{"collection":"scripture-revelation","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_53346/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_53346","id":"gutenberg_53346","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/53346","summary":null,"tags":["Analogy (Religion)","Apologetics -- Early works to 1800","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Religion/Spirituality","Christianity","Eschatology","Natural theology","Revelation"],"text":"THE\n ANALOGY OF RELIGION,\n TO THE\n Constitution and Course of Nature.\n\n TO WHICH ARE ADDED\n TWO BRIEF DISSERTATIONS:\n I. ON PERSONAL IDENTITY.--II. ON THE NATURE OF VIRTUE.\n\n BY\n JOSEPH BUTLER, D.C.L.\n\n Ejus [Analogi\u00e6] h\u00e6c vis est, ut id quod dubium est ad\n aliquid simile, de quo non qu\u00e6ritur referat ut incerta\n certis probet.--QUINTIL. l. i. c. 6.\n\n WITH\n AN INTRODUCTION, NOTES, CONSPECTUS, AND AMPLE INDEX,\n BY\n HOWARD MALCOM, D.D.\n PRESIDENT OF THE UNIVERSITY, LEWISBURG, PENNSYLVANIA.\n\n SEVENTEENTH EDITION.\n PHILADELPHIA:\n J. B. LIPPINCOTT & CO.\n 1873.\n\n Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1857, by\n J. B. LIPPINCOTT & CO.\n in the Clerk\u2019s Office of the District Court of the United\n States in and for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS.\n\n\n PAGE\n\n EDITOR\u2019S INTRODUCTION 5\n\n \u201d PREFACE 19\n\n \u201d CONSPECTUS 21\n\n AUTHOR\u2019S ADVERTISEMENT 66\n\n \u201d INTRODUCTION 67\n\n PART I.\n\n OF NATURAL RELIGION.\n\n CHAP. I.--A Future Life 77\n\n CHAP. II.--The Government of God by Rewards and Punishments 95\n\n CHAP. III.--The Moral Government of God 105\n\n CHAP. IV.--Probation, as implying Trial, Difficulties, and\n Danger 128\n\n CHAP. V.--Probation, as intended for Moral Discipline and\n Improvement 136\n\n CHAP. VI.--The Opinion of Necessity, considered as influencing\n Practice 157\n\n CHAP. VII.--The Government of God, considered as a Scheme or\n Constitution, imperfectly comprehended 171\n\n CONCLUSION 180\n\n PART II.\n\n OF REVEALED RELIGION.\n\n CHAP. I.--The Importance of Christianity 186\n\n CHAP. II.--The supposed Presumption against a Revelation,\n considered as miraculous 202\n\n CHAP. III.--Our Incapacity of judging, what were to be expected\n in a Revelation; and the Credibility, from Analogy,\n that it must contain things appearing liable to\n Objections 209\n\n CHAP. IV.--Christianity, considered as a Scheme or Constitution,\n imperfectly comprehended 223\n\n CHAP. V.--The Particular System of Christianity; the\n Appointment of a Mediator, and the Redemption of\n the World by him 230\n\n CHAP. VI.--Want of Universality in Revelation; and of the\n supposed Deficiency in the Proof of it 247\n\n CHAP. VII.--The Particular Evidence for Christianity 263\n\n CHAP. VIII.--Objections against arguing from the Analogy of\n Nature to Religion 296\n\n CONCLUSION 306\n\n DISSERTATIONS.\n\n DISSERTATION I.--Personal Identity 317\n\n DISSERTATION II.--The Nature of Virtue 324\n\n INDEX TO PART I 333\n\n INDEX TO PART II 343\n\n\n\n\nEditor\u2019s Introduction\n\n\nJOSEPH BUTLER was born at Wantage, England, May 18th, 1692, the\nyoungest of eight children. The biographies of that day were few\nand meagre; and in few cases is this so much to be regretted as in\nButler\u2019s. It would have been both interesting and profitable to trace\nthe development and occupations of one of the mightiest of human minds.\nBut no cotemporary gathered up the incidents of his life, and now all\nefforts to elicit them have been without success.\n\nHis father was a prosperous dry-goods merchant, who, at the time of his\nson\u2019s birth, had retired from business with a competency, and resided\nin a suburban mansion called \u201cThe Priory,\u201d still in existence.\n\nBeing a non-conformist, he educated Joseph at a \u201cdissenting\u201d academy\nat Gloucester, under SAMUEL JONES, a gentleman of great ability, and\na skilful instructor, who raised up some of the greatest men of their\nday.[1]\n\nIt was while a member of this academy, and about the age of twenty-one,\nthat Butler disclosed to the world his wonderful power of abstract\nreasoning, in his famous correspondence with Samuel Clarke, in relation\nto that eminent author\u2019s \u201c_Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of\nGod_.\u201d This correspondence is now generally inserted at the end of that\nwork.\n\nMr. Butler having deliberately adopted Episcopal views, and resolved\nto unite himself with the Established Church, his father, with\npraiseworthy liberality, sent him to Oxford, where he entered Oriel\nCollege, March, 1714. Of his college life there is no account; nor of\nthe time and place of his ordination. He removed to London in 1718,\non receiving the appointment of \u201cPreacher at the Rolls.\u201d His famous\nFifteen Sermons were preached in that chapel, and published before\nresigning the place, with a dedication to Sir Joseph Jekyl, \u201cas a\nparting mark of gratitude for the favors received during his connection\nwith that learned society.\u201d\n\nOne of Butler\u2019s warmest college friends was Edward Talbot second son\nof a clergyman who afterwards became Bishop of Durham. This admirable\nyoung man died of smallpox; in his last hours recommending Butler to\nhis father\u2019s patronage; and scarcely had that gentleman attained the\nsee of Durham, before he gave Mr. B. the living of Haughton, from\nwhence he transferred him, in 1725, to the richer benefice of Stanhope.\n\nOn receiving this honorable and lucrative appointment, he resigned\nthe Lectureship at the Rolls, and in the autumn of 1726 retired to\nhis beautiful residence at Stanhope. Here, without a family to occupy\nhis time, he devoted himself to his great work, the Analogy: using\nhorseback exercise, seeing little company, living abstemiously and\ncaring for his flock.