{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_52915/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_52915","id":"gutenberg_52915","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/52915","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Nihilism (Philosophy)","Power (Philosophy)","Values"],"text":"THE\n\nWILL TO POWER\n\n_AN ATTEMPTED_\n\n_TRANSVALUATION OF ALL VALUES_\n\nBy\n\nFRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE\n\n\nTRANSLATED BY\n\nANTHONY M. LUDOVICI\n\n\nVOL. II\n\nBOOKS III AND IV\n\nT.N. FOULIS\n\n13 & 15 FREDERICK STREET\n\nEDINBURGH: AND LONDON\n\n1913\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS OF VOL. II.\n\nTRANSLATOR'S PREFACE\n\nTHIRD BOOK. THE PRINCIPLES OF A NEW VALUATION.\n\nI. THE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE--\n\n_(a)_ The Method of Investigation\n_(b)_ The Starting-Point of Epistemology\n_(c)_ The Belief in the \"Ego.\" Subject\n_(d)_ Biology of the Instinct of Knowledge. Perspectivity\n_(e)_ The Origin of Reason and Logic\n_(f)_ Consciousness\n_(g)_ Judgment. True--False\n_(h)_ Against Causality\n_(i)_ The Thing-in-Itself and Appearance\n_(k)_ The Metaphysical Need\n_(l)_ The Biological Value of Knowledge\n_(m)_ Science\n\nII. THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE--\n\n1. The Mechanical Interpretation of the World\n2. The Will to Power as Life--\n_(a)_ The Organic Process\n_(b)_ Man\n3. Theory of the Will to Power and of Valuations\n\nIII. THE WILL TO POWER AS EXEMPLIFIED IN\n\nSOCIETY AND IN THE INDIVIDUAL\n\n1. Society and the State\n2. The Individual\n\nIV. THE WILL TO POWER IN ART\n\nFOURTH BOOK. DISCIPLINE AND BREEDING.\n\nI. THE ORDER OF RANK--\n\n1. The Doctrine of the Order of Rank\n2. The Strong and the Weak\n3. The Noble Man\n4. The Lords of the Earth\n5. The Great Man\n6. The Highest Man as Lawgiver of the Future\n\nII. DIONYSUS\n\nIII. ETERNAL RECURRENCE\n\n\n\n\nTRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.\n\n\nFor the history of the text constituting this volume I would refer\nreaders to my preface to _The Will to Power,_ Books I, and II., where\nthey will also find a brief explanation of the actual title of the\ncomplete work.\n\nIn the two books before us Nietzsche boldly carries his principle\nstill further into the various departments of human life, and does not\nshrink from showing its application even to science, to art, and to\nmetaphysics.\n\nThroughout Part I. of the Third Book we find him going to great pains\nto impress the fact upon us that science is as arbitrary as art in\nits mode of procedure, and that the knowledge of the scientist is but\nthe outcome of his inexorable will to power interpreting facts in the\nterms of the self-preservative conditions of the particular order of\nhuman beings to which he belongs. In Aphorisms 515 and 516, which are\ntypical of almost all the thought expressed in Part I., Nietzsche says\ndistinctly: \"The object is not 'to know,' but to schematise,--to impose\nas much regularity and form upon chaos as our practical needs require.\"\n\nUnfamiliarity, constant change, and the inability to reckon with\npossibilities, are sources of great danger: hence, everything _must_\nbe explained, assimilated, and rendered capable of calculation, if\nNature is to be mastered and controlled.\n\nSchemes for interpreting earthly phenomena must be devised which,\nthough they do not require to be absolute or irrefutable, must\nyet favour the maintenance of the kind of men that devises them.\nInterpretation thus becomes all important, and facts sink down to\nthe rank of raw material which must first be given some shape (some\nsense--always anthropocentric) before they can become serviceable.\n\nEven the development of reason and logic Nietzsche consistently shows\nto be but a spiritual development of the physiological function\nof digestion which compels an organism to make things \"like\" (to\n\"assimilate\") before it can absorb them (Aph. 510). And seeing that he\ndenies that hunger can be a first motive (Aphs. 651-656), and proceeds\nto show that it is the am\u0153ba's will to power which makes it extend its\npseudopodia in search of what it can appropriate, and that, once the\nappropriated matter is enveloped, it is a process of making _similar_\nwhich constitutes the process of absorption, reason itself is by\ninference acknowledged to be merely a form of the same fundamental will.\n\nAn interesting and certainly inevitable outcome of Nietzsche's argument\nappears in Aph. 516, where he declares that even our inability to deny\nand affirm one and the same thing is not in the least necessary, _but\nonly a sign of inability._\n\nThe whole argument of Part I. tends to draw science ever nearer and\nnearer to art (except, of course, in those cases in which science\nhappens to consist merely of an ascertainment of facts), and to prove\nthat the one like the other is no more than a means of gaining some\nfoothold upon the slippery soil of a world that is for ever in flux.\n\nIn the rush and pell-mell of Becoming, some milestones must be fixed\nfor the purposes of human orientation. In the torrent of evolutionary\nchanges pillars must be made to stand, to which man can for a space\nhold tight and collect his senses. Science, like art, accomplishes this\nfor us, and it is our will to power which \"creates the impression of\nBeing out of Becoming\" (Aph. 517).\n\nAccording to this standpoint, then, consciousness is also but a weapon\nin the service of the will to power, and it extends or contracts\naccording to our needs (Aph. 524). It might disappear altogether (Aph.\n523), or, on the other hand, it might increase and make our life more\ncomplicated than it already is. But we should guard against making\nit the Absolute behind Becoming, simply because it happens to be the\nhighest and most recent evolutionary form (Aph. 709). If we had done\nthis with each newly acquired characteristic, sight itself, which is a\nrelatively recent development, would also have required to have been\ndeified.\n\nPantheism, Theism, Unitarianism--in fact all religions in which a\n_conscious_ god is worshipped, are thus aptly classed by Nietzsche\nas the result of man's desire to elevate that which is but a new and\nwonderful instrument of his will to power, to the chief place in the\nimaginary world beyond (eternal soul), and to make it even the deity\nitself (God Omniscient).\n\nWith the question of Truth we find Nietzsche quite as ready to uphold\nhis thesis as with all other questions. He frankly declares that \"the\ncriterion of truth lies in the enhancement of the feeling of power\"\n(Aph. 534), and thus stands in diametrical opposition to Spencer, who\nmakes constraint or inability the criterion of truth. (See _Principles\nof Psychology,_ new edition, chapter ix.... \"the unconceivableness of\nits negation is the ultimate test of the truth of a proposition.\")\n\nHowever paradoxical Nietzsche's view may seem, we shall find that\nit is actually substantiated by experience; for the activity of our\nsenses certainly convinces us more or less according to the degree to\nwhich it is provoked. Thus, if we walked for long round a completely\ndark room, and everything yielded, however slightly, to our touch, we\nshould remain quite unconvinced that we were in a room at all, more\nparticularly if--to suppose a still more impossible case--the floor\nyielded too. What provokes great activity in the bulbs of our fingers,\nthen, likewise generates the sensation of truth.\n\nFrom this Nietzsche proceeds to argue that what provokes the strongest\nsentiments in ourselves is also true to us, and, from the standpoint of\nthought, \"that which gives thought the greatest sensation of strength\"\n(Aph. 533).\n\nThe provocation of intense emotion, and therefore the provocation\nof that state in which the body is above the normal in power, thus\nbecomes the index to truth; and it is a very remarkable thing that two\nprominent English thinkers should, at the very end of their careers,\nhave practically admitted this, despite the fact that all their\nphilosophical productions had been based upon a completely different\nbelief. I refer, of course, to Spencer and Buckle, who both upheld the\nview that in a system of thought the emotional factor is of the highest\nimportance.\n\nIt follows from all this, that lies and false doctrines may quite\nconceivably prove to be even more preservative to species than truth\nitself, and although this is a view we have already encountered in the\nopening aphorisms of _Beyond Good and Evil,_ in Aph, 538 this volume\nwe find it further elucidated by Nietzsche's useful demonstration\nof the fact that \"the easier way of thinking always triumphs over\nthe more difficult way\"; and that logic, inasmuch as it facilitated\nclassification and orderly thought, ultimately \"got to act like truths.\"\n\nBefore leaving Part I., with which it would be impossible to deal in\nfull, a word or two ought to be said in regard to Nietzsche's views\nconcerning the belief in \"cause and effect.\" In the _Genealogy of\nMorals_ (1st Essay, Aph. 13), we have already read a forecast of our\nauthor's more elaborate opinions on this question, and the aphorism\nin question might be read with advantage in conjunction with the\ndiscussion on the subject found in this book (Aphs. 545-555).\n\nThe whole of Nietzsche's criticism, however, resolves itself into\nthis, that the doctrine of causality begins with an unnecessary\nduplication of all that happens. Language, and its origin among a\npeople uneducated in thoughts and concepts, is at the root of this\nscientific superstition, and Nietzsche traces its evolution from the\nprimeval and savage desire always to find a \"doer\" behind every deed:\nto find some one who is responsible and who, being known, thus modifies\nthe unfamiliarity of the deed which requires explaining. \"The so-called\ninstinct of causality [of which Kant speaks with so much assurance] is\nnothing more than the fear of the unfamiliar.\"\n\nIn Aph. 585 (A), we have a very coherent and therefore valuable\nexposition of much that may still seem obscure in Nietzsche's\nstandpoint, and we might almost regard this aphorism as the key to\nthe epistemology of the Will to Power. When we find the \"will to\ntruth\" defined merely as \"the longing for a stable world,\" we are in\npossession of the very leitmotiv of Nietzsche's thought throughout Part\nI., and most of what follows is clearly but an elaboration of this\nthought.\n\nIn Part II. Nietzsche reveals himself as utterly opposed to all\nmechanistic and materialistic interpretations of the Universe. He\nexalts the spirit and repudiates the idea that mere pressure from\nwithout--naked environment--is to be held responsible (and often\nguilty!) for all that materialistic science would lay at its door.\nDarwin again comes in for a good deal of sharp criticism; and, to those\nwho are familiar with the nature of Nietzsche's disagreement with this\nnaturalist, such aphorisms as Nos. 643, 647, 649, 651, 684, 685, will\nbe of special interest. There is one question of great moment, which\nall Nietzsche's perfectly sincere and profoundly serious deprecation\nof the Darwinian standpoint ought to bring home to all Englishmen who\nhave perhaps too eagerly endorsed the conclusions of their own British\nschool of organic evolution, and that is, to what extent were Malthus,\nand afterwards his disciple Darwin, perhaps influenced in their\nanalysis of nature by preconceived notions drawn from the state of\nhigh pressure which prevailed in the thickly-populated and industrial\ncountry in which they both lived?\n\nIt is difficult to defend Darwin from the fundamental attack which\nNietzsche directs at the very root of his teaching, and which turns\nupon the question of the motive of all Life's struggle. To assume\nthat the motive is always a \"struggle for existence\" presupposes the\nconstant presence of two conditions--want and over-population,--an\nassumption which is absolutely non-proven, and it likewise lends a\npeculiarly ignoble and cowardly colouring to the whole of organic life,\nwhich not only remains unsubstantiated in fact, but which the struggle\nfor power completely escapes. In Part III., which, throughout, is\npretty plain sailing, Aphorism 786 contains perhaps the most important\nstatements. Here morality is shown to be merely an instrument, but this\ntime it is the instrument of the gregarious will to power. In the last\nparagraph of this aphorism Nietzsche shows himself quite antagonistic\nto Determinism, because of its intimate relation to, and its origin in,\na mechanistic interpretation of the Universe. But we should always\nremember that, inasmuch as Nietzsche would distribute beliefs, just as\nothers distribute bounties--that is to say, according to the needs of\nthose whom he has in view, we must never take for granted that a belief\nwhich he deprecates for one class of man ought necessarily, according\nto him, to be denied another class.\n\nHard as it undoubtedly is to bear this in mind, we should remember that\nhis appeal is almost without interruption made to higher men, and that\ndoctrines and creeds which he condemns for them he would necessarily\nexalt in the case of people who were differently situated and otherwise\nconstituted. Christianity is a case in point (see _Will to Power,_ vol.\ni. Aph. 132).\n\nWe now come to Part IV., which is possibly the most important part of\nall, seeing that it treats of those questions which may be regarded as\nNietzsche's most constant concern from the time when he wrote his first\nbook.\n\nThe world as we now see and know it, with all that it contains which is\nbeautiful, indifferent, or ugly, from a human standpoint, is, according\nto Nietzsche, the creation of our own valuing minds. Perhaps only a few\npeople have had a hand in shaping this world of values. Maybe their\nnumber could be counted on the fingers of two hands; but still, what\nNietzsche insists upon is, that it is human in its origin. Our whole\noutlook, everything that gives us joy or pain, must at one time or\nother have been valued for us, and in persisting in these valuations\nwe, as the acclimatised herd, are indebted to our artists, to our\nhigher men, to all those in history, who at some time or other have\ndared to stand up and to declare emphatically that _this_ was ugly and\nthat _that_ was beautiful, and to fight, and if necessary to die, for\ntheir opinion.\n\nReligion, morality, and philosophy, while they all aim at so-called\nuniversal Truth, tend to depreciate the value of life in the eyes of\nexceptional men. Though they establish the \"beautiful\" for the general\nstock, and in that way enhance the value of life for that stock,\nthey contradict higher men's values, and, by so doing, destroy their\ninnocent faith in the world. For the problem here is not, what value is\ntrue?--but, what value is most conducive to the highest form of human\nlife on earth?\n\nNietzsche would fain throw all the burden of valuing upon the Dionysian\nartist him who speaks about this world out of the love and plenitude\nof power that is in his own breast, him who, from the very health that\nis within him, cannot look out upon life without transfiguring it,\nhallowing it, blessing it, and making it appear better, bigger, and\nmore beautiful. And, in this view, Nietzsche is quite consistent; for,\nif we must accept his conclusion that our values are determined for us\nby our higher men, then it becomes of the highest importance that these\nvaluers should be so constituted that their values may be a boon and\nnot a bane to the rest of humanity.\n\nAlas! only too often, and especially in the nineteenth century, have\nmen who lacked this Dionysian spirit stood up and valued the world; and\nit is against these that Nietzsche protests. It is the bad air they\nhave spread which he would fain dispel.\n\nAn to what art means to the artist himself, apart from its actual\neffect on the world, Nietzsche would say that it is a manner of\ndischarging his will to power. The artist tries to stamp his opinion\nof what is desirable, and of what is beautiful or ugly, upon his\ncontemporaries and the future; it is in this valuing that his impulse\nto prevail finds its highest expression. Hence the instinctive economy\nof artists in sex matters--that is to say, in precisely that quarter\nwhither other men go when their impulse to prevail urges them to\naction. Nietzsche did not of course deny the sensual nature of artists\n(Aph. 815); all he wished to make plain was this, that an artist who\nwas not moderate, _in eroticis,_ while engaged upon his task, was open\nto the strongest suspicion.\n\nIn the Fourth Book Nietzsche is really at his very best. Here, while\ndiscussing questions such as \"The Order of Rank,\" he is so thoroughly\nin his exclusive sphere, that practically every line, even if it were\nisolated and taken bodily from the context, would bear the unmistakable\ncharacter of its author. The thought expressed in Aphorism 871 reveals\na standpoint as new as it is necessary. So used have we become to the\npractice of writing and legislating for a mass, that we have forgotten\nthe rule that prevails even in our own navy--that the speed of a fleet\nis measured by its slowest vessel.\n\nOn the same principle, seeing that all our philosophies and moralities\nhave hitherto been directed at a mass and at a mob, we find that their\nelevation must of necessity be decided by the lowest of mankind. Thus\nall passions are banned, because base men do not know how to enlist\nthem in their service. Men who are masters of themselves and of others,\nmen who understand the management and privilege of passion, become the\nmost despised of creatures in such systems of thought, because they are\nconfounded with the vicious and licentious; and the speed of mankind's\nelevation thus gets to be determined by humanity's slowest vessels.\n\nAphorisms 881, 882, 886 fully elucidate the above considerations, while\nin 912, 916, 943, and 951 we have plans of a constructive teaching\nwhich the remainder of Part I. elaborates.\n\nAnd now, following Nietzsche carefully through Part II. (Dionysus),\nwhat is the inevitable conclusion of all we have read? This analysis\nof the world's collective values and their ascription to a certain\n\"will to power\" may now seem to many but an exhaustive attempt at a new\nsystem of nomenclature, and little else. As a matter or fact it is very\nmuch more than this. By mean? of it Nietzsche wishes to show mankind\nhow much has lain, and how much still lies, in man's power By laying\nhis finger on everything and declaring to man that it was human will\nthat created it. Nietzsche wished to give man the courage of this will,\nand a clean conscience in exercising it. For it was precisely this very\nwill to power which had been most hated and most maligned by everybody\nup to Nietzsche's time.\n\nLong enough, prompted by the fear of attributing any one of his\nhappiest thoughts to this hated fundamental will, had man ascribed\nall his valuations and all his most sublime inspirations to something\noutside himself,--whether this something were a God, a principle, or\nthe concept Truth. But Nietzsche's desire was to show man how human,\nall too human, have been the values that have appeared heretofore;\nhe wished to prove, that to the rare sculptors of values, the world,\ndespite its past, is still an open field of yielding clay, and in\npointing to what the will to power has done until now, Nietzsche\nsuggests to these coming sculptors what might still be done, provided\nthey fear nothing, and have that innocence and that profound faith in\nthe fundamental will which others hitherto have had in God, Natural\nLaws, Truth, and other euphemistic fictions.\n\nThe doctrine of Eternal Recurrence, to which Nietzsche attached so much\nimportance that it may be regarded almost as the inspiration which led\nto his great work, _Thus Spake Zarathustra,_ ought to be understood\nin the light of a purely disciplinary and chastening creed. In one of\nhis posthumous works we find Nietzsche saying: \"The question which\nthou shalt have to answer before every deed that thou doest;--is this\nsuch a deed as I am prepared to perform an incalculable number of\ntimes,--is the best ballast.\" Thus it is obvious that, feeling the need\nof something in his teaching which would replace the metaphysics of\nformer beliefs, he applied the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence to this\nend. Seeing, however, that even among Nietzscheans themselves there\nis considerable doubt concerning the actual value of the doctrine as\na ruling belief, it does not seem necessary to enter here into the\nscientific justification which he claims for it. Suffice it to say\nthat, as knowledge stands at present, the statement that the world will\nrecur eternally in small things as in great, is still a somewhat daring\nconjecture--a conjecture, however, which would have been entirely\nwarrantable if its disciplinary value had been commensurate with its\ndaring.\n\n                                               ANTHONY M. LUDOVICI.\n\n\n\n\nTHIRD BOOK.\n\nTHE PRINCIPLES OF A NEW VALUATION.\n\n\n\n\nI.\n\n\nTHE WILL TO POWER IN SCIENCE.\n\n\n(a) The Method of Investigation.\n\n\n466.\n\nThe distinguishing feature of our nineteenth century is not the triumph\nof _science,_ but the triumph of the scientific _method_ over science.\n\n\n467.\n\n_The history of scientific methods_ was regarded by Auguste Comte\nalmost as philosophy itself.\n\n\n468.\n\nThe great _Methodologists:_ Aristotle, Bacon, Descartes, Auguste Comte.\n\n\n469.\n\nThe most valuable knowledge is always discovered last: but the most\nvaluable knowledge consists of _methods._\n\nAll methods, all the hypotheses on which the science of our day\ndepends, were treated with the profoundest contempt for centuries:\non their account a man used to be banished from the society of\n_respectable_ people--he was held to be an \"_enemy of God,_\" a reviler\nof the highest ideal, a madman.\n\nWe had the whole _pathos_ of mankind against us,--our notion of what\n\"truth\" ought to be, of what the service of truth ought to be, our\nobjectivity, our method, our calm, cautious and distrustful manner were\naltogether _despicable...._ At bottom, that which has kept men back\nmost, is an \u00e6sthetic taste: they believed in the picturesque effect of\ntruth; what they demanded of the scientist was, that he should make a\nstrong appeal to their imagination.\n\nFrom the above, it would almost seem as if the very _reverse_ had been\nachieved, as if a sudden _jump_ had been made: as a matter of fact, the\nschooling which the moral hyperboles afforded, gradually prepared the\nway for that _milder form of pathos_ which at last became incarnate in\nthe scientific man....\n\n_Conscientiousness in small things,_ the self-control of the religious\nman, was a preparatory school for the scientific character, as was\nalso, in a very pre-eminent sense, the attitude of mind which makes a\nman _take problems seriously,_ irrespective of what personal advantage\nhe may derive from them....\n\n\n\n\n_(b)_ The Starting-point of Epistemology.\n\n\n470.\n\nProfound disinclination to halt once and for all at any collective view\nof the world. The charm of the opposite point of view: the refusal to\nrelinquish the stimulus residing in the enigmatical.\n\n\n471.\n\nThe hypothesis that, at bottom, things proceed in such a moral fashion\nthat _human reason must be right,_ is a mere piece of good-natured\nand simple-minded trustfulness, the result of the belief in Divine\ntruthfulness--God regarded as the Creator of all things.--These\nconcepts are our inheritance from a former existence in a Beyond.\n\n\n472.\n\nThe contradiction of the so-called \"facts of consciousness.\"\nObservation a thousand times more difficult, error is perhaps the\nabsolute _condition_ of observation.\n\n\n473.\n\nThe intellect cannot criticise itself, simply because it can be\ncompared with no other kind of intellect, and also because its ability\nto know would only reveal itself in the presence of \"actual reality\";\nthat is to say, because, in order to criticise the intellect, we should\nhave to be higher creatures with \"absolute knowledge.\" This would\npresuppose the existence of _something,_ a \"thing-in-itself,\" apart\nfrom all the perspective kinds of observation and senso-spiritual\nperception. But the psychological origin of the belief in _things,_\nforbids our speaking of \"things in themselves.\"\n\n\n474.\n\nThe idea that a sort of adequate relation exists between _subject_ and\n_object,_ that the object is something which _when seen from inside_\nwould be a subject, is a well-meant invention which, I believe, has\nseen its best days. The measure of that which we are conscious of, is\nperforce entirely dependent upon the coarse utility of the function of\nconsciousness: how could this little garret-prospect of consciousness\nwarrant our asserting anything in regard to \"subject\" and \"object,\"\nwhich would bear any relation to reality!\n\n\n475.\n\nCriticism of modern philosophy: erroneous starting-point, as if there\nwere such things as \"facts of consciousness\"--and no _phenomenalism_ in\n_introspection._\n\n\n476.\n\n\"Consciousness\"--to what extent is the idea which is thought of, the\nidea of will, or the idea of a feeling (_which is known by us alone_),\nquite superficial? Our _inner_ world is also \"appearance.\"\n\n\n477.\n\nI am convinced of the phenomenalism of the _inner_ world also:\neverything that reaches our consciousness is utterly and completely\nadjusted, simplified, schematised, interpreted, the _actual_ process\nof inner \"perception,\" the _relation of causes_ between thoughts,\nfeelings, desires, between subject and object, is absolutely concealed\nfrom us, and may be purely imaginary. This \"_inner_ world of\nappearance\" is treated with precisely the same forms and procedures as\nthe \"outer\" world. We never come across a single \"fact\": pleasure and\npain are more recently evolved intellectual phenomena....\n\nCausality evades us; to assume the existence of an immediate causal\nrelation between thoughts, as Logic does, is the result of the coarsest\nand most clumsy observation. There are _all sorts of passions_ that may\nintervene between two thoughts: but the interaction is too rapid--that\nis why we _fail to recognise_ them, that is why we actually _deny_\ntheir existence....\n\n\"Thinking,\" as the epistemologists understand _\\r_ it, never takes\nplace at all: it is an absolutely gratuitous fabrication, arrived at\nby selecting one element from the process and by eliminating all the\nrest--an artificial adjustment for the purpose of the understanding....\n\nThe \"mind,\" _something that thinks_: at times, even, \"the mind absolute\nand pure\"--this concept is an evolved and second result of false\nintrospection, which believes in \"thinking\": in the first place an act\nis imagined here which does not really occur at all, _i.e._ \"thinking\";\nand, _secondly,_ a subject-substratum is imagined in which every\nprocess of this thinking has its origin, and nothing else--that is to\nsay, _both the action and the agent are fanciful._\n\n\n478.\n\nPhenomenalism must not be sought in the wrong quarter: nothing is more\nphenomenal, or, to be more precise, nothing is so much _deception,_ as\nthis inner world, which we observe with the \"inner sense.\"\n\nOur belief that the will is a cause was so great, that, according to\nour personal experiences in general, we projected a cause into all\nphenomena (_i.e._ a certain motive is posited as the cause of all\nphenomena).\n\nWe believe that the thoughts which follow one upon the other in our\nminds are linked by some sort of causal relation: the logician, more\nespecially, who actually speaks of a host of facts which have never\nonce been seen in reality, has grown accustomed to the prejudice that\nthoughts _are the cause_ of thoughts.\n\nWe believe--and even our philosophers believe it still--that pleasure\nand pain are the causes of reactions, that the very purpose of pleasure\nand pain is to occasion reactions. For hundreds of years, pleasure and\npain have been represented as the _motives_ for every action. Upon\nreflection, however, we are bound to concede that everything would have\nproceeded in exactly the same way, according to precisely the same\nsequence of cause and effect, if the states \"pleasure\" and \"pain\" had\nbeen entirely absent; and that we are simply deceived when we believe\nthat they actually cause anything:--they are the _attendant phenomena,_\nand they have quite a different purpose from that of provoking\nreactions; they are in themselves effects involved in the process of\nreaction which takes place.\n\n_In short:_ Everything that becomes conscious is a final phenomenon, a\nconclusion--and is the cause of nothing; all succession of phenomena\nin consciousness is absolutely atomistic.--And we tried to understand\nthe universe from the _opposite_ point of view--as if nothing were\neffective or real, save thinking, feeling, willing! ...\n\n\n479.\n\n_The phenomenalism of the \"inner world!\" A chronological inversion\ntakes place,_ so that the cause reaches consciousness as the\neffect.--We know that pain is projected into a certain part of the\nbody although it is not really situated there; we have learnt that all\nsensations which were ingenuously supposed to be conditioned by the\nouter world are, as a matter of fact, conditioned by the inner world:\nthat the real action of the outer world never takes place in a way of\nwhich we can become conscious.... That fragment of the outer world of\nwhich we become conscious, is born after the effect produced by the\nouter world has been recorded, and is subsequently interpreted as the\n\"cause\" of that effect....\n\nIn the phenomenalism of the \"inner world,\" the chronological order\nof cause and effect is inverted. The fundamental fact of \"inner\nexperience\" is, that the cause is imagined after the effect has been\nrecorded.... The same holds good of the sequence of thoughts: we seek\nfor the reason of a thought, before it has reached our consciousness;\nand then the reason reaches consciousness first, whereupon follows\nits effect. All our dreams are the interpretation of our collective\nfeelings with the view of discovering the possible causes of the\nlatter; and the process is such that a condition only becomes\nconscious, when the supposed causal link has reached consciousness.[1]\n\nThe whole of \"inner experience\" is founded on this: that a cause is\nsought and imagined which accounts for a certain irritation in our\nnerve-centres, and that it is only the cause which is found in this way\nwhich reaches consciousness; this cause may have absolutely nothing to\ndo with the real cause--it is a sort of groping assisted by former\n\"inner experiences,\" that is to say, by memory. The memory, however,\nretains the habit of old interpretations,--that is to say, of erroneous\ncausality,--so that \"inner experience\" comprises in itself all the\nresults of former erroneous fabrications of causes. Our \"outside\nworld,\" as we conceive it every instant, is indissolubly bound up with\nthe old error of cause: we interpret by means of the schematism of\n\"the thing,\" etc.\n\n\n\"Inner experience\" only enters consciousness when it has found a\nlanguage which the individual can _understand_--that is to say, a\ntranslation of a certain condition into conditions with which he is\n_familiar;_ \"understand\" means simply this: to be able to express\nsomething new in the terms of something old or familiar. For instance,\n\"I feel unwell\"--a judgment of this sort presupposes a _very great and\nrecent neutrality on the part of the observer:_ the simple man always\nsays, \"This and that make me feel unwell,\"--he begins to be clear\nconcerning his indisposition only after he has discovered a reason for\nit.... This is what I call _a lack of philological_ knowledge; to be\nable to read a text, _as such,_ without reading an interpretation into\nit, is the latest form of \"inner experience,\"--it is perhaps a barely\npossible form....\n\n\n[Footnote 1: When in our dream we hear a bell ringing, or a tapping at\nour door, we scarcely ever wake before having already accounted for the\nsound, in the terms of the dream-world we were in.--TR.]\n\n\n480.\n\nThere are no such things as \"mind,\" reason, thought, consciousness,\nsoul, will, or truth: they all belong to fiction, and can serve no\npurpose. It is not a question of \"subject and object,\" but of a\nparticular species of animal which can prosper only by means of a\ncertain _exactness,_ or, better still, _regularity_ in recording its\nperceptions (in order that experience may be capitalised)....\n\nKnowledge works as an _instrument_ of power. It is therefore obvious\nthat it increases with each advance of power....\n\nThe purpose of knowledge: in this case, as in the case of \"good\" or\n\"beautiful,\" the concept must be regarded strictly and narrowly from an\nanthropocentric and biological standpoint. In order that a particular\nspecies may maintain and increase its power, its conception of reality\nmust contain enough which is calculable and constant to allow of its\nformulating a scheme of conduct. _The utility of preservation_--and\n_not_ some abstract or theoretical need to eschew deception--stands as\nthe motive force behind the development of the organs of knowledge; ...\nthey evolve in such a way that their observations may suffice for our\npreservation. In other words, the _measure_ of the desire for knowledge\ndepends upon the extent to which _the Will to Power_ grows in a certain\nspecies: a species gets a grasp of a given amount of reality, _in order\nto master it, in order to enlist that amount in its service._\n\n\n\n(c) The Belief in the \"Ego.\" Subject.\n\n\n481.\n\nIn opposition to Positivism, which halts at phenomena and says,\n\"These are only _facts_ and nothing more,\" I would say: No,\nfacts are precisely what is lacking, all that exists consists of\n_interpretations._ We cannot establish any fact \"in itself\": it\nmay even be nonsense to desire to do such a thing. \"Everything is\n_subjective,_\" ye say: but that in itself is _interpretation._ The\nsubject is nothing given, but something superimposed by fancy,\nsomething introduced behind.--Is it necessary to set an interpreter\nbehind the interpretation already to hand? Even that would be fantasy,\nhypothesis.\n\nTo the extent to which knowledge has any sense at all, the world is\nknowable: but it may be interpreted _differently,_ it has not one sense\nbehind it, but hundreds of senses.--\"Perspectivity.\"\n\nIt is our needs that _interpret the world_; our instincts and their\nimpulses for and against. Every instinct is a sort of thirst for power;\neach has its point of view, which it would fain impose upon all the\nother instincts as their norm.\n\n\n482.\n\nWhere our ignorance really begins, at that point from which we can see\nno further, we set a word; for instance, the word \"I,\" the word \"do,\"\nthe word \"suffer\"--these concepts may be the horizon lines of our\nknowledge, but they are not \"truths.\"\n\n\n483.\n\nOwing to the phenomenon \"thought,\" the ego is taken for granted; but\nup to the present everybody believed, like the people, that there\nwas something unconditionally certain in the notion \"I think,\" and\nthat by analogy with our understanding of all other causal reactions\nthis \"I\" was the given _cause_ of the thinking. However customary\nand indispensable this fiction may have become now, this fact proves\nnothing against the imaginary nature of its origin; it might be a\nlife-preserving belief and _still_ be _false._\n\n\n484.\n\n\"Something is thought, therefore there is something that thinks\": this\nis what Descartes' argument amounts to. But this is tantamount to\nconsidering our belief in the notion \"_substance_\" as an \"_a priori_\"\ntruth:--that there must be something \"that thinks\" when we think, is\nmerely a formulation of a grammatical custom which sets an agent to\nevery action. In short, a metaphysico-logical postulate is already put\nforward here--and it is not merely _an ascertainment of fact...._ On\nDescartes' lines nothing absolutely certain is attained, but only the\nfact of a very powerful faith.\n\nIf the proposition be reduced to \"Something is thought, therefore there\nare thoughts,\" the result is mere tautology; and precisely the one\nfactor which is in question, the \"_reality_ of thought,\" is not touched\nupon,--so that, in this form, the apparitional character of thought\ncannot be denied. What Descartes _wanted_ to prove was, that thought\nnot only had _apparent reality,_ but absolute reality.\n\n\n485.\n\nThe concept _substance_ is an outcome of the concept _subject,_ and not\nconversely! If we surrender the concept soul, the subject, the very\nconditions for the concept \"substance\" are lacking. _Degrees of Being_\nare obtained, but Being is lost.\n\nCriticism of \"_reality_\": what does a _\"plus or minus of reality\"_ lead\nto, the gradation of Being in which we believe?\n\nThe degree of our feeling of _life_ and _power_ (the logic and\nrelationship of past life) presents us with the measure of \"Being,\"\n\"reality,\" \"non-appearance.\"\n\n_Subject i_ this is the term we apply to our belief in an _entity_\nunderlying all the different moments of the most intense sensations\nof reality; we regard this belief as the effect of a cause,--and we\nbelieve in our belief to such an extent that, on its account alone,\nwe imagine \"truth,\" \"reality,\" \"substantiality.\"--a \"Subject\" is the\nfiction which would fain make us believe that several similar states\nwere the effect of one substratum: but we it was who first _created_\nthe \"similarity\" of these states; the similising and adjusting of them\nis the _fact--not_ their similarity (on the contrary, this ought rather\nto be denied).\n\n\n486.\n\nOne would have to know what _Being_ is, in order to be able to\n_decide_ whether this or that is real (for instance, \"the facts of\nconsciousness\"); it would also be necessary to know what _certainty_\nand _knowledge_ are, and so forth.--But, as we do _not_ know these\nthings, a criticism of the faculty of knowledge is nonsensical: how is\nit possible for an instrument to criticise itself, when it is itself\nthat exercises the critical faculty. It cannot even define itself!\n\n\n487.\n\nShould not all philosophy ultimately disclose the first principles on\nwhich the reasoning processes depend?--that is to say, our _belief_\nin the \"ego\" as a substance, as the only reality according to which,\nalone, we are able to ascribe reality to things? The oldest realism\nat length comes to light, simultaneously with man's recognition of\nthe fact that his whole religious history is no more than a history\nof soul-superstitions. _Here there is a barrier;_ our very thinking,\nitself, involves that belief (with its distinctions--substance,\naccident, action, agent, etc.); to abandon it would mean to cease from\nbeing able to think.\n\nBut that a belief, however useful it may be for the preservation of a\nspecies, has nothing to do with the truth, may be seen from the fact\nthat we _must_ believe in time, space, and motion, without feeling\nourselves compelled to regard them as absolute realities.\n\n\n488.\n\n_The psychological origin of our belief in reason.--_The ideas\n\"reality,\" \"Being,\" are derived from our _subject-_feeling.\n\n\"Subject,\" interpreted through ourselves so that the ego may stand as\nsubstance, as the cause of action, as the _agent._\n\nThe metaphysico-logical postulates, the belief in substance, accident,\nattribute, etc. etc., draws its convincing character from our habit of\nregarding all our actions as the result of our will: so that the ego,\nas substance, does not vanish in the multiplicity of changes.--_But\nthere is no such thing as will._ We have no categories which allow\nus to separate a \"world as thing-in-itself,\" from \"a world of\nappearance.\" All our _categories of reason_ have a sensual origin: they\nare deductions from the empirical world. \"The soul,\" \"the ego\"--the\nhistory of these concepts shows that here, also, the oldest distinction\n(\"_spiritus_,\" \"life\") obtains....\n\nIf there is nothing material, then there can be nothing immaterial. The\nconcept no longer _means_ anything.\n\nNo subject-\"atoms.\" The sphere of a subject _increasing_ or\n_diminishing_ unremittingly, the centre of the system continually\n_displacing_ itself, in the event of the system no longer being able\nto organise the appropriated mass, it divides into two. On the other\nhand, it is able, without destroying it, to transform a weaker subject\ninto one of its own functionaries, and, to a certain extent, to compose\na new entity with it. Not a \"substance,\" but rather something which in\nitself strives after greater strength; and which wishes to \"preserve\"\nitself only indirectly (it wishes to _surpass_ itself).\n\n\n489.\n\nEverything that reaches consciousness as an entity is already\nenormously complicated: we never have anything more than the _semblance\nof an entity._\n\nThe phenomenon of the _body_ is the richer, more distinct, and more\ntangible phenomenon: it should be methodically drawn to the front, and\nno mention should be made of its ultimate significance.\n\n\n490.\n\nThe assumption of a _single subject_ is perhaps not necessary, it\nmay be equally permissible to assume a plurality of subjects, whose\ninteraction and struggle lie at the bottom of our thought and our\nconsciousness in general. A sort of _aristocracy_ of \"cells\" in which\nthe ruling power is vested? Of course an aristocracy of equals, who are\naccustomed to ruling co-operatively, and understand how to command?\n\n_My hypotheses_. The subject as a plurality. Pain intellectual and\ndependent upon the judgment harmful, projected. The effect always\n\"unconscious\": the inferred and imagined cause is projected, it\n_follows_ the event. Pleasure is a form of pain. The only kind of power\nthat exists is of the same nature as the power of will: a commanding\nof other subjects which thereupon alter themselves. The unremitting\ntransientness and volatility of the subject. \"Mortal soul.\" _Number_ as\nperspective form.\n\n\n491.\n\nThe belief in the body is more fundamental than the belief in the soul:\nthe latter arose from the unscientific observation of the agonies\nof the body. (Something which leaves it. The belief in the _truth of\ndreams_)\n\n\n492.\n\nThe body and physiology the starting-point: why?--We obtain a correct\nimage of the nature of our subject-entity, that is to say, as a\nnumber of regents at the head of a community (not as \"souls\" or as\n\"life-forces\") as also of the dependence of these regents upon their\nsubjects, and upon the conditions of a hierarchy, and of the division\nof labour, as the means ensuring the existence of the part and the\nwhole. We also obtain a correct image of the way in which the living\nentities continually come into being and expire, and we see how\neternity cannot belong to the \"subject\"; we realise that the struggle\nfinds expression in obeying as well as in commanding, and that a\nfluctuating definition of the limits of power is a factor of life. The\ncomparative _ignorance_ in which the ruler is kept, of the individual\nperformances and even disturbances taking place in the community,\nalso belong to the conditions under which government may be carried\non. In short, we obtain a valuation even of _want-of-knowledge,_\nof seeing-things-generally-as-a-whole, of simplification, of\nfalsification, and of perspective. What is most important, however,\nis, that we regard the ruler and his subjects as of the _same kind,_\nall feeling, willing, thinking--and that wherever we see or suspect\nmovement in a body, we conclude that there is co-operative-subjective\nand invisible life. Movement as a symbol for the eye; it denotes that\nsomething has been felt, willed, thought.\n\nThe danger of directly questioning the subject _concerning_ the\nsubject, and all spiritual self-reflection, consists in this, that it\nmight be a necessary condition of its activity to interpret itself\n_erroneously._ That is why we appeal to the body and lay the evidence\nof sharpened senses aside: or we try and see whether the subjects\nthemselves cannot enter into communication with us.\n\n\n\n_(d)_ Biology of the Instinct of Knowledge. Perspectivity.\n\n\n493.\n\n_Truth is that kind of error_ without which a certain species of living\nbeing cannot exist. The value for _Life_ is ultimately decisive.\n\n\n494.\n\nIt is unlikely that our \"knowledge\" extends farther than is exactly\nnecessary for our self-preservation. Morphology shows us how the\nsenses and the nerves as well as the brain evolve in proportion as the\ndifficulties of acquiring sustenance increase.\n\n\n495.\n\nIf the morality of \"Thou shalt not lie\" be refuted, the sense for truth\nwill then have to justify itself before another tribunal--as a means\nto the preservation of man, _as Will to Power._\n\nLikewise our love of the beautiful: it is also the _creative will._\nBoth senses stand side by side; the sense of truth is the means\nwherewith the power is appropriated to adjust things according to one's\ntaste. The love of adjusting and reforming--a primeval love! We can\nonly _take cognisance_ of a world which we ourselves have _made._\n\n\n496.\n\nConcerning the multifariousness of knowledge. The tracing of _its_\nrelation to many other things (or the relation of kind)--how should\n\"knowledge\" be of another? The way to know and to investigate is in\nitself among the conditions of life; that is why the conclusion that\nthere could be no other kind of intellect (for ourselves) than the kind\nwhich serves the purpose of our preservation is an excessively hasty\none: this _actual_ condition may be only an accidental, not in the\nleast an essential; one.\n\nOur apparatus for acquiring knowledge is not adjusted for knowledge.\n\n\n497.\n\n_The most strongly credited a priori \"truths\" are, to my mind, mere\nassumptions pending further investigation_; for instance, the law\nof causation is a belief so thoroughly acquired by practice and so\ncompletely assimilated, that to disbelieve in it would mean the ruin of\nour kind. But is it therefore true? What an extraordinary conclusion!\nAs if truth were proved by the mere fact that man survives!\n\n\n498.\n\nTo what extent is our _intellect_ also a result of the conditions of\nlife?--We should not have it did we not _need_ to have it, and we\nshould not have it _as_ we have it, if we did not need it _as_ we need\nit--that is to say, if we could live otherwise.\n\n\n499.\n\nThinking in a primitive (inorganic) state is to _persevere in forms,_\nas in the case of the crystal.--In _our_ thought, the _essential\nfactor_ is the harmonising of the new material with the old schemes (=\nProcrustes' bed), the _assimilation_ of the unfamiliar.\n\n\n500.\n\nThe perception of the senses projected outwards: \"inwards\" and\n\"outwards\"--does the _body_ command here?\n\nThe same equalising and ordering power which rules in the idioplasma,\nalso rules in the incorporation of the outer world: our sensual\nperceptions are already the _result_ of this process of _adaptation_\nand _harmonisation_ in regard to _all_ the past in us; they do not\nfollow directly upon the \"impression.\"\n\n\n501.\n\nAll thought, judgment, perception, regarded as an act of _comparing_[2]\nhas as a first condition the act of _equalising,_ and earlier still the\nact of _\"making equal.\"_ The process of making equal is the same as the\nassimilation by the am\u0153ba of the nutritive matter it appropriates.\n\n\"Memory\" late, in so far as the equalising instinct appears to have\nbeen _subdued_: the difference is preserved. Memory--a process of\nclassification and collocation; active--who?\n\n[Footnote 2: The German word _vergleichen,_ meaning \"to compare,\"\ncontains the root \"equal\" _(gleich)_ which cannot be rendered in\nEnglish. TR.]\n\n\n502.\n\nIn regard to the _memory,_ we must unlearn a great deal: here we meet\nwith the greatest temptation to assume the existence of a \"soul,\"\nwhich, irrespective of time, reproduces and recognises again and again,\netc. What I have experienced, however, continues to live \"in the\nmemory\"; I have nothing to do with it when memory \"comes,\" my will is\ninactive in regard to it, as in the case of the coming and going of a\nthought. Something happens, of which I become conscious: now something\nsimilar comes--who has called it forth? Who has awakened it?\n\n\n503.\n\nThe whole apparatus of knowledge is an abstracting and simplifying\napparatus--not directed at knowledge, but at the _appropriation_ of\nthings: \"end\" and \"means\" are as remote from the essence of this\napparatus as \"concepts\" are. By the \"end\" and the \"means\" a process is\nappropriated (--a process is _invented_ which may be grasped), but by\n\"_concepts_\" one appropriates the \"things\" which constitute the process.\n\n\n504.\n\n_Consciousness_ begins outwardly as co-ordination and knowledge of\nimpressions,--at first it is at the point which is remotest from the\nbiological centre of the individual; but it is a process which deepens\nand which tends to become more and more an inner function, continually\napproaching nearer to the centre.\n\n\n505.\n\nOur perceptions, as we understand them--that is to say, the sum of all\nthose perceptions the consciousness whereof was useful and essential\nto us and to the whole organic processes which preceded us: therefore\nthey do not include all perceptions (for instance, not the electrical\nones);--that is to say, we have _senses_ only for a definite selection\nof perceptions--such perceptions as concern us with a view to our\nself-preservation. _Consciousness extends so far only as it is useful._\nThere can be no doubt that all our sense-perceptions are entirely\npermeated by valuations (useful or harmful--consequently, pleasant or\npainful). Every particular colour; besides being a colour, expresses a\nvalue to us (although we seldom admit it, or do so only after it has\naffected us exclusively for a long time, as in the case of convicts\nin gaol or lunatics). Insects likewise react in different ways to\ndifferent colours: some like this shade, the others that. Ants are a\ncase in point.\n\n\n506.\n\nIn the beginning _images_ how images originate in the mind must be\nexplained. Then _words,_ applied to images. Finally _concepts,_\npossible only when there are words--the assembling of several pictures\ninto a whole which is not for the eye but for the ear (word). The\nsmall amount of emotion which the \"word\" generates,--that is, then,\nwhich the view of the similar pictures generates, for which one word\nis used,--this simple emotion is the common factor, the basis of a\nconcept. That weak feelings should all be regarded as alike, _as the\nsame,_ is the fundamental fact. There is therefore a confusion of\ntwo very intimately associated feelings in the _ascertainment_ of\nthese feelings;--but who is it that ascertains? _Faith_ is the very\nfirst step in every sensual impression: a sort of yea-saying is the\n_first_ intellectual activity! A \"holding-a-thing-to-be-true\" is\nthe beginning. It were our business, therefore, to explain how the\n\"holding-of-a-thing-to-be-true\" arose! What sensation lies beneath the\ncomment \"true\"?\n\n\n507.\n\nThe _valuation_, \"I believe that this and that is so,\" is the essence\nof \"truth.\" In all valuations, the conditions of _preservation_ and\nof _growth_ find expression. All our _organs and senses_ of knowledge\nhave been developed only in view of the conditions of preservation\nand growth. The _trust_ in reason and its categories, the trust\nin dialectics, and also the _valuation_ of logic, prove only that\n_experience_ has taught the usefulness of these things to life: not\ntheir \"truth.\" The prerequisites of all living things and of their\nlives is: that there should be a large amount of faith, that it should\nbe possible to pass definite judgments on things, and that _there\nshould be no doubt_ at all concerning all essential values. Thus it is\nnecessary that something should be assumed to be true, _not_ that it\n_is_ true.\n\n\"The _real_ world and the world of _appearance_\"-- I trace this\ncontrast to the _relation of values._ We have posited _our_ conditions\nof existence as the _attributes of being_ in general. Owing to the\nfact that, in order to prosper, we must be stable in our belief, we\ndeveloped the idea that the real world was neither a changing nor an\nevolving one, but a world of _being._\n\n\n\n_(e)_ The Origin of Reason and Logic.\n\n\n508.\n\nOriginally there was chaos among our ideas. Those ideas which were able\nto stand side by side remained over, the greater number perished--and\nare still perishing.\n\n\n509.\n\nThe kingdom of desires out of which logic grew: the gregarious instinct\nin the background. The assumption of similar facts is the first\ncondition for \"similar souls.\" _For the purpose of mutual understanding\nand government._\n\n\n510.\n\nConcerning the _origin of logic._ The fundamental proneness to\n_equalise_ things and to _see them equal_, gets to be modified,\nand kept within bounds, by the consideration of what is useful or\nharmful--in fact, by considerations of success: it then becomes adapted\nin suchwise as to be gratified in a milder way, without at the same\ntime denying life or endangering it. This whole process corresponds\nentirely with that external and mechanical process (which is its\nsymbol) by which the _protoplasm_ continually assimilates, makes equal\nto itself, what it appropriates, and arranges it according to its own\nforms and requirements.\n\n\n511.\n\nLikeness and Similarity.\n\n1. The coarser the organ the more apparent likenesses it sees;\n\n2. The mind _will_ have likeness--that is to say, the identification\nof one sensual impression with others already experienced: just as the\nbody _assimilates_ inorganic matter.\n\nFor the understanding of Logic:--\n\n_The will which tends to see likeness everywhere is the will to\npower_--the belief that something is so and so (the essence of a\njudgment), is the result of a will which _would fain have it_ as\nsimilar as possible.\n\n\n512.\n\nLogic is bound up with the proviso: granted _that identical cases\nexist_. As a matter of fact, before one can think and conclude in a\nlogical fashion, _this_ condition _must_ first be assumed. That is\nto say, the will to _logical truth_ cannot be consummated before a\nfundamental falsification of all phenomena has been assumed. From which\nit follows that an instinct rules here, which is capable of employing\nboth means: first, falsification; and secondly, the carrying out of its\nown point of view: logic does not spring from a will to truth.\n\n\n513.\n\nThe inventive force which devised the categories, worked in the service\nof our need of security, of quick intelligibility, in the form of\nsigns, sounds, and abbreviations.--\"Substance,\" \"subject,\" \"object,\"\n\"Being,\" \"Becoming,\" are not matters of metaphysical truth. It was\nthe powerful who made the names of things into law, and, among the\npowerful, it was the greatest artists in abstraction who created the\ncategories.\n\n\n514.\n\nA moral--that is to say, a method of living which long experience\nand experiment have tested and proved efficient, at last enters\nconsciousness as a law, as dominant.... And then the whole group of\nrelated values and conditions become part of it: it becomes venerable,\nunassailable, holy, true; a necessary part of its evolution is that\nits origin should be forgotten.... That is a sign that it has become\nmaster. Exactly the same thing might have happened with the categories\nof reason: the latter, after much groping and many trials, might have\nproved true through relative usefulness.... A stage was reached when\nthey were grasped as a whole, and when they appealed to consciousness\nas a whole,--when belief in them was commanded,--that is to say, when\nthey acted as if they commanded.... From that time forward they passed\nas a priori, as beyond experience, as irrefutable. And, possibly, they\nmay have been the expression of no more than a certain practicality\nanswering the ends of a race and a species,--their usefulness alone is\ntheir \"truth.\"\n\n\n515.\n\nThe object is, not \"to know,\" but to schematise,--to impose as much\nregularity and form upon chaos, as our practical needs require. In\nthe formation of reason, logic, and the categories, it was a need\nin us that was the determining power: not the need \"to know,\" but\nto classify, to schematise, for the purpose of intelligibility and\ncalculation. (The adjustment and interpretation of all similar and\nequal things,--the same process, which every sensual impression\nundergoes, is the development of reason!) No pre-existing \"idea\" had\nanything to do with it: but utility, which teaches us that things\ncan be reckoned with and managed, only when we view them roughly\nas equal.... _Finality_ in reason is an effect, not a cause: Life\ndegenerates with every other form of reason, although constant attempts\nare being made to attain to those other forms of reason;--for Life\nwould then become too obscure, too unequal.\n\nThe categories are \"truths\" only in the sense that they are the\nconditions of our existence, just as Euclid's Space is a conditional\n\"truth.\" (Between ourselves, as no one will maintain that men are\nabsolutely necessary, reason, as well as Euclid's Space, are seen\nto be but an idiosyncrasy of one particular species of animals, one\nidiosyncrasy alone among many others....)\n\nThe subjective constraint which prevents one from contradicting here,\nis a biological constraint: the instinct which makes us see the utility\nof concluding as we do conclude, is in our blood, we _are_ almost this\ninstinct.... But what simplicity it is to attempt to derive from this\nfact that we possess an absolute truth! ... The inability to contradict\nanything is a proof of impotence but not of \"truth.\"\n\n\n516.\n\nWe are not able to affirm and to deny one and the same thing: that\nis a principle of subjective experience--which is not in the least\n\"necessary,\" _but only a sign of inability._\n\nIf, according to Aristotle, the _principium contradictionis_ is the\nmost certain of all principles; if it is the most ultimate of all,\nand the basis of every demonstration; if the principle of every\nother axiom lie within it: then one should analyse it all the more\nseverely, in order to discover how many assumptions _already lie_ at\nits root. It either assumes something concerning reality and Being,\nas if these had become known in some other sphere--that is to say, as\nif it were _impossible_ to ascribe the opposite attributes to it; or\nthe proposition means: that the opposites _should_ not be ascribed to\nit. In that case, logic would be an imperative, _not_ directed at the\nknowledge of truth, but at the adjusting and fixing of a world _which\nmust seem true to us._\n\nIn short, the question is a debatable one: are the axioms of logic\nadequate to reality, or are they measures and means by which alone\nwe can, _create_ realities, or the concept \"reality\"?... In order to\naffirm the first alternative, however, one would, as we have seen,\nrequire a previous knowledge of Being; which is certainly not the case.\nThe proposition therefore contains no _criterion of truth,_ but an\n_imperative_ concerning that which _should_ pass as true.\n\nSupposing there were no such thing as A identical with itself, as\nevery logical (and mathematical) proposition presupposes, and that A\nis in itself an _appearance,_ then logic would have a mere world _of\nappearance_ as its first condition. As a matter of fact, we believe\nin that proposition, under the influence of an endless empiricism\nwhich seems to _confirm_ it every minute. The \"thing\"--that is the\nreal substratum of A; _our belief in things_ is the first condition of\nour faith in logic. The A in logic is, like the atom, a reconstruction\nof the thing.... By not understanding this, and by making logic\ninto a criterion of _real being,_ we are already on the road to the\nclassification of all those hypostases, substance, attribute, object,\nsubject, action, etc., as realities--that is to say, the conception of\na metaphysical world or a \"real world\" (--_this is, however, once more\nthe world of appearance..._).\n\nThe primitive acts of thought, affirmation, and negation, the holding\nof a thing for true, and the holding of a thing for not true,--in so\nfar as they do not only presuppose a mere habit, but the very _right_\nto postulate truth or untruth at all,--are already dominated by a\nbelief, _that there is such a thing as knowledge for us,_ and _that\njudgments can really hit the truth:_ in short, logic never doubts that\nit is able to pronounce something concerning truth in itself (--that\nis to say, that to the thing which is in itself true, no opposite\nattributes _can_ be ascribed).\n\nIn this belief there _reigns_ the sensual and coarse prejudice that our\nsensations teach us _truths_ concerning things,--that I cannot at the\nsame moment of time say of one and the same thing that it is _hard_ and\n_soft._ (The instinctive proof, \"I cannot have two opposite sensations\nat once,\" is quite _coarse_ and _false_.)\n\nThat all contradiction in concepts should be forbidden, is the result\nof a belief, that we _are able_ to form concepts, that a concept not\nonly characterises but also _holds_ the essence of a thing.... As a\nmatter of fact, logic (like geometry and arithmetic) only holds good of\n_assumed existences which we have created._ Logic is _the attempt on\nour part to understand the actual world according to a scheme of Being\ndevised by ourselves; or, more exactly, it is our attempt at making the\nactual world more calculable and more susceptible to formulation, for\nour own purposes...._\n\n\n517.\n\nIn order to be able to think and to draw conclusions, it is necessary\nto _acknowledge that which exists:_ logic only deals with formul\u00e6 for\nthings which are constant. That is why this acknowledgment would not in\nthe least prove reality: \"that which is\" is part of our optics. The ego\nregarded as Being (not affected by either Becoming or evolution).\n\nThe _assumed world_ of subject, substance, reason, etc., is necessary,\nan adjusting, simplifying falsifying, artificially-separating power\nresides in us. \"Truth\" is the will to be master over the manifold\nsensations that reach consciousness; it is the will to _classify_\nphenomena according to definite categories. In this way we start out\nwith a belief in the \"true nature\" of things (we regard phenomena as\nreal).\n\nThe character of the world in the process of Becoming _is not\nsusceptible of formulation;_ it is \"false\" and \"contradicts itself.\"\n_Knowledge_ and the process of _evolution_ exclude each other.\n_Consequently,_ knowledge must be something else: it must be preceded\nby a will to make things knowable, a kind of Becoming in itself must\ncreate the _illusion_ of _Being._\n\n\n518.\n\nIf our \"ego\" is the only form of Being, according to which we make\nand understand all Being: very good! In that case it were very\nproper to doubt whether an _illusion_ of perspective were not active\nhere--the apparent unity which everything assumes in our eyes on the\nhorizon-line. Appealing to the body for our guidance, we are confronted\nby such appalling manifoldness, that for the sake of method it is\nallowable to use that phenomenon which is _richer_ and more easily\nstudied as a clue to the understanding of the poorer phenomenon.\n\nFinally: admitting that all is Becoming, _knowledge is only possible\nwhen based on a belief in Being._\n\n\n519.\n\nIf there is \"only one form of Being, the ego,\" and all other forms\nof Being are made in its own image,--if, in short, the belief in the\n\"ego,\" together with the belief in logic, stands and falls with the\nmetaphysical truth of the categories of reason: if, in addition, the\n\"ego\" is shown to be something that is _evolving: then----_\n\n\n520.\n\nThe continual transitions that occur, forbid our speaking of the\n\"individual,\" etc.; the \"number\" of beings itself fluctuates. We should\nknow nothing of time or of movement, if, in a rough way, we did not\nbelieve we saw things \"standing still\" behind or in front of things\nmoving. We should also know just as little about cause and effect,\nand without the erroneous idea of \"empty space\" we should never have\narrived at the concept of space at all. The principle of identity is\nbased on the \"fact of appearance\" that there are some things alike.\nStrictly speaking, it would not be possible to \"understand\" and \"know\"\nan evolving world; something which is called \"knowledge\" exists only\nin so far as the \"understanding\" and \"knowing\" intellect already\nfinds an adjusted and rough world to hand, fashioned out of a host\nof mere appearances, but become fixed _to_ the extent in which this\nkind of appearance has helped to preserve life; only to this extent is\n\"knowledge\" possible--that is to say, as a measuring of earlier and\nmore recent errors by one another.\n\n\n521.\n\n_Concerning logical appearance._--The concept \"individual\" and the\nconcept \"species\" are equally false and only apparent. \"_Species_\" only\nexpresses the fact that an abundance of similar creatures come forth at\nthe same time, and that the speed of their further growth and of their\nfurther transformation has been made almost imperceptible for a long\ntime: so that the actual and trivial changes and increase of growth are\nof no account at all (--a stage of evolution in which the process of\nevolving is not visible, so that, not only does a state of equilibrium\n_seem_ to have been reached, but the road is also made clear for the\nerror of supposing _that an actual goal has been reached_--and that\nevolution had a goal...).\n\nThe form seems to be something enduring, and therefore valuable;\nbut the form was invented merely by ourselves; and however often\n\"the same form is attained,\" it does not signify that it _is the\nsame form,--because something new always appears_; and we alone, who\ncompare, reckon the new with the old, in so far as it resembles the\nlatter, and embody the two in the unity of \"form.\" As if a _type_ had\nto be reached and were actually intended by the formative processes.\n\n_Form, species, law, idea, purpose_--the same fault is made in respect\nof all these concepts, namely, that of giving a false realism to a\npiece of fiction: as if all phenomena were infused with some sort of\nobedient spirit--an artificial distinction is here made between that\n_which_ acts and that _which_ guides action (but both these things are\nonly fixed in order to agree with our metaphysico-logical dogma: they\nare not \"facts\").\n\nWe should not interpret this _constraint_ in ourselves, to imagine\nconcepts, species, forms, purposes, and laws (\"_a world of identical\ncases_\") as if we were in a position to construct a _real world_; but\nas a constraint to adjust a world by means of which _our existence_\nwill be ensured: we thereby create a world which is determinable,\nsimplified, comprehensible, etc., for us.\n\nThe very same constraint is active in _the functions of the senses_\nwhich support the reason--by means of simplification, coarsening,\naccentuation, and interpretation; whereon all \"recognition,\" all the\nability of making one's self intelligible rests. Our _needs_ have made\nour senses so precise, that the \"same world of appearance\" always\nreturns, and has thus acquired the semblance of _reality._\n\nOur subjective constraint to have faith in logic, is expressive only\nof the fact that long before logic itself became conscious in us, we\ndid nothing _save introduce its postulates into the nature of things:_\nnow we find ourselves in their presence,--we can no longer help\nit,--and now we would fain believe that this constraint is a guarantee\nof \"truth.\" We it was who created the \"thing,\" the \"same thing,\" the\nsubject, the attribute, the action, the object, the substance, and\nthe form, after we had carried the process of equalising, coarsening,\nand simplifying as far as possible. The world _seems_ logical to us,\nbecause we have already made it logical.\n\n\n522.\n\n_Fundamental solution._--We believe in reason: this is, however, the\nphilosophy of colourless _concepts._ Language is built upon the most\n_na\u00eff_ prejudices.\n\nNow we read discord and problems into things, because we are able to\n_think only_ in the form of language--we also believe in the \"eternal\ntruth\" of \"wisdom\" (for instance, subject, attribute, etc.).\n\n_We cease from thinking if we do not wish to think under the control\nof language_; the most we can do is to attain to an attitude of doubt\nconcerning the question whether the boundary here really is a boundary.\n\n_Rational thought is a process of interpreting according to a scheme\nwhich we cannot reject._\n\n\n\n(_f_) Consciousness.\n\n\n523.\n\nThere is no greater error than that of making psychical and physical\nphenomena the two faces, the two manifestations of the same substance.\nBy this means nothing is explained: the concept _\"substance\"_ is\nutterly useless as a means of explanation. _Consciousness_ may be\nregarded as secondary, almost an indifferent and superfluous thing,\nprobably destined to disappear and to be superseded by perfect\nautomatism--\n\nWhen we observe mental phenomena we may be likened to the deaf and dumb\nwho divine the spoken word, which they do not hear, from the movements\nof the speaker's lips. From the appearance of the inner mind we draw\nconclusions concerning invisible and other phenomena, which we could\nascertain if our powers of observation were adequate for the purpose.\n\nFor this inner world we have no finer organs, and that is why a\n_complexity which is thousandfold_ reaches our consciousness as a\nsimple entity, and we invent a process of causation in it, despite\nthe fact that we can perceive no cause either of the movement or of\nthe change--the sequence of thoughts and feelings is nothing more\nthan their becoming visible to consciousness. That this sequence\nhas anything to do with a chain of causes is not worthy of belief:\nconsciousness never communicates an example of cause and effect to us.\n\n\n524.\n\n_The part \"consciousness\" plays,_--It is essential that one should not\nmistake the part that \"consciousness plays\" it is our _relation to the\nouter world; it was the outer world that developed it._ On the other\nhand, the _direction_--that is to say, the care and cautiousness which\nis concerned with the inter-relation of the bodily functions, does\n_not_ enter into our consciousness any more than does the _storing\nactivity_ of the intellect: that there is a superior controlling\nforce at work in these things cannot be doubted--a sort of directing\ncommittee, in which the various _leading desires_ make their votes and\ntheir power felt. \"Pleasure\" and \"pain\" are indications which reach us\nfrom this sphere: as are also _acts of will_ and _ideas._\n\n_In short:_ That which becomes conscious has causal relations which are\ncompletely and absolutely concealed from our knowledge--the sequence of\nthoughts, feelings, and ideas, in consciousness, does not signify that\nthe order in which they come is a causal order: it is _so apparently,_\nhowever, in the highest degree. We have _based_ the whole of our notion\nof _intellect, reason, logic,_ etc., upon this _apparent truth_ (all\nthese things do not exist: they are imaginary syntheses and entities),\nand we then projected the latter into and _behind_ all things!\n\nAs a rule _consciousness_ itself is understood to be the general\nsensorium and highest ruling centre; albeit, it is only a _means of\ncommunication:_ it was developed by intercourse, and with a view to\nthe interests of intercourse.... \"Intercourse\" is understood, here,\nas \"relation,\" and is intended to cover the action of the outer world\nupon us and our necessary response to it, as also our actual influence\n_upon_ the outer world. It is _not_ the conducting force, but an _organ\nof the latter._\n\n\n525.\n\nMy principle, compressed into a formula which savours of antiquity, of\nChristianity, Scholasticism, and other kinds of musk: in the concept,\n\"God is _spirit,_\" God as perfection is \"_denied...._\"\n\n\n526.\n\nWherever people have observed a certain unity in the grouping of\nthings, _spirit_ has always been regarded as the cause of this\nco-ordination: an assumption for which reasons are entirely lacking.\nWhy should the idea of a complex fact be one of the conditions of that\nfact? Or why should the _notion_ of a complex fact have to precede it\nas its cause?\n\nWe must be on our guard against explaining _finality_ by the spirit:\nthere is absolutely no reason whatever for ascribing to spirit the\npeculiar power of organising and systematising. The domain of the\nnervous system is much more extensive: the realm of consciousness is\nsuperadded. In the collective process of adaptation and systematising,\nconsciousness plays no part at all.\n\n\n527.\n\nPhysiologists, like philosophers, believe that consciousness increases\nin _value_ in proportion as it _gains_ in clearness: the most lucid\nconsciousness and the most logical and impassive thought are of the\n_first_ order. Meanwhile--according to what standard is this value\ndetermined?--In regard to the _discharge of will-power_ the most\nsuperficial and _most simple_ thought is the most useful--it might\ntherefore, etc. etc. (because it leaves few motives over).\n\n_Precision in action_ is opposed to the _far-sighted_ and often\nuncertain judgments of _caution:_ the latter is led by the _deeper_\ninstinct.\n\n\n528.\n\n_The chief error of psychologists:_ they regard the indistinct idea as\nof a lower _kind_ than the distinct; but that which keeps at a distance\nfrom our consciousness and which is therefore _obscure, may_ on that\nvery account be quite clear in itself. _The fact that a thing becomes\nobscure_ is a question _of the perspective of consciousness._\n\n\n529.\n\nThe great misapprehensions:--\n\n(1) The senseless _overestimation of consciousness,_ its elevation to\nthe dignity of an entity: \"a spirit,\" \"a soul,\" something that feels,\nthinks, and wills;\n\n(2) The spirit regarded as a _cause,_ especially where finality,\nsystem, and co-ordination appear;\n\n(3) Consciousness classed as the highest form attainable, as the most\nsuperior kind of being, as \"God\";\n\n(4) Will introduced wherever effects are observed;\n\n(5) The \"real world\" regarded as the spiritual world, accessible by\nmeans of the facts of consciousness;\n\n(6) Absolute knowledge regarded as the faculty of consciousness,\nwherever knowledge exists at all.\n\n_Consequences:_--\n\nEvery step forward consists of a step forward in consciousness; every\nstep backwards is a step into unconsciousness (unconsciousness was\nregarded as a falling-back upon the _passions_ and _senses--_as a\nstate of _animalism ..._.)\n\nMan approaches reality and real being through dialectics: man _departs_\nfrom them by means of instincts, senses, and automatism....\n\nTo convert man into a spirit, would mean to make a god of him: spirit,\nwill, goodness--all one.\n\n_All goodness_ must take its root in spirituality, must be a fact of\nconsciousness.\n\nEvery step made towards _something better_ can be only a step forward\nin _consciousness._\n\n\n\n(g) Judgment. True--false.\n\n\n530.\n\nKant's theological bias, his unconscious dogmatism, his moral outlook,\nruled, guided, and directed him.\n\nThe \u03c0\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03c8\u03b5\u1fe1\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2: how is the fact knowledge possible? Is knowledge\na fact at all? What is knowledge? If we do not _know_ what knowledge\nis, we cannot possibly reply to the question, Is there such a thing\nas knowledge? Very _fine!_ But if I do not already \"know\" whether\nthere is, or can be, such a thing as knowledge, I cannot reasonably\nask the question, \"What is knowledge?\" Kant _believes_ in the fact of\nknowledge: what he requires is a piece of _na\u00efvet\u00e9: the knowledge of\nknowledge!_\n\n\"Knowledge is judgment.