{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_52945/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_52945","id":"gutenberg_52945","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/52945","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Teaching & Education","Logic"],"text":"Note: Project Gutenberg also has an HTML version of this\n      file which includes the original illustrations.\n      See 52945-h.htm or 52945-h.zip:\n      (https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/52945/pg52945-images.html)\n      or\n      (https://www.gutenberg.org/files/52945/52945-h.zip)\n\n\n      Images of the original pages are available through\n      Internet Archive. See\n      https://archive.org/details/reformedlogicsys00mclarich\n\n\nTranscriber's note:\n\n      Text enclosed by underscores is in italics (_italics_).\n\n      Text enclosed by equal signs is in bold face (=bold=).\n\n      A carat character is used to denote superscription. A\n      single character following the carat is superscripted\n      (example: _e_^2).\n\n      ['s] represents lower case s with an acute accent.\n      [n.] represents lower case n with dot under.\n\n\n\n\n\nREFORMED LOGIC\n\n\nOxford\n\nHorace Hart, Printer to the University\n\n\nREFORMED LOGIC\n\nA System Based on Berkeley's Philosophy\nwith an Entirely New Method of Dialectic\n\nby\n\nD. B. McLACHLAN\n\n\n 'SPIRITS are active, indivisible substances; IDEAS [objects]\n are inert, fleeting, dependent things, which subsist not\n by themselves, but are supported by, or exist in minds or\n spiritual substances.... The cause of Ideas is an incorporeal\n active SUBSTANCE or Spirit.'\n\n   --_Berkeley._\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nLondon\nSwan Sonnenschein & Co.\nPaternoster Square\n1892\n\n[All rights reserved]\n\n\n\n\n    '_Looking to the chaotic state of logic text-books at the\n    present time, one would be inclined to say that there does\n    not exist anywhere a recognised, currently-received body of\n    speculation to which the title Logic can be unambiguously\n    assigned, and that we must therefore resign the hope of\n    attaining by any empirical consideration of the received\n    doctrine, a precise determination of the nature and limits of\n    logical theory._'\n\n      _Encyc. Brit._, Art., LOGIC.\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE\n\n\nThe object of the following treatise is to give an intelligible\naccount of the principal facts of Mind, with a method for the right\nexpression and criticism of Reasoning. It is based on principles not\nbefore applied to such a purpose. The current systems of Metaphysic\nare obscure and difficult simply because they start from false\npremises, not because the nature and operations of Mind cannot, if\nproperly understood, be made as comprehensible to beginners as other\nbranches of knowledge. The rules of Dialectic are quite within the\ncapacity of any intelligent schoolboy, and should be an essential part\nof early education, like Arithmetic.\n\nLet not the student be repelled at finding a philosophy reputed to\nbe one of the most difficult taken as the basis of this work. It is\nBerkeleyism considerably modified. Also it is to be borne in mind that\na philosophy is not to be judged by its _prim\u00e2 facie_ probability, but\nby its power of explaining many facts in a coherent and lucid way. A\ntheory that does this should not be rejected for a seeming paradox at\nthe outset.\n\nMost of the theoretical and all the dialectical parts of this work can\nbe adapted to Realistic thinking, by treating the judgments of the two\nBerkeleyan categories as intuitions instead of inferences.\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n\n  PAGE\n\n  PREFACE                                                            v\n\n\n  INTRODUCTION\n\n  SECT.\n\n  I Division of Philosophies into Ideal and\n  Substantial--Substantial subdivided into Mental and\n  Material--Berkeley's philosophy a Mental Substantialism            1\n\n  II Ontological principles essential to logical\n  theory--Mind consists of (at least) Self and a Plastic\n  Substance--Functions of each--Perception of Inorganic\n  things discussed--Berkeley's view on this point\n  rejected--Body to be considered an apparatus of Perception         4\n\n  III Current Metaphysic is Ideal and therefore\n  incoherent--Substantial alone has a connecting\n  principle--Importance of Categories in Substantialism--Its\n  doctrine of Reason totally different from the Academic             8\n\n\n  INTELLECT\n\n  IV Origin of Intellect--Its use--Difference\n  between Sentimental and Intellectual\n  consciousness--Intellect not the governing intelligence\n  of Man--Moral education the most important                        11\n\n  V Truth, its various meanings--Veracity--Correct\n  Ideation--Correct Inference--No absolute standard of\n  Truth--_Nisi utile est, quod novimus, stulta est\n  Sapentia_--Schopenhauer on the function of Intellect              14\n\n  VI Standard of Truth relating to Bodily welfare\n  different from that relating to Mental welfare--Realism\n  the theory of Perception under the former standard--Its\n  main dogmas--Cause why it is superseded--Superstition\n  of One Truth--Realism and Substantialism both true and\n  yet contradictory                                                 18\n\n\n  PERCEPTION\n\n  VII Defined, according to Substantial\n  principles--Noumenon--Subject--Object--Sentiment\n  not excited by Objects, but Objects accompany\n  Sentiments--Subject not passive in\n  Perception--ATTENTION--Kant's opinion on the\n  inconceivability of Noumena refuted--Difficulty of\n  overcoming Realistic prejudices--Science of little use\n  in Philosophy                                                     23\n\n\n  IDEAS\n\n  VIII How produced--Hume's notion untenable--No\n  innate Ideas--but Sentiment is innate--Division of\n  Ideas into Particular, General, and Imaginary                     27\n\n  IX MEMORY--OBLIVION--RECOLLECTION--Images, how\n  preserved and how lost--Good Memory not necessarily\n  advantageous--Recovery of the apparently Forgotten--Sudden\n  extinction of Ideas--'Decay of the mind' in\n  old age--Memory inexplicable on any theory but the\n  Substantial--John Stuart Mill's confession--Memory the\n  chief fact of Mental Science                                      28\n\n  X Sentiments may be remembered--Feelings and\n  Emotions--No detailed analysis of Sentiments possible\n  or necessary--Spinoza's list--Can sentiments be\n  noumenally excited without objects?                               34\n\n  XI Analysis of Comparison--It is the principle\n  of Generalisation and Imagination                                 36\n\n\n  GENERALISATION\n\n  XII Purpose of Generalisation--Objects\n  classified must be similar and have similar\n  utilities--Inferiority of general\n  ideas acquired by definition--Names not essential to\n  general thought--Generalisation resembles composite\n  photography--Classification on mere objective\n  resemblance--neat but superficial--Conceptualism                  38\n\n  XIII MATTER the most general notion derived\n  from Objects--Belief in Real Matter a form of Mysticism--A\n  material basis for phenomena unnecessary                          43\n\n  XIV NOMINALISM--Berkeley's Nominalism, and\n  objections thereto--Concrete Thought expressed in general\n  terms                                                             46\n\n  XV Generalisation the bane of European\n  philosophy--Plato's theories on General Ideas--Aristotle's\n  'Essence'--Classification a means, not the end of Reason--The\n  explanatory Unity a unity of service--Evolution a concrete\n  Platonism                                                         58\n\n\n  IMAGINATION\n\n  XVI How distinguished from Recollection and\n  Reverie--Imagination by Simple\n  Combination--By Transfusion--Artistic Imagination--Rational\n  Imagination--Wrong views of Metaphysicians                        63\n\n\n  DIALECTIC\n\n  XVII Recapitulation of the genealogy of Reason--It\n  is the art of conceiving the Future and Unknown--Dialectic\n  the science of Reason--Division of theorems into\n  Arguments and Fallacies--Method of Dialectic                      68\n\n  XVIII The RATIONAL PARALLEL--Rational\n  Conclusions are never certain--Essential parts of an\n  Argument--Rules of Parallel--False conclusions cannot\n  be destroyed but may be stigmatised--In what\n  circumstances we may reason concerning a known fact               74\n\n  XIX Hypothetical Arguments--Current errors\n  with respect to these--Dilemma                                    80\n\n  XX DEBATE is extra-dialectic--How a\n  valid argument may be criticised                                  87\n\n\n  CATEGORIES\n\n  XXI Natural--Realistic--Scientific--Philosophical\n  --Categories of Pythagoreans--of Aristotle--of Kant, etc.         92\n\n  XXII Category of Inherence--It is a metaphysical\n  analysis of objects--Examples of Judgment and Argument--Use\n  of Standards for Mediate Comparison                               97\n\n  XXIII Category of Association\n  defined--Position--Examples of Judgment and\n  Argument--Movement--Number--Flat Space                           103\n\n  XXIV Perspection or Depth in groups--Perspective\n  degradation--Redintegration, real and ideal--This groupment\n  as a fixed Precedent--Standard of Depth--Sky Perspection         108\n\n  XXV Concretion of Cubic ideas from flat\n  objects--Backs of things--Resistance--Dr. Johnson on\n  Idealism--Danger of trifling with Idealists, illustrated from\n  the Dabist\u00e1n--Geographical Concretion--Its superiority to mere\n  Recollection--Sphericity of the Earth, what it means             118\n\n  XXVI Material Sequence defined, with\n  examples--TIME the interval between objects in\n  Sequence--Eternity--Scientific confusion of Sequence with\n  Causation                                                        126\n\n  XXVII CAUSATION--Its peculiarities--How\n  distinguished from Sequence--Effects are never\n  causes--Cause consists of Motive, Plan, and\n  Power--Generation not causation--Atoms not\n  causes--Sub-categories of Causation--'Conservation'\n  of Energy discussed--Note on DREAMS                              130\n\n\n  REDACTION OF COLLOQUIAL ARGUMENTS\n\n  XXVIII Language not naturally an instrument of\n  Argument--How to adapt it to this purpose--Negative\n  words--Partitive words--Redaction does not extend to the\n  correction of faulty observation--Syllogistic Conversion\n  not necessary on the Substantial method                          151\n\n\n  FALLACIES\n\n  XXIX Of Equivocation--Of Imperfect Observation                   157\n\n  XXX Of Parallel Arrangement--Suppressed\n  Precedent--Inferring a negative from Contrast--False\n  Analogy--Doubtful Precedent--Of Accident--Of Division--Of\n  Composition--Dialectical Tautology--Cross\n  Reasoning--Fallacy of No Case--Of Inversion--Suppressed\n  Conclusion--Of No Application--Of Irrelevant Conclusion          161\n\n\n  ACADEMICAL DIALECTIC\n\n  XXXI Various notions of Reason entertained by\n  Syllogists--One only true, Analogy                               175\n\n  XXXII 'Immediate Inference' is not Argument,\n  but explicitness and emphasis in language                        176\n\n  XXXIII Arithmetic, what it is--The Real and the\n  Symbolic--Reasoning enters only into the Real--The Symbolic\n  a kind of expression                                             177\n\n  XXXIV Geometrical Demonstration not a form of\n  Reasoning--The so-called 'deductive reasoning' of Geometry\n  a graduated series of lessons in perception                      182\n\n  XXXV Induction not a special kind of reasoning,\n  but a deduction with suppressed precedent--Other meanings\n  of the word                                                      185\n\n  XXXVI Aristotle's Dictum explained and refuted                   187\n\n  XXXVII Mediate Comparison not Argument                           189\n\n  XXXVIII Syllogism analysed--It is not\n  Argument--Doctrine of the Predicate--Moods of the\n  Syllogism discussed--All moods reducible to One                  191\n\n\n  STUDIES IN DIALECTIC\n\n  XXXIX Additional examples to illustrate the\n  Dialectic of Substantialism                                      205\n\n\n\n\nINTRODUCTION\n\n\nI--RELATION OF BERKELEY'S PHILOSOPHY TO OTHER SYSTEMS\n\nPhilosophies are either Ideal or Substantial. The ideal are those\nwhich resolve all things, actual and possible, into thought or\nconsciousness. They seek to find in consciousness the reason and\nmeaning of itself, or, if this be impossible, to account for each item\nin consciousness by defining its relation to some other item, or to\nsome general mass of consciousness. This type of philosophy includes\nGerman transcendentalism and idealism, and some species of Buddhist\nand Persian metaphysic. European idealists are seldom consistent, for\nat the basis of their philosophies (or at the apex) they place GOD,\nwho is not an item of human consciousness, actual or potential, and\nwho therefore occupies, whether it be admitted or not, the relation of\nsubstance to human thought.\n\nSubstantial philosophies affirm that thought invariably inheres in\nsome sort of Substance, for whose service it exists. It is incapable\nof independent being, and cannot be understood abstracted from its\nsubstance. It is intermittent, called up when wanted, and is liable to\nvariation and aberration.\n\nSubstantialists differ however as to what the substance of human\nintelligence is. Some hold that it is the human body. Consciousness\nexists, they argue, for the use of the body and varies with its\ncondition. This class of philosophers may be subdivided into\nMaterialists and Metaphysicians (including logicians).\n\nMaterialists believe that consciousness is a product of the physical\nbody--has therefore no existence before the body is formed or after it\nis dissolved. It is really as physical as the teeth or hair.\n\nIn metaphysic the intelligence is supposed to have a principle of\nexistence apart from the body, and does not, or need not, share the\nfate of the body. The body is nevertheless regarded as the substance\nor superior fact during the union of the two. This is an eminently\ninconsistent philosophy, for if consciousness has an existence apart\nfrom body it must be in some other substance, and if so its relations\nto that substance are more important than its relations to the body,\nand should be the first object of inquiry. Metaphysic is in its\ndevelopment an idealism, since the connection admitted between body\nand thought is too slight to afford a sufficient explanation of\nintelligence, and no other substantial relation is known.\n\nThe notion that an invisible immaterial substance may underlie\nconsciousness has occurred to some philosophers, among others to\nthe illustrious BERKELEY. His theory of Vision, which has never been\nrefuted or even weakened, is founded on this hypothesis.\n\nBerkeleyan substantialism combines the characteristic features of\nthe other theories, and affords an easy solution of many difficult\nproblems in philosophy. It has in common with idealism--whence it is\nsometimes, but erroneously, called by that name--that it regards all\n_material_ bodies and things as facts or items of consciousness.\nIt agrees with materialism that a substance is essential to\nconsciousness, and that the consciousness of man serves the needs of\nhis body, though that is not the highest use to which it can be put.\nIt confirms the metaphysical view that intelligence is not, in its\nabstract or essential character, dependent on the body, and may\ntherefore survive the body.\n\nThis is the theory on which the following logic is based: I shall\nrefer to it briefly as Substantialism.\n\n\nII--ONTOLOGICAL NOTIONS\n\nSubstantialism has two main divisions--Ontology, which treats of the\nmental substance in itself, and Logic or Metaphysic, which deals\nwith its consciousness. The present essay is specially concerned with\nlogic, but certain ontological premises must be assumed to render\nthe logic intelligible. This follows from the subordinate relation of\nconsciousness to substance.\n\nThe substantial mind consists of two principal parts--a SELF and a\nPLASMA--the Atman and Aka['s]a of Sanscrit philosophers.\n\nSelf is the seat of Energy and Consciousness. The plasma is inert\nand unconscious; it protects the Self and receives, communicates,\nand retains impressions of experience, both the external and the\ninternal[1].\n\nThe Self would be conscious though isolated from other minds, at least\nfrom those of its own grade of being. It would feel the fluctuations\nof its energy. But the experience called 'external' depends on the\nmutual action of minds. It is the form into which their consciousness\nis thrown when they come in contact. It lasts no longer than the\ncontact, and so has only a casual existence.\n\nThe constitution of the mind is not given by Berkeley, and on other\npoints also we must supplement and correct his philosophy. He was\nwrong as regards the mental cause of the perception of the Inorganic\nor Dead.\n\nSince external experience implies that another mind is operating\nupon ours, what mind is operating when we perceive an object that is\napparently mindless? Berkeley replies that it is the supreme mind that\nis then acting upon us.\n\nMany objections can be urged against this view. I will mention only\none, which seems to me conclusive. By every canon of judgment we\npossess, the living or organised is better--more important and\nsignificant--than the lifeless and elemental; so if Berkeley's\nreasoning be valid the phenomena excited by finite and created beings\nare superior to those excited by their Creator. The movements of a\nliving man are referred to a human mind--a putrescent carcase is a\nvision immediately induced by the Deity.\n\nThe beauty of the starry sky is irrelevant to the question. Apart from\nthe finite life and thought that may be associated with the stars,\nthey have no more philosophical importance than a spadeful of sand.\n\nA more reasonable account of the inorganic is found in several ancient\nphilosophies. Gnostics and Neo-Platonists referred the elemental to\na cosmic mind (_Demiurgos_) intermediate between human beings and the\nSupreme. The demiurgic mind is inconceivably greater and more powerful\nthan the human, but is not necessarily better in quality. It is the\norigin of all natural forces, and its organic processes are what\nwe term 'physical laws.' This is the explanation of inorganic\nconsciousness which I feel disposed to adopt, but to discuss it fully\nwould carry us too far from the subject of this work.\n\nThe next point relates to the body. What is its function in\nsubstantialism? The brain, says Berkeley, is an idea in the mind, and\nhe ridicules the notion that one idea should generate all other\nideas. This is an argument against materialism. No doubt he would have\nadmitted, though he does not say so, that the body-idea facilitates,\nor at least must precede, the experience of other ideas. He would not\nhave denied that it is an _instrumental_ idea.\n\nSince his time an important discovery has been made with reference to\nthe constitution of the body. I allude to the Cell theory. It is no\nlonger possible to regard the body either as a self-moving machine (if\nthis is not a contradiction in terms), or as a lump of 'dead matter'\nanimated by the mind. It is a society of minute animals[2], each\nhaving a certain degree of independent energy and liberty of movement.\nThey are organised and governed by the human or animal mind with which\nthey are associated. In short, the relation of the cell to the man is\nanalogous to, if not quite the same as, the relation of the man to the\ncosmic being.\n\nThis discovery complicates the problem of 'external' consciousness,\nwithout however affecting the principles on which a substantialist\nwould endeavour to solve it. Instead of conceiving human minds as\ncoming into immediate contact in perception, we have to conceive the\ncellular systems of each as forming a medium between the two. We\ndo not perceive the other mind immediately or intuitively; what we\nperceive intuitively is certain affections in our own organism, which\nwe must first refer to the other body, and then to the mind behind\nthat body. Our knowledge of other human beings is thus altogether\ninferential.\n\nThe cellular medium explains why we are not generally aware of\nthe substantial constitution of other minds; it is veiled by the\nintervening organisms.\n\nThe relation of body to mind, the reason of embodiment, and so forth,\nare questions of prime importance in ontology, but in logic we are\nconcerned only with the object in consciousness, without reference to\nthe apparatus of perception. The instrument of intellectual perception\nmay in its proper character be ignored.\n\n\nIII--DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SUBSTANTIAL AND METAPHYSICAL LOGIC\n\nAll the current academic metaphysic is ideal. Materialists, when they\nattempt to explain thought, fail to attach it properly to the body,\nor to account for that large and important division of mental activity\nwhich has no bearing, direct or indirect, on bodily welfare. They drop\ntheir materialism at an early stage of their enquiry and continue on\nthe metaphysical method.\n\nHence in none of the current systems is there any true principle of\narrangement in the treatment of logical phenomena. Unless we know the\nuse of a thing we cannot describe it, let alone explain it. We\nknow not the relative importance of its parts, and we arrange them\naccording to superficial resemblances, or on some arbitrary principle\nwhich conceals instead of revealing their meaning.\n\nSubstantial philosophy alone possesses a principle of coherence. The\nfacts of consciousness are determined by anterior facts of substance,\nand there can be only one true mode in which to present them--they\nmust follow and reflect the substantial order. They will thus appear\nas a consecutive and coherent system of ideas, no one of which could\nbe otherwise placed without damage to the whole. This is perhaps the\nmost important respect in which substantial logic differs from others.\n\nThe doctrine of Categories has to receive full development in order\nto elucidate the genesis of the 'material world.' Except to a\nsubstantialist the categories have no particular value, and so they\nare barely mentioned in the academic systems.\n\nThe theory of Reasoning or Dialectic (logic in the narrower sense)\ngiven in the following chapters, will be found totally different from\nthe academic. It does not merely state in other words or metaphors the\ndoctrines laid down in works of the Aristotelian type,--it declares\nthat the theory of reasoning taught in these works is altogether\nfalse. Our argumentation is not conducted in syllogisms, either tacit\nor explicit. This has been suspected by several critics of logic,\nbut no attempt has been made to substitute a more correct theory and\nmethod. Of course logicians do not always reason wrongly, and true\narguments may be stated in the syllogistic form. What I mean is\nthat logicians nowhere tell us in what right reasoning essentially\nconsists, and for want of a distinct notion on the subject they all of\nthem occasionally admit as valid, arguments that are not so.\n\nThe main dogma of substantialism should be kept in view in reading the\nfollowing pages. It is mind alone that is conceived as having solidity\nand energy: material things are temporary forms of our consciousness;\nthey have length and breadth but no depth, and they are without\nenergy, even passive resistance. If an object cannot be removed at\npleasure, what resists us is the other mind causing that object, not\nthe object itself.\n\nAs far as possible I have utilised the existing logical terminology.\nBut substantialism has notions which require special technical words,\nand I have not hesitated to invent such when necessary. On the other\nhand, I have rejected the latinisms of current logic, which have never\nbeen assimilated by modern languages. The English language is good\nenough for all the purposes of logic.\n\n\n    [Footnote 1: The mental substance is the _fifth essence_ of\n    the initiate Greeks and of Alchemists. They also called it\n    _chaos_ and _first matter_. 'Man was made of that very\n    matter and chaos whereof all the world was made, and all the\n    creatures in it: which is a most high mystery to understand,\n    and must, nay is altogether necessary to be known of him that\n    expecteth good from this art, being the ground of the wisdom\n    thereof. Foolish men, nay they that the world holds for great\n    doctors, say and tell it for truth, that God made man of a\n    piece of mud, or clay, or dust of the earth, which is false;\n    it was no such matter, but a Quintessential Matter which is\n    called earth, but is no earth.'--_De Manna Benedicto._]\n\n    [Footnote 2: See Stricker's _Manual of Histology_; _Bioplasm_,\n    and other works, by Dr. Lionel S. Beale, M.B., F.R.S.; and an\n    article on the New Psychology, by A. Fouill\u00e9, in the _Revue\n    des Deux Mondes_ for October 15th, 1891.]\n\n\n\n\nINTELLECT\n\n\nIV--ITS ORIGIN AND FUNCTION\n\nThe mind has at physical birth one uniform quality of plasma and\nconsciousness. By education and experience a portion of the plasma is\ngradually changed, and the consciousness excited by this portion is\nwhat we call INTELLECT. The word may also stand for the plasma so\ndifferentiated.\n\nThe consciousness pertaining to the plasma left in its primitive state\nis SENTIMENT, which generally corresponds to what is termed the moral\nnature of man.\n\nIntellect is a temporary condition arising out of the need to preserve\nthe Self from hostile and inharmonious surroundings. The adaptation is\nartificial, and may therefore be well-done, or ill-done, or over-done.\nIt is over-done when too much of the plasma and mental energy is\ndevoted to intellectual purposes--when the individual has, to use\na common expression, more head than heart. In this case the end is\nsacrificed to the means.\n\nI conceive the intellect as a hardening of the plasma in its\nsuperficies, the formation of a sort of rind capable of receiving\nfiner, sharper, and more enduring impressions than the plasma of\nsentiment; and, being harder, it is better able than the latter to\nresist enfeebling influences. Its duty is to challenge and inspect\nvibrations before permitting them to pass inwards to the region of\nsentiment. Yet the intellectual consciousness is itself a degree\nof sentiment, and in intellects not sufficiently trained it may be\nimpossible to distinguish thoughts that are purely intellectual, from\nthoughts that are also to some extent sentimental. Upon minds of this\nsort the best-prepared arguments have no hold; they must be mixed with\noratory and poetry to receive any attention. It need not be said\nthat a mind which responds only to 'persuasive' language is feeble\nof intellect. It lives in the present only, and is incapable of\nfar-reaching designs. It is to the intellect we owe the power of\nconceiving the past and future, and of laying plans for the future.\n\nA mind properly intellectualised is, of its kind, strong and\nself-controlled. With the intellect defective the man exhibits\npassion, undue excitement and demonstrativeness. He responds to\nthe least stimulus, like an exposed nerve; his energy is wasted\nin explosions. Sentiment is the inmost nerve of man--intellect its\nprotecting sheath. The most carefully trained intellect is liable at\ntimes to be carried by assault or stratagem; then follows a feeling\nof emptiness occasioned by loss of energy. On the other hand an\nappearance of self-command may be really due to apathy,--the mind\nis of a low type and callous to influences that usually affect its\nspecies. If it is bad to be explosive, it is perhaps worse to be\nincapable of exploding.\n\nIntellect is not the supreme or ruling intelligence of man. It\ninitiates nothing. It is a light to direct our steps, but we do not\nwalk where the light happens to fall--we make it fall where we\ndesire to walk. Hence the diversity of occupation and intellectual\naccomplishments in men. Each acquires the sort of intellect he\nthinks will be sentimentally most serviceable to him; and on matters\nconcerning which he has not learnt to reason he consults other men.\nWe are not born rational beings; we are in no sense rational on all\nsubjects; we are rational only on those few which we have mastered.\n\nMen pretend to act from reason only, and perhaps they do on matters to\nwhich they are indifferent. But in general their rationality consists\nin finding pretexts for what on sentimental grounds they have already\nresolved to do, and in finding ways and means to carry out their\nresolves. Sentiment is the moving spring of conduct: intellect is\nthe executive faculty. Those historical philosophers are mistaken who\nsuppose the progress of mankind results from intellectual discoveries\nand inventions. These are effects, not causes, of progress--effects of\n_sentimental_ disagreement with previous conditions.\n\nIntellect is little more than an extension inwards of our senses.\nIt is an epitome and rearrangement of their observations, and is as\ninstrumental as they. We are not necessarily improved by a development\nof the intellect forced upon us from without. Education is sometimes\na dagger put into the hands of an assassin. The best education is\nlargely sentimental (moral), for that is not confined to preserving\nthe mind we have--it gives us another and a better mind, and so\nindirectly improves the intellect.\n\n\nV--TRUTH\n\nThis word has several meanings which it may be well to notice.\n\nAs _veracity_ it means an agreement between our thoughts and our\nlanguage. It supposes that we take reasonable pains to learn the\nconventional laws upon which language is founded, and then endeavour\nas far as possible to bring our speech in conformity with these laws.\nSince language is an art (like music) it may be acquired well or ill,\nso that a mistake in the use of a phrase or term is not regarded as\nuntruth. There must be deliberate abuse of language to constitute a\nlie.\n\nAgreement between an idea of memory and the actual experience--correct\nrecollection--is another meaning of truth.\n\nAlso truth may signify agreement between an inferential thought\nand the fact to which it refers, although the fact has not yet been\nobserved. In this sense truth must be construed liberally. We never\nforesee a future fact exactly as it will take place. Our anticipations\nare vague and our preparations for them general, but that on the whole\nis enough for our purposes. At least it is all that reason affords us.\nIf we are absolutely certain of a future fact and can figure it in the\nmind precisely as it will take place, that means that it has already\noccurred so often that we are virtually using our memory, not our\nreason.\n\nAn inference may be considered true if it is the best we can draw from\nthe information at our command, though in point of fact it may prove\nto be very incorrect.\n\nThere is no mass of speculative Truth which everybody ought to\npossess on pain of being considered foolish or miscreant. This notion,\nformerly so prevalent, betrays gross ignorance of the nature and\nfunction of intellect. It makes intellectual speculation an end in\nitself. Our ideas must be such as serve the uses of our sentimental or\ninner soul, and since the sentiments (tastes) of men vary widely,\nso ought also their intellectual ideas. Though change of sentiment\nmodifies ideas, change of ideas does not modify sentiment. There is\ntherefore no sort of good in uniformity of belief in itself. It is\ncreditable to modern times that men have shaken off the procrustean\nbeliefs of the Middle Ages, and are free to adapt their intellects\nto their real sentimental needs. The numerous sections into which\nspeculative thought is now broken up, and the frequent changes of\ntheory, are signs of healthy and active sentiment.\n\nIn matters of social policy, where large bodies of men have to carry\nout a single design, uniformity must be attained by persuasion or\ncompromise. But such matters relate only to physical well-being, into\nwhich philosophical truth can hardly be said to enter.\n\nThis relative and, in the widest sense, utilitarian view of\nintellectual truth applies both to quantity and quality of ideas. We\nshould not learn what we do not sentimentally require. That is waste\nof power. Useless knowledge is folly, said both Plato and Aristotle.\nTo mistake knowledge to be the pursuit of man is to confuse the means\nwith the end, says the author of the Bhagavad Gita.\n\nThe quality of our ideas must not be good beyond our necessities.\nIf they are, we shall suffer by acting on them. They will land us in\ncircumstances for which our nature is not fully prepared.\n\nIf there were an abstract or standard truth, it would be good for\nevery species of being, and no doubt the thoughts of a man are nearer\nto it than the thoughts of a horse. Therefore a horse ought to be\nimproved by receiving a human intellect. But if we could insinuate\ninto a horse's mind the knowledge possessed by an educated man, we\nshould spoil what may have been a good horse and produce a monstrous\nand horrible man. So is it with ourselves. If we could receive\nknowledge far in advance of our requirements or out of relation to\nthem, it would drive us mad or be itself madness. Our constitution and\nnecessities determine what we can know and what we ought to know.\nNot all possible knowledge is good, and what is good for some may be\nuseless or bad for others. Schopenhauer says well[3]: 'The faculty of\nKnowing ... has only arisen for the purpose of self-preservation,\nand therefore stands in a precise relation, admitting of countless\ngradations, to the requirements of each animal species.'\n\n\nVI--REALISM\n\nIf our interests were single and uniform, one consistent scheme of\nintellectual knowledge would suffice. We need never be in fundamental\ncontradiction with ourselves. Every advance in knowledge would\nillustrate and confirm what we had already learned.\n\nBut we are not of this simple constitution. We are first and\nessentially minds, we are next and temporarily embodied minds, and\nin each of these characters we have distinct and, to a great extent,\nconflicting interests. Hence we have to acquire different species of\nknowledge and admit different standards of truth. The ideas that serve\nthe interests of the embodied man are false to the same man considered\napart from his embodiment, and contrariwise--false, in the sense of\nbeing useless and perhaps misleading.\n\nHence the existence of Common-sense for the embodied interests,\nand Philosophy for the purely mental interests. Science is common\nknowledge carried to its utmost perfection, but not partaking in the\nleast of the philosophical character.\n\n\n_Realism_ is the notion of perception that is acquired with our common\nknowledge. It is seldom explicitly defined or defended, for in order\nto this a comparison with philosophic theories would have to be made,\nand the defects of realism would be apparent. The realistic view is so\nnamed by philosophers to distinguish it from their own views.\n\nFor corporeal purposes it is useful to believe, and it is therefore\nrelatively true, that there is a real space which would exist although\nall objects were removed from it. Objects are real solid things\nstored in space like casks in a cellar. They have fixed dimensions\nnotwithstanding that they appear to contract and dilate as we leave or\napproach them. It is quite 'natural' they should appear smaller at a\ndistance. Distant perception is conceivable, therefore it is possible,\nand since calculations based on this assumption are verified by\nexperience, it must and does take place. Time also is as real as\nspace, and would exist by itself though space and its contents were\nannihilated. It is a sort of stream.\n\nAll these propositions are true for certain necessary purposes. We\nbegin to form such ideas from the moment we are born, and during the\nyears of infancy we are doing nothing else intellectually but working\nout the notions of space, time, magnitude, distance. Most of our\nschool education is of the same kind. By the time we reach maturity\nrealism has become so rooted in our intellect that--as regards the\nmajority of men--no sceptical considerations are strong enough\nto unsettle them. For why? They enable the natural man to provide\nsufficiently well for his bodily needs and other needs depending\ntherefrom, and he has therefore no motive for doubting his realism or\nfor acquiring any other sort of ideas. He is quite right to abide by\nthose which have answered his purposes.\n\nIt is not from without but from within that doubts arise as to\nrealistic truth. They arise when the mind has acquired power over and\nabove what is needed for bodily uses, and begins to think on its own\naccount. Sentiments are felt which do not depend on or refer to bodily\nlife, and a new intellect has to be formed to explain and protect\nthese sentiments. This new intellect is Philosophy. It is the science\nand practical conduct of mind considered as abstracted from body.\n\nMuch of the obscurity of philosophy is traceable to the superstition\nof a fixed standard of truth which must be recognised universally.\nWe are reluctant to accept philosophical hints and inferences\nbecause they conflict with truths that have been physically verified.\nOr--which is more common--we take up a few philosophical propositions\nand tack on to them all the science we know, believing they make a\nhomogeneous whole, because truth must be self-consistent.\n\n\nTime and labour would be spared if we could be told at the right\nmoment that truth is expedience[4], and that there is no need to\nharmonise philosophy and science. We are each of us two men in one,\nand each of these men must be allowed to think for himself. There is\nno reason why they should quarrel; there is no reason why they should\neven argue. The science in our mind should not be ousted to make room\nfor the philosophy; let them exist together and work alternately. When\nthe mariner is at sea he must mind his ship and study the weather;\nwhen he is on shore he may neglect both. So when we are navigating\nthe body we have to think in categories proper to its safety; as\nphilosophers we dismiss the realistic categories and think in other\nforms, but we need not then call the realism false or foolish. In its\nproper place it is right and true[5].\n\nBetween realism and substantialism there is therefore no necessary\nconflict or competition. They are each indispensable. It is absurd\nto carry realism into philosophy, and no less absurd to carry\nsubstantialism into common affairs, or to reproach a substantialist\nbecause he acts and speaks occasionally like other people. It\nis probable however that in a community largely composed of\nsubstantialists the realism of common action would be less stringent\nthan is now found necessary.\n\n\n    [Footnote 3: _Will in Nature_, 'Physiology of Plants.']\n\n    [Footnote 4: This does not apply to truth in the sense of\n    veracity.]