\n\nSeven years thus rolled away; when to draw him from what seemed to his\nfriends too great retirement and application, Lord-Chancellor Talbot\nmade him his chaplain, and afterwards, in 1736, gave him a prebend\u2019s\nstall in Rochester. In 1736, Butler being now forty-four, Caroline,\nconsort of George II., appointed him \u201cClerk of the Closet,\u201d an office\nwhich merely required his attendance at the Queen\u2019s apartments every\nevening, from seven to nine.\n\nBeing now in London, convenient to the press, and enjoying both leisure\nand competency, he published his immortal ANALOGY--the cherished work\nof his life. The Queen was delighted with the book, and made herself\nmaster of its glorious array of reasoning. But she died the same year,\nand he lost not only a patroness, but a friend. He returned to his\nbenefice at Stanhope, the income of which had been held during his\nresidence in London.\n\nOn her death-bed, the Queen had urged her husband to promote her\nhonored chaplain to a bishopric; and next year, the see of Norwich\nbecoming vacant, the Bishop of Bristol was translated to it, and the\nsee of Bristol given to Butler. Bristol was the poorest bishopric\nin England, its emoluments being but $2,000 per annum; less than\nthose of the rectorship of Stanhope. Butler distinctly disclosed his\ndisappointment in his letter to the minister Walpole, accepting the\nposition; and declared that he did not think it \u201cvery suitable to the\ncondition of his fortune, nor answerable to the recommendation with\nwhich he was honored.\u201d The king was not displeased at this candor,\nand in 1740 improved his income by giving him, in addition to his\nbishopric, the profitable and influential office of Dean of St.\nPaul\u2019s. Butler, who had retained the living of Stanhope along with\nhis bishopric, now resigned that rectorship. \u201cThe rich revenues,\u201d says\nProfessor Fitzgerald, \u201cof the Deanery of St. Paul, enabled him to\ngratify his taste at Bristol.\u201d He expended about $25,000 in improving\nand beautifying the episcopal residence and gardens. He fostered useful\ncharities, and employed his wealth for others rather than for himself.\n\nIn 1750, upon the death of Dr. Edward Chandler, Bishop of Durham,\nButler was promoted to that see, the most honorable and lucrative\nin England. He had before been offered the Primacy, on the death of\nArchbishop Potter, but declined it, with the remark that \u201cit was too\nlate for him to try to support a falling church.\u201d On assuming his\ndiocese at Durham, Butler delivered and published his famous Charge\nto the Clergy, upon \u201cThe Use and Importance of External Religion.\u201d\nHe was at once assailed vigorously, in pamphlets and papers, by\nArchdeacon Blackburn, the Rev. T. Lindsay, and others, on the charge\nof Popery; an imputation which is still sometimes cast upon him, and\nwhich finds some slender support in his setting up a marble cross over\nthe communion-table at Bristol. That he never was a Papist, is now so\nevident, that we can account for the imputation only by the strong\njealousy of the Romish Church then prevalent.\n\nButler now became still more munificent. His private charities were\nexceedingly generous, and his public ones seemed sometimes to border on\nextravagance. He gave $2,000 a year to the county hospital, and often\ngave away thousands of dollars at a time. But though quite lavish in\nbuildings and ornaments, as well as in benevolence, he was remarkably\nfrugal in his personal expenses. It is said of him, by Rev. John\nNewton, that on one occasion, when a distinguished visitor dined with\nhim by appointment, the provision consisted of a single joint of meat,\nand a pudding. The bishop remarked to his guest on that occasion, that\nhe \u201chad long been disgusted with the fashionable expense of time and\nmoney in entertainments, and was determined that it should receive no\ncountenance from his example.\u201d\n\nOf his amusements we know little except that he took much horseback\nexercise, and often employed his secretary, Mr. Emms, to play for him\non the organ.\n\nButler held the see of Durham less than two years. Symptoms of general\nphysical decay betrayed themselves about the time of his promotion, and\nin spite of all that skill and affection could prompt, he sunk to rest\nJune 16th, 1752, aged sixty. He was never married.\n\nA considerable number of his sermons and charges have been printed,\nbut are too philosophical to be generally read. His great work is the\nAnalogy, published in 1736, and from that day read and admired by every\nhighly-cultivated mind. He was induced to write by a state of things\nvery remarkable in the history of religion. Debauchery and infidelity\nwere almost universal, not in any one class of society but in all.\nEngland had reached the culminating point of irreligion, and the firm\nre-establishment of Episcopacy had as yet done nothing to mend the\nnation\u2019s morals. Piety was deemed a mark of ignorance and vulgarity,\nand multitudes of those who professed it were persecuted to dungeons\nand death.\n\nInfidel writers, warmed into life by court corruption, became more\nnumerous and audacious than ever before. Their methods of attacking\nChristianity were various; but the most successful then, as always, was\nto impugn certain doctrines and declarations of the Sacred Scriptures,\nas irrational, and hence reject the whole. They generally admitted the\nBeing and perfection of God, and extolled the sufficiency of natural\nreligion; but denied any revelation, or any necessity for one. The\nverdict of the world was that the Bible is not authentic, that man is\nnot accountable, nor even probably immortal, that God neither rewards\nnor punishes, and that present indulgence, as far as our nature admits,\nis both wise and safe.