\" But judgment is a belief that something is\nthis or that! And not knowledge! \"All knowledge consists in synthetic\njudgments\" which have the character of being _universally true_ (the\nfact is _so_ in all cases, and does not change), and which have the\ncharacter of being _necessary_ (the reverse of the proposition cannot\nbe imagined to exist).\n\nThe _validity_ of a belief in knowledge is always taken for granted; as\nis also the _validity_ of the feelings which conscience dictates. Here\n_moral ontology_ is the _ruling_ bias.\n\nThe conclusion, therefore, is: (1) there are propositions which we\nbelieve to be universally true and necessary.\n\n(2) This character of universal truth and of necessity cannot spring\nfrom experience.\n\n(3) Consequently it must base itself upon no experience at all, _but\nupon something else_, it must be derived from another source of\nknowledge!\n\nKant concludes (1) that there are some propositions which hold good\nonly on one condition; (2) this condition is that they do not spring\nfrom experience, but from pure reason.\n\nThus, the question is, whence do we derive our reasons for _believing_\nin the truth of such propositions? No, whence does our belief get\nits cause? But the _origin of a belief,_ of a strong conviction,\nis a psychological problem: and very limited and narrow experience\nfrequently brings about such a belief! _It already presupposes_ that\nthere are not only \"data _a posteriori_\" but also \"data _a priori_\"--\nthat is to say, \"previous to experience.\" Necessary and universal truth\ncannot be given by experience: it is therefore quite clear that it has\ncome to us without experience at all?\n\nThere is no such thing as an isolated judgment!\n\nAn isolated judgment is never \"true,\" it is never knowledge; only in\n_connection with,_ and when _related to,_ many other judgments, is a\nguarantee of its truth forthcoming.\n\nWhat is the difference between true and false belief? What is\nknowledge? He \"knows\" it, that is heavenly! Necessary and universal\ntruth cannot be given by experience! It is therefore independent of\nexperience, _of_ all experience! The view which comes quite _a priori,_\nand therefore independent of all experience, _merely out of reason,_ is\n\"pure knowledge\"!\n\n\"The principles of logic, the principle of identity and of\ncontradiction, are examples of pure knowledge, because they precede all\nexperience.\"--But these principles are not cognitions, but _regulative\narticles of faith._\n\nIn order to establish the _a priori_ character (the pure rationality)\nof mathematical axioms, space _must be conceived as a form of pure\nreason._\n\nHume had declared that there were no _a priori_ synthetic judgments.\nKant says there are--the mathematical ones! And if there are such\njudgments, there may also be such things as metaphysics and a knowledge\nof things by means of pure reason!\n\nMathematics is possible under conditions which are _not_ allowed to\nmetaphysics. All human knowledge is either experience or mathematics.\n\nA judgment is synthetic--that is to say, it co-ordinates various ideas.\nIt is _a priori_--that is to say, this co-ordination is universally\ntrue and necessary, and is arrived at, not by sensual experience, but\nby pure reason.\n\nIf there are such things as _a priori_ judgments, then reason must be\nable to co-ordinate: co-ordination is a form. Reason must _possess a\nformative faculty._\n\n\n531.\n\n_Judging_ is our oldest faith; it is our habit of believing this to be\ntrue or false, of asserting or denying, our certainty that something\nis thus and not otherwise, our belief that we really \"know\"--_what_ is\nbelieved to be true in all judgments?\n\nWhat are _attributes_?--We did not regard changes in ourselves merely\nas such, but as \"things in themselves,\" which are strange to us, and\nwhich we only \"perceive\"; and we did _not_ class them as phenomena,\nbut as Being, as \"attributes\"; and in addition we invented a creature\nto which they attach themselves--that is to say, we made the _effect_\nthe _working cause,_ and _the latter_ we made _Being._ But even in\nthis plain statement, the concept \"effect\" is arbitrary: for in regard\nto those changes which occur in us, and of which we are convinced\nwe ourselves are _not_ the cause, we still argue that they must be\neffects: and this is in accordance with the belief that \"every change\nmust have its author\";--but this belief in itself is already mythology;\nfor it _separates_ the working _cause from_ the cause in work. When I\nsay the \"lightning flashes,\" I set the flash down, once as an action\nand a second time as a subject acting; and thus a thing is fancifully\naffixed to a phenomenon, which is not one with it, but which is\n_stable,_ which _is,_ and does not \"come.\"--_To make the phenomenon the\nworking cause,_ and to make _the effect into a thing--into Being:_\nthis is the _double_ error, or _interpretation,_ of which we are guilty.\n\n\n532.\n\nThe _Judgment_--that is the faith: \"This and this is so. In every\njudgment, therefore, there lies the admission that an \"identical\"\ncase has been met with: it thus takes some sort of comparison for\ngranted, with the help of the memory. Judgment does _not_ create the\nidea that an identical case seems to be there. It believes rather that\nit actually perceives such a case; it works on the hypothesis that\nthere are such things as identical cases. But what is that much _older_\nfunction called, which must have been active much earlier, and which\nin itself equalises unequal cases and makes them alike? What is that\nsecond function called, which with this first one as a basis, etc. etc,\n\"That which provokes the same sensations as another thing is equal\nto that other thing\": but what is that called which makes sensations\nequal, which regards them as equal?--There could be no judgments if\na sort of equalising process were not active within all sensations:\nmemory is only possible by means of the underscoring of all that has\nalready been experienced and learned. Before a judgment can be formed,\n_the process of assimilation must already have been completed_: thus,\neven here, an intellectual activity is to be observed which does\nnot enter consciousness in at all the same way as the pain which\naccompanies a wound. Probably the psychic phenomena correspond to all\nthe organic functions--that is to say, they consist of assimilation,\nrejection, growth, etc.\n\nThe essential thing is to start out from the body and to use it as the\ngeneral clue. It is by far the richer phenomenon, and allows of much\nmore accurate observation. The belief in the body is much more soundly\nestablished than the belief in spirit.\n\n\"However strongly a thing may be believed, the degree of belief is no\ncriterion of its truth.\" But what is truth? Perhaps it is a form of\nfaith, which has become a condition of existence? Then _strength_ would\ncertainly be a criterion; for instance, in regard to causality.\n\n\n533.\n\nLogical accuracy, transparency, considered as the criterion\nof truth (\"_omne illud verum est, quod clare et distincte\npercipitur._\"--Descartes): by this means the mechanical hypothesis of\nthe world becomes desirable and credible.\n\nBut this is gross confusion: like _simplex sigillum veri._ Whence comes\nthe knowledge that the real nature of things stands in _this_ relation\nto our intellect? Could it not be otherwise? Could it not be this,\nthat the hypothesis which gives the intellect the greatest feeling of\npower and security, is _preferred, valued,_ and marked as _true_--The\nintellect sets its _freest_ and _strongest faculty_ and _ability_\nas the criterion of what is most valuable, consequently of what is\n_true...._\n\n    \"True\"--from the standpoint of sentiment--is that which most\n    provokes sentiment (\"I\");\n\n    from the standpoint of thought--is that which gives thought\n    the greatest sensation of strength;\n\n    from the standpoint of touch, sight, and hearing--is that\n    which calls forth the greatest resistance.\n\nThus it is the _highest degrees of activity_ which awaken belief in\nregard to the _object_, in regard to its \"reality.\" The sensations of\nstrength, struggle, and resistance convince the subject that there is\nsomething which is being resisted.\n\n\n534.\n\nThe criterion of truth lies in the enhancement of the feeling of power.\n\n\n535.\n\nAccording to my way of thinking, \"truth\" does not necessarily mean\nthe opposite of error, but, in the most fundamental cases, merely\nthe relation of different errors to each other: thus one error might\nbe older, deeper than another, perhaps altogether ineradicable, one\nwithout which organic creatures like ourselves could not exist;\nwhereas other errors might not tyrannise over us to that extent as\nconditions of existence, but when measured according to the standard\nof those other \"tyrants,\" could even be laid aside and \"refuted.\" Why\nshould an irrefutable assumption necessarily be \"true\"? This question\nmay exasperate the logicians who limit _things_ according to the\nlimitations they find in themselves: but I have long since declared war\nwith this logician's optimism.\n\n\n536.\n\nEverything simple is simply imaginary, but not \"true.\" That which is\nreal and true is, however, neither a unity nor reducible to a unity.\n\n\n537.\n\n_What is truth?_--Inertia; _that_ hypothesis which brings satisfaction,\nthe smallest expense of intellectual strength, etc.\n\n\n538.\n\nFirst proposition. The _easier_ way of thinking always triumphs\nover the more difficult way;--_dogmatically_: _simplex sigillum\nveri_.--_Dico_: to suppose that _clearness_ is any proof of truth, is\nabsolute childishness. . . .\n\nSecond proposition. The teaching of Being, of things, and of all those\nconstant entities, is a _hundred times more easy_ than the teaching of\n_Becoming_ and of evolution. . .\n\nThird proposition. Logic was intended to be a method of _facilitating_\nthought: a _means of expression_, --not truth. . . . Later on it got to\n_act_ like truth. . . .\n\n\n539.\n\nParmenides said: \"One can form no concept of the non-existent\";--we are\nat the other extreme, and say, \"That Of which a concept can be formed,\nis certainly fictional.\"\n\n\n540.\n\nThere are many kinds of eyes. Even the Sphinx has eyes--therefore there\nmust be many kinds of \"truths,\" and consequently there can be no truth.\n\n\n541.\n\n_Inscriptions over the porch of a modern lunatic asylum._\n\n\"That which is necessarily true in thought must be necessarily true in\nmorality.\"--HERBERT SPENCER.\n\n\"The ultimate test of the truth of a proposition is the\ninconceivableness of its negation,\"--HERBERT SPENCER.\n\n\n542.\n\nIf the character of existence were false,:--and this would be\npossible,--what would truth then be, all our truth? ... An unprincipled\nfalsification of the false? A higher degree of falseness? ...\n\n\n543.\n\nIn a world which was essentially false, truthfulness would be an\n_anti-natural tendency_: its only purpose would be to provide a means\nof attaining to a _higher degree of falsity._ For a world of truth and\nBeing to be simulated, the truthful one would first have to be created\n(it being understood that he must believe himself to be \"truthful\").\n\nSimple, transparent, not in contradiction with himself, lasting,\nremaining always the same to himself, free from faults, sudden changes,\ndissimulation, and form: such a man conceives a world of Being as\n\"_God_\" in His own image.\n\nIn order that truthfulness may be possible, the whole sphere in which\nman moves must be very tidy, small, and respectable: the advantage\nin every respect must be with the truthful one.--Lies, tricks,\ndissimulations, must cause astonishment.\n\n\n544.\n\n_\"Dissimulation\"_ increases in accordance with the rising _order of\nrank_ among organic beings. In the inorganic world it seems to be\nentirely absent. There power opposes power quite roughly _--ruse_\nbegins in the organic world; plants are already masters of it. The\ngreatest men, such as C\u00e6sar and Napoleon (see Stendhal's remark\nconcerning him),[3] as also the higher races (the Italians), the Greeks\n(Odysseus); the most supreme cunning, belongs to the very _essence_\nof the elevation of man. ... The problem of the actor. My Dionysian\nideal.... The optics of all the organic functions, of all the strongest\nvital instincts: the power which _will_ have error in all life; error\nas the very first principle of thought itself. Before \"thought\" is\npossible, \"fancy\" must first have done its work; the _picturing_ of\nidentical cases, of the _seemingness_ of identity, is more primeval\nthan the cognition of identity.\n\n[Footnote 3: The reference to Stendhal here, seems to point to a\npassage in his _Life of Napoleon_ (Preface, p. xv) of which Nietzsche\nhad made a note in another place, and which reads: \"Une croyance\npresque instinctive chez moi c'est que tout homme puissant ment quand\nil parle et \u00e0 plus forte raison quand il \u00e9crit.\"]\n\n\n\n\n_(h)_ Against Causality.\n\n\n545.\n\nI believe in absolute space as the basis of force, and I believe the\nlatter to be limited and formed. Time, eternal. But space and time\nas things in themselves do not exist. \"Changes\" are only appearances\n(or mere processes of our senses to us); if we set recurrence,\nhowever regular, between them, nothing is proved beyond the fact that\nit has always happened so. The feeling that _post hoc_ is _propter\nhoc,_ is easily explained as the result of a misunderstanding, it is\ncomprehensible. But appearances cannot be \"causes\"!\n\n\n546.\n\nThe interpretation of a phenomenon, _either_ as an action _or_ as the\nendurance of an action (that is to say, every action involves the\nsuffering of it), amounts to this: every change, every differentiation,\npresupposes the existence of an agent and somebody acted upon, _who_ is\n\"altered.\"\n\n\n547.\n\nPsychological history of the concept _subject._ The body, the thing,\nthe \"whole,\" which is visualised by the eye, awakens the thought of\ndistinguishing between an action and an agent; the idea that the agent\nis the cause of the action, after having been repeatedly refined, at\nlength left the \"subject\" over.\n\n\n548.\n\nOur absurd habit of regarding a mere mnemonic sign or abbreviated\nformula as an independent being, and ultimately as a _cause_; as, for\ninstance, when we say of lightning that it flashes, even the little\nword \"I.\" A sort of double-sight in seeing which makes sight a _cause\nof seeing in itself_: this was the feat in the invention of the\n\"subject\" of the \"ego.\"\n\n\n549.\n\n\"Subject,\" \"object,\" \"attribute\"--these distinctions have been _made,_\nand are now used like schemes to cover all apparent facts. The false\nfundamental observation is this, that I believe it is I who does\nsomething, who suffers something, who \"has\" something, who \"has\" a\nquality.\n\n\n550.\n\nIn every judgment lies the whole faith in subject, attribute, or cause\nand effect (in the form of an assumption that every effect is the\nresult of activity, and that all activity presupposes an agent), and\neven this last belief is only an isolated case of the first, so that\nfaith remains as the most fundamental belief! there are such things as\nsubjects, everything that happens is related attributively to a subject\nof some sort.\n\nI notice something, and try to discover the reason of it: originally\nthis was, I look for an _intention_ behind it, and, above all, I\nlook for one who has an intention, for a subject, an agent: every\nphenomenon is an action, formerly intentions were seen behind _all_\nphenomena, this is our oldest habit. Has the animal also this habit?\nAs a living organism, is it not also compelled to interpret things\nthrough itself. The question why? is always a question concerning the\n_causa finalis,_ and the general \"purpose\" of things. We have no sign\nof the \"sense of the efficient cause\"; in this respect Hume is quite\nright, habit (but not only that of the individual) allows us to expect\nthat a certain process, frequently observed, will follow upon another,\nbut nothing more! That which gives us such an extraordinarily firm\nfaith in causality, is not the rough habit of observing the sequence of\nprocesses, but our _inability_ to _interpret_ a phenomenon otherwise\nthan as the result of _design._ It is the _belief in_ living and\nthinking things, as the only agents of _causation_; it is the belief in\nwill, in design--the belief that all phenomena are actions, and that\nall actions presuppose an agent; it is the belief in the \"subject.\" Is\nnot this belief in the concepts subject and object an arrant absurdity?\n\nQuestion: Is the design the cause of a phenomenon? Or is that also\nillusion? Is it not the phenomenon itself?\n\n\n551.\n\n_A criticism of the concept \"cause.\"_--We have absolutely no experience\nconcerning _cause_, viewed psychologically we derive the whole concept\nfrom the subjective conviction, that _we_ ourselves are causes--that is\nto say, that the arm moves.... _But that is an error._ We distinguish\nourselves, the agents, from the action, and everywhere we make use of\nthis scheme--we try to discover an agent behind every phenomenon. What\nhave we done? We have _misunderstood_ a feeling of power, tension,\nresistance, a muscular feeling, which is already the beginning of the\naction, and posited it as a cause; or we have understood the will to\ndo this or that, as a cause, because the action follows it. There is\nno such thing as \"Cause,\" in those few cases in which it seemed to\nbe given, and in which we projected it out of ourselves in_ order to\nunderstand a phenomenon,_ it has been shown to be an illusion. Our\nunderstanding of a phenomenon consisted in our inventing a subject\nwho was responsible for something happening, and for the manner in\nwhich it happened. In our concept \"cause\" we have embraced our feeling\nof will, our feeling of \"freedom,\" our feeling of responsibility and\nour design to do an action: _causa efficiens_ and _causa finalis_ are\nfundamentally one.\n\nWe believed that an effect was explained when we could point to a state\nin which it was inherent. As a matter of fact, we invent all causes\naccording to the scheme of the effect: the latter is known to us.... On\nthe other hand, we are not in a position to say of any particular thing\nhow it will \"act.\" The thing, the subject the will, the design--all\ninherent in the conception \"cause.\" We try to discover things in order\nto explain why something has changed. Even the \"atom\" is one of these\nfanciful inventions like the \"thing\" and the \"primitive subject.\"...\n\nAt last we understand that things--consequently also atoms--effect\nnothing: _because they are non-existent;_ and that the concept\ncausality is quite! useless. Out of a necessary sequence of states,\nthe latter's causal relationship does _not_ follow (that would be\nequivalent to extending their _active principle_ from 1 to 2, to 3, to\n4, to 5). _There is no such thing as a cause or an effect._ From the\nstandpoint of language we do not know how to rid ourselves of them.\nBut that does not matter. If I imagine _muscle_ separated from its\n\"effects,\" I have denied it....\n\nIn short: _a phenomenon is neither effected nor capable of effecting.\nCausa_ is a _faculty to effect something,_ superadded fancifully to\nwhat happens....\n\n_The interpretation of causality is an illusion...._ A \"thing\" is the\nsum of its effects, synthetically united by means of a concept, an\nimage. As a matter of fact, science has robbed the concept causality\nof all meaning, and has reserved it merely as an allegorical formula,\nwhich has made it a matter of indifference whether cause or effect be\nput on this side or on that. It is asserted that in two complex states\n(centres of force) the quantities of energy remain constant.\n\n_The calculability of a phenomenon_ does not lie in the fact that\na rule is observed, or that a necessity is obeyed, or that we have\nprojected a law of causality into every phenomenon: it lies in the\n_recurrence of \"identical cases.\"_\n\nThere is no such thing as a _sense of causality,_ as Kant would have\nus believe. We are aghast, we feel insecure, we will have something\nfamiliar, which can be relied upon.... As soon as we are shown the\nexistence of something old in a new thing, we are pacified. The\nso-called instinct of causality is nothing more than the _fear of\nthe unfamiliar_, and the attempt at finding something in it which is\nalready _known._--It is not a search for causes, but for the familiar.\n\n\n552.\n\n_To combat determinism and teleology._--From the fact that something\nhappens regularly, and that its occurrence may be reckoned upon, it\ndoes not follow that it happens _necessarily._ If a quantity of force\ndetermines and conducts itself in a certain way in every particular\ncase, it does not prove that it has \"no free will.\" \"Mechanical\nnecessity\" is not an established fact: it was _we_ who first read\ninto the nature of all phenomena. We interpreted the possibility of\n_formularising_ phenomena as a result of the dominion of necessary law\nover all existence. But it does not follow, because I do a determined\nthing, that I am bound to do it. _Compulsion_ cannot be demonstrated\nin things: all that the rule proves is this, that one and the same\nphenomenon is not another phenomenon. Owing to the very fact that we\nfancied the existence of subjects \"_agents_\" in things, the notion\narose that all phenomena are the _consequence_ of a _compulsory force_\nexercised over the subject--exercised by whom? once more by an \"agent.\"\nThe concept \"Cause and Effect\" is a dangerous one, so long as people\nbelieve in something that _causes,_ and a something that is _caused._\n\n_(a)_ Necessity is not an established fact, but an interpretation.\n\n***\n\n_(b)_ When it is understood that the \"subject\" is nothing that _acts,_\nbut only a thing of fancy, there is much that follows.\n\nOnly with the subject as model we invented _thingness_ and read it into\nthe pell-mell of sensations. If we cease from believing in the _acting_\nsubject, the belief in _acting_ things, in reciprocal action, in cause\nand effect between phenomena which we call things, also falls to pieces.\n\nIn this case the world of _acting atoms_ also disappears: for this\nworld is always assumed to exist on the pre-determined grounds that\nsubjects are necessary.\n\nUltimately, of course, _the \"thing-in-itself\"_ also disappears: for\nat bottom it is the conception of a \"subject-in-itself.\" But we\nhave seen that the subject is an imaginary thing. The antithesis\n\"thing-in-itself\" and \"appearance\" is untenable; but in this way the\nconcept \"_appearance_\" also disappears.\n\n***\n\n_(c)_ If we abandon the idea of the acting _subject,_ we also abandon\nthe _object_ acted upon. Duration, equality to self, Being, are\ninherent neither in what is called subject, nor in what is called\nobject: they are complex phenomena, and in regard to other phenomena\nare apparently durable--they are distinguishable, for instance, by\nthe different tempo with which they happen (repose--movement, fixed\n--loose: all antitheses which do not exist in themselves and by means\nof which _differences of degree_ only are expressed; from a certain\nlimited point of view, though, they seem to be antitheses. There are no\nsuch things as antitheses; it is from logic that we derive our concept\nof contrasts--and starting out from its standpoint we spread the error\nover all things).\n\n***\n\n_(d)_ If we abandon the ideas \"subject\" and \"object\"; then we must also\nabandon the idea _\"substance\"_--and therefore its various modifications\ntoo; for instance: \"matter,\" \"spirit,\" and other hypothetical things,\n\"eternity and the immutability of matter,\" etc. We are then rid of\n_materiality._\n\n***\n\nFrom a moral standpoint _the world is false._ But inasmuch as morality\nitself is a part of this world, morality also is false. The will\nto truth is a process of _establishing things_, it is a process of\n_making_ things true and lasting, a total elimination of that _false_\ncharacter, a transvaluation of it into _being._ Thus, \"truth\" is not\nsomething which is present and which has to be found and discovered; it\nis something _which has to be created_ and which _gives_ its name _to a\nprocess,_ or, better still, to the Will to overpower, which in itself\nhas no purpose: to introduce truth is a _processus in infinitum,_ an\n_active determining_--it is not a process of becoming conscious of\nsomething, which in itself is fixed and determined. It is merely a word\nfor \"The Will to Power.\"\n\nLife is based on the hypothesis of a belief in stable and regularly\nrecurring things, the mightier it is, the more vast must be the world\nof knowledge and the world called being. Logicising, rationalising, and\nsystematising are of assistance as means of existence.\n\nMan projects his instinct of truth, his \"aim,\" to a certain extent\nbeyond himself, in the form of a metaphysical world of Being, a\n\"thing-in-itself,\" a world already to hand. His requirements as a\ncreator make him _invent_ the world in which he works in advance; he\nanticipates it: this anticipation (this faith in truth) is his mainstay.\n\n***\n\nAll phenomena, movement, Becoming, regarded as the establishment of\nrelations of degree and of force, as a contest....\n\n***\n\nAs soon as we _fancy_ that some one is responsible for the fact that\nwe are thus and thus, etc. (God, Nature), and that we ascribe our\nexistence, our happiness, our misery, our _destiny,_ to that some one,\nwe corrupt the _innocence of Becoming_ for ourselves. We then have some\none who wishes to attain to something by means of us and with us.\n\n***\n\nThe \"welfare of the individual\" is just as fanciful as the \"welfare\nof the species\": the first is _not_ sacrificed to the last; seen\nfrom afar, the species is just as fluid as the individual. \"The\n_preservation_ of the species\" is only a result of the _growth_ of the\nspecies--that is to say, _of the overcoming of the species_ on the road\nto a stronger kind.\n\n***\n\nTheses:--The apparent conformity of means to end (\"the conformity of\nmeans to end which far surpasses the art of man) is merely the result\nof that \"_Will to Power_\" which manifests itself in all phenomena:--_To\nbecome stronger_ involves a process of ordering, which may well be\nmistaken for an attempted conformity of means to end:--The _ends_ which\nare apparent are not intended but, as soon as a superior power prevails\nover an inferior power, and the latter proceeds to work as a function\nof the former, an order of _rank_ is established, an organisation which\nmust give rise to the idea that there is an arrangement of means and\nends.\n\nAgainst apparent \"_necessity_\":--\n\nThis is only an expression for the fact that a certain power is not\nalso something else.\n\nAgainst the apparent conformity of means to ends\":--\n\nThe latter is only an _expression_ for the order among the spheres of\npower and their interplay.\n\n_(i)_ The Thing-in-Itself and Appearance.\n\n\n553.\n\nThe foul blemish on Kant's criticism has at last become visible\neven to the coarsest eyes: Kant had no right to his distinction\n\"_appearance_\" and \"_thing-in-itself,_\"--in his own writings he had\ndeprived himself of the right of differentiating any longer in this\nold and hackneyed manner, seeing that he had condemned the practice of\ndrawing any conclusions concerning the cause of an appearance from the\nappearance itself, as unallowable in accordance with his conception\nof the idea of causality and its _purely intraphenomenal_ validity,\nand this conception, on the other hand, already anticipates that\n_differentiation,_ as if the \"thing in itself\" were not only inferred\nbut actually _given._\n\n\n554.\n\nIt is obvious that neither things-in-themselves _nor_ appearances can\nbe related to each other in the form of cause and effect: and from this\nit follows that the concept \"cause and effect\" is _not applicable_ in a\nphilosophy which believes in things-in-themselves and in appearances.\nKant's mistake--... As a matter of fact, from a psychological\nstandpoint, the concept \"cause and effect\" is derived from an attitude\nof mind which believes it sees the action of will upon will everywhere,\nwhich believes only in living things, and at bottom only in souls (not\nin things). Within the mechanical view of the world (which is logic\nand its application to space and time) that concept is reduced to\nthe mathematical formula with which--and this is a fact which cannot\nbe sufficiently emphasised--nothing is ever understood, but rather\n_defined_--deformed.\n\n\n555.\n\nThe greatest of all fables is the one relating to knowledge. People\nwould like to know how things-in-themselves are constituted: but\nbehold, there are no things-in-themselves! But even supposing there\n_were_ an \"in-itself,\" an unconditional thing, it could on that very\naccount _not be known_! Something unconditioned cannot be known:\notherwise it would not be unconditioned! Knowing, however, is always a\nprocess of \"coming into relation with something\"; the knowledge-seeker,\non this principle, wants the thing, which he would know, to be nothing\nto him, and to be nothing to anybody at all: and from this there\nresults a contradiction,--in the first place, between this _will_ to\nknow, and this desire that the thing to be known _should_ be nothing\nto him (wherefore know at all then?); and secondly, because something\nwhich is nothing to anybody, does not even _exist,_ and therefore\ncannot be known. Knowing means: \"to place one's self in relation with\nsomething,\" to feel one's self conditioned by something and one's\nself conditioning it under all circumstances, then, it is a process\nof _making stable or fixed,_ of _defining,_ of _making conditions\nconscious_ (not a process of _sounding_ things, creatures, or objects\nin-themselves).\n\n\n556.\n\nA \"thing-in-itself\" is just as absurd as a \"sense-in-itself,\" a\n\"meaning-in-itself.\" There is no such thing as a \"fact-in-itself,\"\n_for a meaning must always be given to it before it can become a fact._\n\nThe answer to the question, \"What is that?\" is a process of _fixing a\nmeaning_ from a different standpoint. The \"_essence_\" the \"_essential\nfactor,_\" is something which is only seen as a whole in perspective,\nand which presupposes a basis which is multifarious. Fundamentally the\nquestion is \"What is that for me?\" (for us, for everything that lives,\netc. etc.).\n\nA thing would be defined when all creatures had asked and answered this\nquestion, \"What is that?\" concerning it. Supposing that one single\ncreature, with its own relations and standpoint in regard to all\nthings, were lacking, that thing would still remain undefined.\n\nIn short: the essence of a thing is really only an _opinion_ concerning\nthat \"thing.\" Or, better still; \"_it is worth_\" is actually what is\nmeant by _\"it is\"_ or by \"that is.\"\n\nOne may not ask: \"_Who_ interprets, then?\" for the act of interpreting\n_itself_ as a form of the Will to Power, manifests itself (not as\n\"Being,\" but as a _process,_ as _Becoming_) as a passion.\n\nThe origin of \"things\" is wholly the work of the idealising, thinking,\nwilling, and feeling subject. The concept thing as well as all its\nattributes.--Even \"the subject\" is a creation of this order, a \"thing\"\nlike all others: a simplification, aiming at a definition of the\n_power_ that fixes, invents, and thinks, as such, as distinct from\nall isolated fixing, inventing, and thinking. Thus a capacity defined\nor distinct from all other individual capacities; at bottom action\nconceived collectively in regard to all the action which has yet to\ncome (action and the probability of similar action).\n\n\n557.\n\nThe qualities of a thing are its effects upon other \"things.\"\n\nIf one imagines other \"things\" to be non-existent, a thing has no\nqualities.\n\nThat is to say; _there is nothing without other things._\n\nThat is to say; there is no \"thing-in-itself.\"\n\n\n558.\n\nThe thing-in-itself is nonsense. If I think all the \"relations,\" all\nthe \"qualities\" all the \"activities\" of a thing, away, the thing itself\ndoes _not_ remain: for \"thingness\" was only _invented fancifully_ by\nus to meet certain logical needs--that is to say, for the purposes of\ndefinition and comprehension (in order to correlate that multitude of\nrelations, qualities, and activities).\n\n\n559.\n\n\"Things which have a nature _in themselves_\"--a dogmatic idea, which\nmust be absolutely abandoned.\n\n\n560.\n\nThat things should have a _nature in themselves,_ quite apart from\ninterpretation and subjectivity, _is a perfectly idle hypothesis_:\nit would presuppose that _interpretation_ and the _act of being\nsubjective_ are not essential, that a thing divorced from all its\nrelations can still be a thing.\n\nOr, the other way round: the apparent _objective_ character of things;\nmight it not be merely the result of a _difference of degree_ within\nthe subject perceiving?--could not that which changes slowly strike\nus as being objective, lasting, Being, \"in-itself\"?--could not the\nobjective view be only a false way of conceiving things and a contrast\n_within_ the perceiving subject?\n\n\n561.\n\nIf all unity were only unity as organisation. But the \"thing\" in\nwhich we believe was _invented_ only as a substratum to the various\nattributes. If the thing \"acts,\" it means: we regard _all the other_\nqualities which are to hand, and which are momentarily latent, as\nthe cause accounting for the fact that one individual quality steps\nforward--that is to say, _we take the sum of its qualities--x--_as\nthe cause of the quality _x_; which is obviously _quite_ absurd and\nimbecile!\n\nAll unity is _only so_ in the form of _organisation_ and _collective\naction:_ in the same way as a human community is a unity--that is to\nsay, _the reverse of_ atomic _anarchy_; thus it is a body politic,\nwhich _stands for_ one, yet _is_ not one.\n\n\n562.\n\n\"At some time in the development of thought, a point must have been\nreached when man became conscious of the fact that what he called\nthe _qualities of a thing_ were merely the sensations of the feeling\nsubject: and thus the qualities ceased from belonging to the thing.\"\nThe \"thing-in-itself\" remained over. 'The distinction between the\nthing-in-itself and the thing-for-us, is based upon that older and\nartless observation which would fain grant energy to things: but\nanalysis revealed that even force was only ascribed to them by our\nfancy, as was also--substance. \"The thing affects a subject?\" Thus the\nroot of the idea of substance is in language, not in things outside\nourselves! The thing-in-itself is not a problem at all!\n\nBeing will have to be conceived as a sensation which is no longer based\nupon anything quite devoid of sensation.\n\nIn movement no new _meaning_ is given to feeling. That which is, cannot\nbe the substance of movement: it is therefore a form of Being.\n\n    _N.B._--The explanation of life may be sought, in the first\n    place, through mental images of phenomena which _precede_ it\n    (purposes);\n\n    Secondly, through mental images of phenomena which follow\n    behind it (the mathematico-physical explanation).\n\nThe two should not be confounded. Thus: the physical explanation, which\nis the symbolisation of the world by means of feeling and thought,\ncannot in itself make feeling and thinking originate again and show\nits derivation: physics must rather construct the world of feeling,\nconsistently _without feeling or purpose _ right up to the highest man.\nAnd teleology is only a _history of purposes,_ and is never physical.\n\n\n563.\n\nOur method of acquiring \"knowledge\" is limited to a process of\nestablishing _quantities,_ but we can by no means help feeling the\ndifference of quantity as differences of _quality._ Quality is merely a\n_relative_ truth for _us_; it is not a \"thing-in-itself.\"\n\nOur senses have a certain definite quantum as a mean, within the limits\nof which they perform their functions--that is to say, we become\nconscious of bigness and smallness in accordance with the conditions of\nour existence. If we sharpened or blunted our senses tenfold, we should\nperish--that is to say, we feel even _proportions_ as _qualities_ in\nregard to our possibilities of existence.\n\n\n564.\n\nBut could not all _quantities_ be merely tokens of _qualities_? Another\nconsciousness and scale of desires must correspond to greater power\nin fact, another point of view; growth in itself is the expression of\na desire _to become more;_ the desire for a greater _quantum_ springs\nfrom a certain _quale,_ in a purely quantitative world, everything\nwould be dead, stiff, and motionless.--The reduction of all qualities\nto quantities is nonsense: it is discovered that they can only stand\ntogether, an analogy--\n\n\n565.\n\nQualities are our insurmountable barriers; we cannot possibly help\nfeeling mere _differences of quantity_ as something fundamentally\ndifferent from quantity--that is to say, as _qualities,_ which we can\nno longer reduce to terms of quantity. But everything in regard to\nwhich the word \"knowledge\" has any sense at all, belongs to the realm\nof reckoning, weighing, and measuring, to quantity whereas, conversely,\nall our valuations (that is to say, our sensations) belong precisely to\nthe realm of qualities, _i.e._ to those truths which belong to us alone\nand to our point of view, and which absolutely cannot be \"known.\" It is\nobvious that every one of us, different creatures, must feel different\nqualities, and must therefore live in a different world from the rest.\nQualities are an idiosyncrasy proper to human nature; the demand that\nthese our human interpretations and values, should be general and\nperhaps real values, belongs to the hereditary madnesses of human pride.\n\n\n566.\n\nThe \"real world,\" in whatever form it has been conceived hitherto--was\nalways the world of appearance _over again._\n\n\n567.\n\nThe world of appearance, _i.e._ a world regarded in the light of\nvalues; ordered, selected according to values--that is to say, in\nthis case, according to the standpoint of utility in regard to the\npreservation and the increase of power of a certain species of animals.\n\nIt is _the point of view,_ then, which accounts for the character of\n\"appearance.\" As if a world could remain over, when the point of view\nis cancelled! By such means _relativity_ would also be cancelled!\n\nEvery centre of energy has its _point of view_ of the whole of the\n_remainder_ of the world--that is to say, its perfectly definite\n_valuation,_ its mode of action, its mode of resistance. The \"world of\nappearance\" is thus reduced to a specific kind of action on the world\nproceeding from a centre.\n\nBut there is no other kind of action: and the \"world\" is only a word\nfor the collective play of these actions. _Reality_ consists precisely\nin this particular action and reaction of every isolated factor against\nthe whole.\n\nThere no longer remains a shadow of a _right_ to speak here of\n\"appearance.\" ...\n\nThe _specific way of reacting_ is the only way of reacting; we do not\nknow how many kinds and what sort of kinds there are.\n\nBut there is no \"_other,_\" no \"real,\" no essential being,--for thus a\nworld _without_ action and reaction would be expressed....\n\nThe antithesis: world of appearance and real world, is thus reduced to\nthe antitheses \"world\" and \"nonentity.\"\n\n\n568.\n\nA criticism of the concept \"_real and apparent_ world.\"--Of these two\nthe first is a mere fiction, formed out of a host of imaginary things.\n\nAppearance itself belongs to reality: it is a form of its being; _i.e._\nin a world where there is no such thing as being, a certain calculable\nworld of _identical_ cases must first be created through _appearance;_\na _tempo_ in which observation and comparison is possible, etc.\n\n\"Appearance\" is an adjusted and simplified world, in which our\n_practical_ instincts have worked: for us it is perfectly true: for we\n_live_ in it, we can live in it: _this is the proof_ of its truth as\nfar as we are concerned....\n\nThe world, apart from the fact that we have to live in it--the\nworld, which we have _not_ adjusted to our being, our logic, and our\npsychological prejudices--does _not_ exist as a world \"in-itself\"; it\nis essentially a world of relations: under certain circumstances it has\na _different aspect_ from every different point at which it is seen:\nit presses against every point, and every point resists it--and these\ncollective relations are in every case _incongruent._\n\nThe _measure of power_ determines what _being_ possesses the other\nmeasure of power: under what form, force, or constraint, it acts or\nresists.\n\nOur particular case is interesting enough: we have created a conception\nin order to be able to live in a world, in order to perceive just\nenough to enable us to _endure_ life in that world....\n\n\n569.\n\nThe nature of our psychological vision is determined by the fact--\n\n(1) That _communication_ is necessary, and that for communication\nto be possible something must be stable, simplified, and capable of\nbeing stated precisely (above all, in the so-called _identical_ case).\nIn order that it may be communicable, it must be felt as something\n_adjusted,_ as \"_recognisable_.\" The material of the senses, arranged\nby the understanding, reduced to coarse leading features, made similar\nto other things, and classified with its like. Thus: the indefiniteness\nand the chaos of sense-impressions are, as it were, _made logical._\n\n(2) The _phenomenal_ world is the adjusted world which _we believe\nto be real,_ Its \"reality\" lies in the constant return of similar,\nfamiliar, and related things, in their _rationalised character,_ and in\nthe belief that we are here able to reckon and determine.\n\n(3) The opposite of this phenomenal world is not \"the real world,\"\nbut the amorphous and unadjustable world consisting of the chaos of\nsensations--that is to say, _another kind_ of phenomenal; world, a\nworld which to us is \"unknowable.\"\n\n(4) The question how things-in-themselves are constituted, quite apart\nfrom our sense-receptivity and from the activity of our understanding,\nmust be answered by the further question: how were we able to know\n_that things existed?_ \"Thingness\" is one of our own inventions. The\nquestion is whether there are not a good many more ways of creating\nsuch a world of appearance--and whether this creating, rationalising,\nadjusting, and falsifying be not the best-guaranteed _reality_ itself:\nin short, whether that which \"fixes the meaning of things\" is not\nthe only reality: and whether the \"effect of environment upon us\"\nbe not merely the result of such will-exercising subjects.... The\nother \"creatures\" act upon us; our _adjusted_ world of appearance\nis an arrangement and an _overpowering_ of its activities: a sort\nof _defensive_ measure. _The subject alone is demonstrable_;\nthe _hypothesis_ might be advanced _that subjects are all that\nexist,_--that \"object\" is only a form of action of subject upon\nsubject ... a _modus of the subject._\n\n\n\n_(k)_ The Metaphysical Need.\n\n\n570.\n\nIf one resembles all the philosophers that have gone before, one\ncan have no eyes for what has existed and what will exist--one sees\nonly what _is._ But as there is no such thing as Being; all that the\nphilosophers had to deal with was a host of _fancies,_ this was their\n\"world.\"\n\n\n571.\n\nTo assert the _existence_ as a whole of things concerning which we know\nnothing, simply because there is an advantage in not being able to know\nanything of them, was a piece of artlessness on Kant's part, and the\nresult of the recoil-stroke of certain needs--especially in the realm\nof morals and metaphysics.\n\n\n572.\n\nAn artist cannot endure reality; he turns away or back from it: his\nearnest opinion is that the worth of a thing consists in that nebulous\nresidue of it which one derives from colour, form, sound, and thought;\nhe believes that the more subtle, attenuated, and volatile, a thing\nor a man becomes, _the more valuable he becomes: the less real,_ the\ngreater the worth. This is Platonism: but Plato was guilty of yet\nfurther audacity in the matter of turning tables--he measured the\ndegree of reality according to the degree of value, and said: The more\nthere is of \"idea\" the more there is of Being. He twisted the concept\n\"reality\" round and said: \"What ye regard as real is an error, and the\nnearer we get to the 'idea' the nearer we are to 'truth.'\"--Is this\nunderstood? It was the _greatest of all rechristenings:_ and because\nChristianity adopted it, we are blind to its astounding features. At\nbottom, Plato, like the artist he was, _placed appearance before_\nBeing! and therefore lies and fiction before truth! unreality before\nactuality!--He was, however, so convinced of the value of appearance,\nthat he granted it the attributes of \"Being,\" \"causality,\" \"goodness,\"\nand \"truth,\" and, in short, all those things which are associated with\nvalue.\n\nThe concept value itself regarded as a cause: first standpoint.\n\nThe ideal granted all attributes, conferring honour: second standpoint.\n\n\n573.\n\nThe idea of the \"true world\" or of \"God\" as absolutely spiritual,\nintellectual, and good, is an _emergency measure_ to the extent to\nwhich the _antagonistic_ instincts are all-powerful....\n\nModeration and existing humanity is reflected exactly in the\nhumanisation of the gods. The Greeks of the strongest period, who\nentertained no fear whatever of themselves, but on the contrary were\npleased with themselves, brought down their gods to all their emotions.\n\nThe spiritualisation of the idea of God is thus very far from being a\nsign of _progress_: one is heartily conscious of this when one reads\nGoethe--in his works the vaporisation of God into virtue and spirit is\nfelt as being upon a lower plane.\n\n\n574.\n\nThe nonsense of all metaphysics shown to reside in the derivation of\nthe conditioned out of the unconditioned.\n\nIt belongs to the nature of thinking that it adds the unconditioned to\nthe conditioned, that it invents it--just as it thought of and invented\nthe \"ego\" to cover the multifariousness of its processes i it measures\nthe world according to a host of self-devised measurements--according\nto its fundamental fictions \"the unconditioned,\" \"end and means,\"\n\"things,\" \"substances,\" and according to logical laws, figures, and\nforms.\n\nThere would be nothing which could be called knowledge, if thought did\nnot first so _re-create_ the world into \"things\" which are in its own\nimage. It is only _through_ thought that there is _untruth._\n\nThe _origin_ of thought, like that of _feelings,_ cannot be traced:\nbut that is _no_ proof of its primordiality or absoluteness! It simply\nshows that we cannot get _behind it,_ because we have nothing else save\nthought and feeling.\n\n\n575.\n\nTo know is to _point to past experience:_ in its nature it is a\n_regressus in infinitum._ That which halts (in the face of a so-called\n_causa prima_ or the unconditioned, etc.) is _laziness,_ weariness.\n\n\n576.\n\n_Concerning the psychology of metaphysics_--the influence of fear. That\nwhich has been most feared, the cause of the _greatest suffering_ (lust\nof power, voluptuousness, etc.), has been treated with the greatest\namount of hostility by men, and eliminated from the \"real\" world. Thus\nthe _passions_ have been step by step _struck out,_ God posited as\nthe opposite of evil--that is to say, reality is conceived to be the\n_negation of the passions and the emotions_ (i.e. _nonentity_).\n\n_Irrationality,_ impulsive action, accidental action, is, moreover,\nhated by them (as the cause of incalculable suffering). _Consequently_\nthey denied this element in the absolute, and interpreted it as\nabsolute \"rationality\" and \"conformity of means to ends.\"\n\n_Change_ and _perishability_ were also feared; and by this fear an\noppressed soul is revealed, full of distrust and painful experiences\n(the case with _Spinoza_: a man differently constituted would have\nregarded this change as a charm).\n\nA nature overflowing and _playing_ with energy, would call precisely\nthe _passions, irrationality_ and _change, good_ in a eudemonistic\nsense, together with their consequences: danger, contrast, ruin, etc.\n\n\n577.\n\nAgainst the value of that which always remains the same (remember\nSpinoza's artlessness and Descartes' likewise), the value of the\nshortest and of the most perishable, the seductive flash of gold on the\nbelly of the serpent _vita_----\n\n\n578.\n\n_Moral values in epistemology itself:_--\n\n    The faith in reason--why not mistrust?\n\n    The \"real world\" is the good world--why?\n\n    Appearance, change, contradiction, struggle, regarded as\n    immoral: the desire for a world which _knows nothing_ of\n    these things.\n\n    The transcendental world discovered, _so that_ a place may\n    be kept for \"moral freedom\" (as in Kant).\n\n    Dialectics as the road to virtue (in Plato and Socrates:\n    probably because sophistry was held to be the road to\n    immorality).\n\n    Time and space are ideal: consequently there is unity in\n    the essence of things; consequently no sin, no evil, no\n    imperfection, a _justification_ of God.\n\n    Epicurus _denied_ the possibility of knowledge, in order to\n    keep the moral (particularly the hedonistic) values as the\n    highest.\n\n    Augustine does the same, and later Pascal (\"corrupted\n    reason\"), in favour of Christian values.\n\n    Descartes' contempt for everything variable; likewise\n    Spinoza's.\n\n\n579.\n\n_Concerning the psychology of metaphysics._--This world is only\napparent: _therefore_ there must be a real world;--this world is\nconditioned: _consequently_ there must be an unconditioned world;--this\nworld is contradictory: _consequently_ there is a world free from\ncontradiction;--this world is evolving: _consequently_ there is\nsomewhere a static world:--a host of false conclusions (blind faith\nin reason: if A exists, then its opposite B must also _exist_). Pain\n_inspires these conclusions_: at bottom they are _withes_ that such\na world might exist; the hatred of a world which leads to suffering\nis likewise revealed by the fact that another and _better_ world is\nimagined: the _resentment_ of the metaphysician against reality is\ncreative here.\n\n_The second_ series of questions: _wherefore_ suffer? ... and from\nthis a conclusion is derived concerning the relation of the real\nworld to our apparent, changing, suffering, and contradictory world:\n(1) Suffering as the consequence of error: how is error possible?\n(2) Suffering as the consequence of guilt: how is guilt possible?\n(A host of experiences drawn from the sphere of nature or society,\nuniversalised and made absolute.) But if the conditioned world be\ncausally determined by the unconditioned, then the _freedom to err, to\nbe sinful,_ must also be derived from the same quarter: and once more\nthe question arises, _to what purpose?_ ... The world of appearance, of\nBecoming, of contradiction, of suffering, is therefore _willed; to what\npurpose?_\n\nThe error of these conclusions; two contradictory concepts are\nformed--because one of them corresponds to a reality, the other\n\"_must_\" also correspond to a reality. \"_Whence_\" would one otherwise\nderive its contradictory concept? _Reason_ is thus a source of\nrevelation concerning the absolute.\n\nBut the _origin_ of the above contradictions _need not necessarily_ be\na supernatural source of reason: it is sufficient to oppose t_he real\ngenesis_ of the concepts, this springs from practical spheres, from\nutilitarian spheres, hence the _strong faith_ it commands _(one is\nthreatened with ruin_ if one's conclusions are not in conformity with\nthis reason; but this fact is no \"_proof_\" of what the latter asserts).\n\n_The preoccupation of metaphysicians with pain,_ is quite artless.\n\"Eternal blessedness\": psychological nonsense. Brave and creative men\nnever make pleasure and pain ultimate questions--they are incidental\nconditions: both of them must be desired when one _will attain to_\nsomething. It is a sign of fatigue and illness in these metaphysicians\nand religious men, that they should press questions of pleasure and\npain into the foreground. Even _morality_ in their eyes derives its\ngreat importance _only_ from the fact that it is regarded as an\nessential condition for abolishing pain.\n\n_The same holds good of the preoccupation with appearance and error_\nthe cause of pain. A superstition that happiness and truth are related\n(confusion: happiness in \"certainty,\" in \"faith\").\n\n\n580.\n\nTo what extent are the various _epistemological positions_\n(materialism, sensualism, idealism) consequences of valuations? The\nsource of the highest feelings of pleasure (\"feelings of value\") may\nalso judge concerning the problem of _reality_!\n\nThe measure of _positive knowledge_ is quite a matter of indifference\nand beside the point; as witness the development of Indici.\n\nThe Buddhistic _negation_ of reality in general (appearance pain) is\nperfectly consistent: undemonstrability, inaccessibility, lack of\ncategories, not only for an \"absolute world,\" but a recognition of\nthe _erroneous procedures_ by means of which the whole concept has\nbeen reached. \"Absolute reality,\" \"Being in itself,\" a contradiction.\nIn a world of _Becoming,_ reality is merely a _simplification_ for\nthe purpose of practical ends, or a _deception_ resulting from the\ncoarseness of certain organs, or a variation in the tempo of Becoming.\n\nThe logical denial of the world and Nihilism is a consequence of the\nfact that we must oppose nonentity with Being, and that Becoming is\ndenied. (\"_Something_\" becomes.)\n\n\n581.\n\n_Being_ and _Becoming._--\"_Reason_\" developed upon a sensualistic basis\nupon the _prejudices of the senses_--that is to say, with the belief in\nthe truth of the judgment of the senses.\n\n\"Being,\" as the generalisation of the concept \"_Life_\" (breath), \"to be\nanimate,\" \"to will,\" \"to act upon,\" \"become.\"\n\nThe opposite is: \"to be inanimate,\" \"_not_ to become,\" \"_not_ to will.\"\n_Thus_: \"Being\" is _not_ opposed to \"not-Being,\" to \"appearance,\" nor\nis it opposed to death (for only that can be dead which can also live).\n\nThe \"soul,\" the \"ego,\" posited as _primeval facts;_ and introduced\nwherever _there is Becoming._\n\n\n582.\n\n_Being_--we have no other idea of it than that which we derive from\n\"_living._\"--How then can everything \"be\" dead?\n\n\n583.\n\n_A._\n\nI see with astonishment that science resigns itself to-day to the fate\nof being reduced to the world of appearance: we certainly have no organ\nof knowledge for the real world--be it what it may.\n\nAt this point we may well ask: With what organ of knowledge is this\ncontradiction established?...\n\nThe fact that a world which is accessible to our organs is also\nunderstood to be dependent upon these organs, and the fact that we\nshould understand a world as subjectively conditioned, are _no_ proofs\nof the actual _possibility_ of an objective world. Who urges us to\nbelieve that subjectivity _is_ real or essential?\n\nThe absolute is even an absurd concept: an \"absolute mode of existence\"\nis nonsense, the concept \"being,\" \"thing,\" is always _relative_ to us.\n\nThe trouble is that, owing to the old antithesis \"apparent\" and \"real,\"\nthe correlative valuations \"of little value\" and \"absolutely valuable\"\nhave been spread abroad.\n\nThe world of appearance does not strike us as a \"valuable\" world;\nappearance is on a lower plane than the highest value. Only a \"real\"\nworld can be absolutely \"valuable\"....\n\n_Prejudice of prejudices!_ It is perfectly possible in itself that\nthe real nature of things would be so unfriendly, so opposed to the\nfirst conditions of life, that appearance is necessary in order to\nmake life possible.... This is certainly the case in a large number of\nsituations--for instance, marriage.\n\nOur empirical world would thus be conditioned, even in its limits\nto knowledge, by the instinct of self-preservation, we regard that\nas good, valuable, and true, which favours the preservation of the\nspecies....\n\n_(a)_ We have no categories which allow us to distinguish between a\nreal and an apparent world. (At the most, there could exist a world of\nappearance, but not _our_ world of appearance.)\n\n_(b)_ Taking the _real_ world for granted, it might still be the _less\nvaluable_ to us; for the quantum of illusion might be of the highest\norder, owing to its value to us as a preservative measure. (Unless\n_appearance_ in itself were sufficient to condemn anything?)\n\n_(c)_ That there exists a correlation between the _degrees of value_\nand the _degrees of reality_ (so that the highest values also possessed\nthe greatest degree of reality), is a metaphysical postulate which\nstarts out with the hypothesis that we _know_ the order of rank among\nvalues; and that this order is a _moral_ one. It is only on this\nhypothesis that _truth_ is necessary as a definition of all that is of\na superior value.\n\n_B._\n\nIt is of cardinal importance that the _real world_ should be\nsuppressed. It is the most formidable inspirer of doubts, and\ndepredator of values, concerning the _world which we are_: it was our\nmost dangerous_ attempt_ heretofore on the life of Life.\n\n_War_ against all the hypotheses upon which a real world has been\nimagined. The notion that _moral values_ are the _highest_ values,\nbelongs to this hypothesis.\n\nThe superiority of the moral valuation would be refuted, if it could\nbe shown to be the result of an _immoral_ valuation--a specific case\nof real immorality: it would thus reduce itself to an _appearance,_\nand as an _appearance_ it would cease from having any right to condemn\nappearance.\n\n_C._\n\nThen the \"Will to Truth\" would have to be examined psychologically: it\nis not a moral power, but a form of the Will to Power. This would have\nto be proved by the fact that it avails itself of every _immoral_ means\nthere is; above all, of the metaphysicians.\n\nAt the present moment we are face to face with the necessity of testing\nthe assumption that moral values are the highest values, _Method in\nresearch_ is attained only when all _moral prejudices_ have been\novercome: it represents a conquest over morality....\n\n\n584.\n\nThe aberrations of philosophy are the outcome of the fact that,\ninstead of recognising in logic and the categories of reason merely\na means to the adjustment of the world for utilitarian ends (that is\nto say, especially, a useful _falsification_), they were taken to be\nthe criterion of truth--particularly of _reality._ The \"criterion\nof truth\" was, as a matter of fact, merely the _biological utility\nof a systematic falsification of this sort, on principle:_ and,\nsince a species of animals knows nothing more important than its own\npreservation, it was indeed allowable here to speak of \"truth.\" Where\nthe artlessness came in, however, was in taking this anthropocentric\nidiosyncrasy as the _measure of things,_ as the canon for recognising\nthe \"real\" and the \"unreal\": in short, in making a relative thing\nabsolute. And behold, all at once, the world fell into the two halves,\n\"real\" and \"apparent\": and precisely that world which man's reason had\narranged for him to live and to settle in, was discredited. Instead of\nusing the forms as mere instruments for making the world manageable\nand calculable, the mad fancy of philosophers intervened, and saw that\nin these categories the concept of that world is given which does\nnot correspond to the concept of the world in which man lives.... The\nmeans were misunderstood as measures of value, and even used as a\ncondemnation of their original purpose....\n\nThe purpose was, to deceive one's self in a useful way: the means\nthereto was the invention of forms and signs, with the help of which\nthe confusing multifariousness of life could be reduced to a useful and\nwieldy scheme.\n\nBut woe! a _moral category_ was now brought into the game: no creature\nwould deceive itself, no creature may deceive itself--consequently\nthere is only a will to truth. What is \"truth\"?\n\nThe principle of contradiction provided the scheme: the real world to\nwhich the way is being sought cannot be in contradiction with itself,\ncannot change, cannot evolve, has no beginning and no end.\n\nThat is the greatest error which has ever been committed, the really\nfatal error of the world: it was believed that in the forms of reason a\ncriterion of reality had been found--whereas their only purpose was to\nmaster reality, by _misunderstanding_ it intelligently....\n\nAnd behold, the world became false precisely owing to the qualities\n_which constitute its reality,_ namely, change, evolution,\nmultifariousness, contrast, contradiction, war. And thenceforward the\nwhole fatality was there.\n\n1. How does one get rid of the false and merely apparent world? (it was\nthe real and only one).\n\n2. How does one become one's self as remote as possible from the\nworld of appearance? (the concept of the perfect being as a contrast\nto the real being; or, more correctly still, as _the contradiction of\nlife_....).\n\nThe whole direction of values was towards the _slander of life_; people\ndeliberately confounded ideal dogmatism with knowledge in general: so\nthat the opposing parties also began to reject _science_ with horror.\n\nThus the road to science was _doubly_ barred: first, by the belief\nin the real world; and secondly, by the opponents of this belief.\nNatural science and psychology were (1) condemned in their objects, (2)\ndeprived of their artlessness....\n\nEverything is so absolutely bound and related to everything else in\nthe real world, that to condemn, or to _think away_ anything, means to\ncondemn and think away the whole. The words \"this should not be,\" \"this\nought not to be,\" are a farce.... If one imagines the consequences,\none would ruin the very source of Life by suppressing everything which\nis in any sense whatever _dangerous or destructive._ Physiology proves\nthis _much better_!\n\nWe see how morality _(a) poisons_ the whole concept of the world, _(b)_\ncuts off the way to _science, (c)_ dissipates and undermines all real\ninstincts (by teaching that their root is _immoral_).\n\nWe thus perceive a terrible tool of decadence at work, which succeeds\nin remaining immune, thanks to the holy names and holy attitudes it\nassumes.\n\n\n585.\n\nThe awful recovery of our _consciousness:_ not of the individual, but\nof the human species. Let us reflect; let us think backwards; let us\nfollow the narrow and broad highway.\n\n_A._\n\nMan seeks \"the truth\": a world that does not contradict itself,\nthat does not deceive, that does not change, a _real_ world--a\nworld in which there is no suffering: contradiction, deception,\nvariability---the causes of suffering! He does not doubt that there is\nsuch a thing as a world as it ought to be; he would fain find a road to\nit. (Indian criticism: even the ego is apparent and _not_ real.)\n\nWhence does man derive the concept of _reality_? --Why does he make\nvariability, deception, contradiction, the origin of _suffering;_ why\nnot rather of his happiness? ...\n\nThe contempt and hatred of all that perishes, changes, and varies:\nwhence comes this valuation of stability? Obviously, the will to truth\nis _merely_ the longing for a _stable world._\n\nThe senses deceive; reason corrects the errors: _therefore,_ it was\nconcluded, reason is the road to a static state; the most _spiritual_\nideas must be nearest to the \"real world.\"--It is from the senses that\nthe greatest number of misfortunes come they are cheats, deluders, and\ndestroyers.\n\nHappiness can be promised only by Being: change and happiness exclude\neach other. The loftiest desire is thus to be one with Being. That is\nthe formula for the way to happiness.\n\n_In summa:_ The world as it _ought_ to be exists; this world in which\nwe live is an error--this our world should _not_ exist.\n\n_The belief in Being_ shows itself only as a result: the real primum\n_mobile_ is the disbelief in Becoming, the mistrust of Becoming, the\nscorn of all Becoming....\n\nWhat kind of a man reflects in this way? An unfruitful, _suffering_\nkind, a world-weary kind. If we try and fancy what the opposite kind\nof man would be like, we have a picture of a creature who would not\nrequire the belief in Being; he would rather despise it as dead,\ntedious, and indifferent....\n\nThe belief that the world which ought to be, is, really exists, is a\nbelief proper to the unfruitful, _who do not wish to create a world as\nit should be._ They take it for granted, they seek for means and ways\nof attaining to it. \"The will to truth\"--_is the impotence of the will\nto create._\n\nTo recognise that something      } Antagonism in\nis _thus_ or _thus:_             } the degrees of\nTo act so that something will    }   energy in\nbe _thus_ or _thus:_             } various natures.\n\n\nThe fiction of a world which corresponds to our desires; psychological\nartifices and interpretations calculated to associate all that we\nhonour and regard as pleasant, with this _real world._\n\n\"The will to truth\" at this stage is essentially _the art of\ninterpretation:_ to which also belongs that interpretation which still\npossesses strength.\n\nThe same species of men, grown one degree poorer, _no longer possessed\nof the power_ to interpret and to create fictions, produces the\nNihi_lists._ A Nihilist is the man who says of the world as it is,\nthat it ought _not_ to exist, and of the world as it ought to be, that\nit does not exist. According to this, existence (action, suffering,\nwilling, and feeling) has no sense: the pathos of the \"in vain\" is the\nNihilist's pathos--and as pathos it is moreover an _inconsistency_ on\nthe part of the Nihilist.\n\nHe who is not able to introduce his will into things, the man without\neither will or energy, at least invests them with some meaning, _i.e._\nhe believes that a will is already in them.\n\nThe degree of a man's _will-power_ may be measured from the extent to\nwhich he can dispense with the meaning in things, from the extent to\nwhich he is able to endure a world without meaning: _because he himself\narranges a small portion of it._\n\nThe _philosophical objective view of things_ may thus be a sign of\npoverty both of will and of energy. For energy organises what is\nclosest and next; the \"scientists,\" whose only desire is to _ascertain_\nwhat exists, are such as cannot arrange things _as they ought to be._\n\nThe _artists,_ an intermediary species, they at least set up a symbol\nof what should exist,--they are productive inasmuch as they actually\n_alter_ and transform; not like the scientists, who leave everything as\nit is.\n\n_The connection between philosophers and the pessimistic religions;_\nthe same species of man (_they attribute the highest degree of\nreality_ to the _things which are valued highest_).\n\n_The connection between philosophers and moral men_ and their\nevaluations (the _moral_ interpretation of the world as the sense of\nthe world: after the collapse of the religious sense).\n\n_The overcoming of philosophers_ by the annihilation of the world of\nbeing: intermediary period of Nihilism; before there is sufficient\nstrength present to transvalue values, and to make the world of\nbecoming, and of appearance, the _only_ world to be deified and called\ngood.\n\n_B._\n\nNihilism as a normal phenomenon may be a symptom of increasing\n_strength_ or of increasing _weakness_:--\n\nPartly owing to the fact that the strength _to create_ and _to will_\nhas grown to such an extent, that it no longer requires this collective\ninterpretation and introduction of a _sense_ (\"present duties,\" state,\netc.);\n\nPartly owing to the fact that even the creative power necessary\nto invent sense, declines, and disappointment becomes the ruling\ncondition. The inability to _believe_ in a sense becomes \"unbelief.\"\n\nWhat is the meaning of _science_ in regard to both possibilities?\n\n(1) It is a sign of strength and self-control; it shows an _ability_ to\ndispense with healing, consoling worlds of illusion.\n\n(2) It is also able to undermine, to dissect, to disappoint, and to\nweaken.\n\n\n_C._\n\n_The belief in truth,_ the need of holding to something which is\nbelieved to be true: psychological reduction apart from the valuations\nthat have existed hitherto. Fear and laziness.\n\nAt the same time _unbelief:_ Reduction. In what way does it acquire a\n_new value,_ if a real world does not exist at all (by this means the\ncapacity of valuing, which hitherto has been _lavished_ upon the world\nof being, becomes free once more).\n\n\n586.\n\nThe _real_ and the _ \"apparent\" world._\n\n_A._\n\nThe _erroneous concepts_ which proceed from this concept are of three\nkinds:--\n\n_(a)_ An unknown world:--we are adventurers, we are inquisitive,--that\nwhich is known to us makes us weary (the danger of the concept lies in\nthe fact it suggests that \"this\" world is known to us....);\n\n_(b) Another_ world, where things are different:--something in us draws\ncomparisons, and thereby our calm submission and our silence lose their\nvalue--perhaps all will be for the best, we have not hoped in vain....\nThe world where things are different--who knows?--where we ourselves\nwill be different....\n\n_(c)_ A _real_ world:--that is the most singular blow and attack\nwhich we have ever received; so many things have become encrusted in\nthe word \"true,\" that we involuntarily give these to the \"real world\";\nthe _real_ world must also be a _truthful_ world, such a one as would\nnot deceive us or make fools of us; to believe in it in this way is to\nbe almost _forced_ to believe (from convention, as is the case among\npeople worthy of confidence).\n\n***\n\nThe concept, \"the _unknown_ world,\" suggests that this world is known\nto us (is tedious);\n\nThe concept, \"the other world,\" suggests that this world _might be\ndifferent,_ it suppresses necessity and fate (it is useless to _submit_\nand to _adapt one's self_);\n\nThe concept, _the true world,_ suggests that this world is\nuntruthful, deceitful, dishonest, not genuine, and not essential,\nand _consequently_ not a world calculated to be useful to us (it is\nunadvisable to become adapted to it; _better_ resist it).\n\n***\n\nThus we _escape_ from \"this\" world in three different ways:----\n\n_(a)_ With our _curiosity_--as though the interesting part was\nsomewhere else;\n\n_(b)_ With our _submission_--as though it was not necessary to submit,\nas though this world was not an ultimate necessity;\n\n_(c)_ With our _sympathy_ and respect--as though this world did not\ndeserve them, as though it was mean and dishonest towards us....\n\n_In summa_: we have become revolutionaries in three different ways; we\nhave made _x_ our criticism of the \"known world.\"\n\n_B._\n\n_The first step to reason:_ to understand to what extent we have been\n_seduced,_--for it might be _precisely_ the reverse:\n\n_(a)_ The _unknown_ world could be so constituted as to give us a\nliking for \"this\" world--it may be a more stupid and meaner form of\nexistence.\n\n_(b)_ The other world, very far from taking account of our desires\nwhich were never realised here, might be part of the mass of things\nwhich _this_ world makes possible for us; to learn to know this world\nwould be a means of satisfying us,\n\n_(c)_ The _true_ world: but who actually says that the apparent world\nmust be of less value than the true world? Do not our instincts\ncontradict this judgment? Is not man eternally occupied in creating an\nimaginative world, because he will have a better world than reality?\n_In the first place,_ how do we know that _our_ world is _not_ the\ntrue world? ... for it might be that the other world is the world of\n\"appearance\" (as a matter of fact, the Greeks, for instance, actually\nimagined a _region of shadows, a life of appearance,_ beside _real_\nexistence). And finally, what right have we to establish _degrees of\nreality,_ as it were? That is something different from an unknown\nworld--that is already the _will to know something of the unknown._ The\n\"other,\" the \"unknown\" world--good! but to speak of the \"true world\" is\nas good as \"_knowing_ something about it,\"--that is the _contrary_ of\nthe assumption of an _x_-world....\n\nIn short, the world _x_ might be in every way a more tedious, a more\ninhuman, and a less dignified world than this one.\n\nIt would be quite another matter if it were assumed that there were\nseveral _x_-worlds--that is to say, every possible kind of world\nbesides our own. But this has _never been assumed...._\n\n_C._\n\nProblem: why has the _image of the other world_ always been to the\ndisadvantage of \"this\" one--that is to say, always stood as a criticism\nof it; what does this point to?--\n\nA people that are proud of themselves, and who are on the ascending\npath of Life, always; picture _another_ existence as lower and less\nvaluable than theirs; they regard the strange unknown world as their\nenemy, as their opposite; they feel no curiosity, but rather repugnance\nin regard to what is strange to them.... Such a body of men would never\nadmit that another people were the \"true people\"....\n\nThe very fact that such a distinction is possible,--that this world\nshould be called the world of appearance, and that the other should be\ncalled the true world,--is symptomatic.\n\nThe places of origin of the idea, of \"another world\":\n\n    The philosopher who invents a rational world where _reason_\n    and logical functions are adequate:--this is the root of\n    the \"true\" world.\n\n    The religious man who invents a \"divine world\";--this is the\n    root of the \"denaturalised\" and the \"anti-natural\" world.\n\n    The moral man who invents a \"free world\":--this is the root\n    of the good, the perfect, the just, and the holy world.\n\nThe _common factor_ in the three places of origin: _psychological_\nerror, physiological confusion.\n\nWith what attributes is the \"other world,\" as it actually appears in\nhistory, characterised? With the stigmata of philosophical, religious,\nand moral prejudices.\n\nThe \"other world\" as it appears in the light of these facts, is\n_synonymous_ with _not-Being,_ with not-living, with the _will_ not to\nlive....\n\n_General aspect:_ it was the instinct of the _fatigue of living,_ and\nnot that of life, which created the \"other world.\"\n\n_Result:_ philosophy, religion, and morality are _symptoms of\ndecadence._\n\n\n\n_(l)_ The Biological Value of Knowledge.\n\n\n587.\n\nIt might seem as though I had evaded the question concerning\n\"certainty\". The reverse is true: but while raising the question of the\ncriterion of certainty, I wished to discover the weights and measures\nwith which men had weighed heretofore--and to show that the question\nconcerning certainty is already in itself a _dependent_ question, a\nquestion of the second rank.\n\n\n588.\n\nThe question of values is more _fundamental_ than the question of\ncertainty: the latter only becomes serious once the question of values\nhas been answered.\n\nBeing and appearance, regarded psychologically, yield no \"Being in\nitself,\" no criterion for reality, but only degrees of appearance,\nmeasured according to the strength of the sympathy which we feel for\nappearance.\n\nThere is no struggle for existence between ideas and observations,\nbut only a struggle for supremacy--the vanquished idea is _not\nannihilated,_ but only _driven to the background_ or _subordinated.\nThere is no such thing as annihilation in intellectual spheres._\n\n\n589.\n\n    \"End and means\"\n    \"Cause and effect\"\n    \"Subject and object\"\n    \"Action and suffering\"\n    \"Thing-in-itself and\n    appearance\"\n\nAs interpretations (_not_ as established facts)--and in what respect\nwere they perhaps necessary interpretations? (as \"preservative\nmeasures\")--all in the sense of a Will to Power.\n\n\n590.\n\nOur values are _interpreted into the heart_ of things.\n\nIs there, then, any _sense_ in the absolute?\n\nIs not sense necessarily _relative-sense_ and perspective?\n\nAll sense is Will to Power (all relative senses may be identified with\nit).