{"collection":"scripture-revelation","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_5273/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_5273","id":"gutenberg_5273","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/5273","summary":null,"tags":["Biology","Category: Essays, Letters & Speeches","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Religion/Spirituality","Category: Science - Biology","Darwin, Charles, 1809-1882","Evolution (Biology)","Natural selection"],"text":"DARWINIANA\n\nESSAYS AND REVIEWS PERTAINING\nTO DARWINISM\n\nBY\nASA GRAY\nFISHER PROFESSOR OF NATURAL HISTORY (BOTANY) IN\nHARVARD UNIVERSITY\n\nNEW YORK:\n1876.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\nDARWINIANA\n\n\nPREFACE\n\nARTICLE I\n\nTHE ORIGIN OF SPECIES BY\nMEANS OF NATURAL SELECTION\n\nViews and Definitions of Species--How Darwin's differs from that of Agassiz,\nand from the Common View--Variation, its Causes unknown.--Darwin's\nGenealogical Tree--Darwin and Agassiz agree in the Capital\nFacts--Embryology--Physical Connection of Species compatible with\nIntellectual Connection--How to prove Transmutation.--Known Extent of\nVariation--Cause of Likeness unknown--Artificial\nSelection.--Reversion--Interbreeding--Natural Selection.--Classification\ntentative.--What Darwin assumes.--Argument stated.--How Natural Selection\nworks.--Where the Argument is weakest.--Objections--Morphology and\nTeleology harmonized.--Theory not atheistical.--Conceivable Modes of\nRelation of God to Nature\n\n\nARTICLE II\n\nDESIGN VERSUS NECESSITY--\nA DISCUSSION\n\nHow Design in Nature can be shown--Design not inconsistent with Indirect\nAttainment\n\n\nARTICLE III\n\nNATURAL SELECTION NOT INCONSISTENT\nWITH NATURAL THEOLOGY\n\nPART I.--Premonitions of Darwinism.--A Proper Subject for\nSpeculation.--Summary of Facts and Ideas suggestive of Hypotheses of\nDerivation\n\nPart II--Limitations of Theory conceded by Darwin.--What Darwinism\nexplains.--Geological Argument strong in the Tertiary Period.--\nCorrespondence between Rank and Geological Succession--Difficulties in\nClassification.--Nature of Affinity.--No Absolute Distinction between\nVegetable and Animal Kingdoms.--Individuality.--Gradation\n\nPART III.--Theories contrasted.--Early Arguments against\nDarwinism.--Philosophical and Theological Objections--Theory may be\ntheistic.--Final Cause not excluded.--Cause of Variation unknown.--Three\nViews of Efficient Cause compatible with Theism.--Agassiz's Objections of a\nPhilosophical Nature.--Minor Objections.--Conclusion\n\n\nARTICLE IV\n\nSPECIES AS TO VARIATION,\nGEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION,\nAND SUCCESSION\n\nAlphonse De Candolle's Study of the Oak Genus.--Variability of the\nSpecies.--Antiquity.--A Common Origin probable.--Dr. Falconer on the Common\nOrigin of Elephants--Variation and Natural Selection\ndistinguished.--Saporta on the Gradation between the Vegetable Forms of the\nCretaceous and the Tertiary.--Hypothesis of Derivation more likely to be\nfavored by Botanists than by Zoologists.--Views of Agassiz respecting the\nOrigin, Dispersion, Variation, Characteristics, and Successive Creation of\nSpecies contrasted with those of De Candolle and others--Definition of\nSpecies--Whether its Essence is in the Likeness\nor in the Genealogical Connection of the Individuals composing a Species\n\n\nARTICLE V\n\nSEQUOIA AND ITS HISTORY:\nTHE RELATIONS OF NORTH AMERICAN\nTO NORTHEAST ASIAN AND TO\nTERTIARY VEGETATION\n\nAge and Size of Sequoia.--Isolation.--Decadence.--Related Genera.-- Former\nDistribution.--Similarity between the Flora of Japan and that of the United\nStates, especially on the Atlantic Side.--Former Glaciation as explaining\nthe Present Dispersion of Species.--This confirmed by the Arctic Fossil\nFlora of the Tertiary Period.--Tertiary Flora derived from the Preceding\nCretaceous.--Order and Adaptation in Organic Nature likened to a\nFlow.--Order implies an Ordainer\n\n\nARTICLE VI\n\nTHE ATTITUDE OF WORKING\nNATURALISTS TOWARD DARWINISM\n\nGeneral Tendency to Acceptance of the Derivative Hypothesis noted.--Lyell,\nOwen, Alphonse De Candolle, Bentham, Flower, Ailman.-- Dr. Dawson's \"Story\nof the Earth and Man\" examined.--Difference between Scientific Men and\nGeneral Speculators or Amateurs in the\nUse of Hypotheses\n\n\nARTICLE VII\n\nEVOLUTION AND THEOLOGY\n\nWritings of Henslow, Hodges, and Le Conte examined.--Evolution and Design\ncompatible.--The Admission of a System of Nature, with Fixed Laws, concedes\nin Principle all that the Doctrine of Evolution requires.--Hypotheses,\nProbabilities, and Surmises, not to be decried by Theologians, who use\nthem, perhaps, more freely and loosely than Naturalists.--Theologians risk\ntoo much in the Defense of Untenable Outposts\n\n\nARTICLE VIII\n\n\"WHAT IS DARWINISM?\"\n\nDr. Hodges Book with this Title criticised.--He declares that Darwinism is\nAtheism, yet its Founder a Theist.--Darwinism founded, however, upon\nOrthodox Conceptions, and opposed, not to Theism, but only to Intervention\nin Nature, while the Key-note of Dr. Hedge's System is Interference.--Views\nand Writings of St. Clair, Winchell, and Kingsley adverted to\n\n\nARTICLE IX\n\nCHARLES DARWIN:\nSKETCH ACCOMPANYING A PORTRAIT IN \"NATURE\"\n\nDarwin's Characteristics and Work as a Naturalist compared with those of\nRobert Brown.--His Illustration of the Principle that \"Nature abhors Close\nFertilization. \"--His Impression upon Natural History exceeded only by\nLinnaeus.--His Service in restoring Teleology to Natural History\n\n\nARTICLE X\n\nINSECTIVOROUS PLANTS\n\nClassification marks Distinctions where Nature exhibits Gradations.--\nRecovery of Forgotten Knowledge and History of what was known of Dionzea,\nDrosera, and Sarracenia.\n\n\nARTICLE XI\n\nINSECTIVOROUS AND CLIMBING PLANTS\n\nReview of Darwin's Two Works upon these Subjects--No Absolute Marks for\ndistinguishing between Vegetables and Animals.--New observations upon the\nSundews or Droseras.--Their Sensitiveness, Movements, Discernment of the\nPresence and Appropriation of Animal Matter.--Dionaea, and other Plants of\nthe same Order.--Utricularia and Pinguicula.--Sarracenia and\nNepenthes.--Climbing Plants; the Climbing effected through Sensitiveness or\nResponse to External Impression and Automatic Movement.--Capacities\ninherent in Plants generally, and apparently of no Service to them,\ndeveloped and utilized by those which climb.--Natural Selection not a\nComplete Explanation\n\n\nARTICLE XII\n\nDURATION AND ORIGINATION OF\nRACE AND SPECIES\n\nPART I.--Do Varieties in Plants wear out, or tend to wear out?--The Question\nconsidered in the Light of Facts, and in that of the Darwinian\nTheory.--Conclusion that Races sexually propagated need not die of Old\nAge.--This Conclusion inferred from the Provisions and Arrangements in\nNature to secure Cross-Fertilization of Individuals.-- Reference to Mr.\nDarwin's Development of this View\n\nPART II.--Do Species wear out, and, if not, why not?--Implication of the\nDarwinian Theory that Species are unlimited in Existence.--Examination of\nan Opposite Doctrine maintained by Naudin.--Evidence that Species may die\nout from Inherent Causes only indirect and inferential from Arrangements to\nsecure Wide Breeding--Physiological Import of Sexes--Doubtful whether\nSexual Reproduction with Wide Breeding is a Preventive or only a Palliative\nof Decrepitude in Species.-- Darwinian Hypothesis must suppose the Former\n\n\nARTICLE XIII\n\nEVOLUTIONARY TELEOLOGY\n\nThe Opposition between Morphology and Teleology reconciled by Darwinism, and\nthe Latter reinstated--Character of the New Teleology.--Purpose and Design\ndistinguished--Man has no Monopoly of the Latter.--Inference of Design from\nAdaptation and Utility legitimate; also in Hume's Opinion irresistible--The\nPrinciple of Design, taken with Specific Creation, totally insufficient and\nlargely inapplicable; but, taken with the Doctrine of the Evolution of\nSpecies in Nature, applicable, pertinent, and, moreover,\nnecessary.--Illustrations from Abortive Organs, supposed Waste of Being,\netc.--All Nature being of a Piece, Design must either pervade or be absent\nfrom the Whole.--Its Absence not to be inferred because the Events take\nplace in Nature--Illustration of the Nature and Province of Natural\nSelection.--It picks out, but does not originate Variations; these not a\nProduct of, but a Response to, the Environment; not physical, but\nphysiological--Adaptations in Nature not explained by Natural Selection\napart from Design or Final Cause--Absurdity of associating Design only with\nMiracle--What is meant by Nature.--The Tradition of the DIVINE in Nature,\ntestified to by Aristotle, comes down to our Day with Undiminished Value\n\n\n\nPREFACE\n\nThese papers are now collected at the request of friends and correspondents,\nwho think that they may be useful; and two new essays are added. Most of\nthe articles were written as occasion called for them within the past\nsixteen years, and contributed to various periodicals, with little thought\nof their forming a series, and none of ever bringing them together into a\nvolume, although one of them (the third) was once reprinted in a pamphlet\nform. It is, therefore, inevitable that there should be considerable\niteration in the argument, if not in the language. This could not be\neliminated except by recasting the whole, which was neither practicable nor\nreally desirable. It is better that they should record, as they do, the\nwriter's freely-expressed thoughts upon the subject at the time; and to\nmany readers there may be some advantage in going more than once, in\ndifferent directions, over the same ground. If these essays were to be\nwritten now, some things might be differently expressed or qualified, but\nprobably not so as to affect materially any important point. Accordingly,\nthey are here reprinted unchanged, except by a few merely verbal\nalterations made in proof-reading, and the striking out of one or two\nsuperfluous or immaterial passages. A very few additional notes or\nreferences are appended.\n\nTo the last article but one a second part is now added, and the more\nelaborate Article XIII is wholly new.\n\nIf it be objected that some of these pages are written in a lightness of\nvein not quite congruous with the gravity of the subject and the\nseriousness of its issues, the excuse must be that they were written with\nperfect freedom, most of them as anonymous contributions to popular\njournals, and that an argument may not be the less sound or an exposition\nless effective for being playful. Some of the essays, however, dealing with\npoints of speculative scientific interest, may redress the balance, and be\nthought sufficiently heavy if not solid.\n\nTo the objection likely to be made, that they cover only a part of the\nground, it can only be replied that they do not pretend to be systematic or\ncomplete. They are all essays relating in some way or other to the subject\nwhich has been, during these years, of paramount interest to naturalists,\nand not much less so to most thinking people. The first appeared between\nsixteen and seventeen years ago, immediately after the publication of\nDarwin's \"Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection,\" as a review of\nthat volume, which, it was then foreseen, was to initiate a revolution in\ngeneral scientific opinion. Long before our last article was written, it\ncould be affirmed that the general doctrine of the derivation of species\n(to put it comprehensively) has prevailed over that of specific creation,\nat least to the extent of being the received and presumably in some sense\ntrue conception. Far from undertaking any general discussion of evolution,\nseveral even of Mr. Darwin's writings have not been noticed, and topics\nwhich have been much discussed elsewhere are not here adverted to. This\napplies especially to what may be called deductive evolution--a subject\nwhich lay beyond the writer's immediate scope, and to which neither the\nbent of his mind nor the line of his studies has fitted him to do justice.\nIf these papers are useful at all, it will be as showing how these new views\nof our day are regarded by a practical naturalist, versed in one department\nonly (viz., Botany), most interested in their bearings upon its special\nproblems, one accustomed to direct and close dealings with the facts in\nhand, and disposed to rise from them only to the consideration of those\ngeneral questions upon which they throw or from which they receive\nillustration.\n\nThen as to the natural theological questions which (owing to circumstances\nneedless now to be recalled or explained) are here throughout brought into\nwhat most naturalists, and some other readers, may deem undue prominence,\nthere are many who may be interested to know how these increasingly\nprevalent views and their tendencies are regarded by one who is\nscientifically, and in his own fashion, a Darwinian, philosophically a\nconvinced theist, and religiously an acceptor of the \"creed commonly called\nthe Nicene,\" as the exponent of the Christian faith.\n\"Truth emerges sooner from error than from confusion,\" says Bacon; and\nclearer views than commonly prevail upon the points at issue regarding\n\"religion and science\" are still sufficiently needed to justify these\nendeavors.\n\nBOTANIC GARDEN, CAMBRIDGE, MASS., June, 1876.\n\n______________________________________\n\n\n\nI\n\nTHE ORIGIN OF SPECIES BY MEANS OF\n\nNATURAL SELECTION [I-1]\n\n(American Journal of Science and Arts, March, 1860)\n\n\n\nThis book is already exciting much attention. Two American editions are\nannounced, through which it will become familiar to many of our readers,\nbefore these pages are issued. An abstract of the argument--for \"the whole\nvolume is one long argument,\" as the author states--is unnecessary in such\na case; and it would be difficult to give by detached extracts. For the\nvolume itself is an abstract, a prodromus of a detailed work upon which the\nauthor has been laboring for twenty years, and which \"will take two or\nthree more years to complete.\" It is exceedingly compact; and although\nuseful summaries are appended to the several chapters, and a general\nrecapitulation contains the essence of the whole, yet much of the aroma\nescapes in the treble distillation, or is so concentrated that the flavor\nis lost to the general or even to the scientific reader. The volume\nitself--the proof-spirit--is just condensed enough for its purpose. It will\nbe far more widely read, and perhaps will make deeper impression, than the\nelaborate work might have done, with all its full details of the facts upon\nwhich the author's sweeping conclusions have been grounded. At least it is\na more readable book: but all the facts that can be mustered in favor of\nthe theory are still likely to be needed.\n\nWho, upon a single perusal, shall pass judgment upon a work like this, to\nwhich twenty of the best years of the life of a most able naturalist have\nbeen devoted? And who among those naturalists who hold a position that\nentitles them to pronounce summarily upon the subject, can be expected to\ndivest himself for the nonce of the influence of received and favorite\nsystems? In fact, the controversy now opened is not likely to be settled in\nan off-hand way, nor is it desirable that it should be. A spirited conflict\namong opinions of every grade must ensue, which--to borrow an illustration\nfrom the doctrine of the book before us--may be likened to the conflict in\nNature among races in the struggle for life, which Mr. Darwin describes;\nthrough which the views most favored by facts will be developed and tested\nby \"Natural Selection,\" the weaker ones be destroyed in the process, and\nthe strongest in the long-run alone survive.\n\nThe duty of reviewing this volume in the American Journal of Science would\nnaturally devolve upon the principal editor,' whose wide observation and\nprofound knowledge of various departments of natural history, as well as of\ngeology, particularly qualify him for the task. But he has been obliged to\nlay aside his pen, and to seek in distant lands the entire repose from\nscientific labor so essential to the restoration of his health--a\nconsummation devoutly to be wished, and confidently to be expected.\nInterested as Mr. Dana would be in this volume, he could not be expected to\naccept this doctrine.\n\nViews so idealistic as those upon which his \"Thoughts upon Species\" [I-2]\nare grounded, will not harmonize readily with a doctrine so thoroughly\nnaturalistic as that of Mr. Darwin. Though it is just possible that one who\nregards the kinds of elementary matter, such as oxygen and hydrogen, and\nthe definite compounds of these elementary matters, and their compounds\nagain, in the mineral kingdom, as constituting species, in the same sense,\nfundamentally, as that of animal and vegetable species, might admit an\nevolution of one species from another in the latter as well as the former\ncase.\n\nBetween the doctrines of this volume and those of the other great\nnaturalist whose name adorns the title-page of this journal, the widest\ndivergence appears. It is interesting to contrast the two, and, indeed, is\nnecessary to our purpose; for this contrast brings out most prominently,\nand sets in strongest light and shade, the main features of the theory of\nthe origination of species by means of Natural Selection.\n\nThe ordinary and generally-received view assumes the independent, specific\ncreation of each kind of plant and animal in a primitive stock, which\nreproduces its like from generation to generation, and so continues the\nspecies. Taking the idea of species from this perennial succession of\nessentially similar individuals, the chain is logically traceable back to a\nlocal origin in a single stock, a single pair, or a single individual, from\nwhich all the individuals composing the species have proceeded by natural\ngeneration. Although the similarity of progeny to parent is fundamental in\nthe conception of species, yet the likeness is by no means absolute; all\nspecies vary more or less, and some vary remarkably--partly from the\ninfluence of altered circumstances, and partly (and more really) from\nunknown constitutional causes which altered conditions favor rather than\noriginate. But these variations are supposed to be mere oscillations from a\nnormal state, and in Nature to be limited if not transitory; so that the\nprimordial differences between species and species at their beginning have\nnot been effaced, nor largely obscured, by blending through variation.\nConsequently, whenever two reputed species are found to blend in Nature\nthrough a series of intermediate forms, community of origin is inferred,\nand all the forms, however diverse, are held to belong to one species.\nMoreover, since bisexuality is the rule in Nature (which is practically\ncarried out, in the long-run, far more generally than has been suspected),\nand the heritable qualities of two distinct individuals are mingled in the\noffspring, it is supposed that the general sterility of hybrid progeny\ninterposes an effectual barrier against the blending of the original\nspecies by crossing.\n\nFrom this generally-accepted view the well-known theory of Agassiz and the\nrecent one of Darwin diverge in exactly opposite directions.\n\nThat of Agassiz differs fundamentally from the ordinary view only in this,\nthat it discards the idea of a common descent as the real bond of union\namong the individuals of a species, and also the idea of a local\norigin--supposing, instead, that each species originated simultaneously,\ngenerally speaking, over the whole geographical area it now occupies or has\noccupied, and in perhaps as many individuals as it numbered at any\nsubsequent period.\n\nMr. Darwin, on the other hand, holds the orthodox view of the descent of\nall the individuals of a species not only from a local birthplace, but from\na single ancestor or pair; and that each species has extended and\nestablished itself, through natural agencies, wherever it could; so that\nthe actual geographical distribution of any species is by no means a\nprimordial arrangement, but a natural result. He goes farther, and this\nvolume is a protracted argument intended to prove that the species we\nrecognize have not been independently created, as such, but have descended,\nlike varieties, from other species. Varieties, on this view, are incipient\nor possible species: species are varieties of a larger growth and a wider\nand earlier divergence from the parent stock; the difference is one of\ndegree, not of kind.\n\nThe ordinary view--rendering unto Caesar the things that are\nCaesar's--looks to natural agencies for the actual distribution and\nperpetuation of species, to a supernatural for their origin.\n\nThe theory of Agassiz regards the origin of species and their present\ngeneral distribution over the world as equally primordial, equally\nsupernatural; that of Darwin, as equally derivative, equally natural.\n\nThe theory of Agassiz, referring as it does the phenomena both of origin\nand distribution directly to the Divine will--thus removing the latter with\nthe former out of the domain of inductive science (in which efficient cause\nis not the first, but the last word)--may be said to be theistic to excess.\nThe contrasted theory is not open to this objection. Studying the facts and\nphenomena in reference to proximate causes, and endeavoring to trace back\nthe series of cause and effect as far as possible, Darwin's aim and\nprocesses are strictly scientific, and his endeavor, whether successful or\nfutile, must be regarded as a legitimate attempt to extend the domain of\nnatural or physical science. For, though it well may be that \"organic forms\nhave no physical or secondary cause,\" yet this can be proved only\nindirectly, by the failure of every attempt to refer the phenomena in\nquestion to causal laws. But, however originated, and whatever be thought\nof Mr. Darwin's arduous undertaking in this respect, it is certain that\nplants and animals are subject from their birth to physical influences, to\nwhich they have to accommodate themselves as they can. How literally they\nare \"born to trouble,\" and how incessant and severe the struggle for life\ngenerally is, the present volume graphically describes. Few will deny that\nsuch influences must have gravely affected the range and the association of\nindividuals and species on the earth's surface. Mr. Darwin thinks that,\nacting upon an inherent predisposition to vary, they have sufficed even to\nmodify the species themselves and produce the present diversity. Mr.\nAgassiz believes that they have not even affected the geographical range\nand the actual association of species, still less their forms; but that\nevery adaptation of species to climate, and of species to species, is as\naboriginal, and therefore as inexplicable, as are the organic forms\nthemselves.\n\nWho shall decide between such extreme views so ably maintained on either\nhand, and say how much of truth there may be in each? The present reviewer\nhas not the presumption to undertake such a task. Having no prepossession\nin favor of naturalistic theories, but struck with the eminent ability of\nMr. Darwin's work, and charmed with its fairness, our humbler duty will be\nperformed if, laying aside prejudice as much as we can, we shall succeed in\ngiving a fair account of its method and argument, offering by the way a few\nsuggestions, such as might occur to any naturalist of an inquiring mind. An\neditorial character for this article must in justice be disclaimed. The\nplural pronoun is employed not to give editorial weight, but to avoid even\nthe appearance of egotism, and also the circumlocution which attends a\nrigorous adherence to the impersonal style.\n\nWe have contrasted these two extremely divergent theories, in their broad\nstatements. It must not be inferred that they have no points nor ultimate\nresults in common.\n\nIn the first place, they practically agree in upsetting, each in its own\nway, the generally-received definition of species, and in sweeping away the\nground of their objective existence in Nature. The orthodox conception of\nspecies is that of lineal descent: all the descendants of a common parent,\nand no other, constitute a species; they have a certain identity because of\ntheir descent, by which they are supposed to be recognizable. So\nnaturalists had a distinct idea of what they meant by the term species, and\na practical rule, which was hardly the less useful because difficult to\napply in many cases, and because its application was indirect: that is, the\ncommunity of origin had to be inferred from the likeness; such degree of\nsimilarity, and such only, being held to be con-specific as could be shown\nor reasonably inferred to be compatible with a common origin. And the usual\nconcurrence of the whole body of naturalists (having the same data before\nthem) as to what forms are species attests the value of the rule, and also\nindicates some real foundation for it in Nature. But if species were created\nin numberless individuals over broad spaces of territory, these individuals\nare connected only in idea, and species differ from varieties on the one\nhand, and from genera, tribes, etc., on the other, only in degree; and no\nobvious natural reason remains for fixing upon this or that degree as\nspecific, at least no natural standard, by which the opinions of different\nnaturalists may be correlated. Species upon this view are enduring, but\nsubjective and ideal. Any three or more of the human races, for example, are\nspecies or not species, according to the bent of the naturalist's mind.\nDarwin's theory brings us the other way to the same result. In his view,\nnot only all the individuals of a species are descendants of a common\nparent, but of all the related species also. Affinity, relationship, all\nthe terms which naturalists use figuratively to express an underived,\nunexplained resemblance among species, have a literal meaning upon Darwin's\nsystem, which they little suspected, namely, that of inheritance. Varieties\nare the latest offshoots of the genealogical tree in \"an unlineal\" order;\nspecies, those of an earlier date, but of no definite distinction; genera,\nmore ancient species, and so on. The human races, upon this view, likewise\nmay or may not be species according to the notions of each naturalist as to\nwhat differences are specific; but, if not species already, those races that\nlast long enough are sure to become so. It is only a question of time.\n\nHow well the simile of a genealogical tree illustrates the main ideas of\nDarwin's theory the following extract from the summary of the fourth\nchapter shows:\n\n\"It is a truly wonderful fact--the wonder of which we are apt to overlook\nfrom familiarity--that all animals and all plants throughout all time and\nspace should be related to each other in group subordinate to group, in the\nmanner which we everywhere behold--namely, varieties of the same species\nmost closely related together, species of the same genus less closely and\nunequally related together, forming sections and sub-genera, species of\ndistinct genera much less closely related, and genera related in different\ndegrees, forming sub-families, families, orders, sub-classes, and classes.\nThe several subordinate groups in any class cannot be ranked in a single\nfile, but seem rather to be clustered round points, and these round other\npoints, and so on in almost endless cycles. On the view that each species\nhas been independently created, I can see no explanation of this great fact\nin the classification of all organic beings; but, to the best of my\njudgment, it is explained through inheritance and the complex action of\nnatural selection, entailing extinction and divergence of character, as we\nhave seen illustrated in the diagram.\n\n\"The affinities of all the beings of the same class have sometimes been\nrepresented by a great tree. I believe this simile largely speaks the truth.\nThe green and budding twigs may represent existing species; and those\nproduced during each former year may represent the long succession of\nextinct species. At each period of growth all the growing twigs have tried\nto branch out on all sides, and overtop and kill the surrounding twigs and\nbranches, in the same manner as species and groups of species have tried to\novermaster other species in the great battle for life. The limbs divided\ninto great branches, and these into lesser and lesser branches, were\nthemselves once, when the tree was small, budding twigs; and this\nconnection of the former and present buds by ramifying branches may well\nrepresent the classification of all extinct and living species in groups\nsubordinate to groups. Of the many twigs which flourished when the tree was\na mere bush, only two or three, now grown into great branches, yet survive\nand bear all the other branches; so with the species which lived during\nlong-past geological periods, very few now have living and modified\ndescendants. From the first growth of the tree, many a limb and branch has\ndecayed and dropped off; and these lost branches of various sizes may\nrepresent those whole orders, families, and genera, which have now no\nliving representatives, and which are known to us only from having been\nfound in a fossil state. As we here and there see a thin, straggling branch\nspringing from a fork low down in a tree, and which by some chance has been\nfavored and is still alive on its summit, so we occasionally see an animal\nlike the Ornithorhynchus or Lepidosiren, which in some small degree\nconnects by its affinities two large branches of life, and which has\napparently been saved from fatal competition by having inhabited a protected\nstation. As buds give rise by growth to fresh buds, and these, if vigorous,\nbranch out and overtop on all sides many a feebler branch, so by generation\nI believe it has been with the great Tree of Life, which fills with its\ndead and broken branches the crust of the earth, and covers the surface\nwith its ever-branching and beautiful ramification.\"\n\n\nIt may also be noted that there is a significant correspondence between the\nrival theories as to the main facts employed. Apparently every capital fact\nin the one view is a capital fact in the other. The difference is in the\ninterpretation. To run the parallel ready made to our hands: [I-4]\n\n\n\"The simultaneous existence of the most diversified types under identical\ncircumstances . . . the repetition of similar types under the most\ndiversified circumstances . . . the unity of plan in otherwise\nhighly-diversified types of animals . . . the correspondence, now generally\nknown as special homologies, in the details of structure otherwise entirely\ndisconnected, down to the most minute peculiarities . . . the various\ndegrees and different kinds of relationship among animals which (apparently)\ncan have no genealogical connection . . . the simultaneous existence in the\nearliest geological periods, . . . of representatives of all the great\ntypes of the animal kingdom . . . the gradation based upon complications of\nstructure which may be traced among animals built upon the same plan; the\ndistribution of some types over the most extensive range of surface of the\nglobe, while others are limited to particular geographical areas . . . the\nidentity of structures of these types, notwithstanding their wide\ngeographical distribution . . . the community of structure in certain\nrespects of animals otherwise entirely different, but living within the\nsame geographical area . . . the connection by series of special structures\nobserved in animals widely scattered over the surface of the globe . . .\nthe definite relations in which animals stand to the surrounding world, . .\n. the relations in which individuals of the same species stand to one\nanother . . . the limitation of the range of changes which animals undergo\nduring their growth . . . the return to a definite norm of animals which\nmultiply in various ways . . . the order of succession of the different\ntypes of animals and plants characteristic of the different geological\nepochs, . . . the localization of some types of animals upon the same points\nof the surface of the globe during several successive geological periods . .\n. the parallelism between the order of succession of animals and plants in\ngeological times, and the gradation among their living representatives . .\n. the parallelism between the order of succession of animals in geological\ntimes and the changes their living representatives undergo during their\nembryological growth, [I-5] . . . the combination in many extinct types of\ncharacters which in later ages appear disconnected in different types, . .\n. the parallelism between the gradation among animals and the changes they\nundergo during their growth, . . . the relations existing between these\ndifferent series and the geographical distribution of animals, . . . the\nconnection of all the known features of Nature into one system--\"\n\n\nIn a word, the whole relations of animals, etc., to surrounding Nature and\nto each other, are regarded under the one view as ultimate facts, or in the\nultimate aspect, and interpreted theologically; under the other as complex\nfacts, to be analyzed and interpreted scientifically. The one naturalist,\nperhaps too largely assuming the scientifically unexplained to be\ninexplicable, views the phenomena only in their supposed relation to the\nDivine mind. The other, naturally expecting many of these phenomena to be\nresolvable under investigation, views them in their relations to one\nanother, and endeavors to explain them as far as he can (and perhaps\nfarther) through natural causes.\n\nBut does the one really exclude the other? Does the investigation of\nphysical causes stand opposed to the theological view and the study of the\nharmonies between mind and Nature? More than this, is it not most\npresumable that an intellectual conception realized in Nature would be\nrealized through natural agencies? Mr. Agassiz answers these questions\naffirmatively when he declares that \"the task of science is to investigate\nwhat has been done, to inquire if possible how it has been done, rather\nthan to ask what is possible for the Deity, since we can know that only by\nwhat actually exists;\" and also when he extends the argument for the\nintervention in Nature of a creative mind to its legitimate application in\nthe inorganic world; which, he remarks, \"considered in the same light,\nwould not fail also to exhibit unexpected evidence of thought, in the\ncharacter of the laws regulating the chemical combinations, the action of\nphysical forces, etc., etc.\" [I-6] Mr. Agassiz, however, pronounces that\n\"the connection between the facts is only intellectual\"--an opinion which\nthe analogy of the inorganic world, just referred to, does not confirm, for\nthere a material connection between the facts is justly held to be\nconsistent with an intellectual--and which the most analogous cases we can\nthink of in the organic world do not favor; for there is a material\nconnection between the grub, the pupa, and the butterfly, between the\ntadpole and the frog, or, still better, between those distinct animals\nwhich succeed each other in alternate and very dissimilar generations. So\nthat mere analogy might rather suggest a natural connection than the\ncontrary; and the contrary cannot be demonstrated until the possibilities of\nNature under the Deity are fathomed.\n\nBut, the intellectual connection being undoubted, Mr. Agassiz properly\nrefers the whole to \"the agency of Intellect as its first cause.\" In doing\nso, however, he is not supposed to be offering a scientific explanation of\nthe phenomena. Evidently he is considering only the ultimate why, not the\nproximate why or how.\n\nNow the latter is just what Mr. Darwin is considering. He conceives of a\nphysical connection between allied species; but we suppose he does not deny\ntheir intellectual connection, as related to a supreme intelligence.\nCertainly we see no reason why he should, and many reasons why he should\nnot, Indeed, as we contemplate the actual direction of investigation and\nspeculation in the physical and natural sciences, we dimly apprehend a\nprobable synthesis of these divergent theories, and in it the ground for a\nstrong stand against mere naturalism. Even if the doctrine of the origin of\nspecies through natural selection should prevail in our day, we shall not\ndespair; being confident that the genius of an Agassiz will be found equal\nto the work of constructing, upon the mental and material foundations\ncombined, a theory of Nature as theistic and as scientific as that which he\nhas so eloquently expounded.\n\nTo conceive the possibility of \"the descent of species from species by\ninsensibly fine gradations\" during a long course of time, and to\ndemonstrate its compatibility with a strictly theistic view of the\nuniverse, is one thing; to substantiate the theory itself or show its\nlikelihood is quite another thing. This brings us to consider what Darwin's\ntheory actually is, and how he supports it.\n\nThat the existing kinds of animals and plants, or many of them, may be\nderived from other and earlier kinds, in the lapse of time, is by no means\na novel proposition. Not to speak of ancient speculations of the sort, it\nis the well-known Lamarckian theory. The first difficulty which such\ntheories meet with is that in the present age, with all its own and its\ninherited prejudgments, the whole burden of proof is naturally, and indeed\nproperly, laid upon the shoulders of the propounders; and thus far the\nburden has been more than they could bear. From the very nature of the\ncase, substantive proof of specific creation is not attainable; but that of\nderivation or transmutation of species may be. He who affirms the latter\nview is bound to do one or both of two things: 1. Either to assign real and\nadequate causes, the natural or necessary result of which must be to\nproduce the present diversity of species and their actual relations; or, 2.\nTo show the general conformity of the whole body of facts to such\nassumption, and also to adduce instances explicable by it and inexplicable\nby the received view, so perhaps winning our assent to the doctrine,\nthrough its competency to harmonize all the facts, even though the cause of\nthe assumed variation remain as occult as that of the transformation of\ntadpoles into frogs, or that of Coryne into Sarzia.\n\nThe first line of proof, successfully carried out, would establish\nderivation as a true physical theory; the second, as a sufficient\nhypothesis.\n\nLamarck mainly undertook the first line, in a theory which has been so\nassailed by ridicule that it rarely receives the credit for ability to\nwhich in its day it was entitled, But he assigned partly unreal, partly\ninsufficient causes; and the attempt to account for a progressive change in\nspecies through the direct influence of physical agencies, and through the\nappetencies and habits of animals reacting upon their structure, thus\ncausing the production and the successive modification of organs, is a\nconceded and total failure. The shadowy author of the \"Vestiges of the\nNatural History of Creation\" can hardly be said to have undertaken either\nline, in a scientific way. He would explain the whole progressive evolution\nof Nature by virtue of an inherent tendency to development, thus giving us\nan idea or a word in place of a natural cause, a restatement of the\nproposition instead of an explanation. Mr. Darwin attempts both lines of\nproof, and in a strictly scientific spirit; but the stress falls mainly upon\nthe first, for, as he does assign real causes, he is bound to prove their\nadequacy.\n\nIt should be kept in mind that, while all direct proof of independent\norigination is attainable from the nature of the case, the overthrow of\nparticular schemes of derivation has not established the opposite\nproposition. The futility of each hypothesis thus far proposed to account\nfor derivation may be made apparent, or unanswerable objections may be\nurged against it; and each victory of the kind may render derivation more\nimprobable, and therefore specific creation more probable, without settling\nthe question either way. New facts, or new arguments and a new mode of\nviewing the question, may some day change the whole aspect of the case. It\nis with the latter that Mr. Darwin now reopens the discussion.\n\nHaving conceived the idea that varieties are incipient species, he is led\nto study variation in the field where it shows itself most strikingly, and\naffords the greatest facilities to investigation. Thoughtful naturalists\nhave had increasing grounds to suspect that a reexamination of the question\nof species in zoology and botany, commencing with those races which man\nknows most about, viz., the domesticated and cultivated races, would be\nlikely somewhat to modify the received idea of the entire fixity of\nspecies. This field, rich with various but unsystematized stores of\nknowledge accumulated by cultivators and breeders, has been generally\nneglected by naturalists, because these races are not in a state of nature;\nwhereas they deserve particular attention on this very account, as\nexperiments, or the materials for experiments, ready to our hand. In\ndomestication we vary some of the natural conditions of a species, and thus\nlearn experimentally what changes are within the reach of varying conditions\nin Nature. We separate and protect a favorite race against its foes or its\ncompetitors, and thus learn what it might become if Nature ever afforded it\nequal opportunities. Even when, to subserve human uses, we modify a\ndomesticated race to the detriment of its native vigor, or to the extent of\npractical monstrosity, although we secure forms which would not be\noriginated and could not be perpetuated in free Nature, yet we attain wider\nand juster views of the possible degree of variation. We perceive that some\nspecies are more variable than others, but that no species subjected to the\nexperiment persistently refuses to vary; and that, when it has once begun\nto vary, its varieties are not the less but the more subject to variation.\n\"No case is on record of a variable being ceasing to be variable under\ncultivation.\" It is fair to conclude, from the observation of plants and\nanimals in a wild as well as domesticated state, that the tendency to vary\nis general, and even universal. Mr. Darwin does \"not believe that\nvariability is an inherent and necessary contingency, under all\ncircumstances, with all organic beings, as some authors have thought.\" No\none supposes variation could occur under all circumstances; but the facts\non the whole imply a universal tendency, ready to be manifested under\nfavorable circumstances. In reply to the assumption that man has chosen for\ndomestication animals and plants having an extraordinary inherent tendency\nto vary, and likewise to withstand diverse climates, it is asked:\n\n\n\"How could a savage possibly know, when he first tamed an animal, whether\nit would vary in succeeding generations and whether it would endure other\nclimates? Has the little variability of the ass or Guinea-fowl, or the\nsmall power of endurance of warmth by the reindeer, or of cold by the\ncommon camel, prevented their domestication? I cannot doubt that if other\nanimals and plants, equal in number to our domesticated productions, and\nbelonging to equally diverse classes and countries, were taken from a state\nof nature, and could be made to breed for an equal number of generations\nunder domestication, they would vary on an average as largely as the parent\nspecies of our existing domesticated productions have varied.\"\n\n\nAs to amount of variation, there is the common remark of naturalists that\nthe varieties of domesticated plants or animals often differ more widely\nthan do the individuals of distinct species in a wild state: and even in\nNature the individuals of some species are known to vary to a degree\nsensibly wider than that which separates related species. In his\ninstructive section on the breeds of the domestic pigeon, our author\nremarks that \"at least a score of pigeons might be chosen which if shown to\nan ornithologist, and he were told that they were wild birds, would\ncertainly be ranked by him as well-defined species. Moreover, I do not\nbelieve that any ornithologist would place the English carrier, the\nshort-faced tumbler, the runt, the barb, pouter, and fantail, in the same\ngenus; more especially as in each of these breeds several truly-inherited\nsub-breeds, or species, as he might have called them, could be shown him.\"\nThat this is not a case like that of dogs, in which probably the blood of\nmore than one species is mingled, Mr. Darwin proceeds to show, adducing\ncogent reasons for the common opinion that all have descended from the wild\nrock-pigeon. Then follow some suggestive remarks:\n\n\n\"I have discussed the probable origin of domestic pigeons at some, yet\nquite insufficient, length; because when I first kept pigeons and watched\nthe several kinds, knowing well how true they bred, I felt fully as much\ndifficulty in believing that they could ever have descended from a common\nparent as any naturalist could in coming to a similar conclusion in regard\nto many species of finches, or other large groups of birds, in Nature. One\ncircumstance has struck me much; namely, that all the breeders of the\nvarious domestic animals and the cultivators of plants, with whom I have\never conversed, or whose treatises I have read, are firmly convinced that\nthe several breeds to which each has attended are descended from so many\naboriginally distinct species. Ask, as I have asked, a celebrated raiser of\nHereford cattle, whether his cattle might not have descended from\nlong-horns, and he will laugh you to scorn. I have never met a pigeon, or\npoultry, or duck, or rabbit fancier, who was not fully convinced that each\nmain breed was descended from a distinct species. Van Mons, in his treatise\non pears and apples, shows how utterly he disbelieves that the several\nsorts, for instance a Ribston-pippin or Codlin-apple, could ever have\nproceeded from the seeds of the same tree. Innumerable other examples could\nbe given. The explanation, I think, is simple: from long-continued study\nthey arc strongly impressed with the differences between the several races;\nand though they well know that each race varies slightly, for they win\ntheir prizes by selecting such slight differences, yet they ignore all\ngeneral arguments, and refuse to sum up in their minds slight differences\naccumulated during many successive generations. May not those naturalists\nwho, knowing far less of the laws of inheritance than does the breeder, and\nknowing no more than he does of the intermediate links in the long lines of\ndescent, yet admit that many of our domestic races have descended from the\nsame parents--may they not learn a lesson of caution, when they deride the\nidea of species in a state of nature being lineal descendants of other\nspecies?\"\n\n\nThe actual causes of variation are unknown. Mr. Darwin favors the opinion\nof the late Mr. Knight, the great philosopher of horticulture, that\nvariability tinder domestication is somehow connected with excess of food.\nHe regards the unknown cause as acting chiefly upon the reproductive system\nof the parents, which system, judging from the effect of confinement or\ncultivation upon its functions, he concludes to be more susceptible than\nany other to the action of changed conditions of life. The tendency to vary\ncertainly appears to be much stronger under domestication than in free\nNature. But we are not sure that the greater variableness of cultivated\nraces is not mainly owing to the far greater opportunities for\nmanifestation and accumulation--a view seemingly all the more favorable to\nMr. Darwin's theory. The actual amount of certain changes, such as size or\nabundance of fruit, size of udder, stands of course in obvious relation to\nsupply of food.    Really, we no more know the reason why the progeny\noccasionally deviates from the parent than we do why it usually resembles\nit. Though the laws and conditions governing variation are known to a\ncertain extent, those governing inheritance are apparently inscrutable.\n\"Perhaps,\" Darwin remarks, \"the correct way of viewing the whole subject\nwould be, to look at the inheritance of every character whatever as the\nrule, and non-inheritance as the anomaly.\" This, from general and obvious\nconsiderations, we have long been accustomed to do. Now, as exceptional\ninstances are expected to be capable of explanation, while ultimate laws\nare not, it is quite possible that variation may be accounted for, while\nthe great primary law of inheritance remains a mysterious fact.\n\nThe common proposition is, that species reproduce their like; this is a\nsort of general inference, only a degree closer to fact than the statement\nthat genera reproduce their like. The true proposition, the fact incapable\nof further analysis, is, that individuals reproduce their like--that\ncharacteristics are inheritable. So varieties, or deviations, once\noriginated, are perpetuable, like species. Not so likely to be perpetuated,\nat the outset; for the new form tends to resemble a grandparent and a long\nline of similar ancestors, as well as to resemble its immediate progenitors.\nTwo forces which coincide in the ordinary case, where the offspring\nresembles its parent, act in different directions when it does not and it\nis uncertain which will prevail. If the remoter but very potent ancestral\ninfluence predominates, the variation disappears with the life of the\nindividual. If that of the immediate parent--feebler no doubt, but\ncloser--the variety survives in the offspring; whose progeny now has a\nredoubled tendency to produce its own like; whose progeny again is almost\nsure to produce its like, since it is much the same whether it takes after\nits mother or its grandmother.\n\nIn this way races arise, which under favorable conditions may be as\nhereditary as species. In following these indications, watching\nopportunities, and breeding only from those individuals which vary most in\na desirable direction, man leads the course of variation as he leads a\nstreamlet--apparently at will, but never against the force of\ngravitation--to a long distance from its source, and makes it more\nsubservient to his use or fancy. He unconsciously strengthens those\nvariations which he prizes when he plants the seed of a favorite fruit,\npreserves a favorite domestic animal, drowns the uglier kittens of a\nlitter, and allows only the handsomest or the best mousers to propagate.\nStill more, by methodical selection, in recent times almost marvelous\nresults have been produced in new breeds of cattle, sheep, and poultry, and\nnew varieties of fruit of greater and greater size or excellence.\n\nIt is said that all domestic varieties, if left to run wild, would revert\nto their aboriginal stocks. Probably they would wherever various races of\none species were left to commingle. At least the abnormal or exaggerated\ncharacteristics induced by high feeding, or high cultivation and prolonged\nclose breeding, would promptly disappear; and the surviving stock would\nsoon blend into a homogeneous result (in a way presently explained), which\nwould naturally be taken for the original form; but we could seldom know if\nit were so. It is by no means certain that the result would be the same if\nthe races ran wild each in a separate region. Dr. Hooker doubts if there is\na true reversion in the case of plants. Mr. Darwin's observations rather\nfavor it in the animal kingdom. With mingled races reversion seems well\nmade out in the case of pigeons. The common opinion upon this subject\ntherefore probably has some foundation, But even if we regard varieties as\noscillations around a primitive centre or type, still it appears from the\nreadiness with which such varieties originate that a certain amount of\ndisturbance would carry them beyond the influence of the primordial\nattraction, where they may become new centres of variation.\n\nSome suppose that races cannot be perpetuated indefinitely even by keeping\nup the conditions under which they were fixed; but the high antiquity of\nseveral, and the actual fixity of many of them, negative this assumption.\n\"To assert that we could not breed our cart and race horses, long and short\nhorned cattle, and poultry of various breeds, for almost an infinite number\nof generations, would be opposed to all experience.\"\n\nWhy varieties develop so readily and deviate so widely under domestication,\nwhile they are apparently so rare or so transient in free Nature, may\neasily be shown. In Nature, even with hermaphrodite plants, there is a vast\namount of cross-fertilization among various individuals of the same\nspecies. The inevitable result of this (as was long ago explained in this\nJournal [I-7]) is to repress variation, to keep the mass of a species\ncomparatively homogeneous over any area in which it abounds in individuals.\nStarting from a suggestion of the late Mr. Knight, now so familiar, that\nclose interbreeding diminishes vigor and fertility; [I-8] and perceiving\nthat bisexuality is ever aimed at in Nature--being attained physiologically\nin numerous cases where it is not structurally--Mr. Darwin has worked out\nthe subject in detail, and shown how general is the concurrence, either\nhabitual or occasional, of two hermaphrodite individuals in the\nreproduction of their kind; and has drawn the philosophical inference that\nprobably no organic being self-fertilizes indefinitely; but that a cross\nwith another individual is occasionally--perhaps at very long\nintervals--indispensable. We refer the reader to the section on the\nintercrossing of individuals (pp. 96--101), and also to an article in the\nGardeners' Chronicle a year and a half ago, for the details of a very\ninteresting contribution to science, irrespective of theory.  In\ndomestication, this intercrossing may be prevented; and in this prevention\nlies the art of producing varieties. But \"the art itself is Nature,\" since\nthe whole art consists in allowing the most universal of all natural\ntendencies in organic things (inheritance) to operate uncontrolled by other\nand obviously incidental tendencies. No new power, no artificial force, is\nbrought into play either by separating the stock of a desirable variety so\nas to prevent mixture, or by selecting for breeders those individuals which\nmost largely partake of the peculiarities for which the breed is valued.\n{I-9]\n\nWe see everywhere around us the remarkable results which Nature may be said\nto have brought about under artificial selection and separation. Could she\naccomplish similar results when left to herself? Variations might begin, we\nknow they do begin, in a wild state. But would any of them be preserved and\ncarried to an equal degree of deviation? Is there anything in Nature which\nin the long-run may answer to artificial selection? Mr. Darwin thinks that\nthere is; and Natural Selection is the key-note of his discourse,\n\nAs a preliminary, he has a short chapter to show that there is variation in\nNature, and therefore something for natural selection to act upon. He\nreadily shows that such mere variations as may be directly referred to\nphysical conditions (like the depauperation of plants in a sterile soil, or\ntheir dwarfing as they approach an Alpine summit, the thicker fur of an\nanimal from far northward, etc.), and also those individual differences\nwhich we everywhere recognize but do not pretend to account for, are not\nseparable by any assignable line from more strongly-marked varieties;\nlikewise that there is no clear demarkation between the latter and\nsub-species, or varieties of the highest grade (distinguished from species\nnot by any known inconstancy, but by the supposed lower importance of their\ncharacteristics); nor between these and recognized species. \"These\ndifferences blend into each other in an insensible series, and the series\nimpresses the mind with an idea of an actual passage.\"\n\nThis gradation from species downward is well made out. To carry it one step\nfarther upward, our author presents in a strong light the differences which\nprevail among naturalists as to what forms should be admitted to the rank\nof species. Some genera (and these in some countries) give rise to far more\ndiscrepancy than others; and it is concluded that the large or dominant\ngenera are usually the most variable. In a flora so small as the British,\n182 plants, generally reckoned as varieties, have been ranked by some\nbotanists as species. Selecting the British genera which include the most\npolymorphous forms, it appears that Babington's Flora gives them 251\nspecies, Bentham's only 112, a difference of 139 doubtful forms. These are\nnearly the extreme views, but they are the views of two most capable and\nmost experienced judges, in respect to one of the best-known floras of the\nworld. The fact is suggestive, that the best-known countries furnish the\ngreatest number of such doubtful cases. Illustrations of this kind may be\nmultiplied to a great extent. They make it plain that, whether species in\nNature are aboriginal and definite or not, our practical conclusions about\nthem, as embodied in systematic works, are not facts but judgments, and\nlargely fallible judgments-\n\nHow much of the actual coincidence of authorities is owing to imperfect or\nrestricted observation, and to one naturalist's adopting the conclusions of\nanother without independent observation, this is not the place to consider.\nIt is our impression that species of animals are more definitely marked\nthan those of plants; this may arise from our somewhat extended\nacquaintance with the latter, and our ignorance of the former. But we are\nconstrained by our experience to admit the strong likelihood, in botany,\nthat varieties on the one hand, and what are called closely-related species\non the other, do not differ except in degree. Whenever this wider\ndifference separating the latter can be spanned by intermediate forms, as\nit sometimes is, no botanist long resists the inevitable conclusion.\nWhenever, therefore, this wider difference can be shown to be compatible\nwith community of origin, and explained through natural selection or in any\nother way, we are ready to adopt the probable conclusion; and we see\nbeforehand how strikingly the actual geographical association of related\nspecies favors the broader view. Whether we should continue to regard the\nforms in question as distinct species, depends upon what meaning we shall\nfinally attach to that term; and that depends upon how far the doctrine of\nderivation can be carried back and how well it can be supported.\n\nIn applying his principle of natural selection to the work in hand, Mr.\nDarwin assumes, as we have seen: i. Some variability of animals and plants\nin nature; 2. The absence of any definite distinction between slight\nvariations, and varieties of the highest grade; 3. The fact that\nnaturalists do not practically agree, and do not increasingly tend to\nagree, as to what forms are species and what are strong varieties, thus\nrendering it probable that there may be no essential and original\ndifference, or no possibility of ascertaining it, at least in many cases;\nalso, 4. That the most flourishing and dominant species of the larger\ngenera on an average vary most (a proposition which can be substantiated\nonly by extensive comparisons, the details of which are not given); and, 5.\nThat in large genera the species are apt to be closely but unequally allied\ntogether, forming little clusters round certain species--just such clusters\nas would be formed if we suppose their members once to have been satellites\nor varieties of a central or parent species, but to have attained at length\na wider divergence and a specific character. The fact of such association\nis undeniable; and the use which Mr. Darwin makes of it seems fair and\nnatural.\n\nThe gist of Mr. Darwin's work is to show that such varieties are gradually\ndiverged into species and genera through natural selection; that natural\nselection is the inevitable result of the struggle for existence which all\nliving things are engaged in; and that this struggle is an unavoidable\nconsequence of several natural causes, but mainly of the high rate at which\nall organic beings tend to increase.\n\nCuriously enough, Mr. Darwin's theory is grounded upon the doctrine of\nMalthus and the doctrine of Hobbes. The elder DeCandolle had conceived the\nidea of the struggle for existence, and, in a passage which would have\ndelighted the cynical philosopher of Malmesbury, had declared that all\nNature is at war, one organism with another or with external Nature; and\nLyell and Herbert had made considerable use of it.   But Hobbes in his theory\nof society, and Darwin in his theory of natural history, alone have built\ntheir systems upon it. However moralists and political economists may\nregard these doctrines in their original application to human society and\nthe relation of population to subsistence, their thorough applicability to\nthe great society of the organic world in general is now undeniable. And to\nMr. Darwin belongs the credit of making this extended application, and of\nworking out the immensely diversified results with rare sagacity and\nuntiring patience. He has brought to view real causes which have been\nlargely operative in the establishment of the actual association and\ngeographical distribution of plants and animals. In this he must be allowed\nto have made a very important contribution to an interesting department of\nscience, even if his theory fails in the endeavor to explain the origin or\ndiversity of species.  \"Nothing is easier,\" says our author, \"than to admit\nin words the truth of the universal struggle for life, or more difficult--at\nleast I have found it so--than constantly to bear this conclusion in mind.\nYet, unless it be thoroughly ingrained in the mind, I am convinced that the\nwhole economy of Nature, with every fact on distribution, rarity,\nabundance, extinction, and variation, will be dimly seen or quite\nmisunderstood. We behold the face of Nature bright with gladness, we often\nsee superabundance of food; we do not see, or we forget, that the birds\nwhich are idly singing round us mostly live on insects or seeds, and are\nthus constantly destroying life; or we forget how largely these songsters,\nor their eggs, or their nestlings, are destroyed by birds and beasts of\nprey; we do not always bear in mind that, though food may be now\nsuperabundant, it is not so at all seasons of each recurring year.\"--(p.\n62.)\n\n\"There is no exception to the rule that every organic being naturally\nincreases at so high a rate that, if not destroyed, the earth would soon be\ncovered by the progeny of a single pair. Even slow-breeding man has doubled\nin twenty-five years, and at this rate, in a few thousand years, there\nwould literally not be standing-room for his progeny. Linnaeus has\ncalculated that if an annual plant produced only two seeds--and there is no\nplant so unproductive as this--and their seedlings next year produced two,\nand so on, then in twenty years there would be a million plants. The\nelephant is reckoned to be the slowest breeder of all known animals, and I\nhave taken some pains to estimate its pro!)able minimum rate of natural\nincrease; it will be under the mark to assume that it breeds when thirty\nyears old, and goes on breeding till ninety years old, bringing forth three\npairs of young in this interval; if this be so, at the end of the fifth\ncentury there would be alive fifteen million elephants, descended from the\nfirst pair.\n\n\"But we have better evidence on this subject than mere theoretical\ncalculations, namely, the numerous recorded cases of the astonishingly\nrapid increase of various animals in a state of nature, when circumstances\nhave been favorable to them during two or three following seasons. Still\nmore striking is the evidence from our domestic animals of many kinds which\nhave run wild in several parts of the world; if the statements of the rate\nof increase of slow-breeding cattle and horses in South America, and\nlatterly in Australia, had not been well authenticated, they would have\nbeen quite incredible. So it is with plants: cases could be given of\nintroduced plants which have become common throughout whole islands in a\nperiod of less than ten years. Several of the plants now most numerous over\nthe wide plains of La Plata, clothing square leagues of surface almost to\nthe exclusion of all other plants, have been introduced from Europe; and\nthere are plants which now range in India, as I hear from Dr. Falconer,\nfrom Cape Comorin to the Himalaya, which have been imported from America\nsince its discovery. In such cases, and endless instances could be given,\nno one supposes that the fertility of these animals or plants has been\nsuddenly and temporarily increased in any sensible degree. The obvious\nexplanation is, that the conditions of life have been very favorable, and\nthat there has consequently been less destruction of the old and young, and\nthat nearly all the young have been enabled to breed. In such cases the\ngeometrical ratio of increase, the result of which never fails to be\nsurprising, simply explains the extraordinarily rapid increase and wide\ndiffusion of naturalized productions in their new homes.\"--(pp. 64, 65.)\n\n\"All plants and animals are tending to increase at a geometrical ratio; all\nwould most rapidly stock any station in which they could anyhow exist; the\nincrease must be checked by destruction at some period of life.\"--(p. 65.)\n\n\nThe difference between the most and the least prolific species is of no\naccount:\n\n\n\"The condor lays a couple of eggs, and the ostrich a score; and yet in the\nsame country the condor may be the more numerous of the two. The Fulmar\npetrel lays but one egg, yet it is believed to be the most numerous bird in\nthe world.\"--(p. 68.)\n\n\"The amount of food gives the extreme limit to which each species can\nincrease; but very frequently it is not the obtaining of food, but the\nserving as prey to other animals, which determines the average numbers of\nspecies.\"--(p. 68.)\n\n\"Climate plays an important part in determining the average numbers of a\nspecies, and periodical seasons of extreme cold or drought I believe to be\nthe most effective of all checks. I estimated that the winter of 1854--'55\ndestroyed four-fifths of the birds in my own grounds; and this is a\ntremendous destruction, when we remember that ten per cent, is an\nextraordinarily severe mortality from epidemics with man. The action of\nclimate seems at first sight to be quite independent of the struggle for\nexistence; but, in so far as climate chiefly acts in reducing food, it\nbrings on the most severe struggle between the individuals, whether of the\nsame or of distinct species, which subsist on the same kind of food, Even\nwhen climate, for instance extreme cold, acts directly, it will be the\nleast vigorous, or those which have got least food through the advancing\nwinter, which will suffer most. When we travel from south to north, or from\na damp region to a dry, we invariably see some species gradually getting\nrarer and rarer, and finally disappearing; and, the change of climate being\nconspicuous, we are tempted to attribute the whole effect to its direct\naction. But this is a very false view; we forget that each species, even\nwhere it most abounds, is constantly suffering enormous destruction at some\nperiod of its life, from enemies or from competitors for the same place and\nfood; and if these enemies or competitors be in the least degree favored by\nany slight change of climate, they will increase in numbers, and, as each\narea is already stocked with inhabitants, the other species will decrease.\nWhen we travel southward and see a species decreasing in numbers, we may\nfeel sure that the cause lies quite as much in other species being favored\nas in this one being hurt. So it is when we travel northward, but in a\nsomewhat lesser degree, for the number of species of all kinds, and\ntherefore of competitors, decreases northward; hence, in going northward,\nor in ascending a mountain, we far oftener meet with stunted forms, due to\nthe directly injurious action of climate, than we do in proceeding\nsouthward or in descending a mountain. When we reach the arctic regions, or\nsnow-capped summits, or absolute deserts, the struggle for life is almost\nexclusively with the elements.\n\n\"That climate acts in main part indirectly by favoring other species, we\nmay clearly see in the prodigious number of plants in our gardens which can\nperfectly well endure our climate, but which never become naturalized, for\nthey cannot compete with our native plants, nor resist destruction by our\nnative animals.\"--(pp. 68, 69.)\n\n\nAfter an instructive instance in which \"cattle absolutely determine the\nexistence of the Scotch fir,\" we are referred to cases in which insects\ndetermine the existence of cattle:\n\n\n\"Perhaps Paraguay offers the most curious instance of this; for here\nneither cattle, nor horses, nor dogs, have ever run wild, though they swarm\nsouthward and northward in a feral state; and Azara and Rengger have shown\nthat this is caused by the greater number in Paraguay of a certain fly,\nwhich lays its eggs in the navels of these animals when first born. The\nincrease of these flies, numerous as they are, must be habitually checked\nby some means, probably by birds. Hence, if certain insectivorous birds\n(whose numbers are probably regulated by hawks or beasts of prey) were to\nincrease in Paraguay, the flies would decrease--then cattle and horses\nwould become feral, and this would certainly greatly alter (as indeed I\nhave observed in parts of South America) the vegetation; this, again, would\nlargely affect the insects; and this, as we have just seen in\nStaffordshire, the insectivorous birds, and so onward in ever-increasing\ncircles of complexity. We began this series by insectivorous birds, and we\nhad ended with them. Not that in Nature the relations can ever be as simple\nas this. Battle within battle must ever be recurring with varying success;\nand yet in the long-run the forces are so nicely balanced that the face of\nNature remains uniform for long periods of time, though assuredly the\nmerest trifle would often give the victory to one organic being over\nanother. Nevertheless, so profound is our ignorance, and so high our\npresumption, that we marvel when we hear of the extinction of an organic\nbeing; and as we do not see the cause, we invoke cataclysms to desolate the\nworld, or invent laws on the duration of the forms of life!\"--(pp. 72, 73.)\n\n\"When we look at the plants and bushes clothing an entangled bank, we arc\ntempted to attribute their proportional numbers and kinds to what we call\nchance. But how false a view is this! Every one has heard that when an\nAmerican forest is cut down, a very different vegetation springs up; but it\nhas been observed that the trees now growing on the ancient Indian mounds,\nin the Southern United States, display the same beautiful diversity and\nproportion of kinds as in the surrounding virgin forests. What a struggle\nbetween the several kinds of trees must here have gone on during long\ncenturies, each annually scattering its seeds by the thousand; what war\nbetween insect and insect--between insects, snails, and other animals, with\nbirds and beasts of prey--all striving to increase, and all feeding on each\nother or on the trees, or their seeds and seedlings, or on the other plants\nwhich first clothed the ground and thus checked the growth of the trees!\nThrow up a handful of feathers, and all must fall to the ground according\nto definite laws; but how simple is this problem compared to the action and\nreaction of the innumerable plants and animals which have determined, in the\ncourse of centuries, the proportional numbers and kinds of trees now\ngrowing on the old Indian ruins!\"--(pp. 74, 75.)\n\n\nFor reasons obvious upon reflection, the competition is often, if not\ngenerally, most severe between nearly related species when they are in\ncontact, so that one drives the other before it, as the Hanoverian the old\nEnglish rat, the small Asiatic cockroach in Russia, its greater congener,\netc. And this, when duly considered, explains many curious results; such,\nfor instance, as the considerable number of different genera of plants and\nanimals which are generally found to inhabit any limited area.\n\n\n\"The truth of the principle that the greatest amount of life can be\nsupported by great diversification of structure is seen under many natural\ncircumstances. In an extremely small area, especially if freely open to\nimmigration, and where the contest between individual and individual must\nbe severe, we always find great diversity in its inhabitants. For instance,\nI found that a piece of turf, three feet by four in size, which had been\nexposed for many years to exactly the same conditions, supported twenty\nspecies of plants, and these belonged to eighteen genera, and to eight\norders, which showed how much these plants differed from each other. So it\nis with the plants and insects on small and uniform islets; and so in small\nponds of fresh water. Farmers find that they can raise most food by a\nrotation of plants belonging to the most different orders; Nature follows\nwhat may be called a simultaneous rotation. Most of the animals and plants\nwhich live close round any small piece of ground could live on it (supposing\nit not to be in any way peculiar in its nature), and may be said to be\nstriving to the utmost to live there; but it is seen that, where they come\ninto the closest competition with each other, the advantages of\ndiversification of structure, with the accompanying differences of habit\nand constitution, determine that the inhabitants, which thus jostle each\nother most closely, shall, as a general rule, belong to what we call\ndifferent genera and orders.\"--(p. 114.)\n\n\nThe abundance of some forms, the rarity and final extinction of many\nothers, and the consequent divergence of character or increase of\ndifference among the surviving representatives, are other consequences. As\nfavored forms increase, the less favored must diminish in number, for there\nis not room for all; and the slightest advantage, at first probably\ninappreciable to human observation, must decide which shall prevail and\nwhich must perish, or be driven to another and for it more favorable\nlocality.\n\nWe cannot do justice to the interesting chapter upon natural selection by\nseparated extracts. The following must serve to show how the principle is\nsupposed to work:\n\n\n\"If during the long course of ages, and under varying conditions of life,\norganic beings vary at all in the several parts of their organization, and\nI think this cannot be disputed; if there be, owing to the high geometrical\npowers of increase of each species, at some age, season, or year, a severe\nstruggle for life, and this certainly cannot be disputed: then, considering\nthe infinite complexity of the relations of all organic beings to each\nother and to their conditions of existence, causing an infinite diversity\nin structure, constitution, and habits, to be advantageous to them, I think\nit would be a most extraordinary fact if no variation ever had occurred\nuseful to each being's own welfare, in the same way as so many variations\nhave occurred useful to man. But if variations useful to any organic being\ndo occur, assuredly individuals thus characterized will have the best\nchance of being preserved in the struggle for life; and from the strong\nprinciple of inheritance they will tend to produce offspring similarly\ncharacterized. This principle of preservation I have called, for the sake\nof brevity, Natural Selection.\"--(pp. 126, 127.)\n\n\n\"In order to make it clear how, as I believe, natural selection acts, I\nmust beg permission to give one or two imaginary illustrations. Let us take\nthe case of a wolf, which preys on various animals, securing some by craft,\nsome by strength, and some by fleetness; and let us suppose that the\nfleetest prey, a deer for instance, had from any change in the country\nincreased in numbers, or that other prey had decreased in numbers, during\nthat season of the year when the wolf is hardest pressed for food. I can\nunder such circumstances see no reason to doubt that the swiftest and\nslimmest wolves would have the best chance of surviving, and so be\npreserved or selected--provided always that they retained strength to\nmaster their prey at this or at some other period of the year, when they\nmight be compelled to prey on other animals. I can see no more reason to\ndoubt this than that man can improve the fleetness of his greyhounds by\ncareful and methodical selection, or by that unconscious selection which\nresults from each man trying to keep the best dogs without any thought of\nmodifying the breed.\n\n\"Even without any change in the proportional numbers of the animals on\nwhich our wolf preyed, a cub might be born with an innate tendency to\npursue certain kinds of prey. Nor can this be thought very improbable; for\nwe often observe great differences in the natural tendencies of our\ndomestic animals: one cat, for instance, taking to catching rats, another\nmice; one cat, according to Mr. St. John, bringing home winged game,\nanother hares or rabbits, and another hunting on marshy ground!, and almost\nnightly catching woodcocks or snipes. The tendency to catch rats rather\nthan mice is known to be inherited. Now, if any slight innate change of\nhabit or of structure benefited an individual wolf, it would have the best\nchance of surviving and of leaving offspring. Some of its young would\nprobably inherit the same habits or structure, and by the repetition of\nthis process a new variety might be formed which would either supplant or\ncoexist with the parent-form of wolf. Or, again, the wolves inhabiting a\nmountainous district, and those frequenting the lowlands, would naturally\nbe forced to hunt different prey; and from a continued preservation of the\nindividuals best fitted for the two sites, two varieties might slowly be\nformed. These varieties would cross and blend where they met; but to this\nsubject of intercrossing we shall soon have to return. I may add that,\naccording to Mr. Pierce, there are two varieties of the wolf inhabiting the\nCatskill Mountains in the United States, one with a light greyhound-like\nform, which pursues deer, and the other more bulky, with shorter legs,\nwhich more frequently attacks the shepherd's flock.\"--(pp. 90, 91.)\n\n\nWe eke out the illustration here with a counterpart instance, viz., the\nremark of Dr. Bachman that \"the deer that reside permanently in the swamps\nof Carolina are taller and longer-legged than those in the higher grounds.\"\n[I-10]\n\nThe limits allotted to this article are nearly reached, yet only four of\nthe fourteen chapters of the volume have been touched. These, however,\ncontain the fundamental principles of the theory, and most of those\napplications of it which are capable of something like verification,\nrelating as they do to the phenomena now occurring. Some of our extracts\nalso show how these principles are thought to have operated through the\nlong lapse of the ages. The chapters from the sixth to the ninth inclusive\nare designed to obviate difficulties and objections, \"some of them so grave\nthat to this day,\" the author frankly says, he \"can never reflect on them\nwithout being staggered.\" We do not wonder at it. After drawing what\ncomfort he can from \"the imperfection of the geological record\" (Chapter\nIX), which we suspect is scarcely exaggerated, the author considers the\ngeological succession of organic beings (Chapter X), to see whether they\nbetter accord with the common view of the immutability of species, or with\nthat of their slow and gradual modification. Geologists must settle that\nquestion. Then follow two most interesting and able chapters on the\ngeographical distribution of plants and animals, the summary of which we\nshould be glad to cite; then a fitting chapter upon classification,\nmorphology, embryology, etc., as viewed in the light of this theory, closes\nthe argument; the fourteenth chapter being a recapitulation.\n\nThe interest for the general reader heightens as the author advances on his\nperilous way and grapples manfully with the most formidable difficulties.\n\nTo account, upon these principles, for the gradual elimination and\nsegregation of nearly allied forms--such as varieties, sub-species, and\nclosely-related or representative species--also in a general way for their\ngeographical association and present range, is comparatively easy, is\napparently within the bounds of possibility. Could we stop here we should\nbe fairly contented. But, to complete the system, to carry out the\nprinciples to their ultimate conclusion, and to explain by them many facts\nin geographical distribution which would still remain anomalous, Mr. Darwin\nis equally bound to account for the formation of genera, families, orders,\nand even classes, by natural selection. He does \"not doubt that the theory\nof descent with modification embraces all the members of the same class,\"\nand he concedes that analogy would press the conclusion still further;\nwhile he admits that \"the more distinct the forms are, the more the\narguments fall away in force.