\n\n    [Footnote 5: Greek philosophers never understood the dual\n    standard of Truth, and insisted that philosophy was the best\n    preparation for every sort of employment. The people, though\n    generally unwise in political matters, had sense enough not to\n    entrust the care of their temporal interests to philosophers,\n    and so the universal utility of philosophy had few\n    opportunities of being tested. A Macedonian king committed the\n    custody of Corinth and its citadel to a philosopher, Persaeus,\n    who was promptly expelled by Aratus--a mere soldier. Persaeus\n    frequented the schools again, and on the well-worn theme that\n    'none but a wise man is fit to be a general' being brought up\n    for discussion, he said, 'It is true, and the gods know it,\n    that this maxim of Zeno once pleased me more than all the\n    rest; but I have changed my opinion since I was taught better\n    by the young Sicyonian.'--Plutarch's _Life of Aratus_.]\n\n\n\n\nPERCEPTION\n\n\nVII\n\nPerception has already been partially defined. So-called 'external\nobjects' are forms excited in our consciousness by pressure of other\nminds. The great permanent 'world' is due to the action of a cosmic\nmind with which we are intimately associated throughout our physical\nlife.\n\nObjects have a totally different sort of existence from minds, for\nwhereas the latter are--at least relative to objects--self-existent,\nthe former have no existence except during the act of perception. If\nminds could be all moved asunder from each other the whole objective\nworld would disappear, yet the universe would be as full as before,\nfor sensation occupies no room.\n\nThe appearances we interpret as distance are due to variations in the\npressure or stimulus producing the object.\n\nIt will be convenient to call the more active mind _Noumenon_, the\nperceiving mind _Subject_. The mind that is subject on one occasion\nmay be noumenon at another, and conversely. The true antithesis to\nsubject is not object, but noumenon. Object has no antithesis, unless\nit be nonentity.\n\nIt is specially to be noticed that an object is not the _cause_ of a\nsentiment. The knife we see or handle is not the cause of the pain it\nmay inflict if driven into our flesh. Pains and pleasures signify that\nthe noumenal action is powerful enough not only to excite objects in\nthe intellect, but to penetrate inwards and excite sentiments also. It\nis the noumenon that causes both object and sentiment, as far as\nthe energy exerted is concerned, but the variation of plasma in the\nsubject is also essential to the distinction of object and sentiment.\n\nThe subject is not quite passive in perception. No consciousness\ntakes place unless the subject is charged with energy. Further, since\nconsciousness is confined to the Self and not inherent in the plasma,\nwe perceive only such vibrations as reach the Self. If the Self is\nabsorbed in one part of the mind, vibrations may take place in other\nparts without being noticed. The more energy we concentrate at the\npoint or surface of contact (Attention), or otherwise bring to bear on\nthe plasmic vibration, the more vivid is the object.\n\nThe fixing or circumscribing of attention so as to break up our\nexperience into distinct things or objects is an acquired art, whence\nwe may infer that the intellectual experience of infancy is a vague\nwhitish surface, not clearly distinguished by colour or movement.\n\nKant and other philosophers admit that objects are caused by noumena,\nbut insist that we can never know or conceive what a noumenon is.\n\nWhy not? Each of us knows himself to be the noumenon of many\nphenomena; he has no doubt that many other phenomena are caused by\nminds like himself, and it is easy to extend this principle to all\nphenomena whatever. They are all caused by minds more or less like\nhuman minds. This is a useful conclusion, although we are not able to\nimagine very accurately the mind of an insect or of a being of cosmic\ndimensions. It is not necessary we should, but the most general\ninference of this sort is better than none at all, and better than the\nnotion that phenomena are self-existent and self-moving.\n\nAlthough simple and intelligible when stated in the abstract,\nperception is difficult to work out in detail. Objections start up on\nevery side, and it requires the utmost patience to reduce them to\nwhat they are--_inferences_ from the realism we are supposed to have\ndiscarded. It is only when we try to dislodge realism wholly and\nconsistently that we find how fast its hold upon our intellect is.\nCritics who profess to treat Berkeley's substantialism seriously and\nsympathetically, constantly bring up against it arguments of the most\nnaively realistic kind. They have no adequate conception how enormous\nis the revolution in thought involved in substituting substantialism\nfor realism. It is a complete dissolution of the natural thought and\nbelief; it means the construction of a new heaven and a new earth with\nlaws to which we have been hitherto unaccustomed. The old science is\nof little or no use to us as substantialists.\n\nPhilosophy is not an advance or correction of science. In so far\nas the latter claims to be absolutely or philosophically true,\nsubstantialism abolishes it in dispensing with the notions of real\nmatter and real space. Hence it is quite irrelevant to point out that\nsubstantialism is inconsistent with (say) the doctrine of physical\nevolution. This theory, though so new, is now often referred to as\naxiomatically true, whereas it is an inference, the evidence for\nwhich, even to many realists, is far from conclusive. Whether it be\nconsidered true or not in science, physical evolution is quite untrue\nin philosophy.\n\n\n\n\nIDEAS\n\n\nVIII--HOW PRODUCED\n\nAn imprint or mould of the object is generally left in the plasma of\nthe subject. The imprint is deep, clear and lasting in proportion to\nthe strength of the exciting cause and the degree of energy assigned\nto the perception. When the noumenon withdraws the object does not at\nonce disappear, for if the energy of attention remain the mould\nleft by the noumenon serves to excite a consciousness similar to the\nobject, and this is what we call an IDEA.\n\nWhat Hume says as to an object differing from an idea in nothing\nbut vividness is evidently incorrect. Objects are generally, but not\nalways, more vivid than ideas, and when an object is present we\nhave an indefeasible conviction of being acted on by something not\nourselves, which conviction is not present in recollection. We may not\nbe able to give a satisfactory reason for the conviction--if we are\narguing idealistically we certainly shall not--but the fact that it is\nthere serves to mark off objects as a class of consciousness distinct\nfrom ideas, irrespective of their vividness. If an object were once\nseen clearly and so remembered, and were afterwards seen indistinctly\nthrough a mist, the latter consciousness would (according to Hume) be\nthe idea and the former the object. Such an application of words would\nbe an abuse of language.\n\nThere are of course no innate ideas of _objects_. There is innate\nconsciousness--the sentimental.\n\n\nIdeas are of three kinds--Particular Ideas, General Ideas,\nImaginary Ideas--corresponding to the so-called faculties of Memory,\nGeneralisation or Classification, and Imagination.\n\n\nIX--MEMORY OF OBJECTS\n\nWhen the energy of attention is exhausted or withdrawn the idea also\ndisappears, but it may be revived by bringing the energised Self in\ncontact with the imprint again, and this operation can be repeated\nindefinitely. The power of exciting ideas of past experience is\nMemory; any particular exercise of memory is Recollection.\n\nThe imprint of an object is not absolutely permanent and is probably\nnever quite true. It begins to lose sharpness at once, but if the\nobject be frequently observed and much remembered, it will retain\nits general character for years. The exercise of memory, instead of\nwearing out the imprint as would be the case with a material negative\nor engraved plate, keeps the channels open[6]. Persons of little\nexperience remember well, for their energy of attention is not\ndistributed over many different ideas; it travels continuously round\na small circuit. One hears ignorant persons recounting events that\nhappened years ago, with as much detail and with almost as much\nsentiment as if they had taken place the day before. A 'good\nmemory' is no proof that the quality of mind or thought is good. All\nexperience is not worth remembering. One of the most difficult things\nin moral culture is to get rid of the imprints of ideas that are out\nof harmony with our improved sentiment.\n\nAlthough the imprints in our mind may close up and leave scarce a\ncicatrice, the part that has been once disturbed is never the same as\nthe virgin plasm. It remains a little more tender. It may not reopen\nto ordinary stimuli, but an extra agitation of the plasm will rip up\nthe closed furrows, and give us back scenes in our life that had long\nceased to be recollected. A great agitation in all parts of the mind\nmay revive what appears to be the whole of our past experience in a\nsimultaneous recollection. So I explain the extraordinary lucidity\nthat sometimes occurs in fevers and in moments of extreme terror.\n\nIt is also conceivable that the egoistic energy may be so strong as\nto destroy outright the moulds of thought, as a flood sweeps away the\nbanks of a river. 'We sometimes find a disease quite strip the mind\nof all its ideas, and the flames of a fever in a few days calcine all\nthose images to dust and confusion which seemed to be as lasting as if\ngraved in marble'[7].\n\nWhat is called 'decay of the mind' in old age is merely the loss of\nthe plasmic images. Since intellect would not have been formed in the\nfirst instance if it had not been wanted, it is to be expected that it\nwill fade out of the mind when it is no longer wanted. So far as the\nrealistic intellect is concerned, we return to 'second childhood' and\nthe uniform sensibility we had at birth.\n\n\nNo philosophy but the substantial explains memory. Idealists and\nmetaphysicians, who recognise only consciousness, are utterly unable\nto account for the revival of a shadowy sort of objects in the absence\nof their original causes. Here is the melancholy confession of John\nStuart Mill on the subject:--\n\n    'If we speak of the Mind as a series of feelings, we are\n    obliged to complete the statement by calling it a series of\n    feelings which is aware of itself as past and future: and we\n    are reduced to the alternative of believing that the Mind, or\n    Ego, is something different from any series of feelings,\n    or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox that\n    something which _ex hypothesi_ is but a series of feelings,\n    can be aware of itself as a series.\n\n    'The truth is that we are here face to face with that final\n    inexplicability at which, as Sir W. Hamilton observes, we\n    inevitably arrive when we reach ultimate facts; and in general\n    one mode of stating it only appears more incomprehensible than\n    another, because the whole of human language is accommodated\n    to the one, and is so incongruous with the other, that it\n    cannot be expressed in any terms which do not deny its truth.\n    The real stumbling-block is perhaps not in any theory of the\n    fact, but in the fact itself. The true incomprehensibility\n    perhaps is, that something which has ceased, or is not yet in\n    existence, can still be, in a manner, present: that a series\n    of feelings, the infinitely greater part of which is past or\n    future, can be gathered up as it were into a single present\n    conception, accompanied by a belief of reality. I think, by\n    far the wisest thing we can do is to accept the inexplicable\n    fact, without any theory of how it takes place; and when we\n    are obliged to speak of it in terms which assume a theory, to\n    use them with a reservation as to their meaning[8].'\n\nMemory an ultimate fact! It is the first that stares us in the face on\nbeginning to philosophise, and it haunts us through all our subsequent\nspeculations. It is the 'dweller on the threshold' of philosophy,\nwhich unless we overcome will overcome us, and frustrate our magic.\n\nThe passage quoted does not show Mill's usual candour and consistency.\nHis philosophy has broken down on an essential point, and he is\nreluctant to admit it. He tries to throw the blame on other things,\nand recommends that those who think with him should maintain a\ndiscreet silence on the subject of memory, or if obliged to speak\nof it do so in ambiguous language. That is hardly honest, and is bad\nphilosophical practice. What we know or think we know we may leave\nalone--it will not run away; it is what we are conscious of not\nknowing that should receive our persistent attention.\n\nMaterialism presents at first sight the data out of which to construct\na theory of memory, for it recognises the dependent character of\nconsciousness and takes body to be its substance. Does the body show\nany marks or traces of thought that may serve to revive ideas in the\nabsence of objects? None have yet been discovered. Nerves are used in\nobjective observation, but they do not appear to be essential either\nto recollection in general or to any of the more elaborate forms of\ninternal thought. The brain is used only when giving expression to\nthought.\n\nMemory is noticed by everyone, even the least metaphysical. Persons\nwho are incapable of understanding the difference between object and\nsubject or general and particular, are yet perfectly well aware of the\ndifference between remembering and forgetting. The phrases relating\nto this distinction are the commonest in every language. Memory is\nconspicuous--notorious--palpable. It is the pivot on which the whole\nmental system revolves. It cannot be gainsaid or ignored. There is no\nprofit in boycotting it in the manner recommended by Mill--it must be\nfaced and explained. 'How do you account for memory?' should be the\nfirst question addressed to one who pretends to have a science of\nmind. If he has no plausible answer to give, his system is not\nworth discussion. A philosophy without a theory of memory is like an\nastronomy without gravitation.\n\n\nX--MEMORY OF SENTIMENTS\n\nSentiments are remembered and recollected like objects. For instance,\na boy is punished for doing wrong and has _pain_; he does wrong again\nand is haunted with the _fear_ of being punished again, which is\nthe recollected and anticipated pain. We have thus two species of\nsentiment corresponding exactly to object and idea. The word 'feeling'\nis appropriate to the first, 'emotion' to the second. 'Passion' is a\nstrong degree of either.\n\nObjects that are associated with feelings are better remembered than\nthose that merely affect the intellect, for there is a double memory\nat work--one in the core and one on the surface of our mind.\n\nSentiments are not susceptible of the same degree of analysis as\nobjects. The inner matrix is more fluid and does not keep details.\nApart from the objects associated with feelings, there is not much\nopportunity or need for classifying them. We are happy, wretched, or\nindifferent--that sums up the sentimental experience.\n\nNo two moral philosophers give the same list of sentiments. Some\nare satisfied with two--pain and pleasure. Spinoza gives a list of\nforty-seven[9] sentiments, which includes luxury and drunkenness. It\nis evident that luxury is a general term which covers many different\nforms of feeling, and if the feeling of intoxication by alcohol is\nworth mentioning, so also must be the intoxications by opium and\ntobacco; and if these are included we must admit the feeling of\nnausea, which brings us to the sentiments associated with all diseased\nconditions of body or mind. Such distinctions are superfluous, for if\nthe sentiment is purely personal and not associated with an external\nobject, it is not of any general interest; if associated with an\nobject and common to many persons it is best defined by reference to\nthe object--as the pleasure of smelling a _rose_.\n\nWe have sometimes feelings of elation and depression for which we\ncannot find an internal reason nor yet an objective sign. Many of\nthe so-called religious experiences are of this sort. So also are the\nsudden sympathies and aversions we feel towards certain people and\nplaces. Here there is an object, but we cannot find anything in the\nobject that can be taken as specially significant of the feeling. We\nare said not to be able to 'analyse' our feeling, that is, assign it\nan object as cause.\n\nThese abnormal feelings may be explained by supposing that some\nexternal influences succeed in reaching our sentiment without exciting\nour intellect. Considering that intellect is artificial and may be\nvery imperfect, and also that its efficiency depends to some extent\non its being less sensitive than the original mental nature, it is\nreasonable to conclude that subtle emanations from our surroundings\nmay occasionally affect us without exciting the intellectual\nconsciousness. Panic, inspiration, mesmerism, and other 'occult'\ninfluences are probably due to this cause. If we further assume that\nsentiments so excited may then, by association, excite appropriate\n_ideas_ in the intellect of the recipient, we have a likely\nexplanation of what is called 'thought-transference.' Since ideas\nexcite emotions, it is reasonable to suppose that feelings may excite\nideas, or even the illusion that objects are being perceived.\n\n\nXI--COMPARISON\n\nMost ideas, except the particular (which are copies of single\nobjects), are associated with a consciousness of resemblance and\ndifference which arises in the following manner.\n\nWhen new experience simply revives the imprint of a former experience\nwe call it the _same_ object or objects, though it is not numerically\nthe same, being different at least in time. If a totally new imprint\nis made in the mind the experience is quite novel or _strange_, but we\ndo not call it different.\n\nExperience is usually neither quite the same as before nor quite\nstrange, which means that the present noumenon has partially revived\nan old imprint and made a partially new one.\n\nIn this case we have a quadruple consciousness. There is first\nthe present object; next the recollection of the object originally\nassociated with the same imprint; thirdly, a consciousness of\n_resemblance_ between the new and the old (the present object and the\nrecollected idea) in so far as the imprints coincide, and (fourthly)\na sense of _difference_ in so far as they disagree. The limitation\nof resemblance gives rise to the sense of difference--a negative\nconsciousness--and the shock of difference emphasises the resemblance.\nThis is Comparison, the common basis of Generalisation and\nImagination.\n\n\n    [Footnote 6: As if the image had the form of a stencil.]\n\n    [Footnote 7: Locke, _Essay on the Understanding_, ii. x. 5.]\n\n    [Footnote 8: _Exam. of Hamilton's Philosophy_, p. 212-3.]\n\n    [Footnote 9: I append Spinoza's list, and print in italics the\n    sentiments that appear to me to be emotions as\n    distinguished from feelings.\n    Desire--Pleasure--Pain--Wonder--_Contempt_--_Love_--_Hate_--\n    _Inclination_--_Aversion_--_Devotion_--Derision--_Hope_--_Fear_--\n    _Confidence_--_Despair_--Joy--Grief--Pity--Approval--Indignation--\n    Overesteem--_Disparagement_--_Envy_--Mercy\n    (or\n    goodwill)--Self-contentment--Humility--_Repentance_--_Pride_--\n    Dejection--Honour--_Shame_--_Regret_--_Emulation_--Thankfulness--\n    Benevolence--Anger--_Revenge_--Cruelty--_Daring_--_Cowardice_--\n    _Consternation_--_Civility_\n    (or\n    deference)--_Ambition_--Luxury--Drunkenness--Avarice--Lust.\n    Pollock's _Spinoza_, ch. vii.]\n\n\n\n\nGENERALISATION\n\n\nXII--NATURE AND FUNCTION\n\nGeneral Ideas are formed by the coincident imprint of several objects\nin some respects different, but which have all a resemblance as\nobjects, and are besides the signs of the same sentimental effect.\nIf the effects are different the confusion of the objects occasions\npractical error, as when we mistake one man for another whom he\nclosely resembles. Though the sentimental utilities should be the\nsame, the object cannot be reduced to a common idea if they are quite\ndissimilar: for example, a sand-glass and a watch have similar uses,\nbut they cannot be generalized. The value of generalisation to a\nthinker is that it economises memory and recollection by making one\ncommon or average idea do duty for many particular ideas. Let us\nfollow the process in detail.\n\nThe first perception of an object leaves an imprint in the substance\nof the intellect. A second perception partially resembling the first\nrevives the first to the extent at least of the resemblance. Supposing\nthis is done by a hundred similar objects it is plain that the\nresembling properties will have been experienced a hundred times,\nwhereas the distinguishing attributes may have been felt a few times\nonly, in some cases only once. Unless we have special reasons for\nobserving the differences and so deepening the impressions of them,\nthey will fade from our memory at a rate corresponding to the paucity\nof experiences. The most general idea will last longest because\n_there_ the impression has been very deep. Our idea of Man or Animal\nwill on this principle, as it is found to do in fact, outlast our\nmemory of many concrete men and animals.\n\nThe objects that contribute to form a general idea or Class are\ncommonly said to 'belong to,' or to 'inhere in,' or to be 'brought\nunder' the idea or class. All these metaphors are wrong and occasion\nmistakes. Generalisation is nothing but condensed or epitomised\nrecollection; it is practised by ourselves for our own convenience,\nand does not imply any essential or extra-personal relation between\nthe objects. We are free to classify things in any order we find\nuseful. A farmer's classification of some animals into cattle, game,\nfowls, birds, and vermin, is perfectly legitimate, for each species is\nbased on a different utility for him.\n\nWe should distinguish general ideas which we ourselves have drawn from\nour primary experience, from the ideas suggested by verbal definitions\nof general ideas formed by other minds. Supposing the objects in\nquestion to be quite unknown to us, the definitional idea is more like\na particular or imaginary idea than a general idea. It is a single\nthin rigid idea, utterly unlike the flexible suggestive thought\nevolved from a large mass of personal experience. Definitional general\nideas are as unsatisfactory as described objects, but we are sometimes\ncompelled to use both when personal experience is totally wanting.\n\nIt is a common error to suppose that general ideas cannot exist in the\nintellect without words by which to name them. Words and other modes\nof marking ideas are useful in all departments of thought, but\nnot more necessary in general thought than in any other. An active\nintellect makes thousands of observations and scores of general ideas\nwhich it may have no means or wish to express in language.\n\nGeneralisation is very like the operation called composite\nphotography. A number of persons are posed in the same attitude and\npartially photographed on the same plate. The result is an average\nor mean likeness of the whole group, but not an exact portrait of\nany individual. So general ideas are 'means' or 'averages' of many\nresembling but slightly differing objects.\n\nThere are other things in the photographic art remarkably similar to\nintellectual thinking. The gelatine film behaves very like the mental\nplasma: only one other physical object (so far as I am aware) is a\nbetter image of the plasm.\n\n\nIn theory the object or phenomenon has no importance. Even when it\nhas the quality we call 'beauty,' that is not a property of the\nbare object, for it is not seen by every person or animal with good\neyesight; it is a sentimental effect associated with the object. Hence\nwe might, if it were possible, ignore all objects except those which\nhave value to us as signs of sentimental effects.\n\nBut in practice we cannot do this. Objects are thrust upon our notice\nwhich we cannot avoid, and which have no sentimental interest for us.\nThese objects are necessarily classified according to their phenomenal\nappearance only, and such ideas lack an essential characteristic of\ntrue general ideas. But we cannot prevent their formation in the\nmind, for generalisation is merely a kind of abbreviated memory, and,\nobjects being once perceived, their recollection is to a great extent\nbeyond our control.\n\nArtificial and adventitious utilities produce the same kind of\none-sided generalisation. If society pays a man in fame or money to\nobserve and describe certain things, his classification of them will\nbe purely phenomenal. He will classify dogs with wolves and nightshade\nwith potato, and will lump together the whole population of a country\nin one class, although it consists of the most divers elements--fools\nand philosophers, rogues and righteous, saints and sinners, patricians\nand plebeians. These are differences much more important than sameness\nof nationality, colour, race, or language.\n\nThis practice, no doubt, gives symmetrical classifications. The\ngreater classes are subdivided into subordinate classes, and these\nagain into lower classes in a many-stepped series. Gradation occurs\nalso in true generalisation, but not to the same extent.\n\nIf we confine our observation to things that are much like each other,\nthe average idea will not be greatly different from a particular idea:\nthis is called _lowness_ in generality. If we run together quadrupeds,\nbipeds and fishes, we shall have a much higher general idea: the\naverage will be very unlike any concrete animal. The higher we\ngeneralise the smaller becomes the content of the idea, but the wider\nits extension, that is, the realm of objects from which it has been\ndrawn, or which it is considered to represent. The usual practice is\nto generalise by fine gradations. Get the general idea of sheep, then\nof cow, then of horse; then average the averages. The result is much\nthe same if we run all the objects together and average them in\none operation, but the slower process gives the neater results. The\ngradations of generality are distinguished by names such as (beginning\nfrom below) variety, species, genus, class, family, kingdom.\n\n\n'Conceptualism' is the metaphysical doctrine now prevalent with\nrespect to general ideas. They are regarded not as objects nor as\nessences, but as forms of consciousness depending more or less on\nour own mental activity. This is true enough so far as it goes, but\nwithout a substantial plasm to hold the 'concept' its formation and\nendurance are quite inexplicable.\n\n\nXIII--MATTER\n\nMatter is the name given to the most general idea we can form of\nobjects. It is supposed to cover all of them. In other words, the\ncontent or 'essence' of the idea is the attribute or attributes\ncommon to all objects without exception. It is the universal objective\nminimum--the least objective experience consistent with the experience\nbeing objective. Some have attempted to define this general idea more\nprecisely by identifying it with some _abstract_ property such as\nextension, resistance, etc. An object may be material without offering\nany resistance to human energy, as a beam of light. A material object\nmay also be without extension, as a sound or smell. The only quality\nleft to matter is bare objectivity, namely, that it is a form of\nconsciousness excited in a mind by some other mind, not occurring\nspontaneously. This seems to me the only true connotation of matter.\n\nMatter is not the antithesis of mind; it is a mere affection of mind.\nThe two are not in any proper sense co-ordinate or equipollent. They\nare to each other somewhat in the relation of a mirror to an\nimage reflected from it. Mind is to each of us a concrete primary\nexperience--the feeling of personal power and identity. Matter is a\ngeneral idea arising from the comparison of objects in consciousness.\nNo two things could well be more diverse.\n\nSince general ideas are products of our own mental energy, and matter\nthe most general of all, it is the farthest removed from the concrete\nobjective condition, and so it is literally true that we never\nobjectively perceive matter though we constantly perceive material\nobjects. It is as impossible to see, touch, or taste matter as it\nis to ride the general idea _Equus_ or dine off the general idea\n_nourishment_. In denying the objectivity of matter we do not deny the\nobjective reality of things: we merely decline to confound a general\nidea with the objects that have contributed to form it. We decline to\nbe _mystics_, in the sense defined by J. S. Mill[10]. The belief in\nthe external existence of matter is a form of mysticism; the Hindus\ncall it _maya_, meaning illusion.\n\nSome metaphysicians argue that since phenomena appear only in\nconjunction, we are compelled by the constitution of our nature\nto think of them conjoined in and by something, and this imaginary\nfoundation and cement is another meaning of the word 'matter.'\n\nFor myself I feel no such compulsion. When things are complex I\nrecollect the several properties as cohering together, and when I\nabstract one or some for special consideration, I sometimes think of\nthe others as forming a 'substance' in which the abstracted properties\ninhere. But I cannot discover any inherence or coherence except the\nmutual, and the notion of an invisible material setting which\nholds all the parts of a thing together seems to me superfluous\nand unwarranted. If it existed it would not be, as logicians argue,\nsomething superior and antithetical to phenomena; it would be simply\nan inferred or latent phenomenon like the luminiferous ether of\nscience. The material substance is evidently a groping of the mind\nafter the noumenal (mental) substance which causes the appearance of\nobjects.\n\n\nXIV--NOMINALISM\n\nNominalists deny the existence of general ideas as distinct from\nparticular ideas. Most of them affirm that we employ general or common\nwords to signify the common properties of similar things, but that we\nare incapable of thinking of these common properties apart from the\nother properties that accompany them.\n\nWhy we should wish to use signs of things we cannot think about,\nor how a word can be a 'sign' when we are incapable of attaching a\ndefinite meaning to it, are points not satisfactorily cleared up by\nnominalists.\n\nConsidering how well Berkeley's principle, combined with the plasmic\ntheory, accounts for generalisation, and how inevitable it is that\nthere should be general ideas distinguishable from particular ideas\nby superior brilliancy and endurance, it is surprising to find in\nBerkeley one of the most convinced and eloquent of nominalists. His\nviews on the subject have so much weight with philosophers that I must\nexamine them at length.\n\n    'It is agreed on all hands,' he writes in the Introduction to\n    his _Principles_, 'that the qualities or modes of things do\n    never really exist each of them apart by itself, and separated\n    from all others, but are mixed, as it were, and blended\n    together, several in the same object. But, we are told, the\n    mind being able to consider each quality singly, or abstracted\n    from those other qualities with which it is united, does by\n    that means frame to itself abstract ideas. For example, there\n    is perceived by sight an object extended, coloured, and moved:\n    this mixed or compound idea the mind resolving into its simple\n    constituent parts, and viewing each by itself, exclusive of\n    the rest, does frame the abstract ideas of extension, colour,\n    and motion. Not that it is possible for colour or motion to\n    exist without extension; but only that the mind can frame\n    to itself by _abstraction_ the idea of colour exclusive\n    of extension, and of motion exclusive of both colour and\n    extension.'\n\nAbstract ideas do not form a fourth class of ideas but are fractions\nof particular, general, or imaginary ideas, and may (as Berkeley,\nreporting the metaphysical doctrine, says) be single or partial\nproperties mentally detached from the collective properties forming an\nobject. In this case they are abstracted properties, not ideas. Since\ngeneral ideas are less complete than the particular ideas from which\nthey were drawn, they are abstract ideas in so far as they are partial\nideas; but all abstract ideas are not general ideas. Berkeley's\nnominalism is based on the supposed impossibility of forming any sort\nof partial idea, and he now proceeds to reproduce the metaphysical\naccount of the general abstract idea.\n\n    'And as the mind frames to itself abstract ideas of qualities\n    or modes, so does it, by the same precision or mental\n    separation, attain abstract ideas [general ideas] of the more\n    compounded beings which include several co-existent qualities.\n    For example, the mind having observed that Peter, James, and\n    John resemble each other in certain common agreements of shape\n    and other qualities, leaves out of the complex or compounded\n    idea it has of Peter, James, and any other particular man,\n    that which is peculiar to each, retaining only what is common\n    to all, and so makes an abstract [general] idea wherein all\n    the particulars equally partake--abstracting entirely from and\n    cutting off those circumstances and differences which might\n    determine it to any particular existence. And after this\n    manner it is said we come by the abstract [general] idea of\n    man, or, if you please, humanity or human nature; wherein it\n    is true there is included colour, because there is no man but\n    has some colour, but then it can be neither white, nor black,\n    nor any particular colour, because there is no one particular\n    colour wherein all men partake. So likewise there is included\n    stature, but then it is neither tall stature, nor low stature,\n    nor yet middle stature, but something abstracted from all\n    these. And so of the rest. Moreover, there being a great\n    variety of other creatures that partake of some parts, but not\n    all, of the complex idea of man, the mind, leaving out those\n    parts which are peculiar to men, and retaining those only\n    which are common to all the living creatures, frames the idea\n    of _animal_, which abstracts not only from all particular\n    men, but also all birds, beasts, fishes and insects. The\n    constituent parts of the abstract idea of animal are body,\n    life, sense, and spontaneous motion. By _body_ is meant body\n    without any particular shape or figure, there being no one\n    shape or figure common to all animals, without covering either\n    of hair, or feathers, or scales, &c., nor yet naked: hair,\n    feathers, scales, and nakedness being the distinguishing\n    properties of particular animals, and for that reason left out\n    of the _abstract_ [general] _idea_. Upon the same account the\n    spontaneous motion must be neither walking, nor flying, nor\n    creeping; it is nevertheless a motion, but what that motion is\n    it is not easy to conceive.'\n\nThis is a fair paraphrase of the accounts given by metaphysicians of\nthe manner of forming general ideas. It is also in itself a perfectly\ncorrect account of the process, considered simply as a manifestation\nof consciousness or a succession of states of consciousness, that is,\napart from the substantial plasmic operation of which it is merely the\nsymptom. Berkeley however denies that it is a true statement of what\ntakes place in the mind of consciousness.\n\n    'Whether others have this wonderful faculty of abstracting\n    their ideas, they best can tell; for myself, I find indeed\n    I have a faculty of imagining or representing to myself, the\n    ideas of those particular things I have perceived, and of\n    variously compounding and dividing them. I can imagine a man\n    with two heads, or the upper parts of a man joined to the body\n    of a horse. I can consider the hand, the eye, the nose each by\n    itself abstracted or separated from the rest of the body.\n    But then, whatever hand or eye I imagine, it must have some\n    particular shape or colour. Likewise the idea of man that I\n    frame to myself must be either of a white, or a black, or\n    a tawny, a straight, or a crooked, a tall, or a low, or a\n    middle-sized man. I cannot by any effort of thought conceive\n    the abstract idea above described. And it is equally\n    impossible for me to form the abstract idea of motion distinct\n    from the body moving, and which is neither swift nor slow,\n    curvilinear nor rectilinear; and the like may be said of all\n    other abstract general ideas whatsoever. To be plain, I own\n    myself able to abstract in one sense, as when I consider\n    some particular parts or qualities separated from others,\n    and which, though they are united in some object, yet it is\n    possible they may really exist without them. But I deny that\n    I can abstract from one another, or conceive separately, those\n    qualities which it is impossible should exist so separated;\n    or that I can form a general notion, by abstracting from\n    particulars in the manner aforesaid--which last are the two\n    proper acceptations of _abstraction_. And there is ground to\n    think most men will acknowledge themselves to be in my case.\n    The generality of men which are simple and illiterate never\n    pretend to _abstract notions_ [general ideas]. It is said they\n    are difficult and not to be attained without pains and study;\n    we may therefore reasonably conclude that, if such there be,\n    they are confined only to the learned.'\n\nIt is quite true that 'the simple and illiterate never _pretend_ to\nabstract notions,' for the sufficient reason that they do not know\nthe names of their mental operations, even if they are capable of\ndiscriminating them. For the same reason they do not pretend to talk\nprose or to be realists.\n\nThe practice of every profession and craft, even the humblest,\ninvolves abstraction and generalisation. The objective properties\nassociated with a given utility have to be abstracted from those which\nare indifferent, and this is what enables men of experience in\nany branch of industry or art to form a speedy judgment on matters\ntouching their special affairs. It is in part what distinguishes the\n'professional' from the 'amateur.'\n\nBerkeley's disclaimer of any power in himself to form general ideas\nis no doubt sincere, and he is justified in reasoning from himself to\nothers. But the point at issue is, whether Berkeley in this instance\ncorrectly analysed his own mental processes. The fact that he was\ncorrect in some points of great importance does not preclude us from\nsurmising that he may have been wrong in others of less importance.\nIn comparison with his discovery of the substantiality of mind, his\noversight on the subject of abstraction is a bagatelle.\n\nHe explains the existence of general words on the theory that they are\nnames of particular ideas which we use to represent all similar ideas.