\n\n\n591.\n\nThe desire for \"established facts\"--Epistemology: how much pessimism\nthere is in it!\n\n\n592.\n\nThe antagonism between the \"true world,\" as pessimism depicts it, and\na world in which it were possible to live--for this the rights of\n_truth_ must be tested. It is necessary to measure all these \"ideal\nforces\" according to the standard of life, in order to understand the\nnature of that antagonism: the struggle of sickly, desperate life,\ncleaving to a beyond, against healthier, more foolish, more false,\nricher, and fresher life. Thus it is not \"truth\" struggling with Life,\nbut _one_ kind of Life with another kind.--But the former would fain\nbe the _higher_ kind!--Here we must prove that some order of rank is\nnecessary,--that the first problem is _the order of rank among kinds of\nLife._\n\n\n593.\n\nThe belief, \"It is _thus_ and _thus,_\" must be altered into the will,\n\"Thus and thus _shall it be._\"\n\n\n\n\n_(m)_ Science.\n\n\n594.\n\nScience hitherto has been a means of disposing of the confusion of\nthings by hypotheses which \"explain everything\"--that is to say, it\nhas been the result of the intellect's repugnance to chaos. This\nsame repugnance takes hold of me when I contemplate _myself;_ I\nshould like to form some kind of representation of my inner world\nfor myself by means of a _scheme,_ and thus overcome intellectual\nconfusion. Morality was a simplification of this sort: it taught man as\n_recognised,_ as _known,_--Now we have annihilated morality--we have\nonce more grown _completely obscure_ to ourselves! I know that I know\nnothing _about myself. Physics_ shows itself to be a _boon_ for the\nmind: science (as the road to _knowledge_) acquires a new charm after\nmorality has been laid aside--and _owing to the fact_ that we find\nconsistency here alone, we must _order_ our lives in accordance with\nit so that it may help us to _preserve it. _ This results in a sort of\n_practical meditation_ concerning the _conditions of our existence_ as\ninvestigators.\n\n\n595.\n\nOur first principles: no God: no purpose: limited energy. We will take\ngood care to _avoid_ thinking out and prescribing the necessary lines\nof thought for the lower orders.\n\n\n596.\n\nNo \"_moral_ education\" of humanity: but the _disciplinary school of\nscientific errors_ is necessary, because truth disgusts and creates a\ndislike of life, provided a man is not already irrevocably launched\nupon his _way,_ and bears the consequences of his honest standpoint\nwith tragic pride.\n\n\n597.\n\nThe first principle of _scientific work:_ faith in the union and\ncontinuance of scientific work, so that the individual may undertake to\nwork at any point, however small, and feel sure that his efforts _will\nnot be in vain._\n\nThere is a great paralysing force: to work _in vain,_ to struggle _in\nvain._\n\n***\n\nThe periods of _hoarding,_ when energy and power are stored, to be\nutilised later by subsequent periods: _Science_ as a _half-way house,_\nat which the mediocre, more multifarious, and more complicated beings\nfind their most natural gratification and means of expression: all\nthose who do well to avoid _action._\n\n\n598.\n\nA. philosopher recuperates his strength in a way quite his own, and\nwith other means: he does it, for instance, with Nihilism. The belief\n_that there is no such thing as truth,_ the Nihilistic belief, is a\ntremendous relaxation for one who, as a warrior of knowledge, is\nunremittingly struggling with a host of hateful truths. For truth is\nugly.\n\n\n599.\n\nThe \"purposelessness of all phenomena\": the belief in this is the\nresult of the view that all interpretations hitherto have been false,\nit is a generalisation on the part of discouragement and weakness--it\nis not a necessary belief.\n\nThe arrogance of man: when he sees no purpose, he _denies_ that there\ncan be one!\n\n\n600.\n\nThe unlimited ways of interpreting the world: every interpretation is a\nsymptom of growth or decline.\n\nUnity (monism) is a need of inertia; Plurality in interpretation is a\nsign of strength. One should not _desire to deprive_ the world of its\ndisquieting and enigmatical nature.\n\n\n601.\n\nAgainst the desire for reconciliation and peaceableness. To this also\nbelongs every attempt on the part of monism.\n\n\n602.\n\nThis relative world, this world for the eye, the touch, and the\near, is very false, even when adjusted to a much more sensitive\nsensual apparatus. But its comprehensibility, its clearness, its\npracticability, its beauty, will begin to _near their end_ if we\n_refine_ our senses, just as beauty ceases to exist when the processes\nof its history are reflected upon: the arrangement of the _end_ is in\nitself an illusion. Let it suffice, that the more coarsely and more\nsuperficially it is understood, the _more valuable,_ the more definite,\nthe more beautiful and important the world then seems. The more\ndeeply one looks into it, the further our valuation retreats from our\nview,-_senselessness approaches!_ We have created the world that has\nany value! Knowing this, we also perceive that the veneration of truth\nis already the _result of illusion_--and that it is much more necessary\nto esteem the formative, simplifying, moulding, and romancing power.\n\n\"All is false--everything is allowed!\"\n\nOnly as the result of a certain bluntness of vision and the desire for\nsimplicity does the beautiful and the \"valuable\" make its appearance:\nin itself it is purely fanciful.\n\n\n603.\n\nWe know that the destruction of an illusion does not necessarily\nproduce a truth, but only one more piece of _ignorance;_ it is the\nextension of our \"empty space,\" an increase in our \"waste.\"\n\n\n604.\n\nOf what alone can _knowledge_ consist?--\"Interpretation,\" the\nintroduction of a sense into things, _not_ \"explanation\" (in the\nmajority of cases a new interpretation of an old interpretation which\nhas grown incomprehensible and little more than a mere sign). There\nis no such thing as an established fact, everything fluctuates,\neverything, is intangible, yielding; after all, the most lasting of all\nthings are our opinions.\n\n\n605.\n\nThe ascertaining of \"truth\" and \"untruth,\" the ascertaining of facts\nin general, is fundamentally different from the creative _placing,_\nforming, moulding, subduing, and _willing_ which lies at the root of\n_philosophy. To give a sense to things_--this duty always remains\n_over,_ provided _no sense already lies in them._ The same holds good\nof sounds, and also of the fate of nations they are susceptible of the\nmost varied interpretations and turns, _for different purposes._\n\nA higher duty is to _fix a goal_ and to mould facts according to\nit: _that is,_ the _interpretation of action,_ and not merely a\n_transvaluation_ of concepts.\n\n\n606.\n\nMan ultimately finds nothing more in things than he himself has laid\nin them--this process of finding again is science, the actual process\nof laying a meaning in things, is art, religion, love, pride. In both,\neven if they are child's play, one should show good courage and one\nshould plough ahead; on the one hand, to find again, on the other,--we\nare the other,--to lay a sense in things.\n\n\n607.\n\n_Science_: its two sides:--\n\n    In regard to the individual;\n\n    In regard to the complex of culture (\"levels of culture\")\n\n--antagonistic valuation in regard to this and that side.\n\n\n608.\n\nThe development of science tends ever more to transform the known into\nthe unknown: its aim, however, is to do the _reverse,_ and it starts\nout with the instinct of tracing the unknown to the known.\n\nIn short, science is laying the road to _sovereign ignorance,_ to a\nfeeling that \"knowledge\" does not exist at all, that it was merely a\nform of haughtiness to dream of such a thing; further, that we have not\npreserved the smallest notion which would allow us to class knowledge\neven as a _possibility_ that \"knowledge\" is a contradictory idea. We\n_transfer_ a primeval myth and piece of human vanity into the land\nof hard facts: we can _allow_ a thing-in-itself as a concept, just\nas little as we can _allow_ \"knowledge-in-itself.\" The _misleading_\ninfluence of \"numbers and logic,\" the misleading influence of \"laws.\"\n\n_Wisdom_ is an attempt to _overcome_ the perspective valuations (_i.e._\nthe \"will to power\"): it is a principle which is both unfriendly to\nLife, and also decadent; a symptom in the case of the Indians, etc.;\n_weakness_ of the power of appropriation.\n\n\n609.\n\nIt does not suffice for you to see in what ignorance man and beast now\nlive; you must also have and learn the _desire_ for _ignorance._ It\nis necessary that you should know that without this form of ignorance\nlife itself would be impossible, that it is merely a vital condition\nunder which, alone, a living organism can preserve itself and prosper:\na great solid belt of ignorance must stand about you.\n\n\n610.\n\nScience--the transformation of Nature into concepts for the purpose of\ngoverning Nature--that is part of the rubric _means._\n\nBut the _purpose_ and _will_ of mankind must grow in the same way, the\nintention in regard to the whole.\n\n\n611.\n\n_Thought_ is the strongest and most persistently exercised function in\nall stages of life--and also in every act of perception or apparent\nexperience! Obviously it soon becomes the _mightiest_ and _most\nexacting_ of all functions, and in time tyrannises over other powers.\nUltimately it becomes \"passion in itself.\"\n\n\n612.\n\nThe right to great passion must be reclaimed for the investigator,\nafter self-effacement and the cult of \"objectivity\" have created a\nfalse order of rank in this sphere. Error reached its zenith when\nSchopenhauer taught: _in the release from passion and_ in will alone\nlay the road to \"truth,\" to knowledge; the intellect freed from will\n_could not help_ seeing the true and actual essence of things. The same\nerror in art: as if everything became _beautiful_ the moment it was\nregarded without will.\n\n\n613.\n\nThe contest for supremacy among the passions, and the dominion of one\nof the passions over the intellect.\n\n\n614.\n\nTo \"humanise\" the world means to feel ourselves ever more and more\nmasters upon earth.\n\n\n615.\n\nKnowledge, among a higher class of beings, will also take new forms\nwhich are not yet necessary.\n\n\n616.\n\nThat the _worth of the world_ lies in our interpretations (that perhaps\nyet other interpretations are possible somewhere, besides mankind's);\nthat the interpretations made hitherto were perspective valuations,\nby means of which we were able to survive in life, _i.e._ in the\nWill to Power and in the growth of power; that every _elevation of\nman_ involves the overcoming of narrower interpretations; that every\nhigher degree of strength or power attained, brings new views in its\ntrain, and teaches a belief in new horizons--these doctrines lie\nscattered through all my works. The world that _concerns us at all_ is\nfalse--that is to say, is not a fact; but a romance, a piece of human\nsculpture, made from a meagre sum of observation; it is \"in flux\"; it\nis something that evolves, a great revolving lie continually moving\nonwards and never getting any nearer to truth--for there is no such\nthing as \"truth.\"\n\n\n617.\n\n_Recapitulation_:--\n\nTo _stamp_ Becoming with the character of Being--this is the highest\n_Will to Power._\n\n_The twofold falsification,_ by the senses on the one hand, by the\nintellect on the other, with the view of maintaining a world of being,\nof rest, of equivalent cases, etc.\n\nThat _everything recurs,_ is the very nearest _approach of a world of\nBecoming to a world of Being, the height of contemplation._\n\nIt is out of the values which have been attributed to Being, that the\ncondemnation of, and dissatisfaction with, Becoming, have sprung: once\nsuch a world of Being had been invented.\n\nThe metamorphoses of Being (body, God, ideas, natural laws, formul\u00e6,\netc.).\n\n\"Being\" as appearance the twisting round of values: appearance was that\nwhich _conferred the values._\n\nKnowledge in itself in a world of Becoming is impossible; how can\nknowledge be possible at all, then? Only as a mistaking of one's self,\nas will to power, as will to deception.\n\nBecoming is inventing, willing, self-denying, self-overcoming; no\nsubject but an action, it places things, it is creative, no \"causes and\neffects.\"\n\nArt is the will to overcome Becoming, it is a process of eternalising,\nbut short-sighted, always according to the perspective, repeating, as\nit were in a small way, the tendency of the whole.\n\nThat which _all life_ shows, is to be regarded as a reduced formula for\nthe collective tendency: hence the new definition of the concept \"Life\"\nas \"will to power.\"\n\nInstead of \"cause and effect,\" the struggle of evolving factors with\none another, frequently with the result that the opponent is absorbed;\nno constant number for Becoming.\n\nThe uselessness of old ideals for the interpretation of all that takes\nplace, once their bestial origin and utility have been recognised, they\nare, moreover, all hostile to life.\n\nThe uselessness of the mechanical theory--it gives the impression that\nthere _can be no purpose._\n\nAll the _idealism_ of mankind, hitherto, is on the point of\nturning into _Nihilism_--may be shown to be a belief in absolute\n_worth_lessness, _i.e. purpose_lessness.\n\nThe annihilation of ideals, the new desert waste the new arts which\nwill help us to endure it--_amphibia_ that we are!\n\n_First principles,_ bravery, patience, no \"stepping-back,\" not too much\nardour to get to the fore. (_N.B._--Zarathustra constantly maintaining\nan attitude of parody towards all former values, as the result of his\noverflowing energy.)\n\n\n\n\nII.\n\n\nTHE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.\n\n\n1. The Mechanical Interpretation of the World.\n\n\n618.\n\nOf all the interpretations of the world attempted heretofore, the\n_mechanical_ one seems to-day to stand most prominently in the front.\nApparently it has a clean conscience on its side; for no science\nbelieves inwardly in progress and success unless it be with the help\nof mechanical procedures. Every one knows these procedures: \"reason\"\nand \"purpose\" are allowed to remain out of consideration as far as\npossible; it is shown that, provided a sufficient amount of time be\nallowed to elapse, everything can evolve out of everything else, and no\none attempts to suppress his malicious satisfaction, when the \"apparent\ndesign in the fate\" of a plant or of the yolk of an egg, may be traced\nto stress and thrust in short, people are heartily glad to pay respect\nto this principle of profoundest stupidity, if I may be allowed to pass\na playful remark concerning these serious matters. Meanwhile, among the\nmost select intellects to be found in this movement, some presentiment\nof evil, some anxiety is noticeable, as if the theory had a rent in it,\nwhich sooner or later might be its last: I mean the sort of rent which\ndenotes the end of all balloons inflated with such theories.\n\nStress and thrust themselves cannot be \"explained,\" one cannot get rid\nof the _actio in distans._ The belief even in the ability to explain is\nnow lost, and people peevishly admit that one can only describe, not\nexplain that the dynamic interpretation of the world, with its denial\nof \"empty space\" and its little agglomerations of atoms, will soon get\nthe better of physicists: although in this way _Dynamis_ is certainly\ngranted an inner quality.\n\n\n619.\n\nThe triumphant concept \"_energy_\" with which our physicists created\nGod and the world, needs yet to be completed: it must be given an\ninner will which I characterise as the \"_Will to Power_\"--that is to\nsay, as an insatiable desire to manifest power; or the application and\nexercise of power as a creative instinct, etc. Physicists cannot get\nrid of the \"_actio in distans_\" in their principles; any more than they\ncan a repelling force (or an attracting one). There is no help for it,\nall movements, all \"appearances,\" all \"laws\" must be understood as\n_symptoms_ of an _inner_ phenomenon, and the analogy of man must be\nused for this purpose. It is possible to trace all the instincts of an\nanimal to the will to power; as also all the functions of organic life\nto this one source.\n\n\n620.\n\nHas anybody ever been able to testify to a _force!_ No, but to\n_effects,_ translated into a completely strange language. Regularity in\nsequence has so spoilt us, _that we no longer wonder at the wonderful\nprocess._\n\n\n621.\n\nA force of which we cannot form any idea, is an empty word, and ought\nto have no civic rights in the city of science: and the same applies to\nthe purely mechanical powers of attracting and repelling by means of\nwhich we can form an image of the world--no more!\n\n\n622.\n\n_Squeezes and kicks_ are something incalculably recent, evolved and\nnot primeval. They presuppose something which holds together and _can_\npress and strike! But how could it hold together?\n\n\n623.\n\nThere is nothing _unalterable_ in chemistry: this is only appearance,\na mere school prejudice. We it was who _introduced_ the unalterable,\ntaking it from metaphysics as usual, Mr. Chemist. It is a mere\nsuperficial judgment to declare that the diamond, graphite, and carbon\nare identical. Why? Simply because no loss of substance can be traced\nin the scales! Well then, at least they have something in common; but\nthe work of the molecules in the process of changing from one form to\nthe other, an action we can neither see nor weigh, is just exactly what\nmakes one material something different--with specifically different\nqualities.\n\n\n624.\n\n_Against_ the physical _atom._--In order to understand the world, we\nmust be able to reckon it up; in order to be able to reckon it up, we\nmust be aware of constant causes; but since we find no such constant\ncauses in reality, we _invent_ them for ourselves and call them atoms.\nThis is the origin of the atomic theory.\n\nThe possibility of calculating the world, the possibility of expressing\nall phenomena by means of formul\u00e6--is that really \"understanding\"? What\nwould be understood of a piece of music, if all that were calculable in\nit and capable of being expressed in formulas, were reckoned up?--Thus\n\"constant causes\", things, substances, something \"unconditioned,\" were\ntherefore _invented_;--what has been attained thereby?\n\n\n625.\n\nThe mechanical concept of \"movement\" is already a translation of the\noriginal process into the _language of symbols of the eye and the\ntouch._\n\nThe concept _atom,_ the distinction between the \"seat of a motive force\nand the force itself,\" is a _language of symbols derived from our\nlogical and physical world._\n\nIt does not lie within our power to alter our means of expression:\nit is possible to understand to what extend they are but symptomatic.\nTo demand an _adequate means of expression is nonsense_: it lies at\nthe heart of a language, of a medium of communication, to express\n_relation_ only.... The concept \"truth\" is _opposed to good sense._\nThe whole province of truth--_falseness_ only applies to the relations\nbetween beings, not to an \"absolute.\" There is no such thing as a\n\"being in itself\" (_relations_ in the first place constitute being),\nany more than there can be \"knowledge in itself.\"\n\n\n626.\n\n\"_The feeling of force_ cannot proceed from movement: feeling in\ngeneral cannot proceed from movement.\"\n\n\"Even in support of this, an apparent experience is the only evidence:\nin a substance (brain) feeling is generated through transmitted motion\n(stimuli). But generated? Would this show that the feeling did _not_\nyet exist there _at all_? so that its appearance would _have_ to\nbe regarded as the _creative act_ of the intermediary--motion? The\nfeelingless condition of this substance is only an hypothesis! not an\nexperience! Feeling, therefore is the _quality_ of the substance: there\nactually are substances that feel.\"\n\n\"Do we learn from certain substances that they have _no_ feeling? No,\nwe merely cannot tell that they have any. It is impossible to seek the\norigin of feeling in non-sensitive substance.\"--_Oh what hastiness!_\n\n\n627.\n\n\"To attract\" and \"to repel\", in a purely mechanical sense, is pure\nfiction: a word. We cannot imagine an attraction without a _purpose.--_\nEither the will to possess one's self of a thing, or the will to defend\none's self from a thing or to repel it--_that_ we \"understand\"; that\nwould be an interpretation which we could use.\n\nIn short, the psychological necessity of believing in causality lies in\nthe _impossibility of imagining a process without a purpose_: but of\ncourse this says nothing concerning truth or untruth (the justification\nof such a belief)! The belief in _caus\u00e6_ collapses with the belief in\n\u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9 (against Spinoza and his causationism).\n\n\n628.\n\nIt is an illusion to suppose that something is _known,_ when all\nwe have is a mathematical formula of what has happened; it is only\n_characterised, described;_ no more!\n\n\n629.\n\nIf I bring a regularly recurring phenomenon into a formula, I have\nfacilitated and shortened my task of characterising the whole\nphenomenon, etc. But I have not thereby ascertained a \"law,\" I have\nonly replied to the question: How is it that something recurs here? It\nis a supposition that the formula corresponds to a complex of really\nunknown forces and the discharge of forces; it is pure mythology to\nsuppose that forces here obey a law, so that, as the result of their\nobedience, we have the same phenomenon every time.\n\n\n630.\n\nI take good care not to speak of chemical \"_laws_\": to do so savours of\nmorality. It is much more a question of establishing certain relations\nof power: the stronger becomes master of the weaker, in so far as the\nlatter cannot maintain its degree of independence,--here there is no\npity, no quarter, and, still less, any observance of \"law.\"\n\n\n631.\n\nThe unalterable sequence of certain phenomena does not prove any \"law,\"\nbut a relation of power between two or more forces. To say, \"But it\nis precisely this relation that remains the same!\" is no better than\nsaying, \"One and the same force cannot be another force.\"--It is not a\nmatter of _sequence,_ but a matter of _interdependence,_ a process in\nwhich the procession of moments do _not_ determine each other after the\nmanner of cause and effect....\n\nThe separation of the \"action\" from the \"agent\"; of the phenomenon from\nthe _worker_ of that phenomenon: of the process from one that is not\nprocess, but lasting, _substance,_ thing, body, soul, etc.; the attempt\nto understand a life as a sort of shifting of things and a changing of\nplaces; of a sort of \"being\" or stable entity: this ancient mythology\nestablished the belief in \"cause and effect,\" once it had found a\nlasting form in the functions of speech and grammar.\n\n\n632.\n\nThe \"regularity\" of a sequence is only a metaphorical expression, not\na fact, just _as if_ a rule were followed here! And the same holds\ngood of \"conformity to law.\" We find a formula in order to express an\never-recurring kind of succession of phenomena: but that does not show\nthat we have _discovered a law_; much less a force which is the cause\nof a recurrence of effects. The fact that something always happens\nthus or thus, is interpreted here as if a creature always acted thus\nor thus as the result of obedience to a law or to a lawgiver: whereas\napart from the \"law\" it would be free to act differently. But precisely\nthat inability to act otherwise might originate in the creature itself,\nit might be that it did not act thus or thus in response to a law,\nbut simply because it was so constituted. It would mean simply: that\nsomething cannot also be something else; that it cannot be first this,\nand then something quite different; that it is neither free nor the\nreverse, but merely thus or thus. _The fault lies in thinking a subject\ninto things._\n\n\n633.\n\nTo speak of two consecutive states, the first as \"cause,\" and the\nsecond as \"effect,\" is false. The first state cannot bring about\nanything, the second has nothing effected in it.\n\nIt is a question of a struggle between two elements unequal in power:\na new adjustment is arrived at, according to the measure of power each\npossesses. The second state is something fundamentally different from\nthe first (it is not its effect): the essential thing Is, that the\nfactors which engage in the struggle leave it with different quanta of\npower.\n\n\n634.\n\n_A. criticism of Materialism._--Let us dismiss the two popular\nconcepts, Necessity and Law, from this idea: the first introduces a\nfalse constraint, the second a false liberty into the world. \"Things\"\ndo not act regularly, they follow no _rule:_ there are no things (that\nis our fiction); neither do they act in accordance with any necessity.\nThere is no obedience here: for, the fact that _something is_ as it is,\nstrong or weak, is not the result of obedience or of a rule or of a\nconstraint....\n\nThe degree of resistance and the degree of superior power--this is the\nquestion around which all phenomena turn: if we, for our own purposes\nand calculations, know how to express this in formulas and \"laws,\" all\nthe better for us! But that does not mean that we have introduced any\n\"morality\" into the world, just because we have fancied it as obedient.\n\nThere are no laws: every power draws its last consequence at every\nmoment. Things are calculable precisely owing to the fact that there is\nno possibility of their being otherwise than they are.\n\nA quantum of power is characterised by the effect it produces\nand the influence it resists. The adiaphoric state which would be\nthinkable in itself, is entirely lacking. It is essentially a will to\nviolence and a will to defend one's self against violence. It is not\nself-preservation: every atom exercises its influence over the whole of\nexistence--it is thought out of existence if one thinks this radiation\nof will-power away. That is why I call it a quantum of \"_Will to\nPower_\"; with this formula one can express the character which cannot\nbe abstracted in thought from mechanical order, without suppressing the\nlatter itself in thought.\n\nThe translation of the world of effect into a _visible_ world--a world\nfor the eye--is the concept \"movement.\" Here it is always understood\nthat _something_ has been moved,--whether it be the fiction of an\natomic globule or even of the abstraction of the latter, the dynamic\natom, something is always imagined that has an effect--that is to say,\nwe have not yet rid ourselves of the habit into which our senses and\nspeech inveigled us. Subject and object, an agent to the action, the\naction and that which does it separated: we must not forget that all\nthis signifies no more than semeiotics and--nothing real. Mechanics as\na teaching of _movement_ is already a translation of phenomena into\nman's language of the senses.\n\n\n635.\n\nWe are in need of \"unities\" in order to be able to reckon: but this is\nno reason for supposing that \"unities\" actually _exist._ We borrowed\nthe concept \"unity\" from our concept \"ego,\"--our very oldest article\nof faith. If we did not believe ourselves to be unities we should never\nhave formed the concept \"thing.\" Now--that is to say, somewhat late in\nthe day, we are overwhelmingly convinced that our conception of the\nconcept \"ego\" is no security whatever for a real entity. In order to\nmaintain the mechanical interpretation of the world theoretically, we\nmust always make the reserve that it is with fictions that we do so:\nthe concept of _movement_ (derived from the language of our senses)\nand the concept of the _atom_ (= entity, derived from our psychical\nexperience) are based upon a _sense-prejudice_ and a _psychological\nprejudice._\n\nMechanics formulates consecutive phenomena, and it does so\nsemeiologically, in the terms of the senses and of the mind (that all\ninfluence is _movement_; that where there is movement something is at\nwork moving): it does not touch the question of the causal force.\n\nThe _mechanical_ world is imagined as the eye and the sense of touch\nalone could imagine a world (as \"moved\"),--in such a way as to be\ncalculable,--as to simulate causal entities \"things\" (atoms) whose\neffect is constant (the transfer of the false concept of subject to the\nconcept atom).\n\nThe mixing together of the concept of numbers, of the concept of thing\n(the idea of subject), of the concept of activity (the separation of\nthat which is the cause, and the effect), of the concept of movement:\nall these things are phenomenal; our eye and our _psychology_ are still\nin it all.\n\nIf we eliminate these adjuncts, nothing remains over but dynamic\nquanta, in a relation of tension to all other dynamic quanta: the\nessence of which resides in their relation to all other quanta, in\ntheir \"influence\" upon the latter. The will to power, not Being, not\nBecoming, but a _pathos_--is the elementary fact, from these first\nresults a Becoming, an influencing....\n\n\n636.\n\nThe physicists believe in a \"true world\" after their own kind; a\nfixed _systematising of atoms_ to perform necessary movements, and\nholding good equally of all creatures, so that, according to them,\nthe \"world of appearance\" reduces itself to the side of general and\ngenerally-needed Being, which is accessible to every one according to\nhis kind (accessible and also adjusted,--made \"subjective\"). But here\nthey are in error. The atom which they postulate is arrived at by the\nlogic of that perspective of consciousness; it is in itself therefore\na subjective fiction. This picture of the world which they project\nis in no way essentially different from the subjective picture: the\nonly difference is, that it is composed simply with more extended\nsenses, but certainly with _our_ senses.... And in the end, without\nknowing it, they left something out of the constellation: precisely\nthe necessary _perspective factor,_ by means of which every centre of\npower--and not man alone--constructs the rest of the world _from its\npoint of view_--that is to say, measures it, feels it, and moulds it\naccording to its degree of strength.... They forgot to reckon with\nthis perspective-fixing power, in \"true being,\"--or, in school-terms,\nsubject-being. They suppose that this was \"evolved\" and added;--but\neven the chemical investigator needs it: it is indeed _specific Being,_\nwhich determines action and reaction according to circumstances.\n\n_Perspectivity is only a complex form, of specificness._ My idea is\nthat every specific body strives to become master of all space, and to\nextend its power (its will to power), and to thrust back everything\nthat resists it. But inasmuch as it is continually meeting the same\nendeavours on the part of other bodies, it concludes by coming to terms\nwith those (by \"combining\" with those) which are sufficiently related\nto it--_and thus they conspire together for power._ And the process\ncontinues.\n\n\n637.\n\nEven in the inorganic world all that concerns an atom of energy is its\nimmediate neighbourhood: distant forces balance each other. Here is\nthe root of _perspectivity,_ and it explains why a living organism is\n\"egoistic\" to the core.\n\n\n638.\n\nGranting that the world disposed of a quantum of force, it is obvious\nthat any transposition of force to any place would affect the whole\nsystem--thus, besides the causality of _sequence,_ there would also be\na dependence, _contiguity,_ and _coincidence._\n\n\n639.\n\nThe only possible way of upholding the sense of the concept \"God\" would\nbe: to make _Him not_ the motive force, but the condition of _maximum\npower,_ an _epoch;_ a point in the further development of the _Will to\nPower;_ by means of which subsequent evolution just as much as former\nevolution--up to Him--could be explained.\n\nViewed mechanically, the energy of collective Becoming remains\nconstant; regarded from the economical standpoint, it ascends\nto its zenith and then recedes therefrom in order to remain\neternally rotatory. This \"_Will to Power_\" expresses itself in the\n_interpretation in the manner in which the strength is used._--The\nconversion of energy into life; \"life in its highest power\"\nthenceforward appears as the goal. The same amount of energy, at\ndifferent stages of development, means different things.\n\nThat which determines growth in Life is the economy which becomes ever\nmore sparing and methodical, which achieves ever more and more with a\nsteadily decreasing amount of energy.... The ideal is the principle of\nthe least possible expense....\n\nThe only thing _that is proved_ is that the world is _not_ striving\ntowards a state of stability. Consequently its zenith must not be\nconceived as a state of absolute equilibrium....\n\nThe dire necessity of the same things happening in the course of the\nworld, as in all other things, is not an eternal determinism reigning\nover all phenomena, but merely the expression of the fact that the\nimpossible is not possible; that a given force cannot be different\nfrom that given force; that a given quantity of resisting force does\nnot manifest itself otherwise than in conformity with its degree of\nstrength;--to speak of events as being necessary is tautological.\n\n\n\n2. The Will to Power as Life.\n\n\n_(a) The Organic Process._\n\n\n640.\n\nMan imagines that he was present at the generation of the organic\nworld: what was there to be observed, with the eyes and the touch,\nin regard to these processes? How much of it can be put into round\nnumbers? What rules are noticeable in the movements? Thus, man would\nfain arrange all phenomena as if they were _for the eye and for the\ntouch,_ as if they were forms of motion: he will discover _formules_\nwherewith to _simplify_ the unwieldy mass of these experiences.\n\n_The reduction of all phenomena_ to the level of men with senses and\nwith mathematics. It is a matter of making _an inventory of human\nexperiences:_ granting that man, or rather the _human eye and the\nability to form concepts,_ have been the eternal witnesses of all\nthings.\n\n\n641.\n\nA plurality of forces bound by a common nutritive process we call\n\"Life.\" To this nutritive process all so-called feeling, thinking,\nand imagining belong as means--that is to say, (1) in the form of\nopposing other forces; (2) in the form of an adjustment of other forces\naccording to mould and rhythm; (3) the form of a valuation relative to\nassimilation and excretion.\n\n\n642.\n\nThe bond between the inorganic and the organic world must lie in the\nrepelling power exercised by every atom of energy. \"Life\" might be\ndefined as a lasting form of _force-establishing processes,_ in which\nthe various contending forces, on their part, grow unequally. To what\nextent does counter-strife exist even in obedience? Individual power is\nby no means surrendered through it. In the same way, there exists in\nthe act of commanding, an acknowledgment of the fact that the absolute\npower of the adversary has not been overcome, absorbed, or dissipated.\n\"Obedience,\" and \"command,\" are forms of the game of war.\n\n\n643.\n\nThe Will to Power _interprets_ (an organ in the process of formation\nhas to be interpreted): it defines, it determines gradations,\ndifferences of power. Mere differences of power could not be aware of\neach other as such: something must be there which _will_ grow, and\nwhich interprets all other things that would do the same, according to\nthe value of the latter. In sooth, all interpretation is but a means\nin itself to become master of something. (Continual _interpretation_ is\nthe first principle of the organic process.)\n\n\n644.\n\nGreater complexity, sharp differentiation, the contiguity of the\ndeveloped organs and functions, with the disappearance of intermediate\nmembers--if _that_ is _perfection,_ then there is a Will to Power\napparent in the organic process by means of whose _dominating,\nshaping,_ and _commanding_ forces it is continually increasing the\nsphere of its power, and persistently simplifying things within that\nsphere, it _grows_ imperatively.\n\n\"Spirit\" is only a means and an instrument in the service of higher\nlife, in the service of the elevation of life.\n\n\n645.\n\n\"_Heredity,_\" as something quite incomprehensible, cannot be used\nas an explanation, but only as a designation for the identification\nof a problem. And the same holds good of \"_adaptability._\" As a\nmatter of fact, the account of morphology, even supposing it were\nperfect, _explains_ nothing, it merely describes an enormous fact.\n_How_ a given organ gets to be used for any particular purpose is not\nexplained. There is just as little explained in regard to these things\nby the assumption of _caus\u00e6 finales_ as by the assumption of _caus\u00e6\nefficientes._ The concept \"causa\" is only a means of expression, no\n_more_; a means of designating a thing.\n\n\n646.\n\nThey are analogies; for instance, our _memory_ may suggest another kind\nof memory which makes itself felt in heredity, development, and forms.\nOur _inventive_ and experimentative powers suggest another kind of\ninventiveness in the application of instruments to new ends, etc.\n\nThat which we call our \"_consciousness_\" is quite guiltless of any\nof the essential processes of our preservation and growth; and no\nhuman brain could be so subtle as to construct anything more than a\nmachine--to which every organic process is infinitely superior.\n\n\n647.\n\n_Against Darwinism._--The use of an organ does _not_ explain its\norigin, on the contrary! During the greater part of the time occupied\nin the formation of a certain quality, this quality does not help to\npreserve the individual; it is of no use to him, and particularly not\nin his struggle with external circumstances and foes.\n\nWhat is ultimately \"useful\"? It is necessary to ask, \"Useful for what\"?\n\nFor instance, that which promotes the _lasting powers_ of the\nindividual might be unfavourable to his strength or his beauty; that\nwhich preserves him might at the same time fix him and keep him stable\nthroughout development. On the other hand, a _deficiency,_ a state of\n_degeneration,_ may be of the greatest possible use, inasmuch as it\nacts as a stimulus to other organs. In the same way, a _state of need_\nmay be a condition of existence, inasmuch as it reduces an individual\nto that modicum of means which, though it _keeps him together,_ does\nnot allow him to squander his strength.--The individual himself is\nthe struggle of parts (for nourishment, space, etc.): his development\ninvolves the _triumph,_ the _predominance,_ of isolated parts; the\n_wasting away,_ or the \"development into organs,\" of other parts.\n\nThe influence of \"environment\" is nonsensically _overrated_ in Darwin,\nthe essential factor in the process of life is precisely the tremendous\ninner power to shape and to create forms, which merely _uses, exploits_\n\"environment.\"\n\nThe new forms built up by this inner power are not produced with a view\nto any end; but, in the struggle between the parts, a new form does not\nexist long _without_ becoming related to some kind of semi-utility,\nand, according to its use, develops itself ever more and more perfectly.\n\n\n648.\n\n\"Utility\" in respect of the acceleration of the speed of evolution, is\na different kind of \"utility\" from that which is understood to mean the\ngreatest possible stability and staying power of the evolved creature.\n\n\n649.\n\n\"Useful\" in the sense of Darwinian biology means: that which favours a\nthing in its struggle with others. But in my opinion the _feeling of\nbeing surcharged,_ the feeling accompanying an _increase in strength,_\nquite apart from the utility of the struggle, is the actual _progress_:\nfrom these feelings the will to war is first derived.\n\n\n650.\n\nPhysiologists should bethink themselves before putting down the\ninstinct of self-preservation as the cardinal instinct of an organic\nbeing. A living thing seeks above all to _discharge_ its strength:\n\"_self-preservation\" _ is only one of the results thereof.--Let us\nbeware of _superfluous_ teleological principles!--one of which is the\nwhole concept of \"self-preservation.\"[4]\n\n[Footnote 4: See _Beyond Good and Evil,_ in this edition, Aph. 13.]\n\n\n651.\n\nThe most-fundamental--and most primeval activity of a protoplasm cannot\nbe ascribed to a will to self-preservation, for it absorbs an amount\nof material which is absurdly out of proportion with the needs of its\npreservation: and what is more, it does _not_ \"preserve itself\" in the\nprocess, but actually falls to _pieces...._ The instinct which rules\nhere, must account for this total absence in the organism of a desire\nto preserve itself: hunger is already an interpretation based upon the\nobservation of a more or less complex organism (hunger is a specialised\nand later form of the instinct; it is an expression of the system of\ndivided labour, in the service of a higher instinct which rules the\nwhole).\n\n\n652.\n\nIt is just as impossible to regard _hunger_ as the _primum mobile,_ as\nit is to take self-preservation to be so. Hunger, considered as the\nresult of insufficient nourishment, means hunger as the result of a\nwill to power _which can no longer dominate_ It is not a question of\nreplacing a loss, it is only later on, as the result of the division of\nlabour, when the Will to Power has discovered other and quite different\nways of gratifying itself, that the appropriating lust of the organism\nis _reduced_ to hunger--to the need of replacing what has been lost.\n\n\n653.\n\nWe can but laugh at the false \"_Altruism_\" of biologists: propagation\namong the am\u0153b\u00e6 appears as a process of jetsam, as an advantage to\nthem. It is an excretion of useless matter.\n\n\n654.\n\nThe division of a protoplasm into two takes place when its power is\nno longer sufficient to subjugate the matter it has appropriated:\nprocreation is the result of impotence.\n\nIn the cases in which the males seek the females and become one with\nthem, procreation is the result of hunger.\n\n\n655.\n\nThe weaker vessel is driven to the stronger from a need of nourishment;\nit desires to get under it, if possible to become _one_ with it. The\nstronger, on the contrary, defends itself from others; it refuses to\nperish in this way; it prefers rather to split itself into two or more\nparts in the process of growing. One may conclude that the greater the\nurgency seems to become one with something else, the more weakness in\nsome form is present. The greater the tendency to variety, difference,\ninner decay, the more strength is actually to hand.\n\nThe instinct to cleave to something, and the instinct to repel\nsomething, are in the inorganic as in the organic world, the uniting\nbond. The whole distinction is a piece of hasty judgment.\n\nThe will to power in every combination of forces, _defending itself\nagainst the stronger and coming down unmercifully upon the weaker, is\nmore correct._\n\nN. B. _All processes may be regarded as \"beings\"._\n\n\n656.\n\nThe will to power can manifest itself only against _obstacles;_ it\ntherefore goes in search of what resists it--this is the primitive\ntendency of the protoplasm when it extends its _pseudopodia_ and feels\nabout it. The act of appropriation and assimilation is, above all, the\nresult of a desire to overpower, a process of forming, of additional\nbuilding and rebuilding, until at last the subjected creature has\nbecome completely a part of the superior creature's sphere of power,\nand has increased the latter.--If this process of incorporation\ndoes not succeed, then the whole organism falls to pieces; and the\n_separation_ occurs as the result of the will to power: in order to\nprevent the escape of that which has been subjected, the will to power\nfalls into two wills (under some circumstances without even abandoning\ncompletely its relation to the two).\n\n\"Hunger\" is only a more narrow adaptation, once the fundamental\ninstinct of power has won power of a more abstract kind.\n\n\n657.\n\nWhat is \"passive\"?\n\n    To be hindered in the outward movement of grasping: it is\n    thus an act of resistance and reaction.\n\nWhat is \"active\"?\n\n    To stretch out for power.\n\n\"Nutrition\"...\n\n    Is only a derived phenomenon; the primitive form of it was\n    the will to stuff everything inside one's own skin.\n\n\"Procreation\"...\n\n    Only derived; originally, in those cases In which one\n    will was unable to organise the collective mass it had\n    appropriated, an _opposing will_ came into power, which\n    undertook to effect the separation and establish a new\n    centre of organisation, after a struggle with the original\n    will.\n\n\"Pleasure\"...\n\n    Is a feeling of power (presupposing the existence of pain).\n\n\n658.\n\n(1) The organic functions shown to be but forms of the fundamental\nwill, the will to power,--and buds thereof.\n\n(2) The will to power specialises itself as will to nutrition, to\nproperty, to _tools,_ to servants (obedience), and to rulers: the body\nas an example.--The stronger will directs the weaker. There is no other\nform of causality than that of will to will. It is not to be explained\nmechanically.\n\n(3) Thinking, feeling, willing, in all living organisms. What is a\ndesire if it be not: a provocation of the feeling of power by an\nobstacle (or, better still, by rhythmical obstacles and resisting\nforces)--so that it surges through it? Thus in all pleasure pain is\nunderstood.--If the pleasure is to be very great, the pains preceding\nit must have been very long, and the whole bow of life must have been\nstrained to the utmost.\n\n(4) Intellectual functions. The will to shaping, forming, and making\nlike, etc.\n\n\n_(b) Man._\n\n\n659.\n\n_With the body as clue._--Granting that the \"_soul_\" was only an\nattractive and mysterious thought, from which philosophers rightly,\nbut reluctantly, separated themselves--that which they have since\nlearnt to put in its place is perhaps even more attractive and even\nmore mysterious. The human _body,_ in which the whole of the most\ndistant and most recent past of all organic life once more becomes\nliving and corporal, seems to flow through, this past and right over\nit like a huge and inaudible torrent; the body is a more wonderful\nthought than the old \"soul.\" In all ages the body, as our actual\nproperty, as our most certain being, in short, as our ego, has been\nmore earnestly believed in than the spirit (or the \"soul,\" or the\nsubject, as the school jargon now calls it). It has never occurred to\nany one to regard his stomach as a strange or a divine stomach; but\nthat there is a tendency and a predilection in man to regard all his\nthoughts as \"inspired,\" all his values as \"imparted to him by a God,\"\nall his instincts as dawning activities--this is proved by the evidence\nof every age in man's history. Even now, especially among artists,\nthere may very often be noticed a sort of wonder, and a deferential\nhesitation to decide, when the question occurs to them, by what means\nthey achieved their happiest work, and from which world the creative\nthought came down to them: when they question in this way, they are\npossessed by a feeling of guilelessness and childish shyness. They dare\nnot say: \"That came from me; it was my hand which threw that die.\"\nConversely, even those philosophers and theologians, who in their logic\nand piety found the most imperative reasons for regarding their body as\na deception (and even as a deception overcome and disposed of), could\nnot help recognising the foolish fact that the body still remained: and\nthe most unexpected proofs of this are to be found partly in Pauline\nand partly in Vedantic philosophy. But what does _strength of faith_\nultimately mean? Nothing!--A strong faith might also be a foolish\nfaith!--There is food for reflection.\n\nAnd supposing the faith in the body were ultimately but the result\nof a conclusion; supposing it were a false conclusion, as idealists\ndeclare it is, would it not then involve some doubt concerning the\ntrustworthiness of the spirit itself which thus causes us to draw wrong\nconclusions?\n\nSupposing the plurality of things, and space, and time, and motion\n(and whatever the other first principles of a belief in the body may\nbe) were errors--what suspicions would not then be roused against the\nspirit which led us to form such first principles? Let it suffice that\nthe belief in the body is, at any rate for the present, a much stronger\nbelief than the belief in the spirit, and he who would fain undermine\nit assails the authority of the spirit most thoroughly in so doing!\n\n\n660.\n\n_The Body as an Empire._\n\nThe aristocracy in the body, the majority of the rulers (the fight\nbetween the cells and the tissues).\n\nSlavery and the division of labour: the higher type alone possible\nthrough the _subjection_ of the lower to a function.\n\nPleasure and pain, not contraries. The feeling of power.\n\n\"Nutrition\" only a result of the insatiable lust of appropriation in\nthe Will to Power.\n\n\"Procreation\": this is the decay which supervenes when the ruling cells\nare too weak to organise appropriated material.\n\nIt is the _moulding_ force which will have a continual supply of new\nmaterial (more \"force\"). The masterly construction of an organism out\nof an egg.\n\n\"The mechanical interpretation\": recognises only quantities: but the\nreal energy is in the quality. Mechanics can therefore only describe\nprocesses; it cannot explain them.\n\n\"Purpose.\" We should start out from the \"sagacity\" of plants.\n\nThe concept of \"meliorism\": _not_ only greater complexity, but greater\n_power_ (it need not be only greater masses).\n\nConclusion concerning the evolution of man: the road to perfection lies\nin the bringing forth of the most powerful individuals, for whose use\nthe great masses would be converted into mere tools (that is to say,\ninto the most intelligent and flexible tools possible).\n\n\n661.\n\nWhy is all _activity,_ even that of a _sense,_ associated with\npleasure? Because, before the activity was possible, an obstacle or\na burden was done away with. Or, rather, because all action is a\nprocess of overcoming, of becoming master of, and of _increasing_ the\n_feeling of power_? The pleasure of thought. Ultimately it is not\nonly the feeling of power, but also the pleasure of creating and of\ncontemplating the _creation:_ for all activity enters our consciousness\nin the form of \"works.\"\n\n\n662.\n\nCreating is an act of selecting and of finishing the thing selected.\n(In every act of the will, this is the essential element.)\n\n\n663.\n\nAll phenomena which are the result of intentions may be reduced to _the\nintention of increasing power._\n\n\n664.\n\nWhen we do anything, we are conscious of a _feeling of strength;_\nwe often have this sensation before the act--that is to say, while\nimagining the thing to do (as, for instance, at the sight of an enemy,\nof an obstacle, which we feel _equal to_): it is always an accompanying\nsensation. Instinctively we think that this feeling of strength is\nthe cause of the action, that it is the \"motive force.\" Our belief in\ncausation is the belief in force and its effect; it is a transcript\nof our experience: in which we identify force and the feeling of\nforce.--Force, however, never moves things; the strength which is\nconscious \"does not set the muscles moving.\" \"Of such a process we have\nno experience, no idea.\" \"We experience as little concerning force as\na motive power, as concerning the _necessity_ of a movement.\" Force is\nsaid to be the constraining element! \"All we know is that one thing\nfollows another;--we know nothing of either compulsion or arbitrariness\nin regard to the one following the other. Causality is first invented\nby thinking compulsion into the sequence of processes. A certain\n\"understanding\" of the thing is the result--that is to say, we humanise\nthe process a little, we make it more \"familiar\"; the familiar is the\nknown habitual fact of _human compulsion associated with the feeling of\nforce._\n\n\n665.\n\nI have the intention of extending my arm; taking it for granted that\nI know as little of the physiology of the human body and of the\nmechanical laws of its movements as the man in the street, what could\nthere be more vague, more bloodless, more uncertain than this intention\ncompared with what follows it? And supposing I were the astutest\nof mechanics, and especially conversant with the formul\u00e6 which are\napplicable in this case, I should not be able to extend my arm one\nwhit the better. Our \"knowledge\" and our \"action\" in this case lie\ncoldly apart: as though in two different regions.--Again: Napoleon\ncarries out a plan of campaign--what does that mean? In this case,\neverything concerning the consummation of the campaign is _known,_\nbecause everything must be done through words of command: but even here\nsubordinates are taken for granted, who apply and adapt the general\nplan to the particular emergency, to the degree of strength, etc.\n\n\n666.\n\nFor ages we have always ascribed the value of an action, of a\ncharacter, of an existence, to the _intention,_ to the _purpose_ for\nwhich it was done, acted, or lived: this primeval idiosyncrasy of taste\nultimately takes a dangerous turn provided the lack of intention and\npurpose in all phenomena comes ever more to the front in consciousness.\nWith it a general depreciation of all values seems to be preparing:\n\"All is without sense.\"--This melancholy phrase means: \"All sense\nlies in the intention, and if the intention is absolutely lacking,\nthen sense must be lacking too.\" In conformity with this valuation,\npeople were forced to place the value of life in a a life after death,\nor in the progressive development of ideas, or of mankind, or of the\npeople, or of man to superman; but in this way the _progressus in\ninfinitum_ of purpose had been reached: it was ultimately necessary to\nfind one's self a place in the process of the world (perhaps with the\ndisd\u00e6monistic outlook, it was a process which led to nonentity).\n\nIn regard to this point, \"_purpose_\" needs a somewhat more severe\ncriticism: it ought to be recognised that an action _is never\ncaused by a purpose;_ that an object and the means thereto are\ninterpretations, by means of which certain points in a phenomena\nare selected and accentuated, at the cost of other, more numerous,\npoints, that every time something is done for a purpose, something\nfundamentally different, and yet other things happen; that in regard\nto the action done with a purpose, the case is the same as with the\nso-called purposefulness of the heat which is radiated from the sun:\nthe greater part of the total sum is squandered; a portion of it, which\nis scarcely worth reckoning, has a \"purpose,\" has \"sense\"; that an\n\"end\" with its \"means\" is an absurdly indefinite description, which\nindeed may be able to command as a precept, as \"will,\" but presupposes\na system of obedient and trained instruments, which, in the place of\nthe indefinite, puts forward a host of determined entities _(i.e._ we\nimagine a system of _clever_ but narrow intellects who postulate end\nand means, in order to be able to grant our only known \"end,\" the r\u00f4le\nof the \"cause of an action,\"--a proceeding to which we have no right:\nit is tantamount to solving a problem by placing its solution in an\ninaccessible world which we cannot observe).\n\nFinally, why could not an \"end\" be merely an _accompanying feature_\nin the series of changes among the active forces which bring about\nthe action--a pale stenographic symbol stretched in consciousness\nbeforehand, and which serves as a guide to what happens, even as\na symbol of what happens, _not_ as its cause?--But in this way we\ncriticise _will_ itself: is it not an illusion to regard that which\nenters consciousness as will-power, as a cause? Are not all conscious\nphenomena only final phenomena--the lost links in a chain, but\napparently conditioning one another in their sequence within the plane\nof consciousness? This might be an illusion.\n\n\n667.\n\nScience does _not_ inquire what impels us to will: on the contrary, it\n_denies_ that _willing_ takes place at all, and supposes that something\nquite different has happened--in short, that the belief in \"will\" and\n\"end\" is an illusion. It does not inquire into the _motives_ of an\naction, as if these had been present in consciousness previous to the\naction, but it first divides the action up into a group of phenomena,\nand then seeks the previous history of this mechanical movement--but\n_not_ in the terms of feeling, perception, and thought; from this\nquarter it can never accept the explanation: perception is precisely\nthe matter of science, _which has to be explained._--The problem of\nscience is precisely to explain the world, _without_ taking perceptions\nas the cause: for that would mean regarding _perceptions_ themselves\nas the _cause_ of perceptions. The task of science is by no means\naccomplished.\n\nThus: either there is _no_ such thing as will,--the hypothesis of\nscience,--or the will is _free_. The latter assumption represents the\nprevailing feeling, of which we cannot rid ourselves, even if the\nhypothesis of science were _proved._\n\nThe popular belief in cause and effect is founded on the principle that\nfree will _is the cause of every effect:_ thereby alone do we arrive\nat the feeling of causation. And thereto belongs also the feeling that\nevery cause is _not_ an effect, but always only a cause--if will is\nthe cause. \"Our acts of will are _not necessary_\"--this lies in the\nvery _concept of \"will.\"_ The effect necessarily comes _after_ the\ncause--that is what we feel. It is merely a _hypothesis_ that even our\nwilling is compulsory in every case.\n\n\n668.\n\n\"To will\" is not \"to desire,\" to strive, to aspire to; it distinguishes\nitself from that through the _passion of commanding._\n\nThere is no such thing as \"willing,\" but only the willing of\n_something:_ the _aim_ must not be severed from the state--as the\nepistemologists sever it. \"Willing,\" as they understand it, is no more\npossible than \"thinking\": it is a pure invention.\n\nIt is essential to willing that something should be _commanded_ (but\nthat does not mean that the will is carried into effect).\n\nThe general _state of tension,_ by virtue of which a force seeks to\ndischarge itself, is not \"willing.\"\n\n\n669.\n\n\"Pain\" and \"pleasure\" are the most absurd _means of expressing_\njudgments, which of course does not mean that the judgments which are\nenunciated in this way must necessarily be absurd. The elimination\nof all substantiation and logic, a yes or no in the reduction to a\npassionate desire to have or to reject, an imperative abbreviation, the\nutility of which is irrefutable: that is pain and pleasure. Its origin\nis in the central sphere of the intellect; its prerequisite is an\ninfinitely accelerated process of perceiving, ordering, co-ordinating,\ncalculating, concluding: pleasure and pain are always final phenomena,\nthey are never causes.\n\nAs to deciding what provokes pain and pleasure, that is a question\nwhich depends upon the _degree of power:_ the same thing, when\nconfronted with a small quantity of power, may seem a danger and may\nsuggest the need of speedy defence, and when confronted with the\nconsciousness of greater power, may be a voluptuous stimulus and may be\nfollowed by a feeling of pleasure.\n\nAll feelings of pleasure and pain presuppose a _measuring of collective\nutility_ and _collective harmfulness_: consequently a sphere where\nthere is the willing of an object (of a condition) and the selection of\nthe means thereto. Pleasure and pain are never \"original facts.\"\n\nThe feelings of pleasure and pain are _reactions of the will_\n(emotions) in which the intellectual centre fixes the value of certain\nsupervening changes as a collective value, and also as an introduction\nof contrary actions.\n\n\n670.\n\n_The belief in \"emotions\"_--Emotions are a fabrication of the\nintellect, an invention of _causes_ which do not exist. All general\n_bodily sensations_ which we do not understand are interpreted\nintellectually--that is to say, a _reason_ is sought why we feel\nthus or thus among certain people or in certain experiences. Thus\nsomething disadvantageous dangerous, and strange is taken for granted,\nas if it were the cause of our being indisposed; as a matter of fact,\nit gets _added to_ the indisposition, so as to make our condition\nthinkable.--Mighty rushes of blood to the brain, accompanied by\na feeling of suffocation, are _interpreted_ as anger: the people\nand things which provoke our anger are a means of relieving our\nphysiological condition. Subsequently, after long habituation, certain\nprocesses and general feelings are so regularly correlated that the\nsight of certain processes provokes that condition of general feeling,\nand induces vascular engorgements, the ejection of seminal fluid, etc.:\nwe then say that the \"emotion is provoked by propinquity.\"\n\n_Judgments_ already inhere in pleasure and pain: stimuli become\ndifferentiated, according as to whether they increase or reduce the\nfeeling of power.\n\n_The belief in willing._ To believe that a thought may be the cause\nof a mechanical movement is to believe in miracles. The _consistency\nof science_ demands that once we have made the world _thinkable_ for\nourselves by means of pictures, we should also make the emotions, the\ndesires, the will, etc., _thinkable_--that is to say, we should _deny_\nthem and treat them as _errors of the intellect._\n\n\n671.\n\nFree will or no free will?--There is _no such thing_ as \"_Will_\": that\nis only a simplified conception on the part of the understanding, like\n\"matter.\"\n\n_All actions must first be prepared and made possible mechanically\nbefore they can be willed._ Or, _in most cases_ the \"_object_\" of an\naction enters the brain only after everything is prepared for its\naccomplishment. The object is an inner \"stimulus\"--nothing _more._\n\n\n672.\n\nThe most proximate prelude to an action relates to that action: but\n_further back still_ there lies a preparatory history which covers _a\nfar wider field:_ the individual action is only a factor in a much more\nextensive and _subsequent_ fact. The shorter and the longer processes\nare not reported.\n\n\n673.\n\nThe theory of _chance:_ the soul is a selecting and self-nourishing\nbeing, which is persistently extremely clever and creative (this\n_creative_ power is commonly overlocked! it is taken to be merely\npassive).\n\nI recognised the _active_ and creative _power_ within the\naccidental.--Accident is in itself nothing more than _the clashing of\ncreative impulses._\n\n\n674.\n\nAmong the enormous multiplicity of phenomena to be observed in an\norganic being, that part which becomes _conscious_ is a mere means:\nand the particle of \"virtue,\" \"self abnegation,\" and other fanciful\ninventions, are denied in a most thoroughgoing manner by the whole of\nthe remaining phenomena. We would do well to study our organism in all\nits immorality....\n\nThe animal functions are, as a matter of fact, a million times more\nimportant than all beautiful states of the soul and heights of\nconsciousness: the latter are an overflow, in so far as they are not\nneeded as instruments in the service of the animal functions. The whole\nof _conscious_ life: the spirit together with the soul, the heart,\ngoodness, and virtue; in whose service does it work? In the greatest\npossible perfection of the means (for acquiring nourishment and\nadvancement) serving the fundamental animal functions: above all, the\n_ascent of the line of Life._\n\nThat which is called \"flesh\" and \"body\" is of such incalculably greater\nimportance, that the rest is nothing more than a small appurtenance.\nTo continue the chain of life _so that it becomes ever more\npowerful_--that is the task.\n\nBut now observe how the heart, the soul, virtue, and spirit together\nconspire formally to thwart this purpose: as _if they_ were the object\nof every endeavour! ... The _degeneration of life_ is essentially\ndetermined by the extraordinary _fallibility of consciousness,_ which\nis held at bay least of all by the instincts, and thus commits the\ngravest and profoundest _errors._\n\nNow could any more insane extravagance of vanity be imagined than\nto measure the _value_ of existence according to the _pleasant or\nunpleasant feelings of this consciousness_? It is obviously only a\nmeans: and pleasant or unpleasant feelings are also no more than means.\n\nAccording to what standard is the objective value measured? According\nto the quantity of _increased_ and _more organised power_ alone.\n\n\n675.\n\nThe value of all _valuing._--My desire would be to see the agent once\nmore identified with the action, after action has been deprived of all\nmeaning by having been separated in thought from the agent; I should\nlike to see the notion of doing _something,_ the idea of a \"purpose,\"\nof an \"intention,\" of an object, reintroduced into the action, after\naction has been made insignificant by having been artificially\nseparated from these things.\n\nAll \"objects,\" \"purposes,\" \"meanings,\" are only manners of expression\nand metamorphoses of the one will inherent in all phenomena; of the\nwill to power. To have an object, a purpose, or an intention, in\nfact _to will_ generally, is equivalent to the desire for _greater\nstrength,_ for fuller growth, and for the _means_ thereto _in addition._\n\nThe most general and fundamental instinct in all action and willing\nis precisely on that account the one which is least known and is most\nconcealed; for in practice we always follow its bidding, for the simple\nreason that we _are_ in ourselves its bidding....\n\nAll valuations are only the results of, and the narrow points of view\nin _servings this_ one will: valuing _in itself_ is nothing save this,\n_--will to power._\n\nTo criticise existence from the standpoint of any one of these\nvalues is utter nonsense and error. Even supposing that a process of\nannihilation follows from such a value, even so this process is in the\nservice of this will.\n\nThe _valuation of existence itself!_ But existence is this valuing\nitself!--and even when we say \"no,\" we still do what we _are._\n\nWe ought now to perceive the _absurdity_ of this pretence at judging\nexistence; and we ought to try and discover _what_ actually takes place\nthere. It is symptomatic.\n\n\n676.\n\n_Concerning the Origin of our Valuations._\n\nWe are able to analyse our body, and by doing so we get the same\nidea of it as of the stellar system, and the differences between\norganic and inorganic lapses. Formerly the movements of the stars were\nexplained as the effects of beings consciously pursuing a purpose:\nthis is no longer required, and even in regard to the movements of\nthe body and its changes, the belief has long since been abandoned\nthat they can be explained by an appeal to a consciousness which has\na determined purpose. By far the greater number of movements have\nnothing to do with consciousness at all: _neither have they anything\nto do with sensation._ Sensations and thoughts are extremely _rare_\nand _insignificant_ things compared with the innumerable phenomena\noccurring every second.\n\nOn the other hand, we believe that a certain conformity of means\nto ends rules over the very smallest phenomenon, which it is quite\nbeyond our deepest science to understand; a sort of cautiousness,\nselectiveness, co-ordination, and repairing process, etc. In short, we\nare in the presence of an _activity_ to which it would be necessary\nto ascribe an _incalculably higher and more extensive intellect_ than\nthe one we are acquainted with. We learn to _think less of_ all that\nis conscious: we unlearn the habit of making ourselves responsible for\nourselves, because, as conscious beings fixing purposes, we are but the\nsmallest part of ourselves.\n\nOf the numerous influences taking effect every second, for instance,\nair, electricity, we feel scarcely anything at all. There might be a\nnumber of forces, which, though they never make themselves felt by\nus, yet influence us continually. Pleasure and pain are very rare and\nscanty phenomena, compared with the countless stimuli with which a cell\nor an organ operates upon another cell or organ.\n\nIt is the phase of the _modesty of consciousness._ Finally, we can\ngrasp the conscious ego itself, merely as an instrument in the\nservice of that higher and more extensive intellect: and then we may\nask whether all conscious _willing,_ all conscious _purposes,_ all\n_valuations,_ are not perhaps only means by virtue of which something\nessentially _different is attained,_ from that which consciousness\nsupposes. We _mean_: it is a question of our _pleasure_ and _pain_ but\npleasure and pain might be the means whereby we _had something to do_\nwhich lies outside our consciousness.\n\nThis is to show how very _superficial_ all conscious phenomena\nreally are; how an action and the image of it differ; how _little_\nwe know about what _precedes_ an action; how fantastic our feelings,\n\"freewill,\" and \"cause and effect\" are; how thoughts and images, just\nlike words, are only signs of thoughts; the impossibility of finding\nthe grounds of any action; the superficiality of all praise and blame;\nhow _essentially our_ conscious life is composed of _fancies_ and\n_illusion_; how all our words merely stand for fancies (our emotions\ntoo), and how the _union of mankind_ depends upon the transmission\nand continuation of these fancies: whereas, at bottom, the real union\nof mankind by means of procreation pursues its unknown way. Does this\nbelief in the common fancies of men really _alter_ mankind? Or is the\nwhole body of ideas and valuations only an expression in itself of\nunknown changes? _Are there_ really such things as will, purposes,\nthoughts, values? Is the whole of conscious life perhaps no more than\n_mirage_? Even when values seem to _determine_ the actions of a man,\nthey are, as a matter of fact, doing something quite different! In\nshort, granting that a certain conformity of means to end might be\ndemonstrated in the action of nature, without the assumption of a\nruling ego: could not _our_ notion of purposes, and our will, etc., be\nonly a _symbolic language_ standing for something quite different--that\nis to say, something not-willing and unconscious? only the thinnest\nsemblance of that natural conformity of means to end in the organic\nworld, but not in any way different therefrom?\n\nBriefly, perhaps the whole of mental development is a matter of the\n_body:_ it is the consciously recorded history of the fact that a\n_higher body is forming._ The organic ascends to higher regions.\nOur longing to know Nature is a means by virtue of which the body\nwould reach perfection. Or, better still, hundreds of thousands of\nexperiments are made to alter the nourishment and the mode of living\nof the _body_: the body's consciousness and valuations, its kinds of\npleasure and pain, are _signs of these changes and experiments. In the\nend, it is not a question concerning man; for he must be surpassed._\n\n\n677.\n\n_To what Extent are all Interpretations of the World Symptoms of a\nRuling Instinct._\n\nThe _artistic_ contemplation of the world: to sit before the world\nand to survey it. But here the analysis of \u00e6sthetical contemplation,\nits reduction to cruelty, its feeling of security, its judicial and\ndetached attitude, etc., are lacking. The artist himself must be taken,\ntogether with his psychology (the criticism of the instinct of play, as\na discharge of energy, the love of change, the love of bringing one's\nsoul in touch with strange things, the absolute egoism of the artist,\netc.). What instincts does he sublimate?\n\nThe _scientific_ contemplation of the world: a criticism of the\npsychological longing for science, the desire to make everything\ncomprehensible; the desire to make everything practical, useful,\ncapable of being exploited--to what extent this is anti-\u00e6sthetic.\nOnly that value counts, which may be reckoned in figures. How it\nhappens that a mediocre type of man preponderates under the influence\nof science. It would be terrible if even history were to be taken\npossession of in this way--the realm of the superior, of the judicial.\nWhat instincts are here sublimated!\n\nThe religious contemplation of the world: a criticism of the religious\nman. It is not necessary to take the moral man as the type, but the man\nwho has extreme feelings of exaltation and of deep depression, and who\ninterprets the former with thankfulness or suspicion without, however,\nseeking their origin in _himself_ (nor the latter either). The man who\nessentially feels anything but free, who sublimates his conditions and\nstates of submission.\n\nThe _moral_ contemplation of the world. The feelings peculiar to\ncertain social ranks are projected into the universe: stability,\nlaw, the making of things orderly, and the making of things alike,\nare _sought_ in the highest spheres, because they are valued most\nhighly,--above everything or behind everything.\n\nWhat is _common_ to all: the ruling instincts _wish to be regarded_ as\n_the highest values in general,_ even as the _creative_ and _ruling\npowers._ It is understood that these instincts either oppose or\novercome each other (join up synthetically, or alternate in power).\nTheir profound antagonism is, however, so great, that in those cases in\nwhich they _all_ insist upon being gratified, a man of very thorough\n_mediocrity_ is the outcome.\n\n\n678.\n\nIt is a question whether the origin of our apparent \"knowledge\" is not\nalso a mere offshoot of our _older valuations,_ which are so completely\nassimilated that they belong to the very basis of our nature. In this\nway only _the more recent_ needs engage in battle _with results of the\noldest needs._\n\nThe world is seen, felt, and interpreted thus and thus, in order\nthat organic life may be preserved with this particular manner of\ninterpretation. Man is _not_ only an individual, but the continuation\nof collective organic life in one definite line. The fact that _man_\nsurvives, proves that a certain species of interpretations (even though\nit still be added to) has also survived; that, as a system, this method\nof interpreting has not changed. \"Adaptation.\"\n\nOur \"dissatisfaction,\" our \"ideal,\" etc., may possibly be the _result_\nof this incorporated piece of interpretation, of our particular point\nof view: the organic world may ultimately perish owing to it just as\nthe division of labour in organisms may be the means of bringing about\nthe ruin of the whole, if one part happen to wither or weaken. The\n_destruction_ of organic life, and even of the highest form thereof,\nmust follow the same principles as the destruction of the individual.\n\n\n679.\n\nJudged from the standpoint of the theory of descent, _individuation_\nshows the continuous breaking up of one into two, and the equally\ncontinuous annihilation of individuals _for the sake of a few_\nindividuals, which evolution bears onwards; the greater mass always\nperishes (\"the body\").\n\nThe fundamental phenomena: _innumerable individuals are sacrificed for\nthe sake of a few,_ in order to make the few possible.--One must not\nallow one's self to be deceived; the case is the same with _peoples_\nand _races_: they produce the \"body\" for the generation of isolated and\nvaluable _individuals,_ who continue the great process.\n\n\n680.\n\nI am opposed to the theory that the individual studies the interests of\nthe _species,_ or of posterity, at the cost of his own advantage: all\nthis is only apparent.\n\nThe excessive importance which he attaches to the _sexual instinct_\nis not the _result_ of the latter's importance to the species, for\nprocreation is the actual performance of the individual, it is his\ngreatest interest, and therefore it is his _highest expression of\npower_ (not judged from the standpoint of consciousness, but from the\nvery centre of the individual).