{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_52914/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_52914","id":"gutenberg_52914","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/52914","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Nihilism (Philosophy)","Power (Philosophy)","Values"],"text":"THE WILL TO POWER\n\nAN ATTEMPTED TRANSVALUATION OF ALL VALUES\n\n\nBY\n\nFRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE\n\n\nTRANSLATED BY\n\nANTHONY M. LUDOVICI\n\n\nVOL. I\n\nBOOKS I AND II\n\n\nThe Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche\n\nThe First Complete and Authorised English Translation\n\nEdited by Dr Oscar Levy\n\nVolume Fourteen\n\nT.N. FOULIS\n\n13 & 15 FREDERICK STREET\n\nEDINBURGH: AND LONDON\n\n\n1914\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS OF VOL. I.\n\n    PREFACE 1\n\n    FIRST BOOK. EUROPEAN NIHILISM. A PLAN\n\n    I. NIHILISM--\n\n    1. Nihilism as an Outcome of the Valuations and Interpretations of\n           Existence which have prevailed hitherto\n    2. Further Causes of Nihilism\n    3. The Nihilistic Movement as an Expression of Decadence\n    4. The Crisis: Nihilism and the Idea of Recurrence\n\n    II. CONCERNING THE HISTORY OF EUROPEAN NIHILISM--\n\n    _(a)_ Modern Gloominess\n    _(b)_ The Last Centuries\n    _(c)_ Signs of Increasing Strength\n\n    SECOND BOOK. A CRITICISM OF THE HIGHEST VALUES THAT HAVE PREVAILED\n    HITHERTO.\n\n    I. CRITICISM OF RELIGION--\n\n    1. Concerning the Origin of Religions\n    2. Concerning the History of Christianity\n    3. Christian Ideals\n\n    II. A CRITICISM OF MORALITY--\n\n    1. The Origin of Moral Valuations\n    2. The Herd\n    3. General Observations concerning Morality\n    4. How Virtue is made to Dominate\n    5. The Moral Ideal--\n\n    _A._ A Criticism of Ideals\n    _B._ A Criticism of the \"Good Man,\" of the Saint, etc.\n    _C._ Concerning the Slander of the so-called Evil Qualities\n    _D._ A Criticism of the Words: Improving, Perfecting, Elevating\n\n    6. Concluding Remarks concerning the Criticism of Morality\n\n    III. CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY--\n\n    1. General Remarks\n    2. A Criticism of Greek Philosophy\n    3. The Truths and Errors of Philosophers\n    4. Concluding Remarks in the Criticism of Philosophy\n\n\n\n\nTRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.\n\n\nIn the volume before us we have the first two books of what was to be\nNietzsche's greatest theoretical and philosophical prose work. The\nreception given to _Thus Spake Zarathustra_ had been so unsatisfactory,\nand misunderstandings relative to its teaching had become so general,\nthat, within a year of the publication of the first part of that\nfamous philosophical poem, Nietzsche was already beginning to see\nthe necessity of bringing his doctrines before the public in a more\ndefinite and unmistakable form. During the years that followed--that is\nto say, between 1883 and 1886--this plan was matured, and although we\nhave no warrant, save his sister's own word and the internal evidence\nat our disposal, for classing _Beyond Good and Evil_ (published 1886)\namong the contributions to Nietzsche's grand and final philosophical\nscheme, \"The Will to Power,\" it is now impossible to separate it\nentirely from his chief work as we would naturally separate _The Birth\nof Tragedy,_ the _Thoughts out of Season,_ the volumes entitled _Human,\nall-too-Human, The Dawn of Day,_ and _Joyful Wisdom._\n\n_Beyond Good and Evil,_ then, together with its sequel, _The Genealogy\nof Morals,_ and the two little volumes, _The Twilight of the Idols_\nand the _Antichrist_ (published in 1889 and 1894 respectively), must\nbe regarded as forming part of the general plan of which _The Will to\nPower_ was to be the _opus magnum._\n\nUnfortunately, _The Will to Power_ was never completed by its author.\nThe text from which this translation was made is a posthumous\npublication, and it suffers from all the disadvantages that a book\nmust suffer from which has been arranged and ordered by foster hands.\nWhen those who were responsible for its publication undertook the task\nof preparing it for the press, it was very little more than a vast\ncollection of notes and rough drafts, set down by Nietzsche from time\nto time, as the material for his chief work; and, as any liberty taken\nwith the original manuscript, save that of putting it in order, would\nprobably have resulted in adding or excluding what the author would\non no account have added or excluded himself, it follows that in some\nfew cases the paragraphs are no more than hasty memoranda of passing\nthoughts, which Nietzsche must have had the intention of elaborating\nat some future time. In these cases the translation follows the German\nas closely as possible, and the free use even of a conjunction has in\ncertain cases been avoided, for fear lest the meaning might be in the\nslightest degree modified. It were well, therefore, if the reader could\nbear these facts in mind whenever he is struck by a certain clumsiness,\neither of expression or disposition, in the course of reading this\ntranslation.\n\nIt may be said that, from the day when Nietzsche first recognised the\nnecessity of making a more unequivocal appeal to his public than\nthe _Zarathustra_ had been, that is to say, from the spring of 1883,\nhis work in respect of _The Will to Power_ suffered no interruption\nwhatsoever, and that it was his chief preoccupation from that period\nuntil his breakdown in 1889.\n\nThat this span of six years was none too long for the task he had\nundertaken, will be gathered from the fact that, in the great work he\nhad planned, he actually set out to show that the life-principle, \"Will\nto Power,\" was the prime motor of all living organisms.\n\nTo do this he appeals both to the animal world and to human society,\nwith its subdivisions, religion, art, morality, politics, etc. etc.,\nand in each of these he seeks to demonstrate the activity of the\nprinciple which he held to be the essential factor of all existence.\n\nFrau Foerster-Nietzsche tells us that the notion that \"The Will to\nPower\" was the fundamental principle of all life, first occurred to her\nbrother in the year 1870, at the seat of war, while he was serving as\na volunteer in a German army ambulance. On one occasion, at the close\nof a very heavy day with the wounded, he happened to enter a small\ntown which lay on one of the chief military roads. He was wandering\nthrough it in a leisurely fashion when, suddenly, as he turned the\ncorner of a street that was protected on either side by lofty stone\nwalls, he heard a roaring noise, as of thunder, which seemed to come\nfrom the immediate neighbourhood. He hurried forward a step or two, and\nwhat should he see, but a magnificent cavalry regiment--gloriously\nexpressive of the courage and exuberant strength of a people--ride\npast him like a luminous stormcloud. The thundering din waxed louder\nand louder, and lo and behold! his own beloved regiment of field\nartillery dashed forward at full speed, out of the mist of motes, and\nsped westward amid an uproar of clattering chains and galloping steeds.\nA minute or two elapsed, and then a column of infantry appeared,\nadvancing at the double--the men's eyes were aflame, their feet struck\nthe hard road like mighty hammer-strokes, and their accoutrements\nglistened through the haze. While this procession passed before him,\non its way to war and perhaps to death,--so wonderful in its vital\nstrength and formidable courage, and so perfectly symbolic of a race\nthat _will_ conquer and prevail, or perish in the attempt,--Nietzsche\nwas struck with the thought that the highest will to live could not\nfind its expression in a miserable \"struggle for existence,\" but in\na will to war, a Will to Power, a will to overpower! This is said to\nbe the history of his first conception of that principle which is at\nthe root of all his philosophy, and twelve years later, in _Thus Spake\nZarathustra,_ we find him expounding it thus:--\n\n\"Wherever I found a living thing, there found I Will to Power; and even\nin the will of the servant found I the will to be master.\n\n\"Only where there is life, is there also will: not, however, Will to\nLife, but--so teach I thee--Will to Power!\n\n\"Much is reckoned higher than life itself by the living one; but out of\nthe very reckoning speaketh--the Will to Power!\"\n\nAnd three years later still, in _Beyond Good and Evil,_ we read the\nfollowing passage:--\n\n\"Psychologists should bethink themselves before putting down the\ninstinct of self-preservation as the cardinal instinct of an organic\nbeing. A living thing seeks above all to _discharge_ its strength--life\nitself is _Will to Power_; self-preservation is only one of the\nindirect and most frequent results thereof.\"\n\nBut in this volume, and the one that is to follow, we shall find\nNietzsche more mature, more sober, and perhaps more profound than\nin the works above mentioned. All the loves and hates by which we\nknow him, we shall come across again in this work; but here he seems\nto stand more above them than he had done heretofore; having once\nenunciated his ideals vehemently and emphatically, he now discusses\nthem with a certain grim humour, with more thoroughness and detail, and\nhe gives even his enemies a quiet and respectful hearing. His tolerant\nattitude to Christianity on pages 8-9, 107, 323, for instance, is\na case in point, and his definite description of what we are to\nunderstand by his pity (p. 293) leaves us in no doubt as to the calm\ndetermination of this work. Book One will not seem so well arranged\nor so well worked out as Book Two; the former being more sketchy and\nmore speculative than the latter. Be this as it may, it contains deeply\ninteresting things, inasmuch as it attempts to trace the elements of\nNihilism--as the outcome of Christian values--in all the institutions\nof the present day.\n\nIn the Second Book Herbert Spencer comes in for a number of telling\nblows, and not the least of these is to be found on page 237, where,\nalthough his name is not mentioned, it is obviously implied. Here\nNietzsche definitely disclaims all ideas of an individualistic\nmorality, and carefully states that _his_ philosophy aims at _a new\norder of rank._\n\nIt will seem to some that morality is dealt with somewhat cavalierly\nthroughout the two books; but, in this respect, it should not be\nforgotten that Nietzsche not only made a firm stand in favour of\nexceptional men, but that he also believed that any morality is nothing\nmore than a mere system of valuations which are determined by the\nconditions in which a given species lives. Hence his words on page 107:\n\"Beyond Good and Evil,--certainly; but we insist upon the unconditional\nand strict preservation of herd-morality\"; and on page 323: \"Suppose\nthe _strong_ were masters in all respects, even in valuing: let us try\nand think what their attitude would be towards illness, suffering,\nand sacrifice! _Self-contempt on the part of the weak_ would be the\nresult: they would do their utmost to disappear and to extirpate their\nkind. And would this be _desirable_?--should we really like a world\nin which the subtlety, the consideration, the intellectuality, the\n_plasticity_--in fact, the whole influence of the weak--was lacking?\"\n\nIt is obvious from this passage that Nietzsche only objected to the\ninfluence of herd-morality outside the herd--that is to say, among\nexceptional and higher men who may be wrecked by it. Whereas most other\nphilosophers before him had been the \"Altruist\" of the lower strata of\nhumanity, Nietzsche may aptly be called the Altruist of the exceptions,\nof the particular lucky cases among men. For such \"varieties,\" he\nthought, the morality of Christianity had done all it could do, and\nthough he in no way wished to underrate the value it had sometimes\nbeen to them in the past, he saw that at present, in any case, it\nmight prove a great danger. With Goethe, therefore, he believed that\n\"Hypotheses are only the pieces of scaffolding which are erected round\na building during the course of its construction, and which are taken\naway as soon as the edifice is completed. To the workman, they are\nindispensable; but he must be careful not to confound the scaffolding\nwith the building.\"[1]\n\nIt is deeply to be deplored that Nietzsche was never able to complete\nhis life-work. The fragments of it collected in volumes i. and ii. of\n_The Will to Power_ are sufficiently remarkable to convey some idea of\nwhat the whole work would have been if only its author had been able to\narrange and complete it according to his original design.\n\nIt is to be hoped that we are too sensible nowadays to allow our\nsensibilities to be shocked by serious and well-meditated criticism,\neven of the most cherished among our institutions, and an honest and\nsincere reformer ought no longer to find us prejudiced--to the extent\nof deafness--against him, more particularly when he comes forward with\na gospel--\"The Will to Power\"--which is, above all, a test of our power\nto will.\n\n                                                   ANTHONY M. LUDOVICI.\n\n\n[Footnote 1: _Naturwissenschaft im Allgemeinen_ (Weimar Edition, i.\nII, p. 132).]\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE.\n\n\n1.\n\nConcerning great things one should either be silent or one should speak\nloftily:--loftily--that is to say, cynically and innocently.\n\n\n2.\n\nWhat I am now going to relate is the history of the next two centuries.\nI shall describe what will happen, what must necessarily happen:\n_the triumph of Nihilism._ This history can be written already; for\nnecessity itself is at work in bringing it about. This future is\nalready proclaimed by a hundred different omens; as a destiny it\nannounces its advent everywhere, for this music of to-morrow all ears\nare already pricked. The whole of our culture in Europe has long\nbeen writhing in an agony of suspense which increases from decade\nto decade as if in expectation of a catastrophe: restless, violent,\nhelter-skelter, like a torrent that will _reach its bourne,_ and\nrefuses to reflect--yea, that even dreads reflection.\n\n\n3.\n\nOn the other hand, the present writer has done little else, hitherto,\nthan _reflect and meditate,_ like an instinctive philosopher and\nanchorite, who found his advantage in isolation--in remaining outside,\nin patience, procrastination, and lagging behind; like a weighing and\ntesting spirit who has already lost his way in every labyrinth of\nthe future; like a prophetic bird-spirit that _looks backwards_ when\nit would announce what is to come; like the first perfect European\nNihilist, who, however, has already outlived Nihilism in his own\nsoul--who has out-grown, overcome, and dismissed it.\n\n\n4.\n\nFor the reader must not misunderstand the meaning of the title which\nhas been given to this Evangel of the Future. \"_The Will to Power:\nAn Attempted Transvaluation of all Values_\"--with this formula a\n_counter-movement_ finds expression, in regard to both a principle and\na mission; a movement which in some remote future will supersede this\nperfect Nihilism; but which nevertheless regards it as a _necessary\nstep,_ both logically and psychologically, towards its own advent,\nand which positively cannot come, except _on top of_ and _out of_ it.\nFor, why is the triumph of Nihilism _inevitable_ now? Because the\nvery values current amongst us to-day will arrive at their logical\nconclusion in Nihilism,--because Nihilism is the only possible outcome\nof our greatest values and ideals,--because we must first experience\nNihilism before we can realise what the actual worth of these \"values\"\nwas.... Sooner or later we shall be in need of _new values._\n\n\n\n\nFIRST BOOK.\n\nEUROPEAN NIHILISM.\n\n\nI.\n\n\nA PLAN.\n\n\n1. Nihilism is at our door: whence comes this most gruesome of all\nguests to us?--To begin with, it is a mistake to point to \"social\nevils,\" \"physiological degeneration,\" or even to corruption as a cause\nof Nihilism. This is the most straightforward and most sympathetic age\nthat ever was. Evil, whether spiritual, physical, or intellectual, is,\nin itself, quite unable to introduce Nihilism, _i.e.,_ the absolute\nrepudiation of worth, purpose, desirability. These evils allow of yet\nother and quite different explanations. But there is one _very definite\nexplanation_ of the phenomena: Nihilism harbours in the heart of\nChristian morals.\n\n\n2. The downfall of Christianity,--through its morality (which is\ninsuperable), which finally turns against the Christian God Himself\n(the sense of truth, highly developed through Christianity, ultimately\nrevolts against the falsehood and fictitiousness of all Christian\ninterpretations of the world and its history. The recoil-stroke of\n\"God is Truth\" in the fanatical Belief, is: \"All is false.\" Buddhism\nof _action_....).\n\n\n3. Doubt in morality is the decisive factor. The downfall of the\n_moral_ interpretation of the universe, which loses its _raison\nd'\u00eatre_ once it has tried to take flight to a Beyond, meets its\nend in Nihilism. \"Nothing has any purpose\" (the inconsistency of\none explanation of the world, to which men have devoted untold\nenergy,--gives rise to the suspicion that all explanations may perhaps\nbe false). The Buddhistic feature: a yearning for nonentity (Indian\nBuddhism has no fundamentally moral development at the back of it; that\nis why Nihilism in its case means only morality not overcome; existence\nis regarded as a punishment and conceived as an error; error is thus\nheld to be punishment--a moral valuation). Philosophical attempts to\novercome the \"moral God\" (Hegel, _Pantheism_). The vanquishing of\npopular ideals: the wizard, the saint, the bard. Antagonism of \"true\"\nand \"beautiful\" and \"good.\"\n\n\n4. Against \"purposelessness\" on the one hand, against moral valuations\non the other: how far has all science and philosophy been cultivated\nheretofore under the influence of moral judgments? And have we not got\nthe additional factor--the enmity of science, into the bargain? Or the\nprejudice against science? Criticism of Spinoza. Christian valuations\neverywhere present as remnants in socialistic and positivistic systems.\n_A criticism of Christian_ morality is altogether lacking.\n\n\n5. The Nihilistic consequences of present natural science (along\nwith its attempts to escape into a Beyond). Out of its practice there\nfinally _arises_ a certain self-annihilation, an antagonistic attitude\ntowards itself--a sort of anti-scientificality. Since Copernicus man\nhas been rolling away from the centre towards _x_.\n\n\n6. The Nihilistic consequences of the political and politico-economical\nway of thinking, where all principles at length become tainted with the\natmosphere of the platform: the breath of mediocrity, insignificance,\ndishonesty, etc. Nationalism. Anarchy, etc. Punishment. Everywhere\nthe _deliverer_ is missing, either as a class or as a single man--the\njustifier.\n\n\n7. Nihilistic consequences of history and of the \"practical historian,\"\n_i.e.,_ the romanticist. The attitude of art is quite unoriginal in\nmodern life. Its gloominess. Goethe's so-called Olympian State.\n\n\n8. Art and the preparation of Nihilism. Romanticism (the conclusion of\nWagner's _Ring of the Nibelung_).\n\n\n\n\nNIHILISM.\n\n\n1. NIHILISM AS AN OUTCOME OF THE VALUATIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS OF\nEXISTENCE WHICH HAVE PREVAILED HERETOFORE.\n\n\n2.\n\nWhat does Nihilism mean?--_That the highest values are losing their\nvalue._ There is no bourne. There is no answer to the question: \"to\nwhat purpose?\"\n\n\n3.\n\nThorough Nihilism is the conviction that life is absurd, in the\nlight of the highest values already discovered; it also includes the\n_view_ that we have not the smallest right to assume the existence of\ntranscendental objects or things in themselves, which would be either\ndivine or morality incarnate.\n\nThis view is a result of fully developed \"truthfulness\": therefore a\nconsequence of the belief in morality.\n\n\n4.\n\nWhat _advantages_ did the Christian hypothesis of morality offer?\n\n(1) It bestowed an intrinsic value upon men, which contrasted with\ntheir apparent insignificance and subordination to chance in the\neternal flux of becoming and perishing.\n\n(2) It served the purpose of God's advocates, inasmuch as it granted\nthe world a certain _perfection_ despite its sorrow and evil--it also\ngranted the world that proverbial \"freedom\": evil seemed full of\n_meaning_.\n\n(3) It assumed that man could have a _knowledge_ of absolute values,\nand thus granted him _adequate perception_ for the most important\nthings.\n\n(4) It prevented man from despising himself as man, from turning\nagainst life, and from being driven to despair by knowledge: it was a\nself-preservative measure.\n\nIn short: Morality was the great _antidote_ against practical and\ntheoretical Nihilism.\n\n\n5.\n\nBut among the forces reared by morality, there was _truthfulness_:\nthis in the end turns against morality, exposes the _teleology_ of the\nlatter, its interestedness, and now the _recognition_ of this lie so\nlong incorporated, from which we despaired of ever freeing ourselves,\nacts just like a stimulus. We perceive certain needs in ourselves,\nimplanted during the long dynasty of the moral interpretation of life,\nwhich now seem to us to be needs of untruth: on the other hand, those\nvery needs represent the highest values owing to which we are able to\nendure life. We have _ceased_ from attaching any worth to what we\nknow, and we _dare_ not attach any more worth to that with which we\nwould fain deceive ourselves--from this antagonism there results a\nprocess of dissolution.\n\n\n6.\n\nThis is the _antinomy_: In so far as we believe in morality, we condemn\nexistence.\n\n\n7.\n\nThe highest values in the service of which man ought to live, more\nparticularly when they oppressed and constrained him most--these\n_social values, owing to their tone-strengthening_ tendencies,\nwere built over men's heads as though they were the will of God or\n\"reality,\" or the actual world, or even a hope of a world to come.\nNow that the lowly origin of these values has become known, the\nwhole universe seems to have been transvalued and to have lost its\nsignificance--but this is only an intermediate stage.\n\n\n8.\n\nThe consequence of _Nihilism_ (disbelief in all values) as a result\nof a moral valuation:--_We have grown to dislike egotism_ (even\nthough we have realised the impossibility of altruism);--_we have\ngrown to dislike what is most necessary_ (although we have recognised\nthe impossibility of a _liberum arbitrium_ and of an \"intelligible\nfreedom\"[1]). We perceive that we do not reach the spheres in which we\nhave set our values--at the same time those other spheres in which we\nlive have _not_ thereby gained _one iota_ in value. On the contrary, we\nare _tired,_ because we have lost the main incentive to live. \"All in\nvain hitherto!\"\n\n\n9.\n\n\"Pessimism as a preparatory state to Nihilism.\"\n\n\n10.\n\nA. Pessimism viewed as strength--_in what respect?_ In the energy of\nits logic, as anarchy, Nihilism, and analysis.\n\nB. Pessimism regarded as collapse--_in what sense?_ In the sense of\nits being a softening influence, a sort of cosmopolitan befingering, a\n\"tout comprendre,\" and historical spirit.\n\n_Critical tension_: extremes make their appearance and become dominant.\n\n\n11.\n\n_The logic of Pessimism leads finally to Nihilism: what is the force at\nwork?_--The notion that _there are no values,_ and _no purpose_: the\nrecognition of the part that moral valuations have played in all other\nlofty values.\n\nResult: _moral valuations are condemnations, negations; morality is the\nabdication of the will to live...._\n\n\n[Footnote 1: This is a Kantian term. Kant recognised two kinds of\nFreedom--the practical and the transcendental kind. The first belongs\nto the phenomenal, the second to the intelligible world.--TRANSLATOR'S\nNOTE.]\n\n\n12.\n\n\nTHE COLLAPSE OF COSMOPOLITAN VALUES.\n\n\n_A._\n\nNihilism will have to manifest itself as a _psychological condition,\nfirst_ when we have sought in all that has happened a purpose which\nis not there: so that the seeker will ultimately lose courage.\nNihilism is therefore the coming into consciousness of the long\n_waste_ of strength, the pain of \"futility,\" uncertainty, the lack\nof an opportunity to recover in some way, or to attain to a state of\npeace concerning anything--shame in one's own presence, as if one\nhad _cheated_ oneself too long.... The purpose above-mentioned might\nhave been achieved: in the form of a \"realisation\" of a most high\ncanon of morality in all worldly phenomena, the moral order of the\nuniverse; or in the form of the increase of love and harmony in the\ntraffic of humanity; or in the nearer approach to a general condition\nof happiness; or even in the march towards general nonentity--any sort\nof goal always constitutes a purpose. The common factor to all these\nappearances is that something will be _attained,_ through the process\nitself: and now we perceive that Becoming has been aiming at _nothing,_\nand has achieved nothing. Hence the disillusionment in regard to a\nso-called _purpose in existence,_ as a cause of Nihilism; whether this\nbe in respect of a very definite purpose, or generalised into the\nrecognition that all the hypotheses are false which have hitherto been\noffered as to the object of life, and which relate to the whole of\n\"Evolution\" (man _no longer_ an assistant in, let alone the culmination\nof, the evolutionary process).\n\nNihilism will manifest itself as a psychological condition, in the\nsecond place, when man has fixed a totality, a systematisation, even an\norganisation in and behind all phenomena, so that the soul thirsting\nfor respect and admiration will wallow in the general idea of a highest\nruling and administrative power (if it be the soul of a logician,\nthe sequence of consequences and perfect reasoning will suffice to\nconciliate everything). A kind of unity, some form of \"monism\":'\nand as a result of this belief man becomes obsessed by a feeling of\nprofound relativity and dependence in the presence of an All which\nis infinitely superior to him, a sort of divinity. \"The general good\nexacts the surrender of the individual ...\" but lo, there is no such\ngeneral good! At bottom, man loses the belief in his own worth when no\ninfinitely precious entity manifests itself through him--that is to\nsay, he conceived such an All, _in order to be able to believe in his\nown worth._\n\nNihilism, as a psychological condition, has yet a third and last form.\nAdmitting these two _points of view_: that no purpose can be assigned\nto Becoming, and that no great entity rules behind all Becoming, in\nwhich the individual may completely lose himself as in an element of\nsuperior value; there still remains the _subterfuge_ which would\nconsist in condemning this whole world of Becoming as an illusion,\nand in discovering a world which would lie beyond it, and would be a\n_real_ world. The moment, however, that man perceives that this world\nhas been devised only for the purpose of meeting certain psychological\nneeds, and that he has no right whatsoever to it, the final form of\nNihilism comes into being, which comprises _a denial of a metaphysical\nworld,_ and which forbids itself all belief in a _real_ world. From\nthis standpoint, the reality of Becoming is the only reality that\nis admitted: all bypaths to back-worlds and false godheads are\nabandoned--but _this world is no longer endured, although no one wishes\nto disown it._\n\nWhat has actually happened? The feeling of worthlessness was realised\nwhen it was understood that neither the notion of \"_Purpose_\" nor\nthat of \"_Unity_\" nor that of \"_Truth_\" could be made to interpret\nthe general character of existence. Nothing is achieved or obtained\nthereby; the unity which intervenes in the multiplicity of events is\nentirely lacking: the character of existence is not \"true,\" it is\n_false_; there is certainly no longer any reason to believe in a _real_\nworld. In short, the categories, \"Purpose,\" \"Unity,\" \"Being,\" by means\nof which we had lent some worth to life, we have once more divorced\nfrom it--and the world now appears _worthless_ to us....\n\n_B._\n\nAdmitting that we have recognised the impossibility of _interpreting_\nworld by means of these three categories, and that from this\nstandpoint the world begins to be worthless to us; we must ask\nourselves whence we derived our belief in these three categories.\nLet us see if it is possible to refuse to believe in them. If we can\n_deprive them of their value,_ the proof that they cannot be applied to\nthe world, is no longer a sufficient reason for _depriving that world\nof its value_.\n\nResult: _The belief_ in the categories of reason[2] is the cause\nof Nihilism--we have measured the worth of the world according to\ncategories _which can only be applied to a purely fictitious world._\n\nConclusion: All values with which we have tried, hitherto, to lend\nthe world some worth, from our point of view, and with which we have\ntherefore _deprived it of all worth_ (once these values have been\nshown to be inapplicable)--all these values, are, psychologically,\nthe results of certain views of utility, established for the purpose\nof maintaining and increasing the dominion of certain communities:\nbut falsely projected into the nature of things. It is always man's\n_exaggerated ingenuousness_ to regard himself as the sense and measure\nof all things.\n\n\n[Footnote 2: This probably refers to Kant's celebrated table of\ntwelve categories. The four classes, quantity, quality, relation, and\nmodality, are each provided with three categories.--TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.]\n\n\n13.\n\nNihilism represents an intermediary pathological condition (the vast\ngeneralisation, the conclusion that there _is no purpose_ in anything,\nis pathological): whether it be that the productive forces are not\nyet strong enough--or that _decadence_ still hesitates and has not yet\ndiscovered its expedients.\n\n_The conditions of this hypothesis_:--That there is _no truth_; that\nthere is no absolute state of affairs--no \"thing-in-itself.\" _This\nalone is Nihilism, and of the most extreme kind._ It finds that the\nvalue of things consists precisely in the fact that these values are\n_not_ real and never have been real, but that they are only a symptom\nof strength on the part of the _valuer,_ a simplification serving the\n_purposes of existence._\n\n\n14.\n\n_Values and their modification_ are related to the _growth of power of\nthe valuer._\n\nThe measure of _disbelief_ and of the \"freedom of spirit\" which is\ntolerated, viewed as an _expression of the growth of power._\n\n\"Nihilism\" viewed as the ideal of the _highest spiritual power,_ of the\nover-rich life, partly destructive, partly ironical.\n\n\n15.\n\nWhat is _belief_? How is a belief born? All belief assumes that\n_something is true._\n\nThe extremest form of Nihilism would mean that _all_ belief--all\nassumption of truth--is false: because no real world is at hand.\nIt were therefore: only an _appearance seen in perspective,_ whose\norigin must be found in us (seeing that we are constantly in need of a\nnarrower, a shortened, and simplified world).\n\nThis should be realised, that the extent to which we can, in our heart\nof hearts, acknowledge appearance, and the necessity of falsehood,\nwithout going to rack and ruin, is the _measure of strength._\n\nIn this respect, Nihilism, in that it is the _negation_ of a real world\nand of Being, might be _a divine view of the world._\n\n\n16.\n\nIf we are disillusioned, we have not become so in regard to life,\nbut owing to the fact that our eyes have been opened to all kinds\nof \"desiderata.\" With mocking anger we survey that which is called\n\"_Ideal_\": we despise ourselves only because we are unable at every\nmoment of our lives to quell that absurd emotion which is called\n\"Idealism.\" This _pampering_ by means of ideals is stronger than the\nanger of the _disillusioned one._\n\n\n17.\n\n_To what extent does Schopenhauerian Nihilism continue to be the result\nof the same ideal as that which gave rise to Christian Theism?_ The\namount of certainty concerning the most exalted desiderata, the highest\nvalues and the greatest degree of perfection, was so great, that the\nphilosophers started out from it as if it had been an _a priori_ and\n_absolute fact_: \"God\" at the head, as the _given quantity_--Truth. \"To\nbecome like God,\" \"to be absorbed into the Divine Being\"--these were\nfor centuries the most ingenuous and most convincing desiderata (but\nthat which convinces is not necessarily true on that account: it is\n_nothing more nor less than convincing._ An observation for donkeys).\n\nThe granting of a _personal-reality_ to this accretion of ideals\nhas been unlearned: people have become atheistic. But has the ideal\nactually been abandoned? The latest metaphysicians, as a matter of\nfact, still seek their true \"reality\" in it--the \"thing-in-itself\"\nbeside which everything else is merely appearance. Their dogma is, that\nbecause our world of appearance is so obviously _not_ the expression\nof that ideal, it therefore cannot be \"true\"--and at bottom does not\neven lead back to that metaphysical world as cause. The unconditioned,\nin so far as it stands for that highest degree of perfection, cannot\npossibly be the reason of all the conditioned. Schopenhauer, who\ndesired it otherwise, was obliged to imagine this metaphysical basis as\nthe antithesis to the ideal, as \"an evil, blind will\": thus it could\nbe \"that which appears,\" that which manifests itself in the world of\nappearance. But even so, he did not give up that ideal absolute--he\ncircumvented it....\n\n(Kant seems to have needed the hypothesis of \"intelligible freedom,\"[3]\nin order to relieve the _ens perfectum_ of the responsibility of having\ncontrived this world as it is, in short, in order to explain evil:\nscandalous logic for a philosopher!).\n\n\n[Footnote 3: See Note on p. 11.]\n\n\n18.\n\n_The most general sign of modern times_: in his own estimation, man has\nlost an infinite amount of _dignity._ For a long time he was the centre\nand tragic hero of life in general; then he endeavoured to demonstrate\nat least his relationship to the most essential and in itself most\nvaluable side of life--as all metaphysicians do, who wish to hold fast\nto the _dignity of man,_ in their belief that moral values are cardinal\nvalues. He who has let God go, clings all the more strongly to the\nbelief in morality.\n\n\n19.\n\nEvery purely _moral_ valuation (as, for instance, the Buddhistic)\n_terminates in Nihilism_: Europe must expect the same thing! It is\nsupposed that one can get along with a morality bereft of a religious\nbackground; but in this direction the road to Nihilism is opened. There\nis nothing in religion which compels us to regard ourselves as valuing\ncreatures.\n\n\n20.\n\nThe question which Nihilism puts, namely, \"to what purpose?\" is the\noutcome of a habit, hitherto, to regard the purpose as something fixed,\ngiven and exacted _from outside_--that is to say, by some supernatural\nauthority. Once the belief in this has been unlearned, the force of an\nold habit leads to the search after _another_ authority, which would\n_know how to speak unconditionally,_ and could _point to_ goals and\nmissions. The authority of the _conscience_ now takes the first place\n(the more _morality_ is emancipated from theology, the more imperative\ndoes it become) as a compensation for the _personal authority._ Or\nthe authority of _reason._ Or the _gregarious instinct_ (the herd).\nOr history with its _immanent_ spirit, which has its goal in itself,\nand to which one can _abandon oneself._ One would like to _evade_ the\n_will,_ as also the _willing_ of a goal and the risk of setting oneself\na goal. One would like to get rid of the responsibility (_Fatalism_\nwould be accepted). Finally: Happiness and with a dash of humbug, the\n_happiness of the greatest number._\n\nIt is said:--\n\n(1) A definite goal is quite unnecessary.\n\n(2) Such a goal cannot possibly be foreseen. Precisely now, when _will_\nin its _fullest strength_ were _necessary,_ it is in the _weakest_\nand most _pusillanimous_ condition. _Absolute mistrust concerning the\norganising power_ of the will.\n\n\n21.\n\n_The perfect Nihilist._--The Nihilist's eye _idealises in an ugly\nsense,_ and is inconstant to what it remembers: it allows its\nrecollections to go astray and to fade, it does not protect them from\nthat cadaverous coloration with which weakness dyes all that is distant\nand past. And what it does not do for itself it fails to do for the\nwhole of mankind as well--that is to say, it allows it to drop.\n\n\n22.\n\nNihilism. It may be _two things_:--\n\nA. Nihilism as a sign of _enhanced spiritual strength_: active Nihilism.\n\nB. Nihilism as a sign of the _collapse_ and _decline_ of spiritual\n_strength_: passive Nihilism.\n\n\n23.\n\nNihilism, a _normal_ condition.\n\nIt may be a sign of _strength_; spiritual vigour may have increased to\nsuch an extent that the _goals_ toward which man has marched _hitherto_\n(the \"convictions,\" articles of faith) are no longer suited to it\n(for a faith generally expresses the exigencies of the _conditions of\nexistence,_ a submission to the authority of an order of things which\n_conduces_ to the _prosperity,_ the _growth_ and _power_ of a living\ncreature ...); on the other hand, a sign of _insufficient_ strength, to\nfix a goal, a \"wherefore,\" and a faith for itself.\n\nIt reaches its _maximum_ of relative strength, as a powerful\n_destructive_ force, in the form of _active Nihilism._\n\nIts opposite would be _weary_ Nihilism, which no longer attacks: its\nmost renowned form being Buddhism: as _passive_ Nihilism, a sign of\nweakness: spiritual strength may be fatigued, _exhausted,_ so that the\ngoals and values which have prevailed _hitherto_ are no longer suited\nto it and are no longer believed in--so that the synthesis of values\nand goals (upon which every strong culture stands) decomposes, and\nthe different values contend with one another: _Disintegration,_ then\neverything which is relieving, which heals, becalms, or stupefies,\nsteps into the foreground under the cover of various _disguises,_\neither religious, moral, political or \u00e6sthetic, etc.\n\n\n24.\n\nNihilism is not only a meditating over the \"in vain!\"--not only the\nbelief that everything deserves to perish; but one actually puts\none's shoulder to the plough; _one destroys._ This, if you will, is\nillogical; but the Nihilist does not believe in the necessity of being\nlogical.... It is the condition of strong minds and wills; and to these\nit is impossible to be satisfied with the negation of judgment: the\n_negation by deeds_ proceeds from their nature. Annihilation by the\nreasoning faculty seconds annihilation by the hand.\n\n\n25.\n\n_Concerning the genesis of the Nihilist._ The courage of all one really\n_knows_ comes but late in life. It is only quite recently that I have\nacknowledged to myself that heretofore I have been a Nihilist from top\nto toe. The energy and thoroughness with which I marched forward as a\nNihilist deceived me concerning this fundamental principle. When one is\nprogressing towards a goal it seems impossible that \"aimlessness _per\nse_\" should be one's fundamental article of faith.\n\n\n26.\n\n_The Pessimism of strong natures._ The \"wherefore\" after a terrible\nstruggle, even after victory. That something may exist which is a\nhundred times _more important_ than the question, whether we feel well\nor unwell, is the fundamental instinct of all strong natures--and\nconsequently too, whether the _others_ feel well or unwell. In short,\nthat we have a purpose, for which we would not even hesitate to\n_sacrifice men,_ run all risks, and bend our backs to the worst: _this\nis the great passion_.\n\n\n\n2. FURTHER CAUSES OF NIHILISM.\n\n\n27.\n\n_The causes of Nihilism_: (1) _The higher species is lacking, i.e.,_\nthe species whose inexhaustible fruitfulness and power would uphold our\nbelief in Man (think only of what is owed to Napoleon--almost all the\nhigher hopes of this century).\n\n(2) _The inferior species_ (\"herd,\" \"ass,\" \"society\") is forgetting\nmodesty, and inflates its needs into _cosmic_ and _metaphysical_\nvalues. In this way all life is _vulgarised_: for inasmuch as the\n_mass_ of mankind rules, it tyrannises over the _exceptions,_ so that\nthese lose their belief in themselves and become _Nihilists._\n\nAll attempts to _conceive of a new species_ come to nothing\n(\"romanticism,\" the artist, the philosopher; against Carlyle's attempt\nto lend them the highest moral values).\n\nThe result is that higher types are _resisted_.\n\n_The downfall and insecurity of all higher types._ The struggle against\ngenius (\"popular poetry,\" etc.). Sympathy with the lowly and the\nsuffering as a _standard_ for the _elevation of the soul_.\n\nThe _philosopher is lacking,_ the interpreter of deeds, and not alone\nhe who poetises them.\n\n\n28.\n\n_Imperfect_ Nihilism--its forms: we are now surrounded by them.\n\nAll attempts made to escape Nihilism, which do not consist in\ntransvaluing the values that have prevailed hitherto, only make the\nmatter worse; they complicate the problem.\n\n\n29.\n\n_The varieties of self-stupefaction._ In one's heart of hearts, not to\nknow, whither? Emptiness. The attempt to rise superior to it all by\nmeans of emotional intoxication: emotional intoxication in the form of\nmusic, in the form of cruelty in the tragic joy over the ruin of the\nnoblest, and in the form of blind, gushing enthusiasm over individual\n_men_ or distinct _periods_ (in the form of hatred, etc.). The attempt\nto work blindly, like a scientific instrument; to keep an eye on the\nmany small joys, like an investigator, for instance (modesty towards\noneself); the mysticism of the voluptuous _joy_ of eternal emptiness;\nart \"for art's sake\" (\"le fait\"), \"immaculate investigation,\" in the\nform of narcotics against the disgust of oneself; any kind of incessant\nwork, _any_ kind of small foolish fanaticism; the medley of all\nmeans, illness as the result of general profligacy (dissipation kills\npleasure).\n\n(1) As a result, feeble will-power.\n\n(2) Excessive pride and the humiliation of petty weakness felt as a\ncontrast.\n\n\n30.\n\nThe time is coming when we shall have to pay for having been\n_Christians_ for two thousand years: we are losing the equilibrium\nwhich enables us to live--for a long while we shall not know in what\ndirection we are travelling. We are hurling ourselves headlong into the\n_opposite_ valuations, with that degree of energy which could only have\nbeen engendered in man by an _overvaluation_ of himself.\n\nNow, everything is false from the root, words and nothing but words,\nconfused, feeble, or over-strained.\n\n_(a)_ There is a seeking after a sort of earthly solution of the\nproblem of life, but in the same sense as that of the _final triumph_\nof truth, love, justice (socialism: \"equality of persons\").\n\n_(b)_ There is also an attempt to hold fast to the _moral ideal_ (with\naltruism, self-sacrifice, and the denial of the will, in the front\nrank).\n\n_(c)_ There is even an attempt to hold fast to a \"Beyond\": were it\nonly as an antilogical _x_; but it is forthwith interpreted in such a\nway that a kind of metaphysical solace, after the old style, may be\nderived from it.\n\n_(d)_ There is an attempt to read the phenomena of life in such a\nway as to arrive _at the divine guidance of old,_ with its powers\nof rewarding, punishing, educating, and of generally conducing to a\nsomething _better_ in the order of things.\n\n_(e)_ People once more believe in good and evil; so that the victory of\nthe good and the annihilation of the evil is regarded as a _duty_ (this\nis English, and is typical of that blockhead, John Stuart Mill).\n\n(f) The contempt felt for \"naturalness,\" for the desires and for the\nego: the attempt to regard even the highest intellectuality of art as a\nresult of an impersonal and disinterested attitude.\n\n(g) The Church is still allowed to meddle in all the essential\noccurrences and incidents in the life of the individual, with a view to\nconsecrating it and giving it a _loftier_ meaning: we still have the\n\"Christian State\" and the \"Christian marriage.\"\n\n\n31.\n\nThere have been more thoughtful and more destructively thoughtful[4]\ntimes than ours: times like those in which Buddha appeared, for\ninstance, in which the people themselves, after centuries of sectarian\nquarrels, had sunk so deeply into the abyss of philosophical dogmas,\nas, from time to time, European people have done in regard to the fine\npoints of religious dogma. \"Literature\" and the press would be the last\nthings to seduce one to any high opinion of the spirit of our times:\nthe millions of Spiritists, and a Christianity with gymnastic exercises\nof that ghastly ugliness which is characteristic of all English\ninventions, throw more light on the subject.\n\nEuropean _Pessimism_ is still in its infancy--a fact which argues\nagainst it: it has not yet attained to that prodigious and yearning\nfixity of sight to which it attained in India once upon a time, and\nin which nonentity is reflected; there is still too much of the\n\"ready-made,\" and not enough of the \"evolved\" in its constitution, too\nmuch learned and poetic Pessimism; I mean that a good deal of it has\nbeen discovered, invented, and \"created,\" but not caused.\n\n\n[Footnote 4: _zerdachtere_.]\n\n\n32.\n\nCriticism of the Pessimism which has prevailed hitherto. The want of\nthe eud\u00e6monological standpoint, as a last abbreviation of the question:\nwhat is the _purpose_ of it all? The reduction of gloom.\n\n_Our_ Pessimism: the world has not the value which we believed it to\nhave,--our faith itself has so increased our instinct for research that\nwe are _compelled_ to say this to-day. In the first place, it seems of\nless value: _at first it is felt_ to be of less value,--only in this\nsense are we pessimists,--that is to say, with the will to acknowledge\nthis transvaluation without reserve, and no longer, as heretofore, to\ndeceive ourselves and chant the old old story.\n\nIt is precisely in this way that we find the pathos which urges us to\nseek for _new values._ In short: the world might have far more value\nthan we thought--we must get behind the _na\u00efvet\u00e9 of our ideals,_ for\nit is possible that, in our conscious effort to give it the highest\ninterpretation, we have not bestowed even a moderately just value upon\nit.\n\nWhat has been _deified_? The valuing instinct inside the _community_\n(that which enabled it to survive).\n\nWhat has been _calumniated_? That which has tended to separate higher\nmen from their inferiors, the instincts which cleave gulfs and build\nbarriers.\n\n\n33.\n\nCauses effecting the _rise of Pessimism_:--\n\n(1) The most powerful instincts and those which promised most for the\nfuture have hitherto been _calumniated,_ so that life has a curse upon\nit.\n\n(2) The growing bravery and the more daring mistrust on the part of man\nhave led him to discover the fact that _these instincts cannot be\ncut adrift from life,_ and thus he turns to embrace life.\n\n(3) Only the most _mediocre,_ who are not _conscious_ of this conflict,\nprosper; the higher species fail, and as an example of degeneration\ntend to dispose all hearts against them--on the other hand, there is\nsome indignation caused by the mediocre positing themselves as the end\nand meaning of all things. No one can any longer reply to the question:\n\"Why?\"\n\n(4) Belittlement, susceptibility to pain, unrest, haste, and confusion\nare steadily increasing--the materialisation of all these tendencies,\nwhich is called \"civilisation,\" becomes every day more simple, with\nthe result that, in the face of the monstrous machine, the individual\n_despairs_ and _surrenders._\n\n\n34.\n\nModern Pessimism is an expression of the uselessness only of the\n_modern_ world, not of the world and existence as such.\n\n\n35.\n\nThe \"preponderance of _pain over pleasure\"_ or the reverse (Hedonism);\nboth of these doctrines are already signposts to Nihilism....\n\nFor here, in both cases, no other final purpose is sought than the\nphenomenon pleasure or pain.\n\nBut only a man who no longer dares to posit a will, a purpose, and a\nfinal goal can speak in this way--according to every healthy type of\nman, the worth of life is certainly not measured by the standard of\nthese secondary things. And a _preponderance_ of pain would be possible\nand, _in spite of it,_ a mighty will, a _saying of yea_ to life, and a\nholding of this preponderance for necessary.\n\n\"Life is not worth living\"; \"Resignation\"; \"what is the good of\ntears?\"--this is a feeble and sentimental attitude of mind. \"_Un\nmonstre gai vaut mieux qu'un sentimental ennuyeux._\"\n\n\n36.\n\nThe philosophie Nihilist is convinced that all phenomena are without\nsense and are in vain, and that there ought to be no such thing as\nBeing without sense and in vain. But whence comes this \"There ought\nnot to be?\"--whence this \"sense\" and _this standard_? At bottom the\nNihilist supposes that the sight of such a desolate, useless Being is\n_unsatisfying_ to the philosopher, and fills him with desolation and\ndespair. This aspect of the case is opposed to our subtle sensibilities\nas a philosopher. It leads to the absurd conclusion that the character\nof existence _must perforce afford pleasure to the philosopher_ if it\nis to have any right to subsist.\n\nNow it is easy to understand that happiness and unhappiness, within\nthe phenomena of this world, can only serve the purpose of _means_:\nthe question yet remaining to be answered is, whether it _will\never be possible_ for us to perceive the \"object\" and \"purpose\" of\nlife--whether the problem of purposelessness or the reverse is not\nquite beyond our ken.\n\n\n37.\n\nThe development of _Nihilism out of Pessimism._ The denaturalisation\nof _Values._ Scholasticism of values. The values isolated, idealistic,\ninstead of ruling and leading action, turn _against_ it and condemn it.\n\nOpposites introduced in the place of natural gradations and ranks.\nHatred of the order of rank. Opposites are compatible with a plebeian\nage, because they are more easy to grasp.\n\nThe _rejected_ world is opposed to an artificially constructed \"true\nand valuable\" one. At last we discover out of what material the \"true\"\nworld was built; all that remains, now, is the rejected world, and to\nthe account of our reasons for _rejecting it we place our greatest\ndisillusionment._\n\nAt this point _Nihilism_ is reached; the directing values have been\nretained--nothing more!\n\nThis gives rise to _the problem of strength and weakness_:--\n\n(1) The weak fall to pieces upon it;\n\n(2) The strong destroy what does not fall to pieces of its own accord;\n\n(3) The strongest overcome the directing values.\n\n_The whole condition of affairs produces the tragic age._\n\n\n\n\n3. THE NIHILISTIC MOVEMENT AS AN EXPRESSION OF DECADENCE.\n\n\n38.\n\nJust lately an accidental and in every way inappropriate term has been\nvery much misused: everywhere people are speaking of \"_Pessimism_,\"\nand there is a fight around the question (to which some replies must be\nforthcoming): which is right--Pessimism or Optimism?\n\nPeople have not yet seen what is so terribly-obvious--namely, that\nPessimism is not a problem but a _symptom,_--that the term ought to be\nreplaced by \"Nihilism,\"--that the question, \"to be or not to be,\" is\nitself an illness, a sign of degeneracy, an idiosyncrasy.\n\nThe Nihilistic movement is only an expression of physiological\ndecadence.\n\n\n39.\n\n_To be understood_:--That every kind of decline and tendency to\nsickness has incessantly been at work in helping to create general\nevaluations: that in those valuations which now dominate, decadence\nhas even begun to preponderate, that we have not only to combat the\nconditions which present misery and degeneration have brought into\nbeing; but that all decadence, previous to that of our own times, has\nbeen transmitted and has therefore remained an _active force_ amongst\nus. A universal departure of this kind, on the part of man, from\nhis fundamental instincts, such universal decadence of the valuing\njudgment, is the note of interrogation _par excellence,_ the real\nriddle, which the animal \"man\" sets to all philosophers.\n\n\n40.\n\n_The notion \"decadence\":--Decay, decline,_ and _waste,_ are, _per se,_\nin no way open to objection; they are the natural consequences of life\nand vital growth. The phenomenon of decadence is just as necessary to\nlife as advance or progress is: we are not in a position which enables\nus to _suppress_ it. On the contrary, reason _would have it retain its\nrights._\n\nIt is disgraceful on the part of socialist-theorists to argue that\ncircumstances and social combinations could be devised which would put\nan end to all vice, illness, crime, prostitution, and poverty.... But\nthat is tantamount to condemning _Life_ ... a society is not at liberty\nto remain young. And even in its prime it must bring forth ordure and\ndecaying matter. The more energetically and daringly it advances, the\nricher will it be in failures and in deformities, and the nearer it\nwill be to its fall. Age is not deferred by means of institutions. Nor\nis illness. Nor is vice.\n\n\n41.\n\nFundamental aspect of the nature of decadence: _what has heretofore\nbeen regarded as its causes are its effects._\n\nIn this way, the whole perspective _of the problems of morality_ is\naltered.\n\nAll the struggle of morals against vice, luxury, crime, and even\nagainst illness, seems a _na\u00efvet\u00e9,_ a superfluous effort: there is no\nsuch thing as \"_improvement_\" (a word against _repentance_).\n\nDecadence itself is not a thing _that can be withstood_: it is\nabsolutely necessary and is proper to all ages and all peoples. That\nwhich must be withstood, and by all means in our power, is the\nspreading of the contagion among the sound parts of the organism.\n\nIs that done? The very _reverse_ is done. It is precisely on this\naccount that one makes a stand on behalf of _humanity._\n\nHow do the _highest values_ created hitherto stand in relation to this\nfundamental question in _biology_? Philosophy, religion, morality, art,\netc.\n\n(The remedy: militarism, for instance, from Napoleon onwards, who\nregarded civilisation as his natural enemy.)\n\n\n42.\n\nAll those things which heretofore have been regarded as the _causes of\ndegeneration,_ are really its effects.\n\nBut those things also which have been regarded as the _remedies_ of\ndegeneration are only _palliatives_ of certain effects thereof: the\n\"cured\" are _types of the degenerate._\n\n_The results of decadence_: vice--viciousness; illness--sickliness;\ncrime--criminality; celibacy--sterility; hysteria--the weakness of the\nwill; alcoholism; pessimism, anarchy; debauchery (also of the spirit).\nThe calumniators, underminers, sceptics, and destroyers.\n\n\n43.\n\nConcerning the notion \"decadence.\" (1) Scepticism is a result of\ndecadence: just as spiritual debauchery is.\n\n(2) Moral corruption is a result of decadence (the weakness of the will\nand the need of strong stimulants).\n\n(3) Remedies, whether psychological or moral, do not alter the march\nof decadence, they do not arrest anything; physiologically they do not\ncount.\n\nA peep into the _enormous futility_ of these pretentious \"reactions\";\nthey are forms of an\u00e6sthetising oneself against certain fatal\nsymptoms resulting from the prevailing condition of things; they do\nnot eradicate the morbid element; they are often heroic attempts to\ncancel the decadent man, to allow only a minimum of his _deleterious\ninfluence_ to survive.\n\n(4) Nihilism is not a cause, but only the _rationale_ of decadence.\n\n(5) The \"good\" and the \"bad\" are no more than two types of decadence:\nthey come together in all its fundamental phenomena.\n\n(6) The _social problem_ is a result of _decadence._\n\n(7) Illnesses, more particularly those attacking the nerves and the\nhead, are signs that the _defensive_ strength of strong nature is\nlacking; a proof of this is that irritability which causes pleasure and\npain to be regarded as problems of the first order.\n\n\n44.\n\n_The most common types of decadence_: (1) In the belief that they are\nremedies, cures are chosen which only precipitate exhaustion;--this is\nthe case with Christianity (to point to the most egregious example of\nmistaken instinct);--this is also the case with \"progress.\"\n\n(2) The _power of resisting_ stimuli is on the wane--chance rules\nsupreme: events are inflated and drawn out until they appear monstrous\n... a suppression of the \"personality,\" a disintegration of the\nwill; in this regard we may mention a whole class of morality, the\naltruistic, that which is incessantly preaching pity, and whose most\nessential feature is the weakness of the personality, so that it _rings\nin unison,_ and, like an over-sensitive string, does not cease from\nvibrating ... extreme irritability....\n\n(3) Cause and effect are confounded: decadence is not understood as\nphysiological, and its results are taken to be the causes of the\ngeneral indisposition:--this applies to all religious morality.\n\n(4) A state of affairs is desired in which suffering shall cease;\nlife is actually considered the cause of all ills--_unconscious_ and\ninsensitive states (sleep and syncope) are held in incomparably higher\nesteem than the conscious states; hence a _method_ of life.\n\n\n45.\n\nConcerning the hygiene of the \"weak.\" All that is done in weakness ends\nin failure. Moral: do nothing. The worst of it is, that precisely the\nstrength required in order to stop action, and to cease from reacting,\nis most seriously diseased under the influence of weakness: that one\nnever reacts more promptly or more blindly than when one should not\nreact at all.\n\nThe strength of a character is shown by the ability to delay and\npostpone reaction: a certain \u1f00\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03af\u03b1 is just as proper to it, as\ninvoluntariness in recoiling, suddenness and lack of restraint in\n\"action,\" are proper to weakness. The will is weak: and the recipe\nfor preventing foolish acts would be: to have a strong will and to do\nnothing--contradiction. A sort of self-destruction, the instinct of\nself-preservation is compromised.... _The weak man injures himself_....\nThat is the decadent _type_.\n\nAs a matter of fact, we meet with a vast amount of thought concerning\nthe means wherewith _impassibility_ may be induced. To this extent, the\ninstincts are on the right scent; for to do nothing is more useful than\nto do something....\n\nAll the practices of private orders, of solitary philosophers, and of\nfakirs, are suggested by a correct consideration of the fact, that a\ncertain kind of man is most _useful to himself_ when he hinders his own\naction as much as possible.\n\n_Relieving measures_: absolute obedience, mechanical activity, total\nisolation from men and things that might exact immediate decisions and\nactions.\n\n\n46.\n\n_Weakness of Will_: this is a fable that can lead astray. For there\nis no will, consequently neither a strong nor a weak one. The\nmultiplicity and disintegration of the instincts, the want of system in\ntheir relationship, constitute what is known as a \"weak will\"; their\nco-ordination, under the government of one individual among them,\nresults in a \"strong will\"--in the first case vacillation and a lack\nof equilibrium is noticeable: in the second, precision and definite\ndirection.\n\n\n47.\n\nThat which is inherited is not illness, but a _predisposition to\nillness_: a lack of the powers of resistance against injurious external\ninfluences, etc. etc, broken powers of resistance; expressed morally:\nresignation and humility in the presence of the enemy.\n\nI have often wondered whether it would not be possible to class all the\nhighest values of the philosophies, moralities, and religions which\nhave been devised hitherto, with the values of the feeble, the _insane_\nand the _neurasthenic_ in a milder form, they present the same evils.\n\nThe value of all morbid conditions consists in the fact that they\nmagnify certain normal phenomena which are difficult to discern in\nnormal conditions....\n\n_Health_ and _illness_ are not essentially different, as the ancient\ndoctors believed and as a few practitioners still believe to-day. They\ncannot be imagined as two distinct principles or entities which fight\nfor the living organism and make it their battlefield. That is nonsense\nand mere idle gossip, which no longer holds water. As a matter of\nfact, there is only a difference of degree between these two living\nconditions: exaggeration, want of proportion, want of harmony among the\nnormal phenomena, constitute the morbid state (Claude Bernard).\n\nJust as \"evil\" may be regarded as exaggeration, discord, and want of\nproportion, so can \"good\" be regarded as a sort of protective diet\nagainst the danger of exaggeration, discord, and want of proportion.\n\n_Hereditary weakness_ as a _dominant_ feeling: the cause of the\nprevailing values.\n\n_N.B._--Weakness is in demand--why?... mostly because people cannot be\nanything else than weak.\n\n_Weakening considered a duty_: The weakening of the desires, of the\nfeelings of pleasure and of pain, of the will to power, of the will\nto pride, to property and to more property; weakening in the form of\nhumility; weakening in the form of a belief; weakening in the form\nof repugnance and shame in the presence of all that is natural--in\nthe form of a denial of life, in the form of illness and chronic\nfeebleness; weakening in the form of a refusal to take revenge, to\noffer resistance, to become an enemy, and to show anger.\n\n_Blunders_ in the treatment: there is no attempt at combating weakness\nby means of any fortifying system; but by a sort of justification\nconsisting of moralising; _i.e.,_ by means of _interpretation._\n\nTwo totally different conditions are _confused_: for instance, the\n_repose of strength,_ which is essentially abstinence from reaction\n(the prototype of the gods whom nothing moves), and the _peace of\nexhaustion,_ rigidity to the point of an\u00e6sthesia. All these philosophic\nand ascetic modes of procedure aspire to the second state, but actually\npretend to attain to the first ... for they ascribe to the condition\nthey have reached the attributes that would be in keeping only with a\ndivine state.\n\n\n48.\n\n_The most dangerous misunderstanding._--There is one concept which\napparently allows of no confusion or ambiguity, and that is the concept\n_exhaustion._ Exhaustion may be acquired or inherited--in any case it\nalters the aspect and _value of things._\n\nUnlike him who involuntarily _gives_ of the superabundance which he\nboth feels and represents, to the things about him, and who sees them\nfuller, mightier, and more pregnant with promises,--who, in fact, _can_\nbestow,--the exhausted one belittles and disfigures everything he\nsees--he impoverishes its worth: he is detrimental....\n\nNo mistake seems possible in this matter: and yet history discloses the\nterrible fact, that the exhausted have always been _confounded_ with\nthose with the most abundant resources, and the latter with the most\ndetrimental.\n\nThe pauper in vitality, the feeble one, impoverishes even life: the\nwealthy man, in vital powers, enriches it. The first is the parasite of\nthe second: the second is a bestower of his abundance. How is confusion\npossible?\n\nWhen he who was exhausted came forth with the bearing of a very\nactive and energetic man (when degeneration implied a certain excess\nof spiritual and nervous discharge), he was _mistaken_ for the wealthy\nman. He inspired terror. The cult of the madman is also always the cult\nof him who is rich in vitality, and who is a powerful man. The fanatic,\nthe one possessed, the religious epileptic, all eccentric creatures\nhave been regarded as the highest types of power: as divine.\n\nThis kind of strength which inspires terror seemed to be, above all,\ndivine: this was the starting-point of authority; here _wisdom_\nwas interpreted, hearkened to, and sought. Out of this there was\ndeveloped, everywhere almost, a _will_ to \"deify,\" _i.e.,_ to a typical\ndegeneration of spirit, body, and nerves: an attempt to discover the\nroad to this higher form of being. To make oneself ill or mad, to\nprovoke the symptoms of serious disorder--was called getting stronger,\nbecoming more superhuman, more terrible and more wise. People thought\nthey would thus attain to such wealth of power, that they would be able\nto _dispense_ it. Wheresoever there have been prayers, some one has\nbeen sought who had something to give away.\n\nWhat led astray, here, was the experience of intoxication. This\nincreases the feeling of power to the highest degree, therefore, to the\nmind of the ingenuous, it is _power._ On the highest altar of power\n_the most intoxicated man_ must stand, the ecstatic. (There are two\ncauses of _intoxication_: superabundant life, and a condition of morbid\nnutrition of the brain.)\n\n\n49.\n\n_Acquired,_ not inherited exhaustion: (1) inadequate _nourishment,_\noften the result of ignorance concerning diet, as, for instance, in the\ncase of scholars; (2) erotic precocity: the damnation more especially\nof the youth of France--Parisian youths, above all, who are already\ndirtied and ruined when they step out of their _lyc\u00e9es_ into the world,\nand who cannot break the chains of despicable tendencies; ironical and\nscornful towards themselves--galley-slaves despite all their refinement\n(moreover, in the majority of cases, already a symptom of racial and\nfamily decadence, as all hypersensitiveness is; and examples of the\ninfection of environment: to be influenced by one's environment is\nalso a sign of decadence); (3) alcoholism, not the instinct but the\nhabit, foolish imitation, the cowardly or vain adaptation to a ruling\nfashion. What a blessing a Jew is among Germans! See the obtuseness,\nthe flaxen head, the blue eye, and the lack of intellect in the face,\nthe language, and the bearing; the lazy habit of stretching the limbs,\nand the need of repose among Germans--a need which is not the result of\noverwork, but of the disgusting excitation and over-excitation caused\nby alcohol.