\n\nBishop Downam,[2] one of the most learned of the clergy, in the early\npart of the seventeenth century writes thus: \u201cIn these times, if a\nman do but labor to keep a good conscience, though he meddle not with\nmatters of state, if he make conscience of swearing, sanctify the\nSabbath, frequent sermons, or abstain from the common corruptions of\nthe times, he shall straightway be condemned for a puritan, and be less\nfavored than either a carnal gospeller, or a close Papist.\u201d\n\nIt was considered settled, especially in polite circles, that\nChristianity, after so long a prevalence, had been found out to be an\nimposture. The clergy, as a body, did nothing to dispel this moral\ngloom, but rather increased it by their violent and scandalous conduct.\nIn the sad language of Bishop Warburton, \u201cReligion had lost its hold on\nthe minds of the people.\u201d He adds with great point, \u201cThough a _rule of\nright_ may direct the philosopher to a principle of action; and the\n_point of honor_ may keep up the thing called manners, among gentlemen:\nyet nothing but _religion_ can ever fix a sober standard of behavior\namong the common people.\u201d Even the universities were on the side of\nirreligion; for professorships, as well as pulpits, were given to men,\nnot for positive worth and fitness, but for possessing qualities then\nmost in vogue with those who held the appointing power. Such were the\ntrying times which had driven our pilgrim fathers to seek a home amid\nthe wilds of an unexplored continent, and to face the dangers of sea\nand savage.\n\nIt must ever be regarded as among the highest instances of God\u2019s\nbringing good out of evil, that this outrageous rampancy of infidelity\nbrought out a host of champions for the truth of His word; who boldly\nmet the odium of discipleship, and waged battle in such style that the\nDeistical controversy was settled forever. Never was a dispute more\ndetermined on both sides, and never was victory more complete. Literary\ninfidelity not only recoiled, but was routed; and can never again\nprevail. Henceforth, no _scholar_ will ever treat the evidences of\nChristianity as a subject of ridicule or contempt.\n\nWhen we contrast the stupendous learning, and powerful logic, of the\nChristian writers of that century, with the superficial and almost\ncontemptible productions of the writers against whom they contended, we\nare tempted to wonder why such power should be requisite to overthrow\nsuch weakness. But we must remember, that frail logic and shallow\nconsiderations, will persuade men to indulge their vices; while\nthe soundest reasonings and the most impressive inducements, with\ndifficulty lead them to self-restraint and true holiness.\n\nThe infidel writers of that day have sunk into such oblivion that\ntheir works are now seldom found but in great libraries; and even\nwell-educated persons scarcely know more of them than their names. Yet\nso perfectly did their principles accord with the temper of the times\nand the universal depravity of the carnal heart, that they enjoyed the\nhighest popularity with all classes. Forever honored be the names of\nthat noble band, who, in face of such odds, established the authority\nof the Bible, and left the advocates of atheism and immorality without\na lurking-place.[3] In this noble cohort Butler stands conspicuous:\nand to him, I think, more than to all the others, is to be attributed\nthe sudden and total overthrow of infidelity, when it was in its glory.\n\nAs a metaphysician, few have equalled him. What he added to the\nscience, has ever since remained a part of it, which can be said\nof scarcely another. He advanced more that was new, fortified old\npositions more ably, and applied speculation to religion more usefully\nthan any before him. Our language furnishes no profounder thinking.\nMerely to understand him is an honorable distinction, and requires no\nsmall previous training of the power of attention. As a polemic, he is\nkeen, sagacious, candid, patient, persevering, calm, inventive, and\nprofound: every page indicates that repose of mind, which belongs only\nto true greatness, combined with a full knowledge of the subject. So\nfar as I am able to judge, he never presses a consideration beyond its\njust limits, and seldom introduces an illustration which has not the\nforce of an argument. Fallacies he seems to abolish at a touch.\n\nThe Analogy employed much of his life. It was begun in his twentieth\nyear, but was not published till he was forty-five. Such a mode of\nwriting never makes large books, for the matter, constantly revised,\nbecomes constantly condensed. The Analogy is so condensed, as that to\nmake a satisfactory synopsis is scarcely practicable. Hence, though my\nConspectus and notes have aided my pupils to understand and remember\nthe argument, they do not in any measure obviate the necessity of\nstudying the book itself. If they do not increase the number of those\nwho shall studiously peruse the book itself, my aim and expectations\nwill be disappointed.\n\nTo this work no reply has ever been attempted! Extensive as is its\ndiffusion, and great as is its acknowledged influence, infidelity\nhas had the highest inducements to attempt to set it aside. Written\nfor a present purpose, and most signally accomplishing it, it is yet\nso written as to endure, in full value, through all coming time.\nIt is undoubtedly \u201cthe most original and the most profound work\nextant, in any language, on the philosophy of religion,\u201d[4] \u201cthe most\nargumentative and philosophical defence of Christianity ever submitted\nto the world.\u201d[5]\n\nWriters in defence of Christianity had, before Butler, amply discussed\nthe several departments of evidences; but still there remained\nobjections. The structure of the globe, the course of nature, the\norganization of animals, &c. were affirmed to contradict revelation.