\n\n\n681.\n\nThe _fundamental errors_ of the biologists who have lived hitherto: it\nis not a matter of the species, but of rearing stronger individuals\n(the many are only a means).\n\nLife is _not_ the continuous adjustment of internal relations to\nexternal relations, but will to power, which, proceeding from inside,\nsubjugates and incorporates an ever-increasing quantity of \"external\"\nphenomena.\n\nThese biologists _continue_ the moral valuations (\"the absolutely\nhigher worth of Altruism,\" the antagonism towards the lust of dominion,\ntowards war, towards all that which is not useful, and towards all\norder of rank and of class).\n\n\n682.\n\nIn natural science, the moral depreciation of the _ego_ still goes hand\nin hand with the overestimation of the _species._ But the species is\nquite as illusory as the ego: a false distinction has been made. The\nego is a hundred times _more_ than a mere unit in a chain of creatures;\nit is the chain _itself,_ in every possible respect, and the species\nis merely an abstraction suggested by the multiplicity and partial\nsimilarity of these chains. That the individual is _sacrificed_ to the\nspecies, as people often say he is, is not a fact at all: it is rather\nonly an example of false interpretation.\n\n\n683.\n\nThe formula of the _\"progress\"-superstition_ according to a famous\nphysiologist of the cerebral regions:--\n\n_\"L'animal ne fait jamais de progr\u00e8s comme esp\u00e8ce. L'homme seul fait de\nprogr\u00e8s comme esp\u00e8ce._\"\n\nNo.\n\n\n684.\n\n_Anti-Darwin._--The _domestication of man:_ what definite value can\nit have, or has domestication in itself a definite value?--There are\nreasons for denying the latter proposition.\n\nDarwin's school of thought certainly goes to great pains to convince\nus of the reverse: it would fain prove that the influence of\ndomestication may be profound and fundamental. For the time being, we\nstand firmly as we did before; up to the present no results save very\nsuperficial modification or degeneration have been shown to follow upon\ndomestication. And everything that escapes from the hand and discipline\nof man, returns almost immediately to its original natural condition.\nThe type remains constant, man cannot \"_d\u00e9naturer la nature_.\"\n\nBiologists reckon upon the struggle for existence, the death of the\nweaker creature and the survival of the most robust, most gifted\ncombatant; on that account they imagine a _continuous increase in the\nperfection of all creatures._ We, on the contrary, have convinced\nourselves of the fact, that in the struggle for existence, accident\nserves the cause of the weak quite as much as that of the strong;\nthat craftiness often supplements strength with advantage; that the\n_prolificness_ of a species is related in a remarkable manner to that\nspecies _chances of destruction_....\n\n_Natural Selection_ is also credited with the power of slowly\neffecting unlimited metamorphoses: it is believed that every advantage\nis transmitted by heredity, and strengthened in the course of\ngenerations (when heredity is known to be so capricious that ...);\nthe happy adaptations of certain creatures to very special conditions\nof life, are regarded as the result of _surrounding influences._\nNowhere, however, are examples of _unconscious selection_ to be found\n(absolutely nowhere). The most different individuals associate one with\nthe other; the extremes become lost in the mass. Each vies with the\nother to maintain his kind; those creatures whose appearance shields\nthem from certain dangers, do not alter this appearance when they are\nin an environment quite devoid of danger.... If they live in places\nwhere their coats or their hides do not conceal them, they do not adapt\nthemselves to their surroundings in any way.\n\nThe _selection of the most beautiful_ has been so exaggerated, that\nit greatly exceeds the instincts for beauty in our own race! As a\nmatter of fact, the most beautiful creature often couples with the\nmost debased, and the largest with the smallest. We almost always see\nmales and females taking advantage of their first chance meeting, and\nmanifesting no taste or selectiveness at all.--Modification through\nclimate and nourishment--but as a matter of fact unimportant.\n\nThere are no _intermediate forms.--_\n\nThe growing evolution of creatures is assumed. All grounds for this\nassumption are entirely lacking. Every type has its _limitations_:\nbeyond these evolution cannot carry it.\n\n_My general point of view. First proposition_: Man as a species is\n_not_ progressing. Higher specimens are indeed attained; but they do\nnot survive. The general level of the species is not raised.\n\n_Second proposition_: Man as a species does not represent any sort of\nprogress compared with any other animal. The whole of the animal and\nplant world does not develop from the lower to the higher.... but all\nsimultaneously, haphazardly, confusedly, and at variance. The richest\nand most complex forms--and the term \"higher type\" means no more than\nthis--perish more easily: only the lowest succeed in maintaining their\napparent imperishableness. The former are seldom attained, and maintain\ntheir superior position with difficulty, the latter are compensated\nby great fruitfulness.--In the human race, also, the _superior\nspecimens,_ the happy cases of evolution, are the first to perish amid\nthe fluctuations of chances for and against them. They are exposed to\nevery form of decadence: they are extreme, and, on that account alone,\nalready decadents.... The short duration of beauty, of genius, of the\nC\u00e6sar, is _sui generis:_ such things are not hereditary. The _type_ is\ninherited, there is nothing extreme or particularly \"happy\" about a\ntype----It is not a case of a particular fate, or of the \"evil will\" of\nNature, but merely of the concept \"superior type\": the higher type is\nan example of an incomparably greater degree of complexity a greater\nsum of co-ordinated elements: but on this account disintegration\nbecomes a thousand times more threatening. \"Genius\" is the sublimest\nmachine in existence--hence it is the most fragile.\n\n_Third propositio:_: The domestication (culture) of man does not\nsink very deep. When it does sink far below the skin it immediately\nbecomes degeneration (type: the Christian). The wild man (or, in moral\nterminology, the _evil_ man) is a reversion to Nature--and, in a\ncertain sense, he represents a recovery, a _cure_ from the effects of\n\"culture.\" ...\n\n\n685.\n\n_Anti-Darwin._--What surprises me most on making a general survey of\nthe great destinies of man, is that I invariably see the reverse of\nwhat to-day Darwin and his school sees or _will_ persist in seeing:\nselection in favour of the stronger, the better-constituted, and the\nprogress of the species. Precisely the reverse of this stares one in\nthe face: the suppression of the lucky cases, the uselessness of the\nmore highly constituted types, the inevitable mastery of the mediocre,\nand even of those who are _below mediocrity._ Unless we are shown some\nreason why man is an exception among living creatures, I incline to the\nbelief that Darwin's school is everywhere at fault. That will to power,\nin which I perceive the ultimate reason and character of all change,\nexplains why it is that selection is never in favour of the exceptions\nand of the lucky cases: the strongest and happiest natures are weak\nwhen they are confronted with a majority ruled by organised gregarious\ninstincts and the fear which possesses the weak. My general view of\nthe world of values shows that in the highest values which now sway the\ndestiny of man, the happy cases among men, the select specimens do not\nprevail: but rather the decadent specimens,--perhaps there is nothing\nmore interesting in the world than this _unpleasant_ spectacle....\n\nStrange as it may seem, the strong always have to be upheld against the\nweak; and the well-constituted against the ill-constituted, the healthy\nagainst the sick and physiologically botched. If we drew our morals\nfrom reality, they would read thus: the mediocre are more valuable than\nthe exceptional creatures, and the decadent than the mediocre; the\nwill to nonentity prevails over the will to life--and the general aim\nnow is, in Christian, Buddhistic, Schopenhauerian phraseology: \"It is\nbetter not to be than to be.\"\n\nI _protest_ against this formulating of reality into a moral: and I\nloathe Christianity with a deadly loathing, because it created sublime\nwords and attitudes in order to deck a revolting truth with all the\ntawdriness of justice, virtue, and godliness....\n\nI see all philosophers and the whole of science on their knees before a\nreality which is the reverse of \"the struggle for life,\" as Darwin and\nhis school understood it--that is to say, wherever I look, I see those\nprevailing and surviving, who throw doubt and suspicion upon life and\nthe value of life.--The error of the Darwinian school became a problem\nto me: how can one be so blind as to make _this_ mistake?\n\nThat _species_ show an ascending tendency, is the most nonsensical\nassertion that has ever been made: until now they have only manifested\na dead level. There is nothing whatever to prove that the higher\norganisms have developed from the lower. I see that the lower, owing to\ntheir numerical strength, their craft, and ruse, now preponderate,--and\nI fail to see an instance in which an accidental change produces\nan advantage, at least not for a very long period: for it would be\nnecessary to find some reason why an accidental change should become so\nvery strong.\n\nI do indeed find the \"cruelty of Nature\" which is so often referred\nto; but in a different place: Nature is cruel, but against her lucky\nand well-constituted children; she protects and shelters and loves the\nlowly.\n\nIn short, the increase of a species' power, as the result of the\npreponderance of its particularly well-constituted and strong\nspecimens, is perhaps less of a certainty than that it is the result of\nthe preponderance of its mediocre and lower specimens ... in the case\nof the latter, we find great fruitfulness and permanence: in the case\nof the former, the besetting dangers are greater, waste is more rapid,\nand decimation is more speedy.\n\n\n686.\n\nMan as he has appeared up to the present is the embryo of the man\nof the future; _all_ the formative powers which are to produce the\nlatter, already lie in the former: and owing to the fact that they are\nenormous, the more _promising for the future_ the modern individual\nhappens to be, the more _suffering_ falls to his lot. This is the\nprofoundest concept of _suffering._ The formative powers clash.--The\nisolation of the individual need not deceive one--as a matter of fact,\nsome uninterrupted current does actually flow through all individuals,\nand does thus unite them. The fact that they feel themselves isolated,\nis the _most powerful spur_ in the process of setting themselves the\nloftiest of aims: their search for happiness is the means which keeps\ntogether and moderates the formative powers, and keeps them from being\nmutually destructive.\n\n\n687.\n\n_Excessive intellectual_ strength sets _itself_ new goals; it is not in\nthe least satisfied by the command and the leadership of the inferior\nworld, or by the preservation of the organism, of the \"individual.\"\n\nWe are _more_ than the individual: we are the whole chain itself, with\nthe tasks of all the possible futures of that chain in us.\n\n\n\n3. Theory of the Will to Power and of Valuations.\n\n\n688.\n\n_The unitary view of psychology._--We are accustomed to regard the\ndevelopment of a vast number of forms as compatible with one single\norigin.\n\nMy theory would be: that the will to power is the primitive motive\nforce out of which all other motives have been derived;\n\nThat it is exceedingly illuminating to substitute _power_ for\nindividual \"happiness\" (after which every living organism is said to\nstrive): \"It strives after power, after _more_ power\";--happiness is\nonly a symptom of the feeling of power attained, a consciousness of\ndifference (it does not strive after happiness: but happiness steps\nin when the object is attained, after which the organism has striven:\nhappiness is an accompanying, not an actuating factor);\n\nThat all motive force is the will to power; that there is no other\nforce, either physical, dynamic, or psychic.\n\nIn our science, where the concept cause and effect is reduced to a\nrelationship of complete equilibrium, and in which it seems desirable\nfor the _same_ quantum of force to be found on either side, _all idea\nof a motive power is absent_: we only apprehend results, and we call\nthese equal from the point of view of their content of force....\n\nIt is a matter of mere experience that change never ceases: at bottom\nwe have not the smallest grounds for assuming that any one particular\nchange must follow upon any other. On the contrary, any state which\nhas been attained would seem almost forced to maintain itself intact\nif it had not within itself a capacity for not desiring to maintain\nitself.... Spinoza's proposition concerning \"self-preservation\" ought\nas a matter of fact to put a stop to change. But the proposition is\nfalse; the contrary is true. In all living organisms it can be clearly\nshown that they do everything not to remain as they are, but to become\ngreater....\n\n\n689.\n\n_\"Will to power\" and causality._--From a psychological point of view\nthe idea of \"cause\" is our feeling of power in the act which is called\nwilling--our concept effect is the superstition that this feeling of\npower is itself the force which moves things....\n\nA state which accompanies an event and is already an effect of\nthat event is deemed \"sufficient cause\" of the latter; the tense\nrelationship of our feeling of power (pleasure as the feeling of power)\nand of an obstacle being overcome--are these things illusions?\n\nIf we translate the notion \"cause\" back into the only sphere which is\nknown to us, and out of which we have taken it, we cannot imagine _any\nchange_ in which the will to power is not inherent. We do not know how\nto account for any change which is not a _trespassing_ of one power on\nanother.\n\nMechanics only show us the results, and then only in images (movement\nis a figure of speech); gravitation itself has no mechanical cause,\nbecause it is itself the first cause of mechanical results.\n\nThe will to _accumulate force_ is confined to the phenomenon of life,\nto nourishment, to procreation, to inheritance, to society, states,\ncustoms, authority. Should we not be allowed to assume that this will\nis the motive power also of chemistry?--and of the cosmic order?\n\nNot only conservation of energy, but the minimum amount of waste; so\nthat the only reality is this: _the will of every centre of power to\nbecome stronger_--not self-preservation, but the desire to appropriate,\nto become master, to become more, to become stronger.\n\nIs the fact that science is possible a proof of the principle of\ncausation--\"From like causes, like effects\"--\"A permanent law of\nthings\"--\"Invariable order\"? Because something is calculable, is it\ntherefore on that account necessary?\n\nIf something happens thus, and thus only, it is not the manifestation\nof a \"principle,\" of a \"law,\" of \"order.\" What happens is that certain\nquanta of power begin to operate, and their essence is to exercise\ntheir power over all other quanta of power. Can we assume the existence\nof a striving after power without a feeling of pleasure and pain,\n_i.e._ without the sensation of an increase or a decrease of power?\nIs mechanism only a language of signs for the concealed fact of a\nworld of fighting and conquering quanta of will-power? All mechanical\nfirst-principles, matter, atoms, weight, pressure, and repulsion, are\nnot facts in themselves, but interpretations arrived at with the help\nof psychical fictions.\n\nLife, which is our best known form of being, is altogether \"will to\nthe accumulation of strength\"--all the processes of life hinge on\nthis: everything aims, not at preservation, but at accretion and\naccumulation. Life as an individual case (a hypothesis which may be\napplied to existence in general) strives after the maximum feeling\nof power; life is essentially a striving after more power; striving\nitself is only a straining after more power; the most fundamental\nand innermost thing of all is this will. (Mechanism is merely the\nsemeiotics of the results.)\n\n\n690.\n\nThe thing which is the cause of the existence of development cannot\nin the course of investigation be found above development; it should\nneither be regarded as \"evolving\" nor as evolved ... the \"will to\npower\" cannot have been evolved.\n\n\n691.\n\nWhat is the relation of the whole of the organic process towards the\nrest of nature?--Here the fundamental will reveals itself.\n\n\n692.\n\nIs the \"will to power\" a kind of will, or is it identical with the\nconcept will? Is it equivalent to desiring or commanding; is it the\nwill which Schopenhauer says is the essence of things?\n\nMy proposition is that the will of psychologists hitherto has been an\nunjustifiable generalisation, and that there is no such thing as this\nsort of will, that instead of the development of one will into several\nforms being taken as a fact, the character of will has been cancelled\nowing to the fact that its content, its \"whither,\" was subtracted from\nit: in Schopenhauer this is so in the highest degree; what he calls\n\"will\" is merely an empty word. There is even less plausibility in\nthe will to live: for life is simply one of the manifestations of the\nwill to power; it is quite arbitrary and ridiculous to suggest that\neverything is striving to enter into this particular form of the will\nto power.\n\n\n693.\n\nIf the innermost essence of existence is the will to power; if\nhappiness is every increase of power, and unhappiness the feeling of\nnot being able to resist, of not being able to become master: may\nwe not then postulate happiness and pain as cardinal facts? Is will\npossible without these two oscillations of yea and nay? But who feels\nhappiness? ... Who will have power? ... Nonsensical question! If the\nessence of all things is itself will to power, and consequently the\nability to feel pleasure and pain! Albeit: contrasts and obstacles are\nnecessary, therefore also, relatively, units which trespass on one\nanother.\n\n\n694.\n\nAccording to the obstacles which a force seeks with a view of\novercoming them, the measure of the failure and the fatality thus\nprovoked must increase, and in so far as every force can only manifest\nitself against some thing that opposes it, an element of unhappiness is\nnecessarily inherent in every action. But this pain acts as a greater\nincitement to life, and increases the will to power.\n\n\n695.\n\nIf pleasure and pain are related to the feeling of power, life would\nhave to represent such an increase in power that the difference, the\n\"plus,\" would have to enter consciousness. A dead level of power,\nif maintained, would have to measure its happiness in relation\nto depreciations of that level, _i.e._ in relation to states of\nunhappiness and not of happiness.... The will to an increase lies\nin the essence of happiness: that power is enhanced, and that this\ndifference becomes conscious.\n\nIn a state of decadence after a certain time the opposite difference\nbecomes conscious, that is decrease: the memory of former strong\nmoments depresses the present feelings of happiness in this state\ncomparison reduces happiness.\n\n\n696.\n\nIt is not the satisfaction of the will which is the cause of happiness\n(to this superficial theory I am more particularly opposed--this absurd\npsychological forgery in regard to the most simple things), but it is\nthat the will is always striving to overcome that which stands in its\nway. The feeling of happiness lies precisely in the discontentedness of\nthe will, in the fact that without opponents and obstacles it is never\nsatisfied. \"The happy man\": a gregarious ideal.\n\n\n697.\n\nThe normal discontent of our instincts--for instance, of the instinct\nof hunger, of sex, of movement--contains nothing which is in itself\ndepressing; it rather provokes the feeling of life, and, whatever the\npessimists may say to us, like all the rhythms of small and irritating\nstimuli, it strengthens. Instead of this discontent making us sick of\nlife, it is rather the great stimulus to life.\n\n(Pleasure might even perhaps be characterised as the rhythm of small\nand painful stimuli.)\n\n\n698.\n\nKant says: \"These lines of Count Verri's (_Sull' indole del piacere\ne del dolore;_ 1781) I confirm with absolute certainty: 'Il solo\nprincipio motore dell' uomo \u00e8 il dolore. Il dolore precede ogni\npiacere. Il piacere non \u00e8 un essere positivo.'\"[5]\n\n[Footnote 5: _On the Nature of Pleasure and Pain._ \"The only motive\nforce of man is pain. Pain precedes every pleasure. Pleasure is not a\npositive thing.\"--Tr.]\n\n\n699.\n\nPain is something different from pleasure--I mean it is not the\nlatter's opposite.\n\nIf the essence of pleasure has been aptly characterised as the feeling\nof increased power (that is to say, as a feeling of difference which\npresupposes comparison), that does not define the nature of pain.\nThe false contrasts which the people, and consequently the language,\nbelieves in, are always dangerous fetters which impede the march of\ntruth. There are even cases where a kind of pleasure is conditioned\nby a certain rhythmic sequence of small, painful stimuli: in this way\na very rapid growth of the feeling of power and of the feeling of\npleasure is attained. This is the case, for instance, in tickling,\nalso in the sexual tickling which accompanies the coitus: here we see\npain acting as the ingredient of happiness. It seems to be a small\nhindrance which is overcome, followed immediately by another small\nhindrance which once again is overcome--this play of resistance and\nresistance overcome is the greatest excitant of that complete feeling\nof overflowing and surplus power which constitutes the essence of\nhappiness.\n\nThe converse, which would be an increase in the feeling of pain through\nsmall intercalated pleasurable stimuli, does not exist: pleasure and\npain are not opposites.\n\nPain is undoubtedly an intellectual process in which a judgment is\ninherent--the judgment harmful, in which long experience is epitomised.\nThere is no such thing as pain in itself. It is not the wound that\nhurts, it is the experience of the harmful results a wound may have for\nthe whole organism, which here speaks in this deeply moving way, and is\ncalled pain. (In the case of deleterious influences which were unknown\nto ancient man, as, for instance, those residing in the new combination\nof poisonous chemicals, the hint from pain is lacking, and we are lost.)\n\nThat which is quite peculiar in pain is the prolonged disturbance,\nthe quivering subsequent to a terrible shock in the ganglia of the\nnervous system. As a matter of fact, nobody suffers from the cause of\npain (from any sort of injury, for instance), but from the protracted\ndisturbance of his equilibrium which follows upon the shock. Pain is a\ndisease of the cerebral centres--pleasure is no disease at all.\n\nThe fact that pain may be the cause of reflex actions has appearances\nand even philosophical prejudice in its favour. But in very sudden\naccidents, if we observe closely, we find that the reflex action occurs\nappreciably earlier than the feeling of pain. I should be in a bad way\nwhen I stumbled if I had to wait until the fact had struck the bell\nof my consciousness, and until a hint of what I had to do had been\ntelegraphed back to me. On the contrary, what I notice as clearly as\npossible is, that first, in order to avoid a fall, reflex action on the\npart of my foot takes place, and then, after a certain measurable space\nof time, there follows quite suddenly a kind of painful wave in my\nforehead. Nobody, then, reacts to pain. Pain is subsequently projected\ninto the wounded quarter--but the essence of this local pain is\nnevertheless not the expression of a kind of local wound, it is merely\na local sign, the strength and nature of which is in keeping with the\nseverity of the wound, and of which the nerve centres have taken note.\nThe fact that as the result of this shock the muscular power of the\norganism is materially reduced, does not prove in any way that the\nessence of pain is to be sought in the lowering of the feeling of power.\n\nOnce more let me repeat: nobody reacts to pain: pain is no \"cause\" of\naction. Pain itself is a reaction; the reflex movement is another and\nearlier process--both originate at different points....\n\n\n700.\n\nThe message of pain: in itself pain does not announce that which has\nbeen momentarily damaged, but the significance of this damage for the\nindividual as a whole.\n\nAre we to suppose that there are any pains which \"the species\" feel,\nand which the individual does not?\n\n\n701.\n\n\"The sum of unhappiness outweighs the sum of happiness: consequently\nit were better that the world did not exist\"--\"The world is something\nwhich from a rational standpoint it were better did not exist, because\nit occasions more pain than pleasure to the feeling subject\"--this\nfutile gossip now calls itself pessimism!\n\nPleasure and pain are accompanying factors, not causes; they are\nsecond-rate valuations derived from a dominating value,--they are one\nwith the feeling \"useful,\" \"harmful,\" and therefore they are absolutely\nfugitive and relative. For in regard to all utility and harmfulness\nthere are a hundred different ways of asking \"what for?\"\n\nI despise this pessimism of sensitiveness: it is in itself a sign of\nprofoundly impoverished life.\n\n\n702.\n\nMan does not seek happiness and does not avoid unhappiness. Everybody\nknows the famous prejudices I here contradict. Pleasure and pain are\nmere results, mere accompanying phenomena--that which every man, which\nevery tiny particle of a living organism will have, is an increase of\npower. In striving after this, pleasure and pain are encountered; it is\nowing to that will that the organism seeks opposition and requires that\nwhich stands in its way.... Pain as the hindrance of its will to power\nis therefore a normal feature, a natural ingredient of every organic\nphenomenon; man does not avoid it, on the contrary, he is constantly\nin need of it: every triumph, every feeling of pleasure, every event\npresupposes an obstacle overcome.\n\nLet us take the simplest case, that of primitive nourishment; the\nprotoplasm extends its pseudopodia in order to seek for that which\nresists it,--it does not do so out of hunger, but owing to its will to\npower. Then it makes the attempt to overcome, to appropriate, and to\nincorporate that with which it comes into contact--what people call\n\"nourishment\" is merely a derivative, a utilitarian application, of the\nprimordial will to become stronger.\n\nPain is so far from acting as a diminution of our feeling of power,\nthat it actually forms in the majority of cases a spur to this\nfeeling,--the obstacle is the stimulus of the will to power.\n\n\n703.\n\nPain has been confounded with one of its subdivisions, which is\nexhaustion: the latter does indeed represent a profound reduction and\nlowering of the will to power, a material loss of strength--that is\nto say, there is _(a)_ pain as the stimulus to an increase or power,\nand _(b)_ pain following upon an expenditure of power; in the first\ncase it is a spur, in the second it is the outcome of excessive\nspurring.... The inability to resist is proper to the latter form of\npain: the provocation of that which resists is proper to the former....\nThe only happiness which is to be felt in the state of exhaustion is\nthat of going to sleep; in the other case, happiness means triumph....\nThe great confusion of psychologists consisted in the fact that they\ndid not keep these two kinds of happiness--that of falling asleep,\nand that of triumph--sufficiently apart. Exhausted people will have\nrepose, slackened limbs, peace and quiet--and these things constitute\nthe bliss of Nihilistic religions and philosophies, the wealthy in\nvital strength, the active, want triumph, defeated opponents, and the\nextension of their feeling of power over ever wider regions. Every\nhealthy function of the organism has this need,--and the whole organism\nconstitutes an intricate complexity of systems struggling for the\nincrease of the feeling of power....\n\n\n704.\n\nHow is it that the fundamental article of faith in all psychologies is\na piece of most outrageous contortion and fabrication? \"Man strives\nafter happiness,\" for instance--how much of this is true? In order to\nunderstand what life is, and what kind of striving and tenseness life\ncontains, the formula should hold good not only of trees and plants,\nbut of animals also. \"What does the plant strive after?\"--But here we\nhave already invented a false entity which does not exist,--concealing\nand denying the fact of an infinitely variegated growth, with\nindividual and semi-individual starting-points, if we give it the\nclumsy title \"plant\" as if it were a unit. It is very obvious that\nthe ultimate and smallest \"individuals\" cannot be understood in the\nsense of metaphysical individuals or atoms; their sphere of power is\ncontinually shifting its ground: but with all these changes, can it be\nsaid that any of them strives after happiness?--All this expanding,\nthis incorporation and growth, is a search for resistance; movement\nis essentially related to states of pain: the driving power here must\nrepresent some other desire if it leads to such continual willing and\nseeking of pain.--To what end do the trees of a virgin forest contend\nwith each other? \"For happiness\"?--For power! ...\n\nMan is now master of the forces of nature, and master too of his own\nwild and unbridled feelings (the passions have followed suit, and have\nlearned to become useful)--in comparison with primeval man, the man of\nto-day represents an enormous quantum of power, but not an increase\nin happiness! How can one maintain, then, that he has striven after\nhappiness?..\n\n\n705.\n\nBut while I say this I see above me, and below the stars, the\nglittering rat's-tail of errors which hitherto has represented the\ngreatest inspiration of man: \"All happiness is the result of virtue all\nvirtue is the result of free will\"!\n\nLet us transvalue the values: all capacity is the outcome of a\nhappy organisation, all freedom is the outcome of capacity (freedom\nunderstood here as facility in self-direction. Every artist will\nunderstand me).\n\n\n706.\n\n\"The value of life.\"--Every life stands by itself; all existence must\nbe justified, and not only life,--the justifying principle must be one\nthrough which life itself speaks.\n\nLife is only a means to something: it is the expression of the forms of\ngrowth in power.\n\n\n707.\n\nThe \"conscious world\" cannot be a starting-point for valuing: an\n\"objective\" valuation is necessary.\n\nIn comparison with the enormous and complicated antagonistic processes\nwhich the collective life of every organism represents, its conscious\nworld of feelings, intentions, and valuations, is only a small slice.\nWe have absolutely no right to postulate this particle of consciousness\nas the object, the wherefore, of the collective phenomena of life:\nthe attainment of consciousness is obviously only an additional means\nto the unfolding of life and to the extension of its power. That\nis why it is a piece of childish simplicity to set up happiness,\nor intellectuality, or morality, or any other individual sphere of\nconsciousness, as the highest value: and maybe to justify \"the world\"\nwith it.\n\nThis is my fundamental objection to all philosophical and moral\ncosmologies and theologies, to all wherefores and highest values that\nhave appeared in philosophies and philosophic religions hitherto. A\nkind of means is misunderstood as the object itself: conversely life\nand its growth of power were debased to a means.\n\nIf we wished to postulate an adequate object of life it would not\nnecessarily be related in any way with the category of conscious life;\nit would require rather to explain conscious life as a mere means to\nitself....\n\nThe \"denial of life\" regarded as the object of life, the object of\nevolution! Existence--a piece of tremendous stupidity! Any such mad\ninterpretation is only the outcome of life's being measured by the\nfactors of consciousness (pleasure and pain, good and evil). Here\nthe means are made to stand against the end--the \"unholy,\" absurd,\nand, above all, disagreeable means: how can the end be any use when\nit requires such means? But where the fault lies is here--instead of\nlooking for the end which would explain the necessity of such means,\nwe posited an end from the start which actually excludes such means,\n_i.e._ we made a desideratum in regard to certain means (especially\npleasurable, rational, and virtuous) into a rule, and then only did we\ndecide what end would be desirable....\n\nWhere the fundamental fault lies is in the fact that, instead of\nregarding consciousness as an instrument and an isolated phenomenon\nof life in general, we made it a standard, the highest value in life:\nit is the faulty standpoint of _a parte ad totum,_--and that is why\nall philosophers are instinctively seeking at the present day for a\ncollective consciousness, a thing that lives and wills consciously with\nall that happens, a \"Spirit,\" a \"God.\" But they must be told that it is\nprecisely thus that life is converted into a monster; that a \"God\" and\na general sensorium would necessarily be something on whose account the\nwhole of existence would have to be condemned.... Our greatest relief\ncame when we eliminated the general consciousness which postulates ends\nand means--in this way we ceased from being necessarily pessimists....\nOur greatest indictment of life was the existence of God.\n\n\n708.\n\n_Concerning the value of \"Becoming.\"_--If the movement of the world\nreally tended to reach a final state, that state would already have\nbeen reached. The only fundamental fact, however, is that it does\nnot tend to reach a final state: and every philosophy and scientific\nhypothesis (_e.g._ materialism) according to which such a final state\nis necessary, is refuted by this fundamental fact.\n\nI should like to have a concept of the world which does justice to this\nfact. Becoming ought to be explained without having recourse to such\nfinal designs. Booming must appear justified at every instant (or it\nmust defy all valuation: which has unity as its end); the present must\nnot under any circumstances be justified by a future, nor must the\npast be justified for the sake of the present. \"Necessity\" must not\nbe interpreted in the form of a prevailing and ruling collective force\nor as a prime motor; and still less as the necessary cause of some\nvaluable result. But to this end it is necessary to deny a collective\nconsciousness for Becoming,--a \"God,\" in order that life may not be\nveiled under the shadow of a being who feels and knows as we do and\nyet _wills_ nothing: \"God\" is useless if he wants nothing; and if he\ndo want something, this presupposes a general sum of suffering and\nirrationality which lowers the general value of Becoming. Fortunately\nany such general power is lacking (a suffering God overlooking\neverything, a general sensorium and ubiquitous Spirit, would be the\ngreatest indictment of existence).\n\nStrictly speaking nothing of the nature of Being must be allowed to\nremain,--because in that case Becoming loses its value and gets to be\nsheer and superfluous nonsense.\n\nThe next question, then, is: how did the illusion Being originate (why\nwas it obliged to originate);\n\nLikewise: how was it that all valuations based upon the hypothesis that\nthere was such a thing as Being came to be depreciated.\n\nBut in this way we have recognised that this hypothesis concerning\nBeing is the source of all the calumny that has been directed against\nthe world (the \"Better world,\" the \"True world\" the \"World Beyond,\" the\n\"Thing-in-itself\").\n\n(1) Becoming has no final state, it does not tend towards stability.\n\n(2) Becoming is not a state of appearance, the world of Being is\nprobably only appearance.\n\n(3) Becoming is of precisely the same value at every instant; the sum\nof its value always remains equal: expressed otherwise, it has no\nvalue; for that according to which it might be measured, and in regard\nto which the word value might have some sense, is entirely lacking.\nThe collective value of the world defies valuation; for this reason\nphilosophical pessimism belongs to the order of farces.\n\n\n709.\n\nWe should not make our little desiderata the judges of existence!\nNeither should we make culminating evolutionary forms (_e.g._ mind) the\n\"absolute\" which stands behind evolution!\n\n\n710.\n\nOur knowledge has become scientific to the extent in which it has\nbeen able to make use of number and measure. It might be worth while\nto try and see whether a scientific order of values might not be\nconstructed according to a scale of numbers and measures representing\nenergy.... All other values are matters of prejudice, simplicity, and\nmisunderstanding. They may all be reduced to that scale of numbers and\nmeasures representing energy. The ascent in this scale would represent\nan increase of value, the descent a diminution.\n\nBut here appearance and prejudice are against one (moral values are\nonly apparent values compared with those which are physiological).\n\n\n711.\n\nWhy the standpoint of \"value\" lapses:--\n\nBecause in the _\"whole process of the universe\" the work of mankind\ndoes not come under consideration_; because a general process (viewed\nin the light of a system) does not exist.\n\nBecause there is no such thing as a whole; because no _depreciation of\nhuman_ existence or human aims can be made in regard to something that\ndoes not exist.\n\nBecause \"necessity,\" \"causality,\" \"design,\" are merely useful\n\"_semblances._\"\n\nBecause the aim is _not_ \"the increase of the sphere of consciousness,\"\n_but the increase of power_; in which increase the utility of\nconsciousness is also contained; and the same holds good of pleasure\nand pain.\n\nBecause a mere _means_ must not be elevated to the highest criterion\nof value (such as states of consciousness like pleasure and pain, if\nconsciousness is in itself only a means).\n\nBecause the world is not an organism at all, but a thing of chaos;\nbecause the development of \"intellectuality\" is only a means tending\nrelatively to extend the duration of an organisation.\n\nBecause all \"desirability\" has no sense in regard to the general\ncharacter of existence.\n\n\n712.\n\n\"God\" is the culminating moment: life is an eternal process of deifying\nand undeifying. _But withal there is no zenith of values,_ but only a\nzenith of _power._\n\nAbsolute _exclusion of mechanical and materialistic interpretations._\nthey are both only expressions of inferior states, of emotions deprived\nof all spirit (of the \"will to power\").\n\n_The retrograde movement front the zenith_ of development (the\nintellectualisation of power on some slave-infected soil) may be shown\nto be the _result_ of the highest degree of energy _turning against_\nitself, once it no longer has anything to organise, and utilising its\npower in order to _disorganise._\n\n_(a)_ The ever-increasing _suppression_ of societies, and the latter's\nsubjection by a smaller number of stronger individuals.\n\n(b) The ever-increasing suppression of the privileged and the strong,\nhence the rise of democracy, and ultimately of _anarchy,_ in the\nelements.\n\n\n713.\n\n_Value_ is the highest amount of power that a man can assimilate--a\nman, not mankind! Mankind is much more of a means than an end. It is a\nquestion of type: mankind is merely the experimental material; it is\nthe overflow of the ill-constituted--a field of ruins.\n\n\n714.\n\nWords relating to values are merely banners planted on those spots\nwhere a _new blessedness_ was discovered--a new _feeling._\n\n\n715.\n\nThe standpoint of \"value\" is the same as that of the _conditions_ of\n_preservation_ and _enhancement,_ in regard to complex creatures of\nrelative stability appearing in the course of evolution.\n\nThere are no such things as lasting and ultimate entities, no atoms, no\nmonads: here also \"permanence\" was first introduced by ourselves (from\npractical, utilitarian, and other motives).\n\n\"The forms that rule\"; the sphere of the subjugated is continually\nextended; or it decreases or increases according to the conditions\n(nourishment) being either favourable or unfavourable.\n\n\"Value\" is essentially the standpoint for the increase or decrease of\nthese dominating centres (pluralities in any case; for \"unity\" cannot\nbe observed anywhere in the nature of development).\n\nThe means of expression afforded by language are useless for the\npurpose of conveying any facts concerning \"development\": the need of\npositing a rougher world of stable existences and things forms part of\nour _eternal desire for preservation._ We may speak of atoms and monads\nin a relative sense: and this is certain, _that the smallest world\nis the most stable world ..._. There is no such thing as will: there\nare only punctuations of will, which are constantly increasing and\ndecreasing their power.\n\n\n\n\nIII\n\n\nTHE WILL TO POWER AS EXEMPLIFIED IN SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL.\n\n\n1. Society and the State.\n\n\n716.\n\nWe take it as a principle that only individuals feel any\nresponsibility. Corporations are invented to do what the individual\nhas not the courage to do. For this reason all communities are vastly\nmore upright and instructive, as regards the nature of man, than the\nindividual who is too cowardly to have the courage of his own desires.\n\nAll altruism is the prudence of the private man. societies are not\nmutually altruistic. The commandment, \"Thou shalt love thy next-door\nneighbour,\" has never been extended to thy neighbour in general. Rather\nwhat Manu says is probably truer: \"We must conceive of all the States\non our own frontier, and their allies, as being hostile, and for the\nsame reason we must consider all of their neighbours as being friendly\nto us.\"\n\nThe study of society is invaluable, because man in society is far more\nchildlike than man individually. Society has never regarded virtue as\nanything else than as a means to strength, power, and order. Manu's\nwords again are simple and dignified: \"Virtue could hardly rely on her\nown strength alone. Really it is only the fear of punishment that keeps\nmen in their limits, and leaves every one in peaceful possession of his\nown.\"\n\n\n717.\n\nThe State, or _unmorality_ organised, is from within--the police, the\npenal code, status, commerce, and the family; and from without, the\nwill to war, to power, to conquest and revenge.\n\nA multitude will do things an individual will not, because of the\ndivision of responsibility, of command and execution; because the\nvirtues of obedience, duty, patriotism, and local sentiment are all\nintroduced; because feelings of pride, severity, strength, hate,\nand revenge in short, all typical traits are upheld, and these are\ncharacteristics utterly alien to the herd-man.\n\n\n718.\n\nYou haven't, any of you, the courage either to kill or to flog a man.\nBut the huge machinery of the State quells the individual and makes him\ndecline to be answerable for his own deed (obedience, loyalty, etc.).\n\nEverything that a man does in the service of the State is against his\nown nature. Similarly, everything he learns in view of future service\nof the State. This result is obtained through division of labour (so\nthat responsibility is subdivided too):--\n\nThe legislator--and he who fulfils the law.\n\nThe teacher of discipline--and those who have grown hard and severe\nunder discipline.\n\n\n719.\n\nA division of labour among the emotions exists inside society, making\nindividuals and classes produce an imperfect, but more useful, kind\nof soul. Observe how every type in society has become atrophied with\nregard to certain emotions with the view of fostering and accentuating\nother emotions.\n\nMorality may be thus justified:--\n\n_Economically,_--as aiming at the greatest possible use of all\nindividual power, with the view of preventing the waste of exceptional\nnatures.\n\n_\u00c6sthetically,_--as the formation of fixed types, and the pleasure in\none's own.\n\n_Politically,_--as the art of bearing with the severe divergencies of\nthe degrees of power in society.\n\n_Psychologically,_ as an imaginary preference for the bungled and the\nmediocre, in order to preserve the weak.\n\n\n720.\n\nMan has one terrible and fundamental wish; he desires power, and this\nimpulse, which is called freedom, must be the longest restrained.\nHence ethics has instinctively aimed at such an education as shall\nrestrain the desire for power; thus our morality slanders the would-be\ntyrant, and glorifies charity, patriotism, and the ambition of the herd.\n\n\n721.\n\nImpotence to power, how it disguises itself and plays the hypocrite, as\nobedience, subordination, the pride of duty and morality, submission,\ndevotion, love (the idolisation and apotheosis of the commander is a\nkind of compensation, and indirect self-enhancement). It veils itself\nfurther under fatalism and resignation, objectivity, self-tyranny,\nstoicism, asceticism, self-abnegation, hallowing. Other disguises are:\ncriticism, pessimism, indignation, susceptibility, beautiful soul,\nvirtue, self--deification, philosophic detachment, freedom from contact\nwith the world (the realisation of impotence disguises itself as\ndisdain).\n\nThere is a universal need to exercise some kind of power, or to create\nfor one's self the appearance of some power, if only temporarily, in\nthe form of intoxication.\n\nThere are men who desire power simply for the sake of the happiness it\nwill bring; these belong chiefly to political parties. Other men have\nthe same yearning, even when power means visible disadvantages, the\nsacrifice of their happiness, and well-being; they are the ambitious.\nOther men, again, are only like dogs in a manger, and will have power\nonly to prevent its falling into the hands of others on whom they would\nthen be dependent.\n\n\n722.\n\nIf there be justice and equality before the law, what would thereby\nbe abolished?--Suspense, enmity, hatred. But it is a mistake to think\nthat you thereby increase happiness; for the Corsicans rejoice in more\nhappiness than the Continentals.\n\n\n723.\n\nReciprocity and the expectation of a reward is one of the most\nseductive forms of the devaluation of mankind. It involves that\nequality which depreciates any gulf as immoral.\n\n\n724.\n\nUtility is entirely dependent upon the object to be attained,--the\nwherefore? And this wherefore, this purpose, is again dependent upon\nthe degree of power. Utilitarianism is not, therefore, a fundamental\ndoctrine; it is only a story of sequels, and cannot be made obligatory\nfor all.\n\n\n725.\n\nOf old, the State was regarded theoretically as a utilitarian\ninstitution; it has now become so in a practical sense. The time of\nkings has gone by, because people are no longer worthy of them. They do\nnot wish to see the symbol of their ideal in a king, but only a means\nto their own ends. That's the whole truth.\n\n\n726.\n\nI am trying to grasp the absolute sense of the communal standard of\njudgment and valuation, naturally without any intention of deducing\nmorals.\n\nThe degree of psychological falsity and denseness required in order to\nsanctify the emotions essential to preservation and expansion of power,\nand to create a good conscience for them.\n\nThe degree of stupidity required in order that general rules and values\nmay remain possible (including education, formation of culture, and\ntraining).\n\nThe degree of inquisitiveness, suspicion, and intolerance required in\norder to deal with exceptions, to suppress them as criminals, and thus\nto give them bad consciences, and to make them sick with their own\nsingularity.\n\n\n727.\n\nMorality is essentially a shield, a means of defence; and, in so far,\nit is a sign of the imperfectly developed man (he is still in armour;\nhe is still stoical).\n\nThe fully developed man is above all provided with _weapons:_ he is a\nman who _attacks._\n\nThe weapons of war are converted into weapons of peace (out of scales\nand carapaces grow feathers and hair).\n\n\n728.\n\nThe very notion, \"living organism\", implies that there must be\ngrowth,--that there must be a striving after an extension of power,\nand therefore a process of absorption of other forces. Under the\ndrowsiness brought on by moral narcotics, people speak of the right of\nthe individual to _defend himself;_ on the same principle one might\nspeak of his right to _attack_: for _both_--and the latter more than\nthe former--are necessities where all living organisms are concerned:\naggressive and defensive egoism are not questions of choice or even of\n\"free will,\" but they are fatalities of life itself.\n\nIn this respect it is immaterial whether one have an individual, a\nliving body, or \"an advancing society\" in view. The right to punish\n(or society's means of defence) has been arrived at only through a\nmisuse of the word \"right\": a right is acquired only by contract, but\nself-defence and self-preservation do not stand upon the basis of a\ncontract. A people ought at least, with quite as much justification, to\nbe able to regard its lust of power, either in arms, commerce, trade,\nor colonisation, as a right the right of growth, perhaps.... When the\ninstincts of a society ultimately make it give up war and renounce\nconquest, it is decadent: it is ripe for democracy and the rule of\nshopkeepers. In the majority of cases, it is true, assurances of peace\nare merely stupefying draughts.\n\n\n729.\n\nThe maintenance of the military State is the last means of adhering to\nthe great tradition of the past; or, where it has been lost, to revive\nit. By means of it the superior or strong type of man is preserved,\nand all institutions and ideas which perpetuate enmity and order of\nrank in States, such as national feeling, protective tariffs, etc., may\non that account seem justified.\n\n\n730.\n\nIn order that a thing may last longer than a person (that is to say,\nin order that a work may outlive the individual who has created it),\nall manner of limitations and prejudices must be imposed upon people.\nBut how? By means of love, reverence, gratitude towards the person\nwho created the work, or by means of the thought that our ancestors\nfought for it, or by virtue of the feeling that the safety of our\ndescendants will be secured if we uphold the work--for instance, the\n_polis._ Morality is essentially the means of; making something survive\nthe individual, because it makes him of necessity a slave. Obviously\nthe aspect from above is different from the aspect from below, and\nwill lead to quite different interpretations. How is organised power\n_maintained_?--By the fact that countless generations sacrifice\nthemselves to its cause.\n\n\n731.\n\nMarriage, property, speech, tradition, race, family, people, and\nState, are each links in a chain--separate parts which have a more\nor less high or low origin. Economically they are justified by the\nsurplus derived from the advantages of uninterrupted work and multiple\nproduction, as weighed against the disadvantages of greater expense\nin barter and the difficulty of making things last. (The working\nparts are multiplied, and yet remain largely idle. Hence the cost of\nproducing them is greater, and the cost of maintaining them by no means\ninconsiderable.) The advantage consists in avoiding interruption and\nincident loss. Nothing is more expensive than a start. \"The higher the\nstandard of living, the greater will be the expense of maintenance,\nnourishment, and propagation, as also the risk and the probability of\nan utter fall on reaching the summit.\"\n\n\n732.\n\nIn bourgeois marriages, naturally in the best sense of the word\nmarriage, there is no question whatsoever of love any more than there\nis of money. For on love no institution can be founded. The whole\nmatter consists in society giving leave to two persons to satisfy\ntheir sexual desires under conditions obviously designed to safeguard\nsocial order. Of course there must be a certain attraction between the\nparties and a vast amount of good nature, patience, compatibility, and\ncharity in any such contract. But the word love should not be misused\nas regards such a union. For two lovers, in the real and strong meaning\nof the word, the satisfaction of sexual desire is unessential; it is a\nmere symbol. For the one side, as I have already said, it is a symbol\nof unqualified submission: for the other, a sign of condescension--a\nsign of the appropriation of property. Marriage, as understood by the\nreal old nobility, meant the breeding forth of the race (but are there\nany nobles nowadays? _Quaeritur_),--that is to say, the maintenance\nof a fixed definite type of ruler, for which object husband and wife\nwere sacrificed. Naturally the first consideration here had nothing to\ndo with love; on the contrary! It did not even presuppose that mutual\nsympathy which is the _sine qua non_ of the bourgeois marriage. The\nprime consideration was the interest of the race, and in the second\nplace came the interest of a particular class. But in the face of the\ncoldness and rigour and calculating lucidity of such a noble concept\nof marriage as prevailed among every healthy aristocracy, like that\nof ancient Athens, and even of Europe during the eighteenth century,\nwe warm-blooded animals, with our miserably oversensitive hearts, we\n\"moderns,\" cannot restrain a slight shudder. That is why love as a\npassion, in the big meaning of this word, was invented for, and in, an\naristocratic community--where convention and abstinence are most severe.\n\n\n733.\n\n_Concerning the future of marriage._ A super-tax on inherited property,\na longer term of military service for bachelors of a certain minimum\nage within the community.\n\nPrivileges of all sorts for fathers who lavish boys upon the world, and\nperhaps plural votes as well.\n\nA medical certificate as a condition of any marriage, endorsed by the\nparochial authorities, in which a series of questions addressed to the\nparties and the medical officers must be answered (\"family histories\").\n\nAs a counter-agent to prostitution, or as its ennoblement, I would\nrecommend leasehold marriages (to last for a term of years or months),\nwith adequate provision for the children.\n\nEvery marriage to be warranted and sanctioned by a certain number of\ngood men and true, of the parish, as a parochial obligation.\n\n\n734.\n\n_Another commandment of philanthropy._--There are cases where to have a\nchild would be a crime--for example, for chronic invalids and extreme\nneurasthenics. These people should be converted to chastity, and for\nthis purpose the music of _Parsifal_ might at all events be tried. For\nParsifal himself, that born fool, had ample reasons for not desiring\nto propagate. Unfortunately, however, one of the regular symptoms of\nexhausted stock is the inability to exercise any self-restraint in the\npresence of stimuli, and the tendency to respond to the smallest sexual\nattraction. It would be quite a mistake, for instance, to think of\nLeopardi as a chaste man. In such cases the priest and moralist play\na hopeless game: it would be far better to send for the apothecary.\nLastly, society here has a positive duty to fulfil, and of all the\ndemands that are made on it, there are few more urgent and necessary\nthan this one. Society as the trustee of life, is responsible to life\nfor every botched life that comes into existence, and as it has to\natone for such lives, it ought consequently to make it impossible for\nthem ever to see the light of day: it should in many cases actually\nprevent the act of procreation, and may, without any regard for rank,\ndescent, or intellect, hold in readiness the most rigorous forms of\ncompulsion and restriction, and, under certain circumstances, have\nrecourse to castration. The Mosaic law, \"Thou shalt do no murder,\" is\na piece of ingenuous puerility compared with the earnestness of this\nforbidding of life to decadents, \"Thou shalt not beget\"!!! ... For\nlife itself recognises no solidarity or equality of rights between the\nhealthy and unhealthy parts of an organism. The latter must at all\ncost be _eliminated,_ lest the whole fall to pieces. Compassion for\ndecadents, equal rights for the physiologically botched--this would be\nthe very pinnacle of immorality, it would be setting up Nature's most\nformidable opponent as morality itself!\n\n\n735.\n\nThere are some delicate and morbid natures, the so-called idealists,\nwho can never under any circumstances rise above a coarse, immature\ncrime: yet it is the great justification of their an\u00e6mic little\nexistence, it is the small requital for their lives of cowardice and\nfalsehood to have been for one _instant_ at least--strong. But they\ngenerally collapse after such an act.\n\n\n736.\n\nIn our civilised world we seldom hear of any but the bloodless,\ntrembling criminal, overwhelmed by the curse and contempt of society,\ndoubting even himself, and always belittling and belying his deeds--a\nmisbegotten sort of criminal; that is why we are opposed to the idea\nthat _all great men have been criminals_ (only in the grand style, and\nneither petty nor pitiful), that crime must be inherent in greatness\n(this at any rate is the unanimous verdict of all those students of\nhuman nature who have sounded the deepest waters of great souls). To\nfeel one's self adrift from all questions of ancestry, conscience, and\nduty--this is the danger with which every great man is confronted.\nYet this is precisely what he desires: he desires the great goal, and\nconsequently the means thereto.\n\n\n737.\n\nIn times when man is led by reward and punishment, the class of man\nwhich the legislator has in view is still of a low and primitive\ntype: he is treated as one treats a child. In our latter-day culture,\ngeneral degeneracy removes all sense from reward and punishment. This\ndetermination of action by the prospect of reward and punishment\npresupposes young, strong, and vigorous races. In effete races impulses\nare so irrepressible that a mere idea has no force whatever. Inability\nto offer any resistance to a stimulus, and the feeling that one must\nreact to it: this excessive susceptibility of decadents makes all such\nsystems of punishment and reform altogether senseless.\n\nThe idea \"amelioration\" presupposes a normal and strong creature whose\naction must in some way be balanced or cancelled if he is not to be\nlost and turned into an enemy of the community.\n\n\n738.\n\n_The effect of prohibition._ Every power which forbids and which knows\nhow to excite fear in the person forbidden creates a guilty conscience.\n(That is to say, a person has a certain desire but is conscious of the\ndanger of gratifying it, and is consequently forced to be secretive,\nunderhand, and cautious.) Thus any prohibition deteriorates the\ncharacter of those who do not willingly submit themselves to it, but\nare constrained thereto.\n\n\n739.\n\n_\"Punishment and reward.\"_--These two things stand or fall together.\nNowadays no one will accept a reward or acknowledge that any authority\nshould have the power to punish. Warfare has been reformed. We have\na desire: it meets with opposition: we then see that we shall most\neasily obtain it by coming to some agreement--by drawing up a contract.\nIn modern society where every one has given his assent to a certain\ncontract, the criminal is a man who breaks that contract. This at least\nis a clear concept. But in that case, anarchists and enemies of social\norder could not be tolerated.\n\n\n740.\n\nCrimes belong to the category of revolt against the social system, A\nrebel is not punished, he is simply suppressed. He _may_ be an utterly\ncontemptible and pitiful creature; but there is nothing intrinsically\ndespicable about rebellion in fact, in our particular society revolt is\nfar from being disgraceful. There are cases in which a rebel deserves\nhonour precisely because he is conscious of certain elements in society\nwhich cry aloud for hostility; for such a man rouses us from our\nslumbers. When a criminal commits but one crime against a particular\nperson, it does not alter the fact that all his instincts urge him\nto make a stand against the whole social system. His isolated act is\nmerely a symptom.\n\nThe idea of punishment ought to be reduced to the concept of the\nsuppression of revolt, a weapon against the vanquished (by means of\nlong or short terms of imprisonment). But punishment should not be\nassociated in any way with contempt. A criminal is at all events a man\nwho has set his life, his honour, his freedom at stake; he is therefore\na man of courage. Neither should punishment be regarded as penance or\nretribution, as though there were some recognised rate of exchange\nbetween crime and punishment. Punishment does not purify, simply\nbecause crime does not sully.\n\nA criminal should not be prevented from making his peace with society,\nprovided he does not belong to the race of criminals. In the latter\ncase, however, he should be opposed even before he has committed an\nact of hostility. (As soon as he gets into the clutches of society the\nfirst operation to be performed upon him should be that of castration.)\nA criminal's bad manners and his low degree of intelligence should\nnot be reckoned against him. Nothing is more common than that he\nshould misunderstand himself (more particularly when his rebellious\ninstinct--the rancour of the _unclassed_--has not reached consciousness\nsimply because he has not read enough). It is natural that he should\ndeny and dishonour his deed while under the influence of fear at\nits failure. All this is quite distinct from those cases in which,\npsychologically speaking, the criminal yields to an incomprehensible\nimpulse, and attributes a motive to his deed by associating it with a\nmerely incidental and insignificant action (for example, robbing a man,\nwhen his real desire was to take his blood).\n\nThe worth of a man should not be measured by any one isolated act.\nNapoleon warned us against this. Deeds which are only skin-deep are\nmore particularly insignificant. If we have no crime--let us say no\nmurder--on our conscience; why is it? It simply means that a few\nfavourable circumstances have been wanting in our lives. And supposing\nwe were induced to commit such a crime would our worth be materially\naffected? As a matter of fact, we should only be despised, if we were\nnot credited with possessing the power to kill a man under certain\ncircumstances. In nearly every crime certain qualities come into play\nwithout which no one would be a true man. Dostoievsky was not far wrong\nwhen he said of the inmates of the penal colonies in Siberia, that they\nconstituted the strongest and most valuable portion of the Russian\npeople. The fact that in our society the criminal happens to be a badly\nnourished and stunted animal is simply a condemnation of our system. In\nthe days of the Renaissance the criminal was a flourishing specimen of\nhumanity, and acquired his own virtue for himself,--Virtue in the sense\nof the Renaissance--that is to say, _virt\u00f9;_ free from moralic acid.\n\nIt is only those whom we do not despise that we are able to elevate.\nMoral contempt is a far greater indignity and insult than any kind of\ncrime.\n\n\n741.\n\nShame was first introduced into punishment when certain penalties\nwere inflicted on persons held in contempt, such as slaves. It was a\ndespised class that was most frequently punished, and thus it came to\npass that punishment and contempt were associated.\n\n\n742.\n\nIn the ancient idea of punishment a religious concept was immanent,\nnamely, the retributive power of chastisement. Penalties purified; in\nmodern society, however, penalties degrade. Punishment is a form of\npaying off a debt: once it has been paid, one is freed from the deed\nfor which one was so ready to suffer. Provided belief in the power of\npunishment exist, once the penalty is paid a feeling of relief and\nlightheartedness results, which is not so very far removed from a state\nof convalescence and health. One has made one's peace with society,\nand one appears to one's self more dignified pure.... To-day, however,\npunishment isolates even more than the crime; the fate behind the sin\nhas become so formidable that it is almost hopeless. One rises from\npunishment still an enemy of society. Henceforward it reckons yet\nanother enemy against it. The _jus talionis_ may spring from the spirit\nof retribution (that is to say, from a sort of modification of the\ninstinct of revenge); but in the Book of Manu, for instance, it is the\nneed of having some equivalent in order to do penance, or to become\nfree in a religious sense.\n\n\n743.\n\nMy pretty radical note of interrogation in the case of all more\nmodern laws of punishment is this: should not the punishment fit the\ncrime?--for in your heart of hearts thus would you have it. But then\nthe susceptibility of the particular criminal to pain would have to\nbe taken into account. In other words, there should be no such thing\nas a preconceived penalty for any crime--no fixed penal code. But as\nit would be no easy matter to ascertain the degree of sensitiveness\nof each individual criminal, punishment would have to be abolished in\npractice? What a sacrifice! Is it not? Consequently ...\n\n\n744.\n\nAh! and the philosophy of jurisprudence! That is a science which, like\nall moral sciences, has not even been wrapped in swaddling-clothes yet.\nEven among jurists who consider themselves liberal, the oldest and\nmost valuable significance of punishment is still misunderstood--it\nis not even known. So long as jurisprudence does not build upon a new\nfoundation--on history and comparative anthropology--it will never\ncease to quarrel over the fundamentally false abstractions which are\nfondly imagined to be the \"philosophy of law,\" and which have nothing\nwhatever to do with modern man. The man of to-day, however, is such a\ncomplicated woof even in regard to his legal valuation that he allows\nof the most varied interpretation.\n\n745.\n\nAn old Chinese sage once said he had heard that when mighty empires\nwere doomed they began to have numberless laws.\n\n746.\n\nSchopenhauer would have all rapscallions castrated, and all geese shut\nup in convents. But from what point of view would this be desirable?\nThe rascal has at least this advantage over other men--that he is not\nmediocre; and the fool is superior to us inasmuch as he does not suffer\nat the sight of mediocrity. It would be better to widen the gulf--that\nis to say, roguery and stupidity should be increased. In this way human\nnature would become broader ... but, after all, this is Fate, and\nit will happen, whether we desire it or not. Idiocy and roguery are\nincreasing: this is part of modern progress.\n\n\n747.\n\nSociety, to-day, is full of consideration, tact, and reticence, and of\ngood-natured respect for other people's rights--even for the exactions\nof strangers. To an even greater degree is there a certain charitable\nand instinctive depreciation of the worth of man as shown by all\nmanner of trustful habits. Respect for men, and not only for the most\nvirtuous, is perhaps the real parting of the ways between us and the\nChristian mythologists also have our good share of irony even when\nlistening to moral sermons. He who preaches morality to us debases\nhimself in our eyes and becomes almost comical. Liberal-mindedness\nregarding morality is one of the best signs of our age. In cases where\nit is most distinctly wanting, we regard it as a sign of a morbid\ncondition (the case of Carlyle in England, of Ibsen in Norway, and\nSchopenhauer's pessimism throughout Europe). If there is anything\nwhich can reconcile us to our own age, it is precisely the amount\nof immorality which it allows itself without falling in its own\nestimation--very much the reverse! In what, then, does the superiority\nof culture over the want of culture consist--of the Renaissance, for\ninstance, over the Middle Ages? In this alone: the greater quantity of\nacknowledged immorality. From this it necessarily follows that the very\n_zenith_ of human development _must_ be regarded by the moral fanatic\nas the _non plus ultra_ of corruption (in this connection let us recall\nSavonarola's judgment of Florence, Plato's indictment of Athens under\nPericles, Luther's condemnation of Rome, Rousseau's anathemas against\nthe society of Voltaire, and Germany's hostility to Goethe).\n\nA little more fresh air, for Heaven's sake! This ridiculous condition\nof Europe _must_ not last any longer. Is there a single idea behind\nthis bovine nationalism? What possible value can there be in\nencouraging this arrogant self-conceit when everything to-day points\nto greater and more common interests?--at a moment when the spiritual\ndependence and denationalisation, which are obvious to all, are paving\nthe way for the reciprocal _rapprochements_ and fertilisations which\nmake up the real value and sense of present-day culture! ... And it is\nprecisely now that \"the new German Empire\" has been founded upon the\nmost thread-bare and discredited of ideas--universal suffrage and equal\nright for all.\n\nThink of all this struggling for advantage among conditions which are\nin every way degenerate: of this culture of big cities, of newspapers,\nof hurry and scurry, and of \"aimlessness\"! The economic unity of\nEurope must necessarily come--and with it, as a reaction, the pacivist\nmovement.\n\nA pacivist party, free from all sentimentality, which forbids its\nchildren to wage war; which forbids recourse to courts of justice;\nwhich forswears all fighting, all contradiction, and all persecution:\nfor a while the party of the oppressed, and later the powerful\nparty:--this party would be opposed to everything in the shape of\nrevenge and resentment.\n\nThere will also be a war party, exercising the same thoroughness and\nseverity towards itself, which will proceed in precisely the opposite\ndirection.\n\n\n749.\n\nThe princes of Europe should really consider whether as a matter of\nfact they can dispense with our services--with us, the immoralists. We\nare to-day the only power which can win a victory without allies: and\nwe are therefore far and away the strongest of the strong. We can even\ndo without lying, and let me ask what other power can dispense with\nthis weapon? A strong temptation fights for us; the strongest, perhaps,\nthat exists--the temptation of truth.... Truth? How do I come by this\nword? I must withdraw it: I must repudiate this proud word. But no. We\ndo not even want it--we shall be quite able to achieve our victory of\npower without its help. The real charm which fights for us, the eye\nof Venus which our opponents themselves deaden and blind--this charm\nis the magic of the extreme. The fascination which everything extreme\nexercises: we immoralists--we are in every way the extremists.\n\n\n750.\n\nThe corrupted ruling classes have brought ruling into evil odour. The\nState administration of justice is a piece of cowardice, because the\ngreat man who can serve as a standard is lacking. At last the feeling\nof insecurity becomes so great that men fall in the dust before any\nsort of will-power that commands.\n\n\n751.\n\n\"The will to power\" is so loathed in democratic ages that the whole of\nthe psychology of these ages seems directed towards its belittlement\nand slander. The types of men who sought the highest honours are said\nto have been Napoleon! C\u00e6sar! and Alexander!--as if these had not been\nprecisely the greatest _scorners_ of honour.\n\nAnd Helvetius would fain show us that we strive after power in order\nto have those pleasures which are at the disposal of the mighty--that\nis to say, according to him, this striving after power is the will to\npleasure--hedonism!\n\n\n752.\n\nAccording as to whether a people feels: \"the rights, the keenness of\nvision, and the gifts of leading, etc., are with the few\" or \"with the\nmany\"--it constitutes En oligarchic or a democratic community.\n\nMonarchy represents the belief in a man who is completely superior a\nleader, a saviour, a demigod.\n\nAristocracy represents the belief in a chosen few--in a higher caste.\n\nDemocracy represents the disbelief in all great men and in all elite\nsocieties: everybody is everybody else's equal, \"At bottom we are all\nherd and mob.\"\n\n\n753.\n\nI am opposed to Socialism because it dreams ingenuously of goodness,\ntruth, beauty, and equal rights (anarchy pursues the same ideal, but in\na more brutal fashion).\n\nI am opposed to parliamentary government and the power of the press,\nbecause they are the means whereby cattle become masters.\n\n\n754.\n\nThe arming of the people means in the end the arming of the mob.\n\n\n755.\n\nSocialists are particularly ridiculous in my eyes, because of their\nabsurd optimism concerning the \"good man\" who is supposed to be waiting\nin their cupboard, and who will come into being when the present\norder of society has been overturned and has made way for natural\ninstincts. But the opposing party is quite as ludicrous, because it\nwill not see the act of violence which lies beneath every law, the\nseverity and egoism inherent in every kind of authority. \"I and my kind\nwill rule and prevail. Whoever degenerates will be either expelled\nor annihilated.\"--This was the fundamental feeling of all ancient\nlegislation. The idea of a higher order of man is hated much more\nprofoundly than monarchs themselves. Hatred of aristocracy always uses\nhatred of monarchy as a mask.\n\n\n756.\n\nHow treacherous are all parties! They bring to light something\nconcerning their leaders which the latter, perhaps, have hitherto kept\nhidden beneath a bushel with consummate art.\n\n\n757.\n\nModern Socialism would fain create a profane counterpart to jesuitism:\neverybody a perfect instrument. But as to the object of it all, the\npurpose of it--this has not yet been ascertained.\n\n\n758.\n\n_The slavery of to-day_: a piece of barbarism. Where are the masters\nfor whom these slaves work? One must not always expect the simultaneous\nappearance of the two complementary castes of society.\n\nUtility and pleasure are slave theories of life.\n\n\"The blessing of work\" is an ennobling phrase for slaves. Incapacity\nfor leisure.\n\n\n759.\n\nThere is no such thing as a right to live, a right to work, or a right\nto be happy: in this respect man is not different from the meanest worm.\n\n\n760.\n\nWe must undoubtedly think of these things as uncompromisingly as Nature\ndoes: they preserve the species.\n\n\n761.\n\nWe should look upon the needs of the masses with ironic compassion:\nthey want something which we have got--Ah!\n\n\n762.\n\nEuropean democracy is only in a very slight degree the manifestation\nof unfettered powers. It represents, above all, the unfettering of\nlaziness, fatigue, and _weakness_.\n\n\n753.\n\n_Concerning the future of the workman_--Workmen men should learn to\nregard their duties as _soldiers_ do. They receive emoluments, incomes,\nbut they do not get wages!\n\nThere is no relationship between _work done_ and money received;\nthe individual should, _according to his kind,_ be so placed as to\n_perform_ the _highest_ that is compatible with his powers.\n\n\n764.\n\nNoblemen ought one day to live as the bourgeois do now--but above\nthem, distinguishing themselves by the simplicity of their wants--the\nsuperior caste will then live in a poorer and simpler way and yet be in\npossession of power.\n\nFor lower orders of mankind the reverse valuations hold good: it is a\nmatter of implanting \"virtues\" in them. Absolute commands, terrible\ncompulsory methods, in order that they may rise above mere ease in\nlife. The remainder may obey, but their vanity demands that they may\nfeel themselves dependent, not upon great men, but upon principles.