\" To command assent we naturally require\ndecreasing probability to be overbalanced by an increased weight of\nevidence. An opponent might plausibly, and perhaps quite fairly, urge that\nthe links in the chain of argument are weakest just where the greatest\nstress falls upon them.\n\nTo which Mr. Darwin's answer is, that the best parts of the testimony have\nbeen lost. He is confident that intermediate forms must have existed; that\nin the olden times when the genera, the families, and the orders, diverged\nfrom their parent stocks, gradations existed as fine as those which now\nconnect closely related species with varieties. But they have passed and\nleft no sign. The geological record, even if all displayed to view, is a\nbook from which not only many pages, but even whole alternate chapters,\nhave been lost out, or rather which were never printed from the autographs\nof Nature. The record was actually made in fossil lithography only at\ncertain times and under certain conditions (i.e., at periods of slow\nsubsidence and places of abundant sediment); and of these records all but\nthe last volume is out of print; and of its pages only local glimpses have\nbeen obtained. Geologists, except Lyell, will object to this--some of them\nmoderately, others with vehemence. Mr. Darwin himself admits, with a candor\nrarely displayed on such occasions, that he should have expected more\ngeological evidence of transition than he finds, and that all the most\neminent paleontologists maintain the immutability of species.\n\nThe general fact, however, that the fossil fauna of each period as a whole\nis nearly intermediate in character between the preceding and the\nsucceeding faunas, is much relied on. We are brought one step nearer to the\ndesired inference by the similar \"fact, insisted on by all paleontologists,\nthat fossils from two consecutive formations are far more closely related\nto each other than are the fossils of two remote formations. Pictet gives a\nwell-known instance--the general resemblance of the organic remains from the\nseveral stages of the chalk formation, though the species are distinct at\neach stage. This fact alone, from its generality, seems to have shaken\nProf. Pictet in his firm belief in the immutability of species\" (p. 335).\nWhat Mr. Darwin now particularly wants to complete his inferential evidence\nis a proof that the same gradation may be traced in later periods, say in\nthe Tertiary, and between that period and the present; also that the later\ngradations are finer, so as to leave it doubtful whether the succession is\none of species--believed on the one theory to be independent, on the other,\nderivative--or of varieties, which are confessedly derivative. The proof of\nthe finer gradation appears to be forthcoming. Des Hayes and Lyell have\nconcluded that many of the middle Tertiary and a large proportion of the\nlater Tertiary mollusca are specifically identical with living species; and\nthis is still the almost universally prevalent view. But Mr. Agassiz states\nthat, \"in every instance where he had sufficient materials, he had found\nthat the species of the two epochs supposed to be identical by Des Hayes\nand Lyell were in reality distinct, although closely allied species.\"[I-11]\nMoreover, he is now satisfied, as we understand, that the same gradation is\ntraceable not merely in each great division of the Tertiary, but in\nparticular deposits or successive beds, each answering to a great number of\nyears; where what have passed unquestioned as members of one species, upon\ncloser examination of numerous specimens exhibit differences which in his\nopinion entitle them to be distinguished into two, three, or more species.\nIt is plain, therefore, that whatever conclusions can be fairly drawn from\nthe present animal and vegetable kingdoms in favor of a gradation of\nvarieties into species, or into what may be regarded as such, the same may\nbe extended to the Tertiary period. In both cases, what some call species\nothers call varieties; and in the later Tertiary shells this difference in\njudgment affects almost half of the species!\n\nWe pass to a second difficulty in the way of Mr. Darwin's theory; to a case\nwhere we are perhaps entitled to demand of him evidence of gradation like\nthat which connects the present with the Tertiary mollusca. Wide, very wide\nis the gap, anatomically and physiologically (we do not speak of the\nintellectual) between the highest quadrumana and man; and comparatively\nrecent, if ever, must the line have bifurcated. But where is there the\nslightest evidence of a common progenitor? Perhaps Mr. Darwin would reply by\nanother question: where are the fossil remains of the men who made the\nflint knives and arrowheads of the Somme Valley?\n\nWe have a third objection, one, fortunately, which has nothing to do with\ngeology. We can only state it here in brief terms. The chapter on hybridism\nis most ingenious, able, and instructive. If sterility of crosses is a\nspecial original arrangement to prevent the confusion of species by\nmingling, as is generally assumed, then, since varieties cross readily and\ntheir offspring is fertile inter se, there is a fundamental distinction\nbetween varieties and species. Mr. Darwin therefore labors to show that it\nis not a special endowment, but an incidental acquirement. He does show that\nthe sterility of crosses is of all degrees; upon which we have only to say,\nNatura non facit saltum, here any more than elsewhere. But, upon his theory\nhe is bound to show how sterility might be acquired, through natural\nselection or through something else. And the difficulty is, that, whereas\nindividuals of the very same blood tend to be sterile, and somewhat remoter\nunions diminish this tendency, and when they have diverged into two\nvarieties the cross-breeds between the two are more fertile than either pure\nstock--yet when they have diverged only one degree more the whole tendency\nis reversed, and the mongrel is sterile, either absolutely or relatively.\nHe who explains the genesis of species through purely natural agencies\nshould assign a natural cause for this remarkable result; and this Mr.\nDarwin has not done. Whether original or derived, however, this arrangement\nto keep apart those forms which have, or have acquired (as the case may be),\na certain moderate amount of difference, looks to us as much designed for\nthe purpose, as does a rachet to prevent reverse motion in a wheel. If\nspecies have originated by divergence, this keeps them apart.\n\nHere let us suggest a possibly attainable test of the theory of derivation,\na kind of instance which Mr. Darwin may be fairly asked to produce--viz.,\nan instance of two varieties, or what may be assumed as such, which have\ndiverged enough to reverse the movement, to bring out some sterility in the\ncrosses. The best marked human races might offer the most likely case. If\nmulattoes are sterile or tend to sterility, as some naturalists confidently\nassert, they afford Mr. Darwin a case in point. If, as others think, no\nsuch tendency is made out, the required evidence is wanting.\n\nA fourth and the most formidable difficulty is that of the production and\nspecialization of organs.\n\nIt is well said that all organic beings have been formed on two great laws:\nunity of type, and adaptation to the conditions of existence.[I-12] The\nspecial teleologists, such as Paley, occupy themselves with the latter\nonly; they refer particular facts to special design, but leave an\noverwhelming array of the widest facts inexplicable. The morphologists\nbuild on unity of type, or that fundamental agreement in the structure of\neach great class of beings which is quite independent of their habits or\nconditions of life; which requires each individual \"to go through a certain\nformality,\" and to accept, at least for a time, certain organs, whether\nthey are of any use to him or not. Philosophical minds form various\nconceptions for harmonizing the two views theoretically. Mr. Darwin\nharmonizes and explains them naturally. Adaptation to the conditions of\nexistence is the result of natural selection; unity of type, of unity of\ndescent. Accordingly, as he puts his theory, he is bound to account for the\norigination of new organs, and for their diversity in each great type, for\ntheir specialization, and every adaptation of organ to function and of\nstructure to condition, through natural agencies. Whenever he attempts this\nhe reminds us of Lamarck, and shows us how little light the science of a\ncentury devoted to structural investigation has thrown upon the mystery of\norganization. Here purely natural explanations fail. The organs being given,\nnatural selection may account for some improvement; if given of a variety\nof sorts or grades, natural selection might determine which should survive\nand where it should prevail.\n\nOn all this ground the only line for the theory to take is to make the most\nof gradation and adherence to type as suggestive of derivation, and\nunaccountable upon any other scientific view--deferring all attempts to\nexplain how such a metamorphosis was effected, until naturalists have\nexplained how the tadpole is metamorphosed into a frog, or one sort of\npolyp into another. As to why it is so, the philosophy of efficient cause,\nand even the whole argument from design, would stand, upon the admission of\nsuch a theory of derivation, precisely where they stand without it. At\nleast there is, or need be, no ground of difference here between Darwin and\nAgassiz. The latter will admit, with Owen and every morphologist, that\nhopeless is the attempt to explain the similarity of pattern in members of\nthe same class by utility or the doctrine of final causes. \"On the ordinary\nview of the independent creation of each being, we can only say that so it\nis, that it has so pleased the Creator to construct each animal and plant.\"\nMr. Darwin, in proposing a theory which suggests a how that harmonizes\nthese facts into a system, we trust implies that all was done wisely, in\nthe largest sense designedly, and by an intelligent first cause. The\ncontemplation of the subject on the intellectual side, the amplest\nexposition of the unity of plan in creation, considered irrespective of\nnatural agencies, leads to no other conclusion.\n\nWe are thus, at last, brought to the question, What would happen if the\nderivation of species were to be substantiated, either as a true physical\ntheory, or as a sufficient hypothesis? What would come of it? The inquiry\nis a pertinent one, just now. For, of those who agree with us in thinking\nthat Darwin has not established his theory of derivation many will admit\nwith us that he has rendered a theory of derivation much less improbable\nthan before; that such a theory chimes in with the established doctrines of\nphysical science, and is not unlikely to be largely accepted long before it\ncan be proved. Moreover, the various notions that prevail--equally among\nthe most and the least religious--as to the relations between natural\nagencies or phenomena and efficient cause, are seemingly more crude,\nobscure, and discordant, than they need be.\n\nIt is not surprising that the doctrine of the book should be denounced as\natheistical. What does surprise and concern us is, that it should be so\ndenounced by a scientific man, on the broad assumption that a material\nconnection between the members of a series of organized beings is\ninconsistent with the idea of their being intellectually connected with one\nanother through the Deity, i.e., as products of one mind, as indicating and\nrealizing a preconceived plan. An assumption the rebound of which is\nsomewhat fearful to contemplate, but fortunately one which every natural\nbirth protests against.\n\nIt would be more correct to say that the theory in itself is perfectly\ncompatible with an atheistic view of the universe. That is true; but it is\nequally true of physical theories generally. Indeed, it is more true of the\ntheory of gravitation, and of the nebular hypothesis, than of the\nhypothesis in question. The latter merely takes up a particular, proximate\ncause, or set of such causes, from which, it is argued, the present\ndiversity of species has or may have contingently resulted. The author does\nnot say necessarily resulted; that the actual results in mode and measure,\nand none other, must have taken place. On the other hand, the theory of\ngravitation and its extension in the nebular hypothesis assume a universal\nand ultimate physical cause, from which the effects in Nature must\nnecessarily have resulted. Now, it is not thought, at least at the present\nday, that the establishment of the Newtonian theory was a step toward\natheism or pantheism. Yet the great achievement of Newton consisted in\nproving that certain forces (blind forces, so far as the theory is\nconcerned), acting upon matter in certain directions, must necessarily\nproduce planetary orbits of the exact measure and form in which observation\nshows them to exist--a view which is just as consistent with eternal\nnecessity, either in the atheistic or the pantheistic form, as it is with\ntheism.\n\nNor is the theory of derivation particularly exposed to the charge of the\natheism of fortuity; since it undertakes to assign real causes for\nharmonious and systematic results. But, of this, a word at the close.\n\nThe value of such objections to the theory of derivation may be tested by\none or two analogous cases. The common scientific as well as popular belief\nis that of the original, independent creation of oxygen and hydrogen, iron,\ngold, and the like. Is the speculative opinion now increasingly held, that\nsome or all of the supposed elementary bodies are derivative or compound,\ndeveloped from some preceding forms of matter, irreligious? Were the old\nalchemists atheists as well as dreamers in their attempts to transmute\nearth into gold? Or, to take an instance from force (power)--which stands\none step nearer to efficient cause than form--was the attempt to prove that\nheat, light, electricity, magnetism, and even mechanical power, are\nvariations or transmutations of one force, atheistical in its tendency? The\nsupposed establishment of this view is reckoned as one of the greatest\nscientific triumphs of this century.\n\nPerhaps, however, the objection is brought, not so much against the\nspeculation itself, as against the attempt to show how derivation might\nhave been brought about. Then the same objection applies to a recent\ningenious hypothesis made to account for the genesis of the chemical\nelements out of the ethereal medium, and to explain their several atomic\nweights and some other characteristics by their successive\ncomplexity--hydrogen consisting of so many atoms of ethereal substance\nunited in a particular order, and so on. The speculation interested the\nphilosophers of the British Association, and was thought innocent, but\nunsupported by facts. Surely Mr. Darwin's theory is none the worse,\nmorally, for having some foundation in fact.\n\nIn our opinion, then, it is far easier to vindicate a theistic character\nfor the derivative theory, than to establish the theory itself upon\nadequate scientific evidence. Perhaps scarcely any philosophical objection\ncan be urged against the former to which the nebular hypothesis is not\nequally exposed. Yet the nebular hypothesis finds general scientific\nacceptance, and is adopted as the basis of an extended and recondite\nillustration in Mr. Agassiz's great work.[I-13]\n\nHow the author of this book harmonizes his scientific theory with his\nphilosophy and theology, he has not informed us. Paley in his celebrated\nanalogy with the watch, insists that if the timepiece were so constructed\nas to produce other similar watches, after a manner of generation in\nanimals, the argument from design would be all the stronger. What is to\nhinder Mr. Darwin from giving Paley's argument a further a-fortiori\nextension to the supposed case of a watch which sometimes produces better\nwatches, and contrivances adapted to successive conditions, and so at\nlength turns out a chronometer, a town clock, or a series of organisms of\nthe same type? From certain incidental expressions at the close of the\nvolume, taken in connection with the motto adopted from Whewell, we judge\nit probable that our author regards the whole system of Nature as one which\nhad received at its first formation the impress of the will of its Author,\nforeseeing the varied yet necessary laws of its action throughout the whole\nof its existence, ordaining when and bow each particular of the stupendous\nplan should be realized in effect, and--with Him to whom to will is to\ndo--in ordaining doing it, Whether profoundly philosophical or not, a view\nmaintained by eminent philosophical physicists and theologians, such as\nBabbage on the one hand and Jowett on the other, will hardly be denounced\nas atheism. Perhaps Mr. Darwin would prefer to express his idea in a more\ngeneral way, by adopting the thoughtful words of one of the most eminent\nnaturalists of this or any age, substituting the word action for \"thought,\"\nsince it is the former (from which alone the latter can be inferred) that\nhe has been considering. \"Taking Nature as exhibiting thought for my guide,\nit appears to me that while human thought is consecutive, Divine thought is\nsimultaneous, embracing at the same time and forever, in the past, the\npresent and the future, the most diversified relations among hundreds of\nthousands of organized beings, each of which may present complications\nagain, which to study and understand even imperfectly--as for instance man\nhimself-- mankind has already spent thousands of years.\"[I-14] In thus\nconceiving of the Divine Power in act as coetaneous with Divine Thought,\nand of both as far as may be apart from the human element of time, our\nauthor may regard the intervention of the Creator either as, humanly\nspeaking, done from all time, or else as doing through all time. In the\nultimate analysis we suppose that every philosophical theist must adopt one\nor the other conception.\n\nA perversion of the first view leads toward atheism, the notion of an\neternal sequence of cause and effect, for which there is no first cause--a\nview which few sane persons can long rest in. The danger which may threaten\nthe second view is pantheism. We feel safe from either error, in our\nprofound conviction that there is order in the universe; that order\npresupposes mind; design, will; and mind or will, personality. Thus\nguarded, we much prefer the second of the two conceptions of causation, as\nthe more philosophical as well as Christian view--a view which leaves us\nwith the same difficulties and the same mysteries in Nature as in\nProvidence, and no other. Natural law, upon this view, is the human\nconception of continued and orderly Divine action.\n\nWe do not suppose that less power, or other power, is required to sustain\nthe universe and carry on its operations, than to bring it into being. So,\nwhile conceiving no improbability of \"interventions of Creative mind in\nNature,\" if by such is meant the bringing to pass of new and fitting events\nat fitting times, we leave it for profounder minds to establish, if they\ncan, a rational distinction in kind between his working in Nature carrying\non operations, and in initiating those operations.\n\nWe wished, under the light of such views, to examine more critically the\ndoctrine of this book, especially of some questionable parts; for instance,\nits explanation of the natural development of organs, and its implication\nof a \"necessary acquirement of mental power\" in the ascending scale of\ngradation. But there is room only for the general declaration that we\ncannot think the Cosmos a series which began with chaos and ends with mind,\nor of which mind is a result: that, if, by the successive origination of\nspecies and organs through natural agencies, the author means a series of\nevents which succeed each other irrespective of a continued directing\nintelligence--events which mind does not order and shape to destined\nends--then he has not established that doctrine, nor advanced toward its\nestablishment, but has accumulated improbabilities beyond all belief. Take\nthe formation and the origination of the successive degrees of complexity\nof eyes as a specimen. The treatment of this subject (pp. i88, 189), upon\none interpretation, is open to all the objections referred to; but, if, on\nthe other hand, we may rightly compare the eye \"to a telescope, perfected\nby the long-continued efforts of the highest human intellects,\" we could\ncarry out the analogy, and draw satisfactory illustrations and inferences\nfrom it. The essential, the directly intellectual thing is the making of the\nimprovements in the telescope or the steam-engine. Whether the successive\nimprovements, being small at each step, and consistent with the general\ntype of the instrument, are applied to some of the individual machines, or\nentire new machines are constructed for each, is a minor matter. Though, if\nmachines could engender, the adaptive method would be most economical; and\neconomy is said to be a paramount law in Nature. The origination of the\nimprovements, and the successive adaptations to meet new conditions or\nsubserve other ends, are what answer to the supernatural, and therefore\nremain inexplicable. As to bringing them into use, though wisdom foresees\nthe result, the circumstances and the natural competition will take care of\nthat, in the long-run. The old ones will go out of use fast enough, except\nwhere an old and simple machine remains still best adapted to a particular\npurpose or condition--as, for instance, the old Newcomen engine for pumping\nout coal-pits. If there's a Divinity that shapes these ends, the whole is\nintelligible and reasonable; otherwise, not.\n\nWe regret that the necessity of discussing philosophical questions has\nprevented a fuller examination of the theory itself, and of the interesting\nscientific points which are brought to bear in its favor. One of its\nneatest points, certainly a very strong one for the local origination of\nspecies, and their gradual diffusion under natural agencies, we must\nreserve for some other convenient opportunity.\n\nThe work is a scientific one, rigidly restricted to its direct object; and\nby its science it must stand or fall. Its aim is, probably, not to deny\ncreative intervention in Nature--for the admission of the independent\norigination of certain types does away with all antecedent improbability of\nas much intervention as may be required--but to maintain that Natural\nSelection, in explaining the facts, explains also many classes of facts\nwhich thousand-fold repeated independent acts of creation do not explain,\nbut leave more mysterious than ever. How far the author has succeeded, the\nscientific world will in due time be able to pronounce.\n\nAs these sheets are passing through the press, a copy of the second edition\nhas reached us. We notice with pleasure the insertion of an additional\nmotto on the reverse of the title page, directly claiming the theistic view\nwhich we have vindicated for the doctrine. Indeed, these pertinent words of\nthe eminently wise Bishop Butler comprise, in their simplest expression,\nthe whole substance of our later pages:\n\n\n\"The only distinct meaning of the word 'natural' is stated, fixed, or\nsettled; since what is natural as much requires and presupposes an\nintelligent mind to render it so, i.e., to effect it continually or at\nstated times, as what is supernatural or miraculous does to effect it for\nonce.\"\n\nII\n\nDESIGN VERSUS NECESSITY\n\nDISCUSSION BETWEEN TWO READERS\nOF DARWIN'S TREATISE ON THE\nORIGIN OF SPECIES, UPON ITS\nNATURAL THEOLOGY\n\n(American Journal of Science and Arts, September, 1860)\n\n\nD.T.--Is Darwin's theory atheistic or pantheistic? or, does it tend to\natheism or pantheism? Before attempting any solution of this question,\npermit me to say a few words tending to obtain a definite conception of\nnecessity and design, as the sources from which events may originate, each\nindependent of the other; and we shall, perhaps, best attain a clear\nunderstanding of each, by the illustration of an example in which simple\nhuman designers act upon the physical powers of common matter.\n\nSuppose, then, a square billiard-table to be placed with its corners\ndirected to the four cardinal points. Suppose a player, standing at the\nnorth corner, to strike a red ball directly to the south, his design being\nto lodge the ball in the south pocket; which design, if not interfered\nwith, must, of course be accomplished. Then suppose another player,\nstanding at the east corner, to direct a white ball to the west corner. This\ndesign also, if not interfered with, must be accomplished. Next suppose both\nplayers to strike their balls at the same instant, with like forces, in the\ndirections before given. In this case the balls would not pass as before,\nnamely, the red ball to the south, and the white ball to the west, but they\nmust both meet and strike each other in the centre of the table, and, being\nperfectly elastic, the red ball must pass to the west pocket, and the white\nball to the south pocket. We may suppose that the players acted wholly\nwithout concert with each other, indeed, they may be ignorant of each other'\ns design, or even of each other's existence; still we know that the events\nmust happen as herein described. Now, the first half of the course of these\ntwo balls is from an impulse, or proceeds from a power, acting from design.\nEach player has the design of driving his ball across the table in a\ndiagonal line to accomplish its lodgment at the opposite corner of the\ntable. Neither designed that his ball should be deflected from that course\nand pass to another corner of the table. The direction of this second part\nof the motion must be referred entirely to necessity, which directly\ninterferes with the purpose of him who designed the rectilinear direction.\nWe are not, in this case, to go back to find design in the creation of the\npowers or laws of inertia and elasticity, after the order of which the\ndeflection, at the instant of collision, necessarily takes place. We know\nthat these powers were inherent in the balls, and were not created to\nanswer this special deflection. We are required, by the hypothesis, to\nconfine attention in point of time, from the instant preceding the impact\nof the balls, to the time of their arrival at the opposite corners of the\ntable. The cues aremoved by design. The impacts are acts from design. The\nfirst half of the motion of each ball is under the direction of design. We\nmean by this the particular design of each player. But, at the instant of\nthe collision of the balls upon each other, direction from design ceases,\nand the balls no longer obey the particular designs of the players, the\nends or purposes intended by them are not accomplished, but frustrated, by\nnecessity, or by the necessary action of the powers of inertia and\nelasticity, which are inherent in matter, and are not made by any design of\na Creator for this special action, or to serve this special purpose, but\nwould have existed in the materials of which the balls were made, although\nthe players had never been born.\n\nI have thus stated, by a simple example in physical action, what is meant\nby design and what by necessity; and that the latter may exist without any\ndependence upon the former. If I have given the statement with what may be\nthought, by some, unnecessary prolixity, I have only to say that I have\nfound many minds to have a great difficulty in conceiving of necessity as\nacting altogether independent of design.\n\nLet me now trace these principles as sources of action in Darwin's work or\ntheory. Let us see how much there is of design acting to produce a foreseen\nend, and thus proving a reasoning and self-conscious Creator; and how much\nof mere blind power acting without rational design, or without a specific\npurpose or conscious foresight. Mr. Darwin has specified in a most clear\nand unmistakable manner the operation of his three great powers, or rather,\nthe three great laws by which the organic power of life acts in the\nformation of an eye. (See p. 169.) Following the method he has pointed out,\nwe will take a number of animals of the same species, in which the eye is\nnot developed. They may have all the other senses, with the organs of\nnutrition, circulation, respiration, and locomotion. They all have a brain\nand nerves, and some of these nerves may be sensitive to light; but have no\ncombination of retina, membranes, humors, etc., by which the distinct\nimage of an object may be formed and conveyed by the optic nerve to the\ncognizance of the internal perception, or the mind. The animal in this case\nwould be merely sensible of the difference between light and darkness. He\nwould have no power of discriminating form, size, shape, or color, the\ndifference of objects, and to gain from these a knowledge of their being\nuseful or hurtful, friends or enemies. Up to this point there is no\nappearance of necessity upon the scene. The billiard-balls have not yet\nstruck together, and we will suppose that none of the arguments that may be\nused to prove, from this organism, thus existing, that it could not have\ncome into form and being without a creator acting to this end with\nintelligence and design, are opposed by anything that can be found in\nDarwin's theory; for, so far, Darwin's laws are supposed not to have come\ninto operation. Give the animals, thus organized, food and room, and they\nmay go on, from generation to generation, upon the same organic level. Those\nindividuals that, from natural variation, are born with light-nerves a\nlittle more sensitive to light than their parents, will cross or interbreed\nwith those who have the same organs a little less sensitive, and thus the\nmean standard will be kept up without any advancement. If our\nbilliard-table were sufficiently extensive, i. e., infinite, the balls\nrolled from the corners would never meet, and the necessity which we have\nsupposed to deflect them would never act.\n\nThe moment, however, that the want of space or food commences natural\nselection begins. Here the balls meet, and all future action is governed by\nnecessity. The best forms, or those nerves most sensitive to light,\nconnected with incipient membranes and humors for corneas and lenses, are\npicked out and preserved by natural selection, of necessity. All cannot\nlive and propagate, and it is a necessity, obvious to all, that the weaker\nmust perish, if the theory be true. Working on, in this way, through\ncountless generations, the eye is at last\n\n\n55\n\nformed in all its beauty and excellence. It must (always assuming that this\ntheory is true) result from this combined action of natural variation, the\nstruggle for life, and natural selection, with as much certainty as the\nballs, after collision, must pass to corners of the table different from\nthose to which they were directed, and so far forth as the eye is formed by\nthese laws, acting upward from the nerve merely sensitive to light, we can\nno more infer design, and from design a designer, than we can infer design\nin the direction of the billiard-balls after the collision. Both are\nsufficiently accounted for by blind powers acting under a blind necessity.\nTake away the struggle for life from the one, and the collision of the\nballs from the other--and neither of these was designed--and the animal\nwould have gone on without eyes. The balls would have found the corners of\nthe table to which they were first directed.\n\nWhile, therefore, it seems to me clear that one who can find no proof of\nthe existence of an intelligent Creator except through the evidence of\ndesign in the organic world, can find no evidence of such design in the\nconstruction of the eye, if it were constructed under the operation of\nDarwin's laws, I shall not for one moment contend that these laws are\nincompatible with design and a self-conscious, intelligent Creator. Such\ndesign might, indeed, have coexisted with the necessity or natural\nselection; and so the billiard-players might have designed the collision\nof their balls; but neither the formation of the eye, nor the path of the\nballs after collision, furnishes any sufficient proof of such design in\neither case.\n\nOne, indeed, who believes, from revelation or any other cause, in the\nexistence of such a Creator, the fountain and Source of all things in\nheaven above and in the earth beneath, will see in natural variation, the\nstruggle for life, and natural selection, only the order or mode in which\nthis Creator, in his own perfect wisdom, sees fit to act. Happy is he who\ncan thus see and adore. But how many are there who have no such\n\n\n56\n\nbelief from intuition, or faith in revelation; but who have by careful and\nelaborate search in the physical, and more especially in the organic world,\ninferred, by induction, the existence of God from what has seemed to them\nthe wonderful adaptation of the different organs and parts of the animal\nbody to its, apparently, designed ends! Imagine a mind of this skeptical\ncharacter, in all honesty and under its best reason, after finding itself\nobliged to reject the evidence of revelation, to commence a search after\nthe Creator, in the light of natural theology. He goes through the proof for\nfinal cause and design, as given in a summary though clear, plain, and\nconvincing form, in the pages of Paley and the \"Bridgewater Treatises.\" The\neye and the hand, those perfect instruments of optical and mechanical\ncontrivance and adaptation, without the least waste or surplusage--these,\nsay Paley and Bell, certainly prove a designing maker as much as the palace\nor the watch proves an architect or a watchmaker. Let this mind, in this\nstate, cross Darwin's work, and find that, after a sensitive nerve or a\nrudimentary hoof or claw, no design is to be found. From this point upward\nthe development is the mere necessary result of natural selection; and let\nhim receive this law of natural selection as true, and where does he find\nhimself? Before, he could refer the existence of the eye, for example, only\nto design, or chance. There was no other alternative. He rejected chance,\nas impossible.\n\nIt must then be a design. But Darwin brings up another power, namely,\nnatural selection, in place of this impossible chance. This not only may,\nbut, according to Darwin, must of necessity produce an eye. It may indeed\ncoexist with design, but it must exist and act and produce its results,\neven without design. Will such a mind, under such circumstances, infer the\nexistence of the designer--God--when he can, at the same time,\nsatisfactorily account for the thing produced, by the operation of this\nnatural selection? It seems to me, therefore, perfectly evident\n\n\n57\n\n\nthat the substitution of natural selection, by necessity, for design in the\nformation of the organic world, is a step decidedly atheistical. It is in\nvain to say that Darwin takes the creation of organic life, in its simplest\nforms, to have been the work of the Deity. In giving up design in these\nhighest and most complex forms of organization, which have always been\nrelied upon as the crowning proof of the existence of an intelligent\nCreator, without whose intellectual power they could not have been brought\ninto being, he takes a most decided step to banish a belief in the\nintelligent action of God from the organic world. The lower organisms will\ngo next.\n\nThe atheist will say, Wait a little. Some future Darwin will show how the\nsimple forms came necessarily from inorganic matter. This is but another\nstep by which, according to Laplace, \"the discoveries of science throw\nfinal causes further back.\"\n\nA.G.--It is conceded that, if the two players in the supposed case were\nignorant of each other's presence, the designs of both were frustrated, and\nfrom necessity. Thus far it is not needful to inquire whether this\nnecessary consequence is an unconditional or a conditioned necessity, nor\nto require a more definite statement of the meaning attached to the word\nnecessity as a supposed third alternative.\n\nBut, if the players knew of each other's presence, we could not infer from\nthe result that the design of both or of either was frustrated. One of them\nmay have intended to frustrate the other's design, and to effect his own.\nOr both may have been equally conversant with the properties of the matter\nand the relation of the forces concerned (whatever the cause, origin, or\nnature, of these forces and properties), and the result may have been\naccording to the designs of both.\n\nAs you admit that they might or might not have designed the collision of\ntheir balls and its consequences the question arises whether there is any\nway of ascertaining which of the\ntwo conceptions we may form about it is the true one. Now, let it be\nremarked that design can never be demonstrated. Witnessing the act does not\nmake known the design, as we have seen in the case assumed for the basis of\nthe argument. The word of the actor is not proof; and that source of\nevidence is excluded from the cases in question. The only way left, and the\nonly possible way in cases where testimony is out of the question, is to\ninfer the design from the result, or from arrangements which strike us as\nadapted or intended to produce a certain result, which affords a\npresumption of design. The strength of this presumption may be zero, or an\neven chance, as perhaps it is in the assumed case; but the probability of\ndesign will increase with the particularity of the act, the specialty of\nthe arrangement or machinery, and with the number of identical or yet more\nof similar and analogous instances, until it rises to a moral certainty--i.\ne., to a conviction which practically we are as unable to resist as we are\nto deny the cogency of a mathematical demonstration. A single instance, or\nset of instances, of a comparatively simple arrangement might suffice. For\ninstance, we should not doubt that a pump was designed to raise water by\nthe moving of the handle. Of course, the conviction is the stronger, or at\nleast the sooner arrived at, where we can imitate the arrangement, and\nourselves produce the result at will, as we could with a pump, and also with\nthe billiard-balls.\n\nAnd here I would suggest that your billiard-table, with the case of\ncollision, answers well to a machine. In both a result is produced by\nindirection--by applying a force out of line of the ultimate direction.\nAnd, as I should feel as confident that a man intended to raise water who\nwas working a pumphandle, as if he were bringing it up in pailfuls from\nbelow by means of a ladder, so, after due examination of the billiard-table\nand its appurtenances, I should probably think it likely that the effect of\nthe rebound was expected and intended no less than that of the immediate\nimpulse. And a similar inspection of arrangements and results in Nature\nwould raise at least an equal presumption of design.\n\nYou allow that the rebound might have been intended, but you require proof\nthat it was. We agree that a single such instance affords no evidence\neither way. But how would it be if you saw the men doing the same thing\nover and over? and if they varied it by other arrangements of the balls or\nof the blow, and these were followed by analogous results? How if you at\nlength discovered a profitable end of the operation, say the winning of a\nwager? So in the counterpart case of natural selection: must we not infer\nintention from the arrangements and the results? But I will take another\ncase of the very same sort, though simpler, and better adapted to\nillustrate natural selection; because the change of direction--your\nnecessity--acts gradually or successively, instead of abruptly.\nSuppose I hit a man standing obliquely in my rear, by throwing forward a\ncrooked stick, called a boomerang. How could he know whether the blow was\nintentional or not? But suppose I had been known to throw boomerangs\nbefore; suppose that, on different occasions, I had before wounded persons\nby the same, or other indirect and apparently aimless actions; and suppose\nthat an object appeared to be gained in the result--that definite ends were\nattained--would it not at length be inferred that my assault, though\nindirect, or apparently indirect, was designed?\n\nTo make the case more nearly parallel with those it is brought to\nillustrate, you have only to suppose that, although the boomerang thrown by\nme went forward to a definite place, and at least appeared to subserve a\npurpose, and the bystanders, after a while, could get traces of the mode or\nthe empirical law of its flight, yet they could not themselves do anything\nwith it. It was quite beyond their power to use it. Would they doubt, or\ndeny my intention, on that account? No: they would insist that design on my\npart must be presumed from the nature of the results; that, though design\nmay have been wanting in any one case, yet the repetition of the result,\nand from different positions and under varied circumstances, showed that\nthere must have been design.\n\nMoreover, in the way your case is stated, it seems to concede the most\nimportant half of the question, and so affords a presumption for the rest,\non the side of design. For you seem to assume an actor, a designer,\naccomplishing his design in the first instance. You--a bystander--infer\nthat the player effected his design in sending the first ball to the pocket\nbefore him. You infer this from observation alone. Must you not from a\ncontinuance of the same observation equally infer a common design of the two\nplayers in the complex result, or a design of one of them to frustrate the\ndesign of the other? If you grant a designing actor, the presumption of\ndesign is as strong, or upon continued observation of instances soon\nbecomes as strong, in regard to the deflection of the balls, or variation\nof the species, as it was for the result of the first impulse or for the\nproduction of the original animal, etc.\n\nBut, in the case to be illustrated, we do not see the player. We see only\nthe movement of the balls. Now, if the contrivances and adaptations\nreferred to really do \"prove a designer as much as the palace or the watch\nproves an architect or a watchmaker\"--as Paley and Bell argue, and as your\nskeptic admits, while the alternative is between design and chance--then\nthey prove it with all the proof the case is susceptible of, and with\ncomplete conviction. For we cannot doubt that the watch had a watchmaker.\nAnd if they prove it on the supposition that the unseen operator acted\nimmediately--i.e., that the player directly impelled the balls in the\ndirections we see them moving, I insist that this proof is not impaired by\nour ascertaining that he acted mediately--i.e., that the present state or\nform of the plants or animals, like the present position of the\nbilliard-balls, resulted from the collision of the individuals with one\nanother, or with the surroundings. The original impulse, which we once\nsupposed was in the line of the observed movement, only proves to have been\nin a different direction; but the series of movements took place with a\nseries of results, each and all of them none the less determined, none the\nless designed.\n\nWherefore, when, at the close, you quote Laplace, that \"the discoveries of\nscience throw final causes farther back,\" the most you can mean is, that\nthey constrain us to look farther back for the impulse. They do not at all\nthrow the argument for design farther back, in the sense of furnishing\nevidence or presumption that only the primary impulse was designed, and\nthat all the rest followed from chance or necessity.\n\nEvidence of design, I think you will allow, everywhere is drawn from the\nobservation of adaptations and of results, and has really nothing to do with\nanything else, except where you can take the word for the will. And in that\ncase you have not argument for design, but testimony. In Nature we have no\ntestimony; but the argument is overwhelming.\n\nNow, note that the argument of the olden time--that of Paley, etc., which\nyour skeptic found so convincing--was always the argument for design in the\nmovement of the balls after deflection. For it was drawn from animals\nproduced by generation, not by creation, and through a long succession of\ngenerations or deflections. Wherefore, if the argument for design is\nperfect in the case of an animal derived from a long succession of\nindividuals as nearly alike as offspring is generally like parents and\ngrandparents, and if this argument is not weakened when a variation, or\nseries of variations, has occurred in the course, as great as any\nvariations we know of among domestic cattle, how then is it weakened by the\nsupposition, or by the likelihood, that the variations have been twice or\nthrice as great as we formerly supposed, or because the variations have been\n\"picked out,\" and a few of them pre served as breeders of still other\nvariations, by natural selection?\n\nFinally let it be noted that your element of necessity has to do, so far as\nwe know, only with the picking out and preserving of certain changing\nforms, i. e., with the natural selection. This selection, you may say, must\nhappen under the circumstances. This is a necessary result of the collision\nof the balls; and these results can be predicted. If the balls strike so\nand so, they will be deflected so and so. But the variation itself is of\nthe nature of an origination. It answers well to the original impulse of the\nballs, or to a series of such impulses. We cannot predict what particular\nnew variation will occur from any observation of the past. Just as the\nfirst impulse was given to the balls at a point out of sight, so the\nimpulse which resulted in the variety or new form was given at a point\nbeyond observation, and is equally mysterious or unaccountable, except on\nthe supposition of an ordaining will. The parent had not the peculiarity of\nthe variety, the progeny has. Between the two is the dim or obscure region\nof the formation of a new individual, in some unknown part of which, and in\nsome wholly unknown way, the difference is intercalated. To introduce\nnecessity here is gratuitous and unscientific; but here you must have it to\nmake your argument valid.\n\nI agree that, judging from the past, it is not improbable that variation\nitself may be hereafter shown to result from physical causes. When it is so\nshown, you may extend your necessity into this region, but not till then.\nBut the whole course of scientific discovery goes to assure us that the\ndiscovery of the cause of variation will be only a resolution of variation\ninto two factors: one, the immediate secondary cause of the changes, which\nso far explains them; the other an unresolved or unexplained phenomenon,\nwhich will then stand just where the product, variation, stands now, only\nthat it will be one step nearer to the efficient cause. This line of\nargument appears to me so convincing, that I am bound to suppose that it\ndoes not meet your case. Although you introduced players to illustrate what\ndesign is, it is probable that you did not intend, and would not accept,\nthe parallel which your supposed case suggested. When you declare that the\nproof of design in the eye and the hand, as given by Paley and Bell, was\nconvincing, you mean, of course, that it was convincing, so long as the\nquestion was between design and chance, but that now another alternative is\noffered, one which obviates the force of those arguments, and may account\nfor the actual results without design. I do not clearly apprehend this\nthird alternative.\n\nWill you be so good, then, as to state the grounds upon which you conclude\nthat the supposed proof of design from the eye, or the hand, as it stood\nbefore Darwin's theory was promulgated, would be invalidated by the\nadmission of this new theory?\n\nD.T.--As I have ever found you, in controversy, meeting the array of your\nopponent fairly and directly, without any attempt to strike the body of his\nargument through an unguarded joint in the phraseology, I was somewhat\nsurprised at the course taken in your answer to my statement on Darwin's\ntheory. You there seem to suppose that I instanced the action of the\nbilliard balls and players as a parallel, throughout, to the formation of\nthe organic world. Had it occurred to me that such an application might be\nsupposed to follow legitimately from my introduction of this action, I\nshould certainly have stated that I did not intend, and should by no means\naccede to, that construction. My purpose in bringing the billiard-table\nupon the scene was to illustrate, by example, design and necessity, as\ndifferent and independent sources from which results, it might indeed be\nidentical results, may be derived All the conclusions, therefore, that you\nhave arrived at through this misconception or misapplication of my\nillustration, I cannot take as an answer to the matter stated or intended\nto be stated by me. Again, following this misconception, you suppose the\nskeptic (instanced by me as revealing through the evidence of design,\nexhibited in the structure of the eye, for its designer, God) as bringing to\nthe examination a belief in the existence of design in the construction of\nthe animals as they existed up to the moment when the eye was, according to\nmy supposition, added to the heart, stomach, brain, etc. By skeptic I, of\ncourse, intended one who doubted the existence of design in every organic\nstructure, or at least required proof of such design. Now, as the watch may\nbe instanced as a more complete exhibition of design than a flint knife or\nan hour-glass, I selected, after the example of Paley, the eye, as\nexhibiting by its complex but harmonious arrangements a higher evidence of\ndesign and a designer than is to be found in a nerve sensitive to light, or\nany mere rudimentary part or organ. I could not mean by skeptic one who\nbelieved in design so far as a claw, or a nerve sensitive to light, was\nconcerned, but doubted all above. For one who believes in design at all\nwill not fail to recognize it in a hand or an eye. But I need not extend\nthese remarks, as you acknowledge in the sequel to your argument that you\nmay not have suited it to the case as I have stated it.\n\nYou now request me to \"state the grounds upon which I conclude that the\nsupposed proof of design from the eye and the hand, as it stood before\nDarwin's theory was promulgated, is invalidated by the admission of that\ntheory.\" It seems to me that a sufficient answer to this question has\nalready been made in the last part of my former paper; but, as you request\nit, I will go over the leading points as there given, with more minuteness\nof detail.\n\nLet us, then, suppose a skeptic, one who is yet considering and doubting of\nthe existence of God, having already concluded that the testimony from any\nand all revelation is insufficient, and having rejected what is called the\na priori arguments brought forward in natural theology, and pertinaciously\ninsisted upon by Dr. Clark and others, turning as a last resource to the\nargument from design in the organic world. Voltaire tells him that a palace\ncould not exist without an architect to design it. Dr. Paley tells him\nthat a watch proves the design of a watchmaker. He thinks this very\nreasonable, and, although he sees a difference between the works of Nature\nand those of mere human art, yet if he can find in any organic body, or\npart of a body, the same adaptation to its use that he finds in a watch,\nthis truth will go very far toward proving, if it is not entirely\nconclusive, that, in making it, the powers of life by which it grew were\ndirected by an intelligent, reasoning master. Under the guidance of Paley he\ntakes an eye, which, although an optical, and not a mechanical instrument\nlike the watch, is as well adapted to testify to design. He sees, first,\nthat the eye is transparent when every other part of the body is opaque.\nWas this the result of a mere Epicurean or Lucretian \"fortuitous concourse\"\nof living \"atoms\"? He is not yet certain it might not be so. Next he sees\nthat it is spherical, and that this convex form alone is capable of changing\nthe direction of the light which proceeds from a distant body, and of\ncollecting it so as to form a distinct image within its globe. Next he sees\nat the exact place where this image must be formed a curtain of nerve-work,\nready to receive and convey it, or excite from it, in its own mysterious\nway, an idea of it in the mind. Last of all, he comes to the crystalline\nlens. Now, he has before learned that without this lens an eye would by the\naqueous and Vitreous humors alone form an image upon the retina, but this\nimage would be indistinct from the light not being sufficiently refracted,\nand likewise from having a colored fringe round its edges. This last effect\nis attributable to the refrangibility of light, that is, to some of the\ncolors being more refracted than others. He likewise knows that more than a\nhundred years ago Mr. Dollond having found out, after many experiments,\nthat some kinds of glass have the power of dispersing light, for each degree\nof its refraction, much more than other kinds, and that on the discovery of\nthis fact he contrived to make telescopes in which he passed the light\nthrough two object-glasses successively, one of which he made of crown and\none of flint glass, so ground and adapted to each other that the greater\ndispersion produced by the substance of one should be corrected by the\nsmaller dispersion of the other. This contrivance corrected entirely the\ncolored images which had rendered all previous telescopes very imperfect. He\nfinds in this invention all the elements of design, as it appeared in the\nthought and action of a human designer. First, conjecture of certain laws\nor facts in optics. Then, experiment proving these laws or facts. Then, the\ncontrivance and formation of an instrument by which those laws or facts\nmust produce a certain sought result.\n\nThus enlightened, our skeptic turns to his crystalline lens to see if he\ncan discover the work of a Dollond in this. Here he finds that an eye,\nhaving a crystalline lens placed between the humors, not only refracts the\nlight more than it would be refracted by the humors alone, but that, in\nthis combination of humors and lens, the colors are as completely corrected\nas in the combination of Dollond's telescope. Can it be that there was no\ndesign, no designer, directing the powers of life in the formation of this\nwonderful organ? Our skeptic is aware that, in the arts of man, great aid\nhas been, sometimes, given by chance, that is, by the artist or workman\nobserving some fortuitous combination, form, or action, around him. He has\nheard it said that the chance arrangement of two pairs of spectacles, in\nthe shop of a Dutch optician, gave the direction\n\n\n67\n\nfor constructing the first telescope. Possibly, in time, say a few\ngeological ages, it might in some optician's shop have brought about a\ncombination of flint and crown glass which, together, should have been\nachromatic. But the space between the humors of the eye is not an optician'\ns shop where object-glasses of all kinds, shapes, and sizes, are placed by\nchance, in all manner of relations and positions. On the hypothesis under\nwhich our skeptic is making his examination--the eye having been completed\nin all but the formation of the lens--the place which the lens occupies\nwhen completed was filled with parts of the humors and plane membrane,\nhomogeneous in texture and surface, presenting, therefore, neither the\nvariety of the materials nor forms which are contained in the optician's\nshop for chance to make its combinations with. How, then, could it be cast\nof a combination not before used, and fashioned to a shape different from\nthat before known, and placed in exact combination with all the parts\nbefore enumerated, with many others not even mentioned? He sees no\nparallelism of condition, then, by which chance could act in forming a\ncrystalline lens, which answers to the condition of an optician's shop,\nwhere it might be possible in many ages for chance to combine existing forms\ninto an achromatic object-glass.\n\nConsidering, therefore, the eye thus completed and placed in its bony case\nand provided with its muscles, its lids, its tear-ducts, and all its other\nelaborate and curious appendages, and, a thousand times more wonderful\nstill, without being encumbered with a single superfluous or useless part,\ncan he say that this could be the work of chance? The improbability of this\nis so great, and consequently the evidence of design is so strong, that he\nis about to seal his verdict in favor of design, when he opens Mr. Darwin's\nbook.\nThere he finds that an eye is no more than a vital aggregation or growth,\ndirected, not by design nor chance, but moulded by natural variation and\nnatural selection, through which it must, necessarily, have been developed\nand formed. Particles or atoms being aggregated by the blind powers of\nlife, must become under the given conditions, by natural variation and\nnatural selection, eyes, without design, as certainly as the red\nbilliard-ball went to the west pocket, by the powers of inertia and\nelasticity, without the design of the hand that put it in motion. (See\nDarwin, p. 169.)\n\nLet us lay before our skeptic the way in which we may suppose that Darwin\nwould trace the operation of life, or the vital force conforming to these\nlaws. In doing this we need not go through with the formation of the\nseveral membranes, humors, etc., but take the crystalline lens as the most\ncurious and nicely arranged and adapted of all the parts, and as giving,\nmoreover, a close parallel, in the end produced, to that produced by\ndesign, by a human designer, Dollond, in forming his achromatic\nobject-glass. If it can be shown that natural variation and natural\nselection were capable of forming the crystalline lens, it will not be\ndenied that they were capable of forming the iris, the sclerotica, the\naqueous humors, or any and all the other parts. Suppose, then, that we have\na number of animals, with eyes yet wanting the crystalline. In this state\nthe animals can see, but dimly and imperfectly, as a man sees after having\nbeen couched. Some of the offspring of these animals have, by natural\nvariation, merely a portion of the membrane which separates the aqueous\nfrom the vitreous humor a little thickened in its middle part, a little\nswelled out. This refracts the light a little more than it would be\nrefracted by a membrane in which no such swelling existed, and not only so,\nbut, in combination with the humors, it corrects the errors of dispersion\nand makes the image somewhat more colorless. All the young animals that\nhave this swelled membrane see more distinctly than their parents or\nbrethren. They, therefore, have an advantage over them in the struggle for\nlife. They can obtain food more easily; can find their prey, and escape\nfrom their enemies with greater facility than their kindred. This thickening\nand rounding of the membrane goes on from generation to generation by\nnatural variation; natural selection all the while \"picking out with\nunerring skill all the improvements, through countless generations,\" until\nat length it is found that the membrane has become a perfect crystalline\nlens. Now, where is the design in all this? The membrane was not thickened\nand rounded to the end that the image should be more distinct and colorless;\nbut, being thickened and rounded by the operation of natural variation,\ninherent in generation, natural selection of necessity produced the result\nthat we have seen. The same result was thus produced of necessity, in the\neye, that Dollond came at, in the telescope, with design, through painful\nguessing, reasoning, experimenting, and forming.\n\nSuppose our skeptic to believe in all this power of natural selection; will\nhe now seal up his verdict for design, with the same confidence that he\nwould before he heard of Darwin? If not, then \"the supposed proof from\ndesign is invalidated by Darwin's theory.\"\n\nA.G.--Waiving incidental points and looking only to the gist of the\nquestion, I remark that the argument for design as against chance, in the\nformation of the eye, is most convincingly stated in your argument. Upon\nthis and upon numerous similar arguments the whole question we are\ndiscussing turns. So, if the skeptic was about to seal his verdict in favor\nof design, and a designer, when Darwin's book appeared, why should his\nverdict now be changed or withheld? All the facts about the eye, which\nconvinced him that the organ was designed, remain just as they were. His\nconviction was not produced through testimony or eyewitness, but design was\nirresistibly inferred from the evidence of contrivance in the eye itself.\n\nNow, if the eye as it is, or has become, so convincingly argued design why\nnot each particular step or part of this result? If the production of a\nperfect crystalline lens in the eye--you know not how--as much indicated\ndesign as did the production of a Dollond achromatic lens--you understand\nhow--then why does not \"the swelling out\" of a particular portion of the\nmembrane behind the iris--caused you know not how--which, by \"correcting\nthe errors of dispersion and making the image somewhat more colorless,\"\nenabled the \"young animals to see more distinctly than their parents or\nbrethren,\" equally indicate design--if not as much as a perfect\ncrystalline, or a Dollond compound lens, yet as much as a common\nspectacle-glass?\nDarwin only assures you that what you may have thought was done directly and\nat once was done indirectly and successively. But you freely admit that\nindirection and succession do not invalidate design, and also that Paley\nand all the natural theologians drew the arguments which convinced your\nskeptic wholly from eyes indirectly or naturally produced.\n\nRecall a woman of a past generation and show her a web of cloth; ask her\nhow it was made, and she will say that the wool or cotton was carded, spun,\nand woven by hand. When you tell her it was not made by manual labor, that\nprobably no hand has touched the materials throughout the process, it is\npossible that she might at first regard your statement as tantamount to the\nassertion that the cloth was made without design. If she did, she would not\ncredit your statement. If you patiently explained to her the theory of\ncarding-machines, spinning-jennies, and power-looms, would her reception of\nyour explanation weaken her conviction that the cloth was the result of\ndesign? It is certain that she would believe in design as firmly as before,\nand that this belief would be attended by a higher conception and reverent\nadmiration of a wisdom, skill, and power greatly beyond anything she had\npreviously conceived possible.\n\nWherefore, we may insist that, for all that yet appears, the argument for\ndesign, as presented by the natural theologians, is just as good now, if we\naccept Darwin's theory, as it was before that theory was promulgated; and\nthat the skeptical juryman, who was about to join the other eleven in a\nunanimous verdict in favor of design, finds no good excuse for keeping the\ncourt longer waiting.[II-1]\n\n\n\nIII\n\nNATURAL SELECTION\n\nNOT INCONSISTENT WITH\n\nNATURAL THEOLOGY\n\n(Atlantic Monthly for July, August, and October, 1860, reprinted in 1861)\n\n\nI\n\n\nNovelties are enticing to most people; to us they are simply annoying. We\ncling to a long-accepted theory, just as we cling to an old suit of\nclothes. A new theory, like a new pair of breeches (the Atlantic still\naffects the older type of nether garment), is sure to have hard-fitting\nplaces; or, even when no particular fault can be found with the article, it\noppresses with a sense of general discomfort. New notions and new styles\nworry us, till we get well used to them, which is only by slow degrees.\n\nWherefore, in Galileo's time, we might have helped to proscribe, or to\nburn--had he been stubborn enough to warrant cremation--even the great\npioneer of inductive research; although, when we had fairly recovered our\ncomposure, and bad leisurely excogitated the matter, we might have come to\nconclude that the new doctrine was better than the old one, after all, at\nleast for those who had nothing to unlearn.\n\nSuch being our habitual state of mind, it may well be believed that the\nperusal of the new book \"On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural\nSelection\" left an uncomfortable impression, in spite of its plausible and\nwinning ways. We were not wholly unprepared for it, as many of our\ncontemporaries seem to have been. The scientific reading in which we\nindulge as a relaxation from severer studies had raised dim forebodings.\nInvestigations about the succession of species in time, and their actual\ngeographical distribution over the earth's surface, were leading up from all\nsides and in various ways to the question of their origin. Now and then we\nencountered a sentence, like Prof. Owen's \"axiom of the continuous\noperation of the ordained becoming of living things,\" which haunted us like\nan apparition. For, dim as our conception must needs be as to what such\noracular and grandiloquent phrases might really mean, we felt confident that\nthey presaged no good to old beliefs. Foreseeing, yet deprecating, the\ncoming time of trouble, we still hoped that, with some repairs and\nmakeshifts, the old views might last out our days. Apres nous le deluge.\nStill, not to lag behind the rest of the world, we read the book in which\nthe new theory is promulgated. We took it up, like our neighbors, and, as\nwas natural, in a somewhat captious frame of mind.\n\nWell, we found no cause of quarrel with the first chapter. Here the author\ntakes us directly to the barn-yard and the kitchen-garden. Like an\nhonorable rural member of our General Court, who sat silent until, near the\nclose of a long session, a bill requiring all swine at large to wear pokes\nwas introduced, when he claimed the privilege of addressing the house, on\nthe proper ground that he had been \"brought up among the pigs, and knew all\nabout them\"--so we were brought up among cows and cabbages; and the lowing\nof cattle, the cackle of hens, and the cooing of pigeons, were sounds native\nand pleasant to our ears. So \"Variation under Domestication\" dealt with\nfamiliar subjects in a natural way, and gently introduced \"Variation under\nNature,\" which seemed likely enough. Then follows \"Struggle for\nExistence\"--a principle which we experimentally know to be true and\ncogent--bringing the comfortable assurance, that man, even upon Leviathan\nHobbes's theory of society, is no worse than the rest of creation, since all\nNature is at war, one species with another, and the nearer kindred the more\ninternecine--bringing in thousandfold confirmation and extension of the\nMalthusian doctrine that population tends far to outrun means of\nsubsistence throughout the animal and vegetable world, and has to be kept\ndown by sharp preventive checks; so that not more than one of a hundred or a\nthousand of the individuals whose existence is so wonderfully and so\nsedulously provided for ever comes to anything, under ordinary\ncircumstances; so the lucky and the strong must prevail, and the weaker and\nill-favored must perish; and then follows, as naturally as one sheep\nfollows another, the chapter on \"Natural Selection,\" Darwin's cheval de\nbataille, which is very much the Napoleonic doctrine that Providence favors\nthe strongest battalions--that, since many more individuals are born than\ncan possibly survive, those individuals and those variations which possess\nany advantage, however slight, over the rest, are in the long-run sure to\nsurvive, to propagate, and to occupy the limited field, to the exclusion or\ndestruction of the weaker brethren. All this we pondered, and could not\nmuch object to. In fact, we began to contract a liking for a system which at\nthe outset illustrates the advantages of good breeding, and which makes the\nmost \"of every creature's best.\"\n\nCould we \"let by-gones be by-gones,\" and, beginning now, go on improving\nand diversifying for the future by natural selection, could we even take up\nthe theory at the introduction of the actually existing species, we should\nbe well content; and so, perhaps, would most naturalists be. It is by no\nmeans difficult to believe that varieties are incipient or possible\nspecies, when we see what trouble naturalists, especially botanists, have\nto distinguish between them--one regarding as a true species what another\nregards as a variety; when the progress of knowledge continually increases,\nrather than diminishes, the number of doubtful instances; and when there is\nless agreement than ever among naturalists as to what is the basis in\nNature upon which our idea of species reposes, or how the word is to be\ndefined. Indeed, when we consider the endless disputes of naturalists and\nethnologists over the human races, as to whether they belong to one species\nor to more, and, if to more, whether to three, or five, or fifty, we can\nhardly help fancying that both may be right--or rather, that the\nuni-humanitarians would have been right many thousand years ago, and the\nmulti-humanitarians will be several thousand years later; while at present\nthe safe thing to say is, that probably there is some truth on both sides.\n\n\"Natural selection,\" Darwin remarks, \"leads to divergence of character; for\nthe more living beings can be supported on the same area, the more they\ndiverge in structure, habits, and constitution\" (a principle which,\nby-the-way, is paralleled and illustrated by the diversification of human\nlabor); and also leads to much extinction of intermediate or unimproved\nforms. Now, though this divergence may \"steadily tend to increase,\" yet\nthis is evidently a slow process in Nature, and liable to much counteraction\nwherever man does not interpose, and so not likely to work much harm for\nthe future. And if natural selection, with artificial to help it, will\nproduce better animals and better men than the present, and fit them better\nto the conditions of existence, why, let it work, say we, to the top of its\nbent There is still room enough for improvement. Only let us hope that it\nalways works for good: if not, the divergent lines on Darwin's lithographic\ndiagram of \"Transmutation made Easy,\" ominously show what small deviations\nfrom the straight path may come to in the end.\n\nThe prospect of the future, accordingly, is on the whole pleasant and\nencouraging. It is only the backward glance, the gaze up the long vista of\nthe past, that reveals anything alarming. Here the lines converge as they\nrecede into the geological ages, and point to conclusions which, upon the\ntheory, are inevitable, but hardly welcome. The very first step backward\nmakes the negro and the Hottentot our blood-relations--not that reason or\nScripture objects to that, though pride may. The next suggests a closer\nassociation of our ancestors of the olden time with \"our poor relations\" of\nthe quadrumanous family than we like to acknowledge. Fortunately,\nhowever--even if we must account for him scientifically --man with his two\nfeet stands upon a foundation of his own. Intermediate links between the\nBimana and the Quadrumana are lacking altogether; so that, put the\ngenealogy of the brutes upon what footing you will, the four-handed races\nwill not serve for our forerunners--at least, not until some monkey, live\nor fossil, is producible with great-toes, instead of thumbs, upon his nether\nextremities; or until some lucky geologist turns up the bones of his\nancestor and prototype in France or England, who was so busy \"napping the\nchuckie-stanes\" and chipping out flint knives and arrow-heads in the time\nof the drift, very many ages ago--before the British Channel existed, says\nLyell [III-1]--and until these men of the olden time are shown to have worn\ntheir great-toes in the divergent and thumblike fashion. That would be\nevidence indeed: but, until some testimony of the sort is produced, we must\nneeds believe in the separate and special creation of man, however it may\nhave been with the lower animals and with plants.\n\nNo doubt, the full development and symmetry of Darwin's hypothesis strongly\nsuggest the evolution of the human no less than the lower animal races out\nof some simple primordial animal--that all are equally \"lineal descendants\nof some few beings which lived long before the first bed of the Silurian\nsystem was deposited.\" But, as the author speaks disrespectfully of\nspontaneous generation, and accepts a supernatural beginning of life on\nearth, in some form or forms of being which included potentially all that\nhave since existed and are yet to be, he is thereby not warranted to extend\nhis inferences beyond the evidence or the fair probability. There seems as\ngreat likelihood that one special origination should be followed by another\nupon fitting occasion (such as the introduction of man), as that one form\nshould be transmuted into another upon fitting occasion, as, for instance,\nin the succession of species which differ from each other only in some\ndetails. To compare small things with great in a homely illustration: man\nalters from time to time his instruments or machines, as new circumstances\nor conditions may require and his wit suggest. Minor alterations and\nimprovements he adds to the machine he possesses; he adapts a new rig or a\nnew rudder to an old boat: this answers to Variation. \"Like begets like,\"\nbeing the great rule in Nature, if boats could engender, the variations\nwould doubtless be propagated, like those of domestic cattle. In course of\ntime the old ones would be worn out or wrecked; the best sorts would be\nchosen for each particular use, and further improved upon; and so the\nprimordial boat be developed into the scow, the skiff, the sloop, and other\nspecies of water-craft--the very diversification, as well as the successive\nimprovements, entailing the disappearance of intermediate forms, less\nadapted to any one particular purpose; wherefore these go slowly out of\nuse, and become extinct species: this is Natural Selection. Now, let a great\nand important advance be made, like that of steam navigation: here, though\nthe engine might be added to the old vessel, yet the wiser and therefore\nthe actual way is to make a new vessel on a modified plan: this may answer\nto Specific Creation. Anyhow, the one does not necessarily exclude the\nother. Variation and natural selection may play their part, and so may\nspecific creation also. Why not?\n\nThis leads us to ask for the reasons which call for this new theory of\ntransmutation. The beginning of things must needs lie in obscurity, beyond\nthe bounds of proof, though within those of conjecture or of analogical\ninference. Why not hold fast to the customary view, that all species were\ndirectly, instead of indirectly, created after their respective kinds, as\nwe now behold them--and that in a manner which, passing our comprehension,\nwe intuitively refer to the supernatural? Why this continual striving after\n\"the unattained and dim?\" why these anxious endeavors, especially of late\nyears, by naturalists and philosophers of various schools and different\ntendencies, to penetrate what one of them calls \"that mystery of\nmysteries,\" the origin of species?\n\nTo this, in general, sufficient answer may be found in the activity of the\nhuman intellect, \"the delirious yet divine desire to know,\" stimulated as\nit has been by its own success in unveiling the laws and processes of\ninorganic Nature; in the fact that the principal triumphs of our age in\nphysical science have consisted in tracing connections where none were\nknown before, in reducing heterogeneous phenomena to a common cause or\norigin, in a manner quite analogous to that of the reduction of supposed\nindependently originated species to a common ultimate origin--thus, and in\nvarious other ways, largely and legitimately extending the domain of\nsecondary causes. Surely the scientific mind of an age which contemplates\nthe solar system as evolved from a common revolving fluid mass--which,\nthrough experimental research, has come to regard light, heat, electricity,\nmagnetism, chemical affinity, and mechanical power as varieties or\nderivative and convertible forms of one force, instead of independent\nspecies--which has brought the so-called elementary kinds of matter, such\nas the metals, into kindred groups, and pertinently raised the question,\nwhether the members of each group may not be mere varieties of one\nspecies--and which speculates steadily in the direction of the ultimate\nunity of matter, of a sort of prototype or simple element which may be to\nthe ordinary species of matter what the Protozoa or what the component\ncells of an organism are to the higher sorts of animals and plants--the\nmind of such an age cannot be expected to let the old belief about species\npass unquestioned. It will raise the question, how the diverse sorts of\nplants and animals came to be as they are and where they are and will allow\nthat the whole inquiry transcends its powers only when all endeavors have\nfailed Granting the origin to be super natural or miraculous even, will not\narrest the inquiry All real origination the philosophers will say, is\nsupernatural, their very question is, whether we have yet gone back to the\norigin and can affirm that the present forms of plants and animals are the\nprimordial, the miraculously created ones. And, even if they admit that,\nthey will still inquire into the order of the phenomena, into the form of\nthe miracle You might as well expect the child to grow up content with what\nit is told about the advent of its infant brother Indeed, to learn that the\nnew comer is the gift of God, far from lulling inquiry, only stimulates\nspeculation as to how the precious gift was bestowed That questioning child\nis father to the man--is philosopher in short-clothes.\n\nSince, then questions about the origin of species will be raised, and have\nbeen raised--and since the theorizings, however different in particulars,\nall proceed upon the notion that one species of plant or animal is somehow\nderived from another, that the different sorts which now flourish are\nlineal (or unlineal) descendants of other and earlier sorts--it now\nconcerns us to ask, What are the grounds in Nature, the admitted facts,\nwhich suggest hypotheses of derivation in some :shape or other? Reasons\nthere must be, and plausible ones, for the persistent recurrence of\ntheories upon this genetic basis. A study of Darwin's book, and a general\nglance at the present state of the natural sciences, enable us to gather\nthe following as among the most suggestive and influential. We can only\nenumerate them here, without much indication of their particular bearing.\nThere is--\n\n1. The general fact of variability, and the general tendency of the variety\nto propagate its like--the patent facts that all species vary more or less;\nthat domesticated plants and animals, being in conditions favorable to the\nproduction and preservation of varieties, are apt to vary widely; and that,\nby interbreeding, any variety may be fixed into a race, that is, into a\nvariety which comes true from seed. Many such races, it is allowed, differ\nfrom each other in structure and appearance as widely as do many admitted\nspecies; and it is practically very difficult, even impossible, to draw a\nclear line between races and species. Witness the human races, for\ninstance. Wild species also vary, perhaps about as widely as those of\ndomestication, though in different ways. Some of them apparently vary\nlittle, others moderately, others immoderately, to the great bewilderment\nof systematic botanists and zoologists, and increasing disagreement as to\nwhether various forms shall be held to be original species or strong\nvarieties. Moreover, the degree to which the descendants of the same stock,\nvarying in different directions, may at length diverge, is unknown. All we\nknow is, that varieties are themselves variable, and that very diverse\nforms have been educed from one stock.\n\n2. Species of the same genus are not distinguished from each other by equal\namounts of difference. There is diversity in this respect analogous to that\nof the varieties of a polymorphous species, some of them slight, others\nextreme. And in large genera the unequal resemblance shows itself in the\nclustering of the species around several types or central species, like\nsatellites around their respective planets. Obviously suggestive this of\nthe hypothesis that they were satellites, not thrown off by revolution,\nlike the moons of Jupiter, Saturn, and our own solitary moon, but gradually\nand peacefully detached by divergent variation. That such closely-related\nspecies may be only varieties of higher grade, earlier origin, or more\nfavored evolution, is not a very violent supposition. Anyhow, it was a\nsupposition sure to be made.