\n\n\n50.\n\n_A theory of exhaustion._--Vice, the insane (also artists), the\ncriminals, the anarchists--these are not the _oppressed_ classes, but\n_the outcasts_ of the community of all classes hitherto.\n\nSeeing that all our classes are permeated by these elements, we have\ngrasped the fact that _modern society_ is not a \"society\" or a \"body,\"\nbut a diseased agglomeration of Chandala,--a society which no longer\nhas the strength even to _excrete_.\n\nTo what extent living together for centuries has very much deepened\n_sickliness_:\n\n    modern virtue   }\n    modern intellect} as forms of disease.\n    modern science  }\n\n\n51.\n\n_The state of corruption._--The interrelation of all forms of\ncorruption should be understood, and the Christian form (Pascal as\nthe type), as also the socialistic and communistic (a result of the\nChristian), should not be overlooked (from the standpoint of natural\nscience, the _highest_ conception of society according to socialists,\nis the lowest in the order of rank among societies); the \"Beyond\"\n--corruption: as though outside the real world of Becoming there were a\nworld of Being.\n\nHere there must be no compromise, but selection, annihilation, and\nwar--the Christian Nihilistic standard of value must be withdrawn from\nall things and attacked beneath every disguise ... for instance, from\nmodern _sociology, music,_ and _Pessimism_ (all forms of the Christian\nideal of values).\n\nEither one thing _or_ the other is true--that is to say, tending to\nelevate the type man....\n\nThe priest, the shepherd of souls, should be looked upon as a form\nof life which must be suppressed. All education, hitherto, has been\nhelpless, adrift, without ballast, and afflicted with the contradiction\nof values.\n\nEither one thing _or_ the other is true--that is to say, tending to\nelevate the type man....\n\nThe priest, the shepherd of souls, should be looked upon as a form\nof life which must be suppressed. All education, hitherto, has been\nhelpless, adrift, without ballast, and afflicted with the contradiction\nof values.\n\n\n52.\n\nIf Nature have no pity on the degenerate, it is not therefore\nimmoral: the growth of physiological and moral evils in the human\nrace, is rather the _result_ of _morbid and unnatural morality._ The\nsensitiveness of the majority of men is both morbid and unnatural.\n\nWhy is it that mankind is corrupt in a moral and physiological respect?\nThe body degenerates if one organ is _unsound._ The _right of altruism_\ncannot be traced to physiology, neither can the right to help and\nto the equality of fate: these are all premiums for degenerates and\nfailures.\n\nThere can be no _solidarity_ in a society containing unfruitful,\nunproductive, and destructive members, who, by the bye, are bound to\nhave offspring even more degenerate than they are themselves.\n\n\n53.\n\nDecadence exercises a profound and perfectly unconscious influence,\neven over the ideals of science: all our sociology is a proof of this\nproposition, and it has yet to be reproached with the fact that\nit has only the experience of _society in the process of decay,_\nand inevitably takes its own decaying instincts as the basis of\nsociological judgment.\n\nThe _declining_ vitality of modern Europe formulates its social ideals\nin its decaying instincts: and these ideals are all so like those of\n_old and effete_ races, that they might be mistaken for one another.\n\nThe _gregarious instinct,_ then,--now a sovereign power,--is something\ntotally different from the instinct of an _aristocratic society_: and\nthe value of the sum depends upon the value of the units constituting\nit.... The whole of our sociology knows no other instinct than that\nof the herd, _i.e.,_ of a _multitude of mere ciphers_--of which every\ncipher has \"equal rights,\" and where it is a virtue to be----naught....\n\nThe valuation with which the various forms of society are judged to-day\nis absolutely the same with that which assigns a higher place to peace\nthan to war: but this principle is contrary to the teaching of biology,\nand is itself a mere outcome of decadent life. Life is a result of war,\nsociety is a means to war.... Mr. Herbert Spencer was a decadent in\nbiology, as also in morality (he regarded the triumph of altruism as a\ndesideratum!!!).\n\n\n54.\n\nAfter thousands of years of error and confusion, it is my good fortune\nto have rediscovered the road which leads to a Yea and to a Nay.\n\nI teach people to say Nay in the face of all that makes for weakness\nand exhaustion.\n\nI teach people to say Yea in the face of all that makes for strength,\nthat preserves strength, and justifies the feeling of strength.\n\nUp to the present, neither the one nor the other has been taught; but\nrather virtue, disinterestedness, pity, and even the negation of life.\nAll these are values proceeding from exhausted people.\n\nAfter having pondered over the physiology of exhaustion for some time,\nI was led to the question: to what extent the judgments of exhausted\npeople had percolated into the world of values.\n\nThe result at which I arrived was as startling as it could possibly\nbe--even for one like myself who was already at home in many a strange\nworld: I found that all prevailing values--that is to say, all those\nwhich had gained ascendancy over humanity, or at least over its tamer\nportions, could be traced back to the judgment of exhausted people.\n\nUnder the cover of the holiest names, I found the most destructive\ntendencies; people had actually given the name \"God\" to all that\nrenders weak, teaches weakness, and infects with weakness.... I found\nthat the \"good man\" was a form of self-affirmation on the part of\ndecadence.\n\nThat virtue which Schopenhauer still proclaimed as superior to all,\nand as the most fundamental of all virtues; even that same pity I\nrecognised as more dangerous than any vice. Deliberately to thwart\nthe law of selection among species, and their natural means of purging\ntheir stock of degenerate members--this, up to my time, had been the\ngreatest of all virtues....\n\nOne should do honour to the _fatality_ which says to the feeble:\n\"perish!\"\n\nThe opposing of this fatality, the botching of mankind and the allowing\nof it to putrefy, was given the name \"God\" One shall not take the name\nof the Lord one's God in vain....\n\nThe race is corrupted--not by its vices, but by its ignorance: it is\ncorrupted because it has not recognised exhaustion as exhaustion:\nphysiological misunderstandings are the cause of all evil.\n\nVirtue is our greatest misunderstanding.\n\nProblem: how were the exhausted able to make the laws of values? In\nother words, how did they who are the last, come to power?... How did\nthe instincts of the animal man ever get to stand on their heads?...\n\n\n\n\n4. THE CRISIS: NIHILISM AND THE IDEA OF RECURRENCE.\n\n\n55.\n\nExtreme positions are not relieved by more moderate ones, but by\nextreme _opposite_ positions. And thus the belief in the utter\nimmorality of nature, and in the absence of all purpose and sense, are\npsychologically necessary attitudes when the belief in God and in an\nessentially moral order of things is no longer tenable.\n\nNihilism now appears, _not_ because the sorrows of existence are\ngreater than they were formerly, but because, in a general way, people\nhave grown suspicious of the \"meaning\" which might be given to evil and\neven to existence. One interpretation has been overthrown: but since it\nwas held to be _the_ interpretation, it seems as though there were no\nmeaning in existence at all, as though everything were in vain.\n\n***\n\nIt yet remains to be shown that this \"in vain!\" is the character\nof present Nihilism. The mistrust of our former valuations has\nincreased to such an extent that it has led to the question: \"are\nnot all 'values' merely allurements prolonging the duration of the\ncomedy, without, however, bringing the unravelling any closer?\" The\n\"long period of time\" which has culminated in an \"in vain,\" without\neither goal or purpose, is the _most paralysing_ of thoughts, more\nparticularly when one sees that one is duped without, however, being\nable to resist being duped.\n\n***\n\nLet us imagine this thought in its worst form: existence, as it is,\nwithout either a purpose or a goal, but inevitably recurring, without\nan end in nonentity: \"_Eternal Recurrence._\"\n\nThis is the extremest form of Nihilism: nothing (purposelessness)\neternal!\n\nEuropean form of Buddhism: the energy of knowledge and of strength\ndrives us to such a belief. It is the most _scientific_ of all\nhypotheses. We deny final purposes. If existence had a final purpose it\nwould have reached it.\n\n***\n\nIt should be understood that what is being aimed at, here, is a\ncontradiction of Pantheism: for \"everything perfect, divine, eternal,\"\n_also_ leads _to the belief in Eternal Recurrence._ Question: has this\npantheistic and affirmative attitude to all things also been made\npossible by morality? At bottom only the moral God has been overcome.\nIs there any sense in imagining a God \"beyond good and evil\"? Would\nPantheism in _this_ sense be possible? Do we withdraw the idea of\npurpose from the process, and affirm the process notwithstanding?\nThis were so if, within that process, something were _attained_ every\nmoment--and always the same thing. Spinoza won an affirmative position\nof this sort, in the sense that every moment, according to him, has\na logical necessity: and he triumphed by means of his fundamentally\nlogical instinct over a like conformation of the world.\n\n***\n\nBut his case is exceptional. If every _fundamental trait of character,_\nwhich lies beneath every act, and which finds expression in every\nact, were recognised by the individual as _his_ fundamental trait of\ncharacter, this individual would be driven to regard every moment of\nhis existence in general, triumphantly as good. It would simply be\nnecessary for that fundamental trait of character to be felt in oneself\nas something good, valuable, and pleasurable.\n\n***\n\nNow, in the case of those men and classes of men who were treated\nwith violence and oppressed by their fellows, _morality_ saved life\nfrom despair and from the leap into nonentity:. for impotence in\nrelation to mankind and _not_ in relation to Nature is what generates\nthe most desperate bitterness towards existence. Morality treated the\npowerful, the violent, and the \"masters\" in general, as enemies against\nwhom the common man must be protected--_that is to say, emboldened,\nstrengthened._ Morality has therefore always taught the most profound\n_hatred_ and _contempt_ of the fundamental trait of character of all\nrulers--_i.e., their Will to Power._ To suppress, to deny, and to\ndecompose this morality, would mean to regard this most thoroughly\ndetested instinct with the reverse of the old feeling and valuation.\nIf the sufferer and the oppressed man were _to lose his belief_ in his\nright to contemn the Will to Power, his position would be desperate.\nThis would be so if the trait above-mentioned were essential to life,\nin which case it would follow that even that will to morality was only\na cloak to this \"Will to Power,\" as are also even that hatred and\ncontempt. The oppressed man would then perceive that he stands _on\nthe same platform_ with the oppressor, and that he has no individual\nprivilege, nor any _higher rank_ than the latter.\n\n***\n\nOn the _contrary_! There is nothing on earth which can have any value,\nif it have not a modicum of power--granted, of course, that life itself\nis the Will to Power. Morality protected the _botched_ and _bungled_\nagainst Nihilism, in that it gave every one of them infinite worth,\nmetaphysical worth, and classed them altogether in one order which did\nnot correspond with that of worldly power and order of rank: it taught\nsubmission, humility, etc. _Admitting that the belief in this morality\nbe destroyed,_ the botched and the bungled would no longer have any\ncomfort, and would perish.\n\n\n\nThis _perishing_ seems like _self-annihilation,_ like an instinctive\nselection of that which must be destroyed. The _symptoms_ of this\nself-destruction of the botched and the bungled: self-vivisection,\npoisoning, intoxication, romanticism, and, above all, the instinctive\nconstraint to acts whereby the powerful are made into _mortal\nenemies_ (training, so to speak, one's own hangmen), _the will to\ndestruction_ as the will of a still deeper instinct--of the instinct of\nself-destruction, of the Will to Nonentity.\n\n***\n\nNihilism is a sign that the botched and bungled in order to be\ndestroyed, that, having been deprived of morality, they no longer have\nany reason to \"resign themselves,\" that they take up their stand on the\nterritory of the opposite principle, and _will also exercise power_\nthemselves, by compelling the powerful to become their hangmen. This\nis the European form of Buddhism, that _active negation,_ after all\nexistence has lost its meaning.\n\n***\n\nIt must not be supposed that \"poverty\" has grown more acute, on the\ncontrary! \"God, morality, resignation\" were remedies in the very\ndeepest stages of misery: _active_ Nihilism made its appearance in\ncircumstances which were relatively much more favourable. The fact,\nalone, that morality is regarded as overcome, presupposes a certain\ndegree of intellectual culture; while this very culture, for its part,\nbears evidence to a certain relative well-being. A certain intellectual\nfatigue, brought on by the long struggle concerning philosophical\nopinions, and carried to hopeless scepticism _against_ philosophy,\nshows moreover that the level of these Nihilists is by no means a\nlow one. Only think of the conditions in which Buddha appeared! The\nteaching of the eternal recurrence would have learned principles to\ngo upon (just as Buddha's teaching, for instance, had the notion of\ncausality, etc.).\n\n***\n\nWhat do we mean to-day by the words \"botched and bungled\"? In the\nfirst place, they are used _physiologically_ and not politically. The\nunhealthiest kind of man all over Europe (in all classes) is the soil\nout of which Nihilism grows: this species of man will regard eternal\nrecurrence as damnation--once he is bitten by the thought, he can no\nlonger recoil before any action. He would not extirpate passively,\nbut would cause everything to be extirpated which is meaningless\nand without a goal to this extent; although it is only a spasm, or\nsort of blind rage in the presence of the fact that everything has\nexisted again and again for an eternity--even this period of Nihilism\nand destruction. The value of such a _crisis_ is that it _purifies,_\nthat it unites similar elements, and makes them mutually destructive,\nthat it assigns common duties to men of opposite persuasions, and\nbrings the weaker and more uncertain among them to the light, thus\ntaking the first step towards a new _order of rank_ among forces\nfrom the standpoint of health: recognising commanders as commanders,\nsubordinates as subordinates. Naturally irrespective of all the present\nforms of society.\n\n***\n\nWhat class of men will prove they are strongest in this new order of\nthings? The most moderate--they who do not _require_ any extreme forms\nof belief, they who not only admit of, but actually like, a certain\nmodicum of chance and nonsense; they who can think of man with a very\nmoderate view of his value, without becoming weak and small on that\naccount; the most rich in health, who are able to withstand a maximum\namount of sorrow, and who are therefore not so very much afraid of\nsorrow--men who are _certain of their power,_ and who represent with\nconscious pride the state of strength to which man has attained.\n\n***\n\nHow could such a man think of Eternal Recurrence?\n\n\n56.\n\n_The Periods of European Nihilism._\n\n_The Period of Obscurity_: all kinds of groping measures devised to\npreserve old institutions and not to arrest the progress of new ones.\n\n_The Period of Light_: men see that old and new are fundamental\ncontraries; that the old values are born of descending life, and that\nthe new ones are born of ascending life--_that all old ideals_ are\nunfriendly to life (born of decadence and determining it, however\nmuch they may be decked out in the Sunday finery of morality). We\n_understand_ the old, but are far from being sufficiently strong for\nthe new.\n\n_The Periods of the Three Great Passions_: contempt, pity, destruction.\n\n_The Periods of Catastrophes_: the rise of a teaching which will sift\nmankind ... which drives the weak to some decision and the strong also.\n\n\n\n\nII.\n\n\nCONCERNING THE HISTORY OF EUROPEAN NIHILISM.\n\n\n_(a)_ MODERN GLOOMINESS.\n\n\n57.\n\nMy friends, we had a hard time as youths; we even suffered from\nyouth itself as though it were a serious disease. This is owing to\nthe age in which we were born--an age of enormous internal decay and\ndisintegration which, with all its weakness and even with the best of\nits strength, is opposed to the spirit of youth. Disintegration--that\nis to say, uncertainty--is peculiar to this age: nothing stands on\nsolid ground or on a sound faith. People live for the morrow, because\nthe day-after-to-morrow is doubtful. All our road is slippery and\ndangerous, while the ice which still bears us has grown unconscionably\nthin: we all feel the mild and gruesome breath of the thaw-wind--soon,\nwhere we are walking, no one will any longer _be able_ to stand!\n\n\n58.\n\nIf this is not an age of decay and of diminishing vitality, it is at\nleast one of indiscriminate and arbitrary experimentalising--and it is\nprobable that out of an excess of abortive experiments there has grown\nthis general impression, as of decay: and perhaps decay itself.\n\n\n59.\n\n_Concerning the history of modern gloominess._\n\nThe state-nomads (officials, etc.): \"homeless\"--.\n\nThe break-up of the family.\n\nThe \"good man\" as a symptom of exhaustion.\n\nJustice as Will to Power (Rearing).\n\nLewdness and neurosis.\n\nBlack music: whither has real music gone?\n\nThe anarchist.\n\nContempt of man, loathing.\n\nMost profound distinction: whether hunger or satiety is creative? The\nfirst creates the _Ideals of Romanticism._\n\nNorthern unnaturalness.\n\nThe need of Alcohol: the \"need\" of the working classes.\n\nPhilosophical Nihilism.\n\n\n60.\n\nThe slow advance and rise of the middle and lower classes (including\nthe lower kind of spirit and body), which was already well under way\nbefore the French Revolution, and would have made the same progress\nforward without the latter,--in short, then, the preponderance of the\nherd over all herdsmen and bell-wethers,--brings in its train:--\n\n(1) Gloominess of spirit (the juxtaposition of a stoical and a\nfrivolous _appearance_ of happiness, peculiar to noble cultures, is on\nthe decline; much suffering is allowed to be _seen_ and _heard_ which\nformerly was borne in concealment);\n\n(2) Moral hypocrisy (a way of _distinguishing_ oneself through\nmorality, but by means of the values of the herd: pity, solicitude,\nmoderation; and not by means of those virtues which are recognised and\nhonoured outside the herd's sphere of power);\n\n(3) A _really_ large amount of sympathy with both pain and joy (a\nfeeling of pleasure resulting from being herded together, which is\npeculiar to all gregarious animals--\"public spirit,\" \"patriotism,\"\neverything, in fact, which is apart from the individual).\n\n\n61.\n\nOur age, with its indiscriminate endeavours to mitigate distress, to\nhonour it, and to wage war in advance with unpleasant possibilities, is\nan age of the _poor._ Our \"_rich people_\"--_they_ are the poorest! The\nreal _purpose_ of all wealth has been forgotten.\n\n\n62.\n\n_Criticism of modern man_:--\"the good man,\" but corrupted and misled by\nbad institutions (tyrants and priests);--reason elevated to a position\nof authority;--history is regarded as the surmounting of errors;--the\nfuture is regarded as progress;--the Christian state (\"God of the\narmies\");--Christian sexual intercourse (as marriage);--the realm of\n\"justice\" (the cult of \"mankind\");--\"freedom.\"\n\nThe _romantic_ attitudes of the modern man;--the noble man\n(Byron, Victor Hugo, George Sand);--taking the part of the\noppressed and the bungled and the botched: motto for historians and\nromancers;--the Stoics of duty;--disinterestedness regarded as art\nand as knowledge;--altruism as the most mendacious form of egoism\n(utilitarianism), the most sentimental form of egoism.\n\nAll this savours of the eighteenth century. But it had other\nqualities which were not inherited, namely, a certain _insouciance,_\ncheerfulness, elegance, spiritual clearness. The spiritual tempo has\naltered; the pleasure which was begotten by spiritual refinement and\nclearness has given room to the pleasure of colour, harmony, mass,\nreality, etc. etc. Sensuality in spiritual things. In short, it is the\neighteenth century of Rousseau.\n\n\n63.\n\nTaken all in all, a considerable amount of _humanity_ has been attained\nby our men of to-day. That we feel this is in itself a proof of the\nfact that we have become so sensitive in regard to small cases of\ndistress, that we somewhat unjustly overlook what has been achieved.\n\nHere we must make allowances for the fact that a great deal of\ndecadence is rife, and that, through such eyes, our world _must appear_\nbad and wretched. But these eyes have always seen in the same way, in\nall ages.\n\n(1) A certain hypersensitiveness, even in morality.\n\n(2) The quantum of bitterness and gloominess, which pessimism bears\nwith it in its judgments--both together have helped to bring about the\npreponderance of the other and _opposite_ point of view, that things\nare not well with our morality.\n\nThe fact of credit, of the commerce of the world, and the means of\ntraffic--are expressions of an extraordinarily mild _trustfulness_ in\nmen.... To that may also be added--\n\n(3) The deliverance of science from moral and religious prejudices: a\nvery good sign, though for the most part misunderstood.\n\nIn my own way, I am attempting a justification of history.\n\n\n64.\n\n_The second appearance of Buddhism._--Its precursory signs: the\nincrease of pity. Spiritual exhaustion. The reduction of all\nproblems to the question of pleasure and pain. The glory of war\nwhich calls forth a counter-stroke. Just as the sharp demarcation of\nnations generates a counter-movement in the form of the most hearty\n\"Fraternity.\" The fact that it is impossible for religion to carry on\nits work any longer with dogma and fables.\n\nThe _catastrophe of Nihilism_ will put an end to all this Buddhistic\nculture.\n\n\n65.\n\nThat which is most sorely afflicted to-day is the instinct and will of\n_tradition_: all institutions which owe their origin to this instinct,\nare opposed to the tastes of the age.... At bottom, nothing is thought\nor done which is not calculated to tear up this spirit of tradition\nby the roots. Tradition is looked upon as a fatality; it is studied\nand acknowledged (in the form of \"heredity\"), but people will not have\nanything to do with it. The extension of one will over long periods\nof time, the selection of conditions and valuations which make it\npossible to dispose of centuries in advance--this, precisely, is what\nis most utterly anti-modern. From which it follows, that disorganising\nprinciples give our age its specific character.\n\n\n66.\n\n\"Be simple\"--a demand which, when made to us complicated and\nincomprehensible triers of the heart and reins, is a simple\nabsurdity.... Be natural: but even if we are unnatural--what then?\n\n\n67.\n\nThe means employed in former times in order to arrive at _similarly\nconstituted_ and lasting types, throughout long generations: entailed\nproperty and the respect of parents (the origin of the faith in gods\nand heroes as ancestors).\n\nNow, the _subdivision of property_ belongs to the opposite tendency.\nThe centralisation of an enormous number of, different interests in one\nsoul: which, _to that end,_ must be very strong and mutable.\n\n\n68.\n\nWhy does everything become _mummery._--The modern man is lacking in\nunfailing instinct (instinct being understood here to mean that which\nis the outcome of a _long period of activity in the same occupation_ on\nthe part of one family of men); the incapability of producing anything\nperfect, is simply the result of this lack of instinct: one individual\nalone cannot make up for the schooling his ancestors should have\ntransmitted to him.\n\nWhat a morality or book of law creates: that deep instinct which\nrenders _automatism_ and perfection possible in life and in work.\n\nBut now we have reached the opposite point; yes, we wanted to reach\nit--the most extreme consciousness, through introspection on the part\nof man and of history: and thus we are practically most distant from\nperfection in Being, doing, and willing: our desires--even our will\nto knowledge--shows how prodigiously decadent we are. We are striving\nafter the very reverse of what _strong races_ and _strong natures_ will\nhave--understanding is an _end_....\n\nThat Science is possible in the way in which it is practised to-day,\nproves that all elementary instincts, _the instincts which ward off\ndanger and protect life,_ are no longer active. We no longer save, we\nare merely spending the capital of our forefathers, even in the way in\nwhich we _pursue knowledge_.\n\n\n69.\n\n_Nihilistic trait_.\n\n_(a)_ In the _natural sciences_ (\"purposelessness\"), causality,\nmechanism, \"conformity to law,\" an interval, a remnant.\n\n_(b)_ Likewise in _politics_: the individual lacks the belief in his\nown right, innocence; falsehood rules supreme, as also the worship of\nthe moment.\n\n_(d)_ Likewise in _political economy_: the abolition of slavery: the\nlack of a redeeming class, and of _one who justifies_--the rise of\nanarchy. \"Education\"?\n\n_(d)_ Likewise in _history_: fatalism, Darwinism; the last attempts at\nreconciling reason and Godliness fail. Sentimentality in regard to the\npast: biographies can no longer be endured! (Phenomenalism even here:\ncharacter regarded as a mask; there are no facts.)\n\n_(e)_ Likewise in _Art_: romanticism and its _counter-stroke_\n(repugnance towards romantic ideals and lies). The latter, morally,\nas a sense of greatest truthfulness, but pessimistic. Pure \"artists\"\n(indifference as to the \"subject\"). (The psychology of the\nfather-confessor and puritanical psychology--two forms of psychological\nromanticism: but also their counter-stroke, the attempt to maintain a\npurely artistic attitude towards \"men\"--but even in this respect no one\ndares to make the _opposite_ valuation.)\n\n\n70.\n\n_Against_ the teaching of the influence of _environment_ and external\ncauses: the power coming from inside is infinitely _superior_;\nmuch that appears like influence acting from without is merely the\nsubjection of environment to this inner power.\n\nPrecisely the same environment may be used and interpreted in opposite\nways: there are no facts. A genius is _not_ explained by such theories\nconcerning origins.\n\n\n71.\n\n\"_Modernity_\" regarded in the light of nutrition and digestion.\n\nSensitiveness is infinitely more acute (beneath moral vestments: the\nincrease of pity), the abundance of different impressions is greater\nthan ever. The _cosmopolitanism_ of articles of diet, of literature,\nnewspapers, forms, tastes, and even landscapes. The speed of this\naffluence is _prestissimo_; impressions are wiped out, and people\ninstinctively guard against assimilating anything or against taking\nanything _seriously_ and \"digesting\" it; the result is a weakening of\nthe powers of digestion. There begin a sort of _adaptation_ to this\naccumulation of impressions. Man unlearns the art of _doing,_ and\n_all he does is to react_ to stimuli coming from his environment. _He\nspends his strength,_ partly in the process of _assimilation,_ partly\nin _defending himself,_ and again partly in _responding to stimuli.\nProfound enfeeblement of spontaneity_:--the historian, the critic, the\nanalyst, the interpreter, the observer, the collector, the reader,--all\nreactive talents,--_all_ science!\n\nArtificial _modification_ of one's own nature in order to make it\nresemble a \"mirror\"; one is interested, but only epidermally: this\nis systematic coolness, equilibrium, a steady _low_ temperature,\njust beneath the thin surface on which warmth, movement, \"storm,\" and\nundulations play.\n\nOpposition of _external_ mobility to a certain _dead heaviness and\nfatigue_.\n\n\n72.\n\nWhere must our modern world be classed--under exhaustion or under\nincreasing strength? Its multiformity and lack of repose are brought\nabout by the highest form of _consciousness._\n\n\n73.\n\nOverwork, curiosity and sympathy--our _modern vices._\n\n\n74.\n\nA contribution to the characterisation of \"_Modernity._\"--Exaggerated\ndevelopment of intermediate forms; the decay of types; the break-up of\ntradition, schools; the predominance of the instincts (philosophically\nprepared: the unconscious has the greater value) after the appearance\nof the _enfeeblement of will power_ and of the will to an end _and_ to\nthe means thereto.\n\n\n75.\n\nA capable artisan or scholar cuts a good figure if he have his pride\nin his art, and looks pleasantly and contentedly upon life. On the\nother hand, there is no sight more wretched than that of a cobbler or\na schoolmaster who, with the air of a martyr, gives one to understand\nthat he was really born for something better. There is nothing better\nthan what is good! and that is: to have a certain kind of capacity and\nto use it. This is _virt\u00f9_ in the Italian style of the Renaissance.\n\nNowadays, when the state has a nonsensically oversized belly, in all\nfields and branches of work there are \"representatives\" over and above\nthe real workman: for instance, in addition to the scholars, there\nare the journalists; in addition to the suffering masses, there is a\ncrowd of jabbering and bragging ne'er-do-wells who \"represent\" that\nsuffering--not to speak of the professional politicians who, though\nquite satisfied with their lot, stand up in Parliament and, with\nstrong lungs, \"represent\" grievances. Our modern life is extremely\n_expensive,_ thanks to the host of middlemen that infest it; whereas\nin the city of antiquity, and in many a city of Spain and Italy\nto-day, where there is an echo of the ancient spirit, the man himself\ncomes forward and will have nothing to do with a representative or an\nintermediary in the modern style--except perhaps to kick him hence!\n\n\n76.\n\nThe pre-eminence of the _merchant_ and the _middleman,_ even in the\nmost intellectual spheres: the journalist, the \"representative,\" the\nhistorian (as an intermediary between the past and the present), the\nexotic and cosmopolitan, the middleman between natural science and\nphilosophy, the semi-theologians.\n\n\n77.\n\nThe men I have regarded with the most loathing, heretofore, are the\nparasites of intellect: they are to be found everywhere, already, in\nour modern Europe, and as a matter of fact their conscience is as light\nas it possibly can be. They may be a little turbid, and savour somewhat\nof Pessimism, but in the main they are voracious, dirty, dirtying,\nstealthy, insinuating, light-fingered gentry, scabby--and as innocent\nas all small sinners and microbes are. They live at the expense of\nthose who have intellect and who distribute it liberally: they know\nthat it is peculiar to the rich mind to live in a disinterested\nfashion, without taking too much petty thought for the morrow, and\nto distribute its wealth prodigally. For intellect is a bad domestic\neconomist, and pays no heed whatever to the fact that everything lives\non it and devours it.\n\n\n\n78.\n\nMODERN MUMMERY\n\nThe motleyness of modern men and its charm Essentially a mask and a\nsign of boredom.\n\nThe journalist.\n\nThe political man (in the \"national swindle\").\n\nMummery in the arts:--\n\n    The lack of honesty in preparing and schooling oneself for\n    them (Fromentin);\n\n    The Romanticists (their lack of philosophy and science and\n    their excess in literature);\n\n    The novelists (Walter Scott, but also the monsters of the\n    _Nibelung,_ with their inordinately nervous music);\n\n    The lyricists.\n\n\"Scientifically.\"\n\nVirtuosos (Jews).\n\nThe popular ideals are overcome, but not yet _in the presence of the\npeople_:\n\nThe saint, the sage, the prophet.\n\n\n79.\n\n_The want of discipline in the modern spirit_ concealed beneath all\nkinds of moral finery.--The show-words are: Toleration (for the\n\"incapacity of saying yes or no\"); _la largeur de sympathie_ (= a\nthird of indifference, a third of curiosity, and a third of morbid\nsusceptibility); \"objectivity\" (the lack of personality and of\nwill, and the inability to \"love\"); \"freedom\" in regard to the rule\n(Romanticism); \"truth\" as opposed to falsehood and lying (Naturalism);\nthe \"scientific spirit\" (the \"human document\": or, in plain English,\nthe serial story which means \"addition\"--instead of \"composition\");\n\"passion\" in the place of disorder and intemperance; \"depth\" in the\nplace of confusion and the pell-mell of symbols.\n\n\n80.\n\n_Concerning the criticism of big words._--I am full of mistrust and\nmalice towards what is called \"ideal\": this is my _Pessimism,_ that\nI have recognised to what extent \"sublime sentiments\" are a source of\nevil--that is to say, a belittling and depreciating of man.\n\nEvery time \"progress\" is expected to result from an ideal,\ndisappointment invariably follows; the triumph of an ideal has always\nbeen a _retrograde movement_.\n\nChristianity, revolution, the abolition of slavery, equal rights,\nphilanthropy, love of peace, justice, truth: all these big words are\nonly valuable in a struggle, as banners: not as realities, but as\n_show-words,_ for something quite different (yea, even quite opposed to\nwhat they mean!).\n\n\n81.\n\nThe kind of man is known who has fallen in love with the sentence\n\"_tout comprendre \u00e0 est tout pardonner\"_ It is the weak and, above all,\nthe disillusioned: if there is something to pardon in everything, there\nis also something to contemn! It is the philosophy of disappointment,\nwhich here swathes itself so humanly in pity, and gazes out so sweetly.\n\nThey are Romanticists, whose faith has gone to pot: now they at least\nwish to look on and see how everything vanishes and fades. They call it\n_l'art pour l'art,_ \"objectivity,\" etc.\n\n\n82.\n\n_The main symptoms of Pessimism_:--Dinners at Magny's; Russian\nPessimism (Tolstoy, Dostoiewsky); \u00e6sthetic Pessimism, _l'art pour\nl'art,_ \"description\" (the romantic and the anti-romantic Pessimism);\nPessimism in the theory of knowledge (Schopenhauer: phenomenalism);\nanarchical Pessimism; the \"religion of pity,\" Buddhistic preparation;\nthe Pessimism of culture (exoticness, cosmopolitanism); moral\nPessimism, myself.\n\n\n83.\n\n\"_Without the Christian Faith_\" said Pascal, \"you would yourselves\nbe like nature and history, _un monstre et un chaos._\" We fulfilled\nthis prophecy: once the weak and optimistic eighteenth century had\n_embellished_ and _rationalised_ man.\n\n_Schopenhauer_ and _Pascal._--I none essential point, Schopenhauer is\nthe first who _takes up Pascal's_ movement again: _un monstre et un\nchaos,_ consequently something that must be negatived ... history,\nnature, and man himself!\n\n\"_Our inability to know the truth_ is the result of our _corruption,_\nof our moral _decay_\" says Pascal. And Schopenhauer says essentially\nthe same. \"The more profound the corruption of reason is, the\nmore necessary is the doctrine of salvation\"--or, putting it into\nSchopenhauerian phraseology, negation.\n\n\n84.\n\n_Schopenhauer as an epigone_ (state of affairs before the\nRevolution):--Pity, sensuality, art, weakness of will, Catholicism\nof the most intellectual desires--that is, at bottom, the good old\neighteenth century.\n\n_Schopenhauer's_ fundamental misunderstanding of the _will_ (just\nas though passion, instinct, and desire were the essential factors\nof will) is typical: the depreciation of the will to the extent of\nmistaking it altogether. Likewise the hatred of willing: the attempt at\nseeing something superior--yea, even superiority itself, and that which\nreally matters, in non-willing, in the \"subject-being _without_ aim or\nintention.\" Great symptom of _fatigue or of the weakness of will_: for\nthis, in reality, is what treats the passions as master, and directs\nthem as to the way and to the measure....\n\n\n85.\n\nThe undignified attempt has been made to regard Wagner and Schopenhauer\nas types of the mentally unsound: an infinitely more essential\nunderstanding of the matter would have been gained if the exact\ndecadent type which each of them represents had been scientifically and\naccurately defined.\n\n\n86.\n\nIn my opinion, Henrik Ibsen has become very German. With all his\nrobust idealism and \"Will to Truth,\" he never dared to ring himself\nfree from moral-illusionism which says \"freedom,\" and will not admit,\neven to itself, what freedom is: the second stage in the metamorphosis\nof the \"Will to Power\" in him who lacks it. In the first stage, one\ndemands justice at the hands of those who have power. In the second,\none speaks of \"freedom,\" that is to say, one wishes to \"shake oneself\nfree\" from those who have power. In the third stage, one speaks of\n\"equal rights\"--that is to say, so long as one is not a predominant\npersonality one wishes to prevent one's competitors from growing in\npower.\n\n\n87.\n\nThe Decline of _Protestantism_: theoretically and historically\nunderstood as a half-measure. Undeniable predominance of Catholicism\nto-day: Protestant feeling is so dead that the strongest\n_anti-Protestant_ movements (Wagner's _Parsifal,_ for instance) are no\nlonger regarded as such. The whole of the more elevated intellectuality\nin France is _Catholic_ in instinct; Bismarck recognised that there was\nno longer any such thing as Protestantism.\n\n\n88.\n\nProtestantism, that spiritually unclean and tiresome form of decadence,\nin which Christianity has known how to survive in the mediocre North,\nis something incomplete and complexly valuable for knowledge, in so far\nas it was able to bring experiences of different kinds and origins into\nthe same heads.\n\n\n89.\n\nWhat has the German spirit not made out of Christianity! And, to refer\nto Protestantism again, how much beer is there not still in Protestant\nChristianity! Can a crasser, more indolent, and more lounging form\nof Christian belief be imagined, than that of the average German\nProtestant?... It is indeed a very humble Christianity. I call it\nthe Hom\u0153opathy of Christianity! I am reminded that, to-day, there\nalso exists a less humble sort of Protestantism; it is taught by\nroyal chaplains and anti-Semitic speculators: but nobody has ever\nmaintained that any \"spirit\" \"hovers\" over these waters. It is merely\na less respectable form of Christian faith, not by any means a more\ncomprehensible one.\n\n\n90.\n\n_Progress._--Let us be on our guard lest we deceive ourselves! Time\nflies forward apace,--we would fain believe that everything flies\nforward with it,--that evolution is an advancing development.... That\nis the appearance of things which deceives the most circumspect. But\nthe nineteenth century shows no advance whatever on the sixteenth:\nand the German spirit of 1888 is an example of a backward movement\nwhen compared with that of 1788.... Mankind does not advance, it does\nnot even exist. The aspect of the whole is much more like that of a\nhuge experimenting workshop where some things in all ages succeed,\nwhile an incalculable number of things fail; where all order, logic,\nco-ordination, and responsibility is lacking. How dare we blink the\nfact that the rise of Christianity is a decadent movement?--that the\nGerman Reformation was a recrudescence of Christian barbarism?--that\nthe Revolution destroyed the instinct for an organisation of society\non a large scale?... Man is not an example of progress as compared with\nanimals: the tender son of culture is an abortion compared with the\nArab or the Corsican; the Chinaman is a more successful type--that is\nto say, richer in sustaining power than the European.\n\n\n_(b)_ THE LAST CENTURIES.\n\n\n91.\n\nGloominess and pessimistic influence necessarily follow in the wake of\nenlightenment. Towards 1770 a falling-off in cheerfulness was already\nnoticeable; women, with that very feminine instinct which always\ndefends virtue, believed that immorality was the cause of it. Galiani\nhit the bull's eye: he quotes Voltaire's verse:\n\n    \"Un monstre gai vaut mieux\n    Qu'un sentimental ennuyeux.\"\n\nIf now I maintain that I am ahead, by a century or two of\nenlightenment, of Voltaire and Galiani--who was much more profound, how\ndeeply must I have sunk into gloominess! This is also true, and betimes\nI somewhat reluctantly manifested some caution in regard to the German\nand Christian narrowness and inconsistency of Schopenhauerian or, worse\nstill, Leopardian Pessimism, and sought the most characteristic form\n(Asia). But, in order to endure that extreme Pessimism (which here and\nthere peeps out of my _Birth of Tragedy),_ to live alone \"without God\nor morality,\" I was compelled to invent a counter-prop for myself.\nPerhaps I know best why man is the only animal that laughs: he alone\nsurfers so excruciatingly that he was _compelled_ to invent laughter.\nThe unhappiest and most melancholy animal is, as might have been\nexpected, the most cheerful.\n\n\n92.\n\nIn regard to German culture, I have always had a feeling as of\n_decline._ The fact that I learned to know a declining form of culture\nhas often made me _unfair_ towards the whole phenomenon of European\nculture. The Germans always follow at some distance behind: they always\ngo to the root of things, for instance:--\n\nDependance upon foreigners; _Kant_--Rousseau, the sensualists, Hume,\nSwedenborg.\n\n_Schopenhauer_--the Indians and Romanticism, Voltaire.\n\n_Wagner_--the French cult of the ugly and of grand opera, _Paris,_ and\nthe flight into _primitive barbarism_ (the marriage of brother and\nsister).\n\nThe law of the _laggard_ (the provinces go to Paris, Germany goes to\nFrance).\n\nHow is it that precisely _Germans discovered the Greek_ (the more an\ninstinct is developed, the more it is _tempted_ to run for once into\nits opposite).\n\nMusic is the last breath of every culture.\n\n\n93.\n\n_Renaissance and Reformation._--What does the Renaissance prove? That\nthe reign of the \"individual\" can be only a short one. The output\nis too great; there is not even the possibility of husbanding or of\ncapitalising forces, and exhaustion sets in step by step. These are\ntimes when everything is _squandered,_ when even the strength itself\nwith which one collects, capitalises, and heaps riches upon riches,\n_is squandered._ Even the opponents of such movements are driven to\npreposterous extremes in the dissipation of their strength: and they\ntoo are very soon exhausted, used up, and completely sapped.\n\nIn the Reformation we are face to face with a wild and plebeian\ncounterpart of the Italian Renaissance, generated by similar impulses,\nexcept that the former, in the backward and still vulgar North, had to\nassume a religious form--there the concept of a higher life had not yet\nbeen divorced from that of a religious one.\n\nEven the Reformation was a movement for individual liberty; \"every one\nhis own priest\" is really no more than a formula for _libertinage._\nAs a matter of fact, the words \"Evangelical freedom\" would have\nsufficed--and all instincts which had reasons for remaining concealed\nbroke out like wild hounds, the most brutal needs suddenly acquired the\ncourage to show themselves, everything seemed justified ... men refused\nto specify the kind of freedom they had aimed at, they preferred to\nshut their eyes. But the fact that their eyes were closed and that\ntheir lips were moistened with gushing orations, did not prevent their\nhands from being ready to snatch at whatever there was to snatch at,\nthat the belly became the god of the \"free gospel,\" and that all lusts\nof revenge and of hatred were indulged with insatiable fury.\n\nThis lasted for a while: then exhaustion supervened, just as it\nhad done in Southern Europe; and again here, it was a low form of\nexhaustion, a sort of general _ruere in servitium_.... Then the\n_disreputable_ century of Germany dawned.\n\n\n94.\n\n_Chivalry_--the position won by power: its gradual break-up (and\npartial transference to broader and more bourgeois spheres). In the\ncase of Larochefoucauld we find a knowledge of the actual impulses of a\nnoble temperament--together with the gloomy Christian estimate of these\nimpulses.\n\nThe _protraction of Christianity_ through the _French Revolution._ The\nseducer is Rousseau; he once again liberates woman, who thenceforward\nis always represented as ever more interesting--_suffering._ Then come\nthe slaves and Mrs. Beecher-Stowe. Then the poor and the workmen.\nThen the vicious and the sick--all this is drawn into the foreground\n(even for the purpose of disposing people in favour of the genius,\nit has been customary for five hundred years to press him forward as\nthe great sufferer!). Then comes the cursing of all voluptuousness\n(Baudelaire and Schopenhauer), the most decided conviction that the\nlust of power is the greatest vice; absolute certainty that morality\nand disinterestedness are identical things; that the \"happiness of all\"\nis a goal worth striving after (_i.e.,_ Christ's Kingdom of Heaven).\nWe are on the best road to it: the Kingdom of Heaven of the poor in\nspirit has begun.--Intermediate stages: the bourgeois (as a result of\nthe _nouveau riche_) and the workman (as a result of the machine).\n\nGreek and French culture of the time of Louis XIV. compared. A decided\nbelief in oneself. A leisure-class which makes things hard for itself\nand exercises a great deal of self-control. The power of form, the will\nto form _oneself._ \"Happiness\" acknowledged as a purpose. Much strength\nand energy _behind_ all formality of manners. Pleasure at the sight of\na life that is _seemingly so easy._ The _Greeks_ seemed like _children_\nto the French.\n\n\n95.\n\n_The Three Centuries._\n\nTheir different kinds of _sensitiveness_ may perhaps be best expressed\nas follows:--\n\n_Aristocracy_: Descartes, the reign of _reason,_ evidence showing the\nsovereignty of the _will_.\n\n_Feminism_: Rousseau, the reign of _feeling,_ evidence showing the\nsovereignty of the senses; all lies.\n\n_Animalism_: Schopenhauer, the reign of _passion,_ evidence showing the\nsovereignty of animality, more honest, but gloomy.\n\nThe seventeenth century is _aristocratic,_ all for order, haughty\ntowards everything animal, severe in regard to the heart, \"austere,\"\nand even free from sentiment, \"non-German,\" averse to all that is\nburlesque and natural, generalising and maintaining an attitude of\nsovereignty towards the past for it believes in itself. At bottom it\npartakes very much of the beast of prey, and practises asceticism in\norder to remain master. It is the century of strength of will, as also\nthat of strong passion.\n\nThe eighteenth century is dominated by _woman,_ it is gushing,\nspiritual, and flat; but with intellect at the service of aspirations\nand of the heart, it is a libertine in the pleasures of intellect,\nundermining all authorities; emotionally intoxicated, cheerful, clear,\nhumane, and sociable, false to itself and at bottom very rascally....\n\nThe nineteenth century is more _animal,_ more subterranean, hateful,\nrealistic, plebeian, and on that very account \"better,\" \"more honest,\"\nmore submissive to \"reality\" of what kind soever, and _truer_; but\nweak of will, sad, obscurely exacting and fatalistic. It has no\nfeeling of timidity or reverence, either in the presence of \"reason\"\nor the \"heart\"; thoroughly convinced of the dominion of the desires\n(Schopenhauer said \"Will,\" but nothing is more characteristic of his\nphilosophy than that it entirely lacks all actual _willing_). Even\nmorality is reduced to an instinct (\"Pity\").\n\nAuguste Comte is _the continuation of the_ eighteenth _century_ (the\ndominion of the heart over the head, sensuality in the theory of\nknowledge, altruistic exaltation).\n\nThe fact that _science_ has become as sovereign as it is to-day, proves\nhow the nineteenth century has _emancipated itself_ from the dominion\nof _ideals._ A certain absence of \"needs\" and wishes makes our\nscientific curiosity and rigour possible--this is our kind of virtue.\n\nRomanticism is the _counterstroke_ of the eighteenth century; a sort of\naccumulated longing for its grand style of exaltation (as a matter of\nfact, largely mingled with mummery and self-deception: the desire was\nto represent _strong nature_ and _strong passion_).\n\nThe nineteenth century instinctively goes in search of _theories_\nby means of which it may feel its _fatalistic, submission to the\nempire of facts_ justified. Hegel's success against sentimentality\nand romantic idealism was already a sign of its fatalistic trend of\nthought, in its belief that superior reason belongs to the triumphant\nside, and in its justification of the actual \"state\" (in the place of\n\"humanity,\" etc.).--Schopenhauer: we are something foolish, and at the\nbest self-suppressive. The success of determinism, the genealogical\nderivation of _obligations_ which were formerly held to be absolute,\nthe teaching of environment and adaptation, the reduction of will to\na process of reflex movement, the denial of the will as a \"working\ncause\"; finally--a real process of re-christening: so little will\nis observed that the word itself becomes _available_ for another\npurpose. Further theories: the teaching of _objectivity,_ \"will-less\"\ncontemplation, as the only road to truth, _as also_ to _beauty_ (also\nthe belief in \"genius,\" in order to have _the right to be submissive_);\nmechanism, the determinable rigidity of the mechanical process;\nso-called \"Naturalism,\" the elimination of the choosing, directing,\ninterpreting subject, on principle.\n\nKant, with his \"practical reason,\" with his _moral fanaticism,_ is\nquite eighteenth century style; still completely outside the historical\nmovement, without any notion whatsoever of the reality of his time, for\ninstance, revolution; he is not affected by Greek philosophy; he is a\nphantasist of the notion of duty, a sensualist with a hidden leaning to\ndogmatic pampering.\n\n_The return to Kant_ in our century means a _return to the eighteenth\ncentury,_ people desire to create themselves a right to the _old ideas_\nand to the old exaltation--hence a theory of knowledge which \"describes\nlimits,\" that is to say, which admits _of the option of fixing a Beyond\nto the domain of reason._\n\n_Hegel's_ way of thinking is not so very far removed from that of\nGoethe: see the latter on the subject of Spinoza, for instance.\nThe will to deify the All and Life, in order to find both _peace_\nand _happiness_ in contemplating them: Hegel looks for reason\neverywhere--in the presence of reason man may be _submissive_ and\nresigned. In Goethe we find a kind of _fatalism_ which is almost\n_joyous_ and _confiding,_ which neither revolts nor weakens, which\nstrives to make a totality out of itself, in the belief that only in\ntotality does everything seem good and justified, and find itself\nresolved.\n\n\n96.\n\nThe period of _rationalism_--followed by a period of _sentimentality._\nTo what extent does Schopenhauer come under \"sentimentality\"? (Hegel\nunder intellectuality?)\n\n\n97.\n\nThe seventeenth century _suffers_ from _humanity_ as from a _host\nof contradictions_ (\"_l'amas de contradictions_\" that we are); it\nendeavours to discover man, to _co-ordinate him,_ to excavate him:\nwhereas the eighteenth century tries to forget what is known of man's\nnature, in order to adapt him to its Utopia. \"Superficial, soft,\nhumane\"--gushes over \"humanity.\"\n\nThe seventeenth century tries to banish all traces of the individual\nin order that the artist's work may resemble life as much as possible.\nThe eighteenth century strives _to create interest in the author_ by\nmeans of the work. The seventeenth century seeks art in art, a piece of\nculture; the eighteenth uses art in its propaganda for political and\nsocial reforms.\n\n\"Utopia,\" the \"ideal man,\" the deification of Nature, the vanity of\nmaking one's own personality the centre of interest, subordination to\nthe propaganda of _social ideas,_ charlatanism--all this we derive from\nthe eighteenth century.\n\nThe style of the seventeenth century: _propre exact et libre._\n\nThe strong individual who is self-sufficient, or who appeals\nardently to God--and that obtrusiveness and indiscretion of modern\nauthors--these things are _opposites._ \"Showing-oneself-off\"--what a\ncontrast to the Scholars of Port-Royal!\n\nAlfieri had a sense for the _grand style._\n\nThe hate of the _burlesque_ (that which lacks dignity), _the lack of a\nsense of Nature_ belongs to the seventeenth century.\n\n\n98.\n\n_Against Rousseau.--Alas!_ man is no longer sufficiently evil;\nRousseau's opponents, who say that \"man is a beast of prey,\" are\nunfortunately wrong. Not the corruption of man, but the softening and\nmoralising of him is the curse. In the sphere which Rousseau attacked\nmost violently, the _relatively_ strongest and most successful type of\nman was still to be found (the type which still possessed the great\npassions intact: Will to Power, Will to Pleasure, the Will and Ability\nto Command). The man of the eighteenth century must be compared with\nthe man of the Renaissance (also with the man of the seventeenth\ncentury in France) if the matter is to be understood at all: Rousseau\nis a symptom of self-contempt and of inflamed vanity--both signs that\nthe dominating will is lacking: he moralises and seeks the _cause_ of\nhis own misery after the style of a revengeful man in the _ruling_\nclasses.\n\n\n99.\n\n_Voltaire--Rousseau._--A state of nature is terrible; man is a beast of\nprey: our civilisation is an extraordinary _triumph_ over this beast of\nprey in nature--this was _Voltaires_ conclusion. He was conscious of\nthe mildness, the refinements, the intellectual joys of the civilised\nstate; he despised obtuseness, even in the form of virtue, and the lack\nof delicacy even in ascetics and monks.\n\nThe _moral depravity_ of man seemed to pre-occupy _Rousseau_; the words\n\"unjust,\" \"cruel,\" are the best possible for the purpose of exciting\nthe instincts of the oppressed, who otherwise find themselves under\nthe ban of the _vetitum_ and of disgrace; _so that their conscience\nis opposed to their indulging any insurrectional desires._ These\nemancipators seek one thing above all: to give their party the great\naccents and attitudes of _higher Nature_.\n\n\n100.\n\n_Rousseau_; the rule founded on sentiment; Nature as the source of\njustice; man perfects himself in proportion as he approaches _Nature_\n(according to Voltaire, in proportion _as he leaves Nature behind_).\nThe very same periods seem to the one to demonstrate the progress of\n_humanity_ and, to the other, the increase of injustice and inequality.\n\nVoltaire, who still understood _umanit\u00e0_ in the sense of the\nRenaissance, as also _virt\u00f9_ (as \"higher culture\"), fights for the\ncause of the \"_honn\u00eates gens_\" \"_la bonne compagnie_\" taste, science,\narts, and even for the cause of progress and civilisation.\n\n_The flare-up occurred towards 1760_: On the one hand the citizen\nof Geneva, on the other _le seigneur de Ferney._ It is only from\nthat moment and henceforward that Voltaire was the man of his age,\nthe philosopher, the representative of Toleration and of Disbelief\n(theretofore he had been merely _un bel esprit_). His envy and hatred\nof Rousseau's success forced him upwards.\n\n\"_Pour 'la canaille' un dieu r\u00e9mun\u00e9rateur et vengeur_\"--Voltaire.\n\nThe criticism of both standpoints in regard to the _value of\ncivilisation._ To Voltaire nothing seems finer than the _social\ninvention_: there is no higher goal than to uphold and perfect it.\n_L'honn\u00eatet\u00e9_ consists precisely in respecting social usage; virtue\nin a certain obedience towards various necessary \"prejudices\" which\nfavour the maintenance of society. _Missionary of Culture,_ aristocrat,\nrepresentative of the triumphant and ruling classes and their values.\nBut Rousseau remained a _plebeian,_ even as _hommes de lettres,_ this\nwas _preposterous_; his shameless contempt for everything that was not\nhimself.\n\nThe _morbid feature_ in Rousseau is the one which happens to have been\nmost admired and _imitated._ (Lord Byron resembled him somewhat, he\ntoo screwed himself up to sublime attitudes and to revengeful rage--a\nsign of vulgarity; later on, when Venice restored his equilibrium,\nhe understood what _alleviates most_ and does the _most good ...\nl'insouciance_.)\n\nIn spite of his antecedents, Rousseau is proud of himself; but he is\nincensed if he is reminded of his origin....\n\nIn Rousseau there was undoubtedly some brain trouble; in Voltaire--rare\nhealth and lightsomeness. _The revengefulness of the sick_; his\nperiods of insanity as also those of his contempt of man, and of his\nmistrust.\n\nRousseau's defence of _Providence_ (against Voltaire's Pessimism):\nhe _had need of_ God in order to be able to curse society and\ncivilisation; everything must be good _per se,_ because God had created\nit; man _alone has corrupted man._ The \"good man\" as a man of Nature\nwas pure fantasy; but with the dogma of God's authorship he became\nsomething probable and even not devoid of foundation.\n\n_Romanticism_ \u00e0 la _Rousseau_: passion (\"the sovereign right of\npassion\"); \"naturalness\"; the fascination of madness (foolishness\nreckoned as greatness); the senseless vanity of the weak; the\nrevengefulness of the masses elevated to the position of _justice_\n(\"in politics, for one hundred years, the leader has always been this\ninvalid\").\n\n\n101.\n\n_Kant_: makes the scepticism of Englishmen, in regard to the theory of\nknowledge, _possible_ for Germans.\n\n(1) By enlisting in its cause the interest of the German's religious\nand moral needs: just as the new academicians used scepticism for the\nsame reasons, as a preparation for Platonism (_vide_ Augustine); just\nas Pascal even used _moral_ scepticism in order to provoke (to justify)\nthe need of belief;\n\n(2) By complicating and entangling it with scholastic flourishes in\nview of making it more acceptable to the German's scientific taste in\nform (for Locke and Hume, alone, were too illuminating, too clear--that\nis to say, judged according to the German valuing instinct, \"too\nsuperficial\").\n\n_Kant_: a poor psychologist and mediocre judge of human nature, made\nhopeless mistakes in regard to great historical values (the French\nRevolution); a moral fanatic _\u00e0 la_ Rousseau; with a subterranean\ncurrent of Christian values; a thorough dogmatist, but bored to\nextinction by this tendency, to the extent of wishing to tyrannise\nover it, but quickly tired, even of 'scepticism; and not yet affected\nby any cosmopolitan thought or antique beauty ... a _dawdler_ and a\n_go-between,_ not at all original (like _Leibnitz,_ something between\nmechanism and spiritualism; like _Goethe,_ something between the taste\nof the eighteenth century and that of the \"historical sense\" [which\n_is_ essentially a sense of exoticism]; like _German music,_ between\nFrench and Italian music; like Charles the Great, who mediated and\nbuilt bridges between the Roman Empire and Nationalism--a dawdler _par\nexcellence_).\n\n\n102.\n\nIn what respect have the _Christian_ centuries with their Pessimism\nbeen _stronger_ centuries than the eighteenth--and how do they\ncorrespond with the _tragic_ age of the Greeks?\n\nThe nineteenth century _versus_ the eighteenth. How was it an\nheir?--how was it a step backwards from the latter? (more lacking in\n\"spirit\" and in taste)--how did it show an advance on the latter?\n(more gloomy, more realistic, _stronger_).\n\n\n103.\n\nHow can we _explain_ the fact that we feel something in common with the\n_Campagna romana?_ And the high mountain chain?\n\nChateaubriand in a letter to M. de Fontanes in 1803 writes his first\nimpression of the _Campagna romana._\n\nThe President de Brosses says of the _Campagna romana_: \"Il fallait\nque Romulus f\u00fbt ivre quand il songea \u00e0 b\u00e2tir une ville dans un terrain\naussi laid.\"\n\nEven Delacroix would have nothing to do with Rome, it frightened him.\nHe loved Venice, just as Shakespeare, Byron, and Georges Sand did.\nTh\u00e9ophile Gautier's and Richard Wagner's dislike of Rome must not be\nforgotten.\n\nLamartine has the language for Sorrento and Posilippo.\n\nVictor Hugo raves about Spain, \"parce que aucune autre nation n'a\nmoins emprunt\u00e9 \u00e0 l'antiquit\u00e9, parce qu'elle n'a subi aucune influence\nclassique.\"\n\n\n104.\n\nThe _two great attempts_ that were made to overcome the eighteenth\ncentury:\n\n_Napoleon,_ in that he called man, the soldier, and the great struggle\nfor power, to life again, and conceived Europe as a political power.\n\n_Goethe,_ in that he imagined a European culture which would consist\nof the whole heritage of what humanity had _attained to_ up to his time.\n\nGerman culture in this century inspires mistrust--the music of the\nperiod lacks that complete element which liberates and binds as well,\nto wit--Goethe.\n\nThe pre-eminence of _music_ in the romanticists of 1830 and 1840.\nDelacroix. Ingres--a passionate musician (admired Gluck, Haydn,\nBeethoven, Mozart), said to his pupils in Rome: \"Si je pouvais vous\nrendre tous musiciens, vous y gagneriez comme peintres\"--likewise\nHorace Vernet, who was particularly fond of Don Juan (as Mendelssohn\nassures us, 1831); Stendhal, too, who says of himself: \"Combien de\nlieues ne ferais-je pas \u00e0 pied, et \u00e0 combien de jours de prison ne me\nsoumetterais-je pas pour entendre _Don Juan ou le Matrimonio segreto_;\net je ne sais pour quelle autre chose je ferais cet effort.\" He was\nthen fifty-six years old.\n\nThe borrowed forms, for instance: Brahms as a typical \"Epigone,\"\nlikewise Mendelssohn's cultured Protestantism (a former \"soul\" is\nturned into poetry posthumously ...)\n\n--the moral and poetical substitutions in Wagner, who used _one_ art as\na stop-gap to make up for what another lacked.\n\n--the \"historical sense,\" inspiration derived from poems, sagas.\n\n--that characteristic transformation of which G. Flaubert is the most\nstriking example among Frenchmen, and Richard Wagner the most striking\nexample among Germans, shows how the romantic belief in love and the\nfuture changes into a longing for nonentity in 1830-50.\n\n\n106.\n\nHow is it that German music reaches its culminating point in the age of\nGerman romanticism? How is it that German music lacks Goethe? On the\nother hand, how much Schiller, or more exactly, how much \"Thekla\"[5] is\nthere not in Beethoven!\n\nSchumann has Eichendorff, Uhland, Heine, Hoffman, Tieck, in him.\nRichard Wagner has Freisch\u00fctz, Hoffmann, Grimm, the romantic Saga,\nthe mystic Catholicism of instinct, symbolism, \"the free-spiritedness\nof passion\" (Rousseau's intention). The _Flying Dutchman_ savours of\nFrance, where _le t\u00e9n\u00e9breux_ (1830) was the type of the seducer.\n\n_The cult of music,_ the revolutionary romanticism of form. Wagner\n_synthesises_ German and French romanticism.\n\n\n[Footnote 5: Thekla is the sentimental heroine in Schiller's\n_Wallenstein._--TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.]\n\n\n107.\n\nFrom the point of view only of his value to Germany and to German\nculture, Richard Wagner is still a great problem, perhaps a German\nmisfortune: in any case, however, a fatality. But what does it\nmatter? Is he not very much more than a German event? It also\nseems to me that to no country on earth is he less related than to\nGermany; nothing was prepared there for his advent; his whole type\nis simply strange amongst Germans; there he stands in their midst,\nwonderful, misunderstood, incomprehensible. But people carefully avoid\nacknowledging this: they are too kind, too square-headed--too German\nfor that. \"Credo quia absurdus est\": thus did the German spirit wish\nit to be, in this case too--hence it is content meanwhile to believe\neverything Richard Wagner wanted to have believed about himself. In all\nages the spirit of Germany has been deficient in subtlety and divining\npowers concerning psychological matters. Now that it happens to be\nunder the high pressure of patriotic nonsense and self-adoration, it is\nvisibly growing thicker and coarser: how could it therefore be equal to\nthe problem of Wagner!\n\n\n108.\n\nThe Germans _are_ not yet anything, but they are _becoming_ something;\nthat is why they have not yet any culture;--that is why they cannot\nyet have any culture!--They are not yet anything: that means they are\nall kinds of things. They are _becoming_ something: that means that\nthey will one day cease from being all kinds of things. The latter is\nat bottom only a wish, scarcely a hope yet. Fortunately it is a wish\nwith which one can live, a question of will, of work, of discipline, a\nquestion of training, as also of resentment, of longing, of privation,\nof discomfort,--yea, even of bitterness,--in short, we Germans _will_\nget something out of ourselves, something that has not yet been wanted\nof us--we want something _more_!\n\nThat this \"German, as he is not as yet\"--has a right to something\nbetter than the present German \"culture\"; that all who wish to\nbecome something better, must wax angry when they perceive a sort of\ncontentment, an impudent \"setting-oneself-at-ease,\" or \"a process of\nself-censing,\" in this quarter: that is my second principle, in regard\nto which my opinions have not yet changed.\n\n\n\n_(c)_ SIGNS OF INCREASING STRENGTH.\n\n\n\n109.\n\nFirst Principle: everything that characterises modern men savours of\ndecay: but side by side with the prevailing sickness there are signs of\na strength and powerfulness of soul which are still untried. _The same\ncauses which tend to promote the belittling of men,_ also force _the\nstronger and rarer individuals upwards to greatness._\n\n\n110.