{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_52814/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_52814","id":"gutenberg_52814","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/52814","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Vico, Giambattista, 1668-1744"],"text":"THE PHILOSOPHY\n\nOF GIAMBATTISTA VICO.\n\nBY BENEDETTO CROCE\n\n\nTRANSLATED BY R. G. COLLINGWOOD\n\nFELLOW AND LECTURER OF PEMBROKE COLLEGE, OXFORD\n\n\nNEW YORK\n\nTHE MACMILLAN COMPANY\n\n1913\n\n\n\nTO\n\nWILHELM WINDELBAND\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE\n\n\nMy reasons for believing that a new exposition of Vico's philosophy is\nrequired may easily be inferred from the observations on the effects of\nhis work and the biographical notes which form respectively the second\nand fourth appendices to this volume.\n\nHere I merely wish to state that my exposition is not meant for a\nsummary of Vico's writings work by work and part by part. It rather\npresupposes an acquaintance with these writings, and, where that is\nlacking, is intended to induce the reader to procure them in order to\nfollow better and to check the interpretation and estimate of them here\noffered.\n\nOn this supposition, though I have made free use of my author's actual\nwords, especially in the chapters dealing with history, I have not\nthought it desirable to mark them as quotations except where it was\nimportant to emphasise the precise phrase of the original. I have in\ngeneral combined such passages from fragments scattered over a wide\nfield, sometimes abbreviating, sometimes amplifying, and always freely\nadding words and phrases of my own by way of commentary: and the\ncontinual use of quotation marks would merely have shown up in a manner\nmore wearisome than valuable the reverse side of my embroidery, which\nany reader who so desires can study by the help of the references given\nat the end of the book.\n\nIn my anxiety to show in every detail of my work, so far as I could,\nthe veneration due to the great name of Vico, I have endeavoured to\nbe brief with the brevity at which he himself aimed as the hall-mark\nof sterling scientific thought. With this in view I have refrained\neven from controversy with his various interpreters, and have either\ncontented myself with mere remarks, or more often left my details\nto be justified by the coherence of my view as a whole. Some of the\ninterpretations supported by me I believe to be the mature fruit of\nthe investigations and controversies which form the greater part\nof the literature on Vico: all the rest, for which I am personally\nresponsible, and the general idea of my book, I will defend against\nalternative and contradictory views when occasion arises, should it\never do so, in the detailed and direct manner which I have not thought\nit necessary to adopt in the course of my exposition. I hope, in fact,\nthat the present work will rekindle rather than quench the discussion\nof Vico's philosophy: since in him we have, as Goethe calls him, the\n_Altvater_ whom a nation is happy to possess, and to him we must hark\nback for a time in order to imbue our modern philosophy with an Italian\nfeeling, however cosmopolitan it may be in thought.\n\nThe dedication of my book, besides being a token of respect to one of\nthe greatest modern teachers of the history of philosophy, is intended\nto express the expectation and hope that the gap in this history to\nwhich I have called attention more than once, especially on page 277 of\nthe present volume, may soon be filled.\n\nB. C.\n\nRAIANO (AQUILA),\n\n_September_ 1910.\n\n\n\n\nTRANSLATOR'S NOTE\n\nThis volume represents the author's _La Filosofia di Giambattista Vico_\n(Bari, 1911) forming vol. ii. of his _Saggi filosofici_; and also\ncontains a paper read before the Accademia Pontaniana in March 1912\nentitled \"Le Fonti della gnoseologia vichiana,\" which figures here as\nAppendix III. The whole of the translation has been revised by the\nAuthor.\n\nR. G. C.\n\nOXFORD, 1913.\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n\n      I. VICO'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE: FIRST PHASE\n     II. VICO'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE: SECOND PHASE\n    III. INTERNAL STRUCTURE OF THE NEW SCIENCE\n     IV. THE IMAGINATIVE FORM OF KNOWLEDGE (POETRY AND LANGUAGE)\n      V. THE SEMI-IMAGINATIVE FORM OF KNOWLEDGE (MYTH AND RELIGION)\n     VI. THE MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS\n    VII. MORALITY AND RELIGION\n   VIII. MORALITY AND LAW\n     IX. THE HISTORICAL ASPECT OF LAW\n      X. PROVIDENCE\n     XI. THE LAW OF REFLUX\n    XII. METAPHYSICS\n   XIII. TRANSITION TO HISTORY: GENERAL CHARACTER OF VICO'S TREATMENT OF HISTORY\n    XIV. NEW PRINCIPLES FOR THE HISTORY OF OBSCURE AND LEGENDARY PERIODS\n     XV. HEROIC SOCIETY\n    XVI. HOMER AND PRIMITIVE POETRY\n   XVII. THE HISTORY OF ROME AND THE RISE OF DEMOCRACY\n  XVIII. THE RETURN OF BARBARISM: THE MIDDLE AGES\n    XIX. VICO AND THE TENDENCIES OF CONTEMPORARY CULTURE\n     XX. CONCLUSION: VICO AND LATER THOUGHT, PHILOSOPHICAL AND HISTORICAL\n\nAPPENDICES\n\n      I. ON THE LIFE AND CHARACTER OF G. B. VICO\n     II. THE LATER HISTORY OF VICO'S THOUGHT\n    III. THE SOURCES OF VICO'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE\n     IV. BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES\n\nNOTE.--PASSAGES OF VICO'S WORKS TO WHICH ESPECIAL\nREFERENCE IS MADE IN THE COURSE OF THE\nEXPOSITION\n\nINDEX OF NAMES\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I\n\n\nVICO'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE: FIRST PHASE\n\n\nThe earliest phase of Vico's theory of knowledge takes the form of a\ndirect criticism of and antithesis to the Cartesianism which had guided\nEuropean thought for more than half a century, and was to maintain its\nsupremacy over mind and spirit for another hundred years.\n\nDescartes, as is well known, had placed the ideal of perfect science in\ngeometry, and endeavoured to reform philosophy and every other branch\nof knowledge upon this model. Now the geometrical method proceeds\nanalytically till it reaches a self-evident truth, and thence by\nsynthetic deduction it advances to more and more complex propositions.\nAccordingly, if philosophy were to adopt a rigorous scientific method,\nit also (thought Descartes) must look for a solid foundation in the\nshape of an elementary and self-evident truth from which to deduce all\nits subsequent statements, whether theological, metaphysical, physical,\nor ethical. Thus self-evidence--the \"clear and distinct perception\nor idea\"--was the supreme test: immediate inference--the intuitive\nconnexion of thought with existence, _cogito_ with _sum--_ provided the\nelementary truth and the foundation of knowledge. By means of the clear\nand distinct perception, together with the systematic doubt which led\nhim to the _cogito,_ Descartes persuaded himself that he had once and\nfor all made an end of scepticism.\n\nBut, by the same argument, all knowledge which had not been or could\nnot be reduced to clear and distinct perception and geometrical\ndeduction was bound to lose in his eyes all value and importance. This\nincluded history, as founded upon testimony; observation of nature,\nwhen not within the sphere of mathematics; practical wisdom and\neloquence, which draw their validity from empirical knowledge of human\ncharacter; and poetry, with its world of imaginary presentations. Such\nproducts of the mind were for Descartes illusions, chaotic visions,\nrather than knowledge: confused ideas, destined either to become clear\nand distinct and so no longer to exist in their original nature, or\nelse to drag on a miserable existence unworthy of a philosopher's\nconsideration. The daylight of the mathematical method rendered useless\nthe lamps which, while they guide us in the darkness, throw deceptive\nshadows.\n\nVico, unlike the other opponents of Descartes, did not confine himself\nto or waste time in scandalised outcries at the danger to religion\nentailed by the subjective method. He did not inquire, like the\nschoolmen, whether the _cogito_ was or was not a syllogism, and if so\nwhether it was or was not defective. He did not join in the protest\nof outraged common-sense against the Cartesian contempt of history,\nrhetoric, and poetry. He went straight to the heart of the question,\nto Descartes' criterion of scientific truth itself, the principle of\nself-evidence. While the French philosopher believed himself to have\nsatisfied all the demands of the strictest science, Vico saw that as\na matter of fact, in view of the need which he set out to meet, his\nproposed method gave little or no assistance.\n\nFine knowledge, says Vico, this of the clear and distinct idea! That\nI think what I think is certainly an indubitable fact; but it has by\nno means the appearance of a scientific statement. Any idea, however\nfalse, may seem self-evident: that I think it so does not give it\nthe force of knowledge. That \"he who thinks, exists\" was a fact well\nknown to Plautus's Sosia, who expressed this conviction in almost\nthe identical words of the Cartesian philosophy: \"but when I think,\nI certainly exist\" (_sed quom cogito, equidem certo sum_). But the\nsceptic will always reply to a Sosia or a Descartes that he has no\ndoubt as to thought; he will even strongly maintain that whatever seems\nto him cogent is certain, and will uphold it against all objections;\nand that he has no doubt as to existence: in fact, he is seeking\nafter it in the right way by suspending judgment and not adding to\nthe obscurity of facts other obscurities arising from opinions. But\nwhile asserting all this he will still maintain that the certitude\nof his thought and of his existence is the certitude not of science\nbut of consciousness, and of common consciousness at that. Clear and\ndistinct perception is so far from being science that since, owing to\nCartesianism, the principle has been applied to physics, our knowledge\nof nature has become no more certain. Descartes tried to leap from the\nplane of common consciousness to that of science: he fell back into\ncommon consciousness again without having touched his scientific ideal.\n\nBut in what does scientific truth consist, if not in immediate\nconsciousness? How does science differ from simple consciousness? What\nis the criterion, or, in other words, what is the condition which makes\nscience possible? Clearness and distinctness do not take us a step\nforward. The formulation of an elementary truth does not solve the\nproblem. The question concerns not a primary truth, but the form which\ntruth must have to enable us to recognise it for scientific or real\ntruth.\n\nIn meeting this question, Vico justified his criticism of the\ninadequacy of the Cartesian criterion by appealing to a principle\nwhich at first sight may seem trite and obvious. It is trite not\nbecause of the historic theory with which Vico associated it, a theory\nlater refuted by himself: not, that is, because it belongs to one of\nthe earliest strata of Italian philosophy; but in the sense that it\nwas common to and practically inseparable from Christian thought.\nTo a Christian who declares every day his belief in a God Almighty,\nOmniscient, Maker of heaven and earth, nothing is more familiar than\nthe assertion that God alone can fully know all things, because he\nalone is their creator. The primal truth, Vico repeats, is in God,\nbecause God is the primal creator. It is an infinite truth because he\nis the maker of all things, and absolute because it displays to him the\ninternal and external qualities of things, all of which he contains in\nhimself.\n\nThis same principle of religion and theology had been already invoked\nin a philosophical context by certain sceptics, as a weapon against\nthe presumptuous claims of human knowledge. Francisco Sanchez, for\nexample, in his _Quod nihil scitur_ (1581), in discussing the difficulty\nof knowing the nature and powers of the soul, had observed that if man\ncould have this knowledge in a perfect degree he would be like God,\nor rather he would be God himself: since it is impossible \"that one\nshould know perfectly things which he has not created, nor could God\nhave created things of which he had not perfect foreknowledge, nor\nruled them when created: he himself therefore, being alone the perfect\nwisdom, knowledge, and intellect, penetrates all things, is wise\nconcerning all things, knows all things, and understands all things,\nbecause he is all things and in all things, and all things are he and\nin him\" (_perfecte cognoscere quis quae non creavit, nec Deus creare\npotuisset nec creata regere quae non perfecte praecognovisset: ipse\nergo solus sapientia cognitio intellectus perfectus omnia penetrat\nomnia sapit omnia cognoscit omnia intelligit, quia ipse omnia est et\nin omnibus, omniaque ipse sunt et in ipso_).[1] But Sanchez appeals to\nthis thought only in passing, and without grasping its philosophical\nimport or realising that his hand was resting upon a treasure; while\nVico for the first time drew from the praise of the infinite power\nand wisdom of God, and from their contrast with the limited faculties\nof man, the universal principle of his theory of knowledge, that the\ncondition under which a thing can be known is that the knower should\nhave made it, that the true is identical with the created: _verum ipsum\nfactum._\n\nThis, he explained, is precisely what is meant by saying that science\nis to know by causes, _per causas scire._ Since a cause is that which\nhas no need of anything external in order to produce its effect, it\nis the genus or mode of a thing: to know the cause is to be able to\nrealise the thing, to deduce it from its cause and create it. In other\nwords, it is an ideal repetition of a process which has been or is\nbeing practically performed. Cognition and action must be convertible\nand identical, just as with God intellect and will are convertible and\nform one single unity.\n\nNow once this connexion of the true with the created is recognised as\nthe ideal, and indeed, since the ideal is the truly real, as the true\nnature of science, the first consequence of such a recognition must be\nthat science is unattainable to man. If God created the world, he alone\nknows it _per causas,_ he alone knows its genera or modes, he alone\npossesses scientific knowledge of it. Did man make the world? Did he\nmake his own soul?\n\nTo man is vouchsafed, not science, but only consciousness, which\nmerely traverses objects without being able to show the genus or form\nwhence they proceed. The truth of consciousness is the human side\nof divine wisdom, related to it as the surface to the solid: rather\nthan truth, we ought to call it certitude. For God, _intellegere,_\nunderstanding; for man only _cogitare,_ thought, the faculty that\ngleans elements of reality, but can never gather them all. For\nGod, true demonstration; for man, observations undemonstrated and\nunscientific, but either certain through indubitable evidence, probable\nthrough sound reasoning, or convincing because of a plausible guess.\n\nCertitude, the truth of consciousness, is not science; but it is not\non that account false. Vico was careful not to call the theories of\nDescartes false: his intention was only to lower them from complete\ntruth to fragmentary truth, from science to consciousness. _Cogito ergo\nsum_ is very far from false. That we find it expressed by Plautus's\nSosia is an argument not for rejecting it, but for accepting it; only,\nas a truth of simple consciousness. Thought is not the cause of my\nexistence, and as such is not the ground of scientific knowledge of\nthat existence. If it were, since man, as the Cartesians admitted,\nconsists of body and mind, thought would be the cause of the body: a\ndoctrine which would plunge us into all the mazes of the controversy on\nthe mutual effects of mind and matter. The _cogito,_ then, is a mere\nsign or indication of my existence, and nothing more. The clear and\ndistinct idea cannot serve as a criterion even of the mind itself, to\nsay nothing of other things; since the mind, though it knows itself,\ndoes not create itself, and accordingly is ignorant of the genus or\nmode by which it has this knowledge. But the clear and distinct idea\nis all that is granted to human thought, and, as the only wealth\nit possesses, is beyond price. For Vico, too, metaphysic holds the\nhighest place among the human sciences, and all others depend upon\nit; but while for Descartes it can proceed by a method of absolute\ndemonstration parallel to that of geometry, for Vico it must be\nsatisfied with probabilities. It is a science not by causes, but of\ncauses. And with probabilities it has been content in its greatest\nperiods, in ancient Greece and in Italy at the Renaissance. Whenever,\nintoxicated by the arrogance that declares that \"a wise man has no\nopinions\" (_sapientem nihil opinati_), it has sought to abandon the\nprobable, it has set its feet upon the path of confusion and decadence.\nThe existence of God is certain, but not scientifically demonstrable;\nand any attempt at such a demonstration must be considered a proof not\nso much of piety as of impiety, since to demonstrate God we must create\nhim: man must become the creator of God. Similarly we must accept as\ntrue all that God has revealed; but we must not ask how it comes to be\ntrue. That we can never understand. Human science bases itself upon\nrevealed truth and the consciousness of God, and finds there its test\nof truth; but the foundation itself is not science, but consciousness.\n\nJust as Vico depreciated metaphysics, theology, and physics, the\nsciences upon which Descartes had bestowed honour and attention, so\nhe reinstated those branches of knowledge which Descartes had in\nturn despised; namely, history, observation of nature, empirical\nknowledge of man and society, eloquence and poetry. Or rather, he could\nvindicate them without reinstating them. Once he had shown that the\nlofty truths of a geometrically deduced philosophy were themselves\nbrought down to mere probability, to statements having the validity of\nsimple consciousness, the other forms of knowledge were _ipso facto_\nconclusively vindicated. All now found themselves upon an equality\nin the position, whether high or low, which we have described. The\nidea of a perfect human science, holding itself aloof from another\nscience unworthy of the title, as founded not on reason but on\nauthority, was shown to be illusory. The authority of observations\nand beliefs, whether one's own or others', public opinion, tradition,\nthe consciousness of mankind, were restored to the position which\nthey had always held: a position which they held even for Descartes\nhimself, who, as often happens, despised the resources in which he was\nrichest and of which he made the greatest use. A conspicuously learned\nman, he depreciated learning and scholarship, as one who has received\nnourishment from it might give himself the luxury of speaking with\ncontempt of the common food which by now forms the very blood in his\nveins.\n\nThe Cartesian polemic against authority had proved in some respects\nbeneficial. It put an end to the servile attitude, all too common, of\ncontinual appeals to authority. But this error was not more prevalent\nthan that of private judgment, which presumed to reorganise knowledge\nfrom top to bottom on the strength of the individual consciousness:\na tendency which ultimately, as in the case of Malebranche, leads to\nprophesying the immolation of all the ancient philosophers and poets,\nand a return to the nakedness of Adam. It is a fallacy, or at least\nan excess, which should be avoided by adopting a sound middle course.\nThis course consists in following private judgment with due regard to\nauthority; in a true catholic union of faith with a criticism limited\nby and helpful to faith; bearing in mind the necessary character of\nmere probability which is proper to human knowledge or science, and\navoiding the tendency of the Reformation which elevates each man's\ninner consciousness into a divine guide in matters of belief.\n\nTo another group of the Cartesian sciences, however, Vico seems to\ngrant a privileged position, one, that is, not of consciousness but\nof science strictly so called, in the sphere not of certitude but\nof truth; namely, the mathematical sciences. These, according to\nhim, form the only region in which man's knowledge is identical in\ncharacter with God's, perfect and demonstrative. This is not due, as\nDescartes supposed, to their self-evident character. Self-evidence,\nwhen employed in physical science and in matters of action, does\nnot yield truth of the same conclusiveness as in mathematics. Nor\nis mathematics in itself self-evident. What clear and distinct idea\ncan lead, for instance, to the conception of a line as composed of\npoints having no parts? But the indivisible point which cannot be\nconceived in the world of reality, can be nevertheless denned. By\ndefining certain names, man creates the elements of mathematics; by\nthe postulates, he carries them on to infinity; by the axioms, he\nestablishes certain eternal truths; and, disposing these elements with\nthe help of these infinities and this eternity, he creates the truth\nwhich he teaches. The validity of mathematics then arises not from the\nCartesian principle, but precisely from Vico's other proposition, the\nconversion of knowledge with creation. \"We demonstrate mathematics,\nbecause we create their truth\" (_mathematica demonstramus, quia verum\nfacimus_). Man assumes unity and multiplicity, points and figures, and\ncreates numbers and quantities which he knows perfectly because they\nare his own work. Mathematics is a constructive science; not only in\nits problems, but even in its theorems, which are commonly supposed\nto be mere objects of contemplation. For this reason it is a science\nwhich demonstrates _per causas,_ in opposition to that other common\nview which excludes from mathematics the concept of causation. It is in\nfact the only one among all the human sciences which truly demonstrates\nby causes. Hence its extraordinary accuracy. The whole secret of the\ngeometrical method lies first in defining the terms, that is, creating\nthe concepts which are to be the subject matter of our reasoning;\nsecondly, in establishing certain common principles by mutual\nconsent of the disputants; and lastly, if required, in making certain\npostulates of such a nature that they can be granted, to enable us to\nproceed with our deductions, which without such an agreement could\nmake no progress; then, upon these principles, to advance by degrees\nfrom the demonstration of the simplest truths to the most complex, and\nnot to affirm the complex propositions before examining singly their\ncomponent parts.\n\nIt might be said that, as to the validity of mathematics, Vico is in\nagreement with Descartes; he differs from him only in his reason for\nthis validity. And, admitting that Vico's reason must be thought the\nmore profound, this would only enhance and strengthen the mathematical\nideal which Descartes had set before science. If mathematics is the one\nperfect form of knowledge attained by the human mind, obviously we must\nfound the others upon it, and either remodel or condemn them according\nto its pattern. Vico, in short, was hasty in declaring Descartes wrong:\nhe had found a better argument whose existence the latter had not\nsuspected. But, however strongly this may appear at first sight (and so\nit has appeared to some commentators), on a closer examination it is\nseen that the high perfection attributed by Vico to mathematics is more\napparent than real; that the vaunted conclusiveness of its method is by\nhis own confession gained at the expense of truth: in a word, that the\nstress of his theory falls less on the truth of mathematics than on its\narbitrary nature.\n\nThe fact is, that man, while occupying himself with the investigation\nof the nature of things, and ultimately realising his total inability\nto attain it, not having in himself the elements of which they are\ncomposed, which are indeed all external to his nature, is led by\ndegrees to the intention of profiting by this very fault of his\nmind. By means of abstraction--not, be it remembered, abstraction\nfrom material things, for Vico is opposed to the empirical origin\nof mathematics, but abstraction brought to bear on metaphysical\nentities--he creates two fictions, _duo sibi confingit_: the point in\ngeometrical figures, and unity in multiplication. Each is a fiction,\n_utrumque fictum,_ because the point when drawn is no longer a point,\nand the unit when multiplied is no longer one. Then, from these\nfictions, by his own arbitrary fiat, _proprio iure,_ he assumes an\ninfinite process, so that lines may be produced or the unit multiplied\n_ad infinitum._ Thus he constructs for his own purposes a world of\nforms and numbers, all of which he embraces within himself; and by\nlengthening, shortening, and combining the lines and adding and\nsubtracting the numbers, he performs infinite operations and learns\ninfinite truths. Since he cannot define things, he defines names; since\nhe cannot reach the elements of reality he satisfies himself with\nimaginary elements, the ideas arising from which admit of no dispute.\nLike God, _ad Dei instar,_ from no material substrate and, as it were,\nout of nothing he creates the point, the line, and the surface; the\npoint, assumed as that which has no parts; the line, as the locus of\na point, or as length without breadth or depth; and the surface, as\nthe meeting of two different lines in one point, that is, length and\nbreadth without depth. Thus mathematics overcomes the failing of human\nknowledge, that its objects are always external to itself, and that the\nmind which endeavours to know them has not created them. Mathematics\ncreates what it knows; it contains in itself its own elements, and\nthus forms a perfect copy of the divine knowledge (_scientiae divinae\nsimiles evadunt_).\n\nThe reader of these and other similar descriptions and praises by Vico\nof the processes of mathematics seems to observe in them something like\na tinge of irony; which, if not actually intentional, certainly results\nfrom the facts of the case. The brilliant truth of mathematics arises,\nit appears, from despair of attaining truth; its tremendous power\nfrom the knowledge of impotence. The similarity of the mathematician\nto God is not altogether unlike that of the imitator of an object to\nits creator. What God is in the universe of reality, man is in the\nuniverse of quantity and number,--a universe indeed, but one peopled by\nabstractions and fictions. The divinity which has been conferred upon\nman is only, so to speak, a Twelfth-night Godhead.\n\nThe different origin assigned by Vico to mathematics results in\na correspondingly profound change in the validity of its truth.\nMathematics no longer, as with Descartes, stands at the summit of human\nknowledge, an aristocratic science, destined to reclaim and to rule\nover the inferior sciences. It occupies a field as strictly limited as\nit is unique, beyond which if it ever attempts to pass it loses in a\nmoment its magical virtue.\n\nThe power of mathematics is met by obstacles both _a parte ante_ and\n_a parte post,_ in its foundations and in the superstructure which in\nits turn it is to support. In its foundations, because if it creates\nits own elements, that is to say, the initial fictions, it does not\ncreate the matter of which they are formed, which is given to it no\nless than to the other human sciences by metaphysics, which while\nit cannot supply it with its true subject matter, supplies it with\ndefinite images of it. From metaphysics, geometry takes the point by\ndrawing it, that is by annihilating it as a point, and arithmetic the\nunit by multiplying it, that is by destroying it _qua_ unit. But since\nmetaphysical truth, however certain it may seem to consciousness,\nis indemonstrable, mathematics itself rests in the last resort upon\nauthority and probability. This is enough to expose the fallaciousness\nof any mathematical treatise which makes use of metaphysics. Vico seems\nto be involved in a kind of circle between geometry and metaphysics,\nof which the former, according to him, owes its truth to the latter,\nand after receiving it gives it back again to metaphysics, thus in\nturn supporting the human science by the divine. But this conception,\nthe truth of which is more than doubtful, indeed we may frankly call\nit inconsistent and contradictory, recalls, whatever its value, the\nmetaphysical or rather poetical or symbolic use made of mathematics by\nPythagoras and other philosophers of antiquity and the Renaissance,\nand has no resemblance to a mathematically-treated philosophy like the\nCartesian. Geometry in Vico's opinion is the one hypothesis by which\nmetaphysics passes over into physical science. But while making this\nadvance it remains a hypothesis, a probability, something intermediate\nbetween faith and criticism, imagination and reason; which indeed is\nthe eternal character of metaphysics and human science in general\naccording to Vico's point of view in this first phase of his theory of\nknowledge.\n\nJust as mathematics cannot be the basis of metaphysics, the science\nfrom which it is itself derived, so it cannot provide a foundation for\nthe other sciences, although they follow it in order of derivation.\nAll objects other than number and size are beyond the reach of the\ngeometrical method. Physical science is indemonstrable: if we could\ndemonstrate the physical world, we should be creating it (_si physica\ndemonstrare possemus, faceremus_): but we do not create it, and\nare accordingly unable to demonstrate it. The introduction of the\nmathematical method into natural science has not helped it. Without the\nmathematical method, science makes great discoveries; by its means it\nhas made none, whether great or small. The physical science of to-day\nis in fact like a house, sumptuously furnished by former owners, to\nwhich their heirs have added nothing, but have occupied themselves\nmerely in moving and rearranging the furniture. Accordingly, we must\nreintroduce and maintain the experimental method in physical science,\nas opposed to this mathematical method; the English tendency as\nopposed to the French; the cautious use made of mathematics by Galileo\nand his school, as against the Cartesians' reckless and presumptuous\nemployment of it. The English are right in not allowing physical\nscience to be taught in the mathematical style. Such a style admits of\nprogress only when the terms are defined, the axioms established, and\nthe postulates granted. In physical science we have to define not terms\nbut things: we can make no unchallenged statements; and the complexity\nof nature forbids our forming any postulates. Thus in the more\nfavourable instances this method results in a mere harmless verbalism.\nObservations of nature are expounded with the phrases: \"By definition\nIV.,\" \"By postulate II.,\" \"By axiom III.,\" and concluded with the\npompous abbreviation \"Q.E.D.\" But all this carries no demonstrative\nconviction. The mind retains as much freedom of opinion as it had\nbefore listening to such noisy methods. In these circumstances Vico\ncould not refrain from satirical comparisons. The geometrical method,\nhe says, in its proper sphere works unnoticed; when it makes a noise,\nit shows that it is doing no work; just as a coward's attack consists\nof much shouting and no blows, while a brave man holds his tongue and\nstrikes home. Again, the man who upholds the geometrical method in\nsubjects where it fails to carry conviction, when he pronounces this\nto be an axiom, or that to be a demonstrated truth, is like a man who\ndraws amorphous pictures, quite unrecognisable without assistance,\nand then writes underneath \"This is a man,\" or \"This is a satyr,\" or\n\"This is a lion,\" or the like. Hence it happens that the very same\ngeometrical method served Proclus to demonstrate the principles of\nAristotelian science, and Descartes to demonstrate his own, though\ntotally distinct from, if not diametrically opposed to them. Yet each\nwas a great geometrician, whom no one could accuse of inability to\nuse the method. What ought to be introduced into natural science is\nnot the method of geometry, but its conclusiveness; which is precisely\nwhat can never be done. Still less is it possible in other sciences,\nin proportion as they are more material and concrete; least of all in\nethical science. For this reason, where the reality cannot be used,\nthe name is misused instead; till, just as the title \"Master,\" which\nTiberius once refused as too haughty, is given to-day to the humblest\nman, so the name \"demonstration,\" applied as it is to arguments at best\nprobable, sometimes patently fallacious, has impaired the respect due\nto truth.\n\nEven for mathematics itself Vico apprehends danger from the\nsubstitution of analytic for geometrical or synthetic methods. He\ndoubts whether modern mechanics is really a product of analysis; for\nanalysis blunts the inventive faculty or talent, and though infallible\nin, its results (_opere_) is confused in its processes (_opera_); while\nthe synthetic method is _turn opere cum opera_ infallible. Analysis\npresents its grounds by inquiring whether the equations of which it is\nin search happen to be present; it appears to be an art of guessing,\na kind of mechanism rather than thought. For similar reasons Vico\nattached no value, to the more or less mechanical topics and arts of\ndiscovery and memory invented by Lulle and Kircher.\n\nThe sympathy with experimental methods which as we have seen estranged\nVico from the French tendency of thought, that is from Cartesianism,\nand directed him towards the Italian and English schools of Galileo\nand Bacon, led him on the other hand to a hostile attitude towards\nAristotelianism and scholasticism. Inculcating as he did the pursuit\nof the particular and the use of inductive methods, asserting that\nman possessed an inexhaustible wealth of physical knowledge which,\nthanks to fire, machinery, and tools, was able to issue in the\ncreation of objects resembling the special products of nature, and\npraising his own metaphysic as one subservient to (_ancillantem_)\nthe ends of experimental science, he was bound to realise how well\ndeserved was the too universal discredit, as he calls it, into which\nAristotelian science had fallen. If he disapproved of the introduction\nby Descartes of physical forms into metaphysics, and of his resulting\nmaterialistic tendencies, he accused Aristotle and the schoolmen of the\nopposite error of introducing metaphysical forms into natural science.\nLike Bacon he held that the syllogism and sorites produce nothing\nnew, and only repeat what was already contained in their premisses.\nHe emphasised the many ill effects of the Aristotelian universal\nin every department of knowledge; in jurisprudence, where empty\ngeneralities crush legislative wisdom; in medicine, which aims rather\nat propping up systems than at healing the sick; and in practical\nlife, in which he describes the abusers of universals by the mocking\ntitle of \"Thematists.\" The use of universals results in homonymies\nor equivocations which cause all kinds of errors. As against this\ndistrust of universals in the sense of general or abstract conceptions,\nVico showed a corresponding reverence for the Platonic ideas, the\nmetaphysical forms, or as he also called them, kinds; the eternal and\ninfinitely perfect patterns of things. A nominalist in mathematics,\nVico was suspicious of nominalism in all other fields of knowledge. He\nasserts the reality of the forms or ideas, and tells how from his youth\nup he was attracted by this doctrine, which he learnt from a teacher of\nhis, who as a Scotist was a follower of the scholastic system most akin\nto Plato's.\n\nTaken as a whole Vico's first theory of knowledge is neither\nintellectualistic, sensationalistic, nor truly speculative. It contains\nall these three elements, harmonised to a certain extent, not by\na hierarchical subordination of any two to the third, but by the\nsubjection of all three to a recognition of the inadequacy of human\nknowledge. Its intention may have been to meet by a tactical manoeuvre\ndogmatics and sceptics at once, the former by denying that we can know\neverything, the latter by denying that we can know nothing at all.\nBut its actual outcome is an assertion of scepticism or agnosticism,\ntinged, however, with a trace of mysticism. God's knowledge is the\ncomplete sphere of knowledge, the unity of which man's is but a series\nof fragments. God knows all things because he contains in himself all\nthe elements of which he makes them: man tries to understand them by\ntaking them to pieces. Human science is a sort of anatomy of the world\nof nature; it divides man into body and soul, and soul into intellect\nand will: from body it abstracts figure and motion, and from these\nexistence and unity. Of these metaphysics studies existence, arithmetic\nunity and multiplication, geometry figure and its measurements,\nmechanics the motion of the circumference, physical science the motion\nof the centre, medicine the body, logic the reason, and ethics the\nwill. But this anatomy meets with the same fate as that of the human\nbody. In the latter case, the greatest physiologists doubt whether,\nowing to the effects of death and of dissection itself, it is possible\nat all to discover the true position, structure, and function of the\norgans. Existence, unity, figure, motion, body, intellect, and will\nare one thing for God, for whom they coalesce into one, and another\nfor man, to whom they remain distinct. For God they live, for man they\nare dead. The clear and distinct perception is a proof not of the\nstrength but of the weakness of the human understanding. Physical laws\nappear self-evident just until they are subjected to comparison with\nmetaphysical. The _Cogito ergo sum_ is absolutely conclusive when man\nconsiders himself as a finite being; but when he includes himself in\nGod, the one true being, he realises that in truth he does not exist\nat all. By means of extension and its three dimensions we believe\nourselves to establish eternal truths; but in fact _coelum ipsum\npetimus stultitia,_ since the eternal truths exist in God alone. The\naxiom that the whole is greater than the part may seem eternal, but if\nwe go back to the beginning, we find that it is false: we see that the\ncentre of the circle contains in itself as much capacity for extension\nas the whole circumference. Wherefore, Vico concludes, \"he has advanced\nin metaphysics who in the study of this science has lost himself.\"\n\nTo hold, as some have done, that these words show Vico a simple\nPlatonist or a follower of the traditional Christian philosophy,\nwould entail denying any importance whatever to his first theory of\nknowledge. It would be a confession of adherence to the fallacious\nmethod of philosophical criticism and history which looks only at the\ngeneral conclusions of a system and ignores the particular content\nwhich alone gives it its true individuality. No doubt, any philosophy\nmust always in its ultimate conclusions be either agnostic, mystical,\nmaterialistic, spiritualistic, or the like: in other words, it must\nhave its place in one or other of the eternal categories in which\nthought and philosophical inquiry move. But to expound philosophers\nin this one-sided manner can only serve to perpetuate the mistakes\nrepeated over and over again in the history of thought, when it passes\nfruitlessly from one error to another, leaving the old only to adopt\nthe new, itself perhaps an old one born again or painted with the\ncolours of youth. The Platonismi agnosticism, or mysticism of Vico\nis in the fullest sense of the word original, because it forms the\naccompaniment of doctrines not only not inferior to the average of\ncontemporary thought, but greatly in advance of it.\n\nThe first of these doctrines is the theory of knowledge as the\nconversion of the true with the created, Vico's substitute for the\notiose criterion of the clear and distinct perception. Though this\nconversion represents for Vico an ideal unattainable to man, it yet\ndoes not bring with it an exact definition of the condition and\ncharacter of knowledge, the identity of thought and being, without\nwhich knowledge is inconceivable.\n\nThe second is the revelation of the nature of mathematics, as unique\namong the forms of human knowledge in origin, rigorous because\narbitrary, wonderful but unfit to rule over and transform the rest of\nour knowledge.\n\nFinally, the third doctrine is the vindication of the world of\nintuition, empirical knowledge, probability, and authority, all those\nforms of experience which intellectualism ignored or denied.\n\nIn these points Vico the agnostic, the Platonist, the mystic, was\nneither agnostic nor mystic nor Platonist. He achieved a threefold\nadvance upon Descartes, and upon all these three heads criticised him\nconclusively.\n\nThe one thing in which Descartes was still in advance of Vico was\nprecisely that dogmatism of which Vico would have none. Descartes,\nwhether he succeeded or not, projected a perfect human science\ndeduced from the internal consciousness. Vico, on the other hand,\nconsidering the French philosopher too confident and despairing of\nthe success of his project, proclaimed the transcendent nature of\ntruth, took his stand upon revelation, and contented himself with\nproducing a metaphysic worthy of man's weakness, _humana imbecillitate\ndignam._ His was a philosophy of humility, as the Cartesian was one of\nself-confidence.\n\nNow Vico could not advance even to this position without relaxing\nto some extent part of his humility, and taking over something of\nDescartes's confidence: without introducing into his Catholic turn of\nmind some trace of the leaven of that Protestantism he thought so\ndangerous, and venturing to conceive a philosophy rather less worthy of\nman's weakness and correspondingly more worthy of man, a creature at\nonce strong and weak, at once man and God. This advance is to be seen\nin the next phase of his thought.\n\n\n[Footnote 1: In the appendix to his _Opera Medica_ (Tolosae Tectosagum,\n1636, p. 110). Windelband draws attention to this thought, _Gesch. der\nneueren Philosophie,_ 3rd ed. i. p. 23.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II\n\n\nVICO'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE: SECOND PHASE\n\n\nThe will to believe, which in Vico's case was very strong, and the\ncomplete sway which the Catholicism of his country and age held over\nhis mind, bound him firmly down to the Christian Platonic metaphysic\nand theory of knowledge; a theory whose inherent contradictions were\nprevented by the above psychological facts from coming explicitly\nbefore his mind. The idea of God at once dominated and supported him;\nhe neither had the audacity nor realised the necessity to probe to the\nbottom such problems as the validity of revelation, the conceivability\nof a God apart from the world, or the possibility of affirming the\nexistence of God without in some sense demonstrating and therefore\ncreating him. For Vico to open up and partially traverse a new path,\nwhich should lead the human mind to transcend that of the Christian\nPlatonists, providence--to use for the moment an idea of his own which\nwe shall explain later on--had perforce to deceive him; to lead him by\na long and circuitous way to the commencement of the new path without\nletting him suspect where it would end.\n\nThe writings in which Vico expounds his first theory of knowledge, _De\nratione studiorum_ and _De antiquissima Italorum sapientia,_ together\nwith the polemical works bearing upon them, belong to the four years\nfrom 1708 to 1712. In the following decade Vico was gradually led\nto devote himself more and more to research in the history of law\nand of the State. He read Grotius as a preparation for writing the\nlife of Antonio Carafa, and plunged into the controversy on Natural\nRights. He pursued his studies of Roman law and the science of law in\ngeneral, in order to fit himself for a chair of jurisprudence at Naples\nUniversity. He pondered upon the origins of languages, religions, and\nstates, out of dissatisfaction with his own historical theories as\nset forth in the _Be antiquissima_; perhaps also his convictions were\nshaken by a well-directed criticism by the editor of the _Giornale\ndei letterati._ His profession, the teaching of rhetoric, gave him\ncontinual opportunities for meditating upon the nature and relations\nof poetry and the forms of language. Thus even if it is inaccurate to\nsay that Vico was led to his later position culminating in the _Scienza\nNuova_ by a philological, not a philosophical process (since clearly\na philosophical position can only come into being through a process\nno less philosophical), it is at least certain that the material and\nstimulus for his new thought were supplied by philological studies.\n\nThese studies seem to have impressed upon him a fact of great\nimportance; namely, that this subject-matter could only be and had\nactually been worked over by his thought through the aid of certain\nnecessary principles, appearing on every page of the history which\nhe had chosen for investigation. He had once believed that the moral\nsciences, as compared with the mathematical method, took the lowest\nplace as regards certainty. But now, in his daily acquaintance with\nthese sciences, he had come to hold the opposite view; namely, that\nnothing could be firmer than the foundation of the moral sciences!\n\nThis certainty was not the simple self-evidence of Descartes, in which\nthe object, however internal it is said to be, remains extrinsic to\nthe subject. It was a truly internal certainty, reached by an internal\nprocess. In the assimilation of historical facts, Vico felt himself\nto be making more truly his own something that already belonged to\nhim; to be entering into possession of what was his by right. He was\nreconstructing the history of man; and what was the history of man but\na product of man himself? Is not the creator of history simply man,\nwith his ideas, his passions, his will, and his actions? And is not the\nmind of man, the creator of history, identical with the mind which is\nat work in thinking it and knowing it? The truth of the constructive\nprinciples of history then comes not from the validity of the clear and\ndistinct idea, but from the indissoluble connexion of the subject and\nobject of knowledge.\n\nThe importance of this new discovery, the discovery of the truth which\nVico now recognised in the moral sciences, lay in the realisation of\na new implication of the theory of knowledge laid down by himself in\nthe former period of his speculations; namely, the criterion of truth\nconsisting in the \"convertibility of the true with the created.\" The\nreason why man could have perfect knowledge of man's world was simply\nthat he had himself made that world. \"When it happens that he who\ncreates things also describes them, then the history is certain in the\nhighest degree.\"\n\nConnected as it thus was with his earlier view, the assertion of the\npossibility of the moral sciences did not, to Vico's own mind, present\nthe importance and bring with it the consequences of a revolution\nentirely overthrowing the structure of his ideas, and compelling him\nto adjust them afresh. On the one hand, this assertion seemed to him a\nconfirmation of his former doctrine, a new example to be added to those\nhe had already collected of perfect knowledge; namely, God's knowledge\nof the universe and man's of the world of mathematics. On the other\nhand, it seemed to be an extension of the field of knowledge, whose\nboundaries (for definite boundaries still existed) had at first been\ntoo narrowly drawn. Formerly he had described a small luminous sphere\nin the centre of a vast and dimly lighted field; now the luminous\nsphere underwent a definite increase in size, and the penumbral region\na corresponding diminution. This increase involved no sort of conflict\nwith his religious beliefs; in fact, it seemed to support them and to\ngain support from them in turn. For did not religion teach the liberty,\nresponsibility, and consciousness which man has in respect of his own\nacts and creations?\n\nThus Vico did not feel obliged to write a new treatise on metaphysics.\nIt seemed enough to add a mere post-script to his former work, and\nto correct to some extent his earlier assertions. His new theory of\nknowledge, while adhering strictly to the criterion of truth enunciated\nby him in opposition to that of Descartes--the principle, that is, that\nonly the creator of a thing can know it--divided the whole of reality\ninto the world of nature and the world of man. But, while it laid down\nthat the world of nature is created by God and that therefore God alone\nknows it, it restricted its agnosticism to this field. It asserted,\non the other hand, that the human world, being man's creation, is\nknown by man. In this way it raised the knowledge of human affairs,\nformerly considered merely approximate and probable, to the rank of\nperfect science; and it expressed surprise that philosophers should\nso laboriously endeavour to attain to science of the world of nature,\nwhich is a sealed book to mankind, while passing over the world of man,\nthe science of which is attainable. The cause of this error he traced\nto the ease with which man's mind, involved and buried as it is in the\nbody, feels bodily things, and the labour and pains it costs it to\nunderstand itself, as the bodily eye sees all objects outside itself,\nbut in order to see itself requires the help of the mirror.\n\nIn everything else his system remained unchanged. Beyond the world\nof man lay the supernatural world, inaccessible to man, and the world\nof nature, itself also in a sense supernatural. Beyond the perfect\nknowledge which man could have of himself lay the metaphysic of\nChristian Platonism, now reduced to impotence, but continuing none\nthe less to embarrass mankind. The natural sciences were now, as\nbefore, regarded as incomplete forms of knowledge: mathematics as a\nsystem of abstractions, absolutely valid in the abstract but in face\nof reality powerless. The Aristotelian syllogism, the Stoic sorites,\nand the Cartesian geometrical method were pursued with the same hatred\nas before; and the same enthusiastic praise was lavished upon the\ninduction advocated and illustrated in his _Organum_ by Bacon, that\n\"great philosopher and great statesman,\" and fruitfully employed by his\ncountrymen in experimental philosophy.\n\nVico's frequent claim to have constructed the science of human affairs\non \"a strict geometric method\" might seem to indicate a change of\nopinion as to the applicability of that method. But his continual\nwarnings, during the same period and in the same works, against the\nuse in physical and moral questions of the mathematical method, which,\n\"where there are no figures either of lines or numbers, either gives\nus no conclusiveness, or else, instead of demonstrating the truth,\nmay often give an appearance of demonstration to falsehood,\" would\nflatly contradict the supposed change of front were it not that we\ncould interpret it so as completely to restore the coherence of Vico's\nthought. This interpretation is quite simple. Once the power of\nconverting the true with the created is seen to attach to the moral\nsciences no less than to geometry, these sciences could and indeed must\ndevelop on a method analogous to the synthetic method of geometry,\nthe method which proceeds from a truth to its immediate consequence.\nIn this manner they follow the progress of the world of man from its\nideal origin to its perfect development; so that the student must\nnot hope to be able to investigate these sciences _per saltum,_ but\nmust traverse them from beginning to end in detail, without refusing\nto accept unforeseen conclusions any more than he can refuse to do\nso in geometry; but concentrating his attention on the firmness of\nthe bond between premisses and conclusion. Thus the method could be\ncalled geometric by analogy or synecdoche; in fact, however, it was\nessentially speculative, and not to be confused with the application of\nmathematics to questions of morals, of which the Cartesians and Spinoza\nhave left examples.\n\nNor can we agree without reservation to the opinion of certain\ncommentators that Vico, in asserting the existence of a single science\nof man, to be studied in the modifications of the human mind, was\nretreating to the position of a follower of Descartes. This opinion\nis often reinforced by another statement of Vico's, namely, that\nto conceive his New Science it would be well to return to a state\nof absolute ignorance, as if no philosophers, philologists, nor\nbooks had even existed in the world. It is true that with the new\nform of his theory of knowledge Vico himself joined the ranks of\nmodern subjectivism, initiated by Descartes. In a sense, indeed,\nhe had already done so in his activistic doctrine of truth as the\nreconstruction of the created. In this quite general sense Vico might\nhimself be called a Cartesian. Nevertheless, if he was still behind\nDescartes in making his subjectivism a principle not of the whole of\nknowledge but of the knowledge of the world of man only, in another\nway he was ahead of the French philosopher, in that for him the\ntruth attained in the world of man was not static but dynamic, not a\ndiscovery but a product, not consciousness but science.\n\nAs for the advice that one should proceed as if there were no books,\nno philosophical or philological doctrines in the world, its meaning\nis merely the necessity of ridding oneself of all prejudice, of all\ncommon habitual assumptions, of all accretions of memory and fancy,\nin order to attain \"the state of pure understanding, empty of every\nparticular form,\" which is necessary for the discovery and apprehension\nof any new truth. So far removed is this advice from the Cartesian or\nMalebranchian renunciation of learning and authority, that--to mention\none fact only--in the very passage to which we have just referred we\nfind the warning that the New Science presupposes a comprehensive and\nvaried mass both of doctrine and of learning, the truths of which\nit takes over as already known, and uses them as terms in its new\npropositions.\n\nIn a word, Vico in his new theory of knowledge became not more\nCartesian but more Vician--more himself. Descartes seemed to him not\neven a serviceable path by which to attain proof of the possibility\nof constructing the science of mind by means of the mind. The true\npath was Vico's own criterion of truth, brought into relation with its\nauthor's observations made in the course of his historical studies.\nIf we wish to look for precedents in the history of philosophy for\nVico's theory of knowledge in its second form, the division between the\ntwo worlds of reality and the two spheres of consciousness, and the\npreference for moral as compared with natural studies, would lead us\nback to the position adopted by Socrates as against the \"Physiologists\"\nof his time, and the feeling of religious mystery which brought the\nAthenian philosopher to a standstill in face of the natural world and\ndirected his efforts to the study of the mind of man. Again, as to the\nsuperior transparency of the moral sciences, as dealing with objects\ncreated by man himself, we might recall the Aristotelian division of\nthe sciences into physical, treating of motion external to man, and\npractical and \"poietic,\" which deal with man's own creations. The\ndistinction passed into the philosophy of the schools: Thomas Aquinas\nspeaks of nature as \"an order which reason contemplates but does not\ncreate\" (_ordo quem ratio considerat sed non facit_), and of the world\nof human activity as \"an order which reason creates by contemplation\"\n(_ordo quem ratio considerando facit_). But no such reference is made\nby Vico, fond as he was of expressing the debt of his own thought to\nthe ancient philosophers; and admitting that the doctrine had some\nforce before his time, the divergence between this earlier view and\nthat of Vico on the knowableness of the world of man is as great as\nthat between the assertion of the omniscience of God the Creator and\nthe theory of knowledge which Vico was able to draw from it.\n\nOf this theory, his doctrine of the moral sciences was neither more\nnor less than the first legitimate application. Both its author and\nthe majority of his commentators are using inaccurate language in\ndescribing it as a simple extension of the previous applications--a\nsecond instance, added to that of the mathematical sciences, already\nexamined.\n\nIn the mathematical sciences, the principle of the conversion of\nthe true with the created had been applied in appearance only.\nThe principle itself was original and sound: so was the theory of\nmathematics. But the connexion between the two truths was altogether\nartificial and false. What was lacking was, unless we are mistaken,\nan effective relation between the concept of God who creates the\nworld and, as creating it, knows it, and that of the man who\narbitrarily constructs a world of abstractions, and in doing so either\nknows nothing at all, or else, when he ceases to be a geometer or\narithmetician and becomes a philosopher, when he is composing not\nEuclid's Elements but the theory of knowledge in the _De antiquissima,_\nknows merely that his procedure is arbitrary. If the mathematical\nsciences construct their concepts as they please, if they produce not\ntruth but definitions, they are as a matter of fact not sciences at\nall, nor any form of knowledge, and cannot be compared with the divine\nknowledge, the knowledge of actual reality. In mathematics, says Vico,\n\"man, holding within himself an imaginary world of lines and numbers,\noperates in this world by abstraction just as God operates in the\nuniverse by reality.\" It is a luminous comparison; but perhaps its\nlight is that of metaphor rather than logic.\n\nIn the moral sciences, on the other hand, the comparison is so entirely\nlogical that it should frankly be called coincidence. Human knowledge\nis qualitatively identical with divine, and knows the world of man\nequally well; it is, however, quantitatively more restricted, and\ndoes not extend like the divine to the world of nature. In the human\nfield we no longer find the expedients of weakness, definitions and\nfalsifications; knowledge is here at its highest point of concreteness.\nMan creates the human world, creates it by transforming himself into\nthe facts of society: by thinking it he re-creates his own creations,\ntraverses over again the paths he has already traversed, reconstructs\nthe whole ideally, and thus knows it with full and true knowledge. Here\nis a real world; and of this world man is truly the God.\n\nIt seems undeniable, then, that the application of the _\"verum-factum\"_\nmade in the New Science is the only one which corresponds to the\ncriterion previously formulated. The earlier attempt at an application\nof it to mathematics, though important in other respects and well\ncalculated to free the mind from mathematical prejudice, cannot be\nconsidered a true or strict use of it. It is possible that Vico\nwas sometimes vaguely conscious of the difference between the two\napplications, the strict and the metaphorical, which as a rule he\nconfused and treated as identical. The science of the world of man, he\nsays, proceeds exactly as does geometry, which while it constructs\nout of its elements or contemplates the world of quantity, itself\ncreates it; but with proportionately greater reality, since order has\nno connexion with human affairs, containing as they do neither points,\nlines, surfaces, nor figures. Another indication of his gradually\ndawning consciousness that he had now for the first time in his\ndoctrine of the world of man discovered a true and proper knowledge,\nnot a mere fiction of knowledge, may perhaps be seen in the much\ngreater conviction, warmth, and enthusiasm with which he now uses the\nepithet \"divine\": quite a different thing from the chilly, if not\nabsolutely ironical, _ad Dei instar_ of the _De antiquissima._ The\nproofs of the New Science, he says more than once, with fervour, \"are\ndivine in their nature, and should give thee, Reader, a divine joy:\nsince in God knowledge and creation are one.\"\n\nThe conversion of the true with the created was bound to react upon\nthe treatment of certitude in one, perhaps the chief, of the various\nmeanings in which Vico uses the word, namely, historical fact: the\n_peculiare, certum,_ as opposed to the _commune_ or _verum._ This forms\nthe other important section of Vico's second theory of knowledge. In\nthe former theory these cognitions were, as we saw, legitimised and\nprotected by being put on a level with all other kinds of knowledge,\nall of them equally weak or equally strong, being all alike founded on\nprobability or authority, whether of the individual (autopsy) or of\nmankind.\n\nBut now that the knowledge of the human mind and its laws was rescued\nfrom the region of authority and probability, historical fact, although\nstill in a sense, by its very nature, founded upon authority, was\nplaced in a new light. The certain must enter into a new relation,\nconfronted as it now was not by another certainty, that is, mere\nprobable knowledge of the human mind, but by a truth, a piece of\nphilosophical knowledge.\n\nThis relation is also called by Vico the relation between philosophy\nand philology: the former dealing with necessities of nature,\n_necessaria naturae,_ and contemplating the reason from which issues\nthe science of truth; the latter with decisions of the human will,\n_placita humani arbitrii,_ and following the authority whence comes\nknowledge of the certain. The one considers the universal, the other\nthe individual; the one, as Leibniz would have said, the _v\u00e9rit\u00e9s de\nraison,_ the other the _v\u00e9rit\u00e9s de fait._ With Vico the distinction\nis not so clearly expressed: in fact, authority as opposed to reason\nsometimes, according to him, becomes a part of reason itself, or is\nconfused with the knowledge of the human will as opposed to that of\nrational volition; but the general sense is none the less quite plain.\nBy philology Vico means not only the study of words and their history,\nbut, since words are bound up with the ideas of things, he means also\nthe history of things. Thus philologists should deal with war, peace,\nalliances, travels, commerce, customs, laws and coinage, geography and\nchronology, and every other subject connected with man's life on earth.\nPhilology in a word, in Vico's sense, which is also the true sense,\nembraces not only the history of language or literature, but also that\nof events, philosophy, and politics.\n\nIt is true that philology, the truth of fact or certitude, had not\nalways been so brutally treated as it was by the Cartesians. Grotius\nhad given evidence of immense historical learning employed on behalf\nof his doctrine of natural right. Gravina, Vico's contemporary and\nfellow-countryman, demanded as necessary to the student of law not\nonly \"the art of reasoning\" (_ratiocinandi ars_) but \"skill in the\nLatin tongue\" (_Latinae linguae peritia_) and \"knowledge of history\"\n(_notitia temporum_). And Leibniz, whom we have just named, reasserted\nthe value of learning as against the Cartesians, and extended his\npatronage, _en grand seigneur,_ to the varied collection of historical\nanecdotes which he scattered freely over his pages. But Vico observed\nthat the philosophy and philology of his time always remained external\nto one another, as they had been almost entirely in Greece and Rome.\nAll the quotations from historians, orators, philosophers, and poets\naccumulated by Grotius were a mere embellishment. Perhaps Vico would\nhave passed the same judgment upon the liberal use made of history by\nLeibniz, if he had known of it and expressed his opinion. In reading\nthe works of philologists he was conscious of such a sense of vacuity\nand weariness in the unintelligent jumble of historical observations,\nthat he was almost led to agree with Descartes and Malebranche in their\nhatred of scholarship: for a time, in fact, he did entirely agree with\nthem. But these two philosophers--so his later thought ran--ought,\ninstead of despising erudition, rather to have asked whether it were\npossible to reclaim philology to philosophical principles; and the\nphilologists for their part, instead of marshalling facts for a display\nof learning, ought to strive to make them the aim of science. Philology\nmust be reduced to a science. This was Vico's idea of the relation of\ncertitude to truth, or philology to philosophy.\n\nWhat was the meaning of reducing philology, or history, which is\nthe same thing, to a science or philosophy? Strictly speaking, the\nreduction is impossible: not because they deal with subject-matter\ndifferent in kind, but because their subject-matter is in point of\nfact homogeneous. History is already essentially philosophy. It\nis impossible to make the most insignificant historical statement\nwithout moulding it with thought, that is with philosophy. But since\nthe existence of this philosophical basis of philology was not at\nthat time realised, indeed it was none too often realised in later\ntimes, and in consequence easily denied; and since most people, as we\nhave seen, imagined either an aristocratic geometrical philosophy,\nhating and avoiding the \"profane mob\" of facts, or else, as at first\nVico did, a philosophy and a history equally devoid of cogency, and\nmerely matters of opinion: for these reasons Vico, after the change\nof his philosophical point of view, now that he had attained to the\nconsciousness of the speculative method in the science of man, and\nunderstood more deeply the human mind, was bound to see how much\ncurrent history stood in need of reform and extension; to feel the lack\nof an improved philology as a consequence of the improved philosophy,\nand to express it in terms of the theory of knowledge by the formula\nreuniting philology to philosophy: \"that this second science, as is\nfair, should be the consequence of the first\" (_ut haec posterior, ut\npar est, prioris sit consequentia_). He was bound, in other words, to\nrescue history from its condition of inferiority, where it was a mere\nslave to caprice, vanity, moralising and precept-making, and other\nirrelevant aims, and to recognise its own true end as a necessary\ncomplement of eternal truth. Philosophy nowadays is full of and\nintimate with historical fact: and this gives it greater breadth and a\nmore lively sense of dealing with concrete reality. This is no doubt\none meaning of Vico's formula concerning the union of philosophy and\nphilology, and the reduction of the latter to a science.\n\nIt is, however, certain that in propounding this formula he had in\nview a further and, as often happened, a different meaning. This other\nmeaning might be most simply illustrated by comparing it, as Vico\nhimself did with Bacon and his \"more certain method of philosophising\":\nthat method which Bacon expressed in the title of his work by the words\n_Cogitata et visa,_ and Vico proposed to \"transfer from the natural to\nthe human or political world.\" In a word, he demanded the construction\nof a typical history of human society (_cogitare_) which was then to be\ndiscovered in the facts (_videre_). Thus the ideal construction would\nacquire certainty from the facts, and the facts truth from the ideal\nconstruction: authority would be confirmed by reason and reason by\nauthority. He demanded a science which should be at once a philosophy\nof man and a universal history of nations. Now this structure which\nhe required--something intermediate between _cogitare_ and _videre,_\nthought and experience, this mixture of the two processes--is\nintrinsically different from the unity of philosophy and philology, in\nso far as that is a philosophical interpretation of factual data. Such\nan interpretation is living history: the other is neither philosophy\nnor history, but an empirical science of man and society, drawing its\nmaterials from schemata which are neither the extra-temporal categories\nof philosophy nor the individual facts of history: although it can\nnever be constructed without philosophical categories and historical\nfacts. It is an empirical science; and as such, neither exact nor true,\nbut only approximative and probable, and subject to verification and\ncorrection from the side both of philosophy and of history.\n\nIt would be impossible to decide either which of these two meanings\nof philology reduced to history is that of Vico himself, since both\nare included in his thought: or which is the prevailing one, since in\npoint of fact now one, now the other prevails: although the second, or\nempirical, signification is the more often formulated. We might even\nsay that when Vico entitled his treatise _Scienza Nuova,_ the principal\nmeaning he attached to this \"invidious\" name referred precisely to this\nempirical science, the science, that is, which was to be at once a\nphilosophy and a history of man: the ideal history of the eternal laws\nwhich govern the course of all nations' deeds in their rise, progress,\npoints of rest, decline and fall. The fact is, Vico did not and could\nnot unify the two different meanings; he maintained the duality which,\nsimply because it was never made explicit, presented an appearance\nof unity. Thus each of the tendencies shown by his interpreters is\npartially justified: one group of whom maintain that Vico laid down\nand employed the speculative method; another, that his procedure was\nboth in intention and in effect empirical, inductive and psychological:\nthe former believing that he aimed at a systematic philosophy of man,\nthe latter that he was bent upon a scheme of sociology or social\npsychology. Both views are one-sided, but the second more so than the\nfirst. If there actually were in Vico elements both of Bacon and of\nPlato, of the empiricist and the philosopher, yet when we look at his\nintellectual personality as a whole, when we penetrate into the depths\nof his mind and share in his difficulties and his colossal labours,\nwe must recognise that whatever he meant and believed Vico was of the\nstuff of a Plato and not a Bacon: that even the Bacon of whom he speaks\nis in part his own invention, a Bacon tinged with Platonism: and that\nthe New Science seemed so new to him fundamentally, not because it\nwas an empirical structure on Bacon's lines--indeed in that case no\nscience could be older: we need only cite Aristotle's _Politics_ and\nMachiavelli's _Discourses,_ --but because it was impregnated throughout\nby a new philosophy, which did in truth break into it on every side,\nthrough all his empiricism.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III\n\n\nINTERNAL STRUCTURE OF THE NEW SCIENCE\n\n\nThe lack of clearness on the relation of philosophy to philology, and\nthe failure to distinguish between the two quite different ways of\nconceiving the reduction of philology to a science, are at once the\nconsequences and the causes of the obscurity which prevails in the\n\"New Science.\" By this name we refer to the whole mass of research and\ntheory which Vico was producing from 1720 to 1730, elaborated above all\nin three works, the _De uno universi iuris principio et fine uno_ and\nthe first and second _Scienza Nuova_; it attains its maturest and most\ndeveloped form in the last of these, and this is the most important for\nreference.\n\nThe New Science, agreeably to the various meanings of the terms\nphilosophy and philology and of the relation between them, consists\nof three groups of investigations, philosophical, historical and\nempirical. Altogether it contains a philosophy of mind, a history, or\ngroup of histories, and a social science. To the first named belong\nthe ideas expressed in various axioms or aphorisms scattered up and\ndown the work, on imagination and the imaginative universal, on the\nintellect and the logical universal, on myth, religion, the moral\njudgment, force and law, certitude and truth, the passions, providence,\nand all the other determinations affecting the course or development\nof the thought or mind of man. To the second, namely history, belong\nthe sketch of a universal history of primitive peoples from the time\nof the Flood, and of the origins of the various civilisations: the\ndescription of the ancient barbaric or heroic society in Greece and\nespecially in Rome, with regard to religion, customs, law, language and\npolitical constitution: the study of primitive poetry, concentrating\nupon the determination of the genesis and character of the Homeric\npoems: the history of the social struggles between the patricians and\nplebeians and the origin of democracy, also studied chiefly in Rome:\nand the description of the return of barbarism or the Middle Ages, also\nstudied in all aspects of life and compared with primitive barbaric\nsociety. Finally, to empirical science belongs the attempt to establish\na uniform course of national history, dealing with the succession both\nof political forms and of other correlative manifestations of life\nboth theoretical and practical, and the series of types successively\ndrawn by Vico of the patriciate, the plebs, feudalism, the patriarchal\nfamily, symbolic law, metaphorical language, hieroglyphic writing and\nso forth.\n\nNow if these three classes of inquiry and theory had been logically\ndistinct in Vico's mind and united and compressed within the limits of\na single book for literary reasons alone, the result might have been\nconfused, ill-proportioned, out of harmony, and therefore fatiguing\nto the reader, but not obscure. But in point of fact it cannot be\nsaid that the _Scienza Nuova,_ at least in its second form, the final\nexposition of his thought given by Vico, lacks a general plan, well\nenough conceived. The treatise is divided into five books. The first\nis intended to summarise general principles, that is, philosophy. The\nsecond, in addition to a short note on the most ancient universal\nhistory, describes the life of barbaric society, to which the third,\non the discovery of the true Homer, the most conspicuous example of\nbarbaric poetry, forms an appendix. The fourth is meant to sketch\nthe empirical science of the movement of national history: and the\nfifth to exemplify the movement of \"reflux\" in the particular case of\nthe Middle Ages. And yet, in spite of this fine architectonic scheme,\nthe second _Scienza Nuova_ is the most obscure, just as it is the\nmost rich and complete of Vico's works. If on the other hand, while\nkeeping his ideas clear in his mind, Vico had used an unfamiliar\nterminology or a style of exposition either too compressed or too full\nof allusions or implicit presuppositions, he would certainly have been\na difficult writer, but in this case, as in the other, not obscure.\nBut such a hypothesis does not suit the facts. Vico is very sparing\nof scholastic language; he prefers living and popular terminology.\nHe is not compressed: in fact, he is fond of repeating his ideas,\nemphasising them by repetition with great insistence. And he lays all\nhis cards on the table: that is to say, he shows all the material by\nwhich his doctrines have been suggested. Finally, it amounts to very\nlittle to say that Vico was not fully conscious of his own discoveries:\nsuch consciousness is more or less deficient in every thinker, and in\nfact none could have it more fully. The obscurity, the real obscurity\nwhich we find in Vico is not superficial. It does not come either from\nmerely general or from secondary causes. It really consists in the\nobscurity of his ideas; in his insufficient understanding of certain\nconnections, and the substitution for them of fallacious ones; in the\narbitrary element, that is, which he introduces into his thought, or\nto put it more simply in his own downright errors. One might rewrite\nthe New Science, recasting the order and changing and elucidating the\nterminology--the present writer has made the attempt for himself--and\nstill the obscurity would remain, or even increase; for in such a\ntranslation the work in losing its original form would lose also the\nturbid but powerful strength which may at times take the place of\nclarity, and, while it does not illuminate, stirs the reader's mind and\ngenerates waves of thought as it were by sympathetic vibrations.\n\nThat Vico's obscurity, his mistake or mistakes, is due to the confusion\nor lack of distinction in his theory of knowledge mentioned above, on\nthe question of the relations between philosophy, history and empirical\nscience--a confusion which exists no less in his actual thought on\nthe problems of the mind and history of man--that this is so can be\nseen by observing how philosophy, history and empirical science pass\ninto each other by turns in Vico's mind, and vitiating each other in\nturn produce the perplexities, ambiguities, exaggerations and hasty\nstatements which perturb the reader of the New Science. The philosophy\nof mind masquerades now as empirical science, now as history: empirical\nscience now as philosophy, now as history: and historical propositions\nassume the universality of philosophical principles or the generality\nof empirical schemata. For example, the philosophy of man undertakes\nto determine the forms, categories or ideal moments of mind in their\nnecessary succession, and in this aspect it well deserves the title or\ndefinition of \"eternal ideal history\" according to which particular\nhistories proceed in time; while no fragment however small of actual\nhistory can be conceived in which this ideal history is not present.