\nIts doctrines and duties, moreover, were pronounced inconsistent\nwith sound reason. Butler repeats none of the old arguments, but\nconfines himself to the showing that the declarations of revelation\nare in perfect harmony with facts seen daily in the world, and which\nall admit. That the world might not have been ordered and governed\notherwise, he does not choose to dispute. Taking things as they are,\nand closely studying the connection between one thing and another,\nwe ought to inquire what course of action on our part, will conform\nto the needs of such a nature and such circumstances. Our bodies are\nconstructed of parts, all adapted to each other, and also to one\ngeneral end. So too, our souls. And the two together have relations\nand adaptations, which may, to some extent at least, indicate what is\ndesigned to be the _general_ end of our existence. If Christianity\nbefits these several parts of our mixed nature and their obvious uses,\nthen there is nothing incongruous between the two; and no objections\nagainst Christianity can be drawn from the course of nature. On the\ncontrary, all seems to be governed as the gospel declares it is, and\nshows that the Author of man and the Author of the Bible is the same.\nThis is still more impressive when we consider that we have a _moral\nfaculty_; for it is the very object and business of this faculty to\ndeal with right and wrong, good and evil; the facts and magnitudes of\nwhich are obvious in the course of nature. If Christianity does, in an\nespecial manner, _befit_ this faculty, if it is adapted to promote our\ngeneral rectitude and happiness, and if it contains no principle which\nis not discernible in the government of the visible world, then there\nis no discrepancy between Christianity and Providence.\n\nThis is Butler\u2019s position. He confines himself to proving such\nan analogy between revelation and the daily course of things, as\nthat nothing known in the universe can be offered in disproof of\nChristianity. The mode of warfare was new. Without professing to prove\nChristianity to be true, he demonstrates that it cannot be proved to be\nfalse; and that if it be even probable, the rejection of it is a gross\nfolly and a tremendous hazard. Every objection against it he proves to\nbe equally forcible against facts which constantly occur, and which all\nadmit, though none profess to understand. Thus leaving the ramparts of\nthe church to be guarded by the mighty men who had valiantly maintained\nits defence, he quietly walked out into the camp of the enemy, and\nspiked every gun!\n\nIt has been said that the whole argument of the \u201cAnalogy\u201d seems to be\nbuilt on Ecclesiasticus xlii. 24: \u201cAll things are double, one against\nthe other, and God hath made nothing imperfect.\u201d If it be so, it\ninvolves no disparagement to have received thus the seminal idea of\nthis immortal work. Who else has so gloriously discerned and expanded\nthe profound philosophy of the son of Sirac? Others have uttered\nsentiments which seem to involve the whole exposition of Butler. Origen\naffirms that \u201che who believes the Scripture to have proceeded from Him\nwho is the Author of nature, may well expect to find the same sort of\ndifficulties in it, as are found in nature.\u201d Shall we assign to Origen\nthe whole credit of the \u201cAnalogy\u201d? As well might we bestow all our\nadmiration for the delightful papers of Addison, in the Spectator, to\nthe classical authors from whom he selected appropriate mottoes! By\nsuch a rule, the entire merit of this most Christian work of Butler\nshould be attributed to the pagan Quintilian, from whom he derives the\nmotto which so appropriately graces his title-page.\n\nA rapid sketch of the outline of the argument will aid the student\nat his outset. He begins by taking for granted the existence of an\nintelligent Author and Governor of the universe. Then, from the\nconditions and changes observed in the visible world, he argues the\nfolly of objecting to revelation on account of doctrines which do but\ndeclare the same general laws and the same principles of government.\nThat there is this harmony, he proves; and hence the probability that\nthe same sort of government will prevail hereafter, which prevails now.\nHe demonstrates that man is under exactly such a probation in this\nworld, and as to this world, as revelation affirms him to be under,\nas to the next; and that embarrassments produced by the doctrine of\nnecessity, involve nature no less than religion. He then evinces the\nneed that man should be placed in a state of training and trial, if he\nis ever to be qualified for better conditions; and that this world,\nas now governed, is exactly adapted to give that training, and to\nproduce such a character as will insure happiness under any possible\ncontingencies. This is the argument of Part I.\n\nProceeding to examine Christianity, he discusses its importance, its\nproofs, the unavoidableness of its containing strange things, the\nabsurdity of expecting fully to comprehend its statements, and the\nabundance of its evidence for candid minds, though they are not, and\nought not to be, irresistible. He answers not only the objections to\nChristianity, but the objections against its proofs; which he shows\nare very different things. Though he keeps rigidly to the refutation\nof objections, and nowhere meddles with the direct evidence of\nChristianity, yet, by removing every objection, he does in fact confirm\nits claims. This clearing away of objections, _after_ the usual proofs\nare presented, crowns and completes the evidence. Thus the ultimate\nresult of a study of his book is not only negative but positive; and\nsuch has been its effect on every candid and competent student.