\n\n\n765.\n\n\"_The Atonement of all Sin?_\"\n\nPeople speak of the profound injustice of the social arrangement, as\nit the fact that one man is born in favourable circumstances and that\nanother is born in unfavourable ones--or that one should possess gifts\nthe other has not, were on the face of it an injustice. Among the\nmore honest of these opponents of society this is what is said: \"We,\nwith all the bad, morbid, criminal qualities which we acknowledge we\npossess, are only the inevitable result of the oppression for ages of\nthe weak by the strong\"; thus they insinuate their evil natures into\nthe consciences of the ruling classes. They threaten and storm and\ncurse. They become virtuous from sheer indignation--they don't want\nto have become bad men and _canaille_ for nothing. The name for this\nattitude, which is an invention of the last century, is, if I am not\nmistaken, pessimism; and even that pessimism which is the outcome of\nindignation. It is in this attitude of mind that history is judged,\nthat it is deprived of its inevitable fatality, and that responsibility\nand even guilt is discovered in it. For the great desideratum is to\nfind guilty people in it. The botched and the bungled, the decadents\nof all kinds, are revolted at themselves, and require sacrifices\nin order that they may not slake their thirst for destruction upon\nthemselves (which might, indeed, be the most reasonable procedure). But\nfor this purpose they at least require a semblance of justification,\n_i.e._ a theory according to which the fact of their existence, and of\ntheir character, may be expiated by a scapegoat. This scapegoat may\nbe God,--in Russia such resentful atheists are not wanting,--or the\norder of society, or education and upbringing, or the Jews, or the\nnobles, or, finally, the well-constituted of every kind. \"It is a sin\nfor a man to have been born in decent circumstances, for by so doing\nhe disinherits the others, he pushes them aside, he imposes upon them\nthe curse of vice and of work.... How can I be made answerable for my\nmisery; surely some one must be responsible for it, or I could not bear\nto live.\"...\n\nIn short, resentful pessimism discovers responsible parties in order to\ncreate a pleasurable sensation for itself--revenge.... \"Sweeter than\nhoney\"--thus does even old Homer speak of revenge.\n\n***\n\nThe fact that such a theory no longer meets with understanding--or\nrather, let us say, contempt is accounted for by that particle of\nChristianity which still circulates in the blood of every one of us; it\nmakes us tolerant towards things simply because we scent a Christian\nsavour about them.... The Socialists appeal to the Christian instincts;\nthis is their really refined piece of cleverness.... Thanks to\nChristianity, we have now grown accustomed to the superstitious concept\nof a soul--of an immortal soul, of soul monads, which, as a matter of\nfact, hails from somewhere else, and which has only become inherent in\ncertain cases--that is to say, become incarnate in them--by accident:\nbut the nature of these cases is not altered, let alone determined by\nit. The circumstances of society, of relationship, and of history are\nonly accidents for the soul, perhaps misadventures: in any case, the\nworld is not their work. By means of the idea of soul the individual is\nmade transcendental; thanks to it, a ridiculous amount of importance\ncan be attributed to him.\n\nAs a matter of fact, it was Christianity which first induced the\nindividual to take up this position of judge of all things. It made\nmegalomania almost his duty: it has made everything temporary and\nlimited subordinate to eternal rights! What is the State, what is\nsociety, what are historical laws, what is physiology to me? Thus\nspeaks something from beyond Becoming, an immutable entity throughout\nhistory: thus speaks something immortal, something divine--it is the\nsoul!\n\nAnother Christian, but no less insane, concept has percolated even\ndeeper into the tissues of modern ideas: the concept of the equality\nof all souls before God. In this concept the prototype of all theories\nconcerning equal rights is to be found. Man was first taught to\nstammer this proposition religiously: later, it was converted into\na moral; no wonder he has ultimately begun to take it seriously, to\ntake it _practically_!--that is to say, politically, socialistically,\nresento-pessimistically.\n\nWherever responsible circumstances or people have been looked for,\nit was the _instinct of revenge_ that sought them. This instinct of\nrevenge obtained such an ascendancy over man in the course of centuries\nthat the whole of metaphysics, psychology, ideas of society, and, above\nall, morality, are tainted with it. Man has nourished this idea of\nresponsibility to such an extent that he has introduced the bacillus\nof vengeance into everything. By means of it he has made God Himself\nill, and killed innocence in the universe, by tracing every condition\nof things to acts of will, to intentions, to responsible agents. The\nwhole teaching of will, this most fatal fraud that has ever existed\nin psychology hitherto, was invented essentially for the purpose of\npunishment. It was the social utility of punishment that lent this\nconcept its dignity, its power, and its truth. The originator of that\npsychology, that we shall call volitional psychology, must be sought in\nthose classes which had the right of punishment in their hands; above\nall, therefore, among the priests who stood on the very pinnacle of\nancient social systems: these people wanted to create for themselves\nthe right to wreak revenge--they wanted to supply God with the\nprivilege of vengeance. For this purpose; man was declared \"free\": to\nthis end every action had to be regarded as voluntary, and the origin\nof every deed had to be considered as lying in consciousness. But by\nsuch propositions as these ancient psychology is refuted.\n\nTo-day, when Europe seems to have taken the contrary direction; when\nwe halcyonians would fain withdraw, dissipate, and banish the concept\nof guilt and punishment with all our might from the world; when our\nmost serious endeavours are concentrated upon purifying psychology,\nmorality, history, nature, social institutions and privileges, and\neven God Himself, from this filth; in whom must we recognise our most\nmortal enemies? Precisely in those apostles of revenge and resentment,\nin those who are _par excellence_ pessimists from indignation, who make\nit their mission to sanctify their filth with the name of \"righteous\nindignation.\"... We others, whose one desire is to reclaim innocence on\nbehalf of Becoming, would fain be the missionaries of a purer thought,\nnamely, that no one is responsible for man's qualities; neither God,\nnor society, nor his parents, nor his ancestors, nor himself--in\nfact, that no one is to blame for him ... The being who might be made\nresponsible for a man's existence, for the fact that he is constituted\nin a particular way, or for his birth in certain circumstances and\nin a certain environment, is absolutely lacking.--_And it is a great\nblessing that such a being is non-existent ..._. We are _not_ the\nresult of an eternal design, of a will, of a desire: there is no\nattempt being made with us to attain to an \"ideal of perfection,\" to\nan \"ideal of happiness,\" to an \"ideal of virtue,\"--and we are just as\nlittle the result of a mistake on God's part in the presence of which\nHe ought to feel uneasy (a thought which is known to be at the very\nroot of the Old Testament). There is not a place nor a purpose nor a\nsense to which we can attribute our existence or our kind of existence.\nIn the first place, no one is in a position to do this: it is quite\nimpossible to judge, to measure, or to compare, or even to deny the\nwhole universe! And why?--For five reasons, all accessible to the man\nof average intelligence: for instance, _because there is no existence\noutside the universe ..._ and let us say it again, this is a great\nblessing, for therein lies the whole innocence of our lives.\n\n\n\n2. The Individual.\n\n\n766.\n\n_Fundamental errors:_ to regard the _herd_ as an aim instead of\nthe individual! The herd is only a means and nothing _more_! But\nnowadays people are trying to understand _the herd_ as they would an\nindividual, and to confer higher rights upon it than upon isolated\npersonalities. Terrible mistake!! In addition to this, all that makes\nfor gregariousness, _e.g._ sympathy, is regarded as the _more valuable_\nside of our natures.\n\n\n767.\n\nThe individual is something quite _new,_ and capable of _creating\nnew things._ He is something absolute, and all his actions are quite\nhis own. The individual in the end has to seek the valuation for his\nactions in himself: because he has to give an individual meaning even\nto traditional words and notions. His interpretation of a formula is at\nleast personal, even if he does not create the formula itself: at least\nas an interpreter he is creative.\n\n\n768.\n\nThe \"ego\" oppresses and kills. It acts like an organic cell. It is\npredatory and violent. It would fain regenerate itself--pregnancy. It\nwould fain give birth to its God and see all mankind at its feet.\n\n\n769.\n\nEvery living organism gropes around as far as its power permits, and\novercomes all that is weaker than itself: by this means it finds\npleasure in its own existence. The _increasing \"humanity\"_ of this\ntendency consists in the fact that we are beginning to feel ever more\nsubtly how difficult it is really to _absorb_ others: while we could\nshow our power by injuring him, his will _estranges_ him from us, and\nthus makes him less susceptible of being overcome.\n\n\n770.\n\nThe degree of resistance which has to be continually overcome in order\nto remain _at the top,_ is the measure of _freedom,_ whether for\nindividuals or for societies: freedom being understood as positive\npower, as will to power. The highest form of individual freedom, of\nsovereignty, would, according to this, in all probability be found not\nfive feet away from its opposite--that is to say, where the danger of\nslavery hangs over life, like a hundred swords of Damocles. Let any one\ngo through the whole of history from this point of view: the ages when\nthe individual reaches perfect maturity, _i.e._ the free ages, when the\nclassical type, _sovereign man,_ is attained to--these were certainly\nnot humane times!\n\nThere should be no choice: either one must be uppermost or\nnethermost--like a worm, despised, annihilated, trodden upon. One\nmust have tyrants against one in order to become a tyrant, _i.e._ in\norder to be free. It is no small advantage to have a hundred swords of\nDamocles suspended over one: it is only thus that one learns to dance,\nit is only thus that one attains to any freedom in one's movements.\n\n\n771.\n\nMan more than any other animal was originally _altruistic_--hence\nhis slow growth (child) and lofty development. Hence, too, his\nextraordinary and latest kind of egoism.--Beasts of prey are much more\n_individualistic._\n\n\n772.\n\nA criticism of _selfishness._ The involuntary ingenuousness of La\nRochefoucauld, who believed that he was saying something bold, liberal,\nand paradoxical (in his days, of course, truth in psychological matters\nwas something that astonished people) when he said. \"_Les grandes \u00e2mes\nne sont pas celles qui ont moins de passions et plus de vertus que les\n\u00e2mes communes, mais seulement celles qui ont de plus grands desseins._\"\nCertainly, John Stuart Mill (who calls Chamfort the _noble_ and\nphilosophical La Rochefoucauld of the eighteenth century) recognises\nin him merely an astute and keen-sighted observer of all that which is\nthe result of habitual selfishness in the human breast, and he adds: \"A\nnoble spirit is unable to see the necessity of a constant observation\nof _baseness_ and _contemptibility_, unless it were to show against\nwhat corrupting influences a lofty spirit and a noble character were\nable to triumph.\"\n\n\n773.\n\n_The Morphology of the Feelings of Self._\n\n_First standpoint_--To what extent are _sympathy_ or _communal\nfeelings,_ the lower or preparatory states, at a time when personal\nself-esteem and initiative in valuation, on the part of individuals,\nare not yet possible?\n\n_Second standpoint._--To what extent is the zenith of collective\nself-esteem, the pride in the distinction of the clan, the feeling\nof inequality and a certain abhorrence of mediation, of equal rights\nand of reconciliation, the school for individual self-esteem? It may\nbe this in so far as it compels the individual to represent the pride\nof the community --he is obliged to speak and act with tremendous\nself-respect, because he stands for the community And the same\nholds good when the individual regards himself as the instrument or\nspeaking-tube of a godhead.\n\n_Third standpoint._--To what extent do these forms of impersonality\ninvest the individual with enormous importance? In so far as higher\npowers are using him as an intermediary: religious shyness towards\none's self is the condition of prophets and poets.\n\n_Fourth standpoint._--To what extent does responsibility for a whole\neducate the individual in foresight, and give him a severe and\nterrible hand, a calculating and cold heart, majesty of bearing and of\naction--things which he would not allow himself if he stood only for\nhis own rights?\n\nIn short, collective self-esteem is the great preparatory school\nfor personal sovereignty. The noble caste is that which creates the\nheritage of this faculty.\n\n\n774.\n\nThe disguised forms of will to power:--\n\n(1) _The desire for freedom,_ for independence for equilibrium,\nfor peace, for _co-ordination._ Also that of the anchorite, the\n\"Free-Spirit.\" In its lowest form, the will to live at all costs--the\ninstinct of self-preservation.\n\n(2) Subordination, with the view of satisfying the will to power of a\nwhole community; submissiveness, the making of one's self indispensable\nand useful to him who has the power; love, a secret path to the heart\nof the powerful, in order to become his master.\n\n(3) The feeling of duty, conscience, the imaginary comfort of belonging\nto a higher order than those who actually hold the reins of power;\nthe acknowledgment of an order of rank which allows of judging even\nthe more powerful, self-depreciation; the discovery of new _codes of\nmorality_ (of which the Jews are a classical example).\n\n\n775.\n\n_Praise and gratitude as forms of will to power.--_Praise and\ngratitude for harvests, for good weather, victories, marriages, and\npeace--all festivals need a subject on which feeling can be outpoured.\nThe desire is to make all good things that happen to one appear as\nthough they had been done to one: people will have a donor. The same\nholds good of the work of art: people are not satisfied with it\nalone, they must praise the artist.--What, then, is praise? It is a\nsort of compensation for benefits received, a sort of giving back,\na manifestation of _our_ power--for the man who praises assents to,\nblesses, values, _judges_. he arrogates to himself the right to give\nhis consent to a thing, to be able to confer honours. An increased\nfeeling of happiness or of liveliness is also an increased feeling\nof power, and it is as a result of this feeling that a man _praises_\n(it is as the outcome of this feeling that he invents a donor, a\n\"subject\"). Gratitude is thus revenge of a lofty kind: it is most\nseverely exercised and demanded where equality and pride both require\nto be upheld--that is to say, where revenge is practised to its fullest\nextent.\n\n\n776.\n\n_Concerning the Machiavellism of Power._\n\nThe _will to power_ appears:--\n\n_(a)_ Among the oppressed and slaves of all kinds, in the form of will\nto \"_freedom_\": the mere fact of breaking loose from something seems to\nbe an end in itself (in a religio-moral sense: \"One is only answerable\nto one's own conscience\"; \"evangelical freedom,\" etc. etc.),\n\n_(b)_ In the case of a stronger species, ascending to power, in the\nform of the will to overpower. If this fails, then it shrinks to the\n\"will to justice\"--that is to say, to the will to the same measure of\nrights as the ruling caste possesses.\n\n_(c)_ In the case of the strongest, richest, most independent, and\nmost courageous, in the form of \"love of humanity,\" of \"love of the\npeople,\" of the \"gospel,\" of \"truth\" of \"God,\" of \"pity,\" of self\nsacrifice,\" etc. etc.; in the form of overpowering, of deeds of\ncapture, of imposing service on some one, of an instinctive reckoning\nof one's self as part of a great mass of power to which one attempts\nto give a direction: the hero, the prophet, the C\u00e6sar, the Saviour,\nthe bell-wether. (The love of the sexes also belongs to this category,\nit will overpower something, possess it utterly, and it looks like\nself-abnegation. At bottom it is only the love of one's instrument, of\none's \"horse\"--the conviction that things belong to one because one is\nin a position to use them.)\n\n_\"Freedom,\" \"Justice,\" \"Love\"_!!!\n\n\n777.\n\n_Love._--Behold this love and pity of women--what could be more\negoistic? ... And when they do sacrifice themselves and their honour\nor reputation, to whom do they sacrifice themselves? To the man? Is it\nnot rather to an unbridled desire? These desires are quite as selfish,\neven though they may be beneficial to others and provoke gratitude.\n... To what extent can such a hyperf\u0153tation of one valuation sanctify\neverything else!!\n\n\n778.\n\n_\"Senses,\" \"Passions.\"._--When the fear of the senses and of the\npassions and of the desires becomes so great as to warn us against\nthem, it is already a symptom of _weakness:_ extreme measures always\ncharacterise abnormal conditions. That which is lacking here, or more\nprecisely that which is decaying, is the power to resist an impulse:\nwhen one feels instinctively that one must yield,--that is to say, that\none must react,--then it is an excellent thing to avoid opportunities\n(temptations).\n\nThe stimulation of the senses is only a temptation in so far as those\ncreatures are concerned whose systems are easily swayed and influenced:\non the other hand, in the case of remarkable constitutional obtuseness\nand hardness, strong stimuli are necessary in order to set the\nfunctions in motion. Dissipation can only be objected to in the case of\none who has no right to it; and almost all passions have fallen into\ndisrepute thanks to those who were not strong enough to convert them to\ntheir own advantage.\n\nOne should understand that passions are open to the same objections as\nillnesses: yet we should not be justified in doing without illnesses,\nand still less without passions. We require the abnormal; we give life\na tremendous shock by means of these great illnesses.\n\nIn detail the following should be distinguished:--\n\n(1) The _dominating passion,_ which may even bring the supremest form\nof health with it: in this case the co-ordination of the internal\nsystem and its functions to perform one task is best attained,--but\nthis is almost a definition of health.\n\n(2) The antagonism of the passions the double, treble, and multiple\nsoul in one breast:[6] this is very unhealthy; it is a sign of inner\nruin and of disintegration, betraying and promoting an internal dualism\nand anarchy--unless, of course, one passion becomes master. _Return to\nhealth._\n\n\n(3) The juxtaposition of passions without their being either opposed\nor united with one another. Very often transitory, and then, as soon\nas order is established, this condition may be a healthy one. A most\ninteresting class of men belong to this order, the chameleons; they are\nnot necessarily at loggerheads with themselves, they are both happy and\nsecure, but they cannot develop--their moods lie side by side, even\nthough they may seem to lie far apart. They change, but they become\nnothing.\n\n[Footnote 6: This refers to Goethe's _Faust._ In Part I., Act I., Scene\n11., we find Faust exclaiming in despair: \"Two souls, alas! within my\nbosom throne!\" See Theodore Martin's _Faust,_ translated into English\nverse.--Tr.]\n\n\n779.\n\nThe quantitative estimate of aims and its influence upon the valuing\nstandpoint, the _great_ and the _small_ criminal. The greatness or\nsmallness of the aims will determine whether the doer feels respect for\nhimself with it all, or whether he feels pusillanimous and miserable.\n\nThe degree of intellectuality manifested in the means employed may\nlikewise influence our valuation. How differently the philosophical\ninnovator, experimenter, and man of violence stands out against\nrobbers, barbarians, adventurers!--There is a semblance of\ndisinterestedness in the former.\n\nFinally, noble manners, bearing, courage, self-confidence,--how they\nalter the value of that which is attained by means of them!\n\n***\n\nConcerning the optics of valuation:--\n\nThe influence of the greatness or smallness of the aims.\n\nThe influence of the intellectuality of the means. The influence of the\nbehaviour in action. The influence of success or failure. The influence\nof opposing forces and their value. The influence of that which is\npermitted and that which is forbidden.\n\n\n780.\n\nThe tricks by means of which actions, measures, and passions are\nlegitimised, which from an individual standpoint are no longer good\nform or even in good taste.--\n\nArt, which allows us to enter such strange worlds, makes them tasteful\nto us.\n\nHistorians prove its justification and reason; travels, exoticism,\npsychology, penal codes, the lunatic asylum, the criminal, sociology.\n\nImpersonality (so that as media of a collective whole we allow\nourselves these passions and action--the Bar, juries, the bourgeois,\nthe soldier, the minister, the prince, society, \"critics\") makes us\nfeel that we are _sacrificing something._\n\n\n781.\n\nPreoccupations concerning one's self and one's eternal salvation are\nnot expressive either of a rich or of a self-confident nature, for the\nlatter lets all questions of eternal bliss go to the devil,--it is\nnot interested in such matters of happiness it is all power, deeds,\ndesires; it imposes itself upon things; it even violates things. The\nChristian is a romantic hypochondriac who does not stand firmly on his\nlegs.\n\nWhenever hedonistic views come to the front, one can always presuppose\nthe existence of pain and a certain ill-constitutedness.\n\n\n782.\n\n\"The growing autonomy of the individual\"--Parisian philosophers like\nM. Fouill\u00e9e talk of such things: they would do well to study the\n_race moutonni\u00e8re_ for a moment; for they belong to it. For Heaven's\nsake open your eyes, ye sociologists who deal with the future! The\nindividual grew strong under quite opposite conditions: ye describe the\nextremest weakening and impoverishment of man; ye actually want this\nweakness and impoverishment, and ye apply the whole lying machinery of\nthe old ideal in order to achieve your end. Ye are so constituted that\nye actually regard your gregarious wants as an ideal! Here we are in\nthe presence of an absolute lack of psychological honesty.\n\n\n783.\n\nThe two traits which characterise the modern European are apparently\nantagonistic _individualism and the demand for equal rights_: this I\nam at last beginning to understand. The individual is an extremely\nvulnerable piece of vanity: this vanity, when it is conscious of its\nhigh degree of susceptibility to pain, demands that every one should\nbe made equal; that the individual should only stand _inter pares_.\nBut in this way a social race is depicted in which, as a matter of\nfact, gifts and powers are on the whole equally distributed. The pride\nwhich would have loneliness and but few appreciators is quite beyond\ncomprehension: really \"great\" successes are only attained through the\nmasses--indeed, we scarcely understand yet that a mob success is in\nreality only a small success; because _pulchrum est paucorum hominum._\n\nNo morality will countenance order of rank among men, and the jurists\nknow nothing of a communal conscience. The principle of individualism\nrejects _really great_ men, and demands the most delicate vision for,\nand the speediest discovery of, a talent among people who are almost\nequal; and inasmuch as every one has some modicum of talent in such\nlate and civilised cultures (and can, therefore, expect to receive his\nshare of honour), there is a more general buttering-up of modest merits\nto-day than there has ever been. This gives the age the appearance of\n_unlimited justice._ Its want of justice is to be found not in its\nunbounded hatred of tyrants and demagogues, even in the arts; but in\nits detestation of noble natures who scorn the praise of the many. The\ndemand for equal rights (that is to say, the privilege of sitting in\njudgment on everything and everybody) is anti-aristocratic.\n\nThis age knows just as little concerning the absorption of the\nindividual, of his mergence into a great type of men who do not want to\nbe personalities. It was this that formerly constituted the distinction\nand the zeal of many lofty natures (the greatest poets among them); or\nof the desire to be a _polis,_ as in Greece; or of Jesuitism, or of\nthe Prussian Staff Corps, and bureaucracy; or of apprenticeship and a\ncontinuation of the tradition of great masters: to all of which things,\nnon-social conditions and the absence of _petty vanity_ are necessary.\n\n\n784.\n\n_Individualism_ is a modest and still unconscious form of will to\npower; with it a single human unit seems to think it sufficient to free\nhimself from the preponderating power of society (or of the State or\nChurch). He does not set himself up in opposition as a _personality,_\nbut merely as a unit; he represents the rights of all other individuals\nas against the whole. That is to say, he instinctively places himself\non a level with every other unit: what he combats he does not combat as\na person, but as a representative of units against a mass.\n\nSocialism is merely an agitatory measure of individualism: it\nrecognises the fact that in order to attain to something, men must\norganise themselves into a general movement--into a \"power.\" But what\nthe Socialist requires is not society as the object of the individual,\n_but society as a means of making many individuals possible_: this is\nthe instinct of Socialists, though they frequently deceive themselves\non this point (apart from this, however, in order to make their kind\nprevail, they are compelled to deceive others to an enormous extent).\nAltruistic moral preaching thus enters into the service of individual\negoism,--one of the most common frauds of the nineteenth century.\n\n_Anarchy_ is also merely an agitatory measure of Socialism; with it\nthe Socialist inspires fear, with fear he begins to fascinate and to\nterrorise: but what he does above all is to draw all courageous and\nreckless people to his side, even in the most intellectual spheres.\n\nIn spite of all this, individualism is the most modest stage of the\nwill to power.\n\n***\n\nWhen one has reached a certain degree of independence, one always\nlongs for more: separation in proportion to the degree of force;\nthe individual is no longer content to regard himself as equal to\neverybody, he actually _seeks for his peer_--he makes himself stand out\nfrom others. Individualism is followed by a development in groups and\norgans; correlative tendencies join up together and become powerfully\nactive: now there arise between these centres of power, friction,\nwar, a reconnoitring of the forces on either side, reciprocity,\nunderstandings, and the regulation of mutual services. Finally, there\nappears an order of rank.\n\nRecapitulation--\n\n1. The individuals emancipate themselves.\n\n2. They make war, and ultimately agree concerning equal rights (justice\nis made an end in itself).\n\n3. Once this is reached, the actual differences in degrees of power\nbegin to make themselves felt, and to a greater extent than before (the\nreason being that on the whole peace is established, and innumerable\nsmall centres of power begin to create differences which formerly were\nscarcely noticeable). Now the individuals begin to form groups, these\nstrive after privileges and preponderance, and war starts afresh in a\nmilder form.\n\nPeople demand freedom only when they have no power. Once power is\nobtained, a preponderance thereof is the next thing to be coveted; if\nthis is not achieved (owing to the fact that one is still too weak for\nit), then _\"justice\" i.e. \"equality_ of power\" become the objects of\ndesire.\n\n\n785.\n\n_The rectification of the concept \"egoism.\"_--When one has discovered\nwhat an error the \"individual\" is, and that every single creature\nrepresents the whole process of evolution (not alone \"inherited,\" but\nin \"himself\"), the individual then acquires _an inordinately great\nimportance._ The voice of instinct is quite right here. When this\ninstinct tends to decline, _i.e._ when the individual begins to seek\nhis worth in his services to others, one may be sure that exhaustion\nand degeneration have set in. An altruistic attitude of mind, when\nit is fundamental and free from all hypocrisy, is the instinct of\ncreating a second value for one's self in the service of other egoists.\nAs a rule, however, it is only apparent--a circuitous path to the\npreservation of one's own feelings of vitality and worth.\n\n\n786.\n\n_The History of Moralisation and Demoralisation._\n\n_Proposition one._--There are no such things as moral actions: they\nare purely imaginary. Not only is it impossible to demonstrate their\nexistence (a fact which Kant and Christianity, for instance, both\nacknowledged) but they are not even possible. Owing to psychological\nmisunderstanding, a man invented an _opposite_ to the instinctive\nimpulses of life, and believed that a new species of instinct was\nthereby discovered: a _primum mobile_ was postulated which does not\nexist at all. According to the valuation which gave rise to the\nantithesis \"moral\" and \"immoral,\" one should say: _There is nothing\nelse on earth but immoral intentions and actions._\n\n_Proposition two._----The whole differentiation, \"moral\" and \"immoral,\"\narises from the assumption that both moral and immoral actions are the\nresult of a spontaneous will--in short, that such a will exists; or in\nother words, that moral judgments can only hold good with regard to\nintuitions and actions _that are free._ But this whole order of actions\nand intentions is purely imaginary: the only world to which the moral\nstandard could be applied does not exist at all: _there is no such\nthing as a moral or an immoral action._\n\nThe _psychological error_ out of which the antithesis \"moral\" and\n\"immoral\" arose is: \"selfless,\" \"unselfish,\" \"self-denying\"--all unreal\nand fantastic.\n\nA false dogmatism also clustered around the concept \"ego\"; it was\nregarded as atomic, and falsely opposed to a non-ego; it was also\nliberated from Becoming, and declared to belong to the sphere of\nBeing. The false materialisation of the ego: this (owing to the belief\nin individual immortality) was made an article of faith under the\npressure of _religio-moral discipline._ According to this artificial\nliberation of the ego and its transference to the realm of the\nabsolute, people thought that they had arrived at an antithesis in\nvalues which seemed quite irrefutable--the single ego and the vast\nnon-ego. It seemed obvious that the value of the individual ego could\nonly exist in conjunction with the vast non-ego, more particularly in\nthe sense of being subject to it and existing only for its sake. Here,\nof course, the gregarious instinct determined the direction of thought:\nnothing is more opposed to this instinct than the sovereignty of the\nindividual. Supposing, however, that the ego be absolute, then its\nvalue must lie in _self-negation._\n\nThus: (1) the false emancipation of the \"individual\" as an atom;\n\n(2) The gregarious self-conceit which abhors the desire to remain an\natom, and regards it as hostile.\n\n(3) As a result: the overcoming of the individual by changing his aim.\n\n(4) At this point there appeared to be actions that were self-effacing:\naround these actions a whole sphere of antitheses was fancied.\n\n(5) It was asked, in what sort of actions does man most strongly\nassert himself? Around these (sexuality, covetousness, lust for power,\ncruelty, etc. etc.) hate, contempt, and anathemas were heaped: it\nwas believed that there could be such things as selfless impulses.\nEverything selfish was condemned, everything unselfish was in demand.\n\n(6) And the result was: what had been done? A ban had been placed\non the strongest, the most natural, yea, the only genuine impulses,\nhenceforward, in order that an action might be praiseworthy, there must\nbe no trace in it of any of those genuine impulses--_monstrous fraud\nin psychology._ Every kind of \"self-satisfaction\" had to be remodelled\nand made possible by means of misunderstanding and adjusting one's self\n_sub specie boni._ Conversely: that species which found its advantage\nin depriving mankind of its self-satisfaction, the representatives of\nthe gregarious instincts, _e.g._ the priests and the philosophers, were\nsufficiently crafty and psychologically astute to show how selfishness\nruled everywhere. The Christian conclusion from this was: \"Everything\nis sin, even our virtues. Man is utterly undesirable. Selfless actions\nare impossible.\" Original sin. In short, once man had opposed his\ninstincts to a purely imaginary world of the good, he concluded by\ndespising himself as incapable of performing \"good\" actions.\n\n_N.B._ In this way Christianity represents a step forward in the\nsharpening of psychological insight: La Rochefoucauld and Pascal. It\nperceived the essential equality of human actions, and the equality of\ntheir values as a whole (all immoral).\n\n***\n\nNow the first serious object was to rear men in whom self-seeking\nimpulses were extinguished. _priests, saints._ And if people doubted\nthat perfection was possible, they did not doubt what perfection was.\n\nThe psychology of the saint and of the priest and of the \"good\" man,\nmust naturally have seemed purely phantasmagorical. The real motive of\nall action had been declared bad: therefore, in order to make action\nstill possible, deeds had to be prescribed which, though not possible,\nhad to be declared possible and sanctified. They now honoured and\nidealised things with as much falsity as they had previously slandered\nthem.\n\nInveighing against the instincts of life came to be regarded as holy\nand estimable. The priestly ideal was: absolute chastity, absolute\nobedience, absolute poverty! The lay ideal: alms, pity, self-sacrifice,\nrenunciation of the beautiful, of reason, and of sensuality, and a dark\nfrown for all the strong qualities that existed.\n\n***\n\nAn advance is made: the slandered instincts attempt to re-establish\ntheir rights (_e.g._ Luther's Reformation, the coarsest form of\nmoral falsehood under the cover of \"Evangelical freedom\"), they are\nrechristened with holy names.\n\nThe calumniated instincts try to demonstrate that they are necessary in\norder that the virtuous instincts may be possible. _Il faut vivre, afin\nde vivre pour autrui:_ egoism as a means to an end.[7]\n\n\nBut people go still further: they try to grant both the egoistic and\naltruistic impulses the right to exist--equal rights for both--from the\nutilitarian standpoint.\n\nPeople go further: they see greater utility in placing the egoistic\nrights before the altruistic--greater utility in the sense of more\nhappiness for the majority, or of the elevation of mankind, etc. etc.\nThus the rights of egoism begin to preponderate, but under the cloak of\nan extremely altruistic standpoint--the collective utility of humanity.\n\nAn attempt is made to reconcile the altruistic mode of action with the\nnatural order of things. Altruism is sought in the very roots of life.\nAltruism and egoism are both based upon the essence of life and nature.\n\nThe disappearance of the opposition between them is dreamt of as a\nfuture possibility. Continued adaptation, it is hoped, will merge the\ntwo into one.\n\nAt last it is seen that altruistic actions are merely a species of the\negoistic--and that the degree to which one loves and spends one's self\nis a proof of the extent of one's individual power and personality. In\nshort, that the more evil man can be made, the better he is, and that\none cannot be the one without the other. At this point the curtain\nrises which concealed the monstrous fraud of the psychology that has\nprevailed hitherto.\n\n***\n\n_Results._--There are only immoral intentions and actions; the\nso-called moral actions must be shown to be immoral. All emotions are\ntraced to a single will, the will to power, and are called essentially\nequal. The concept of life: in the apparent antithesis good and evil,\ndegrees of power in the instincts alone are expressed. A temporary\norder of rank is established according to which certain instincts are\neither controlled or enlisted in our service. Morality is justified:\neconomically, etc.\n\n***\n\nAgainst proposition two.--Determinism: the attempt to rescue the moral\nworld by transferring it to the unknown.\n\nDeterminism is only a manner of allowing ourselves to conjure our\nvaluations away, once they have lost their place in a world interpreted\nmechanistically. Determinism must therefore be attacked and undermined\nat all costs: just as our right to distinguish between an absolute and\nphenomenal world should be disputed.\n\n[Footnote 7: Spencer's conclusion in the _Data of Ethics._--Tr.]\n\n\n787.\n\nIt is absolutely necessary to emancipate ourselves from motives:\notherwise we should not be allowed to attempt to sacrifice ourselves\nor to neglect ourselves! Only the innocence of Becoming gives us the\nhighest courage and the highest freedom.\n\n\n788.\n\nA clean conscience must be restored to the evil man--has this been my\ninvoluntary endeavour all the time? for I take as the evil man him\nwho is strong (Dostoievsky's belief concerning the convicts in prison\nshould be referred to here).\n\n\n789.\n\nOur new \"freedom.\" What a feeling of relief there is in the thought\nthat we emancipated spirits do not feel ourselves harnessed to any\nsystem of teleological aims. Likewise that the concepts reward and\npunishment have no roots in the essence of existence! Likewise that\ngood and evil actions are not good or evil in themselves, but only\nfrom the point of view of the self-preservative tendencies of certain\nspecies of humanity! Likewise that our speculations concerning pleasure\nand pain are not of cosmic, far less then of metaphysical, importance!\n(That form of pessimism associated with the name of Hartmann, which\npledges itself to put even the pain and pleasure of existence into\nthe balance, with its arbitrary confinement in the prison and within\nthe bounds of pre-Copernican thought, would be something not only\nretrogressive, but degenerate, unless it be merely a bad joke on the\npart of a \"Berliner.\"[8])\n\n[Footnote 8: \"Berliner\"--The citizens of Berlin are renowned in Germany\nfor their poor jokes.--Tr.]\n\n\n790.\n\nIf one is clear as to the \"wherefore\" of one's life, then the \"how\" of\nit can take care of itself.\n\n\nIt is already even a sign of disbelief in the wherefore and in the\npurpose and sense of life--in fact, it is a sign of a lack of\nwill--when the value of pleasure and pain step into the foreground,\nand hedonistic and pessimistic teaching becomes prevalent; and\nself-abnegation, resignation, virtue, \"objectivity,\" _may,_ at the very\nleast, be signs that the most important factor is beginning to make its\nabsence felt.\n\n\n791.\n\nHitherto there has been no German culture. It is no refutation of this\nassertion to say that there have been great anchorites in Germany\n(Goethe, for instance); for these had their own culture. But it was\nprecisely around them, as though around mighty, defiant, and isolated\nrocks, that the remaining spirit of Germany, _as their antithesis,_\nlay that is to say, as a soft, swampy, slippery soil, upon which every\nstep and every footprint of the rest of Europe made an impression and\ncreated forms. German culture was a thing devoid of character and of\nalmost unlimited yielding power.\n\n\n792.\n\nGermany, though very rich in clever and well-informed scholars, has\nfor some time been so excessively poor in great souls and in mighty\nminds, that it almost seems to have forgotten what a great soul or\na mighty mind is; and to-day mediocre and even ill-constituted men\nplace themselves in the market square without the suggestion of a\nconscience-prick or a sign of embarrassment, and declare themselves\ngreat men, reformers, etc. Take the case of Eugen D\u00fchring, for\ninstance, a really clever and well-informed scholar, but a man who\nbetrays with almost every word he says that he has a miserably small\nsoul, and that he is horribly tormented by narrow envious feelings;\nmoreover, that it is no mighty overflowing, benevolent, and spendthrift\nspirit that drives him on, but only the spirit of ambition! But to be\nambitious in such an age as this is much more unworthy of a philosopher\nthan ever it was: to-day, when it is the mob that rules, when it is the\nmob that dispenses the honours.\n\n\n793.\n\nMy \"future\": a severe polytechnic education. Conscription; so that as\na rule every man of the higher classes should be an officer, whatever\nelse he may be besides.\n\n\n\n\nIV.\n\nTHE WILL TO POWER IN ART.\n\n\n794.\n\nOur religion, morality, and philosophy are decadent human institutions.\nThe counter-agent. Art.\n\n\n795.\n\nThe _Artist-philosopher._ A higher concept of art. Can man stand at\nso great a distance from his fellows as to mould them? (Preliminary\nexercises thereto:--\n\n1. To become a self-former, an anchorite.\n\n2. To do what artists have done hitherto, _i.e._ to reach a small\ndegree of perfection in a certain medium.)\n\n\n796.\n\nArt as it appears without the artist, _i.e._ as a body, an organisation\n(the Prussian Officers' Corps, the Order of the Jesuits). To what\nextent is the artist merely a preliminary stage? The world regarded as\na self-generating work of art.\n\n\n797.\n\nThe phenomenon, \"artist,\" is the easiest to see through: from it one\ncan look down upon the fundamental instincts of power, of nature, etc.,\neven of religion and morality.\n\n\"Play,\" uselessness--as the ideal of him who is overflowing with power,\nas the ideal of the child. The childishness of God, \u03c0\u03b1\u1fd1\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b1\u03af\u03b6\u03c9\u03bd.\n\n\n798.\n\n_Apollonian, Dionysian._ There are two conditions in which art\nmanifests itself in man even as a force of nature, and disposes of\nhim whether he consent or not: it may be as a constraint to visionary\nstates, or it may be an orgiastic impulse. Both conditions are to be\nseen in normal life, but they are then somewhat weaker: in dreams and\nin moments of elation or intoxication.[9]\n\nBut the same contrast exists between the dream state and the state of\nintoxication; both of these states let loose all manner of artistic\npowers within us, but each unfetters powers of a different kind.\nDreamland gives us the power of vision, of association, of poetry:\nintoxication gives us the power of grand attitudes, of passion, of\nsong, and of dance.\n\n[Footnote 9: German: \"Rausch.\"--There is no word in English for the\nGerman expression \"Rausch.\" When Nietzsche uses it, he means a sort of\nblend of our two words: intoxication and elation.--Tr.]\n\n\n799.\n\nSexuality and voluptuousness belong to the Dionysiac intoxication:\nbut neither of them is lacking in the Apollonian state. There is also\na difference of tempo between the states.... _The extreme peace of\ncertain feelings of intoxication_ (or, more strictly, the slackening\nof the feeling of time, and the reduction of the feeling of space) is\nwont to reflect itself in the vision of the most restful attitudes\nand states of the soul. The classical style essentially represents\nrepose, simplification, foreshortening, and concentration--the _highest\nfeeling of power_ is concentrated in the classical type. To react with\ndifficulty: great consciousness: no feeling of strife.\n\n\n800.\n\nThe feeling of intoxication is, as a matter of fact, equivalent to a\nsensation of _surplus power_: it is strongest in seasons of rut: new\norgans, new accomplishments, new colours, new forms. Embellishment is\nan outcome of _increased power._ Embellishment is merely an expression\nof a triumphant will, of an increased state of co-ordination, of a\nharmony of all the strong desires, of an infallible and perpendicular\nequilibrium. Logical and geometrical simplification is the result of an\nincrease of power: conversely, the mere aspect of such a simplification\nincreases the sense of power in the beholder.... The zenith of\ndevelopment: the grand style.\n\nUgliness signifies _the decadence of a type_: contradiction and\nfaulty co-ordination among the inmost desires--this means a decline\nin the _organising_ power, or, psychologically speaking, in the will.\nThe condition of pleasure which is called intoxication is really\nan exalted feeling of power. ... Sensations of space and time are\naltered; inordinate distances are traversed by the eye, and only then\nbecome visible; the extension of the vision over greater masses and\nexpanses; the refinement of the organ which apprehends the smallest\nand most elusive things; divination, the power of understanding at the\nslightest hint, at the smallest suggestion; intelligent sensitiveness;\n_strength_ as a feeling of dominion in the muscles, as agility and\nlove of movement, as dance, as levity and quick time; strength as the\nlove of proving strength, as bravado, adventurousness, fearlessness,\nindifference in regard to life and death.... All these elated moments\nof life stimulate each other; the world of images and of imagination\nof the one suffices as a suggestion for the other: in this way states\nfinally merge into each other, which might do better to keep apart,\n_e.g._ the feeling of religious intoxication and sexual irritability\n(two very profound feelings, always wonderfully co-ordinated. What is\nit that pleases almost all pious women, old or young? Answer: a saint\nwith beautiful legs, still young, still innocent). Cruelty in tragedy\nand pity (likewise normally correlated). Spring-time, dancing, music,\n--all these things are but the display of one sex before the other,--as\nalso that \"infinite yearning of the heart\" peculiar to Faust.\n\nArtists when they are worth anything at all are men of strong\npropensities (even physically), with surplus energy, powerful animals,\nsensual; without a certain overheating of the sexual system a man like\nRaphael is unthinkable.... To produce music is also in a sense to\nproduce children; chastity is merely the economy of the artist, and\nin all creative artists productiveness certainly ceases with sexual\npotency.... Artists should not see things as they are; they should\nsee them fuller, simpler, stronger: to this end, however, a kind of\nyouthfulness, of vernality, a sort of perpetual elation, must be\npeculiar to their lives.\n\n\n801.\n\nThe states in which we transfigure things and make them fuller, and\nrhapsodise about them, until they reflect our own fulness and love\nof life back upon us: sexuality, intoxication, post-prandial states,\nspring, triumph over our enemies, scorn, bravado, cruelty, the ecstasy\nof religious feeling. But three elements above all are active:\n_sexuality, intoxication, cruelty_; all these belong to the oldest\n_festal joys_ of mankind, they also preponderate in budding artists.\n\nConversely: there are things with which we meet which already show\nus this transfiguration and fulness, and the animal world's response\nthereto is a state of excitement in the spheres where these states\nof happiness originate. A blending of these very delicate shades of\nanimal well-being and desires is the _\u00e6sthetic state._ The latter only\nmanifests itself in those natures which are capable of that spendthrift\nand overflowing fulness of bodily vigour; the latter is always the\n_primum mobile._ The sober-minded man, the tired man, the exhausted and\ndried-up man (_e.g._ the scholar), can have no feeling for art, because\nhe does not possess the primitive force of art, which is the tyranny\nof inner riches: he who cannot give anything away cannot feel anything\neither.\n\n_\"Perfection\"_--In these states (more particularly in the case of\nsexual love) there is an ingenuous betrayal of what the profoundest\ninstinct regards as the highest, the most desirable, the most valuable,\nthe ascending movement of its type; also of the condition towards which\nit is actually striving. Perfection: the extraordinary expansion of\nthis instinct's feeling of power, its riches, its necessary overflowing\nof all banks.\n\n\n802.\n\nArt reminds us of states of physical vigour: it may be the overflow and\nbursting forth of blooming life in the world of pictures and desires;\non the other hand, it may be an excitation of the physical functions by\nmeans of pictures and desires of exalted life--an enhancement of the\nfeeling of life, the latter's stimulant.\n\nTo what extent can ugliness exercise this power? In so far as it may\ncommunicate something of the triumphant energy of the artist who has\nbecome master of the ugly and the repulsive; or in so far as it gently\nexcites our lust of cruelty (in some circumstances even the lust of\ndoing harm to ourselves, self-violence, and therewith the feeling of\npower over ourselves).\n\n\n803.\n\n\"Beauty\" therefore is, to the artist, something which is above all\norder of rank, because in beauty contrasts are overcome, the highest\nsign of power thus manifesting itself in the conquest of opposites;\nand achieved without a feeling of tension: violence being no longer\nnecessary, everything submitting and obeying so easily, and doing so\nwith good grace; this is what delights the powerful will of the artist.\n\n\n804.\n\nThe biological value of _beauty_ and _ugliness._ That which we feel\ninstinctively opposed to us \u00e6sthetically is, according to the longest\nexperience of mankind, felt to be harmful, dangerous, and worthy of\nsuspicion: the sudden utterance of the \u00e6sthetic instinct, _e.g._ in the\ncase of loathing, implies an act of judgment. To this extent beauty\nlies within the general category of the biological values, useful,\nbeneficent, and life-promoting: thus, a host of stimuli which for\nages have been associated with, and remind us of, useful things and\nconditions, give us the feeling of beauty, _i.e._ the increase of the\nfeeling of power (not only things, therefore, but the sensations which\nare associated with such things or their symbols). In this way beauty\nand ugliness are recognised as determined by our most fundamental\nself-preservative values. Apart from this, it is nonsense to postulate\nanything as beautiful or ugly. Absolute beauty exists just as little\nas absolute goodness and truth. In a particular case it is a matter of\nthe self-preservative conditions of a certain type of man: thus the\ngregarious man will have quite a different feeling for beauty from the\nexceptional or super-man.\n\nIt is the optics of things in the foreground which only consider\nimmediate consequences, from which the value beauty (also goodness and\ntruth) arises.\n\nAll instinctive judgments are short-sighted in regard to the\nconcatenation of consequences: they merely advise what must be done\nforthwith. Reason is essentially an obstructing apparatus preventing\nthe immediate response to instinctive judgments: it halts, it\ncalculates, it traces the chain of consequences further.\n\nJudgments concerning beauty and ugliness are short-sighted (reason is\nalways opposed to them): but they are convincing in the highest degree;\nthey appeal to our instincts in that quarter where the latter decide\nmost quickly and say yes or no with least hesitation, even before\nreason can interpose.\n\nThe most common affirmations of beauty stimulate each other\nreciprocally; where the \u00e6sthetic impulse once begins to work, a\nwhole host of other and foreign perfections crystallise around the\n\"particular form of beauty.\" It is impossible to remain objective, it\nis certainly impossible to dispense with the interpreting, bestowing,\ntransfiguring, and poetising power (the latter is a stringing together\nof affirmations concerning beauty itself). The sight of a beautiful\nwoman....\n\nThus (1) judgment concerning beauty is short-sighted; it sees only the\nimmediate consequences.\n\n(2) It smothers the object which gives rise to it with a charm that is\ndetermined by the association of various judgments concerning beauty,\nwhich, however, are quite alien to the _essence of the particular\nobject._ To regard a thing as beautiful is necessarily to regard it\nfalsely (that is why incidentally love marriages are from the social\npoint of view the most unreasonable form of matrimony).\n\n\n805.\n\n_Concerning the genesis of Art._ That making perfect and seeing\nperfect, which is peculiar to the cerebral system overladen with sexual\nenergy (a lover alone with his sweetheart at eventide transfigures the\nsmallest details: life is a chain of sublime things, \"the misfortune\nof an unhappy love affair is more valuable than anything else\"); on\nthe other hand, everything perfect and beautiful operates like an\nunconscious recollection of that amorous condition and of the point of\nview peculiar to it--all perfection, and the whole of the beauty of\nthings, through contiguity, revives aphrodisiac bliss. (Physiologically\nit is the creative instinct of the artist and the distribution of\nhis semen in his blood.) The desire for art and beauty is an indirect\nlonging for the ecstasy; of sexual desire, which gets communicated to\nthe brain. The world become perfect through \"love.\"\n\n\n806.\n\n_Sensuality in its various disguises._--(1) As idealism (Plato), common\nto youth, constructing a kind of concave-mirror in which the image of\nthe beloved is an incrustation, an exaggeration, a transfiguration, an\nattribution of infinity to everything. (2) In the religion of love, \"a\nfine young man,\" \"a beautiful woman,\" in some way divine; a bridegroom,\na bride of the soul. (3) In art, as a decorating force, _e.g._ just as\nthe man sees the woman and makes her a present of everything that can\nenhance her personal charm, so the sensuality of the artist adorns an\nobject with everything else that he honours and esteems, and by this\nmeans perfects it (or idealises it). Woman, knowing what man feels\nin regard to her, tries to meet his idealising endeavours half-way\nby decorating herself, by walking and dancing well, by expressing\ndelicate thoughts: in addition, she may practise modesty, shyness,\nreserve--prompted by her instinctive feeling that the idealising\npower of man increases with all this, (In the extraordinary finesse\nof woman's instincts, modesty must not by any means be considered as\nconscious hypocrisy: she guesses that it is precisely artlessness and\nreal shame which seduces man most and urges him to an exaggerated\nesteem of her. On this account, woman is ingenuous, owing to the\nsubtlety of her instincts which reveal to her the utility of a state of\ninnocence. A wilful closing of one's eyes to one's self.... Wherever\ndissembling has a stronger influence by being unconscious it actually\nbecomes unconscious.)\n\n\n807.\n\nWhat a host of things can be accomplished by the state of intoxication\nwhich is called by the name of love, and which is something else\nbesides love!--And yet everybody has his own experience of this matter.\nThe muscular strength of a girl suddenly increases as soon as a man\ncomes into her presence: there are instruments with which this can be\nmeasured. In the case of a still closer relationship of the sexes,\nas, for instance, in dancing and in other amusements which society\ngatherings entail, this power increases to such an extent as to make\nreal feats of strength possible: at last one no longer trusts either\none's eyes, or one's watch! Here at all events we must reckon with the\nfact that dancing itself, like every form of rapid movement, involves\na kind of intoxication of the whole nervous, muscular, and visceral\nsystem. We must therefore reckon in this case with the collective\neffects of a double intoxication.--And how clever it is to be a little\noff your head at times! There are some realities which we cannot admit\neven to ourselves: especially when; we are women and have all sorts\nof feminine, _\"pudeurs.\"..._Those young creatures dancing over there\nare obviously beyond all reality: they are dancing only with a host\nof tangible ideals: what is more, they even see ideals sitting around\nthem, their mothers!... An opportunity for quoting _Faust._ They look\nincomparably fairer, do these pretty creatures, when they have lost\ntheir head a little; and how well they know it too, they are even more\ndelightful _because_ they know it! Lastly, it is their finery which\ninspires them; their finery is their third little intoxication. They\nbelieve in their dressmaker as in their God: and who would destroy this\nfaith in them? Blessed is this faith! And self-admiration is healthy!\nSelf-admiration can protect one even from cold! Has a beautiful woman,\nwho knew she was well-dressed, ever caught cold? Never yet on this\nearth! I even suppose a case in which she has scarcely a rag on her.\n\n\n808.\n\nIf one should require the most astonishing proof of how far the power\nof transfiguring, which comes of intoxication, goes, this proof is\nat hand in the phenomenon of love; or what is called love in all\nthe languages and silences of the world. Intoxication works to such\na degree upon reality in this passion that in the consciousness of\nthe lover the cause of his love is quite suppressed, and something\nelse seems to take its place,--a vibration and a glitter of all the\ncharm-mirrors of Circe.... In this respect to be man or an animal\nmakes no difference: and still less does spirit, goodness, or honesty.\nIf one is astute, one is befooled astutely; if one is thick-headed,\none is befooled in a thick-headed way. But love, even the love of\nGod, saintly love, \"the love that saves the soul,\" are at bottom all\none; they are nothing but a fever which has reasons to transfigure\nitself--a state of intoxication which does well to lie about itself....\nAnd, at any rate, when a man loves, he is a good liar about himself\nand to himself: he seems to himself transfigured, stronger, richer,\nmore perfect; he _is_ more perfect.... _Art_ here acts as an organic\nfunction: we find it present in the most angelic instinct \"love\";\nwe find it as the greatest stimulus of life--thus art is sublimely\nutilitarian, even in the fact that it lies.... But we should be wrong\nto halt at its power to lie: it does more than merely imagine; it\nactually transposes values. And it not only transposes the _feeling_\nfor values: the lover actually _has_ a greater value; he is stronger.\nIn animals this condition gives rise to new weapons, colours, pigments,\nand forms, and above all to new movements, new rhythms, new love-calls\nand seductions. In man it is just the same. His whole economy is\nricher, mightier, and _more complete_ when he is in love than when he\nis not. The lover becomes a spendthrift; he is rich enough for it. He\nnow dares; he becomes an adventurer, and even a donkey in magnanimity\nand innocence; his belief in God and in virtue revives, because he\nbelieves in love. Moreover, such idiots of happiness acquire wings and\nnew capacities, and even the door to art is opened to them.\n\nIf we cancel the suggestion of this intestinal fever from the lyric\nof tones and words, what is left to poetry and music? ... _L'art pour\nl'art_ perhaps; the professional cant of frogs shivering outside in\nthe cold, and dying of despair in their swamp.... Everything else was\ncreated by love.\n\n\n809.\n\nAll art works like a suggestion on the muscles and the senses which\nwere originally active in the ingenuous artistic man; its voice is only\nheard by artists--it speaks to this kind of man, whose constitution\nis attuned to such subtlety in sensitiveness. The concept \"layman\"\nis a misnomer. The deaf man is not a subdivision of the class, whose\nears are sound. All art works as a _tonic;_ it increases strength, it\nkindles desire _(i.e._ the feeling of strength), it excites all the\nmore subtle recollections of intoxication; there is actually a special\nkind of memory which underlies such states--a distant flitful world of\nsensations here returns to being.\n\nUgliness is the contradiction of art. It is that which art _excludes,_\nthe _negation_ of art: wherever decline, impoverishment of life,\nimpotence, decomposition, dissolution, are felt, however remotely, the\n\u00e6sthetic man reacts with his _No._ Ugliness _depresses_: it is the sign\nof depression. It _robs_ strength, it impoverishes, it weighs down, ...\nUgliness _suggests_ repulsive things. From one's states of health one\ncan test how an indisposition may increase one's power of fancying ugly\nthings. One's selection of things, interests, and questions becomes\ndifferent. Logic provides a state which is next of kin to ugliness:\nheaviness, bluntness. In the presence of ugliness equilibrium is\nlacking in a mechanical sense: ugliness limps and stumbles--the direct\nopposite of the godly agility of the dancer.\n\nThe \u00e6sthetic state represents an overflow _of means of communication_\nas well as a condition of extreme sensibility to stimuli and signs. It\nis the zenith of communion and transmission between living creatures;\nit is the source of languages. In it, languages, whether of signs,\nsounds, or glances, have their birthplace. The richer phenomenon is\nalways the beginning: our abilities are subtilised forms of richer\nabilities. But even to-day we still listen with our muscles, we even\nread with our muscles.\n\nEvery mature art possesses a host of conventions as a basis: in so\nfar as it is a language. Convention is a condition of great art,\n_not_ an obstacle to it.... Every elevation of life likewise elevates\nthe power of communication, as also the understanding of man. _The\npower of living in other people's souls_ originally had nothing to do\nwith morality, but with a physiological irritability of suggestion:\n\"sympathy,\" or what is called \"altruism,\" is merely a product of\nthat psycho-motor relationship which is reckoned as spirituality\n(psycho-motor induction, says Charles F\u00e9r\u00e9). People never communicate a\nthought to one another: they communicate a movement, an imitative sign\nwhich is then interpreted as a thought.\n\n\n810.\n\n_Compared with music,_ communication by means of words is a shameless\nmode of procedure; words reduce and stultify; words make impersonal;\nwords make common that which is uncommon.\n\n\n811.\n\nIt is exceptional states that determine the artist--such states as are\nall intimately related and entwined with morbid symptoms, so that it\nwould seem almost impossible to be an artist without being ill.\n\nThe physiological conditions which in the artist become moulded into a\n\"personality,\" and which, to a certain degree, may attach themselves to\nany man:--\n\n(1) Intoxication, the feeling of enhanced power; the inner compulsion\nto make things a mirror of one's own fulness and perfection.\n\n(2) The extreme sharpness of certain senses, so that they are capable\nof understanding a totally different language of signs--and to create\nsuch a language (this is a condition which manifests itself in some\nnervous diseases); extreme susceptibility out of which great powers of\ncommunion are developed; the desire to speak on the part of everything\nthat is capable of making-signs; a need of being rid of one's self by\nmeans of gestures and attitudes; the ability of speaking about one's\nself in a hundred different languages--in fact, a state of _explosion._\n\nOne must first imagine this condition as one in which there is a\npressing and compulsory desire of ridding one's self of the ecstasy of\na state of tension, by all kinds of muscular work and movement; also as\nan involuntary _co-ordination_ of these movements with inner processes\n(images, thoughts, desires)--as a kind of automatism of the whole\nmuscular system under the compulsion of strong stimuli acting from\nwithin; the inability to resist reaction; the apparatus of resistance\nis also suspended. Every inner movement (feeling, thought, emotion)\nis accompanied by _vascular changes,_ and consequently by changes in\ncolour, temperature, and secretion. The suggestive power of music, its\n\"_suggestion mentale._\"\n\n(3) _The compulsion to imitate:_ extreme irritability, by means of\nwhich a certain example becomes contagious--a condition is guessed\nand represented merely by means of a few signs.... A complete picture\nis visualised by one's inner consciousness, and its effect soon shows\nitself in the movement of the limbs,--in a certain suspension of the\n_will_ (Schopenhauer!!!!). A sort of blindness and deafness towards the\nexternal world,--the realm of admitted stimuli is sharply defined.\n\nThis differentiates the artist from the layman (from the spectator\nof art): the latter reaches the height of his excitement in the mere\nact of apprehending: the former in giving--and in such a way that\nthe antagonism between these two gifts is not only natural but even\ndesirable. Each of these states has an opposite standpoint--to demand\nof the artist that he should have the point of view of the spectator\n(of the critic) is equivalent to asking him to impoverish his creative\npower.... In this respect the same difference holds good as that which\nexists between the sexes: one should not ask the artist who gives to\nbecome a woman--to _\"receive.\"_\n\nOur \u00e6sthetics have hitherto been women's \u00e6sthetics, inasmuch as they\nhave only formulated the experiences of what is beautiful, from the\npoint of view of the receivers in art. In the whole of philosophy\nhitherto the artist has been lacking ... _i.e._ as we have already\nsuggested, a necessary fault: for the artist who would begin to\nunderstand himself would therewith begin to mistake himself--he must\nnot look backwards, he must not look at all; he must give.--It is an\nhonour for an artist to have no critical faculty; if he can criticise\nhe is mediocre, he is modern.\n\n\n812.\n\nHere I lay down a series of psychological states as signs of\nflourishing and complete life, which to-day we are in the habit of\nregarding as morbid. But, by this time, we have broken ourselves of\nthe habit of speaking of healthy and morbid as opposites: the question\nis one of degree, what I maintain on this point is that what people\ncall healthy nowadays represents a lower level of that which under\nfavourable circumstances actually would be healthy--that we are\nrelatively sick....\n\nThe artist belongs to a much stronger race. That which in us would be\nharmful and sickly, is natural in him. But people object to this that\nit is precisely the impoverishment of the machine which renders this\nextraordinary power of comprehending every kind of suggestion possible:\n_e.g._ our hysterical females.\n\nAn overflow of spunk and energy may quite as well lead to symptoms of\npartial constraint, sense hallucinations, peripheral sensitiveness,\nas a poor vitality does--the stimuli are differently determined, the\neffect is the same.... What is not the same is above all the ultimate\nresult; the extreme torpidity of all morbid natures, after their\nnervous eccentricities, has nothing in common with the states of the\nartist, who need in no wise repent his best moments.... He is rich\nenough for it all: he can squander without becoming poor.\n\nJust as we now feel justified in judging genius as a form of neurosis,\nwe may perhaps think the same of artistic suggestive power,--and\nour artists are, as a matter of fact, only too closely related to\nhysterical females!!! This, however, is only an argument against the\npresent day, and not against artists in general.\n\nThe inartistic states are: objectivity, reflection suspension of the\nwill ... (Schopenhauer's scandalous misunderstanding consisted in\nregarding art as a mere bridge to the denial of life)... The inartistic\nstates are: those which impoverish, which subtract, which bleach, under\nwhich life suffers--the Christian.\n\n\n813.\n\nThe modern artist who, in his physiology, is next of kin to the\nhysteric, may also be classified as a character belonging to this state\nof morbidness. The hysteric is false,--he lies from the love of lying,\nhe is admirable in all the arts of dissimulation,--unless his morbid\nvanity hood-wink him. This vanity is like a perpetual fever which is\nin need of stupefying drugs, and which recoils from no self-deception\nand no farce that promises it the most fleeting satisfaction. (The\nincapacity for pride and the need of continual revenge for his\ndeep-rooted self-contempt, this is almost the definition of this man's\nvanity.)\n\nThe absurd irritability of his system, which makes a crisis out of\nevery one of his experiences, and sees dramatic elements in the most\ninsignificant occurrences of life, deprives him of all calm reflection;\nhe ceases from being a personality, at most he is a rendezvous of\npersonalities of which first one and then the other asserts itself with\nbarefaced assurance. Precisely on this account he is great as an actor\n_i_ all these poor will-less people, whom doctors study so profoundly,\nastound one through their virtuosity in mimicking, in transfiguration,\nin their assumption of almost any character required.\n\n\n814.\n\nArtists are not men of great passion, despite all their assertions\nto the contrary both to themselves and to others. And for the\nfollowing two reasons: they lack all shyness towards themselves (they\nwatch themselves live, they spy upon themselves, they are much too\ninquisitive), and they also lack shyness in the presence of passion\n(as artists they exploit it). Secondly, however, that vampire, their\ntalent, generally forbids them such an expenditure of energy as passion\ndemands.--A man, who has a talent is sacrificed to that talent; he\nlives under the vampirism of his talent.\n\nA man does not get rid of his passion by reproducing it, but rather\nhe is rid of it if he is able to reproduce it. (Goethe teaches the\nreverse, but it seems as though he deliberately misunderstood himself\nhere--from a sense of delicacy.)\n\n\n815.\n\n_Concerning a reasonable mode of life._--.Relative, chastity, a\nfundamental and shrewd caution in regard to _erotica,_ even in thought,\nmay be a reasonable mode of life even in richly equipped and perfect\nnatures. But this principle applies more particularly to artists; it\nbelongs to the best wisdom of their lives. Wholly trustworthy voices\nhave already been raised in favour of this view, _e.g._ Stendhal, Th.\nGautier, and Flaubert. The artist is perhaps in his way necessarily\na sensual man, generally susceptible, accessible to everything, and\ncapable of responding to the remotest stimulus or suggestion of a\nstimulus. Nevertheless, as a rule he is in the power of his work, of\nhis will to mastership, really a sober and often even a chaste man. His\ndominating instinct will have him so: it does not allow him to spend\nhimself haphazardly. It is one and the same form of strength which is\nspent in artistic conception and in the sexual act: there is only one\nform of strength. The artist who yields in this respect, and who spends\nhimself, is betrayed: by so doing he reveals his lack of instinct, his\nlack of will in general. It may be a sign of decadence,--in any case it\nreduces the value of his art to an incalculable degree.\n\n\n816.\n\nCompared with the artist, the scientific man, regarded as a phenomenon,\nis indeed a sign of a certain storing-up and levelling-down of\nlife (but also of an increase of strength, severity, hardness, and\nwill-power). To what extent can falsity and indifference towards truth\nand utility be a sign of youth, of childishness, in the artist? ...\nTheir habitual manner, their unreasonableness, their ignorance of\nthemselves, their indifference to \"eternal values,\" their seriousness\nin play, their lack of dignity; clowns and gods in one; the saint and\nthe rabble.... Imitation as an imperious instinct.--Do not artists of\nascending life and artists of degeneration belong to all phases? ...\nYes!\n\n\n817.\n\nWould any link be missing in the whole chain of science and art, if\nwoman, if woman's work, were excluded from it? Let us acknowledge the\nexception--it proves the rule--that woman is capable of perfection in\neverything which does not constitute a work: in letters, in memoirs,\nin the most intricate handiwork--in short, in everything which is not\na craft; and just precisely because in the things mentioned woman\nperfects herself, because in them she obeys the only artistic impulse\nin her nature,--which is to captivate.... But what has woman to do\nwith the passionate indifference of the genuine artist who sees more\nimportance in a breath, in a sound, in the merest trifle, than in\nhimself?--who with all his five fingers gropes for his most secret\nand hidden treasures?--who attributes no value to anything unless\nit knows how to take shape (unless it surrenders itself, unless it\nvisualises itself in some way). Art as it is practised by artists--do\nyou not understand what it is? is it not an outrage on all _our\npudeurs? ..._ Only in this century has woman dared to try her hand at\nliterature (\"_Vers la canaille plumi\u00e8re \u00e9crivassi\u00e8re,\"_ to speak with\nold Mirabeau): woman now writes, she now paints, she is losing her\ninstincts. And to what purpose, if one may put such a question?\n\n\n818.\n\nA man is an artist to the extent to which he regards everything\nthat inartistic people call \"form\" as the actual substance, as the\n\"principal\" thing. With such ideas a man certainly belongs to a world\nupside down: for henceforward substance seems to him something merely\nformal,--his own life included.\n\n\n819.\n\nA sense for, and a delight in, nuances (which is characteristic of\nmodernity), in that which is not general, runs counter to the instinct\nwhich finds its joy and its strength in grasping what is typical: like\nGreek taste in its best period. In this there is an overcoming of the\nplenitude of life; restraint dominates, the peace of the strong soul\nwhich is slow to move and which feels a certain repugnance towards\nexcessive activity is defeated. The general rule, the law, is honoured\nand made prominent, conversely, the exception is laid aside, and shades\nare suppressed. All that which is firm, mighty, solid, life resting\non a broad and powerful basis, concealing its strength this pleases:\n_i.e._ it corresponds with what we think of ourselves.\n\n\n820.\n\nIn the main I am much more in favour of artists than any philosopher\nthat has appeared hitherto: artists, at least, did not lose sight of\nthe great course which life pursues; they loved the things \"of this\nworld,\"--they loved their senses. To strive after \"spirituality,\"\nin cases where this is not pure hypocrisy or self-deception, seems\nto me to be either a misunderstanding, a disease, or a cure, I wish\nmyself, and all those who live without the troubles of a puritanical\nconscience, and who are able to live in this way, an ever greater\nspiritualisation and multiplication of the senses. Indeed, we would\nfain be grateful to the senses for their subtlety, power, and\nplenitude, and on that account offer them the best we have in the way\nof spirit. What do we care about priestly and metaphysical anathemas\nupon the senses? We no longer require to treat them in this way: it\nis a sign of well-constitutedness when a man like Goethe clings with\never greater joy and heartiness to the \"things of this world\"--in this\nway he holds firmly to the grand concept of mankind, which is that man\nbecomes the glorifying power of existence when he learns to glorify\nhimself.\n\n\n821.\n\n_Pessimism in art?