\nBut, since ideal history is also for Vico the empirical determination\nof the order in which the forms of civilisations, states, languages,\nstyles, and kinds of poetry succeed one another, it comes about that he\nconceives the empirical series as identical with the ideal series, and\nas deriving validity from it. Hence he asserts that this series must\nalways be exactly reproduced in the facts, \"even if infinite worlds\nwere produced from time to time through eternity\": an assertion which\nis plainly false, since there is no reason why the empirical fact of\nGreek or Roman aristocracy should be repeated for ever, with a \"must\nhave been, must be now, must be hereafter\"; or why civilisations\nshould rise and fall precisely as did those of antiquity. And this\nvery treatment of the empirical course of events as absolute threw\na shadow of empiricism over their ideal course; since the latter\nonce identified with the former took over its empirical and temporal\ncharacter instead of the eternal and extra--temporal character which it\nhad as originally conceived. The same must be said of the various forms\nof mind which, as ideal and extra--temporal, are always all present\nin every fact; but Vico, by confusing them with the real and concrete\nfacts which empirical science splits up into its schemata, destroyed\nthem in their ideal form and distinction as soon as he had stated\nthem. It is true that the moment of force is not that of justice; but\nthe empirical type of barbaric society founded upon force, precisely\nbecause it is a representative and approximative determination, and is\nreferred to a concrete and total state of things, contains not only\nforce but justice as well; and when this ideal moment and this type\nof society are interchanged and treated as identical, on the one hand\nthe philosophical concept of force is confused with that of justice\nand becomes impure, contradictory and incoherent, and finally annuls\nitself: on the other, the empirical type of barbaric society becomes\nexaggerated and unduly rigid. The confusion between the philosophic\nand the empirical is clearly expressed in Vico's aphorism defining\nthe nature of things. \"Nature of things is nothing else than their\nproduction at certain times and in certain manners: and whenever these\nlatter are of such a kind, then the things produced are of such a kind\nand no other.\" Here we see the confusion between time and manner,\nbetween ideal and empirical genesis. Similarly, it is perfectly true\nthat history ought to proceed in harmony with philosophy, and that a\nphilosophical absurdity can never be a historical event: but, since\nthe distinction between philosophy and empirical science was not\ndrawn by Vico, when evidence was lacking and philosophy therefore\ninapplicable he felt no less sure of attaining truth. He merely filled\nthe gap with a conjecture supplied by the schema of empirical science,\nand persuaded himself that he had fallen back on a \"metaphysical\nproof.\" Or again, if he found himself faced by uncertain facts,\ninstead of patiently waiting till the discovery of further evidence\nshould dispel the doubt, he cut the knot by accepting the facts, as\nhe put it, in conformity with laws: which always means the empirical\nschema. A legitimate method, doubtless, when treated as hypothetical.\nBut this hypothesis became in its turn, for Vico, a \"truth meditated\nin the idea\": so that the comparison with facts, which none the less\nhe recommends for the sake of confirmation, became strictly speaking\nsuperfluous: or, if the comparison showed that the facts disagreed\nwith it, the facts, as mere appearance, must be in the wrong, rather\nthan the hypothesis, which is laid down as philosophical truth, and\ntherefore indubitable. Hence arises the tendency observed in Vico to do\nviolence to the facts.\n\nThese examples are enough to indicate the deep-seated fault in the\nstructure of the New Science, and to establish one point in our\nexposition and criticism of Vico's thought, in the course of which\nmany other examples of the same point will arise of themselves, and\nthose already given will become more clear. But another point which\nmust be well established is that this fault is the fault of an organism\nin the highest degree healthy, and that the different species of\ninquiry between which Vico failed to distinguish were composed of\ninvestigations of extraordinary originality, truth, and importance.\nIt is in fact the fault often found in highly original and inventive\nintellects, which seldom work out their discoveries in accurate detail,\nwhile less inventive minds are generally more precise and logical.\nDepth and acuteness do not always flourish equally side by side: and\nVico, however much he fell short in acuteness, was always profoundly\ndeep.\n\nLight and shade, truth and error, which alternate and interweave at\nalmost every point in the New Science, are variously distinguished\naccording to the various temperaments of readers and critics: and in\nconspicuous cases, like that of Vico, such variations assume the most\nsharply defined form. Some minds are self-willed and suspicious, quick\nto mark any trifling contradiction, merciless in demanding proof of\nevery statement, and indefatigable in wielding the forceps of dilemma\nto dismember an unfortunate great man. For them Vico's work, like many\nothers of the same kind, is a closed book. At most, it will provide\nthem with a theme for what is known as a \"refutation\": an easy and\ncongenial task, yet hardly a successful one, since the man they have\ndemolished generally emerges from the slaughter more alive than before.\nBut there is another type of mind, which, at the first word which\nreaches the heart, at the first ray of truth which dawns upon the eyes,\nopens its whole self in desire, abandons itself in faith, and grows\nwild with enthusiasm; which refuses to hear of faults and never sees\ndifficulties, or the difficulties at once vanish, and the faults find\nthe easiest of justifications: and when it commits itself to writing,\nits writings appear in the guise of \"defences.\" For such a mind we fear\nthat the New Science is a book all too open. No doubt, if these two\nattitudes were the only alternatives, if no third choice were open,\none would have to choose the fault of love rather than that of cold\nindifference; the excess of faith, which may yet enrich us by one or\ntwo aspects of the truth, rather than the absence of faith which never\nlets us realise one. But a third attitude is possible to, and indeed\nincumbent on the critic; namely, that which never takes its eyes off\nthe light, but yet does not conceal the shade; which transcends the\nletter to attain the spirit, yet not ignoring the letter, but always\nreturning to it, always endeavouring to play the part of a free but not\na fanciful interpreter, a warm lover but not a blind one.\n\nThe two points above established, the strength and weakness essential\nto Vico's intellect, his tendency to confusion or his confusion of\ntendencies, supply us with a kind of general canon of interpretation;\nnamely, that of separating analytically at every step his pure\nphilosophy from the empiricism and history with which he mixes, and\nin which so to speak he embodies it, and on the other hand separating\nthe latter from the former: and of observing, in the process, the\ncauses and effects of the mixture. The dross cannot be treated as\nnon-existent, bound up as it is with the gold in its natural state: but\nit must not hinder us from recognising and purifying the gold. Or, to\ndrop the metaphor, the history must be indeed a history, but that it\ncan only be if guided by intelligence.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV\n\n\nTHE IMAGINATIVE FORM OF KNOWLEDGE\n\n(POETRY AND LANGUAGE)\n\n\nThe chief, almost indeed the only, forms of the mind studied by Vico in\nthe New Science are the inferior, individualising activities to which\nhe gives the general name of \"certitude.\" These are, in the region of\ntheoretic mind, imagination: in that of the practical mind, power or\nwill: and in the empirical science corresponding to the philosophy\nof mind, the barbaric society and poetic wisdom whose examination\noccupies, in his own words, \"almost the whole bulk of the work.\"\n\nHis deep interest in these lower forms, and in the primitive societies\nand barbaric histories which display them, is further illustrated\nand explained, among his external circumstances, by the studies he\nundertook in Roman law and its expressions and rhetorical figures:\nby the still living tradition of Italian humanism: by the recently\nstimulated pursuit of the archaeological sciences: by his own desire\nto investigate the earliest civilisation of Italy, and so forth. But\nmany of his contemporaries and countrymen were handling the same\nmaterials without acquiring any of his taste for and comprehension of\nimagination, simplicity and force: indeed Vico himself, when he wrote\nthe _De antiquissima,_ had the taste for these things but as yet no\ncomprehension of them. The full reason for this interest is seen when\nwe consider the development of Vico as a philosopher, without losing\nsight of the complexity of his nature in all its opposition to the\nCartesian type of mind. Cartesianism, with its attention confined to\nthe universalising and abstractive forms, ignored the individualising:\nand this necessarily attracted Vico all the more towards them as\ntowards a mysterious problem. Cartesianism shrank in horror from\nthe tangled forest of history: Vico plunged eagerly into that very\ndepartment of history where the historical flavour, so to speak, is\nstrongest; namely, that which is furthest and psychologically most\ndifferent from civilised periods. Cartesianism extended the psychology\nof civilisation to all periods and nations: Vico was led to investigate\nin all their profound divergencies and contradictions the modes of\nfeeling and thought proper to various times.\n\nThe great effort which had to be made, and actually was made by Vico,\nin order to penetrate through modern intellectualism and recapture the\npoint of view of primitive psychology, is expressed in his language\nabout the \"grave difficulties\" entailed by his \"labour of fully\ntwenty-five years\" in the attempt to \"stoop from these civilised\nnatures of ours to those absolutely wild and savage minds, which we\ncannot picture to ourselves at all, and can only understand with great\ntoil.\" It is expressed again, rather differently, by his insistence\non the impossibility, now that, even with the common people, the\nmind of man is too completely separated from the senses, accustomed\nto the free use of abstract terms, sharpened by the art of writing,\nand spiritualised so to speak by the employment of numbers,--the\nimpossibility of entering into the chaotic fancy of primitive man,\nwhose mind was the very reverse of abstract, acute or spiritual; but\nrather sunk in the senses, blunted by passion, and buried in the body:\nand of grasping such ideas as that of the \"sympathy of nature.\" This\nnecessary effort--a painful one, but successful--was another reason\nfor his feeling that his science was \"new.\" He says indeed that this\nstudy of the ideal form and the historic period of certitude was\nentirely lacking to Greek philosophy as a whole. Plato had attempted it\nin the _Cratylus,_ but unsuccessfully, because he knew nothing of the\nlanguage of the first legislators, the heroic poets, and was deceived\nby the altered and modernised forms under which the laws existed in\nhis time after continual revision at Athens. Among the moderns, J. C.\nScaliger, Francisco Sanchez and Gaspar Schopp had fallen into a similar\nmistake when they attempted to explain language by the principles of\nlogic, and indeed of Aristotelian logic, in spite of its having arisen\ncenturies after language itself. Grotius, Selden, Puffendorf and the\nother writers on natural rights also studied human nature as civilised\nby religion and law; so that in retracing the course of history they\nbegan in the middle: that is to say, they confined themselves to the\nintellect, ignoring the imagination, and to the will under moral\nrestraint, passing over the undisciplined passions. Vico himself, while\nhe had shown his interest in this problem by undertaking to investigate\nthe \"most ancient wisdom of Italy,\" was yet led astray in his study by\nfollowing the lead of the author of the _Cratylus._\n\nIn its philosophical aspect, the New Science might, owing to this\nprominence given to the study of the individualising forms, above all\nthe imagination (since the doctrine that primitive man is a poet and\nthinks in poetic images is in Vico's words the \"master key\" of the\nwork) be called, without undue paradox, a philosophy of Mind with\nspecial attention to the Philosophy of Imagination or Aesthetic.\n\nAesthetic may in fact be considered as a discovery of Vico's, though\nwith the reservations to which the determination of discoveries and\ndiscoverers is always subject; and although he did not deal with it in\na separate treatise or give it the happy title with which Baumgarten\nchristened it ten years or so later. It is interesting however to\nnotice that the terminology of the New Science lights upon a name\nsimilar to one of the equivalents for Aesthetic which Baumgarten passes\nin review; namely that of \"the Logic of Poetry.\" But ultimately the\nname matters little: what does matter is the fact: and the fact is that\nVico adopted a theory of poetry which was then and was still for a time\nto be a bold and revolutionary innovation. At that time, as is well\nknown, the old practical or didactic theory held the field: the theory\nwhich, starting late in the history of the ancient world, persisting\nthrough the Middle Ages, and transplanted into the Renaissance,\nregarded poetry as an ingenious disguise for the popularising of\nlofty philosophical and theological ideas. Beside this theory, though\ninferior in authority, stood another, which considered poetry as the\nproduct of or means to diversion and pleasure. These views had come\nto alter the original meaning of the Aristotelian treatise on poetry,\nso as to be at last introduced into it and discovered there as if\nAristotle himself had held and written them. Nor was this mistake\ncorrected by Cartesianism, which, as we should expect from its general\ndirection, rather tended to enfeeble and annul the very object of\nthese definitions, as a thing of no value, or practically none. At a\ntime when philosophers were trying to reduce metaphysics and ethics to\na mathematical form, and despised concrete intuition: when men were\ndevising a literature and a poetry suited to disseminate science among\nthe common people or the world of fashion: when experiments were being\nmade in the construction of artificial, logical languages, superior to\nthose of past or present usage: when, finally, it was thought possible\nto lay down rules for composing musical airs without being a musician,\nand poems without being a poet: in this atmosphere of detachment,\ncoolness, hostility and mockery, only a miracle could arouse a\ndifferent and indeed opposite feeling--a warm and vivid consciousness\nof the real nature of poetry in its original function: and this miracle\nwas worked by the keen, restless and stormy mind of Giambattista Vico.\n\nHe criticised at once the three doctrines of poetry as a means of\nadorning and communicating intellectual truth, as merely subservient\nto pleasure, and as a harmless mental exercise for those who can do\nit. Poetry is not esoteric wisdom: it does not presuppose the logic\nof the intellect: it does not contain philosophical judgments. The\nphilosophers, in finding these things in poetry, have simply put them\nthere themselves without realising it. Poetry is produced not by the\nmere caprice of pleasure, but by natural necessity. It is so far\nfrom being superfluous and capable of elimination, that without it\nthought cannot arise: it is the primary activity of the human mind.\nMan, before he has arrived at the stage of forming universals, forms\nimaginary ideas. Before he reflects with a clear mind, he apprehends\nwith faculties confused and disturbed: before he can articulate, he\nsings: before speaking in prose, he speaks in verse: before using\ntechnical terms, he uses metaphors, and the metaphorical use of words\nis as natural to him as that which we call \"natural.\" So far from being\na fashion of expounding metaphysics poetry is distinct from and opposed\nto metaphysics. The one frees the intellect from the senses, the other\nsubmerges and overwhelms it in them: the one reaches perfection in\nproportion as it rises to universality, the other, as it confines\nitself to the particular: the one enfeebles the imagination, the other\nstrengthens it. The one takes precautions against turning the mind into\nbody, the other delights in giving body to the mind. The judgments\nof poetry are composed of sense and emotion, those of philosophy are\ncomposed of reflection, which if introduced into poetry makes it frigid\nand unreal: and no one in the whole course of history has ever been at\nonce a great poet and a great metaphysician. Poets and philosophers\nmay be called respectively the senses and the intellect of mankind: and\nin this sense we may retain as true the scholastic saying \"there is\nnothing in the intellect which was not first in the senses.\" Without\nsense, we cannot have intellect: without poetry, we cannot have\nphilosophy, nor indeed any civilisation.\n\nAlmost more miraculous than this conception of poetry is the fact\nthat Vico saw into the true nature of language, a problem much less\ncanvassed and investigated, and no more satisfactorily solved, by\nancient and modern philosophy down to the present day. Language was\nas a rule alternately confused with logic and debased into a mere\nexternal and conventional sign, or else in despair referred to a\ndivine origin. Vico realised that the divine origin was in this\ncase a mere refuge of indolence; that language is neither logic nor\nconvention, and, like poetry, is neither esoteric wisdom nor due to\na decision or agreement. Language arises naturally. In its first\nform, men express themselves \"by mute actions,\" or by signs, and\n\"by bodies having natural connexions with the ideas which they wish\nto indicate,\" _i.e._ by means of symbolic objects. But in the case\nboth of articulated languages and of common speech, all philologists\nhave, \"with an excess of good faith,\" which means a deficiency of\ninsight, accepted the view that meanings are decided at pleasure:\nwhereas at the so-called origin of language meanings must have been\nnatural, and every common word must certainly have started from one\nsingle individual of one nation, and been derived from the primitive\nlanguage of gestures and objects. In Latin, as in other tongues, it\nis to be noticed that almost all the words are formed to express\nnatural properties, or used by transference: and the greater part of\nevery language, in every nation, is metaphorical. The opposite opinion\nwas due to the ignorance of grammarians, who, meeting with a great\nnumber of words expressing confused and indistinct ideas, and not\nknowing their origin, which had formerly made them lucid and distinct,\ninvented for their own peace of mind the conventional theory; and\ndragged in Aristotle and Galen as against Plato and Iamblichus. The\nserious objection generally brought against the natural origin of\nlanguage and in favour of the conventional, namely the variations in\nthe common speech among different nations, is solved by considering\nthat owing to diversities of climate, temperament and custom nations\nlooked at the same useful or necessary objects in different aspects,\nand hence produced different languages. This is also seen in the case\nof proverbs; which are substantially identical maxims of human life,\nbut expressed in as many different forms as there are, or have been,\ndifferent nations. The insistence, then, with which Vico claims to have\ndiscovered the true origin of languages \"in the principles of poetry\"\nis of especial importance. On the one hand, it entails the assertion of\nthe spontaneous and imaginative origin of language, and on the other\nit tends implicitly if not explicitly to suppress the dualism between\npoetry and language.\n\nIn these principles of poetry Vico found not only the origin of\nlanguages, but also that of letters or writing. He pronounced the\nseparation of the two Origins, connected as they were by nature and\nappearing, in the primitive dumb language of signs and objects, as\nidentical, to be a mere mistake of the grammarians. Here again, it\nis no case of esoteric wisdom or convention. Hieroglyphics were not\ninvented by philosophers as a means of concealing the mysteries of\ntheir lofty thoughts: they were a universal and natural necessity to\nall primitive peoples: and only the alphabetic scripts arose among\nnations by a free agreement. In other words Vico drew a distinction\n(though in a confused manner) within the so-called scripts, between\nthose which are true scripts and therefore conventional, and\nothers which are directly expressive and are therefore language,\nstory-telling, poetry and painting. These expressive scripts or\nlanguages are characterised by the inseparability of content from\nform. They are poetical just in the sense that the story and its\nexpression are one and the same thing, namely a metaphor common to\npoetry and painting, so that it could be depicted by a dumb man without\nverbal expression. As examples, Vico quotes traditional anecdotes;\nfor instance, the five \"real words\" (the frog, the mouse, the bird,\nthe ploughshare and the bow) sent by Idanturas king of the Scythians\nto Darius when the latter had declared war on him: and the parable of\nthe tall poppies which King Tarquin enacted before the eyes of his son\nSextus's ambassador, concerning the means of ruling Gabii--methods\nof expression parallel to practices still found among savages and\nthe lower classes:--and in addition to these, heraldry, flags, and\nthe emblems upon medals and coins. There is a frivolous legend which\nbelittles and degrades the true value of heraldry by asserting it to\nhave been invented in German tournaments as a custom of gallantry\nby young men seeking to win the love of noble maidens. But in the\nMiddle Ages heraldry was a serious thing. It was, so to speak, the\nhieroglyphic script of the period: a wordless language to eke out the\npoverty of ordinary speech and alphabetic writing. It was only later,\nin times of culture, that it became a sport and a pleasure, and gallant\nand learned blazonings were adopted which had to be enlivened by means\nof mottoes because their own meaning was now merely analogical; while\nprimitive and natural heraldry was dumb, or rather spoke without\nneeding an interpreter. Even in the days of culture a few such\nexpressive forms retained this simplicity and naturalness. Flags or\nensigns for instance form a kind of armed language with which nations,\nas if deprived of speech, make themselves understood in the wider\naffairs of the natural rights of peoples; wars, alliances and commerce.\n\nThus in the light of Vico's aesthetical idea poetry, words, metaphors,\nwriting and graphic symbols are all illuminated and spring to life:\ngreat things and small, epic poetry and heraldry. The doctrine of\nimaginary forms was quite a new departure in the history of ideas: for\nwhile Vico opposed his own conceptions to those of the contemporary\nschools, especially the Cartesian, he by no means attached himself to\nany other more or less remote school or tradition. He himself felt\nthat he was opposed not to a particular school but to all who had ever\nformulated doctrines on the subject. He says that he has \"overturned\"\nall the theories about poetry held by Plato, Aristotle, and so on down\nto Patrizio, Scaliger and Castelvetro in modern times, all of whom\nhad lost themselves in ineptitudes which \"even to mention makes one\nashamed.\" Patrizio made poetry begin with the songs of birds and the\nwhistling of the wind! As regards language, he had been ultimately\ndissatisfied both with Plato and with the moderns Wolfgang Latius,\nScaliger and Sanchez. As regards writing, once the theory of divine\norigin supported by Mallinkrot and Ingewald Eling was refuted, or\nrather interpreted in his own way, which came to the same thing, he\nmade an attempt to discredit the futile, vague, ill-founded, misshapen,\npompous and absurd opinions which derived it from the Goths and through\nthem from Adam and personal instruction from God, or more directly from\nthe Earthly Paradise, or from a Gothic Mercury as inventor. Finally,\nas to heraldry, he remarks that the writers on the subject have never\nunderstood anything about it, and have only by a mere random guess let\nfall a hint of the truth in calling it \"heroic.\"\n\nIn fact it would be hard to find real and true precedents for Vico's\naesthetic conceptions. At most, we might indicate vague suggestions\ncontained in various scattered statements which he collects: a certain\nimmediate stimulus in the discussions of the seventeenth century on\nthe distinctions between intellect and genius, reason and imagination,\ndialectic and rhetoric: and a certain convergence of external\nparticulars, such as the collection of rhetorical subtleties expressed\nin subtleties of language, made by Tesauro, a rhetorician of the time.\n\nThese conceptions, however, produced as they were by a remarkable\nstroke of originality, no sooner passed from general outline to\nparticular determinations, from the first idea or inspiration to\nconcrete development, than they appear to become confused, fluctuating\nand unstable. We may set aside the various opinions successively held\nby Vico, and bound up with the historical growth of his mind, upon\nthe subjects of poetry, language or metaphor, beginning with his\nacademic orations, passing thence by way of the _De ratione_ and _De\nantiquissima_ to the _Diritto universale,_ from these to the first and\nthence to the second _Scienza Nuova_: a study of these might supply\nsubject-matter for a special essay, but does not come within the scope\nof our treatise. But even in the final form of his aesthetic thought,\ncontradictory doctrines exist side by side. He is not content with\nsaying, as he does say, that poetical form is the primary activity of\nthe mind; that it is composed of feelings of emotion; and that it is\nentirely imaginative and devoid of concepts and reflection. He goes on\nto add that poetry, as opposed to history, \"represents reality in its\nbest idea,\" and therefore fulfils the justice and gives every man the\nreward or punishment which he does not always get in history, governed\nas the latter often is by caprice, necessity and chance. Again, he\nsays that the end of poetry is \"to give life to the lifeless,\" since\nits most sublime task is the attempt to give life and sensation to\ninsensible objects. He says that poetry is \"nothing but imitation\";\nthat children, with their great imitative powers, are poets; and that\nprimitive races, the children of mankind, were also sublime poets. He\nsays that poetry has for its special subject-matter \"the impossible\nmade credible\": for instance, it is impossible that body should be\nmind, and yet it was believed that the thundering sky was Jupiter.\nHence the miracles performed by magicians by means of incantations\nwere a favourite subject of poetry. He says that poetry is due to\n\"poverty,\" that is, that it is a pathological product of the mind.\nSince uncivilised man is of low brain-power and cannot satisfy the\nthirst he feels for the general and the universal, he fills their place\nby inventing imaginary genera, poetical universals or characters.\nConsequently the truth of the poet is identical with the truth of the\nphilosopher: the one abstract, the other clothed in images: the one\na metaphysic of reason, the other a metaphysic of feeling and fancy,\nsuited to the understanding of the people. From poverty also, that is\nfrom inability to articulate, arises song, and therefore mutes and\nstammerers utter sounds which are songs: and metaphor arises from\ninability to express things in an accurate manner. He says, finally,\nthat the aim of poetry is to teach the people to act virtuously.\n\nThese sayings indicate very various ideas about poetry, of which\nsome are compatible with the central doctrine but thrown out in a\ndisconnected manner and therefore not in fact reconciled with it:\nothers are quite incompatible. Vico might have been cited in turn, on\nthe testimony of single passages, as a supporter of the moralistic\ntheory of art, the didactic theory, the abstract or typical theory, the\nmythological theory, the animistic theory, and so on. And if he neither\nfalls back into the old theories he hated, nor loses himself among\nthe new fallacies which followed him, it is due to the fact that all\nthese waverings and inconsistencies were continually submerged by the\nthought that poetry is the primary form of the mind, prior to intellect\nand free from reflection and reasoning.\n\nJust as he was unable by the use of his leading principle to\ndistinguish and reconcile the other theories on the nature of poetry\nwhich already existed or had been invented by himself, so he did\nnot succeed in escaping from the tyranny of old or new empirical\nclassifications. He struggled to reduce these in their turn to\nphilosophical form, and tried to deduce successively the various kinds\nof poetry, epic, lyric and dramatic: the kinds of verse and metre,\nspondaic, iambic and prose: the kinds of figurative language, metaphor,\nmetonymy, synecdoche and irony: the parts of speech, onomatopoeism,\ninterjection, pronoun, particle, noun and verb: the moods and tenses of\nthe verb (in which connexion he refers to a case of aphasia observed\nby himself in Naples, \"a gentleman seized with a severe apoplexy,\nwho utters nouns but has completely forgotten verbs\"): the kinds of\nwriting, hieroglyphic, symbolic and alphabetical: and of languages,\naccording to their increasing complexity, from monosyllables to\ncompound words and from a preponderance of vowels and diphthongs\nto a preponderance of consonants. In the course of these attempts\nhe frequently offered new and sometimes correct interpretations of\nisolated facts: but he did not and could not connect them into a\nscientific system. Moreover he never realised the relation between\npoetry and the other arts. On the one hand, he unites them, as when he\nconsiders painting and poetry to be fundamentally identical and notes\na number of analogies between the poetry and painting of the Middle\nAges: on the other, he separates them sharply, as when he asserts\nthat delicacy in art is the outcome of philosophy, and that painting,\nsculpture, casting and intaglio are the most delicate arts because they\nare compelled to abstract the surface of the material objects they\nrepresent.\n\nThese inconsistencies and errors which we have briefly reviewed are due\npartly to Vico's insufficient power of distinguishing and elaborating,\npartly--and this is the greater part--to that fundamental fault which\nwe have already seen to exist in the structure of the New Science. In\nthis case the fault is, more precisely, Vico's confusion between the\nphilosophical concept of the poetic form of the mind, and the empirical\nconcept of the barbaric form of civilisation. \"This earliest age of the\nworld,\" as he himself says, \"can be truly said to have concerned itself\nexclusively with the primary activity of the mind.\" But the earliest\nage of the world, composed as it was of men of flesh and blood, not of\nphilosophical categories, cannot have been concerned with one solitary\nactivity of the mind. This single activity may have preponderated,\nas we generally say: the very word reveals the quantitative and\napproximative nature of the conception: but all the others must have\nbeen at work simultaneously, imagination and intellect, perception and\nabstraction, will and morality, song and arithmetic. Vico could not\nshut his eyes to this obvious fact, and introduced into this phase of\ncivilisation not only the poet, but also the theologian, the physicist,\nthe astronomer, the _pater-familias,_ the warrior, the politician,\nand the lawgiver; but he tried to regard the activities of all these\nas \"poetical\" in character, as he called it, by a metaphor drawn from\nthe alleged preponderance of the imaginative form of the mind; and\nthe whole system he called \"poetic wisdom.\" The metaphorical nature\nof the terminology is suggested, in fact leaps to the eye, in certain\ncharacteristic passages, as where the \"arts,\" that is, the mechanical\ncrafts which produce objects of practical utility, are called \"poetry\nwith a certain kind of reality,\" and where ancient Roman law, because\nof the abundance of formulae and ceremonies with which it was adorned,\nis said to be a \"serious dramatic poem.\" But the metaphors are\ndangerous, since, as in the case of the New Science, they light upon\na soil favourable to their growth into concepts: and in point of fact\nthe historical phase of barbarism, metaphorically expressed as poetic\nwisdom, soon turned in Vico's mind into the ideal phase of poetry, and\ntransferred all its own attributes to this ideal phase. The former\nincluded theologians, and accordingly Vico regarded poetry as theology,\nbut an imaginative theology: teachers, and poetry became a teacher,\nbut of the common people: natural scientists, and it became science,\nbut the science of an imaginary world. And since these barbarians,\nuncultivated as they were and confined to the world of images, could\nnot think in concepts, the imaginations of poetry, individualised and\nparticular, and its judgments, always expressed in material form,\nwere falsely interpreted as \"imaginative universals,\" supposed to be\nsomething intermediate between the individualising intuition and the\nuniversalising concept. Poetry, which ought to represent sense and\nnothing else, came to represent a sense already intellectualised; and\nthe saying that nothing is found in the intellect that has not already\nbeen in the sense, acquired the meaning, that the intellect is nothing\nbut the sense clarified, and the sense nothing but the intellect\nconfused. Thus there was no further need for the added caution\n\"except the intellect itself\" (_nisi intellectus ipse_). Conversely,\nbarbaric civilisation became a kind of mythological or allegorical\nrepresentation of the ideal phase of poetry, and primitive tribes were\ntransformed into crowds of \"sublime poets\" just as, in the ontogenesis\ncorresponding to this philogenesis, children had been made into poets.\nThe concept of the \"imaginative universal\" unites in itself the double\ncontradiction of the doctrine; since to the imaginative element must\nbe joined, in this mental construction, the element of universality\nwhich taken by itself would be a true and proper universal, rational\nand not imaginative. Hence arises a _petitio principii_ by which the\norigin of the rational universal, the point requiring explanation, is\nalready presupposed. On the other hand, if the imaginative universal is\ninterpreted as freed from the element of universality, that is, as a\nmere imagination, Vico's aesthetic doctrine would certainly become once\nmore consistent: but his \"poetic wisdom\" or barbaric civilisation would\nbe deprived of an indispensable portion of its organism in parting with\nevery kind of concept: for concepts are, so to speak, the skeleton of\nthe body.\n\nTo resolve the contradiction it was necessary to separate poetry from\npoetic wisdom: and we do find some signs of this separation in Vico. He\nsometimes admits, almost against his will, the lack of correspondence\nbetween the philosophical category and the type of society, and in\ndealing with the latter is compelled to fall back upon such phrases\nas \"very nearly\" and \"more or less.\" He says, for instance, that\nprimitive man consisted \"exclusively of strong imagination, with no,\nor very little, reason\": that he was \"almost all body, with hardly\nany reflection\": or again, after making a show of philosophical\ndistinction between the three languages of gods, heroes and men, he\ngoes on to observe that \"the language of the gods was almost all dumb,\nand very little articulate; the language of heroes was composed of\nequal quantities of articulation and dumb-show; the language of men\nwas almost all articulated, and very little in dumb-show.\" He admits\nagain in a fine simile that poetic speech out-lived poetic wisdom and\nsurvived far into the historic and civilised period, \"as great and\nrapid rivers run far out into the sea and keep their waters fresh as\nthey bear them along with the force of their flow.\" Even in modern\ntimes we cannot afford entirely to neglect imaginative speech: \"to\ndescribe the operations of the pure mind, we must avail ourselves of\npoetic language, of metaphors drawn from the senses.\" It appears that\npoetry does not end with barbarism, for poets arise even in civilised\ntimes: and if it is said that the poets of the earliest times were\nnaturally imaginative, those of later days artificially so, that is,\naccording to Vico, by deliberately forgetting the proper use of words,\nfreeing themselves from philosophy, filling their minds with childish\nand vulgar prejudices and submitting to the bondage of conventions like\nthe use of rhyme--all these restrictions, besides being easily refuted,\nare merely an unsuccessful attempt to diminish the weight of the fact\nabove mentioned, namely that poetry belongs to all ages, not merely to\nthat of barbarism: it is an ideal category, not a historic fact. But\nthe restrictions prove, as also do the infrequency and the unemphatic\nnature of the passages quoted, that Vico was not in a position to\neffect the separation of poetry from poetic wisdom, hampered as he was\nby the hybrid character of the concept and of the actual method of the\nNew Science.\n\nIf, on the other hand, the idea of poetry as pure imagination had not\nremained firmly at the foundation of Vico's thought, in spite of all\nthe confusions and inconsistencies in which it became involved, and\nhad not been at work underground, so to speak, in the New Science,\nit would have been difficult or perhaps impossible to understand the\nleading conception which dominates his philosophy of mind, closely\nconnected as it is with that idea. This is the conception of the mind\nas a development, or, to use Vico's own words, a progress or unfolding\n(_corso, spiegamento_); a conception which improved upon, though it\ndid not explicitly contradict, the ordinary view which was almost\nexclusively confined to the enumeration and classification of the\nmind's faculties. The doctrine of imaginative universals as spontaneous\nmental products, rudimentary universals but not without an element of\ntruth in them, was at least an adequate weapon against the empirical\ntheory which made civilisation the outcome of a highly developed and\nrational practical wisdom and the personal labour of God or of wise\nmen who must have sprung from the earth or fallen from heaven in some\nunaccountable manner.\n\nVico clearly stated the dilemma between the two, and only two, possible\nexplanations of the origin of society. Either it came from the\nreflection of wise men, or from a certain human feeling and instinct\namong brutish men. He accepted the latter solution, that of \"brutes\"\nwhich gradually became human: the theory, that is, of the evolution\nof thought from the imaginative to the rational universal, and the\nprogress of social relations from force to equity. But was this an\nadequate foundation for \"ideal history\" or the philosophy of mind? In\nthe philosophy of mind, it could be translated into a similar if not\nidentical view--the doctrine which, owing to Cartesianism and a certain\nrecrudescence of the Scholasticism of Duns Scotus, lasted down to\nVico's own times and expressed the life of the mind by the successive\nstages of the concept, obscurity, confusion, clarity and distinctness.\nLeibniz, as is well known, made a special study of obscure and\nconfused perceptions, the _\"petites perceptions.\"_ The doctrine was\nessentially intellectualistic, since the concepts, however confused\nor obscure, were never anything else than concepts: and hence it was\nunable to account either for poetry or even for mental development,\nthe dialectic of which cannot be understood if it is regarded as\nconsisting of merely quantitative differences. Such differences are\nin reality not differences at all, but identities and therefore the\nnegation of change: and in fact the whole of this school of thought was\nanti-aesthetic and static, devoid both of a true theory of imagination\nand a true theory of development. Vico's thought, on the other hand,\nwas averse to intellectualism and in sympathy with imagination: it was\nentirely dynamic and evolutionary. For Vico, mind is an eternal drama:\nand since drama demands antithesis, his philosophy of mind is rooted\nin antithesis, that is in the real distinction and opposition between\nimagination and thought, poetry and metaphysic, force and equity,\npassion and morality; although he seems sometimes, for the reasons\ngiven above, to mistake its nature; or rather, although he actually\ndoes sometimes confuse it with empirical inquiries and doctrines, and\nwith the determinations of history.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V\n\n\nTHE SEMI-IMAGINATIVE FORM OF KNOWLEDGE\n\n(MYTH AND RELIGION)\n\n\nVico's doctrine of mythology, while no less original and profound than\nthat of poetry, is also, like the latter, not entirely lucid: for the\nrelations between poetry and myth are so close that the shadow cast\nupon the one must of necessity extend to some degree over the other.\n\nIn proceeding to inquire, as we have hitherto done and shall\ncontinue to do, into the state of contemporary knowledge of the\nseveral sciences and problems with which Vico set out to deal, we\nmay briefly recall _\u00e0 propos_ of the study of mythology not only the\ngreat literary collections of myths formed during the sixteenth and\nseventeenth centuries, of which Boccaccio had already given an example\nin the fourteenth century, but also the learned defences of the two\nexplanatory theories, already known to classical antiquity and not\nentirely unknown in the Middle Ages. These were, first, the theory\nof myth as allegory of philosophical truths (moral, political and so\nforth), and secondly, the theory of myth as the history of actual\npersons and events, adorned by the fancy which made heroes into gods\n(Euhemerism). The former tendency inspired among other works the\n_Mythologiae sive explanationis fabularum libri decem_ of Natale Conti\n(1568) and Bacon's _De sapientia veterum_ (1609); in which, however,\nthis system had been advanced with a certain hesitation, and with\nthe explicit caution that, even if it were not valid as historical\ninterpretation, it would always be of value as moralisation (_aut\nantiquitatem illustrabimus aut res ipsas:_ \"we shall explain either\nantiquity or the facts themselves\"). The latter was authoritatively\nrepresented by John Leclerc (Clericus), the learned Dutch Genevese for\nwhom Vico expressed so much respect and gratitude for the attention he\nhad deigned to bestow upon his _Diritto universale._ His edition of\nHesiod's _Theogony_ marked an epoch in the study of mythology, and he\nwas followed among others by Banier, author of the work _Les Fables\nexpliqu\u00e9es par l'histoire_(1735). A third system, also not without some\nancient precedent, derived myths from particular nations, the Egyptians\nor the Hebrews, or from the original works of individual philosophers\nand poets. This view, when it neither resolved itself into a pure and\nsimple historical supposition as to the origin of some or all myths,\nnor appealed to divine revelation, clearly involved the theory that\nmyth is not an eternal form but a contingent product of the mind, born\nat a certain time and capable of dying or already dead.\n\nVico strongly opposed the first and third of these views of mythology,\nnamely the allegorical theory and that of historical derivation.\nOn the allegorical view, he mentions Bacon's treatise, which had\nstimulated him to the study of the subject, out which he considered\n\"more ingenious than sound\": on the other school, which regarded myths\nas sacred history altered and corrupted by the Gentiles and especially\nby the Greeks, he refers to Vossius's _De theologia gentili_ (1642)\nand to a dissertation by Daniel Huet. Myths or fables do not contain\nesoteric wisdom, that is to say, rational concepts, subtly concealed by\nthe veil of fable: hence they are not allegorical. Allegory implies on\nthe one hand the concept or thing signified, on the other the fable\nor medium of concealment, and between the two, the art by which both\nare kept in equilibrium. But myths cannot be split up into these three\nmoments, nor even into a thing signified and a thing which signifies\nit: their meaning is univocal. The theory also implies that a believer\nin the content does not believe in the form: but the makers of myths\nbelieved fully and ingenuously in their own work. Once, for instance,\nthat first divine fable was created, the myth than which none greater\nwas ever afterwards invented, that of Jupiter, king and father of gods\nand men, in the act of thundering, the very men who had invented him\nbelieved in him, and with their religion of terror feared, reverenced\nand worshipped him.\n\nMyth, in a word, is not fable but history of such a kind as could\nbe constructed by primitive minds, and strictly considered by them\nas an account of actual fact. The philosophers who arose later made\nuse of myths to expound their doctrines in an allegorical manner; or\ndeceived themselves into thinking that they found them there owing to\nthe feeling of veneration which attaches to antiquity, and increases\nas our comprehension of it diminishes; or thought it expedient to make\nuse of such things for political purposes, like Plato Homerising, and\nat the same time Platonising Homer: and in doing this they turned the\nmyths into fables, which they were not originally, and are essentially\nnot. Thus we may say that the philosophers and students of mythology\nwho indulged in such strange fancies about the legends were the real\npoets, while the primitive poets or myth-makers were the true students,\nand intended to narrate the actual facts of their time. For the same\nreason, namely, because myth is an essential part of poetic or barbaric\nwisdom, and, as such, a spontaneous product of all times and places,\nit cannot be attributed to one single nation as its inventor, from\nwhich it passed to others; as if it were a particular discovery of a\nparticular man or the object of revelation.\n\nThis doctrine, superior as it is to the allegorical and historical\ntheories, is another aspect of Vico's vindication of the non-logical\nforms of knowledge as against the intellectualism which denied\nthem and merely represented them either as artificial forms or as\ndue to supernatural causes. Nor does the opinion seem acceptable\nwhich attaches Vico to the Neo-Euhemeristic school. He does not\nindeed explicitly combat this school, and we may even grant that he\npresents certain superficial resemblances to it: but together with\nthe resemblances there is this radical difference, that for Vico the\nstories are not alterations of actual history, but are essentially\nhistory; their supposed alteration is the actual truth as it appeared\nto the primitive mind.\n\nVico did not and could not give a more precise determination of the\nnature of myth, precisely because owing to the fluctuating character\nof his concept of poetry, itself he was not in a position to lay down\nthe boundary between the two forms. He talks generally of poetry and\nmyth as distinct things, but he does not establish the distinction.\nAnd yet Vico was familiar enough with the concept which supplies\nthis distinctive criterion, and had enunciated it: but instead of\nusing it for his doctrine of mythology, he had made of it one or\nmore of his various definitions of poetry. That \"poetic character,\"\nthat \"imaginative universal\" whose introduction into aesthetic as\nthe explanatory principle of poetry causes so many insuperable\ndifficulties, is really the definition of mythology, and as such\nprovides the science of mythology with the true principle that is\nrequired. If the concept of accomplishing great labours for the common\nwelfare cannot be disengaged from the idea of a particular man who\naccomplished one of these labours, this concept becomes for instance\nthe myth of Hercules: and Hercules is at once an individual man who\ndoes individual actions, and kills the Lernaean hydra and the Nemean\nlion or cleanses the stables of Augeas, and also a concept: just as\nthe concept of beneficent and glorious labour is at once a concept and\nHercules: a universal and an imaginary idea: an imaginative universal.\n\nAgain, that sublime task which Vico declared proper to poetry, the task\nof giving life to inanimate objects, belongs properly not to poetry\nbut to myth. Mythology, embodying its concepts in images, which are\nalways individual things, at last animates them like living beings.\nThus primitive man, ignorant of the cause of lightning and therefore\nnot possessing the scientific definition of it, was led by the\nmythological tendency to conceive the sky as a vast living being, who,\nlike man himself when, in the grip of his fierce passions, he shouted,\nmuttered or roared, spoke and meant something by his speech. It is\nmythology again, not poetry, whose origin must be traced to \"poverty,\"\nto the weakness of men's minds and their inability to deal with the\nproblems they would solve, in their incapacity for thinking in rational\nuniversals and expressing themselves in accurate language, whence\narose imaginative universals and metonymy, synecdoche and metaphor\nof all kinds. The contradictions we have seen in the imaginative\nuniversal which make it incapable of acting as the foundation of an\naesthetic doctrine are quite in keeping in the doctrine of myth: for\nmyth consists precisely of these contradictions: it is a concept\ntrying to be an image and an image trying to be a concept, and hence a\nkind of poverty, or even of powerful impotence,--a contrast, a mental\ntransition where white no longer exists and black has not yet come\ninto being. Finally, poetic wisdom, that is, the theology, science,\ncosmography, geography, astronomy and the whole system of other ideas\nand beliefs of primitive nations as Vico describes them, was really\nmythology, not, as he says, poetry, for the good reason, given by\nhimself, that these things were their history: and poetry is poetry and\nnot history, even more or less imaginary history. The Homeric poems are\npoetry in so far as they express the aspirations of Hellenism: the same\npoems, in so far as they were recited and heard as accounts of actual\nfacts, are history: the two things being forms of mental products\nwhich, though they seem to be materially united in a single work, are\nnot for that reason to be identified.\n\nAll this was both seen and not seen, or rather, sometimes realised and\nsometimes overlooked, by Vico: and hence he cannot be said to have\nsucceeded in determining satisfactorily the distinction, and solving\nthe problem of the relation, between mythology and poetry. Another\nproblem of importance relating to the science of mythology, and still\nthe subject of controversy, namely, the question whether myth belongs\nto philosophy or to history, might be supposed to have been decisively\nsolved by Vico: since he repeats over and over again that myths contain\nthe historical judgments of primitive peoples, not the philosophical.\nBut in reality when we examine the point closely it appears that he\nneither solved the problem nor even propounded it. The historical\njudgments of which Vico is speaking are contrasted strictly not with\nphilosophical judgments in general but with the \"mystical judgments\nof the earliest philosophy\" and the \"judgments of analogy\" which the\nwriters criticised by Vico found in mythology. Thus on the one hand his\nwords repeat the criticism of the allegorical theory and, on the other,\ncontrovert that fallacious method of historical interpretation which\nascribes the ideas and customs of to-day to the nations of antiquity.\nThe fact is that Vico's theory is just as much in agreement with the\ntheory connecting myth with philosophy as with that which connects it\nwith history; and as much with the eclecticism which admits both these\nelements as with the speculative view which also admits them both, but\nbecause philosophy and history both in themselves and as constituents\nof myth are at bottom one and the same.\n\nConsidered as \"poverty,\" myth must be superseded. In the natural\neffort of the human mind to rejoin God, the true One, from whom it\nhas come, and its inability owing to the exuberant animal nature of\nprimitive man to make use of the faculty, buried as it is beneath his\ntoo keen senses, of abstracting from subjects their properties and\nuniversal forms,--in these circumstances, it constructs for itself\nfanciful unities, imaginary genera or myths: but in its subsequent\nprogress and development, it gradually resolves the imaginary genera\ninto intelligible genera, poetic universals into rational, and sets\nitself free from mythology. Thus the error of myth passes into the\ntruth of philosophy. Vico knew and employed a concept of error, error\nproperly so called, which proceeds from the will, not from thought,\nwhich is never in error as regards itself, \"for the mind is always\nput under compulsion by truth, since we can never lose sight of God\"\n(_mens enim semper a vero urgetur quia numquam aspectu amittere\npossumus Deum_); the error which consists in the arbitrary conjunction\nof unmeaning words, \"but words very often, by the will of him who\nis lying, escape the force of truth and desert the mind, or even do\nviolence to the mind and turn away from God\" (_verba autem saepissime\nveri vim voluntate mentientis eludunt ac mentem deserunt, immo menti\nvim aciunt et Deo absistunt_); the error, in a word, which exists when,\nin his own powerful language, \"though men speak with their mouth,\nthey have nothing in their minds; since within their minds there is\nfalsity, which is nothing.\" But he also knows that error is never\npure error, simply because there is no such thing as a false idea and\nfalsity consists only in the wrong combination of ideas, and therefore\nit always contains truth, and every fable has a certain element of\ntruth. Hence, far from despising fables, Vico recognised their value\nas embryonic forms so to speak of stored-up knowledge or of what will\none day develop into philosophy. The poets (which means, in Vico's new\nsense of the word, myth-makers) are the senses (that is, in its new\nmeaning, rudimentary and imperfect philosophy): the philosophers are\nthe intellect of mankind, that is the more highly developed philosophy\nwhich derives from the former. The idea of God evolves by degrees from\nthe God who strikes the imagination of the isolated man, to the God\nof the family, _divi parentum,_ the God of a social class or country,\n_divi patrii,_ the God of nations, and finally to the God \"who is\nJupiter to all men,\" the God of humanity. The fables stimulated Plato\nto understand the three divine punishments which not men but only gods\ncould inflict, oblivion, infamy and remorse: the passage through the\nlower world suggested to him the concept of the purgatorial journey\nby which the soul is purified of passions, and the arrival in Elysium\nsuggested the journey of union by which the mind comes to unite itself\nwith God by the contemplation of the eternal divine ideas.\n\nFrom the similes and metaphors of the poets Aesop drew the examples\nand fables by which he gave advice: and the instance founded upon\na single case which satisfies an untutored mind developed into\ninduction, drawing its validity from several similar cases, as taught\ndialectically by Socrates, and thence the syllogism invented by\nAristotle, which cannot exist without a universal. The etymologies\nof words reveal the truths observed by primitive man and deposited\nby him in his language: for instance the fact, laboriously proved by\nmodern philosophers, that the senses themselves create the so-called\nsensible qualities is already suggested in the Latin word _olfacere,_\nwhich implies the idea that the sense of smell \"makes\" the odour. Vico\nattaches such importance to this connexion between poetic universals\nand rational universals, between myth and philosophy, that he is led\nto assert that such judgments of philosophers as cannot find parallel\nor precedent in poetic and popular wisdom must be wrong. Here we have\nanother meaning sometimes assigned by him to the relation of philosophy\nto philology: namely, a reciprocal confirmation of common wisdom by\nesoteric wisdom and _vice versa,_ both of which are united in the idea\nof an everlasting philosophy of man.\n\nSimultaneously with his theory of myth and its relation to philosophy,\nVico expounds his theory of religion, and the relation it bears to\nphilosophy. Two thoughts on this subject are to be found up and down\nthe New Science. The first is, that religion arises in the phase of\nweakness and savagery from the mind's need to allay its desire to\nunderstand more or less the phenomena of nature and man; for instance,\nto explain lightning. The second is, that religion is produced in\nthe mind by fear of the person who threatens by lightning. We might\ndescribe these two views as theories respectively of the theoretical\nand practical origin of religion; and since according to Vico's\ndoctrine man consists of nothing but intellect and will, clearly\nreligion can have no other origin than these two. Now, setting aside\nreligion in its practical aspect, to be discussed later, religion in\nits theoretical aspect is surely nothing else than the imaginative\nuniversal, poetic animism, or myth. To it belongs the institution\nwhich Vico calls divination; that is, the methods of collecting and\ninterpreting the language of Jupiter, the \"real words,\" gestures and\nsigns of God, formed as imaginative universals and created by the\nanimating fancy. And as from myth come science and philosophy, so in\nlike manner from divination comes the knowledge of ground and cause,\nphilosophic or scientific prediction.\n\nIn this way Vico escaped the prejudice which was beginning to prevail\nin his time--we may recall Van Dale's history of ancient oracles,\npopularised by Fontenelle, and Banier's book already mentioned--and\nwas to be so powerful for a century, of considering religions as\n\"some one else's imposture\": whereas, he says, they were really due\nto \"one's own credulity.\" The man who refused to admit the artificial\norigin of myth could not admit it of religion. But just as he denied\nno less the supernatural or revealed origin of myth, so at the same\ntime he proclaimed neither more nor less than the natural, even\nthe human, origin of religions; and--a fact especially worthy of\nnotice--placed this origin in an inadequate form of the mind, namely\nthe semi-imaginative form identical with mythology. Nor need we\nattach weight to certain brief and incidental remarks which seem to\ncontradict this theory, as when he says that religion precedes not only\nphilosophy but language itself, which presupposes the consciousness\nof some community between man and man: such equivocations are due to\nthe invariable confusedness of his method and his habitual lack of\nclearness. The identification of religion with myth, and its human\norigin, are ideas not only emphatically expressed, but essential to\nVico's whole system. It is a human origin which in his own words\ndoes not exclude a different concept of religion, namely as revealed\nand hence of supernatural origin. In fact he always separates\npoetic theology, which is mythology, and natural theology, which is\nmetaphysics or philosophy, from revealed theology. But this last\nconcept is admitted by him not because it is connected with the others\nand derived from a principle common to them, but simply because Vico\nasserted its existence no less than theirs. The human origin, poetic\ntheology, followed by metaphysical theology, is the form valid for\nthe Gentile portion of mankind, that is the whole human race except\nthe Hebrew people with its privilege of revelation. The motives that\nled Vico to maintain this dualism and the annoying inconsistencies\nin which it compelled him to rest will be seen later on in their own\nplace. But precisely because Vico left this dualism without mediation,\nwe must in expounding his thought hold fast both terms of the dualism:\nand for the time being we will confine ourselves to the merely human\norigin--religion as a product of the theoretical needs of man in a\ncondition of comparative moral poverty. This conception has only an\nindirect connexion with Bruno's view of religion as a thing necessary\nto the ignorant and undeveloped mob, and with Campanula's theory\nof natural or permanent religion, an eternal rational philosophy\ncoinciding with a Christianity freed from its abuses. Its parallels\nin contemporary authors are few and distant: even when they mention\nit in passing, they grasp it only in a superficial way and propound\nit without connecting it at all with their other ideas: they attack\nreligion as a form of ignorance, and omit the wisdom of the ignorance,\nor religion as truth.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI\n\n\nTHE MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS\n\n\nVico's other doctrines on the theoretical reason, that is to say on\nthe logic of philosophy, of physical and mathematical science and of\nhistorical study, have been expounded above in the statement of his\ntheory of knowledge, and are drawn almost entirely from his early\nworks, since in the New Science the phase of the \"completely developed\nmind\" hardly appears except as a limit of the field of study. Here it\nwill suffice to mention that he also touches upon the problem of the\nrelation of poetry to history: but, still because of the confusion\nof philosophy with social science, he fails fully to solve it. From\none point of view it seems to Vico that history is prior to poetry,\nbecause the latter, as he says, presupposes reality and contains an\n\"imitation of the second degree\": from another, poetry is the primary\nform, because among primitive peoples history is poetry, and the first\nhistorians are poets. At any rate he insists upon the poetic element\nessential to history: of Herodotus, the father of Greek history,\nhe observes that not only are \"his books full, for the most part,\nof fables,\" but \"the style retains a very great Homeric element, a\nfeature which all subsequent historians retained, using as they did\na phraseology intermediate between the poetic and the colloquial\":\n\"almost the words of the poets,\" _verba ferme poetarum,_ as he says\nelsewhere in a phrase borrowed from Cicero.\n\nNor are the relations between theory and practice, intellect and\nwill, explained in detail by Vico, although on the whole he suggests\nthe general idea that as in God intellect and will coincide, so it\nis in man, God's image; whose mind is not divided into thought and\nwill--thought proceeding according to one method and will according to\nanother--but his thought and will interpenetrate and form one single\nwhole: a view far superior to that of the contemporary philosophy\nof Leibniz, which retained the idea of a divine arbitrament and\ntherefore of irrationality. Another view, peculiar to Vico, might\nbe taken by a hasty interpreter to imply the priority of practice\nto theory. He says that philosophers arrive at their conceptions\nthanks to experience of social institutions and laws in which men\nagree as a kind of universals: that Socrates and Plato, for instance,\npresupposed the Athenian democracy and law-courts. But the succession\nof religions producing republics, republics producing laws, and laws\nproducing philosophical ideas, which he calls \"a fragment of the\nhistory of philosophy philosophically narrated,\" is really a theory of\nsociological, not of philosophical value.\n\nAs regards his doctrines of practical reason, which we are here\nbeginning to consider, it might be thought that Vico, unlike his\nattitude with regard to the theoretical reason, did not stand in sharp\nopposition to the thought of his time, but actually united himself with\na contemporary movement, namely the school of natural rights. The head\nof the school and leader of the movement, Hugo Grotius, was called by\nVico one of his \"four authors,\" together with Plato, from whom he had\ndrawn his aspirations towards an idealistic philosophy, Bacon, who had\naroused in his mind the idea of a positive and historical science of\nsociety, and Tacitus, his debt to whom, or at least the debt which he\nbelieved he owed him, we shall examine later on. Along with Grotius he\nfrequently mentions the other chief authorities on natural rights,\nSelden and Puffendorf, omitting their innumerable followers, whom he\nconsiders less as scientific authorities than as \"adorners\" of the\nGrotian system.\n\nHis adherence to the school, in a certain sense, is clear, and is\nadmitted and proclaimed by Vico himself. But it is also beyond doubt\nthat he was no mere adherent: he was not a follower of the kind that\nretains the general or leading ideas while developing and correcting\ndetails. He was a follower in the dialectical sense only, that is,\nin so far as he thought it necessary to contest the primary theses,\nor to accept them only in a profoundly modified form. Natural right\noffered him not solutions but problems: and of these, while some came\nbefore him already clearly formulated, others, and these were the more\nimportant, arose only in his own mind: problems either unsolved or\nunrealised, till Vico propounded and in part solved them.\n\nNatural rights presented many aspects and many tendencies: and it\nwould be well to begin by distinguishing and enumerating these. In\nthe first place, the school taken as a whole and in its essential\ncharacter expressed the social progress by which Europe, on emerging\nfrom feudalism and religious warfare, acquired a new consciousness,\ndistinctively bourgeois and non-clerical in character; and it\nobserved that the growth of this consciousness was contemporaneous\nwith the anti-clerical and bourgeois institution of \"masonry.\" The\nword \"natural\" meant, among other things, \"not supernatural\": and\nhence implied hostility or indifference towards the supernatural,\nthe institutions representing it, and the social conflicts resulting\nfrom it. It was not by accident that Grotius was an Arminian; that\nPuffendorf went to law with theologians; that Thomasius is remembered\nas one of the champions of freedom of conscience. The protestations of\nrespect for religion and the church, habitually and liberally inserted\nby these publicists in their works,--which are draped, so to speak,\nwith a veil of piety,--were merely politic safeguards, enabling the\nauthor to threaten the enemy unobserved and to strike from under cover.\nThis caution is praised, in Grotius's case for example, by a follower\nof the school (the author of _Pauco plenior iuris naturalis historia,_\n1719), who extols the master as \"the instrument of divine providence,\"\ncoming like Messiah to redeem the \"natural light\" from its bondage to\nthe \"supernatural,\" and as such gifted with all the power and ability\nhe could need: so that after tasting the persecutions of Scholasticism,\n\"he behaved with caution, to avoid further irritating the jealousy\nagainst his natural and reasonable prudence that had issued forth from\nits lair at his threats\" (_caute versabatur ... ne maius bilem adversus\nprudentiam naturalem et rationalem ex latebris productam tam minis\nirritaret_), and in proceeding to separate human from divine laws,\ndid not execute a frontal assault on the theological school when he\nattacked its fundamental errors, but even praised it in the preface to\nhis work. The word \"natural\" also denoted what is common to individuals\nof different nations and ranks: and hence from a practical point of\nview provided an admirable war-cry for uniting the bourgeoisie of\ndifferent countries in definite common aspirations and struggles. The\ntreatises of natural rights were for the bourgeoisie of the seventeenth\nand eighteenth centuries what the \"Manifesto of the communists\" and the\ncry \"Proletariates of the world, unite\" attempted to be for the working\nclasses of the nineteenth.\n\nIn so far as this school and this publicism were signs of a practical\nmovement, the philosophical interest held in them a secondary place\nand discharged a function of minor importance: so that, secondly, the\nworks on natural right, philosophically considered, did not as a rule\nrise above a simple popular empiricism. The principles on which they\nrest are not examined and often not even superficially reconciled: the\nconcepts which they use are less concepts than general representations:\nand the form of the writing is systematic in appearance only. Some\nof these writers endeavoured to harmonise their doctrines of natural\nright with the Platonic, Stoic or Cartesian philosophies, or appealed\nto logical or metaphysical axioms, or made use of deduction and the\nmathematical method. But all this was mere aggregation, not fusion;\nornament, not reinforcement: at most, it was of value as a proof of\ndiligence and earnest intentions.\n\nThe philosophy, however, which was more or less implicit in the\npamphleteers of natural rights, and explicit in the philosophers who\nset out to elaborate the doctrine, agreed with the spirit of the\ntime, whose general characteristics are well known. Thus arose the\nthird or ethical aspect of natural right, namely its utilitarianism;\nsometimes more or less concealed, sometimes openly declared, and\nworked out from time to time by a philosophy of mathematical or\nsensationalistic methods, and of materialistic or rationalistic\ntendencies: or else, what comes practically to the same thing, an\nabstract and intellectualistic morality, threatening at any moment to\nfall into utilitarianism. From this intellectualism and utilitarianism,\ncombined with the practical and revolutionary character of this mental\nmovement,--which was bent rather upon bringing about the triumph of\nan abstract system of right than upon recognising that which really\ndevelops in history, in all the complexity of its many forms and\nvicissitudes--derived its fourth characteristic, the lack of historical\nsense, or the anti-historical attitude of the school, which set up the\nabstract ideal of a human nature apart from human history instead of\nfused with and living in it.\n\nFinally, bourgeois, anticlerical, utilitarian and materialistic as it\nwas, the movement of natural right had a fifth important trait, namely\nits aversion to transcendence and its tendency towards an immanental\nconception of man and of society. This characteristic is neither fully\nexplained nor fully worked out in the doctrines, but is none the less\neasily recognised among the total views of the school.\n\nNow Vico's genius was truly and indeed exclusively theoretical, and not\nat all practical or reformatory: his method was profoundly speculative\nand contemptuous of empiricism, his mind idealistic and opposed to\nmaterialism and utilitarianism: his theory of knowledge eager for the\nconcrete, for \"certitude,\" and, as such, of historical sympathies.\nConsequently his doctrine of the practical reason, though deriving its\nimpetus from the theory of natural rights, was bound to emerge in a\nshape different from or even contrary to that theory in all the first\nfour characteristics enumerated above. And if it did in one respect\ncoincide--which it only does in the conclusion, not in the path by\nwhich the conclusion is reached--it did so in the very point in which\nVico would least have wished it: in its immanental or anti-religious\ntendency.\n\nBut since our subject is not the criticisms and modifications which the\ntheory of natural right received from Vico's thought, but rather that\nthought itself, it is time to pick up the thread of the exposition,\nfollowing an order somewhat different from that in which we have\nsummed up the various characteristics of the theory, and beginning by\nobserving Vico's opposition to the professed or implicit utilitarianism\nof the school, and the ethical doctrine by which he replaced it.\n\nThe two chief representatives of utilitarianism in the seventeenth\ncentury, whom Vico always keeps in view, are Hobbes and Spinoza: but in\naddition to them, he refers to Locke and Bayle and, in the preceding\ncentury, Machiavelli; and going back to the ancients, the Stoics with\ntheir conception of faith and the Epicureans with that of chance,\nCarneades and his scepticism, and finally the unconscious theory\ncontained in the saying \"_Vae victis_\" attributed to Brennus, chief\nof the Gauls who took Rome. He admired Hobbes's splendid attempt to\nenrich philosophy by a theory which had been lacking to the greatest\ndays of Greece, the theory of man considered in the whole society\nof the human race: but he pronounced the result unsatisfactory, and\nthe attempt, whose outcome, like that of Locke's system, was hardly\ndistinguishable from Epicureanism, a failure. Hobbes did not observe\nthat he could never have propounded his problem of the natural rights\nof mankind had not his motive been supplied by the Christian religion\nitself, which commands not indeed justice but charity to all mankind.\nWith the Stoics on the other hand, with the fatalism and determinism\nwhich made it impossible for them to reason soundly about the state and\nlaws, with the so-called \"Spinozists of antiquity,\" he ideally united\nSpinoza; the uniqueness of whose utilitarianism, equally removed from\nthe Lockian spirit and the Hobbist, since Spinoza \"judges of the truth\nof things by the mind, not by sense\" (_mente non sensu de veris rerum\ndiiudicat_), did not escape Vico's notice. But unique though it was,\nit led Spinoza to think of the state in a somewhat undignified way\n\"as of a mere society of shopkeepers.\" These utilitarian doctrines,\nwith their libels upon human nature, seemed to Vico only fit for men\nwithout hope, too insignificant ever to have a share in the state or\nproud enough to believe themselves repressed and denied access to the\npositions of which in their arrogance they thought themselves worthy.\nAmong these he counted the unfortunate Spinoza, who, he thinks, having\nas a Jew no country of his own, was moved by envy to devote himself to\nthe construction of a metaphysic \"intended to overthrow all the nations\nof the world.\" He passes stern judgment upon the state of contemporary\nethics, which was all that it could be on the basis of a mechanistic\nand materialistic metaphysic without a gleam of finalism. Descartes\nproduced nothing at all in this field, since his few written remains\non the subject do not amount to a doctrine, and his treatise of the\nPassions belongs rather to medicine than to morals. Malebranche and\nNicole were equally sterile, and Pascal's _Pens\u00e9es,_ the one exception,\nare \"but scattered lights.\" Of the Italians, Pallavicino's treatise\n_Del bene_ offers no very profound depths of ethics: and Muratori's\nattempt in his _Filosofia Morale_ was a very unsuccessful one.\n\nUtility is not the explanatory principle of morality, because it\nproceeds from man's bodily nature, and on that account is subject to\nchange, while morality, _honestas,_ is eternal. To derive morality\nfrom utility is to confound the occasion with the cause, to confine\noneself to the surface and to offer no explanation at all of the facts.\nNone of the various modes in which philosophers have successively\ncalled the utilitarian principle to life, fraud or imposture, force,\ndesire,--none of these accounts for differentiation, that is, for the\nsocial organism. What fraud could ever have seduced and deceived the\nsupposed simple and frugal first owners of the land, living as they did\nperfectly contented with their lot? What force could have succeeded,\nif the rich, the alleged usurpers, were few, and the poor, the\nrobbed, were many? Such explanations are ridiculous, and unworthy of\na serious problem. These strong and powerful men were really powerful\nwith something other than mere strength: thus they became protectors\nof the weak and enemies of destructive and anti-social tendencies:\ntheir rule was one of force, it is true, but \"imposed by a more\npowerful character\" (_a natura praestantiori dictata_); a fact which\nthe barbarian Brennus may be pardoned for not knowing, but not so a\nphilosopher. The force which created and organised the earliest states\nwas nothing but \"noble human nature,\" to which states must always hark\nback, although they may have been won by fraud and force, in order\nto subsist and maintain themselves: which agrees with Machiavelli's\nadvice to hark back to the beginnings, but with the implication that\nthe deepest beginnings are to be found in mercy and justice. Men are\nheld together by something stouter than utility. Human society cannot\noriginate and endure without mutual trust; unless people accept each\nother's promises and take each other's word for facts they cannot\nexamine. Could this trust be perhaps ensured by strict penal laws\nagainst falsehood? But laws are a product of society, and this mutual\ntrust is necessary that society may arise. It may be said, as it is by\nLocke, that we are dealing with a psychological process, by which men\ngradually acquired the habit of believing when some one spoke to them\nand promised to tell the truth. But in that case these men already\nunderstood the idea of a truth which by mere disclosure compelled\nassent without any personal teaching; and the psychological principle\nof habituation is transcended.\n\nThe true cause of human society then is not utility, which only assists\nthe action of the cause as its occasion, and brings it about that men,\nwith all the weakness and poverty of their nature, and the divisions\namong them due to original sin, are led to extol their social nature\n\"under compulsion of facts\" (_rebus ipsis dictantibus_), in the phrase\nof the jurist Pomponius, quoted with approval by Vico. Objects, facts\nand circumstances in morality change, though morality itself does not\nchange: and hence arises the illusion of the utilitarians, who cling\nto the external, confine themselves to the appearance and see the\nchange but not the permanence. Murder is forbidden: but the approval,\nbestowed upon the man who when his life is threatened and he cannot\notherwise save himself kills his unjust aggressor, does not imply that\nthe moral judgment upon homicide varies; since in these particular\ncircumstances the case is really one not of homicide but of capital\npunishment inflicted by the unjustly attacked person finding himself\nalone: a power tacitly delegated to him so to speak by society. Theft\nis forbidden: but the man who in order to preserve his life steals a\nloaf from another does not violate morality because he is exercising a\nright founded upon equity.