\n\n_General survey: the ambiguous_ character of our _modern\nworld_--precisely the same symptoms might at the same time be\nindicative of either _decline_ or _strength._ And the signs of strength\nand of emancipation dearly bought, might in view of traditional\n(or _hereditary_) appreciations concerned with the feelings, be\n_misunderstood_ as indications of weakness. In short, _feeling,_ as a\n_means of fixing valuations,_ is not _on a level with the times._\n\n_Generalised_: Every valuation is always _backward_; it is merely the\nexpression of the conditions which favoured survival and growth in a\nmuch earlier age: it struggles against new conditions of existence\nout of which it did not arise, and which it therefore necessarily\nmisunderstands: it hinders, and excites suspicion against, all that is\nnew.\n\n\n111.\n\n_The problem of the nineteenth century._--To discover whether its\nstrong and weak side belong to each other. Whether they have been cut\nfrom one and the same piece. Whether the variety of its ideals and\ntheir contradictions are conditioned by a higher purpose: whether\nthey are something higher.--For it might be _the prerequisite of\ngreatness,_ that growth should take place amid such violent tension.\nDissatisfaction, Nihilism, _might be a good sign._\n\n\n112.\n\n_General survey._--As a matter of fact, all abundant growth involves a\nconcomitant process of _crumbling to bits_ and _decay_: suffering and\nthe symptoms of decline _belong_ to ages of enormous progress; every\nfruitful and powerful movement of mankind has always _brought about_\na concurrent Nihilistic movement. Under certain circumstances, the\nappearance of _the extremest_ form of Pessimism and actual _Nihilism_\nmight be the sign of a process of incisive and most essential growth,\nand of mankind's transit into completely new conditions of existence.\n_This is what I have understood._\n\n\n113.\n\n_A._\n\nStarting out with a thoroughly courageous _appreciation_ of our men of\nto-day:--we must not allow ourselves to be deceived by appearance: this\nmankind is much less effective, but it gives quite different pledges\nof _lasting strength,_ its tempo is slower, but the rhythm itself is\nricher. _Healthiness_ is increasing, the real conditions of a healthy\nbody are on the point of being known, and will gradually be created,\n\"asceticism\" is regarded with irony. The fear of extremes, a certain\nconfidence in the \"right way,\" no raving: a periodical self-habituation\nto narrower values (such as \"mother-land,\" \"science,\" etc.).\n\nThis whole picture, however, would still be _ambiguous_: it might be a\nmovement either of _increase_ or _decline_ in Life.\n\n_B._\n\nThe belief in \"progress\"--in lower spheres of intelligence, appears as\nincreasing life: but this is self-deception;\n\n    in higher spheres of intelligence it is a sign of\n    _declining_ life.\n\nDescription of the symptoms.\n\nThe unity of the aspect: uncertainty in regard to the standard of\nvaluation.\n\nFear of a general \"in vain.\"\n\nNihilism.\n\n\n114.\n\nAs a matter of fact, we are no longer so urgently in need of an\nantidote against the first Nihilism: Life is no longer so uncertain,\naccidental, and senseless in modern Europe. All such tremendous\n_exaggeration_ of the value of men, of the value of evil, etc., are\nnot so necessary now; we can endure a considerable diminution of this\nvalue, we may grant a great deal of nonsense and accident: the _power_\nman has acquired now allows of a _lowering_ of the means of discipline,\nof which the strongest was the moral interpretation of the universe.\nThe hypothesis \"God\" is much too extreme.\n\n\n115.\n\nIf anything shows that our _humanisation_ is a genuine sign of\n_progress,_ it is the fact that we no longer require excessive\ncontraries, that we no longer require contraries at all....\n\nWe may love the senses; for we have spiritualised them in every way and\nmade them artistic;\n\nWe have a right to all things which hitherto have been most\n_calumniated._\n\n\n116.\n\n_The reversal of the order of rank._--Those pious counterfeiters--the\npriests--are becoming Chandala in our midst:--they occupy the\nposition of the charlatan, of the quack, of the counterfeiter, of the\nsorcerer: we regard them as corrupters of the will, as the great\nslanderers and vindictive enemies of Life, and as the _rebels_ among\nthe bungled and the botched. We have made our middle class out of our\nservant-caste--the Sudra--that is to say, our people or the body which\nwields the political power.\n\nOn the other hand, the Chandala of former times is paramount: the\n_blasphemers,_ the _immoralists,_ the independents of all kinds, the\nartists, the Jews, the minstrels--and, at bottom, all _disreputable_\nclasses are in the van.\n\nWe have elevated ourselves to _honourable_ thoughts,--even more, we\ndetermine what honour is on earth,--\"nobility.\" ... All of us to-day\nare _advocates of life._--We _Immoralists_ are to-day the _strongest_\npower: the other great powers are in need of us ... we re-create the\nworld in our own image.\n\nWe have transferred the label \"Chandala\" to the _priests,_ the\n_backworldsmen,_ and to the deformed _Christian society_ which has\nbecome associated with these people, together with creatures of like\norigin, the pessimists, Nihilists, romanticists of pity, criminals, and\nmen of vicious habits--the whole sphere in which the idea of \"God\" is\nthat of _Saviour...._\n\nWe are proud of being no longer obliged to be liars, slanderers, and\ndetractors of Life....\n\n\n117.\n\n_The advance_ of the nineteenth century upon the eighteenth (at bottom\nwe _good Europeans_ are carrying on a war against the eighteenth\ncentury):\n\n(1) \"The return to Nature\" is getting to be understood, ever more\ndefinitely, in a way which is quite the reverse of that in which\nRousseau used the phrase--_away from idylls and operas!_\n\n(2) Ever more decided, more anti-idealistic, more objective, more\nfearless, more industrious, more temperate, more suspicious of sudden\nchanges, _anti-revolutionary_;\n\n(3) The question of _bodily health_ is being pressed ever more\ndecidedly in front of the health of \"the soul\": the latter is regarded\nas a condition brought about by the former, and bodily health is\nbelieved to be, at least, the prerequisite to spiritual health.\n\n\n118.\n\nIf anything at all has been achieved, it is a more innocent attitude\ntowards the senses, a happier, more favourable demeanour in regard\nto sensuality, resembling rather the position taken up by Goethe; a\nprouder feeling has also been developed in knowledge, and the \"reine\nThor\"[6] meets with little faith.\n\n\n[Footnote 6: This is a reference to Wagner's _Parsifal._ The character\nas is well known, is written to represent a son of heart's affliction,\nand a child of wisdom--humble, guileless, loving, pure, and a\nfool.--TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.]\n\n\n119.\n\nWe \"_objective people._\"--It is not \"pity\" that opens up the way for\n_us_ to all that is most remote and most strange in life and culture;\nbut our accessibility and ingenuousness, which precisely does not\n\"pity,\" but rather takes pleasure in hundreds of things which formerly\ncaused pain (which in former days either outraged or moved us, or in\nthe presence of which we were either hostile or indifferent). Pain in\nall its various phases is now interesting to us: on that account we are\ncertainly _not_ the more pitiful, even though the sight of pain may\nshake us to our foundations and move us to tears: and we are absolutely\nnot inclined to be more helpful in view thereof.\n\nIn this _deliberate_ desire to look on at all pain and error, we have\ngrown stronger and more powerful than in the eighteenth century; it\nis a proof of our increase of strength (we have _drawn closer_ to the\nseventeenth and sixteenth centuries). But it is a profound mistake\nto regard our \"romanticism\" as a proof of our \"beautified souls.\" We\nwant _stronger_ sensations than all _coarser_ ages and classes have\nwanted. (This fact must not be confounded with the needs of neurotics\nand decadents; in their case, of course, there is a craving for pepper\n--even for cruelty.)\n\nWe are all seeking conditions _which are emancipated from_ the\nbourgeois, and to a greater degree from the priestly, notion of\nmorality (every book which savours at all of priestdom and theology\ngives us the impression of pitiful _niaiserie_ and mental indigence).\n\"Good company,\" in fact, finds everything insipid which is not\nforbidden and considered compromising in bourgeois circles; and the\ncase is the same with books, music, politics, and opinions on women.\n\n\n120.\n\n_The simplification of man in the nineteenth century_ (The eighteenth\ncentury was that of elegance, subtlety, and generous feeling).--Not\n\"return to nature\"; for no natural humanity has ever existed yet.\nScholastic, unnatural, and antinatural values are the rule and the\nbeginning; man only reaches Nature after a long struggle--he never\nturns his \"back\" to her.... To be natural means, to dare to be as\nimmoral as Nature is.\n\nWe are coarser, more direct, richer in irony towards generous feelings,\neven when we are beneath them.\n\nOur _haute vol\u00e9e,_ the society consisting of our rich and leisured\nmen, is more natural: people hunt each other, the love of the sexes\nis a kind of sport in which marriage is both a charm and an obstacle;\npeople entertain each other and live for the sake of pleasure; bodily\nadvantages stand in the first rank, and curiosity and daring are the\nrule.\n\nOur attitude towards _knowledge_ is more natural; we are innocent\nin our absolute spiritual debauchery, we hate pathetic and hieratic\nmanners, we delight in that which is most strictly prohibited, we\nshould scarcely recognise any interest in knowledge if we were bored in\nacquiring it.\n\nOur attitude to _morality_ is also more natural. Principles have become\na laughing-stock; no one dares to speak of his \"duty,\" unless in irony.\nBut a helpful, benevolent disposition is highly valued. (Morality is\nlocated in _instinct_ and the rest is despised. Besides this there are\nfew points of honour.)\n\nOur attitude to _politics_ is more natural: we see problems of power,\nof the quantum of power, against another quantum. We do not believe in\na right that does not proceed from a power which is able to uphold it.\nWe regard all rights as conquests.\n\nOur valuation of _great men and things_ is more natural: we regard\npassion as a privilege; we can conceive of nothing great which does not\ninvolve a great crime; all greatness is associated in our minds with a\ncertain standing-beyond-the-pale in morality.\n\nOur attitude to _Nature_ is more natural: we no longer love her for her\n\"innocence,\" her \"reason,\" her \"beauty,\" we have made her beautifully\ndevilish and \"foolish.\" But instead of despising her on that account,\nsince then we have felt more closely related to her and more familiar\nin her presence. She does _not_ aspire to virtue: we therefore respect\nher.\n\nOur attitude towards _Art_ is more natural: we do not exact beautiful,\nempty lies, etc., from her; brutal positivism reigns supreme, and it\nascertains things with perfect calm.\n\nIn short: there are signs showing that the European of the nineteenth\ncentury is less ashamed of his instincts; he has gone a long way\ntowards acknowledging his unconditional naturalness and immorality,\n_without bitterness_: on the contrary, he is strong enough to endure\nthis point of view alone.\n\nTo some ears this will sound as though _corruption_ had made strides:\nand certain it is that man has not drawn nearer to the \"Nature\"\nwhich Rousseau speaks about, but has gone one step farther in the\ncivilisation before which Rousseau _stood in horror._ We have grown\n_stronger,_ we have drawn nearer to the seventeenth century, more\nparticularly to the taste which reigned towards its close (Dancourt, Le\nSage, Renard).\n\n\n121.\n\n_Culture_ versus _Civilisation._--The culminating stages of culture\nand civilisation lie apart: one must not be led astray as regards the\nfundamental antagonism existing between culture and civilisation.\nFrom the moral standpoint, great periods in the history of culture\nhave always been periods of corruption; while on the other hand,\nthose periods in which man was deliberately and compulsorily _tamed_\n(\"civilisation\") have always been periods of intolerance towards the\nmost intellectual and most audacious natures. Civilisation desires\nsomething different from what culture strives after: their aims may\nperhaps be opposed....\n\n\n122.\n\n_What I warn people against_: confounding the instincts of decadence\nwith those of _humanity_;\n\nConfounding the _dissolving means_ of civilisation _and those which\nnecessarily promote decadence,_ with _culture_;\n\nConfounding _debauchery,_ and the principle, \"laisser aller,\" with the\n_Will to Power_ (the latter is the exact reverse of the former).\n\n\n123.\n\nThe unsolved problems which I set anew: the _problem of civilisation,_\nthe struggle between Rousseau and Voltaire about the year 1760. Man\nbecomes deeper, more mistrustful, more \"immoral,\" stronger, more\nself-confident--and therefore \"_more natural_\"; that is \"progress.\"\nIn this way, by a process of division of labour, the more evil strata\nand the milder and tamer strata of society get separated: so that _the\ngeneral facts_ are not visible at first sight.... It is a sign of\n_strength,_ and of the self-control and fascination of the strong, that\nthese stronger strata possess the arts in order to make their greater\npowers for evil felt as something \"_higher_\" As soon as there is\n\"progress\" there is a transvaluation of the strengthened factors into\nthe \"good.\"\n\n\n124.\n\nMan must have the _courage_ of his natural instincts restored to him.--\n\n_The poor opinion_ he has of himself must be destroyed (_not_ in the\nsense of the individual, but in the sense of the _natural_ man ...)--\n\nThe _contradictions_ in things must be eradicated, after it has been\nwell understood that we were responsible for them--\n\n_Social idiosyncrasies_ must be stamped out of existence (guilt,\npunishment, justice, honesty, freedom, love, etc. etc.)--\n\nAn advance towards \"_naturalness_\": in all political questions, even\nin the relations between parties, even in merchants', workmen's, or\ncontractors' parties, only _questions_ of _power_ come into play:--\n\"what one _can_ do\" is the first question, what one ought to do is only\na secondary consideration.\n\n\n125.\n\nSocialism--or the _tyranny_ of the meanest and the most\nbrainless,--that is to say, the superficial, the envious, and the\nmummers, brought to its zenith,--is, as a matter, of fact, the logical\nconclusion of \"modern ideas\" and their latent anarchy: but in the\ngenial atmosphere of democratic well-being the capacity for forming\nresolutions or even for coming _to an end_ at all, is paralysed. Men\nfollow--but no longer their reason. That is why socialism is on the\nwhole a hopelessly bitter affair: and there is nothing more amusing\nthan to observe the discord between the poisonous and desperate faces\nof present-day socialists--and what wretched and nonsensical feelings\ndoes not their style reveal to us!--and the childish lamblike happiness\nof their hopes and desires. Nevertheless, in many places in Europe,\nthere may be violent hand-to-hand struggles and irruptions on their\naccount: the coming century is likely to be convulsed in more than\none spot, and the Paris Commune, which finds defenders and advocates\neven in Germany, will seem to have been but a slight indigestion\ncompared with what is to come. Be this as it may, there will always\nbe too many people of property for socialism ever to signify anything\nmore than an attack of illness: and these people of property are like\none man with one faith, \"one must possess something in order _to\nbe_ some one.\" This, however, is the oldest and most wholesome of\nall instincts; I should add: \"one must desire more than one has in\norder to _become_ more.\" For this is the teaching which life itself\npreaches to all living things: the morality of Development. To have\nand to wish to have more, in a word, _Growth_--that is life itself.\nIn the teaching of socialism \"a will to the denial of life\" is but\npoorly concealed: botched men and races they must be who have devised\na teaching of this sort. In fact, I even wish a few experiments might\nbe made to show that in a socialistic society, life denies itself,\nand itself cuts away its own roots. The earth is big enough and man\nis still unexhausted enough for a practical lesson of this sort and\n_demonstratio ad absurdum_--even if it were accomplished only by a vast\nexpenditure of lives--to seem worth while to me. Still, Socialism,\nlike a restless mole beneath the foundations of a society wallowing in\nstupidity, will be able to achieve something useful and salutary: it\ndelays \"Peace on Earth\" and the whole process of character-softening of\nthe democratic herding animal; it forces the European to have an extra\nsupply of intellect,--that is to say, craft and caution, and prevents\nhis entirely abandoning the manly and warlike qualities,--it also saves\nEurope awhile from the _marasmus femininus_ which is threatening it.\n\n\n126.\n\nThe most favourable obstacles and remedies of modernity:\n\n(1) Compulsory _military service_ with real wars in which all joking is\nlaid aside.\n\n(2) _National_ thick-headedness (which simplifies and concentrates).\n\n(3) Improved _nutrition_ (meat).\n\n(4) Increasing _cleanliness_ and wholesomeness in the home.\n\n(5) The predominance of _physiology_ over theology, morality,\neconomics, and politics.\n\n(6) Military discipline in the exaction and the practice of one's\n\"duty\" (it is no longer customary to praise).\n\n\n127.\n\nI am delighted at the military development of Europe, also at the inner\nanarchical conditions: the period of quietude and \"Chinadom\" which\nGaliani prophesied for this century is now over. Personal and _manly_\ncapacity, bodily capacity recovers its value, valuations are becoming\nmore physical, nutrition consists ever more and more of flesh. Fine\nmen have once more become possible. Bloodless sneaks (with mandarins\nat their head, as Comte imagined them) are now a matter of the past.\nThe savage in every one of us is _acknowledged,_ even the wild animal.\n_Precisely on that account,_ philosophers will have a better chance.\n--Kant is a scarecrow!\n\n\n128.\n\nI have not yet _seen_ any reasons to feel discouraged. He who acquires\nand preserves a _strong will,_ together with a broad mind, has a more\nfavourable chance now than ever he had. For the _plasticity_ of man has\nbecome exceedingly great in democratic Europe: men who learn easily,\nwho readily adapt themselves, are the rule: the gregarious animal of\na high order of intelligence is prepared. He who would command finds\nthose who _must_ obey: I have Napoleon and Bismarck in mind, for\ninstance. The struggle against strong and unintelligent wills, which\nforms the surest obstacle in one's way, is really insignificant Who\nwould not be able to knock down these \"objective\" gentlemen with weak\nwills, such as Ranke and Renan!\n\n\n129.\n\n_Spiritual enlightenment_ is an unfailing means of making men\nuncertain, weak of will, and needful of succour and support; in\nshort, of developing the herding instincts in them. That is why all\ngreat artist-rulers, hitherto (Confucius in China, the Roman Empire,\nNapoleon, Popedom--at a time when they had the courage of their\nworldliness and frankly pursued power) in whom the ruling instincts,\nthat had prevailed until their time, culminated, also made use of the\nspiritual enlightenment--or at least allowed it to be supreme (after\nthe style of the Popes of the Renaissance). The self-deception of\nthe masses on this point, in every democracy for instance, is of the\ngreatest possible value: all that makes men smaller and more amenable\nis pursued under the title \"progress.\"\n\n\n130.\n\nThe highest equity and mildness as a condition of _weakness_ (the New\nTestament and the early Christian community--manifesting itself in the\nform of utter foolishness in the Englishmen, Darwin and Wallace). Your\nequity, ye higher men, drives you to universal suffrage, etc.; your\n\"humanity\" urges you to be milder towards crime and stupidity. In the\n_end_ you will thus help stupidity and harmlessness to conquer.\n\n_Outwardly_: Ages of terrible wars, insurrections, explosions.\n_Inwardly_: ever more and more weakness among men; _events_ take the\n_form of excitants._ The Parisian as the type of the European extreme.\n\n_Consequences_: (1) Savages (at first, of course, in conformity with\nthe culture that has reigned hitherto); (2) _Sovereign individuals_\n(where _powerful_ barbarous _masses_ and emancipation from all that\nhas been, are crossed). The age of greatest stupidity, brutality, and\nwretchedness in the masses, and _in the highest individuals._\n\n\n131.\n\nAn incalculable number of higher individuals now perish: but he who\n_escapes their fate_ is as strong as the devil. In this respect we are\nreminded of the conditions which prevailed in the Renaissance.\n\n\n132.\n\nHow are _Good Europeans_ such as ourselves distinguished from the\npatriots? In the first place, we are atheists and immoralists, but we\ntake care to support the religions and the morality which we associate\nwith the gregarious instinct: for by means of them, an order of men is,\nso to speak, being prepared, which must at some time or other fall into\nour hands, which must actually _crave_ for our hands.\n\nBeyond Good and Evil,--certainly; but we insist upon the unconditional\nand strict preservation of herd-morality.\n\nWe reserve ourselves the right to several kinds of philosophy which it\nis necessary to learn: under certain circumstances, the pessimistic\nkind as a hammer; a European Buddhism might perhaps be indispensable.\n\nWe should probably support the development and the maturation of\ndemocratic tendencies; for it conduces to weakness of will: in\n\"Socialism\" we recognise a thorn which prevents smug ease.\n\nAttitude towards the people.. Our prejudices; we pay attention to the\nresults of cross-breeding.\n\nDetached, well-to-do, strong: irony concerning the \"press\" and its\nculture. Our care: that scientific men should not become journalists.\nWe mistrust any form of culture that tolerates news-paper reading or\nwriting.\n\nWe make our accidental positions (as Goethe and Stendhal did), our\nexperiences, a foreground, and we lay stress upon them, so that we\nmay deceive concerning our backgrounds. We ourselves _wait_ and\navoid putting our heart into them. They serve us as refuges, such as\na wanderer might require and use--but we avoid feeling at home in\nthem. We are ahead of our fellows in that we have had a _disciplina\nvoluntatis._ All strength is directed to the _development of the will,_\nan art which allows us to wear masks, an art of understanding _beyond_\nthe passions (also \"super-European\" thought at times).\n\nThis is our preparation before becoming the law-givers of the future\nand the lords of the earth; if not we, at least our children. Caution\nwhere marriage is concerned.\n\n\n133.\n\n_The twentieth century._--The Abb\u00e9 Galiani says somewhere: \"_La\npr\u00e9voyance est la cause des guerres actuelles de l'Europe. Si l'on\nvoulait se donner la peine de ne rien pr\u00e9voir, tout le monde serait\ntranquille, et je ne crois pas qu'on serait plus malheureux parce qu'on\nne ferait pas la guerre._\" As I in no way share the unwarlike views of\nmy deceased friend Galiani, I have no fear whatever of saying something\nbeforehand with the view of conjuring in some way the cause of wars.\n\nA condition of excessive _consciousness,_ after the worst of\nearthquakes: with new questions.\n\n\n134.\n\nIt is the time of the _great noon, of the most appalling\nenlightenment_: my particular kind of _Pessimism_: the great\nstarting-point.\n\n(1) Fundamental contradiction between civilisation and the elevation of\nman.\n\n(2) Moral valuations regarded as a history of lies and the art of\ncalumny in the service of the Will to Power (of the will of the _herd,_\nwhich rises against stronger men).\n\n(3) The conditions which determine every elevation in culture (the\nfacilitation of a _selection_ being made at the cost of a crowd) are\nthe _conditions_ of all growth.\n\n(4). _The multiformity_ of the world as a question of _strength,_\nwhich sees all things in the _perspective of their growth._ The moral\nChristian values to be regarded as the insurrection and mendacity of\nslaves (in comparison with the aristocratic values of the _ancient\nworld). _\n\n\n\n\nSECOND BOOK.\n\nCRITICISM OF THE HIGHEST VALUES THAT HAVE PREVAILED HITHERTO.\n\n\n\nI.\n\n\nCRITICISM OF RELIGION.\n\n\nAll the beauty and sublimity with which we have invested real and\nimagined things, I will show to be the property and product of man, and\nthis should be his most beautiful apology. Man as a poet, as a thinker,\nas a god, as love, as power. Oh, the regal liberality with which he\nhas lavished gifts upon things in order _to impoverish_ himself and\nmake himself feel wretched! Hitherto, this has been his greatest\ndisinterestedness, that he admired and worshipped, and knew how to\nconceal from himself that _he_ it was who had created what he admired.\n\n\n\n1. CONCERNING THE ORIGIN OF RELIGIONS.\n\n\n135.\n\n_The origin of religion._--Just as the illiterate man of to-day\nbelieves that his wrath is the cause of his being angry, that his\nmind is the cause of his thinking, that his soul is the cause of\nhis feeling, in short, just as a mass of psychological entities\nare still unthinkingly postulated as causes; so, in a still more\nprimitive age, the same phenomena were interpreted by man by means of\npersonal entities. Those conditions of his soul which seemed strange,\noverwhelming, and rapturous, he regarded as obsessions and bewitching\ninfluences emanating from the power of some personality. (Thus the\nChristian, the most puerile and backward man of this age, traces hope,\npeace, and the feeling of deliverance to a psychological inspiration\non the part of God: being by nature a sufferer and a creature in need\nof repose, states of happiness, peace, and resignation, perforce seem\nstrange to him, and seem to need some explanation.) Among intelligent,\nstrong, and vigorous races, the epileptic is mostly the cause of a\nbelief in the existence of some _foreign power_; but all such examples\nof apparent subjection--as, for instance, the bearing of the exalted\nman, of the poet, of the great criminal, or the passions, love and\nrevenge--lead to the invention of supernatural powers. A condition is\nmade concrete by being identified with a personality, and when this\ncondition overtakes anybody, it is ascribed to that personality. In\nother words: in the psychological concept of God, a certain state of\nthe soul is personified as a cause in order to appear as an effect.\n\nThe psychological logic is as follows: when the _feeling of power_\nsuddenly seizes and overwhelms a man,--and this takes place in the\ncase of all the great passions,--a doubt arises in him concerning his\nown person: he dare not think himself the cause of this astonishing\nsensation--and thus he posits a _stronger_ person, a Godhead as its\ncause. In short, the origin of religion lies in the extreme feelings\nof power, which, being _strange,_ take men by surprise: and just\nas the sick man, who feels one of his limbs unaccountably heavy,\nconcludes that another man must be sitting on it, so the ingenuous\n_homo religiosus,_ divides himself up into _several people._ Religion\nis an example of the \"_alt\u00e9ration de la personalit\u00e9._\" A sort of _fear_\nand _sensation of terror_ in one's own presence.... But also a feeling\nof inordinate _rapture_ and _exaltation._ Among sick people, the\n_sensation of health_ suffices to awaken a belief in the proximity of\nGod.\n\n\n136.\n\n_Rudimentary psychology of the religious man:--_All changes are\neffects; all effects are effects of will (the notion of \"Nature\"\nand of \"natural law,\" is lacking); all effects presuppose an agent.\nRudimentary psychology: one is only a cause oneself, when one knows\nthat one has willed something.\n\nResult: States of power impute to man the feeling that he is _not_ the\ncause of them, that he is not _responsible_ for them: they come without\nbeing willed to do so--consequently we cannot be their originators:\nwill that is not free (that is to say, the knowledge of a change in our\ncondition which we have not helped to bring about) requires a _strong_\nwill.\n\n_Consequence of this rudimentary psychology_: Man has never dared to\ncredit _himself_ with his strong and startling moods, he has always\nconceived them as \"passive,\" as \"imposed upon him from outside\":\nReligion is the offshoot of a _doubt_ concerning the entity of the\nperson, an _alt\u00e9ration_ of the personality: in so far as everything\ngreat and strong in man was considered _superhuman_ and _foreign,_ man\nbelittled himself,--he laid the two sides, the very pitiable and weak\nside, and the very strong and startling side apart, in two spheres, and\ncalled the one \"Man\" and the other \"God.\"\n\nAnd he has continued to act on these lines; during the period of the\n_moral idiosyncrasy_ he did not interpret his lofty and sublime moral\nstates as \"proceeding from his own will\" or as the \"work\" of the\nperson. Even the Christian himself divides his personality into two\nparts, the one a mean and weak fiction which he calls man, and the\nother which he calls God (Deliverer and Saviour).\n\nReligion has lowered the concept \"man\"; its ultimate conclusion is\nthat all goodness, greatness, and truth are superhuman, and are only\nobtainable by the grace of God.\n\n\n137.\n\nOne way of raising man out of his self-abasement, which brought about\nthe decline of the point of view that classed all lofty and strong\nstates of the soul, as strange, was the theory of relationship. These\nlofty and strong states of the soul could at least be interpreted as\nthe influence of our _forebears_; we belonged to each other, we were\nirrevocably joined; we grew in our own esteem, by acting according to\nthe example of a model known to us all.\n\nThere is an attempt on the part of noble families to associate religion\nwith their own feelings of self-respect. Poets and seers do the same\nthing; they feel proud that they have been worthy,--that they have been\n_selected_ for such association,--they esteem it an honour, not to be\nconsidered at all as individuals, but as mere mouthpieces (Homer).\n\nMan gradually takes possession of the highest and proudest states of\nhis soul, as also of his acts and his works. Formerly it was believed\nthat one paid oneself the greatest honour by denying one's own\nresponsibility for the highest deeds one accomplished, and by ascribing\nthem to--God. The will which was not free, appeared to be that which\nimparted a higher value to a deed: in those days a god was postulated\nas the author of the deed.\n\n\n138.\n\nPriests are the actors of something which is supernatural, either in\nthe way of ideals, gods, or saviours, and they have to make people\nbelieve in them; in this they find their calling, this is the purpose\nof their instincts; in order to make it as credible as possible, they\nhave to exert themselves to the utmost extent in the art of posing;\ntheir actor's sagacity must, above all, aim at giving them _a clean\nconscience,_ by means of which, alone, it is possible to persuade\neffectively.\n\n\n139.\n\nThe priest wishes to make it an understood thing, that he is the\n_highest type_ of man, that he rules,--even over those who wield the\npower,--that he is indispensable and unassailable,--that he is the\n_strongest power_ in the community, not by any means to be replaced or\nundervalued.\n\n_Means thereto_: he alone is cultured; he alone is the _man of virtue_;\nhe alone has _sovereign power over himself_: he alone is, in a certain\nsense, God, and ultimately goes back to the Godhead; he alone is the\nmiddleman between God and _others_; the Godhead administers punishment\nto every one who puts the priest at a disadvantage, or who thinks in\nopposition to him.\n\n_Means thereto: Truth_ exists. There is only one way of attaining to\nit, and that is to become a priest. Everything good, which relates\neither to order, nature, or tradition, is to be traced to the wisdom\nof the priests. The Holy Book is their work. The whole of nature is\nonly a fulfilment of the maxims which it contains. No other _source of\ngoodness_ exists than the priests. Every other kind of perfection, even\nthe _warrior's,_ is different in rank from that of the priests.\n\n_Consequence_: If the priest is to be the _highest_ type, then the\n_degrees_ which lead to his _virtues_ must be the degrees of value\namong men. _Study, emancipation from material things, inactivity,\nimpassibility, absence of passion, solemnity_;--the opposite of all\nthis is found in the _lowest_ type of man.\n\nThe priest has taught a kind of morality which conduced to his being\nconsidered the _highest type_ of man. He conceives a _type_ which\nis the _reverse_ of his own: the Chandala. By making _these_ as\ncontemptible as possible, some strength is lent to the _order of\ncastes._ The priest's excessive fear of _sensuality_ also implies that\nthe latter is the most serious threat to the _order of castes_ (that is\nto say, _order_ in general).... Every \"free tendency\" _in puncto puncti\noverthrows_ the laws of marriage.\n\n\n140.\n\nThe _philosopher_ considered as the development of the _priestly_\ntype:--He has the heritage of the priest in his blood; even as a rival\nhe is compelled to fight with the same weapons as the priest of his\ntime;--he aspires to the _highest authority._\n\nWhat is it that bestows _authority_ upon men who have no physical power\nto wield (no army, no arms at all ...)? How do such men gain authority\n_over_ those who are in possession of material power, and who represent\nauthority? (Philosophers enter the lists against princes, victorious\nconquerors, and wise statesmen.)\n\nThey can do it only by establishing the belief that they are in\npossession of a power which is higher and stronger--_God._ Nothing is\nstrong enough: every one is in _need_ of the mediation and the services\nof priests. They establish themselves as indispensable _intercessors._\nThe conditions of their existence are: (1) That people believe in the\nabsolute superiority of their god, in fact believe in _their god_';\n(2) that there is no other access, no direct access to god, save\nthrough them. The _second_ condition alone gives rise to the concept\n\"heterodoxy\"; the _first_ to the concept \"disbelievers\" (that is to\nsay, he who believes in another god).\n\n\n141.\n\n_A Criticism of the Holy Lie._--That a lie is allowed in pursuit\nof holy ends 'is a principle which belongs to the theory of all\npriestcraft, and the object of this inquiry is to discover to what\nextent it belongs to its practice.\n\nBut philosophers, too, whenever they intend taking over the leadership\nof mankind, with the ulterior motives of priests in their minds, have\nnever failed to arrogate to themselves the right to lie: Plato above\nall. But the most elaborate of lies is the double lie, developed\nby the typically Arian philosophers of the Vedanta: two systems,\ncontradicting each other in all their main points, but interchangeable,\ncomplementary, and mutually expletory, when educational ends were in\nquestion. The lie of the one has to create a condition in which the\ntruth of the other can alone become _intelligible...._\n\nHow _far_ does the holy lie of priests and philosophers go?--The\nquestion here is, what hypotheses do they advance in regard to\neducation, and what are the dogmas they are compelled to _invent_ in\norder to do justice to these hypotheses?\n\nFirst: they must have power, authority, and absolute credibility on\ntheir side.\n\nSecondly: they must have the direction of the whole of Nature, so that\neverything affecting the individual seems to be determined by their law.\n\nThirdly: their domain of power must be very extensive, in order that\nits control may escape the notice of those they subject: they must know\nthe penal code of the life beyond--of the life \"after death,\"--and, of\ncourse, the means whereby the road to blessedness may be discovered.\nThey have to put the notion of a natural course of things out of sight,\nbut as they are intelligent and thoughtful people, they are able to\n_promise_ a host of effects, which they naturally say are conditioned\nby prayer or by the strict observance of their law. They can, moreover,\n_prescribe_ a large number of things which are exceedingly reasonable\n--only they must not point to experience or empiricism as the source\nof this wisdom, but to revelation or to the fruits of the \"most severe\nexercises of penance.\"\n\nThe _holy lie,_ therefore, applies principally to the _purpose_ of\nan action (the natural purpose, reason, is made to vanish: a moral\npurpose, the observance of some law, a service to God, seems to be the\npurpose): to the _consequence_ of an action (the natural consequence\nis interpreted as something supernatural, and, in order to be on\nsurer ground, other incontrollable and supernatural consequences are\nforetold).\n\nIn this way the concepts _good_ and _evil_ are created, and seem\nquite divorced from the natural concepts: \"useful,\" \"harmful,\"\n\"life-promoting,\" \"life-retarding,\"--indeed, inasmuch as _another_\nlife is imagined, the former concepts may even be _antagonistic_ to\nNature's concepts of good and evil. In this way, the proverbial concept\n\"conscience\" is created: an inner voice, which, though it makes itself\nheard in regard to every action, does not measure the worth of that\naction according to its results, but according to its conformity or\nnon-conformity to the \"law.\"\n\nThe holy lie therefore invented: (1) a _god_ who _punishes_ and\n_rewards,_ who recognises and carefully observes the law-book of the\npriests, and who is particular about sending them into the world as\nhis mouthpieces and plenipotentiaries; (2) an _After Life,_ in which,\nalone, the great penal machine is supposed to be active--to this end\nthe _immortality of the soul_ was invented; (3) a _conscience in\nman,_ understood as the knowledge that good and evil are permanent\nvalues--that God himself speaks through it, whenever its counsels are\nin conformity with priestly precepts; (4) _Morality_ as the denial of\nall natural processes, as the subjection of all phenomena to a moral\norder, as the interpretation of all phenomena as the effects of a moral\norder of things (that is to say, the concept of punishment and reward),\nas the only power and only creator of all transformations; (5) _Truths_\ngiven, revealed, and identical with the teaching of the priests: as the\ncondition to all salvation and happiness in this and the next world.\n\n_In short_: what is the price paid for the _improvement_ supposed\nto be due to morality?--The unhinging of _reason,_ the reduction of\nall motives to fear and hope (punishment and reward); _dependence_\nupon the tutelage of priests, and upon a formulary exactitude\nwhich is supposed to express a divine will; the implantation of\na \"conscience\" which establishes a false science in the place of\nexperience and experiment: as though all one had to do or had not\nto do were predetermined--a kind of contraction of the seeking and\nstriving spirit;--_in short_: the worst _mutilation_ of man that can be\nimagined, and it is pretended that \"the good man\" is the result.\n\nPractically speaking, all reason, the whole heritage of intelligence,\nsubtlety, and caution, the first condition of the priestly canon, is\narbitrarily reduced, when it is too late, to a simple _mechanical_\nprocess: conformity with the law becomes a purpose in itself, it is the\nhighest purpose; _Life no longer contains any problems_;--the whole\nconception of the world is polluted by the notion of _punishment_;\n--Life itself, owing to the fact that the _priests life_ is upheld as\nthe _non plus ultra_ of perfection, is transformed into a denial and\npollution of life;--the concept \"God\" represents an aversion to Life,\nand even a criticism and a contemning of it. Truth is transformed in\nthe mind, into _priestly_ prevarication; the striving after truth, into\nthe _study of the Scriptures,_ into the way to _become a theologian._\n\n\n142.\n\n_A criticism of the Law-Book of Manu._--The whole book is founded upon\nthe holy lie. Was it the well-being of humanity that inspired the whole\nof this system? Was this kind of man, who believes in the _interested_\nnature of every action, interested or not interested in the success\nof this system? The desire to improve mankind--whence comes the\ninspiration to this feeling? Whence is the concept improvement taken?\n\nWe find a class of men, _the sacerdotal class,_ who consider themselves\nthe standard pattern, the highest example and most perfect expression\nof the type man. The notion of \"improving\" mankind, to this class of\nmen, means to make mankind like themselves. They believe in their own\nsuperiority, they _will_ be superior in practice: the cause of the holy\nlie is _The Will to Power...._\n\nEstablishment of the dominion: to this end, ideas which place a _non\nplus ultra_ of power with the priesthood are made to prevail. Power\nacquired by lying was the result of the recognition of the fact that it\nwas not already possessed physically, in a military form.... Lying as a\nsupplement to power--this is a new concept of \"truth.\"\n\nIt is a mistake to presuppose _unconscious_ and _innocent_ development\nin this quarter--a sort of self-deception. Fanatics are not the\ndiscoverers of such exhaustive systems of oppression.... Cold-blooded\nreflection must have been at work here; the same sort of reflection\nwhich Plato showed when he worked out his \"State\"--\"One must desire the\nmeans when one desires the end.\" Concerning this political maxim, all\nlegislators have always been quite clear.\n\nWe possess the classical model, and it is specifically Arian: we\ncan therefore hold the most gifted and most reflective type of man\nresponsible for the most systematic lie that has ever been told....\nEverywhere almost the lie was copied, and thus _Avian influence_\ncorrupted the world....\n\n\n143.\n\nMuch is said to-day about the _Semitic_ spirit of the _New Testament_:\nbut the thing referred to is merely priestcraft,--and in the purest\nexample of an Arian law-book, in Manu, this kind of \"Semitic\nspirit\"--that is to say, _Sacerdotalism,_ is worse than anywhere else.\n\nThe development of the Jewish hierarchy is _not_ original: they learnt\nthe scheme in Babylon--it is Arian. When, later on, the same thing\nbecame dominant in Europe, under the preponderance of Germanic blood,\nthis was in conformity to the spirit of the _ruling race_: a striking\ncase of atavism. The Germanic middle ages aimed at a revival of the\n_Arian order of castes_.\n\nMohammedanism in its turn learned from Christianity the use of a\n\"Beyond\" as an instrument of punishment.\n\nThe scheme of a _permanent community,_ with priests at its\nhead--this oldest product of Asia's great culture in the domain of\norganisation--_naturally_ provoked reflection and imitation in every\nway.--Plato is an example of this, but above all, the Egyptians.\n\n\n144.\n\n_Moralities_ and _religions_ are the principal means by which one can\nmodify men into whatever one likes; provided one is possessed of an\noverflow of creative power, and can cause one's will to prevail over\nlong periods of time.\n\n\n145.\n\nIf one wish to see an _affirmative_ Arian religion which is the product\nof a _ruling_ class, one should read the law-book of Manu. (The\ndeification of the feeling of power in the Brahmin: it is interesting\nto note that it originated in the warrior-caste, and was later\ntransferred to the priests.)\n\nIf one wish to see an _affirmative_ religion of the Semitic order,\nwhich is the product of the _ruling_ class, one should read the Koran\nor the earlier portions of the Old Testament. (_Mohammedanism,_ as a\nreligion for men, has profound contempt for the sentimentality and\nprevarication of Christianity, ... which, according to Mohammedans, is\na woman's religion.)\n\nIf one wish to see a _negative_ religion of the Semitic order, which is\nthe product of the _oppressed_ class, one should read the New Testament\n(which, according to Indian and Arian points of view, is a religion for\nthe Chandala).\n\nIf one wish to see a _negative_ Arian religion, which is the product of\nthe _ruling_ classes, one should study Buddhism.\n\nIt is quite in the nature of things that we have no Arian religion\nwhich is the product of the _oppressed_ classes; for that would have\nbeen a contradiction: a race of masters is either paramount or else it\ngoes to the dogs.\n\n\n146.\n\nReligion, _per se,_ has nothing to do with morality; yet both offshoots\nof the Jewish religion are _essentially_ moral religions--which\nprescribe the rules of living, and procure obedience to their\nprinciples by means of rewards and punishment.\n\n\n147.\n\n_Paganism--Christianity.--Paganism_ is that which says yea to all\nthat is natural, it is innocence in being natural, \"naturalness.\"\n_Christianity_ is that which says no to all that is natural, it is a\ncertain lack of dignity in being natural; hostility to Nature.\n\n\"Innocent\":--Petronius is innocent, for instance. Beside this happy\nman a Christian is absolutely devoid of innocence. But since even\nthe _Christian_ status is ultimately only a natural condition, the\nterm \"Christian\" soon begins to mean the _counterfeiting of the\npsychological interpretation._\n\n\n148.\n\nThe Christian priest is from the root a mortal enemy of sensuality: one\ncannot imagine a greater contrast to his attitude than the guileless,\nslightly awed, and solemn attitude, which the religious rites of the\nmost honourable women in Athens maintained in the presence of the\nsymbol of sex. In all non-ascetic religions the procreative act is\n_the_ secret _per se_: a sort of symbol of perfection and of the\ndesigns of the future: re-birth, immortality.\n\n\n149.\n\nOur belief in ourselves is the greatest fetter, the most telling spur,\nand the _strongest pinion._ Christianity ought to have elevated the\ninnocence of man to the position of an article of belief--men would\nthen have become gods: in those days believing was still possible.\n\n\n150.\n\nThe egregious _lie_ of history: as if it were the _corruption_ of\nPaganism that opened the road to Christianity. As a matter of fact, it\nwas the enfeeblement and _moralisation_ of the man of antiquity. The\nnew interpretation of natural functions, which made them appear like\n_vices,_ had already gone before!\n\n\n151.\n\nReligions are ultimately wrecked by the belief in morality. The idea of\nthe Christian moral God becomes untenable,--hence \"Atheism,\"--as though\nthere could be no other god.\n\n_Culture_ is likewise wrecked by the belief in morality. For when the\nnecessary and only possible conditions of its growth are revealed,\nnobody _will_ any longer countenance it (Buddhism).\n\n\n152.\n\n_The physiology of Nihilistic religions._--All in all, the _Nihilistic_\nreligions are _systematised histories of sickness_ described in\nreligious and moral terminology.\n\nIn pagan cultures it is around the interpretation of the great annual\ncycles that the religious cult turns; in Christianity it is around a\ncycle of _paralytic phenomena._\n\n\n153.\n\nThis _Nihilistic_ religion gathers together all the _decadent elements_\nand things of like order which it can find in antiquity, viz.:--\n\n_(a)_ The _weak_ and the _botched_ (the refuse of the ancient world,\nand that of which it rid itself with most violence).\n\n_(b)_ Those who are _morally obsessed_ and _anti-pagan._\n\n_(c)_ Those who are _weary of politics_ and indifferent (the _blas\u00e9_\nRomans), the _denationalised,_ who know not what they are.\n\n_(d)_ Those who are tired of themselves--who are happy to be party to a\nsubterranean conspiracy.\n\n\n154.\n\n_Buddha_ versus _Christ._--Among the Nihilistic religions, Christianity\nand _Buddhism_ may always be sharply distinguished. _Buddhism_ is the\nexpression of a _fine evening,_ perfectly sweet and mild--it is a sort\nof gratitude towards all that lies hidden, including that which it\nentirely lacks, viz., bitterness, disillusionment, and resentment.\nFinally it possesses lofty intellectual love; it has got over all\nthe subtlety of philosophical contradictions, and is even resting\nafter it, though it is precisely from that source that it derives its\nintellectual glory and its glow as of a sunset (it originated in the\nhigher classes).\n\n_Christianity_ is a degenerative movement, consisting of all kinds\nof decaying and excremental elements: it is _not_ the expression of\nthe downfall of a race, it is, from the root, an agglomeration of all\nthe morbid elements which are mutually attractive and which gravitate\nto one another.... It is therefore _not_ a national religion, _not_\ndetermined by race: it appeals to the disinherited everywhere; it\nconsists of a foundation of resentment against all that is successful\nand dominant: it is in need of a symbol which represents the damnation\nof everything successful and dominant. It is opposed to every form of\n_intellectual_ movement, to all philosophy: it takes up the cudgels for\nidiots, and utters a curse upon all intellect. Resentment against those\nwho are gifted, learned, intellectually independent: in all these it\nsuspects the element of success and domination.\n\n\n155.\n\nIn Buddhism this thought prevails: \"All passions, everything which\ncreates emotions and leads to blood, is a call to action\"--to this\nextent alone are its believers _warned_ against evil. For action has\nno sense, it merely binds one to existence. All existence, however, has\nno sense. Evil is interpreted as that which leads to irrationalism:\nto the affirmation of means whose end is denied. A road to nonentity\nis the desideratum, _hence all_ emotional impulses are regarded with\nhorror. For instance: \"On no account seek after revenge! Be the enemy\nof no one!\"--The Hedonism of the weary finds its highest expression\nhere. Nothing is more utterly foreign to Buddhism than the Jewish\nfanaticism of St. Paul: nothing could be more contrary to its instinct\nthan the tension, fire, and unrest of the religious man, and, above\nall, that form of sensuality which sanctifies Christianity with the\nname \"Love.\" Moreover, it is the cultured and very intellectual classes\nwho find blessedness in Buddhism: a race wearied and besotted by\ncenturies of philosophical quarrels, but not _beneath all culture_ as\nthose classes were from which Christianity sprang.... In the Buddhistic\nideal, there is essentially an emancipation from good and evil: a\nvery subtle suggestion of a Beyond to all morality is thought out\nin its teaching, and this Beyond is supposed to be compatible with\nperfection,--the condition being, that even good actions are only\nneeded _pro tem.,_ merely as a means,--that is to say, in order to be\nfree from _all_ action.\n\n\n156.\n\n_How very curious_ it is to see a _Nihilistic_ religion such as\nChristianity, sprung from, and in keeping with, a decrepit and worn-out\npeople, who have outlived all strong instincts, being transferred step\nby step to another environment--that is to say, to a land of young\npeople, _who have not yet lived at all._ The joy of the final chapter,\nof the fold and of the evening, preached to barbarians and Germans!\nHow thoroughly all of it must first have been barbarised, Germanised!\nTo those who had dreamed of a _Walhalla_: who found happiness only in\nwar!--A _super_national religion preached in the midst of chaos, where\n_no nations yet existed even._\n\n\n157.\n\nThe only way to refute priests and religions is this: to show that\ntheir errors are no longer _beneficent_--that they are rather harmful;\nin short, that their own \"proof of power\" no longer holds good....\n\n\n\n2. CONCERNING THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY.\n\n\n\n158.\n\nChristianity as an _historical reality_ should not be confounded with\nthat one root which its name recalls. The _other_ roots, from which it\nhas sprung, are by far the more important. It is an unprecedented abuse\nof names to identify such manifestations of decay and such abortions as\nthe \"Christian Church,\" \"Christian belief,\" and \"Christian life,\" with\nthat Holy Name. What did Christ _deny_?--Everything which to-day is\ncalled Christian.\n\n\n159.\n\nThe whole of the Christian _creed_--all Christian \"truth,\" is idle\nfalsehood and deception, and is precisely the reverse of that which was\nat the bottom of the first Christian movement.\n\nAll that which in the _ecclesiastical_ sense is Christian, is just\nexactly what is most radically _anti-Christian_: crowds of things and\npeople appear instead of symbols, history takes the place of eternal\nfacts, it is all forms, rites, and dogmas instead of a \"practice\" of\nlife. To be really Christian would mean to be absolutely indifferent to\ndogmas, cults, priests, church, and theology.\n\nThe practice of Christianity is no more an impossible phantasy than the\npractice of Buddhism is: it is merely a means to happiness.\n\n\n160.\n\nJesus goes straight to the point, the \"Kingdom of Heaven\" in the heart,\nand He does _not_ find the means in duty to the Jewish Church; He\neven regards the reality of Judaism (its need to maintain itself) as\nnothing; He is concerned purely with the _inner_ man.\n\nNeither does He make anything of all the coarse forms relating to man's\nintercourse with God: He is opposed to the whole of the teaching of\nrepentance and atonement; He points out how man ought to live in order\nto feel himself \"deified,\" and how futile it is on his part to hope to\nlive properly by showing repentance and contrition for his sins. \"Sin\nis of no account\" is practically his chief standpoint.\n\nSin, repentance, forgiveness,--all this does not belong to Christianity\n... it is Judaism or Paganism which has become mixed up with Christ's\nteaching.\n\n\n161.\n\nThe _Kingdom of Heaven_ is a state of the heart (of children it is\nwritten, \"for theirs is the Kingdom of Heaven\"): it has nothing to\ndo with superterrestrial things. The Kingdom of God \"cometh,\" not\nchronologically or historically, not on a certain day in the calendar;\nit is not something which one day appears and was not previously there;\nit is a \"change of feeling in the individual,\" it is something which\nmay come at any time and which may be absent at any time....\n\n\n162.\n\n_The thief on the cross_;--When the criminal himself, who endures a\npainful death, declares: \"the way this Jesus suffers and dies, without\na murmur of revolt or enmity, graciously and resignedly, is the only\nright way,\" he assents to the gospel; and by this very fact _he is in\nParadise...._\n\n\n163.\n\nJesus bids us:--not to resist, either by deeds or in our heart, him who\nill-treats us;\n\nHe bids us admit of no grounds for separating ourselves from our wives;\n\nHe bids us make no distinction between foreigners and\nfellow-countrymen, strangers and familiars;\n\nHe bids us show anger to no one, and treat no one with contempt;--give\nalms secretly; not to desire to become rich;--not to swear;--not to\nstand in judgment;--become reconciled with our enemies and forgive\noffences;--not to worship in public.\n\n\"Blessedness\" is nothing promised: it is here, with us, if we only wish\nto live and act in a particular way.\n\n\n164.\n\n_Subsequent Additions_;--The whole of the prophet- and\nthaumaturgist-attitudes and the bad temper; while the conjuring-up of a\nsupreme tribunal of justice is an abominable corruption (see Mark vi.\n11: \"And whosoever shall not receive you.... Verily I say unto you, It\nshall be more tolerable for Sodom and Gomorrha,\" etc.). The \"fig tree\"\n(Matt. xxi. 18, 19): \"Now in the morning as he returned into the city,\nhe hungered. And when he saw a fig tree in the way, he came to it, and\nfound nothing thereon, but leaves only, and said unto it, Let no fruit\ngrow on thee henceforward for ever. And presently the fig tree withered\naway.\"\n\n\n165.\n\nThe teaching of rewards and punishments has become mixed up with\nChristianity in a way which is quite absurd; everything is thereby\nspoilt. In the same way, the practice of the first _ecclesia\nmilitans,_ of the Apostle Paul and his attitude, is put forward as if\nit had been _commanded_ or predetermined.\n\nThe subsequent glorification of the actual _life_ and _teaching_ of the\nfirst Christians: as if everything had been _prescribed beforehand_ and\nhad been only a matter of _following_ directions----And as for the\n_fulfilment of scriptural prophecies_: how much of all that is more\nthan forgery and cooking?\n\n\n166.\n\nJesus opposed a real life, a life in truth, to ordinary life: nothing\ncould have been more foreign to His mind than the somewhat heavy\nnonsense of an \"eternal Peter,\"--of the eternal duration of a single\nperson. Precisely what He combats is the exaggerated importance of the\n\"person\": how can He wish to immortalise it?\n\nHe likewise combats the hierarchy within the community; He never\npromises a certain proportion of reward for a certain proportion of\ndeserts: how can He have meant to teach the doctrine of punishment and\nreward in a Beyond?\n\n\n167.\n\nChristianity is an ingenuous attempt at bringing about a _Buddhistic\nmovement in favour of peace,_ sprung from the very heart of the\nresenting masses ... but transformed by _Paul_ into a mysterious\npagan cult, which was ultimately able to accord with the whole of\n_State organisation_ ... and which carries on war, condemns, tortures,\nconjures, and hates.\n\nPaul bases his teaching upon the need of mystery felt by the great\nmasses capable of religious emotions: he seeks a _victim,_ a bloody\nphantasmagoria, which may be equal to a contest with the images of\na secret cult: God on the cross, the drinking of blood, the _unio\nmystica_ with the \"victim.\"\n\nHe seeks the prolongation of life after death (the blessed and atoned\nafter-life of the individual soul) which he puts in causal relation\nwith the _victim_ already referred to (according to the type of\nDionysos, Mithras, Osiris).\n\nHe feels the necessity of bringing notions of _guilt_ and _sin_\ninto the foreground, _not_ a new practice of life (as Jesus Himself\ndemonstrated and taught), but a new cult, a new belief, a belief in a\nmiraculous metamorphosis (\"Salvation\" through belief).\n\nHe understood the _great needs of the pagan worlds_ and he gave quite\nan absolutely arbitrary picture of those two plain facts, Christ's life\nand death. He gave the whole a new accent, altering the equilibrium\neverywhere ... he was one of the most active destroyers of primitive\nChristianity.\n\nThe attempt made on the life of _priests and theologians_ culminated,\nthanks to Paul, in a new priesthood and theology--a _ruling_ caste and\na _Church._\n\nThe attempt made to suppress the fussy importance of the \"person,\"\nculminated in the belief in the eternal \"personality\" (and in the\nanxiety concerning \"eternal salvation\" ...), and in the most\nparadoxical exaggeration of individual egoism.\n\nThis is the humorous side of the question--tragic humour: Paul again\nset up on a large scale precisely what Jesus had overthrown by His\nlife. At last, when the Church edifice was complete, it even sanctioned\nthe _existence_ of the _State._\n\n\n168.\n\nThe Church is precisely that against which Jesus inveighed--and against\nwhich He taught His disciples to fight.\n\n\n169.\n\nA God who died for our sins, salvation through faith, resurrection\nafter death--all these things are the counterfeit coins of real\nChristianity, for which that pernicious blockhead Paul must be held\nresponsible.\n\nThe _life which must serve as an example_ consists in love and\nhumility; in the abundance of hearty emotion which does not even\nexclude the lowliest; in the formal renunciation of all desire of\nmaking its rights felt; in conquest, in the sense of triumph over\noneself; in the belief in salvation in this world, despite all sorrow,\nopposition, and death; in forgiveness and the absence of anger and\ncontempt; in the absence of a desire to be rewarded; in the refusal\nto be bound to anybody; abandonment to all that is most spiritual and\nintellectual;--in fact, a very proud life controlled by the will of a\nservile and poor life.\n\nOnce the Church had allowed itself to take over _all the Christian\npractice,_ and had formally sanctioned the State,--that kind of life\nwhich Jesus combats and condemns,--it was obliged to lay the sense\nof Christianity in other things than early Christian ideals--that is\nto say, in the _faith_ in incredible things, in the ceremonial of\nprayers, worship, feasts, etc. etc. The notions \"sin,\" \"forgiveness,\"\n\"punishment,\" \"reward\"--everything, in fact, which had nothing in\ncommon with, and was quite _absent_ from, primitive Christianity, now\ncomes into the foreground.\n\nAn appalling stew of Greek philosophy and Judaism; asceticism;\ncontinual judgments and condemnations; the order of rank, etc.\n\n\n170.\n\nChristianity has, from the first, always transformed the symbolical\ninto crude realities:\n\n(1) The antitheses \"true life\" and \"false life\" were misunderstood and\nchanged into \"life here\" and \"life beyond.\"\n\n(2) The notion \"eternal life,\" as opposed to the personal life which is\nephemeral, is translated into \"personal immortality\";\n\n(3) The process of fraternising by means of sharing the same food and\ndrink, after the Hebrew-Arabian manner, is interpreted as the \"miracle\nof transubstantiation.\"\n\n(4) \"Resurrection\" which was intended to mean the entrance to the\n\"true life,\" in the sense of being intellectually \"born again,\" becomes\nan historical contingency, supposed to take place at some moment after\ndeath;\n\n(5) The teaching of the Son of man as the \"Son of God,\"--that is to\nsay, the life-relationship between man and God,--becomes the \"second\nperson of the Trinity,\" and thus the filial relationship of every\nman--even the lowest--to God, is _done away with_;\n\n(6) Salvation through faith (that is to say, that there is no other way\nto this filial relationship to God, save through the _practice of life_\ntaught by Christ) becomes transformed into the belief that there is a\nmiraculous way of _atoning_ for all _sin_; though not through our own\nendeavours, but by means of Christ:\n\nFor all these purposes, \"Christ on the Cross\" had to be interpreted\nafresh. The _death_ itself would certainly not be the principal feature\nof the event ... it was only another sign pointing to the way in\nwhich one should behave towards the authorities and the laws of the\nworld--_that one was not to defend oneself--this was the exemplary\nlife._\n\n\n171.\n\nConcerning the psychology of _Paul._--The important fact is Christ's\ndeath. This remains to be _explained ..._. That there may be truth or\nerror in an explanation never entered these people's heads: one day a\nsublime possibility strikes them, \"His death _might_ mean so and so\"\n--and it forthwith _becomes_ so and so. An hypothesis is proved by the\nsublime _ardour_ it lends to its discoverer....\n\n\"The proof of strength\": _i.e.,_ a thought is demonstrated by its\n_effects_ (\"by their fruits,\" as the Bible ingenuously says); that\nwhich fires enthusiasm must be _true,_--what one loses one's blood for\nmust be _true--_\n\nIn every department of this world of thought, the sudden feeling of\npower which an idea imparts to him who is responsible for it, is\nplaced to the _credit_ of that idea:--and as there seems no other way\nof honouring an idea than by calling it true, the first epithet it is\nhonoured with is the word _true._ ... How could it have any effect\notherwise? It was imagined by some power: if that power were not\nreal, it could not be the cause of anything.... The thought is then\nunderstood as _inspired_: the effect it causes has something of the\nviolent nature of a demoniacal influence--\n\nA thought which a decadent like Paul could not resist and to which he\ncompletely yields, is thus \"proved\" _true_!!!\n\nAll these holy epileptics and visionaries did not possess a thousandth\npart of the honesty in self-criticism with which a philologist,\nnowadays, reads a text, or tests the truth of an historical event....\nBeside us, such people were moral cretins.\n\n\n172.\n\nIt matters little _whether a thing be true,_ provided it be\n_effective_: total _absence of intellectual uprightness._ Everything\nis good, whether it be lying, slander, or shameless \"cooking,\" provided\nit serve to heighten the degree of heat to the point at which people\n\"believe.\"\n\nWe are face to face with an actual school for the teaching of _the\nmeans wherewith_ men are _seduced_ to a belief: we see systematic\n_contempt_ for those spheres whence contradiction might come (that\nis to say, for reason, philosophy, wisdom, doubt, and caution); a\nshameless praising and glorification of the teaching, with continual\nreferences to the fact that it was God who presented us with it--that\nthe apostle signifies nothing--that no criticism is brooked, but\nonly faith, acceptance; that it is the greatest blessing and favour\nto receive such a doctrine of salvation; that the state in which one\nshould receive it, ought to be one of the profoundest thankfulness and\nhumility....\n\nThe resentment which the lowly feel against all those in high places,\nis continually turned to account: the fact that this teaching is\nrevealed to them as the reverse of the wisdom of the world, against\nthe power of the world, seduces them to it. This teaching convinces\nthe outcasts and the botched of all sorts and conditions; it promises\nblessedness, advantages, and privileges to the most insignificant and\nmost humble men; it fanaticises the poor, the small, and the foolish,\nand fills them with insane vanity, as though _they_ were the meaning\nand salt of the earth.\n\nAgain, I say, all this cannot be sufficiently contemned, we spare\nourselves a criticism of the teaching; it is sufficient to take\nnote of the means it uses in order to be aware of the nature of the\nphenomenon one is examining. It identified itself with _virtue,_\nit appropriated the whole of the _fascinating power of virtue,_\nshamelessly, for its own purposes ... it availed itself of the power of\nparadox, and of the need, manifested by old civilisation, for pepper\nand absurdity; it amazed and revolted at the same time; it provoked\npersecutions and ill-treatment.