two years later for a military staff\n appointment. This he abandoned in 1838. He died in 1862 after having\n destroyed most of his writings. Three Years after his death was\n published the volume, _La Recherche d\u2019une premi\u00e8re V\u00e9rit\u00e9, fragments\n posthumes de Jules Lequier_. The reader should note the very\n interesting remarks by Renouvier at the end of the first volume of his\n Psychologie rationnelle, 1912 ed., pp. 369-393, on Lequier and his\n Philosophy, also the Fragments reprinted by Renouvier in that work,\n _Comment trouver, comment chercher_, vol. i., on Subject and Object\n (vol. ii.), and on Freedom.\n\n\n [31] Lotze employs a similar phrase, eine Gem\u00fcths-sache.\n\n\nHere again, as in the philosophy of Cournot, we find the main emphasis\nfalling upon the double problem of the period. It is in reality one\nproblem with two aspects\u2014the relation of science to morality, or, in\nother words, the place and significance of freedom.\n\nThe general influence of Renouvier has led to the formation of a\nneo-critical \u201cschool\u201d of thought, prominent members of which may be\ncited: Pillon and Prat, his intimate friends, S\u00e9ailles and Darlu, who\nhave contributed monographs upon their master\u2019s teaching, together with\nHamelin, Liard and Brochard, eminent disciples. Hamelin (1856-1907),\nwhose premature and accidental death deprived France of a keen thinker,\nis known for his _Essai sur les El\u00e9ments principaux de la\nRepr\u00e9sentation_ (1907), supplementing the doctrines of Renouvier by\nthose of Hegel.\n\nIn the work of Liard (1846-1917), _La Science positive et la\nM\u00e9taphysique_ (1879), we see a combination of the influence of\nVacherot, Renouvier and Kant. He was also perplexed by the problem of\nefficient and final causes as was Lachelier, whose famous thesis _De\nl\u2019Induction_ appeared eight years earlier. While Lachelier was\ninfluenced by Kant, he, none the less, belongs to the current of the\nnew spiritualism which we shall presently examine. Liard, however, by\nhis adherence to many critical and neo-critical standpoints may be\njustly looked upon as belonging to that great current of which\nRenouvier is the prominent thinker.\n\nBrochard (1848-1907) is mainly known by his _treatise De l\u2019Erreur_\n(1879) and his volumes on Ethics, _De la Responsabilit\u00e9 morale_ (1876),\nand _De l\u2019Universalit\u00e9 des Notions morales_ (1876), in all of which the\nprimacy of moral considerations is advocated in a tone inspired by\nRenouvier\u2019s strong moral standpoint. The work _De l\u2019Erreur_ emphasises\nthe importance of the problem of freedom as being the crux of the whole\nquestion involved in the relation of science and morality. Adhering to\nthe neo-critical doctrines in general, and particularly to the value of\nthe practical reason, Brochard, by his insistence upon action as a\nfoundation for belief, has marked affinities with the doctrines of\nBlondel (and Olle-Laprune), the significance of whose work will appear\nat the end of our next section.\n\nThe phenomenalism of Renouvier was followed up by two thinkers, who\ncannot, however, be regarded as belonging to his neo-critical school.\nIn 1888 Gourd published his work entitled _Le Ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne_, which was\nfollowed six years later by the slightly more coherent attempt of\nBoirac to base a philosophy upon the phenomenalism which expresses\nitself so rigidly in Hume. In his book _L\u2019Id\u00e9e du Ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne_ (1894), he\nhad, however, recourse to the Leibnitzian doctrines, which had finally\nexercised a considerable influence over Renouvier himself.\n\nIII\n\nThe reaction against positivism and against eclecticism took another\nform quite apart from that of the neocritical philosophy. This was the\ntriumphant spiritualist philosophy, as we may call it, to give it a\ngeneral name, represented by a series of great thinkers\u2014Ravaisson,\nLachelier, Fouill\u00e9e, Guyau, Boutroux, Bergson and, we may add, Blondel.\nThese men have all of them had an influence much greater than that of\nRenouvier, and this is true of each of them separately. This is rather\nnoteworthy for, if we exclude Fouillee, whose writings are rather too\nnumerous, the works of all the other men together do not equal in\nquantity the work of Renouvier. There is another point which is worthy\nof notice. While Renouvier worked in comparative solitude and never\ntaught philosophy in any college or university, being, in fact,\nneglected by the University of Paris, all the company\u2014Ravaisson,\nLachelier, Fouill\u00e9e, Guyau, Boutroux and Bergson\u2014had a connection with\nthe University of Paris in general, being associated with the Sorbonne,\nthe Coll\u00e8ge de France or the important Ecole Normale Sup\u00e9rieure.\n\nThe initiator of the spiritualistic philosophy was Ravaisson\n(1815-1900), who himself drew inspiration from Maine de Biran, to whose\nwork he had called attention as early as 1840 in a vigorous article\ncontributed to the _Revue des Deux Mondes_. This roused the indignation\nof Victor Cousin and the eclectics, who in revenge excluded Ravaisson\nfrom the Institute. His independent spirit had been shown in his thesis\n_De l\u2019Habitude_ (1838)[32] and his remarkable study of the metaphysics\nof Aristotle (1837-1846).\n\n [32] Reproduced in 1894 in the _Revue de M\u00e9taphysique et de Morale_.\n\n\nRavaisson\u2019s chief title to fame, however, lies in his famous\nphilosophic manifesto of 1867, for such, in fact, was his _Rapport sur\nla Philosophie en France au XIX\u00e8 Si\u00e8cle_. This Report, prepared for the\n_Exposition universelle_ at the request of the Ministry of Education,\nmarks an epoch, for with it began the current of thought which was to\ndominate the close of the century. The \u201cmanifesto\u201d was a call to free\nspirits to assert themselves in favour of a valid idealism. It, in\nitself, laid the foundations of such a philosophy and dealt a blow to\nboth the Eclectic School of Cousin and the followers of Auguste Comte.\nRavaisson wrote little, but his influence was powerful and made itself\nfelt in the University, where in his office of president of the\n_agr\u00e9gation en philosophie_ he exercised no little influence over the\nminds of younger men. His pupils, among whom are to be found Lachelier,\nBoutroux and Bergson, have testified to the profound and inspiring\ninfluence which this thinker exercised. A notable tribute to his memory\nis the address given by Bergson when he was appointed to take\nRavaisson\u2019s place at the _Acad\u00e9mie des Sciences morales et politiques_\nin 1904.\n\nVarious influences meet in Ravaisson and determine his general attitude\nto thought. He reverts, as we have said, to Maine de Biran, whose\ninsistence upon the inner life he approves. We must examine human\nconsciousness and make it our basis. We have in it powers of will, of\ndesire and of love. Ravaisson blends the Aristotelian insistence upon\nThought with the Christian insistence upon Love. In his method he\nmanifests the influence of the German philosopher, Schelling, whose\nlectures he attended at Munich in company with the young Swiss thinker,\nSecretan.[33] This influence is seen in his doctrine of synthesis and\nhis intellectual intuition. Science continues to give us analyses ever\nmore detailed, but it cannot lead us to the absolute. Our highest, most\nsublime knowledge is gained by a synthesis presented in and to our\nconsciousness, an intuition. Further, he argues that efficient causes,\nabout which science has so much to say, are really dependent upon final\ncauses. Spiritual reality is anterior to material reality, and is\ncharacterised by goodness and beauty. Himself an artist, imbued with a\npassionate love of the beautiful (he was guardian of sculptures at the\nLouvre), he constructs a philosophy in the manner of an artist. Like\nGuyau, he writes metaphysics like poetry, and although he did not give\nus anything like _Vers d\u2019un Philosophe_, he would have endorsed the\nremarks which Guyau made on the relation of poetry and philosophy if,\nindeed, it is not a fact that his influence inspired the younger man.\n\n [33] Charles Secretan (1815-1895), a Swiss thinker with whom Renouvier\n had interesting correspondence. His _Philosophie de la Libert\u00e9_\n appeared in 1848-1849, followed by other works on religious\n philosophy. Pillon wrote a monograph upon him.\n\n\nAfter surveying the currents of thought up to 1867 Ravaisson not only\nsummed up in his concluding pages the elements of his own philosophy,\nbut he ventured to assume the role of prophet. \u201cMany signs permit us to\nforesee in the near future a philosophical epoch of which the general\ncharacter will be the predominance of what may be called spiritualistic\nrealism or positivism, having as generating principle the consciousness\nwhich the mind has of itself as an existence recognised as being the\nsource and support of every other existence, being none other than its\naction.\u201d[34] His prophecy has been fulfilled in the work of Lachelier,\nGuyau, Fouill\u00e9e, Boutroux, Bergson, Blondel and Weber.\n\n [35] _Rapport_, 2nd ed., 1885, p. 275.\n\n\nAfter Ravaisson the spiritualist philosophy found expression in the\nwork of Lachelier (1832-1918), a thinker whose importance and whose\ninfluence are both quite out of proportion to the small amount which he\nhas written.[36] A brilliant thesis of only one hundred pages, _Du\nFondement de l\u2019Induction_, sustained in 1871, together with a little\nstudy on the Syllogism and a highly important article on _Psychologie\net M\u00e9taphysique_, contributed to the _Revue philosophique_ in May of\n1885, constitute practically all his written work.[37] It was orally\nthat he made his influence felt; by his teaching at the Ecole Normale\nSup\u00e9rieure (1864-1875) he made a profound impression upon the youth of\nthe University and the Ecole by the dignity and richness of his\nthought, as well as by its thoroughness.\n\n [36] Dr. Merz, in his admirable _History of European Thought in the\n Nineteenth Century_, is wrong in regard to Lachelier\u2019s dates; he\n confuses his resignation of professorship (1875) with his death. This,\n however, did not occur until as late as 1918. See the references in\n Mertz, vol. iii., p. 620, and vol. iv., p. 217.\n\n\n [37] The thesis and the article have been published together by Alcan,\n accompanied by notes on Pascal\u2019s Wager. The _Etude sur le Syllogisme_\n also forms a volume in Alcan\u2019s _Biblioth\u00e8que de Philosophie\n contemporaine_.\n\n\nLachelier was a pupil of Ravaisson, and owes his initial inspiration to\nhim. He had, however, a much more rigorous and precise attitude to\nproblems. This is apparent in the concentration of thought contained in\nhis thesis. It is one of Lachelier\u2019s merits that he recognised the\nsignificance of Kant\u2019s work in a very profound manner. Until his thesis\nappeared the influence of Leibnitz had been more noticeable in French\nthought than that of Kant. It was noticeable in Ravaisson, and\nRenouvier, in spite of his professed adherence to Kant, passed to a\nLeibnitzian position in his _Nouvelle Monadologie_.\n\nThe valuable work _Du Fondement de l\u2019Induction_ is concerned mainly\nwith the problem of final causes, which Lachelier deduces from the\nnecessity of totality judgments over and above those which concern\nmerely efficient causes. On the principle of final causes, or a\nideological conception of a rational unity and order, he founds\nInduction. It cannot be founded, he claims, upon a mere empiricism.\nThis is a point which will concern us later in our examination of the\nproblem of science.\n\nLachelier was left, however, with the dualism of mechanism, operating\nsolely by efficient causes, and teleology manifested in final causes, a\ndualism from which Kant did not manage to escape. In his article\n_Psychologic et M\u00e9taphysique_ he endeavoured to interpret mechanism\nitself as a teleological activity of the spirit.[38] He indicates the\nabsolute basis of our life and experience, indeed of the universe\nitself, to be the absolute spontaneity of spirit. In spirit and in\nfreedom we live and move and have our being. We do not affirm ourselves\nto be what we are, but rather we are what we affirm ourselves to be. We\nmust not say that our present depends upon our past, for we really\ncreate all the moments of our life in one and the same act, which is\nboth present to each moment and above them all.[39] Here psychology\nappears as the science of thought itself and resolves itself into\nmetaphysics. Here, too, we find the significance of the new\nspiritualism; we see its affinity with, and its contrast to, the\ndoctrines of the older spiritualism as professed by Cousin. Lachelier\nhere strikes the note which is so clearly characteristic of this\ncurrent of thought, and is no less marked in his work than in that of\nBergson\u2014namely, a belief in the supremacy of spirit and in the reality\nof freedom.\n\n [38] It is interesting to compare this with the attitude taken by\n Lotze in Germany.\n\n\n [39] _Psychologie et M\u00e9taphysique_, p. 171.\n\n\nThe notion of freedom and of the spontaneity of the spirit became\nwatchwords of the new spiritualist philosophers. Under the work and\ninfluence of Boutroux (1845-1921) these ideas were further emphasised\nand worked out more definitely to a position which assumes a critical\nattitude to the dogmatism of modern science and establishes a\ncontingency in all things. Boutroux\u2019s thesis _De la Contingence des\nLois de la Nature_ appeared in 1874 and was dedicated to Ravaisson. His\nchief fame and his importance in the development of the spiritualist\nphilosophy rest upon this book alone. In 1894 he published a course of\nlectures given at the Sorbonne in 1892-3, _Sur l\u2019Id\u00e9e de Loi\nnaturelle_, which supplements the thesis. Outside his own country\nattention has been more readily bestowed upon his writings on the\nhistory of philosophy, of which subject he was Professor. In his own\ncountry, however, great interest and value are attached to his work on\n_The Contingency of the Laws of Nature_. In this Boutroux combines the\nattitude of Ravaisson with that of Lachelier. The totality of the laws\nof the universe manifests, according to him, a contingency. No\nexplanation of these laws is possible apart from a free spiritual\nactivity. The stress laid upon contingency in the laws of nature\nculminates in the belief in the freedom of man.\n\nThe critique of science which marked Boutroux\u2019s work has profoundly\ninfluenced thinkers like Hannequin, Payot and Milhaud,[40] and in the\nfollowing century appears in the work of Duhem and of Henri Poincar\u00e9,\nthe noted mathematician, whose books on _La Science et l\u2019Hypoth\u00e8se_\n(1902), _La Valeur de la Science_ (1905), and _Science et M\u00e9thode_\n(1909) have confirmed many of Boutroux\u2019s conclusions.[41]\n\n [40] Hannequin\u2019s notable work is the _Essai critique sur L\u2019Hypoth\u00e8se\n des Atomes_ (1896). Payot\u2019s chief book is _La Croyance_ (1896).\n Milhaud\u2019s critique of science is contained in his _Essai sur les\n Conditions et les Limites de la Certitude logique_ (1894), and in _Le\n Rationnel_ (1898). Duhem\u2019s book is _La Th\u00e9orie physique_ (1906).\n\n\n [41] It is interesting to note that Boutroux married Poincar\u00e9\u2019s\n sister, and that his son, Pierre Boutroux, whose education was guided\n by both his uncle and his father, is now Professor at the Coll\u00e8ge de\n France. Emile Boutroux was a pupil of Zeller, whose lectures on Greek\n philosophy he attended in Heidelberg, 1868. He expressed to the writer\n his grief at the later prostitution of German thought to nationalist\n and materialist aims. He was Professor of the History of Philosophy in\n Paris from 1888, then Honorary Professor of Modern Philosophy. In 1914\n he gave the Hertz Lecture to the British Academy on _Certitude et\n V\u00e9rit\u00e9_. He was until his death Directeur de la Fondation Thiers, a\n college for post-graduate study, literary, philosophical and\n scientific.\n\n\nWhile the new spiritualist current was thus tending to a position far\nremoved from that of Taine, at the commencement of our period, a\nwavering note was struck by the idealist Fouill\u00e9e (1838-1912), who,\nwhile maintaining a general attitude in harmony with the new doctrines\nendeavoured to effect a reconciliation with the more positive attitude\nto science and philosophy. In his _philosophie des ide\u00e9s-forces_[42] he\nendeavoured to combine and reconcile the diverging attitudes of Plato\nand of Comte. He shows a scorn of the neo-critical though of Renouvier.\nHe wrote in his shorter life more books than did Renouvier, and he is\nconspicuous among this later group of thinkers for his mass-production\nof books, which appeared steadily at the rate of one _per annum_ to the\nextent of some thirty-seven volumes, after he gave up his position as\n_ma\u00eetre de conf\u00e9rence_ at the Ecole Normale owing to ill-health.[43]\n\n [42] His _Evolutionnisme des Id\u00e9es-forces_ appeared in 1890, _La\n Psychologie des Id\u00e9es-forces_ three years later. His _Morale des\n Id\u00e9es-forces_ belongs to the next century (1907), but its principles\n were contained already in his thesis _Libert\u00e9 et D\u00e9terminisme_.\n\n\n [43] He only held this for three years, 1872-75.\n\n\nFouill\u00e9e, with the noblest intentions, set himself to the solution of\nthat problem which we have already indicated as being the central one\nof our period, the relation of science and ethics, or, in brief, the\nproblem of freedom. This was the subject of his thesis, undoubtedly the\nbest book he ever wrote, _La Libert\u00e9 et le D\u00e9terminisme_, which he\nsustained in 1872.[44] The attitude which he takes in that work is the\nkeynote to his entire philosophy. Well grounded in a knowledge of the\nhistory of systems of philosophy, ancient and modern, he recognises\nelements of truth in each, accompanied by errors due mainly to a\none-sided perspective.[45] He recalls a statement of Leibnitz to the\neffect that most systems are right in their assertions and err in their\ndenials. Fouill\u00e9e was convinced that there was reconciliation at the\nheart of things, and that the contradictions we see are due to our\npoint of view. Facing, therefore, in this spirit, the problems of the\nhour, he set himself \u201cto reconcile the findings of science with the\nreality of spirit, to establish harmony between the determinism upheld\nby science and the liberty which the human spirit acclaims, between the\nmechanism of nature and the aspirations of man\u2019s heart, between the\nTrue which is the object of all science and the Good which is the goal\nof morality.\u201d[46]\n\n [44] This work created quite a stir in the intellectual and political\n world in France just after the war. Fouill\u00e9e\u2019s book led to an attack\n on the ministry, which did not go so far as that occasioned by\n Renouvier\u2019s volume in 1849. (See p. 61.)\n\n\n [45] Fouill\u00e9e stands in marked contrast to Comte in his general\n acquaintance with the history of ideas. Comte, like Spencer, knew\n little of any philosophy but his own. Fouill\u00e9e, however, was well\n schooled, not only in Plato and the ancients, but had intimate\n knowledge of the work of Kant, Comte, Spencer, Lotze, Renouvier,\n Lachelier, Boutroux and Bergson.\n\n\n [46] This is also the idea expressed at length in his _Avenir de la\n M\u00e9taphysique_, 1889.\n\n\nFouill\u00e9e had no desire to offer merely another eclecticism _\u00e0 la mode\nde Cousin_; he selects, therefore, his own principle of procedure. This\nprinciple is found in his notion of _id\u00e9e-force_. Following ancient\nusage, he employs the term \u201cidea\u201d for _any_ mental presentation. For\nFouill\u00e9e, however, ideas are not _id\u00e9es-spectacles_, merely exercising\na platonic influence \u201cremote as the stars shining above us.\u201d They are\nnot merely mental reproductions of an object, real or hypothetical,\noutside the mind. Ideas are in themselves forces which endeavour to\nwork out their own realisation. Fouill\u00e9e opposes his doctrine to the\nevolutionary theory of Spencer and Huxley. He disagrees with their\nmechanism and epiphenomenalism, pointing out legitimately that our\nideas, far from being results of purely physical and independent\ncauses, are themselves factors, and very vital factors, in the process\nof evolution. Fouill\u00e9e looks upon the mechanistic arrangement of the\nworld as an expression or symbol of idea or spirit in a manner not\nunlike that of Lotze.\n\nHe bears out his view of _id\u00e9es-forces_ by showing how a state of\nconsciousness tries to realise its object. The idea of movement is\nclosely bound up with the physiological and physical action, and,\nmoreover, tends to produce it. This realisation is not a merely\nmechanistic process but is teleological and depends on the vital unity\nbetween the physical and the mental. On this fundamental notion\nFouill\u00e9e constructs his psychology, his ethic, his sociology and his\nmetaphysic. He sees in the evolutionary process ideas at work which\ntend to realise themselves. One of these is the idea of freedom, in\nwhich idea he endeavours to find a true reconciliation of the problem\nof determinism in science and the demands of the human spirit which\ndeclares itself free. The love of freedom arising from the idea of\nfreedom creates in the long run this freedom. This is Fouill\u00e9e\u2019s method\nall through. \u201cTo conceive and to desire the ideal is already to begin\nits realisation.\u201d He applies his method with much success in the realm\nof ethics and sociology where he opposes to the Marxian doctrine of a\nmaterialist determination of history that of a spiritual and\nintellectual determination by ideas. Fouill\u00e9e\u2019s philosophy is at once\nintellectual and voluntarist. He has himself described it as\n\u201cspiritualistic voluntarism.\u201d It is a system of idealism which reflects\nalmost all the elements of modern thought. In places his doctrine of\nreconciliation appears to break down, and the psychological law summed\nup in _id\u00e9es-forces_ is hardly sufficient to bear the vast erection\nwhich Fouill\u00e9e builds upon it. The idea is nevertheless a valuable and\nfruitful one. Fouill\u00e9e\u2019s respect for positive science is noteworthy, as\nis also his great interest in social problems.[47]\n\n [47] At the end of the century these problems received highly\n specialised attention in the work of the sociologists inspired by\n Comte\u2019s influence. Works of special merit in this direction are:\n tspmas, with his _Soci\u00e9t\u00e9\u2019s animales_ (1876) and Tarde, predecessor of\n Bergson at the Coll\u00e8ge de France (1843-1907), with his _Criminalit\u00e9\n compar\u00e9e_ (1898) and _Les Lois de l\u2019Imitation_ (1900), also Durkheim\u2019s\n work _De la Division du Travail social_ (1893) and _Les R\u00e9gles de la\n M\u00e9thode sociologique_ (1894), and Izoulet, with his _La Cit\u00e9 moderne_\n (1894). Note those of Levy-Bruhl, Bougl\u00e9, and Le Bon.\n\n\nThe importance of the sociological aspect of all problems was\nemphasised in a brilliant manner by Guyau (1854-1888), the step-son of\nFouill\u00e9e. Guyau was a gifted young man, whose death at the early age of\nthirty-four was a sore bereavement for Fouill\u00e9e and undoubtedly a\ndisaster for philosophy. Guyau was trained by his step-father,[48] and\nassisted him in his work. When ill-health forced both men from their\nprofessorships,[49] they lived in happy comradeship at Mentone at the\nsame time, it is interesting to note, that Nietzsche was residing\nthere. Equally interesting is it to observe that although Guyau and\nFouill\u00e9e were unaware of the German thinker\u2019s presence or his work,\nNietzsche was well acquainted with theirs, particularly that of Guyau.\nDoubtless he would have been pleased to meet the author of the\n_Esquisse d\u2019une Morale sans Obligation ni Sanction_ (1885) and\n_L\u2019Irreligion de l\u2019Avenir_ (1887). Editions of these books exist in the\n_Nietzsche-Archiv_ bearing Nietzsche\u2019s notes and comments.\n\n [48] Some authorities are of opinion that Fouill\u00e9e was actually the\n father of Guyau. Fouill\u00e9e married Guyau\u2019s mother.\n\n\n [49] Guyau taught at the Lyc\u00e9e Condorcet (1874) where young Henri\n Bergson was studying (1868-1878).\n\n\nGuyau himself has a certain affinity with Nietzsche, arising from his\ninsistence upon Life and its power; but the author of the delightful\nlittle collection _Vers d\u2019un Philosophe_ (1881) is free from the egoism\nexpressed in _Der Wille zur Macht_. Guyau posits as his\n_id\u00e9e-directrice_ the conception of Life, both individual and social,\nand in this concept he professes to find a basis more fundamental than\nthat of force, movement or existence. Life involves expansion and\nintension, fecundity and creation. It means also consciousness,\nintelligence and feeling, generosity and sociability. \u201cHe only lives\nwell who lives for others.\u201d Life can only exist by extending. It can\nnever be purely egoistic and endure; a certain giving of itself, in\ngenerosity and in love, is necessary for its continuance. Such is the\nview which the French philosopher-poet expresses in opposition to\nNietzsche, starting, however, from the concept of Life did Nietzsche.\nGuyau worked out a doctrine of ethics and of religion based upon this\nconcept which will demand our special attention in its proper place,\nwhen we consider the moral and religious problem. He strove to give an\nidealistic setting to the doctrines of evolution, and this alone would\ngive him a place among the great thinkers of the period.\n\nIn his doctrine of the relation of thought and action Guyau followed\nthe _philosophie des id\u00e9es-forces_. On the other hand there are very\nremarkable affinities between the thought of Guyau and that of Bergson.\nGuyau is not so severely intellectual as Fouill\u00e9e; his manner of\nthought and excellence of style are not unlike Bergson. More noticeably\nhe has a conception of life not far removed from the _\u00e9lan vital_. His\n\u201cexpansion of life\u201d has, like Bergson\u2019s _\u00e9volution cr\u00e9atrice_, no goal\nother than that of its own activity. After Guyau\u2019s death in 1888 it was\nfound that he had been exercised in mind about the problem of Time, for\nhe left the manuscript of a book entitled _La Gen\u00e8se de l\u2019Id\u00e9e de\nTemps_.[50] He therein set forth a belief in a psychological,\nheterogeneous time other than mathematical time, which is really\nspatial in character. In this psychological time the spirit lives. The\nyear following Guyau\u2019s death, but before his posthumous work appeared,\nBergson published his thesis _Les Donn\u00e9es imm\u00e9diates de la Conscience_\n(1889), which is better described by its English title _Time and Free\nWill_, and in which this problem which had been present to Guyau\u2019s mind\nis taken up and treated in an original and striking manner. In Guyau,\ntoo, is seen the rise of the conception of activity so marked in the\nwork of Bergson and of Blondel. \u201cIt is _action_ and the power of life,\u201d\nhe insists, \u201cwhich alone can solve, if not entirely at least partially,\nthose problems to which abstract thought gives rise.\u201d[51]\n\n [50] This work was edited and published by Fouill\u00e9e two years after\n Guyau\u2019s death, and reviewed by Bergson in the _Revue philosophique_ in\n 1891.\n\n\n [51] _Esquisse d\u2019une Morale sans Obligation ni Sanction_, p. 250.\n\n\nBergson, born in 1859, Professor at the Coll\u00e8ge de France from 1901 to\n1921, now retired, has had a popularity to which none of the other\nthinkers of this group, or indeed of our period, has attained. He is\nthe only one of the new idealists or spiritualists who is well known\noutside his own country. For this reason foreigners are apt to regard\nhim as a thinker unrelated to any special current of thought, an\ninnovator. Although much is original and novel in his philosophy, his\nthought marks the stage in the development to which the spiritualist\ncurrent has attained in contemporary thought. The movement of which he\nforms a part we can trace back as far as Maine de Biran, to whom\nBergson owes much, as he does also to Ravaisson, Lachelier, Boutroux\nand Guyau.\n\nTwo important books by Bergson came prior to 1900, his _Time and Free\nWill_ (1889) and his _Matter and Memory_ (1896). His famous _Creative\nEvolution_ appeared in 1907. It is but his first work \u201cwrit large,\u201d for\nwe have in _Time and Free Will_ the essentials of his philosophy.\n\nHe makes, as did Guyau, a central point of Change, a universal\nbecoming, and attacks the ordinary notion of time, which he regards as\nfalse because it is spatial. We ourselves live and act in _dur\u00e9e_,\nwhich is Bergson\u2019s term for real time as opposed to that fictitious\ntime of the mathematician or astronomer. He thus lays stress upon the\ninward life of the spirit, with its richness and novelty, its eternal\nbecoming, its self-creation. He has his own peculiar manner of\napproaching our central problem, that of freedom, of which he realises\nthe importance. For him the problem resolves itself into an application\nof his doctrine of _la dur\u00e9e_, to which we shall turn in due course.\n\nBergson insists with Guyau and Blondel upon the primary significance of\naction. The importance attached to action colours his whole theory of\nknowledge. His epistemology rests upon the thesis that \u201cthe brain is an\ninstrument of action and not of representation,\u201d and that \u201cin the study\nof the problems of perception the starting- point should be action and\nnot sensation.\u201d This is a psychology far different from that of\nCondillac and Taine, and it is largely upon his merit as a psychologist\nthat Bergson\u2019s fame rests. He devoted his second work, _Matter and\nMemory_, to showing that memory is something other than a function of\nthe brain. His distinction between \u201cpure\u201d memory and mere memorising\npower, which is habit, recalls the _m\u00e9moire_ of Maine de Biran and of\nRavaisson upon _Habit_. Bergson sees in memory a manifestation of\nspirit, which is a fundamental reality, no mere epiphenomenon. Spirit\nis ever striving against matter, but in spite of this dualism which he\ncannot escape, he maintains that spirit is at the origin of things.\nThis is a difficulty which is more clearly seen in his later book,\n_Creative Evolution_. Matter is our enemy and threatens our personality\nin its spiritual reality by a tendency to lead us into habit, away from\nlife, freedom and creativeness.\n\nFurther we must, he claims, endeavour to see things _sub specie\ndurationis in a dur\u00e9e_, in an eternal becoming. We cannot expect to\ngrasp all the varied reality of life in a formula or indeed in any\npurely intellectual manner. This is the chief defect of science and of\nthe so-called scientific point of view. It tries to fix in concepts,\nmoulds and solid forms a reality which is living and moving eternally.\nFor Bergson all is Change, and this eternal becoming we can only grasp\nby intuition. Intuition and intellect do not, however, oppose one\nanother. We are thus led to realise that Life is more than logic. The\nBergsonian philosophy concludes with intuitionism and contingency,\nwhich drew upon it the severe criticisms of Fouill\u00e9e,[52] who termed it\na philosophy of scepticism and nihilism. Of all the spiritualist group\nFouill\u00e9e stands nearest the positive attitude to science, and his\nstrong intellectualism comes out in his criticism of Bergson, who well\nrepresents, together with Blondel, the tendency towards\nnon-intellectual attitudes inherent in the spiritualist development.\nBlondel has endeavoured to treat the great problems, a task which\nBergson has not attempted as yet, partly because he (Bergson) shares\nRenan\u2019s belief that \u201cthe day of philosophic systems has gone,\u201d partly\nbecause he desires to lay the basis of a philosophy of the spirit to\nwhich others after him may contribute, and so he devotes his attention\nto method and to those crucial points, such as the problem of freedom\nupon which a larger doctrine must necessarily rest.[53]\n\n [52] Particularly in his work _Le Mouvement id\u00e9aliste et la R\u00e9action\n contre la Science positive_ (cf. .206), 1896, and later in _La Pens\u00e9e\n et les nouvelles Ecoles anti-intellectualistes_, 1910.\n\n\n [53] For a fuller appreciation of the Bergsonian doctrines than is\n possible in such a survey as this, the reader is referred to the\n author\u2019s monograph, _Bergson and His Philosophy_, Methuen and Co.,\n 1920.\n\n\nThe current of the new idealism or spiritualism reaches a culminating\npoint in the work of Blondel (born about 1870), whose remarkable and\nnoteworthy book _L\u2019Action_ appeared in l893.[54] The fundamental thesis\nof the Philosophy of Action[55] is that man\u2019s life is primarily one of\naction, consequently philosophy must concern itself with the active\nlife and not merely with thought. By its nature, action is something\nunique and irreducible to other elements or factors. It is not the\nresult of any synthesis: it is itself a living synthesis, and cannot be\ndealt with as the scientist deals with his data. Blondel lays emphasis,\nas did Bergson, upon \u201cthe living\u201d being unique and inexpressible in\nformulae. Intellect cannot grasp action; \u201cone penetrates the living\nreality only by placing oneself at the dynamic point of view of the\nwill.\u201d[56] His words recall Bergson\u2019s attitude to the free act. \u201cThe\nprinciple of action eludes positive knowledge at the moment at which it\nmakes it possible, and, in a word that needs to be better defined, it\nis subjectivity.\u201d[57]\n\n [54] The same year in which the philosophic interest in France,\n growing since 1870, and keener in the eighties, led to the foundation\n of the famous _Revue de M\u00e9taphysique et de Morale_ by Xavier L\u00e9on. In\n 1876 (the same year in which Professor Croom Robertson in England\n established the periodical _Mind_) Ribot had founded the _Revue\n philosophique de la France et de l\u2019Etranger_. These journals, along\n with the teaching in the Lyc\u00e9es, have contributed to make the French\n people the best educated, philosophically, of any people.\n\n\n [55] It is interesting to note that this designation has been used by\n its author to replace his original term \u201c_pragmatisme_,\u201d which he\n employed in 1888 and abandoned upon becoming acquainted with the\n theory of Peirce and James, and with their use of the term in another\n manner, with which he did not agree. See _Bulletin de la Soci\u00e9t\u00e9\n fran\u00e7aise de Philosophie_, 1902.\n\n\n [56] _L\u2019 Action_, p. 100.\n\n\n [57] _Ibid_., p. 87.\n\n\nBlondel, however, leads us beyond this subjectivity, for it is not the\nwill which causes what is. Far from that, he maintains that in so far\nas it wills it implies something which it does not and cannot create of\nitself; it wills to be what it is not yet. We do not act for the mere\nsake of acting, but for some end, something beyond the particular act.\nAction is not self-contained or self- sufficing: it is a striving to\nfurther attainment or achievement. It therefore pre-supposes some\nreality beyond itself. Here appear the elements of \u201cpassion\u201d and\n\u201csuffering\u201d due to resistance, for all action involves some opposition.\nIn particular moral action implies this resistance and a consciousness\nof power to overcome the resistance, and it therefore involves a\nreality which transcends the sphere in which we act.\n\nOwing to this inequality between the power and the wish, we are obliged\nto complete our actions or our activity in general by a belief in a\nReality beyond. It is, however, \u201ca beyond that is within,\u201d a Divine\npower immanent in man. This view, Blondel claims, unites the idea of\nGod \u201ctranscendent\u201d with the idea of God as \u201cimmanent.\u201d Man\u2019s action\npartakes of both, for in so far as it results from his own will it is\nimmanent; transcendence is, however, implied in the fact that the end\nof man\u2019s action as a whole is not \u201cgiven.\u201d Blondel leads us to a\nconception of a religious idealism in which every act of our ordinary\nexistence leads ultimately to a religious faith. Every action is\nsacramental. Blondel and his follower Laberthonni\u00e8re, who has taken up\nthis idea from his master in his volume of _Essais de Philosophie\nr\u00e9ligieuse_ (1901), go beyond a purely pragmatist or voluntarist\nposition by finding the supreme value of all action, and of the\nuniverse, not in will but in love. For Blondel this word is no mere\nsentiment or transient feeling, but a concrete reality which is the\nperfection of will and of intellect alike, of action and of knowledge.\nThe \u201cPhilosophy of Action,\u201d asserts Blondel, includes the \u201cPhilosophy\nof the Idea.\u201d In the fact of love, he claims, is found the perfect\nunity between the self and the non-self, the ground of personality and\nits relation to the totality of persons, producing a unity in which\neach is seen as an end to others as well as to himself. \u201cLove,\u201d says\nLaberthonni\u00e8re, \u201cis the first and last word of all. It is the\nprinciple, the means and the end. It is in loving that one gets away\nfrom self and raises oneself above one\u2019s temporal individuality. It is\nin loving that one finds God and other beings, and that one finds\noneself.\u201d It is, in short, these idealists claim, the _Summum Bonum_;\nin it is found the Absolute which philosophers and religious mystics of\nall ages have ever sought.\n\nThe \u201cphilosophy of action\u201d is intimately bound up with the \u201cphilosophy\nof belief,\u201d formulated by Oll\u00e9-Laprune, and the movement in religious\nthought known generally as Modernism, which is itself due to the\ninfluence of modern philosophic thought upon the dogmas of the\nChristian religion, as these are stated by the Roman Church. Both the\nPhilosophy of Belief and Modernism are characterised by an intense\nspirituality and a moral earnestness which maintain the primacy of the\npractical reason over the theoretical reason. Life, insists\nOll\u00e9-Laprune in his book _Le Prix de la Vie_ (l885),[58] is not\ncontemplation but active creation. He urges us to a creative evolution\nof the good, to an employment of _id\u00e9es-forces_. \u201cThere are things to\nbe made whose measure is not determined; there are things to be\ndiscovered, to be invented, new forms of the good, ideas which have\nnever yet been received\u2014creations, as it were, of the spirit that loves\nthe good.\u201d This dynamism and power of will is essential. We must not\nlose ourselves in abstractions; action is the supreme thing: it alone\nconstitutes reality.\n\n [58] This has been followed in the new century by _La Raison et le\n Rationalisme_, 1906. As early as 1880, however, he issued his work _La\n Certitude morale_, which influenced Blondel, his pupil.\n\n\nA similar note is sounded by the Modernists or Neo-Catholics,\nparticularly by the brilliant disciple and successor of Bergson, Le\nRoy, who in _Dogme et Critique_ (1907) has based the reality of\nreligious dogma upon its practical significance. We find P\u00e9guy (who\nfell on the field of battle in 1914) applying Bergsonian ideas to a\nfervid religious faith. Wilbois unites these ideas to social ethics in\nhis _Devoir et Dur\u00e9e_ (1912). In quite different quarters the new\nspiritualism and philosophy of action have appeared as inspiring the\nSyndicalism of Sorel, who endeavours to apply the doctrines of Bergson,\nOll\u00e9-Laprune and Blondel to the solution of social questions in his\n_R\u00e9flexions sur la Violence_ (1907) and _Illusions du Progr\u00e8s_ (1911).\n\nIt would be erroneous to regard Bergson\u2019s intuitional philosophy as\ntypical of all contemporary French thought. Following Renouvier,\nFouill\u00e9e and Boutroux, there prevail currents of a more intellectualist\nor rationalist type, to which we are, perhaps, too close to see in true\nand historical perspective. The _\u00e9lan vital_ of French thought\ncontinues to manifest itself in a manner which combines the work of\nBoutroux and Bergson with Blondel\u2019s idealism. A keen interest is being\ntaken in the works of Spinoza, Kant and Hegel, and this is obviously\ninfluencing the trend of French philosophy at the moment, without\ngiving rise to a mere eclecticism. French thought is too original and\ntoo energetic for that. In addition to these classical studies we\nshould note the great and growing influence of the work of Durkheim and\nof Hamelin, both of whom we have already mentioned. The former gave an\nimmense impetus to sociological studies by his earlier work. Further\ninterest arose with his _Formes \u00e9l\u00e9mentaires de la Vie religieuse_ in\n1912. Hamelin indicated a turning-point from _neo-criticisme_ through\nthe new spiritualist doctrines to Hegelian methods and ideas.\nBrunschwicg, who produced a careful study of Spinoza, wrote as early as\n1897 on _La Modalit\u00e9 du Jugement_, a truly Kantian topic. This\nthinker\u2019s later works, _Les Etapes de la Philosophie mathematique_\n(1912) and the little volume _La Vie de l\u2019esprit_, illustrate a\ntendency to carry out the line taken by Boutroux\u2014namely, to arrive at\nthe statement of a valid idealism disciplined by positivism. The papers\nof Berthelot in his _Evolutionnisme et Platonisme_ are a further\ncontribution to this great end. In the work of Evellin, _La Raison pure\net les Antinomies_ (1907), the interest in Kant and Hegel is again\nseen. No\u00ebl, who contributed an excellent monograph on Lachelier to the\n_Revue de M\u00e9taphysique et de Morale_ (that journal which is an\nexcellent witness in itself to the vitality of contemporary French\nphilosophy), produced a careful study of Hegel\u2019s Logik in 1897. Since\nthat date interest has grown along the lines of Boutroux, Bergson and\nBlondel in an attempt to reach a positive idealism, which would combine\nthe strictly positivist attitude so dear to French minds with the\ntendency to spiritualism or idealism which they also manifest. This\nattempt, which in some respects amounts to an effort to restate the\nprinciples of Hegel in modern or contemporary terms, was undertaken by\nWeber in 1903 in his book entitled _Vers le Positivisme absolu par\nl\u2019Id\u00e9alisme_. Philosophy in France realises to-day that the true course\nof spiritual development will be at once positive and idealistic.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III\nSCIENCE\n\n\nINTRODUCTION: The scientific outlook\u2014Progress of the sciences\u2014The\npositivist spirit, its action on science, philosophy and literature\u2014The\nproblem as presented to philosophy.\n\nI. Comte\u2019s positivism\u2014Work of prominent scientists\u2014Position maintained\nby Berthelot and Bernard\u2014Renan\u2019s confidence\u2014Vacherot and\nTaine\u2014Insufficiency of sciences alone.\n\nII. Cournot and Renouvier attack the dogmatism of science.\n\nIII. The neo-spiritualist group continue and develop this attack, which\nbecomes a marked feature in Lachelier, Boutroux, and Bergson.\n\nEntire change of attitude in the development of the period.\n\nThe problem of freedom opened up in the process.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III\nSCIENCE\n\nHaving thus surveyed the main currents of our period and indicated the\ngeneral attitude adopted to knowledge by the various thinkers, we\napproach more closely to the problem of the relation of science and\nphilosophy. The nineteenth century was a period in which this problem\nwas keenly felt, and France was the country in which it was tensely\ndiscussed by the most acute minds among the philosophers and among the\nscientists. French thought and culture, true to the tradition of the\ngreat geometrician and metaphysician Descartes, have produced men whose\ntraining has been highly scientific as well as philosophical. Her\nphilosophers have been keenly versed in mathematics and physical\nscience, while her scientists have had considerable power as\nphilosophical thinkers.\n\nOne of the very prominent tendencies of thought in the first half of\nthe nineteenth century was the growing belief and confidence in the\nnatural sciences. In France this was in large measure due to the\nprogress of those sciences themselves and to the influences of Comte,\nwhich was supported by the foreign influences of Kant\u2019s teaching and\nthat of the English School, particularly John Stuart Mill. These three\ngreat streams of thought, widely different in many respects, had this\nin common\u2014that they tended to confuse philosophy and science to such a\ndegree that it seemed doubtful whether the former could be granted any\nexistence by itself. Science, somewhat intoxicated by the praise and\nworship bestowed upon her, became proud, arrogant and overbearing. She\nscorned facts which could not be adapted to her own nature, she ignored\ndata which were not quantitative and materialistic, and she regarded\ntruth as a system of laws capable of expression by strict mathematical\nmethods and formulae*. Hence science became characterised by a firm\nbelief in absolute determinism, in laws of necessity operating after\nthe manner of mathematical laws. This \u201cuniversal mathematic\u201d\nendeavoured also to explain the complex by reference to the simple.\nDifficulties were encountered all along the line, for experience, it\nwas found, did not quite fit into rigid formulae*, \u201cnew\u201d elements of\nexperience presented a unique character and distressing discrepancy.\nConfidence in science, however, was not shaken by this, for the perfect\nscience, it was imagined, was assured in a short time. Patience might\nbe needed, but no doubt was entertained of the _possibility_ of such a\nconstruction. Doubters were told to look at the rising sciences of\npsychology and sociology, which, as Auguste Comte had himself\nprophesied, were approaching gradually to the \u201ctype\u201d venerated\u2014namely,\nan exact and mathematical character. Biology, it was urged, was merely\na special branch of physico-chemistry. As for beliefs in freedom, in\nart, morality and religion, these, like philosophy (metaphysics)\nitself, belonged to the earlier stages (the theological and\nmetaphysical) of Comte\u2019s list, stages rapidly to be replaced by the\nthird and final \u201cpositive\u201d era.\n\nSuch, briefly stated, were the affirmations so confidently put forward\non behalf of science by its devoted worshippers. Confidence in science\nwas a marked feature of the work written by Renan in the years\n1848-1849, _L\u2019Avenir de la Science_. Yet, paradoxical as it may seem,\nRenan himself played a large part in undermining this confidence. Yet\nthe time of his writing this work is undoubtedly the period when the\nconfidence in science was most marked. By this it is not implied that\nan even greater confidence in science has not been professed since by\nmany thinkers. That is probably true, but the important point is that\nat this time the confidence in science was less resisted than ever in\nits history. It seemed to have a clear field and positivism seemed to\nbe getting unto itself a mighty victory.\n\nThe cult of facts, which is so marked a characteristic of the\nscientific or positivist temper, penetrated, it is interesting to note,\ninto the realm of literature, where it assumed the form of \u201crealism.\u201d\nIn his Intelligence we find Taine remarking, \u201c_de tout petits fails\nbien choisis, importants, significatifs, amplement circonstanci\u00e9s et\nminutieusement not\u00e9s, voil\u00e0 aujourd\u2019hui la mati\u00e8re de toute\nscience_.\u201d[1] It was also, in the opinion of several writers, the\n_mati\u00e8re de toute litt\u00e9rature_. The passion for minute details shows\nitself in the realism of Flaubert and Zola, in the psychology of\nStendthal* and the novels of the Goncourts. It was no accident that\ntheir works were so loved by Taine. A similar spirit of \u201cpositivism\u201d or\n\u201crealism\u201d animated both them and him.\n\n [1] Preface to _Intelligence_.\n\n\nWith the turn of the half century, however, a change manifested itself\nby the fact that the positivist current began to turn against itself,\nand our period is, in some respects, what Fouill\u00e9e has called _la\nr\u00e9action centre la science positive_.[2] The function of philosophy is\nessentially criticism, and although at that period the vitality of\nphilosophy was low, it nevertheless found enough energy to criticise\nthe demands and credentials of Science.\n\n [2] Compare also Aliotta\u2019s book, _The Idealistic Reaction against\n Science_, Eng. trans., 19l4.\n\n\nThe publication of Claude Bernard\u2019s volume _Introduction \u00e0 la M\u00e9decine\nexperimentale_[3] drew from the pen of Paul Janet, the last of the\nEclectic School dominated by Cousin, an article of criticism which\nappeared in the _Revue des Deux Mondes_, and was later published in his\nvolume of essays entitled, _Les Probl\u00e8mes du XIXe Si\u00e8cle_. Although\nJanet\u2019s essay reveals all the deficiencies of the older spiritualism,\nhe makes a gallant attempt to combat the dogmatism and the assumed\nfinality of Bernard\u2019s point of view and that of the scientists in\ngeneral. Janet regarded the sciences and their relation to philosophy\nas constituting an important problem for the century and in this\njudgment he was not mistaken.\n\n [3] _Cf_. Livre III., _Science_, chap, i., on \u201cMethod in General\u201d;\n chap, ii., on The Experimental Method in Physiology,\u201d pp. 213-279.\n\nI\n\nWe have, in our Introductory Chapter, reckoned Auguste Comte among the\ninfluential antecedents of our period. Here, in approaching the study\nof the problem of science, we may note that the tendency towards the\nstrictly scientific attitude, and to the promotion of the scientific\n_spirit_ in general, was partly due to the influence of his positivism.\nComte\u2019s intended Religion of Humanity failed, his system of positive\nphilosophy has been neglected, but the SPIRIT which he inculcated has\nabided and has borne fruit. We would be wrong, however, if we\nattributed much to Comte as the originator of that spirit. His positive\nphilosophy, although it greatly stimulated and strengthened the\npositive attitude adopted by the natural sciences, was itself in large\nmeasure inspired by and based upon these sciences. Consequently much of\nComte\u2019s glory was a reflected light, his thought was a challenge to the\nold spiritualism, an assertion of the rights of the sciences to\nproclaim their existence and to demand serious consideration.\n\nAlthough he succeeded in calling the attention of philosophy to the\nnatural sciences, yet owing to the mere fact that he based himself on\nthe sciences of his day much of his thought has become obsolete by the\nprogress and extension of those very sciences themselves. He tended,\nwith a curious dogmatism, to assign limits to the sciences by keeping\nthem in separate compartments and in general by desiring knowledge to\nbe limited to human needs. Although there is important truth in his\ndoctrine of discontinuity or irreducible differences, the subsequent\ndevelopment of the natural sciences has cleared away many barriers\nwhich he imagined to be impassable. There still are, and may always be,\ngaps in our knowledge of the progress from inorganic to organic, from\nthe living creature to self-conscious personality, but we have a\ngreater conception of the unity of Nature than had Comte. Many new\nideas and discoveries have transformed science since his day,\nparticularly the doctrines dealing with heat as a form of motion, with\nlight, electricity, and the radio-activity of matter, the structure of\nthe atom, and the inter-relation of physics and chemistry.\n\nComte\u2019s claim for different methods in the different departments of\nscience is of considerable interest, in view of present-day biological\nproblems and the controversies of vitalists, mechanists and\nneo-vitalists.[4] Although Comte insisted upon discontinuity, yet he\nurged the necessity for an _esprit d\u2019ensemble_, the consideration of\nthings synthetically, in their \u201ctogetherness.\u201d He feared that analysis,\nthe _esprit de d\u00e9tail_ or mathematisation, was being carried out _\u00e0\nl\u2019outrance_. This opinion he first stated in 1825 in his tract entitled\n_Consid\u00e9rations sur les Sciences et les Savants_. On the social side he\nbrought this point out further by insisting on the _esprit d\u2019ensemble_\nas involving the social standpoint in opposition to a purely\nindividualistic view of human life.\n\n [4] See, for example, _The Mechanism of Life_, by Dr. Johnstone,\n Professor of Oceanography in the University of Liverpool. (Arnold,\n 1921.)\n\n\nComte was slow to realise the importance of Ethics as an independent\nstudy. Psychology he never recognised as a separate discipline, deeming\nit part of physiology. He gave a curious appreciation to phrenology.\nUnfortunately he overlooked the important work done by the\nintrospectionist psychologists in England and the important work of\nMaine de Biran in his own country. One is struck by Comte\u2019s inability\nto appreciate the immense place occupied by psychology in modern life\nand in particular its expression in the modern novel and in much modern\npoetry. An acquaintance with the works of men like De Regnier, Pierre\nLoti and Anatole France is sufficient to show how large a factor the\npsychological method is in French literature and life. It is to be put\ndown to Comte\u2019s eternal discredit that he failed to appreciate\npsychology. Here lies the greatest defect in his work, and it is in\nthis connection that his work is now being supplemented. Positivism in\nFrance to-day is not a synonym for \u201cComtism\u201d at all; the term is now\nemployed to denote the spirit and temper displayed in the methods of\nthe exact sciences. For Comte, we must never forget, scientific\ninvestigation was a means and not an end in itself. His main purpose\nwas social and political regeneration. Positivism since Comte differs\nfrom his philosophy by a keen attention bestowed upon psychology, and\nmany of Comte\u2019s inadequate conceptions have been enriched by the\nintroduction of a due recognition of psychological factors.\n\nIt is to be noted that Comte died two years before Darwin\u2019s\n_chef-d\u2019\u0153uvre_ appeared, and that he opposed the doctrine of evolution\nas put forward by Lamarck. Although Comte\u2019s principle of discontinuity\nmay in general have truth in it, the problem is a far more complicated\none than he imagined it to be. Again, while Comte\u2019s opposition to the\nsubjectivism of Cousin was a wholesome influence, he did not accord to\npsychology its full rights, and this alone has been gravely against the\nacceptance of his philosophy, and explains partly the rise and progress\nof the new spiritualist doctrines. His work served a useful purpose,\nbut Comte never closed definitely with the problem of the precise\nsignificance of \u201cpositivism\u201d or with its relation to a general\nconception of the universe; in short, he confined himself to increasing\nthe scientific spirit in thought, leaving aside the difficulty of\nrelating science and philosophy.\n\nComte stated in his _Philosophie positive_[5] that he regarded attempts\nto explain all phenomena by reference to one law as futile, even when\nundertaken by the most competent minds well versed in the study of the\nsciences. Although he believed in discontinuity he tried to bridge some\ngaps, notably by his endeavour to refer certain physiological phenomena\nto the law of gravitation.\n\n [5] Vol. i., pp. 53-56.\n\n\nThe chief work which this undoubtedly great mind accomplished was the\norganisation of the scientific spirit as it appeared in his time. Renan\nhardly does justice to him in his sarcastic remark in his _Souvenirs\nd\u2019Enfance et de Jeunesse_. \u201cI felt quite irritated at the idea of\nAuguste Comte being dignified with the title of a great man for having\nexpressed in bad French what all scientific minds had seen for the last\ntwo hundred years as clearly as he had done.\u201d His work merits more than\ndismissal in such a tone, and we may here note, as the essence of the\nspirit which he tried to express, his definition of the positive or\nscientific attitude to the universe given at the commencement of his\ncelebrated Cours de _Philosophie positive_. There, in defining the\npositive stage, Comte speaks of it as that period in which \u201cthe human\nspirit, recognising the impossibility of obtaining absolute\nconceptions, abandons the search for the origin and the goal of the\nuniverse and the inner causes of things, to set itself the task merely\nof discovering, by reasoning and by experience combined, the effective\nlaws of phenomena\u2014that is to say, their invariable relations of\nsuccession and of similarity.\u201d[6] This positive spirit Comte strove to\nexpress rather than to originate, for it was already there in the\nsciences. Undoubtedly his work made it more prominent, more clear, and\nso we have to note an interaction between positivism in the sciences\nand in philosophy.\n\n [6] Le\u00e7on i.\n\n\nIt is equally important for our purpose to notice that the period was\none rich in scientific thought. The work of Lavoisier and Bichat, both\nof whom as contemporaries of Maine de Biran, belong to the former\ncentury, was now bearing fruit. Lavoisier\u2019s influence had been great\nover chemistry, which he established on a modern basis, by formulating\nthe important theory of the conservation of mass and by clearing away\nfalse and fan- tastic conceptions regarding combustion.[7] Bichat, the\ngreat anatomist and physiologist, died in 1802, but the publication of\nhis works in a completed form was not accomplished until 1854. The work\nand influence of the _Acad\u00e9mie des Sciences_ are noteworthy features of\nFrench culture at this time. There stands out prominently the highly\nimportant work of Cuvier in anatomy, zoology and pal\u00e6ontology.[8] The\nnineteenth century was a period of great scientists and of great\nscientific theories. Leverrier, applying himself to the problem of the\nmotions of Uranus, found a solution in the hypothesis of another\nplanet, Neptune, which was actually discovered from his calculations in\n1846. This was a notable victory for logical and scientific method. In\n1809 Lamarck had outlined, prior to Spencer or Darwin, the scheme of\nthe evolutionary theory (Transformism).[9] Spencer\u2019s work, which\nappeared from 1850 onwards, has always commanded respect and attention\nin France even among its critics.[10] Interest increased upon the\npublication of Darwin\u2019s _Origin of Species_ in 1859, and its\ntranslation into French in 1862. These dates coincide with the rise of\nthe _Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 d\u2019Anthropologie_ de Paris, founded by Broca in the same\nyear that Darwin\u2019s book appeared. Another translation from Darwin\u2019s\nwork followed in 1872, _Descendance de l\u2019Homme_, which aroused further\ninterest in the evolutionary theory. At the same time the work of men\nsuch as Pasteur, Bertrand, Berthelot and Bernard gave an impetus and a\npower to science. Poincare belongs rather to the twentieth century.\nPasteur (1822-1895) showed mankind how science could cure its ills by\npatient labour and careful investigation, and earned the world\u2019s\ngratitude for his noble work. His various _Discours_ and his volume,\n_Le Budget de la Science_ (1868), show his faith in this progressive\npower of science. In Bertrand (1822-1900), his contemporary who held\nthe position of Professor of Mathematics at the College de France, a\nsimilar attitude appears.\n\n [7] Lavoisier perished at the guillotine in 1794, and his death was a\n tragic loss to science.\n\n\n [8] Cuvier\u2019s _Anatomie compar\u00e9e_ appeared in the years 1800-1805,\n following his _Histoire naturelle_ (1798-1799). Later came his\n _Rapport sur les Sciences naturelles_ (1810) and his work _Le Regne\n animal_ (1816).He died in 1832. We may note that Cuvier opposed the\n speculative evolutionary doctrines of Lamarck, with whom he indulged\n in controversy.\n\n\n [9] In his work, _Philosophie zoologique, ou Exposition des\n Consid\u00e9rations relatives a l\u2019Histoire naturelle des Animaux_, 2 vols\n Paris, Dentu, 1809.\n\n\n [10] His _Social Statics_ was published in 1850, and his _Psychology_\n five years later. His life work, _The Synthetic Philosophy_, extends\n over the period 1860-1896.\n\n\nOne of the foremost scientific minds, however, was Claude Bernard\n(1813-1878), a friend of Renan, who held the Chair of Medicine at the\nCollege de France, and was, in addition, the Professor of Physiology at\nthe Facult\u00e9 des Sciences at the Sorbonne. Science, Bernard maintained,\nconcerns itself only with phenomena and their laws. He endeavoured in\nhis celebrated _Introduction \u00e0 l\u2019Etude de la M\u00e9d\u00e9cine exp\u00e9rimentale_,\npublished in 1865, to establish the science of physiology upon a sound\nbasis, having respect only to fact, not owning homage to theories of a\nmetaphysical character or to the authority of persons or creeds. He\ndesired to obtain by such a rigorous and precise method, objectivity.\n\u201cThe experimental method is,\u201d he insists, \u201cthe really scientific\nmethod, which proclaims the freedom of the human spirit and its\nintelligence. It not only shakes off the yoke of metaphysics and of\ntheology, in addition it refuses to admit personal considerations and\nsubjective standpoints.\u201d[11]\n\n [11] _Introduction \u00e0 l\u2019Etude de la M\u00e9d\u00e9cine exp\u00e9rimentale_, chap. ii,\n sect. 4.\n\n\nBernard\u2019s attitude is distinctly that of a positivist, and the general\ntone of his remarks as well as his attitude on many special points\nagrees with that of Comte. His conclusions regarding physiology are\nakin to those expressed by Comte concerning biology. Bernard excludes\nany metaphysical hypothesis such as the operation of a vital principle,\nand adheres strictly to physicochemical formulas. He accepts, however,\nComte\u2019s warning about the reduction of the higher to terms of the\nlower, or, in Spencerian phraseology, the explanation of the more\ncomplex by the less complex. Consequently, he carefully avoids the\nstatement that he desires to \u201creduce\u201d physiology to physics and\nchemistry. He makes no facile and light-hearted transition as did\nSpencer; on the contrary, he claims that the living has some specific\nquality which cannot be \u201creduced\u201d to other terms, and which cannot be\nsummed up in the formulae of physics or chemistry. The physiologist and\nthe medical practitioner must never overlook the fact that every living\nbeing forms an organism and an individuality. The physiologist,\ncontinues Bernard, must take notice of this unity or harmony of the\nwhole, even while he penetrates the interior to know the mechanism of\neach of its parts. The physicist and the chemist can ignore any notion\nof final causes in the facts they observe, but the physiologist must\nadmit a harmonious finality, a harmony pre-established in the organism,\nwhose actions form and express a unity and solidarity, since they\ngenerate one another. Life itself is _creation_; it is not capable of\nexpression merely in physico-chemical formulae. The creative character,\nwhich is its essence, never can be so expressed. Bernard postulated an\nabstract, _id\u00e9e directrice et cr\u00e9atrice_, presiding over the evolution\nof an organism. \u201c_Dans tout germe vivant, il y a une id\u00e9e cr\u00e9atrice qui\nse d\u00e9veloppe et se manifeste par l\u2019organisation. Pendant toute sa dur\u00e9e\nl\u2019\u00eatre vivant reste sous l\u2019influence de cette m\u00eame force vitale,\ncr\u00e9atrice, et la mort arrive lorsqu\u2019elle ne peut plus se r\u00e9aliser. Ici\ncomme partout, tout d\u00e9rive de l\u2019id\u00e9e, qui, seule, cr\u00e9e et dirige_.\u201d[12]\n\n [12] _Introduction \u00e0 l\u2019Etude de la M\u00e9d\u00e9cine exp\u00e9rimentale_, p.151 ff.\n\n\nThe positivist spirit is again very marked in the doctrines of\nBerthelot (1827-1907), another very great friend of Renan, who, in\naddition to being a Senator, and Minister of Education and of Foreign\nAffairs, held the Chair of Organic Chemistry at the Coll\u00e8ge de France.\nIn 1886 he published his volume, Science et Philosophie, which contains\nsome interesting and illuminating observations upon _La Science id\u00e9ale\net la Science positive_. Part of this, it may be noted, was written as\nearly as 1863, in correspondence with Renan, and as a reply to a letter\nof his of which we shall speak presently.[13] Berthelot states his case\nwith a clearness which merits quotation.\n\n [13] See the _Fragments_ of Renan, published 1876, pp 193-241.\n _Reponse de M. Berthelot_.\n\n\n\u201cPositive science,\u201d he says, \u201cseeks neither first causes nor the\nultimate goal of things. In order to link together a multitude of\nphenomena by one single law, general in character and conformable to\nthe nature of things, the human spirit has followed a simple and\ninvariable method. It has stated the facts in accordance with\nobservation and experience, compared them, extracted their relations,\nthat is the general facts, which have in turn been verified by\nobservation and experience, which verification constitutes their only\nguarantee of truth. A progressive generalisation, deduced from prior\nfacts and verified unceasingly by new observations, thus brings our\nknowledge from the plane of particular and popular facts to general\nlaws of an abstract and universal character. But, in the construction\nof this pyramid of science, everything from base to summit rests upon\nobservation and experience. It is one of the principles of positive\nscience that no reality can be established by a process of reasoning.\nThe universe cannot be grasped by a _priori_ methods.\u201d\n\nLike Comte, Berthelot believed in the progress of all knowledge through\na theological and metaphysical stage to a definitely scientific or\npositive era. The sciences are as yet young, and we cannot imagine the\ndevelopment and improvement, social and moral, which will accrue from\ntheir triumph in the future. For Berthelot, as for Renan, the idea of\nprogress was bound up essentially with the triumph of the scientific\nspirit. In a Discourse at the Sorbonne given in commemoration of the\nfiftieth anniversary of his being appointed Professor at the Coll\u00e8ge de\nFrance, we find this faith in science reiterated. \u201cTo-day,\u201d he remarks,\n\u201cScience claims a triple direction of societies, materially,\nintellectually and morally. By this fact the role of the men of\nscience, both as individuals and as a class, has unceasingly come to\nplay a great part in modern states.\u201d\n\nThese scientific men, Berthelot and Bernard, with whom Renan was on\nterms of friendship, had a large influence in the formation of his\nthought, after he had quitted the seminary and the Church. As a young\nman Renan possessed the positive spirit in a marked degree, and did not\nfail to disclose his enthusiasm for \u201cScience\u201d and for the scientific\nmethod. His book _L\u2019Avenir de la Science_, which we have already noted,\nwas written when he was only twenty-five, and under the immediate\ninfluence of the events of 1848, particularly the socialist spirit of\nSaint-Simon and the \u201corganising\u201d attitude of Auguste Comte. It did not,\nhowever, see publication until 1890, when the Empire had produced a\npessimistic temper in him, later accentuated by the Commune and the\nPrussian War. The dominant note of the whole work is the touching and\nalmost pathetic belief in Science, which leads the young writer to an\noptimism both in thought and in politics. \u201cScience\u201d constitutes for him\nthe all-in-all. Although he had just previously abandoned the seminary,\nhis priestly style remained with him to such a degree that even his\ntreatment of science is characterised by a mixture of the unction of\nthe _cur\u00e9_ and the subtilty of the dialectician. Levites were still to\nbe necessary to the people of Israel, but they were to be the priests\nof the most High, whose name, according to Renan, was \u201cScience.