\n\nThe only philosophy which carries with it a true ethic seems to Vico\nto be the Platonic, resting as it does upon a metaphysical principle,\nthe eternal idea which draws out of itself and creates matter: while\nthe Aristotelian ethic is founded upon a metaphysic leading to a\nphysical principle, that of the matter from which particular forms are\ndrawn, a principle which makes God a potter shaping objects external\nto himself. The ethic of the Roman lawyers was doubtless rich in fine\naphorisms: but it was nothing but a mere art of equity, conveyed by\nmeans of endless minute maxims of natural justice, sought for by the\nwriters in the reason of the laws and the will of the lawgiver. Hence\nit cannot be regarded as a moral philosophy, in which the best method\nis to proceed from a very small number of eternal truths, established\nby ideal justice in the fabric of metaphysic. For analogous reasons\nVico could not rest satisfied with Grotius and the school of natural\nrights: of which in general he makes the perfectly just remark that\ntheir ponderous tomes, in spite of the impressive titles they bear,\ncontain nothing that is not universally known. If Grotius's principles\nbe weighed in the accurate balance of criticism, they are all found to\nbe probable or plausible rather than necessary and incontestable. In\ndealing with the question of utility, Grotius missed the exact point by\nfailing to distinguish the occasion from the cause: nor did he \"nail\ndown\"--that is, he did not end--the ancient dispute as to whether right\nis a question of nature or of human opinion only, the same controversy\nas that carried on by philosophers and theologians with Carneades the\nsceptic and Epicurus: he advances the hypothesis of primitive men\nwho were \"simpletons,\" but quite omits to give reasons for it. And\nsince these \"simpletons\" of his, after suffering injuries from their\nbeast-like isolation, initiated a sociable life, a step to which they\nwere determined by utility, Grotius himself slipped unawares into\nutilitarianism and Epicureanism.\n\nVico on the other hand answered the question, whether right is natural\nor conventional, by the grave aphorism \"except in their natural\ncondition, things neither progress nor endure.\" To the question,\nwhence society arises, he replies by mentioning the common feeling of\nhumanity, the conscience, the need which man feels of escaping from\nthe internal enemy, which tortures his heart. The origin of society\ncertainly lies in fear, but it is fear of oneself, not of another's\nviolence: it lies in the agonies of remorse, the shame whose tinge\nsuffusing the cheeks of the earliest men lit the first beacon of\nmorality upon earth. Shame is the mother of all virtues, honour,\nfrugality, honesty, loyalty to the pledged word, truthfulness in\nspeech, abstention from others' property, and chastity. In extolling\nsociety, man is extolling human nature.\n\nShame or the moral consciousness, translated into terms of the\ncorresponding empirical science, becomes that common consciousness of\nman upon matters of human necessity or utility which is the source of\nthe natural right of nations. This common consciousness, says Vico,\nis an unreflective judgment, felt in common by a whole class, a whole\npeople, a whole nation and the whole of mankind. An unreflective\njudgment is not strictly a judgment at all, since reflection is\ninseparable from judgment: it is not judgment, because it is felt\nand not thought. But on the other hand it is not what is called a\n\"feeling,\"--a vague term unknown to Vico, as it is to traditional\nphilosophy. It is rather a practical attitude of mind, similar on the\nwhole in persons living in similar conditions and producing similar\ncustoms in the various social groups, from the customs of a particular\nclass to those of all mankind. The attitude is quite spontaneous, and\nfor this very reason unreflective; so that customs arise from within,\nnot from without, and their similarity does not depend upon imitation\n(\"without one nation taking example from another\"). Through this\n_sensus communis_ the moral consciousness embodies itself in compact\nand unyielding institutions: and thus the _sensus communis_ reduces to\ncertitude the free will of man, which is in itself quite uncertain.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII\n\n\nMORALITY AND RELIGION\n\n\nBut this internal fear, shame or moral consciousness is aroused in man\nby religion. The fear is the fear of God, the shame is abasement before\nhis face. Primitive man wanders over the earth alone, wild, fierce,\nwithout articulate speech, without a permanent mate, at the mercy of\nhis unbridled and violent passions, a \"brute\" rather than a man. What\ncan restrain him? what can rescue him from at last destroying himself?\nWise men cannot direct him, for we cannot say whence or how they can\nreach him. The intervention of God cannot save him: God has withdrawn\nhimself to his chosen people, and has no dealings with the rest of\nmankind, the Gentiles. But this \"brute\" is still a man: God, while\nabandoning him, has left a spark of his own essence at the bottom of\nhis heart. See! the sky lightens: the wild creature stands awestruck\nand afraid: in his mind arises the shadowy idea of something greater\nthan he, something divine. So he conceives or rather imagines a first\nGod, a Sky-god, a thundering Jupiter: and to this deity he turns to\nappease his wrath or invoke his aid. But in order to conciliate him and\nsecure his help, he must shape his own life conformably to his purpose:\nhe must humble himself before his God, overcome his own pride and\narrogance, abstain from certain actions and perform others. Thus the\nconception of a deity lends power to that peculiar possession of the\nhuman will, the attempt, that is, the liberty, to control the movements\ncommunicated to the mind by the body and to annul or to redirect them\nsimultaneously. With these acts of self-control, with freedom, morality\ncomes into existence: the fear of God has laid the foundations of human\nlife. Altars arise all over the earth: the caves of her mountains,\nwhither the man now bears the woman, ashamed as he is of gratifying his\ndesires before the face of the sky, which is the face of God, preside\nat the first marriage-rites and shelter the first families: her bosom\nopens to receive the sacred trust of the bodies of the dead. The first\nand fundamental ethical institutions--worship, wedlock and burial--have\narisen.\n\nThis social and ethical power of the idea of God appears again in the\ncourse of subsequent history: since when nations have relapsed into\nsavagery through warfare, and human laws have no more power over them,\nreligion is the only means of subduing them. It reappears again in the\nindividual development of human life: children indeed cannot learn\npiety except through the fear of some deity; and when all natural help\nfails him man requires a superior being to save him, and this being is\nGod. All nations believe in a divine providence: tribes living in a\nsociety without any consciousness of God, for instance in some parts of\nBrazil, among the Kafirs, and in the Antilles, are travellers' tales,\nan attempt to increase the sale of their books by the narration of\nportents.\n\nIf this is so,--and doubtless it is--then no doctrine can be more\nfoolish than that which claims to conceive a morality and civilisation\nwithout religion. Just as no well-established physical science is\npossible without the guidance of abstract mathematical truth, so\nno knowledge of morality can arise except together with abstract\nmetaphysical truths, without, that is, the idea of God. When the\nreligious consciousness is extinguished or obscured the conception\nof society and the state is extinguished or obscured with it. Jews,\nChristians, Gentiles and Mahommedans possess this conception because\nall alike believe in some deity, whether as an infinite free spirit,\nor as several gods consisting of mind and body, or as one single God,\nan infinite free spirit in an infinite body. The Epicureans did not\npossess such a conception, attributing to God as they did body alone,\nand chance together with body: nor did the Stoics, who made him subject\nto fate. And Cicero made the admirable remark to the Epicurean Atticus,\nthat he could not discuss laws with him unless he first granted the\nexistence of the divine providence. Hobbes, who revived Epicureanism,\nand Spinoza, who revived Stoicism, as we have seen entirely failed to\nunderstand the nature of society and the state. One must consort with\nprimitive man, stupid, hirsute, unclean and dishevelled, to refute\nthose learned authors of \"desiccated literature,\" with Peter Bayle at\ntheir head, who maintain that human society can and indeed does live\nwithout religion.\n\nThe absence of the idea of God supplied the chief argument in Vico's\ncriticism of Grotius and Puffendorf, two of these authors whom he held\nin great honour as \"princes\" of the school of natural rights. Neither\nof these writers, he says, lays down the principle of divine providence\nas primary and essential. Grotius does not expressly deny it: but on\naccount of his very attachment to truth, he endeavours to exclude it,\nand asserts that his system will stand even if all knowledge of God be\nremoved. Hence Vico accuses him of Socinianism, since he makes human\ninnocence consist in the simplicity of human nature. Puffendorf is\nstill worse: he seems to ignore providential direction, and begins\nwith the scandalously Epicurean supposition that man is thrown into\nthis world with no help or attention from God, without even that spark\nwithin his heart which is destined to grow into the flame of morality:\nand having been reproved for this, he tries to justify himself in a\nspecial essay, but does not succeed in discovering the true principle\non which alone society can be explained.\n\nNow why, in face of all these energetic declarations and arguments\nof Vico's on the necessity of religion to morality, did we say above\nthat the only point of real resemblance between him and Grotius,\nPuffendorf and the natural-right school generally was his purely\nimmanental conception of ethics? Because, if we examine the point\nclosely, Vico is not in opposition to the method of that school. Like\nthem, in constructing his science of human society he excludes with\nGrotius all idea of God, and with Puffendorf considers man as without\nhelp or attention from God, excluding him, that is, from revealed\nreligion and its God. As for these two writers, so for Vico the subject\nunder consideration is natural rights, not supernatural: the law\nof the Gentiles, not of the chosen people: the law which arises of\nitself among the caves, not that which comes down from Sinai. Vico's\nopposition, which he expresses with his accustomed confusion and\nobscurity, turns not upon assertions like these, but upon the actual\nconception of religion. In one word, the religion of which he speaks is\nnot the same as that of which Grotius and Puffendorf spoke, or rather\ndid not speak.\n\nReligion, as we have already seen, means for Vico not necessarily\nrevelation, but conception of reality: either that which expresses\nitself as it does in the period of fully developed mind in the form\nof intelligible metaphysic, which passes from the thought of God to\nexplain logic by its reasoning and to condescend to purify the human\nheart by morality: or that which takes concrete shape, as it does in\nthe earliest stage of humanity, in the form of poetical metaphysics.\nOne may easily ignore revealed religion when inquiring into the\nfoundations of morality: but how can one ever ignore this natural\nreligion, identical as it is with knowledge of the truth? Plutarch,\ndiscussing the primitive religions of terror, asks the question whether\nit would not have been better, instead of worshipping the gods in so\nimpious a manner, that there should be no religion at all: but he\nforgot that from these cruel superstitions brilliant civilisations\ndeveloped, and no civilisation could ever have grown from atheism.\nWithout a religion, whether gentle or fierce, rational or fantastic, to\ngive the idea, more or less clearly defined, more or less elevated, of\nsomething superior to the individual and uniting all individuals, the\nmoral will would have no object for its volition.\n\nAt this point we see the meaning of what we have described as the\nsecond, practical or ethical, signification of the word \"religion\" in\nVico. In this signification, Vico justifies and vindicates the impious\nsaying that \"fear creates the gods\": he even places the source of\nreligion in the longing for eternal life which man feels when stirred\nby a universal sense of immortality hidden in the depths of the mind.\nIn this second signification, religion is a practical fact, indeed it\nis morality itself, as in the first meaning it was truth itself.\n\nIf the meaning of religion for Vico, either as the condition of\nmorality, in the first sense of the word, or as synonymous with it,\nin the second, is once understood, it is clear that when he condemned\nGrotius and Puffendorf for their omission of this most important\nconcept, he was substantially doing nothing but clenching his criticism\nof the insipid moralising and the concealed utilitarianism of these\ntwo thinkers. On other occasions also he resorted to the valuable\nweapon of the concept of religion, with the same end in view. Because\nif he sometimes credited philosophy with the task of assisting\nmankind by raising and directing fallen human nature, at other times\nhe decided that philosophy is rather adapted to reasoning, and that\nthe moral philosophers with the greatest powers of reasoning are of\nvalue only to stimulate the senses by their eloquence to perform the\nduties of virtue, while religion alone has the power of making men act\nvirtuously. Then in the empirical science corresponding to this part of\nthe philosophy of mind, Vico turns religion (or poetical metaphysic)\nand philosophy into two historical epochs, making the former\ncharacteristic of the barbaric period and the latter of the civilised.\nHe maintains, as he is clearly bound to do, that religion is the sole\nfoundation of all civilisation and of philosophy itself, and rejects\nPolybius's saying that if there had been philosophers in the world\nreligion would have been unnecessary. How could philosophy have arisen,\nhe objects, had not states, that is, civilisation, arisen first? and\nhow could states have arisen without the aid of religion? Thus the\nsaying ought to be reversed: without religion there is no philosophy.\nIt was religion, it was the divine providence that tamed the sons of\nPolyphemus and reduced them to the humanity of Aristides and Socrates,\nof Laelius and Scipio Africanus.\n\nThe conception again of the \"state of nature,\" which served in the\ntreatises of the school of natural rights as an hypothesis and a\nmeans of exposition with a view either to developing the argument\nindependently of mystical theology without evoking too many protests,\nor to conveying implicitly their utilitarian theories, acquired in\nVico's hands a new function and a new content. A perfectly honest\nCatholic, having satisfied his conscience by separating revealed from\nhuman religion, he was in a position to assume the state of nature\nas a literal and actual reality. It is an ideal reality, in so far\nas it represents in the dialectic of the practical consciousness a\nmoment necessary for the genesis of reality, the pre-moral moment: a\nhistorical and empirical reality, as the approximately actual condition\nof those periods of anarchy and disturbance which precede the rise of\ncivilisations or follow upon their fall. The natural-right school\nacquiesced more or less in the traditional doctrine of the church,\nnamely that the Gentiles, in the dispersion following on the confusion\nof Babel, had taken away with them a residuum of revealed religion, a\nvague memory of the true God, and that hence arose the possibility of\nsocial life and of false gods, shadows of the true God: and thus the\n\"state of nature\" had been put forward in their system as something\nabstract and unreal. Vico worked out strictly the distinction between\nJews and Gentiles, and conceived the state of nature as devoid of\nany help coming from previous revelation: as a state in which man\nstood alone, so to speak, face to face with his own chaotic and\nturbulent passions. It was a state actually without morality, but--in\ncontradistinction to the utilitarian hypothesis--pregnant with moral\nrequirements, and was transcended by this implicit character becoming\nexplicit. But this transcendence was brought about naturally, not by\nmeans of divine grace: the true divine grace is human nature itself,\nshared by Gentiles no less than Jews, all equally illuminated by a\ndivine light.\n\nMan's will is free, weak though it is, to make his passions into\nvirtues; and in his struggle towards virtue he is helped in a natural\nmanner by God through providence. Certainly Vico did not intend to deny\nthe efficacy of direct and personal divine grace as well: but following\nhis usual method he separates the latter from the natural operation of\nprovidence, which is the only question of importance for him and the\nonly one he considers. So far as concerns the controversies on grace,\nhe always likes to maintain a middle position between two extremes\nrepresented typically, according to him, by Pelagianism and Calvinism:\nand ever since as a young man he studied the works of Richard, the\ntheologian of the Sorbonne, he had accepted his demonstration of\nthe superiority of the Augustinian doctrine, just because it was\nintermediate between these extremes. A moderate doctrine of this\nkind seemed to him, as he says, to provide a suitable foundation for\na principle of the natural rights of nations which should explain the\norigin of Roman and other Gentile law, while at the same time remaining\nin agreement with the Catholic religion. He was inclined to admit that\nthere was a privileged nation, namely the Jewish; and that in the\nstruggle against the passions the Christian had an advantage over the\nnon-Christian, because in cases where natural grace failed he might be\nhelped by supernatural. But, in a word, miracles are miracles, and the\nNew Science is not a science of the miraculous.\n\nThat it is not, is proved by Vico's criticism on the third of the\n\"principles\" of natural rights, against John Selden, a famous man in\nhis day though forgotten later, and author of _De iure naturali et\ngentium iuxta disciplinant Hebraeorum_ (1640). Selden disagreed with\nGrotius, in this as in certain other questions, in not denying, and\neven in exalting, the value of religion: he conceived moral and civil\nlife impossible for mankind except through revelation. This revelation,\nmade by God to the Jewish people, passed from them according to Selden\nby several channels to the Gentiles: Pythagoras for instance had learnt\nfrom Ezekiel; Aristotle, at the time of the campaigns of Alexander in\nAsia, formed a friendship with Simon the Just; Numa Pompilius acquired\nsome knowledge of the Bible and the prophets. This was enough to\nreassure any believer who had been frightened away from the works of\nthe natural-right school by their heterodox tendencies. But Vico will\nhave none of this ultra-religious system. If Grotius ignored providence\nand Puffendorf denied it, Selden was wrong, said Vico, in supplying it,\nmaking it a _deus ex machina,_ without explaining it by the essential\ncharacter of the human mind. It was a system not only unphilosophical\nbut incompatible with sacred history, which admits to a certain extent\neven in the case of the Jews a natural, not revealed, law: and it was\nonly because, during the captivity in Egypt, they lost sight of this\nthat the direct intervention of God with the laws given to Moses took\nplace. Nor did the theory agree, as to the alleged dissemination of\nJewish knowledge and laws among the Gentiles, with the words of the Jew\nJosephus and of Lactantius; and in general, it was unsupported by even\nthe smallest documentary evidence. Vico's conclusion therefore remains\nunaltered. The Jews enjoyed in addition the extraordinary aid of the\ntrue God: but the other nations attained civilisation solely through\nthe ordinary light of providence.\n\nWhether or no Vico quoted and interpreted Grotius and Puffendorf\naccurately is for us a question of small importance. His exposition\nand estimate of other philosophers matter less than his own doctrines,\nwhatever their historical relations, which, to tell the truth, are many\nin number. Nevertheless it will be as well to indicate briefly, as\nregards the difficulties which may arise upon this point, the answer\nwhich we think plausible. Any one who after reading Vico's censures\nopened the _De iure belli et pacis_ and found that Grotius explicitly\nincludes among his three fundamental principles, with reason and the\nsocial nature, the divine will, and that this ignoring of God amounts\nto little more than a mere phrase laying emphasis on the power of the\nsocial nature and reason, which would take effect \"even if we were\nto grant that God does not exist\" (_etiamsi dar emus non esse Deum_)\nor that he does not care for human affairs, \"which cannot be granted\nwithout the grossest impiety\" (_quod sine summo scelere dari nequit_):\nany one who opened Puffendorf and read a most solemn denunciation of\nthe Grotian hypothesis as impious and absurd, and a declaration that\nnatural laws would remain hanging in the air devoid of force apart\nfrom the will of God as legislator; any one who read these words might\nbe led to accuse Vico of negligence or even of insincerity in his\ncriticisms of his predecessors. But in truth Vico did not know what to\nmake of a God set side by side with other sources of morality, or set\nabove them as a superfluous source for the sources: he, searching for\nGod as he did in the heart of man, saw and felt the gulf fixed between\nhim and those who no longer had him in their hearts and barely kept\nhim on their lips through habit or prudence. A more subtle question\nwould be to ask why,--if Vico agreed with the natural-right school in\nignoring revelation, and if he instead of rejecting it deepened their\nsuperficial immanental doctrine,--why he put himself forward as their\nimplacable enemy and persisted in boasting loudly before prelates and\npontiffs of having formulated a system of natural rights different from\nthat of the three Protestant authors and adapted to the Roman church.\nThe supposition that he acted thus through politic caution might be\nadvanced if instead of Vico we were dealing with, for instance, a\npassionate and powerful but deceitful friar like Tommaso Campanella:\nbut the spotless character of Vico entirely precludes it, and we can\nonly suppose that, lacking as his ideas always were in clarity, on\nthis occasion he indulged his tendency to confusion and nourished his\nillusions, to the extent of conferring upon himself the flattering\nstyle and title of _Defensor Ecclesiae_ at the very moment when he\nwas destroying the religion of the church by means of the religion of\nhumanity.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII\n\n\n\nMORALITY AND LAW\n\nWith the dazzling light of his originality still shining before our\neyes, it is impossible to fix our attention upon those doctrines and\nclassifications which Vico drew from the traditional philosophy and\nplaced especially in the first book of the _Diritto universale_: though\nit is precisely these that have become favourites with many readers,\nand are now almost common property through the frequent quotation of\nthem. That God is \"infinite power knowledge and will\" (_posse nosse\nvelle infinitum_) and man \"finite power knowledge and will struggling\ntowards the infinite\" (_posse nosse velle finitum quod tendit ad\ninfinitum_): that the state is the image of God, and because \"it has\nall things beneath it, nothing above\" (_omnia infra se, nil superius\nhabet_), therefore \"it renders account to God alone and to no one else\"\n(_uni Deo, praeterea reddat rationem nemini_), and that just as in God\nfreedom is inherent in his eternal reason, so the state freely obeys\nthe laws it has itself established: that justice \"directs and equates\nutilities\" (_utilitates dirigit et exaequat_), directing, like an\narchitect, in the building-up of the state, the two particular kinds\nof justice, commutative and distributive, the two divine artisans that\nmeasure utility with the two divine measures, arithmetic and geometry,\nso that \"what is equal when you measure is also just when you choose\"\n(_quod est aequum cum metiris, idem est iustum quum eligis_), these\nand similar assertions seem not merely lacking in originality but\neven false or meaningless, adorned though they may be with the name\neither of Aristotle or of Campanella or of other philosophers of the\nancient world or the Renaissance. If, to take one, justice consisted\nin measuring, a philosophy of justice would be unnecessary, for the\nscience of calculation and measurement would be enough. Vico himself at\none point involuntarily and ingenuously discloses the vicious circle\nof this metaphor substituted for a concept, by saying that men ought\n\"to share utility equally among themselves, only preserving a _just_\ndifference where it is a question of desert, and that to preserve the\nequality.\"\n\nMore profitable than collecting these second-hand formulae would be to\ncollect the many acute observations of moral psychology found here and\nthere in his writings, expressed in his gem-like style; or to recall\nhis little-known theory of laughter, which he derives from disappointed\nexpectation and from the weakness of the mind, and therefore denies\nthe faculty both to animals and to the perfect man, considering a man\nwho laughs to be a satyr or faun, intermediate between a brute and a\nman. But abstaining from such a collection, which forms no part of our\nplan, we would rather observe that even in the commonplace distinctions\nand classifications mentioned above Vico shows a certain merit: he\nrecognises, even while he propounds them, the necessary confusion\nand identification of all or many of these distinctions. Thus after\ndistinguishing the two kinds of justice, the three kinds of virtue and\nthe three kinds of law, he ends by declaring that these dualities,\ntriplicities and multiplicities each form a unity.\n\nJustice and virtue also, for Vico, form a unity, since that power of\ntruth, or human reason, which is virtue in so far as it struggles\nwith selfishness, is also justice in so far as it directs or equates\nutilities. This implies that Vico does not distinguish, at least in the\nsystematic exposition of the _Diritto universale,_ between law and\nmorality: a distinction which indeed received little emphasis in the\ndoctrine of natural rights, and is barely indicated in Grotius, for\ninstance, as one between a greater and less degree of morality. Vico's\ndoctrine of punishment is also purely moral, and deduced from the\nethical concept of remorse. It is inflicted, he says, by the law, and\nis nothing but a social reinforcement of the individual conscience, in\nthe case where the offender does not himself expiate his crime by means\nof remorse and internal punishment.\n\nBut the more the problem of the relation between law and morality is\nabsent in Vico's theoretical formulation and systematic treatment,\nthe more present it is in his particular observations; indeed it may\nbe said to pervade the whole of the New Science. Nor could it be\notherwise, seeing that this relation refers to the distinction between\nthe moral will and the inferior or earlier forms of will; and we know\nthat all Vico's tendencies were towards exploring the lower and obscure\nregion of the mind, both cognitive and practical, in the sphere alike\nof imagination, will and passion.\n\nHe always realised the supreme importance of the passions; and if\nhe could not approve of giving them the upper hand, if he always\nconsidered the Epicurean morality a morality \"of idlers shut up in\ntheir pleasure-gardens,\" he did not at all approve of excessively\nsevere moralities such as that of the Stoics, which was no less than\nthe other a morality of \"solitaries,\" not one for men living in a\nstate. Stoicism certainly preaches an eternal and immutable justice,\nand makes honour the criterion of human action; but it does violence\nto human nature, dehumanises it, annuls it and drives it to despair by\npretending that it is quite insensible to the passions, by ignoring\nthe utility and necessity of the bodily nature, by inculcating that\nrule--a rule \"harder than iron\"--that sins are all equal and that he\nwho strikes a slave is as guilty as he who kills his father. The\nsame doubts must have been aroused in Vico's mind by Jansenism, as he\ncomplains that \"out of hatred of probability, Christian morality in\nFrance is becoming rigidified.\" We ought to follow not these solitary\nphilosophers but rather those political ones, especially the Platonic\ntype, which recognises that the passions should be not eradicated but\nmoderated and \"converted into human virtues.\" Thus out of cruelty,\navarice and ambition, the three universal faults of mankind, Providence\nelicits the warrior, the merchant and the judge; the bravery, wealth\nand wisdom of states. From these three failings, which would destroy\nmankind on the earth, civil prosperity is formed.\n\nConcerning matters of utility, Vico observes that \"in themselves,\" _ex\nse,_ they are neither good nor bad (_neque turpes neque honestae_) but\nbecome so merely through their relation to the moral consciousness\n(\"but their unfairness is baseness, their fairness, honour: _sed\nearum inaequalitas est turpitudo, acqualitas autem honestas_\"). In\nthe empirical science of utility, he defends against Grotius a \"prior\nnatural law,\" _ius naturale prius,_ to which belong self-defence and\nthe procreation and upbringing of children: and this right he connects\nwith the Stoic _\u1f00\u03b4\u03b9\u03ac\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd._ That it has no moral authority is proved\nby the fact that the law which follows it in the historical order, the\n\"posterior natural law,\" _ius naturale posterius,_ defined by Justinian\nas \"that which is established among all men by natural reason and is\npreserved by all nations alike\" (_quod naturalis ratio inter omnes\nhomines constituit et apud omnes gentes per aeque custoditur_), is\nprior in the order of right, _prius iure,_ overcomes the former when\nthey conflict and sets upon it the seal of immutability. Now, although\nthis first natural law is defined and exemplified in a merely empirical\nmanner, it is surely at bottom nothing but pure law, law not yet\nmoralised.\n\nBut it is upon the concept of \"certitude\" that law as distinct from\nmorality properly, according to Vico, rests. The word certitude is used\nby him in many senses, neither clearly distinguished nor harmonised nor\ndeduced one from another: though they all as we have seen unite, rather\nconfusedly, in the general idea of the spontaneous as distinguished,\nfrom the reflective form of the mind. Certitude in its practical\nsignification implies among other things an opposition to the \"truth\"\nof volition, and is, in a word, force as against equity and justice,\nauthority as against reason, mere will as against the moral will.\nThese are distinctions occurring to our own thoughts, rather than\nstated by Vico, who both distinguishes and fails to distinguish. For\ninstance, he affirms that \"certitude proceeds from authority, truth\nfrom reason\" (_certuni ab auctoritate est, verum a ratione_) and\nimmediately afterwards adds that \"it is quite impossible for authority\nto conflict with reason, for in that case there would be not laws but\nabortive laws\" (_auctoritas cum ratione omnino pugnare non potest,\nnam ita non leges essent, sed monstra legum_). At any rate, the New\nScience seems to him, by reason of this treatment of certitude, to\ncontain a philosophy of authority, which, he adds, \"is the source of\nwhat theological moralists call external justice.\" That is to say, he\nconnected the concept of certitude with the distinction and terminology\nof external and internal, already employed by the scholastic morality,\nwhich, used about this time by Christianus Thomasius, were destined\nwithout any great philosophical merit on his part to give an impetus\nto the investigation of the philosophical relations between law and\nmorality.\n\nAnother and kindred meaning of practical certitude in Vico is the\nso-called letter of the law, _formula legum;_ which may stand in\nopposition to reason and the moral consciousness, but none the less\nhas its own peculiar value: \"_dura lex, sed certa: durum sed scriptum\nest_--the law is harsh, but it is certain; it is harsh, but so it is\nwritten.\" It is in a word the value of law simply as law, which though\ndevoid of any real ethical content yet has always the value that comes\nfrom a command over the will. \"The certitude of law\" (writes Vico) \"is\na darkening of the reason supported merely by authority, and makes the\nlaw harsh in practical experience by laying down their certitude, which\nin good Latin (_certuni_) means particularised, or in the scholastic\nterminology individualised.\" To a certain extent Vico grasped the\nindividual character which lies at the root of every law. That one\nmust \"judge according to law, not according to example\" (_legibus non\nexemplis iudicandum_) is a comparatively late principle: the first laws\nwere strictly _\"exempta,\"_ exemplary punishments. From real examples\nwere derived the ideal examples employed by logic and rhetoric: and\nwhen the intelligible universal was understood, it was recognised that\nlaw had a certain universal character.\n\nThe primitive society sketched by Vico is, in its juristic aspect,\nthe myth so to speak of pure law or practical force. Once upon a time\nmen lived possessed of immense bodily strength, and proportionately\nfeeble in understanding, who thought all strength greater than their\nown divine, and this belief constituted their law. They thought of\nthe gods simply as beings stronger than themselves, whom they were\ncompelled to obey, though with a bad grace: like Polyphemus, who if he\nhad been strong enough would have fought Zeus himself, or Achilles,\nwho told Apollo that if only they were equally matched he would not\nhesitate to try his strength against him. The wisdom of providence\ndecreed that these fierce men, not tamed as yet by the rule of reason,\nshould at least fear the divine nature of force and measure reason by\nits standard. This is the foundation of the principle of the \"external\njustice of war.\" But the myth of the period of force cannot have the\nstrictness of a philosophical concept, and consequently these strong\nmen are considered by Vico from another point of view as ethically the\nbest: \"strongest\" and \"best,\" _fortissimi_ and _optimi,_ are regarded\nas synonymous terms: and their law, though not truth or rational law,\nis not pure certitude, but truth \"mixed with certitude,\" _ex certo\nmixtum._ But the very mixture of certitude with, and its preponderance\nover, truth, which is here asserted, postulates the concept of pure\ncertitude as presupposed by Vico.\n\nWhen Vico accused Grotius and the school of natural rights of\ncommencing their history half-way, with the civilised ages, and\noverlooking the earlier periods, the accusation, in its bearing upon\nthe philosophy of practice, may be translated into a charge of ignoring\nthe ideal moment of force and confining the attention to justice,\nequity and morality. The moment of force, constituting the other\nand earlier \"half,\" was the field chosen by Hobbes, before him by\nMachiavelli, and still earlier by Epicurus, all of whom treated of this\nmoment alone, \"with impiety towards God, infamy to rulers and injustice\ntowards nations.\" Hence the conclusion is easy, that in refuting the\nutilitarians and the theorists of force, Vico was at the same time\nrecognising and absorbing the need which they represented, their only\nmistake having been that they developed this need in an abstract and\none-sided way. His \"state of nature\" is in some respects like that of\nHobbes, with the difference that mankind transcends the latter owing to\nthe recognition of utility, the former owing to the religious and moral\nconsciousness. But Vico does not on this account express any gratitude\nto Hobbes or Spinoza, Machiavelli or Epicurus, since he believed\nhimself to have found in a classical author all the materials and the\nstimulus he required, all the counter-poise necessary to the Platonic\nphilosophy. This was one of his \"four authors,\" the one of whom we\nsaid earlier that we had still to see the use which Vico made, namely\nTacitus. This writer for his part contemplates with his unequalled\nmetaphysical powers man as he is, while Plato contemplates him as he\nought to be. Just as Plato in his universal science explores every\ncorner of nobility, so Tacitus \"descends into every scheme of utility,\"\nin order that among the infinite chaotic chances of malice and fortune\nthe man of practical wisdom may act well. To the union in his mind\nof Greek philosopher and Roman historian, which he interprets, as is\neasily seen, in the manner usual among the \"Tacitean\" politicians of\nthe seventeenth century, Vico attributes his own success in sketching\na real idea of eternal history, \"which the wise man would construct\nboth of esoteric wisdom such as Plato's, and of common wisdom such as\nthat of Tacitus.\" To Tacitus, finally, he owed the impulse towards the\nsupreme task of making concrete his ideal, and realising the republic\nof Plato in the \"dregs of Romulus.\"\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IX\n\n\nTHE HISTORICAL ASPECT OF LAW\n\nAs the cognitive mind passes from feeling without noticing to noticing\nwith disturbed and confused faculties, and thence to the reflection\nof the clear mind, so analogously the volitional mind passes from\nthe state of nature to practical certitude and thence to practical\ntruth. In the correlative empirical science, the transition is more\nor less that from the savage to the heroic or barbaric condition and\nfrom the latter to the civilised. In these three types of society, all\nthe manifestations of life correspond: thus there are three kinds of\ncharacter, three kinds of manners and customs, three kinds of law and\ntherefore of states, three kinds of language and writing, three kinds\nof authority, reason and justice, and three divisions of history.\nConfused and sometimes self-contradictory though Vico may be in fixing\nthe particulars of these various correspondences, his general idea is\nplain. Where reflection is at a low ebb and imagination flourishes, the\npassions also flourish, habits are violent, governments aristocratic\nor feudal, families subjected to strict paternal rule, laws severe,\nlegal procedure symbolical, language couched in metaphor and writing in\nhieroglyphics. Where on the other hand reflection predominates, poetry\nbecomes either separate from or charged with philosophy, manners and\ncustoms lose their violence, the passions are brought into subjection,\nthe people take the government into their own hands, all members of\nthe family are alike citizens of the state, law is mitigated by equity\nand its procedure simplified, language loses its metaphorical clothing\nand writing becomes alphabetical. Mixed forms, which some politicians\naim at producing artificially, would be abortions: and though we do\nfind natural hybrid forms which retain a tinge of the earlier, each\none, by reason of its own unity, always tries so far as possible to\ndivest its subject of every property belonging to other forms.\n\nWhich of the various social types forms the foundation of the others\nand supplies the criterion for judging them? or what is the criterion\nand standard by which they must all alike be judged? For Vico, such a\nquestion is meaningless. Governments, he says, must adapt themselves\nto the nature of the people governed: the school of princes is the\nmorality of nations. We may shudder at war, at the law of the stronger,\nat the reduction of the conquered to slavery, that is, to chattels:\nbut the society which expressed itself in these customs was necessary\nand therefore good. The worship of strength, as we have said, occupied\nthe position and discharged the function of the as yet impossible rule\nof reason. Later came the period of fully developed human reason, when\nmen no longer valued each other by the standard of force, but by virtue\nof their rational nature, which is the true and eternal human nature,\nrecognised one another as equals. The change of time brought change of\ncustoms: and the new were no less good, but no more so, than the old.\n\nIt would be as useless to seek the common measure of these various\nsocial types, as to ask what is the real age of the individual life,\nthe common measure of childhood, youth, maturity and old age. The\ncomparison is one presented by Vico himself. As children shape all\ntheir ideas according to their whims and carry them out with violence,\nas youths animate everything by their imagination, as grown men guide\ntheir affairs rather by pure reason and old men by sound prudence;\nso it is with the human race, which after its feeble, isolated and\npoverty-stricken origins, grows at first in unrestrained liberty, then\nrediscovers the necessaries, utilities and comforts of life by genius\nand imagination (the age of poetry), and finally cultivates wisdom by\nmeans of reason (the age of philosophy). Similarly, natural right arose\nfirst in laws so to speak of just passion and just violence: then it\nwas clothed in various myths of just reason: and finally it was openly\nproclaimed in its pure rationality and noble truth.\n\nBy such a method of handling and passing judgment upon governments,\nlaws and customs, Vico, escaped another of the leading doctrines or\nsuppositions of the school of natural rights, the abstraction and\nanti-historicism we mentioned in its own place, which resulted in the\nconception of a natural law standing above positive law and therefore\nconstituting a kind of eternal code, a perfect scheme of legislation,\nnot yet fully actual but to be actualised, whose outlines show up\nclearly in the works of the school through their veil of doctrine and\nphilosophy. But this eternal code was in its most important part a\ncontingent and transitory code; or at least it advocated a code in\nagreement with the reformatory and revolutionary tendencies of these\nwriters, publicists as they were rather than philosophers.\n\nVico rids himself of the ideal eternal code without seeming to do\nso: though he is quite ready to recognise that the \"philosophers'\nnatural right,\" _ius naturale philosophorum,_ is in idea eternal, and\ninexorably laid down \"in accordance with eternal reason,\" _ad rationis\naeternae libellam._ But from this verbal concession of eternity made\nout of respect for the old traditional scholastic philosophy, whose\ninfluence he felt now and then, he goes on to deny its real eternity\nand supra-historical character; since instead of placing it above\nand outside history he puts it in the place which belongs to it,\nwithin history. The law of violence or heroic law, after passing into\nthe law of uncivilised society, gradually attains a certain limit of\nclarity, in which state the only thing wanting to its perfection is\nthat some school of philosophers should complete it by establishing it\nwith reasoned principles, upon the idea of eternal justice: and this\nreasoning and systematisation is the _\"ius naturale philosophorum\"_ the\nextreme form of the historical development of law, not its unchanging\nrule; a product, not a standard. Hence Vico's charge against Grotius\nof confusing the _\"ius naturale philosophorum,\"_ the law composed of\nreasoned principles derived from moralists, theologians and, in part,\njurists, with the natural law of nations, _ius naturale gentium_ (in\nGrotius's language, confusing natural law with an arbitrary or positive\nform of law): of misunderstanding the Roman jurists, who intended to\nspeak solely of the latter: and of offering to correct and venturing to\ncriticise writers whose faults on inspection vanish.\n\nThe eternal code, considered in its essentials, is a Utopia: and since\nthe first and greatest of Utopias is Plato's Republic, it is important,\nin order better to decide the point at issue, to examine Vico's\nattitude towards the political scheme of Plato. If we may listen to\nhis own words, the _Republic_ was another of his many incentives and\nexamples when he conceived the New Science. With the study of Plato\nbegan the unconscious awakening in him of \"the thought of conceiving\nan ideal eternal law, to be expressed in a universal state built on\nthe idea or plan of providence, on which idea, indeed, are founded\nall the states of every period and race: an ideal Republic like that\nwhich Plato ought, as a consequence of his divine metaphysic, to have\nconceived.\" He ought, but could not, owing to his \"ignorance of the\nfirst man's fall\"; ignorance, that is, of the original state of nature\nand of the exclusively poetic or \"common\" wisdom which followed it:\nan ignorance maintained by the error, common to the minds of all men,\nof measuring by oneself the almost unknown nature of other people,\nas Plato exalted the rude and barbaric beginnings of Gentile man to\nthe perfect state of his loftiest esoteric knowledge of the divine,\nand fancied these earliest men to possess a high degree of this\nesoteric wisdom, whereas on the contrary they were really \"brutes,\nall stupidity and ferocity.\" In consequence of this learned error\nPlato, instead of conceiving an eternal Republic and the laws of an\neternal justice by which Providence governs the nations of the world\nand directs it by means of the common needs of mankind, by which it is\nled to the common consciousness of the whole human race, \"conceived\nan ideal Republic and a merely ideal justice, by which nations are\nnot guided at all.\" In fact, they ought not to be guided by it: since\namong the determinations of the perfect state there are some which are\ndishonourable and detestable, such as the community of wives. Thus Vico\ntook from Plato the idea of an eternal state, but entirely inverted it\nby the reservation which he added to it, that the true eternal republic\nis not the abstract state of Plato, but the course of history in all\nits phases, including the brutes at one end and Plato at the other.\nThis is the \"republic of mankind,\" the \"great state of mankind,\" the\n\"universal republic\" (_generis humani respublica, magna generis humani\ncivitas, respublica universa_) of which he means to investigate the\n\"form, ranks, societies, occupations, laws, crimes, punishments, and\nscience of jurisprudence\" (_formam ordines societates negotia leges\npeccata poenas et scientiam in ea tractandi iuris_) and to follow\nthe development of all these \"from their origin, the beginnings of\nhumanity, under the control of divine Providence, national custom\nand authority\" (_a suis usque primis humanitatis originibus, divina\nprovidentia moderante, moribus gentium ac proinde auctoritate_), that\nis to say, \"by means of the various elements of human utility and\nnecessity, or even by means of opportunities arising by the spontaneous\naction of circumstances\" (_per varia utilitatum et necessitatum,\nhumanarum rudimenta, sive adeo per ipsarum sponte rerum oblatas\noccasiones_). The \"great state of the nations founded and governed by\nGod\" is thus nothing else than History.\n\nWhile refusing a fixed code and the draft of a model society, we do\nnot mean to deny the possibility of a practical aspect of the science\nconceived by Vico, the New Science in its triple form of ideal history,\ntypical history and historical history. Every truth has its practical\nside, that is to say, its practical consequences: and thinking in this\nor that way of the nature and development of mankind involves this or\nthat practical line of conduct. A man who believes for instance in\nthe docile innocence of savage races will approach them with a smile\non his face, kindly words on his lips and the alphabet and catechism\nof rights and duties in his hand: one who believes in Vico's \"brutes\"\nwill adopt somewhat sterner methods, perhaps even fire and the sword.\nOne who, like Vico, believes that \"custom is more potent than law\" and\nthat \"custom changes not at a blow, but gradually and slowly\" will\nnot be inclined to hasty legislation, and will not delude himself\ninto thinking he can remodel human nature after an ideal of his own\ndevising. Such conduct in any case is not theory, but practice: and\nwhen the attempt is made to reduce it to theory, either a chaotic\nconfusion of necessary and contingent determinations results, or else\nif we avoid these errors and strive to attain a strictly doctrinal form\nof conduct, we get neither more nor less than the scientific theory\nitself, from which our conduct derived.\n\nThe thought of following up the New Science with a practical theory\nappropriate to it evidently occurred to Vico. Even in the first\nItalian edition of the work he stated two \"practical\" corollaries:\nfirst, a new art of criticism, to serve as a light to distinguish\nthe truth in obscure and legendary history; and secondly an art of\ndiagnosis, so to speak, for determining the degrees of necessity or\nutility in human affairs, and as its ultimate consequence, the chief\nend of this science, consisting in the recognition of indubitable\nsymptoms of the conditions of nations. Properly considered, these arts\nof criticism and diagnosis unite into one, namely the better knowledge\nwhich it was possible, owing to the principles laid down by Vico, to\nobtain concerning the past and present life of nations.\n\nThis idea is repeated and explained in other parts of the same work.\nThe sciences, studies and arts developed up to now, says Vico,\ndeal with particular objects: the New Science, on the other hand,\ninvestigating as it does the principles themselves which lie at the\nsource of all studies, is able to establish the \u1f00\u03ba\u03bc\u03ae or state of\nperfection of the entire system, and the degrees and extremes by which\nand within which human nature like all other mortal things must run\nits course and come to an end: so that through this science we can\nanswer the practical questions how a nation in its rise may come to its\nstate of perfection, and how in its decadence it may be stimulated to\nnew life. The state of perfection would consist in a nation's resting\nupon fixed principles both demonstrated by unchanging reason and put\ninto practice by human habits; principles in which the esoteric wisdom\nof the philosopher would extend a helping hand to the common wisdom\nof nations, thus uniting men of the greatest academic reputation with\nall those of wisdom in the state, the philosophers with the statesmen;\nand the science of civil matters divine and human, religion and law, a\ntheology and morality imposed by command and acquired by habituation,\nwould be supplemented by the science of natural laws divine and\nhuman, a theology and morality imposed by reason and acquired by\nratiocination: so that to transgress such principles would be true\nerror, the wandering not of men but of wild animals.\n\nThe practical aspect of the New Science, then, was simply a summary or\nduplicate of the science itself, emphasising the two leading elements\nof spontaneous and reflective wisdom, certitude and truth, and the\nnecessity of bearing both in mind.\n\nYears later, in one of the elaborations of the second _Scienza\nNuova_ made by Vico, we again meet with the idea and the phrase of a\npractical aspect of this science, in the title of a special concluding\nparagraph which he proposed to add to his work. It begins thus: \"The\nwhole of this work has now been thought out as a mere contemplative\nscience dealing with the common character of nations: for this reason\nit may seem to offer no assistance to human prudence in order either\nto prevent or to delay the entire ruin of nations on the path of\ndecadence, and thus to lack the practical side which every science must\nhave whose subject-matter is dependent upon the human will, all such\nsciences being called practical.\" Now in what could such a practical\nside consist? \"This practical application can easily be found from the\ncontemplation itself of the course of the history of nations: which the\nwise men (statesmen) and princes of states observing, could by means\nof good ordinances, laws and examples recall peoples to their \u1f00\u03ba\u03bc\u03ae\nor state of perfection.\" In other words: a man warned is half saved.\nContemplation is the only principle of conduct which the New Science\ncan supply. The other half of salvation depends not on the person\nwarning, namely thought, but upon the person warned, upon action. It\ndoes not occur to Vico to try to determine the \"ordinances, laws and\nexamples\" whose adoption would be of value in this or that crisis\nor situation. This would not be a philosopher's task, as in fact\nhe himself clearly recognises next moment, when he says: \"The only\npractical principles we philosophers can supply are ones which can be\nconfined to the academic sphere.\"\n\nIt would certainly be rash to claim precise knowledge of Vico's\nreasons for omitting this note on practical principles in the final\nmanuscript of the last edition of the _Scienza Nuova,_ just as he had\nomitted in the second work of that title the assertions on the subject\nwhich had appeared in the first. But we may at least venture to guess\nthat the principal reason was the obvious emptiness of this passage,\npromising as it did a practical application which it failed to provide,\nand finally confessing that such a practical application was either\nimpossible or already included in the theory itself.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER X\n\n\n\nPROVIDENCE\n\n\n\nThe true and only reality then, in the world of nations, is the course\nof their history: and the principle which regulates this course is\nProvidence. From this point of view the New Science may be defined as\na \"rational civil theology of the divine providence.\" Bacon, among his\nhistorical sciences, had named a _Historia Nemeseos_ (history of Divine\nRetribution). What for Bacon was little more than a mere name was for\nVico a clearly stated problem and a developed theory. Philosophers,\naccording to him, when they did not ignore Providence entirely, as\nmaterialists and determinists, considered it solely in the sphere of\nnatural law, calling metaphysic by the name of \"natural theology,\" and\nsupporting the identification of God with the natural order observed\nin the motions of bodies, such as the spheres and the elements, and\nwith the final cause which was seen to exist over and above the other\nnatural causes. As against all this it was important to work out the\ndoctrine of Providence \"in the economy of matters civil.\"\n\nIt was observed by some of his earliest commentators, and the\nobservation has been frequently repeated since, that Vico used the\nword \"providence\" indifferently in a subjective and an objective\nsense: sometimes to indicate the human belief in a provident deity\ncontrolling their doctrine, sometimes to denote the actual operation\nof this providence. The double or triple meaning of a single word in\nVico's terminology is a thing which by now need cause no astonishment.\nWe have often already been obliged to take pains to distinguish his\nhomonyms and unite his synonyms. Hence we may at once recognise that\none meaning of \"Providence\" for Vico might be and indeed is the\nbelief in Providence, man's idea of God, first in the form of myth\nand later in the pure and rational form of philosophy. The Gentile\nnations of antiquity, he says, \"began their metaphysical poetic wisdom\nby contemplating God in the attribute of his providence,\" upon which\nrested augury and divination. Without this idea, then, wisdom, the\nconsciousness of the infinite, cannot take shape within man, nor can\nmorality, the fear of and respect for the higher power which governs\nthe affairs of men, arise. But in this sense of the word a further\ndiscussion of providence is unnecessary, after what we have said on the\nsubjects of mythology and of the relation between morality and religion.\n\nWe therefore pass at once to Providence in its second sense, the real\nand strict conception of it; and here it seems advisable to leave Vico\nfor a moment and to clear up certain points of doctrine.\n\nIt is a common observation that to create a given fact is one thing, to\nknow it when created quite another. The knowledge of what a fact really\nis often comes in the life of the individual years later, in the life\nof mankind centuries later, than the fact itself. The very persons who\nare directly responsible for a given fact as a rule do not know it, or\nknow it in a very imperfect and fallacious manner; so much so that the\nillusions which are said to accompany human activity have passed into\na proverb. The poet thinks he is singing of purity when he is really\nsinging of sensuality, and of strength while he is really singing of\nweakness; he believes himself to be a dreadful pessimist and is really\nchildishly optimistic: imagines himself a devil, when he is a good\nfellow without an ounce of vice in him. Philosophers deceive themselves\nno less. We need not go far to find examples. The philosopher we are\nstudying supplies a whole series of them; few have been more in the\ndark as to the real tendencies of their own thought. The politician\nalso deceives himself; very often he believes and declares himself\nto be fighting for liberty while he is a mere reactionary, or while\nbelieving himself to be serving the cause of reaction is really\ninciting to revolt and aiding the cause of freedom: and so on. Such\nillusions are easy to understand. Individuals and nations in the heat\nof creation, or scarcely yet passing out of such a state, can perhaps\nexpress their state of mind, but cannot treat it in the critical spirit\nof historical narration: and accordingly, when they cannot reconcile\nthemselves to waiting in silence, they compose imaginary histories of\nthemselves, _Wahrheiten und Dichtungen_ at once. In fact this proved\ndifficulty of understanding one's actions while acting is one motive\nof the wise advice to speak of oneself as little as possible and of\nthe suspicion with which autobiographies and memoirs are regarded.\nSuch works are interesting and possibly even valuable; but they never\npresent the strict historical truth of the facts they narrate.\n\nHuman labours are thus veiled in the mists of illusion which arise from\nindividuals. The superficial historian clings to the veil, and in his\nattempt to describe the course of events, uses these illusions to make\nhis voice carry. In this way the history of poetry takes the form of a\nnarration of the intentions, opinions and aims of poets, or of those\nattributed to them by their contemporaries; the history of philosophy\nbecomes a series of anecdotes concerning the sentiments, whims and\npractical aims of philosophers: the history of politics, a tissue\nof intrigue, base interests, gossip and greed. But a more careful\nhistorian, or one of a different type, will have nothing to do with\nhistory of this kind. His first act is to dispel the mists, to sweep\naway the individual and his illusions, and to look facts in the face as\nthey appeared in their objective succession and their supra-individual\norigin. Real, true history arises independently of individuals, as a\nproduct growing to completion behind their backs, the product of a\nforce apart from individual agents, which may be called Fate, Chance,\nFortune or God. The individual, who at first was everything, and filled\nthe whole stage with his posturing and declamation, is now, in this\nsecond aspect of history, less than nothing; his actions and cries,\nstripped of all serious potency, provoke laughter or pity. We look in\nterror at the Fate that dominates him, we stand aghast at the strange\ncoincidence of chance or the caprices of Fortune, we bow before the\ninscrutable designs of the divine providence. The individual appears\nin turn as the inert material, the powerless plaything and the blind\ninstrument of these forces. But deeper thought leads us beyond even\nthis second view of history. The pity which the individual seems to\narouse and the amusement he evokes are in reality deserved not by him\nbut by his fancies, or rather, by those individuals who mistake fancy\nfor truth. Real history is composed of actions, not of fancies and\nillusions: but actions are the work of individuals, not indeed in so\nfar as they dream, but in the inspiration of genius, the divine madness\nof truth, the holy enthusiasm of the hero. Fate, Chance, Fortune,\nGod--all these explanations have the same defect: they separate the\nindividual from his product, and instead of eliminating the capricious\nelement, the individual will in history, as they claim to do, they\nimmensely reinforce and increase it. Blind Fate, irresponsible chance,\nand tyrannical God are all alike capricious: and hence Fate passes into\nChance and God, Chance into Fate and God, and God into both the others,\nall three being equivalent and identical.\n\nThe idea which transcends and corrects alike the individualistic\nand supra-individualistic views of history is the idea of history\nas rational. History is made by individuals: but individuality is\nnothing but the concreteness of the universal, and every individual\naction, simply because it is individual, is supra-individual. Neither\nthe individual nor the universal exists as a distinct thing: the real\nthing is the one single course of history, whose abstract aspects\nare individuality without universality and universality without\nindividuality. This one course of history is coherent in all its many\ndeterminations, like a work of art which is at the same time manifold\nand single, in which every word is inseparable from the rest, every\nshade of colour related to all the others, every line connected\nwith every other line. On this understanding alone history can be\nunderstood. Otherwise it must remain unintelligible, like a string of\nwords without meaning or the incoherent actions of a madman.\n\nHistory then is the work neither of Fate nor of Chance but of the\nnecessity which is not determination and the liberty which is not\nchance. And since the religious view, that history is the work of God,\nhas this advantage and superiority over the others, that it introduces\na cause for history other than fate or chance, and therefore not\nproperly speaking a cause at all, but a creative activity, a free and\nintelligent mind, it is natural that out of gratitude to this higher\nview no less than by the suitability of the language we should be led\nto give to the rationality of history the name of God who rules and\ngoverns all things, and to call it the Divine Providence. In so naming\nit, we at the same time purge the title of its mythical dross which\ndebased God and his providence afresh into a fate or a chance. Thus\nprovidence in history, in this final logical form, has double value\nas a criticism of individual illusions, when they come forward as\nthe entire and only reality of history, and as a criticism of divine\ntranscendence. And we may say that this is the point of view which\nalways has been and always is adopted, as if instinctively, without the\nprofession of an explicit theory, by all minds naturally gifted with\nthat particular faculty which we call the historic sense.\n\nIf now, to return to Vico, we ask how he solved the problem of the\nmotive force of history, and what was the precise content for him of\nthe concept of providence in the objective sense, it is perfectly easy\nto exclude the supposition that his was the transcendent or miraculous\nProvidence which had formed the subject of Bossuet's eloquent\n_Discours._ It is easy both because in all his philosophy he invariably\nreduces the transcendent to the immanent, and repeats over and over\nagain here that his providence operates by natural means or (using\nscholastic phraseology) by secondary causes: and because upon this\npoint his interpreters are practically unanimous.\n\nNo less insistent is his criticism of fate and chance, or according\nto his threefold division fortune, fate and chance. He observes that\nthe doctrine of fate moves in a vicious circle, because the eternal\nseries of causes in which it holds the world bound and chained, depends\nupon the will of Jupiter, and at the same time Jupiter is subject to\nfate; whence it results that the Stoics are themselves entangled in\nthat \"chain of Jupiter\" with which they would imprison all things\nhuman. These three concepts, corresponding to that of opportunity when\nan object of desire is in question, to that of good luck in the case\nof unhoped-for events, and to that of accident in the case of the\nunexpected, are distinctions of the subjective understanding rather\nthan anything else: objectively they come under one single law which\nmay also be called fortune, if with Plato we recognise opportunity\nas the mistress of human affairs: and all three are manifestations\nand paths of the divine Providence which is intelligence, liberty and\nnecessity. The creator of the world of nations \"was indeed Mind, since\nmen made it by their intelligence: it was not Fate, because they made\nit by free choice, nor yet Chance, since to all eternity on doing thus\nthe same results follow.\"\n\nVico lights up in the most fanciful ways the comedy of errors formed\nby man's illusions as to the end of his own actions. Men thought they\nwere escaping the threats of the thundering sky by carrying their\nwomen into caves to satisfy their animal passions out of God's sight:\nand by thus keeping them safely secluded they founded the first\nchaste unions and the first societies; marriage and the family. They\nfortified themselves in suitable places with the intention of defending\nthemselves and their families: and in reality, by thus fortifying\nthemselves in fixed places they put an end to their nomadic life and\nprimitive wanderings, and began to learn agriculture. The weak and\ndisorderly, reduced to the extremity of hunger and mutual slaughter,\nto save their lives took refuge in these fortified places, and became\nservants to the heroes: and thus without knowing it they raised the\nfamily to an aristocratic or feudal status. The aristocrats, feudal\nchiefs or patricians, their rule once established, hoped to defend and\nsecure it by the strictest treatment of their servants the plebeians:\nbut in this way they awoke in the servants a consciousness of their\nown power and made the plebeians into men, and the more the patricians\nprided themselves on their patriciate and struggled to preserve it,\nthe more effectively they worked to destroy the patrician state and to\ncreate democracy. Thus, says Vico, the world of nations issues \"from a\nmind widely different from, sometimes quite opposed, always superior,\nto the particular ends set before themselves by men: which restricted\nends have been made means to wider ends, and employed to preserve the\nhuman race upon this earth.\"\n\nIt may be gathered from some of our quotations from Vico that he\nsometimes tended to conceive men as conscious of their own utilitarian\nends but unconscious of moral ends. This would logically lead to\nexplaining social life on exclusively utilitarian principles, and to\nconsidering morality as an accident relatively to the human will and\ntherefore not really moral: an external accretion more or less capable\nof holding mankind together, or the obscure work of a supramundane\nprovidence. This utilitarianism especially creeps into a passage where\nhe says that man, on account of his corrupt nature, being under the\ntyranny of self-love which compels him to make private utility his\nchief guide and to want every useful thing for himself and nothing for\nhis fellow, unable to hold his passions in check so as to direct them\nby justice, in the state of nature desires only his own safety; after\ntaking a wife and begetting children, desires his safety and the safety\nof his family; after attaining civil life, desires his own safety\ntogether with the safety of his city; after extending his rule over\nother peoples, he desires the safety of the nation; after joining with\nother nations in wars, treaties, alliances and commerce, he desires\nhis safety and that of all mankind: and \"in all these circumstances\nhe principally desires his own interest.\" For this reason \"it can be\nnothing else than divine providence that binds him down within such\nordinances as to maintain by justice the society of the family, the\nstate and ultimately of mankind; by which ordinances since man cannot\nattain what he wants, at least he wants to attain as much utility as\nis permitted: and this is what is called justice.\" The public virtue\nof Rome, he writes elsewhere, \"was nothing but a good use made by\nprovidence of grave, unsightly and cruel private faults, that states\nmight be preserved at a time when human minds, being in a state of\nextreme particularity, could not naturally understand a common good.\"\n\nUtilitarianism was however, as we know, strongly repugnant to Vico's\nobserved ethics, founded as the latter is upon the moral consciousness\nor shame; and hence these statements, which unconsciously tend in that\ndirection, can only be explained as resulting from the disturbance\nsometimes produced in his mind by the lingering remains of the\ntranscendent or theological conception of providence, and also from the\nconfused character of his thought, which prevented him from keeping\nthe idea of individual illusions clearly distinguished from that of\nindividual aims; so that he sometimes substituted the second when he\nought to have been dealing solely with the first. If the provident\ndeity is \"the unity of the spirit which informs and animates the\nworld of nations,\" these do not fail to obtain their particular ends\nin order that it may move on to its universal ones, but both alike\nare realised in them: and man is at every moment both utilitarian and\nmoral, or at least supposes himself to be moral when he is utilitarian\nor utilitarian when he is really moral.\n\nIn any case, and in spite of these vacillations or rather confusions,\nthe conception of particular ends as the vehicle of universal and\nof illusion as accompanying and co-operating with action implies a\ndialectical conception of the movement of history, and the transcending\nof the problem of evil. This problem is in fact very little emphasised\nby Vico, owing to the strength of his belief in the universal\ngovernment of providence and of his persuasion that so-called evil is\nnot only willed by man under the appearance of good, but is itself\nessentially a good. In a few rare passages in his earliest writings,\nwhere he encounters the problem of evil, Vico solves it simply in the\nsense that we men because of our iniquity which leads us to \"regard\nourselves, not this universe of things\" (_nosmetipsos, non hanc rerum\nuniversitatem spectamus_) consider as evil those things which run\ncounter to us, \"which yet, since they contribute to the common nature\nof the world, are good\" (_quae tamen, quia in mundi commune conferunt,\nbona sunt_).\n\nVico's conception of history thus became truly objective, freed from\ndivine arbitrament, but freed equally from the rule of trifling causes\nand gossiping explanations, and acquiring a knowledge of its own\nessential end, which is to understand the nexus of facts, the logic\nof events; to be the rational reconstruction of a rational fact.\nHistorical study at this time suffered less from the first of these\nerrors (the theological conception had been ever since the beginning of\nthe Italian Renaissance falling into universal decay) than from that\nform of history which was just then acquiring the name of \"pragmatic,\"\nwhich restricted itself to the personal aspect of events, and failing\nby these means to reach full historical truth tried to gain warmth\nand life by means of political and moral instruction. A monument of\npragmatic history arose in Vico's own country and contemporaneously\nwith the _Scienza Nuova:_ Pietro Giannone's _Civil History of the\nKingdom of Naples._ The author was a man of his own district and age,\nand wrote a great work in the sphere of polemic, and even in certain\nrespects of history: but such that all its greatness only serves to\nemphasise the greatness of Vico's book. If Vico had had to describe\nthe origins of ecclesiastical property and power in the Middle Ages,\nhe would have been able to write of something very different from the\nguile of popes, bishops and abbots, and the simplicity of dukes and\nemperors. And as we shall see, whenever he undertook to investigate any\npart of history he actually did discover in it something very different\nfrom these things.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XI\n\n\n\nTHE LAW OF REFLUX\n\n\n\nThe mind, after traversing its course of progress, after rising from\nsensation successively to the imaginative and the rational universal\nand from violence to equity, is bound in conformity with its eternal\nnature to re-traverse the course, to relapse into violence and\nsensation, and thence to renew its upward movement, to commence a\nreflux.\n\nThis is the philosophical meaning of Vico's \"reflux,\" but not the exact\nmanner in which we find it expressed in his writings, where the eternal\ncircle is considered almost exclusively as exemplified in the history\nof nations, as a reflux in the civil affairs of man. Civilisation\ncomes to an end in the \"barbarism of reflection,\" which is worse than\nthe primitive barbarism of sensation; for while the latter was not\nwithout a wild nobility, the former is contemptible, untrustworthy\nand treacherous; and thus it is necessary that this evil subtlety of\nmalicious intellect should rust away through the long centuries of a\nnew barbarism of sensation. We must however withdraw and purge the\nconception of \"reflux\" from historical facts and the sociological\nscheme, not only to explain the absolute and eternal character\nwhich Vico attributes to it, but also to justify the historical\nrepresentation and sociological law founded upon it, and drawing their\ncogency primarily from it.\n\nThe laws of flux and reflux, laid down by the philosophers and\npoliticians of Greece and of the Italian Renaissance, were founded no\nless than Vico's upon a philosophy, but upon a very superficial one;\nthey assumed their object to possess external and empty political\nforms, and endeavoured to fix the succession of these forms upon data\nof experience or by vague reasonings. But Vico's object is the forms of\nculture, including in themselves all the activities of life, economy\nand law, religion and art, science and language, and referring them\nback to their inmost source, the human mind, he establishes their\nsuccession \"according to the rhythm of the elementary forms of the\nmind.\" Thus all the learning which has been expended in comparing the\nVician reflux with the theories of Plato or Polybius, Machiavelli or\nCampanella, is practically wasted: the more so that Vico (who, as we\nknow, though often misunderstanding his predecessors cannot be accused\nof wishing to pass them over: in fact, where he thought he found\nparallel or identical ideas in them, he was apt to boast of the fact)\nfelt no need of mentioning this point, or thought it unimportant. The\n\"circular movement\" (\u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03ba\u03cd\u03ba\u03bb\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2) of Polybius, the economy of nature\nby which states alter, change and return to the same point, has been\nthought almost an anticipation of the eternal ideal history; but Vico\nsets Polybius with the others, when he asks the reader to consider \"how\n(little) philosophers have thought with knowledge upon their principles\nof civil government, and with what (little) truth Polybius has reasoned\nupon its changes.\" Campanella connected his historical cycles with\nastrological laws; and Machiavelli conceives the catastrophe which\nopens the reflux thus: \"When human craft and malignity have gone as far\nas they can go, it happens of necessity that the world purifies itself\nby one of the three methods (pestilence, famine and deluge, beside\nthe human methods of new religions and languages) in order that men,\nhaving become few and chastened, may live more conveniently and become\nbetter.\" The one precedent to which Vico refers, but only to interpret\nit in a way altogether his own and in fact to give it a totally new\ncontent, is the ancient Egyptian tradition of the three successive ages\nof gods, heroes and men.\n\nIf the philosophy lying at its root gives strength to Vico's\nsociological theory of reflux, the historical element with which it is\nleavened to some degree weakens it. Vico was especially versed in and\nattached to Roman history, which had been the first of his historical\nstudies and the object of many years' devotion. The history of Rome\naccordingly, whether because of his deeper study of it or because of\nits complexity, impressiveness and long duration, came to stand in\nVico's mind as the typical or normal history, to serve as a standard\nfor all others, and be confused with the law of flux and reflux itself.