\n\nIt is the same kind of _well-thought-out meanness_ with which the\nJewish priesthood established their power and built up their Church....\n\nOne must be able to discern: (1) that warmth of passion \"love\" (resting\non a base of ardent sensuality); (2) the thoroughly _ignoble character_\nof Christianity:--the continual exaggeration and verbosity;--the lack\nof cool intellectuality and irony;--the unmilitary character of all its\ninstincts;--the priestly prejudices against manly pride, sensuality,\nthe sciences, the arts.\n\n\n173.\n\n_Paul_: seeks power _against_ ruling Judaism,--his attempt is too\nweak.... Transvaluation of the notion \"Jew\": the \"race\" is put aside:\nbut that means denying the very basis of the whole structure. The\n\"martyr,\" the \"fanatic,\" the value of all _strong_ belief. Christianity\nis the _form of decay_ of the old world, after the latter's collapse,\nand it is characterised by the fact that it brings all the most sickly\nand unhealthy elements and needs to the top.\n\n_Consequently other_ instincts had to step into the foreground, in\norder to _constitute_ an entity, a power able to stand alone--in short,\na condition of tense sorrow was necessary, like that out of which the\nJews had derived their _instinct of self-preservation...._\n\nThe persecution of Christians was invaluable for this purpose.\n\nUnity in the face of danger; the conversion of the masses becomes the\nonly means of putting an end to the persecution of the individual. (The\nnotion \"conversion\" is therefore made as elastic as possible.)\n\n\n174.\n\nThe _Christian Judaic_ life: here resentment did not prevail. The\ngreat persecutions alone could have driven out the passions to that\nextent--as also the _ardour of love_ and _hate._\n\nWhen the creatures a man most loves are sacrificed before his eyes for\nthe sake of his faith, that man becomes _aggressive_; the triumph of\nChristianity is due to its persecutors.\n\n_Asceticism_ is not specifically Christian: this is what Schopenhauer\nmisunderstood. It only shoots up in Christianity, wherever it would\nhave existed without that religion.\n\nMelancholy Christianity, the torture and torment of the conscience,\nalso only a peculiarity of a particular soil, where Christian values\nhave taken root: it is not Christianity properly speaking. Christianity\nhas absorbed all the different kinds of diseases which grow from morbid\nsoil: one could refute it at one blow by showing that it did not know\nhow to resist any contagion. But _that_ precisely is the essential\nfeature of it. Christianity is a type of decadence.\n\n\n175.\n\nThe reality on which Christianity was able to build up its power\nconsisted of the small dispersed _Jewish families,_ with their warmth,\ntenderness, and peculiar readiness to help, which, to the whole of the\nRoman Empire, was perhaps the most incomprehensible and least familiar\nof their characteristics; they were also united by their pride at\nbeing a \"chosen people,\" concealed beneath a cloak of humility, and by\ntheir secret denial of all that was uppermost and that possessed power\nand splendour, although there was no shade of envy in their denial.\n_To have recognised this as a power,_ to have regarded this _blessed_\nstate as communicable, seductive, and infectious even where pagans\nwere concerned--this constituted Paul's genius: to use up the treasure\nof latent energy and cautious happiness for the purposes of \"a Jewish\nChurch of free confession,\" and to avail himself of all the Jewish\nexperience, their propaganda, and their expertness in _the preservation\nof a community_ under a foreign power--this is what he conceived to\nbe his duty. He it was who discovered that absolutely unpolitical and\nisolated body of _paltry people,_ and their art of asserting themselves\nand pushing themselves to the front, by means of a host of acquired\nvirtues which are made to represent the only forms of virtue (\"the\nself-preservative measure and weapon of success of a certain class of\nman\").\n\nThe principle of _love_ comes from the small community of Jewish\npeople: a _very passionate_ soul glows here, beneath the ashes of\nhumility and wretchedness: it is neither Greek, Indian, nor German. The\nsong in praise of love which Paul wrote is not Christian; it is the\nJewish flare of that eternal flame which is Semitic. If Christianity\nhas done anything essentially new in a psychological sense, it is this,\nthat it has _increased the temperature of the soul_ among those cooler\nand more noble races who were at one time at the head of affairs;\nit discovered that the most wretched life could be made rich and\ninvaluable, by means of an elevation of the temperature of the soul....\n\nIt is easily understood that a transfer of this sort could _not_\ntake place among the ruling classes: the Jews and Christians were at\na disadvantage owing to their bad manners--spiritual strength and\npassion, when accompanied by bad manners, only provoke loathing (I\nbecome aware of these bad manners while reading the New Testament). It\nwas necessary to be related both in baseness and sorrow with this type\nof lower manhood in order to feel anything attractive in him.... The\nattitude a man maintains towards the New Testament is a test of the\namount of taste he may have for the classics (see Tacitus); he who is\nnot revolted by it, he who does not feel honestly and deeply that he is\nin the presence of a sort of _f\u0153da superstitio_ when reading it, and\nwho does not draw his hand back so as not to soil his fingers--such a\nman does not know what is classical. A man must feel about \"the cross\"\nas Goethe did.[1]\n\n\n[Footnote 1:\n\nVieles kann ich ertragen. Die meisten beschwerlichen Dinge\nDuld' ich mit ruhigem Mut, wie es ein Gott mir gebeut.\nWenige sind mir jedoch wie Gift und Schlange zuwider;\nViere: Rauch des Tabaks, Wanzen, und Knoblauch und\nGoethe's _Venetian Epigrams,_ No. 67.\n\nMuch can I bear. Things the most irksome\nI endure with such patience as comes from a god.\nFour things, however, repulse me like venom:--Tobacco\nsmoke, garlic, bugs, and the cross.\n\n(TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.)\n]\n\n\n176.\n\n_The reaction of paltry people_:--Love provides the feeling of highest\npower. It should be understood to what extent, not man in general, but\nonly a certain kind of man is speaking here.\n\n\"We are godly in love, we shall be 'the children of God'; God loves us\nand wants nothing from us save love\"; that is to say: all morality,\nobedience, and action, do not produce the same feeling of power and\nfreedom as love does;--a man does nothing wicked from sheer love, but\nhe does much more than if he were prompted by obedience and virtue\nalone.\n\nHere is the happiness of the herd, the communal feeling in big things\nas in small, the living sentiment of unity felt as the _sum of the\nfeeling of life._ Helping, caring for, and being useful, constantly\nkindle the feeling of power; visible success, the expression of\npleasure, emphasise the feeling of power; pride is not lacking either,\nit is felt in the form of the community, the House of God, and the\n\"chosen people.\"\n\nAs a matter of fact, man has once more experienced an \"_alt\u00e9ration\" of\nhis personality_: this time he called his feeling of love--God. The\nawakening of such a feeling must be pictured; it is a sort of ecstasy,\na strange language, a \"Gospel\"--it was this newness which did not\nallow man to attribute love to himself--he thought it was God leading\nhim on and taking shape in his heart. \"God descends among men,\" one's\nneighbour is transfigured and becomes a God (in so far as he provokes\nthe sentiment of love), _Jesus is the neighbour,_ the moment He is\ntransfigured in thought into a God, and into a cause _provoking the\nfeeling of power._\n\n\n177.\n\nBelievers are aware that they owe an infinite amount to Christianity,\nand therefore conclude that its Founder must have been a man of the\nfirst rank.... This conclusion is false, but it is typical of the\nreverents. Regarded objectively, it is, _in the first place,_ just\npossible that they are mistaken concerning the extent of their debt to\nChristianity: a man's convictions prove nothing concerning the thing\nhe is convinced about, and in religions they are more likely to give\nrise to suspicions.... Secondly, it is possible that the debt owing\nto Christianity is not due to its Founder at all, but to the whole\nstructure, the whole thing--to the Church, etc. The notion \"Founder\"\nis so very equivocal, that it may stand even for the accidental\ncause of a movement: the person of the Founder has been inflated in\nproportion as the Church has grown: but even this process of veneration\nallows of the conclusion that, at one time or other, this Founder was\nsomething exceedingly insecure and doubtful--in the beginning.... Let\nany one think of the _free and easy way_ in which Paul treats the\nproblem of the personality of Jesus, how he almost juggles with it:\nsome one who died, who was seen after His death,--some one whom the\nJews delivered up to death--all this was only the theme--_Paul_ wrote\nthe music to it.\n\n\n178.\n\nThe founder of a religion _may_ be quite insignificant--a wax vesta and\nno _more_!\n\n\n179.\n\n_Concerning the psychological problem of Christianity.--The driving\nforces are_: resentment, popular insurrection, the revolt of the\nbungled and the botched. (In Buddhism it is different: it is not _born_\nof _resentment._ It rather combats resentment because the latter leads\nto _action_!)\n\nThis party, which stands for freedom, understands that the _abandonment\nof antagonism in thought and deed_ is a condition of distinction and\npreservation. Here lies the psychological difficulty which has stood in\nthe way of Christianity being understood: the force which created it,\nurges to a struggle against itself.\n\nOnly as a party standing _for peace_ and _innocence_ can this\ninsurrectionary movement hope to be successful: it must conquer by\nmeans of excessive mildness, sweetness, softness, and its instincts\nare aware of this. The _feat_ was to deny and condemn the force, of\nwhich man is the expression, and to press the reverse of that force\ncontinually to the fore, by word and deed.\n\n\n180.\n\n_The pretence of youthfulness._--It is a mistake to imagine that,\nwith Christianity, an ingenuous and youthful people rose against an\nold culture; the story goes that it was out of the lowest levels of\nsociety, where Christianity flourished and shot its roots, that the\nmore profound source of life gushed forth afresh: but nothing can\nbe understood of the psychology of Christianity, if it be supposed\nthat it was the expression of revived youth among a people, or of\nthe resuscitated strength of a race. It is rather a typical form\nof decadence, of moral-softening and of hysteria, amid a general\nhotch-potch of races and people that had lost all aims and had grown\nweary and sick. The wonderful company which gathered round this\nmaster-seducer of the populace, would not be at all out of place in a\nRussian novel: all the diseases of the nerves seem to give one another\na rendezvous in this crowd--the absence of a known duty, the feeling\nthat everything is nearing its end, that nothing is any longer worth\nwhile, and that contentment lies in _dolce far niente_.\n\nThe power and certainty of the future in the Jew's instinct, its\nmonstrous will for life and for power, lies in its ruling classes; the\npeople who upheld primitive Christianity are best distinguished by this\n_exhausted condition_ of their instincts. On the one hand, they are\nsick of everything; on the other, they are content with each other,\nwith themselves and for themselves.\n\n\n181.\n\nChristianity regarded as _emancipated Judaism_ (just as a nobility\nwhich is both racial and indigenous ultimately emancipates itself from\nthese conditions, and _goes in search of_ kindred elements....).\n\n(1) As a Church (community) on the territory of the State, as an\nunpolitical institution.\n\n(2) As life, breeding, practice, art of living.\n\n(3) As a _religion of sin_ (sin committed against _God, being the\nonly recognised kind,_ and the only cause of all suffering), with a\nuniversal cure for it. There is no sin save against God; what is done\nagainst men, man shall not sit in judgment upon, nor call to account,\nexcept in the name of God. At the same time, all commandments (love):\neverything is associated with God, and all acts are performed according\nto God's will. Beneath this arrangement there lies exceptional\nintelligence (a very narrow life, such as that led by the Esquimaux,\ncan only be endured by most peaceful and indulgent people: the\nJud\u00e6o-Christian dogma turns against sin in favour of the \"sinner\").\n\n\n182.\n\nThe Jewish priesthood understood how to present everything it claimed\nto be right as a _divine precept,_ as an act of obedience to God, and\nalso to introduce all those things which conduced to _preserve Israel_\nand were the _conditions_ of its existence (for instance: the large\nnumber of \"_works_\": circumcision and the cult of sacrifices, as the\nvery pivot of the national conscience), not as Nature, but as God.\n\n_This process continued; within the very heart_ of Judaism, where the\nneed of these \"works\" was not felt (that is to say, as a means of\nkeeping a race distinct), a priestly sort of man was pictured, whose\nbearing towards the aristocracy was like that of \"noble nature\"; a\nsacerdotalism of the soul, which now, in order to throw its opposite\ninto strong relief, attaches value, not to the \"dutiful acts\"\nthemselves, but to the sentiment....\n\nAt bottom, the problem was once again, how to make a certain kind of\nsoul _prevail_: it was also _a popular insurrection in the midst of\na priestly people_--a pietistic movement coming from below (sinners,\npublicans, women, and children). Jesus of Nazareth was the symbol of\ntheir sect. And again, in order to believe in themselves, they were in\nneed of a _theological transfiguration_: they require nothing less than\n\"the Son of God\" in order to create a belief for themselves. And just\nas the priesthood had falsified the whole history of Israel, another\nattempt was made, here, to _alter and falsify_ the whole history of\nmankind in such a way as to make Christianity seem like the most\nimportant event it contained. This movement could have originated only\nupon the soil of Judaism, the main feature of which was the confounding\nof _guilt with sorrow_ and the reduction of all _sin_ to _sin against\nGod._ Of all this, Christianity is the _second degree of power._\n\n\n183.\n\nThe symbolism of Christianity is based upon that of _Judaism,_ which\nhad already transfigured all reality (history, Nature) into a holy and\nartificial unreality--which refused to recognise real history, and\nwhich showed no more interest in a natural course of things.\n\n\n184.\n\nThe Jews made the attempt to prevail, after two of their castes--the\nwarrior and the agricultural castes, had disappeared from their midst.\n\nIn this sense they are the \"castrated people\": they have their priests\nand then--their Chandala....\n\nHow easily a disturbance occurs among them--an insurrection of their\nChandala. This was the origin of _Christianity._\n\nOwing to the fact that they had no knowledge of warriors except as\ntheir masters, they introduced enmity towards the nobles, the men\nof honour, pride, and power, and the _ruling_ classes, into their\nreligion: they are pessimists from _indignation...._\n\nThus they created a very important and novel position: the priests in\nthe van of the Chandala--against the _noble classes...._\n\nChristianity was the logical conclusion of this movement: even in the\nJewish priesthood, it still scented the existence of the caste, of the\nprivileged and noble minority--_it therefore did away with priests._\n\nChrist is the unit of the Chandala who removes the priest ... the\nChandala who redeems himself....\n\nThat is why the _French_ Revolution is the lineal descendant and the\ncontinuator of _Christianity--_ it is characterised by an instinct of\nhate towards castes, nobles, and the last privileges.\n\n\n185.\n\nThe \"_Christian Ideal_\" put on the stage with Jewish astuteness--these\nare the fundamental _psychological forces_ of its \"nature\":--\n\nRevolt against the ruling spiritual powers;\n\nThe attempt to make those virtues which facilitate the _happiness of\nthe lowly,_ a standard of all values--in fact, to call _God_ that which\nis no more than the self-preservative instinct of that class of man\npossessed of least vitality;\n\nObedience and absolute _abstention_ from war and resistance, justified\nby this ideal;\n\nThe love of one another as a result of the love of God.\n\n_The trick_: The _denial_ of all _natural mobilia,_ and their\ntransference to the spiritual world beyond ... the exploitation of\n_virtue_ and its _veneration_ for wholly interested motives, gradual\n_denial_ of virtue in everything that is not Christian.\n\n\n186.\n\nThe _profound contempt_ with which the Christian was treated by\nthe noble people of antiquity, is of the same order as the present\ninstinctive aversion to Jews: it is the hatred which free and\nself-respecting classes feel towards those _who wish to creep\nin secretly,_ and who combine an awkward bearing with foolish\nself-sufficiency.\n\nThe New Testament is the gospel of a completely _ignoble_ species of\nman; its pretensions to highest values--_yea, to all_ values, is, as a\nmatter of fact, revolting--even nowadays.\n\n\n187.\n\nHow little the subject matters! It is the spirit which gives the thing\nlife! What a quantity of stuffy and sick-room air there is in all that\nchatter about \"redemption,\" \"love,\" \"blessedness,\" \"faith,\" \"truth,\"\n\"eternal life\"! Let any one look into a really pagan book and compare\nthe two; for instance, in Petronius, nothing at all is done, said,\ndesired, and valued, which, according to a bigoted Christian estimate,\nis not sin, or even deadly sin. And yet how happy one feels with the\npurer air, the superior intellectuality, the quicker pace, and the\nfree overflowing strength which is certain of the future! In the whole\nof the New Testament there is not one _bouffonnerie_: but that fact\nalone would suffice to refute any book....\n\n\n188.\n\nThe _profound lack of dignity_ with which all life, which is not\nChristian, is condemned: it does not suffice them to think meanly of\ntheir actual opponents, they cannot do with less than a general slander\nof everything that is not _themselves...._ An abject and crafty soul is\nin the most perfect harmony with the arrogance of piety, as witness the\nearly Christians.\n\nThe _future_: they see that _they are heavily paid for it.... Theirs is\nthe muddiest kind of spirit that exists._ The whole of Christ's life is\nso arranged as to confirm the prophecies of the Scriptures: He behaves\nin such wise _in order that_ they may be right....\n\n\n189.\n\nThe deceptive interpretation of the words, the doings, and the\ncondition of _dying people_; the natural fear of death, for instance,\nis systematically confounded with the supposed fear of what is to\nhappen \"after death.\" ...\n\n\n190.\n\nThe _Christians_ have done exactly what the Jews did before them.\nThey introduced what they conceived to be an innovation and a thing\nnecessary to self-preservation into their Master's teaching, and wove\nHis life into it They likewise credited Him with all the wisdom of a\nmaker of proverbs--_in short,_ they represented their everyday life and\nactivity as an act of obedience, and thus sanctified their propaganda.\n\nWhat it all depends upon, may be gathered from Paul: it is _not much._\nWhat remains is the development of a type of saint, out of the values\nwhich these people regarded as saintly.\n\nThe whole of the \"doctrine of miracles,\" including the resurrection, is\nthe result of self-glorification on the part of the community, which\nascribed to its Master those qualities it ascribed to itself, but in a\nhigher degree (or, better still, it derived its strength from Him....)\n\n\n191.\n\nThe Christians have never led the life which Jesus commanded them to\nlead, and the impudent fable of the \"justification by faith,\" and its\nunique and transcendental significance, is only the result of the\nChurch's lack of courage and will in acknowledging those \"_works_\"\nwhich Jesus commanded.\n\nThe Buddhist behaves differently from the non-Buddhist; but _the\nChristian behaves as all the rest of the world does,_ and possesses a\nChristianity of ceremonies and _states of the soul._\n\nThe profound and contemptible falsehood of Christianity in Europe makes\nus deserve the contempt of the Arabs, Hindoos, and Chinese....\n\nLet any one listen to the words of the first German statesman,\nconcerning that which has preoccupied Europe for the last forty years.\n\n\n192.\n\n\"_Faith_\" or \"_works_\"?--But that the \"works,\" the habit of particular\nworks may engender a certain _set of values or thoughts,_ is just as\nnatural as it would be unnatural for \"works\" to proceed from mere\nvaluations. Man must practise, _not_ how to strengthen feelings of\nvalue, but how to strengthen action: first of all, one must be able\n_to do something...._ Luther's Christian Dilettantism. Faith is an\nasses' bridge. The background consists of a profound conviction on\nthe part of Luther and his peers, that they are enabled to accomplish\nChristian \"works,\" a personal fact, disguised under an extreme doubt\nas to whether _all_ action is not sin and devil's work, so that the\nworth of life depends upon isolated and highly-strained conditions of\n_inactivity_ (prayer, effusion, etc.).--Ultimately, Luther would be\nright: the instincts which are expressed by the whole bearing of the\nreformers are the most brutal that exist. Only in _turning absolutely\naway_ from themselves, and in becoming absorbed in the _opposite_ of\nthemselves, only by means of an _illusion_ (\"faith\") was existence\nendurable to them.\n\n\n193.\n\n\"What was to be done in order to believe?\"--an absurd question. That\nwhich is wrong with Christianity is, that it does none of the things\nthat Christ _commanded._\n\nIt is a mean life, but _seen_ through the eye of contempt.\n\n\n194.\n\nThe entrance into the _real_ life--_a man saves his own life by living\nthe life of the multitude._\n\n\n195.\n\nChristianity has become something fundamentally different from what\nits Founder wished it to be. It is the great _anti-pagan movement_ of\nantiquity, formulated with the use of the life, teaching, and \"words\"\nof the Founder of Christianity, but interpreted quite _arbitrarily,_\naccording to a scheme embodying _profoundly different needs_:\ntranslated into the language of all the _subterranean religions_ then\nexisting.\n\nIt is the rise of Pessimism (whereas Jesus wished to bring the peace\nand the happiness of the lambs): and moreover the Pessimism of the\nweak, of the inferior, of the suffering, and of the oppressed.\n\nIts mortal enemies are (1) _Power,_ whether in the form of character,\nintellect, or taste, and \"worldliness\"; (2) the \"good cheer\" of\nclassical times, the noble levity and scepticism, hard pride, eccentric\ndissipation, and cold frugality of the sage, Greek refinement in\nmanners, words, and form. Its mortal enemy is as much the _Roman_ as\nthe _Greek._\n\nThe attempt on the part of _anti-paganism_ to establish itself on\na philosophical basis, and to make its tenets possible: it shows a\ntaste for the ambiguous figures of antique culture, and above all for\nPlato, who was, more than any other, an anti-Hellene and Semite in\ninstinct.... It also shows a taste for Stoicism, which is essentially\nthe work of Semites (\"dignity\" is regarded as severity, law; virtue\nis held to be greatness, self-responsibility, authority, greatest\nsovereignty over oneself--this is Semitic.) The Stoic is an Arabian\nsheik wrapped in Greek togas and notions.\n\n\n196.\n\nChristianity only resumes the fight which had already been begun\nagainst the _classical_ ideal and _noble_ religion.\n\nAs a matter of fact, the whole process of _transformation_ is only\nan adaptation to the needs and to the level of intelligence of\n_religious_ masses then existing:--those masses which believed in\nIsis, Mithras, Dionysos, and the \"great mother,\" and which demanded\nthe following things of a religion: (1) hopes of a beyond, (2) the\nbloody phantasmagoria of animal sacrifice (the mystery), (3) holy\nlegend and the redeeming _deed,_ (4) asceticism, denial of the\nworld, superstitious \"purification,\" (5) a hierarchy as a part of\nthe community. In short, Christianity everywhere fitted the already\nprevailing and increasing _anti-pagan tendency_--those cults which\nEpicurus combated,--or more exactly, those _religions proper to the\nlower herd, women, slaves, and ignoble classes._\n\nThe misunderstandings are therefore the following:--\n\n(1) The immortality of the individual;\n\n(2) The assumed existence of _another_ world;\n\n(3) The absurd notion of punishment and expiation in the heart of the\ninterpretation of existence;\n\n(4) The profanation of the divine nature of man, instead of its\naccentuation, and the construction of a very profound chasm, which\ncan only be crossed by the help of a miracle or by means of the most\nthorough self-contempt;\n\n(5) The whole world of corrupted imagination and morbid passion,\ninstead of a simple and loving life of action, instead of Buddhistic\nhappiness attainable on earth;\n\n(6) An ecclesiastical order with a priesthood, theology, cults, and\nsacraments; in short, everything that Jesus of Nazareth _combated_;\n\n(7) The _miraculous_ in everything and everybody, superstition too:\nwhile precisely the trait which distinguished Judaism and primitive\nChristianity was their _repugnance to_ miracles and their relative\n_rationalism._\n\n\n197.\n\n_The psychological pre-requisites:--Ignorance_ and _lack of\nculture,_--the sort of ignorance which has unlearned every kind of\nshame: let any one imagine those impudent saints in the heart of\nAthens;\n\nThe _Jewish instinct of a chosen people_: they appropriate _all the\nvirtues,_ without further ado, as their own, and regard the rest of\nthe world as their opposite; this is a profound sign of _spiritual\ndepravity_;\n\n_The total lack of real aims_ and real _duties,_ for which other\nvirtues are required than those of the bigot--_the State undertook\nthis work for them_: and the impudent people still behaved as though\nthey had no need of the State. \"Except ye become as little children\"\n--oh, how far we are from this psychological ingenuousness!\n\n\n198.\n\nThe Founder of Christianity had to pay dearly for having directed His\nteaching at the lowest classes of Jewish society and intelligence. They\nunderstood Him only according to the limitations of their own spirit.\n... It was a disgrace to concoct a history of salvation, a personal\nGod, a personal Saviour, a personal immortality, and to have retained\nall the meanness of the \"person,\" and of the \"history\" of a doctrine\nwhich denies the reality of all that is personal and historical.\n\nThe legend of salvation takes the place of the symbolic \"now\" and \"all\ntime,\" of the symbolic \"here\" and \"everywhere\"; and miracles appear\ninstead of the psychological symbol.\n\n\n199.\n\nNothing is less innocent than the New Testament. The soil from which it\nsprang is known.\n\nThese people, possessed of an inflexible will to assert themselves, and\nwho, once they had lost all natural hold on life, and had long existed\nwithout any right to existence, still knew how to prevail by means of\nhypotheses which were as unnatural as they were imaginary (calling\nthemselves the chosen people, the community of saints, the people of\nthe promised land, and the \"Church\"): these people made use of their\n_pia fraus_ with such skill, and with such \"clean consciences,\" that\none cannot be too cautious when they preach morality. When Jews step\nforward as the personification of innocence, the danger must be great.\nWhile reading the New Testament a man should have his small fund of\nintelligence, mistrust, and wickedness constantly at hand.\n\nPeople of the lowest origin, partly mob, outcasts not only from good\nsociety, but also from respectable society; grown away from the\n_atmosphere_ of culture, and free from discipline; ignorant, without\neven a suspicion of the fact that conscience can also rule in spiritual\nmatters; in a word--the Jews: an instinctively crafty people, able to\ncreate an advantage, a means of _seduction_ out of every conceivable\nhypothesis of superstition, even out of ignorance itself.\n\n\n200.\n\nI regard Christianity as the most fatal and seductive lie that has ever\nyet existed--as the greatest and most _impious lie_: I can discern the\nlast sprouts and branches of its ideal beneath every form of disguise,\nI decline to enter into any compromise or false position in reference\nto it--I urge people to declare open war with it.\n\nThe _morality of paltry people_ as the measure of all things: this is\nthe most repugnant kind of degeneracy that civilisation has ever yet\nbrought into existence. And this _kind of ideal_ is hanging still,\nunder the name of \"God,\" over men's heads!!\n\n\n201.\n\nHowever modest one's demands may be concerning intellectual\ncleanliness, when one touches the New Testament one cannot help\nexperiencing a sort of inexpressible feeling of discomfort; for the\nunbounded cheek with which the least qualified people will have their\nsay in its pages, in regard to the greatest problems of existence,\nand claim to sit in judgment on such matters, exceeds all limits. The\nimpudent levity with which the most unwieldy problems are spoken of\nhere (life, the world, God, the purpose of life), as if they were not\nproblems at all, but the most simple things which these little bigots\n_know all about_!!!\n\n\n202.\n\nThis was the most fatal form of insanity that has ever yet existed on\nearth:--when these little lying abortions of bigotry begin laying claim\nto the words \"God,\" \"last judgment,\" \"truth,\" \"love,\" \"wisdom,\" \"Holy\nSpirit,\" and thereby distinguishing themselves from the rest of the\nworld; when such men begin to transvalue values to suit themselves, as\nthough they were the sense, the salt, the standard, and the measure of\nall things; then all that one should do is this: build lunatic asylums\nfor their incarceration. To _persecute_ them was an egregious act of\nantique folly: this was taking them too seriously; it was making them\nserious.\n\nThe whole fatality was made possible by the fact that a similar form\nof megalomania was already _in existence,_ the _Jewish_ form (once\nthe gulf separating the Jews from the Christian-Jews was bridged, the\nChristian-Jews _were compelled_ to employ those self-preservative\nmeasures afresh which were discovered by the Jewish instinct, for\ntheir own self-preservation, after having accentuated them); and again\nthrough the fact that Greek moral philosophy had done everything that\ncould be done to prepare the way for moral-fanaticism, even among\nGreeks and Romans, and to render it palatable.... Plato, the great\nimporter of corruption, who was the first who refused to see Nature\nin morality, and who had already deprived the Greek gods of all their\nworth by his notion \"_good_\" was already tainted with _Jewish bigotry_\n(in Egypt?).\n\n\n203.\n\nThese small virtues of gregarious animals do not by any means lead\nto \"eternal life\": to put them on the stage in such a way, and to\nuse them for one's own purpose is perhaps very smart; but to him who\nkeeps his eyes open, even here, it remains, in spite of all, the most\nludicrous performance. A man by no means deserves privileges, either on\nearth or in heaven, because he happens to have attained to perfection\nin the art of behaving like a good-natured little sheep; at best, he\nonly remains a dear, absurd little ram with horns--provided, of course,\nhe does not burst with vanity or excite indignation by assuming the\nairs of a supreme judge.\n\nWhat a terrible glow of false colouring here floods the meanest\nvirtues--as though they were the reflection of divine qualities!\n\nThe _natural_ purpose and utility of every virtue is systematically\n_hushed up_; it can only be valuable in the light of a _divine_ command\nor model, or in the light of the good which belongs to a beyond or a\nspiritual world. (This is magnificent!--As if it were a question of the\n_salvation of the soul_: but it was a means of making things bearable\nhere with as many beautiful sentiments as possible.)\n\n\n204.\n\nThe _law,_ which is the fundamentally realistic formula of certain\nself-preservative measures of a community, forbids certain actions\nthat have a definite tendency to jeopardise the welfare of that\ncommunity: it does _not_ forbid the attitude of mind which gives rise\nto these actions--for in the pursuit of other ends the community\nrequires these forbidden actions, namely, when it is a matter of\nopposing its _enemies._ The moral idealist now steps forward and says:\n\"God sees into men's hearts: the action itself counts for nothing;\nthe reprehensible attitude of mind from which it proceeds must be\nextirpated ...\" In normal conditions men laugh at such things; it is\nonly in exceptional cases, when a community lives _quite_ beyond the\nneed of waging war in order to maintain itself, that an ear is lent to\nsuch things. Any attitude of mind is abandoned, the utility of which\ncannot be conceived.\n\nThis was the case, for example, when Buddha appeared among a people\nthat was both peaceable and afflicted with great intellectual weariness.\n\nThis was also the case in regard to the first Christian community (as\nalso the Jewish), the primary condition of which was the absolutely\n_unpolitical_ Jewish society. Christianity could grow only upon the\nsoil of Judaism--that is to say, among a people that had already\nrenounced the political life, and which led a sort of parasitic\nexistence within the Roman sphere of government, Christianity goes a\nstep _farther_: it allows men to \"emasculate\" themselves even more; the\ncircumstances actually favour their doing so.--_Nature_ is _expelled_\nfrom morality when it is said, \"Love ye your enemies\": for _Nature's_\ninjunction, \"Ye shall _love_ your neighbour and _hate_ your enemy,\"\nhas now become senseless in the law (in instinct); now, even _the love\na man feels for his neighbour_ must first be based upon something (_a\nsort of love of God_). _God_ is introduced everywhere, and _utility_\nis withdrawn; the natural _origin_ of morality is denied everywhere:\nthe _veneration of Nature,_ which lies in _acknowledging a natural\nmorality,_ is _destroyed_ to the roots....\n\nWhence comes the _seductive charm_ of this emasculate ideal of man? Why\nare we not _disgusted_ by it, just as we are disgusted at the thought\nof a eunuch?... The answer is obvious: it is not the voice of the\neunuch that revolts us, despite the cruel mutilation of which it is the\nresult; for, as a matter of fact, it has grown sweeter.... And owing to\nthe very fact that the \"male organ\" has been amputated from virtue, its\nvoice now has a feminine ring, which, formerly, was not to be discerned.\n\nOn the other hand, we have only to think of the terrible hardness,\ndangers, and accidents to which a life of manly virtues leads--the\nlife of a Corsican, even at the present day, or that of a heathen Arab\n(which resembles the Corsican's life even to the smallest detail:\nthe Arab's songs might have been written by Corsicans)--in order to\nperceive how the most robust type of man was fascinated and moved by\nthe voluptuous ring of this \"goodness\" and \"purity.\" ... A pastoral\nmelody ... an idyll ... the \"good man\": such things have most effect in\nages when tragedy is abroad.\n\n***\n\nWith this, we have realised to what extent the \"idealist\" (the ideal\neunuch) also proceeds from a definite reality and is not merely a\nvisionary.... He has perceived precisely that, for his kind of reality,\na brutal injunction of the sort which prohibits certain actions has no\nsense (because the instinct which would urge him to these actions is\n_weakened,_ thanks to a long need of practice, and of compulsion to\npractise). The castrator formulates a host of new self-preservative\nmeasures for a perfectly definite species of men: in this sense he is\na realist. The _means_ to which he has recourse for establishing his\nlegislation, are the same as those of ancient legislators: he appeals\nto all authorities, to \"God,\" and he exploits the notions \"guilt and\npunishment\"--that is to say, he avails himself of the whole of the\nolder ideal, but interprets it differently; for instance: punishment is\ngiven a place in the inner self (it is called the pang of conscience).\n\nIn practice this kind of man _meets with his end_ the moment the\nexceptional conditions favouring his existence cease to prevail--a sort\nof insular happiness, like that of Tahiti, and of the little Jews in\nthe Roman provinces. Their only _natural_ foe is the soil from which\nthey spring: they must wage war against that, and once more give their\n_offensive_ and _defensive_ passions rope in order to be equal to\nit: their opponents are the adherents of the old ideal (this kind of\nhostility is shown on a grand scale by Paul in relation to Judaism, and\nby Luther in relation to the priestly ascetic ideal). The mildest form\nof this antagonism is certainly that of the first Buddhists; perhaps\nnothing has given rise to so much work, as the enfeeblement and\ndiscouragement of the feeling of _antagonism._ The struggle against\nresentment almost seems the Buddhist's first duty; thus only is his\n_peace_ of soul secured. To isolate oneself without bitterness, this\npresupposes the existence of a surprisingly mild and sweet order of\nmen,--saints....\n\n***\n\nThe _Astuteness of moral castration._--How is war waged against\nthe virile passions and valuations? No violent physical means are\navailable; the war must therefore be one of ruses, spells, and lies--in\nshort, a \"spiritual war.\"\n\nFirst recipe: One appropriates virtue in general, and makes it the main\nfeature of one's ideal; the older ideal is denied and declared to be\n_the reverse of all ideals._ Slander has to be carried to a fine art\nfor this purpose.\n\nSecond recipe: A type of man is set up as a general _standard_; and\nthis is projected into all things, behind all things, and behind the\ndestiny of all things--as God.\n\nThird recipe: The opponents of one's ideal are declared to be the\nopponents of God; one arrogates to oneself a _right_ to great pathos,\nto power, and a right to curse and to bless.\n\nFourth recipe: All suffering, all gruesome, terrible, and fatal things\nare declared to be the results of opposition to _ones_ ideal--all\nsuffering is _punishment_ even in the case of one's adherents (except\nit be a trial, etc.).\n\nFifth recipe: One goes so far as to regard Nature as the reverse of\none's ideal, and the lengthy sojourn amid natural conditions is\nconsidered a great trial of patience--a sort of martyrdom; one studies\ncontempt, both in one's attitudes and one's looks towards all \"natural\nthings.\"\n\nSixth recipe: The triumph of anti-naturalism and ideal castration,\nthe triumph of the world of the pure, good, sinless, and blessed, is\nprojected into the future as the consummation, the finale, the great\nhope, and the \"Coming of the Kingdom of God.\"\n\nI hope that one may still be allowed to _laugh_ at this artificial\nhoisting up of a small species of man to the position of an absolute\nstandard of all things?\n\n\n205.\n\nWhat I do not at all like in Jesus of Nazareth and His Apostle Paul,\nis that they _stuffed so much into the heads of paltry people,_ as\nif their modest virtues were worth so much ado. We have had to pay\ndearly for it all; for they brought the most valuable qualities of both\nvirtue and man into ill repute; they set the guilty conscience and the\nself-respect of noble souls at loggerheads, and they led the _braver,\nmore magnanimous, more daring, and more excessive_ tendencies of strong\nsouls astray--even to self-destruction.\n\n\n206.\n\nIn the New Testament, and especially in the Gospels, I discern\nabsolutely no sign of a \"_Divine_\" voice: but rather an _indirect\nform_ of the most subterranean fury, both in slander and\ndestructiveness--one of the most dishonest forms of hatred. It lacks\n_all_ knowledge of the qualities of a _higher nature._ It makes an\nimpudent abuse of all kinds of plausibilities, and the whole stock of\nproverbs is used up and foisted upon one in its pages. Was it necessary\nto make a _God_ come in order to appeal to those publicans and to say\nto them, etc. etc.?\n\nNothing could be more vulgar than this struggle with the _Pharisees,_\ncarried on with a host of absurd and unpractical moral pretences; the\nmob, of course, has always been entertained by such feats. Fancy the\nreproach of \"hypocrisy!\" coming from those lips! Nothing could be more\nvulgar than this treatment of one's opponents--a most insidious sign of\nnobility or its _reverse...._\n\n\n207.\n\nPrimitive Christianity is the _abolition_ of the _State_: it prohibits\noaths, military service, courts of justice, self-defence or the defence\nof a community, and denies the difference between fellow-countrymen and\nstrangers, as also the _order of castes._\n\n_Christs example_; He does not withstand those who ill-treat Him; He\ndoes not defend Himself; He does more, He \"offers the left cheek\"\n(to the demand: \"Tell us whether thou be the Christ?\" He replies:\n\"Hereafter shall ye see the Son of man sitting on the right hand of\npower, and coming in the clouds of heaven\"). He forbids His disciples\nto defend Him; He calls attention to the fact that He could get help\nif He wished to, but _will_ not.\n\nChristianity also means the _abolition of society,_ it prizes\neverything that society despises, its very growth takes place among the\noutcasts, the condemned, and the leprous of all kinds, as also among\n\"publicans,\" \"sinners,\" prostitutes, and the most foolish of men (the\n\"fisher folk \"); it despises the rich, the scholarly, the noble, the\nvirtuous, and the \"punctilious.\" ...\n\n\n208.\n\nThe war against the noble and the powerful, as it is waged in the New\nTestament, is reminiscent of Reynard the Fox and his methods: but\n_plus_ the Christian unction and the more absolute refusal to recognise\none's own craftiness.\n\n\n209.\n\nThe Gospel is the announcement that the road to happiness lies open for\nthe lowly and the poor--that all one has to do is to emancipate one's\nself from all institutions, traditions, and the tutelage of the higher\nclasses. Thus Christianity is no more than the _typical teaching of\nSocialists._\n\nProperty, acquisitions, mother-country, status and rank, tribunals,\nthe police, the State, the Church, Education, Art, militarism: all\nthese are so many obstacles in the way of happiness, so many mistakes,\nsnares, and devil's artifices, on which the Gospel passes sentence--all\nthis is typical of socialistic doctrines.\n\nBehind all this there is the outburst, the explosion, of a\nconcentrated loathing of the \"masters,\"--the instinct which discerns\nthe happiness of freedom after such long oppression.... (Mostly a\nsymptom of the fact that the inferior classes have been treated too\nhumanely, that their tongues already taste a joy which is forbidden\nthem.... It is not hunger that provokes revolutions, but the fact that\nthe mob have contracted an appetite _en mangeant...._)\n\n\n210.\n\nLet the _New Testament only be read as a book of seduction_: in it\nvirtue is appropriated, with the idea that public opinion is best\nwon with it,--and as a matter of fact it is a very modest kind of\n_virtue,_ which recognises only the ideal gregarious animal and nothing\nmore (including, of course, the herdsmen): a puny, soft, benevolent,\nhelpful, and gushingly-satisfied kind of virtue which to the outside\nworld is quite devoid of pretensions,--and which separates the \"world\"\nentirely from itself. The _crassest arrogance_ which fancies that the\ndestiny of man turns around it, and it alone, and that on the one side\nthe community of believers represents what is right, and on the other\nthe world represents what is false and eternally to be reproved and\nrejected. The most _imbecile hatred_ of all things in power, which,\nhowever, never goes so far as to touch these things. A kind of _inner\ndetachment_ which, outwardly, leaves everything as it was (servitude\nand slavery; and knowing how to convert _everything_ into a means of\nserving God and virtue).\n\n\n211.\n\nChristianity is possible as the _most private_ form of life; it\npresupposes the existence of a narrow, isolated, and absolutely\nunpolitical society--it belongs to the conventicle. On the other hand,\na \"Christian _State_,\" \"Christian politics,\" are pieces of downright\nimpudence; they are lies, like, for instance, a Christian leadership\nof an army, which in the end regards \"the God of hosts\" as chief of\nthe staff. Even the Papacy has never been able to carry on politics\nin a Christian way...; and when Reformers indulge in politics, as\nLuther did, it is well known that they are just as ardent followers of\nMachiavelli as any other immoralists or tyrants.\n\n\n212.\n\nChristianity is still possible at any moment. It is not bound to any\none of the impudent dogmas that have adorned themselves with its name:\nit needs neither the teaching of the _personal God,_ nor of _sin,_\nnor of _immortality,_ nor of _redemption,_ nor of _faith_; it has\nabsolutely no need whatever of metaphysics, and it needs asceticism and\nChristian \"natural science\" still less. Christianity is a _method of\nlife,_ not a system of belief. It tells us how we should behave, not\nwhat we should believe.\n\nHe who says to-day: \"I refuse to be a soldier,\" \"I care not for\ntribunals,\" \"I lay no claim to the services of the police,\" \"I will\nnot do anything that disturbs the peace within me: and if I must\nsuffer on that account, nothing can so well maintain my inward peace as\nsuffering\"--such a man would be a Christian.\n\n\n213.\n\n_Concerning the history of Christianity._--Continual change of\nenvironment: Christian teaching is thus continually changing its\n_centre of gravity._ The favouring of _low_ and _paltry_ people....\nThe development of _Caritas...._ The type \"Christian\" gradually\nadopts everything that it originally rejected (_and in the rejection\nof which it asserted its right to exist_). The Christian becomes a\ncitizen, a soldier, a judge, a workman, a merchant, a scholar, a\ntheologian, a priest, a philosopher, a farmer, an artist, a patriot,\na politician, a prince ... he re-enters all those _departments of\nactive life_ which he had forsworn (he defends himself, he establishes\ntribunals, he punishes, he swears, he differentiates between people\nand people, he contemns, and he shows anger). The whole life of the\nChristian is ultimately exactly that life _from which Christ preached\ndeliverance...._ The Church is just as much a factor in the _triumph_\nof the Antichrist, as the modern State and modern Nationalism.... The\nChurch is the barbarisation of Christianity.\n\n\n214.\n\nAmong the powers that have mastered _Christianity_ are: Judaism\n(_Paul_); Platonism (Augustine); The cult of mystery (the teaching of\nsalvation, the emblem of the \"cross\"); Asceticism (hostility towards\n\"Nature,\" \"Reason,\" the \"senses,\"--the Orient ...).\n\n\n215.\n\nChristianity is a denaturalisation of gregarious morality: under the\npower of the most complete misapprehensions and self-deceptions.\nDemocracy is a more natural form of it, and less sown with falsehood.\nIt is a fact that the oppressed, the low, and whole mob of slaves and\nhalf-castes, _will prevail._\n\nFirst step: they make themselves free--they detach themselves, at\nfirst in fancy only; they recognise each other; they make themselves\nparamount.\n\nSecond step: they enter the lists, they demand acknowledgment, equal\nrights, \"Justice.\"\n\nThird step: they demand privileges (they draw the representatives of\npower over to their side).\n\nFourth step: they _alone_ want all power, and they _have_ it.\n\nThere are _three elements_ in Christianity which must be distinguished:\n_(a)_ the oppressed of all kinds, _(b)_ the mediocre of all kinds,\n_(c)_ the dissatisfied and diseased of all kinds. The _first_ struggle\nagainst the politically noble and their ideal; the second contend with\nthe exceptions and those who are in any way privileged (mentally or\nphysically); the third oppose the _natural instinct_ of the happy and\nthe sound.\n\nWhenever a triumph is achieved, the second element steps to the fore;\nfor then Christianity has won over the sound and happy to its side\n(as warriors in its cause), likewise the powerful (interested to this\nextent in the conquest of the crowd)--and now it is the _gregarious\ninstinct,_ that _mediocre nature_ which is valuable in every respect,\nthat now gets its highest sanction through Christianity. This mediocre\nnature ultimately becomes so conscious of itself (gains such courage\nin regard to its own opinions), that it arrogates to itself even\n_political power_....\n\nDemocracy is Christianity _made natural_: a sort of \"return to Nature,\"\nonce Christianity, owing to extreme anti-naturalness, might have been\novercome by the opposite valuation. Result: the aristocratic ideal\nbegins to _lose its natural character_ (\"the higher man,\" \"noble,\"\n\"artist,\" \"passion,\" \"knowledge\"; Romanticism as the cult of the\nexceptional, genius, etc. etc.).\n\n\n216.\n\n_When the \"masters\" may also become Christians._--It is of the nature\nof a _community_ (race, family, herd, tribe) to regard all those\nconditions and aspirations which favour its survival, as in themselves\n_valuable_; for instance: obedience, mutual assistance, respect,\nmoderation, pity--as also, to _suppress_ everything that happens to\nstand in the way of the above.\n\nIt is likewise of the nature of the _rulers_ (whether they are\nindividuals or classes) to patronise and applaud those virtues which\nmake their subjects _amenable_ and _submissive_--conditions and\npassions which may be utterly different from their own.\n\nThe _gregarious instinct_ and the _instinct of the rulers_ sometimes\n_agree_ in approving of a certain number of qualities and\nconditions,--but for different reasons: the first do so out of direct\negoism, the second out of indirect egoism.\n\n_The submission to Christianity on the part of master races_ is\nessentially the result of the conviction that Christianity is a\n_religion for the herd,_ that it teaches obedience: in short, that\nChristians are more easily ruled than non-Christians. With a hint of\nthis nature, the Pope, even nowadays, recommends Christian propaganda\nto the ruling Sovereign of China.\n\nIt should also be added that the seductive power of the Christian ideal\nworks most strongly upon natures that love danger, adventure, and\ncontrasts; that love everything _that entails a risk,_ and wherewith a\n_non plus ultra_ of powerful feeling may be attained. In this respect,\none has only to think of Saint Theresa, surrounded by the heroic\ninstincts of her brothers:--Christianity appears in those circumstances\nas a dissipation of the will, as strength of will, as a will that is\nQuixotic.\n\n\n\n3. CHRISTIAN IDEALS.\n\n\n217.\n\nWar against the _Christian ideal,_ against the doctrine of\n\"blessedness\" and \"salvation\" as the aims of life, against the\nsupremacy of the fools, of the pure in heart, of the suffering and of\nthe botched!\n\nWhen and where has any man, _of any note at all,_ resembled the\nChristian ideal?--at least in the eyes of those who are psychologists\nand triers of the heart and reins. Look at all Plutarch's heroes!\n\n\n218.\n\n_Our claim to superiority_: we live in an age of _Comparisons_; we\nare able to calculate as men have never yet calculated; in every way\nwe are history become self-conscious. We enjoy things in a different\nway; we suffer in a different way: our instinctive activity is the\ncomparison of an enormous variety of things. We understand everything;\nwe experience everything, we no longer have a hostile feeling left\nwithin us. However disastrous the results may be to ourselves, our\nplunging and almost lustful inquisitiveness, attacks, unabashed, the\nmost dangerous of subjects....\n\n\"Everything is good\"--it gives us pain to say \"nay\" to anything. We\nsuffer when we feel that we are sufficiently foolish to make a definite\nstand against anything.... At bottom, it is we scholars who to-day are\nfulfilling Christ's teaching most thoroughly.\n\n\n219.\n\nWe cannot suppress a certain irony when we contemplate those who think\nthey have overcome Christianity by means of modern natural science.\nChristian values are by no means overcome by such people. \"Christ on\nthe cross\" is still the most sublime symbol--even now....\n\n\n220.\n\nThe two great Nihilistic movements are: _(a)_ Buddhism, _(b)_\nChristianity. The latter has only just about reached a state of\nculture in which it can fulfil its original object,--it has found its\n_level,_--and now it can manifest itself _without disguise_.....\n\n\n221.\n\nWe have _re-established_ the Christian ideal, it now only remains _to\ndetermine_ its value.\n\n(1) Which values does it _deny_? What does _the ideal that opposes it_\nstand for?--Pride, pathos of distance, great responsibility, exuberant\nspirits, splendid animalism, the instincts of war and of conquest;\nthe deification of passion, revenge, cunning, anger, voluptuousness,\nadventure, knowledge--the _noble ideal_ is denied: the beauty, wisdom,\npower, pomp, and awfulness of the type man: the man who postulates\naims, the \"future\" man (here Christianity presents itself as the\n_logical result_ of _Judaism_).\n\n(2) _Can it be realised?_--Yes, of course, when the climatic conditions\nare favourable--as in the case of the Indian ideal. Both neglect the\nfactor _work._--It separates a creature from a people, a state, a\ncivilised community, and jurisdiction; it rejects education, wisdom,\nthe cultivation of good manners, acquisition and commerce; it cuts\nadrift everything which is of use and value to men--by means of an\nidiosyncrasy of sentiment it _isolates_ a man. It is non-political,\nanti-national, neither aggressive nor defensive,--and only possible\nwithin a strictly-ordered State or state of society, which allows these\n_holy parasites_ to flourish at the cost of their neighbours.....\n\n(3) It has now become the will to be _happy_--and nothing else!\n\"Blessedness\" stands for something self-evident, that no longer\nrequires any justification--everything else (the way to live and let\nlive) is only a means to an end....\n\nBut what follows is the result of a _low order of thought,_ the fear of\npain, of defilement, of corruption, is great enough to provide ample\ngrounds for allowing everything to go to the dogs.... This is a _poor_\nway of thinking, and is the sign of an exhausted race; we _must_ not\nallow ourselves to be deceived. (\"Become as little children.\" Natures\n_of the same order_: Francis of Assisi, neurotic, epileptic, visionary,\nlike Jesus.)\n\n\n222.\n\nThe _higher_ man distinguishes himself from the _lower_ by his\nfearlessness and his readiness to challenge misfortune: it is a\nsign of _degeneration_ when eudemonistic values begin to prevail\n(physiological fatigue and enfeeblement of will-power). Christianity,\nwith its prospect of \"blessedness,\" is the typical attitude of mind of\na suffering and impoverished species of man. Abundant strength will be\nactive, will suffer, and will go under: to it the bigotry of Christian\nsalvation is bad music and hieratic posing and vexation.\n\n\n223.\n\n_Poverty, humility, and chastity_ are dangerous and slanderous ideals;\nbut like poisons, which are useful cures in the case of certain\ndiseases, they were also necessary in the time of the Roman Empire.\n\nAll ideals are dangerous: because they lower and brand realities; they\nare all poisons, but occasionally indispensable as cures.\n\n\n224.\n\nGod created man, happy, idle, innocent, and immortal: our actual life\nis a false, decadent, and sinful existence, a punishment.... Suffering,\nstruggle, work, and death are raised as objections against life, they\nmake life questionable, unnatural--something that must cease, and for\nwhich one not only requires but also _has_--remedies!\n\nSince the time of Adam, man has been in an abnormal state: God\nHimself delivered up His Son for Adam's sin, in order to put an end\nto the abnormal condition of things: the natural character of life\nis a _curse_; to those who believe in Him, Christ restores normal\nlife: He makes them happy, idle, and innocent. But the world did not\nbecome fruitful without labour; women do not bear children without\npain; illness has not ceased: believers are served just as badly as\nunbelievers in this respect. All that has happened is, that man is\ndelivered from _death_ and _sin--_two assertions which allow of no\nverification, and which are therefore emphasised by the Church with\nmore than usual heartiness. \"He is free from sin,\"--not owing to\nhis own efforts, not owing to a vigorous struggle on his part, but\n_redeemed by the death of the Saviour,_--consequently, perfectly\ninnocent and paradisaical.\n\n_Actual_ life is nothing more than an illusion (that is to say, a\ndeception, an insanity). The whole of struggling, fighting, and\nreal existence--so full of light and shade, is only bad and false:\neverybody's duty is to be _delivered_ from it.\n\n\"Man, innocent, idle, immortal, and happy\"--this concept, which is\nthe object of the \"most supreme desires,\" must be criticised before\nanything else. Why should guilt, work, death, and pain (_and,_ from\nthe Christian point of view, also _knowledge_ ...) be _contrary_ to\nall supreme desires?--The lazy Christian notions: \"blessedness,\"\n\"innocence,\" \"immortality.\"\n\n\n225.\n\nThe eccentric concept \"holiness\" does not exist--\"God\" and \"man\" have\nnot been divorced from each other. \"Miracles\" do not exist--such\nspheres do not exist: the only one to be considered is the\n\"intellectual\" (that is to say, the symbolically-psychological). As\ndecadence: a counterpart to \"Epicureanism.\" ... Paradise according to\nGreek notions was only \"Epicurus' Garden.\"\n\nA life of this sort lacks a purpose: it _strives after_ nothing;--a\nform of the \"Epicurean gods\"--there is no longer any reason to aim at\nanything,--not even at having children:--everything has been done.\n\n\n226.\n\nThey despised the body: they did not reckon with it: nay, more--they\ntreated it as an enemy. It was their delirium to think that a man\ncould carry a \"beautiful soul\" about in a body that was a cadaverous\nabortion.... In order to inoculate others with this insanity they\nhad to present the concept \"beautiful soul\" in a different way, and\nto transvalue the natural value, until, at last, a pale, sickly,\nidiotically exalted creature, something angelic, some extreme\nperfection and transfiguration was declared to be the higher man.\n\n\n227.\n\nIgnorance in matters psychological.--The Christian has no nervous\nsystem;--contempt for, and deliberate and wilful turning away from, the\ndemands of the body, and the _naked_ body; it is assumed that all this\nis in keeping with man's nature, and _must perforce work the ultimate\ngood of the soul_;--all functions of the body are systematically\nreduced to moral values; illness itself is regarded as determined by\nmorality, it is held to be the result of sin, or it is a trial or a\nstate of salvation, through which man becomes more perfect than he\ncould become in a state of health (Pascal's idea); under certain\ncircumstances, there are wilful attempts at inducing illness.\n\n\n228.\n\nWhat in sooth is this struggle \"against Nature\" on the part of the\nChristian? We shall not, of course, let ourselves be deceived by\nhis words and explanations. It is Nature against something which is\nalso Nature. With many, it is fear; with others, it is loathing;\nwith yet others, it is the sign of a certain intellectuality, the\nlove of a bloodless and passionless ideal; and in the case of the\nmost superior men, it is love of an abstract Nature--these try to\nlive up to their ideal. It is easily understood that humiliation in\nthe place of self-esteem, anxious cautiousness towards the passions,\nemancipation from the usual duties (whereby, a higher notion of rank is\ncreated), the incitement to constant war on behalf of enormous issues,\nhabituation to effusiveness of feelings--all this goes to constitute\na type: in such a type the _hypersensitiveness_ of a perishing body\npreponderates; but the nervousness and the inspirations it engenders\nare _interpreted_ differently. The _taste_ of this kind of creature\ntends either (1) to subtilise, (2) to indulge in bombastic eloquence,\nor (3) to go in for extreme feelings. The natural inclinations _do_\nget satisfied, but they are interpreted in a new way; for instance,\nas \"justification before God,\" \"the feeling of redemption through\ngrace,\" every undeniable _feeling of pleasure_ becomes (interpreted\nin this way!) pride, voluptuousness, etc. General problem: what will\nbecome of the man who slanders and practically denies and belittles\nwhat is natural? As a matter of fact, the Christian is an example of\nexaggerated self-control: in order to tame his passions, he seems to\nfind it necessary to extirpate or crucify them.\n\n\n229.\n\nMan did not know himself physiologically throughout the ages his\nhistory covers; he does not even know himself now. The knowledge, for\ninstance, that man has a nervous system (but no \"soul\") is still the\nprivilege of the most educated people. But man is not satisfied, in\nthis respect, to say he does not know. A man must be very superior to\nbe able to say: \"I do not know this,\"--that is to say, to be able to\nadmit his ignorance.\n\nSuppose he is in pain or in a good mood, he never questions that he\ncan find the reason of either condition if only he seeks.... In truth,\nhe cannot find the reason; for he does not even suspect where it\nlies.... What happens?... He takes the _result_ of his condition for\nits _cause_; for instance, if he should undertake some work (really\nundertaken because his good mood gave him the courage to do so) and\ncarry it through successfully: behold, the work itself is the _reason_\nof his good mood.... As a matter of fact, his success was determined by\nthe same cause as that which brought about his good mood--that is to\nsay, the happy co-ordination of physiological powers and functions.\n\nHe feels bad: _consequently_ he cannot overcome a care, a scruple,\nor an attitude of self-criticism.... He really fancies that his\ndisagreeable condition is the result of his scruple, of his \"sin,\" or\nof his \"self-criticism.\"\n\nBut after profound exhaustion and prostration, a state of recovery sets\nin. \"How is it possible that I can feel so free, so happy? It is a\nmiracle; only a God could have effected this change.\"--Conclusion: \"He\nhas forgiven my sin.\" ...\n\nFrom this follow certain practices: in order to provoke feelings of\nsinfulness and to prepare the way for crushed spirits it is necessary\nto induce a condition of morbidity and nervousness in the body. The\nmethods of doing this are well known. Of course, nobody suspects\nthe causal logic of the fact: the _maceration_ of the _flesh_ is\ninterpreted religiously, it seems like an end in itself, whereas it\nis no more than a _means_ of bringing about that morbid state of\nindigestion which is known as repentance (the \"fixed idea\" of sin, the\nhypnotising of the hen by-means of the chalk-line \"sin\").\n\nThe mishandling of the body prepares the ground for the required range\nof \"guilty feelings\"--that is to say, for that general state of pain\nwhich _demands an explanation...._\n\nOn the other hand, the _method_ of \"salvation\" may also develop\nfrom the above: every dissipation of the feelings, whether prayers,\nmovements, attitudes, or oaths, has been provoked, and exhaustion\nfollows; very often it is acute, or it appears in the form of\nepilepsy. And behind this condition of deep somnolence there come signs\nof recovery--or, in religious parlance, \"Salvation.\"\n\n\n230.\n\nFormerly, the conditions and results of _physiological exhaustion_ were\nconsidered more important than healthy conditions and their results,\nand this was owing to the suddenness, fearfulness, and mysteriousness\nof the former. Men were terrified by themselves, and postulated the\nexistence of a _higher_ world. People have ascribed the origin of the\nidea of two worlds--one this side of the grave and the other beyond\nit--to sleep and dreams, to shadows, to night, and to the fear of\nNature: but the symptoms of physiological exhaustion should, above all,\nhave been considered.\n\nAncient religions have quite special methods of disciplining the\npious into states of exhaustion, in which they _must_ experience such\nthings.... The idea was, that one entered into a new order of things,\nwhere everything ceases to be known.--The _semblance_ of a higher\npower....\n\n231.\n\nSleep is the result of every kind of exhaustion; exhaustion follows\nupon all excessive excitement....\n\nIn all pessimistic religions and philosophies there is a yearning for\nsleep; the very notion \"sleep\" is deified and worshipped.\n\nIn this case the exhaustion is racial; sleep regarded psychologically\nis only a symbol of a much deeper and longer _compulsion to rest....\nIn praxi_ it is death which rules here in the seductive image of its\nbrother sleep....\n\n\n232.\n\nThe whole of the Christian training in repentance and redemption may\nbe regarded as a _folie circulaire_ arbitrarily produced; though,\nof course, it can be produced only in people who are predisposed to\nit--that is to say, who have morbid tendencies in their constitutions.\n\n\n233.\n\n_Against remorse and its purely psychical treatment._--To be unable\nto have done with an experience is already a sign of decadence.\nThis reopening of old wounds, this wallowing in self-contempt and\ndepression, is an additional form of disease; no \"salvation of the\nsoul\" ever results from it, but only a new kind of spiritual illness....\n\nThese \"conditions of salvation\" of which the Christian is conscious are\nmerely variations of the same diseased state--the interpretation of an\nattack of epilepsy by means of a particular formula which is provided,\n_not_ by science, but by religious mania.