\u201d\n\nHis ardour for Science is not confined to this one book: it runs\nthrough all his writings. Prospero, a character who personifies\nrational thought in _L\u2019Eau de Jouvence_, one of Renan\u2019s _Drames\nphilosophiques_, expresses an ardent love for science continually. In\nhis preface to _Souvenirs d\u2019Enfance et de Jeunesse_ we find Renan upon\nthe same theme. Quaintly enough he not only praises the objectivity\nwhich is characteristic of the scientific point of view, but seems to\ndelight in its abstraction. The superiority of modern science consists,\nhe claims, in this very abstraction. But he is aware that the very\nindefatigability with which we fathom nature removes us, in a sense,\nfurther from her. He recognises how science leads away from the\nimmediacy of vital and close contact with nature herself. \u201cThis is,\nhowever, as it should be,\u201d asserts Renan, \u201cand let no one fear to\nprosecute his researches, for out of this merciless dissection comes\nlife.\u201d He does not stay to assure us, or to enlighten us, as to how\nthat life can be infused into the abstract facts which have resulted\nfrom the process of dissection. Fruitful and suggestive as many of his\npages are, they fail to approach the concrete difficulties which this\npassage mentions.\n\nWriting from Dinant in Brittany in 1863 to his friend, Berthelot, Renan\ngives his view of the Sciences of Nature and the Historical Sciences.\nThis letter, reprinted in his _Dialogues et Fragments philosophiques_,\nin 1876, expresses Renan\u2019s.views in a clear and simple form upon the\nplace of science in his mind and also upon the idea of progress, as for\nhim the two are intimately connected. Extreme confidence is expressed\nin the power of science. Renan at this time had written, but not\npublished, his _Avenir de la Science_. In a brief manner this letter\nsummarises much contained in the larger work. The point of view is\nsimilar. Science is to be the great reforming power.\n\nThe word \u201cScience\u201d is so constantly upon Renan\u2019s lips that we can see\nthat it has become an obsession with mm to employ it, or a device.\nCertainly Renan\u2019s extensive and ill-defined usage of it conceals grave\ndifficulties. One is tempted frequently to regard it as a synonym for\nphilosophy or metaphysics, a word which he dislikes. That does not,\nhowever, add to clearness, and Renan\u2019s usage of \u201cScience\u201d as a term\nconfuses both science and philosophy together. Even if this were not\nthe case, there is another important point to note\u2014 namely, that even\non a stricter interpretation Renan, by his wide use of the term,\nactually undermines the confidence in the natural sciences. For he\nembraces within the term \u201cScience\u201d not merely those branches of\ninvestigation which we term in general the sciences of nature, but also\nthe critical study of language, of history and literature. He expressly\nendeavours to show in the letter to Berthelot that true science must\ninclude the product of man\u2019s spirit and the record of the development\nof that spirit.\n\nRenan assumed quite definitely a positivist attitude to metaphysics.\n\u201cPhilosophy,\u201d he remarks, \u201cis not a separate science; it is one side of\nevery science. In the great optic pencil of human knowledge it is the\ncentral region where the rays meet in one and the same light.\u201d\nMetaphysical speculation he scorned, but he admitted the place for a\ncriticism of the human mind such as had been given by Kant in _The\nCritique of Pure Reason_.\n\nKantian also, in its professions at least, was the philosophy of\nVacherot, who stated that the aim of his work, _La M\u00e9taphysique et la\nScience_, was \u201cthe reconciliation of metaphysics with science.\u201d[14]\nThese dialogues between a philosopher and a man of science, for of such\ndiscussions the book is composed, never really help us to get close to\nthe problem, for Vacherot\u2019s Kantianism is a profession which merely\ncovers an actual positivism. His metaphysical doctrines are\nsuperimposed on a severe and rigid naturalism, but are kept from\nconflict with them, or even relation with them, by being allotted to a\ndistant limbo of pure ideals, outside the world which science displays\nto us.\n\n [14] See particularly his statements to this effect in his Preface,\n pp. xxxvii-xl.\n\n\nTaine, in spite of his severely positive attitude, was a strong\nchampion of metaphysics. The sciences needed, he claimed, a science of\nfirst principles, a metaphysic. Without it, \u201cthe man of science is\nmerely a _man\u0153uvre_ and the artist a _dilettante_.\u201d The positive\nsciences he re- garded as inferior types of analysis. Above them \u201cis a\nsuperior analysis which is metaphysics, and which reduces or takes up\nthese laws of the sciences into a universal formula.\u201d This higher\nanalysis, however, does not give the lie to the others: it completes\nthem.\n\nIt was indeed a belief and hope of Taine that the sciences will be more\nand more perfected until they can each be expressed in a kind of\ngeneric formula, which in turn may be capable of expression in some\nsingle formula. This single law is being sought by science and\nmetaphysic, although it must belong to the latter rather than to the\nformer. From it, as from a spring, proceeds, according to Taine, the\neternal roll of events and the infinite sea of things.\n\nTaine\u2019s antagonism to the purely empirical schools centres round his\nconception of the law of causality. He disagrees with the assertion\nthat this law is a synthetic, a _posteriori_ judgment, a habit, as Hume\nsaid, or a mechanical _attente_, as Mill thought, or a generalisation\nof the sensation of effort which we feel in ourselves, as was suggested\nby Maine de Biran. Yet he also opposes Kant\u2019s doctrine, in which\ncausality is regarded as a synthetic _a priori_ judgment. His own\ncriticism of Hume and Kant was directed to denial of the elements of\nheterogeneity in experience, which are so essential to Hume\u2019s view, and\nto a denial of the distinction maintained by Kant between logical and\ncausal relations. Taine considered that all might be explained by\nlogical relations, that all experience might some day be expressed in\none law, one formula. The _more geometrico_ of Spinoza and the\n\u201cuniversal mathematic\u201d of Descartes reappear in Taine. He even essays\nin _L\u2019Intelligence_ to equate the principle of causality (_principe de\nraison explicative_) with that of identity.\n\nHis attempt to reduce the principle of causality to that of identity\ndid not succeed very well, and from the nature of the case this was to\nbe expected. As Fouill\u00e9e well points out in his criticism of Taine,\nboth in _La Libert\u00e9 et le D\u00e9terminisme_ and the concluding pages of his\nearlier work on Plato,[15] the notion of difference and heterogeneity\nwhich arises in the action of cause and effect can never be reducible\nto a mere identity, for the notion of identity has nothing in common\nwith that of difference. Differences cannot be ignored; variety and\nchange are undeniable facts of experience. Fouill\u00e9e here touches the\nweak spot of Taine\u2019s doctrine. In spite of a seemingly great power of\ncriticism there is an underlying dogmatism in his work, and the chief\nof those dogmas, which he does not submit to criticism, is the\nassertion of the universal necessity of all things. To this postulate\nhe gives a false air of objectivity. He avoids stating why we do\nobjectify causality, and he diverts discussion from the position that\nthis postulate may itself be subjective.\n\n [15] Vol. 4.\n\n\nThe particular bearing of Taine\u2019s psychology upon the general problem\nof knowledge is interesting. He defines perception in _L\u2019Intelligence_\nas _une hallucination vraie_. His doctrine of the \u201cdouble aspect,\u201d\nphysical and mental, recalls to mind the Modes of Spinoza. In his\nattitude to the difficult problem of movement and thought he rests in\nthe dualism of Spinoza, fluctuating and not enunciating his doctrine\nclearly. The primacy of movement to thought he abandoned as too\nmechanical a doctrine, and regarded the type of existence as mental in\ncharacter. Taine thus passes from the materialism of Hobbes to the\nidealism of Leibnitz. \u201cThe physical world is reducible to a system of\nsigns, and no more is needed for its construction and conception than\nthe materials of the moral world.\u201d\n\nWhen we feel ourselves constrained to admit the necessity of certain\ntruths, if we are inclined to regard this as due to the character of\nour minds themselves (_notre structure mentale_), as Kant maintained,\nTaine reminds us that we must admit that our mind adapts itself to its\nenvironment. He here adopts the view of Spencer, a thinker who seems to\nhave had far more influence upon the Continent than in his own country.\nAlthough Taine thus reposes his epistemology upon this basis, he does\nnot answer the question which the Kantian can still put to him\u2014namely,\n\u201cHow do we know the structure of things?\u201d He is unable to escape from\nthe difficulty of admitting either that it is from experience, an\nadmission which his anti-empirical attitude forbids him to make (and\nwhich would damage his dogma of universal logical necessity), or that\nour knowledge is obtained by analysing our own thoughts, in which case\nhe leaves us in a vicious circle of pure subjectivity from which there\nis no means of escape.\n\nThe truth is that Taine vainly tried to establish a phenomenal\ndoctrine, not purely empirical in character like that of Hume, but a\nphenomenalism wedded to a necessity which is supposed to be\nself-explanatory. Such a notion of necessity, however, is formal and\nabstract. Rather than accept Taine\u2019s view of a law, a formula, an\n\u201ceternal axiom\u201d at the basis of things, we are obliged to postulate an\nactivity, creative in character, of whose action universal laws are but\nexpressions. Law, formula, axiom without action are mere abstractions\nwhich can of themselves produce nothing.\n\nTaine\u2019s positivism, however, was not so rigid as to exclude a belief in\nthe value of metaphysics. It is this which distinguishes him from the\nComtian School. We see in him the confidence in science complemented by\nan admission of metaphysics, equivalent to a turning of \u201cpositivism\u201d in\nscience and philosophy against itself. Much heavier onslaughts upon the\nsovereignty of science came, however, from the thinker who is the great\nlogician and metaphysician of our period, Renouvier. To him and to\nCournot we now turn.\n\nII\n\nWhile Taine had indeed maintained the necessity of a metaphysic, he\nshared to a large degree the general confidence in science displayed by\nComte, Bernard, Berthelot and Renan. But the second and third groups of\nthinkers into which we have divided our period took up first a critical\nattitude to science and, finally, a rather hostile one.\n\nCournot marks the transition between Comte and Renouvier. His _Essai\nsur les Fondements de nos Connaissances et sur les Caract\u00e8res de la\nCritique philosophique_ contains some very calm and careful thought on\nthe relation of science and philosophy, which is the product of a\nsincere and well-balanced mind.[16] He inherits from the positivists an\nintense respect for scientific knowledge, and remarks at the outset\nthat he is hostile to any philosophy which would be so foolish as to\nattempt to ignore the work of the modern sciences.\n\n [16] See in particular the second chapter of vol. 2, _Du Contraste de\n la Science et de la Philosophie et de la Philosophie des Sciences_,\n pp. 216-255.\n\n\nHis work _Mat\u00e9rialisme, Vitalisme, Rationalisme_ is a striking example\nof this effort on Cournot\u2019s part, being devoted to a study of the use\nwhich can be made in philosophy of the data afforded by the sciences.\nSomewhat after the manner of Comte, Cournot looks upon the various\nsciences as a hierarchy ranging from mathematics to sociology. Yet he\nreminds the scientists of the insufficiency of their point of view, for\nthe sciences, rightly pursued, lead on to philosophy. He laments,\nhowever, the confusion of the two, and thinks that such confusion is\n\u201cpartly due to the fact that in the realm of speculations which are\nnaturally within the domain of the philosopher, there are to be found\nhere and there certain theories which can actually be reduced to a\nscientific form\u201d[17] He offers, as an instance of this, the theory of\nthe syllogism, which has affinities to algebraical equations\u2014but this\ninterpenetration should not cause us, he argues, to abandon or to lose\nsight of the distinction between science and philosophy.\n\n [17] _Essai sur les Fondements de nos Connaissances_, vol. 2, p. 224.\n\n\nThis distinction, according to Cournot, lies in the fact that science\nhas for its object that which can be measured, and that which can be\nreduced to a rigorous chain or connection. In brief, science is\ncharacterised by quantity. Philosophy, on the other hand, concerns\nitself with quality, for it endeavours not so much to measure as to\nappreciate.\n\nCournot reminds the apostles of science that quantity, however\nintimately bound up with reality it may be, is not the essence of that\nreality itself. He is afraid, too, that the neglect of philosophy by\nscience may cause the latter to develop along purely utilitarian lines.\nAs an investigation of reality, science is not ultimate. It has limits\nby the fact that it is concerned with measurement, and thus is excluded\nfrom those things which are qualitative and incapable of quantitative\nexpression. Science, moreover, has its roots in philosophy by virtue of\nthe metaphysical postulates which it utilises as its basis. Physics and\ngeometry, Cournot maintains, both rest upon definitions which owe their\norigin to speculative thought rather than to experience, yet these\nsciences claim an absolute value for themselves and for those\npostulates as being descriptions of reality in an ultimate sense.\n\nFollowing out his distinction between philosophy and the sciences,\nCournot claims in a Kantian manner that while the latter are products\nof the human understanding the former is due to the operation of\nreason. This apparent dualism Cournot does not shrink from maintaining;\nindeed, he makes it an argument for his doctrine of discontinuity. The\ndevelopment of a science involves a certain breach with reality, for\nthe progress of the science involves abstraction, which ever becomes\nmore complicated. Cournot here brings out the point which we noticed\nwas stressed by Renan.[18]\n\n [18] See above, p. 105.\n\n\nReason produces in us the idea of order, and this \u201cidea of order and of\nreason in things is the basis of philosophic probability, of induction\nand analogy.\u201d[19] This has important bearings upon the unity of science\nand upon the conception of causality which it upholds. In a careful\nexamination of the problems of induction and analogy, Cournot\nemphasises the truth that there are facts which cannot be fitted into a\nmeasured or logical sequence of events. Reality cannot be fitted into a\nformula or into concepts, for these fail to express the infinite\nvariety and richness of the reality which displays itself to us.\nScience can never be adequate to life, with its pulsing spontaneity and\nfreedom. It is philosophy with its _vue d\u2019ensemble_ which tries to\ngrasp and to express this concreteness, which the sciences, bound to\ntheir systematic connection of events within separate compartments,\nfail to reach or to show us. Referring to the ideas of beauty and of\ngoodness, Cournot urges a \u201ctransrationalism,\u201d as he calls it, which,\nwhile loyal to the rational requirements of science, will enable us to\ntake the wider outlook assumed by philosophy.[20]\n\n [19] _Essai sur les Fondements de nos Connaissances_, p. 384.\n\n\n [20] The parallelism of some of Cournot\u2019s ideas here with those\n expressed by Bergson, although they have been enunciated by the later\n thinker in a more decided manner, is so obvious as hardly to need to\n be indicated.\n\n\nLike Cournot, the author of the _Essais de Critique g\u00e9n\u00e9rale_ was a\nkeen antagonist of all those who sought to deify Science. It was indeed\nthis which led Renouvier to give this title to his great work, the\nfirst part of which was published at a time when the confidence in\nScience appeared to be comparatively unassailed. We find him defending\nphilosophy as against the scientists and others by an insistence upon\nits critical function.\n\nIn examining Comte\u2019s positivism in his work _Histoire et Solution des\nProbl\u00e8mes m\u00e9taphysiques_, Renouvier points out that its initial idea is\na false one\u2014namely, that philosophy can be constituted by an assembling\ntogether of the sciences.[21] Such an assembly does not, he objects,\nmake a system. Each science has its own postulates, its own data, and\nScience as a whole unity of thought or knowledge does not exist. He\nattacks at the same time the calm presumption of the positivist who\nmaintains that the scientific stage is the final and highest\ndevelopment. Renouvier is considerably annoyed at this unwarranted\ndogmatism and assumed air of finality.\n\n [21] Book X.: _De l\u2019Etat actuel de la Philosophie en France_, chap.\n 1., _De l\u2019Aboutissement des Esprits au Positivisme_, pp. 416-417.\n\n\nOwing to the excellent training he had received at the Ecole\nPolytechnique, and by his own profound study, Renouvier was able on\nmany technical points to meet the scientists on their own ground. His\nthird _Essai de Critique g\u00e9n\u00e9rale_ is devoted to a study of \u201cthe\nPrinciples of Nature,\u201d in which he criticises many of the principles\nand assumptions of mechanism, while many pages of his two previous\n_Essais_ are concerned with the discussion of questions intimately\naffecting the sciences.[22]\n\n [22] This is particularly noticeable in the matter printed as\n appendices to his chapters. (_Cf_. the _Logic_, vol 2.)\n\n\nAn important section of his second Essay, _Psychologie rationnelle_,\ndeals with the \u201cClassification of the Sciences.\u201d[23] Renouvier there\npoints out that the attempt to classify the sciences in accordance with\ntheir degrees of certainty ends in failure. All of them, when loyal to\ntheir own principles, endeavour to display equal certainty. By loyalty\nRenouvier shows that he means adherence to an examination of certain\nclasses of phenomena, the observation of facts and laws, with the\nproposal of hypotheses, put forward frankly as such. He draws a line\nbetween the logical and the physical sciences\u2014a division which he\nclaims is not only a division according to the nature of their data,\nbut also according to method. Following another division, we may draw a\nline between sciences which deal with objects which are organic, living\ncreatures, and those which are not.\n\n [23] Vol. 2, chap. xviii., _De la Certitude des Sciences et leur\n Classification rationnelle_, pp. 139-186, including later observations\n on Spencer.\n\n\nRenouvier\u2019s line is not, it must be remembered in this connection, a\npurely imaginary one. It is a real line, an actual gap. For him there\nis a real discontinuity in the universe. Taine\u2019s doctrine of a\nuniversal explanation, of a rigid unity and continuity, is, for\nRenouvier, anathema, _c\u2019est la math\u00e9matisation a l\u2019outrance_. This\nappears most markedly in the pages which he devotes to the\nconsideration of _la synth\u00e8se totale_.\n\nAn important section of his _Trait\u00e9 de Logique_ (the first _Essai de\nCritique g\u00e9n\u00e9rale_) deals with the problem of this Total Synthesis of\nall phenomena.[24] This is a conception which Renouvier affirms to be\nunwarrantable and, indeed, in the last analysis impossible. A general\nsynthesis, an organisation or connected hierarchy of sciences, is a\nfond hope, an illusion only of a mind which can overlook the real\ndiscontinuity which exists between things and between groups of things.\n\n [24] Vol. I, pp. 107-115, and also vol. 2, pp. 202-245.\n\n\nHe sees in it the fetish of the Absolute and the Infinite and the lure\nof pantheism, a doctrine to which he opposes his \u201cPersonalism.\u201d He\nreminds the scientists that personality is the great factor to which\nall knowledge is related, and that all knowledge is relative. A law is\na law, but the guarantee of its permanence is not a law. It is no more\neasy, claims Renouvier, to say why phenomena do not stop than it is to\nknow why they have begun. Laws indeed abide, but \u201cnot apart from\nconscious personalities who affirm them.\u201d[25] Further, attacking the\nself-confident and dogmatic attitude in the scientists, Renouvier\nreminds them that it is impossible to demonstrate _every_ proposition;\nand in an important note on \u201cInduction and the Sciences\u201d[26] he points\nout that induction always implies a certain _croyance_. This is no\npeculiar, mystical thing; it is a fact, he remarks, which colours all\nthe interesting acts of human personality. He here approaches Cournot\nin observing that all speculation is attended by a certain coefficient\nof doubt or uncertainty and so becomes really rational belief. With\nCournot, too, Renouvier senses the importance of analogy and\nprobability in connection with hypotheses in the world of nature and of\nmorals. In short, he recognises as central the problem of freedom.\n\n [25] _Logique_, vol. 2, p. 321.\n\n\n [26] Note B to chap. xxxv. of the _Logique_, vol. 2, p. 13.\n\n\nRenouvier attacks Comte\u2019s classification or \u201chierarchy\u201d of the sciences\nas mischievous and inexact. It is not based, he claims, upon any\ndistinction in method, nor of data. It is not true that the sciences\nare arranged by Comte in an order where they successively imply one\nanother, nor in an order in which they have come to be constituted as\n\u201cpositive\u201d.[27]\n\n [27] This outburst of attack is a sample of Renouvier\u2019s usual attitude\n to Positivism. (_Deuxi\u00e8me Essai_, vol. 2, pp. 166-170.)\n\n\nHe justifies to the scientist the formulation of hypothesis as a\nnecessary working method of co-ordinating in a provisional manner\nvarying phenomena. Many hypotheses and inductions of science are,\nhowever, unjustifiable from a strictly logical standpoint, Renouvier\nreminds us. His chief objection, however, is that those hypotheses and\ninductions are put forward so frequently as certainties by a science\nwhich is dogmatic and surpasses its limits.\n\nScience, Renouvier claims, does not give us a knowledge of the\nabsolute, but an understanding of the relative. It is in the light of\nhis doctrine of relativity and of the application of the law of number\nthat he criticises many of the attitudes adopted by the scientists.\nWhatever savours of the Absolute or the Infinite he opposes, and his\nview of cause depends on this. He scorns the fiction of an infinite\nregress, and affirms real beginnings to various classes of phenomena.\nCausality is not to be explained, he urges in his _Nouvelle\nMonadologie_, save by a harmony. He differs from Leibnitz, however, in\nclaiming in the interests of freedom that this harmony is not\npre-established. In meeting the doctrine of the reduction of the\ncomplex to the simple, Renouvier cites the case of \u201creducing\u201d sound,\nheat, light and electricity to movement. This may be superficially\ncorrect as a generality, but Renouvier aptly points out that it\noverlooks the fact that, although they may all be abstractly\ncharacterised as movement, yet there are differences between them as\nmovements which correspond to the differences of sensation they arouse\nin us.\n\nRenouvier upholds real differences, real beginnings, and, it must be\nadded, a reality behind and beyond the appearances of nature. His\n_Monadologie_ admits that \u201cwe can continue to explain nature\nmathematically and mechanically, provided we recognise that it is an\nexternal appearance\u2014that thought, mind or spirit is at the heart of\nit.\u201d This links Renouvier to the group of new spiritualists. His\nattitude to science is akin to theirs. He does not fear science when it\nconfines itself to its proper limits and recognises these. It has no\nquarrel with philosophy nor philosophy with it. Advance in science\ninvolves, he believes, an advance also in theology and in metaphysics.\n\nThe sciences are responsible for working out the laws determining the\ndevelopment of the Universe. But between Science, an ideal unachieved,\nand the sciences which in themselves are so feeble, imperfect and\nlimited, Renouvier claims that General Criticism, or Philosophy, has\nits place. \u201cIn spite of the discredit into which philosophy has fallen\nin these days, it can and ought to exist. Its object has been always\nthe investigation of God, man, liberty, immortality, the fundamental\nlaws of the sciences. \u2018All these intimately connected and\ninterpenetrating problems comprise the domain of philosophy.\u201d In those\ncases where no science is possible, this seeming impossibility must\nitself be investigated, and philosophy remains as a \u201cGeneral Criticism\u201d\n(_Critique g\u00e9n\u00e9rale_) of our knowledge. \u201cIt is this notion,\u201d he says,\n\u201cwhich I desired to indicate by banishing the word \u2018Philosophy\u2019 from\nthe title of my Essays. The name ought to change when the method\nchanges.\u201d[28] Thus Renouvier seeks to establish a \u201ccritique\u201d midway\nbetween scepticism and dogmatism, and endeavours to found a philosophy\nwhich recognises at one and the same time the demands of _science et\nconscience_.\n\n [28] _Logique_, vol. 2, p. 352.\n\nIII\n\nOn turning to the spiritualist current of thought we find it, like the\nneo-criticism, no less keen in its criticism of science. The inadequacy\nof the purely scientific attitude is the recurring theme from Ravaisson\nto Boutroux, Bergson and Le Roy. The attitude assumed by Ravaisson\ncoloured the whole of the subsequent development of the new\nspiritualist doctrines, and not least their bearing upon the problem of\nscience and its relation to metaphysics.\n\nMechanism, Ravaisson pointed out, quoting the classical author upon\nwhom he had himself written so brilliantly (Aristotle), does not\nexplain itself, for it implies a \u201cprime mover,\u201d not itself in motion,\nbut which produces movement by spiritual activity. Ravaisson also\nrefers to the testimony of Leibnitz, who, while agreeing that all is\nmechanical, carefully added to this statement one to the effect that\nmechanism itself has a principle which must be looked for outside\nmatter and which is the object of metaphysical research. This spiritual\nreality is found only, according to Ravaisson, in the power of goodness\nand beauty\u2014that is to say, in a reality which is not non-scientific but\nrather ultra-scientific. There are realities, he claims, to which\nscience does not attain.\n\nThe explanation of nature presupposes soul or spirit. It is true,\nRavaisson admits, that the physical and chemical sciences consider\nthemselves independent of metaphysics; true also that the metaphysician\nin ignoring the study of those sciences omits much from his estimate of\nthe spirit. Indeed, he cannot well dispense with the results of the\nsciences. That admission, however, does not do away with the\npossibility of a true \u201capologia\u201d for metaphysics. To Newton\u2019s sarcastic\nremark, \u201cPhysics beware of metaphysics,\u201d Hegel replied cogently that\nthis was equivalent to saying, \u201cPhysics, keep away from thought.\u201d\nSpirit, however, cannot be omitted from the account; it is the\ncondition of all that is, the light by which we see that there is such\na thing as a material universe. This is the central point of\nRavaisson\u2019s philosophy. The sciences of nature may be allowed and\nencouraged to work diligently upon their own principles, but the very\nfact that they are individual sciences compels them to admit that they\nview the whole \u201cpiecemeal\u201d. Philosophy seeks to interpret the whole as\na whole. Ravaisson quotes Pascal\u2019s saying, \u201c_Il faut avoir une pens\u00e9e\nde derri\u00e8re la t\u00eate et juger de tout par l\u00e0_.\u201d This _pens\u00e9e de derri\u00e8re\nla t\u00eate_, says Ravaisson, while not preventing the various sciences\nfrom speaking in their own tongue, is just the metaphysical or\nphilosophical idea of the whole.\n\nIt is claimed, Aristotle used to say, that mathematics have absolutely\nnothing in common with the idea of the good. \u201cBut order, proportion,\nsymmetry, are not these great forms of beauty?\u201d asks Ravaisson. For him\nthere is spirit at the heart of things, an activity, _un feu primitif\nqui est l\u2019\u00e2me_, which expresses itself in thought, in will and in love.\nIt is a fire which does not burn itself out, because it is enduring\nspirit, an eternal cause, the absolute substance is this spiritual\nreality. Where the sciences fall short is that they fail to show that\nnature is but the refraction of this spirit. This is a fact, however,\nwhich both religion and philosophy grasp and uphold.\n\nThese criticisms were disturbing for those minds who found entire\nsatisfaction in Science or rather in the sciences, but they were\nsomewhat general. Ravaisson\u2019s work inculcated a spirit rather than\nsustained a dialectic. Its chief value lay in the inspiration which it\nimparted to subsequent thinkers who endeavoured to work out his general\nideas with greater precision.\n\nIt was this task which Lachelier set himself in his _Induction_. He had\nkeenly felt the menace of science, as had Janet;[29] he had appreciated\nthe challenge offered to it by Ravaisson\u2019s ideas. Moreover, Lachelier\u2019s\nacute mind discovered the crucial points upon which the new\nspiritualism could base its attack upon the purely scientific\ndogmatism. Whatever Leibnitz might have said, creative spontaneity of\nthe spirit, as it was acclaimed by Ravaisson, could not easily be\nfitted into the mechanism and determinism upheld by the sciences.\nRavaisson had admitted the action of efficient causes in so far as he\nadmitted the action of mechanism, which is but the outcome of these\ncauses. In this way he endeavoured to satisfy the essential demands of\nthe scientific attitude to the universe. But recognising the inadequacy\nof this attitude he had upheld the reality of final causes and thus\nopposed to the scientists a metaphysical doctrine akin to the religious\nattitude of Hellenism and Christianity.\n\n [29] We refer here to the quotation from Janet\u2019s _Probl\u00e8mes du XIXe\n Si\u00e8cle_, given above on p. 95. Janet himself wrote on _Final Causes_\n but not Wlth the depth or penetration of Lachelier.\n\n\nLachelier saw that the important point of Ravaisson\u2019s doctrine lay in\nthe problem of these two types of causality. His thesis is therefore\ndevoted to the examination of efficient and final causes. This little\nwork of Lachelier marks a highly important advance in the development\nof the spiritualist philosophy. He clarifies and re-affirms more\nprecisely the position indicated by Ravaisson. Lacheher tears up the\ntreaty of compromise which was drafted by Leibnitz to meet the rival\ndemands of science with its efficient causes and philosophy with its\nfinal causes. The world of free creative spontaneity of the spirit\ncannot be regarded, Lachelier claims (and this is his vital point), as\nmerely the complement of, or the reflex from, the world of mechanism\nand determinism.\n\nHe works out in his thesis the doctrine that efficient causes can be\ndeduced from the formal laws of thought. This was Taine\u2019s position, and\nit was the limit of Taine\u2019s doctrine. Lachelier goes further and\nundermines Taine\u2019s theories by upholding final causes, which he shows\ndepend upon the conception of a totality, a whole which is capable of\ncreating its parts. This view of the whole is a philosophical\nconception to which the natural sciences never rise, and which they\ncannot, by the very nature of their data and their methods, comprehend.\nYet it is only such a conception which can supply any rational basis\nfor the unity of phenomena and of experience. Only by seeing the\nvariety of all phenomena in the light of such an organic unity can we\nfind any meaning in the term universe, and only thus, continues\nLachelier, only on the principle of a rational and universal order and\non the reality of final causes, can we base our inductions. The\n\u201cuniformity of nature,\u201d that fetish of the scientists which, as\nLachelier well points out, is merely the empirical regularity of\nphenomena, offers no adequate basis for a single induction.\n\nLachelier developed his doctrines further in the article, _Psychologie\net M\u00e9taphysique_. We can observe in it the marks which so profoundly\ndistinguish the new spiritualism from the old, as once taught by\nCousin. The old spiritualism had no place between its psychology and\nits metaphysics for the natural sciences. Indeed it was quite incapable\nof dealing with the problem which their existence and success\npresented, and so it chose to ignore them as far as possible. The new\nspiritualism, of which Lachelier is perhaps the profoundest speculative\nmind, not only is acquainted with the place and results of the\nsciences, but it feels itself equal to a criticism of them, an advance\nwhich marks a highly important development in philosophy.\n\nIn this article Lachelier endeavours to pass beyond the standpoint of\nCousin, and in so doing we see not only the influence of Ravaisson\u2019s\nideas of the creative activity of the spirit, but also of the\ndiscipline of the Kantian criticism, with which Lachelier, unlike many\nof his contemporaries in France at that time, was well acquainted.\n\nHe first shows that the study of psychology reveals to us the human\npowers of sensation, feeling and will. These are the immediate data of\nconsciousness. Another element, however, enters into consciousness, not\nas these three, a definite content, but as a colouring of the whole.\nThis other element is \u201cobjectivity,\u201d an awareness or belief that the\nworld without exists and continues to exist independently of our\nobservation of it. Lachelier combats, however, the Kantian conception\nof the \u201cthing-in-itself.\u201d If, he argues, the world around us appears as\na reality which is independent of our perception, it is _not_ because\nit is a \u201cthing-in-itself,\u201d but rather it appears as independent because\nwe, possessing conscious intelligence, succeed in making it an object\nof our thought, and thus save it from the mere subjectivity which\ncharacterises our sense-experience. It is upon this fact, Lachelier\nrightly insists, that all our science reposes. A theory of knowledge as\nproposed by Taine, based solely on sensation and professing belief in\n_hallucination vraie_, is itself a contradiction and an abuse of\nlanguage. \u201cIf thought is an illusion,\u201d remarks Lachelier, \u201cwe must\nsuppress all the sciences.\u201d[30]\n\n [30] _Psychologie et M\u00e9taphisique_, p.151.(See especially the passages\n on pp.150-158.)\n\n\nHe then proceeds to show that if we admit thought to be the basis of\nour knowledge of the world, that is, of our sciences, then we admit\nthat our sciences are themselves connstructions, based upon a\nsynthetic, constructive, creative activity of our mind or spirit. For\nour thought is not merely another \u201cthing\u201d added to the world of things\noutside us. Our thought is not a given and predetermined datum, it is\n\u201ca living dialectic,\u201d a creative activity, a self-creative process,\nwhich is synthetic, and not merely analytic in character. \u201cThought,\u201d he\nsays, \u201ccan rest upon itself, while everything else can only rest upon\nit; the ultimate _point d\u2019appui_ of all truth and of all existence is\nto be found in the absolute spontaneity of the spirit.\u201d[31] Here,\nLachelier maintains, lies the real _a priori_; here, too, is the very\nimportant passage from psychology to metaphysics.\n\n [31] _Psychologie et M\u00e9taphysique_, p. 158.\n\n\nFinally his treatment of the problems of knowledge and of the\nfoundations of science leads him to reemphasise not only the reality of\nspirit but its spontaneity. He recognises with Cournot and Renouvier\nthat the vital problem for science and philosophy is that of freedom.\nThe nature of existence is for Lachelier a manifestation of spirit, and\nis seen in will, in necessity and in freedom. It is important to note\nthat for him it is _all_ these simultaneously. \u201cBeing,\u201d he remarks in\nconcluding his brilliant essay,[32] \u201cis not first, a blind necessity,\nthen a will which must be for ever bound down in advance to necessity\nand, lastly, a freedom which would merely be able to recognise such\nnecessity and such a bound will; being is entirely free, in so far as\nit is self-creative; it is entirely an expression of will, in so far as\nit creates itself in the form of something concrete and real; it is\nalso entirely an expression of necessity, in so far as its\nself-creation is intelligible and gives an account of itself.\u201d\n\n [32] _Ibid_., p. 170.\n\n\nAt this stage something in the nature of a temporary \u201cset-back\u201d is\ngiven to the flow of the spiritualist current by Fouillee\u2019s attitude,\nwhich takes a different line from that of Ravaisson and Lachelier. The\nattitude towards Science, which we find adopted by Fouillee, is\ndetermined by his two general principles, that of reconcilation, and\nhis own doctrine of _id\u00e9es-forces_. His conciliatory spirit is well\nseen in the fact that, although he has a great respect for science and\ninherits many of the qualities contained in Taine\u2019s philosophy,\nparticularly the effort to maintain a regular continuity and solidarity\nin the development of reality, nevertheless he is imbued with the\nspirit of idealism which characterises all this group of thinkers. The\nresult is a mixture of Platonism and naturalism, and to this he himself\nconfesses in his work, _Le Mouvement id\u00e9aliste et la R\u00e9action contre la\nScience positive_, where he expresses a desire \u201cto bring back Plato\u2019s\nideas from heaven to earth, and so to make idealism consonant with\nnaturalism.\u201d[33]\n\n [33] _Le Mouvement id\u00e9aliste el la R\u00e9action contre la Science\n positive_, p. xxi.\n\n\nFouill\u00e9e claims to take up a position midway between the materialists\nand the idealists. Neither standpoint is, in his view, adequate to\ndescribe reality. He is particularly opposed to the materialistic and\nmechanistic thought of the English Evolutionary School, as presented by\nSpencer and Huxley, with its pretensions to be scientific. Fouillee\naccepts, with them, the notion of evolution, but he disagrees entirely\nwith Spencer\u2019s attempt to refer everything to mechanism, the mechanism\nof matter in motion. In any case, Fouill\u00e9e claims, movement is a very\nslender and one-sided element of experience upon which to base our\ncharacterisation of all reality, for the idea of motion arises only\nfrom our visual and tactual experience. He revolts from the\nepiphenomenalism of Huxley as from a dire heresy. Consciousness cannot\nbe regarded as a mere \u201cflash in the pan.\u201d Even science must admit that\nall phenomena are to be defined by their relation to, and action upon,\nother phenomena. Consciousness, so regarded, will be seen, he claims,\nas a unique power, possessing the property of acting upon matter and of\ninitiating movement. It is itself a factor, and a very vital one, in\nthe evolutionary process. It is no mere reflex or passive\nrepresentation. On this point of the irreducibility of the mental life\nand the validity of its action, Fouill\u00e9e parts company with Taine. On\nthe other hand, he disagrees with the idealistic school of thought,\nwhich upholds a pure intellectualism and for whom thought is the\naccepted characterisation of reality. This, complains Fouill\u00e9e, is as\nmuch an abstraction and a one-sided view as that of Spencer.\n\nIn this manner Fouill\u00e9e endeavours to \u201crectify the scientific\nconception of evolution\u201d by his doctrine of _id\u00e9es-forces_. \u201cThere is,\u201d\nhe says,[34] \u201cin every idea a commencement of action, and even of\nmovement, which tends to persist and to increase like an _\u00e9lan_. . . .\nEvery idea is already a force.\u201d Psychologically it is seen in the\nactive, conative or appetitive aspect of consciousness. To think of a\nthing involves already, in some measure, a tendency toward it, to\ndesire it. Physiologically considered, _id\u00e9es-forces_ are found to\noperate, not mechanically, but by a vital solidarity which is much more\nthan mere mechanism, and which unites the inner consciousness to the\nouter physical fact of movement. From a general philosophical point of\nview the doctrine of _id\u00e9es-forces_ establishes the irreducibility of\nthe mental, and the fact that, so far from the mental being a kind of\nphosphorescence produced as a result of the evolutionary process, it is\na prime factor in that evolution, of which mechanism is only a symbol.\nHere Fouill\u00e9e rises almost to the spiritualism of Ravaisson. Mechanism,\nhe declares, is, after all, but a manner of representing to ourselves\nthings in space and time. Scientists speak of forces, but the real\nforces are ideas, and other so-called \u201cforces\u201d are merely analogies\nwhich we have constructed, based upon the inner mental feeling of\neffort, tendency, desire and will.[35]\n\n [34] _La Libert\u00e9 et le D\u00e9terminisme_, p. 97, 4e ed.\n\n\n [35] This was a point upon which Maine de Biran had insisted. (See p.\n 20.)\n\n\nThe scientists have too often, as Fouill\u00e9e well points in his work on\n_L\u2019Evolutionnisme des Id\u00e9es-forces_, regarded the concept of Evolution\nas all-sufficing, as self-explanatory. Philosophy, however, cannot\naccept such dogmatism from science, and asserts that evolution is\nitself a result and not in itself a cause. With such a view Fouill\u00e9e is\nfound ultimately in the line of the general development of the\nspiritual philosophy continuing the hostility to science as ultimate or\nall-sufficing. Further developments of this attitude are seen in\nBoutroux and in Bergson.\n\nIn the work of Boutroux we find a continuation of that type of\ncriticism of science which was a feature in Ravaisson and Lachelier. He\nhas also affinities with Renouvier (and, we may add, with Comte),\nbecause of his insistence upon the discontinuity of the sciences; upon\nthe element of \u201cnewness\u201d found in each which prevents the higher being\ndeduced from the lower, or the superior explained by reference to the\ninferior. Boutroux opposes Spencer\u2019s doctrines and is a keen antagonist\nof Taine and his claim to deduce all from one formula. Such a notion as\nthat of Taine is quite absurd, according to Boutroux, for there is no\nnecessary bond between one and another science. This is Boutroux\u2019s main\npoint in _La Contingence des Lois de la Nature_.\n\nBy a survey of laws of various types, logical, mathematical,\nmechanical, physical, chemical, biological, psychological and\nsociological, Boutroux endeavours to show that they are constructions\nbuilt up from facts. Just as nature offers to the scientist facts for\ndata, so the sciences themselves offer these natural laws as data to\nthe philosopher, for his constructed explanation of things which is\nmetaphysics or philosophy.\n\n\u201cIn the actual condition of our knowledge,\u201d he remarks, \u201cscience is not\none, but multiple; science, conceived as embracing all the sciences, is\na mere abstraction.\u201d This is a remark which recalls Renouvier\u2019s witty\nsaying, \u201cI should very much like to meet this person I hear so much\nabout, called \u2018science.\u2019\u201d We have only sciences, each working after its\nown manner upon a small portion of reality. Man has a thirst for\nknowledge, and he sees, says Boutroux, in the world an \u201censemble\u201d of\nfacts of infinite variety. These facts man endeavours to observe,\nanalyse, and describe with increasing exactness. Science, he points\nout, is just this description.\n\nIt is futile to attempt a resolution of all things into the principle\nof identity. \u201cThe world is full of a number of things,\u201d and, therefore,\nargues Boutroux, the formula A = B can never be strictly and absolutely\ntrue. \u201cNature never offers to us identities, but only resemblances.\u201d\nThis has important bearing upon the law of causality, of which the\nsciences make so much. For there is such a degree of heterogeneity in\nthe things to which the most elementary and general laws of physics and\nchemistry are applied that it is impossible to say that the consequent\nis proportional to the antecedent\u2014that is to say, it is impossible to\nwork out absolutely the statement that an effect is the unique result\nof a certain invariable cause. The fundamental link escapes us and so,\nfor us, there is a certain contingency in experience. There is,\nfurther, a creativeness, a newness, which is unforeseeable. The passage\nfrom the inorganic to the organic stresses this, for the observation of\nthe former would never lead us to the other, for it is a creation, a\nveritable \u201cnew\u201d thing. Boutroux is here dealing hard blows at Taine\u2019s\nconception. He continues it by showing that in the conscious living\nbeing we are introduced to a new element which is again absolutely\nirreducible to physical factors. Life, and consciousness too, are both\ncreators. The life of the mind is absolutely _sui generis_; it cannot\nbe explained by physiology, by reflex action, or looked upon as merely\nan epiphenomenon. Already Boutroux finds himself facing the central\nproblem of Freedom. He recognises that as psychological phenomena\nappear to contain qualities not given in their immediate antecedents,\nthe law of proportion of cause to effect does not apply to the actions\nof the human mind.\n\nThe principle of causality and the principle of the conservation of\nenergy are m themselves scientific \u201cshibboleths,\u201d and neither of them,\nasserts Boutroux, can be worked out so absolutely as to justify\nthemselves as ultimate descriptions of the universe. They are valuable\nas practical maxims for the scientist, whose object is to follow the\nthreads of action in this varied world of ours. They are incomplete,\nand have merely a relative value. Philosophy cannot permit their\napplication to the totality of this living, pulsing universe. For\ncause, we must remember, does not in its strictly scientific meaning\nimply creative power. The cause of a phenomenon is itself a phenomenon.\n\u201cThe positive sciences in vain pretend to seize the divine essence or\nreason behind things.\u201d[36] They arrive at descriptive formul\u00e6 and there\nthey leave us. But, as Boutroux well reminds us in concluding his\nthesis, formulas never explain anything because they cannot even\nexplain themselves. They are simply constructions made by observation\nand abstraction and which themselves require explanation.\n\n [36] _Contingence des Lois de la Nature_, p 154.\n\n\nThe laws of nature are not restrictions which have been, as it were,\nimposed upon her They are themselves products of freedom; they are, in\nher, what habits are to the individual. Their constancy is like the\nstability of a river-bed which the freely running stream at some early\ntime hollowed out.\n\nThe world is an assembly of beings, and its vitality and nature cannot\nbe expressed in a formula. It comprises a hierarchy of creatures,\nrising from inorganic to organic forms, from matter to spirit, and in\nman it displays an observing intelligence, rising above mere\nsensibility and expressly modifying things by free will. In this\nconception Boutroux follows Ravaisson, and he is also influenced by\nthat thinker\u2019s belief in a spiritual Power of goodness and beauty. He\nthus leads us to the sphere of religion and philosophy, both of which\nendeavour, in their own manner, to complete the inadequacy of the\npurely scientific standpoint. He thus stands linked up in the total\ndevelopment with Cournot and Renouvier, and in his own group with\nLachelier, in regard to this question of the relation of philosophy and\nthe sciences.\n\nThe critique of science, which is so prominent in Boutroux, was\ncharacteristic of a number of thinkers whom we cannot do more than\nmention here in passing, for in general their work is not in line with\nthe spiritualist development, but is a sub-current running out and\nseparated from the main stream. This is shown prominently in the fact\nthat, while Boutroux\u2019s critique is in the interests of idealism and the\nmaintenance of some spiritual values, much subsequent criticism of\nscience is a mere empiricism and, being divorced from the general\nprinciples of the spiritualist philosophy, tends merely to accentuate a\nvein of uncertainty\u2014indeed, scepticism of knowledge. Such is the\ngeneral standpoint taken by Milhaud, Payot, and Duhem. Rather apart\nfrom these stands the works of acute minds like Poincar\u00e9, Durand de\nGros, and Hannequin, whose discussion of the atomic doctrines is a work\nof considerable merit. To these may be added Lalande\u2019s criticism of the\ndoctrine of evolution and integration by his opposing to it that of\ndissolution and disintegration. Passing references to these books must\nnot, however, detain us from following the main development which, from\nBoutroux, is carried on by Bergson.\n\nWe find that Bergson, like Boutroux, holds no brief for science, and in\nparticular he opposes some of its doctrines which have been\ndogmatically and uncritically accepted. His work, _Mati\u00e9re et M\u00e9moire_,\nis a direct critique of the scientific postulate of psycho-physical\nparallelism which Bergson regards as the crux of the problem at issue\nbetween science and philosophy\u2014namely, that of freedom. He shows that\nthis theory, which has been adopted by science because of its\nconvenience, ought not to be accepted by philosophy without criticism.\nIn his opinion it cannot stand the criticism which he brings against\nit. A relation between soul and body is undeniable, but he does not\nagree that that relation is one of absolute parallelism. To maintain\nparallelism is to settle at once and beforehand, in an unwarrantably _a\npriori_ manner, the whole problem of freedom. His intense spiritualism\nsees also in such a doctrine the deadly enemy Epiphenomenalism, the\nbelief that the spiritual is only a product of the physical. He\nmaintains the unique and irreducible nature of consciousness, and\nclaims that the life of the soul or spirit is richer and wider than the\nmere physical activity of the brain, which is really its instrument.\nBergson asks us to imagine the revolution which might have been, had\nour early scientists devoted themselves to the study of mind rather\nthan matter, and claims that we suffer from the dogmatism of\nmaterialistic science and the geometrical and mathematical conceptions\nof \u201ca universal science\u201d or \u201cmathematic\u201d which come from the\nseventeenth century, and are seen later in Taine.\n\nThe inadequacy of the scientific standpoint is a theme upon which\nBergson never tires of insisting. Not only does he regard a metaphysic\nas necessary to complete this inadequacy, but he claims that our\nintellect is incapable of grasping reality in its flux and change. The\ntrue instrument of metaphysics is, according to him, intuition.\nBergson\u2019s doctrine of intuition does not, however, amount to a pure\nhostility to intellectual constructions. These are valuable, but they\nare not adequate to reality. Metaphysics cannot dispense with the\nnatural sciences. These sciences work with concepts, abstractions, and\nso suffer by being intellectual moulds. We must not mistake them for\nthe living, pulsing, throbbing reality of life itself which is far\nwider than any intellectual construction.\n\nBy his insistence upon this point, in which he joins hands with several\nof his predecessors, Bergson claims to have got over the Kantian\ndifficulties of admitting the value and possibility of a metaphysic.\nThere is nothing irrational, he insists, in his doctrine of\nmetaphysical intuition or \u201cintellectual sympathy\u201d; it is rather\nsuper-rational, akin to the spirit of the poet and the artist. The\nvarious sciences can supply data and, as such, are to be respected, for\nthey have a relative value. What Bergson is eager to do is to combat\ntheir absolute value. His metaphysic is, however, no mere \u201cphilosophy\nof the sciences\u201d in the sense of being a mere summary of the results of\nthe sciences. His intuition is more than a mere generalisation of\nfacts; it is an \u201cintegral experience,\u201d a penetration of reality in its\nflux and change, a looking upon the world _sub specie durationis_. It\nis a vision, but it is one which we cannot obtain without intellectual\nor scientific labour. We can become better acquainted with reality only\nby the progressive development of science _and_ philosophy. We cannot\nlive on the dry bread of the sciences alone, an intuitional philosophy\nis necessary for our spiritual welfare. Science promises us well-being\nor pleasure, but philosophy, claims Bergson, can give us joy, by its\nintuitions, its super-intellectual vision, that vital contact with life\nitself in its fulness, which is far grander and truer than all the\nabstractions of science. This is the culmination of much already\nindicated in Cournot, Renouvier, Ravaisson, Lachelier, and Boutroux,\nwhich Bergson presents in a manner quite unique, thus closing in our\nperiod the development of that criticism and hostility to the finality\nand absoluteness of the purely scientific attitude which is so marked a\nfeature of both our second and third groups, the neo-critical thinkers\nand the neo-spiritualists.\n\n*    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *\n\n\nBeginning with a glowing confidence in the sciences as ultimate\ninterpretations of reality, we thus have witnessed a complete turn of\nthe tide during the develop-* since 1851. Also, in following out the\nchanges in the attitude adopted to Science, we have been enabled to\ndiscover in a general manner that the central and vital problem which\nour period presents is that of Freedom. It will be interesting to find\nwhether in regard to this problem, too, a similar change of front will\nbe noticeable as the period is followed to its close.\n\nNOTE.\u2014The reader may be interested to find that Einstein has brought\nout some of Boutroux\u2019s points very emphatically, and has confirmed the\nview of geometry held by Poincar\u00e9. Compare the following statements:\n    Boutroux: \u201cMathematics cannot be applied with exactness to\n    reality.\u201d \u201cMathematics and experience can never be exactly fitted\n    into each other.\u201d\n    Poincar\u00e9: \u201cFormul\u00e6 are not true, they are convenient.\u201d\n    Einstein: \u201cIf we deny the relation between the body of axiomatic\n    Euclidean geometry or the practically rigid body of reality, we\n    readily arrive at the view entertained by that acute and profound\n    thinker, H. Poincar\u00e9 . . . _Sub specie \u00e6terni_, Poincar\u00e9, in my\n    opinion, is right\u201d (_Sidelights on Relativity_, pp. 33-35).\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV\nFREEDOM\n\n\nINTRODUCTORY: The central problem of our period\u2014The reconciliation of\nscience with man\u2019s beliefs centres around the question of\nFreedom\u2014Unsatisfactoriness of Kant\u2019s solution felt.\n\nI. The positivist belief in universal and rigid determinism, especially\nshown in Taine. Renan\u2019s view.\n\nII. Cournot and Renouvier uphold Freedom\u2014Strong logical and moral case\nput forward for it.\n\nIII. The new spiritualists, Ravaisson and Lacheher, set Freedom in the\nforefront of their philosophy\u2014Fouill\u00e9e attempts a reconciliation by the\nidea of Freedom as a determining force\u2014Guyau, Boutroux, Blondel and\nBergson insist on the reality of Freedom\u2014They surpass Cournot and\nRenouvier by upholding contingency \u2014This is especially true of Guyau,\nBoutroux and Bergson.\n\nBelief in creativeness and spontaneity replace the older belief in\ndeterminism.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV\nFREEDOM\n\nThe discussions regarding the relation between science and philosophy\nled the thinkers of our period naturally to the crucial problem of\nfreedom. Science has almost invariably stood for determinism, and men\nwere becoming impatient of a dogmatism which, by its denial of freedom,\nleft little or no place for man, his actions, his beliefs, his moral\nfeelings.\n\n\u201c_La nature fatale offre \u00e0 la Libert\u00e9\nUn probl\u00e8me_.\u201d[1]\n\n\n [1] Guyau, in his _Vers d\u2019un Philosophe_, \u201c_Moments de Foi_\u2014I.,\u201d _En\n lisant Kant_, p. 57.\n\n\nIt was precisely this problem which was acutely felt in the philosophy\nof our period as it developed and approached the close of the century.\n\nIn a celebrated passage of his _Critique of Judgment_ the philosopher\nKant had drawn attention to the necessity of bringing together the\nconcept of freedom and the concept of nature as constructed by modern\nscience, for the two were, he remarked, separated by an abyss. He\nhimself felt that the realm of freedom should exercise an influence\nupon the realm of science, but his own method prohibited his attempting\nto indicate with any preciseness what that influence might be. The\nfatal error of his system, the artificial division of noumena and\nphenomena, led him to assign freedom only to the world of noumena.\nAmong phenomena it had no place, but reigned transcendent, unknown and\nunknowable, beyond the world we know.\n\nThe artificiality of such a solution was apparent to the thinkers who\nfollowed Kant, and particularly was this felt in France. \u201cPoor\nconsolation is it,\u201d remarked Fouill\u00e9e, in reply to Kant\u2019s view, \u201cfor a\nprisoner bound with chains to know that in some unknown realm afar he\ncan walk freely devoid of his fetters.\u201d\n\nThe problem of freedom, both in its narrow sphere of personal free-will\nand in its larger social significance, is one which has merited the\nattention of all peoples in history. France, however, has been\npre-eminently a cradle for much acute thought on this matter. It loomed\nincreasingly large on the horizon as the Revolution approached, it\nshone brilliantly in Rousseau. Since the Revolution it has been equally\ndiscussed, and is the first of the three watchwords of the republic,\nwhose philosophers, no less than its politicians, have found it one of\ntheir main themes.\n\nThe supreme importance of the problem of freedom in our period was due\nmainly to the need felt by all thinkers for attempting, in a manner\ndifferent from that of Kant, a reconciliation between science and\nmorals (_science et conscience_), and to find amid the development of\nscientific thought a place for the personality of the thinker himself,\nnot merely as a passive spectator, but as an agent, a willing and\nacting being. Paul Janet, in his essays entitled _Probl\u00e8mes du XIXe\nSi\u00e8cle_,[2] treating the question of science, asks whether the growing\nprecision of the natural sciences and \u201cthe extension of their\n\u2018positive\u2019 methods, which involve a doctrine or assumption of\ninfallible necessity, do not imperil gravely the freedom of the moral\nagent?\u201d While himself believing that, however closely the sciences may\nseem to encroach upon the free power of the human soul, they will only\napproach in an indefinite \u201casymptote,\u201d never succeeding in annulling\nit, he senses the importance of the problem. Science may endeavour to\ntie us down to a belief in universal and rigid determinism, but the\nhuman spirit revolts from the acceptance of such a view, and acclaims,\nto some degree at least, the reality of a freedom which cannot be\neasily reconciled with the determinist doctrines.\n\n [2] Published in 1872.\n\n\nIn the period which we have under review the central problem is\nundoubtedly that of freedom. Practically all the great thinkers in\nFrance during this period occupied themselves with this problem, and\nrightly so, for they realised that most of the others with which\nphilosophy concerns itself depend in a large degree upon the attitude\nadopted to freedom. Cournot, Renouvier, Ravaisson, Lachelier, Fouill\u00e9e,\nBoutroux, Blondel and Bergson have played the chief part in the arena\nof discussion, and although differing considerably in their methods of\ntreatment and not a little in the form of their conclusions, they are\nat one in asserting the vital importance of this problem and its\nprimacy for philosophy. The remark of Fouill\u00e9e is by no means too\nstrong: \u201cThe problem which we are going to discuss is not only a\nphilosophical problem; it is, _par excellence_, _the_ problem for\nphilosophy. All the other questions are bound up with this.\u201d[3] This\ntruth will be apparent when, after showing the development of the\ndoctrines concerning freedom, we come, in our subsequent chapters, to\nconsider its application to the questions of progress, of ethics and of\nthe philosophy of religion.\n\n [3] In his preface to his Thesis _Libert\u00e9 et D\u00e9terminisme_, later\n editions, p. vii.\n\nI\n\nWe find in the thought of our period a very striking development or\nchange in regard to the problem of freedom. Beginning with a strictly\npositivist and naturalist belief in determinism, it concludes with a\nspiritualism or idealism which not only upholds freedom but goes\nfurther in its reaction against the determinist doctrines by\nmaintaining contingency.\n\nTaine and Renan both express the initial attitude, a firm belief in\ndeterminism, but it is most clear and rigid in the work of Taine. His\nwhole philosophy is hostile to any belief in freedom. The strictly\npositivist, empiricist and naturalist tone of his thought combined with\nthe powerful influence of Spinoza\u2019s system to produce in him a firm\nbelief in necessity\u2014a necessity which, as we have seen, was severely\nrational and of the type seen in mathematics and in logic. Although it\nmust also be admitted that in this view of change and development Taine\nwas partly influenced by the Hegelian philosophy, yet his formulations\nwere far more precise and mathematical than those of the German\nthinker.\n\nWe have, in considering his attitude to science, seen the tenacious\nmanner in which he clings to his dogma of causality or universal\nnecessity. All living things, man included, are held in the firm grip\nof \u201cthe steel pincers of necessity.\u201d Every fact and every law in the\nuniverse has its _raison explicative_, as Taine styles it. He quotes\nwith approval, in his treatment of this question at the close of his\nwork _De l\u2019Intelligence_, the words of the great scientist and\npositivist Claude Bernard: \u201c_Il y a un d\u00e9terminisme absolu, dans les\nconditions d\u2019existence des ph\u00e9nom\u00e8nes naturels, aussi bien pour les\ncorps vivants que pour les corps bruts_.\u201d[4] In Taine and the school of\nscientists like Bernard, whose opinions on this matter he voices, no\nroom is accorded to freedom.\n\n [4] _De l\u2019Intelligence_, vol. 2, p. 480, the quotation from Bernard is\n to be found in his _Introduction \u00e0 l\u2019Etude de la M\u00e9decine\n exp\u00e9rimentale_, p. 115.\n\n\nTaine\u2019s belief in universal necessity and his naturalistic outlook led\nhim to regard man from the physical standpoint as a mechanism, from the\nmental point of view a theorem. Vice and virtue are, to quote his own\nwords, \u201cproducts just as vitriol or sugar.\u201d This remark having appeared\nto many thinkers a scandalous assertion, Taine explained in an article\ncontributed to the _Journal des D\u00e9bats_[5] that he did not mean to say\nthat vice and virtue were, like vitriol or sugar, _chemical_ but they\nare nevertheless products, _moral_ products, which moral elements bring\ninto being by their assemblage. And, he argues, just as it is necessary\nin order to make vitriol to know the chemical elements which go to its\ncomposition, so in order to create in man the hatred of a lie it is\nuseful to search for the psychological elements which, by their union,\nproduce truthfulness.\n\n [5] On December 19th, 1872.\n\n\nEven this explanation of his position, however, did not prevent the\nassertion being made that such a view entirely does away with all\nquestion of moral responsibility. To this criticism Taine objected. \u201cIt\ndoes not involve moral indifference. We do not excuse a wicked man\nbecause we have explained to ourselves the causes of his wickedness.\nOne can be determinist with Leibnitz and nevertheless admit with\nLeibnitz that man is responsible \u2014that is to say, that the dishonest\nman is worthy of blame, of censure and punishment, while the honest man\nis worthy of praise, respect and reward.\u201d\n\nIn one of his _Essais_ Taine further argued in defence of his doctrine\nof universal determination that since WE ourselves are determined\u2014that\nis to say, since there is a psychological determinism as well as a\nphysical determinism\u2014we do not feel the restriction which this\ndeterminism implies, we have the illusion of freedom and act just as if\nwe were free. To this Fouill\u00e9e replied that the value of Taine\u2019s\nargument was equal to that of a man who might say, \u201cBecause _I_ am\nasleep, all of me, all my powers and faculties, therefore I am in a\nstate where I am perfectly free and responsible.\u201d Certainly Taine\u2019s\nremark that _we_ are determined had nothing in common with the belief\nin that true determinism, which is equally true freedom, since it is\n_self_-determination. Taine professed no such doctrine, and rested in a\npurely naturalistic fatalism, built upon formul\u00e6 of geometry and logic,\nin abstraction from the actual living and acting of the soul, and this\ndogma of determinism, to which he clung so dearly, colours his view of\nethics and of history. For Taine, \u201cthe World is a living geometry\u201d and\n\u201cman is a theorem that walks.\u201d\n\nLike Taine, Renan set out from the belief in universal causation, but\nhe employed the conception not so much in a warfare against man\u2019s\nfreedom of action as against the theologians\u2019 belief in miracle and the\nsupernatural. There is none of Taine\u2019s rigour and preciseness in Renan,\nand it is difficult to grasp his real attitude to the problem of\nfreedom. If he ever had one, may be doubted. The blending of\nviewpoints, the paradox so characteristic of him, seems apparent even\nin this question.\n\nHis intense humanism prompted him to remarks in praise of freedom, and\nhe seems to have recognised in man a certain power of freedom; but in\nview of his belief in universal cause he is careful to qualify this.\nFurther, his intensely religious mind remained in love with the\ndoctrine of divine guidance which is characteristic of Christian and\nmost religious thought. Although Renan left the Church, this belief\nnever left Renan. He sees God working out an eternal purpose in\nhistory, and this he never reconciled with the problem of man\u2019s free\nwill. The humanist in him could remark that the one object of life is\nthe development of the mind, and the first condition for this is\nfreedom. Here he appears to have in view freedom from political and\nreligious restrictions. He is thinking of the educational problem. His\nown attitude to the ultimate question of freedom in itself, as opposed\nto determinism, is best expressed in his _Examen d\u2019une Conscience\nphilosophique_. He there shows that the universe is the result of a\nlengthy development, the. beginnings of which we do not know. \u201cIn the\ninnumerable links of that chain,\u201d says Renan, \u201cwe find not one free act\nbefore the appearance of man, or, if you like, living beings.