\n\n    '... an idea which, considered in itself, is particular,\n    becomes general by being made to represent or stand for all\n    other particular ideas of the same sort. To make this plain by\n    an example, suppose a geometrician is demonstrating the method\n    of cutting a line in two equal parts. He draws, for instance,\n    a black line of one inch in length: this, which in itself is\n    a particular line, is nevertheless with regard to its\n    signification general, since, as it is there used, it\n    represents all particular lines whatsoever; so that what is\n    demonstrated of it is demonstrated of all lines, or, in other\n    words, of a line in general. And, as _that particular line_\n    becomes general by being made a sign, so the _name_ \"line,\"\n    which taken absolutely is particular, by being a sign is made\n    general. And as the former owes its generality not to its\n    being the sign of an abstract or general line, but of all\n    particular right lines that may possibly exist, so the latter\n    must be thought to derive its generality from the same cause,\n    namely, the various particular lines which it indifferently\n    denotes.'\n\nThese extracts will suffice to show what was Berkeley's doctrine on\nthe subject of general ideas.\n\nWith respect to the analogy supposed to exist between the generality\nof a name and the generality of a general idea, it has to be observed\nthat a name owes its generality solely to its being the sign of a\ngeneral idea. It is an imputed or conventional generality,--in its\nproper character a general name is concrete and individual. Also it\ndoes not resemble the thing it signifies (the general idea), nor the\nconcrete things from which that has been derived.\n\nThe generality of a general idea, on the other hand, depends\naltogether on its _resemblance_ to many particular things. It is\nindependent of convention. Hence there is no real analogy between the\ntwo generalities.\n\nConsidering that Berkeley professes himself unable to imagine abstract\nproperties, it is surprising how easily and naturally he writes about\ngeometrical lines--which are abstract properties. Probably he means\nconcrete _strokes_.\n\nWhat sort of representation can subsist between one concrete stroke\nand every other concrete stroke? If it is straight it will not\ncorrectly represent a curve; if it is curved it will not represent\na straight stroke. A stroke an inch long cannot stand for a stroke a\nhundred miles long; a black stroke does not properly represent a red\nstroke. So it is incorrect to say that 'what is demonstrated of _it_\nis demonstrated of all strokes, or, in other words, of a stroke\nin general.' A particular object can stand only for itself, and\nif general words stand for many things it is not by direct\nrepresentation, but because they first suggest general ideas, which\nare the true substitutes of many particular things.\n\nA reference to geometrical objects, themselves so abstract, is a\ndoubtful mode of showing how well one concrete thing can represent\nothers. Had Berkeley taken a more complex object as his general\nrepresentative he would have seen the weakness of his argument.\nSuppose a biologist has to discourse on a province of animal life\ncomprising many species, and takes an individual of one species as a\nrepresentative of the whole. His sample is perhaps a hare, but he\nhas to treat of birds and fishes. What is to prevent his hearers from\nconcluding that birds are furred animals and fishes quadrupeds? Are\nthey to be expected to see in the hare only the properties common to\nall the animals reviewed? If so they have the power denied them\nby nominalists of forming a pure general idea, and the hare is\nsuperfluous. The common properties could have been defined and\nimagined without a concrete specimen, with irrelevant attributes,\nbeing brought into the discourse.\n\n\nAll nominalists insist that if we think long on a general idea it\nbecomes particular, and from this they argue that it is not, and never\nhas been, a general idea[11].\n\nThe experiments of this sort proposed by logicians are misleading,\nbecause we are without the ordinary motives for thinking generally.\nIn practical thought we have some sufficient reason for attending to\na fraction of consciousness and excluding the rest, and the irrelevant\nqualities are distinctly less charged with attention than the\nprincipal quality.\n\nThe power of abstracting thought is a matter of education. It is that\nruling of the spirit which is more difficult than the capture of a\ncity. We have to master the restless energic Self and fix it down on a\nparticular plasmic figure, or a mere point or edge of one, preventing\nthe energy from spreading to adjacent images. That is irksome and\nfatiguing, but it is only a high degree of the faculty everyone\npossesses of distinguishing particular objects from each other. Some\nminds are so flaccid that you cannot hold them to one subject, even\nthe most particular and obvious, for five minutes at a time. Training\nenables us to bring into the focus of attention just what we wish to\nobserve or think about, and leave the rest in the background, however\nclosely it may be connected with the matter that immediately interests\nus. But for this power much of our energy would be expended to no\npurpose. Abstraction is simply attention of a minute and concentrated\nkind--a bringing of our energy of observation or recollection to a\nfine point.\n\nWhen abstraction need not be prolonged--when we are free to pass\nrapidly from one general or abstract idea to another--there is no\ndifficulty in partial thinking. We skim over the plasmic imprints,\nlightly brushing the surface of each where it is most prominent and\ntherefore most general, but not pausing to recollect particulars. It\nis this rapid delicate touch we oftenest use in actual thought; but\nwhen for purposes of experiment we come down heavily on an imprint,\nthen the Self overflows to adjacent channels and particular memories\nare stirred up, in spite of every effort to limit our attention.\n\nSo common and easy is rapid general thought that it is constantly\nused as a substitute for concrete thought, when a sketchy treatment of\nthings is all that is wanted.\n\n'A bird has alighted on the fence.' The speaker saw a particular\nconcrete bird, and might have tried to describe it in the concrete.\nBut the attributes that rendered it concrete are supposed not to be\nof present importance, and the hearer is consequently invited to think\nonly of bird in general. Would a nominalist affirm that in such a case\nthe words are meaningless unless the idea is concreted--unless the\ngeneral sketch is filled out in detail?\n\nTake another example. 'The man sat by the window overlooking the river\nthat flowed towards the city.'\n\nHere all the nouns are general, but the picture is individual and\nconcrete. It is also quite intelligible, as a sketch. We can think of\na man without assigning to him any particular type of face, or colour\nof hair, or stature, or age, or clothing. Our idea is the general idea\n_man_ used as a sketch of a particular man. He is in a house because\nhe is looking through a window, but we do not stay to imagine the\nhouse as cottage, inn, or mansion. We call up the general idea\n_house_, which is definite enough for our purpose, and we cannot doubt\nfor a moment that we have such a general idea. The river may be wide\nor narrow, straight or crooked, navigable or not, but we think only\nof the general idea _river_, which is water flowing between banks. And\nsurely we can imagine a general _city_ without giving it any definite\nsize, or form, or nationality, or number of inhabitants!\n\n\nThese considerations clearly demonstrate that we have general ideas,\nwhich are not merely concrete ideas used as examples, and if we can\nemploy them in the manner just indicated, where a light superficial\nrecollection is all that is necessary, we can equally well use them\nin their more legitimate character, as signs of certain general\nutilities.\n\n\nXV--ERRORS WITH RESPECT TO GENERALISATION\n\nGeneralisation has been the bane of European philosophy. It has\nmonopolised well-nigh the whole metaphysical attention. It has been\nconsidered the radical fact of mind from which all others have grown,\nwhereas it is no more than a method for abbreviating recollection.\nIt neither reveals to us new things, nor reduces the multiplicity of\nthings actually existing.\n\nPlato insisted on the importance of general thought as against the\nfluctional idealism of Heraclitus, but he was wholly mistaken as\nto the nature of general ideas. He thought they were external\nobjects--also types and causes of primary objects. But patterns are\nnot causes, and general ideas are quite obviously suggested by things,\nnot things derived from general ideas. The notion that the general\nidea is either the cause, or an image and revelation of the cause, of\nthings is an error of perennial recurrence. In some form or other it\nis always with us.\n\nPlato also taught that general ideas are recollections of knowledge\nacquired in the condition prior to embodiment, which the objective\nexperience of this life serves to revive. These several doctrines are\nsomewhat inconsistent with each other. The last is interesting but\nlacks confirmation.\n\nAristotle admitted the superiority of general over particular ideas,\nand thought that the former corresponded to some specially important\npart of objects called the 'essence.'\n\nThis is nearer the truth. The essence of an object is that part of\nit, which being present, a given sentimental result follows, or may be\nexpected to follow, or may be made to follow. A certain experience of\nthings is necessary before we can know what is the objective minimum\nconsistent with some sentimental utility. If things are classified\nwith due regard to their utilities, the essence will be the same as\nthe general idea. It is however not true that the essence or any other\npart of the object causes the sentimental effect (VII).\n\n\nA common form of the generalistic superstition is to suppose that a\nthing is explained or sufficiently accounted for by classifying it.\n\nIn all philosophies of Greek derivation--the Asiatic seem to be free\nfrom this defect--reason is considered to be 'the bringing of a thing\nunder a class-notion,' and when this is done we are supposed to know\nthe thing completely. An elaborate and utterly false dialectic has\nbeen erected on this foundation.\n\nNo doubt our first attempt at explaining a thing is to refer it to a\ngeneral idea--to classify it. This usually suggests something to add\nto the bare phenomenon by way of explanation or hypothesis. But only\nif we have a prior knowledge of the general idea, derived from things\nbetter known than the present phenomenon. The general idea is simply\na short formula of that prior knowledge. Suppose we thoroughly know\na body of similar things _a_, _b_, _c_, and also reduce them to the\ngeneral image X; then on seeing _d_ and noticing that it is like\n_a_, _b_, _c_, we briefly think, 'Oh, it is X,' which excuses us from\nstudying it further. We at once transfer to _d_ our whole knowledge\nof _a_, _b_, _c_, and in this ideal transfer the explanation\nconsists--not in the classification. The transfer is often tacit--if\nexplicit it is an 'argument.'\n\nIf there has been no better known _a_, _b_, _c_, it is evident that\nthe mere generalisation of new facts _d_, _e_, _f_, will not add\nanything to our knowledge of _them_. In deduction we should only\nreturn to them the knowledge just extracted from them. We should be\nexplaining things by themselves--reasoning in a circle[12].\n\nThe _unity_, which explains is not the general idea. It is a unity of\nfunction or service, and may include things utterly heterogeneous, and\ntherefore incapable of being reduced to a common idea. The pen in my\nhand consists of wood and metal; if I generalise them into Matter--the\nnearest class that includes both--I do not thereby explain the pen.\nBut it is explained by the unity of service: the wood and metal\ncontribute to form one instrument for writing.\n\n\nThe best results of modern science are discoveries of utilities\n(inventions); discoveries of the relations of sequence among objects,\nwhich enable us to predict their arrival years in advance; of\ncoexistences on the great cosmic scale (geographical and stellar\nexploration); of co-inherence of properties in individual objects\n(chemistry). Yet science is still too generalistic. It runs too much\nto classification and nomenclature, which is nothing but _memoria\ntechnica_. Modern biology presents a curious return of Platonism. The\ngeneral idea is not indeed put forward as the cause of individuals,\nbut a particular concrete animal is found who closely resembles the\ngeneral idea, and it is imagined that an animal like him was the\noriginal cause of all animals of his species. When it happens--as\nit occasionally must in a thorough-going system of phenomenal\nclassification--that the average or general idea falls between two\nspecies, no individual can be found to represent it with the desired\nexactness. In this case it is supposed by evolutionists that the\nintermediate animal has existed but is now extinct. These are the\n'missing links' so badly wanted to complete the evolutionary scheme.\n\n\n    [Footnote 10: 'Mysticism is neither more nor less than\n    ascribing objective existence to the subjective creations\n    of our own faculties, to ideas or feelings of the\n    mind.'--_Logic_, chapter on 'Fallacies.']\n\n    [Footnote 11: With equal plausibility it might be argued that\n    we have no particular ideas, because it is difficult if not\n    impossible to observe and remember all the details of any\n    object. Our most particular ideas are slightly abstract,\n    and in the process of forgetting they become more and more\n    abstract, until they disappear altogether.]\n\n    [Footnote 12: Mill's nominalistic tendencies led him to the\n    same conclusion: 'Our general ideas contain nothing but what\n    has been put into them, either by our passive experience, or\n    by our active habits of thought; and the metaphysicians in all\n    ages, who have attempted to construct the laws of the universe\n    by reasoning from our supposed necessities of thought, have\n    always proceeded, and only could proceed, by laboriously\n    finding in their own minds what they themselves had formerly\n    put there, and evolving from their ideas of things what they\n    had first involved in those ideas.'--_Logic_, Bk. V. c. 3. \u00a7\n    3.]\n\n\n\n\nIMAGINATION\n\n\nXVI\n\nThis faculty or habit consists essentially in combining ideas\n(particular or general), or objects and ideas, so as to form systems\ndifferent from those occurring in actual experience. The whole has\nnever been perceived, though all its elements have been perceived.\n\nAny association of ideas may be called imaginary if it occurs in an\norder different from the order of experience. But the term Imagination\nis properly confined to novel combinations deliberately and\nconsciously formed to serve some utility. It is thus distinguished\nfrom Reverie, in which no choice or control enters into the\nrecollection.\n\nWe control our ideal associations by means of comparison, which is\ntherefore what distinguishes imagination from reverie. For instance,\nif I see a vase from which the handle has been broken off, I can\nimagine the handle restored, but to do this I must be able to compare\nthe broken vase with a similar whole vase, or with the general idea\n'whole vase.' The combination I form is novel, for I have never\nseen this particular vase in a whole state; if I had I should not be\nimagining it but recollecting it.\n\n\nThere are two principal distinctions to be noticed in imagination; one\nrelates to the mode of forming the imaginary idea, the other to its\nuse.\n\nIn the above case we form the whole by mechanical extension or\naddition. The process is as simple as nailing one piece of wood to\nanother. But suppose the broken vase is of porcelain and the whole one\nof bronze, the restoration can still be made, but it is no mechanical\njunction of two previous ideas. It is a fusion of the material\nsupplied by one idea with a form supplied by another. On the same\nprinciple a vase may be wholly designed from hints supplied by a score\nor more of vases, differing in material, in size, colour, decoration,\nand so forth. In these cases the new idea may be said to be totally\ndifferent throughout its length from any other and from any object.\nYet it is a combination of previous ideas. We do not create any\nabsolutely new idea. This may be called imagination by _transfusion_.\nThe elements may be so well mixed that it is impossible to trace each\nback to its origin.\n\nTransfusion may be further complicated by recompounding ideas already\ncompound. This occurs, as we shall see, in forming the 'external\nworld' of materialists and realists.\n\n\nThe two uses to which imaginary ideas are put are the Artistic and the\nRational.\n\nWe have seen (X) that emotions may be excited by objects or ideas.\nHence, agreeable emotions may be excited by suggesting the objects\nassociated with the original agreeable feelings; and novel emotions\nmay be excited by novel combinations of the ideas of experienced\nobjects that have been signs of feelings. From this possibility has\narisen that extensive province of activity called ART, which consists\nin imagining novel combinations of things capable of exciting novel\nand pleasurable emotions (not feelings), and in finding means of\nsuggesting such ideas to others. Some of these combinations are so\nsubtle, and the emotions they excite so exquisite, that we value the\nartistic work at a great price, and rank the man who imagined it among\nthe benefactors of his species.\n\nREASON, or the Rational Imagination, does not appeal directly to the\nemotions. It serves the uses of life by enabling us to imagine what we\nhave not yet experienced but may have to experience, and the quality\naimed at is accuracy of intellectual ideation, not emotional pleasure.\nIt is found by experience that an intellect well furnished with ideas\nmay learn to combine them into pictures or preconceptions of the\nfuture, and the indirect utility of this accomplishment is very great.\nIf it does not, like art, give immediate sentimental pleasure,\nit often enables us so to control events that we are brought into\nconditions affording more lasting satisfaction than many expensive\nworks of art. Reason, then, is the imaginative faculty applied to the\npurpose of acquiring ideas of experience that has not yet taken place,\nand it is good in proportion to the similarity of the idea to the\nanticipated or unknown experience.\n\nAlthough imagination is more important than generalisation, it has\nreceived little attention from metaphysicians. Their treatment of it\nis not uniform, but it generally exhibits two fundamental defects.\nThey consider it an independent or ultimate faculty, that is, one\nincapable of resolution into anything more simple. We have seen that\nit is an application of comparison, and comparison depends on the\ncoincidence of particular ideas.\n\nThen they regard imagination only in its artistic uses, not\nperceiving that it is also the basis of reason. Reason they treat\nas generalisation--a vice that pervades all their systems. They put\nreason and art in essential opposition, whereas the difference between\nthem is only specific--a difference of use.\n\nSome metaphysicians confound imagination with mere recollection. 'It\nis,' says one of them, 'the faculty representative of the phenomena\nboth of the external and internal worlds.' But there is a great\ndifference between the representation of what we have experienced\nactually, and the representation of a future and perhaps impossible\nevent: the latter only is imaginative. 'There is no train of ideas,'\nsays another, 'to which the term imagination may not be applied.' If a\nman at the end of the day calls to mind all the events of the day in\na train of ideas, that is recollection, and would be very\ninappropriately termed imagination. According to a third, imagination\nhas for its object the concrete as opposed to abstractions and\ngeneralities. This also is inexact. A traveller may describe in\ngeneral the qualities of a foreign country or tribe of men, and we\nshall imagine that generality without a concrete picture. The power of\nimagining generalities and abstractions necessarily follows from the\npower of forming them in the first instance.\n\n\n\n\nDIALECTIC\n\n\nXVII--ITS SCOPE\n\nThe derivation of Reason as given in the preceding sections may be\nsummed up thus:--the meeting of Minds gives Perception or primary\nexperience; Attention selects therefrom objects of special interest\nto the observer; Memory retains impressions of these in the mental\nplasma, by which ideas of them are recollected though the originating\nmind be not present; community with divergence of imprint gives rise\nto Comparison; from this are derived Imagination and Generalisation;\nfrom imagination emerge Reason and Art.\n\nGeneralisation is thus only a collateral relation of reason, not\nits immediate parent nor in the direct line of descent. It is not\nessential to reason, but may enter as a subsidiary process into an\nargument. If the things we argue about are numerous it will be more\ncorrect to generalise them and then argue from the general idea,\nthan to argue from one concrete object to another. But innumerable\ninferences are drawn from one particular thing to another, and these\ninvolve no generalisation.\n\nReason is chiefly the art of predicting by means of the intellect what\nwill occur to us in the future. Its use is to enable us to prepare\nfor future events in so far as our resources permit. We never predict\nquite accurately, but general preconceptions are better than none\nat all. The same process by which we preconceive the future can be\napplied to the conception of what is actually taking place but not\nwithin our ken--as at the antipodes--and can be applied also to events\nthat took place in the past and will never be experienced by us. It\nmight be objected that as regards the past we can have no motive in\nimagining it, seeing we can never experience it. But a conception of\nthe past is often a necessary condition of our conceiving the future,\nand is artistically interesting. It awakens pleasing emotions to be\nable to picture to ourselves, even imperfectly, states of the world\nand of society that have long been obsolete.\n\nAn investigation of the manner in which reason supplies us with ideas\nof the unknown, involves the consideration and arrangement of so\nmany details that it may be regarded as a small science in\nitself--DIALECTIC.\n\nA dialectician (logician in the narrower sense) is neither a\ngrammarian nor an encyclopedia of the best information on every\nsubject. His office consists in deciding whether certain theorems\nare arguments or not. An ARGUMENT is an act or product of rational\nimagination. Theorems which purport to be arguments, but are not, are\nFALLACIES.\n\nA fallacy is not merely a _bad_ argument--it is no argument at all.\nQuite apart from fallacy there is a goodness and badness in arguments,\nbut with this discrimination the dialectician (as such) has nothing\nto do. Only persons experienced in the matter are competent to decide\nbetween good and bad arguments. Hence when the quality of an argument\nis in question the dialectician takes no part in the debate: he is\nneither combatant nor umpire. He is at most an impartial president\nwhose chief duty is to see that people do not debate about mere words\nand foregone conclusions. Granting that a theorem has the qualities\nof an argument, the dialectician is not competent to say that it is\nimproper or too trivial to be discussed. He is not a judge of what\npeople ought to be interested in.\n\nFrom his better knowledge of what constitutes rational prediction, a\ndialectician may offer his services to disentangle and render explicit\ninvolved and partial arguments. Many people reason well who are yet\nunable to express themselves coherently. A dialectician should be able\nto reconstruct an argument from the slightest hint, as a naturalist\nimagines an animal from a single bone. In ordinary reasoning the\narguments are seldom fully expressed, and the reasoners themselves are\nnot always quite conscious of the premises from which they argue. All\nsuch suppressed and overlooked assumptions should be brought to light\nby dialectic, the aim of which is to render reason as self-conscious\nas possible.\n\nThough a dialectician need not be an expert in any department of\nknowledge, he must know the facts on which an argument is built,\notherwise he may be deceived by equivocal language. Reverting to the\ninstance of the vase--the dialectician must have seen both the whole\nvase and the broken vase, but he need not have any opinion as to\nwhether the proposed handle is the most suitable, or not. That must\nbe left to those who are familiar with vases and who are interested in\nthe restoration of the one in question.\n\nThe definition here given of the scope and office of dialectic may\nappear to some too modest. But in reality there is a great deal\ninvolved in it. Philosophers have been discussing Reason for twenty\ncenturies or more, and have not produced a satisfactory definition\nof it. Consequently they cannot decide with any confidence whether a\ntheorem is an argument or a fallacy. The cleverest of them give\ntheir sanction to theorems that are demonstrably fallacies. They are\nevidently judging more by ear than by rule. All this causes confusion\nof mind and waste of energy.\n\nDialectic takes its general idea of reason from the higher analysis\nof logic, and brings the general idea to bear on concrete arguments.\nA dialectician makes a collection of theorems for study just as\na botanist makes a collection of plants. He sorts them out into\nconvenient classes, separates the valid or useful from the erroneous\nand misleading, studies the relation of language to argument and the\ninfluence for good or ill that words have upon rational thought.\n\nFrom the example of the vase cited above it will be seen that in\nevery act of reason two principal things are requisite. There must\nbe something wholly known (or comparatively well known) and something\nless well known, and the reasoning or argument consists in ideally\ncompleting the latter on the model of the former. If we would predict\nthe coming of a future season of the year we must have a picture in\nthe mind of all the seasons in the order in which they occur. If we\nwould go straight to a place on the surface of the earth we must have\na plan of the way in our imagination. If we would predict the effect\nof a drug on an animal body we must have previously noticed the effect\nit has produced--and so on. Neither the mind nor intellect supplies\nspontaneously any of these models; they are all formed out of actual\nexperience remembered and recollected. When they have been refined\ninto extremely general ideas they are apt to be taken for innate\ntendencies of the intellect, as Kant erroneously thought. They are not\nso; all we know of the intellect is consistent with the belief that\nit begins with pure plasm without a trace of idea, and is absolutely\nindifferent to the imprints it may receive. Doctrines of innate\nideas--innate forms of thought or categories--innate 'principles' of\nvarious kinds--are devices of metaphysicians to cover the weakness of\ntheir theories.\n\nThe two main parts of an argument divide naturally into four\nsubdivisions. There is the thing argued about (corresponding to the\nbroken vase); there is the ideal extension or restoration; in the\nmodel we reason from there are the parts corresponding to each of\nthese. I propose to take terms for these four parts from one of the\nmost important, formal and correct modes of reasoning--the application\nof a precedent or statute to a case in Law.\n\n\nXVIII--THE RATIONAL PARALLEL\n\nEvery argument, whatever be the matter of it, consists in bringing\na _Case_ under a _Precedent_, and applying to the case ideally the\nbetter knowledge possessed of the precedent. The _Conclusion_ (also\ncalled Inference or Deduction) is the result of this application, and\nis always an addition to our stock of ideas.\n\nA conclusion has never the same reality as actual experience. It is\nnot 'true' in that sense, though it may be 'morally' true, that is,\nwe are ready to act upon it without hesitation--to stake our life or\nfortune on it. As regards actual or experienced fact there can be no\nargument, since it is useless to 'predict' what we already know.\n\nAcademical logicians have a doctrine the reverse of this. They assert\nthat their syllogisms yield conclusions that are always as certain as\nthe premises. Grant their premises and you are obliged to accept their\nconclusions. This is so, because a regular syllogistic conclusion is\nsimply a restating in other words of the information, or part of the\ninformation, already contained in the premises. If the syllogism has\nany use at all, it is merely as an aid to recollection; no new idea\nis generated by it. It is needless to insist on a fact so notorious as\nthat ordinary rational conclusions--those that form the staple of our\ndaily thought--are not by any means so certain as the data from which\nthey are drawn. For example, the sky is red and lowering this evening,\nand we conclude therefrom that the weather will be bad to-morrow.\nThere is no doubt about the present aspect of the sky, but much doubt\nabout the inference.\n\nThe form of an act of reasoning or argumentation may be rendered\nplainer by a diagram.\n\n    S   A\n   --- ---\n    C  _I_\n   --- ---\n\nS A represents the precedent. S is the Subject or body of the\nprecedent; A (the _Applicate_) is one property, or a part, or a\nrelation of S abstracted from the rest to illustrate a case. C is the\ncase; _I_ is the conclusion (or inference). _I_ results from imagining\nC to be associated with a property or relation similar to A. The sum\nof our _I_'s constitutes what we know of the world and man before\nwe were born, of what is taking place in other parts of the world or\nuniverse, of what may take place in the future, and of the concealed\nand inaccessible parts of present objects. This is true not only\nof the results of our own reasoning but of what we have learned as\nverified knowledge from others, for the interpretation of language is,\nin the last analysis, a rational conclusion.\n\nAll the parts of an argument exist in the mind, but they are not\nalways expressed in language. When treated dialectically the implicit\nmembers are expressed, and the terms arranged so as to show as clearly\nas possible the nature of the argument. The following are the\npoints most necessary to be observed in constructing or analysing an\nargument.\n\n\n(1) C must resemble S, for that is the basis of the argument. If C\nis not felt to be like S, or (as sometimes happens) is explicitly\ndeclared to be unlike S, there can be no conclusion. The precedent is\nnot applicable to the case. A may, or may not, be associated with S;\nthat is to say, a verbal negation may appear in the statement of the\nrelation of S to A, but there must be no negation with respect to the\nrelation of C to S.\n\nThe resemblance of C to S may, however, vary in degree from the\nfaintest analogy to community of species. The difference between them\nmay far outweigh their resemblance. There may even be no material\nlikeness, but only a similarity of function, or position, or of any\nthe most trivial attribute. Only it is to be observed that the kind\nand degree of resemblance between S and C determine the kind\nand degree of resemblance between A and _I_. We must not infer\nspecifically unless the case is specifically like the precedent.\nIn all other instances we can only infer proportionally or by\ntransfusion.\n\n\n(2) None of the antecedents must be a verbal or identical proposition,\nthat is, a proposition which merely substitutes one name or nominal\nphrase for another; nor must the case be merely the precedent\nexpressed in other words, or the precedent a paraphrase of the case.\nIn any of these circumstances one of the elements of the argument is\nwanting; we have two names for one thing or two propositions giving\nthe same information.\n\n\n(3) The precedent may (as has been already remarked) be a general\nidea, or may be an individual idea or object. If S A has occurred\nfrequently it is certain to be generalised, and so may form a maxim,\na law, a rule, an induction, &c. But one well-observed precedent is\nenough to suggest a conclusion, if there has been no experience to the\ncontrary. There is therefore no dialectical difference between arguing\nfrom a general idea (class notion) to an individual or subordinate\nidea, and arguing from one individual to another. Comparison and\ninference occur in both.\n\n\n(4) After separating A from S care should be taken that it is A and\nnot S that is used to generate _I_. Examples are plentiful of theorems\nin which S and A change parts, which invalidates the conclusion. Other\nerrors in stating theorems intended to be arguments will be noticed\nunder the head of 'Fallacies.'\n\nThe following is an argument conformable to the above rules.\n\n  Tyrants             | deserve death\n  --------------------+-----------------------------\n  Caesar was a tyrant | _no doubt he deserved death_\n\nThis square mode of stating the argument is adapted from the general\ntype, and brings out the mutual relations of the compared parts better\nthan the three-lined arrangement. The word 'therefore,' which usually\nintroduces a logical conclusion, is ambiguous. It may mean that the\nantecedents are the causes of the fact mentioned in the conclusion,\nor merely that the antecedents are the reasons why we believe the\nconclusion. The former is the scientific 'therefore,' the latter is\nthe purely dialectical. I shall generally omit the illative word, and\nprint conclusions in italics, besides entering them invariably in the\nfourth compartment of the parallel when this arrangement is adopted.\n\n\nAn idea once generated in the intellect is not to be erased at\npleasure. It can be obliterated only by the process of forgetting. If\nafter we have formed a dialectical conclusion we meet with evidence\nthat contradicts it, the only result of that evidence is to affix\na mark of falsity to the conclusion, so that as often as it is\nrecollected the stigma is recollected too, and neutralises the effect\nof the idea. A negative or destructive argument is thus, plasmically\nspeaking, a positive addition to the idea it seeks to efface. For the\ntime being it renders the idea more conspicuous, as the word CANCELLED\nstamped in large letters across a document makes it more evident than\nit was before; but no doubt the stigmatising of an idea hastens the\nprocess of oblivion, for we thenceforth bestow less attention upon it.\nStigmatic arguments are not another species, but merely the ordinary\nconstructive arguments used for a particular purpose.\n\nSuppose we have inferred from the general resemblance of the earth to\nthe moon that the latter is inhabited, we stigmatise this belief by\nsuch an argument as--\n\n  Without air                 | animals cannot live\n  ----------------------------+-----------------------------------\n  There is no air in the moon | _there can be no life in the moon_\n\nThere is an exception to the rule that argument is superfluous when\nthe speaker has already verified the conclusion. It is when he is\naddressing a person who has not had the same experience as himself and\nwho doubts his word. The speaker may then resort to arguments drawn\nfrom antecedents recognised by the hearer, if any such are applicable\nto the subject. But a fact may be truly reported though neither the\nwitness nor a sceptical hearer can find dialectical antecedents to\nprove it, for there may be no relation between the fact in question\nand any prior knowledge they possess, or they may not be able to find\nthe relation.\n\nThis brings us again to that view of the intellect which represents\nit as artificial and limited by experience. Man is rational only\non matters familiar to him; in utterly novel circumstances he is\nirrational, and must fall back for guidance on his general mental\nsentiment, or the advice of persons more experienced than himself.\n\n\nXIX--HYPOTHETICAL ARGUMENTS\n\nIt is allowable to imagine ourselves placed in circumstances not yet\nrealised, or in possession of information not yet acquired, and\nto anticipate or rehearse the reasoning we should employ under the\nsupposed conditions. Such arguments take in language a conditional or\nhypothetical phraseology.\n\nThe case may be entirely fictitious, but I cannot find a valid\ninstance of a whole precedent being fictitious. Its dubiety turns on\nour knowledge or ignorance of the applicate. Has a subject such or\nsuch an attribute? Then it may be applied to illustrate a certain\ncase. 'If it is true that Damon and Pythias are inseparable, _then\nPythias must be in town_, for I have just seen Damon.'\n\nIt is more often the case that is dubious. 'If Caius is a European _he\nis white_, for all Europeans are white.' 'If Damon is in town _Pythias\nis in town_, for they are inseparable.' 'If I were you _I should\ndefer the voyage to the summer season_, as I have always found winter\ntravelling disagreeable.' But the word 'if' does not always mark a\nhypothetical thought. In the proposition, 'if children are neglected\nthey will grow up ignorant,' we have a dogmatic or assertorial\njudgment--'neglected children grow up ignorant.' (Bain.)\n\nThe precedent may be suppressed in hypothetical as in dogmatic\nargument. 'If the crops are good, corn will be cheap' implies the\nunspoken precedent, 'good crops have been invariably followed by cheap\ncorn.' 'If logic is useless it deserves to be neglected,' carries the\nmind to the more general thesis, 'all useless studies deserve to be\nneglected.' 'If Great Britain should be invaded the volunteers will be\ncalled out,' rests on the precedent judgment, 'it is the duty of the\nvolunteer army to repel invaders.'\n\nArguments in which both applicate and case are hypothetical are so\nvery dubious that they cannot be considered of any practical use.\n'_If_ opium is poisonous, and _if_ this substance is opium, you will\nbe poisoned by taking this substance.'\n\nThe Aristotelian hypothetical is almost invariably a fallacy,\nsometimes on more than one account. It usually consists of--first, a\nconditional or doubtful statement; next, a solution of the doubt by\nmeans of positive information; finally and by way of inference the\nfirst statement is given without the doubt. Here is an example from\nJevons: 'If the barometer is falling, bad weather is coming; but the\nbarometer is falling; therefore bad weather is coming.'\n\nWhere did the information that the barometer is falling come from? If\nwe knew it before uttering the first proposition, we were affecting\nan ignorance that did not exist. The second proposition takes away all\noccasion for argument; it is an amendment of the first proposition,\nand what we get from the theorem as a whole is a _case_, followed by\na prediction for which there is no precedent justification. We are\narguing in a circle.\n\n'If Aristotle is right, slavery is a proper form of society; but\nslavery is not a proper form of society; therefore Aristotle is not\nright.' If we knew for certain (as the second proposition indicates)\nthat slavery is not a proper form of society, what is the use or\nmeaning of treating the question as hypothetical (as is done in\nthe first)? If we acquired the information after uttering the first\nproposition, there was no occasion to go on with the argument; we\nshould have said simply, 'Slavery is not a proper form of society,\nthough Aristotle said it was.' It is needless, except for verbal\ncompleteness, to say 'he was not right'--we have _logically_ said so.