\n\nWe should remember that we have no right to require the removal of\nobjections, and that therefore the whole of Butler\u2019s work is in fact\nsupererogatory; a concession and kindness to such as have doubts,\neither honest or captious. Our only rightful demand of Christianity is\nfor _credentials_. It presents these in its nature, its miracles, its\nprophecies, its propagation, its influence, and its success. If these\nare competent, we should bow to its teachings. To suppose that we are\ncapable of judging of the _propriety_ of all God\u2019s law, or even to\nunderstand his reasons for it, if they were disclosed, is absurd.\n\nIt is true we naturally presume that a revelation in words, and a\nrevelation by natural objects and the visible order of things, would\ncoincide; but to find out the fact or the extent of such coincidence,\nis not our first business. We are to weigh the _testimony_ in favor of\nreligion, embrace it, if sufficient, and attribute the obscurity of any\npart, to our present want of capacity. The solution of difficulties\nserves to _confirm_ our faith in Christianity, but has no place in our\n_ground of reception_: and we have no right to wait for such solution,\nhowever painful and embarrassing may be the difficulties.\n\nAnother, and perhaps even more important, use of the \u201cAnalogy,\u201d is to\ndissipate the prejudices and objections to Christianity which prevent\na candid study of its evidences. These prepossess and poison the mind,\nand obstruct or abate the force of the best arguments. Few, if any,\nafter a careful examination of the positive evidences of Christianity,\nconclude them to be inadequate. But many are they, who having heard\nobjections which their scanty learning does not enable them to answer,\nand their no less scanty interest in the subject does not induce them\nto examine, or which their inclinations lead them to cherish, cast\nit all aside. In this way they relieve themselves from the labor of\ninvestigation, as well as their compunctions of conscience; while they\nindulge both their love of sin and pride of singularity.\n\nAn instance of the use of this book to such a mind, we have in the\ncase of Chalmers. He had read, when a young man, several infidel\nproductions. Their semblance of logic and learning, and supercilious\nconfidence of style, disposed him to regard all religion as mere\nsuperstition. His mind was poisoned. Accustomed as he had been to\nthe positive and precise reasonings of mathematics, he could not\nfind similar proofs for Christianity. But he was induced, by some\nfriends, to study Butler\u2019s Analogy. This, as he expresses it, took\nChristianity \u201cout of the class of unlikelihoods.\u201d It brought him to\nthe investigation, as if the evidence was neither plus nor minus. He\nexamined the evidences as he would have done a declaration that Cicero\nweighed just one hundred and fifty pounds; open to the smallest proof\nor presumption on the positive side of the question. Delivered from\nprejudice, not only against Christianity but against its proofs, he\nsoon saw the madness of deism, and immovably accepted the word of God,\nthough he did not, at that time, feel its transforming power on his own\nheart. Long afterwards he writes, \u201cI cannot render sufficient homage to\nthe argument, which first, addressing itself to the _subject-matter_ of\nChristianity, relieves it of all disproof, and pronounces it worthy of\na trial; and then, addressing itself to the evidence of Christianity,\nrelieves it of all objections, and makes good, to that evidence, all\nthe entireness and efficiency which natively belong to it.\u201d Years\nafterwards he said, \u201cButler made me a Christian.\u201d That it did far more\nfor him than to effect his change of sentiment, that it continued to\nbe a light in his firmament, is touchingly told in the Preface of his\nBridgewater Treatise, where he says, \u201cI have derived greater aid from\nthe views and reasonings of Butler, than I have been able to find,\nbesides, in the whole range of our extant authorship.\u201d\n\nTo the sincere believer in the word of God the study of Butler is of\ngreat use. Doubts are among Satan\u2019s tried weapons, and often haunt\nthe holiest, especially if of a contemplative turn. They see goodness\noppressed, and vice rampant; the world ruled by wicked men, and\ntruth making its way with difficulty. Their hearts are traitorous,\ntheir surroundings full of temptation, and the direct evidence of\nChristianity they may never have studied. To such the analogical\nargument comes with full power, meets a candid examination, and\nprevails.\n\nTo no Christian is this book so useful as the minister. He is\nconstantly confronted by the difficulties which Butler so triumphantly\nhandles. Here he is furnished, not only with a shield to protect his\nown mind from subtle darts, but a sword to demolish the cavil, and\ndefend the system of which he is a public teacher.\n\nTo _all_ persons this book is of great value. We arrive at certainty\nin but few of our decisions, and are often obliged, even in matters of\ngreat moment, to act on probability. Thus we employ precautions when\nan evil is not certain to occur. If the evil would be very serious,\nwe adopt the precaution, when there is but little probability, or\nperhaps a bare possibility, of its occurrence. Now, Butler has shown\nthat if the proofs of revelation were weak, nay, if it had absolutely\nno proof, nay further, if on fair examination there appeared not even\na probability of its truth, still there would remain a _possibility_,\nand this alone, considering the tremendous issues at stake, should make\nevery man a Christian. This argument cannot be applied to Mahometanism\nor any other religion, because against those much may be advanced as\n_disproof_. Our author, having shown the utter absence of disproof,\nshuts us up to the reception of Christianity, were its truth barely\npossible.