\n\nWhen a man is ill his very _goodness_ is sickly.... By far the\ngreatest portion of the psychical apparatus which Christianity has\nused, is now classed among the various forms of hysteria and epilepsy.\n\nThe whole process of spiritual healing must be remodelled on a\nphysiological basis: the \"sting of conscience\" as such is an obstacle\nin the way of recovery--as soon as possible the attempt must be made\nto counterbalance everything by means of new actions, so that there\nmay be an escape from the morbidness of _self-torture...._ The purely\npsychical practices of the Church and of the various sects should be\ndecried as dangerous to the health. No invalid is ever cured by prayers\nor by the exorcising of evil spirits: the states of \"repose\" which\nfollow upon such methods of treatment, by no means inspire confidence,\nin the psychological sense....\n\nA man is _healthy_ when he can laugh at the seriousness and ardour with\nwhich he has allowed himself to be _hypnotised_ to any extent by any\ndetail in his life--when his remorse seems to him like the action of a\ndog biting a stone--when he is ashamed of his repentance.\n\nThe purely psychological and religious practices, which have existed\nhitherto, only led to an _alteration in the symptoms_: according to\nthem a man had recovered when he bowed before the cross, and swore\nthat in future he would be a good man.... But a criminal, who, with\na certain gloomy seriousness cleaves to his fate and refuses to\nmalign his deed once it is done, has more _spiritual health...._\nThe criminals with whom Dostoiewsky associated in prison, were all,\nwithout exception, unbroken natures,--are they not a hundred times more\nvaluable than a \"broken-spirited\" Christian?\n\n(For the treatment of pangs of conscience I recommend Mitchell's\nTreatment.[2])\n\n\n[Footnote 2: TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.--In _The New Sydenham Society's Lexicon\nof Medicine and the Allied Sciences,_ the following description of\nMitchell's treatment is to be found: \"A method of treating cases of\nneurasthenia and hysteria ... by removal from home, rest in bed,\nmassage twice a day, electrical excitation of the muscles, and\nexcessive feeding, at first with milk.\"]\n\n\n234.\n\nA _pang of conscience_ in a man is a sign that his character is not\nyet equal to his _deed._ There is such a thing as a pang of conscience\nafter _good deeds_: in this case it is their unfamiliarity, their\nincompatibility with an old environment.\n\n\n235.\n\n_Against remorse._--I do not like this form of cowardice in regard to\none's own actions, one must not leave one's self in the lurch under\nthe pressure of sudden shame or distress. Extreme pride is much more\nfitting here. What is the good of it all in the end! No deed gets\nundone because it is regretted, no more than because it is \"forgiven\"\nor \"expiated.\" A man must be a theologian in order to believe in\na power that erases faults: we immoralists prefer to disbelieve\nin \"faults.\" We believe that all deeds, of what kind soever, are\nidentically the same at root; just as deeds which turn _against_ us\nmay be useful from an economical point of view, and even _generally\ndesirable._ In certain individual cases, we admit that we might well\nhave been _spared_ a given action; the circumstances alone predisposed\nus in its favour. Which of us, if _favoured_ by circumstances, would\nnot already have committed every possible crime?... That is why one\nshould never say: \"Thou shouldst never have done such and such a\nthing,\" but only: \"How strange it is that I have not done such and\nsuch a thing hundreds of times already!\"--As a matter of fact, only\na very small number of acts are _typical_ acts and real epitomes of\na personality, and seeing what a small number of people really are\npersonalities, a single act very rarely _characterises_ a man. Acts\nare mostly dictated by circumstances; they are superficial or merely\nreflex movements performed in response to a stimulus, long before the\ndepths of our beings are affected or consulted in the matter. A fit of\ntemper, a gesture, a blow with a knife: how little of the individual\nresides in these acts!--A deed very often brings a sort of stupor or\nfeeling of constraint in its wake: so that the agent feels almost\nspellbound at its recollection, or as though he _belonged to it,_\nand were not an independent creature. This mental disorder, which is\na form of hypnotism, must be resisted at all costs: surely a single\ndeed, whatever it be, when it is compared with all one has done, is\n_nothing,_ and may be deducted from the sum without making the account\nwrong. The unfair interest which society manifests in controlling the\nwhole of our lives in one direction, as though the very purpose of its\nexistence were to cultivate a certain individual act, should not infect\nthe man of action: but unfortunately this happens almost continually.\nThe reason of this is, that every deed, if followed by unexpected\nconsequences, leads to a certain mental disturbance, no matter whether\nthe consequences be good or bad. Behold a lover who has been given a\npromise, or a poet while he is receiving applause from an audience:\nas far as _intellectual torpor_ is concerned, these men are in no way\ndifferent from the anarchist who is suddenly confronted by a detective\nbearing a search warrant.\n\nThere are some acts which are _unworthy_ of us: acts which, if they\nwere regarded as typical, would set us down as belonging to a lower\nclass of man. The one fault that has to be avoided here, is to regard\nthem as typical. There is another kind of act of which _we_ are\nunworthy: exceptional acts, born of a particular abundance of happiness\nand health; they are the highest waves of our spring tides, driven to\nan unusual height by a storm--an accident: such acts and \"deeds\" are\nalso not typical. An artist should never be judged according to the\nmeasure of his works.\n\n\n236.\n\nA. In proportion as Christianity seems necessary to-day, man is still\nwild and fatal....\n\nB. In another sense, it is not necessary, but extremely dangerous,\nthough it is captivating and seductive, because it corresponds with\nthe _morbid_ character of whole classes and types of modern humanity,\n... they simply follow their inclinations when they aspire to\nChristianity--they are decadents of all kinds.\n\nA and B must be kept very sharply apart. In the _case of A,_\nChristianity is a cure, or at least a taming process (under certain\ncircumstances it serves the purpose of making people ill: and this is\nsometimes useful as a means of subduing savage and brutal natures).\nIn the _case of B,_ it is a symptom of illness itself, it renders the\nstate of decadence _more acute_; in this case it stands opposed to\na _corroborating_ system of treatment, it is the invalid's instinct\nstanding _against_ that which would be most salutary to him.\n\n\n237.\n\nOn one side there are the _serious,_ the _dignified,_ and _reflective_\npeople: and on the other the barbarous, the unclean, and the\nirresponsible beasts: it is merely a question of _taming animals_--and\nin this case the tamer must be hard, terrible, and awe-inspiring, at\nleast to his beasts.\n\nAll essential requirements must be imposed upon the unruly creatures\nwith almost brutal distinctness--that is to say, magnified a thousand\ntimes.\n\nEven the fulfilment of the requirement must be presented in the\ncoarsest way possible, so that it may command respect, as in the case\nof the spiritualisation of the Brahmins. _The struggle with the rabble\nand the herd._ If any degree of tameness and order has been reached,\nthe chasm separating these _purified_ and _regenerated_ people from the\nterrible _remainder_ must have been bridged....\n\nThis chasm is a means of increasing self-respect in higher castes,\nand of confirming their belief in _that_ which they represent--hence\nthe _Chandala._ Contempt and its excess are perfectly correct\npsychologically--that is to say, magnified a hundred times, so that it\nmay at least be felt.\n\n\n238.\n\nThe struggle against _brutal_ instincts is quite different from\nthe struggle against _morbid_ instincts; it may even be a means\nof overcoming brutality by making the brutes _ill._ The psychical\ntreatment practised by Christianity is often nothing more than the\nprocess of converting a brute into a sick and _therefore_ tame animal.\n\nThe struggle against raw and savage natures must be a struggle with\nweapons which are able to affect such natures: _superstitions_ and such\nmeans are therefore indispensable and essential.\n\n239.\n\nOur age, in a certain sense, is _mature_ (that is to say, decadent),\njust as Buddha's was.... That is why a sort of Christianity is possible\nwithout all the absurd dogmas (the most repulsive offshoots of ancient\nhybridism).\n\n\n240.\n\nSupposing it were impossible to disprove Christianity, Pascal thinks,\nin view of the _terrible_ possibility that it may be true, that it is\nin the highest degree prudent to be a Christian. As a proof of how\nmuch Christianity has lost of its terrible nature, to-day we find that\nother attempt to justify it, which consists in asserting, that even if\nit were a mistake, it nevertheless provides the greatest advantages\nand pleasures for its adherents throughout their lives:--it therefore\nseems that this belief should be upheld owing to the peace and quiet\nit ensures--not owing to the terror of a threatening possibility, but\nrather out of fear of a life that has lost its charm. This hedonistic\nturn of thought, which uses happiness as a proof, is a symptom of\ndecline: it takes the place of the proof resulting from power or from\nthat which to the Christian mind is most terrible--namely, _fear._ With\nthis new interpretation, Christianity is, as a matter of fact, nearing\nits stage of exhaustion. People are satisfied with a Christianity which\nis an _opiate,_ because they no longer have the strength to seek, to\nstruggle, to dare, to stand alone, nor to take up Pascal's position and\nto share that gloomily brooding self-contempt, that belief in human\nunworthiness, and that anxiety which believes that it \"may be damned.\"\nBut a Christianity the chief object of which is to soothe diseased\nnerves, does _not require_ the terrible solution consisting of a \"God\non the cross\"; that is why Buddhism is secretly gaining ground all\nover Europe.\n\n\n241.\n\nThe humour of European culture: people regard one thing as true, but do\n_the other._ For instance, what is the use of all the art of reading\nand criticising, if the ecclesiastical interpretation of the Bible,\nwhether according to Catholics or Protestants, is still upheld!\n\n\n242.\n\nNo one is sufficiently aware of the barbarity of the notions among\nwhich we Europeans still live. To think that men have been able to\nbelieve that the \"Salvation of the soul\" depended upon a book!... And I\nam told that this is still believed.\n\nWhat is the good of all scientific education, all criticism and all\nhermeneutics, if such nonsense as the Church's interpretation of the\nBible has not yet turned the colours of our bodies permanently into the\nred of shame?\n\n\n243.\n\n_Subject for reflection_: To what extent does the fatal belief in\n\"Divine Providence\"--the most _paralysing_ belief for both the hand\nand the understanding that has ever existed--continue to prevail;\nto what extent have the Christian hypothesis and interpretation of\nLife continued their lives under the cover of terms like \"Nature,\"\n\"Progress,\" \"perfectionment,\" \"Darwinism,\" or beneath the superstition\nthat there is a certain relation between happiness and virtue,\nunhappiness and sin? That absurd _belief_ in the course of things, in\n\"Life\" and in the \"instinct of Life\"; that foolish _resignation_ which\narises from the notion that if only every one did his duty _all_ would\ngo well--all this sort of thing can only have a meaning if one assumes\nthat there is a direction of things _sub specie boni._ Even _fatalism,_\nour present form of philosophical sensibility, is the result of a\n_long_ belief in Divine Providence, an unconscious result: as though it\nwere nothing to do with us how everything goes! (As though we _might_\nlet things take their own course; the individual being only a _modus_\nof the absolute reality.)\n\n\n244.\n\nIt is the height of psychological falsity on the part of man to imagine\na being according to his own petty standard, who is a beginning, a\n\"thing-in-itself,\" and who appears to him good, wise, mighty, and\nprecious; for thus he suppresses in thoughts _all the causality_\nby means of which every kind of goodness, wisdom, and power comes\ninto existence and has value. In short, elements of the most recent\nand most conditional origin were regarded not as evolved, but as\nspontaneously generated and \"things-in-themselves,\" and perhaps as\nthe cause of all things.... Experience teaches us that, in every case\nin which a man has means elevated the interests of the species above\nthose of the individual. Its real _historical_ effect, its fatal\neffect, remains precisely the _increase of egotism,_ of individual\negotism, to excess (to the extreme which consists in the belief in\nindividual immortality). The individual was made so important and so\nabsolute, by means of Christian values, that he could no longer be\n_sacrificed,_ despite the fact that the species can only be maintained\nby human sacrifices. All \"souls\" became _equal_ before God: but this\nis the most pernicious of all valuations! If one regards individuals\nas equals, the demands of the species are ignored, and a process is\ninitiated which ultimately leads to its ruin. Christianity is the\n_reverse of the_ principle of _selection._ If the degenerate and sick\nman (\"the Christian\") is to be of the same value as the healthy man\n(\"the pagan\"), or if he is even to be valued higher than the latter,\nas Pascal's view of health and sickness would have us value him, the\nnatural course of evolution is thwarted and the _unnatural_ becomes\nlaw.... In practice this general love of mankind is nothing more\nthan deliberately favouring all the suffering, the botched, and the\ndegenerate: it is this love that has reduced and weakened the power,\nresponsibility, and lofty duty of sacrificing men. According to the\nscheme of Christian values, all that remained was the alternative\nof self-sacrifice, but this _vestige_ of human sacrifice, which\nChristianity conceded and even recommended, has no meaning when\nregarded in the light of rearing a whole species. The prosperity of the\nspecies is by no means affected by the sacrifice of one individual\n(whether in the monastic and ascetic manner, or by means of crosses,\nstakes, and scaffolds, as the \"martyrs\" of error). What the species\nrequires is the suppression of the physiologically botched, the\nweak and the degenerate: but it was precisely to these people that\nChristianity appealed as a _preservative_ force, it simply strengthened\nthat natural and very strong instinct of all the weak which bids them\nprotect, maintain, and mutually support each other. What is Christian\n\"virtue\" and \"love of men,\" if not precisely this mutual assistance\nwith a view to survival, this solidarity of the weak, this thwarting of\nselection? What is Christian altruism, if it is not the mob-egotism of\nthe weak which divines that, if everybody looks after everybody else,\nevery individual will be preserved for a longer period of time?... He\nwho does not consider this attitude of mind as _immoral,_ as a crime\nagainst life, himself belongs to the sickly crowd, and also shares\ntheir instincts.... Genuine love of mankind exacts sacrifice for\nthe good of the species--it is hard, full of self-control, because\nit needs human sacrifices. And this pseudo-humanity which is called\nChristianity, would fain establish the rule that nobody should be\nsacrificed.\n\n\n247.\n\nNothing could be more useful and deserves more promotion than\nsystematic _Nihilism in action._--As I understand the phenomena of\nChristianity and pessimism, this is what they say: \"We are ripe for\nnonentity, for us it is reasonable not to be.\" This hint from \"reason\"\nin this case, is simply the voice of _selective Nature._\n\nOn the other hand, what deserves the most rigorous condemnation, is\nthe ambiguous and cowardly infirmity of purpose of a religion like\n_Christianity,_--or rather like the _Church,_--which, instead of\nrecommending death and self-destruction, actually protects all the\nbotched and bungled, and encourages them to propagate their kind.\n\nProblem: with what kind of means could one lead up to a severe form of\nreally contagious Nihilism--a Nihilism which would teach and practise\nvoluntary death with scientific conscientiousness (and not the feeble\ncontinuation of a vegetative sort of life with false hopes of a life\nafter death)?\n\nChristianity cannot be sufficiently condemned for having depreciated\nthe _value_ of a great _cleansing_ Nihilistic movement (like the one\nwhich was probably in the process of formation), by its teaching of\nthe immortality of the private individual, as also by the hopes of\nresurrection which it held out: that is to say, by dissuading people\nfrom performing the _deed of Nihilism_ which is suicide.... In the\nlatter's place it puts lingering suicide, and gradually a puny, meagre,\nbut durable life; gradually a perfectly ordinary, bourgeois, mediocre\nlife, etc.\n\n\n248.\n\n_Christian moral quackery._--Pity and contempt succeed each other at\nshort intervals, and at the sight of them I feel as indignant as if I\nwere in the presence of the most despicable crime. Here error is made\na duty--a virtue, misapprehension has become a knack, the destructive\ninstinct is systematised under the name of \"redemption\"; here every\noperation becomes a wound, an amputation of those very organs whose\nenergy would be the prerequisite to a return of health. And in the\nbest of cases no cure is effected; all that is done is to exchange one\nset of evil symptoms for another set.... And this pernicious nonsense,\nthis systematised profanation and castration of life, passes for\nholy and sacred; to be in its service, to be an instrument of this\nart of healing--that is to say, to be a priest, is to be rendered\ndistinguished, reverent, holy, and sacred. God alone could have been\nthe Author of this supreme art of healing; redemption is only possible\nas a revelation, as an act of grace, as an unearned gift, made by the\nCreator Himself.\n\nProposition I.: Spiritual healthiness is regarded as morbid, and\ncreates suspicion....\n\nProposition II.: The prerequisites of a strong, exuberant life--strong\ndesires and passions--are reckoned as objections against strong and\nexuberant life.\n\nProposition III.: Everything which threatens danger to man, and which\ncan overcome and ruin him, is evil--and should be torn root and branch\nfrom his soul.\n\nProposition IV.: Man converted into a weak creature, inoffensive to\nhimself and others, crushed by humility and modesty, and conscious of\nhis weakness,--in fact, the \"sinner,\"--this is the desirable type, and\none which one can _produce_ by means of a little spiritual surgery....\n\n\n249.\n\nWhat is it I protest against? That people should regard this paltry and\npeaceful mediocrity, this spiritual equilibrium which knows nothing\nof the fine impulses of great accumulations of strength, as something\nhigh, or possibly as the standard of all things.\n\n_Bacon of Verulam_ says: _Infimarum virtutum apud vulgus laus est,\nmediarum admiratio, supremarum sensus nullus._ Christianity as a\nreligion, however, belongs to the _vulgus_: it has no feeling for the\nhighest kind of _virtus_.\n\n\n250.\n\nLet us see what the \"genuine Christian\" does of all the things which\nhis instincts forbid him to do:--he covers beauty, pride, riches,\nself-reliance, brilliancy, knowledge, and power with suspicion and\n_mud_--in short, _all culture_: his object is to deprive the latter of\nits _clean conscience._\n\n\n251.\n\nThe attacks made upon Christianity, hitherto, have been not only timid\nbut false. So long as Christian morality was not felt to be a _capital\ncrime against Life,_ its apologists had a good time. The question\nconcerning the mere \"truth\" of Christianity--whether in regard to the\nexistence of its God, or to the legendary history of its origin, not to\nspeak of its astronomy and natural science--is quite beside the point\nso long as no inquiry is made into the value of Christian _morality._\nAre Christian morals _worth anything,_ or are they a profanation and an\noutrage, despite all the arts of holiness and seduction with which they\nare enforced? The question concerning the truth of the religion may be\nmet by all sorts of subterfuges; and the most fervent believers can,\nin the end, avail themselves of the logic used by their opponents, in\norder to create a right for their side to assert that certain things\nare irrefutable--that is to say, they _transcend_ the means employed\nto refute them (nowadays this trick of dialectics is called \"Kantian\nCriticism\").\n\n\n252.\n\nChristianity should never be forgiven for having ruined such men as\nPascal. This is precisely what should be combated in Christianity,\nnamely, that it has the will to break the spirit of the strongest\nand noblest natures. One should take no rest until this thing is\nutterly destroyed:--the ideal of mankind which Christianity advances,\nthe demands it makes upon men, and its \"Nay\" and \"Yea\" relative to\nhumanity. The whole of the remaining absurdities, that is to say,\nChristian fable, Christian cobweb-spinning in ideas and principles,\nand Christian theology, do not concern us; they might be a thousand\ntimes more absurd and we should not raise a finger to destroy them.\nBut what we do stand up against, is that ideal which, thanks to its\nmorbid beauty and feminine seductiveness, thanks to its insidious and\nslanderous eloquence, appeals to all the cowardices and vanities of\nwearied souls,--and the strongest have their moments of fatigue,--as\nthough all that which seems most useful and desirable at such\nmoments--that is to say, confidence, artlessness, modesty, patience,\nlove of one's like, resignation, submission to God, and a sort of\nself-surrender--were useful and desirable _per se_; as though the puny,\nmodest abortion which in these creatures takes the place of a soul,\nthis virtuous, mediocre animal and sheep of the flock--which deigns to\ncall itself man, were not only to take precedence of the stronger, more\nevil, more passionate, more defiant, and more prodigal type of man, who\nby virtue of these very qualities is exposed to a hundred times more\ndangers than the former, but were actually to stand as an ideal for man\nin general, as a goal, a measure--the highest desideratum. The creation\nof _this_ ideal was the most appalling temptation that had ever\nbeen put in the way of mankind; for, with it, the stronger and more\nsuccessful exceptions, the lucky cases among men, in which the will\nto power and to growth leads the whole species \"man\" one step farther\nforward, this type was threatened with disaster. By means of the values\nof this ideal, the growth of such higher men would be checked at the\nroot. For these men, owing to their superior demands and duties,\nreadily accept a more dangerous life (speaking economically, it is a\ncase of an increase in the costs of the undertaking coinciding with\na greater chance of failure). What is it we combat in Christianity?\nThat it aims at destroying the strong, at breaking their spirit, at\nexploiting their moments of weariness and debility, at converting\ntheir proud assurance into anxiety and conscience-trouble; that it\nknows how to poison the noblest instincts and to infect them with\ndisease, until their strength, their will to power, turns inwards,\nagainst themselves--until the strong perish through their excessive\nself-contempt and self-immolation: that gruesome way of perishing, of\nwhich _Pascal_ is the most famous example.\n\n\n\n\nII.\n\n\nA CRITICISM OF MORALITY.\n\n\n1. THE ORIGIN OF MORAL VALUATIONS.\n\n\n253.\n\nThis is an attempt at investigating morality without being affected by\nits charm, and not without some mistrust in regard to the beguiling\nbeauty of its attitudes and looks. A world which we can admire, which\nis in keeping with our capacity for worship--which is continually\n_demonstrating_ itself--in small things or in large: this is the\nChristian standpoint which is common to us all.\n\nBut owing to an increase in our astuteness, in our mistrust, and in our\nscientific spirit (also through a more developed instinct for truth,\nwhich again is due to Christian influence), this interpretation has\ngrown ever less and less tenable for us.\n\nThe craftiest of subterfuges: Kantian criticism. The intellect not\nonly denies itself every right to interpret things in that way, but\nalso to reject the interpretation once it has been made. People are\nsatisfied with a _greater_ demand upon their credulity and faith, with\na renunciation of all right to reason concerning the proof of their\ncreed, with an intangible and superior \"Ideal\" (God) as a stop-gap.\n\nThe Hegelian subterfuge, a continuation of the Platonic, a piece\nof romanticism and reaction, and at the same time a symptom of\nthe historical sense of a new _power_: \"Spirit\" itself is the\n\"self-revealing and self-realising ideal\": we believe that in the\n\"process of, development\" an ever greater proportion of this ideal is\nbeing manifested--thus the ideal is being realised, faith is vested in\nthe _future_ into which all its noble needs are projected and in which\nthey are being worshipped.\n\nIn short:--\n\n(1) God is unknowable to us and not to be demonstrated by us (the\nconcealed meaning behind the whole of the epistemological movement);\n\n(2) God may be demonstrated, but as something evolving, and we are\npart of it, as our pressing desire for an ideal proves (the concealed\nmeaning behind the historical movement).\n\nIt should be observed that criticism is _never_ levelled at the ideal\nitself, but only at the problem which gives rise to a controversy\nconcerning the ideal--that is to say, why it has not yet been realised,\nor why it is not demonstrable in small things as in great.\n\n***\n\nIt makes all the difference: whether a man recognises this state of\ndistress as such owing to a passion or to a yearning in himself, or\nwhether it comes home to him as a problem which he arrives at only by\nstraining his thinking powers and his historical imagination to the\nutmost.\n\nAway from the religious and philosophical points of view we find the\nsame phenomena. Utilitarianism (socialism and democracy) criticises\nthe origin of moral valuations, though it believes in them just as\nmuch as the Christian does. (What guilelessness! As if morality could\nremain when the sanctioning _deity_ is no longer present! The belief in\na \"Beyond\" is absolutely necessary, if the faith in morality is to be\nmaintained.)\n\n_Fundamental problem_: whence comes this almighty power of _Faith?\nWhence this faith in morality?_ (It is betrayed by the fact that even\nthe fundamental conditions of life are falsely interpreted in favour of\nit: despite our knowledge of plants and animals. \"Self-preservation\":\nthe Darwinian prospect of a reconciliation of the altruistic and\negotistic principles.)\n\n\n254.\n\nAn inquiry into the _origin of our moral valuations_ and tables of\nlaw has absolutely nothing to do with the _criticism_ of them, though\npeople persist in believing it has; the two matters lie quite apart,\nnotwithstanding the fact that the knowledge of the _pudenda origo_\nof a valuation does diminish its prestige, and prepares the way to a\ncritical attitude and spirit towards it.\n\nWhat is the actual worth of our valuations and tables of moral laws?\n_What is the outcome of their dominion?_ For whom? In relation to\nwhat?--answer: for Life. But _what is Life?_ A new and more definite\nconcept of what \"Life\" is, becomes necessary here. My formula of this\nconcept is: Life is Will to Power.\n\n_What is the meaning of the very act of valuing?_ Does it point back to\nanother, metaphysical world, or does it point down? (As Kant believed,\nwho lived in a period which _preceded_ the great historical movement.)\nIn short: _what is its origin?_ Or had it no human \"origin\"?--Answer:\nmoral valuations are a sort of explanation, they constitute a method\nof interpreting. Interpretation in itself is a symptom of definite\nphysiological conditions, as also of a definite spiritual level of\nruling judgments. _What is it that interprets?_--Our passions.\n\n\n255\n\nAll virtues should be looked upon as physiological _conditions_: the\nprincipal organic functions, more particularly, should be considered\nnecessary and good. All virtues are really refined _passions_ and\nelevated physiological conditions.\n\nPity and philanthropy may be regarded as the developments of\nsexual relations,--justice as the development of the passion for\nrevenge,--virtue as the love of resistance, the will to power,--honour\nas an acknowledgment of an equal, or of an equally powerful, force.\n\n\n256.\n\nUnder \"Morality\" I understand a system of valuations which is in\nrelation with the conditions of a creature's life.\n\n\n257.\n\nFormerly it was said of every form of morality, \"Ye shall know them by\ntheir fruits.\" I say of every form of morality: \"It is a fruit, and\nfrom it I learn the _Soil_ out of which it grew.\"\n\n\n258.\n\nI have tried to understand all moral judgments as symptoms and a\nlanguage of signs in which the processes of physiological prosperity\nor the reverse, as also the consciousness of the conditions of\npreservation and growth, are betrayed--a mode of interpretation equal\nin worth to astrology, prejudices, created by instincts (peculiar\nto races, communities, and different stages of existence, as, for\ninstance, youth or decay, etc.).\n\nApplying this principle to the morality of Christian Europe more\nparticularly, we find that our moral values are signs of decline, of a\ndisbelief in _Life,_ and of a preparation for pessimism.\n\nMy leading doctrine is this: _there are no moral phenomena, but only a\nmoral interpretation of phenomena. The origin of this interpretation\nitself lies beyond the pale of morality._\n\nWhat is the meaning of the fact that we have imagined a\n_contradiction_ in existence? This is of paramount importance: behind\nall other valuations those moral valuations stand commandingly.\nSupposing they disappear, according to what standard shall we then\nmeasure? And then of what value would knowledge be, etc. etc.???\n\n\n259.\n\nA point of view: in all valuations there is a definite purpose:\nthe _preservation_ of an individual, a community, a race, a state,\na church, a belief, or a culture.--Thanks to the fact that people\n_forget_ that all valuing has a purpose, one and the same man may swarm\nwith a host of contradictory valuations, and _therefore with a host of\ncontradictory impulses._ This is the _expression of disease in man_ as\nopposed to the health of animals, in which all the instincts answer\ncertain definite purposes.\n\nThis creature full of contradictions, however, has in his being a grand\nmethod of acquiring knowledge: he feels the pros and cons, he elevates\nhimself _to Justice_--that is to say, to the ascertaining of principles\n_beyond the valuations good and evil._\n\nThe wisest man would thus be the _richest in contradictions,_ he would\nalso be gifted with mental antenn\u00e6 wherewith he could understand all\nkinds of men; and with it all he would have his great moments, when all\nthe chords in his being would ring in _splendid unison_--the rarest of\n_accidents_ even in us! A sort of planetary movement.\n\n\n260.\n\n\"To will\" is to will an object. But \"object,\" as an idea, involves\na valuation. Whence do valuations originate? Is a permanent norm,\n\"pleasant or painful,\" their basis?\n\nBut in an incalculable number of cases we first of all _make_ a thing\npainful, by investing it with a valuation.\n\nThe compass of moral valuations: they play a part in almost every\nmental impression. To us the world is _coloured_ by them.\n\nWe have imagined the purpose and value of all things: owing to this\nwe possess an enormous fund of _latent power,_ but the study of\n_comparative_ values teaches us that values which were actually opposed\nto each other have been held in high esteem, and that there have been\n_many_ tables of laws (they could not, therefore, have been worth\nanything _per se_).\n\nThe analysis of individual tables of laws revealed the fact that they\nwere framed (often very badly) as the _conditions of existence_ for\nlimited groups of people, to ensure their maintenance.\n\nUpon examining modern men, we found that there are a large number\nof _very different_ values to hand, and that they no longer contain\nany creative power--the fundamental principle: \"the condition of\nexistence\" is now quite divorced from the moral values. It is much\nmore superfluous and not nearly so painful. It becomes an _arbitrary_\nmatter. Chaos.\n\nWho creates _the goal_ which stands above mankind kind and above the\nindividual? Formerly morality was a _preservative_ measure: but nobody\nwants to _preserve_ any longer, there is nothing to preserve. Thus we\nare reduced to an _experimental morality,_ each must _postulate_ a goal\nfor himself.\n\n\n261.\n\nWhat is the _criterion_ of a moral action? (1) Its disinterestedness,\n(2) its universal acceptation, etc. But this is parlour-morality. Races\nmust be studied and observed, and, in each case, the criterion must be\ndiscovered, as also the thing it expresses: a belief such as: \"This\nparticular attitude or behaviour belongs to the principal condition of\nour existence.\" Immoral means \"that which brings about ruin.\" Now all\nsocieties in which these principles were discovered have met with their\nruin: a few of these principles have been used and used again, because\nevery newly established community required them; this was the case, for\ninstance, with \"Thou shalt not steal.\" In ages when people could not be\nexpected to show any marked social instinct (as, for instance, in the\nage of the Roman Empire) the latter was, religiously speaking, directed\ntowards the idea of \"spiritual salvation,\" or, in philosophical\nparlance, towards \"the greatest happiness.\" For even the philosophers\nof Greece did not feel any more for their \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03c2.\n\n\n262.\n\n_The necessity of false values._--A judgment may be refuted when it is\nshown that it was conditioned: but the necessity of retaining it is\nnot thereby cancelled. Reasons can no more eradicate false values than\nthey can alter astigmatism in a man's eyes.\n\nThe need of their _existence_ must be understood: they are the _result_\nof causes which have nothing to do with reasoning.\n\n\n263.\n\nTo _see_ and _reveal_ the problem of morality seems to me to be the new\ntask and the principal thing of all. I deny that this has been done by\nmoral philosophies heretofore.\n\n\n264.\n\nHow false and deceptive men have always been concerning the fundamental\nfacts of their inner world! Here to have no eye; here to hold one's\ntongue, and here to open one's mouth.\n\n\n265.\n\nThere seems to be no knowledge or consciousness of the many\n_revolutions_ that have taken place in moral judgments, and of\nthe number of times that \"evil\" has really and seriously been\nchristened \"good\" and _vice versa._ I myself pointed to one of these\ntransformations with the words \"Sittlichkeit der Sitte.\"[3] Even\nconscience has changed its sphere: formerly there was such a thing as\na gregarious pang of conscience.\n\n\n[Footnote 3: The morality of custom.]\n\n\n266.\n\nA. _Morality_ as the work of _Immorality._\n\n1. In order that moral values may attain to _supremacy,_ a host of\nimmoral forces and passions must assist them.\n\n2. The establishment of moral values is the work of immoral passions\nand considerations.\n\nB. _Morality as the work of error._\n\nC. _'Morality gradually contradicts itself._ Requital--Truthfulness,\nDoubt, \u03ad\u03c0\u03bf\u03c7\u03ae, Judging. The \"Immorality\" of _belief_ in morality.\n\nThe steps:--\n\n1. Absolute dominion of morality: all biological phenomena measured and\n_judged_ according to its values.\n\n2. The attempt to identify Life with morality (symptom of awakened\nscepticism: morality must no longer be regarded as the opposite of\nLife); many means are sought--even a transcendental one.\n\n3. The _opposition of Life_ and _Morality._ Morality condemned and\nsentenced by Life.\n\nD. To what extent was morality _dangerous_ to Life?\n\n_(a)_ It depreciated the joy of living and the gratitude felt towards\nLife, etc.\n\n_(b)_ It checked the tendency to beautify and to ennoble Life.\n\n_(c)_ It checked the knowledge of Life.\n\n_(d)_ It checked the unfolding of Life, because it tried to set the\nhighest phenomena thereof at variance with itself.\n\nE. Contra-account: the _usefulness_ of morality to Life.\n\n(1) Morality may be a preservative measure for the general whole, it\nmay be a process of uniting dispersed members: it is useful as an agent\nin the production of the man who is a \"_tool_.\"\n\n(2) Morality may be a preservative measure mitigating the inner danger\nthreatening man from the direction of his passions: it is useful to\n\"_mediocre people_.\"\n\n(3) Morality may be a preservative measure resisting the life-poisoning\ninfluences of profound sorrow and bitterness: it is useful to the\n\"_sufferers_.\"\n\n(4) Morality may be a preservative measure opposed to the terrible\noutbursts of the mighty: it is useful to the \"_lowly_.\"\n\n267.\n\nIt is an excellent thing when one can use the expressions \"right\" and\n\"wrong\" in a definite, narrow, and \"bourgeois\" sense, as for instance\nin the sentence: \"Do right and fear no one\";[4]--that is to say, to\ndo one's duty, according to the rough scheme of life within the limit\nof which a community exists.--Let us not think meanly of what a few\nthousand years of morality have inculcated upon our minds.\n\n\n[Footnote 4: \"Thue Recht und scheue Niemand.\"]\n\n\n268.\n\nTwo types of morality must not be confounded: the morality with which\nthe instinct that has remained healthy defends itself from incipient\ndecadence, and the other morality by means of which this decadence\nasserts itself, justifies itself, and leads downwards.\n\nThe first-named is usually stoical, hard, tyrannical _(Stoicism_ itself\nwas an example of the sort of \"drag-chain\" morality we speak of); the\nother is gushing, sentimental, full of secrets, it has the women and\n\"beautiful feelings\" on its side (Primitive Christianity was an example\nof this morality).\n\n\n269.\n\nI shall try to regard all moralising, with one glance, as a\nphenomenon--also as a _riddle._ Moral phenomena have preoccupied me\nlike riddles. To-day I should be able to give a reply to the question:\nwhy _should_ my neighbour's welfare be of greater value to me than\nmy own? and why is it that my neighbour himself _should_ value his\nwelfare differently from the way in which I value it--that is to say,\nwhy should precisely _my_ welfare be paramount in his mind? What is\nthe meaning of this \"Thou shalt,\" which is regarded as \"given\" even by\nphilosophers themselves?\n\nThe seemingly insane idea that a man should esteem the act he performs\nfor a fellow-creature, higher than the one he performs for himself,\nand that the same fellow-creature should do so too (that only those\nacts should be held to be good which are performed with an eye to\nthe neighbour and for his welfare) has its reasons--namely, as the\nresult of the social instinct which rests upon the valuation, that\nsingle individuals are of little importance although collectively\ntheir importance is very great. This, of course, presupposes that they\nconstitute a _community_ with one feeling and one conscience pervading\nthe whole. It is therefore a sort of exercise for keeping one's eyes in\na certain direction; it is the will to a kind of optics which renders a\nview of one's self impossible.\n\nMy idea: goals are wanting, and _these must be individuals._ We see the\ngeneral drift: every individual gets sacrificed and serves as a tool.\nLet any one keep his eyes open in the streets--is not every one he sees\na slave? Whither? What is the purpose of it all?\n\n\n270.\n\nHow is it possible that a man can respect himself _only_ in regard\nto moral values, that he subordinates and despises everything in\nfavour of good, evil, improvement, spiritual salvation, etc.? as,\nfor instance, Henri Fr\u00e9d. Amiel. What is the meaning of the _moral\nidiosyncrasy_?--I mean this both in the psychological and physiological\nsense, as it was, for instance, in Pascal. In cases, then, in which\n_other_ great qualities are not wanting; and even in the case of\nSchopenhauer, who obviously valued what he did not and _could_ not have\n...--is it not the result of a merely mechanical _moral interpretation_\nof real states of pain and displeasure? is it not a particular form\nof _sensibility_ which does _not_ happen to _understand_ the cause\nof its many unpleasurable feelings, but _thinks to explain them with\nmoral hypotheses?_ In this way an occasional feeling of well-being and\n_strength_ always appears under the optics of a \"clean conscience,\"\nflooded with light through the proximity of God and the consciousness\nof salvation.... Thus the _moral idiosyncratist_ has (1) _either_\nacquired his real worth in approximating to the virtuous type of\nsociety: \"the good fellow,\" \"_the upright man_\"--a sort of medium\nstate of high respectability: _mediocre_ in all his abilities,\nbut honest, conscientious, firm, respected, and tried, in all his\naspirations; (2) _or,_ he imagines he has acquired that worth, simply\nbecause he cannot otherwise understand all his states--he is unknown to\nhimself; he therefore interprets himself in this fashion.--Morality is\nthe only _scheme of interpretation_ by means of which this type of man\ncan tolerate himself:--is it a form of vanity?\n\n\n271.\n\n_The predominance of moral values._--The consequence of this\npredominance: the corruption of psychology, etc.; the fatality which\nis associated with it everywhere. What is the _meaning_ of this\npredominance? What does it point to?\n\nTo a certain _greater urgency_ of saying nay or yea definitely in\nthis domain. All sorts of _imperatives_ have been used in order to\nmake moral values appear as if they were for ever fixed:--they have\nbeen enjoined for the longest period of time: they almost appear\nto be instinctive, like inner commands. They are the expression of\n_society's preservative measures,_ for they are felt to be almost\n_beyond question._ The practice--that is to say, the _utility_ of being\nagreed concerning superior values, has attained in this respect to\na sort of sanction. We observe that every care is taken to paralyse\nreflection and criticism in this department--look at Kant's attitude!\nnot to speak of those who believe that it is immoral even to prosecute\n\"research\" in these matters.\n\n\n272.\n\n_My desire_ is to show the absolute homogeneity of all phenomena, and\nto ascribe to moral differentiations but the value of _perspective_; to\nshow that all that which is praised as moral is essentially the same\nas that which is immoral, and was only made possible, according to\nthe law of all moral development--that is to say, by means of immoral\nartifices and with a view to immoral ends--just as all that which\nhas been decried as immoral is, from the standpoint of economics,\nboth superior and essential; and how development leading to a greater\nabundance of life necessarily Involves _progress_ in the realm _of\nimmorality_. \"Truth,\" that is the extent to which we _allow_ ourselves\nto comprehend _this_ fact.\n\n\n273.\n\nBut do not let us fear: as a matter of fact, we require a great deal of\nmorality, in order to be immoral in this subtle way; let me speak in a\nparable:--\n\nA physiologist interested in a certain illness, and an invalid who\nwishes to be cured of that same illness, have not the same interests.\nLet us suppose that the illness happens to be morality,--for morality\nis an illness,--and that we Europeans are the invalid: what an amount\nof subtle torment and difficulty would arise supposing we Europeans\nwere, at once, our own inquisitive spectators and the physiologist\nabove-mentioned! Should we under these circumstances earnestly desire\nto rid ourselves of morality? Should we want to? This is of course\nirrespective of the question whether we should be _able_ to do\nso--whether we can be _cured_ at all?\n\n\n\n\n2. THE HERD.\n\n\n\n274.\n\n_Whose will to power is morality?_--The _common factor_ of all European\nhistory since the time of _Socrates_ is the attempt to make the _moral\nvalues_ dominate all other values, in order that they should not be\nonly the leader and judge of life, but also: (1) knowledge, (2) Art,\n(3) political and social aspirations. \"Amelioration\" regarded as the\nonly duty, everything else used as a _means_ thereto (or as a force\ndistributing, hindering, and endangering its realisation, and therefore\nto be opposed and annihilated ...).--A similar movement to be observed\n_in China_ and _India._\n\nWhat is the meaning of this _will to power on the part of moral\nvalues,_ which has played such a part in the world's prodigious\nevolutions?\n\n_Answer:--Three powers lie concealed behind it_; (1) The instinct\nof the _herd_ opposed to the strong and the independent; (2) the\ninstinct of all _sufferers_ and all _abortions_ opposed to the happy\nand well-constituted; (3) the instinct of the mediocre opposed to\nthe exceptions.--_Enormous advantage of this movement,_ despite the\ncruelty, falseness, and narrow-mindedness which has helped it along\n(for the history of the _struggle of morality with the fundamental\ninstincts of life_ is in itself the greatest piece of immorality that\nhas ever yet been witnessed on earth ...).\n\n\n275.\n\n\nThe fewest succeed in discovering a problem behind all that which\nconstitutes our daily life, and to which we have become accustomed\nthroughout the ages--our eye does not seem focussed for such things:\nat least, this seems to me to be the case in so far as our morality is\nconcerned.\n\n\"Every man should be the preoccupation of his fellows\"; he who thinks\nin this way deserves honour: no one ought to think of himself.\n\n\"Thou shalt\": an impulse which, like the sexual impulse, cannot fathom\nitself, is set apart and is not condemned as all the other instincts\nare--on the contrary, it is made to be their standard and their judge!\n\nThe problem of \"equality,\" in the face of the fact that we all thirst\nfor distinction: here, on the contrary, we should demand of ourselves\nwhat we demand of others. That is so tasteless and obviously insane;\nbut--it is felt to be holy and of a higher order. The fact that it is\nopposed to common sense is not even noticed.\n\nSelf-sacrifice and self-abnegation are considered distinguishing, as\nare also the attempt to obey morality implicitly, and the belief that\none should be every one's equal in its presence.\n\nThe neglect and the surrender of Life and of well-being is held to be\ndistinguished, as are also the complete renunciation of individual\nvaluations and the severe exaction from every one of the same\nsacrifice. \"The value of an action is once and for all _fixed_: every\nindividual must submit to this valuation.\"\n\nWe see: an authority speaks--who speaks?--We must condone it in human\npride, if man tried to make this authority as high as possible, for\nhe wanted to feel as humble as he possibly could by the side of it.\nThus--God speaks!\n\nGod was necessary as an unconditional sanction which has no superior,\nas a \"Categorical Imperator\": or, in so far as people believed in the\nauthority of reason, what was needed was a \"unitarian metaphysics\" by\nmeans of which this view could be made logical.\n\nNow, admitting that faith in God is dead: the question arises once\nmore: \"who speaks?\" My answer, which I take from biology and not from\nmetaphysics, is: \"the _gregarious instinct speaks._\" This is what\ndesires to be master: hence its \"thou shalt!\"--it will allow the\nindividual to exist only as a part of a whole, only in favour of the\nwhole, it hates those who detach themselves from everything--it turns\nthe hatred of all individuals against him.\n\n\n276.\n\nThe whole of the morality of Europe is based upon the values _which\nare useful to the herd_: the sorrow of all higher and exceptional men\nis explained by the fact that everything which distinguishes them from\nothers reaches their consciousness in the form of a feeling of their\nown smallness and egregiousness. It is the _virtues_ of modern men\nwhich are the causes of pessimistic gloominess; the mediocre, like the\nherd, are not troubled much with questions or with conscience--they\nare cheerful. (Among the gloomy strong men, Pascal and Schopenhauer are\nnoted examples.)\n\n_The more dangerous a quality seems to the herd, the more completely it\nis condemned._\n\n\n277.\n\nThe morality of _truthfulness_ in the herd. \"Thou shalt be\nrecognisable, thou shalt express thy inner nature by means of clear\nand constant signs--otherwise thou art dangerous: and supposing\nthou art evil, thy power of dissimulation is absolutely the worst\nthing for the herd. We despise the secretive and those whom we\ncannot identify.--_Consequently_ thou must regard thyself as\nrecognisable, thou mayest not remain _concealed_ from thyself, thou\nmayest not even believe in the possibility of thy ever _changing_.\"\nThus, the insistence upon truthfulness has as its main object the\n_recognisability_ and the _stability_ of the individual. As a matter\nof fact, it is the object of education to make each gregarious\nunit believe in a certain _definite dogma_ concerning the nature\nof man: education _first creates this dogma_ and thereupon exacts\n\"truthfulness.\"\n\n\n278.\n\nWithin the confines of a herd or of a community--that is to say, _inter\npares,_ the _over-estimation_ of truthfulness is very reasonable. A\nman must not allow himself to be deceived--and _consequently_ he\nadopts as his own personal morality that he should deceive no one!--a\nsort of mutual obligation among equals! In his dealings with the\noutside world caution and danger demand that he should _be on his guard\nagainst deception_: the first psychological condition of this attitude\nwould mean that he is also on his guard against _his own people._\nMistrust thus appears as the source of truthfulness.\n\n\n279.\n\n_A criticism of the virtues of the herd._--Inertia is active: (1)\nIn confidence, because mistrust makes suspense, reflection, and\nobservation necessary. (2) In veneration, where the gulf that\nseparates power is great and submission necessary: then, so that\nfear may cease to exist, everybody tries to love and esteem, while\nthe difference in power is interpreted as a difference of value:\nand thus the relationship to the powerful _no longer has anything\nrevolting in it._ (3) In the sense of truth. What is truth? Truth\nis that explanation of things which causes us the smallest amount\nof mental exertion (apart from this, lying is extremely fatiguing).\n(4) In sympathy. It is a relief to know one's self on the same level\nwith all, to feel as all feel, and to _accept_ a belief which is\nalready current; it is something passive beside the activity which\nappropriates and continually carries into practice the most individual\nrights of valuation (the latter process allows of no repose). (5) In\nimpartiality and coolness of judgment: people scout the strain of being\nmoved, and prefer to be detached and \"objective.\" (6) In uprightness:\npeople prefer to obey a law which is to hand rather than to _create_\na new one, rather than to command themselves and others: the fear of\ncommanding--it is better to submit than to rebel. (7) In toleration:\nthe fear of exercising a right or of enforcing a judgment.\n\n\n280.\n\nThe instinct of the herd values the _juste milieu_ and the _average_\nas the highest and most precious of all things: the spot where the\nmajority is to be found, and the air that it breathes there. In this\nway it is the opponent of all order of rank; it regards a climb from\nthe level to the heights in the same light as a descent from the\nmajority to the minority. The herd regards the _exception,_ whether\nit be above or beneath its general level, as something which is\nantagonistic and dangerous to itself. Their trick in dealing with\nthe exceptions above them, the strong, the mighty, the wise, and the\nfruitful, is to persuade them to become guardians, herdsmen, and\nwatchmen--in fact, to become their _head-servants_: thus they convert\na danger into a thing which is useful. In the middle, fear ceases:\nhere a man is alone with nothing; here there is not much room even for\nmisunderstandings; here there is equality; here a man's individual\nexistence is not felt as a reproach, but as the _right_ existence;\nhere contentment reigns supreme. Mistrust is active only towards the\nexceptions; to be an exception is to be a sinner.\n\n\n281.\n\nIf, in compliance with our communal instincts, we make certain\nregulations for, ourselves and forbid certain acts, we do not of\ncourse, in common reason, forbid a certain kind of \"existence,\" nor\na certain attitude of mind, but only a particular application and\ndevelopment of this \"existence\" and \"attitude of mind.\" But then the\nidealist of virtue, the _moralist,_ comes along and says: \"God sees\ninto the human heart! What matters it that ye abstain from certain\nacts: ye are not any better on that account!\" Answer: Mr. Longears\nand Virtue-Monger, we do not want to be better at all, we are quite\nsatisfied with ourselves, all we desire is that we should not _harm_\none another--and that is why we forbid certain actions when they take\na particular direction--that is to say, when they are against our\nown interests: but that does not alter the fact that when these same\nactions are directed against the enemies of our community--against\nyou, for instance--we are at a loss to know how to pay them sufficient\nhonour. We educate our children up to them; we develop them to the\nfullest extent. Did we share that \"god-fearing\" radicalism which your\nholy craziness recommends, if we were green-horns enough to condemn\nthe source of those forbidden \"acts\" by condemning the \"heart\" and the\n\"attitude of mind\" which recommends them, that would mean condemning\nour very existence, and with it its greatest prerequisite--an attitude\nof mind, a heart, a passion which we revere with all our soul. By\nour decrees we prevent this attitude of mind from breaking out and\nventing itself in a useless way--we are prudent when we prescribe\nsuch laws for ourselves; we are also _moral_ in so doing.... Have\nyou no idea--however vague--what sacrifices it has cost us, how much\nself-control, self-subjection, and hardness it has compelled us to\nexercise? We are vehement in our desires; there are times when we even\nfeel as if we could devour each other.... But the \"communal spirit\" is\nmaster of us: have you observed that this is almost a definition of\nmorality?\n\n\n282.\n\n_The weakness of the gregarious animal_ gives rise to a morality\nwhich is precisely similar to that resulting from the weakness of the\ndecadent man: they understand each other; they _associate_ with each\nother (the great decadent religions always rely upon the support of\nthe herd). The gregarious animal, as such, is free from all morbid\ncharacteristics, it is in itself an invaluable creature; but it is\nincapable of taking any initiative; it must have a \"leader\"--the\npriests understand this.... The state is not subtle, not secret\nenough; the art of \"directing consciences\" slips its grasp. How is the\ngregarious animal infected with illness by the priest?\n\n\n283.\n\n_The hatred directed against the privileged in body and spirit_:\nthe revolt of the ugly and bungled souls against the beautiful, the\nproud, and the cheerful. The weapons used: contempt of beauty, of\npride, of happiness: \"There is no such thing as merit,\" \"The danger is\nenormous: it is right that one _should_ tremble and feel ill at ease,\"\n\"Naturalness is evil; it is right to oppose all that is natural--even\n'reason'\" (all that is antinatural is elevated to the highest place).\n\nIt is again the _priests_ who exploit this condition, and who win the\n\"people\" over to themselves. \"The sinner\" over whom there is more joy\nin heaven than over \"the just person.\" This is the struggle against\n\"paganism\" (the pang of conscience, a measure for disturbing the\nharmony of the soul).\n\n_The hatred of the mediocre_ for the _exceptions,_ and of the herd for\nits independent members. (Custom actually regarded as \"morality.\") The\nrevulsion of feeling _against_ \"egotism\": that only is worth anything\nwhich is done \"for another.\" \"We are all equal\";--against the love of\ndominion, against \"dominion\" in general;--against privilege;--against\nsectarians, free-spirits, and sceptics;--against philosophy (a\nforce opposing mechanical and automatic instincts); in philosophers\nthemselves--\"the categorical imperative,\" the essential nature of\nmorality, \"general and universal.\"\n\n\n284.\n\nThe qualities and tendencies which are _praised_: peacefulness, equity,\nmoderation, modesty, reverence, respectfulness, bravery, chastity,\nhonesty, fidelity, credulity, rectitude, confidence, resignation,\npity, helpfulness, conscientiousness, simplicity, mildness, justice,\ngenerosity, leniency, obedience, disinterestedness, freedom from envy,\ngood nature, industry.\n\nWe must ascertain to what extent _such qualities_ are conditioned\nas means to the attainment of certain desires and _ends_ (often an\n\"_evil_\" end); or as results of dominating passions (for instance,\n_intellectuality_): or as the expressions of certain states of\nneed--that is to say, as _preservative measures_ (as in the case of\ncitizens, slaves, women, etc.).\n\nIn short, every one of them is not _considered \"good\" for its own\nsake,_ but rather because it approximates to a standard prescribed\neither by \"society\" or by the \"herd,\" as a means to the ends of the\nlatter, as necessary for their preservation and enhancement, and also\nas the result of an actual _gregarious instinct_ in the individual;\nthese qualities are thus in the service of an instinct which is\n_fundamentally different_ from these _states of virtue._ For the herd\nis _antagonistic, selfish, and pitiless_ to the outside world; it is\nfull of a love of dominion and of feelings of mistrust, etc.\n\nIn the \"herdsman\" this _antagonism_ comes to the _fore_ he must have\nqualities which are _the reverse of_ those possessed by the herd.\n\nThe mortal enmity of the herd towards all _order of rank_: its\ninstinct is in favour of the _leveller_ (Christ). Towards all _strong\nindividuals (the sovereigns)_ it is hostile, unfair, intemperate,\narrogant, cheeky, disrespectful, cowardly, false, lying, pitiless,\ndeceitful, envious, revengeful.\n\n\n285.\n\nMy teaching is this, that the herd seeks to maintain and preserve one\ntype of man, and that it defends itself on two sides--that is to say,\nagainst those which are decadents from its ranks (criminals, etc.), and\nagainst those who rise superior to its dead level. The instincts of the\nherd tend to a stationary state of society; they merely preserve. They\nhave no creative power.\n\nThe pleasant feelings of goodness and benevolence with which the just\nman fills us (as opposed to the suspense and the fear to which the\ngreat innovating man gives rise) are our own sensations of personal\nsecurity and equality: in this way the gregarious animal glorifies\nthe gregarious nature, and then begins to feel at ease. This judgment\non the part of the \"comfortable\" ones rigs itself out in the most\nbeautiful words--and thus \"morality\" is born. Let any one observe,\nhowever, the _hatred of the herd_ for all truthful men.\n\n\n286.\n\nLet us not deceive ourselves! When a man hears the whisper of the moral\nimperative in his breast, as altruism would have him hear it, he\nshows thereby that he belongs to the _herd._ When a man is conscious\nof the opposite feelings,--that is to say, when he sees his danger and\nhis undoing in disinterested and unselfish actions,--then he does not\nbelong to the herd.\n\n\n287.\n\nMy philosophy aims at a new _order of rank: not_ at an individualistic\nmorality.[5] The spirit of the herd should rule within the herd--but\nnot beyond it: the leaders of the herd require a fundamentally\ndifferent valuation for their actions, as do also the independent ones\nor the beasts of prey, etc.\n\n\n[Footnote 5: TRANSLATOR'S NOTE--Here is a broad distinction between\nNietzsche and Herbert Spencer.]\n\n\n\n3. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING MORALITY.\n\n\n288.\n\n_Morality regarded as an attempt at establishing human pride._--The\n\"Free-Will\" theory is anti-religious. Its ultimate object is to bestow\nthe right upon man to regard himself as the _cause_ of his highest\nstates and actions: it is a form of the growing _feeling of pride._\n\nMan feels his power his \"happiness\"; as they say: there must be a will\nbehind these states--otherwise they do not belong to him. Virtue is\nan attempt at postulating a modicum of will, past or present, as the\nnecessary antecedent to every exalted and strong feeling of happiness:\nif the will to certain actions is regularly present in consciousness,\na sensation of power may be interpreted as its result. This is a\n_merely psychological point of view,_ based upon the false assumption\nthat nothing belongs to us which we have not consciously willed. The\nwhole of the teaching of responsibility relies upon the ingenuous\npsychological rule that the will is the only cause, and that one must\nhave been aware of having willed in order to be able to regard _one's\nself_ as a cause.\n\n_Then comes the counter-movement_--that of the moral-philosophers.\nThese men still labour under the delusion that a man is responsible\nonly for what he has willed. The value of man is then made a _moral\nvalue_: thus morality becomes a _causa prima_; for this there must be\nsome kind of principle in man, and \"free will\" is posited as _prima\ncausa._ The _arri\u00e8re pens\u00e9e_ is always this: If man is not a _causa\nprima_ through his will, he must be irresponsible,--therefore he\ndoes not come within the jurisdiction of morals,--virtue or vice is\nautomatic and mechanical....\n\nIn short: in order that man may respect himself he must be capable of\nbecoming evil.\n\n\n289.\n\n_Theatricalness_ regarded as the result of \"Free Will\" morality. It\nis a step in the _development of the feeling of power itself_ to\nbelieve one's self to be the author of one's exalted moments (of one's\nperfection) and to have _willed_ them....\n\n(Criticism: all perfect action is precisely unconscious and not\ndeliberate; consciousness is often the expression of an imperfect\nand often morbid constitution. _Personal perfection regarded as\ndetermined by will, as an act of consciousness,_ as reason with\ndialectics, is a caricature, a sort of self-contradiction.... Any\ndegree of consciousness renders perfection _impossible._ ... A form of\n_theatricalness_.)\n\n\n\n290.\n\nThe _moral hypothesis,_ designed with a view to _justifying God,_\nsaid: evil must be voluntary (simply in order that the _voluntariness\nof goodness_ might be believed in); and again, all evil and suffering\nhave an _object which is salvation_.\n\nThe notion \"guilt\" was considered as something which had no\nconnection at all with the ultimate cause of existence, and the\nnotion \"punishment\" was held to be an educating and beneficent act,\nconsequently an act proceeding from a _good_ God.\n\nThe absolute dominion of moral valuations _over_ all others: nobody\ndoubted that God could not be evil and could do no harm--that is to\nsay, perfection was understood merely as _moral_ perfection.\n\n\n291.\n\nHow false is the supposition that an action must depend upon what has\npreceded it in consciousness! And morality has been measured in the\nlight of this supposition, as also criminality....\n\nThe value of an action must be judged by its results, say the\nutilitarians: to measure it according to its origin involves the\nimpossibility of _knowing_ that origin.\n\nBut do we know its results? Five stages ahead, perhaps. Who can tell\nwhat an action provokes and sets in motion? As a stimulus? As the spark\nwhich fires a powder-magazine? Utilitarians are simpletons.... And\nfinally, they would first of all have to know _what_ is useful; here\nalso their sight can travel only over five stages or so.... They have\nno notion of the great economy which cannot dispense with evil.\n\nWe do not know the origin or the results: has an action, then, any\nvalue?\n\nWe have yet the action itself to consider: the states of consciousness\nthat accompany it, the yea or nay which follows upon its performance:\ndoes the value of an action lie in the subjective states which\naccompany it? (In that case, the value of music would be measured\naccording to the pleasure or displeasure which it occasions in us ...\nwhich it gives to the _composer._ ...) Obviously feelings of value\nmust accompany it, a sensation of power, restraint, or impotence--for\ninstance, freedom or lightsomeness. Or, putting the question\ndifferently: could the value of an action be reduced to physiological\nterms? could it be the expression of completely free or constrained\nlife?--Maybe its _biological_ value is expressed in this way....\n\nIf, then, an action can be judged neither in the light of its origin,\nnor its results, nor its accompaniments in consciousness, then its\nvalue must be _x_ unknown....\n\n\n292.\n\nIt amounts to a _denaturalisation of morality,_ to _separate_ an action\nfrom a man; to direct hatred or contempt against \"sin\"; to believe that\nthere are actions which are good or bad in themselves.\n\nThe _re-establishment of_ \"_Nature_\": an action in itself is quite\ndevoid of value; the whole question is this: who performed it? One and\nthe same \"crime\" may, in one case, be the greatest privilege, in the\nother infamy. As a matter of fact, it is the selfishness of the judges\nwhich interprets an action (in regard to its author) according as to\nwhether it was useful or harmful to themselves (or in relation to its\ndegree of likeness or unlikeness to them).\n\n\n293.\n\nThe concept \"reprehensible action\" presents us with some difficulties.