\n\n3. The actual geographical distribution of species upon the earth's surface\ntends to suggest the same notion. For, as a general thing, all or most of\nthe species of a peculiar genus or other type are grouped in the same\ncountry, or occupy continuous, proximate, or accessible areas. So well does\nthis rule hold, so general is the implication that kindred species are or\nwere associated geographically, that most trustworthy naturalists, quite\nfree from hypotheses of transmutation, are constantly inferring former\ngeographical continuity between parts of the world now widely disjoined, in\norder to account thereby for certain generic similarities among their\ninhabitants; just as philologists infer former connection of races, and a\nparent language, to account for generic similarities among existing\nlanguages. Yet no scientific explanation has been offered to account for\nthe geographical association of kindred species, except the hypothesis of a\ncommon origin.\n\n4. Here the fact of the antiquity of creation, and in particular of the\npresent kinds of the earth's inhabitants, or of a large part of them, comes\nin to rebut the objection that there has not been time enough for any\nmarked diversification of living things through divergent variation--not\ntime enough for varieties to have diverged into what we call species.\n\nSo long as the existing species of plants and animals were thought to have\noriginated a few thousand years ago, and without predecessors, there was no\nroom for a theory of derivation of one sort from another, nor time enough\neven to account for the establishment of the races which are generally\nbelieved to have diverged from a common stock. Not so much that five or six\nthousand years was a short allowance for this; but because some of our\nfamiliar domesticated varieties of grain, of fowls, and of other animals,\nwere pictured and mummified by the old Egyptians more than half that number\nof years ago, if not earlier. Indeed, perhaps the strongest argument for\nthe original plurality of human species was drawn from the identification\nof some of the present races of men upon these early historical monuments\nand records.\n\nBut this very extension of the current chronology, if we may rely upon the\narchaeologists, removes the difficulty by opening up a longer vista. So does\nthe discovery in Europe of remains and implements of prehistoric races of\nmen, to whom the use of metals was unknown--men of the stone age, as the\nScandinavian archaeologists designate them. And now, \"axes and knives of\nflint, evidently wrought by human skill, are found in beds of the drift at\nAmiens (also in other places, both in France and England), associated with\nthe bones of extinct species of animals.\" These implements, indeed, were\nnoticed twenty years ago; at a place in Suffolk they have been exhumed from\ntime to time for more than a century; but the full confirmation, the\nrecognition of the age of the deposit in which the implements occur, their\nabundance, and the appreciation of their bearings upon most interesting\nquestions, belong to the present time. To complete the connection of these\nprimitive people with the fossil ages, the French geologists, we are told,\nhave now \"found these axes in Picardy associated with remains of Elephas\nprimigenius, Rhinoceros tichorhinus, Equus fossilis, and an extinct species\nof Bos.\"[III-2] In plain language, these workers in flint lived in the time\nof the mammoth, of a rhinoceros now extinct, and along with horses and\ncattle unlike any now existing--specifically different, as naturalists say,\nfrom those with which man is now associated.  Their connection with\nexisting human races may perhaps be traced through the intervening people\nof the stone age, who were succeeded by the people of the bronze age, and\nthese by workers in iron.[III-3] Now, various evidence carries back the\nexistence of many of the present lower species of animals, and probably of a\nlarger number of plants, to the same drift period. All agree that this was\nvery many thousand years ago. Agassiz tells us that the same species of\npolyps which are now building coral walls around the present peninsula of\nFlorida actually made that peninsula, and have been building there for many\nthousand centuries.\n\n5. The overlapping of existing and extinct species, and the seemingly\ngradual transition of the life of the drift period into that of the present,\nmay be turned to the same account. Mammoths, mastodons, and Irish elks, now\nextinct, must have lived down to human, if not almost to historic times.\nPerhaps the last dodo did not long outlive his huge New Zealand kindred.\nThe aurochs, once the companion of mammoths, still survives, but owes his\npresent and precarious existence to man's care. Now, nothing that we know\nof forbids the hypothesis that some new species have been independently and\nsupernaturally created within the period which other species have survived.\nSome may even believe that man was created in the days of the mammoth,\nbecame extinct, and was recreated at a later date. But why not say the same\nof the aurochs, contemporary both of the old man and of the new? Still it\nis more natural, if not inevitable, to infer that, if the aurochs of that\nolden time were the ancestors of the aurochs of the Lithuanian forests, so\nlikewise were the men of that age the ancestors of the present human races.\nThen, whoever concludes that these primitive makers of rude flint axes and\nknives were the ancestors of the better workmen of the succeeding stone\nage, and these again of the succeeding artificers in brass and iron, will\nalso be likely to suppose that the Equus and Bos of that time, different\nthough they be, were the remote progenitors of our own horses and cattle.\nIn all candor we must at least concede that such considerations suggest a\ngenetic descent from the drift period down to the present, and allow time\nenough--if time is of any account-- for variation and natural selection to\nwork out some appreciable results in the way of divergence into races, or\neven into so-called species. Whatever might have been thought, when\ngeological time was supposed to be separated from the present era by a\nclear line, it is now certain that a gradual replacement of old forms by\nnew ones is strongly suggestive of some mode of origination which may still\nbe operative. When species, like individuals, were found to die out one by\none, and apparently to come in one by one, a theory for what Owen\nsonorously calls \"the continuous operation of the ordained becoming of\nliving things\" could not be far off.\n\nThat all such theories should take the form of a derivation of the new from\nthe old seems to be inevitable, perhaps from our inability to conceive of\nany other line of secondary causes in this connection. Owen himself is\napparently in travail with some transmutation theory of his own conceiving,\nwhich may yet see the light, although Darwin's came first to the birth.\nDifferent as the two theories will probably be, they cannot fail to exhibit\nthat fundamental resemblance in this respect which betokens a community of\norigin, a common foundation on the general facts and the obvious suggestions\nof modern science. Indeed--to turn the point of a pungent simile directed\nagainst Darwin--the difference between the Darwinian and the Owenian\nhypotheses may, after all, be only that between homoeopathic and heroic\ndoses of the same drug.\n\nIf theories of derivation could only stop here, content with explaining the\ndiversification and succession of species between the teritiary period and\nthe present time, through natural agencies or secondary causes still in\noperation, we fancy they would not be generally or violently objected to by\nthe savants of the present day. But it is hard, if not impossible, to find\na stopping-place. Some of the facts or accepted conclusions already\nreferred to, and several others, of a more general character, which must be\ntaken into the account, impel the theory onward with accumulated force.\nVires (not to say virus) acquirit eundo. The theory hitches on wonderfully\nwell to Lyell's uniformitarian theory in geology--that the thing that has\nbeen is the thing that is and shall be--that the natural operations now\ngoing on will account for all geological changes in a quiet and easy way,\nonly give them time enough, so connecting the present and the proximate\nwith the farthest past by almost imperceptible gradations--a view which\nfinds large and increasing, if not general, acceptance in physical geology,\nand of which Darwin's theory is the natural complement.\n\nSo the Darwinian theory, once getting a foothold, marches; boldly on,\nfollows the supposed near ancestors of our present species farther and yet\nfarther back into the dim past, and ends with an analogical inference which\n\"makes the whole world kin.\" As we said at the beginning, this upshot\ndiscomposes us. Several features of the theory have an uncanny look. They\nmay prove to be innocent: but their first aspect is suspicious, and high\nauthorities pronounce the whole thing to be positively mischievous. In this\ndilemma we are going to take advice. Following the bent of our prejudices,\nand hoping to fortify these by new and strong arguments, we are going now\nto read the principal reviews which undertake to demolish the theory--with\nwhat result our readers shall be duly informed.\n\n\nII\n\n\n\"I can entertain no doubt, after the most deliberate study and\ndispassionate judgment of which I am capable, that the view which most\nnaturalists entertain, and which I formerly entertained, namely, that each\nspecies has been independently created, is erroneous. I am fully convinced\nthat species are not immutable; but that those belonging to what are called\nthe same genera are lineal descendants of some other and generally extinct\nspecies, in the same manner as the acknowledged varieties of any one species\nare the descendants of that species. Furthermore, I am convinced that\nNatural Selection has been the main, but not exclusive, means of\nmodification.\"\n\n\nThis is the kernel of the new theory, the Darwinian creed, as recited at\nthe close of the introduction to the remarkable book under consideration.\nThe questions, \"What will he do with it?\" and \"How far will he carry it?\"\nthe author answers at the close of the volume:\n\n\n\"I cannot doubt that the theory of descent with modification embraces all\nthe members of the same class.\" Furthermore, \"I believe that all animals\nhave descended from at most only four or five progenitors, and plants from\nan equal or lesser number.\"\n\n\nSeeing that analogy as strongly suggests a further step in the same\ndirection, while he protests that \"analogy may be a deceitful guide,\" yet\nhe follows its inexorable leading to the inference that--\n\n\"Probably all the organic beings which have ever lived on this ear have\ndescended from some one primordial form, into which life was first\nbreathed.\"[III-4]\n\n\nIn the first extract we have the thin end of the wedge driven a little way;\nin the last, the wedge driven home.\n\nWe have already sketched some of the reasons suggestive of such a theory of\nderivation of species, reasons which gave it plausibility, and even no small\nprobability, as applied to our actual world and to changes occurring since\nthe latest tertiary period. We are well pleased at this moment to find that\nthe conclusions we were arriving at in this respect are sustained by the\nvery high authority and impartial judgment of Pictet, the Swiss\npaleontologist. In his review of Darwin's book[III-5] -- the fairest and\nmost admirable opposing one that has appeared--he freely accepts that\nensemble of natural operations which Darwin impersonates under the now\nfamiliar name of Natural Selection, allows that the exposition throughout\nthe first chapters seems \"a la fois prudent et fort,\" and is disposed to\naccept the whole argument in its foundations, that is, so far as it relates\nto what is now going on, or has taken place in the present geological\nperiod--which period he carries back through the diluvial epoch to the\nborders of the tertiary.[III-6] Pictet accordingly admits that the theory\nwill very well account for the origination by divergence of nearly-related\nspecies, whether within the present period or in remoter geological times;\na very natural view for him to take, since he appears to have reached and\npublished, several years ago, the pregnant conclusion that there most\nprobably was some material connection between the closely-related species of\ntwo successive faunas, and that the numerous close species, whose limits are\nso difficult to determine, were not all created distinct and independent.\nBut while thus accepting, or ready to accept, the basis of Darwin's theory,\nand all its legitimate direct inferences, he rejects the ultimate\nconclusions, brings some weighty arguments to bear against them, and is\nevidently convinced that he can draw a clear line between the sound\ninferences, which he favors, and the unsound or unwarranted theoretical\ndeductions, which he rejects. We hope he can.\n\nThis raises the question, Why does Darwin press his theory to these extreme\nconclusions? Why do all hypotheses of derivation converge so inevitably to\none ultimate point? Having already considered some of the reasons which\nsuggest or support the theory at its outset--which may carry it as far as\nsuch sound and experienced naturalists as Pictet allow that it may be\ntrue--perhaps as far as Darwin himself unfolds it in the introductory\nproposition cited at the beginning of this article--we may now inquire after\nthe motives which impel the theorist so much farther. Here proofs, in the\nproper sense of the word, are not to be had. We are beyond the region of\ndemonstration, and have only probabilities to consider. What are these\nprobabilities? What work will this hypothesis do to establish a claim to be\nadopted in its completeness? Why should a theory which may plausibly enough\naccount for the diversification of the species of each special type or\ngenus be expanded into a general system for the origination or successive\ndiversification of all species, and all special types or forms, from four\nor five remote primordial forms, or perhaps from one? We accept the theory\nof gravitation because it explains all the facts we know, and bears all the\ntests that we can put it to. We incline to accept the nebular hypothesis,\nfor similar reasons; not because it is proved--thus far it is incapable of\nproof--but because it is a natural theoretical deduction from accepted\nphysical laws, is thoroughly congruous with the facts, and because its\nassumption serves to connect and harmonize these into one probable and\nconsistent whole. Can the derivative hypothesis be maintained and carried\nout into a system on similar grounds? If so, however unproved, it would\nappear to be a tenable hypothesis, which is all that its author ought now\nto claim. Such hypotheses as, from the conditions of the case, can neither\nbe proved nor disproved by direct evidence or experiment, are to be tested\nonly indirectly, and therefore imperfectly, by trying their power to\nharmonize the known facts, and to account for what is otherwise\nunaccountable. So the question comes to this: What will an hypothesis of\nthe derivation of species explain which the opposing view leaves\nunexplained?\n\nQuestions these which ought to be entertained before we take up the\narguments which have been advanced against this theory. We can barely\nglance at some of the considerations which Darwin adduces, or will be sure\nto adduce in the future and fuller exposition which is promised. To display\nthem in such wise as to indoctrinate the unscientific reader would require\na volume. Merely to refer to them in the most general terms would suffice\nfor those familiar with scientific matters, but would scarcely enlighten\nthose who are not. Wherefore let these trust the impartial Pictet, who\nfreely admits that, \"in the absence of sufficient direct proofs to justify\nthe possibility of his hypothesis, Mr. Darwin relies upon indirect proofs,\nthe bearing of which is real and incontestable;\" who concedes that \"his\ntheory accords very well with the great facts of comparative anatomy and\nzoology--comes in admirably to explain unity of composition of organisms,\nalso to explain rudimentary and representative organs, and the natural\nseries of genera and species--equally corresponds with many paleontological\ndata--agrees well with the specific resemblances which exist between two\nsuccessive faunas, with the parallelism which is sometimes observed between\nthe series of paleontological succession and of embryonal development,\"\netc.; and finally, although he does not accept the theory in these results,\nhe allows that \"it appears to offer the best means of explaining the manner\nin which organized beings were produced in epochs anterior to our own.\"\n\nWhat more than this could be said for such an hypothesis? Here, probably,\nis its charm, and its strong hold upon the speculative mind. Unproven\nthough it be, and cumbered prima facie with cumulative improbabilities as\nit proceeds, yet it singularly accords with great classes of facts\notherwise insulated and enigmatic, and explains many things which are thus\nfar utterly inexplicable upon any other scientific assumption.\n\nWe have said that Darwin's hypothesis is the natural complement to Lyell's\nuniformitarian theory in physical geology. It is for the organic world what\nthat is for the inorganic; and the accepters of the latter stand in a\nposition from which to regard the former in the most favorable light.\nWherefore the rumor that the cautious Lyell himself has adopted the\nDarwinian hypothesis need not surprise us. The two views are made for each\nother, and, like the two counterpart pictures for the stereoscope, when\nbrought together, combine into one apparently solid whole.\n\nIf we allow, with Pictet, that Darwin's theory will very well serve for all\nthat concerns the present epoch of the world's history--an epoch in which\nthis renowned paleontologist includes the diluvial or quaternary\nperiod--then Darwin's first and foremost need in his onward course is a\npracticable road from this into and through the tertiary period, the\nintervening region between the comparatively near and the far remote past.\nHere Lyell's doctrine paves the way, by showing that in the physical geology\nthere is no general or absolute break between the two, probably no greater\nbetween the latest tertiary and the quaternary period than between the\nlatter and the present time. So far, the Lyellian view is, we suppose,\ngenerally concurred in. It is largely admitted that numerous tertiary\nspecies have continued down into the quaternary, and many of them to the\npresent time. A goodly percentage of the earlier and nearly half of the\nlater tertiary mollusca, according to Des Hayes, Lye!!, and, if we mistake\nnot, Bronn, still live. This identification, however, is now questioned by\na naturalist of the very highest authority. But, in its bearings on the new\ntheory, the point here turns not upon absolute identity so much as upon\nclose resemblance. For those who, with Agassiz, doubt the specific identity\nin any of these cases, and those who say, with Pictet, that \"the later\ntertiary deposits contain in general the debris of species very nearly\nrelated to those which still exist, belonging to the same genera, but\nspecifically different,\" may also agree with Pictet, that the\nnearly-related species of successive faunas must or may have had \"a\nmaterial connection.\" But the only material connection that we have an idea\nof in such a case is a genealogical one. And the supposition of a\ngenealogical connection is surely not unnatural in such cases--is\ndemonstrably the natural one as respects all those tertiary species which\nexperienced naturalists have pronounced to be identical with existing ones,\nbut which others now deem distinct For to identify the two is the same\nthing as to conclude the one to be the ancestor of the other No doubt there\nare differences between the tertiary and the present individuals,\ndifferences equally noticed by both classes of naturalists, but differently\nestimated By the one these are deemed quite compatible, by the other\nincompatible, with community of origin But who can tell us what amount of\ndifference is compatible with community of origin? This is the very\nquestion at issue, and one to be settled by observation alone Who would have\nthought that the peach and the nectarine came from one stock? But, this\nbeing proved is it now very improbable that both were derived from the\nalmond, or from some common amygdaline progenitor? Who would have thought\nthat the cabbage, cauliflower, broccoli kale, and kohlrabi are derivatives\nof one species, and rape or colza, turnip, and probably ruta-baga, of\nanother species? And who that is convinced of this can long undoubtingly\nhold the original distinctness of turnips from cabbages as an article of\nfaith? On scientific grounds may not a primordial cabbage or rape be\nassumed as the ancestor of all the cabbage races, on much the same ground\nthat we assume a common ancestry for the diversified human races? If all\nOur breeds of cattle came from one stock why not this stock  from the\nauroch, which has had all the time between the diluvial and the historic\nperiods in which to set off a variation perhaps no greater than the\ndifference between some sorts of domestic cattle?\n\nThat considerable differences are often discernible between tertiary\nindividuals and their supposed descendants of the present day affords no\nargument against Darwin's theory, as has been rashly thought, but is\ndecidedly in its favor. If the identification were so perfect that no more\ndifferences were observable between the tertiary and the recent shells than\nbetween various individuals of either, then Darwin's opponents, who argue\nthe immutability of species from the ibises and cats preserved by the\nancient Egyptians being just like those of the present day, could\ntriumphantly add a few hundred thousand years more to the length of the\nexperiment and to the force of their argument.\n\nAs the facts stand, it appears that, while some tertiary forms are\nessentially undistinguishable from existing ones, others are the same with\na difference, which is judged not to be specific or aboriginal; and yet\nothers show somewhat greater differences, such as are scientifically\nexpressed by calling them marked varieties, or else doubtful species; while\nothers, differing a little more, are confidently termed distinct, but\nnearly-related species. Now, is not all this a question of degree, of mere\ngradation of difference? And is it at all likely that these several\ngradations came to be established in two totally different ways--some of\nthem (though naturalists can't agree which) through natural variation, or\nother secondary cause, and some by original creation, without secondary\ncause? We have seen that the judicious Pictet answers such questions as\nDarwin would have him do, in affirming that, in all probability, the\nnearly-related species of two successive faunas were materially connected,\nand that contemporaneous species, similarly resembling each other, were not\nall created so, but have become so. This is equivalent to saying that\nspecies (using the term as all naturalists do, and must continue to employ\nthe word) have only a relative, not an absolute fixity; that differences\nfully equivalent to what are held to be specific may arise in the course of\ntime, so that one species may at length be naturally replaced by another\nspecies a good deal like it, or may be diversified into two, three, or more\nspecies, or forms as different as species. This concedes all that Darwin has\na right to ask, all that he can directly infer from evidence. We must add\nthat it affords a locus standi, more or less tenable, for inferring more.\n\nHere another geological consideration comes in to help on this inference.\nThe species of the later tertiary period for the most part not only\nresembled those of our days--many of them so closely as to suggest an\nabsolute continuity--but also occupied in general the same regions that\ntheir relatives occupy now. The same may be said, though less specially, of\nthe earlier tertiary and of the later secondary; but there is less and less\nlocalization of forms as we recede, yet some localization even in palaeozoic\ntimes. While in the secondary period one is struck with the similarity of\nforms and the identity of many of the species which flourished apparently\nat the same time in all or in the most widely-separated parts of the world,\nin the tertiary epoch, on the contrary, along with the increasing\nspecialization of climates and their approximation to the present state, we\nfind abundant evidence of increasing localization of orders, genera and\nspecies, and this localization strikingly accords with the present\ngeographical distribution of the same groups of species Where the imputed\nforefathers lived their relatives and supposed descendants now flourish All\nthe actual classes of the animal and vegetable kingdoms were represented in\nthe tertiary faunas and floras and in nearly the same proportions and the\nsame diversities as at present The faunas of what is now Europe, Asia\nAmerica and Australia, differed from each other much as they now differ: in\nfact--according to Adolphe Brongniart, whose statements we here\ncondense[III-7]--the inhabitants of these different regions appear for the\nmost part to have acquired, before the close of the tertiary period, the\ncharacters which essentially distinguish their existing faunas. The Eastern\nContinent had then, as now, its great pachyderms, elephants, rhinoceros,\nhippopotamus; South America, its armadillos, sloths, and anteaters;\nAustralia, a crowd of marsupials; and the very strange birds of New Zealand\nhad predecessors of similar strangeness.\n\nEverywhere the same geographical distribution as now, with a difference in\nthe particular area, as respects the northern portion of the continents,\nanswering to a warmer climate then than ours, such as allowed species of\nhippopotamus, rhinoceros, and elephant, to range even to the regions now\ninhabited by the reindeer and the musk-ox, and with the serious disturbing\nintervention of the glacial period within a comparatively recent time. Let\nit be noted also that those tertiary species which have continued with\nlittle change down to our days are the marine animals of the lower grades,\nespecially mollusca. Their low organization, moderate sensibility, and the\nsimple conditions of an existence in a medium like the ocean, not subject\nto great variation and incapable of sudden change, may well account for\ntheir continuance; while, on the other hand, the more intense, however\ngradual, climatic vicissitudes on land, which have driven all tropical and\nsubtropical forms out of the higher latitudes and assigned to them their\nactual limits, would be almost sure to extinguish such huge and unwieldy\nanimals as mastodons, mammoths, and the like, whose power of enduring\naltered circumstances must have been small.\n\nThis general replacement of the tertiary species of a country by others so\nmuch like them is a noteworthy fact. The hypothesis of the independent\ncreation of all species, irrespective of their antecedents, leaves this\nfact just as mysterious as is creation itself; that of derivation\nundertakes to account for it. Whether it satisfactorily does so or not, it\nmust be allowed that the facts well accord with that hypothesis. The same\nmay be said of another conclusion, namely, that the geological succession\nof animals and plants appears to correspond in a general way with their\nrelative standing or rank in a natural system of classification. It seems\nclear that, though no one of the grand types of the animal kingdom can be\ntraced back farther than the rest, yet the lower classes long preceded the\nhigher; that there has been on the whole a steady progression within each\nclass and order; and that the highest plants and animals have appeared only\nin relatively modern times. It is only, however, in a broad sense that this\ngeneralization is now thought to hold good. It encounters many apparent\nexceptions, and sundry real ones. So far as the rule holds, all is as it\nshould be upon an hypothesis of derivation.\n\nThe rule has its exceptions. But, curiously enough, the most striking class\nof exceptions, if such they be, seems to us even more favorable to the\ndoctrine of derivation than is the general rule of a pure and simple\nascending gradation. We refer to what Agassiz calls prophetic and synthetic\ntypes; for which the former name may suffice, as the difference between the\ntwo is evanescent.\n\n\n\"It has been noticed,\" writes our great zoologist, \"that certain types,\nwhich are frequently prominent among the representatives of past ages,\ncombine in their structure peculiarities which at later periods are only\nobserved separately in different, distinct types. Sauroid fishes before\nreptiles, Pterodactyles before birds, Ichthyosauri before dolphins, etc.\nThere are entire families, of nearly every class of animals, which in the\nstate of their perfect development exemplify such prophetic relations.\n\nThe sauroid fishes of the past geological ages are an example of this kind\nThese fishes which preceded the appearance of reptiles present a\ncombination of ichthyic and reptilian characters not to be found in the\ntrue members of this class, which form its bulk at present. The\nPterodactyles, which preceded the class of birds, and the Ichthyosauri,\nwhich preceded the Cetacea, are other examples of such prophetic\ntypes.\"--(Agassiz, \"Contributions, Essay on Classification,\" p. 117.)\n\n\nNow, these reptile-like fishes, of which gar-pikes are the living\nrepresentatives, though of earlier appearance, are admittedly of higher rank\nthan common fishes. They dominated until reptiles appeared, when they\nmostly gave place to (or, as the derivationists will insist, were resolved\nby divergent variation and natural selection into) common fishes, destitute\nof reptilian characters, and saurian reptiles--the intermediate grades,\nwhich, according to a familiar piscine saying, are \"neither fish, flesh,\nnor good red-herring,\" being eliminated and extinguished by natural\nconsequence of the struggle for existence which Darwin so aptly portrays.\nAnd so, perhaps, of the other prophetic types. Here type and antitype\ncorrespond. If these are true prophecies, we need not wonder that some who\nread them in Agassiz's book will read their fulfillment in Darwin's.\n\nNote also, in this connection, that along with a wonderful persistence of\ntype, with change of species, genera, orders, etc., from formation to\nformation, no species and no higher group which has once unequivocally died\nout ever afterward reappears. Why is this, but that the link of generation\nhas been sundered? Why, on the hypothesis of independent originations, were\nnot failing species recreated, either identically or with a difference, in\nregions eminently adapted to their well-being? To take a striking case.\nThat no part of the world now offers more suitable conditions for wild\nhorses and cattle than the pampas and other plains of South America, is\nshown by the facility with which they have there run wild and enormously\nmultiplied, since introduced from the Old World not long ago. There was no\nwild American stock. Yet in the times of the mastodon and megatherium, at\nthe dawn of the present period, wild-horses--certainly very much like the\nexisting horse--roamed over those plains in abundance. On the principle of\noriginal and direct created adaptation of species to climate and other\nconditions, why were they not reproduced, when, after the colder\nintervening era, those regions became again eminently adapted to such\nanimals? Why, but because, by their complete extinction in South America,\nthe line of descent was there utterly broken? Upon the ordinary hypothesis,\nthere is no scientific explanation possible of this series of facts, and of\nmany others like them. Upon the new hypothesis, \"the succession of the same\ntypes of structure within the same areas during the later geological\nperiods ceases to be mysterious, and is simply explained by inheritance.\"\nTheir cessation is failure of issue.\n\nAlong with these considerations the fact (alluded to on page 98) should be\nremembered that, as a general thing, related species of the present age are\ngeographically associated. The larger part of the plants, and still more of\nthe animals, of each separate country are peculiar to it; and, as most\nspecies now flourish over the graves of their by-gone relatives of former\nages, so they now dwell among or accessibly near their kindred species.\n\nHere also comes in that general \"parallelism between the order of\nsuccession of animals and plants in geological times, and the gradation\namong their living representatives\" from low to highly organized, from\nsimple and general to complex and specialized forms; also \"the parallelism\nbetween the order of succession of animals in geological times and the\nchanges their living representatives undergo during their embryological\ngrowth,\" as if the world were one prolonged gestation. Modern science has\nmuch insisted on this parallelism, and to a certain extent is allowed to\nhave made it out. All these things, which conspire to prove that the\nancient and the recent forms of life \"are somehow intimately connected\ntogether in one grand system,\" equally conspire to suggest that the\nconnection is one similar or analogous to generation. Surely no naturalist\ncan be blamed for entering somewhat confidently upon a field of speculative\ninquiry which here opens so invitingly; nor need former premature endeavors\nand failures utterly dishearten him.\n\nAll these things, it may naturally be said, go to explain the order, not\nthe mode, of the incoming of species. But they all do tend to bring out the\ngeneralization expressed by Mr. Wallace in the formula that \"every species\nhas come into existence coincident both in time and space with preexisting\nclosely-allied species.\" Not, however, that this is proved even of existing\nspecies as a matter of general fact. It is obviously impossible to prove\nanything of the kind. But we must concede that the known facts strongly\nsuggest such an inference. And--since species are only congeries of\nindividuals, since every individual came into existence in consequence of\npreexisting individuals of the same sort, so leading up to the individuals\nwith which the species began, and since the only material sequence we know\nof among plants and animals is that from parent to progeny--the presumption\nbecomes exceedingly strong that the connection of the incoming with the\npreexisting species is a genealogical one.\n\nHere, however, all depends upon the probability that Mr. Wallace's\ninference is really true. Certainly it is not yet generally accepted; but a\nstrong current is setting toward its acceptance.\n\nSo long as universal cataclysms were in vogue, and all life upon the earth\nwas thought to have been suddenly destroyed and renewed many times in\nsuccession, such a view could not be thought of. So the equivalent view\nmaintained by Agassiz, and formerly, we believe, by D'Orbigny, that\nirrespectively of general and sudden catastrophes, or any known adequate\nphysical cause, there has been a total depopulation at the close of each\ngeological period or formation, say forty or fifty times or more, followed\nby as many independent great acts of creation, at which alone have species\nbeen originated, and at each of which a vegetable and an animal kingdom\nwere produced entire and complete, full-fledged, as flourishing, as\nwide-spread, and populous, as varied and mutually adapted from the\nbeginning as ever afterward--such a view, of course, supersedes all\nmaterial connection between successive species, and removes even the\nassociation and geographical range of species entirely out of the domain of\nphysical causes and of natural science. This is the extreme opposite of\nWallace's and Darwin's view, and is quite as hypothetical. The nearly\nuniversal opinion, if we rightly gather it, manifestly is, that the\nreplacement of the species of successive formations was not complete and\nsimultaneous, but partial and successive; and that along the course of each\nepoch some species probably were introduced, and some, doubtless, became\nextinct. If all since the tertiary belongs to our present epoch, this is\ncertainly true of it: if to two or more epochs, then the hypothesis of a\ntotal change is not true of them.\n\nGeology makes huge demands upon time; and we regret to find that it has\nexhausted ours--that what we meant for the briefest and most general sketch\nof some geological considerations in favor of Darwin's hypothesis has so\nextended as to leave no room for considering \"the great facts of\ncomparative anatomy and zoology\" with which Darwin's theory \"very well\naccords,\" nor for indicating how \"it admirably serves for explaining the\nunity of composition of all organisms, the existence of representative and\nrudimentary organs, and the natural series which genera and species\ncompose.\" Suffice it to say that these are the real strongholds of the new\nsystem on its theoretical side; that it goes far toward explaining both the\nphysiological and the structural gradations and relations between the two\nkingdoms, and the arrangement of all their   forms in groups subordinate to\ngroups, all within a few great types; that it reads the riddle of abortive\norgans and of morphological conformity, of which no other theory has ever\noffered a scientific explanation, and supplies a ground for harmonizing the\ntwo fundamental ideas which naturalists and philosophers conceive to have\nruled the organic world, though they could not reconcile them; namely,\nAdaptation to Purpose and Conditions of Existence, and Unity of Type. To\nreconcile these two undeniable principles is the capital problem in the\nphilosophy of natural history; and the hypothesis which consistently does\nso thereby secures a great advantage.\n\nWe all know that the arm and hand of a monkey, the foreleg and foot of a\ndog and of a horse, the wing of a bat, and the fin of a porpoise, are\nfundamentally identical; that the long neck of the giraffe has the same and\nno more bones than the short one of the elephant; that the eggs of Surinam\nfrogs hatch into tadpoles with as good tails for swimming as any of their\nkindred, although as tadpoles they never enter the water; that the\nGuinea-pig is furnished with incisor teeth which it never uses, as it sheds\nthem before birth; that embryos of mammals and birds have branchial slits\nand arteries running in loops, in imitation or reminiscence of the\narrangement which is permanent in fishes; and that thousands of animals and\nplants have rudimentary organs which, at least in numerous cases, are\nwholly useless to their possessors, etc., etc. Upon a derivative theory\nthis morphological conformity is explained by community of descent; and it\nhas not been explained in any other way.\n\nNaturalists are constantly speaking of \"related species,\" of the \"affinity\"\nof a genus or other group, and of \"family resemblance\"--vaguely conscious\nthat these terms of kinship are something more than mere metaphors, but\nunaware of the grounds of their aptness. Mr. Darwin assures them that they\nhave been talking derivative doctrine all their lives--as M. Jourdain\ntalked prose--without knowing it.\n\nIf it is difficult and in many cases practically impossible to fix the\nlimits of species, it is still more so to fix those of genera; and those of\ntribes and families are still less susceptible of exact natural\ncircumscription. Intermediate forms occur, connecting one group with\nanother in a manner sadly perplexing to systematists, except to those who\nhave ceased to expect absolute limitations in Nature. All this blending\ncould hardly fail to suggest a former material connection among allied\nforms, such as that which the hypothesis of derivation demands.\n\nHere it would not be amiss to consider the general principle of gradation\nthroughout organic Nature--a principle which answers in a general way to the\nLaw of Continuity in the inorganic world, or rather is so analogous to it\nthat both may fairly be expressed by the Leibnitzian axiom, Natura non agit\nsaltatim. As an axiom or philosophical principle, used to test modal laws\nor hypotheses, this in strictness belongs only to physics. In the\ninvestigation of Nature at large, at least in the organic world, nobody\nwould undertake to apply this principle as a test of the validity of any\ntheory or supposed law. But naturalists of enlarged views will not fail to\ninfer the principle from the phenomena they investigate--to perceive that\nthe rule holds, under due qualifications and altered forms, throughout the\nrealm of Nature; although we do not suppose that Nature in the organic\nworld makes no distinct steps, but only short and serial steps--not\ninfinitely fine gradations, but no long leaps, or few of them.\n\nTo glance at a few illustrations out of many that present themselves. It\nwould be thought that the distinction between the two organic kingdoms was\nbroad and absolute.  Plants and animals belong to two very different\ncategories, fulfill opposite offices and, as to the mass of them are so\nunlike that the difficulty of the ordinary observer would be to find points\nof comparison Without entering into details which would fill an article, we\nmay safely say that the difficulty with the naturalist is all the other\nway--that all these broad differences vanish one by one as we approach the\nlower confines of the two kingdoms, and that no absolute distinction\nwhatever is now known between them. It is quite possible that the same\norganism may be both vegetable and animal, or may be first the one and then\nthe other. If some organisms may be said to be at first vegetables and then\nanimals, others, like the spores and other reproductive bodies of many of\nthe lower Algae, may equally claim to have first a characteristically\nanimal, and then an unequivocally vegetable existence. Nor is the gradation\nrestricted to these simple organisms. It appears in general functions, as\nin that of reproduction, which is reducible to the same formula in both\nkingdoms, while it exhibits close approximations in the lower forms; also\nin a common or similar ground of sensibility in the lowest forms of both, a\ncommon faculty of effecting movements tending to a determinate end, traces\nof which pervade the vegetable kingdom--while, on the other hand, this\nindefinable principle, this vegetable\n\n\"Animula vagula, blandula,\nHospes comesque corporis,\"\n\ngraduates into the higher sensitiveness of the lower class of animals. Nor\nneed we hesitate to recognize the fine gradations from simple sensitiveness\nand volition to the higher instinctive and to the other psychical\nmanifestations of the higher brute animals. The gradation is undoubted,\nhowever we may explain it.\n\nAgain, propagation is of one mode in the higher animals, of two in all\nplants; but vegetative propagation, by budding or offshoots, extends\nthrough the lower grades of animals. In both kingdoms there may be\nseparation of the offshoots, or indifference in this respect, or continued\nand organic union with the parent stock; and this either with essential\nindependence of the offshoots, or with a subordination of these to a common\nwhole; or finally with such subordination and amalgamation, along with\nspecialization of function, that the same parts, which in other cases can\nbe regarded only as progeny, in these become only members of an individual.\n\nThis leads to the question of individuality, a subject quite too large and\ntoo recondite for present discussion. The conclusion of the whole matter,\nhowever, is, that individuality--that very ground of being as distinguished\nfrom thing--is not attained in Nature at one leap. If anywhere truly\nexemplified in plants, it is only in the lowest and simplest, where the\nbeing is a structural unit, a single cell, member-less and organless,\nthough organic--the same thing as those cells of which all the more complex\nplants are built up, and with which every plant and (structurally) every\nanimal began its development. In the ascending gradation of the vegetable\nkingdom individuality is, so to say, striven after, but never attained; in\nthe lower animals it is striven after with greater though incomplete\nsuccess; it is realized only in animals of so high a rank that vegetative\nmultiplication or offshoots are out of the question, where all parts are\nstrictly members and nothing else, and all subordinated to a common nervous\ncentre--is fully realized only in a conscious person.\n\nSo, also, the broad distinction between reproduction by seeds or ova and\npropagation by buds, though perfect in some of the lowest forms of life,\nbecomes evanescent in others; and even the most absolute law we know in the\nphysiology of genuine reproduction--that of sexual cooperation--has its\nexceptions in both kingdoms in parthenogenesis, to which in the vegetable\nkingdom a most curious and intimate series of gradations leads. In plants,\nlikewise, a long and finely graduated series of transitions leads from\nbisexual to unisexual blossoms; and so in various other respects. Everywhere\nwe may perceive that Nature secures her ends, and makes her distinctions on\nthe whole manifest and real but everywhere without abrupt breaks We need\nnot wonder therefore that gradations between species and varieties should\noccur; the more so, since genera, tribes, and other groups into which the\nnaturalist collocates species, are far from being always absolutely limited\nin Nature, though they are necessarily represented to be so in systems.\n>From the necessity of the case, the classifications of the naturalist\nabruptly define where Nature more or less blends. Our systems are nothing,\nif not definite. They express differences, and some of the coarser\ngradations. But this evinces not their perfection, but their imperfection.\nEven the best of them are to the system of Nature what consecutive patches\nof the seven colors are to the rainbow.\n\nNow the principle of gradation throughout organic Nature may, of course, be\ninterpreted upon other assumptions than those of Darwin's\nhypothesis--certainly upon quite other than those of a materialistic\nphilosophy, with which we ourselves have no sympathy. Still we conceive it\nnot only possible, but probable, that this gradation, as it has its natural\nground, may yet have its scientific explanation. In any case, there is no\nneed to deny that the general facts correspond well with an hypothesis like\nDarwin's, which is built upon fine gradations.\n\nWe have contemplated quite long enough the general presumptions in favor of\nan hypothesis of the derivation of species. We cannot forget, however,\nwhile for the moment we overlook, the formidable difficulties which all\nhypotheses of this class have to encounter, and the serious implications\nwhich they seem to involve. We feel, moreover, that Darwin's particular\nhypothesis is exposed to some special objections. It requires no small\nstrength of nerve steadily to conceive, not only of the diversification, but\nof the formation of the organs of an animal through cumulative variation\nand natural selection. Think of such an organ as the eye, that most perfect\nof optical instruments, as so produced in the lower animals and perfected\nin the higher! A friend of ours, who accepts the new doctrine, confesses\nthat for a long while a cold chill came over him whenever he thought of the\neye. He has at length got over that stage of the complaint, and is now in\nthe fever of belief, perchance to be succeeded by the sweating stage, during\nwhich sundry peccant humors may be eliminated from the system. For\nourselves, we dread the chill, and have some misgivings about the\nconsequences of the reaction. We find ourselves in the \"singular position\"\nacknowledged by Pictet--that is, confronted with a theory which, although\nit can really explain much, seems inadequate to the heavy task it so boldly\nassumes, but which, nevertheless, appears better fitted than any other that\nhas been broached to explain, if it be possible to explain, somewhat of the\nmanner in which organized beings may have arisen and succeeded each other.\nIn this dilemma we might take advantage of Mr. Darwin's candid admission,\nthat he by no means expects to convince old and experienced people, whose\nminds are stocked with a multitude of facts all regarded during a long\ncourse of years from the old point of view. This is nearly our case. So,\nowning no call to a larger faith than is expected of us, but not prepared to\npronounce the whole hypothesis untenable, under such construction as we\nshould put upon it, we naturally sought to attain a settled conviction\nthrough a perusal of several proffered refutations of the theory. At least,\nthis course seemed to offer the readiest way of bringing to a head the\nvarious objections to which the theory is exposed. On several accounts some\nof these opposed reviews especially invite examination. We propose,\naccordingly, to conclude our task with an article upon \"Darwin and his\nReviewers.\"\n\n\nIII\n\n\nThe origin of species, like all origination, like the institution of any\nother natural state or order, is beyond our immediate ken. We see or may\nlearn how things go on; we can only frame hypotheses as to how they began.\n\nTwo hypotheses divide the scientific world, very unequally, upon the origin\nof the existing diversity of the plants and animals which surround us. One\nassumes that the actual kinds are primordial; the other, that they are\nderivative. One, that all kinds originated supernaturally and directly as\nsuch, and have continued unchanged in the order of Nature; the other, that\nthe present kinds appeared in some sort of genealogical connection with\nother and earlier kinds, that they became what they now are in the course\nof time and in the order of Nature.\n\nOr, bringing in the word species, which is well defined as \"the perennial\nsuccession of individuals,\" commonly of very like individuals--as a close\ncorporation of individuals perpetuated by generation, instead of\nelection--and reducing the question to mathematical simplicity of\nstatement: species are lines of individuals coming down from the past and\nrunning on to the future; lines receding, therefore, from our view in either\ndirection. Within our limited observation they appear to be parallel lines,\nas a general thing neither approaching to nor diverging from each other.\n\nThe first hypothesis assumes that they were parallel from the unknown\nbeginning and will be to the unknown end. The second hypothesis assumes\nthat the apparent parallelism is not real and complete, at least\naboriginally, but approximate or temporary; that we should find the lines\nconvergent in the past, if we could trace them far enough; that some of\nthem, if produced back, would fall into certain fragments of lines, which\nhave left traces in the past, lying not exactly in the same direction, and\nthese farther back into others to which they are equally unparallel. It will\nalso claim that the present lines, whether on the whole really or only\napproximately parallel, sometimes fork or send off branches on one side or\nthe other, producing new lines (varieties), which run for a while, and for\naught we know indefinitely when not interfered with, near and approximately\nparallel to the parent line. This claim it can establish; and it may also\nshow that these close subsidiary lines may branch or vary again, and that\nthose branches or varieties which are best adapted to the existing\nconditions may be continued, while others stop or die out. And so we may\nhave the basis of a real theory of the diversification of species and here\nindeed, there is a real, though a narrow, established ground to build upon\nBut as systems of organic Nature, both doctrines are equally hypotheses,\nare suppositions of what there is no proof of from experience, assumed in\norder to account for the observed phenomena, and supported by such indirect\nevidence as can be had.\n\nEven when the upholders of the former and more popular system mix up\nrevelation with scientific discussion--which we decline to do--they by no\nmeans thereby render their view other than hypothetical. Agreeing that\nplants and animals were produced by Omnipotent fiat does not exclude the\nidea of natural order and what we call secondary causes. The record of the\nfiat--\"Let the earth bring forth grass, the herb yielding seed,\" etc., \"and\nit was so;\" \"let the earth bring forth the living creature after his kind,\ncattle and creeping thing and beast of the earth after his kind, and it was\nso\"--seems even to imply them. Agreeing that they were formed of \"the dust\nof the ground,\" and of thin air, only leads to the conclusion that the\npristine individuals were corporeally constituted like existing\nindividuals, produced through natural agencies. To agree that they were\ncreated \"after their kinds\" determines nothing as to what were the original\nkinds, nor in what mode, during what time, and in what connections it\npleased the Almighty to introduce the first individuals of each sort upon\nthe earth. Scientifically considered, the two opposing doctrines are\nequally hypothetical.\n\nThe two views very unequally divide the scientific world; so that believers\nin \"the divine right of majorities\" need not hesitate which side to take,\nat least for the present. Up to a time quite within the memory of a\ngeneration still on the stage, two hypotheses about the nature of light\nvery unequally divided the scientific world. But the small minority has\nalready prevailed: the emission theory has gone out; the undulatory or wave\ntheory, after some fluctuation, has reached high tide, and is now the\npervading, the fully-established system. There was an intervening time\nduring which most physicists held their opinions in suspense.\n\nThe adoption of the undulatory theory of light called for the extension of\nthe same theory to heat, and this promptly suggested the hypothesis of a\ncorrelation, material connection, and transmutability of heat, light,\nelectricity, magnetism, etc.; which hypothesis the physicists held in\nabsolute suspense until very lately, but are now generally adopting. If not\nalready established as a system, it promises soon to become so. At least,\nit is generally received as a tenable and probably true hypothesis.\n\nParallel to this, however less cogent the reasons, Darwin and others,\nhaving shown it likely that some varieties of plants or animals have\ndiverged in time into cognate species, or into forms as different as\nspecies, are led to infer that all species of a genus may have thus\ndiverged from a common stock, and thence to suppose a higher community of\norigin in ages still farther back, and so on. Following the safe example of\nthe physicists, and acknowledging the fact of the diversification of a once\nhomogeneous species into varieties, we may receive the theory of the\nevolution of these into species, even while for the present we hold the\nhypothesis of a further evolution in cool suspense or in grave suspicion.\nIn respect to very many questions a wise man's mind rests long in a state\nneither of belief nor unbelief. But your intellectually short-sighted people\nare apt to be preternaturally clear-sighted, and to find their way very\nplain to positive conclusions upon one side or the other of every mooted\nquestion.\n\nIn fact, most people, and some philosophers, refuse to hold questions in\nabeyance, however incompetent they may be to decide them. And, curiously\nenough, the more difficult, recondite, and perplexing, the questions or\nhypotheses are--such, for instance, as those about organic Nature--the more\nimpatient they are of suspense. Sometimes, and evidently in the present\ncase, this impatience grows out of a fear that a new hypothesis may\nendanger cherished and most important beliefs. Impatience under such\ncircumstances is not unnatural, though perhaps needless, and, if so, unwise.\n\nTo us the present revival of the derivative hypothesis, in a more winning\nshape than it ever before had, was not unexpected. We wonder that any\nthoughtful observer of the course of investigation and of speculation in\nscience should not have foreseen it, and have learned at length to take its\ninevitable coming patiently; the more so, as in Darwin's treatise it comes\nin a purely scientific form, addressed only to scientific men. The\nnotoriety and wide popular perusal of this treatise appear to have\nastonished the author even more than the book itself has astonished the\nreading world Coming as the new presentation does from a naturalist of\nacknowledged character and ability and marked by a conscientiousness and\ncandor which have not always been reciprocated we have thought it simply\nright to set forth the doctrine as fairly and as favorably as we could There\nare plenty to decry it and the whole theory is widely exposed to attack For\nthe arguments on the other side we may look to the numerous adverse\npublications which Darwin s volume has already called out and especially to\nthose reviews which propose directly to refute it. Taking various lines and\nreflecting very diverse modes of thought, these hostile critics may be\nexpected to concentrate and enforce the principal objections which can be\nbrought to bear against the derivative hypothesis in general, and Darwin's\nnew exposition of it in particular.\n\nUpon the opposing side of the question we have read with attention--1. An\narticle in the North American Review for April last; 2. One in the\nChristian Examiner, Boston, for May; 3. M. Pictet's article in the\nBibliotheque Universelle, which we have already made considerable use of,\nwhich seems throughout most able and correct, and which in tone and\nfairness is admirably in contrast with--4. The article in the Edinburgh\nReview for May, attributed--although against a large amount of internal\npresumptive evidence--to the most distinguished British comparative\nanatomist; 5. An article in the North British Review for May; 6. Prof.\nAgassiz has afforded an early opportunity to peruse the criticisms he makes\nin the forthcoming third volume of his great work, by a publication of them\nin advance in the American Journal of Science for July.\n\nIn our survey of the lively discussion which has been raised, it matters\nlittle how our own particular opinions may incline. But we may confess to\nan impression, thus far, that the doctrine of the permanent and complete\nimmutability of species has not been established, and may fairly be\ndoubted. We believe that species vary, and that \"Natural Selection\"   works;\nbut we suspect that its operation, like every analogous natural operation,\nmay be limited by something else. Just as every species by its natural rate\nof reproduction would soon completely fill any country it could live in,\nbut does not, being checked by some other species or some other\ncondition--so it may be surmised that variation and natural selection have\ntheir struggle and consequent check, or are limited by something inherent\nin the constitution of organic beings.\n\nWe are disposed to rank the derivative hypothesis in its fullness with the\nnebular hypothesis, and to regard both as allowable, as not unlikely to\nprove tenable in spite of some strong objections, but as not therefore\ndemonstrably true. Those, if any there be, who regard the derivative\nhypothesis as satisfactorily proved, must have loose notions as to what\nproof is. Those who imagine it can be easily refuted and cast aside, must,\nwe think, have imperfect or very prejudiced conceptions of the facts\nconcerned and of the questions at issue.\n\nWe are not disposed nor prepared to take sides for or against the new\nhypothesis, and so, perhaps, occupy a good position from which to watch the\ndiscussion and criticise those objections which are seemingly inconclusive.\nOn surveying the arguments urged by those who have undertaken to demolish\nthe theory, we have been most impressed with a sense of their great\ninequality. Some strike us as excellent and perhaps unanswerable; some, as\nincongruous with other views of the same writers; others, when carried out,\nas incompatible with general experience or general beliefs, and therefore\nas proving too much; still others, as proving nothing at all; so that, on\nthe whole, the effect is rather confusing and disappointing. We certainly\nexpected a stronger adverse case than any which the thoroughgoing opposers\nof Darwin appear to have made out. Wherefore, if it be found that the new\nhypothesis has grown upon our favor as we proceeded, this must be\nattributed not so much to the force of the arguments of the book itself as\nto the want of force of several of those by which it has been assailed.\nDarwin's arguments we might resist or adjourn; but some of the refutations\nof it give us more concern than the book itself did.\n\nThese remarks apply mainly to the philosophical and theological objections\nwhich have been elaborately urged, almost exclusively by the American\nreviewers. The North British reviewer, indeed, roundly denounces the book\nas atheistical, but evidently deems the case too clear for argument. The\nEdinburgh reviewer, on the contrary, scouts all such objections--as well he\nmay, since he records his belief in \"a continuous creative operation,\" a\nconstantly operating secondary creational law,\" through which species are\nsuccessively produced; and he emits faint, but not indistinct, glimmerings\nof a transmutation theory of his own;[III-8] so that he is equally exposed\nto all the philosophical objections advanced by Agassiz, and to most of\nthose urged by the other American critics, against Darwin himself.\n\nProposing now to criticise the critics, so far as to see what their most\ngeneral and comprehensive objections amount to, we must needs begin with\nthe American reviewers, and with their arguments adduced to prove that a\nderivative hypothesis ought not to be true, or is not possible,\nphilosophical, or theistic.\n\nIt must not be forgotten that on former occasions very confident judgments\nhave been pronounced by very competent persons, which have not been finally\nratified. Of the two great minds of the seventeenth century, Newton and\nLeibnitz, both profoundly religious as well as philosophical, one produced\nthe theory of gravitation, the other objected to that theory that it was\nsubversive of natural religion. The nebular hypothesis--a natural\nconsequence of the theory of gravitation and of the subsequent progress of\nphysical and astronomical discovery--has been denounced as atheistical even\ndown to our own day. But it is now largely adopted by the most theistical\nnatural philosophers as a tenable and perhaps sufficient hypothesis, and\nwhere not accepted is no longer objected to, so far as we know, on\nphilosophical or religious grounds.\n\nThe gist of the philosophical objections urged by the two Boston reviewers\nagainst an hypothesis of the derivation of species--or at least against\nDarwin's particular hypothesis-- is, that it is incompatible with the idea\nof any manifestation of design in the universe, that it denies final\ncauses. A serious objection this, and one that demands very serious\nattention.\n\nThe proposition, that things and events in Nature were not designed to be\nso, if logically carried out, is doubtless tantamount to atheism. Yet most\npeople believe that some were designed and others were not, although they\nfall into a hopeless maze whenever they undertake to define their position.\nSo we should not like to stigmatize as atheistically disposed a person who\nregards certain things and events as being what they are through designed\nlaws (whatever that expression means), but as not themselves specially\nordained, or who, in another connection, believes in general, but not in\nparticular Providence. We could sadly puzzle him with questions; but in\nreturn he might equally puzzle us. Then, to deny that anything was\nspecially designed to be what it is, is one proposition; while to deny that\nthe Designer supernaturally or immediately made it so, is another: though\nthe reviewers appear not to recognize the distinction.\n\nAlso, \"scornfully to repudiate\" or to \"sneer at the idea of any\nmanifestation of design in the material universe,\"[III-9] is one thing;\nwhile to consider, and perhaps to exaggerate, the difficulties which attend\nthe practical application of the doctrine of final causes to certain\ninstances, is quite another thing: yet the Boston reviewers, we regret to\nsay, have not been duly regardful of the difference. Whatever be thought of\nDarwin's doctrine, we are surprised that he should be charged with scorning\nor sneering at the opinions of others, upon such a subject. Perhaps Darwin'\ns view is incompatible with final causes--we will consider that question\npresently-- but as to the Examiner's charge, that he \"sneers at the idea of\nany manifestation of design in the material universe,\" though we are\nconfident that no misrepresentation was intended, we are equally confident\nthat it is not at all warranted by the two passages cited in support of it.\nHere are the passages:\n\n\n\"If green woodpeckers alone had existed, or we did not know that there were\nmany black and pied kinds, I dare say that we should have thought that the\ngreen color was a beautiful adaptation to hide this tree-frequenting bird\nfrom its enemies.\"\n\n\"If our reason leads us to admire with enthusiasm a multitude of inimitable\ncontrivances in Nature, this same reason tells us, though we may easily err\non both sides, that some contrivances are less perfect. Can we consider the\nsting of the wasp or of the bee as perfect, which, when used against many\nattacking animals, cannot be withdrawn, owing to the backward serratures,\nand so inevitably causes the death of the insect by tearing out its\nviscera?\"\n\n\nIf the sneer here escapes ordinary vision in the detached extracts (one of\nthem wanting the end of the sentence), it is, if possible, more\nimperceptible when read with the context. Moreover, this perusal inclines\nus to think that the Examiner has misapprehended the particular argument or\nobject, as well as the spirit, of the author in these passages. The whole\nreads more naturally as a caution against the inconsiderate use of final\ncauses in science, and an illustration of some of the manifold errors and\nabsurdities which their hasty assumption is apt to involve--considerations\nprobably equivalent to those which induced Lord Bacon to liken final causes\nto \"vestal virgins.\" So, if any one, it is here Bacon that \"sitteth in the\nseat of the scornful.\" As to Darwin, in the section from which the extracts\nwere made, he is considering a subsidiary question, and trying to obviate a\nparticular difficulty, but, we suppose, is wholly unconscious of denying\n\"any manifestation of design in the material universe.\" He concludes the\nfirst sentence:\n\n\n    --\"and consequently that it was a character of importance, and might have\nbeen acquired through natural selection; as it is, I have no doubt that the\ncolor is due to some quite distinct cause, probably to sexual selection.\"\n\n\nAfter an illustration from the vegetable creation, Darwin adds:\n\n\n\"The naked skin on the head of a vulture is generally looked at as a direct\nadaptation for wallowing in putridity; and so it may be, or it may possibly\nbe due to the direct action of putrid matter; but we should be very\ncautious in drawing any such inference, when we see that the skin on the\nhead of the clean-feeding male turkey is likewise naked. The sutures in the\nskulls of young mammals have been advanced as a beautiful adaptation for\naiding parturition, and no doubt they facilitate or may be indispensable\nfor this act; but as sutures occur in the skulls of young birds and\nreptiles, which have only to escape from a broken egg, we may infer that\nthis structure has arisen from the laws of growth, and has been taken\nadvantage of in the parturition of the higher animals.\"\n\n\nAll this, simply taken, is beyond cavil, unless the attempt to explain\nscientifically how any designed result is accomplished savors of\nimpropriety.\n\nIn the other place, Darwin is contemplating the patent fact that\n\"perfection here below\" is relative, not absolute--and illustrating this by\nthe circumstance that European animals, and especially plants, are now\nproving to be better adapted for New Zealand than many of the indigenous\nones--that \"the correction for the aberration of light is said, on high\nauthority, not to be quite perfect even in that most perfect organ, the\neye.\" And then follows the second extract of the reviewer. But what is the\nposition of the reviewer upon his own interpretation of these passages? If\nhe insists that green woodpeckers were specifically created so in order\nthat they might be less liable to capture, must he not equally hold that\nthe black and pied ones were specifically made of these colors in order\nthat they might be more liable to be caught? And would an explanation of the\nmode in which those woodpeckers came to be green, however complete,\nconvince him that the color was undesigned?\n\nAs to the other illustration, is the reviewer so complete an optimist as to\ninsist that the arrangement and the weapon are wholly perfect (quoad the\ninsect) the normal use of which often causes the animal fatally to injure\nor to disembowel itself? Either way it seems to us that the argument here,\nas well as the insect, performs hari-kari. The Examiner adds:\n\n\n\"We should in like manner object to the word favorable, as implying that\nsome species are placed by the Creator under unfavorable circumstances, at\nleast under such as might be advantageously modified.\"\n\n\nBut are not many individuals and some races of men placed by the Creator\n\"under unfavorable circumstances, at least under such as might be\nadvantageously modified?\" Surely these reviewers must be living in an ideal\nworld, surrounded by \"the faultless monsters which our world ne'er saw,\" in\nsome elysium where imperfection and distress were never heard of! Such\narguments resemble some which we often hear against the Bible, holding that\nbook responsible as if it originated certain facts on the shady side of\nhuman nature or the apparently darker lines of Providential dealing, though\nthe facts are facts of common observation and have to be confronted upon\nany theory.\n\nThe North American reviewer also has a world of his own--just such a one as\nan idealizing philosopher would be apt to devise--that is, full of sharp\nand absolute distinctions: such, for instance, as the \"absolute\ninvariableness of instinct;\" an absolute want of intelligence in any brute\nanimal; and a complete monopoly of instinct by the brute animals, so that\nthis \"instinct is a great matter\" for them only, since it sharply and\nperfectly distinguishes this portion of organic Nature from the vegetable\nkingdom on the one hand and from man on the other: most convenient views for\nargumentative purposes, but we suppose not borne out in fact.\n\nIn their scientific objections the two reviewers take somewhat different\nlines; but their philosophical and theological arguments strikingly\ncoincide. They agree in emphatically asserting that Darwin's hypothesis of\nthe origination of species through variation and natural selection\n\"repudiates the whole doctrine of final causes,\" and \"all indication of\ndesign or purpose in the organic world . . . is neither more nor less than\na formal denial of any agency beyond that of a blind chance in the\ndeveloping or perfecting of the organs or instincts of created beings. . .\n. It is in vain that the apologists of this hypothesis might say that it\nmerely attributes a different mode and time to the Divine agency--that all\nthe qualities subsequently appearing in their descendants must have been\nimplanted, and have remained latent in the original pair.\" Such a view, the\nExaminer declares, \"is nowhere stated in this book, and would be, we are\nsure, disclaimed by the author.\"\n\nWe should like to be informed of the grounds of this sureness. The marked\nrejection of spontaneous generation--the statement of a belief that all\nanimals have descended from four or five progenitors, and plants from an\nequal or lesser number, or, perhaps, if constrained to it by analogy, \"from\nsome one primordial form into which life was first breathed\"--coupled with\nthe expression, \"To my mind it accords better with what we know of the laws\nimpressed on matter by the Creator, that the production and extinction of\nthe past and present inhabitants of the world should have been due to\nsecondary causes,\" than \"that each species has been independently\ncreated\"--these and similar expressions lead us to suppose that the author\nprobably does accept the kind of view which the Examiner is sure he would\ndisclaim. At least, we charitably see nothing in his scientific theory to\nhinder his adoption of Lord Bacon's \"Confession of Faith\" in this regard--\n\"That, notwithstanding God hath rested and ceased from creating, yet,\nnevertheless, he doth accomplish and fulfill his divine will in all things,\ngreat and small, singular and general, as fully and exactly by providence\nas he could by miracle and new creation, though his working be not\nimmediate and direct, but by compass; not violating Nature, which is his\nown law upon the creature.\"\n\n\nHowever that may be, it is undeniable that Mr. Darwin has purposely been\nsilent upon the philosophical and theological applications of his theory.\nThis reticence, under the circumstances, argues design, and raises inquiry\nas to the final cause or reason why. Here, as in higher instances,\nconfident as we are that there is a final cause, we must not be\noverconfident that we can infer the particular or true one. Perhaps the\nauthor is more familiar with natural-historical than with philosophical\ninquiries, and, not having decided which particular theory about efficient\ncause is best founded, he meanwhile argues the scientific questions\nconcerned--all that relates to secondary causes--upon purely scientific\ngrounds, as he must do in any case. Perhaps, confident, as he evidently is,\nthat his view will finally be adopted, he may enjoy a sort of satisfaction\nin hearing it denounced as sheer atheism by the inconsiderate, and\nafterward, when it takes its place with the nebular hypothesis and the\nlike, see this judgment reversed, as we suppose it would be in such event.\n\nWhatever Mr. Darwin's philosophy may be, or whether he has any, is a matter\nof no consequence at all, compared with the important questions, whether a\ntheory to account for the origination and diversification of animal and\nvegetable forms through the operation of secondary causes does or does not\nexclude design; and whether the establishment by adequate evidence of\nDarwin's particular theory of diversification through variation and natural\nselection would essentially alter the present scientific and philosophical\ngrounds for theistic views of Nature. The unqualified affirmative judgment\nrendered by the two Boston reviewers, evidently able and practised\nreasoners, \"must give us pause.\" We hesitate to advance our conclusions in\nopposition to theirs. But, after full and serious consideration, we are\nconstrained to say that, in our opinion, the adoption of a derivative\nhypothesis, and of Darwin's particular hypothesis, if we understand it,\nwould leave the doctrines of final causes, utility, and special design,\njust where they were before. We do not pretend that the subject is not\nenvironed with difficulties. Every view is so environed; and every shifting\nof the view is likely, if it removes some difficulties, to bring others\ninto prominence. But we cannot perceive that Darwin's theory brings in any\nnew kind of scientific difficulty, that is, any with which philosophical\nnaturalists were not already familiar.\n\nSince natural science deals only with secondary or natural causes, the\nscientific terms of a theory of derivation of species--no less than of a\ntheory of dynamics--must needs be the same to the theist as to the atheist.\nThe difference appears only when the inquiry is carried up to the question\nof primary cause--a question which belongs to philosophy. Wherefore, Darwin\n's reticence about efficient cause does not disturb us. He considers only\nthe scientific questions. As already stated, we think that a theistic view\nof Nature is implied in his book, and we must charitably refrain from\nsuggesting the contrary until the contrary is logically deduced from his\npremises. If, however, he anywhere maintains that the natural causes\nthrough which species are diversified operate without an ordaining and\ndirecting intelligence, and that the orderly arrangements and admirable\nadaptations we see all around us are fortuitous or blind, undesigned\nresults--that the eye, though it came to see, was not designed for seeing,\nnor the hand for handling--then, we suppose, he is justly chargeable with\ndenying, and very needlessly denying, all design in organic Nature;\notherwise, we suppose not. Why, if Darwin's well-known passage about the\neye[III-10] equivocal though some of the language be--does not imply\nordaining and directing intelligence, then he refutes his own theory as\neffectually as any of his opponents are likely to do. He asks:\n\n\"May we not believe that [under variation proceeding long enough,\ngeneration multiplying the better variations times enough, and natural\nselection securing the improvements] a living optical instrument might be\nthus formed as superior to one of glass as the works of the Creator are to\nthose of man?\"\n\nThis must mean one of two things: either that the living instrument was\nmade and perfected under (which is the same thing as by) an intelligent\nFirst Cause, or that it was not. If it was, then theism is asserted; and as\nto the mode of operation, how do we know, and why must we believe, that,\nfitting precedent forms being in existence, a living instrument (so\ndifferent from a lifeless manufacture) would be originated and perfected in\nany other way, or that this is not the fitting way? If it means that it was\nnot, if he so misuses words that by the Creator he intends an unintelligent\npower, undirected force, or necessity, then he has put his case so as to\ninvite disbelief in it. For then blind forces have produced not only\nmanifest adaptions of means to specific ends--which is absurd enough--but\nbetter adjusted and more perfect instruments or machines than intellect\n(that is, human intellect) can contrive and human skill execute--which no\nsane person will believe.\n\nOn the other hand, if Darwin even admits--we will not say adopts--the\ntheistic view, he may save himself much needless trouble in the endeavor to\naccount for the absence of every sort of intermediate form. Those in the\nline between one species and another supposed to be derived from it he may\nbe bound to provide; but as to \"an infinite number of other varieties not\nintermediate, gross, rude, and purposeless, the unmeaning creations of an\nunconscious cause,\" born only to perish, which a relentless reviewer has\nimposed upon his theory--rightly enough upon the atheistic alternative--the\ntheistic view rids him at once of this \"scum of creation.\" For, as species\ndo not now vary at all times and places and in all directions, nor produce\ncrude, vague, imperfect, and useless forms, there is no reason for\nsupposing that they ever did. Good-for-nothing monstrosities, failures of\npurpose rather than purposeless, indeed, sometimes occur; but these are just\nas anomalous and unlikely upon Darwin's theory as upon any other. For his\nparticular theory is based, and even over-strictly insists, upon the most\nuniversal of physiological laws, namely, that successive generations shall\ndiffer only slightly, if at all, from their parents; and this effectively\nexcludes crude and impotent forms. Wherefore, if we believe that the\nspecies were designed, and that natural propagation was designed, how can\nwe say that the actual varieties of the species were not equally designed?\nHave we not similar grounds for inferring design in the supposed varieties\nof species, that we have in the case of the supposed species of a genus?