\u201d With\nman, however, freedom comes into the scheme of things. A free cause is\nseen employing the forces of nature for willed ends. Yet this is but\nnature itself blossoming to self-consciousness; this free cause\nemanates from nature itself. There is no rude break between man with\nhis free power and unconscious nature. Both are interconnected. Freedom\nis indeed the appearance of something \u201cnew,\u201d but it is not, insists\nRenan, something divorced from what has gone before.\n\nWe see in Renan a rejection of the severely deterministic doctrine of\nTaine, but it is by no means a complete rejection or refutation of it.\nRenan adheres largely to the scientific and positivist attitude which\nis such a feature of Taine\u2019s work. His humanism, however, recognises\nthe inadequacy of such doctrines and compels him to speak of freedom as\na human factor, and he thus brings us a step nearer to the development\nof the case for freedom put forward so strongly by Cournot and\nRenouvier and by the neo-spiritualists.\n\nII\n\nA very powerful opposition to all doctrines based upon or upholding\ndeterminism shows itself in the work of Cournot and the neo-critical\nphilosophy. The idea of freedom is a central one in the thought of both\nCournot and Renouvier.\n\nCournot devoted his early labours to a critical and highly technical\nexamination of the question of probability, considered in its\nmathematical form, a task for which he was well equipped.[6] Being not\nonly a man of science but also a metaphysician, or rather a philosopher\nwho approached metaphysical problems from the impulse and data accorded\nhim by the sciences, Cournot was naturally led to the wider problem of\n_probabilit\u00e9 philosophique_. He shows in his _Essai sur les Fondements\nde nos Connaissances_ that hazard or chance are not merely words which\nwe use to cover our ignorance, as Taine would have claimed. Over\nagainst the doctrine of a universal determinism he asserts the reality\nof these factors. The terms chance and hazard represent a real and\nvital element in our experience and in the nature of reality itself.\nProbability is a factor to be reckoned with, and this is so because of\nthe elements of contingency in nature and in life. Freedom is bound up\nessentially with the vitality which is nature itself.\n\n [6] See his _Essai sur les Fondements de nos Connaissances: \u201cHazard,\u201d_\n chap. iii.; \u201c_Probabilit\u00e9 Philosophique_,\u201d chap, iv., pp. 71-101; and\n chap. v., \u201c_De l\u2019Harmonie et de la Finalit\u00e9_,\u201d pp. 101-144.\n\n\nThe neo-critical philosopher, Renouvier, is a notable champion of\nfreedom. We have already seen the importance he attaches to the\ncategory of personality. For him, personality represents a\nconsciousness in possession of itself, a free and rational harmony\u2014in\nshort, freedom personified.\n\nFrom a strictly demonstrative point of view Renouvier thinks it is\nimpossible to prove freedom as a fact. However, he lays before us with\nintense seriousness various. considerations of a psychological and a\nmoral character which have an important bearing upon the problem. This\nproblem, he asserts, not only concerns our actions but also our\nknowledge. To bring out this point clearly, Renouvier develops some of\nthe ideas of his friend, Jules Lequier, on the notion of the autonomy\nof the reason, or rather of the reasonable will. In this way he shows\ndoubt and criticism to be themselves signs of freedom, and asserts that\nwe form our notions of truth freely, or that at least they are\ncreations of our free thought, not laid upon us by an external\nauthority.\n\nMore light is thrown on the problem by considering what Renouvier calls\n_vertige mental_, a psychopathological condition due to a disturbance\nof the rational harmony or self-possession which constitutes the\nessence of the personal consciousness. This state is characterised by\nhallucination and error. It is the extreme opposite of the\nself-conscious, reflective personality in full possession of itself and\nexercising its will rationally. Renouvier shows that between these two\nextremes there are numerous planes of _vertige mental_ in which the\npart played by our will is small or negligible, and we are thus victims\nof habit or tendency. Is there, then, any place for freedom? There most\ncertainly is, says Renouvier, for our freedom manifests itself whenever\nwe inhibit an action to which we are excited by habit, passion or\nimagination. Our freedom is the product of reflection. We are at\nliberty to be free, to determine ourselves in accordance with higher\nmotives. This power is just our personality asserting itself, and it\ndoes not contradict our being, more often than not, victims of habit.\nWe have it in our power to make fresh beginnings. Renouvier\u2019s disbelief\nin strict continuity is here again apparent. We must admit freedom of\ncreation in the personality itself, and not seek to explain our actions\nby trying to ascend some scale of causes to infinity. There is no such\nthing as a sum to infinity of a series; there is no such thing as the\ninfluence of an infinite series of causes upon the performance of a\nconsciously willed act in which the personality asserts its initiative\u2014\nthat is, its power of initiation of a new series, in short, its\nfreedom.\n\nPassing from these psychological considerations, Renouvier calls our\nattention to some of a moral nature, no less important, in his opinion,\nfor shedding light upon the nature of freedom. If, he argues, all is\nnecessary, if all human actions are predetermined, then popular\nlanguage is guilty of a grave extravagance and appears ridiculous,\ninsinuating, as it does, that many acts might have been left undone and\nmany events might have occurred differently, and that a man might have\ndone other than he did. In the light of the hypothesis of rigorous\nnecessity, the mention of ambiguous futures and the notion of \u201cbeing\notherwise\u201d (_le pouvoir \u00eatre autrement_) seem foolish. Science may\nassert the docrine of necessity and preach it valiantly, but the human\nconscience feels it to be untrue and will not be gainsaid. The\nscientist himself is forced to admit that man does not accept his\ngospel of universal predestination or fatalism. This Renouvier\nrecognises as an important point in the debate. Strange, is it not, he\nremarks, that the mind of the philosopher himself, a sanctuary or\nshrine for truth, should appear as a rebellious citadel refusing to\nsurrender to the truth of this universal necessity. We believe\nourselves to be free agents or, at least beings who are capable of some\nfree action. However slight such action, it would invalidate the\nhypothesis of universal necessity.\n\nIf all things are necessitated, then moral judgments, the notions of\nright and of duty, have no foundation in the nature of things. Virtue\nand crime lose their character; the sentiments and feelings, such as\nregret, hope, fear, desire, change their meaning or become meaningless.\nRenouvier lays great stress upon these moral considerations.\n\nAgain, if everything be necessitated, error is as necessary as truth.\nThe false is indeed true, being necessary, and the true may become\nfalse. Disputes rage over what is false or true, but these disputes\ncannot be condemned, for they themselves are, by virtue of the\nhypothesis, necessary, and the disputes are necessarily absurd and\nridiculous from this point of view. Where then is truth? Where is\nmorality? We have here no basis for either. Looking thus at history,\nall its crimes and infamies are equally lawful, for they are\ninevitable; such is the result, Renouvier shows, of viewing all human\naction as universally predetermined.\n\nThe objections thus put forward by Renouvier against the doctrine of\nuniversal necessity are powerful ones. They possess great weight and\nresult in the admission, even by its upholders, that \u201cthe judgment of\nfreedom is a natural datum of consciousness and is bound up with our\nreflective judgments upon which we act, being itself the foundation of\nthese.\u201d\n\nYet, we have, Renouvier reminds us, no logical proof of the reality of\nfreedom. We feel ourselves moved, spontaneously and unconstrained. The\nfuture, in so far as it depends upon ourselves, appears not as\nprearranged but ambiguous, open.[7] Whether our judgment be true or\nfalse, we in practical life act invariably on the belief in freedom.\nThat, of course, as Renouvier admits at this stage of his discussion,\ndoes not prove that our belief is not an illusion. It is a feeling,\nnatural and spontaneous.\n\n [7] Cf., later, Bergson\u2019s remark: \u201cThe portals of the future stand\n wide open, the future is being made.\u201d\n\n\nOne of the most current forms of the doctrine of freedom has been that\nknown as the \u201cliberty of indifference.\u201d The upholders of this theory\nregard the will as separated from motives and ends. The operation of\nthe will is regarded by them as indifferent to the claims or influence\nof reason or feeling. Will is superadded externally to motives, where\nsuch exist, or may be superimposed on intellectual views even to the\nextent of annulling these. Judgment and will are separated in this\nview, and the will is a purely arbitrary or indifferent factor. It can\noperate without reason against reason. The opponents of freedom find\nlittle difficulty in assailing this view, in which the will appears to\noperate like a dice or a roulette game, absolutely at hazard, reducing\nman to a non-rational creature. Such a type of will, however, Renouvier\ndeclares to be non-existent, for every man who has full consciousness\nof an act of his has at the same time a consciousness of an end or\npurpose for this act, and he proposes to realise by this means a good\nwhich he regards as preferable to any other. In so far as he has doubts\nof this preference the act and the judgment will be suspended. He must,\nhowever, if he be an intelligent being, pursue what he deems to be his\ngood\u2014that is to say, what he deems to be good at the time of acting.\nRenouvier here agrees with Socrates and Plato in the view that no man\ndeliberately and knowingly wills what he considers to be evil or to be\nbad for him. Virtue involves knowledge, and although there is the\nalmost proverbial phrase of Ovid and of Paul, about seeing and\napproving the better, yet nevertheless doing the worse, it is a general\nstatement which does not express an antithesis as present to\nconsciousness at the time of action. The agent may afterwards say\n\n. . . \u201c_Video meliora proboque\ndeteriora sequor_.\u201d\n\n\nbut at the time of action \u201cthe worse\u201d must appear to him as a good, at\nany rate then and in his own judgment. Further, beyond these\npsychological considerations there are grave moral objections,\nRenouvier points out, to admitting \u201can indifferent will,\u201d for the acts\nof such a will being purely arbitrary and haphazard, the man will be no\nmoral agent, no responsible person. A man who wills apart from the\nconsideration of any motive whatever can never perform any meritorious\naction. Under the conception of an indifferent will the term \u201cmerit\u201d\nceases to have a meaning. The theologians who have asserted the\ndoctrine (indeed, it seems to have originated, Renouvier thinks, with\nthem) have readily admitted this point, for it opens up the way for\ntheir theory of divine grace or the good will of God acting directly\nupon or within the agent. Will and merit are for them quite separate,\nthe latter being due to the mystical operations of divine favour or\ngrace, in honour of which the indifference of the will has been\npostulated. Philosophers not given to appeals to divine grace, who have\nupheld the doctrine of the indifferent will, have really been less\nconsistent than the theoloians and have fallen into grave error.\n\nRenouvier appeals to the testimony of the penal laws of all nations in\nfavour of his criticism of an indifferent will. Motive _is_ deemed a\nreal factor, for men are not deemed to have acted indifferently. Some\ndeliberation, indeed, is implied in all action which is conscious and\nhuman, some comparison of motives and a conscious, decision. The values\nof truth, as well as those of morality are equally fatal to the\nindifferentist; for, asks Renouvier, is a man to be regarded as not\ndetermined to affirm as true what he judges to be true?\n\nThe doctrine of freedom as represented by that of an indifferent will\nis no less vicious, Renouvier affirms, than the opposing doctrine of\nuniversal necessity. The truth is that they both rest on fictions.\n\u201cIndifferentism\u201d imagines a will divorced from judgment, separated from\nthe rational man himself, an unseizable power, a mysterious absolute\ncause unconnected with reflection or deliberation, a mere chimera. For\ndeterminism the will is equally a fiction.\n\nA way out of this difficulty is to be found, according to Renouvier, in\nviewing the will in a manner different from that of the\n\u201cindifferentists.\u201d Let us suppose the will bound up with motive, a\nmotive drawn from the intellectual and moral equipment of the man.\nThis, however, gives rise to psychological determinism. The will, it is\nargued, follows always the last determination of the understanding.\nGreater subtilty attends on this argument against freedom than those\nput forward on behalf of physical determinism. Renouvier sees that\nthere is no escape from such a doctrine as psychological determinism\nunless we take a view of the will as bound up with the nature of man as\na whole, with his powers of intellect and feeling. Such a will cannot\nbe characterised as indifferent or as the mere resultant of motives.\n\nThe Kantian element in Renouvier\u2019s thought is noticeable in the strong\nmoral standpoint from which he discusses all problems, and this is\nparticularly true of his discussion of this very vital one of freedom.\nHe is by no means, however, a disciple of Kant, and he joins battle\nstrongly with the Kantian doctrine of freedom. This is natural in view\nof his entire rejection of Kant\u2019s \u201cthing-in-itself,\u201d or noumena, and it\nfollows therefrom, for Kant attached freedom only to the noumenal\nworld, denying its operation in the world of phenomena. The rejection\nof noumena leaves Renouvier free to discuss freedom in a less remote or\nless artificial manner than that of Kant.\n\nIf it be true, argues Renouvier, that necessity rules supreme, then the\nhuman spirit can find peace in absolute resignation; and in looking\nback over the past history of humanity one need not have different\nfeelings from those entertained by the geologist or paleontologist.\nEthics, politics and history thus become purely \u201cnatural\u201d sciences (if\nindeed ethics could here have meaning, would it not be identical with\nanthropology? At any rate, it would be purely positive. A normative\nview of ethics would be quite untenable in the face of universal\nnecessity). Any inconvenience, pain or injustice would have to be\naccepted and not even named \u201cevil,\u201d much less could any effort be truly\nmade to expel it from the scheme of things. To these accusations the\ndefenders of necessity object. The practical man, they say, need not\nfeel this, in so far as he is under the illusion of freedom and unaware\nof the rigorous necessity of all things. He need not refrain from\naction.\n\nBut this defence of necessity leads those who wish to maintain the case\nagainst it to continue the argument. Suppose that the agent does _not_\nforget that all is necessitated, what then? Under no illusion of the\nidea of freedom, he then acts at every moment of his existence in the\nknowledge that he cannot but do what he is doing, he cannot but will\nwhat he wills, he cannot but desire what he desires. In time this must\nproduce, says Renouvier, insanity either of an idle type or a furious\nkind, he will become an indifferent imbecile or a raving fanatic, in\neither case a character quite abnormal and dangerous. These are extreme\nresults, but between the two extremes all degrees of character are to\nbe, found. The most common type of practical reason presents an\nantinomy in the system of universal necessity. The case for necessity\nmust reckon with this fact\u2014namely, that the operation of necessity has\nitself given rise to ethics which exists, and, according to the case,\nits existence is a necessary one; yet ethics constitutes itself in\nopposition to necessity, and under the sway of necessity is quite\nmeaningless. Here is a paradox which is not lessened if we suppose the\nethical position to be an absurd and false one. Whether false or not,\nmorality in some form is practically as universal as human nature. That\nnature, Renouvier insists, can hardly with sincerity believe an\nhypothesis or a dogma which its own moral instincts belie continually.\n\nIf, on the other hand, truth lies with the upholders of freedom, then\nman\u2019s action is seen to have great value and significance, for man then\nappears as creating a new order of things in the world. His new acts,\nRenouvier admits, will not be without preceding ones, without roots or\nreasons, but they will be without _necessary_ connection with the whole\nscheme of things. He is thus creating a new order; he is creating\nhimself and making his own history. Conscious pride or bitter remorse\ncan both alike be present to him. The great revolutions of history will\nbe regarded by him not as mystical sweepings of some unknown force\nexternal to himself, but as results of the thought and work of humanity\nitself. A philosophy which so regards freedom will thus be a truly\n\u201chuman\u201d philosophy. Renouvier rightly recognises that the whole\nphilosophy of history turns upon the attitude which we adopt to\nfreedom.\n\nIn view of the many difficulties connected with the problem of freedom\nmany thinkers would urge us to a compromise. Renouvier is aware of the\ndangers of this attitude, and he brings into play against it his\nlogical method of dealing with problems. This does not contradict his\nstatement about the indemonstrability of freedom, nor does it minimise\nthe weight and significance of the moral case for freedom: it\ncomplements it. Between contradictories or incompatible propositions no\nmiddle course can be followed. Freedom and necessity cannot be both at\nthe same time true, or both at the same time false, for of the two\nthings one must be true\u2014namely, either human actions are all of them\ntotally predetermined by their conditions or antecedents, or they are\nnot all of them totally predetermined. It is to this pass that we are\nbrought in the logical statement of the case. Now sceptics would here\nassert that doubt was the only solution. This would not realh be a\nsolution, and however legitimate doubt is in front of conflicting\ntheories, it involves the death of the soul if it operates in practical\naffairs and in any circumstances where some belief is absolutely\nnecessary to the conduct of life and to action.\n\nThe freedom in question, as Renouvier is careful to remind us, does not\ninvolve our maintaining the total indetermination of things or denial\nof the operations of necessity within limits. Room is left for freedom\nwhen it is shown that this necessity is not universal. Many\nconsequences of free acts may be necessitated. For example, says\nRenouvier, I have a stone in my hand. I can freely will to hurl it\nnorth or south, high or low, but once thrown from my hand its path is\nstrictly determined by the law of gravity. The voluntary movement of a\nman on the earth may, however slightly, alter the course of a distant\nplanet. Freedom, we might say, operates in a sphere to which necessity\nsupplies the matter. Ultimately any free act is a choice between two\nalternatives, equally possible, but both necessitated as possibilities.\nThe points of free action may seem to take up a small amount of room in\nthe world, so to speak, but we must realise how vital they are to any\njudgment regarding its character, and how tremendously important they\nare from a moral point of view. So far, claims Renouvier, from the\nadmittance of freedom being a destruction of the laws of the universe,\nit really shows us a special law of that universe, not otherwise to be\nexplained\u2014namely, the moral law. Freedom is thus regarded by Renouvier\nas a positive fact, a moral certainty.\n\nFreedom is the pillar of the neo-critical philosophy; it is the first\ntruth involved at once in all action and in all knowledge. Truth and\nerror are not well explained, or, indeed, at all explained, by a\ndoctrine which, embracing them both as equally necessary, justifies\nthem equally, and so in a sense verifies both of them. It was this\npoint which Brochard developed in his work _L\u2019Erreur_, which has\nneo-critical affinities. Man is only capable of science because he is\nfree; it is also because he is free that he is subject to error.[8]\nRenouvier claims that \u201cwe do not avoid error always, but we always\n_can_ avoid it.\u201d[9] Truth and error can only be explained, he urges, by\nbelief in the ambiguity of futures, movements of thought involving\nchoice between opinions which conflict\u2014in short, by belief in freedom.\nThe calculation of probabilities and the law of the great numbers\ndemonstrates, Renouvier claims, the indetermination of futures, and\nconsciousness is aware of this ambiguity in practical life. This belief\nin the ambiguity of futures is a condition, he shows, of the exercise\nof the human consciousness in its moral aspect, and this consciousness\nin action regards itself as suspended before indetermination\u2014that is,\nit affirms freedom. This affirmation of freedom Renouvier asserts to be\na necessary element of any rational belief whatever. It alone gives\nmoral dignity and supremacy to personality, whose existence is the\ndeepest and most radical of all existences. The personal life in its\nhighest sense and its noblest manifestation is precisely Freedom.\nRenouvier assures us that there is nothing mysterious or mystical about\nthis freedom. It is not absolute liberty and contingency of all things;\nit is an attribute of persons. The part played thus freely by\npersonality in the scheme or order of the universe proves to us that\nthat order or scheme is not defined or formed in a predetermined\nmanner; it is only in process of being formed, and our personal efforts\nare essential factors in its formation. The world is an order which\nbecomes and which is creating itself, not a pre-established order which\nsimply unrolls itself in time. For a proper understanding of the nature\nof this problem \u201cwe are obliged to turn to the practical reason. It is\na moral affirmation of freedom which we require; indeed, any other kind\nof affirmation would, Renouvier maintains, presuppose this. The\npractical reason must lay down its own basis and that of all true\nreason, for reason is not divided against itself reason is not\nsomething apart from man; it is man, and man is never other than\npractical\u2014_i.e._, acting.\u201d[10] Considered from this standpoint there\nare four cases which present themselves to the tribunal of our\njudgment\u2014namely, the case for freedom, the case against freedom, the\ncase for necessity and the case against necessity.\n\n [8] _De L\u2019Erreur_, p. 47.\n\n\n [9] _Psychologie rationnelle_, vol. 2, p. 96.\n\n\n [10] _Psychologie rationnelle_, vol. 2, p 78.\n\n\nThe position is tersely put in the Dilemma presented by Jules Lequier,\nthe friend of Renouvier, quoted in the _Psychologie rationnelle_. There\nare four possibilities:\n\nTo affirm necessity, necessarily. To affirm necessity, freely. To\naffirm freedom, necessarily. To affirm freedom, freely.\n\nOn examining these possibilities we find that to affirm necessity,\nnecessarily, is valueless, for its contradictory, freedom, is equally\nnecessary. To affirm necessity, freely, does not offer us a better\nposition, for here again it is necessity which is affirmed. If we\naffirm freedom necessarily, we are in little better case, for necessity\noperates again (although Renouvier notes that this gives a certain\nbasis for morality). In the free affirmation of freedom, however, is to\nbe found not only a basis for morals, but also for knowledge and the\nsearch for truth. Indeed, as we are thus forced \u201cto admit the truth of\neither necessity or freedom, and to choose between the one and the\nother with the one or with the other,\u201d[11] we find that the affirmation\nof necessity involves contradiction, for there are many persons who\naffirm freedom, and this they do, if the determinist be right,\nnecessarily. The affirmation of freedom, on the other hand, is free\nfrom such an absurdity.\n\n [11] _Ibid_., p. 138.\n\n\nSuch is the conclusion to which Renouvier brings us after his wealth of\nlogical and moral considerations. He combines both types of discussion\nand argument in order to undermine the belief in determinism and to\nuphold freedom, which is, in his view, the essential attribute of\npersonality and of the universe itself. He thus succeeded in altering\nsubstantially the balance of thought in favour of freedom, and further\nweight was added to the same side of the scales by the new spiritualist\ngroup who placed freedom in the forefront of their thought.\n\nIII\n\nThe development of the treatment of this problem within the thought of\nthe new spiritualists or idealists is extremely interesting, and it\nproceeded finally to a definite doctrine of contingency as the century\ndrew to its close. The considerations set forth are usually\npsychological in tone, and not so largely ethical as in the\nneo-critical philosophy.\n\nRavaisson declared himself a champion of freedom. He accepted the\nprinciple of Leibnitz, to the effect that everything has a reason, from\nwhich it follows that everything is necessitated, without which there\ncould be no certitude and no science. But, says Ravaisson, there are\ntwo kinds of necessity\u2014one absolute, one relative. The former is\nlogical, the type of the principle of identity, and is found in\nsyllogisms and in mathematics, which is just logic applied to quantity.\nThe other type of necessity is moral, and is, unlike the former,\nperfectly in accord with freedom. It indeed implies freedom, the\nfreedom of self-determination. The truly wise man can- not help doing\nwhat is right and good. The slave of Passion and caprice and evil has\nno freedom. The wise man selecting the good chooses it infallibly, but\nat the time with perfect free-will. \u201cIt is perhaps because the good or\nthe beautiful is simply nothing other than love\u2014that is, the power of\nwill in all its purity, and so to will what is truly good is to will\noneself (_c\u2019est se vouloir soi-m\u00eame_).\u201d[12]\n\n [12] _La Philosophie en France_, p. 268.\n\n\nNature is not, as the materialists endeavour to maintain, entirely\ngeometrical\u2014that is to say, fatalistic in character. Morality enters\ninto the scheme of things and, with it, ends freely striven for. There\nis present a freedom which is a kind of necessity, yet opposed to\nfatalism. This freedom involves a determination by conceptions of\nperfection, ideals of beauty and of good. \u201cFatality is but an\nappearance; spontaneity and freedom constitute reality.\u201d[13] So far,\ncontinues Ravaisson, from all things operating by brute mechanism or by\npure hazard, things operate by the development of a tendency to\nperfection, to goodness and beauty. Instead of everything submitting to\na blind destiny, everything obeys, and obeys willingly, a divine\nProvidence.\n\n [13] _Ibid_., p. 270.\n\n\nRavaisson\u2019s fundamental spiritualism is clear in all this, and it\nserves as the starting-point for the thinkers who follow him.\nSpiritualism is bound up with spontaneity, creation, freedom, and this\nis his central point, this insistence on freedom. While resisting\nmechanical determination he endeavours to retain a determination of\nanother kind\u2014namely, by ends, a teleology or finalism. This is\nextremely interesting when observed in relation to the subsequent\ndevelopment in Lachelier, Boutroux, Blondel and Bergson.\n\nLachelier\u2019s treatment of freedom is an important landmark in the\nspiritualist development. By his concentrated analysis of the problem\nof induction he brought out the significance of efficient and final\ncauses respectively. He appears as the pupil of Ravaisson, whose\ninitial inspiration is apparent in his whole work, especially in his\ntreatment of freedom. He dwells upon the fact of the spontaneity of the\nspirit\u2014a point of view which Ravaisson succeeded in imparting to the\nthree thinkers, Lachelier, Boutroux and Bergson. Besides the influence\nof Ravaisson, however, that of Kant and Leibnitz appears in Lachelier\u2019s\nattitude to freedom. Yet he passes beyond the Kantian position, and he\nrejects the double-aspect doctrine which Leibnitz maintained with\nregard to efficient and final causes. Lachelier insists that the\nspontaneity of spirit stands above and underlies the whole of nature.\nThis is the point which Boutroux, under Lachelier\u2019s influence, took up\nin his _Contingence des Lois de la Nature_. Lachelier, in attacking the\npurely mechanistic conception of the universe, endeavoured, as he\nhimself put it, \u201cto substitute everywhere force for inertia, life for\ndeath and freedom for fatalism.\u201d Rather than universal necessity it is\nuniversal contingence which is the real definition of existence. We are\nfree to determine ourselves in accordance with ends we set before us,\nand to act in the manner necessary to accomplish those ends. Our life\nitself, as he shows in the conclusion of his brilliant little article\n_Psychologie et M\u00e9taphysique_, is creative, and we must beware of\narguing that what we have been makes us what we are, for that character\nwhich we look upon as determining us need not do so if we free\nourselves from habit, and, further, this character is, in any case,\nitself the result of our free actions over extended time, the free\ncreation of our own personality.\n\nWhile with Ravaisson and Lachelier the concept of freedom was being\nrather fully developed in opposition to the determinist doctrines,\nFouill\u00e9e, in his brilliant and acute thesis on _Libert\u00e9 et\nD\u00e9terminisme_, endeavoured to call a halt to this supremacy of Freedom,\nand to be true to the principles of reconciliation which he laid down\nfor himself in his philosophy. He confesses himself, at the outset, to\nbe a pacifist rather than a belligerent in this classic dispute between\ndeterminists on the one hand and partisans of freedom on the other. He\nbelieves that, on intimate investigation pursued sufficiently far, the\ntwo opposing doctrines will be seen to converge. Such a declaration\nwould seem to be dangerously superficial in a warfare as bitter and as\nsharp as this. It must be admitted that, as is the case with many who\nprofess to conciliate two conflicting views, Fouill\u00e9e leaves us at\ntimes without precise and definite indication of his own position.\n\nIn contrast to the attitude of Ravaisson and Lachelier Fouill\u00e9e\ninclines in some respects to the attitude of Taine and many passages of\nhis book show him to be holding at least a temporary brief for the\npartisans of determinism. He agrees notably with Taine in his objecting\nto the contention that under the determinist theory moral values lose\ntheir significance. Fouill\u00e9e claims that it is both incorrect and\nunfair to argue that \u201cunder the necessity-hypothesis a thing being all\nthat it can be is thereby all that it should be.\u201d[14].\n\n [14] _La Libert\u00e9 et le D\u00e9terminisme_, p. 51 (fourth edition).\n\n\nHe goes on to point out that the consciousness of independence, which\nis an essential of freedom, may be nothing more than a lack of\nconsciousness of our dependence. Motives he is inclined to speak of as\ndetermining the will itself, while he looks upon the \u201cliberty of\nindifference\u201d or of hazard as merely a concession to the operations of\nmechanical necessity. The \u201cliberty of indifference\u201d is often the mere\nplay of instinct and of fatality, while hazard, so far from being an\nargument in the hands of the upholders of freedom, is really a\ndetermination made previously by something other than one\u2019s own will.\n\nThis is a direct attack upon the doctrines put forward by both Cournot\nand Renouvier. Fouill\u00e9e is well aware of this, and twenty pages of his\nthesis are devoted to a critical and hostile examination of the\nstatements of both Renouvier and his friend Lequier.[15] Fouill\u00e9e\nclaims that these two thinkers have only disguised and misplaced the\n\u201cliberty of indifference\u201d; they have not, he thinks, really suppressed\nit, although both of them profess to reject it absolutely. A keen\ndiscussion between Fouill\u00e9e and Renouvier arose from this and continued\nfor some time, being marked on both sides by powerful dialectic.\nRenouvier used his paper the _Critique philosophique_ as his medium,\nwhile Fouill\u00e9e continued in subsequent editions of his thesis, in his\n_Id\u00e9e moderne du Droit_ and also in his acute study _Critique des\nSyst\u00e8mes de Morale contemporains_. Fouill\u00e9e took Renouvier to task\nparticularly for his maintaining that if all be determined then truth\nand error are indistinguishable. Fouill\u00e9e claims that the distinction\nbetween truth and error is by no means parallel to that between\nnecessity and freedom. An error may, he points out, be necessitated,\nand consequently we must look elsewhere for our doctrine of certitude\nthan to the affirmation of freedom. In the philosophy of Renouvier, as\nwe have seen, these two are intimately connected. Fouill\u00e9e criticises\nthe neo-critical doctrine of freedom on the ground that Renouvier mars\nhis thought by a tendency to look upon the determinist as a passive and\ninert creature. This, he says, is \u201cthe argument of laziness\u201d applied to\nthe intelligence. \u201cOne forgets,\u201d says Fouill\u00e9e, \u201cthat if intelligence\nis a mirror, it is not an immovable and powerless mirror: it is a\nmirror always turning itself to reality.\u201d[16]\n\n [15] _Ibid_., pp. 117-137.\n\n\n [16] _La Libert\u00e9 et le D\u00e9terminisme_, p. 129.\n\n\nOn examining closely the difference between Renouvier and Fouill\u00e9e over\nthis problem of freedom, we may attribute it to the fact that while the\none thinker is distinctly and rigorously an upholder of continuity, the\nother believes in no such absolute continuity. For Fouill\u00e9e there is,\nin a sense, nothing new under the sun, while Renouvier in his thought,\nwhich has been well described as a philosophy of discontinuity, has a\nplace for new things, real beginnings, and he is in this way linked up\nto the doctrine of creative development as set forth ultimately by\nBergson. It will be seen also as we proceed that Fouill\u00e9e, for all he\nhas to say on behalf of determinism, is not so widely separated in his\nview of freedom from that worked out by Bergson, although at the first\nglance the gulf between them seems a wide one.\n\nFouill\u00e9e, while attacking Renouvier, did not spare that other acute\nthinker, Lachelier, from the whip of his criticism. He takes objection\nto a passage in that writer\u2019s _Induction_ where he advocates the\ndoctrine that the production of ideas \u201cis free in the most rigorous\nsense of that word, since each idea is in itself absolutely independent\nof that which precedes it, and is born out of nothing, as is a world.\u201d\nTo this view of the spontaneity of the spirit Fouill\u00e9e opposes the\nremark that Lachelier is considering only the _new forms_ which are\nassumed by a mechanism which is always operating under the same laws of\ncausality. He asks us in this connection to imagine a kaleidoscope\nwhich is being turned round. The images which succeed each other will\nbe in this sense a formal creation, a form _independent_ of that which\nwent before, but, as he is anxious to remind us, the same mechanical\nand geometrical laws will be operating continually in producing these\nforms.\n\nHaving had these encounters with the upholders of freedom, and thus to\nsome degree having conveyed the impression of being on the side of the\ndeterminists, Fouill\u00e9e proceeds to the task he had set himself\u2014namely,\nthat of reconciliation. He felt the unsatisfactoriness of Kant\u2019s\ntreatment of freedom,[17] and he endeavours to remedy the lack in Kant\nof a real link between the determinism of the natural sciences and the\nhuman consciousness of freedom, realised in the practical reason.\nFouill\u00e9e proposes to find in his _id\u00e9es-forces_ a middle term and to\noffer us a solution of the problem at issue in the dispute.\n\n [17] See above, p. 136.\n\n\nHe begins by showing that there has been an unfortunate neglect of one\nimportant factor in the case\u2014a factor whose reality is frankly admitted\nby both parties. This central, incontestable fact is the _idea_ of\nfreedom. This idea, according to Fouill\u00e9e, arises in us as the result\nOf a combination of various psychological factors, such as notions of\ndiversity, possibility, with the tendency to action arising from the\nnotion of action, which thus shows itself as a force. The combination\nof these results in the genesis of the idea of freedom. Now the\nstronger this idea of freedom is in our minds the more we make it\nbecome a reality. It is an \u201cidea-force\u201d which by being thought tends to\naction and thus increases in power and fruitfulness. The idea of\nfreedom becomes, by a kind of determinism, more powerful in proportion\nto the degree with which it is acted upon. Determinism thus reflects\nupon itself and in a curious way turns to operate against itself. This\ndirecting power of the idea of freedom cannot be denied even by the\nmost rigorous upholders of determinism. They at least are forced to\nfind room in their doctrine for _the idea_ of freedom and its practical\naction on the lives of men, both individually and in societies. The\nvice of the doctrines of determinism has been the refusal to admit the\nreality of the liberating idea of freedom, which is tending always to\nrealise itself.\n\nThe belief in freedom is, therefore, Fouill\u00e9e claims, a powerful force\nin the world. Nothing is a more sure redeemer of men and societies from\nevil ways than the realisation of this idea of freedom. So largely is\nthis the case that indeed the extinction of the _belief_ in freedom\nwould, he argues, not differ much in consequence from the finding that\nfreedom was an illusion, or, if it be a fact, its abolition.\n\nHaving thus rectified the doctrine of determinism by including a place\nwithin it for _the idea_ of freedom, Fouill\u00e9e proceeds by careful\nanalysis to show the error of belief in freedom understood as that of\nan indifferent will. This raises as many fallacious views as that of a\ndeterminism bereft of the idea of freedom. The capricious and\nindifferent liberty he rejects, and in so doing shows us the importance\nof the intelligent power of willing, and also reaffirms the\ndeterminists\u2019 thesis of inability to do certain things. The psychology\nof character shows us a determined freedom, and in the intelligent\npersonality a reconciliation of freedom and determinism is seen to be\neffected. Fouill\u00e9e shows that if it were not true that very largely\nwhat we have been makes us what we are, and that what we are determines\nour future actions, then education, moral guidance, laws and social\nsanctions would all be useless. Indifferentism in thought is the\nreversal of all thought.\n\nFouill\u00e9e sees that the antithesis between Freedom and Necessity is not\nabsolute, and he modifies the warmth of Renouvier\u2019s onslaughts upon the\nupholders of determinism. But he believes we can construct a notion of\nmoral freedom which will not be incompatible with the determinism of\nnature. To effect this reconciliation, however, we must abandon the\nview of Freedom as a decision indifferently made, an action of sheer\nwill unrelated to intelligence. Freedom is not caprice; it is, Fouill\u00e9e\nclaims, a power of indefinite development.\n\nYet, in the long and penetrating Introduction to his volume on the\n_Evolutionnisme des Id\u00e9es-forces_, Fouill\u00e9e points out that however\nmuch science may feel itself called upon to uphold a doctrine of\ndeterminism for its own specific purposes, we must remember that the\nsphere of science is not all-embracing. There is the sphere of action,\nand the practical life demands and, to a degree demonstrates, freedom.\nFouillee admits in this connection the indetermination of the future,\n_pour notre esprit_. We act upon this idea of relative indeterminism,\ncombining with it the idea of our own action, the part which we\npersonally feel called upon to play. He recognises in his analysis how\nimportant is this point for the solution of the problem. We cannot\noverlook the contribution which our personality is capable of making to\nthe whole unity of life and experience, not only by its achievements in\naction, but by its ideals, by that which we feel both _can_ and\n_should_ be. Herein lies, according to Fouill\u00e9e\u2019s analysis, the secret\nof duty and the ideal of our power to fulfil it, based upon the central\nidea of our freedom. By thus acting on these ideas, and by the light\nand inspiration of these ideals, we tend to realise them. It is this\nwhich marks the point where a doctrine of pure determinism not only\nshows itself erroneous and inadequate, but as Fouillee puts it, the\nhuman consciousness is the point where it is obliged to turn against\nitself \u201cas a serpent which bites its own tail.\u201d[18] Fatalism is a\nspeculative hypothesis and nothing else. Freedom is equally an\nhypothesis, but, adds Fouill\u00e9e, it is an hypothesis which is at work in\nthe world.\n\n [18] _Evolutionnisme des Id\u00e9es-forces_, Introduction, p. lxxiv.\n\n\nIn the thought of Guyau there is a further insistence upon freedom in\nspite of the fact that his spiritualism is super-added to much which\nreveals the naturalist and positive outlook. He upholds freedom and,\nindeed, contingency, urging, as against Ravaisson\u2019s teleology, that\nthere is no definite tendency towards truth, beauty and goodness. At\nall times, too, Guyau is conscious of union with nature and with his\nfellows in a way which operates against a facile assertion of freedom.\nIn his _Vers d\u2019un Philosophe_ he remarks:\n\n\u201c_Ce mot si doux au coeur et si cher, Libert\u00e9,\nJ\u2019en pr\u00e9f\u00e8rs encore un: c\u2019est Solidarit\u00e9._\u201d[19]\n\n\n [19] _Vers d\u2019un Philosophe, \u201cSolidarit\u00e9,\u201d_ p. 38.\n\n\nThe maintenance of the doctrine of liberty, which in view of the facts\nwe are bound to maintain, does away, Guyau insists, with the doctrine\nof Providence; for him, as for Bergson, there is no _pr\u00e9vision_ but\nonly _nouveaut\u00e9_ in the universe. Guyau indeed is not inclined to admit\neven that end which Bergson seems to favour\u2014namely, \u201cspontaneity of\nlife itself.\u201d The world does not find its end in us, any more than we\nfind our \u201cends\u201d fixed for us in advance. Nothing is fixed, arranged or\npredetermined; there is not even a primitive adaptation of things to\none another, for such adaptation would involve the pre-existence of\nideas prior to the material world, together with a demiurge arranging\nthings upon a plan in the manner of an architect. In reality there is\nno plan; every worker conceives his own. The world is a superb example,\nnot of order, such as we associate with the idea of Providence in\naction, but the reverse, disorder, the result of contingency and\nfreedom.\n\nThe supreme emphasis upon the reality of freedom appears, however, in\nthe work of Boutroux and of Bergson at the end of our period. They\narrive at a position diametrically opposed to that of the upholders of\ndeterminism, by their doctrines of contingency as revealed both in the\nevolution of the universe and in the realm of personal life. There is\nthus seen, as was the case with the problem of science, a complete\n\u201cturn of the tide\u201d in the development since Comte.\n\nBoutroux, summing up his thesis _La contingence des Lois de la Nature_,\nindicates clearly in his concluding chapter his belief in contingency,\nfreedom and creativeness. The old adage, \u201cnothing is lost, nothing is\ncreated,\u201d to which science seems inclined to attach itself, has not an\nabsolute value, for in the hierarchy of creatures contingency, freedom,\nnewness appear in the higher ranks. There is at work no doubt a\nprinciple of conservation, but this must not lead us to deny the\nexistence and action of another principle, that of creation. The world\nrises from inorganic to organic forms, from matter to spirit, and in\nman himself from mere sensibility to intelligence, with its capacity\nfor criticising and observing, and to will capable of acting upon\nthings and modifying them by freedom.\n\nBoutroux inclines to a doctrine of finalism somewhat after the manner\nof Ravaisson. The world he conceives as attracted to an end; the\nbeautiful and the good are ideals seeking to be realised; but this\nbelief in finality does not, he expressly maintains, exclude\ncontingency. To illustrate this, Boutroux uses a metaphor from\nseamanship: the sailors in a ship have a port to make for, yet their\nadaptations to the weather and sea en route permit of contingency along\nwith the finality involved in their making for port. So it is with\nbeings in nature. They have not merely the one end, to exist amid the\nobstacles and difficulties around them, \u201cthey have an ideal to realise,\nand this ideal consists in approaching to God, to his likeness, each\nafter his kind. The ideal varies with the creatures, because each has\nhis special nature, and can only imitate God in and by his own\nnature.\u201d[20]\n\n [20] _La Contingence des Lois de la Nature_, p. 158.\n\n\nBoutroux\u2019s doctrine of freedom and contingency is not opposed to a\nteleological conception of the universe, and in this respect he stands\nin contrast to Bergson, who, in the rigorous application of his theory\nof freedom, rules out all question of teleology. With Renouvier and\nwith Bergson, however, Boutroux agrees in maintaining that this\nfreedom, which is the basis of contingency in things, is not and cannot\nbe a datum of experience, directly or indirectly, because experience\nonly seizes things which are actually realised, whereas this freedom is\na creative power, anterior to the act. Heredity, instinct, character\nand habit are words by which we must not be misled or overawed into a\ndisbelief in freedom. They are not absolutely fatal and fully\ndetermined. The same will, insists Boutroux, which has created a habit\n_can_ conquer it. Will must not be paralysed by bowing to the assumed\nsupremacy of instincts or habits. Habit itself is not a contradiction\nof spontaneity; it is itself a result of spontaneity, a state of\nspontaneity itself, and does not exclude contingency or freedom.\n\nMetaphysics can, therefore, according to Boutroux, construct a doctrine\nof freedom based on the conception of contingency. The supreme\nprinciples according to this philosophy will be laws, not those of the\npositive sciences, but the laws of beauty and goodness, expressing in\nsome measure the divine life and supposing free agents. In fact the\ntriumph of the good and the beautiful will result in the replacement of\nlaws of nature, strictly so called, by the free efforts of wills\ntending to perfection\u2014that is, to God.\n\nFurther studies upon the problem of freedom are to be found in\nBoutroux\u2019s lectures given at the Sorbonne in 1892-93 in the course\nentitled _De l\u2019Id\u00e9e de la Loi naturelle dans la Science et la\nPhilosophie contemporaines_. He there recognises in freedom the crucial\nquestion at issue between the scientists and the philosophers, for he\nstates the object of this course of lectures as being a critical\nexamination of the notion we have of the laws of nature, with a view to\ndetermining the situation of human personality, particularly in regard\nto free action.[21] Boutroux recognises that when the domain of science\nwas less extensive and less rigorous than it is now it was much easier\nto believe in freedom. The belief in Destiny possessed by the ancients\nhas faded, but we may well ask ourselves, says Boutroux, whether modern\nscience has not replaced it by a yet more rigorous fatalism.[22] He\nconsiders that the modern doctrine of determinism rests upon two\nassumptions\u2014namely, that mathematics is a perfectly intelligible\nscience, and is the expression of absolute determinism; also that\nmathematics can be applied with exactness to reality. These assumptions\nthe lecturer shows to be unjustifiable. Mathematics and experience can\nnever be fitted exactly into each other, for there are elements in our\nexperience and in our own nature which cannot be mathematically\nexpressed. This Boutroux well emphasises in his lecture upon\nsociological laws, where he asserts that history cannot be regarded as\nthe unrolling of a single law, nor can the principle of causality,\nstrictly speaking, be applied to it.[23] An antecedent certainly may be\nan influence but not a cause, as properly understood. He here agrees\nwith Renouvier s position and attitude to history, and shows the vital\nbearing of the problem of freedom upon the philosophy of history, to\nwhich we shall presently give our special attention.\n\n [21] _De l\u2019Id\u00e9e de la Loi naturelle_, Lecture IV., p. 29.\n\n\n [22] Compare Janet\u2019s remark, given on p. 136.\n\n\n [23] Lecture XIII.\n\n\nInstead of the ideal of science, a mathematical unity, experience shows\nus, Boutroux affirms, a hierarchy of beings, displaying variety and\nspontaneity\u2014in short, freedom. So far, therefore, from modern science\nbeing an advocate of universal determinism, it is really, when rightly\nregarded, a demonstration, not of necessity, but of freedom. Boutroux\u2019s\ntreatment of the problem of freedom thus demonstrates very clearly its\nconnection with that of science, and also with that of progress. It\nforms pre-eminently the central problem.\n\nThe idea of freedom is prominent in the \u201cphilosophy of action\u201d and in\nthe Bergsonian philosophy; indeed, Bergson\u2019s treatment of the problem\nis the culmination of the development of the idea in Cournot, Renouvier\nand the neo-spiritualists. In Blondel the notion is not so clearly\nworked out, as there are other considerations upon which he wishes to\ninsist. Blondel is deeply concerned with the power of ideals over\naction, and his thought of freedom has affinities to the psychology of\nthe _id\u00e9es-forces_. This is apparent in his view of the will, where he\ndoes not admit a purely voluntarist doctrine. His insistence on the\ndynamic of the will in action is clear, but he reminds us that the will\ndoes not cause or produce everything, for the will wills to be what is\nnot yet; it strives for achievement, to gain something beyond itself.\nMuch of Blondel\u2019s treatment of freedom is coloured by his religious and\nmoral psychology, factors with which Bergson does not greatly concern\nhimself in his writings. Blondel endeavours to maintain man\u2019s freedom\nof action and at the same time to remain loyal to the religious notion\nof a Divine Providence, or something akin to that. Consequently he is\nled to the dilemma which always presents itself to the religious\nconsciousness when it asserts its own freedom\u2014namely, how can that\nfreedom be consistent with Divine guidance or action? Christian\ntheology has usually been determinist in character, but Blondel\nattempts to save freedom by looking upon God as a Being immanent in\nman.\n\nBergson makes Freedom a very central point in his philosophy, and his\ntreatment of it bears signs of the influence of De Biran, Ravaisson,\nLachelier, Guyau and Boutroux. He rejects, however, the doctrine of\nfinality as upheld by Ravaisson, Lachelier and Boutroux, while he\nstresses the contingency which this last thinker had brought forward.\nHis solution of the problem is, however, peculiarly his own, and is\nbound up with his fundamental idea of change, or LA DUR\u00c9E.\n\nIn his work _Les Donn\u00e9es imm\u00e9diates de la Conscience_, or _Time and\nFree-Will_, he criticises the doctrine of physical determinism, which\nis based on the principle of the conservation of energy, and on a\npurely mechanistic conception of the universe. He here points out, and\nlater stresses in his _Matiere et M\u00e9moire_, the fact that it has not\nbeen proved that a strictly determined psychical state corresponds to a\ndefinite cerebral state. We have no warrant for concluding that because\nthe physiological and the psychological series exhibit some\ncorresponding terms that therefore the two series are absolutely\nparallel. To do so is to settle the problem of freedom in an entirely\n_a priori_ manner, which is unjustifiable.\n\nThe more subtle and plausible case for psychological determinism\nBergson shows to be no more tenable than that offered for the physical.\nIt is due to adherence to the vicious Association-psychology, which is\na psychology without a self. To say the self is determined by motive\nwill not suffice, for in a sense it is true, in another sense it is\nnot, and we must be careful of our words. If we say the self acts in\naccordance with the strongest motive, well and good, but how do we know\nit is the strongest? Only because it has prevailed\u2014that is, only\nbecause the self acted upon it, which is totally different from\nclaiming that the self was determined by it externally. To say the self\nis determined by certain tives is to say it is self-determined. The\nessential thing in all this is the vitality of the self.\n\nThe whole difficulty, Bergson points out, arises from the fact that all\nattempts to demonstrate freedom tend only to strengthen the artificial\ncase for determinism, because freedom is only characteristic of a self\n_in action_. He is here in line on this point with Renouvier and\nBoutroux, although the reasons he gives for it go beyond in\npsychological penetration those assigned by these thinkers. When our\naction is over, says Bergson, it seems plausible to argue a case for\ndeterminism because of our spatial conception of time and the\nrelationships of events in time. We have a habit of thinking in terms\nof space, by mathematical time, not in real time or _la dur\u00e9e_ as\nBergson calls it, the time in which the living soul acts.\n\nBergson thus makes room in the universe for a freedom of the human\nwill, a creative activity, and thus delivers us from the bonds of\nnecessity and fatalism in which the physical sciences and the\nassociationist psychology would bind us. We perceive ourselves as\ncentres of indetermination, creative spirits. We must guard our\nfreedom, for it is an essential attribute of spirit. In so far as we\ntend to become dominated by matter, which acts upon us in habit and\nconvention, we lose our freedom. It is not absolute, and many never\nachieve it, for their personality never shines forth at all: they live\ntheir lives in habit and routine, victims of automatism. We have,\nhowever, Bergson urges, great power of creation. He stresses, as did\nGuyau, the Conception of Life, as free, expanding, and in several\nrespects his view of freedom is closer to that of Guyau than to that of\nBoutroux, in spite of the latter\u2019s contingency. There is no finalism\nadmitted by Bergson, for he sees in any teleology only \u201ca reversed\nmechanism.\u201d\n\nObviously the maintenance of such a doctrine of freedom as that of\nBergson is of central importance in any philosophy which contains it.\nOur conceptions of ethics and of progress depend upon our view of\nfreedom. For Bergson \u201cthe portals of the future stand wide open, the\nfuture is being made.\u201d He is an apostle of a doctrine of absolute\ncontingency which he applied to the evolution of the world, in his\nfamous volume _L\u2019Evolution Cr\u00e9atrice_ (published in 1907). His\nphilosophy has been termed pessimistic by some in view of his rejection\nof any teleological conception. Such a doctrine would conflict with his\n\u201cfree\u201d universe and his absolute contingency. On the other hand, it\nleaves open an optimistic view, because of its freedom, its insistence\nupon the possibilities of development. It is not only a reaction\nagainst the earlier doctrines of determinism, it is a deliverance of\nthe human soul which has always refused, even when religious, to\nabandon entirely the belief in its own freedom.\n\nSuch is the doctrine of freedom which closes our period, a striking\ncontrast to the determinism which, under the influence of modern\nscience, characterised its opening. The critique of science and the\nassaults upon determinism proceeded upon parallel lines. In many\nrespects they were two aspects of the one problem, and in themselves\nwere sufficient to describe the essential development in the thought of\nour half century, for the considerations of progress, ethics and\nreligion to which we now turn derive their significance largely from\nwhat has been set forth in these chapters on Science and Freedom.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V\nPROGRESS\n\n\nINTRODUCTORY : Freedom and Progress intimately connected\u2014Confidence in\nProgress, a marked feature of the earlier half of the nineteenth\ncentury, was bound up with confidence in Science and Reason, and in a\nbelief in determinism, either natural or divine\u2014Condorcet, Saint-Simon,\nComte and others proclaim Progress as a dogma.\n\nI. The idea of progress in Vacherot, Tame and Renan\u2014Interesting\nreflections of Renan based on belief in Reason.\n\nII. Cournot and Renouvier regard Progress in a different light, owing\nto their ideas on Freedom\u2014They look upon it as a possibility only, but\nnot assured, not inevitable\u2014Renouvier\u2019s study of history in relation to\nprogress and his view of immortality as Progress\u2014No law of progress\nexists.\n\nIII. The new spiritualist group emphasise the lack of any law of\nprogress, by their insistence on the spontaneity of the spirit,\ncreativeness and contingency\u2014Difficulties of finalsm or teleology in\nrelation to progress as free\u2014No law or guarantee of progress.\n\nCONCLUSION : Complete change from earlier period regarding Progress\u2014New\nview of it developed\u2014Facile optimism rejected.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V\nPROGRESS\n\nIntimately bound up with the idea of freedom is that of progress. For,\nalthough our main approach to the discussion of freedom was made by way\nof the natural sciences, by a critique of physical determinism, and\nalso by way of the problem of personal action, involving a critique of\npsychological determinism, it must be noted that there have appeared\nthroughout the discussion very clear indications of the vital bearing\nof freedom upon the wide field of humanity\u2019s development considered as\na whole\u2014in short, its history. The philosopher must give some account\nof history, if he is to leave no gap in his view of the universe. The\nphilosophy of history will obviously be vastly different if it be based\non determinism rather than on freedom. When the philosopher looks at\nhistory his thoughts must inevitably centre around the idea of\nprogress. He may believe in it or may reject it as an illusion, but his\nattitude to it will be very largely a reflection of the doctrine which\nhe has formed regarding freedom.\n\nThe notion of progress is probably the most characteristic feature\nwhich distinguishes modern civilisation from those of former times. It\nwould have seemed to the Greeks foolishness. We owe it to the people\nwho, in the modern world, have been what Greece was in the ancient\nworld, the glorious mother of ideas. The eighteenth century was marked\nin France by a growing belief in progress, which was encouraged by the\nEncyclopaedists and rose to enthusiasm at the Revolution. Its best\nexpression was that given by Condorcet, himself an Encyclopaedist, and\noriginally a supporter of the Revolution. His _Sketch of an Historical\nPicture of the Progress of the Human Mind_ was written in 1793 (while\nits author was threatened with the guillotine[1]), published two years\nlater, and became, in the early years of the nineteenth century, a\npowerful stimulus to thought concerning progress. Much of the work is\ndefective, but it had a great influence upon Saint-Simon, the early\nsocialists, and upon the doctrines of Auguste Comte, which themselves\nare immediate antecedents of our own period. We may note briefly here,\nthat Condorcet believed in a sure and infallible progress in knowledge\nand in social welfare. This is the important doctrine which Saint-Simon\nand Comte both accepted from him. His ideal of progress is contained in\nthe three watchwords of the Revolution, _Libert\u00e9_, _Egalit\u00e9_,\n_Fraternit\u00e9_, particularly the last two. He forecasts an abandonment of\nmilitarism, prophesies an era of universal peace, and the reign of\nequality between the sexes. Equality is a point which he insists upon\nvery keenly, and, although he did not speak of sociology as did Comte,\nnor of socialism as did Saint-Simon, he claimed that the true history\nof mankind is the history of the great mass of workers: it is not\ndiplomatic and military, not the record of dazzling deeds of great men.\nCondorcet, however, was dogmatic in his belief in progress, and he did\nnot work out any \u201claw\u201d of progress, although he believed progress to be\na law of the universe, in general, and an undeniable truth in regard to\nthe life-history of mankind.\n\n [1] He was ultimately imprisoned and driven to suicide.\n\n\nLater, his friend Cabanis upheld a similarly optimistic view, and\nendeavoured to argue for it, against the Traditionalists, who we may\nremember endeavoured to restate Catholicism, and to make an appeal to\nthose whom the events of the Revolution had disturbed and\ndisillusioned. The outcome of the Terror had somewhat shaken the belief\nin a straightforward progress, but enthusiastic exponents of the\ndoctrine were neither lacking nor silent. Madame de Sta\u00ebl continued the\nthought of Condorcet, thus forming a link between him and Saint-Simon\nand Comte. The influence of the Traditionalists and the general current\nof thought and literature known as Romanticism, helped also to solve a\ndifficulty which distinguishes Condorcet from Comte. This difficulty\nlay in the eighteenth-century attitude to the Middle Ages, which\nCondorcet had accepted, and which seriously damaged his thesis of\ngeneral progress, for in the eighteenth century the Middle Ages were\nlooked upon as a black, dark regress, for which no thinker had a good\nword to say. The change of view is seen most markedly when we come to\nComte, whose admiration of the Middle Ages is a conspicuous feature of\nhis work. While, however, Saint-Simon and Comte were working out their\nideas, great popularity was given to the belief in progress by the\ninfluence of Cousin, Jouffroy, Guizot, and by Michelet\u2019s translation of\nthe _Scienza nuova_ of the Italian thinker Vico, a book then a century\nold but practically unknown in France. For Cousin, the world process\nwas a result of a necessary evolution of thought, which he conceived in\nrather Hegelian fashion. Jouffroy agreed with this fatal progress,\nalthough he endeavoured to reconcile it with that of personal freedom.\nGuizot\u2019s main point was that progress and civilisation are the same\nthing, or rather, that civilisation is to be defined only by progress,\nfor that is its fundamental idea. His definition of progress is not,\nhowever, strikingly clear, and he calls attention to two types of\nprogress\u2014one involving an improvement in social welfare, the other in\nthe spiritual or intellectual life. Although Guizot tried to show that\nprogress in both these forms is a fact, he did not touch ultimate\nquestions, nor did he successfully show that progress is the universal\nkey to human history. He did not really support his argument that\ncivilisation _is_ progress in any convincing way, but he gave a\nstimulus to reflection on the question of the relationship of these\ntwo. Michelet\u2019s translation of Vico came at an appropriate time, and\nserved a useful purpose. It showed to France a thinker who, while not\ndenying a certain progress over short periods, denied it over the long\nperiod, and reverted rather to the old notion of an eternal recurrence.\nFor Vico, the course of human history was not rectilineal but rather\nspiral, although he, too, refrained from indicating any law. He claimed\nclearly enough that each civilisation must give way to barbarism and\nanarchy, and the cycle be again begun.\n\nSuch were the ideas upon progress which were current at the time when\nSaint-Simon, Fourier and Comte were busily thinking out their\ndoctrines, the main characteristics of which we have already noted in\nour Introduction on the immediate antecedents of our period. The\nthought given to the question of progress in modern France is almost\nunintelligible save in the light of the doctrines current from\nCondorcet, through Saint-Simon to Comte, for the second half of the\ncentury is again characterised by a criticism and indeed a reaction\nagainst the idea professed in the first half. This was true in regard\nto Science and to Freedom. We shall see a similar type of development\nillustrated again respecting Progress.\n\nAlready we have noted the general aim and object which both Saint-Simon\nand Comte had in view. The important fact for our discussion here is\nthat Saint-Simon, by his respect for the Middle Ages, and for the power\nof religion, was able to rectify the defects which the ideas of the\neighteenth century had left in Condorcet\u2019s doctrine of progress.\nMoreover, he claimed, as Condorcet had not done, to indicate a \u201claw of\nprogress,\u201d which gives rise alternately to \u201corganic\u201d and to \u201ccritical\u201d\nperiods. The Middle Ages were, in the opinion of Saint-Simon, an\nadmirable period, displaying as they did an organic society, where\nthere was a temporal and spiritual authority. With Luther began an\nanarchical, critical period. According to Saint-Simon s law of progress\na new organic period will succeed this, and the characteristic of that\nperiod will be socialism. He advocated a gradual change, not a violent\nrevolutionary one, but he saw in socialism the inevitable feature of\nthe new era. With its triumph would come a new world organisation and a\nleague of peoples in which war would be no more, and in which the lot\nof the proletariat would be free from oppression and misery. The\nSaint-Simonist School became practically a religious sect, and the\nchief note in its gospel was \u201cProgress.\u201d\n\nThat the notion of progress was conspicuous in the thought of this time\nis very evident. It was, indeed, in the foreground, and a host of\nwriters testify to this, whom we cannot do much more than mention here.\nA number of them figured in the events of 1848. The social reformers\nall invoked \u201cProgress\u201d as justification for their theories being put\ninto action. Bazard took up the ideas of Saint-Simon and expounded them\nin his _Exposition de la Doctrine saint-simonienne_ (1830). Buchez, in\nhis work on the philosophy of history, assumed progress (1833). The\nwork of Louis Blanc on _L\u2019Organisation du Travail_ appeared in 1839 in\na periodical calling itself _Revue des Progr\u00e8s_. The brochure from\nProudhon, on property, came in 1840, and was followed later by _La\nPhilosophie du Progr\u00e8s_ (1851). Meanwhile Fourier\u2019s _Th\u00e9orie des Quatre\nMouvements et des Destin\u00e9es g\u00e9n\u00e9rales_ attempted in rather a fantastic\nmanner to point the road to progress. Worthless as many of his quaint\npages are, they were a severe indictment of much in the existing order,\nand helped to increase the interest and the faith in progress.\nFourier\u2019s disciple, Consid\u00e9rant, was a prominent figure in 1848. The\nUtopia proposed by Cabet insisted upon _fraternit\u00e9_ as the keynote to\nprogress, while the volumes of Pierre Leroux, _De l\u2019Humanit\u00e9_, which\nappeared in the same year as Cabet\u2019s volume, 1840, emphasised _\u00e9galit\u00e9_\nas the essential factor. His humanitarianism influenced the\nwoman-novelist, George Sand. This same watchword of the Revolution had\nbeen eulogised by De Tocqueville in his important study of the American\nRepublic in 1834, and that writer had claimed _\u00e9galit\u00e9_ as the goal of\nhuman progress. All these men take progress as an undoubted fact; they\nonly vary by using a different one of the three watchwords, _Libert\u00e9_,\n_Egalit\u00e9_, _Fraternit\u00e9_, to denote the kind of progress they mean.