\n\nWhen two or more alternative data are presented, of which only one\nis valid or relevant to a proposed argument, but we know not at\nfirst which the valid datum is, we have the _dilemma_ (_trilemma_,\n_tetralemma_, &c.) of logicians. In such conditions we have a double\nprocess to go through; we must first settle by observation or by an\nauxiliary argument which of the alternative data to select, and then\nwork out the principal argument in the regular dogmatic form.\n\nSuppose we have to determine dialectically the specific gravity of a\npiece of metal, but do not know whether it is gold or gun-metal. It is\nevident we must first somehow make up our mind as to its identity, and\nthen proceed on the usual method of argumentation. The 'making up\nour mind' is probably itself an argument, and might be of this\ncharacter--'A piece of yellow metal stamped with what appears to be\na hall-mark, is more likely to be gold than gun-metal; this piece of\nmetal has traces of such a stamp; so I conclude _it is gold_.' Then\nwe proceed to the principal question--'The specific gravity of gold is\n19\u00b726; I have concluded that this object is gold; I conclude further\nthat _it has a specific gravity of_ 19\u00b726.'\n\nWe may work out all the alternative conclusions first and fix on a\ndatum afterwards, as in deciding how we shall invest our money. 'If\nI put my money in Consols I shall have a small return with good\nsecurity; if I buy Patagonian bonds I may have a large interest for a\ntime, but the security is bad.' The next thing to settle is whether\nin our experience or on accepted principles small profit with good\nsecurity is, or is not, to be preferred to large profit and bad\nsecurity: having decided in favour of the former alternative, we now\nchoose our investment dogmatically--'A good security with small\nprofit is to be preferred; Consols are of this character; _they are a\nsuitable investment for me_.'\n\nWe may be unable to decide for any of the alternative data, but we\nwork out all the possible arguments as hypotheses, and so are prepared\nin a degree for all the possible events. A person is seen approaching\nour residence, but we cannot discern whether it is A. B., who is\na bore, or C. D., who is an entertaining companion. We argue\nrapidly--'If it is A. B. _I shall have a bad half-hour_, for he always\nwearies me; if it is C. D. _I shall have an agreeable distraction_,\nfor he is very amusing.'\n\n\nAccording to the syllogists, the dilemmatic premises are a statement\nof alternative data and the choice of one of them, and the inference\nis the rejection of the remainder: or the rejection may be given as\nmatter of fact and the selection as conclusion. In neither case have\nwe argument.\n\nFrom the moment we select a datum the remaining data are of no import\nto us, and they need not be mentioned. The selection of one datum\nis logically identical with the rejection of the rest, and this\nis therefore not a conclusion from that.--'Do you take tea or\ncoffee?'--'Tea, please.'--'Then I conclude you do not take coffee.'--A\nperson who would 'conclude' in this fashion would be justly deemed\nirrational. The choice of the tea is a fact, and the rejection of the\ncoffee is the same fact otherwise expressed, so that the rejection\ncannot be a rational conclusion.--'My doctor sends me off every\nwinter to Nice, Algiers, or Egypt; but I never go to Algiers or\nEgypt.'--There is no occasion to say, 'therefore you go to Nice'; that\nhas been already announced as a matter of fact and is not susceptible\nof inference. For the sake of verbal emphasis we might remark, 'So it\nis to Nice you go', but this is not logically requisite.\n\nWhately's examples of this kind of theorem are exactly of the model\njust given.--'Either the earth is eternal, or the work of chance, or\nthe work of an intelligent Being; it is not eternal, nor the work of\nchance, _therefore_ it is the work of an intelligent Being.' This is\nput forward in all gravity as a specimen of reasoning. It is plain\nthat if we know the premises as matters of fact, we also know the\nproposed conclusion as a matter of fact. There is no occasion to\nreason about it.\n\nThe Aristotelian hypothetical can be reduced to arithmetical\nsubtraction. Suppose we put five balls into a bag and afterwards take\nout three without seeing the remainder: is the judgment that two balls\nremain in the bag a logical inference? No--it is matter of fact. Since\nwe last perceived the objects they have undergone diminution, but that\ndoes not confer on what is left of them the imaginary character proper\nto a rational conclusion. What remains is as much fact--recollected\nbut not imaginary fact--as before the subtraction.\n\nWhately's next example is--'It is either spring, summer, autumn, or\nwinter; but it is neither spring nor summer; therefore it is either\nautumn or winter.' This is aggravated fallacy. Not only is it mere\nsubtraction, but the remainder is _perceived_--not recollected, as in\nthe preceding case. The actual season of the year is a known fact, and\nis not rendered more certain by an inference drawn from the absence\nof some other season. Arguments have no validity as against matters\nof fact, and add nothing to their authority. Fact is above, and\nindependent of, argument. The example just cited may be paralleled\nthus--'The cards in my hand are either spades, hearts, clubs,\nor diamonds; but they are neither spades nor hearts; therefore\nthey are either clubs or diamonds'.--I _see_ that they are\neither clubs or diamonds: the perceptual judgment renders the\nrational--imaginary--judgment superfluous. Reason is intended to\nsupplement experience--not to supersede it.\n\n\nXX--DEBATE\n\nThe purpose of debate is to determine the goodness or badness of an\nargument by general logical criticism and knowledge of the matter.\nThis is not dialectic, but takes place after the dialectician\nhas declared that a given theorem is valid argument. If then its\nconclusion is repugnant to us we may seek to stigmatise it--or remove\na stigma as the case may be--by going behind the argument to the\ncomposition of the judgments that enter into it.\n\nLet us take the case of Caesar being proved to be a tyrant in a\nsociety that punishes tyranny with death. There are two ways in which\nhe may be saved or his punishment mitigated.\n\nWe are not bound to take the first precedent that is offered from\nwhich to generate a conclusion. We grant that Caesar resembles the\ngeneral notion 'tyrant,' but we ask if he does not resemble in an\nequal or greater degree some other person or class in regard to\nwhom capital punishment is no just treatment. Does he resemble a\n'successful and patriotic general'--a 'benevolent monarch'--a 'wise\nlegislator'--a 'virtuous man'? All these resemblances are compatible\nwith his being a tyrant in some senses of the word. Let us not condemn\nCaesar for what may be a merely technical offence--the usurpation\nof authority--if in other respects he is an admirable man. So an\nopportunity must be given to Caesar or his advocate to suggest other\nprecedents, yielding a different conclusion, by which to complete our\nimperfect knowledge of the case. Socrates, when he was brought under\nthe class 'perverters of youth'--which also yielded the conclusion\n'death'--suggested as an amendment that he should be classed under\n'national benefactors,' with the conclusion 'maintenance for life at\nthe public expense.'\n\nIt is not enough that we can say of a case that it 'is' this or that,\nand so proceed to draw the conclusion bound up in that classification.\n'Is' in the case means likeness to the precedent, and one 'is' is good\nonly when no better can be found.\n\nIf after having weighed the alternative precedents it appears clear\nthat Caesar resembles tyrants more than any other class of persons,\nthe prospect looks bad for him. But there is still a chance of\nescaping the worst penalty. It turns on the meaning of the word\n'all,' which in logic generally introduces a proposition to which no\nexception has been found--the misnamed and misleading 'universal.'\n\nLogicians do not hesitate to say that in this connection it means 'all\npossible, known or unknown, past or future individuals of the class.'\nThey suppose, or talk as if they supposed, that at some fixed date in\nour life we enter into possession of our general ideas, and that no\nsubsequent experience can modify them. Hence the moment it is admitted\nthat Caesar is a tyrant, he is supposed to come under the rule of a\nstereotyped general idea with inflexible consequences.\n\nThis is not quite so. 'All' does not mean 'all possible' but\n'all known up to the present time, _exclusive of the case under\ndiscussion_.' Our general or average ideas are the plasmic product of\nthe individuals we have actually known--not a unit more. And as that\nidea is liable to be modified by every new individual examined, it\nis possible that on examining Caesar we may find reason to change our\ngeneral idea, to the extent at least of dividing it into two species,\nthe tyrants who deserve death and the tyrants who deserve some milder\npunishment, and that we shall resolve to bring Caesar under the latter\nspecies. Thus if the idea threatens to hang Caesar, on the other hand\nCaesar may burst the idea, and his case establish itself as a new\nprecedent. That is how general ideas multiply--by a sort of fission.\n\nIn the proposition 'tyrants deserve death' as first proposed, we are\ndealing with the old general idea, and--as regards all individuals\nexcept those from which it was drawn--the proposition is little\nmore than a hypothesis. The idea is itself on trial. Until Caesar is\nexamined we do not fully know how the general tyrant is in future to\nbe defined. Our examination of Caesar is a part of our education on\nthe subject of tyrants. In judging we learn, and the general idea\nwhich remains _after Caesar is examined_ is that by which he is to be\njudged.\n\nIf our idea of tyrant remains unshaken after the trial of Caesar, and\nif he is found to resemble that class more than any other, then--and\nnot till then--are we compelled to pass on him the judgment associated\nwith the definition of tyrant.\n\nAn argument based on a particular or solitary precedent is criticised\non the same principles. We seek to prove either that the case is not\nsufficiently like the precedent to justify the application, or that\nthe applicate is not a property of the precedent. If we make good\neither of these propositions, we prevent the suggested conclusion from\nbeing fastened on the case.\n\n\nThe syllogistic dialecticians do not admit alternative precedents\nor reconstruction of general ideas: their terms and figures are not\nadapted to express such notions. Hence they cannot evade a conclusion\nwhose premises are correctly given. They have an axiom to the effect\nthat a judgment must be absolutely true or absolutely false--a door\nmust be open or shut, it cannot be ajar; every colour is white\nor black, it cannot be green or grey, and so on. Now in practical\nreasoning we may and constantly do admit premises and reject the\nconclusions they dialectically involve. We look at the question 'from\nanother point of view.' This means that while admitting there is some\nground for bringing a case under a certain precedent, we contend that\non the whole it is preferable to bring it under another precedent\nwith a different conclusion. The proposed handle _may_ fit the vase\nsomehow, but we think another sort of handle will suit it better.\nOr--rather than accept an objectionable conclusion--we will divide our\nidea. This is degree in truth. And that is the elastic method on which\nwe reason in actual affairs. Logicians give a false account of reason,\nand so their systems are neglected and their authority is never\nrecognised in real debates.\n\n\n\n\nCATEGORIES\n\n\nXXI--CATEGORIES OF SUBSTANTIALISM, AND OTHERS\n\nA Category is primarily a class of Judgments. Since arguments are\ncomposed of judgments, a category is also a class of arguments; that\nis to say, the argument follows the classification of the judgment.\nThis is not the practice of syllogists, who have categories for\njudgments only, the arguments being classified according to verbal\nexpression.\n\nI distinguish six categories--two Natural and four Artificial. The\njudgments of a natural category concern experience presented in\na synthesis whose composition is due to the noumenal mind; the\ncategories corresponding to this definition are--\n\n  Inherence--\n  Association.\n\nAn artificial category is so called because the synthesis is formed by\nthe subjective mind.\n\nThe first category of this kind is\n\n  Perspection--\n\nwhich is an artificial arrangement of objects according to a\nfigurative interpretation of certain appearances they present.\n\nThe second artificial category I will call\n\n  Concretion--\n\nas it is an ideal cohesion of experiences never wholly perceived\nat once. These two categories are those chiefly responsible for the\nrealistic mode of thought.\n\nThe third artificial category is that which is called in science\ncausation, but it is only\n\n  Sequence,--\n\nthat is, a series of phenomena sufficiently coherent to afford a basis\nfor inference, but not necessarily or energically connected. Hume and\nothers have conclusively proved that such phenomena are not causally\nrelated.\n\nFinally there is\n\n  Causation--\n\nin the proper sense of the word, that is, the relation between energic\nmind and its effects. This is the category of human affairs generally,\nand of all the Cosmic that we explain by analogy with the Human. It is\nthe only exhaustive explanation of phenomena, and so is the category\nwhich philosophy would substitute for the rest. When we can truly\nresolve things into effects analogous to human actions, we have\nreached the highest standpoint from which they can be viewed.\n_Realistic_ anthropomorphism is the first and rudest explanation of\nthings: _idealistic_ anthropomorphism is the last and most refined.\n\nThe artificial categories are all formed on analogies supplied by\nthe natural, since the intellect is incapable of imagining anything\nabsolutely original.\n\nEach category may include judgments of other categories in a\nsubordinate relation. Inherence and concretion enter to some extent as\nauxiliaries into all the others. A group category may be treated as an\nindividual object for certain purposes, and an individual as a group\nof properties. In the one case a fictitious unity is created, in the\nother a real unity is imaginatively dissolved. But in general the\ncategories are sufficiently distinct and may be considered as mutually\nexclusive. They will be separately analysed and exemplified.\n\n\nThe term category is used in common logic to signify the final classes\ninto which _judgments_ can be arranged. To this minor use only is\nthe category applied. It does not either denote a classification of\n_arguments_ or a distinct province of ideas whose origin and validity\nshould be a matter of investigation. In Greek and modern logic\narguments are distinguished solely by their verbal expression--never\nby the character of the judgment that enters into them. Treated in\nthis superficial and haphazard way, the categories necessarily play a\nquite insignificant part in philosophy.\n\nThe oldest known set of categories is that quoted by Aristotle in his\nMetaphysic as being held by a sect of Pythagoreans. It consists of the\nfollowing series of contraries--\n\n  Bound.    Infinity.\n  Odd.      Even.\n  Unity.    Plurality.\n  Right.    Left.\n  Male.     Female.\n  Rest.     Motion.\n  Straight. Crooked.\n  Light.    Darkness.\n  Good.     Bad.\n  Square.   Oblong.\n\nAristotle's own categories are the following:--\n\n  (1)  _Essence_ or _Substance_, as man, horse:\n  (2)  _Quantity_, as two cubits long:\n  (3)  _Quality_, as white, erudite:\n  (4)  _Relation_, as double, half, greater:\n  (5)  _Place_, as in the Agora:\n  (6)  _Time_, as yesterday:\n  (7)  _Posture_, as standing, sitting:\n  (8)  _Having_ (Condition?), as to be shod, armed:\n  (9)  _Action_, as he is cutting, burning:\n  (10) _Passion_, as he is being cut.\n\nThis list can be reduced to one half the number. Quantity, Quality,\nPosture, Condition are kinds of _Attribute_ or _Property_ of the\nSubstance. Place and Time are valid. Action and Passion are both\nreferable to causation. Non-causal sequence or consecution (as day\nfollowing night)--one of the commonest judgments--is not mentioned.\n\nThe Stoics reduced Aristotle's ten categories to four--Substratum or\nSubstance, the Essential Quality, Manner of being, and Relation.\n\nKa[n.]\u00e1da, a Hindu philosopher, has six categories--Substance,\nQuality, Action, Genus, Individuality, and Concretion or Co-inherence.\n\nPlotinus was acquainted with the Aristotelian and Stoic lists and\noffers as his own:--(1) Fundamental forms of the _Ideal_--Being,\nRest, Motion, Identity, Difference; (2) Categories of the\n_Sensible_--Substance, Relation, Quality, Quantity, Motion.\n\nDescartes recognised but two final categories, the Absolute and the\nRelative.\n\nKant has an elaborate scheme of categories, which he considered to be,\nnot merely classes of judgments, but innate power of the mind by which\nwe are moved to form the judgments. They are the following:--\n\n  I.  _Of Quantity._  Unity, Plurality, Totality.\n  II.  _Of Quality._   Reality, Negation, Limitation.\n  III.  _Of Relation._  Of Inherence and Subsistence\n  (_substantia et accidens_).\n  Of Causality and Dependence\n  (cause and effect).\n  Of Community (reciprocity between\n  the active and the passive).\n  IV.  _Of Modality._  Possibility, Impossibility, Existence,\n  Non-existence, Necessity,\n  Contingency.\n\nSir William Hamilton's categories were Being, Being by itself, and\nBeing by accident.\n\nCategories have also been proposed by Spinoza, Locke, Wolff, Leibnitz,\nHerbart, Mill, and others. No two of them are alike. They are not\nformed on any definite principle, but are individual opinions as to\nthe most convenient way to classify judgments[13].\n\n\nXXII--INHERENCE\n\nAn object being given by perception we develop our knowledge of it,\nfirst by narrowing our focus of attention so as to perceive parts and\nsingle attributes of the object; next by widening our attention so as\nto include several objects in one view. The first process is Analysis\nor Abstraction; it informs us what attributes co-inhere to constitute\nthe object. The second is Synthesis or Grouping, by which we learn\nthe relations of one thing to others. These operations comprise all we\nknow about a thing, for it can have no attributes which are not either\ninternal or external.\n\nPractical analysis means cutting a thing to pieces or dissolving it,\nand this has a certain value because it multiplies objects. But it\ndoes not increase our knowledge of the first thing. On the contrary,\nby destroying a thing we render a knowledge of it impossible. The\nanalysis which gives knowledge is Metaphysical Abstraction--an\nattention concentrated on the parts of a thing without destroying\ntheir connection with the other inherent parts. The metaphysical\nelements may be quite different from the mechanically divisible parts.\nThey are generally a species of things which could not exist alone,\nsuch as red, blue, straight, curved, square, round, acid, sweet,\ninsipid, fragrant, sharp, hot, heavy, dull, loud, bright, and a\nmultitude of properties of that abstract kind.\n\nFor many of these--at least for the description of them--a comparison\nof two or more things is essential. A sound is heard to be loud by\ncomparison with another which is low or soft; a knife is known to\nbe blunt by experience of another more sharp, or the same knife in\na sharper condition. But comparison does not alter the essential\ncharacter of abstract attention--it serves merely as an incitement to\nit. Difference between qualities otherwise alike whets our attention\nto a finer discrimination.\n\nThe properties recognised by each sense are easily distinguished in\nthe bulk from those of another sense. Colour is distinct from Figure\nin a more marked degree than red from blue or square from circular.\nFine degrees of Sound may be difficult to discriminate, but not the\ndifference between a sound and a smell or a taste.\n\nStill broader contrasts give rise to an artificial but sometimes\nuseful kind of attribution--the negative. When we do not know much\nconcerning the positive characteristics of a thing, it is something\nto know that it has _not_ this or that property. What Thought is,\npositively, few people know, but they are able to say (with a little\nprompting) that it is un-extended, im-material, im-ponderable, and so\nforth. This comparison re-acts on the thing better known, and so we\ncall visual objects 'extended' from their dissimilarity to thoughts.\nBut for that there would have been no occasion to notice the abstract\nextension of visual objects. The term 'visual object' would have\ntacitly included extension. There must be great and general ignorance\nof a thing to excuse the negative attribution: it is not allowable\nto speak of plants as non-metals, or sheep as non-horses, but a large\nclass of animals is called in-vertebrate. In this case the negative\nproperty serves to bar a possible inference that all animals are\nvertebrate, since those we know best are so.\n\n\nThe judgment in this category is a consciousness of the attributes\nmaking up a thing, or so much of it as interests us. 'Cleopatra's\nNeedle is an obelisk of granite, about sixty-eight feet high, and is\ncarved with hieroglyphics.' If we go on to say that it stands on the\nThames Embankment, we shift into the category of association. The\nrelation of an object to its place is different from that of one\ninherent attribute of the object to another, or to the whole.\n\nThe properties of a general idea are defined in this category. The\nsynthesis is natural or noumenal, the artificiality of the idea\nconsisting merely in the omission of some of the concrete properties.\n'Garden rhubarb [in general] has broadly cordate leaves, strongly\nveined beneath; the footstalks are long, thick, and fleshy, with a\nchannel above; its growth is exceedingly rapid.' These are properties\ninherent in a unity not of our making. The botanist changes into the\ncategory of sequence when he says, 'the stalks are used for tarts and\nmade into jam.'\n\nIn a complicated object or general idea some of the judgments we treat\nas inherent may be inferences in other categories used subordinately.\n'The ancient Persians had remarkably thin and weak skulls. They were\ngood horsemen and archers, courageous and spirited in battle. They\nwore a tunic and trousers of leather.... They were quick and\nlively, keen-witted, capable of repartee, ingenious, and--for\nOrientals--far-sighted. They had fancy and imagination, a relish for\npoetry and art, and they were not without a certain power of political\ncombination.' Some of these properties might have been perceived\nobjectively, but not the possession of fancy and imagination, which\ncould only be known by inference in causation--here used to complete\na coherent unity. The historian employs causation as a principal\ncategory when he tells us that 'their bards did not touch the chords\nwhich rouse what is noblest and highest in our nature.' The thought\nimplied in touching chords--the notion of will directing action--is\na different judgment from the perception of an inherent permanent\nattribute.\n\nThe argument in this category consists in ideally completing an\nimperfect object by comparison with a similar object, or the idea of a\nsimilar object. Suppose we have studied thoroughly one or more rhubarb\nplants, and then see a plant with broadly cordate leaves, footstalks\nlong, thick, and fleshy, and having a channel above. In the time at\nour disposal we cannot ascertain if its growth is exceedingly rapid,\nbut we are justified in inferring that it is, and that the plant\nwe are examining is in all other respects rhubarb. If the Egyptian\nobelisks we have seen were sculptured with hieroglyphics throughout\ntheir length, and we see an obelisk part of which is underground, it\nis a rational inference that that part also is sculptured.\n\nWe have proved that certain samples of aluminium have a specific\ngravity of 2\u00b76, and then see a metal--of specific gravity\nunknown--which has all the other properties of aluminium: we may\nconfidently infer that this metal also would, if tested, show a\nspecific gravity of 2\u00b76.\n\n\nFor purposes of reason it may be necessary to compare things that\ncannot be brought physically together. When this happens we generally\ncompare them in _idea_, or the idea of one with the other as object.\nWhen great accuracy is required and the idea--which is always rather\nvague--cannot be relied on, we have recourse to mediate comparison.\n_Standards_ are employed. These are manageable or portable objects\nwith which principal things are separately compared by way of\neffecting indirectly a comparison between them. Standards can only\nmediate comparisons between _abstract_ properties, for if they\ncontained all the concrete properties of the compared objects they\nwould, by supposition, be as unmanageable as the latter. We have\nstandards for length in rules, scales, tapes, chains; the balance is\na standard for weight. There are also scales for pitch of sound,\nvarieties of colour, degree of light, heat, atmospheric pressure, and\nprobably some others for special purposes.\n\nIndirect comparison is not in itself inference; or if inference it is\nsubordinate and preparatory to some more important conclusion. A coin\nis weighed and concluded to be _light_, but this is only a datum in\ndetermining the more important question whether it is a forged coin or\nnot.\n\n\nXXIII--ASSOCIATION\n\nIn this category we widen the attention so as to include several\nobjects in one act of perception.\n\nThe first result of this diffusion of attention is to lessen the\nbrilliancy of objects. Our attention is a light which is intensified\nwhen narrowed and concentrated--enfeebled when dispersed over several\nobjects. The observation of a group amounts practically to observing\nthe objects in rapid succession. At a given moment we perceive only\none thing well, or it may be only a small part of a thing, but we have\na dull sense of other things adjacent, which we have just seen and\nmay immediately see again in any order we please. That is all that is\nmeant by perception of a group.\n\nTo distinguish this category properly from the next we must consider\nthe group of objects as divested of depth or distance outwards. It\nis to be regarded as a flat surface standing a few feet from us, the\nobjects in it having absolutely the dimensions they appear to\nhave. This is in fact their _real_ magnitude, for the supposed real\nmagnitude is a matter of theory, and means the perceptual magnitude\ntaken under certain conditions of observation. The real magnitude is\nconstantly changing, so for practical convenience in determining size,\netc., we refer all objects to one condition of observation--that in\nwhich they can be touched as well as seen.\n\nIn metaphysic we are not obliged to recognise this convention. If an\nobject a mile off appears to be an inch high, it is an inch high\nas really as if it were in a photograph or picture and materially\nrepresented of that height. The mystery of the change of size in\nobjects is not explained or reasoned away by any device for overcoming\nsome of its practical inconveniences. It depends on the degree of\nenergy with which minds affect each other.\n\nA group has properties which an object has not; or, if this be not\nstrictly the case, we may say that the properties we look for in a\ngroup are not those we distinguish in a single object. The special\nproperties of a group are _positions_. It is unnecessary to say\n'relative' positions, for position cannot be otherwise than relative.\nPosition cannot be defined by reference to anything more simple. What\nis meant is intuitively known to everybody. But let us take a concrete\nexample--a man with a horse and cart standing on a bridge. Each object\nin this group has a position towards the other objects. The bridge is\n_over_ the river and _under_ the cart; the cart is _upon_ the bridge\nand _behind_ the horse; the man is _in_ the cart; the horse is\n_before_ and _outside_ of the cart, it is _near_ one end of the\nbridge, _far_ from the other, and _between_ the two extremities. These\nare the principal positions in a natural group or association,\nby which is meant the objects we can see (or are supposed to see)\nsimultaneously, and whose mutual positions we are considering.\n\nThe use of observing positions is the same as that which moves us to\nall rational study, namely, its value in prediction. We can reason\nfrom one object to another in a group just as we reason from one\nproperty to another in an object.\n\nSuppose our perception of a landscape is interrupted for a moment,\nand when we next endeavour to perceive it we find we only perceive a\nportion of it, the rest being 'hidden' by an intervening object. As\nfar as we are concerned the hidden part has been annihilated. We only\nremember what was there. But this recollection is also a preconception\nof what we may be able to cause to appear again, either by removing\nthe obstructing object, by waiting till it has been removed, or by\nwalking round and standing between it and the landscape.\n\nIf this be too close to mere recollection, we have pure reasoning\nwhen from the general appearance of a group we imagine generally some\nconcealed part of it not before seen. A procession of people dressed\nin mourning is usually accompanied by a hearse: from perceiving the\npeople only on a certain occasion we predict the hearse. The sound of\na steam-whistle enables us to imagine a train in a certain locality,\nthough fog or other obstruction may prevent our seeing it. The scent\nof flowers prepares us for finding them somewhere near us. From smoke\nwe predict the nearness of a chimney. The trail of an animal is a clue\nto his position.\n\nThe judgment in this category is therefore a consciousness of\nposition, such as those mentioned above. The argument is a completion\nof one association by comparison with another--the expectation of\nsimilarity in groups.\n\n\n_Movement._ All judgments as to _change_ of position in objects come\nunder this category. It takes at least two things arranged in a group\nto produce the perception of movement. If there were but one thing in\nour field of observation we could not say whether it moved or not, for\nthere would be nothing which it would pass, or leave, or approach. It\nwould appear to stand still. There is, however, more in movement than\ndepends on mere perception.\n\nAll movement is due to energy either in the observer or in the other\nmind acting upon his. Energy is not a generalisation of moving things,\nnor a property, nor a relation, though all these may be signs of\nenergy. The most abstract idea of movement is _Motion_. It may be\ndefined as a series of positions.\n\n\n_Number._ If we treat a group as a large loose object we shall\nperceive in it certain properties not strictly positional. Number is\none of these.\n\nA group of three coins has not the same practical value as a group\nof six or sixty, and we are thus obliged to notice the difference and\ndistinguish degrees of this property by names--hence Arithmetic.\n\n\n_Flat Space_ or space of two dimensions is another property of a\ngroup. Grouped objects have frequently intervals between them.\nSuch intervals are negations of perception--interruptions or\ndiscontinuities of experience. But by abstraction we can reduce the\nobjects bounding an interval to a geometrical line, and so give a sort\nof positive existence to the interval. Thus we talk of a hole or of\ndarkness as if they were true objects, and measure them by standards\nof length.\n\nIf we abstract the boundary lines from a space we get the idea\n'intervalness,' which is the right name for two-dimensioned space.\nThis abstract idea is nearly the same as abstract size. Space is\ninterval without bounds--size is object without contents. Space and\nsize are equally _nothing_ intrinsically or in their own right,\nbut they have been reached by different modes of refining away the\npositive qualities associated with them, and this difference of origin\nis slightly suggested by their names. Spaces have a use in perception\nsimilar to _rests_ in music--they relieve the attention and give\ncontrast and vigour to the next positive object.\n\n\nXXIV--PERSPECTION\n\nThis is the first of the artificial categories. It is an ideal\ntreatment of an associated group to facilitate a certain kind of\nreasoning.\n\nReason--let me repeat--is the imaginary extension of experience\nby comparison with more complete experience of a similar kind. By\nreasoning in inherence we complete single objects; by inference in\nassociation we complete groups. These two categories demonstrate that\na natural group consists of fragments of objects, and fragments of\nother natural groups which are possible but not yet developed. A hill\nis partly concealed by a house, the house partly concealed by a tree,\nthe tree by a stone fence, the fence by a growth of ivy. A river\ndisappears at a curve and is lost to view; we know from experience of\nother rivers that under certain conditions we might perceive the river\nfurther on as a feature in several more landscapes. As we gaze at an\nassociation of objects these possible completions occur to us--not\nfully or definitely but sufficiently to convince us that the group\nmight be developed into many other groups, and into a multitude of\nobjects of forms different from those we actually perceive. By our\nhypothesis the observer has always been stationary, the objects have\nmoved to and fro but not from near to far. Their real dimensions have\nremained unaltered, and nothing has occurred to suggest that they\never appear of other dimensions. In short we are gazing on a piece of\nstage-scenery.\n\nBut there is another element in perception. We and all other real\n(mental) beings are part of the cosmic force. We are co-creators of\nwhat we perceive--limited gods, not machine-men as the scientific\npeople would have us believe. But for our power of affecting each\nother and our readiness to receive impressions from other minds, there\nwould be no perception--no material objects. We (that is, all\nsentient beings) could, by unanimous resolution, annul the material\ncreation--blot out the universe of objective things in a moment.\nUnited to and implied in this general power is the particular power\nof modifying our world without destroying it. We can redistribute the\nactive and passive forces so as to produce other perceptual effects\nthan those present at a given moment. And we habitually do this to\nsome extent. Within a limited scope our world is plastic as dough,\nand we knead it to any form we please. For example, we exert energy\nto change our place, and immediately the group before us breaks up\nand undergoes metamorphosis. Some objects disappear altogether, and\nentirely new objects present themselves. Some become smaller, others\nlarger; some fractional forms fill out to completion, some integers\nundergo curtailment, others separate into several distinct objects. In\na few minutes the first group has dissolved into a second, which may\nmerge into a third, and so on indefinitely.\n\nIn contemplating these phenomena we discern a third form of\ncompleteness and incompleteness, distinct from those that enter into\ninherence and association. Hence a new type of reasoning--another\ncategory: the Perspective.\n\nIt will be convenient to suppose that the modifications to which it\nrefers are solely due to the observing mind, as the most conspicuous\nand comprehensive really are, but some of the minor perspective\nchanges are due to the noumenon of the object.\n\nWe have first to get a criterion of perspective perfection. What this\nshall be is to some extent a matter of convention. The standard I\nshall adopt is, that an object of a nature to be perceptible to all\nthe senses would be most perfect if within reach of touch. If it can\nbe heard it is then heard at its loudest--this is correct enough for\nour purpose,--if it can be seen it is then seen at its largest and\nbrightest. This is Perspective Completeness at the Tactual Range. It\nmeans the closest contact of noumenon and subject, compatible with\nclear definition in perception.\n\nNow let us exert energy and disarrange a group. Those things that were\nor might have been tangible in the former position, are no longer so,\nbut they may still be seen, heard, or even smelt. The bright colours\nhave however somewhat faded, the size has shrunk, some of the details\nare lost. Here is a lapse from perspective completeness. It is\nindicated, not as in the first two categories by mechanical cutting\naway of mass and circumstance, but by deterioration all over the\nobject. We seem to be thrown out of focus in relation to it, and the\nperspective degradation may increase until the object has dwindled to\na speck and finally disappears altogether.\n\n\nThe judgment in this category consists in observing the kind and\ndegree of degradation to which things are liable in perspection. In\naddition to change in size, brightness, detail and loudness, which\nhave been already mentioned, occultation as in the second category\ncan be used as an indirect datum. An object which eclipses another is\ninvariably more perfect perspectively than the object eclipsed.\nThe motion of objects has also to be taken into account. As objects\ndegrade their movements slacken, and recover power as the objects are\nrestored.\n\nBy attending to all these indications and checking each by the rest,\nwe have the elements of a fairly accurate inference as to comparative\nperspective condition. We have constant practice in this sort of\nthought with frequent opportunities of verifying our conclusions;\npenalties are annexed to failure and rewards to success. It is no\nwonder then that in the course of years we become expert in judging of\nperspective condition, so that when confronted with a natural group\nwe can estimate almost instantly the degree in which each object falls\nshort of perspective integrity.\n\nThe result of this practice is that on perceiving a natural group\nof many objects, we graduate them according to the perspective\ndeterioration which each exhibits, and for greater precision we figure\nthe perspective difference as an interval between the objects--an\nimaginary interval modelled on the true interval of association. The\nobject on a distant horizon is visually as near as the ground we can\ntouch by stooping, but in this imaginary group the former is placed\nat the far end of the line and the latter at the near end, and between\nthem are ranged the other objects each at a point corresponding\nto what we suppose to be its perspective distance. That is how a\nlandscape acquires depth. Space outwards is an ideal imitation of\nreal lateral interval. It is the measure and expression of perspective\ndefacement.\n\nFrom what has been said it follows that the near objects will be\nrelatively large, clear, and lively in motion, while the far will\nbe small, dull, and slow, but this rule is liable to many exceptions\nwhich can only be learnt by experience.