\nRome showed him the asylum of Romulus, that is, the transition from the\nstate of nature to the political organism: aristocracies, monarchical\nat first in appearance only, later not even in appearance: democracy,\nissuing from its struggle with aristocracy and ending in real monarchy,\nthe perfect form of civil life; thence by a process of degeneration,\nthe barbarism of reflection or civilisation, incomparably worse than\nthe primitive noble barbarism, and following in its train a second\ncondition of wandering in a state of nature and a new barbarism, a new\nyouth, the Middle Ages. It is the history of Rome hardly generalised\nat all and supplemented here and there by that of Greece, that appears\nin the Vician aphorisms formulating the laws of social dynamics. Men\nfirst feel the prick of necessity, then the attraction of utility:\nnext they become aware of convenience, and after that take delight in\npleasure; then dissipate themselves in luxury and finally fall victims\nto the madness of abusing their resources. There must at first be men\nof brute strength like Polyphemus, that man may obey man in the state\nof family life, and to induce him to obey the law in the future state\nof civil life. There must be noble and proud men like Achilles, not\ninclined by nature to yield to their equals, in order to establish\nover the family the aristocratic type of republic. Then valiant and\njust men like Aristides and Scipio Africanus are necessary, to open\nthe path to popular liberty. After this arise men of great apparent\nvirtues accompanied by faults no less great, like Alexander or Caesar,\nacquiring immense popular reputations and introducing monarchy. Later\nstill there must be serious reflective natures like Tiberius to\nconsolidate the monarchy; and lastly wild, dissolute and shameless\ncharacters like Caligula, Nero and Domitian to overthrow it.\n\nOwing to this rarefaction of Roman history into typical history, and\nthe simultaneous consolidation of typical history into the history of\nRome, Vico's law of reflux is riddled with exceptions, much more common\nand serious than those of the corresponding empirical laws; so that if\nas he believes his empirical science is identical with the ideal laws\nof the mind, its alleged permanency throughout all eternity and the\nwhole universe seems the merest irony. He says that Carthage, Capua and\nNumantia, the three cities which threatened to dispute with Rome the\nempire of the world, failed to accomplish the ordained course of human\naffairs: since the Carthaginians were thwarted by the acuteness of the\nnative African temperament, which by maritime commerce they increased\nstill further: the Capuans by the soft climate and fertility of rich\nCampania: and the Numantines by their suppression in the first burst\nof heroism at the hands of Rome, led by Scipio Africanus the conqueror\nof Carthage, and aided by the forces of the world. And passing from\nancient to modern times, America would now be traversing the path of\nhuman affairs but for its discovery by Europeans: Poland and England\nare still aristocratic, but would have arrived at perfect monarchy had\nnot the natural course of civil affairs been hindered by extraordinary\ncauses. As for the Middle Ages, they cannot be considered as in Vico's\nestimation a true return to the state of nature, if they open with\nthe establishment of Christianity, the religion of the true God; nor\nin any case does the return to the state of nature and to barbarism\nseem the only path open to a nation that has attained its \u1f00\u03ba\u03bc\u03ae, its\nculmination. The alternative is that a decadent nation should lose\nits independence and fall under the rule of a better. Nor, lastly, is\ndecadence inevitable if statesmen and philosophers working in harmony\ncan preserve the perfection that has been reached and check the\nthreatened destruction, and if in point of fact, as he observes, the\naristocratic republics which survived his own day as remnants of the\nMiddle Ages succeeded in preserving themselves by arts of \"superfine\nwisdom.\" His own time Vico thought to be one of high civilisation.\nA complete humanity, he says, seems to be scattered to-day over\nall nations. A few great monarchs rule the world of nations, and\nthose barbarian monarchs who still exist do so either owing to the\npersistence of the \"common wisdom\" of imaginative and cruel religions,\nor because of the natural temperaments of their respective peoples. The\nnations which form the empire of the Czar of Russia are of a sluggish\ndisposition; those of the Khan of Tartary are an effeminate race; the\nsubjects of the Negus of Ethiopia and the King of Fez and of Morocco\nare few and weak. In the temperate zone Japan maintains a heroic\ncharacter not unlike that of Rome in the period of the Punic wars;\nher people are warlike, her language resembling Latin, her religion\na fierce one of terrible gods all loaded with formidable weapons.\nThe Chinese on the other hand, whose religion is mild, cultivate\nliterature and are humane in the highest degree: the peoples of the\nIndies are also humane and practise the arts of peace; the Persians\nand Turks mingle the rude doctrine of their religion with an Asiatic\nsoftness, the Turks especially tempering their arrogance with pomp,\nmagnificence, liberality and gratitude. Europe is above all humane,\ncomposed as it is of great monarchies and universally professing the\nChristian faith which inculcates an infinitely pure and perfect idea\nof God and commands charity to the whole human race. Vico fixed his\nattention upon the confederacy of the Swiss cantons and the united\nprovinces of Holland, which reminded him of the Aetolian and Achaean\nleagues, and on the composition of the German Empire, a system of free\nstates and sovereign princes, which seemed to him a kind of attempt\nin the direction of a great aristocratic state; the most perfect\nof all, and the ultimate form of civil life, since no other can be\nconceived superior to it, reproducing as it does the earliest form, the\naristocracy of patricians each supreme in his own family and all united\nin the ruling class of the first state; but reproducing it in a form\nnot of barbarism but of the highest civilisation. Such is the humanity\nby which Europe is on every hand distinguished, that it abounds with\nevery element contributory to human happiness, mental pleasures no\nless than bodily comforts, and all this in virtue of the Christian\nreligion, teaching as it does sublime truths, supported by the most\nlearned philosophers of the Gentile races and of the three greatest\nlanguages of the world, Hebrew, Greek and Latin, and thus uniting the\nwisdom of authority with that of reason, the choicest philosophical\ndoctrine with the most highly developed philological learning. Can this\nlofty civilisation, safeguarded as it is by Christianity, be moving,\nor ever likely to move towards a new state of nature? It is difficult\nto discover Vico's real opinion on this point. Among his verses there\nis a poem of a profoundly pessimistic tone, but this is a youthful\neffusion, and in any case refers to the end of the world as imminent,\nrather than to a future social decadence. In his letters there is a\nmelancholy picture of the condition of learning in his time: but it\napplies to this restricted field only, not to the sphere of social and\npolitical life. On the other hand, in his last philosophical work, the\n_De mente heroica,_ referring to those who declared that all things\nwere now perfect and that no new tasks could arise, he says that the\ntide of progress is flowing at its strongest. \"The world is still\nyoung: for only in the last seven hundred years, four hundred of which\nwere spent in barbarism, how many new discoveries have been made! How\nmany new arts have arisen! How many new sciences have been developed!\"\n(_Mundus iuvenescit adhuc; nam septingentis non ultra abhinc annis,\nquorum tamen quadringentos barbaries percurrit, quot nova inventa! quot\nnovae artes! quot novae scientiae excogitatae!_) But we may observe\nthat the _De mente heroica_ is an official oration, and that Vico may\non that account have suppressed for the occasion his doubts or his\ndeepest convictions. In any case, how can we reconcile the prophecy of\nan imminent collapse with the rise of that creation of providence, the\nNew Science, shedding upon the life of nations a light which rendered\npossible the diagnosis and cure of their ailments? On the whole it is\nprobable that the difficulty of determining Vico's opinion as to the\nfate of contemporary society is due to the fact that he had really no\nsettled conviction on the subject, and was led hither and thither in\nvarious and contrary directions by the influence of hopes and fears.\n\nIf it had not been disturbed by the scheme of Roman history, the\nempirical theory of the reflux would never have been forced to admit\nso many and serious exceptions; nor would it have fallen into such\npainful confusions. It would have accommodated its author's historical\nobservations with greater ease, and its general characteristics would\nhave been much simpler and more general. It would have consisted\nprimarily in the determination and illustration of the connexion\nbetween predominantly imaginative and predominantly intellectual,\nspontaneous and reflective, periods, the latter periods issuing out\nof the former by an increase of energy, and returning to them by\ndegeneration and decomposition. Political history shows over and\nover again the spectacle of aristocracies declining from their first\nstrength to a debased and contemptible state and yielding before the\nonset of classes less refined or even absolutely uncultured, but of\nstouter moral fibre; while these again, after becoming civilised in\ntheir turn and attaining the highest development of the historical\nidea whose germ they bear within themselves, enter upon a new period\nof decay and fermentation, from which issues a new ruling class in the\nvigour of a youthful barbarism. The history of philosophy again shows\npositive and speculative periods; philosophical solutions congeal into\nscholastic theory and dogma, the mind reverts to the mere unthinking\nobservation of particular fact, and the speculative process arises once\nmore. Literary history, too, speaks of periods of realism and idealism,\nromantic and classical periods: of a corrupt classicism, Alexandrian or\ndecadent art, and of a romantic barbarism which arises from it. These\nare true cases of Vico's reflux. But since the nature of the mind which\nunderlies these cycles is outside time and therefore exists in every\nmoment of time, we must not exaggerate the difference of the periods:\nand if on the one hand the outline of the law must be distinct, it\nmust on the other hand not lose a certain elasticity. We must never\nforget that at every period, aristocratic or democratic, romantic or\nclassical, positive or speculative, and even in every individual and\nevery fact, moments both aristocratic and democratic, romantic and\nclassical, positive and speculative can be observed; and that these\ndistinctions are to a great extent quantitative and made for the sake\nof convenience. These facts should lead us to avoid alike maintaining\nthe law at all costs and so falling into artificiality, and rejecting\nit entirely and so refusing the help which may be derived from general\nand approximative views.\n\nThus understood and amended, not only is the theory free from the\ngreat and striking exceptions which are necessary when it is modelled\nupon the history and final catastrophe of Rome, but the accusations of\nundue uniformity lodged against Vico disappear. Vincenzo Cuoco, one\nof the first, if not the first intelligent student of Vico's works,\nremarks concerning and in criticism of the law of reflux, that \"nature\nnever resembles itself; it is man who by compounding his observations\nforms classes and names.\" This is perfectly true; but if applied to\nthis case it would be an argument not against the Vician reflux but\nagainst every sort of empirical human science. Others accused Vico\nof overlooking groups of causes of great historical weight, such as\nclimate, racial and national character, and exceptional occurrences.\nBut, omitting the fact that he often mentions these things, for he\nconnects national character and climate with the forms and changes\nof states, and mentions events and circumstances which upset the\nnatural and ordinary course of national history, for example in his\ndiscussion of Greek history, the truth is that he was bound to ignore\nthem and could not waste time over such things, since his concern was\nwith uniformities and not with divergences, or rather with certain\nuniformities and not with certain others which compared with the\nformer were negligible divergences. Similarly--the parallel is an\nobvious one, and indeed is more than a parallel--any one who attempts\nto trace the general characteristics of the different periods of\nlife, infancy, childhood, adolescence and so forth, will ignore the\ncomparative rapidity and slowness of development due to differences\nof climate, race or accidental circumstances. Another of these\ntrue but irrelevant charges is that Vico denied the communication\nand interpenetration of civilisations, and insisted that they arise\nseparately in different nations without any mutual knowledge and\ntherefore without reciprocal imitation. This charge has been met by the\nobservation that Vico does not fail to record cases of the influence\nof one people upon another and of the transmission of civilisations\nand their products; the transmission for example of alphabetic writing\nfrom the Chaldaeans to the Phoenicians and from them to the Egyptians;\nand that in any case his law is not empirical but philosophical and\nrefers to the spontaneous creative activity of the human mind. The\npoint at issue is however precisely the empirical aspect of this law,\nnot the philosophical: and the true reply seems to us to be, as we have\nalready suggested, that Vico could not take and ought not to have taken\nother circumstances into account, just as--to recall one instance--any\none who in studying the various phases of life describes the first\nmanifestations of the sexual craving in the vague imaginations and\nsimilar phenomena of puberty, does not take into account the ways in\nwhich the less experienced may be initiated into love by the more\nexperienced, since he is setting out to deal not with the social laws\nof imitation but with the physiological laws of organic development.\nIf it is said that even without imitation or sophistication the sexual\ncraving arises no less and demands satisfaction, such a statement\ndoubtless merely asserts the incontrovertible truth of a certain very\nancient Eastern tale included by Boccaccio in the _Decameron_: but at\nthe same time it supplies the most complete parallel to the famous and\nmuch controverted aphorism of Vico.\n\nNor is the Vician law of reflux necessarily opposed, as has often been\nthought, to the conception of social progress. It would be so opposed\nif instead of being a law of mere uniformity it were one of identity,\nin agreement with the idea of an unending cyclical repetition of single\nindividual facts which has been adopted by certain extravagant minds\nof both ancient and modern times. The reflux of history, the eternal\ncycle of the mind, can and must be conceived, even if Vico does not\nso express it, as not merely diverse in its uniform movements, but\nas perpetually increasing in richness and outgrowing itself, so that\nthe new period of sense is in reality enriched by all the intellect\nand all the development that preceded it, and the same is true of the\nnew period of the imagination or of the developed mind. The return of\nbarbarism in the Middle Ages was in some respects uniform with ancient\nbarbarism; but it must not for that reason be considered as identical\nwith it, since it contains in itself Christianity, which summarises and\ntranscends ancient thought.\n\nWhether the conception of progress is formulated and thrown into relief\nby Vico is quite another question. Vico does not deny progress; he\neven refers to it in speaking of the conditions of his own time as an\nactual fact: but he has no conception of it and still less does he\nthrow such a conception into relief. His philosophy, while it attains\nthe lofty vision of the process of mind in obedience to its own laws,\nnevertheless retains by reason of this failure to apprehend the\nprogressive enrichment of reality an element of sadness and desolation.\nThe individual character of men and events is obliterated in Vico;\nindividuals and events are represented merely as particular cases of\none aspect of the mind or of one phase of civilisation. Hence we always\nfind Aristides alongside of Scipio and Alexander alongside of Caesar:\nnever Aristides simply as Aristides, Scipio as Scipio, and Alexander\nand Caesar as Alexander and as Caesar. Progress implies that each fact\nand each individual has its own unique function; each makes its own\ncontribution, for which no other can be substituted, to the poem of\nhistory; and each responds with a deeper voice to the one that went\nbefore.\n\nBut the reason why Vico was bound to miss the idea of progress and\nwhy his studies in history were inevitably one-sided can be clearly\nperceived only after a review of his metaphysics.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XII\n\n\n\nMETAPHYSICS\n\n\n\nBy \"metaphysics\" we understand Vico's conception of reality as a\nwhole, not of the world of man by itself; and we also include in the\nmeaning of the word his ultimate negative conclusion asserting the\nunknowability or the imperfect knowability of one or more spheres of\nreality, or of that highest sphere in which the others reunite.\n\nIn point of fact, as we observed in considering the second and latest\nform of his theory of knowledge, Vico drew a sharp line between the\nworld of man and the world of nature: the former transparent to man\nbecause created by him, the latter opaque, because only God its\nCreator has knowledge of it. And his conception of the total and\nultimate reality, the metaphysic which he expounds together with his\nearlier theory of knowledge, retains the value granted to it by that\ntheory and no other: it is a probable conjecture, but one incapable\nof verification, and reaches completion in the certitude of revealed\ntheology. Hence this metaphysic remains out of all possible connexion\nwith the New Science, which proceeds by the certain method of truth and\ncuts itself off from revelation. Vico never rejected it. He discusses\nit in his autobiography of 1725, the year of the first _Scienza Nuova;_\nhe refers to it with satisfaction in 1737, seven years after the\nsecond _Scienza Nuova,_ when his scientific life was, as he himself\nconsidered, at an end. But though he never rejected it he always kept\nit aside, so to speak, in a corner of his mind.\n\nThis point established, it might seem that there can be nothing more to\nbe said of any philosophical importance about Vico's metaphysics. But\nthis is not the case. Since every department of philosophy implies in\nitself every other, and since we can therefore always deduce from the\ntreatment of one of the so-called particular philosophical sciences the\ncharacter of the whole, it is legitimate to examine the New Science\nand to consider what metaphysic is implicit therein; to determine what\nphilosophical complement is logically supported and demanded by this\nscience.\n\nThe New Science, which asserted the full knowability of human affairs,\nnot merely on the surface, like a psychological treatment, but in\nthe depths of their nature: the New Science, which transcended the\nindividual to attain the conception of the mind which informs all\nthings and is Providence: the Science which with divine pleasure\ncontemplated the eternal cycle of the mind, elevated as it was to such\na height, necessarily tended to interpret the whole of reality, both\nNature and God, as Mind. That this tendency was objective to the New\nScience, and not subjective to Vico, in whose mind the science so to\nspeak thought itself out, need hardly be repeated. Vico personally not\nonly did not encourage it but actually curtailed and repressed it so\nenergetically as to leave no trace of it in his works. There was no\nphilosophical doctrine of which he had such terror and against which\nhe so frequently waged war as that of pantheism; and perhaps this\npolemical preoccupation is the only trace, though quite an involuntary\ntrace, visible in his writings of the tendency which he must have\nobserved in himself. He was, and wished to remain, a Christian and a\nCatholic; transcendence, the personality of God, the substantiality\nof the soul, though his science did not lead him towards them, were\nuncontrollable necessities to his consciousness. But just as this fact\nallowed Vico to repress but not to eradicate the essential logical\ntendency of his thought, so it enables us to recognise that tendency\nin the facts themselves. An Italian critic, Spaventa, is right when he\nsays that in Vico the necessity of a new metaphysic makes itself felt;\nanother, a German Catholic, is equally right in denning his system\nas \"semi-pantheistic.\" It would perhaps be more dangerous to go on\nto say, with the Italian above mentioned, that Vico makes an advance\non the Cartesian idea of two substances and the Spinozistic of two\nattributes, and even on the Leibnitian doctrine of the monad, and that\nhe transcends parallelism and pre-established harmony by distinguishing\nthe two providences, the two attributes, nature and mind, in such a way\nthat the one is a step to the other, and by conceiving the point of\nunion and the origin of the opposition as an unfolding or development,\nso that nature is regarded as the phenomenon and proper basis of\nmind, the pre-supposition which mind creates to itself in order to be\nreally mind, to be a true unity. For while we may doubt whether the\ndistinction of the two attributes or two providences, the natural and\nthe human, is a well-grounded and inevitable consequence of conceiving\nsubstance as mind and thought, it is impossible to deduce the\nevolutionary transition from one to the other as a tendency implicit in\nVico's conception of thought. There is certainly particular documentary\nevidence for this latter particular tendency: but it is scanty and\nunconvincing, and occurs not in the system of the New Science but\nrather in the chronologically earlier system.\n\nFor the metaphysic laid down by Vico in the earlier phase of his\nthought is not, as it has seemed to some, and as it may at first sight\nappear, entirely devoid of significance and value. It shows the same\naversion to materialism and the same love of idealism which inspire\nthe meditations of the New Science. The philosophy of Epicurus, which\ntakes as its starting-point matter already formed and divided into\nultimate particles of various shapes, composed of other parts which\nare supposed to be indivisible owing to the absence of void between\nthem, seemed to him a philosophy such as to satisfy the na\u00efve mind of\na child or the uncritical mind of a woman; and the delight with which\nhe followed the explanation of the forms of material nature according\nto this philosopher, in the poem of Lucretius, was equalled by the\namusement and pity with which he watched him forced by stern necessity\nto lose himself in countless ineptitudes and follies in trying to\nexplain the phenomena of thought. Vico accused the Cartesian physics\nno less than the Epicurean of a \"false position,\" since it also takes\nready-formed matter as its starting-point, differing from the Epicurean\nmatter in that, while the latter limits the divisibility of matter at\nthe atoms, the former makes its elements infinitely divisible; that\nthe one places motion in the void, the other in the solid; the one\ninitiates the shaping of its infinite worlds by a casual declination\nof atoms from the downward path of their own weight and gravitation,\nthe other generates its indefinite vortices from an impetus imparted\nto a section of inert and therefore not yet divided matter, which on\nreceiving this motion divides into fragments, and, hampered by its\nmass, necessarily makes an effort to move in a straight line, and\nbeing unable to do so through its solidity begins, divided as it is\ninto fragments, to move about the centre of each fragment. In this way\nwhile Epicurus entrusted the world to chance, Descartes subjected it\nto fate; and it was in vain that to save himself from materialism he\nsuperimposed upon his physics a quasi-Platonic metaphysic, by which he\nattempted to establish two substances, the one extended and the other\nintelligent, and to make room for an immaterial agent; for these two\nparts were not reconciled in his system, since his mechanical physics\nincluded in itself a metaphysic like the Epicurean, establishing\none kind and one only of active material substance. For similar\nor analogous reasons Vico rejected the philosophies of Gassendi,\nSpinoza and Locke; and the physical science of other authors such as\nRobert Boyle seemed to him valuable for purposes of medicine and the\n\"spargiric art,\" but useless for philosophy. Galileo he considered to\nhave looked at physical science with the eye of a great geometrician,\nbut without the aid of the full light of metaphysics. He had sympathy\nwith philosophers who were also geometricians, and therefore with the\nPythagorean or Timaean physics, according to which the world consists\nof numbers; with the Platonic metaphysics, which from the form of our\nminds without any other hypothesis establishes, upon our knowledge\nand consciousness of certain eternal truths which are in our mind and\ncannot be ignored or denied, the eternal idea as the principle of all\nthings; with the doctrine of metaphysical points, attributed by him\nto Zeno the Stoic; and finally with the philosophy of the Italian\nRenaissance, the period adorned by Ficino, Pico della Mirandola,\nSteuco, Nifo, Mazzoni, Piccolomini, Acquaviva and Patrizio.\n\nThe fundamental concept of his cosmology was supplied by the\nmetaphysical point, in which the employment of mathematics in\nmetaphysics, a process admitted by Vico as analogous to that of\nconstruction, found expression. Just as from the geometrical point\nproceed the line and the surface, and the point which is defined as\nhaving no parts supplies the proof that lines otherwise incommensurable\ncan be divided equally into their component points, so it is legitimate\nto postulate points not geometrical but metaphysical, which though not\nextended generate extension. Between God, who is rest, and matter,\nwhich is motion, the intermediate place is taken by the metaphysical\npoint, whose attribute is conation, the indefinite energy and attempt\non the part of the universe to bring into being and sustain each\nparticular thing. The existence of matter is nothing but an indefinite\npower of keeping the universe extended, which underlies all extended\nobjects equally however unequal they may be, and also an indefinite\npower of motion underlying all particular motions, however unequal.\nBehind a grain of sand lies something which when this particle is\ndivided gives to it and preserves in it an infinite extension and\nmagnitude; so that the whole mass of the universe is included in the\ngrain of sand, if not actually, yet potentially and in capacity. This\neffort of the universe, underlying each smallest particle of matter,\nis neither the extension of the particle nor the extension of the\nuniverse: it is the thought of God, which, free from all materiality,\ngives motion and impulse to the whole. Every particular determination\nof reality agrees with this fundamental truth. Time is divisible,\neternity indivisible; disturbances of the mind wax and wane, its\nquiescence has no degrees; extended things are corruptible, unextended\nthings permanent in their indivisibility; body can be divided, mind\ncannot; possibilities are at a single point, accidents are everywhere;\nscience is one, while opinion produces differences; virtue is neither\nin one place nor another, vice walks up and down in every direction;\nthe good is one, the bad is innumerable; in every kind of thing in a\nword the best occurs in the category of the indivisible.\n\nSubstance in general, which underlies and sustains things, is divided\ninto two species, extended substance or that which equally supports\nunequal extensions, and thinking substance which equally supports\nunequal thoughts. And just as one part of extension is divided from\nanother but indivisible in the substance of the body, so one part of\nthought, that is to say a determinate thought, is divided from another\nbut indivisible in the substance of the soul. Activity or freedom is\npeculiar to the soul, and entirely denied to body: and Descartes, in\nmaking a conation of body the beginning of his physics, was strictly\nadopting the methods of a poet and falling into the anthropomorphic\nconceptions of primitive races. The phenomena which students of\nmechanics call activities, forms, or powers, are insensible movements\nby which bodies move either, as the ancients said, towards their\ncentres of gravity, or, as the modern theory of mechanics asserts, away\nfrom their centre of motion. The communication of motion, moreover,\nis just as inconceivable in body as is activity. To grant it would be\nequivalent to granting the interpenetration of bodies, since motion\nis nothing but matter in motion; the blow given to a ball is only the\noccasion for the energy of the universe, which was so weak in the ball\nas to make it seem at rest, to expand and thus to give it an appearance\nof more sensible motion. On the other hand, Vico agreed with the\nCartesians, especially Malebranche, as to the origin of ideas, which\nhe inclined to believe that God creates in us from time to time. He\nalso held with the Cartesians that the lower animals are automata;\nand he agreed with all contemporary thought as to the subjectivity of\nsecondary qualities.\n\nSetting aside these last doctrines, which are not Vico's own, indeed\nhe scarcely refers to them, the fundamental doctrine of metaphysical\npoints is all his own. His attribution of it to an imaginary Zeno,\nin whose person were combined and confused the Eleatic and the Stoic\n(a mistake common in the philosophical literature of the time), can\ndeceive nobody, and did not even deceive Vico himself, who when pressed\nexplained how he had been led to that interpretation of Aristotle's\nstatements about Zeno, and finally says that if the doctrine cannot\nbe accepted as that of Zeno, he will adopt it as his own, without\nthe patronage of any great names. Nor on the other hand can it be\ntraced to the Leibnitian monadology. We cannot be sure that Vico\nwas acquainted with this doctrine. In any case he does not mention\nit, while Leibniz he does mention in terms of deep respect: and the\nresemblance is very vague, for the metaphysical points are not monads.\nThe discovery by Leibniz and Newton of the differential calculus may\nhowever be said to have influenced him. It was then for the first time\nbecoming known in Italy; and its terminology of maximum infinities,\ngreater and less infinities, and so on would, says Vico, completely\nbaffle the human understanding, since the infinite admits neither of\ndegrees nor of multiplication, but for the help of a metaphysic which\nshows that all actual extension and actual movement is a power or\ncapacity for extension and motion always equal to itself and infinite.\nThe contributions of Platonic lines of thought (the Platonism of the\nRenaissance) and those of Galileo, especially the latter, to Vico's\nconception have been worked out with even more justice: his originality\nhowever is in no degree impaired by these facts.\n\nThe idea in which his originality found expression was, no doubt,\nfantastic and arbitrary, and in consequence bound to remain undeveloped\nand without influence on Vico's other conceptions. To the reviewer\nin the _Giornale dei letterati,_ who called this metaphysic a mere\nsketch, the author replied that it was quite complete: an abortion in\nfact, rather than a sketch, and, as such, complete. And in the _Scienza\nNuova,_ beside a few references to the refusal to attribute activity to\nmatter, there is one fugitive but interesting attempt at a connexion\nwith a geometrical or arithmetical metaphysic on the model of that\ndescribed above. In this passage it is stated that upon the order of\nmaterial and complex civil affairs the order of numbers, which are\nabstract and absolutely simple, is imposed: and the fact is noted that\ngovernments begin with the one, in domestic monarchy, pass to the few\nin aristocracy, advance to the many and the all in popular republics,\nand finally return to the one in civil monarchies, so that humanity\nmoves perpetually from the one to the one, from domestic monarchy to\ncivil monarchy.\n\nBut if we can and must deny all value to Vico's cosmology, if the\ncontradictions and obscurities in which he involves himself are\nmanifest, and were observed by critics of his own time, still we cannot\ndeny its dynamic nature as opposed to the mechanicism of contemporary\nphilosophy. The theory of metaphysical points, in which God appears as\nthe great geometrician who creates by knowing and knows by creating the\nrealities of the universe, is as it were a symbol of the necessity of\ninterpreting nature in idealistic language. We find here and there a\ntheologian Vico, an agnostic Vico, or even a fanciful Vico composing\ncosmological and physical romances: but look where we will among his\nworks, we shall never find a materialistic Vico.\n\nEven this by no means overbold metaphysic aroused suspicions of\npantheism, though the author insisted upon the theological doctrine\nthat God's activity is convertible _ab intra_ with the thing created\nand _ab extra_ with the fact, and that therefore the world was created\nin time; that the human soul, which as a mirror of the divine thinks\ninfinity and eternity, is not bounded by the body and therefore not\nby time, and is therefore immortal; and that man, even if God were to\nreveal it to him, cannot understand how the infinite enters into finite\nobjects. However, he thought it necessary to conclude his replies to\nhis critics by collecting statements demonstrating his orthodoxy, and\nclinching the matter with the remark that \"since God is in one sense\nsubstance and in another His creatures, and since the _ratio essendi_\nor essence is proper to substance, the created substances even as\nregards their essence are diverse and distinct from the substance of\nGod.\"\n\nVico's thought was limited by the idea of transcendence, which\nprevented him from attaining not only the unity of reality, but also\na truly complete knowledge of that world of man which he had so\npowerfully explained by means of the opposite principle. We now see why\nVico, though he did not deny the fact of progress, could have no real\nconception of it. It has been observed that the conception of progress\nis foreign to Catholicism and dates from the Protestant Reformation,\nand that therefore the Catholic Vico was bound to deny himself the\nuse of it. But the conception of an immanent providence is no less\nirreconcilable with Catholicism, and yet Vico is saturated with this\nidea. This means that he did not lack the impulse: rather he was unable\nto pass a certain point beyond which his faith would have been too\nobviously defeated. Progress, deduced from the immanent providence and\nintroduced into the New Science, would have accentuated the difference\nwithin the uniformity, the origin at every moment of something new,\nthe perpetual enrichment of the flux at every reflux: it would have\nchanged history from an orderly traversing and retraversing of the line\ndrawn by God under the eye of God to a drama whose _ratio essendi_ is\ncontained within itself: it would have enmeshed and drawn with it the\nwhole universe and realised the thought of infinite worlds. In face\nof this vision Vico paused in apprehension and stubbornly refused to\nproceed: the philosopher in him had yielded to the Catholic.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIII\n\n\nTRANSITION TO HISTORY: GENERAL CHARACTER OF VICO'S TREATMENT OF HISTORY\n\nIt is clear from the facts above discussed that the historical portion\nof the New Science could not take the shape of a history of the human\nrace in which peoples and individuals were recognised as playing each\nits own unique part in the whole course of events. To enable it to\nfulfil such a function Vico would have had to close up his system of\nthought, which was still at one point incomplete and not impervious\nto the religious idea, and to elevate his provident deity into a\nprogressive deity, determining flux and reflux as the eternal rhythm\nof the process. Or on the other hand in order to attain the vision of\nindividuality, in the diametrically opposite sense, in history, he\nwould have had to abandon his rudimentary idealistic philosophy, break\ndown the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary providence,\nand trace the history of man on the plan which God had revealed or\npermitted him to discover. Vico's orthodoxy rebelled against the former\nalternative, while his philosophy kept him from the second: and the\nresult of his dilemma was that the history he reconstructed was not and\ncould not be a universal history.\n\nIn consequence, it was not what is called a philosophy of history, if\nthat phrase is taken in its original sense of a \"universal history\n\"--one which concentrates its attention upon the broadest and\nleast obvious connexions of facts--\"philosophically narrated,\" more\nphilosophically, that is, than is usual with annalists, anecdotists and\ncompilers dealing with courts, politics and nations. The controversy\nas to whether Vico or Herder can claim to be the founder of the\nphilosophy of history must be frankly decided in favour of Herder,\nwhose work shows just that procedure of universal history which is\nlacking in the New Science. On the other hand it would be easy to\nfind numerous predecessors for Herder, beginning with the Hebrew\nprophets and the scheme of the Four Monarchies, which remained not\nonly in the Middle Ages but well into modern times the constructive\nscheme of universal history. Nor would it be out of place to add that\nthe so-called philosophy of history, in so far as it is a universal\nhistory, constitutes neither a special philosophical science nor a form\nof history capable of sharp distinction from the rest, except when the\npassion for making it self-subsistent gives it the appearance of an\nabstract history or a historicised philosophy. Thus when Vico or Herder\nis credited with the foundation of a new science in the philosophy of\nhistory, the compliment is a doubtful one: a fact which especially in\nthe case of Vico has gone far to obscure the value of their work. In\nfact, the \"New Science of the common character of nations,\" understood\nas the equivocal science of the philosophy of history, has eclipsed the\nNew Science as a new philosophy of mind and a rudimentary metaphysic of\nthought.\n\nThe conflict which for the general consciousness existed between\nscience and faith reappears in Vico's treatment of history as a\ndistinction and opposition between Jewish and Gentile history, sacred\nhistory and profane. Jewish history was not subjected, he believed,\nto the laws of history in general. Its course was unique, and its\ndevelopment proceeded on principles peculiar to itself, namely, the\ndirect action of God. The New Science, which in its philosophical\npart did not give the explanatory principles of this process, was in\nconsequence not compelled to deal with it in its historical part.\nThis is perhaps what Vico would have wished. But the wish was met,\nsetting aside the necessity of guarding against the charge of impiety,\nwhich was certainly a danger, by his scruples as a believer, and a\nconscientious believer; which urged him to look for some kind of\nharmony between the two histories, since however sharply distinguished\n(he recalled how even a Gentile writer, Tacitus, had described the Jews\nas \"unsociable\"), both alike developed under terrestrial conditions\nand had points of mutual contact, at least in the origin of mankind\nand its regeneration by means of Christianity. Following the inherent\ntendencies of his thought, Vico ought to and would willingly have\navoided the narration of universal history and confined himself\nexclusively to questions of philosophy and philology. But as it\nhappened, he was compelled now and then to depart from his programme\nand to attempt at once a unification of the two histories and a defence\nof sacred history based on arguments supplied by science and profane\nhistory.\n\nThis is the least successful, but a profoundly significant part of\nhis work. He was forced to admit, though the admission was opposed by\nall his discoveries and outraged his whole system of thought, that\nthe Hebrews had enjoyed the privilege of always keeping intact their\nmemories of the beginning of the world, a memory which other nations\nclaimed in vain; and hence sacred history must supply the true origin\nand succession of universal history. The necessity of connecting his\nviews on primitive civilisation with Biblical chronology, with the date\nusually assigned to the creation of the world, with the traditions of\na universal deluge and of a race of giants--the necessity of finding,\nas he says, the \"continuity of sacred with profane history\"--led him\nto the most extravagant flights of fancy. After the flood, in the year\n1656 from the creation, at the separation of the sons of Noah, while\nthe Hebrews began or continued their sacred history with Abraham and\nthe other patriarchs and then with the laws given to Moses by God, all\nthe other descendants of Shem, Ham, and Japhet, the first race more\nslowly and for a shorter period, the second and third with greater\nrapidity and for a longer time, lapsed into the state of nature and\nwandered over the earth as insensible and savage brutes. And while the\nHebrews, subjected to their theocratic government, strictly educated\nand practising ablution, remained of normal stature, the members of\nthe other races, living without either physical or moral discipline,\nwallowing in dirt and excrement and absorbing nitrogenous salts (just\nas the earth is enriched and made fertile by excrement), grew to\nmonstrous and gigantic size. The state of nature lasted a hundred years\nfor the Semites and two hundred for the other two races; at the end of\nwhich the earth which had long been sodden with the moisture of the\nuniversal deluge began to dry up and emit dry exhalations or fiery\nmatter into the air so as to generate lightning. With lightning, as\nwe already know, and with the mythology of the thundering sky, which\nis Jupiter, arose in these brutes the consciousness of God and of\nthemselves, by which they became human. Thus begins the \"age of the\ngods,\" which, socially, is that of domestic monarchy where the father\nis king and priest. In the course of this age the system of greater\ndeities was gradually established, and the giants, by means of their\nreligions of terror and their domestic education taming the flesh\nand developing the spiritual element in them, and by the practice of\nwashing, shrank by degrees to the normal size of the men whom we find\nat the beginning of the next or heroic age.\n\nSuch are the chief points in Vico's quaint reconstruction of the\nearliest history of man upon the earth, harmonised with the account\nin sacred history. We shall be less inclined to amusement or ridicule\nif we reflect upon the tragedy underlying the comedy: the tormented\nconscience of the believer which in its struggle with the philosopher\nseeks refuge in these extravagant ideas. At any rate, they gave Vico\na series of insecure stepping-stones--the flood, the giants, the dry\nexhalations--which enabled him to cross the torrent of religious\ntradition and reach the dry land of critical history, where he found\nthe primary starting-point of his philosophy of mind, the state of\nnature. It may further be suggested that the contact with Hebrew\nhistory--the only one which presented itself to him as a history in the\nstrict sense, a _unicum,_ something absolutely individualised even if\nin a miraculous manner--suggested to him the few attempts met with in\nhis works to assign to various peoples a special function or mission;\nthus it sometimes appeared to him that the Hebrews represented _mens,_\nthe Chaldeans _ratio,_ and the Japhetic races _phantasia._\n\nParallel to this imaginary history of the origin of the human race\non the earth is Vico's attempt at Biblical apologetics. He lost no\nopportunity of adducing proofs from profane sources to confirm the\nstatements of sacred history. For instance, a confirmation of the flood\nand the giants is supplied by the similar traditions of Greek and other\nnations. The theocratic government, which is not definitely mentioned\nby any profane history but merely alluded to obscurely by poets in\ntheir tales, is met with in the government of the Hebrews before and\nafter the flood. The Hebrews again knew nothing of divination because\nthey lived in direct contact with the true God, while the Chaldees\nhad a system of magic or divination according to the movements of the\nstars, and the European peoples a system of augury. One certainly\nfeels in all this something of an effort, a will to see or not to\nsee: a kind of self-interruption and stimulation to belief. It is not\ninfrequent among cultured and scientifically educated believers. Again,\nin his exposition of the historical genesis of grammatical forms, where\nhe says that verbs began with the imperative, the monosyllabic command\ngiven by the father to wife, child or slave (_es, sta, i, da, fac,_\netc.), Vico draws from this an indirect demonstration of the truth of\nChristianity, because the roots of Hebrew verbs are always found in\nthe third person singular of the past tense; a clear proof that the\npatriarchs must have given their commands to their families in the\nname of a single God (_Deus dixit_). This, in Vico's opinion, is \"a\nlightning to confound all those writers who have believed the Hebrews\nto be a colony proceeding from Egypt; since from the beginning of its\nfoundation the Hebrew tongue had its origin in a single God.\" But in\ntruth these lightnings instead of descending upon the head of the\nunbeliever serve only to illuminate the poverty of the arguments upon\nwhich apologetics rest, even with a man like Vico; and, objectively\nconsidered, the division introduced by religious scruple between sacred\nand profane history, and the consequent dogmatic treatment of the one,\nwith its strange hypotheses and defences, and critical treatment of the\nother, produced and still produces an irresistible impression that the\nseclusion of sacred history from human science is due to the impotence\nnot of the human science but of the sacred history; its impotence, that\nis, to preserve itself intact within the limits of science. Seldom has\na religious scruple so endangered the cause of religion.\n\nBut Vico had far too genuine and exacting a scientific sense added\nto his natural antipathies to permit him ever to become a Selden\nor a Bossuet; and hence this apologetic for and harmonisation of\nsacred history remains in him a mere episode, which it is possible to\nignore. And since on the other hand he was not permitted to treat\nphilosophy and history as entirely profane and to represent the\ncomplex movement of history according to the fundamental criterion of\nprogress, his only course was to look at the facts from the point of\nview which his philosophy left open to him, that of flux and reflux,\nthe eternal process and the eternal phases of the mind. Here lay his\nstrength. Here he could recognise the specific, if not strictly the\nindividual, character of laws, customs, poetry and myth, of whole\nsocial and cultural formations which history down to his own time\nhad entirely misunderstood. For this reason, in narrating history he\nwas bound to confine himself to emphasising the common aspects of\ncertain groups of facts belonging to various nations and periods. In\nthe New Science, he says, \"the whole history of the laws and deeds of\nRome and Greece is set forth, not in its particularity and in time,\nbut following the substantial identity of intention and diversity of\nthe modes of expression.\" Elsewhere he says, \"the facts are adduced\nafter the fashion of examples, because they are understood by means of\nprinciples,\" for \"to see the principles confirmed by the innumerable\nhost of their consequences is a thing which must await certain other\nworks of ours, which are either as yet unpublished or now in process\nof publication.\" In other words, as we know, this science contains on\nthe one hand a philosophical side, and on the other a descriptive or\nempirical, exemplified in history, in which the Romans figure not as\nRomans but in virtue of the common nature which they share with Greeks\nand possibly with Japanese; the history of Rome under the kings or in\nthe early Republican period demonstrates its affinity with that of the\nearlier centuries of the Middle Ages; and Homer stands not as Homer but\nas an example of primitive poetry, and across the centuries finds and\ngreets his brother in Dante. It is at once a strength and a limitation,\nbecause history emphatically does not fundamentally consist of these\nresemblances; but without the perception of the resemblances how could\nwe ever determine the differences? Dante is not Homer, the barons\nare not the \"patres,\" the Athenian Solon is not the Roman Publilius\nPhilo; but certainly Dante is in some respects more closely related to\nHomer than to Petrarch, the early barons are nearer to the \"patres\"\nthan to the later courtier-nobles, and Solon is more akin to a Roman\ntribune or dictator than to any other of the seven sages among whom\nhe is usually placed. To observe these resemblances means denying\nor rejecting other more superficial ones, and preparing the way for\nknowledge of individuality by indicating the approximate place where\nthe truth is to be found. Vico classifies, rather than narrates and\nrepresents; but there is classification and classification; it may be\npressed into the service of a superficial thought or of a profound one.\nAnd the historical side of the New Science is one great substitution of\nprofound for superficial classifications.\n\nIn this process, which constitutes the strength of Vico's treatment\nof history, the deficiencies and errors come not from outside the\nlimits of the process but from causes at work within these limits\nthemselves. It has been alleged in defence of Vico that a great part\nof his errors is due to the scantiness and inadequacy of the materials\nat his disposal. But the materials for any study are always scanty\nand inadequate compared to our thirst for knowledge; and in judging\na historian the question is not this, but the method, cautious or\nincautious, on which he employs the materials that are at his disposal.\nAgain, it has been said that Vico has the faults of his age; but this\nis to forget that he was born in the century which saw the development\nof the highly critical philology of Joseph Scaliger and the whole Dutch\nschool, and that Zeno, Maffei and Muratori were his contemporaries\nin Italy. The truth is that just as the attitude of thought already\ndescribed in Vico confused pure philosophical method with the\ndeterminations of empirical science and historical data, so it confused\nhistorical research with the mixture of philosophy and empirical\nscience. Vico was in a state similar to that of drunkenness; confusing\ncategories with facts, he felt absolutely certain _a priori_ of what\nthe facts would say: instead of letting them speak for themselves he\nput his own words into their mouth. A common illusion with him was to\nseem to see connexions between things where there was really none. This\nmade him turn every hypothetical conjunction into a certainty, and read\nin other writers instead of their actual words things that they had\nnever written, but which were internally spoken by himself unawares\nand projected into the writings of others. Exactitude was for him an\nimpossibility, and in his mental excitement and exaltation he almost\ndespised it: what harm can ten, twenty, a hundred errors do to what is\nsubstantially true? Exactitude, \"diligence,\" as he says, \"must lose\nitself in arguments of any size, because it is a minute, and because\nminute also a slow-footed virtue.\" Fanciful etymologies, daring and\ngroundless mythological interpretations, changes of name and date,\nexaggerations of fact, false quotations are met with throughout his\npages, and many may be found noted in the fine edition of the second\n_Scienza Nuova_ by Nicolini. Thus, as we observed in speaking of his\nphilosophy that Vico's was not an acute mind, so now in speaking of his\nhistorical work we must say that it was not critical. But as while we\ndenied him acuteness on a small scale we acknowledged his profundity\nor acuteness on a large scale, so here also we ought to add that if\nVico lacked the critical sense in small matters, in great matters he\nhad abundance of it. Careless, headstrong and confused in detail;\ncautious, logical and penetrative in essentials; he exposes his flank\nor rather his whole body to the attacks of the most miserable and\nmechanical pedant, and over-awes and inspires respect in every critic\nand historian however great. And, _totus mens_ though he is and all\nabsorbed by his own discoveries, often he does not give his power of\ninvestigation and observation time and room to develop, and instead of\nhistory he invents myths and investigates romances; but when he allows\nthe power free play, it does wonders in the field of history too, as we\nshall try to show in the following chapters.\n\nBut to judge the historical views of Vico by confronting them, as many\nhave done, with those of modern historical research and praising or\ndepreciating them accordingly would hardly be conclusive. Where the\ntwo terms of the comparison agreed the agreement might be fortuitous:\nwhere they diverged, the later doctrine might be but a development or\nconsequence of the earlier attempt, and in any case the modern state\nof historical knowledge by no means provides an absolute standard. On\nthe other hand it would be out of place, as well as beyond our power,\nto rehandle all the problems dealt with by Vico to see what there is of\ntruth and falsehood in his conclusions. That would mean no less than\nwriting a third _Scienza Nuova_ more adapted to our own times. Our task\nis merely to indicate the principal historical problems which Vico set\nbefore himself, to state the solutions he gave, and always to keep in\nmind the state of knowledge not in our own day but in Vico's, so as\nto determine what progress in historical study may be set down to his\ninfluence.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIV\n\n\nNEW PRINCIPLES FOR THE HISTORY OF OBSCURE AND LEGENDARY PERIODS\n\n\nThe period of historical research which preceded the life of Vico\nwas, as we have said, by no means credulous or uncritical. The day\nwas past when \"chronicles of the world\" were compiled, when any fable\nand any falsification however gross was accepted as history: and the\nseed sown by a few humanists had borne fruit in the Italian men of\nlearning, the French juridical school, the school of Scaliger mentioned\nabove, and all the great chronologists, epigraphists, archaeologists,\ntopographers and geographers who in the seventeenth century formed\nthe first immense critical collections of sources for ancient\nhistory. While the philologists were thus improving and perfecting\ntheir methods, detecting impostures and bridging lacunae, Bayle,\nFontenelle, Saint-\u00c9vremond and many others were engaged in spreading a\nscepticism or historical Pyrrhonism as it was also called, due to the\nintellectualistic philosophy; and thus anticipating the polemic against\nthe truth and utility of history which was to arise with immense vigour\nin the following century.\n\nThis latter tendency was hypercritical rather than critical, its end\nbeing the destruction of history in general: and since historical\nscepticism was very apt to assume the character of a paradox adapted\nto the needs of elegant society and the wits, its influence on the\nprogress of research was very small, or at most it succeeded in\nproducing strong reactions, one of which is represented by Vico, in\nfavour of tradition and authority. It is on the other hand only proper\nto observe the failings of the first seriously scientific efforts\nof philologists and antiquaries. They rehabilitated witnesses, laid\nbare falsifications, reconstructed lists of rulers and magistrates,\nconnected chronology and contradicted certain legends: but, whether\nowing to the tendencies of thought usual among pure scholars and\nphilologists or because of the general atmosphere of their century's\nculture, they neither had nor conveyed a feeling for the antique and\nthe primitive. Strong in detail, they were weak in essentials. When\none of the most brilliant grasped, for instance, the importance of\nballad-literature as a means of transmitting history at a period when\nthe use of writing was unknown or uncommon, he did not receive from\nthis observation and others like it such a shock as might stimulate him\nto recast from top to bottom his intuition and conception of primitive\nlife, as was the case with Vico, who almost in a flash grasped the\nphilosophical form of certitude and the two periods of mental and\nsocial life corresponding to it in actual history: the periods of\nobscurity and of legend.\n\nVico himself started from a kind of scepticism, a scepticism as\nregards the prejudices of scholars and nations generally about the\ncharacter and facts of antiquity: and in combating these prejudices\nhe drew up a series of principles or \"aphorisms,\" inspired apparently\nby Bacon's \"idola,\" to which they present an analogy in the field\nof historical research. Vico puts the student on his guard first\nagainst the \"magnificent opinions\" which have been held up to his own\nday \"concerning the most remote and least known antiquity\": a na\u00efve\nillusion whose origin he traces to the fact that man when in a state of\nentire ignorance erects himself into a rule for the universe. Here is\nthe closest analogy with Bacon: for this statement is precisely like\nthe class of \"_idola tribus,_\" in which thought makes itself the rule\nof things \"on the analogy of man, not of the universe\" (_ex analogia\nhominis, non ex analogia universi_). On the same observation is founded\nthe remark that \"rumour grows in its course,\" _fama crescit eundo,_ and\nTacitus's _omne ignotum pro magnifico est,_ everything unknown is taken\nfor something great. Hence arises the habit of interpreting ancient\ncustoms in the expectation of finding them similar or superior to those\nof modern civilised life. Thus Cicero admired the humanity of the early\nRomans in calling enemies in war \"guests\": not realising that the fact\nwas precisely the opposite of this, and that guests were _hostes,_\nstrangers and enemies. In the same way Seneca, by way of proving the\nduty of kindness to slaves, recalled that masters were anciently called\n\"fathers of the family\"; as if _\"patres familias\"_ might not have been\nthe very reverse of kind not only to slaves and servants but to their\nown children, regarded as on the level of slaves. The same prejudice\nled Grotius, in his desire to show the gentleness of the ancient\nGermans, to collect a great number of barbaric laws in which homicide\nwas punished by a fine of a few pence: which is on the contrary really\na proof of the cheapness of the blood of poor rustic vassals, who are\nprecisely the \"_homines_\" mentioned by these laws.\n\nIn the second place, he warns us not to trust to the \"conceit of\nnations,\" all of which, Greek or barbarian, Chaldean, Scythian,\nEgyptian, or Chinese, claimed, as Diodorus Siculus observes, to have\nfounded humanity, discovered the amenities of life, and preserved their\nmemory intact from the beginning of the world. Each of them, having\nfor several thousand years had no communication with the others which\nmight have led to the sharing of ideas, resembled in the obscurity of\nits chronology a man who sleeping in a very small chamber is misled by\nthe darkness into believing it much too large ever to touch it with\nhis hand. He who accepts these dreamer's boasts for certain knowledge\nfinds himself in the difficulty of having to choose between the various\nmemories of various nations, all of which with equal justification\nclaim to be original.\n\nBy the side of national conceit Vico placed the \"conceit of the\nlearned,\" who desire their own knowledge to be as old as the world,\nand consequently delight in fancying an inaccessible esoteric wisdom\namong the ancients, coinciding miraculously with the opinions professed\nby each one of themselves, which they dress in the garb of antiquity\nin order to enforce their acceptance. Such was the mistake not only\nof Plato, especially in the researches of the _Cratylus,_ but of all\nhistorians, ancient and modern: Vico himself had fallen into it, and\nwas therefore able to study it closely in his own case, when in the _De\nantiquissima_ he believed himself to have found in the etymologies of\nLatin words the proof of an Italian metaphysic exactly agreeing with\nhis own doctrines of the conversion of the _veruni_ with the _factum_\nand of metaphysical points.\n\nFrom these three prejudices, especially from the conceit of the\nlearned, follows the fourth, here called that of the \"sources\" or\n\"channels of culture,\" ironically called by Vico the theory of\n\"scholastic succession among nations.\" Upon this theory Zoroaster for\ninstance instructed Berosus for Chaldaea, Berosus in his turn Mercurius\nTrimegistus for Egypt, Mercurius taught Atlas the Ethiopian lawgiver,\nAtlas Orpheus the Thracian missionary, and finally Orpheus established\nhis school in Greece. Long journeys these, and easy forsooth to those\nprimitive nations which, scarcely out of the state of savagery, lived\nperched on mountains in almost inaccessible situations, unknown even\nto their neighbours! And these long journeys were undertaken with\nthe object of spreading discoveries, which any nation could make\nfor itself. If, when nations came to know each other through wars\nand treaties, they were found to agree, that was because they all\ncontained some motive of truth and sprang from the same needs of man.\nWas it necessary to suppose the Athenian or Mosaic law to have affected\nthat of the Romans, as did these \"comparers\" or delivers of laws, in\norder to explain the origin of the right recognised in Palestine,\nAthens and Rome to kill the thief by night? Was it necessary for\nPythagoras to travel spreading the doctrine of the transmigration of\nsouls, which we find as far afield as India?\n\nThere remained the prejudice of considering the ancient historians\nas best informed about primitive times: whereas in the history of\norigins they knew as little as, or less than, ourselves. As for Greek\nhistory, Vico found, or rather imagined that he found, in Thucydides,\na confession that the Greeks up to the generation preceding that\nhistorian knew nothing of their own antiquity: and he also observed\nthat it was only in the time of Xenophon that Greek historians began\nto have any precise information upon Persian affairs. Roman historians\ncommonly began with the foundation of Rome: but the beginning of Rome\nwas certainly not the beginning of the world. Rome was a new city\nfounded in the midst of a large number of small and more ancient\npeoples in Latium: and even in the case of Rome Livy refuses to\nguarantee the truth of the facts of the earlier centuries of its\nhistory up to the Punic wars, which he is in a position to describe\nmore accurately. He even confesses frankly that he does not know at\nwhat point Hannibal made his great and memorable entry into Italy,\nwhether by the Cottian Alps or the Apennines. So well informed were the\nancient historians!\n\nOwing to these and similar sceptical principles, the whole of Greek\nhistory to the time of Herodotus and of Roman down to the second Punic\nwar seemed to Vico quite uncertain, an unclaimed territory, so to\nspeak, where one might enter and take possession by squatter's right.\nHe entered armed with positive principles directly issuing from the\nnegative ones we have enumerated. For if Vico denied the credibility\nof historians distant in time from the facts they described, if\nhe discounted national pride, if he laid bare the illusions and\ncharlatanism of the learned, he nevertheless did not rest content with\nthis work of destruction. In place of the old untrustworthy method\nhe had banished, he endeavoured to supply a new, of better qualities\nand greater tenacity; a system of methods by which it was possible to\nacquire new historical documents and also to improve the study of those\nalready known. No advance in historical knowledge is in fact ever made\nexcept by thus turning from the received narrative to the document\nunderlying it, which alone has the power of confirming, correcting and\nenriching the narrative.\n\nThe first of Vico's contributions to historical method, the first\nsource for the knowledge of the earliest civilisations which he\nexposed, is the etymology of language. The usual methods of this study\nin his time were purely arbitrary: it proceeded by considering the\nsound of each syllable or letter and looking for other superficial\nresemblances, and inferring from these facts the derivation of a word\nfrom this or that language, Latin, Greek or Hebrew. But etymology\nbecomes a fruitful study only when it is remembered that language is\nthe best evidence for the ancient life of a people, the life lived\nby them while the language was in the making: and when the student\naccordingly never ceases to explain language by customs and customs\nby language. Thus the etymology of abstract words leads us into the\nheart of a purely rustic society; for _intellegere,_ to understand,\nfor example, recalls _legere,_ to collect the produce of the fields\n(hence _legumina,_ vegetables); _disserere,_ to discuss, refers to\nscattering seed; and the majority of words for inanimate things reveal\nrelations with the human body and its members, and the sensations\nand passions of man; thus \"mouth\" means any aperture, \"lip\" the edge\nof a pot, \"forehead\" and \"back\" are used for before and behind; and\nso on. Vico aimed at one science of etymology common to all native\nlanguages, composed of monosyllabic, and largely onomatopoeic roots:\nanother of foreign loan-words, introduced after nations became mutually\nacquainted: a third, of universal application, for the science of\ninternational law, from which it should appear how the same men, facts\nor objects, looked at from the different points of view of different\nnations, received different names; and finally a dictionary of mental\nwords, common to all nations, which should explain the uniform ideas of\nsubstances and the different modifications of them in national thought\nconcerning the human needs and utilities common to all, according to\nthe differences of their situation, climate, character and customs, and\nshould thus narrate the origins of the various vocal languages, all\nconverging in an ideal common language.\n\nThe second source revealed by Vico is the interpretation of myths or\nfables, which agreeably to his doctrine were not allegories, fictions\nor impostures, but the science of primitive man. In the _Diritto\nuniversale_ Vico distinguished four different and successive characters\nof the gods. At first they represented natural facts, Jupiter the sky,\nDiana the flowing water, Dis or Pluto the lower earth, Neptune the sea,\nand so on; secondly, natural human affairs, for instance, Vulcan fire,\nCeres corn, Saturn the seed; thirdly, social facts; and finally they\nrose to heaven and were translated to the stars, and terrestrial and\nhuman things were distinguished from divine. But in the two _Scienze\nNuove_ he emphasised almost exclusively the third or social meaning,\nwhich became in his eyes the original; since, he appears to have\nthought, the earliest nations were too much intent upon themselves,\ntoo much immersed in their hard and difficult life, to speculate in\nabstraction from social matters. Hence he found reflected in mythology\nthe institutions, inventions, social cleavages, class-struggles,\ntravels and warfare of primitive nations. Even in considerably advanced\nperiods Vico was hostile to naturalistic or philosophical explanations.\nThe saying \"know thyself\" attributed to the ancient sage seemed to him\nmerely a piece of advice to the Athenian democracy, to know its own\nstrength, later transferred to a metaphysical and moral sense. Beside\nthis principle of social interpretation he established another of great\nimportance: namely, that indecent meanings were inserted in myths at a\nlate and corrupt period when men interpreted early customs in the light\nof their own, or tried to justify their own lusts by fancying that the\ngods had set them the example. Hence arose the adulterous Jupiter,\nJuno as the implacable enemy of Hercules' virtue, the chaste Diana\nsoliciting the embraces of the sleeping Endymion, Apollo persecuting\nmodest maidens even to their death, Mars, not content with committing\nadultery with Venus by land, but pursuing her even into the sea, and,\nworst of all, the love of Jupiter for Ganymede and of Jupiter again,\ntransformed into a swan, for Leda. Such representations can only result\nin unrestrained vice, as happened in the case of the young Chaereas in\nTerence's comedy. But in their original shape and meaning all myths\nwere serious and austere, worthy of the founders of nations. The\npursuit of Daphne by Apollo for instance referred to the magicians or\ndiviners who arranged weddings and followed women through the woods\nwhere they were still liable to promiscuous ravishing; Venus, covering\nher nakedness with the cestus, was a modest symbol of solemn matrimony;\nthe heroes, sons of Jupiter, were not the offspring of adultery, but\nborn of permanent and solemn marriages celebrated according to the will\nof Jupiter as revealed by the diviners. To the pure all things are\npure, and impure to the impure: the forests and mountain-tops could\nnever beget the fancies of the closet and the brothel.\n\nBeside these two rich sources, language and mythology, Vico names and\nemploys a third, which he calls the \"great fragments of the ancient\nworld,\" that is to say, the memories preserved by historians and poets,\nsuch as the Egyptian tradition of the three ages of gods, heroes\nand men; the language of the gods mentioned in Homer; the thirty\nthousand names of the gods collected by Varro and referring to a like\nnumber of needs in the natural, moral, economic and civil life of the\nearliest times; the grove of Romulus, which Livy calls \"the ancient\nplan of founding cities,\" and a few other golden sayings of ancient\nhistorians. Till now these fragments had been useless for the purposes\nof science, lying as they did in dirt, confusion and incompleteness:\nbut when cleaned, restored and fitted together they conveyed valuable\ninformation. Nor did he overlook the monuments of architecture and\nsculpture, though the use he made of them was slight, and he saw that\nthey were in the long run of little practical value. He declared that\nas for the historic period the most certain documents are the public\ncoins, so for the legendary and obscure period their place is taken by\n\"certain traces remaining in marble,\" as proofs of ancient customs,\nlike the Egyptian pyramids with their hieroglyphic inscriptions and\nother fragments of the ancient world found in every region and bearing\nsimilar pictographic characters. It is also worthy of remark that he\ngives examples of arguments founded on technical observations and\nleading to conclusions in the sphere of prehistoric archaeology: as\nfor instance when he says that one early period of human life is\ndistinguished by the eating of roasted flesh, the simplest and least\nelaborate kind of food, because it requires nothing except the fire: a\nlater period by boiled flesh, which also requires water, caldron and\ntripod.\n\nOne powerful method of investigation in Vico's hands is the\ncomparative method, consisting in the comparison of better-known\nprocesses of development with those known imperfectly or in parts only,\nand the consequent reconstruction of the latter on the basis of the\nformer. So for instance the principle of heroism, revealed by evidence\nfound in Roman history, helps to explain the legendary history of the\nGreeks, to supply the deficiencies of that of Egypt and to shed light\non the unknown history of all other nations of antiquity. Without\ndenying the fact of transmission from one nation to another, Vico\npoured scorn upon the abuse of this conception, and minimised its value\nin the case of primitive societies: using in its place the idea of\nspontaneous development and endeavouring to reconstruct the process by\nthe comparative method. But he took this method in a very broad sense,\nand made use in it of materials drawn from the most widely varying\ncountries and periods. To explain for example how the thundering sky\nsuggested to primitive man the idea of a god, he mentions the fact that\nthe natives of America, when first they heard the noise and recognised\nthe deadly effects of firearms in the hands of the Spaniards, believed\nthem to be gods: the rhapsodists of the Homeric poems reminded him of\nthe singers on the quay at Naples with their ballads of Roland and the\npaladins: the transformations or metamorphoses described by the ancient\npoets resembled the tales of goblins and fairies still told by mothers\nto amuse little children, or the widely-scattered mediaeval legends of\nthe magician Merlin: he traces the mythology of the hearth down to the\ncustom of the log which in Boccaccio's time at Florence the head of\nthe family used to light upon the hearth at the new year, sprinkling\nincense and wine on it, and the Christmas-eve log among the lower\nclasses at Naples; not to mention the custom in the Neapolitan kingdom\nof counting families by \"hearths.\" He brought the serpent Python and\nall other mythical serpents into relation with the viper of the\nVisconti \"che i milanesi accampa\" (\"which calls to arms the Milanese\")\nand the hieroglyphic script with the _\"r\u00e9bus de Picardie\"_ used in the\nnorth of France.\n\nIt would be useless to look in earlier or contemporary philology\nfor clear general precedents for these principles, negative and\npositive, established by Vico for the history of obscure and legendary\nperiods. They are too closely bound up with and essential to his whole\nphilosophical thought ever to have originated apart from this thought\nitself. The rude fragments of ancient Roman laws, customs and formulae,\nthe Homeric poems, the words of the Latin language, when examined with\nunprejudiced eyes--the power which enables a man of genius to see\nthings without distortion--and worked over by a mind ready to accept\nthem in their true nature, were bound to excite in Vico, compared with\nthe learned but colourless or falsely-coloured historical research of\nhis day, a rebellion and upheaval like that which took place a century\nlater in the mind of Augustin Thierry when he saw, depicted in the\npages of Chateaubriand's poetical prose, Pharamond and his Franks,\nwith their unrestrained movements, their rude and savage arms, their\nterrible war-cries and their barbaric songs.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XV\n\n\n\nHEROIC SOCIETY\n\n\n\nAs the Franks, in the compilations of national history made by the\nJesuit colleges and other French schools, appear stripped of all\ntheir characteristic features and reduced to wise monarchs, pious\nqueens and devoted warriors of the Church, so ancient and primitive\nhistory, thanks to the rhetoric and the na\u00efve ideas of scholars, has\nbeen painted in brilliant and untrue colours of the same kind as\nthose with which Lebrun or Luca Giordano painted their pompous and\ntheatrical pictures. Kings who devoted themselves to sage counsel in\norder to aid their subjects while at the same time not diminishing the\nsplendour of their courts and the brilliancy of their happy nobles,\nphilosopher kings such as made Plato sigh for the day when philosophers\nshould rule or kings philosophise; loyal and valiant knights, eager\nto sacrifice themselves for the common welfare; statesmen who used to\naccomplish pilgrimages at speed in order to bring back from afar to\ntheir waiting citizens laws more wise than their own; good fathers of\nfamilies, admirable mothers, brave and obedient young men, loving and\nmodest maidens, every one a personification of some virtue or even of\nall virtues at once, models of human perfection: such are the figures\nwhich sanctified by their venerable antiquity fill alike volumes\nand imaginations. These are the heroes of Greek and Roman history:\nand all this splendid cloth-of-gold decoration must be torn off and\ncleared away if we would attempt to discover in the deepest recesses\nof the memory of mankind the true heroes, the heroes of reality, not\nof literature, of life, not of the stage: ignorant, superstitious,\nfierce, selfish, harsh to their families, cruel to their inferiors,\navaricious, grasping, and yet, in spite of or even because of these\nsame characteristics of barbarism, heroes: virtuous with the one kind\nof virtue possible and necessary in primitive times, the virtue of\nstrength, discipline, and a deep and uncompromising sense of religion.\n\nThe misrepresentation of the primitive hero as a wise and virtuous\nmember of a civilised society reaches its height, so far as political\nhistory is concerned, in the failure to understand the three chief\nwords which sum up the constitution of the state: king, people and\nfreedom. By a misunderstanding of the first, it is believed that the\noriginal form of the state was monarchy, the absolute monarchy which\nrests on the strength of the people and keeps in check the nobles:\nwhich is really a late development in history, if not the latest.