\nNothing in all that happens can be reprehensible in itself: _one would\nnot dare to eliminate it completely_; for everything is so bound up\nwith everything else, that to exclude one part would mean to exclude\nthe whole.\n\nA reprehensible action, therefore, would mean a reprehensible world as\na whole....\n\nAnd even then, in a reprehensible world even reprehending would be\nreprehensible.... And the consequence of an attitude of mind that\ncondemns everything, would be the affirmation of everything in\npractice.... If Becoming is a huge ring, everything that forms a part\nof it is of equal value, is eternal and necessary.--In all correlations\nof yea and nay, of preference and rejection, love and hate, all that\nis expressed is a certain point of view, peculiar to the interests of\na certain type of living organism: everything that lives says _yea_ by\nthe very fact of its existence.\n\n\n294.\n\n_Criticism of the subjective feelings of value.--_Conscience. Formerly\npeople argued: conscience condemns this action, therefore this action\nis reprehensible. But, as a matter of fact, conscience condemns an\naction because that action has been condemned for a long period of\ntime: all conscience does is to imitate. It does not create values.\nThat which first led to the condemnation of certain actions, was\n_not_ conscience: but the knowledge of (or the prejudice against)\nits consequences.... The approbation of conscience, the feeling of\nwell-being, of \"inner peace,\" is of the same order of emotions as the\nartist's joy over his work--it proves nothing.... Self-contentment\nproves no more in favour of that which gives rise to it, than its\nabsence can prove anything against the value of the thing which fails\nto give rise to it. We are far too ignorant to be able to judge of the\nvalue of our actions: in this respect we lack the ability to regard\nthings objectively. Even when we condemn an action, we do not do so\nas judges, but as adversaries.... When noble sentiments accompany an\naction, they prove nothing in its favour: an artist may present us\nwith an absolutely insignificant thing, though he be in the throes of\nthe most exalted pathos during its production. It were wiser to regard\nthese sentiments as misleading: they actually beguile our eye and our\npower, away from criticism, from caution and from suspicion, and the\nresult often is that we make _fools_ of ourselves ... they actually\nmake fools of us.\n\n\n295.\n\nWe are heirs to the conscience-vivisection and self-crucifixion of two\nthousand years: in these two practices lie perhaps our longest efforts\nat becoming perfect, our mastery, and certainly our subtlety; we have\naffiliated natural propensities with a heavy conscience.\n\nAn attempt to produce an entirely opposite state of affairs would be\npossible: that is to say, to affiliate all desires of a beyond, all\nsympathy with things which are opposed to the senses, the intellect,\nand nature--in fact, all the ideals that have existed hitherto (which\nwere all anti-worldly), with a heavy conscience.\n\n\n296.\n\nThe great _crimes_ in _psychology_:--\n\n(1) That all _pain_ and _unhappiness_ should have been falsified by\nbeing associated with what is wrong (guilt). (Thus pain was robbed of\nits innocence.)\n\n(2) That all _strong emotions_ (wantonness, voluptuousness, triumph,\npride, audacity, knowledge, assurance, and happiness in itself) were\nbranded as sinful, as seductive, and as suspicious.\n\n(3) That _feelings of weakness,_ inner acts of cowardice, lack of\npersonal courage, should have decked themselves in the most beautiful\nwords, and have been taught as desirable in the highest degree.\n\n(4) That _greatness_ in man should have been given the meaning of\ndisinterestedness, self-sacrifice for another's good, for other people;\nthat even in the scientist and the artist, the _elimination of the\nindividual personality_ is presented as the cause of the greatest\nknowledge and ability.\n\n(5) That _love_ should have been twisted round to mean submission\n(and altruism), whereas it is in reality an act of appropriation or\nof bestowal, resulting in the last case from a superabundance in the\nwealth of a given personality. Only the _wholest_ people can love; the\ndisinterested ones, the \"objective\" ones, are the worst lovers (just\nask the girls!). This principle also applies to the love of God or of\nthe \"home country\": a man must be able to rely absolutely upon himself.\n(Egotism may be regarded as the _pre-eminence of the ego,_ altruism as\nthe _pre-eminence of others_.)\n\n(6) Life regarded as a punishment (happiness as a means of seduction);\nthe passions regarded as devilish; confidence in one's self as godless.\n\n_The whole of psychology is a psychology of obstacles,_ a sort of\n_barricade_ built out of fear; on the one hand we find the masses (the\nbotched and bungled, the mediocre) defending themselves, by means of\nit, against the _strong_ (and finally _destroying_ them in their growth\n...); on the other hand, we find all the instincts with which these\nclasses are best able to prosper, sanctified and alone held in honour\nby them. Let anyone examine the Jewish priesthood.\n\n\n297.\n\n_The vestiges of the depreciation of Nature_ through moral\ntranscendence: The value of disinterestedness, the cult of altruism;\nthe belief in a reward in the play of natural consequences; the belief\nin \"goodness\" and in genius itself, as if the one, like the other,\nwere the _result of disinterestedness_; the continuation of the\nChurch's sanction of the life of the citizen; the absolutely deliberate\nmisunderstanding of history (as a means of educating up to morality)\nor pessimism in the attitude taken up towards history (the latter\nis just as much a result of the depreciation of Nature, as is that\n_pseudo-justification_ of history, that refusal to see history as the\npessimist _sees_ it).\n\n\n298.\n\n\"_Morality for its own sake_\"--this is an important step in the\ndenaturalisation of morals: in itself it appears as a final value. In\nthis phase religion has generally become saturated with it: as, for\ninstance, in the case of Judaism. It likewise goes through a phase in\nwhich it _separates itself from_ religion, and in which no God is\n\"moral\" enough for it: it then prefers the impersonal ideal.... This is\nhow the case stands at present.\n\n\"_Art for Art's sake_\": this is a similarly dangerous principle: by\nthis means a false contrast is lent to things--it culminates in the\nslander of reality (\"idealising\" _into the hateful_). When an ideal\nis severed from reality, the latter is debased, impoverished, and\ncalumniated. _\"Beauty for Beauty's sake,\" \"Truth for Truth's sake,\"\n\"Goodness for Goodness' sake\"_--these are three forms of the evil eye\nfor reality.\n\n_Art, knowledge, and morality_ are _means_: instead of recognising a\nlife-promoting tendency in them, they have been associated with the\n_opposite of Life_--with \"_God_\"--they have also been regarded as\nrevelations of a higher world, which here and there transpires through\nthem....\n\n\"_Beautiful_\" and \"_ugly_,\" \"_true_\" and \"_false_,\" \"_good_\" and\n\"_evil_\"--these things are _distinctions_ and _antagonisms_ which\nbetray the preservative and promotive measures of Life, not necessarily\nof man alone, but of all stable and enduring organisms which take up a\ndefinite stand against their opponents. The _war_ which thus ensues is\nthe essential factor: it is a means of _separating_ things, _leading to\nstronger_ isolation....\n\n\n299.\n\n_Moral naturalism_: The tracing back of apparently independent and\nsupernatural values to their real \"nature\"--that is to say, to\n_natural immorality,_ to natural \"utility,\" etc.\n\nPerhaps I may designate the tendency of these observations by the term\n_moral naturalism_: my object is to re-translate the moral values which\nhave apparently become independent and _unnatural_ into their real\nnature--that is to say, into their natural \"_immorality_.\"\n\n_N.B._--Refer to Jewish \"holiness\" and its natural basis. The case is\nthe same in regard to _the moral law which has been made sovereign,_\nemancipated from its real _feature_ (until it is almost the _opposite_\nof Nature).\n\nThe stages in the _denaturalisation of morality_ (or so-called\n\"_Idealisation_\"):--\n\nFirst it is a road to individual happiness,\n\nthen it is the result of knowledge,\n\nthen it is a Categorical Imperative,\n\nthen it is a way to Salvation,\n\nthen it is a denial of the will to live.\n\n(The gradual progress of the _hostility_ of morality to _Life_.)\n\n\n300.\n\nThe suppressed and effaced _Heresy_ in morality.--Concepts: paganism,\nmaster-morality, _virt\u00f9_.\n\n\n301.\n\n_My problem_: What harm has mankind suffered hitherto from morals, as\nalso from its own morality? Intellectual harm, etc.\n\n\n302.\n\nWhy are not human values once more deposited nicely in the rut to\nwhich they alone have a right--as routinary values? Many species\nof animals have already become extinct; supposing man were also to\ndisappear, nothing would be lacking on earth. A man should be enough of\na philosopher to admire even this \"nothing\" (_Nil admirari_).\n\n\n303.\n\nMan, a small species of very excitable animals,\nwhich--fortunately--has its time. Life in general on earth is a\nmatter of a moment, an incident, an exception that has no consequence,\nsomething which is of no importance whatever to the general character\nof the earth; the earth itself is, like every star, a hiatus between\ntwo nonentities, an event without a plan, without reason, will, or\nself-consciousness--the worst kind of necessity--_foolish_ necessity....\nSomething in us rebels against this view; the serpent vanity whispers\nto our hearts, \"All this must be false because it is revolting....\nCould not all this be appearance? And man in spite of all, to use\nKant's words\"----\n\n\n\n4. HOW VIRTUE IS MADE TO DOMINATE.\n\n\n304.\n\n_Concerning the ideal of the moralist._--In this treatise we wish to\nspeak of the great _politics_ of virtue. We wrote it for the use of\nall those who are interested, not so much in the process of becoming\nvirtuous as in that of making others virtuous--in how virtue _is made\nto dominate._ I even intend to prove that in order to desire this\none thing--the dominion of virtue--the other must be systematically\navoided; that is to say, one must renounce all hopes of becoming\nvirtuous. This sacrifice is great: but such an end is perhaps a\nsufficient reward for such a sacrifice. And even greater sacrifices!...\nAnd some of the most famous moralists have risked as much. For these,\nindeed, had already recognised and anticipated the truth which is to\nbe revealed for the first time in this treatise: that the _dominion of\nvirtue_ is absolutely attainable _only by the use of the same means_\nwhich are employed in the attainment of any other dominion, in any case\nnot _by_ means of virtue itself....\n\nAs I have already said, this treatise deals with the politics of\nvirtue: it postulates an ideal of these politics; it describes it as it\nought to be, if anything at all can be perfect on this earth. Now, no\nphilosopher can be in any doubt as to what the type of perfection is\nin politics; it is, of course, Machiavellianism. But Machiavellianism\nwhich is _pur, sans m\u00e9lange, cru, vert, dans toute sa force, dans\ntoute son \u00e2pret\u00e9,_ is superhuman, divine, transcendental, and can\nnever be achieved by man--the most he can do is to approximate it.\nEven in this narrower kind of politics--in the politics of virtue--the\nideal never seems to have been realised. Plato, too, only bordered\nupon it. Granted that one have eyes for concealed things, one can\ndiscover, even in the most guileless and most conscious _moralists_\n(and this is indeed the name of these moral politicians and of the\nfounders of all newer moral forces), traces showing that they too paid\ntheir tribute to human weakness. _They all aspired_ to virtue on their\nown account--at least in their moments of weariness; and this is the\nleading and most capital error on the part of any moralist--whose duty\nit is to be an _immoralist in deeds._ That he must not exactly _appear\nto be the latter,_ is another matter. Or rather it is _not_ another\nmatter: systematic self-denial of this kind (or, expressed morally:\ndissimulation) belongs to, and is part and parcel of, the moralist's\ncanon and of his self-imposed duties: without it he can never attain\nto his particular kind of perfection. Freedom from morality _and from\ntruth_ when enjoyed for that purpose which rewards every sacrifice: for\nthe sake of making _morality dominate_--that is the canon. Moralists\nare in need of the _attitudes of virtue,_ as also of the attitudes of\ntruth; their error begins when they _yield_ to virtue, when they lose\ncontrol of virtue, when they themselves become _moral_ or _true._ A\ngreat moralist is, among other things, necessarily a great actor; his\nonly danger is that his pose may unconsciously become a second nature,\njust like his ideal, which is to keep his _esse_ and his _operari_\napart in a divine way; everything he does must be done _sub specie\nboni_--a lofty, remote, and exacting ideal! A _divine_ ideal! And, as\na matter of fact, they say that the moralist thus imitates a model\nwhich is no less than God Himself: God, the greatest Immoralist in\ndeeds that exists, but who nevertheless understands how to remain what\nHe _is,_ the _good_ God....\n\n\n305.\n\nThe dominion of virtue is not established by means of virtue itself;\nwith virtue itself, one renounces power, one loses the Will to Power.\n\n\n306.\n\nThe victory of a moral ideal is achieved by the same \"immoral\" means as\nany other victory: violence, lies, slander, injustice.\n\n\n307.\n\nHe who knows the way fame originates will be suspicious even of the\nfame virtue enjoys.\n\n\n308.\n\nMorality is just as \"immoral\" as any other thing on earth; morality is\nin itself a form of immorality.\n\nThe great _relief_ which this conviction brings. The contradiction\nbetween things disappears, the unity of all phenomena is _saved----_\n\n\n309.\n\nThere are some who actually go in search of what is immoral. When they\nsay: \"this is wrong,\" they believe it ought to be done away with\nor altered. On the other hand, I do not rest until I am quite clear\nconcerning the _immorality_ of any particular thing which happens to\ncome under my notice. When I discover it, I recover my equanimity.\n\n\n310.\n\n\nA. _The ways which lead to power_: the presentation of the new virtue\nunder the name of an _old_ one,--the awakening of \"interest\" concerning\nit (\"happiness\" declared to be its reward, and _vice vers\u00e2_),--artistic\nslandering of all that stands in its way,--the exploitation of\nadvantages and accidents with the view of glorifying it,--the\nconversion of its adherents into fanatics by means of sacrifices and\nseparations,--symbolism _on a grand scale_.\n\nB. _Power attained_: (1) Means of constraint of virtue; (2) seductive\nmeans of virtue; (3) the (court) etiquette of virtue.\n\n\n311.\n\n\n_By what means does a virtue attain to power?--_With precisely the\nsame means as a political party: slander, suspicion, the undermining of\nopposing virtues that happen to be already in power, the changing of\ntheir names, systematic persecution and scorn; in short, _by means of\nacts of general \"immorality.\"_\n\nHow does a _desire_ behave towards itself in order to become a\n_virtue_?--A process of rechristening; systematic denial of its\nintentions; practice in misunderstanding itself; alliance with\nestablished and recognised virtues; ostentatious enmity towards its\nadversaries. If possible, too, the protection of sacred powers must be\npurchased; people must also be intoxicated and fired with enthusiasm;\nidealistic humbug must be used, and a party must be won, which _either_\ntriumphs _or_ perishes--one must be _unconscious and na\u00eff_.\n\n\n312.\n\nCruelty has become transformed and elevated into tragic pity, so that\nwe no longer recognise it as such. The same has happened to the love\nof the sexes which has become amour-passion; the slavish attitude of\nmind appears as Christian obedience; wretchedness becomes humility;\nthe disease of the _nervus sympathicus,_ for instance, is eulogised as\nPessimism, Pascalism, or Carlylism, etc.\n\n\n313.\n\nWe should begin to entertain doubts concerning a man if we heard that\nhe required reasons in order to remain respectable: we should, in any\ncase, certainly avoid his society. The little word \"for\" in certain\ncases may be compromising; sometimes a single \"for\" is enough to\nrefute one. If we should hear, in course of time, that such-and-such\nan aspirant for virtue was in need of _bad_ reasons in order to remain\nrespectable, it would not conduce to increasing our respect for him.\nBut he goes further; he comes to us, and tells us quite openly: \"You\ndisturb my morality, with your disbelief, Mr. Sceptic; so long as you\ncannot believe in my _bad reasons,_--that is to say, in my God, in a\ndisciplinary Beyond, in free will, etc.,--you put obstacles in the way\nof my virtue.... Moral, sceptics must be suppressed: they prevent the\n_moralisation of the masses_.\"\n\n\n314.\n\nOur most sacred convictions, those which are permanent in us concerning\nthe highest values, are _judgments emanating from our muscles._\n\n\n315.\n\n_Morality in the valuation of races and classes.--_In view of the fact\nthat the _passions_ and _fundamental instincts_ in every race and class\nexpress the means which enable the latter to preserve themselves (or at\nleast the means which have enabled them to live for the longest period\nof time), to call them \"virtuous\" practically means:\n\nThat they change their character, shed their skins, and blot out their\npast.\n\nIt means that they should cease from differentiating themselves from\nothers.\n\nIt means that they are getting to resemble each other in their needs\nand aspirations--or, more exactly, _that they are declining...._\n\nIt means that the will to one kind of morality is merely the _tyranny_\nof the particular species, which is adapted to that kind of morality,\nover other species: it means a process of annihilation or general\nlevelling in favour of the prevailing species (whether it be to\nrender the non-prevailing species harmless, or to exploit them); the\n\"Abolition of Slavery\"--a so-called tribute to \"human dignity\"; in\ntruth, the _annihilation_ of a fundamentally different species (the\nundermining of its values and its happiness).\n\nThe qualities which constitute the strength of an _opposing race_ or\nclass are declared to be the most evil and pernicious things it has:\nfor by means of them it may be harmful to us (its virtues are slandered\nand rechristened).\n\nWhen a man or a people harm us, their action constitutes an objection\nagainst them: but from their point of view we are desirable, because we\nare such as can be useful to them.\n\nThe insistence upon spreading \"humaneness\" (which guilelessly starts\nout with the assumption that it is in possession of the formula \"What\nis human\") is all humbug, beneath the cover of which a certain definite\ntype of man strives to attain to power: or, more precisely, a very\nparticular kind of instinct--the _gregarious instinct._ \"The equality\nof men\": this is what lies _concealed_ behind the tendency of _making_\never more and more men _alike_ as men.\n\n_The \"interested nature\" of the morality of ordinary people._ (The\ntrick was to elevate the great passions for power and property to the\npositions of protectors of virtue.)\n\nTo what extent do all kinds of _business men_ and money-grabbers--all\nthose who give and take credit--find it _necessary_ to promote the\nlevelling of all characters and notions of value? the _commerce and the\nexchange of the world_ leads to, and almost purchases, virtue.\n\nThe _State_ exercises the same influence, as does also any sort of\nruling power at the head of officials and soldiers; _science_ acts in\nthe same way, in order that it may work in security and economise its\nforces. And the _priesthood_ does the same.\n\nCommunal morality is thus promoted here, because it is advantageous;\nand, in order to make it triumph, war and violence are waged against\nimmorality--with what \"right\"? Without any right whatsoever; but in\naccordance with the instinct of self-preservation. The same classes\navail themselves of immorality when it serves their purpose to do so.\n\n\n316.\n\nObserve the hypocritical colour which all _civil institutions_ are\npainted, just as if they were _the offshoots of morality_--for\ninstance: marriage, work, calling, patriotism, the family, order,\nand rights. But as they were all established in favour of the _most\nmediocre_ type of man, to protect him from exceptions and the need of\nexceptions, one must not be surprised to find them sown with lies.\n\n\n317.\n\n_Virtue_ must be defended against its preachers: they are its worst\nenemies. For they teach virtue as an ideal _for all_; they divest\nvirtue of the charm which consists in its rareness, its inimitableness,\nits exceptional and non-average character--that is to say, of its\n_aristocratic charm._ A stand must also be made against those\nembittered idealists who eagerly tap all pots and are satisfied to\nhear them ring hollow: what ingenuousness--to _demand_ great and rare\nthings, and then to declare, with anger and contempt of one's fellows,\nthat they do not exist!--It is obvious, for instance, that a _marriage_\nis worth only as much as those are worth whom it joins--that is to say,\nthat on the whole it is something wretched and indecent: no priest or\nregistrar can make anything else of it.\n\n_Virtue_[6] has all the instincts of the average man against it: it is\nnot profitable, it is not prudent, and it isolates. It is related to\npassion, and not very accessible to reason; it spoils the character,\nthe head, and the senses--always, of course, subject to the medium\nstandard of men; it provokes hostility towards order, and towards the\n_lies_ which are concealed beneath all order, all institutions, and\nall reality--when seen in the light of its pernicious influence upon\n_others,_ it is _the worst of vices_.\n\nI recognise virtue in that: (1) it does not insist upon being\nrecognised; (2) it does not presuppose the existence of virtue\neverywhere, but precisely something else; (3) it does _not suffer_\nfrom the absence of virtue, but regards it rather as a relation of\nperspective which throws virtue into relief: it does not proclaim\nitself; (4) it makes no propaganda; (5) it allows no one to pose as\njudge because it is always a _personal_ virtue; (6) it does precisely\nwhat is generally _forbidden_: virtue as I understand it is the actual\n_vetitum_ within all gregarious legislation; (7) in short, I recognise\nvirtue in that it is in the Renaissance style--_virt\u00f9_--free from all\nmoralic acid....\n\n\n[Footnote 6: TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.--Virtue is used here, of course, in the\nsense of \"the excellence of man,\" not in the sense of the Christian\nnegative virtue.]\n\n\n318.\n\nIn the first place[7] Messrs. Virtue-mongers, you have no superiority\nover us; we should like to make you take _modesty_ a little more to\nheart: it is wretched personal interests and prudence which suggest\nyour virtue to you. And if you had more strength and courage in your\nbodies you would not lower yourselves thus to the level of virtuous\nnonentities. You make what you can of yourselves: partly what you are\nobliged to make,--that is to say, what your circumstances force you\nto _make,_--partly what suits your pleasure and seems useful to you.\nBut if you do only what is in keeping with your inclinations, or\nwhat necessity exacts from you, or what is useful to you, you ought\n_neither to praise yourselves nor let others praise you_!... One is\na _thoroughly puny kind of man_ when one is _only_ virtuous: nothing\nshould mislead you in this regard! Men who have to be considered at\nall, were never such donkeys of virtue: their inmost instinct, that\nwhich determined their quantum of power, did not find its reckoning\nthus: whereas with your minimum amount of power nothing can seem more\nfull of wisdom to you than virtue. But the _multitude_ are on your\nside: and because you _tyrannise_ over us, we shall fight you....\n\n\n[Footnote 7: TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.--Here Nietzsche returns to Christian\nvirtue which is negative and moral.]\n\n\n319.\n\nA _virtuous man_ is of a lower species because, in the first place,\nhe has no \"personality,\" but acquires his value by conforming with a\ncertain human scheme which has been once and for ever fixed. He has no\nindependent value: he may be compared; he has his equals, he _must_ not\nbe an individual.\n\nReckoning up the qualities of the _good_ man, why is it they appear\npleasant to us? Because they urge us neither to war, to mistrust, to\ncaution, to the accumulating of forces, nor to severity: our laziness,\nour good nature, and our levity, have a _good time._ This, our _feeling\nof well-being,_ is _what we project into_ the good man in the form of a\n_quality,_ in the form of a _valuable possession._\n\n\n320.\n\nUnder certain circumstances, virtue is merely a venerable form of\nstupidity: who could blame you for it? And this form of virtue has not\nbeen outlived even to-day. A sort of honest peasant-simplicity, which\nis possible, however, in all classes of society, and which one cannot\nmeet with anything else than a respectful smile, still thinks to-day\nthat everything is in good hands--that is to say, in \"God's hands\": and\nwhen it supports this proposition with that same modest assurance as\nthat with which it would assert that two and two are four, we others\nnaturally refrain from contradiction.\n\nWhy disturb _this_ pure foolery? Why darken it with our cares\nconcerning man, people, goals, the future? Even if we wished to\ndo so, we shouldn't succeed. _In_ all things these people see the\nreflection of their own venerable stupidity and goodness (in them the\nold God--_deus myops--_ still lives); we others see something else in\neverything: our problematic nature, our contradictions, our deeper,\nmore painful, and more suspicious wisdom.\n\n\n321.\n\nHe who finds a particular virtue an easy matter, ultimately laughs at\nit. Seriousness cannot be maintained once virtue is attained. As soon\nas a man has reached virtue, he jumps out of it--whither? Into devilry.\n\nMeanwhile, how intelligent all our evil tendencies and impulses have\nbecome! What an amount of inquisitiveness torments them! They are all\nfishhooks of knowledge!\n\n\n322.\n\nThe idea is to associate vice with something so terrible that at\nlast one is obliged to run away from it in order to be rid of its\nassociations. This is the well-known case of Tannh\u00e4user. Tannh\u00e4user,\nbrought to his wits' end by Wagnerian music, cannot endure life any\nlonger even in the company of Mrs. Venus: suddenly virtue begins to\nhave a charm for him; a Thuringian virgin goes up in price, and what\nis even worse still, he shows a liking for Wolfram von Eschenbach's\nmelody....\n\n\n323.\n\n_The Patrons of Virtue._--Lust of property, lust of power, laziness,\nsimplicity, fear; all these things are interested in virtue; that is\nwhy it stands so securely.\n\n\n324.\n\n_Virtue_ is no longer believed in; its powers of attraction are dead;\nwhat is needed is some one who will once more bring it into the market\nin the form of an outlandish kind of adventure and of dissipation. It\nexacts too much extravagance and narrow-mindedness from its believers\nto allow of conscience not being against it to-day. Certainly, for\npeople, without either consciences or scruples, this may constitute\nits new charm: it is now what it has never been before--a vice.\n\n\n325.\n\nVirtue is still the most expensive vice: _let_ it remain so!\n\n\n326.\n\nVirtues are as dangerous as vices, in so far as they are allowed to\nrule over one as authorities and laws coming from outside, and not as\nqualities one develops one's self. The latter is the only right way;\nthey should be the most personal means of defence and most individual\nneeds--the determining factors of precisely _our_ existence and growth,\nwhich we recognise and acknowledge independently of the question\nwhether others grow with us with the help of the same or of different\nprinciples. This view of the danger of the virtue which is understood\nas impersonal and _objective_ also holds good of modesty: through\nmodesty many of the choicest intellects perish. The morality of modesty\nis the worst possible softening influence for those souls for which it\nis pre-eminently necessary that they become _hard_ betimes.\n\n\n327.\n\nThe domain of morality must be reduced and limited step by step; the\nnames of the instincts which are really active in this sphere must be\ndrawn into the light of day and honoured, after they have lain all\nthis time in the concealment of hypocritical names of virtue. Out of\nrespect for one's \"honesty,\" which makes itself heard ever more and\nmore imperiously, one ought to unlearn the shame which makes one deny\nand \"explain away\" all natural instincts. The extent to which one can\ndispense with virtue is the measure of one's strength; and a height may\nbe imagined where the notion \"virtue\" is understood in such a way as\nto be reminiscent of _virt\u00f9_--the virtue of the Renaissance--free from\nmoralic acid. But for the moment--how remote this ideal seems!\n\n_The reduction of the domain of morality_ is a sign of its progress.\nWherever, hitherto, thought has not been guided by causality, thinking\nhas taken a _moral_ turn.\n\n\n328.\n\nAfter all, what have I achieved? Let us not close our eyes to this\nwonderful result: I have lent new _charms_ to virtue--it now affects\none in the same way as something _forbidden._ It has our most subtle\nhonesty against it, it is salted in the \"_cum grano salis_\" of the\nscientific pang of conscience. It savours of antiquity and of old\nfashion, and thus it is at last beginning to draw refined people and\nto make them inquisitive--in short, it affects us like a vice. Only\nafter we have once recognised that everything consists of lies and\nappearance, shall we have again earned the right to uphold this most\nbeautiful of all fictions--virtue. There will then remain no further\nreason to deprive ourselves of it: only when we have shown virtue to\nbe a _form of immorality_ do we again _justify it,_--it then becomes\nclassified, and likened, in its fundamental features, to the profound\nand general immorality of all existence, of which it is then shown to\nbe a part. It appears as a form of luxury of the first order, the most\narrogant, the dearest, and rarest form of vice. We have robbed it of\nits grimaces and divested it of its drapery; we have delivered it from\nthe importunate familiarity of the crowd; we have deprived it of its\nridiculous rigidity, its empty expression, its stiff false hair, and\nits hieratic muscles.\n\n\n329.\n\nAnd is it supposed that I have thereby done any harm to virtue?... Just\nas little as anarchists do to princes. Only since they have been shot\nat, have they once more sat securely on their thrones.... For thus\nit has always been and will ever be: one cannot do a thing a better\nservice than to persecute it and to run it to earth.... This--I have\ndone.\n\n\n\n5. THE MORAL IDEAL.\n\n\nA. _A Criticism of Ideals._\n\n\n\n330.\n\nIt were the thing to begin this criticism in suchwise as to do away\nwith the word \"_Ideal_\": a criticism of _desiderata._\n\n\n331.\n\nOnly the fewest amongst us are aware of what is involved, from the\nstandpoint of _desirability,_ in every \"thus should it be, but it\nis not,\" or even \"thus it ought to have been\": such expressions of\nopinion involve a condemnation of the whole course of events. For\nthere is nothing quite isolated in the world: the smallest thing bears\nthe largest on its back; on thy small injustice the whole nature of\nthe future depends; the whole is condemned by every criticism which\nis directed at the smallest part of it. Now granting that the moral\nnorm--even as Kant understood it--is never completely fulfilled, and\nremains like a sort of Beyond hanging over reality without ever falling\ndown to it; then morality would contain in itself a judgment concerning\nthe whole, which would still, however, allow of the question: _whence\ndoes it get the right thereto?_ How does the part come to acquire this\njudicial position relative to the whole? And if, as some have declared,\nthis moral condemnation of, and dissatisfaction with, reality, is\nan ineradicable instinct, is it not possible that this instinct may\nperhaps belong to the ineradicable stupidities and immodesties of our\nspecies?--But in saying this, we are doing precisely what we deprecate;\nthe point of view of desirability and of unauthorised fault-finding\nis part and parcel of the whole character of worldly phenomena just\nas every injustice and imperfection is--it is our very notion of\n\"perfection\" which is never gratified. Every instinct which desires\nto be indulged gives expression to its dissatisfaction with the\npresent state of things: how? Is the whole perhaps made up of a host\nof dissatisfied parts, which all have desiderata in their heads? Is\nthe \"course of things\" perhaps \"the road hence? the road leading away\nfrom reality \"--that is to say, eternal dissatisfaction in itself? Is\nthe conception of desiderata perhaps the essential motive-power of all\nthings? Is it--_deus_?\n\n***\n\nIt seems to me of the utmost importance that we should rid ourselves\nof the notion of _the_ whole, of an entity, and of any kind of power\nor form of the unconditioned. For we shall never be able to resist the\ntemptation of regarding it as the supreme being, and of christening\nit \"God.\" The \"All\" must be subdivided; we must unlearn our respect\nfor it, and reappropriate that which we have lent the unknown and an\nimaginary entity, for the purposes of our neighbour and ourselves.\nWhereas, for instance, Kant said: \"Two things remain for ever worthy\nof honour\" (at the close of his _Practical Reason_)--to-day we should\nprefer to say: \"Digestion is more worthy of honour.\" The concept,\n\"the All,\" will always give rise to the old problems, \"How is evil\npossible?\" etc. Therefore, _there is no \"All\",_ there _is no_ great\n_sensorium_ or _inventarium_ or power-magazine.\n\n\n332.\n\nA man as he _ought_ to be: this sounds to me in just as bad taste as:\n\"A tree as it ought to be.\"\n\n\n333.\n\nEthics: or the \"philosophy of desirability.\"--\"Things _ought_ to be\notherwise,\" \"things _ought_ to become different\": dissatisfaction\nwould thus seem the heart of ethics.\n\nOne could find a way out of it, first, by selecting only those states\nin which one is free from emotion; secondly, by grasping the insolence\nand stupidity of the attitude of mind: for to desire that something\nshould be otherwise than it is, means to desire that _everything_\nshould be different--it involves a damaging criticism of the whole.\n_But life itself consists in such desiring!_\n\nTo ascertain _what exists, how it exists_ seems an ever so much higher\nand more serious matter than every \"thus should it be,\" because the\nlatter, as a piece of human criticism and arrogance, appears to be\ncondemned as ludicrous from the start. It expresses a need which would\nfain have the organisation of the world correspond with our human\nwell-being, and which directs the will as much as possible towards the\naccomplishment of that relationship.\n\nOn the other hand, this desire, \"thus it ought to be,\" has only called\nforth that other desire, \"_what exists?_\" The desire of knowing what\nexists, is already a consequence of the question, \"how? is it possible?\nWhy precisely so?\" Our wonder at the disagreement between our desires\nand the course of the world has led to our learning to know the\ncourse of the world. Perhaps the matter stands differently: maybe the\nexpression, \"thus it ought to be,\" is merely the utterance of our\ndesire to overcome the world----\n\n\n334.\n\nTo-day when every attempt at determining how man should be--is\nreceived with some irony, when we adhere to the notion that in spite\nof all one only _becomes_ what one _is_(in spite of all--that is to\nsay, education, instruction, environment, accident, and disaster),\nin the matter of morality we have learnt, in a very peculiar way,\nhow to _reverse_ the relation of cause and effect. Nothing perhaps\ndistinguishes us more than this from the ancient believers in morality.\nWe no longer say, for instance, \"Vice is the cause of a man's\nphysical ruin,\" and we no longer say, \"A man prospers with virtue\nbecause it brings a long life and happiness.\" Our minds to-day are\nmuch more inclined to the belief that vice and virtue are not causes\nbut only _effects._ A man becomes a respectable member of society\nbecause he _was_ a respectable man from the start--that is to say,\nbecause he was born in possession of good instincts and prosperous\npropensities.... Should a man enter the world poor, and the son of\nparents who are neither economical nor thrifty, he is insusceptible\nof being improved--that is to say, he is only fit for the prison or\nthe madhouse.... To-day we are no longer able to separate moral from\nphysical degeneration: the former is merely a complicated symptom of\nthe latter; a man is necessarily bad just as he is necessarily ill....\nBad: this word here stands for a certain _lack of capacity_ which is\nrelated physiologically with the degenerating type--for instance, a\nweak will, an uncertain and many-sided personality, the inability to\nresist reacting to a stimulus and to control one's self, and a certain\nconstraint resulting from every suggestion proceeding from another's\nwill. Vice is not a cause; it is an _effect._ ... Vice is a somewhat\narbitrary-epitome of certain effects resulting from physiological\ndegeneracy. A general proposition such as that which Christianity\nteaches, namely, \"Man is evil,\" would be justified provided one were\njustified in regarding a given type of degenerate man as normal. But\nthis may be an exaggeration. Of course, wherever Christianity prospers\nand prevails, the proposition holds good: for then the existence of an\nunhealthy soil--of a degenerate territory--is demonstrated.\n\n\n335.\n\nIt is difficult to have sufficient respect for man, when one sees how\nhe understands the art of fighting his way, of enduring, of turning\ncircumstances to his own advantage, and of overthrowing opponents;\nbut when he is seen in the light of his _desires,_ he is the most\nabsurd of all animals. It is just as if he required a playground\nfor his cowardice, his laziness, his feebleness, his sweetness, his\nsubmissiveness, where he recovers from his strong virile virtues. Just\nlook at man's \"_desiderata_\" and his \"ideals.\" Man, when he _desires,\n_ tries to recover from that which is eternally valuable in him, from\nhis deeds; and then he rushes into nonentity, absurdity, valuelessness,\nchildishness. The intellectual indigence and lack of inventive power of\nthis resourceful and inventive animal is simply terrible. The \"ideal\"\nis at the same time the penalty man pays for the enormous expenditure\nwhich he has to defray in all real and pressing duties.--Should reality\ncease to prevail, there follow dreams, fatigue, weakness: an \"ideal\"\nmight even be regarded as a form of dream, fatigue, or weakness. The\nstrongest and the most impotent men become alike when this condition\novertakes them: they _deify_ the cessation of work, of war, of\npassions, of suspense, of contrasts, of \"reality \"--in short, of the\nstruggle for knowledge and of the _trouble_ of acquiring it.\n\n\"Innocence\" to them is idealised stultification; \"blessedness\" is\nidealised idleness; \"love,\" the ideal state of the gregarious animal\nthat will no longer have an enemy. And thus everything that lowers and\nbelittles man is elevated to an _ideal_.\n\n\n336.\n\nA desire _magnifies_ the thing desired; and by not being realised it\ngrows--the _greatest ideas_ are those which have been created by the\nstrongest and longest desiring. Things grow _ever more valuable_ in our\nestimation, the more our desire for them increases: if \"moral values\"\nhave become the highest values, it simply shows that the moral ideal\nis the one which has been _realised least_ (and thus it _represented\nthe Beyond to all suffering,_ as a road to _blessedness_). Man,\nwith ever-increasing ardour, has only been embracing _clouds_: and\nultimately called his desperation and impotence \"God.\"\n\n\n337.\n\nThink of the _na\u00efvet\u00e9_ of all ultimate \"desiderata\"--when the\n\"wherefore\" of man remains unknown.\n\n\n338.\n\nWhat is the counterfeit coinage of morality? First of all we should\nknow what \"good and evil\" mean. That is as good as wishing to know why\nman is here, and what his goal or his destiny is. And that means that\none would fain know that man actually _has_ a goal or a destiny.\n\nThe very obscure and arbitrary notion that humanity has a general\nduty to perform, and that, as a whole, it is striving towards a\ngoal, is still in its infancy. Perhaps we shall once more be rid\nof it before it becomes a \"fixed idea.\" ... But humanity does not\nconstitute a whole: it is an indissoluble multiplicity of ascending\nand descending organisms--it knows no such thing as a state of youth\nfollowed by _maturity_ and then age. But its strata lie confused and\nsuperimposed--and in a few thousand years there may be even younger\ntypes of men than we can point out to-day. Decadence, on the other\nhand, belongs to all periods of human history: everywhere there is\nrefuse and decaying matter, such things are in themselves vital\nprocesses; for withering and decaying elements must be eliminated.\n\nUnder the empire of Christian prejudice _this question was never put\nat all_: the purpose of life seemed to lie in the salvation of the\nindividual soul; the question whether humanity might last for a long or\na short time was not considered. The best Christians longed for the end\nto come as soon as possible;--concerning the needs of the individual,\n_there seemed to be no doubt whatsoever._ ... The duty of every\nindividual for the present was identical with what it would be in any\nsort of future for the man of the future: the value, the purpose, the\nlimit of values was for ever fixed, unconditioned, eternal, one with\nGod.... What deviated from this eternal type was impious, diabolic,\ncriminal.\n\nThe centre of gravity of all values for each soul lay in that soul\nitself: salvation or damnation! The salvation of the _immortal_ soul!\nThe most extreme form of _personalisation...._ For each soul there\nwas only one kind of perfection; only one ideal, only one road to\nsalvation.... The most extreme form of the principle of _equal rights,_\nassociated with an optical magnification of individual importance to\nthe point of megalomania.... Nothing but insanely important souls,\nrevolving round their own axes with unspeakable terror....\n\n***\n\nNobody believes in these assumed airs of importance any longer\nto-day: and we have sifted our wisdom through the sieve of contempt.\nNevertheless the _optical habit_ survives, which would fain measure the\nvalue of man by his proximity to a certain _ideal maw._ at bottom the\npersonalisation view is upheld as firmly as that of the _equality of\nrights as regards the ideal._ In short: people _seem to think that they\nknow_ what _the ultimate desideratum_ is in regard to the ideal man....\n\nBut this belief is merely the result of the exceedingly _detrimental\ninfluence_ of the Christian ideal, as anybody can discover for himself\nevery time he carefully examines the \"ideal type.\" In the first place,\nit is believed that the approach to a given \"type\" is desirable;\n_secondly,_ that this particular type is known; _thirdly,_ that every\ndeviation from this type is a retrograde movement, a stemming of the\nspirit of progress, a loss of power and might in man.... To dream of a\nstate of affairs in which this _perfect_ man will be in the majority:\nour friends the Socialists and even Messrs. the Utilitarians have not\nreached a higher level than this. In this way an _aim_ seems to have\ncrept into the _evolution_ of man: at any rate the belief in a certain\n_progress towards an ideal_ is the only shape in which an _aim_ is\nconceived in the history of mankind to-day. In short: the coming of the\n\"_Kingdom of God_\" has been placed in the future, and has been given an\nearthly, a human meaning--but on the whole the faith in the _old_ ideal\nis still maintained....\n\n\n340.\n\n_The more concealed forms of the cult of Christian, moral ideals._--The\n_insipid and cowardly notion \"Nature\"_ invented by Nature-enthusiasts\n(without any knowledge whatsoever of the terrible, the implacable,\nand the cynical element in even \"the most beautiful\" aspects), is\nonly a sort of attempt at _reading_ the moral and Christian notion of\n\"humanity\" into Nature;--Rousseau's concept of Nature, for instance,\nwhich took for granted that \"Nature\" meant freedom, goodness,\ninnocence, equity, justice, and _Idylls,_ was nothing more at bottom\nthan the cult of Christian morality. We should collect passages from\nthe poets in order to see _what_ they admired, in lofty mountains, for\ninstance. What Goethe had to do with them--why he admired Spinoza.\nAbsolute _ignorance_ concerning the reasons of this _cult...._\n\nThe _insipid and cowardly concept \"Man\"_ \u00e0 la Comte and Stuart\nMill, is at times the subject of a cult.... This is only the\nChristian moral ideal again under another name.... Refer also to the\nfreethinkers--Guyau for example.\n\nThe _insipid and cowardly concept \"Art\"_ which is held to mean sympathy\nwith all suffering and with everything botched and bungled (the same\nthing happens to _history,_ cf. Thierry): again it is the cult of the\nChristian moral ideal.\n\nAnd now, as to the whole _socialistic ideal_: it is nothing but a\nblockheaded misunderstanding of the Christian moral ideal.\n\n\n341.\n\n_The origin of the ideal._ The examination of the soil out of which it\ngrows.\n\n_A._ Starting out from those \"\u00e6sthetic\" mental states during which the\nworld seems rounder, fuller, and _more perfect_: we have the pagan\nideal with its dominating spirit of self-affirmation (_people give of\ntheir abundance_). The highest type: the _classical_ ideal--regarded\nas an expression of the successful nature of _all_ the more important\ninstincts. In this classical ideal we find _the grand style_ as the\nhighest style. An expression of the \"will to power\" itself. The\ninstinct which is most feared _dares to acknowledge itself._\n\n_B._ Starting out from the mental states in which the world seemed\nemptier, paler, and thinner, when \"spiritualisation\" and the absence\nof sensuality assume the rank of perfection, and when all that is\nbrutal, animal, direct, and proximate is avoided (_people calculate\nand select_): the \"sage,\" \"the angel\"; priestliness = virginity =\nignorance, are the physiological ideals of such idealists: the _an\u00e6mic_\nideal. Under certain circumstances this an\u00e6mic ideal may be the ideal\nof such natures as _represent_ paganism (thus Goethe sees his \"saint\"\nin Spinoza).\n\n_C._ Starting out from those mental states in which the world seemed\nmore absurd, more evil, poorer, and more deceptive, an ideal cannot\neven be imagined or desired in it (_people deny and annihilate_);\nthe projection of the ideal into the sphere of the anti-natural,\nanti-actual, anti-logical; the state of him who judges thus (the\n\"impoverishment\" of the world as a result of suffering: _people take,\nthey no longer bestow_): the _anti-natural ideal._\n\n(The _Christian ideal_ is a _transitional form_ between the second\nand the third, now inclining more towards the former type, and anon\ninclining towards the latter.)\n\n_The three ideals: A._ Either a _strengthening_ of Life (_paganism,_)\nor _B._ an _impoverishment_ of Life (_an\u00e6mia_), or _C._ a _denial_ of\nLife (_anti-naturalism_). The state of beatitude in _A._ is the feeling\nof extreme abundance; in _B._ it is reached by the most fastidious\nselectiveness; in _C._ it is the contempt and the destruction of Life.\n\n\n342.\n\n_A._ The _consistent_ type understands that even evil must not be\nhated, must not be resisted, and that it is not allowable to make war\nagainst one's self; that it does not suffice merely to accept the pain\nwhich such behaviour brings in its train; that one lives entirely in\npositive feelings; that one takes the side of one's opponents in word\nand deed; that by means of a superf\u0153tation of peaceful, kindly,\nconciliatory, helpful, and loving states, one impoverishes the soil of\nthe other states, ... that one is in need of unremitting _practice._\nWhat is achieved thereby?--The Buddhistic type, or the _perfect_ cow.\n\nThis point of view is possible only where no moral fanaticism\nprevails--that is to say, when evil is not hated on its own account,\nbut because it opens the road to conditions which are painful (unrest,\nwork, care, complications, dependence).\n\nThis is the Buddhistic point of view: there is no hatred of sin, the\nconcept \"sin,\" in fact, is entirely lacking.\n\n_B._ The _inconsistent_ type. War is waged against evil--there is a\nbelief that war waged _for Goodness' sake_ does not involve the same\nmoral results or affect character in the same way as war generally\ndoes (and owing to which tendencies it is detested as _evil)._ As a\nmatter of fact, a war of this sort carried on against evil is much\nmore profoundly pernicious than any sort of personal hostility; and\ngenerally, it is \"the person\" which reassumes, at least in fancy, the\nposition of opponent (the devil, evil spirits, etc.). The attitude of\nhostile observation and spying in regard to everything which may be\nbad in us, or hail from a bad source, culminates in a most tormented\nand most anxious state of mind: thus \"miracles,\" rewards, ecstasy, and\ntranscendental solutions of the earth-riddle now became _desirable_.\n... The Christian type: or the _perfect bigot_.\n\n_C._ The _stoical_ type. Firmness, self-control, imperturbability,\npeace in the form of the rigidity of a will long active--profound\nquiet, the defensive state, the fortress, the mistrust of war--firmness\nof principles; the unity of _knowledge_ and _will_; great self-respect.\nThe type of the anchorite. _The perfect blockhead._\n\n\n343.\n\nAn ideal which is striving to prevail or to assert itself endeavours\nto further its purpose _(a)_ by laying claim to a _spurious_ origin;\n_(b)_ by assuming a relationship between itself and the powerful ideals\nalready existing; _(c)_ by means of the thrill produced by mystery,\nas though an unquestionable power were manifesting itself; _(d)_ by\nthe slander of its opponents' ideals; _(e)_ by a lying teaching of\nthe advantages which follow in its wake, for instance: happiness,\nspiritual peace, general peace, or even the assistance of a mighty\nGod, etc.--Contributions to the psychology of the idealists: Carlyle,\nSchiller, Michelet.\n\nSupposing all the means of defence and protection, by means of which an\nideal survives, are discovered, is it thereby _refuted_? It has merely\navailed itself of the means of which everything lives and grows--they\nare all \"immoral.\"\n\nMy view: all the forces and instincts which are the source of life\nare lying beneath the _ban of morality_: morality is the life-denying\ninstinct. Morality must be annihilated if life is to be emancipated.\n\n\n344.\n\nTo _avoid_ knowing himself is the prudence of the idealist. The\nidealist: a creature who has reasons for remaining in the dark\nconcerning himself, and who is also clever enough to remain in the dark\nconcerning these reasons also.\n\n\n345.\n\n_The tendency of moral evolution._--Every one's desire is that there\nshould be no other teaching and valuation of things than those by means\nof which he himself succeeds. Thus the _fundamental tendency_ of the\n_weak_ and _mediocre_ of all times, has been to _enfeeble the strong\nand to reduce them to the level of the weak: their chief weapon in this\nprocess_ was the _moral principle._ The attitude of the strong towards\nthe weak is branded as evil; the highest states of the strong become\nbad bywords.\n\nThe struggle of the many against the strong, of the ordinary against\nthe extraordinary, of the weak against the strong: meets with one\nof its finest interruptions in the fact that the rare, the refined,\nthe more exacting, present themselves as the weak, and repudiate the\ncoarser weapons of power.\n\n\n346.\n\n(1) The so-called pure instinct for knowledge of all philosophers\nis dictated to them by their moral \"truths,\" and is only seemingly\nindependent.\n\n(2) The \"Moral Truths,\" \"thus shall things be done,\" are mere states\nof consciousness of an instinct which has grown tired, \"thus and thus\nare things done by us.\" The \"ideal\" is supposed to re-establish and\nstrengthen an instinct; it flatters man to feel he can obey when he is\nonly an automaton.\n\n\n347.\n\n_Morality as a means of seduction._--\"Nature is good; for a wise\nand good God is its cause. Who, therefore, is responsible for the\n'corruption of man'? Tyrants and seducers and the ruling classes are\nresponsible--they must be wiped out\": this is Rousseau's logic (compare\nwith _Pascals_ logic, which concludes by an appeal to original sin).\n\nRefer also to _Luther's_ logic, which is similar. In both cases a\npretext is sought for the introduction of an insatiable lust of revenge\nas a _moral and religious_ duty. The hatred directed against the ruling\nclasses tries to _sanctify_ itself ... (the \"sinfulness of Israel\" is\nthe basis of the priest's powerful position).\n\nCompare this with _Pauls_ logic, which is similar. It is always under\nthe cover of God's business that these reactions appear, under the\ncover of what is right, or of humanity, etc. In the case of _Christ_\nthe rejoicings of the people appear as the cause of His crucifixion.\nIt was an anti-priestly movement from the beginning. Even in the\nanti-Semitic movement we find the same trick: the opponent is overcome\nwith moral condemnations, and those who attack him pose as _retributive\nJustice._\n\n\n348.\n\n_The incidents of the fight_: the fighter tries to transform his\nopponent into the _exact opposite_ of himself--imaginatively, of\ncourse. He tries to believe in himself to such an extent that he may\nhave the courage necessary for the \"good Cause\" (as if he were the\n_good Cause_); as if reason, taste, and virtue were being assailed\nby his opponents.... The belief of which he is most in need, as the\nstrongest means of defence and attack, _is the belief in himself,_\nwhich, however, knows how to misinterpret itself as a belief in\nGod. He never pictures the advantages and the uses of victory, but\nonly understands victory for the sake of victory--for God's sake.\nEvery small community (or individual), finding itself involved in\na struggle, strives to convince itself of this: \"_Good taste, good\njudgment, and virtue are ours._\" War urges people to this _exaggerated\nself-esteem_....\n\n\n349.\n\nWhatever kind of _eccentric ideal_ one may have (whether as\na \"Christian,\" a \"free-spirit,\" an \"immoralist,\" or a German\nImperialist), one should try to avoid insisting upon its being _the_\nideal; for, by so doing, it is deprived of all its privileged nature.\nOne should have an ideal as a distinction; one should not propagate it,\nand thus level one's self down to the rest of mankind.\n\nHow is it, that in spite of this obvious fact, the majority of\nidealists indulge in propaganda for their ideal, just as if they had\nno right to it unless the _majority_ acquiesce therein?--For instance,\nall those plucky and insignificant girls behave in this way, who claim\nthe right to study Latin and mathematics. What is it urges them to do\nthis? I fear it is the instinct of the herd, and the terror of the\nherd: they fight for the \"emancipation of woman,\" because they are best\nable to achieve their own private little distinction by fighting for it\nunder the cover of a _charitable movement,_ under the banner bearing\nthe device \"For others.\"\n\nThe _cleverness_ of idealists consists in their persistently posing\nas the missionaries and \"representatives\" of an ideal: they thus\n\"beautify\" themselves in the eyes of those who still believe in\ndisinterestedness and heroism. Whereas real heroism consists, _not_\nin fighting under the banner of self-sacrifice, submission, and\ndisinterestedness, but in _not fighting at all_.... \"I am thus; I will\nbe thus--and you can go to the devil!\"\n\n\n350.\n\n_Every_ ideal assumes _love, hate, reverence,_ and _contempt._ Either\npositive feeling is the _primum mobile,_ or negative feeling is.\n_Hatred_ and _contempt_ are the _primum mobile_ in all the ideals which\nproceed from resentment.\n\nB. _A Criticism of the \"Good Man\" of the Saint, etc._\n\n\n351.\n\nThe \"_good man_\" Or, hemiplegia of virtue.--In the opinion of every\nstrong and natural man, love and hate, gratitude and revenge, goodness\nand anger, affirmative and negative action, belong to each other. A\nman is good on condition that he knows how to be evil; a man is evil,\nbecause otherwise he would not know how to be good. Whence comes\nthe morbidness and ideological unnaturalness which repudiates these\ncompounds--which teaches a sort of one-sided efficiency as the highest\nof all things? Whence this hemiplegia of virtue, the invention of the\ngood man? The object seems to be to make man amputate those instincts\nwhich enable him to be an enemy, to be harmful, to be angry, and to\ninsist upon revenge.... This unnaturalness, then, corresponds to that\ndualistic concept of a wholly good and of a wholly bad creature (God,\nSpirit, Man); in the first are found all the positive, in the second\nall the negative forces, intentions, and states. This method of valuing\nthus believes itself to be \"idealistic\"; it never doubts that in its\nconcept of the \"good man,\" it has found the highest desideratum. When\naspiring to its zenith it fancies a state in which all evil is wiped\nout, and in which only good creatures have actually remained over.\nIt does not therefore regard the mutual dependence of the opposites\ngood and evil as proved. On the contrary, the latter ought to vanish,\nand the former should remain. The first has a right to exist, the\nsecond ought not _to be with us at all...._ What, as a matter of fact,\nis the reason of this desire? In all ages, and particularly in the\nChristian age, much labour has been spent in trying to reduce men\nto this one-sided activity: and even to-day, among those who have\nbeen deformed and weakened by the Church, people are not lacking who\ndesire precisely the same thing with their \"humanisation\" generally,\nor with their \"Will of God,\" or with their \"Salvation of the Soul.\"\nThe principal injunction behind all these things is, that man should\nno longer do anything evil, that he should under no circumstances be\nharmful or _desire_ harm. The way to arrive at this state of affairs is\nto amputate all hostile tendencies, to suppress all the instincts of\nresentment, and to establish \"spiritual peace\" as a chronic disease.\n\nThis attitude of mind, in which a certain type of man is bred,\nstarts out with this absurd hypothesis: good and evil are postulated\nas realities which are in a state of mutual contradiction (not as\ncomplementary values, which they are), people are advised to take the\nside of the good, and it is insisted upon that a good man resists\nand forswears evil until every trace of it is uprooted--_but with\nthis valuation Life is actually denied,_ for in all its instincts\nLife has both yea and nay. But far from understanding these facts,\nthis valuation dreams rather of returning to the wholeness, oneness,\nand strengthfulness of Life: it actually believes that a state of\nblessedness will be reached when the inner anarchy and state of unrest\nwhich result from these opposed impulses is brought to an end.--It is\npossible that no more dangerous ideology, no greater mischief _in the\nscience of psychology,_ has ever yet existed, as this will to good: the\nmost repugnant type of man has been reared, the man who is _not free,_\nthe bigot; it was taught that only in the form of a bigot could one\ntread the path which leads to God, and that only a bigot's life could\nbe a godly life.\n\nAnd even here, Life is still in the right--Life that knows not how to\nseparate Yea from Nay: what is the good of declaring with all one's\nmight that war is an evil, that one must harm no one, that one must\nnot act negatively? One is still waging a war even in this, it is\nimpossible to do otherwise! The good man who has renounced all evil,\nand who is afflicted according to his desire with the hemiplegia of\nvirtue, does not therefore cease from waging war, or from making\nenemies, or from saying \"nay\" and doing \"nay.\" The Christian, for\ninstance, hates \"sin\"!--and what on earth is there which he does\nnot call \"sin\"! It is precisely because of his belief in a moral\nantagonism between good and evil, that the world for him has grown\nso full of hatefulness and things that must be combated eternally.\nThe \"good man\" sees himself surrounded by evil, and, thanks to the\ncontinual onslaughts of the latter, his eye grows more keen, and in\nthe end discovers traces of evil in every one of his acts. And thus he\nultimately arrives at the conclusion, which to him is quite logical,\nthat Nature is evil, that man is corrupted, and that being good is an\nact of grace (that is to say, it is impossible to man when he stands\nalone). In short: _he denies Life,_ he sees how \"good,\" as the highest\nvalue, _condemns_ Life.... And thus his ideology concerning good and\nevil ought to strike him as refuted. But one cannot refute a disease.\nTherefore he is obliged to conceive _another_ life!...\n\n\n352.\n\nPower, whether in the hands of a god or of a man, is always understood\nto consist in the ability to _harm_ as well as to _help._ This is the\ncase with the Arabs and with the Hebrews, in fact with all strong and\nwell-constituted races.\n\nThe dualistic separation of the two powers is fatal.... In this way\nmorality becomes the poisoner of life.\n\n\n353.\n\n_A criticism of the good man._--Honesty, dignity, dutifulness, justice,\nhumanity, loyalty, uprightness, clean conscience--is it really supposed\nthat, by means of these fine-sounding words, the qualities they stand\nfor are approved and affirmed for their own sake? Or is it this, that\nqualities and states indifferent in themselves have merely been looked\nat in a light which lends them some value? Does the worth of these\nqualities lie in themselves, or in the use and advantages to which they\nlead (or to which they seem to lead, to which they are expected to\nlead)?\n\nI naturally do not wish to imply that there is any opposition between\nthe _ego_ and the _alter_ in the judgment: the question is, whether\nit is the _results_ of these qualities, either in regard to him who\npossesses them or in regard to environment, society, \"humanity,\" which\nlend them their value; or whether they have a value in themselves....\nIn other words: is it _utility_ which bids men condemn, combat, and\ndeny the opposite qualities (duplicity, falseness, perversity, lack\nof self-confidence, inhumanity)? Is the essence of such qualities\ncondemned, or only their consequences? In other words: were it\n_desirable_ that there should exist no men at all possessed of such\nqualities? _In any case, this is believed_.... But here lies the error,\nthe shortsightedness, the monocularity of _narrow egoism._\n\nExpressed otherwise: would it be desirable to create circumstances in\nwhich the whole advantage would be on the side of the just--so that\nall those with opposite natures and instincts would be discouraged and\nwould slowly become extinct?\n\nAt bottom, this is a question of taste and of _\u00e6sthetics_: should we\ndesire the most honourable types of men--that is to say, the greatest\nbores--alone to subsist? the rectangular, the virtuous, the upright,\nthe good-natured, the straightforward, and the \"blockheads\"?\n\nIf one can imagine the total suppression of the huge number\nconstituting the \"others,\" even the just man himself ceases from having\na right to exist,--he is, in fact, no longer necessary,--and in this\nway it is seen that coarse utility alone could have elevated such an\n_insufferable_ virtue to a place of honour.\n\nDesirability may lie precisely on the other side. It might be better\nto create conditions in which the \"just man\" would be reduced to\nthe humble position of a \"useful instrument\"--an \"ideal gregarious\nanimal,\" or at best a herdsman: in short, conditions in which he would\nno longer stand in the highest sphere, which requires _other qualities_.\n\n\n354.\n\n_The \"good man\" as a tyrant--_Mankind has always repeated the same\nerror: it has always transformed a mere vital measure into the\n_measure_ and standard of life;--instead of seeking the standard in\nthe highest ascent of life, in the problem of growth and exhaustion,\nit takes the _preservative measures_ of a very definite kind of life,\nand uses them to exclude all other kinds of life, and even to criticise\nLife itself and to select from among its forms. That is to say, man\nultimately forgets that measures are a means to an end, and gets to\nlike them for themselves: they take the place of a goal in his mind,\nand even become the standard of goals to him--that is to say, _a given\nspecies of man_ regards his means of existence as the only legitimate\nmeans, as the means which ought to be imposed upon all, as \"truth,\"\n\"goodness,\" \"perfection\": the given species, in fact, begins to\n_tyrannise._ ... It is a _form of faith,_ of instinct, when a certain\nspecies of man does not perceive that his kind has been conditioned,\nwhen he does not understand his relation to other species. At any rate,\nany species of men (a people or a race) seems to be doomed as soon as\nit becomes tolerant, grants equal rights, and no longer desires to be\nmaster.\n\n\n355.\n\n\"All good people are weak: they are good because they are not strong\nenough to be evil,\" said the Latuka chieftain Comorro to Baker.\n\n* * *\n\n\"Disasters are not to the faint-hearted,\" is a Russian proverb.\n\n\n356.\n\nModest, industrious, benevolent, and temperate: thus you would that\nmen were?