\n\nThere have not been wanting persons to disparage the \u201cAnalogy,\u201d because\nit affords, as they say, no _direct_ proof of revelation. As well might\nwe demand a discussion of chemistry in a work on astronomy. Scores of\nwriters _prove_ Christianity, and here we have one to relieve us from\nthe difficulties which beset it, and objections which still remain.\nThere is an aspect in which the Analogy may be said to contribute\nthe best of proof. What can go further towards establishing a point,\nthan to demonstrate that there is no proof of the contrary? What can\nshow the fallacy of a set of objections, more than to prove that\nthey might be urged with no less force against the obvious course of\nnature? This use of analogy is conformable to the severest logic, and\nthough offering no pretence of positive argument, goes far towards\nestablishing full conviction. \u201cThe probabilities,\u201d says STEWART,\n\u201cresulting from a concurrence of different analogies, may rise so high\nas to produce an effect on the belief scarcely distinguishable from\nmoral certainty.\u201d\n\nWhen it is considered that Butler\u2019s argument is wholly in addition\nto the cumulative mass of direct and almost irresistible evidence,\nand removes even the objections which attend the subject, we see the\nrejection of Christianity to be inexpressibly rash and absurd. We see\nthe skeptic condemned at his own bar, for acting in the most momentous\nof all possible concerns, in a manner the very opposite of that which\nhe calls sensible and prudent in his ordinary affairs. The \u201cAnalogy\u201d\nestablishes, beyond cavil, strong _presumptions_ that Christianity is\ntrue, aside from all inspection of its proofs. The man, therefore, who\nreally understands this book, and refuses to be a Christian, is led by\nhis lusts and not his reason.\n\nSome admirers of this book have lamented as a defect, its want of\nevangelical tincture, and its exclusive reference to natural things. To\nme, this is a prime recommendation. Were it otherwise, the reasoning\nwould be in a circle. The very structure of the argument demands that\nit should avoid quotations from the Bible.\n\nIt must be admitted, however, that some expressions, taken just as they\nstand, without qualification by the current of the argument, tend to\nlead astray. For instance, \u201cThere is nothing in the human mind contrary\nto virtue.\u201d \u201cMen\u2019s happiness and virtue are left to themselves.\u201d\n\u201cReligion requires nothing which we are not well able to perform.\u201d \u201cOur\nrepentance is accepted, to eternal life.\u201d \u201cOur relations to God are\nmade known by reason.\u201d Such expressions are not to be taken alone, but\nas explained by the general drift of sentiment and doctrine. No one can\nbe familiar with his works, without finding the fullest evidence that\nChristianity was to Butler infinitely more than a creed or a ritual.\nNor should we forget that such expressions are not to be interpreted by\nthe tenor of the \u201cAnalogy\u201d only, but by that of his whole \u2018Works.\u2019\n\nEven if it be judged that he everywhere fails to express himself in\nsuch phrase as we usually call evangelical, it should be remembered\nthat he was a Church-of-England man, at a time when there was a\npowerful reaction against the evangelism of the Puritans, and when a\nreal lack of emotional piety was general in his church.\n\nThat he did not enjoy in his last illness, which extended over a long\nperiod, that sustaining sense of the love of Christ which hearty\nChristians generally feel, is certain. A friend, trying to relieve\nhis depression, reminded him of his excellent life, and especially\nhis wide liberalities. He immediately replied, \u201cl am but a steward!\nAll is His, intrusted to me, to promote his glory and the good of\nmankind; how can I know that I have not abused the trust? I reflect on\nall these things, and they fill my soul with terror by the feeling of\nresponsibility they awaken.\u201d\n\nOn another occasion, his chaplain sought to soothe his troubled spirit\nby referring to the extensive influence of his _Analogy_ in reclaiming\nskeptics. His reply was, \u201cI _began_ the Analogy with a view to the\nglory of God; but as I proceeded, visions of the fame it might bring\nme mingled themselves with my motives, and all was polluted and made\nsinful! The book may be a blessing to others, but it weighs like lead\non my soul.\u201d \u201cAdmit all this,\u201d tenderly replied the chaplain; \u201cyet has\nnot Jesus said, \u2018Whosoever cometh unto me shall in no wise be cast\nout\u2019?\u201d Instantly the Bishop raised himself in the bed, exclaiming,\n\u201cHow wonderful that the force of this passage never struck me before!\n\u2018Whosoever,\u2019--_all_, ALL! \u2018In no wise,\u2019--no amount of sin can prevent\nacceptance! Christ\u2019s righteousness will hide the iniquities of _all_\nwho accept his offer of mercy!\u201d\n\nFrom that time, for weeks, Butler spoke to all who approached him, of\na _full_ and _free_ salvation. He died triumphantly repeating this\npassage.\n\nIf all that is said of the lack of evangelical sentiment in Butler or\nhis book be conceded, it certainly cannot impair either the value of\nthe analogical argument, or the force of our author\u2019s use of it.\n\nVarious circumstances conspire to make the study of \u201cThe Analogy\u201d\ndifficult. The nature of the reasoning--the conciseness, and often\nobscurity of the style--the dislocation of parts by frequent\ndigressions--the arrest of a close course of reasoning to answer\nobjections--and the abstruseness of the subject itself--combine to\nmake the full comprehension of its import difficult. Mackintosh says,\n\u201cNo thinker so great, was ever so bad a writer.