\nWhen a naturalist comes to regard as three closely related species what\nhe before took to be so many varieties of one species how has he thereby\nstrengthened our conviction that the three forms are designed to have\nthe differences which they actually exhibit? Wherefore so long as\ngradatory, orderly, and adapted forms in Nature argue design, and at\nleast while the physical cause of variation is utterly unknown and\nmysterious, we should advise Mr. Darwin to assume in the philosophy of\nhis hypothesis that variation has been led along certain beneficial\nlines. Streams flowing over a sloping plain by gravitation (here the\ncounterpart of natural selection) may have worn their actual channels as\nthey flowed; yet their particular courses may have been assigned; and\nwhere we see them forming definite and useful lines of irrigation, after\na manner unaccountable on the laws of gravitation and dynamics, we\nshould believe that the distribution was designed.\n\nTo insist, therefore, that the new hypothesis of the derivative origin of\nthe actual species is incompatible with final causes and design, is to take\na position which we must consider philosophically untenable. We must also\nregard it as highly unwise and dangerous, in the present state and present\nprospects of physical and physiological science. We should expect the\nphilosophical atheist or skeptic to take this ground; also, until better\ninformed, the unlearned and unphilosophical believer; but we should think\nthat the thoughtful theistic philosopher would take the other side. Not to\ndo so seems to concede that only supernatural events can be shown to be\ndesigned, which no theist can admit--seems also to misconceive the scope\nand meaning of all ordinary arguments for design in Nature. This\nmisconception is shared both by the reviewers and the reviewed. At least,\nMr. Darwin uses expressions which imply that the natural forms which\nsurround us, because they have a history or natural sequence, could have\nbeen only generally, but not particularly designed--a view at once\nsuperficial and contradictory; whereas his true line should be, that his\nhypothesis concerns the order and not the cause, the how and not the why of\nthe phenomena, and so leaves the question of design just where it was\nbefore.\n\nTo illustrate this from the theist's point of view: Transfer the question\nfor a moment from the origination of species to the origination of\nindividuals, which occurs, as we say, naturally. Because natural, that is,\n\"stated, fixed, or settled,\" is it any the less designed on that account?\nWe acknowledge that God is our maker--not merely the originator of the\nrace, but our maker as individuals--and none the less so because it pleased\nhim to make us in the way of ordinary generation. If any of us were born\nunlike our parents and grandparents, in a slight degree, or in whatever\ndegree, would the case be altered in this regard?\n\nThe whole argument in natural theology proceeds upon the ground that the\ninference for a final cause of the structure of the hand and of the valves\nin the veins is just as valid now, in individuals produced through natural\ngeneration, as it would have been in the case of the first man,\nsupernaturally created. Why not, then, just as good even on the supposition\nof the descent of men from chimpanzees and gorillas, since those animals\npossess these same contrivances? Or, to take a more supposable case: If the\nargument from structure to design is convincing when drawn from a particular\nanimal, say a Newfoundland dog, and is not weakened by the knowledge that\nthis dog came from similar parents, would it be at all weakened if, in\ntracing his genealogy, it were ascertained that he was a remote descendant\nof the mastiff or some other breed, or that both these and other breeds\ncame (as is suspected) from some wolf? If not, how is the argument for\ndesign in the structure of our particular dog affected by the supposition\nthat his wolfish progenitor came from a post-tertiary wolf, perhaps less\nunlike an existing one than the dog in question is to some other of the\nnumerous existing races of dogs, and that this post-tertiary came from an\nequally or more different tertiary wolf? And if the argument from structure\nto design is not invalidated by our present knowledge that our\nindividual dog was developed from a single organic cell, how is it\ninvalidated by the supposition of an analogous natural descent, through a\nlong line of connected forms, from such a cell, or from some simple animal,\nexisting ages before there were any dogs?\n\nAgain, suppose we have two well-known and apparently most decidedly\ndifferent animals or plants, A and D, both presenting, in their structure\nand in their adaptations to the conditions of existence, as valid and clear\nevidence of design as any animal or plant ever presented: suppose we have\nnow discovered two intermediate species, B and C, which make up a series\nwith equable differences from A to D. Is the proof of design or final cause\nin A and D, whatever it amounted to, at all weakened by the discovery of the\nintermediate forms? Rather does not the proof extend to the intermediate\nspecies, and go to show that all four were equally designed? Suppose, now,\nthe number of intermediate forms to be much increased, and therefore the\ngradations to be closer yet--as close as those between the various sorts of\ndogs, or races of men, or of horned cattle: would the evidence of design,\nas shown in the structure of any of the members of the series, be any\nweaker than it was in the case of A and D? Whoever contends that it would\nbe, should likewise maintain that the origination of individuals by\ngeneration is incompatible with design, or an impossibility in Nature. We\nmight all have confidently thought the latter, antecedently to experience\nof the fact of reproduction. Let our experience teach us wisdom.\n\nThese illustrations make it clear that the evidence of design from\nstructure and adaptation is furnished complete by the individual animal or\nplant itself, and that our knowledge or our ignorance of the history of its\nformation or mode of production adds nothing to it and takes nothing away.\nWe infer design from certain arrangements and results; and we have no other\nway of ascertaining it. Testimony, unless infallible, cannot prove it, and\nis out of the question here. Testimony is not the appropriate proof of\ndesign: adaptation to purpose is. Some arrangements in Nature appear to be\ncontrivances, but may leave us in doubt. Many others, of which the eye and\nthe hand are notable examples, compel belief with a force not appreciably\nshort of demonstration. Clearly to settle that such as these must have been\ndesigned goes far toward proving that other organs and other seemingly less\nexplicit adaptations in Nature must also have been designed, and clinches\nour belief, from manifold considerations, that all Nature is a preconcerted\narrangement, a manifested design. A strange contradiction would it be to\ninsist that the shape and markings of certain rude pieces of flint, lately\nfound in drift-deposits, prove design, but that nicer and thousand-fold\nmore complex adaptations to use in animals and vegetables do not a fortiori\nargue design.\n\nWe could not affirm that the arguments for design in Nature are conclusive\nto all minds. But we may insist, upon grounds already intimated, that,\nwhatever they were good for before Darwin's book appeared, they are good\nfor now. To our minds the argument from design always appeared conclusive\nof the being and continued operation of an intelligent First Cause, the\nOrdainer of Nature; and we do not see that the grounds of such belief would\nbe disturbed or shifted by the adoption of Darwin's hypothesis. We are not\nblind to the philosophical difficulties which the thoroughgoing implication\nof design in Nature has to encounter, nor is it our vocation to obviate\nthem It suffices us to know that they are not new nor peculiar\ndifficulties--that, as Darwin's theory and our reasonings upon it did not\nraise these perturbing spirits, they are not bound to lay them. Meanwhile,\nthat the doctrine of design encounters the very same difficulties in the\nmaterial that it does in the moral world is Just what ought to be expected.\n\nSo the issue between the skeptic and the theist is only the old one, long\nago argued out--namely, whether organic Nature is a result of design or of\nchance. Variation and natural selection open no third alternative; they\nconcern only the question how the results, whether fortuitous or designed,\nmay have been brought about. Organic Nature abounds with unmistakable and\nirresistible indications of design, and, being a connected and consistent\nsystem, this evidence carries the implication of design throughout the\nwhole. On the other hand, chance carries no probabilities with it, can never\nbe developed into a consistent system, but, when applied to the explanation\nof orderly or beneficial results, heaps up improbabilities at every step\nbeyond all computation. To us, a fortuitous Cosmos is simply inconceivable.\nThe alternative is a designed Cosmos.\n\nIt is very easy to assume that, because events in Nature are in one sense\naccidental, and the operative forces which bring them to pass are themselves\nblind and unintelligent (physically considered, all forces are), therefore\nthey are undirected, or that he who describes these events as the results\nof such forces thereby assumes that they are undirected. This is the\nassumption of the Boston reviewers, and of Mr. Agassiz, who insists that\nthe only alternative to the doctrine, that all organized beings were\nsupernaturally created just as they are, is, that they have arisen\nspontaneously through the omnipotence of matter.[III-11]\n\nAs to all this, nothing is easier than to bring out in the conclusion what\nyou introduce in the premises. If you import atheism into your conception\nof variation and natural selection, you can readily exhibit it in the\nresult. If you do not put it in, perhaps there need be none to come out.\nWhile the mechanician is considering a steamboat or locomotive-engine as a\nmaterial organism, and contemplating the fuel, water, and steam, the source\nof the mechanical forces, and how they operate, he may not have occasion to\nmention the engineer. But, the orderly and special results accomplished, the\nwhy the movements are in this or that particular direction, etc., is\ninexplicable without him. If Mr. Darwin believes that the events which he\nsupposes to have occurred and the results we behold were undirected and\nundesigned, or if the physicist believes that the natural forces to which\nhe refers phenomena are uncaused and undirected, no argument is needed to\nshow that such belief is atheism. But the admission of the phenomena and of\nthese natural processes and forces does not necessitate any such belief, nor\neven render it one whit less improbable than before.\n\nSurely, too, the accidental element may play its part in Nature without\nnegativing design in the theist's view. He believes that the earth's surface\nhas been very gradually prepared for man and the existing animal races,\nthat vegetable matter has through a long series of generations imparted\nfertility to the soil in order that it may support its present occupants,\nthat even beds of coal have been stored up for man's benefit Yet what is\nmore accidental, and more simply the consequence of physical agencies than\nthe accumulation of vegetable matter in a peat bog and its transformation\ninto coal? No scientific person at this day doubts that our solar system is\na progressive development, whether in his conception he begins with molten\nmasses, or aeriform or nebulous masses, or with a fluid revolving mass of\nvast extent, from which the specific existing worlds have been developed\none by one What theist doubts that the actual results of the development in\nthe inorganic worlds are not merely compatible with design but are in the\ntruest sense designed re suits? Not Mr. Agassiz, certainly, who adopts a\nremarkable illustration of design directly founded on the nebular hypothesis\ndrawing from the position and times of the revolution of the world, so\noriginated direct evidence that the physical world has been ordained in\nconformity with laws which obtain also among living beings But the reader\nof the interesting exposition[III-12] will notice that the designed result\nhas been brought to pass through what, speaking after the manner of men,\nmight be called a chapter of accidents.\n\nA natural corollary of this demonstration would seem to be, that a material\nconnection between a series of created things--such as the development of\none of them from another, or of all from a common stock--is highly\ncompatible with their intellectual connection, namely, with their being\ndesigned and directed by one mind. Yet upon some ground which is not\nexplained, and which we are unable to conjecture, Mr. Agassiz concludes to\nthe contrary in the organic kingdoms, and insists that, because the members\nof such a series have an intellectual connection, \"they cannot be the result\nof a material differentiation of the objects themselves,\"[III-13] that is,\nthey cannot have had a genealogical connection. But is there not as much\nintellectual connection between the successive generations of any species\nas there is between the several species of a genus, or the several genera\nof an order? As the intellectual connection here is realized through the\nmaterial connection, why may it not be so in the case of species and genera?\nOn all sides, therefore, the implication seems to be quite the other way.\n\n\nReturning to the accidental element, it is evident that the strongest point\nagainst the compatibility of Darwin's hypothesis with design in Nature is\nmade when natural selection is referred to as picking out those variations\nwhich are improvements from a vast number which are not improvements, but\nperhaps the contrary, and therefore useless or purposeless, and born to\nperish. But even here the difficulty is not peculiar; for Nature abounds\nwith analogous instances. Some of our race are useless, or worse, as\nregards the improvement of mankind; yet the race may be designed to improve,\nand may be actually improving. Or, to avoid the complication with free\nagency--the whole animate life of a country depends absolutely upon the\nvegetation, the vegetation upon the rain. The moisture is furnished by the\nocean, is raised by the sun's heat from the ocean's surface, and is wafted\ninland by the winds. But what multitudes of raindrops fall back into the\nocean--are as much without a final cause as the incipient varieties which\ncome to nothing! Does it therefore follow that the rains which are bestowed\nupon the soil with such rule and average regularity were not designed to\nsupport vegetable and animal life? Consider, likewise, the vast proportion\nof seeds and pollen, of ova and young--a thousand or more to one--which\ncome to nothing, and are therefore purposeless in the same sense, and only\nin the same sense, as are Darwin's unimproved and unused slight variations.\nThe world is full of such cases; and these must answer the argument--for we\ncannot, except by thus showing that it proves too much.\n\nFinally, it is worth noticing that, though natural selection is\nscientifically explicable, variation is not. Thus far the cause of\nvariation, or the reason why the offspring is sometimes unlike the parents,\nis just as mysterious as the reason why it is generally like the parents.\nIt is now as inexplicable as any other origination; and, if ever explained,\nthe explanation will only carry up the sequence of secondary causes one\nstep farther, and bring us in face of a somewhat different problem, but\nwhich will have the same element of mystery that the problem of variation\nhas now. Circumstances may preserve or may destroy the variations man may\nuse or direct them but selection whether artificial or natural no more\noriginates them than man originates the power which turns a wheel when he\ndams a stream and lets the water fall upon it The origination of this power\nis a question about efficient cause. The tendency of science in respect to\nthis obviously is not toward the omnipotence of matter, as some suppose,\nbut to ward the omnipotence of spirit.\n\nSo the real question we come to is as to the way in which we are to\nconceive intelligent and efficient cause to be exerted, and upon what\nexerted. Are we bound to suppose efficient cause in all cases exerted upon\nnothing to evoke something into existence--and this thousands of times\nrepeated, when a slight change in the details would make all the difference\nbetween successive species? Why may not the new species, or some of them,\nbe designed diversifications of the old?\n\nThere are, perhaps, only three views of efficient cause which may claim to\nbe both philosophical and theistic:\n\n    1.   The view of its exertion at the beginning of time, endowing matter and\ncreated things with forces which do the work and produce the phenomena.\n\n    2.   This same view, with the theory of insulated interpositions, or\noccasional direct action, engrafted upon it--the view that events and\noperations in general go on in virtue simply of forces communicated at the\nfirst, but that now and then, and only now and then, the Deity puts his\nhand directly to the work.\n\n    3.   The theory of the immediate, orderly, and constant, however infinitely\ndiversified, action of the intelligent efficient Cause.\n\nIt must be allowed that, while the third is preeminently the Christian\nview, all three are philosophically compatible with design in Nature. The\nsecond is probably the popular conception. Perhaps most thoughtful people\noscillate from the middle view toward the first or the third--adopting the\nfirst on some occasions, the third on others. Those philosophers who like\nand expect to settle all mooted questions will take one or the other\nextreme. The Examiner inclines toward, the North American reviewer fully\nadopts, the third view, to the logical extent of maintaining that \"the\norigin of an individual, as well as the origin of a species or a genus, can\nbe explained only by the direct action of an intelligent creative cause.\"\nTo silence his critics, this is the line for Mr. Darwin to take; for it at\nonce and completely relieves his scientific theory from every theological\nobjection which his reviewers have urged against it.\n\nAt present we suspect that our author prefers the first conception,\nthough he might contend that his hypothesis is compatible with either of\nthe three. That it is also compatible with an atheistic or pantheistic\nconception of the universe, is an objection which, being shared by all\nphysical, and some ethical or moral science, cannot specially be urged\nagainst Darwin's system. As he rejects spontaneous generation, and admits of\nintervention at the beginning of organic life, and probably in more than one\ninstance, he is not wholly excluded from adopting the middle view, although\nthe interventions he would allow are few and far back. Yet one\ninterposition admits the principle as well as more. Interposition\npresupposes particular necessity or reason for it, and raises the question,\nwhen and how often it may have been necessary. It might be the natural\nsupposition, if we had only one set of species to account for, or if the\nsuccessive inhabitants of the earth had no other connections or\nresemblances than those which adaptation to similar conditions, which final\ncauses in the narrower sense, might explain. But if this explanation of\norganic Nature requires one to \"believe that, at innumerable periods in the\nearth's history, certain elemental atoms have been commanded suddenly to\nflash into living tissues,\" and this when the results are seen to be\nstrictly connected and systematic, we cannot wonder that such interventions\nshould at length be considered, not as interpositions or interferences, but\nrather--to use the reviewer's own language--as \"exertions so frequent and\nbeneficent that we come to regard them as the ordinary action of Him who\nlaid the foundation of the earth, and without whom not a sparrow falleth to\nthe ground.\"[III-14] What does the difference between Mr. Darwin and his\nreviewer now amount to? If we say that according to one view the\norigination of species is natural, according to the other miraculous, Mr.\nDarwin agrees that \"what is natural as much requires and presupposes an\nintelligent mind to render it so-- that is, to effect it continually or at\nstated times--as what is supernatural does to effect it for once.\"[III-15]\nHe merely inquires into the form of the miracle, may remind us that all\nrecorded miracles (except the primal creation of matter) were\ntransformations or actions in and upon natural things, and will ask how\nmany times and how frequently may the origination of successive species be\nrepeated before the supernatural merges in the natural.\n\nIn short, Darwin maintains that the origination of a species, no less than\nthat of an individual, is natural; the reviewer, that the natural\norigination of an individual, no less than the origination of a species,\nrequires and presupposes Divine power. A fortiori, then, the origination of\na variety requires and presupposes Divine power. And so between the\nscientific hypothesis of the one and the philosophical conception of the\nother no contrariety remains. And so, concludes the North American\nreviewer, \"a proper view of the nature of causation places the vital\ndoctrine of the being and the providence of a God on ground that can never\nbe shaken.\"[III-16] A worthy conclusion, and a sufficient answer to the\ndenunciations and arguments of the rest of the article, so far as\nphilosophy and natural theology are concerned. If a writer must needs use\nhis own favorite dogma as a weapon with which to give coup de grace to a\npernicious theory, he should be careful to seize his edge-tool by the\nhandle, and not by the blade.\n\nWe can barely glance at a subsidiary philosophical objection of the North\nAmerican reviewer, which the Examiner also raises, though less explicitly.\nLike all geologists, Mr. Darwin draws upon time in the most unlimited\nmanner. He is not peculiar in this regard. Mr. Agassiz tells us that the\nconviction is \"now universal, among well-informed naturalists, that this\nglobe has been in existence for innumerable ages, and that the length of\ntime elapsed since it first became inhabited cannot be counted in years;\"\nPictet, that the imagination refuses to calculate the immense number of\nyears and of ages during which the faunas of thirty or more epochs have\nsucceeded one another, and developed their long succession of generations.\nNow, the reviewer declares that such indefinite succession of ages is\n\"virtually infinite,\" \"lacks no characteristic of eternity except its\nname,\" at least, that \"the difference between such a conception and that of\nthe strictly infinite, if any, is not appreciable.\" But infinity belongs to\nmetaphysics. Therefore, he concludes, Darwin supports his theory, not by\nscientific but by metaphysical evidence; his theory is \"essentially and\ncompletely metaphysical in character, resting altogether upon that idea of\n'the infinite' which the human mind can neither put aside nor\ncomprehend.\"[III-17] And so a theory which will be generally regarded as\nmuch too physical is transferred by a single syllogism to metaphysics.\n\nWell, physical geology must go with it: for, even on the soberest view, it\ndemands an indefinitely long time antecedent to the introduction of organic\nlife upon our earth. A fortiori is physical astronomy a branch of\nmetaphysics, demanding, as it does, still larger \"instalments of infinity,\"\nas the reviewer calls them, both as to time and number. Moreover, far the\ngreater part of physical inquiries now relate to molecular actions, which,\na distinguished natural philosopher informs us, \"we have to regard as the\nresults of an infinite number of in finitely small material particles,\nacting on each other at infinitely small distances\"--a triad of\ninfinities--and so physics becomes the most metaphysical of sciences.\nVerily, if this style of reasoning is to prevail--\n\n\"Thinking is but an idle waste of thought,\n\n     And naught is everything, and everything is naught.\"\n\n\nThe leading objection of Mr. Agassiz is likewise of a philosophical\ncharacter. It is, that species exist only \"as categories of thought\"--that,\nhaving no material existence, they can have had no material variation, and\nno material community of origin. Here the predication is of species in the\nsubjective sense, the inference in the objective sense. Reduced to plain\nterms, the argument seems to be: Species are ideas; therefore the objects\nfrom which the idea is derived cannot vary or blend, and cannot have had a\ngenealogical connection.\n\nThe common view of species is, that, although they are generalizations, yet\nthey have a direct objective ground in Nature, which genera, orders, etc.,\nhave not. According to the succinct definition of Jussieu--and that of\nLinnaeus is identical in meaning--a species is the perennial succession of\nsimilar individuals in continued generations. The species is the chain of\nwhich the individuals are the links. The sum of the\ngenealogically-connected similar individuals constitutes the species, which\nthus has an actuality and ground of distinction not shared by genera and\nother groups which were not supposed to be genealogically connected. How a\nderivative hypothesis would modify this view, in assigning to species only\na temporary fixity, is obvious. Yet, if naturalists adopt that hypothesis,\nthey will still retain Jussieu's definition, which leaves untouched the\nquestion as to how and when the \"perennial successions\" were established.\nThe practical question will only be, How much difference between two sets of\nindividuals entitles them to rank under distinct species? and that is the\npractical question now, on whatever theory. The theoretical question is--as\nstated at the beginning of this article--whether these specific lines were\nalways as distinct as now.\n\nMr. Agassiz has \"lost no opportunity of urging the idea that, while species\nhave no material existence, they yet exist as categories of thought in the\nsame way [and only in the same way] as genera, families, orders, classes,\"\netc. He\n\n\"has taken the ground that all the natural divisions in the animal kingdom\nare primarily distinct, founded upon different categories of characters,\nand that all exist in the same way, that is, as categories of thought,\nembodied in individual living forms. I have attempted to show that branches\nin the animal kingdom are founded upon different plans of structure, and\nfor that very reason have embraced from the beginning representatives\nbetween which there could be no community of origin; that classes are\nfounded upon different modes of execution of these plans, and therefore\nthey also embrace representatives which could have no community of origin;\nthat orders represent the different degrees of complication in the mode of\nexecution of each class, and therefore embrace representatives which could\nnot have a community of origin any more than the members of different\nclasses or branches; that families are founded upon different patterns of\nform, and embrace, representatives equally independent in their origin; that\ngenera are founded upon ultimate peculiarities of structure, embracing\nrepresentatives which, from the very nature of their peculiarities, could\nhave no community of origin; and that, finally, species are based upon\nrelations--and proportions that exclude, as much as all the preceding\ndistinctions, the idea of a common descent.\n\n\"As the community of characters among the beings belonging to these\ndifferent categories arises from the intellectual connection which shows\nthem to be categories of thought, they cannot be the result of a gradual\n\n    material differentiation of the objects themselves. The argument on which\nthese views are founded may be summed up in the following few words:\nSpecies, genera, families, etc., exist as thoughts, individuals as\nfacts.\"[III-18]\n\nAn ingenious dilemma caps the argument:\n\n\n\"It seems to me that there is much confusion of ideas in the general\nstatement of the variability of species so often repeated lately. If\nspecies do not exist at all, as the supporters of the transmutation theory\nmaintain, how can they vary? And if individuals alone exist, how can the\ndifferences which may be observed among them prove the variability of\nspecies?\"\n\n\nNow, we imagine that Mr. Darwin need not be dangerously gored by either\nhorn of this curious dilemma. Although we ourselves cherish old-fashioned\nprejudices in favor of the probable permanence, and therefore of a more\nstable objective ground of species, yet we agree--and Mr. Darwin will agree\nfully with Mr. Agassiz--that species, and he will add varieties, \"exist as\ncategories of thought,\" that is, as cognizable distinctions--which is all\nthat we can make of the phrase here, whatever it may mean in the\nAristotelian metaphysics. Admitting that species are only categories of\nthought, and not facts or things, how does this prevent the individuals,\nwhich are material things, from having varied in the course of time, so as\nto exemplify the present almost innumerable categories of thought, or\nembodiments of Divine thought in material forms, or--viewed on the human\nside--in forms marked with such orderly and graduated resemblances and\ndifferences as to suggest to our minds the idea of species, genera, orders,\netc., and to our reason the inference of a Divine Original? We have no\nclear idea how Mr. Agassiz intends to answer this question, in saying that\nbranches are founded upon different plans of structure, classes upon\ndifferent mode of execution of these plans, orders on different degrees of\ncomplication in the mode of execution, families upon different patterns of\nform, genera upon ultimate peculiarities of structure, and species upon\nrelations and proportions. That is, we do not perceive how these several\n\"categories of thought\" exclude the possibility or the probability that the\nindividuals which manifest or suggest the thoughts had an ultimate\ncommunity of origin.\n\nMoreover, Mr. Darwin might insinuate that the particular philosophy of\nclassification upon which this whole argument reposes is as purely\nhypothetical and as little accepted as is his own doctrine. If both are\npure hypotheses, it is hardly fair or satisfactory to extinguish the one by\nthe other. If there is no real contradiction between them, nothing is\ngained by the attempt.\n\nAs to the dilemma propounded, suppose we try it upon that category of\nthought which we call chair. This is a genus, comprising a common chair\n(Sella vulgaris), arm or easy chair (S. cathedra), the rocking-chair (S.\noscillans)--widely distributed in the United States--and some others, each\nof which has sported, as the gardeners say, into many varieties. But now,\nas the genus and the species have no material existence, how can they vary?\nIf only individual chairs exist, how can the differences which may be\nobserved among them prove the variability of the species? To which we reply\nby asking, Which does the question refer to, the category of thought, or\nthe individual embodiment? If the former, then we would remark that our\ncategories of thought vary from time to time in the readiest manner. And,\nalthough the Divine thoughts are eternal, yet they are manifested to us in\ntime and succession, and by their manifestation only can we know them, how\nimperfectly! Allowing that what has no material existence can have had no\nmaterial connection or variation, we should yet infer that what has\nintellectual existence and connection might have intellectual variation;\nand, turning to the individuals, which represent the species, we do not see\nhow all this shows that they may not vary. Observation shows us that they\ndo. Wherefore, taught by fact that successive individuals do vary, we\nsafely infer that the idea must have varied, and that this variation of the\nindividual representatives proves the variability of the species, whether\nobjectively or subjectively regarded.\n\nEach species or sort of chair, as we have said, has its varieties, and one\nspecies shades off by gradations into another. And--note it well--these\nnumerous and successively slight variations and gradations, far from\nsuggesting an accidental origin to chairs and to their forms, are very\nproofs of design.\n\nAgain, edifice is a generic category of thought. Egyptian, Grecian,\nByzantine, and Gothic buildings are well-marked species, of which each\nindividual building of the sort is a material embodiment. Now, the question\nis, whether these categories or ideas may not have been evolved, one from\nanother in succession, or from some primal, less specialized, edificial\ncategory. What better evidence for such hypothesis could we have than the\nvariations and grades which connect these species with each other? We might\nextend the parallel, and get some good illustrations of natural selection\nfrom the history of architecture, and the origin of the different styles\nunder different climates and conditions. Two considerations may qualify or\nlimit the comparison. One, that houses do not propagate, so as to produce\ncontinuing lines of each sort and variety; but this is of small moment on\nAgassiz's view, he holding that genealogical connection is not of the\nessence of a species at all. The other, that the formation and development\nof the ideas upon which human works proceed are gradual; or, as the same\ngreat naturalist well states it, \"while human thought is consecutive,\nDivine thought is simultaneous.\" But we have no right to affirm this of\nDivine action.\n\nWe must close here. We meant to review some of the more general scientific\nobjections which we thought not altogether tenable. But, after all, we are\nnot so anxious just now to know whether the new theory is well founded on\nfacts, as whether it would be harmless if it were. Besides, we feel quite\nunable to answer some of these objections, and it is pleasanter to take up\nthose which one thinks he can.\n\nAmong the unanswerable, perhaps the weightiest of the objections, is that\nof the absence, in geological deposits, of vestiges of the intermediate\nforms which the theory requires to have existed. Here all that Mr. Darwin\ncan do is to insist upon the extreme imperfection of the geological record\nand the uncertainty of negative evidence. But, withal, he allows the force\nof the objection almost as much as his opponents urge it--so much so,\nindeed, that two of his English critics turn the concession unfairly upon\nhim, and charge him with actually basing his hypothesis upon these and\nsimilar difficulties--as if he held it because of the difficulties, and not\nin spite of them; a handsome return for his candor!\n\nAs to this imperfection of the geological record, perhaps we should get a\nfair and intelligible illustration of it by imagining the existing animals\nand plants of New England, with all their remains and products since the\narrival of the Mayflower, to be annihilated; and that, in the coming time,\nthe geologists of a new colony, dropped by the New Zealand fleet on its way\nto explore the ruins of London, undertake, after fifty years of\nexamination, to reconstruct in a catalogue the flora and fauna of our day,\nthat is, from the close of the glacial period to the present time. With all\nthe advantages of a surface exploration, what a beggarly account it would\nbe! How many of the land animals and plants which are enumerated in the\nMassachusetts official reports would it be likely to contain?\n\nAnother unanswerable question asked by the Boston reviewers is, Why, when\nstructure and instinct or habit vary-- as they must have varied, on Darwin's\nhypothesis--they vary together and harmoniously, instead of vaguely? We\ncannot tell, because we cannot tell why either varies at all. Yet, as they\nboth do vary in successive generations--as is seen under domestication--and\nare correlated, we can only adduce the fact. Darwin may be precluded from\nour answer, but we may say that they vary together because designed to do\nso. A reviewer says that the chance of their varying together is\ninconceivably small; yet, if they do not, the variant individuals must all\nperish. Then it is well that it is not left to chance. To refer to a\nparallel case: before we were born, nourishment and the equivalent to\nrespiration took place in a certain way. But the moment we were ushered\ninto this breathing world, our actions promptly conformed, both as to\nrespiration and nourishment, to the before unused structure and to the new\nsurroundings.\n\n\"Now,\" says the Examiner, \"suppose, for instance, the gills of an aquatic\nanimal converted into lungs, while instinct still compelled a continuance\nunder water, would not drowning ensue?\" No doubt. But--simply contemplating\nthe facts, instead of theorizing--we notice that young frogs do not keep\ntheir heads under water after ceasing to be tadpoles. The instinct promptly\nchanges with the structure, without supernatural interposition--just as\nDarwin would have it, if the development of a variety or incipient species,\nthough rare, were as natural as a metamorphosis.\n\n\"Or if a quadruped, not yet furnished with wings, were suddenly inspired\nwith the instinct of a bird, and precipitated itself from a cliff, would\nnot the descent be hazardously rapid?\" Doubtless the animal would be no\nbetter supported than the objection. But Darwin makes very little indeed of\nvoluntary efforts as a cause of change, and even poor Lamarck need not be\ncaricatured. He never supposed that an elephant would take such a notion\ninto his wise head, or that a squirrel would begin with other than short and\neasy leaps; yet might not the length of the leap be increased by practice?\n\nThe North American reviewer's position, that the higher brute animals have\ncomparatively little instinct and no intelligence, is a heavy blow and great\ndiscouragement to dogs, horses, elephants, and monkeys. Thus stripped of\ntheir all, and left to shift for themselves as they may in this hard world,\ntheir pursuit and seeming attainment of knowledge under such peculiar\ndifficulties are interesting to contemplate. However, we are not so sure as\nis the critic that instinct regularly increases downward and decreases\nupward in the scale of being. Now that the case of the bee is reduced to\nmoderate proportions,[III-19] we know of nothing in instinct surpassing that\nof an animal so high as a bird, the talegal, the male of which plumes\nhimself upon making a hot-bed in which to batch his partner's eggs--which\nhe tends and regulates the beat of about as carefully and skillfully as the\nunplumed biped does an eccaleobion.[III-20]\n\nAs to the real intelligence of the higher brutes, it has been ably defended\nby a far more competent observer, Mr. Agassiz, to whose conclusions we\nyield a general assent, although we cannot quite place the best of dogs \"in\nthat respect upon a level with a considerable proportion of poor humanity,\"\nnor indulge the hope, or indeed the desire, of a renewed acquaintance with\nthe whole animal kingdom in a future life.\n\nThe assertion that acquired habitudes or instincts, and acquired\nstructures, are not heritable, any breeder or good observer can refute.\n\n   That \"the human mind has become what it is out of a developed\ninstinct,\" is a statement which Mr. Darwin nowhere makes, and, we presume,\nwould not accept. That he would have us believe that individual animals\nacquire their instincts gradually,[III-21] is a statement which must have\nbeen penned in inadvertence both of the very definition of instinct, and of\neverything we know of in Mr. Darwin's book.\n\nIt has been attempted to destroy the very foundation of Darwin's hypothesis\nby denying that there are any wild varieties, to speak of, for natural\nselection to operate upon. We cannot gravely sit down to prove that wild\nvarieties abound. We should think it just as necessary to prove that snow\nfalls in winter. That variation among plants cannot be largely due to\nhybridism, and that their variation in Nature is not essentially different\nfrom much that occurs in domestication, and, in the long-run, probably\nhardly less in amount, we could show if our space permitted.\n\nAs to the sterility of hybrids, that can no longer be insisted upon as\nabsolutely true, nor be practically used as a test between species and\nvarieties, unless we allow that hares and rabbits are of one species. That\nsuch sterility, whether total or partial, subserves a purpose in keeping\nspecies apart, and was so designed, we do not doubt. But the critics fail\nto perceive that this sterility proves nothing whatever against the\nderivative origin of the actual species; for it may as well have been\nintended to keep separate those forms which have reached a certain amount\nof divergence, as those which were always thus distinct.\n\nThe argument for the permanence of species, drawn from the identity with\nthose now living of cats, birds, and other animals preserved in Egyptian\ncatacombs, was good enough as used by Cuvier against St.-Hilaire, that is,\nagainst the supposition that time brings about a gradual alteration of\nwhole species; but it goes for little against Darwin, unless it be proved\nthat species never vary, or that the perpetuation of a variety necessitates\nthe extinction of the parent breed. For Darwin clearly maintains--what the\nfacts warrant--that the mass of a species remains fixed so long as it\nexists at all, though it may set off a variety now and then. The variety may\nfinally supersede the parent form, or it may coexist with it; yet it does\nnot in the least hinder the unvaried stock from continuing true to the\nbreed, unless it crosses with it. The common law of inheritance may be\nexpected to keep both the original and the variety mainly true as long as\nthey last, and none the less so because they have given rise to occasional\nvarieties. The tailless Manx cats, like the curtailed fox in the fable, have\nnot induced the normal breeds to dispense with their tails, nor have the\nDorkings (apparently known to Pliny) affected the permanence of the common\nsort of fowl.\n\nAs to the objection that the lower forms of life ought, on Darwin's theory,\nto have been long ago improved out of existence, and replaced by higher\nforms, the objectors forget what a vacuum that would leave below, and what\na vast field there is to which a simple organization is best adapted, and\nwhere an advance would be no improvement, but the contrary. To accumulate\nthe greatest amount of being upon a given space, and to provide as much\nenjoyment of life as can be under the conditions, is what Nature seems to\naim at; and this is effected by diversification.\n\nFinally, we advise nobody to accept Darwin's or any other derivative theory\nas true. The time has not come for that, and perhaps never will. We also\nadvise against a similar credulity on the other side, in a blind faith that\nspecies--that the manifold sorts and forms of existing animals and\nvegetables--\"have no secondary cause.\" The contrary is already not\nunlikely, and we suppose will hereafter become more and more probable. But\nwe are confident that, if a derivative hypothesis ever is established, it\nwill be so on a solid theistic ground.\n\nMeanwhile an inevitable and legitimate hypothesis is on trial--an\nhypothesis thus far not untenable--a trial just now very useful to science,\nand, we conclude, not harmful to religion, unless injudicious assailants\ntemporarily make it so.\n\nOne good effect is already manifest; its enabling the advocates of the\nhypothesis of a multiplicity of human species to perceive the double\ninsecurity of their ground. When the races of men are admitted to be of one\nspecies, the corollary, that they are of one origin, may be expected to\nfollow. Those who allow them to be of one species must admit an actual\ndiversification into strongly-marked and persistent varieties, and so admit\nthe basis of fact upon which the Darwinian hypothesis is built; while those,\non the other hand, who recognize several or numerous human species, will\nhardly be able to maintain that such species were primordial and\nsupernatural in the ordinary sense of the word.\n\nThe English mind is prone to positivism and kindred forms of materialistic\nphilosophy, and we must expect the derivative theory to be taken up in that\ninterest. We have no predilection for that school, but the contrary. If we\nhad, we might have looked complacently upon a line of criticism which would\nindirectly, but effectively, play into the hands of positivists and\nmaterialistic atheists generally. The wiser and stronger ground to take is,\nthat the derivative hypothesis leaves the argument for design, and\ntherefore for a designer, as valid as it ever was; that to do any work by an\ninstrument must require, and therefore presuppose, the exertion rather of\nmore than of less power than to do it directly; that whoever would be a\nconsistent theist should believe that Design in the natural world is\ncoextensive with Providence, and hold as firmly to the one as he does to\nthe other, in spite of the wholly similar and apparently insuperable\ndifficulties which the mind encounters whenever it endeavors to develop the\nidea into a system, either in the material and organic, or in the moral\nworld. It is enough, in the way of obviating objections, to show that the\nphilosophical difficulties of the one are the same, and only the same, as\nof the other. IV\n\nSPECIES AS TO VARIATION,\n\nGEOGRAPHICAL\n\nDISTRIBUTION,\n\nAND SUCCESSION\n\n(American Journal of Science and Arts, May, 1863)\n\n\n\nEtude sur l'Espece, a l'Occasion d'une Revision de la Famille des\nCupuliferes, par M. ALPHONSE DE CANDOLLE.-- This is the title of a paper by\nM. Alph. De Candolle, growing out of his study of the oaks. It was\npublished in the November number of the Bibliotheque Universelle, and\nseparately issued as a pamphlet. A less inspiring task could hardly be\nassigned to a botanist than the systematic elaboration of the genus Quercus\nand its allies. The vast materials assembled under De Candolle's hands,\nwhile disheartening for their bulk, offered small hope of novelty. The\nsubject was both extremely trite and extremely difficult. Happily it\noccurred to De Candolle that an interest might be imparted to an onerous\nundertaking, and a work of necessity be turned to good account for science,\nby studying the oaks in view of the question of species.     What this term\nspecies means, or should mean, in natural history, what the limits of\nspecies, inter se or chronologically, or in geographical distribution, their\nmodifications, actual or probable, their origin, and their destiny--these\nare questions which surge up from time to time; and now and then in the\nprogress of science they come to assume a new and hopeful interest. Botany\nand zoology, geology, and what our author, feeling the want of a new term\nproposes to name epiontology, [IV-1] all lead up to and converge into this\nclass of questions, while recent theories shape and point the discussion So\nwe look with eager interest to see what light the study of oaks by a very\ncareful experienced and conservative botanist, particularly conversant with\nthe geographical relations of plants may throw upon the subject.\n\nThe course of investigation in this instance does not differ from that\nordinarily pursued by working botanists nor, in deed are the theoretical\nconclusions other than those to which a similar study of other orders might\nnot have equally led. The oaks afford a very good occasion for the\ndiscussion of questions which press upon our attention, and perhaps they\noffer peculiarly good materials on account of the number of fossil species.\n\nPreconceived notions about species being laid aside, the specimens in hand\nwere distributed, according to their obvious resemblances, into groups of\napparently identical or nearly identical forms, which were severally\nexamined and compared. Where specimens were few, as from countries little\nexplored, the work was easy, but the conclusions, as will be seen, of small\nvalue. The fewer the materials, the smaller the likelihood of forms\nintermediate between any two, and--what does not appear being treated upon\nthe old law-maxim as non-existent--species are readily enough defined.\nWhere, however, specimens abound, as in the case of the oaks of Europe, of\nthe Orient, and of the United States, of which the specimens amounted to\nhundreds, collected at different ages, in varied localities, by botanists\nof all sorts of views and predilections--here alone were data fit to draw\nuseful conclusions from. Here, as De Candolle remarks, he had every\nadvantage, being furnished with materials more complete than any one person\ncould have procured from his own herborizations, more varied than if he had\nobserved a hundred times over the same forms in the same district, and more\nimpartial than if they had all been amassed by one person with his own\nideas or predispositions. So that vast herbaria, into which contributions\nfrom every source have flowed for years, furnish the best possible data--at\nleast are far better than any practicable amount of personal\nherborization--or the comparative study of related forms occurring over\nwide tracts of territory. But as the materials increase, so do the\ndifficulties. Forms, which appeared totally distinct, approach or blend\nthrough intermediate gradations; characters, stable in a limited number of\ninstances or in a limited district, prove unstable occasionally, or when\nobserved over a wider area; and the practical question is forced upon the\ninvestigator, What here is probably fixed and specific, and what is\nvariant, pertaining to individual, variety, or race?\n\nIn the examination of these rich materials, certain characters were found\nto vary upon the same branch, or upon the same tree, sometimes according to\nage or development, sometimes irrespective of such relations or of any\nassignable reasons. Such characters, of course, are not specific, although\nmany of them are such as would have been expected to be constant in the\nsame species, and are such as generally enter into specific definitions.\nVariations of this sort, De Candolle, with his usual painstaking, classifies\nand tabulates, and even expresses numerically their frequency in certain\nspecies. The results are brought well to view in a systematic enumeration:\n\n    1.   Of characters which frequently vary upon the same branch: over a dozen\nsuch are mentioned.\n\n    2.   Of those which sometimes vary upon the same branch: a smaller number of\nthese are mentioned.\n\n    3.   Those so rare that they might be called monstrosities.\nThen he enumerates characters, ten in number, which he has never found to\nvary on the same branch, and which, therefore, may better claim to be\nemployed as specific. But, as among them he includes the duration of the\nleaves, the size of the cupule, and the form and size of its scales, which\nare by no means quite uniform in different trees of the same species, even\nthese characters must be taken with allowance. In fact, having first\nbrought together, as groups of the lowest order, those forms which varied\nupon the same stock, he next had to combine similarly various forms which,\nthough not found associated upon the same branch, were thoroughly blended\nby intermediate degrees:\n\n\n\"The lower groups (varieties or races) being thus constituted, I have given\nthe rank of species to the groups next above these, which differ in other\nrespects, i.e., either in characters which were not found united upon\ncertain individuals, or in those which do not show transitions from one\nindividual to another. For the oaks of regions sufficiently known, the\nspecies thus formed rest upon satisfactory bases, of which the proof can be\nfurnished. It is quite otherwise with those which are represented in our\nherbaria by single or few specimens. These are provisional species--species\nwhich may hereafter fall to the rank of simple varieties. I have not been\ninclined to prejudge such questions; indeed, in this regard, I am not\ndisposed to follow those authors whose tendency is, as they say, to reunite\nspecies. I never reunite them without proof in each particular case; while\nthe botanists to whom I refer do so on the ground of analogous variations\nor transitions occurring in the same genus or in the same family. For\nexample resting on the fact that Quercus hex, Q. coccifera, Q. acutifolia,\netc., have the leaves sometimes entire and sometimes toothed upon the same\nbranch, or present transitions from one tree to another, I might readily\nhave united my Q. Tlapuxahuensis to Q. Sartorii of Liebmann, since these\ntwo differ only in their entire or their toothed leaves. From the fact that\nthe length of the peduncle varies in Q. Robur and many other oaks, I might\nhave combined Q. Seemannii Liebm. with Q. salicifolia Nee. I have not\nadmitted these inductions, but have demanded visible proof in each\nparticular case. Many species are thus left as provisional; but, in\nproceeding thus, the progress of the science will be more regular, and the\nsynonymy less dependent upon the caprice or the theoretical opinions of\neach author.\"\n\n\nThis is safe and to a certain degree judicious, no doubt, as respects\npublished species. Once admitted, they may stand until they are put down by\nevidence, direct or circumstantial. Doubtless a species may rightfully be\ncondemned on good circumstantial evidence. But what course does De Candolle\npursue in the case--of every-day occurrence to most working botanists,\nhaving to elaborate collections from countries not so well explored as\nEurope--when the forms in question, or one of the two, are as yet unnamed?\nDoes he introduce as a new species every form which he cannot connect by\nocular proof with a near relative, from which it differs only in\nparticulars which he sees are inconstant in better known species of the\nsame group? We suppose not. But, if he does, little improvement for the\nfuture upon the state of things revealed in the following quotation can be\nexpected:\n\n\"In the actual state of our knowledge, after having seen nearly all the\noriginal specimens, and in some species as many as two hundred\nrepresentatives from different localities, I estimate that, out of the\nthree hundred species of Cupuliferae which will be enumerated in the\nProdromus, two-thirds at least are provisional species. In general, when we\nconsider what a multitude of species were described from a single specimen,\nor from the forms of a single locality, of a single country, or are badly\ndescribed, it is difficult to believe that above one-third of the actual\nspecies in botanical works will remain unchanged.\"\n\n\nSuch being the results of the want of adequate knowledge, how is it likely\nto be when our knowledge is largely increased? The judgment of so practised\na botanist as De Candolle is important in this regard, and it accords with\nthat of other botanists of equal experience.\n\n\"They are mistaken,\" he pointedly asserts, \"who repeat that the greater\npart of our species are clearly limited, and that the doubtful species are\nin a feeble minority. This seemed to be true, so long as a genus was\nimperfectly known, and its species were founded upon few specimens, that is\nto say, were provisional. Just as we come to know them better, intermediate\nforms flow in, and doubts as to specific limits augment.\"\n\nDe Candolle insists, indeed, in this connection, that the higher the rank\nof the groups the more definite their limitation, or, in other terms, the\nfewer the ambiguous or doubtful forms, that genera are more strictly\nlimited than species tribes than genera, orders than tribes, etc. We are\nnot convinced of this Often where it has appeared to be so, advancing\ndiscovery has brought intermediate forms to light, perplexing to the\nsystematist. \"They are mistaken, we think more than one systematic botanist\nwill say, \"who repeat that the greater part of our natural orders and\ntribes are absolutely limited,\" however we may agree that we will limit\nthem. Provisional genera we suppose are proportionally hardly less common\nthan provisional species; and hundreds of genera are kept up on\nconsiderations of general propriety or general convenience, although well\nknown to shade off into adjacent ones by complete gradations. Somewhat of\nthis greater fixity of higher groups, therefore, is rather apparent than\nreal. On the other hand, that varieties should be less definite than\nspecies, follows from the very terms employed. They are ranked as\nvarieties, rather than species, just because of their less definiteness.\n\nSingular as it may appear, we have heard it denied that spontaneous\nvarieties occur. De Candolle makes the important announcement that, in the\noak genus, the best known species are just those which present the greatest\nnumber of spontaneous varieties and sub-varieties. The maximum is found in\nQ. Robur, with twenty-eight varieties, all spontaneous. Of Q. Lusitanica\neleven varieties are enumerated, of Q. Calliprinos ten, of Q. coccifera\neight, * etc. And he significantly adds that \"these very species which offer\nsuch numerous modifications are themselves ordinarily surrounded by other\nforms, provisionally called species, because of the absence of known\ntransitions or variations, but to which some of these will probably have to\nbe joined hereafter.\" The inference is natural, if not inevitable, that the\ndifference between such species and such varieties is only one of degree,\neither as to amount of divergence, or of hereditary fixity, or as to the\nfrequency or rarity at the present time of intermediate forms.\n\nThis brings us to the second section of De Candolle's article, in which he\npasses on, from the observation of the present forms and affinities of\ncupuliferous plants, to the consideration of their probable history and\norigin. Suffice it to say, that he frankly accepts the inferences derived\nfrom the whole course of observation, and contemplates a probable\nhistorical connection between congeneric species. He accepts and, by\nvarious considerations drawn from the geographical distribution of European\nCupuliferae, fortifies the conclusion--long ago arrived at by Edward\nForbes--that the present species, and even some of their varieties, date\nback to about the close of the Tertiary epoch, since which time they have\nbeen subject to frequent and great changes of habitation or limitation, but\nwithout appreciable change of specific form or character; that is, without\nprofounder changes than those within which a species at the present time is\nknown to vary. Moreover, he is careful to state that he is far from\nconcluding that the time of the appearance of a species in Europe at all\nindicates the time of its origin. Looking back still further into the\nTertiary epoch, of which the vegetable remains indicate many analogous, but\nfew, if any, identical forms, he concludes, with Heer and others, that\nspecific changes of form, as well as changes of station, are to be\npresumed; and, finally, that \"the theory of a succession of forms through\nthe deviation of anterior forms is the most natural hypothesis, and the\nmost accordant with the known facts in palaeontology, geographical botany\nand zoology, of anatomical structure and classification: but direct proof\nof it is wanting, and moreover, if true, it must have taken place very\nslowly; so slowly, indeed, that its effects are discernible only after a\nlapse of time far longer than our historic epoch.\"\nIn contemplating the present state of the species of Cupuliferae in Europe,\nDe Candolle comes to the conclusion that, while the beech is increasing,\nand extending its limits southward and westward (at the expense of\nConiferae and birches), the common oak, to some extent, and the Turkey oak\ndecidedly, are diminishing and retreating, and this wholly irrespective of\nman's agency. This is inferred of the Turkey oak from the great gaps found\nin its present geographical area, which are otherwise inexplicable, and\nwhich he regards as plain indications of a partial extinction. Community of\ndescent of all the individuals of species is of course implied in these and\nall similar reasonings.\n\nAn obvious result of such partial extinction is clearly enough brought to\nview The European oaks (like the American species) greatly tend to vary\nthat is they manifest an active disposition to produce new forms Every form\ntends to become hereditary and so to pass from the state of mere variation\nto that of race and of these competing incipient races some only will\nsurvive. Quercus Robur offers a familiar illustration of the manner in\nwhich one form may in the course of time become separated into two or more\ndistinct ones.\n\nTo Linnaeus this common oak of Europe was all of one species. But of late\nyears the greater number of European botanists have regarded it as\nincluding three species, Q. pedunculata, Q. sessiliflora, and Q. pubescens.\nDe Candolle looks with satisfaction to the independent conclusion which he\nreached from a long and patient study of the forms (and which Webb, Gay,\nBentham, and others, had equally reached), that the view of Linnaeus was\ncorrect, inasmuch as it goes to show that the idea and the practical\napplication of the term species have remained unchanged during the century\nwhich has elapsed since the publication of the \"Species Plantarum.\" But,\nthe idea remaining unchanged, the facts might appear under a different\naspect, and the conclusion be different, under a slight and very supposable\nchange of circumstances. Of the twenty-eight spontaneous varieties of Q.\nRobur, which De Candolle recognizes, all but six, he remarks, fall\nnaturally under the three sub-species, pedunculata, sessiliflora, and\npubescens, and are therefore forms grouped around these as centres; and,\nmoreover, the few connecting forms are by no means the most common. Were\nthese to die out, it is clear that the three forms which have already been\nso frequently taken for species would be what the group of four or five\nprovisionally admitted species which closely surround Q. Robur now are. The\nbest example of such a case, as having in all probability occurred through\ngeographical segregation and partial extinction, is that of the cedar, thus\nseparated into the Deodar, the Lebanon, and the Atlantic cedars--a case\nadmirably worked out by Dr. Hooker two or three years ago. [IV-2]\nA special advantage of the Cupuliferae for determining the probable\nantiquity of existing species in Europe, De Candolle finds in the size and\ncharacter of their fruits. However it may be with other plants (and he\ncomes to the conclusion generally that marine currents and all other means\nof distant transport have played only a very small part in the actual\ndispersion of species), the transport of acorns and chestnuts by natural\ncauses across an arm of the sea in a condition to germinate, and much more\nthe spontaneous establishment of a forest of oaks or chestnuts in this way,\nDe Candolle conceives to be fairly impossible in itself, and contrary to\nall experience. From such considerations, i.e., from the actual dispersion\nof the existing species (with occasional aid from post-tertiary deposits),\nit is thought to be shown that the principal Cupuliferae of the Old World\nattained their actual extension before the present separation of Sicily,\nSardinia and Corsica, and of Britain, from the European Continent.\n\nThis view once adopted, and this course once entered upon, has to be\npursued farther. Quercus Robur of Europe with its bevy of admitted\nderivatives, and its attending species only provisionally admitted to that\nrank, is very closely related to certain species of Eastern Asia, and of\nOregon and California--so closely that \"a view of the specimens by no means\nforbids the idea that they have all originated from Q. Robur, or have\noriginated, with the latter, from one or more preceding forms so like the\npresent ones that a naturalist could hardly know whether to call them\nspecies or varieties.\" Moreover, there are fossil leaves from diluvian\ndeposits in Italy, figured by Gaudin, which are hardly distinguishable from\nthose of Q. Robur on the one hand, and from those of Q. Douglasii, etc., of\nCalifornia, on the other. No such leaves are found in any tertiary deposit\nin Europe; but such are found of that age, it appears, in Northwest\nAmerica, where their remote descendants still flourish. So that the probable\ngenealogy of Q. Robur, traceable in Europe up to the commencement of the\npresent epoch, looks eastward and far into the past on far-distant shores.\n\nQuercus Ilex, the evergreen oak of Southern Europe and Northern Africa,\nreveals a similar archaeology; but its presence in Algeria leads De\nCandolle to regard it as a much more ancient denizen of Europe than Q.\nRobur; and a Tertiary oak, Q. ilicoides, from a very old Miocene bed in\nSwitzerland, is thought to be one of its ancestral forms. This high\nantiquity once established, it follows almost of course that the very\nnearly-related species in Central Asia, in Japan, in California, and even\nour own live-oak with its Mexican relatives, may probably enough be\nregarded as early offshoots from the same stock with Q. hex.\n\nIn brief--not to continue these abstracts and remarks, and without\nreference to Darwin's particular theory (which De Candolle at the close\nvery fairly considers)--if existing species, or many of them, are as\nancient as they are now generally thought to be, and were subject to the\nphysical and geographical changes (among them the coming and the going of\nthe glacial epoch) which this antiquity implies; if in former times they\nwere as liable to variation as they now are; and if the individuals of the\nsame species may claim a common local origin, then we cannot wonder that\n\"the theory of a succession of forms by deviations of anterior forms\"\nshould be regarded as \"the most natural hypothesis,\" nor at the general\nadvance made toward its acceptance.\n\nThe question being, not, how plants and animals originated, but, how came\nthe existing animals and plants to be just where they are and what they\nare, it is plain that naturalists interested in such inquiries are mostly\nlooking for the answer in one direction. The general drift of opinion, or\nat least of expectation, is exemplified by this essay of De Candolle; and\nthe set and force of the current are seen by noticing how it carries along\nnaturalists of widely different views and prepossessions--some faster and\nfarther than others--but all in one way. The tendency is, we may say, to\nextend the law of continuity, or something analogous to it, from inorganic\nto organic Nature, and in the latter to connect the present with the past\nin some sort of material connection. The generalization may indeed be\nexpressed so as not to assert that the connection is genetic, as in Mr.\nWallace's formula: \"Every species has come into existence coincident both\nin time and space with preexisting closely-allied species.\" Edward Forbes,\nwho may be called the originator of this whole line of inquiry, long ago\nexpressed a similar view. But the only material sequence we know, or can\nclearly conceive, in plants and animals, is that from parent to progeny;\nand, as De Candolle implies, the origin of species and that of races can\nhardly be much unlike, nor governed by other than the same laws, whatever\nthese may be.\n\nThe progress of opinion upon this subject in one generation is not badly\nrepresented by that of De Candolle himself, who is by no means prone to\nadopt new views without much consideration. In an elementary treatise\npublished in the year 1835, he adopted and, if we rightly remember,\nvigorously maintained, Schouw's idea of the double or multiple origin of\nspecies, at least of some species--a view which has been carried out to its\nultimate development only perhaps by Agassiz, in the denial of any necessary\ngenetic connection among the individuals of the same species, or of any\noriginal localization more restricted than the area now occupied by the\nspecies. But in i855, in his \"Geographic Botanique,\" the multiple\nhypothesis, although in principle not abandoned, loses its point, in view\nof the probable high antiquity of existing species. The actual vegetation\nof the world being now regarded as a continuation, through numerous\ngeological, geographical, and more recently historical changes, of anterior\nvegetations, the actual distribution of plants is seen to be a consequence\nof preceding conditions; and geological considerations, and these alone,\nmay be expected to explain all the facts--many of them so curious and\nextraordinary--of the actual geographical distribution of the species. In\nthe present essay, not only the distribution but the origin of congeneric\nspecies is regarded as something derivative; whether derived by slow and\nvery gradual changes in the course of ages, according to Darwin, or by a\nsudden, inexplicable change of their tertiary ancestors, as conceived by\nHeer, De Candolle hazards no opinion. It may, however, be inferred that he\nlooks upon \"natural selection\" as a real, but insufficient cause; while\nsome curious remarks upon the number of monstrosities annually produced,\nand the possibility of their enduring, may be regarded as favorable to\nHeer's view.\n\nAs an index to the progress of opinion in the direction referred to, it\nwill be interesting to compare Sir Charles Lyell's well-known chapters of\ntwenty or thirty years ago, in which the permanence of species was ably\nmaintained, with his treatment of the same subject in a work just issued in\nEngland, which, however, has not yet reached us.\n\nA belief of the derivation of species may be maintained along with a\nconviction of great persistence of specific characters. This is the idea of\nthe excellent Swiss vegetable palaeontologist, Heer, who imagines a sudden\nchange of specific type at certain periods, and perhaps is that of Pictet.\nFalconer adheres to somewhat similar views in his elaborate paper on\nelephants, living and fossil, in the Natural History Review for January\nlast. Noting that \"there is clear evidence of the true mammoth having\nexisted in America long after the period of the northern drift, when the\nsurface of the country had settled down into its present form, and also in\nEurope so late as to have been a contemporary of the Irish elk, and on the\nother hand that it existed in England so far back as before the deposition\nof the bowlder clay; also that four well-defined species of fossil elephant\nare known to have existed in Europe; that \"a vast number of the remains of\nthree of these species have been exhumed over a large area in Europe; and,\neven in the geological sense, an enormous interval of time has elapsed\nbetween the formation of the most ancient and the most recent of these\ndeposits, quite sufficient to test the persistence of specific characters\nin an elephant,\" he presents the question, \"Do, then, the successive\nelephants occurring in these strata show any signs of a passage from the\nolder form into the newer?\"\n\nTo which the reply is: \"If there is one fact which is impressed on the\nconviction of the observer with more force than any other, it is the\npersistence and uniformity of the characters of the molar teeth in the\nearliest known mammoth and his most modern successor . . . Assuming the\nobservation to be correct, what strong proof does it not afford of the\npersistence and constancy, throughout vast intervals of time, of the\ndistinctive characters of those organs which arc most concerned in the\nexistence and habits of the species? If we cast a glance back on the long\nvista of physical changes which our planet has undergone since the Neozoic\nepoch, we can nowhere detect signs of a revolution more sudden and\npronounced, or more important in its results, than the intercalation and\nsudden disappearance of the glacial period. Yet the 'dicyclotherian'\nmammoth lived before it, and passed through the ordeal of all the hard\nextremities it involved, bearing his organs of locomotion and digestion all\nbut unchanged. Taking the group of four European fossil species above\nenumerated, do they show any signs in the successive deposits of a\ntransition from the one form into the other? Here again the result of my\nobservation, in so far as it has extended over the European area, is, that\nthe specific characters of the molars are constant in each, within a\nmoderate range of variation, and that we nowhere meet with intermediate\nforms.\" . . .\n\nDr. Falconer continues (page 80):\n\n\n\"The inferences which I draw from these facts are not opposed to one of the\nleading propositions of Darwin's theory. With him, I have no faith in the\nopinion that the mammoth and other extinct elephants made their appearance\nsuddenly, after the type in which their fossil remains are presented to us.\nThe most rational view seems to be, that they are in some shape the\nmodified descendants of earlier progenitors. But if the asserted facts be\ncorrect, they seem clearly to indicate that the older elephants of Europe,\nsuch as E. meridionalis and E. antiguus, were not the stocks from which the\nlater species, E. primigenius and E. Africanus sprung, and that we must\nlook elsewhere for their origin. The nearest affinity, and that a very\nclose one, of the European E. meridionalis is with the Miocene E.\nplanifrons of India; and of E. primigenius, with the existing India\nspecies.\n\n\"Another reflection is equally strong in my mind--that the means which have\nbeen adduced to explain the origin of the species by 'natural selection,'\nor a process of variation from external influences, are inadequate to\naccount for the phenomena. The law of phyllotaxis, which governs the\nevolution of leaves around the axis of a plant, is as nearly constant in\nits manifestation as any of the physical laws connected with the material\nworld. Each instance, however different from another, can be shown to be a\nterm of some series of continued fractions. When this is coupled with the\ngeometrical law governing the evolution of form, so manifest in some\ndepartments of the animal kingdom, e. g., the spiral shells of the\nMollusca, it is difficult to believe that there is not, in Nature, a\ndeeper-seated and innate principle, to the operation of which natural\nselection is merely an adjunct. The whole range of the Mammalia, fossil and\nrecent, cannot furnish a species which has had a wider geographical\ndistribution, and passed through a longer term of time, and through more\nextreme changes of climatal conditions, than the mammoth. If species are so\nunstable, and so susceptible of mutation through such influences, why does\nthat extinct form stand out so signally a monument of stability? By his\nadmirable researches and earnest writings, Darwin has, beyond all his\ncontemporaries, given an impulse to the philosophical investigation of the\nmost backward and obscure branch of the biological sciences of his day; he\nhas laid the foundations of a great edifice; but he need not be surprised\nif, in the progress of erection, the superstructure is altered by his\nsuccessors, like the Duomo of Milan from the Roman to a different style of\narchitecture.\"\n\n\nEntertaining ourselves the opinion that something more than natural\nselection is requisite to account for the orderly production and succession\nof species, we offer two incidental remarks upon the above extract.\n\n    1. We find in it--in the phrase \"natural selection, or a process of\nvariation from external influences\"--an example of the very common\nconfusion of two distinct things, viz., variation and natural selection.\nThe former has never yet been shown to have its cause in \"external\ninfluences,\" nor to occur at random. As we have elsewhere insisted, if not\ninexplicable, it has never been explained; all we can yet say is, that\nplants and animals are prone to vary, and that some conditions favor\nvariation. Perhaps in this Dr. Falconer may yet find what he seeks: for \"it\nis difficult to believe that there is not in nature a deeper-seated and\ninnate principle, to the operation of which natural selection is merely an\nadjunct.\" The latter, which is the ensemble of the external influences,\nincluding the competition of the individuals them selves, picks out certain\nvariations as they arise, but in no proper sense can be said to originate\nthem\n\n    2. Although we are not quite sure how Dr Falconer in tends to apply the law\nof phyllotaxis to illustrate his idea, we fancy that a pertinent\nillustration may be drawn from it in this way. There are two species of\nphyllotaxis, perfectly distinct, and we suppose, not mathematically\nreducible the one to the other, viz.: (1.) That of alternate leaves, with\nits vane ties and (2.) That of verticillate leaves, of which opposite leaves\npresent the simplest case That although generally constant a change from one\nvariety of alternate phyllotaxis to an other should occur on the same axis,\nor on successive axes, is not surprising, the different sorts being terms\nof a regular series--although indeed we have not the least idea as to how\nthe change from the one to the other comes to pass But it is interesting\nand in this connection perhaps instructive, to remark that while some\ndicotyledonous plants hold to the verticillate, i.e., opposite-leaved\nphyllotaxis throughout, a larger number--through the operation of some deep\nseated and innate principle which we cannot fathom--change abruptly into\nthe other species at the second or third node, and change back again in the\nflower, or else effect a synthesis of the two species in a manner which is\npuzzling to understand. Here is a change from one fixed law to another, as\nunaccountable, if not as great, as from one specific form to another.\n\nAn elaborate paper on the vegetation of the Tertiary period in the\nsoutheast of France, by Count Gaston de Saporta, published in the Annales\ndes Sciences Naturelles in 1862, vol. xvi., pp. 309-344--which we have not\nspace to analyze--is worthy of attention from the general inquirer, on\naccount of its analysis of the Tertiary flora into its separate types,\nCretaceous, Austral, Tropical, and Boreal, each of which has its separate\nand different history--and for the announcement that \"the hiatus, which, in\nthe idea of most geologists, intervened between the close of the Cretaceous\nand the beginning of the Tertiary, appears to have had no existence, so far\nas concerns the vegetation; that in general it was not by means of a total\noverthrow, followed by a complete new emission of species, that the flora\nhas been renewed at each successive period; and that while the plants of\nSouthern Europe inherited from the Cretaceous period more or less rapidly\ndisappeared, as also the austral forms, and later the tropical types (except\nthe laurel, the myrtle, and the Chamaerops humilis), the boreal types,\ncoming later, survived all the others, and now compose, either in Europe,\nor in the north of Asia, or in North America, the basis of the actual\narborescent vegetation. Especially \"a very considerable number of forms\nnearly identical with tertiary forms now exist in America, where they have\nfound, more easily than in our soil--less vast and less extended\nsouthward--refuge from ulterior revolutions,\" The extinction of species is\nattributed to two kinds of causes; the one material or physical, whether\nslow or rapid; the other inherent in the nature of organic beings,\nincessant, but slow, in a manner latent, but somehow assigning to the\nspecies, as to the individuals, a limited period of existence, and, in some\nequally mysterious but wholly natural way, connected with the development\nof organic types: \"By type meaning a collection of vegetable forms\nconstructed upon the same plan of organization, of which they reproduce the\nessential lineaments with certain secondary modifications, and which appear\nto run back to a common point of departure.\"\n\nIn this community of types, no less than in the community of certain\nexisting species, Saporta recognizes a prolonged material union between\nNorth America and Europe in former times. Most naturalists and geologists\nreason in the same way--some more cautiously than others--yet perhaps most\nof them seem not to perceive how far such inferences imply the doctrine of\nthe common origin of related species.\n\nFor obvious reasons such doctrines are likely to find more favor with\nbotanists than with zoologists. But with both the advance in this direction\nis seen to have been rapid and great; yet to us not unexpected. We note,\nalso, an evident disposition, notwithstanding some endeavors to the\ncontrary, to allow derivative hypotheses to stand or fall upon their own\nmerits--to have indeed upon philosophical grounds certain presumptions in\ntheir favor--and to be, perhaps, quite as capable of being turned to good\naccount as to bad account in natural theology.[IV-3]\n\nAmong the leading naturalists, indeed, such views--taken in the widest\nsense--have one and, so far as we are now aware, only one thoroughgoing and\nthoroughly consistent opponent, viz., Mr. Agassiz.