\nInto this error had fallen Jean Bodin, whom Vico chose as the object\nof his polemic. But Bodin, more acute than other political writers,\ninvolved himself in a contradiction, because though he accepted the\ncommon error he nevertheless, observing the effects of an aristocratic\nrepublic in the supposed freedom of ancient Rome, propped up his system\nby distinguishing between state and government, and asserting that\nRome in the earliest period was popular in state but aristocratically\ngoverned; and since this prop was too weak to bear the whole weight\nof the facts he at last confessed that this republic was aristocratic\nboth in government and in state, thus contradicting the whole of his\nown doctrine as to the necessary succession of states. The truth is\nthat the kings of these earliest periods were at Rome, as at Sparta and\nelsewhere, not monarchs at all. The fathers, patricians or heroes were\nmonarchical kings only in the period of domestic monarchy, when each\nfamily lived separately; but they were kings of a special kind, subject\nto no one but God, armed with religions of terror and consecrated with\nthe most cruel penalties. On emerging from this first state, when\nthe fathers united into a patrician order, their king was simply one\nor more of themselves, the mere magistrate of the order. Hence Rome,\nafter expelling the Tarquins by a purely aristocratic revolution, did\nnot change her state at all. She preserved her kings in the shape of\ntwo consuls, \"annual kings,\" two aristocratic kings who were \"deprived\nof no single detail of the royal power.\" The two kings of Sparta had\nthe same character; they were liable like the consuls to be held\naccountable for their actions and could be condemned to death by the\nephors.\n\nAs these states had been falsely considered monarchical, so, no less\nfalsely, they had been taken as popular in character. The people\nreferred to in this way does not coincide with, in fact it excludes,\nthe plebs: the _\"populus\"_ was simply the patrician order, and freedom\nmeant simply the freedom of the patricians, the liberty of the master:\nand the \"_patria_\" was appropriately so called, because it really was\n_res patrum,_ the property of a few fathers. It is absurd to think that\nthe plebs, a horde of the most worthless labourers treated as slaves,\ncould possess the right of electing the king, and that the fathers\nconfined themselves to merely approving this election in the senate.\nThe relations between fathers and plebeians were quite other than\nneighbourly peace, mutual trust and hearty co-operation. The heroes,\naccording to a passage of Aristotle, took a solemn oath to be eternal\nenemies of the plebs: that was the form their democratic spirit took.\nAnd the \"Roman virtue\" which sets before us so many and such glorious\nexamples, gives no example of kindliness to the common people. Brutus,\nwho dedicated his house in the persons of his two sons to the cause of\nfreedom: Scaevola, who terrified Porsena by punishing his own right\nhand in the fire: the stern Manlius, who executed his own son when he\nreturned victorious through a successful breach of military discipline:\nCurtius, who leapt in full armour with his horse into the fatal chasm:\nDecius, who devoted himself for the safety of his army: Fabricius\nand Curius, who refused the Samnite gold and the kingdom of Pyrrhus:\nAttilius Regulus, who went to certain death to preserve the sanctity\nof a Roman's oath: what did these men ever do for the commons, except\nincrease their miseries by war, plunge them deeper into the waters of\nusury, and immure them more closely in the private dungeons of the\nnobles where they were flogged bare-backed like the vilest slaves?\nAnd woe to any aristocrat who allowed himself the slightest desire\nto alleviate these miseries! He was promptly accused of sedition and\ntreason and sent to his death; the fate that in Rome befel Manlius\nCapitolinus, who saved the Capitol from the fires of the Gaul, and\nyet for his democratic sympathies was thrown from the Tarpeian rock;\nthe fate that came in Sparta, the hero-city of Greece as Rome was the\nhero-city of the world, to the great-souled king Agis, the Manlius\nCapitolinus of Lacedaemon, who, for trying to lighten the burden of the\nunhappy commons by a law abolishing debts and to aid them by another\ngiving them testamentary rights, was strangled by the ephors. The\nfamous \"Roman virtue\" amazes any one who is obsessed by the modern idea\nof a virtue consisting in justice and benevolence to all mankind. What\nvirtue could live with such pride? What moderation with such avarice?\nWhat mercy with such cruelty? What justice with such inequality?\n\nThe heroes treated their own families no less harshly than the plebs.\nThe education of children was stern, rough and cruel. The Spartans, in\norder that their sons might not fear pain and death, beat them within\nan inch of their lives in the temple of Diana, so that they often fell\ndead in agonies of pain beneath their father's blows. In Greece as in\nRome it was lawful to kill innocent new-born children, a custom the\nreverse of the modern, by which the delights which surround little\nchildren shape the softer side of human nature. Wives were bought by\nthe dowries of the heroic period, a survival of which was the practice\nsolemnly observed in Rome of marriage _\"coemptione et farre\"_ (a\nsimilar custom is ascribed by Tacitus to the ancient Germans and must\nbe considered universal among barbarous peoples), and were maintained\nsimply as a necessity of nature for the procreation of children and in\nother respects treated like slaves; as can still be seen in many parts\nof the old world and almost everywhere in the new. The acquisition of\nchildren and the thrift of the wife were simply reckoned as so much\nprofit to the father and husband.\n\nThe counterpart of this political and domestic system is found in\nthe ordinary life of the period, which was innocent of all luxury,\nrefinement and ease. Pastimes were arduous, such as wrestling and\nhunting, to harden body and mind, or else dangerous, like jousting or\nhunting big game, to accustom men to think lightly of wounds and death.\nWars were carried on under a religious aspect and were always therefore\nextremely bitter. From such wars resulted the system of heroic slavery,\nby which the conquered were held to be men without God, so that they\nlost civil and natural liberty at once. Foreigners were considered\nenemies: the earliest nations were intensely inhospitable. Brigandage\nand piracy were recognised; and Plutarch says that the heroes\nconsidered it a great honour and prize of valour to be called \"robbers.\"\n\nIt was, in fine, a society immediately proceeding out of that of the\ngods, which as we know was the climax of the state of nature. In its\npassage from the prehistoric age as we should say in modern language\ninto the dawn of history it still retained much of the earlier customs,\nthose customs which Vico thinking of the lonely Polyphemus in his\ncave called \"Cyclopean rules.\" The age of gold out of which it came,\ninnocent, kindly, humane, tolerant and dutiful, as scholars and poets\nbelieved, was in reality one perpetual \"superstitious fanaticism,\"\ntormented by a continual terror of the gods, to placate whom men used\nto offer human sacrifice, traces of which remain among the historic\nPhoenicians, Scyths and Germans, the tribes of America and even the\nRomans themselves, who afterwards substituted for it the ceremony\nof throwing straw puppets into the Tiber. Even the sacrifice of\nchildren was not unknown; memories of it are preserved in Agamemnon's\nsacrifice of Iphigenia and elsewhere. But in this age of the gods,\nin spite of or by means of this cruel superstition, were founded\nthe great institutions of humanity; religious cults together with\naugurial divination, marriage and burial. Weddings, judgment-seats\nand altars, and the removal of the bodies of the dead from the reach\nof the malignant air and the wild beasts \"taught the human brutes to\nbe pious\" as Foscolo says in his _Sepolcri,_ merely versifying Vico's\nprose. These \"Cyclopes\" who conjoined and confused in themselves the\nfunctions of king, wise man (that is divination) and priest, at first\nplaced their dwellings on the heights of mountains, in places airy and\ntherefore healthy, naturally fortified, and near the perennial springs,\nwhere were the nests of eagles and vultures, the birds with which\naugury dealt. Hence the importance of water and fire, which became\nsymbols of the family; the earliest marriages were solemnised _\"aqua\net igni\"_ between parties who shared a common spring and hearth, and\ntherefore belonged to the same household; so that they must have been\nbetween brothers and sisters. The period of the cyclopes was a strongly\nmoral period. It was not true of it that \"pleasure and law were one\"\nin the sense fancied by later effeminate poets; for these men, whose\nminds like those which we may still find among the peasants of to-day\nwere insensible to the refinements of vice, found that alone pleasant\nwhich was lawful and that alone lawful which was useful. They were\njust with the justice of a savage towards his god; continent, for they\nhad made an end of promiscuous intercourse; brave, hard-working and\nhigh-spirited, as they were bound to be, surrounded as they were by\nhardships and perils. It was only later that these primeval groups of\nhumanity descended into the plains and began to till them, and then,\nfrom living inland as they did at first, travelled gradually to the\nsea, learnt the art of navigation and founded colonies.\n\nIn this way families or _gentes_ existed before states. States were in\nfact formed of families grouped into an order of _gentes maiores_ or\n\"ancient noble houses\" as they were afterwards called to distinguish\nthem from others added later to the order (for instance at the time\nof Junius Brutus, to fill the vacancies in the Roman senate after\nthe expulsion of the kings) and called _\"gentes minores.\"_ But these\n_gentes_ had within themselves an element of differentiation and\nstrife. Families were not composed, as is generally believed owing\nto the common mistake of giving modern meanings to ancient words, of\nwives and children alone; but also of slaves, _famuli,_ those who,\nbeing less strong and remaining longer in the nomadic state of nature,\nfinally \"as sometimes wild animals, driven either by extreme cold or by\nhunters, to save their life betake themselves to inhabited places\" had\nsought refuge with the stronger, in the fortresses of the fathers. In\nreturn for the protection thus granted they tilled the father's land,\nand were bound and as it were tied to them, and hence called _nexi_;\nthey followed them and served them, and therefore gained the name of\n_clientes._ The relation of slaves to fathers was the second form\nof human relation, the first being the natural one of matrimony; it\nconstituted the feudal status, which has wrongly been believed peculiar\nto a certain definite period of barbarism, the Middle Ages, whereas it\nexisted in all heroic societies, and was the eternal feudal principle\nwhence sprang all the republics of the world. As Tacitus says, speaking\nof the Germans, the chief oath of these slaves and clients was to\nguard and defend each his own master and to assign to his master's\nglory his own deeds of valour (_suum principem defendere et tueri,\nsua quoque fortia facta gloriae eius adsignare, praecipuum iuramentum\nerat_); which is one of the severest conditions of the feudal system.\nMoreover the father's children are rather confused with the slaves\nthan distinguished from them. They are distinguished by their title of\n_liberi,_ but are identified by their similar position of obedience and\nlack of separate personality.\n\nThe need felt by the fathers of securing themselves against the\nfrequent mutinies of the slaves led to the mutual alliance of fathers,\nthe patrician order and the heroic state. Of this state the slaves\nconstituted the first plebs. They had no citizen's rights, since they\nwere not citizens; no solemnities of marriage, since the auspices\nwere a monopoly of the fathers; nor the right of making wills, since\nthat right had and always kept the political character of a command.\nThey were therefore excluded from the _comitia curiata_ held by the\npatricians under arms, which survived later for dealing with sacred\nquestions; profane matters being everywhere in the earliest times, at\nRome as in Greece and Egypt, considered as sacred. The king of the\npatricians, whom we have called the magistrate of the order, was thus\nespecially their leader and general in their resistance to the slaves\nor plebeians.\n\nBut the heroes did not provide for the stability of their order by\nmeans of forcible resistance alone. Just as, when they abdicated\ntheir position of sovereignty in their respective families for one of\nsubordination to the higher sovereignty of the order, they formed a\nkind of noble or armed feudal system, so to keep their slaves more or\nless reconciled to obedience they granted them, without admitting them\nto citizenship, a kind of rustic feudalism. The origin of property is\nthus explained in a way entirely different on the one hand from the\ncharmingly poetical theory according to which men adorned with all\nthe virtues of the golden age when justice dwelt on earth, foreseeing\nthe disorder that might result from communism, themselves with kindly\narbitration marked out the limits of fields, endeavouring not to assign\nto one nothing but fertile, to another nothing but barren ground; to\none a waterless portion, to another one abounding in perennial streams:\nand different on the other hand from the \"philosophical\" origin by\na voluntary submission to the wise, or that invented by \"politician\nkings\" who derived property from violence. The granting of this rustic\nfeudalism, which might be called the first agrarian law, distinguished\nthree kinds of land-tenure: bonitary for the people, quiritary or\nnoble, supported by arms, for the fathers, and eminent, belonging\nto the whole order. And since the strength of the order rested upon\nits wealth, it did all in its power to prevent the enrichment of\nthe plebs; and in war--here we see the social motive of the \"Roman\nclemency\"--deprived the conquered of their arms only, leaving them in\nbonitary possession of their lands and imposing upon them a suitable\ntribute. For the same reason the patricians were very reluctant to go\nto war, for then the plebeian multitude gained experience of warfare\nand became dangerous.\n\nThe detachment of law from force was slow, and traces of the latter\nremained in every part of the former. In the heroic republic there\nwere at first no laws providing for the punishment of offences and\nthe restitution of private injuries; hence, failing judiciary laws,\narose the need of duels and reprisals, which perpetuated the customs\nof the age of innocence or of the gods. Poetry and history describe\nsome of these duels, which were armed judgments: for instance, that of\nMenelaus and Paris under the walls of Troy, and that of the Horatii and\nCuriatii, between Rome and Alba. It was a plan of divine providence,\nin order that between barbaric nations of scanty understanding and\nincapable of listening to reason war should not always beget war: that\nright and wrong might be to some degree determined by a belief in the\nfavour or disfavour of the gods as the cause of victory or defeat.\n\nThese ordeals by battle were accompanied and superseded by ordeals by\nverbal formulae, used in their religious habit of mind with the most\nminute and scrupulous exactitude and with care not to alter a single\nletter (_religio verborum_). Horatius, who by killing his sister fell\nunder the law \"_horrendi carminis,_\" could never have been acquitted\nby the decemvirs, however free from blame they thought him; and the\npeople acquitted him, says Livy, \"more through admiration of his valour\nthan the justice of his cause\" (_magis admiratione virtutis quant iure\ncausae_). In later days Roman law still retained this character of\nverbal precision to such a degree that it forms the crux of several\nof Plautus's comedies, in which panders are at the mercy of enamoured\nyoung men who have led them to violate some legal formula.\n\nThe private law of this society corresponded closely with its economic\nconstitution. It was an entirely natural society, confined to the\nnecessaries of life, and did not use money; hence the law knew nothing\nof contracts formed, according to the law of a later period, by mere\nconsent. All obligations were ratified by giving the hand; the first\nbuying and selling was barter; the rent of a house consisted in a\nmortgage on the soil for building it, the rent of land in planting it;\ncompanies and credit were unknown.\n\nThe material character of the first contracts and the forcible\ncharacter of early legal processes were gradually modified as time went\non, and became symbolic. As the fiction of force in marriage-rites\nrecalled the actual force with which the giants dragged the first women\ninto caves, so no less the ceremonies of _mancipatio, usucapio_ and\nvengeance had formerly been acts really performed. _Mancipatio_ was\nperformed as we said with the actual hand, that is with real force;\nfor instance, in occupation, the original source of all rights of\npossession; _usucapio_ by the permanent planting of the body upon the\nthing possessed; vengeance was originally a duel or a _\"conditio,\"_\nprivate retaliation. Then they became ceremonies or fictions:\n_mancipatio_ became a civil transference with solemn acts and phrases\n(_si quis nexum faciet mancipiumque uti lingua nuncupassit ita ius\nesto_--\"If any one makes a thing bond to him and his possession, let\nthe law be so that he publish it with his tongue\"); _usucapio_ a tenure\nwhich is supposed to last as long as life; retaliation a series of\npersonal actions accompanied by a solemn declaration of them to the\ndebtor. There were worn in the forum as many masks as there were legal\npersonalities, and under the \"person\" or mask of a paterfamilias were\nhidden all the children and all the slaves of the house. Instead of\nabstract forms, which were not yet thought of, living bodily forms were\nused. Heredity for instance was invented as mistress of hereditary\nproperty, and imagined to exist completely in every particular piece of\ninherited goods; the idea of indivisible right again, was materialised\nin the glebe or clod of earth presented to the judge with the formula\n_\"hunc fundum\"_ This ancient jurisprudence was throughout poetical;\nits fictions turned facts into falsehoods and falsehoods into facts,\nmade the unborn live, the living dead, and the dead to survive in their\nposterity. It created numbers of empty legal personalities without\nsubjects (_iura imaginaria_), rights invented by the imagination; and\nthe formulae in which the laws were expressed were called because of\ntheir strict rhythm of such and so many words \"verses\"_--carmina._\nThe fragments of the Twelve Tables, if carefully considered, end their\nsentences for the most part in an Adonian verse, which is ultimately\na fragment of the hexameter metre; and Cicero, realising this, begins\nhis \"Laws\" with the sentence _Deos caste adeunto pietatem adhibento._\nCicero also tells us that the Roman boys used to sing the laws of the\ntwelve tables \"like a regular song\" (_tanquam necessarium carmen_), and\nAelian says the same of the Cretan children and the laws of Minos. The\nEgyptian laws according to one tradition were \"poems of the goddess\nIsis,\" and those given by Lycurgus to the Spartans and by Draco to the\nAthenians were formulated in verse. The whole of the ancient Roman\nlaw was a \"serious poem,\" or as Vico says elsewhere a \"kind of Roman\ndrama,\" _poema quoddam dramaticum Romanum,_ performed by the Romans in\nthe forum; and ancient jurisprudence was a \"severe poetry.\"\n\nThis poetic atmosphere in heroic society and this metrical tendency\nin its language are facts borne out by many witnesses and proofs, by\nthe observations and conjectures of scholars and by the narrations of\ntravellers and missionaries. Hebraists are divided upon the question\nwhether Hebrew poetry is metrical or rhythmical; but Josephus, Origen\nand Eusebius are in favour of metre, and St. Jerome asserts that a\ngreat part of the book of Job is in hexameter verse. The Arabs, who had\nno knowledge of writing, preserved their language down to the time when\nthey overran the eastern provinces of the Greek empire by handing on\nthe memory of their national poems. The Egyptians wrote the lives of\nthe dead in verse; the Persians and Chinese committed to verse their\nearliest history, as also, according to Tacitus, the Germans and,\naccording to Justus Lipsius, the Americans. And since of these two last\nnations the former was only known to the Romans late in their history\nand the latter to Europe at the end of the fifteenth century, there\nis good reason to suppose that the same is true of all other barbaric\nnations ancient and modern.\n\nThe earliest metre, found not only in Greece but in Assyria, Phoenicia\nand Egypt, was the heroic or hexameter. Owing to the slowness of\nthought and the difficulties of pronunciation it was bound at first\nto have a spondaic character (hence the final foot in the line was\nalways a spondee) and only later when mind and tongue became more\nactive did it admit the dactyl. Then, when this activity still further\nincreased, arose the iambic (_pede praesto_ as Horace calls it) which\napproximates most nearly to prose; so much so, indeed, that the early\nprose writers before Gorgias practically used the iambic metre of\npoetry, and prose frequently passed over into iambic verse. Tragedy was\ncomposed in iambics, a metre which is naturally adapted to it, produced\nas it was to give expression to wrath, according to the story which\nmakes Archilochus invent it to express his anger against Lycambus;\nand if comedy afterwards adopted the same metre, it was only by the\n\"meaningless following of example,\" not because the iambic metre was\nnaturally suited to it as it was to tragedy.\n\nThe primitive language of these societies was poetical not only\nthrough its use of metre but also by being composed through and\nthrough of lively metaphors, vivid fancies, striking resemblances,\napt comparisons, expressions by means of cause or effect, whole or\npart, elliptic or pleonastic figures of speech, onomatopoeisms or\nimitations of sounds by words, abbreviations, compound words, minute\ncircumlocutions, characteristic epithets, contortions in syntax and\nepisodes. All these are ways of making oneself understood devised\nby men ignorant of the precise words required, or of a word, if in\nconversation, understood by both parties. The episode is characteristic\nof women and peasants, who are unable to select what they need and\nomit what is alien to their subject; contorted language is the result\nof inability to express oneself directly, or of being prevented from\ndoing so, as may be seen in the case of irascible or contemptuous\npersons, who make use of the nominative and oblique cases but do not\nutter verbs. The very words of these languages taken one by one reveal\nin the frequency of their diphthongs a trace of the song out of which\nspeech arose; and this abundance of diphthongs still remains in the\nGreek and French languages, which passed rapidly and prematurely from\nthe age of spontaneity to that of reflection. The German language\nwould certainly offer a rich store of heroic forms, with its abundance\nof compound words which so happily translate those of Greek, and its\nsyntax which exceeds Latin in complexity as Latin does Greek. If German\nscholars, says Vico several times with a wistful glance at a field of\nstudy closed to himself, would use the principles of the New Science in\nresearch upon the origins of their language, they would certainly make\nwonderful discoveries.\n\nThe conception of the universe prevalent among the men of this period,\nand the histories of themselves which they related, of their origins,\nwarfare and fortunes, were also poetical, or rather mythical. It was\neven the case as we have seen that their conceptions in the sphere\nof social history preceded those of a cosmological, physical or\npsychological character. By a rigid application of this principle Vico\ndeveloped his doctrine of \"natural theogony,\" arising naturally in the\nimagination on the occasion of certain human needs and utilities: the\ngenesis of the twelve greater Gods, _Di maiores,_ that is to say,\nthe gods invented by the _gentes maiores_ and, to a great extent,\nbrought by them to the foundation of the state. Jupiter or the sky,\nwith his language of lightning, was the author of the first laws of the\nfamily; Juno symbolised marriage, Diana matrimonial chastity, Apollo\nthe light of civilisation; Vulcan, Saturn and Cybele were respectively\nthe fire with which the forests were burnt to make clearings, the\nsowing of seed and the tilling of land; Mars symbolised the warfare\nof the heroes _\"pro aris et focis,\"_ and Venus civilised beauty. In\naddition to this celestial Venus arose a plebeian Venus to whom was\ngiven the attribute of doves; not as typifying the passion of love, but\nbecause they were _\"degeneres\"_ common birds in comparison with the\neagle. A double signification, patrician and plebeian, was given in\nthe same way to Vulcan and Mars. The stormy relations of the fathers\nwith the slaves, the struggles and penalties referred to in the myths\nof Tantalus and Sisyphus, begin to be reflected in the twelve greater\ngods. Hercules, struggling with Antaeus, signifies the nobles of the\nheroic cities, and Antaeus the mutinied slaves led back into the\nprimitive cities on the mountain-tops (Antaeus lifted up into the air)\nand overcome and bound down to the earth, that is to say forced back\nto their servile labour. The birth of the tenth divinity, Minerva,\nexpresses the weakening and diminution of the heroic power, since the\nplebeian Vulcan (the mutinied slaves) strikes the head of Jupiter with\nan axe, the tool of a servile art. Mercury represents the granting of\nbonitary rights to the plebs and the maintenance of quiritary rights\nby the fathers. The last of the twelve deities, Neptune, arose when\nthe peoples descended to the sea-coast; and the legends of Minos, the\nArgonauts, the Trojan war, the return of Ulysses, Europa and the bull,\nthe Minotaur, Perseus and Theseus refer to colonisation and piracy.\nThe mythological interpretation of history does not cease with the\nfoundation of states. The founders of civilisation, Zoroaster and\nMercurius Trimegistus, Orpheus and Confucius, even if they are not\nstrictly gods, are at least poetical characters. Aesop is typical of\nthe _\"socii\"_ or slaves of the heroes and hence is represented as ugly,\nthat is, devoid of civilised beauty (_honestas_); and his fable of the\nlions' society shows to perfection the real relation of the heroes to\ntheir slaves, in which the latter share the toils, but not the spoils.\nDraco, of whom Greek historians tell us nothing but that he imposed\na stern code of laws, symbolises the cruelty of the heroes to their\nslaves. Solon was either a party-leader of the Athenian plebs, or else\na simple personification of the plebs itself, considered from the point\nof view of its vengeance. In the history of Rome we find poetical\nfigures in Romulus, to whom were ascribed all the laws of the orders;\nin Numa, author of the laws dealing with sacred matters and religious\nceremonies; in Tullus Hostilius, who organised and legislated for the\nmilitary system; in Servius Tullius the author of the census (which\nhas been imagined, contrary to all historical truth, the foundation\nof a popular republic, whereas it was really the foundation of an\naristocratic); and in Tarquinius Priscus, who invented insignia of rank\nand military uniforms; lastly, the Decemvirs and the Twelve Tables are\nturned into poetical figures, since to these events and persons were\nascribed a great number of laws favourable to liberty and really dating\nfrom a later period.\n\nThus, before philosophers began to elaborate the system of myths by\ncreating new ones when they believed they were interpreting the old\n(Plato for instance introduced into the myth of Jupiter the idea of\nthe omnipresent and all-pervading ether, his own invention, and other\nphilosophers saw in the birth of Minerva from the head of Jupiter a\ndescription of the divine wisdom, or in Chaos and Orcus the confused\nmass of the universal seeds of nature and the primitive matter of\nthe world), poet-theologians had expressed their ideas in mythology,\nideas in which the metaphysical and physical elements were very small,\nbut containing a large nucleus of human and political fact. The Chaos\nof these theologian-poets was the confusion of human seed during the\nperiod of brutal community of women; it was confused because devoid of\nhuman regulation, obscure because devoid of the light of civilisation.\nThe misshapen monster Orcus devoured everything because men in this\ncommunity had no human shape, and were absolved by the void, because\nthrough the impossibility of knowing their offspring they left no trace\nof themselves behind. The four elements of the world corresponded to\nthe four elements of social life: the air where Jupiter lightened,\nthe water of the perennial springs, the fire that burnt the forests,\nand the earth, the scene of man's labours. Being and subsisting were\nconceived the former as the act of eating (peasants still say of a\nsick man, meaning that he is not dead yet, that he is \"still eating\")\nand the latter as \"standing upon one's feet.\" The composition of the\nbody was analysed into solids and liquids, that of the soul into\nair: generation into the act of _\"concipere\"_ or _\"concapere,\"_ that\nis, taking hold of neighbouring material bodies, overcoming their\nresistance and adapting and assimilating them to one's own nature: and\nall the internal functions of the soul were ascribed to the head, the\nbreast or the heart.\n\nCosmographical ideas were narrow, confined as they were to the life\nof these societies. The first heaven was placed no farther off than\nthe tops of the mountains, where the giants saw the lightning play:\nthe lower world was no deeper than a ditch, and was only by degrees\nenlarged and sunk into the valleys as opposed to the sky, that is to\nsay to the mountain-tops; the earth was identified with the limits\nof the cultivated fields. In the course of time the sky, the object\nof contemplation from which auguries were drawn, was lifted to a\ngreater height, and with it the gods and heroes who were attached to\nthe planets and constellations; and thus arose poetical astronomy.\nGeographical knowledge extended no farther than the country inhabited\nby each nation; and this is the reason why peoples travelling into\nforeign and distant lands gave to the new cities and to the mountains,\nhills, passes, islands and promontories the same names which were\nborne by those of their native land. Asia or India was at first for\nthe Greeks the eastern part of Greece itself, Europe or Hesperia its\nwestern, and Thrace or Scythia its northern district.\n\nBut we will not enter into further details; indeed we have omitted much\nalready. It is not the detail that gives its value to Vico's picture\nof the heroic age. His etymologies, his mythical interpretations, the\ngenesis and chronological succession of his gods, the genesis and\nsuccession of his phonetic, metrical and stylistic forms--each, taken\nby itself, may be contested; but taken as a whole they are rich with\na truth which transcends the single propositions. This truth is the\nmighty effort to recall a form of humanity and society still doubtless\nliving in surviving records and monuments, still recognisable here and\nthere in a fragmentary form in various parts of the modern world; but\nfor centuries, even in Vico's days, buried beneath a mass of irrelevant\nfancies, conventional types, and prejudices of every kind, which\nprevented its true characteristics from appearing.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVI\n\n\nHOMER AND PRIMITIVE POETRY\n\n\nThe poet of primitive society was Homer: and if such was his character,\nhe could not have enjoyed the profound wisdom, the delicate and lofty\nsense of morality, and the supreme knowledge of all the sublimest\narts and sciences which ancient philosophers and writers fancied him\nto possess, and the common opinion of literary men and critics still\nattributed to him in the seventeenth century.\n\nWhat an extravagant philosopher Homer would have been, if he had\nindeed been a philosopher: how miserably, had he set out to do so,\nwould he have organised Greek civilisation! His Jupiter indicates\nforce, brute force, as the standard of the respect due to him; his\nMinerva despoils Venus, knocks Mars down with a stone, strikes Diana\nand is in turn insulted by Mars; and both Venus and Mars are wounded\nby Diomed, a mere mortal. The heroes Achilles and Agamemnon exchange\ninsults such as would hardly be used by servants in a comedy to-day:\nthey call each other \"dogs\" and quarrel in the most uncivil manner for\nthe possession of Briseis and Chryseis. Ferocious in their customs,\nthey leave the bodies of their enemies to dogs and crows: intemperate\nin their pleasures, they drink to excess. Lofty intelligence, kindness\nof heart, balance of mind may be sought in vain in all their actions\nand sentiments. The fact is, these heroes show themselves men of the\nscantiest understanding, the wildest imagination, the most violent\npassions; boorish, barbarous, intractable, fierce, arrogant, defiant\nand obstinate in their resolves and at the same time flighty in the\nextreme, at the mercy of any new object that presents itself to\ntheir eyes. Here again, the most striking parallel may be found in\nthe psychology of the peasant, who as may be seen every day embraces\nany reasonable motive proposed to him but owing to the weakness of\nhis intellect soon abandons the idea he has been persuaded to adopt\nand slips naturally back to his first intention. In the same way the\nHomeric heroes sometimes acquiesce in the first word of opposition\noffered to them; sometimes at a sudden mournful recollection they burst\ninto bitter lamentation in the midst of their anger: or else, if while\nin the greatest misery they meet with something pleasant, like Ulysses\nat the feast of Alcinous, they lose all memory of their sorrows and\nbecome completely cheerful; or else, when in a calm and peaceful state\nof mind, they take offence at a harmless word and flying into a blind\npassion threaten the speaker with a cruel death. Even the virtues which\nthey possess in an eminent degree, their frankness, vigour, magnanimity\nand generosity, are tinged with this same character of unreflective\npassion.\n\nThe hero of heroes, Achilles, who bears on his shoulders the destinies\nof Troy, owing to a private wrong he had received from Agamemnon--a\ngrave wrong, but an insufficient motive for the ruin of his country and\nhis whole nation--condemned all the Greeks to defeat and destruction\nat the hands of Hector; and he only determined to aid them in order\nto assuage the personal grief caused by Hector's slaying his friend\nPatroclus. If only this extreme aloofness had been due to passion and\njealousy! But though when Agamemnon deprived him of Briseis he made\nenough noise to fill heaven and earth and supply the plot of the entire\n_Iliad,_ yet he never in the whole course of the poem shows a spark\nof real love: just as Menelaus mustered the whole of Greece against\nTroy to avenge the rape of Helen but never suffers the least pang of\njealousy against Paris who is enjoying her. So devoid is Achilles of\ncommon humanity, that when Hector wishes to arrange that the victor in\nthe fight shall bury the vanquished, he forgets that they are equals in\nrank and that death levels all, and savagely answers: \"When have men\never made a truce with lions, and when have wolves and lambs had the\nsame wish?\" and he adds, \"If I slay thee, I will drag thee bound naked\nto my chariot round the walls of Troy three days\" (as he actually did\nin the sequel) and finally, \"I will give thee to my hounds to devour.\"\nAnd he would have carried out his threat, had not the unhappy father\nPriam come to him to ransom the corpse. But even in this deeply-moving\ninterview, when he has received Priam in his tent after the latter has,\nescorted by Mercury, passed alone through the midst of the Greek camp,\nwhen he has welcomed him to his table, at a single involuntary word\nthat falls from the lips of the unhappy old man as he bewails the loss\nof so valiant a son Achilles forgets the sacred law of hospitality;\nand, ignoring the full and complete trust which Priam had placed in\nhim, untouched by the terrible misfortunes of such a king, by the\nrespect due to a father and the veneration due to so old a man, without\nreflecting on the reversal of his fortunes, of all things the most apt\nto excite pity, flies into a bestial rage and shouts a threat that he\n\"will cut off his head\"! Death itself does not end his anger at the\nloss of Briseis, were it not that the beautiful and unhappy princess\nPolyxena, daughter of the once rich and powerful Priam and now a\nwretched slave, is sacrificed on his tomb, that the shade glutted with\nrevenge may drink the last drop of her innocent blood; and in the lower\nworld, when Ulysses asks him what state he prefers, Achilles answers\nthat he \"would rather be the commonest slave, but alive\"! Such is the\nhero whom Homer adorns with the permanent epithet of \"without reproach\"\n(\u1f00\u03bc\u03cd\u03bc\u03c9\u03bd) and celebrates in the hearing of Greece as a pattern of\nheroic virtue. Such a hero, whose reasoning powers are concentrated in\nhis spear-point, can only be classed with those self-satisfied persons\nof whom we say nowadays that they are too fine to breathe the common\nair.\n\nIf Homer's greatest characters are so discordant with our civilised\nnature, the similes which he uses are drawn from savage beasts and wild\nnature generally. If the life which he represents--a life of children\nin its intellectual futility, of women in its imaginative vigour, and\nof headstrong youths in the violence of its passion--and the tales\nof which the _Odyssey_ is full, tales worthy of an old woman engaged\nin amusing children, prevent our attributing any esoteric wisdom to\nHomer, the striking success of these wild similes is certainly not\ncharacteristic of a mind tamed and civilised by philosophy of any sort.\nNor could that truculent and savage style in which he describes the\nvarious sanguinary battles, the diverse and extravagantly bloodthirsty\nspecies of butchery which especially go to make the sublimity of the\n_Iliad,_ have originated in a mind humanised and softened by philosophy.\n\nBut who was Homer? What opinions as to him can we find in ancient\nwriters, and what facts can we draw from his poems? An unprejudiced\nreader of the _Iliad_ and _Odyssey_ is at every step aware of and\nbaffled by extravagant and inconsistent statements. The life portrayed\nis inconsistent: it takes us now here, now there, over a long period\nof time; on the one hand we find Achilles the hero of force, on the\nother Ulysses the hero of wisdom: on the one hand, cruelty, barbarism,\nferocity and brutality, on the other the luxury of Alcinous, the\ndelights of Calypso, the pleasures of Circe, the songs of the Sirens\nand the pastimes of suitors who tempt and even win over the chaste\nPenelope. On the one hand we are shown boorish and uncivilised\nmanners, on the other jewels, magnificent clothing, exquisite foods\nand the arts of sculpture in bas-relief and metal-founding; on the one\nhand a strictly heroic society, on the other some signs of popular\nliberty. This delicate life fits ill with the savage and cruel life\nwhich especially in the _Iliad_ is ascribed to the same heroes at the\nsame time. To regard them thus as contemporaneous is an impossibility.\nFrom the customs of the Trojan period we have leapt abruptly into\nthose of the time of Numa, to such an extent that \"_ne placidis coeant\ninmitia_\" we are compelled to suppose that the two poems were the work\nof many hands extending over many ages. The geographical allusions are\nequally inconsistent. These, no less, bring us into varied and distant\nphysical surroundings. The scene of the _Iliad_ lies to the east of\nGreece, inclining to the northward: that of the _Odyssey_ in the west,\ninclining to the southward. The language, again, is inconsistent. The\nconfusion of dialects persists in spite of the revision of Aristarchus,\nand has been explained by the most extraordinary hypotheses, such as\nthe theory that Homer drew the elements of his vocabulary from all the\nvarious Greek nationalities.\n\nPassing from the poems to the traditions of their author, the lives\nof Homer by Herodotus (if Herodotus really wrote it) and Plutarch\nare valueless. The most elementary facts about Homer are unknown: it\nis precisely concerning the man whom they considered the greatest\nluminary of Greece that the ancients leave us most completely in the\ndark. We know neither Homer's date nor his birthplace: each one of\nthe Greek peoples claimed him as their citizen. It is said indeed\nthat he was poor and blind, but it is just these details which excite\nour suspicion, as our laughter is aroused by the argument of Longinus\nwhich makes the _Iliad_ the work of his youth and the _Odyssey_ that\nof his old age. It would be indeed remarkable if such knowledge were\ncurrent concerning a man in whose case the two trifling details of\ntime and place were unknown! Above all, criticism must ask how a single\nman could ever have composed two poems of such a length at a time when\nwriting was not in existence: since the three inscriptions of heroic\nage, one of Amphitryon, another of Hippoco\u00f6n and a third of Laomedon\nmentioned with an excess of good faith by Vossius are mere forgeries\nlike those made by the strikers of false coins.\n\nAll these considerations led Vico to suspect that Homer himself was not\na real person but one of those poetic characters to whom the ancient\nworld ascribed long series of actions, works and events. If we try to\nconceive the Homeric poems not as the work of an individual but as\ntwo great storehouses of the manners and customs of earliest Greece,\ncontaining the history of its natural law and heroic period; if instead\nof a single poet we imagine a whole nation of poets, and instead of a\nsingle act of creation, a national poetry developing in the course of\ncenturies, everything falls into its place and finds an explanation.\nThe extravagance of the legends is explained by the fact that the\ncomposition of the _Iliad_ and _Odyssey_ falls in the third period of\ntheir existence. In the hands of the theological poets they were true\nand severe, by the heroic poets they were altered and corrupted, and\nin this corrupt state they were incorporated in the two poems. The\nvariety of customs is explained if we consider the various periods of\ncomposition, and so also the \"young Homer\" and \"old Homer,\" which are\nsymbolic of the earlier and later periods of primitive Greece. The\ndiversity of sites assigned to his birth and death and the variety\nof his dialects are accounted for by the fact that different peoples\nproduced the lays. Finally, it is explained why every Greek people\nclaimed him as a citizen, just because these peoples were themselves\nHomer; and why he was called blind and a beggar, because such were\nas a rule the singers who went about from fair to fair reciting their\ntales. Thus in order to be rightly understood Homer must lose himself\nin the crowd of Greek peoples and be considered an idea or heroic\ncharacter; a type of the Greeks in so far as they narrated tales in\nballad form. Thus facts which had only caused confusion and lacked\nplausibility in Homer as then understood became natural and necessary\nelements of the Homer now rediscovered. Above all, this latter Homer\ndeserves the high praise of being the first of all historians of\nGreece known to us. In Homer we have a proof of the original identity\nof history and poetry, and a confirmation of Strabo's assertion that\nbefore Herodotus, before even Hecataeus of Miletus, the history of the\nGreek peoples was written by their poets. In two golden passages of the\n_Odyssey_ a man is praised for having told a story well and said to\nhave \"told it as a musician and a singer.\"\n\nVico did not undertake a detailed investigation into the way in which\nthe Homeric poems were elaborated. He seems however to incline towards\ntwo chief poet-authors, one, a native of the east of Greece, towards\nthe north, for the _Iliad,_ the other for the _Odyssey,_ a native of\nthe west towards the south: and by the title \"Homer\" he understands a\ncomposer and compiler of legends. But on the other hand, owing to the\npurely ideal meaning which this name has for him, we must not rule out\nthe interpretation that the two Homers in their turn may be two streams\nof poetry and two groups of peoples or of popular singers. The historic\nfigures whom Vico finds before him are the rhapsodes, men of the people\nwho wandered independently about the fairs and festivals of the Greek\ncities reciting the songs of Homer. From the time of their primitive\ncomposition long ages elapsed before the Pisistratidae had them\ndivided and arranged into two groups, the _Iliad_ and the _Odyssey,_ a\nfact which shows clearly that in their time only a confused mass of\nmaterial was to be found, and decreed that they should henceforth be\nsung by the rhapsodes at the Panathenaea.\n\nIt is however certainly not in the resolution, materially understood,\nof the individual Homer into a myth or poetic character that the\nimportance of Vico's theory lies: and the same is perhaps the case\nwith its truth. From the inconsistencies observed by him, and not\nalways accurately observed (which are moreover unimportant, since\nthe inaccuracies he notes might easily be balanced by the correct\nstatements he omits), there was no strictly logical passage to the\ndenial of the existence of an individual Homer, the principal author\nof one or both poems. These inconsistencies might serve to demonstrate\nthat the poet or poets were working upon a rich fund of traditional\nmaterial, of origin very various both as to time and place, and not\nregularly stratified according to origin, but having its strata\nconfused and contorted. One or more poets, or even many poets and an\nable compiler of their lays, or a society of able compilers: these and\nsimilar hypotheses might equally well have been suggested, as happened\nlater, and supported, as was later the case, by arguments neither more\nnor less cogent, because incapable of documentary proof. But underlying\nthis resolution of Homer into a poetic character, as it underlay other\nresolutions made or attempted by Vico, lay the discovery of the long\nand laborious historical genesis through which the matter of these\npoems had passed, so that in this sense they might really be called a\nproduct of collaboration on the part of the whole Greek people. The\nsubstitution of a nation of Homers for a single Homer was only another\ncase of mythology constructed according to the principles discovered\nby Vico himself: mythology which must be retranslated into scientific\nprose. In the same way Vico's analysis of the customs described in the\nHomeric poems may be, and is, not only here and there adulterated with\na few inaccuracies, but is on the whole exaggerated and one-sided.\nStill, this analysis taken as a whole was a great advance and opened\nnew paths to Homeric criticism. How could the stubborn illusion of the\nnoble Homeric hero, a great lord and a good ruler, a shining example\nof all civil, military and domestic virtues, be dispelled except by\nsetting against it the picture of a boorish Achilles, full of elemental\npassions, violent, stubborn, unreasoning, quick to a generous impulse\nbut no less quick to outbursts of brutal wrath?\n\nVico's progress in artistic appreciation of the Homeric poetry was\nno less marked. The recognition that a sound and rational philosophy\nwas not to be found in the poet Homer would, in the mouth of any\nother critic of the time, have amounted to a slur on the poet: as\nexpressed by Vico and as the consequence of his new aesthetic ideas it\nwas a compliment. The errors which intellectualism and neo-classical\ncriticism discovered in Homer led the critics to repeat freely the\nsaying of Horace that \"good Homer nods at times\": whereas Vico on\nthe contrary exclaims \"if he had not nodded so often he would never\nhave been good!\" (_nisi ita saepe dormitasset, nunquam bonus fuisset\nHomerus_). Homer was a great poet precisely because he was not a\nphilosopher. He had a retentive memory, a strong imagination and a\nsublime mind; and neither the philosophies nor the arts of poetry\nand criticism which came after him could ever produce a poet at all\nlike him. He was the only poet who could conceive heroic characters:\nhis comparisons are incomparable, his speeches sublime, expressive\nof the individuality of the speaker, and created by the power of a\nvivid imagination: his diction is clear and splendid, his language\ncomposed entirely of similes, images and comparisons, and has none of\nthose ideas of genus and species by which things are intellectually\ndefined. He is not delicate but grand, for delicacy is a small virtue\nand grandeur naturally despises small things: or even, just as a great\nand rushing torrent cannot help the turbidness of its water, and must\nperforce sweep rocks and trees with it in the violence of its course,\nso too in Homer we may find things of no value. But the torrent with\nall its impurities sweeps on its way superb and impetuous; and Homer in\nspite of and partly because of his ruggedness is for ever the father\nand prince of all sublime poets.\n\nThis new departure in Homeric criticism brought with it implicitly a\ncomplete revolution in the history of ancient literature. But on this\nsubject Vico made only a few scattered remarks. He was no specialist:\nhe did not write from a specialist's point of view, and too often when\ndocumentary evidence and thought were unable to solve a difficulty he\nsolved it by means of his fancy, a faculty which was however in his\ncase radiant with gleams of insight. Thus, the cyclic poets were not\nso called because of the circle of listeners in the centre of which\nthey declaimed their poems, like the \"Rinaldi\" or ballad-singers whom\nVico saw on the quay at Naples, and this circle had no connexion with\nthe _vilem patulumque orbem_ of Horace: but the observation that they\ndiffered little from these ballad-singers was sound. In the same way,\nwe need not linger on his guesses at the dates of Homer and Hesiod,\nnor need we take literally his division of lyric poetry into three\nperiods, namely those respectively of religious hymns, funeral chants\nfor dead heroes and melic lyrics or \"musical airs,\" the last including\nPindar, and admired, flourishing as it did at the epoch of the \"pompous\nvirtue\" of Greece, at the Olympic games where these poets sang. But\nstill Vico has here put his finger on the difference between primitive\nand refined or cultured lyric poetry. The origin of tragedy he ascribes\nto the dithyramb or dramatic satire, of which no example has come down\nto us, and in rural customs compared by him to those which were still\nin evidence during his own lifetime in Campania at vintage season; and\nhe notes the relation between tragedy and the epic. Tragedy had its\nrude beginnings at a time when the heroic spirit was already dead:\nit perfected itself by becoming subordinate to the Homeric poetry,\nderiving its inspiration from Homeric characters and avoiding original\nones. The old comedy was closely related to tragedy. Like the latter\nit was derived from a chorus, and it preserved its archaic character\nin that it displayed living persons and real actions. The new comedy\non the other hand was marked off by a profound change of spirit. Here\nthe effects of philosophy were directly felt. Imaginative genera were\nsuperseded by intelligible and rational universals: and Menander and\nthe other poets of the new comedy, living in the most humane period\nof Greek history, took their intelligible genera from human life and\ndepicted them in their comedies, over which one feels that the breath\nof Socratic philosophy has passed. The persons of the new comedy were\ncast in a mould, and were not public but private characters: and as\nthe chorus represents the public and argues about public affairs only,\nthere is no room for it in the new comedy. About this time began the\npractice of inserting idealised heroes of perfect morals into poetry.\nAristotle, remembering the strongly individualised characters of\nHomer, still maintained as a principle of poetic composition that\nthe heroes of tragedy should be neither very good nor very bad, but\nrather a mixture of great virtues and great faults. But the poets of\nthe late period, making use of the idea originated by philosophers,\nformed a \"heroism of virtue\": a heroism which may be called \"gallant.\"\nAccordingly they either invented entirely new legends or else used old\nlegends which had originally presented themselves to the founders of\nthe nation in an appropriately stern and severe form, but softened them\nby adapting them to the softening of manners. Equally gallant is the\n\"shepherd\" of the Greek Bucolic poets, Bion and Moschus, \"wasting away\nwith the most delicate love,\" He makes the general observation on Greek\nand Latin literature, that the boundary between verse and prose was so\nstrictly guarded on both sides that no ancient writer ever composed\nboth orations and poems--a rule to which perhaps the only exception\nis the wretched verses (_ridenda poemata_) of Cicero: and Vico tried\nto explain this fact by the democratic habits which compelled orators\nstudiously to avoid the cultivation of lofty and fanciful modes of\nexpression, which would have puzzled the people and hindered their full\nand clear comprehension of the point at issue.\n\nVico does not treat Roman literature so fully as Greek, which provided\nhim with much more primitive documents. But he detected certain\nanalogies between the origins of Latin and Greek literature. The first\npoets and authors in the Latin language were the Salii, sacred poets;\nand this was natural in the beginning of a nation's culture; for in the\nprimitive religious period the gods are the only object of praise. And\njust as the earliest fragments of Latin known to us, the remains of\nthe hymns of the Salii, give an impression of hexameter verse, so the\nsame metre is felt in the records of Romans who celebrated triumphs,\nsuch as the _\"duello magno dirimendo, regibus subiugandis\"_ of Lucius\nAemilius Regillus and the _\"fudit fugat prosternit maximas legiones\"_\nof Acilius Glabrio. The first Roman poets, too, sang true stories: this\nwas the case with Livius Andronicus and his Romanid containing the\nannals of early Rome, and with Naevius, and later Ennius, who described\nthe Punic wars. Satire also was levelled against real and for the most\npart notorious persons. The Romans however differed from the Greeks\nin advancing with a more measured step and not making the swift and\nabrupt transition from barbarism to effeminacy: so that they entirely\nlost the history of their gods (which Varro called the \"obscure period\"\nof Rome) and preserved their heroic history, extending down to the\nPublilian and Petelian laws, in common speech only. In its greatest\nmanifestations the literature of Rome is the work of cultivated poets\nlike Virgil, whom Vico admires for his profound knowledge of heroic\nantiquity, but says of him that so far as poetical power is concerned\nhe is not to be compared with Homer; a verdict agreeing with that of\nPlutarch and Longinus, but in opposition to the view of neo-classical\ncriticism. Another example of cultivated and reflective poetry is to\nbe found in Horace, who like Pindar in the pompous period of Greece\ncomposed his odes at the most \"ostentatious\" epoch of Roman history,\nthe Augustan age.\n\nThe Biblical literature would have given Vico materials of great value\nfor the study of primitive poetry; and he actually did move a few steps\ntowards it when he observed that poetry was the primitive language of\nall nations \"including the Hebrews\"; and that Moses made no use of the\nesoteric wisdom of the Egyptian priests and wrote his history \"in a\nstyle which has much in common with that of Homer and often surpasses\nhim in sublimity of expression.\" But Vico drops the subject at once, as\nif he instinctively guessed what might come of treating the Pentateuch\nas he had done the _Iliad,_ and Moses like Homer. So he prefers to wax\nenthusiastic over the phrase in which God describes himself to Moses\n_\"Ego sum qui sum,\"_ to which he ascribes a metaphysical profundity\nonly attained by the Greeks when Plato conceived God as to_ on,_ and\nunknown to the Latins down to the latest period, for the word _ens_ is\nnot pure Latin but belongs to debased Latin. Or he contents himself\nwith emphatically pointing out that at a time when Greece was under\nthe sway of a superstitious and natural law, God gave to his people a\ncode \"so full of weight as regards the dogmas of divinity and so full\nof humanity as regards the practice of justice, that not even in the\nhumanest period of Greek history could a Plato have conceived or an\nAristides executed it\"; a code \"whose ten chief enactments contain an\neternal and universal justice founded upon the excellent conception\nof a purified human nature, and are capable of forming by habituation\na character such as the maxims of the greatest philosophers could\nonly with great difficulty form by ratiocination; whence Theophrastus\ncalled the Hebrews philosophers by nature.\" The success that attended\nthe \"will to believe\" was all the more striking if as we suspect Vico\nhad read the abhorred Spinoza's _Tractatus Theologico-politicus,_\nwhere the Hebrew prophets, while their \"piety\" is recognised, are\nsaid to be entirely devoid of \"sublime thoughts.\" Spinoza maintains\nthat they only taught \"very simple things which any one could easily\ndiscover, and adorned these with a style and supported them by reasons\nmost calculated to move the mind of the multitude to devotion towards\nGod\"; and that the laws revealed by God to Moses were \"nothing but\nthe laws of the particular government of the Jews\": and he sets out\nto examine the text of the Bible and the problem of the authenticity\nof the Pentateuch and the respective authors of its various books. We\nmight almost venture to say that it was Spinoza's Biblical criticism\nthat suggested to Vico his criticism of the composition and spirit of\nthe Homeric poems; but that the latter, after passing in this way from\nsacred to profane history, from Moses to Homer, set his face stubbornly\nagainst the opposite transition from Homer to Moses, from profane\nhistory to sacred.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVII\n\n\nTHE HISTORY OF ROME AND THE RISE OF DEMOCRACY\n\n\nHeroic society in the period of youthful vigour above described\ncontains within itself, rigorously repressed, and in fact made into a\nsupport, the element of opposition; the slaves, clients or vassals,\nthat is to say the plebs. But this element little by little succeeds in\ndetaching itself from and opposing itself to the society, engaging it\nin a continual and undisguised conflict, so as by degrees to overthrow\nthis old society and give life and form to a new society of which it\nis itself the material: a democratic society, the popular republic.\nVico believes this process to be uniform in all peoples; but since\nreferences to histories other than that of Rome are either absent or\nvery vague (he hardly mentions the origin of the Athenian democracy)\nthe description of this process appears in the pages of the New Science\nas a fragment of Roman history, or as we should nowadays call it the\nsocial history of Rome.\n\nVico's guesses about the population and primitive culture of Italy are\nof no great importance. The subject belongs rather to archaeology and\nethnography than to history, and Vico did not make a special study\nof it. In the _De antiquissima sapientia Italorum_ he had provided\nthe origins of Rome with a basis in an Italian civilisation of high\nantiquity, earlier than the Greek and derived from Egypt, which\nthe Romans absorbed in a manner agreeing with their character; by\nrejecting, that is to say, its theoretical hypotheses while taking over\ntheir practical results, just as they adopted from the Etruscans their\ntragic religion and their art of tactics, and as they later adopted\nlaws from Athens and Sparta. In this way their ignorance and savagery\nremained unchanged, and hence they spoke the language of philosophers\nwithout being philosophical. In his later writings Vico still for a\ntime maintained the priority and independence of the earliest Italian\ncivilisation as regards that of Greece, and considered Pythagoras less\nas the founder than as the student of Italian wisdom. Finally, however,\nhe seems to have given up this view, just as he definitely abandoned\nthat which explained the origins of Roman religion, language, customs\nand law by the imitation of foreign peoples and \"frankly confessed that\nhe had been in error here\" owing to the example of Plato's _Cratylus._\nWhat conditions brought about the rise of Rome Vico does not precisely\nsay. He is certain that if Rome and the world did not begin together,\nat least the foundation of Rome was a new beginning. The point of\ndeparture which he assumes is the asylum of Romulus, consisting of\nthe \"families\" of fathers who gave their hospitality to wanderers\nand made them into _famuli._ There was no Trojan colonisation; Vico\nknows Bochart's treatise (1663) criticising the legend of Aeneas's\narrival in Italy and accepts its conclusions, which only confirm the\ndoubts already entertained by certain ancient historians. For Vico,\nthe Trojan origin of Rome is a legend sprung from the union of two\ndifferent examples of national arrogance: that of the Greeks, who made\nsuch a noise about the Trojan war and forced their Aeneas into the\nhistory of Rome, and that of the Romans, who accepted him in order to\nboast of a distinguished foreign origin. The legend moreover could\nnot have arisen much before the time of the war with Pyrrhus, when\nRome began to acquire a taste for things Greek. In order to explain\nthe infusion of Greek names and myths into the story of primitive Rome\nand the similarity of the Roman alphabet to the ancient Greek, Vico\nwould incline rather to the hypothesis that early in their history the\nRomans conquered and destroyed some Greek colony on the Latin coast, of\nwhich all trace has since been lost in the mists of antiquity; and that\nthrough receiving its inhabitants in Rome as refugees and allies, they\ncame under the influence of several Hellenic traditions and customs.\n\nVico does not spend much time over the historical events of the royal\nperiod. Here in fact lay one of the chief differences between his\ncriticism and that which had already been originated and was continued\nafter his time dealing with the first centuries of Roman history. Vico\naims not at substituting historical for legendary anecdotes but at\nunderstanding the essence of institutions and the ways in which they\nchange. He uses two guiding principles, as we have seen in considering\nthe royal period: first, that it was a period not of monarchy but\nof aristocracy and that therefore the type of heroic society or the\npatriarchal republic is applicable to it: secondly, that the names\nof the kings are symbols or \"poetic characters\" for the institutions\nof this society. In Vico's judgment, as we have had occasion to\nobserve, the constitution of Servius Tullius should not be considered\nthe basis of popular liberty, as the later Romans considered it; it\nwas really the basis of the liberty of the feudal lords, since by it\nthe patricians granted to the plebeians the bonitary tenure of their\nland together with the duty of paying rent to and serving at their\nown expense in war themselves, the patricians. And Junius Brutus, in\ndriving out the Tarquins and replacing them by two consuls or annual\naristocratic kings, restored to the Roman republic its primitive form;\nthat is to say, he delivered the lords from the domination of their\ntyrants but left the people under the domination of their lords.\n\nThe patricians' oppression of the plebeians after the restoration\nof Junius Brutus and the struggles and resistance caused by it\nconstitute the soul of the new development and contain the secret of\nthe greatness of Rome, the \"key to universal Roman history,\" _clavis\nhistoriae Romanae universae._ Polybius's explanation of this greatness\nis too vague. He describes it as due to the virtue or the religion\nof the patricians and relates the facts of this virtue rather than\ntheir cause. Vico also criticises Machiavelli, at one time because he\nadduces certain civil and military institutions as the cause of Rome's\ngreatness without investigating the cause of those institutions, that\nis to say the character of Roman society: at another time for adducing\nwhat was only a partial cause, the high spirit of the plebeians. He\nthinks Plutarch worst of all, since envy of the virtue and wisdom\nof Rome leads him to ascribe her greatness to fortune. The fact was\nthat Rome subjugated the other cities of Latium and then Italy and\nthe world because her heroism was still young, while among the other\nLatin peoples it had begun to decay. Thanks to this youthful vigour\nthe patricians were strong enough to preserve their order and the\nreligion which formed its foundation and safeguard (the nobles, Vico\nobserves at this point, were always and everywhere religious, so that\nthe first sign of contempt for religion among them is a symptom of\nnational decadence); the plebeians were spirited enough to demand a\nshare in religion, auspices and all civil rights; the lawyers, lastly,\nwere wise enough to interpret the old laws and apply them to any new\ncase that might arise, and strove with all their might to alter the\ntext of these laws as little and as slowly as possible. These were the\nchief causes of the growth and permanence of the Roman empire; for\nin all its political changes it contrived to remain faithful to its\nprinciples. Prowess in war was another result of the rivalry of the\norders; since the nobles were naturally consecrated to the safety of\ntheir country, as the only means of preserving the civil privileges of\ntheir order, and the plebeians accomplished brilliant deeds in order\nto prove themselves worthy of patrician honours. And when the Romans\nextended their conquests and their victories over the whole world, they\nmade use of four rules which they had already applied to the plebeians\nwithin Rome itself. They reduced barbarian provinces to the position of\nclients by planting colonies in them: they granted civilised provinces\nbonitary tenure of their land: to Italy they gave the quiritary tenure:\nand to the municipia, the towns which had earned better treatment, they\naccorded the same equality with themselves which the plebs had finally\nwon.\n\nThe result of the first struggles, in which the point at issue was\naccording to Vico the bonitary possession of land (a right already\nrecognised in the constitution of Servius, but cancelled by the\nnobles in return for arrears of rent), is seen in the tribunate, and\nlater, when the plebeians claimed the right of quiritary tenure, in\nthe laws of the Twelve Tables, ratifying this plebeian victory. But\nthe law of the Twelve Tables represented at the same time the victory\nof written law, the end of the secrecy with which the laws had been\nfenced round by the patricians, who alone knew, understood, interpreted\nand therefore applied them as they thought fit. This publication and\ncodification of a written law cannot have been benevolently granted by\nthe patricians out of that anxiety \"not to despise the wishes of the\nplebs\" of which Livy speaks; rather they must have resisted it with\nall the stubbornness which Dionysius of Halicarnassus describes and\nexpresses in the phrase \"_mores patrios servandos, leges ferri non\noportere_\" (our fathers' customs must be preserved, and laws must not\nbe passed).\n\nLater historians decorated the origin of the Twelve Tables with\nvarious legends. They told, among other things, of the mission sent\nby the decemvirs to Athens to bring back new laws: a tale given by\nLivy and Dionysius, but unknown to Polybius and discredited by Cicero.\nHow, in the savage aloofness of primitive nations, between whom oral\ncommunication could only have been instituted by the necessities of\nwarfare, alliances and commerce, could the fame of Solon's wisdom have\ncrossed the seas from distant Attica to Rome? How could the Romans of\nthat time have possessed such accurate knowledge of the quality of\nAthenian law as to believe it capable of setting at rest the strife\nbetween their plebeians and their nobles? How could ambassadors have\ntravelled between Greece and those Romans whom seventy-two years later\nthe Greeks of Tarentum could still maltreat as strangers? And what\nshall we say of ambassadors who returned carrying with them the Greek\nlaws from Athens but without knowing what they meant; so that but\nfor the coincidence by which Hermodorus the pupil of Heraclitus, an\nexile from his country, happened to be in Rome, the Romans would have\nbeen unable to make any use of this unintelligible and inaccessible\ntreasure? Again, how could Hermodorus have translated the laws into\nLatin of such purity that Diodorus Siculus pronounced it devoid of the\nslightest taint of Hellenism, and with a perfection unattained by any\nsubsequent writer of any period in a translation from the Greek? How\ndid he contrive to clothe Greek ideas in Latin words so appropriate\n(for instance, _auctoritas_) that Greeks, Dio Cassius among them,\ndeclare that their own language has no corresponding words by which\nto explain them? Heraclitus's letter to Hermodorus must have been\nconveyed by the same mail that served Pythagoras in his distant\nvoyages up and down the world: it is, in fact, an imposture of the\nfirst quality, and the whole story of the Athenian origin of these laws\nis due to the arrogance of scholars, who derived them first from the\nother Latin peoples (such as the Aequi), then from the Greek cities\nof Italy, then from Sparta and finally from Athens, with whose name,\nthanks to the renown of the Athenian philosophers, they were at last\nsatisfied. No doubt, the laws of the Twelve Tables present resemblances\nnot only to Athenian or Spartan laws but to those of various nations,\nthe Mosaic code among others; but this is due to the uniformity of\nnational history. No doubt, the decemvirs were in antiquity supposed\nto have originated laws bearing clear traces of Greek influence, such\nas that prohibiting the Greek style of mourning at funerals: but this\nis because as we have seen the decemviral legislation, like the names\nof the various kings, became a \"poetic character,\" and to it were\nreferred all laws later recorded in the public archives which tended\nto the equalisation of liberty. But the original law of the Twelve\nTables, with its primitive rudeness, inhumanity, cruelty and ferocity,\nwhich agrees so ill with the period of highly-developed civilisation at\nAthens, is a document of the greatest value for the ancient natural law\nof the Latin peoples, and the customs which had existed among them from\nthe age of Saturn.\n\nQuiritary tenure of land and a written code of law once gained, the\nstruggle recommenced over the question of the right of marriage. The\ntrue meaning of this contest has been lost among the absurdities\nwritten on the subject by the ancient historians themselves, in the\nbelief that its basis was the desire on the part of the plebeians (who\nwere little more than wretched and common slaves) to be allowed to form\nconnexions with the nobles. This error has made Roman history even less\ncredible than the legendary history of Greece; for if we do not know\nthe meaning of the latter, the former is in opposition to the true\norder of human desires. It shows us a plebs aspiring first to nobility,\nsecondly to offices and magistracies, and finally to wealth: whereas\nmen desire first of all wealth, then offices in the state, and lastly\nnobility. What the Roman plebs really claimed was not _\"connubio, cum\npatribus\"_ but _\"connubio, patrum\"_: not the right of connexion by\nmarriage with the nobles--a claim which they would not have wished\nto make, and was at bottom unimportant--but the right of contracting\nsolemn marriages as the nobles did. For without such solemn marriages,\nwithout privilege of the auspices, the plebeians were in fact unable\nto enjoy the quiritary tenure of land and to transmit it to their\nfamilies, deprived as they were of descent, kindred and relatives. The\ndemand for _connubio_ was, in a word, simply equivalent to a demand for\nthe rights of citizens, and it was satisfied by the Canuleian law.\n\nThe next demand of the plebeians was for privileges depending on\npublic rights. Of these they gained first the _imperium_ together\nwith the consulship, and lastly the offices of priest and pontifex,\nwhich carried with them knowledge of the law. In this way the system\nof seigneurial liberty planned by Servius Tullius grew into a system\nof popular liberty, and the census, which was originally paid to the\npatricians, was paid hereafter into the public treasury, out of which\nthe expenses of the plebeians in war were paid. The tribunes now\nproceeded to demand the power of legislation; for the previous laws,\nthe Horatian and Hortensian, had not made plebiscites binding on the\nwhole people, except upon the two special occasions which led to the\nsecession of the plebs to the Aventine and Janiculum respectively.\nThis new victory, which established the superiority of the plebs and\ntransformed the aristocratic into a popular republic, was the Publilian\nlaw due to the Dictator Publilius Philo and decreeing that plebiscites\nshould \"be binding on all the Quirites\" (_omnes quirites tenerent_).\nThe authority of the senate came out of the struggle somewhat\nimpaired, for while formerly the fathers had acted as \"_auctores_\"\nfor the deliberations of the people, they were now the proposers of\nlaw to the people, which the latter then approved according to the\nformula submitted to them by the senate, or else \"antiquated\" the\nproposal (_antiquo,_ to vote against a measure) and decided to make no\ninnovation. Besides this, the plebs won the last office to be conceded\nto them, that of censor. The Petelian law, a few years later, abolished\nthe last remnant of feudalism, the bond (_nexus_) which made the\nplebeians the bondmen of the nobles for debt and often compelled them\nto spend their lives working in their private prisons.\n\nSome time later, when the division between patriciate and plebs with\nthe corresponding _comitia curiata_ and _tributa_ was replaced by\nFabius Maximus's division according to the property of citizens, who\nwere now grouped into three classes of senators, knights and plebeians,\nthe order of the nobles disappeared entirely: \"senator\" and \"knight\"\nwere no longer synonymous with \"patrician,\" nor \"plebeian\" with\n\"base-born.\" The Senate however preserved sovereign dominion over the\nfinances of the Roman Empire, though the Empire itself had passed to\nthe plebeians; and thanks to the so-called \"_senatusconsultum ultimum_\"\nit maintained this dominion by force of arms as long as Rome remained\na popular republic. Whenever the people attempted to take it into\ntheir own hands, the Senate armed the Consuls, who forthwith declared\ntraitors and put to death plebeian tribunes who had originated these\nattempts. This may be explained as a right of feudal sovereignty\nsubject to a higher sovereign, a view confirmed by the language of\nScipio Nasica when he armed the people against Tiberius Gracchus:\n\"whoever wishes for the safety of the republic, let him follow the\nconsul\" (_qui rempublicam salvam velit, consulem sequatur_). And\nindeed, once the road to office was opened by law to the multitude\nwhich rules in a popular republic, there was nothing left in time of\npeace but to contest its rule not by laws but by force of arms, and\nfor those in power to pass laws for self-enrichment like the Gracchan\nagrarian measures, resulting at once in civil wars at home and unjust\nwars abroad.\n\nWith the triumph of the plebs and the change of constitution from\naristocratic to popular, the whole face of society changed. In the\nfirst place, the aspect of the family changed. Here, during the rule\nof the patriciate, testamentary succession was admitted only at a late\ndate and was easily cancelled, in order to keep wealth in patrician\nhands: kindred even in the seventh degree excluded the emancipated son\nfrom the paternal heritage: emancipation had the effect of a penalty:\nlegitimising was not allowed: and it is doubtful whether a woman could\ninherit. But in the democratic society, since for the plebs wealth,\nstrength and power all depended on the number of their children, family\nfeeling began to grow up, and the praetors began to consider its claims\nand to satisfy them by means of the _\"honorum possessiones,\"_ thus\nremedying the faults or shortcomings of wills and facilitating the\ndiffusion of wealth, the only thing desired by the common people.\n\nA change took place, again, in the meaning of the institutions of\nproperty. The civil tenure was no longer a matter of public right,\nbut was dispersed among the various private tenures of the citizens\nnow forming the body of the popular state. \"Eminent\" tenure no longer\nsignifies the strongest kind of tenure, unencumbered by any actual\ncharge, even a public charge, but applies simply to an estate free\nfrom any private charge. Quiritary tenure is no longer that of which\nthe noble was feudal lord and under the obligation to aid his client,\nthe plebeian, if ousted from it: it has become a private civil tenure,\ncapable of being defended by a civil suit as opposed to the bonitary\nwhich could be maintained by possession only.\n\nThe forms of legal process were pruned of the luxurious growth\nof fictions, solemn formulae and symbolic acts, simplified and\nrationalised: the intellect, the thought of the legislator was\nbrought into play and the citizens conformed to an idea of a common\nrational utility, understood as spiritual in value. Causes, which were\noriginally formulae safeguarded by accurate and precise language,\nbecame affairs or negotiations solemnised by agreement and, in the\ncase of transference of tenure, by natural tradition; and it was only\nin contracts said to be completed by word of mouth, that is to say\nin stipulations, that the safeguards remained \"causes\" in the strict\nancient meaning of the word. Thus the certitude of the law, when the\nhuman reason was fully developed, passed into the truth of ideas\ndetermined by the circumstances of fact, a \"formula devoid of any\nparticular form\" (_formula naturae,_ as Varro calls it) which, like\na light, informs in all the minutest details of their surface the\ndetails of fact over which it extends. In popular republics the ruling\nprinciple is the _aequum bonum,_ natural equity.