\u201d But this, like some\nother objections of Sir James, is stated too strongly. The language is\ngood, sinewy Saxon, and will endure when much that is now called fine\nwriting, will seem grotesque. Still it is possible to write philosophy\nin better phrase, as has been shown by at least two great men, Berkeley\nand Stewart. Had Butler but possessed the glowing style of Berkeley,\nor the smooth, graceful, and transparent diction of Dugald Stewart,\nhis work, instead of serving only for close thinkers, or a college\ntext-book, would have been read by all classes, and banished that\nvulgar infidelity which flippant writers still disseminate. That it is\nthus restricted in its influence is a misfortune to the world. But he\nwrote for a class, and did his work completely. Literary infidelity was\nconquered. Vulgar, ignorant, licentious infidelity, will always exist,\nand is even now deplorably prevalent. Both Europe and America contain\nconceited and malignant ignoramuses, who by their sneers, their cavils,\nand their audacity, make havoc of souls. Of these, Tom Paine is a type,\nwhose book, the contempt of cultivated minds, continues to be sold and\nread. For this class of persons, \u201cBaxter\u2019s Call,\u201d or \u201cAlleine\u2019s Alarm,\u201d\nare far more suitable than treatises on the evidences of Christianity,\nor even Butler\u2019s Analogy.\n\n\n\n\nEditor\u2019s Preface.\n\n\nThe text is the result of a careful collation of the various principal\neditions. Occasionally solecisms are corrected, and a word transposed\nor put in italics, when a sentence could thus be made perspicuous. The\nauthor had a fashion of beginning a large proportion of his sentences\nwith \u201cand,\u201d \u201cbut,\u201d \u201cnow,\u201d \u201cindeed,\u201d \u201chowever,\u201d &c., which often served\nto perplex, and in such cases they have been omitted. Long paragraphs,\ncomprehending different topics, have been so divided as to correspond\nwith the true analysis; which will greatly assist the student in\ndetecting the successive stages of the argument. Special pains has been\ntaken to correct and improve the punctuation. Hundreds of sentences\nhave thus been rendered more perspicuous, and many which were obscure,\nhave been made lucid. In no respect was Butler\u2019s style, as printed, so\ndefective.\n\nThe Conspectus is made much ampler than any other, for this reason:\nthat students are apt to content themselves with such help instead of\nmastering the full discussion by the author. In the present case they\ncannot so do, for such is the fulness of the Conspectus, that if they\nmaster this, they have mastered the subject itself in full.\n\nNotes by the present editor are distinguished from those of the author\nby being enclosed in brackets. They are designed to open out further\nviews, to elucidate the text, to facilitate extended researches, and to\nsuggest topics for conversation in the class-room.\n\nThe Index has cost far more labor than would be supposed, and may not\nbe of much benefit to the undergraduate. Its advantages will not be\nsmall to him in after life when he desires to recur to particular\ntopics. The general scholar will find it enables him to make use of the\nbook for occasional reference. Without it the work is not complete for\nthe class-room, still less for the library.\n\nThat students of the Analogy need help, is confessed; and all attempts\nto furnish it have been kindly received. As is remarked by Bishop\nWilson, \u201cHis argument, clear and convincing as it is to a prepared\nmind, is not obvious to the young reader, whose experience of life\nbeing small, and his habits of reflection feeble, has not the furniture\nnecessary for comprehending, at first, the thoughts and conclusions of\nsuch a mind. The style is too close, too negligent, too obscure, to be\nsuitable for the young.\u201d\n\nIf it be asked why, with several existing helps to the study of the\nAnalogy, I offer another, I frankly reply, because I have found none of\nthem satisfactory, either to the public or to myself.\n\n * * * * *\n\nSome teachers prefer their text-books to be accompanied by a set of\nquestions. Such will find in this edition all they desire. They have\nonly to enunciate each sentence of the Conspectus in the interrogative\nform, and they will have every possible question prepared to their\nhand.\n\n\n\n\nConspectus of the Author\u2019s Introduction.\n\n\nI. _What is probable evidence?_\n\n =1.= It differs from demonstration in that it admits of degrees; of\n _all_ degrees.\n\n 1.) One probability does not beget assurance.\n\n 2.) But the slightest presumption makes a probability.\n\n 3.) The repetition of it may make certainty.\n\n =2.= What constitutes probability is _likeness_; in regard to the\n event itself, or its kind of evidences, or its circumstances.\n\n 1.) This daily affords presumptions, evidence, or conviction:\n according as it is occasional, common, or constant.\n\n 2.) Measures our hopes and fears.\n\n 3.) Regulates our expectations as to men\u2019s conduct.\n\n 4.) Enables us to judge of character from conduct.\n\n =3.= It is an imperfect mode of judging, and adapted to beings of\n limited capacities.\n\n =4.= Where better evidence cannot be had, it constitutes moral\n obligation, even though great doubts remain.\n\n 1.) We are as much bound to do what, on the whole, _appears_ to\n be best, as if we _knew_ it to be so.\n\n 2.) In questions of great moment, it is reasonable to act when\n the favorable chances are no greater than the unfavorable.\n\n 3.) There are numberless cases in which a man would be thought\n distracted if he did not act, and that earnestly, where the\n chances of success were _greatly against_ him.\n\n\nII. _The use and application of probabilities_.\n\nShall not go further into the _nature_ of probable evidence, nor\ninquire _why_ likeness begets presumption and conviction; nor how far\nanalogical reasoning can be reduced to a _system_; but shall only show\nhow just and conclusive this mode of reasoning is.