\nMeanwhile, Michelet and his friend Quinet combated the Hegelian\nconception of history maintained by Cousin, and they claimed _libert\u00e9_\nto be the watchword of progress. The confidence of all in progress is\nalmost pathetic in its unqualified optimism. It is not remarkable that\nthe events of 1851 proved a rude shock. Javary, a writer who, in 1850,\npublished a little work, _De l\u2019Id\u00e9e du Progr\u00e8s_, claimed that the idea\nis the supremely interesting question of the time in its relation to a\ngeneral philosophy of history and to the ultimate destiny of mankind.\nThis is fairly evident from the writers we have cited, without Javary\u2019s\nremark, but it is worth noting as being the observation of a\ncontemporary. With the mention of Reynaud\u2019s _Philosophie religieuse_,\nupholding the principle of indefinite perfectability and Pelletan\u2019s\n_Profession du Foi du XIXe Si\u00e8cle_, wherein he maintained confidently\nand dogmatically that progress is the general law of the universe, we\nmust pass on from these minor people to consider one who had a\nprofounder influence on the latter half of the century, and who took\nover the notion of progress from Saint-Simon.\n\nThis was Comte, whose attitude to progress in many respects resembles\nthat of Saint-Simon, but he brought to his work a mental equipment\nlacking in the earlier writer and succeeded, by the position he gave to\nit in his Positive Philosophy, in making the idea of progress one which\nsubsequent thinkers could not omit from consideration.\n\nAccording to Comte, the central factor in progress is the mental.\nIdeas, as Fouill\u00e9e was later to assert, are the real forces in\nhumanity\u2019s history. These ideas develop in accordance with the \u201cLaw of\nthe Three Stages,\u201d already explained in our Introduction. In spite of\nthe apparent clearness and simplicity of this law, Comte had to admit\nthat as a general law of all development it was to some degree rendered\ndifficult in its application by the lack of simultaneity in development\nin the different spheres of knowledge and social life. While\nrecognising the mental as the keynote to progress, he also insisted\nupon the solidarity of the physical, intellectual, moral and social\nlife of man, and to this extent admitted a connection and interaction\nbetween material welfare and intellectual progress. The importance of\nthis admission lay in the fact that it led Comte to qualify what first\nappears as a definite and confident belief in a rectilineal progress.\nHe admits that such a conception is not true, for there is\nretrogression, conflict, wavering, and not a steady development. Yet he\nclaims that there is a general and ultimate progress about a mean line.\nThe causes which shake and retard the steady progress are not\nall-powerful, they cannot upset the fundamental order of development.\nThese causes which do give rise to variations are, we may note in\npassing, the effects of race, climate and political and military feats\nlike those of Napoleon, for whom Comte did not disguise his hatred,\nstyling him the man who had done most harm to humanity. Great men upset\nhis sociological theories, but Comte was no democrat and strongly\nopposed ideas of Liberty and Equality. We have remarked upon his\ngeneral attitude to his own age, as one of criticism and anarchy. In\nthis he was probably correct, but he quite underestimated the extent\nand duration of that anarchy, particularly by his estimate of the\ndecline and fall of Catholicism and of militarism, which he regarded as\nthe two evils of Europe. The events of the twentieth century would have\nbeen a rude shock to him, particularly the international conflagration\nof 1914-1918. It was to Europe that Comte confined his philosophy of\nhistory and consequently narrowed it. He knew little outside this\nfield.\n\nHe endeavoured, however, to apply his new science of sociology to the\ndevelopment of European history. His work contains much which is good\nand instructive, but fails ultimately to establish any law of progress.\nIt does not seem to have occurred to Comte\u2019s mind that there might not\nbe one. This was the question which was presented to the thinkers after\nhim, and occupies the chief place in the subsequent discussion of\nprogress.\n\nI\n\nIn the second half of the century the belief in a definite and\ninevitable progress appears in the work of those thinkers inspired by\nthe positivist spirit, Vacherot, Taine and Renan. Vacherot\u2019s views on\nthe subject are given in one of his _Essais de Philosophie\ncritique_,[2] entitled \u201c_Doctrine du Progr\u00e8s_.\u201d These pages, in which\nsublime confidence shines undimmed, were intended as part of a longer\nwork on the Philosophy of History. Many of Renan\u2019s essays, and\nespecially the concluding chapters of his work _L\u2019Avenir de la\nScience_, likewise profess an extreme confidence in progressive\ndevelopment. Yet Taine and Renan are both free from the excessive and\nglowing confidence expressed by Condorcet, Saint-Simon and Comte.\nUndoubtedly the events of their own time reacted upon their doctrine of\nprogress, and we have already noted the pessimism and disappointment\nwhich coloured their thoughts regarding contemporary political events.\nBoth, however, are rationalists, and have unshaken faith in the\nultimate triumph of reason.\n\n [2] Published in 1864.\n\n\nThe attitude which Taine adopts to history finds a parallel in the\nfatalism and determinism of Spinoza, for he looks upon the entire life\nof mankind as the unrolling of a rigidly predetermined series of\nevents. \u201cOur preferences,\u201d he remarks, \u201care futile; nature and history\nhave determined things in advance; we must accommodate ourselves to\nthem, for it is certain that they will not accommodate themselves to\nus.\u201d Taine\u2019s view of history reflects his rejection of freedom, for he\nmaintains that it is a vast regulated chain which operates\nindependently of individuals. Fatalism colours it entirely. It is\nprecisely this attitude of Taine which raises the wrath of Renouvier,\nand also that of both Cournot and Fouill\u00e9e, whose discussions we shall\nexamine presently. They see in such a doctrine an untrue view of\nhistory and a theory vicious and detestable from a moral standpoint,\nalthough it doubtless, as Fouill\u00e9e sarcastically remarks, has been a\nvery advantageous one for the exploiters of humanity in all ages to\nteach and to preach to the people.\n\nIn passing from Taine\u2019s fatalistic view of history to note his views on\nprogress we find him asserting that man\u2019s nature does not in itself\ninspire great optimism, for that nature is largely animal, and man is\never ready, however \u201ccivilised\u201d he may appear to be, to return to his\nnative primitive ferocity and barbarism. Man is not, according to\nTaine, even a sane animal, for he is by nature mad and foolish. Health\nand wisdom only occasionally reign, and so we have no great ground for\noptimism when we examine closely the nature of man, as it really is.\nTaine\u2019s treatment of the French Revolution[3] shows his hostility to\ndemocracy, and he is sceptical about the value or meaning of the\nwatchwords, \u201cRights of Man,\u201d or _Libert\u00e9_, _Egalit\u00e9_, _Fraternit\u00e9_.\nThis last, he claims, is merely a verbal fiction useful for disguising\nthe reality, which is actual warfare of all against all.\n\n [3] _\u201cLa R\u00e9volution,\u201d_ in his large work, _Les Origines de la France\n contemporaine_.\n\n\nYet in spite of these considerations Taine believes in a definitely\nguaranteed progress. Man\u2019s lower nature does not inspire optimism, but\nhis high power of reason does, and it is on this faith in reason that\nTaine confidently founds his assertions regarding progress. He sees in\nreason the ultimate end and meaning of all else. The triumph of reason\nis an ideal goal to which, in spite of so many obstacles, all the\nforces of the universe are striving. In this intellectual progress,\nthis gradual rationalisation of mankind, Taine sees the essential\nelement of progress upon which all other goods depend. The betterment\nof social conditions will naturally follow; it is the spiritual and\nmental factor which is the keynote of progress Reason, he contends,\nwill give us a new ethic, a new politic and a new religion.\n\nRenan shares with Taine the belief in reason and its ultimate triumph.\nHis views on progress are, however, more discursive, and are extremely\ninteresting and suggestive. He was in his later years shrewd enough to\ndiscover the difficulties of his own doctrine. Thus although he\nbelieved in a \u201cguaranteed\u201d progress, Renan marks a stage midway between\nthe idea of progress as held by Comte and Taine on the one hand, and by\nCournot and Renouvier on the other.\n\nHis early book, _L\u2019Avenir de la Science_, glows with ardent belief in\nthis assured progress, which is bound up with his confidence in science\nand rationality. \u201cOur creed,\u201d he there declares, \u201cis the reasonableness\nof progress.\u201d This idea of progress is almost as central a point in\nRenan\u2019s thought as it was in that of Comte, and he gave it a more\nmetaphysical significance. His general philosophy owes much to history,\nand for him the philosophy of history is the explanation of progress.\nBy this term he means an ever-growing tendency to perfection, to fuller\nconsciousness and life, to nobler, better and more beautiful ends. He\nthinks it necessary to conceive of a sort of inner spring, urging all\nthings on to fuller life. He seems here to anticipate vaguely the\ncentral conception of Guyau and of Bergson. But, like Taine, Renan\nfounds his doctrine of progress on rationalism. He well expresses this\nin one of his _Drames philosophiques (L\u2019Eau de Jouvence)_, through the\nmouth of Prospero, who represents rational thought. This character\ndeclares that \u201cit is science which brings about social progress, and\nnot progress which gives rise to science. Science only asks from\nsociety to have granted to it the conditions necessary to its life and\nto produce a sufficient number of minds capable of understanding\nit.\u201d[4] In the preface written for this drama he declares that science\nor reason will ultimately succeed in creating the power and force of\ngovernment in humanity.\n\n [4] _L\u2019Eau de Jouvence_, Act 4, Scene I., Conclusion.\n\n\nThese thoughts re-echo many of the sentiments voiced on behalf of\nprogress by Condorcet, Saint-Simon and Comte. It is interesting,\nhowever, to note an important point on which Renan not only parts\ncompany with them, but ranges himself in opposition to them. This point\nis that of socialism or democracy, call it what one will.\n\nIn the spring of 1871 Renan was detained at Versailles during the\nuproar of the Commune in Paris, and there wrote his _Dialogues et\nFragments philosophiques_, which were published five years later. In\nthese pages certain doctrines of progress and history are set forth,\nnotably in the \u201cdialogues of three philosophers of that school whose\nground-principles are the cult of the ideal, the negation of the\nsupernatural and the investigation of reality.\u201d Renan raises a\ndiscussion of the end of the world\u2019s development. The universe, he\nmaintains, is not devoid of purpose: it pursues an ideal end. This goal\nto which the evolutionary process moves is the reign of reason. But\nthere are striking limitations to this advance. From this kingdom of\nreason on the earth the mass of men are shut out. Renan does not\nbelieve in a gradual improvement of the mass of mankind accompanied by\na general rationalisation which is democratic. The truth is that Renan\nwas an intellectual aristocrat and, as such, he abhorred Demos. His\ngospel of culture, upon which he lays the greatest stress, is for the\nfew who are called and chosen, while the many remain outside the pale,\nbeyond the power of the salvation he offers. The development of the\ndemocratic idea he looks upon as thoroughly mischievous, inasmuch as it\ninvolves, in his opinion, degeneration, a levelling down to mediocrity.\nIn his philosophy of history he adopts an attitude somewhat akin to\nthat of Carlyle in his worship of Great Men. The end of history is,\nRenan states, the production of men of genius. The great mass of men,\nthe common stuff of humanity, he likens to the soil from which these\nGreat Ones grow. The majority of men have their existence justified\nonly by the appearance upon the scene of \u201cHeroes of Culture.\u201d In this\nteaching the parallelism to the gospel of the Superman is apparent, yet\nit seems clear that although Renan\u2019s man of culture despises the\nignorance and vulgarity of the crowd, he does so condescendingly as a\nbenefactor, and is free from the passionate hatred and scorn to which\nNietzsche\u2019s Superman is addicted. Nevertheless, Renan\u2019s attitude of\nuncompromising hostility to democratic development is very marked. He\ncouples his confidence in Science to his anti-democratic views, and\naffirms the \u201cHerd\u201d to be incapable of culture. Although the process of\nrationalisation and the establishment of the kingdom of reason is\napplicable only to the patrician and not to the _plebs_, this process\nis claimed by Renan to be capable of great extension, not in the number\nof its adherents but in the extent of culture. In this final reign of\nreason, instinctive action and impulse will be replaced by\ndeliberation, and science will succeed religion.\n\nHis famous letter to Berthelot includes a brief statement of his views\non progressive culture, which, for him, constitutes the sign of\nprogress. \u201cOne ought never,\u201d he writes, \u201cto regret seeing clearer into\nthe depths.\u201d By endeavouring to increase the treasure of the truths\nwhich form the paid-up capital of humanity, we shall be carrying on the\nwork of our pious ancestors, who loved the good and the true as it was\nunderstood in their time. The true men of progress, he claims, are\nthose who profess as their starting-point a profound respect for the\npast. Renan himself was a great lover of the past, yet we find him\nremarking in his _Souvenirs d\u2019Enfance et de Jeunesse_ that he has no\nwish to be taken for an uncompromising reactionist. \u201cI love the past,\nbut I envy the future,\u201d and he thinks that it would be extremely\npleasant to live upon this planet at as late a period as possible. He\nappears jealous of the future and of the young, whose fate it will be\nto know what will be the outcome of the activities of the German\nEmperor, what will be the climax of the conflict of European\nnationalities, what development socialism will take. His shrewd mind\nhad alreadv foreseen in a measure the possible development of German\nmilitarism and of Bolshevism. He regards the world as moving towards a\nkind of \u201cAmericanism,\u201d by which he means a type of life in which\nculture and refinement shall have little place. Yet, although he has a\nhorror and a dread of democracy, he feels also that the evils\naccompanying it may be, after all, no worse than those involved in the\nreactionary dominance of nobles and clergy.\n\nHumanity has not hitherto marched, he thinks, with much method. Order\nhe considers to be desirable, but only in view of progress. Revolutions\nare only absurd and odious, he asserts in _L\u2019Avenir de la Science_, to\nthose who do not believe in progress. Yet he claims that reaction has\nits place in the plan of Providence, for it works unwittingly for the\ngeneral good. \u201cThere are,\u201d to quote his metaphor, \u201cdeclivities down\nwhich the _r\u00f4le_ of the traction engine consists solely in holding\nback.\u201d\n\nRenan thinks that if democratic ideas should secure a clear triumph,\nscience and scientific teaching would soon find the modest subsidies\nnow accorded them cut off. He fears the approach of an era of\nmediocrity, of vulgarity, in fact, which will persecute the\nintellectuals and deprive the world of liberty. He is not thoughtlessly\noptimistic; he was far too shrewd an intellect for that. Our age, he\nsuggests, may be regarded in future as the turning point of humanity\u2019s\nhistory, that point where its deterioration set in, the prelude to its\ndecline and fall. But he asserts, as against this, that Nature does not\nknow the meaning of the word \u201cdiscouragement.\u201d Humanity, proving itself\nincapable of progress, but only capable of further deterioration, would\nbe replaced by other forms. \u201cWe must not, because of our personal\ntastes, our prejudices perhaps, set ourselves to oppose the action of\nour time. This action goes on without regard to us and probably is\nright.\u201d[5] The future of science is assured. With its progress, Renan\npoints out, we must reckon upon the decay of organised religion, as\nprofessed by sects or churches. The disappearance of this organised\nreligion will, however, result most assuredly in a temporary moral\ndegeneration, since morality has been so conventionally bound up with\nthe Church. An era of egoism, military and economic in character, will\narise and for a time prevail.\n\n [5] Preface to _Souvenirs d\u2019Enfance et de Jeunesse_.\n\n\nYet we must not, Renan reminds us, grumble at having too much unrest\nand conflict. The great object in life is the development of the mind,\nand this requires liberty or freedom. The worst type of society is the\ntheocratic state, or the ancient pontifical dominion or any modern\nreplica of these where dogma reigns supreme. A humanity which could not\nbe revolutionary, which had lost the attraction of \u201cUtopias,\u201d believing\nitself to have established the perfect form of existence would be\nintolerable. This raises also the query that if progress be the main\nfeature of our universe, then we have a dilemma to face, for either it\nleads us to a _terminus ad quem_, and so finally contradicts itself, or\nelse it goes on for ever, and it is doubtful then in what sense it can\nbe a progress.\n\nRenan\u2019s own belief was essentially religious, and was coloured by\nChristian and Hebrew conceptions. It was a rationalised belief in a\nDivine Providence. He professed a confidence in the final triumph of\ntruth and goodness, and has faith in a dim, far-off divine event which\nhe terms \u201cthe complete advent of God.\u201d The objections which are so\nfrequently urged by learned men against finalism or teleology of any\nkind whatsoever Renan deemed superficial and claimed, rightly enough,\nthat they are not so much directed against teleology but against\ntheology, against obsolete ideas of God, particularly against the dogma\nof a deliberate and omnipotent Creator. Renan\u2019s own doctrine of the\nDeity is by no means clear, but he believed in a spiritual power\ncapable of becoming some day conscious, omniscient and omnipotent. God\nwill then have come to himself. From this point of view the universe is\na progress to God, to an increasing realisation of the Divinity in\ntruth, beauty and goodness.\n\nThe universe, Renan claims, must be ultimately rooted and grounded in\ngoodness; there must be, in spite of all existing \u201cevils,\u201d a balance on\nthe side of goodness, otherwise the universe would, like a vast\nbanking-concern, fail. This balance of goodness is the _raison d\u2019\u00eatre_\nof the world and the means of its existence. The general life of the\nuniverse can be illustrated, according to Renan, by that of the oyster,\nand the formation within it of the pearl, by a malady, a process vague,\nobscure and painful. The pearl is the spirit which is the end, the\nfinal cause and last result, and assuredly the most brilliant outcome\nof this universe. Through suffering the pearl is formed; and likewise,\nthrough constant pain and conflict, suffering and hardship, the spirit\nof man moves intellectually and morally onward and upward, to the\ncompleted realisation of justice, beauty, truth and infinite goodness\nand love, to the complete and triumphant realisation of God. We must\nhave patience, claims Renan, and have faith in these things, and have\nhope and take courage. \u201cOne day virtue will prove itself to have been\nthe better part.\u201d Such is his doctrine of progress.\n\nII\n\nWith Cournot and Renouvier our discussion takes a new form. Renan,\nTaine, Vacherot and the host of social and political writers, together\nwith August Comte himself, had accepted the fact of progress and clung\nto the idea of a law of progress. With these two thinkers, however,\nthere is a more careful consideration given to the problem of progress.\nIt was recognised as a problem and this was an immense advance upon the\nprevious period, whose thinkers accepted it as a dogma.\n\nTrue to the philosophic spirit of criticism and examination which\ninvolves the rejection of dogma as such, Cournot and Renouvier approach\nthe idea of progress with reserve and free from the confidently\noptimistic assertions of the eighteenth and early nineteenth century.\nScorning the rhetoric of political socialists, positivists and\nrationalists, they endeavour to view progress as the central problem of\nthe philosophy of history, to ascertain what it involves, and to see\nwhether such a phrase as \u201claw of progress\u201d has a meaning before they\ninvoke it and repeat it in the overconfident manner which characterised\ntheir predecessors. We have maintained throughout this work that the\ncentral problem of our period was that of freedom. By surveying the\ngeneral character of the thought of the time, and in following this by\nan examination of the relation of science and philosophy, we were able\nto show how vital and how central this problem was. From another side\nwe are again to emphasise this. Having seen the way in which the\nproblem of freedom was dealt with, we are in a position to observe how\nthis coloured the solutions of other problems. The illustration is\nvivid here, for Cournot and Renouvier develop their philosophy of\nhistory from their consideration of freedom, and base their doctrines\nof progress upon their maintenance of freedom.\n\nIt is obvious that the acceptance of such views as those expressed on\nfreedom by both Cournot and Renouvier must have far-reaching effects\nupon their general attitude to history, for how is the dogma of\nprogress, as it had been preached, to be reconciled with free action?\nIt is much easier to believe in progress if one be a fatalist. The\ndifficulty here was apparent to Comte when he admitted the influence of\nvariations, disturbing causes, which resulted in the development of\nmankind assuming an oscillating character rather than that of a\nstraight-forward progress. He did not, however, come sufficiently close\nto this problem, and left the difficulty of freedom on one side by\nasserting that the operation of freedom, chance or contingency (call it\nwhat we will), issuing in non-predetermined actions, was so limited as\nnot to interfere with the general course of progress.\n\nCournot and Renouvier take up the problem where Comte left it at this\npoint. Each of them takes it a stage further onward in the development.\nThe fundamental ideas of Cournot we have briefly noted as being those\nof order, chance and probability. The relation of these to progress he\ndiscusses, not only in his _Essai sur les Fondements de nos\nConnaissances_ and the _Trait\u00e9 de l\u2019Encha\u00eenement d\u2019Id\u00e9es_, but also in\na most interesting manner in his two volumes entitled _Consid\u00e9rations\nsur la Marche des Id\u00e9es et des Ev\u00e8nements dans les Temps modernes_.\nLike Comte, he is faithful, as far as his principles will allow, to the\nidea of order. There is order in the universe to a certain degree;\nscience shows it to us. There is also, he maintains, freedom, hazard or\nchance. Looking at history he sees, as did Comte, phenomena which, upon\ntaking a long perspective, appear as interferences. Pure reason is, he\nclaims, really incapable of deciding the vital question whether these\ndisturbances are due to a pure contingency, chance or freedom, or\nwhether they mark the points of the influence of the supernatural upon\nmankind\u2019s development. He refers to the _encha\u00eenement de circonstances\nprovidentielles_ which helped the early Jews and led to the propagation\nof their monotheism; which helped also the development of the Christian\nreligion in the Roman Empire. Hazard itself, he claims,[6] may be the\nagent or minister of Providence. Such a view claims to be loyal at once\nto freedom and to order.\n\n [6] _Essai sur les Fondaments de nos Connaissances_, vol. i, chap. 5.\n\n\nCournot continues his discussion further and submits many other\nconsiderations upon progress. He claims that it is absurd to see in\nevery single occurrence the operations of a divine providence or the\nwork of a divine architect. Such a view would exalt his conception of\norder, undoubtedly, but only at the expense of his view of freedom. He\nwill not give up his belief in freedom, and in consequence declares\nthat there is no pre-arranged order or plan in the sense of a \u201claw.\u201d He\nsets down many considerations which appear as dilemmas to the pure\nreason, and which only action, he thinks, will solve. He points out the\ndifficulty of economic and social progress owing to our being unable to\ntest theories until they are in action on a large field. He shows too\nhow conflicting various developments may be, and how progress in one\ndirection may involve degeneration in another. Equality may be good in\nsome ways, unnatural and evil in others. Increase of population may be\napplauded as a progress from a military standpoint, but may be an\neconomic evil with disastrous suffering as its consequence. The\n\u201cprogress\u201d to peace and stability in a society usually involves a\ndecrease in vitality and initiative. By much wealth of argument, no\nless than by his general attitude, Cournot was able to apply the breaks\nto the excessive confidence in progress and to call a halt for sounder\ninvestigation of the matter.\n\nRenouvier did much more in this direction. In his _Second Essay of\nGeneral Criticism_ he touched upon the problem of progress in relation\nto freedom, and his fourth and fifth essays constitute five large\nvolumes dealing with the \u201cPhilosophy of History.\u201d He also devotes the\nlast two chapters of _La Nouvelle Monadologie_ to progress in relation\nto societies, and brings out the central point of his social ethics,\nthat justice is the criterion of progress. Indeed, all that Renouvier\nsays regarding history and progress leads up, in a manner peculiarly\nhis own, to his treatment of ethics, which will claim attention in our\nnext chapter.\n\n_The Analytic Philosophy of History_ forms an important item in the\nphilosophical repertoire of Renouvier. He claims it to be a necessary\nfeature of the neo-critical, and indeed of any serious, philosophy. It\nis, he claims, not a branch of knowledge which has an isolated place,\nfor it is as intimately connected to life as is any theory to the facts\nwhich it embraces. That is not to say, and Renouvier is careful to make\nthis clear, that we approach history assuming that there are laws\ngoverning it, or a single law or formula by which human development can\nbe expressed. The \u201cPhilosophy of History\u201d assumes no such thing; it is\nprecisely this investigation which it undertakes, loyal to the\nprinciples of General Criticism of which it, in a sense, forms a part.\nIn a classification it strictly stands between General Criticism or\nPure Philosophy and History itself.\n\n\u201cHistory,\u201d says Renouvier, \u201cis the experience which humanity has of\nitself,\u201d[7] and his conclusions regarding progress depend on the views\nhe holds regarding human personality and its essential attribute,\nfreedom. The philosophy of history has to consider whether, in\nobserving the development of humanity on the earth, one may assert the\npresence of any general law or laws. Can one say legitimately that\nthere has been development? Is there really such a thing as progress?\nIf so, what is our idea of progress? What is the trend of humanity\u2019s\nhistory? These are great questions.\n\n [7] _Introduction \u00e0 la Philosophie de l\u2019Histoire_, Pr\u00e9face.\n\n\nThe attitude which Renouvier adopts to the whole course of human\nhistory is based upon his fundamental doctrines of discontinuity,\nfreedom and personality. There are, he claims, real beginnings,\nunpredicable occurrences, happenings which cannot be explained as\nhaving been caused by preceding events. We must not, he urges, allow\nourselves to be hypnotised by the name \u201cHistory,\u201d as if it were in\nitself some great power, sweeping all of us onward in its course, or a\nvast ocean in which we are merely waves. Renouvier stands firm in his\nloyalty to personality, and sees in history, not a power of this sort,\nbut simply the total result of human actions. History is the collective\nwork of the human spirit or of free personalities.[8]\n\n [8] Renouvier\u2019s great objection to Comte\u2019s work was due to his\n disagreement with Comte\u2019s conception of Humanity. To Renouvier, with\n his intense valuation of personality, this Comtian conception was too\n much of an abstraction.\n\n\nIt is erroneous to look upon it as either the fatalistic functioning of\na law of things or as the results of the action of an all-powerful\nDeity or Providence. Neither the \u201cscientific\u201d view of determinism nor\nthe theological conception of God playing with loaded dice, says\nRenouvier, will explain history. It is the outcome of human action, of\npersonal acts which have real worth and significance in its formation.\nHistory is no mere display of marionettes, no Punch-and-Judy show with\na divine operator pulling strings from his concealed position behind\nthe curtain. Equally Renouvier disagrees with the view that history is\nmerely an unrolling in time of a plan conceived from eternity. Human\nsociety and civilisation (of which history is the record) are products\nof man\u2019s own thought and action, and in consequence manifest\ndiscontinuity, freedom and contingency. Renouvier thus opposes strongly\nall those thinkers, such as the Saint-Simonists, Hegelians and\nPositivists, who see in history only a fatalistic development. He joins\nbattle especially with those who claim that there is a fatalistic or\nnecessitated progress. History has no law, he claims, and there is not\nand cannot be any law of progress.\n\nThe idea of progress is certainly, he admits, one with which the\nphilosopher is brought very vitally into contact in his survey of\nhistory. Indeed an elucidation of, this notion might itself be a part\nof the historian\u2019s task. If so, the historians have sadly neglected\npart of their work. Renouvier calls attention to the fact that all\nthose historians or philosophers who accept a comforting doctrine of\nhumanity\u2019s assured progress make very plausible statements, but they\nnever seem able to state with any clearness or definiteness what\nconstitutes progress, or what significance lies in their oft-repeated\nphrase, \u201cthe law of progress.\u201d He rightly points out that this\ninsistence upon a law, coupled with a manifest inability to indicate\nwhat it is, causes naturally a certain scepticism as to there being any\nsuch law at all.\n\nRenouvier brands the search for any law of progress a futile one, since\nwe cannot scientifically or logically define the goal of humanity or\nthe course of its development because of the fact of freedom and\nbecause of our ignorance. We must realise that we, personally at\nfirsthand, see only an infinitesimal part of humanity\u2019s life on this\nplanet alone, not to speak of a destiny possible beyond this globe, and\nthat, at second-hand, we have only evidence of a portion of the great\nprocession of human events. We do not know humanity\u2019s beginning and\nprimitive history, nor do we know its goal, if it has one. These\nfactors alone are grave hindrances to the formulation of any conception\nof progress. Reflection upon them might have saved men, Renouvier\nobserves, from the presumptuous belief in assured progress. We cannot\npresume even to estimate the tendencies, the direction of its course,\nbecause of the enormous and ever-increasing complexity of free human\nactivity.\n\nBy his large work on the \u201cPhilosophy of History,\u201d Renouvier shows that\nthe facts of history themselves are against the theory of a universal\nand continuous progress, for the record shows us conflict, advance,\nretrogression, peoples rising, others degenerating, empires\nestablishing themselves and passing away by inward ruin or outer\nassaults, or both, and civilisations evolving and disintegrating in\ntheir turn. The spectacle does not readily promote an optimistic view\nof human development at all, much less support the doctrine of a sure\nand certain progress. Renouvier does not blind himself to the constant\nstruggle and suffering. The theatre, or rather the arena, of history\npresents a curious spectacle. In politics and in religion he shows us\nthat there are conflicts of authority and of free thought, a warfare of\nmajorities with minorities, a method of fighting issues slightly less\nsavage than the appeal to pure force, but amounting to what he terms \u201ca\npacific application of the principle of force.\u201d History shows us the\ncorruption, tyranny and blindness of many majorities, and the tragic\nand necessary resort to force as the only path to liberty for\ndown-trodden minorities. How, Renouvier asks, can we fit this in with a\ndoctrine of assured progress, or, indeed, progress at all?\n\nFurther, he does not find it difficult to show that much unthinking\nutterance on the part of the optimists may be somewhat checked by calm\nreflection on even one or two questions. For example, Was progress\ninvolved in the change from ancient slavery to the wage-slavery of\nmodern industrialism? Was Christianity, as Nietzsche and others have\nattempted to maintain, a retrogression? Or, again, Was the change from\nGreek city life to the conditions of the Middle Ages in any way to be\nregarded as a progress?\n\nRenouvier considers it quite erroneous to assert, as did Comte, that\nthere is a steady and continuous development underlying the\noscillations, and that the variations, as it were, from the direct line\nof progress cancel one another or balance each other, leaving, as Renan\nclaimed, a balance always and inevitably on the side of goodness.\n\nSuch a confidence in the great world banking concern Renouvier does not\npossess. There is no guarantee that the account of goodness may not be\noverdrawn and found wanting. He reminds us sternly and solemnly of the\nterrible solidarity which characterises evil. Deceit, greed, lust,\nviolence and war have an enormous power of breeding each other and of\nsupporting one another increasingly. The optimistic doctrines of\nprogress are simply untrue statements of the facts of history, and\nfalsely coloured views of human nature. It is an appalling error in\n\u201csocial dynamics\u201d to overlook the clash of interest, the greed of\nnation and of class, the fundamental passionate hate and war. With it\nis coupled an error in \u201csocial statics,\u201d in which faith is put in\ninstitutions, in the mechanism of society. These, declares Renouvier,\nwill not save humanity; they will, indeed, ruin it if it allow itself,\nthrough spiritual and moral lethargy, to be dominated by them. They\nhave been serviceable creations of humanity at some time or other, and\nthey must serve men, but men must not be bound down to serve them. This\nservitude is evil, and it has profoundly evil consequences.\n\nHaving attacked Comte\u2019s view of progress and of order in its static and\ndynamic point of view, Renouvier then brings up his heavy artillery of\nargument against Comte\u2019s idealisation of the Middle Ages. To assert\nthat this period was an advance on the life of the Greek city,\nRenouvier considers to be little short of impudence. The art and\nscience and philosophy of the Greeks are our best heritage, while the\nMiddle Ages, dominated by a vicious and intolerant Church, with its\ninfallible theology and its crushing power of the clergy, was a \u201cdead\nhand\u201d upon the human spirit. While it provided an organic society, it\nonly succeeded in doing so by narrowing and crushing the human\nintellect. The Renascence and the Reformation proved that there were\nessential elements of human life being crushed down. They reached a\npoint, however, where they exploded.\n\nNot only does Renouvier thus declare the Middle Ages to be a regress,\nbut he goes the length of asserting that the development of European\nhistory _could_ have been different. This is his doctrine of freedom\napplied to history. There is no reason at all for our regarding the\nMiddle Ages or any such period as necessitated in the order of\nmankind\u2019s development. There is no law governing that development;\nconsequently, had mankind, or even a few of its number, willed and\nacted upon their freedom differently, the whole trend of the period we\ncall the Dark Ages might have been quite other than it was. Renouvier\ndoes not shirk the development of this point, which is a central one\nfor his purpose. It may seem fantastic to the historians, who must of\ncourse accept the past as given and consequently regard reflection on\n\u201cwhat might have been\u201d as wasted time. Certainly the past cannot be\naltered\u2014that is not Renouvier\u2019s point. He intends to give a lesson to\nhumanity, a stern lesson to cure it of its belief in fatalism in regard\nto history. This is the whole purpose of the curious volume he\npublished in 1876, entitled _Uchronie_, which had as its explanatory\nsub-title _L\u2019Utopie dans l\u2019Histoire, Esquisse historique du\nD\u00e9veloppement de la Civilisation europ\u00e9enne, tel qu\u2019il n\u2019a pas \u00e9t\u00e9, tel\nqu\u2019il avail pu \u00eatre_. The book, consisting of two manuscripts supposed\nto be kept in the care of an old Dutch monk, is actually an imaginary\nconstruction by Renouvier himself of European history in the period 100\nto 800 A.D., written to show the real possibility that the sequence of\nevents from the Emperor Nerva to the Emperor Charlemagne might have\nbeen radically different from what it actually was.\n\nAll this is intended by Renouvier to combat the \u201cuniversal\njustification of the past.\u201d He sees that the doctrine of progress as\nusually stated is not only a lie, but that it is an extremely dangerous\none, for it justifies the past, or at least condones it as inevitable,\nand thus makes evil a condition of goodness, demoralises history,\nnullifies ethics and encourages the damnation of humanity itself. This\nfatalistic doctrine, asserts Renouvier with great earnestness, must be\nabandoned; freedom must be recognised as operative, and the human will\nas making history.There is no law of progress, and the sooner humanity\ncan come to realise this the better it will be for it. Only by such a\nrealisation can it work out its own salvation. \u201cThe real law lies\u201d,\ndeclares Renouvier,\u201donly in an equal possibility of progress or\ndeterioration for both societies and individuals.\u201d If there is to be\nprogress it can only come because, and when, humanity recognises itself\nas collectively responsible for its own history, and when each person\nfeels his own responsibility regarding that action. No acceptance of\nevents will avail; we must _will_ progress and consciously set\nourselves to realise it. It is possible, but it depends on us. Here\nRenouvier\u2019s considerations lead him from history to ethics. \u201cAlmost all\nthe Great Men, men of great will, have been fatalists. So slowly does\nhumanity emerge from its shadows and beget for itself a just notion of\nits autonomy. The phantom of necessity weighs heavily,\u201d he laments,\n\u201cover the night of history.\u201d[9] With freedom and a recognition of its\nfreedom by humanity generally we may see the dawn of better things.\nHumanity will then consciously and deliberately make its history, and\nnot be led by the operations of herd-instinct and fatalistic beliefs\nwhich in the past have so disgraced and marred its record.\n\n [9] _Psychologie ralionnelle_, vol. 2, p. 91.\n\n\nThe existing condition of human society can only be described frankly,\nin Renouvier\u2019s opinion, as a state of war. Each individual, each class,\neach nation, each race, is actually at war with others. It matters not\nwhether a diplomatic state of peace, as it is called, exists or not;\nthat must not blind us to the facts. By institutions, customs, laws,\nhidden fraud, diplomacy, and open violence, this conflict is kept up.\nIt is all war, says Renouvier. Modern society is based on war,\neconomic, military or judicial. Indeed, military and naval warfare is a\nclear issue, but only a symbol of what always goes on. Might always has\nthe upper hand, hence ordinary life in modern society is just a state\nof war. Our civilisation does not rest on justice, or on the conception\nof justice; it rests on power and might. Until it is founded on\njustice, peace, he urges, will not be possible; humanity will be\nenslaved in further struggles disastrous o itself. This doctrine of the\n_\u00e9tat de guerre_, as descriptive of modern society, he makes a feature\nof his ethics, upon which we must not here encroach, but may point out\nthat he insists upon justice as the ultimate social criterion, and\nclaims that this is higher than charity, which is inadequate as a basis\nfor society, however much it may alleviate its ills. One of the chief\nnecessities, he points out, an essential to any progressive measure\nwould be to moralise our modern notion of the state.[10] In the notes\nto his last chapter of the _Nouvelle Monadologie_ Renouvier attacks the\nMarxian doctrine of the materialistic determination of history.\n\n [10] This point was further emphasised by Henri Michel in his work,\n _L\u2019Id\u00e9e de l\u2019Etat_.\n\n\nThis same book, however, we must note, marks a stage in Renouvier\u2019s own\nthought different from his doctrines in the earlier _Essais de Critique\ng\u00e9n\u00e9rale_, and this later philosophy, of which the _Monadologie_ and\n_Personnalisme_ are the two most notable volumes, displays an attempt\nto look upon progress from a more ultimate standpoint. His _th\u00e9odic\u00e9e_\nhere involves the notion, seen in Ravaisson, of an early perfection,\ninvolving a subsequent \u201cfall,\u201d the world now, with its _guerre\nuniverselle_, being an intermediate stage between a perfect or\nharmonious state in the past and one which lies in the future.\n\nThe march of humanity is an uncertain one because it is free. The\nphilosophy of history thus reiterates the central importance of\nfreedom. The actual end or purpose of this freedom is not simply, says\nRenouvier, the attainment of perfection, but rather the possibility of\nprogress. It was this thought which led him on in his reflections\nfurther than any of the thinkers of our period, or at least more\ndeliberately than any, to indicate his views on the doctrine of a\nfuture life for humanity. So far from this being a purely religious\nproblem, Renouvier rightly looks upon it as merely a carrying further\nafield of the conception of progress.\n\nFor him, and this is the significant point for us here, any notion of a\nfuture life for humanity, in the accepted sense of immortality, is\nbound up with, and indeed based upon, the conception of progressive\ndevelopment. It is true that Renouvier, like Kant, looks upon the\nproblems of \u201cGod, Freedom and Immortality\u201d as the central ones in\nphilosophy, true also that he recognises the significance of this\nbelief in a Future Life as an extremely important one for religious\nteaching; but his main attitude to the question is merely a\ncontinuation of his general doctrine of progress, coupled with his\nappreciation of personality. It is in this light only that Renouvier\nreflects upon the problem of Immortality. He makes no appeal to a world\nbeyond our experience\u2014a fact which follows from his rejection of the\nKantian world of \u201cnoumena\u201d; nor does he wish the discussion to be based\non the assertions of religious faith. He admits that belief in a Future\nLife involves faith, in a sense, but it is a rational belief, a\nphilosophical hypothesis and, more particularly, according to\nRenouvier, a moral hypothesis. He asserts against critics that the\nundertaking of such a discussion is a necessary part of any Critical\nPhilosophy, which would be incomplete without it, as its omission would\ninvolve an inadequate account of human experience.\n\nRenouvier claims that, in the first instance, the question of a future\nexistence arises naturally in the human mind from the discrepancy which\nis manifest in our experience between nature on the one hand and\nconscience on the other. The course of events is not in accord with\nwhat we feel to be morally right, and the demands of the moral law are,\nto Renouvier\u2019s mind, supreme. He realises how acutely this discrepancy\nis sometimes felt by the human mind, and his remarks on this point\nrecall those of the sensitive soul, who, feeling this acutely, cried\nout:\n\n\u201cAh, Love! could thou and I with Fate conspire\nTo grasp this sorry Scheme of Things entire,\nWould we not shatter it to bits\u2014and then\nRe-mould it nearer to the heart\u2019s desire.\u201d\n\n\nThese lines well express the sharpness of Renouvier\u2019s own feelings, and\nhe claims that, such a conspiracy being impossible, the belief in\nImmortality becomes a necessary moral postulate or probability.\n\nThe grounds for such a postulate are to be found, he claims, even in\nthe processes of nature itself. The law of finality or teleology\nmanifests itself throughout the universe: purpose is to be seen at work\nin the Cosmos. It is true that in the lower stages of existence it\nseems obscure and uncertain, but an observer cannot fail to see \u201cends\u201d\nbeing achieved in the biological realm. The functions of organisms,\nmore particularly those of the animal world, show us a realm of ends\nand means at work for achieving those ends. This development in the\ndirection of an end, this teleology, implies, says Renouvier, a\ndestiny. The whole of existence is a gradual procession of beings at\nhigher and higher levels of development, ends and means to each other,\nand all inheriting an immense past, which is itself a means to their\nexistence as ends in themselves. May one not then, suggests Renouvier,\nmake a valid induction from the destiny thus recognised and partially\nfulfilled of certain individual creatures, to a destiny common to all\nthese creatures indefinitely prolonged?[11]\n\n [11] _Psychologic rationnelle_, vol. 2, pp. 220-221.\n\n\nThe objection is here made that Nature does not concern herself with\nindividuals; for her the individual is merely a means for the carrying\non and propagation of the species. Individuals come into being, live\nfor a time and pass away, the species lives on perpetually; only\nspecies are in the plan of the universe, individuals are of little or\nno worth. To this Renouvier replies that species live long but are not\nperpetual; whole species have been wiped out by happenings on our\nplanet, many now are dying out. The insinuation about the worthlessness\nof individuals rouses his wrath, for it strikes at the very root of his\nphilosophy, of which personality is the keynote. This, he says, is to\nlapse into Pantheism, into doctrines of Buddhists and of Spinoza.\nPantheism and all kindred views are to be rejected. It is not in the\nindefinable, All-existing, the eternal and infinite One, that we find\nhelp with regard to the significance of ends in nature. Ends are to be\nsought in the individuals or the species. But while it behoves us to\nlook upon the world as existing for the species and not the species for\nthe sake of the world, we must remember that the species exists for the\nsake of the individuals in it. It is false to look upon the individuals\nas existing merely for the sake of the species.\n\nIf we subordinate the individual to the species, sacrificing his\ninherent worth and unique value, and then subordinate species to genus\nand all genera to the All, we lose ourselves in the Infinite substance\nin which everything is swallowed up. Again, Pantheism tends to speak of\nthe perfection of individuals, and speaks loudly of progress from one\ngeneration to another. But it tells only of a future which involves the\nentire sacrifice of all that has worth or value in the past. It shows\nendless sacrifice, improvement too, but all for naught. \u201cWhat does it\nmatter to say that the best is yet to be, if the best must perish as\nthe good, to give place to a yet better \u2018best\u2019 which will not have the\nvirtue of enduring any more than the others? Do we offer any real\nconsolation to Sisyphus,\u201d asks Renouvier, \u201cby promising him\nannihilation, which is coupled with the promise of successors capable\nof lifting his old rock higher and still higher up the fatal slope, by\noffering him the eternal falling of this rock and successors who will\ncontinually be annihilated and endlessly be replaced by others?\u201d The\nrock is the personal life. On this theory, however high the rock be\npushed, it always is destined to fall back to the same depth, as low as\nif it had never been pushed up hill at all. We refuse to reconcile a\nworld containing real ends and purposes within it with such a game,\nvast and miserable, in which no actor plays for his own sake, and all\nthe false winners lose all their gains by being obliged to leave the\nparty while the play goes on for ever. This is to throw away all\nindividual worth, the value of all personal work and effort, to declare\nindividuality a sham, and to embrace fatality. It is this mischievous\nPantheism which is the curse of many religions and many philosophies.\nAgainst it Renouvier wages a ceaseless warfare. The individuals, he\nasserts exist both for their own sake and worth, also for the sake and\nwelfare of others. In the person, the law of finality finds its highest\nexpression. Personality is of supreme and unique value.\n\nThis being so, it becomes a necessary postulate of our philosophy, if\nwe really believe in the significance of personalities and in progress\n(which Renouvier considers to have no meaning apart from them), to\nconclude that death is but an event in the career of these\npersonalities. They are perpetuated beyond death.\n\nFor Renouvier, as for Kant, the chief arguments for survival are based\non considerations of a moral character, upon the demands of the moral\nideal for self- realisation, for the attainment of holiness or, more\nproperly, \u201cwholeness.\u201d This progress can only be made possible by the\ncontinued existence after bodily death of the identical personality,\nunique and of eternal worth in the scheme of things, capable of further\ndevelopment than is possible amid the conditions of life as we know it.\n\nWe must, however, present to ourselves Immortality as given by the\ndevelopment of appearances in this world of phenomena, under the\ngeneral laws with which we are acquainted to-day, thus correcting the\nmethod of Kant, who placed Immortality in a noumenal world. The\nsalvation of a philosopher should not be of such a kind. We must treat\nImmortality as a Law, not as a miracle. The thinker who accepts the\nlatter view quits the realm of science\u2014that is, of experience and\nreason\u2014to establish a mystic order in contradiction with the laws of\nnature. The appeal to the \u201csupernatural\u201d is the denial of nature, and\nthe appellant ruins his own case by his appeal. If Immortality is a\nfact, it must be considered rationally.\n\nIs Death\u2014that is, the destruction of individuals as such, or the\nannihilation of personalities\u2014a reality? Renouvier reminds those who\njeer at the doctrine of Immortality that \u201cthe reality of death (as so\ndefined) has not been, and cannot be, proved.\u201d Our considerations must\nof necessity be hypothetical, but they can be worthy of rational\nbeings. We must then keep our hopes and investigations within the realm\nof the universe and not seek to place our hope of immortality in a\nregion where nothing exists, \u201cnot even an ether to support the wings of\nour hope.\u201d\n\nRenouvier\u2019s general considerations led him to view all individuals as\nhaving a destiny in which their individuality should be conserved and\ndeveloped. When we turn in particular to man, these points are to be\nseen in fuller light. The instinctive belief in Immortality is bound up\nwith his nature as a thinking being who is capable of setting up, and\nof striving after, ends. This continual striving is a marked\ncharacteristic of all human life, a counting oneself not to have\nattained, a missing of the mark.\n\nThe human consciousness protests against annihilation. At times this is\nvery keenly expressed. \u201cAt the period of the great aspirations of the\nheart, the ecstasy of noble passions is accompanied by the conviction\nof Immortality. Life at its highest, realising its richest personality,\nprotests, in virtue of its own worth, and in the name of the depths of\npower it still feels latent in itself, against the menace of\nannihilation.\u201d[12] It cries out with its unconquerable soul:\n\n\u201cGive me the glory of going on and not to die!\u201d\n\n\n [12] _Psychologie rationnelle_, vol. 2, p. 249.\n\n\nRenouvier finds a further witness in the testimony of Love\u2014that is to\nsay, in nature itself arrived at the consciousness of that passion in\nvirtue of which it exists and assuring itself by this passion, of the\npower to surmount all these short-comings and failures. Love casteth\nout fear, the dread of annihilation, and shows itself \u201cstronger than\ndeath.\u201d Hope and Love unite in strengthening the initial belief in\nImmortality and the \u201cwill to survive.\u201d\n\nRenouvier admits that this is _a priori_ reasoning, and speedily _a\nposteriori_ arguments can be brought up as mighty battering-rams\nagainst the fortress of immortal life, but although they mav shake its\nwalls, they are unable to destroy the citadel. Nothing can demonstrate\nthe impossibility of future existence, whereas the whole weight of the\nmoral law and the teleological elements at work in the universe are,\naccording to Renouvier, in favour of such a belief.\n\nMorality, like every other science, is entitled to, nay obliged to,\nemploy the hypothesis of harmony. Now in this connection the hypothesis\nof harmony (or, as Kant styled it, the concurrence of happiness and\nvirtue necessary to a conception of order) finds reinforcement from the\nconsideration of the meaning and significance of freedom. For the\nactual end or purpose of freedom is not simply the attainment of\nperfection, but rather the possibility of progress. Immortality becomes\na necessary postulate, reinforced by instinct, reason, morality, by the\nfact of freedom, and the notion of progress. Further, Renouvier feels\nthat if we posit death as the end of all we thereby give an absolute\nvictory to physical evil in the universe.\n\nThe postulate of Immortality has a certain dignity and worth. The\ndiscussion of future life must, however, be kept within the\npossibilities of law and phenomena. Religious views, such as those of\nPriestley, by their appeal to the miraculous debase the notion of\nImmortality itself. Talk of an immortal essence, and a mortal essence\nis meaningless, for unless the same identical person, with his unique\ncharacter and memory, persists, then our conception of immortality is\nof little or no value. The idea of an indestructible spiritual\nsubstance is not any better or more acceptable. Our notion of a future\nlife must be based upon the inherent and inalienable rights of the\nmoral person to persistence and to chances of further development or\nprogress. Although we must beware of losing ourselves in vain\nspeculations, which really empty our thought of all its content,\nRenouvier claims that we are quite entitled to lay down hypotheses.\n\nThe same general laws which we see in operation and which have brought\nthe universe and the beings in it to the stage of development in which\nthey now are may, without contradiction, be conceived as operating in\nfurther developments after the change we call bodily death. There is no\nincongruity in conceiving the self-same personality continuing in a\nsecond and different organism. Renouvier cites the case of the grub and\nthe butterfly and other metamorphoses. In man himself he points to\norganic crises, which give the organism a very different character and\neffect a radical change in its constitution. For example, there is the\ncritical exit from the mother\u2019s womb, involving the change from a being\nliving in an enclosure to that of an independent creature. When once\nthe crisis of the first breath be passed the organism starts upon\nanother life. There are other crises, as, for instance, the radical\nchanges which operate in both sexes at the stage of puberty. Just as\nthe personality persists in its identity through all these changes, may\nit not pass through that of bodily death?\n\nThe Stoics believed in a cosmic resurrection. Substituting the idea of\nprogress for their view of a new beginning, Renouvier claims that we\nmay attain the hypothesis that all human history is but a fragment in a\ndevelopment incomparably greater and grander. Again, we may conceive of\nlife in two worlds co-existing, indeed interpenetrating, so that the\ndead are not gone far from us into some remote heaven.\n\nBut, whatever form we give to our hypothesis regarding progress into\nanother existence beyond this present one, Renouvier does not easily\nallow us to forget that it must be based upon the significance of\nfreedom, progress and personality supported by moral considerations.\nEven this progress is not guaranteed, and even if it should be the\nachievement of some spirits there is no proof that it is universal. Our\ndestiny, he finally reminds us, lies in our own hands, for progress\nhere means an increased capacity for progress later, while spiritual\nand moral indifference will result finally, and indeed, necessarily, in\nannihilation. Here, as so often in his work, Renouvier puts moral\narguments and appeals in the forefront of his thought. Progress in\nrelation to humanity\u2019s life on earth drew from him an appeal for the\nestablishment of justice: progress in a further world implies equally a\nmoral appeal. Our duty is to keep the ideal of progress socially and\nindividually ever before us, and to be worthy of immortality if it be a\nfact, rather than to lose ourselves in the mistaken piety of \u201cother-\nworldliness.\u201d About neither progress can we be dogmatic; it is not\nassured, Renouvier has shown, and we must work for it by the right use\nof our freedom, our intelligence and our will.\n\nIII\n\nNo thinker discussed the problem of progress with greater energy or\npenetration than Renouvier. The new spiritualist group, however,\ndeveloped certain views arising from the question of contingency, or\nthe relation of freedom to progress. These thinkers were concerned more\nwith psychological and metaphysical work, and with the exception of\nFouill\u00e9e and Guyau, they wrote little which bore directly upon the\nproblem of progress. Many of their ideas, however, have an indirect\nbearing upon important points at issue.\n\nIn Ravaisson, Lachelier and Boutroux, we find the question of teleology\npresented, and also that of the opposition of spirit and matter. From\nthe outset the new spiritualism had to wrestle with two difficulties\ninherent in the thought of Ravaisson. These were, firstly, the\nreconciliation of the freedom and spontaneity of the spirit with the\noperations of a Divine Providence or teleology of some kind; and,\nsecondly, the dualism assumed in the warfare of spirit and matter,\nalthough spirit was held to be superior and anterior to matter. This\nlast involved a complication for any doctrine of progress, as it\nrequired a primitive \u201cfall\u201d to account for matter, even a fall of the\nDeity himself. This Ravaisson himself admits, and he thinks that in\ncreating the world God had to sacrifice some of his own being. In this\ncase \u201cprogress\u201d is set over against a transcendental existence, and is\nbut the reawakening of what once existed in God, and in a sense now and\neternally exists. Progress there is, claims Ravaisson, towards truth\nand beauty and goodness. This is the operation of a Divine Providence\nacting by attracting men freely to these ideals, and as these are\nsymbols of God himself, progress is the return of the spirit through\nself-conscious personalities to the fuller realisation of harmony,\nbeauty and love\u2014that is, to the glory of God, who has ever been, now\nis, and ever shall be, perfect beauty, goodness and love.\n\nThus, although from a temporal and finite standpoint Ravaisson can\nspeak of progress, it is doubtful if he is justified in doing so\nultimately, _sub specie \u00e6ternitatis_. To solve the problem in the way\nhe presents it, one would need to know more about the ultimate value\nand significance of the personalities themselves, and their destiny in\nrelation to the Divinity who is, as he claims, perfect harmony, beauty\nand love. It was this point, so dear to an upholder of personality,\nwhich had led Renouvier to continue his discussion of progress in\nrelation to history as generally understood, until it embraced a wider\nfield of eternal destiny, and to consider the idea of a future life as\narising from, and based upon, the conception of progress. It is this\nsame point which later perplexes Bergson, when he recognises this\nself-conscious personality as the ultimate development of the \u00e9volution\ncr\u00e9atrice, and so constituting in a sense the goal of the spirit,\nalthough he is careful to state that there is no finalism involved at\nall. Ravaisson stands for this finalism, however, in claiming that\nthere are ends. He does not see how otherwise we could speak of\nprogress, as we should have no criterion, no _terminus ad quem_; all\nwould be simply process, not progress.\n\n_\u201cD\u00e9tachement de Dieu, retour \u00e0 Dieu, cl\u00f4ture du grand cercle cosmique,\nrestitution de l\u2019universel \u00e9quilibre, telle est l\u2019histoire du monde.\u201d_\nSuch is Ravaisson\u2019s doctrine, much of which is akin to, and indeed\nre-echoes, much in Christian theology from St. Augustine, with his idea\nof an eternal and restless movement of return to the divinity, to the\nWestminster divines in their answer to the important query about the\nchief end of man, which they considered to be not only to glorify God\nbut to enjoy Him for ever. This last and rather strange phrase only\nseems to have significance if we conceive, in Ravaisson\u2019s manner, of\nbeauty, truth and goodness as expressions or manifestations of the\nDivinity to whom the world-process may freely tend.\n\nFor Lachelier the universal process presents a triple aspect, mechanism\nwhich is coupled with finalism and with freedom. These three principles\nare in action simultaneously in the world and in the individual. Each\nof us is at once matter, living soul and personality\u2014that is,\nnecessity, finality and freedom. The laws of the universe, so far from\nbeing expressed entirely by mechanical formulae, can only be expressed,\nas Ravaisson had claimed, by an approach to harmony and beauty, not in\nterms of logic or geometry. All this involves a real progress, a\ncreativeness, which differs from Ravaisson\u2019s return, as it were, to the\nbosom of God.\n\nBoutroux combines the views of Ravaisson and Lachelier by insisting on\nfreedom and contingency, but maintaining at the same time a\nteleological doctrine. Already in discussing his conception of freedom\nwe have referred to his metaphor of the sailors in the ship. His\ndoctrine of contingency is directly opposed to any rigid pre-ordained\nplan of reality or progress, but it does not prevent the spirit from a\ncreative teleology, the formation of a plan as it advances. This is\nprecisely, is it not, the combination of free action and of teleology\nwhich we find in our own lives? Boutroux is thus able to side with\nRavaisson in his claim to see tendencies to beauty and truth and\ngoodness, the fruits of the spirit, which it creates and to which it\ndraws us, while at the same time he maintains freedom in a manner quite\nas emphatic as Lachelier. He is careful to remind us that \u201cnot all\ndevelopments are towards perfection.\u201d[13] In particular he dislikes the\ntype of social theory or of sociology which undervalues the personal\nlife.[14]\n\n [13] _Contingence des Lois de la Nature_, p. 127.\n\n\n [14] Thus he agrees with Renouvier\u2019s objection to Comte\u2019s view and to\n Communism.\n\n\nSimilar in many ways to the ideas of Ravaisson and of Boutroux are\nthose expressed by Blondel. He is concerned deeply with the problem of\nGod and progress, which arises out of his view of the Deity as immanent\nand as transcendent. He is quite Bergsonian in his statement that God\ncreates Himself in us, but he qualifies this by asking the significant\nquestion, \u201cIf he does not EXIST how can He create Himself in us.\u201d This\nbrings us back to Ravaisson\u2019s view. Other remarks of Blondel, however,\nrecall the doctrine of Vacherot and of Renan, that God is the ideal to\nwhich we are ever striving. \u201cIt is a necessity that we should be moving\non, for He is always beyond.\u201d All action is an advance, a progress\nthrough the realm of materialistic determinism to the self-conscious\npersonality in man, but it is from a transcendent teleology, a Divine\nProvidence, that this action proceeds.\n\nThis is the line of thought pursued by Fouill\u00e9e, who in many of his\nwritings gives considerable attention to the doctrines of progress. It\nmay be doubted, however if he ever surpassed the pages in his _Libert\u00e9\net D\u00e9terminisme_ and _L\u2019Evolutionnisme des Id\u00e9es-forces_, which deal\nwith this point. These are the best expressions of his philosophy, and\nFouill\u00e9e repeated himself a great deal. We might add, however, his\n_Socialism_ and his book on _L\u2019Avenir de la M\u00e9taphysique_.\n\nWe have observed the importance attached by Comte to his new science of\nsociology. Fouill\u00e9e endeavours to give to it a metaphysical\nsignificance with which Comte did not concern himself. He suggests in\nhis volume on _La Science sociale contemporaine_ that as biology and\nsociology are closely related, the laws common to them may have a\ncosmic significance. Is the universe, he asks, anything more than a\nvast society in process of formation, a vast system of conscious,\nstriving atoms? Social science which Fouill\u00e9e looks upon, as did Comte,\nas constituting the crown of human knowledge, may offer us, he thinks,\nthe secret of universal life, and show us the world as the great\nsociety in process of development, erring here and blundering there in\nan effort to rise above the sphere of physical determinism and\nmaterialism to a sphere where justice shall be supreme, and brotherhood\ntake the place of antagonism, greed and war. The power at the heart of\nthings, which is always ready to manifest itself in the human\nconsciousness when it can, might be expressed, says Fouill\u00e9e, in one\nword as \u201csociability.\u201d\n\nLife in its social aspect displays a _conspiration_ to a common end.\nThe life of a community resembles a highly evolved organism in many\nrespects, as Fouill\u00e9e shows; but although he thus partially adopts the\nbiological and positivist view of the sociologists, Fouill\u00e9e does not\noverlook the idealistic conceptions of Renouvier and his plea for\nsocial justice. He rather emphasises this plea, and takes the\nopportunity to point out that it represents the best political thought\nof his country, being founded on the doctrine of the _contrat social_\nof Rousseau, of which social theory it is a clear and modern\ninterpretation.