--that _good men_ were? But such men I can only conceive as\nslaves, the slaves of the future.\n\n\n357.\n\n_The metamorphoses of slavery_; its disguise in the cloak of religion;\nits transfiguration through morality.\n\n\n358.\n\n_The ideal slave_ (the \"good man\").--He who cannot regard himself\nas a \"purpose,\" and who cannot give himself any aim whatsoever,\ninstinctively honours the morality of _unselfishness._ Everything urges\nhim to this morality: his prudence, his experience, and his vanity. And\neven faith is a form of self-denial.\n\n***\n\n_Atavism_: delightful feeling, to be able to obey unconditionally for\nonce.\n\n***\n\nIndustry, modesty, benevolence, temperance, are just so many\n_obstacles_ in the way of _sovereign sentiments,_ of great _ingenuity,_\nof an heroic purpose, of noble existence for one's self.\n\n***\n\nIt is not a question of _going ahead_ (to that end all that is required\nis to be at best a herdsman, that is to say, the prime need of the\nherd), it is rather a matter of _getting along alone,_ of _being able\nto be another._\n\n\n359.\n\nWe must realise _all_ that has been accumulated as the result of\nthe highest moral _idealism_: how almost _all other values_ have\ncrystallised round it. This shows that it has been desired for _a very\nlong time_ and with the _strongest passions_--and that it has not yet\nbeen attained: otherwise it would have _disappointed_ everybody (that\nis to say, it would have been followed by a more moderate valuation).\n\nThe _saint_ as the _most powerful type_ of man: _this_ ideal it is\nwhich has elevated the value of moral perfection so high. One would\nthink that the whole of science had been engaged in proving that the\n_moral_ man is the most _powerful_ and most godly.--The conquest of the\nsenses and the passions--everything inspired _terror_;--the unnatural\nseemed to the spectators to be _supernatural_ and _transcendental...._\n\n\n360.\n\nFrancis of Assisi: amorous and popular, a poet who combats the order\nof rank among souls, in favour of the lowest. The denial of spiritual\nhierarchy--\"all alike before God.\"\n\nPopular ideals: the good man, the unselfish man, the saint, the sage,\nthe just man. O Marcus Aurelius!\n\n\n361.\n\nI have declared war against the an\u00e6mic Christian ideal (together with\nwhat is closely _I_ related to it), not because I want to annihilate\nit, but only to put an end to its _tyranny_ and clear the way for\nother _ideals,_ for _more robust_ ideals.... The _continuance_ of the\nChristian ideal belongs to the most desirable of desiderata: if only\nfor the sake of the ideals which wish to take their stand beside it and\nperhaps above it--they must have opponents, and strong ones too, in\norder to grow _strong_ themselves. That is why we immoralists require\nthe _power_ of _morality,_ our instinct of self-preservation insists\nupon our opponents maintaining their strength--all it requires is to\n_become master of them_.\n\n\n\nC. _Concerning the Slander of the so-called Evil Qualities_.\n\n\n362.\n\nEgoism and its problem! The Christian gloominess of La Rochefoucauld,\nwho saw egoism in everything, and imagined that he had therefore\n_reduced_ the worth of things and virtues! In opposition to him,\nI first of all tried to show that nothing else _could_ exist save\negoism,--that in those men whose _ego_ is weak and thin, the power to\nlove also grows weak,--that the greatest lovers are such owing to the\nstrength of their _ego,_--that love is an expression of egoism, etc.\nAs a matter of fact, the false valuation aims at the interest of those\nwho find it useful, whom it helps--in fact, the herd; it fosters a\npessimistic mistrust towards the basis of Life; it would fain undermine\nthe most glorious and most well-constituted men (out of fear); it would\nassist the lowly to have the upper hand of their conquerors; it is the\ncause of universal dishonesty, especially in the most useful type of\nmen.\n\n\n363.\n\nMan is an indifferent egoist: even the cleverest regards his habits as\nmore important than his advantage.\n\n\n364.\n\nEgoism! But no one has yet asked: _what_ is the _ego_ like? Everybody\nis rather inclined to see all _egos_ alike. This is the result of the\nslave theory, of _universal suffrage,_ and of \"equality.\"\n\n\n365.\n\nThe behaviour of a higher man is the result of a very complex set of\nmotives: any word such as \"pity\" _betrays_ nothing of this complexity.\nThe most important factor is the feeling, \"who am I? who is the other\nrelative to me?\"--Thus the valuing spirit is continually active.\n\n\n366.\n\nTo think that the history of all moral phenomena may be simplified, as\nSchopenhauer thought,--that is to say, that _pity_ is to be found at\nthe root of every moral impulse that has ever existed hitherto,--is\nto be guilty of a degree of nonsense and ingenuousness worthy only\nof a thinker who is devoid of all historical instincts and who has\nmiraculously succeeded in evading the strong schooling in history which\nthe Germans, from Herder to Hegel, have undergone.\n\n\n367.\n\n_My \"pity.\"_--This is a feeling for which I can find no adequate\nterm: I feel it when I am in the presence of any waste of precious\ncapabilities, as, for instance, when I contemplate Luther: what power\nand what tasteless problems fit for back-woodsmen! (At a time when the\nbrave and light-hearted scepticism of a Montaigne was already possible\nin France!) Or when I see some one standing below where he might have\nstood, thanks to the development of a set of perfectly senseless\naccidents. Or even when, with the thought of man's destiny in my mind,\nI contemplate with horror and contempt the whole system of modern\nEuropean politics, which is creating the circumstances and weaving\nthe fabric of the _whole_ future of mankind. Yes, to what could not\n\"mankind\" attain, if----! This is my \"pity\"; despite the fact that no\nsufferer yet exists with whom I sympathise in this way.\n\n\n368.\n\nPity is a waste of feeling, a moral parasite which is injurious to\nthe health, \"it cannot possibly be our duty to increase the evil in\nthe world.\" If one does good merely out of pity, it is one's self and\nnot one's neighbour that one is succouring. Pity does not depend upon\nmaxims, but upon emotions. The suffering we see infects us; pity is an\ninfection.\n\n\n369.\n\nThere is no such thing as egoism which keeps within its bounds and\ndoes not exceed them--consequently, the \"allowable,\" the \"morally\nindifferent\" egoism of which some people speak, does not exist at all.\n\n\"One is continually promoting the interests of one's '_ego_' at the\ncost of other people \"; \"Living consists in living at the cost of\nothers\"--he who has not grasped this fact, has not taken the first step\ntowards truth to himself.\n\n\n370.\n\nThe \"subject\" is a piece of fiction: the _ego_ of which every one\nspeaks when he blames egoism, does not exist at all.\n\n\n371.\n\nOur \"ego\"--which is _not_ one with the unitary controlling force of our\nbeings!--is really only an imagined synthesis; therefore there can _be_\nno \"_egoistic_\" _actions_.\n\n\n372.\n\nSince all instincts are unintelligent, utility cannot represent a\nstandpoint as far as they are concerned. Every instinct, when it is\nactive, sacrifices strength and other instincts into the bargain: in\nthe end it is stemmed, otherwise it would be the end of everything\nowing to the waste it would bring about. Thus: that which is\n\"unegoistic,\" self-sacrificing, and imprudent is nothing in particular\n--it is common to all the instincts; they do not consider the welfare\nof the whole _ego_ (_because they simply do not think!_), they act\ncounter to our interests, against the _ego_: and often _for_ the\n_ego--_innocent in both cases!\n\n\n373.\n\n_The origin of moral values._--Selfishness has as much value as the\nphysiological value of him who possesses it. Each individual represents\nthe whole course of Evolution, and he is not, as morals teach,\nsomething that begins at his birth. If he represent the _ascent_ of the\nline of mankind, his value is, in fact, very great; and the concern\nabout his maintenance and the promoting of his growth may even be\nextreme. (It is the concern about the promise of the future in him\nwhich gives the well-constituted individual such an extraordinary right\nto egoism.) If he represent _descending_ development, decay, chronic\nsickening, he has little worth: and the greatest fairness would have\nhim take as little room, strength, and sunshine as possible from the\nwell-constituted. In this case society's duty is to _suppress egoism_\n(for the latter may sometimes manifest itself in an absurd, morbid,\nand seditious manner): whether it be a question of the decline and\npining away of single individuals or of whole classes of mankind. A\nmorality and a religion of \"love,\" the _curbing_ of the self-affirming\nspirit, and a doctrine encouraging patience, resignation, helpfulness,\nand co-operation in word and deed may be of the highest value within\nthe confines of such classes, even in the eyes of their rulers:\nfor it restrains the feelings of rivalry, of resentment, and of\nenvy,--feelings which are only too natural in the bungled and the\nbotched,--and it even deifies them under the ideal of humility, of\nobedience, of slave-life, of being ruled, of poverty, of illness, and\nof lowliness. This explains why the ruling classes (or races) and\nindividuals of all ages have always upheld the cult of unselfishness,\nthe gospel of the lowly and of \"God on the Cross.\"\n\nThe preponderance of an altruistic way of valuing is the result of\na consciousness of the fact that one is botched and bungled. Upon\nexamination, this point of view turns out to be: \"I am not worth\nmuch,\" simply a psychological valuation; more plainly still: it is\nthe feeling of impotence, of the lack of the great self-asserting\nimpulses of power (in muscles, nerves, and ganglia). This valuation\ngets translated, according to the particular culture of these classes,\ninto a moral or religious principle (the pre-eminence of religious or\nmoral precepts is always a sign of low culture): it tries to justify\nitself in spheres whence, as far as it is concerned, the notion \"value\"\nhails. The interpretation by means of which the Christian sinner\ntries to understand himself, is an attempt at justifying his lack of\npower and of self-confidence: he prefers to feel himself a sinner\nrather than feel bad for nothing: it is in itself a symptom of decay\nwhen interpretations of this sort are used at all. In some cases the\nbungled and the botched do not look for the reason of their unfortunate\ncondition in their own guilt (as the Christian does), but in society:\nwhen, however, the Socialist, the Anarchist, and the Nihilist are\nconscious that their existence is something for which some one must\nbe _guilty,_ they are very closely related to the Christian, who also\nbelieves that he can more easily endure his ill ease and his wretched\nconstitution when he has found some one whom he can hold _responsible_\nfor it. The instinct of _revenge_ and _resentment_ appears in both\ncases here as a means of enduring life, as a self-preservative measure,\nas is also the favour shown to _altruistic_ theory and practice. The\n_hatred of egoism,_ whether it be one's own (as in the case of the\nChristian), or another's (as in the case of the Socialists), thus\nappears as a valuation reached under the predominance of revenge; and\nalso as an act of prudence on the part of the preservative instinct\nof the suffering, in the form of an increase in their feelings of\nco-operation and unity.... At bottom, as I have already suggested,\nthe discharge of resentment which takes place in the act of judging,\nrejecting, and punishing egoism (one's own or that of others) is\nstill a self-preservative measure on the part of the bungled and the\nbotched. In short: the cult of altruism is merely a particular form of\negoism, which regularly appears under certain definite physiological\ncircumstances.\n\nWhen the Socialist, with righteous indignation, cries for \"justice,\"\n\"rights,\" \"equal rights,\" it only shows that he is oppressed by his\ninadequate culture, and is unable to understand why he suffers: he\nalso finds pleasure in crying;--if he were more at ease he would take\njolly good care not to cry in that way: in that case he would seek his\npleasure elsewhere. The same holds good of the Christian: he curses,\ncondemns, and slanders the \"world\"--and does not even except himself.\nBut that is no reason for taking him seriously. In both cases we are\nin the presence of invalids who feel better for crying, and who find\nrelief in slander.\n\n\n374.\n\nEvery society has a tendency to reduce its opponents to\n_caricatures,_--at least in its own imagination,--as also to\nstarve them. As an example of this sort of caricature we have our\n\"_criminal._\" In the midst of the Roman and aristocratic order of\nvalues, the _Jew_ was reduced to a caricature. Among artists, \"Mrs.\nGrundy and the bourgeois\" become caricatures; while among pious\npeople it is the heretics, and among aristocrats, the plebeian. Among\nimmoralists it is the moralist. Plato, for instance, in _my_ books\nbecomes a caricature.\n\n\n375.\n\nAll the instincts and forces which morality praises, seem to me to\nbe essentially the same as those which it slanders and rejects: for\ninstance, justice as will to power, will to truth as a means in the\nservice of the will to power.\n\n\n376.\n\nThe _turning of_ man's _nature inwards._ The process of turning a\nnature inwards arises when, owing to the establishment of peace and\nsociety, powerful instincts are prevented from venting themselves\noutwardly, and strive to survive harmlessly inside in conjunction with\nthe imagination. The need of hostility, cruelty, revenge, and violence\nis reverted, \"it steps backwards\"; in the thirst for knowledge there\nlurks both the lust of gain and of conquest; in the artist, the powers\nof dissimulation and falsehood find their scope; the instincts are thus\ntransformed into demons with whom a fight takes place, etc.\n\n\n377.\n\n_Falsity._--Every _sovereign instinct_ makes the others its\ninstruments, its retainers and its sycophants: it never allows itself\nto be called by its more hateful name: and it brooks no terms of praise\nin which it cannot _indirectly_ find its share. Around every sovereign\ninstinct all praise and blame in general crystallises into a rigorous\nform of ceremonial and etiquette. This is _one_ of the causes of\nfalsity.\n\n_Every_ instinct _which aspires to dominion,_ but which finds itself\nunder a yoke, requisitions all the most beautiful names and the\n_most generally accepted_ values to strengthen it and to support its\nself-esteem, and this explains why _as a rule_ it dares to come forward\nunder the name of the \"master\" it is combating and from whom it would\nbe free (for instance, under the domination of Christian values, the\ndesires of the flesh and of power act in this way). This is the _other_\ncause of falsity.\n\nIn both cases _complete ingenuousness_ reigns: the falseness _never_\neven occurs to the mind of those concerned. It is the sign of a\n_broken_ instinct when man sees the motive force and its \"expression\"\n(\"the mask\") as separate things--it is a sign of inner contradiction\nand is much less formidable. Absolute _innocence_ in bearing, word,\nand passion, a \"good conscience\" in falseness, and the certainty\nwherewith all the grandest and most pompous words and attitudes are\nappropriated--all these things are necessary for victory.\n\nIn the _other case_: that is to say, when _extreme clearsightedness_\nis present, the genius of the _actor_ is needful as well as tremendous\ndiscipline in self-control, if victory is to be achieved. That is why\npriests are the cleverest and _most conscious_ hypocrites; and then\ncome princes, in whom their position in life and their antecedents\naccount for a certain histrionic gift. Society men and diplomatists\ncome third, and women fourth.\n\n_The fundamental thought_: Falsity seems so deep, so many-sided, and\nthe _will_ is directed so inexorably against perfect self-knowledge\nand accurate self-classification, that one is _very probably right in\nsupposing that Truth_ and _the will to truth_ are perhaps something\nquite different and only _disguises._ (The need of _faith_ is the\ngreatest obstacle in the way of truthfulness.)\n\n\n378.\n\n\"Thou shalt not tell a falsehood\": people insist upon truthfulness. But\nthe acknowledgment of facts (the refusal to allow one's self to be lied\nto) has always been greatest with liars: they actually recognised the\nreality of this popular \"truthfulness.\" There is too much or too little\nbeing said continually: to insist upon people's _exposing themselves_\nwith every word they say, is a piece of na\u00efvet\u00e9.\n\nPeople say what they think, they are \"truthful\"; but _only under\ncertain circumstances_: that is to say, provided they be _understood_\n(_inter pares_), and understood with good will into the bargain (_once\nmore inter pares_). One conceals one's self in the presence of the\n_unfamiliar_: and he who would attain to something, says what he would\nfain have people think about him, but _not_ what he thinks. (\"The\npowerful man is always a liar.\")\n\n\n379.\n\nThe great counterfeit coinage of Nihilism concealed beneath an artful\nabuse of moral values:--\n\n_(a)_ Love regarded as self-effacement; as also pity.\n\n_(b)_ The _most impersonal intellect_ (\"the philosopher\") can know the\n_truth_, \"the true essence and nature of things.\"\n\n_(c)_ Genius, _great men_ are _great,_ because they do not strive\nto further their own interests: the _value_ of man _increases_ in\nproportion as he effaces himself.\n\n_(d)_ Art as the work of the \"_pure free-willed subject_\";\nmisunderstanding of \"objectivity.\"\n\n_(e)_ Happiness as the object of life: _virtue_ as a means to an end.\n\nThe pessimistic condemnation of life by Schopenhauer is a _moral_ one.\nTransference of the gregarious standards into the realm of metaphysics.\n\nThe \"individual\" lacks sense, he must therefore have his origin in \"the\nthing in itself\" (and the significance of his existence must be shown\nto be \"error\"); parents are only an \"accidental cause.\"--The mistake\non the part of science in considering the individual as the result of\nall past life instead of the epitome of all past life, is now becoming\nknown.\n\n\n380.\n\n1. Systematic _falsification of history,_ so that it may present a\nproof of the moral valuation:\n\n_(a)_ The decline of a people and corruption. _(b)_ The rise of a\npeople and virtue. _(c)_ The zenith of a people (\"its culture\")\nregarded as the result of high moral excellence.\n\n2. Systematic falsification of _great men, great creators,_ and _great\nperiods._ The desire is to make _faith_ that which distinguishes great\nmen: whereas carelessness in this respect, scepticism, \"immorality,\"\nthe right to repudiate a belief, belongs to greatness (C\u00e6sar, Frederick\nthe Great, Napoleon; but also Homer, Aristophanes, Leonardo, Goethe).\nThe principal fact--their \"free will\"--is always suppressed.\n\n\n381.\n\nA great _lie_ in history; as if the _corruption of the Church were the\ncause_ of the Reformation! This was only the pretext and self-deception\nof the agitators--very strong needs were making themselves felt, the\nbrutality of which sorely required a spiritual dressing.\n\n\n382.\n\nSchopenhauer declared high intellectuality to be the _emancipation_\nfrom the will: he did not wish to recognise the freedom from moral\nprejudices which is coincident with the emancipation of a great mind;\nhe refused to see what is the typical immorality of genius; he artfully\ncontrived to set up the only moral value he honoured--self-effacement,\nas the one _condition_ of highest intellectual activity: \"objective\"\ncontemplation. \"Truth,\" even in art, only manifests itself after the\nwithdrawal of the _will_....\n\nThrough all moral idiosyncrasies I see a _fundamentally different\nvaluation._ Such absurd distinctions as \"genius\" and the world of will,\nof morality and immorality, _I know nothing about at all._ The moral is\na lower kind of animal than the immoral, he is also weaker; indeed--he\nis a type in regard to morality, but he is not a type of his own. He\nis a copy; at the best, a good copy--the standard of his worth lies\n_without_ him. I value a man according to the _quantum of power and\nfullness of his will_: not according to the enfeeblement and moribund\nstate thereof. I consider that a philosophy which _teaches_ the denial\nof will is both defamatory and slanderous.... I test the _power_ of\na _will_ according to the amount of resistance it can offer and the\namount of pain and torture it can endure and know how to turn to its\nown advantage; I do not point to the evil and pain of existence with\nthe finger of reproach, but rather entertain the hope that life may one\nday be more evil and more full of suffering than it has ever been.\n\nThe zenith of intellectuality, according to Schopenhauer, was to arrive\nat the knowledge that all is to no purpose--in short, to recognise what\nthe good man already _does_ instinctively.... He denies that there can\nbe higher states of intellectuality--he regards his view as a _non plus\nultra.._.. Here intellectuality is placed much lower than goodness; its\nhighest value (as art, for instance) would be to lead up to, and to\nadvise the adoption of, morality, the absolute predominance of _moral\nvalues._\n\nNext to Schopenhauer I will now characterise _Kant_: there was nothing\nGreek in Kant; he was quite anti-historical (cf. his attitude in\nregard to the French Revolution) and a moral fanatic (see Goethe's\nwords concerning the radically evil element in human nature[8]).\n_Saintliness_ also lurked somewhere in his soul.... I require a\ncriticism of the saintly type.\n\nHegel's value: \"Passion.\"\n\nHerbert Spencer's tea-grocer's philosophy: total absence of an ideal\nsave that of the mediocre man.\n\nFundamental instinct of all philosophers, historians, and\npsychologists: everything of _value_ in mankind, art, history, science,\nreligion, and technology must be shown to be _morally valuable_ and\n_morally conditioned,_ in its aim, means, and result. Everything is\nseen in the light of this highest value; for instance, Rousseau's\nquestion concerning civilisation, \"Will it make man grow better?\"--a\nfunny question, for the reverse is _obvious,_ and is a fact which\nspeaks _in favour_ of civilisation.\n\n\n[Footnote 8: TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.--This is doubtless a reference to a\npassage in a letter written by Goethe to Herder, on 7th June 1793,\nfrom the camp at Marienborn, near Mainz, in which the following\nwords occur:--\"_Dagegen hat aber auch Kant seinen philosophischen\nMantel, nachdem er ein langes Menschenleben gebraucht hat, ihn von\nmancherlei sudelhaften Vorurteilen zu reinigen, freventlich mit dem\nSchandfleck des radikalen B\u00f6sen beschlabbert, damit doch auch Christen\nherbeigelockt werden den Saum zu k\u00fcssen?--_(\"Kant, on the other hand,\nafter he had tried throughout his life to keep his philosophical cloak\nunsoiled by foul prejudices, wantonly dirtied it in the end with the\ndisreputable stain of the 'radical evil' in human nature, in order that\nChristians too might be lured into kissing its hem.\") From this passage\nit will be seen how Goethe had anticipated Nietzsche's view of Kant;\nnamely, that he was a Christian in disguise.]\n\n\n383.\n\n_Religious morality.--_Passion, great desire; the passion for power,\nlove, revenge, and property: the moralists wish to uproot and\nexterminate all these things, and \"purify\" the soul by driving them out\nof it.\n\nThe argument is: the passions often lead to disaster--therefore, they\nare evil and ought to be condemned. Man must wring himself free from\nthem, otherwise he cannot be a _good_ man....\n\nThis is of the same nature as: \"If thy right eye offend thee, pluck it\nout.\" In this particular case when, with that \"bucolic simplicity,\"\nthe Founder of Christianity recommended a certain practice to His\ndisciples, in the event of sexual excitement, the result would not be\nonly the loss of a particular member, but the actual castration of the\nwhole of the man's character.... And the same applies to the moral\nmania, which, instead of insisting upon the control of the passions,\nsues for their extirpation. Its conclusion always is: only the\nemasculated man is a good man.\n\nInstead of making use of and of _economising_ the great sources of\npassion, those torrents of the soul which are often so dangerous,\noverwhelming, and impetuous, morality--this most shortsighted and most\ncorrupted of mental attitudes--would fain make them _dry up._\n\n\n384.\n\n_Conquest over the passions?_--No, not if this is to mean their\nenfeeblement and annihilation. _They must be enlisted in our service_:\nand to this end it may be necessary to tyrannise them a good deal (not\nas individuals, but as communities, races, etc.). At length we should\ntrust them enough to restore their freedom to them: they love us like\ngood servants, and willingly go wherever our best interests lie.\n\n\n385.\n\n_Intolerance on the part of morality_ is a sign of man's _weakness_:\nhe is frightened of his own \"immorality,\" he must _deny_ his strongest\n_instincts,_ because he does not yet know how to use them. Thus the\nmost fruitful quarters of the globe remain uncultivated longest: the\npower is lacking that might become master here....\n\n\n386.\n\nThere are some very simple peoples and men who believe that continuous\nfine weather would be a desirable thing: they still believe to-day\nin _rebus moralibus,_ that the \"good man\" alone and nothing else than\nthe \"good man\" is to be desired, and that the ultimate end of man's\nevolution will be that only the good man will remain on earth (and that\nit is only to that end that all efforts should be directed). This is\nin the highest degree an _uneconomical_ thought; as we have already\nsuggested, it is the very acme of simplicity, and it is nothing more\nthan the expression of the _agreeableness_ which the \"good man\" creates\n(he gives rise to no fear, he permits of relaxation, he gives what one\nis able to take).\n\nWith a more educated eye one learns to desire exactly the reverse--that\nis to say, an ever greater _dominion of evil,_ man's gradual\nemancipation from the narrow and aggravating bonds of morality, the\ngrowth of power around the greatest forces of Nature, and the ability\nto enlist the passions in one's service.\n\n\n387.\n\nThe whole idea of the hierarchy of the _passions_: as if the only right\nand normal thing were to be led by _reason_--whereas the passions are\nabnormal, dangerous, half-animal, and moreover, in so far as their end\nis concerned, nothing more than _desires for pleasure...._\n\nPassion is deprived of its dignity (1) as if it only manifested\nitself in an unseemly way and were not necessary and always the\n_motive force_, (2) inasmuch as it is supposed to aim at no high\npurpose--merely at pleasure....\n\nThe misinterpretation of passion and _reason,_ as if the latter were\nan independent entity, and not a state of relationship between all\nthe various passions and desires; and as though every passion did not\npossess its quantum of reason....\n\n\n388.\n\nHow it was that, under the pressure of the dominion of an ascetic\nand _self-effacing morality,_ it was precisely the passions--love,\ngoodness, pity, even justice, generosity, and heroism, which were\nnecessarily misunderstood?\n\nIt is the _richness of a personality,_ the fullness of it, its power\nto flow over and to bestow, its instinctive feeling of ease, and its\naffirmative attitude towards itself, that creates great love and great\nsacrifices: these passions proceed from strong and godlike personalism\nas surely as do the desire to be master, to obtrude, and the inner\ncertainty that one has a right to everything. The _opposite_ views,\naccording to the most accepted notions, are indeed common views; and if\none does not stand firmly and bravely on one's legs, one has nothing to\ngive, and it is perfectly useless to stretch out one's hand either to\nprotect or to support others....\n\nHow was it possible to _transform_ these instincts to such an extent\nthat man could feel that to be of value which is directed against\nhimself, so that he could sacrifice himself for another self! O the\npsychological baseness and falseness which hitherto has laid down the\nlaw in the Church and in Church-infected philosophy!\n\nIf man is thoroughly sinful, then all he can do is to hate himself. As\na matter of fact, he ought not to regard even his fellows otherwise\nthan he does himself; the love of man requires a justification, and it\nis found in the fact that _God commanded it._--From this it follows\nthat all the natural instincts of man (to love, etc.) appear to him\nto be, in themselves, prohibited; and that he re-acquires a right to\nthem only after having _denied_ them as an obedient worshipper of God.\n... Pascal, the admirable _logician_ of Christianity, _went as far as\nthis_! let any one examine his relations to his sister. \"Not to make\none's self loved,\" seemed Christian to him.\n\n\n389.\n\nLet us consider how dearly a moral canon such as this (\"an ideal\")\nmakes us pay. (Its enemies are--well? The \"egoists.\")\n\nThe melancholy astuteness of self-abasement in Europe (Pascal,\nLa Rochefoucauld)--inner enfeeblement, discouragement, and\nself-consumption of the non-gregarious man.\n\nThe perpetual process of laying stress upon mediocre qualities as being\nthe most valuable (modesty in rank and file, Nature converted into an\ninstrument).\n\nPangs of conscience associated with all that is self-glorifying and\noriginal: thus follows the unhappiness--the _gloominess_ of the world\nfrom the standpoint of stronger and better-constituted men!\n\nGregarious consciousness and timorousness transferred to philosophy and\nreligion.\n\nLet us leave the psychological impossibility of a purely unselfish\naction out of consideration!\n\n\n390.\n\nMy ultimate conclusion is, that the _real_ man represents a much\nhigher value than the \"desirable\" man of any ideal that has ever\nexisted hitherto; that all \"desiderata\" in regard to mankind have\nbeen absurd and dangerous dissipations by means of which a particular\nkind of man has sought to establish _his_ measures of preservation\nand of growth as a law for all; that every \"desideratum\" of this\nkind which has been made to dominate has _reduced_ man's worth, his\nstrength, and his trust in the future; that the indigence and mediocre\nintellectuality of man becomes most apparent, even to-day, when he\nreveals a _desire_; that man's ability to fix values has hitherto been\ndeveloped too inadequately to do justice to the actual, not merely\nto the \"desirable,\" _worth of man_; that, up to the present, ideals\nhave really been the power which has most slandered man and power, the\npoisonous fumes which have hung over reality, and which have _seduced\nmen to yearn for nonentity_....\n\n\n\nD. _A Criticism of the Words: Improving, Perfecting, Elevating._\n\n\n391.\n\nThe standard _according_ to which the value of moral valuations is to\nbe determined.\n\nThe fundamental fact _that has been overlooked_: The contradiction\nbetween \"becoming more moral\" and the elevation and the strengthening\nof the type man.\n\n_Homo natura_: The \"will to power.\"\n\n\n392.\n\nMoral values regarded as _values of appearance_ and compared with\n_physiological_ values.\n\n\n393.\n\nReflecting upon generalities is always retrograde: the last of the\n\"desiderata\" concerning men, for instance, have never been regarded as\nproblems by philosophers. They always postulate the \"_improvement_\"\nof man, quite guilelessly, as though by means of some intuition they\nhad been helped over the note of interrogation following the question,\n_why_ necessarily \"_improve!_\" To what extent is it _desirable_ that\nman should be more _virtuous,_ or more _intelligent,_ or _happier!_\nGranting that nobody yet _knows_ the \"wherefore?\" of mankind, all\nsuch desiderata have no sense whatever; and if one aspires to one\nof them--who knows?--perhaps one is frustrating the other. Is an\nincrease of virtue compatible with an increase of intelligence and\ninsight? _Dubito_: only too often shall I have occasion to show that\nthe reverse is true. Has virtue, as an end, in the strict sense of the\nword, not always been opposed to happiness hitherto? And again, does it\nnot require misfortune, abstinence, and self-castigation as a necessary\nmeans? And if the aim were to arrive at the _highest insight,_ would\nit not therefore be necessary to renounce all hope of an increase in\nhappiness, and to choose danger, adventure, mistrust, and seduction as\na road to enlightenment?... And suppose one will have happiness; maybe\none should join the ranks of the \"poor in spirit.\"\n\n\n394.\n\nThe wholesale deception and fraud of so-called _moral improvement._\n\nWe do not believe that one man can be another if he is not that\nother already--that is to say, if he is not, as often happens, an\naccretion of personalities or at least of parts of persons. In this\ncase it is possible to draw another set of actions from him into the\nforeground, and to drive back \"the older man.\" ... The man's aspect\nis altered, but _not_ his actual nature.... It is but the merest\n_factum brutum_ that any one should cease from performing certain\nactions, and the fact allows of the most varied interpretations.\nNeither does it always follow therefrom that the habit of performing\na certain action is entirely arrested, nor that the reasons for\nthat action are dissipated. He whose destiny and abilities make him\na criminal never unlearns anything, but is continually adding to his\nstore of knowledge: and long abstinence acts as a sort of tonic on\nhis talent.... Certainly, as far as society is concerned, the only\ninteresting fact is that some one has ceased from performing certain\nactions; and to this end society will often raise a man out of those\ncircumstances which make him _able_ to perform those actions: this\nis obviously a wiser course than that of trying to break his destiny\nand his particular nature. The Church,--which has done nothing except\nto take the place of, and to appropriate, the philosophic treasures\nof antiquity,--starting out from another standpoint and wishing to\nsecure a \"soul\" or the \"salvation\" of a soul, believes in the expiatory\npower of punishment, as also in the obliterating power of forgiveness:\nboth of which supposed processes are deceptions due to religious\nprejudice--punishment expiates nothing, forgiveness obliterates\nnothing; what is done cannot be undone. Because some one forgets\nsomething it by no means proves that something has been wiped out....\nAn action leads to certain consequences, both among men and away from\nmen, and it matters not whether it has met with punishment, or whether\nit has been \"expiated,\" \"forgiven,\" or \"obliterated,\" it matters not\neven if the Church meanwhile canonises the man who performed it. The\nChurch believes in things that do not exist, it believes in \"Souls\"; it\nbelieves in \"influences\" that do not exist--in divine influences; it\nbelieves in states that do not exist, in sin, redemption, and spiritual\nsalvation: in all things it stops at the surface and is satisfied with\nsigns, attitudes, words, to which it lends an arbitrary interpretation.\nIt possesses a method of counterfeit psychology which is thought out\nquite systematically.\n\n\n395.\n\n\"Illness makes men better,\" this famous assumption which is to be met\nwith in all ages, and in the mouth of the wizard quite as often as in\nthe mouth and maw of the people, really makes one ponder. In view of\ndiscovering whether there is any truth in it, one might be allowed to\nask whether there is not perhaps a fundamental relationship between\nmorality and illness? Regarded as a whole, could not the \"improvement\nof mankind\"--that is to say, the unquestionable softening, humanising,\nand taming which the European has undergone within the last two\ncenturies--be regarded as the result of a long course of secret and\nghastly suffering, failure, abstinence, and grief? Has illness made\n\"Europeans\" \"better\"? Or, put into other words, is not our modern\nsoft-hearted European morality, which could be likened to that of the\nChinese, perhaps an expression of physiological _deterioration_?...\nIt cannot be denied, for instance, that wherever history shows us\n\"man\" in a state of particular glory and power, his type is always\ndangerous, impetuous, and boisterous, and cares little for humanity;\nand perhaps, in those cases in which _it seems otherwise,_ all that\nwas required was the courage or subtlety to see sufficiently below the\nsurface in psychological matters, in order even in them to discover the\ngeneral proposition: \"the more healthy, strong, rich, fruitful, and\nenterprising a man may feel, the more immoral he will be as well.\" A\nterrible thought, to which one should on no account give way. Provided,\nhowever, that one take a few steps forward with this thought, how\nwondrous does the future then appear! What will then be paid for more\ndearly on earth, than precisely this very thing which we are all trying\nto promote, by all means in our power--the humanising, the improving,\nand the increased \"civilisation\" of man? Nothing would then be more\nexpensive than virtue: for by means of it the world would ultimately\nbe turned into a hospital: and the last conclusion of wisdom would be,\n\"everybody must be everybody else's nurse.\" Then we should certainly\nhave attained to the \"Peace on earth,\" so long desired! But how little\n\"joy we should find in each other's company\"! How little beauty, wanton\nspirits, daring, and danger! So few \"actions\" which would make life on\nearth worth living! Ah! and no longer any \"deeds\"! But have not all the\n_great_ things and deeds which have remained fresh in the memory of\nmen, and which have not been destroyed by time, been _immoral_ in the\ndeepest sense of the word?...\n\n\n396.\n\nThe priests--and with them the half-priests or philosophers of all\nages--have always called that doctrine true, the educating influence\nof which was a benevolent one or at least seemed so--that is to say,\ntended to \"improve.\" In this way they resemble an ingenuous plebeian\nempiric and miracle-worker who, because he had tried a certain poison\nas a cure, declared it to be no poison. \"By their fruits ye shall know\nthem\"--that is to say, \"by our truths.\" This has been the reasoning\nof priests until this day. They have squandered their sagacity, with\nresults that have been sufficiently fatal, in order to make the \"proof\nof power\" (or the proof \"by the fruits \") pre-eminent and even supreme\narbiter over all other forms of proof. \"That which makes good must\nbe good; that which is good cannot lie\"--these are their inexorable\nconclusions--\"that which bears good fruit must consequently be true;\nthere is no other criterion of truth.\" ...\n\nBut to the extent to which \"improving\" acts as an argument,\ndeteriorating must also act as a refutation. The error can be shown to\nbe an error, by examining the lives of those who represent it: a false\nstep, a vice can refute.... This indecent form of opposition, which\ncomes from below and behind--the doglike kind of attack, has not died\nout either. Priests, as psychologists, never discovered anything more\ninteresting than spying out the secret vices of their adversaries--they\nprove Christianity by looking about for the world's filth. They apply\nthis principle more particularly to the greatest on earth, to the\ngeniuses: readers will remember how Goethe has been attacked on every\nconceivable occasion in Germany (Klopstock and Herder were among the\nfirst to give a \"good example\" in this respect--birds of a feather\nflock together).\n\n\n397.\n\nOne must be very immoral in order to _make people moral by deeds._ The\nmoralist's means are the most terrible that have ever been used; he\nwho has not the courage to be an immoralist in deeds may be fit for\nanything else, but not for the duties of a moralist.\n\nMorality is a menagerie; it assumes that iron bars may be more useful\nthan freedom, even for the creatures it imprisons; it also assumes that\nthere are animal-tamers about who do not shrink from terrible means,\nand who are acquainted with the use of red-hot iron. This terrible\nspecies, which enters into a struggle with the wild animal, is called\n\"priests.\"\n\n***\n\nMan, incarcerated in an iron cage of errors, has become a caricature\nof man; he is sick, emaciated, ill-disposed towards himself, filled\nwith a loathing of the impulses of life, filled with a mistrust of\nall that is beautiful and happy in life--in fact, he is a wandering\nmonument of misery. How shall we ever succeed in vindicating this\nphenomenon--this artificial, arbitrary, and _recent_ miscarriage--the\nsinner--which the priests have bred on their territory?\n\n***\n\nIn order to think fairly of morality, we must put two _biological_\nnotions in its place: the _taming_ of the wild beasts, and the _rearing\nof a particular species._\n\nThe priests of all ages have always pretended that they wished to\n\"_improve_\" ... But we, of another persuasion, would laugh if a\nlion-tamer ever wished to speak to us of his \"improved\" animals. As a\nrule, the taming of a beast is only achieved by deteriorating it: even\nthe moral man is not a better man; he is rather a weaker member of his\nspecies. But he is less harmful....\n\n\n398.\n\nWhat I want to make clear, with all the means in my power, is:--\n\n_(a)_ That there is no worse confusion than that which confounds\n_rearing_ and _taming_: and these two things have always been\nconfused.... Rearing, as I understand it, is a means of husbanding\nthe enormous powers of humanity in such a way that whole generations\nmay build upon the foundations laid by their progenitors--not only\noutwardly, but inwardly, organically, developing from the already\nexisting stem and growing _stronger_....\n\n_(b)_ That there is an exceptional danger in believing that mankind as\na whole is developing and growing stronger, if individuals are seen\nto grow more feeble and more equally mediocre. Humanity--mankind--is\nan abstract thing: the object of _rearing,_ even in regard to the most\nindividual cases, can only be the _strong_ man (the man who has no\nbreeding is weak, dissipated, and unstable).\n\n\n\n6. CONCLUDING REMARKS CONCERNING THE CRITICISM OF MORALITY.\n\n\n399.\n\nThese are the things I demand of you--however badly they may sound in\nyour ears: that you subject moral valuations themselves to criticism.\nThat you should put a stop to your instinctive moral impulse--which in\nthis case demands submission and not criticism--with the question: \"why\nprecisely submission?\" That this yearning for a \"why?\"--for a criticism\nof morality should not only be your present form of morality, but the\nsublimest of all moralities, and an honour to the age you live in. That\nyour honesty, your will, may give an account of itself, and not deceive\nyou: \"why not?\"--Before what tribunal?\n\n\n400.\n\nThe three _postulates_:--\n\n    All that is ignoble is high (the protest of the \"vulgar\n    man\").\n\n    All that is contrary to Nature is high (the protest of the\n    physiologically botched).\n\n    All that is of average worth is high (the protest of the\n    herd, of the \"mediocre\").\n\nThus in the _history of morality_ a _will to power_ finds expression,\nby means of which, either the slaves, the oppressed, the bungled and\nthe botched, those that suffer from themselves, or the mediocre,\nattempt to make those valuations prevail which favour _their_ existence.\n\nFrom a biological standpoint, therefore, the phenomenon Morality is of\na highly suspicious nature. Up to the present, morality has developed\nat the _cost_ of: the ruling classes and their specific instincts,\nthe well-constituted and _beautiful_ natures, the independent and\nprivileged classes in all respects.\n\nMorality, then, is a sort of counter-movement opposing Nature's\nendeavours to arrive at a _higher type._ Its effects are: mistrust of\nlife in general (in so far as its tendencies are felt to be immoral),\n--hostility towards the senses (inasmuch as the highest values are\nfelt to be opposed to the higher instincts),--Degeneration and\nself-destruction of \"higher natures,\" because it is precisely in them\nthat the conflict becomes _conscious._\n\n\n401.\n\n_Which values have been paramount hitherto?_\n\nMorality as the leading value in all phases of philosophy (even with\nthe Sceptics). Result: this world is no good, a \"true world\" must exist\nsomewhere.\n\nWhat is it that here determines the highest value? What, in sooth,\nis morality? The instinct of decadence; it is the exhausted and\nthe disinherited who _take their revenge_ in this way and play the\n_masters_....\n\nHistorical proof: philosophers have always been decadents and always in\nthe pay of Nihilistic religions.\n\nThe instinct of decadence appears as the will to power. The\nintroduction of its system of means: its means are absolutely immoral.\n\nGeneral aspect: the values that have been highest hitherto have been a\nspecial instance of the will to power; morality itself is a particular\ninstance of _immorality._\n\n***\n\nWhy the Antagonistic Values always succumbed.\n\n1. How was this actually _possible!_ Question: why did life and\nphysiological well-constitutedness succumb everywhere? Why was there no\naffirmative philosophy, no affirmative religion?\n\n    The historical signs of such movements: the pagan religion.\n    Dionysos _versus_ the Christ. The Renaissance. Art.\n\n2. The strong and the weak: the healthy and the sick; the exception and\nthe rule. There is no doubt as to who is the stronger....\n\n_General view of history_; Is man an _exception_ in the history of life\non this account?--An objection to _Darwinism._ The means wherewith\nthe weak succeed in ruling have become: instincts, \"humanity,\"\n\"institutions.\" ...\n\n3. The proof of this rule on the part of the weak is to be found in\nour political instincts, in our social values, in our arts, and in our\n_science._\n\n***\n\nThe _instincts of decadence_ have become master of the _instincts of\nascending_ life.... The _will to nonentity_ has prevailed over the\n_will to life_!\n\nIs this _true_? is there not perhaps a stronger guarantee of life and\nof the species in this victory of the weak and the mediocre?--is it\nnot perhaps only a means in the collective movement of life, a mere\nslackening of the pace, a protective measure against something even\nmore dangerous?\n\nSuppose the _strong_ were masters in all respects, even in valuing:\nlet us try and think what their attitude would be towards illness,\nsuffering, and sacrifice! _Self-contempt on the part of the weak_ would\nbe the result: they would do their utmost to disappear and to extirpate\ntheir kind. And would this be _desirable_?--should we really like a\nworld in which the subtlety, the consideration, the intellectuality,\nthe _plasticity_--in fact, the whole influence of the weak--was\nlacking?[9] ...\n\nWe have seen two \"wills to power\" at war _(in this special case we\nhad a principle_: that of agreeing with the one that has hitherto\nsuccumbed, and of disagreeing with the one that has hitherto\ntriumphed): we have recognised the \"real world\" as a \"_world of lies_\"\nand morality as a _form of immorality._ We do _not_ say \"the stronger\nis wrong.\"\n\nWe have understood _what_ it is that has determined the highest values\nhitherto, and _why_ the latter should have prevailed over the opposite\nvalue: it was numerically the _stronger_.\n\nIf we now purify _the opposite value_ of the infection, the\nhalf-heartedness, _and the degeneration,_ with which we identify it, we\nrestore Nature to the throne, free from moralic acid.\n\n\n[Footnote 9: TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.--We realise here the great difference\nbetween Nietzsche and those who draw premature conclusions from\nDarwinism. There is no brutal solution of modern problems in\nNietzsche's philosophy. He did not advocate anything so ridiculous as\nthe total suppression of the weak and the degenerate. What he wished to\nresist and to overthrow _was their supremacy, their excessive power._\nHe felt that there was a desirable and stronger type which was in need\nof having its hopes, aspirations, and instincts upheld in defiance of\nChristian values.]\n\n\n402.\n\n_Morality,_ a useful error; or, more clearly still, a necessary and\nexpedient lie according to the greatest and most impartial of its\nsupporters.\n\n\n403.\n\nOne ought to be able to acknowledge the truth up to that point where\none is sufficiently elevated no longer to require the _disciplinary\nschool of moral error._--When one judges life morally, it _disgusts_\none.\n\nNeither should false personalities be invented; one should not say, for\ninstance, \"Nature is cruel.\" It is precisely when one perceives _that\nthere is no such central controlling and responsible force that one is\nrelieved!_\n\n    _Evolution of man._ A. He tried to attain to a certain power\n    over Nature and over himself. (Morality was necessary in\n    order to make man triumph in his struggle with Nature and\n    \"wild animals.\")\n\n    B. If power over Nature has been attained, this power can\n    be used as a help in our development: Will to Power as a\n    self-enhancing and self-strengthening principle.\n\n\n404.\n\nMorality may be regarded as the _illusion of a species,_ fostered with\nthe view of urging the individual to sacrifice himself to the future,\nand seemingly granting him such a very great value, that with that\n_self-consciousness_ he may tyrannise over, and constrain, other sides\nof his nature, and find it difficult to be pleased with himself.\n\nWe ought to be most profoundly thankful for what morality has done\nhitherto: _but now it is no more than a burden_ which may prove fatal.\n_Morality itself_ in the form of honesty urges us to deny morality.\n\n\n405.\n\nTo what extent is the _self-destruction of morality_ still a sign of\nits own strength? We Europeans have within us the blood of those who\nwere ready to die for their faith; we have taken morality frightfully\nseriously, and there is nothing which we have not, at one time,\nsacrificed to it. On the other hand, our intellectual subtlety has\nbeen reached essentially through the vivisection of our consciences.\nWe do not yet know the \"whither\" towards which we are urging our\nsteps, now that we have departed from the soil of our forebears. But\nit was on this very soil that we acquired the strength which is now\ndriving us from our homes in search of adventure, and it is thanks\nto that strength that we are now in mid-sea, surrounded by untried\npossibilities and things undiscovered--we can no longer choose, we must\nbe conquerors, now that we have no land in which we feel at home and\nin which we would fain \"survive.\" A concealed \"_yea_\" is driving us\nforward, and it is stronger than all our \"nays.\" Even our _strength_ no\nlonger bears with us in the old swampy land: we venture out into the\nopen, we attempt the task. The world is still rich and undiscovered,\nand even to perish were better than to be half-men or poisonous men.\nOur very strength itself urges us to take to the sea; there where all\nsuns have hitherto sunk we know of a new world....\n\n\n\n\nIII.\n\nCRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY.\n\n\n1. GENERAL REMARKS.\n\n\n\n406.\n\nLet us rid ourselves of a few superstitions which heretofore have been\nfashionable among philosophers!\n\n\n407.\n\nPhilosophers are prejudiced _against_ appearance, change, pain, death,\nthe things of the body, the senses, fate, bondage, and all that which\nhas no purpose.\n\nIn the first place, they believe in: absolute knowledge, (2) in\nknowledge for its own sake,\n\n(3) in virtue and happiness as necessarily related,\n\n(4) in the recognisability of men's acts. They are led by instinctive\ndeterminations of values, in which _former_ cultures are reflected\n(more dangerous cultures too).\n\n\n408.\n\nWhat have philosophers _lacked_! (1) A sense of history, (2) a\nknowledge of physiology, (3) a goal in the future.--The ability to\ncriticise without irony or moral condemnation.\n\n\n409.\n\nPhilosophers have had (1) from times immemorial a wonderful capacity\nfor the _contradictio in adjecto,_ (2) they have always trusted\nconcepts as unconditionally as they have mistrusted the senses: it\nnever seems to have occurred to them that notions and words are our\ninheritance of past ages in which thinking was neither very clear nor\nvery exact.\n\nWhat seems to dawn upon philosophers last of all: that they must\nno longer allow themselves to be presented with concepts already\nconceived, nor must they merely purify and polish up those concepts;\nbut they must first _make_ them, _create_ them, themselves, and\nthen present them and get people to accept them. Up to the present,\npeople have trusted their concepts generally, as if they had been a\nwonderful _dowry_ from some kind of wonderland: but they constitute\nthe inheritance of our most remote, most foolish, and most intelligent\nforefathers. This _piety_ towards that _which already exists in us_\nis perhaps related to the _moral element in science._ What we needed\nabove all is absolute scepticism towards all traditional concepts (like\nthat which a certain philosopher may already have possessed--and he was\nPlato, of course: for he taught _the reverse_).\n\n\n410.\n\nProfoundly mistrustful towards the dogmas of the theory of knowledge,\nI liked to look now out of this window, now out of that, though I took\ngood care not to become finally fixed anywhere, indeed I should have\nthought it dangerous to have done so--though finally: is it within the\nrange of probabilities for an instrument to criticise its own fitness?\nWhat I noticed more particularly was, that no scientific scepticism or\ndogmatism has ever arisen quite free from all _arri\u00e8res pens\u00e9es_--that\nit has only a secondary value as soon as the motive lying immediately\nbehind it is discovered.\n\nFundamental aspect: Kant's, Hegel's, Schopenhauer's, the sceptical and\nepochistical, the historifying and the pessimistic attitudes--all have\na _moral_ origin. I have found no one who has dared to _criticise the\nmoral valuations,_ and I soon turned my back upon the meagre attempts\nthat have been made to describe the evolution of these feelings (by\nEnglish and German Darwinians).\n\nHow can Spinoza's position, his denial and repudiation of the moral\nvalues, be explained? (It was the result of his Theodicy!)\n\n\n411.\n\n_Morality regarded as the highest form of protection._--Our world is\n_either_ the work and expression (the _modus_) of God, in which case\nit must be _in the highest degree perfect_ (Leibnitz's conclusion\n...),--and no one doubted that he knew what perfection must be\nlike,--and then all evil can only be _apparent_ (Spinoza is _more\nradical,_ he says this of good and evil), or it must be a part of God's\nhigh purpose (a consequence of a particularly great mark of favour\non God's part, who thus allows man to choose between good and evil:\nthe privilege of being no automaton; \"freedom,\" with the ever-present\ndanger of making a mistake and of choosing wrongly.... See Simplicius,\nfor instance, in the commentary to Epictetus).\n\n_Or_ our world is imperfect; evil and guilt are real, determined, and\nare absolutely inherent to its being; in that case it cannot be the\n_real_ world: consequently knowledge can only be a way of denying\nthe world, for the latter is error which may be recognised as such.\nThis is Schopenhauer's opinion, based upon Kantian first principles.\nPascal was still more desperate: he thought that even knowledge must be\ncorrupt and false--that _revelation_ is a necessity if only in order to\nrecognise that the world should be denied....\n\n\n412.\n\nOwing to our habit of believing in unconditional authorities, we have\ngrown to feel a profound need for them: indeed, this feeling is so\nstrong that, even in an age of criticism such as Kant's was, it showed\nitself to be superior to the need for criticism, and, in a certain\nsense, was able to subject the whole work of critical acumen, and to\nconvert it to its own use. It proved its superiority once more in\nthe generation which followed, and which, owing to its historical\ninstincts, naturally felt itself drawn to a relative view of all\nauthority, when it converted even the Hegelian philosophy of evolution\n(history rechristened and called philosophy) to its own use, and\nrepresented history as being the self-revelation and self-surpassing\nof moral ideas. Since Plato, philosophy has lain under the dominion of\nmorality. Even in Plato's predecessors, moral interpretations play a\nmost important r\u00f4le (Anaximander declares that all things are made to\nperish as a punishment for their departure from pure being; Heraclitus\nthinks that the regularity of phenomena is a proof of the morally\ncorrect character of evolution in general).\n\n\n413.\n\nThe progress of philosophy has been hindered most seriously hitherto\nthrough the influence of moral _arri\u00e8res-pens\u00e9es._\n\n\n414.\n\nIn all ages, \"fine feelings\" have been regarded as arguments, \"heaving\nbreasts\" have been the bellows of godliness, convictions have been the\n\"criteria\" of truth, and the need of opposition has been the note of\ninterrogation affixed to wisdom. This falseness and fraud permeates\nthe whole history of philosophy. But for a few respected sceptics,\nno instinct for intellectual Uprightness is to be found anywhere.\nFinally, _Kant_ guilelessly sought to make this thinker's corruption\nscientific by means of his concept, \"_practical reason_\". He expressly\ninvented a reason which, in certain cases, would allow one _not_ to\nbother about reason--that is to say, in cases where the heart's desire,\nmorality, or \"duty\" are the motive power.\n\n\n415.\n\n_Hegel_: his popular side, the doctrine of war and of great men. Right\nis on the side of the victorious: he (the victorious man) stands for\nthe progress of mankind. His is an attempt at proving the dominion of\nmorality by means of history.\n\nKant: a kingdom of moral values withdrawn from us, invisible, real.\n\nHegel: a demonstrable process of evolution, the actualisation of the\nkingdom of morality.\n\nWe shall not allow ourselves to be deceived either in Kant's or Hegel's\nway:--We no longer _believe,_ as they did, in morality, and therefore\nhave no philosophies to found with the view of justifying morality.\nCriticism and history have no charm for us _in this_ respect: what is\ntheir charm, then?\n\n\n416.\n\nThe importance of German philosophy (_Hegel,_) the thinking out of a\nkind of _pantheism_ which would not reckon evil, error, and suffering\nas arguments against godliness. _This grand initiative_ was misused\nby the powers that were (State, etc.) to sanction the rights of the\npeople that happened to be paramount.\n\n_Schopenhauer_ appears as a stubborn opponent of this idea; he is a\nmoral man who, in order to keep in the right concerning his moral\nvaluation, finally becomes a _denier of the world._ Ultimately he\nbecomes a \"mystic.\"\n\nI myself have sought an _\u00e6sthetic_ justification of the ugliness in\nthis world. I regarded the desire for beauty and for the persistence\nof certain forms as a temporary preservative and recuperative measure:\nwhat seemed to me to be fundamentally associated with pain, however,\nwas the eternal lust of creating and the _eternal compulsion to\ndestroy._\n\nWe call things ugly when we look at them with the desire of attributing\nsome sense, some _new_ sense, to what has become senseless: it is the\naccumulated power of the creator which compels him to regard what has\nexisted hitherto as no longer acceptable, botched, worthy of being\nsuppressed--ugly!\n\n\n417.\n\n_My first solution of the problem: Dionysian wisdom. The joy in the\ndestruction of the most noble thing,_ and at the sight of its gradual\nundoing, regarded as the joy over what is _coming and what lies in the\nfuture,_ which triumphs over _actual things, however good they may\nbe._ Dionysian: temporary identification with the principle of life\n(voluptuousness of the martyr included).\n\n_My innovations._ The Development of Pessimism: intellectual\npessimism; _moral_ criticism, the dissolution of the last comfort.\nKnowledge, a sign of _decay,_ veils by means of an illusion all strong\naction; isolated culture is unfair and therefore strong.\n\n(1) My _fight_ against decay and the increasing weakness of\npersonality. I sought a new _centrum._\n\n(2) The impossibility of this endeavour is _recognised._\n\n(3) _I therefore travelled farther along the road of dissolution--and\nalong it I found new sources of strength for individuals._ We _must\nbe destroyers_!--I perceived that the state of _dissolution is one\nin which individual beings are able to arrive at a kind of perfection\nnot possible hitherto, it is an image and isolated example of life\nin general._ To the paralysing feeling of general dissolution and\nimperfection, I opposed the _Eternal Recurrence._\n\n\n418.\n\nPeople naturally seek the picture of life in _that_ philosophy which\nmakes them most cheerful--that is to say, in that philosophy which\ngives the highest sense of freedom to _their strongest instinct._ This\nis probably the case with me.\n\n\n419.\n\nGerman philosophy, as a whole,--Leibnitz, Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, to\nmention the greatest,--is the most out-and-out _form of romanticism_\nand home-sickness that has ever yet existed: it is a yearning for the\nbest that has ever been known on earth. One is at home nowhere; that\nwhich is ultimately yearned after is a place where one can somehow\nfeel at home; because one has been at home there before, and that\nplace is the _Greek_ world! But it is precisely in that direction\nthat airbridges are broken down_--save,_ of course, the rainbow\nof concepts! And the latter lead everywhere, to all the homes and\n\"fatherlands\" that ever existed for Greek souls! Certainly, one must be\nvery light and thin in order to cross these bridges! But what happiness\nlies even in this desire for spirituality, almost for ghostliness!\nWith it, how far one is from the \"press and bustle\" and the mechanical\nboorishness of the natural sciences, how far from the vulgar din\nof \"modern ideas\"! One wants to get back to the Greeks _via_ the\nFathers of the Church, from North to South, from formul\u00e6 to forms; the\npassage out of antiquity--Christianity--is still a source of joy as a\nmeans of access to antiquity, as a portion of the old world itself,\nas a glistening mosaic of ancient concepts and ancient valuations.\nArabesques, scroll-work, rococo of scholastic abstractions--always\nbetter, that is to say, finer and more slender, than the peasant and\nplebeian reality of Northern Europe, and still a protest on the part\nof higher intellectuality against the peasant war and insurrection\nof the mob which have become master of the intellectual taste of\nNorthern Europe, and which had its leader in a man as great and\nunintellectual as Luther:--in this respect German philosophy belongs\nto the Counter-Reformation, it might even be looked upon as related\nto the Renaissance, or at least to the will to Renaissance, the will\nto get ahead with the discovery of antiquity, with the excavation of\nancient philosophy, and above all of pre-Socratic philosophy--the\nmost thoroughly dilapidated of all Greek temples! Possibly, in \u00e0 few\nhundred years, people will be of the opinion that all German philosophy\nderived its dignity from this fact, that step by step it attempted\nto reclaim the soil of antiquity, and that therefore all demands for\n\"originality\" must appear both petty and foolish when compared with\nGermany's higher claim to having refastened the bonds which seemed for\never rent--the bonds which bound us to the Greeks, the highest type\nof \"men\" ever evolved hitherto. To-day we are once more approaching\nall the fundamental principles of the cosmogony which the Greek mind\nin Anaximander, Heraclitus, Parmenides, Empedocles, Democritus, and\nAnaxagoras, was responsible for. Day by day we are growing more\n_Greek_; at first, as is only natural, the change remains confined to\nconcepts and valuations, and we hover around like Greasing spirits: but\nit is to be hoped that some day our _body_ will also be involved! Here\nlies (and has always lain) my hope for the German nation.\n\n\n420.\n\nI do not wish to convert anybody to philosophy: it is both necessary\nand perhaps desirable that the philosopher should be a _rare_\nplant. Nothing is more repugnant to me than the scholarly praise of\nphilosophy which is to be found in Seneca and Cicero. Philosophy\nhas not much in common with virtue. I trust I may be allowed to say\nthat even the scientific man is a fundamentally different person\nfrom the philosopher. What I most desire is, that the genuine notion\n\"philosopher\" should not completely perish in Germany. There are so\nmany incomplete creatures in Germany already who would fain conceal\ntheir ineptitude beneath such noble names.\n\n\n421.\n\nI must _set up the highest ideal of a philosopher._ Learning is not\neverything! The scholar is the sheep in the kingdom of learning; he\nstudies because he is told to do so, and because others have done so\nbefore him.\n\n\n422.\n\nThe superstition concerning _philosophers_: They are confounded with\nmen _of science._ As if the value of things were inherent in them\nand required only to be held on to tightly! To what extent are their\nresearches carried on under the influence of values which already\nprevail (their hatred of appearance of the body, etc.)? Schopenhauer\nconcerning morality (scorn of Utilitarianism). Ultimately the confusion\ngoes so far that Darwinism is regarded as philosophy, and thus at the\npresent day power has gone over to the men of _science._ Even Frenchmen\nlike Taine prosecute research, or mean to prosecute research,\n_without_ being already in possession of a standard of valuation.\nProstration before \"facts\" of a kind of cult. As a matter of fact, they\n_destroy_ the existing valuations.