\n\nMost naturalists take into their very conception of a species, explicitly\nor by implication, the notion of a material connection resulting from the\ndescent of the individuals composing it from a common stock, of local\norigin. Agassiz wholly eliminates community of descent from his idea of\nspecies, and even conceives a species to have been as numerous in\nindividuals and as wide-spread over space, or as segregated in\ndiscontinuous spaces, from the first as at the later period.\n\nThe station which it inhabits, therefore, is with other naturalists in no\nwise essential to the species, and may not have been the region of its\norigin. In Agassiz's view the habitat is supposed to mark the origin, and\nto be a part of the character of the species. The habitat is not merely the\nplace where it is, but a part of what it is.\n\nMost naturalists recognize varieties of species; and many, like De\nCandolle, have come to conclude that varieties of the highest grade, or\nraces, so far partake of the characteristics of species, and are so far\ngoverned by the same laws, that it is often very difficult to draw a clear\nand certain distinction between the two. Agassiz will not allow that\nvarieties or races exist in Nature, apart from man's agency.\n\nMost naturalists believe that the origin of species is supernatural, their\ndispersion or particular geographical area, natural, and their extinction,\nwhen they disappear, also the result of physical causes. In the view of\nAgassiz, if rightly understood, all three are equally independent of\nphysical cause and effect, are equally supernatural.\n\nIn comparing preceding periods with the present and with each other, most\nnaturalists and palaeontologists now appear to recognize a certain number of\nspecies as having survived from one epoch to the next, or even through more\nthan one formation, especially from the Tertiary into the post-Tertiary\nperiod, and from that to the present age. Agassiz is understood to believe\nin total extinctions and total new creations at each successive epoch, and\neven to recognize no existing species as ever contemporary with extinct\nones, except in the case of recent exterminations.\n\nThese peculiar views if sustained will effectually dispose of every form of\nderivative hypothesis.\n\nReturning for a moment to De Candolle's article, we are disposed to notice\nhis criticism of Linnaeus's \"definition\" of the term species (Philosophia\nBotanica, No. 157): \"Species tot numeramus quot diversae formae in\nprincipio sunt creatae\"-- which he declares illogical, inapplicable, and\nthe worst that has been propounded. \"So, to determine if a form is\nspecific, it is necessary to go back to its origin which is impossible A\ndefinition by a character which can never be verified is no definition at\nall.\"\n\nNow as Linnaeus practically applied the idea of species with a sagacity\nwhich has never been surpassed and rarely equaled and indeed may be said to\nhave fixed its received meaning in natural history, it may well be inferred\nthat in the phrase above cited he did not so much undertake to frame a\nlogical definition, as to set forth the idea which, in his opinion, lay at\nthe foundation of species; on which basis A.L. Jussieu did construct a\nlogical definition--\"Nunc rectius definitur perennis individuorum similium\nsuccessio continuata generatione renascentium.\" The fundamental idea of\nspecies, we would still maintain, is that of a chain of which\ngenetically-connected individuals are the links. That, in the practical\nrecognition of species, the essential characteristic has to be inferred, is\nno great objection--the general fact that like engenders like being an\ninduction from a vast number of instances, and the only assumption being\nthat of the uniformity of Nature. The idea of gravitation, that of the\natomic constitution of matter, and the like, equally have to be verified\ninferentially. If we still hold to the idea of Linnaeus, and of Agassiz,\nthat existing species were created independently and essentially all at\nonce at the beginning of the present era, we could not better the\npropositions of Linnaeus and of Jussieu. If; on the other hand, the time has\ncome in which we may accept, with De Candolle, their successive\norigination, at the commencement of the present era or before, and even by\nderivation from other forms, then the \"in principio\" of Linnaeus will refer\nto that time, whenever it was, and his proposition be as sound and wise as\never.\n\nIn his \"Geographie Botanique\" (ii., 1068-1077) De Candolle discusses this\nsubject at length, and in the same interest. Remarking that of the two\ngreat facts of species, viz., likeness among the individuals, and\ngenealogical connection, zoologists have generally preferred the\nlatter,[IV-4] while botanists have been divided in opinion, he pronounces\nfor the former as the essential thing, in the following argumentative\nstatement:\n\n\n\"Quant a moi, j'ai ete conduit, dans ma definition de l'espece, a mettre\ndecidement la ressemblance au-dessus de caracteres de succession. Ce n'est\npas seulement a cause des circonstances propres au regne vegetal, dont je\nm'occupe exclusivement; ce n'est pas non plus afin de sortir ma definition\ndes theories et de la rendre le plus possible utile aux naturalistes\ndescripteurs et nomenclateurs, c'est aussi par un motif philosophique. En\ntoute chose il faut aller au fond des questions, quand on le peut. Or,\npourquoi la reproduction est-elle possible, habituelle, feconde\nindefiniment, entre des etres organises que nous dirons de la meme espece?\nParce qu'ils se ressemblent et uniquement a cause de cela. Lorsque deux\nespeces ne peuvent, ou, s'il s'agit d'animaux superieurs, ne peuvent et ne\nveulent se croiser, c'est qu'elles sont tres differentes. Si l'on obtient\ndes croisements, c'est que les individus sont analogues; si ces croisements\ndonnent des produits feconds, c'est que les individus etaient plus\nanalogues; si ces produits euxmemes sont feconds, c'est que la ressemblance\netait plus grande; s'ils sont fecond habituellement et indefiniment, c'est\nque la ressemblance interieure et exterieure etait tres grande. Ainsi le\ndegre de ressemblance est le fond; la reproduction en est seulement la\nmanifestation et la mesure, et il est logique de placer la cause au-dessus\nde l'effet.\"\n\n\nWe are not yet convinced. We still hold that genealogical connection,\nrather than mutual resemblance, is the fundamental thing--first on the\nground of fact, and then from the philosophy of the case. Practically, no\nbotanist can say what amount of dissimilarity is compatible with unity of\nspecies; in wild plants it is sometimes very great, in cultivated races\noften enormous. De Candolle himself informs us that the different\nvariations which the same oak-tree exhibits arc significant indications of a\ndisposition to set up separate varieties, which becoming hereditary may\nconstitute a race; he evidently looks upon the extreme forms, say of\nQuercus Robur, as having thus originated; and on this ground, inferred from\ntransitional forms, and not from their mutual resemblance, he includes them\nin that species. This will be more apparent should the discovery of\ntransitions, which he leads us to expect, hereafter cause the four\nprovisional species which attend Q. Robur to be merged in that species. It\nmay rightly be replied that this conclusion would be arrived at from the\nlikeness step by step in the series of forms; but the cause of the likeness\nhere is obvious. And this brings in our \"motif philosophique.\"\n\nNot to insist that the likeness is after all the variable, not the\nconstant, element--to learn which is the essential thing, resemblance among\nindividuals or their genetic connection--we have only to ask which can be\nthe cause of the other.\n\nIn hermaphrodite plants (the normal case), and even as the question is\ningeniously put by De Candolle in the above extract, the former surely\ncannot be the cause of the latter, though it may, in case of crossing,\noffer occasion. But, on the ground of the most fundamental of all things in\nthe constitution of plants and animals--the fact incapable of further\nanalysis, that individuals reproduce their like, that characteristics are\ninheritable--the likeness is a direct natural consequence of the genetic\nsuccession; \"and it is logical to place the cause above the effect.\"\n\nWe are equally disposed to combat a proposition of De Candolle's about\ngenera, elaborately argued in the \"Geographie Botanique,\" and incidentally\nreaffirmed in his present article, viz., that genera are more natural than\nspecies, and more correctly distinguished by people in general, as is shown\nby vernacular names. But we have no space left in which to present some\nevidence to the contrary.\n\n\n     V\n\nSEQUOIA AND ITS HISTORY\n\nTHE RELATIONS OF NORTH AMERICAN\n\nTO NORTHEAST ASIAN AND TO\n\nTERTIARY VEGETATION\n\n(A Presidential Address to the American Association for the Advancement of\nScience, at Dubuque, August, 1872)\n\n\n\nThe session being now happily inaugurated, your presiding officer of the\nlast year has only one duty to perform before he surrenders the chair to\nhis successor. If allowed to borrow a simile from the language of my own\nprofession, I might liken the President of this Association to a biennial\nplant. He flourishes for the year in which he comes into existence, and\nperforms his appropriate functions as presiding officer. When the second\nyear comes round, he is expected to blossom out in an address and disappear.\nEach president, as he retires, is naturally expected to contribute something\nfrom his own investigations or his own line of study, usually to discuss\nsome particular scientific topic.\n\nNow, although I have cultivated the field of North American botany, with\nsome assiduity, for more than forty years, have reviewed our vegetable\nhosts, and assigned to no small number of them their names and their place\nin the ranks, yet, so far as our own wide country is concerned, I have been\nto a great extent a closet botanist. Until this summer I had not seen the\nMississippi, nor set foot upon a prairie.\n\nTo gratify a natural interest, and to gain some title for addressing a body\nof practical naturalists and explorers, I have made a pilgrimage across the\ncontinent. I have sought and viewed in their native haunts many a plant and\nflower which for me had long bloomed unseen, or only in the hortus siccus.\nI have been able to see for myself what species and what forms constitute\nthe main features of the vegetation of each successive region, and\nrecord--as the vegetation unerringly does--the permanent characteristics of\nits climate.\n\nPassing on from the eastern district, marked by its equably distributed\nrainfall, and therefore naturally forest-clad, I have seen the trees\ndiminish in number, give place to wide prairies, restrict their growth to\nthe borders of streams, and then disappear from the boundless drier plains;\nhave seen grassy plains change into a brown and sere desert--desert in the\ncommon sense, but hardly anywhere botanically so--have seen a fair growth\nof coniferous trees adorning the more favored slopes of a mountain-range\nhigh enough to compel summer showers; have traversed that broad and bare\nelevated region shut off on both sides by high mountains from the moisture\nsupplied by either ocean, and longitudinally intersected by sierras which\nseemingly remain as naked as they were born; and have reached at length the\nwestward slopes of that high mountain-barrier which, refreshed by the\nPacific, bears the noble forests of the Sierra Nevada and the Coast Ranges,\nand among them trees which are the wonder of the world. As I stood in their\nshade, in the groves of Mariposa and Calaveras, and again under the canopy\nof the commoner redwood, raised on columns of such majestic height and\nample girth, it occurred to me that I could not do better than to share\nwith you, upon this occasion, some of the thoughts which possessed my mind.\nIn their development they may, perhaps, lead us up to questions of\nconsiderable scientific interest.\n\nI shall not detain you with any remarks--which would now be trite--upon the\nsize or longevity of these far-famed Sequoia-trees, or of the sugar-pines,\nincense-cedar, and firs associated with them, of which even the prodigious\nbulk of the dominating Sequoia does not sensibly diminish the grandeur.\nAlthough no account and no photographic representation of either species of\nthe far-famed Sequoia-trees gives any adequate impression of their singular\nmajesty--still less of their beauty--yet my interest in them did not\nculminate merely or mainly in considerations of their size and age. Other\ntrees, in other parts of the world, may claim to be older. Certain\nAustralian gumtrees (Eucalypti) are said to be taller. Some, we are told,\nrise so high that they might even cast a flicker of shadow upon the summit\nof the Pyramid of Cheops. Yet the oldest of them doubtless grew from seed\nwhich was shed long after the names of the pyramid-builders had been\nforgotten. So far as we can judge from the actual counting of the layers of\nseveral trees, no Sequoia now alive sensibly antedates the Christian era.\n\nNor was I much impressed with an attraction of man's adding. That the more\nremarkable of these trees should bear distinguishing appellations seems\nproper enough; but the tablets of personal names which are affixed to many\nof them\n\n\n172\n\nin the most visited groves--as if the memory of more or less notable people\nof our day might be made enduring by the juxtaposition--do suggest some\nincongruity. When we consider that a hand's breadth at the circumference of\nany one of the venerable trunks so placarded has recorded in annual lines\nthe lifetime of the individual thus associated with it, one may question\nwhether the next hand's breadth may not measure the fame of some of the\nnames thus ticketed for adventitious immortality. Whether it be the man or\nthe tree that is honored in the connection, probably either would live as\nlong, in fact and in memory, without it.\n\nOne notable thing about the Sequoia-trees is their isolation. Most of the\ntrees associated with them are of peculiar species, and some of them are\nnearly as local. Yet every pine, fir, and cypress of California is in some\nsort familiar, because it has near relatives in other parts of the world.\nBut the redwoods have none. The redwood--including in that name the two\nspecies of \"big-trees\"--belongs to the general Cypress family, but is sui\ngeneris. Thus isolated systematically, and extremely isolated\ngeographically, and so wonderful in size and port, they more than other\ntrees suggest questions.\n\nWere they created thus local and lonely, denizens of California only; one\nin limited numbers in a few choice spots on the Sierra Nevada, the other\nalong the Coast Range from the Bay of Monterey to the frontiers of Oregon?\nAre they veritable Melchizedeks, without pedigree or early relationship,\nand possibly fated to be without descent?\nOr are they now coming upon the stage--or rather were they coming but for\nman's interference--to play a part in the future?\nOr are they remnants, sole and scanty survivors of a race that has played a\ngrander part in the past, but is now verging to extinction? Have they had a\ncareer, and can that career be ascertained or surmised, so that we may at\nleast guess whence they came, and how, and when?\n\nSEQUOIA AND ITS HISTORY 173\n\nTime was, and not long ago, when such questions as these were regarded as\nuseless and vain--when students of natural history, unmindful of what the\nname denotes, were content with a knowledge of things as they now are, but\ngave little heed as to how they came to be so. Now such questions are held\nto be legitimate, and perhaps not wholly unanswerable. It cannot now be\nsaid that these trees inhabit their present restricted areas simply because\nthey are there placed in the climate and soil of all the world most\ncongenial to them. These must indeed be congenial, or they would not\nsurvive. But when we see how the Australian Eucalyptus-trees thrive upon\nthe Californian coast, and how these very redwoods flourish upon another\ncontinent; how the so-called wild-oat (Avena sterilis of the Old World) has\ntaken full possession of California; how that cattle and horses, introduced\nby the Spaniard, have spread as widely and made themselves as much at home\non the plains of La Plata as on those of Tartary; and that the\ncardoon-thistle-seeds, and others they brought with them, have multiplied\nthere into numbers probably much exceeding those extant in their native\nlands; indeed, when we contemplate our own race, and our particular stock,\ntaking such recent but dominating possession of this New World; when we\nconsider how the indigenous flora of islands generally succumbs to the\nforeigners which come in the train of man; and that most weeds (i.e., the\nprepotent plants in open soil) of all temperate climates are not \"to the\nmanner born,\" but are self-invited intruders--we must needs abandon the\nnotion of any primordial and absolute adaptation of plants and animals to\ntheir habitats, which may stand in lieu of explanation, and so preclude our\ninquiring any further. The harmony of Nature and its admirable perfection\nneed not be regarded as inflexible and changeless. Nor need Nature be\nlikened to a statue, or a cast in rigid bronze, but rather to an organism,\nwith play and adaptability of parts, and life and even soul informing the\nwhole. Under the former view Nature\n\n\n174\n\nwould be \"the faultless monster which the world ne'er saw,\" but inscrutable\nas the Sphinx, whom it were vain, or worse, to question of the whence and\nwhither. Under the other, the perfection of Nature, if relative, is\nmultifarious and ever renewed; and much that is enigmatical now may find\nexplanation in some record of the past.\n\nThat the two species of redwood we are contemplating originated as they are\nand where they are, and for the part they are now playing, is, to say the\nleast, not a scientific supposition, nor in any sense a probable one. Nor\nis it more likely that they are destined to play a conspicuous part in the\nfuture, or that they would have done so, even if the Indian's fires and the\nwhite man's axe had spared them. The redwood of the coast (Sequoia\nsempervirens) had the stronger hold upon existence, forming as it did large\nforests throughout a narrow belt about three hundred miles in length, and\nbeing so tenacious of life that every large stump sprouts into a copse. But\nit does not pass the bay of Monterey, nor cross the line of Oregon,\nalthough so grandly developed not far below it. The more remarkable Sequoia\ngigantea of the Sierra exists in numbers so limited that the separate\ngroves may be reckoned upon the fingers, and the trees of most of them have\nbeen counted, except near their southern limit, where they are said to be\nmore copious. A species limited in individuals holds its existence by a\nprecarious tenure; and this has a foothold only in a few sheltered spots,\nof a happy mean in temperature, and locally favored with moisture in\nsummer. Even there, for some reason or other, the pines with which they are\nassociated (Pinus Lambertiana and P. ponderosa), the firs (Abies grandis\nand A. amabilis), and even the incense-cedar (Libocedrus decurrens), possess\na great advantage, and, though they strive in vain to emulate their size,\nwholly overpower the Sequoias in numbers. \"To him that hath shall be\ngiven.\" The force of numbers eventually wins. At least in the\ncommonly-visited groves Sequoia gigantea is invested in its\n\nSEQUOIA AND ITS HISTORY  175\n\nlast stronghold, can neither advance into more exposed positions above, nor\nfall back into drier and barer ground below, nor hold its own in the\nlong-run where it is, under present conditions; and a little further drying\nof the climate, which must once have been much moister than now, would\nprecipitate its doom. Whatever the individual longevity, certain if not\nspeedy is the decline of a race in which a high death-rate afflicts the\nyoung. Seedlings of the big trees occur not rarely, indeed, but in meagre\nproportion to those of associated trees; T small indeed is the chance that\nany of these will attain to \"the days of the years of their fathers.\" \"Few\nand evil\" are .: the days of all the forest likely to be, while man, both\nbar-barian and civilized, torments them with fires, fatal at once to\nseedlings, and at length to the aged also. The forests of California, proud\nas the State may be of them, are already too scanty and insufficient for her\nuses. Two lines, such as may be drawn with one sweep of a brush over the\nmap, would cover them all. The coast redwood--the most important tree in\nCalifornia, although a million times more numerous than its relative of the\nSierra--is too good to live long. Such is its value for lumber and its\naccessibility, that, judging the future by the past, it is not likely, in\nits primeval growth, to outlast its rarer fellow-species.\n\nHappily man preserves and disseminates as well as destroys. The species\nwill doubtless be preserved to science, and for ornamental and other uses,\nin its own and other lands; and the more remarkable individuals of the\npresent day are likely to be sedulously cared for, all the more so as they\nbecome scarce.\n\nOur third question remains to be answered: Have these famous Sequoias\nplayed in former times and upon a larger stage a more imposing part, of\nwhich the present is but the epilogue? We cannot gaze high up the huge and\nvenerable trunks, which one crosses the continent to behold, without\nwishing that these patriarchs of the grove were able, like the\n\n\n176\n\nlong-lived antediluvians of Scripture, to hand down to us, through a few\ngenerations, the traditions of centuries, and so tell us somewhat of the\nhistory of their race. Fifteen hundred annual layers have been counted, or\nsatisfactorily made out, upon one or two fallen trunks. It is probable that\nclose to the heart of some of the living trees may be found the circle that\nrecords the year of our Saviour's nativity. A few generations of such trees\nmight carry the history a long way back. But the ground they stand upon, and\nthe marks of very recent geological change and vicissitude in the region\naround, testify that not very many such generations can have flourished\njust there, at least in an unbroken series. When their site was covered by\nglaciers, these Sequoias must have occupied other stations, if, as there is\nreason to believe, they then existed in the land.\n\nI have said that the redwoods have no near relatives in the country of\ntheir abode, and none of their genus anywhere else. Perhaps something may\nbe learned of their genealogy by inquiring of such relatives as they have.\nThere are only two of any particular nearness of kin; and they are far\naway. One is the bald cypress, our Southern cypress, Taxodium, inhabiting\nthe swamps of the Atlantic coast from Maryland to Texas, thence\nextending--with, probably, a specific difference--into Mexico. It is well\nknown as one of the largest trees of our Atlantic forest-district, and,\nalthough it never--except perhaps in Mexico, and in rare instances--attains\nthe portliness of its Western relatives, yet it may equal them in\nlongevity. The other relative is Glyptostrobus, a sort of modified\nTaxodium, being about as much like our bald cypress as one species of\nredwood is like the other.\n\nNow, species of the same type, especially when few, and the type peculiar,\nare, in a general way, associated geographically, i.e., inhabit the same\ncountry, or (in a large sense) the same region. Where it is not so, where\nnear relatives are separated, there is usually something to be explained.\nHere is an instance.  stance. These four trees, sole representatives of\ntheir tribe, dwell almost in three separate quarters of the world: the two\nredwoods in California, the bald cypress in Atlantic North America, its\nnear relative, Glyptostrobus, in China.\n\nIt was not always so. In the Tertiary period, the geological botanists\nassure us, our own very Taxodium or bald cypress, and a Glyptostrobus,\nexceedingly like the present Chinese tree, and more than one Sequoia,\ncoexisted in a fourth quarter of the globe, viz., in Europe! This brings up\nthe question, Is it possible to bridge over these four wide intervals of\nspace and the much vaster interval of time, so as to bring these\nextraordinarily separated relatives into connection? The evidence which may\nbe brought to bear upon this question is various and widely scattered. I\nbespeak your patience while I endeavor to bring together, in an abstract,\nthe most important points of it.\n\nSome interesting facts may come out by comparing generally the botany of\nthe three remote regions, each of which is the sole home of one of these\ngenera, i.e., Sequoia in California, Taxodium in the Atlantic United\nStates,[V-1] and Glyptostrobus in China, which compose the whole of the\npeculiar tribe under consideration.\n\nNote then, first, that there is another set of three or four peculiar\ntrees, in this case of the yew family, which has just the same peculiar\ndistribution, and which therefore may have the same explanation, whatever\nthat explanation be. The genus Torreya, which commemorates our botanical\nNestor and a former president of this Association, Dr. Torrey, was founded\nupon a tree rather lately discovered (that is, about thirty-five years ago)\nin Northern Florida. It is a noble, yew like tree, and very local, being, so\nfar as known, nearly confined to a few miles along the shores of a single\nriver. It seems as if it had somehow been crowded down out of the\nAlleghanies into its present limited southern quarters; for in cultivation\nit evinces a northern hardiness. Now, another species of Torreya is a\ncharacteristic tree of Japan; and one very like it, if not the same,\ninhabits the mountains of Northern China--belongs, therefore, to the Eastern\nAsiatic temperate region, of which Northern China is a part, and Japan, as\nwe shall see, the portion most interesting to us. There is only one more\nspecies of Torreya, and that is a companion of the redwoods in California.\nIt is the tree locally known under the name of the California nutmeg. Here\nare three or four near brethren, species of the same genus, known nowhere\nelse than in these three habitats.\n\nMoreover, the Torreya of Florida is associated with a yew; and the trees of\nthis grove are the only yew-trees of Eastern North America; for the yew of\nour Northern woods is a decumbent shrub. A yew-tree, perhaps the same, is\nfound with Taxodium in the temperate parts of Mexico. The only other yews\nin America grow with the redwoods and the other Torreya in California, and\nextend northward into Oregon. Yews are also associated with Torreya in\nJapan; and they extend westward through Mantchooria and the Himalayas to\nWestern Europe, and even to the Azores Islands, where occurs the common yew\nof the Old World.\n\nSo we have three groups of coniferous trees which agree in this peculiar\ngeographical distribution, with, however, a notable extension of range in\nthe case of the yew: 1. The redwoods, and their relatives, Taxodium and\nGlyptostrobus, which differ so as to constitute a genus for each of the\nthree regions; 2. The Torreyas, more nearly akin, merely a different\nspecies in each region; 3. The yews, still more closely related while more\nwidely disseminated, of which it is yet uncertain whether they constitute\nseven, five, three, or only one species.  Opinions differ, and can hardly\nbe brought to any decisive test. However it be determined, it may still be\nsaid that the extreme differences among the yews do not surpass those of\nthe recognized variations of the European yew, the cultivated races\nincluded.\n\nIt appears to me that these several instances all raise the very same\nquestion, only with different degrees of emphasis, and, if to be explained\nat all, will have the same kind of explanation.\n\nContinuing the comparison between the three regions with which we are\nconcerned, we note that each has its own species of pines, firs, larches,\netc., and of a few deciduous-leaved trees, such as oaks and maples; all of\nwhich have no peculiar significance for the present purpose, because they\nare of genera which are common all round the northern hemisphere. Leaving\nthese out of view, the noticeable point is that the vegetation of\nCalifornia is most strikingly unlike that of the Atlantic United States.\nThey possess some plants, and some peculiarly American plants, in\ncommon--enough to show, as I imagine, that the difficulty was not in the\ngetting from the one district to the other, or into both from a common\nsource, but in abiding there. The primordially unbroken forest of Atlantic\nNorth America, nourished by rainfall distributed throughout the year, is\nwidely separated from the western region of sparse and discontinuous\ntree-belts of the same latitude on the western side of the continent (where\nsummer rain is wanting, or nearly so), by immense treeless plains and\nplateaux of more or less aridity, traversed by longitudinal mountain-ranges\nof a similar character. Their nearest approach is at the north, in the\nlatitude of Lake Superior, where, on a more rainy line, trees of the\nAtlantic forest and that of Oregon may be said to intermix. The change of\nspecies and of the aspect of vegetation in crossing, say on the\nforty-seventh parallel, is slight in comparison with that on the\nthirty-seventh or near it. Confining our attention to the lower latitude,\nand under the exceptions already specially noted, we may say that almost\nevery characteristic form in the vegetation of the Atlantic States is\nwanting in California, and the characteristic plants and trees of California\nare wanting here.\n\nCalifornia has no magnolia nor tulip trees, nor star-anise tree; no\nso-called papaw (Asimina); no barberry of the common single-leaved sort; no\nPodophyllum or other of the peculiar associated genera; no nelumbo nor\nwhite water-lily; no prickly ash nor sumach; no loblolly-bay nor Stuartia;\nno basswood nor linden-trees; neither locust, honey-locust, coffeetrees\n(Gymnocladus) nor yellow-wood (Cladrastis); nothing answering to Hydrangea\nor witch-hazel, to gum-trees (Nyssa and Liquidambar), Viburnum or Diervilla;\nit has few asters and golden-rods; no lobelias; no huckleberries and hardly\nany blueberries; no Epigaea, charm of our earliest Eastern spring,\ntempering an icy April wind with a delicious wild fragrance; no Kalmia nor\nClethra, nor holly, nor persimmon; no catalpa-tree, nor trumpet-creeper\n(Tecoma); nothing answering to sassafras, nor to benzoin-tree, nor to\nhickory; neither mulberry nor elm; no beech, true chestnut, hornbeam, nor\niron-wood, nor a proper birch-tree; and the enumeration might be continued\nvery much further by naming herbaceous plants and others familiar only to\nbotanists.\n\nIn their place California is filled with plants of other types--trees,\nshrubs, and herbs, of which I will only remark that they are, with one or\ntwo exceptions, as different from the plants of the Eastern Asiatic region\nwith which we are concerned (Japan, China, and Mantchooria), as they are\nfrom those of Atlantic North America. Their near relatives, when they have\nany in other lands, are mostly southward, on the Mexican plateau, or many\nas far south as Chili. The same may be said of the plants of the\nintervening great Plains, except that northward in the subsaline vegetation\nthere are some close alliances with the flora of the steppes of Siberia.\nAnd\n\n\n181\n\nalong the crests of high mountain-ranges the Arctic-Alpine . flora has sent\nsouthward more or less numerous representatives through the whole length of\nthe country.\n\nIf we now compare, as to their flora generally, the Atlantic United States\nwith Japan, Mantchooria, and Northern China--i.e., Eastern North America\nwith Eastern North Asia, half the earth's circumference apart--we find an\nastonishing similarity. The larger part of the genera of our own region,\nwhich I have enumerated as wanting in California, are present in Japan or\nMantchooria, along with many other peculiar plants, divided between the\ntwo. There are plants enough of the one region which have no representatives\nin the other. There are types which appear to have reached the Atlantic\nStates from the south; and there is a larger infusion of subtropical\nAsiatic types into temperate China and Japan; among these there is no\nrelationship between the two countries to speak of. There are also, as I\nhave already said, no small number of genera and some species which, being\ncommon all round or partly round the northern temperate zone, have no\nspecial significance because of their occurrence in these two antipodal\nfloras, although they have testimony to bear upon the general question of\ngeographical distribution. The point to be remarked is, that many, or even\nmost, of the genera and species which are peculiar to North America as\ncompared with Europe, and largely peculiar to Atlantic North America as\ncompared with the Californian region, are also represented in Japan and\nMantchooria, either by identical or by closely-similar forms! The same rule\nholds on a more northward line, although not so strikingly. If we compare\nthe plants, say of New England and Pennsylvania (latitude 450_470), with\nthose of Oregon, and then with those of Northeastern Asia, we shall find\nmany of our own curiously repeated in the latter, while only a small number\nof them can be traced along the route even so far as the western slope of\nthe Rocky Mountains. And these repetitions of East American types in Japan\n\n\n182\n\nand neighboring districts are in all degrees of likeness. Sometimes the one\nis undistinguishable from the other; sometimes there is a difference of\naspect, but hardly of tangible character; sometimes the two would be termed\nmarked varieties if they grew naturally in the same forest or in the same\nregion; sometimes they are what the botanist calls representative species,\nthe one answering closely to the other, but with some differences regarded\nas specific; sometimes the two are merely of the same genus, or not quite\nthat, but of a single or very few species in each country; in which case the\npoint which interests us is, that this peculiar limited type should occur\nin two antipodal places, and nowhere else.\n\nIt would be tedious, and, except to botanists, abstruse, to enumerate\ninstances; yet the whole strength of the case depends upon the number of\nsuch instances. I propose therefore, if the Association does me the honor\nto print this discourse, to append in a note a list of the more remarkable\nones.[V-2] But I would here mention certain cases as specimens.\n\nOur Rhus Toxicodendron, or poison-ivy, is very exactly repeated in Japan,\nbut is found in no other part of the world, although a species much like it\nabounds in California. Our other poisonous Rhus (R. venenata), commonly\ncalled poison-dogwood, is in no way represented in Western America, but has\nso close an analogue in Japan that the two were taken for the same by\nThunberg and Linnaeus, who called them both R. vernix.\n\nOur northern fox-grape, Vitis Labrusca, is wholly confined to the Atlantic\nStates, except that it reappears in Japan and that region.\nThe original Wistaria is a woody leguminous climber with showy blossoms,\nnative to the middle Atlantic States; the other species, which we so much\nprize in cultivation, W. Sinensis, is from China, as its name denotes, or\nperhaps only from Japan, where it is certainly indigenous.\n\nOur yellow-wood (Cladrastis) inhabits a very limited district on the\nwestern slope of the Alleghanies. Its only and very near relative, Maackia,\nis confined to Mantchooria.\n\nThe Hydrangeas have some species in our Alleghany region: all the rest\nbelong to the Chino-Japanese region and its continuation westward. The same\nmay be said of Philadelphus, except that there are one or two mostly very\nsimilar species in California and Oregon.\n\nOur May-flower (Epigaea) and our creeping snowberry, otherwise peculiar to\nAtlantic North America, recur in Japan.\n\nOur blue cohosh (Caulophyllum) is confined to the woods of the Atlantic\nStates, but has lately been discovered in Japan. A peculiar relative of it,\nDiphylleia, confined to the higher Alleghanies, is also repeated in Japan,\nwith a slight difference, so that it may barely be distinguished as another\n: species. Another relative is our twin-leaf (Jeffersonia) of the Alleghany\nregion alone: a second species has lately turned up in Mantchooria. A\nrelative of this is Podophyllum, our mandrake, a common inhabitant of the\nAtlantic United States, but found nowhere else. There is one other species\nof it, and that is in the Himalayas. Here are four most peculiar genera of\none family, each of a single species in the Atlantic United States, which\nare duplicated on the other side of the world, either in identical or\nalmost identical species, or in an analogous species, while nothing else of\nthe kind is known in any other part of the world.\n\nI ought not to omit ginseng, the root so prized by the Chinese, which they\nobtain from their northern provinces and Mantchooria, and which is now\nknown to inhabit Corea and Northern Japan. The Jesuit Fathers identified\nthe plant in Canada and the Atlantic States, brought over the Chinese name\nby which we know it, and established the trade in it, which was for many\nyears most profitable. The exportation of ginseng to China probably has not\nyet entirely ceased. Whether the Asiatic and the Atlantic American ginsengs\nare to be regarded as of the same species or not is somewhat uncertain, but\nthey are hardly, if at all, distinguishable.\n\nThere is a shrub, Elliottia, which is so rare and local that it is known\nonly at two stations on the Savannah River in Georgia. It is of peculiar\nstructure, and was without near relative until one was lately discovered in\nJapan (Tripetaleia), so like it as hardly to be distinguishable except by\nhaving the parts of the blossom in threes instead of fours--a difference\nnot uncommon in the same genus, or even in the same species.\n\nSuppose Elliottia had happened to be collected only once, a good while ago,\nand all knowledge of the limited and obscure locality were lost; and\nmeanwhile the Japanese form came to be known. Such a case would be parallel\nwith an actual one. A specimen of a peculiar plant (Shortia galacifolia)\nwas detected in the herbarium of the elder Michaux, who collected it (as\nhis autograph ticket shows) somewhere in the high Alleghany Mountains, more\nthan eighty years ago. No one has seen the living plant since or knows\nwhere to find it, if haply it still flourishes in some secluded spot. At\nlength it is found in Japan; and I had the satisfaction of making the\nidentification.[V-3] A relative is also known in Japan; and a less near one\nhas just been detected in Thibet.\n\nWhether the Japanese and the Alleghanian plants are exactly the same or\nnot, it needs complete specimens of the two to settle. So far as we know,\nthey are just alike; and, even if some difference were discerned between\nthem, it would not appreciably alter the question as to how such a result\ncame to pass. Each and every one of the analogous cases I have been\ndetailing--and very many more could be mentioned--raises the same question,\nand would be satisfied with the same answer.\n\nThese singular relations attracted my curiosity early in the course of my\nbotanical studies, when comparatively few of them were known, and my serious\nattention in later years, when I had numerous and new Japanese plants to\nstudy in the collections made, by Messrs. Williams and Morrow, during\nCommodore Perry's visit in 1853, and especially, by Mr. Charles Wright, of\nCommodore Rodgers's expedition in 1855. I then discussed this subject\nsomewhat fully, and tabulated the facts within my reach.[V-4]\n\nThis was before Heer had developed the rich fossil botany of the arctic\nzone, before the immense antiquity of existing species of plants was\nrecognized, and before the publication of Darwin's now famous volume on the\n\"Origin of Species\" had introduced and familiarized the scientific world\nwith those now current ideas respecting the history and vicissitudes of\nspecies with which I attempted to deal in a moderate and feeble way.\n\nMy speculation was based upon the former glaciation of the northern\ntemperate zone, and the inference of a warmer period preceding and perhaps\nfollowing. I considered that our own present vegetation, or its proximate\nancestry, must have occupied the arctic and subarctic regions in pliocene\ntimes, and that it had been gradually pushed southward as the temperature\nlowered and the glaciation advanced, even beyond its present habitation;\nthat plants of the same stock and kindred, probably ranging round the arctic\nzone as the present arctic species do, made their forced migration southward\nupon widely different longitudes, and receded more or less as the climate\ngrew warmer; that the general difference of climate which marks the eastern\nand the western sides of the continents--the one extreme, the other\nmean--was doubtless even then established, so that the same species and the\nsame sorts of species would be likely to secure and retain foothold in the\nsimilar climates of Japan and the Atlantic United States, but not in\nintermediate regions of different distribution of heat and moisture; so that\ndifferent species of the same genus, as in Torreya, or different genera of\nthe same group, as redwood, Taxodium, and Glyptostrobus, or different\nassociations of forest-trees, might establish themselves each in the region\nbest suited to the particular requirements, while they would fail to do so\nin any other. These views implied that the sources of our actual vegetation\nand the explanation of these peculiarities were to be sought in, and\npresupposed, an ancestry in pliocene or earlier times, occupying the higher\nnorthern regions. And it was thought that the occurrence of peculiar North\nAmerican genera in Europe in the Tertiary period (such as Taxodium, Carya,\nLiquidambar, sassafras, Negundo, etc.) might be best explained on the\nassumption of early interchange and diffusion through North Asia, rather\nthan by that of the fabled Atlantis.\n\nThe hypothesis supposed a gradual modification of species in different\ndirections under altering conditions, at least to the extent of producing\nvarieties, sub-species, and representative species, as they may be\nvariously regarded; likewise the single and local origination of each type,\nwhich is now almost universally taken for granted.\n\nThe remarkable facts in regard to the Eastern American and Asiatic floras\nwhich these speculations were to explain have since increased in number,\nespecially through the admirable collections of Dr. Maximowicz in Japan and\nadjacent countries, and the critical comparisons he has made and is still\nengaged upon.\n\nI am bound to state that, in a recent general work[V-5] by a distinguished\nEuropean botanist, Prof. Grisebach, of Jotting, these facts have been\nemptied of all special significance, and the relations between the Japanese\nand the Atlantic United States flora declared to be no more intimate than\nmight be expected from the situation, climate, and present opportunity of\ninterchange. This extraordinary conclusion is reached by regarding as\ndistinct species all the plants common to both countries between which any\ndifferences have been discerned, although such differences would probably\ncount for little if the two inhabited the same country, thus transferring\nmany of my list of identical to that of representative species; and then by\nsimply eliminating from consideration the whole array of representative\nspecies, i.e., all cases in which the Japanese and the American plant are\nnot exactly alike. As if, by pronouncing the cabalistic word species, the\nquestion were settled, or rather the greater part of it remanded out of the\ndomain of science; as if, while complete identity of forms implied\ncommunity of origin, anything short of it carried no presumption of the\nkind; so leaving all these singular duplicates to be wondered at, indeed,\nbut wholly beyond the reach of inquiry.\n\nNow, the only known cause of such likeness is inheritance; and as all\ntransmission of likeness is with some difference in individuals, and as\nchanged conditions have resulted, as is well known, in very considerable\ndifferences, it seems to me that, if the high antiquity of our actual\nvegetation could be rendered probable, not to say certain, and the former\nhabitation of any of our species or of very near relatives of them in high\nnorthern regions could be ascertained, my whole case would be made out. The\nneedful facts, of which I was ignorant when my essay was published, have now\nbeen for some years made known--thanks, mainly, to the researches of Heer\nupon ample collections of arctic fossil plants. These are confirmed and\nextended by new investigations, by Heer and Lesquereux, the results of\nwhich have been indicated to me by the latter.[V-6]\nThe Taxodium, which everywhere abounds in the miocene formations in Europe,\nhas been specifically identified, first by Goeppert, then by Heer, with our\ncommon cypress of the Southern States. It has been found fossil in\nSpitzbergen, Greenland, and Alaska--in the latter country along with the\nremains of another form, distinguishable, but very like the common species;\nand this has been identified by Lesquereux in the miocene of the Rocky\nMountains. So there is one species of tree which has come down essentially\nunchanged from the Tertiary period, which for a long while inhabited both\nEurope and North America, and also, at some part of the period, the region\nwhich geographically connects the two (once doubtless much more closely\nthan now), but which has survived only in the Atlantic United States and\nMexico.\n\nThe same Sequoia which abounds in the same miocene formations in Northern\nEurope has been abundantly found in those of Iceland, Spitzbergen,\nGreenland, Mackenzie River, and Alaska. It is named S. Langsdorfii, but is\npronounced to be very much like S. sempervirens, our living redwood of the\nCalifornian coast, and to be the ancient representative of it. Fossil\nspecimens of a similar, if not the same, species have recently been\ndetected in the Rocky Mountains by Hayden, and determined by our eminent\npalaeontological botanist, Lesquereux; and he assures me that he has the\ncommon redwood itself from Oregon in a deposit of tertiary age. Another\nSequoia (S. Sternbergii), discovered in miocene deposits in Greenland, is\npronounced to be the representative of S. gigantea, the big tree of the\nCalifornian Sierra. If the Taxodium of the tertiary time in Europe and\nthroughout the arctic regions is the ancestor of our present bald\ncypress--which is assumed in regarding them as specifically identical-- then\nI think we may, with our present light, fairly assume that the two redwoods\nof California are the direct or collateral descendants of the two ancient\nspecies which so closely resemble them.\n\nThe forests of the arctic zone in tertiary times contained at least three\nother species of Sequoia, as determined by their remains, one of which,\nfrom Spitzbergen, also much resembles the common redwood of California.\nAnother, \"which appears to have been the commonest coniferous tree on\nDisco,\" was common in England and some other parts of Europe. So the\nSequoias, now remarkable for their restricted station and numbers, as well\nas for their extraordinary size, are of an ancient stock; their ancestors\nand kindred formed a large part of the forests which flourished throughout\nthe polar regions, now desolate and ice-clad, and which extended into low\nlatitudes in Europe. On this continent one species, at least, had reached\nto the vicinity of its present habitat before the glaciation of the region.\nAmong the fossil specimens already found in California, but which our\ntrustworthy palaeontological botanist has not yet had time to examine, we\nmay expect to find evidence of the early arrival of these two redwoods upon\nthe ground which they now, after much vicissitude, scantily occupy.\n\nDifferences of climate, or circumstances of migration, or both, must have\ndetermined the survival of Sequoia upon the Pacific, and of Taxodium upon\nthe Atlantic coast. And still the redwoods will not stand in the east, nor\ncould our Taxodium find a congenial station in California. Both have\nprobably had their opportunity in the olden time, and failed.\n\nAs to the remaining near relative of Sequoia, the Chinese Glyptostrobus, a\nspecies of it, and its veritable representative, was contemporaneous with\nSequoia and Taxodium, not only in temperate Europe, but throughout the\narctic regions from Greenland to Alaska. According to Newberry, it was\nabundantly represented in the miocene flora of the temperate zone of our\nown continent, from Nebraska to the Pacific.\n\nVery similar would seem to have been the fate of a more familiar\ngymnospermous tree, the Gingko or Salisburia. It is now indigenous to Japan\nonly. Its ancestor, as we may fairly call it--since, according to Heer, \"it\ncorresponds so entirely with the living species that it can scarcely be\nseparated from it\"--once inhabited Northern Europe and the whole arctic\nregion round to Alaska, and had even a representative farther south, in our\nRocky Mountain district. For some reason, this and Glyptostrobus survive\nonly on the shores of Eastern Asia.\n\nLibocedrus, on the other hand, appears to have cast in its lot with the\nSequoias. Two species, according to Heer, were with them in Spitzbergen. L.\ndecurrens, the incense cedar, is one of the noblest associates of the\npresent redwoods. But all the rest are in the southern hemisphere, two at\nthe southern extremity of the Andes, two in the South-Sea Islands. It is\nonly by bold and far-reaching suppositions that they can be geographically\nassociated.\n\nThe genealogy of the Torreyas is still wholly obscure; yet it is not\nunlikely that the yew-like trees, named Taxites, which flourished with the\nSequoias in the tertiary arctic forests, are the remote ancestors of the\nthree species of Torreya, now severally in Florida, in California, and in\nJapan.\n\nAs to the pines and firs, these were more numerously associated with the\nancient Sequoias of the polar forests than with their present\nrepresentatives, but in different species, apparently more like those of\nEastern than of Western North America. They must have encircled the polar\nzone then, as they encircle the present temperate zone now.\n\nI must refrain from all enumeration of the angiospermous or ordinary\ndeciduous trees and shrubs, which are now known, by their fossil remains,\nto have flourished throughout the polar regions when Greenland better\ndeserved its name and enjoyed the present climate of New England and New\nJersey. Then Greenland and the rest of the north abounded with oaks,\nrepresenting the several groups of species which now inhabit both our\nEastern and Western forest districts; several poplars, one very like our\nbalsam poplar or balm-of-Gilead tree; more beeches than there are now, a\nhornbeam, and a hop-hornbeam, some birches, a persimmon, and a planer-tree,\nnear representatives of those of the Old World, at least of Asia, as well\nas of Atlantic North America, but all wanting in California; one Juglans\nlike the walnut of the Old World, and another like our black walnut; two or\nthree grapevines, one near our Southern fox grape or muscadine, another\nnear our Northern frostgrape; a Tilia, very like our basswood of the\nAtlantic States only; a Liquidambar; a magnolia, which recalls our M.\ngrandiflora; a Liriodendron, sole representative of our tulip-tree; and a\nsassafras, very like the living tree.\n\nMost of these, it will be noticed, have their nearest or their only living\nrepresentatives in the Atlantic States, and when elsewhere, mainly in\nEastern Asia. Several of them, or of species like them, have been detected\nin our tertiary deposits, west of the Mississippi, by Newberry and\nLesquereux. Herbaceous plants, as it happens, are rarely preserved in a\nfossil state, else they would probably supply additional testimony to the\nantiquity of our existing vegetation, its wide diffusion over the northern\nand now frigid zone, and its enforced migration under changes of\nclimate.[V-7] Concluding, then, as we must, that our existing vegetation is\na continuation of that of the tertiary period, may we suppose that it\nabsolutely originated then? Evidently not. The preceding Cretaceous period\nhas furnished to Carruthers in Europe a fossil fruit like that of the\nSequoia gigantea of the famous groves, associated with pines of the same\ncharacter as those that accompany the present tree; has furnished to Heer,\nfrom Greenland, two more Sequoias, one of them identical with a tertiary\nspecies, and one nearly allied to Sequoia Langsdorfii, which in turn is a\nprobable ancestor of the common California redwood; has furnished to\nNewberry and Lesquereux in North America the remains of another ancient\nSequoia, a Glyptostrobus, a Liquidambar which well represents our\nsweet-gum-tree, oaks analogous to living ones, leaves of a plane-tree, which\nare also in the Tertiary, and are scarcely distinguishable from our own\nPlatanus occidentalis, of a magnolia and a tulip-tree, and \"of a sassafras\nundistinguishable from our living species.\" I need not continue the\nenumeration. Suffice it to say that the facts justify the conclusion which\nLesquereux--a scrupulous investigator--has already announced: that \"the\nessential types of our actual flora are marked in the Cretaceous period, and\nhave come to us after passing, without notable changes, through the\nTertiary formations of our continent.\"\n\nAccording to these views, as regards plants at least, the adaptation to\nsuccessive times and changed conditions has been maintained, not by absolute\nrenewals, but by gradual modifications. I, for one, cannot doubt that the\npresent existing species are the lineal successors of those that garnished\nthe earth in the old time before them, and that they were as well adapted\nto their surroundings then, as those which flourish and bloom around us are\nto their conditions now. Order and exquisite adaptation did not wait for\nman's coming, nor were they ever stereotyped. Organic Nature--by which I\nmean the system and totality of living things, and their adaptation to each\nother and to the world--with all its apparent and indeed real stability,\nshould be likened, not to the ocean, which varies only by tidal\noscillations from a fixed level to which it is always returning, but rather\nto a river, so vast that we can neither discern its shores nor reach its\nsources, whose onward flow is not less actual because too slow to be\nobserved by the ephemerae which hover over its surface, or are borne upon\nits bosom.\n\nSuch ideas as these, though still repugnant to some, and not long since to\nmany, have so possessed the minds of the naturalists of the present day\nthat hardly a discourse can be pronounced or an investigation prosecuted\nwithout reference to them. I suppose that the views here taken are little,\nif at all, in advance of the average scientific mind of the day. I cannot\nregard them as less noble than those which they are succeeding. An able\nphilosophical writer, Miss Frances Power Cobbe, has recently and truthfully\nsaid:[V-8]\n\n\n\"It is a singular fact that, when we can find out how anything is done, our\nfirst conclusion seems to be that God did not do it. No matter how\nwonderful, how beautiful, how intimately complex and delicate has been the\nmachinery which has worked, perhaps for centuries, perhaps for millions of\nages, to bring about some beneficent result, if we can but catch a glimpse\nof the wheels its divine character disappears.\"\n\n\nI agree with the writer that this first conclusion is premature and\nunworthy--I will add, deplorable. Through what faults or infirmities of\ndogmatism on the one hand, and skepticism on the other, it came to be so\nthought, we need not here consider. Let us hope, and I confidently expect,\nthat it is not to last; that the religious faith which survived without a\nshock the notion of the fixity of the earth itself may equally outlast the\nnotion of the fixity of the species which inhabit it; that, in the future\neven more than in the past, faith in an order, which is the basis of\nscience, will not--as it cannot reasonably--be dissevered from faith in an\nOrdainer, which is the basis of religion.\n\n\n\n VI\n\nTHE ATTITUDE OF\n\nWORKING NATURALISTS\n\nTOWARD DARWINISM [VI-1]\n\n(The Nation, October 16, 1873)\n\n\n\nThat homely adage, \"What is one man's meat is another man's poison,\" comes\nto mind when we consider with what different eyes different naturalists\nlook upon the hypothesis of the derivative origin of actual specific forms,\nsince Mr. Darwin gave it vogue and vigor and a raison d'\u00eatre for the\npresent day. This latter he did, not only by bringing forward a vera causa\nin the survival of the fittest under changing circumstances--about which\nthe question among naturalists mainly is how much it will explain, some\nallowing it a restricted, others an unlimited operation--but also by\nshowing that the theory may be made to do work, may shape and direct\ninvestigations, the results of which must in time tell us whether the\ntheory is likely to hold good or not. If the hypothesis of natural\nselection and the things thereto appertaining had not been capable of being\nput to useful work, although, like the \"Vestiges of the Natural History of\nCreation,\" it might have made no little noise in the world, it would hardly\nhave engaged the attention of working naturalists as it has done. We have\nno idea even of opening the question as to what work the Darwinian theory\nhas incited, and in what way the work done has reacted upon the theory; and\nleast of all do we like to meddle with the polemical literature of the\nsubject, already so voluminous that the German bibliographers and\nbooksellers make a separate class of it. But two or three treatises before\nus, of a minor or incidental sort, suggest a remark or two upon the\nattitude of mind toward evolutionary theories taken by some of the working\nnaturalists.\n\nMr. Darwin's own expectation, that his new presentation of the subject\nwould have little or no effect upon those who had already reached\nmiddle-age, has--out of Paris--not been fulfilled. There are, indeed, one\nor two who have thought it their duty to denounce the theory as morally\ndangerous, as well as scientifically baseless; a recent instance of the\nsort we may have to consider further on. Others, like the youth at the\nriver's bank, have been waiting in confident expectation of seeing the\ncurrent run itself dry. On the other hand, a notable proportion of the more\nactive-minded naturalists had already come to doubt the received doctrine\nof the entire fixity of species, and still more that of their independent\nand supernatural origination. While their systematic work all proceeded\nimplicitly upon the hypothesis of the independence and entire permanence of\nspecies, they were perceiving more or less clearly that the whole question\nwas inevitably to be mooted again, and so were prepared to give the\nalternative hypothesis a dispassionate consideration. The veteran Lyell set\nan early example, and, on a reconsideration of the whole question, wrote\nanew his famous chapter and reversed his former and weighty opinion. Owen,\nstill earlier, signified his adhesion to the doctrine of derivation in some\nform, but apparently upon general, speculative grounds; for he repudiated\nnatural selection, and offered no other natural solution of the mystery of\nthe orderly incoming of cognate forms. As examples of the effect of\nDarwin's \"Origin of Species\" upon the minds of naturalists who are no\nlonger young, and whose prepossessions, even more than Lyell's, were likely\nto bias them against the new doctrine, two from the botanical side are\nbrought to our notice through recent miscellaneous writings which are now\nbefore us.[VI-2]\n\nBefore the publication of Darwin's first volume, M. Alphonse de Candolle\nhad summed up the result of his studies in this regard, in the final\nchapter of his classical \"Geographie Botanique Raisonnee,\" in the\nconclusion, that existing vegetation must be regarded as the continuation,\nthrough many geological and geographical changes, of the anterior\nvegetations of the world; and that, consequently, the present distribution\nof species is explicable only in the light of their geological history. He\nsurmised that, notwithstanding the general stability of forms, certain\nspecies or quasi-species might have originated through diversification\nunder geographical isolation. But, on the other hand, he was still disposed\nto admit that even the same species might have originated independently in\ntwo or more different regions of the world; and he declined, as unpractical\nand unavailing, all attempts to apply hypotheses to the elucidation of the\norigin of species. Soon after Darwin's book appeared, De Candolle had\noccasion to study systematically a large and wide-spread genus-- that of\nthe oak. Investigating it under the new light of natural selection, he came\nto the conclusion that the existing oaks are all descendants of earlier\nforms, and that no clear line can be drawn between the diversification whic\nh has resulted in species and that which is exhibited in races and minor\nvarieties.\n\nAnd now, in the introductory chapter of the volume of essays before us, he\ninforms us that the idea which pervades them all, and in some sort connects\nvery diverse topics, is that of considering this principle of selection. Of\nthe principle itself, he remarks that it is neither a theory nor an\nhypothesis, but the expression of a necessary fact; that to deny it is very\nmuch like denying that round stones will roll downhill faster and farther\nthan flat ones; and that the question of the present day in natural history\nis not whether there be natural selection, or even whether forms are derived\nfrom other forms, but to comprehend how, in what proportions, and by what\nmeans hereditary deviations take place, and in what ways an inevitable\nselection takes effect upon these. In two of these essays natural selection\nis directly discussed in its application to the human race; the larger one\ndealing ably with the whole subject, and with results at first view\nseemingly in a great degree negative, but yet showing that the supposed\n\"failure of natural selection in the case of man\" was an unwarrantable\nconclusion from too limited a view of a very complicated question. The\narticle abounds in acute and fertile suggestions, and its closing chapter,\n\"on the probable future of the human species\" under the laws of selection,\nis highly interesting and noteworthy. The other and shorter essay discusses\na special point, and brings out a corollary of the law of heredity which may\nnot have been thought of before, but which is perfectly clear as soon as it\nis stated. It explains at once why contagious or epidemic diseases are most\nfatal at their first appearance, and less so afterward: not by the dying\nout of a virus--for, when the disease reaches a new population, it is as\nvirulent as ever (as, for instance, the smallpox among the Indians)--but by\nthe selection of a race less subject to attack through the destruction of\nthose that were more so, and the inheritance of the comparative immunity by\nthe children and the grandchildren of the survivors; and how this immunity\nitself, causing the particular disease to become rare, paves the way to a\nreturn of the original fatality; for the mass of such population, both in\nthe present and the immediately preceding generation, not having been\nexposed to the infection, or but little exposed, has not undergone\nselection, and so in time the proportion liable to attack, or to fatal\nattack, gets to be as large as ever. The greater the fatality, especially in\nthe population under marriageable age, the more favorable the condition of\nthe survivors; and, by the law of heredity, their children should share in\nthe immunity. This explanation of the cause, or of one cause, of the return\nof pests at intervals no less applies to the diminution of the efficacy of\nremedies, and of preventive means, such as vaccination. When Jenner\nintroduced vaccination, the small-pox in Europe and European colonies must\nhave lost somewhat of its primitive intensity by the vigorous weeding out\nof the more susceptible through many generations. Upon the residue,\nvaccination was almost complete protection, and, being generally practised,\nsmall-pox consequently became rare. Selection thus ceasing to operate, a\npopulation arises which has not been exposed to the contagion, and of which\na considerable proportion, under the common law of atavism, comes to be\nvery much in the condition of a people invaded for the first time by the\ndisease. To these, as we might expect, vaccination would prove a less\nsafeguard than to their progenitors three or four generations before.\n\nMr. Bentham is a veteran systematic botanist of the highest rank and widest\nknowledge. He had not, so far as we know, touched upon questions of\norigination in the ante-Darwinian era. The dozen of presidential addresses\ndelivered at anniversary meetings of the Linnean Society, from his\nassumption of the chair in the year 1862 down to the current year--each\ndevoted to some topic of interest--and his recent \"Memoir on Compositae,\"\nsumming up the general results of a revision of an order to which a full\ntenth of all higher plants belong, furnish apt examples both of cautious\ncriticism, conditional assent (as becomes the inaugurator of the\nquantification of the predicate), and of fruitful application of the new\nviews to various problems concerning the classification and geographical\ndistribution of plants. In his hands the hypothesis is turned at once to\npractical use as an instrument of investigation, as a means of\ninterrogating Nature. In the result, no doubt seems to be left upon the\nauthor's mind that the existing species of plants are the result of the\ndifferentiation of previous species, or at least that the derivative\nhypothesis is to be adopted as that which offers the most natural, if not\nthe only, explanation of the problems concerned. Similar conclusions\nreached in this country, from a study of the relations of its present flora\nwith that which in earlier ages occupied the arctic zone, might also be\nreferred to. (See preceding article.)\n\nAn excellent instance of the way in which the derivative hypothesis is\npractically applied in these days, by a zoologist, is before us in Prof.\nFlower's modest and admirable paper on the Ungulata, or hoofed animals, and\ntheir geological history. We  refer to it here, not so much for the\nconclusions it reaches or suggests, as to commend the clearness and the\nimpartiality of the handling, and the sobriety and moderation of the\ndeductions. Confining himself \"within the region of the known, it is shown\nthat, at least in one group of animals, the facts which we have as yet\nacquired point to the former existence of various intermediate forms, so\nnumerous that they go far to discredit the view of the sudden introduction\nof new species. . . . The modern forms are placed along lines which\nconverge toward a common centre.\" The gaps between the existing forms of\nthe odd-toed group of ungulates (of which horses, rhinoceroses, and tapirs,\nare the principal representatives) are most bridged over by palaeontology,\nand somewhat the same may be said of the even-toed group, to which the\nruminants and the porcine genus belong. \"Moreover, the lines of both groups\nto a certain extent approximate, but, within the limits of our knowledge,\nthey do not meet. . - . Was the order according to which the introduction\nof new forms seems to have taken place since the Eocene then entirely\nchanged, or did it continue as far back as the period when these lines would\nhave been gradually fused in a common centre?\"\n\nFacts like these, which suggest grave diversification under long lapse of\ntime, are well supplemented by those which essentially demonstrate a\nslighter diversification of many species over a wide range of space;\nwhether into species or races depends partly upon how the naturalist uses\nthese terms, partly upon the extent of the observations, or luck in getting\ntogether intermediate forms. The researches of Prof. Baird upon the birds\nof this continent afford a good illustration. A great number of our birds\nwhich have been, and must needs have been, regarded as very distinct\nspecies, each mainly with its own geographical area, are found to mingle\ntheir characters along bordering lines; and the same kinds of differences\n(of coloration, form, or other) are found to prevail through the species of\neach region, thus impressing upon them a geographical facies. Upon a\nsubmergence of the continent, reducing these several regions to islands\nsufficiently separated, these forms would be unquestioned species.\n\nConsiderations such as these, of which a few specimens have now been\nadduced (not general speculations, as the unscientific are apt to suppose),\nand trials of the new views to see how far they will explain the problems\nor collocate the facts they are severally dealing with, are what have\nmainly influenced working naturalists in the direction of the provisional\nacceptance of the derivative hypothesis. They leave to polemical\nspeculators the fruitless discussion of the question whether all species\ncame from one or two, or more; they are trying to grasp the thing by the\nnear, not by the farther end, and to ascertain, first of all, whether it is\nprobable or provable that present species are descendants of former ones\nwhich were like them, but less and less like them the farther back we go.\n\nAnd it is worth noting that they all seem to be utterly unconscious of\nwrong-doing. Their repugnance to novel hypotheses is only the natural and\nhealthy one. A change of a wonted line of thought is not made without an\neffort, nor need be made without adequate occasion. Some courage was\nrequired of the man who first swallowed an oyster from its shell; and of\nmost of us the snail would still demand more. As the unaccustomed food\nproves to be good and satisfying, and also harmless, we may come to like\nit. That, however, which many good and eminent naturalists find to be\nhealthful and reasonable, and others innocuous, a few still regard as most\nunreasonable and harmful. At present, we call to mind only two who not only\nhold to the entire fixity of species as an axiom or a confirmed principle,\nbut also as a dogma, and who maintain, either expressly or implicitly, that\nthe logical antithesis to the creation of species as they are, is not by\nlaw (which implies intention), but by chance. A recent book by one of these\nnaturalists, or rather, by a geologist of eminence, the \"Story of the Earth\nand Man,\" by Dr. Dawson,4 is now before us. The title is too near that of\nGuyot's \"Earth and Man,\" with the publication of which popular volume that\ndistinguished physical naturalist commenced his career in this country; and\nsuch catch-titles are a sort of trade-mark. As to the nature and merits of\nDr. Dawson's work, we have left ourselves space only to say: 1. That it is\naddressed ad populum, which renders it rather the more than less amenable\nto the criticisms we may be disposed to make upon it. 2. That the author is\nthoroughly convinced that no species or form deserving the name was ever\nderived from another, or originated from natural causes; and he maintains\nthis doctrine with earnestness, much variety of argument and illustration,\nand no small ability; so that he may be taken as a representative of the\nview exactly opposed to that which is favored by those naturalists whose\nessays we have been considering--to whom, indeed, he stands in marked\ncontrast in spirit and method, being greatly disposed to argue the question\nfrom the remote rather than the near end. 3. And finally, he has a\nconviction that the evolutionary doctrines of the day are not only untrue,\nbut thoroughly bad and irreligious. This belief, and the natural anxiety\nwith which he contemplates their prevalence, may excuse a certain vehemence\nand looseness of statement which were better avoided, as where the\ngeologists of the day are said to be \"broken up into bands of specialists,\nlittle better than scientific banditti, liable to be beaten in detail, and\nprone to commit outrages on common-sense and good taste which bring their\notherwise good cause into disrepute;\" and where he despairingly suggests\nthat the prevalence of the doctrines he deprecates \"seems to indicate that\nthe accumulated facts of our age have gone altogether beyond its capacity\nfor generalization, and, but for the vigor which one sees everywhere, might\nbe taken as an indication that the human mind has fallen into a state of\nsenility.\"\n\nThis is droll reading, when one considers that the \"evolutionist\" is the\nonly sort of naturalist who has much occasion to employ his \"capacity for\ngeneralization\" upon \"the accumulated facts\" in their bearing upon the\nproblem of the origin of species; since the \"special creationist,\" who\nmaintains that they were supernaturally originated just as they are, by the\nvery terms of his doctrine places them out of the reach of scientific\nexplanation. Again, when one reflects upon the new impetus which the\nderivative hypothesis has given to systematic natural history, and reads\nthe declaration of a master in this department (the President of the\nLinnean Society) that Mr. Darwin \"has in this nineteenth century brought\nabout as great a revolution in the philosophic study of organic Nature as\nthat which was effected in the previous century by the immortal Swede,\" it\nsounds oddly to hear from Dr. Dawson that \"it obliterates the fine\nperception of differences from the mind of the naturalist, . . . . destroys\nthe possibility of a philosophical classification, reducing all things to a\nmere series, and leads to a rapid decay in systematic zoology and botany,\nwhich is already very manifest among the disciples of Spencer and Darwin in\nEngland.\" So, also, \"it removes from the study of Nature the ideas of final\ncause and purpose\"--a sentence which reads curiously in the light of\nDarwin's special investigations, such as those upon the climbing of plants,\nthe agency of insects in the fertilization of blossoms, and the like, which\nhave brought back teleology to natural science, wedded to morphology and\nalready fruitful of discoveries.     The difficulty with Dr. Dawson here is\n(and it need not be underrated) that apparently he cannot as yet believe an\nadaptation, act, or result, to be purposed the apparatus of which is\nperfected or evolved in the course of Nature--a common but a crude state of\nmind on the part of those who believe that there is any originating purpose\nin the universe, and one which, we are sure, Dr. Dawson does not share as\nrespects the material world until he reaches the organic kingdoms, and\nthere, possibly, because he sees man at the head of them--of them, while\nabove them. However that may be, the position which Dr. Dawson chooses to\noccupy is not left uncertain. After concluding, substantially, that those\n\"evolutionists\" who exclude design from Nature thereby exclude theism, which\nnobody will deny, he proceeds (on page 348) to give his opinion that the\n\"evolutionism which professes to have a creator somewhere behind it . . . .\nis practically atheistic,\" and, \"if possible, more unphilosophical than\nthat which professes to set out from absolute and eternal nonentity,\" etc.\n\nThere are some sentences which might lead one to suppose that Dr. Dawson\nhimself admitted of an evolution \"with a creator somewhere behind it.\" He\noffers it (page 320) as a permissible alternative that even man \"has been\ncreated mediately by the operation of forces also concerned in the\nproduction of other animals;\" concedes that a just theory \"does not even\nexclude evolution or derivation, to a certain extent\" (page 341); and that\n\"a modern man of science\" may safely hold \"that all things have been\nproduced by the Supreme Creative Will, acting either directly or through\nthe agency of the forces and materials of his own production.\" Well, if\nthis be so, why denounce the modern man of science so severely upon the\nother page merely for accepting the permission? At first sight, it might be\nthought that our author is exposing himself in one paragraph to a share of\nthe condemnation which he deals out in the other. But the permitted views\nare nowhere adopted as his own; the evolution is elsewhere restricted\nwithin specific limits; and as to \"mediate creation,\" although we cannot\ndivine what is here meant by the term, there is reason to think it does not\nimply that the several species of a genus were mediately created, in a\nnatural way, through the supernatural creation of a remote common ancestor.\nSo that his own judgment in the matter is probably more correctly gathered\nfrom the extract above referred to and other similar deliverances, such as\nthat in which he warns those who \"endeavor to steer a middle course, and to\nmaintain that the Creator has proceeded by way of evolution,\" that \"the\nbare, hard logic of Spencer, the greatest English authority on evolution,\nleaves no place for this compromise, and shows that the theory, carried out\nto its legitimate consequences, excludes the knowledge of a Creator and the\npossibility of his work.\"\n\nNow, this is a dangerous line to take. Those defenders of the faith are\nmore zealous than wise who must needs fire away in their catapults the very\nbastions of the citadel, in the defense of outposts that have become\nuntenable. It has been and always will be possible to take an atheistic\nview of Nature, but far more reasonable from science and philosophy only to\ntake a theistic view. Voltaire's saying here holds true: that if there were\nno God known, it would be necessary to invent one. It is the best, if not\nthe only, hypothesis for the explanation of the facts. Whether the\nphilosophy of Herbert Spencer (which is not to our liking) is here fairly\npresented, we have little occasion and no time to consider. In this regard,\nthe close of his article No. 12 in the Contemporary Review shows, at least,\nhis expectation of the entire permanence of our ideas of cause, origin, and\nreligion, and predicts the futility of the expectation that the \"religion\nof humanity\" will be the religion of the future, or \"can ever more than\ntemporarily shut out the thought of a Power, of which humanity is but a\nsmall and fugitive product, which was in its course of ever-changing\nmanifestation before humanity was, and will continue through other\nmanifestations when humanity has ceased to be.\" If, on the one hand, the\nphilosophy of the unknowable of the Infinite may be held in a merely\nquasi-theistic or even atheistic way, were not its ablest expounders and\ndefenders Hamilton and Dean Mansel? One would sup-pose that Dr. Dawson\nmight discern at least as much of a divine foundation to Nature as Herbert\nSpencer and Matthew Arnold; might recognize in this power that \"something\nnot ourselves that makes\" for order as well as \"for righteousness,\" and\nwhich he fitly terms supreme creative will; and, resting in this, endure\nwith more complacency and faith the inevitable prevalence of evolutionary\nviews which he is powerless to hinder. Although he cannot arrest the stream,\nhe might do something toward keeping it in safe channels.\n\nWe wished to say something about the way in which scientific men, worthy of\nthe name, hold hypotheses and theories, using them for the purpose of\ninvestigation and the collocation of facts, yielding or withholding assent\nin degrees or provisionally, according to the amount of verification or\nlikelihood, or holding it long in suspense; which is quite in contrast to\nthat of amateurs and general speculators (not that we reckon Dr. Dawson in\nthis class), whose assent or denial seldom waits, or endures qualification.\nWith them it must on all occasions be yea or nay only, according to the\nletter of the Scriptural injunction, and whatsoever is less than this, or\nbetween the two, cometh of evil.\n\n\n\nVII\n\nEVOLUTION AND\n\nTHEOLOGY [VII-1]\n\n(The Nation, January 15, 1874)\n\n\n\nThe attitude of theologians toward doctrines of evolution, from the nebular\nhypothesis down to \"Darwinism,\" is no less worthy of consideration, and\nhardly less diverse, than that of naturalists. But the topic, if pursued\nfar, leads to questions too wide and deep for our handling here, except\nincidentally, in the brief notice which it falls in our way to take of the\nRev. George Henslow's recent volume on \"The Theory of Evolution of Living\nThings.\" This treatise is on the side of evolution, \"considered as\nillustrative of the wisdom and beneficence of the Almighty.