\n\nThe harsh punishments of the periods of domestic monarchy and heroic\nsociety (the laws of the Twelve Tables condemned those who set fire\nto another's crops to be burnt alive, perjurers to be thrown from the\nTarpeian rock, and insolvent debtors to be cut in pieces while living)\nwere replaced by milder penalties, since the multitude, whose members\nare weak, is naturally disposed to clemency.\n\nLaws, which under the aristocracy were few, inflexible and religiously\nobserved, multiplied under the democracy and became liable to change\nand modification. The Spartans, who preserved their aristocracy,\nsaid that at Athens they had many laws and wrote them; at Sparta few,\nbut they obeyed them. The Roman plebs, like the Athenian, passed new\nlaws every day, and the attempt by Sulla, the leader of the noble\nparty, to reduce them by the institution of \"_quaestiones perpetuae_\"\nor permanent courts was in vain, for after his time laws were again\nmultiplied.\n\nWar itself, which was under the aristocratic republics very cruel\nand resulted in the destruction of conquered towns and the reduction\nof the vanquished to the condition of labourers scattered over the\ncountry-side and cultivating it on behalf of the victors, was mitigated\nby the popular republics, which while they deprived the conquered of\nthe rights of heroic society left them in possession of the natural\nrights of the human race. Empires grew, since a popular republic is\nmuch more adapted to conquest than an aristocratic, and a monarchy most\nof all.\n\nBut with all this humanisation of customs, the power of wise rule,\npolitical virtue, diminished. The ancient patricians enforced a rigid\nrespect for law; and each, possessing a large share of the public\nutility, set his own minor personal interests below this greater\nparticular interest, guaranteed as it was by the state. Hence all\ncourageously defended and wisely consulted for the good of the state.\nIn a popular state on the other hand since the citizens controlled\nthe state property by dividing it among themselves into as many small\nportions as there were citizens in the body of the people, and through\nthe causes which produced that form of state, ease, paternal affection,\nconjugal love and desire of life, men were led to consider the smallest\ndetails favourable to their own private interest; that is to regard\nnothing but the _aequum bonum,_ the only interest of which a multitude\nis capable.\n\nAt this point arises spontaneously a new form of government, which has\nlong been preparing and has now become inevitable, namely monarchy.\nThe ordinary political writers make monarchy originate, without any of\nthe numerous and complex causes which are necessary to produce it, at\nthe very outset of human history, \"as a frog,\" says Vico, \"is born of a\nsummer shower.\" Still less did it originate artificially by the royal\nlaw which Tribonian believes to have deprived the Roman people of its\nfree and sovereign power and conferred it upon Octavius Augustus. The\nlaw which brought monarchy into being was a natural law whose formula\nof eternal validity is as follows: when in a popular republic every one\nseeks his private interest only and presses the public forces into its\nservice at risk of destruction to the state, to preserve the latter\nfrom ruin a man must arise, as Augustus did at Rome (who as Tacitus\nsays \"received under his sovereign power the whole state, worn out with\ncivil wars, taking the title of Princeps\": _qui cuncta bellis civilibus\nfessa nomine principis sub imperium accepit):_ a single man, who by\nforce of arms takes in hand all the affairs of the state and leaves his\nsubjects to look after their own affairs or after any public business\nhe may entrust to them; surrounding himself with a small number of\nstatesmen as a cabinet to discuss public questions or principles of\ncivil equity. Such a monarch is welcomed by nobles and plebeians alike:\nby the nobles, who after having been already humiliated by their\nsubjection to plebeian rule abandon their ancient aristocratic claim\nto sovereignty and think only of securing a comfortable life; and by\nthe plebeians, who after an experiment in anarchy or unbridled demagogy\n(than which no tyranny is worse, since it produces as many tyrants as\nthere are bold and dissolute men in the state) are led by their own\nmisfortunes to welcome peace and protection.\n\nMonarchy is then a new form of popular government. In order that a\npowerful man may become sovereign, it is necessary that the people\nshall take his side, and that he should rule in a popular manner;\nmaking all his subjects equal, humiliating the great to protect the\nmultitude against their oppression, keeping the people satisfied\nand content as regards the necessaries of life and the enjoyment of\nnatural liberty, and employing a well-balanced system of concessions\nand privileges granted sometimes to whole classes (in which case they\nare called \"privileges of liberty\") sometimes to particular persons,\nby promoting into a higher class men of unusual merit and exceptional\nvirtues.\n\nIn monarchy, a \"humane\" government no less than democracy, the\nprocess of humanisation or softening of customs and laws, already\nbegun under popular republics, still continues. The rigid bonds of\nthe patriarchal family and kinship relax further. The Emperors, who\ntended to be overshadowed by the splendours of the nobility, made\nefforts to promote the rights of human nature common to nobles and\nplebeians. Augustus strove to safeguard the trusteeships by which\nformerly property had passed to persons incapable of inheritance thanks\nonly to the conscientiousness of the injured heir; he transformed\nsuch understandings from a right into a necessity, by obliging heirs\nto execute them. A number of senatusconsulta followed which placed\n_cognati_ (relations generally) on a level with _agnati_ (relations\nthrough the father). Finally, Justinian abolished the difference\nbetween property inherited and property in the hands of trustees,\nconfused the Falcidian quarter with the Trebellian and put _cognati_\nand _agnati_ on precisely the same footing as regards inheritance\n_\"ab intestato.\"_ The latest Roman law was so entirely on the side\nof testaments that, while originally these could be broken for the\nslightest cause, they now had to be interpreted in the way most\nadapted to secure their validity. Once the \"cyclopean\" right of the\nfather over the persons of his children had disappeared, his economic\nright over property acquired by them disappeared also; and hence\nthe emperors first introduced the _peculium castrense_ (property\nobtained during military service) to attract young men to war, then the\n_peculium quasicastrense,_ to attract them into the praetorian guard,\nand finally to satisfy those who were neither soldiers nor scholars\nthe _peculium adventitium._ They deprived the _patria potestas_ of\nits influence over adoptions, now no longer restricted to the small\ncircle of relations; they uniformly countenanced formal adoption\n(_arrogatio_) which was somewhat difficult owing to the difficulty\nof a father's becoming a subordinate member of another family; they\nconsidered emancipation as a benefit and gave to legitimization \"by a\nsubsequent marriage\" all the efficacy of solemn wedlock. The _imperium\npaternum,_ as an arrogant title seeming to detract from the imperial\nmajesty, was altered into _patria potestas._ The humane tendencies of\nthe monarchs extended moreover to that part of the ancient \"family\"\nwhich consisted of slaves: for the emperors restrained the cruelty of\nmasters towards these, and benefited them by increasing the force and\ndecreasing the solemnity of manumission; and citizen rights, which were\ngiven originally only to distinguished foreigners who had deserved well\nof the Roman people, were granted to every one born in Rome, even of a\nslave father provided his mother were free or enfranchised. Punishments\nwere also made milder, and the monarchs distinguished themselves by\nthe gracious title of \"clement.\" The letter of the law always tended\nto be more freely interpreted in the light of natural equity, and it\nmay be said that Constantine absolutely cancelled the letter when he\nlaid down the principle that any particular motive of equity should\noverride the law. Thus was attained the precise opposite of the\n_\"privilegia ne irroganto\"_ of the Twelve Tables (\"that no exceptions\nbe made\"): all privileges were exceptions to the law dictated by some\nparticular merit in the facts which lifted them out of the sphere of\nlegal generalisations. The restriction of rights to particular peoples\nwas by degrees abolished: under Caracalla the whole Roman world was\nconverted into a single Rome, since great monarchs desire the whole\nworld to become one city, according to the thought of Alexander the\nGreat, when he said that for him all the world was a single city of\nwhich his phalanx was the citadel. The praetor's edict gives place,\nunder Hadrian, to the \"perpetual edict\" of Salvius Julianus, almost\nexclusively composed of provincial edicts.\n\nWith monarchy, the natural law of races gives place to the natural law\nof nations; and hence this political, social and juridical form is the\nmost suitable to human nature at its fullest rational development. Here\ntoo, as we have already had occasion to remark, we reach again after\na long process the unity which existed in the person of the primitive\nfather under domestic monarchy; and the course of national history must\nbe considered as absolutely complete. To go further is impossible: the\nonly possibility, at this stage of the highest human civilisation and\nrefinement, is corruption, the return of barbarism as a \"barbarism of\nreflection\" and a relapse into a kind of new state of nature, to return\nonce more into a new and heroic barbarism.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVIII\n\n\nTHE RETURN OF BARBARISM: THE MIDDLE AGES\n\n\nOf this kind of \"reflux\" Vico mentions and examines only one instance:\nthe period of European history which had in his own days for the first\ntime been marked out definitely by historians and given the name\n(though Vico does not use it) of the \"Middle Ages.\"\n\nThat this was a period of decadence and barbarism was certainly not\na new thought for consciousness: for, especially in the humanistic\nperiod, a general feeling of estrangement and repulsion had been felt\ntowards these centuries of \"middle and low Latinity\" in which the\ntreasures of the classical literatures were neglected and scattered,\nand humane studies either lost their vigour or disappeared completely.\nThis consciousness, general on the part of cultivated Europe, was\nespecially full and vivid in Italy; for that country could never forget\nthat though for other peoples the Middle Ages had seen the rise of\ntheir fortunes, power and civilisation, for her they had meant the end\nof Rome's greatness, the humiliation of her name before the arrogant\nVandal, Visigoth and Lombard, the devastation of rich cities, and\nthe destruction of majestic monuments whose miserable wreckage could\nbe seen on every hand. Machiavelli had opened his _Histories_ with\na famous and striking picture of the general change which followed\nthe fall of the Western Empire. But to pass in review the ruins or\nto collect the antiquities of the Middle Ages was not the way to\npenetrate into the spirit of the period, any more than to note a\nman's faults and the marks which distinguish him from another is the\nsame thing as understanding the soul of either. Vico was the first to\nunderstand the soul of the Middle Ages, that is to say, the mental,\nsocial and cultural constitution of the period.\n\nThough living in a part of Italy rich not only in documents but in\nsurvivals of the Middle Age, Vico confesses that this second period\nof barbarism is much more obscure to him than the first, and that\nit is only the first that has enabled him to throw light upon the\nsecond. This he expressed by the mere fact that he named the period\n\"the second barbarism,\" or the \"return\" or \"reflux\" of barbarism,\nand thus considered it as an instance of his ideal law of reflux.\nThe Middle Ages seemed to him both a representation of the primitive\nconditions of life, and in consequence a reproduction of the social\nprocess developing out of them. It was a view as original as it was\nrich in truth: and it is no objection to it to say that Vico reveals\nthe generic characters rather than the particular traits of the Middle\nAges, because we know that the problem he set before himself was\nprecisely the investigation of generic characters or uniformities, and\nthat he avoided history properly so called in order to escape a dilemma\nbetween science and faith, between the purely immanental conception of\nhistory, excluding revelation and miracle, and the purely transcendent\nconception, miraculous and therefore difficult to treat in a scientific\nmanner. Even in our own times, it is a fact worth noticing that we have\nseen a recrudescence of this attempt to harmonise religion and history\nby abstracting from the individual aspect of events and reducing\nhistory to a history of institutions and uniformities.[1] In this\nposition assumed by the problem in Vico's mind we may see the reason\nfor the fact, which some have thought very strange in a Catholic, that\nhe lays no stress on Christianity, and when he encounters it at the\noutset of the Middle Ages dismisses it in a few words; saying that God,\nhaving by superhuman ways shown clearly the truth of the Christian\nreligion, when he opposed the virtue of the martyrs to the power of\nRome, and the doctrine of the Fathers, together with the miracles,\nto the empty wisdom of Greece, and knowing that armed nations must\narise on every hand ready to fight for the divinity of that religion's\nauthor, permitted the birth of a new order of civilisation among the\nnations, in order that the true religion might be established according\nto the natural course of human affairs.\n\nWe must be content then with the resemblances observed by Vico between\nmediaeval society and that of the early centuries of Greece and Rome,\nand not take offence if his exemplifications and proofs very often seem\nfallacious and fanciful. His main historical thought as we know already\nis robust enough to pass over the errors or to live in the midst of\nthem unimpaired.\n\nWe see (to reconstruct his story or picture, with some rearrangement)\nin the Middle Ages groups of dwellings everywhere springing up on the\nmountains, each dominated by its fortress as in the divine age of\nthe \"Cyclopes\"; for the unhappy people, ground down by the violence\nof barbarian invasions and intestine strife, had no other means of\ndefence. The most ancient cities built in the Middle Ages and almost\nall capitals of states are as a matter of fact placed upon heights;\nall new seigneuries formed at the time were called \"castella\" by the\nItalians; and this perhaps is also the reason why nobles were called\nmen \"born in a high or conspicuous position\" (_summo, illustri loco\nnati_) while the plebeians living in the plains below were \"born in a\nlow or obscure place\" (_imo, obscuro loco nati_). We find asyla or\nsanctuaries again open especially with the ecclesiastical lords, who\nwere in humanity in advance of their savage times; here took refuge the\noppressed and the terrified, to seek protection for person or property.\nHence in Germany, a country which must have been wilder than the other\nparts of Europe, there remained almost more ecclesiastical than secular\nlords. A famous example of these political formations was the Abbey\nof St. Laurence at Aversa in the kingdom of Naples, with which was\nincorporated that of St. Laurence at Capua. This monastery governed\neither directly or by abbots or monks dependent upon it no less than a\nhundred and ten churches in Campania, Samnium, Apulia and the ancient\nCalabria, from the river Volturnus to the gulf of Tarentum; the abbots\nof St. Laurence were lords or barons of almost the whole of this\ncountry. The small chapels which they built in mountainous and remote\nplaces for the celebration of the mass and other religious offices\nbecame natural sanctuaries for the population, and they built their\nhouses round them: and this is the reason why in Europe so many cities,\nlands and castles bear the names of saints, and why the churches are\nthe most ancient monuments of this period. Consequently we also find\nfeudalism, not establishing itself in Europe for the first time, but\nappearing once more. It has been mistakenly believed to be a relic of\nRoman law after its destruction by the barbarians (such is the theory\nof Oldenorp and all other jurists) whereas really Roman law itself\narose out of the ruins of the feudalism of early Latin barbarism, and\nmediaeval feudalism was not a new law of the European nations, but\na very ancient law renewed by the last barbarism. This feudalism is\nfar from being the \"vile matter\" which Cujas calls it: it is a heroic\nmatter, one worthy to be celebrated by the most erudite and profound\nlearning of Greece and Rome. And to what is it due, if not to this\nessential unity of nature, that the choicest expressions of Roman law,\nwhich Cujas himself allows to mitigate the barbarism of feudalistic\nlearning, are so precisely adequate to express the properties and\nattributes of the system that no better terminology could be desired?\n\nWith the Middle Ages, then, we return to the fundamental division\nbetween heroes and slaves, between _\"viri\"_ or \"barons\" (\"_varones_\" is\nthe word still used for men, _\"viri\"_ in Spanish) and mere \"_homines_\"\nas the vassals were called: between _\"patres\"_ or \"patrons\" and\nserfs. The learned students of feudalism who translate _\"feudum\"_\nby _\"clientela\"_ are really giving something, much more than a good\nlinguistical equivalent; they are unawares giving a historical\ndefinition of the feoff. The first feoffs of the Middle Ages were\nnecessarily personal, like the first _clientelae_ of Romulus: a form\nof vassalage still extant in Vico's time in the north, especially in\nPoland, where the _\"kmet\"_ were a kind of slaves who were often used\nas stakes in their lord's games, and passed with their families into\nthe hands of the winner. Then came rustic feoffs, real in character\nand consisting in uncultivated land assigned by the victors to the\nconquered for their sustenance, while they themselves kept the\ncultivated land: these feoffs were called by the feudalists, with\na new elegance of Latinity and an equally sound historical truth,\n_\"beneficia.\"_ The ancient \"_next_\" were the new \"liege\" or bound men,\nwho were compelled to join in all the friendships and quarrels of their\nlord, and supplied what in Rome was called _\"opera militaris,\"_ and in\nthe Middle Ages _\"militare servitium.\"_ The feudal bond extended itself\nto larger political relations, and just as conquered kings became\nallies or _socii_ of Rome and \"upheld the majesty of the Roman people,\"\nso there were sovereign feoffs subordinated to higher sovereignties\nwhose representatives, the great kings and lords of large kingdoms and\nnumerous provinces, took the title of \"majesty.\"\n\nRepublics became aristocratic once more in government if not in\nconstitution: this is admitted by political writers, among others\nby Bodin, who even says that his own kingdom of France was purely\naristocratic in constitution under the Merovingian and Capetian\ndynasties. Till the end of the sixteenth century living witnesses\nto the past remained in the aristocratic kingdoms of Sweden and\nDenmark; and Poland, mentioned above, preserved the same constitution\ndown to Vico's own time. The first state parliaments of Europe must\nhave consisted like Romulus's senate of the elders of the nobility\n(_seniores,_ hence _seigneurs_); and were armed courts of barons\nor peers like the _comitia curiata_ of old. In these parliaments\nwere decided feudal causes concerning rights or successions or the\ndevolution of feoffs through felony or default of heirs: which causes,\nconfirmed many times by these judgments, formed the customs of\nfeudalism. Vico saw a relic of these parliaments in the Sacred Royal\nCouncil at Naples, the president of which assumed the title of \"Sacred\nRoyal Majesty,\" as the councillors did the title of _\"milites,\"_ and\nwhose sentences admitted of no appeal to any other tribunal, but only a\nrequest for revision by the Council itself.\n\nThe governments, beside being aristocratic, were enveloped in an\natmosphere of religion to such an extent that not only were bishops\nand abbots very often, as we saw, feudatories, but feudatories and\nsovereigns adorned themselves freely with religious insignia; Catholic\nkings everywhere, in order to defend the Christian religion whose\nprotectors they were, wore the dalmatic of the diaconate, consecrated\ntheir persons (whence the title \"Sacred Royal Majesty\"), and took\nrank in the church, as Hugh Capet took the title of Count and Abbot\nof Paris; thus as we see from the earliest documents the French lords\ncalled themselves dukes and abbots or counts and abbots simultaneously.\nThese early Christian kings were the first to institute armed\nreligious orders, by the help of which they defended Catholicism\nagainst Arians, Saracens and other infidels. _\"Pura et pin bella\"_\nreturned once more as in the heroic period; the globe surmounted by\nthe cross worn by the Christian potentates on their crowns recalls\nthe cross upon the standards in the holy wars or crusades. Heroic\nslavery returns, and lasts a long time among Christian nations because,\nconsidering war as the judgment of God, the victors believed the\nvanquished to be abandoned by God and held them no better than beasts\n(thus the Christians called the Turks \"dogs\" and were in turn called\n\"pigs\" by them). The ancients deprived the conquered of all things\nhuman and divine. The new barbarians on occupying a city endeavoured\nabove everything to search out and carry off the tombs or relics of\nsaints, which the peoples of that time buried and concealed with all\npossible care; and thus almost all translations of relics took place\nat this time. A trace of this custom survives in the rule by which a\nconquered nation must buy back from the victorious generals all the\nbells in the cities they have taken.\n\nAnalogous resemblances may be found in the juridical regulation of\nproperty. The primary division of property in feudal law is that\ninto feudal goods and allodial goods. Allodial tenure was in origin\na highly secure right, unencumbered by any external charge, even a\npublic one; and applied to property directly acquired or conquered by\nthe patricians or barons. Feudal tenure required the approval of the\nlord by whom it had been granted. Allodial tenure thus corresponded to\nquiritary _ex optimo iure,_ and feudal to bonitary; and it was only\nwhen later in modern Europe as previously in ancient Rome a new census\nand treasury were formed, and when allodial property was made subject\nto public charges, that it could be contemptuously described as \"goods\nof the spindle\" as opposed to feudal, \"goods of the lance.\" Thus, to\ntake an example, the provinces which were later incorporated into the\nFrench kingdom had formerly been sovereign principalities feudally\ndependent upon the ruler of the said kingdom; their sovereign princes\nbeing free from all public charge in the tenure of their (allodial)\npossessions. Later, when through succession, rebellion or failure of\nheirs these provinces became part of the kingdom, the property was\nmade liable to taxation and tribute; the tenure _ex optimo iure_ was\nconfused with private non-feudal tenure subject to these charges, and\nallodials in the noble sense of the word were identified with allodials\nin the common sense. The later students of feudalism missed the point\nof the primitive distinction just as the late Roman jurists forgot\nthe meaning of tenure _ex optimo iure._ To the feudal tenure belonged\nemphyteosis (so that the allodial right ultimately signified both what\nthe vassal paid to the sovereign and the planter to his immediate\nlord): \"commendations,\" identical with the ancient _clientela_: the\n\"census\" by which the vassals were bound to serve their lords in war\n(the tributaries, _angarii_ or _perangarii,_ being equivalent to the\nRoman _assidui_): the _\"precaria,\"_ which must originally have been\nland granted by lords in response to the prayers of the poor: and\n\"_libelli_\" or transferences of non-movable property which in this\nagricultural economy took the place of commerce. The exclusion of women\nfrom inheritance, which went back to the beginnings of Roman law, was\nrenewed in the form of the \"salic law\" in Germany and among all the\nearly barbarian nations of Europe, though it preserved its force only\nin France and Savoy.\n\nPunishments were cruel; death was called the \"ordinary penalty.\" But\nthere was in the Middle Ages no real penal law and procedure dealing\nwith private offences. The murder of a plebeian was committed either\nby his own lord, whom nobody could accuse, or by another lord, who\ncould indemnify the man's own lord for his loss as if he had been a\nslave. This custom was still in force in Poland, Lithuania, Denmark,\nSweden and Norway. Under the name of \"canonical purgations\" (though\nunrecognised by canon law) certain kinds of divine judgments or duels\nwere practised throughout Europe; and private vengeance flourished down\nto the time of Bartolo. In judgments concerned with allodial rights,\nthe lords met in arms; and in the kingdom of Naples even in Vico's own\ndays barons avenged intrusions upon their own feoffs on the part of\nother barons not by civil suits but by duels. In a society ruled by\nforce, what wonder that the robbers of the heroic age returned, and\nthat \"pirate\" became a title of nobility? Never has the fortune of\nkingdoms been so various or so inconstant.\n\nThe Roman law of Justinian, penetrated as it was by the idea of equity,\nwas abandoned and fell into oblivion. In France and Spain any one who\ndared to appeal to it in a cause was severely punished; in Italy it\nis certain that the nobles considered it dishonourable to regulate\ntheir affairs by Roman law, and professed to live according to that\nof the Lombards; while the plebeians, slower in throwing off ancient\ncustoms, continued to practise certain parts of the Roman law by force\nof habit. In fact the law of the period consisted rather of habits than\nof statutes: rigid formulae and solemn ceremonial once more acquired\nimportance, and a distinction was made between _pacta nuda,_ naked\nagreements, and _pacta vestita,_ agreements clothed and reinforced\nby these formulae and ceremonies. An example of the respect in which\nformulae were held is afforded by the action of the Emperor Conrad\nIII. On taking Weinsberg, a town which had supported his rival for the\nempire, he condemned it to extermination, making an exception only\nin favour of the women and all they could bring out with them. The\nwomen came out of the doomed city carrying on their backs their sons,\nhusbands and fathers: and the Emperor, standing before the gate at the\nhead of his army with swords drawn and lances in rest to satisfy their\nleader's terrible wrath, watched them and allowed them to pass safe and\nsound out of respect for the letter of his own decree.\n\nIt was an illiterate period, a fact expressed by Vico in the statement\nthat languages again became \"mute\" or hieroglyphic. The common tongues,\nItalian, French, Spanish and German, were not written down: only a few\necclesiastics wrote a barbarous Latin, and hence \"cleric\" and \"scholar\"\nbecame synonymous terms; but among the very priests such ignorance\nprevailed that we find documents signed by bishops with the sign of\nthe cross, as they were unable to write their own names. Owing to this\npaucity of learning an English law laid down that a man condemned to\ndeath should be reprieved if he could write, as a valuable craftsman;\nand \"man of letters\" as well as \"cleric\" or \"clerk\" remained a name for\na learned man. Hence the value and general employment of family arms\nto indicate the owners of a house, a tomb, land or livestock, and the\nfrequency with which coats-of-arms are found on buildings of the time.\n\nWith barbarism returned the predominance of verse over prose. The prose\nof the Fathers of the Latin Church--and the same is true of those\nof the Greek--is full of poetic rhythms, so as to resemble a chant.\nThe first modern lyric poetry was religious; and if there was not\nstrictly a Christian religious poetry, this was because the subjects\nof our theology transcend all intelligence and imagination and crush\nthe poetic faculty. Poetry and history were once more confounded; the\nromantic poets, the heroic poets of the return to barbarism, believed\ntheir own stories to be true, and thus Boiardo and Ariosto took as\nsubject for their poems Turpin, Bishop of Paris. And just as the French\nlanguage, when owing to the famous Parisian school and the highly\nsubtle scholastic theology it passed at a stroke from spontaneity to\nreflection, preserved pure diphthongs in great number while adopting\nabstract terms, so the story of Turpin survived in France like a\nHomeric poem. These authors of Latin poems confined themselves entirely\nto history, for instance, William of Apulia's _De gestis Normannorum in\nItalia_ and Gunther's _Carmen heroicum de rebus a Frederico Barbarossa\ngestis._ The first writers in the vernacular were in Italy poets no\nless than in Provence and France. A punctilious virtue like that of\nAchilles again appeared, the complete morality of the duellist; hence\narose the proud laws, the lofty duties and the vindictive satisfactions\nof the knight-errants sung by the romantic poets. Does not Cola di\nRienzo seem to be a real Homeric character in his swift outburst of\nemotion when, as we read in his life, while speaking of the unhappy\nstate of Rome he excited both himself and his listeners to unrestrained\ntears? Hyperbole was a common type of thought, as in children; for \"I\noften remember,\" writes Vico, \"when walking abroad that the gentle\nslopes which unfold themselves before my eyes appeared when I was a\nchild to be steep and lofty mountains.\" Thus in the Middle Ages Roland\nand the other paladins were represented as gigantic in stature: and\nimages of divine beings, the eternal Father, Christ, or the Virgin,\npainted or sculptured, were of colossal dimensions.\n\nBut the human mind is like land which, after lying waste for long\ncenturies, when first cultivated bears crops of wonderful quality,\nsize and abundance. Thus at the close of barbarism in Italy after four\nsavage and stormy centuries, arose Dante, the Homer of the second\nbarbarism, just as somewhat later flourished the delicate verse of\nPetrarch and the gallant and graceful prose of Boccaccio; all three\nincomparable in their way. And since barbarism is, as we have already\nindicated, truthful, frank, faithful, generous and magnanimous by\nnature, Dante puts on the stage real persons and real actions of the\ndead; and his poem is called a \"comedy\" in allusion to the ancient\ncomedy which followed the same principle. It is a poem in which both\nthe _Iliad_ and the _Odyssey_ find parallels; the former in the\n_Inferno,_ where Dante employs his choleric genius and all his vast\nimagination in describing the effects of implacable wrath and recalling\nnumbers of merciless punishments, a worthy companion-picture to the\nhorrid slaughters of Homer (whose descriptions of them inspire pity in\nus, but gave nothing but pleasure to his own audience); the latter,\nthe _Odyssey,_ which celebrates the heroic endurance of Ulysses, is\nparalleled by the _Purgatorio,_ a spectacle of severe punishments\nborne with immovable patience, and the _Paradiso_ where infinite\njoy is experienced with an infinite tranquillity of mind. Another\nsimilarity between Dante and Homer lies in the physiognomy of the\nformer's language, which is so varied that some suppose him to have\ncollected it like Homer from all the dialects of his nation; an opinion\nof sixteenth-century scholars which will not stand criticism, for it\nis certain that when Dante used them these expressions must have been\ncurrent at Florence, and that a lifetime would have been insufficient\nto collect them from this side and from that when there were no writers\nin the various dialects. But the most important resemblance of Dante\nto Homer is in poetic sublimity. Dante is a divine poet who to the\ndelicate imaginations of to-day seems rough and uncivilised, and often\nshocks by unwonted harmonies an ear that has become morbidly sensitive\nthrough effeminate music. But he is received very differently by men\nof severe tastes who refuse to be satisfied with flowers, ornaments\nand graces. Like Homer too he is great not in esoteric wisdom but in\nthe vigour of his imagination. Dante was undoubtedly a very learned\ntheologian, but that was his weakness rather than his strength. If he\nhad known neither Scholasticism nor Latin, he would have been a still\ngreater poet, and perhaps the Tuscan language would have had what Latin\nnever had, a poet who could in everything bear comparison with Homer.\n\nThe man who wrote this page of criticism on Dante and vindicated him\nonce more after centuries of anti-Dantesque taste (or mere Dantesque\ngrammar or Dantesque scholasticism) and vindicated him in the very\nheight of the prosperity of the Arcadianism so hostile to him, deserved\nto have made the acquaintance of William Shakespeare genius, which he\nwas perhaps the only man alive capable of understanding. But in Italy,\nas in most countries outside England, nothing was known of Shakespear\nat this time, and Vico has only the vague and belated remark about him\nthat the English, untouched by the prevailing delicacy of the century,\ntook no pleasure in tragedies which had not an element of atrocity in\nthem, just as the earliest taste of Greek drama was for the abominable\nfeast of Thyestes and Medea's impious slaughter of her brother and\nchildren. The tendency towards Teutonic poetry and literature remained\nin Vico as we know an aspiration only; he was unable to get a clear\nview of it however closely he tried to examine it; and when he does\nmention it upon the strength of second-hand information, it is only to\nsay that in the German nation, especially in the purely agricultural\nprovince of Silesia, \"poets arose naturally\"; in his search for\nan unsophisticated popular poetry he had in fact stumbled without\nrealising his mistake upon the Silesian school of Hoffmanswaldau and\nL\u00f6henstein, the German imitators of the Neapolitan Marino. But the only\nvalue of the anecdote is to illustrate anew the tricks played upon Vico\nby his lively fancy.\n\nHow the world emerged from the second barbarismi and the feudal\nconstitution, Vico does not say. He does not seem to have fixed his\nattention upon the communal movement which presents so many analogies\nwith the struggles of the Roman plebs and the formation of ancient\ndemocracy. He makes game, here again, of those who traced the genesis\nof modern monarchies such as the French to a simple law like that of\nTribonian by which, he explains ironically, the paladins of France\ndeprived themselves of their power and conferred it upon the kings of\nthe Capetian dynasty. He also observes that the baronial power, being\ndispersed and dissipated by reason of civil wars in which they were\nobliged to depend upon the people, was the more easily gathered up\nby sovereign monarchs; and that thus the \"_obsequium_\" of vassals to\ntheir baron passed into the \"_obsequium principis._\" But he gives quite\na special importance to the rediscovery of Roman law (that \"natural\nlaw of the European nations\" as Grotius had called it) by the studies\nundertaken in the Italian universities. Men thus learnt anew the\nprinciples of natural equity; the nobles and plebeians became equal in\nthe eyes of civil law as they are already in human nature, the secrets\nof the laws passed out of the hands of the feudatories, whose power\nconsequently diminished by degrees, and the humane government of free\nrepublics and perfect monarchies came into being. The reflux of heroic\nsociety had now undergone a contrary reflux; it was no longer possible,\nunder the conditions of modern civilisation, to recall it to life,\njust as it was impossible for the attempts of the Pythagoreans and\nDion of Syracuse to restore the ancient aristocracies. The plebeians,\nonce recognised as naturally equals of the nobles, no longer submitted\nto remaining inferior to them in civil life. And the few aristocratic\nrepublics which here and there survived in Europe were compelled to\ntake infinite pains and all manner of wise measures in order to keep\nquiet and contented the multitudes whom they governed.\n\n\n[Footnote 1: See my preface to Sorel's _Reflections on Violence_\n(Italian tr., Bari, 1909). pp. xxii-xxvii.]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIX\n\n\nVICO AND THE TENDENCIES OF CONTEMPORARY CULTURE\n\n\nHaving reached, in his review of the course of history, his own time,\na time of civilisation spread over all nations, Vico gives a rapid\ndescription of the contemporary world and then says no more: perhaps\nunsatisfied, at any rate uncertain or cautious. As he was not led to\nembark upon the New Science by the direct call of political problems,1\nat least in the ordinary meaning of the phrase, he never descends from\nthe contemplations of the New Science to: the practical life, even\nin the form which it most usually takes with a philosopher, a work\nor short treatise criticising laws and institutions or suggesting\nimprovements. Even when he does dimly conceive the idea of a \"practical\naspect\" of his science, he never supposes that so far as he is\nconcerned it could ever exist except \"within the academies.\"\n\nPractical philosophy \"within the academies,\" that is to say, within the\nsphere of culture, is however still practical and political; and it is\nassuredly not the least important branch of politics. And a historian\nor philosopher can never entirely avoid it, though he can emphasise it\nmore or less and develop it more or less fully.\n\nVico does emphasise and develop it freely. The first expression of\nhis scientific life was precisely an examination of modern methods\nof study and education as compared with those of the ancients: an\nexamination which after various attempts and uncertainties in his first\ndiscoveries, took form in his University inaugural lecture of 1708, _De\nnostri temporis studiorum ratione._ In the following years, engaged as\nhe was upon the New Science, he gave no further public demonstration\nof his discontent with the prevailing tendency of studies; but he\nexpressed his feelings on the subject all the more often and all the\nmore strongly in private letters, and did not wish to pass over the\nquestion in his autobiography. We need not then infer his polemical\nattitude from hints and chance phrases of his chief work; since he has\nhimself more than once converted these hints into explicit statements\nand these chance phrases into leading propositions.\n\nThis polemic occupies two closely-related spheres corresponding to\nthe double aspect of the New Science as a Philosophy of Mind and a\nGeneralising Science. Under the first aspect Vico had vindicated\nthe claims of imagination, the imaginative universal, probability,\ncertitude, experience and authority, and therefore also of poetry,\nreligion, history, observation of nature, scholarship and tradition.\nUnder the second, he had traced a scheme of the natural development of\nthe mind both in the history of mankind and in that of the individual,\nwhich he brings into constant relation with the phases of history.\nHence his examination was bound to extend on the one hand to the mental\ncondition of his own time and on the other to the way in which the\neducation of children and young people was conceived and undertaken.\nIn both spheres Vico saw the same defects; he was met by the same and\nintellectualism which had made impossible the process of thought and\nhad mutilated and falsified the truth of human history.\n\nOn emerging from grammar-schools, boys were immediately plunged into\nlogic. The logic studied might be, according to the teacher's taste,\neither the scholastic or more often that composed by Arnauld and\ncalled the Port-Royal Logic, itself in substance Aristotelian and\nScholastic, but full of dry judgments concerning abstruse subjects in\nadvanced sciences and far removed from common knowledge; overloaded\nin fact with examples drawn from such sciences. Such a discipline was\nmeant to make boys critical and to eradicate from their minds not\nonly false, but even probable and plausible opinions. As a matter of\nfact it eradicated nothing, since their minds were still empty or\nscantily furnished, and unable to make any use of criticism for lack\nof matter to criticise. They were to be taught to judge before being\ntaught to apprehend, an order false to the natural course of ideas,\nwhich are first apprehended, then judged, and finally reasoned. The\nresult was that minds educated in this way became arid and unfruitful\nin development, and believed themselves capable of judging everything,\nwhile able to create nothing. They remained all their lives intensely\nacute in formal thinking, but incapable of any great labour; critical,\nin fact, but sterile. This caused not only unsoundness and arrogance of\njudgment but incapacity in practical life, dealings with men, and civil\neloquence, which is founded less upon criticism than upon plausibility,\nand attains its end by making opportune remarks, understanding the\npsychology of one's inter-locutor and acting in a manner adapted to it.\nVico himself had suffered from the logico-critical method of education.\nOne of his first teachers, the Jesuit Del Balzo, had put into his hands\nthe works of the epitomist Paulus Venetus: and his mind, being too weak\nas yet to cope with this kind of Chrysippean logic, almost broke down\nunder the strain; so that having given up his studies in despair it was\neighteen months before he resumed them. He preserved a happier memory\nof his youthful essays in poetry in the wildest style of the Neapolitan\nschool of Marino: a form of diversion, he says, almost necessary to\nthe mind of the young when metaphysic has rendered it too subtle and\ntoo rigid in precisely those years when the ardour of youth ought to\nlead the mind into errors, so as to save it from becoming chilly and\ndry. This age, the \"barbarism of intellect,\" vigorous in imagination\nand also, through the close connexion that exists between the two,\nin memory, requires to be nourished and exercised by the reading of\npoetry, history and rhetoric as well as by the study of languages. The\nart which it ought to learn is not criticism but \"topic,\" the true\nart of the \"_ingenium_\" or faculty of invention. By means of this art\nchildren acquire materials which enable them to form sound judgments in\nlater life; for sound judgment depends upon a complete knowledge of its\nsubject-matter, and \"topic\" is the art of discovering the whole content\nof any given thing. In this way young people simply by following the\ncourse of nature become at once philosophers and good speakers.\n\nSome antidote is doubtless necessary to the exuberance of the\nimagination. But this must be sought in linear geometry rather than in\nlogic: for geometry is to some extent pictorial in character, while it\nstrengthens the memory by the great number of its elements, ennobles\nthe imagination by the delicacy of its figures and stimulates the\ninventive faculty by forcing it to review all these figures in order to\nchoose those suitable to the demonstration of the quantity required.\nBut the whole value of geometry also was annulled by the method then\nin favour with the schools, the algebraic method; which like the\nscholastic logic numbs all the vigour of youthful faculties, obscures\nthe imagination, enfeebles the memory, and renders the inventive power\nand the understanding sluggish; thus damaging the liberal arts in four\ndistinct ways, in the knowledge of languages and history, in invention\nand in prudence. More particularly algebra is fatal to the inventive\nfaculty, because in using the algebraic method one is conscious only of\nthe immediate field of vision; it weakens the memory because once the\nsecond sign is found the first need no longer be remembered; it blinds\nthe imagination, because that faculty is not used at all; it destroys\nthe understanding, because it lays claim to the power of divination.\nYoung men who have devoted their time to it on proceeding to deal with\nthe affairs of civil life find themselves, to their great grief and\nremorse, unfitted for such a life. Hence, to make it useful in some\ndegree and to prevent these ill effects, it should be studied for a\nshort time only at the close of the mathematical course, and employed\nonly as a means of abbreviation. The habit of reasoning is formed much\nbetter by metaphysical analysis, which in all questions begins by\ntaking truth in the infinity of being, and then descends by degrees;\nthrough the genera of the substance, eliminating in every species that\nwhich the thing is not, till it arrives at the ultimate differentia\nconstituting the essence of the thing we wish to know.\n\nEducation as a whole was suffering from an excess of mathematics and\na lack of concreteness. As if boys, on emerging from academic life,\nwere to enter a human world composed of lines, numbers and algebraic\nsymbols, their heads were crammed with the magnificent phrases\n\"demonstration,\" \"demonstrative truth,\" and \"evidence,\" and the rule\nof probability was condemned; though this rule is the only guide of\nstatesmen in their counsels, generals in their campaigns, orators in\ntheir treatment of a cause, judges in giving a decision, physicians in\ntreating bodily diseases, and moralistic theologians in treating those\nof the conscience; the rule which the world accepts, and upon which\nit rests in all disputes and controversies, in all measures, and in\nall elections; which are universally determined by unanimity or the\nmajority of votes. Such an education bred up an empty and inflated\ngeneration, pedantry without wisdom and argument without truth.\n\nThe educators themselves, that is to say, the general atmosphere of\nculture, resembled this scheme of education. Poetry was dead. The\nanalytic methods had \"numbed\" (to repeat once more a word which Vico\nuses with great frequency and force) \"all the generosity of the better\npoetry.\" And indeed Europe was never so entirely barren of all poetic\ngrowth as it was in the first half of the eighteenth century. Italy\nwas reduced to the drama of Metastasio; France had produced no one to\nsucceed Corneille and Moli\u00e8re; in Spain the national drama, that great\noutburst of the national spirit, was dead, and a rationalism imitating\nthat of France was taking its place; England seemed to have entirely\nforgotten that she once gave birth to Shakespear, and even Germany was\nwasting her time over neo-classical imitations. Not only did nobody\ncreate new poetry, but nobody wanted it. The philosophers, following\nDescartes and Malebranche, had declared a war of extermination against\nall the faculties of the mind which depend upon sense, and especially\nagainst the imagination, which they hated as the source of every\nerror. They condemned the poets on the false pretext that they told\n\"fables,\" as if the fables they told were not those eternal properties\nof the human mind which to the political philosophers, economists and\nmoralists are the subject-matter of reasoning, and to the poets that of\nrepresentation.\n\nThe Cartesians also used their authority to belittle the study of\nlanguages. Did not Descartes say that the knowledge of Latin was no\ngreater knowledge than was possessed by Cicero's servant-girl? Serious\nscholarship in Latin and Greek had come to an end with the writers\nof the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; the study of oriental\nlanguages was confined to the Protestants; and Holland was the only\ncountry in which law was still a subject of research. The famous\nlibrary of Valletta at Naples, rich in the finest editions of Greek\nand Latin works, was generously bought by the fathers of the Oratory,\nbut for less than half its original value owing to the depreciation\nof books. In France the library of Cardinal Dubois found no purchaser\nand was sold in small lots. Princes no longer loved good Latin, and\nnone of them thought of preserving to posterity by the pen of pure\nLatin scholarship even an event so weighty as the War of the Spanish\nSuccession, comparable only to the second Punic war.\n\nNew methods were in great favour: but none of these could point to new\nfacts discovered by their help. New formulae, old facts; and instead of\nfacts, a futile hope of attaining universal knowledge in the shortest\ntime and with the smallest effort. Civil and political learning was\nneglected for physical science, and physical science for mathematical;\nexperience was almost ignored; the inventive thought of the previous\ncentury all but entirely exhausted. Scepticism, the result of the\nCartesian method, invaded the field of knowledge.\n\nThe whole of Europe was during this period still under the dominion\nof the French language, a language which differs from the Italian in\nits hostility to poetry and eloquence; rich, says Vico, in terms of\nsubstance, and consequently, since substance is a brutal and immobile\nthing and does not admit of comparisons, incapable of giving colour,\namplitude or weight to its statements; it resists inversion and is\nbarren of metaphor. The French have no periods but only members\nof periods: their prosody has no verse better than the so-called\nAlexandrine, a system of couplets more thin and lifeless than the\nelegiac: and their words admit of no accent except those on the last\ntwo syllables. French is a language incapable of the sublime, but well\nadapted to the petty: owing to its abundance of terms of substance or\nabstract terms it is adapted also to the didactic style, and instead of\neloquence it offers _esprit._ It was not unfitting that criticism and\nanalysis originated in France and made use of the French tongue.\n\nThe only possession of value which grew up day by day in all this\npoverty was the abstracts, the encyclopaedias, the dictionaries of\nscience which bore the names of such men as Bayle, Hoffmann and Moreri:\nthe idlest and most casual method of learning that could possibly\nbe devised. The genius of the age was more drawn towards expounding\nsecond-hand knowledge in an abbreviated form than towards attempting to\nenlarge its bounds. That seemed impossible: so men went on compiling\ndictionaries of mathematics. Every one felt a thirst for cheap science.\nTo be thought good, a book must be clear and simple, capable of being\ndiscussed with ladies as a pastime; if it demanded wide and copious\nerudition of the reader, and forced upon him the unpleasant exercise of\nthought and synthesis, it was condemned as unintelligible.\n\nThese dictionaries and abstracts recalled to Vico's mind the similar\nproducts of the Greek decadence, the anthologies, lexicons and\nencyclopaedias of Suidas, Stobaeus and Photius. The whole culture\nof his time seemed to him to be repeating the downfall of Greek\nscience, exhausting itself in a metaphysic either useless or harmful\nto civilisation and a mathematics engaged in investigating quantities\nintangible by rule and compass, and incapable of application. Like\nothers among the best minds of his country he was persuaded that\nthe republic of letters was approaching dissolution, if the divine\nprovidence failed by one of its innumerable secret paths to infuse\nnew vigour into it. Where was now the wise man, the real \"_sapiens_\"\nwhom Vico had found in history, first in the barbaric figure of the\ntheologian-poet, then in the civilised and rational figure of Greek\nphilosopher and Roman jurist, the man whom for to-day he hoped to find\nin the master of eloquence like himself, called to give unity, life and\npower to all knowledge? Wisdom is indeed not this or that science, nor\nyet the sum total of science; it is the faculty which rules over all\nstudies and by which all the sciences and arts that go to make humanity\nare acquired. And since man is both thought and spirit, intellect and\nwill, it must satisfy both these sides of man, the second as a result\nof the first: it must teach the knowledge of divine things, to bring\nto perfection things human. The wise man is man in his totality and\nentirety, the whole man.\n\nThe ideal is no doubt lofty, and the criticism upon the educational\nmethod and tendencies of thought current in his age are, no doubt,\nperfectly just. And yet among all these admirable truths, far in\nadvance of the eighteenth century as they are, we feel in Vico the\neducationalist and critic something of the reactionary. We feel\nthat, in his exclusive care for the fate of the highest and most\naustere science and his exclusive attention to the most complete\nform of human life, he failed to grasp the revolutionary importance\nof this scepticism or rationalism, this rebellion against the past,\nthe necessary weapon of a warfare against kings, nobles and priests;\nof these abstracts and dictionaries which were to develop into the\nEncyclopaedia; of this popular science, the forerunner of journalism,\nand these booklets for the use of ladies in fashionable conversation\nwhich were the nourishment of the eighteenth-century salons and\nprepared men's minds for the radicalism of the Jacobins. We feel in\nhim here as in his philosophical system, the Catholic chained to the\nphilosopher, the Christian pessimist weighing down the dialectic\nof immanence. Unable to realise his adversaries' progress, he does\nnot comprehend their real nature as lower than himself, but yet\nconstituting steps leading up to himself, steps which he ought to\nhave traversed in order to attain a truer understanding and grasp\nof himself. His polemical attitude towards the culture of his time\ncompletes and confirms the analysis already given of the merits and\ndefects of his philosophy.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XX\n\n\nCONCLUSION: VICO AND THE LATER DEVELOPMENTS OF PHILOSOPHICAL AND\nHISTORICAL THOUGHT\n\n\nThe reader need not expect that having brought our exposition to\na close we shall add a verdict upon Vico's work, or what is known\nas an \"appreciation\" of it. If the verdict has not already emerged\nas a result of the exposition itself, or as identical with it, if\ndescription and criticism have been not one and same, the fault lies\neither with ourselves or with the reader's lack of attention; and\nin either case it cannot now be repaired by ornamental additions or\nredundant repetitions.\n\nWe confess also that we feel no sympathy with the chapters commonly\nplaced at the conclusion of critical works upon philosophers and\nnarrating the later history of their ideas. For if these \"ideas\" are\nunderstood in an extrinsic sense, in their influence upon society and\nculture, such a review may indeed have a value of its own,[1] but is\nforeign to the history of philosophy properly so called: if on the\nother hand they are considered as real and living philosophical ideas,\ntheir later history amounts to neither more nor less than the history\nof subsequent philosophy, and there is no reason for appending it to a\nstudy of one philosopher rather than another. Any other method implies\nthe uncritical theory that ideas are something solid and crystallised,\nlike precious stones handed on from one generation to another, whose\nshape and glitter can always be recognised unaltered in the new diadems\nthey compose and the new brows they adorn. But in reality ideas are\nnothing but the unremitting thought of man, and transmission for them\nis nothing less than transformation.\n\nIt is nevertheless a fact that no one has written on Vico without\nfeeling a need of casting his eyes over later years and noting the\nresemblances and analogies between the Neapolitan philosopher's\ndoctrines and those of fifty or a hundred years after. And further,\nwe ourselves, in spite of the antipathy we admittedly feel, and the\nmethodical criteria we professedly employ, yet recognise now the\nsame necessity. Why is this? Because Vico in his own day passed for\nan eccentric and lived as a recluse; because the later development of\nthought was almost entirely untouched by his direct influence; because\neven to-day, though well enough known in certain restricted circles,\nhe has not taken the place he deserves in the general history of\nthought. How then can we show the manner in which his doctrines, true\nor false, respond to the deepest needs of the mind, more simply than by\nrecording the similarity of the ideas and attempts which later appeared\nin such profusion and intensity as to stamp their individuality upon\nthe philosophical and historical labours of a whole century? And even\nif after our intrinsic examination of his thought this comparison with\nthe facts of later history seems unnecessary, it will at least be\ngranted that if our discourse like any other must have its rhetorical\nconclusion, no peroration occurs more naturally than one consisting in\na rapid review of subsequent philosophy and philology and emphasising\ntheir points of contact with the thought of Vico.\n\nWe might even adopt the method by which he compares the second\nbarbarism with the first, and present the later history of thought\nas a \"reflux\" of Vico's ideas. In the first place his criticism of\nDescartes' immediate knowledge recurs, together with his conversion\nof the true with the created, in the speculative movement beginning\nwith Kant and Hegel and culminating in the doctrine of the identity of\ntruth and reality, thought and existence. His unity of philosophy and\nphilology recurs in the vindication of history against the scepticism\nand intellectualism of the eighteenth century due to Cartesianism;\nin the \u00e0 priori synthesis of Kant which reconciles the real and the\nideal, experience and the categories; and in the historical philosophy\nof Hegel, the greatest exponent of nineteenth-century historical\ntendencies. This unity of philosophy and philology, a unity with Vico\nsometimes confused and impure in method, recurred in its faulty aspects\nalso in the Hegelian school; so that this mental tendency might with\njustice be entitled \"Vicianism.\" The limitation which Vico tried to\nimpose on the value of mathematics and exact science recurred, as\ndid his criticism of the mathematical and naturalistic conception of\nphilosophy, in Jacobi's critique of Spinozistic determinism and Hegel's\nof the abstract intellect; and in the case of mathematics in particular\nDugald Stewart and others recognised that its validity lay not in the\npostulates but in the definitions, and the \"fictions\" of which Vico\nspeaks reappear in the modern terminology of the philosophy of these\nsciences. His poetical logic or science of the imagination passes\ninto Aesthetic, so ardently studied by the philosophers, literary men\nand artists of Germany in the eighteenth century, brought by Kant\ninto great prominence by his criticism of the Leibnitian doctrine of\nintuition as confused conception, and further advanced by Schelling and\nHegel, who place art among the pure forms of the mind and so approach\nthe position of Vico. Romanticism too, especially in Germany but also\nmore or less in other countries, was Vician, emphasising as it did\nthe original function of the imagination. His doctrines of language\nrecurred when Herder and Humboldt treated it not intellectualistically\nas an artificial system of symbols, but as a free and poetic creation\nof the mind. The theory of religion and mythology abandoned the\nhypotheses of allegory and deception, and with David Hume recognised\nthat religion is a natural fact, corresponding to the beginnings of\nhuman life in its passionate and imaginative state; with Heyne, that\nmythology is \"symbolic speech,\" a product not of arbitrary invention\nbut of necessity and poverty, of the \"lack of words,\" which finds\nexpression \"in comparisons with things already known\" (_per rerum iam\ntum notarum similitudines);_ and with Ottfried M\u00fcller, that it is\nimpossible to understand mythology without entering into the very heart\nof the human soul, where we may see its necessity and spontaneity.\nReligion was regarded no longer as something extraneous or hostile to\nphilosophy, as a piece of stupidity or of deception practised by the\nunscrupulous upon the simple, but according to Vico's own doctrine\nas a rudimentary philosophy; so that the whole content of reasoned\nmetaphysic was already to a certain extent implicit in poetical or\nreligious metaphysic. Similarly, poetry and history were no longer kept\ndistinct or set face to face to destroy each other; and as one of the\ngreat inspirers of the new German literature, Hamann (who in many ways\nresembles Vico in tendency, though unequal to him in mental power),\nhad already foreseen when he uttered the warning, \"if our poetry\nis worthless, our history will become leaner than Pharaoh's kine,\"\na breath of poetry revived the historical study of the nineteenth\ncentury; once colourless, it became picturesque: once frigid, it\nregained warmth and life. The criticism of Hobbes' and Locke's\nutilitarianism, and the affirmation of the moral consciousness as a\nspontaneous sense of shame and a judgment entirely free from reflection\nreappeared in full panoply with the Critique of the Practical Reason;\nand that of their social atomism and consequent contractualism in\nHegel's Philosophy of Right. The liberty of conscience and religious\nindifferentism professed and inculcated by the publicists of the\nseventeenth century were negated as a philosophical doctrine; and a\nnation without God seemed to Hegel, as it did to Vico, a phenomenon not\nto be found in history and existing only in the gossip of travellers in\nunknown or little-known lands. Carrying on the work of the Reformation,\nwhich Vico could neither grasp nor truly appreciate, the idealistic\nphilosophy of Germany aimed not at exterminating religion, but at\nrefining it, and at giving philosophy itself the spiritual value of\nreligion. The certitude, the hard certitude which Vico distinguished\nfrom truth in the sphere of law, formed the subject of thought from\nThomasius to Kant and Fichte and so on to the most recent writers, who\nhave sought even if they have never found the distinctive criterion\nof the two forms; all or nearly all show a vivid consciousness of\nwhat is called \"constraint\" or \"compulsion,\" a fact which had been\nalmost forgotten in the old superficial and rhetorical moral theory.\nThe historical school of law, in its reaction against the abstract\nrevolutionary and reformatory tendencies of the eighteenth century,\nwas bound to recall Vico's polemic against the Platonic or Grotian\ntheory of an ideal republic or a natural law above and outside history\nand serving as a standard for history, and to recognise with Vico that\nlaw is correlative to the whole social life of a people at a given\nmoment of its history and capable of being judged only in relation to\nit; a living and plastic reality, in a continual process of change\nlike that of language. Finally, Vico's providence, the rationality\nand objectivity of history, which obeys a logic different from that\nattributed to it by the fancies and illusions of the individual,\nacquires a more prosaic name, but without changing its nature, in\nthe \"cunning of the reason\" formulated by Hegel: it appeared again,\ningeniously but perversely treated, in Schopenhauer's \"cunning of\nthe species,\" and again, treated with little ingenuity on a purely\npsychological method, in Wundt's so-called law of the \"heterogenesis of\nends.\"\n\nAlmost all the leading doctrines of nineteenth-century idealism, we\nhave seen, may be regarded as refluxes of Vician doctrines. Almost\nall; for there is one of which we find in Vico not the premonition but\nthe necessity, not a temporary filling but a gap to be filled. Here\nthe nineteenth century is no longer a reflux of, but an advance upon\nVico; and discordant voices of warning or reproach rise up against\nhim. His distinction of the two worlds of mind and nature, to both of\nwhich the criterion of his theory of knowledge, the conversion of the\ntruth with the thing created, was applicable, but applicable to the\nformer by man himself because that world is a world created by man,\nand therefore knowable by him, to the second by God the Creator, so\nthat this world is unknowable by man; this distinction was not accepted\nby the new philosophy, which, more Vician than Vico, made the demigod\nMan into a God, lifted human thought to the level of universal mind or\nthe idea, spiritualised or idealised nature, and tried to understand\nit speculatively in the \"Philosophy of Nature\" as itself a product of\nmind. As soon as the last remnant of transcendence was in this way\ndestroyed, the concept of progress overlooked by Vico and grasped and\naffirmed to some extent by the Cartesians and their eighteenth-century\nfollowers in their superficial and rationalistic manner shone out in\nits full splendour.\n\nBut if in this point Vico cannot stand the comparison with later\nphilosophy, the failure is amply atoned by the full agreement\nbetween his historical discoveries and the criticism and research\nof the nineteenth century. Above all, he agrees with his successors\nin his rules of method, his scepticism as regards the narrative of\nancient historians, his recognition of the superiority of documents\nand monuments over narrative, his investigation of language as a\nstore-house of primitive beliefs and customs, his social interpretation\nof mythology, his emphasis on spontaneous development rather than\nexternal communication of civilisation, his care not to interpret\nprimitive psychology in the light of modern psychology; and so on.\nIn his actual solutions of historical problems he also agrees with\nlater historians. These restated the archaic and barbaric character\nof primitive Greek and Roman civilisation, and the aristocratic and\nfeudal tendency of its political constitution: they took up the view\nof ancient legal ceremonial as a dramatic poem containing allusions to\nthe actions of fighting: the transformation of the Roman heroes into\nheroes of democracy came to an end with the Jacobins in France and\ntheir imitators in Italy and elsewhere; Homer was considered great in\nproportion to his ruggedness; the history of Rome was reconstructed\nchiefly on the basis of Roman law, and the names of the seven kings\nappeared as symbols of institutions and the traditional origin of\nRome as a late invention derived from Greece or from Greek models:\nthe substance of this history was seen to consist in the economic and\njuridical struggle between patriciate and plebs, and the plebs was\nderived from the _famuli_ or clients: the struggle of the classes,\nwhich Vico was the first to illuminate clearly, was recognised as a\ncriterion of wide application to the history of all time and serving\nas an explanation of the most sweeping social revolutions: the Middle\nAges, especially during the Restoration which followed the Napoleonic\nperiod, exercised a powerful appeal to sentiment and influence\non thought, being admired and regretted as the antithesis of the\nrationalistic bourgeois society, and understood in consequence as the\nreligious, aristocratic and poetical period discovered by Vico, the\nyouth of modern Europe. Thus Italy rediscovered the greatness of her\nown Dante, and the criticism of that poet which Vico had initiated\nwas carried to completion by De Sanctis. In the same way, Niebuhr and\nMommsen brought to maturity his view of Roman history; Wolf, his theory\nof Homer; Heyne, M\u00fcller and Bachhofen, his interpretation of mythology;\nGrimm and other philologists his projected reconstruction of ancient\nlife by means of etymology; Savigny and the historical school, his\nstudy of the spontaneous development of law, and his preference for\ncustom rather than statute and code: Thierry and Fustel de Coulanges in\nFrance, Troya in Italy and a host of scholars in Germany his conception\nof the Middle Ages and of feudalism: Marx and Sorel his idea of the\nstruggle of classes and the rejuvenation of society by a return to a\nprimitive state of mind and a new barbarism: and lastly the superman\nof Nietzsche recalls in some degree Vico's hero. These are merely a\nfew names picked without care and almost at random; for to mention\nall, and each in his right place, would mean writing the whole history\nof the latest phase of European thought, a history which is not yet\nfinished, though it has undergone, under the name of \"positivism,\" a\nparenthetical recurrence of the abstract and materialistic thought of\nthe eighteenth century, a parenthesis which now however seems to be at\nan end.\n\nThese innumerable reappearances of the work of an individual in the\nwork of several generations, this parallelism between a man and a\ncentury, justify a fanciful phrase with which we might draw from the\nlater developments in order to describe Vico; namely that he is neither\nmore nor less than the nineteenth century in germ. The description may\nserve to summarise our reconstruction and exposition of his doctrines,\nand to contribute towards a right understanding of his place in the\nhistory of modern philosophy. He may rightly be placed side by side\nwith Leibniz, with whom he has so often been compared; but not, as\nhas been believed, because of any resemblance (the comparisons made in\nthis belief have been shown to be false or superficial) but precisely\nbecause he is unlike him and in fact his very opposite. Leibniz is\nCartesianism raised to its highest power; an intellectualist, in spite\nof the _petites perceptions_ and the confused knowledge; a mechanicist,\nin spite of his dynamism, which perhaps exists in his fancy rather than\nin his actual thought; hostile to history, in spite of his immense\nhistorical erudition; blind to any knowledge of the true nature of\nlanguage, though deeply interested in language all his life; devoid of\ndialectic, in spite of his attempt to explain the evil in the universe.\nIn relation to later idealism, the Leibnitian philosophy stands as\nthe most complete expression of the old metaphysic which had to be\ntranscended: that of Vico is the sketch of the new metaphysic, only\nneeding further development and determination. The one spoke to his own\ncentury, and his century crowded round him and echoed his words far and\nwide. The other spoke to a century yet to come; and the place in which\nhe cried was a wilderness that gave no answer. But the crowd and the\nwilderness add nothing to and take nothing from the intrinsic character\nof a thought.\n\n\n[Footnote 1: See Appendix II.]\n\n\n\n\nAPPENDICES\n\n\n\n\nAPPENDIX I\n\n\nON THE LIFE AND CHARACTER OF G. B. VICO[1]\n\n\nI\n\nThe transformation, half rhetorical, half mythical, which the heat of\nthe national reawakening effected in poets, philosophers, and almost\nevery character of any importance in Italian history, representing\nthem as patriots, liberals, and in open rebellion or secret revolt\nagainst the throne and the altar, tried for a time to touch with its\nmagic wand and to work its will upon Giambattista Vico. It was said,\namong other things, that Vico, conscious of the severe blow dealt by\nhis thought to the traditional beliefs of religion, and warned by his\nfriends, took pains to plunge the New Science into such obscurity\nthat only the finest intellects could perceive its tendencies. But\nthough this legend, energetically spread as it was by the patriots and\nrepublicans of 1799, was believed here and there, it could not long\nstand out against criticism or even against common sense; and Cataldo\nIannelli was right to pass over it with a few words of contemptuous\nirony.[2] It is certain from an objective point of view that Vico's\ndoctrines implicitly contained a criticism of Christian transcendence\nand theology as well as of the history of Christianity. From the\nsubjective point of view it may be that Vico during his youth (of which\nwe know very little) was the victim of religious doubts. Such doubts\nmay have been suggested to him not only by his reading, but by the\nsociety of young men of his own age, among whom \"libertines,\" or as\ncontemporary literature still called them \"epicureans\" or \"atheists,\"\nwere not uncommon.[3] In a letter of 1720 to Father Giacchi, he says\nthat at Naples the \"weaknesses and errors dating from his early youth\"\nare remembered against him, and that these, fixed in the memory, became\nas often happens \"eternal criteria for the judgment of everything\nbeautiful and complete which he subsequently succeeded in doing.\"[4]\nWhat can these errors and weaknesses have been?\n\nAgain when the _De universi iuris uno principio et fine uno_ appeared,\nor rather the \"Synopsis\" which announced its programme, \"the first\nvoices\" which Vico heard raised against him \"were tinged with an\nassumed piety.\" He found protection and consolation in the face of\nsuch criticism in religion itself, that is to say in the approval of\nGiacchi, \"the leading light of the strictest and most holy order of\nreligious.\"[5] But just as we possess no detailed information as to the\ncriticisms levelled against him on this head, so we have no certain\nknowledge even of the most general kind as to the religious doubts that\nmay have troubled him. All Vico's writings show the Catholic religion\nestablished in his heart, grave, solid and immovable as a pillar of\nadamant; so solid and so strong that it remained absolutely untouched\nby the criticism of mythology inaugurated by himself. Nor was Vico\nan irreproachable Catholic in external demonstration only. He not\nonly submitted every word he ever printed to the double censorship,\npublic and private, of ecclesiastical friends, and led his life as a\nphilosopher and writer among priestly vestments and monastic cowls no\nless than among legal gowns; he was even scrupulous enough to desist\nfrom his commentary on Grotius, thinking it unseemly that a Catholic\nshould annotate a Protestant writer;[6] and so delicate was his sense\nof Catholic honour that he refused to admit polemic upon matters of\nreligious feeling. \"As to this difficulty,\" he says to his critics\nof the _Giornale dei letterati_, \"like that which you propound to me\nconcerning the immortality of the soul, where it appears that you have\nin hand seven distinct arguments, if they had not been prepared for me\nby you, I should judge that they go deeper and penetrate to a region\nwhich is not only protected and secured by my life and conduct, but\nwhich to defend is to outrage. But let us return to our subject.\"[7]\nHis Catholicism was untainted by the superstition so general and so\ndeeply rooted at the time, especially at Naples, where St. Januarius\nintervened as an actor and director in every event of public and\nprivate life. It was the Catholicism of a lofty soul and mind, not the\nfaith of a charcoal-burner. But Vico never assumed the part of censor\nof superstitions. He was content with not speaking of them, as one\nkeeps silence concerning the failings of persons or institutions which\ncommand one's respect.\n\n\n[Footnote 1: Since the preceding portions of this work are strictly\nconfined to the analysis of Vico's philosophy and give no information\nas to his life and personal character, the reader will not be\ndispleased to find in this appendix a lecture delivered by myself upon\nthe latter subject before the Neapolitan _Societ\u00e0 di storia patria_ on\nApril 14, 1909, and later written down and published in the Florence\n_Voce_(1st year, No. 43, October 7, 1909). I add for convenience of\nmemory that Vico was born at Naples on June 23, 1668 (not 1670 as he\nsays in his autobiography), and died on January 23 (not 20 as all\nhis biographers say), 1744: the new edition of the _Autobiografia,\ncarteggio e poesie varie_ (Bari, Laterza, 1911), pp. 101, 123, 124.]\n\n[Footnote 2: See for the whole question Croce, _Bibliografia vichiana,_\npp. 91-5.]\n\n[Footnote 3: In the _Giornali_ of Confuorto (MSS. in the library of\nthe Neapolitan Historical Soc. xx. c. 22, vol. iii. f. 111) under\nAugust 1692, we find \"certain civil persons were imprisoned in the\nprisons of St. Dominic by the tribunal of the Holy Office; among them\nthe doctor Giacinto de Cristofaro, son of the doctor Bernardo; many\nothers escaped, members of the Epicurean or Atheist sect, who believe\nthe soul to perish with the body.\" This De Cristofaro is the famous\nNeapolitan mathematician and jurisconsult, for whom see F. Amodeo,\n_Vita matematica napoletana,_ part iii. (Naples, Giannini, 1905), pp.\n31-44; he was Vico's friend. For other notices of the \"Epicureans\" at\nNaples at this time see Carducci, _Opere,_ vol. ii. pp. 235-6.]\n\n[Footnote 4: Letter of October 12, 1720.]\n\n[Footnote 5: _Ibid._]\n\n[Footnote 6: _Autobiografia,_ in _Opere,_ ed. Ferrari, 2nd ed. iv. p.\n367.]\n\n[Footnote 7: The \"subject\" is therefore not the religious objections,\nwhich he regarded as a personal insult (_Riposta al Giornale dei\nletterati,_ in _Opp._ ii. p. 160).]