_--The artist gradually learns to like for their own\nsake, those means which bring about the condition of \u00e6sthetic elation;\nextreme delicacy and glory of colour, definite delineation, quality of\ntone; distinctness where in normal conditions distinctness is absent.\nAll distinct things, all nuances, in so far as they recall extreme\ndegrees of power which give rise to intoxication, kindle this feeling\nof intoxication by association;--the effect of works of art is the\nexcitation of the state which creates art, of \u00e6sthetic intoxication.\n\nThe essential feature in art is its power of perfecting\nexistence, its production of perfection and plenitude; art is\nessentially the affirmation, the blessing, and the deification of\nexistence.... What does a pessimistic art signify? Is it not a\n_contradictio_?--Yes.--Schopenhauer is in error when he makes certain\nworks of art serve the purpose of pessimism. Tragedy does not teach\n\"resignation.\" ... To represent terrible and questionable things\nis, in itself, the sign of an instinct of power and magnificence\nin the artist; he doesn't fear them.... There is no such thing as\na pessimistic, art.... Art affirms. Job affirms. But Zola? and the\nGoncourts?--the things they show us are ugly, their reason, however,\nfor showing them to us is their love of ugliness ... I don't care what\nyou say! You simply deceive yourselves if you think otherwise.--What a\nrelief Dostoievsky is!\n\n\n822.\n\nIf I have sufficiently initiated my readers into the doctrine that\neven \"goodness,\" in the whole comedy of existence, represents a form\nof exhaustion, they will now credit Christianity with consistency for\nhaving conceived the good to be the ugly. In this respect Christianity\nwas right.\n\nIt is absolutely unworthy of a philosopher to say that \"the good and\nthe beautiful are one\"; if he should add \"and also the true,\" he\ndeserves to be thrashed. Truth is ugly.\n\nArt is with us in order that we may not perish through truth.\n\n\n823.\n\nMoralising tendencies may be combated with art. Art is freedom from\nmoral bigotry and philosophy _\u00e0 la_ Little Jack Horner: or it may be\nthe mockery of these things. The flight to Nature, where beauty and\nterribleness are coupled. The concept of the great man.\n\n--Fragile, useless souls-de-luxe, which are disconcerted by a mere\nbreath of wind, \"beautiful souls.\"\n\n--Ancient ideals, in their inexorable hardness and brutality, ought to\nbe awakened, as the mightiest of monsters that they are.\n\n--We should feel a boisterous delight in the psychological perception\nof how all moralised artists become worms and actors without knowing it.\n\n--The falsity of art, its immorality, must be brought into the light of\nday.\n\n--The \"fundamental idealising powers\" (sensuality, intoxication,\nexcessive animality) should be brought to light.\n\n\n824.\n\nModern counterfeit practices in the arts: regarded as necessary--that\nis to say, as fully in keeping with the needs most proper to the modern\nsoul.\n\nThe gaps in the gifts, and still more in the education, antecedents,\nand schooling of modern artists, are now filled up in this way:--\n\n_First:_ A less artistic public is sought which is capable of unlimited\nlove (and is capable of falling on its knees before a personality).\nThe superstition of our century, the belief in \"genius,\" assists this\nprocess.\n\n_Secondly;_ Artists harangue the dark instincts of the dissatisfied,\nthe ambitious, and the self-deceivers of a democratic age: the\nimportance of poses.\n\n_Thirdly:_ The procedures of one art are transferred to the realm\nof another; the object of art is confounded with that of science,\nwith that of the Church, or with that of the interests of the race\n(nationalism), or with that of philosophy--a man rings all bells at\nonce, and awakens the vague suspicion that he is a god.\n\n_Fourthly:_ Artists flatter women, sufferers, and indignant folk.\nNarcotics and opiates are made to preponderate in art. The fancy of\ncultured people, and of the readers of poetry and ancient history, is\ntickled.\n\n\n825.\n\nWe must distinguish between the \"public\" and the \"select\"; to satisfy\nthe public a man must be a charlatan to-day, to satisfy the select he\n_will_ be a virtuoso and nothing else. The geniuses peculiar to our\ncentury overcame this distinction, they were great for both; the great\ncharlatanry of Victor Hugo and Richard Wagner was coupled with such\ngenuine virtuosity that it even satisfied the most refined artistic\nconnoisseurs. This is why greatness is lacking: these geniuses had a\ndouble outlook; first, they catered for the coarsest needs, and then\nfor the most refined.\n\n\n826.\n\nFalse \"accentuation\": (1) In romanticism, this unremitting\n\"_expressivo_\" is not a sign of strength, but of a feeling of\ndeficiency;\n\n(2) Picturesque music, the so-called dramatic kind, is above all\neasier (as is also the brutal scandalmongering and the juxtaposition of\nfacts and traits in realistic novels);\n\n(3) \"Passion\" as a matter of nerves and exhausted souls; likewise the\ndelight in high mountains, deserts, storms, orgies, and disgusting\ndetails,--in bulkiness and massiveness (historians, for instance); as a\nmatter of fact, there is actually a cult of exaggerated feelings (how\nis it that in stronger ages art desired just the opposite--a restraint\nof passion?);\n\n(4) The preference for exciting materials (_Erotica_ or _Socialistica_\nor _Pathologica_): all these things are the signs of the style\nof public that is being catered for to-day--that is to say, for\noverworked, absentminded, or enfeebled people.\n\nSuch people must be tyrannised over in order to be affected.\n\n\n827.\n\nModern art is the art of tyrannising. A coarse and salient definiteness\nin delineation; the motive simplified into a formula; formul\u00e6\ntyrannise. Wild arabesques within the lines; overwhelming masses,\nbefore which the senses are confused; brutality in coloration, in\nsubject-matter, in the desires. Examples: Zola, Wagner, and, in a more\nspiritualised degree, Taine. Hence logic, massiveness, and brutality.\n\n\n828.\n\nIn regard to the painter: _Tous ces modernes sont des po\u00e8tes qui ont\nvoulu \u00eatre peintres, L'un a cherch\u00e9 des drames dans l'histoire,\nl'autre des sc\u00e8nes de m\u0153urs, celui ci traduit des religions, celui\nl\u00e0 une philosophie._ One imitates Raphael, another the early Italian\nmasters. The landscapists employ trees and clouds in order to make odes\nand elegies. Not one is simply a painter; they are all arch\u00e6ologists,\npsychologists, and impresarios of one or another kind of event or\ntheory. They enjoy our erudition and our philosophy. Like us, they are\nfull, and too full, of general ideas. They like a form, not because it\nis what it is, but because of what it expresses. They are the scions of\na learned, tormented, and reflecting generation, a thousand miles away\nfrom the Old Masters who never read, and only concerned themselves with\nfeasting their eyes.\n\n\n829.\n\nAt bottom, even Wagner's music, in so far as it stands for the whole\nof French romanticism, is literature: the charm of exoticism (strange\ntimes, customs, passions), exercised upon sensitive cosy-corner people.\nThe delight of entering into extremely distant and prehistoric lands to\nwhich books lead one, and by which means the whole horizon is painted\nwith new colours and new possibilities.... Dreams of still more distant\nand unexploited worlds; disdain of the boulevards. ... For Nationalism,\nlet us not deceive ourselves, is also only a form of exoticism....\nRomantic musicians merely relate what exotic books have made of them:\npeople would fain experience exotic sensations and passions according\nto Florentine and Venetian taste; finally they are satisfied to look\nfor them in an image.... The essential factor is the kind of novel\ndesire, the desire to imitate, the desire to live as people have\nlived once before in the past, and the disguise and dissimulation of\nthe soul.... Romantic art is only an emergency exit from defective\n\"reality.\"\n\nThe attempt to perform new things: revolution, Napoleon. Napoleon\nrepresents the passion of new spiritual possibilities, of an extension\nof the soul's domain.\n\nThe greater the debility of the will, the greater the extravagances in\nthe desire to feel, to represent, and to dream new things.--The result\nof the excesses which have been indulged in: an insatiable thirst for\nunrestrained feelings.... Foreign literatures afford the strongest\nspices.\n\n\n830.\n\nWinckelmann's and Goethe's Greeks, Victor Hugo's Orientals, Wagner's\nEdda characters, Walter Scott's Englishmen of the thirteenth\ncentury--some day the whole comedy will be exposed! All of it was\ndisproportionately historical and false, _but_--modern.\n\n\n831.\n\nConcerning the characteristics of national genius in regard to the\nstrange and to the borrowed--\n\nEnglish genius vulgarises and makes realistic everything it sees;\n\nThe French whittles down, simplifies, rationalises, embellishes;\n\nThe German muddles, compromises, involves, and infects everything with\nmorality;\n\nThe Italian has made by far the freest and most subtle use of borrowed\nmaterial, and has enriched it with a hundred times more beauty than\nit ever drew out of it: it is the richest genius, it had the most to\nbestow.\n\n\n832.\n\nThe Jews, with Heinrich Heine and Offenbach, approached genius in\nthe sphere of art. The latter was the most intellectual and most\nhigh-spirited satyr, who as a musician abided by great tradition,\nand who, for him who has something more than ears, is a real relief\nafter the sentimental and, at bottom, degenerate musicians of German\nromanticism.\n\n\n833.\n\n_Offenbach;_ trench music imbued with Voltaire's intellect, free,\nwanton, with a slight sardonic grin, but clear and intellectual almost\nto the point of banality (Offenbach never titivates), and free from the\n_mignardise_ of morbid or blond-Viennese sensuality.\n\n\n834.\n\nIf by artistic genius we understand the most consummate freedom\nwithin the law, divine ease, and facility in overcoming the greatest\ndifficulties, then Offenbach has even more right to the title genius\nthan Wagner has. Wagner is heavy and clumsy: nothing is more foreign to\nhim than the moments of wanton perfection which this clown Offenbach\nachieves as many as five times, six times, in nearly every one of his\nbuffooneries. But by genius we ought perhaps to understand something\nelse.\n\n\n835.\n\n_Concerning \"music.\"_--French, German, and Italian music. (Our most\ndebased periods in a political sense are our most productive. The\nSlavs?)--The ballet, which is the outcome of excessive study of the\nhistory of strange civilisations, has become master of opera.--Stage\nmusic and musicians music.--It is an error to suppose that what Wagner\ncomposed was _a. form_: it was rather formlessness. The possibilities\nof dramatic construction have yet to be discovered.--Rhythm.\n\"Expression\" at all costs. Harlotry in instrumentation.--All honour to\nHeinrich Sch\u00fctz; all honour to Mendelssohn: in them we find an element\nof Goethe, but nowhere else! (We also find another element of Goethe\ncoming to blossom in Rahel; a third element in Heinrich Heine.)\n\n\n836.\n\nDescriptive music leaves reality to work its effects alone.... All\nthese kinds of art are easier, and more easy to imitate; poorly gifted\npeople have recourse to them. The appeal to the instincts; suggestive\nart.\n\n\n837.\n\n_Concerning our modern music._--The decay of melody, like the decay\nof \"ideas,\" and of the freedom of intellectual activity, is a piece\nof clumsiness and obtuseness, which is developing itself into new\nfeats of daring and even into principles;--in the end man has only the\nprinciples of his gifts, or of his lack of gifts.\n\n\"Dramatic music\"--nonsense! It is simply bad music.... \"Feeling\" and\n\"passion\" are merely substitutes when lofty intellectuality and the\njoy of it (_e.g._ Voltaire's) can no longer be attained. Expressed\ntechnically, feeling and \"passion\" are easier; they presuppose a much\npoorer kind of artist. The recourse to drama betrays that an artist is\nmuch more a master in tricky means than in genuine ones. To-day we have\nboth dramatic painting and dramatic poetry, etc.\n\n\n838.\n\nWhat we lack in music is an \u00e6sthetic which would impose laws upon\nmusicians and give them a conscience; and as a result of this we lack\na real contest concerning \"principles.\"--For as musicians we laugh\nat Herbart's velleities in this department just as heartily as we\nlaugh at Schopenhauer's. As a matter of fact, tremendous difficulties\npresent themselves here. We no longer know on what basis to found our\nconcepts of what is exemplary, masterly, perfect. With the instincts\nof old loves and old admiration we grope about in a realm of values,\nand we almost believe, \"that is good which pleases us\".... I am always\nsuspicious when I hear people everywhere speak innocently of Beethoven\nas a \"classic\"; what I would maintain, and with some seventy, is that,\nin other arts, a classic is the very reverse of Beethoven. But when\nthe complete and glaring dissolution of style, Wagner's so-called\ndramatic style, is taught and honoured as exemplary, as masterly, as\nprogressive, then my impatience exceeds all bounds. Dramatic style in\nmusic, as Wagner understood it, is simply renunciation of all style\nwhatever; it is the assumption that something else, namely, drama, is a\nhundred times more important than music. Wagner can paint; he does not\nuse music for the sake of music, with it he accentuates attitudes; he\nis a poet. Finally he made an appeal to beautiful feelings and heaving\nbreasts, just as all other theatrical artists have done, and with it\nall he converted women and even those whose souls thirst for culture\nto him. But what do women and the uncultured care about music? All\nthese people have no conscience for art: none of them suffer when the\nfirst and fundamental virtues of an art are scorned and trodden upon in\nfavour of that which is merely secondary (as _ancilla dramaturgica_).\nWhat good can come of all extension in the means of expression, when\nthat which is expressed, art itself, has lost all its law and order?\nThe picturesque pomp and power of tones, the symbolism of sound,\nrhythm, the colour effects of harmony and discord, the suggestive\nsignificance of music, the whole sensuality of this art which Wagner\nmade prevail--it is all this that Wagner derived, developed, and drew\nout of music. Victor Hugo did something very similar for language: but\nalready people in France are asking themselves, in regard to the case\nof Victor Hugo, whether language was not corrupted by him, whether\nreason, intellectuality, and thorough conformity to law in language\nare not suppressed when the sensuality of expression is elevated to a\nhigh place? Is it not a sign of decadence that the poets in France have\nbecome plastic artists, and that the musicians of Germany have become\nactors and culturemongers?\n\n\n839.\n\nTo-day there exists a sort of musical pessimism even among people\nwho are not musicians. Who has not met and cursed the confounded\nyouthlet who torments his piano until it shrieks with despair,\nand who single-handed heaves the slime of the most lugubrious and\ndrabby harmonies before him? By so doing a man betrays himself as a\npessimist.... It is open to question, though, whether he also proves\nhimself a musician by this means. I for my part could never be made\nto believe it. Wagnerite _pur sang_ is unmusical, he submits to the\nelementary forces of music very much as a woman submits to the will\nof the man who hypnotises her--and in order to be able to do this he\nmust not be made suspicious _in rebus musicis et musicantibus_ by a\ntoo severe or too delicate conscience. I said \"very much as\"--but in\nthis respect I spoke perhaps more than a parable. Let any one consider\nthe means which Wagner uses by preference, when he wishes to make an\neffect (means which for the greater part he first had to invent), they\nare appallingly similar to the means by which a hypnotist exercises\nhis power (the choice of his movements, the general colour of his\norchestration; the excruciating evasion of consistency, and fairness\nand squareness, in rhythm; the creepiness, the soothing touch, the\nmystery, the hysteria of his \"unending melody\"). And is the condition\nto which the overture to _Lohengrin,_ for instance, reduces the men,\nand still more the women, in the audience, so essentially different\nfrom the somnambulistic trance? On one occasion after the overture in\nquestion had been played, I heard an Italian lady say, with her eyes\nhalf closed, in a way in which female Wagnerites are adepts: \"_Come si\ndorme con questa musica!_\"[10]\n\n[Footnote 10: \"How the music makes one sleep!\"--Tr.]\n\n\n840.\n\n_Religion in music._--What a large amount of satisfaction all religious\nneeds get out of Wagnerian music, though this is never acknowledged\nor even understood! How much prayer, virtue, unction, virginity,\nsalvation, speaks through this music!... Oh what capital this cunning\nsaint, who leads and seduces us back to everything that was once\nbelieved in, makes out of the fact that he may dispense with words\nand concepts! ... Our intellectual conscience has no need to feel\nashamed--it stands apart--if any old instinct puts its trembling lips\nto the rim of forbidden philtres.... This is shrewd and healthy, and,\nin so far as it betrays a certain shame in regard to the satisfaction\nof the religious instinct, it is even a good sign.... Cunning\nChristianity: the type of the music which came from the \"last Wagner.\"\n\n\n841.\n\nI distinguish between courage before persons, courage before things,\nand courage on paper. The latter was the courage of David Strauss, for\ninstance. I distinguish again between the courage before witnesses\nand the courage without witnesses: the courage of a Christian, or\nof believers in God in general, can never be the courage without\nwitnesses--but on this score alone Christian courage stands condemned.\nFinally, I distinguish between the courage which is temperamental and\nthe courage which is the fear of fear; a single instance of the latter\nkind is moral courage. To this list the courage of despair should be\nadded.\n\nThis is the courage which Wagner possessed. His attitude in regard to\nmusic was at bottom a desperate one. He lacked two things which go\nto make up a good musician: nature and nurture, the predisposition\nfor music and the discipline and schooling which music requires. He\nhad courage: out of this deficiency he established a principle; he\ninvented a kind of music for himself. The dramatic music which he\ninvented was the music which he was able to compose,--its limitations\nare Wagner's limitations.\n\nAnd he was misunderstood!--Was he really misunderstood?... Such is\nthe case with five-sixths of the artists of to-day. Wagner is their\nSaviour: five-sixths, moreover, is the \"lowest proportion.\" In any case\nwhere Nature has shown herself without reserve, and wherever culture is\nan accident, a mere attempt, a piece of dilettantism, the artist turns\ninstinctively--what do I say?--I mean enthusiastically, to Wagner; as\nthe poet says: \"Half drew he him, and half sank he.\"[11]\n\n[Footnote 11: This is an adapted quotation from Goethe's poem, \"The\nFisherman.\" The translation is E. A. Bowring's.--Tr.]\n\n\n842.\n\n\"Music\" and the grand style. The greatness of an artist is not to be\nmeasured by the beautiful feelings which he evokes: let this belief\nbe left to the girls. It should be measured according to the extent\nto which he approaches the grand style, according to the extent to\nwhich he is capable of the grand style. This style and great passion\nhave this in common--that they scorn to please; that they forget to\npersuade; that they command: that they will.... To become master of\nthe chaos which is in one; to compel one's inner chaos to assume form;\nto become consistent, simple, unequivocal, mathematical, law this is\nthe great ambition here. By means of it one repels; nothing so much\nendears people to such powerful men as this,--a desert seems to lie\naround them, they impose silence upon all, and awe every one with the\ngreatness Of their sacrilege.... All arts know this kind of aspirant to\nthe grand style: why are they absent in music? Never yet has a musician\nbuilt as that architect did who erected the Palazzo Pitti.... This is a\nproblem. Does music perhaps belong to that culture in which the reign\nof powerful men of various types is already at an end? Is the concept\n\"grand style\" in fact a contradiction of the soul of music,--of \"the\nWoman\" in our music? ...\n\nWith this I touch upon the cardinal question: how should all our music\nbe classified? The age of classical taste knows nothing that can be\ncompared with it: it bloomed when the world of the Renaissance reached\nits evening, when \"freedom\" had already bidden farewell to both men and\ntheir customs--is it characteristic of music to be Counter-Renaissance?\nIs music, perchance, the sister of the baroque style, seeing that in\nany case they were contemporaries? Is not music, modern music, already\ndecadence? ...\n\nI have put my finger before on this question: whether music is not an\nexample of Counter-Renaissance art? whether it is not the next of kin\nto the baroque style? whether it has not grown in Opposition to all\nclassic taste, so that any aspiration to classicism is forbidden by the\nvery nature of music?\n\nThe answer to this most important of all questions of values would\nnot be a very doubtful one, if people thoroughly understood the\nfact that music attains to its highest maturity and plenitude as\nromanticism--likewise as a reactionary movement against classicism.\n\nMozart, a delicate and lovable soul, but quite eighteenth century,\neven in his serious lapses ... Beethoven, the first great romanticist\naccording to the French conception of romanticism, just as Wagner is\nthe last great romanticist ... both of them are instinctive opponents\nof classical taste, of severe style--not to speak of \"grand\" in this\nregard.\n\n\n843.\n\nRomanticism: an ambiguous question, like all modern questions.\n\nThe \u00e6sthetic conditions are twofold:--\n\nThe abundant and generous, as opposed to the seeking and the desiring.\n\n\n844.\n\nA romanticist is an artist whose great dissatisfaction with himself\nmakes him productive--; who looks away from himself and his fellows,\nand sometimes, therefore, looks backwards.\n\n\n845.\n\nIs art the result of dissatisfaction with reality? or is it the\nexpression of gratitude for happiness experienced? In the first case,\nit is romanticism; in the second, it is glorification and dithyramb\n(in short, apotheosis art): even Raphael belongs to this, except for\nthe fact that he was guilty of the duplicity of having defied the\nappearance of the Christian view of the world. He was thankful for life\nprecisely where it was not exactly Christian.\n\nWith a moral interpretation the world is insufferable; Christianity was\nthe attempt to overcome the world with morality: _i.e._ to deny it.\n_In praxi_ such a mad experiment--an imbecile elevation of man above\nthe world--could only end in the beglooming, the dwarfing, and the\nimpoverishment of mankind: the only kind of man who gained anything by\nit, who was promoted by it, was the most mediocre, the most harmless\nand gregarious type.\n\nHomer as an apotheosis artist; Rubens also. Music has not yet had such\nan artist.\n\nThe idealisation of the great criminal (the feeling for his greatness)\nis Greek; the depreciation, the slander, the contempt of the sinner, is\nJud\u00e6o-Christian.\n\n\n846.\n\nRomanticism and its opposite. In regard to all \u00e6sthetic values I now\navail myself of this fundamental distinction: in every individual\ncase I ask myself has hunger or has superabundance been creative\nhere? At first another distinction might perhaps seem preferable, it\nis far more obvious,--_e.g._ the distinction which decides whether a\ndesire for stability, for eternity, for Being, or whether a desire for\ndestruction, for change, for Becoming, has been the cause of creation.\nBut both kinds of desire, when examined more closely, prove to be\nambiguous, and really susceptible of interpretation only according to\nthat scheme already mentioned and which I think is rightly preferred.\n\nThe desire for destruction, for change, for Becoming, may be the\nexpression of an overflowing power pregnant with promises for the\nfuture (my term for this, as is well known, is Dionysian); it may,\nhowever, also be the hate of the ill-constituted, of the needy and of\nthe physiologically botched, that destroys, and must destroy, because\nsuch creatures are indignant at, and annoyed by everything lasting and\nstable.\n\nThe act of immortalising can, on the other hand, be the outcome\nof gratitude and love: an art which has this origin is always an\napotheosis art; dithyrambic, as perhaps with Rubens, happy, as perhaps\nwith Hafiz; bright and gracious, and shedding a ray of glory over all\nthings, as in Goethe. But it may also, however, be the outcome of the\ntyrannical will of the great sufferer who would make the most personal,\nindividual, and narrow trait about him, the actual idiosyncrasy of his\npain--in fact, into a binding law and imposition, and who thus wreaks\nhis revenge upon all things by stamping, branding, and violating them\nwith the image of his torment. The latter case is romantic pessimism\nin its highest form, whether this be Schopenhauerian voluntarism or\nWagnerian music.\n\n\n847.\n\nIt is a question whether the antithesis, classic and romantic, does not\nconceal that other antithesis, the active and the reactive.\n\n\n848.\n\nIn order to be a classic, one must be possessed of all the strong and\napparently contradictory gifts and passions: but in such a way that\nthey run in harness together, and culminate simultaneously in elevating\na certain species of literature or art or politics to its height and\nzenith (they must not do this after that elevation has taken place\n...). They must reflect the complete state (either of a people or of\na culture), and express its most profound and most secret nature,\nat a time when it is still stable and not yet discoloured by the\nimitation of foreign things (or when it is still dependent ...); not\na reactive but a deliberate and progressive spirit, saying Yea in all\ncircumstances, even in its hate.\n\n\"And does not the highest personal value belong thereto?\" It is worth\nconsidering whether moral prejudices do not perhaps exercise their\ninfluence here, and whether great moral loftiness is not perhaps a\ncontradiction of the classical? ... Whether the moral monsters must\nnot necessarily be romantic in word and deed? Any such preponderance\nof one virtue over others (as in the case of the moral monster) is\nprecisely what with most hostility counteracts the classical power in\nequilibrium, supposing a people manifested this moral loftiness and\nwere classical notwithstanding, we should have to conclude boldly that\nthey were also on the same high level in immorality! this was perhaps\nthe case with Shakespeare (provided that he was really Lord Bacon).\n\n\n849.\n\n_Concerning the future. Against the romanticism of great passion._--We\nmust understand how a certain modicum of coldness, lucidity,\nand hardness is inseparable from all classical taste: above all\nconsistency, happy intellectuality, \"the three unities,\" concentration,\nhatred of all feeling, of all sentimentality, of all _esprit,_\nhatred of all multiformity, of all uncertainty, evasiveness, and of\nall nebulosity, as also of all brevity, finicking, prettiness and\ngood nature. Artistic formul\u00e6 must not be played with: life must be\nremodelled so that it should be forced to formulate itself accordingly.\n\nIt is really an exhilarating spectacle which we have only learned\nto laugh at quite recently, because we have only seen through it\nquite recently: this spectacle of Herder's, Winckelmann's, Goethe's,\nand Hegel's contemporaries claiming that they had rediscovered the\nclassical ideal ... and at the same time, Shakespeare! And this same\ncrew of men had scurvily repudiated all relationship with the classical\nschool of France! As if the essential principle could not have been\nlearnt as well here as elsewhere! ... But what people wanted was\n\"nature,\" and \"naturalness\": Oh, the stupidity of it! It was thought\nthat classicism was a kind of naturalness!\n\nWithout either prejudice or indulgence we should try and investigate\nupon what soil a classical taste can be evolved. The hardening,\nthe simplification, the strengthening, and the bedevilling of man\nare inseparable from classical taste. Logical and psychological\nsimplification. A contempt of detail, of complexity, of obscurity.\n\nThe romanticists of Germany do not protest against classicism, but\nagainst reason, against illumination, against taste, against the\neighteenth century.\n\nThe essence of romantico-Wagnerian music is the opposite of the\nclassical spirit.\n\nThe will to unity (because unity tyrannises. _e.g._ the listener and\nthe spectator), but the artist's inability to tyrannise over himself\nwhere it is most needed--that is to say, in regard to the work itself\n(in regard to knowing what to leave out, what to shorten, what to\nclarify, what to simplify). The overwhelming by means of masses\n(Wagner, Victor Hugo, Zola, Taine).\n\n\n850.\n\n_The Nihilism of artists._--Nature is cruel in her cheerfulness;\ncynical in her sunrises. We are hostile to emotions. We flee thither\nwhere Nature moves our senses and our imagination, where we have\nnothing to love, where we are not reminded of the moral semblances and\ndelicacies of this northern nature; and the same applies to the arts.\nWe prefer that which no longer reminds us of good and evil. Our moral\nsensibility and tenderness seem to be relieved in the heart of terrible\nand happy Nature, in the fatalism of the senses and forces. Life\nwithout goodness.\n\nGreat well-being arises from contemplating Nature's indifference to\ngood and evil.\n\nNo justice in history, no goodness in Nature. That is why the\npessimist when he is an artist prefers those historical subjects where\nthe absence of justice reveals itself with magnificent simplicity,\nwhere perfection actually comes to expression--and likewise he prefers\nthat in Nature, where her callous evil character is not hypocritically\nconcealed, where that character is seen in perfection.... The\nNihilistic artist betrays himself in willing and preferring cynical\nhistory and cynical Nature.\n\n\n851.\n\nWhat is tragic?--Again and again I have pointed to the great\nmisunderstanding of Aristotle in maintaining that the tragic emotions\nwere the two depressing emotions--fear and pity. Had he been right,\ntragedy would be an art unfriendly to life: it would have been\nnecessary to caution people against it as against something generally\nharmful and suspicious. Art, otherwise the great stimulus of life, the\ngreat intoxicant of life, the great will to life, here became a tool of\ndecadence, the hand-maiden of pessimism and ill-health (for to suppose,\nas Aristotle supposed, that by exciting these emotions we thereby\npurged people of them, is simply an error). Something which habitually\nexcites fear or pity, disorganises, weakens, and discourages: and\nsupposing Schopenhauer were right in thinking that tragedy taught\nresignation (_i.e._ a meek renunciation of happiness, hope, and of\nthe will to live), this would presuppose an art in which art itself\nwas denied. Tragedy would then constitute a process of dissolution;\nthe instinct of life would destroy itself in the instinct of art.\nChristianity, Nihilism, tragic art, physiological decadence; these\nthings would then be linked, they would then preponderate together\nand assist each other onwards--downwards.... Tragedy would thus be a\nsymptom of decline.\n\nThis theory may be refuted in the most cold-blooded way, namely, by\nmeasuring the effect of a tragic emotion by means of a dynamometer\nThe result would be a fact which only the bottomless falsity of\na doctrinaire could misunderstand: that tragedy is a tonic. If\nSchopenhauer refuses to see the truth here, if he regards general\ndepression as a tragic condition, if he would have informed the Greeks\n(who to his disgust were not \"resigned\") that they did not firmly\npossess the highest principles of life: it is only owing to his _parti\npris,_ to the need of consistency in his system, to the dishonesty of\nthe doctrinaire--that dreadful dishonesty which step for step corrupted\nthe whole psychology of Schopenhauer (he who had arbitrarily and almost\nviolently misunderstood genius, art itself, morality, pagan religion,\nbeauty, knowledge, and almost everything).\n\n\n852.\n\n_The tragic artist._--Whether, and in regard to what, the judgment\n\"beautiful\" is established is a question of an individual's or of a\npeople's strength The feeling of plenitude, of overflowing strength\n(which gaily and courageously meets many an obstacle before which\nthe weakling shudders)--the feeling of power utters the judgment\n\"beautiful\" concerning things and conditions which the instinct of\nimpotence can only value as hateful and ugly. The _flair_ which\nenables us to decide whether the objects we encounter are dangerous,\nproblematic, or alluring, likewise determines our \u00e6sthetic Yea. (\"This\nis beautiful,\" is an affirmation).\n\nFrom this we see that, generally speaking, a preference for\nquestionable and terrible things is a symptom of strength; whereas the\ntaste for pretty and charming trifles is characteristic of the weak\nand the delicate. The love of tragedy is typical of strong ages and\ncharacters: its _non plus ultra_ is perhaps the _Divina Commedia._ It\nis the heroic spirits which in tragic cruelty say Yea unto themselves:\nthey are hard enough to feel pain as a pleasure.\n\nOn the other hand, supposing weaklings desire to get pleasure from\nan art which was not designed for them, what interpretation must we\nsuppose they would like to give tragedy in order to make it suit their\ntaste? They would interpret their own feeling of value into it: _e.g._\nthe \"triumph of the moral order of things,\" or the teaching of the\n\"uselessness of existence,\" or the incitement to \"resignation\" (or also\nhalf-medicinal and half-moral outpourings, _\u00e0 la_ Aristotle). Finally,\nthe art of terrible natures, in so far as it may excite the nerves,\nmay be regarded by the weak and exhausted as a stimulus: this is now\ntaking place, for instance, in the case of the admiration meted out to\nWagner's art. A test of man's well-being and consciousness of power is\nthe extent to which he can acknowledge the terrible and questionable\ncharacter of things, and whether he is in any need of a faith at the\nend.\n\nThis kind of artistic pessimism is precisely the reverse of that\nreligio-moral pessimism which suffers from the corruption of man\nand the enigmatic character of existence: the latter insists upon\ndeliverance, or at least upon the hope of deliverance. Those\nwho suffer, doubt, and distrust themselves,--the sick, in other\nwords,--have in all ages required the transporting influence of visions\nin order to be able to exist at all (the notion \"blessedness\" arose in\nthis way). A similar case would be that of the artists of decadence,\nwho at bottom maintain a Nihilistic attitude to life, and take\nrefuge in the beauty of form,--in those select cases in which Nature\nis perfect, in which she is indifferently great and indifferently\nbeautiful. (The \"love of the beautiful\" may thus be something very\ndifferent from the ability to see or create the beautiful: it may be\nthe expression of impotence in this respect.) The most convincing\nartists are those who make harmony ring out of every discord, and\nwho benefit all things by the gift of their power and inner harmony:\nin every work of art they merely reveal the symbol of their inmost\nexperiences--their creation is gratitude for life.\n\nThe depth of the tragic artist consists in the fact that his \u00e6sthetic\ninstinct surveys the more remote results, that he does not halt\nshortsightedly at the thing that is nearest, that he says Yea to the\nwhole cosmic economy, which justifies the terrible, the evil, and the\nquestionable; which more than justifies it.\n\n\n853.\n\n_Art in the \"Birth of Tragedy.\"_\n\nI.\n\nThe conception of the work which lies right in the background of this\nbook, is extraordinarily gloomy and unpleasant: among all the types\nof pessimism which have ever been known hitherto, none seems to have\nattained to this degree of malice. The contrast of a true and of an\napparent world is entirely absent here: there is but one world, and it\nis false, cruel, contradictory, seductive, and without sense. A world,\nthus constituted is the true world. We are in need of lies in order to\nrise superior to this reality, to this truth--that is to say, in order\nto live.... That lies should be necessary to life is part and parcel of\nthe terrible and questionable character of existence.\n\nMetaphysics, morality, religion, science, in this book, all these\nthings are regarded merely as different forms of falsehood: by means of\nthem we are led to believe in life. \"Life, must inspire confidence\";\nthe task which this imposes upon us is enormous. In order to solve,\nthis problem man must already be a liar in his heart, but he must above\nall else be an artist. And he is that. Metaphysics, religion, morality,\nscience, all these things are but the offshoot of his will to art,\nto falsehood, to a flight from \"truth,\" to a denial of \"truth.\" This\nability, this artistic capacity _par excellence_ of man--thanks to\nwhich he overcomes reality with lies,--is a quality which he has in\ncommon with all other forms of existence. He himself is indeed a piece\nof reality, of truth, of nature: how could he help being also a piece\nof genius in prevarication!\n\nThe fact that the character of existence is misunderstood, is the\nprofoundest and the highest secret motive behind everything relating\nto virtue, science, piety, and art. To be blind to many things, to\nsee many things falsely, to fancy many things: Oh, how clever man has\nbeen in those circumstances in which he believed he was anything but\nclever! Love, enthusiasm, \"God\"--are but subtle forms of ultimate\nSelf-deception; they are but seductions to life and to the belief in\nlife! In those moments when man was deceived, when he had befooled\nhimself and when he believed in life: Oh, how his spirit swelled within\nhim! Oh, what ecstasies he had! What power he felt! And what artistic\ntriumphs in the feeling of power! ... Man had once more become master\nof \"matter,\"--master of truth! ... And whenever man rejoices it is\nalways in the same way: he rejoices as an artist, his power is his joy,\nhe enjoys falsehood as his power....\n\n\nII.\n\nArt and nothing else! Art is the great means of making life possible,\nthe great seducer to life, the great stimulus of life.\n\nArt is the only superior counter-agent to all will to the denial of\nlife; it is _par excellence_ the anti-Christian, the anti-Buddhistic,\nthe anti-Nihilistic force.\n\nArt is the alleviation of the seeker after knowledge,--of him who\nrecognises the terrible and questionable character Of existence, and\nwho will recognise it,--of the tragic seeker after knowledge.\n\nArt is the alleviation of the man of action,--of him who not only sees\nthe terrible and questionable character of existence, but also lives\nit, will live it,--of the tragic and warlike man, the hero. Art is the\nalleviation of the sufferer,--as the way to states in which pain is\nwilled, is transfigured, is deified, where suffering is a form of great\necstasy.\n\n\nIII.\n\nIt is clear that in this book pessimism, or, better still, Nihilism,\nstands for \"truth.\" But truth is not postulated as the highest measure\nof value, and still less as the highest power. The will to appearance,\nto illusion, to deception, to becoming, and to change (to objective\ndeception), is here regarded as more profound, as more primeval, as\nmore metaphysical than the will to truth, to reality, to appearance:\nthe latter is merely a form of the will to illusion. Happiness is\nlikewise conceived as more primeval than pain: and pain is considered\nas conditioned, as a consequence Of the will to happiness (of the will\nto Becoming, to growth, to forming, i.e. to creating; in creating,\nhowever, destruction is included). The highest state of Yea-saying to\nexistence is conceived as one from which the greatest pain may not be\nexcluded: the tragico-Dionysian state.\n\n\nIV.\n\nIn this way this book is even anti-pessimistic, namely, in the sense\nthat it teaches something which is stronger than pessimism and which\nis more \"divine\" than truth: Art. Nobody, it would seem, would be more\nready seriously to utter a radical denial of life, an actual denial\nof action even more than a denial of life, than the author of this\nbook. Except that he knows--for he has experienced it, and perhaps\nexperienced little else!--that art is of more value than truth.\n\nEven in the preface, in which Richard Wagner is, as it were, invited\nto join with him in conversation, the author expresses this article of\nfaith, this gospel for artists; \"Art is the only task of life, art is\nthe metaphysical activity of life....\"\n\n\n\n\nFOURTH BOOK\n\n\nDISCIPLINE AND BREEDING.\n\n\n\n\nI.\n\n\nTHE ORDER OF RANK.\n\n\n1. The Doctrine of the Order of Rank.\n\n\n854.\n\nIn this age of universal suffrage, in which everybody is allowed to\nsit in judgment upon everything and everybody, I feel compelled to\nre-establish the order of rank.\n\n\n855.\n\nQuanta of power alone determine rank and distinguish rank: nothing else\ndoes.\n\n\n856.\n\n_The will to power._--How must those men be constituted who would\nundertake this transvaluation? The order of rank as the order of power:\nwar and danger are the prerequisites which allow of a rank maintaining\nits conditions. The prodigious example: man in Nature--the weakest and\nshrewdest creature making himself master, and putting a yoke upon all\nless intelligent forces.\n\n\n857.\n\nI distinguish between the type which represents ascending life and\nthat which represents decay, decomposition and weakness. Ought one to\nsuppose that the question of rank between these two types can be at all\ndoubtful?\n\n\n858.\n\nThe modicum of power which you represent decides your rank; all the\nrest is cowardice.\n\n\n859.\n\nThe advantages of standing detached from one's age.--Detached from\nthe two movements, that of individualism and that of collectivist\nmorality; for even the first does not recognise the order of rank, and\nwould give one individual the same freedom as another. My thoughts are\nnot concerned with the degree of freedom which should be granted to\nthe one or to the other or to all, but with the degree of power which\nthe one or the other should exercise over his neighbour or over all;\nand more especially with the question to what extent a sacrifice of\nfreedom, or even enslavement, may afford the basis for the cultivation,\nof a _superior_ type. In plain words: _how could one sacrifice the\ndevelopment of mankind_ in order to assist a higher species than man to\ncome into being.\n\n\n860.\n\n_Concerning rank._--The terrible consequences of \"equality\"--in the end\neverybody thinks he has the right to every problem. All order of rank\nhas vanished.\n\n\n861.\n\nIt is necessary for _higher_ men to declare war upon the masses! In\nall directions mediocre people are joining hands in order to make\nthemselves masters. Everything that pampers, that softens, and that\nbrings the \"people\" or \"woman\" to the front, operates in favour of\nuniversal suffrage,--that is to say, the dominion of _inferior_ men.\nBut we must make reprisals, and draw the whole state of affairs (which\ncommenced in Europe with Christianity) to the light of day and to\njudgment.\n\n\n862.\n\nA teaching is needed which is strong enough to work in a _disciplinary_\nmanner; it should operate in such a way as to strengthen the strong and\nto paralyse and smash up the world-weary.\n\nThe annihilation of declining races. The decay of Europe. The\nannihilation of slave-tainted valuations. The dominion of the world\nas a means to the rearing of a higher type. The annihilation of the\nhumbug which is called morality (Christianity as a hysterical kind\nof honesty in this regard: Augustine, Bunyan.) The annihilation of\nuniversal suffrage--that is to say, that system by means of which the\nlowest natures prescribe themselves as a law for higher natures. The\nannihilation of mediocrity and its prevalence. (The one-sided, the\nindividuals--peoples; constitutional plenitude should be aimed at by\nmeans of the coupling of opposites; to this end race-combinations\nshould be tried.) The new kind of courage--no _a priori_ truths (those\nwho were accustomed to believe in something sought such truths!),\nbut _free_ submission to a ruling thought, which has its time; for\ninstance, time conceived as the quality of space, etc.\n\n\n\n2. The Strong and the Weak.\n\n\n863.\n\n_The notion, \"strong and weak man\"_ resolves itself into this, that in\nthe first place much strength is inherited--the man is a total sum; in\nthe other, _not yet enough_ (inadequate inheritance, subdivision of the\ninherited qualities). Weakness may be a _starting_ phenomenon: _not yet\nenough_; or a final phenomenon: \"no more.\"\n\nThe determining point is there where great strength is present, or\nwhere a great amount of strength can be discharged. The mass, as the\nsum-total of the _weak,_ reacts _slowly;_ it defends itself against\nmuch for which it is too weak,--against that for which it has no\nuse; it _never_ creates, it _never_ takes a step forward. This is\nopposed to the theory which denies the strong individual and would\nmaintain that the \"masses do everything.\" The difference is similar\nto that which obtains between separated generations: four or even\nfive generations may lie between the masses and him who is the moving\nspirit--it is a _chronological_ difference.\n\nThe _values of the weak_ are in the van, because the strong have\nadopted them in order to _lead_ with them.\n\n\n864.\n\n_Why the weak triumph._--On the whole, the sick and the weak have\nmore _sympathy_ and are more \"humane\"; the sick and the weak have\nmore intellect, and are more changeable more variegated, more\nentertaining--more malicious; the sick alone invented _malice._ (A\nmorbid precocity is often to be observed among rickety, scrofulitic,\nand tuberculous people.) _Esprit:_ the property of older races; Jews,\nFrenchmen, Chinese. (The anti-Semites do not forgive the Jews for\nhaving both intellect--and money. Anti-Semites--another name for\n\"bungled and botched.\")\n\nThe sick and the weak have always had _fascination_ on their side; they\nare more _interesting_ than the healthy: the fool and the saint--the\ntwo most interesting kinds of men.... Closely related thereto is the\n\"genius.\" The \"great adventurers and criminals\" and all great men,\nthe most healthy in particular, have always been _sick_ at certain\nperiods of their lives--great disturbances of the emotions, the\npassion for power, love, revenge, are all accompanied by very profound\nperturbations. And, as for decadence, every man who does not die\nprematurely manifests it in almost every respect--he therefore knows\nfrom experience the instincts which belong to it: for _half his life_\nnearly every man is decadent.\n\nAnd finally, woman! _One-half of mankind is weak,_ chronically sick,\nchangeable, shifty woman requires strength in order to cleave to it;\nshe also requires a religion of the weak which glorifies weakness,\nlove, and modesty as divine: or, better still, she makes the strong\nweak--she _rules_ when she succeeds in overcoming the strong. Woman\nhas always conspired with decadent types,--the priests, for instance,\nagainst the mighty, against the \"strong,\" against _men._ Women avail\nthemselves of children for the cult of piety, pity, and love:--the\n_mother_ stands as the symbol of _convincing_ altruism.\n\nFinally, the increase of civilisation with its necessary correlatives,\nthe increase of morbid elements, of the _neurotic_ and _psychiatric_\nand of the _criminal._ A sort of _intermediary species_ arises,\nthe artist. He is distinct from those who are criminals as the\nresult of weak wills and of the fear of society, although they may\nnot yet be ripe for the asylum; but he has antennas which grope\ninquisitively into both spheres, this specific plant of culture,\nthe modern artist, painter, musician, and, above all, novelist, who\ndesignates his particular kind of attitude with the very indefinite\nword \"naturalism.\"... Lunatics, criminals, and realists[1] are on\nthe increase: this is the sign of a growing culture plunging forward\nat headlong speed--that is to say, its excrement, its refuse, the\nrubbish that is shot from it every day, is beginning to acquire more\nimportance, the retrogressive movement _keeps pace_ with the advance.\n\nFinally, _the social mishmash,_ which is the result of revolution,\nof the establishment of equal rights, and of the superstition, the\n\"equality of men.\" Thus the possessors of the instincts of decline\n(of resentment, of discontent, of the lust of destruction, of anarchy\nand Nihilism), as also the instincts of slavery, of cowardice, of\ncraftiness, and of rascality, which are inherent among those classes\nof society which have long been suppressed, are beginning to get\ninfused into the blood of all ranks. Two or three generations later,\nthe race can no longer be recognised--everything has become _mob._ And\nthus there results a collective instinct against _selection,_ against\nevery kind of _privilege_, and this instinct operates with such power,\ncertainty, hardness, and cruelty that, as a matter of fact, in the end,\neven the privileged classes have to submit: all those who still wish to\nhold on to power flatter the mob, work with the mob, and must have the\nmob on their side--the \"geniuses\" _above all._ The latter become the\n_heralds_ of those feelings with which the mob can be inspired,--the\nexpression of pity, of honour, even for all that suffers, all that is\nlow and despised, and has lived under persecution, becomes predominant\n(types: Victor Hugo, Richard Wagner).--The rise of the mob signifies\nonce more the rise of old values.\n\nIn the case of such an extreme movement, both in tempo and in means,\nas characterises our civilisation, man's ballast is shifted. Those\nmen whose worth is greatest, and whose mission, as it were, is to\ncompensate for the very great danger of such a morbid movement,--such\nmen become dawdlers _par excellence_; they are slow to accept anything,\nand are tenacious; they are creatures that are relatively lasting\nin the midst of this vast mingling and changing of elements. In\nsuch circumstances power is necessarily relegated to the _mediocre:\nmediocrity,_ as the trustee and bearer of the future, consolidates\nitself against the rule of the mob and of eccentricities (both of\nwhich are, in most cases, united). In this way a new antagonist is\nevolved for exceptional men--or in certain cases a new temptation.\nProvided that they do not adapt themselves to the mob, and stand up\nfor what satisfies the instincts of the disinherited, they will find\nit necessary to be \"mediocre\" and sound. They know: _mediocritas_\nis also _aurea,_--it alone has command of money and _gold_ (of all\nthat glitters ...).... And, once more, old virtue and the whole\nsuperannuated world of ideals in general secures a gifted host of\nspecial-pleaders.... Result: mediocrity acquires intellect, wit, and\ngenius, it becomes entertaining, and even seductive.\n\n***\n\n_Result._--A high culture can only stand upon a broad basis, upon a\nstrongly and soundly consolidated mediocrity. In its service and\nassisted by it, _science_ and even art do their work. Science could\nnot wish for a better state of affairs: in its essence it belongs to a\nmiddle-class type of man,--among exceptions it is out of place,--there\nis not anything aristocratic and still less anything anarchic in its\ninstincts.--The power of the middle classes is then upheld by means of\ncommerce, but, above all, by means of money-dealing: the instinct of\ngreat financiers is opposed to everything extreme--on this account\nthe Jews are, for the present, the most _conservative_ power in the\nthreatening and insecure conditions of modern Europe. They can have\nno use either for revolutions, for socialism, or for militarism: if\nthey would have power, and if they should need it, even over the\nrevolutionary party, this is only the result of what I have already\nsaid, and it in no way contradicts it. Against other extreme movements\nthey may occasionally require to excite terror by showing how much\npower is in their hands. But their instinct itself is inveterately\nconservative and \"mediocre, ... Wherever power exists, they know how to\nbecome mighty; but the application of their power always takes the same\ndirection. The polite term for _mediocre,_ as is well known, is the\nword _\"Liberal.\"_\n\n_Reflection._--It is all nonsense to suppose that this general\n_conquest of values_ is anti-biological. In order to explain it, we\nought to try and show that it is the result of a certain interest of\nlife to maintain the type \"man,\" even by means of this method which\nleads to the prevalence of the weak and the physiologically botched--if\nthings were otherwise, might man not cease to exist? Problem ...\n\nThe _enhancement_ of the type may prove fatal to the _maintenance of\nthe species._ Why?--The experience of history shows that strong races\n_decimate_ each other _mutually,_ by means of war, lust for power, and\nventurousness; the strong emotions; wastefulness (strength is no longer\ncapitalised, disturbed mental systems arise from excessive tension);\ntheir existence is a costly affair in short, they persistently give\nrise to friction _between themselves;_ periods of _profound slackness_\nand torpidity intervene: all great ages have to be _paid for...._ The\nstrong are, after all, weaker, less wilful, and more absurd than the\naverage weak ones.\n\nThey are _squandering_ races. \"_Permanence,_\" in itself, can have no\nvalue: that which ought to be preferred thereto would be a shorter life\nfor the species, but a life _richer_ in creations. It would remain\nto be proved that, even as things are, a richer sum of creations is\nattained than in the case of the shorter existence; _i.e._ that man, as\na storehouse of power, attains to a much higher degree of dominion over\nthings under the conditions which have existed hitherto.... We are here\nface to face with a problem of _economics._\n\n[Footnote 1: The German word is \"Naturalist,\" and really means\n\"realist\" in a bad sense.--Tr.]\n\n\n865.\n\nThe state of mind which calls itself \"idealism,\" and which will neither\nallow mediocrity to be mediocre nor woman to be woman! Do not make\neverything uniform! We should have a clear idea of how _dearly we have\nto pay for the establishment of a virtue;_ and that virtue is nothing\ngenerally desirable, but a _noble piece of madness,_ a beautiful\nexception, which gives us the privilege of feeling elated....\n\n\n866.\n\nIt is _necessary_ to show _that a counter-movement is inevitably\nassociated_ with any increasingly economical consumption of men\nand mankind, and with an ever more closely involved \"machinery\" of\ninterests and services. I call this counter-movement the _separation\nof the luxurious surplus of mankind:_ by means of it a stronger kind,\na higher type, must come to light, which has other conditions for its\norigin and for its maintenance than the average man. My concept, my\nmetaphor for this type is, as you know, the word \"Superman.\" Along the\nfirst road, which can now be completely surveyed, arose adaptation,\nstultification, higher Chinese culture, modesty in the Instincts,\nand satisfaction at the sight of the belittlement of man--a kind of\n_stationary level of mankind._ If ever we get that inevitable and\nimminent, general control of the economy of the earth, then mankind\n_can_ be used as machinery and find its best purpose in the service of\nthis economy--as an enormous piece of clock-work consisting of ever\nsmaller and ever more subtly adapted wheels; then all the dominating\nand commanding elements will become ever more superfluous; and the\nwhole gains enormous energy, while the individual factors which compose\nit represent but small modicums of strength and of _value._ To oppose\nthis dwarfing and adaptation of man to a specialised kind of utility, a\nreverse movement is needed -the procreation of the _synthetic_ man who\n_embodies_ everything and _justifies_ it; that man for whom the turning\nof mankind into a machine is a first condition of existence, for whom\nthe rest of mankind is but soil on which he can devise his _higher\nmode_ of existence.\n\nHe is in need of the _opposition_ of the masses, of those who are\n\"levelled down\"; he requires that feeling of distance from them; he\nstands upon them, he lives on them. This higher form of _aristocracy_\nis the form of the future. From the moral point of view, the collective\nmachinery above described, that solidarity of all wheels, represents\nthe most extreme example in the _exploitation of mankind_: but it\npresupposes the existence of those for whom such an exploitation would\nhave some _meaning.[2]_ Otherwise it would signify, as a matter of\nfact, merely the general depreciation of the type man,--a _retrograde\nphenomenon_ on a grand scale.\n\nReaders are beginning to see what I am combating--namely, _economic_\noptimism: as if the genera] welfare of everybody must necessarily\nincrease with the growing self-sacrifice of everybody. The very reverse\nseems to me to be the case, _the self-sacrifice of everybody amounts\nto a collective loss;_ man becomes _inferior_--so that nobody knows\nwhat end this monstrous purpose has served. A wherefore? a _new_\nwherefore?--this is what mankind requires.\n\n[Footnote 2: This sentence for ever distinguishes Nietzsche's\naristocracy from our present plutocratic and industrial one, for which,\nat the present moment at any rate, it would be difficult to discover\nsome meaning.--Tr.]\n\n\n\n867.\n\nThe recognition of the _increase of collective power:_ we should\ncalculate to what extent the ruin of individuals, of castes, of ages,\nand of peoples, is included in this general increase.\n\nThe transposition of the _ballast_ of a culture. The _cost_ of every\nvast growth: who bears it? _Why must it be enormous at the present\ntime?_\n\n\n868.\n\nGeneral aspect of the future European: the latter regarded as the most\nintelligent servile animal, very industrious, at bottom very modest,\ninquisitive to excess, multifarious, pampered, weak of will,--a chaos\nof cosmopolitan passions and intelligences. How would it be possible\nfor a stronger race to be bred from him?--Such a race as would have a\nclassical taste? The classical taste: this is the will to simplicity,\nto accentuation, and to happiness made visible, the will to the\nterrible, and the courage for psychological _nakedness_ (simplification\nis the outcome of the will to accentuate; allowing happiness as well\nas nakedness to become visible is a consequence of the will to the\nterrible ...). In order to fight one's way out of that chaos, and up\nto this form, a certain _disciplinary constraint_ is necessary: a man\nshould have to choose between either going to the dogs or _prevailing._\nA ruling race can only arise amid terrible and violent conditions.\nProblem: where are the _barbarians_ of the twentieth century? Obviously\nthey will only show themselves and consolidate themselves after\nenormous socialistic crises. They will consist of those elements which\nare capable of the _greatest hardness towards themselves,_ and which\ncan guarantee the _most enduring will-power._\n\n\n869.\n\nThe mightiest and most dangerous passions of man, by means of which he\nmost easily goes to rack and ruin, have been so fundamentally banned\nthat mighty men themselves have either become impossible or else must\nregard themselves as _evil,_ \"harmful and prohibited.\" The losses are\nheavy, but up to the present they have been necessary. Now, however,\nthat a whole host of counter-forces has been reared, by means of the\ntemporary suppression of these passions (the passion for dominion, the\nlove of change and deception), their liberation has once more become\npossible: they will no longer possess their old savagery. We can now\nallow ourselves this tame sort of barbarism: look at our artists and\nour statesmen!\n\n\n870.\n\n\n\n_The root of all evil:_ that the slave morality of modesty, chastity,\nselflessness, and absolute obedience should have triumphed. Dominating\nnatures were thus condemned (1) to hypocrisy, (2) to qualms of\nconscience,--creative natures regarded themselves as rebels against\nGod, uncertain and hemmed in by eternal values.\n\nThe barbarians showed that the ability o_f keeping within the bounds\nof moderation_ was not in the scope of their powers: they feared and\nslandered the passions and instincts of nature--likewise the aspect\nof the ruling C\u00e6sars and castes. On the other hand, there arose the\nsuspicion that all _restraint_ is a form of weakness or of incipient\nold age and fatigue (thus La Rochefoucauld suspects that \"virtue\" is\nonly a euphemism in the mouths of those to whom vice no longer affords\nany pleasure). The capacity for restraint was represented as a matter\nof hardness, self-control, asceticism, as a fight with the devil,\netc. etc. The natural _delight_ of \u00e6sthetic natures, in measure; _the\npleasure derived from the beauty of measure,_ was _overlooked_ and\n_denied,_ because that which was desired was an anti-eud\u00e6monistic\nmorality. The belief in the pleasure which comes of restraint has\nbeen lacking hitherto--this pleasure of a rider on a fiery steed! The\nmoderation of weak natures was confounded with the restraint of the\nstrong!\n\nIn short, the best things have been blasphemed because weak or\nimmoderate swine have thrown a bad light upon them--the best men have\n_remained concealed_--and have often _misunderstood_ themselves.\n\n\n871.\n\n_Vicious_ and _unbridled people_: their depressing influence upon the\n_value of the pussions._ It was the appalling barbarity of morality\nwhich was principally responsible in the Middle Ages for the compulsory\nrecourse to a veritable \"league _of_ virtue\"--and this was coupled with\nan equally appalling exaggeration of all that which constitutes the\nvalue of man. Militant \"civilisation\" (taming) is in need of all kinds\nof irons and tortures in order to maintain itself against terrible and\nbeast-of-prey natures.\n\nIn this case, contusion, although it may have the most nefarious\ninfluences, is quite natural: that which _men of power and will are\nable to demand of themselves_ gives them the standard for what they\nmay also allow themselves. Such natures are the very opposite of the\n_vicious_ and the _unbridled;_ although under certain circumstances\nthey may perpetrate deeds for which an inferior man would be convicted\nof vice and intemperance.\n\nIn this respect the concept, \"_all men are equal before God_\" does\nan extraordinary amount of harm; actions and attitudes of mind were\nforbidden which belonged to the prerogative of the strong alone, just\nas if they were in themselves unworthy of man. All the tendencies of\nstrong men were brought into disrepute by the fact that the defensive\nweapons of the most weak (even of those who were weakest towards\nthemselves) were established as a standard of valuation.\n\nThe confusion went so far that precisely the great _virtuosos_ of life\n(whose self-control presents the sharpest contrast to the vicious and\nthe unbridled) were branded with the most opprobrious names. Even to\nthis day people feel themselves compelled to disparage a C\u00e6sar Borgia:\nit is simply ludicrous. The Church has anathematised German Kaisers\nowing to their vices: as if a monk or a priest had the right to say\na word as to what a Frederick II. should allow himself. Don Juan is\nsent to hell: this is very _na\u00eff._ Has anybody ever noticed that all\ninteresting men are lacking in heaven? ... This is only a hint to the\ngirls, as to where they may best find salvation. If one think at all\nlogically, and also have a profound insight into that which makes a\ngreat man, there, can be no doubt at all that the Church has dispatched\nall \"great men\" to Hades--its fight is _against_ all \"greatness in man.\"\n\n\n872.\n\nThe rights which a man arrogates to himself are relative to the duties\nwhich he sets himself, and to the tasks which he feels _capable of\nperforming._ The great majority of men have no right to life, and are\nonly a misfortune to their higher fellows.\n\n\n873.\n\n_The misunderstanding of egoism:_ on the part of _ignoble natures_ who\nknow nothing of the lust of conquest and the insatiability of great\nlove, and who likewise know nothing of the overflowing feelings of\npower which make a man wish to overcome things, to force them over to\nhimself, and to lay them on his heart, the power which impels an artist\nto his material. It often happens also that the active spirit looks\nfor a field for its activity. In ordinary \"egoism\" it is precisely the\n... \"non-ego,\" the _profoundly mediocre creature,_ the member of the\nherd, who wishes to maintain himself--and when this is perceived by the\nrarer, more subtle, and less mediocre natures, it revolts them. For the\njudgment of the latter is this: \"We are the _noble_! It is much more\nimportant to maintain _us_ than _that_ cattle!\"\n\n\n874.\n\n_The degeneration of the ruler and of the ruling classes_ has been the\ncause of all the great disorders in history! Without the Roman C\u00e6sars\nand Roman society, Christianity would never have prevailed.\n\nWhen it occurs to inferior men to doubt whether higher men exist, then\nthe danger is great I It is then that men finally discover that there\nare virtues even among inferior, suppressed, and poor-spirited men,\nand that everybody is equal before God: which is the _non plus ultra_\nof all confounded nonsense that has ever appeared on earth! For in the\nend higher men begin to measure themselves according to the standard\nof virtues upheld by the slaves--and discover that they are \"proud,\"\netc., and that all their _higher_ qualities should be condemned.\n\nWhen Nero and Caracalla stood at the helm, it was then that the paradox\narose: \"The lowest man is of more value than that one on the throne!\"\nAnd thus the path was prepared for an _image of God_ which was as\nremote as possible from the image of the mightiest,--God on the Cross!\n\n\n875.\n\n_Higher man and gregarious man._--When great men are _wanting,_ the\ngreat of the past are converted into demigods or whole gods: the rise\nof religions proves that mankind no longer has any pleasure in man\n(\"nor in woman neither,\" as in Hamlet's case). Or a host of men are\nbrought together in a heap, and it is hoped that as a Parliament they\nwill operate just as tyrannically.\n\nTyrannising is the distinctive quality of great men; they make inferior\nmen stupid.\n\n\n876.\n\nBuckle affords the best example of the extent to which a plebeian\nagitator of the mob is incapable of arriving at a clear idea of\nthe concept, \"higher nature.\" The opinion which he _combats_ so\npassionately--that \"great men,\" individuals, princes, statesmen,\ngeniuses, warriors, are the levers and _causes_ of all great movements,\nis instinctively misunderstood by him, as if it meant that all that was\nessential and valuable in such a \"higher man,\" was the fact that he\nwas capable of setting masses in motion; in short, that his sole merit\nwas the effect he produced.... But the \"higher nature\" of the great man\nresides precisely in being different, in being unable to communicate\nwith others, in the loftiness of his rank--_not_ in any sort of effect\nhe may produce even though this be the shattering of both hemispheres.\n\n\n877.\n\nThe Revolution made Napoleon possible: that is its justification.\nWe ought to desire the anarchical collapse of the whole of our\ncivilisation if such a reward were to be its result. Napoleon made\nnationalism possible: that is the latter's excuse.\n\nThe value of a man (apart, of course, from morality and immorality:\nbecause with these concepts a man's _worth_ is not even skimmed) does\nnot lie in his utility; because he would continue to exist even if\nthere were nobody to whom he could be useful. And why could not that\nman be the very pinnacle of manhood who was the source of the worst\npossible effects for his race: so high and so superior, that in his\npresence everything would go to rack and ruin from envy?\n\n\n878.\n\nTo appraise the value of a man according to his _utility_ to mankind,\nor according to what he costs it, or the _damage_ he is able to inflict\nupon it, is just as good and just as bad as to appraise the value\nof a work of art according to its _effects._ But in this way the\nvalue of one man compared with another is not even touched upon. The\n\"moral valuation,\" in so far as it is _social_ measures men altogether\naccording to their effects. But what about the man who has his own\ntaste on his tongue, who is surrounded and concealed by his isolation,\nuncommunicative and not to be communicated with; a man whom no one has\nfathomed yet--that is to say, a creature of a higher, and, at any rate,\n_different_ species, how would ye appraise his worth, seeing that ye\ncannot know him and can compare him with nothing?\n\n_Moral valuation_ was the cause of the most enormous obtuseness\nof judgment: the value of a man in himself is _underrated,_\nwell-nigh _overlooked,_ practically _denied._ This is the remains of\nsimple-minded teleology: the value of man _can only be measured with\nregard to other men._\n\n\n879.\n\n_To be obsessed by moral considerations_ presupposes a very low\ngrade of intellect: it shows that the instinct for special rights,\nfor standing apart, the feeling of freedom in creative natures, in\n\"children of God\" (or of the devil), is lacking. And irrespective of\nwhether _he_ preaches a ruling morality or _criticises_ the prevailing\nethical code from the point of view of his own ideal: by doing these\nthings a man shows that he belongs to the herd--even though he may be\nwhat it is most in need of--that is to say, a \"shepherd.\"\n\n\n880.\n\nWe should substitute morality by the will to our own ends, and\n_consequently_ to the means to them.\n\n\n881.\n\n_Concerning the order of rank._--What is it that constitutes the\n_mediocrity_ of the typical man? That he does not understand that\nthings necessarily have _their other side;_ that he combats evil\nconditions as if they could be dispensed with, that he will not take\nthe one with the other; that he would fain obliterate and erase the\n_specific character of a thing,_ of a circumstance, of an age, and\nof a person, by calling only a portion of their qualities good, and\nsuppressing the remainder. The \"desirability\" of the mediocre is that\nwhich we others combat: their _ideal_ is something which shall no\nlonger contain anything harmful, evil, dangerous, questionable, and\ndestructive. We recognise the reverse of this: that with every growth\nof man his other side must grow as well; that the highest man, if\nsuch a concept be allowed, would be that man who would represent _the\nantagonistic character of existence_ most strikingly, and would be its\nglory and its only justification.... Ordinary men may only represent\na small corner and nook of this natural character; they perish the\nmoment the multifariousness of the elements composing them, and the\ntension between their antagonistic traits, increases: but this is the\nprerequisite for greatness in man. That man should become better and at\nthe same time more evil, is my formula for this inevitable fact.\n\nThe majority of people are only piecemeal and fragmentary examples\nof man: only when all these creatures are jumbled together does one\nwhole man arise Whole ages and whole peoples in this sense, have a\nfragmentary character about them; it may perhaps be part of the economy\nof human development that man should develop himself only piecemeal.\nBut, for this reason, one should not forget that the only important\nconsideration is the rise of the synthetic man; that inferior men, and\nby far the great majority of people, are but rehearsals and exercises\nout of which here and there a whole man may arise; a man who is a\nhuman milestone, and who indicates how far mankind has advanced up to\na certain point. Mankind does not advance in a straight line,--often\na type is attained which is again lost (for instance, with all the\nefforts of three hundred years, we have not reached the men of the\nRenaissance again, and in addition to this we must not forget that the\nman of the Renaissance was already behind his brother of classical\nantiquity).\n\n\n882.\n\nThe superiority of the Greek and the man of the Renaissance is\nrecognised, but people would like to produce them without the\nconditions and causes of which they were the result.\n\n\n883.\n\n_\"Purification of taste\"_ can only be the result of the _strengthening_\nof the type. Our society to-day represents only the cultivating\nsystems, the cultivated man is _lacking._ The great _synthetic man,_ in\nwhom the various forces for attaining a purpose are correctly harnessed\ntogether, is altogether wanting. The specimen we possess is the\n_multifarious_ man, the most interesting form of chaos that has ever\nexisted: but _not_ the chaos _preceding_ the creation of the world, but\nthat following it: _Goethe_ as the most beautiful expression of the\ntype (_completely and utterly un-Olympian_!)[3]\n\n[Footnote 3: The Germans always call Goethe the Olympian.--Tr.]\n\n\n884.\n\nHandel, Leibniz, Goethe, and Bismarck, are characteristic of the\n_strong German type._ They lived with equanimity, surrounded by\ncontrasts. They were full of that agile kind of strength which\ncautiously avoids convictions and doctrines, by using the one as a\nweapon against the other, and reserving absolute freedom for themselves.\n\n\n885.\n\nOf this I am convinced, that if the rise of great and rare men had\nbeen made dependent upon the voices of the multitude (taking for\ngranted, of course, that the latter knew the qualities which belong\nto greatness, and also the price that all greatness pays for its\nself-development), then there would never have been any such thing as a\ngreat man!\n\nThe fact that things pursue their course _independently_ of the voice\nof the many, is the reason why, a few astonishing things have taken\nplace on earth.\n\n\n886.\n\n_The Order of Rank in Human Values._\n\n_(a)_ A man should not be valued according to isolated acts. _Epidermal\nactions._ Nothing is more rare than a _personal_ act. Class, rank,\nrace, environment, accident--all these things are much more likely to\nbe expressed in an action or deed than the \"personality\" of the doer.\n\n_(b)_ We should on no account jump to the conclusion that there are\nmany people who are personalities. Some men are but conglomerations\nof personalities, whilst the majority are not even _one._ In all\ncases in which those average qualities preponderate, which ensure\nthe maintenance of the species, to be a personality would involve\nunnecessary expense, it would be a luxury in fact, it would be\nfoolish to demand of anybody that he should be a personality. In such\ncircumstances everybody is a channel or a transmitting vessel.\n\n_(c)_ A \"personality\" is a relatively _isolated_ phenomenon; in view of\nthe superior importance of the continuation of the race at an average\nlevel, a personality might even be regarded as something _hostile to\nnature._ For a personality to be possible, timely isolation and the\nnecessity for an existence of offence and defence, are prerequisites;\nsomething in the nature of a walled enclosure, a capacity for shutting\nout the world; but above all, a much _lower degree of sensitiveness_\nthan the average man has, who is too easily infected with the views of\nothers.