\" It was\nsubmitted for and received one of the Actonian prizes recently awarded by\nthe Royal Institution of Great Britain. We gather that the staple of a part\nof it is worked up anew from some earlier discourses of the author upon\n\"Genesis and Geology,\" \"Science and Scripture not antagonistic,\" etc.\n\nIn coupling with it a chapter of the second volume of Dr. Hodge's\n\"Systematic Theology (Part II, Anthropology),\" we call attention to a\nrecent essay, by an able and veteran writer, on the other side of the\nquestion. As the two fairly enough represent the extremes of Christian\nthought upon the subject, it is convenient to review them in connection.\nTheologians have a short and easy, if not wholly satisfactory, way of\nrefuting scientific doctrines which they object to, by pitting the authority\nor opinion of one savant against another. Already, amid the currents and\neddies of modern opinion, the savants may enjoy the same advantage at the\nexpense of the divines-- we mean, of course, on the scientific arena; for\nthe mutual refutation of conflicting theologians on their own ground is no\nnovelty. It is not by way of offset, however, that these divergent or\ncontradictory views are here referred to, but only as an illustration of the\nfact that the divines are by no means all arrayed upon one side of the\nquestion in hand. And indeed, in the present transition period, until some\none goes much deeper into the heart of the subject, as respects the\nrelations of modern science to the foundations of religious belief, than\neither of these writers has done, it is as well that the weight of opinion\nshould be distributed, even if only according to prepossessions, rather than\nthat the whole stress should bear upon a single point, and that perhaps the\nauthority of an interpretation of Scripture. A consensus of opinion upon\nDr. Hodge's ground, for instance (although better guarded than that of Dr.\nDawson), if it were still possible, would--to say the least--probably not\nat all help to reconcile science and religion. Therefore, it is not to be\nregretted that the diversities of view among accredited theologians and\ntheological naturalists are about as wide and as equably distributed between\nthe extremes (and we may add that the views themselves are quite as\nhypothetical) as those which prevail among the various naturalists and\nnatural philosophers of the day.\n\nAs a theologian, Mr. Henslow doubtless is not to be compared with the\nveteran professor at Princeton. On the other hand, he has the advantage of\nbeing a naturalist, and the son of a naturalist, as well as a clergyman:\nconsequently he feels the full force of an array of facts in nature, and of\nthe natural inferences from them, which the theological professor, from his\nBiblical standpoint, and on his implicit assumption that the Old Testament\nmust needs teach true science, can hardly be expected to appreciate.\nAccordingly, a naturalist would be apt to say of Dr. Hodge's exposition of\n\"theories of the universe\" and kindred topics--and in no captious spirit--\nthat whether right or wrong on particular points, he is not often right or\nwrong in the way of a man of science.\n\nProbably from the lack of familiarity with prevalent ideas and their\nhistory, the theologians are apt to suppose that scientific men of the\npresent day are taking up theories of evolution in pure wantonness or mere\nsuperfluity of naughtiness; that it would have been quite possible, as well\nas more proper, to leave all such matters alone. Quieta non movere is\ndoubtless a wise rule upon such subjects, so long as it is fairly\napplicable. But the time for its application in respect to questions of the\norigin and relations of existing species has gone by. To ignore them is to\nimitate the foolish bird that seeks security by hiding its head in the\nsand. Moreover, the naturalists did not force these questions upon the\nworld; but the world they study forced them upon the naturalists. How these\nquestions of derivation came naturally and inevitably to be revived, how\nthe cumulative probability that the existing are derived from preexisting\nforms impressed itself upon the minds of many naturalists and thinkers, Mr.\nHenslow has briefly explained in the introduction and illustrated in the\nsucceeding chapters of the first part of his book. Science, he declares,\nhas been compelled to take up the hypothesis of the evolution of living\nthings as better explaining all the phenomena. In his opinion, it has\nbecome \"infinitely more probable that all living and extinct beings have\nbeen developed or evolved by natural laws of generation from preexisting\nforms, than that they, with all their innumerable races and varieties,\nshould owe their existences severally to Creative fiats.\" This doctrine,\nwhich even Dr. Hodge allows may possibly be held in a theistic sense, and\nwhich, as we suppose, is so held or viewed by a great proportion of the\nnaturalists of our day, Mr. Henslow maintains is fully compatible with\ndogmatic as well as natural theology; that it explains moral anomalies, and\naccounts for the mixture of good and evil in the world, as well as for the\nmerely relative perfection of things; and, finally, that \"the whole scheme\nwhich God has framed for man's existence, from the first that was created\nto all eternity, collapses if the great law of evolution be suppressed.\"\nThe second part of his book is occupied with a development of this line of\nargument. By this doctrine of evolution he does not mean the Darwinian\nhypothesis, although he accepts and includes this, looking upon natural\nselection as playing an important though not an unlimited part. He would be\nan evolutionist with Mivart and Owen and Argyll, even if he had not the\nvera causa which Darwin contributed to help him on. And, on rising to man,\nhe takes ground with Wallace, saying:\n\n\n\"I would wish to state distinctly that I do not at present see any evidence\nfor believing in a gradual development of man from the lower animals by\nordinary natural laws; that is, without some special interference, or, if\nit be preferred, some exceptional conditions which have thereby separated\nhim from all other creatures, and placed him decidedly in advance of them\nall. On the other hand, it would be absurd to regard him as totally severed\nfrom them. It is the great degree of difference I would insist upon,\nbodily, mental, and spiritual, which precludes the idea of his having been\nevolved by exactly the same processes, and with the same limitations, as,\nfor example, the horse from the palaeotherium.\"\n\n\nIn illustrating this view, he reproduces Wallace's well-known points, and\nadds one or two of his own. We need not follow up his lines of argument.\nThe essay, indeed, adds nothing material to the discussion of evolution,\nalthough it states one side of the case moderately well, as far as it goes.\n\nDr. Hodge approaches the subject from the side of systematic theology, and\nconsiders it mainly in its bearing upon the origin and original state of\nman. Under each head he first lays down \"the Scriptural doctrine,\" and then\ndiscusses \"anti-Scriptural theories,\" which latter, under the first head,\nare the heathen doctrine of spontaneous generation, the modern doctrine of\nspontaneous generation, theories of development, specially that of Darwin,\nthe atheistic character of the theory, etc. Although he admits \"that there\nis a theistic and an atheistic form of the nebular hypothesis as to the\norigin of the universe, so there may be a theistic interpretation of the\nDarwinian theory,\" yet he contends that \"the system is thoroughly\natheistic,\" notwithstanding that the author \"expressly acknowledges the\nexistence of God.\" Curiously enough, the atheistic form of evolutionary\nhypotheses, or what he takes for such, is the only one which Dr. Hodge\ncares to examine. Even the \"Reign of Law\" theory, Owen's \"purposive route of\ndevelopment and chance . . . . by virtue of inherent tendencies thereto,\" as\nwell as other expositions of the general doctrine on a theistic basis, are\nbarely mentioned without a word of comment, except, perhaps, a general\n\"protest against the arraying of probabilities against the teachings of\nScripture.\"\n\nNow, all former experience shows that it is neither safe nor wise to\npronounce a whole system \"thoroughly atheistic\" which it is conceded may be\nheld theistically, and which is likely to be largely held, if not to\nprevail, on scientific grounds. It may be well to remember that, \"of the\ntwo great minds of the seventeenth century, Newton and Leibnitz, both\nprofoundly religious as well as philosophical, one produced the theory of\ngravitation, the other objected to that theory that it was subversive of\nnatural religion; also that the nebular hypothesis--a natural consequence\nof the theory of gravitation and of the subsequent progress of physical and\nastronomical discovery--has been denounced as atheistical even down to our\nday.\" It has now outlived anathema.\n\nIt is undeniable that Mr. Darwin lays himself open to this kind of attack.\nThe propounder of natural selection might be expected to make the most of\nthe principle, and to overwork the law of parsimony in its behalf. And a\nsystem in which exquisite adaptation of means to ends, complicated\ninter-dependencies, and orderly sequences, appear as results instead of\nbeing introduced as factors, and in which special design is ignored in the\nparticulars, must needs be obnoxious, unless guarded as we suppose Mr.\nDarwin might have guarded his. ground if he had chosen to do so. Our own\nopinion, after long consideration, is, that Mr. Darwin has no atheistical\nintent; and that, as respects the test question of design in Nature, his\nview may be made clear to the theological mind by likening it to that of\nthe \"believer in general but not in particular Providence.\" There is no\nneed to cull passages in support of this interpretation from his various\nworks while the author--the most candid of men--retains through all the\neditions of the \"Origin of Species\" the two mottoes from Whewell and Bishop\nButler.[VII-2]\n\nThe gist of the matter lies in the answer that should be rendered to the\nquestions--1. Do order and useful-working collocation, pervading a system\nthroughout all its parts, prove design? and, 2. Is such evidence negatived\nor invalidated by the probability that these particular collocations belong\nto lineal series of such in time, and diversified in the course of\nNature--grown up, so to say, step by step? We do not use the terms\n\"adaptation, \"arrangement of means to ends,\" and the like, because they beg\nthe question in stating it.\n\nFinally, ought not theologians to consider whether they have not already,\nin principle, conceded to the geologists and physicists all that they are\nasked to concede to the evolutionists; whether, indeed, the main natural\ntheological difficulties which attend the doctrine of evolution--serious as\nthey may be--are not virtually contained in the admission that there is a\nsystem of Nature with fixed laws. This, at least, we may say, that, under a\nsystem in which so much is done \"by the establishment of general laws,\" it\nis legitimate for any one to prove, if he can, that any particular thing in\nthe natural world is so done; and it is the proper business of scientific\nmen to push their enquiries in this direction.\n\nIt is beside the point for Dr. Hodge to object that, \"from the nature of\nthe case, what concerns the origin of things cannot be known except by a\nsupernatural revelation;\" that \"science has to do with the facts and laws\nof Nature: here the question concerns the origin of such facts.\" For the\nvery object of the evolutionists, and of Mr. Darwin in particular, is to\nremove these subjects from the category of origination, and to bring them\nunder the domain of science by treating them as questions about how things\ngo on, not how they began. Whether the succession of living forms on the\nearth is or is not among the facts and laws of Nature, is the very matter\nin controversy.\n\nMoreover, adds Dr. Hodge, it has been conceded that in this matter \"proofs,\nin the proper sense of the word, are not to be had; we are beyond the\nregion of demonstration, and have only probabilities to consider.\"\nWherefore \"Christians have a right to protest against the arraying of\nprobabilities against the clear teachings of Scripture.\" The word is\nitalicized, as if to intimate that probabilities have no claims which a\ntheologian is bound to respect. As to arraying them against Scripture, there\nis nothing whatever in the essay referred to that justifies the statement.\nIndeed, no occasion offered; for the writer was discussing evolution in its\nrelations to theism, not to Biblical theology, and probably would not be\ndisposed to intermix arguments so different in kind as those from natural\nscience and those from revelation. To pursue each independently, according\nto its own method, and then to compare the results, is thought to be the\nbetter mode of proceeding. The weighing of probabilities we had regarded as\na proper exercise of the mind preparatory to forming an opinion.\nProbabilities, hypotheses, and even surmises, whatever they may be worth,\nare just what, as it seems to us, theologians ought not to be foremost in\ndecrying, particularly those who deal with the reconciliation of science\nwith Scripture, Genesis with geology, and the like. As soon as they go\nbeyond the literal statements even of the English text, and enter into the\ndetails of the subject, they find ample occasion and display a special\naptitude for producing and using them, not always with very satisfactory\nresults. It is not, perhaps, for us to suggest that the theological army in\nthe past has been too much encumbered with impedimenta for effective\naggression in the conflict against atheistic tendencies in modern science;\nand that in resisting attack it has endeavored to hold too much ground, so\nwasting strength in the obstinate defense of positions which have become\nunimportant as well as untenable. Some of the arguments, as well as the\nguns, which well served a former generation, need to be replaced by others\nof longer range and greater penetration.\n\nIf the theologians are slow to discern the signs and exigencies of the\ntimes, the religious philosophical naturalists must be looked to. Since the\nabove remarks were written, Prof. Le Conte's \"Religion and Science,\" just\nissued, has come to our hands. It is a series of nineteen Sunday lectures\non the relation of natural and revealed religion, prepared in the first\ninstance for a Bible-class of young men, his pupils in the University of\nSouth Carolina, repeated to similar classes at the University of\nCalifornia, and finally delivered to a larger and general audience. They are\nprinted, the preface states, from a verbatim report, with only verbal\nalterations and corrections of some redundancies consequent upon\nextemporaneous delivery. They are not, we find, lectures on science under a\nreligious aspect, but discourses upon Christian theology and its\nfoundations from a scientific layman's point of view, with illustrations\nfrom his own lines of study. As the headings show, they cover, or, more\ncorrectly speaking, range over, almost the whole field of theological\nthought, beginning with the personality of Deity as revealed in Nature, the\nspiritual nature and attributes of Deity, and the incarnation; discussing\nby the way the general relations of theology to science, man, and his place\nin Nature; and ending with a discussion of predestination and free-will, and\nof prayer in relation to invariable law--all in a volume of three hundred\nand twenty-four duodecimo pages! And yet the author remarks that many\nimportant subjects have been omitted because he felt unable to present them\nin a satisfactory manner from a scientific point of view. We note, indeed,\nthat one or two topics which would naturally come in his way--such,\nespecially, as the relation of evolution to the human race--are somewhat\nconspicuously absent. That most of the momentous subjects which he takes up\nare treated discursively, and not exhaustively, is all the better for his\nreaders. What they and we most want to know is, how these serious matters\nare viewed by an honest, enlightened, and devout scientific man. To solve\nthe mysteries of the universe, as the French lady required a philosopher to\nexplain his new system, \"dans un mot,\" is beyond rational expectation.\n\nAll that we have time and need to say of this little book upon great\nsubjects relates to its spirit and to the view it takes of evolution. Its\ntheology is wholly orthodox; its tone devotional, charitable, and hopeful;\nits confidence in religious truth, as taught both in Nature and revelation,\ncomplete; the illustrations often happy, but often too rhetorical; the\nscience, as might be expected from this author, unimpeachable as regards\nmatters of fact, discreet as to matters of opinion. The argument from\ndesign in the first lecture brings up the subject of the introduction of\nspecies. Of this, considered \"as a question of history, there is no witness\non the stand except geology.\"\n\n\n\"The present condition of geological evidence is undoubtedly in favor of\nsome degree of suddenness--is against infinite gradations. The evidence may\nbe meagre . . . but whether meagre or not, it is all the evidence we have.\n. . . Now, the evidence of geology to-day is, that species seem to come in\nsuddenly and in full perfection, remain substantially unchanged during the\nterm of their existence, and pass away in full perfection. Other species\ntake their place apparently by substitution, not by transmutation. But you\nwill ask me, 'Do you, then, reject the doctrine of evolution? Do you accept\nthe creation of species directly and without secondary agencies and\nprocesses?' I answer, No! Science knows nothing of phenomena which do not\ntake place by secondary causes and processes. She does not deny such\noccurrence, for true Science is not dogmatic, and she knows full well that,\ntracing up the phenomena from cause to cause, we must somewhere reach the\nmore direct agency of a First Cause. . . . It is evident that, however\nspecies were introduced, whether suddenly or gradually, it is the duty of\nScience ever to strive to understand the means and processes by which\nspecies originated. . . . Now, of the various conceivable secondary causes\nand processes, by some of which we must believe species originated, by far\nthe most probable is certainly that of evolution from other species.\"\n\n\n    (We might interpose the remark that the witness on the stand, if subjected\nto cross-examination by a biologist, might be made to give a good deal of\ntestimony in favor of transmutation rather than substitution.) After\nreferring to different ideas as to the cause or mode of evolution, he\nconcludes that it can make no difference, so far as the argument of design\nin Nature is concerned, whether there be evolution or not, or whether, in\nthe case of evolution, the change be paroxysmal or uniform. We may infer\neven that he accepts the idea that \"physical and chemical forces are\nchanged into vital force, and vice versa.\" Physicists incline more readily\nto this than physiologists; and if what is called vital force be a force in\nthe physicists' sense, then it is almost certainly so. But the illustration\non page 275 touches this point only seemingly. It really concerns only the\nstoring and the using of physical force in a living organism. If, for want\nof a special expression, we continue to use the term vital force to\ndesignate that intangible something which directs and governs the\naccumulation and expenditure of physical force in organisms, then there is\nas yet no proof and little likelihood that this is correlate with physical\nforce.\n\n\"A few words upon the first chapter of Genesis and the Mosaic cosmogony,\nand I am done,\" says Prof. Le Conte, and so are we:\n\n\n\"It might be expected by many that, after speaking of schemes of\nreconciliation, I should give mine also. My Christian friends, these\nschemes of reconciliation become daily more and more distasteful to me. I\nhave used them in times past; but now the deliberate construction of such\nschemes seems to me almost like trifling with the words of Scripture and\nthe teachings of Nature. They seem to me almost irreverent, and quite\nforeign to the true, humble, liberal spirit of Christianity; they are so\nevidently artificial, so evidently mere ingenious human devices. It seems\nto me that if we will only regard the two books in the philosophical spirit\nwhich I have endeavored to describe, and then simply wait and possess our\nsouls in patience, the questions in dispute will soon adjust themselves as\nother similar questions have already done.\"\n\n\n\nVIII\n\nWHAT IS DARWINISM? [VIII-1]\n\nThe Nation, May 28, 1874)\n\n\nThe question which Dr. Hodge asks he promptly and decisively answers: \"What\nis Darwinism? it is atheism.\"\n\nLeaving aside all subsidiary and incidental matters, let us consider--1.\nWhat the Darwinian doctrine is, and 2. How it is proved to be atheistic.\nDr. Hodge's own statement of it cannot be very much bettered:\n\n\n\"His [Darwin's] work on the 'Origin of Species' does not purport to be\nphilosophical. In this aspect it is very different from the cognate works of\nMr. Spencer. Darwin does not speculate on the origin of the universe, on\nthe nature of matter or of force. He is simply a naturalist, a careful and\nlaborious observer, skillful in his descriptions, and singularly candid in\ndealing with the difficulties in the way of his peculiar doctrine. He set\nbefore himself a single problem--namely, How are the fauna and flora of our\nearth to be accounted for? . . . To account for the existence of matter and\nlife, Mr. Darwin admits a Creator. This is done explicitly and repeatedly. .\n. . He assumes the efficiency of physical causes, showing no disposition to\nresolve them into mind-force or into the efficiency of the First Cause. . .\n. He assumes, also, the existence of life in the form of one or more\nprimordial germs. . . . How all living things on earth, including the\nendless variety of plants and all the diversity of animals, . . . have\ndescended from the primordial animalcule, he thinks, may be accounted for\nby the operation of the following natural laws, viz.: First, the law of\nHeredity, or that by which like begets like--the offspring are like the\nparent. Second, the law of Variation; that is, while the offspring are in\nall essential characteristics like their immediate progenitor, they\nnevertheless vary more or less within narrow limits from their parent and\nfrom each other. Some of these variations are indifferent, some\ndeteriorations, some improvements--that is, such as enable the plant or\nanimal to exercise its functions to greater advantage. Third, the law of\nOver-Production. All plants and animals tend to increase in a geometrical\nratio, and therefore tend to overrun enormously the means of support. If\nall the seeds of a plant, all the spawn of a fish, were to arrive at\nmaturity, in a very short time the world could not contain them. Hence, of\nnecessity, arises a struggle for life. Only a few of the myriads born can\npossibly live. Fourth, here comes in the law of Natural Selection, or the\nSurvival of the Fittest; that is, if any individual of a given species of\nplant or animal happens to have a slight deviation from the normal type\nfavorable to its success in the struggle for life, it will survive. This\nvariation, by the law of heredity, will be transmitted to its offspring,\nand by them again to theirs. Soon these favored ones gain the ascendency,\nand the less favored perish, and the modification becomes established in\nthe species. After a time, another and another of such favorable variations\noccur, with like results. Thus, very gradually, great changes of structure\nare introduced, and not only species, but genera, families, and orders, in\nthe vegetable and animal world, are produced\" (pp. 26-29).\n\n\nNow, the truth or the probability of Darwin's hypothesis is not here the\nquestion, but only its congruity or incongruity with theism. We need take\nonly one exception to this abstract of it, but that is an important one for\nthe present investigation. It is to the sentence which we have italicized\nin the earlier part of Dr. Hodge's own statement of what Darwinism is. With\nit begins our inquiry as to how he proves the doctrine to be atheistic.\n\nFirst, if we rightly apprehend it, a suggestion of atheism is infused into\nthe premises in a negative form: Mr. Darwin shows no disposition to resolve\nthe efficiency of physical causes into the efficiency of the First Cause.\nNext (on page 48) comes the positive charge that \"Mr. Darwin, although\nhimself a theist,\" maintains that \"the contrivances manifested in the\norgans of plants and animals . . . are not due to the continued cooperation\nand control of the divine mind, nor to the original purpose of God in the\nconstitution of the universe.\" As to the negative statement, it might\nsuffice to recall Dr. Hodge's truthful remark that Darwin \"is simply a\nnaturalist,\" and that \"his work on the origin of species does not purport\nto be philosophical.\" In physical and physiological treatises, the most\nreligious men rarely think it necessary to postulate the First Cause, nor\nare they misjudged by the omission. But surely Mr. Darwin does show the\ndisposition which our author denies him, not only by implication in many\ninstances, but most explicitly where one would naturally look for it,\nnamely--at the close of the volume in question: \"To my mind, it accords\nbetter with what we know of the laws impressed on matter by the Creator,\"\netc. If that does not refer the efficiency of physical causes to the First\nCause, what form of words could do so? The positive charge appears to be\nequally gratuitous. In both Dr. Hodge must have overlooked the beginning as\nwell as the end of the volume which he judges so hardly. Just as\nmathematicians and physicists, in their systems, are wont to postulate the\nfundamental and undeniable truths they are concerned with, or what they\ntake for such and require to be taken for granted, so Mr. Darwin\npostulates, upon the first page of his notable work, and in the words of\nWhewell and Bishop Butler: 1. The establishment by divine power of general\nlaws, according to which, rather than by insulated interpositions in each\nparticular case, events are brought about in the material world; and 2.\nThat by the word ':natural\" is meant \"stated, fixed, or settled,\" by this\nsame power, \"since what is natural as much requires and presupposes an\nintelligent agent to render it so--i.e., to effect it continually or at\nstated times--as what is supernatural or miraculous does to effect it for\nonce.[VIII-2] So when Mr. Darwin makes such large and free use of \"natural\nas antithetical to supernatural\" causes, we are left in no doubt as to the\nultimate source which he refers them to. Rather let us say there ought to\nbe no doubt, unless there are other grounds for it to rest upon.\n\nSuch ground there must be, or seem to be, to justify or excuse a veteran\ndivine and scholar like Dr. Hodge in his deduction of pure atheism from a\nsystem produced by a confessed theist, and based, as we have seen, upon\nthoroughly orthodox fundamental conceptions. Even if we may not hope to\nreconcile the difference between the theologian and the naturalist, it may\nbe well to ascertain where their real divergence begins, or ought to begin,\nand what it amounts to. Seemingly, it is in their proximate, not in their\nultimate, principles, as Dr. Hodge insists when he declares that the whole\ndrift of Darwinism is to prove that everything \"may be accounted for by the\nblind operation of natural causes, without any intention, purpose, or\ncooperation of God.\" \"Why don't he say,\" cries the theologian, \"that the\ncomplicated organs of plants and animals are the product of the divine\nintelligence? If God made them, it makes no difference, so far as the\nquestion of design is concerned, how he made them, whether at once or by\nprocess of evolution.\" But, as we have seen, Mr. Darwin does say that, and\nhe over and over implies it when he refers the production of species \"to\nsecondary causes,\" and likens their origination to the origination of\nindividuals; species being series of individuals with greater difference.\nIt is not for the theologian to object that the power which made individual\nmen and other animals, and all the differences which the races of mankind\nexhibit, through secondary causes, could not have originated congeries of\nmore or less greatly differing individuals through the same causes.\n\nClearly, then, the difference between the theologian and the naturalist is\nnot fundamental, and evolution may be as profoundly and as particularly\ntheistic as it is increasingly probable. The taint of atheism which, in Dr.\nHodge's view, leavens the whole lump, is not inherent in the original grain\nof Darwinism--in the principles posited--but has somehow been introduced in\nthe subsequent treatment. Possibly, when found, it may be eliminated.\nPerhaps there is mutual misapprehension growing out of some ambiguity in the\nuse of terms. \"Without any intention, purpose, or cooperation of God.\"-\nThese are sweeping and effectual words. How came they to be applied to\nnatural selection by a divine who professes that God ordained whatsoever\ncometh to pass? In this wise: \"The point to be proved is, that it is the\ndistinctive doctrine of Mr. Darwin that species owe their origin--1. Not to\nthe original intention of the divine mind; 2. Not to special acts of\ncreation calling new forms into existence at certain epochs; 3. Not to the\nconstant and everywhere operative efficiency of God guiding physical causes\nin the production of intended effects; but 4. To the gradual accumulation\nof unintended variations of structure and instinct securing some advantage\nto their subjects.\" Then Dr. Hodge adduces \"Darwin's own testimony,\" to the\npurport that natural selection denotes the totality of natural causes and\ntheir interactions, physical and physiological, reproduction, variation,\nbirth, struggle, extinction--in short, all that is going on in Nature; that\nthe variations which in this interplay are picked out for survival are not\nintentionally guided; that \"nothing can be more hopeless than the attempt\nto explain this similarity of pattern in members of the same class by\nutility or the doctrine of final causes\" (which Dr. Hodge takes to be the\ndenial of any such thing as final causes); and that the interactions and\nprocesses going on which constitute natural selection may suffice to\naccount for the present diversity of animals and plants (primordial\norganisms being postulated and time enough given) with all their structures\nand adaptations--that is, to account for them scientifically, as science\naccounts for other things.\n\nA good deal may be made of this, but does it sustain the indictment?\nMoreover, the counts of the indictment may be demurred to. It seems to us\nthat only one of the three points which Darwin is said to deny is really\nopposed to the fourth, which he is said to maintain, except as concerns the\nperhaps ambiguous word unintended. Otherwise, the origin of species through\nthe gradual accumulation of variations--i.e., by the addition of a series\nof small differences--is surely not incongruous with their origin through\n\"the original intention of the divine mind\" or through \"the constant and\neverywhere operative efficiency of God.\"- One or both of these Mr. Darwin\n(being, as Dr. Hodge says, a theist) must needs hold to in some form or\nother; wherefore he may be presumed to hold the fourth proposition in such\nwise as not really to contradict the first or the third. The proper\nantithesis is with the second proposition only, and the issue comes to\nthis: Have the multitudinous forms of living creatures, past and present,\nbeen produced by as many special and independent acts of creation at very\nnumerous epochs? Or have they originated under causes as natural as\nreproduction and birth, and no more so, by the variation and change of\npreceding into succeeding species?\n\nThose who accept the latter alternative are evolutionists. And Dr. Hodge\nfairly allows that their views, although clearly wrong, may be genuinely\ntheistic. Surely they need not become the less so by the discovery or by\nthe conjecture of natural operations through which this diversification and\ncontinued adaptation of species to conditions is brought about. Now, Mr.\nDarwin thinks--and by this he is distinguished. from most\nevolutionists--that he can assign actual natural causes, adequate to the\nproduction of the present out of the preceding state of the animal and\nvegetable world, and so on backward--thus uniting, not indeed the beginning\nbut the far past with the present in one coherent system of Nature. But in\nassigning actual natural causes and processes, and applying them to the\nexplanation of the whole case, Mr. Dar-win assumes the obligation of\nmaintaining their general sufficiency--a task from which the numerous\nadvocates and acceptors of evolution on the general concurrence of\nprobabilities and its usefulness as a working hypothesis (with or without\nmuch conception of the manner how) are happily free. Having hit upon a\nmodus operandi which all who understand it admit will explain something,\nand many that it will explain very much, it is to be expected that Mr.\nDarwin will make the most of it. Doubtless he is far from pretending to\nknow all the causes and operations at work; he has already added some and\nrestricted the range of others; he probably looks for additions to their\nnumber and new illustrations of their efficiency; but he is bound to expect\nthem all to fall within the category of what he calls natural selection (a\nmost expansible principle), or to be congruous with it--that is, that they\nshall be natural causes. Also--and this is the critical point--he is bound\nto maintain their sufficiency without intervention.\n\nHere, at length, we reach the essential difference between Darwin, as we\nunderstand him, and Dr. Hodge. The terms which Darwin sometimes uses, and\ndoubtless some of the ideas they represent, are not such as we should adopt\nor like to defend; and we may say once for all--aside though it be from the\npresent issue--that, in our opinion, the adequacy of the assigned causes to\nthe explanation of the phenomena has not been made out. But we do not\nunderstand him to deny \"purpose, intention, or the cooperation of God\" in\nNature. This would be as gratuitous as unphilosophical, not to say\nunscientific. When he speaks of this or that particular or phase in the\ncourse of events or the procession of organic forms as not intended, he\nseems to mean not specially and disjunctively intended and not brought\nabout by intervention. Purpose in the whole, as we suppose, is not denied\nbut implied. And when one considers how, under whatever view of the case,\nthe designed and the contingent lie inextricably commingled in this world\nof ours, past man's disentanglement, and into what metaphysical dilemmas\nthe attempt at unraveling them leads, we cannot greatly blame the\nnaturalist for relegating such problems to the philosopher and the\ntheologian. If charitable, these will place the most favorable construction\nupon attempts to extend and unify the operation of known secondary causes,\nthis being the proper business of the naturalist and physicist; if wise,\nthey will be careful not to predicate or suggest the absence of intention\nfrom what comes about by degrees through the continuous operation of\nphysical causes, even in the organic world, lest, in their endeavor to\nretain a probable excess of supernaturalism in that realm of Nature, they\ncut away the grounds for recognizing it at all in inorganic Nature, and so\nfall into the same condemnation that some of them award to the Darwinian.\n\nMoreover, it is not certain that Mr. Darwin would very much better his\ncase, Dr. Hodge being judge, if he did propound some theory of the nexus of\ndivine causation and natural laws, or even if he explicitly adopted the one\nor the other of the views which he is charged with rejecting. Either way he\nmight meet a procrustean fate; and, although a saving amount of theism\nmight remain, he would not be sound or comfortable. For, if he predicates\n\"the constant and everywhere operative efficiency of God,\" he may \"lapse\ninto the same doctrine\" that the Duke of Argyll and Sir John Herschel \"seem\ninclined to,\" the latter of whom is blamed for thinking \"it but reasonable\nto regard the force of gravitation as the direct or indirect result of a\nconsciousness or will existing somewhere,\" and the former for regarding \"it\nunphilosophical 'to think or speak as if the forces of Nature were either\nindependent of or even separate from the Creator's power' \": while if he\nfalls back upon an \"original intention of the divine mind,\" endowing matter\nwith forces which he foresaw and intended should produce such results as\nthese contrivances in Nature, he is told that this banishes God from the\nworld, and is inconsistent with obvious facts. And that because of its\nimplying that \"He never interferes to guide the operation of physical\ncauses. We italicize the word, for interference proves to be the keynote of\nDr. Hodge's system. Interference with a divinely ordained physical Nature\nfor the accomplishment of natural results! An unorthodox friend has just\nimparted to us, with much misgiving and solicitude lest he should be thought\nirreverent, his tentative hypothesis, which is, that even the Creator may be\nconceived to have improved with time and experience! Never before was this\ntheory so plainly and barely put before us. We were obliged to say that, in\nprinciple and by implication, it was not wholly original.\n\nBut in such matters, which are far too high for us, no one is justly to be\nheld responsible for the conclusions which another may draw from his\nprinciples or assumptions. Dr. Hodge's particular view should be gathered\nfrom his own statement of it:\n\n\n\"In the external world there is always and everywhere indisputable evidence\nof the activity of two kinds of force, the one physical, the other mental.\nThe physical belongs to matter, and is due to the properties with which it\nhas been endowed; the other is the everywhere present and ever-acting mind\nof God. To the latter are to be referred all the manifestations of design\nin Nature, and the ordering of events in Providence. This doctrine does not\nignore the efficiency of second causes; it simply asserts that God\noverrules and controls them. Thus the Psalmist says: 'I am fearfully and\nwonderfully made. My substance was not hid from Thee when I was made in\nsecret, and curiously wrought (or embroidered) in the lower parts of the\nearth. . . . God makes the grass to grow, and herbs for the children of\nmen.'- He sends rain, frost, and snow. He controls the winds and the waves.\nHe determines the casting of the lot, the flight of an arrow, and the\nfalling of a sparrow.\"\n\n\nFar be it from us to object to this mode of conceiving divine causation,\nalthough, like the two other theistic conceptions referred to, it has its\ndifficulties, and perhaps the difficulties of both. But, if we understand\nit, it draws an unusually hard and fast line between causation in organic\nand inorganic Nature, seems to look for no manifestation of design in the\nlatter except as \"God overrules and controls\" second causes, and, finally,\nrefers to this overruling and controlling (rather than to a normal action\nthrough endowment) all embryonic development, the growth of vegetables, and\nthe like. He even adds, without break or distinction, the sending of rain,\nfrost, and snow, the flight of an arrow, and the falling of a sparrow.\nSomehow we must have misconceived the bearing of the statement; but so it\nstands as one of \"the three ways,\" and the right way, of \"accounting for\ncontrivances in Nature; the other two being--1. Their reference to the\nblind operation of natural causes; and, 2. That they were foreseen and\npurposed by God, who endowed matter with forces which he foresaw and\nintended should produce such results, but never interferes to guide their\noperation.\n\nIn animadverting upon this latter view, Dr. Hodge brings forward an\nargument against evolution, with the examination of which our remarks must\nclose:\n\n\n\"Paley, indeed, says that if the construction of a watch be an undeniable\nevidence of design, it would be a still more wonderful manifestation of\nskill if a watch could be made to produce other watches, and, it may be\nadded, not only other watches, but all kinds of timepieces, in endless\nvariety. So it has been asked, If a man can make a telescope, why cannot\nGod make a telescope which produces others like itself? This is simply\nasking whether matter can be made to do the work of mind. The idea involves\na contradiction. For a telescope to make a telescope supposes it to select\ncopper and zinc in due proportions, and fuse them into brass; to fashion\nthat brass into inter-entering tubes; to collect and combine the requisite\nmaterials for the different kinds of glass needed; to melt them, grind,\nfashion, and polish them, adjust their densities, focal distances, etc.,\netc. A man who can believe that brass can do all this might as well believe\nin God\" (pp. 45, 46).\n\n\nIf Dr. Hodge's meaning is, that matter unconstructed cannot do the work of\nmind, he misses the point altogether; for original construction by an\nintelligent mind is given in the premises. If he means that the machine\ncannot originate the power that operates it, this is conceded by all except\nbelievers in perpetual motion, and it equally misses the point; for the\noperating power is given in the case of the watch, and implied in that of\nthe reproductive telescope. But if he means that matter cannot be made to do\nthe work of mind in constructions, machines, or organisms, he is surely\nwrong. \"Sovitur ambulando,\" vel scribendo; he confuted his argument in the\nact of writing the sentence. That is just what machines and organisms are\nfor; and a consistent Christian theist should maintain that is what all\nmatter is for. Finally, if, as we freely suppose, he means none of these,\nhe must mean (unless we are much mistaken) that organisms originated by the\nAlmighty Creator could not be endowed with the power of producing similar\norganisms, or slightly dissimilar organisms, without successive\ninterventions. Then he begs the very question in dispute, and that, too, in\nthe face of the primal command, \"Be fruitful and multiply,\" and its\nconsequences in every natural birth. If the actual facts could be ignored,\nhow nicely the parallel would run! \"The idea involves a contradiction.\" For\nan animal to make an animal, or a plant to make a plant, supposes it to\nselect carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen, to combine these into\ncellulose and protoplasm, to join with these some phosphorus, lime, etc.,\nto build them into structures and usefully-adjusted organs. A man who can\nbelieve that plants and animals can do this (not, indeed, in the crude way\nsuggested, but in the appointed way) \"might as well believe in God.\" Yes,\nverily, and so he probably will, in spite of all that atheistical\nphilosophers have to offer, if not harassed and confused by such arguments\nand statements as these.\n\nThere is a long line of gradually-increasing divergence from the\nultra-orthodox view of Dr. Hodge through those of such men as Sir William\nThomson, Herschel, Argyll, Owen, Mivart, Wallace, and Darwin, down to those\nof Strauss, Vogt, and Buchner. To strike the line with telling power and\ngood effect, it is necessary to aim at the right place. Excellent as the\npresent volume is in motive and clearly as it shows that Darwinism may bear\nan atheistic as well as a theistic interpretation, we fear that it will not\ncontribute much to the reconcilement of science and religion.\n\nThe length of the analysis of the first book on our list precludes the\nnotices which we intended to take of the three others. They are all the\nproduction of men who are both scientific and religious, one of them a\ncelebrated divine and writer unusually versed in natural history. They all\nlook upon theories of evolution either as in the way of being established\nor as not unlikely to prevail, and they confidently expect to lose thereby\nno solid ground for theism or religion. Mr. St. Clair, a new writer, in his\n\"Darwinism and Design; or, Creation by Evolution,\" takes his ground in the\nfollowing succinct statement of his preface:\n\n\n\"It is being assumed by our scientific guides that the design-argument has\nbeen driven out of the field by the doctrine of evolution. It seems to be\nthought by our theological teachers that the best defense of the faith is\nto deny evolution in toto, and denounce it as anti-Biblical. My volume\nendeavors to show that, if evolution be true, all is not lost; but, on the\ncontrary, something is gained: the design-argument remains unshaken, and\nthe wisdom and beneficence of God receive new illustration.\"\n\n\nOf his closing remark, that, so far as he knows, the subject has never\nbefore been handled in the same way for the same purpose, we will only say\nthat the handling strikes us as mainly sensible rather than as\nsubstantially novel. He traverses the whole ground of evolution, from that\nof the solar system to \"the origin of moral species.\" He is clearly a\ntheistic Darwinian without misgiving, and the arguments for that hypothesis\nand for its religious aspects obtain from him their most favorable\npresentation, while he combats the dysteleology of Hackel, Buchner, etc.,\nnot, however, with any remarkable strength.\n\nDr. Winchell, chancellor of the new university at Syracuse, in his volume\njust issued upon the \"Doctrine of Evolution,\" adopts it in the abstract as\n\"clearly as the law of universal intelligence under which complex results\nare brought into existence\" (whatever that may mean), accepts it\npractically for the inorganic world as a geologist should, hesitates as to\nthe organic world, and sums up the arguments for the origin of species by\ndiversification unfavorably for the Darwinians, regarding it mainly from the\ngeological side. As some of our zoologists and palaeontologists may have\nsomewhat to say upon this matter, we leave it for their consideration. We\nare tempted to develop a point which Dr. Winchell incidentally refers\nto--viz., how very modern the idea of the independent creation and fixity\nof species is, and how well the old divines got on without it. Dr. Winchell\nreminds us that St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas were model\nevolutionists; and, where authority is deferred to, this should count for\nsomething.\n\nMr. Kingsley's eloquent and suggestive \"Westminster Sermons,\" in which he\ntouches here and there upon many of the topics which evolution brings up,\nhas incorporated into the preface a paper which he read in 187i to a\nmeeting of London clergy at Sion College, upon certain problems of natural\ntheology as affected by modern theories in science. We may hereafter have\noccasion to refer to this volume. Meanwhile, perhaps we may usefully\nconclude this article with two or three short extracts from it:\n\n\n\"The God who satisfies our conscience ought more or less to satisfy our\nreason also. To teach that was Butler's mission; and he fulfilled it well.\nBut it is a mission which has to be refulfilled again and again, as human\nthought changes, and human science develops, For if, in any age or country,\nthe God who seems to be revealed by Nature seems also different from the\nGod who is revealed by the then-popular religion, then that God and the\nreligion which tells of that God will gradually cease to be believed in.\n\n\"For the demands of reason--as none knew better than good Bishop\nButler--must be and ought to be satisfied. And, therefore, when a popular\nwar arises between the reason of any generation and its theology, then it\nbehooves the ministers of religion to inquire, with all humility and godly\nfear, on whose side lies the fault; whether the theology which they expound\nis all that it should be, or whether the reason of those who impugn it is\nall that it should be.\"\n\n\nPronouncing it to be the duty of the naturalist to find out the how of\nthings, and of the natural theologian to find out the why, Mr. Kingsley\ncontinues:\n\n\n\"But if it be said, 'After all, there is no why; the doctrine of evolution,\nby doing away with the theory of creation, does away with that of final\ncauses,' let us answer boldly, 'Not in the least.' We might accept all that\nMr. Darwin, all that Prof. Huxley, all that other most able men have so\nlearnedly and acutely written on physical science, and yet preserve our\nnatural theology on the same basis as that on which Butler and Paley left\nit. That we should have to develop it I do not deny.\n\n\"Let us rather look with calmness, and even with hope and good-will, on\nthese new theories; they surely mark a tendency toward a more, not a less,\nScriptural view of Nature.\n\n\"Of old it was said by Him, without whom nothing is made, 'My Father\nworketh hitherto, and I work.' Shall we quarrel with Science if she should\nshow how these words are true? What, in one word, should we have to say but\nthis: 'We know of old that God was so wise that he could make all things;\nbut, behold, he is so much wiser than even that, that he can make all\nthings make themselves?' \"\n\n\n\nCHARLES DARWIN: A SKETCH\n\n(Nature, June 4, 1874, accompanying a portrait)\n\n\nTwo British naturalists, Robert Brown and Charles Darwin, have, more than\nany others, impressed their influence upon science in this nineteenth\ncentury. Unlike as these men and their works were and are, we may most\nreadily subserve the present purpose in what we are called upon to say of\nthe latter by briefly comparing and contrasting the two.\n\nRobert Brown died sixteen years ago, full of years and scientific honors,\nand he seems to have finished, several years earlier, all the scientific\nwork that he had undertaken. To the other, Charles Darwin, a fair number of\nproductive years may yet remain, and are earnestly hoped for. Both enjoyed\nthe great advantage of being all their lives long free from exacting\nprofessional duties or cares, and so were able in the main to apply\nthemselves to research without distraction and according to their bent.\nBoth, at the beginning of their career, were attached to expeditions of\nexploration in the southern hemisphere, where they amassed rich stores of\nobservation and materials, and probably struck out, while in the field,\nsome of the best ideas which they subsequently developed. They worked in\ndifferent fields and upon different methods; only in a single instance, so\nfar as we know, have they handled the same topic; and in this the more\npenetrating insight of the younger naturalist into an interesting general\nproblem may be appealed to in justification of a comparison which some will\ndeem presumptuous. Be this as it may, there will probably be little dissent\nfrom the opinion that the characteristic trait common to the two is an\nunrivaled scientific sagacity. In this these two naturalists seem to us,\neach in his way, preeminent. There is a characteristic likeness,\ntoo--underlying much difference--in their admirable manner of dealing with\nfacts closely, and at first hand, without the interposition of the formal\nlaws, vague ideal conceptions, or \"glittering generalities\" which some\nphilosophical naturalists make large use of.\n\nA likeness may also be discerned in the way in which the work or\ncontributions of predecessors and contemporaries are referred to. The brief\nhistorical summaries prefixed to many of Mr. Brown's papers are models of\njudicial conscientiousness. And Mr. Darwin's evident delight at discovering\nthat some one else has \"said his good things before him,\" or has been on\nthe verge of uttering them, seemingly equals that of making the discovery\nhimself. It reminds one of Goethe's insisting that his views in morphology\nmust have been held before him and must be somewhere on record, so obvious\ndid they appear to him.\n\nConsidering the quiet and retired lives led by both these men, and the\nprominent place they are likely to occupy in the history of science, the\ncontrast between them as to contemporary and popular fame is very\nremarkable. While Mr. Brown was looked up to with the greatest reverence by\nall the learned botanists, he was scarcely heard of by any one else; and\nout of botany he was unknown to science except as the discoverer of the\nBrownian motion of minute particles, which discovery was promulgated in a\nprivately-printed pamphlet that few have ever seen. Although Mr. Darwin had\nbeen for twenty years well and widely known for his \"Naturalist's Journal,\"\nhis works on \"Coral Islands,\" on \"Volcanic Islands, and especially for his\nresearches on the Barnacles, it was not till about fifteen years ago that\nhis name became popularly famous. Ever since no scientific name has been so\nwidely spoken. Many others have had hypotheses or systems named after them,\nbut no one else that we know of a department of bibliography. The nature of\nhis latest researches accounts for most of the difference, but not for all,\nThe Origin of Species is a fascinating topic, having interests and\nconnections with every branch of science, natural and moral. The\ninvestigation of recondite affinities is very dry and special; its\nquestions, processes, and results alike--although in part generally\npresentable in the shape of morphology--are mainly, like the higher\nmathematics, unintelligible except to those who make them a subject of\nserious study. They are especially so when presented in Mr. Brown's manner.\nPerhaps no naturalist ever recorded the results of his investigations in\nfewer words and with greater precision than Robert Brown: certainly no one\never took more pains to state nothing beyond the precise point in question.\nIndeed, we have sometimes fancied that he preferred to enwrap rather than to\nexplain his meaning; to put it into such a form that, unless you follow\nSolomon's injunction and dig for the wisdom as for hid treasure, you may\nhardly apprehend it until you have found it all out for yourself, when you\nwill have the satisfaction of perceiving that Mr. Brown not only knew all\nabout it, but had put it upon record. Very different from this is the way\nin which Mr. Darwin takes his readers into his confidence, freely displays\nto them the sources of his information, and the working of his mind, and\neven shares with them all his doubts and misgivings, while in a clear\nexposition he sets forth the reasons which have guided him to his\nconclusions. These you may hesitate or decline to adopt, but you feel sure\nthat they have been presented with perfect fairness; and if you think of\narguments against them you may be confident that they have all been duly\nconsidered before.\n\nThe sagacity which characterizes these two naturalists is seen in their\nsuccess in finding decisive instances, and their sure insight into the\nmeaning of things. As an instance of the latter on Mr. Darwin's part, and a\njustification of our venture to compare him with the facile princeps\nbotanicorum, we will, in conclusion, allude to the single instance in which\nthey took the same subject in hand. In his papers on the organs and modes\nof fecundation in Orchideae and Asclepiadeae, Mr. Brown refers more than\nonce to C.K. Sprengel's almost forgotten work, shows how the structure of\nthe flowers in these orders largely requires the agency of insects for\ntheir fecundation, and is aware that \"in Asclepiadeae . . . the insect so\nreadily passes from one corolla to another that it not unfrequently visits\nevery flower of the umbel.\" He must also have contemplated the transport of\npollen from plant to plant by wind and insects; and we know from another\nsource that he looked upon Sprengel's ideas as far from fantastic. Yet,\ninstead of taking the single forward step which now seems so obvious, he\neven hazarded the conjecture that the insect-forms of some orchideous\nflowers are intended to deter rather than to attract insects. And so the\nexplanation of all these and other extraordinary structures, as well as of\nthe arrangement of blossoms in general, and even the very meaning and need\nof sexual propagation, were left to be supplied by Mr. Darwin. The aphorism\n\"Nature abhors a vacuum\" is a characteristic specimen of the science of the\nmiddle ages. The aphorism \"Nature abhors close fertilization,\" and the\ndemonstration of the principle, belong to our age, and to Mr. Darwin. To\nhave originated this, and also the principle of natural selection--the\ntruthfulness and importance of which are evident the moment it is\napprehended--and to have applied these principles to the system of Nature in\nsuch a manner as to make, within a dozen years, a deeper impression upon\nnatural history than has been made since Linnaeus, is ample title for one\nman's fame.\n\nThere is no need of our giving any account or of estimating the importance\nof such works as the \"Origin of Species by means of Natural Selection,\" the\n\"Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication,\" the \"Descent of Man,\nand Selection in Relation to Sex,\" and the \"Expression of the Emotions in\nMen and Animals\"--a series to which we may hope other volumes may in due\ntime be added. We would rather, if space permitted, attempt an analysis of\nthe less known, but not less masterly, subsidiary essays, upon the various\narrangements for insuring cross-fertilization in flowers, for the climbing\nof plants, and the like. These, as we have heard, may before long be\nreprinted in a volume, and supplemented by some long-pending but still\nunfinished investigations upon the action of Dionaea and Drosera--a capital\nsubject for Mr. Darwin's handling.\n\nA propos to these papers, which furnish excellent illustrations of it, let\nus recognize Darwin's great service to natural science in bringing back to\nit Teleology; so that, instead of Morphology versus Teleology, we shall\nhave Morphology wedded to Teleology. To many, no doubt, evolutionary\nTeleology comes in such a questionable shape as to seem shorn of all its\ngoodness; but they will think better of it in time, when their ideas become\nadjusted, and they see what an impetus the new doctrines have given to\ninvestigation. They are much mistaken who suppose that Darwinism is only of\nspeculative importance, and perhaps transient interest. In its working\napplications it has proved to be a new power, eminently practical and\nfruitful.\n\nAnd here, again, we are bound to note a striking contrast to Mr. Brown,\ngreatly as we revere his memory. He did far less work than was justly to be\nexpected from him. Mr. Darwin not only points out the road, but labors upon\nit indefatigably and unceasingly. A most commendable noblesse oblige\nassures us that he will go on while strength (would we could add health)\nremains. The vast amount of such work he has already accomplished might\novertax the powers of the strongest. That it could have been done at all\nunder constant infirm health is most wonderful.\n\n\n\nX\n\nINSECTIVOROUS PLANTS\n\n(The Nation, April 2 and 9, 1874)\n\n\n\nThat animals should feed upon plants is natural and normal, and the reverse\nseems impossible. But the adage, \"Natura non agit saltatim,\" has its\napplication even here. It is the naturalist, rather than Nature, that draws\nhard and fast lines everywhere, and marks out abrupt boundaries where she\nshades off with gradations. However opposite the parts which animals and\nvegetables play in the economy of the world as the two opposed kingdoms of\norganic Nature, it is becoming more and more obvious that they are not only\ntwo contiguous kingdoms, but are parts of one whole--antithetical and\ncomplementary to each other, indeed; but such \"thin partitions do the\nbounds divide\" that no definitions yet framed hold good without exception.\nThis is a world of transition in more senses than is commonly thought; and\none of the lessons which the philosophical naturalist learns, or has to\nlearn, is, that differences the most wide and real in the main, and the most\nessential, may nevertheless be here and there connected or bridged over by\ngradations. There is a limbo filled with organisms which never rise high\nenough in the scale to be manifestly either animal or plant, unless it may\nbe said of some of them that they are each in turn and neither long. There\nare undoubted animals which produce the essential material of vegetable\nfabric, or build up a part of their structure of it, or elaborate the\ncharacteristic leaf-green which, under solar light, assimilates inorganic\ninto organic matter, the most distinguishing function of vegetation. On the\nother hand, there are plants--microscopic, indeed, but\nunquestionable--which move spontaneously and freely around and among\nanimals that are fixed and rooted. And, to come without further parley to\nthe matter in hand, while the majority of animals feed directly upon plants,\n\"for 'tis their nature to,\" there are plants which turn the tables and feed\nupon them. Some, being parasitic upon living animals, feed insidiously and\nfurtively; these, although really cases in point, are not so extraordinary,\nand, as they belong to the lower orders, they are not much regarded, except\nfor the harm they do. There are others, and those of the highest orders,\nwhich lure or entrap animals in ways which may well excite our special\nwonder--all the more so since we are now led to conclude that they not only\ncapture but consume their prey.\n\nAs respects the two or three most notable instances, the conclusions which\nhave been reached are among the very recent acquisitions of physiological\nscience. Curiously enough, however, now that they are made out, it appears\nthat they were in good part long ago attained, recorded, and mainly\nforgotten. The earlier observations and surmises shared the common fate of\ndiscoveries made before the time, or by those who were not sagacious enough\nto bring out their full meaning or importance. Vegetable morphology, dimly\napprehended by Linnaeus, initiated by Casper Frederick Wolff, and again,\nindependently in successive generations, by Goethe and by De Candolle,\noffers a parallel instance. The botanists of Goethe's day could not see any\nsense, advantage, or practical application, to be made of the proposition\nthat the parts of a blossom answer to leaves; and so the study of\nhomologies had long to wait. Until lately it appeared to be of no\nconsequence whatever (except, perhaps, to the insects) whether Drosera and\nSarracenia caught flies or not; and even Dionaea excited only unreflecting\nwonder as a vegetable anomaly. As if there were real anomalies in Nature,\nand some one plant possessed extraordinary powers denied to all others, and\n(as was supposed) of no importance to itself!\n\nThat most expert of fly-catchers, Dionaea, of which so much has been\nwritten and so little known until lately, came very near revealing its\nsecret to Solander and Ellis a hundred years ago, and doubtless to John\nBartram, our botanical pioneer, its C probable discoverer, who sent it to\nEurope. Ellis, in his published letter to Linnaeus, with which the history\nbegins, described the structure and action of the living trap correctly;\nnoticed that the irritability which called forth the quick movement closing\nthe trap, entirely resided in the few small bristles of its upper face;\nthat this whole surface was studded C with glands, which probably secreted\na liquid; and that the trap did not open again when an insect was captured,\neven upon the death of the captive, although it opened very soon when\nnothing was caught, or when the irritation was caused by a bit of straw, or\nany such substance. It was Linnaeus who originated the contrary and\nerroneous statement, which has long prevailed in the books, that the trap\nreopened when the fatigued captive became quiet, and let it go; as if the\nplant caught flies in mere play and pastime! Linnaeus also omitted all\nallusion to a secreted liquid--which was justifiable, as. Ellis does not\nstate that he had actually seen any; and, if he did see it, quite mistook\nits use, supposing it to be, like the nectar of flowers, a lure for\ninsects, a bait for the trap. Whereas, in fact, the lure, if there be any,\nmust be an odor (although nothing is perceptible to the human olfactories);\nfor the liquid secreted by the glands never appears until the trap has\nclosed upon some insect, and held it at least for some hours a prisoner.\nWithin twenty-four or forty-eight hours this glairy liquid is abundant,\nbathing and macerating the body of the perished insect. Its analogue is not\nthe nectar of flowers, but the saliva or the gastric juice!\n\nThe observations which compel such an inference are re-cent, and the\nsubstance of them may be briefly stated. The late Rev. Dr. M. A. Curtis (by\nwhose death, two years ago, we lost one of our best botanists, and the\nmaster in his especial line, mycology), forty years and more ago resided at\nWilmington, North Carolina, in the midst of the only district to which the\nDionaea is native; and he published, in 1834, in the first volume of the\n\"Journal of the Boston Society of Natural History,\" by far the best account\nof this singular plant which had then appeared. He remarks that \"the little\nprisoner is not crushed and suddenly destroyed, as is sometimes supposed,\"\nfor he had often liberated \"captive flies and spiders, which sped away as\nfast as fear or joy could hasten them.\" But he neglected to state, although\nhe must have noticed the fact, that the two sides of the trap, at first\nconcave to the contained insect, at length flatten and close down firmly\nupon the prey, exerting no inconsiderable pressure, and insuring the death\nof any soft-bodied insect, if it had not already succumbed to the\nconfinement and salivation. This last Dr. Curtis noticed, and first\ndiscerned its import, although he hesitated to pronounce upon its\nuniversality. That the captured insects were in some way \"made subservient\nto the nourishment of the plant\" had been conjectured from the first. Dr.\nCurtis \"at times (and he might have always at the proper time) found them\nenveloped in a fluid of mucilaginous consistence, which seems to act as a\nsolvent, the insects being more or less consumed in it.\" This was verified\nand the digestive character of the liquid well-nigh demonstrated six or\nseven years ago by Mr. Canby, of Wilmington, Delaware, who, upon a visit to\nthe sister-town of North Carolina, and afterward at his home, followed up\nDr. Curtis's suggestions with some capital observations and experiments.\nThese were published at Philadelphia in the tenth volume of Meehan's\nGardeners' Monthly, August, i868; but they do not appear to have attracted\nthe attention which they merited.\n\nThe points which Mr. Canby made out are, that this fluid is always poured\nout around the captured insect in due time, \"if the leaf is in good\ncondition and the prey suitable;\" that it comes from the leaf itself, and\nnot from the decomposing insect (for, when the trap caught a plum-curculio,\nthe fluid was poured out while he was still alive, though very weak, and\nendeavoring, ineffectively, to eat his way out); that bits of raw beef,\nalthough sometimes rejected after a while, were generally acted upon in the\nsame manner--i.e., closed down upon tightly, salvered with the liquid,\ndissolved mainly, and absorbed; so that, in fine, the fluid may well be\nsaid to be analogous to the gastric juice of animals, dissolving the prey\nand rendering it fit for absorption by the leaf. Many leaves remain\ninactive or slowly die away after one meal; others reopen for a second and\nperhaps even a third capture, and are at least capable of digesting a second\nmeal.\n\nBefore Mr. Canby's experiments had been made, we were aware that a similar\nseries had been made in England by Mr. Darwin, with the same results, and\nwith a small but highly-curious additional one--namely, that the fluid\nsecreted in the trap of Dionaea, like the gastric juice, has an acid\nreaction. Having begun to mention unpublished results (too long allowed to\nremain so), it may be well, under the circumstances, to refer to a still\nmore remarkable experiment by the same most sagacious investigator. By a\nprick with a sharp lancet at a certain point, he has been able to paralyze\none-half of the leaf-trap, so that it remained motionless under the\nstimulus to which the other half responded. Such high and sensitive\norganization entails corresponding ailments. Mr. Canby tells us that he\ngave to one of his Dionaea-subjects a fatal dyspepsia by feeding it with\ncheese; and under Mr. Darwin's hands another suffers from paraplegia.\n\nFinally, Dr. Burdon-Sanderson's experiments, detailed at the last meeting\nof the British Association for the Advancement of Science, show that the\nsame electrical currents are developed upon the closing of the Dionaea-trap\nas in the contraction of a muscle.\n\nIf the Venus's Fly-trap stood alone, it would be doubly marvelous--first,\non account of its carnivorous propensities, and then as constituting a real\nanomaly in organic Nature, to which nothing leads up. Before acquiescing in\nsuch a conclusion, the modern naturalist would scrutinize its relatives.\nNow, the nearest relatives of our vegetable wonder are the sundews.\n\nWhile Dionaea is as local in habitation as it is singular in structure and\nhabits, the Droseras or sundews are widely diffused over the world and\nnumerous in species. The two whose captivating habits have attracted\nattention abound in bogs all around the northern hemisphere. That flies are\ncaught by them is a matter of common observation; but this was thought to\nbe purely accidental. They spread out from the root a circle of small\nleaves, the upper face of which especially is beset and the margin fringed\nwith stout bristles (or what seem to be such, although the structure is more\ncomplex), tipped by a secreting gland, which produces, while in vigorous\nstate, a globule of clear liquid like a drop of dew-- whence the name, both\nGreek and English. One expects these seeming dew-drops to be dissipated by\nthe morning sun; but they remain unaffected. A touch shows that the\nglistening drops are glutinous and extremely tenacious, as flies learn to\ntheir cost on alighting, perhaps to sip the tempting liquid, which acts\nfirst as a decoy and then like birdlime. A small fly is held so fast, and\nin its struggles comes in contact with so many of these glutinous globules,\nthat it seldom escapes.\n\nThe result is much the same to the insect, whether captured in the trap of\nDionaea or stuck fast to the limed bristles of Drosera. As there are various\nplants upon whose glandular hairs or glutinous surfaces small insects are\nhabitually caught and perish, it might be pure coincidence that the most\neffectual arrangement of the kind happens to occur in the nearest relatives\nof Dionaea. Roth, a keen German botanist of the eighteenth century, was the\nfirst to detect, or at least to record, some evidence of intention in\nDrosera, and to compare its action with that of Dionaea, which, through\nEllis's account, had shortly before been made known in Europe. He noticed\nthe telling fact that not only the bristles which the unfortunate insect\nhad come in contact with, but also the surrounding rows, before widely\nspreading, curved inward one by one, although they had not been touched, so\nas within a few hours to press their glutinous tips likewise against the\nbody of the captive insect--thus doubling or quadrupling the bonds of the\nvictim and (as we may now suspect) the surfaces through which some part of\nthe animal substance may be imbibed. For Roth surmised that both these\nplants were, in their way, predaceous. He even observed that the disk of\nthe Drosera-leaf itself often became concave and enveloped the prey. These\nfacts, although mentioned now and then in some succeeding works, were\ngenerally forgotten, except that of the adhesion of small insects to the\nleaves of sundews, which must have been observed in every generation. Up to\nand even within a few years past, if any reference was made to these\nasserted movements (as by such eminent physiologists as Meyen and\nTreviranus) it was to discredit them. Not because they are difficult to\nverify, but because, being naturally thought improbable, it was easier to\ndeny or ignore them. So completely had the knowledge of almost a century\nago died out in later years that, when the subject was taken up anew in our\ndays by Mr. Darwin, he had, as we remember, to advertise for it, by sending\na \"note and query\" to the magazines, asking where any account of the\nfly-catching of the leaves of sundew was recorded.\n\nWhen Mr. Darwin takes a matter of this sort in hand, he is not likely to\nleave it where he found it. He not only confirmed all Roth's observations\nas to the incurving of the bristles toward and upon an insect entangled on\nany part of the disk of the leaf, but also found that they responded\nsimilarly to a bit of muscle or other animal substance, while to any\nparticles of inorganic matter they were nearly indifferent. To minute\nfragments of carbonate of ammonia, however, they were more responsive. As\nthese remarkable results, attained (as we are able to attest) half a dozen\nyears ago, remained unpublished (being portions of an investigation not yet\ncompleted), it would have been hardly proper to mention them, were it not\nthat independent observers were beginning to bring out the same or similar\nfacts. Mrs. Treat, of New Jersey, noticed the habitual infolding of the\nleaf in the longer-leaved species of sundew (American Journal of Science\nfor November, 1871), as was then thought for the first time--Roth's and\nWithering's observations not having been looked up. In recording this, the\nnext year, in a very little book, entitled \"How Plants Behave,\" the\nopportunity was taken to mention, in the briefest way, the capital\ndiscovery of Mr. Darwin that the leaves of Drosera act differently when\ndifferent objects are placed upon them, the bristles closing upon a\nparticle of raw meat as upon a living insect, while to a particle of chalk\nor wood they are nearly inactive. The same facts were independently brought\nout by Mr. A. W. Bennett at the last year's meeting of the British\nAssociation for the Advancement of Science, and have been mentioned in the\njournals.\n\nIf to these statements, which we may certify, were added some far more\nextraordinary ones, communicated to the French Academy of Science in May\nlast by M. Zeigler, a stranger story of discrimination on the part of\nsundew-bristles would be told. But it is safer to wait for the report of\nthe committee to which these marvels were referred, and conclude this\nsufficiently \"strange eventful history\" with some details of experiments\nmade last summer by Mrs. Treat, of New Jersey, and published in the December\nnumber of the American Naturalist. It is well to note that Mrs. Treat\nselects for publication the observations of one particular day in July,\nwhen the sundew-leaves were unusually active; for their moods vary with\nthe weather, and also in other unaccountable ways, although in general the\nsultrier days are the most appetizing:\n\n\n\"At fifteen minutes past ten of the same day I placed bits of raw beef on\nsome of the most vigorous leaves of Drosera longifolia. Ten minutes past\ntwelve, two of the leaves had folded around the beef, hiding it from sight.\nHalf-past eleven of the same day, I placed living flies on the leaves of D.\nlongifolia. At 12 and 48 minutes one of the leaves had folded entirely\naround its victim, the other leaves had partially folded, and the flies had\nceased to struggle. By 2 and 30 minutes four leaves had each folded around\na fly. . . . I tried mineral substances--bits of dry chalk, magnesia, and\npebbles. In twenty-four hours, neither the leaves nor their bristles had\nmade any move like clasping these articles. I wet a piece of chalk in\nwater, and in less than an hour the bristles were curving about it, but\nsoon unfolded again, leaving the chalk free on the blade of the leaf.\nParallel experiments made on D. rotundifolia, with bits of beef and of\nchalk, gave the same results as to the action of the bristles; while with a\npiece of raw apple, after eleven hours, \"part of the bristles were clasping\nit, but not so closely as the beef,\" and in twenty-four hours \"nearly all\nthe bristles were curved toward it, but not many of the glands were\ntouching it.\"\n\n\nTo make such observations is as easy as it is interesting. Throughout the\nsummer one has only to transfer plants of Drosera from the bogs into pots\nor pans filled with wet moss--if need be, allowing them to become\nestablished in the somewhat changed conditions, or even to put out fresh\nleaves--and to watch their action or expedite it by placing small flies\nupon the disk of the leaves. The more common round-leaved sundew acts as\nwell as the other by its bristles, and the leaf itself is sometimes almost\nequally prehensile, although in a different way, infolding the whole border\ninstead of the summit only. Very curious, and even somewhat painful, is the\nsight when a fly, alighting upon the central dew-tipped bristles, is held\nas fast as by a spider's web; while the efforts to escape not only entangle\nthe insect more hopelessly as they exhaust its strength, but call into\naction the surrounding bristles, which, one by one, add to the number of the\nbonds, each by itself apparently feeble, but in their combination so\neffectual that the fly may be likened to the sleeping Gulliver made fast in\nthe tiny but multitudinous toils of the Liliputians. Anybody who can\nbelieve that such an apparatus was not intended to capture flies might say\nthe same of a spider's web.\n\nIs the intention here to be thought any the less real because there are\nother species of Drosera which are not so perfectly adapted for\nfly-catching, owing to the form of their leaves and the partial or total\nwant of cooperation of their scattered bristles? One such species, D.\nfiliformis, the thread-leaved sundew, is not uncommon in this country, both\nnorth and south of the district that Dionaea locally inhabits. Its leaves\nare long and thread-shaped, beset throughout with glutinous gland-tipped\nbristles, but wholly destitute of a blade. Flies, even large ones, and even\nmoths and butterflies, as Mrs. Treat and Mr. Canby affirm (in the American\nNaturalist), get stuck fast to these bristles, whence they seldom escape.\nAccidental as such captures are, even these thread-shaped leaves respond\nmore or less to the contact, somewhat in the manner of their brethren. In\nMr. Canby's recent and simple experiment, made at Mr. Darwin's suggestion,\nwhen a small fly alights upon a leaf a little below its slender apex, or\nwhen a bit of crushed fly is there affixed, within a few hours the tip of\nthe leaf bends at the point of contact, and curls over or around the body\nin question; and Mrs. Treat even found that when living flies were pinned\nat half an inch in distance from the leaves, these in forty minutes had\nbent their tips perceptibly toward the flies, and in less than two hours\nreached them! If this be confirmed--and such a statement needs ample\nconfirmation--then it may be suspected that these slender leaves not only\nincurve after prolonged contact, just as do the leaf-stalks of many\nclimbers, but also make free and independent circular sweeps, in the manner\nof twining stems and of many tendrils.\n\nCorrelated movements like these indicate purpose. When performed by\nclimbing plants, the object and the advantage are obvious. That the\napparatus and the actions of Dionaea and Drosera are purposeless and\nwithout advantage to the plants themselves, many have been believed in\nformer days, when it was likewise conceived that abortive and functionless\norgans were specially created \"for the sake of symmetry\" and to display a\nplan; but this is not according to the genius of modern science.\n\nIn the cases of insecticide next to be considered, such evidence of intent\nis wanting, but other and circumstantial evidence may be had, sufficient to\nwarrant convictions. Sarracenias have hollow leaves in the form of pitchers\nor trumpet-shaped tubes, containing water, in which flies and other insects\nare habitually drowned. They are all natives of the eastern side of North\nAmerica, growing in bogs or low ground, so that they cannot be supposed to\nneed the water as such. Indeed, they secrete a part if not all of it. The\ncommonest species, and the only one at the North, which ranges from\nNewfoundland to Florida, has a broad-mouthed pitcher with an upright lid,\ninto which rain must needs fall more or less. The yellow Sarracenia, with\nlong tubular leaves, called \"trumpets in the Southern States, has an\narching or partly upright lid, raised well above the orifice, so that some\nwater may rain in; but a portion is certainly secreted there, and may be\nseen bedewing the sides and collected at the bottom before the mouth opens.