\n\n\n\nII\n\n\nVico's attitude towards social and political life resembles in more\nthan one respect his attitude towards religion. There is in him\nno trace of the missionary, the propagandist, the agitator or the\nconspirator as there was in some of the Renaissance philosophers,\nnotably Giordano Bruno and Campanella, whom although--perhaps\nbecause--a Neapolitan, Vico never mentions. Certainly, his age and his\ncountry were not the time or place for heroes; there was none of that\nrapid social change and revolution from which heroes spring. Political\nparties however were active in favour of Austria and France, and men\nwere arising who devoted their labours and their lives to one or other\nof these parties, or were persecuted and fled into exile: and above all\nthis was the period in which culminated the struggle between Church\nand State, between Naples and Rome, in the person of Pietro Giannone,\na man of whom Vico never speaks, just as he never mentions and in fact\nseems to ignore the entire movement. Political life rolled past over\nhis head, like the sky and its stars, and he never wasted his strength\nin a vain attempt to reach it. Political and social controversy, like\nreligious, was outside the sphere of his activity. He was indeed a\nnon-political person. We cannot describe it as a fault or a weakness,\nfor every one has his limitations; one struggle excludes another, and\none labour makes others impossible.\n\nNot that he avoided all contact with political life and its\nrepresentatives. Only too often he was compelled to pay his respects\nto both, in the form of histories, speeches, verses and epigrams in\nLatin and Italian; and these alone would be sufficient material for the\nreconstruction of Neapolitan history in all its vicissitudes from the\nend of the seventeenth century to the middle of the eighteenth: the\nSpanish viceregency, the conspiracy and revolution attempted by the\npartisans of Austria, the reaction and re-establishment of the Spanish\nviceregency, the Austrian conquest, the Austrian viceregency, the\nSpanish reconquest and the reign of Charles Bourbon. But Vico, \"very\npliant because of his necessity\"[8] and as professor of eloquence in\nthe royal university, was compelled to supply the literary compositions\nrequired by the solemnities of the day, just as the draper supplied\nhangings and the plasterer volutes and arabesques. And what hangings\nand arabesques he produced! The Spanish style of the seventeenth\ncentury was still predominant in literature; and this fact is alone\nalmost enough to explain the extravagance and ornateness, as it seems\nto us, of Vico's flood of panegyrics. The indifference and innocence of\nhis own attitude may be illustrated by the passage in his autobiography\nwhere after mentioning the _Panegyricus Philippo V inscriptus_ composed\nby himself to the order of the Spanish viceroy, the Duke of Ascalona,\nhe goes on as if it was a mere nothing, with no connexion but a simple\n\"soon after\": \"soon after, this kingdom having passed under the rule of\nAustria, the lord Count Wirrigo of Daun, at that time governor of the\nimperial armies in this country, _ordered me_\" to compose inscriptions\nfor the expiatory monuments to Guiseppe Capece and Carlo di Sangro,[9]\nthe two rebels against Philip V. executed by the previous government\nsome years before in the suppression of the conspiracy of Macchia\ndescribed by Vico from the Bourbon point of view in his _De Parthenopea\nconiuratione._\n\nBut this implies no baseness of character on Vico's part. It must\nbe said that in these writings of his, orator and panegyrist though\nhe is, he can never be called a flatterer. The flatterer, the man\nwithout a conscience, reviles and calumniates the enemies of the man\nhe is praising, or even strikes the conquered: and this is servility.\nBut Vico, who though he knew who the Italian or Neapolitan was that\nsent to the _Acta Lipsiensia_ the note injurious to himself, and\nmight easily have ruined him, since the note was anti-Catholic in\ntendency, generously refused to reveal his name,[10] gave no doubt his\nservices as professor of eloquence but refrained from trafficking in\nthe interests of the patrons whom he praised. Of the _Life of Antonio\nCarafa_ which he composed for a commission and married one of his\ndaughters on the proceeds, he says that the work was \"tempered by\nhonour towards the subject, reverence towards princes and the just\nclaims of truth.\"[11] And to return to the case of Capece and Sangro\nmentioned above, when he spoke in the _De Parthenopea coniuratione_\nof the death of these two enemies to the triumphant party, he shows\nhere too in various details the nobility of his spirit: of Capece, who\nrefused to surrender to the Spanish soldiers, he writes \"exposing his\nbreast to death, and demanding death with his warlike arms, he fell\nunrepentant, a most valiant manner of death, were it only honoured in\nits cause\" (_ostentans pectus neci eamque infensis armis efflagitans,\ninexoratus occubuit, fortissimum mortis genus si causa cohonestasset_).\nOf Sangro too, having reported the rumour that Louis XIV. sent him a\nreprieve which arrived too late, he adds: \"whence the condemned man,\nwho had already suffered the penalty, is the more to be pitied\" (_unde\nmaior damnati qui iam poenas persolverat, miseratio_).[12]\n\nHe must have known, and doubtless did know, that most of the persons\nwhose praises he composed were of very little worth. To read his\npanegyrics, one would suppose that Naples was adorned with a nobility\nresplendent in its virtue, cultivation and learning: and yet, in\ngiving Father De Vitry the information he desired upon the condition\nof studies in Naples, Vico did not conceal the facts: \"the nobles\nslumber amid the enjoyments of a life of pleasure.\"[13] His pupil\nAntonio Genovesi has preserved to us one of his satirical expressions\nupon this nobility, often in extreme poverty but always proud and\nready to go hungry at home in order to drive abroad in coaches\nsumptuously dressed.[14] With reference to the literary duke of\nLaurenzano, he formulated the theory that \"noble\" writers could not\nfail of excellence:[15] and yet I have discovered among his papers\nthe manuscript of a book by this duke, rewritten from end to end by\nthe same Vico.[16] Such are the contradictions and the transactions\ninto which a poor man falls when the pressure of want has made him\ntimid and cautious; so that it is not easy to determine how far his\nadmiration was merely assumed at command or by complaisance, or how\nfar his feeling of social inferiority developed into a real admiration\nfor those above him in the scale, who possessed riches and dignity and\neverything he lacked and were the \"seigneurs.\"\n\n[Footnote 8: _Opp._ vi. p. 20.]\n\n[Footnote 9: _Autob._ in _Opp._ iv. p. 394.]\n\n[Footnote 10: Letter of December 4, 1729: in _Opp._ vi. p. 32.]\n\n[Footnote 11: _Autob._ in _Opp._ iv. p. 366.]\n\n[Footnote 12: _Opp._ i. pp. 367, 368.]\n\n[Footnote 13: _Opp._ vi. p. 9.]\n\n[Footnote 14: He said that many of them \"dragged their carriages with\ntheir own guts\" (_Suppl. alla Bibl. vich._ p. 10).]\n\n[Footnote 15: _Opp._ vi. p. 95.]\n\n[Footnote 16: _Bibl. vich._ pp. 27-8.]\n\n\n\nIII\n\n\nFor, as is well known, his financial state was always of the gloomiest.\nThe son of a small Neapolitan bookseller, he was at first compelled to\ngo as a private tutor to a wild town of the Cilento; later, returning\nto Naples, he tried in vain to obtain the position of secretary of the\ncity, and having in 1699 been elected to the chair of rhetoric, he held\nthat position for thirty-six years at an annual stipend of a hundred\nducats (_\u00a317_). His attempt to pass to a chair of greater importance in\n1723 failed, whether owing to ill-luck or to inability--he recognised\nthat he was a \"man of little spirit in matters of utility,\"[17]--he was\ncompelled to give up hopes of academic advancement. He was therefore\nobliged to eke out his resources by literary work such as we have\nmentioned, and still more by private lessons; he not only kept school\nat his own house as well as at the university, but he went up and down\nother men's steps to teach grammar to youths or even to children. His\nfamily fife was not a happy one. His wife was illiterate, and had not\nthe qualities with which her sex sometimes compensates the defect;\nshe was incapable of any domestic employment whatever, so that her\nhusband had to take her place. Of his children, one girl died after a\nlong illness and the heavy expenses which embitter the diseases of the\npoor; one boy showed such strong vicious tendencies that the father was\ncompelled to seek the intervention of the police and place him in a\nhouse of correction. So sublimely irrational was his fatherly affection\nthat upon this occasion when he saw from the window the police officers\nhe had called in, coming to take his miserable and beloved son away, he\nran to him crying, \"my son, flee!\"[18]\n\nHe was indeed of an extremely affectionate disposition; a fact which\nmay be gathered for instance from the noble and touching speech he\ncomposed on the death of his friend Donna Angela Cimini, from the\ntone of pity and indignation with which in the _Scienza Nuova_ he\nspoke of the oppressed plebeians whose history he is investigating or\nof the tragic figures of Priam and Polyxena, the romance of which he\nfeels keenly; and finally, from certain stylistic details scattered\nhere and there, such as the aphorism (no. xl.) where he says that\nwitches in order to solemnise their rites \"slay without pity and\ncut in pieces most lovely and innocent children,\" quite upset, in\nthe most inopportune but significant fashion, by the fate of these\nlittle persons, whom his excited imagination adorns with a superlative\nloveliness. His greatest domestic happiness came from his daughter\nLuisa, a cultured and poetical soul, and his son Gennaro, who shared\nwith him and ultimately succeeded to his chair. When, in his panegyric\non the Countess of Althann, he calls ironically upon the philosophers\nwho dispute as they walk in pleasant gardens or beneath painted\nporticoes, free from the agony and weariness of \"wives in travail\" and\n\"children wasting away with disease,\"[19] we feel that he is speaking\nfrom his own experience and smarting under the memory of domestic\ntroubles.\n\nWe often meet, especially in these days, with men of some talent who\nconsider themselves freed from this or that humble duty: and we ought\nthe more to admire this man of genius who on the contrary accepted\nthem every one, and (to use a phrase of Flaubert's) while thinking the\nthought of a demigod lived the life of a townsman or even that of a man\nof the people. He had acquired the habit of reading, writing, thinking\nand composing his works \"while discussing matters with his friends\namid the uproar of his children.\"[20]\n\nHis health was never very good: his friends called him \"Mastro\nTisicuzzo\":[21] very weak in youth, he was in his old age afflicted\nwith ulcers in the throat and pains in his thighs and legs. In a word,\nthe repose, the peace, the tranquillity which other philosophers enjoy\nall their life or for long periods together was always lacking to Vico.\nHe was forced to play both Martha and Mary: working at every moment for\nhis own and his family's practical needs and working at the same time\nto fulfil the mission to which he was devoted from his birth and to\ngive concrete form to the spiritual world that moved within him.\n\n\n[Footnote 17: _Autob._ in _Opp._ iv. p. 349.]\n\n[Footnote 18: Villarosa in the additions to the _Autobiography (Opp._\niv. p. 420).]\n\n[Footnote 19: _Opp._ vi. p. 235.]\n\n[Footnote 20: _Autob._ in _Opp._ iv. p. 366.]\n\n[Footnote 21: \"Mr. Skin-and-bones\": cf. _Bibl. vich._ p. 87.]\n\n\n\nIV\n\n\nThus we need not invent or demand a heroic Vico, looking for him\nin the life of religion, society or politics. The true hero is the\nVico who stands before us, the hero of the philosophic life. Others\nbeside ourselves have noticed his love for the word \"hero\" and all\nits derivatives, \"heroism,\" \"heroic,\" and so on: and the continual\nuse and varied application he makes of it. Heroism was for him the\nmighty virgin force which appears in the beginning and reappears in the\nreflux of history. This force he must surely have felt in himself as\nhe laboured for the truth and, overthrowing obstacles of every kind,\nopened up new paths of science. It was this force that enabled him to\novercome the youthful uncertainties, fears and defeats which sometimes\nplunged him in a profound individual and cosmic pessimism, visible\nin the poem entitled \"Feelings of One in Despair,\" to rise to the\ncertainty of scientific method enunciated in the _De nostri temporis\nstudiorum ratione_ and his first attempt at philosophico-historical\nresearch represented by the _De antiquissima Italorum sapientia_;\nand from this point, abandoning in part his own thought and weaving\na new tissue of what remained, led him to the _De uno universi iuris\nprincipio et fine uno_ and to the _Scienza Nuova_ \"after twenty-five\nyears,\" as he says of the discoveries contained in that work, \"of\nunremitting and toilsome thought.\"\n\nThe work completed by this poor teacher of grammar and rhetoric, by\nthis pedagogue whom a contemporary satirist saw \"lean, with a rolling\neye, ferule in hand,\"[22] by this unhappy _paterfamilias,_ is amazing\nand almost terrifying; such is the mass of mental power compressed into\nit. It is a work at once reactionary and revolutionary: reactionary in\nrelation to the present, by its attachment to the traditions of the\nancient world and the Renaissance; revolutionary as against the present\nand the past in laying the foundations of that future later to be known\nas the Nineteenth century.\n\nWithin the domain of science, this humble man of the people became an\naristocrat: and the \"lordly style\"[23] which he falsely ascribed to the\nwretched writings of the proud nobles and pompous prelates of his day\nwas in reality his own. He loathed the polite and social literature\nwhich was gradually spreading in France and Italy and other European\ncountries, the \"ladies' books.\"[24] But he avoided no less that other\nclass of treatise which we nowadays call \"handbooks,\" which explain in\ndetail elementary definitions and facts ascertained by others; books\nuseless except to the young.[25] Vico, who suffered quite enough from\nthe young within the circle of his school, saw no need to sacrifice to\nthem any part of his own inviolable life of science. The public towards\nwhich he looked was not composed of boys, lords and ladies. When he\nwrote, his first practical thought was, \"what would a Plato, a Varro\nor a Quintus Mucius Scaevola think of the fruits of his thought?\" and\nsecondly, \"what will posterity think?\"[26] Among his contemporaries he\nlooked only at the republic of letters, the brotherhood of scholars,\nthe Academies of Europe: a public which did not require him to\nrepeat what had been already discovered and stated in the course of\nthe history of science, and was perfectly familiar to him, but only\ndemanded the exposition of such thoughts as constituted a real advance\nof knowledge: not voluminous works, but \"little books, all full of\noriginal things.\"[27] His public was an ideal one, which sometimes\nin his simplicity he confused with the actual professional scholars\nand the critics of literary reviews: and the mistake often caused him\nsurprise. Short books on metaphysical subjects seemed to him to have\na peculiar power, as in fact they have; he compares them very justly\nwith religious meditations \"which briefly set forth a small number of\npoints\" and are more valuable for the development of the Christian\nspirit than \"the most eloquent and lucid sermons of the most gifted\npreachers.\"[28] This love of brevity inspires his refusal to burden\nwith many books the republic of letters, which, he says, is already\nsinking beneath the weight. He left his discourses unpublished, only\nprinted his _De ratione_ out of a sense of duty, and often expressed a\ndesire that the _Scienza Nuova_ alone should survive him, as the work\nwhich summed up in itself the concentrated and perfected fruits of all\nhis earlier efforts.\n\nHis aristocratic ideal was accompanied by the loftiest dignity and the\nprofoundest loyalty in his conception of the life of science. From his\npolemics we might compile a whole catechism on the right method of\nconducting literary controversy. We must aim at victory, he says, not\nin the controversy but in the truth; hence he desires that it should\nbe conducted \"in the calmest manner of reasoning,\" because \"he who is\nstrong does not threaten, and he who is right does not use insults\";\nthe dispute must at any rate be interspersed with peaceful words\n\"showing that the minds of the disputants are placid and tranquil, not\nexcited and perturbed.\" To opponents whose objections are vague he\nreplies, \"the judgment is in too general terms: and serious men never\ndeign to reply except to particular and determinate criticisms made\nupon them.\" When these same opponents appeal to the \"refined taste of\nthe age, which has banished,\" etc., etc., he replies contemptuously,\n\"a grave criticism this, in truth: it is no criticism at all. In thus\ntaking refuge from one's opponents before the tribunal of one's own\njudgment, by saying that what they say is a thing of which one has no\nidea, from an opponent one becomes the judge.\" He refused to rely upon\nhis authorities, but yet did not undervalue them; authority ought to\n\"make us attentive to seek the causes which could have induced authors,\nespecially the most weighty, to adopt such and such opinions.\" Again,\naccused of attributing errors to philosophers so as to be able to\nrefute them with ease, like Aristotle, he protests with dignity: \"I\nwould rather enjoy my own small and simple stock of knowledge than be\ncompared in bad faith with a great philosopher.\" His moderation may be\nillustrated by his splendid eulogy of Descartes, though he spent the\nbest part of his mental powers in opposing him. His loyalty is shown\nby his prompt recognition of his own errors: \"I admit,\" he says at\none point to the critics of the _Giornale dei letterati_, \"that my\ndistinction is faulty.\"[29] \"The reader must not think it ostentatious\nin us\" (he writes in the second _Scienza Nuova_), \"that not satisfied\nwith the favourable judgments of such men as these upon our works,\nwe yet disapprove and reject these works. On the contrary, it is a\nproof of the high veneration and respect in which we hold these men.\nFor rude and haughty writers uphold their works even against the just\naccusations and reasonable corrections of others: some, who by chance\nare of a small spirit, sate themselves with the favourable judgments\nthey receive and because of these go no further towards perfection:\nbut in our case the praise of great minds has increased our courage to\namend, to complete, and even to recast in a better form this work of\nours.\"[30]\n\nHis scientific life was upright, worthy of a serious searcher after\ntruth; his emotional life disturbed and restless, worthy of one who\nsees face to face the truth he has long sought and desired, and\nrejoices in the power of laying it before mankind. Hence his lofty\npoetry, expressed not in verse but in prose, and especially in the\n_Scienza Nuova_. \"Vico is a poet,\" writes Tommaseo: \"he brings\nfire from smoke, and lively images from metaphysical abstractions:\nhe reasons as he narrates and depicts while he reasons: over the\nmountain-tops of thought he does not walk, he flies; and in one\nsentence he often compresses more lyrical feeling than may be found in\nmany an ode.\"[31] De Sanctis saw in the _Scienza Nuova_ the progress\nof a poem, almost a new _Divina commedia._ Sublime like Dante, he was\nmore severe than Dante himself; if the lips of the Ghibelline show at\ntimes the flicker of \"a passing smile,\" Vico looks at history with\na face \"that never smiles.\" Moreover, the man whose style has been\nso often criticised is not a commonplace writer; he was as careful a\nstudent of pure Tuscan[32] as he was a fine connoisseur, according to\nCapasso, of Latin phraseology.[33] But he was faulty in the arrangement\nof his books, because his mind did not master all the philosophical and\nhistorical material it had accumulated; he wrote carelessly because\nwildly and as if possessed by a demon: and hence arise the lack of\nproportion and the confusion in the various parts of his work, within\nsingle pages and single paragraphs. He often gives the impression of\na bottle of water quickly inverted, in which the liquid trying to\nissue forth so presses against the narrow opening \"that it comes out\npainfully, drop by drop.\" Painfully, by fragments, and disjointedly.\nOne idea while he is expressing it recalls another, that a fact, and\nthat another fact: he tries to say everything at once, and parenthesis\nbranches off into parenthesis in a manner to make one's brain reel. But\nthese chaotic periods, weighted as they are with original thoughts, are\nno less woven of striking phrases, statuesque words, phrases full of\nemotion, and picturesque images. A bad writer, if you will, but his is\nthe kind of bad writing of which only great writers possess the secret.\n\n\n[Footnote 22: _Bill. vich._ p. 82.]\n\n[Footnote 23: _Opp._ vi. p. 93.]\n\n[Footnote 24: _Ibid._ vi. p. 5.]\n\n[Footnote 25: _Ibid._ v. p. 50 (note).]\n\n[Footnote 26: _Ibid._ ii. p. 123.]\n\n[Footnote 27: _Ibid._ ii. p. 148.]\n\n[Footnote 28: For instance in his letter to Saliani, November 18,\n1725, published in _Bibl. vich._ pp. 97-8, the autograph being in my\npossession.]\n\n[Footnote 29: See the _Riposte_ in _Opp._ ii. _passim._]\n\n[Footnote 30: _Opp._ v. p. 10.]\n\n[Footnote 31: _G. B. Vico e il suo secolo_ in the volume _La Storia\ncivile nella letteratura_ (Turin, Loescher, 1872), p. 104: cf. a\njudgment on Vico as a writer, _ibid._ pp. 9-10.]\n\n[Footnote 32: _Opp._ iv. pp. 333-4; vi. pp. 41, 140.]\n\n[Footnote 33: _Bibl. vich._ p. 87.]\n\n\n\nV\n\n\nThe philosophical heroism of Vico asserts itself not only in the\ninternal struggle with himself for the elaboration of his science.\nIt was exposed to other and sterner trials. The position reached by\nhis thought, opposed as it was to the present, and while apparently\nreactionary turned in reality towards the future, inevitably prevented\nhim from being understood. No doubt this is the fate of every man\nof genius: his inmost thought is never understood, even when social\nfortune seems to favour him, even when he arouses enthusiasm and finds\na host of disciples and imitators. The words which Hegel is said\nto have uttered on his deathbed--\"one only of my pupils understood\nme, and he misunderstood me\"--admirably express this historical\nnecessity: the man whom his age fully understands dies with his age.\nAnd yet the disproportion between the value of a man's thought and\nhis contemporaries' failure to understand it has seldom if ever been\ngreater than in Vico's case. If he had been free from other causes of\ndiscontent, this alone would have been sufficient. The \"desire for\npraise,\" which in other than commonplace minds is a desire to see what\nthey think true and good shared, approved and universalised among other\nminds, was always with him a \"vain desire.\"\n\nHe was the more afflicted by this misunderstanding and indifference\nbecause, as we may well suppose, he was fully conscious of the\nimportance of his own discoveries. He knew that Providence had\nentrusted to him a lofty mission: he knew himself to be \"born for\nthe glory of his country, and therefore in Italy; since, being born\nthere and not in Morocco, he became a scholar.\"[34] When he published\nthe _Scienza Nuova,_ he believed that he had fired a mine whose\nloud explosion he expected every minute. Nothing happened: nobody\nmentioned it to him: so that he wrote some days later, to a friend:\n\"In publishing my work in this city I seem to have launched it upon a\ndesert. I avoid all public places, so as not to meet the persons to\nwhom I have sent it, and if by chance I do meet them, I greet them\nwithout stopping; for when this happens, these people give me not\nthe faintest sign that they have received my book, and so confirm my\nimpression of having published it in a wilderness.\"[35] He had frankly\nexpected a swift and immediate effect: he had hoped to find, among his\ncontemporaries and acquaintances at Naples, minds ready and intellects\nopen to receive and bear fruit of his thoughts: and he hoped this\nof monks engaged in composing and learning by rote wordy sermons,\npoetasters rhyming in sonnets and advocates compiling second-hand\nspeeches!\n\nInstead of this, he found many sceptical and indifferent, and several\ninclined to laugh. His _Diritto universale_ had been as Metastasio\ninforms us[36] generally \"blamed for obscurity\" on its publication; it\nwas not widely read and was hastily criticised for the extravagances\nwhich an inattentive and superficial reading revealed at every\npoint.[37] Father Paoli, to whom the author had given a copy, wrote in\nit a couplet making a joke of its unintelligibility.[38] The _Scienza\nNuova_ was in an even worse case. We know that Nicola Capasso, a\nscholar and well disposed towards Vico, on trying to read it fancied\nhe had lost his wits, and by way of a joke hurried off to his doctor\nCirillo, to have his pulse felt.[39] A Neapolitan nobleman when asked\nby Finetti at Venice what opinion was held of Vico at Naples, said that\nfor a time he had passed for a really learned man, but that later his\nstrange opinions had won him the reputation of an eccentric. \"And when\nhe published the _Scienza Nuova_?\" insisted Finetti. \"Oh, by then,\"\nreplied the other, \"he was quite mad!\"[40] His detractors even attacked\nhim in the modest profession by which he earned his living; they said\nhe was \"good at teaching youths who had completed their course, that\nis to say when they already knew all they needed,\" or again, more\ninsidiously, that he was fitted less for teaching than for \"giving good\nadvice to the teachers themselves;\"[41] so that they recognised his\nsuperiority only to use it in damaging his private interests.\n\n\n[Footnote 34: _Autob._ in _Opp._ iv. p. 385.]\n\n[Footnote 35: Letter to Giacchi, November 25, 1725, in _Opp._ vi. p.\n28.]\n\n[Footnote 36: _Bibl. vich._ p. 40.]\n\n[Footnote 37: _Opp._ vi. p. 20.]\n\n[Footnote 38: _Bibl. vich._ p. 26.]\n\n[Footnote 39: _Ibid._ p. 87.]\n\n[Footnote 40: _Bibl. vich._ p. 86: cf. _Autob._ in _Opp._ iv. p. 416.]\n\n[Footnote 41: _Autob._ in _Opp._ iv. p. 416.]\n\n\n\nVI\n\n\nThe indifference of the public and the insincerity or malignity\nof critics could not for Vico be compensated by the friends and\nappreciative readers of whom Vico had a certain number. How indeed\ncould it have been otherwise, when he cultivated them artificially\nwith such care and anxiety? Consider for instance the way in which\nhe cultivated the friendship of Giacchi the Capucin. He praised his\n\"admirable works,\" his \"most divine talents,\" the \"rare sublimity\" of\nhis \"marvellous and divine ideas.\" He tells him that he has given to\nthe scholars of the city the eulogistic letter sent to him by Giacchi\nand that they all admire \"the sublime workmanship of the conception\";\nand yet he himself used to rewrite in scholar's Latin the inscriptions\nGiacchi composed in monk's Latin![42] On another occasion he wrote that\nthe praises of a Giacchi had excited envy and had in certain quarters\nbeen described as flatteries. He took no less pains to propitiate\nthe Archbishop of Bari, Muzio di Gaeta, a conceited creature full\nof his own merits and incapable of speaking except about himself.\nMuzio wrote a panegyric on Pope Benedict XIII., a work of which,\nthough Vico praised it again and again, he had never heard enough,\nand was always covertly or openly demanding new praises. So Vico used\nto besprinkle him patiently with the desired fluid: \"the marvellous\nwork of Your Excellency\"; his \"lordly diction\"; his \"demosthenic\ndigressions\"; his eloquence, that philosophic speech employed in\nGreece by the Academic school, in Rome by Cicero, and \"among the\nItalians by none but Your Excellency!\" To the advocate Francesco\nSolla, who had been his pupil and had subsequently retired into the\ncountry, he hinted that the _Scienza Nuova_ looked towards him as one\nof the few men in the world possessed of a mind penetrating enough\nto receive it unhampered by any prejudices concerning the origin of\nmankind.[43] Such were the guileless artifices and the pitiful little\nschemes by which he contrived to give an illusory satisfaction to his\nthirst for recognition and praise, and a narcotic to his overwrought\nnerves. But the final results were miserable enough. Giacchi's\nletters contain not a word to show that he had ever grasped one of\nVico's doctrines or even that he had examined them with any serious\ninterest. Monsignor di Gaeta, after a labyrinth of circumlocutions,\nadmits that he \"admired more than he understood\" of Vico's works;[44]\nand possibly he was so much occupied in admiring his own prose that\nhe never read them at all. Solla, in whom Vico placed such hopes,\nthought the discourse on the death of Angela Cimini superior to all\nthe author's other works, including the _Scienza Nuova_ itself. Vico\nreceived a no less incautious compliment from another admirer; though\na warm and affectionate one,--Esteban.[45] Compliments of a vague and\nunintelligent kind sometimes reached him in return for the copies of\nhis works which he sent not only to Neapolitan scholars but to those\nof Rome, Pisa, Padua and even Germany, Holland and England: he sent a\ncopy to Isaac Newton.[46] Generally, however, these gifts were received\nin contemptuous silence. At most, Vico acquired the reputation of a\nscholar among hundreds of scholars, a man of letters among thousands of\nsimilar men; a learned man, but nothing more.\n\nAmong the modest, the insignificant, and the young, Vico no doubt had\nstrong admirers. Among these were the poet, later a sacred orator,\nGherardo de Angelis, Solla and Esteban whom we have mentioned, the monk\nNicola Concina of Padua, and some more. But though their affection\nwas strong their intelligence was weak. Even Concina admitted while\nrhapsodising his enthusiasm that he did not very clearly comprehend\nhis master: \"Oh, what fruitful and sublime lights are here! If only\nI had the talent to make use of them, to comprehend their depth and\nthe wonderful art of which I seem to catch a glimpse!\"[47] The best\nservice that these friends could do him was to soothe with kindly words\nVico's embittered spirit, if they could not do so by following his\ninmost thoughts. This is what Esteban does at the close of the letter\nin which he excuses himself for his foolish remark on the funeral\nspeech of Angela Cimini in phrases he must have gathered from the\nmaster's lips: \"Be confident, Sir, that Providence, through channels\nunimagined by yourself, will cause to spring up for you a perennial\nfountain of immortal glory!\"[48] The Jesuit Father Domenico Lodovico,\nwho wrote the couplet inscribed beneath Vico's portrait, on receiving\nthe _Scienza Nuova_ sent to the author with much sound sense a little\nwine from the cellar and a little bread from the oven of the Jesuit\nhouse of the Nunziatella, together with a graceful letter begging\nthe author to accept \"these trifles, simple as they are, since the\ninfant Jesus himself did not refuse the rude offerings of pastoral\npeasants.\" He suggested too that at the side of the alphabet in the\nsymbolic frontispiece to the work a little dwarf should be added in the\nposture of one dumb with astonishment like Dante's mountaineer, and\nthat beneath him should be written, \"with a significant diaeresis,\"\nthe name Lodo-vico![49] Among the young men of his school there were\nsome who, nourished upon his doctrines, were ready to defend their\nmaster with their swords;[50] but we all know the value of these\nyouthful enthusiasms. If these scholars had really assimilated Vico's\ndoctrines or any part of them, we should have found traces of it in\nthe literature or culture of the next generation after Vico; but such\ntraces are entirely absent. Hardly a single one of his formulae, his\nhistorical statements, or conceptions even superficially understood\nis to be found in Conti at Venice, Concina at Padua, Ignazio Luzan\nin Spain--though the last named was living at Naples when the\n_Scienza Nuova_ was published;[51] or even, within the author's own\nneighbourhood, in Genovesi or Galiani.\n\nEnvy, insincerity, gossip, calumny and stupidity provoked violent\noutbursts of anger on Vico's part. He confesses this fault in his\nautobiography where he says that he inveighed in too severe a manner\nagainst the errors of conception or doctrine or the incivility of his\nliterary rivals, when in Christian charity and as a true philosopher\nhe ought to have ignored or pardoned them.[52] But as a matter of fact\nthis fault did not greatly distress him: he thought it rather an\nornament. The funeral speech for Angela Cimini contained a kind of hymn\nto anger, the \"heroic wrath which in noble spirits disturbs and shakes\nto the depths by its boiling all those evil thoughts of the mind,\nwhich beget the vile swarm of fraud, deceit and falsehood, and renders\nthe hero frank, truthful and loyal; and thus making him a partisan of\ntruth, arms him as the valiant knight of reason to do battle with wrong\nand offence.\"[53]\n\nAlthough in his writings he guards \"with all his power\" against falling\ninto this passion[54] we feel a scarcely repressed torrent of wrath in\nhis private letters whenever he denounces the \"miserable pedants\" who\n\"love learning more than truth,\" or the common tendency of man to be\n\"all memory and imagination,\" and so forth. In conversation also, it\nseems, he could be very violent. When in 1736 Damiano Romano published\na work controverting his theory of the Twelve Tables, Vico, although\naccording to Romano himself he had been spoken of as \"most learned\"\nand \"most famous,\" together with other titles of respect, \"tore the\nbook to pieces with his teeth in a way that made every one present\ntremble with horror,\" rinding a sign of the deepest malignity in the\nfact that \"a lad like myself should join issue with him.\"[55] But his\noutbursts of wrath were succeeded by fits of the deepest dejection. In\na sonnet he speaks of himself as over-whelmed by that fate \"which the\nunjust hate of others often creates,\" and says that for this reason he\nhas separated himself from human society to live with himself alone.\nSometimes he shakes off this torpor for a moment: then, he says:\n\nI draw within myself again, and pressed\nBy heavy cares, return to where I stood:[56]\nMy fate and not my fault I do lament.\n\n[Footnote 42: Published by me in _Napoli nobilis,_ xiii. (1904), f. 1.,\nand again in _Secondo suppl. alla Bibl. vich._ pp. 70-2.]\n\n[Footnote 43: _Opp._ vi. p. 17.]\n\n[Footnote 44: _Bibl. vich._ pp. 103-5.]\n\n[Footnote 45: _Opp._ vi. p. 145.]\n\n[Footnote 46: _Ibid._ p. 110.]\n\n[Footnote 47: _Opusc.,_ ed. Villarosa, ii. p. 277.]\n\n[Footnote 48: _Bibl. vich._ p. 105.]\n\n[Footnote 49: \"I praise Vico.\" Letter published by me in _Bibl. vich._\np. 107.]\n\n[Footnote 50: _Bibl. vich._ pp. 87-8.]\n\n[Footnote 51: _Ibid._ p. 44.]\n\n[Footnote 52: _Autob._ in _Opp._ iv. p. 416: cf. the evidence of a\npupil in _Bibl. vich._ p. 89.]\n\n[Footnote 53: _Opp._ vi. p. 254.]\n\n[Footnote 54: _Autob._ in _Opp._ iv. p. 416.]\n\n[Footnote 55: _Bibl. vich._ p. 88.]\n\n[Footnote 56: Sonnet published by G. Gentile, _Il Figlio di G. B. Vico_\n(Naples, Pierro, 1905), p. 173.]\n\n\n\nVII\n\n\nBut among all these troubles, obstacles and disappointments, in\nthe midst of this sadness which often draped his life in black,\nVico enjoyed one of the loftiest joys accessible to man; the \"life\nof meditation\" freed and purified from passion, lived by man in\nsolitude without the turbulent and grievous company of the body:\nthe life of security, because it is \"made one with the soul always\nready and present which shows man his being rooted in the Eternal\nthat measures all times and walking in the Infinite that comprehends\nall finite things; it crowns him with an eternal and immeasurable\njoy not restricted invidiously to certain places nor grudgingly to\ncertain times; but it can grow up within himself only if without envy\nof rivalry or fear of diminution it spreads and communicates itself\nunceasingly to more and more human minds.\"[57] That he has attained\ntruth he never doubts, though he never ceases to elaborate it further;\nwith the system presented in the work on _Universal Law,_ his mind,\nhe says, \"rested content.\"[58] The weariness and even the pain he\nhad suffered were dear to him, because through them he arrived at\nhis discoveries: \"I bless the twenty-five full years I have spent\nin meditation upon this subject, in the midst of the adversities of\nfortune and the checks I have often received from the unhappy example\nof great thinkers who have attempted new and weighty discoveries.\"[59]\nHow could he have done anything but bless these fatigues, pains and\nadversities, if, whenever he rose above the passionate perturbations\nof the empirical man and the struggles of the practical man, his mind\nshowed him the inevitable necessity of his toil and of his sufferings,\ntwo necessities fused into one another so as to become one and\nindivisible?\n\nHis own philosophical doctrine then brought him the remedy for his\nills, and worked in his spirit the _catharsis_ of liberation; the\ndoctrine of the immanent Providence, or as it was later called,\nhistorical necessity, which was his central thought. \"Praise be to\nProvidence for ever, which, when the weak sight of mortals sees in it\nnothing but stern justice, then most of all is at work on a crowning\nmercy! For by this task I see that I am clothed upon with a new man;\nI feel that everything that goaded me to bewail my hard lot and to\ndenounce the corruption of literature that has caused that lot, has\nvanished; for this corruption and this lot have strengthened me and\nenabled me to perfect my task. And more, it may perhaps not be true,\nbut it would please me, were it true, that this labour has filled me\nwith a certain spirit of heroism, through which no fear of death any\nlonger disturbs me and my mind feels no disquietude at the words of my\nrivals. Lastly, it has established me as upon a mighty rock of adamant\nbefore the judgment of God, who rewards the work of creation by the\napproval of the wise, who are always and everywhere few in numbers ...\nmen of the loftiest intellect, of a learning all their own, generous\nand great-hearted, whose only labour is to enrich with deathless works\nthe commonwealth of letters.\"[60] Thus Providence showed him the\nnecessity of all that had befallen or should befall him in his life,\ntaught him resignation and promised him glory.\n\n\n[Footnote 57: _Opp._ vi. p. 287.]\n\n[Footnote 58: _Ibid._ p. 18.]\n\n[Footnote 59: _Ibid._ pp. 153-4.]\n\n[Footnote 60: _Opp._ vi. pp. 29-30.]\n\n\n\nVIII\n\n\nSo the hot-tempered man became at last tolerant: tolerant with that\ntolerance, that lofty indulgence which must not be confused with common\ntoleration. The University, in which he had hoped for advancement and\ntowards which he directed the thought of his earlier works, would\nhave none of him; he retired within himself to think out the _Scienza\nNuova._ Now, says he with a smile in which we may still see a trace of\nbitterness, I owe this work to the University, which, by judging me\nunworthy of the chair and not wishing me to be \"occupied in treating\nparagraphs,\" gave me leisure for meditation: \"what greater obligation\ncould I have?\"[61] A friend, Sostegni the Florentine, in a sonnet to\nVico, let slip some words in condemnation of the city of Naples for\nmaking so little of her distinguished son. Vico in his reply justifies\nhis native place in noble words, as being stern towards him because she\nexpected and desired much of him:\n\nStern mother, she caresses not her son,\nLest so she fall into obscurity,\nBut gravely listens, watching as he speaks.[62]\n\nThis was the spirit that found expression in the Autobiography, a\nwork which has been misjudged and in fact entirely misunderstood by\nFerrari, who censures its prevailing teleological tendency and laments\nthe absence of a \"psychological\" explanation of Vico's life;[63]\nas if Vico had not himself explained that he was writing it from a\n\"philosophical\" point of view.[64] And what is the meaning of a\nphilosophical treatment of a philosopher's life but an understanding\nof the objective necessity of his thought and a perception of the\nscaffolding it involves even where the author at the moment of thinking\ndid not clearly perceive it? Vico \"meditates upon the causes, natural\nand moral, and upon the occasions of his fortunes; he meditates upon\nthe inclinations or aversions he felt from childhood towards this or\nthat branch of study; he meditates upon the opportunities or hindrances\nwhich assisted or retarded his progress; he meditates, lastly, upon\ncertain efforts of his own in right directions which bore fruit in the\nreflections upon which he built his final work, the _Scienza Nuova,_\nwhich work was to demonstrate that his literary life was bound to have\nbeen what it was and not different.\"[65] Vico's _Autobiography_ is,\nin a word, the application of the _Scienza Nuova_ to the life of its\nauthor, the course of his own individual history: and its method is as\njust and true as it is original. Vico succeeded in part only of his\nattempt, and could not form a criticism and history of himself to the\nsame extent to which a modern critic and historian is in a position\nto do--whose efforts will again be improved upon by those of the\nfuture--is too obvious to need emphasising. The _Autobiography_ itself\nconcludes with a blessing upon the author's hardships, a profession of\nfaith in Providence and a sure expectation of fame and glory.\n\n\n[Footnote 61: _Ibid._ p. 29.]\n\n[Footnote 62: _Ibid._ p. 446.]\n\n[Footnote 63: In the Introduction to vol. iv. of the _Opere._]\n\n[Footnote 64: _Autob._ in _Opp._ iv. p. 402.]\n\n[Footnote 65: _Ibid._]\n\n\n\nIX\n\n\nIn the last years of his life Vico, enfeebled by age, domestic trouble\nand illness, \"entirely gave up his studies\":[66]\n\n    My pen is slipping from my palsied grasp;\n    The door of my thought's treasury is closed,[67]\n\nhe cries in two mournful lines of a sonnet in 1735. He prepared at\nthis time additions and corrections for a possible reprint of the\nsecond _Scienza Nuova,_ and incorporated them in the final manuscript\nof the work; he thought for a time of printing his small work \"on the\nEquilibrium of the Living Body\" (_De aequilibrio corporis animantis_)\ncomposed many years earlier and now lost;[68] he still discharged\nsome of the duties of his office, such as the speech on the marriage\nof the king, Charles Bourbon, in 1738. But from 1736 or 1737 his son\nbegan to assist him in his professional work, and in January 1741 he\nwas definitely appointed to the chair on his father's resignation.[69]\nVico henceforth lived among his family like an old soldier _exacta\nmilitia,_ thinking over his past battles and conscious of having\ndone his life's work. His good son read to him for some hours every\nday out of the Latin classics he had once loved and studied so well.\nAnd in this evening of his life he was at least spared the crowning\nagony suffered in his last years by a philosopher more fortunate than\nhimself, Immanuel Kant; the agony of continuing and completing his\nsystem of philosophy, and wearing himself out in a fruitless struggle\nwith thoughts that eluded his grasp and words that no longer obeyed\nhim. Vico had said all he had to say; a great historian of his own\nlife, he knew the moment at which Providence had finished its work in\nhim, closed the door of thought it had so freely opened, and ordered\nhim to lay down his pen.[70]\n\n\n[Footnote 66: _Ibid._ p. 415.]\n\n[Footnote 67: _Opp._ vi. p. 425 (Sonnet on the marriage of Raimondo di\nSangro, 1735).]\n\n[Footnote 68: _Bibl. vich._ pp. 38-9.]\n\n[Footnote 69: Gentile, _Il Figlio di G. B. Vico,_ pp. 30-48.]\n\n[Footnote 70: The documents and the scattered notes used in this\nlecture and quoted from the contents of my _Bibliografia vichiana_ are\nnow all collected in my edition of the _Autobiografia, carteggio e\npoesie varie:_ cf. the present vol. _infra,_ p. 308.]\n\n\n\n\nAPPENDIX II\n\n\nTHE LATER HISTORY OF VICO'S THOUGHT[1]\n\n\nThe history of the vicissitudes of Vico's reputation must not be\nallowed to replace or be confused with the exposition and valuation of\nhis thought, by losing sight of the history of philosophy properly so\ncalled or confusing it with the history of culture.[2] But even when\nwe pass to this second history, we must guard against another kind of\nerror, namely the pretence of determining by its means whether Vico's\nwork was or was not of use in the advancement of culture, and what\ndegree of utility we should grant it. The inquiry is meaningless, and\nthe degree cannot be measured: for rightly considered one disciple may\nbe worth tens or hundreds, one effect produced after centuries may\ncompensate its age-long delay, one point undeservedly forgotten may\nbecome as notable and instructive as the best-deserved reputation,\nand one single truth twice discovered independently may from this\nre-discovery and seeming superfluity receive a confirmation of its\ninevitable necessity. The work of Vico--such is the usual verdict--was\nentirely useless, because it appeared out of its due time and\nprematurely, and remained unknown or was known only because it could\nconvey nothing new. Such language is a blasphemy against history, which\nallows nothing to be useless and is always and throughout the work of\nProvidence, whose vast utilities must not be measured by the pettiness\nof the human span.\n\nWas Vico appreciated in the course of the eighteenth century? Did any\none read him, understand him and follow his lead? The question has\nbeen answered with equal decision in the affirmative and the negative.\nThe affirmative answer has been supported by a diligent collection of\nscattered passages up and down the writers of the century mentioning\nhis name and doctrines and an accumulation of possible or apparent\ntraces of his thoughts visible though unacknowledged in Italian and\nforeign literature. But a thinker like Vico can only be said to be\nknown when his fundamental thought has been grasped and the spirit\nthat animated him has been felt. Now the majority of the facts alleged\nas proof of the efficacy of his work concerns particular doctrines\ndetached from the whole and accepted or contested just like those of\nany other scholar and critic or any paradox-monger of his time. This\nis true in the first place of his theory on the origin of the Twelve\nTables, discussed in the controversy between Bernardo Tanucci and Guido\nGrandi from 1728 to 1731, contested in 1736 by Damiano Romano, accepted\nin France by Bonamy in 1735 and recalled in 1750 by Terrasson; of the\nviews on the history and primitive government of Rome, mentioned by\nChastellux, adopted and expanded by Duni, and used by Du Bignon who\nlearnt them from Duni; of the hypotheses as to the prehistoric period\nand the origins of humanity, employed and modified by Boulanger in\nFrance and Mario Pagano in Italy; and lastly, of some conceptions upon\npoetry and language which reappear in Pagano, Cesarotti and some others.\n\nA more essential question was that of the method of studying and\njudging political institutions and laws; a question upon which\nMontesquieu has been compared with Vico and accused of freely using the\n_Scienza Nuova_ without acknowledging his debt. It is now established\nthrough Montesquieu's journal that in 1728 Antonio Conti at Venice\nadvised the future author of the _Esprit des Lois_ to buy Vico's book\nat Naples; and Montesquieu must have followed this advice on reaching\nNaples in the following year; for a copy of the 1725 edition of the\n_Scienza Nuova_ is still preserved in the library at the ch\u00e2teau of La\nBr\u00e8de. But the mind of the French writer was too different from and\ninferior to that of Vico to draw vital nourishment from a work such as\nthe _Scienza Nuova;_ and the traces of imitation alleged to have been\ndiscovered in the _Esprit des Lois_ are very doubtful and in any case\nof minor importance. It must be said on the other hand that the merit\ngenerally attributed to Montesquieu of having introduced the historical\nelement into positive laws and thus considering legislation in a truly\nphilosophical manner (as Hegel said later), that is, as a moment\ndepending upon a totality relative to all the other determinations\nwhich go to form the character of a people or a period; this merit, in\norder both of time and of excellence, belongs in reality to Vico.\n\nLike Montesquieu in the science of legislation, so Wolf in the Homeric\nquestion has been suspected of tacitly deriving help from Vico's\nspeculations. But at the time when he published the _Prolegomena ad\nHomerum_ in 1795 Wolf did not know the _Scienza Nuova_; which he\nknew in name only in 1801 and in fact the year after, when Cesarotti\npresented him with the book. We must observe that Vico's judgment as\nto the barbaric nature of the Homeric epos and the absence in it of\nesoteric wisdom had been published in 1765 by the _Gazette litt\u00e9raire\nde l'Europe_; and further, that the _Scienza Nuova_ was known and\nused by the Danish philologist and archaeologist Zoega, who quotes it\nin an essay on Homer composed in 1788 though not published till long\nafterwards; and that Zoega corresponded with Heyne, who afterwards\naccused Wolf of having derived from his own lectures the theory set\nforth in the _Prolegomena._ Heyne had in fact expressed the idea of\na gradual genesis of the Homeric poems in 1790. In a word we may say\nthat Vico's views had to some extent penetrated into the atmosphere of\nGerman philology: in which case Wolf may have originally had a certain\nindirect knowledge of them. Even apart from this indirect communication\nthe fact remains, and is recognised by all students of the question,\nthat the Homeric theory conceived by Wolf must really be called\nnot Wolfian but Vician, since such it truly is in its fundamental\ncharacteristics. Moreover, Wolf, as a philologist far superior to Vico\nbut much less great as a thinker, was not in a position to understand\nthe ideas which had led his predecessor to the doctrine he held\nconcerning Homer: a fact which is clear from the somewhat superficial\narticle he wrote on the subject in 1807.\n\nThere was certainly at Naples during the eighteenth century a vague\nconsciousness in many minds of the greatness of Vico's work; but in\nwhat precisely this greatness consisted nobody could determine, owing\nto the lack of adequate experience and preparation. Outside Italy,\nespecially in Germany, where this preparation existed or at least was\nmuch greater, Vico's work remained generally unknown, partly through\nthe discredit into which Italian books had fallen since the end of the\nseventeenth century, and partly through the dimculties which Vico's\nstyle presented to a foreign reader. When the _Scienza Nuova_ did\nfall into the hands of men competent to understand it, a series of\ninsignificant accidents interposed to prevent such an understanding.\nHamann procured the _Scienza Nuova_ from Florence in 1777, at which\ntime he was engaged upon economics and physiocracy, fancying that it\ndealt with these subjects; and the delusion was not dispelled when in\nglancing over it he found himself faced by a collection of philological\nstudies and studies carried out with considerable carelessness. Goethe\nreceived it at Naples in 1787 from Filangieri, who warmly recommended\nit, took it back to Germany and lent it in 1792 to Jacobi; but it was\na happy coincidence rather than a true knowledge or a clear intuition\nthat led him to couple Vico's name with that of Hamann. Herder, who may\nalso have known Vico's work less through his correspondence with Hamann\nin 1777 than by his travels in Italy in 1789, speaks of it in 1797\nin quite general terms, without noticing one of the many connexions\nbetween Vico and himself, especially as regards the theory of language\nand poetry.\n\nThe only men in the eighteenth century who really to some extent\npenetrated into the fundamental thought of Vico and proclaimed though\nunwillingly his genuine greatness were--and this is another proof of\nthe solid mental fibre of Catholicism--his Catholic opponents, of whom\nthere were plenty: Romano, Lami, Rogadei, and above all Finetti. They\nsaw that in spite of his stubborn protestations of religious orthodoxy\nVico held a conception of Providence very different from that of\nChristian theology; and that though he continually used the name of God\nhe never allowed him to operate effectively in history as a personal\nGod; that he made so sharp a distinction between sacred and profane\nhistory as to reach a purely natural and human theory of the origin of\ncivilisation, by means of the state of nature, and of the origin of\nreligion, by means of fear, shame and the imaginative universal; while\nthe traditional Catholic doctrine admitted a certain communication\nbetween sacred and profane history, and recognised in pagan religion\nand civilisation the leaven of some kind of vague recollection of the\nprimitive revealed truth; that though protesting that he accepted and\nreinforced the authority of the Bible, he threatened and shook it on\nmany points; and that his criticism of profane historical tradition,\nconducted in a haughty spirit of rebellion against the past, might\nopen the road to the most dangerous abuses, since it provoked the\napplication of the same spirit and method to sacred history, which\nhappened in the case of Boulanger.[3] In this accusation are faithfully\nindicated all the points destined later to enter into the nineteenth\ncentury's solemn eulogy of Vico. Thus churchmen began to be suspicious\nof him; and this bore fruit later in the restoration period, in the\nanti-Vician polemic of Bishop Colangelo, and somewhat earlier in a\nverdict of the royal censor Lorenzo Giustiniani, who pronounced the\n_Scienza Nuova_ \"a work marking a most unfortunate crisis in European\nhistory.\"\n\nThis tendency was opposed by the enthusiastic young students of\nsocial and political matters at Naples at the end of the eighteenth\ncentury, preparing themselves for an active part in the imminent\nrevolution. Among them Vico came to be considered as an anti-clerical\nand anti-Catholic, and the legend arose, mentioned elsewhere in this\nvolume, that Vico purposely and deliberately made his work obscure\nin order to escape ecclesiastical censure. These young men applied\nthemselves to the study and praise of the _Scienza Nuova;_ they\nproposed to reprint it, since it had become rare, together with the\nother works and unpublished manuscripts of the author; they prepared\nexpositions and criticisms of Vico's philosophical and historical\nsystem; some like Pagano tried to work it up afresh by adding to it\nthe ideas of French sensationalism, others like Filangieri did not let\ntheir admiration of it dispel their rosy dreams of reform. In 1797\nthe German Gerning on coming to Naples noted the zeal with which Vico\nwas studied, and projected a translation or at least a summary of the\n_Scienza Nuova_ in German. When the fall of the Neapolitan Republic\nin 1799 drove these young men, or rather those of them who escaped\nthe massacres and the gallows of the Bourbon reaction, into exile in\nNorthern Italy and especially in Lombardy, the cult of Vico was for the\nfirst time ardently propagated. Vincenzo Cuoco, Francesco Lomonaco,\nFrancesco Salfi and other southern patriots passed the knowledge of the\n_Scienza Nuova_ to Monti, who mentioned it in his inaugural lecture\nat Pavia in 1803, to Ugo Foscolo, who absorbed many of its ideas into\nhis poem the _Sepolcri_ and his critical essays: to Alessandro Manzoni,\nwho was later to institute in his _Discorso sulla storia longobarda_\na famous comparison between Vico and Muratori: and to others of less\nimportance. Cuoco introduced Vico's work to Deg\u00e9rando, then at work on\nhis _Histoire compar\u00e9e des syst\u00e8mes philosophiques_; another exile,\nDe Angelis, put the _Scienza Nuova_ into the hands of Jules Michelet;\nSalfi mentioned Vico in articles in the _Revue Encyclop\u00e9dique_ and in\nbooks and minor works in French. It was also through the suggestion\nof these Neapolitans that the _Scienza Nuova_ was reprinted at Milan\nin 1801; and other editions and collections of Vico's smaller works\nwere not long in appearing. Thus in the first decade of the nineteenth\ncentury Vico's reputation, which had till then been merely local to\nNaples, spread over the whole of Italy.\n\nBut, suitably to their personal disposition and to the spirit of the\ntimes, the first and chief debt which the patriotic students of Vico\nowed to his thought was political in character or rather belonging to\npolitical philosophy; and consisted in a criticism of that Jacobinism\nand philo-Gallicism of which they had had such unhappy experience\nin the events of 1799.[4] Vico's thought led them to more concrete\nconcepts; and this is particularly visible in Vincenzo Cuoco's\nadmirable _Saggio storico sulla rivoluzione napoletana_ (1800).\nSimilarly Ballanche some decades later in his _Essais de paling\u00e9n\u00e9sie\nsociale_ (1827) wrote that if Vico had been known in France in the\neighteenth century he would have exercised a beneficial influence on\nthe subsequent social revolutions. Another particular aspect of Vico's\nwork, the reform undertaken by him of historical methodology and social\nscience as an aid to history, was observed and emphasised by the\narchaeologist Cataldo Iannelli in his work _Sulla natura e necessit\u00e0\ndella scienza delle cose e delle storie umane_ (1818). Foscolo and\nthose who drew their inspiration from him chiefly introduced into\nliterary criticism and history something of Vico's conceptions on the\nhistorical interpretation of poetry.\n\nIn Germany on the other hand Jacobi, who had read the _De\nantiquissima,_ immediately placed himself in the centre of the Vician\nphilosophy by discovering and pointing out in 1811, in his work _\u00dcber\nden g\u00f6ttlichen Dingen und ihrer Offenbarung,_ the close connexion\nbetween the principle of the convertibility of the true and the\ncreated and the Kantian theory that one can perfectly conceive and\nunderstand only what one is able to construct: a single step from\nwhich position leads, as he observes, to the system of identity. The\nsame fact was recognised by Baader, who found in this system the\nconfirmation and foundation of the principle enunciated by Vico. But\nthe translation of the _Scienza Nuova_ made by Weber in 1822 seems to\nhave been unsuccessful; and it does not appear that Vico was known to\nHegel, with whom he has so many substantial and formal affinities,\nespecially in the _Phenomenology_; and whose mania for triads might be\nblamed just as the Catholic Finetti had blamed Vico for always standing\n\"upon rule of three.\" The resemblances again of Vico's theories to the\nnew German philological doctrines of Niebuhr, M\u00fcller, B\u00f6ckh and many\nothers were not at all willingly admitted. The attitude of Niebuhr is\ncharacteristic. Whether he knew Vico's work or not when he published\nthe first edition of his _R\u00f6mische Geschichte,_ he certainly knew\nit later through Savigny and through the article entitled _Vico und\nNiebuhr_ published in 1816 by the Swiss Orelli; and yet he continued to\nignore him, through some kind of contempt or depreciation; an attitude\nhardly praiseworthy but imitated by Mommsen.\n\nIn France, the spread of knowledge concerning Vico's thought was due\nto Michelet, who translated his works and in his last years described\nItaly as \"the second mother and nurse who in my youth suckled me upon\nVirgil, and in my maturity nourished me with Vico; potent cordials that\nhave many times renewed my heart.\" Michelet was the first or one of the\nfirst to proclaim, in his introduction, that Vico was not understood\nin the eighteenth century because he wrote for the nineteenth.\nMichelet was joined by Ballanche, of whom we spoke above, and also by\nJouffroy, Lerminier, Chateaubriand, and Cousin, some of whom grasped\nthe connexion between Vico and the German philosophy that Cousin was\nat this time propagating in France; and later by Laurent, Vacherot,\nDe Ferron, Franck, Cournot and many others. Vico was read and admired\nby Comte, who mentioned him in a letter to John Stuart Mill in 1844,\nand lastly L\u00e9on Gambetta conceived in his youth a general history of\ncommerce upon the scheme of the Vician \"reflux.\" The popularity of\nVico's name in France at this period was so great that it is several\ntimes mentioned in joke in passages of Balzac's novels and in\nFlaubert's _Bouvard et P\u00e9cuchet._ But thought of the quality of Vico's\ncould never have a very deep or lasting influence in the persistently\nintellectualistic and spiritualistic atmosphere of France. Perhaps the\nmost conspicuous results it produced were the theories of Fustel de\nCoulanges on the ancient city and the origin of feudalism.\n\nBut, to return to Italy, if the aspirations towards a national\nuprising, which tended to vindicate and glorify all the ornaments\nItaly could boast, raised Vico's name almost to a level with that of\nDante, the simultaneous renaissance of philosophy, which was shaking\noff the sensationalism and materialism of the eighteenth century, was\nbound to attach itself to the last great idealistic philosopher, to\nuse his thoughts and to shelter itself behind his authority. Vico's\ncomplete works were now collected and editions of the single treatises\nmultiplied. And since in the national uprising two currents could be\ndistinguished, partly successive and partly fused, the neo-Guelphian\nand the radical, and since this distinction was represented in\nthe philosophical awakening by that between Catholic idealism and\nrationalistic idealism, the schools of Rosmini and Gioberti on the one\nhand and Bruno and Hegel on the other; Vico, at once a Catholic and a\nfree philosopher, lent himself admirably, as is easy to understand, to\nthe contrary sympathies and interpretations of the two schools. Thus\noriginated two different pictures of him, both historically justified,\nthough the one painted him as he would have wished to be, the other as\nhe was. The Vico of the liberal Catholics was above all the Vico of\nthe metaphysical points, the Platonist, the mystic of the unknowable\nGod, the traditionalist of the prologues to the _Diritto universale,_\nand hence the strictly Italian philosopher as opposed to those of\nthe rest of Europe, sons of the Reformation: whereas the Vico of the\nrationalists, the bold and heretical author of the _Scienza Nuova,_\nis a European philosopher to be set side by side with Descartes and\nSpinoza, Kant and Hegel. The former picture may be seen in the works\nof Rosmini, Gioberti, Tommaseo and many others, among which we must\nnot forget those of a Neapolitan writer of lofty spirit, Enrico Cenni,\nperhaps the best of all, who draws a loving picture of the Vico of\nthe Catholics. The latter portrait is found in the philosophers and\ncritics who from 1840 onwards acquired their education in the school\nof German idealism; especially Bertrando Spaventa and Francesco de\nSanctis, who were the first to see clearly Vico's relations to earlier\nand later European thought and to substitute for mere observations\nand vague impressions on the subject a scientific interpretation and\na determinate judgment. That the second school of interpreters and\ncritics were in the right, and that the liberal or idealistic Catholics\nhad taken up an untenable position and reproduced in their irresolution\nand incoherence the irresolution and incoherence of Vico himself, was\nproved by the fact, among others, that less liberal but more consistent\nCatholics like the Spaniard Jaime Balmes show an inflexible distrust\nand hostility towards the author of the _Scienza Nuova._\n\nThe study of history in Italy during this period was less deeply\nmodified by Vico's influence; chiefly perhaps because the impulse of\nthe national uprising led to the neglect of primitive and Roman history\nand the devotion of all its best energies to research into the origin\nand vicissitudes of the Italian republics, a subject Vico had entirely\nignored. On the other hand, jurisprudence especially in the south was\ndominated by his thought; and though it produced in this field no great\nscientific results, it gave to the jurists a loftiness and breadth of\njudgment and a concreteness of view which were long remembered and\nregretted.\n\nAfter 1870, with the decay of philosophy in Italy and elsewhere, the\nstudy of Vico also decayed: and for more than forty years there was no\ndemand for a reprint of his works. The monograph by Cantoni in the year\n1867, in spite of some valuable passages, already shows unmistakable\nsigns of the decadence, founded as it is upon the idea that Vico's\nvalue is greater according as he is less of a metaphysician and more\nof a psychologist and historian: a position due not so much to the\nintrinsic weakness ascribed to him by Cantoni in philosophical matters\nas to the implicit conviction on the critic's part that metaphysic\nin general is a valueless thing, useful only for rousing enthusiasm\nin the addled heads of southern Italians. The great idealist of the\nNew Science was subjected, as a final insult, to the praises of the\npositivists, who in their astonishing ignorance almost amounting\nto innocence did not--and still do not--hesitate to allege as a\nconfirmation of their formal profession of faith the words \"verum ipsum\nfactum,\" which according to them means that the truth is the fact\nwhich we see and touch. Writings making any serious contribution to\nthe knowledge of any particular point on Vico's doctrines were rare.\nInterest in Vico only reawoke within the last decade with the general\nreawakening of philosophical studies.\n\nOf the two best comprehensive works on Vico published towards the end\nof last century one is due to the German Catholic Karl Werner (1881)\nwho expounds his philosophical and historical doctrines with great\ncare, judging them from the point of view of speculative theism, a\ntheory evolved under the influence of Baader and the second philosophy\nof Schelling, and tending much more to the comprehension of Vico than\nthe psychology of Cantoni. The other is the work of an Englishman,\nRobert Flint (1884), who wrote for the collection of Philosophical\nClassics a brief monograph upon the subject, accurate in detail, and\nif not profound at least guided by clear and sound sense. Recently\nSorel in France has shown the fruitfulness of certain views of Vico's,\nespecially that of the reflux, by applying them to the history of\nprimitive Christianity and the theory of the modern proletarian\nmovement, while in Germany Biese and Mauthner have brought his\nconceptions of metaphor and language once more into favour.\n\nBut in spite of all this Vico has never had justice done him in works\ndevoted to the history of modern philosophy. These, in the case both\nof H\u00f6ffding's book and of the greatly superior work of Windelband, and\nin fact of all others, either pass over the Italian philosopher in\ncomplete silence or else merely mention him as an experimenter, later\nthan Bossuet and earlier than Herder, in the dubious science of the\n\"philosophy of history.\" This lack of attention arises partly from an\ninsufficient knowledge of Vico's real nature; his fertile activities\nin the theory of knowledge, in ethics, in aesthetic, in law and in\nreligion are all hidden behind that one label \"philosopher of history.\"\nPartly however it is due to the reaction of the history of politics\nand culture on the history of philosophy; which produces the effect\nthat thinkers whose social influence came to an end with the fall of\nthe peoples or states to which they belonged, or who for some reason\nor other had no considerable influence on European civilisation, are\nsacrificed to others much less important from a philosophical point of\nview but more influential or better known as exponents of social life\nand representatives of cultural tendencies; so that where it would\nbe thought impossible to ignore, for example, Paley or d'Holbach or\nMendelssohn, it seems natural to pass over Giambattista Vico, though in\nsuch company he is a giant among pigmies. The historical injustice of\nthis course has been already shown theoretically by the distinction we\nhave emphasised between the history of philosophy and the history of\nculture; and in Vico's special case by our whole work, which clearly\nshows the lacuna left by the omission of Vico in the general history of\nEuropean thought at the beginning of the eighteenth century.\n\n\n[Footnote 1: This appendix briefly recapitulates the chief results of\nmy researches into the subject set forth in the _Bibliografia vichiana_\nand its two supplements (cf. the present volume, _infra,_ p. 310,\nto which work I refer for fuller details and for the evidence for the\nfacts here laid down.]\n\n[Footnote 2: See above, pp. 236, 237.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Labanca has devoted a highly instructive volume to the\nCatholic criticisms of Vico: see the present volume, _infra,_ p. 309.]\n\n[Footnote 4: See above, pp. 247-9.]\n\n\n\n\nAPPENDIX III\n\n\nTHE SOURCES OF VICO'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE[1]\n\n\nMy statement, that the criterion of knowledge contained in Vico's\nformula of the conversion of the true with the created is an original\nand modern principle, has been contradicted by certain Catholic\neditors; who state that this doctrine, however true, is not original\nto Vico, and is indeed far from modern, being a purely Scholastic\ndoctrine. If I thought otherwise, this was only due to my insufficient\nknowledge of Scholasticism.\n\nI might indeed ask at the outset how such complete ignorance of\nscholasticism were possible: an ignorance not of its manifold\nvarieties and the tangled forest of its distinctions--that would be\ncomprehensible: but of no less a matter than the fundamental criterion\nof its theory of knowledge, the starting-point of modern thought and\nas such, it would seem, inevitably familiar to every student of the\nelements of philosophy. But since it is always useful to suspect\noneself of ignorance, or even to believe oneself more ignorant than\none really is, I will make so far as concerns myself a voluntary\ndisplay of humility. I find it less easy, I confess, to extend the\naccusation of ignorance to all who, like myself, have failed to run\nVico's criterion to earth in the scholastic lumber-room: Jacobi for\ninstance, who on reading it as expressed in the _De antiquissima,_ sees\nin it the first manifestation of Kantianism and absolute idealism:[2]\nor the Catholic theologian Baader, who finds its later development\nin Schelling's philosophy of identity:[3] or the learned and subtle\nSpanish Thomist, Jaime Balmes, who treats it as a unique idea and\nattacks it from the scholastic point of view:[4] or the equally learned\nCatholic Bertini, who accepts and develops Jacobi's observation:[5]\nor the eminent historian of philosophy Wilhelm Windelband, who, while\nunacquainted with Vico's doctrines, on coming across indications of a\nsimilar thought in Sanchez's _Quod nihil scitur_ was greatly struck by\nit and endorsed its value by the assertion that it was to bear fruit\nat a later date and in the hands of a greater philosopher, Immanuel\nKant:[6] or again the specialist in the history of scholasticism, Karl\nWerner, the author of a careful monograph on Vico,[7] who nowhere\nnotices the alleged scholastic character of Vico's theory of knowledge.\nScholasticism must indeed be a difficult and mysterious doctrine, if it\nis inaccessible to all these students, qualified and bound though they\nare to understand it.\n\nBut we cannot pause on the threshold to speculate: we must plunge\nstraight into the argument. In what part of scholasticism can we find\nVico's criterion converting knowledge with creation?\n\nThe Thomistic saying, \"truth and reality are convertible,\" _ens et\nverum convertuntur,_ has been quoted:[8] but quotations of this kind\nare perhaps more calculated to confuse by words than to convince by\nfacts. The same value attaches to the statement that Vico himself\nconfessed the scholastic origin of his principle, since the very first\nchapter of the _De antiquissima_ begins with the words \"in Latin,\nthe truth and the fact reciprocate, or, as the scholastic mob says,\nconvert,\" _\"Latinis verum et factum reciprocantur, seu, ut scholarum\nvulgus loquitur, convertuntur.\"_ Here it is perfectly clear to any\none on a moment's thought that Vico, Latinist as he was, meant\nsimply to substitute the Ciceronian \"_reciprocari_\" for the barbarous\n\"_converti._\"\n\nSt. Thomas explained the meaning of his formula quite clearly,\nespecially in the Summa Theologica, Part I. question xvi. art. 3.\nHere he asks whether the truth and the reality are convertible,\n_utrum verum et ens convertantur;_ to which he replies as follows:\n\"that as the good is of the nature of the desirable, so the truth\nhas the nature of knowledge. But in so far as a thing has existence\nin itself, thus far it is knowable. And for this reason it is said\nin _De anima,_ Bk. III. text. 37 (431 b 21) that 'the soul is in a\nsense all things' according to sense and intellect. And hence as the\ngood is convertible with the existent, so is the true. But yet as the\ngood adds to existence the nature of the desirable, so also the truth\nadds a reference to the intellect.\" (_Quod sicut bonum habet rationem\nappetibilis, ita verum habet ordinem cognitionis. Unumquodque autem\nin quantum habet de esse, in tantum est cognoscibile. Et propter hoc\ndicitur in_ 3 _de Anima, text._ 37, _quod 'anima est quodammodo omnia'\nsecundum sensum et intellectum. Et ideo sicut bonum convertitur cum\nente, ita et verum. Sed tamen sicut bonum addit rationem appetibilis\nsupra ens, ita et verum comparationem ad intellectum._) Nothing then\ncan be known except what exists, and nothing can exist but what is\ngood: existence, truth and goodness are all convertible. Thus, too,\nthings are called good in so far as they correspond to the idea in\ntheir Creator's mind. \"Each single thing partakes of the truth of\nits own nature in so far as it imitates the knowledge of God, like\nan artefact in so far as it agrees with the art\": \"the knowledge of\nGod is the cause of things\": \"the knowledge of God is the measure of\nthings.\" (_Unumquodque in tantum habet de veritate suae natura, in\nquantum imitatur Dei scientiam sicut artificiatum in quantum concordat\narti_ I. xiv. 12. _Scientia Dei est causa rerum_ I. xiv. 12. _Scientia\nDei est mensura rerum_ I. xiv. 12.) But truth and goodness, the\nobjects of intellect and will respectively, if on the one hand they\nare \"convertible in reality,\" _convertentur secundum rem,_ on the\nother they are \"distinguishable in thought,\" _diversificantur secundum\nrationem_ (I. lix. 2). What have these thoughts in common with Vico's\nidea that the condition of knowing a truth is to create it? In fact,\nwhat is here stated is that the condition of making a thing is to\nknow it, or as St. Thomas says in the same place (I. xiv. 8) in St.\nAugustine's words (_De Trinitate_ xv. 13) \"_Universas creaturas et\nspirituelles et corporales non quia sunt ideo novit Deus, sed ideo\nsunt quia novit._\" (God does not know all His creatures corporeal and\nspiritual because they exist: but they exist because He knows them.)\n\nVico makes no kind of mention of the formula _ens et verum\nconvertuntur,_ though he knows and quotes--a fact which has escaped my\ncritics--the analogous phrase \"the true and the good are convertible,\"\n_verum et bonum convertuntur:_[9] a formula which he diverts to his\nown purposes, or rather unites it with his own. \"In the first place,\"\nhe writes, \"I establish a truth which is convertible with the created,\nand in this sense I understand the good of the schools, convertible\nwith existence: and hence I infer that the one and only truth is in\nGod, since in Him is contained all Creation.\"[10] This union is reached\nquite openly by identifying _verum_ with _factum,_ then _factum_\nwith _ens,_ and finally the _verum-factum-ens_ with the _bonum_: by\nsubstituting the doctrine of Vico for that of the schools. By such a\nmethod of interpretation one could reduce all doctrines to a single\none, a _perennis philosophia._ I do not say that it would be a method\nentirely devoid of truth; but it is certainly not a historical method.\n\nThat Vico's criterion is not only different from but inconsistent\nwith Thomism was shown, as I have already said, by Balmes; who\npronounced it \"specious but devoid of solid foundation.\" He uses St.\nThomas's statements to controvert Vico's theological doctrine that God\nunderstands because He creates, opposing to it the Scholastic view\nthat He creates because He understands. He denies, that the Word was\nconceived by the mere knowledge of what is contained in the divine\nomnipotence, for it is conceived not simply by creatures but also and\nchiefly by the cognition of the divine essence (\"for the Father by\nunderstanding himself and the Son and the Holy Ghost and all other\nthings embraced by His knowledge conceives the Word, so that thus\nthe whole Trinity is implied in the Word, and also every creature\":\n_Pater enim intellegendo se et Filium et Spiritum sanctum et omnia\nalia quae ejus scientia continentur concipit Verbum, ut sic tota\nTrinitas Verbo dicatur, et etiam omnis creatura);_ he objects that,\ngranting this criterion, God could never know himself, because He\nis not His own cause. He denies that intelligence is only possible\nthrough causality, inasmuch as it is also possible through identity.\nHe accuses Vico's criterion of involving scepticism: in a word he\nmaintains that the facts of knowledge are known by reason, even if they\nare not the products of reason.[11] I am not concerned to ask whether\nBalmes is right, or whether Vico's criterion can be reconciled with\nChristian theology. I am concerned merely with establishing, not only\nby quotation from St. Thomas but also by the help of the judgment of\nan authoritative interpreter of his system that this doctrine is not\nThomistic.\n\nEven granting that the criterion in question is irreconcilable with\nThomism but not with an improved Christian theology, it is certainly\nirreconcilable with both in the form it adopts in what I have called\n\"Vico's second theory of knowledge,\" in the _Scienza Nuova,_ which\nBalmes either did not know or omitted to mention, and is passed over by\nmy critics with a light-heartedness that is not particularly enviable.