\n\nThe first _question_ concerning the _order of rank:_ how far is a man\ndisposed to be _solitary_ or _gregarious?_ (in the latter case, his\nvalue consists in those qualities which secure the survival of his\ntribe or his type; in the former case, his qualities are those which\ndistinguish him from others, which isolate and defend him, and make his\n_solitude possible_).\n\n_Consequence:_ the solitary type should not be valued from the\nstandpoint of the gregarious type, or _vice vers\u00e2._\n\nViewed from above, both types are necessary; as is likewise their\nantagonism,--and nothing is _more_ thoroughly reprehensible than\nthe \"desire\" which would develop a _third_ thing out of the two\n(\"virtue\" as hermaphroditism). This is as little worthy of desire as\nthe equalisation and reconciliation of the sexes. The _distinguishing\nqualities must be developed ever more and more,_ the gulf must _be made\never wider...._\n\nThe concept of _degeneration_ in both cases: the approximation of\nthe qualities of the herd to those of solitary creatures: and _vice\nvers\u00e2_--in short, when they begin to _resemble_ each other. This\nconcept of degeneration is beyond the sphere of moral judgments.\n\n\n887.\n\nWhere the _strongest natures_ are to be sought. The ruin and\ndegeneration of the _solitary_ species is much greater and more\nterrible: they have the instincts of the herd, and the tradition of\nvalues, against them; their weapons of defence, their instincts of\nself-preservation, are from the beginning insufficiently strong and\nreliable--fortune must be peculiarly favourable to them if they are _to\nprosper_ (they prosper best in the lowest ranks and dregs of society;\nif ye are seeking _personalities_ it is there that ye will find them\nwith much greater certainty than in the middle classes!)\n\nWhen the dispute between ranks and classes, which aims at equality of\nrights, is almost settled, the fight will begin against the _solitary\nperson._ (In a certain sense _the latter can maintain and develop\nhimself most easily in a democratic society:_ there where the coarser\nmeans of defence are no longer necessary, and a certain habit of\norder, honesty, justice, trust, is already a general condition.) The\n_strongest_ must be most tightly bound, most strictly watched, laid\nin chains and supervised: this is the instinct of the herd. To them\nbelongs a r\u00e9gime of self-mastery, of ascetic detachment, of \"duties\"\nconsisting in exhausting work, in which one can no longer call one's\nsoul one's own.\n\n\n888.\n\nI am attempting an _economic_ justification of virtue. The object is to\nmake man as useful as possible, and to make him approximate as nearly\nas one can to an infallible machine: to this end he must be equipped\nwith _machine-like virtues_ (he must learn to value those states in\nwhich he works in a most mechanically useful way, as the highest of\nall: to this end it is necessary to make him as disgusted as possible\nwith the other states, and to represent them as very dangerous and\ndespicable).\n\nHere is the first stumbling-block: the tediousness and monotony\nwhich all mechanical activity brings with it. To learn to endure\n_this_--and not only to endure it, but to see tedium enveloped in a\nray of exceeding charm: this hitherto has been the task of all higher\nschools. To learn something which you don't care a fig about, and to\nfind precisely your \"duty\" in this \"objective\" activity; to learn to\nvalue happiness and duty as things apart; this is the invaluable task\nand performance of higher schools. It is on this account that the\nphilologist has, hitherto, been the educator _per se:_ because his\nactivity, in itself, affords the best pattern of magnificent monotony\nin action; under his banner youths learn to \"swat\": first prerequisite\nfor the thorough fulfilment of mechanical duties in the future (as\nState officials, husbands, slaves of the desk, newspaper readers,\nand soldiers). Such an existence may perhaps require a philosophical\nglorification and justification more than any other: pleasurable\nfeelings must be valued by some sort of infallible tribunal, as\naltogether of inferior rank; \"duty _per se_\" perhaps even the pathos\nof reverence in regard to everything unpleasant,--must be demanded\nimperatively as that which is above all useful, delightful, and\npractical things.... A mechanical form of existence regarded as the\nhighest and most respectable form of existence, worshipping itself\n(type: Kant as the fanatic of the formal concept \"Thou shalt\").\n\n\n889.\n\nThe economic valuation of all the ideals that have existed\nhitherto--that is to say, the selection and rearing of definite\npassions and states at the cost of other passions and states. The\nlawgiver (or the instinct of the community) selects a number of states\nand passions the existence of which guarantees the performance of\nregular actions (mechanical actions would thus be the result of the\nregular requirements of those passions and states).\n\nIn the event of these states and passions containing ingredients\nwhich were painful, a means would have to be found for overcoming\nthis painfulness by means of a valuation; pain would have to be\ninterpreted as something valuable, as something pleasurable in a higher\nsense. Conceived in a formula: \"_How does something unpleasant become\npleasant?_\" For instance, when our obedience and our submission to the\nlaw become honoured, thanks to the energy, power, and self-control\nthey entail. The same holds good of our public spirit, of our\nneighbourliness, of our patriotism, our \"humanisation,\" our \"altruism,\"\nand our \"heroism.\" The _object of all idealism_ should, be to induce\npeople to do unpleasant things cheerfully.\n\n\n890.\n\nThe _belittlement_ of man must be held as the chief aim for a long\nwhile: because what is needed in the first place is a broad basis from\nwhich a stronger species of man may arise (to what extent hitherto has\n_every stronger_ species of man arisen from a _substratum of inferior\npeople?_).\n\n\n891.\n\nThe absurd and contemptible form of idealism which would not have\nmediocrity mediocre, and which instead of feeling triumphant at being\nexceptional, becomes _indignant_ at cowardice, falseness, pettiness,\nand wretchedness. _We should not wish things to be any different,_ we\nshould make the gulfs even _wider_!--The higher types among men should\nbe compelled to distinguish themselves by means of the sacrifices which\nthey make to their own existence.\n\n_Principal point of view; distances_ must be established, but _no\ncontrasts must be created._ The _middle classes_ must be dissolved, and\ntheir influence decreased: this is the principal means of maintaining\ndistances.\n\n\n892.\n\nWho would dare to disgust the mediocre of their mediocrity! As\nyou observe, I do precisely the reverse: every step away from\nmediocrity--thus do I teach--leads to _immorality._\n\n\n893.\n\nTo hate mediocrity is unworthy of a philosopher: it is almost a note of\ninterrogation to his \"_right_ to philosophy.\" It is precisely because\nhe is the exception that he must protect the rule and ingratiate all\nmediocre people.\n\n\n894.\n\nWhat I combat: that an exceptional form should make war upon the\nrule--instead of understanding that the continued existence of the rule\nis the first condition of the value of the exception. For instance,\nthere are women who, instead of considering their abnormal thirst for\nknowledge as a distinction, would fain dislocate the whole status of\nwomanhood.\n\n\n895.\n\nThe _increase of strength_ despite the temporary ruin of the\nindividual:--\n\nA new level must be established;\n\nWe must have a method of storing up forces for the maintenance of small\nperformances, in opposition to economic waste;\n\nDestructive nature must for once be reduced to an _instrument_ of this\neconomy of the future;\n\nThe weak must be maintained, because there is an enormous mass of\n_finicking_ work to be done;\n\nThe weak and the suffering must be upheld in their belief that\nexistence is still possible;\n\n_Solidarity_ must be implanted as an instinct opposed to the instinct\nof fear and servility;\n\nWar must be made upon accident, even upon the accident of \"the great\nman.\"\n\n\n896.\n\nWar upon _great_ men justified on economic grounds. Great men are\ndangerous; they are accidents, exceptions, tempests, which are strong\nenough to question things which it has taken time to build and\nestablish. Explosive material must not only be discharged harmlessly,\nbut, if possible, its discharge must be _prevented_ altogether, this is\nthe fundamental instinct of all civilised society.\n\n\n897.\n\nHe who thinks over the question of how the type man may be elevated\nto its highest glory and power, will realise from the start that he\nmust place himself beyond morality; for morality was directed in its\nessentials at the opposite goal--that is to say, its aim was to arrest\nand to annihilate that glorious development wherever it was in process\nof accomplishment. For, as a matter of fact, development of that sort\nimplies that such an enormous number of men must be subservient to\nit, that a _counter-movement_ is only too natural: the weaker, more\ndelicate, more mediocre existences, find it necessary to take up sides\n_against_ that glory of life and power; and for that purpose they\nmust get a new valuation of themselves by means of which they are\nable to condemn, and if possible to destroy, life in this high degree\nof plenitude. Morality is therefore essentially the expression of\nhostility to life, in so far as it would overcome vital types.\n\n\n898.\n\n_The strong of the future._--To what extent necessity on the one hand\nand accident on the other have attained to conditions from which a\n_stronger species_ may be reared: this we are now able to understand\nand to bring about consciously; we can now create those conditions\nunder which such an elevation is possible.\n\nHitherto education has always aimed at the utility of society: _not_\nthe greatest possible utility for the future, but the utility of the\nsociety actually extant. What people required were \"instruments\" for\nthis purpose. Provided the _wealth of forces were greater,_ it would\nbe possible to think of a draft being made upon them, the aim of which\nwould not be the utility of society, but some future utility.\n\nThe more people grasped to what extent the present form of society\nwas in such a state of transition as sooner or later to be _no longer\nable to exist for its own sake,_ but only as a means in the hands of a\nstronger race, the more _this task would have to be brought forward._\n\nThe increasing belittlement of man is precisely the impelling\npower which leads one to think of the cultivation of a _stronger\nrace:_ a race which would have a surplus precisely there where the\ndwarfed species was weak and growing weaker (will, responsibility,\nself-reliance, the ability to postulate aims for one's self).\n\nThe means would be those which history teaches: _isolation_ by means of\npreservative interests which would be the reverse of those generally\naccepted; exercise in transvalued valuations; distance as pathos; a\nclean conscience in what to-day is most despised and most prohibited.\n\nThe _levelling_ of the mankind of Europe is the great process which\nshould not be arrested; it should even be accelerated. The necessity of\n_cleaving gulfs,_ of _distance,_ of the _order of rank,_ is therefore\nimperative; but not the necessity of retarding the process above\nmentioned.\n\nThis _levelled-down_ species requires justification as soon as it is\nattained: its justification is that it exists for the service of a\nhigher and sovereign race which stands upon it and can only be elevated\nupon its shoulders to the task which it is destined to perform. Not\nonly a ruling race whose task would be consummated in ruling alone:\nbut a race with _vital spheres_ of its own, with an overflow of energy\nfor beauty, bravery, culture, and manners, even for the most abstract\nthought; a yea-saying race which would be able to allow itself every\nkind of great luxury--strong enough to be able to dispense with the\ntyranny of the imperatives of virtue, rich enough to be in no need of\neconomy or pedantry; beyond good and evil; a forcing-house for rare and\nexceptional plants.\n\n\n899.\n\nOur psychologists, whose glance dwells involuntarily upon the symptoms\nof decadence, lead us to mistrust intellect ever more and more. People\npersist in seeing only the weakening, pampering, and sickening effects\nof intellect, but there are now going to appear:--\n\nNew                Cynics             The union of intellectual\n  barbarians       Experimentalists   superiority with well-being\n                   Conquerors         and an overflow of strength.\n\n\n\n900.\n\nI point to something new: certainly for such a democratic community\nthere is a danger of barbarians; but these are sought only down below.\nThere is also _another kind of barbarians_ who come from the heights: a\nkind of conquering and ruling natures, which are in search of material\nthat they can mould. Prometheus was a barbarian of this stamp.\n\n\n901.\n\n_Principal standpoint:_ one should not suppose the mission of a higher\nspecies to be the _leading_ of inferior men (as Comte does, for\ninstance); but the inferior should be regarded as the _foundation_\nupon which a higher species may live their higher life--upon which\nalone they _can stand._ The conditions under which a _strong, noble_\nspecies maintains itself (in the matter of intellectual discipline) are\nprecisely the reverse of those under which the industrial masses--the\ntea-grocers _\u00e0 la_ Spencer--subsist. Those qualities which are within\nthe grasp only of the _strongest_ and most _terrible_ natures, and\nwhich make their existence possible leisure, adventure, disbelief, and\neven dissipation--would necessarily ruin mediocre natures --and does\ndo so--when they possess them. In the case of the latter industry,\nregularity, moderation, and strong \"conviction\" are in their proper\nplace--in short, all \"gregarious virtues\": under their influence these\nmediocre men become perfect.\n\n\n902.\n\n_Concerning the ruling types._ The shepherd as opposed to the \"lord\"\n(the former is only a means to the maintenance of the herd; the latter,\nthe _purpose_ for which the herd exists).\n\n\n903.\n\nThe temporary preponderance of social valuations is both comprehensible\nand useful; it is a matter of building a _foundation_ upon which a\n_stronger_ species will ultimately be made possible. The standard\nof strength: to be able to live under the transvalued valuations,\nand to desire them for all eternity. State and society regarded as a\nsub-structure: economic point of view, education conceived as breeding.\n\n\n904.\n\nA consideration which \"free spirits\" _lack_: that the same discipline\nwhich makes a strong nature still stronger, and enables it to go in for\nbig undertakings, _breaks up and withers the mediocre_: doubt --_la\nlargeur de c\u0153ur_--experiment--independence.\n\n\n905.\n\nThe hammer. How should men who must value in the opposite way be\nconstituted?--Men who possess _all_ the qualities of the modern soul,\nbut are strong enough to convert them into real health? The means to\ntheir task.\n\n\n906.\n\nThe strong man, who is mighty in the instincts of a strong and healthy\norganisation, digests his deeds just as well as he digests his meals;\nhe even gets over the effects of heavy fare: in the main, however, he\nis led by an inviolable and severe instinct which prevents his doing\nanything which goes against his grain, just as he never does anything\nagainst his taste.\n\n\n907.\n\n_Can_ we _foresee_ the favourable circumstances under which creatures\nof the highest value might arise? It is a thousand times too\ncomplicated, and the probabilities of failure are _very great:_ on that\naccount we cannot be inspired by the thought of striving after them!\nScepticism.--To oppose this we can enhance courage, insight, hardness,\nindependence, and the feeling of responsibility; we can also subtilise\nand learn to forestall the delicacy of the scales, so that favourable\naccidents may be enlisted on our side.\n\n\n908.\n\nBefore we can even think of acting, an enormous amount of work requires\nto be done. In the main, however, _a cautious exploitation_ of the\npresent conditions would be our best and most advisable course of\naction. The actual _creation_ of conditions such as those which occur\nby accident, presupposes the existence of _iron_ men such as have not\nyet lived. Our first task must be to make the personal ideal _prevail_\nand _become realised_! He who has understood the nature of man and _the\norigin of mankind's greatest specimens, shudders before man and takes\nflight from all action_: this is the result of inherited valuations!!\n\nMy consolation is, that the nature of man is _evil,_ and this\nguarantees his _strength_!\n\n\n909.\n\n_The typical forms of self-development, or the eight principal\nquestions:_--\n\n1. Do we want to be more multifarious or more simple than we are?\n\n2. Do we want to be happier than we are, or more indifferent to both\nhappiness and unhappiness?\n\n3. Do we want to be more satisfied with ourselves, or more exacting and\nmore inexorable?\n\n4. Do we want to be softer, more yielding, and more human than we are,\nor more inhuman?\n\n5. Do we want to be more prudent than we are, or more daring?\n\n6. Do we want to attain a goal, or do we want to avoid all goals (like\nthe philosopher, for instance, who scents a boundary, a _cul-de-sac,_ a\nprison, a piece of foolishness in every goal)?\n\n7. Do we want to become more respected, or more feared, or more\n_despised_?\n\n8. Do we want to become tyrants, and seducers, or do we want to become\nshepherds and gregarious animals?\n\n\n910.\n\n_The type of my disciples._--To such men as _concern vie in any way_\nI wish suffering, desolation, sickness, ill-treatment, indignities of\nall kinds. I wish them to be acquainted with profound self-contempt,\nwith the martyrdom of self-distrust, with the misery of the defeated: I\nhave no pity for them; because I wish them to have the only thing which\nto-day proves whether a man has any value or not, namely, _the capacity\nof sticking to his guns._\n\n\n911.\n\nThe happiness and self-contentedness of the lazzaroni, or the\nblessedness of \"beautiful souls,\" or the consumptive love of Puritan\npietists, proves nothing in regard to _the order of rank_ among men.\nAs a great educator one ought inexorably to thrash a race of such\nblissful creatures into unhappiness. The danger of belittlement and of\na slackening of powers follows immediately I am _opposed_ to happiness\n_\u00e0 la_ Spinoza or _\u00e0 la_ Epicurus, and to all the relaxation of\ncontemplative states. But when virtue is the means to such happiness,\nwell then, _one must master even virtue._\n\n\n912.\n\nI cannot see how any one can make up for having missed going to _a\ngood school_ at the proper time. Such a person does not know himself;\nhe walks through life without ever having learned to walk. His soft\nmuscles betray themselves at every step. Occasionally life itself is\nmerciful enough to make a man recover this lost and severe schooling:\nby means of periods of sickness, perhaps, which exact the utmost\nwill-power and self-control; or by means of a sudden state of poverty,\nwhich threatens his wife and child, and which may force a man to\nsuch activity as will restore energy to his slackened tendons, and a\n_tough spirit_ to his will to life. The most desirable thing of all,\nhowever, is, under all circumstances to have severe discipline _at\nthe right time, i.e._ at that age when it makes us proud that people\nshould expect great things from us. For this is what distinguishes hard\nschooling, as good schooling, from every other schooling, namely, that\na good deal is demanded, that a good deal is severely exacted; that\ngoodness, nay even excellence itself, is required as if it were normal;\nthat praise is scanty, that leniency is non-existent; that blame is\nsharp, practical, and without reprieve, and has no regard to talent and\nantecedents. We are in every way in need of such a school: and this\nholds good of corporeal as well as of spiritual things; it would be\nfatal to draw distinctions here! The same discipline makes the soldier\nand the scholar efficient; and, looked at more closely, there is no\ntrue scholar who has not the instincts of a true soldier in his veins.\nTo be able to command and to be able to obey in a proud fashion; to\nkeep one's place in rank and file, and yet to be ready at any moment\nto lead; to prefer danger to comfort; not to weigh what is permitted\nand what is forbidden in a tradesman's balance; to be more hostile to\npettiness, slyness, and parasitism than to wickedness. What is it that\none _learns_ in a hard school?--_to obey_ and _to command._\n\n\n913.\n\nWe should _repudiate_ merit--and do only that which stands above all\npraise and above all understanding.\n\n\n914.\n\nThe new forms of morality:--\n\nFaithful vows concerning that which one wishes to do or to leave\nundone; complete and definite abstention from many things. Tests as to\nwhether one is _ripe_ for such discipline.\n\n\n915.\n\nIt is my desire to _naturalise asceticism:_ I would substitute the\nold intention of asceticism, \"self-denial,\" by my own intention,\n_self-strengthening:_ a gymnastic of the will; a period of abstinence\nand occasional fasting of every kind, even in things intellectual; a\ncasuistry in deeds, in regard to the opinions which we derive from our\npowers; we should try our hand at adventure and at deliberate dangers.\n(_D\u00eeners chez Magny:_ all intellectual gourmets with spoilt stomachs.)\n_Tests_ ought also to be devised for discovering a man's power in\nkeeping his word.\n\n\n916.\n\nThe things which have become _spoilt_ through having been abused by the\nChurch:--\n\n(1) _Asceticism._--People have scarcely got the courage yet to bring to\nlight the natural utility and necessity of asceticism for the purpose\nof the _education of the will._ Our ridiculous world of education,\nbefore whose eyes the useful State official hovers as an ideal to\nbe striven for, believes that it has completed its duty when it has\ninstructed or trained the brain; it never even suspects that something\nelse is first of all necessary --the education of _will-power;_ tests\nare devised for everything except for the most important thing of all:\nwhether a man can _will,_ whether he can _promise;_ the young man\ncompletes his education without a question or an inquiry having been\nmade concerning the problem of the highest value of his nature.\n\n(2) _Fasting:_--In every sense--even as a means of maintaining the\ncapacity for taking pleasure in all good things (for instance, to give\nup reading for a while, to hear no music for a while, to cease from\nbeing amiable for a while: one ought also to have fast days for one's\nvirtues).\n\n(3) _The monastery._--Temporary isolation with severe seclusion from\nall letters, for instance; a kind of profound introspection and\nself-recovery, which does not go out of the way of \"temptations,\" but\nout of the way of \"duties\"; a stepping out of the daily round of one's\nenvironment; a detachment from the tyranny of stimuli and external\ninfluences, which condemns us to expend our power only in reactions,\nand does not allow it to gather volume until it bursts into spontaneous\nactivity (let anybody examine our scholars closely: they only think\nreflexively, _i.e._ they must first read before they can think).\n\n(4) _Feasts._--A man must be very coarse in order not to feel the\npresence of Christians and Christian values as oppressive, so\noppressive as to send all festive moods to the devil. By feasts we\nunderstand: pride, high-spirits, exuberance; scorn of all kinds of\nseriousness and Philistinism; a divine saying of Yea to one's self, as\nthe result of physical plenitude and perfection--all states to which\nthe Christian cannot honestly say Yea. _A feast is a pagan thing par\nexcellence._\n\n(5) The _courage of ones own nature: dressing-up in morality,_--To be\nable to call one's passions good without the help of a moral formula:\nthis is the standard which measures the extent to which a man is able\nto say Yea to his own nature, namely, how much or how little he has to\nhave recourse to morality.\n\n(6) _Death._--The foolish physiological fact must be converted into a\nmoral necessity. One should live in such a way that _one may have the\nwill to die at the right time_!\n\n\n917.\n\n_To feel ones self stronger_ or, expressed otherwise: happiness always\npresupposes a comparison (not necessarily with others, but with one's\nself, in the midst of a state of growth, and without being conscious\nthat one is comparing).\n\n_Artificial_ accentuation: whether by means of exciting chemicals or\nexciting errors (\"hallucinations.\")\n\nTake, for instance, the Christian's feeling of _security_; he feels\nhimself strong in his confidence, in his patience, and his resignation:\nthis artificial accentuation he owes to the fancy that he is protected\nby a God. Take the feeling of _superiority,_ for instance: as when the\nCaliph of Morocco sees only globes on which his three united kingdoms\ncover four-fifths of the space. Take the feeling of _uniqueness,_\nfor instance: as when the European imagines that culture belongs to\nEurope alone, and when he regards himself as a sort of abridged cosmic\nprocess; or, as when the Christian makes all existence revolve round\nthe \"Salvation of man.\"\n\nThe question is, where does one begin to feel the pressure of\nconstraint: it is thus that different degrees are ascertained. A\nphilosopher for instance, in the midst of the coolest and most\ntransmontane feats of abstraction feels like a fish that enters its\nelement: while colours and tones oppress him; not to speak of those\ndumb desires--of that which others call \"the ideal.\"\n\n\n918.\n\nA healthy and vigorous little boy will look up sarcastically if he be\nasked: \"Wilt thou become virtuous?\"--but he immediately becomes eager\nif he be asked: \"Wilt thou become stronger than thy comrades?\"\n\n***\n\nHow does one become stronger?--By deciding slowly; and by holding\nfirmly to the decision once it is made. Everything else follows\nof itself. Spontaneous and changeable natures: both species of\nthe weak. We must not confound ourselves with them; we must feel\ndistance--betimes!\n\nBeware of good-natured people!. Dealings with them make one torpid.\nAll environment is good which makes one exercise those defensive and;\naggressive powers which are instinctive in man. All one's inventiveness\nshould apply itself to putting one's power of will to the test....\n_Here_ the determining factor must be recognised as something which is\nnot knowledge, astuteness, or wit.\n\nOne must learn to command betimes,--likewise to obey. A man must learn\nmodesty and tact in modesty: he must learn to distinguish and to\nhonour where modesty is displayed; he must likewise distinguish and\nhonour wherever he bestows his confidence.\n\nWhat does one repent most? One's modesty; the fact that one has not\nlent an ear to one's most individual needs; the fact that one has\nmistaken one's self; the fact that one has esteemed one's self low;\nthe fact that one has lost all delicacy of hearing in regard to one's\ninstincts.--This want of reverence in regard to one's self is avenged\nby all sorts of losses: in health, friendship, well-being, pride,\ncheerfulness, freedom, determination, courage. A man never forgives\nhimself, later on, for this want of genuine egoism: he regards it as an\nobjection and as a cause of doubt concerning his real ego.\n\n\n919.\n\nI should like man to begin by _respecting_ himself: everything else\nfollows of itself. Naturally a man ceases from being anything to others\nin this way: for this is precisely what they are least likely to\nforgive. \"What? a man who respects himself?\"[4] This is something quite\ndifferent from the blind instinct to _love_ one's self. Nothing is more\ncommon in the love of the sexes or in that duality which is called\nego, than a certain contempt for that which is loved the fatalism of\nlove.\n\n[Footnote 4: Cf. Disraeli in _Tancred:_ \"Self-respect, too, is a\nsuperstition of past ages.... It is not suited to these times; it\nis much too arrogant, too self-conceited, too egoistical. No one is\nimportant enough to have self-respect nowadays\" (book iii. chap.\nv.).--Tr.]\n\n\n920.\n\n\"I will have this or that\"; \"I would that this or that were so\"; \"I\nknow that this or that is so the degrees of power: the man of _will,_\nthe man of _desire,_ the man of _fate._\n\n\n921.\n\n_The means by which a strong species maintains itself_:--\n\nIt grants itself the right of exceptional actions, as a test of the\npower of self-control and of freedom.\n\nIt abandons itself to states in which a man is not allowed to be\nanything else than a barbarian.\n\nIt tries to acquire strength of will by every kind of asceticism.\n\nIt is not expansive, it practises silence; it is cautious in regard to\nall charms.\n\nIt learns to obey in such a way that obedience provides a test of\nself-maintenance. Casuistry is carried to its highest pitch in regard\nto points of honour.\n\nIt never argues, \"What is sauce for the goose is sauce for the\ngander,\"--but conversely! it regards reward, and the ability to repay,\nas a privilege, as a distinction.\n\nIt does not covet _other_ people's virtues.\n\n\n922.\n\nThe way in which one has to treat raw savages and the impossibility of\ndispensing with barbarous methods, becomes obvious, in practice, when\none is transplanted, with all one's European pampering, to a spot such\nas the Congo, or anywhere else where it is necessary to maintain one's\nmastery over barbarians.\n\n\n923.\n\n_Warlike and peaceful people._--Art thou a man who has the instincts of\na warrior in thy blood? If this be so, another question must be put. Do\nthy instincts impel thee to attack or to defend? The rest of mankind,\nall those whose instincts are not warlike, desire peace, concord,\nfreedom, \"equal rights\": these things are but names and steps for one\nand the same thing. Such men only wish to go where it is not necessary\nfor them to defend themselves,--such men become discontented with\nthemselves when they are obliged to offer resistance: they would fain\ncreate circumstances in which war is no longer necessary. If the worst\ncame to the worst, they would resign themselves, obey, and submit: all\nthese things are better than waging war--thus does the Christian's\ninstinct, for instance, whisper to him. In the born warrior's\ncharacter there is something of armour, likewise in the choice of his\ncircumstances and in the development of every one of his qualities,\nweapons are best evolved by the latter type, shields are best devised\nby the former.\n\nWhat expedients and what virtues do the unarmed and the undefended\nrequire in order to survive--and even to conquer?\n\n\n924.\n\nWhat will become of a man who no longer has any reasons for either\ndefence or attack? What will remain of his _passions_ when he has lost\nthose which form his defence and his weapons?\n\n\n925.\n\nA marginal note to a _niaiserie anglaise_: \"Do not to others that\nwhich you would not that they should do unto you.\" This stands for\nwisdom; this stands for prudence; this stands as the very basis of\nmorality as \"a golden maxim.\" John Stuart Mill believes in it (and what\nEnglishman does not?).... But the maxim does not bear investigation.\nThe argument, Do not as you would not be done by, forbids action\nwhich produce harmful results; the thought behind always is that an\naction is invariably requited. What if some one came forward with the\n_\"Principe\"_ in his hands, and said: \"We must do those actions alone\nwhich enable us to steal a march on others,--and which deprive others\nof the power of doing the same to us\"?--On the other hand, let us\nremember the Corsican who pledges his honour to vendetta. He too does\nnot desire to have a bullet through him; but the prospect of one, the\nprobability of getting one, does not deter him from vindicating his\nhonour.... And in all really decent actions are we not intentionally\nindifferent as to what result they will bring? To avoid an action which\nmight have harmful results,--that would be tantamount to forbidding all\ndecent actions in general.\n\nApart from this, the above maxim is valuable because it betrays a\ncertain _type of man_: it is the instinct of the herd which formulates\nitself through him,--we are equal, we regard each other as equal: as\nI am to thee so art thou to me.--In this community equivalence of\nactions is really believed in--an equivalence which never under any\ncircumstances manifests itself in real conditions. It is impossible\nto requite every action: among real individuals equal actions do not\nexist, consequently there can be no such thing as \"requital.\" ... When\nI do anything, I am very far from thinking that any man is able to do\nanything at all like it: the action belongs to me.... Nobody can pay\nme back for anything I do; the most that can be done is to make me the\nvictim of another action.\n\n\n926.\n\n_Against John Stuart Mill._--I abhor the man's vulgarity when he says:\n\"What is right for one man is right for another\"; \"Do not to others\nthat which you would not that they should do unto you. Such principles\nwould fain establish the whole of human traffic _upon mutual services,_\nso that every action would appear to be a cash payment for something\ndone to us. The hypothesis here is ignoble to the last degree: it\nis taken for granted that there is some sort of equivalence in value\nbetween my actions and thine; the most personal value Of an action is\nsimply cancelled in this manner (that part of an action which has no\nequivalent and which cannot be remunerated). \"Reciprocity\" is a piece\nof egregious vulgarity; the mere fact that what I do _cannot_ and _may_\nnot be done by another, that there is _no such thing as equivalence_\n(except in those _very select circles_ where one actually has one's\nequal, _inter pares_), that in a really profound sense a man never\nrequites because he is something _unique_ in himself and can only do\n_unique_ things,--this fundamental conviction contains the cause of\n_aristocratic aloofness from the mob_, because the latter believes in\nequality, and _consequently_ in the feasibility of equivalence and\n\"reciprocity.\"\n\n\n927.\n\nThe suburban Philistinism of moral valuations and of its concepts\n\"useful\" and \"harmful\" is well founded; it is the necessary point of\nview of a community which is only able to see and survey _immediate\nand proximate_ consequences. The _State_ and the _political man_ are\nalready in need of a more _super-moral_ attitude of mind: because\nthey have to calculate concerning a much more complicated tissue\nof consequences. An economic policy for the whole world should be\npossible which could look at things in such broad perspective that all\nits isolated demands would seem for the moment not only unjust, but\narbitrary.\n\n\n928.\n\n\"_Should one follow one's feelings?_\"--To set one's life at stake on\nthe impulse of the moment, and actuated by a generous feeling, has\nlittle worth, and does not even distinguish one. Everybody is alike in\nbeing capable of this--and in behaving in this way with determination,\nthe criminal, the bandit, and the Corsican certainly outstrip the\nhonest man.\n\nA higher degree of excellence would be to overcome this impulse, and to\nrefrain from performing an heroic deed at its bidding--and to remain\ncold, _raisonnable_, free from the tempestuous surging of concomitant\nsensations of delight.... The same holds good of pity: it must first be\n_sifted through_ reason; without this it becomes just as dangerous as\nany other passion.\n\nThe _blind yielding_ to a passion, whether it be generosity, pity, or\nhostility, is the cause of the greatest evil. Greatness of character\ndoes not consist in not possessing these passions--on the contrary, a\nman should possess them to a terrible degree: but he should lead them\nby the bridle.. and even this he should not do out of love of control,\nbut merely because....\n\n\n929.\n\n\"To give up one's life for a cause\"--very effective. But there are many\nthings for which one gives up one's life: the passions, one and all,\nwill be gratified. Whether one's life be pledged to pity, to anger,\nor to revenge--it matters not from the point of view of value. How\nmany have not sacrificed their lives for pretty girls--and even what\nis worse, their health! When one has temperament, one instinctively\nchooses the most dangerous things: if one is a philosopher, for\ninstance, one chooses the adventures of speculation; if one is\nvirtuous, one chooses immorality. One kind of man will risk nothing,\nanother kind will risk everything. Are we despisers of life? On the\ncontrary, what we seek is life raised to a higher power, life in\ndanger.... But, let me repeat, we do not, on that account, wish to\nbe more virtuous than others, Pascal, for instance, wished to risk\nnothing, and remained a Christian. That perhaps was virtuous.----A man\nalways sacrifices something.\n\n\n930.\n\nHow many _advantages_ does not a man sacrifice! To how small an extent\ndoes he seek his own profit! All his emotions and passions wish to\nassert their rights, and how remote a passion is From that cautious\nutility which consists in personal profit!\n\nA man does _not_ strive after \"happiness\"; one must be an Englishman to\nbe able to believe that a man is always seeking his own advantage. Our\ndesires long to violate things with passion--their overflowing strength\nseeks obstacles.\n\n\n931.\n\nAll passions are generally _useful,_ some directly, others indirectly;\nin regard to utility it is absolutely impossible to fix upon any\ngradation of values,--however certainly the forces of nature in general\nmay be regarded as good (_i.e._ useful), from an economic point of\nview, they are still the sources of much that is terrible and much\nthat is fatally irrevocable. The most one might say would be, that\nthe mightiest passions are the most valuable: seeing that no stronger\nsources of power exist.\n\n\n932.\n\nAll well-meaning, helpful, good-natured attitudes of mind have _not_\ncome to be honoured on account of their usefulness: but because they\nare the conditions peculiar to _rich souls_ who are able to bestow\nand whose value consists in their vital exuberance. Look into the\neyes of the benevolent man! In them you will see the exact reverse of\nself-denial, of hatred of self, of Pascalism.\n\n\n933.\n\n_In short,_ what we require is to dominate the passions and not to\nweaken or to extirpate them!--The greater the dominating power of the\nwill, the greater the freedom that may be given to the passions.\n\nThe \"great man\" is so, owing to the free scope which he gives to his\ndesires, and to the still greater power which knows how to enlist these\nmagnificent monsters into its service.\n\nThe \"good man\" in every stage of civilisation is at one and the same\ntime the _least dangerous_ and the _most useful:_ a sort of medium;\nthe idea formed of such a man by the common mind is that he is some\none _whom one has no reason to fear, but whom one must not therefore\ndespise._\n\nEducation: essentially a means of _ruining_ exceptions in favour of the\nrule. Culture: essentially the means of directing taste against the\nexceptions in favour of the mediocre.\n\nOnly when a culture can dispose of an overflow of force, is it capable\nof being a hothouse for the luxurious culture of the exception, of the\nexperiment, of the danger, of the _nuance: this_ is the tendency of\n_every_ aristocratic culture.\n\n\n934.\n\nAll questions of strength: to what extent ought one to try and\nprevail against the preservative measures of society and the latter's\nprejudices?--to what extent ought one to unfetter _one's terrible\nqualities,_ through which so many go to the dogs?--to what extent\nought one to run counter to _truth,_ and take up sides with its most\nquestionable aspects?--to what extent ought one to oppose suffering,\nself-contempt, pity, disease, vice, when it is always open to question\nwhether one can ever master them (what does not kill us makes us\n_stronger..._.)?--and, finally, to what extent ought one to acknowledge\nthe rights of the rule, of the common-place, of the petty, of the good,\nof the upright, in fact of the average man, without thereby allowing\none's self to become vulgar? ... The strongest test of character is to\nresist being ruined by the seductiveness of goodness. _Goodness_ must\nbe regarded as a luxury, as a refinement, as a _vice._\n\n\n\n3. The Noble Man.\n\n\n935.\n\n_Type._ real goodness, nobility, greatness of soul, as the result of\nvital wealth: which does not give in order to receive--and which has no\ndesire to _elevate_ itself by being good, _squandering_ is typical of\ngenuine goodness, vital _personal_ wealth is its prerequisite.\n\n\n936.\n\n_Aristocracy._--Gregarious ideals at present culminating in the highest\nstandard of value for society. It has been attempted to give them a\ncosmic, yea, and even a metaphysical, value.--I defend _aristocracy_\nagainst them.\n\nAny society which would of itself preserve a feeling of respect\nand _d\u00e9licatesse_ in regard to freedom, must consider itself as an\nexception, and have a force against it from which it distinguishes\nitself, and upon which it looks down with hostility.\n\nThe more rights I surrender and the more I level myself down to others,\nthe more deeply do I sink into the average and ultimately into the\ngreatest number. The first condition which an aristocratic society\nmust have in order to maintain a high degree of freedom among its\nmembers, is that extreme tension which arises from the presence of\nthe most _antagonistic_ instincts in all its units: from their will to\ndominate....\n\nIf ye would fain do away with strong contrasts and differences of rank,\nye will also abolish, strong love, lofty attitudes of mind, and the\nfeeling of individuality.\n\n***\n\nConcerning the _actual_ psychology of societies based upon freedom and\nequality.--What is it that tends to _diminish_ in such a society?\n\nThe will to be _responsible for ones self_ (the loss of this is a sign\nof the decline of autonomy); the ability to defend and to attack, even\nin spiritual matters; the power of command; the sense of reverence,\nof subservience, the ability to be silent, _great passion,_ great\nachievements, tragedy and cheerfulness.\n\n\n937.\n\nIn 1814 Augustin Thierry read what Montlosier had said in his work, _De\nla Monarchie fran\u00e7aise:_ he answered with a cry of indignation, and set\nhimself to his task. That emigrant had said:\n\n\"_Race d'affranchis, race d'esclaves arrach\u00e9s de nos mains, peuple\ntributaire, peuple nouveau, licence vous fut octroy\u00e9e d'\u00eatre libres,\net non pas \u00e0 nous d'\u00eatre nobles; pour nous tout est de droit, pour\nvous tout est de gr\u00e2ce, nous ne sommes point de votre communaut\u00e9; nous\nsommes un tout par nous m\u00eames._\"\n\n\n938.\n\nHow constantly the aristocratic world shears and weakens itself ever\nmore and more! By means of its noble instincts it abandons its\nprivileges, and owing to its refined and excessive culture, it takes\nan interest in the people, the weak, the poor, and the poetry of the\nlowly, etc.\n\n\n939.\n\nThere is such a thing as a noble and dangerous form of carelessness,\nwhich allows of profound conclusions and insight: the carelessness\nof the self-reliant and over-rich soul, which has never _troubled_\nitself about friends, but which knows only hospitality and knows\nhow to practise it; whose heart and house are open to all who will\nenter--beggar, cripple, or king. This is genuine sociability: he who is\ncapable of it has hundreds of \"friends,\" but probably not one friend.\n\n\n940.\n\nThe teaching \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u1f04\u03b3\u03b1\u03bd applies to men with overflowing\nstrength,--not to the mediocre, \u1f10\u03b3\u03ba\u03c1\u03ac\u03c4\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1 and \u1f04\u03c3\u03ba\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 are only\nsteps to higher things. Above them stands \"golden Nature.\"\n\n_\"Thou shalt\"_--unconditional obedience in Stoics, in Christian and\nArabian Orders, in Kant's philosophy (it is immaterial whether this\nobedience is shown to a superior or to a concept).\n\nHigher than \"Thou shalt\" stands \"I will\" (the heroes); higher than \"I\nwill\" stands \"I am\" (the gods of the Greeks).\n\nBarbarian gods express nothing of the pleasure of restraint,--they are\nneither simple, nor light-hearted, nor moderate.\n\n\n941.\n\nThe essence of our gardens and palaces (and to the same extent the\nessence of all yearning after riches) is _the desire to rid the eye of\ndisorder and vulgarity, and to build a home for our soul's nobility._\n\nThe majority of people certainly believe that they will develop higher\nnatures when those beautiful and peaceful things have operated upon\nthem: hence the exodus to Italy, hence all travelling, etc., and all\nreading and visits to theatres. _People want to be formed_--that is the\nkernel of their labours for culture! But the strong, the mighty, would\nthemselves _have a hand in the forming, and would fain have nothing\nstrange about them_!\n\nIt is for this reason, too, that men go to open Nature, not to find\nthemselves, but to lose themselves and to forget themselves. The desire\n\"_to get away from one's self_\" is proper to all weaklings, and to all\nthose who are discontented with themselves.\n\n\n942.\n\nThe only nobility is that of birth and blood. (I do not refer here to\nthe prefix \"Lord\" and _L'almanac de Gotha_: this is a parenthesis for\ndonkeys.) Wherever people speak of the \"aristocracy of intellect,\"\nreasons are generally not lacking for concealing something, it is\nknown to be a password among ambitious Jews. Intellect alone does\nnot ennoble; on the contrary, something is always needed _to ennoble\nintellect._--What then is needed?--Blood.\n\n\n943.\n\nWhat is noble?\n\n--External punctiliousness; because this punctiliousness hedges a man\nabout, keeps him at a distance, saves him from being confounded with\nsomebody else.\n\nA frivolous appearance in word, clothing, and bearing, with which\nstoical hardness and self-control protect themselves from all prying\ninquisitiveness or curiosity.\n\n--A slow step and a slow glance. There are not too many valuable things\non earth: and these come and wish to come of themselves to him who has\nvalue. We are not quick to admire.\n\n--We know how to bear poverty, want, and even illness.\n\n--We avoid small honours owing to our mistrust of all who are\nover-ready to praise: for the man who praises believes he understands\nwhat he praises: but to understand--Balzac, that typical man of\nambition, betrayed the fact _comprendre c'est \u00e9galer._\n\n--Our doubt concerning the communicativeness of our hearts goes very\ndeep; to us, loneliness is not a matter of choice, it is imposed upon\nus.\n\n--We are convinced that we only have duties to our equals, to others we\ndo as we think best: we know that justice is only to be expected among\nequals (alas! this will not be realised for some time to come),\n\n--We are ironical towards the \"gifted\"; we hold the belief that no\nmorality is possible without good birth.\n\n--We always feel as if we were those who had to dispense honours: while\nhe is not found too frequently who would be worthy of honouring us.\n\n--We are always disguised: the higher a man's nature the more is he\nin need of remaining incognito. If there be a God, then out of sheer\ndecency He ought only to show Himself on earth in the form of a man.\n\n--We are capable of _otium,_ of the unconditional conviction that\nalthough a handicraft does not shame one in any sense, it certainly\nreduces one's rank. However much we may respect \"industry,\" and know\nhow to give it its due, we do not appreciate it in a bourgeois sense,\nor after the manner of those insatiable and cackling artists who, like\nhens, cackle and lay eggs, and cackle again.\n\n--We protect artists and poets and any one who happens to be a master\nin something; but as creatures of a higher order than those, who only\nknow how to do something, who are only \"productive men,\" we do not\nconfound ourselves with them.\n\n--We find joy in all _forms_ and ceremonies; we would fain foster\neverything formal, and we are convinced that courtesy is one of the\ngreatest virtues; we feel suspicious of every kind of _laisser aller,_\nincluding the freedom of the press and of thought; because, under such\nconditions, the intellect grows easy-going and coarse, and stretches\nits limbs.\n\n--We take pleasure in women as in a perhaps daintier, more delicate,\nand more ethereal kind of creature. What a treat it is to meet\ncreatures who have only dancing and nonsense and finery in their\nminds! They have always been the delight of every tense and profound\nmale soul, whose life is burdened with heavy responsibilities.\n\n--We take pleasure in princes and in priests, because in big things, as\nin small, they actually uphold the belief in the difference of human\nvalues, even in the estimation of the past, and at least symbolically.\n\n--We are able to keep silence _i_ but we do not breathe a word of this\nin the presence of listeners.\n\n--We are able to endure long enmities: we lack the power of easy\nreconciliations.\n\n--We have a loathing of demagogism, of enlightenment, of amiability,\nand plebeian familiarity.\n\n--We collect precious things, the needs of higher and fastidious souls;\nwe wish to possess nothing in common. We want to have our own books,\nour _own_ landscapes.\n\n--We protest against evil and fine experiences, and take care not to\ngeneralise too quickly. The individual case: how ironically we regard\nit when it has the bad taste to put on the airs of a rule!\n\n--We love that which is _na\u00eff,_ and _na\u00eff_ people, but as spectators\nand higher creatures; we think Faust is just as simple as his Margaret.\n\n--We have a low estimation of good people, because they are gregarious\nanimals: we know how often an invaluable golden drop of goodness\nlies concealed beneath the most evil, the most malicious, and the\nhardest exterior, and that this single grain outweighs all the mere\ngoody-goodiness of milk-and-watery souls.\n\n--We don't regard a man of our kind as refuted by his vices, nor by his\ntomfooleries. We are well aware that we are not recognised with ease,\nand that we have every reason to make our foreground very prominent.\n\n\n944.\n\n_What is noble?_--The fact that one is constantly forced to be playing\na part. That one is constantly searching for situations in which one\nis forced to put on airs. That one leaves happiness to the _greatest\nnumber:_ the happiness which consists of inner peacefulness, of virtue,\nof comfort, and of Anglo-angelic-back-parlour-smugness, _\u00e0 la_ Spencer.\nThat one instinctively seeks for heavy responsibilities. That one knows\nhow to create enemies everywhere, at a pinch even in one's self. That\none contradicts the _greatest number,_ not in words at all, but by\ncontinually behaving differently from them.\n\n\n945.\n\nVirtue (for instance, truthfulness) is _our_ most noble and most\ndangerous luxury. We must not decline the disadvantages which it brings\nin its train.\n\n\n946.\n\nWe refuse to be _praised:_ we do what serves our purpose, what gives us\npleasure, or what we are obliged to do.\n\n\n947.\n\nWhat is chastity in a man? It means that his taste in sex has remained\nnoble; that _in eroticis_ he likes neither the brutal, the morbid, nor\nthe clever.\n\n\n948.\n\nThe concept of honour is founded upon the belief in select society,\nin knightly excellences, in the obligation of having continually to\nplay a part. In essentials it means that one does not take one's life\ntoo seriously, that one adheres unconditionally to the most dignified\nmanners in one's dealings with everybody (at least in so far as they do\nnot belong to \"us\"); that one is neither familiar, nor good-natured,\nnor hearty, nor modest, except _inter pares_; that one is _always\nplaying a part._\n\n\n949.\n\nThe fact that one sets one's life, one's health, and one's honour\nat stake, is the result of high spirits and of an overflowing and\nspendthrift will: it is not the result of philanthropy, but of the fact\nthat every danger kindles our curiosity concerning the measure of our\nstrength, and provokes our courage.\n\n\n950.\n\nEagles swoop down straight nobility of soul is best revealed by the\nmagnificent and proud foolishness with which it makes its _attacks._\n\n\n951.\n\nWar should be made against all namby-pamby ideas of _nobility_!--A\ncertain modicum of brutality cannot be dispensed with: no more\nthan we can do without a certain approximation to criminality.\n\"Self-satisfaction\" must _not_ be allowed; a man should look upon\nhimself with an adventurous spirit; he should experiment with himself\nand run risks with himself--no beautiful soul-quackery should be\ntolerated. I want to give _a more robust ideal_ a chance of prevailing.\n\n\n952.\n\n\"Paradise is under the shadow of a swordsman\"--this is also a symbol\nand a test-word by which souls with noble and warrior-like origin\nbetray and discover themselves.\n\n\n953.\n\n_The two paths._--There comes a period when man has a surplus amount\nof power at his disposal. Science aims at establishing the _slavery of\nnature._\n\nThen man acquires the _leisure_ in which to develop himself into\nsomething new and more lofty. _A new aristocracy._ It is then that a\nlarge number of virtues which are now _conditions of existence_ are\nsuperseded.--Qualities which are no longer needed are on that account\nlost. We no longer need virtues: _consequently_ we are losing them\n(likewise the morality of \"one thing is needful,\" of the salvation of\nthe soul, and of immortality: these were means wherewith to make man\ncapable of enormous self-tyranny, through the emotion of great fear!!!).\n\nThe different kinds of needs by means of whose discipline man is\nformed: need teaches work, thought, and self-control.\n\n***\n\n_Physiological_ purification and strengthening. The new aristocracy is\nin need of an opposing body which it may combat: it must be driven to\nextremities in order to maintain itself.\n\n_The two futures of mankind_: (1) the consequence of a levelling-down\nto mediocrity, (2) conscious aloofness and self-development.\n\nA doctrine which would cleave a _gulf:_ it maintains the _highest and\nthe lowest species_ (it destroys the intermediate).\n\nThe aristocracies, both spiritual and temporal, which have existed\nhitherto prove nothing _against_ the necessity of a new aristocracy.\n\n\n\n4. The Lords of the Earth.\n\n\n954.\n\nA certain question constantly recurs to us; it is perhaps a seductive\nand evil question; may it be whispered into the ears of those who\nhave a right to such doubtful problems--those strong souls of to-day\nwhose dominion over themselves is unswerving: is it not high time,\nnow that the type \"gregarious animal\" is developing ever more and\nmore in Europe, to set about rearing, thoroughly, artificially, and\nconsciously, an opposite type, and to attempt to establish the latter's\nvirtues? And would not the democratic movement itself find for the\nfirst time a sort of goal, salvation, and justification, if some one\nappeared who availed himself of it--so that at last, beside its new\nand sublime product, slavery (for this must be the end of European\ndemocracy), that higher species of ruling and C\u00e6sarian spirits might\nalso be produced, which would stand upon it, hold to it, and would\nelevate themselves through it? This new race would climb aloft to new\nand hitherto impossible things, to a broader vision, and to its task on\nearth.\n\n\n955.\n\nThe aspect of the European of to-day makes me very hopeful. A daring\nand ruling race is here building itself up upon the foundation of\nan extremely intelligent, gregarious mass. It is obvious that the\neducational movements for the latter are not alone prominent nowadays.\n\n\n956.\n\nThe same conditions which go to develop the gregarious animal also\nforce the development of the leaders.\n\n\n957.\n\nThe question, and at the same time the task, is approaching with\nhesitation, terrible as Fate, but nevertheless inevitable: how shall\nthe earth as a whole be ruled? And to what end shall man as a whole--no\nlonger as a people or as a race--be reared and trained?\n\nLegislative moralities are the principal means by which one can form\nmankind, according to the fancy of a creative and profound will:\nprovided, of course, that such an artistic will of the first order gets\nthe power into its own hands, and can make its creative will prevail\nover long periods in the form of legislation, religions, and morals.\nAt present, and probably for some time to come, one will seek such\ncolossally creative men, such really great men, as I understand them,\nin vain: they will be lacking, until, after many disappointments, we\nare forced to begin to understand why it is they are lacking, and that\nnothing bars with greater hostility their rise and development, at\npresent and for some time to come, than that which is now called _the_\nmorality in Europe. Just as if there were no other kind of morality,\nand could be no other kind, than the one we have already characterised\nas herd-morality. It is this morality which is now striving with\nall its power to attain to that green-meadow happiness on earth,\nwhich consists in security, absence of danger, ease, facilities for\nlivelihood, and, last but not least, \"if all goes well,\" even hopes\nto dispense with all kinds of shepherds and bell-wethers. The two\ndoctrines which it preaches most universally are \"equality of rights\"\nand \"pity for all sufferers\"--and it even regards suffering itself as\nsomething which must be got rid of absolutely. That such ideas may be\nmodern leads one to think very poorly of modernity. He, however, who\nhas reflected deeply concerning the question, how and where the plant\nman has hitherto grown most vigorously, is forced to believe that this\nhas always taken place under the opposite conditions; that to this end\nthe danger of the situation has to increase enormously, his inventive\nfaculty and dissembling powers have to fight their way up under long\noppression and compulsion, and his will to life has to be increased\nto the unconditioned will to power, to over-power: he believes that\ndanger, severity, violence, peril in the street and in the heart,\ninequality of rights, secrecy, stoicism, seductive art, and devilry of\nevery kind--in short, the opposite of all gregarious desiderata--are\nnecessary for the elevation of man. Such a morality with opposite\ndesigns, which would rear man upwards instead of to comfort and\nmediocrity; such a morality, with the intention of producing a ruling\ncaste--the future lords of the earth--must, in order to be taught at\nall, introduce itself as if it were in some way correlated to the\nprevailing moral law, and must come forward under the cover of the\nlatter's words and forms. But seeing that, to this end, a host of\ntransitionary and deceptive measures must be discovered, and that the\nlife of a single individual stands for almost nothing in view of the\naccomplishment of such lengthy tasks and aims, the first thing that\nmust be done is to rear _a new kind_ of man in whom the duration of\nthe necessary will and the necessary instincts is guaranteed for many\ngenerations. This must be a new kind of ruling species and caste--this\nought to be quite as clear as the somewhat lengthy and not easily\nexpressed consequences of this thought. The aim should be to prepare\na _transvaluation of values_ for a particularly strong kind of man,\nmost highly gifted in intellect and will, and, to this end, slowly\nand cautiously to liberate in him a whole host of slandered instincts\nhitherto held in check: whoever meditates about this problem belongs\nto us, the free spirits--certainly not to that kind of \"free spirit\"\nwhich has existed hitherto: for these desired practically the reverse.\nTo this order, it seems to me, belong, above all, the pessimists of\nEurope, the poets and thinkers of a revolted idealism, in so far as\ntheir discontent with existence in general must _consistently_ at least\nhave led them to be dissatisfied with the man of the present; the same\napplies to certain insatiably ambitious artists who courageously and\nunconditionally fight against the gregarious animal for the special\nrights of higher men, and subdue all herd-instincts and precautions\nof more exceptional minds by their seductive art. Thirdly and lastly,\nwe should include in this group all those critics and historians by\nwhom the discovery of the Old World, which has begun so happily--this\nwas the work of the _new_ Columbus, of German intellect--will be\ncourageously _continued_ (for we still stand in the very first stages\nof this conquest). For in the Old World, as a matter of fact, a\ndifferent and more lordly morality ruled than that of to-day; and the\nman of antiquity, under the educational ban of his morality, was a\nstronger and deeper man than the man of to-day--up to the present he\nhas been the only well-constituted man. The temptation, however, which\nfrom antiquity to the present day has always exercised its power on\nsuch lucky strokes of Nature, _i.e._ on strong and enterprising souls,\nis, even at the present day, the most subtle and most effective of\nanti-democratic and anti-Christian powers, just as it was in the time\nof the Renaissance.\n\n\n958.\n\nI am writing for a race of men which does not yet exist: for \"the lords\nof the earth.\"\n\nIn Plato's _Theages_ the following passage will be found: \"Every one\nof us would like if possible to be master of mankind; if possible, a\n_God!\" This_ attitude of mind must be reinstated in our midst.\n\nEnglishmen, Americans, and Russians.\n\n\n959.\n\nThat primeval forest-plant Man always appears where the struggle for\npower has been waged longest. _Great_ men.\n\nPrimeval forest creatures, the _Romans._\n\n\n960.\n\nFrom now henceforward there will be such favourable first conditions\nfor greater ruling powers as have never yet been found on earth.\nAnd this is by no means the most important point. The establishment\nhas been made possible of international race unions which will set\nthemselves the task of rearing a ruling race, the future \"lords\nof the earth\"--a new, vast aristocracy based upon the most severe\nself-discipline, in which the will of philosophical men of power and\nartist-tyrants will be stamped upon thousands of years: a higher\nspecies of men which, thanks to their preponderance of will, knowledge,\nriches, and influence, will avail themselves of democratic Europe as\nthe most suitable and supple instrument they can have for taking the\nfate of the earth into their own hands, and working as artists upon man\nhimself. Enough! The time is coming for us to transform all our views\non politics.\n\n\n\n5. The Great Man.\n\n\n961.\n\nI will endeavour to see at which periods in history great men arise.\nThe significance of despotic moralities that have lasted a long time:\nthey strain the bow, provided they do not break it.\n\n\n962.\n\nA great man,--a man whom Nature has built up and invented in a grand\nstyle,--What is such a man? _First,_ in his general course of action\nhis consistency is so broad that owing to its very breadth it can be\nsurveyed only with difficulty, and consequently misleads; he possesses\nthe capacity of extending his will over great stretches of his life,\nand of despising and rejecting all small things, whatever most\nbeautiful and \"divine\" things of the world there may be among them.\n_Secondly,_ he is _colder, harder, less cautious and more free from\nthe fear of \"public opinion\";_ he does not possess the virtues which\nare compatible with respectability and with being respected, nor any\nof those things which are counted among the \"virtues of the herd.\" If\nhe is unable to _lead_, he walks alone; he may then perchance grunt\nat many things which he meets on his way. _Thirdly_, he asks for no\n\"compassionate\" heart, but servants, instruments; in his dealings with\nmen his one aim is _to make_ something out of them. He knows that he\ncannot reveal himself to anybody: he thinks it bad taste to become\nfamiliar; and as a rule he is not familiar when people think he is.\nWhen he is not talking to his soul, he wears a mask. He would rather\nlie than tell the truth, because lying requires more spirit and _will_.\nThere is a loneliness within his heart which neither praise nor blame\ncan reach, because he is his own judge from whom is no appeal.\n\n\n963.\n\nThe great man is necessarily a sceptic (I do not mean to say by this\nthat he must appear to be one), provided that greatness consists in\nthis: to _will_ something great, together with the means thereto.\nFreedom from any kind of conviction is a factor in his _strength\nof will_. And thus it is in keeping with that \"enlightened form of\ndespotism\" which every great passion exercises. Such a passion enlists\nintellect in its service; it even has the courage for unholy means;\nit creates without hesitation; it allows itself convictions, it even\n_uses_ them, but it never submits to them. The need of faith and\nof anything unconditionally negative or affirmative is a proof of\nweakness; all weakness is weakness of will. The man of faith, the\nbeliever, is necessarily an inferior species of man. From this it\nfollows that \"all freedom of spirit,\" _i.e._ instinctive scepticism, is\nthe prerequisite of greatness.\n\n\n964.\n\nThe great man is conscious of his power over a people, and of the fact\nthat he coincides temporarily with a people or with a century--this\n_magnifying_ of his self-consciousness as _causa_ and _voluntas_\nis _misunderstood_ as \"altruism\": he feels driven to _means_ of\ncommunication: all great men are _inventive_ in such means. They want\nto form great communities in their own image; they would fain give\nmultiformity and disorder definite shape; it stimulates them to behold\nchaos.\n\nThe misunderstanding of love. There is a _slavish_ love which\nsubordinates itself and gives itself away--which idealises and deceives\nitself; there is a _divine_ species of love which despises and loves at\nthe same time, and which _remodels_ and _elevates_ the thing it loves.\n\nThe object is to attain that enormous _energy of greatness_ which can\nmodel the man of the future by means of discipline and also by means\nof the annihilation of millions of the bungled and botched, and which\ncan yet avoid _going to ruin_ at the sight of the suffering _created_\nthereby, the like of which has never been seen before.\n\n\n965.\n\nThe revolution, confusion, and distress of whole peoples is in my\nopinion of less importance than _the misfortunes which attend great\nindividuals in their development._ We must not allow ourselves to be\ndeceived: the many misfortunes of all these small folk do not together\nconstitute a sum-total, except in the feelings of _mighty_ men.--To\nthink of one's self in moments of great danger, and to draw ones own\nadvantage from the calamities of thousands in the case of the man\nwho differs very much from the common ruck--may be a sign of a great\ncharacter which is able to master its feeling of pity and justice.\n\n\n966.\n\nIn contradistinction to the animal, man has developed such a host\nof _antagonistic_ instincts and impulses in himself, that he has\nbecome master of the earth by means of this synthesis.--Moralities\nare only the expression of local and limited _orders of rank in_ this\nmultifarious world of instincts which prevent man from perishing\nthrough their _antagonism._ Thus a masterful instinct so weakens and\nsubtilises the instinct which opposes it that it becomes an _impulse_\nwhich provides the _stimulus_ for the activity of the principal\ninstinct.\n\nThe highest man would have the greatest multifariousness in his\ninstincts, and he would _possess_ these in the relatively strongest\ndegree in which he is able to endure them. As a matter of fact,\nwherever the plant, man, is found strong, mighty instincts are to be\nfound opposing each other (_e.g._ Shakespeare), but they are subdued.\n\n\n967.\n\nWould one not be justified in reckoning all great men among the\n_wicked?_ This is not so easy to demonstrate in the case of\nindividuals. They are so frequently capable of masterly dissimulation\nthat they very often assume the airs and forms of great virtues. Often,\ntoo, they seriously reverence virtues, and in such a way as to be\npassionately hard towards themselves; but as the result of cruelty.\nSeen from a distance such things are liable to deceive. Many, on the\nother hand, misunderstand themselves; not infrequently, too, a great\nmission will call forth great qualities, _e.g._ justice. The essential\nfact is: the greatest men may also perhaps have great virtues, but then\nthey also have the opposites of these virtues. I believe that it is\nprecisely out of the presence of these opposites and of the feelings\nthey suscitate, that the great man arises,--for the great man is the\nbroad arch which spans two banks lying far apart.\n\n\n968.\n\nIn _great men_ we find the specific qualities of life in their highest\nmanifestation: injustice, falsehood, exploitation. But inasmuch as\ntheir effect has always been _overwhelming,_ their essential nature has\nbeen most thoroughly misunderstood, and interpreted as goodness. The\ntype of such an interpreter would be Carlyle.[5]\n\n[Footnote 5: This not only refers to _Heroes and Hero-Worship,_\nbut doubtless to Carlyle's prodigious misunderstanding of Goethe a\nmisunderstanding which still requires to be put right by a critic\nuntainted by Puritanism.--Tr.]\n\n\n969.\n\nGenerally speaking, everything _is worth no more and no less than one\nhas paid for it._ This of course does not hold good in the case of an\nisolated individual; the great capacities of the individual have no\nrelation whatsoever to that which he has done, sacrificed, and suffered\nfor them. But if one should examine the previous history of his race\none would be sure to find the record of an extraordinary storing up and\ncapitalising of power by means of all kinds of abstinence, struggle,\nindustry, and determination. It is because the great man has cost so\nmuch, and not because he stands there as a miracle, as a gift from\nheaven, or as an accident, that he became great: \"Heredity\" is a false\nnotion. A man's ancestors have always paid the price of what he is.\n\n\n970.\n\n_The danger of modesty._ To adapt ourselves too early to duties,\nsocieties, and daily schemes of work in which accident may have placed\nus, at a time when neither our powers nor our aim in life has stepped\nperemptorily into our consciousness; the premature certainty of\nconscience and feeling of relief and of sociability which is acquired\nby this precocious, modest attitude, and which appears to our minds\nas a deliverance from those inner and outer disturbances of our\nfeelings--all this pampers and keeps a man down in the most dangerous\nfashion imaginable. To learn to respect things which people about us\nrespect, as if we had no standard or right of our own to determine\nvalues; the strain of appraising things as others appraise them,\n_counter_ to the whisperings of our inner taste, which also has a\nconscience of its own, becomes a terribly subtle kind of constraint:\nand if in the end no explosion takes place which bursts all the bonds\nof love and morality at once, then such a spirit becomes withered,\ndwarfed, feminine, and objective. The reverse of this is bad enough,\nbut still it is better than the foregoing: to suffer from one's\nenvironment, from its praise just as much as from its blame; to be\nwounded by it and to fester inwardly without betraying the fact; to\ndefend one's self involuntarily and suspiciously against its love; to\nlearn to be silent, and perchance to conceal this by talking; to create\nnooks and safe, lonely hiding-places where one can go and take breath\nfor a moment, or shed tears of sublime comfort--until at last one has\ngrown strong enough to say: \"What on earth have I to do with you?\" and\nto go _one's_ way alone.\n\n\n971.\n\nThose men who are in themselves destinies, and whose advent is the\nadvent of fate, the whole race of _heroic_ bearers of burdens: oh!\nhow heartily and gladly would they have respite from themselves for\nonce in a while!--how they crave after stout hearts and shoulders, that\nthey might free themselves, were it but for an hour or two, from that\nwhich oppresses them! And how fruitlessly they crave! ... They wait;\nthey observe all that passes before their eyes: no man even cometh nigh\nto them with a thousandth part of their suffering and passion, no man\nguesseth to what end they have waited.... At last, at last, they learn\nthe first lesson of their life: to wait no longer; and forthwith they\nlearn their second lesson: to be affable, to be modest; and from that\ntime onwards to endure everybody and every kind of thing--in short, to\nendure still a little more than they had endured theretofore.\n\n\n\n6. The Highest Man as Lawgiver of the Future.\n\n\n972.\n\n_The lawgivers of the future._--After having tried for a long time in\nvain to attach a particular meaning to the word \"philosopher,\"--for I\nfound many antagonistic traits, I recognised that we can distinguish\nbetween two kinds of philosophers:--\n\n(1) Those who desire to establish any large system of values (logical\nor moral);\n\n(2) Those who are the _lawgivers_ of such valuations.\n\nThe former try to seize upon the world of the present or the past,\nby embodying or abbreviating the multifarious phenomena by means of\nsigns: their object is to make it possible for us to survey, to reflect\nupon, to comprehend, and to utilise everything that has happened\nhitherto--they serve the purpose of man by using all past things to the\nbenefit of his future.\n\nThe second class, however, are _commanders;_ they say: \"Thus shall it\nbe!\" They alone determine the \"whither\" and the \"wherefore,\" and that\nwhich will be useful and beneficial to man; they have command over the\nprevious work of scientific men, and all knowledge is to them only\na means to their creations. This second kind of philosopher seldom\nappears; and as a matter of fact their situation and their danger is\nappalling. How often have they not intentionally blindfolded their\neyes in order to shut out the sight of the small strip of ground which\nseparates them from the abyss and from utter destruction. Plato, for\ninstance, when he persuaded himself that \"the good,\" as he wanted it,\nwas not Plato's good, but \"the good in itself,\" the eternal treasure\nwhich a certain man of the name of Plato had chanced to find on his\nway! This same will to blindness prevails in a much coarser form in the\ncase of the founders of religion; their \"Thou shalt\" must on no account\nsound to their ears like \"I will,\"--they only dare to pursue their task\nas if under the command of God; their legislation of values can only be\na burden they can bear if they regard it as \"revelation,\" in this way\ntheir conscience is not crushed by the responsibility.\n\nAs soon as those two comforting expedients--that of Plato and that of\nMuhammed--have been overthrown, and no thinker can any longer relieve\nhis conscience with the hypothesis \"God\" or \"eternal values,\" the\nclaim of the lawgiver to determine new values rises to an awfulness\nwhich has not yet been experienced. Now those elect, on whom the\nfaint light of such a duty is beginning to dawn, try and see whether\nthey cannot escape it--as their greatest danger--by means of a timely\nside-spring: for instance, they try to persuade themselves that their\ntask is already accomplished, or that it defies accomplishment, or that\ntheir shoulders are not broad enough for such burdens, or that they\nare already taken up with burdens closer to hand, or even that this\nnew and remote duty is a temptation and a seduction, drawing them away\nfrom all other duties; a disease, a kind of madness. Many, as a matter\nof fact, do succeed in evading the path appointed to them: throughout\nthe whole of history we can see the traces of such deserters and their\nguilty consciences. In most cases,, however, there comes to such men\nof destiny that hour of delivery, that autumnal season of maturity, in\nwhich they are forced to do that which they did not even \"wish to do\":\nand that deed before which in the past they have trembled most, falls\neasily and unsought from the tree, as an involuntary deed, almost as a\npresent.