\n\nWe may take the opportunity afforded here by Fouill\u00e9e\u2019s mention of\nsociology, in which he was so keenly interested, to observe that the\npositivist tendency to emphasise an indefinite progress remained with\nmost of the sociologists and some of the historians. It is seen in the\ntwo famous sociological works of Tarde and Durkheim respectively, _Les\nLois de l\u2019Imitation_ and _La Division du Travail social_. Two writers\non history deserve mention as illustrating the same tendency: Lacombe,\nwhose work _De l\u2019Histoire consid\u00e9r\u00e9e comme Science_ (1894) was very\npositivist in outlook, and X\u00e9nopol. This last writer, treating history\nin 1899 in his _Principes fondamentaux de l\u2019Histoire_,[15]\ndistinguished cause in history from causality in science, and showed\nthat white the latter leads to the formation of general laws the former\ndoes not. History has no laws, for it is succession but never\nrepetition. Much of his book, however, reflects the naturalism and\npositivism which is a feature of the sociological writers.[16]\n\n [15] This work, revised and considerably augmented, was re-issued in\n 1905 with the new title, _La Th\u00e9orie de l\u2019Histoire_.\n\n\n [16] It was this which made Enouvier criticise sociology. He disagreed\n with its principles almost entirely. On this, see his notes to \u201c_La\n Justice_,\u201d Part VII. of _La Nouvelle Monadogie_, pp. 527-530.\n\n\nIt was his doctrine of _id\u00e9es-forces_ and its essential spiritualism or\nidealism which distinguished Fouill\u00e9e\u2019s attitude from that of these\nsociologists who were his contemporaries. It was the basis, too, of his\ntrenchant criticisms of socialism, particularly its Marxian forms.\nFouill\u00e9e agrees with Comte\u2019s doctrine that speculation or thought is\nthe chief factor and prime mover in social change. For Fouill\u00e9e the\nidea is always a force; and it is, in this connection, the supreme\nforce. The history of action can only be understood, he asserts, in\nrelation to the history of ideas. This is the central gospel of the\n_\u00e9volutionnisme des id\u00e9es-forces_. The mental or spiritual is the\nimportant factor. This he opposes to the Marxian doctrine of economic\ndeterminism. Will is, he claims a greater reality than brute forces,\nand in will lies the essence of the human spirit. It is a will,\nhowever, which is bound up with reason and self-consciousness, and\nwhich is progressive in character.\n\nSumming up his work, _Histoire g\u00e9n\u00e9rale de la Philosophie_, Fouill\u00e9e\nrefers in his Conclusion to the idea of progress as having become the\ndominant note in philosophy. He looks upon the history of philosophy\nas, in some measure, witness to this. Above the ebb and flow of the\nvaried systems and ideas which the ages have produced he sees an\nadvance accomplished in the direction to which humanity is\ntending\u2014perfect knowledge of itself or collective self-consciousness\nand perfect self- possession. This type of progress is not to be\nequated with scientific progress. He points out that in the development\nof philosophy, which is that of human reflection itself, two\ncharacteristics appear. The distinction of two kinds or aspects of\ntruth is seen in philosophy; one section, dealing with logic,\npsychology, aesthetic and applied ethics, or sociology, approaches to a\nscientific character of demonstrability, while the other section, which\nconstitutes philosophy in the strict sense of metaphysic, deals with\nultimate questions not capable of proof but demanding a rational faith.\nObviously the same kind of progress cannot be found in each of these\nsections. This must be realised when progress in knowledge is spoken\nabout. He suggests, as illustrative of progress even in the speculative\nrealm, the fact that humanity is slowly purifying its conception of\nGod\u2014a point for further notice in our last chapter.\n\nHowever much Fouill\u00e9e is concerned with establishing; a case for\nprogress in knowledge, it is clear that his main stress is on the\nprogress in self-consciousness or that self- determination which is\nfreedom. This freedom can only grow as man consciously realises it\nhimself. It is an _id\u00e9e-force_, and has against it all the forces of\nfatalism and of egoism. For Fouill\u00e9e quite explicitly connects his\ndoctrine of freedom with that of altruism. The real freedom and the\nreal progress are one, he claims, since they both are to be realised\nonly in the increasing power of disinterestedness and love. He believes\nin the possibility of a free progress. Fatality is really egoism, or\nproduces it.\n\nFouill\u00e9e has a rather clear optimism, for he finds in the development\nof real freedom a movement which will involve a moral and social union\nof mankind. The good- will is more truly human nature than egoism and\nselfishness. These vices, he maintains in his _Id\u00e9e moderne du\nDroit_,[17] are largely a product of unsatisfied physical wants. The\nideal of the good-will is not a contradiction of human nature, because,\nhe asserts, that nature desires and wills its good. More strikingly, he\nstates that the human will tends ultimately not to conflict but to\nco-operation as it becomes enlightened and universalised. He disagrees\nwith the pessimists and upholds a comparatively cheerful view of human\nnature. Egoism is much less deeply rooted than sympathy, and therefore,\nhe says, war and strife are transitory features of human development.\nOne contrasts the views of Taine and Renouvier with this, and feels\nthat man\u2019s history has been, as far as we know it, entirely of this\n\u201ctransitory\u201d nature, and is long likely to be so.\n\n [17] _L\u2019Id\u00e9e moderne du Droit_, Livre IV.\n\n\nFouill\u00e9e\u2019s optimism seems to be overdrawn mainly because of his\ndoctrine of the _id\u00e9e-force_. He exaggerates the response which human\nnature is likely to make to the ideal good. Even if it be lifted up, it\nis not likely to draw _all_ men to it. Yet Fouill\u00e9e\u2019s social and\nethical doctrines stand entirely upon this foundation. They are\nvaluable views, and Fouill\u00e9e is never better than when he is exhorting\nhis fellows to act upon the ideas of freedom, of justice, of love and\nbrotherhood. He is right in his insistence upon humanity\u2019s power to\ncreate good- will, to develop a new order. For the good man, he says,\nfatality and egoism are obstacles to be overcome Believing in freedom\nand in sympathy, he acts to others in a spirit of freedom and love. By\nhis very belief in universal good-will among men, he assists largely in\ncreating it and realising it in the world.[18]\n\n [18] Conclusion to _Libert\u00e9 et D\u00e9terminisme_.\n\n\nBut did not Fouill\u00e9e, one asks, overrate the number of good men (as\ngood in his sense), or rather did he not exaggerate the capacities of\nhuman nature to respond to the ideal which he presents? Much of his\nconfidence in moral and social progress finds its explanation here.\n\nHis step-son, Guyau, was not quite so optimistic, although he believed\nin a progress towards \u201csociability\u201d and he adopted many of the\ndoctrines of the _philosphie des id\u00e9es-forces_. He attacks cheerful\noptimism in his _Esquisse d\u2019une Morale sans Obligation ni Sanction_,\nwhere he remarks[19] that an absolute theory of optimism is really an\nimmoral theory, for it involves the negation of progress in the strict\nand true sense. This is because, when it dominates the mind, it\nproduces a feeling of entire satisfaction and contentment with the\nexisting reality, resulting in resignation and acceptance of, if not an\nactual worship of, the _status quo_. In its utter obedience to all\n\u201cpowers that be,\u201d the notions of right and of duty are dimmed, if not\nlost. A definitely pessimistic view of the universe would, he suggests,\nbe in many respects better and more productive of good than an\noutrageous optimism. Granting that it is a wretched state in which a\nman sees all things black, it is preferable, Guyau thinks, to that in\nwhich all things appear rosy or blue.\n\n [19] _Esquisse d\u2019une Morale_, p. 10.\n\n\nGuyau concludes his _Esquisse d\u2019une Morale sans Obligation ni Sanction_\nby remarking: \u201cWe are, as it were, on the _Leviathan_, from which a\nwave has torn the rudder and a blast of wind carried away the mainmast.\nIt is lost in the ocean as our earth is lost in space. It floats thus\nat random, driven by the tempest, like a huge derelict, yet with men\nupon it, and yet it reaches port. Perhaps our earth, perhaps humanity,\nwill also reach that unknown end which they will have created for\nthemselves. No hand directs us; the rudder has long been broken, or\nrather it has never existed; we must make it: it is a great task, and\nit is our task.\u201d This paragraph speaks for itself as regards Guyau\u2019s\nattitude to the doctrine of an assured progress.\n\nIn his notable book _L\u2019Irreligion de l\u2019Avenir_, the importance of which\nwe shall note more fully when we deal with the religious problem in our\nlast chapter, Guyau indicates the possibilities of general intellectual\nprogress in the future. The demand of life itself for fuller expression\nwill involve the decay of cramping superstitions and ecclesiastical\ndogmas. The aesthetic elements will be given a larger place, and there\nwill be intellectual freedom. Keen as Guyau is upon maintaining the\nsociological standpoint, he sees the central factor in progress to be\nthe mental. \u201cProgress,\u201d he remarks,[20] \u201cis not simply a sensible\namelioration of life\u2014it is also the achievement of a better\nintellectual formulation of life, it is a triumph of logic. To progress\nis to attain to a more complete consciousness of one\u2019s self and of the\nworld, and by that very fact to a more complete inner consistency of\none\u2019s theory of the world.\u201d Guyau follows his stepfather in his view of\n\u201csociability\u201d or _fraternit\u00e9_ (to use the watchword of the Revolution)\nas the desirable end at which we should progressively aim\u2014a conclusion\nwhich is but the social application of his central concept of Life.\n\n [20] Introduction to _L\u2019Irreligion de l\u2019Avenir_.\n\n\nThe next step in human progress must be in the direction of human\nsolidarity. Guyau thinks it will arise from collective, co-operative\nenergy (_synergie sociale_). Further progress must involve\nsimultaneously _sympathie sociale_, a community of fellowship or\ncomradeship, promoted by education of a true kind, not mere\ninstruction, but a proper development and valuation of the feelings.\nHere art will play its part and have its place beside science, ethics\nand philosophy in furthering the ideal harmony in human society. Such\nProgress involves, therefore, that the Beautiful must be sought and\nappreciated no less than the True and the Good, for it is a revelation\nof the larger Life of which we ourselves are part. These ideals are in\nthemselves but manifestations of the Supreme Vitality.\n\nThe same spontaneous vital activity of which Guyau makes a central\ndoctrine characterises Bergson\u2019s view of reality. He upholds, like\nBoutroux, freedom and contingency, but he will not admit finalism in\nany shape or form, not even a teleology which is created in the process\nof development. He refuses to admit as true of the universal process in\nnature and in human history what is certainly true of human life\u2014the\nfact that we create ends as we go on living. For Bergson there is no\nend in the universe, unless it be that of spontaneity of life such as\nGuyau had maintained. There is no guarantee of progress, no law of\ndevelopment, but endless possibility of progress. Such a view, as we\nhave already insisted, is not pessimistic. It is, however, a warning to\nfacile optimism to realise that humanity, being free, may go \u201cdead\nwrong.\u201d While Boutroux maintains with Ravaisson that there is at the\nheart of things a tendency to superior values such as beauty, goodness\nand truth, and while Renan assures us that the balance of goodness in\nthe world is a guarantee of its ultimate triumph, Bergson, like\nRenouvier, gives us stern warning that there is no guarantee in the\nnature of things that humanity should not set its heart on other\nvalues, on materialistic and egoistic conceptions, and go down in ruin\nquarrelling and fighting for these things. There is no power, he\nreminds us, keeping humanity right and in the line of desirable\nprogress. All is change, but that is not to say that all changes are\ndesirable or progressive. Here we arrive at a point far removed from\nthe rosy optimism of the earlier thinkers. Progress as a comfortable\ndoctrine, confidently accepted and dogmatically asserted, no longer\nholds ground; it is seen to be quite untenable.\n\nIn Bergson the difficulty which besets Ravaisson reappears more\nmarkedly\u2014namely, the relation of spirit and matter to one another, and\nto the power at the heart of things, which, according to Bergson\nhimself, is a spiritual principle. Here we seem forced to admit\nRavaisson\u2019s view of a \u201cfall\u201d or, as the theologians would say, a\n\u201cKenosis\u201d of the deity in order to create the material universe. Yet in\nthe processes of nature we see spirit having to fight against matter,\nand of this warfare Bergson makes a great point. These considerations\nlead to discussions which Bergson has not touched upon as yet. He does\nnot follow Ravaisson and Boutroux into the realm of theological ideas.\nIf he did he might have to make admissions which would compromise, or\nat least modify, other doctrines expressed by him. He will have none of\nHegel or of the Absolute Idealism which sees the world process as a\ndevelopment of a Divine Idea. It is new and it is creation; there is no\nrepetition. Even God himself _se fait_ in the process, and it may be,\nsuggests Bergson, that love is the secret of the universe. If so we may\nwell ask with Blondel, \u201cIf God _se fait_ in the process, then does he\nnot already exist and, in a sense, the process with him?\u201d Instead,\nhowever, of reverting to Ravaisson\u2019s view of the whole affair being a\nsearch for, and return to God, Bergson claims that the development is a\npurely contingent one, in which a super-consciousness develops by\nexperiment and error.\n\nBergson\u2019s God, if he may be so-called, is not so much a Creator, but a\npower creative of creators\u2014that is, human personalities capable of free\naction. The Deity is immanent in man, and, like man, is ignorant of the\ntrend of the whole process. The universe, according to Bergson, is a\nvery haphazard affair, in which the only permanence is change. There is\nno goal, and progress has little meaning if it be only and merely\nfurther change, which may be equally regress rather than progress. To\nlive is not merely to change, but to triumph over change to set up some\nvalues as of absolute worth, and to aim at realising and furthering\nthese. Apart from some philosophy of values the conception of progress\nhas little meaning.\n\nInteresting discussions of various aspects of the problem are to be\nfound in the writings of the sociologist we have mentioned, Durkheim,\nparticularly _La Division du Travail sociale_, _Le Suicide_ and _Les\nFormes \u00e9l\u00e9mentaires de la Vie religieuse_. There is an interesting\nvolume by Weber, entitled _Le Rythme du Progres_, and there are the\nnumerous books of Dr. Gustave Le Bon.\n\nAlthough he is not strictly a philosopher in the academic or\nprofessional sense, and his work belongs to literature rather than to\nthe philosophy of the period, we cannot help calling attention briefly\nhere, at the conclusion of this chapter, to the genial pessimism of\nBergson\u2019s great literary contemporary, Anatole France, the famous\nsatirist of our age. His irony on questions like that of progress is\nvery marked in _L\u2019Ile des Penguins_ and in _J\u00e9r\u00f4me Coignard_. A remark\nfrom one of his works, this latter, will sufficiently illustrate his\nview on progress. \u201cI take little interest,\u201d remarks his character, the\nAbb\u00e9 Coignard, \u201cin what is done in the King\u2019s Cabinet, for I notice\nthat the course of life is in no way changed, and after reforms men are\nas before, selfish, avaricious, cowardly, cruel, stupid and furious by\nturns, and there is always a nearly even number of births, marriages,\ncuckolds and gallows-birds, in which is made manifest the beautiful\nordering of our society. This condition is stable, sir, and nothing\ncould shake it, for it is founded on human misery and imbecility, and\nthose are foundations which will never be wanting.\u201d The genial old Abb\u00e9\nthen goes on to remind socialist revolutionaries that new economic\nschemes will not radically change human nature. We easily see the ills\nin history and blind ourselves with optimism for the future. Even in\nSorel, the Syndicalist, who has added to his articles on _Violence_\n(which appeared in 1907 in the periodical _Le Mouvement socialiste_) a\nwork on _Les Illusions du Progr\u00e8s_, we find the same doctrines about\nthe vices of modern societies, which he considers no better than\nancient ones in their morality; they are filled with more hypocrisy,\nthat is all. France and Sorel only add more testimony to the utter\ncollapse of the old doctrine of assured and general progress.\n\n*    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *\n\n\nTo such a final position do we come in following out the development of\nthe idea of progress. The early assurance and dogmatic confidence which\nmarked the early years of the century are followed by a complete\nabandonment of the idea of a guaranteed or assured progress, whether\nbased on the operations of a Divine Providence, or on faith in the\nultimate triumph of reason, or on merely a fatalistic determinism.\nProgress is only a possibility, and its realisation depends on\n\u2018humanity\u2019s own actions. Further, any mention of progress in future\nmust not only present it as quite contingent, but we have to reckon\nwith the fact that the idea of progress may itself progress until it\nresolves itself into another conception less complicated and less\nparadoxical, such as \u201cthe attainment of a new equilibrium.\u201d Some effort\nmust be devoted also to a valuation of criteria. Various values have in\nthe past been confused together, scientific, materialistic, hedonistic,\nmoral, aesthetic. Ultimately it seems that we shall find difficulty in\nsettling this apart from the solution offered by Renouvier\u2014namely, that\ntrue progress is not merely intellectual, but moral. It involves not\nmerely a conquest of material nature but of human nature\u2014a self-\nmastery. Progress is to be measured not by the achievements of any\naristocracy, intellectual or other, but by the general social status,\nand our criterion of progress must be ultimately that of social\njustice. This itself is a term needing interpretation, and to this\nquestion of ethics we now turn.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI\nETHICS\n\n\nINTRODUCTION : Difficulties of the moral problem as presented in the\nnineteenth century\u2014Recognised as a social problem\u2014Influence of Comte\nimportant in this connection\u2014Other influences\u2014Christianity\u2014Kant\u2014The\npractical reason.\n\nI. Taine and Renan\u2014Renan\u2019s critique of Christian morality\u2014Early\nsocialistic views\u2014Change in his later life\u2014Prefers criterion of beauty\nto that of goodness.\n\nII. Renouvier the great moralist of our period\u2014Relation to Kant \u2014His\nScience de la Morale\u2014Personality in Ethics\u2014Justice.\n\nIII. Fouill\u00e9e, Guyau, Oll\u00e9-Laprune and Rauh pass further from the\nKantian rigorism to an ethic in harmony with the philosophy of\nid\u00e9es-forces of life and action\u2014Humanitarianism of Fouill\u00e9e and\nGuyau\u2014Id\u00e9es-forces and Morale sans Obligation ni Sanction \u2014Rauh\u2019s\ndoctrines\u2014Other thinkers.\n\nCONCLUSION: Action and belief\u2014Ethics and Religion.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI\nETHICS\n\nMoral philosophy is probably the most difficult branch of those various\ndisciplines of the human spirit summed up in the general conception of\nphilosophy. This difficulty is one which all the thinkers of our period\nrecognised. Many of them, occupied with other problems on the\npsychological or metaphysical side, did not write explicitly upon\nethics. Yet the problem of ethics, its place, significance and\nauthority, is but the other side of that problem of freedom which has\nappeared throughout this development as central and vital. The ethical\nconsciousness of man has never been content for long with the assertion\nthat ethics is a purely positive science, although it has obviously a\npositive side. The essence of morality has been regarded as not merely\na description of what exists, but what might, should or ought to exist.\nEthics is normative, it erects or endeavours to outline a standard\nwhich is an ideal standard. This is the characteristic of ethics, and\nso long as the moral conscience of humanity, individually and\ncollectively, does not slumber nor die, it will remain so. This\nconflict between the ideal and the real, the positive and normative is\nindeed the chief source of pain and conflict to man, but without it he\nwould cease to be human.\n\nWhatever the difficulties, the philosopher who aspires to look upon\nhuman life as a whole must give _some_ interpretation of this vital\naspect of human consciousness. It is in this connection that a solution\nof the problem of freedom is so valuable, for under a purely\ndeterminist and positivist reading of life, the moral sentiments become\nmere data for an anthropological survey, the hope and tragedy of human\nlife are replaced, comfortably perhaps for some, by an interpretation\nin which the true significance of ethics is lost.\n\nOne of the outstanding features of the discussion upon ethics in our\nperiod is the fact that the social standpoint colours most of the\ndiscussion. This was largely due to the impulse given by Comte and\ncontinued by the sociologists. We have already remarked the importance\nwhich he attached to his new science of society or \u201csociology.\u201d However\nmuch the development of this branch of study may have disappointed the\nhopes of Comte, it has laid a powerful and necessary emphasis upon the\nsolidarity of the problems of society. As Comte claimed that psychology\ncould not be profitably studied in the isolated individual alone, so he\ninsisted that ethics could only be studied with profit from a social\nstandpoint. This was not forgotten by subsequent thinkers, even by\nthose who were not his followers, and the main development of the\nethical problem in our period is marked by an increasing insistence\nupon sociability and solidarity. Comte was able to turn the thoughts of\nphilosophers away from pre-occupation with the isolated individual,\nconceived as a cold and calculating intellectual machine, a \u201cfiction\u201d\nwhich had engrossed the minds of thinkers of the previous century. He\nwas able also to indicate the enormous part played by instincts,\nparticularly \u201cherd-instincts,\u201d by passion and feelings of social hatred\nand social sympathy. It was the extension of social sympathy upon which\nComte insisted as the chief good. The great defect of Christianity from\nan ethical standpoint was, Comte pointed out, due to its\nindividualistic ethic. To the doctrine of \u201csaving one\u2019s own soul\u201d Comte\nopposed that of the salvation of humanity. The social unit is not the\nindividual man or woman, it is the family. In that society which is not\na mere association but a union, arising from common interests and\nsympathy, the individual realises himself as part of society. The\nhighest ethical conception, however, arises when the individual,\ntranscending himself and his family, feels and acts as a member of\nhumanity itself, not only in his public, but also in his private life.\nIn the idea of humanity Comte finds the concrete form of that universal\nwhich in the ethic of Kant was the symbol of duty itself.\n\nIt was by this insistence on human social solidarity that Comte left\nhis mark upon the ethical problem. Many of the details of social ethics\ngiven in the last three large volumes of his work are extremely\nthoughtful and interesting, in spite of their excessive optimism, but\nwe can only here indicate what is sufficient for our purpose, his\ninfluence over subsequent thought. That is summed up in the words\n\u201csolidarity\u201d and \u201csocial standpoint.\u201d\n\nWe may observe that the supreme problems in social ethics Comte\nregarded as being those of education or mental development and the\n\u201cright to work.\u201d[1] He foresaw, as did Renan, that Culture and Economic\nJustice were the two _foci_ around which the ethical problems were to\nbe ranged in the immediate future. He regretted that the proletariat in\ntheir cry for justice had not sufficient culture to observe that they\nthemselves are not a class apart, however class-conscious they be. They\nstand solid with the community, and Comte prophesied that, finding this\nout sooner or later, they would have to realise the folly of violent\nrevolution. Only a positive culture or education of the democracy\ncould, he believed, solve this social problem, which is there precisely\nbecause the proletariat are not sufficiently, and do not feel\nthemselves to be, incorporated in the life of the community or of\nhumanity. Only when they realise this will work be ennobled by a\nfeeling of service. The Church has a moral advantage here, in that she\nhas her organisation complete for furthering the conception of service\nto God. Comte realised this advantage of religious morality, but he\nthought it would come also to \u201cpositive\u201d morality when men came to a\nconception of service for humanity To this great end, he urged, our\neducation should be directed, and it should aim, he thought, at the\ndecline and elimination of militarism which, in Comte\u2019s view\ncorresponds to the second stage of development (marked also by\ntheology), a stage to be superseded in man\u2019s development, by an era in\nwhich the war-spirit will be replaced by that of productive service\nperformed not only _pour la patrie_, but _pour l\u2019humanit\u00e9_.\n\n [1] Comte criticised the teaching given to the young in France as\n being \u201cinstruction\u201d rather than \u201ceducation.\u201d This has frequently been\n insisted upon since his time.\n\n\nIn viewing the general influences which bore upon the study of the\nethical problem in our period this stress upon the social character of\nmorality is supreme, and is the most distinctly marked. But in addition\nto the sociological influence there are others which it is both\ninteresting and important to note briefly. There is the influence of\ntraditional religious morality, bound up with Christianity as presented\nby the Roman Catholic Church. The deficiencies of this are frequently\nbrought out in the discussion, but in certain of the thinkers, chiefly\nthe \u201cmodernists,\u201d it appears as an influence contributing to a\nreligious morality and as offering, indeed, the basis of a religion.\nOther writers, however, while rejecting the traditional morality of the\nChurch, lay stress upon a humanitarian ethic which has an affinity to\nthe idealistic morality preached by the founder of Christianity, a\nmorality which manifests a spirit different from that which his Church\nhas usually shown. Indeed, the general tendency of the ethical\ndevelopment in our period is one of opposition to the ecclesiastical\nand traditional standpoint in ethics.\n\nThen there is the influence of Kant\u2019s ethics, and here again, although\nRenouvier owed much to Kant, the general tendency is to get away from\nthe formalism and rigorism of his \u201ccategorical imperative.\u201d The current\nof English Utilitarian ethics appears as rather a negative influence,\nand is rather scorned when mentioned. The common feature is that of the\nsocial standpoint, issuing in conceptions of social justice or\nhumanitarianism and finding in action and life a concrete morality\nwhich is but the reflection of the living conscience of mankind\ncreating itself and finding in the claims of the practical reason that\nAbsolute or Ideal to which the pure reason feels it cannot alone\nattain.\n\nI\n\nTaine and Renan were influenced by the outlook adopted by Comte. It\nmight well be said that Taine was more strictly positivist than Comte.\nIn his view of ethics, Taine, as might be expected from the general\ncharacter of his work and his philosophical attitude, adheres to a\nrigidly positivist and naturalist conception. He looks upon ethics as\npurely positive, since it merely states the scientific conditions of\nvirtue and vice, and he despairs of altering human nature or conduct.\nThis is due almost entirely to his doctrine of rigid determinism which\nreacts with disastrous consequences upon his ethical outlook. This only\nfurther confirms our contention that the problem of freedom is the\ncentral and vital one of the period. We have already pointed out the\ncriticism which Fouill\u00e9e brought against Taine\u2019s dogmatic belief in\ndeterminism, as an incomplete doctrine, a half-truth, which involves\nmischievous consequences and permits of no valuable discussion of the\nethical problem.\n\nMore interesting and useful, if we are to follow at all closely the\nethical thought of our period, is it to observe the attitude adopted to\nethics by Taine\u2019s contemporary, Renan.\n\nThe extreme confidence which Renan professed to have in \u201cscience,\u201d and\nindeed in all intellectual pursuits, led him to accord to morality\nrather a secondary place. \u201cThere are three great things,\u201d he remarks in\nhis _Discours et Conf\u00e9rences_,[2] \u201cgoodness, beauty and truth, and the\ngreatest of these is truth.\u201d Neither virtue, he continues, nor art is\nable to exclude illusions. Truth is the representation of reality, and\nin this world the search for truth is the most serious occupation of\nall. One of his main charges against the Christian Church in general is\nthat it has insisted upon moral good to such an extent as to undervalue\nand depreciate the other goods, expressed in beauty and in truth. It\nhas looked upon life from one point of view only\u2014namely, the moral\u2014and\nhas judged all action by ethical values alone, despising in this way\nphilosophy, science, literature, poetry, painting and music. In its\nmore ascetic moods it has claimed that these things are \u201cof the devil.\u201d\nThus Christianity has introduced a vicious distinction which has done\nmuch to mutilate human nature and to cramp the wholesome expression of\nthe life of the human spirit. Whatever is an expression of spirit is,\nclaims Renan, to be looked upon as sacred. If such a distinction as\nthat of sacred and profane were to be drawn it should be between what\nappertains to the soul and what does not. The distinction, when made\nbetween the ethical and the beautiful or true, is disastrous.\n\n [2] _Discours_, dated November 26th, 1885.\n\n\nRenan considers that of the two, the ethical and the beautiful, the\nlatter may be the finer and grander distinction, the former merely a\nspecies of it. The moral, he thinks, will give place to the beautiful.\n\u201cBefore any action,\u201d he himself says in _L\u2019Avenir de la Science_, \u201cI\nprefer to ask myself, not whether it be good or bad, but whether it be\nbeautiful or ugly, and I feel that I have in this an excellent\ncriterion.\u201d\n\nMorality, he further insists, has been conceived up to now in far too\nrigid a manner as obedience to a law, as a warfare and strife between\nopposing laws. But the really virtuous man is an artist who is creating\nbeauty, the beauty of character, and is fashioning it out of his human\nnature, as the sculptor fashions a statue out of marble or a musician\ncomposes a melody from sounds. Neither the sculptor nor the musician\nfeels that he is obeying a law. He is expressing and creating beauty.\n\nAnother criticism which Renan brings against the ethic of Christianity\nis its insistence upon humility as a virtue. He sees nothing virtuous\nin it as it is generally interpreted: quite rightly he suspects it of\nhypocritically covering a gross pride, after the manner of the\nPharisees. He gives a place to honest asceticism which has its\nnobility, even although it be a narrow, misconceived ideal. Much nobler\nis it, he thinks, than the type of life which has only one object,\ngetting a fortune.\n\nThis leads him to another remark on the moral hypocrisy of so many\nprofessedly religious folk. Having an easy substance and possessing\nalready a decent share of this world\u2019s goods, they devote all their\nenergies to the pursuit of pleasure or of further superfluous wealth.\nFrom this position they criticise the worker who endeavours to improve\nhis lot, and have the audacity to tell him in pious fashion that he\nmust not be materialistic, and must not set his heart on this world\u2019s\ngoods. It would be laughable were it not so tragic. The whole question\nof the relativity of the two positions is overlooked, the whole ethic\nof the business ignored. Material welfare is good and valuable, says\nRenan, in so far as it frees man\u2019s spirit from mean and wretched\ndependence and a cramped life which injures development, physical and\nspiritual. These goods are a means to an end. When, therefore, a man,\nalready comfortably endowed, amasses more and more for its own sake, he\ncommits both a profane and immoral act. But when a worker endeavours to\naugment his recompense for his labour, he is but demanding \u201cwhat is the\ncondition of his redemption. He is performing a virtuous action.\u201d[3]\n\n [3] _L\u2019Avenir de la Science_, p. 83.\n\n\nSound as many of these considerations undoubtedly are, they come from\nthe Renan, who wrote in the years 1848-9 _L\u2019Avenir de la Science_. He\nlived long enough to see that these truths had complements, that there\nmight be, even ethically, another side. In speaking of Progress this\nhas been noted: in his later years he forecasted the coming of an era\nof egoism, of national and industrial selfishness, working itself out\nin policies of military imperialism among the nations, and of economic\ngreed and tyranny among the proletariat. His remarks about the virtuous\naction of the worker bettering his lot were inspired by the socialism\nof Saint-Simon. Renan did not at that time raise in his own mind the\nquestion of the workers themselves carrying their reaction so far, that\nit, although just at first, might reach a point where it became a\ndictatorship decreed by self-interest alone. It is in Renouvier that we\nfind this danger more clearly indicated. In so far as Renan felt it,\nhis solution was that which he suggested for the elimination of all\nsocial wickedness\u2014 namely, the increase of education. He looked upon\nwickedness as a symptom of a lack of culture, particularly the lack of\nany moral teaching.\n\nIt was precisely this point, the education of the democracy, morally no\nless than intellectually, which presented a certain difficulty to the\nFrench Republic when, after several unsuccessful attempts, the plan for\nstate education of a compulsory, gratuitous and secular character was\ncarried in 1882, largely through the efforts of Jules Ferry.[4]\n\n [4] In 1848 Hippolyle Carnot had this plan ready. The fall of the\n Ministry, in which he was Minister of Education, was due partly to the\n discussion raised by Renouvier\u2019s book (see p. 61 of the present work).\n With the fall of the Ministry, and in 1851, of the Republic, the\n scheme went too. France had to wait eleven years longer than England\n for free, compulsory education. Her educational problem has always\n been complicated by the attitude of the Roman Catholic Church to\n religious education and its hostility to \u201clay\u201d schools. Brilliant as\n France is intellectually, there are numbers of her people who do not\n read or write owing to the delay of compulsory state education. The\n latest census, that of 1921, asked the question, \u201c_Savez-vous \u00e0 la\n fois lire et \u00e9crire?_\u201d in order to estimate this number.\n\nII\n\nThe great moralist of our period was Renouvier. Not only, as we have\nalready seen, did ethical considerations mark and colour his whole\nthought, but he set forth those considerations themselves with a\nremarkable power. His treatise in two volumes on _The Science of\nEthics_ is one of the most noteworthy contributions to ethical thought\nwhich has been made in modern times. Although half a century has\nelapsed since its publication on the eve of the Franco-Prussian War,\nits intense pre-occupation with the problems which beset our modern\nindustrial civilisation, its profound judgments and discussions\nconcerning subjects so vital to the world of to-day (such as the\nrelations of the sexes, marriage, sex-ethics, civil liberty, property,\ncommunism, state intervention, socialist ideals, nationalism, war, the\nmodern idea of the State, and international law), give to it a value,\nwhich very few works upon the subject possess. Long as the work is, it\nhas the merit of thoroughness, and difficulties are not slurred over,\nbut stated frankly, and some endeavours are made to overcome them.\nConsequently, it is a work which amply repays careful study. It is\nalmost presumption to attempt in a few pages to summarise Renouvier\u2019s\nimportant treatise. Some estimate of its significance is, however,\nvital to our history.\n\nThe title itself is noteworthy and must at that date have appeared more\nstriking than it does to us now by its claim that there is a _science_\nof ethics.[5] We are accustomed to regard physics, mathematics and even\nlogic as entitled to the name Sciences. Can we legitimately speak of a\nScience of Ethics?\n\n [5] It is interesting for comparative study to note that Leslie\n Stephen\u2019s _Science of Ethics_ was a much later production than\n Renouvier\u2019s treatise, appearing thirteen years later.\n\n\nRenouvier insists that we can. Morality deals with facts, although they\nare not embraced by the categories of number, extension, duration or\nbecoming (as mathematical and physical data), but rather by those of\ncausality, finality and consciousness. The facts \u201care not the natural\nbeing of things, but the _devoir-\u00eatre_ of the human will, the\n_devoir-faire_ of persons, and the devoir-\u00eatre of things in so far as\nthey depend upon persons.\u201d[6] Personal effort, initiative and\nresponsibility lie at the basis of all ethics. Morality is a\nconstruction, like every science, partly individual and partly\ncollective; it must lay down postulates, and if it is to justify the\nclaim to be a science, these postulates must be such as to command a\n_consensus gentium_. Further, if ethics is to be scientifically based\nit must be independent. In the past this has unfortunately not been the\ncase, for history shows us ethics bound up with some system of religion\nor metaphysics. If ethics is to be established as a science, Renouvier\npoints out that it must be free from all hypothesis of an irrelevant\ncharacter, such as cosmological speculations and theological dogmas.\nRenouvier\u2019s insistence upon the independence of ethics was followed up\nin an even clearer and more trenchant manner by Guyau in his famous\n_Esquisse d\u2019une Morale sans Obligation ni Sanction_.\n\n [6] _Science de la Morale_, vol. I, p. 10.\n\n\nAlthough, generally, ethics has suffered by reason of its alliance to\ntheological and metaphysical systems, Renouvier affirms that, in this\nconnection, there is one philosophy which is not open to\nobjection\u2014namely, the Critical Philosophy of Kant. This is because it\nsubordinates all the unknown to phenomena, all phenomena to\nconsciousness, and, within the sphere of consciousness itself,\nsubordinates the speculative reason (_reinen Vernunft_) to the\npractical reason (_praktischen Vernunft_). Its chief value, according\nto Renouvier, lies precisely in this maintenance of the primacy of\nmoral considerations.\n\nTwo standpoints or lines of thought which are characteristic of\nRenouvier, and whose presence we have already noted in our first\nchapter, operate also in his ethics and govern his whole treatment of\nthe nature of morality and the problems of the moral life. Briefly\nstated these are, firstly, his regard for the Critical Philosophy of\nKant; secondly, his view of man as \u201can order, a harmony of functions\nreciprocally conditioned, and, by this fact, inseparable.\u201d[7] As in his\ntreatment of Certitude, Renouvier showed this to be a psychological\ncomplex into which entered elements not only of cognition, but of\nfeeling and will, the same insistence upon this unity of human nature\nmeets us again in his ethics. \u201cAny ethical doctrine which definitely\nsplits up the elements of human nature is erroneous.\u201d[8] Abstraction is\nnecessary and useful for any science, even the science of ethics, but\nhowever far we may carry our scientific analysis, we must never lose\nsight of the fact that we are dealing with abstractions. To lose sight\nof the relationship of the data under observation or discussion is,\nindeed, working away from the goal of scientific knowledge.\n\n [7] _Science de la Morale_ (first edition, 1869), vol. I, p. 189.\n\n\n [8] _Ibid_.\n\n\n\u201cNothing,\u201d remarks Renouvier in this connection, \u201chas done more to\nhinder the spread of Kant\u2019s doctrines in the world than his assertion\nthat the morally good act must be performed absolutely without\nfeeling.\u201d In view of man as he is, and in so far as we understand human\nnature at all, it seems a vain and foolish statement. For Kant, Duty\nwas supreme, and the sole criterion of a good act was, for him, its\nbeing done from a consciousness of Duty. He himself had to confess that\nhe did not know of any act which quite fulfilled this ideal of moral\naction. With this view of morality Renouvier so heartily disagrees that\nhe is inclined to think that, so far from a purely rational act (if we\nsuppose such an act possible) being praiseworthy, he would almost give\ngreater moral worth to an act purely emotional, whose \u201cmotive\u201d lay, not\nin the idea of cold and stern Duty, but in the warm impulses of the\nhuman heart, springing from emotion or feeling alone. Emotion is a part\nof our nature\u2014it has its role to play; the rational element enters as a\nguide or controlling power. It is desirable that all acts should be so\nguided, but that is far from stating, as does Kant, that they should\nproceed solely from rational considerations. Ultimately reason and\nsentiment unite in furthering the same ends. No adequate conception of\njustice can be arrived at which is not accompanied by, and determined\nby, correlatively, love of humanity. Kant rigorously excluded from\noperation even the most noble feelings, whose intrusion should dim the\nworth and glory of his moral act, devoid of feeling. But \u201cwithout\ngood-will and mutual sympathy of persons, no society could ever have\nestablished itself beyond the family, and scarcely the family\nitself.\u201d[9]\n\n [9] _Science de la Morale_, vol. I, p. 184.\n\n\nRenouvier confesses that in most of this treatment of the problem of\nethics he follows Kant[10] and although his admiration for Kant\u2019s work\nis not concealed, nevertheless he is not altogether satisfied with it,\nand does not refrain from criticism. Indeed this reconstruction of the\nCritical Philosophy in a revised version is the main effort of the\nneo-critical philosopher, and it is constantly manifest.\n\n [10] On p. 108 (vol. I) he refers to \u201c_le philosophie que je suis, et\n que j\u2019aimerais de pouvoir suivre toujours_.\u201d\n\n\nHe complains that Kant did not adhere rigorously to his own principles,\nbut vainly strove to give an objectivity to the laws of the practical\nreason by connecting them to metaphysics. But, he says, \u201con the other\nhand I maintain that the errors of Kant can be corrected in accordance\nwith the actual principles of his own philosophy. I continue my serious\nattachment to this great reformer in spite of the very serious\nmodifications I am endeavouring to make in his work.\u201d[11]\n\n [11] _Science de la Morale_, vol. I, p. no. 110.\n\n\nIn the opinion of Renouvier, Kant\u2019s work, the _Metaphysic of Morals_,\nis marred by its neglect of history in its relation to ethics, by a\ndisfigured picture of right which does not make it any more applicable\nto existing human conditions, also by the rather artificial and\ncomplicated nature of its doctrines. He further reproaches Kant for\nexcessive rigorism and formalism, accompanied by a vagueness which\nprevents the application of much of his teaching. This, it seems to us,\nis a reproach which can be hurled easily at most of the ethical\nteachers whom the world has seen. The incessant vagueness of\nparadoxical elements in the utterances of such teachers has inevitably\ncompelled their disciples to find refuge in insisting upon a \u201cright\nspirit\u201d of action, being devoid of any clear teaching as to what might\nconstitute right action in any particular case.\n\nThe rudiments of morality, according to Renouvier, are found in the\ngeneral notion of \u201cobligation,\u201d the sense of ought (_devoir-faire_)\nwhich the human consciousness cannot escape. Any end of action is\nconceived as a good for the agent himself; and because of liberty of\nchoice between actions or ends, or between both, certain of these are\ndeemed morally preferable. There are certain obligations which are\npurely personal, elementary virtues demanded from any rational being.\nIt is his interest to preserve his body by abstaining from excesses; it\nis his interest also to conserve and develop the faculties of his\nnature. This is the point upon which Guyau makes such insistence in\ncommon with Nietzsche\u2014the development, expansion and intensification of\nlife. There are, Renouvier points out, duties towards oneself,\ninvolving constant watchfulness and intelligence, so that the agent may\nbe truly self-possessed under all circumstances, maintaining an empire\nover himself and not falling a constant victim to passion. \u201cGreater is\nhe that ruleth himself than he that taketh a city,\u201d are not vain words.\nThis is the rudimentary but essential virtue which Renouvier calls\n\u201cvirtue militant\u201d\u2014moral courage. Intellectually it issues in Prudence\nor Wisdom; on the side of sense and passion it is represented by\nTemperance. These duties are present to conscience, which itself arises\nfrom a doubling of consciousness. \u201cWe have the empirical person with\nhis experience of the past, and we have the ideal person\u2014that is to\nsay, that which we wish to be,\u201d[12] our ideal character. In so far as\nwe are conscientious we endeavour to bring \u201cwhat we are\u201d into line with\n\u201cwhat we conceive we should be.\u201d The moral agent thus has duties\ntowards himself, obligations apart from any relation to or with others\nof his kind.\n\n [12] _Science de la Morale_, vol. I, p. 25.\n\n\nThis elementary morality is \u201cessentially subjective,\u201d[13] but this only\nshows us that the most thorough-going individualism does not by its\nneglect of others, its denial of altruism, thereby escape entirely from\nmoral obligations. There are always duties to one\u2019s higher self, even\nfor a Robinson Crusoe. Frequently it is stated that duties and rights\nare co-relative; but Renouvier regards Duty as more fundamental than\nRight, which he uses only of man in association with his fellows.\nBetween persons, right and duty are in a synthesis, but the person\nhimself has no rights as distinct from duties to himself; he has no\nright not to do what it is his duty to perform. From this it follows\nthat if his personal notion of obligation changes, he has no right\nwhatever to carry out actions in accordance with his judgments made\nprior to his change of conscience, merely for the sake of consistency.\nHe is in this respect a law to him- self, for no man can act as a\nconscience for another. The notion of rights only arises when others\nare in question, and only too often the word has been abused by being\nemployed where simply power is meant, as, for example, in many views of\n\u201cnatural right.\u201d This procedure both sullies the usage of the term\nRight and lowers the status of personality. It is always, Renouvier\nclaims, to \u201cthe inherent worth and force of personality, with its\npowers of reflection, deliberation, liberty, self-possession and\nself-direction, that one must return in order to understand each and\nevery virtue.\u201d\n\n [13] _Science de la Morale_, vol. I, p. 81.\n\n\nRenouvier\u2019s insistence upon the inherent worth, the dignity and moral\nvalue of personality becomes clearer as he proceeds from his treatment\nof the lonely individual (who, it may be objected, is to such an extent\nan abstraction, as to resemble a fiction) to associated persons. The\nreciprocal relation of two persons brings out the essential meaning of\nJustice. Two personalities co-operating for a common end find\nthemselves each possessed of duties and, inversely therefore, of rights\nwhich are simply duties regarded from the point of view not of the\nagent, but of the other party. The neo-critical ethic here brings\nitself definitely into line with the principle of practical reason of\nthe Critical Philosophy. This, says Renouvier,[14] is the profound\nmeaning of Justice, which consists in the fact that the moral agent,\ninstead of subordinating the ends of other people to his own, considers\nthe personalities[15] of others as similar to his own and possessing\ntheir own ends which he must respect. This principle is that which Kant\nformulated under the name of \u201cpractical obligation\u201d or \u201csupreme\nprinciple.\u201d[16] \u201cRecognise the personality of others as equal in nature\nand dignity, as being an end in itself, and consequently refrain from\nemploying the personality of others merely as a means to achieve your\nown ends.\u201d\n\n [14] _Science de la Morale_, vol. I, pp. 82-83.\n\n\n [15] Personality is a better translation, as it avoids the rather\n legal and technical meaning of \u201cperson\u201d in English.\n\n\n [16] In a footnote to this passage, Renouvier states his own\n preference for \u201cmoral obligation\u201d rather than \u201cimperative of\n conscience.\u201d\n\n\nThis doctrine of Personalism is an assertion not only of _Libert\u00e9_,\n_Egalit\u00e9_, _Fraternit\u00e9_ as necessary and fundamental principles, but\nalso of the value of personality in general and the relativity of\n\u201cthings.\u201d It constitutes an ethical challenge to the existing state of\nsociety which is not only inclined, in its headlong pursuit of wealth,\nits fanatical worship of Mammon, to treat its workers as purely \u201cmeans\u201d\nto the attainment of its end, but further minimises personality by its\nlegal codes and social conventions, which both operate far more readily\nand efficiently in the defence of property than in the defence or\nprotection of personality. From the ethical standpoint the world is a\nrealm of ends or persons and all other values must be adjusted in\nrelation to these.\n\nWe have been told by religious ethical teachers that we must love our\nneighbour as ourself, and have been reminded by moralists continually\nof the conflict between Egoism and Altruism. Renouvier points out that\nultimately obligation towards others is reducible to a duty to oneself.\nHe does not do this from the point of view of Hobbes, who regarded all\nactions, however altruistic they appeared to be, as founded purely upon\nself-interest, but rather from the opposite standpoint. \u201cWe should make\nour duty to others rank foremost among our duties to ourselves.\u201d[17]\nThis is the transcendent duty through the performance of which we\nachieve a realisation of the solidarity of persons, demonstrate an\nobjective value for our own existence, and gain a fuller and richer\nlife.\n\n [17] _Science de la Morale_, vol. I, p. 85.\n\n\nThe idea of personal and moral reciprocity was formulated by the\nChinese and the Greeks; at a later date it reappeared in the teaching\nof Jesus. This ancient and almost universal maxim has been stated both\npositively and negatively: \u201cDo not to others what you would not have\nthem do unto you,\u201d \u201cDo as you would be done by.\u201d The maxim itself,\nhowever, beyond a statement of the principle of reciprocity rather\nvaguely put, has no great value for the science of ethics. Renouvier\nregards it not as a principle of morality but a rule-of-thumb, and he\nconsiders the negative statement of it to be more in harmony with what\nwas intended by the early ethical teachers\u2014namely, to give a practical\nwarning against the committing of evil actions rather than to establish\na scientific principle of right action.\n\nRenouvier has shown the origin of the notion of Justice as arising\nprimarily from an association of two persons. \u201cReason established a\nkind of community and moral solidarity in this reciprocity.\u201d[18] This\nright and duty unite to constitute Justice. It is truly said that it is\njust to fulfil one\u2019s duty, just to demand one\u2019s right, and Justice is\nformed by a union of these two in such a manner that they always\ncomplement one another. Bearing in mind the doctrine of personality as\nan end, we get a general law of action which may be stated in these\nterms: \u201cAlways act in such a way that the maxim applicable to your act\ncan be erected by your conscience into a law common to you and your\nassociate.\u201d Now to apply this to an association of any number of\npersons\u2014_e g._, human society as a whole\u2014we need only generalise it and\nstate it in these terms: \u201cAct always in such a way that the maxim of\nyour conduct can be erected by your conscience into a universal law or\nformulated in an article of legislation which you can look upon as\nexpressing the will of every rational being.\u201d This \u201ccategorical\nobligation\u201d is the basis of ethics. It stands clear of hypothetical\ncases as a general law of action, and \u201cthere is no such thing really as\npractical morality,\u201d remarks Renouvier, \u201cexcept by voluntary obedience\nto a law.\u201d[19]\n\n [18] _Ibid_., pp. 79-80.\n\n\n [19] _Science de la Morale_, vol. I, p. 100.\n\n\nThe fulfilment of our duties to ourselves generally tends to fit us for\nfulfilling our duties to others, and the neglect of the former will\nlead inevitably to inability to perform these latter. Our duty to\nothers thus involves our duty to ourselves.[20]\n\n [20] The notion of self-sacrifice itself involves also, to a degree,\n the maintenance of self, without which there could be no self to\n sacrifice. History has frequently given examples of men of all types\n refusing to sacrifice their lives for a certain cause because they\n wished to preserve them for some other (and possibly better\u2014in their\n minds at any rate, better) form of self-sacrifice.\n\n\nPersonality which lies at the root of the moral problem demands Truth\nand Liberty, and it has a right to these two, for without them it is\ninjured. They are essential to a society of persons. Another vital\nelement in society is Work, the neglect of which is a grave immoral\nact, for as there is in any society a certain amount of necessary work\nto be performed, a \u201cslacker\u201d dumps his share upon his fellows to\nperform in addition to their own share. With industrial or general\nlaziness, and the parasitism of those whose riches enable them to live\nwithout working, is to be condemned also the shirking of intellectual\nwork by all. Quite apart from those who are \u201cintellectuals\u201d as such, a\nsolemn duty of work, of thought, reflection and reasoning lies on each\nperson in a society. Apathy among citizens is really a form of culpable\nnegligence. The duty of work and thought is so vital and of such\nethical, political and social importance that Renouvier suggests that\nthe two words, work and duty, be regarded as synonyms. It might, he\nthinks, make clearer to many the obligation involved.\n\nJustice has been made clear in the foregoing remarks, but in view of\nKant\u2019s distinction of \u201clarge\u201d and \u201cstrict\u201d duties, Renouvier raises the\nquestion of the relation of Justice and Goodness. He concludes that\nacts proceeding from the latter are to be distinguished from Justice.\nThey proceed not from considerations of persons as such, but from their\n\u201cnature\u201d or common humanity, and are near to being \u201cduties to oneself.\u201d\nThey are of the heart rather than of the head, proceeding from\nsentiments of humanity, and sentiment is not, strictly speaking, the\nfoundation of justice, which is based on the notions of duties and\nrights. There can be, therefore, an opposition of Justice and of\nGoodness (Kindness or Love), and the sphere of the latter is often\nlimited by considering the former. Renouvier recognises the fact that\nJustice in the moral sense of recognition and respect for personality\nis itself often \u201cconstitutionally and legally\u201d violated in societies by\ncustom, laws and institutions as well as by members of society in their\nactions, and he notes that this \u201clegal\u201d injustice makes the problem of\nthe relation of Justice and Charity excessively difficult.\n\nThe science of ethics is faced with a double task owing to the nature\nof man\u2019s evolution and history. Human societies have been built upon a\nbasis which is not that of justice and right, but upon the basis of\nforce and tyranny\u2014in short, upon war. There is, therefore, for the\nmoralist the twin duty of constructing laws and principles for the true\nsociety founded upon an ethical basis, that is to say on conceptions of\nJustice, while at the same time he must give practical advice to his\nfellows living and striving in present society, where a continual state\nof war exists owing to the operation of force and tyranny in place of\njustice, and he must so _apply_ his principles that they may be capable\nof moving this unjust existing society progressively towards the ideal\nsociety.\n\nIn our account of Renouvier\u2019s \u201cPhilosophy of History\u201d we brought out\nhis insistence upon war as the essential feature of man\u2019s life on this\nplanet, as the basis of our present \u201ccivilisation.\u201d Here he proclaims\nit again in his ethics.[21] War reigns everywhere: it is around us and\nwithin us\u2014individuals, families, tribes, classes, nations and races. He\nincludes in the term much more than open fighting with guns. The\ndistribution of wealth, of property (especially of land), wages, custom\nduties, diplomacy, fraud, violence, bigotry, orthodoxy, and\npersecution, lies themselves, are all, to him, forms of war. Its most\nludicrous stronghold is among men who pride themselves on being at\npeace with all men, while they force their idea of God upon other men\u2019s\nconsciences. Religious intolerance is one, and a very absurd kind of\nwarfare.[22]\n\n [21] _Science de la Morale_, vol. I, p. 332.\n\n\n [22] Renouvier sums up its spirit in the words: \u201c_Crois ce que je\n crois moi, o\u00f9 je te tue_\u201d (_La Nouvelle Monadologie_).\n\n\nThe principle of justice confers upon the person a certain \u201cright of\ndefence\u201d in the midst of all this existing varied warfare of mankind.\nIt involves, according to Renouvier, resistance. The just man cannot\nstand by and see the unjust man oppress his fellow so that the victim\nis \u201cobliged to give up his waistcoat after having had his coat torn\nfrom him.\u201d Otherwise we must confuse the _just_ with the _saintly_ man\nwho only admits one law\u2014namely, that of sacrifice. But Renouvier will\nhave us be clear as to the price involved in all this violent\nresistance. It means calling up powers of evil, emissaries of\ninjustice. He does not found his \u201cright of defence\u201d on rational right;\nit is to misconceive it so to found it. We must recognise the use of\nviolence and force, even in self-defence, as in itself evil, an evil\nnecessitated by facts which do not conform to the rules of peace and\njustice themselves. It is to a large degree necessary, unfortunately,\nbut is none the less evil and to be frankly regarded as evil, and\nlikely to multiply evil in the world, owing to the tremendous\nsolidarity of wickedness of which Renouvier has already spoken in\nhistory. It is the absence of the reign of justice which necessitates\nthese conflicts, and we have to content ourselves with a conception of\nactual \u201cright,\u201d a conception already based on war, not with one of\n\u201crational right\u201d or justice.\n\nRight in the true sense, Renouvier insists, belongs to a state of\npeace; in a state of war, such as our civilisation is perpetually in,\nit cannot be realised. The objection may be made that Renouvier is then\njustifying the means by the end. He emphatically denies this. By no\nmeans is this the case, for \u201cthe evil,\u201d he remarks, \u201cwhich corrects\nanother evil does not therefore become good; it may be useful, but it\nis none the less evil, immoral, or unjust, and what is not just is not\njustifiable. Wars, rebellions, revolutions may lessen certain evils,\nbut they do not thereby cease to be any the less evils themselves.\nMorally we are obliged to avoid all violence; a revolution is only\njustified if its success gives an indication of its absolute necessity.\nWe must lament, from the standpoint of ethics or justice, the evil\nstate of affairs which gives rise to it.[23]\n\n [23] On this point, it is interesting to compare with the above the\n views of Spinoza in his _Tractatus Theologico-politicus_ and\n _Tractatus-politicus_, and those of T. H. Green in his _Lectures on\n Political Obligation_.\n\n\nRenouvier devotes a considerable portion of his treatise to problems of\ndomestic morals, economic questions and problems of a political and\ninternational character. In all these discussions, however, he\nmaintains as central his thesis of the supremacy of personality.\n\nUnder _droit domestique_ he defends very warmly the right of the woman\nand the wife to treatment as a personality. He laments particularly the\ninjustice which usually rules in marriage, where, under a cloak of\nlegality, the married man denies to his wife a personal control of her\nown body and the freedom of self-determination in matters of sexual\nintercourse. So unjust and loathsome in its violation of the\npersonality of woman is the modern view of marriage that Renouvier\nconsiders it little better than polygamy (which is often a better state\nfor women than monogamy) or prostitution. It is less just than either,\nowing to its degradation of the personality of the wife. He remarked\ntoo in his _Nouvelle Monadologie_ that love (in the popular sense),\nbeing so largely an affair of passion and physical attraction, is\nusually unjust, and that friendship is a better basis for the\nrelationship of marriage, which should be, while it lasts among\nmankind, one of justice.[24] Consequently, it should involve neither\nthe idea of possession nor of obedience, but of mutual comradeship.\n\n [24] See particularly the notes in _La Nouvelle Monadologie_ appended\n to the fourth part, \u201cPassion,\u201d pp. 216-222.\n\n\nIn the economic sphere Renouvier endeavours to uphold freedom, and for\nthis reason he is an enemy of communism. Hostile to the communistic\ndoctrine of property, he is a definite defender of property which he\nconsiders to be a necessity of personality. He considers each person in\nthe community entitled to property as a guarantee of his own liberty\nand development. While disagreeing with communism, Renouvier is\nsympathetic to the socialist view that property might be, and should\nbe, more justly distributed, and he advocates means to limit excessive\npossession by private persons and to \u201cgeneralise\u201d the distribution of\nthe goods of the community among its members. Progressive taxation, a\nguarantee of the \u201cright to work\u201d and a complete system of insurance are\namong his suggestions. He is careful, however, to avoid giving to the\nstate too much power.\n\nRenouvier was no lover of the state. While regarding it as necessary\nunder present conditions, he agrees with the anarchist idealists, to\nwhom government is an evil. He admits its use, however, as a guarantor\nof personal liberty, but is against any semblance of state- worship.\nThe state is not a person, nor is it, as it exists at present, a moral\ninstitution. One of the needs of modern times is, he points out, the\nmoralising of the conception of the state, and of the state itself.\nAlthough, therefore, he has no _a priori_ objection to state\ninterference in the economic sphere, and would not advocate a mere\n_laissez-faire_ policy, with its vicious consequences, yet he does not\nlook with approval upon such interference unless it be \u201cthe collective\nexpression of the personalities forming the community.\u201d\n\nThe fact of living in a society, highly organised although it be, does\nnot diminish at all the moral significance of personality. Rights and\nduties belong essentially to persons and to them only. We must beware\nof the political philosophy which regards the citizens as existing only\nfor the state. Rather the state exists, or should exist, for the\nwelfare of the citizens. In the past this was a grave defect of\nmilitary despotisms, and was well illustrated by the view of the state\ntaken, or rather inculcated, by German political philosophy. In the\nfuture the danger of the violation of personality may lie, Renouvier\nthinks, in another direction\u2014namely, in the establishment of\nCommunistic states. The basic principle of his ethic is the person as\nan end in himself, and the treatment of persons as ends. If this be so,\na Communistic Republic which has as its motto \u201cEach for all,\u201d without\nalso \u201cAll for each,\u201d may gravely violate personality and the moral law\nif, by constraint, it treats all its citizens and their efforts not as\nends in themselves, but merely means to the collective ends of all.\n\nThe moral ideal demands that personality must not be obliterated.\nPersonality bound up with \u201cautonomy of reason\u201d is the fundamental\nethical fact.[25] In the last resort, responsibility rests upon the\nindividuals of the society for the evils of the system of social\norganisation under which they live. The state itself cannot be regarded\nas a moral person. Renouvier opposes strongly any doctrine which tends\nto the personalisation or the deification of the state.\n\n [25] Note that Renouvier prefers this term to Kant\u2019s \u201cautonomy of\n will,\u201d which he thinks confuses moral obligation and free-will.\n\n\nHe combats also the modern doctrines of \u201cnationality,\u201d and claims that\neven the idea of the state is a higher one, for it at any rate involves\nco-operating personalities, while a nation is a fiction, of which no\nsatisfactory definition can be given. He laughs at the \u201cunity of\nlanguage, race, culture and religion,\u201d and asks where we can find a\nnation?[26] War and death have long since destroyed such united and\nharmonious groups as were found in ancient times.\n\n [27] _Science de la Morale_, vol. 2, chap. xcvi, \u201c_Id\u00e9es de la\n Nationalit\u00e9 et d\u2019Etat_,\u201d pp. 416-427.\n\n\nIn approaching the questions of international morality Renouvier makes\nclear that there is only one morality, one code of justice. Morality\ncannot be divided against itself, and there cannot be an admission that\nthings which are immoral in the individual are justifiable, or\npermissible, between different states. Morality has not been applied to\nthese relationships, which are governed by aggressive militarism and\ndiplomacy, the negation of all conceptions of justice. Ethical\nobligation has only a meaning and significance for personalities, and\nour states do but reflect the morality of those who constitute them;\nour world reflects the relationships and immorality of the states. War\ncharacterises our whole civilisation, domestic, economic and\ninternational. To have inter- national peace, internal peace is\nessential, and this pre- supposes the reign of justice within states.