\n\n\nOn the analogy of the other forms of inference--which consist in\ncompleting imperfect things by reference to others more perfect--the\nessence of an argument in perspection is the power to imagine an\nobject which is perspectively defective, brought up to the tactual\nrange and displaying all the qualities it would possess in that\nposition. This is done by comparing it with the idea of the same or\na similar object experienced at the tactual range; and is done for an\nulterior purpose, like all other intellectual operations. A great part\nof our material happiness consists in the exercise of the short senses\n(taste, touch and smell), and the chief use of perspective reasoning\nis to enable us to judge of the energy required to bring a distant\nobject near for close perception. We have therefore to observe our\nenergic fluctuations in conjunction with perspective change, if we\nwould extract the utmost practical benefit from this category. The\nperspective inferences are none the less useful after we discover that\nthey are not intuitions, and that the completeness we imaginatively\nassign to distant objects has no existence until we exert the\ncorresponding energy.\n\nA landscape being rendered perspective we can determine the\nperspective state of any new object that may enter it, by reference to\nthe objects adjoining it, and this though the object be of a species\nquite unknown to us and which therefore, by itself, would afford no\nclue to its perspective distance.\n\nThe imaginary interval we place between objects of different\nperspective effacement, can be expressed in terms of exact lateral\nmeasurement. This is done by developing and measuring the associative\ngroups represented in the perspective group. Supposing we wish to\nget an exact definition of the perspective condition of a mountain\nrelative to a certain station, we can, from that station, develop\nall the natural groups up to the mountain (walk over the ground)\nand measure the lateral intervals and masses disclosed. The total\nmeasurements will be a definition of the mountain's perspective\ndistance in terms of true associative distance. That is what we mean\nby saying a mountain is ten miles off. It is not _really_ ten miles\noff--it is not an inch off. But to render it tactually perfect we\nshould have to expend an amount of energy equal to 17,600 times the\nenergy required to move from one associative object to another a\nyard apart from it laterally. If we practise the mileage scale in\nconjunction with the perspective indications, we may acquire the art\nof expressing in miles, though not measured, the distance of objects\nestimated from purely perspective data, but few can do this with any\nnear approach to exactness[14].\n\nThe realistic three-dimensioned space is a combination of the true\ninterval of association and the false interval of perspection. This\ngenerates an idea resembling the capacity or vacancy in a room\nor vessel, and thus it is supposed that objects occupy a sort of\nuniversal room without walls, floor, or ceiling. It is however the\nenclosing objects which make a room, and when they are abstracted\nthere remains nothing. The universal room is therefore nothing--a\nmyth. It is a useful working theory for common purposes, but in\nphilosophy it is superfluous and obstructive.\n\nIn the definitions of geometry no difference is made between the depth\nof a landscape and the 'third dimension' of any small cubic object.\nThey are both called 'third dimension' or 'cubic dimension.' Yet\nthey are inferences of different categories, and neither is real.\nThe former, as we have just seen, is the imagined redintegration of\nobjects perspectively shrunk and defaced. The latter is the imaginary\ncompletion of a thing having many surfaces or facets, only one of\nwhich can be shown at a time.\n\n\n_Sky Perspection._ The effect produced on our mind by the observation\nof celestial objects, reveals at once the artificiality of cubic\nspace. Clouds in their form and movements are somewhat like earthly\nthings--vapour or mountains,--and so we conceive them partially\ngraduated in distance and floating in a concavity. But whether they\nare a mile off, or twenty miles off, few of us can tell.\n\nWhen we contemplate the sun, moon and stars, our realism is completely\nat fault. These we cannot modify at will, and they move too slowly and\npresent too uniform an aspect to cause the perspective effect. Since\nwe have never seen them at the tactual range we know not to what\ndegree they are perspectively incomplete; hence they appear without\nrelative distance--distance being simply a metaphor of perspective\neffacement. If 'cubic space' is real, let the realists tell us why we\ndo not see it in the sky--why we do not arrange the stars behind\neach other according to their calculated distances. This question\nis unanswerable realistically, but idealistically it presents no\ndifficulty. The sky is not spaced, because the conditions are wanting\nunder which the illusion of terrestrial space is formed in the\nintellect.\n\nBy close instrumental attention to the moon and planets a slight\nparallax is observable, and on the analogy of terrestrial parallax\nastronomers are able to calculate what they call the distance of these\nbodies. Perhaps their calculations are right, but the magnitudes are\nnot conceivable as associative distance, being so much greater than we\nhave any experience of. We take them to mean that the heavenly bodies\nare extremely degraded, perspectively speaking. Their noumena are in\ncontact with our minds, for this is essential to perception, but\nif astronomical calculations are correct the contact is infinitely\nslight, compared with what it would be, supposing--to speak\nrealistically--we could go to the stars or they could be brought to\nus.\n\n\nBerkeley's _Theory of Vision_ and _Dialogues_ are occupied with the\nanalysis of perspection. The arguments he uses to show that distance\noutwards is not real are in the main those given in this section.\n\n\nXXV--CONCRETION\n\nIf we take a cricket-ball in the hand and turn it round we shall\nperceive a series of discs. Only one of these can be seen at a time,\nbut if we perceive and remember the whole series we shall be able to\ninfer all from the perception of one in a similar object. The same\noccurs with other cubical or solid objects. This is a form of ideal\nconstruction different from any we have yet considered. It differs\nfrom inherence in that the object which we conceptually put together\nis never objectively perceived as a whole. It is an imaginary whole\nconstructed in the intellect out of fragmentary experience. It differs\nfrom association on the same grounds; the latter can be all perceived\nat once in forming the judgment. It differs from perspection in that\nthe imperfection of experience is due to curtailment, not to general\ndeterioration. What we actually see may be perspectively perfect. It\ndiffers also from the next category in that the series of perceptions\ncan occur in various orders of succession.\n\n\n_The 'backs' of Things._ We talk of the back of a thing, but nobody\nhas ever seen a back. Things have no backs in the popular sense of the\nword. When we turn round a back to perceive it, it is then a front.\nEverything is a flat upright surface, and its appearance of solidity\ncan be imitated on a surface known to be flat, and with nearly the\nsame illusive completeness as in the original object. In turning\nthings round we merely change the surface; we are exercising our power\nto alter primary consciousness.\n\nWhen two persons perceive the 'same' object from contrary directions,\nthe sameness means that the two objects proceed from the same cause,\nor can be reduced to the same general idea. But the objects are\nnumerically distinct. By a similar turn of speech we say that A\nand _a_ are the same _letter_, but they are evidently distinct and\ndissimilar objects. If we hold a thing before a mirror and see what is\ntermed its back, we produce a new object resembling the first in some\nrespects but without its resistance.\n\n\nResistance is a negative term signifying the limit of our power to\nalter primary experience. Where our power ceases resistance is said to\nbegin, and we meet with resistance when we apply a power inadequate to\nthe desired effect.\n\nDr. Johnson's solitary experiment in idealistic philosophy has been\noften related. He struck a post, and because it did not disappear he\nthought he had disproved Berkeley's statement that material objects\nexist only in the perceiving mind. The experiment merely showed that\nall means are not adequate to change all primary experience. Had he\nshut his eyes, or turned a corner, or occupied his attention with\nother matters, the post would have vanished. He chose improper means\nand therefore met with 'resistance.' No idealist believes we can\nchange our primary experience by any capricious and frivolous\nmeans[15].\n\n\n_Geographical Concretion._ The knowledge of large geographical areas\nis an artificial construction without objective reality.\n\nOur experience is, literally and exactly, a series or sequence--a flux\nor stream. It is composed of objects or of groups, according to the\nwidth of our attention. If we travel over a large tract of country\nthe experience is a train of objects or views, which follow each other\ncontinuously but for interruptions in attention. If we were bound to\nthink of things in the order in which they were experienced, we should\nhave to imagine our topographical consciousness as a long ribbon of\nviews, like the pictures of a panorama. Supposing we travelled hither\nand thither over one county, it would appear to us as a straight\nstrip of land which might be several hundred miles long. If we again\ntraversed the ground, but in another order, we should have another\nstrip resembling the first, but also differing from it, and it would\nbe necessary to keep the two from being confused in our mind. If\nseveral persons traversed the same ground but in divers directions,\nthey would each retain a different recollection of it, and it would\nbe extremely hard for any two of them to agree as to the order in\nsuccession of any portion of the ground traversed.\n\nOur experience of the natural group suggests a mode of treating our\ngeographical experience which overcomes many of these inconveniences.\nWe find that we can traverse (either bodily or by the eye) a single\nlandscape in a thousand directions, and retain a memory of it without\nany reference to these directions. What we remember is the mutual\npositions of the objects, not the order in which they were observed.\nAs this greatly facilitates the memory of one group, we apply the\nsame principle of synthesis to the succession of groups composing\nour geographical experience. We dismiss from our minds the order of\nobservation, and construct instead an imaginary group of associated\nobjects or places having mutual positions. It is imaginary, for no one\nhas ever seen as a co-existent synthesis the objects of a county,\nnot to speak of a country or continent. Substituting for memory of\nsuccession, a memory of position, there grows up in our mind a large\nco-existent image of a country on the model of a single group, which\naffords all the advantages as regards economy of energy which we\nenjoy by virtue of comprehending a natural group in one act of\nconsciousness.\n\nTake an instance of this economy. Suppose a man travelled from London\nto Oxford, then to Exeter, then to Portsmouth, then to Brighton, and\nafterwards desired to return to London. If he, acting on a mistaken\nconception of truth and disdaining instruction from others, persisted\nin remembering the objects perceived on his journey as--what they\nno doubt literally were--a continuous series, he would be unable to\nimagine any way of returning to London except by reversing the order\nof his journey. If on the other hand he carried in his mind an image\nof the ground in question, with the mutual position of the places,\nit would enable him to _foresee_ that London was to be reached by\njourneying northward from Brighton, in far less time and at far less\ncost than by returning the way he came. Thus does conceptual position,\nwhen it is correctly imagined, prove its superiority to the order of\nexperience. And we say that the ideal picture is truer than the crude\nmemory,--not that it is really so if natural order is a test of truth,\nbut because it is the least onerous, which is our practical standard\nof truth. The only object of knowledge being the wise management of\nenergy, that sort of knowledge must be considered truest that enables\nus to have the feelings we desire at the least cost. In one sense\ntruth means the quickest and easiest way of passing from one state of\nconsciousness to another preconceived state.\n\nIt may be objected to the above example as a valid deduction from an\nimaginary synthesis, that the relation of London to Brighton is now a\ncertainty, whereas an inference can be no more than a probability. The\nreply is, that if a man has already traversed the route in question,\nit is to him an actual experience and his idea of it is ever\nafterwards a memory, not an inference. But until it is actually\nperceived it must be imaginary, and therefore slightly problematical.\nAlthough a man is convinced that others are not deceiving him in\nsaying a place is to be reached in a certain way, he cannot be\nabsolutely sure that he fully understands the directions given,\nin other words, that his image of the route corresponds to their\nperception of it. There probably never is exact similarity between one\nman's primary experience and another man's idea of it. It may even\nbe doubted whether there is ever exact similarity between a man's own\nprimary experience and his subsequent idea of it.\n\nThe geographical synthesis is founded on actual exploration\nsupplemented by inference. The mutual position of some important\nplaces are determined and serve as precedents for a multitude of minor\npositional deductions. _A_ is twenty miles north of London, _B_ is\nten miles south of London, hence _A_ is thirty miles north of _B_.\nThe mileage is determined by imagining the synthesis developed into\nnatural groups and measured laterally. Other scales are the time\nspent in travelling between the places, or the money it costs, or the\ndistance delineated on a map.\n\nThough the geographical concretion may be modelled on the association,\nwe cannot treat it perspectively, for the places being purely\nideal (except the one we are at), the ideal image is not liable to\ndeterioration by weakened perception. It may suffer degradation by\nforgetfulness, but that has nothing to do with perspection.\n\n\n_Sphericity of the Earth._ The geographical synthesis is not always\nformed on the pattern of a natural association. That is the first and\nmost obvious shape to give it, and for thousands of years it\nappears to have answered the topographical needs of mankind. But as\nexploration extended it was found that the associative theory did not\nin some cases afford true preconception. If we travel far enough\nin any fixed direction we shall return to the point from which we\nstarted. This could not have been predicted from a synthesis formed\non the model of a landscape. Such a return however takes place in the\nobjects denominated spheres, and so the spherical instead of the flat\nform has been conceptually given to the geographical concretion. That\nis all that is meant by saying that the world is round. There is\nno world, as the mystical realist--projecting outwards his mental\nsynthesis--imagines. There is only a scheme of spherical positions\nin the intellect, which facilitates the recollection of places and\nenables us to foresee the shortest and easiest way of reaching--_i.e._\nexperiencing places. The concretion is true inasmuch as the prediction\nis found to coincide with real experience. But that by no means\nimplies that the places exist except when perceived in minds.\n\n\nXXVI--SEQUENCE\n\nSequence is a series most resembling a procession of objects in a\nnatural group (second category). It differs therefrom in that the\nobjects cannot be seen together. It differs from concretion in that\nthe order in which the objects appear cannot be altered, or if they\nare human and alterable we cease to treat them as a sequence. They\nno longer have the predictive value which moves us to form artificial\ngroups of objects.\n\nSatisfactory examples of reasoning in sequence are less numerous than\nmight be supposed. It is a poor category for argument. Series either\noccur with perfect regularity, like the seasons of the year, phases\nof the moon, &c., and then they rapidly become mere recollections and\nlose the problematical character essential to a true inference, or\nthe connection between the objects is too casual for argumentative\npurposes. Darwin's theory of the formation of coral atolls is a fine\nargument in sequence, but the application of this theory to reefs not\nexamined by him is hardly uncertain enough to be an argument. It is\nthe first sequential inference that is valid--the rest are foregone\nconclusions.\n\nGeology supplies some good sequences. It has been noticed, for\ninstance, that the sea leaves ripple-marks on sandy beaches, and\nstones with similar marks have been found at a distance from the sea;\nit is a valid sequential inference that the marks in the latter case\nhave also been formed by the action of the waves. Here the difference\nin locality between the two compared series--the modern complete\nand the ancient incomplete--supplies that slight element of doubt\nessential to an argument.\n\nSo as regards the mode of making ancient flint tools: it has been\nfound that tools exactly similar to the ancient can now be made with\nthe simplest possible means, and it is a true argument to infer that\nthe ancient implements were made by these means. The conclusion is\nhighly probable without being infallibly certain, and that is what a\ndialectical conclusion ought to be.\n\nWe may admit that some of the astronomical sequences are forms of\nreasoning, for they were such to their first discoverers, and to minds\nnot thoroughly conversant with them they are still in the nature of\npredictions that might fail of accomplishment. Political, financial,\nand sporting forecasts are sequential arguments, and we may also\ninclude speculations on the future states of all growing organisms and\ndeveloping institutions.\n\n\n_Time._ The intervals between the objects of a sequence are imagined\nafter the model of lateral intervals in association. This is Time.\nLike space it is mere blanks in experience, though treated by realists\nas external and self-subsisting. It can be measured by reference to\nobjects on whose sequential recurrence we have the most reliance, such\nas the phases of the moon, the positions of the sun in the ecliptic,\nthe movements of the hands of a clock or the chiming of its bells.\nAbstract or unbounded time is called 'eternity'; like abstract space\nit is a refined form of nothing. Time and space are usually coupled\ntogether as if co-ordinate, but eternity is the co-ordinate of space.\nTime is divided sequence and would correspond to materially divided\nspace, that is, space with objects in it at regular intervals.\n\nMatter, space, and time are the three pillars of the realistic world.\nWe have now seen what they are made of. Matter is a general idea\ncompiled by ourselves from phenomenal consciousness. It is no\nsubstance--only an average. Space has even less reality. It is first\nthe interval between two objects in association; then this interval\nis used metaphorically as an expression and measure of perspective\ndecadence. Time is an application of the same associative interval\nto express the blanks between objects in sequence. Space and time\nare thus pure nullities--negatives with positive names. These three\nnotions being exploded as entities, there remain as a residuum of true\nfact and the starting-point of philosophy--_minds_, their _energies_,\nand their _consciousness_. This is a very ancient triad.\n\n\nScience constantly confounds sequence and causation. We are told that\nthe moon _causes_ eclipses of the sun, that heat _causes_ objects to\nexpand, that a seal _causes_ an imprint. This is a metaphor from human\ncausation, and the expression is now so rooted in language that it\nwould hardly be possible to introduce a more correct phraseology. Yet\nit is as incorrect as to say that one o'clock causes two o'clock, or\nthat daylight causes darkness. The confusion has arisen from the fact\nthat both sequence and causation deal with fixed inconvertible series,\nbut only in the latter is there real power exerted to produce the\neffect. Material things and their apparent effects are due to a cause\nlying behind both.\n\n\nXXVII--CAUSATION\n\nCausation differs from all other categories in that one of its\nelements is mental. It is a series beginning in the mind--in this\nrelation denominated _cause_--and developing into objective phenomena\ncalled _effects_ or an effect. The series being known by judgment\nwe can infer similar causes from perception of similar effects. The\ncommonest causation is the use and interpretation of language. Because\nwe utter words from a certain motive we infer that all who utter\nthe same words do so from the same motive. That is the reason of the\nintelligibility of words.\n\nThis category is peculiar from the extremely narrow range of the\nexperience which supplies the judgments. We never perceive any mind\nbut one--our own--and this has to supply all the judgments by which we\nreason concerning other minds. There is therefore no category in which\ncorrect reasoning is so difficult and so rare. No amount of experience\nentirely overcomes this defect, for if we are ignorant we cannot\nunderstand the wise, and if we are wise we cannot conceive the motives\nof the ignorant and vicious. Only those persons who are mentally very\nlike each other are mutually comprehensible.\n\nThis category has a further peculiarity. In all the rest the inference\nrelates to objective experience, and this being due to interaction of\nminds we are justified in saying that until it is perceived it has no\nexistence. But in causation we are inferring something with reference\nto a mind, and this exists though we never can perceive it. We know\nthat minds exist without perception because we know that our own\nexists though no one perceives us--though we are in total darkness and\nsilence and cannot ourselves perceive our bodies. As already stated,\nExistence has not the same meaning when applied to objects and\nto minds, objects being merely temporary conditions of minds. The\nnon-existence of inferred but unperceived objects does not follow from\nany defect in the faculty of inference, but depends on the essential\ncharacter of objects. They are created by mutual contact of minds\nand cannot exist without that condition, however clearly they may be\ninferred and however correctly their appearance may be predicted.\n\n\nCausation is confounded with sequence because both are series. Let\nme illustrate the difference between them by an example. I turn the\nstop-cock of a pipe, and water flows from the open end of the pipe.\nIn popular and even scientific language it would be said that I caused\nthe water to flow. But this is incorrect. All I caused was the turning\nof the tap; that alone was wholly due to my energy and intelligence.\nThere followed as a sequence the outflow of water, but that was due\npartly to cosmic force and partly to the previous human causation (not\nmine) implied in making and laying down the pipe so as to utilise the\ncosmic force. I merely removed an obstacle that prevented the further\ndevelopment of the force in a particular direction. My relation to the\noutflow was sequence, not causation.\n\nIn observation sequence registers fixed or probable series of\n_objects_ without regard to their causes. It is sufficient if they\noccur regularly enough to justify prediction. Causation, on the other\nhand, pays no regard to physical connection of any sort, but seeks\nout the being or beings who supplied the energy producing an effect or\nseries of effects. The speculations in causation pass quite beyond the\ndomain of objectivity, over into the realm of true creation.\n\nWhen we read that 'the succession of events is an endless chain of\neffects which are in their turn causes of new effects,' what is meant\nis sequence, and for 'cause' and 'effect' the terms 'antecedent' and\n'consequent' should have been employed. Sequences may be 'chains' and\nmay be long, but if so their links have been forged by independent\ncauses acting _across_ the chain; as when a line of soldiers fire\nin succession at regular intervals, or as in the case of the moon's\nquarters. In these instances the objects, although forming a series,\nhas each a cause of its own.\n\nCertainly a causation is a series, for the cause precedes the effect.\nBut an effect is never the cause of a succeeding effect. When this\nappears to be the case the explanation is that the energy was not\nexhausted in producing the immediate simple effect, but has produced\na complicated effect in which a series may be discovered. An\nobjective effect, being a mere flash of consciousness--a shadow on a\nwindow-blind--is incapable of causing anything.\n\n\n_Analysis of Cause._ Cause is mind in action. It consists of at\nleast energy and a sentimental _motive_--energy exerted to gratify\nsentiment. If the mind is intellectualised there will probably be\nan ideal element in the cause--in this connection called _plan_\nor _design_--for the better direction of the energy. Normal human\ncausation consists of an effort of mind directed towards the objective\nrealisation of a plan, for the gratification of a sentiment. This is\nthe same as WILL.\n\nAll three elements of cause may be furnished by the same\nindividual--or any two of them--or only one. For instance, the man who\nwants a house supplies the motive, the architect provides the design,\nthe builder finds the energy.\n\nOne plan may use up an indefinite number of separate stores of energy.\nEven in an individual the realisation of a plan exhausts the powers\nof millions of organic cells. A military campaign illustrates the\nrelation of plan to power. The design may have been formed by one man,\nand then communicated wholly or partially to a hundred thousand, and\nthe energies of these may be devoted to its realisation. The soldier\nfights with his own energy, but he is directed by his commander's\nidea, or so much of it as has been confided to him. The design may\nstretch from the commander to the soldier, but not the energy. In\norder that the commander should be termed the 'cause' of his private's\nactivity, it would be necessary to eliminate the notion of exerted\nenergy from causation, and reduce it to bare communication of design,\nwhich would be absurd.\n\nThe stretching of one design over many relays of energy has no\ndoubt helped to confirm the notion that causation is a long chain of\nalternate causes and effects. The truth is that energy can act only\nat short range, and has to be incessantly renewed. The world is in a\nconstant state of creation and dissolution, say the Kabbalists. It is\nabsurd to speak of anything that existed a thousand or even a hundred\nyears ago as the _cause_ of anything existing to-day. The design may\nintellectually survive, but the energy is long since dissipated. We\nhave never more than about a day's supply of energy in store at once.\n\nIf sentiment, power, and design are supplied by different individuals,\nno single one of them can be called the cause of the effect. The\nrelation of each to the result is sequence. When we have traced\nan effect to the mind or minds that supplied the three or the two\nnecessary elements--supposing the design is sometimes omitted and\nthe act what we call _instinctive_--we have obtained a complete\nexplanation of the effect. Our curiosity is then absolutely satisfied.\nWe have reached a true beginning.\n\nIt is the want of this thorough explanation that renders material\nscience so disappointing. We are put off with a mere physical\nantecedent, which itself needs explanation as much as its consequent.\nIt does not make the antecedent more significant to place it far back\nin time, for time by itself is not a cause--it is merely a name given\nto intervals of experience. A thing is never truly explained until we\nsee that its production either caused pleasure to something else, or\nwas expected to cause pleasure. Behind everything must be Sentiment.\n\nOne generation of beings is not the cause of the following generation,\nelse the former would have perished in begetting the latter. More\nparticularly, a man is not the _effect_ of his parents or remoter\nancestors, though they stood to him in an antecedent relation. The\nseed of his body was taken from theirs, but his energy is his\nown, drawn direct from the universal source. If he resembles them\ncorporeally it is because he previously resembled them mentally,\nnot because the cells of his body have hereditary tendencies to\ntake particular forms. Hence the Darwinian genealogy of men and\nanimals--supposing it were correct--does not explain them. It is\na phenomenal schematism based on or implying an erroneous\nassumption--that generation is causation.\n\nAtomism--the theory of Democritus--is founded on another false view\nof causation. The physical parts of a thing are conceived to be\nthe causes of the thing, and so the least conceivable particles of\n'matter' are considered the first causes and true explanation of all\nthings. This notion appears to be useful in chemistry, but it cannot\nbe accepted as philosophy. If our senses were sharpened to perceive\natoms these would simply be small phenomena, and it would still be\nnecessary to inquire what motive and power produced them. It has been\nsuggested that atoms may be inherently sentient and dynamic: if\nso they are minute animals or cells, and we are still without\nan explanation of their occurrence in organised masses. It is\ninconceivable that they should spontaneously enter into intricate\ncombinations, whose evident purpose has only an indirect and partial\nbearing on their welfare.\n\nThough advocated by men of undoubted ability, Atomism and Evolution\nare nothing more than forms of the ordinary realistic belief, that\nthings are caused by their physical antecedents. The two theories are\nsupposed to be complementary, but in reality they are contradictory.\nIf an animal body is caused by its parents it cannot be caused by its\nown atoms, and _vice vers\u00e2_.\n\n\n_Varieties of Causation._ Abstract causation--the category--consists\nof a cause and an effect. The former, as we have seen, is complicated,\nthe latter may comprise several objects. Ignoring the complications\ninvolved in the use of an organism--which comes between the mind and\nthe final effect--we distinguish four or five varieties of causation.\n\n  C--_e_^1--_e_^2--_e_^3--_e_^4\n\nThe cause C produces from its own energy the series of effects\n_e_^1--_e_^4, like the rebounding of a missile from the surface of\nground or water. This may be called 'ricochet.'\n\nEffects, each having an independent cause, sometimes form a series\nlike a ladder:\n\n  _e_^1  _e_^2  _e_^3  _e_^4  _e_^5\n  |      |      |      |      |\n  C      C      C      C      C\n\nThis is the species illustrated by a successive discharge of musketry.\nThe causation of science consists of the _effects_ in this species\nconsidered apart from the causes.\n\nIn the 'gamut' the effects are in sequence, but they have all the same\nphysical antecedent.\n\n  _e_^1  _e_^2  _e_^3  _e_^4  _e_^5\n  |      |      |      |      |\n  +------+------+------+------+\n  |\n  C\n\nThe successive acts of the same man or animal are of this kind.\n\nIn each of these species the effects are in series and may be treated\nas a sequence, but the cause or causes lie outside the sequence. Far\nfrom mere regularity of succession being a proof of causation between\nthe objects, it may very easily be itself a part of the causal design.\n\nIn the 'capstan' several partial causes contribute to produce one\neffect, as when a gang of men manipulate one engine.\n\n  C   C\n  \\ /\n  C--_e_--C\n  / \\\n  C   C\n\nThe 'star' or 'fountain' is the converse of the last. A single cause\nproduces several simultaneous partial\n\n  _e_ _e_\n  \\ /\n  _e_--C--_e_\n  / \\\n  _e_ _e_\n\neffects, as when we strike our open hand smartly on the surface of\nwater.\n\nThese sub-categories enable us, if we so wish, to define an energic\nseries somewhat more precisely than by calling it a causation in the\nmost abstract sense. Possibly also the figures delineated represent\nthe primitive forms which energy takes when emerging into the\nphenomenal. The 'star' is a most characteristic form. The dendritic\nshape so frequently met with in objects is a star springing from a\nray of a preceding star. Perhaps each vegetable bud has an independent\ncause; if not they are 'ricochets' from the general plant life. In the\ncombinations of these elementary effects we have a likely explanation\nof plant and crystal formation.\n\n\n_'Conservation' of Energy._ Energy is annihilated in the using. It\nemanates from a great universal centre, and at a short distance from\nthat centre is completely and irrecoverably dissipated. The apparent\nfixity of things is purely formal--like the fixity of a water-fall,\nwhich renews its substance every few seconds. That is the meaning\nof saying that the world is in a constant state of formation and\ndissolution.\n\nPhysical theorists represent energy under the figure of substance, but\nthey suppose it is fixed in _quantity_ though constantly undergoing\nchange of _form_--the scientific view, here as elsewhere, being just\nthe opposite of the philosophical.\n\nObserve--say the conservationists--the case of a man raising a heavy\nstone from the earth. He fatigues himself but he does not destroy\nenergy; he acquires command over the energy-in-position of the stone,\nand in using it to crack a cocoa-nut or drive a post he receives back\nhis own energy undiminished in quantity.\n\nThat seems reasonable at first sight. A quantity of energy is taken\nfrom the man and put into the stone; it is taken from the stone and\nput into the driven post. To be sure, if the man undrives the post he\ndoes not thereby disfatigue himself, as the theory would lead us to\nexpect--he fatigues himself the more.\n\nThe same 'law,' we are told, holds good in building a dam across a\nstream and utilising the force of water to drive a mill. The energy\napparently lost in the construction is recovered in the superior ease\nwith which we grind our corn or saw our timber. There is a confusion\nin the terminology here: to save energy that would otherwise be lost\nis not identical with recovering energy that has once been used.\n\nWe make a gun, load it, and discharge a bullet against a target. What\nhas become of the force expended? It has been transformed into heat,\nsay the conservationists. And when the target and flattened bullet\nhave cooled down? The energy has gone to raise the general temperature\nof the universe!\n\nThat is a conclusion hard to believe and impossible to verify.\nBut--granting that the individual explosions of a gun may be the\n'conservation' of some antecedent power--how do we recover the initial\nexpense of the instrument? And if not recoverable, where at least\nand in what form does it exist? Prior to the explosions that are\nrepresented by heated targets and the like, energy was spent in\ninventing and making the gun, making the ammunition, loading and\naiming the piece. All these were essential to the effect--and what has\nbecome of them? Have they also gone to warm the universe?\n\nInstead of raising a stone to a height, let us carry it along\nhorizontally till we feel the same degree of fatigue. If energy in\nthe using is merely transformed but not lost, we should now be in\npossession of some power equivalent to the energy expended. But we are\nnot--we have nothing to show for our trouble.\n\nIf we construct a water-mill and fix it high and dry in the middle of\na plain, instead of under a fall of water, we get no return for the\nenergy expended. By such a law as the conservation of energy, and\nwith the usefulness of a properly placed mill as the measure of\ncompensation, we should receive an equivalent return no matter where\nthe mill is placed. What has _place_ to do with the action of a\nuniversal law?\n\nInstead of raising the stone or carrying it horizontally, let us\nfind it near the edge of a precipice and roll it over. There is no\nproportion between the push that launched the stone, and the force it\nexhibits on reaching the foot of the precipice. How is the equivalence\nof energy maintained in this case? It will be replied that the force\nnow at work is gravitation. If so, it was gravitation that brought\ndown the first stone on the post--not any energy transferred from us\nto the stone. The raising of the stone put us in a position to use the\nforce of gravity, just as climbing the precipice put us in a position\nto roll the stone over the edge of it.\n\nSuch considerations as these make this 'law' incredible to me. But\nwhen I pass from the explanation to the concrete facts, I have no\ndifficulty in understanding them. It is the law that is obscure--not\nthe facts.\n\nThere exists nothing but living minds of different degrees of energy.\nWe men are small beings associated with a cosmical creature whose\nforce is immeasurably greater than ours, and we have intelligence\nenough to utilise part of this force to supplement our own. That is\nthe meaning of _mechanism_. Some efforts to control the cosmic forces\nare profitable, but there is no transmutation of our energy into\nthe result, nor any necessary equivalence between the labour and\nthe result. We may stumble upon an available cosmic force almost by\naccident--we may waste a life-time over a mechanical problem and fail\nto solve it.\n\nThe utilisation of cosmic force by man is best explained by comparing\nit with animal slavery. Trap a wild elephant and train him to draw and\ncarry--you have constructed an engine. There are of course important\ndifferences between the two kinds of instrument, due to the enormous\ndisproportion between the magnitude and power of the respective\nentities. In the case of the animal the whole life comes under our\ncontrol: in the case of the cosmos we can utilise only a minute\nfraction of it, and that rather by putting ourselves in its way than\nby making it obey us. The animal we have to feed: the cosmic being\ndoes not draw upon us for its nourishment. We can direct the animal\nthrough his sensibility: the cosmic sensibility appears to be beyond\nour power of irritation.\n\nApart from these differences the general laws of the one kind of tool\nare those of the other also. We have not transferred power to the\nraised stone, or the coiled spring, or the loaded gun, or the embanked\nriver--any more than to the tamed and harnessed horse. There is no\nfixed ratio between the fatigue of catching and training an animal,\nand the energy saved by making him work for us. The animal's work\nis not our own energy given back to us--neither is the machine's. A\nplough is useless without cattle to draw it--so is a turbine without\nwater to drive it. When coal is burned to 'generate' electricity,\nthat is the cosmic equivalent of exhausting or killing one animal\nto overpower or to feed another: the energy of combustion is utterly\ndestroyed--not transformed into the electricity.\n\n\nThe question can be more accurately stated and brought to a plain\nissue if we use the terms and forms of dialectic.