\n\n\n973.\n\n_The human horizon._--Philosophers may be conceived as men who make\nthe greatest efforts to _discover_ to what extent man can _elevate_\nhimself--this holds good more particularly of Plato: how far man's\n_power_ can extend. But they do this as individuals; perhaps the\ninstinct of C\u00e6sars and of all founders of states, etc., was greater,\nfor it preoccupied itself with the question how far man could be urged\nforward in _development_ under \"favourable circumstances.\" What they\ndid not sufficiently understand, however, was the nature of favourable\ncircumstances. The great question: \"Where has the plant 'man' grown\nmost magnificently heretofore? In order to answer this, a comparative\nstudy of history is necessary.\n\n\n974.\n\nEvery fact and every work exercises a fresh persuasion over every age\nand every new species of man. History always enunciates new truths.\n\n\n975.\n\nTo remain objective, severe, firm, and hard while making a thought\nprevail is perhaps the best forte of artists; but if for this purpose\nany one have to work upon human material (as teachers, statesmen,\nhave to do, etc.), then the repose, the coldness, and the hardness\nsoon vanish. In natures like C\u00e6sar and Napoleon we are able to divine\nsomething of the nature of \"disinterestedness\" in their work on their\nmarble, whatever be the number of men that are sacrificed in the\nprocess. In this direction the future of higher men lies: to bear the\ngreatest responsibilities and not to go to rack and ruin through\nthem.--Hitherto the deceptions of inspiration have almost always been\nnecessary for a man not to lose faith in his own hand, and in his right\nto his task.\n\n\n976.\n\nThe reason why philosophers are mostly failures. Because among the\nconditions which determine them there are qualities which generally\nruin other men:--\n\n(1) A philosopher must have an enormous multiplicity of qualities; he\nmust be a sort of abbreviation of man and have all man's high and base\ndesires: the danger of the contrast within him, and of the possibility\nof his loathing himself;\n\n(2) He must be inquisitive in an extraordinary number of ways: the\ndanger of versatility;\n\n(3) He must be just and honest in the highest sense, but profound both\nin love and hate (and in injustice);\n\n(4) He must not only be a spectator but a lawgiver: a judge and\ndefendant (in so far as he is an abbreviation of the world);\n\n(5) He must be extremely multiform and yet firm and hard. He must be\nsupple.\n\n\n977.\n\nThe really _regal_ calling of the philosopher (according to the\nexpression of Alcuin the Anglo-Saxon): \"_Prava corrigere, et recta\ncorroborare, et sancta sublimare._\"\n\n\n978.\n\nThe new philosopher can only arise in conjunction with a ruling class,\nas the highest spiritualisation of the latter. Great politics, the\nrule of the earth, as a proximate contingency, the total _lack of\nprinciples_ necessary thereto.\n\n\n979.\n\nFundamental concept: the new values must first be created--this remains\n_our duty_! The philosopher must be our lawgiver. New species. (How the\ngreatest species hitherto [for instance, the Greeks] were reared: this\nkind of accident must now be _consciously_ striven for.)\n\n\n980.\n\nSupposing one thinks of the philosopher as an educator who, looking\ndown from his lonely elevation, is powerful enough to draw long chains\nof generations up to him: then he must be granted the most terrible\nprivileges of a great educator. An educator never says what he himself\nthinks; but only that which he thinks it is good for those whom he is\neducating to hear upon any subject. This dissimulation on his part\nmust not be found out; it is part of his masterliness that people\nshould believe in his honesty, he must be capable of all the means of\ndiscipline and education: there are some natures which he will only be\nable to raise by means of lashing them with his scorn; others who are\nlazy, irresolute, cowardly, and vain, he will be able to affect only\nwith exaggerated praise. Such a teacher stands beyond good and evil,\nbut nobody must know that he does.\n\n\n981.\n\nWe must _not_ make men \"better,\" we must _not_ talk to them about\nmorality in any form as if \"morality in itself,\" or an ideal kind\nof man in general, could be taken for granted; but we must _create\ncircumstances_ in which _stronger men are necessary,_ such as for\ntheir part will require a morality (or, better still: a bodily and\nspiritual discipline) which makes men strong, and upon which they will\nconsequently insist! As they will need one so badly, they will have it.\n\nWe must not let ourselves be seduced by blue eyes and heaving breasts:\n_greatness of soul has absolutely nothing romantic about it. And\nunfortunately nothing whatever amiable either._\n\n\n982.\n\nFrom warriors we must learn: (1) to associate death with those\ninterests for which we are fighting--that makes us venerable; (2) we\nmust learn to _sacrifice_ numbers, and to take our cause sufficiently\nseriously not to spare men; (3) we must practise inexorable discipline,\nand allow ourselves violence and cunning in war.\n\n\n983.\n\nThe _education_ which rears those _ruling_ virtues that allow a man to\nbecome master of his benevolence and his pity: the great disciplinary\nvirtues (\"Forgive thine enemies\" is mere child's play beside them),\n_and the passions of the creator, must be elevated_ to the heights--we\nmust cease from carving marble! The exceptional and powerful position\nof those creatures (compared with that of all princes hitherto): the\nRoman C\u00e6sar with Christ's soul.\n\n\n984.\n\nWe must not separate greatness of soul from intellectual greatness. For\nthe former involves _independence_; but without intellectual greatness\nindependence should not be allowed; all it does is to create disasters\neven in its lust of well-doing and of practising \"justice.\" Inferior\nspirits _must_ obey, consequently they cannot be possessed of greatness.\n\n\n985.\n\nThe more lofty philosophical man who is surrounded by loneliness, not\nbecause he wishes to be alone, but because he is what he is, and cannot\nfind his equal: what a number of dangers and torments are reserved for\nhim, precisely at the present time, when we have lost our belief in\nthe order of rank, and consequently no longer know how to understand\nor honour this isolation! Formerly the sage almost sanctified himself\nin the consciences of the mob by going aside in this way; to-day\nthe anchorite sees himself as though enveloped in a cloud of gloomy\ndoubt and suspicions. And not alone by the envious and the wretched:\nin every well-meant act that he experiences he is bound to discover\nmisunderstanding, neglect, and superficiality. He knows the crafty\ntricks of foolish pity which makes these people feel so good and holy\nwhen they attempt to save him from his own destiny, by giving him more\ncomfortable situations and more decent and reliable society. Yes, he\nwill even get to admire the unconscious lust of destruction with which\nall mediocre spirits stand up and oppose him, believing all the while\nthat they have a holy right to do so! For men of such incomprehensible\nloneliness it is necessary to put a good stretch of country between\nthem and the officiousness of their fellows: this is part of their\nprudence. For such a man to maintain himself uppermost to-day amid\nthe dangerous maelstroms of the age which threaten to draw him under,\neven cunning and disguise will be necessary. Every attempt he makes to\norder his life in the present and with the present, every time he draws\nnear to these men and their modern desires, he will have to expiate as\nif it were an actual sin: and withal he may look with wonder at the\nconcealed wisdom of his nature, which after every one of these attempts\nimmediately leads him back to himself by means of illnesses and painful\naccidents.\n\n\n986.\n\n                    _\"Maledetto colui_\n    _che contrista, un spirto immortal!\"_\n    MANZONI (_Conte di Carmagnola,_ Act II.)\n\n\n987.\n\nThe most difficult and the highest form which man can attain is the\nmost seldom successful: thus the history of philosophy reveals a\nsuperabundance of bungled and unhappy cases of manhood, and its march\nis an extremely slow one; whole centuries intervene and suppress what\nhas been achieved: and in this way the connecting-link is always made\nto fail. It is an appalling history, this history of the highest men,\nof the sages.--What is most often damaged is precisely the recollection\nof great men, for the semi-successful and botched cases of mankind\nmisunderstand them and overcome them by their \"successes.\" Whenever\nan \"effect\" is noticeable, the masses gather in a crowd round it;\nto hear the inferior and the poor in spirit having their say is a\nterrible ear-splitting torment for him who knows and trembles at the\nthought, that the fate of man depends upon the success of its highest\ntypes. From the days of my childhood I have reflected upon the sage's\nconditions of existence, and I will not conceal my happy conviction\nthat in Europe he has once more become possible--perhaps only for a\nshort time.\n\n\n988.\n\nThese new philosophers begin with a description of a systematic order\nof rank and difference of value among men,--what they desire is, alas\nprecisely the reverse of an assimilation and equalisation of man: they\nteach estrangement in every sense, they cleave gulfs such as have\nnever yet existed, and they would fain have man become more evil than\nhe ever was. For the present they live concealed and estranged even\nfrom each other. For many reasons they will find it necessary to be\nanchorites and to wear masks--they will therefore be of little use\nin the matter of seeking for their equals. They will live alone, and\nprobably know the torments of all the loneliest forms of loneliness.\nShould they, however, thanks to any accident, meet each other on the\nroad, I wager that they would not know each other, or that they would\ndeceive each other in a number of ways.\n\n\n989.\n\n\"Les philosophes ne sont pas faits pour s'aimer. Les aigles ne volent\npoint en compagnie. Il faut laisser cela aux perdrix, aux \u00e9tourneaux\n... Planer au-dessus et avoir des griffes, voila le lot des grands\ng\u00e9nies.\"--GALIANI.\n\n\n990.\n\nI forgot to say that such philosophers are cheerful, and that they\nlike to sit in the abyss of a perfectly clear sky: they are in need of\ndifferent means for enduring life than other men; for they suffer in\na different way (that is to say, just as much from the depth of their\ncontempt of man as from their love of man).--The animal which suffered\nmost on earth discovered for itself _--laughter._\n\n\n991.\n\n_Concerning the misunderstanding of \"cheerfulness.\"_ --It is a\ntemporary relief from long tension; it is the wantonness, the\nSaturnalia of a spirit, which is consecrating and preparing itself for\nlong and terrible resolutions. The \"fool\" in the form of \"science.\"\n\n\n992.\n\nThe new order of rank among spirits; tragic natures no longer in the\nvan.\n\n\n993.\n\nIt is a comfort to me to know that over the smoke and filth of human\nbaseness there is a _higher and brighter_ mankind, which, judging from\ntheir number, must be a small race (for everything that is in any way\ndistinguished is _ipso facto_ rare). A man does not belong to this race\nbecause he happens to be more gifted, more virtuous, more heroic, or\nmore loving than the men below, but because he is _colder, brighter,\nmore far-sighted, and more lonely;_ because he endures, prefers, and\neven insists upon, loneliness as the joy, the privilege, yea, even the\ncondition of existence; because he lives amid clouds and lightnings as\namong his equals, and likewise among sunrays, dewdrops, snowflakes,\nand all that which must needs come from the heights, and which in its\ncourse moves ever from heaven to earth. The desire to look aloft is not\nour desire.--Heroes, martyrs, geniuses, and enthusiasts of all kinds,\nare not quiet, patient, subtle, cold, or slow enough for us.\n\n\n994.\n\nThe absolute conviction that valuations above and below are different;\nthat innumerable experiences are wanting to the latter: that when\nlooking upwards from below misunderstandings are necessary.\n\n\n995.\n\nHow do men attain to great power and to great tasks? All the virtues\nand proficiences of the body and the soul are little by little\nlaboriously acquired, through great industry, self-control, and keeping\none's self within narrow bounds, through a frequent, energetic, and\ngenuine repetition of the same work and of the same hardships; but\nthere are men who are the heirs and masters of this slowly acquired\nand manifold treasure of virtues and proficiences because, owing\nto happy and reasonable marriages and also to lucky accidents, the\nacquired and accumulated forces of many generations, instead of being\nsquandered and subdivided, have been assembled together by means of\nsteadfast struggling and willing. And thus, in the end, a man appears\nwho is such a monster of strength, that he craves for a monstrous\ntask. For it is our power which has command of us: and the wretched\nintellectual play of aims and intentions and motivations lies only in\nthe foreground--however much weak eyes may recognise the principal\nfactors in these things.\n\n\n990.\n\nThe sublime man has the highest value, even when he is most delicate\nand fragile, because an abundance of very difficult and rare things\nhave been reared through many generations and united in him.\n\n\n997.\n\nI teach that there are higher and lower men, and that a single\nindividual may under certain circumstances justify whole millenniums of\nexistence --that is to say, a wealthier, more gifted, greater, and more\ncomplete man, as compared with innumerable imperfect and fragmentary\nmen.\n\n\n998.\n\nAway from rulers and rid of all bonds, live the highest men: and in the\nrulers they have their instruments.\n\n\n999.\n\n_The order of rank:_ he who _determines_ values and leads the will of\nmillenniums, and does this by leading the highest natures--he _is the\nhighest man._\n\n\n1000.\n\nI fancy I have divined some of the things that lie hidden in the soul\nof the highest man; perhaps every man who has divined so much must go\nto ruin: but he who has seen the highest man must do all he can to\nmake him _possible._ Fundamental thought: we must make the future the\nstandard of all our valuations--and not seek the laws for our conduct\nbehind us.\n\n\n1001.\n\nNot \"mankind,\" but _Superman_ is the goal!\n\n\n1002.\n\n\"Come l'uom s'eterna....\"--_Inf._ xv. 85.\n\n\n\n\nII.\n\n\nDIONYSUS.\n\n\n1003.\n\nTo _him who is one of Nature's lucky strokes,_ to, him unto whom my\nheart goes out, to him who is carved from one integral block, which is\nhard, sweet, and fragrant--to him from whom even my nose can derive\nsome pleasure--let this book be dedicated.\n\nHe enjoys that which is beneficial to him.\n\nHis pleasure in anything ceases when the limits of what is beneficial\nto him are overstepped.\n\nHe divines the remedies for partial injuries; his illnesses are the\ngreat stimulants of his existence.\n\nHe understands how to exploit his serious accidents.\n\nHe grows stronger under the misfortunes which threaten to annihilate\nhim.\n\nHe instinctively gathers from all he sees, hears, and experiences,\nthe materials for what concerns him most,--he pursues a selective\nprinciple,--he rejects a good deal.\n\nHe reacts with that tardiness which long caution and deliberate\n_pride_ have bred in him,--he tests the stimulus: whence does it come?\nwhither does it lead? He does not submit.\n\nHe is always in his own company, whether his intercourse be with books,\nwith men, or with Nature.\n\nHe honours anything by choosing it, by conceding to it, by trusting it.\n\n\n1004.\n\nWe should attain to such a height, to such a lofty eagle's ledge, in\nour observation, as to be able to understand that everything happens,\n_just as it ought to happen_: and that all \"imperfection,\" and the pain\nit brings, belong to all that which is most eminently desirable.\n\n\n1005.\n\nTowards 1876 I experienced a fright; for I saw that everything I had\nmost wished for up to that time was being compromised. I realised this\nwhen I perceived what Wagner was actually driving at: and I was bound\nvery fast to him--by all the bonds of a profound similarity of needs,\nby gratitude, by the thought that he could not be replaced, and by the\nabsolute void which I saw facing me.\n\nJust about this time I believed myself to be inextricably entangled in\nmy philology and my professorship--in the accident and last shift of my\nlife: I did not know how to get out of it, and was tired, used up, and\non my last legs.\n\nAt about the same time I realised that what my instincts most desired\nto attain was precisely the reverse of what Schopenhauer's instincts\nwanted--that is to say, a _justification of life,_ even where it was\nmost terrible, most equivocal, and most false: to this end, I had the\nformula \"_Dionysian_\" in my hand.\n\nSchopenhauer's interpretation of the \"absolute\" as _will_ was certainly\na step towards that concept of the \"absolute\" which supposed it to be\nnecessarily good, blessed, true, and integral, but Schopenhauer did\nnot understand how to deify this will: he remained suspended in the\nmoral-Christian ideal. Indeed, he was still so very much under the\ndominion of Christian values, that, once he could no longer regard\nthe absolute as God, he had to conceive it as evil, foolish, utterly\nreprehensible. He did not realise that there is an infinite number of\nways of being different, and even of being God.\n\n\n1006.\n\nHitherto, moral values have been the highest values: does anybody doubt\nthis? If we bring down the values from their pedestal, we thereby\nalter _all_ values; the principle of their _order of rank_ which has\nprevailed hitherto is thus overthrown.\n\n\n1007.\n\nTransvalue values--what does this mean? It implies that all spontaneous\nmotives, all new, future, and stronger motives, are still extant; but\nthat they now appear under false names and false valuations, and have\nnot yet become conscious of themselves.\n\nWe ought to have the courage to become, conscious, and to affirm all\nthat which has been _attained_--to get rid of the humdrum character\nof old valuations, which makes us unworthy of the best and strongest\nthings that we have achieved.\n\n\n1008.\n\nAny doctrine would be superfluous for which everything is not already\nprepared in the way of accumulated forces and explosive material. A\ntransvaluation of values can only be accomplished when there is a\ntension of new needs, and a new set of needy people who feel all old\nvalues as painful,--although they are not conscious of what is wrong.\n\n\n1009.\n\nThe standpoint from which my values are determined: is abundance or\ndesire active? ... Is one a mere spectator, or is one's own shoulder\nat the wheel--is one looking away or is one turning aside? ... Is one\nacting spontaneously, as the result of accumulated strength, or is one\nmerely reacting to a goad or to a stimulus? ... Is one simply acting\nas the result of a paucity of elements, or of such an overwhelming\ndominion over a host of elements that this power enlists the latter\ninto its service if it requires them? ... Is one a _problem_ one's\nself or is one a _solution_ already? ... Is _one perfect_ through\nthe smallness of the task, or _imperfect_ owing to the extraordinary\ncharacter of the aim? ... Is one genuine or only an _actor;_ is one\ngenuine as an actor, or only the bad copy of an actor? is one a\nrepresentative or the creature represented? Is one a personality or\nmerely a rendezvous of personalities? ... Is one ill from a disease or\nfrom surplus health? Does one lead as a shepherd, or as an \"exception\"\n(third alternative: as a fugitive)? Is one in need of dignity, or can\none play the clown? Is one in search of resistance, or is one evading\nit? Is one imperfect owing to one's precocity or to one's tardiness? Is\nit one's nature to say yea, or no, or is one a peacock's tail of garish\nparts? Is one proud enough not to feel ashamed even of one's vanity? Is\none still able to feel a bite of conscience (this species is becoming\nrare; formerly conscience had to bite too often: it is as if it now no\nlonger had enough teeth to do so)? Is one still capable of a \"duty\"?\n(there are some people who would lose the whole joy of their lives\nif they were _deprived_ of their duty--this holds good especially of\nfeminine creatures, who are born subjects).\n\n\n1010.\n\nSupposing our common comprehension of the universe were a\n_misunderstanding,_ would it be possible to conceive of a form of\n_perfection,_ within the limits of which even such a _misunderstanding\nas this_ could be sanctioned?\n\nThe concept of a _new_ form of perfection: that which does _not_\ncorrespond to our logic, to our \"beauty,\" to our \"good,\" to our\n\"truth,\" might be perfect in a _higher_ sense even than our ideal is.\n\n\n1011.\n\nOur most important limitation: we must not deify the unknown; we are\njust beginning to know so little. The false and wasted endeavours.\n\nOur \"new world\": we must ascertain to what extent we are the _creators_\nof our valuations--we will thus be able to put \"sense\" into history.\n\nThis belief in truth is reaching its final logical conclusion in\nus--ye know how it reads: that if there is anything at all that must\nbe worshipped it is _appearance;_ that _falsehood_ and _not_ truth\nis--divine.\n\n\n1012.\n\nHe who urges rational thought forward, thereby also drives its\nantagonistic power--mysticism and foolery of every kind--to new feats\nof strength.\n\nWe should recognise that every movement is (1) _partly_ the\nmanifestation of fatigue resulting from a previous movement (satiety\nafter it, the malice of weakness towards it, and disease); and (2)\n_partly_ a newly awakened accumulation of long slumbering forces, and\ntherefore wanton, violent, healthy.\n\n\n1013.\n\nHealth and morbidness: let us be careful! The standard is the bloom of\nthe body, the agility, courage, and cheerfulness of the mind--but also,\nof course, how much _morbidness a man can bear and overcome,_--and\nconvert into health. That which would send more delicate natures to the\ndogs, belongs to the stimulating means of _great_ health.\n\n\n1014.\n\nIt is only a question of power: to have all the morbid traits of the\ncentury, but to balance them I by means of overflowing, plastic, and\nrejuvenating power. The _strong_ man.\n\n\n1015.\n\n_Concerning the strength of the nineteenth century.--_We are more\nmedi\u00e6val than the eighteenth century; not only more inquisitive or more\nsusceptible to the strange and to the rare. We have revolted against\nthe _Revolution,_ ... We have freed ourselves from the fear of reason,\nwhich was the spectre of the eighteenth century: we once more dare to\nbe childish, lyrical, absurd, in a word, we are musicians. And we are\njust as little frightened of the _ridiculous_ as of the _absurd._ The\n_devil_ finds that he is tolerated even by God:[6] better still, he has\nbecome interesting as one who has been misunderstood and slandered for\nages,--we are the saviours of the devil's honour.\n\nWe no longer separate the great from the terrible. We reconcile good\nthings, in all their complexity, with the very _worst_ things; we\nhave overcome the _desideratum_ of the past (which wanted goodness to\ngrow without the increase of evil). The _cowardice_ towards the ideal,\npeculiar to the Renaissance, has diminished--we even dare to aspire to\nthe latter's morality. _Intolerance_ towards priests and the Church has\nat the same time come to an end; \"It is immoral to believe in God\"--but\nthis is precisely what we regard as the best possible justification of\nthis belief.\n\nOn all these things we have conferred the civic rights of our minds. We\ndo not tremble before the back side of \"good things\" (we even look for\nit, we are brave and inquisitive enough for that), of Greek antiquity,\nof morality, of reason, of good taste, for instance (we reckon up\nthe losses which we incur with all this treasure: we almost reduce\nourselves to poverty with such a treasure). Neither do we conceal the\nback side of \"evil things\" from ourselves.\n\n[Footnote 6: This is reminiscent of Goethe's _Faust,_ See \"Prologue in\nHeaven.\"--Tr.]\n\n\n1016.\n\n_That which does us honour._--If anything does us honour, it is this:\nwe have transferred our seriousness to other things; all those things\nwhich have been despised and laid aside as base by all ages, we regard\nas important--on the other hand, we surrender \"fine feelings\" at a\ncheap rate.\n\nCould any aberration be more dangerous than the contempt of the body?\nAs if all intellectuality were not thereby condemned to become morbid,\nand to take refuge in the _vapeurs_ of \"idealism\"!\n\nNothing that has been thought out by Christians and idealists holds\nwater: we are more radical. We have discovered the \"smallest world\"\neverywhere as the most decisive.\n\nThe paving-stones in the streets, good air in our rooms, food\nunderstood according to its worth: we value all the _necessaries_ of\nlife seriously, and _despise_ all \"beautiful soulfulness\" as a form of\n\"levity and frivolity.\" That which has been most despised hitherto, is\nnow pressed into the front rank.\n\n\n1017\n\nIn the place of Rousseau's \"man of Nature,\" the nineteenth century has\ndiscovered a much _more genuine_ image of \"Man,\"--it had the courage\nto do this.... On the whole, the Christian concept of man has in a way\nbeen reinstalled. What we have not had the courage to do, was to call\nprecisely this \"man _par excellence_,\" good, and to see the future of\nmankind guaranteed in him. In the same way, we did not dare to regard\nthe _growth in the terrible side_ of man's character as an accompanying\nfeature of every advance in culture; in this sense we are still\nunder the influence of the Christian ideal, and side with it against\npaganism, and likewise against the Renaissance concept of _virt\u00f9._ But\nthe key of culture is not to be found in this way: and _in praxi_ we\nstill have the forgeries of history in favour of the \"good man\" (as if\nhe alone constituted the progress of humanity) and the _socialistic\nideal (i.e._ the _residue_ of Christianity and of Rousseau in the\nde-Christianised world).\n\n_The fight against the eighteenth century:_ it meets with its _greatest\nconquerors_ in _Goethe_ and _Napoleon._ Schopenhauer, too, fights\nagainst the eighteenth century; but he returns involuntarily to\nthe seventeenth--he is a modern Pascal, with Pascalian valuations,\n_without_ Christianity. Schopenhauer was not strong enough to invent a\n_new yea._\n\n_Napoleon:_ we see the necessary relationship between the higher and\nthe terrible man. \"Man\" reinstalled, and her due of contempt and fear\nrestored to woman. Highest activity and health are the signs of the\ngreat man; the straight line and grand style rediscovered in action;\nthe mightiest of all instincts, that of life itself,--the lust of\ndominion,--heartily welcomed.\n\n\n1018.\n\n(_Revue des deux mondes,_ 15th February 1887. Taine concerning\nNapoleon) \"Suddenly the master faculty reveals itself: the _artist,_\nwhich was latent in the politician, comes forth from his scabbard; he\ncreates _dans l'id\u00e9al et l'impossible._ He is once more recognised as\nthat which he is: the posthumous brother of Dante and of Michelangelo;\nand verily, in view of the definite contours of his vision, the\nintensity, the coherence, and inner consistency of his dream, the depth\nof his meditations, the superhuman greatness of his conception, he is\ntheir equal: _son g\u00e9nie a la m\u00eame taille et la m\u00eame structure; il est\nun des trois esprits souverains de la renaissance italienne._\"\n\n_Nota bene._ Dante, Michelangelo, Napoleon.\n\n\n1019.\n\n_Concerning the pessimism of strength._ In the internal economy of\n_the primitive_ man's soul, the _fear_ of evil preponderates. What is\n_evil!_ Three kinds of things: accident, uncertainty, the unexpected.\nHow does primitive man combat evil?--He conceives it as a thing of\nreason, of power, even as a person. By this means he is enabled to\nmake treaties with it, and generally to operate upon it in advance--to\nforestall it.\n\n--Another expedient is to declare its evil and harmful character to\nbe but apparent: the consequences of accidental occurrences, and of\nuncertainty and the unexpected, are interpreted as _well-meant,_ as\nreasonable.\n\n--A third means is to interpret evil, above all, as merited: evil is\nthus justified as a punishment.\n\n--In short, _man submits to in_ all religious and moral interpretations\nare but forms of submission to evil.--The belief that a good purpose\nlies behind all evil, implies the renunciation of any desire to combat\nit.\n\nNow, the history of every culture shows a diminution of this _fear\nof the accidental, of the uncertain, and of the unexpected._ Culture\nmeans precisely, to learn to reckon, to discover causes, to acquire\nthe power of forestalling events, to acquire a belief in necessity.\nWith the growth of culture, man is able to dispense with that primitive\nform of submission to evil (called religion or morality), and that\n\"justification of evil.\" Now he wages war against \"evil,\"--he gets rid\nof it. Yes, a state of security, of belief in law and the possibility\nof calculation, is possible, in which consciousness regards these\nthings with tedium,--in which the joy of the accidental, of the\nuncertain, and of the unexpected, actually becomes a spur.\n\nLet us halt a moment before this symptom of _highest_ culture, I\ncall it the _pessimism of strength._ Man now no longer requires a\n\"justification of evil\"; justification is precisely what he abhors:\nhe enjoys evil, _pur, cru_; he regards purposeless evil as the most\ninteresting kind of evil. If he had required a God in the past, he now\ndelights in cosmic disorder without a God, a world of accident, to the\nessence of which terror, ambiguity, and seductiveness belong.\n\nIn a state of this sort, it is precisely _goodness_ which requires\nto be justified--that is to say, it must either have an evil and a\ndangerous basis, or else it must contain a vast amount of stupidity:\n_in which case it still pleases._ Animality no longer awakens terror\nnow; a very intellectual and happy wanton spirit in favour of the\nanimal in man, is, in such periods, the most triumphant form of\nspirituality. Man is now strong enough to be able to feel ashamed of\n_a belief in God:_ he may now play the part of the devil's advocate\nafresh. If in practice he pretends to uphold virtue, it will be for\nthose reasons which lead virtue to be associated with subtlety,\ncunning, lust of gain, and a form of the lust of power.\n\n_This pessimism of strength_ also ends in a _theodicy, i.e._ in an\nabsolute saying of yea to the world--but the same arguments will\nbe raised in favour of life which formerly were raised against it:\nand in this way, in a conception of this world _as the highest ideal\npossible,_ which has been effectively attained.\n\n\n1020.\n\n_The principal kinds of pessimism:--_\n\nThe pessimism of _sensitiveness_ (excessive irritability with a\npreponderance of the feelings of pain).\n\nThe pessimism of the _will that is not free_ (otherwise expressed: the\nlack of resisting power against stimuli).\n\nThe pessimism of _doubt_ (shyness in regard to everything fixed, in\nregard to all grasping and touching).\n\nThe psychological conditions which belong to these different kinds of\npessimism, may all be observed in a lunatic asylum, even though they\nare there found in a slightly exaggerated form. The same applies to\n\"Nihilism\" (the penetrating feeling of nonentity).\n\nWhat, however, is the nature of Pascal's moral pessimism, and the\n_metaphysical pessimism_ of the Ved\u00e2nta-Philosophy? What is the nature\nof the _social pessimism_ of anarchists (as of Shelley), and of the\npessimism of compassion (like that of Leo Tolstoy and of Alfred de\nVigny)?\n\nAre all these things not also the phenomena of decay and sickness?...\nAnd is not excessive seriousness in regard to moral values, or in\nregard to \"other-world\" fictions, or social calamities, or _suffering_\nin general, of the same order? All such _exaggeration_ of a single and\nnarrow standpoint is in itself a sign of sickness. The same applies to\nthe preponderance of a negative over an affirmative attitude!\n\n_In this respect we must not confound with the above:_ the joy of\nsaying and doing _no,_ which is the result of the enormous power and\ntenseness of an affirmative attitude--peculiar to all rich and mighty\nmen and ages. It is, as it were, a luxury, a form of courage too,\nwhich opposes the terrible, which has sympathy with the frightful and\nthe questionable, because, among other things, one is terrible and\nquestionable: the _Dionysian_ in will, intellect, and taste.\n\n\n1021.\n\n_My Five \"Noes.\"_\n\n(1) My fight against _the feeling of sin_ and the introduction of\nthe notion of _punishment_ into the physical and metaphysical world,\nlikewise into psychology and the interpretation of history. The\nrecognition of the fact that all philosophies and valuations hitherto\nhave been saturated with morality.\n\n(2) My identification and my discovery of the _traditional_ ideal,\nof the Christian ideal, even where the dogmatic form of Christianity\nhas been wrecked. The _danger of the Christian ideal_ resides in its\nvaluations, in that which can dispense with concrete expression: my\nstruggle against _latent Christianity_ (for instance, in music, in\nSocialism).\n\n(3) My struggle against the eighteenth century of Rousseau, against\nhis \"Nature,\" against his \"good man,\" his belief in the dominion of\nfeeling--against the pampering, weakening, and moralising of man: an\nideal born of the _hatred of aristocratic culture,_ which in practice\nis the dominion of unbridled feelings of resentment, and invented as a\nstandard for the purpose of war (the Christian morality of the feeling\nof sin, as well as the morality of resentment, is an attitude of the\nmob).\n\n(4) My fight against _Romanticism,_ in which the ideals of Christianity\nand of Rousseau converge, but which possesses at the same time a\nyearning for that _antiquity_ which knew of sacerdotal and aristocratic\nculture, a yearning for _virt\u00f9,_ and for the \"strong man\"--something\nextremely hybrid; a false and imitated kind of _stronger_ humanity,\nwhich appreciates extreme conditions in general and sees the symptom\nof strength in them (\"the cult of passion\"; an imitation of the\nmost expressive _forms, furore espressivo,_ originating not out of\nplenitude, but out _of want)._--(In the nineteenth century there are\nsome things which are born out of relative plenitude--_i.e._ out of\n_well-being;_ cheerful music, etc.--among poets, for instance, Stifter\nand Gottfried Keller give signs of more strength and inner well-being\nthan--. The great strides of engineering, of inventions, of the natural\nsciences and of history (?) are relative products of the strength and\nself-reliance of the nineteenth century.)\n\n(5) My struggle against the _predominance of gregarious instincts,_ now\nscience makes common cause with them; against the profound hate with\nwhich every kind of order of rank and of aloofness is treated.\n\n\n1022.\n\nFrom the pressure of plenitude, from the tension of forces that are\ncontinually increasing within us and which cannot yet discharge\nthemselves, a condition is produced which is very similar to that which\nprecedes a storm: we--like Nature's sky--become overcast. I hat, too,\nis \"pessimism.\".. A teaching which puts an end to such a condition by\nthe fact that it _commands_ something: a transvaluation of values by\nmeans of which the accumulated forces are given a channel, a direction,\nso that they explode into deeds and flashes of lightning-does not\nin the least require to be a hedonistic teaching: in so far as it\n_releases strength_ which was compressed to an agonising degree, it\nbrings happiness.\n\n\n1023.\n\n_Pleasure_ appears with the feeling of power.\n\n_Happiness_ means that the consciousness of power and triumph has begun\nto prevail.\n\n_Progress_ is the strengthening of the type, the ability to exercise\ngreat will-power, everything else is a misunderstanding and a danger.\n\n\n1024.\n\nThere comes a time when the old masquerade and moral togging-up of the\npassions provokes repugnance: _naked Nature;_ when the _quanta_ of\n_power_ are recognised as _decidedly_ simple (as _determining rank_);\nwhen _grand style_ appears again as the result of great passion.\n\n\n1025.\n\nThe purpose of culture _would have_ us enlist everything terrible,\nstep by step and experimentally, into its service; but before it is\n_strong enough_ for this it must combat, moderate, mask, and even curse\neverything terrible.\n\nWherever a culture points to anything as evil, it betrays its _fear_\nand therefore weakness.\n\n_Thesis:_ everything good is the evil of yore which has been rendered\nserviceable. _Standard:_ the more terrible and the greater the passions\nmay be which an age, a people, and an individual are at liberty to\npossess, because they are able to use them as _a means, the higher is\ntheir culture:_ the more mediocre, weak, submissive, and cowardly a man\nmay be, the more things he will regard as _evil:_ according to him the\nkingdom of evil is the largest. The lowest man will see the kingdom of\nevil (_i.e._ that which is forbidden him and which is hostile to him)\neverywhere.\n\n\n1026.\n\nIt is not a fact that \"happiness follows virtue\"--but it is the mighty\nman who first _declares his happy state to be virtue._\n\nEvil actions belong to the mighty and the virtuous: bad and base\nactions belong to the subjected.\n\nThe mightiest man, the creator, would have to be the most evil,\ninasmuch as he makes his ideal prevail over all men in _opposition_ to\ntheir ideals, and remoulds them according to his own image.\n\nEvil, in this respect, means hard, painful, enforced.\n\nSuch men as Napoleon must always return and always settle our belief\nin the self-glory of the individual afresh: he himself, however, was\ncorrupted by the means he had to stoop to, and had _lost noblesse_\nof character. If he had had to prevail among another kind of men, he\ncould have availed himself of other means; and thus it would not seem\n_necessary_ that a C\u00e6sar _must become bad._\n\n\n1027.\n\nMan is a combination of the _beast_ and the _super-beast_; higher\nman a combination of the monster and the superman:[7] these opposites\nbelong to each other. With every degree of a man's growth towards\ngreatness and loftiness, he also grows downwards into the depths and\ninto the terrible: we should not desire the one without the other;--or,\nbetter still: the more fundamentally we desire the one, the more\ncompletely we shall achieve the other.\n\n[Footnote 7: The play on the German words: \"Unthier\" and \"\u00dcberthier,\"\n\"Unmensch\" and \"\u00dcbermensch,\" is unfortunately not translatable.--Tr.]\n\n\n1028.\n\nTerribleness belongs to greatness: let us not deceive ourselves.\n\n\n1029.\n\nI have taught the knowledge of such terrible things, that all\n\"Epicurean contentment\" is impossible concerning them. Dionysian\npleasure is the only _adequate_ kind here: _I was the first to discover\nthe tragic._ Thanks to their superficiality in ethics, the Greeks\nmisunderstood it. Resignation is not the lesson of tragedy, but only\nthe misunderstanding of it! The yearning for nonentity is the _denial_\nof tragic wisdom, its opposite!\n\n\n1030.\n\nA rich and powerful soul not only gets over painful and even terrible\nlosses, deprivations, robberies, and insults: it actually leaves such\ndark infernos in possession of still greater plenitude and power;\nand, what is most important of all, in possession of an increased\nblissfulness in love. I believe that he who has divined something of\nthe most fundamental conditions of love, will understand Dante for\nhaving written over the door of his Inferno: \"I also am the creation of\neternal love.\"\n\n\n1031.\n\nTo have travelled over the whole circumference of the modern soul,\nand to have sat in all its corners--my ambition, my torment, and my\nhappiness.\n\nVeritably to have _overcome_ pessimism, and, as the result thereof, to\nhave acquired the eyes of a Goethe--full of love and goodwill.\n\n\n1032.\n\nThe first question is by no means whether we are satisfied with\nourselves; but whether we are satisfied with anything at all. Granting\nthat we should say yea to any single moment, we have then affirmed\nnot only ourselves, but the whole of existence. For nothing stands by\nitself, either in us or in other things: and if our soul has vibrated\nand rung with happiness, like a chord, once only and only once, then\nall eternity was necessary in order to bring about that one event,--and\nall eternity, in this single moment of our affirmation, was called\ngood, was saved, justified, and blessed.\n\n\n1033.\n\nThe passions which _say yea._ I ride, happiness, health, the love of\nthe sexes, hostility and war, reverence, beautiful attitudes, manners,\nstrong will, the discipline of lofty spirituality, the will to power,\nand gratitude to the Earth and to Life: all that is rich, that would\nfain bestow, and that refreshes, gilds, immortalises, and deifies\nLife--the whole power of the virtues that _glorify_--all declaring\nthings good, saying yea, and doing yea.\n\n\n1034.\n\nWe, many or few, who once more dare to live in a world _purged of\nmorality_, we _pagans_ in faith, we are probably also the first who\nunderstand what a _pagan faith_ is: to be obliged to imagine higher\ncreatures than man, but to imagine them _beyond_ good and evil; to be\ncompelled to value all higher existence as _immoral_ existence. We\nbelieve in Olympus, and _not_ in the \"man on the cross.\"\n\n\n1035.\n\nThe more modern man has exercised his idealising power in regard to a\n_God_ mostly by _moralising the latter_ ever more and more--what does\nthat mean?--nothing good, a diminution in man's strength.\n\nAs a matter of fact, the reverse would be possible: and indications\nof this are not wanting. God imagined as emancipation from morality,\ncomprising the whole of the abundant assembly of Life's contrasts, and\n_saving_ and _justifying_ them in a divine agony. God as the beyond,\nthe superior elevation, to the wretched _cul-de-sac_ morality of \"Good\nand Evil.\"\n\n\n1036.\n\nA humanitarian God cannot be _demonstrated_ from the world that\nis known to us: so much are ye driven and forced to conclude\nto-day. But what conclusion do ye draw from this? \"He cannot be\ndemonstrated to _us_\": the scepticism of knowledge. You all _fear_\nthe conclusion: \"From the world that is known to us quite a different\nGod would be _demonstrable,_ such a one as would certainly not be\nhumanitarian\"--and, in a word, you cling fast to your God, and invent a\nworld for Him which _is unknown to us._\n\n\n1037.\n\nLet us banish the highest good from our concept of God: it is unworthy\nof a God. Let us likewise banish the highest wisdom: it is the vanity\nof philosophers who have perpetrated the absurdity of a God who is a\nmonster of wisdom: the idea was to make Him as like them as possible.\nNo! God _as the highest power_--that is sufficient!--Everything\nfollows from that, even--\"the world\"!\n\n\n1038\n\nAnd how many new Gods are not still possible! I, myself, in whom the\nreligious--that is to say, the god-_creating_ instinct occasionally\nbecomes active at the most inappropriate moments: how very differently\nthe divine has revealed itself every time to me! ... So many strange\nthings have passed before me in those timeless moments, which fall into\na man's life as if they came from the moon, and in which he absolutely\nno longer knows how old he is or how young he still may be! ... I would\nnot doubt that there are several kinds of gods.... Some are not wanting\nwhich one could not possibly imagine without a certain halcyonic calm\nand levity.... Light feet perhaps belong to the concept \"God\". Is it\nnecessary to explain that a _God_ knows how to hold Himself preferably\noutside all Philistine and rationalist circles? also (between\nourselves) beyond good and evil? His outlook is a _free_ one--as Goethe\nwould say.--And to invoke the authority of Zarathustra, which cannot be\ntoo highly appreciated in this regard: Zarathustra goes as far as to\nconfess, \"I would only believe in a God who knew how to _dance_ ...\"\n\nAgain I say: how many new Gods are not still possible! Certainly\nZarathustra himself is merely an old atheist: he believes neither in\nold nor in new gods. Zarathustra says, _\"he would\"_--but Zarathustra\nwill not.... Take care to understand him well.\n\nThe type God conceived according to the type of creative spirits, of\n\"great men.\"\n\n\n1039.\n\nAnd how many new _ideals_ are not, at bottom, still possible? Here is\na little ideal that I seize upon every five weeks, while upon a wild\nand lonely walk, in the azure moment of a blasphemous joy. To spend\none's life amid delicate and absurd things; a stranger to reality,\nhalf-artist, half-bird, half-metaphysician; without a yea or a nay for\nreality, save that from time to time one acknowledges it, after the\nmanner of a good dancer, with the tips of one's toes; always tickled\nby some happy ray of sunlight; relieved and encouraged even by sorrow\n--for sorrow _preserves_ the happy man; fixing a little tail of jokes\neven to the most holy thing: this, as is clear, is the ideal of a heavy\nspirit, a ton in weight _of the spirit of gravity._\n\n\n1040.\n\n_From the military-school of the soul._ (Dedicated to the brave, the\ngood-humoured, and the abstinent.)\n\nI should not like to undervalue the amiable virtues; but greatness\nof soul is not compatible with them. Even in the arts, grand style\nexcludes all merely pleasing qualities.\n\n***\n\nIn times of painful tension and vulnerability, choose war. War hardens\nand develops muscle.\n\n***\n\nThose who have been deeply wounded have the Olympian laughter; a man\nonly has what he needs.\n\n***\n\nIt has now already lasted ten years: no sound any longer _reaches_\nme--a land without rain. A man must have a vast amount of humanity at\nhis disposal in order not to pine away in such drought.[8]\n\n[Footnote 8: For the benefit of those readers who are not acquainted\nwith the circumstances of Nietzsche's life, it would be as well to\npoint out that this is a purely personal plaint, comprehensible enough\nin the mouth of one who, like Nietzsche, was for years a lonely\nanchorite.--Tr.]\n\n\n1041.\n\n_My new road to an affirmative attitude._--Philosophy, as I have\nunderstood it and lived it up to the present, is the voluntary quest\nof the repulsive and atrocious aspects of existence. From the long\nexperience derived from such wandering over ice and desert, I learnt\nto regard quite differently everything that had been philosophised\nhitherto: the _concealed_ history of philosophy, the psychology of its\ngreat names came into the light for me. \"How much truth can a spirit\n_endure_; for how much truth is it _daring_ enough?\"--this for me\nwas the real measure of value. Error is a piece of _cowardice_ ...\nevery victory on the part of knowledge, is the _result_ of courage, of\nhardness towards one's self, of cleanliness towards one's self.... The\nkind of _experimental philosophy_ which I am living, even anticipates\nthe possibility of the most fundamental Nihilism, on principle: but\nby this I do not mean that it remains standing at a negation, at a\n_no,_ or at a will to negation. It would rather attain to the very\nreverse--to a _Dionysian affirmation_ of the world, as it is, without\nsubtraction, exception, or choice--it would have eternal circular\nmotion: the same things, the same reasoning, and the same illogical\nconcatenation. The highest state to which a philosopher can attain: to\nmaintain a Dionysian attitude to Life--my formula for this is _amor\nfati._\n\nTo this end we must not only consider those aspects of life which\nhave been denied hitherto, as: _necessary,_ but as desirable, and not\nonly desirable to those aspects which have been affirmed hitherto (as\ncomplements or first prerequisites, so to speak), but for their own\nsake, as the more powerful, more terrible, and more _veritable_ aspects\nof life, in which the latter's will expresses itself most clearly.\n\nTo this end, we must also value that aspect of existence which alone\nhas been affirmed until now; we must understand whence this valuation\narises, and to how slight an extent it has to do with a Dionysian\nvaluation of Life: I selected and understood that which in this respect\nsays \"yea\" (on the one hand, the instinct of the sufferer; on the\nother, the gregarious instinct; and thirdly, the _instinct of the\ngreater number_ against the exceptions).\n\nThus I divined to what extent a stronger kind of man must necessarily\nimagine--the elevation and enhancement of man in another direction:\n_higher creatures,_ beyond good and evil, beyond those values which\nbear the stamp of their origin in the sphere of suffering, of the herd,\nand of the greater number--I searched for the data of this topsy-turvy\nformation of ideals in history (the concepts \"pagan,\" \"classical,\"\n\"noble,\" have been discovered afresh and brought forward).\n\n\n1042.\n\nWe should demonstrate to what extent the religion of the Greeks was\n_higher_ than Jud\u00e6o-Christianity. The latter triumphed because the\nGreek religion was degenerate (and decadent).\n\n\n1043.\n\nIt is not surprising that a couple of centuries have been necessary in\norder to link up again--a couple of centuries are very little indeed.\n\n\n1044.\n\nThere must be some people who sanctify functions, not only eating and\ndrinking, and not only in memory of them, or in harmony with them; but\nthis world must be for ever glorified anew, and in a novel fashion.\n\n\n1045.\n\nThe most intellectual men feel the ecstasy and charm of _sensual_\nthings in a way which other men --those with \"fleshy hearts\"--cannot\npossibly imagine, and ought not to be able to imagine: they are\nsensualists with the best possible faith, because they grant the senses\na more fundamental value than that fine sieve, that thinning and\nmincing machine, or whatever it is called, which in the language of the\npeople is termed _\"spirit\"_ The strength and power of the senses--this\nis the most essential thing in a sound man who is one of Nature's lucky\nstrokes: the splendid beast must first be there--otherwise what is the\nvalue of all \"humanisation\"?\n\n\n1046.\n\n(1) We want to hold fast to our senses, and to the belief in them--and\naccept their logical conclusions! The hostility to the senses in the\nphilosophy that has been written up to the present, has been man's\ngreatest feat of nonsense.\n\n(2) The world now extant, on which all earthly and living things have\nso built themselves, that it now appears as it does (enduring and\nproceeding slowly), we would fain _continue building_--not criticise it\naway as false!\n\n(3) Our valuations help in the process of building; they emphasise and\naccentuate. What does it mean when whole religions say: \"Everything is\nbad and false and evil\"? This condemnation of the whole process can\nonly be the judgment of the failures!\n\n(4) True, the failures might be the greatest sufferers and therefore\nthe most subtle! The contented might be worth little!\n\n(5) We must understand the fundamental _artistic_ phenomenon which is\ncalled \"Life,\"--_the formative_ spirit, which constructs under the most\nunfavourable circumstances: and in the slowest manner possible----The\n_proof_ of all its combinations must first be given afresh: _it\nmaintains itself._\n\n\n1047.\n\nSexuality, lust of dominion, the pleasure derived from appearance\nand deception, great and joyful gratitude to Life and its typical\nconditions--these things are essential to all paganism, and it has\na good conscience on its side.--_That which is hostile to Nature_\n(already in Greek antiquity) combats paganism in the form of morality\nand dialectics.\n\n\n1040.\n\nAn anti-metaphysical view of the world--yes, but an artistic one.\n\n\n1049.\n\n_Apollo's_ misapprehension: the eternity of beautiful forms, the\naristocratic prescription, \"_Thus shall it ever be!_\"\n\n_Dionysus_. Sensuality and cruelty. The perishable nature of existence\nmight be interpreted as the joy of procreative and destructive force,\nas _unremitting creation._\n\n\n1050.\n\nThe word \"_Dionysian_\" expresses: a constraint to unity, a soaring\nabove personality, the common-place, society, reality, and above\nthe abyss of the _ephemeral_, the passionately painful sensation of\nsuperabundance, in darker, fuller, and more fluctuating conditions;\nan ecstatic saying of yea to the collective character of existence,\nas that which remains the same, and equally mighty and blissful\nthroughout all change, the great pantheistic sympathy with pleasure\nand pain, which declares even the most terrible and most questionable\nqualities of existence good, and sanctifies them; the eternal will to\nprocreation, to fruitfulness, and to recurrence; the feeling of unity\nin regard to the necessity of creating and annihilating.\n\nThe word \"_Apollonian_\" expresses: the constraint to be absolutely\nisolated, to the typical \"individual,\" to everything that simplifies,\ndistinguishes, and makes strong, salient, definite, and typical to\nfreedom within the law.\n\nThe further development of art is just as necessarily bound up with the\nantagonism of these two natural art-forces, as the further development\nof mankind is bound up with the antagonism of the sexes. The plenitude\nof power and restraint, the highest form of self-affirmation in a cool,\nnoble, and reserved kind of beauty: the Apollonianism of the Hellenic\nwill.\n\nThis antagonism of the Dionysian and of the Apollonian in the Greek\nsoul, is one of the great riddles which made me feel drawn to the\nessence of Hellenism. At bottom, I troubled about nothing save the\nsolution of the question, why precisely Greek Apollonianism should have\nbeen forced to grow out of a Dionysian soil: the Dionysian Greek had\nneed of being Apollonian; that is to say in order to break his will to\nthe titanic, to the complex, to the uncertain, to the horrible by a\nwill to measure, to simplicity, and to submission to rule and concept.\nExtravagance, wildness, and Asiatic tendencies lie at the root of the\nGreeks. Their courage consists in their struggle with their Asiatic\nnature: they were not given beauty, any more than they were given Logic\nand moral! naturalness: in them these things are victories, they are\nwilled and fought for--they constitute the _triumph_ of the Greeks.\n\n\n1051.\n\nIt is clear that only the rarest and most lucky cases of humanity\ncan attain to the highest and most sublime human joys in which Life\ncelebrates its own glorification; and this only happens when these\nrare creatures themselves and their forbears have lived a long\npreparatory life leading to this goal, without, however, having done\nso consciously. It is then that an overflowing wealth of multifarious\nforces and the most agile power of \"free will\" and lordly command\nexist together in perfect concord in one man; then the intellect is\njust as much at ease, or at home, in the senses as the senses are at\nease or at home in it; and everything that takes place in the latter\nmust give rise to extraordinarily subtle joys in the former. And _vice\nvers\u00e2:_ just think of this _vice vers\u00e2_ for a moment in a man like\nHafiz; even Goethe, though to a lesser degree, gives some idea of this\nprocess. It is probable that, in such perfect and well-constituted\nmen, the most sensual functions are finally transfigured by a symbolic\nelatedness of the highest intellectuality; in themselves they feel a\nkind of _deification of the body_ and are most remote from the ascetic\nphilosophy of the principle \"God is a Spirit\": from this principle it\nis clear that the ascetic is the \"botched man\" who declares only that\nto be good and \"God\" which is absolute, and which judges and condemns.\n\nFrom that height of joy in which man feels himself completely and\nutterly a deified form and self-justification of nature, down to the\njoy of healthy peasants and healthy semi-human beasts, the whole of\nthis long and enormous gradation of the light and colour of _happiness_\nwas called by the Greek--not without that grateful quivering of one\nwho is initiated into secret, not without much caution and pious\nsilence--by the godlike name: _Dionysus._ What then _do_ all modern\nmen--the children of a crumbling, multifarious, sick and strange age\n_know_ of the _compass_ of Greek happiness, how _could_ they know\nanything about it! Whence would the slaves of \"modern ideas\" derive\ntheir right to Dionysian feasts!\n\nWhen the Greek body and soul were in full \"bloom,\" and not, as it were,\nin states of morbid exaltation and madness, there arose the secret\nsymbol of the loftiest affirmation and transfiguration of life and the\nworld that has ever existed. There we have a _standard_ beside which\neverything that has grown since must seem too short, too poor, too\nnarrow: if we but pronounce the word \"Dionysus\" in the presence of\nthe best of more recent names and things, in the presence of Goethe,\nfor instance, or Beethoven, or Shakespeare, or Raphael, in a trice we\nrealise that our best things and moments are _condemned._ Dionysus\nis a _judge!_ Am I understood? There can be no doubt that the Greeks\nsought to interpret, by means of their Dionysian experiences, the\nfinal mysteries of the \"destiny of the soul\" and everything they knew\nconcerning the education and the purification of man, and above all\nconcerning the absolute hierarchy and inequality of value between man\nand man. There is the deepest experience of all Greeks, which they\nconceal beneath great silence,--_we do not know the Greeks_ so long\nas this hidden and sub-terranean access to them remains obstructed.\nThe indiscreet eyes of scholars will never perceive anything in these\nthings, however much learned energy may still have to be expended in\nthe service of this excavation--; even the noble zeal of such friends\nof antiquity as Goethe and Winckelmann, seems to savour somewhat of\nbad form and of arrogance, precisely in this respect. To wait and to\nprepare oneself; to await the appearance of new sources of knowledge;\nto prepare oneself in solitude for the sight of new faces and the\nsound of new voices; to cleanse one's soul ever more and more of the\ndust and noise, as of a country fair, which is peculiar to this age;\nto _overcome_ everything Christian by something super-Christian,\nand not only to rid oneself of it,--for the Christian doctrine is\nthe counter-doctrine to the Dionysian; to rediscover the _South_\nin oneself, and to stretch a clear, glittering, and mysterious\nsouthern sky above one; to reconquer the southern healthiness and\nconcealed power of the soul, once more for oneself; to increase the\ncompass of one's soul step by step, and to become more supernational,\nmore European, more super-European, more Oriental, and finally more\n_Hellenic_--for Hellenism was, as a matter of fact, the first great\nunion and synthesis of everything Oriental, and precisely on that\naccount, the _beginning_ of the European soul, the discovery of _our\n\"new_ world\":--he who lives under such imperatives, who knows what he\nmay not encounter some day? Possibly--a _new dawn!_\n\n\n1052.\n\n_The two types; Dionysus and Christ on the Cross._ We should ascertain\nwhether the typically _religious_ man is a decadent phenomenon (the\ngreat innovators are one and all morbid and epileptic); but do not let\nus forget to include that type of the religious man who is _pagan._ Is\nthe pagan cult not a form of gratitude for, and affirmation of, Life?\nOught not its most representative type to be an apology and deification\nof Life? The type of a well-constituted and ecstatically overflowing\nspirit! The type of a spirit which absorbs the contradictions and\nproblems of existence, and which _solves_ them!\n\nAt this point I set up the _Dionysus_ of the Greeks: the religious\naffirmation of Life, of the whole of Life, not of denied and partial\nLife (it is typical that in this cult the sexual act awakens ideas of\ndepth, mystery, and reverence).\n\nDionysus _versus_ \"Christ\"; here you have the contrast. It is _not_\na difference in regard to the martyrdom,--but the latter has a\ndifferent meaning. Life itself--Life s eternal fruitfulness and\nrecurrence caused anguish, destruction, and the will to annihilation.\nIn the other case, the suffering of the \"Christ as the Innocent One\"\nstands as an objection against Life, it is the formula of Life's\ncondemnation.--Readers will guess that the problem concerns the meaning\nof suffering; whether a Christian or a tragic meaning be given to it.\nIn the first case it is the road to a holy mode of existence; in the\nsecond case _existence itself is regarded as sufficiently holy_ to\njustify an enormous amount of suffering. The tragic man says yea even\nto the most excruciating suffering: he is sufficiently strong, rich,\nand capable of deifying, to be able to do this; the Christian denies\neven the happy lots on earth: he is weak, poor, and disinherited enough\nto suffer from life in any form. God on the Cross is a curse upon Life,\na signpost directing people to deliver themselves from it;--Dionysus\ncut into pieces is a _promise_ of Life: it will be for ever born anew,\nand rise afresh from destruction.\n\n\n\n\nIII.\n\n\nETERNAL RECURRENCE.\n\n\n1053.\n\nMy philosophy reveals the triumphant thought through which all other\nsystems of thought must ultimately perish. It is the great disciplinary\nthought: those races that cannot bear it are doomed; those which regard\nit as the greatest blessing are destined to rule.\n\n\n1054.\n\nThe _greatest_ of all fights: for this purpose a new _weapon_ is\nrequired.\n\nA hammer: a terrible alternative must be created. Europe must be\nbrought face to face with the logic of facts, and confronted with the\nquestion whether its will for ruin is really earnest.\n\nGeneral levelling down to mediocrity must be avoided. Rather than this\nit would be preferable to perish.\n\n\n1055.\n\nA pessimistic attitude of mind and a pessimistic doctrine and ecstatic\nNihilism, may in certain circumstances even prove indispensable to the\nphilosopher--that is to say, as a mighty form of pressure, or hammer,\nwith which he can smash up degenerate, perishing races and put them out\nof existence; with which he can beat a track to a new order of life,\nor instil a longing for nonentity in those who are degenerate and who\ndesire to perish.\n\n\n1056.\n\nI wish to teach the thought which gives unto many the right to cancel\ntheir existences--the great disciplinary thought.\n\n\n1057.\n\n_Eternal Recurrence. _ A prophecy.\n\n1. The exposition of the doctrine and its _theoretical_ first\nprinciples and results.\n\n2. The proof of the doctrine.\n\n3. Probable results which will follow from its being _believed._ (It\nmakes everything break open.)\n\n_(a)_ The means of enduring it.\n\n_(b)_ The means of ignoring it.\n\n4. Its place in history is a means.\n\nThe period _of_ greatest danger. The foundation of an oligarchy _above_\npeoples and their interests: education directed at establishing a\npolitical policy for humanity in general.\n\n_A counterpart of Jesuitism._\n\n\n1058.\n\nThe two greatest philosophical points of view (both discovered by\nGermans).\n\n(a) That of _becoming_ and that of _evolution._\n\n(b) That based upon the _values of existence_ (but the wretched form of\nGerman pessimism must first be overcome!)--\n\nBoth points of view reconciled by me in a decisive manner.\n\nEverything becomes and returns for ever, _escape is impossible!_\n\nGranted that we _could_ appraise the value of existence, what would\nbe the result of it? The thought of recurrence is a principle _of\nselection_ in the service of _power_ (and barbarity!).\n\nThe ripeness of man for this thought.\n\n\n1059.\n\n1. The thought of eternal recurrence: its first principles which must\nnecessarily be true if it were true. What its result is.\n\n2. It is the most _oppressive_ thought: its probable results, provided\nit be not prevented, that is to say, provided all values be not\ntransvalued.\n\n3. The means of _enduring it:_ the transvaluation of all values.\nPleasure no longer to be found in certainty, but in uncertainty; no\nlonger \"cause and effect,\" but continual creativeness; no longer\nthe will to self-preservation, but to power; no longer the modest\nexpression \"it is all _only_ subjective,\" but \"it is all _our_ work!\nlet us be proud of it.\"\n\n\n1060.\n\nIn order to endure the thought of recurrence, freedom from morality\nis necessary; new means against the _fact pain_ (pain regarded as\nthe instrument, as the father of pleasure; there is no accretive\nconsciousness of pain); pleasure derived from all kinds of uncertainty\nand tentativeness, as a counterpoise to extreme fatalism; suppression\nof the concept \"necessity\"; suppression of the \"will\"; suppression of\n\"absolute knowledge.\"\n\n_Greatest elevation_ of man's _consciousness of strength,_ as that\nwhich creates superman.\n\n\n1061.\n\nThe two extremes of thought--the materialistic and the platonic--are\nreconciled in _eternal recurrence_: both are regarded as ideals.\n\n\n1062.\n\nIf the universe had a goal, that goal would have been reached by now.\nIf any sort of unforeseen final state existed, that state also would\nhave! been reached. If it were capable of any halting or stability of\nany being, it would only have possessed this capability of becoming\nstable for one instant in its development; and again becoming would\nhave been at an end for ages, and with it all thinking and all\n\"spirit.\" The fact of \"intellects\" being in a _state of development_\nproves that the universe can have no goal, no final state, and is\nincapable of being. But the old habit of thinking of some purpose in\nregard to all phenomena, and of thinking of a directing and creating\ndeity in regard to the universe, is so powerful, that the thinker has\nto go to great pains in order to avoid thinking of the very aimlessness\nof the world as intended. The idea that the universe intentionally\nevades a goal, and even knows artificial means wherewith it prevents\nitself from falling into a circular movement, must occur to all those\nwho would fain attribute to the universe the capacity of eternally\nregenerating itself--that is to say, they would fain impose upon a\nfinite, definite force which is invariable in quantity, like the\nuniverse, the miraculous gift of renewing its forms and its conditions\n_for all eternity._ Although the universe is no longer a God, it must\nstill be capable of the divine power of creating and transforming;\nit must forbid itself to relapse into any one of its previous forms;\nit must not only have the intention, but also the means, of avoiding\nany sort of repetition, every second of its existence, even, it must\ncontrol every single one of its movements, with the view of avoiding\ngoals, final states, and repetitions and all the other results of such\nan unpardonable and insane method of thought and desire. All this\nis nothing more than the old religious mode of thought and desire,\nwhich, in spite of all, longs to believe that in some way or other the\nuniverse resembles the old, beloved, infinite, and infinitely-creative\nGod--that in some way or other \"the old God still lives\"--that longing\nof Spinoza's which is expressed in the words \"_deus sive natura_\"\n(what he really felt was \"_natura sive deus_\"). Which, then, is the\nproposition and belief in which the decisive change, the present\n_preponderance_ of the scientific spirit over the religious and\ngod-fancying spirit, is best formulated? Ought it not to be: the\nuniverse, as force, must not be thought of as unlimited, because it\ncannot be thought of in this way,--we forbid ourselves the concept\n_infinite_ force, because it is _incompatible_ with the idea of force?\nWhence it follows that the universe lacks the power of eternal renewal.\n\n\n1063.\n\nThe principle of the conservation of energy inevitably involves\n_eternal recurrence._\n\n\n1064.\n\nThat a state of equilibrium has never been reached, proves that it is\nimpossible, but in infinite space it must have been reached. Likewise\nin spherical space. The _form_ of space must be the cause of the\neternal movement, and ultimately of all imperfection. That \"energy\" and\n\"stability\" and \"immutability\" are contradictory. The measure of energy\n(dimensionally) is fixed though it is essentially fluid.\n\n\"That which is timeless\" must be refuted, any given moment of energy,\nthe absolute conditions for a new distribution of all forces are\npresent, it cannot remain stationary. Change is part of its essence,\ntherefore time is as well; by this means, however, the necessity of\nchange has only been established once more in theory.\n\n\n1065.\n\nA certain emperor always bore the fleeting nature of all things in his\nmind, in order not to value them too seriously, and to be able to live\nquietly in their midst. Conversely, everything seems to me much too\nimportant for it to be so fleeting, I seek an eternity for everything:\nought one to pour the most precious salves and wines into the sea? My\nconsolation is that everything that has been is eternal: the sea will\nwash it up again.\n\n\n1066.\n\n_The new concept of the universe._ The universe exists; it is nothing\nthat grows into existence and that passes out of existence. Or, better\nstill, it develops, it passes away, but it never began to develop,\nand has never ceased from passing away; it _maintains_ itself in both\nstates. It lives on itself, its excrements are its nourishment.\n\nWe need not concern ourselves for one instant with the hypothesis of a\n_created_ world. The concept create is to-day utterly indefinable and\nunrealisable; it is but a word which hails from superstitious ages,\nnothing can be explained with a word. The last attempt that was made\nto conceive of a world that _began_ occurred quite recently, in many\ncases with the help of logical reasoning,--generally, too, as you will\nguess, with an ulterior theological motive.\n\nSeveral attempts have been made lately to show that the concept that\n\"the universe has an infinite past (_regressus in infinitum_) is\ncontradictory, it was even demonstrated, it is true, at the price\nof confounding the head with the tail. Nothing can prevent me from\ncalculating backwards from this moment of time, and of saying: \"I\nshall never reach the end\"; just as I can calculate without end in a\nforward direction, from the same moment. It is only when I wish to\ncommit the error--I shall be careful to avoid it--of reconciling this\ncorrect concept of a _regressus in infinitum_ with the absolutely\nunrealisable concept of a finite _progressus_ up to the present; only\nwhen I consider the direction (forwards or backwards) as logically\nindifferent, that I take hold of the head--this very moment--and think\nI hold the tail: this pleasure I leave to you, Mr. D\u00fchring!...\n\nI have come across this thought in other thinkers before me, and every\ntime I found that it was determined by other ulterior motives (chiefly\ntheological, in favour of a _creator spiritus)._ If the universe were\nin any way able to congeal, to dry up, to perish; or if it were capable\nof attaining to a state of equilibrium; or if it had any kind of goal\nat all which a long lapse of time, immutability, and finality reserved\nfor it (in short, to speak metaphysically, if becoming could resolve\nitself into being or into nonentity), this state ought already to have\nbeen reached.\n\nBut it has not been reached: it therefore follows.... This is the only\ncertainty we can grasp, which can serve as a corrective to a host of\ncosmic hypotheses possible in themselves. If, for instance, materialism\ncannot consistently escape the conclusion of a finite state, which\nWilliam Thomson has traced out for it, then materialism is thereby\nrefuted.\n\nIf the universe may be conceived as a definite quantity of energy,\nas a definite number of centres of energy,--and every other concept\nremains indefinite and therefore useless,--it follows therefrom that\nthe universe must go through a calculable number of combinations in\nthe great game of chance which constitutes its existence. In infinity,\nat some moment or other, every possible combination must once have\nbeen realised; not only this, but it must have been realised an\ninfinite number of times. And inasmuch as between every one of these\ncombinations and its next recurrence every other possible combination\nwould necessarily have been undergone, and since every one of these\ncombinations would determine the whole series in the same order, a\ncircular movement of absolutely identical series is thus demonstrated:\nthe universe is thus shown to be a circular movement which has already\nrepeated itself an infinite number of times, and which plays its game\nfor all eternity.--This conception is not simply materialistic; for if\nit were this, it would not involve an infinite recurrence of identical\ncases, but a finite state. Owing to the fact that the universe has\nnot reached this finite state, materialism shows itself to be but an\nimperfect and provisional hypothesis.\n\n\n1067.\n\nAnd do ye know what \"the universe\" is to my mind? Shall I show it\nto you in my mirror? This universe is a monster of energy, without\nbeginning or end; a fixed and brazen quantity o; energy which grows\nneither bigger nor smaller, which does not consume itself, but only\nalters its face; as a whole its bulk is immutable, it is a household\nwithout either losses or gains, but likewise without increase and\nwithout sources of revenue, surrounded by nonentity as by a frontier,\nit is nothing vague or wasteful, it does not stretch into infinity;\nbut it is a definite quantum of energy located in limited space,\nand not in space which would be anywhere empty. It is rather energy\neverywhere, the play of forces and force-waves, at the same time one\nand many, agglomerating here and diminishing there, a sea of forces\nstorming and raging in itself, for ever changing, for ever rolling\nback over in calculable ages to recurrence, with an ebb and flow of\nits forms, producing the most complicated things out of the most\nsimple structures; producing the most ardent, most savage, and most\ncontradictory things out of the quietest, most rigid, and most frozen\nmaterial, and then returning from multifariousness to uniformity, from\nthe play of contradictions back into the delight of consonance, saying\nyea unto itself, even in this homogeneity of its courses and ages; for\never blessing itself as something which recurs for all eternity,--a\nbecoming which knows not satiety, or disgust, or weariness:--this, my\nDionysian world of eternal self-creation, of eternal self-destruction,\nthis mysterious world of twofold voluptuousness; this, my \"Beyond Good\nand Evil\" without aim, unless there is an aim in the bliss of the\ncircle, without will, unless a ring must by nature keep goodwill to\nitself,--would you have a name for my world? A _solution_ of all your\nriddles? Do ye also want a light, ye most concealed, strongest and\nmost undaunted men of the blackest midnight?--_This world is the Will\nto Power--and nothing else!_ And even ye yourselves are this will to\npower--and nothing besides!","title":"The Will to Power: An Attempted Transvaluation of All Values. Book III and IV","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":99364}