\nIn other species, the orifice is so completely overarched as essentially to\nprevent the access of water from without. In these tubes, mainly in the\nwater, flies and other insects accumulate, perish, and decompose. Flies\nthrown into the open-mouthed tube of the yellow Sarracenia, even when free\nfrom water, are unable to get out--one hardly sees why, except that they\ncannot fly directly upward; and microscopic chevaux-de-frise of fine,\nsharp-pointed bristles which line most of the interior, pointing strictly\ndownward, may be a more effectual obstacle to crawling up the sides than\none would think possible. On the inside of the lid or hood of the purple\nNorthern species, the bristles are much stronger; but an insect might\nescape by the front without encountering these. In this species, the\npitchers, however, are so well supplied with water that the insects which\nsomehow are most abundantly attracted thither are effectually drowned, and\nthe contents all summer long are in the condition of a rich liquid manure.\n\nThat the tubes or pitchers of the Southern species are equally attractive\nand fatal to flies is well known. Indeed, they are said to be taken into\nhouses and used as fly-traps. There is no perceptible odor to draw insects,\nexcept what arises from the decomposition of macerated victims; nor is any\nkind of lure to be detected at the mouth of the pitcher of the common\npurple-flowered species. Some incredulity was therefore natural when it was\nstated by a Carolinian correspondent (Mr. B.F. Grady) that in the\nlong-leaved, yellow-flowered species the lid just above the mouth of the\ntubular pitcher habitually secretes drops of a sweet and viscid liquid,\nwhich attracts flies and apparently intoxicates them, since those that sip\nit soon become unsteady in gait and mostly fall irretrievably into the well\nbeneath. But upon cultivating plants of this species, obtained for the\npurpose, the existence of this lure was abundantly verified; and, although\nwe cannot vouch for its inebriating quality, we can no longer regard it as\nunlikely.\n\nNo sooner was it thus ascertained that at least one species of Sarracenia\nallures flies to their ruin than it began to appear that--just as in the\ncase of Drosera--most of this was a mere revival of obsolete knowledge. The\n\"insect-destroying process\" was known and well described sixty years ago,\nthe part played by the sweet exudation indicated, and even the intoxication\nperhaps hinted at, although evidently little thought of in those\nante-temperance days. Dr. James Macbride, of South Carolina--the early\nassociate of Elliott in his \"Botany of South Carolina and Georgia,\" and to\nwhose death, at the age of thirty-three, cutting short a life of remarkable\npromise, the latter touchingly alludes in the preface to his second\nvolume--sent to Sir James Edward Smith an account of his observations upon\nthis subject, made in 1810 and the following years. This was read to the\nLinnaean Society in 1815, and published in the twelfth volume of its\n\"Transactions.\" From this forgotten paper (to which attention has lately\nbeen recalled) we cull the following extracts, premising that the\nobservations mostly relate to a third species, Sarracenia adunca, alias\nvariolaris, which is said to be the most efficient fly-catcher of the kind:\n\n\n\"If, in the months of May, June, or July, when the leaves of those plants\nperform their extraordinary functions in the greatest perfection, some of\nthem be removed to a house and fixed in an erect position, it will soon be\nperceived that flies are attracted by them. These insects immediately\napproach the fauces of the leaves, and, leaning over their edges, appear to\nsip with eagerness something from their internal surfaces. In this position\nthey linger; but at length, allured as it would seem by the pleasure of\ntaste, they enter the tubes. The fly which has thus changed its situation\nwill be seen to stand unsteadily; it totters for a few seconds, slips, and\nfalls to the bottom of the tube, where it is either drowned or attempts in\nvain to ascend against the points of the hairs. The fly seldom takes wing\nin its fall and escapes. . . . in a house much infested with flies, this\nentrapment goes on so rapidly that a tube is filled in a few hours, and it\nbecomes necessary to add water, the natural quantity being insufficient to\ndrown the imprisoned insects. The leaves of S. adunca and rubra might well\nbe employed as fly-catchers; indeed, I am credibly informed they are in\nsome neighborhoods. The leaves of the S. flava [the species to which our\nforegoing remarks mainly relate], although they are very capacious, and\noften grow to the height of three feet or more, are never found to contain\nso many insects as those of the species above mentioned.\n\n\"The cause which attracts flies is evidently a sweet, viscid substance\nresembling honey, secreted by or exuding from the internal surface of the\ntube . . . From the margin, where it commences, it does not extend lower\nthan one-fourth of an inch.\n\n\"The falling of the insect as soon as it enters the tube is wholly\nattributable to the downward or inverted position of the hairs of the\ninternal surface of the leaf. At the bottom of a tube split open, the hairs\nare plainly discernible pointing downward; as the eye ranges upward, they\ngradually become shorter and attenuated, till at or just below the surface\ncovered by the bait they are no longer perceptible to the naked eye nor to\nthe most delicate touch. It is here that the fly cannot take a hold\nsufficiently strong to support itself, but falls. The in. ability of\ninsects to crawl up against the points of the hairs I have often tested in\nthe most satisfactory manner.\"\n\n\nFrom the last paragraph it may be inferred that Dr. Macbride did not\nsuspect any inebriating property in the nectar, and in a closing note there\nis a conjecture of an impalpable loose powder in S. flava, at the place\nwhere the fly stands so unsteadily, and from which it is supposed to slide.\nWe incline to take Mr. Grady's view of the case.\n\nThe complete oblivion into which this paper and the whole subject had\nfallen is the more remarkable when it is seen that both are briefly but\nexplicitly referred to in Elliott's book, with which botanists are\nfamiliar.\n\nIt is not so wonderful that the far earlier allusion to these facts by the\nyounger Bartram should have been overlooked or disregarded. With the genuine\nlove of Nature and fondness for exploration, 'William Bartram did not\ninherit the simplicity of his father, the earliest native botanist of this\ncountry. Fine writing was his foible; and the preface to his well-known\n\"Travels\" (published at Philadelphia in 1791) is its full-blown\nillustration, sometimes perhaps deserving the epithet which he applies to\nthe palms of Florida--that of pomposity. In this preface he declares that\n\"all the Sarracenias are insect-catchers, and so is the Drosera\nrotundifolia. Whether the insects caught in their leaves, and which\ndissolve and mix with the fluid, serve for aliment or support to these kind\nof plants is doubtful,\" he thinks, but he should be credited with the\nsuggestion. In one sentence he speaks of the quantities of insects which,\n\"being invited down to sip the mellifluous exuvia from the interior surface\nof the tube, where they inevitably perish,\" being prevented from returning\nby the stiff hairs all pointing downward. This, if it refers to the sweet\nsecretion, would place it below, and not, as it is, above the bristly\nsurface, while the liquid below, charged with decomposing insects, is\ndeclared in an earlier sentence to be \"cool and animating, limpid as the\nmorning dew.\" Bartram was evidently writing from memory; and it is very\ndoubtful if he ever distinctly recognized the sweet exudation which entices\ninsects.\n\nWhy should these plants take to organic food more than others? If we cannot\nanswer the question, we may make a probable step toward it. For plants that\nare not parasitic, these, especially the sundews, have much less than the\nordinary amount of chlorophyll--that is, of the universal leaf-green upon\nwhich the formation of organic matter out of inorganic materials depends.\nThese take it instead of making it, to a certain extent.\n\nWhat is the bearing of these remarkable adaptations and operations upon\ndoctrines of evolution? There seems here to be a field on which the\nspecific creationist, the evolutionist with design, and the necessary\nevolutionist, may fight out an interesting, if not decisive, \"triangular\nduel.\"\n\n\n\nXI\n\nINSECTIVOROUS AND\n\nCLIMBING PLANTS [XI-1]\n\n(The Nation, January 6 and 13, 1876)\n\n\n\"Minerals grow; vegetables grow and live; animals grow, live, and feel;\"\nthis is the well-worn, not to say out-worn, diagnosis of the three kingdoms\nby Linnaeus. It must be said of it that the agreement indicated in the\nfirst couplet is unreal, and that the distinction declared in the second is\nevanescent. Crystals do not grow at all in the sense that plants and\nanimals grow. On the other hand, if a response to external impressions by\nspecial movements is evidence of feeling, vegetables share this endowment\nwith animals; while, if conscious feeling is meant, this can be affirmed\nonly of the higher animals. What appears to remain true is, that the\ndifference is one of successive addition. That the increment in the organic\nworld is of many steps; that in the long series no absolute lines separate,\nor have always separated, organisms which barely respond to impressions\nfrom those which more actively and variously respond, and even from those\nthat consciously so respond--this, as we all know, is what the author of the\nworks before us has undertaken to demonstrate. Without reference here either\nto that part of the series with which man is connected, and in some sense\nor other forms a part of, or to that lower limbo where the two organic\nkingdoms apparently merge--or whence, in evolutionary phrase, they have\nemerged--Mr. Darwin, in the present volumes, directs our attention to the\nbehavior of the highest plants alone. He shows that some (and he might add\nthat all) of them execute movements for their own advantage, and that some\ncapture and digest living prey. When plants are seen to move and to devour,\nwhat faculties are left that are distinctively animal?\n\nAs to insectivorous or otherwise carnivorous plants, we have so recently\nhere discussed this subject--before it attained to all this new\npopularity--that a brief account of Mr. Darwin's investigation may\nsuffice.[XI-2] It is full of interest as a physiological research, and is a\nmodel of its kind, as well for the simplicity and directness of the means\nemployed as for the clearness with which the results are brought\nout--results which any one may verify now that the way to them is pointed\nout, and which, surprising as they are, lose half their wonder in the ease\nand sureness with which they seem to have been reached.\n\nRather more than half the volume is devoted to one subject, the\nround-leaved sundew (Drosera rotundifolia), a rather common plant in the\nnorthern temperate zone. That flies stick fast to its leaves, being limed\nby the tenacious seeming dew-drops which stud its upper face and margins,\nhad long been noticed in Europe and in this country. We have heard hunters\nand explorers in our Northern woods refer with satisfaction to the fate\nwhich in this way often befalls one of their plagues, the black fly of early\nsummer. And it was known to some observant botanists in the last century,\nalthough forgotten or discredited in this, that an insect caught on the\nviscid glands it has happened to alight upon is soon fixed by many\nmore--not merely in consequence of its struggles, but by the spontaneous\nincurvation of the stalks of surrounding and untouched glands; and even the\nbody of the leaf had been observed to incurve or become cup-shaped so as\npartly to involve the captive insect.\n\nMr. Darwin's peculiar investigations not only confirm all this, but add\ngreater wonders. They relate to the sensitiveness of these tentacles, as he\nprefers to call them, and the mode in which it is manifested; their power\nof absorption; their astonishing discernment of the presence of animal or\nother soluble azotized matter, even in quantities so minute as to rival the\nspectroscope--that most exquisite instrument of modern research--in\ndelicacy; and, finally, they establish the fact of a true digestion, in all\nessential respects similar to that of the stomach of animals.\n\nFirst as to sensitiveness and movement. Sensitiveness is manifested by\nmovement or change of form in response to an external impression. The\nsensitiveness in the sundew is all in the gland which surmounts the\ntentacle. To incite movement or other action, it is necessary that the\ngland itself should be reached. Anything laid on the surface of the viscid\ndrop, the spherule of clear, glairy liquid which it secretes, produces no\neffect unless it sinks through to the gland; or unless the substance is\nsoluble and reaches it in solution, which, in the case of certain\nsubstances, has the same effect. But the glands themselves do not move, nor\ndoes any neighboring portion of the tentacle. The outer and longer\ntentacles bend inward (toward the centre of the leaf) promptly, when the\ngland is irritated or stimulated, sweeping through an arc of 1800 or less,\nor more--the quickness and the extent of the inflection depending, in\nequally vigorous leaves, upon the amount of irritation or stimulation, and\nalso upon its kind. A tentacle with a particle of raw meat on its gland\nsometimes visibly begins to bend in ten seconds, becomes strongly incurved\nin five minutes, and its tip reaches the centre of the leaf in half an\nhour; but this is a case of extreme rapidity. A particle of cinder, chalk,\nor sand, will also incite the bending, if actually brought in contact with\nthe gland, not merely resting on the drop; but the inflection is then much\nless pronounced and more transient. Even a bit of thin human hair, only\n1/8000 of an inch in length, weighing only the 1/78740 of a grain, and\nlargely supported by the viscid secretion, suffices to induce movement;\nbut, on the other hand, one or two momentary, although rude, touches with a\nhard object produce no effect, although a repeated touch or the slightest\npressure, such as that of a gnat's foot, prolonged for a short time, causes\nbending. The seat of the movement is wholly or nearly confined to a portion\nof the lower part of the tentacle, above the base, where local irritation\nproduces not the slightest effect. The movement takes place only in\nresponse to some impression made upon its own gland at the distant\nextremity, or upon other glands far more remote. For if one of these members\nsuffers irritation the others sympathize with it. Very noteworthy is the\ncorrelation between the central tentacles, upon which an insect is most\nlikely to alight, and these external and larger ones, which, in proportion\nto their distance from the centre, take the larger share in the movement.\nThe shorter central ones do not move at all when a bit of meat, or a\ncrushed fly, or a particle of a salt of ammonia, or the like, is placed upon\nthem; but they transmit their excitation across the leaf to the surrounding\ntentacles on all sides; and they, although absolutely untouched, as they\nsuccessively receive the mysterious impulse, bend strongly inward, just as\nthey do when their own glands are excited. Whenever a tentacle bends in\nobedience to an impulse from its own gland, the movement is always toward\nthe centre of the leaf; and this also takes place, as we have seen, when an\nexciting object is lodged at the centre. But when the object is placed upon\neither half of the leaf, the impulse radiating thence causes all the\nsurrounding untouched tentacles to bend with precision toward the point of\nexcitement, even the central tentacles, which are motionless when\nthemselves charged, now responding to the call. The inflection which\nfollows mechanical irritation or the presence of any inorganic or insoluble\nbody is transient; that which follows the application of organic matter\nlasts longer, more or less, according to its nature and the amount; but\nsooner or later the tentacles resume their former position, their glands\nglisten anew with fresh secretion, and they are ready to act again.\n\nAs to how the impulse is originated and propagated, and how the movements\nare made, comparatively simple as the structure is, we know as little as we\ndo of the nature of nervous impulse and muscular motion. But two things Mr.\nDarwin has wellnigh made out, both of them by means and observations so\nsimple and direct as to command our confidence, although they are contrary\nto the prevalent teaching. First, the transmission is through the ordinary\ncellular tissue, and not through what are called the fibrous or vascular\nbundles. Second, the movement is a vital one, and is effected by contraction\non the side toward which the bending takes place, rather than by turgescent\ntension of the opposite side. The tentacle is pulled over rather than\npushed over. So far all accords with muscular action.\n\nThe operation of this fly-catching apparatus, in any case, is plain. If the\ninsect alights upon the disk of the leaf, the viscid secretion holds it\nfast--at least, an ordinary fly is unable to escape--its struggles only\nincrease the number of glands involved and the amount of excitement; this\nis telegraphed to the surrounding and successively longer tentacles, which\nbent over in succession, so that within ten to thirty hours, if the leaf is\nactive and the fly large enough, every one of the glands (on the average,\nnearly two hundred in number) will be found applied to the body of the\ninsect. If the insect is small, and the lodgment toward one side, only the\nneighboring tentacles may take part in the capture. If two or three of the\nstrong marginal tentacles are first encountered, their prompt inflection\ncarries the intruder to the centre, and presses it down upon the glands\nwhich thickly pave the floor; these notify all the surrounding tentacles of\nthe capture, that they may share the spoil, and the fate of that victim is\neven as of the first. A bit of meat or a crushed insect is treated in the\nsame way.\n\nThis language implies that the animal matter is in some way or other\ndiscerned by the tentacles, and is appropriated. Formerly there was only a\npresumption of this, on the general ground that such an organization could\nhardly be purposeless. Yet, while such expressions were natural, if not\nunavoidable, they generally were used by those familiar with the facts in a\nhalf-serious, half-metaphorical sense. Thanks to Mr. Darwin's\ninvestigations, they may now be used in simplicity and seriousness.\n\nThat the glands secrete the glairy liquid of the drop is evident, not only\nfrom its nature, but from its persistence through a whole day's exposure to\na summer sun, as also from its renewal after it has been removed, dried up,\nor absorbed. That they absorb as well as secrete, and that the whole\ntentacle may be profoundly affected thereby, are proved by the different\neffects, in kind and degree, which follow the application of different\nsubstances. Drops of rain-water, like single momentary touches of a solid\nbody, produce no effect, as indeed they could be of no advantage; but a\nlittle carbonate of ammonia in the water, or an infusion of meat, not only\ncauses inflection, but promptly manifests its action upon the contents of\nthe cells of which the tentacle is constructed. These cells are\nsufficiently transparent to be viewed under the microscope without\ndissection or other interference; and the change which takes place in the\nfluid contents of these cells, when the gland above has been acted upon, is\noften visible through a weak lens, or sometimes even by the naked eye,\nalthough higher powers are required to discern what actually takes place.\nThis change, which Mr. Darwin discovered, and turns to much account in his\nresearches, he terms \"aggregation of the protoplasm.\" When untouched and\nquiescent, the contents appear as an homogeneous purple fluid. When the\ngland is acted upon, minute purple particles appear, suspended in the now\ncolorless or almost colorless fluid; and this change appears first in the\ncells next the gland, and then in those next beneath, traveling down the\nwhole length of the tentacle. When the action is slight, this appearance\ndoes not last long; the particles of \"aggregated protoplasm redissolved, the\nprocess of redissolution traveling upward from the base of the tentacle to\nthe gland in a reverse direction to that of the aggregation. Whenever the\naction is more prolonged or intense, as when a bit of meat or crushed fly,\nor a fitting solution, is left upon the gland, the aggregation proceeds\nfurther, so that the whole protoplasm of each cell condenses into one or\ntwo masses, or into a single mass which will often separate into two, which\nafterward reunite; indeed, they incessantly change their forms and\npositions, being never at rest, although their movements are rather slow.\nIn appearance and movements they are very like amoebae and the white\ncorpuscles of the blood. Their motion, along with the streaming movement of\nrotation in the layer of white granular protoplasm that flows along the\nwalls of the cell, under the high powers of the microscope \"presents a\nwonderful scene of vital activity.\" This continues while the tentacle is\ninflected or the gland fed by animal matter, but vanishes by dissolution\nwhen the work is over and the tentacle straightens. That absorption takes\nplace, and matter is conveyed from cell to cell, is well made out,\nespecially by the experiments with carbonate of ammonia. Nevertheless, this\naggregation is not dependent upon absorption, for it equally occurs from\nmechanical irritation of the gland, and always accompanies inflection,\nhowever caused, though it may take place without it. This is also apparent\nfrom the astonishingly minute quantity of certain substances which suffices\nto produce sensible inflection and aggregation--such, for instance, as the\n1/20000000 or even the 1/30000000 of a grain of phosphate or nitrate of\nammonia!\n\nBy varied experiments it was found that the nitrate of ammonia was more\npowerful than the carbonate, and the phosphate more powerful than the\nnitrate, this result being intelligible from the difference in the amount\nof nitrogen in the first two salts, and from the presence of phosphorus in\nthe third. There is nothing surprising in the absorption of such extremely\ndilute solutions by a gland. As our author remarks: \"All physiologists\nadmit that the roots of plants absorb the salts of ammonia brought to them\nby the rain; and fourteen gallons of rain-water contain a grain of ammonia;\ntherefore, only a little more than twice as much as in the weakest solution\nemployed by me. The fact which appears truly wonderful is that the\n1/20000000 of a grain of the phosphate of ammonia, including less than\n1/30000000 of efficient matter (if the water of crystallization is\ndeducted), when absorbed by a gland, should induce some change in it which\nleads to a motor impulse being transmitted down the whole length of the\ntentacle, causing its basal part to bend, often through an angle of 180\ndegrees.\" But odoriferous particles which act upon the nerves of animals\nmust be infinitely smaller, and by these a dog a quarter of a mile to the\nleeward of a deer perceives his presence by some change in the olfactory\nnerves transmitted through them to the brain.\n\nWhen Mr. Darwin obtained these results, fourteen years ago, he could claim\nfor Drosera a power and delicacy in the detection of minute quantities of a\nsubstance far beyond the resources of the most skillful chemist; but in a\nfoot-note he admits that \"now the spectroscope has altogether beaten\nDrosera; for, according to Bunsen and Kirchhoff, probably less than the\n1/200000000 of a grain of sodium can be thus detected.\"\n\nFinally, that this highly-sensitive and active living organism absorbs,\nwill not be doubted when it is proved to digest, that is, to dissolve\notherwise insoluble animal matter by the aid of special secretions. That it\ndoes this is now past doubting. In the first place, when the glands are\nexcited they pour forth an increased amount of the ropy secretion. This\noccurs directly when a bit of meat is laid upon the central glands; and the\ninfluence which they transmit to the long-stalked marginal glands causes\nthem, while incurving their tentacles, to secrete more copiously long\nbefore they have themselves touched anything. The primary fluid, secreted\nwithout excitation, does not of itself digest. But the secretion under\nexcitement changes in Nature and becomes acid. So, according to Schiff,\nmechanical irritation excites the glands of the stomach to secrete an acid.\nIn both this acid appears to be necessary to, but of itself insufficient\nfor, digestion. The requisite solvent, a kind of ferment called pepsin,\nwhich acts only in the presence of the acid, is poured forth by the glands\nof the stomach only after they have absorbed certain soluble nutritive\nsubstances of the food; then this pepsin promptly dissolves muscle,\nfibrine, coagulated albumen, cartilage, and the like. Similarly it appears\nthat Drosera-glands, after irritation by particles of glass, did not act\nupon little cubes of albumen. But when moistened with saliva, or replaced\nby bits of roast-meat or gelatine, or even cartilage, which supply some\nsoluble peptone-matter to initiate the process, these substances are\npromptly acted upon, and dissolved or digested; whence it is inferred that\nthe analogy with the stomach holds good throughout, and that a ferment\nsimilar to pepsin is poured out under the stimulus of some soluble animal\nmatter. But the direct evidence of this is furnished only by the related\ncarnivorous plant, Dionaea, from which the secretions, poured out when\ndigestion is about to begin, may be collected in quantity sufficient for\nchemical examination. In short, the experiments show \"that there is a\nremarkable accordance in the power of digestion between the gastric juice\nof animals, with its pepsin and hydrochloric acid, and the secretion of\nDrosera, with its ferment and acid belonging to the acetic series. We can,\ntherefore, hardly doubt that the ferment in both cases is closely similar,\nif not identically the same. That a plant and an animal should pour forth\nthe same, or nearly the same, complex secretion, adapted for the same\npurpose of digestion, is a new and wonderful fact in physiology.\"\n\nThere are one or two other species of sundew--one of them almost as common\nin Europe and North America as the ordinary round-leaved species--which act\nin the same way, except that, having their leaves longer in proportion to\ntheir breadth, their sides never curl inward, but they are much disposed to\naid the action of their tentacles by incurving the tip of the leaf, as if\nto grasp the morsel. There are many others, with variously less efficient\nand less advantageously arranged insectivorous apparatus, which, in the\nlanguage of the new science, may be either on the way to acquire something\nbetter, or of losing what they may have had, while now adapting themselves\nto a proper vegetable life. There is one member of the family (Drosophyllum\nLusitanicum), an almost shrubby plant, which grows on dry and sunny hills\nin Portugal and Morocco--which the villagers call \"the flycatcher,\" and\nhang up in their cottages for the purpose--the glandular tentacles of which\nhave wholly lost their powers of movement, if they ever had any, but which\nstill secrete, digest, and absorb, being roused to great activity by the\ncontact of any animal matter. A friend of ours once remarked that it was\nfearful to contemplate the amount of soul that could be called forth in a\ndog by the sight of a piece of meat. Equally wonderful is the avidity for\nanimal food manifested by these vegetable tentacles, that can \"only stand\nand wait\" for it.\n\nOnly a brief chapter is devoted to Dionaea of North Carolina, the Venus's\nfly-trap, albeit, \"from the rapidity and force of its movements, one of the\nmost wonderful in the world.\" It is of the same family as the sundew; but\nthe action is transferred from tentacles on the leaf to the body of the\nleaf itself, which is transformed into a spring-trap, closing with a sudden\nmovement over the alighted insect. No secretion is provided beforehand\neither for allurement or detention; but after the captive is secured,\nmicroscopic glands within the surface of the leaf pour out an abundant\ngastric juice to digest it. Mrs. Glass's classical directions in the\ncook-book, \"first catch your hare,\" are implicitly followed.\n\nAvoiding here all repetition or recapitulation of our former narrative,\nsuffice it now to mention two interesting recent additions to our\nknowledge, for which we are indebted to Mr. Darwin. One is a research, the\nother an inspiration. It is mainly his investigations which have shown that\nthe glairy liquid, which is poured upon and macerates the captured insect,\naccomplishes a true digestion; that, like the gastric juice of animals, it\ncontains both a free acid and pepsin or its analogue, these two together\ndissolving albumen, meat, and the like. The other point relates to the\nsignificance of a peculiarity in the process of capture. When the trap\nsuddenly incloses an insect which has betrayed its presence by touching one\nof the internal sensitive bristles, the closure is at first incomplete. For\nthe sides approach in an arching way, surrounding a considerable cavity,\nand the marginal spine-like bristles merely intercross their tips, leaving\nintervening spaces through which one may look into the cavity beneath. A\ngood idea may be had of it by bringing the two palms near together to\nrepresent the sides of the trap, and loosely interlocking the fingers to\nrepresent the marginal bristles or bars. After remaining some time in this\nposition the closure is made complete by the margins coming into full\ncontact, and the sides finally flattening down so as to press firmly upon\nthe insect within; the secretion excited by contact is now poured out, and\ndigestion begins. Why these two stages? Why should time be lost by this\npreliminary and incomplete closing? The query probably was never distinctly\nraised before, no one noticing anything here that needed explanation.\nDarwinian teleology, however, raises questions like this, and Mr. Darwin\nnot only propounded the riddle but solved it. The object of the partial\nclosing is to permit small insects to escape through the meshes, detaining\nonly those plump enough to be worth the trouble of digesting. For naturally\nonly one insect is caught at a time, and digestion is a slow business with\nDionaeas, as with anacondas, requiring ordinarily a fortnight. It is not\nworth while to undertake it with a gnat when larger game may be had. To\ntest this happy conjecture, Mr. Canby was asked, on visiting the Dionaeas\nin their native habitat, to collect early in the season a good series of\nleaves in the act of digesting naturally-caught insects. Upon opening them\nit was found that ten out of fourteen were engaged upon relatively large\nprey, and of the remaining four three had insects as large as ants, and one\na rather small fly.\n\n\"There be land-rats and water-rats\" in this carnivorous sun-dew family.\nAldrovanda, of the warmer parts of Europe and of India, is an aquatic plant,\nwith bladdery leaves, which were supposed to be useful in rendering the\nherbage buoyant in water. But it has recently been found that the bladder\nis composed of two lobes, like the trap of its relative Dionaea, or the\nvalves of a mussel-shell; that these open when the plant is in an active\nstate, are provided with some sensitive bristles within, and when these are\ntouched close with a quick movement. These water-traps are manifestly\nadapted for catching living creatures; and the few incomplete\ninvestigations that have already been made render it highly probably that\nthey appropriate their prey for nourishment; whether by digestion or by\nmere absorption of decomposing animal matter, is uncertain. It is certainly\nmost remarkable that this family of plants, wherever met with, and under the\nmost diverse conditions and modes of life, should always in some way or\nother be predaceous and carnivorous.\n\nIf it be not only surprising but somewhat confounding to our\nclassifications that a whole group of plants should subsist partly by\ndigesting animal matter and partly in the normal way of decomposing\ncarbonic acid and producing the basis of animal matter, we have, as Mr.\nDarwin remarks, a counterpart anomaly in the animal kingdom. While some\nplants have stomachs, some animals have roots. \"The rhizocephalous\ncrustaceans do not feed like other animals by their mouths, for they are\ndestitute of an alimentary canal, but they live by absorbing through\nroot-like processes the juices of the animals on which they are parasitic.\"\n\nTo a naturalist of our day, imbued with those ideas of the solidarity of\norganic Nature which such facts as those we have been considering suggest,\nthe greatest anomaly of all would be that they are really anomalous or\nunique. Reasonably supposing, therefore, that the sundew did not stand\nalone, Mr. Darwin turned his attention to other groups of plants; and,\nfirst, to the bladderworts, which have no near kinship with the sundews,\nbut, like the aquatic representative of that family, are provided with\nbladdery sacs, under water. In the common species of Utricularia or\nbladderwort, these little sacs, hanging from submerged leaves or branches,\nhave their orifice closed by a lid which opens inwardly--a veritable\ntrapdoor. It had been noticed in England and France that they contained\nminute crustacean animals. Early in the summer of 1874, Mr. Darwin\nascertained the mechanism for their capture and the great success with\nwhich it is used. But before his account was written out, Prof. Cohn\npublished an excellent paper on the subject in Germany; and Mrs. Treat, of\nVineland, New Jersey, a still earlier one in this country--in the New York\nTribune in the autumn of 1874. Of the latter, Mr. Darwin remarks that she\n\"has been more successful than any other observer in witnessing the actual\nentrance of these minute creatures.\" They never come out, but soon perish\nin their prison, which receives a continued succession of victims, but\nlittle, if any, fresh air to the contained water. The action of the trap is\npurely mechanical, without evident irritability in the opening or shutting.\nThere is no evidence nor much likelihood of proper digestion; indeed, Mr.\nDarwin found evidence to the contrary. But the more or less decomposed and\ndissolved animal matter is doubtless absorbed into the plant; for the whole\ninterior of the sac is lined with peculiar, elongated and four-armed very\nthin-walled processes, which contain active protoplasm, and which were\nproved by experiment to \"have the power of absorbing matter from weak\nsolutions of certain salts of ammonia and urea, and from a putrid infusion\nof raw meat.\"\n\nAlthough the bladderworts \"prey on garbage,\" their terrestrial relatives\n\"live cleanly,\" as nobler plants should do, and have a good and true\ndigestion. Pinguicula, or butterwort, is the representative of this family\nupon land. It gets both its Latin and its English name from the fatty or\ngreasy appearance of the upper face of its broad leaves; and this\nappearance is due to a dense coat or pile of short-stalked glands, which\nsecrete a colorless and extremely viscid liquid. By this small flies, or\nwhatever may alight or fall upon the leaf, are held fast. These waifs might\nbe useless or even injurious to the plant. Probably Mr. Darwin was the\nfirst to ask whether they might be of advantage. He certainly was the first\nto show that they probably are so. The evidence from experiment, shortly\nsummed up, is, that insects alive or dead, and also other nitrogenous\nbodies, excite these glands to increased secretion; the secretion then\nbecomes acid, and acquires the power of dissolving solid animal\nsubstances--that is, the power of digestion in the manner of Drosera and\nDionaea. And the stalks of their glands under the microscope give the same\nocular evidence of absorption. The leaves of the butterwort are apt to have\ntheir margins folded inward, like a rim or hem. Taking young and vigorous\nleaves to which hardly anything had yet adhered, and of which the margins\nwere still flat, Mr. Darwin set within one margin a row of small flies.\nFifteen hours afterward this edge was neatly turned inward, partly covering\nthe row of flies, and the surrounding glands were secreting copiously. The\nother edge remained flat and unaltered. Then he stuck a fly to the middle\nof the leaf just below its tip, and soon both margins infolded, so as to\nclasp the object. Many other and varied experiments yielded similar\nresults. Even pollen, which would not rarely be lodged upon these leaves, as\nit falls from surrounding wind-fertilized plants, also small seeds, excited\nthe same action, and showed signs of being acted upon. \"We may therefore\nconclude,\" with Mr. Darwin, \"that Pinguicula vulgaris, with its small\nroots, is not only supported to a large extent by the extraordinary number\nof insects which it habitually captures, but likewise draws some\nnourishment from the pollen, leaves, and seeds, of other plants which often\nadhere to its leaves. It is, therefore, partly a vegetable as well as an\nanimal feeder.\"\n\nWhat is now to be thought of the ordinary glandular hairs which render the\nsurface of many and the most various plants extremely viscid? Their number\nis legion. The Chinese primrose of common garden and house culture is no\nextraordinary instance; but Mr. Francis Darwin, counting those on a small\nspace measured by the micrometer, estimated them at 65,371 to the square\ninch of foliage, taking in both surfaces of the leaf, or two or three\nmillions on a moderate-sized specimen of this small herb. Glands of this\nsort were loosely regarded as organs for excretion, without much\nconsideration of the  question whether, in vegetable life, there could be\nany need to excrete, or any advantage gained by throwing off such products;\nand, while the popular name of catch-fly, given to several common species\nof Silene, indicates long familiarity with the fact, probably no one ever\nimagined that the swarms of small insects which perish upon these sticky\nsurfaces were ever turned to account by the plant. In many such cases, no\ndoubt they perish as uselessly as when attracted into the flame of a\ncandle. In the tobacco-plant, for instance, Mr. Darwin could find no\nevidence that the glandular hairs absorb animal matter. But Darwinian\nphilosophy expects all gradations between casualty and complete adaptation.\nIt is most probable that any thin-walled vegetable structure which secretes\nmay also be capable of absorbing under favorable conditions. The myriads of\nexquisitely-constructed glands of the Chinese primrose are not likely to be\nfunctionless. Mr. Darwin ascertained by direct experiment that they\npromptly absorb carbonate of ammonia, both in watery solution and in vapor.\nSo, since rain-water usually contains a small percentage of ammonia, a use\nfor these glands becomes apparent--one completely congruous with that of\nabsorbing any animal matter, or products of its decomposition, which may\ncome in their way through the occasional entanglement of insects in their\nviscid secretion. In several saxifrages--not very distant relatives of\nDrosera--the viscid glands equally manifested the power of absorption.\n\nTo trace a gradation between a simply absorbing hair with a glutinous tip,\nthrough which the plant may perchance derive slight contingent advantage,\nand the tentacles of a sundew, with their exquisite and associated\nadaptations, does not much lessen the wonder nor explain the phenomena.\nAfter all, as Mr. Darwin modestly concludes, \"we see how little has been\nmade out in comparison with what remains unexplained and unknown.\" But all\nthis must be allowed to be an important contribution to the doctrine of the\ngradual acquirement of uses and functions, and hardly to find conceivable\nexplanation upon any other hypothesis.\n\nThere remains one more mode in which plants of the higher grade are known\nto prey upon animals; namely, by means of pitchers, urns, or tubes, in\nwhich insects and the like are drowned or confined, and either macerated or\ndigested. To this Mr. Darwin barely alludes on the last page of the present\nvolume. The main facts known respecting the American pitcher-plants have,\nas was natural, been ascertained in this country; and we gave an abstract,\ntwo years ago, of our then incipient knowledge. Much has been learned\nsince, although all the observations have been of a desultory character. If\nspace permitted, an instructive narrative might be drawn up, as well of the\neconomy of the Sarracenias as of how we came to know what we do of it. But\nthe very little we have room for will be strictly supplementary to our\nformer article.\n\nThe pitchers of our familiar Northern Sarracenia, which is likewise\nSouthern, are open-mouthed; and, although they certainly secrete some\nliquid when young, must derive most of the water they ordinarily contain\nfrom rain. How insects are attracted is unknown, but the water abounds with\ntheir drowned bodies and decomposing remains.\n\nIn the more southern S. flava, the long and trumpet-shaped pitchers\nevidently depend upon the liquid which they themselves secrete, although at\nmaturity, when the hood becomes erect, rain may somewhat add to it. This\nspecies, as we know, allures insects by a peculiar sweet exudation within\nthe orifice; they fall in and perish, though seldom by drowning, yet few\nare able to escape; and their decomposing remains accumulate in the narrow\nbottom of the vessel. Two other long-tubed species of the Southern States\nare similar in these respects. There is another, S. psittacina, the\nparrot-headed species, remarkable for the cowl-shaped hood so completely\ninflexed over the mouth of the small pitcher that no rain can possibly\nenter. Little is known, however, of the efficiency of this species as a\nfly-catcher; but its conformation has a morphological interest, leading up,\nas it does, to the Californian type of pitcher presently to be mentioned.\n\nBut the remaining species, S. variolaris, is the most wonderful of our\npitcher-plants in its adaptations for the capture of insects. The inflated\nand mottled lid or hood overarches the ample orifice of the tubular pitcher\nsufficiently to ward off the rain, but not to obstruct the free access of\nflying insects. Flies, ants, and most insects, glide and fall from the\ntreacherous smooth throat into the deep well below, and never escape. They\nare allured by a sweet secretion just within the orifice-- which was\ndiscovered and described long ago, and the knowledge of it wellnigh\nforgotten until recently. And, finally, Dr. Mellichamp, of South Carolina,\ntwo years ago made the capital discovery that, during the height of the\nseason, this lure extends from the orifice down nearly to the ground, a\nlength of a foot or two, in the form of a honeyed line or narrow trail on\nthe edge of the wing-like border which is conspicuous in all these species,\nalthough only in this one, so far as known, turned to such account. Here,\none would say, is a special adaptation to ants and such terrestrial and\ncreeping insects. Well, long before this sweet trail was known, it was\nremarked by the late Prof. Wyman and others that the pitchers of this\nspecies, in the savannahs of Georgia and Florida, contain far more ants\nthan they do of all other insects put together.\n\nFinally, all this is essentially repeated in the peculiar Californian\npitcher-plant (Darlingtonia), a genus of the same natural family, which\ncaptures insects in great variety, enticing them by a sweetish secretion\nover the whole inside of the inflated hood and that of a curious forked\nappendage, resembling a fish-tail, which overhangs the orifice. This\norifice is so concealed that it can be seen and approached only from below,\nas if--the casual observer might infer--to escape visitation. But dead\ninsects of all kinds, and their decomposing remains, crowd the cavity and\nsaturate the liquid therein contained, enticed, it is said, by a peculiar\nodor, as well as by the sweet lure which is at some stages so abundant as\nto drip from the tips of the overhanging appendage. The principal\nobservations upon this pitcher-plant in its native habitat have been made\nby Mrs. Austin, and only some of the earlier ones have thus far been\npublished by Mr. Canby. But we are assured that in this, as in the\nSarracenia variolaris, the sweet exudation extends at the proper season\nfrom the orifice down the wing nearly to the ground, and that ants follow\nthis honeyed pathway to their destruction. Also, that the watery liquid in\nthe pitcher, which must be wholly a secretion, is much increased in\nquantity after the capture of insects.\n\nIt cannot now well be doubted that the animal matter is utilized by the\nplant in all these cases, although most probably only after maceration or\ndecomposition. In some of them even digestion, or at least the absorption\nof undecomposed soluble animal juices, may be suspected; but there is no\nproof of it. But, if pitchers of the Sarracenia family are only macerating\nvessels, those of Nepenthes--the pitchers of the Indian Archipelago,\nfamiliar in conservatories--seem to be stomachs. The investigations of the\nPresident of the Royal Society, Dr. Hooker, although incomplete, wellnigh\ndemonstrate that these not only allure insects by a sweet secretion at the\nrim and upon the lid of the cup, but also that their capture, or the\npresence of other partly soluble animal matter, produces an increase and an\nacidulation of the contained watery liquid, which thereupon becomes capable\nof acting in the manner of that of Drosera and Dionaea, dissolving flesh,\nalbumen, and the like.\n\nAfter all, there never was just ground for denying to vegetables the use of\nanimal food. The fungi are by far the most numerous family of plants, and\nthey all live upon organic matter, some upon dead and decomposing, some\nupon living, some upon both; and the number of those that feed upon living\nanimals is large. Whether these carnivorous propensities of higher plants\nwhich so excite our wonder be regarded as survivals of ancestral habits, or\nas comparatively late acquirements, or even as special endowments, in any\ncase what we have now learned of them goes to strengthen the conclusion that\nthe whole organic world is akin.\n\nThe volume upon \"The Movements and Habits of Climbing Plants\" is a revised\nand enlarged edition of a memoir communicated to the Linnaean Society in\n1865, and published in the ninth volume of its Journal. There was an extra\nimpression, but, beyond the circle of naturalists, it can hardly have been\nmuch known at first-hand. Even now, when it is made a part of the general\nDarwinian literature, it is unlikely to be as widely read as the companion\nvolume which we have been reviewing; although it is really a more readable\nbook, and well worthy of far more extended notice at our hands than it can\nnow receive. The reason is obvious. It seems as natural that plants should\nclimb as it does unnatural that any should take animal food. Most people,\nknowing that some plants \"twine with the sun,\" and others \"against the\nsun,\" have an idea that the sun in some way causes the twining; indeed, the\nnotion is still fixed in the popular mind that the same species twines in\nopposite directions north and south of the equator.\n\nReaders of this fascinating treatise will learn, first of all, that the sun\nhas no influence over such movements directly, and that its indirect\ninfluence is commonly adverse or disturbing, except the heat, which\nquickens vegetable as it does animal life. Also, that climbing is\naccomplished by powers and actions as unlike those generally predicated of\nthe vegetable kingdom as any which have been brought to view in the\npreceding volume. Climbing plants \"feel\" as well as \"grow and live;\" and\nthey also manifest an automatism which is perhaps more wonderful than a\nresponse by visible movement to an external irritation. Nor do plants grow\nup their supports, as is unthinkingly supposed; for, although only growing\nor newly-grown parts act in climbing, the climbing and the growth are\nentirely distinct. To this there is one exception--an instructive one, as\nshowing how one action passes into another, and how the same result may be\nbrought about in different ways--that of stems which climb by rootlets, such\nas of ivy and trumpet-creeper. Here the stem ascends by growth alone,\ntaking upward direction, and is fixed by root-lets as it grows. There is no\nbetter way of climbing walls, precipices, and large tree-trunks.\n\nBut small stems and similar supports are best ascended by twining; and this\ncalls out powers of another and higher order. The twining stem does not\ngrow around its support, but winds around it, and it does this by a\nmovement the nature of which is best observed in stems which have not yet\nreached their support, or have overtopped it and stretched out beyond it.\nThen it may be seen that the extending summit, reaching farther and farther\nas it grows, is making free circular sweeps, by night as well as by day, and\nirrespective of external circumstances, except that warmth accelerates the\nmovement, and that the general tendency of young stems to bend toward the\nlight may, in case of lateral illumination, accelerate one-half the circuit\nwhile it equally retards the other. The arrest of the revolution where the\nsupporting body is struck, while the portion beyond continues its movement,\nbrings about the twining. As to the proximate cause of this sweeping\nmotion, a few simple experiments prove that it results from the bowing or\nbending of the free summit of the stem into a more or less horizontal\nposition (this bending being successively to every point of the compass,\nthrough an action which circulates around the stem in the direction of the\nsweep), and of the consequent twining, i.e., \"with the sun,\" or with the\nmovement of the hands of a watch, in the hop, or in the opposite direction\nin pole-beans and most twiners.     Twining plants, therefore, ascend trees or\nother stems by an action and a movement of their own, from which they derive\nadvantage. To plants liable to be overshadowed by more robust companions,\nclimbing is an economical method of obtaining a freer exposure to light and\nair with the smallest possible expenditure of material. But twiners have\none disadvantage: to rise ten feet they must produce fifteen feet of stem\nor thereabouts, according to the diameter of the support, and the openness\nor closeness of the coil. A rootlet-climber saves much in this respect, but\nhas a restricted range of action, and other disadvantages.\n\nThere are two other modes, which combine the utmost economy of material\nwith freer range of action. There are, in the first place, leaf-climbers of\nvarious sorts, agreeing only in this, that the duty of laying hold is\ntransferred to the leaves, so that the stem may rise in a direct line.\nSometimes the blade or leaflets, or some of them, but more commonly their\nslender stalks, undertake the work, and the plant rises as a boy ascends a\ntree, grasping first with one hand or arm, then with the other. Indeed, the\ncomparison, like the leaf-stalk, holds better than would be supposed; for\nthe grasping of the latter is not the result of a blind groping in all\ndirections by a continuous movement, but of a definite sensitiveness which\nacts only upon the occasion. Most leaves make no regular sweeps; but when\nthe stalks of a leaf-climbing species come into prolonged contact with any\nfitting extraneous body, they slowly incurve and make a turn around it, and\nthen commonly thicken and harden until they attain a strength which may\nequal that of the stem itself. Here we have the faculty of movement to a\ndefinite end, upon external irritation, of the same nature with that\ndisplayed by Dionaea and Drosera, although slower for the most part than\neven in the latter. But the movement of the hour-hand of the clock is not\ndifferent in nature or cause from that of the second-hand.\n\nFinally--distribution of office being, on the whole, most advantageous and\neconomical, and this, in the vegetable kingdom, being led up to by\ndegrees--we reach, through numerous gradations, the highest style of\nclimbing plants in the tendril-climber. A tendril morphologically, is\neither a leaf or branch of stem, or a portion of one, specially organized\nfor climbing. Some tendrils simply turn away from light, as do those of\ngrape-vines, thus taking the direction in which some supporting object is\nlikely to be encountered; most are indifferent to light; and many revolve\nin the manner of the summit of twining stems. As the stems which bear these\nhighly-endowed tendrils in many cases themselves also revolve more or less,\nthough they seldom twine, their reach is the more extensive; and to this\nendowment of automatic movement most tendrils add the other faculty, that\nof incurving and coiling upon prolonged touch, or even brief contact, in\nthe highest degree. Some long tendrils, when in their best condition,\nrevolve so rapidly that the sweeping movement may be plainly seen; indeed,\nwe have seen a quarter-circuit in a Passiflora sicyoides accomplished in\nless than a minute, and the half-circuit in ten minutes; but the other half\n(for a reason alluded to in the next paragraph) takes a much longer time.\nThen, as to the coiling upon contact, in the case first noticed in this\ncountry,[XI-3] in the year 1858, which Mr. Darwin mentions as having led him\ninto this investigation, the tendril of Sicyos was seen to coil within half\na minute after a stroke with the hand, and to make a full turn or more\nwithin the next minute; furnishing ocular evidence that tendrils grasp and\ncoil in virtue of sensitiveness to contact, and, one would suppose,\nnegativing Sachs's recent hypothesis that all these movements are owing \"to\nrapid growth on the side opposite to that which becomes concave\"--a view to\nwhich Mr. Darwin objects, but not so strongly as he might. The tendril of\nthis sort, on striking some fitting object, quickly curls round and firmly\ngrasps it; then, after some hours, one side shortening or remaining short\nin proportion to the other, it coils into a spire, dragging the stem up to\nits support, and enabling the next tendril above to secure a readier hold.\n\nIn revolving tendrils perhaps the most wonderful adaptation is that by\nwhich they avoid attachment to, or winding themselves upon, the ascending\nsummit of the stem that bears them. This they would inevitably do if they\ncontinued their sweep horizontally. But when in its course it nears the\nparent\n\n    stem the tendril moves slowly, as if to gather strength, then C.~ stiffens\nand rises into an erect position parallel with it, and C so passes by the\ndangerous point; after which it comes rapidly down to the horizontal\nposition, in which it moves until it again approaches and again avoids the\nimpending obstacle.\n\nClimbing plants are distributed throughout almost all the natural orders.\nIn some orders climbing is the rule, in most it is the exception, occurring\nonly in certain genera. The tendency of stems to move in circuits--upon\nwhich climbing more commonly depends, and out of which it is conceived to\nhave been educed--is manifested incipiently by many a plant which does not\nclimb. Of those that do there are all degrees, from the feeblest to the\nmost efficient, from those which have no special adaptation to those which\nhave exquisitely-endowed special organs for climbing. The conclusion reached\nis, that the power \"is inherent, though undeveloped, in almost every\nplant;\" \"that climbing plants have utilized and perfected a\nwidely-distributed and incipient capacity, which, as far as we can see, is\nof no service to ordinary plants.\"\n\nInherent powers and incipient manifestations, useless to their possessors\nbut useful to their successors--this, doubtless, is according to the order\nof Nature; but it seems to need something more than natural selection to\naccount for it.\n\n\n\nXII\n\nDURATION AND\n\nORIGINATION OF\n\nRACE AND SPECIES--\n\nIMPORT OF SEXUAL REPRODUCTION\n\n\nI\nDo Varieties wear out, or tend to wear out?\n\n(New York Tribune, and American Journal of Science and the Arts, February,\n1875)\n\n\n\nThis question has been argued from time to time for more than half a\ncentury, and is far from being settled yet. Indeed, it is not to be settled\neither way so easily as is sometimes thought. The result of a prolonged and\nrather lively discussion of the topic about forty years ago in England, in\nwhich Lindley bore a leading part on the negative side, was, if we rightly\nremember, that the nays had the best of the argument. The deniers could\nfairly well explain away the facts adduced by the other side, and evade the\nforce of the reasons then assigned to prove that varieties were bound to die\nout in the course of time. But if the case were fully re-argued now, it is\nby no means certain that the nays would win it. The most they could expect\nwould be the Scotch verdict, \"not proven.\" And this not because much, if\nany, additional evidence of the actual wearing out of any variety has\nturned up since, but because a presumption has been raised under which the\nevidence would take a bias the other way. There is now in the minds of\nscientific men some reason to expect that certain varieties would die out\nin the long run, and this might have an important influence upon the\ninterpretation of the facts. Curiously enough, however, the recent\ndiscussions to which our attention has been called seem, on both sides, to\nhave overlooked this.\n\nBut, first of all, the question needs to be more specifically stated. There\nare varieties and varieties. They may, some of them, disappear or\ndeteriorate, but yet not wear out--not come to an end from any inherent\ncause. One might even say, the younger they are the less the chance of\nsurvival unless well cared for. They may be smothered out by the adverse\nforce of superior numbers; they are even more likely to be bred out of\nexistence by unprevented cross-fertilization, or to disappear from mere\nchange of fashion. The question, however, is not so much about reversion to\nan ancestral state, or the falling off of a high-bred stock into an\ninferior condition. Of such cases it is enough to say that, when a variety\nor strain, of animal or vegetable, is led up to unusual fecundity or of\nsize or product of any organ, for our good, and not for the good of the\nplant or animal itself, it can be kept so only by high feeding and\nexceptional care; and that with high feeding and artificial appliances\ncomes vastly increased liability to disease, which may practically\nannihilate the race. But then the race, like the bursted boiler, could not\nbe said to wear out, while if left to ordinary conditions, and allowed to\ndegenerate back into a more natural if less useful state, its hold on life\nwould evidently be increased rather than diminished.\n\nAs to natural varieties or races under normal conditions, sexually\npropagated, it could readily be shown that they are neither more nor less\nlikely to disappear from any inherent cause than the species from which\nthey originated. Whether species wear out, i.e., have their rise,\nculmination, and decline, from any inherent cause, is wholly a geological\nand very speculative problem, upon which, indeed, only vague conjectures can\nbe offered. The matter actually under discussion concerns cultivated\ndomesticated varieties only, and, as to plants, is covered by two\nquestions.\n\nFirst, Will races propagated by seed, being so fixed that they come true to\nseed, and purely bred (not crossed with any other sort), continue so\nindefinitely, or will they run out in time--not die out, perhaps, but lose\ntheir distinguishing characters? Upon this, all we are able to say is that\nwe know no reason why they should wear out or deteriorate from any inherent\ncause. The transient existence or the deterioration and disappearance of\nmany such races are sufficiently accounted for otherwise; as in the case of\nextraordinarily exuberant varieties, such as mammoth fruits or roots, by\nincreased liability to disease, already adverted to, or by the failure of\nthe high feeding they demand. A common cause, in ordinary cases, is\ncross-breeding, through the agency of wind or insects, which is difficult\nto guard against. Or they go out of fashion and are superseded by others\nthought to be better, and so the old ones disappear.\n\nOr, finally, they may revert to an ancestral form. As offspring tend to\nresemble grandparents almost as much as parents, and as a line of\nclose-bred ancestry is generally prepotent, so newly-originated varieties\nhave always a tendency to reversion. This is pretty sure to show itself in\nsome of the progeny of the earlier generations, and the breeder has to\nguard against it by rigid selection. But the older the variety is--that is,\nthe longer the series of generations in which it has come true from\nseed--the less the chance of reversion: for now, to be like the immediate\nparents, is also to be like a long line of ancestry; and so all the\ninfluences concerned--- that is, both parental and ancestral\nheritability--act in one and the same direction. So, since the older a race\nis the more reason it has to continue true, the presumption of the\nunlimited permanence of old races is very strong.\n\nOf course the race itself may give off new varieties; but that is no\ninterference with the vitality of the original stock. If some of the new\nvarieties supplant the old, that will not be because the unvaried stock is\nworn out or decrepit with age, but because in wild Nature the newer forms\nare better adapted to the surroundings, or, under man's care, better\nadapted to his wants or fancies.\n\nThe second question, and one upon which the discussion about the wearing\nout of varieties generally turns, is, Will varieties propagated from buds,\ni.e., by division, grafts, bulbs, tubers, and the like, necessarily\ndeteriorate and die out? First, Do they die out as a matter of fact? Upon\nthis, the testimony has all along been conflicting. Andrew Knight was sure\nthat they do, and there could hardly be a more trustworthy witness.\n\n\n\"The fact,\" he says, fifty years ago, \"that certain varieties of some\nspecies of fruit which have been long cultivated cannot now be made to grow\nin the same soils and under the same mode of management, which was a\ncentury ago so perfectly successful, is placed beyond the reach of\ncontroversy. Every experiment which seemed to afford the slightest prospect\nof success was tried by myself and others to propagate the old varieties of\nthe apple and pear which formerly constituted the orchards of Herefordshire,\nwithout a single healthy or efficient tree having been obtained; and I\nbelieve all attempts to propagate these varieties have, during some years,\nwholly ceased to be made.\"\n\n\nTo this it was replied, in that and the next generation, that cultivated\nvines have been transmitted by perpetual division from the time of the\nRomans, and that several of the sorts, still prized and prolific, are well\nidentified, among them the ancient Graecula, considered to be the modern\nCorinth or currant grape, which has immemorially been seedless; that the\nold nonpareil apple was known in the time of Queen Elizabeth; that the\nwhite beurre pears of France have been propagated from the earliest times;\nand that golden pippins, St. Michael pears, and others said to have run\nout, were still to be had in good condition.\n\nComing down to the present year, a glance through the proceedings of\npomological societies, and the debates of farmers' clubs, brings out the\nsame difference of opinion. The testimony is nearly equally divided.\nPerhaps the larger number speak of the deterioration and failure of\nparticular old sorts; but when the question turns on \"wearing out,\" the\npositive evidence of vigorous trees and sound fruits is most telling. A\nlittle positive testimony outweighs a good deal of negative. This cannot\nreadily be explained away, while the failures may be, by exhaustion of\nsoil, incoming of disease, or alteration of climate or circumstances. On\nthe other hand, it may be urged that, if a variety of this sort is fated to\nbecome decrepit and die out, it is not bound to die out all at once, and\neverywhere at the same time. It would be expected first to give way\nwherever it is weakest, from whatever cause. This consideration has an\nimportant bearing upon the final question, Are old varieties of this kind\non the way to die out on account of their age or any inherent limit of\nvitality?\n\nHere, again, Mr. Knight took an extreme view. In his essay in the\n\"Philosophical Transactions,\" published in the year 1810, he propounded the\ntheory, not merely of a natural limit to varieties from grafts and\ncuttings, but even that they would not survive the natural term of the life\nof the seedling trees from which they were originally taken. Whatever may\nhave been his view of the natural term of the life of a tree, and of a\ncutting being merely a part of the individual that produced it, there is no\ndoubt that he laid himself open to the effective replies which were made\nfrom all sides at the time, and have lost none of their force since.\nWeeping-willows, bread-fruits, bananas, sugar-cane, tiger-lilies, Jerusalem\nartichokes, and the like, have been propagated for a long while in this\nway, without evident decadence.     Moreover, the analogy upon which his\nhypothesis is founded will not hold. Whether or not one adopts the present\nwriter's conception, that individuality is not actually reached or\nmaintained in the vegetable world, it is clear enough that a common plant\nor tree is not an individual in the sense that a horse or man, or any one\nof the higher animals, is--that it is an individual only in the sense that\na branching zoophyte or mass of coral is. Solvitur crescendo: the tree and\nthe branch equally demonstrate that they are not individuals, by being\ndivided with impunity and advantage, with no loss of life, but much\nincrease. It looks odd enough to see a writer like Mr. Sisley reproducing\nthe old hypothesis in so bare a form as this: \"I am prepared to maintain\nthat varieties are individuals, and that as they are born they must die,\nlike other individuals . . . We know that oaks, Sequoias, and other trees,\nlive several centuries, but how many we do not exactly know. But that they\nmust die, no one in his senses will dispute.\" Now, what people in their\nsenses do dispute is, not that the tree will die, but that other trees,\nestablished from its cuttings, will die with it.\n\nBut does it follow from this that non-sexually-propagated varieties are\nendowed with the same power of unlimited duration that is possessed by\nvarieties and species propagated sexually--i.e., by seed? Those who think\nso jump too soon at their conclusion. For, as to the facts, it is not\nenough to point out the diseases or the trouble in the soil or the\natmosphere to which certain old fruits are succumbing, nor to prove that a\nparasitic fungus (Peronospora infestans) is what is the matter with\npotatoes. For how else would constitutional debility, if such there be,\nmore naturally manifest itself than in such increased liability or\ndiminished resistance to such attacks? And if you say that, anyhow, such\nvarieties do not die of old age--meaning that each individual attacked does\nnot die of old age, but of manifest disease--it may be asked in return, what\nindividual man ever dies of old age in any other sense than of a similar\ninability to resist invasions which in earlier years would have produced no\nnoticeable effect? Aged people die of a slight cold or a slight accident,\nbut the inevitable weakness that attends old age is what makes these slight\nattacks fatal.\n\nFinally, there is a philosophical argument which tells strongly for some\nlimitation of the duration of non-sexually propagated forms, one that\nprobably Knight never thought of, but which we should not have expected\nrecent writers to overlook. When Mr. Darwin announced the principle that\ncross-fertilization between the individuals of a species is the plan of\nNature, and is practically so universal that it fairly sustains his\ninference that no hermaphrodite species continually self-fertilized would\ncontinue to exist, he made it clear to all who apprehend and receive the\nprinciple that a series of plants propagated by buds only must have weaker\nhold of life than a series reproduced by seed. For the former is the\nclosest possible kind of close breeding. Upon this ground such varieties\nmay be expected ultimately to die out; but \"the mills of the gods grind so\nexceeding slow\" that we cannot say that any particular grist has been\nactually ground out under human observation.\n\nIf it be asked how the asserted principle is proved or made probable, we\ncan here merely say that the proof is wholly inferential. But the inference\nis drawn from such a vast array of facts that it is wellnigh irresistible.\nIt is the legitimate explanation of those arrangements in Nature to secure\ncross-fertilization in the species, either constantly or occasionally,\nwhich are so general, so varied and diverse, and, we may add, so exquisite\nand wonderful, that, once propounded, we see that it must be true.* What\nelse, indeed, is the meaning and\n\n\n    * Here an article would be in place, explaining the arrangements in Nature\nfor cross-fertilization, or wide-breeding, in plants, through the agency,\nsometimes of the winds, but more commonly of insects; the more so, since\nthe development of the principle, the appreciation of its importance, and\nits confirmation by abundant facts, are mainly due to Mr. Darwin. But our\nreviews and notices of his early work \"On the Contrivances in Nature for\nthe Fertilization of Orchids by Means of Insects, in 1862, and his various\nsubsequent papers upon other parts of this subject, are either too technical\nor too fragmentary or special to be here reproduced. Indeed, a popular\nessay is now hardly needed, since the topic has been fully presented, of\nlate years, in the current popular and scientific journals, and in common\neducational works and text-books, so that it is in the way of becoming a\npart--and a most inviting part--of ordinary botanical instruction. use of\nsexual reproduction? Not simply increase of numbers; for that is otherwise\neffectually provided for by budding propagation in plants and many of the\nlower animals. There are plants, indeed, of the lower sort (such as\ndiatoms), in which the whole multiplication takes place in this way, and\nwith great rapidity. These also have sexual reproduction; but in it two old\nindividuals are always destroyed to make a single new one! Here propagation\ndiminishes the number of individuals fifty per cent. Who can suppose that\nsuch a costly process as this, and that all the exquisite arrangements for\ncross-fertilization in hermaphrodite plants, do not subserve some most\nimportant purpose? How and why the union of two organisms, or generally of\ntwo very minute portions of them, should reenforce vitality, we do not\nknow, and can hardly conjecture. But this must be the meaning of sexual\nreproduction.\n\nThe conclusion of the matter, from the scientific point of view, is, that\nsexually-propagated varieties or races, although liable to disappear through\nchange, need not be expected to wear out, and there is no proof that they\ndo; but, that non-sexually propagated varieties, though not especially\nliable to change, may theoretically be expected to wear out, but to be a\nvery long time about it.\n\n\nII\n\nDo Species wear out? and if not, why not?\n\n\nThe question we have just been considering was merely whether races are, or\nmay be, as enduring as species. As to the inherently unlimited existence of\nspecies themselves, or the contrary, this, as we have said, is a geological\nand very speculative problem. Not a few geologists and naturalists,\nhowever, have concluded, or taken for granted, that species have a natural\nterm of existence--that they culminate, decline, and disappear through\nexhaustion of specific vitality, or some equivalent internal cause. As\nmight be expected from the nature of the inquiry, the facts which bear upon\nthe question are far from decisive. If the fact that species in general\nhave not been interminable, but that one after another in long succession\nhas become extinct, would seem to warrant this conclusion, the persistence\nthrough immense periods of no inconsiderable number of the lower forms of\nvegetable and animal life, and of a few of the higher plants from the\nTertiary period to the present, tells even more directly for the limitless\nexistence of species. The disappearance is quite compatible with the latter\nview; while the persistence of any species is hardly explicable upon any\nother. So that, even under the common belief of the entire stability and\nessential inflexibility of species, extinction is more likely to have been\naccidental than predetermined, and the doctrine of inherent limitation is\nunsupported by positive evidence.\n\nOn the other hand, it is an implication of the Darwinian doctrine that\nspecies are essentially unlimited in existence. When they die out--as\nsooner or later any species may--the verdict must be accidental death,\nunder stress of adverse circumstances, not exhaustion of vitality; and,\ncommonly, when the species seems to die out, it will rather have suffered\nchange. For the stock of vitality which enables it to vary and. survive in\nchanged forms under changed circumstances must be deemed sufficient for a\ncontinued unchanged existence under unaltered conditions. And, indeed, the\nadvancement from simpler to more complex, which upon the theory must have\nattended the diversification, would warrant or require the supposition of\nincrease instead of diminution of power from age to age.\n\nThe only case we call to mind which, under the Darwinian view, might be\ninterpreted as a dying out from inherent causes, is that of a species which\nrefuses to vary, and thus lacks the capacity of adaptation to altering\nconditions. Under altering conditions, this lack would be fatal. But this\nwould be the fatality of some species or form in particular, not of species\nor forms generally, which, for the most part, may and do vary sufficiently,\nand in varying survive, seemingly none the worse, but rather the better,\nfor their long tenure of life.\n\nThe opposite idea, however, is maintained by M. Naudin,[XII-1] in a\ndetailed exposition of his own views of evolution, which differ widely from\nthose of Darwin in most respects, and notably in excluding that which, in\nour day, gives to the subject its first claim to scientific (as\ndistinguished from purely speculative) attention; namely, natural\nselection. Instead of the causes or operations collectively personified\nunder this term, and which are capable of exact or probable appreciation,\nM. Naudin invokes \"the two principles of rhythm and of the decrease of\nforces in Nature.\" He is a thorough evolutionist, starting from essentially\nthe same point with Darwin; for he conceives of all the forms or species of\nanimals and plants \"comme tire tout entier d'un protoplasma primordial,\nuniform, instable, eminemment plastique.\" Also in \"l'integration croissante\nde la force evolutive a mesure qu'elle se partage dans les formes produites,\net la decroissance proportionelle de la plasticite de ces formes a mesure\nqu'elles s'eloignent davantage de leur origine, et qu'elles sont mieux\narretees.\" As they get older, they gain in fixity through the operation of\nthe fundamental law of inheritance; but the species, like the individual,\nloses plasticity and vital force. To continue in the language of the\noriginal:\n\n\n\"C'est dire qu'il y a eu, pour l'ensemble du monde organique, une periode\nde formation ou tout etait changeant et mobile, une phase analogue a la vie\nembryonnaire et a la jeunesse de chaque etre particulier; et qu'a cet age\nde mobilite et de croissance a succede une periode de stabilite, au moins\nrelative, une sorte d'age adulte, ou la force evolutive, ayant acheve son\noeuvre, n'est plus occupee qu'a la maintenir, sans pouvoir produire\nd'organismes nouveaux. Limitee en quantite, comme toutes les forces en jeu\ndans une planete ou dans un systeme sideral tout entier, cette force n'a pu\naccomplir qu'un travail limite; et du meme qu'un organisme, animal ou\nvegetal, ne croit pas indefiniment et qu'il s'arrete a des proportions que\nrien ne peut faire depasser, de meme aussi l'organisme total de la nature\ns'est arrete a un etat d'equilibre, dont la duree, selon toutes\nvraisemblances, doit etre beaucoup plus longue que celle de la phase de\ndeveloppement et de croissance.\n\n\nA fixed amount of \"evolutive force\" is given, to begin with. At first\nenormous, because none has been used up in work, it is necessarily\nenfeebled in the currents into which the stream divides, and the narrower\nand narrower channels in which it flows with slowly-diminishing power.\nHence the limited although very unequal duration of all individuals, of all\nspecies, and of all types of organization. A multitude of forms have\ndisappeared already, and the number of species, far from increasing, as some\nhave believed, must, on the contrary, be diminishing. Some species, no\ndoubt, have suffered death by violence or accident, by geological changes,\nlocal alteration of the conditions, or the direct or indirect attacks of\nother species; but these have only anticipated their fate, for M. Naudin\ncontends that most of the extinct species have died a natural death from\nexhaustion of force, and that all the survivors are on the way to it. The\ngreat timepiece of Nature was wound up at the beginning, and is running\ndown. In the earlier stages of great plasticity and exuberant power,\ndiversification took place freely, but only in definite lines, and species\nand types multiplied. As the power of survival is inherently limited, still\nmore the power of change: this diminishes in time, if we rightly apprehend\nthe idea, partly through the waning of vital force, partly through the\nfixity acquired by heredity--like producing like, the more certainly in\nproportion to the length and continuity of the ancestral chain And so the\nsmall variations of species which we behold are the feeble remnants of the\npristine plasticity and an exhausted force.[XII-2] This force of variation\nor origination of forms has acted rhythmically or intermittently, because\neach movement was the result of the rupture of an equilibrium, the\nliberation of a force which till then was retained in a potential state by\nsome opposing force or obstacle, overcoming which it passes to a new\nequilibrium and so on Hence alternations of dynamic activity and static\nrepose, of origination of species and types, alternated with periods of\nstability or fixity. The timepiece does not run down regularly, but \"la\nforce procede par saccades; et . . . par pulsations d'autant plus\nenergiques que la nature etait plus pres de son commencement.\"\n\nSuch is the hypothesis. For a theory of evolution, this is singularly\nunlike Darwin's in most respects, and particularly in the kind of causes\ninvoked and speculations indulged in. But we are not here to comment upon\nit beyond the particular point under consideration, namely, its doctrine of\nthe inherently limited duration of species. This comes, it will be noticed,\nas a deduction from the modern physical doctrine of the equivalence of\nforce. The reasoning is ingenious, but, if we mistake not, fallacious.