\n\nA theory is an argument--when it is not a fallacy--and an argument,\nwe have seen, consists of two parts. There is the matter of fact\nrequiring explanation, and the antecedent knowledge which is used to\nillustrate it. Of these the precedent is the more important, and it is\nno valid objection to a criticism that the person who offers it\nknows less about the _case_ than the theorist. The critic may be in\npossession of a better precedent, which the theorist has failed to\nnotice, perhaps from a too exclusive attention to the case.\n\nIn the question before us the case is Mechanical or Inorganic Energy.\nIt is not an object, but an inference from the knowledge of our\npersonal mental energy. This latter is the only energy we really\nperceive. But we find in objects, or associated with the perception of\nthem, a power capable of assisting or of opposing our efforts--hence\nwe conclude it is something of the same nature as our own power. We\ncannot well avoid that inference, and there is no apparent reason why\nwe should try to avoid it.\n\nSo far science and philosophy are at one, but here they part company.\nPhilosophy consistently endows Nature with sentiency also, for we\nnever--to our certain knowledge--meet with energy without sentiency,\nand we have no right to transfer one attribute without the other.\n\nAlthough science is indebted to the assimilation of organic and\ninorganic--Nature explained by Man--for the first notion of external\nenergy, no sooner is the notion formed than the argument is discarded,\nand external energy is declared to be entirely destitute of an organic\nand mental character. How then is it to be further explained? To what\nshall it now be likened?\n\nIn the materialistic scheme all things are supposed to be resolved\ninto matter and force. Matter is conceived as a self-existent\nsubstance, indestructible, &c. It is better known than force, for\nmaterial things can be directly perceived whereas force is imaginary\nall the time. Under these circumstances it is natural though illogical\nto treat force as a species of matter. With only two things left in\nthe universe, the better known of the two will be used to explain the\nless known, if an explanation is considered indispensable. Force is\naccordingly brought as a 'case' under matter as a 'precedent,' and\nis concluded to be indestructible because matter is believed to be\nindestructible; and when energy appears to be wasted the inference is\nthat it has simply withdrawn from view, like an object that has ceased\nto be perceived and may be perceived again. That seems to be the\nevolution of the scientific notion of inorganic energy.\n\nThis theorem is fallacious in two respects. There is no such matter\nas science imagines. Matter is a general idea formed by the study\nof material objects, which are states of consciousness excited by\nnoumenal contact. It is the average object--a mere affection or\nformation of the observing mind. _We_ are the makers of matter.\nSuch an idea cannot be said to be indestructible: in a sense it is\ndestroyed in an individual when it is forgotten or inactive; it\nwould certainly be destroyed if all minds ceased to form it. Thus the\nprecedent in the scientific theory of force is itself false.\n\nThen energy is not in the least like matter--either the matter of\nscience or that of philosophy. The energy we really know is a unique\nexperience--not a general idea, nor anything analogous to a phenomenal\nobject; so that even if the proposed precedent were true in itself, it\nis not applicable to the case. To complete our knowledge of external\nenergy we must go back to that comparison which first suggested to us\nthat there is external energy, namely, the comparison of living man\nwith living nature.\n\nIf this is not a correct account of the derivation of the notion that\ncosmic energy is indestructible, let conservationists tell us what is\nthe parallel on which they are arguing. Here is a blank theorem for\ncompletion--\n\n          _x_        | is indestructible\n  -------------------+------------------------------\n  Cosmic energy is a | _it must therefore be considered\n  sort of _x_        | indestructible_\n\nMatter, as we have seen, is not _x_. Human energy is not _x_. Our\nindividual power--so far as experience informs us--is destroyed in\nthe using. A day's work exhausts us, and we have to pass into the\ncondition called sleep to be refilled. It is sleep, not food, that\nrefreshes the mind. Food restores the bodily tool we have been working\nwith--puts a fresh edge on the chisel,--but it does not recuperate the\npower that wields the tool.\n\nWhat then is _x_?\n\n\n    _NOTE ON DREAMS_\n\n    If dreams could be studied with our waking consciousness they\n    would throw much light on our mental nature. Being a poor\n    dreamer myself I am not competent to discuss this phase of\n    psychology as it deserves. I think however the bulk of our\n    dreams can be reduced to two principles. There is first\n    the simple lowering of the mental energy, which weakens the\n    attention and dissolves the artificial categories, thus making\n    ordinary reason impossible. There is just enough energy left\n    to revive a few scattered ideas, which blend together\n    without control or regard to precedent. Hence the singular\n    combinations they sometimes form.\n\n    In the waking state the objective and intellectual\n    experience are generally more vivid and engrossing than the\n    sentimental--at least in masculine persons. (I deliberately\n    avoid the phrase 'masculine mind,' because there is manifestly\n    no sex in mind.) In dreams the converse of this is the case.\n    The objects we appear to see are dull and indistinct, being\n    ideas mistaken for objects, whilst the feelings are evidently\n    genuine and sometimes of great intensity. This may be\n    explained on the occult principle alluded to in section X.\n\n    What I understand by occult influence is this. In ordinary\n    experience the object is first perceived, then a sentiment may\n    be excited either by the same noumenon or by recollection. In\n    the occult procedure this order is reversed. The sentiment is\n    first secretly reached through the chinks of our intellectual\n    armour, and the intellect is not excited at all or only by\n    association. During sleep, when the Self is nearly exhausted\n    of power, it is likely we are more exposed than usual to such\n    influences. They invade our mind and excite our sentiment\n    without awaking the intellect. Whatever ideas accompany the\n    sentiments are generally inadequate to explain them, the stock\n    of available ideas being now reduced.\n\n    The conversations we hold in dreams, and the apparent\n    communication of knowledge that takes place, are referred by\n    Du Prel to a division of the ego into two or more individuals\n    who talk together. This notion appears to me forced and\n    unthinkable. Under what image is the ego figured that\n    it should be capable of division? In the waking state we\n    sometimes ask ourselves questions, and on consideration find\n    answers to them. We cannot recall a name, a word, or date,\n    though we know it is somewhere in our memory, and we pause and\n    search till we succeed in exciting the latent image. When this\n    takes place in a dream the information is assumed to come from\n    another individual by an easy dramatisation.\n\n    A disturbance in the body during sleep may constitute--like\n    all bodily suffering--a drain upon our mental energy, which\n    will be felt as a sentiment and may excite ideas by sympathy.\n    No doubt many dreams are caused in this manner.\n\n    Since our waking consciousness is highly artificial and\n    imaginary, we may infer that whilst dreaming we are nearer to\n    the natural, primitive state of the mind, but in a weakened\n    condition.\n\n\n    [Footnote 13: Ueberweg's _Logic_, Fleming's _Vocabulary_, and\n    Dickenson's _Dict. of Philosophy_.]\n\n    [Footnote 14: When the perspective object is accurately\n    measured by instrument at a known distance from the eye, and\n    the tactual size of the object is also known, the associative\n    distance can be calculated by simple proportion. Multiply the\n    measuring distance by the tactual size and divide the product\n    by the perspective size--the quotient is the distance. The\n    perspective size of objects is greatly exaggerated in realism.\n    Most people think they see a man at his full stature for a\n    distance of fifty yards or so. At that distance the tallest\n    man does not measure half an inch in height. At twenty feet a\n    six-foot man measures 3\u00b76 inches--at ten feet 7\u00b72 inches.\n    The people assembled in a room forty feet long range in\n    real--perspective--height from seven inches to two inches.\n    When a man is nearer than ten feet we do not perceive him in\n    one operation--we observe him in parts which we put together\n    in the mind.]\n\n    [Footnote 15: Probably Dr. Johnson meant to be humorous in his\n    way. The principles of Idealism are apt to excite mirth in the\n    unphilosophical, but the laugh is not always on the side of\n    the scoffer. A member of the Persian philosophical sect\n    called Samradians once said to his steward: 'The world and\n    its inhabitants have no actual existence; they have merely\n    an ideal being.' The servant on hearing this took the first\n    favourable opportunity to conceal his master's horse, and\n    when he was about to ride brought him an ass with the horse's\n    saddle. When the Samradian asked, 'Where is the horse?'--the\n    servant replied, 'Thou hast been thinking of an idea; there\n    was no horse in being.' The master answered, 'It is true';\n    he then mounted the ass, and after riding for some time he\n    suddenly dismounted and taking the saddle off the ass's back\n    placed it on the servant's, drawing the girths tightly; and\n    having forced the bridle into his mouth, he mounted him and\n    flogged him along vigorously. The servant in piteous accents\n    exclaimed, 'What is the meaning of this treatment?'--to which\n    the Samradian replied, 'There is no such thing as a whip; it\n    is merely ideal; thou art only thinking of some illusion.'\n    After which the steward repented and restored the horse.\n\n    Another Samradian--or perhaps the same individual--having\n    married the daughter of a rich man, she, on finding out\n    her husband's creed, proposed to have some amusement at his\n    expense. One day the Samradian brought in a bottle of pure\n    wine, which during his absence she emptied of its contents and\n    filled with water. When the time for taking wine arrived she\n    poured out water instead of wine, into a gold cup which was\n    her own property. The Samradian having observed, 'Thou hast\n    given me water instead of wine,'--she answered, 'It is only\n    ideal; there was no wine in existence.' The husband then said,\n    'Thou hast spoken well; hand me the cup that I may go to\n    a neighbour's house and bring it back full of wine.' He\n    thereupon took out the gold cup, which he sold, and instead\n    of it brought back an earthen vessel full of wine. The wife on\n    seeing this said, 'What hast thou done with the golden cup?'\n    He replied, 'Thou art surely thinking of some ideal\n    golden cup'--on which the woman greatly regretted her\n    witticism.--_Dabist\u00e1n_, v. i. p. 199-200.]\n\n\n\n\nREDACTION OF COLLOQUIAL ARGUMENTS\n\n\nXXVIII\n\nA clever man has said that the use of language is to conceal thought.\nIts primary use is certainly not to reveal thought, but to enable\none person to produce an effect on the mind of another or of others,\neither for their or his own advantage. In the course of using\nspeech as an instrument of command, entreaty, persuasion, menace, or\nfustigation, it may happen that the movements of the speaker's mind\nare revealed to some extent, but this is a mere incident, not the main\npurpose of the speech.\n\nGrammar is the system of rules which govern the use of language in its\nprimary and ordinary capacity.\n\nIt follows from this that language is in no sense a revelation of the\nreasoning processes, nor do the rules of grammar coincide with the\nlaws of intellect. It is just as reasonable to expect to find the\nmetaphysic of thought revealed in any of the industrial and fine arts,\nas to look for it in the structure of speech. Aristotle drew his logic\nfrom the composition of the Greek sentence--he might as well have\nsought for logic in the constitution of the Greek buskin.[16]\n\nEven when men begin to reason aloud and seek to render their logical\nmovements as evident as possible, they are so hampered by the ordinary\nhabits and rules of speech that their meaning is often difficult or\nimpossible of comprehension. Whence arises the necessity, if we would\nreason aloud to any purpose, of redacting or translating language from\nthe vernacular into a dialect more indicative of the logical processes\nthat take place when we reason.\n\nThis redaction consists mainly in distinguishing clearly the four\nparts composing an argument, namely, the Subject of the Precedent; the\nCase which is brought under it for judgment; the Applicate or part of\nthe precedent bearing on the case; the Conclusion, which is the ideal\njudgment concerning the case. When these four parts are expressed and\nclearly understood we have a perfect argument, so far as argumentation\ndepends on language. But probably we have spoiled the language from\nthe grammatical and rhetorical point of view. We may have had\nto supply much that would be redundant and unsightly in ordinary\nconversation or writing, and to take away much that is appropriate to\ncolloquial discourse. We are diverting language to a use for which\nit was not designed, and we need not be surprised if the result is\nungraceful. This cannot be helped since there exists no other means\nthan language by which to express our concrete reasoning.\n\nI have already shown practically how an argument can be arranged so\nas to indicate the logical relations subsisting between its parts. A\nGreek cross is drawn, and in the four angles thus made the four parts\nof the argument are written, or the principal words of each. Begin\nwith the conclusion, for that is generally the most explicitly given;\nthen find or supply the part of the precedent that agrees or logically\nrhymes with it; next place the subject in the first compartment, and\nthe case under it. These relative positions should not be varied. When\nthis has been practiced for a while it enables one to dismember the\nmost intricate argument with ease and exactness.\n\nThe redaction or re-writing of the language can be abbreviated by\nregarding the horizontal line as equivalent to a declaration of\nresemblance between case and precedent-subject, and (by application)\nbetween the illustrative abstraction and conclusion. If there is an\nargument at all there must be this resemblance, and the right-hand\nparts must have one of the six categorical relations to the left-hand\nparts. The contents of the angles may be cut down to a word or two,\nas--\n\n          I.\n  Tyrants | death\n  --------+--------\n  Caesar  | _death_\n\nIf the category be further indicated by a numeral over the upright\nline, we have the essential parts of the argument in a very compact\nform. The cross and categorical numeral may be regarded as a\nsufficient substitute for grammatical syntax and punctuation.\n\nThe negative word that generally occurs in stigmatic arguments\nrequires special attention. It should always be put in the second\nangle, and when it may read so as to negative the subject it should\nbe hyphened to the predicate, thus giving it the value of _non_, _un_,\n_im_, or other negative prefix. To say colloquially that 'all Russians\nare not angels' leaves room to believe that some Russians are angels,\nthe 'not' applying to 'all' instead of to 'angels.' By linking 'not'\nto 'angels' we get a term equivalent to non-angelic, which expresses\nthe meaning intended--that no Russians are angels.\n\nCaution should be observed with partitive words like 'some,' 'many,'\n'a few,' &c. There is little danger of ambiguity when they occur in\nthe case, for that means that we bring only a portion of a group\nof things to judgment, which we are manifestly entitled to do. The\nconclusion however applies only to the portion in question, not to\nthe rest of the group. 'Honest men deserve respect; some Negroes are\nhonest men; _these particular Negroes deserve respect_.'\n\nIn the precedent, partitive words imply that only some of the subject\nhave the applicate. If that portion is a dialectical 'all'--that is,\nif there has been no exception in the course of our experience--we\nmay, though that experience has been limited, venture to treat the\napplicate as universal and ground a conclusion upon it. If the subject\nis really partitive--if we know for certain that some subjects have\nthe applicate and others have it not--the conclusion must follow the\ngreater probability. If the number and character of the observed cases\nis known we can express the probability arithmetically; it is the\nnumber of occurrences of a given character divided by the total\nnumber.\n\nRedaction must not be used to correct original errors of observation;\nits purpose is to render explicit in language what is implicit in\nthought, not what might have been thought supposing the thinker had\nbeen more intelligent or industrious than he was.\n\n'Conversion' is a process admitted or required in the artificial\nmethods of syllogistic dialectic. It consists mainly in transposing\nthe subject and predicate of a proposition, as 'some Europeans are\nMohammedans'--'some Mohammedans are Europeans,' This operation\nnever takes place in real argument, or is merely the emendation of a\nproposition at first awkwardly expressed. Conversion can take place\nonly when the predicate is a class, hence the categorical propositions\ncannot be converted.\n\n\n    [Footnote 16: Though evidently suggested by language, the\n    form which the syllogistic logic finally assumed is so unlike\n    anything grammatical, that it is easily convertible into\n    symbols having no resemblance to language. It has been\n    put into literal symbols with algebraic values, and into\n    geometrical diagrams. A logical machine has even been invented\n    by Professor Jevons, 'worked by keys like a pianoforte,' which\n    returns 'infallible answers'--of the Aristotelian sort--to\n    every kind of question. That is sufficiently unlike both\n    reason and language.]\n\n\n\n\nFALLACIES\n\n\nXXIX--OF EQUIVOCATION AND MAL-OBSERVATION\n\nFallacies are counterfeit or sham arguments. They may fail to be\narguments--(1) because their antecedents are false; (2) because the\nantecedents though true are not arranged dialectically, and do not\nsuggest the right conclusion; (3) because the language is equivocal.\n\nTo take the last first. So many things are called by the same name,\nand so many different names may be applied to the same thing, that if\nwe attempt to argue from words alone, without any personal knowledge\nof the things or judgments that are in question, we shall certainly\nmake mistakes. The only security against this sort of fallacy is much\nexperience, and the self-denial necessary to relinquish argument and\nthe criticism of arguments, when we have no sufficient knowledge of\nthe data.\n\nThe degree of imperfection in observation which should be considered\nto render the theorem fallacious, is no easy matter to determine. One\nclass of logicians (the Formal) get over the difficulty by declaring\nthat dialectic is not concerned with concrete knowledge at all,[17]\nbut only with its general properties (as conceived by Aristotle),\nand they have set up as a standard of logical truth the capability of\nbeing imagined. A centaur is to them as true a fact as a horse, and\nthey would accept as valid such a theorem as this: 'All centaurs\nobject to be shod with iron; Gryneus is a centaur; therefore we may\nconclude that he would resist being shod with iron.' No amount of\nconceivability or formal coherence can make this other than nonsense.\n\nJ. S. Mill and his followers go to the opposite extreme. They\nstudy all the sciences and endeavour to master their methods of\nreasoning--which is well; but they do so with the prepossession that\nthere exists some absolute standard of knowledge to fail in attaining\nwhich involves fallacy. They thus condemn as false all theorems based\non superseded notions of nature and man. Only modern thinkers can\nargue rationally--the ancients were all and habitually victims of\nfallacy,--and of the moderns only the few are rational who have\nmastered the latest theories on every subject. This is the principle\nof Mill's doctrine on the fallacies of observation; we can see that\nhe regarded all beliefs as fallacious which he had himself outgrown\nor did not feel a need of. 'Truth' was simply the facts and judgments\nthat happened to suit Mill's mental constitution.\n\nFrom the Substantial point of view this is an untenable position.\n\nNo degree of observation is intrinsically defective if it serve\nthe purpose of intellect, which is to protect the mind. There is no\nintellectual truth as a thing in itself. The thoughts of a sparrow or\na child are as perfect as those of a man, if they afford the necessary\ndefence to the individual's sentiment. As we change our inner mental\ncharacter, new intellectual ideas have to be acquired and the old\nare discarded, perhaps completely forgotten. They appear now to be\nignorances and fallacies--mal-observation and bad reasoning. The\nnew seem to be so much truer--perhaps infallibly true. All that is\nillusion. We make another advance, and the thoughts that a week before\nwere as stable as rocks are now cast aside as absurd. Perhaps the\nbelief in the certainty of present judgments is a condition of our\nmaking the best use of them; if so they should not be shaken until we\nare ready to enter on the next stage of knowledge.\n\nIt is quite true that one man may know more than another, but the\nground on which the more intellectual is generally considered to be\nsuperior to the latter is not the right one. He is not better for his\nintellectual acquirements, but he is better if his mind, being of a\nfiner sort, required a superior intellect to defend it. At bottom,\nthen, the general cause of mal-observation--there are particular\ncauses which interfere with the general rule--is inferiority of\nsentimental character. We do not see what we do not need to see, and\nwe see imperfectly what is not essential to our well-being. That we\nshould be ignorant or reason badly about what does not concern us is\nnot in itself a defect.\n\nIt is inconsistent with these views on the function of intellect\nto admit that any sort of non-observation or mal-observation can be\nalways and for all alike fallacious. If there are things which\nwe habitually ignore, the presumption is that they do not concern\nus--that the knowledge they would confer is not essential to our\nwelfare and would be intellectual lumber.\n\nI should therefore abstain from condemning as fallacies theorems\ndrawn in good faith from facts believed to be true, and which serve as\nmotives of conduct. They are sophisms only when the reasoners have not\ntaken ordinary pains to verify their data, or, knowing the antecedents\nto be false, pretend to believe them for some immoral purpose.\n\n\nXXX--OF PARALLEL ARRANGEMENT\n\nThere is no fault of perversion, mutilation, or entanglement in the\nstatement of an argument that we do not meet with in actual reasoning.\nEven in the writings of educated and honest thinkers it is rare to\nmeet with an argument the parts of which are clearly distinguished by\nthe author himself, and expressed so as to show the precise degree of\nforce they ought to carry. Reasoning is still only a semi-conscious\nprocess directed by rule-of-thumb. We make certain statements and find\nthey have a power of moving others, so we continue to make them.\nBut whether the result is due to the rationality of the discourse or\nmerely to the docility of the hearers, we do not know, and--so long as\nthe desired result follows--we do not care to inquire.\n\nFor this state of things logicians are to a great extent responsible.\nThey are uncritical imitators of the Greek philosophers, whose notions\non dialectic were quite wrong. The Greeks and their medieval and\nmodern followers have squandered attention on a mental process which\nis not reason, mistaking it for reason, so that practically there has\nnever been a science of dialectic. However much reasoners may have\nwished to present their thoughts coherently, they have not been\nprovided with a method or notation adapted to the purpose. With an\ninstinctive sense of the futility of the Syllogism, they have ignored\nit completely. I cannot call to mind a single controversial work that\nhas been presented in syllogistic form, nor do even trained logicians\nuse it overtly in argument.[18] Yet if it were what it professes to\nbe, it would be as natural and convenient to express our arguments in\nsyllogism as it is to put down on paper a sum in arithmetic. We are,\nas regards the expression of reasoning, in the position of numerical\nthinkers before the invention of figures and the elaboration of\narithmetical rules. We have to do all our arguments 'in our head,' and\nso we do them badly. We can seldom be sure of the correctness of\nour own reasonings, and we are constantly being misled by sophistry.\nNothing indeed will enable us to reason well or to detect false\nreasoning on a subject of which we are entirely ignorant, but a large\nmeasure of protection would be afforded by the adoption of a uniform\nsystem of presenting arguments, by which all the assumptions they\ninvolve are rendered explicit.\n\n\nOne of the commonest omissions in argumentation is to take the\nprecedent for granted. This is allowable when it is a fact universally\nknown or believed. 'If you let the glass fall it will be broken,'--the\nomitted precedent is the known consequences of letting brittle\nthings fall to the ground. 'Caius is a liar, therefore he is a\ncoward'--presupposes that every liar is a coward.\n\nThis liberty of suppression is sometimes used sophistically. The\ntacit precedent is not universally known or accepted, but if it is\nquestioned the sophist is ready with an exclamation of surprise\nor contempt at our supposed ignorance. Persons who are afraid of\nappearing singular in their beliefs are liable to be deceived by this\ntrick.\n\n    'It frequently happens,' says Whately, 'in the case of a\n    fallacy [of omitted precedent] that the hearers are left to\n    the alternative of supplying either a premiss which is not\n    true, or else one which does not prove the conclusion: _e.g._\n    if a man expatiates on the distress of the country, and thence\n    argues that the government is tyrannical, we must suppose him\n    to assume either that \"every distressed country is under a\n    tyranny,\" which is a manifest falsehood, or merely that \"every\n    country under a tyranny is distressed,\" which, however true,\n    proves nothing, the Middle Term being undistributed.... Which\n    are we to suppose the speaker meant us to understand? Surely\n    just whichever each of his hearers might happen to prefer:\n    some might assent to the false premiss; others allow the\n    unsound syllogism; to the sophist himself it is indifferent,\n    as long as they can be brought to admit the conclusion.'\n\n\nWe sometimes attempt to reason from _Contrast_ instead of resemblance,\nwith a confused notion that things which differ in some respects must\ndiffer also in others. 'Who spareth the rod hateth the child; the\nparent who loveth his child must _therefore_ spare not the rod.' The\nfallacy of this becomes apparent when we complete the theorem in the\nparallel form.\n\n                                VI.\n  The hating parent              | spares the rod\n  -------------------------------+---------------\n  The loving parent differs from | [_No Conclusion_]\n  the hating parent              |\n\nThe following has often been presented as a valid argument--'What is\nuniversally believed must be true; the belief in God's existence is\nnot universal; it is therefore not true.'\n\n                               I.\n  What is universally believed | is true\n  -----------------------------+-------\n  The existence of God is not  | _N. C._\n  universally believed\n\nTo establish the conclusion aimed at, it would be necessary to lay\ndown as precedent--'What is not universally believed is not true.'\n\nThese theorems from contrast are on a par with the following--\n\n                     I.\n  Cows               | are four-footed\n  -------------------+--------------------------\n  Sheep are not cows | _sheep are not four-footed_\n\nThis is the fallacy called in the quaint language of the syllogists\n'Illicit Process of the Major Term.'\n\n\nIn _False Analogy_ the resemblance is so slight that the application\nis untrustworthy, or a conclusion is drawn in excess of the\nresemblance. If from the habit of calling a deep bay or salt-water\nloch an 'arm' of the sea from its analogy to a human arm, we conclude\nthat the sea has elbows and wrists, we commit this fallacy. The earth\nis like an orange, but we must not think that it is pulpy inside.\n\nAkin to this is the fallacy of _False Generality_ or _Doubtful\nPrecedent_. It consists in carelessly or perversely using bad\nantecedents when better are available. This applies to such current\nprejudices as that all Frenchmen are frivolous, all Germans mystical,\nall Jews dishonest, all Carthaginians faithless, all rich people\npurseproud, all nobles haughty, and so on. Even if all the\nCarthaginians we personally knew had proved faithless, our general\nknowledge of mankind should keep us from inferring that a whole\nnation should be faithless. The most we should conclude is that _some_\nCarthaginians are faithless, but we are free to exercise caution in\nfuture dealings with members of that race. All these generalities\nare grounded on this prior argument: 'when a known portion of a class\nexhibits certain qualities, we are justified in inferring that the\nwhole class possess these qualities'--which is only occasionally true.\n\n\nThe fallacy of _Accident_ occurs when the precedent is so defined\nas not to exclude exceptions, and the case happens to be one of\nthe exceptions. 'What gives pain should be abstained from; surgical\noperations give pain; they should therefore be abstained from.' The\npainful things that should be universally abstained from are those\nwhich give needless or useless pain, not the sort that give less pain\nthan they remove. Falstaff committed this fallacy when he supposed\nthat the King would be a boon companion like the Prince. So did the\ncolonists who introduced rabbits and water-cress into Australia, on\nthe supposition that they would there have the same function or value\nas in Great Britain. In consequence of the Accidental change the\nrabbits have developed into a pest, and the water-cress obstructs\nnavigation.\n\n\nIf the applicate is a property of the subject only when the latter is\ntaken collectively, it will not yield a true conclusion when the parts\nor individuals of the subject are taken separately. All the angles of\na triangle are equal to two right angles, but it does not follow that\none of them--though it resembles the triangle to some extent--is equal\nto two right angles. In this instance we should render the meaning\nclear by saying 'collectively equal,' when no argument follows and no\nmistake is made. This is called the fallacy of _Division_.\n\n\nThe fallacy of _Composition_ is the converse of this. What is true\nof several singulars may not be true of all of them taken together.\nBecause each of the witnesses in a law case is liable to error, it\ndoes not follow that the concurrent testimony of many is not to be\ncredited. (Jevons.)\n\n\n_Circular_ or _Tautological_ theorems (_Petitio Principii_ Begging the\nQuestion) are a breach of rule 2, section XVIII. This fallacy often\nconsists in proposing as a precedent the case, or information drawn\nfrom the case and stated in other words. 'To allow every man an\nunbounded freedom of speech must always be, on the whole, advantageous\nto the State; for it is highly conducive to the interests of the\nCommunity that each individual should enjoy a liberty perfectly\nunlimited of expressing his sentiments.' (Whately.)\n\n  It is conducive    | that each individual should enjoy\n  -------------------+------------------------------\n  It is advantageous | to allow\n\nThere may be tautology in a single word--the 'question-begging\nepithet.' We undertake to prove something, but get no further than\nthe use of metaphors implying the point in dispute. For example, some\nscientific writers are anxious to promote the belief that animal life\nis a combination of natural forces--that there is no individual life\ndistinct from cosmic life,--but all their proof consists in calling a\nman or beast a 'machine,' and calling machines 'creatures.' This might\nbe mistaken for the Substantialist doctrine on the same subject, but\nthe two are radically different. Substantialism asserts that man and\nnature have _similar_ lives--materialism teaches that they have only\none life in common, and that the coarse, mindless life of the cosmos\nas conceived realistically.\n\nConclusions may be used as precedents before verification, but it is\nnot lawful to assume a hypothetical precedent on the understanding\nthat it is to be proved in the course of the argument, and then use\nthe conclusion so obtained to prove its own precedent. This is also\ndialectical tautology, but the circle includes two or more theorems.\nWhen naturalists tell us that in the struggle for life the fittest\nonly survive, and when asked how we know which are the fittest they\nreply that the fittest are known by the fact of their surviving, we\nhave a tautological argument.\n\n  Animals that survive | are the fittest  | Fittest animals | survive\n  ---------------------+------------------+-----------------+--------------\n  A particular animal  | _hence it is the | This animal is  | _which is the\n  has survived         | fittest of its   | the fittest of  | reason it has\n                       | species_         | its species.    | survived_\n\nSurvival under competitive conditions is first assumed, and from it\nis deduced the superiority of the existing type of animal; then this\ninferential superiority is offered to justify the previously imagined\ncompetitive survival. The two hypotheses waltz round each other\nwithout making any rational advance.\n\nWhen a book is quoted to prove its own authenticity we have\nthis fallacy; or when the precedent is as unknown as the\nconclusion,--'Paradise was in Armenia, therefore Gihon is an Asiatic\nriver.'\n\nThe academical syllogism as defined--not always as presented--contains\ntwo fallacies, one of which is tautology. 'ALL Europeans are white;\nCaius is a European; therefore he is white.' If, as logicians say, the\n'all' is absolute and includes Caius even before he is mentioned, then\nit is clear that the theorem amounts to saying, 'All Europeans are\nwhite, and one of them is Caius.' 'Both the twins are fair-haired;\nCaius is one of the twins; therefore he is fair-haired':--the\npretended conclusion is merely a naming of a part of the precedent.\nThe first of these theorems may be interpreted so as to give a valid\nconclusion. We are informed that an unknown person called Caius is a\nEuropean; we are not told, and we do not know, what is the colour of\nhis skin; but because all the Europeans we have known have been white,\nwe infer--pending actual knowledge--that Caius is white. Logicians\ninterpret the syllogism otherwise, for they have a notion that reason\nshould give infallible certainty.\n\n\nAfter the precedent has been divided into subject and applicate,\nthe former is sometimes used as applicate and so generates a wrong\nconclusion. This may be called _Cross Reasoning_ or _Diagonal\nReasoning_--the fallacy termed by logicians 'Undistributed Middle.'\n\n  Manx cats            | have no tails\n  ---------------------+----------------------\n  This cat has no tail | _it must be a Manx cat_\n\nDe Morgan has this example--'His imbecility of character might have\nbeen inferred from his proneness to favourites; for all weak princes\nhave this failing.'\n\n  All weak princes | are prone\n  -----------------+------------------------\n  He was prone     | _he must have been weak_\n\nStatements are sometimes put forward as reasoning which contain no\ncase, either expressed or understood. This will seem hardly\ncredible seeing that the illustration of a case is the purpose of\nargumentation. Not only does it occur, but a certain form of it is\nregarded by some logicians as valid reasoning. It is the 'particular'\nsyllogism of the Third Figure.\n\n  _Socrates was poor;\n  Socrates was wise._\n\nFrom these premises no conclusion can be extracted, unless it be the\nverbal summary--'Socrates was both poor and wise.' But logicians draw\nfrom it the dialectic conclusion--\n\n  _Therefore some men have been poor and wise_,\n  or\n  _Therefore one man has been poor and wise_.\n\nBoth these conclusions are inadmissible. It is because they are\nempirically true that we are apt to think their truth depends on the\nantecedent information. If we wish to extend the qualities of Socrates\nto 'some men' we must make them a case with 'Socrates is poor and\nwise' for a precedent, but I fail to see how it is to be done. If we\nadd to the premises, 'One man was Socrates, therefore one man was poor\nand wise,' we have a tautological fallacy.\n\n\nJ. S. Mill notices a fallacy which amounts to an _Inversion_ of the\nParallel: the conclusion is known or believed and the truth of the\nantecedents is inferred backwards.\n\n    'People continually think and express themselves as if they\n    believed that the premises cannot be false if the conclusion\n    is true. The truth, or supposed truth, of the inferences which\n    follow from a doctrine, often enables it to find acceptance\n    in spite of gross absurdities in it. How many philosophical\n    systems which had scarcely any intrinsic recommendation have\n    been received by thoughtful men because they were supposed to\n    lend additional support to religion, morality, some favourite\n    view of politics, or some other cherished persuasion; not\n    merely because their wishes were thereby enlisted on its side,\n    but because its leading to what they deemed sound conclusions\n    appeared to them a strong presumption in favour of its\n    truth, though the presumption, when viewed in its true light,\n    amounted only to the absence of that particular evidence\n    of falsehood which would have resulted from its leading by\n    correct inference to something already known to be false.'[19]\n\nThe conclusion of an argument may sometimes be left unexpressed. If\nthe antecedents are strong and the conclusion obvious it weakens the\nargument to state the conclusion in full, besides reflecting on the\ncapacity of the reader or hearer to draw the conclusion for himself.\nHence we find at the end of controversial and indignant writings such\nexpressions as--'Comment is superfluous'--'We leave the reader to draw\nhis own conclusions,'--or simply a point of exclamation is appended.\n\nSophistical insinuations are suggested in this manner. A train of\nideas is laid that generates a conclusion which the speaker is afraid\nor ashamed to put into words.