\nOne of them asserts that \"the alleged distinction\" (the distinction\nthat is drawn by myself) \"between Vico's first and second theories of\nknowledge does not in point of fact exist, and produces no effects of\nany kind.\" What? Has it no effects, when those historical studies and\nsciences of mind, which in the _De antiquissima_ occupied the lowest\nposition among mere probabilities became in the _Scienza Nuova_ the\ntruest of all--true even in a higher degree than mathematics itself\nas dealing with the human world which \"is man's creation?\" when their\nform is found \"in the modifications of the actual human mind itself?\"\nwhen they have \"a reality as much greater, as the reality of the laws\nof human affairs is greater than that of points, lines, areas and\nfigures?\"[12] Is there no distinction, when we pass from the scepticism\nof the _De antiquissima_ to the rationalism of the statement that these\n\"proofs are of a divine nature,\" and must produce \"a divine pleasure,\nsince in God to know and to create are one and the same\"?[13]\n\nIt is true that upon this point my attention has been recalled to a\nwell-known passage of Galileo (_Dialogo dei massimi sistemi_), an\nespecial favourite of our own Spaventa,[14] where we find the thought\nthat the human intellect differs from the divine _extensiv\u00e8,_ but\nnot _intensiv\u00e8,_ and that if the divine intellect knows infinitely\nmore about mathematical propositions because it knows them all, yet\n\"of these few facts known by the human intellect, its knowledge is\nequal to that of the divine in objective certainty, since it attains\ncomprehension of the necessity than which no greater certainty, it\nseems, can exist.\" But in any case Galileo was not a Schoolman, and\nmoreover this pronouncement of his seemed so dangerous to the Christian\ntheory of ideas, that he himself was obliged to alter it by admitting\nthat while \"so far as the truth of which mathematical proof gives no\nknowledge is concerned, this is identical with that which the divine\nwisdom knows,\" yet \"the manner, in which God knows the infinitely\nnumerous propositions of which we know a few, is immensely superior to\nour own, which proceeds discursively from one conclusion to another,\nwhile His is simple intuition.\" It is important too not to forget\nthat this very statement figures among the heads of the accusation in\nGalileo's trial.[15]\n\nIf the formula of the conversion of the true with the created is not\nfound in Thomism, it may perhaps be found, at least in its original,\nsceptical or mystical, intention, in other tendencies of scholasticism\nor mediaeval philosophy generally. With Thomism Vico seems to have had\nneither acquaintance nor sympathy: but from his autobiography it is\nplain that he studied nominalism and the summaries of Petrus Hispanus\nand Paulus Venetus, though with little profit,[16] and later also,\nmuch more profitably, the Scotist philosophy; which he considered the\nmost Platonic of the Scholastic systems.[17] Traces of this appear in\nseveral views expressed in the _De antiquissima,_ especially in those\ndealing with universals and ideas. In this direction, the direction\nthat is to say of the Scotist system and the closely allied system of\nOccamism, I have attempted various researches, without attaining any\nremarkable results: further, I have applied for assistance to various\nspecialists in Scholasticism, but in vain; they would do nothing\nbut express their own superficial impressions or lose themselves\nin idle disputation. In general it seems possible to say that Duns\nScotus's theory of knowledge presents points of affinity to that of\nVico: for example, in the polemic against the Thomistic doctrine of\nthe _adaequatio intellectus et rei,_ which he refutes by applying it\nto the divine knowledge, since God knows objects as willed by Him,\nand they exist because He wills their existence without His being\nnecessitated by them.[18] For Occam again the thought of objects has\nno reality and objectivity (or subjectivity according to the usage of\nScholastic terminology, which is the reverse of modern) in God, and is\nnothing else than the objects themselves, known by God according to the\npossibility of creating them, in virtue of which they are thinkable\nto the divine mind.[19] But the question for Vico is not merely the\npriority of creation to knowledge or knowledge to creation, but the\nconvertibility or identity of knowledge and creation.\n\nIn certain recently published philosophical observations by Paolo\nSarpi,[20] a nominalist of Occam's school,[21] the following statements\nare to be found. They are the more notable because standing as they\ndo without any results in Sarpi's thought and being undeveloped in\nsubsequent philosophy, they seem to be not his own invention but a\nmere repetition of scholastic dicta. \"We have certain knowledge both\nof the existence and of the cause of those things which we understand\nfully how to create: of those which we know by experience, we know the\nexistence, but not the cause. We can however guess at it, and look\nsimply for a possible cause: but out of many found to be possible\nwe cannot be certain which is the true one. This fact may be seen\nin descriptions of astronomical theories, and would also be true in\nthe case of a man who saw a clock for the first time. Of the various\nguesses, that of a man who knew how to make similar objects would\nbe nearest the truth, _e.g._ one who understood the construction of\nmachinery when he saw a different kind of machine: but none the less\nhe will never on that account[22] know for certain. There are then\nthree kinds of knowledge: first, knowledge how to make the object:\nsecondly, experience of it: and thirdly, guessing at possibilities.\"\nThis thought, then, namely that objects are known by their creator,\nand that God knows objects because He creates them, seems to have been\ncurrent in the schools: and this explains the fact of its reappearing\nin an incidental manner and as an obvious truth in Francesco Sanchez's\n_Quod nihil scitur_ (1581) where it is declared impossible \"_perfecte\ncognoscere quis quae non creavit; nec Deus creare potuisset nec creata\nregere quae non perfecte precognovisset_\"[23] (that one should know\nperfectly things which he has not created: nor could God have been able\nto create nor after creating them to control things which He had not\nperfectly foreknown).\n\nBut need we continue to look for it in the guise of a casual remark\nor an isolated proposition, devoid of philosophical connexion, in the\nworks of philosophers or the lecture-rooms of the schools? Did it not\nsimply form a part of the common thought which daily declares that the\nman who has made a thing knows it better than he who has not made it?\nProbably a little attention would reveal it in many and dissimilar\ntreatises; and for my own part, while reading the _Chronicon_ of Otto\nof Freising the other day, I came across it in the introduction to\nthe third book, where the chronicler, writing as is well known under\nthe influence of St. Augustine's _Civitas Dei,_ is arrested by the\nobjection that God's designs in history are inscrutable, and delivers\nhimself of the following reflections: \"What then shall we do? If we\ncannot understand, shall we hold our peace? Then who will reply to\nthose who flatter, repel those who attack, and by the reason and might\nof his words confute those who would destroy the faith that is in us?\nSo we cannot understand the secret counsels of God, and yet we are\noften compelled to give a reasonable account of these things. What?\nShall we reason about things which we do not understand? We can give\nreasons, but human reasons, when yet we cannot understand the divine\nreasons. And thus it happens that when we speak of theological matters,\nlacking the right words for them, we being men use our own words; and\nin speaking of so great a God in human language, we use our words the\nmore boldly _quo ipsum figmentum nostrum cognoscere non dubitamus,_\nbecause we never doubt that we know the thing we have ourselves formed:\n_quis enim melius cognoscit quam qui creavit?_ for who knows a thing\nbetter than he who has created it?\"[24] The logic of the Abbot of\nFreising at this point may be thought a trifle sophistical: but the\nfact remains that he refers to a common opinion that he knows things\nwho has made them.\n\nBut probably Vico was stimulated to the establishment of his criterion\nless by certain tendencies of Scotism or by current opinions than by\nthe philosophers of the Renaissance, which he considered the golden\nage of metaphysical study, when shone, as he says, \"Marsilio Ficino,\nPico della Mirandola, Augustino Nifo and Augustino Steuco, Jacopo\nMazzoni, Alessandro Piccolomini, Matteo Acquaviva and Francesco\nPatrizio.\"[25] In Ficino, whose name he couples with those of Plato\nand Plotinus,[26] and especially in his _Theologia Platonica,_ Vico\ncould read a magnificent description of the productive character of\nthe divine wisdom and its parallelism with that of the geometrician.\nNature, says Ficino, which is divine art, differs from human art in\nthat it produces its creations from within, by living reasons: and \"it\ndoes not touch the surface of matter by means of a hand or any other\nexternal instrument, as the soul of a geometer touches the dust when\nhe describes figures upon the earth, but _perinde ut geometrica mens\nmateriam intrinsecus phantasticam fabricat,_ it operates like the mind\nof a geometer creating an imaginary matter from within itself. For\nas the geometer's mind, while it considers within itself the nature\nof figures, forms internally by pictures the image of figures, and\nby means of this image forms an imaginary spirit without any toil or\ndesign, so in the divine art of nature a wisdom of some kind by means\nof intellectual processes endows with natural seeds the life-giving\nand motive force itself which is its companion.\"[27] Vico must have\nrecalled this passage in Ficino when in his inaugural lecture of 1699\nhe compared God, \"the artist of nature,\" to the human mind which\n\"we may without impiety call the God of art,\" just as he must have\nremembered it in the _De antiquissima_ where he compares God to the\ngeometrician.[28] Vico might however have found thoughts of this\nkind in various Renaissance philosophers, not only in Ficino: among\nothers, in Girolamo Cardano, who contrasts divine and human knowledge,\nthough with a different conclusion; and restricts the one to finite\nobjects (\"for understanding is brought about by a kind of proportion,\n_proportione quaderni fit,_ and there is no proportion between the\ninfinite and the finite\"), denying that man can know God, for as Vico\nsaid later in almost the same words, \"if I knew God, I should be God,\"\n_si scirem Deus essem._ Thus he postulated \"other sciences, and other\nmodes of understanding, entirely different from this of ours; more\ntrue, more solid, more firm, as a body is than its shadow: and again\nother principles which we can by no reason apprehend.\" And not only did\nhe postulate them, but among the human sciences he observed one which\nas opposed to the natural sciences reached not merely the surfaces of\nthings but almost the things themselves, namely mathematics. \"The human\nsoul, situated in the body, cannot attain to the substances of things,\nbut wanders about upon their surfaces by the help of the senses,\nexamining measurements, actions, resemblances and doctrines. But the\nknowledge of the mind, which creates the fact, is in a sense itself the\nfact, just as even among human sciences the knowledge of a triangle,\nthat it has three angles equal to two right angles, is practically\nidentical with the truth itself (_scientia vero mentis, quae res\nfacit, est quasi ipsa res, veluti etiam in humanis scientia trigoni,\nquod habeat tres angulos duobus rectis aequales, eadem ferme est ipsi\nveritati_), whence it is clear that there is in us a natural science\nof a different kind from true science.\"[29] Here, in the definition of\ndivine knowledge and of the procedure of human knowledge in the case of\nmathematics, as opposed to that of physical science, is implicit the\nprinciple that true knowledge consists in the identity of thought with\nits object.\n\nThe idea of the opposition of mathematics to physical science, in the\ncertainty of the one and the uncertainty of the other, persisted in the\nNeapolitan philosophers and scientists of Vico's youth, even if they\nlost sight of the reason of this opposition. Tommaso Cornelio in his\n\"progymnasma\" _De ratione philosophandi_ (1661) after reviewing the\nerrors produced by the illusions of sense in physical science, says,\n\"the contemplations of mathematics are not subjected to errors of this\nkind, dealing as they do with things whose images are not introduced\ninto the mind by the senses; for the mind can by itself adequately\nconceive figures and numbers, whose properties and analogies are\nexamined by mathematicians, without aid from sense.\"[30] This ought to\nbe emphasised, since it seems highly probable that Vico was stimulated\nto the establishment of his general theory of knowledge by reflection\nupon mathematics and the contrast between it and physical science.\nIn fact the Latin speeches, our earliest documents for his studies,\nthough they show the influence of Ficino and a certain amount of\nCartesianism,[31] are never dominated by this general criterion. It is\nonly in the last of these speeches, that of 1707, that the distinction\nbetween mathematics and natural science begins to appear; in the next\nyear it is clearly stated in the _De ratione studiorum,_ where it takes\nthe form of a general criterion. \"We demonstrate geometry because we\nmake it: if we could demonstrate physical facts, we should be creating\nthem. For the true forms of things exist only in God the greatest\nand best, and to these the nature of them conforms\" (_geometrica\ndemonstramus quia facimus: si physica demonstrare possemus, faceremus.\nIn uno enim Deo Opt. Max. sunt verae rerum formae, quibus earundem est\nconformata natura_). And this theory attained its full development in\n1710 in the _De antiquissima._\n\nSuch are the probable precedents, or as the common but inaccurate\nmetaphor expresses it, \"sources\" of Vico's theory of knowledge. I do\nnot think that the formation of this theory can have been influenced by\nthe propositions of Geulinx and Malebranche which have been pointed out\nto me,[32] namely that \"no one can make that which he does not know,\"\nand that \"God alone knows his works, because he foreknows his action.\"\nIn these propositions the old Thomistic doctrine is substantially\nsummarised. Much more tenable would be a connexion or at least a\ncomparison with Spinoza; we may recall the Spinozistic identification\nof the _ordo et connexio idearum_ and the _ordo et connexio rerum._\nAnother ingenious, but I think, inaccurate view is that \"the analytic\ngeometry of Descartes was the introduction of the genetic principle\ninto the study of geometrical objects,\" so that the principle _verum\nipsum factum_ \"before being formulated by Vico had been practised by\nDescartes\"; and Vico in the _De antiquissima_ \"adopted the scientific\nmethod of Descartes, which he stated as the convertibility of the true\nwith the created,\" raising it \"from a certitude to a criterion.\"[33]\nWe are dealing here not with practice, but simply with the theory of\nmethod: for this method, conceived in its universality, just so far as\nit is practical has always been practised; not by Descartes alone, and\nnot only by analytic geometry.\n\nWe should certainly be better informed as to the precedents of Vico's\ncriterion if we knew more of his studies preparatory to the _De\nantiquissima,_ and if in general we had more literary evidence about\nhis youth. Perhaps even the precedents I have indicated, which I only\ncalled probable, are not quite free from an element of chance; they\nmay be connexions only imagined by myself and non-existent for Vico's\nmind, while others not accidental may perhaps be still unknown, or\nawait discovery by a student more fortunate than myself. But it may\nnot be out of place to remark that the search for \"precedents\" does\nnothing to explain the new thought that followed them; much less does\nit detract from the value of that thought. Such information, though on\nthe one hand it enriches our knowledge of the history of philosophy, on\nthe other hand has absolutely no effect upon the determinate thought\nunder examination. It is valuable in the biography of a philosopher,\nbut valueless for the comprehension of the proper meaning of the new\ntheory, which must be sought essentially in the new problem which it\nfaces and attempts to solve. In the history of philosophy the same\nprinciples hold good as in that of literature. Take for example the\nepisode of Argante and Tancred in canto xix. of \"Jerusalem Delivered\";\nArgante, while taking up his position for the fight with his adversary,\nturns \"as if in doubt\" to the \"afflicted city,\" towards Jerusalem\nattacked by the crusaders; and when Tancred brutally mocks him, asking\nwhether he does this out of fear, he replies:--\n\n    I was but thinking how this city,\n    The immemorial green of Juda's realm,\n    Is falling, vanquished; whose unhappy fate\n    I have in vain endeavoured to repel.\n\nHere the precedents are easily found; Hector parting from Andromache\nand foreseeing the unhappy fate of Ilion, Priam and all his people\n(\u1f12\u03c3\u03c3\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f27\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1, etc., _II._ vi. 448-9); or Aeneas as he gazes upon its\ndownfall (_ruit alto a culmine Troia: ... si Pergama dextra,_ etc.,\n_Aen._ ii. 290-92). And yet the tragic melancholy of Argante is an\nentirely new creation, and altogether original to Tasso.\n\nFicino, Cardano, Tommaso Cornelio, Scotus and Occam, and any others who\nhave been or shall be added to the list, have or may have anticipated\nthis or that element of Vico's formula: and yet when we turn from their\nstatements to the _De antiquissima_ and the polemics that follow it,\nand read the definition of science, of true science, as the conversion\nof the true with the created, it strikes us as an entirely original\ntheory. The fact is that Vico had not to face the same opponents and to\nsolve the same problems that were faced and solved by the schoolmen,\nnominalists and mystics of the Middle Ages or by the Platonists and\nnaturalists of the Renaissance, nor yet those of Descartes in his\n_Discours sur la m\u00e9thode;_ and the saying that \"he alone knows things\nwho creates them\" acquires a new value, a new meaning (and this is its\nproper meaning) from its being used to refute the Cartesian _cogito_\nand the doctrine of immediate knowledge. Vico takes an old rusty\nsword and makes of it at least a glittering and trenchant weapon. For\nthe same reason the phrase is no longer a mere accident or incident,\nbut the starting-point of a special study, the foundation of a new\nphilosophy, and Vico could quite well describe it as something not\nlearnt from another but thought out and established by himself. And\nwhen he wants to find some original for it, he invents a history which\nis really a fiction or a myth; namely the history of ancient Italian\nwisdom which used this criterion as its supreme guide and left a trace\nof it in the Latin language in the synonymity of the words _verum_ and\n_factum._\n\nThe refutation of the Cartesian criterion (which De Sanctis thought\n\"complete,\" the \"last word of criticism\"[34]) is the negative aspect\nof Vico's theory of knowledge. Its positive side, absent in the _De\nantiquissima,_ is developed as we have said in the _Scienza Nuova,_\nwhere the human knowledge of the mind and of history is raised to\nthe level of divine knowledge. And since some critics have not only\nchosen to ignore the obvious difference between these two phases of\nVico's thought but have spoken of a too easy transition from the\none to the other, it will be well to observe that this transition\nwas for Vico if not entirely conscious at least very slow and very\ndifficult. He must at one time have shared Descartes' and Malebranche's\ncontempt for history; in the speech of 1701 he even echoed a saying\nof Descartes against philologists:--\"You, Philologist, boast of\nknowing everything about the furniture and clothing of the Romans\nand of being more intimate with the quarters, tribes and streets of\nRome than with those of your own city. Why this pride? You know no\nmore than did the potter, the cook, the cobbler, the summoner, the\nauctioneer of Rome.\"[35] But eleven years later, in the second reply\nto the _Giornale dei letterati,_ Vico refers to the same phrase with\nthe contrary conclusion, and deplores that \"the study of languages is\nto-day considered profitless, thanks to the authority of Descartes,\nwho says that to know Latin is to know no more than did Cicero's\nservant-girl.\"[36] Vico had in the meantime become conscious of the\nimportance of the \"probable\" knowledge of history and politics. He\nrefers to his former anti-historical Cartesianism in a passage of\nthe _De constantia philologiae_ which has generally escaped notice.\nSpeaking of philology he says: \"I, who have all my life delighted\nin the use of reason more than in memory, seem to myself the more\nignorant the more facts I know in philology. Whence Ren\u00e9 Descartes and\nMalebranche were not far wrong when they said that it was alien to the\nphilosopher to work much and for long at philology.\" But he adds that\nlater he perceived that \"these two most notable philosophers ought,\nit they had been zealous for the common glory of Christendom, not for\nthe private glory of philosophers, so to have pressed forward the\nstudy of philology as to see whether philology could be attached to\nthe principles of philosophy (_ut viderent philosophi an philologiam\nad philosophiae principia revocare possent_).\"[37] The elevation of\nphilology to the rank of philosophy, of the knowledge of the world of\nman to the level of divine knowledge, is the positive aspect of Vico's\ntheory of knowledge. It is this that is developed in the _Scienza\nNuova,_ towards which the _De antiquissima,_ with the indication of the\nhistorical sciences as against Cartesianism, only prepared the way.\n\nThus of the three points in which I placed the originality and value\nof Vico's first theory of knowledge, two, namely the criterion of\nknowledge opposed to that of Descartes and the defence of concrete as\nopposed to abstract sciences, are not only left intact by the inquiries\ninto their sources which I have just described, but are actually\nreinforced.\n\nThere remains the third of my points: the Vician theory of the\narbitrary nature of mathematics, the originality of which has also been\nimpugned by arguments which seem to me to have even less foundation\nthan those I have examined above.\n\nDo we find the doctrine that the fundamental objects of mathematics,\nthe unit of arithmetic and the point of geometry, are unreal or\nfictitious, propounded before Vico's time? Do we find it--this is the\nchief point--propounded not as a casual remark or an intuition of a\ntruth, but as a consciously reasoned concept from which legitimate\nconsequences are drawn as to the limitations of mathematics and its\ninability to furnish real knowledge of mind, nature and history?\n\nAll through the Middle Ages the Aristotelian theory of mathematics is\ncontinually enunciated. According to this theory mathematics is the\nmost certain of the sciences because the simplest; it abstracts from\nall sensible matter, but not from intelligible matter (\u1f56\u03bb\u03b7 \u03bd\u03bf\u03b7\u03c4\u03ae) which\nexists in sensible objects but not qua sensible (\u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd1\u03c2 \u1f00\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u1fd1\u03c2\n\u1f51\u03c0\u03ac\u03c1\u03c7\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b1 \u03bc\u1f74 \u1f96 \u1f00\u1f30\u03c3\u03b8\u03b7\u03c4\u03ac)[38] According to Cassiodorus it constituted the\nbody of _doctrinalis_ as opposed to _naturalis_ (physical) science and\n_divina._ Albertus Magnus followed Aristotle in defining mathematical\nentities as separable \"in imagination,\" \"in thought\" but not \"in\nreality\" (_in phantasmate, secundum rationem, non secundum esse_)\nfrom the sensible matter to which \"they are conjoined by existence\"\n(_per esse sunt coniunctae_); and St. Thomas said that mathematics\n\"though the objects it considers are not separate, yet considers them\nin so far as they are separate\" (_etsi sunt non separata ea quae\nconsiderat, tamen considerat ea in quantum sunt separata_).[39] The\narbitrary character of its foundations was never suspected. Dante, when\nhe wished to indicate \"the things which not being subject to our power\nwe can only contemplate and not create,\" enumerated \"the objects of\nmathematics, physical science and divinity\" (_mathematica, physica et\ndivina_).[40]\n\nJust as mathematics was not always equally valued in antiquity, so,\nand much more so, after the Renaissance of learning, it was variously\nexalted or despised. Giordano Bruno satirised the abuse of it, and\nsaid that without physical science \"to be able to calculate and\nmeasure, to understand geometry and perspective, is but a pastime of\ningenious fools,\" and warned his readers against confusing mathematical\n\"signs\" and real \"causes\": \"a reflected or direct ray, an acute or\nobtuse angle, a perpendicular, incident or straight line, a greater\nor smaller are of a circle, such and such an aspect, are mathematical\ncircumstances and not natural causes. To play with geometry is one\nthing, to prove by means of nature is another. It is not lines\nand angles that make the fire more or less hot, but near and far\nsituations, short and long spaces of time.\"[41] Campanella flatly\ndenied Aristotle's assertion of the superiority of mathematics to\nphysical science, declaring that its alleged purity was really weakness\n(_debilitas_), its simplicity was inability to include more things\n(_plura accipere_), its universality a contradiction against the nature\nof true science which is always of particulars (_de singularibus_),\nits demonstrative method by signs not by causes (_per signa, non per\ncausas_); and finally that it is not a science investigated for its\nown sake and is valueless unless it is applied to physical matters\n(_nisi applicentur physicis rebus_).[42] Bacon is of the same opinion,\nthat mathematics taken by itself is useless, and is useful only as an\n\"auxiliary science,\" a \"great appendix\" to the physical sciences.[43]\nThese definitions and restrictions, and others like them, might have\nyielded as a conclusion the entirely instrumental and practical\ncharacter of mathematical science: but the conclusion was not drawn, so\nfar as I know; and Bacon himself considered mathematics as in itself\ntoo exclusively and uselessly theoretical. \"For since,\" he goes on in\nthe passage above quoted, \"it is a fact of human nature, no doubt to\nthe great detriment of science, that it rejoices in the open plains\nof generalities, so to speak, rather than in the forests and closes\nof the particular, no discovery is more pleasant and gratifying than\nmathematics wherewith to sate this love of wandering and of meditation.\"\n\nThe \"creation\" of mathematics spoken of by Ficino, Cardano and\nothers signified a mental production entirely free from material\npresuppositions, and for that reason not less true but true in a\nhigher sense. It is almost the same sense as that found in Descartes\nand his followers. Locke asserts the reality of mathematical truths,\nthough he admits that there are in nature no figures corresponding\nto the archetypes existing in the mind of the geometrician;[44] and\nLeibniz, commenting on this passage, says that \"the ideas of justice\nand temperance are no more our own invention than those of the circle\nand the square.\"[45] Tommaso Cornelio, whom we have quoted on the\ncontrast between physical science and mathematics, also believed that\nmathematics rested on \"certain notions and understandings which nature\nhas put into the minds of men as foundations of science.\"[46]\n\nAnother kind of \"creation,\" and one which seems to have more connexion\nwith Vico's _\"fingere\"_ is discussed in a passage of Aristotle's\n_Metaphysics_ which has had a good deal of influence. \"We find also,\"\nAristotle says, \"geometrical figures by actualising them (\u1f10\u03bd\u03b5\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u03af\u03b1),\nbecause they are found by being divided: if they _were_ divided, they\nwould be obvious, but in reality they exist potentially. Why has the\ntriangle two right angles? Because the angles round one point are equal\nto two right angles. If then we construct the angle along one side, it\nwould become plain to any one looking at it. Why is the angle in the\nsemicircle equal to a right angle? Because if there are three equal\nlines, two in the base and one drawn perpendicular to it, it is plain\nto any one who sees it and knows that. Whence it is evident that we\ndiscover things that exist potentially by reducing them to actuality.\nThis is because the actuality is understanding, and the potentiality\nproceeds from the actuality; so we know by making (\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe1\u03c4\u03bf\n\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u03b3\u03b9\u03b3\u03bd\u03ce\u03c3\u03ba\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd).\"[47] But these observations belong to the\nexplanations given by Aristotle in this passage of the conceptions of\npotentiality and actuality; they are not at all opposed to his theory\nof mathematics as studying the intelligible matter which subsists\nin sensible matter, and they only explain the difference between\npotential and actual truth. In the same way we sometimes find in later\nphilosophers the assertion that mathematical truths are demonstrated\nand problems resolved \"by making them.\" Thus Sarpi writes in the\npassage mentioned above: \"in mathematics, he who constructs knows\nbecause he makes, and he who analyses learns because he seeks how the\nthing is made. The mode of composition then belongs to the inventive\nfaculty and that of analysis to the discursive: the former is that\nof problems, the latter of theorems; the latter are demonstrated by\nanalysis, the former by composition.\"[48]\n\nIt has also been recently asserted that the Vician philosophy of\nmathematics reappears bodily in Galileo and his school;[49] an\nastounding fact when baldly stated, since even though Vico opposes\nand prefers the great Pisan to Descartes for the moderate use he makes\nof mathematics in physical science, it is certain that for Galileo as\nfor Leonardo da Vinci mathematics had an objective validity, and the\nbook of nature is written in mathematical characters and geometrical\nfigures. In any case, the passage of Galileo which has been quoted\nin this reference, on the intensive identity of human with divine\nknowledge, has nothing to do with the present question, and another\npassage which asserts that the explanations of terms are free, and it\nis in the power of every workman to circumscribe and define in his own\nway the things he is dealing with, without ever being led by this into\nerror or falsehood, and that for instance one may call the bow the\nstern and the stern the bow, says nothing but a platitude hardly worth\nsaying except by way of adorning a page of controversial rhetoric.[50]\nIn controversy one is often obliged to insist upon platitudes, and\nthe controversy upon which I am now engaged itself presents too many\nexamples.\n\nA passage from the _Lezioni accademiche_ of Galileo's pupil Evangelista\nTorricelli in which he speaks of the difference between physical and\nmathematical definitions seems at first sight more convincing. But the\ncritic who has called attention to this passage[51] says too much when\nhe asserts that \"it is beyond doubt that Vico had read it,\" since it is\nunquestionable that Vico had _not_ read it. The _Lezioni accademiche_\nwere published first posthumously in 1715[52] and Vico's theory of\nmathematics is expounded in the _De ratione_ in 1708 and the _De\nantiquissima,_ 1710. This, it is true, is of secondary importance, for\nVico may have known Torricelli's doctrine through indirect channels,\nthrough other books or even orally through some Neapolitan friend or\npupil of Torricelli; in any case, if the latter's theory though unknown\nto Vico was really identical with his own, the similarity of ideas\nbetween the two would be of the greatest interest. Unfortunately the\ncritic has been too hasty, as it seems to me, even in his study and\ninterpretation of the pages of Torricelli.\n\nIn the passage in question, a lecture _Della leggerezza,_ read to\nthe Accademia della Crusca, Torricelli controverts, as based on mere\nappearances and not confirmed by facts and reasoning, Aristotle's\ndefinition in the _De coelo_: \"heavy is that which has a natural\nproperty of going towards the centre.\" He remarks upon this: \"The\ndefinitions of Physics differ from those of Mathematics in that the\nformer are obliged to adapt and adjust themselves to the object\ndefined, while the latter mathematical definitions are free and can be\nformed at the will of the geometrician who is defining. The reason is\nperfectly plain: the things defined in Physics do not come into being\nwith the definition, they exist already by themselves and are found\nin nature previously. But the things defined by geometry, that is by\nthe science of abstraction, have no existence in the universe of the\nworld other than that which definition gives to them in the universe\nof intelligence. Thus whatever objects of Mathematics are defined,\nthe same objects will come into existence simultaneously with the\ndefinition.\"[53]\n\nThe arbitrary character of mathematics seems here to be clearly stated.\nBut let us reserve our judgment and read on. \"If I were to say, the\ncircle is a plane figure with four equal sides and four right angles,\nthis is not at all a false definition; but for the rest of my book I\nshould have to mean, whenever I spoke of a circle, a certain figure\nwhich others have called a square. But if a man should say in Physics,\n'the horse is a rational animal,' should we not be justified in calling\nhim the horse? We must first look very carefully to see whether the\nhorse is a rational animal or not and then define it as it is, in\norder that the physical definition may conform to the object and not\nbe counted defective.\" Here we see that what appeared to be a profound\nthought has turned out to be a platitude; it is indifferent whether we\ncall the bow the stern or the stern the bow, said Galileo, or, says\nTorricelli in his turn, whether we call a square a circle or a circle a\nsquare; while it does not seem to him an indifferent matter whether we\ncall a horse a rational animal. But even this does not prevent him from\nadmitting later some degree of arbitrariness in physical terminology,\nwhen he says, \"since then it is not demonstrated that the intrinsic\nprinciple of downward motion exists upon the earth, I will accept this\ndefinition, if the tests will allow me, as the simple imposition of a\nname, and, replacing the verb 'to be' by the verb 'to be called,' I\nwill adapt the definition to my own requirements thus: That is called\nheavy which descends to the centre. Whenever any one says, the earth is\nheavy, I will agree, but always with the interpretation that the word\n'heavy' only signifies descending in a lighter medium.\"[54]\n\nIt seems to me then that the difference which he begins by laying down\nbetween mathematics and physical science is considerably obscured in\nthe sequel. And indeed how could Torricelli have seriously thought that\nthe foundation of mathematics was a \"fiction,\" when among his lectures\none heard the title \"in Praise of Mathematics\"? In this lecture he\nsays, quite in the Galilean style: \"That to read the great Book of the\nUniverse, the book on whose pages may be found the true philosophy\nwritten by God, mathematics are indispensable, will be seen by any\none who with noble thoughts aspires to the science of the integral\nparts and greatest members of this huge body we call the World. The\none alphabet, the only characters with which we can read the great\nmanuscript of the divine philosophy in the book of the Universe are\nthose poor figures you see in the text-books of geometry.\"[55] The most\nwe can see in these statements is a vague and hazy presentment of the\nprofound difference between physical truths and the so-called truths of\nmathematics.\n\nIn conclusion, until for the third of my three points we can discover\nmuch more obvious \"sources\" than those suggested up till now, I shall\nsee no cause to modify my verdict upon the originality of Vico's\nconception of mathematics. This originality is further proved by the\nimportant consequences drawn by Vico from his theory of mathematics for\nhis philosophical method; for every one knows that a thought taken over\nbodily from another remains inert and sterile, while an original idea\nis always active and fruitful.\n\n_Note._--I have selected, of the various criticisms directed against\nmy book on Vico, that concerning his \"originality,\" because this gave\nme opportunities for researches and explanations of some value. But my\nbook has been subjected to two general criticisms which do not lend\nthemselves to the same treatment.\n\nIt has been said that in my exposition of Vico's philosophy I have\nfollowed my personal philosophical convictions: and sermons and\nepistles have been showered upon me preaching the duty of casting\noff prejudices, etc., and narrating the history of philosophy in an\nobjective manner, etc. But I should like my critics to believe that my\n\"convictions\" cannot have, to my mind, the character of prejudices,\nbut precisely that of liberation from prejudice, which is what they\ndemand: that detachment and purity of understanding which is necessary\nfor the comprehension of historical facts, and is not, as some fancy,\na primeval innocence, but the fruit of laborious cultivation. To\ngrasp Vico historically in his strict reality I have been compelled\nto undergo a _catharsis_ of prejudices, consisting in my case of\nthe philosophy to which my own efforts had led me. My ideas may be\nuntrue, but that is another question; and that means that if their\nfalsity is proved I am bound to clear and purify my mind by means\nof less false ideas; but these in their turn must always be ideas\nand become convictions. In point of abstract method, no objection at\nall can be made to any one who looks at Vico through the spectacles\nof scholasticism if he thinks they make his sight more distinct and\npenetrating; the most we can do is to try and persuade him that\nthere are better spectacles on the market. But we certainly have\nthe right to smile if this same scholastic goes on to warn us that\n\"in studying a philosopher, in investigating and reconstructing his\nthought, it is absolutely necessary to bring to the task a mind free\nfrom preconceptions and hostile to prejudices\"; while all the time he\nis trying to pass off his scholastic opinions and religious beliefs\nunder the banner of objectivity, sincerity and freedom from prejudice.\n\"Philosophers\"--I have seen this assertion too--\"are unfitted for\nwriting the history of philosophy, because they have ideas of their\nown.\" And who is fitted for it? People who are not philosophers? Does\nnot Vico teach us precisely this, that where he who makes the facts (as\nthe philosopher makes philosophy) himself narrates them, there history\nreaches its highest certainty?\n\nThe other criticism concerns the idealistic interpretation which I\nhave given to some of Vico's doctrines. It is contended that Vico\nwas a Catholic, and that fact is supposed to prove that he could not\nhave entertained the ideas which I find in his works. But that Vico\nprofessed himself an entirely orthodox Catholic, and that he clung to\nCatholicism with all the strength and zeal of his mind I have myself\nsaid again and again: I have even defended him against the accusations\nor praises dealt out to him by other critics for deceit or prudence in\nhis attitude to the Church. But is it really so amazing, so unheard-of\na thing, to find heterodox ideas in an orthodox writer? Are they not\nfound in the Early Fathers and the Schoolmen, in mediaeval and modern\ntheologians and mystics? To take an example of the many that occur,\nan example for a double reason above suspicion: Nicholas of Cusa was\na Catholic and in fact a Cardinal of Holy Church, and in his lifetime\nthe intimate friend of three popes. And yet the Catholic historian of\nScholasticism, De Wulf, wrote of him \"Le Cardinal catholique est-il\ndonc panth\u00e9iste?... Il s'en d\u00e9fend vivement dans son _Apologia doctae\nignorantiae,_ mais on peut dire de lui comme d'Eckehart: 'il fait\nfl\u00e9chir la logique au profit de son orthodoxie et retient de force les\ncons\u00e9quences de ses pr\u00e9misses'\" (_Hist. de la philos. m\u00e9di\u00e9vale,_ p.\n389). If this happened to the Cardinal of Cusa or the Franciscan Master\nEckehart, could it not happen to the Catholic Vico? M. de Wulf the\nCatholic historian is allowed to use this admirable method of criticism\nand to distinguish intention and action, will and logic. Why should it\nbe denied to me? But enough.\n\n\n\n[Footnote 1: A lecture delivered before the _Accademia pontaniana_ on\nMarch 10, 1912, and here reprinted from the _Atti_ of that society,\nvol. xlii.]\n\n[Footnote 2: _Von den g\u00f6ttlichen Dingen und ihrer Offenbarung_ (1811),\nW.W. iii. 351-354.]\n\n[Footnote 3: _Vorlesungen \u00fcber religiose Philosophie,_ W.W. i. 195, and\n_Vorles. \u00fcber spekul. Dogmatik, ib._ ix. 106 (passages quoted by K.\nWerner, G. B. Vico, p. 324).]\n\n[Footnote 4: _La Filosofia fondamentale,_ translated from the Spanish,\nNaples, 1851, bk. i. ch. 30-31.]\n\n[Footnote 5: _Storia critica delle prove metafisiche di una realit\u00e0\nsovrasensibile (Atti dell' Accademia di Torino,_ i. 1866), pp. 640-41.]\n\n[Footnote 6: _Geschichte der neueren Philosophie_ (1878), 5th edition,\ni. 23.]\n\n[Footnote 7: _G. B. Vico als Philosoph und gelehrter Forscher_ (Wien,\n1881). It is well known that Werner has written upon St. Thomas, Duns\nScotus, late Scholasticism, Suarez, Augustinianism, nominalism, etc.]\n\n[Footnote 8: Th. Neal (A. Cecconi), _Vico e l'immanenza,_ in the Roman\n_Cultura contemporanea,_ iii. (1911) parts 7-8, pp. 1-24.]\n\n[Footnote 9: Cf. _Summa Theol._ i. q. v. a. I: q. xxi. a. 1-2.]\n\n[Footnote 10: _Prima risposta al Giornale dei letterati (Opere,_ ed.\nFerrari, ii. 117).]\n\n[Footnote 11: Balmes, _loc. cit._]\n\n[Footnote 12: _Scienza Nuova,_ ed. Nicolini, i. 187-8.]\n\n[Footnote 13: _Ibid._ p. 188.]\n\n[Footnote 14: _Scritti filosofici,_ ed. Gentile, pp. 383-7, and\n_Esperienza e metafisica,_ p. 218 _sqq._]\n\n[Footnote 15: See Gentile's note, _loc. cit._]\n\n[Footnote 16: _L'Autobiografia, il carteggio e le poesie varie,_ ed.\nCroce, pp. 4-5. Mauthner's assertion (_Beitr\u00e4ge zu einer Kritik der\nSprache,_ Berlin, 1901, ii. 497-8) that Vico was a nominalist and\nthat the great discoveries of the _Scienza Nuova_ were due to his\nnominalism, is quite arbitrary and not founded correctly on his\nautobiography.]\n\n[Footnote 17: _Autobiography,_ ed. cit. pp. 5-6. Pietro Giannone was\nalso studying Scotism about 1690 (_Vita scritta da lui medesimo,_ ed.\nNicolini, pp. 6-7).]\n\n[Footnote 18: Werner, _Johannes Duns Scotus_ (Wien, 1881), p. 76.]\n\n[Footnote 19: Werner, _Die nachscotistische Scholastik_ (Wien, 1883),\np. 82.]\n\n[Footnote 20: _Scritti filosofici inediti,_ ed. Papini (Lanciano,\nCarabba, 1910).]\n\n[Footnote 21: See Gentile's observations on Papini's edition, in the\n_Critica,_ review viii. 62-5.]\n\n[Footnote 22: Papini's edition has \"po'\" (little): but his source, the\nMarcian MS., has an abbreviation to be read as \"per\u00f2\" (therefore).]\n\n[Footnote 23: Appendix to his _Opera medica_ (Tolosae Tectasogum,\n1636), p. 10.]\n\n[Footnote 24: _Ottonis Episcopi Frisigensis Opera,_ ex recens. R.\nWilmans, i. _Chronicon_ (Hannoveriae, 1867), pp. 118-19.]\n\n[Footnote 25: _Autob._ ed. cit. p. 21.]\n\n[Footnote 26: _Ibid._ p. 25.]\n\n[Footnote 27: _Theologia Platonica_ (Bale, 1561), i. 123. This passage\nof Ficino has been quoted and commented on by my friend Gentile, in a\nhighly important monograph on _La prima fase della filosofia di G. B.\nVico_ (viz. the \"inaugural lectures\"), published in the miscellany in\nhonour of Francesco Torraca (1912, see _infra,_ p. 310) and read in MS.\nby myself, thanks to the courtesy of the author.]\n\n[Footnote 28: See Gentile's monograph, mentioned above.]\n\n[Footnote 29: These passages of the _Tractatus de arcanis\naeternitatis,_ ch. iv., and of the _De subtilitate,_ bks. xi. and\nxxi. are quoted and commented on by Fiorentino, _Bernardino Telesio\nossia studi storici su l' idea della natura nel risorgimento italiano_\n(Florence, Le Monnier, 1872), i. 212-13, who does not fail to observe\nthe relations with Vico's criterion.]\n\n[Footnote 30: Thomae Cornelii consentini _Progymnasmata physica_\n(Naples, MDCLXXXVIII.), p. 70: cf. also p. 64.]\n\n[Footnote 31: See Gentile's monograph, mentioned above.]\n\n[Footnote 32: By A. Pastore in a review of my monograph on Vico in the\n_Giorn. stor. d. left. ital._ lviii., cf. pp. 400-402.]\n\n\n[Footnote 33: A. A. Zottoli, _G. B. Vico,_ in _Cultura,_ Rome, xxx.\n(1911) pp. 422-3.]\n\n[Footnote 34: _Opp._ ed. Ferrari, ii. 166.]\n\n[Footnote 35: _Orazioni latine,_ ed. Galasso, p. 28.]\n\n[Footnote 36: _Opp._ ed. Ferrari, ii. 166.]\n\n[Footnote 37: _Ibid._ 232.]\n\n[Footnote 38: _Metaphys._ vi. 1036 a.]\n\n[Footnote 39: The passages of Cassiodorus, Albertus and St. Thomas may\nbe found collected in Mari\u00e9tan, _Probl\u00e8me de la classification des\nsciences d'Aristote \u00e0 saint Thomas_ (Paris, 1901), see pp. 80, 168-9,\n182-3, 185-6.]\n\n[Footnote 40: _De monarchia,_ i. c. 3.]\n\n[Footnote 41: _La Cena delle ceneri_ (1584) in his _Opere italiane,_\ned. Gentile, i. 62, 107-8.]\n\n[Footnote 42: _Logicorum libri tr\u00e8s,_ bk. ii. art. 7-10 (in the\n_Philosophiae rationalis pars secunda,_ Parisiis, 1637, pp. 433-7).]\n\n[Footnote 43: _De dignitate et augmentis scientiarum,_ bk. iii. c. 6.]\n\n[Footnote 44: _Essay,_ iv. ch. 4, \u00a7 6.]\n\n[Footnote 45: _Nouveaux essais,_ iv. ch. 4.]\n\n[Footnote 46: _Op. cit._ p. 64.]\n\n[Footnote 47: _Metaphys._ viii. 1051 b. I append the passage:\n\u03b5\u1f51\u03c1\u1f30\u03c3\u03ba\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03b3\u03c1\u03ac\u03bc\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f10\u03bd\u03b5\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u1f30\u1fb3 \u00b7 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03b9\u03c1\u03bf\u1fe1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1\n\u03b5\u1f51\u03c1\u1f30\u03c3\u03ba\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2. \u03b5\u1f76 \u03b4' \u1f27\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u1fc3\u03c1\u03b7\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1 \u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03b5\u03c1\u1f70 \u1f02\u03bd \u1f27\u03bd \u00b7 \u03bd\u1fe6\u03bd \u03b4' \u1f10\u03bd\u03c5\u03c0\u03ac\u03c1\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\n\u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03ac\u03bc\u03b5\u03b9. \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c4\u03af \u03b4\u03cd\u03bf \u1f40\u03c1\u03b8\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u00f2 \u03c4\u03c1\u03af\u03b3\u03c9\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u1f43\u03c4\u03b9 \u03b1\u1f31 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f31 \u03bc\u1f31\u03b1\u03bd \u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03b3\u03bc\u1f74\u03bd \u03b3\u03c9\u03bd\u03af\u03b1\u03b9\n\u1f32\u03c3\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u03cd\u03bf \u1f40\u03c1\u03b8\u03b1\u1fd1\u03c2. \u03b5\u1f76 o\u1f56\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u1fc6\u03ba\u03c4\u03bf \u1f21 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f21\u03bd \u03c0\u03bb\u03b5\u03c5\u03c1\u1f70\u03bd \u1f30\u03b4\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9 \u1f02\u03bd \u1f27\u03bd \u03b5\u1f50\u03b8\u1f7a\u03c2\n\u03b4\u1fc6\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd. \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c4\u03af \u1f10\u03bd \u1f21\u03bc\u03b9\u03ba\u03c5\u03ba\u03bb\u03af\u1ff3 \u1f40\u03c1\u0398\u1f74 \u03ba\u03b1\u0398\u03cc\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5; \u03b4\u03b9\u1f40\u03c4\u03b9 \u1f10\u1f70\u03bd \u03c4\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd1\u03c2, \u1f24 \u03c4\u03b5 \u03b2\u03ac\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2\n\u03b4\u03cd\u03bf \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f21 \u1f10\u03ba \u03bc\u03ad\u03c3\u03bf\u03c5 \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u0398\u03b5\u1fd1\u03b1 \u1f40\u03c1\u0398\u1f74, \u1f30\u03b4\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9 \u03b4\u1fc6\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7 \u1f10\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd1\u03bd\u03bf \u03b5\u1f30\u03b4\u1f40\u03c4\u03b9. \u1f64\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5\n\u03c6\u03b1\u03bd\u03b5\u03c1\u00f2v \u1f44\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03ac\u03bc\u03b5\u03b9 \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd\u03ad\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u1f30\u03b1\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03b3\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b1 \u03b5\u1f51\u03c1\u1f30\u03c3\u03ba\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9. \u03b1\u1f34\u03c4\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd\n\u03b4' \u1f44\u03c4\u03b9 \u03bd\u1f40\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f21 \u1f10\u03bd\u03b5\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u1f30\u1fb3 \u00b7 \u1f64\u03c3\u03c4 \u1f10\u03be \u1f10\u03bd\u03b5\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u1f30\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f21 \u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03ac\u03bc\u03b9\u03c2. \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe1\u03c4\u03bf\n\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u03b3\u03b9\u03b3\u03bd\u03ce\u03c3\u03ba\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd.]\n\n[Footnote 48: _Scritti filosofici,_ ed. Papini, p. 7. In a passage of\nthe _Arte di ben pensare (Scritti,_ p. 72) Sarpi returns to mathematics\nand, while agreeing that it is less uncertain than the other sciences\nbecause in it \"the mode and the proposition\" are more clearly shown,\ngoes on to say \"it is also made in the same manner (as the others): it\nis not free from the suspicion of being not quite true.\" But clearly\nhe is here speaking of the application of mathematics, of the act of\ncounting and measuring physical objects: \"this alone is certain: I\ncount and reason in this manner, just as in eating honey I feel the\neffect which I call sweet; where I may be in error is the question\nwhether this effect comes from the object or from the disposition of my\ntaste: and there is no science where there are number and measurement,\nfor all we can know is that we measure or count like this, and that\nthe measure comes in or is used as many times as the thing seems to be\nequal to one such part and that equality is a concept of ours by which\nwe express what then seems to happen.\"]\n\n[Footnote 49: G. Papini, _La Novit\u00e0 di Vico_ in _L'Anima,_ Florence,\nSeptember 1911, pp. 264-6; cf. on this article, _Critica,_ x. 56-8.]\n\n[Footnote 50: Papini probably owes this passage to a small anthology of\nGalileo by Favaro (Florence, Barb\u00e8ra, 1910), p, 303, which refers to\nthe national edition of his _Opere,_ iv. 631; here the passage occurs\nin the _Considerazioni sopra il discorso di Colombo_ (1615).]\n\n[Footnote 51: G. Papini, _loc. cit._ pp. 265-6.]\n\n[Footnote 52: _Lezioni accademiche di Evangelista Torricelli,\nmathematico e filosofo del serenissimo Ferdinando II Granduca di\nToscana, lettore delle matematiche nello studio di Firenze e accademico\ndella Crusca_ (Florence, MDCCXV.). The editor's preface shows that the\nwork had not been previously published.]\n\n[Footnote 53: _Op. cit._ pp. 31-2.]\n\n[Footnote 54: _Op. cit._ p. 33.]\n\n[Footnote 55: _Op. cit._ p. 66.]\n\n\n\n\nAPPENDIX IV\n\n\nBIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES\n\n\nI. WORKS OF VICO\n\n\nVico's earliest extant work is the poem entitled _Feelings of one in\ndespair,_ composed certainly before the author's twenty-fifth year at\nVatolla in the Cilento, where he lived for nine years as a tutor at\nthe Casa Rocca, printed by Gonzatti at Venice and dated 1693. This was\nfollowed by verses and speeches of a merely rhetorical character.\n\nThe philosophical characteristics are accentuated in the six speeches\nread by Vico at Naples University, 1699-1707, not printed by him, and\nrediscovered and published by Galasso (Naples, Morano, 1869). In these\nspeeches, though some tendencies of his thought show themselves, his\nphilosophy is still the traditional system, not without some traces of\nCartesianism. Vico's opposition to Cartesianism and formal adoption of\nhis own views are announced for the first time in the inaugural lecture\nfor the year 1708, entitled _De nostri temporis studiorum ratione,_\npublished next year by the author himself (Naples, Mosca, 1709). A\nlong digression (\u00a7\u00a7 12-15) contains a sketch of the history of Roman\njurisprudence, his first essay in the historical studies which led\nlater on to the _Diritto universale_ and the two _Scienze Nuove._\n\nThe following year appeared Vico's first constructively philosophical\nand historical work: the _De antiquissima Italorum sapientia ex\nlinguae Latinae originibus eruenda,_ or rather the first book of that\nwork (Naples, Mosca, 1710): the other two were never written, but\nwe can form an idea of their intended contents from what is said in\nthe Autobiography. Beside Vico's theory of knowledge in its first\nform and the metaphysic which he always maintained in its entirety,\nthe _De antiquissima_ contained an attempt to reconstitute for the\nfirst time primitive wisdom, or rather one particular instance of\nprimitive wisdom, that of Italy; but as we have already said in the\ntext of our exposition the attempt was founded on the idea that this\nwisdom was philosophical, and conducted according to the criterion\nof the transmission of culture which Vico subsequently rejected, as\nhe rejected the traditional opinion, accepted in this work, of the\nAthenian origin of the laws of the Twelve Tables. We must accordingly\nrefuse to accept Cantoni's verdict (_G. B. Vico,_ p. 38) that the\n_De antiquissima_ forms \"a strange anomaly in the history of Vico's\nthought, being contrary to his whole scientific life, his tendencies,\nhis principles, and the method which later he almost universally\napplies in his historical researches.\" The reverse is in fact the case:\nnamely that this work is the starting-point of his future developments\nand that without it we cannot understand his later thought.\n\nThe criticisms directed by the _Giornale dei letterati d' Italia_\n(1711, vols. v. and viii.) against the historical and some of the\nphilosophical positions of the _De antiquissima_ evoked Vico's two\nimportant _Replies_ (Naples, Mosca, 1711 and 1712) in which he defends\nand elucidates his views on the theory of knowledge and metaphysics.\nThe part of the _De antiquissima_ that never went to the press included\nhis meditations on the philosophy of medicine, from which he extracted\nan essay _De aequilibrio corporis animantis:_ this he thought of\npublishing many years later, but it is now lost. Of these studies,\ntherefore, as of his speculations upon physics intended to constitute a\n_Liber physicus,_ we know only what he tells us in his autobiography.\n\nSetting aside his rhetorical and occasional compositions, the largest\nof which is the _De rebus gestis Antonii Caraphaei_ (Naples, Mosca,\n1716), the continuation of his thought, now concentrating upon moral\nand historical problems, is sketched in a lecture of 1719 (of which\nan abstract is included in the autobiography) and developed first in\n1720 in a printed prospectus of four double-columned pages known as the\n_Sinopsi del diritto universale,_ and secondly in the vast treatise,\n_De universi iuris uno principio et fine uno liber unus_ (Naples,\nMosca, 1720) completed next year with the _Liber alter qui est de\nconstantia iurisprudentis,_ and supplemented in 1722 by the _Notae in\nduos libros,_ etc. (same publisher); a work which is usually referred\nto briefly following the author's example as the _Diritto universale._\n\nThis book, according to Cantoni (_op. cit._ p. 243) represents the\nculminating point of Vico's scientific activity. The verdict is no\nmore acceptable than that quoted above. The author (_Opp._ v. 10-11)\nrejected the _Diritto universale_ because he seemed to find persisting\nthere the prejudice and the pretence of \"descending\" from the thought\nof Plato and other philosophers to that of primitive man, a tendency\nwhich led him astray \"in certain matters\"; but he also calls it, and\nrightly, a \"sketch for the _Scienza Nuova,_\" which it really is.\nThe ideas about poetry are here still confused, Homer is not yet a\nmyth, the mythological canons have less unity than they acquired\nlater, the theory of reflux is only faintly adumbrated, and in a\nword both the ideal eternal history and the theory of knowledge upon\nwhich it is founded are as yet immature. The book is all contained,\nunder a new form, in his later work, except the general ethical and\njuridical philosophy, which is not highly original, and some historical\ndevelopments which are merely alluded to in the later writings.\n\nThe MS. of an Italian work in two books, in which Vico expounded his\ndoctrines \"by a negative method,\" has been lost. But he expounds them\npositively and at less length in the _Principi di una Scienza Nuova\nintorno alla comune natura delle nazioni, per la quale si ritrovano i\nprincipi di altro sistema del diritto naturale delle genti_ (Naples,\nMosca, 1725) which is known by the title (again authorised by himself)\nof First _Scienza Nuova._\n\nIn 1725, the year of the publication of the first _Scienza Nuova,_ Vico\nrelated the history of his studies: _Vita di G. B. Vico scritta da\nse medesimo,_ which was inserted in Caloger\u00e0's _Raccolta di opuscoli\nscientifici e filologici_ (Venice, Zani, 1728, vol. i. pp. 145-256).\nAmong the minor writings of this period may be noted the two speeches\non the death of the Countess of Althann (1724) and the Marchesana della\nPetrella Angiola Cimini (1727); the little volume _Vici vindiciae_\n(Naples, Mosca, 1729) containing a personal defence (together with an\nimportant theoretical digression on \"laughter\") against a malevolent\nnotice inserted in the _Acta Lipsiensia_ of 1727, about the _Scienza\nNuova;_ and some fine letters to Giacchi, Degli Angioli, Esperti, De\nVitry and Solla on the contrast between his works and the state of\nlearning at this time.\n\nTo the first _Scienza Nuova_ Vico thought of adding a long series of\n_Annotations_ in a reprint of it which he was preparing at Venice\nbetween 1728 and 1730. But since this scheme was not carried out,\nand on the other hand he was dissatisfied with the book not so much\non account of the matter, he says, as on account of the arrangement\n(_Opp._ vi. 11), he resolved to publish an entirely new exposition\nof his doctrines in the _Cinque libri de' principi di una Scienza\nNuova d'intorno alla comune natura delle nazioni, in questa seconda\nimpressione con pi\u00f9 propia maniera condotti e di molto accresciuti_\n(Naples, Mosca, 1730), which form the second _Scienza Nuova._ While\nCantoni (_op. cit._ pp. 238-9) considers this work the dotage of\nVico's thought, it is really the necessary result and perfect form in\nwhich his previous attempts issued; it is the book which with the _De\nantiquissima_ and the autobiography supplies all the necessary material\nfor a knowledge of his thought. In the _Diritto universale_ and the\nfirst _Scienza Nuova_ we can find a few details omitted in the later\nwork; but those treatises display the same doctrines as the second\n_Scienza Nuova_ in a manner much less profound and solid, and certainly\nless characteristic of the author. The detailed comparison of these\nthree works has been made with great care in the short summaries added\nby Ferrari to his editions of the first and second _Scienza Nuova._\n\nEven the 1730 edition was increased by the author from 1731 to about\n1740 by many variations and additions, though without changing the\narrangement or the substance of the work. These additions were taken\nfor the most part incorporated in a final MS. on which was based the\nedition of the _Principi di una Scienza Nuova intorno alla comune\nnatura delle nazioni,_ published the very year of Vico's death (Naples,\nStamperia Muziana, 1744). In the National Library at Naples are\npreserved the autographs both of this MS. and of two earlier MSS. of\nadditions and corrections, unpublished fragments of which have been\npublished by Giordano (Naples, 1818) and Del Giudice (Naples, 1862).\nAll the unpublished fragments and variants have been now collected by\nNicolini in the edition hereafter mentioned (p. 307).\n\nAfter the second _Scienza Nuova_ Vico wrote hardly anything. We may\nnote among these few productions the speech _De mente heroica_ (Naples,\n1732), the addition to the autobiography (1731), and a few sonnets\nin which, composed though they were, like almost all his verses, by\nrequest and as occasional pieces, a personal note may at times be felt.\n\n\nII. REPRINTS, COLLECTIONS, AND TRANSLATIONS\n\nTwo collections of Vico's minor works have been made, one of the\n_Latinae orationes_ alone by F. Daniele (Naples, 1766), and the other,\nrich in unpublished matter, of the Italian and Latin _Opuscoli,_\nin four volumes, by C. A. de Rosa, Marchese di Villarosa (Naples,\n1818-23). Vico's son Gennaro furnished Villarosa with all his father's\nextant papers; and these priceless autographs are still preserved at\nNaples in the house of my intimate friends the engineers Tommaso and\nVincenzo de Rosa di Villarosa.\n\nThe first and only edition as it may be called, since all others\nare merely reproductions of it, of Vico's complete works is that of\nGiuseppe Ferrari, in six volumes (Milan, _Classici italiani,_ 1835-37)\nreprinted with improvements in 1852-54. The _Opere_ edited by N. M.\nCorcia (Naples, Tipografia della Sibilla, 1834, 2 vols.) are only a\nselection; and the _Opere_ edited by F. Predari (Milan, Bravetta, 1835)\nnever went beyond one ill-arranged volume. The edition which followed\nthat of Ferrari (Naples, Iovane, 1840-41) is also incomplete and\nill-arranged, but contains some small unpublished works. The Neapolitan\nedition of the _Opere_ in eight volumes (i.-ii. 1858, iii. 1861, iv.\n1859, v.-vi. 1860, vii. 1865, viii. 1869, the earlier volumes at the\nTipografia dei Classici Italiani, the others by the publisher Morano)\nis based mainly upon Ferrari, but somewhat incorrect; it is however the\nmost complete of all, as containing the _Sinopsi,_ the _Istituzioni\noratorie,_ and the _Orazioni latine_ published by Galasso subsequently\nto Ferrari's edition, as well as the Italian translations by the\nadvocate F. S. Pomodoro of the _De ratione, De antiquissima,_ and\n_Diritto universale._\n\nUnpublished or scattered works of Vico not appearing in any of these\neditions have been collected by Croce, _Bibliografia vichiana_ and\n_Primo_ and _Secondo supplemento_: see below.\n\nA critical edition of the second _Scienza Nuova_ is now being printed\nin the _Collezione dei classici della filosofia modernadiretta da\nB. Croce e G. Gentile_ (Bari, Laterza): the first volume is to be\npublished at the same time as the present monograph.[1] It is being\nedited by Dr. Fausto Nicolini, who by using the autograph MSS. has\nenriched Ferrari's edition, which contained the fragments suppressed in\nthe 1730 issue, by all the fragments of the intermediate redactions\ndown to the 1744 text; Vico's quotations have been checked and\nreferences given in notes to the passages of classical and modern\nauthors to which he refers; and, finally, in deference to a wish\noften expressed by men of letters as authoritative as Tommaseo, the\northography and punctuation have been corrected. Ferrari's valuable\nsummaries are reproduced, with a few emendations, in Nicolini's edition.\n\nNicolini is also at work on a new edition of the complete works, to\nform part of Laterza's collection of _Scrittori d' Italia,_ the scheme\nand detailed index of which may be seen in Croce, _Secondo supplemento\nalla Bibliografia vichiana_ (pp. 102-13). The fifth volume of this\ncollection, edited by Croce, is also to appear with the present\nmonograph.\n\nVico's Latin works have frequently been translated into Italian: the\n_De antiquissima_ anonymously, perhaps by Vincenzo Monti (1816), and\nlater by Sarchi (1870): the first book of the _Diritto naturale_ by\nCorcia (1839), Amante (1841), Giani (1855), and Sarchi (1866), and both\nbooks, with the _De ratione_ and _De antiquissima,_ as we have said, by\nPomodoro.\n\nThe second _Scienza Nuova_ was translated into French, much\nabbreviated, by Jules Michelet, under the title of _Principes de la\nphilosophie de l'histoire_ (Paris, Renouard, 1827) and frequently\nreprinted; and again, in full, by an anonymous translator described as\n\"l'Auteur de l'Essai sur la formation du dogme catholique,\" in reality\nCristina Trivulzi, Princess of Belgioioso (Paris, Renouard, 1844).\nMichelet also translated some of Vico's minor works, published with\nthe _Scienza Nuova_ in the edition of the _Oeuvres choisies de Vico_\n(Paris, Hachette, 1835) and frequently reprinted.\n\nIn German there is a translation in full with good notes by W. E.\nWeber (Leipzig, Brockhaus, 1844). There is also a summary of the first\nbook of the _Diritto universale_ by K. H. M\u00fcller, forming the first\nvolume of a series of Vico's _Kleine Schriften_ which was not continued\n(Neubrandenburg, Brunslow, 1854).\n\nThe only English translation is a version of the book on Homer based\non Michelet's French translation and inserted in H. Nelson Coleridge's\n_Introduction to the Study of the Greek Classic Poets_ (3rd ed.,\nLondon, Murray, 1846).\n\n\n[Footnote 1: By now (1913) the second volume has appeared: the third\nwill appear next year.]\n\n\nIII. BIOGRAPHY OF VICO\n\nBy way of supplement to the autobiography, Villarosa collected\ninformation on Vico's last years and published it as a continuation of\nthat work in his edition of the _Opuscoli,_ vol. i. (1818).\n\nThis supplement, together with everything else that has been published\nin the way of documents or contemporary records of Vico, may be found\ncollected in the fifth volume of the new edition of his works above\nmentioned (p. 307) and entitled: _L'Autobiografia, il carteggio e le\npoesie varie,_ ed. B. Croce (Bari, Laterza, 1911).\n\n\nIV. LITERATURE ON VICO\n\nThere are only three monographs on Vico which may still be read with\nprofit (that of Ferrari, _La Mente del Vico,_ admirable editor though\nhe was, may best be consigned to merciful oblivion); they are as\nfollows:--\n\n1. Carlo Cantoni, _G.B.V., studi critici e comparativi_ (Turin,\nCivelli, 1867). Cf. for certain reservations A. Faggi, in _Rivista\nfilosofica italiana,_ vol. ix., 1906, pp. 593-606, and G. Gentile, in\n_Critica,_ vol. v., 1907, pp. 197-201.\n\n2. Karl Werner, _G.B.V. als Philosoph und gelehrter Forscher,_ (Wien,\nBraum\u00fcller, 1881). Cf. _Zeitschrift f\u00fcr Philosophie und philos.\nKritik,_ vol. lxxii., 1883, pp. 139-52.\n\n3. Robert Flint, _Vico_ (Edinburgh and London, 1884). (Italian\ntranslation by F. Finocchietti, Florence, 1888).\n\nSee what has been said of these above, p. 277. Of short and general\nstudies the following are the best:--\n\n1. B. Spaventa, _G.B.V.,_ in _Prolusione \u00e8 introduzione alle lezioni\ndi filosofia_ (Naples, Vitale, 1862), pp. 83-102, reprinted under the\ntitle _La Filosofia italiana nelle sue relazioni con la filosofia\neuropea,_ ed. G. Gentile (Bari, Laterza, 1908); see pp. 111-35 of this\nreprint.\n\n2. F. de Sanctis, _Storia della letteratura italiana_ (Naples, Morano,\n1870; new ed. Croce, Bari, Laterza, 1912), vol. ii. pp. 342-62.\n\n3. F. Fiorentino, _Lettere sopra la \"Scienza Nuova\"_ (Florence, 1865),\nreprinted in _Scritti vari_ (Naples, Morano, 1871), pp. 161-211.\n\n4. E. Cauer, _G.B.V. und seine Stellung zur modernen Wissenschaft_\n(in _Deutsches Museum,_ edited by R. Prutz and W. Woelfsohn, Leipzig,\nHinrichs, year I, 1851, vol. i. pp. 249-65).\n\nFor special points the following may be consulted:--\n\n1. F. A. Wolf, _G.B.V. \u00fcber den Homer_ (in _Museum der\nAlterthumswissenschaft,_ Berlin, 1807, vol. ii. pp. 555-70).\n\n2. J. K. von Orelli, _Vico und Niebuhr_ (in _Schweizerisches Museum,_\nAarau, vol. i. p. 184 _sqq._).\n\n3. C. Iannelli, _Sulla natura e necessit\u00e0 della scienza delle cose e\ndelle storie umane_ (Naples, Porcelli, 1818, and Milan, Fontana, 1832).\n\n4. Emerico Amari, _Critica di una scienza della legislazione\ncomparata_ (Genoa, Istituto dei Sordomuti, 1857). Cf. on this book K.\nWerner, _E.A. in seinem Verh\u00e4ltnis zu G.B.V._ (Wien, 1880; from the\n_Sitzungsberichte der phil.-histor. Klasse_ of the Imperial Academy of\nVienna, vol. xcvi.).\n\n5. F. Acri, _Teoria del V. intorno alle idee O paradimmi_ (in _Abbozzo\ndi una teoria delle idee,_ Palermo, Lao, 1870; and with modifications\nin the volume _Videbimus in aenigmate,_ Bologna, Mareggiane 1907, pp.\n287-313).\n\n6. E. Cenni, an exposition of Vico's metaphysic in the volume entitled\n_Considerazioni sull' Italia ad occasione del traforo del Gottardo_\n(Florence, Cellini, 1884), pp. 109-82.\n\n7. E. Bouvy, _De V. Cartesii adversario_ (Paris, Hachette, 1889).\n\n8. E. Bouvy, _La Critique dantesque au dix-huiti\u00e8me si\u00e8cle: Dante et\nV._ (Paris, Leroux, 1892).\n\n9. G. Sorel, _\u00c9tude sur V._ (in _Devenir social,_ Paris, vol. ii.,\n1896) and see esp. the same author's _Le Syst\u00e8me historique de Renan_\n(Paris, Jacques, 1905), _passim._\n\n10. B. Labanca, _G.B.V. e i suoi critici cattolici_ (Naples, Pierro,\n1898).\n\n11. G. Rossi, _V. nei tempi di V._ (in _Rivista filosofica italiana,_\nvol. ii., 1899, pp. 294-319, and part 2, _ibid._ vol. x., 1907, pp.\n602-34).\n\n12. A. Olivieri, _Gli studi omerici di G.B.V._ (in _Atti della r.\nAccad. di archeologia, lettere e belle arti,_ Naples, vol. xxiv., 1905).\n\n13. C. Trabalza, _Storia della grammatica italiana_ (Milan, Hoepli,\n1908), ch. xii. pp. 364-76.\n\n14. P. Garofalo, _Acrisia vichiana nella \"Scienza Nuova,\"_ critical\nannotations (Naples, Detken, 1909): cf. F. Nicolini, in _Critica,_ vol.\nviii., 1910, pp. 374-8.\n\n15. G. Maugain, _\u00c9tude sur l'\u00e9volution intellectuelle de l'Italie de\n1657 \u00e0 1750 environ_ (Paris, Hachette, 1909).\n\n16. On my own previous work upon Vico, it should be observed that\nthe materials of the chapter on Vico's aesthetic doctrine in Croce,\n_Estetica_ (4th ed., Bari, Laterza, 1912, ch. v. pp. 255-71), have been\nworked up in a more mature form into ch. iv. of the present monograph:\nthe essay on Vico's Ethics (in _Critica,_ vi., 1908, pp. 71-7) has been\nabsorbed into chaps, vi.-viii.; and similarly that on the _Lineamenti\ndi storia letteraria in G.B.V._ (_ibid._ pp. 460-80) into chaps, xvi.\nand xviii.; my other scattered writings have in general been only of\ntechnical, philological, or polemical interest. In the miscellaneous\n_Studi in onore di F. Torraca_ (Naples, Perrella, 1912) is a short\nessay by me upon _La Dottrina del riso e dell' ironia in G.B.V._\n\nThe whole of the literature on Vico, together with extracts from rare\nbooks, minor works, and articles, and with unpublished documents\ntogether with fully detailed notes on the editions of Vico's writings,\nis collected in the three works to which I have frequently referred,\nnamely: B. Croce, _Bibliografia vichiana contenente nella parte I\nil catalogo delle edizioni, traduzioni e manoscritti delle opere di\nG.B.V.; nella parte II, quello dei giudizi e lavori storico-critici\nintorno al V. sino al-l' anno corrente; nella parte III lettere\ninedite del V. e al V., documenti e altri scritti inediti o rari, e\nvarie appendici illustrative_ (Naples, 1904: reprinted from _Atti\ndell' Accademia pontaniana,_ Naples, vol. xxxiv.; pp. xii. 127,\n4to);--_Supplemento alla Bibliografia vichiana_ (Naples, 1907;\nreprinted from _Atti,_ vol. xxxvii. pp. 34, 4to)--and _Secondo\nSupplemento_ (Naples, 1911, reprinted from _Atti,_ vol. xl. pp. 116,\n4to); the whole collected in one volume under the title: _Bibliografia\nvichiana; raccolta di tre memorie presentate all' Accademia pontaniana\ndi Napoli nel 1903, 1907 e 1910,_ with an appendix by F. Nicolini\n(Bari, Laterza, 1911).[1]\n\n[Footnote 1: Since the publication of the Italian edition of this work\nin 1911 several studies of Vico have appeared. The following may be\nnoted:--\n\nG. Gentile, _La Prima Fase della filosofia di G.B.V.,_ Naples, 1912 (in\nthe _Studi in onore di F. Torraca_), quoted _supra,_ p. 287 n.\n\nF. Pessico, _Ripensando la Scienza Nuova_ (in _Rassegna nazionale,_\nNovember 1, 1912).\n\nG. Folchieri, _Il Carattere dell' opera di G.B.V._ (Perugia, Bartelli,\n1913). F. Nicolini, _Spigolature vichiane; sul testo delle Vindiciae_\n(in _Scritti vari in onore di R. Renier,_ Turin, 1912).\n\nB. Croce, _Il V. e la critica omerica_ (in the volume _Saggio sullo\nHegel e altri scritti di storia della filosofia,_ Bari, Laterza, 1913,\npp. 269-282).\n\nCf. also W. Windelband, _Die Geschichte der neueren Philosophie,_ 5th\ned. Leipzig, 1911, vol. i. pp. 597-8.]\n\n\nNOTE\n\nPASSAGES OF VICO'S WORKS TO WHICH ESPECIAL REFERENCE IS MADE IN THE\nCOURSE OF THE EXPOSITION\n\nCHAPTER I.--For this chapter see the _De ratione,_ the _De\nantiquissima,_ the two _Riposte al Giornale dei letterati,_ and the\nfirst part of the Autobiography. For the note (p. 8) on the spirit of\nthe Reformation, see _Opere,_ ed. Ferrari, 2nd ed. vi. 5.\n\nChapter _II.--Opp._ v. 147, 239, 136-7, 51; iv. 33; v. 50-51, 147;\niv-33, 63-4; iii. 200; v. 17, 97, 103, 149-50, 174; iv. 20, 248; iii.\n232; iv. 20; v. 562.\n\nChapter III.--_Opp._ v. 147, 162, 99, 42; iv. 73, 81, 174-5; v. 91, 145.\n\nChapter IV.--_Opp._ v. 141, 166, 42; iii. 232, 272-3; iv. 20; v. 175,\n259, 107; iv. 22, 33; v. 180, 441, 209-10, 201; iv. 205, 206; iii. 274,\n275; v. 230, 211, 169; iv. 201, 233, 365; v. 55, 82, 187, 196-7; iv.\n224; v. 110, 112, 168, 212, 237, 217, 379, 440, 212, 238; iv. 24.\n\nChapter V.--_Opp._ v. 80-81; iv. 20, 21, 74; v. 169; v. 161-7; iv.\n191-3, 168-9, v. 18; iv. 169, 50-51; iii. 26; ii. 96-7; v. 166, 43,\n169, 420-21, 387, 192, 379, 108.\n\nChapter VI.--_Opp._ v. 437, 18; iv. 165; v. 109, 110, 534; vi. 15; v.\n532; iii. 12; v. 106; v. 49; iv. 343; vi. 127; iii. 30; iv. 87; iii.\n57; v. 490; iv. 40-41; iii. 30; iv. 334; iv. 35; iii. 12, 30; v. 97;\niii. 234-40; iv. 49; v. 98, 131; iv. 42-3.\n\nChapter VII.--_Opp._ v. 142, 168, 173, 248, 250; iv. 291; v. 106, 242,\n142, 137-8, 290; iv. 175-7, 42-3; v. 153, 241; iv. 9; v. 96, 242, 574;\niv. 332; v. 97; iv. 176-7, 43; v. 176, 131.\n\nChapter _VIII.--Opp._ iv. 309-13; v. 185; iii. 55, 28, 43-4; v. 97;\niii. 47-52, 52-3; iv. 14, 45, 57; v. 148, 133; iii. 53, 85-7, 58; v.\n240-41, 484; iv. 170-71, 180, 351.\n\nChapter _IX.--Opp._ v. 462-3, 544; iv. 43-4, 46; iii. 94, 192-3, 85,\n87; iv. 18, 335, 15; v. 129-30, 563, 564; iii. 55; v. 571; iv. 245, 13,\n159-60; _Scritti inediti,_ Del Giudice, pp. 11-14.\n\nChapter X.--_Opp._ v. 13-14, 128, 143-4, 172, 570; iii. 22; iv. 42; v.\n97, 572, 45-6, 463.\n\nChapter _XI.--Opp._ iv. 62; v. 116, 183, 558, 559, 561, 570; vi. 127;\niii. 95; iv. 249.\n\nChapter XII.--Same sources as for Ch. I. and also vi. 105-6; v. 524-5.\n\nChapter XIII.--_Opp._ v. 60; iii. 249; v. 157, 167-70, 108; iii.\n251-61; iv. 17, 253; v. 103, 217-18, 562; _Scritti inediti,_ p. 9.\n\nChapter XIV.--_Opp._ v. 94-6, 58, 79, 321, 63-4, 84-5, 96, 93, 100; iv.\n27-8, 29-30, 97, 169, 200, 271; v. 182-3, 61-4; iii. 230; iv. 236-43,\n184; iii. 450-59; v. 113, 115, 149, 211, 59, 74, 100, 183; iv. 75-6,\n89; v. 206; iv. 99; iii. 273; v. 260; iii. 280; v. 430-31, 202-3, 98-9.\n\nChapter XV.--_Opp._ v. 356, 357, 255, 355, 121, 361-3, 363-365. 340,\n341, 253, 251-3, 259, 132, 118, 278, 311, 309, 307, 118-19, 120, 121,\n481, 484-6, 293-4, 246, 526, 528, 530-31, 223-5, 444, 43, 114-15,\n222-3, 460, 220, 194, 191-3, 186, 249, 369, 371, 372, 375, 382, 403,\n69; iv. 54, 83-4, 225-6.\n\nChapter XVI.--_Opp._ v. 380-81, 422-5, 452, 277, 360-61, 381, 426,\n435-6, 465, 425, 427, 442, 427-32, 440-41, 445. 448-9, 451, 455, 428-9,\n445, 449-56, 445-6, 448, 452, 378-81, 441-2, 453-4, 78, 446-7, 458-60,\n433-4, 439; iv. 178; vi. 46; v. 100-101, 467-80, 381, 223-4, 457, 100.\n102, 226, 438; iv. 163, 25, 63, 200, 128; iii. 295.\n\nChapter XVII.--_Opp._ iv. 249-50, 228; v. 183, 188; iii. 306-10; iv.\n93, 34, 155; v. 86, 277, 322-3, 416, 129, 413-416, 81, 326, 86; iii.\n473; v. 509-10, 102; iii. 469-75, 87, 122-3; iv. 67-71; v. 123-4, 191,\n85, 100, 88, 290-91, 310, 496, 88-92, 123, 495-505. 502, 327. 525-30,\n531, 534, 596, 474-476, 401, 551, 555, 514, 476, 515, 537-8, 122, 503,\n521, 508, 523, 503, 514.\n\nChapter XVIII.--_Opp._ v. 550, 537, 259, 540-41. 546, 555-556; iv. 101,\n545, 347-8, 552, 555, 544, 554, 537, 539, 538, 551, 328, 547, 552,\n512, 553, 550, 508-9, 68, 488, 547, 538-9, 231, 233, 204, 222, 226,\n361, 425, 428-39, 457; iii. 357. vi. 37, 45-6; iii. 270; vi. 35, 37-8,\n42, 48; v. 429, 439; iv. 198-200; vi. 38; v. 43, 226, 555, 544, 508-9,\n557-8; iv. 235-6, 71.\n\nChapter XIX.--For this chapter see the _De ratione,_ the first pages of\nthe Autobiography and the letters to Esperti, De Vitry, and Solla. On\nwisdom see also _Opp._ v. 153.\n\n\n\n\nINDEX OF NAMES\n(Not retained for this text version.)\n\n\nTHE END","title":"The Philosophy of Giambattista Vico","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":102845}