\n\nThe _explanation_ of this misunderstanding. The man who is able to\ncommand is a rare phenomenon; he misinterprets himself. What one\n_wants_ to do, above all, is to disclaim all authority and to attribute\nit to _circumstances._ In Germany the critic's estimations belong to\nthe history of awakening _manhood._ Lessing, etc. (Napoleon concerning\nGoethe). As a matter of fact, the movement is again made retrograde\nowing to German romanticism: and the _fame_ of German philosophy\nrelies upon it as if it dissipated the danger of scepticism and could\n_demonstrate faith._ Both tendencies culminate in Hegel: at bottom,\nwhat he did was to generalise the fact of German criticism and the\nfact of German romanticism,--a kind of dialectical fatalism, but to\nthe honour of intellectuality, with the actual submission of the\nphilosopher to reality. _The critic prepares the way_: that is all!\n\nWith Schopenhauer the philosopher's mission dawns; it is felt that\nthe object is to determine _values_; still under the dominion of\neudemonism. The ideal of Pessimism.\n\n\n423.\n\n_Theory and practice._--This is a pernicious distinction, as if there\nwere an _instinct of knowledge,_ which, without inquiring into the\nutility or harmfulness of a thing, blindly charged at the truth; and\nthen that, apart from this instinct, there were the whole world of\n_practical_ interests.\n\nIn contradiction of this, I try to show what instincts are active\nbehind all these _pure_ theorists,--and how the latter, as a whole,\nunder the dominion of their instincts, fatally make for something\nwhich _to their minds_ is \"truth,\" to their minds and _only_ to their\nminds. The struggle between systems, together with the struggle between\nepistemological scruples, is one which involves very special instincts\n(forms of vitality, of decline, of classes, of races, etc.).\n\nThe so-called _thirst for knowledge_ may be traced to the _lust of\nappropriation_ and of _conquest_: in obedience to this lust the\nsenses, memory, and the instincts, etc., were developed. The quickest\npossible reduction of the phenomena, economy, the accumulation of spoil\nfrom the world of knowledge (_i.e._ that portion of the world which has\nbeen appropriated and made manageable)....\n\nMorality is therefore such a curious science, because it is in the\nhighest degree _practical_: the purely scientific position, scientific\nuprightness, is thus immediately abandoned, as soon as morality calls\nfor replies to its questions. Morality says: I _require_ certain\nanswers--reasons, arguments; scruples may come afterwards, or they may\nnot come at all.\n\n\"How must one act?\" If one considers that one is dealing with a\nsupremely evolved type--a type which has been \"dealt with\" for\ncountless thousands of years, and in which everything has become\ninstinct, expediency, automatism, fatality, the _urgency_ of this moral\nquestion seems rather funny.\n\n\"How must one act?\" Morality has always been a subject of\nmisunderstanding: as a matter of fact, a certain species, which was\nconstituted to act in a certain way, wished to justify itself by\n_making_ its norm paramount.\n\n\"How must one act?\" this is not a cause, but an _effect._ Morality\nfollows, the ideal comes first....\n\nOn the other hand, the appearance of moral scruples (or in other\nwords, _the coming to consciousness of the values_ which guide action)\nbetray a certain _morbidness_; strong ages and people do not ponder\nover their rights, nor over the principles of action, over instinct or\nover reason. _Consciousness_ is a sign that the real morality--that\nis to say, the certainty of instinct which leads to a definite\ncourse of action--is going to the dogs.... Every time a new _world\nof consciousness_ is created, the moralists are signs of a lesion,\nof impoverishment and of disorganisation. Those who are _deeply\ninstinctive_ fear bandying words over duties: among them are found\npyrrhonic opponents of dialectics and of knowableness in general.... A\nvirtue is _refuted_ with a \"for.\" ...\n\n_Thesis_: The appearance of moralists belongs to periods when morality\nis declining.\n\n_Thesis_: The moralist is a dissipator of moral instincts, however much\nhe may appear to be their restorer.\n\n_Thesis_: That which really prompts the action of a moralist is not a\nmoral instinct, but the _instincts of decadence,_ translated into the\nforms of morality (he regards the growing uncertainty of the instincts\nas _corruption_).\n\n_Thesis_: The _instincts of decadence_ which, thanks to moralists, wish\nto become master of the instinctive morality of stronger races and\nages, are:--\n\n(1) The instincts of the weak and of the botched;\n\n(2) The instincts of the exceptions, of the anchorites, of the\nunhinged, of the abortions of quality or of the reverse;\n\n(3) The instincts of the habitually suffering, who require a noble\ninterpretation of their condition, and who therefore require to be as\npoor physiologists as possible.\n\n\n424.\n\nThe humbug of the _scientific spirit._--One should not affect the\nspirit of science, when the time to be scientific is not yet at\nhand; but even the genuine investigator has to abandon vanity, and\nhas to affect a certain kind of method which is not yet seasonable.\nNeither should we falsify things and thoughts, which we have arrived\nat differently, by means of a false arrangement of deduction and\ndialectics. It is thus that Kant in his \"morality\" falsifies his\ninner tendency to psychology; a more modern example of the same thing\nis Herbert Spencer's _Ethics._ A man should neither conceal nor\nmisrepresent the _facts_ concerning the way in which he conceived his\nthoughts. The deepest and most inexhaustible books will certainly\nalways have something of the aphoristic and impetuous character of\nPascal's _Pens\u00e9es_. The motive forces and valuations have lain long\nbelow the surface; that which comes uppermost is their effect.\n\nI guard against all the humbug of a false scientific spirit:--\n\n(1) In respect of the manner of _demonstration,_ if it does not\ncorrespond to the genesis of the thoughts;\n\n(2) In respect of the demands for _methods_ which, at a given period in\nscience, may be quite impossible;\n\n(3) In respect of the demand for _objectivity_ for cold impersonal\ntreatment, where, as in the case of all valuations, we describe\nourselves and our intimate experiences in a couple of words. There\nare ludicrous forms of vanity, as, for instance, Sainte-Beuve's. He\nactually worried himself all his life because he had shown some warmth\nor passion either \"_pro_\" or \"con,\" and he would fein have lied that\nfact out of his life.\n\n\n425.\n\n\"Objectivity\" in the philosopher: moral indifference in regard to one's\nself, blindness in regard to either favourable or fetal circumstances.\nUnscrupulousness in the use of dangerous means; perversity and\ncomplexity of character considered as an advantage and exploited.\n\nMy profound indifference to myself: I refuse to derive any advantage\nfrom my knowledge, nor do I wish to escape any disadvantages which it\nmay entail.--I include among these disadvantages that which is called\nthe _perversion_ of character; this prospect is beside the point: I use\nmy character, but I try neither to understand it nor to change it--the\npersonal calculation of virtue has not entered my head once. It strikes\nme that one closes the doors of knowledge as soon as one becomes\ninterested in one's own personal case--or even in the \"Salvation of\none's soul\"!... One should not take one's morality too seriously, nor\nshould one forfeit a modest right to the opposite of morality....\n\nA sort of _heritage of morality_ is perhaps presupposed here: one\nfeels that one can be lavish with it and fling a great deal of it out\nof the window without materially reducing one's means. One is never\ntempted to admire \"beautiful souls,\" one always knows one's self to be\ntheir superior. The monsters of virtue should be met with inner scorn;\n_d\u00e9niaiser la vertu_--Oh, the joy of it!\n\nOne should revolve round one's self, have no desire to be \"better\" or\n\"anything else\" at all than one is. One should be too interested to\nomit throwing the tentacles or meshes of every morality out to things.\n\n\n426.\n\nConcerning the psychology of _philosophers._ They should be\npsychologists--this was possible only from the nineteenth century\nonwards--and no longer little Jack Homers, who see three or four\nfeet in front of them, and are almost satisfied to burrow inside\nthemselves. We psychologists of the future are not very intent on\nself-contemplation: we regard it almost as a sign of degeneration when\nan instrument endeavours \"to know itself\":[10] we are instruments of\nknowledge and we would fain possess all the precision and ingenuousness\nof an instrument--consequently we may not analyse or \"know\" ourselves.\nThe first sign of a great psychologist's self-preservative instinct:\nhe never goes in search of himself, he has no eye, no interest, no\ninquisitiveness where he himself is concerned.... The great egoism\nof our dominating will insists on our completely shutting our eyes to\nourselves, and on our appearing \"impersonal,\" \"disinterested\"!--Oh to\nwhat a ridiculous degree we are the reverse of this!\n\nWe are no Pascals, we are not particularly interested in the\n\"Salvation of the soul,\" in our own happiness, and in our own\nvirtue.--We have neither enough time nor enough curiosity to be so\nconcerned with ourselves. Regarded more deeply, the case is again\ndifferent, we thoroughly mistrust all men who thus contemplate their\nown navels: because introspection seems to us a degenerate form of\nthe psychologist's genius, as a note of interrogation affixed to the\npsychologist's instinct: just as a painter's eye is degenerate which is\nactuated by the _will_ to see for the sake of seeing.\n\n\n[Footnote 10: TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.--Goethe invariably inveighed against\nthe \"gnoti seauton\" of the Socratic school; he was of the opinion that\nan animal which tries to see its inner self must be sick.]\n\n\n\n\n2. A CRITICISM OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY.\n\n\n427.\n\nThe apparition of Greek philosophers since the time of Socrates is a\nsymptom of decadence; the anti-Hellenic instincts become paramount.\n\nThe \"_Sophist_\" is still quite Hellenic--as are also Anaxagoras,\nDemocritus, and the great Ionians; but only as transitional forms. The\n_polis_ loses its faith in the unity of its culture, in its rights of\ndominion over every other _polis...._ Cultures, that is to say, \"the\ngods,\" are exchanged, and thus the belief in the exclusive prerogative\nof the _deus autochthonus_ is lost. Good and Evil of whatever origin\nget mixed: the boundaries separating good from evil gradually\n_vanish...._ This is the \"Sophist.\" ...\n\nOn the other hand, the \"philosopher\" is the _reactionary_: he insists\nupon the _old_ virtues. He sees the reason of decay in the decay of\ninstitutions: he therefore wishes to revive _old_ institutions;--he\nsees decay in the decline of authority: he therefore endeavours to\nfind _new_ authorities (he travels abroad, explores foreign literature\nand exotic religions....);--he will reinstate the _ideal polis,_ after\nthe concept \"polis\" has become superannuated (just, as the Jews kept\nthemselves together as a \"people\" after they had fallen into slavery).\nThey become interested in all tyrants: their desire is to re-establish\nvirtue with \"_force majeure_\".\n\nGradually everything _genuinely Hellenic_ is held responsible for\nthe state of _decay_ (and Plato is just as ungrateful to Pericles,\nHomer, tragedy, and rhetoric as the prophets are to David and\nSaul). _The downfall of Greece is conceived as an objection to the\nfundamental principles of Hellenic culture: the profound error of\nphilosophers_--Conclusion: the Greek world perishes. The cause thereof:\nHomer, mythology, ancient morality, etc.\n\nThe anti-Hellenic development of philosophers' valuations:--the\nEgyptian influence (\"Life after death\" made into law....);--the Semitic\ninfluence (the \"dignity of the sage,\" the \"Sheik\");--the Pythagorean\ninfluence, the subterranean cults, Silence, means of terrorisation\nconsisting of appeals to a \"Beyond,\" _mathematics_: the religious\nvaluation consisting of a sort of intimacy with a cosmic entity;--the\nsacerdotal, ascetic, and transcendental influences;--the _dialectical_\ninfluence,--I am of opinion that even Plato already betrays revolting\nand pedantic meticulousness in his concepts!--Decline of good\nintellectual taste: the hateful noisiness of every kind of direct\ndialectics seems no longer to be felt.\n\nThe _two_ decadent tendencies and extremes run side by side: (a) the\nluxuriant and more charming kind of decadence which shows a love of\npomp and art, and (b) the gloomy kind, with its religious and moral\npathos, its stoical self-hardening tendency, its Platonic denial of the\nsenses, and its preparation of the soil for the coming of Christianity.\n\n\n428.\n\nTo what extent psychologists have been corrupted by the moral\nidiosyncrasy!--Not one of the ancient philosophers had the courage to\nadvance the theory of the non-free will (that is to say, the theory\nthat denies morality);--not one had the courage to identify the typical\nfeature of happiness, of every kind of happiness \"pleasure\"), with the\nwill to power: for the pleasure of power was considered immoral;--not\none had the courage to regard virtue as a _result of immorality_ (as a\nresult of a will to power) in the service of a species (or of a race,\nor of a _polis_); for the will to power was considered immoral.\n\nIn the whole of moral evolution, there is no sign of truth: all\nthe conceptual elements which come into play are fictions; all the\npsychological tenets are false; all the forms of logic employed in this\ndepartment of prevarication are sophisms. The chief feature of all\nmoral philosophers is their total lack of intellectual cleanliness and\nself-control: they regard \"fine feelings\" as arguments: their heaving\nbreasts seem to them the bellows of godliness.... Moral philosophy is\nthe most suspicious period in the history of the human intellect.\n\nThe first great example: in the name of morality and under its\npatronage, a great wrong was committed, which as a matter of fact was\nin every respect an act of decadence. Sufficient stress cannot be laid\nupon this fact, that the great Greek philosophers not only represented\nthe decadence of _every kind of Greek ability_, but also made it\n_contagious_.... This \"virtue\" made wholly abstract was the highest\nform of seduction; to make oneself abstract means to turn one's back on\nthe world.\n\nThe moment is a very remarkable one: the Sophists are within sight\nof the first _criticism of morality,_ the first _knowledge_ of\nmorality:--they classify the majority of moral valuations (in view\nof their dependence upon local conditions) together;--they lead one\nto understand that every form of morality is capable of being upheld\ndialectically: that is to say, they guessed that all the fundamental\nprinciples of a morality must be _sophistical_--a proposition which\nwas afterwards proved in the grandest possible style by the ancient\nphilosophers from Plato onwards (up to Kant);--they postulate the\nprimary truth that there is no such thing as a \"moral _per se_,\" a\n\"good _per se_,\" and that it is madness to talk of \"truth\" in this\nrespect.\n\nWherever was _intellectual uprightness_ to be found in those days?\n\nThe Greek culture of the Sophists had grown out of all the Greek\ninstincts; it belongs to the culture of the age of Pericles as\nnecessarily as Plato does not: it has its predecessors in Heraclitus,\nDemocritus, and in the scientific types of the old philosophy; it\nfinds expression in the elevated culture of Thucydides, for instance.\nAnd--it has ultimately shown itself to be right: every step in the\nscience of epistemology and morality has _confirmed the attitude_ of\nthe Sophists.... Our modern attitude of mind is, to a great extent,\nHeraclitean, Democritean, and Protagorean ... to say that it is\n_Protagorean_ is even sufficient: because Protagoras was in himself a\nsynthesis of the two men Heraclitus and Democritus.\n\n(_Plato_: a _great Cagliostro,_--let us think of how Epicurus judged\nhim; how Timon, Pyrrho's friend, judged him----Is Plato's integrity by\nany chance beyond question?... But we at least know what he wished to\nhave _taught_ as absolute truth--namely, things which were to him not\neven relative truths: the separate and immortal life of \"souls.\")\n\n\n429.\n\nThe _Sophists_ are nothing more, nor less than realists: they elevate\nall the values and practices which are common property to the rank of\nvalues--they have the courage, peculiar to all strong intellects,\nwhich consists in _knowing_ their immorality....\n\nIs it to be supposed that these small Greek independent republics,\nso filled with rage and envy that they would fain have devoured each\nother, were led by principles of humanity and honesty? Is Thucydides\nby any chance reproached with the words he puts into the mouths of\nthe Athenian ambassadors when they were treating with the Melii anent\nthe question of destruction or submission? Only the most perfect\nTartuffes could have been able to speak of virtue in the midst of that\ndreadful strain--or if not Tartuffes, at least _detached philosophers,_\nanchorites, exiles, and fleers from reality.... All of them, people\nwho denied things in order to be able to exist.\n\nThe Sophists were Greeks: when Socrates and Plato adopted the cause\nof virtue and justice, they were _Jews_ or I know not what. _Grote's_\ntactics in the defence of the Sophists are false: he would like to\nraise them to the rank of men of honour and moralisers--but it was\ntheir honour not to indulge in any humbug with grand words and virtues.\n\n\n430.\n\nThe great reasonableness underlying all moral education lay in the fact\nthat it always attempted to attain to _the certainty of an instinct_:\nso that neither good intentions nor good means, as such, first required\nto enter consciousness. Just as the soldier learns his exercises, so\nshould man learn how to act in life. In truth this unconsciousness\nbelongs to every kind of perfection: even the mathematician carries out\nhis calculations unconsciously....\n\nWhat, then, does Socrates' _reaction_ mean, which recommended\ndialectics as the way to virtue, and which was charmed when morality\nwas unable to justify itself logically? But this is precisely what\nproves its _superiority_--without unconsciousness _it is worth nothing_!\n\nIn reality it means _the dissolution of Greek instincts,_ when\n_demonstrability_ is posited as the first condition of personal\nexcellence in virtue. All these great \"men of virtue\" and of words are\nthemselves types of dissolution.\n\nIn practice, it means that moral judgments have been torn from the\nconditions among which they grew and in which alone they had some\nsense, from their Greek and Gr\u00e6co-political soil, in order to be\n_denaturalised_ under the cover of being _made sublime._ The great\nconcepts \"good\" and \"just\" are divorced from the first principles of\nwhich they form a part, and, as \"ideas\" _become free,_ degenerate\ninto subjects for discussion. A certain truth is sought behind them;\nthey are regarded as entities or as symbols of entities: a world is\n_invented_ where they are \"at home,\" and from which they are supposed\nto hail.\n\n_In short_: the scandal reaches its apotheosis in Plato.... And then it\nwas necessary to invent the _perfectly abstract_ man also:--good, just,\nwise, and a dialectician to boot--in short, the _scarecrow_ of the\nancient philosopher: a plant without any soil whatsoever; a human race\ndevoid of all definite ruling instincts; a virtue which \"justifies\"\nitself with reasons. The perfectly absurd \"individual\" _per se_! the\nhighest form of _Artificiality...._\n\nBriefly, the denaturalisation of moral values resulted in the creation\nof a degenerate _type of man_--\"the good man,\" \"the happy man,\"\n\"the wise man.\"--Socrates represents a moment of the most _profound\nperversity_ in the history of values.\n\n\n431.\n\n_Socrates._--This veering round of Greek taste in favour of dialectics\nis a great question. What really happened then? Socrates, the\n_roturier_ who was responsible for it, was thus able to triumph over\na more noble taste, the taste of _the noble_:--the mob gets the upper\nhand along with dialectics. Previous to Socrates dialectic manners\nwere repudiated in good society; they were regarded as indecent; the\nyouths were Warned against them. What was the purpose of this display\nof reasons? Why demonstrate? Against others one could use authority.\nOne commanded, and that sufficed. Among friends, _inter pares,_ there\nwas tradition--_also_ a form of authority: and last but not least,\none understood each other. There was no room found for dialectics.\nBesides, all such modes of presenting reasons were distrusted. All\nhonest things do not carry their reasons in their hands in such\nfashion. It is indecent to show all the five fingers at the same time.\nThat which can be \"demonstrated\" is little worth. The instinct of\nevery party-speaker tells him that dialectics excites mistrust and\ncarries little conviction. Nothing is more easily wiped away than the\neffect of a dialectician. It can only be a _last defence._ One must\nbe in an extremity; it is necessary to have to _extort_ one's rights;\notherwise one makes no use of dialectics. That is why the Jews were\ndialecticians, Reynard the Fox was a dialectician, and so was Socrates.\nAs a dialectician a person has a merciless instrument in his hand:\nhe can play the tyrant with it; he compromises when he conquers. The\ndialectician leaves it to his opponent to demonstrate that he is not an\nidiot; he is made furious and helpless, while the dialectician himself\nremains calm and still possessed of his triumphant reasoning powers--he\n_paralyses_ his opponent's intellect.--The dialectician's irony is a\nform of mob-revenge: the ferocity of the oppressed lies in the cold\nknife-cuts of the syllogism....\n\nIn Plato, as in all men of excessive sensuality and wild fancies, the\ncharm of concepts was so great, that he involuntarily honoured and\ndeified the concept as a form of ideal. _Dialectical intoxication_: as\nthe consciousness of being able to exercise control over one's self by\nmeans of it--as an instrument of the Will to Power.\n\n\n432.\n\n_The problem of Socrates._--The two antitheses: the _tragic_ and the\n_Socratic_ spirits--measured according to the law of Life.\n\nTo what extent is the Socratic spirit a decadent phenomenon? to what\nextent are robust health and power still revealed by the whole attitude\nof the scientific man, his dialectics, his ability, and his severity?\n(the health of the _plebeian_; whose malice, _esprit frondeur,_\nwhose astuteness, whose rascally depths, are held in check by his\n_cleverness_; the whole type is \"ugly\").\n\n_Uglification_: self-derision, dialectical dryness, intelligence in\nthe form of a _tyrant_ against the \"tyrant\" (instinct). Everything in\nSocrates is exaggeration, eccentricity, caricature; he is a buffoon\nwith the blood of Voltaire in his veins.\n\nHe discovers a new form of _agon_; he is the first fencing-master in\nthe superior classed of Athens; he stands for nothing else than the\n_highest form of cleverness_: he calls it \"virtue\" (he regarded it as a\nmeans of _salvation_; he did not choose to be _clever,_ cleverness was\n_de rigueur_); the proper thing is to control one's self in suchwise\nthat one enters into a struggle _not_ with passions but with reasons\nas one's weapons (Spinoza's stratagem--the unravelment of the errors\nof passion);--it is desirable to discover how every one may be caught\nonce he is goaded into a passion, and to know how illogically passion\nproceeds; self-mockery is practised in order to injure the very roots\nof the _feelings of resentment._\n\nIt is my wish to understand which idiosyncratic states form a part of\nthe Socratic problem: its association of reason, virtue, and happiness.\nWith this absurd doctrine of the identity of these things it succeeded\n_in charming_ the world: ancient philosophy could not rid itself of\nthis doctrine....\n\nAbsolute lack of objective interest: hatred of science: the\nidiosyncrasy of considering one's self a problem. Acoustic\nhallucinations in Socrates: morbid element. When the intellect is\nrich and independent, it most strongly resists preoccupying itself\nwith morality. How is it that Socrates is a _moral-maniac_?--Every\n\"practical\" philosophy immediately steps into the foreground in times\nof distress. When morality and religion become the chief interests of a\ncommunity, they are signs of a state of distress.\n\n\n433.\n\nIntelligence, clearness, hardness, and logic as weapons against the_\nwildness of the instincts_. The latter must be dangerous and must\nthreaten ruin, otherwise no purpose can be served by developing\n_intelligence_ to this degree of tyranny. In order to make a _tyrant_\nof intelligence the instincts must first have proved themselves\ntyrants. This is the problem. It was a very timely one in those days.\nReason became virtue--virtue equalled happiness.\n\n_Solution_: Greek philosophers stand upon the same fundamental fact\nof their inner experiences as Socrates does; five feet from excess,\nfrom anarchy and from dissolution--all decadent men. They regard him\nas a doctor: Logic as will to power, as will to control self, as will\nto \"happiness.\" The wildness and anarchy of Socrates' instincts is a\n_sign of decadence_, as is also the superf\u0153tation of logic and clear\nreasoning in him. Both are abnormities, each belongs to the other.\nCriticism. Decadence reveals itself in this concern about \"happiness\"\n(_i.e._ about the \"salvation of the soul\"; _i.e. to feel that one's\ncondition is a danger_). Its fanatical interest in \"happiness\" shows\nthe pathological condition of the subconscious self: it was a vital\ninterest. The _alternative_ which faced them all was: to be reasonable\nor to perish. The morality of Greek philosophers shows that they felt\nthey were in danger.\n\n\n434.\n\n_Why everything resolved itself into mummery.--_Rudimentary\npsychology, which only considered the _conscious_ lapses of men (as\ncauses), which regarded \"consciousness\" as an attribute of the soul,\nand which sought a will behind every action (_i.e._ an intention),\ncould only answer \"_Happiness_\" to the question: \"_What does man\ndesire?_\" (it was impossible to answer \"Power,\" because that would have\nbeen _immoral)_;--consequently behind all men's actions there is the\nintention of attaining to happiness by means of them. Secondly: if man\nas a matter of fact does not attain to happiness, why is it? Because he\nmistakes the means thereto.--_What is the unfailing means of acquiring\nhappiness?_ Answer: _virtue._--Why virtue? Because virtue is supreme\nrationalness, and rationalness makes mistakes in the choice of means\nimpossible: virtue in the form of _reason_ is the way to happiness.\nDialectics is the constant occupation of virtue, because it does away\nwith passion and intellectual cloudiness.\n\nAs a matter of fact, man does _not_ desire \"happiness.\" Pleasure is\na sensation of power: if the passions are excluded, those states of\nthe mind are also excluded which afford the greatest sensation of\npower and therefore of pleasure. The highest rationalism is a state of\ncool clearness, which is very far from being able to bring about that\nfeeling of power which every kind of _exaltation_ involves....\n\nThe ancient philosophers combat everything that intoxicates and\nexalts--everything that impairs the perfect coolness and impartiality\nof the mind.... They were consistent with their first false principle:\nthat consciousness was the _highest,_ the _supreme_ state of mind, the\nprerequisite of perfection--whereas the reverse is true....\n\nAny kind of action is imperfect in proportion as it has been willed or\nconscious. The philosophers of antiquity _were the greatest duffers_\nin practice, \"because they condemned themselves\" theoretically\nto _dufferdom,_.... In practice everything resolved itself into\ntheatricalness: and he who saw through it, as Pyrrho did, for instance,\nthought as everybody did--that is to say, that in goodness and\nuprightness \"paltry people\" were far superior to philosophers.\n\nAll the deeper natures of antiquity were disgusted at the _philosophers\nof virtue_; all people saw in them was brawlers and actors. (This was\nthe judgment passed on _Plato_ by _Epicurus_ and _Pyrrho_.)\n\n_Result_: In practical life, in patience, goodness, and mutual\nassistance, paltry people were above them:--this is something like the\njudgment Dostoiewsky or Tolstoy claims for his muzhiks: they are more\nphilosophical in practice, they are more courageous in their way of\ndealing with the exigencies of life....\n\n\n435.\n\n_A criticism of the philosopher._--Philosophers and moralists merely\ndeceive themselves when they imagine that they escape from decadence\nby _opposing_ it. That lies beyond their wills: and however little they\nmay be aware of the fact, it is generally discovered, subsequently that\nthey were among the most powerful promoters of decadence.\n\nLet us examine the philosophers of Greece--Plato, for instance. He\nit was who separated the instincts from the polis, from the love of\ncontest, from military efficiency, from art, beauty, the mysteries,\nand the belief in tradition and in ancestors.... He was the seducer of\nthe nobles: he himself seduces through the _roturier_ Socrates.... He\ndenied all the first principles of the \"noble Greek\" of sterling worth;\nhe made dialectics an everyday practice, conspired with the tyrants,\ndabbled in politics for the future, and was the example of a man whose\n_instincts_ were the example of a man whose _instincts_ were most\nperfectly separated from _tradition._ He is profound and passionate in\neverything that is _anti-Hellenic_....\n\nOne after the other, these great philosophers represent the _typical_\nforms of decadence: the moral and religious idiosyncrasy, anarchy,\nnihilism, (\u1f00\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03af\u03b1), cynicism, hardening principles, hedonism, and\nreaction.\n\nThe question of \"happiness,\" of \"virtue,\" and of the \"salvation of the\nsoul,\" is the expression of _physiological contradictoriness_ in these\ndeclining natures: their instincts lack all _balance_ and _purpose._\n\n\n436.\n\nTo what extent do dialectics and the faith in reason rest upon _moral_\nprejudices? With Plato we are as the temporary inhabitants of an\nintelligible world of goodness, still in possession of a bequest from\nformer times: divine dialectics taking its root in goodness leads to\neverything good (it follows, therefore, that it must lead \"backwards\").\nEven Descartes had a notion of the fact that, according to a thoroughly\nChristian and moral attitude of mind, which includes a belief in a\n_good_ God as the Creator of all things, the truthfulness of God\n_guarantees_ the judgments of our senses for us. But for this religious\nsanction and warrant of our senses and our reason, whence should\nwe obtain our right to trust in existence? That thinking must be a\nmeasure of reality,--that what cannot be the subject of thought, cannot\n_exist,_--is a coarse _non plus ultra_ of a moral blind confidence\n(in the essential principle of truth at the root of all things); this\nin itself is a mad assumption which our experience contradicts every\nminute. We cannot think of anything precisely as it is....\n\n\n437.\n\nThe real _philosophers of Greece_ are those which came before Socrates\n(with Socrates something changes). They are all distinguished men,\nthey take their stand away from the people and from usage; they have\ntravelled; they are earnest to the point of sombreness, their eyes\nare calm, and they are not unacquainted with the business of state and\ndiplomacy. They anticipated all the great concepts which coming sages\nwere to have concerning things in general: they themselves represented\nthese concepts, they made systems out of themselves. Nothing run give a\nhigher idea of Greek intellect than this sudden fruitfulness in types,\nthan this involuntary completeness in the drawing up of all the great\npossibilities of the philosophical ideal. I can see only one original\nfigure in those that came afterwards: a late arrival but necessarily\nthe last--_Pyrrho_ the nihilist. His instincts were opposed to the\ninfluences which had become ascendant in the mean-time the Socratic\nschool, Plato, and the artistic optimism of Heraclitus. (Pyrrho goes\nback to Democritus _via_ Protagoras....)\n\n***\n\nWise weariness: Pyrrho. To live humbly among the humble. Devoid of\npride. To live in the vulgar way; to honour and believe what every\none believes. To be on one's guard against science and intellect, and\nagainst everything that _puffs one out._ ... To be simply patient\nin the extreme, careless and mild;--_\u1f70\u03c0\u03ac\u03b8\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1_ or, better still,\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03b1\u1fe2\u03c4\u03b7\u03c2. A Buddhist for Greece, bred amid the tumult of the\nSchools; born alter his time; weary; an example of the protest of\nweariness against the eagerness of dialecticians; the incredulity of\nthe tired man in regard to the importance of everything. He had seen\n_Alexander_; he had seen the _Indian penitents._ To such late-arrivals\nand creatures of great subtlety, everything lowly, poor, and idiotic,\nis seductive. It narcoticises: it gives them relaxation (Pascal).\nOn the other hand, they mix with the crowd, and get confounded\nwith the rest. These weary creatures need warmth.... To overcome\ncontradiction; to do away with contests; to have no will to excel in\nany way; to deny the _Greek_ instincts (Pyrrho lived with his sister,\nwho was a midwife.) To rig out wisdom in such a way that it no longer\ndistinguishes; to give it the ragged mantle of poverty; to perform\nthe lowest offices, and to go to market and sell sucking-pigs....\nSweetness, clearness, indifference; no need of virtues that require\nattitudes; to be equal to all even in virtue: final conquest of one's\nself, final indifference.\n\nPyrrho and Epicurus;--two forms of Greek decadence; they are related\nin their hatred of dialectics and all _theatrical_ virtues. These\ntwo things together were then called philosophy; Pyrrho and Epicurus\nintentionally held that which they loved in low esteem; they chose\ncommon and even contemptible names for it, and they represented a state\nin which one is neither ill, healthy, lively, nor dead.... Epicurus was\nmore _na\u00eff,_ more idyllic, more grateful; Pyrrho had more experience of\nthe world, had travelled more, and was more nihilistic. His life was a\nprotest against the great _doctrine of Identity_ (Happiness = Virtue =\nKnowledge). The proper way of living is not promoted by science: wisdom\ndoes not make \"wise.\" ... The proper way of living does not desire\nhappiness, it turns away from happiness....\n\n\n438.\n\nThe war against the \"old faith,\" as Epicurus waged it, was, strictly\nspeaking, a struggle against _pre-existing_ Christianity--the struggle\nagainst a world then already gloomy, moralised, acidified throughout\nwith feelings of guilt, and grown old and sick.\n\nNot the \"moral corruption\" of antiquity, but precisely its _moral\ninfectedness_ was the prerequisite which enabled Christianity to become\nits master. Moral fanaticism (in short: Plato) destroyed paganism by\ntransvaluing its values and poisoning its innocence. We ought at last\nto understand that what was then destroyed was _higher_ than what\nprevailed! Christianity grew on the soil of psychological corruption,\nand could only take root in rotten ground.\n\n\n439.\n\nScience: as a disciplinary measure or as an instinct--I see a decline\nof the instincts in Greek philosophers: otherwise they could not have\nbeen guilty of the profound error of regarding the conscious state\nas the more valuable state. The intensity of consciousness stands in\nthe inverse ratio to the ease and speed of cerebral transmission.\nGreek philosophy upheld the opposite view, which is always the sign of\nweakened instincts.\n\nWe must, in sooth, seek _perfect life_ there where it is least\nconscious (that is to say, there where it is least aware of its logic,\nits reasons, its means, its intentions, and its _utility)._ The return\nto the facts of _common sense,_ the facts of the common man and of\n\"paltry people.\" _Honesty and intelligence_ stored up for generations\nof people who are quite unconscious of their principles, and who\neven have some fear of principles. It is not reasonable to desire a\n_reasoning virtue._ ... A philosopher is compromised by such a desire.\n\n\n440.\n\nWhen morality--that is to say, refinement, prudence, bravery, and\nequity--have been stored up in the same way, thanks to the moral\nefforts of a whole succession of generations, the collective power of\nthis hoard of virtue projects its rays even into that sphere where\nhonesty is most seldom present--the sphere of _intellect._ When a\nthing becomes conscious, it is the sign of a state of ill-ease in\nthe organism; something new has got to be found, the organism is not\nsatisfied or adapted, it is subject to distress, suspense, and it is\nhypersensitive--precisely all this is consciousness....\n\nGennius lies in the instincts; goodness does too. One only acts\nperfectly when one acts instinctively. Even from the moral point of\nview all thinking which is conscious is merely a process of groping,\nand in the majority of cases an attack on morality. Scientific honesty\nis always sacrificed when a thinker begins to reason: let any one try\nthe experiment: put the wisest man in the balance, and then let him\ndiscourse upon morality....\n\nIt could also be proved that the whole of a man's _conscious_ thinking\nshows a much lower standard of morality than the thoughts of the same\nman would show if they were led by his _instincts._\n\n\n441.\n\nThe struggle against Socrates, Plato, and all the Socratic schools,\nproceeds from the profound instinct that man _is_ not made _better_\nwhen he is shown that virtue may be demonstrated or based upon\nreason.... This in the end is the niggardly fact, it was the agonal\ninstinct in all these born dialecticians, which drove them to glorify\ntheir _personal abilities_ as the _highest of all qualities,_ and to\nrepresent every other form of goodness as conditioned by them. The\n_anti-scientific_ spirit of all this \"philosophy\": it _will never admit\nthat it is not right._\n\n\n442.\n\nThis is extraordinary. From its very earliest beginnings, Greek\nphilosophy carries on a struggle against science with the weapons of\na theory of knowledge, especially of scepticism; and why is this? It\nis always in favour of _morality...._ (Physicists and medical men\nare hated.) Socrates, Aristippus, the Megarian school, the Cynics,\nEpicurus and Pyrrho--a general onslaught upon knowledge in favour\nof _morality...._ (Hatred of dialectics also.) There is still a\nproblem to be solved: they approach sophistry in order to be rid of\nscience. On the other hand, the physicists are subjected to such an\nextent that, among their first principles, they include the theory of\ntruth and of real being: for instance, the atom, the four elements\n(_juxtaposition_ of being, in order to explain its multiformity and its\ntransformations). Contempt of _objectivity_ in interests is taught:\nreturn to practical interest, and to the personal utility of all\nknowledge....\n\nThe struggle against science is directed at: (1) its pathos\n(objectivity); (2) its means (that is to say, at its utility); (3) its\nresults (which are considered childish). It is the same struggle which\nis taken up later on by the _Church_ in the name of piety: the Church\ninherited the whole arsenal of antiquity for her war with science. The\ntheory of knowledge played the same part in the affair as it did in\nKant's or the Indians' case. There is no desire whatever to be troubled\nwith it, a free hand is wanted for the \"purpose\" that is envisaged.\n\nAgainst what powers are they actually defending themselves? Against\ndutifulness, against obedience to law, against the compulsion of going\nhand in hand--I believe this is what is called _Freedom...._\n\nThis is how decadence manifests itself: the instinct of solidarity is\nso degenerate that solidarity itself gets to be regarded as _tyranny_:\nno authority or solidarity is brooked, nobody any longer desires to\nfall in with the rank and file, and to adopt its ignobly slow pace. The\nslow movement which is the tempo of science is generally hated, as are\nalso the scientific man's indifference in regard to getting on, his\nlong breath, and his impersonal attitude.\n\n\n443.\n\nAt bottom, morality is _hostile_ to science: Socrates was so already\ntoo--and the reason is, that science considers certain things important\nwhich have no relation whatsoever to \"good\" and \"evil,\" and which\ntherefore reduce the gravity of our feelings concerning \"good\" and\n\"evil.\" What morality requires is that the whole of a man should serve\nit with all his power: it considers it waste on the part of a creature\nthat _can ill afford waste,_ when a man earnestly troubles his head\nabout stars or plants. That is why science very quickly declined\nin Greece, once Socrates had inoculated scientific work with the\ndisease of morality. The mental attitudes reached by a Democritus, a\nHippocrates, and a Thucydides, have not been reached a second time.--\n\n\n444.\n\nThe problem of the _philosopher_ and of the _scientific_ man.--The\ninfluence of age; depressing habits (sedentary study _\u00e0 la_ Kant;\nover-work; inadequate nourishment of the brain; reading). A more\nessential question still: is it not already perhaps a _symptom_ of\ndecadence when thinking tends to establish _generalities_?\n\n_Objectivity regarded as the disintegration of the will_ (to be able\nto remain as detached as possible ...). This presupposes a tremendous\nadiaphora in regard to the strong passions: a kind of isolation, an\nexceptional position, opposition to the normal passions.\n\nType: desertion of _home-country_ emigrants go ever greater distances\nafield; growing exoticism; the voice of the old imperative dies\naway;--and the continual question \"whither?\" (\"happiness\") is a sign\nof _emancipation_ from forms of organisation, a sign of breaking loose\nfrom everything.\n\nProblem: is the man of _science_ more of a decadent symptom than the\nphilosopher?--as a _whole_ scientific man is not, cut loose from\neverything, only a part of his being is consecrated exclusively to the\nservice of knowledge and disciplined to maintain a special attitude and\npoint of view; in his department he is in need of _all_ the virtues\nof a strong race, of robust health, of great severity, manliness and\nintelligence. He is rather a symptom of the great multiformity of\nculture than of the effeteness of the latter. The decadent scholar\nis a _bad_ scholar. Whereas the decadent philosopher has always been\nreckoned hitherto as the typical philosopher.\n\n\n445.\n\nAmong philosophers, nothing is more rare than _intellectual\nuprightness_: they perhaps say the very reverse, and even believe it.\nBut the prerequisite of all their work is, that they can only admit\nof certain truths; they know what they _have_ to prove; and the fact\nthat they must be agreed as to these \"truths\" is almost what makes them\nrecognise one another as philosophers. There are, for instance, the\ntruths of morality. But belief in morality is not a proof of morality:\nthere are cases--and the philosopher's case is one in point--when a\nbelief of this sort is simply a piece of _immorality_.\n\n\n446.\n\n_What is the retrograde factor in a philosopher?_--He teaches that\nthe qualities which he happens to possess are the only qualities that\nexist, that they are indispensable to those who wish to attain to the\n\"highest good\" (for instance, dialectics with Plato). He would have\nall men raise themselves, _gradatim,_ to _his_ type as the highest. He\ndespises what is generally esteemed--by him a gulf is cleft between\nthe highest _priestly_ values and the values of the _world._ He knows\nwhat is true, who God is, what every one's goal should be, and the way\nthereto.... The typical philosopher is thus an absolute dogmatist;--if\nhe _requires_ scepticism at all it is only in order to be able to speak\ndogmatically of his _principal purpose_.\n\n\n447.\n\nWhen the philosopher is confronted with his rival--science, for\ninstance, he becomes a sceptic; then he appropriates a _form of\nknowledge_ which he denies to the man of science; he goes hand in\nhand with the priest so that he may not be suspected of atheism or\nmaterialism; he considers an attack made upon himself as an attack\nupon morals, religion, virtue, and order--he knows how to bring his\nopponents into ill repute by calling them \"seducers\" and \"underminers\":\nthen he marches shoulder to shoulder with power.\n\nThe philosopher at war with other philosophers:--he does his best\nto compel them to appear like anarchists, disbelievers, opponents of\nauthority. In short, when he fights, he fights exactly like a priest\nand like the priesthood.\n\n\n\n\n3. THE TRUTHS AND ERRORS OF PHILOSOPHERS.\n\n\n\n448.\n\nPhilosophy defined by Kant: \"_The science of the limitations of\nreason_\"!!\n\n\n449.\n\nAccording to Aristotle, Philosophy is the art of discovering truth. On\nthe other hand, the Epicurians, who availed themselves of Aristotle's\n_sensual_ theory of knowledge, retorted in ironical opposition to the\nsearch for truth: \"Philosophy is the art of _Life._\"\n\n\n450.\n\n_The three great na\u00efvet\u00e9s:--_\n\nKnowledge as a means of happiness (as if ...);\n\nKnowledge as a means to virtue (as if ...);\n\nKnowledge as a means to the \"denial of Life\"--inasmuch as it leads to\ndisappointment--(as if ...).\n\n\n451.\n\nAs if there were a \"truth\" which one could by some means approach!\n\n\n452.\n\nError and ignorance are fatal.--The assumption that _truth has been\nfound_ and that ignorance and error are at an end, constitutes one\nof the most seductive thoughts in the world. Granted that it be\ngenerally accepted, it paralyses the will to test, to investigate,\nto be cautious, and to gather experience: it may even be regarded as\ncriminal--that is to say, as a _doubt_ concerning truth....\n\n\"Truth\" is therefore more fatal than error and ignorance, because it\nparalyses the forces which lead to enlightenment and knowledge. The\npassion for _idleness_ now stands up for \"truth\" (\"Thought is pain\nand misery!\"), as also do order, rule, the joy of possession, the\npride of wisdom--in fact, _vanity._--it is easier to _obey_ than to\n_examine_; it is more gratifying to think \"I possess the truth,\" than\nto see only darkness in all directions; ... but, above all, it is\nreassuring, it lends confidence, and alleviates life--it \"improves\"\nthe character inasmuch as it _reduces mistrust._\" Spiritual peace,\" \"a\nquiet conscience\"--these things are inventions which are only possible\nprovided \"_Truth be found._\"--\"By their fruits ye shall know them.\" ...\n\"Truth\" is the truth because it makes men _better...._ The process goes\non: all goodness and all success is placed to the credit of \"truth.\"\n\nThis is the _proof by success_: the happiness, contentment, and the\nwelfare of a community or of an individual, are now understood to be\nthe _result of the belief in morality_.... Conversely: _failure_ is\nascribed to a _lack_ of faith.\n\n\n453.\n\nThe causes of error lie just as much in the _good_ as in the _bad will_\nof man:--in an incalculable number of cases he conceals reality from\nhimself, he falsifies it, so that he may not suffer from his good or\nbad will. God, for instance, is considered the shaper of man's destiny;\nhe interprets his little lot as though everything were intentionally\nsent to him for the salvation of his soul,--this act of ignorance in\n\"philology,\" which to a more subtle intellect would seem unclean and\nfalse, is done, in the majority of cases, with perfect _good faith._\nGoodwill, \"noble feelings,\" and \"lofty states of the soul\" are just as\nunderhand and deceptive in the means they use as are the passions love,\nhatred, and revenge, which morality has repudiated and declared to be\negotistic.\n\nErrors are what mankind has had to pay for most dearly: and taking them\nall in all, the errors which have resulted from goodwill are those\nwhich have wrought the most harm. The illusion which makes people\nhappy is more harmful than the illusion which is immediately followed\nby evil results: the latter increases keenness and mistrust, and\npurifies, the understanding; the former merely narcoticises....\n\nFine feelings and noble impulses ought, speaking physiologically, to be\nclassified with the narcotics: their abuse is followed by precisely the\nsame results as the abuse of any other opiate--_weak nerves_.\n\n\n454.\n\nError is the most expensive luxury that man can indulge in: and if the\nerror happen to be a physiological one, it is fatal to life. What has\nmankind paid for most dearly hitherto? For its \"truths \": for every one\nof these were errors _in physiologicis>_....\n\n\n455.\n\nPsychological _confusions_: the _desire for belief_ is confounded with\nthe \"will to truth\" (for instance, in Carlyle). But the _desire for\ndisbelief_ has also been confounded with the \"will to truth\" (a need of\nridding one's self of a belief for a hundred reasons: in order to carry\none's point against certain \"believers\"). _What is it that inspires\nSceptics?_ The hatred of dogmatists--or a need of repose, weariness as\nin Pyrrho's case.\n\nThe _advantages_ which were expected to come from truth, were the\nadvantages resulting from a belief in _it_: for, in itself, truth could\nhave been thoroughly painful, harmful, and even fatal. Likewise truth\nwas combated only on account of the advantages which a victory over it\nwould provide--for instance, emancipation from the yoke of the ruling\npowers.\n\nThe method of truth was _not_ based upon motives of truthfulness, but\nupon _motives of power, upon the desire to be superior._\n\n_How is_ truth _proved_? By means of the feeling of increased\npower,--by means of utility,--by means of indispensability,--_in short,\nby means of its advantages_ (that is to say, hypotheses concerning what\ntruth should be like in order that it may be embraced by us). But this\ninvolves _prejudice_: it is a sign that _truth_ does not enter the\nquestion at all....\n\nWhat is the meaning of the \"will to truth,\" for instance in the\nGoncourts? and in the _naturalists_?--A criticism of \"objectivity.\"\n\nWhy should we know: why should we not prefer to be deceived?...\nBut what was needed was always belief--and _not_ truth.... Belief\nis created by means which are quite _opposed_ to the method of\ninvestigation: _it even depends upon the exclusion of the latter._\n\n\n456.\n\nA certain degree of faith suffices to-day to give us an _objection_\nto what is believed--it does more, it makes us question the spiritual\nhealthiness of the believer.\n\n\n457.\n\n_Martyrs._--To combat anything that is based upon reverence, opponents\nmust be possessed of both daring and recklessness, and be hindered\nby no scruples.... Now, if one considers that for thousands of\nyears man has sanctified as truths only those things which were in\nreality errors, and that he has branded any criticism of them with\nthe hall-mark of badness, one will have to acknowledge, however\nreluctantly, that a goodly amount of _immoral deeds_ were necessary in\norder to give the initiative to an attack--I mean to _reason...._ That\nthese immoralists have always posed as the \"martyrs of truth\" should\nbe forgiven them: the truth of the matter is that they did not stand\nup and deny owing to an instinct for truth; but because of a love of\ndissolution, criminal scepticism, and the love of adventure. In other\ncases it is personal rancour which drives them into the province of\nproblems--they only combat certain points of view in order to be\nable to carry their point against certain people. But, above all, it\nis revenge which has become scientifically useful--the revenge of the\noppressed, those who, thanks to the truth that happens to be ruling,\nhave been pressed aside and even smothered....\n\nTruth, that is to say the scientific method, was grasped and favoured\nby such as recognised that it was a useful weapon of war--an instrument\nof _destruction_....\n\nIn order to be honoured as opponents, they were moreover obliged\nto use an apparatus similar to that used by those whom they were\nattacking: they therefore brandished the concept \"truth\" as absolutely\nas their adversaries did--they became fanatics at least in their\nposes, because no other pose could be expected to be taken seriously.\nWhat still remained to be done was left to persecution, to passion,\nand the uncertainty of the persecuted--hatred waxed great, and the\nfirst impulse began to die away and to leave the field entirely to\nscience. Ultimately all of them wanted to be right in the same absurd\nway as their opponents.... The word \"conviction,\" \"faith,\" the pride\nof martyrdom--these things are most unfavourable to knowledge. The\nadversaries of truth finally adopt the whole subjective manner of\ndeciding about truth,--that is to say, by means of poses, sacrifices,\nand heroic resolutions,--and thus _prolong_ the _dominion_ of the\nanti-scientific method. As martyrs they compromise their very own deed.\n\n\n458.\n\n_The dangerous distinction between \"theoretical\" and \"practical\"_ in\nKant for instance, but also in the ancient philosophers:--they behave\nas if pure intellectuality presented them with the problems of science\nand metaphysics;--they behave as if practice should be judged by a\nmeasure of its own, whatever the judgment of theory may be.\n\nAgainst the first tendency I set up my _psychology of philosophers_:\ntheir strangest calculations and \"intellectuality\" are still but the\nlast pallid impress of a physiological fact; spontaneity is absolutely\nlacking in them, everything is instinct, everything is intended to\nfollow a certain direction from the first....\n\nAgainst the second tendency I put my question: whether we know another\nmethod of acting correctly, besides that of thinking correctly;\nthe last case _is_ action, the first presupposes thought Are we\npossessed of a means whereby we can judge of the value of a method\nof life differently from the value of a theory: through induction or\ncomparison?... Guileless people imagine that in this respect we are\nbetter equipped, we know what is \"good\"--and the philosophers are\ncontent to repeat this view. We conclude that some sort of _faith_ is\nat work in this matter, and nothing more....\n\n\"Men must act; _consequently_ rules of conduct are necessary\"--this is\nwhat even the ancient Sceptics thought. The _urgent need_ of a definite\ndecision in this department of knowledge is used as an argument in\nfavour of regarding something as _true_!...\n\n\"Men must not act\"--said their more consistent brothers, the Buddhists,\nand then thought out a mode of conduct which would deliver man from the\nyoke of action....\n\nTo adapt one's self, to live as the \"_common man_\" lives, and to regard\nas right and proper what _he_ regards as right: this is _submission_ to\nthe _gregarious instinct._ One must carry one's courage and severity\nso far as to learn to consider such submission a _disgrace._ One should\nnot live according to two standards!... One should not separate theory\nand practice!...\n\n\n459.\n\nOf all that which was formerly held to be true, not one word is to be\ncredited. Everything which was formerly disdained as unholy, forbidden,\ncontemptible, and fatal--all these flowers now bloom on the most\ncharming paths of truth.\n\nThe whole of this old morality concerns us no longer: it contains not\none idea which is still worthy of respect. We have outlived it--we\nare no longer sufficiently coarse and guileless to be forced to allow\nourselves to be lied to in this way.... In more polite language: we are\ntoo virtuous for it.... And if truth in the old sense were \"true\" only\nbecause the old morality said \"yea\" to it, and _had a right_ to say\n\"yea\" to it: it follows that no truth of the past can any longer be of\nuse to us.... Our _criterion_ of truth is /certainly not morality: we\n_refute_ an assertion when we show that it is dependent upon morality\nand is inspired by noble feelings.\n\n\n460.\n\nAll these values are empirical and conditioned. But he who believes\nin them and who honours them, _refuses_ to acknowledge this aspect of\nthem. All philosophers believe in these values, and one form their\nreverence takes is the endeavour to make _a priori truths_ out of them.\nThe falsifying nature of _reverence_....\n\nReverence is the supreme test of intellectual _honesty,_ but in the\nwhole history of philosophy there is no such thing as intellectual\nhonesty,--but the \"love of goodness ...\"\n\nOn the one hand, there is an absolute _lack of method_ in testing the\nvalue of these values; _secondly,_ there is a general disinclination\neither to test them or to regard them as conditioned at all.--All\n_anti-scientific_ instincts assembled round moral values in order to\n_keep science out_ of this department....\n\n\n\n4. CONCLUDING REMARKS IN THE CRITICISM OF PHILOSOPHY.\n\n\n\n461.\n\n_Why philosophers are slanderers._--The artful and blind hostility\nof philosophers towards the _senses_--what an amount of _mob_ and\n_middle-class_ qualities lie in all this hatred!\n\nThe crowd always believes that an abuse of which it feels the harmful\nresults, constitutes an _objection_ to the thing which happens to be\nabused: all insurrectionary movements against principles, whether in\npolitics or agriculture, always follow a line of argument suggested by\nthis ulterior motive: the abuse must be shown to be necessary to, and,\ninherent in, the principle.\n\nIt is a _woeful_ history: mankind looks for a principle, from the\nstandpoint of which he will be able to contemn man--he invents a world\nin order to be able to slander and throw mud at this world: as a matter\nof fact, he snatches every time at nothing, and construes this nothing\nas \"God,\" as \"Truth,\" and, in any case, as judge and detractor of\n_this_ existence....\n\nIf one should require a proof of how deeply and thoroughly the actually\n_barbarous_ needs of man, even in his present state of tameness and\n\"civilisation,\" still seek gratification, one should contemplate the\n\"leitmotifs\" of the whole of the evolution of philosophy:--a sort\nof revenge upon reality, a surreptitious process of destroying the\nvalues by means of which men live, a _dissatisfied_ soul to which\nthe conditions of discipline is one of torture, and which takes a\nparticular pleasure in morbidly severing all the bonds that bind it to\nsuch a condition.\n\nThe history of philosophy is the story of a _secret and mad hatred_\nof the prerequisities of Life, of the feelings which make for the\nreal values of Life, and of all partisanship in favour of Life.\nPhilosophers have never hesitated to affirm a fanciful world, provided\nit contradicted this world, and furnished them with a weapon wherewith\nthey could calumniate this world. Up to the present, philosophy has\nbeen the _grand school of slander_: and its power has been so great,\nthat even to-day our science, which pretends to be the advocate of\nLife, has _accepted_ the fundamental position of slander, and treats\nthis world as \"appearance,\" and this chain of causes as though it were\nonly phenomenal. What is the hatred which is active here?\n\nI fear that it is still the _Circe of philosophers--_Morality, which\nplays them the trick of compelling them to be ever slanderers.... They\nbelieved in moral \"truths,\" in these they thought they had found the\nhighest values; what alternative had they left, save that of denying\nexistence ever more emphatically the more they got to know about it?...\nFor this life is _immoral...._ And it is based upon immoral first\nprinciples: and morality says _nay_ to Life.\n\nLet us suppress the real world: and in order to do this, we must first\nsuppress the highest values current hitherto--morals.... It is enough\nto show that morality itself _is immoral,_ in the same sense as that in\nwhich immorality has been condemned heretofore. If an end be thus made\nto the tyranny of the former values, if we have suppressed the \"real\nworld,\" a _new order of values_ must follow of its own accord.\n\nThe world of appearance and the world _of lies_: this constitutes the\ncontradiction. The latter hitherto has been the \"real world,\" \"truth,\"\n\"God.\" This is the one which we still have to suppress.\n\nThe _logic of my conception_:\n\n(1) _Morality as the highest value_ (it is master of _all_ the phases\nof philosophy, even of the Sceptics). _Result_: this world is no good,\nit is not the \"real world.\"\n\n(2) _What_ is it that determines the highest value here? What, in\nsooth, is morality?--It is the instinct of _decadence_; it is the\nmeans whereby the exhausted and the degenerate _revenge themselves._\n_Historical_ proof: philosophers have always been decadents ... in the\nservice of _nihilistic_ religions.\n\n(3) It is the instinct of decadence coming to the fore as _will to\npower._ Proof: the absolute _immorality_ of the means employed by\nmorality throughout its history.\n\nGeneral aspect: the values which have been highest hitherto constitute\na specific case of the will to power; morality itself is a specific\ncase of immorality.\n\n\n462.\n\n_The principal innovations_: Instead of \"moral values,\" nothing but\n_naturalistic values._ Naturalisation of morality.\n\nIn the place of \"sociology,\" a _doctrine of the forms of dominion._\n\nIn the place of \"society,\" the _complex whole of culture,_ which is\n_my_ chief interest (whether in its entirety or in parts).\n\nIn the place of the \"theory of knowledge,\" a _doctrine which laid down\nthe value of the passions_ (to this a hierarchy of the passions would\nbelong: the passions _transfigured_; their _superior rank,_ their\n\"_spirituality_\").\n\nIn the place of \"metaphysics\" and religion, the doctrine of _Eternal\nRecurrence_ (this being regarded as a means to the breeding and\nselection of men).\n\n\n463.\n\nMy precursors: Schopenhauer. To what extent I deepened pessimism, and\nfirst brought its full meaning within my grasp, by means of its most\nextreme opposite.\n\nLikewise: the higher Europeans, the pioneers of _great politics._\n\nLikewise: the Greeks and their genesis.\n\n\n464.\n\nI have named those who were unconsciously my workers and precursors.\nBut in what direction may I turn with any hope of finding my particular\nkind of philosophers themselves, or at least _my yearning for new\nphilosophers_? In that direction, alone, where a _noble_ attitude of\nmind prevails, an attitude of mind which believes in slavery and in\nmanifold orders of rank, as the prerequisites of any high degree of\nculture. In that direction, alone, where a _creative_ attitude of\nmind prevails, an attitude of mind which does not regard the world\nof happiness and repose, the \"Sabbath of Sabbaths\" as an end to be\ndesired, and which, even in peace, honours the means which lead to new\nwars; an attitude of mind which would prescribe laws for the future,\nwhich for the sake of the future would treat everything that exists\nto-day with harshness and even tyranny; a daring and \"immoral\" attitude\nof mind, which would wish to see both the good and the evil qualities\nin man developed to their fullest extent, because it would feel itself\nable to put each in its right place--that is to say, in that place in\nwhich each would need the other. But what prospect has he of finding\nwhat he seeks, who goes in search of philosophers to-day? Is it not\nprobable that, even with the best Diogenes-lantern in his hand, he will\nwander about by night and day in vain? This age is possessed of the\n_opposite_ instincts. What it wants, above all, is comfort; secondly,\nit wants publicity and the deafening din of actors' voices, the big\ndrum which appeals to its Bank-Holiday tastes; thirdly, that every\none should lie on his belly in utter subjection before the greatest\nof all lies--which is \"the equality of men\"--and should honour only\nthose virtues which _make men equal and place them in equal positions._\nBut in this way, the rise of the philosopher, as I understand him, is\nmade completely impossible--despite the fact that many may regard the\npresent tendencies as rather favourable to his advent. As a matter of\nfact, the whole world mourns, to-day, the hard times that philosophers\n_used_ to have, hemmed in between the fear of the stake, a guilty\nconscience, and the presumptuous wisdom of the Fathers of the Church:\nbut the truth is, that precisely these conditions were _ever so much\nmore favourable_ to the education of a mighty, extensive, subtle,\nrash, and daring intellect than the conditions prevailing to-day. At\npresent another kind of intellect, the intellect of the demagogue, of\nthe actor, and perhaps of the beaver- and ant-like scholar too, finds\nthe best possible conditions for its development. But even for artists\nof a superior calibre the conditions are already far from favourable:\nfor does not every one of them, almost, perish owing to his want of\ndiscipline? They are no longer tyrannised over by an outside power--by\nthe tables of absolute values enforced by a Church or by a monarch:\nand thus they no longer learn to develop their \"inner tyrant,\" their\n_will._ And what holds good of artists also holds good, to a greater\nand more fatal degree, of philosophers. Where, then, are free spirits\nto be found to-day? Let any one show me a free spirit to-day!\n\n\n465.\n\nUnder \"Spiritual freedom\" I understand something very definite: it is\na state in which one is a hundred times superior to philosophers and\nother disciples of \"truth\" in one's severity towards one's self, in\none's uprightness, in one's courage, and in one's absolute will to say\nnay even when it is dangerous to say nay. I regard the philosophers\nthat have appeared heretofore as _contemptible libertines_ hiding\nbehind the petticoats of the female \"Truth.\"\n\nEND OF VOL. I.","title":"The Will to Power: An Attempted Transvaluation of All Values. Book I and II","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":85687}