\nWar we shall have with us, Renouvier reminds us, in all its forms, in\nour institutions, our laws and customs, until it has disappeared from\nour hearts. Treaties of \u201cpeace\u201d and federations or leagues of nations\nare themselves based on injustice and on force, and in this he sees but\nanother instance of the \u201cterrible solidarity of evil.\u201d[28] Better it is\nto recognise this, thinks Renouvier, than to consider ourselves in, or\neven near, a Utopia, whence human greed and passion have fled.\n\n [28] _Science de la Morale_, vol. 2, p. 474.\n\n\nWe find in Renouvier\u2019s ethics a notable reversion to the individualism\nwhich characterised the previous century. Much of the individualistic\ntone of his work is, however, due to his finding himself in opposition\nto the doctrines preached by communists, positivists, sociologists,\npessimistic and fatalistic historians, and supporters of the deified\nstate. Renouvier acclaims the freedom of the individual, but his\nindividualism is \u201cpersonalism.\u201d In proclaiming that the basis of\njustice and of all morality is respect for personality, as such, he has\nno desire to set up a standard of selfish individualism; he wishes only\nto combat those heretical doctrines which would minimise and crush\npersonality. For him the moral \u201cperson\u201d is not an isolated\nindividual\u2014he is a social human being, free and responsible, who lives\nwith his fellows in society. Only upon a recognition of personality as\na supreme value can justice or peace ever be attained in human society;\nand it is to this end that all moral education, Renouvier advocates,\nshould tend. The moral ideal should be, in practice, the constant\neffort to free man from the terrible solidarity of evil which\ncharacterises the civilisation into which he is born, and to establish\na community or association of personalities. Such an ideal does not lie\nnecessarily at the end of a determined evolution; Renouvier\u2019s views on\nhistory and progress have shown us that. Consequently it depends upon\nus; it is our duty to believe in its possibility and to work, each\naccording to his or her power, for its realisation. The ideal or the\nidea, will, in so far as it is set before self-conscious personalities\nas an end, become a force. Renouvier agrees on this point with\nFouill\u00e9e, to whose ethic, founded on the conception of _id\u00e9es-forces_,\nwe now turn.\n\nIII\n\nThe philosophy of _id\u00e9e-forces_ propounded by Fouill\u00e9e assumes, in its\nethical aspect, a role of reconciliation (which is characteristic, as\nwe have noted, of his whole method and his entire philosophy) by\nattempting a synthesis of individualism and humanitarianism. It is\ntherefore another kind of _personnalisme_, differing in type from that\nof Renouvier. Fouill\u00e9e\u2019s full statement of his ethical doctrines was\nnot written until the year 1907,[29] but long before the conclusion of\nthe nineteenth century he had already indicated the essential points of\nhis ethics. The conclusion of his thesis _La Libert\u00e9 et le\nD\u00e9terminisme_ (1872) is very largely filled with his ethical views and\nwith his optimism. Four years later appeared his study _L\u2019Id\u00e9e moderne\ndu Droit en Allemagne, en Angleterre et en France_, which was followed\nin 1880 by _La Science sociale contemporaine_, where the relation of\nthe study of ethics to that of sociology was discussed. A volume\ncontaining much acute criticism of current ethical theories was his\n_Critique des Syst\u00e8mes de Morale contemporains_ (1883), which gave him\na further opportunity of offering by way of contrast his application of\nthe doctrine of _id\u00e9es-forces_ to the solution of moral problems. To\nthis he added in the following year a study upon _La Propri\u00e9t\u00e9 sociale\net la D\u00e9mocratie_, where he discussed the ethical value and\nsignificance of various political and socialist doctrines. Ethical\nquestions raised by the problems of education he discussed in his\n_L\u2019Enseignement au Point de Vue national_ (1891). At the close of the\ncentury he issued his book on morality in his own country, _La France\nau Point de Vue morale_ (1900).[30]\n\n [29] His _Morale des Id\u00e9es-forces_ was then published.\n\n\n [30] It is interesting to note the wealth of Fouill\u00e9e\u2019s almost annual\n output on ethics alone in his later years. We may cite, in the\n twentieth century: _La R\u00e9forme de l\u2019Enseignement par la Philosophie_,\n 1901; _La Conception morale et critique de l\u2019Enseignement_; _Nietzsche\n et l\u2019Immoralisme_, 1904; _Le Moralisme de Kant et l\u2019Amoralisme\n contemporaine_, 1905; _Les El\u00e9ments sociologiques de la Morale_, 1905;\n _La Morale des Id\u00e9es-forces_, 1907; _Le Socialisme_, 1910; _La\n D\u00e9mocratie politique et sociale en France_, 1910; and the posthumous\n volume, _Humanitaires et Libertaires au Point de Vue sociologique et\n morale_, 1914.\n\n\nFouill\u00e9e endeavours to unite the purely ideal aspect of ethics\u2014that is\nto say, its notion of what ought to be, with the more positive view of\nethics as dealing with what now is. His ethic is, therefore, an attempt\nto relate more intimately the twin spheres of Renouvier, _l\u2019\u00e9tat de\nguerre_ with _l\u2019\u00e9tat de paix_, for it is concerned not only with what\n_is_, but with that which _tends_ to be and which _can_ be by the\nsimple fact that it is _thought_. As, however, what _can_ be is a\nmatter of intense interest to us, we are inevitably led from this to\nconsider what _ought_ to be\u2014that is to say, what is better, or of more\nworth or value. The ethical application of the philosophy of\n_id\u00e9es-forces_ is at once theoretical and practical, that philosophy\nbeing concerned both with ideas and values.\n\nAs in his treatment of freedom we found Fouill\u00e9e beginning with the\n_idea_ of freedom, so here in a parallel manner he lays down the _idea_\nof an end of action as an incontestable fact of experience, although\nthe existence of such an end is contested and is a separate question.\nThis idea operates in consciousness as a power of will (_volont\u00e9 de\nconscience_). Intelligence, power, love and happiness-in short, the\nhighest conscious life\u2014are involved in it, not only for us, but for\nall. Thus it comes about that the conscious subject, just because he\nfinds himself confronted by nature and by over-individual ends,\nproposes to himself an ideal, and imposes at the same time upon himself\nthe obligation to act in conformity with this full consciousness which\nis in all, as in him, and thus he allows universal consciousness to\noperate in his own individual life. Here we have conscience, the idea\nof duty or obligation, accounted for, and the principle of autonomy of\nthe moral person laid down. The ethical life is shown as the conscious\nwill in action, finding within itself its own end and rule of action,\nfinding also the conscious wills of others like itself. Morality is the\nindefinite extension of the conscious will which brings about the\ncondition that others tend to become \u201cme.\u201d Through the increasing power\nof intellectual disinterestedness and social sympathy, the old formula\n\u201c_cogito, conscius sum_\u201d gives place to that of \u201c_conscii sumus_,\u201d and\nthis is no mere intellectual speculation, but a concrete principle of\naction and feeling which is itself akin to the highest and best in all\nreligions.\n\nOne of the features of this ethic is its insistence upon the primacy of\nself-consciousness. Indeed, it has its central point in the doctrine of\nself-consciousness, which, according to Fouill\u00e9e, implies the\nconsciousness of others and of the whole unity of mankind. Emphasising\nhis gospel of _id\u00e9es-forces_, he outlines a morality in which the ideal\nshall attract men persuasively, and not dominate them in what he\nregards as the arbitrary and rather despotic manner of Kant.\n\nBy advocating the primacy of self-consciousness Fouill\u00e9e claims to\nestablish an ethic which towers above those founded upon pleasure,\nhappiness and feeling. The morality of the _id\u00e9es-forces_ is not purely\nsentimental, not purely intellectual, not purely voluntarist; it claims\nto rest on the totality of the functions of consciousness, as revealed\nin the feelings, in intellect and will, acting in solidarity and in\nharmony.\n\nHe endeavours to unite the positive and evolutionary views of morality\nto those associated with theological or metaphysical doctrines,\nconcerning the deity or the morally perfect absolute. He claims,\nagainst the theologians and on behalf of the positivists, that ethics\ncan be an independent study, that it is not necessarily bound up with\ntheological dogmas. There is no need to found the notion of duty upon\nthat of the existence of God. Our own existence is sufficient; the\nvoice of conscience is within our human nature. He objects, as did\nNietzsche, to the formality and rigour of Kant\u2019s \u201ccategorical\nimperative.\u201d His method is free from the legalism of Kant, and in him\nand Guyau is seen an attempt to relate morality itself to life,\nexpanding and showing itself creative of ideals and tending to their\nfulfilment.\n\nFrom the primacy of self-consciousness which can be expressed in the\nnotion, _Je pense, donc j\u2019ai une valeur morale_, a transition is made\nto a conception of values. _Je pense, donc j\u2019evalue des objets_. The\nessential element in the psychology of the _idees-forces_ then comes\ninto play by tending to the realisation of the ideals conceived and\nbased on the valuation previously made. Finally, Fouill\u00e9e claims that\non this ethical operation of the _id\u00e9es-forces_ can be founded the\nnotion of a universal society of consciences. This notion itself is a\nforce operating to create that society. The ideal is itself persuasive,\nand Fouillee\u2019s inherent optimism, which we have observed in his\ndoctrine of progress, colours also his ethical theory. He has faith in\nmen\u2019s capacity to be attracted by the ideals of love and brotherhood,\nand insists that in the extension of these lies the supreme duty, and\nthe ideal, like the notion of duty itself, is a creation of our own\nthought. The realisation of the universality, altruism, love and\nbrotherhood of which he speaks, depends upon our action, our power to\nfoster ideas, to create ideals, particularly in the minds of the young,\nand to strive ever for their realisation. This is the great need of our\ntime, Fouill\u00e9e rightly urges.[31] Such a morality contains in a more\nconcentrated form, he thinks, the best that has been said and thought\nin the world-religions; it achieves also that union of the scientific\nspirit with the aspirations of man, which Fouill\u00e9e regards as so\ndesirable, and he claims for it a philosophical value by its success in\nuniting the subjective and personal factors of consciousness with those\nwhich are objective and universal.\n\n [31] The work of Benjamin Kidd should be compared in this connection,\n particularly his _Social Evolution_, 1894; _Principles of Western\n Civilisation_, 1902; and _The Science of Power_, 1918 (chap, v., \u201cThe\n Emotion of the Ideal\u201d).\n\n\nSimilar in several respects to the ethical doctrines of Fouill\u00e9e are\nthose of his step-son. Guyau insists more profoundly, however, upon the\n\u201cfree\u201d conception of morality, as spontaneous and living, thus marking\na further reaction from Kant\u2019s doctrine. Both Fouill\u00e9e and Guyau\ninteracted upon one another in their mental relationship, and both of\nthem (particularly Guyau) have affinities with Nietzsche, who knew\ntheir work. While the three thinkers are in revolt against the Kantian\nconception of ethics, the two Frenchmen use their conceptions to\ndevelop an ethic altruistic in character, far removed from the egoism\nwhich characterises the German.[32]\n\n [32] We find the optimism and humanitarian idealism of the Frenchmen\n surprising. May not this be piecisely because the world has followed\n the gospel of Nietzsche? We may dislike him, but he is a greater\n painter of the real state of world-morality than are the two\n Frenchmen. They, with their watchword of _fraternit\u00e9_, are proclaiming\n a more excellent way they are standing for an ethical ideal of the\n highest type.\n\n\nGuyau, after showing in his critique of English Ethics (_La Morale\nanglaise contemporaine_, 1879) the inadequacies of a purely utilitarian\ndoctrine of morality, endeavoured to set forth in a more constructive\nmanner the principles of a scientific morality in his _Esquisse d\u2019une\nMorale sans Obligation ni Sanction_.\n\nHe takes as his starting-point the position where John Stuart Mill fell\nfoul of the word \u201cdesirable.\u201d What, asks Guyau, is the supreme desire\nof every living creature? The answer to this question is \u201cLife.\u201d What\nwe all of us desire most and constantly is Life, the most intensive and\nextensive in all its relationships, physical and spiritual. In the\nprinciple of Life we find cause and end\u2014a unity which is a synthesis of\nall desires and all desirables. Moreover, the concept or the principle\nof Life embraces all functions of our nature\u2014those within consciousness\nand those which are subconscious or unconscious. It thus relates\nintimately purely instinctive action and reflective acts, both of which\nare manifestations of Life and can enrich and increase its power.\n\nThe purely hedonistic views of the Utilitarians he considers untrue.\nDoubtless, he admits, there is a degree of truth in the doctrine that\nconsciousness tends to pursue the line of greatest pleasure or least\nresistance, but then we must remember how slight a part this\nconsciousness actually plays. Instincts and an intensive subconscious\n\u201cwill-to-live\u201d are constantly operating. A purely scientific ethic, if\nit is to present a complete scheme, must allow for this by admitting\nthat the purely hedonistic search after pleasure is not in itself a\ncause of action, but is an effect of a more fundamental or dominating\nfactor. This factor is precisely the effort of Life to maintain itself,\nto intensify itself and expand. The chief motive power lies in the\n\u201cintensity of Life.\u201d \u201cThe end which actually determines all conscious\naction is also the cause which produces every unconscious action; it is\nLife itself, Life at once the most intense and the most varied in its\nforms. From the first thrill of the embryo in its mother\u2019s womb to the\nlast convulsion of the old man, every movement of the being has had as\ncause Life in its evolution; this universal cause of actions is, from\nanother point of view, its constant effect and end.\u201d[33]\n\n [33] _Esquisse d\u2019une Morale_, p. 87.\n\n\nA true ethic proceeding upon the recognition of these principles is\nscientific, and constitutes a science having as its object all the\nmeans by which Life, material and spiritual, may be conserved and\nexpanded. Rising in the evolutionary development we find the variety\nand scope of action increased. The highest beings find rest not in\nsleep merely, but in variety and change of action. The moral ideal lies\nin activity, in all the variety of its manifestations. For Guyau, as\nfor Bergson, the worst vice is idleness, inertia, lack of _\u00e9lan vital_,\ndecay of personal initiative, and a consequent degeneration to merely\nautomatic existence.\n\nHedonism is quite untenable as a principle; pleasure is merely a\nconsequence, and its being set in the van of ethics is due to a false\npsychology and false science. Granting that pleasure attends the\nsatisfaction of a desire, pain its repression, recognising that a\nfeeling of pleasure accompanies many actions which expand life, we must\nlive, as Guyau reminds us, before we enjoy. The activity of life surges\nwithin us, and we do not act with a view to pleasure or with pleasure\nas a motive, but life, just because it is life, seeks to expand. Man in\nacting has created his pleasures and his organs. The pleasure and the\norgan alike proceed from function\u2014that is, life itself. The pleasure of\nan action and even the consciousness of it are attributes, not ends.\nThe action arises naturally from the inherent intensity of life.\n\nThe hedonists, too, says Guyau, have been negligent of the widest\npleasures, and have frequently confined their attention to those of\neating and drinking and sexual intercourse, purely sensitive, and have\nneglected those of living, willing and thinking, which are more\nfundamental as being identical with the consciousness of life. But\nGuyau asserts that, as the greatest intensity of life involves\nnecessarily its widest expansion, we must give special attention to\nthought and will and feeling, which bring us into touch universally\nwith our fellows and promote the widest life. This expansiveness of\nlife has great ethical importance. With the change in the nature of\nreproduction, involving the sexual union of two beings, \u201ca new moral\nphase began in the world.\u201d It involved an expansion not merely\nphysical, but mental\u2014a union, however crude, of soul.\n\nIt is in the extension of this feature of human life that Guyau sees\nthe ethical ideal. The most perfect organism is the most sociable, for\nthe ideal of the individual life is the common or social life. Morality\nis for him almost synonymous with sociability, disinterestedness, love\nand brotherhood, and in it we find, he says, \u201cthe flower of human\nlife.\u201d\n\nAll our action should be referred to this moral ideal of sociability.\nGuyau sees in the phrase \u201csocial service\u201d a conception which should not\nbe confined to those who are endeavouring in some religious or\nphilanthropic manner to alleviate the suffering caused by evil in human\nsociety, but a conception to which the acts, all acts, of all members\nof society should be related. Like Renouvier, he gives to work an\nimportant ethical value. \u201cTo work is to produce\u2014that is, to be useful\nto oneself and to others.\u201d In work he sees the economic and moral\nreconciliation of egoism and altruism. It is a good and it is\npraiseworthy. Those who neglect and despise it are parasites, and their\nexistence in society is a negation of the moral ideal of sociability\nand social service. In so far as the work of certain persons leads to\nthe accumulation of excessive capital in individual hands, it is likely\nto annul itself sooner or later in luxury and idleness. Such an immoral\nstate of affairs, it is the concern of society, by its laws of\ninheritance and possession, to prevent.\n\nHaving made clear his principle of morality, Guyau then has to face the\nquestion of its relation to the notion of duty or obligation. Duty in\nitself is an idea which he rejects as vague, and he disapproves of the\nexternal and artificial element present in the Kantian \u201crigorism.\u201d For\nGuyau the very power of action contained in life itself creates an\nimpersonal duty. While Emerson could write:\n\n\u201cDuty says, \u2018I must,\u2019\nThe youth replies, \u2018I can,\u2019\u201d\n\n\nthe view of Guyau is directly the converse; for him \u201cI can\u201d gives the\n\u201cI must\u201d; it is the power which precedes and creates the obligation.\nLife cannot maintain itself unless it grows and expands. The soul that\nliveth to itself, that liveth solely by habit and automatism, is\nalready dead. Morality is the unity of the personality expanding by\naction and by sympathy. It is at this point that Guyau\u2019s thought\napproaches closely to the _philosophie des id\u00e9es-forces_ of his\nstep-father, by his doctrine of thought and action.\n\nImmorality is really unsociability, and Guyau thinks this a better\nkey-note than to regard it as disobedience. If it is so to be spoken\nof, it is disobedience to the social elements in one\u2019s own self\u2014a\nmischievous duplication of personality, egoistic in character and\nprofoundly antisocial. The sociological elements which characterise all\nGuyau\u2019s work are here very marked. In the notion of sociability we find\nan equivalent of the older and more artificial conception of Duty\u2014a\nconception which lacks concreteness and offers in itself so little\nguidance because it is abstract and empty. The criterion of\nsociability, Guyau claims, is much more concrete and useful. He asks us\nto observe its spirituality, for the more gross and materialistic\npleasures fall short of the criterion by the very fact that they cannot\nbe shared. Guyau\u2019s thought is here at its best. The higher pleasures,\nwhich are not those of bodily enjoyment and satisfaction, but those of\nthe spirit, which thinks, feels, wills and loves, are precisely those\nwhich come nearest to fulfilling the ideal of sociability, for they\ntend less to divide men than to unite them and to urge them to a closer\nco-operation for their spiritual advancement. Guyau writes here with\nsarcasm regarding the lonely imbecile in the carriage drawn by four\nhorses. For his own part it is enough to have\u2014\n\n\u201c. . . a Loaf of Bread beneath the Bough,\nA Flask of Wine, a Book of Verse\u2014and Thou\nBeside me singing in the Wilderness\u2014\nAnd Wilderness is Paradise enow.\u201d\n\n\nHe knows who really has chosen the better part. One cannot rejoice much\nand rejoice alone. Companionship and love are supremely valuable\n\u201cgoods,\u201d and the pleasure of others he recognises as a very real part\nof his own. The egoist\u2019s pleasure is, on the other hand, very largely\nan illusion. He loses, says Guyau, far more by his isolated enjoyment\nthan he would gain by sharing.\n\nLife itself is the greatest of all goods, as it is the condition of all\nothers, but life\u2019s value fades if we are not loved. It is love,\ncomradeship and the fellowship of kindred souls which give to the\nhumblest life a significance and a feeling of value. This, Guyau points\nout with some tenderness, is the tragedy of suicides. These occurrences\nare a social no less than an individual tragedy. The tragic element\nlies in the fact that they were persons who were unable to give their\ndevotion to some object, and the loss of personalities in this way is a\nreal loss to society, but it is mainly society itself which is to blame\nfor them.\n\nWe need not fear, says Guyau, that such a gospel will promote unduly\nthe operation of mere animality or instinctive action, for in the\ngrowth of the scientific spirit he sees the development of the great\nenemy of all instinct. It is the dissolving force _par excellence_, the\nrevolutionary spirit which incessantly wages warfare within society\nagainst authority, and in the individual it operates through reason\nagainst the instinctive impulses. Every instinct tends to lapse in so\nfar as it is reflected upon by consciousness.\n\nThe old notion of duty or obligation must, in Guyau\u2019s opinion, be\nabandoned. The sole commandment which a scientific and positive ethic,\nsuch as he endeavours to indicate, can recognise, is expressible only\nin the words, \u201cDevelop your life in all directions, be an individual as\nrich as possible in energy, intensive and extensive\u201d\u2014in other words,\n\u201cBe the most social and sociable being you can.\u201d It is this which\nreplaces the \u201ccategorical imperative.\u201d\n\nHe aptly points out the failure of modern society to offer scope for\ndevotion, which is really a superabundance of life, and its proneness\nto crush out opportunities which offer a challenge to the human spirit.\nThere is a claim of life itself to adventure; there is a pleasure in\nrisk and in conflict; and this pleasure in risk and adventure has been\nlargely overlooked in its relation to the moral life. Such risk and\nadventure are not merely a pure negation of self or of personal life,\nbut rather, he considers, that life raised to its highest power,\nreaching the sublime. By virtue of such devotion our lives are\nenriched. He draws a touching picture of the sacrifice upon which our\nmodern social life and civilisation are based, and draws an analogy\nbetween the blood of dead horses used by the ploughman in fertilising\nhis field, and the blood of the martyrs of humanity, _qui ont f\u00e9cond\u00e9\nl\u2019avenir_. Often they may have been mistaken; later generations may\nwonder if their cause was worth fighting for; yet, although nothing\ntruly is sadder than to die in vain, that devotion was valuable in and\nfor itself.\n\nWith the demand of life for risk in action is bound up the impetus to\nundertake risk in thought. From this springs the moral need for faith,\nfor belief and acceptance of some hypotheses. The very divergence or\ndiversity of the world-religions is not discouraging but rather the\nreverse. It is a sign of healthy moral life. Uniformity would be highly\ndetrimental; it would cease to express life, for with conformity of\nbelief would come spiritual decline and stagnation. Guyau anticipates\nhere his doctrine of a religion of free thought, a \u201cnon-religion\u201d of\nthe future, which we shall discuss in our next chapter, when we examine\nhis book on that subject. In the diversity of religious views Guyau\nsees a moral good, for these religions are themselves an expression of\nlife in its richness, and the conservation and expansion of this rich\nvariety of life are precisely the moral ideal itself.\n\nWe must endeavour to realise how rich and varied the nature of human\nlife really is. Revolutionaries, Guyau points out, are always making\nthe mistake of regarding life and truth as too simple. Life and truth\nare so complex that evolution is the key-note to what is desirable in\nthe individual intellect and in society, not a revolution which must\ninevitably express the extreme of one side or the other. The search for\ntruth is slow and needs faith and patience, but the careful seekers of\nit are making the future of mankind. But truth will be discovered only\nin relation to action and life and in proportion to the labour put into\nits realisation. The search for truth must never be divorced from the\nactive life, Guyau insists, and, indeed, he approaches the view that\nthe action will produce the knowledge, \u201cHe that doeth the will shall\nknow of the doctrine.\u201d Moreover he rightly sees in action the wholesome\ncure for pessimism and that cynicism which all too frequently arises\nfrom an equal appreciation of opposing views. \u201cEven in doubt,\u201d he\nexclaims, \u201cwe can love; even in the intellectual night, which prevents\nour seeing any ultimate goal, we can stretch out a hand to him who\nweeps at our feet.\u201d[34] In other words, we must do the duty that lies\nnearest, in the hope and faith that by that action itself light will\ncome.\n\n [34] _Esquisse d\u2019une Morale sans Obligation ni Sanction_, p. 178.\n\n\nIn the last part of his treatise Guyau deals with the difficult problem\nof \u201csanction,\u201d so ultimately connected with ethics, and, it must be\nadded, with religion. The Providence who rewards and punishes us,\naccording to the orthodox religious creed of Christendom, is merely a\npersonified \u201csanction\u201d or distributive justice, operating in a\nterrestrial and celestial court of assize. Guyau condemns this as an\nutterly immoral conception. Religious sanctions, as he has not much\ndifficulty in showing, are more cruel than those which a man could\nimagine himself inflicting upon his mortal enemy. The \u201cHeavenly Father\u201d\nought at least to be as good as earthly ones, who do not cruelly punish\ntheir children. Guyau touches upon an important point here, which will\nbe further emphasised\u2014namely, the necessity for making our idea of God,\nif we have one at all, harmonious with our own ethical conceptions. The\nold ideas of the divinity are profoundly immoral and are based on\nphysical force. This is natural because those views which have survived\nin modern times are those of primitive and savage people to whom the\nmost holy was the most powerful and physically majestic. But, says\nGuyau, now that we see that \u201call physical force represents moral\nweakness,\u201d the idea of God the All-terrible, with his hell-fire ready\nfor the sinful soul, must be condemned as immoral blasphemy itself.\n\u201cGod,\u201d he remarks, \u201cin damning any soul might be said to damn himself.\u201d\n\nVirtue is really its own reward. No one should be or do good in order\nto gain an entry into paradise or to escape the torments of hell. That\nis to build morality on an immoral principle and on a belief, not in\ngoodness as valuable in and for itself, but on a basis of material\nself-interest alone, \u201cthe best policy.\u201d It is true, Guyau admits, that\nvirtue involves happiness, but it is not in this sense. A conflict\nbetween \u201cpleasure\u201d and virtue is usually one of higher _versus_ lower\nideals. Virtue is not a precedent to sense-happiness, and in this sense\nis not at all equivalent or bound up with happiness, but, as the facts\nof life reveal, very often opposed to it.\n\nGuyau opposes the ordinary view of punishment in society and shows that\nit is both immoral and socially harmful in its application. It adds\nevil to evil, and legal murder is really more absurd than the illegal\nmurder. Punishment, capital or other, is no \u201ccompensation\u201d exacted for\nthe crime committed, and it never can be such. Attempts to treat and\ncure the guilty one would, Guyau suggests, be far more rational, humane\nand really beneficial to society itself, which at present creates by\nits punishments, especially those inflicted for first offences, a\n\u201ccriminal class.\u201d One should convert the criminal before punishing him,\nand then, Guvau asks, if he is converted, why punish him?\n\nThe appeal to justice denoted in the words \u201cTo everyone according to\nhis works\u201d is frequently heard in the defence of punishment. This is an\nexcellent maxim in Guyau\u2019s opinion, but he is careful to point out that\nit is purely one of social economics. It is a plea for a just\ndistribution of the products of labour, but does not apply at all to\nthe problem of punishment. In a manner which recalls the remarks of\nRenan, Guyau sees in evil-doing a lack of culture, or rather of that\nsociability, which comes of social culture, from consciousness of a\nmembership of society and a solidarity with one\u2019s fellows. In vice and\nin virtue alike the human will appears aspiring to better things\naccording to its lights. As virtue is its own reward, so is evil; and\nthe moralist must say to the wicked: \u201cVerily they have their reward\u201d\n(_Comme si ce n\u2019\u00e9tait pas assez pour eux d\u2019\u00eatre m\u00e9chants_).\n\nGuyau comments upon the gradual modifications of punishment from a\nsocial point of view. There was the day when the chastisement was\ninfinitely worse than the crime itself. Then came the morality of\nreciprocity, \u201can eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth,\u201d an ethic\nwhich represented a high ideal for primitive man to reach, and one to\nwhich, Guyau thinks, we have yet to reach to-day in some spheres of\nlife. Yet a further moral development will show how foolish, in a\ncivilised society, are wrath and hatred of the criminal and the cry for\nvengeance. Society must aim at ensuring protection for itself with the\nminimum of individual suffering. Punishment must be regarded as an\nexample for the future rather than as revenge or compensation. In the\nindividual himself Guyau observes how powerful can be the inner\nsanction of remorse, the suffering caused by the unrealised ideal. This\nis perhaps the only real moral punishment, and it is one which society\ncannot itself directly enforce. Only by increasing \u201csociability\u201d and\nsocial sensitiveness can this sanction be indirectly developed.\n\nHerein lies the highest ethical ideal, far more concrete and living, in\nGuyau\u2019s opinion, than the rigorism of a Kant or the \u201cscholastic\u201d[35]\ntemper of a Renouvier. Charity or love for all men, whatever their\nvalue morally, intellectually or physically, must, he claims, \u201cbe the\nfinal end pursued even by public opinion.\u201dIn co-operation and\nsociability, he finds the vital moral ideal; in love and brotherhood,\nhe finds the real sanction which should operate.\u201dLove supposes\nmutuality of love,\u201d he says; and there is one idea superior to that of\njustice, that is the idea of brotherhood, and he remarks with a humane\ntenderness \u201cthe guilty have probably more need for love than anyone\nelse.\u201d \u201cI have,\u201d he cries, \u201ctwo hands\u2014the one for gripping the hand of\nthose with whom I march along in life, the other to lift up the fallen.\nIndeed, to these I should be able to stretch out both hands\ntogether.\u201d[36]\n\n [35] This is Guyau\u2019s word to describe Renouvier, whom he regards as\n far too much under the influence of Kant.\n\n\n [36] _Esquisse d\u2019une Morale sans Obligation ni Sanction_, p. 223.\n\n\nWhile Fouill\u00e9e and, more especially, Guyau were thus outlining an ethic\nmarked by a strong humanitarianism, a more definitely religious ethic\nwas being proclaimed by that current of philosophy of belief and of\naction which has profoundly associated itself in its later developments\nwith \u201cModernism\u201d in the Roman Church. The tendency to stress action and\nthe practical reason is noticeable in the work of Brochard,\nOll\u00e9-Laprune and Blondel, also in Rauh. They agree with Renouvier in\nadvocating the primacy of the practical reason, but their own reasons\nfor this are different from his, or at least in them the reasons are\nmore clearly enunciated. Plainly these reasons lie in the difficulties\nof intellectualism and the quest of truth. They propose the quest of\nthe good in the hope of finding in that sphere some objectivity, some\nabsolute, in fact, which they cannot find out by intellectual\nsearching. They correspond in a somewhat parallel fashion to the\nphilosophy of intuition with its rejection of intellectualism as\noffering a final solution. These thinkers desire by action, by doing\nthe will, to attain to a knowledge of the doctrine. The first word in\ntheir gospel is\u2014\n\n\u201cIm Anfang war die That.\u201d\n\n\nIt is for them the beginning and the end. Their certainty is an act of\nbelief, which grows out of action and life. It is a curious mixture of\ninsistence upon life and action, such as we find in Guyau and in\nBergson, coupled with a religious Platonism. Brochard\u2019s work is of this\ntype. He wrote as early as 1874 on _La Responsabilit\u00e9 morale_, and in\n1876 on _L\u2019Universalit\u00e9 des Notions morales_. Three years later\nappeared his work _L\u2019Erreur_. Oll\u00e9-Laprune and Blondel, who best\nrepresent this tendency, do not like Guyau\u2019s ethics, which lacks the\nreligious idealism which they consider should be bound up with\nmorality. This was the thesis developed in the volume _La Certitude\nmorale_, written by Oll\u00e9-Laprune in 1881. \u201cBy what right,\u201d says\nOll\u00e9-Laprune in his subsequent book _Le Prix de la Vie_ (1895), \u201ccan\nGuyau speak of a high exalted life, of a moral ideal? It is impossible\nto speak so when you have only a purely naturalistic ethic; for merely\nto name these things is an implication that there is not only intensity\nin life, but also quality. You suppress duty because you can see in it\nonly a falsely mystical view of life and of nature. What you fail to\nrealise is that between duty and life there is a profound agreement.\nYou reduce duty to life, and in life itself you consider only its\nquantity and intensity, and regard as illusion everything that is of a\ndifferent order from the natural physical order in which you imprison\nyourself.\u201d[37]\n\n [37] _Le Prix de la Vie_, p. 139.\n\n\nSuch a criticism is not altogether fair to Guyau who, as we noted,\nproclaimed the superiority of the higher qualities of spiritual life.\nIt does, however, attack his abandonment of the idea of Duty; and we\nmust now turn to examine a thinker, who, by his contribution to ethics,\nendeavoured to satisfy the claims of life and of duty.\n\nThis was Rauh, whose _Essai sur le Fondement m\u00e9taphysique de la Morale_\nappeared in 1890. It had been preceded by a study of the psychology of\nthe feelings, and was later followed by _L\u2019Exp\u00e9rience morale_ (1903).\nIn seeking a metaphysical foundation for morality, Rauh recalls Kant\u2019s\n_Metaphysic of Morals_. He, indeed, agrees with Kant in the view that\nthe essence of morality lies in the sentiment of obligation. Belief or\nfaith in an ideal, by which it behoves us to act, imposes itself, says\nRauh, upon the mind of man as essential. It is as positive a fact as\nthe laws of the natural sciences. Man not only states facts and\nformulates general laws in a scientific manner, he also conceives and\nbelieves in ideals, which become bound up in his mind with the\nsentiment of obligation\u2014that is, the general feeling of duty. But\nbeyond a general agreement upon this point, Rauh does not follow Kant.\nHe tends to look upon the ethical problem in the spirit which Guyau,\nBergson and Blondel show in their general philosophic outlook. In life,\naction and immediacy alone can we find a solution. Nothing practical\ncan be deduced from the abstract principle of obligation or duty in\ngeneral. The moral consciousness of man is, in Rauh\u2019s opinion, akin to\nthe intuitional perceptions of Bergson\u2019s philosophy. Morality,\nmoreover, is creating itself perpetually by the reflection of sensitive\nminds on action and on life itself. \u201cMorality, or rather moral action,\nis not merely the crown of metaphysical speculation, but itself the\ntrue metaphysic, which is learnt only in living, as it is naught but\nlife itself.\u201d[38] In concluding his thesis, Rauh reminds us that \u201cthe\nessential and most certain factor in the midst of the uncertainties of\nlife and of duty lies in the constant consciousness of the moral\nideal.\u201d In it he sees a spiritual reality which, if we keep it ever\nbefore us, may inspire the most insignificant of our actions and render\nthem into a harmony, a living harmony of character.\n\n [38] _Essai sur le Fondement m\u00e9taphysique de la Morale_, p. 255.\n\n\nRauh\u2019s doctrines, we claim, have affinities to the doctrines of action\nand intuition. That does not imply, however, that the intelligence is\nto be minimised\u2014far from this; but the intelligence triumphs here in\nrealising that it is not all-sufficing or supreme. \u201cThe heart hath\nreasons which the reason cannot know.\u201d While Fouill\u00e9e had remarked that\nmorality is metaphysics in action, Rauh points out that \u201cmetaphysics in\naction\u201d is the foundation of our knowledge. We must, he insists, seek\nfor certitude in an immediate and active adaptation to reality instead\nof deducing a rule or rules of action from abstract systems.\n\nHe separates himself from the sociologists[39] by pointing out that,\nhowever largely social environment may determine our moral ideals and\nrules of conduct, nevertheless the ethical decision is fundamentally an\nabsolutely personal affair. The human conscience, in so far as active,\nmust never _passively_ accept the existing social morality. It finds\nitself sometimes in agreement, sometimes obliged to give a newer\ninterpretation to old conventions, and at times is obliged to revolt\nagainst them. In no case can the idea of duty be equated simply and\ncalmly with acquiescence in the collective general will. It must demand\nfrom social morality its credentials and hold itself free to criticise\nthe current ethic of the community. More often than not society acts,\nRauh thinks, as a break rather than a stimulus; and social interest is\nnot a measure of the moral ideal, but rather a limitation of it.\n\n [39] The relation of ethics and sociology is well discussed, not only\n by Durkheim (who, in his _Division du Travail social_, speaks of the\n development of democracy and increasing respect for human\n personality), but also by L\u00e9vy-Bruhl, who followed his thesis on\n _L\u2019Id\u00e9e de Responsabilit\u00e9_, 1883, by the volume, _La Morale el la\n Science des Moeurs_.\n\n\nAlthough the moral ideal is one which must be personally worked out, it\nis not a merely individualistic affair. Rauh does not abandon the\nguidance of reason, but he objects equally to the following of instinct\nor a transcendent teaching divorced from the reality of life. Our guide\nmust be reflection upon instinct, and this is only possible by action\nand experience, the unique experience of living itself. Reason itself\nis experience; and it is our duty to face problems personally and\nsincerely, in a manner which the rational element in us renders\n\u201cimpersonal, universal and disinterested.\u201d\n\nAny code of morality which is not directly in contact with life is\nworthless, and all ethical ideas which are not those of our time are of\nlittle value. Only he is truly a man who lives the life of his time.\nThe truly moral man is he who is alive to this spirit and who does not\nunreflectingly deduce his rules of conduct from ancient books or\nteachers of a past age. The art of living is the supreme art, and it is\nthis which the great moralists have endeavoured to show humanity.\nNeither Socrates nor Jesus wrote down their ethical ideas: they lived\nthem.\n\nRauh thus reminds us partly of Guyau in his insistence upon life. He\nregards the ethical life at its highest, as one _sans obligation ni\nsanction_. Rather than the Kantian obligation of duty, of constraint,\nhe favours in his second book, _L\u2019Exp\u00e9rience morale_, a state of\nspontaneity, of passion and exaltation of the personal conscience which\nfaces the issue in a disinterested manner. The man who is morally\nhonest himself selects his values, his ideals, his ends, by the light\nwhich reason gives him. Ethics becomes thus an independent science, a\nscience of \u201cends,\u201d which Reason, as reflected in the personal\nconscience, acclaims a science of the ideal ordering of life.\n\nSuch was Rauh\u2019s conception of rational moral experience, one which he\nendeavoured to apply in his lectures to the two problems which he\nconsidered to be supreme in his time, that of patriotism and of social\njustice.\n\nThese problems were further touched upon in 1896, when L\u00e9on Bourgeois\n(since noted for his advocacy of the \u201cLeague of Nations\u201d) published his\nlittle work _Solidarit\u00e9_, which was also a further contribution to an\nindependent, positive and lay morality. In the conception of the\nsolidarity of humanity throughout the ages, Bourgeois accepted the\nteaching of the sociologists, and urges that herein can be found an\nobligation, for the present generation must repay their debt to their\nancestors and be worthy of the social heritage which has made them what\nthey are. Somewhat similar sentiments had Been expressed by Marion in\nhis Solidarit\u00e9 morale (1880). Ethical questions were kept in the\nforefront by the society known as _L\u2019Union pour l\u2019Action morale_,\nfounded by Desjardins and supported by Lagneau (1851- 1894). After the\nexcitement of the Dreyfus case (1894- 1899) this society took the name\n_L\u2019Union pour la Verit\u00e9_. In 1902 Lapie made an eloquent plea for a\nrational morality in his _Logique de la Volont\u00e9_, and in the following\nyear S\u00e9ailles published his _Affirmations de la Conscience moderne_.\nThe little _Pr\u00e9cis_ of Andr\u00e9 Lalande, written in the form of a\ncatechism, was a further contribution to the establishment of a\nrational and independent lay morality, which the teaching of ethics as\na subject in the _lyc\u00e9es_ and lay schools rendered in some degree\nnecessary.[40] This little work appeared in 1907, the same year in\nwhich Paul Bureau wrote his book _La Crise morale des Temps nouveaux_.\nThen Parodi (who in 1919 produced a fine study of French thought since\n1890[41]) followed up the discussion of ethical problems by his work\n_Le Probl\u00e8me morale et la Pens\u00e9e contemporaine_ (1909), and in 1912\nWilbois published his contribution entitled _Devoir et Dur\u00e9e: Essai de\nMorale sociale_.\n\n [40] The teaching of a lay morality is a vital and practical problem\n which the Government of the Republic is obliged to face. The urgent\n need for such lay teaching will be more clearly demonstrated or\n evident when our next chapter, dealing with the religious problem, has\n been read.\n\n\n [41] _La Philosophie contemporaine en France_.\n\n\nThus concludes a period in which the discussion, although not marked by\na definite turning round of positions as was manifested in our\ndiscussions of science, freedom and progress, bears signs of a general\ndevelopment. This development is shown by the greater insistence upon\nthe social aspects of ethics and by a turning away from the formalism\nof Kant to a more concrete conception of duty, or an ethic in which the\nnotion of duty itself has disappeared. This is the general tendency\nfrom Renan with his insistence upon the aesthetic element, Renouvier\nwith his claim for justice in terms of personality, to Fouill\u00e9e, Guyau,\nOll\u00e9-Laprune and Rauh with their insistence upon action, upon love and\nlife.\n\nYet, although the departure from an intense individualism in ethics is\ndesirable, we must beware of the danger which threatens from the other\nextreme. We cannot close this chapter without insisting upon this\npoint. Good must be personally realised in the inner life of\nindividuals, even if they form a community. The collective life is\nindeed necessary, but it is not collectively that the good is\nexperienced. It is personal. In the neglect of this important aspect\nlies the error of much Communistic philosophy and of that social\nscience which looks on society as purely an organism. This analogy is\nfalse, for however largely a community exhibits a general likeness to\nan organism, it is a superficial resemblance. There is not a centre of\nconsciousness, but a multitude of such centres each living an inner\nlife of personal experience which is peculiarly its own; and these\npersonalities, we must remember, are not simply a homogeneous mass of\nsocial matter, they are capable of realising the good each in his or\nher own manner. This is the only realisation of the good.\n\nIn this chapter we have traced the attempt to reconcile _science et\nconscience_, after the way had been opened up by the maintenance of\nfreedom. It was recognised that reason is not entirely pure\nspeculation: it is also practical. Human nature seeks for goodness as\nwell as for truth. It is noticeable that while the insistence upon the\nprimacy of the practical reason developed, on the one hand, into a\nphilosophy of action (anti-intellectual action in its extreme\ndevelopment as shown in Syndicalism), the same tendency, operating in a\ndifferent manner and upon different data, essayed to find in action,\nand in the belief which arises from action, that Absolute or Ideal to\nwhich the pure reason feels it cannot alone attain\u2014namely, the\nrealisation of God. To this problem of religion we devote our next\nchapter.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII\nRELIGION\n\n\nINTRODUCTION: The religious situation in France in the nineteenth\ncentury\u2014The intellectual and political forces against the Roman\nCatholic Church\u2014Its claims, its orthodoxy and tyranny\u2014The\nhumanitarians\u2014The power of Rome\u2014Church and State\u2014The educational\nproblem\u2014Clericalism\u2014The cult of Jeanne d\u2019Arc\u2014The lack of a _via media_\nbetween Roman orthodoxy and _libre pens\u00e9e_\u2014Protestantism negligible.\n\nI. Comte\u2019s effort in his \u201cReligion of Humanity\u201d\u2014Renan and the\nChurch\u2014Freedom\u2014Denial of supernatural elements in Christianity\u2014_Vie de\nJ\u00e9sus_\u2014Renan not irreligious\u2014Piety\u2014Love and Goodness reveal the\nDivine\u2014God the \u201cideal\u201d\u2014Vacherot and Taine.\n\nII. Renouvier\u2019s efforts, with Pillon, in the _Critique philosophique_\nand _Critique religieuse_\u2014His republican theology\u2014Freedom, personality\nand God\u2014The deity as finite\u2014God as Goodness and as a Person.\n\nIII. Ravaisson\u2019s blend of Hellenism and Christian\nthought\u2014Boutroux\u2014Fouill\u00e9e on the Idea of God\u2014The importance of Guyau\u2019s\n_L\u2019Irreligion de l\u2019Avenir_\u2014The decay of dogma and ecclesiasticism\u2014The\nterm \u201cirreligion\u201d misleading\u2014Sociology and religion-Freedom\u2014Religious\neducation and tolerance\u2014Modernism and the Church\u2014Loisy and\nothers\u2014Symbolism and _Fid\u00e9isme_.\n\nCONCLUSION: The personal factor in faith\u2014Freedom vital to\nreligion\u2014Change of attitude since the eighteenth century\u2014Value of\nreligion\u2014Tendency towards a free religion devoid of dogmas, expressive\nof the best aspirations of man\u2019s mind.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII\nRELIGION\n\nIt is outside our purpose to embark upon discussions of the religious\nproblem in France, in so far as this became a problem of politics. Our\nintention is rather to examine the inner core of religious thought, the\nphilosophy of religion, which forms an appropriate final chapter to our\nhistory of the development of ideas.\n\nYet, although our discussion bears mainly upon the general attitude to\nreligion, upon the development of central religious ideas such as the\nidea of God, and upon the place of religion in the future\u2014that is to\nsay, upon the philosophy of religion\u2014it is practically impossible to\nunderstand the religious attitude of our thinkers without a brief\nnotice of the religious situation in France during the nineteenth and\ntwentieth centuries.\n\nIn our Introduction we briefly called attention to the attempt of the\nTraditionalists after the Revolution to recall their countrymen to the\nChristian faith as presented in and by the Roman Catholic Church. The\nefforts made by De Bonald, De Maistre, Chateaubriand, Lamennais and\nLacordaire did not succeed as they had hoped, but, nevertheless, a\nconsiderable current of loyalty to the Church and the Catholic religion\nset in. Much of this loyalty was bound up with sentimental affection\nfor a monarchy, and arose partly from anti-revolutionary sentiments.[1]\nIt cannot, however, be entirely explained by these political feelings.\nThere was the expression of a deeper and more spiritual reaction\ndirected against the materialistic and sceptical teachings of the\neighteenth century. Man\u2019s heart craved comfort, consolation and warmth.\nIt had been starved in the previous century, and revolution and war had\nonly added to the cup of bitterness. Thus there came an epoch of\nRomanticism in religion of which the sentimental and assumed orthodoxy\nof Chateaubriand was a sign of the times. His _G\u00e9nie du Christianisme_\nmay now appear to us full of sentimentality, but it was welcomed at the\ntime, since it expressed at least some of those aspirations which had\nfor long been denied an expression. It was this which marked the great\ndifference between the two centuries in France. The eighteenth was\nmainly concerned with scoffing at religion. Its rationalism was that of\nVoltaire. In the first half of the nineteenth century the pendulum\nswung in the opposite direction. Romanticism, in poetry, in literature,\nin philosophy and in religion was _\u00e0 la mode_, and it led frequently to\nsentimentality or morbidity. Lamartine, Victor Hugo and De Vigny\nprofessed the Catholic faith for many years. We may note, and this is\nimportant, that in France the only form of Christianity which holds any\nsway over the people in general is the Roman Catholic faith. Outside\nthe Roman Church there is no religious organisation which is of much\naccount. This explains why it is so rare to find a thinker who owns\nallegiance to any Church or religion, and yet it would be wrong to deem\nthem irreligious. There is no _via media_ between Catholicism and free\npersonal thought. This was a point which Renan quite keenly felt, and\nof which his own spiritual pilgrimage, which took him out of the bounds\nof the Church of his youth, is a fine illustration. Many of France\u2019s\nnoblest sons have been brought up in the religious atmosphere of the\nChurch and owe much of their education to her, and Rome believes in\neducation. The control of education has been throughout the century a\nproblem severely contested by Church and State. More important for our\npurpose than the details of the quarrels of Church and State is the\nintellectual condition of the Church itself.\n\n [1] De Maistre regarded the Revolution as an infliction specially\n bestowed upon France for her national neglect of religion\u2014his\n religion, of course. The same crude, misleading, and vicious arguments\n have since been put forward by the theologians in their efforts to\n push the cause of the Church with the people. This was very noticeable\n both in the war of 1870 and that of 1914. In each case it was argued\n that the war was a punishment from God for France\u2019s frivolity and\n neglect of the Church. In 1914, in addition, it was deemed a direct\n divine reply to \u201cDisestablishment.\u201d\n\n\nThis reveals a striking vitality, a vigour and initiative at war with\nthe central powers of the Vatican, a seething unrest which uniformity\nand authority find annoying. How strong the power of the central\nauthority was, the affair of the Concordat had shown, when forty\nbishops were deposed for non-acceptance of the arrangement between\nNapoleon and the Pope.[2] Stronger still was the iron hand of the Pope\nover intellectual freedom.\n\n [2] The Revolution had separated Church and State and suppressed\n clerical privilege by the \u201cCivil Constitution of the Clergy\u201d enactment\n of 1790. Napoleon, alive to the patriotic value of a State Church,\n repealed this law and declared the divorce of Church and State to be\n null and void. His negotiations with the Pope (Pius VII.) resulted, in\n 1801, in the arrangement known as the _Concordat_, by which the Roman\n Catholic Church was again made the established national Church, its\n clergy became civil servants paid by the State, and its worship became\n a branch of public administration.\n\n\nLamennais was not a \u201cmodernist,\u201d as this term is now understood, for\nhis theology was orthodox. His fight with the Vatican was for freedom\nin the relations of the Church to society. He pleaded in his _Essai sur\nL\u2019indifference en Mati\u00e8re de Religion_ for the Church to accept the\nprinciple of freedom, to leave the cherished fondling of the royalist\ncause, and to present to the world the principles of a Christian\ndemocracy. Lamennais and other liberal-minded men desired the\nseparation of Church and State, and were tolerant of those who were not\nCatholic. They claimed, along with their own \u201cright to believe,\u201d that\nof others \u201cnot to believe.\u201d His was a liberal Catholicism, but its\nproposals frightened his co-religionists, and drew upon him in 1832 an\nencyclical letter (_Mirari vos_) from the Vatican. The Pope denounced\nliberalism absolutely as an absurd and an erroneous doctrine, a piece\nof folly sprung from the \u201cfetid source of indifferentism.\u201d Lamennais\nfound he could not argue, as Renan himself later put it, \u201cwith a bar of\niron.\u201d It was the reactionary De Maistre, with his principle of papal\nauthority,[3] and not Lamennais, whom the Vatican, naturally enough,\nchose to favour, or rather to follow.\n\n [3] As stated in _Du Pape_, 1819.\n\n\nThus Lamennais found himself, by an almost natural and inevitable\nprocess, outside the Church, and this in spite of the fact that his\ntheology was orthodox. He endeavoured to present his case in his paper\n_L\u2019Avenir_ and in an influential brochure, _The Words of a Believer_,\nwhich left its mark upon Hugo, Michelet, Lamartine, and George Sand.\nHis views blended with the current of humanitarian and democratic\ndoctrines which developed from the Saint-Simonists, Pierre Leroux and\nsimilar thinkers. We have already noted that these social reformers\nheld to their beliefs with the conviction that in them and not in the\nRoman Church lay salvation.\n\nThis brings us to a crucial point which is the clue to much of the\nsubsequent thought upon religion. This is the profound and seemingly\nirreconcilable difference between these two conceptions of religion.\n\nThe orthodox Catholic faith believes in a supernatural revelation, and\nis firmly convinced that man is inherently vile and corrupt, born in\nsin from which he cannot be redeemed, save by the mystical operations\nof divine grace, working only through the holy sacraments and clergy of\nthe one true Church, to whom all power was given, according to its\nview, by the historic Jesus. Its methods are conservative, its\ndiscipline rigid and based on tradition and authority. Its system of\nsalvation is excessively individualistic. It holds firmly to this\npessimistic view of human nature, based on the doctrine of original\nsin, thus maintaining a creed which, in the hands of a devoted clergy,\nwho are free from domestic ties, works as a powerful moral force upon\nthe individual believer. His freedom of thought is restricted; he can\nneither read nor think what he likes, and the Church, having made the\nthirteenth-century doctrines of Aquinas its official philosophy, hurls\nanathema at ideas scientific, political, philosophical or theological\nwhich have appeared since. No half-measures are allowed: either one is\na loyal Catholic or one is not a Catholic at all. In this relentlessly\nuncompromising attitude lies the main strength of Catholicism; herein\nalso is contained its weakness, or at least that element which makes it\nmanufacture its own greatest adversaries.\n\nWhile claiming to be the one Church of Jesus Christ, it does not by any\nmeans put him in the foreground of its religion. Its hierarchy of\nsaints is rather a survival of polytheism; its worship of the Virgin\nand cult of the _Sacr\u00e9 C\u0153ur_ issue often in a religious sentimentality\nand sensuality promoted by the denial of a more healthy outlet for\ninstincts which are an essential part of human nature. Tribute,\nhowever, must be paid\u2014high tribute\u2014to the devotion of individuals,\nparticularly to the work done by the religious orders of women, whose\ndevotion the Church having won by its intense appeal to women keeps,\nconsecrates and organises in a manner which no other Church has\nsucceeded in doing. This is largely the secret of the vigorous life of\nthe Church, for as a power of charity the Roman Church is remarkable\nand deserves respect. Her educational efforts, her missions, hospitals,\nher humbler clergy, and her orders which offer opportunity of service\nor of sanctuary to all types of human nature\u2014these constitute Roman\nCatholicism in a truer manner than the diplomacy of the Jesuits or the\ncouncils of the Vatican. It is this pulsing human heart of hers which\nkeeps her alive, not the rigid intellectual dogmatism and antiquated\ntheology which she expounds, nor her loyalty to the established\npolitical order, which, siding with the rich and powerful, frequently\ngives to this professedly spiritual power a debasing taint of\nmaterialism.\n\nAgainst all this, and in vital opposition to this, we have the\nhumanitarians who, rejecting the doctrine of corruption, believe that\nhuman instincts and human reason themselves make for goodness and for\nGod. While Catholicism looks to the past, humanitarianism looks\nforward, believes in freedom and in progress, and regards the immanent\nChrist-spirit as working in mankind. Its gospel is one of love and\nbrotherhood, a romantic doctrine issuing in love and pity for the\noppressed and the sinful. In the collective consciousness of mankind it\nsees the incarnation, the growth of the immanent God. Therefore it\nclaims that in democracy, socialism and world brotherhood lies the true\nChristianity. This, the humanitarians claim, is the true religious\nidealism\u2014that which was preached by the Founder himself and which his\nChurch has betrayed. The humanitarians make service to mankind the\nessence of religion, and regard themselves as more truly Christian than\nthe Church.\n\nIn those countries where Protestantism has a large following, the two\ndoctrines of humanitarian optimism and of the orthodox pessimism\nregarding human nature are confused vaguely together. The English mind\nin particular is able to compromise and to blend the two conflicting\nphilosophies in varying degrees; but in the French mind its clearer\npenetration and more logical acumen prevent this. The Frenchman is an\nidealist and tends to extremes, either that of whole-hearted devotion\nto a dominating Church or that of the abandonment of organised\nreligion. In Protestantism he sees only a halfway house, built upon the\nfirst principles of criticism, and unwilling to pursue those principles\nto their conclusion\u2014namely, the rejection of all organised Church\nreligion, the adoption of perfect freedom for the individual in all\nmatters of belief, a religion founded on freedom and on personal\nthought which alone is free.\n\nSuch were the two dominant notes in religious thought in France at the\nopening of our period.\n\nCatholicism resisted the humanitarianism of 1848 and strengthened its\npower after the _coup d\u2019\u00e9tat_. The Church and the Vatican became more\nstaunch in their opposition to all doctrines of modern thought. The\nFrench clergy profited by the alliance with the aristocracy, while\nreligious orders, particularly the Jesuits, increased in number and in\npower. Veuillot proclaimed the virtues of Catholicism in his writings.\nMeanwhile the Pope\u2019s temporal power decreased, but his spiritual power\nwas increasing in extent and in intensity. Centralisation went on\nwithin the Church, and Rome (_i.e._, the Pope and the Vatican) became\nall-powerful.\n\nJust after the half-century opens the Pope (Pius IX.), in 1854,\nproclaimed his authority in announcing the dogma of the Immaculate\nConception of the Virgin Mary.[4] As France had heard the sentence,\n_L\u2019Etat, c\u2019est moi_, from the lips of one of its greatest monarchs, it\nnow heard from another quarter a similar principle enunciated,\nL\u2019Eglise, c\u2019est moi. As democracy and freedom cried out against the\none, they did so against the other. Undaunted, the Vatican continued in\nits absolutism, even although it must have seen that in some quarters\nrevolt would be the result. Ten years later the Pope attacked the whole\nof modern thought, to which he was diametrically opposed, in his\nencyclical _Quanta Cura_ and in his famous _Syllabus_, which\nconstituted a catalogue of the modern errors and heresies which he\ncondemned. This famous challenge was quite clear and uncompromising in\nits attitude, concluding with a curse upon \u201chim who should maintain\nthat the Roman Pontiff can, and must, be reconciled and compromise with\nprogress, liberalism and modern civilisation!\u201d To the doctrine of\n_L\u2019Eglise, c\u2019est moi_ had now been added that of _La Science, aussi,\nc\u2019est moi_. This was not all. In 1870 the dogma of Papal Infallibility\nwas proclaimed. By a strange irony of history, however, this\ndeclaration of spiritual absolutism was followed by an entire loss of\ntemporal power. The outbreak of the war in that same year between\nFrance and Prussia led to the hasty withdrawal of French troops from\nthe Papal Domain and the Eternal City fell to the secular power of the\nItalian national army under Victor Emmanuel.\n\n [4] This new dogma of the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin must\n not, of course, be confused, as it often is by those outside the\n Catholic Church, with the quite different and more ancient proposition\n which asserts the Virgin Birth of Jesus.\n\n\nThe defeat of France at the hands of Prussia in 1871 issued in a\nrevival of religious sentiment, frequently seen in defeated nations. A\nspecial mission or crusade of national repentance gathered in large\nsubscriptions which built the enormous Church of the Sacr\u00e9 Coeur\noverlooking Paris from the heights of Montmartre.[5]\n\n [5] The anti-Catholic element, however, have had the audacity, and\n evidently the legal right, to place a statue to a man who, some\n centuries back, was burned at the stake for failing to salute a\n religious procession, in such a position immediately in front of this\n great church that the plan for the large staircase cannot be carried\n out.\n\n\nSeeking for religious consolation, the French people found a\nCatholicism which had become embittered and centralised for warfare\nupon liberal religion and humanitarianism. They found that the only\norganised religion they knew was dominated by the might of Rome and the\npowers of the clergy. These even wished France, demoralised as she was\nfor the moment, to undertake the restoration of the Pope\u2019s temporal\npower in Italy. Further, they were definitely in favour of monarchy:\n\u201cthe altar and the throne\u201d were intimately associated in the\necclesiastical mind.\n\nIt was the realisation of this which prompted Gambetta to cry out to\nthe Third Republic with stern warning, \u201cClericalism is your enemy.\u201d\nThus began the political fight for which Rome had been strengthening\nherself. With the defeat of the clerical-monarchy party in 1877 the\nsafety of the Republic was assured. From then until 1905 the Republic\nand the Church fought each other. Educational questions were bitterly\ncontested (1880). The power of the Jesuits, especially, was regarded as\na constant menace to the State. The Dreyfus affair (1894- 1899) did not\nimprove relations, with its intense anti-semitism and anti-clericalism.\nThe battle was only concluded by the legislation of Waldeck-Rousseau in\n1901 and Combes in 1903, expelling religious orders. Combes himself had\nstudied for the priesthood and was violently anti-clerical. The\nculmination came in the Separation Law of 1905 carried by Briand, in\nthe Pope\u2019s protest against this, followed by the Republic\u2019s\nconfiscation of much Church property, a step which might have been\navoided if the French Catholics had been allowed to have their way in\nan arrangement with the State regarding their churches. This was\nprevented by the severance of diplomatic relations between France and\nthe Vatican and by the Pope\u2019s disagreement with the French Catholics\nwhose wishes he ignored in his policy of definite hostility to the\nFrench Government.[6]\n\n [6] Relations with the Vatican, which were seen to be desirable during\n the Great European War, have since been resumed (in 1921) by the\n Republic.\n\n\nDuring our period a popular semi-nationalist and semi-religious cult of\nJeanne d\u2019Arc, \u201cthe Maid of Orleans,\u201d appeared in France. The clergy\nexpressly encouraged this, with the definite object of enlisting\nsentiments of nationality and patriotism on the side of the Church.\nEcclesiastical diplomacy at headquarters quickly realised the use which\nmight be made of this patriotic figure whom, centuries before, the\nChurch had thought fit to burn as a witch. The Vatican saw a\npossibility of blending French patriotism with devotion to Catholicism\nand thus possibly strengthening, in the eyes of the populace at least,\nthe waning cause of the Church.\n\nThe adoration of Jeanne d\u2019Arc was approved as early as 1894, but when\nthe Church found itself in a worse plight with its relation to the\nState, it made preparations in 1903 for her enrolment among the\nsaints.[7] She was honoured the following year with the title of\n\u201cVenerable,\u201d but in 1908, after the break of Church and State, she was\naccorded the full status of a saint, and her statue, symbolic of\npatriotism militant, stands in most French churches as conspicuous\noften as that of the Virgin, who, in curious contrast, fondles the\nyoung child, and expresses the supreme loveliness of motherhood.