\n\n\nThe second fault of the syllogism as defined may be called the fallacy\nof _No Application_. It consists in arranging propositions so as to\nend in a classification, but no applicate is detached and no rational\nconclusion is drawn. 'Jones is a Welshman; all Welshmen are Britons;\ntherefore Jones is a Briton.' If in actual thinking it were ever\ndesired to establish by argument that Jones is a Briton, it would be\nwith the object of applying to him some quality connoted by Briton,\nbut the presence of which in Jones is a matter of doubt. This would be\na conclusion--but not the mere classification.\n\n\n_Irrelevant Conclusion_--the fallacy called by Aristotelians\n_Ignoratio elenchi_--is an attempt to substitute a better argument\nfor the one proposed, but which proves something which has not been\ndenied, or stigmatises something that has not been asserted. It\nfrequently arises from honest ignorance of the question at issue, as\nin the objections usually made to the Berkeleyan Substantialism. It\ncan also be used as a weapon of sophistry, by confusing the matter in\ndispute or diverting attention to side issues. It is irrelevant to\nthe truth of a conclusion to point out that he who now supports it\nformerly opposed it, or that his conduct is inconsistent with a belief\nin it. Appeals to passion--to reverence for authority--to popular\nbelief--are instances of this fallacy.\n\n\nThe best protection against Fallacy--next to a thorough knowledge of\nthe matter--is a clear notion of the properties of a valid argument;\nit is useful however to be able to distinguish and name the faulty\ntheorems one constantly meets in controversial speeches and writings.\n\n\n    [Footnote 17: One fault of observation is noticed by formal\n    logicians; it is that of assigning an improper cause, _Non\n    causa pro caus\u00e2_ or _Post hoc ergo propter hoc_. It is evident\n    that defects in every other category have an equal light to be\n    noticed.]\n\n    [Footnote 18: Whately complains of the disinclination shown\n    by logicians to put their rules into practice. 'Whenever they\n    have to treat of anything that is beyond the mere elements of\n    Logic, they totally lay aside all reference to the principles\n    they have been occupied in establishing and explaining, and\n    have recourse to a loose, vague, and popular kind of language;\n    such as would be best suited indeed to an exoterical discourse\n    but seems strangely incongruous in a professed logical\n    treatise.... Surely it affords but too much plausibility to\n    the cavils of those who scoff at Logic altogether, that the\n    very writers who profess to teach it should never themselves\n    make any application of, or reference to, its principles,\n    when, and _when only_, such application and reference are\n    to be expected.' _Logic_, Book III. Introd. The fact here\n    admitted proves that even logicians do not find their method\n    of any practical use. But what is the meaning of the emphatic\n    'when only'? Why should a logical method be unsuitable for\n    every sort of subject except those matters of logic that are\n    beyond the mere elements?]\n\n    [Footnote 19: _Logic_, 'Fallacies,' c. 6.]\n\n\n\n\nACADEMICAL DIALECTIC\n\n\nXXXI--ANALOGY\n\nLogicians of Greek inspiration apply the term reasoning or argument\nto at least eight different intellectual operations, some of them\nimportant indeed but only one of them argument. This is Analogy--which\nreceives but little notice from logicians because it does not give\ncertain conclusions. The operations mistaken for argument are:\n\n  Immediate Inference--\n  Arithmetical Calculation--\n  Geometrical Demonstration--\n  Induction--\n  Aristotle's Dictum--\n  Mediate Comparison--\n  Syllogism.\n\n\nXXXII--IMMEDIATE INFERENCE\n\nSome logicians maintain that it is possible to draw a kind of\nconclusions from one judgment alone. These pretended conclusions are\nof two species.\n\nThe first is a restatement in different words of the whole or part\nof the single idea, and it is preceded by 'therefore' to give it\nthe appearance of an argument. 'All men suffer, therefore some men\nsuffer.' 'John is a man, therefore he is a living creature.' 'This\nweighs that down, therefore it is heavier.' These are all obvious\ntautologisms. It is not an inference to deny the opposite of what we\nhave asserted, as 'The weather is warm, therefore it is not cold.'\nThe conditional and dilemmatic examples of logicians abound in such\n'inferences.' We cannot entirely avoid these locutions, as they give\npoint and clearness to speech, but they are not argument, even when\nintroduced by 'therefore.'\n\nThe other species of spurious conclusions arises out of what is\ntechnically called Conversion. This is a process permitted in\nSyllogistic in order to render propositions more explicit. The subject\nmay change places with the predicate, a 'some' may be inserted, an\n'all' suppressed, or a 'not' may be made to qualify one word instead\nof another. In all this there must be no change in the meaning of the\nproposition, and therefore there can be no inference. If the second\nproposition means something more or different from the first,\nanother premise is unconsciously taken for granted, or the supposed\ninterpretation amounts to interpolation. The reasoner may have\ninadvertently or sophistically added something to the original datum.\nHere is an example of inference by conversion--'All cabbages are\nplants, therefore _some_ plants are cabbages.' If it is not understood\nfrom the terms of the first proposition that plants are limited to\nsuch as are cabbages, the 'some' of the converted proposition is an\ninterpolation supplied from the reasoner's knowledge of the matter. In\nthis case the 'quantification' of plants is not a valid inference from\nthe original information.\n\n\nXXXIII--ARITHMETICAL CALCULATION\n\nArithmetic is first a manipulation of symbols called 'figures.' There\nare ten of these, and they are capable of many species of combination,\nand an indefinite number of individual operations under each species.\nCertain rules govern each sort of operation, and when the rules are\nproperly understood and recollected the operations can be performed\nwith absolute certainty. Although the figures have names relating to\nnumber, and the problems given for exercise make mention of acres,\npounds, tons, miles, and all sorts of concrete objects, the symbolic\ncalculations of books have no necessary relation to real things,\nnumbers, or quantities. They are a purely conventional treatment\nof arbitrary marks that may mean anything or nothing. That is the\narithmetic of the 'schools.' There is no trace of reasoning or\nargument in it--it is mere rule and recollection.\n\nThere is however real Number and there is real Quantity. Number is\nthat quality in which a group of three things (for instance) is seen\nto differ from a group of four or seven, even when the things are\notherwise quite similar. We begin by distinguishing ten primary\ndegrees of this difference, and then consider other degrees as\nmultiples or parts of these primary degrees.\n\nQuantity is degree in size, and is a property quite different from\nnumber. But, for convenience, we assume that quantities are all units\nor fractions of certain standard quantities, and we are thus enabled\nto use the same terms for both number and quantity.\n\nThe names which written language provides for the numerical degrees\nand their combinations are inconvenient to use, and so a set of\nsymbols was devised exclusively for numerical designation. These\nare the figures of arithmetic. They are the technical vocabulary of\nnumber, and of quantity considered as number.\n\nNumber and quantity admit of but two kinds of variation--increase and\ndiminution. These variations can be denoted so correctly by figures,\nthat any combination we first make in figures according to rule can be\nreproduced in real objects, provided the objects are in other respects\npossible. The result of this perfection of technical nomenclature is\nthat our study of number and quantity has been transferred from real\nobjects to figures. It has become symbolic and indirect, and most of\nus never go beyond the symbols; that is, what we call arithmetic is\nan affair of figures, not of true quantities and numbers. We talk\nof miles, tons, and pounds sterling, but we do not _think_ of miles,\ntons, and pounds sterling--we think of _figures_. A thousand shillings\nis to us, when arithmetically stated, '1000_s._,' just as it is here\nrepresented on paper; we do not think of silver coins, and we could\nnot if we tried imagine a thousand things of any sort. There is in\nreality an enormous difference between '0001_s._' and '1000_s._,'\nbut to the arithmetician the only objective difference is one of\narrangement in figures.\n\nFrom these considerations it follows that there are two sciences of\nnumber. There is the true science which deals with quantities really\nseen in objects and imagined in the mind, and an artificial science\ndealing with figures which have only a historical connection with real\nquantity. Of the latter, unfortunately, our arithmetical education\nchiefly consists. We are never taught to distinguish number and size\nin things by the 'eye,' that is, by reason. The symbolism that was\noriginally intended to assist real arithmetical thought has ended by\nsupplanting it. An ignorant shepherd, bricklayer, or carpenter, who is\naccustomed to make a rapid estimate of the number of things in a\nmass, or the area of planking in a log, has a better training in real\narithmetical science than some mathematicians. If we are obliged to\npractise genuine arithmetical thought in engineering, astronomy, and\nother professions, our scholastic symbolism gets realised to some\nextent, and is a great assistance in arithmetical estimation. But\nwithout this it has no more reference to number and quantity than a\nmusical education, based entirely on the printed or written notation,\nhas to the appreciation of musical sounds. A book arithmetician is in\nthe position of a person thoroughly acquainted with theoretical music,\nand who can even compose music _according to rule_, but who is unable\nto distinguish a high note from a low one or harmony from discord in\nactual sound.\n\nIt will thus be seen that it is only in the real arithmetic that\nreasoning can enter. The judgment in free arithmetical observation is\nthe counting of actual groups and the measurement of actual surfaces,\nand the argument consists in estimating the number of individuals\nin other groups, and the size of other surfaces, without counting or\nmeasurement. But this exercise never enters into symbolic arithmetic.\nAll the apparent conclusions of book arithmetic are tautological; they\nconsist in repeating in one combination of symbols the whole or\npart of what has been already given in another combination. It is an\nexercise in expression--nothing more.\n\nArithmetical ratio has a resemblance to the rational parallel.\n3:5::9:15 might be arranged thus--\n\n  5 | 15\n  --+---\n  3 |  9\n\nThis is not argument, for two reasons. (1) The apparent conclusion\nis not an effort of rational imagination; it is a figure that can\nbe obtained with infallible certainty by treating the other figures\naccording to a rule, which has only to be recollected and applied. (2)\nThe relation between the left-hand figures and the right-hand figures\nis not a categorical judgment; it is a form of resemblance, and so it\ncannot yield a valid conclusion.\n\n\nXXXIV--GEOMETRICAL DEMONSTRATION\n\nThis exercise is regarded by logicians as one of the purest forms\nof argument. It is nothing more than an aid to a certain kind of\nperception.\n\nTake, for instance, the fifth proposition of the first book of\nEuclid--'The angles at the base of an isosceles triangle are equal,\nand if the equal sides be produced the angles on the other side shall\nalso be equal.' The proposition is accompanied by a diagram of an\nisosceles triangle with the equal sides already produced, so that\nthe conditional phrasing of the proposition does not mean that the\nproduction of the sides, and what results therefrom, are future\nor possible events which neither Euclid nor anybody else has yet\nexperienced, and the probability of which is an argumentative\nconclusion.\n\nWhat the proposition means is this: an isosceles triangle of which the\nequal sides have been produced, has equal angles on the same side of\nthe base both within and without the triangle. It is an affirmation of\nwhat is, not of what we must believe to be for reasons to be given.\n\nThe truth of the proposition is seen at once from simple inspection of\nthe diagram. It is an association of properties related in a certain\nmanner. It has many relations which the geometer does not mention in\nthis proposition, but those which he mentions are seen to be correctly\ndescribed as soon as we direct attention to them. If we have any doubt\non the subject we remove it by measuring the angles.\n\nEuclid however does not appeal to the powers of inspection we can\nexercise in this case, and he ignores our facilities for measurement.\nHe appeals to simpler and easier kinds of perception expressed in\nhis axioms, which he began by assuming we were capable of exercising\nwithout demonstration. They constitute what he considers the minimum\npower of relational perception, which if a man have not he cannot be\ntaught geometry. Euclid also in this proposition refers to the result\nof a prior demonstration, the relation in which he supposes we have\nseized. By means of these antecedents he _prompts_ our perceptive\nfaculty up to the point of seeing the relations expressed in this\nproposition. If we saw them without the prompting, the latter is\nsuperfluous; if the relations do not stand the test of measurement,\nthe prompting goes for nothing.\n\nAll Euclid's demonstrations are of this sort. They are pointings-out\nof what can be seen by inspection and sufficient attention. He is\nnot bringing a case under a precedent--he is describing relations in\nthings, that may serve as precedents in concrete or applied geometry.\nThe service he performs is that of a connoisseur who points out the\nbeauties of a picture or landscape to a careless or uninterested\nspectator. Relations are sometimes difficult to see--much more\ndifficult than colours or masses--and there is a legitimate sphere of\nusefulness for people who point out what others are apt to overlook.\nThere is no prediction in this. We are not asked to conceive anything\nthat is not before us. Geometrical demonstration thus assists\nperception, but does not imply reasoning. Euclid does not argue--he\nprompts.\n\nThose who maintain that Euclid is syllogistic do so on the ground\nthat the axioms are generalisations, and that as often as one is cited\nthere occurs the subsumption of an object under a class-notion. That\nwould not be argument; but let us suppose it means bringing a\ncase under a precedent. Then if the axioms be precedents and the\ndemonstration an application of them to new cases, the theorem is a\nfallacy--a useless argument written to prove a foregone certainty,\nfor the conclusion can be and generally is perfectly known without\nreference to the demonstration.\n\nIt appears to me more true to regard the axioms as the simplest\nrelations, which everybody may be supposed capable of perceiving,\nand that geometrical demonstration consists in showing that other\nrelations not so apparent are really varieties or combinations of the\nsimpler relations. By using in concert with the axioms the relations\nalready demonstrated, we are enabled to grasp relations that would not\nhave been at all obvious on first beginning the geometrical praxis.\nEuclid's geometry is thus a series of graduated lessons in a special\nsort of observation, not a system of deductive arguments.\n\nThe educational theory that geometry is exceptionally good training\nfor the reason--apart from its practical utility in mechanics--is thus\nevidently a mistake. Abstract geometry may induce habits of minute\nobservation and exact definition, but reason nowhere enters into the\nstudy. As a rational gymnastic there is nothing better than the game\nof chess.\n\n\nXXXV--INDUCTION\n\nThose who contend that there is a kind of argument called Inductive\ndifferent from the Deductive, illustrate their view by some such\nexample as the following:--'This, that, and the other magnet' [that\nis, all the magnets we know] 'attract iron; therefore all possible\nmagnets attract iron.' They say there is an irresistible compulsion\nin the mind to draw such a conclusion from information of the kind\nexemplified, and they contrast that type of thought with a deductive\nargument like--'All magnets attract iron; this object is a magnet;\ntherefore it attracts iron.' They figure the former as a progress\nupwards, the latter as a regress downwards.\n\nThat is Induction as understood by J. S. Mill and Sir William\nHamilton; on this point these philosophers happen to agree.\n\nThe first of those arguments is a deduction with the precedent\nomitted. Expressed in full it amounts to this--'Any relation\nobserved several times to subsist between two classes of objects, and\nconcerning which no exception has ever been observed, may be taken as\nuniversal; there is such a relation between known magnets and known\niron; therefore it may be regarded as universal.' The precedent is not\na mental compulsion, but a result of experience. Induction as above\ndefined is therefore only a species of deductive conclusions.\n\nMost logicians take the word Induction in its etymological sense, as\nmeaning systematic observation carried on with a view to obtaining\na general idea of some class of objects; or of establishing a\ncategorical relation between one object or class and another, by\neliminating all the alternative correlatives. In neither operation\nwould Induction be argument.\n\nIn science a 'perfect induction' is one in which all existing objects\nof a class, or all objects related in a certain manner, have been\nperceived, so that there is no other object concerning which a\nconclusion can be drawn. In such cases, says Mill, there is no\ninduction--only a summary of experience. He evidently regarded the\nconclusion with respect to unknown cases as the essence of induction,\nwhereas in the scientific sense the induction is the positive content\nof the idea, or the abstract relation--the unknown cases are ignored,\nor there may be none. In scientific writings induction sometimes means\nthe _method_ of observation rather than the result--the method of\ncorrecting inferences by perception, wherever possible.\n\n\nXXXVI--ARISTOTLE'S DICTUM\n\nThis is usually put into English thus--'Whatever is affirmed or denied\nof a class, may be affirmed or denied of any part of that class,'\nand such an affirmation or denial is supposed to be an act of reason.\nArchbishop Whately expounds the Dictum in analysing the following\ntheorem--Whatever exhibits marks of design had an intelligent author;\nthe world exhibits marks of design; therefore the world had an\nintelligent author.\n\n    'In the first of these premises,' he says, 'we find it assumed\n    universally of the _class_ of \"things which exhibit marks of\n    design,\" that they had an intelligent author; and in the other\n    premise, \"the world\" is referred to that class as comprehended\n    in it: now it is evident that whatever is said of the whole of\n    a class, may be said of anything comprehended in that class:\n    so that we are thus authorised to say of the world, that \"it\n    had an intelligent author.\" Again, if we examine a syllogism\n    with a negative conclusion, as, _e.g._ \"nothing which exhibits\n    marks of design could have been produced by chance; the\n    world exhibits, &c.; therefore the world could not have been\n    produced by chance:\" the process of Reasoning will be found\n    to be the same; since it is evident, that whatever is _denied_\n    universally of any class may be denied of anything that is\n    comprehended in that class. On further examination it will be\n    found, that all valid arguments whatever may be easily reduced\n    to such a form as that of the foregoing syllogisms; and that\n    consequently the principle on which they are constructed is\n    the UNIVERSAL PRINCIPLE of Reasoning.'[20]\n\nThe examples given by Whately are perfectly valid; the first is a\nconstructive argument in the Sixth Category, the second a stigmatic\nin the Fifth. I have in several places admitted that the arguments\nadduced by syllogists are sometimes correct, the fault complained of\nbeing in the mode in which such correct arguments are interpreted.\nThey are interpreted wrongly, and then other theorems are found or\nmade agreeing with the _interpretation_, and the admitted soundness\nof the first theorems is used to procure acceptance for the second.\nThings brought under the same definition ought to be essentially\nalike, but they are not so when the utmost latitude is taken to\n'assume' that predicates have properties which they obviously have\nnot.\n\n\nThe objections we make to the Dictum as above interpreted are--(1)\nthat in reasoning the precedent (major premise) need not be a class;\n(2) if it is a class, it consists of all _known_ things of a similar\nkind, not of all _possible_ things of a similar kind. When interpreted\nin the latter sense the Dictum becomes dialectically tautological, as\nhas been often observed.\n\n\nXXXVII--MEDIATE COMPARISON\n\nA few pages further on Whately gives a totally different account of\nreasoning, without being aware of his inconsistency.\n\n    'Every syllogism has three, and only three terms: viz. the\n    middle term and the two terms (or extremes, as they are\n    commonly called) of the Conclusion or Question. Of these,\n    first, the subject of the conclusion is called the _minor_\n    term; second, its predicate, the _major_ term; and third, the\n    _middle_ term, (called by the older logicians \"Argumentum\") is\n    that with which each of them is separately compared, in order\n    to judge of their agreement or disagreement with each other.\n    If therefore there were two middle terms, the extremes or\n    terms of conclusion not being both compared to the same, could\n    not be conclusively compared to each other.'[21]\n\nHere reasoning is made to consist in comparing two things by\nreference to a third which both resemble. There is not a word about\nclassification, which is declared just before--in loud capitals--to be\nthe universal principle of reasoning!\n\n  On this definition we remark--\n\n(1) Comparison by mediation is untrustworthy, unless the qualities\ncompared be rigidly defined or restricted, as in geometry and the use\nof standards (XXII). In geometry the only two qualities recognised\nare figure and magnitude. The axiom of mediate comparison means that\nthings having the same magnitude as a third thing are to be considered\nequal, though they may have different outlines. But the axiom is\nliable to be untrue in things of three or more qualities. Add colour.\nThen a white sphere may resemble a white cube on the one side, and a\nblack sphere on the other, but the white cube does not at all resemble\nthe black sphere. This axiom is therefore inadmissible or at\nleast extremely risky in logic, which treats of things having many\nqualities.\n\n(2) Comparison, however correctly performed, is never the end, but\nonly a means, of reasoning.\n\n\nXXXVIII--SYLLOGISM\n\nWe have already had two distinct definitions of syllogism. According\nto the first it is the application of class-attributes to individuals\nknown to belong to the class; according to the second it is the\ncomparison of two things or terms by reference to a third which both\nresemble. When we arrive at the chapters in logic books devoted to the\nexposition of the syllogism in detail, we find that the theorems there\ndiscussed do not conform to either of those definitions. The only\nsort of syllogism that can be 'converted' is one consisting of two\nclassifications, and a conclusion which predicates a classification,\nas thus--\n\n  _All Englishmen are Europeans;\n  John Smith is an Englishman;\n  therefore John Smith is a European._\n\nObserve the difference between this theorem and that adduced in\nillustration of the Dictum (XXXVI). In the latter the first premise\nis a categorical judgment and so therefore is the conclusion; in the\ntheorem just given the first premise is a classification, and the\nconclusion is necessarily a classification.\n\nWe first remark that such an 'argument' is never met with in\nreal spontaneous thinking--it occurs only in logic books. It is\nmanufactured exclusively for Peripatetic consumption. The reason it\nis not to be found is simple--the conclusion it yields is a\nclassification, and that is not enough for valid argument.\nIn reasoning we may introduce a classification as the _minor\npremise_--that is, the proposition which brings the case under the\nprecedent--but the applicate is never a general or class idea. It is\none or more properties abstracted from the subject (whether the latter\nbe a single object or general idea), and applied to the case. Merely\nto classify a case and so leave it would answer no rational purpose.\n\nLogicians urge in recommendation of this syllogism that it gives a\ncertain conclusion. The premises being correct, the conclusion is\ninfallibly true.\n\nNo doubt it is, for in contemplating a thing we can mentally enter it\ninto all the classes to which it appears to belong, whatever be their\ngenerality. Knowing the class European and the individual John Smith,\nwe see at once that the latter is contained in the former, and we can\ndo this without putting him first in the minor class English. It is\nlike saying, 'The pavilion is in the garden, John Smith is in the\npavilion, therefore he is in the garden.' Of course he is! The minor\npremise of a double classification is superfluous. The fact that\nsuch conclusions are certain, shows how nugatory they are. We are\nnot certain of anything till it has been experienced. In legitimate\nreasoning the conclusion is never more than probable. The certainty of\nthese double classifications shows that we are stating what we already\nknow--not imagining an ideal addition to our positive knowledge.\n\n\n_Doctrine of the Predicate._ So long as logicians are permitted to\nfabricate their own examples, all is plain sailing with the syllogism.\nBut they are sometimes obliged to deal with genuine arguments. In\nthis case what they do is to assume that _for logical purposes_ every\npredicate of the precedent--that is, the applicate--is a general or\nclass term. Even when an argument is good they spoil it with a bad\ntheory.\n\nSir William Hamilton states that up to his time logicians recognised\nbut one type of proposition--that called by him the proposition 'in\nextension,' which means the classifying of the subject. He announced\nthat he intended to introduce a proposition 'in comprehension,'\nmeaning a judgment in the category of inherence--as for instance, 'man\nis responsible.' He further said that he recognised a third type of\nproposition, that concerning 'cause and effect.'\n\nBut in the course of working out these logical novelties he seems to\nhave discovered that they were irreconcilable with conversion, and so\nhe dropped them. The judgment in comprehension, he then declared, was\nto all intents and purposes the same as one in extension, and as to\ncausation--why, a cause is a class, and an effect is an individual\nbelonging to that class![22]\n\n\nLet us see what is the result of treating applicates as general ideas.\nTake an example in each of the categories.\n\n'The paper is white.' This means that the paper has the property or\nattribute of whiteness. In logic it is interpreted to mean that paper\nis an individual of the class _white_. This is wrong, for there is no\nsuch class. No sane person would form a class out of salt, snow, milk,\nchina, silver, the moon, and other white things; for though they have\na common property it is not the sign of a common human utility.\n\nThe confusing a single property with a class is not always owing to\nexigencies of syllogism. It pervades the writings of most Western\nmetaphysicians, and may be accounted for in this manner.\n\nGeneral ideas and abstract properties or ideas have in common that\nthey are _partial_ recognitions of what we perceive (XIV). The\npartition in each is however made in a different way, and for a\ndifferent purpose. In generalisation the selection is done almost\nmechanically. We see many things that have some common relation,\nfunction, or utility for us, and we remember only so much of them\nas appears to be necessary for the recognition of that relation or\nutility--just so much of the Intellectual experience as has always\naccompanied the Sentimental experience. The process is very like that\nof putting a piece of wood or ivory in a turning-lathe, and whittling\noff all that we do not want. A general idea is the useful core of\na multitude of superposed observations, each of which had something\nirrelevant--something which it is better to forget. We whittle this\noff and remember only the core.\n\nAbstraction, on the other hand, is a conscious and deliberate\noperation from beginning to end. It consists in distinguishing one by\none the properties of a thing, and even treating each property as if\nit had an independent existence. For this exercise it is not\nnecessary to observe many things: we can analyse one alone, though an\nacquaintance with other cognate objects is sometimes necessary to call\nour attention to single properties. We need the shock of difference to\nbe able to distinguish well a fine abstraction--the difference between\nshades of colours, for example. Abstraction is thus a minute\nattention to individuals, and need not for a moment be confounded with\ngeneralisation.\n\nAnother cause of the confusion in question can be traced to the use of\nthe verb 'is' to represent both the relation of a thing to the general\nidea it has contributed to form, and the relation of a single property\nto the thing in which it inheres. We say 'The man _is_ a British\nsubject'--classifying him; we say also 'The man _is_ cold'--mentioning\none of his attributes. There is no class of cold men, and the two\nrelations have nothing in common. A class does not inhere in a man as\ncold inheres in him. There is no _object_ corresponding to class--it\nis a conceptual creation.\n\nThe ambiguity of 'is' favours the syllogistic doctrine of predication,\nand there is a rule to the effect that in syllogising propositions,\nall verbs are to be converted into 'is' (or its conjugates) with a\nparticiple or noun, so that if they were not before statements\nof classification they now become such. 'He walks' is clearly no\nclassification; but 'he is walking' is assimilated by false analogy\nto such a classification as 'he is human,' and so is treated as a\nclassification by those who reason according to the Letter.\n\nThe substantive verb has no positive and uniform meaning. As an\nauxiliary it is a mere sign of tense, and in other positions it is an\nindefinite mark of relationship, the precise meaning of which must\nbe determined by the subject and the context. It may sometimes be\ndispensed with in classification, as 'Victoria Regina'--'Phillips,\nDentist.'\n\nIn the second category we have such propositions as 'the book lies on\nthe table.' In syllogistic this is first altered to 'the book is lying\non the table,' and it is feigned that 'lying on the table' is a class\nor general idea, and 'book' an individual of that class. To interpret\n'the groom stands by the horse' a class has to be created, composed of\nthe persons who happen to be standing by horses.\n\n'The mountain is ten miles off' is a judgment in perspection.\nSyllogistically we are asked to believe that a class of things exists\nhaving the common property of being ten miles off, and that the\nmountain is entered in that class. The absurdity of this doctrine is\nself-evident.\n\nIn the remaining categories the reduction to 'is' has, if possible, a\nworse effect. In changing 'Canada lies west of Ireland' into\n'Canada is a country lying west of Ireland,' we lose the relation\nin concretion, and express instead a verbal definition. Instead of\naffirming a position we explain a name. In such a proposition as 'the\ntown of A lies 100 miles due north of B,' it is plain the predicate\ncannot be a class, for only one place has the quality expressed.\n\nIn the fifth category we have such a proposition as 'water freezes\nwhen the temperature falls to zero Centigrade.' This is turned into a\nsubstantive sentence by saying 'water is that liquid which freezes,'\n&c., which is a verbal or identical proposition.\n\n'Cecrops founded Athens' is a judgment in causation. In turning it\ninto 'Cecrops was (or is) the founder of Athens,' we emphasise the\nman's name, but the relation signified by 'founded' is slurred over\nor lost sight of. Boole converts 'Caesar conquered the Gauls' into\n'Caesar is he who conquered the Gauls,'[23] and this he interpreted\nas classification. We need not be surprised that he should suppose\na class could be formed by one individual, for he elsewhere tells us\nthat _Nothing_ is a class.[24]\n\nClassification is not judgment of any sort--it is a variety of\nrecollection. Logicians imagine it is the only judgment, and so far as\nthey can they degrade true judgments to that spurious form.\n\n\n_Moods of the Syllogism._ Having persuaded themselves that\nclassification is the beginning, middle, and end of reasoning,\nlogicians next proceed to divide the matter of their science.\n\nModern logicians who have some acquaintance with real thinking as\nexemplified in works of physical science, can, if acting according\nto their natural intelligence, lay down correct rules for dividing a\nsubject. These are simple and obvious: divide according to fundamental\nresemblance--let each division correspond to some definite human\nutility--let the more important properties take precedence of the less\nimportant, and so forth: the merest common sense.\n\nBut in the division of their own subject they follow Aristotle, and so\nlose their way.\n\nIt is plain that an act of reasoning is a mental thing in the first\nplace, and only when uttered, and thus in a secondary sense, is it\na material object. The classification of arguments should therefore\nfollow mental characteristics. Logicians make it follow the material\ncharacteristics of the terms in which the arguments are uttered. Their\nmoods of the syllogism are mere varieties of expression, not varieties\nof reason.\n\nThe number of these moods is accidental, depending on flexibility\nof language and ingenuity in inventing varieties of syntax. Mere\ntransposition of premises constitutes a difference of mood. Logicians\nhowever pretend to base their numeration on a more general necessity.\nThey calculate from the distinctive parts of the three propositions\nforming a syllogism, varied by negation, &c., that there _ought to be_\nsixty-four moods. Experience proves that in spite of their free and\neasy method of multiplying syllogistic varieties they cannot produce\nanything like that number. One logician has thirty-six moods, another\nthirty-two, a third eleven; the more orthodox fix the number at\nnineteen. But they all admit that every argument can be reduced to\none of four fundamental types--the moods of the First Figure. Why then\nhave more classes than these four? Because, says Whately, it would be\n'occasionally tedious' to reduce every argument to the first figure.\n\nIf the 11, 19, 32, or 36 classes were natural arguments taken\ndown untouched from men's lips, and it was found to be useless and\ntroublesome to reduce them to four artificial forms, the plea might\nbe admitted. But the so-called valid syllogisms are themselves\nartificial, and just as tedious to make as the moods of the first\nfigure. Not only so, but an elaborate system of mnemonic rules is\nprovided for reducing the valid moods to the fundamental moods, thus\nadmitting that the former are only intermediate halting places between\nthe natural speech and the fundamental moods. It is _expected_ that\nthe intermediates should be reduced to the first figure.\n\nIs there anything analogous to this sort of division in any science or\nbranch of practical thought? Would logicians themselves sanction such\na classification in a natural science? If a zoologist, for example,\nwere to determine beforehand how many classes of animals there\nought to be, would they not say he was acting improperly? If, after\ndiscovering that he had five times as many classes as he could find\nanimals to put into them, he still retained his classification and\nrequired his pupils to write out the names or symbols of all the\nuseless classes--would not logicians be apt to call him a pedant? Yet\nin a modern work on logic such a task is prescribed for students:--\n\n    'Write out the sixty-four moods of the syllogism, _and strike\n    out the fifty-three invalid ones_.'\n\nWe might have excused the existence of a merely verbal classification\nin logic, if it were accompanied by and subordinated to a\nclassification of theorems considered as mental facts. But in\nsyllogistic the verbal is the dominant classification, and we have\nseen from the procedure of Sir William Hamilton--in dropping his\ncategorical judgments--that when the two principles of division\nconflict, it is the mental which has to give way. The Letter is\nallowed to kill the Spirit.\n\n\n_All the Moods reducible to One._ Syllogists appear not to know their\nown schematism very well. They say there are four ultimate moods,\nwhich it is impossible to reduce to any lower number. But since each\nof the four is, mentally, a double classification, it must be possible\nto reflect this common property in the mode of expression. The\ndifference between them can only be verbal. Let us adopt another than\nthe ordinary symbolism.\n\nCut a card into three triangular pieces of unequal size, and call\nthem by the letters A, B, C, beginning with the largest. These are the\nterms of the syllogism.\n\n         A                 A\n        /\\B               /\\                B\n       / /\\C             /  \\              /\\C\n      / / /\\            /    \\            / /\\\n     / / /  \\          /      \\          / /  \\\n    / / /    \\        /        \\        / /    \\\n   / / /      \\      /          \\      / /      \\\n  +------------+    +------------+    +----------+\n  _Barbara._                  _Celarent._\n\n         A                    A\n        /\\B                 /\\               B\n       / /\\    C           /  \\             /\\   C\n      / /  \\  :           /    \\           /  \\  :\n     / /    \\: :         /      \\         /    \\: :\n    / /     /\\  :       /        \\       /     /\\  :\n   / /     /  \\  :     /          \\     /     /  \\  :\n  +------------+...   +------------+   +----------+...\n  _Darii._                    _Ferio._\n\nThe first mood _Barbara_ is formed by placing the cards on top of each\nother, so that B is within the margin of A, and C within the margin of\nB. This is the syllogism, 'All B is A, all C is B, therefore all C is\nA.'\n\nNext let B and C be as above, but let A be wholly apart from both.\nThis is _Celarent_: 'No B is A, all C is B, therefore no C is A.'\n\nIn _Darii_ the whole of B is in A, but only a part of C coincides with\nB. The syllogism is: 'All B is A, some C is B, therefore some C is A.'