\n\nTo call that \"evolutive force\" which produces the change of one kind of\nplant or animal into another, is simple and easy, but of little help by way\nof explanation. To homologize it with physical force, as M. Naudin's\nargument requires, is indeed a step, and a hardy one; but it quite\ninvalidates the argument. For, if the \"evolutive force\" is a part of the\nphysical force of the universe, of which, as he reminds us, the sum is\nfixed and the tendency is toward a stable equilibrium in which all change is\nto end, then this evolutive was derived from the physical force; and why\nnot still derivable from it? What is to prevent its replenishment in\nvegetation, pari passu with that great operation in which physical force is\nstored up in vegetable organisms, and by the expenditure or transformation\nof which their work, and that of all animals, is carried on? Whatever be\nthe cause (if any there be) which determines the decadence and death of\nspecies, one cannot well believe that it is a consequence of a diminution\nof their proper force by plant-development and division; for instance, that\nthe sum of what is called vital force in a full-grown tree is not greater,\ninstead of less, than that in the seeding, and in the grove greater than in\nthe single parental tree. This power, if it be properly a force, is\ndoubtless as truly derived from the sunbeam as is the power which the plant\nand animal expend in work. Here, then, is a source of replenishment as\nlasting as the sun itself, and a ground--so far as a supply of force is\nconcerned--for indefinite duration. For all that any one can mean by the\nindefinite existence of species is, that they may (for all that yet\nappears) continue while the external conditions of their being or\nwell-being continue.\n\nPerhaps, however, M. Naudin does not mean that \"evolutive force,\" or the\nforce of vitality, is really homologous with common physical force, but\nonly something which may be likened to it. In that case the parallel has\nonly a metaphorical value, and the reason why variation must cease and\nspecies die out is still to seek. In short, if that which continues the\nseries of individuals in propagation, whether like or unlike the parents,\nbe a force in the physical sense of the term, then there is abundant\nprovision in Nature for its indefinite replenishment. If, rather, it be a\npart or phase of that something which directs and determines the\nexpenditure of force, then it is not subject to the laws of the latter, and\nthere is no ground for inferring its exhaustibility. The limited vitality\nis an unproved and unprovable conjecture. The evolutive force, dying out in\nthe using, is either the same conjecture repeated, or a misapplied analogy.\n\nAfter all--apart from speculative analogies--the only evidences we possess\nwhich indicate a tendency in species to die out, are those to which Mr.\nDarwin has called attention. These are, first, the observed deterioration\nwhich results, at least in animals, from continued breeding in and in,\nwhich may possibly be resolvable into cumulative heritable disease; and,\nsecondly, as already stated (p. 285), what may be termed the sedulous and\nelaborate pains everywhere taken in Nature to prevent close\nbreeding--arrangements which are particularly prominent in plants, the\ngreater number of which bear hermaphrodite blossoms. The importance of this\nmay be inferred from the universality, variety, and practical perfection of\nthe arrangements which secure the end; and the inference may fairly be\ndrawn that this is the physiological import of sexes.\nIt follows from this that there is a tendency, seemingly inherent, in\nspecies as in individuals, to die out; but that this tendency is\ncounteracted or checked by sexual wider breeding, which is, on the whole,\namply secured in Nature, and which in some way or other reenforces vitality\nto such an extent as to warrant Darwin's inference that \"some unknown great\ngood is derived from the union of individuals which have been kept distinct\nfor many generations.\" Whether this reenforcement is a complete preventive\nof decrepitude in species, or only a palliative, is more than we can\ndetermine. If the latter, then existing species and their derivatives must\nperish in time, and the earth may be growing poorer in species, as M.\nNaudin supposes, through mere senility. If the former, then the earth, if\nnot even growing richer, may be expected to hold its own, and extant species\nor their derivatives should last as long as the physical world lasts and\naffords favorable conditions. General analogies seem to favor the former\nview. Such facts as we possess, and the Darwinian hypothesis, favor the\nlatter.\n\nXIII\n\nEVOLUTIONARY TELEOLOGY\n\n\nWhen Cuvier spoke of the \"combination of organs in such order that they may\nbe in consistence with the part which the animal has to play in Nature,\"\nhis opponent, Geoffroy St.-Hilaire, rejoined, \"I know nothing of animals\nwhich have to play a part in Nature.\" The discussion was a notable one in\nits day. From that time to this, the reaction of morphology against \"final\ncauses\" has not rarely gone to the extent of denying the need and the\npropriety of assuming ends in the study of animal and vegetable\norganizations. Especially in our day, when it became apparent that the\nactual use of an organ might not be the fundamental reason of its\nexistence-- that one and the same organ, morphologically considered, was\nmodified in different cases to the most diverse uses, while intrinsically\ndifferent organs subserved identical functions, and consequently that use\nwas a fallacious and homology the surer guide to correct classification--it\nwas not surprising that teleological ideas nearly disappeared from natural\nhistory. Probably it is still generally thought that the school of Cuvier\nand that of St.-Hilaire have neither common ground nor capability of\nreconcilement.\n\nIn a review of Darwin's volume on the \"Fertilization of Orchids\" * (too\ntechnical and too detailed for reproduction here), and later in a brief\nsketch of the character of his scientific work (art. IX, p. 234), we\nexpressed our sense of the great gain to science from his having brought\nback teleology to natural history. In Darwinism, usefulness and purpose\ncome to the front again as working principles of the first order; upon\nthem, indeed, the whole system rests.\n\nTo most, this restoration of teleology has come from an unexpected quarter,\nand in an unwonted guise; so that the first look of it is by no means\nreassuring to the minds of those who cherish theistic views of Nature.\nAdaptations irresistibly suggesting purpose had their supreme application\nin natural theology. Being manifold, particular, and exquisite, and\nevidently inwrought into the whole system of the organic world, they were\nheld to furnish irrefragable as well as independent proof of a personal\ndesigner, a divine originator of Nature. By a confusion of thought, now\nobvious, but at the time not unnatural, they were also regarded as proof of\na direct execution of the contriver's purpose in the creation of each organ\nand organism, as it were, in the manner man contrives and puts together a\nmachine--an idea which has been set up as the orthodox doctrine, but which\nto St. Augustine and other learned Christian fathers would have savored of\nheterodoxy.\n\nIn the doctrine of the origination of species through natural selection,\nthese adaptations appear as the outcome rather than as the motive, as final\nresults rather than final causes. Adaptation to use, although the very\nessence of Darwinism, is not a fixed and inflexible adaptation, realized\nonce for all at the outset; it includes a long progression and succession\nof modifications, adjusting themselves to changing circumstances, under\nwhich they may be more and more diversified, specialized, and in a just\nsense perfected. Now, the question is, Does this involve the destruction or\nonly the reconstruction of our consecrated ideas of teleology? Is it\ncompatible with our seemingly inbore conception of Nature as an ordered\nsystem? Furthermore, and above all, can the Darwinian theory itself\ndispense with the idea of purpose, in the ordinary sense of the word, as\ntantamount to design?\n\nFrom two opposing sides we hear the first two questions answered in the\nnegative. And an affirmative response to the third is directly implied in\nthe following citation:\n\n\n\"The word purpose has been used in a sense to which it is, perhaps, worth\nwhile to call attention. Adaptation of means to an end may be provided in\ntwo ways that we at present know of: by processes of natural selection, and\nby the agency of an intelligence in which an image or idea of the end\npreceded the use of the means. In both cases the existence of the\nadaptation is accounted for by the necessity or utility of the end. It\nseems to me convenient to use the word purpose as meaning generally the end\nto which certain means are adapted, both in these two cases and in any\nother that may hereafter become known, provided only that the adaptation is\naccounted for by the necessity or utility of the end. And there seems no\nobjection to the use of the phrase 'final cause' in this wider sense, if it\nis to be kept at all. The word 'design' might then be kept for the special\ncase of adaptation by an intelligence. And we may then say that, since the\nprocess of natural selection has been understood, purpose has ceased to\nsuggest design to instructed people, except in cases where the agency of\nman is independently probable.\"--P.C.W., in the Contemporary Review for\nSeptember, 1875, p. 657.\n\n\nThe distinction made by this anonymous writer is convenient and useful, and\nhis statement clear. We propose to adopt this use of the terms purpose and\ndesign, and to examine the allegation. The latter comes to this: \"Processes\nof natural selection\" exclude \"the agency of an intelligence in which the\nimage or idea of the end precedes the use of the means;\" and since the\nformer have been understood \"purpose has ceased to suggest design to\ninstructed people, except in cases where the agency of man is independently\nprobable.\" The maxim \"L'homme propose, Dieu dispose,\" under this reading\nmeans that the former has the monopoly of design, while the latter\naccomplishes without designing. Man's works alone suggest design.\n\nBut it is clear to us that this monopoly is shared with certain beings of\ninferior grade. Granting that quite possibly the capture of flies for food\nby Dionaea and the sundews may be attributed to purpose apart from design\n(if it be practicable in the last resort to maintain this now convenient\ndistinction), still their capture by a spider's-web, and by a swallow on\nthe wing, can hardly \"cease to suggest design to instructed people.\" And\nsurely, in coming at his master's call, the dog fulfills his own design as\nwell as that of his master; and so of other actions and constructions of\nbrute animals.\n\nWithout doubt so acute a writer has a clear and sensible meaning; so we\nconclude that he regards brutes as automata, and was thinking of design as\ncoextensive merely with general conceptions. Not concerning ourselves with\nthe difficulty he may have in drawing a line between the simpler judgments\nand affections of man and those of the highest-endowed brutes, we subserve\nour immediate ends by remarking that the automatic theory would seem to be\none which can least of all dispense with design, since, either in the\nliteral or current sense of the word, undesigned automatism is, as near as\nmay be, a contradiction in terms. As the automaton man constructs manifests\nthe designs of its maker and mover, so the more efficient automata which\nman did not construct would not legitimately suggest less than human\nintelligence. And so all adaptations in the animal and vegetable world\nwhich irresistibly suggest purpose (in the sense now accepted) would also\nsuggest design, and, under the law of parsimony, claim to be thus\ninterpreted, unless some other hypothesis will better account for the\nfacts. We will consider, presently, if any other does so.\n\nWe here claim only that some beings other than men design, and that the\nadaptations of means to ends in the structure of animals and plants, in so\nfar as they carry the marks of purpose, carry also the implication of\nhaving been designed. Also, that the idea or hypothesis of a designing\nmind, as the author of Nature--however we came by it--having possession of\nthe field, and being one which man, himself a designer, seemingly must\nneeds form, cannot be rivaled except by some other equally adequate for\nexplanation, or displaced except by showing the illegitimacy of the\ninference. As to the latter, is the common apprehension and sense of\nmankind in this regard well grounded? Can we rightly reason from our own\nintelligence and powers to a higher or a supreme intelligence ordering and\nshaping the system of Nature?\n\nA very able and ingenious writer upon \"The Evidences of Design in Nature,\"\nin the Westminster Review for July, 1875, maintains the negative. His\narticle may be taken as the argument in support of the position assumed by\n\"P.C.W.,\" in the Contemporary Review above cited. It opens with the\nadmission that the orthodox view is the most simple and apparently\nconvincing, has had for centuries the unhesitating assent of an immense\nmajority of thinkers, and that the latest master-writer upon the subject\ndisposed to reject it, namely, Mill, comes to the conclusion that, \"in the\npresent state of our knowledge, the adaptations in Nature afford a large\nbalance of probability in favor of creation by intelligence.\" It proceeds\nto attack not so much the evidence in favor of design as the foundation\nupon which the whole doctrine rests, and closes with the prediction that\nsooner or later the superstructure must fall. And, truly, if his reasonings\nare legitimate, and his conclusions just, \"Science has laid the axe to the\ntree.\"\n\n\n\"Given a set of marks which we look upon in human productions as unfailing\nindications of design,\" he asks, \"is not the inference equally legitimate\nwhen we recognize these marks in Nature? To gaze on such a universe as\nthis, to feel our hearts exult within us in the fullness of existence, and\nto offer in explanation of such beneficent provision no other word but\nChance, seems as unthankful and iniquitous as it seems absurd. Chance\nproduces nothing in the human sphere; nothing, at least, that can be relied\nupon for good. Design alone engenders harmony, consistency; and Chance not\nonly never is the parent, but is constantly the enemy of these. How, then,\ncan we suppose Chance to be the author of a system in which everything is\nas regular as clockwork? . . . The hypothesis of Chance is inadmissible.\"\n\n\nThere is, then, in Nature, an order; and, in \"P.C.W.'s\" sense of the word,\na manifest purpose. Some sort of conception as to the cause of it is\ninevitable, that of design first and foremost. \"Why\"--the Westminster\nReviewer repeats the question--\"why, if the marks of utility and adaptation\nare conclusive in the works of man, should they not be considered equally\nconclusive in the works of Nature?\" His answer appears to us more ingenious\nthan sound. Because, referring to Paley's watch,--\n\n\n\"The watch-finder is not guided solely in his inference by marks of\nadaptation and utility; he would recognize design in half a watch, in a\nmere fragment of a watch, just as surely as in a whole time-keeper . . .\nTwo cog-wheels, grasping each other, will be thought conclusive evidence of\ndesign, quite independently of any use attaching to them. And the\ninference, indeed, is perfectly correct; only it is an inference, not from\na mark of design, properly so called, but from a mark of human workmanship .\n. . No more is needed for the watch-finder, since all the works of man are,\nat the same time, products of design; but a great deal more is requisite\nfor us, who are called upon by Paley to recognize design in works in which\nthis stamp, this label of human workmanship, is wanting. The mental\noperation required in the one case is radically different from that\nperformed in the other; there is no parallel, and Paley's demonstration is\ntotally irrelevant.\"[XIII-2]  But, surely, all human doings are not\n\"products of design;\" many are contingent or accidental. And why not\nsuppose that the finder of the watch, or of the watch-wheel, infers both\ndesign and human workmanship? The two are mutually exclusive only on the\nsupposition that man alone is a designer, which is simply begging the\nquestion in discussion. If the watch-finder's attention had been arrested by\na different object, such as a spider's web, he would have inferred both\ndesign and non-human workmanship. Of some objects he might be uncertain\nwhether they were of human origin or not, with-out ever doubting they were\ndesigned, while of others this might remain doubtful. Nor is man's\nrecognition of human workmanship, or of any other, dependent upon his\ncomprehending how it was done, or what particular ends it subserves. Such\nconsiderations make it clear that \"the label of human workmanship\" is not\nthe generic stamp from which man infers design. It seems equally clear that\n\"the mental operation required in the one case\" is not so radically or\nmaterially \"different from that performed in the other\" as this writer\nwould have us suppose. The judgment respecting a spider's web, or a\ntrap-door spider's dwelling, would be the very same in this regard if it\npreceded, as it occasionally might, all knowledge of whether the object met\nwith were of human or animal origin. A dam across a stream, and the\nappearance of the stumps of trees which entered into its formation, would\nsuggest design quite irrespective of and antecedent to the considerable\nknowledge or experience which would enable the beholder to decide whether\nthis was the work of men or of beavers. Why, then, should the judgment that\nany particular structure is a designed work be thought illegitimate when\nattributed to a higher instead of a lower intelligence than that of man? It\nmight, indeed, be so if the supposed observer had no conception of a power\nand intelligence superior to his own. But it would then be more than\n\"irrelevant;\" it would be impossible, except on the supposition that the\nphenomena would of themselves give rise to such an inference. That it is\nnow possible to make the inference, and, indeed, hardly possible not to make\nit, is sufficient warrant of its relevancy.\n\nIt may, of course, be rejoined that, if this important factor is given, the\ninference yields no independent argument of a divine creator; and it may\nalso be reasonably urged that the difference between things that are made\nunder our observation and comprehension, and things that grow, but have\noriginated beyond our comprehension, is too wide for a sure inference from\nthe one to the other. But the present question involves neither of these.\nIt is simply whether the argument for design from adaptations in Nature is\nrelevant, not whether it is independent or sure. It is conceded that the\nargument is analogical, and the parallel incomplete. But the gist is in the\npoints that are parallel or similar. Pulleys, valves, and suchlike\nelaborate mechanical adaptations, cannot differ greatly in meaning,\nwherever met with.\n\nThe opposing argument is repeated and passed in another form:\n\n\n\"The evidence of design afforded by the marks of adaptation in works of\nhuman competence is null and void in the case of creation itself . . .\nNature is full of adaptations; but these are valueless to us as traces of\ndesign, unless we know something of the rival adaptations among which an\nintelligent being might have chosen. To assert that in Nature no such rival\nadaptations existed, and that in every case the useful function in question\ncould be established by no other instrument but one, is simply to reason in\na circle, since it is solely from what we find existing that our notions of\npossibility and impossibility are drawn. . . . We cannot imagine ourselves\nin the position of the Creator before his work began, nor examine the\nmaterials among which he had to choose, nor count the laws which limited\nhis operations. Here all is dark, and the inference we draw from the\nseeming perfections of the existing instruments or means is a measure of\nnothing but our ignorance.\"\n\n\nBut the question is not about the perfection of these adaptations, or\nwhether others might have been instituted in their place. It is simply\nwhether observed adaptations of intricate sorts, admirably subserving uses,\ndo or do not legitimately suggest to one designing mind that they are the\nproduct of some other. If so, no amount of ignorance, or even\ninconceivability, of the conditions and mode of production could affect the\nvalidity of the inference, nor could it be affected by any misunderstanding\non our part as to what the particular use or function was; a statement\nwhich would have been deemed superfluous, except for the following:\n\n\n\"There is not an organ in our bodies but what has passed, and is still\npassing, through a series of different and often contradictory\ninterpretations. Our lungs, for instance, were anciently conceived to be a\nkind of cooling apparatus, a refrigerator; at the close of the last century\nthey were supposed to be a centre of combustion; and nowadays both these\ntheories have been abandoned for a third . . . Have these changes modified\nin the slightest degree the supposed evidence of design?\"\n\n\nWe have not the least idea why they should. So, also, of complicated\nprocesses, such as human digestion, being replaced by other and simpler\nones in lower animals, or even in certain plants. If \"we argue the\nnecessity of every adaptation solely from the fact that it exists,\" and\nthat \"we cannot mutilate it grossly without injury to the function,\" we do\nnot \"announce triumphantly that digestion is impossible in any way but\nthis,\" etc., but see equal wisdom and no impugnment of design in any number\nof simpler adaptations accomplishing equivalent purposes in lower animals.\n\nFinally, adaptation and utility being the only marks of design in Nature\nwhich we possess, and adaptation only as subservient to usefulness, the\nWestminster Reviewer shows us how:\n\n\n\"The argument from utility may be equally refuted another way. We found in\nour discussion of the mark of adaptation that the positive evidence of\ndesign afforded by the mechanisms of the human frame was never accompanied\nby the possibility of negative evidence. We regarded this as a suspicious\ncircumstance, just as the fox, invited to attend the lion in his den, was\ndeterred from his visit by observing that all the foottracks lay in one\ndirection. The same suspicious circumstance warns us now. If positive\nevidence of design be afforded by the presence of a faculty, negative\nevidence of design ought to be afforded by the absence of a faculty. This,\nhowever, is not the case.\" [Then follows the account of a butterfly, which,\nfrom the wonderful power of the males to find the females at a great\ndistance, is conceived to possess a sixth sense.] \"Do we consider the\ndeficiency of this sixth sense in man as the slightest evidence against\ndesign? Should we be less apt to infer creative wisdom if we had only four\nsenses instead of five, or three instead of four? No, the case would stand\nprecisely as it does now. We value our senses simply because we have them,\nand because our conception of life as we desire it is drawn from them. But\nto reason from such value to the origin of our endowment, to argue that our\nsenses must have been given to us by a deity because we prize them, is\nevidently to move round and round in a vicious circle.\n\n\"The same rejoinder is easily applicable to the argument from beauty, which\nindeed is only a particular aspect of the argument from utility. It is\ncertainly improbable that a random daubing of colors on a canvas will\nproduce a tolerable painting, even should the experiment be continued for\nthousands of years. Our conception of beauty being given, it is utterly\nimprobable that chance should select, out of the infinity of combinations\nwhich form and color may afford, the precise combination which that\nconception will approve. But the universe is not posterior to our sense of\nbeauty, but antecedent to it: our sense of beauty grows out of what we see;\nand hence the conformance of our world to our aesthetical conceptions is\nevidence, not of the world's origin, but of our own.\"\n\n\nWe are accustomed to hear design doubted on account of certain failures of\nprovision, waste of resources, or functionless condition of organs; but it\nis refreshingly new to have the very harmony itself of man with his\nsurroundings, and the completeness of provision for his wants and desires,\nbrought up as a refutation of the validity of the argument for design. It\nis hard, indeed, if man must be out of harmony with Nature in order to\njudge anything respecting it, or his relations with it; if he must have\nexperience of chaos before he can predicate anything of order.\n\nBut is it true that man has all that he conceives of, or thinks would be\nuseful, and has no \"negative evidence of design afforded by the absence of\na faculty\" to set against the positive evidence afforded by its presence?\nHe notes that he lacks the faculty of flight, sometimes wants it, and in\ndreams imagines that he has it, yet as thoroughly believes that he was\ndesigned not to have it as that he was designed to have the faculties and\norgans which he possesses. He notes that some animals lack sight, and so,\nwith this negative side of the testimony to the value of vision, he is \"apt\nto infer creative wisdom\" both in what he enjoys and in what the lower\nanimal neither needs nor wants. That man does not miss that which he has no\nconception of, and is by this limitation disqualified from judging rightly\nof what he can conceive and know, is what the Westminster Reviewer comes\nto, as follows:\n\n\n\"We value the constitution of our world because we live by it, and because\nwe cannot conceive ourselves as living otherwise. Our conceptions of\npossibility, of law, of regularity, of logic, are all derived from the same\nsource; and as we are constantly compelled to work with these conceptions,\nas in our increasing endeavors to better our condition and increase our\nprovision we are constantly compelled to guide ourselves by Nature's\nregulations, we accustom ourselves to look upon these regularities and\nconceptions as antecedent to all work, even to a Creator's, and to judge of\nthe origin of Nature as we judge of the origin of inventions and utilities\nascribable to man. This explains why the argument of design has enjoyed\nsuch universal popularity. But that such popularity is no criterion of the\nargument's worth, and that, indeed, it is no evidence of anything save of\nan unhappy weakness in man's mental constitution, is abundantly proved by\nthe explanation itself.\"    Well, the constitution and condition of man being\nsuch that he always does infer design in Nature, what stronger presumption\ncould there possibly be of the relevancy of the inference? We do not say of\nits correctness: that is another thing, and is not the present point. At\nthe last, as has well been said, the whole question resolves itself into\none respecting the ultimate veracity of Nature, or of the author of Nature,\nif there be any.\n\nPassing from these attempts to undermine the foundation of the\ndoctrine--which we judge to be unsuccessful--we turn to the consideration\nof those aimed at the superstructure. Evidences of design may be relevant,\nbut not cogent. They may, as Mill thought, preponderate, or the wavering\nbalance may incline the other way. There are two lines of argument: one\nagainst the sufficiency, the other against the necessity, of the principle\nof design. Design has been denied on the ground that it squares with only\none part of the facts, and fails to explain others; it may be superseded by\nshowing that all the facts are in the way of being explained without it.\n\nThe things which the principle of design does not explain are many and\nserious. Some are in their nature inexplicable, at least are beyond the\npower and province of science. Others are of matters which scientific\nstudents have to consider, and upon which they may form opinions, more or\nless well grounded. As to biological science--with which alone we are\nconcerned--it is getting to be generally thought that this principle, as\ncommonly understood, is weighted with much more than it can carry.\n\nThis statement will not be thought exaggerated by those most familiar with\nthe facts and the ideas of the age, and accustomed to look them in the\nface. Design is held to, no doubt, by most, and by a sure instinct; not,\nhowever, as always offering an explanation of the facts, but in spite of\nthe failure to do so. The stumbling-blocks are various, and they lie in\nevery path: we can allude only to one or two as specimens.\n\nAdaptation and utility are the marks of design. What, then, are organs not\nadapted to use marks of? Functionless organs of some sort are the heritage\nof almost every species. We have ways of seeming to account for them--and\nof late one which may really account for them--but they are unaccountable\non the principle of design. Some, shutting their eyes to the difficulty,\ndeny that we know them to be functionless, and prefer to believe they must\nhave a use because they exist, and are more or less connected with organs\nwhich are correlated to obvious use; but only blindfolded persons care to\ntread the round of so narrow a circle. Of late some such abortive organs in\nflowers and fruits are found to have a use, though not the use of their\nkind. But unwavering believers in design should not trust too much to\ninstances of this sort. There is an old adage that, if anything be kept\nlong enough, a use will be found for it. If the following up of this line,\nwhen it comes in our way, should bring us round again to a teleological\nprinciple, it will not be one which conforms to the prevalent ideas now\nattacked.\n\nIt is commonly said that abortive and useless organs exist for the sake of\nsymmetry, or as parts of a plan. To say this, and stop there, is a fine\ninstance of mere seeming to say something. For, under the principle of\ndesign, what is the sense of introducing useless parts into a useful\norganism, and what shadow of explanation does \"symmetry\" give? To go\nfurther and explain the cause of the symmetry and how abortive organs came\nto be, is more to the purpose, but it introduces quite another principle\nthan that of design. The difficulty recurs in a somewhat different form\nwhen an organ is useful and of exquisite perfection in some species, but\nfunctionless in another. An organ, such as an eye, strikes us by its\nexquisite and, as we may, perfect adaptation and utility in some animal; it\nis found repeated, still useful but destitute of many of its adaptations,\nin some animal of lower grade; in some one lower still it is rudimentary and\nuseless. It is asked, If the first was so created for its obvious and actual\nuse, and the second for such use as it has, what was the design of the\nthird? One more case, in which use after all is well subserved, we cite\nfrom the article already much quoted from:\n\n\n\"It is well known that certain fishes (Pleuronecta) display the singularity\nof having both eyes on the same side of their head, one eye being placed a\nlittle higher than the other. This arrangement has its utility; for the\nPleuronecta, swimming on their side quite near the bottom of the sea, have\nlittle occasion for their eyesight except to observe what is going on above\nthem. But the detail to which we would call notice is, that the original\nposition of the eyes is symmetrical in these fishes, and that it is only at\na certain point of their development that the anomaly is manifested, one of\nthe eyes passing to the other side of the head. It is almost inconceivable\nthat an intelligent being should have selected such an arrangement; and\nthat, intending the eyes to be used only on one side of the head, he should\nhave placed them originally on different sides.\"\n\n\nThen the waste of being is enormous, far beyond the common apprehension.\nSeeds, eggs, and other germs, are designed to be plants and animals, but\nnot one of a thousand or of a million achieves its destiny. Those that fall\ninto fitting places and in fitting numbers find beneficent provision, and,\nif they were to wake to consciousness, might argue design from the\nadaptation of their surroundings to their well-being. But what of the vast\nmajority that perish? As of the light of the sun, sent forth in all\ndirections, only a minute portion is intercepted by the earth or other\nplanets where some of it may be utilized for present or future life, so of\npotential organisms, or organisms begun, no larger proportion attain the\npresumed end of their creation.\n\n\n\"Destruction, therefore, is the rule; life is the exception. We notice\nchiefly the exception--namely, the lucky prize-winner in the lottery-- and\ntake but little thought about the losers, who vanish from our field of\nobservation, and whose number it is often impossible to estimate. But, in\nthis question of design, the losers are important witnesses. If the maxim\n'audi alteram partem' is applicable anywhere, it is applicable here. We\nmust hear both sides, and the testimony of the seed fallen on good ground\nmust be corrected by the testimony of that which falls by the wayside, or on\nthe rocks. When we find, as we have seen above, that the sowing is a\nscattering at random, and that, for one being provided for and living, ten\nthousand perish unprovided for, we must allow that the existing order would\nbe accounted as the worst disorder in any human sphere of action.\"\n\n\nIt is urged, moreover, that all this and much more applies equally to the\npast stages of our earth and its immensely long and varied succession of\nformer inhabitants, different from, yet intimately connected with, the\npresent. It is not one specific creation that the question has to deal\nwith--as was thought not very many years ago--but a series of creations\nthrough countless ages, and of which the beginning is unknown.\n\nThese references touch a few out of many points, and merely allude to some\nof the difficulties which the unheeding pass by, but which, when brought\nbefore the mind, are seen to be stupendous.\n\nSomewhat may be justly, or at least plausibly, said in reply to all this\nfrom the ordinary standpoint, but probably not to much effect. There were\nalways insuperable difficulties, which, when they seemed to be few, might\nbe regarded as exceptional; but, as they increase in number and variety,\nthey seem to fall into a system. No doubt we may still insist that, \"in the\npresent state of our knowledge, the adaptations in Nature afford a large\nbalance of probability in favor of creation by intelligence,\" as Mill\nconcluded; and probability must needs be the guide of reason through these\ndark places. Still, the balancing of irreconcilable facts is not a\nsatisfying occupation, nor a wholly hopeful one, while fresh weights are\nfrom time to time dropping into the lighter side of the balance. Strong as\nour convictions are, they may be overborne by evidence. We cannot rival the\nfabled woman of Ephesus, who, beginning by carrying her calf from the day of\nits birth, was still able to do so when it became an ox. The burden which\nour fathers carried comfortably, with some adventitious help, has become\ntoo heavy for our shoulders.\n\nSeriously, there must be something wrong in the position, some baleful\nerror mixed with the truth, to which this contradiction of our inmost\nconvictions may be attributed. The error, as we suppose, lies in the\ncombination of the principle of design with the hypothesis of the\nimmutability and isolated creation of species. The latter hypothesis, in\nits nature un-provable, has, on scientific grounds, become so far\nimprobable that few, even of the anti-Darwinian naturalists, now hold to it;\nand, whatever may once have been its religious claims, it is at present a\nhinderance rather than a help to any just and consistent teleology.\n\nBy the adoption of the Darwinian hypothesis, or something like it, which we\nincline to favor, many of the difficulties are obviated, and others\ndiminished. In the comprehensive and far-reaching teleology which may take\nthe place of the former narrow conceptions, organs and even faculties,\nuseless to the individual, find their explanation and reason of being.\nEither they have done service in the past, or they may do service in the\nfuture. They may have been essentially useful in one way in a past species,\nand, though now functionless, they may be turned to useful account in some\nvery different way hereafter. In botany several cases come to our mind\nwhich suggest such interpretation.\n\nUnder this view, moreover, waste of life and material in organic Nature\nceases to be utterly inexplicable, because it ceases to be objectless. It\nis seen to be a part of the general \"economy of Nature,\" a phrase which has\na real meaning. One good illustration of it is furnished by the pollen of\nflowers. The seeming waste of this in a pine-forest is enormous. It gives\nrise to the so-called \"showers of sulphur,\" which every one has heard of.\nMyriads upon myriads of pollen-grains (each an elaborate organic structure)\nare wastefully dispersed by the winds to one which reaches a female flower\nand fertilizes a seed. Contrast this with one of the close-fertilized\nflowers of a violet, in which there are not many times more grains of\npollen produced than there are of seeds to be fertilized; or with an\norchis-flower, in which the proportion is not widely different. These\nlatter are certainly the more economical; but there is reason to believe\nthat the former arrangement is not wasteful. The plan in the violet-flower\nassures the result with the greatest possible saving of material and\naction; but this result, being close-fertilization or breeding in and in,\nwould, without much doubt, in the course of time, defeat the very object of\nhaving seeds at all.[XIII-3] So the same plant produces other flowers also,\nprovided with a large surplus of pollen, and endowed (as the others are\nnot) with color, fragrance, and nectar, attractive to certain insects, which\nare thereby induced to convey this pollen from blossom to blossom, that it\nmay fulfill its office. In such blossoms, and in the great majority of\nflowers, the fertilization and consequent perpetuity of which are committed\nto insects, the likelihood that much pollen may be left behind or lost in\nthe transit is sufficient reason for the apparent superfluity. So, too, the\ngreater economy in orchis-flowers is accounted for by the fact that the\npollen is packed in coherent masses, all attached to a common stalk, the end\nof which is expanded into a sort of button, with a glutinous adhesive face\n(like a bit of sticking-plaster), and this is placed exactly where the head\nof a moth or butterfly will be pressed against it when it sucks nectar from\nthe flower, and so the pollen will be bodily conveyed from blossom to\nblossom, with small chance of waste or loss. The floral world is full of\nsuch contrivances; and while they exist the doctrine of purpose or final\ncause is not likely to die out. Now, in the contrasted case, that of\npine-trees, the vast superabundance of pollen would be sheer waste if the\nintention was to fertilize the seeds of the same tree, or if there were any\nprovision for insect-carriage; but with wide-breeding as the end, and the\nwind which \"bloweth where it listeth\" as the means, no one is entitled to\ndeclare that pine-pollen is in wasteful excess. The cheapness of\nwind-carriage may be set against the overproduction of pollen.\n\nSimilar considerations may apply to the mould-fungi and other very low\norganisms, with spores dispersed through the air in countless myriads, but\nof which only an infinitesimal portion find opportunity for development.\nThe myriads perish. The exceptional one, falling into a fit medium, is\nimagined by the Westminster Reviewer to argue design from the beneficial\nprovision it finds itself enjoying, in happy ignorance of the perishing or\nlatent multitude. But, in view of the large and important part they play\n(as the producers of all fermentation and as the omnipresent\nscavenger-police of Nature), no good ground appears for arguing either\nwasteful excess or absence of design from the vast disparity between their\npotential and their actual numbers. The reserve and the active members of\nthe force should both be counted in, ready as they always and everywhere\nare for service. Considering their ubiquity, persistent vitality, and\npromptitude of action upon fitting occasion, the suggestion would rather be\nthat, while\n\n\". . . thousands at His bidding speed,\nAnd post o'er land and ocean without rest,\nThey also serve [which] only stand and wait.\"\n\n\nFinally, Darwinian teleology has the special advantage of accounting for\nthe imperfections and failures as well as for successes. It not only\naccounts for them, but turns them to practical account. It explains the\nseeming waste as being part and parcel of a great economical process.\nWithout the competing multitude, no struggle for life; and without this, no\nnatural selection and survival of the fittest, no continuous adaptation to\nchanging surroundings, no diversification and improvement, leading from\nlower up to higher and nobler forms. So the most puzzling things of all to\nthe old-school teleologists are the principia of the Darwinian. In this\nsystem the forms and species, in all their variety, are not mere ends in\nthemselves, but the whole a series of means and ends, in the contemplation\nof which we may obtain higher and more comprehensive, and perhaps worthier,\nas well as more consistent, views of design in Nature than heretofore. At\nleast, it would appear that in Darwinian evolution we may have a theory that\naccords with if it does not explain the principal facts, and a teleology\nthat is free from the common objections.\n\nBut is it a teleology, or rather--to use the new-fangled term--a\ndysteleology? That depends upon how it is held. Darwinian evolution\n(whatever may be said of other kinds) is neither theistical nor\nnontheistical. Its relations to the question of design belong to the\nnatural theologian, or, in the larger sense, to the philosopher. So long as\nthe world lasts it will probably be open to any one to hold consistently, in\nthe last resort, either of the two hypotheses, that of a divine mind, or\nthat of no divine mind. There is no way that we know of C by which the\nalternative may be excluded. Viewed philosophically, the question only is,\nWhich is the better supported hypothesis of the two?\n\nWe have only to say that the Darwinian system, as we understand it,\ncoincides well with the theistic view of Nature. It not only acknowledges\npurpose (in the Contemporary Reviewer's sense), but builds upon it; and if\npurpose in this sense does not of itself imply design, it is certainly\ncompatible with it, and suggestive of it. Difficult as it may be to\nconceive and impossible to demonstrate design in a whole of which the\nseries of parts appear to be contingent, the alternative may be yet more\ndifficult and less satisfactory. If all Nature is of a piece--as modern\nphysical philosophy insists-- then it seems clear that design must in some\nway, and in some sense, pervade the system, or be wholly absent from it. Of\nthe alternatives, the predication of design--special, general, or\nuniversal, as the case may be--is most natural to the mind; while the\nexclusion of it throughout, because some utilities may happen, many\nadaptations may be contingent results, and no organic maladaptations could\ncontinue, runs counter to such analogies as we have to guide us, and leads\nto a conclusion which few men ever rested in. It need not much trouble us\nthat we are incapable of drawing clear lines of demarkation between mere\nutilities, contingent adaptations, and designed contrivances in Nature; for\nwe are in much the same condition as respects human affairs and those of\nlower animals. What results are comprehended in a plan, and what are\nincidental, is often more than we can readily determine in matters open to\nobservation. And in plans executed mediately or indirectly, and for ends\ncomprehensive and far-reaching, many purposed steps must appear to us\nincidental or meaningless. But the higher the intelligence, the more fully\nwill the incidents enter into the plan, and the more universal and\ninterconnected may the ends be. Trite as the remark is, it would seem still\nneedful to insist that the failure of a finite being to compass the designs\nof an infinite mind should not invalidate its conclusions respecting\nproximate ends which he can understand. It is just as in physical science,\nwhere, as our knowledge and grasp increase, and happy discoveries are made,\nwider generalizations are formed, which commonly comprehend, rather than\ndestroy, the earlier and partial ones. So, too, the \"sterility\" of the old\ndoctrine of final causes in science, and the presumptuous uses made of\nthem, when it was supposed that every adapted arrangement or structure\nexisted for this or that direct and special end, and for no other, can\nhardly be pressed to the conclusion that there are no final causes, i.e.,\nultimate reasons of things.[XIII-4] Design in Nature is distinguished from\nthat in human affairs--as it fittingly should be--by all comprehensiveness\nand system. Its theological synonym is Providence. Its application in\nparticular is surrounded by similar insoluble difficulties; nevertheless,\nboth are bound up with theism.\n\nProbably few at the present day will maintain that Darwinian evolution is\nincompatible with the principle of design; but some insist that the theory\ncan dispense with, and in fact supersedes, this principle.\n\nThe Westminster Reviewer cleverly expounds how it does so. The exposition\nis too long to quote, and an abstract is unnecessary, for the argument\nadverse to design is, as usual, a mere summation or illustration of the\nfacts and assumptions of the hypothesis itself, by us freely admitted.\nSimplest forms began; variations occurred among them; under the competition\nconsequent upon the arithmetical or geometrical progression in numbers,\nonly the fittest for the conditions survive and propagate, vary further, and\nare similarly selected; and so on.\n\n\n\"Progress having once begun by the establishment of species, the laws of\natavism and variability will suffice to tell the remainder of the story.\nThe colonies gifted with the faculty of forming others in their likeness\nwill soon by their increase become sole masters of the field; but the\ncommon enemy being thus destroyed, the struggle for life will be renewed\namong the conquerors. The saying that 'a house divided against itself\ncannot stand,' receives in Nature its flattest contradiction. Civil war is\nhere the very instrument of progress; it brings about the survival of the\nfittest. Original differences in the cell-colonies, however slight, will\nbring about differences of life and action; the latter, continued through\nsuccessive generations, will widen the original differences of structure;\ninnumerable species will thus spring up, branching forth in every direction\nfrom the original stock; and the competition of these species among each\nother for the ground they occupy, or the food they seek, will bring out and\ndevelop the powers of the rivals. One chief cause of superiority will lie\nin the division of labor instituted by each colony; or, in other words, in\nthe localization of the colony's functions. In the primitive associations\n(as in the lowest organisms existing now), each cell performed much the\nsame work as its neighbor, and the functions necessary to the existence of\nthe whole (alimentation, digestion, respiration, etc.) were exercised by\nevery colonist in his own behalf. Social life, however, acting upon the\ncells as it acts upon the members of a human family, soon created\ndifferences among them--differences ever deepened by continuance, and\nwhich, by narrowing the limits of each colonist's activity, and increasing\nhis dependence on the rest, rendered him fitter for his special task. Each\nfunction was thus gradually monopolized; but it came to be the appanage of a\nsingle group of cells, or organ; and so excellent did this arrangement\nprove, so greatly were the powers of each commonwealth enhanced by the\ndivision of its labor, that the more organs a colony possessed, the more\nlikely it was to succeed in its struggle for life. . . We shall go no\nfurther, for the reader will easily fill out the remainder of the picture\nfor himself. Man is but an immense colony of cells, in which the division\nof labor, together with the centralization of the nervous system, has\nreached its highest limit. It is chiefly to this that his superiority is\ndue; a superiority so great, as regards certain functions of the brain,\nthat he may be excused for having denied his humbler relatives, and dreamed\nthat, standing alone in the centre of the universe, sun, moon, and stars,\nwere made for him.\"\n\n\nLet us learn from the same writer how both eyes of the flounder get, quite\nunintentionally, on the same side of the head. The writer makes much of this\ncase (see p. 306), and we are not disposed to pass it by:\n\n\n\"A similar application may be made to the Pleuronecta. Presumably, these\nfishes had adopted their peculiar mode of swimming long before the position\nof their eyes became adapted to it. A spontaneous variation occurred,\nconsisting in the passage of one eye to the opposite side of the head; and\nthis variation afforded its possessors such increased facilities of sight\nthat in the course of time the exception became the rule. But the\nremarkable point is, that the law of heredity not only preserved the\nvariation itself, but the date of its occurrence; and that, although for\nthousands of years the adult Pleuronecta have had both eyes on the same\nside, the young still continue during their earlier development to exhibit\nthe contrary arrangement, just as if the variation still occurred\nspontaneously.\"\n\n\nHere a wonderful and one would say unaccountable transference takes place\nin a short time. As Steenstrup showed, one eye actually passes through the\nhead while the young fish is growing. We ask how this comes about; and we\nare told, truly enough, that it takes place in each generation because it\ndid so in the parents and in the whole line of ancestors. Why offspring\nshould be like parent is more than any one can explain; but so it is, in a\nmanner so nearly fixed and settled that we can count on it; yet not from\nany absolute necessity that we know of, and, indeed, with sufficiently\nstriking difference now and then to demonstrate that it might have been\notherwise, or is so in a notable degree. This transference of one eye\nthrough the head, from the side where it would be nearly useless to that in\nwhich it may help the other, bears all the marks of purpose, and so carries\nthe implication of design. The case is adduced as part of the evidence that\nDarwinian evolution supersedes design. But how? Not certainly in the way\nthis goes on from generation to generation; therefore, doubtless in the way\nit began. So we look for the explanation of how it came about at the first\nunintentionally or accidentally; how, under known or supposed conditions,\nit must have happened, or at least was likely to happen. And we read, \"A\nspontaneous variation occurred, consisting in the passage of one eye to the\nopposite side of the head.\" That is all; and we suppose there is nothing\nmore to be said. In short, this surprising thing was undesigned because it\ntook place, and has taken place ever since! The writer presumes, moreover\n(but this is an obiter dictum), that the peculiarity originated long after\nflounders had fixed the habit of swimming on one side (and in this\nparticular case it is rather difficult to see how the two may have gone on\npari passu), and so he cuts away all obvious occasion for the alteration\nthrough the summation of slight variations in one direction, each bringing\nsome advantage.\n\nThis is a strongly-marked case; but its features, although unusually\nprominent, are like those of the general run of the considerations by which\nevolution is supposed to exclude design. Those of the penultimate citation\nand its context are all of the same stamp. The differences which begin as\nvariations are said to be spontaneous--a metaphorical word of wide\nmeanings--are inferred to be casual (whereas we only know them to be\noccult), or to be originated by surrounding agencies (which is not in a just\nsense true); they are legitimately inferred to be led on by natural\nselection, wholly new structures or organs appear, no one can say how,\ncertainly no one can show that they are necessary outcomes of what\npreceded; and these two are through natural selection kept in harmony with\nthe surroundings, adapted to different ones, diversified, and perfected;\npurposes are all along subserved through exquisite adaptations; and yet the\nwhole is thought to be undesigned, not because of any assigned reason why\nthis or that must have been thus or so, but simply because they all\noccurred in Nature! The Darwinian theory implies that the birth and\ndevelopment of a species are as natural as those of an individual, are\nfacts of the same kind in a higher order. The alleged proof of the absence\nof design from it amounts to a simple reiteration of the statement, with\nparticulars. Now, the marks of contrivance in the structure of animals used\nnot to be questioned because of their coming in the way of birth and\ndevelopment. It is curious that a further extension of this birth and\ndevelopment should be held to disprove them. It appears to us that all this\nis begging the question against design in Nature, instead of proving that\nit may be dispensed with.\n\nTwo things have helped on this confusion. One is the notion of the direct\nand independent creation of species, with only an ideal connection between\nthem, to question which was thought to question the principle of design.\nThe other is a wrong idea of the nature and province of natural selection.\nIn former papers we have over and over explained the Darwinian doctrine in\nthis respect. It may be briefly illustrated thus: Natural selection is not\nthe wind which propels the vessel, but the rudder which, by friction, now\non this side and now on that, shapes the course. The rudder acts while the\nvessel is in motion, effects nothing when it is at rest. Variation answers\nto the wind: \"Thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell when it\ncometh and whither it goeth.\" Its course is controlled by natural\nselection, the action of which, at any given moment, is seemingly small or\ninsensible; but the ultimate results are great. This proceeds mainly\nthrough outward influences. But we are more and more convinced that\nvariation, and therefore the ground of adaptation, is not a product of, but\na response to, the action of the environment. Variations, in other words,\nthe differences between individual plants and animals, however originated,\nare evidently not from without but from within--not physical but\nphysiological.\n\nWe cannot here assign particularly the reasons for this opinion. But we\nnotice that the way in which varieties make their appearance strongly\nsuggests it. The variations of plants which spring up in a seed-bed, for\ninstance, seem to be in no assignable relation to the external conditions.\nThey arise, as we say, spontaneously, and either with decided characters\nfrom the first, or with obvious tendencies in one or few directions. The\noccult power, whatever it be, does not seem in any given case to act\nvaguely, producing all sorts of variations from a common centre, to be\nreduced by the struggle for life to fewness and the appearance of order;\nthere are, rather, orderly indications from the first. The variations of\nwhich we speak, as originating in no obvious casual relation to the\nexternal conditions, do not include dwarfed or starved, and gigantesque or\nluxuriant forms, and those drawn up or expanded on the one hand, or\ncontracted and hardened on the other, by the direct difference in the supply\nof food and moisture, light and heat. Here the action of the environment is\nboth obvious and direct. But such cases do not account for much in\nevolution.\n\nMoreover, while we see how the mere struggle and interplay among occurring\nforms may improve them and lead them on, we cannot well imagine how the\nadaptations which arrest our attention are thereby secured. Our difficulty,\nlet it be understood, is not about the natural origination of organs. To\nthe triumphant outcry, \"How can an organ, such as an eye, be formed under\nNature?\" we would respond with a parallel question, How can a complex and\nelaborate organ, such as a nettle-sting, be formed under Nature? But it is\nso formed. In the same species some individuals have these\nexquisitely-constructed organs and some have not. And so of other glands,\nthe structure and adaptation of which, when looked into, appear to be as\nwonderful as anything in Nature. The impossibility lies in conceiving how\nthe obvious purpose was effectuated under natural selection alone. This,\nunder our view, any amount of gradation in a series of forms goes a small\nway in explaining. The transit of a young flounder's eye across the head is\na capital instance of a wonderful thing done under Nature, and done\nunaccountably.\n\nBut simpler correlations are involved in similar difficulty. The\nsuperabundance of the pollen of pine-trees above referred to, and in\noak-trees, is correlated with chance fertilization under the winds. In the\nanalogous instance of willows a diminished amount of pollen is correlated\nwith direct transportation by insects. Even in so simple a case as this it\nis not easy to see how this difference in the conveyance would reduce the\nquantity of pollen produced. It is, we know, in the very alphabet of\nDarwinism that if a male willow-tree should produce a smaller amount of\npollen, and if this pollen communicated to the offspring of the female\nflowers it fertilized a similar tendency (as it might), this male progeny\nwould secure whatever advantage might come from the saving of a certain\namount of work and material; but why should it begin to produce less pollen?\nBut this is as nothing compared with the arrangements in orchid-flowers,\nwhere new and peculiar structures are introduced--structures which, once\noriginated and then set into variation, may thereupon be selected, and\nthereby led on to improvement and diversification. But the origination, and\neven the variation, still remains unexplained either by the action of\ninsects or by any of the processes which collectively are personified by\nthe term natural selection. We really believe that these exquisite\nadaptations have come to pass in the course of Nature, and under natural\nselection, but not that natural selection alone explains or in a just sense\noriginates them. Or rather, if this term is to stand for sufficient cause\nand rational explanation, it must denote or include that inscrutable\nsomething which produces--as well as that which results in the survival\nof--\"the fittest.\"\n\nWe have been considering this class of questions only as a naturalist might\nwho sought for the proper or reasonable interpretation of the problem\nbefore him, unmingled with considerations from any other source. Weightier\narguments in the last resort, drawn from the intellectual and moral\nconstitution of man, lie on a higher plane, to which it was unnecessary for\nour particular purpose to rise, however indispensable this be to a full\npresentation of the evidence of mind in Nature. To us the evidence, judged\nas impartially as we are capable of judging, appears convincing. But,\nwhatever view one unconvinced may take, it cannot remain doubtful what\nposition a theist ought to occupy. If he cannot recognize design in Nature\nbecause of evolution, he may be ranked with those of whom it was said,\n\"Except ye see signs and wonders ye will not believe.\" How strange that a\nconvinced theist should be so prone to associate design only with miracle!\n\nAll turns, however, upon what is meant by this Nature, to which it appears\nmore and more probable that the being and becoming--no less than the\nwell-being and succession--of species and genera, as well as of\nindividuals, are committed. To us it means \"the world of force and movement\nin time and space,\" as Aristotle defined it--the system and totality of\nthings in the visible universe. What is generally called Nature Prof.\nTyndall names matter--a peculiar nomenclature, requiring new definitions (as\nhe avers), inviting misunderstanding, and leaving the questions we are\nconcerned with just where they were. For it is still to ask: whence this\nrich endowment of matter? Whence comes that of which all we see and know is\nthe outcome? That to which potency may in the last resort be ascribed,\nProf. Tyndall, suspending further judgment, calls mystery--using the word\nin one of its senses, namely, something hidden from us which we are not to\nseek to know. But there are also mysteries proper to be inquired into and\nto be reasoned about; and, although it may not be given unto us to know the\nmystery of causation, there can hardly be a more legitimate subject of\nphilosophical inquiry. Most scientific men have thought themselves\nintellectually authorized to have an opinion about it. \"For, by the\nprimitive and very ancient men, it has been handed down in the form of\nmyths, and thus left to later generations, that the Divine it is which\nholds together all Nature;\" and this tradition, of which Aristotle, both\nnaturalist and philosopher, thus nobly speaks[XIII-5]--continued through\nsucceeding ages, and illuminated by the Light which has come into the\nworld--may still express the worthiest thoughts of the modern scientific\ninvestigator and reasoner.\n\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\nI-1. \"On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the\nPreservation of Favored Races in the Struggle for Life,\" by Charles Darwin,\nM.A., Fellow of the Royal, Geological, Linnaean, etc., Societies, Author of\n\"Journal of Researches during H. M. S. Beagle's Voyage round the World.\"\nLondon: John Murray. 1859. 502 pp., post 8vo.\n\nI-2. Article in this Journal, vol. xxiv., p. 305.\n\nI-3. \"Species tot sunt, quot diversas formas ab initio produxit Infinitum\nEns; quae formae secundum generationis inditas leges, produxere plures, at\nsibi semper similes.\"--Linn. Phil. Bot., 99, 157.\n\nI-4. Agassiz, \"Essay on Classification; Contributions to Natural History,\"\np. 132, et seq.\n\nI-5. As to this, Darwin remarks that he can only hope to see the law\nhereafter proved true (p. 449); and p. 338: \"Agassiz insists that ancient\nanimals resemble to a certain extent the embryos of recent animals of the\nsame classes; or that the geological succession of extinct forms is in some\ndegree parallel to the embryological development of recent forms. I must\nfollow Pictet and Huxley in thinking that the truth of this doctrine is\nvery far from proved. Yet I fully expect to see it hereafter confirmed, at\nleast in regard to subordinate groups, which have branched off from each\nother within comparatively recent times. For this doctrine of Agassiz\naccords well with the theory of natural selection.\"\n\nI-6. Op. cit., p. 131.--One or two Bridgewater Treatises, and most modern\nworks upon natural theology, should have rendered the evidences of thought\nin inorganic Nature not \"unexpected.\"\n\nI-7. Volume xvii. (2), 1854, p. 13.\n\nI-8. We suspect that this is not an ultimate fact, but a natural consequence\n   of inheritance--the inheritance of disease or of tendency to disease,\n   which close interbreeding perpetuates and accumulates, but wide\n   breeding may neutralize or eliminate.\n\nI-9. The rules and processes of breeders of animals, and their results, are\nso familiar that they need not be particularized. Less is popularly known\nabout the production of vegetable races. We refer our readers back to this\nJournal, vol. xxvii., pp. 440--442 (May, 1859), for an abstract of the\npapers of M. Vilmorin upon this subject.\n\nI-10. Quadrupeds of America,\" vol. ii., p. 239.\n\nI-11. \"Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences,\" vol. iv.,\np. 178.\n\nI-12. Owen adds a third, viz., vegetative repetition; but this, in the\nvegetable kingdom, is simply unity of type.\n\nI-13. \"Contributions to Natural History of America,\" vol. i., pp. 127--131.\n\nI-14. Op. cit., p. 130.\n\nII-1. To parry an adversary's thrust at a vulnerable part, or to show that\nit need not be fatal, is an incomplete defense. If the discussion had gone\non, it might, perhaps, have been made to appear that the Darwinian\nhypothesis, so far from involving the idea of necessity (except in the\nsense that everything is of necessity), was based upon the opposite idea,\nthat of contingency.\n\nIII-1. Vide \"Proceedings of the British Association for the Advancement of\nScience,\" 1859, and London Athenoeum, passim. It appears to be conceded\nthat these \"celts\" or stone knives are artificial productions, and\napparently of the age of the mammoth, the fossil rhinoceros, etc.\n\nIII-2. See \"Correspondence of M. Nickles,\" in American Journal of Science\nand Arts, for March, 1860.\n\nIII-3. See Morlot, \"Some General Views on Archaeology,\" in American Journal\nof Science and Arts, for January, 186o, translated from \"Bulletin de la\nSociete Vaudoise,\" 1859.\n\nIII-4. Page 484, English edition. In the new American edition (vide\nSupplement, pp. 431, 432) the principal analogies which suggest the extreme\nview are referred to, and the remark is appended: \"But this inference is\nchiefly grounded on analogy, and it is immaterial whether or not it be\naccepted. The case is different with the members of each great class, as\nthe Vertebrata or Articulata; for here we have in the laws of homology,\nembryology, etc., some distinct evidence that all have descended from a\nsingle primordial parent.\"\n\nIII-5. In Bibliotheque Universelle de Geneve, March, 1860.\n\nIII-6. This we learn from his very interesting article, \"De la Question de\nl'Homme Fossile,\" in the same (March) number of the Biblioteque\nUniverselle. (See, also, the same author's \"Note sur la Periode\nQuaternaire ou Diluvienne, consideree dans ses Rapports avec l'Epoque\nActuelle,\" in the number for August, 1860, of the same periodical.)\n\nIII-7. In Comptes Rendus, Academie des Sciences, February 2, 1857.\n\nIII-8. Whatever it may be, it is not \"the homoeopathic form of the\ntransmutative hypothesis,\" as Darwin's is said to be (p. 252, American\nreprint), so happily that the prescription is repeated in the second (p.\n259) and third (p. 271) dilutions, no doubt, on Hahnemann's famous\nprinciple, of an increase of potency at each dilution. Probably the\nsupposed transmutation is per saltus. \"Homoeopathic doses of\ntransmutation,\" indeed! Well, if we really must swallow transmutation in\nsome form or other, as this reviewer intimates, we might prefer the mild\nhomoeopathic doses of Darwin's formula to the allopathic bolus which the\nEdinburgh general practitioner appears to be compounding.\n\nIII-9. Vide North American Review, for April, 1860, p. 475, and Christian\nExaminer, for May, p. 457.\n\nIII-10. Page 188, English edition.\n\nIII-11. In American Journal of Science, July, 1860, pp. 147--149.\n\nIII-12. In \"Contributions to the Natural History of the United States,\" vol.\ni., p.128, 129.\n\nIII-13. Contributions to the Natural History of the United States,\" vol. 1,\np. 130; and American Journal of Science, July, 1860, p. 143.\n\nIII-14. North American Review for April 1860, p. 506.\n\nIII-15. Vide motto from Butler, prefixed to the second edition of Darwin's\nwork.\n\nIII-16. North American Review, loc. cit., p. 504.\n\nIII-17. North American Review, loc. cit., p. 487, et passim.\n\nIII-18. In American Journal of Science, July, 1860, p. 143.\n\nIII-19. Vide article by Mr. C. Wright, in the Mathematical Monthly for May\nlast.\n\nIII-20. Vide Edinburgh Review for January, 1860, article on\n\"Acclimatization,\" etc.\n\nIII-21. American Journal of Science, July, 1860, p. 146.\n\nIV-1. A name which, at the close of his article, De Candolle proposes for\nthe study of the succession of organized beings, to comprehend, therefore,\npalaeontology and all included under what is called geographical botany and\nzoology--the whole forming a science parallel to geology--the latter\ndevoted to the history of unorganized bodies, the former, to that of\norganized beings, as respects origin, distribution, and succession. We are\nnot satisfied with the word, notwithstanding the precedent of palaeontology;\nsince ontology, the Science of being, has an established meaning as\nreferring to mental existence--i.e., is a synonym for a department of\nmetaphysics.\n\nIV-2. Natural History Review, January, 1862\n\nIV-3. What the Rev. Principal Tulloch remarks in respect to the philosophy\nof miracles has a pertinent application here. We quote at second hand:\n\n\"The stoutest advocates of interference can mean nothing more than that the\nSupreme Will has so moved the hidden springs of Nature that a new issue\narises on given circumstances. The ordinary issue is supplanted by a higher\nissue. The essential facts before us are a certain set of phenomena, and a\nHigher Will moving them. How moving them? is a question for human\ndefinition; the answer to which does not and cannot affect the divine\nmeaning of the change. Yet when we reflect that this Higher Will is every.\nwhere reason and wisdom, it seems a juster as well as a more comprehensive\nview to regard it as operating by subordination and evolution, rather than\nby interference or violation.\"\n\nIV-4. Particularly citing Flourens: \"La ressemblance n'est qu'une condition\nsecondaire; la condition essentielle est la descendance: ce n'est pas la\nressemblance, c'est la succession des individus, qui fait l'espece.\"\n\nV-1. The phrase \"Atlantic United States\" is here used throughout in\ncontradistinction to Pacific United States: to the former of course belong,\nbotanically and geographically, the valley of the Mississippi and its\ntributaries up to the eastern border of the great woodless plains, which\nconstitute an intermediate region.\n\nV-2. The tabulated list referred to was printed as an appendix to the\nofficial edition of this discourse, but is here omitted.\n\nV-3. American Journal of Science, 1867, p. 402; \"Proceedings of American\nAcademy,\" vol. viii., p. 244.\n\nV-4. \"Memoirs of American Academy,\" vol. vi., pp. 377--458 (1859)\n\n\nV-5. Die vegetation der erde nach ihrer kilmatischen Anordnung,\" 1871.\n\nV-6. Reference should also be made to the extensive researches of Newberry\nupon the tertiary and cretaceous floras of the Western United States. See\nespecially Prof. Newberry's paper in the Boston Journal of Natural History,\nvol. vii., No. 4, describing fossil plants of Vancouver's Island, etc.; his\n\"Notes on the Later Extinct Floras of North America,\" etc., in \"Annals of\nthe Lyceum of Natural History,\" vol. ix., April, 1868; \"Report on the\nCretaceous and Tertiary Plants collected in Raynolds and Hayden's\nYellowstone and Missouri Exploring Expedition, 1859--1860,\" published in\n1869; and an interesting article entitled \"The Ancient Lakes of Western\nAmerica, their Deposits and Drainage,\" published in The American\nNaturalist, January, 1871.\n\nThe only document I was able to consult was Lesquereux's \"Report on the\nFossil Plants,\" in Hayden's report of 1872.\n\nV-7. There is, at least, one instance so opportune to the present argument\nthat it should not pass unnoticed, although I had overlooked the record\nuntil now. Onoclea sensibilis is a fern peculiar to the Atlantic United\nStates (where it is common and wide-spread) and to Japan. Prof. Newberry\nidentified it several years ago in a collection, obtained by Dr. Hayden, of\nmiocene fossil plants of Dakota Territory, which is far beyond its present\nhabitat. He moreover regards it as probably identical with a fossil specimen\n\"described by the late Prof. E. Forbes, under the name of Filicites\nHebridicus, and obtained by the Duke of Argyll from the island of Mull.\"\n\nV-8. \"Darwinism in Morals,\" in Theological Review, April, 1871.\n\nVI-1. \"Histoire des Sciences et des Sevants depuis deux Siecles, suivie\nd'autres etudes sur des sujets scientifiques, en particulier sur la\nSelection dans 1'Esp\u00e8ce Humaine, par Alphonse De Candolle.\" Geneve: H.\nGeorg. 1873.\n\n\"Addresses of George Bentham, President, read at the anniversary meetings\nof the Linnaean Society, 1862--1873.\"\n\n\"Notes on the Classification, History, and Geographical Distribution of\nCompositae. By George Bentham.\" Separate issue from the Journal of the\nLinnean Society. Vol. XIII. London. 1873.\n\n\"On Palaeontological Evidence of Gradual Modification of Animal Forms, read\nat the Royal Institution of Great Britain, April 25, 1873. By Prof. W.H.\nFlower.\" (Journal of the Royal Institution, pp. 11.)\n\n\"The Distribution and Migration of Birds. Memoir presented to the National\nAcademy of Sciences, January, 1865, abstracted in the American Journal of\nScience and the Arts. 1866, etc. By Spencer F. Baird.\"\n\n\"The Story of the Earth and Man. By J.W. Dawson, LL.D., F.R.S., F.G.S.,\nPrincipal and Vice-Chancellor of McGill University, Montreal. London:\nHodder & Stoughton; New York: Harper & Brothers. 1873. Pp. 403, 12mo.\n\nVI-2. Since this article was in type, noteworthy examples of appreciative\nscientific judgment of the derivative hypothesis have come to hand: 1. In\nthe opening address to the Geological Section of the British Association,\nat its recent meeting, by its president, the veteran Phillips, perhaps the\noldest surviving geologist after Lyell; and, 2. That of Prof. Allman,\nPresident of the Biological Section. The first touches the subject briefly,\nbut in the way of favorable suggestion; the second is a full and\ndiscriminating exposition of the reasons which seem to assure at least the\nprovisional acceptance of the hypothesis, as a guide in all biological\nstudies, \"a key to the order and hidden forces of the world of life.\"\n\nVII-1. \"The Theory of Evolution of Living Things, and the Application of the\nPrinciples of Evolution to Religion, considered as illustrative of the\n'Wisdom and Beneficence of the Almighty.' By the Rev. George Henslow, M.A.,\nF.L.S., F.G.S., etc.\" New York: Macmillan & Co. 1873. 12mo, pp. 220.\n\n\"Systematic Theology. By Charles Hodge, D.D., Professor in the Theological\nSeminary, Princeton, New Jersey. Vol. ii. (Part II, Anthropology.\") New\nYork: Charles Scribner & Co. 1872.\n\n\"Religion and Science: A Series of Sunday Lectures on the Relation of\nNatural and Revealed Religion, or the Truths Revealed in Nature and\nScripture. By Joseph Le Conte, Professor of Geology and Natural History in\nthe University of California.\" New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1874. 12mo, pp.\n324.\n\nVII-2. \"But with regard to the material world, we can at least go so far as\nthis-- we can perceive that events are brought about, not by insulated\ninterpositions of divine power, exerted in each particular case, but by the\nestablishment of general laws.--Whewell's Bridgewater Treatise.\n\n\"The only distinct meaning of the world 'natural' is stated, fixed, or\nsettled; since what is natural as much requires and presupposes an\nintelligent agent to render it so--i.e., to effect it continually or at\nstated times--as what is supernatural or miraculous does to effect it for\nonce.\"--Butler's Analogy.\n\nVIII-1. \"What Is Darwinism? By Charles Hodge, Princeton, N.J.\" New York:\n\nScribner, Armstrong & Co. 1874.\n\"The Doctrine of Evolution. By Alexander Winchell, LL.D., etc. New York:\nHarper & Brothers. 1874.\n\n\"Darwinism and Design; or, Creation by Evolution. By George St. Clair.\"\nLondon: Hodder & Stoughton. 1873.\n\n\"Westminster Sermons. By the Rev. Charles Kingsley, F.L.S., F.G.S., Canon\nof Westminster, etc.\" London and New York: Macmillan & Co. 1874.\n\nVIII-2. These two postulate-mottoes are quoted in full in a previous\narticle, in No. 446 of The Nation.\n\nXI-1. \"Insectivorous Plants. By Charles Darwin, M.A., F.R.S.\" With\nIllustrations. London: John Murray. 1875. Pp. 462. New York: D. Appleton &\nCo.\n\n\"The Movements and Habits of Climbing Plants. By Charles Darwin, M.A.,\nF.R.S., etc.\" Second Edition, revised, with Illustrations. London: John\nMurray. 1875. Pp. 208. New York: D. Appleton & Co.\n\nXI-2. The Nation, Nos. 457, 458, 1874. It was in these somewhat light and\ndesultory, but substantially serious, articles that some account of Mr.\nDarwin's observations upon the digestive powers of Drosera and Dionaea\nfirst appeared; in fact, their leading motive was to make sufficient\nreference to his then unpublished discoveries to guard against expected or\npossible claims to priority. Dr. Burdon-Sanderson's lecture, and the report\nin Nature, which first made them known in England, appeared later.\n\nA mistake on our part in the reading of a somewhat ambiguous sentence in a\nletter led to the remark, at the close of the first of those articles, that\nthe leaf-trap of Dionaea had been paralyzed on one side in consequence of a\ndexterous puncture. What was communicated really related to Drosera.\n\nXI-3. A. Gray, in \"Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and\nSciences,\" vol. iv., p. 98; and American Journal of Science and the Arts,\nMarch, 1859, p. 278.\n\nXII-1. \"Les Especes affines et la Theorie de l'Evolution,\" par Charles\nNaudin, Membre de l'Institut, in Bulletin de la Societe Botanique de\nFrance, tome xxi., pp. 240-272, 1874. See also Comptes Rendus, September 27\nand October 4, 1875, reproduced in \"Annales des Sciences Naturelles,\" 1876,\npp. 73-81.\n\nXII-2. In noticing M. Naudin's paper in the Comptes Rendus, now reprinted in\nthe \"Annales des Sciences Naturelles,\" entitled \"Variation desordonnee des\nPlantes Hybrides et Deductions qu'on peut en tirer,\" we were at a loss to\nconceive why he attributed all present variation of species to atavism,\ni.e., to the reappearance of ancestral characters (American Journal of\nScience, February, 1876). His anterior paper was not then known to us; from\nwhich it now appears that this view comes in as a part of the hypothesis of\nextreme plasticity and variability at the first, subsiding at length into\nentire fixity and persistence of character. According to which, it is\nassumed that the species of our time have lost all power of original\nvariation, but can still reproduce some old ones--some reminiscences, as it\nwere, of youthful vagaries--in the way of atavism.\n\nXIII-1. London, 1862.\n\nXIII-2. Hume, in his \"Essays,\" anticipated this argument. But he did not\nrest on it. His matured convictions appear to be expressed in statements\nsuch as the following, here cited at second hand from Jackson's \"Philosophy\nof Natural Theology,\" a volume to which a friend has just called our\nattention:\n\n\"Though the stupidity of men,\" writes Hume, \"barbarous and uninstructed, be\nso great that they may not see a sovereign author in the more obvious works\nof Nature, to which they are so much familiarized, yet it scarce seems\npossible that any one of good understanding should reject that idea, when\nonce it is suggested to him. A purpose, an intention, a design, is evident\nin everything; and when our comprehension is so far enlarged as to\ncontemplate the first rise of this visible system, we must adopt, with the\nstrongest conviction, the idea of some intelligent cause or author. The\nuniform maxims, too, which prevail throughout the whole frame of the\nuniverse, naturally, if not necessarily, lead us to conceive this\nintelligence as single and undivided, where the prejudices of education\noppose not so reasonable a theory. Even the contrarieties of Nature, by\ndiscovering themselves everywhere, become proofs of some consistent plan,\nand establish one single purpose or intention, however inexplicable and\nincomprehensible.\"---(\"Natural History of Religion,\" xv.)\n\n\"In many views of the universe, and of its parts, particularly the latter,\nthe beauty and fitness of final causes strike us with such irresistible\nforce that all objections appear (what I believe they really are) mere\ncavils and sophisms.\"-- (\"Dialogues concerning Natural Religion,\" Part X.)\n\n\"The order and arrangement of Nature, the curious adjustment of final\ncauses, the plain use and intention of every part and organ, all these\nbespeak in the clearest language an intelligent cause or author.\"--(Ibid.,\nPart IV.)\n\n\n\nXIII-3. See Section I, Chapter 12.\n\nXIII-4. \"No single and limited good can be assigned by us as the final cause\nof any contrivance in Nature. The real final cause . . . is the sum of all\nthe uses to which it is ever to be put. Any use to which a contrivance of\nNature is put, we may be sure, is a part of its final cause.\"--(G. F.\nWright, in The New-Englander, October, 1871.)\n\nXIII-5. \"No single and limited good can be assigned by us as the final cause\nof any contrivance in Nature. The real final cause . . . is the sum of all\nthe uses to which it is ever to be put. Any use to which a contrivance of\nNature is put, we may be sure, is a part of its final cause.\"--(G. F.\nWright, in The New-Englander, October, 1871.)","title":"Darwiniana; Essays and Reviews Pertaining to Darwinism","tradition":"scripture-revelation","translated_text":null,"word_count":107082}