[8] The\ncult of Jeanne d\u2019Arc flourished particularly in 1914 on the sentiments\nof patriotism, militarism and religiosity then current. This was\nnatural because it is for these very sentiments that she stands as a\nsymbol. She is evidently a worthy goddess whose worship is worth while,\nfor we are assured that it was through _her_ beneficent efforts that\nthe German Army retired from Paris in 1914 and again in 1918. The\nsaintly maid of Orleans reappeared and beat them back! Such is the\npower of the \u201cculte\u201d which the Church eagerly fosters. The Sacr\u00e9 Coeur\nalso has its patriotic and military uses, figuring as it did as an\nemblem on some regimental flags on the battlefield. Meanwhile, the\ncelebrations of Napoleon\u2019s centenary (1921) give rise to the conjecture\nthat he, too, will in time rank with Joan of Arc as a saint. His\ncanonisation would achieve absolutely that union of patriotic and\nreligious sentimentality to which the Church in France directs its\nactivities.\n\n [7] t is interesting to observe the literature on Jeanne d\u2019Arc\n published at this time: Anatole France, _Vie de Jeanne d\u2019Arc_ (2\n vols., 1908); Durand, _Jeanne d\u2019Arc et l\u2019Eglise_ (1908). These are\n noteworthy, also Andrew Lang\u2019s work, _The Maid of Orleans_ (also\n 1908).\n\n\n [8] Herein, undoubtedly, lies the strong appeal of the Church to\n women.\n\n\nThe vast majority of the 39,000,000 French people are at least\nnominally Catholic, even if only from courtesy or from a utilitarian\npoint of view. Only about one in sixty of the population are\nProtestant. Although among cultured conservatives there is a real\ndevotion to the Church, the creed of France is in general something far\nmore broad and human than Catholicism, in spite of the tremendously\nhuman qualities which that Church possesses. The creed of France is\nsummed up better in art, nature, beauty, music, science, _la patrie_,\nhumanity, in the worship of life itself.[9]\n\n [9] Those who desire to study the religious psychology of France\n during our period cannot find a better revelation than that given in\n the wonderful novel by Roger Martin du Card, entitled Jean Barois.\n\nI\n\nIt was against such a background of ecclesiastical and political\naffairs that the play of ideas upon religion went on. Such was the\nenvironment, the tradition which surrounded our thinkers, and we may\nvery firmly claim that only by a recognition that their religious and\nnational _milieu_ was of such a type as we have outlined, can the real\nsignificance of their religious thought be understood. Only when we\nhave grasped the essential attitude of authority and tradition of the\nRoman Church, its ruthless attitude to modern thought of all kinds, can\nwe understand the religious attitude of men like Renan, Renouvier and\nGuyau.\n\nWe are also enabled to see why the appeal of the Saint-Simonist group\ncould present itself as a religious and, indeed, Christian appeal\noutside the Church. It enables us to understand why Cousin\u2019s\nspiritualism pleased neither the Catholics nor their opponents, and to\nrealise why the \u201cReligion of Humanity,\u201d which Auguste Comte\ninaugurated, made so little appeal.[10] This has been well styled an\n\u201cinverted Catholicism,\u201d since it endeavours to preserve the ritual of\nthat religion and to embody the doctrines of humanitarianism. Naturally\nenough it drew upon itself the scorn of both these groups. The Catholic\nsaw in it only blasphemy: the humanitarian saw no way in which it might\nfurther his ends.\n\n [10] Littr\u00e9, his disciple, as we have already noted, rejected this\n part of his master\u2019s teaching. Littr\u00e9 was opposed by Robinet, who laid\n the stress upon the \u201cReligion of Humanity\u201d as the crown of Comte\u2019s\n work.\n\n\nComte\u2019s attempt to base his new religion upon Catholicism was quite\ndeliberate, for he strove to introduce analogies with \u201ceverything great\nand deep which the Catholic system of the Middle Ages effected or even\nprojected.\u201d He offered a new and fantastic trinity, compiled a calendar\nof renowned historical personalities, to replace that of unknown\nsaints. He proclaimed \u201cpositive dogmas \u201cand aspired to all the\nauthority and infallibility of the Roman Pontiff, supported by a\ntrained clergy, whose word should be law. Curiously enough he, too, had\nhis anathemas, in that he had days set apart for the solemn cursing of\nthe great enemies of the human race, such as Napoleon. It was indeed a\nreversed Catholicism, offering a fairly good caricature of the methods\nof the Roman Church, and it was equally obnoxious in its tyrannical\nattitude.[11] While it professed to express humanity and love as its\ncentral ideas it proceeded to outline a method which is the utter\nnegation of these. Comte made the great mistake of not realising that\nloyalty to these ideals must involve spiritual freedom, and that the\nreligion of humanity must be a collective inspiration of free\nindividuals, who will in love and fellowship tolerate differences upon\nmetaphysical questions. Uniformity can only be mischievous.\n\n [11] Guyau\u2019s criticisms of Comte\u2019s \u201cReligion of Humanity\u201d in his\n _L\u2019Irreligion de l\u2019Avenir_ are interesting. \u201cThe marriage of positive\n science and blind sentiment cannot produce religion\u201d (p. 314; Eng.\n trans., p. 366). \u201cComtism, which consists of the rites of religion and\n nothing else, is an attempt to maintain life in the body after the\n departure of the soul\u201d (p. 307; Eng. trans., p. 359).\n\n\nIt was because he grasped this vital point that Renan\u2019s discussion of\nthe religious question is so instructive. For him, religion is\nessentially an affair of personal taste. Here we have another\nindication of the clear way in which Renan was able to discern the\ntendencies of his time. He published his _Etudes d\u2019Histoire religieuse_\nin 1857, and his Preface to the _Nouvelles Etudes d\u2019Histoire\nreligieuse_ was written in 1884. He claims there that freedom is\nessential to religion, and that it is absolutely necessary that the\nState should have no power whatever over it. Religion is as personal\nand private a matter as taste in literature or art. There should be no\nState laws, he claims, relating to religion at all, any more than dress\nis prescribed for citizens by law. He well points out that only a State\nwhich is strictly neutral in religion can ever be absolutely free from\nplaying the _r\u00f4le_ of persecutor. The favouring of one sect will entail\nsome persecution or hardship upon others. Further, he sees the iniquity\nof taxing the community to pay the expenses of clergy to whose\nteachings they may object, or whose doctrines are not theirs. Freedom,\nRenan believed, would claim its own in the near future and, denouncing\nthe Concordat, he prophesied the abolition of the State Church.\n\nThe worst type of organisation Renan holds to be the theocratic state,\nlike Islam, or the ancient Pontifical State in which dogma reigns\nsupreme. He condemns also the State whose religion is based upon the\nprofession of a majority of its citizens. There should be, as Spinoza\nwas wont to style it, \u201cliberty of philosophising.\u201d The days of the\ndominance of dogma are passing, in many quarters gone by already,\n\u201cReligion has become for once and all a matter of personal taste.\u201d\n\nRenan himself was deeply religious in mind. He was never an atheist and\ndid not care for the term \u201cfree-thinker\u201d because of its implied\nassociations with the irreligion of the previous century. He stands\nout, however, not only in our period of French thought, but in the\nworld development of the century as one of the greatest masters of\nreligious criticism. His historical work is important, and he possessed\na knowledge and equipment for that task. His distinguished Semitic\nscholarship led to his obtaining the chair of Hebrew at the Coll\u00e8ge de\nFrance, and enabled him to write his Histories, one of the Jews and one\nof Christianity.\n\nIt was as a volume of this _Histoire des Origines du Christianisme_\nthat his _Vie de J\u00e9sus_ appeared in 1863. This life of the Founder of\nChristianity produced a profound stir in the camps of religious\northodoxy, and drew upon its author severe criticisms. Apart from the\nparticular views set forth in that volume, we must remember that the\nvery fact of his writing upon \u201ca sacred subject,\u201d which was looked upon\nas a close preserve, reserved for the theologians or churchmen alone,\nwas deemed at that time an original and daring feat in France.\n\nHis particular views, which created at the time such scandal, were akin\nto those of Baur and the Tubingen School, which Strauss (Renan\u2019s\ncontemporary) had already set forth in his _Leben Jesu_.[12] Briefly,\nthey may be expressed as the rejection of the supernatural. Herein is\nseen the scientific or \u201cpositive\u201d influence at work upon the dogmas of\nthe Christian religion, a tendency which culminated in \u201cModernism\u201d\nwithin the Church, only to be condemned violently by the Pope in 1907.\nIt was this temper, produced by the study of documents, by criticism\nand historical research which put Renan out of the Catholic Church. His\nrational mind could not accept the dogmas laid down. Lamennais (who was\nconservative and orthodox in his theology, and possessed no taint of\n\u201cmodernism\u201d in the technical sense) had declared that the\nstarting-point should be faith and not reason. Renan aptly asks in\nreply to this, \u201cand what is to be the test, in the last resort, of the\nclaims of faith is not reason?\u201d\n\n [12] Written in 1835. Littr\u00e9 issued a French translation in 1839, a\n year previous to the appearance of the English version by George\n Eliot. Strauss\u2019s life covers 1808-1874.\n\n\nIn Renan we find a good illustration of the working of the spirit of\nmodern thought upon a religious mind. Being a sincere and penetrating\nintellect he could not, like so many people, learned folk among them,\nkeep his religious ideas and his reason in separate watertight\ncompartments. This kind of people Renan likens in his _Souvenirs\nd\u2019Enfance et de Jeunesse_ to mother-o\u2019-pearl shells of Francois de\nSales \u201cwhich are able to live in the sea without tasting a drop of salt\nwater.\u201d Yet he realises the comfort of such an attitude. \u201cI see around\nme,\u201d he continues, \u201cmen of pure and simple lives whom Christianity has\nhad the power to make virtuous and happy. . . . But I have noticed that\nnone of them have the critical faculty, for which let them bless God!\u201d\nHe well realises the contentment which, springing sometimes from a\ndullness of mind or lack of sensitiveness, excludes all doubt and all\nproblems.\n\nIn Catholicism he sees a bar of iron which will not reason or bend. \u201cI\ncan only return to it by amputation of my faculties, by definitely\nstigmatising my reason and condemning it to perpetual silence.\u201d Writing\nof his exit from the Seminary of Saint Sulpice, where he was trained\nfor the priesthood, he remarks in his _Souvenirs d\u2019Enfance et de\nJeunesse_ that \u201cthere were times when I was sorry that I was not a\nProtestant, so that I might be a philosopher without ceasing to be a\nChristian.\u201d For Renan, as for so many minds in modern France, severance\nfrom the Roman Church is equivalent to severance from Christianity as\nan organised religion. The practical dilemma is presented of\nunquestioning obedience to an infallible Church on the one hand, or the\nattitude of _libre-penseur_ on the other. There are not the\naccommodating varieties of the Protestant presentation of the Christian\nreligion. Renan\u2019s spiritual pilgrimage is but an example of many. In a\nmeasure this condition of affairs is a source of strength to the Roman\nChurch for, since a break with it so often means a break with\nChristianity or indeed with all definite religion, only the bolder and\nstronger thinkers make the break which their intellect makes\nimperative. The mass of the people, however dissatisfied they may be\nwith the Church, nevertheless accept it, for they see no alternative\nbut the opposite extreme. No half-way house of non-conformity presents\nitself as a rule.\n\nYet, as we have insisted, Renan had an essentially religious view of\nthe universe, and he expressly claimed that his break with the Church\nand his criticism of her were due to a devotion to pure religion, and\nhe even adds, to a loyalty to the spirit of her Founder. Although, as\nhe remarks in his _Nouvelles Etudes religieuses_, it is true that the\nmost modest education tends to destroy the belief in the superstitious\nelements in religion, it is none the less true that the very highest\nculture can never destroy religion in the highest sense. \u201cDogmas pass,\nbut piety is eternal.\u201d The external trappings of religion have suffered\nby the growth of the modern sciences of nature and of historical\ncriticism. The mind of cultivated persons does not now present the same\nattitude to evidence in regard to religious doctrines which were once\naccepted without question. The sources of the origins of the Christian\nreligion are themselves questionable. This, Renan says, must not\ndiscourage the believers in true religion, for that is not the kind of\nfoundation upon which religion reposes. Dogmas in the past gave rise to\ndivisions and quarrels, only by feeling can religious persons be united\nin fellowship. The most prophetic words of Jesus were, Renan points\nout, those in which he indicated a time when men \u201cwould not worship God\nin this mountain nor in Jerusalem, but when the true worshippers would\nworship in spirit and in truth.\u201d It was precisely this spirit which\nRenan admired in Jesus, whom he considered more of a philosopher than\nthe Church, and he reminds the \u201cChristians\u201d[13] who railed against him\nas an unbeliever that Jesus had had much more influence upon him than\nthey gave him credit for, and, more particularly, that his break with\nthe Church was due to loyalty to Jesus. By such loyalty Renan meant not\na blind worship, but a reverence which endeavoured to appreciate and\nfollow the ideals for which Jesus himself stood. It did not involve\nslavish acceptance of all he said, even if that were intelligible, and\nclear, which it is not. \u201cTo be a Platonist,\u201d remarks Renan, \u201cI need not\nadore Plato, or believe _all_ that he said.\u201d[14]\n\n [13] Renan complains of the ignorance of the clergy of Rome regarding\n his own work, which they did not understand because they had not read\n it, merely relying on the Press and other sources for false and\n biassed accounts.\n\n\n [14] _Cf._ Renan\u2019s Essay in _Questions contemporaines_ on \u201c_L\u2019Avenir\n religieux des Soci\u00e9t\u00e9s modernes_.\u201d\n\n\nRenan is in agreement with the central ideas of Jesus\u2019 own faith, and\nhe rightly regards him as one of the greatest contributors to the\nworld\u2019s religious thought. Renan\u2019s religion is free from\nsupernaturalism and dogma. He believes in infinite Goodness or\nProvidence, but he despises the vulgar and crude conceptions of God\nwhich so mar a truly religious outlook. He points out how prayer, in\nthe sense of a request to Heaven for a particular object, is becoming\nrecognised as foolish. \u2018As a \u201cmeditation,\u201d an interview with one\u2019s own\nconscience, it has a deeply religious value. The vulgar idea of prayer\nreposes on an immoral conception of God. Renan rightly sees the central\nimportance for religion of possessing a sane view of the divinity, not\none which belongs to primitive tribal wargods and weather-gods. He\naptly says, in this connection, that the one who was defeated in 1871\nwas not only France but _le bon Dieu_ to which she in vain appealed. In\nhis place was to be found, remarks Renan with a little sarcasm, \u201conly a\nLord God of Hosts who was unmoved by the moral \u2018d\u00e9licatesse\u2019 of the\nUhlans and the incontestable excellence of the Prussian shells.\u201d[15] He\nrightly points to the immoral use made of the divinity by pious folk\nwhose whole religion is utilitarian and materialistic. They do good\nonly in order to get to heaven or escape hell,[16] and believe in God\nbecause it is necessary for them to have a confidant and sonsoler, to\nwhom they may cry in time of trouble, and to whose will they may\nresignedly impute the evil chastisement which their own errors have\nbrought upon them individually or collectively. But, he rightly claims,\nit is only where utilitarian calculations and self-interest end, that\nreligion begins with the sense of the Infinite and of the Ideal\nGoodness and Beauty and Love.\n\n [15] _Dialogues et Fragments philosophiques_, p. ix.\n\n\n [16] One pious individual thought to convert Renan himself by writing\n him every month, quite briefly, to this effect \u201cThere is a hell.\u201d\n\n\nHe endeavours in his _Examen de Conscience philosophique_ (1888) to sum\nup his attitude upon this question. There he affirms that it is beyond\ndispute or doubt that we have no evidence whatever of the action in the\nuniverse of one or of several wills superior to that of man. The actual\nstate of this universe gives no sign of any external intervention, and\nwe know nothing of its beginning. No beneficent interfering power, a\n_deus ex machin\u00e2_, corrects or directs the operation of blind forces,\nenlightens man or improves his lot. No God appears miraculously to\nprevent evils, to crush disease, stop wars, or save his children from\nperil. No end or purpose is visible to us. God in the popular sense,\nliving and acting as a Divine Providence, is not to be seen in our\nuniverse. The question is, however, whether this universe of ours is\nthe totality of existence. Doubt comes into play here, and if our\nuniverse is not this totality, then God, although absent from his\nworld, might still exist outside it. Our finite world is little in\nrelation to the Infinite, it is a mere speck in the universe we know,\nand its duration to a divine Being might be only a day.\n\nThe Infinite, continues Renan, surrounds our finite world above and\nbelow. It stretches on the one hand to the infinitely large concourse\nof worlds and systems, and, on the other, to the infinitely little as\natoms, microbes and the germs by which human life itself is passed on\nfrom one generation to another. The prospect of the world we know\ninvolves logically and fatally, says Renan, atheism. But this atheism,\nhe adds, may be due to the fact that we cannot see far enough. Our\nuniverse is a phenomenon which has had a beginning and will have an\nend. That which has had no beginning and will have no end is the\nAbsolute All, or God. Metaphysics has always been a science proceeding\nupon this assumption, \u201cSomething exists, therefore something has\nexisted from all eternity.\u201d which is akin to the scientific principle,\n\u201cNo effect with- out a cause.\u201d[17]\n\n [17] _Examen de Conscience philosophique_, p. 412 of the volume\n _Feuilles d\u00e9tach\u00e9es_.\n\n\nWe must not allow ourselves to be misled too far by the constructions\nor inductions about the uniformity and immutability of the laws of\nnature. \u201cA God may reveal himself, perhaps, one day.\u201d The infinite may\ndispose of our finite world, use it for its own ends. The expression,\n\u201cNature and its author,\u201d may not be so absurd as some seem to think it.\nIt is true that our experience presents no reason for forming such an\nhypothesis, but we must keep our sense of the infinite. \u201cEverything is\npossible, even God,\u201d and Renan adds, \u201cIf God exists, he must be good,\nand he will finish by being just.\u201d It is as foolish to deny as to\nassert his existence in a dogmatic and thoughtless manner. It is upon\nthis sense of the infinite and upon the ideals of Goodness, Beauty and\nLove that true faith or piety reposes.\n\nLove, declares Renan, is one of the principal revelations of the\ndivine, and he laments the neglect of it by philosophy. It runs in a\ncertain sense through all living beings, and in man has been the school\nof gentleness and courtesy\u2014nay more, of morals and of religion. Love,\nunderstood in the high sense, is a sacred, religious thing, or rather\nis a part of religion itself. In a tone which recalls that of the New\nTestament and Tolstoi, Renan beseeches us to remember that God _is_\nLove, and that where Love is there God is. In loving, man is at his\nbest; he goes out of himself and feels himself in contact with the\ninfinite. The very act of love is veritably sacred and divine, the\nunion of body and soul with another is a holy communion with the\ninfinite. He remarks in his _Souvenirs d\u2019Enfance et de Jeunesse_,\ndoubtless remembering the simple purity and piety of his mother and\nsister, that when reflection has brought us to doubt, and even to a\nscepticism regarding goodness, then the spontaneous affirmation of\ngoodness and beauty which exists in a noble and virtuous woman saves us\nfrom cynicism and restores us to communication with the eternal spring\nin which God reflects himself. Love, which Renan with reason laments as\nhaving been neglected on its most serious side and looked upon as mere\nsentimentality, offers the highest proof of God. In it lies our\numbilical link with nature, but at the same time our communion with the\ninfinite. He recalls some of Browning\u2019s views in his attitude to love\nas a redeeming power. The most wretched criminal still has something\ngood in him, a divine spark, if he be capable of loving.\n\nIt is the spirit of love and goodness which Renan admires in the simple\nfaith of those separated far from him in their theological ideas. \u201cGod\nforbid,\u201d he says,[18] \u201cthat I should speak slightingly of those who,\ndevoid of the critical sense, and impelled by very pure and powerful\nreligious motives, are attached to one or other of the great\nestablished systems of faith. I love the simple faith of the peasant,\nthe serious conviction of the priest.\u201d\n\n [18] _L\u2019Avenir de la Science_, pp. 436, 437; Eng. trans., p. 410.\n\n\n\u201cSupprimer Dieu, serait-ce amoindrir l\u2019univers?\u201d\n\n\nasks Guyau in one of his _Vers d\u2019un Philosophe_.\u2019[19] Renan observes\nthat if we tell the simple to live by aspiration after truth and\nbeauty, these words would have no meaning for them. \u201cTell them to love\nGod, not to offend God, they will understand you perfectly. God,\nProvidence, soul, good old words, rather heavy, but expressive and\nrespectable which science will explain, but will never replace with\nadvantage. What is God for humanity if not the category of the\n_ideal_?\u201d[20]\n\n [19] _\u201cQuestion,\u201d Vers d\u2019un Philosophe_, p. 65.\n\n\n [20] _L\u2019Avenir de la Science_,\u201d p. 476; Eng. trans., p. 445.\n\n\nThis is the point upon which Vacherot insisted in his treatment of\nreligion. He claimed that the conception of God arises in the human\nconsciousness from a combination of two separate ideas. The first is\nthe notion of the Infinite which Science itself approves, the second\nthe notion of perfection which Science is unable to show us anywhere\nunless it be found in the human consciousness and its thoughts, where\nit abides as the magnetic force ever drawing us onward and acts at the\nsame time as a dynamic, giving power to every progressive movement,\nbeing \u201cthe Ideal\u201d in the mind and heart of man.\n\nSimilar was the doctrine of Taine, who saw in Reason the ideal which\nwould produce in mankind a new religion, which would be that of Science\nand Philosophy demanding from art forms of expression in harmony with\nthemselves. This religion would be free in doctrine. Taine himself\nlooked upon religion as \u201ca metaphysical poem accompanied by belief,\u201d\nand he approached to the conception of Spinoza of a contemplation which\nmay well be called an \u201cintellectual love of God.\u201d\n\nII\n\nLike Renan, Renouvier was keenly interested in religion and its\nproblems; he was also a keen opponent of the Roman Catholic Church and\nfaith, against which he brought his influence into play in two ways\u2014by\nhis _n\u00e9o-criticisme_ as expressed in his written volumes and by his\nenergetic editing of the two periodicals _La Critique philosophique_\nand _La Critique religieuse_.\n\nIn undertaking the publication of these periodicals Renouvier\u2019s\nconfessed aim was that of a definite propaganda. While the Roman Church\nprofited by the feelings of disappointment and demoralisation which\nfollowed the Franco-Prussian War, and strove to shepherd wavering souls\nagain into its fold, to find there a peace which evidently the world\ncould not give, Renouvier (together with his friend Pillon) endeavoured\nto rally his countrymen by urging the importance, and, if possible, the\nacceptance of his own political and religious convictions arising out\nof his philosophy. The _Critique philosophique_ appeared weekly from\nits commencement in 1872 until 1884, thereafter as a monthly until\n1889. Among its contributors, whose names are of religious\nsignificance, were A. Sabatier, L. Dauriac, R. Allier[21] and William\nJames.\n\n [21] Now Dean of the Protestant Faculty of Theology in Paris.\n\n\nRenouvier\u2019s great enthusiasm for his periodical is the main feature of\nthis period of his life, although, owing to his tremendous energy, it\ndoes not seem to have interfered with the publication of his more\npermanent works. The political and general policy of this journal may\nbe summed up in a sentence from the last year\u2019s issue,[22] where we\nfind Renouvier remarking that it had been his aim throughout \u201cto uphold\nstrictly republican principles and to fight all that savoured of\nCaesar, or imperialism.\u201d The declared foe of monarchy in politics, he\nwas equally the declared foe of the Pope in the religious realm. His\nattitude was one of very marked hostility to the power of the Vatican,\nwhich he realised to be increasing within the Roman Church, and one of\nkeen opposition to the general power of that Church and her clergy in\nFrance. Renouvier\u2019s paper was quite definitely and aggressively\nanti-Catholic. He urged all Catholic readers of his paper who professed\nloyalty to the Republic to quit the Roman Church and to affiliate\nthemselves to the Protestant body.\n\n [22] _La Critique philosophique_, 1889, tome ii., p. 403.\n\n\nIt was with this precise object in view that, in 1878, he added to his\n_Critique philosophique_ a supplement which he entitled _La Critique\nreligieuse_, a quarterly intended purely for propaganda purposes.\n\u201cCriticism,\u201d he had said, \u201cis in philosophy what Protestantism is in\nreligion.\u201d[23] As certitude is, according to Renouvier\u2019s doctrines, the\nfruit of intelligence, heart and will, it can never be obtained by the\ncoercion of authority or by obedience such as the Roman Church demands.\nHe appealed to the testimony of history, as a witness to the conflict\nbetween authority and the individual conscience. Jesus, whom the Church\nadores, was himself a superb example of such revolt. History, however,\nshows us, says Renouvier, the gradual decay of authority in such\nmatters. Thought, if it is really to be thought in its sincerity, must\nbe free. This Renouvier realised, and in this freedom he saw the\ncharacteristic of the future development of religion, and shows\nhimself, in this connection, in substantial agreement with Renan and\nGuyau.\n\n [23] _Ibid_., 1873, pp. 145-146.\n\n\nRenouvier\u2019s interest in theology and religion, and in the theological\nimplications of all philosophical thought, was not due merely to a\npurely speculative impulse, but to a very practical desire to initiate\na rational restatement of religious conceptions, which he considered to\nbe an urgent need of his time. He lamented the influence of the Roman\nChurch over the minds of the youth of his country, and realised the\nvital importance of the controversy between Church and State regarding\nsecular education. Renouvier was a keen supporter of the secular\nschools (_\u00e9coles la\u00efques_). In 1879, when the educational controversy\nwas at its height, he issued a little book on ethics for these\ninstitutions (_Petit Trait\u00e9 de Morale pour les Ecoles la\u00efques_), which\nwas republished in an enlarged form in 1882, when the secular party,\nably led by Jules Ferry, triumphed in the establishment of compulsory,\nfree, secular education. That great achievement, however, did not solve\nall the difficulties presented by the Church in its educational\nattitude, and even now the influence of clericalism is dreaded.\n\nRenouvier realised all the dangers, but he was forced also to realise\nthat his enthusiastic and energetic campaign against the power of the\nChurch had failed to achieve what he had desired. He complained of\nreceiving insufficient support from quarters where he might well have\nexpected it. His failure is a fairly conclusive proof that\nProtestantism has no future in France: it is a stubborn survival,\nrather than a growing influence. With the decline in the power and\nappeal of the Roman Catholic Church will come the decline of religion\nof a dogmatic and organised kind. Renouvier probably had an influence\nin hastening the day of the official severance of Church and State, an\nevent which he did not live long enough to see.[24]\n\n [24] It occurred, however, only two years after his death.\n\n\nHaving become somewhat discouraged, Renouvier stopped the publication\nof his religious quarterly in 1885 and made the _Critique\nphilosophique_ a monthly instead of a weekly Journal. It ceased in\n1889, but the following year Renouvier\u2019s friend, Pillon, began a new\nperiodical, which bore the same name as the one which had ceased with\nthe outbreak of the war in 1870. This was _L\u2019Ann\u00e9e philosophique_, to\nwhich Renouvier contributed articles from time to time on religious\ntopics.\n\nSome writers are of the opinion that Renouvier\u2019s attacks on the Roman\nCatholic Church and faith, so far from strengthening the Protestant\nparty in France, tended rather to increase the hostility to the\nChristian religion generally or, indeed, to any religious view of the\nuniverse.\n\nRenouvier\u2019s own statements in his philosophy, in so far as these\nconcern religion and theology, are in harmony with his rejection of the\nAbsolute in philosophy and the Absolute in politics. His criticism of\nthe idea of God, the central point in any philosophy of religion, is in\nterms similar to his critique of the worship of the Absolute or the\ndeification of the State.\n\nIn dealing with the question of a \u201cTotal Synthesis\u201d Renouvier indicated\nhis objections to the metaphysical doctrine of an Absolute, which is\ndiametrically opposed to his general doctrine of relativity. He is\nviolently in conflict with all religious conceptions which savour of\nthis Absolute or have a pantheistic emphasis, which would diminish the\nvalue and significance of relativity and of personality. The\n\u201cAll-in-All\u201d conception of God, which represents the pantheistic\nelements in many theologies and religions, both Christian and other, is\nnot really a consciousness, he shows, for consciousness itself implies\na relation, a union of the self and non-self. In such a conception\nactor, play and theatre all blend into one, God alone is real, and he\nis unconscious, for there is, according to this hypothesis, nothing\noutside himself which he can know. Renouvier realises that he is faced\nwith the ancient problem of the One and the Many, with the alternative\nof unity or plurality. With his usual logical decisiveness Renouvier\nposits plurality. He does not attempt to reconcile the two opposites,\nand he deals with the problem in the manner in which he faced the\nantinomies of Kant. Both cannot be true, and the enemy of pantheism and\nabsolutism acclaims pluralism, both for logical reasons and in order to\nsafeguard the significance of personality. In particular he directly\ncriticises the philosophy of Spinoza in which he sees the supreme\nstatement of this philosophy of the eternal, the perfect, necessary,\nunchanging One, who is the same yesterday, to-day and forever. He\nadmits that the idea of law or a system of laws leads to the\nintroduction of something approaching the hypothesis of unity, but he\nis careful to show by his doctrine of freedom and personality that this\nis only a limited unity and that, considered even from a scientific\nstandpoint, a Total Synthesis, which is the logical outcome of such an\nhypothesis, is ultimately untenable. He overthrows the idols of Spinoza\nand Hegel. Such absolutes, infinite and eternal, whether described as\nan infinite love which loves itself or a thought thinking thought, are\nnothing more to Renouvier than vain words, which it is absurd to offer\nas \u201cThe Living God.\u201d\n\nAgainst these metaphysical erections Renouvier opposes his doctrines of\nfreedom, of personality, relativity and pluralism. He offers in\ncontrast the conception of God as a Person, not an Absolute, but\nrelative, not infinite, but finite, limited by man\u2019s freedom and by\ncontingency in the world of creatures. God, in his view, is not a Being\nwho is omnipotent, or omniscient. He is a Person of whom man is a type,\ncertainly a degraded type, but man is made in the image of the divine\npersonality. Our notion of God, Renouvier reminds us, must be\nconsistent with the doctrine of freedom, hence we must conceive of him\nnot merely as a creator of creatures or subjects, but of creative power\nitself in those creatures. The relation of God to man is more complex\nthan that of simple \u201ccreation\u201d as this word is usually comprehended,\n\u201cIt is a creation of creation,\u201d says Renouvier,[25] a remark which is\nparallel to the view expressed by Bergson, to the effect that, we must\nconceive of God as a \u201ccreator of creators.\u201d[26] The existence of this\nCreative Person must be conceived, Renouvier insists, as indissolubly\nbound up with his work, and it is unintelligible otherwise. That work\nis one of creation and not emanation\u2014it involves more than mere power\nand transcendence. God is immanent in the universe.\n\n [25] _Psychologie ralionnelle_, vol. 2, p. 104.\n\n\n [26] In his address to the Edinburgh Philosophical Society, 1914.\n\n\nTheology has wavered between the two views\u2014that of absolute\ntranscendence and omnipotence and that of immanence based on freedom\nand limitation. In the first, every single thing depends upon the\noperation of God, whose Providence rules all. This is pure determinism\nof a theological character. In the other view man\u2019s free personality is\nrecognised; part of the creation is looked upon as partaking of freedom\nand contingency, therefore the divinity is conceived as limited and\nfinite.\n\nRenouvier insists that this view of God as finite is the only tenable\none, for it is the only one which gives a rational and moral\nexplanation of evil. In the first view God is responsible for all\nthings, evil included, and man is therefore much superior to him from a\nmoral standpoint. The idea of God must be ethically acceptable, and it\nis unfortunate that this idea, so central to religion, is the least\nsusceptible to modification in harmony with man\u2019s ethical development.\nWe already have noticed Guyau\u2019s stress upon this point in our\ndiscussion of ethics. Our conception of God must, Renouvier claims, be\nthe affirmation of our highest category, Personality, and must express\nthe best ethical ideals of mankind. Society suffers for its immoral and\nprimitive view of God, which gives to its religion a barbarous\ncharacter which is disgraceful and revolting to finer or more\nthoughtful minds.\n\nIt is true that the acceptance of the second view, which carries with\nit the complete rejection of the ideas of omnipotence and omniscience,\nmodifies profoundly many of the old and primitive views of God.\nRenouvier recognises this, and wishes his readers also to grasp this\npoint, for only so is religion to be brought forward in a development\nharmonious with the growth of man\u2019s mind in other spheres. Man should\nnot profess the results of elaborate culture in science while he\nprofesses at the same time doctrines of God which are not above those\nof a savage or primitive people. This is the chief mischief which the\ninfluence of the Hebrew writings of the Old Testament has had upon the\nChristian religion. The moral conscience now demands their rejection,\nfor to those who value religion they can only appear as being of pure\nblasphemy. God is neither omnipotent nor omniscient, consequently many\nthings must be unknown to him until they happen. Foreknowledge and\npredetermination on his part are impossible, according to Renouvier.\nGod is not to be conceived as a consciousness enveloping the entire\nuniverse, past, present and future, in a total synthesis. Such a belief\nis mischievous to humanity because of its fatalism, in spite of the\ncomfortable consolation it offers to pious souls. Moreover, it presents\nthe absurd view of God working often against himself.\n\nThe idea of God, Renouvier shows, arises out of the discussions of the\nnature of the universal laws of the universe and from the progress of\npersonalities. The plausible conceptions of God based on causality and\non \u201cnecessary essence\u201d have not survived the onslaughts of Criticism.\nThe personality of God seems to us, says Renouvier, indicated as the\nconclusion and the almost necessary culmination of the consideration of\nthe probabilities laid down by the practical reason or moral law. The\nprimary, though not primitive, evidence for the existence of God is\ncontained in, and results from, the generalisation of the idea of\n\u201cends\u201d in the universe. We must not go bevond phenomena or seek\nevidence in some fictitious sphere outside of our experience. In its\nmost general and abstract sense the idea of God arises from the\nconception of moral order, immortality, or the accord of happiness and\ngoodness. We cannot deny the existence of a morality in the order and\nmovements of the world, a physical sanction to the moral laws of virtue\nand of progress, an external reality of good, a supremacy of good, a\nwitness of the Good itself. Renouvier does not think that any man,\nhaving sufficiently developed his thought, would refuse to give the\nname God to the object of this supreme conception, which at first may\nseem abstract because it is not in any way crude, many of its intrinsic\nelements remaining undetermined in face of our ignorance, but which,\nnevertheless, or just for that very reason, is essentially practical\nand moral, representing the most notable fact of all those included in\nour belief. This method of approaching the problem of God is, he\nthinks, both simple and grand. It is a noble contrast to the scholastic\nedifice built up on the metaphysical perfection of being, called the\nAbsolute. In this conception all attributes of personality are replaced\nby an accumulation of metaphysical properties, contradictory in\nthemselves and quite incompatible with one another. This Absolute is a\npure chimerical abstraction; its pure being and pure essence are\nequivalent to pure nothing or pure nonsense.\n\nThe fetish of pure substance, substantial cause, absolute being,\nwhatever it be called, is vicious at all times, but particularly when\nwe are dealing with the fundamental problems of science. It would be\nadvisable here that the only method of investigation be that of\natheism, for scientific investigation should not be tainted by any\nprejudices or preconceived ideas upon the nature of the divinity.\n\nWhat really is Atheism? The answer to this query, says Renouvier, is\nclear. The idea of God is essentially a product of the moral law or\nconscience. An atheist is, strictly speaking, one who does not admit\nthe reality of this moral order of ends and of persons as valuable in\nthemselves. Verily, he himself may personally lead a much more upright\nlife than the loud champions of theism, but he denies the general moral\norder, which is God. With the epithet of atheist as commonly used for\nthose who merelv have a conception of God which differs from the\northodox view, we are not here concerned. That may be dismissed as a\nmisuse of the word due to religious bigotry. The fruits of true atheism\nare materialism, pantheism and fatalism. Indeed any doctrine, even a\ntheological doctrine, which debases and destroys the inherent value of\nthe human consciousness and personality, is rightly to be regarded,\nwhatever it may _say_ about God, however it may repeat his name (and\ntwo of these doctrines are very fond of this repetition, but this must\nnot blind us to the real issue)\u2014that doctrine is atheistic. The most\nresolute materialists, the most high-minded worshippers of Providence\nand the great philosophers of the Absolute, find themselves united here\nin atheism. God is not a mere totality of laws operating in the\nuniverse. Such a theism is but a form of real atheism. We must, insists\nRenouvier, abandon views of this type, with all that savours of an\nAbsolute, a Perfect Infinite, and affirm our belief in the existence of\nan order of Goodness which gives value to human personality and assures\nultimate victory to Justice. This is to believe in God. We arrive at\nthis belief rationally and after consideration of the world and of the\nmoral law of persons. Through these we come to God. We do not begin\nwith him and pretend to deduce these from his nature by some\nincomprehensible _a priori_ propositions. The methods of the old\ndogmatic theology are reversed. Instead of beginning with a Being of\nwhom we know nothing and can obviously deduce nothing, let us proceed\ninductively, and by careful consideration of the revelation we have\nbefore us in the world and in humanity let us build up our idea of God.\n\nRenouvier is anxious that we should examine the data upon which we may\nfound \u201crational hypotheses\u201d as to the nature of God. The Critical\nPhilosophy has upset the demonstrations of the existence of God, which\nwere based upon causality and upon necessary existence (the\ncosmological and ontological proofs). Neo-criticism not only\nestablishes the existence of God as a rational hypothesis, but \u201cthis\npoint of view of the divine problem is the most favourable to the\nnotion of the personality of God. The personality of God seems to us to\nbe indicated as the looked-for conclusion and almost necessary\nconsummation of the probabilities of practical reason.\u201d[27]\n\n [27] _Psychologie rationnelle_, vol. 2, p. 300.\n\n\nThe admission of ends, of finality, or purpose in the universe is\nfrequently given as involving a supreme consciousness embracing this\nteleology. Also it is argued that Good could not exist in its\ngenerality save in an external consciousness\u2014that is, a divine mind. By\nrecalling the objections to a total synthesis of phenomena, Renouvier\nrefutes both these arguments which rest upon erroneous methods in\nontology and in theology. The explanation of the world by God, as in\nthe cosmological argument, is fanciful, while the ontological argument\nleads us to erect an unintelligible and illogical absolute. Renouvier\nregards God as existing as a general consciousness corresponding to the\ngenerality of ends which man himself finds before him, finite, limited\nin power and in knowledge. But in avowing this God, Renouvier points\nhim out to us as the first of all beings, a being like them, not an\nabsolute, but a personality, possessing (and this is important) the\nperfection of morality, goodness and justice. He is the supreme\npersonality in action, and as a perfect person he respects the\npersonality of others and operates on our world only in the degree\nwhich the freedom and individuality of persons who are not himself can\npermit him, and within the limits of the general laws under which he\nrepresents to himself his own enveloped existence. This is the\nhypothesis of unity rendered intelligible, and as such Renouvier claims\nthat it bridges in a marvellous manner the gap always deemed to exist\nbetween monotheism and polytheism\u2014the two great currents of religious\nthought in humanity. The monotheists have appeared intolerant and\nfanatical in their religion and in their deity (not in so far as it was\nmanifest in the thoughts of the simple, who professed a faith of the\nheart, but as shown in the ambitious theology of books and of schools),\nbearing on their banner the signs of a jealous deity, wishing no other\ngods but himself, declaring to his awed worshippers: \u201cI am that I am;\nhave no other gods but me!\u201d On the other hand, the polytheistic peoples\nhave been worshippers of beauty and goodness in all things, and where\nthey saw these things they created a deity. They were more concerned\nwith the immortality of good souls than the eternal existence of one\nsupreme being; they were free-thinkers, creators of beauty and seekers\nafter truth, and believers in freedom. The humanism of Greece stands in\ncontrast to the idolatrous theocracy of the Hebrews.\n\nThe unity of God previously mentioned does not exclude the possibility\nof a plurality of divine persons. God the one would be the first and\nforemost, _rex hominum deorumque_. Some there may be that rise through\nsaintliness to divinity, Sons of God, persons surpassing man in\nintelligence, power and morality. To take sides in this matter is\nequivalent to professing a particular religion. We must avoid the\nabsolutist spirit in religion no less than in philosophy. By this\nRenouvier means that brutal fanaticism which prohibits the Gods of\nother people by passion and hatred, which aims at establishing and\nimposing its own God (which is, after all, but its own idea of God) as\nthe imperialist plants his flag, his kind and his customs in new\nterritory, in the spirit of war and conquest. Such a \u201choly war\u201d is an\noutrage, based not upon real religion, but on intolerant fanaticism in\nwhich freedom and the inherent rights of personality to construct its\nown particular faith are denied.\n\nRenouvier finds a parallelism between the worship of the State in\npolitics and of the One God in religion. The systems in which unity or\nplurality of divine personality appears differ from one another in the\nsame way in which monarchal and republican ideas differ. Monarchy in\nreligion offers the same obstacles to progress as it has done in\npolitics. It involves a parallel enslavement of one\u2019s entire self and\ngoods, a conscription which is hateful to freedom and detrimental to\npersonality. To this supreme and regal Providence all is due; it alone\nin any real sense exists. Persons are shadows, of no reality, serfs\nless than the dust, to whom a miserable dole is given called grace, for\nwhich prayer and sacrifice are to be unceasingly made or chastisements\nfrom the Almighty will follow. This notion is the product of monarchy\nin politics, and with monarchy it will perish. The two are bound up,\nfor \u201cby the grace of God\u201d we are told monarchs hold their thrones, by\nhis favour their sceptre sways and their battalions move on to victory.\nThis monarchal God, this King of kings and Lord of hosts, ruler of\nheaven and earth, is the last refuge of monarchs on the earth.\nConfidence in both has been shaken, and both, Renouvier asserts, will\ndisappear and give place to a real democracy, not only to republics on\nearth, but to the conception of the whole universe as a republic. Men\nraise up saints and intercessors to bridge the gulf between the divine\nMonarch and his slaves. They conceive angels as doing his work in\nheaven; they tolerate priests to bring down grace to them here and now.\nThe doctrine of unity thus gives rise to fanatical religious devotion\nor philosophical belief in the absolute, which stifles religion and\nperishes in its own turn. The doctrine of immortality, based on the\nbelief in the value of human personality, leads us away from monarchy\nto a republic of free spirits. A democratic religion in this sense will\ndisplay human nature raised to its highest dignity by virtue of an\nenergetic affirmation of personal liberty, tolerance, mutual respect\nand liberty of faith\u2014a free religion without priests or clericalism,\nnot in conflict with science and philosophy, but encouraging these\npursuits and in turn encouraged by them.[28]\n\n [28] The fullest treatment of this is the large section in the\n conclusion to the _Philosophie analytique de l\u2019Histoire_ (tome iv.).\n _Cf_. also the discussion of the influence of religious beliefs on\n societies in the last chapter of _La Nouvelle Monadologie_.\n\nIII\n\nRavaisson, in founding the new spiritual philosophy, professed certain\ndoctrines which were a blending of Hellenism and Christianity. In the\nmidst of thought which was dominated by positivism, naturalism or\nmaterialism, or by a shallow eclecticism, wherein religious ideas were\nrather held in contempt, he issued a challenge on behalf of spiritual\nvalues and ideals. Beauty, love and goodness, he declared, were divine.\nGod himself is these things, said Ravaisson, and the divinity is \u201cnot\nfar from any of us.\u201d In so far as we manifest these qualities we\napproach the perfect personality of God himself. In the infinite, in\nGod, will is identical with love, which itself is not distinguished\nfrom the absolutely good and the absolutely beautiful. This love can\ngovern our wills; the love of the beautiful and the good can operate in\nour lives. In so far as this is so, we participate in the love and the\nlife of God.\n\nBoutroux agrees substantially with Ravaisson, but he lays more stress\nupon the free creative power of the deity as immanent. \u201cGod,\u201d he\nremarks in his thesis, \u201cis not only the creator of the world, he is\nalso its Providence, and watches over the details as well as over the\nwhole.\u201d[29] God is thus an immanent and creative power in his world as\nwell as the perfect being of supreme goodness and beauty. Boutroux here\nfinds this problem of divine immanence and transcendence as important\nas does Blondel, and his attitude is like that of Blondel, midway\nbetween that of Ravaisson and Bergson.\n\n [29] _La Contingence des Lois de la Nature_, p. 150.\n\n\nReligion, Boutroux urges, must show man that the supreme ideal for him\nis to realise in his own nature this idea of God. There is an\nobligation upon man to pursue after these things-goodness, truth,\nbeauty and love\u2014for they are his good, they are the Good; they are,\nindeed, God. In them is a harmony which satisfies his whole nature, and\nwhich does not neglect or crush any aspect of character, as narrow\nconceptions of religion inevitably do. Boutroux insists upon the\nnecessity for intellectual satisfaction, and opposes the \u201cphilosophy of\naction\u201d in ils doctrine of \u201cfaith for faith\u2019s sake.\u201d At the same time\nhe conceives Reason as a harmony, not merely a coldly logical thing.\nFeeling and will must be satisfied also.[30]\n\n [30] Boutroux has in his volume, _Science et Religion dans la\n Philosophie contemporaine_, contributed a luminous and penetrating\n discussion of various religious doctrines from Comte to William James.\n This was published in 1908.\n\n\nWe have observed already how Fouill\u00e9e claimed that the ethics of his\n_id\u00e9es-forces_ contained the gist of what was valuable in the world\nreligions. He claims that philosophy includes under the form of\nrational belief or thought what the religions include as instinctive\nbelief. In religion he sees a spontaneous type of metaphysic, while\nmetaphysic or philosophy is a rationalised religion.\n\nNothing in this connection is more important than a rational and\nharmonious view of God. This he insists upon in his thesis and in his\n_Sketch of the Future of a Metaphysic founded on Experience_. The old\nidea of God was that of a monarch governing the world as a despot\ngoverns his subjects. The government of the universe may still be held\nto be a monarchy, but modern science is careful to assure us that it\nmust be regarded as an absolutely constitutional monarchy. The monarch,\nif there be one, acts in accordance with the laws and respects the\nestablished constitution. Reason obliges us to conceive of the\nsovereign: experience enlightens us as to the constitution.\n\nThere can be little doubt that one of the world\u2019s greatest books upon\nreligion is the work of Guyau, which appeared in 1886, bearing the\narresting title, _L\u2019Irreligion de l\u2019Avenir_. Its sub-title describes it\nas an Etude sociologique, and it is this treatment of the subject from\nthe standpoint of sociology which is such a distinctive feature of the\nbook. The notion of a _social bond_ between man and the powers superior\nto him, but resembling him, is, claims Guyau, a point of unity in which\nall religions are at one. The foundation of the religious sentiment\nlies in sociality, and the religious man is just the man who is\ndisposed to be sociable, not only with all living beings whom he meets,\nbut with those whom he imaginatively creates as gods. Guyau\u2019s thesis,\nbriefly put, is that religion is a manifestation of life (again he\ninsists on \u201cLife,\u201d as in his Ethics, as a central conception), becoming\nself-conscious and seeking the explanation of things by analogies drawn\nfrom human society. Religion is \u201csociomorphic\u201d rather than merely\nanthropomorphic; it is, indeed, a universal sociological hypothesis,\nmythical in form.\n\nThe religious sentiment expresses a consciousness of dependence, and in\naddition, adds Guyau, it expresses the need of affection, tenderness\nand love\u2014that is to say, the \u201csocial\u201d side of man\u2019s nature. In the\nconception of the Great Companion or Loving Father, humanity finds\nconsolation and hope. Children and women readily turn to such an ideal,\nand primitive peoples, who are just like children, conceive of the\ndeity as severe and all- powerful. To this conception moral attributes\nwere subsequently added, as man\u2019s own moral conscience developed, and\nit now issues in a doctrine of God as Love. All this development is,\ntogether with that of esthetics and ethics, a manifestation of life in\nits individual and more especially social manifestations.\n\nIt is the purpose of Guyau\u2019s book not only to present a study of the\nevolution of religion in this manner, from a sociological point of\nview, but to indicate a further development of which the beginnings are\nalready manifest\u2014namely, a decomposition of all systems of dogmatic\nreligion. It is primarily the decay of dogma and ecclesiasticism which\nhe intends to indicate by the French term _irr\u00e9ligion_. The English\ntranslation of his work bears the title _The Non-religion of the\nFuture_. Had Guyau been writing and living in another country it is\nundoubtedly true that his work would probably have been entitled _The\nReligion of the Future_. Owing to the Roman Catholic environment and\nthe conception of religion in his own land, he was, however, obliged to\nabandon the use of the word religion altogether. In order to avoid\nmisunderstanding, we must examine the sense he gives to this word, and\nshall see then that his title is not meant to convey the impression of\nbeing anti-religious in the widest sense, nor is it irreligious in the\nEnglish meaning of that word.\n\nGuyau considers every positive and historical religion to present three\ndistinct and essential elements:\n\nAn attempt at a mythical and non-scientific explanation of (_a_)\nnatural phenomena\u2014_e.g._, intervention, miracles, efficacious prayer;\n(_b_) historical facts\u2014_e.g._, incarnation of Buddha or Jesus.\nA system of dogmas\u2014that is to say, symbolic ideas or imaginative\nbeliefs\u2014forcibly imposed upon one\u2019s faith as absolute verities, even\nthough they are susceptible to no scientific demonstration or\nphilosophical justification.\nA cult and a system of rites or of worship, made up of more or less\nimmutable practices which are looked upon as possessing a marvellous\nefficacy upon the course of things, a propitiatory virtue.[31]\n\n [31] _L\u2019Irr\u00e9ligion de l\u2019Avenir_, p. xiii; Eng. trans., p. 10.\n\n\nBy these three different and really organic elements, religion is\nclearly marked off from philosophy. Owing to the stability of these\nelements religion is apt to be centuries behind science and philosophy,\nand consequently reconciliation is only effected by a subtle process\nwhich, while maintaining the traditional dogmas and phrases, evolves a\nnew interpretation of them sufficiently modern to harmonise a little\nmore with the advance in thought, but which presents a false appearance\nof stability and consistency, disguising the real change of meaning, of\nview-point and of doctrine. Of this effort we shall see the most\nnotable instance is that of the \u201cModernists\u201d or Neo-Catholics in France\nand Italy, and the Liberal Christians in England and America.\n\nGuyau claims that these newer interpretations, subtle and useful as\nthey are, and frequently the assertions of minds who desire sincerely\nto adapt the ancient traditions to modern needs, are in themselves\nhypocritical, and the Church in a sense does right to oppose them.\nGuyau cannot see any satisfactoriness in these compromises and\nadaptations which lack the clearness of the old teaching, which they in\na sense betray, while they do not sufficiently satisfy the demands of\nmodern thought.\n\nWith the decay of the dogmatic religion of Christendom which is\nsupremely stated in the faith of the Roman Catholic Church, there must\nfollow the non-religion of the future, which may well preserve, he\npoints out, all that is pure in the religious sentiment and carry with\nit an admiration for the cosmos and for the infinite powers which are\nthere displayed. It will be a search for, and a belief in, an ideal not\nonly individual, but social and even cosmic, which shall pass the\nlimits of actual reality. Hence it appears that \u201cnon-religion\u201d or\n\u201ca-religion,\u201d which is for Guyau simply \u201cthe negation of all dogma, of\nall traditional and supernatural authority, of all revelation, of all\nmiracle, of all myth, of all rite erected into a duty,\u201d is most\ncertainly not a synonym for irreligion or impiety, nor does it involve\nany contempt for the moral and metaphysical doctrines expressed by the\nancient religions of the world. The non-religious man in Guyau\u2019s sense\nof the term is simply the man without a religion, as he has defined it\nabove, and he may quite well admire and sympathise with the great\nfounders of religion, not only in that they were thinkers,\nmetaphysicians, moralists and philanthropists, but in that they were\nreformers of established belief, more or less avowed enemies of\nreligious authority and of every affirmation laid down by an\necclesiastical body in order to bind the intellectual freedom of\nindividuals. Guyau\u2019s remarks in this connection agree with the tone in\nwhich Renan spoke of his leaving the Church because of a feeling of\nrespect and loyalty to its Founder. Guyau points out that there exists\nin the bosom of every great religion a dissolving force\u2014namely, the\nvery force which in the beginning served to constitute it and to\nestablish its triumphant revolt over its predecessor. That force is the\nabsolute right of private judgment, the free factor of the personal\nconscience, which no external authority can succeed, ultimately, in\ncoercing or silencing. The Roman Church, and almost every other\norganised branch of the Christian religion, forgets, when faced with a\nspirit which will not conform, that it is precisely to this spirit that\nit owes its own foundation and also the best years of its existence.\nGuyau has little difficulty in pressing the conclusions which follow\nfrom the recognition of this vital point.\n\nBriefly, it follows that the hope of a world-religion is an illusion,\nwhether it be the dream of a perfect and world-wide Judaism, Buddhism,\nChristianity, or Mohammedanism. The sole authority in religious\nmatters, that of the individual conscience, prevents any such\nconsummation, which, even if it could be achieved, would be\nmischievous. The future will display a variety of beliefs and\nreligions, as it does now. This need not discourage us, for therein is\na sign of vitality or spiritual life, of which the world-religions are\nexamples, marred, however, by their profession of universality, an\nideal which they do not and never will realise.\n\nThe notion of a Catholic Church or a great world- religion is really\ncontrary to the duty of personal thought and reflection, which must\ninevitably (unless they give way to mere lazy repetition of other\npeople\u2019s thoughts) lead to differences. The tendency is for humanity to\nmove away from dogmatic religion, with its pretensions to universality,\ncatholicity, and monarchy (of which, says Guyau, the most curious type\nhas just recently been achieved in our own day, by the Pope\u2019s\nproclamation of the dogma of papal infallibility), towards religious\nindividualism and to a plurality of religions. There may, of course, be\nreligious associations or federations, but these will be free, and will\nnot demand the adherence to any dogma as such.\n\nWith the decay of dogmatic religion the best elements of religious life\nwill have freer scope to develop themselves, and will grow both in\nintensity and in extent. \u201cHe alone is religious, in the philosophical\nsense of the word, who researches for, who thinks about, who loves,\ntruth.\u201d Such inquiry or search involves freedom, it involves conflict,\nbut the conflict of ideas, which is perfectly compatible with\ntoleration in a political sense, and is the essence of the spirit of\nthe great world teachers. This is what Jesus foresaw when he remarked:\n\u201cI did not come to bring peace, but a sword.\u201d More fully, he might have\nput it, Guyau suggests: \u201cI came not to bring peace into human thought,\nbut an incessant battle of ideas; not repose, but movement and progress\nof spirit; not universal dogma, but liberty of belief, which is the\nfirst condition of growth.\u201d Well might Renan remark that it was loyalty\nto such a spirit which caused him to break with the Church.\n\nWhile attacking religious orthodoxy in this manner, Guyau is careful to\npoint out that if religious fanaticism ls bad, anti-religious\nfanaticism is equally mischievous, wicked and foolish.[32] While the\neighteenth century could only scoff at religion, the nineteenth\nrealised the absurdity of such raillery. We have come to see that even\nalthough a belief may be irrational and even erroneous, it may still\nsurvive, and it may console multitudes whose minds would be lost on the\nstormy sea of life without such an anchor. While dogmatic or positive\nreligions do exist they will do so, Guyau reminds us, for quite\ndefinite and adequate reasons, chiefly because there are people who\nbelieve them, to whom they mean something and often a great deal. These\nreasons certainly do diminish daily, and the number of adherents, too,\nbut we must refrain from all that savours of anti- religious\nfanaticism.[33] He himself speaks with great respect of a Christian\nmissionary. Are we not, he asks, both brothers and humble collaborators\nin the work and advance of humanity? He sees no real inconsistency\nbetween his own dislike of orthodoxy and dogma and the missionary\u2019s\nwork of raising the ignorant to a better life by those very dogmas. It\nis a case of relative advance and mental progress.\n\n [32] He cites a curious case of anti-religious fanaticism at\n Marseilles in 1885, when all texts and scripture pictures were removed\n fromthe schools.\n\n\n [33] Guyau\u2019s book abounds in illustrations. He mentions here Huss\u2019s\n approval of the sincerity of one man who brought straw from his own\n house to burn him. Huss admired this act of a man in whom he saw a\n brother in sincerity.\n\n\nIt is with great wealth of discussion that Guyau recounts the genesis\nof religions in primitive societies to indicate the sociological basis\nof religion. More important are his chapters on the dissolution of\nreligions in existing societies, in which he shows the\nunsatisfactoriness of the dogmas of orthodox Protestantism equally with\nthose of the Catholic Church. As mischievous as the notion of an\ninfallible Church is that of an infallible book, literally\u2014that is to\nsay, foolishly-interpreted. He recognises that for a literal\nexplanation of the Bible must be substituted, and is, indeed, being\nsubstituted, a literary explanation. Like Renan, he criticises the\nvulgar conception of prayer and of religious morality which promotes\ngoodness by promise of paradise or fear of hell. He urges in this\nconnection the futility of the effort made by Michelet, Quinet and,\nmore especially, by Renouvier and Pillon to \u201cProtestantise\u201d France.\nWhile admitting a certain intellectual, moral and political superiority\nto it, Guyau claims that for the promotion of morality there is little\nuse in substituting Protestantism for Catholicism. He forecasts the\nlimitation of the power of priests and other religious teachers over\nthe minds of young children. Protestant clergymen in England and\nAmerica he considers to be no more tolerant in regard to the\neducational problem than the priests. Guyau urges the importance of an\nelementary education being free from religious propaganda. He was\nwriting in 1886, some years after the secular education law had been\ncarried. There is, however, more to be done, and he points out \u201chow\nstrange it is that a society should not do its best to form those whose\nfunction it is to form it.\u201d[34] In higher education some attention\nshould be given to the comparative study of religions. \u201cEven from the\npoint of view of philosophy, Buddha and Jesus are more important than\nAnaximander or Thales.\u201d[35] It is a pity, he thinks, that there is not\na little more done to acquaint the young with the ideas for which the\ngreat world-teachers, Confucius, Zoroaster, Buddha, Socrates, Mohammed,\nstood, instead of cramming a few additional obscure names from early\nnational history. It would give children at least a notion that history\nhad a wider range than their own country, a realisation of the fact\nthat humanity was already old when Christ appeared, and that there are\ngreat religions other than Christianity, religions whose followers are\nnot poor ignorant savages or heathen, but intelligent beings, from whom\neven Christians may learn much. It is thoroughly mischievous, he aptly\nadds, to bring up children in such a narrow mental atmosphere that the\nrest of their life is one long disillusionment.\n\n [34] _L\u2019Irr\u00e9ligion de l\u2019Avenir_, p. 232; Eng. trans., p. 278.\n\n\n [35] _Ibid_., p. 236; Eng. trans., p. 283.\n\n\nWith particular reference to his own country, Guyau criticises the\nreligious education of women, the question of \u201cmixed marriages,\u201d the\ncelibacy of the Roman Catholic clergy, and the influence of religious\nbeliefs upon the limitation or increase of the family.\n\nAfter having summed up the tendency of dogmatic religion to decay, he\nasks if any unification of the great religions is to-day possible, or\nwhether any new religion may be expected? The answer he gives to both\nthese questions is negative, and he produces a wealth of very valid\nreasons in support of his finding. He is, of course, here using the\nterm religion as he has himself defined it. The claim to universality\nby all world-religions, the insistence by each that it alone is the\nreally best or true religion, precludes any question of unity. As well\nmight we imagine unity between Protestantism and the Roman Catholic\nChurch.\n\nIn the \u201cnon-religious\u201d state, dogma will be replaced by individual\nconstructions. Religion will be a free, personal affair, in which the\ngreat philosophical hypotheses (_e.g._, Theism and Pantheism) will be\nto a large extent utilised. They will, however, be regarded as such by\nall, as rational hypotheses, which some individuals will accept, others\nwill reject. Certain doctrines will appeal to some, not to others. The\nevidence for a certain type of theism will seem adequate to some, not\nto others. There will be no endeavour to impose corporately or singly\nthe acceptance of any creed upon others.