\n\nIn _Ferio_ A is again wholly separated from the others, and C is only\npartially in B. Argument: 'No B is A, some C is B, therefore some C is\nnot A.'\n\nIt is to be remembered that all the other figures and moods are\nreducible to the above figure of four moods, so that the reduction\napplicable to the latter is equally applicable to the former.\n\nTo reduce _Darii_ to _Barbara_ all that is necessary is to ignore the\ndotted part of C. That is suggested by the use of the word 'some,'\nwhich has a correlative 'all' or 'others.' But the correlative\nquantity does not enter into the syllogism, and we know nothing about\nit. It may not even exist. We are therefore at liberty to substitute\nfor 'some C' the name D, and consider it an integer instead of a\nfraction. Then we have the _Barbara_ syllogism: 'All B is A, all D (=\nsome C) is B, therefore all D is A.' The phrase 'all of some' is quite\nallowable: 'I met some firemen, all of whom wore brass helmets.'\n\n_Ferio_ in the same manner is reduced to _Celarent_. The dotted part\nof C is cut away, and the part really significant in the syllogism is\ncalled E. Then 'No B is A, all E is B, no E is A.'\n\nFinally _Celarent_ can be reduced to _Barbara_. B cannot indeed be\nenclosed in A, but we assume the existence of a whole having all the\ncharacters which A has _not_, or having none of the characters which\nA has. This is the whole F = Not-A. Then _Celarent_ becomes _Barbara_\nthus: 'All B is F, all C is B, therefore all C is F.'\n\nThis demonstrates that there is only one fundamental operation where\nsyllogists suppose there are at least four. The difference is wholly a\nmatter of language, and disappears on changing the names of the terms\nand ignoring irrelevant suggestions. But the syllogism, I repeat, does\nnot represent the act of reasoning, and its moods and figures are fit\nonly to be a game for children.\n\n\n    [Footnote 20: _Logic_, Book I. \u00a7 3.]\n\n    [Footnote 21: _Logic_, Book II. c. 3. \u00a7 2.]\n\n    [Footnote 22: _Lectures_, iii. pp. 287 and 356. The\n    impossibility of reconciling their definitions and rules to\n    real thinking and argument is the despair of logicians. Most\n    of them take to symbols, which are more accommodating than\n    real experience, having just such properties as their makers\n    choose to put in them. Sir William Hamilton had the courage to\n    declare that a logician might use arguments of a concrete or\n    real form, but that it is not necessary they should agree with\n    real fact. 'The logician has a right to suppose any material\n    impossibility, any material falsity; he takes no account of\n    what is objectively impossible or false, he has a right to\n    assume what premises he please, provided that they do not\n    involve a contradiction in terms.'--_Id._ 322. That means\n    in plain English that a logician may misrepresent matters of\n    fact, if he cannot otherwise establish his theory!]\n\n    [Footnote 23: _Laws of Thought_, p. 35.]\n\n    [Footnote 24: _Ibid._ p. 47.]\n\n\n\n\nSTUDIES IN DIALECTIC\n\n\nXXXIX\n\nThe theorems given for practice in logic books are useful dialectic\nmaterial, but they do not fully illustrate all the categories.\nLogicians have no definite categories, and in selecting examples they\nare unconsciously biassed in favour of those that can be most easily\ninterpreted to signify classification. The really generalistic\nexamples are rare; the most are judgments of inherence, admitted in\nvirtue of the assumption that inherent properties can--when it\nis needful to preserve the traditional notion of predication--be\nconsidered class-ideas. Theorems in perspection and concretion we do\nnot expect to find in logic books, for these, in so far as they are\ndistinct from association, are categories peculiar to the Berkeleyan\nphilosophy.\n\nWhately has the following example in association--'Lias lies above red\nsandstone; red sandstone lies above coal; therefore lias lies above\ncoal.' No doubt Whately would, in syllogising this, have changed the\npropositions to 'Red sandstone is lying,' &c., and have assumed that\n'lying above coal' is a class to which red sandstone belongs.\n\n***\n\nHere are examples of arguments in inherence--\n\n\nA hot skin, quick pulse, intense thirst have invariably in my\nexperience coexisted with fever; the person now examined exhibits\nthese symptoms, so I infer that he has a fever.\n\n\nGreat width of skull between the ears is invariably found united with\na destructive temperament; this animal's skull is very wide between\nthe ears; hence it may be concluded that he has a destructive\ntemperament.\n\n\nCloven feet belong universally--_i.e._ as far as our experience\ngoes--to horned animals; we may conclude that this fossil animal,\nsince it appears to have had cloven feet, was horned.\n\n                           I.\n  Cloven feet              | inhere with horns\n  -------------------------+-------------------\n  Fossil animal appears to | _it is probable he\n  have had cloven feet     |  had horns_\n\nWhen an architect, contemplating the fragments of a building, restores\nit in imagination after the analogy of similar buildings, we have an\nargument in inherence. Such speculations are generally too long and\ncomplex for analysis, but an instructive example occurs in Canon\nRawlinson's _Seventh Oriental Monarchy_, which I will venture to\nquote, marking the phrases that introduce or express the rational\nidea. Observe the difference of style between this, which is real\npractical reasoning, and the trivial certainties of Syllogistic.\n\n    'What remains of this massive erection [the Takht-i-Khosru,\n    or palace of Chosro\u00ebs Anushirwan, at Ctesiphon] is a mere\n    fragment, which, _to judge from the other extant Sassanian\n    ruins_, cannot have formed so much as one fourth part of\n    the original edifice. Nothing has come down to our day but a\n    single vaulted hall on the grandest scale, together with the\n    mere outer wall of what no doubt constituted the main facade\n    of the building. The apartments, which, _according to all\n    analogy_, must have existed at the two sides, and in the rear,\n    of the great hall, some of which _should_ have been vaulted,\n    have wholly perished. _Imagination may supply_ them from the\n    Firuzabad, or the Mashita palace; but not a trace, even of\n    their foundations, is extant; and the details consequently are\n    uncertain, though the general plan can scarcely be doubted. At\n    each side of the great hall _were probably_ two lateral ones,\n    communicating with each other, and capable of being entered\n    either from the hall or from the outer air. Beyond the great\n    hall _was probably_ a domed chamber equalling it in width,\n    and opening upon a court, round which were a number of\n    moderate-sized apartments. The entire building _was no doubt_\n    an oblong square, of which the shorter sides seem to have\n    measured 370 feet. It had at least three, and _may not\n    improbably have had_ a larger number of entrances, since it\n    belongs to tranquil times and a secure locality.'\n\n***\n\nThe most notable argument in the category of concretion is undoubtedly\nthe inference as to the sphericity of the earth. Next is the\nsub-inference by Columbus that China could be reached by sailing\nwestward from Portugal. If the syllogistic opinion were valid--that a\nconclusion must be absolutely true or absolutely false--the expedition\nof Columbus was based on a fallacy. Most people think it was eminently\nrational.\n\nNo one has seen the north or the south poles, and the conviction that\nthey could be realised, if certain difficulties of transport were\novercome, is a sub-inference of the same character.\n\n\nHere is a common type of inference in perspection--\n\n                     III.\n  That church         | is 100 yards off\n  --------------------+----------------------\n  A man appears on    | _he is_ 100 _ys. off_\n  the roof of the ch. |\n\nAnd this--\n\n                             III.\n  That distant house          | is 60 ft. high\n  ----------------------------+------------------------\n  It appears to be scaffolded | _the scaffold is about_\n  to a third of its height    | 20 _feet high_\n\nIn these cases we have not seen the man or the scaffolding before,\nand have not measured the latter or the distance to the former: the\nconclusions are imaginary judgments fairly drawn from known premises.\n\n***\n\nThe deciphering of hieroglyphics, cuneiform inscriptions, and remains\nof other dead and forgotten languages, is argument in causation.\nExamples cannot conveniently be quoted even in a condensed form, but\nthis kind of reasoning is most interesting dialectically from the\nslightness of the analogies that are nevertheless found to give valid\nconclusions.\n\n***\n\nThis is considered argument by Whately--\n\n                         I.\n  Louis                  | is a good king\n  -----------------------+---------------------------\n  The governor of France | _therefore the g. of F. is\n  is Louis               | a good king_\n\nThe supposed case is a verbal proposition, serving to rename the\nsubject of precedent. There is no reasoning. If we already know that\nLouis is a good king and is also the governor of France (the given\nmatters of fact), there is no rational imagination involved in\nrearranging these data as in the proposed conclusion.\n\n***\n\n'He who calls you a man speaks truly; he who calls you a fool calls\nyou a man; therefore he who calls you a fool speaks truly.'--A fallacy\nof cross reasoning, and the predicate is a class.\n\n  All fools     | are men\n  --------------+--------\n  You are a man | _N. C._\n\n***\n\n'Nothing is heavier than platina; feathers are heavier than nothing;\ntherefore feathers are heavier than platina.'--A trivial equivoque.\n\nThe following is more subtle. 'Theft is a crime; theft was encouraged\nby the laws of Sparta; therefore the laws of Sparta encouraged\ncrime.'--At most the laws of Sparta encouraged one crime; but there\nis a fallacy of equivocation. Taking things surreptitiously from\nthe person in whose possession they may be, is not a crime--is not\ntheft--in a society so communistic as the Spartan. There it was\nencouraged as an exercise in adroitness. This example shows the\nnecessity of knowing the matter of the argument.\n\n***\n\n    'Warm countries alone produce wine; Spain is a warm country;\n    therefore Spain produces wine.'\n\n                     V.\n  Wine               | is p. in w. countries\n  -------------------+----------------------\n  Spain is a warm c. | _N. C._\n\n***\n\n'Meat and drink are necessaries of life; the revenues of Vitellius\nwere spent in meat and drink; therefore the revenues of Vitellius were\nspent on the necessaries of life.'--Fallacy of composition: meat and\ndrink in moderate quantities are necessaries of one life, but not food\nof every kind and in excessive quantities.\n\n***\n\n'He who is most hungry eats most; he who eats least is most hungry;\ntherefore he who eats least eats most.'--A fallacy of accident: he who\neats least does not _at the same time_ eat most.\n\n***\n\n'Whatever body is in motion must move either in the place where it\nis, or in the place where it is not; neither of these is possible;\ntherefore there is no such thing as motion.'--It is an abuse of reason\nto attempt to disprove matters of fact. The conclusion of an argument\nbeing always problematical, it can have no force against actual\nexperience. We experience motion, therefore it cannot be disproved.\n\n***\n\n'A wise lawgiver must either recognise the rewards and punishments\nof a future state, or he must be able to appeal to an extraordinary\nProvidence, dispensing them regularly in this life; Moses did not do\nthe former, therefore he must have done the latter'--(Warburton, from\nWhately).--The reasoner omitted to establish that Moses was a wise\nlawgiver, so that the precedent does not apply to his case, except by\ncourtesy.\n\n***\n\n'That man is independent of the caprices of fortune who places\nhis chief happiness in moral and intellectual excellence; a true\nphilosopher is independent of the caprices of fortune; therefore a\ntrue philosopher is one who places his chief happiness in moral and\nintellectual excellence.' An instance of cross reasoning.\n\n                             I.\n  He who places              | is independent\n  ---------------------------+---------------\n  Philosopher is independent | _N. C._\n\n***\n\n    'For those who are bent on cultivating their minds by diligent\n    study, the incitement of academical honours is unnecessary;\n    and for the idle it is ineffectual, for such are indifferent\n    to mental improvement; therefore the incitement of academical\n    honours is either unnecessary or ineffectual.'\n\nA fallacy of doubtful precedent: because two kinds of students are not\nbenefited by the hope of honours it is prematurely concluded that no\nothers exist who may be so benefited.\n\n***\n\n    'He who bears arms at the command of the magistrate does what\n    is lawful for a Christian; the Swiss in the French service,\n    and the British in the American service, bore arms at the\n    command of the magistrate; therefore they did what is lawful\n    for a Christian.'\n\nThe conclusion is valid so far as the information given enables us to\njudge. If we know from other sources that the Swiss and British\nwho are referred to, committed atrocities at the command of the\nmagistrate, the conclusion is a fallacy of accident. In general it is\nlawful to obey a magistrate, but there may be particular cases when it\nis not.\n\n***\n\n'Anyone who is candid will refrain from condemning a book without\nreading it; some reviewers do not refrain from this; therefore some\nreviewers are not candid.'--This is cross reasoning and invalid. It\nis one thing to say that the uncandid do not refrain, and another that\nall who do not refrain are uncandid. The conclusion is taken from the\nlatter proposition, which is not asserted.\n\n***\n\n    'Everyone desires happiness; virtue is happiness; therefore\n    everyone desires virtue.'\n\n                                 I.\n  Whoever desires an effect      | desires the cause of that effect\n  -------------------------------+---------------------------------\n  Everyone desires the happiness | _everyone desires virtue_\n  which is caused by virtue      |\n\nThe case is manifestly untrue.\n\n***\n\n    'He who has a confirmed habit of any kind of action exercises\n    no self-denial in the practice of that action; a good man\n    has a confirmed habit of virtue; therefore he who exercises\n    self-denial in the practice of virtue is not a good\n    man.'--(Arist. _Eth._ Bk. II., from Whately.)\n\n                   VI.                                          I.\n  He who has a      | exercises no       || He who exercises no | is good\n  habit, &c.        | self-denial        || self-denial in the  |\n                    |                    || practice of virtue  |\n  ------------------+--------------------++---------------------+--------\n  A good man has    | _He exercises no   || He who _does_       | _N. C._\n  this habit with   | self-denial with   || exercise &c.        |\n  respect to virtue | respect to virtue_ ||                     |\n\nThe conclusion drawn is fallacious, the second theorem being based on\ncontrast.\n\n***\n\n    'According to theologians, a man must possess faith to be\n    acceptable to the Deity; now he who believes all the fables\n    of heathen mythology must possess faith; therefore such a one\n    must, according to theologians, be acceptable to the Deity.'\n\n'Faith' is ambiguous, meaning in the precedent, spiritual aspiration,\nand in the case ignorant credulity.\n\n***\n\n'No evil should be allowed that good may come of it; all punishment is\nan evil; therefore no punishment should be allowed that good may come\nof it.'--'Evil' is ambiguous, meaning wrong-doing in the precedent and\npain in the case; the conclusion is therefore fallacious.\n\n***\n\n'The principles of justice are variable; the appointments of\nnature are invariable; therefore the principles of justice are no\nappointments of nature.'--(Arist. _Eth._ Bk. V., from Whately.) The\nterms 'principles of justice' and 'nature' require to be defined. It\nmight be said that justice is one principle, everywhere and always the\nsame, and that only its embodiments in law and custom are variable.\n\n***\n\n'What happens every day is not improbable; some things, against which\nthe chances are many thousands to one, happen every day; therefore\nsome things against which the chances are many thousands to one, are\nnot improbable.'--A fallacy of division: that improbable things in\ngeneral happen every day does not render the occurrence of any one a\nprobable event.\n\n***\n\n'Protection from punishment is plainly due to the innocent; therefore,\nas you maintain that this person ought not to be punished, it\nappears that you are convinced of his innocence.'--A fallacy of cross\nreasoning.\n\n                                  I.\n  Innocent persons                | deserve  protection\n  --------------------------------+--------------------\n  This person deserves protection | _N. C._\n\n***\n\n'He who cannot possibly act otherwise than he does, has neither\nmerit nor demerit in his action; a liberal and benevolent man cannot\npossibly act otherwise than he does in relieving the poor; therefore\nsuch a man has neither merit nor demerit in his action.'--To 'have\nmerit in an action' is scarcely intelligible. A man's merit is in his\ncharacter, and his actions are effects and signs of character.\n\n***\n\n    'All the fish that the net inclosed were an indiscriminate\n    mixture of various kinds; those that were set aside and saved\n    as valuable were fish that the net inclosed; therefore\n    those that were set aside and saved as valuable were an\n    indiscriminate mixture of various kinds.'\n\nAn instance of the fallacy of division: what is true of the whole\ncontents of the net is not necessarily true of a portion of the\ncontents.\n\n***\n\n'A desire to gain by another's loss is a violation of the tenth\ncommandment; all gaming, therefore, since it implies a desire to\nprofit at the expense of another, involves a breach of the tenth\ncommandment.'--A valid argument in inherence.\n\n  All desire to gain by, &c.          | violates\n  ------------------------------------+--------------\n  Gaming involves this kind of desire | _it violates_\n\n***\n\n'He that destroys a man who usurps despotic power in a free country,\ndeserves well of his countrymen; Brutus destroyed Caesar, who usurped\ndespotic power in Rome; therefore he deserved well of the Romans.'--If\nRome was 'a free country' the conclusion is valid.\n\n***\n\n    'No fish suckles its young; the whale suckles its young; the\n    whale is therefore no fish.'\n\n                I.\n  What suckles  | is no-fish\n  --------------|----------------\n  Whale suckles | _it is no-fish_\n\n***\n\n    'This explosion must have been occasioned by gunpowder, for\n    nothing else would have possessed sufficient force.'\n\n                          V.\n  Explosions of a certain | can only be occasioned by\n  destructiveness         | gunpowder\n  ------------------------+--------------------------\n  This explosion has that | _it must have been\n  destructiveness         | occasioned by gunpowder_\n\n***\n\n    'Every man should be moderate, for excess will cause disease.'\n\n                         V.\n  To avoid disease       | moderation is requisite\n  -----------------------+------------------------\n  Every man should avoid | _every man should\n  disease                | be moderate_\n\n***\n\n    'Blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy.'\n\n                       I.\n  To obtain mercy      | is blessed\n  ---------------------+---------------------\n  Those who show mercy | _they must be\n  obtain mercy         | considered blessed_\n\n***\n\n    'Some speculative men are unworthy of trust; for they are\n    unwise, and no unwise man can be trusted.'\n\n                       I.\n  Unwise men           | are not to be trusted\n  ---------------------+-----------------------------\n  Some speculative men | _they are not to be trusted_\n  are unwise\n\n***\n\n    'No idle person can be a successful writer of history;\n    therefore Hume, Macaulay, Hallam and Grote must have been\n    industrious.'\n\n                         I.\n  Successful historians  | are not idle persons\n  -----------------------+---------------------\n  Hume and the rest were | _they cannot have\n  successful historians  | been idle persons_\n\n***\n\n'Lithium is an element; for it is an alkali-producing substance, which\nis a metal, which is an element.'--Fallacy of no-application.\n\n  Every alk.   | is a metal      || Every metal   | is an element\n  prod. subst. |                 ||               |\n  -------------+-----------------++---------------+-------------------\n  L. is alk.   | _it is a metal_ || L. is a metal | _it is an element_\n  p. subst.    |                 ||               |\n\n***\n\n    'Rational beings are accountable for their actions; brutes not\n    being rational, are therefore exempt from responsibility.'\n\n                      I.\n  Rational beings     | are accountable\n  --------------------+----------------\n  Brutes not rational | _N. C._\n\n***\n\n    'Whatever tends to withdraw the mind from pursuits of a low\n    nature deserves to be promoted; classical learning does\n    this, since it gives us a taste for intellectual enjoyments;\n    therefore it deserves to be promoted.'\n\n                 V.                   I.\n  Whatever gives | tends      || Whatever tends | deserves\n  ---------------+------------++----------------+--------------\n  Learning gives | _it tends_ || Learning tends | _it deserves_\n\n***\n\n'Bacon was a great lawyer and statesman; and as he was also a\nphilosopher, we may infer that any philosopher may be a great\nlawyer and statesman.'--The theorem infers the general inherence of\nphilosophy with eminence in law and politics, from the single instance\nof Bacon: it is evidently a fallacy of doubtful precedent.\n\n***\n\n    'Snowdon is the highest mountain in England and Wales. Snowdon\n    is not so high as Ben Nevis. Therefore the highest mountain in\n    England and Wales is not so high as Ben Nevis.'\n\nThis means: 'the highest mountain in England and Wales is called\nSnowdon, and it is not so high as Ben Nevis.' The apparent conclusion\nmerely repeats a part of the information given already. There is no\ncase. The following is a theorem of the same kind--\n\n    'Lithium is the lightest metal known. Lithium is the metal\n    indicated by one bright line in the spectrum. Therefore the\n    lightest metal known is the metal indicated by a spectrum of\n    one bright line.'\n\n***\n\n    'If ye were Abraham's children, ye would do the works of\n    Abraham.'\n\n                         VI.\n  Abraham's children      | do his works\n  ------------------------+------------------------\n  If ye were his children | _ye would do his works_\n\n***\n\n'Since all metals are elements, the most rare of all the metals\nmust be the most rare of all the elements.'--There is a suppressed\nprecedent to the effect that the most rare individual of a species\nmust be the most rare of its genus, which may or may not be true.\n\n***\n\n    'All vice is odious; but avarice is a vice; for it makes men\n    slaves; therefore avarice is odious.'\n\n                    V.                                    I.\n  Whatever enslaves | is a vice      || All vice          | is odious\n  ------------------+----------------++-------------------+---------------\n  Avarice enslaves  | _it is a vice_ || Avarice is a vice | _it is odious_\n\n***\n\n    'Bucephalus is a horse; a horse is a quadruped; a quadruped is\n    an animal; an animal is a substance; therefore Bucephalus is a\n    substance.'\n\n  All horses |are quads.|| Quads.    | animals   ||   Animal | substance\n  -----------+----------++-----------+-----------++----------+----------\n  Bu. is a h.|_he is q._||B. is quad.|_he is an._||Bu. is an.|_he is\n  subst._\n\nThis is what logicians call a _Sorites_. There may be a chain of valid\narguments, in which the conclusion of one is precedent or case of the\nnext; but the propositions just quoted do not make an argument, being\nmerely a string of classifications. If we know what Bucephalus and\nsubstance mean, we know by perception that Bucephalus is a substance.\n\n***\n\n    'Every being is then happy when it acquires the proper\n    perfection of its nature; and consequently all vital beings\n    are capable of receiving felicity that are capable of arriving\n    at the perfection of their nature.'\n\n                            I.\n  Every being that acquires | is happy\n  --------------------------+------------------------------\n  All vital beings capable  | _must be capable of receiving\n  of acquiring              | felicity_\n\nThis is perilously near tautology; it can be saved only by assuming\nthat 'every being capable of happiness' is a more extensive class\nthan 'all vital beings capable of arriving at the perfection of their\nnature.'\n\n***\n\n    'The soul's debility is not owing to her lapse into matter;\n    for as this lapse is voluntary, the soul must have sinned\n    prior to her descent.'\n\n                    VI.\n  Voluntary lapse    | proves prior sin\n  -------------------+-----------------------------\n  Soul's lapse is v. | _her debility must have been\n                       antecedent to lapse_\n\n***\n\n  _Cogito ergo sum._--\n\n                  I.\n  Whatever thinks | is\n  ----------------+---------------------------\n  I think         | _I must believe that I am_\n\nThat we exist is the most certain fact we know: it cannot be\nstrengthened by any argumentation. If we can doubt that we _are_, we\ncan with better reason doubt that we think.\n\n***\n\nHere is Hamilton's example of a disjunctive syllogism, which he\nconsidered a valid argument--'The hope of immortality is either a\nrational expectation or an illusion; but the hope of immortality is\na rational expectation; therefore the hope of immortality is not an\nillusion.' It is a flagrant tautologism.\n\n***\n\n    'If man be not a morally responsible being, he must want\n    either the power of recognising moral good (as an intelligent\n    agent), or the power of willing it (as a free agent); but\n    man wants neither of these powers; therefore man is a morally\n    responsible being.'\n\nAdopted by Hamilton from Krug and given as valid. It is first a\nfallacy of contrast, and if amended in this respect it would still be\na fallacy of tautology.\n\n                               I.\n  If m. lacked certain pp.     | he would be irresp.\n  -----------------------------+--------------------\n  He does _not_ lack these pp. | _N. C._\n\n***\n\n'If Aeschines joined in the public rejoicings, he is inconsistent; if\nhe did not, he is unpatriotic; but he either joined, or not, therefore\nhe is either inconsistent or unpatriotic.'--An excellent specimen of\nlogicians' logic: on a par with this--If it is fine weather, I go;\nif it rains, I stay; it must either rain or be fine, therefore I must\neither go or stay.\n\n***\n\n    'If the world were eternal, the most useful arts, such as\n    painting, &c. would be of unknown antiquity: and on the same\n    supposition there would be records long prior to the Mosaic;\n    and likewise the sea and land in all parts of the globe might\n    be expected to maintain the same relative situations now as\n    formerly: but none of these is the fact: therefore the world\n    is not eternal.'\n\n  If some things were different | the w. would be eternal\n  from what they are            |\n  ------------------------------+------------------------\n  They are _not_ different      | _N. C._\n\n***\n\n    'If the world existed from eternity, there would be records\n    prior to the Mosaic; and if it were produced by chance, it\n    would not bear marks of design: there are no records prior to\n    the Mosaic, and the world does bear marks of design: therefore\n    it neither existed from eternity, nor is it the work of\n    chance.'\n\nTwo theorems are here mixed together, both fallacies of contrast--\n\n  Existence of records | would prove the w. etern.\n  ---------------------+--------------------------\n  Records do not exist | the w. is non-eternal\n\n  Non-existence of marks | wd. pr. w. made by chance\n  ---------------------+----------------------------\n  The marks exist        | w. was not made by chance\n\n***\n\n    'If this man were wise, he would not speak irreverently of\n    Scripture in jest; and if he were good he would not do so in\n    earnest; but he does it, either in jest or earnest; therefore\n    he is either not wise or not good.'\n\nAs it stands this is quite circular, but it might be rendered valid by\ngeneralisation:--\n\n                            VI.\n  To speak irrev. of Scr. in | indicates that a man is not\n  jest or earnest            |  wise or not good\n  ---------------------------+------------------------------\n  This man does it           | we must infer that _he is not\n                             | w. or not g._\n\n***\n\n'If virtue were a habit worth acquiring, it must ensure either power,\nor wealth, or honour, or pleasure; but virtue ensures none of\nthese; therefore virtue is not a habit worth attaining.' Fallacy of\ncontrast--\n\n                     I.\n  What ensures       | is worth\n  -------------------+---------\n  V. does not ensure | _N. C._\n\n***\n\n'If men are not likely to be influenced in the performance of a known\nduty by taking an oath to perform it, the oaths commonly administered\nare superfluous; if they are likely to be so influenced, everyone\nshould be made to take an oath to behave rightly throughout his\nlife; but one or other must be the case; _therefore_ either the oaths\ncommonly administered are superfluous, or everyone should be made to\ntake an oath to behave rightly throughout his life.'--This will be\nmore intelligible if contracted thus: If oaths fail to influence they\nare superfluous; if they influence they should be obligatory; but they\neither influence or do not; therefore they are either superfluous\nor should be obligatory. There is no argument; the alternative\nconclusions merely repeat the alternative precedents.\n\n***\n\n'If virtue is voluntary, vice is voluntary; but virtue is voluntary;\ntherefore so is vice.' (Arist. _Eth._ Bk. III. quoted by Whately.)\nThis is a circular way of saying that we believe it to be a fact that\nvice is voluntary. The argumentative form is probably supposed to\ngive the assertion greater weight than it would have if expressed as a\nperceptual judgment.\n\n***\n\nThis is valid argument, according to Hamilton--'If man were suited to\nlive out of society, he would either be a god or a beast; but man is\nneither a god nor a beast; therefore he is not suited to live out of\nsociety.'--It has faults of contrast and tautology.\n\n                           I.\n  Only gods and beasts     | are suited\n  -------------------------+-----------\n  Man is neither g. nor b. | _N. C._\n\n***\n\n'If iron is impure, it is brittle; but this iron is impure; therefore\nit is brittle.'--A valid dogmatic argument.\n\n                    I.\n  Impure iron       | is brittle\n  ------------------+-----------------\n  This iron is imp. | _it must be br._\n\n***\n\n'If the weather is fine, we shall go into the country; now the weather\nis fine, therefore we shall go into the country.'--We never get beyond\nthe simple judgment that our going into the country is associated with\nfine weather.\n\n***\n\nThe following is valid:--'As often as the weather is fine, my\nbrother has a habit of going into the country; if the weather be fine\nto-morrow I infer that he will go into the country.' Here a particular\nhypothetical case is illustrated by reference to a general habit.\n\n***\n\n'As often as the weather is fine my brother goes into the country;\nif it be not fine to-morrow I conclude that he will not go into\nthe country.'--A fallacy of contrast: we are not informed in the\nantecedents what the brother does on wet days.\n\n***\n\n    'If there are sharpers in the company we ought not to gamble;\n    but there are no sharpers in the company; therefore we ought\n    to gamble.'\n\n                  I.\n  Presence of sh. | forbids to gamble\n  ----------------+------------------\n  Absence of sh.  | _N. C._\n\n***\n\n'Logic as it was cultivated by the schoolmen proved a fruitless study;\ntherefore logic as it is cultivated at the present day must be a\nfruitless study likewise.'--We must take the conclusion as valid,\nuntil we know in what respects modern logic is superior to scholastic\nlogic.\n\n***\n\n    'Few treatises of science convey important truths, without\n    any admixture of error, in a perspicuous and interesting form:\n    therefore though a treatise would deserve much attention which\n    should possess such excellence, it is plain that few treatises\n    of science do deserve much attention.'\n\nThis means no more than that treatises of a certain excellence\nwould deserve attention, and that there are few of them. There is no\nargument.\n\n***\n\n    'Some objects of great beauty answer no other purpose but to\n    gratify the sight: many flowers have great beauty; and many of\n    them accordingly answer no other purpose than to gratify the\n    sight.'\n\n                          I.\n  Some obj. which answer  | are beautiful\n  ------------------------+--------------\n  Many flowers are beaut. | _N. C._\n\n***\n\n    'None but Whites are civilised; the ancient Germans were\n    Whites; therefore they were civilised.'\n\n                        I.\n  All civilised nations | are Whites\n  ----------------------|-----------\n  Anc. Ger. were Wh.    | _N. C._\n\n***\n\n    'Wilkes was a favourite with the populace; he who is a\n    favourite with the populace must understand how to manage\n    them; he who understands how to manage them must be well\n    acquainted with their character; he who is well acquainted\n    with their character must hold them in contempt; therefore\n    Wilkes must have held the populace in contempt.'\n\n  Favourites    | must kn. how to       || He who kn. how | must be\n                | manage                || to  manage     | acquainted\n  --------------+-----------------------++----------------+--------------\n  W. was a fav. | _he knew how to man._ || W. knew        | _he was acq._\n\n  He who is acq. | must despise\n  ---------------+---------------------\n  W. was acq.    | _he must have desp._\n\n***\n\n    'Something has existed from eternity. For since something now\n    is, it is manifest that something always was. Otherwise the\n    things that now are must have risen out of nothing, absolutely\n    and without cause. Which is a plain contradiction in terms.\n    For to say a thing is produced, and yet that there is no\n    cause at all of that production, is to say that something is\n    effected when it is effected by nothing, that is, at the same\n    time when it is not effected at all. Whatever exists has a\n    cause of its existence, either in the necessity of its own\n    nature, and then it must have been of itself eternal: or in\n    the will of some other being, and then that other being must,\n    at least in the order of nature and causality, have existed\n    before it.'\n\nIn this theorem we have a case--'Something is'; and a\nconclusion--'Something has existed from eternity.' The reasoner\nseeks a credible or conceivable precedent by which to connect that\nconclusion with the case.\n\nWe are offered a choice of two theorems. The first is untenable, for\nwe have never had the experience that is given as precedent; it is\nalso tautological, as the 'something' of the case is the 'whatever' of\nthe precedent.\n\n                                      V.\n  Whatever exists in the necessity    | has existed from eternity\n  of its own nature                   |\n  ------------------------------------+-------------------------------\n  'Something' exists in the necessity | _it has existed from eternity_\n  of its own nature\n\nIt is not inconceivable that something should be self-existent, but we\nknow nothing as to its being eternal. We are not familiar enough with\nself-existent things and eternal things to warrant us in asserting\ndogmatically that where the first quality is, there also must be the\nsecond.\n\nThe next theorem is that everything must be caused, and that causation\ninvolves a _regressum ad infinitum_. On this principle there must\nhave been things for an eternity backwards. According to the theory of\ncausation given in section XXVII, a true beginning is reached when we\ndiscover the motive, design and power that produced an effect. It is\nnot necessary to ask next what caused that motive, design and power.\nThe infinite regress is applicable only to _material sequence_, in\nwhich there is no proper beginning or end. The author of the above\nargument seems to be trying to combine the notion of causation by\n_will_ with that of infinite regress. But his language is too obscure\nto make it certain what he means exactly.\n\n***\n\nThe three following theorems--in a diluted form--occur in an otherwise\nexcellent work on the politics and social life of the ancient Greeks.\n\n'The Athenians who opposed the union of Greece and Macedonia were old\nmen, and the result was mischievous; other similar instances are\nfound in history; therefore the government of old men is always\nmischievous.'--A fallacy of false generality. Everybody knows that\nsome old men have been wise governors. Cicero, from his experience,\ndrew the opposite conclusion--that the only safe rulers were old men.\n\n'All old political leaders are mischievous; Gladstone is old;\ntherefore he is to be considered politically mischievous.'--Even were\nthe precedent not false the argument is superfluous, for the effect of\nGladstone's politics is now matter of fact or history.\n\n'Gladstone is politically mischievous; he advocates Home Rule for\nIreland; therefore Irish Home Rule must be mischievous.'--A fallacy\nof division: a political leader might on the whole be mischievous,\nbut his measures need not on that account be each and every one\nmischievous.\n\nIf dialectic were taught generally and on a rational method, a\nresponsible author would avoid bad reasoning of this sort as carefully\nas he avoids bad grammar, vulgar imagery, or faulty arithmetic.\n\n\n\n\n      *      *      *      *      *      *\n\n\n\n\nTranscriber's note:\n\nPunctuation has been corrected without comment.\n\nThe spelling in this book is that found in the Oxford English\n Dictionary (OED).\n\nPage 78: 'comformable' corrected to 'conformable'\n\n \"The following is an argument conformable to the above rules.\"\n\nPage 99: \"un-extended, im-material, im-ponderable\"\n\nThe author used hyphens in the above words for emphasis.\nOther instances of hyphens used for emphasis occur in the book.\nOther instances of hyphenated and unhyphenated words occur in the book.\n\nPage 164: 'premiss' is a variant of 'premise' (OED), which occurs more\n frequently in the book.\n\nPage 216: 'inclose is a variant of 'enclose' (OED).\n\n \"All the fish that the net inclosed were an indiscriminate....\"","title":"Reformed Logic: A System Based on Berkeley's Philosophy with an Entirely New Method of Dialectic","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":50755}