\n\nWith Guyau\u2019s conception of the future of religion or non-religion,\nwhichever we care to call it, we may well close this survey of the\nreligious ideas in modern France. In the Roman Church on the one hand,\nand, on the other, in the thought of Renan, Renouvier and Guyau,\ntogether with the multitude of thinking men and women they represent,\nmay be seen the two tendencies\u2014one conservative, strengthening its\ninternal organisation and authority, in defiance of all the influences\nof modern thought, the other a free and personal effort, issuing in a\ngenuine humanising of religion and freeing it from ecclesiasticism and\ndogma.\n\nA word may be said here, however, with reference to the \u201cModernists.\u201d\nThe Modernist movement is a French product, the result of the\ninteraction of modern philosophical and scientific ideas upon the\nteaching of the Roman Church. It has produced a philosophical religion\nwhich owes much to Oll\u00e9-Laprune and Blondel, and is in reality modern\nscience with a veneer of religious idealism or platonism. It is a\ntheological compromise, and has no affinities with the efforts of\nLamennais. As a compromise it was really opposed to the traditions of\nthe French, to whose love of sharp and clear thinking such general and\nrather vague syntheses are unacceptable. It must be admitted, however,\nthat there is a concreteness, a nearness to reality and life, which\nseparates it profoundly from the highly abstract theology of Germany,\nas seen in Ritschl and Harnack.\n\nThe Abb\u00e9 Marat of the Theological School at the Sorbonne and Father\nGratry of the Ecole Normale were the initiators of this movement, as\nfar back as the Second Empire. \u201cModernism\u201d was never a school of\nthought, philosophical or religious, and it showed itself in a freedom\nand life, a spirit rather than in any formula;. As Sorel\u2019s syndicalism\nis an application of the Bergsonian and kindred doctrines to the left\nwings, and issues in a social theory of \u201caction,\u201d so Modernism is an\nattempt to apply them to the right and issues in a religion founded on\naction rather than theology. The writings of the Modernists are\nextensive, but we mention the names of the chief thinkers. There is the\nnoted exegetist Loisy, who was dismissed in 1894 from the Catholic\nInstitute of Paris and now holds the chair of the History of Religions\nat the College de France. His friend, the Abb\u00e9 Bourier, maintained the\ndoctrine, \u201c Where Christ is there is the Church,\u201d with a view to\ninsisting upon the importance of being a Christian rather than a\nCatholic or a Protestant.\n\nThe importance of the Catholic thinker, Blondel, both for religion and\nfor philosophy, has already been indicated at an earlier stage in this\nbook. His work inspires most.Modernist thought. Blondel preaches, with\ngreat wealth of philosophical and psychological argument, the great\nCatholic doctrine of the collaboration of God with man and of man with\nGod. Man at one with himself realises his highest aspirations. Divine\ntranscendence and divine immanence in man are reconciled. God and man,\nin this teaching, are brought together, and the stern realism of\nevery-day life and the idealism of religion unite in a sacramental\nunion. The supreme principle in this union Laberthonni\u00e8re shows to be\nLove. He is at pains to make clear, however, that belief in Love as the\nultimate reality is no mere sentimentality, no mere assertion of the\nwill-to-believe. For him the intellect must play its part in the\nreligious life and in the expression of faith. No profounder\nintellectual judgment exists than just the one which asserts \u201cGod is\nLove,\u201d when this statement is properly apprehended and its momentous\nsignificance clearly realised. We cannot but lament, with\nLaberthonni\u00e8re, the abuse of this proposition and its subsequent loss\nof both appeal and meaning through a shallow familiarity. The\nreiteration of great conceptions, which is the method by which the\ngreat dogmas have been handed down from generations, tends to blurr\ntheir real significance. They become stereotyped and empty of life. It\nis for this reason that Le Roy in _Dogme et Critique_ (1907) insisted\nupon the advisability of regarding all dogmas as expressions of\npractical value in and for action, rather than as intellectual\npropositions of a purely \u201creligious\u201d or ecclesiastical type, belonging\nsolely to the creeds.\n\nTo Blondel, Laberthonni\u00e8re, and Le Roy can be added the names of\nFonsegrive, Sertillanges, Loyson and Houtin, the last two of whom\nultimately left the Church, for the Church made up its mind to crush\nModernism. The Pope had intimated in 1879 that the thirteenth-century\nphilosophy of Aquinas was to be recognised as the only official\nphilosophy.[36] Finally, Modernism was condemned in a Vatican\nencyclical (_Pascendi Dominici Gregis_) in 1907, as was also the social\nand educational effort, _Le Sillon_.\n\n [36] This led to revival of the study of the _Summa Theologi\u00e6_ and to\n the commencement of the review of Catholic philosophy, _Revue\n Thomiste_.\n\n\nSuch has been Rome\u2019s last word, and it is not surprising, therefore,\nthat France is the most ardent home of free thought upon religious\nmatters, that the French people display a spirit which is unable to\nstop at Protestantism, but which heralds the religion or the\n_non-religion_ of the future to which Guyau has so powerfully indicated\nthe tendencies and has by so doing helped, in conjunction with Renan\nand Renouvier, to hasten its realisation.\n\nA parallel to the \u201cmodernist\u201d theology of the Catholic thinkers was\nindicated on the Protestant side by the theology of Auguste Sabatier,\nwhose _Esquisse d\u2019une Philosophie de la Religion d\u2019apr\u00e8s la Psychologie\net l\u2019Histoire_ appeared in 1897[37] and of Menegoz,[38] whose\n_Publications diverges sur le Fid\u00e9isme et son Application a\nl\u2019Enseignement chr\u00e9tien traditionnel_ were issued in 1900. Sabatier\nassigns the beginning of religion to man\u2019s trouble and distress of\nheart caused by his aspirations, his belief in ideals and higher\nvalues, being at variance with his actual condition. Religion arises\nfrom this conflict of real and ideal in the soul of man. This is the\nessence of religion which finds its expression in the life of faith\nrather than in the formation of beliefs which are themselves accidental\nand transitory, arising from environment and education, changing in\nform from aee to age both in the individual and the race. While LeRoy\non the Catholic side, maintained that dogmas were valuable for their\npractical significance, Sabatier and M\u00e9n\u00e9goz claimed that all religious\nknowledge is symbolical. Dogmas are but symbols, which inadequately\nattempt to reveal their object. That object can only be grasped by\n\u201cfaith\u201d as distinct from \u201cbelief\u201d\u2014that is to say, by an attitude in\nwhich passion, instinct and intuition blend and not by an attitude\nwhich is purely one of intellectual conviction. This doctrine of\n\u201csalvation by faith independently of beliefs\u201d has a marked relationship\nnot only to pragmatism and the philosophy of action, but to the\nphilosophy of intuition. A similar anti-intellectualism colours the\n\u201csymbolo-fid\u00e9ist\u201d currents within Catholicism, which manifest a more\nextreme character. A plea voiced against all such tendencies is to be\nfound in Bois\u2019 book, _De la Connaissance religieuse_ (1894), where an\nendeavour is made to retain a more intellectual attitude, and it again\nfound expression in the volume by Boutroux, written as late as 1908,\nwhich deals with the religious problem in our period.\n\n [37] It was followed after his death in 1901 by the volume _Les\n Religions d\u2019Authorit\u00e9 et la Religion de l\u2019Esprit_, 1904.\n\n\n [38] This is the late Eugene M\u00e9n\u00e9goz, Professor of Theology in Paris,\n not Ferdinand M\u00e9n\u00e9goz, his nephew, who is also a Professor of Theology\n now at Strasbourg.\n\n\nQuoting Boehme in the interesting conclusion to this book on _Science\nand Religion in Contemporary Philosophy_ (1908) Boutroux sums up in the\nwords of the old German mystic his attitude to the diversity of\nreligious opinions. \u201cConsider the birds in our forests, they praise God\neach in his own way, in diverse tones and fashions. Think you God is\nvexed by this diversity and desires to silence discordant voices? All\nthe forms of being are dear to the infinite Being himself!\u201d[39]\n\n [39] It is interesting to compare with the above the sentiments\n expressed in Matthew Arnold\u2019s poem, entitled Progress:\n\n\u201cChildren of men! the unseen Power, whose eye\nFor ever doth accompany mankind,\nHath look\u2019d on no religion scornfully\nThat men did ever find.\n\n\nThis survey of the general attitude adopted towards religion and the\nproblems which it presents only serves to emphasise more clearly those\ntendencies which we have already denoted in previous chapters. As the\ndiscussion of progress was radically altered by the admission of the\nprinciple of freedom, and the discussion of ethics passes bevond rigid\nformulae to a freer conception of morality, so here in religion the\ninsistence upon freedom and that recognition of personality which\naccompanies it, colours the whole religious outlook. Renan, Renouvier\nand Guyau, the three thinkers who have most fully discussed religion in\nour period, join in proclaiming the importance of the personal factor\nin religious belief, and in valiant opposition to that Church which is\nthe declared enemy of freedom, they urge that in freedom of thought\nlies the course of all religious development in the future, for only\nthus can be expressed the noblest and highest aspirations of man\u2019s\nspirit.\n\n\n\nCONCLUSION\n\n\nThe foregoing pages have been devoted to a history of ideas rather than\nto the maintenance of any special thesis or particular argument.\nConsequently it does not remain for us to draw any definitely logical\nconclusions from the preceding chapters. The opportunity may be justly\ntaken, however, of summing up the general features of the development.\n\nFew periods in the history of human thought can rival in interest that\nof the second half of the nineteenth century in France. The discussion\ncovers the principal problems with which man\u2019s mind is occupied in\nmodern times and presents these in a manner which is distinctly human\nand not merely national. This alone would give value to the study of\nsuch a period. There is, however, to be added the more striking fact\nthat there is a complete \u201cturning of the tide\u201d manifested during these\nfifty years in the attitude to most of the problems. Beginning with an\noverweening confidence in science and a belief in determinism and in a\ndestined progress, the century closed with a complete reversal of these\nconceptions.\n\nMaterialism and naturalism are both recognised as inadequate, a\nreaction sets in against positivism and culminates in the triumph of\nspiritualism or idealism. This idealism is free from the cruder aspects\nof the Kantian or Hegelian philosophy. The Thing-in-itself and the\nAbsolute are abandoned; relativity is proclaimed in knowledge, and\nfreedom in the world of action. Thoughts or ideas show themselves as\nforces operating in the evolution of history. This is maintained in\nopposition to the Marxian doctrine of the purely economic or\nmaterialistic determination of history. A marked tendency, however, is\nmanifested to regard all problems from a social stand point. The\ndogmatic confidence in science gives way to a more philosophical\nattitude, while the conflict of science and religion resolves itself\ninto a decay of dogma and the conception of a free religion.\n\nWe have indicated the problem presented by \u201c_science et conscience_,\u201d\nand in so far as we have laid down any thesis or argument in these\npages, as distinct from an historical account of the development, that\nthesis has been, that the central problem in the period was that of\nfreedom. It was to this point which the consideration of science, or\nrather of the sciences, led us. We have observed the importance of the\nsciences for philosophy, and it is clear that, so far from presenting\nany real hostility to philosophy, it can acclaim their autonomy and\nfreedom, without attempting by abstract methods to absorb them into\nitself. They are equally a concrete part of human thought, and in a\ndeep and real sense a manifestation of the same spirit which animates\nphilosophy.\n\nBy recognising the sciences philosophy can avoid the fallacy of\nideology on the one hand and naturalism on the other. Unlike the old\neclecticism, the new thought is able to take account of science and to\ncriticise its assertions. We have seen how this has been accomplished,\nand the rigidly mechanical view of the world abandoned for one into\nwhich human freedom enters as a real factor. This transforms the view\nof history and shows us human beings creating that history and not\nmerely being its blind puppets. History offers no cheerful outlook for\nthe easy-going optimist; it is not any more to be regarded as mere data\nfor pessimistic reflections, but rather a record which prompts a\nfeeling of responsibility. The world is not ready-made, and if there is\nto be progress it must be willed by us and achieved by our struggle and\nlabour.\n\nThe doctrine of immanence upon which the modern tendency is to insist,\nin place of the older idea of transcendence, makes us feel, not only\nthat we are free, but that our freedom is not in opposition to, or in\nspite of, the divine spirit, but is precisely an expression of divine\nimmanence. Instead of the gloomy conception of a whole which determines\nitself apart from us, we feel ourselves part, and a very responsible\npart, of a reality which determines itself collectively and creatively\nby its own action, by its own ideals, which it has itself created. This\nfreedom must extend not only to our conceptions of history but also to\nthose of ethics and of religion.\n\n\u201cEnglish philosophy ends in considering nature as an assemblage of\nfacts; German philosophy looks upon it chiefly as a system of laws. If\nthere is a place midway between the two nations it belongs to us\nFrenchmen. We applied the English ideas in the eighteenth century; we\ncan in the nineteenth give precision to the German ideas. What we have\nto do is to temper, amend and complete the two spirits, one by the\nother, to fuse them into one, to express them in a style that shall be\nintelligible to everybody and thus to make of them the universal\nspirit.\u201d\n\nSuch was Taine\u2019s attitude, and it indicates clearly the precise\nposition of French thought. We are apt to consider Taine purely as an\nempiricist, but we must remember that he disagreed with the radical\nempiricism of John Stuart Mill. His own attitude was largely that of a\nreaction against the vague spiritualism of the Eclectic School,\nespecially Cousin\u2019s eclecticism, a foreign growth on French soil, due\nto German influence. The purely _a priori_ constructions of the older\nspiritualism could find no room, and allowed none, for the sciences.\nThis was sufficient to doom it, and to lead naturally to a reaction of\na positive kind, revolting from all _a priori_ constructions.\n\nIt was to combat the excessive positive reaction against metaphysics\nthat Renouvier devoted his energies, but while professing to modernise\nKant and to follow out the general principles of his Critical\nPhilosophy, Renouvier was further removed from the German thinker than\nhe at times seems to have observed. Renouvier must undoubtedly share\nwith Comte the honours of the century in French Philosophy. Many\ninfluences, however, prevented the general or speedy acceptance of\nRenouvier\u2019s doctrines. The University was closed against him, as\nagainst Comte. He worked in isolation and his style of presentation,\nwhich is heavy and laborious, does not appeal to the _esprit_ of the\nFrench mind. Probably, too, his countrymen\u2019s ignorance of Kant at the\ntime Renouvier wrote his _Essais de Critique g\u00e9n\u00e9rale_ prevented an\nunderstanding and appreciation of the neo-critical advance on\nCriticism.\n\nRenouvier commands respect, but he does not appear to be in the line of\ndevelopment which manifests so essentially the character of French\nthought. This is to be found rather in that spiritualism, which, unlike\nthe old, does not exclude science, but welcomes it, finds a place for\nit, although not by any means an exclusive place. The new spiritualists\ndid not draw their inspiration, as did Cousin, from any German source,\ntheir initial impulse is derived from a purely French thinker, Maine de\nBiran, who, long neglected, came to recognition in the work of\nRavaisson and those subsequent thinkers of this group, right up to\nBergson.\n\nThis current of thought is marked by a vitality and a concreteness\nwhich are a striking contrast to the older eclectic spiritualism.\nHaving submitted itself to the discipline of the sciences, it is\nacquainted with their methods and data in a manner which enables it to\noppose the dogmatism of science, and to acclaim the reality of values\nother than those which are purely scientific. Ignoring _a priori_\nconstruction, or eclectic applications of doctrines, it investigates\nthe outer world of nature and the inner life of the spirit.\n\nWe have said that these ideas are presented, not merely from a national\nstandpoint, but from one which is deeply human and universal. \u201c_La\nScience_,\u201d re-marked Pasteur, \u201c_n\u2019a pas de patrie_.\u201d We may add that\nphilosophy, too, owns no special fatherland. There is not in\nphilosophy, any more than in religion, \u201ca chosen people,\u201d even although\nthe Jews of old thought themselves such, and among moderns the Germans\nhave had this conceit about their _Kultur_. In so far as philosophy\naims at the elucidation of a true view of the universe, it thereby\ntends inevitably to universality. But just as a conception of\ninternationalism, which should fail to take into account the factors of\nnationality, would be futile and disastrous, so a conception of the\nevolution of thought must likewise estimate the characteristics which\nnationality produces even in the philosophical field.\n\nSuch characteristics, it will be found, are not definite doctrines, for\nthese may be transferred, as are scientific discoveries, from one\nnation to another, and absorbed in such a manner that they become part\nof the general consciousness of mankind. They are rather differences of\ntone and colour, form or expression, which express the vital genius of\nthe nation. There are features which serve to distinguish French\nphilosophy from the development which has occurred in Germany, Italy,\nEngland and America.\n\nModern French thought does not deliberately profess to maintain\nallegiance to any past traditions, for it realises that such a\nprocedure would be inconsistent with that freedom of thought which is\nbound up with the spirit of philosophy. It does, however, betray\ncertain national features, which are characteristic of the great French\nthinkers from Descartes, Pascal and Malebranche onwards.\n\nOne of the most remarkable points about these thinkers was their\nintimacy with the sciences. Descartes, while founding modern\nphilosophy, also gave the world analytic geometry; Pascal made certain\nphysical discoveries and was an eminent mathematician. Malebranche,\ntoo, was keenly interested in science. In the following century the\nEncyclopaedists displayed their wealth of scientific knowledge, and in\nthe nineteenth century we have seen the work of Comte based on science,\nthe ability of Cournot and Renouvier in mathematics, while men like\nBoutroux, Hergson and Le Roy possess a thorough acquaintance with\nmodern science.\n\nThese facts have marked results, and distinguish French philosophy from\nthat of Germany, where the majority of philosophers appear to haye been\ntheological students in their youth and to have suffered from the\neffects of their subject for the remainder of their lives. Theological\nstudy does not produce clearness; it does not tend to cultivate a\nspirit of precision, but rather one of vagueness, of which much German\nphilosophy is the product. On the other hand, mathematics is a study\nwhich demands clearness and which in turn increases the spirit of\nclarity and precision.\n\nThere is to be seen in our period a strong tendency to adhere to this\nfeature of clearness. Modern French philosophy is remarkably lucid.\nIndeed, it is claimed that there is no notion, however profound it may\nbe, or however based on technical research it may be, which cannot be\nconveyed in the language of every day. French philosophy does not\ninvent a highly technical vocabulary in order to give itself airs in\nthe eyes of the multitude, on the plea that obscurity is a sign of\nerudition and learning. On the contrary, it remembers Descartes\u2019\nintimate association of clearness with truth, remembers, too, his clear\nand simple French which he preferred to the scholastic Latin. It knows\nthat to convince others of truth one must be at least clear to them\nand, what is equally important, one must be clear in one\u2019s own mind\nfirst. Clarity does not mean shallowness but rather the reverse,\nbecause it is due to keen perceptive power, to a seeing further into\nthe heart of things, involving an intimate contact with reality.\n\nFrench thought has always remained true to a certain \u201ccommon sense.\u201d\nThis is a dangerous and ambiguous term. In its true meaning it\nsignifies the general and sane mind of man free from all that prejudice\nor dogma or tradition, upon which, of course, \u201ccommon sense\u201d in the\npopular meaning is usually based. A genuine \u201ccommon sense\u201d is merely\n\u201c_libert\u00e9_\u201d for the operation of that general reason which makes man\nwhat he is. It must be admitted that, owing to the fact that philosophy\nis taught in the _lyc\u00e9es_, the French are the best educated of any\nnation in philosophical ideas and have a finer general sense of that\nspirit of criticism and appreciation which is the essence of\nphilosophy, than has any other modern nation. Philosophy in France is\nnot written in order to appeal to any school or class. Not limited to\nan academic circle only, it makes its pronouncements to humanity and\nthus embodies in a real form the principles of _egalit\u00e9_ and\n_fraternit\u00e9_. It makes a democratic appeal both by its _clart\u00e9_ and its\nbelief that _la raison commune_ is in some degree present in every\nhuman being.\n\nNot only was clearness a strong point in the philosophy of Descartes,\nbut there was also an insistence upon method. Since the time of his\nfamous _Discours de la M\u00e9thode_ there has always been a unique value\nplaced upon method in French thought, and this again serves to\ndistinguish it profoundly from German philosophy, which is, in general,\nconcerned with the conception and production of entire systems. The\nidea of an individual and systematic construction is an ambitious\nconceit which is not in harmony with the principles of _libert\u00e9_,\n_egalit\u00e9_, _fraternit\u00e9_. Such a view of philosophical work is not a\nsociable one, from a human standpoint, and tends to give rise to a\nspirit of authority and tradition. Apart from this aspect of it, there\nis a more important consideration. All those systems take one idea as\ntheir starting-point and build up an immense construction _a priori_.\nBut another idea may be taken and opposed to that. There is thus an\nimmense wastage of labour, and the individual effort is never\ntranscended. Yet an idea is only a portion of our intelligence, and\nthat intelligence itself is, in turn, only a portion of reality. A\nwider conception of philosophy must be aimed at, one in which the _vue\nd\u2019ensemble_ is not the effort of one mind, but of many, each\ncontributing its share to a harmonious conception, systematic in a\nsense, but not in the German sense. Modern French thought has a dislike\nof system of the individualistic type; it realises that reality is too\nrich and complex for such a rapid construction to grasp it. It is\nopposed to systems, for the French mind looks upon philosophy as a\nmanifestation of life itself\u2014life blossoming to self-consciousness,\nstriving ever to unfold itself more explicitly and more clearly,\nendeavouring to become more harmonious, more beautiful, and more noble.\nThe real victories of philosophical thought are not indicated by the\nproduction of systems but by the discovery or creation of ideas. Often\nthese ideas have been single and simple, but they have become veritable\nforces, in the life of mankind.\n\nFrench thinkers prefer to work collectively at particular problems\nrather than at systems. Hence the aim and tone of their work is more\nuniversal and human, and being more general is apt to be more generous.\nThis again is the expression of _liberte_, _\u00e9galit\u00e9_ and _fraternit\u00e9_\nin a true sense. The French prefer, as it were, in their philosophical\ncampaign for the intellectual conquest of reality diverse batteries of\n_soixante-quinze_ acting with precision and alertness to the clumsy\nproduction of a \u201cBig Bertha.\u201d The production of ambitious systems, each\nprofessing to be the final word in the presentation of reality, has not\nattracted the French spirit. It looks at reality differently and\nprefers to deal with problems in a clear way, thereby indicating a\nmethod which may be applied to the solution of others as they present\nthemselves. This is infinitely preferable to an ambitious unification,\nwhich can only be obtained at the sacrifice of clearness or meaning,\nand it arises from that keen contact with life, which keeps the mind\nfrom dwelling too much in the slough of abstraction, from which some of\nthe German philosophers never succeed in escaping. Their pilgrimage to\nthe Celestial City ends there, and consequently the account of their\nitinerary cannot be of much use to other pilgrims.\n\nAnother feature of modern French thought is the intimacy of the\nconnection between psychology and metaphysics, and the intensive\ninterest in psychology, which is but the imestigation of the inner life\nof man. While in the early beginnings of ancient Greek philosophy some\ntime was spent in examining the outer world before man gave his\nattention to the world within, we find Descartes, at the beginning of\nmodern philosophy, making his own consciousness of his own existence\nhis starting-point. Introspection has always played a prominent part in\nFrench philosophy. Pascal was equally interested in the outer and the\ninner world. Through Maine de Biran this feature has come down to the\nnew spiritualists and culminates in Bergson\u2019s thought, in which\npsychological considerations hold first rank.\n\nThe social feature of modern French thought should not be omitted. In\nGermany subsequent thought has been coloured by the Reformation and the\nparticular aspects of that movement. In France one may well say that\nsubsequent thought has been marked by the Revolution. There is a\ntheological flavour about most German philosophy, while France, a\nseething centre of political and social thought, has given to her\nphilosophy a more sociological trend.\n\nThe French spirit in philosophy stands for clearness, concreteness and\nvitality. Consequently it presents a far greater brilliance, richness\nand variety than German philosophy displays.[1] This vitality and even\nexuberance, which are those of the spirit of youth manifesting a _joie\nde vivre_ or an _\u00e9lan vital_, have been very strongly marked since the\nyear 1880, and have placed French philosophy in the van of human\nthought.\n\n [1] It is, therefore to be lamented that French thought has not\n received the attention which it deseives. In England far more\n attention has been given to the nineteenth-century German philosophy,\n while the history of thought in France, especially in the period\n between Comte and Bergson, has remained in sad neglect. This can and\n should be speedily remedied.\n\n\nIt would be vain to ask whither its advance will lead. Even its own\nprinciples prevent any such forecast; its creative richness may blossom\nforth to-morrow in forms entirely new, for such is the characteristic\nof life itself, especially the life of the spirit, upon which so much\nstress is laid in modern French philosophy. The New Idealism lays great\nstress upon dynamism, voluntarism or action. Freedom and creative\nactivity are its keynotes, and life, ever fuller and richer, is its\naspiration. _La Vie_, of which France (and its centre, Paris) is such\nan expression, finds formulation in the philosophy of contemporary\nthinkers.[2]\n\n [2] The student of comparative thought will find it both interesting\n and profitable to compare the work done recently in Italy by Croce and\n Gentile. The intellectual kinship of Croce and Bergson has frequently\n been pointed out, but Gentile\u2019s work comes very close to the\n philosophy of action and to the whole positive-idealistic tendency of\n contemporary French thought. This is particularly to be seen in\n _L\u2019atto del pensare come atto puro_ (1912), and in _Teoria generalo\n dello spirito come atto puro_ (1916). Professor Carr, the well-known\n exponent of Bergson\u2019s philosophy, remarks in his introduction to the\n English edition of Gentile\u2019s book, \u201cWe may individualise the mind as a\n natural thing-object person. . . . Yet our power to think the mind in\n this way would be impossible were not the mind with and by which we\n think it, itself not a thing, not a _fact_, but _act_; . . . never\n _factum_, but always _fieri_.\u201d This quotation is from p. xv of the\n _Theory of Mind as Pure Act_. With one other quotation direct from\n Gentile we must close this reference to Italian neo-idealism. \u201cIn so\n far as the subject is constituted a subject by its own act it\n constitutes the object. . . . Mind is the transcendental activity\n productive of the objective world of experience\u201d (pp. 18, 43). Compare\n with this our quotation from Ravaisson, given on p. 75 of this work,\n and the statement by Lachelier on p. 122, both essential principles of\n the French New Idealism.\n\n\nOne word of warning must be uttered against those who declare that the\ntendency of French thought is in the direction of anti-intellectualism.\nSuch a declaration rests on a misunderstanding, which we have\nendeavoured in our pages to disclose It is based essentially upon a\ndoctrine of Reason which belongs to the eighteenth century. The severe\nrationalism of that period was mischievous in that it rested upon a\none-sided view of human nature, on a narrow interpretation of \u201cReason\u201d\nwhich gave it only a logical and almost mathematical significance. To\nthe Greeks, whom the French represent in the modern world, the term\n\u201cNOUS\u201d meant more than this\u2014it meant an intelligible harmony. We would\ndo wrong to look upon the most recent developments in France as being\nanti-rational, they are but a revolt against the narrow view of Reason,\nand they constitute an attempt to present to the modern world a\nconception akin to that of the Greeks. Human reason is much more than a\npurely logical faculty, and it is this endeavour to relate all problems\nto life itself with its pulsing throb, which represents the real\nattitude of the French mind. There is a realisation expressed\nthroughout that thought, that life is more than logic. The clearness of\ngeometry showed Descartes that geometry is not all-embracing. Pascal\nfound that to the logic of geometry must be added a spirit of\nappreciation which is not logical in its nature, but expresses another\nside of man\u2019s mind. To-day France sees that, although a philosophy must\nendeavour to satisfy the human intelligence, a merely intellectual\nsatisfaction is not enough. The will and the feelings play their part,\nand it was the gteat fault of the eighteenth century to misunderstand\nthis The search to-day is for a system of values and of truth in action\nas well as a doctrine about things in their purely theoretical aspects.\n\nThis is a serious demand, and it is one which philosophy must endeavour\nto appreciate Salvation will not be found in a mere dilettantism which\ncan only express ieal indifference, nor in a dogmatism which results in\nbigotry and pride. Criticism is required, but not a purely destructive\ncriticism, rather one which will offer some acceptable view of the\nuniverse. Such a view must combine true positivism or realism with a\ntrue idealism, by uniting fact and spirit, things and ideas. Its\nachievement can only be possible to minds possessing some creative and\nconstructive power, yet minds who have been schooled in the college of\nreality. This is the task of philosophy in France and in other lands.\nThat task consists not only in finding values and in defining them but\nin expressing them actively, and in endeavouring to realise them in the\ncommon life.\n\n\n\nBIBLIOGRAPHY\n\n\nI. Works of the Period classified under Authors. (The more important\nmonographs are cited.) Names of philosophical journals.\n\nII. Books on the Period.\n\nIII. Comparative Table showing contemporary German and Anglo-American\nWorks from 1851 to 1921.\n\nI\nWORKS OF THE PERIOD CLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORS.\n\nBERGSON: _Les Donn\u00e9es imm\u00e9diates de la Conscience_. 1889. English\nTranslation\u2014_Time and Free-Will._ 1910.\n_Mati\u00e8re et M\u00e9moire_. 1896. (E.T.[1] 1911.)\n_Le Rire_. 1901. (E.T. 1911.)\n_Introduction a la M\u00e9taphysique_. 1903. _Revue de M\u00e9taphysique et de\nMorale_. (E.T. 1913.)\n_L\u2019Evolution cr\u00e9atrice_. 1907. (E.T. 1911.)\n_L\u2019Energie spirituelle_. 1919. (E.T. 1920.)\nSome monographs on Bergson: Le Roy (1912), Maritain (1914) in France,\nMeckauer (1917) in Germany, and for the English reader Lindsay (1911),\nStewart (1911), Carr (1912), Cunningham (1916), and Gunn (1920).\nBERNARD: _Introduction a l\u2019Etude de la M\u00e9decine exp\u00e9rimental_. 1865.\nBERTHELOT: _Science et Philosophie_. 1886. BINET: _Magn\u00e9tisme animal_.\n1886.\n_Les Alt\u00e9rations de la Personnalit\u00e9_. 1892.\n_L\u2019Introduction \u00e0 la Psychologie exp\u00e9rimental_. 1894.\n(Founded the _Ann\u00e9e psychologique_ in 1895.) BLONDEL: _L\u2019Action, Essai\nd\u2019une Critique de la Vie et d\u2019une Science de la Pratique_. 1893.\n_Histoire et Dogme_. 1904. BOIRAC: _L\u2019Id\u00e9e du Ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne_. 1894. BOIS:\n_De la Connaissance religieuse_. 1894. BOURGEOIS: _Solidarit\u00e9_. 1896.\nBOUTROUX (EMILE): _De la Contingence des Lois de la Nature_ 1874. (E.T.\n1916.)\n_De l\u2019Id\u00e9e de Loi naturelle dans la Science et la Philosophie\ncontemporaines_. 1895. (E.T. 1914.)\n_Questions de Morale et d\u2019Education_. 1895. (E.T. 1913.)\n_De l\u2019Influence de la Philosophie \u00e9cossaise sur la Philosophie\nfran\u00e7aise_. 1897.\n_La Science et la Religion dans la Philosophie contemporaine_. 1908.\n(E.T. 1909.)\n_Rapport sur la Philosophie en France depuis_ 1867. Paper read to Third\nCongress of Philosophy at Heidelberg in 1908. _Revue de M\u00e9taphysique et\nde Morale_. Nov., 1908.\n_Etudes d\u2019Histoire de la Philosophie_. (E.T. 1912.)\n_The Beyond that is Within_. E.T. 1912. (Addresses.) BROCHARD: _De la\nResponsabilit\u00e9 morale_. 1874.\n_De l\u2019Universalit\u00e9 des Notions morales_. 1876.\n_De L\u2019Erreur_. 1879. BRUNSCHWICG: _La Modalit\u00e9 du jugement_. 1897.\n_La Vie de l\u2019Esprit_. 1900.\n_Les Etapes de la Philosophie math\u00e9matique_. 1912. BUREAU: _La Crise\nmorale des Temps nouveau_. 1907. CARO: _Le Mat\u00e9rialisme et la Science_.\n1868.\n_Probl\u00e8mes de Morale sociale_. 1876. COMTE: _Cours de Philosophie\npositive_. 6 vols. 1830-42.\n_Discours sur l\u2019Esprit positive_. 1844.\n_Syst\u00e8me de Politique positive_. 4 vols. 1851-4.\n_Cat\u00e9chisme positiviste._ _Synth\u00e8se subjective_ (vol. i.). 1856.\n_Note_.\u2014The Free and Condensed Translation of Comte\u2019s Positive\nPhilosophy in English by Miss Martineau, appeared in two volumes in\n1853. Monograph by L\u00e9vy-Bruhl. COURNOT: _Essai sur les Fondements de\nnos Connaissances et sur les Caract\u00e8res de la Critique philosophique_\n(2 vols.). 1851.\n_Trait\u00e9 de l\u2019Encha\u00eenement des Id\u00e9es fondamentales dans les Sciences et\ndans l\u2019Histoire_ (2 vols.). 1861.\n_Consid\u00e9rations sur la Marche des Id\u00e9es et des Ev\u00e9nements dans les\nTemps modernes_ (2 vols.). 1872.\n_Mat\u00e9rialisme, Vitalisme, Rationalisine: Etude sur l\u2019Emploi des Donn\u00e9es\nde la Science en Philosophie_. 1875.\n_Note_.\u2014A number of the _Revue de M\u00e9taphysique et de Morale_ was\ndevoted to Cournot in 1905. See also the Monograph by Bottinelli and\nhis _Souvenirs de Cournot_. 1913. COUTURAT: _De l\u2019Infini math\u00e9matique_.\n_Les Principes des Math\u00e9matiques_. CRESSON: _Le Malaise de la pens\u00e9e\nphilosophique contemporaine_. 1905. DAURIAC: _Croyance et Realit\u00e9_.\n1889.\n_Motions de Mati\u00e8re et de Force_. 1878. DELBOS: _L\u2019Esprit philosophique\nde l\u2019Allemagne et la Pens\u00e9e fran\u00e7aise_. 1915. DUHEM: _La Th\u00e9orie\nphysique_. 1906. DUNAN: _Les deux Id\u00e9alismes_. 1911. DURKHEIM: _De la\nDivision du Travail social_. 1893.\n_Les Regles de la M\u00e9thode sociologique_. 1894.\n_Le Suicide_. 1897.\n_Les Formes \u00e9l\u00e9mentaires de la Vie religieuse_. 1912. (E. T.) ESPINAS:\n_Societ\u00e9s animales_. 1876. EVELLlN: _La Raison pure et les Antinomies_.\n1907. FONSEGRIVE: _Morale et Soci\u00e9t\u00e9_. 1907. FOUILL\u00c9E: _La Philosophie\nde Platon 2 vols_. 1869. Prize for competition in 1867, on the. Theory\nof Ideas, offered by the Acad\u00e9mie des Sciences morales et politiques.\n\u201cCrowned\u201d after publication by the Acad\u00e9mie fran\u00e7aise. 1871. Second\nEdition, revised, and enlarged to four volumes. 1888-9.\n_La Libert\u00e9 et le Determinisme_. 1872. (Doctorate Thesis)\n_La Philosophie de Socrate_. 2 vols 1874. Prize in 1868, Acad\u00e9mie des\nSciences morales et politiques.\n_Histoire g\u00e9n\u00e9rale de la Philosophie_. 1875. New Edition revised and\naugmented, 1910.\n_Extraits des grands Philosophes_. 1877.\n_L\u2019Id\u00e9e moderne du Droit en Allemagne, en Ingleterre et en France_.\n1878.\n_La Science sociale contemporaine_. 1880.\n_Critique des Syst\u00e8mes contemporains_. 1883.\n_La Propri\u00e9t\u00e9 sociale et la D\u00e9mocratie_. 1884.\n_L\u2019Avenir de la M\u00e9taphysique fond\u00e9e sur l\u2019Exp\u00e9rience_. 1889.\n_L\u2019Evolutionisme des Id\u00e9es-forces_. 1890.\n_L\u2019Enseignement au Point de Vue national_. 1891 (E. T. 1892.)\n_La Psychologie des Id\u00e9es-forces_. 2 vols. 1893.\n_Temp\u00e9rament et Caract\u00e8re selon les Individus, les Sexes et les Races_.\n1895.\n_Le Mouvement id\u00e9aliste et la R\u00e9action contre la Science positive_.\n1895.\n_Le Mouvement positiviste et la Conception sociologique du Monde_.\n1896.\n_Psychologie du Peuple fran\u00e7ais_. 1898.\n_Les Etudes classiques et la D\u00e9mocratie_. 1898.\n_La France au Point de Vue moral_. 1900.\n_La Reforme de l\u2019Enseignement par la Philosophie_. 1901.\n_La Conception morale et civique de L\u2019Enseignement_.\n_Nietzsche et l\u2019Immoralisme_. 1904.\n_Esquisse psychologique des Peuples europ\u00e9ens_. 1903.\n_Le Moralisme de Kant et l\u2019Amoralisme contemporain_. 1905.\n_Les Elements sociologiques de la Morale_. 1905.\n_La Morale des Id\u00e9es-forces_. 1907.\n_Le Socialisme et la Sociologie r\u00e9formiste_. 1909.\n_La D\u00e9mocratie politique et sociale en France_. 1911.\n_La Pens\u00e9e et les nouvelles Ecoles anti-int\u00e9llectualistes_. 1912.\nPosthumous: _Esquisse d\u2019une Interpr\u00e9tation du Monde_.\n_Humanitaires et Libertaires_. 1914.\n_Equivalents philosophiques des Religions_.\nOn Fouill\u00e9e, monograph by Augustin Guyau, son of J. M. Guyau. GOBLOT:\n_Trait\u00e9 de Logique_. 1918. GOURD: _Le Ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne_. 1888.\n_La Philosophie de la Religion_. 1911. GUYAU: _La Morale d\u2019Epicure et\nses Rapports avec les Doctrines contemporaines_. 1878. \u201cCrowned\u201d four\nyears before by the Acad\u00e9mie des Sciences morales et politiques.\n_La Morale anglaise contemporaine_. 1879. An extension of the Prize\nEssay (Second Part).\n_Vers d\u2019un Philosophe_. 1881.\n_Probl\u00e8mes de l\u2019Esth\u00e9tique contemporaine_. 1884.\n_Esquisse d\u2019une Morale sans Obligation ni Sanction_. 1885. (E.T. 1898.)\n_L\u2019Irr\u00e9ligion de l\u2019Avenir_. 1887. (E.T. 1897.)\nPosthumous: _Education et H\u00e9r\u00e9dit\u00e9_. (E.T. 1891.)\n_L\u2019Art au Point de Vue sociologique_.\n_La Gen\u00e8se de l\u2019Id\u00e9e de Temps_. 1890.\nThere is a monograph on Guyau by Fouill\u00e9e. HAMELIN: _Essai sur les\nEl\u00e9ments principaux de la Repr\u00e9sentation_. 1907. HANNEQUIN: _Essai\ncritique sur l\u2019Hypoth\u00e8se des Atomes_. 1896. IZOULET: _La Cit\u00e9 moderne_.\n1894. JANET (PAUL): _La Famille_. 1855.\n_Histoire de la Philosophie morale et politique dans L\u2019Antiquit\u00e9 et\ndans les Temps modernes._ 2 vols. 1858. Republished as _Histoire de la\nScience politique dans ses Rapports avec la Morale_. 1872.\n_La Philosophie du Bonheur_. 1862.\n_La Crise philosophique_. 1865.\n_Le Cerveau et la Pens\u00e9e_. 1867.\n_El\u00e9ments de Morale_. 1869.\n_Les Probl\u00e8mes du XIXe Si\u00e8cle_. 1872.\n_La Morale_. 1874 (E T. 1884.)\n_Philosophie de la R\u00e9volution fran\u00e7aise_. 1875.\n_Les Causes finales_. 1876. (E.T. 1878.)\nJANET (PIERRE): _L\u2019Automatisme psychologique_. 1889\n_L\u2019Etat mental des Hyst\u00e9riques_. 1894.\n_N\u00e9vroses et Id\u00e9es-fixes_. 1898.\n(Janet founded the _Journal de Psychologie_. 1904). JAVARY: _L\u2019Id\u00e9e du\nProgr\u00e8s_. 1850. LABERTHONNI\u00c8RE. _Le Dogmatisme morale_. 1898.\n_Essais de Philosophie religieuse_. 1901.\n_Le R\u00e9alisme chr\u00e9tien et l\u2019Id\u00e9alisme grec_. LACHELIER: _Du Fondement de\nl\u2019Induction_. 1871.\n_Psychologie et M\u00e9taphysique_. 1885. Article in _Revue de M\u00e9taphysique\net de Morale_, now published with the above.\n_Etude sur le Syllogisme_. 1907.\nMonograph by S\u00e9ailles, article by No\u00ebl. LACOMBE: _De l\u2019Histoire\nconsid\u00e9r\u00e9e comme Science_. 1894. LALANDE: _La Dissolution oppos\u00e9e \u00e0\nl\u2019Evolution, dans les Sciences physiques et morales_. 1899.\n_Pr\u00e9cis raisonn\u00e9 de Morale pratique par Questions et R\u00e9ponses_. 1907.\nLAPIE: _Logique de la Volont\u00e9_. 1902. LE BON: _Lois psychologiques de\nl\u2019Evolution des Peuples_.\n_Les Opinions et les Croyances._ 1911.\n_Psychologie du Socialisme_. 1899.\n_Psychologie des Foules._ (E.T.)\n_La Vie des V\u00e9rit\u00e9s_. 1914. LEQUIER: _La Recherche d\u2019une Premi\u00e8re\nV\u00e9rit\u00e9 (Fragments posthumes)_. 1865. LE ROY: _Dogme et Critique_. 1907.\nLIARD: _Des D\u00e9finitions g\u00e9ometriques et des D\u00e9finitions empiriques_.\n1873.\n_La Science positive et la M\u00e9taphysique_. 1879.\n_Morale et Enseignement civique_. 1883.\n_L\u2019Enseignement sup\u00e9rieure en France_, 1789 \u00e0 1889. 1889. LOISY:\n_L\u2019Evangile et l\u2019Eglise_. (E.T.) MARION: _La Solidarit\u00e9 morale_. 1880.\nM\u00c9N\u00c9GOZ: _Publications diverses sur le Fid\u00e9isme et son Application \u00e0\nl\u2019Enseignement chr\u00e9tien traditionnel_. 1900. Two additional volumes\nlater. MEYERSON: _Identit\u00e9 et R\u00e9alit\u00e9_. 1907 MICHELET: _L\u2019Amour_. 1858\n_Le Pr\u00eatre la Femme et la Famille_. 1859.\n_La Bible de l\u2019Humanit\u00e9._ 1864\nMILHAUD: _Essai sur les Conditions et les Limites de la Certitude\nlogique._ 1894\n_Le Rationnel_. 1898. OLL\u00c9-LAPRUNE: _La Certitude morale_. 1880.\n_Le Prix de la Vie_. 1885\n_La Philosophie et le Temps pr\u00e9sent_. 1895.\n_La Raison et le Rationalisme_. 1906. PARODI: _Le Probl\u00e8me morale et la\nPens\u00e9e contemporaine_. 1910. PASTEUR: _Le Budget de la Science_. 1868\nPAULHAN: _Ph\u00e9nom\u00e8nes affectifs_.\n_L\u2019Activit\u00e9 mentale_. 1889 PAYOT: _La Croyance_. 1896. PELLETAN:\n_Profession da Foi du XIXe Si\u00e8cle_. 1852. POINCAIR\u00c9: _La Science et\nl\u2019Hypoth\u00e8se_. 1902. (E.T. 1905.)\n_La Valeur de la Science_. 1905.\n_Science et M\u00e9thode_. 1909\n_Derni\u00e8res pens\u00e9es_. PROUDHON: _Qu\u2019est-ce que la Propri\u00e9t\u00e9?_ 1840\n_Syst\u00e8me des Contradictions \u00e9conomiques_. 1846\n_La Philosophie du Progr\u00e8s_. 1851.\n_De la Justice_. 1858. RAUH: _Psychologie appliqu\u00e9e \u00e0 la Morale et \u00e0\nl\u2019Education_.\n_De la M\u00e9thode dans la Psychologie des Sentiments_.\n_Essai sur le Fondement m\u00e9taphysique de la Morale_. 1890.\n_L\u2019Exp\u00e9rience morale_. 1903. RAVAISSON-MOLLIEN (1813-1900): _Habitude_.\n1838. (Thesis.) Reprinted 1894 in _Revue de M\u00e9taphysique et de Morale_.\n_Aristote_. 1837. Vol. I. Vol. II. in 1846. Development of work crowned\nby Acad\u00e9mie des Sciences morales et politiques in 1833, when the author\nwas twenty.\n_Rapport sur la Philosophie en France au XIXe Si\u00e8cle_. 1867.\n_La Philosophie de Pascal (Revue des Deux Mondes_. 1887)\n_L\u2019Education (Revue bleue_. 1887).\n_M\u00e9taphysique et Morale (Revue des Deux Mondes_. 1893).\n_Le Testament philosophique (Revue des Deux Mondes_. 1901).\n_Cf_. Boutroux on Ravaisson (_Revue de M\u00e9taphysique et de Morale_.\n1900).\nBergson : _Discours \u00e0 l\u2019Acad\u00e9mie des Sciences morales et politiques_.\n1904. RENAN: _Averro\u00e8s et l\u2019Averroisme_. 1852.\n_Etudes d\u2019Histoire religieuse_. 1857.\n_Essais de Morale et de Critique_. 1851).\n_Les Origines du Christianisme_. 1863-83. 8 vols., of which: _Vie de\nJ\u00e9sus_. 1863. (E.T.)\n_Questions contemporaines_. 1868.\n_La R\u00e9forme intellectual et morale_. 1871.\n_Dialogues et Fragments philosophiques_. 1870. (E.T. 1883.)\n_Drames philosophiques_.\n_Souvenirs d\u2019Enfance et de Jeunesse_. 1883. (E.T. 1883.)\n_Nouvelles Etudes d\u2019Histoire religieuse_. 1884. (E.T. 1886.)\n_Histoire du Peuple d\u2019Isra\u00ebl_. 5 vols. 1887-04. (E.T. 1888-91. 3 vols.)\n_L\u2019Avenir de la Science_. 1890. Written 1848-9. (E.T.)\n_Feuilles d\u00e9tach\u00e9es_. 1802.\nFor monographs on Renan: Allier: _La Philosophie de Renan_. 1895.\nMonod: _Renan, Taine, Michelet_. 1894.\nS\u00e9ailles: _Renan_. 1894*. RENOUVIER: _Manuel de Philosophie moderne_.\n1842.\n_Manuel de Philosophie ancienne_. 1844.\n_Manuel r\u00e9publicaine de l\u2019Homme et du Citoyen_. 1848.\n_Gouvernement direct et Organisation communale et centrale de la\nR\u00e9publique_. 1851.\n_Essais de Critique g\u00e9n\u00e9rale_. 4 vols. 1854, 1859, 1864, 1864. (On\nrevision these four became thirteen vols.)\n_La Science de la Morale_. 2 vols. 1869.\n_1er Essai_, revised: _Trait\u00e9 de Logique g\u00e9n\u00e9ral et de Logique\nformelle_. 3 vols. 1875.\n_2e Essai_, revised: _Trait\u00e9 de Psychologie rationnelle_. 3 vols. 1875.\n_Uchronie (L\u2019Utopie dans l\u2019Histoire), Esquisse historique du\nD\u00e9veloppement de la Civilisation europ\u00e9enne, tel qu\u2019il n\u2019a pas \u00e9t\u00e9, tel\nqu\u2019il aurait pu \u00eatre_. 1876.\n_Petit Trait\u00e9 de Morale pour les Ecoles la\u00efques_. 1879.\n_Esquisse d\u2019une Classification syst\u00e9matique des Doctrines\nphilosophiques_. 2 vols. 1886.\n_3e Essai_, revised: _Les Principes de la Nature_. 1892.\n_Victor Hugo, le Po\u00e8te_. 1893.\n_4e Essai_, revised: _L\u2019lntroduction \u00e0 la Philosophie analytique de\nl\u2019Histoire_. 1896.\n_5e Essai_, new: _La Philosophie analytique de l\u2019Histoire_. 4 vols. I.\nand II. 1806. III. and IV. 1897. (This brought the Essais up to\nthirteen volumes.)\n_La Nouvelle Monadologie_. 1891). (With L. Prat.) (\u201cCrowned\u201d by the\nAcad\u00e9mie des Sciences morales et politiques.)\n_Victor Hugo, le Philosophe_. 1900.\n_Les Dilemmes de la M\u00e9taphysique pure_. 1901.\n_Histoire et Solution des Probl\u00e8mes m\u00e9taphysiques_. 1901.\n_Le Personnalisme, suivi d\u2019une Etude sur la Perception externe et sur\nla Force_ 1903.\nPosthumous:\n_Derniers entretiens_. 1905.\n_Doctrine de Kant_. 1906.\nFor his two journals, see under \u201cPeriodicals.\u201d\nIn the latest edition the complete _Essais de Critique g\u00e9n\u00e9rale_ are\nonly ten volumes, as follows: _Logic_, 2; _Psychology_, 2; _Principles\nof Nature_, 1; _Introduction to Philosophy of History_, 1; _and the\nPhilosophy of History_, 4.\nThe best monograph is that of S\u00e9ailles, 1905.\nRenouvier\u2019s Correspondence with the Swiss Philosopher, S\u00e9cretan, has\nbeen published; _cf_. also _The Letters of William James_. REYNAUD:\n_Philosophie religieuse_. 1858. (Third Edition.) RIBOT: _La Psychologie\nanglaise contemporaine_. 1870. (E.T. 1873.)\n_H\u00e9r\u00e9dit\u00e9, Etude psychologique_. 1873. (E.T. 1875.)\n_La Psychologie allemande contemporaine_. 1879. (E.T. 1886.)\n_Les Maladies de la M\u00e9moire, Essai dans la Psychologie positive_. 1881.\n(E.T. 1882.)\n_Les Maladies de la Volont\u00e9_. 1883. (E.T. 1884.)\n_Les Maladies de la Personnalit\u00e9_. 1885. (E.T. 1895.)\n_La Psychologie de l\u2019Attention_. 1889. (E.T. 1890.)\n_La Psychologie des Sentiments._ 1896. (E.T. 1897.)\n_L\u2019Evolution des Id\u00e9es g\u00e9n\u00e9rales._ 1897. (E.T. 1899.)\n_Essai sur l\u2019Imagination cr\u00e9atrice_. 1900.\n_La Logique des Sentiments_. 1904.\n_Essai sur les Passions_. 1906.\n_La Vie inconsciente et les Mouvements_. SABATIER (AUGUSTE): _Esquisse\nd\u2019une Philosophie de Religion d\u2019apr\u00e8s la Psychologie et l\u2019Histoire_.\n1897.\n_Les Religions d\u2019Autorit\u00e9 et la Religion de l\u2019Esprit_. 1904. (E.T.)\nSABATIER (PAUL): _A propos de la S\u00e9paration des Eglises de l\u2019Etat_.\n1905. E.T., Robert Dell, 1906 (with Text of the Law). S\u00c9AILLES:\n_Affirmations de la Conscience moderne_. 1903. SIMON: _La Libert\u00e9 de\nConscience_. 1859.\n_Dieu, Patrie, Libert\u00e9_. 1883. SOREL: _Reflexions sur la Violence_.\n1907. (E.T 1916.)\n_Illusions du Progr\u00e8s_. 1911. TAINE: _Les Philosophes fran\u00e7ais au XIXe\nSiecle_. 1857.\n_Essais de Critique et d\u2019Histoire_. 1858.\n_Philosophie de l\u2019Art_. 2 vols. 1865. (E.T. 1865.)\n_Nouveaux Essais de Critique et d\u2019Histoire_. 1865.\n_De l\u2019Int\u00e9lligence_. 2 vols. 1870. (E T. 1871.)\nThe work _Origines de la France contemporaine_ in 5 vols, 1876-93.\n_Histoire de la Litt\u00e9rature anglaise_. 5 vols. 1863. (E.T. by Van Laun.\n1887.)\nMonographs: De Margerie: _Taine_. 1894.\nMonod: _Renan, Taine, et Michelet_. 1894.\nBarzellotti: _La Philosophie de Taine._\nBoutmy: _H. Taine_. 1897.\nGiraud: _Essai sur Taine_. 1901. TARDE: _Criminalit\u00e9 compar\u00e9e_. 1898.\n_Les Lois de l\u2019Imitation_. 1900. VACHEROT: _Histoire de l\u2019Ecole\nd\u2019Alexandrie_. 1846-51.\n_La M\u00e9taphysique et la Science_. 3 vols. 1858.\n_La D\u00e9mocratie_. 1860.\n_Essais de Philosophie critique_. 1864.\n_La Religion_. 1868.\n_La Science et la Conscience_. 1870.\n_Le Nouveau Spiritualisme_. 1884.\n_Cf_. Parodi on Vacherot, _Revue de M\u00e9taphysique et de Morale_. 1899.\nWEBER: _Le Rythme du Progr\u00e8s_.\n_Vers le Positivisme absolu par l\u2019Id\u00e9alisme_. 1903. WlLBOIS: _Devoir et\nDur\u00e9e: Essai de Morale sociale_. 1912. X\u00c9NOPOL: _Principes fondamentaux\nde l\u2019Histoire_. 1899. Revised and reissued in larger form in 1905 as\n_La Th\u00e9orie de l\u2019Histoire_.\n\n [1] This abbreviation is used throughout for \u201cEnglish Translation.\u201d\n\nPERIODICALS\n\n\u201cLA CRITIQUE PHILOSOPHIQUE,\u201d of Renouvier and Pillon, 1872. to 1884,\nweekly; monthly from 1885 to 1889.\n\u201cLA CRITIQUE RELIGIEUSE,\u201d 1878-1884 (quarterly). Renouvier.\n\u201cREVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE DE LA FRANCE ET DE L\u2019\u00c9TRANGER,\u201d founded by Ribot\nin 1876.\n\u201cL\u2019ANN\u00c9E PHILOSOPHIQUE.\u201d 1867-1869. Renouvier and Pillon, refounded in\n1890 by Pillon.\n\u201cREVUE DE M\u00c9TAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE,\u201d founded by Xavier Leon in 1893.\n\u201cCrowned\u201d by Acad\u00e9mie des Sciences morales et politiques, 1921.\n\u201cANN\u00c9E PSYCHOLOGIQUE,\u201d founded by Beaunet and Binet, 1895.\n\u201cREVUE DE PHILOSOPHIE,\u201d founded by Peillaube, 1900.\n\u201cREVUE THOMISTE.\u201d\n\u201cANNALES DE PHILOSOPHIE CHR\u00c9TIENNE.\u201d Laberthonni\u00e8re.\n\u201cANN\u00c9E SOCIOLOGIQUE.\u201d 1896-1912. Durkheim.\n\u201cJOURNAL DE PSYCHOLOGIE NORMALE ET PATHOLOGIQUE.\u201d Founded 1904 by Janet\nand Dumas.\n\u201cBULLETIN DE LA SOCI\u00c9T\u00c9 FRAN\u00c7AISE DE PHILOSOPHIE.\u201d From 1901.\n\nII\nGENERAL BOOKS ON THE PERIOD.\n\nALIOTTA: _The Idealistic Reaction against Science_. (E.T. from Italian.\n1914.) BARTH: _Die Philosophie der Geschichte als Sociologie_. 1897.\nBERGSON: _La Philosophie fran\u00e7aise_. 1915. BOUTROUX: _Philosophie en\nFrance depuis_ 1867. Report to Congress of Philosophy given in the\n_Revue de M\u00e9taphysique et de Morale_. 1908.\n_La Philosophie_: an Essay in the volume of collected Essays entitled:\n_Un Demi-Si\u00e8cle de la Civilisation fran\u00e7aise_. 1870- 1915. Pp. 25-48.\n(Paris: Hachette. 1916.) DWELSHAUVERS: _La Psychologie fran\u00e7aise\ncontemporaine_. 1920. FAGUET: _Dix-Neuvi\u00e8me Si\u00e8cle_. 1887.\n_Politiques et Moralistes du XIXe Si\u00e8cle_. 1881. FERRAZ: _Etudes sur la\nPhilosophie en France au XIXe Si\u00e8cle_. 3 vols. 1882-9.\nIt is interesting to notice the triple division adopted by Ferraz:\nSocialism (under which heading he also groups Naturalism and\nPositivism). Traditionalism (Ultramontanism). Spiritualism (together\nwith Liberalism).\nFISCHER: _Geschichte der neuern Philosophie_. 9 vols. FOUILL\u00c9E:\n_Histoire de la Philosophie_, Latest Edition, last Chapter.\n_Le Mouvement id\u00e9aliste et la R\u00e9action contre la Science positive._\n1896.\n_La Pens\u00e9e et les nouvelles Ecoles anti-intellectualistes_. 1912.\nH\u00d6FFDING: _Modern Philosophers._ (E.T. from Danish. 1915.) L\u00c9VY-BRUHL:\n_Modern Philosophy in France_. Chicago, 1899. MERZ: _History of\nEuropean Thought in the Nineteenth Century_. 4 vols.\nA great work. Very comprehensive, particularly for German and British\nthought. PARODI: _La Philosophie contemporaine en France_. 1919.\nAn excellent treatment of the development from 1890 onwards by a French\nthinker. (\u201cCrowned\u201d by Acad\u00e9mie.) RAVAISSON: _Rapport sur la\nPhilosophie en France au XIXe Si\u00e8cle_. 1867. (Second Edition, 1889.)\nThis has become an acknowledged classic. RENOUVIER: _Philosophie\nanalytique de l\u2019Histoire_. (Vol. IV. latest sections.) 1897.\nRUGGIERO: _Modern Philosophy_. 1912. (E.T. from Italian. 1921.)\nGives a stimulating account of German, French, Anglo- American and\nItalian thought. STEBBING: _Pragmatism and French Voluntarism_. 1914.\nTAINE: _Les Philosophes fran\u00e7ais du XIXe Si\u00e8cle_. 1857. TURQUET-MILNES,\nG.: _Some Modern French Writers: A Study in Bergsonism_. 1921.\nDeals mainly with literary figures-e.g., Barres, P\u00e9guy, France,\nBourget, Claudel. VILLA: _Contemporary Psychology_. (E.T. from Italian.\n1903.)\n_L\u2019Idealismo moderno_. 1905. WEBER: _Histoire de la Philosophie\neurop\u00e9enne_. (Eighth Edition, 1914.)\n\n* * * * *\n\nThe article contributed by Ribot to _Mind_ in 1877 is worthy of notice,\nwhile much light is thrown on the historical development by articles in\nthe current periodicals cited on p. 338, especially in the _Revue\nphilosophique_ and the _Revue de M\u00e9taphysique et de Morale_.\n\n\n\nIIII\nCOMPARATIVE TABLE\n\nTHE CHIEF PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS IN FRANCE, GERMANY, ENGLAND AND AMERICA\nFROM 1851 TO 1921.\n\n\n_FRANCE._ _GERMANY._ _ENGLAND AND AMERICA._ l851     COURNOT: \u201cEssai\nsur les Fondements de nos Connaissances.\u201d     1851     FECHNER: \u201cZend\nAvesta.\u201d     1851     MANSEL: \u201cProlegomena to Logic.\u201d RENOUVIER:\n\u201cGouvernement direct et Organisation communale.\u201d\n\nPROUDHON: \u201cLa Philosophie du Progr\u00e8s.\u201d\n\n1852     MOLESCHOTT: \u201cDer Kreislauf des Lebens.\u201d LOTZE: \u201cMedizinische\nPsychologie oder Physiologie der Seele.\u201d 1854     RENOUVIER: \u201cEssai de\nCritique g\u00e9n\u00e9rale\u201d(Ier Essai).\n1854     FERRIER: \u201cInstitutes of Metaphysic.\u201d COMTE completes \u201cSysteme\nde Politique positive.\u201d\n\n1855     B\u00dcCHNER: \u201cKraft und Stoff.\u201d     1855     BAIN: \u201cThe Senses and\nthe Intellect.\u201d FECHNER: \u201cUber die physikalische und die philosophische\nAtomlehre.\u201d     SPENCER: \u201cPrinciples of Psychology.\u201d CZOLBE: \u201cNeue\nDarstellung des Sensualismus.\u201d\n1856     COMTE: \u201cSynth\u00e8se subjective,\u201d vol. i.     1856     LOTZE:\n\u201cMikrokosmos\u201d (1856-1864).\n\nCZOLBE: \u201cDie Enstehung des Selbstbewusstseins.\u201d 1857     TAINE:\n\u201cPhilosophes ran\u00e7ais du XIXe Siecle.\u201d\n1857     BUCKLE: \u201cHistory of Civilization in England\u201d (vol. i.). RENAN:\n\u201cEtudes d\u2019Histoire religieuse.\u201d     MANSEL: \u201cThe Limits of Religious\nThought.\u201d 1858     VACHEROT: \u201cLa M\u00e9taphysique et la Science.\u201d     1858 \n   HAMILTON: \u201cLectures\u201d (1858-1860). 1859     RENOUVIER: \u201cDeuxi\u00e8me\nEssai de Critique generale.\u201d     I859     DARWIN: \u201cOrigin of Species.\u201d\n\n1860     FECHNER: \u201cElemente der Psychophysik.\u201d\n1861     COURNOT: \u201cTrait\u00e9 de l\u2019Encha\u00eenement des Idees.\u201d     1861    \nFECHNER: \u201cUber die Seelenfrage.\u201d\n\n1862     H\u00c4CKEL: \u201cGeneralle Morphologie\u201d (1862-1866).     1862    \nSPENCER: \u201cFirst Principles.\u201d 1863     RENAN: \u201cVie de J\u00e9sus.\u201d     1863  \n  VOGT: \u201cVorlesungen iiber den Menschen.\u201d     1863     MILL (J. S.):\n\u201cUtilitarianism.\u201d\n\nFECHNER: \u201cDie Drei Motive des Glaubens.\u201d\n1864     RENOUVIER: \u201cTroisi\u00e8me Essai de Critique g\u00e9n\u00e9rale\u201d; \u201cQuatri\u00e8me\nEssai de Critique g\u00e9n\u00e9rale.\u201d\n1865     BERNARD: \u201cIntroduction \u00e0 l\u2019Etude de la M\u00e9decine\nexp\u00e9rimentale.\u201d     1865     D\u00dcHRING: \u201cDer Wert des Lebens.\u201d     1865  \n  HODGSON: \u201cTime and Space.\u201d\n\nCZOLBE: \u201cDie Grenzen und der Ursprung der Menschlichen Erkenntnis.\u201d    \nMILL (J. S): \u201cExamination of Sir William Hamilton\u2019s Philosophy.\u201d\n\nHAMILTON: \u201cLectures on Metaphysics.\u201d STIRLING: \u201cSecret of Hegel.\u201d 1866 \n   LANGE: \u201cGeschichte des Materialismus.\u201d\n1867     RAVAISSON: \u201cRapport sur la Philosophie en France au XIXe\nSiecle.\u201d     1867     MARX: \u201cDas Kapital.\u201d     1867     BUCKLE:\n\u201cHistory of Civilization in England\u201d ( vol. ii.). 1868     RENAN:\n\u201cQuestions contemporaines.\u201d     1868     LOTZE: \u201cGeschichte der\nAsthetik in Deutschland.\u201d\n\nH\u00c4CKEL: \u201cNat\u00fcrliche Sch\u00f6pftungsgeschichte 1869     RENOUVIER: \u201cScience\ndeU Morale.\u201d     1869     HARTMANN: \u201cPhilosophic des Unbewussten.\u201d 1870\n    TAINE: \u201cDe l\u2019Intelligence.\u201d     1870     RITSCHL: \u201cLehre von der\nRechfertigung\u201d(1870-1874). 1871     LACHELIER: \u201cDu Fondement de\nl\u2019Induction.\u201d\n1872     FOUILL\u00c9E: \u201cLa LibertcS et la Determinisme,\u201d     1872    \nSTRAUSS: \u201cDer Alte und der neue Glaube.\u201d     1872     MAURICE: \u201cMoral\nand Metaphysical Philosophy.\u201d JANET: \u201cProblemes du XIXe Siecle.\u201d    \nNIETZSCHE: \u201cDie Geburt der Trag\u00f6die\u201d     WALLACE: \u201cLogic of Hegel.\u201d\nCOURNOT: \u201cConsiderations sur la Marche des Idees.\u201d\n1873     RIBOT: \u201cIWredite.\u201d 1873     1973     SIGWART: \u201cLogik\u201d\n(1873-1878). 1873     1973     STEPHEN (J. F.): \u201cLiberty,\nEquality,Fraternity.\u201d 1874     BOUTROUX: \u201cLa Contingence des Lois de la\nNature.\u201d     1874     LOTZE: \u201cDrei Bucher der Logik.\u201d     1874    \nSIDGWICK: \u201cMethod of Ethics.\u201d\n\nWUNDT: \u201cPhysiologische Psychologie.\u201d\nBRENTANO: \u201cPsychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt.\u201d 1875     COURNOT:\n\u201cMaterialisme, Vitalisme,Rationalisme.\u201d\nRENOUVIER: Revises first and second \u201cEssais.\u201d 1876     RENAN:\n\u201cDialogues et Fragments philosophiques.\u201d     1876     FECHNER:\n\u201cVorschule der Asthetik.\u201d     1876     BRADLEY: \u201cEthical Studies.\u201d\nJANET: \u201cLes Causes finales.\u201d\nGROTE: \u201cMoral Ideals.\u201d\n\n\n1877     FLINT: \u201cTheism.\u201d 1878     FOUILLEE: \u201cL\u2019Idee du Droit.\u201d    \n1878     NIETZSCHE: \u201cMenschliches Allzumenschhches \u201c(1878-1880).    \n1878     HODGSON: \u201cPhilosophy of Reflection.\u201d 1879     BROCHARD: \u201cDe\nl\u2019Erreur.\u201d     1879     LOTZE: \u201cDrei Bucher der Metaphysik.\u201d     1879  \n  SPENCER: \u201cData of Ethics.\u201d\n\nHARTMANN: \u201cPhanomenologie des sittlichen Bewusstseins.\u201d     BALFOUR:\n\u201cDefence of Philosophic Doubt.\u201d 1880     AVENARIUS: \u201cKritik der reinen\nErfahrung\u201d(1880-1890)     1880     CAIRD: \u201cPhilosophy ol Religion.\u201d\n1881     GUYAU: \u201cVers d\u2019un Philosophe.\u201d     1881     NIETZSCHE:\n\u201cMorgenrote.\u201d\n\n1882     NIETZSCHE: \u201cDie frohliche Wissenschaft.\u201d     1882     STEPHEN\n(L.): \u201cScience of Ethics.\u201d 1883     NIETZSCHE: \u201cAlso sprach\nZarathustra\u201d(1883-1891)     1883     GREEN: \u201cProlegomena to Ethics.\u201d\nDUHRING: \u201cDer Ersatz der Religion.\u201d     BRADLEY: \u201cPrinciples of Logic.\u201d\nWUNDT: \u201cLogik.\u201d\nMACH: \u201cDie Mechanik in ihrer Entwicklung.\u201d 1885     GUYAU: \u201cEsquisse\nd\u2019une Morale sans Obligation ni Sanction.\u201d\n1885     MARTINEAU: \u201cTypes o. Ethical Theory.\u201d LACHELIER: \u201cPsychologic\net M\u00e9taphysique.\u201d     BOSANQUET: \u201cKnowledge and Reality.\u201d 1886    \nGUYAU: \u201cL\u2019Irreligion de l\u2019Avenir.\u201d     1886     MACH: \u201cAnalyse der\nEmpfindungen.\u201d     1886     WARD: \u201cPsychology\u201d (article).\n\nWUNDT: \u201cEthik.\u201d\nNIETZSCHE: \u201cJenseits von Gut und B\u00f6se.\u201d 1887     NIETZSCHE: \u201cZur\nGenealogie der Moral.\u201d     1887     SETH (Pringle-Pattison):\n\u201cHegelianism and Personality.\u201d 1888     EUCKEN: \u201cDie Einheit des\nGeisteslebens.\u201d     1888     BOSANQUKT: \u201cLogic.\u201d 1889     BERGSON: \u201cLes\nDonnees immediates de la Conscience.\u201d     1889     WUNDT: \u201cSystem der\nPhilosophie.\u201d     1889     MARTINEAU: \u201cStudy of Religion.\u201d FOUILLEE:\n\u201cL\u2019Avenir de la Metaphysique.\u201d     LIPPS: \u201cGrundthatsachen des\nSeelenlebens.\u201d     ALEXANDER: \u201cMoral Order and Progress.\u201d JANET\n(Pierre): \u201cL\u2019Automatisme psychologique.\u201d\n\nPAULHAN: \u201cL\u2019Activit\u00e9 mentale.\u201d 1890     RENAN: \u201cL\u2019Avenir de la\nScience.\u201d     1890     JAMES: \u201cPrinciples of Psychology.\u201d FOUILL\u00c9E:\n\u201cL\u2019Evolutionnisme des Id\u00e9es-forces.\u201d\nRAUH: \u201cLe Fondement m\u00e9taphysique de la Morale\u201d\n\n1891     SIMMEL: \u201cMoralwissenschaft.\u201d AVENARIUS: \u201cDer menschliche\nWeltbegriff.\u201d 1892     RENOUVIER Revises third \u201cEssai.\u201d\n1892     PEARSON: \u201cGrammar Of Science.\u201d RENAN \u201cFeuilles d\u00e9tach\u00e9es.\u201d\n1893     DURKHEIM: \u201cDe la Division du Travail social.\u201d     1893    \nHUXLEY: \u201cEvolution and Ethics.\u201d BLONDEL: \u201cL\u2019Action.\u201d     CAIRD:\n\u201cEvolution of Religion\u201d FOUILL\u00c9E: \u201cPsychologie des Id\u00e9es-forces.\u201d    \nBRADLEY: \u201cAppearance and Reality.\u201d\n\n1894     MEINONG: \u201cWerththeorie\u201d (Psychologisch-ethische\nUntersuchungen).     1894     FRASER: \u201cPhilosophy of Theism\u201d HERTZ:\n\u201cPrinzipien der Mechanik.\u201d\n1895     FOUILL\u00c9E: \u201cLe Mouvement id\u00e9aliste.\u201d\n1895     BALFOUR: \u201cFoundations of Belief.\u201d 1896     BERGSON: \u201cMati\u00e8re\net M\u00e9moire\u201d     1896     EUCKEN: \u201cDer Kampf um einen geistigen\nLebensinhalt.\u201d     1896     STOUT: \u201cAnalytic Psychology.\u201d RENOUVIER:\nRevises fourth \u201cEssai.\u201d\nHOBHOUSE: \u201cTheory of Knowledge.\u201d RENOUVIER: Publishes fifth \u201cEssai\u201d (La\nPhilosophie analytique de l\u2019Histoire), vols. 1 and 2.     MERZ:\n\u201cHistory of Thought in the Nineteenth Century\u201d (1896-1914).\n\nMACTAGGART: \u201cHegelian Dialectic.\u201d 1897     RENOUVIER: Ditto, vols. 3\nand 4.     1897     HARTMANN: \u201cKategorienlehre.\u201d     1897     JAMES:\n\u201cThe Will to Believe SABATIER: \u201cEsquisse d\u2019une Philosophie de\nReligion.\u201d     DREWS: \u201cDas Ich als Grundproblem der Metaphysik.\u201d\n\nEHRENFELS: \u201cSystem der Werttheorie\u201d (1897-1898).\n\n1898     WALLACE: \u201cNatural Theology and Ethics.\u201d 1899     RENOUVIER\n(and Prat): \u201cLa Nouvelle Monadologie.\u201d     1899     MEINONG: \u201cUber\ngegenst\u00e4nde h\u00f6heren Ordnung.\u201d     1899     WARD: \u201cNaturalism and\nAgnosticism.\u201d\n\n\nBOSANQUET: \u201cPhilosophical Theory of the State.\u201d HODGSON: \u201cMetaphysic of\nExperience.\u201d 1900     TARDE: \u201cLes Lois de l\u2019Imitation.\u201d     1900    \nPETZOLDT: \u201cDie Philosophie der reinen Erfahrung.\u201d     1900     ROYCE:\n\u201cThe World and the Individual.\u201d BRUNSCHWICG: \u201cLa Vie de l\u2019Esprit.\u201d\n\n\n1901     EUCKEN: \u201cDas Wesen der Religion.\u201d EUCKEN: \u201cDas Wahrheitsgehalt\nder Religion.\u201d 1902     POINCAR\u00c9     1902     COHEN: \u201cSystem der\nPhilosophie: Logik.\u201d     1902     JAMES: \u201cVarieties of Religious\nExperience.\u201d\n\n\nCLIFFORD: \u201cEssays and Lectures.\u201d 1903     WEBER: \u201cVers le Positivisme\nabsolu par l\u2019Id\u00e9alisme.\u201d     1903     BERGMANN: \u201cSystem des objectiven\nIdealismus.\u201d     1903     RUSSELL: \u201cPrinciples of Mathematics.\u201d RAUH:\n\u201cL\u2019Exp\u00e9rience morale.\u201d\nSCHILLER: \u201cHumanism.\u201d RENOUVIER: \u201cLe Personnalisme.\u201d\n\n1904     COHEN: \u201cSystem der Philosophie: Ethik.\u201d     1904    \nMACTAGGART: \u201cHegelian Cosmology.\u201d 1905     POINCAR\u00c9: \u201cValeur de la\nScience.\u201d     1905     MACH: Erkenntnis und Irrtum.\u201d\n1906     OLL\u00c9-LAPRUNE: \u201cLa Raison et le Rationalisme.\u201d     1906    \nMEINONG: \u201cDie Stellung der Gegenstandtheorie ein System der\nWissenschaften.\u201d     1906     BAILLIE: \u201cIdealistic Construction of\nExperience.\u201d DUHEM: \u201cLa Th\u00e9orie physique.\u201d\nBALDWIN: \u201cThought and Things.\u201d 1907     HAMELIN: \u201cLes El\u00e9ments\nprincipaux de la R\u00e9presentation.\u201d     1907     EUCKEN: \u201cGrundlinien\neiner neuen Lebensauschauung.\u201d     1907     SCHILLER: \u201cStudies in\nHumanism.\u201d BERGSON: \u201cL\u2019Evolution cr\u00e9atrice.\u201d     EUCKEN: \u201cHauptprobleme\nder Religionsphilosophie.\u201d\nEVELLIN: \u201cLa Raison pure et les Antinomies.\u201d\nLALANDEL \u201cPr\u00e9cis de Morale.\u201d FOUILL\u00c9E: \u201cMorale des Id\u00e9es-forces.\u201d 1908 \n   BOUTROUX: \u201cScience et Religion.\u201d     1908     EUCKEN: \u201cSinn und\nWertdes Lebens.\u201d\n\nEUCKEN: \u201cPhilosophie des Geisteslebens.\u201d M\u00dcNSTERBERG: \u201cPhilosophie der\nWerte.\u201d 1909     POINCAR\u00c9: \u201cScience et M\u00e9thode.\u201d\n1909     DEWEY: \u201cLogical Theory.\u201d\n\n1910     REMKHE: \u201cPhilosophie als Grundwissenschaft\u201d\n1911     DUNAN: \u201cLes Deux Id\u00e9alismes.\u201d     1911     EUCKEN: \u201cKonnen wir\nnoch Christen sein?\u201d     1911     WARD: \u201cRealm of Ends.\u201d 1912    \nFOUILL\u00c9E: \u201cLa Pens\u00e9e.\u201d     1912     COHEN: \u201cSystem der Philosophie:\n\u00c6sthetik.\u201d     1912     BOSANQUET: \u201cValue and Destiny of the\nIndividual\u201d DURKHEIM: \u201cFormes \u00e9l\u00e9mentaires de la Vie religieuse.\u201d    \nEUCKEN: \u201cErkennen und Leben.\u201d\n\n\n1913     BOSANQUET: \u201cValue and Destiny of the Individual.\u201d 1914    \nFOUILL\u00c9E: \u201cHumanitaires et Libertaires.\u201d\n\n1915     SORLEY: \u201cMoral Values and the Idea of God.\u201d 1917     LOISY:\n\u201cLa Religion.\u201d\n1918     GOBLOT: \u201cTrait\u00e9 de Logique.\u201d 1919     BERGSON: \u201cL\u2019Energie\nspirituelle.\u201d\n\n1920     ALEXANDER: \u201cSpace, Time and Deity.\u201d 1921     RUSSELL:\n\u201cAnalysis of Mind.\u201d MACTAGGART: \u201cNature of Existence.\u201d","title":"Modern French Philosophy: a Study of the Development Since Comte","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":104472}