\n\n =1.= In determining our judgments and practice.\n\n 1.) There may be cases in which its value is doubtful.\n\n 2.) There may be seeming analogies, which are not really such.\n\n 3.) But as a mode of argument, it is perfectly just and\n conclusive.\n\n =2.= In noting correspondencies between the different parts of God\u2019s\n government.\n\n 1.) We may expect to find the same sort of difficulties in the\n Bible, as we do in Nature.\n\n 2.) To deny the Bible to be of God, because of these\n difficulties, requires us to deny that the world was made by\n him.\n\n 3.) If there be a likeness between revelation and the system of\n nature, it affords a presumption that both have the same author.\n\n 4.) To reason on the construction and government of the world,\n without settling foundation-principles, is mere hypothesis.\n\n 5.) To apply principles which are certain, to cases which are\n not applicable, is no better.\n\n 6.) But to join abstract reasonings to the observation of\n facts, and argue, from known present things, to what is likely\n or credible, must be right.\n\n 7.) We cannot avoid acting thus, if we act at all.\n\n =3.= In its application to religion, revealed, as well as natural.\n This is the use which will be made of analogy in the following\n work. In so using it,\n\n 1.) It will be taken for proved that there is an intelligent\n Creator and Ruler.\n\n --There are no presumptions _against_ this, prior to proof.\n\n --There are proofs:--from analogy, reason, tradition, &c.\n\n --The fact is not denied by the generality of skeptics.\n\n 2.) No regard will be paid to those who idly speculate as to how\n the world _might_ have been made and governed.\n\n --Such prating would amount to this:\n\n \u00b7 All creatures should have been made at first as happy as\n they could be.\n\n \u00b7 Nothing of hazard should be put upon them.\n\n \u00b7 Should have been _secured_ in their happiness.\n\n \u00b7 All punishments avoided.\n\n --It is a sufficient reply to such talk that mankind have not\n faculties for such speculations.\n\n 3.) We are, to some extent, judges as to _ends_; and may\n conclude that Nature and Providence are designed to produce\n virtue and happiness; but of the _means_ of producing these in\n the highest degree, we are not competent judges.\n\n --We know not the extent of the universe;\n\n --Nor even how one person can best be brought to perfection.\n\n --We are not often competent to judge of the conduct of each\n other.\n\n --As to God, we may presume that order will prevail in his\n universe; but are no judges of his modes for accomplishing\n this end.\n\n 4.) Instead of vainly, and perhaps sinfully, imagining schemes\n for God\u2019s conduct, we must _study what is_.\n\n --Discovering general laws.\n\n --Comparing the known course of things with what revelation\n teaches us to expect.\n\n\nIII. _The force of this use of Analogy._\n\n =1.= Sometimes is practically equivalent to proof.\n\n =2.= Confirms what is otherwise proved.\n\n =3.= Shows that the system of revelation is no more open to\n ridicule, than the system of nature.\n\n =4.= Answers almost all objections against religion.\n\n =5.= To a great extent answers objections against the _proofs_ of\n religion.\n\n\nIV. _General scope of the book._\n\n =1.= The divine government is considered, as containing in it,\n\n Chap. 1. Man\u2019s future existence.\n\n \u201d 2. In a state of reward or punishment.\n\n \u201d 3. This according to our behavior.\n\n \u201d 4. Our present life probationary.\n\n \u201d 5. And also disciplinary.\n\n \u201d 6. Notwithstanding the doctrine of necessity.\n\n \u201d 7. Or any apparent want of wisdom or goodness.\n\n =2.= Revealed religion is considered,\n\n Chap. 1. As important.\n\n \u201d 2. As proved by miracles.\n\n \u201d 3. As containing strange things.\n\n \u201d 4. As a scheme imperfectly comprehended.\n\n \u201d 5. As carried on by a mediator.\n\n \u201d 6. As having such an amount of evidence as God saw fit to give.\n\n \u201d 7. As having sufficient and full evidence.\n\n\nConspectus of the Analogy.\n\n\nPART I.\n\n\nCHAPTER I.\n\nA FUTURE LIFE.\n\nWill not discuss the subject of identity; but will consider what\nanalogy suggests from changes which do not destroy; and thus see\nwhether it is not _probable_ that we shall live hereafter.\n\n\nI. _The probabilities that we shall survive death._\n\n =1.= It is a law of nature that creatures should exist in different\n stages, and in various degrees of perfection.\n\n --Worms turn into flies.\n\n --Eggs are hatched into birds.\n\n --Our own present state is as different from our state in the\n womb, as two states of the same being can be.\n\n --That we shall hereafter exist in a state as different from\n the present as the present is from our state in the womb, is\n according to analogy.\n\n =2.= We now have capacities for happiness, action, misery, &c., and\n there is always a probability that things will continue as they\n are, except when experience gives us reason to think they will be\n altered. This is a general law; and is our _only_ natural reason\n for expecting the continuance of any thing.\n\n =3.= There is no reason to apprehend that death will destroy us.\n If there was, it would arise from the nature of death; or from the\n analogy of nature.\n\n 1.) Not from the nature of death.\n\n --We know not what death is.\n\n --But only _some_ of its _effects_.\n\n --These effects do not imply the destruction of the living\n agent.\n\n --We know little of what the _exercise_ of our powers depends\n upon; and nothing of what _the powers_ themselves depend on.\n\n --We may be unable to _exercise_ our powers, and yet not lose\n them--_e.g._ sleep, swoon.\n\n 2.) Not from analogy.\n\n --Reason shows no connection between death and our\n destruction.\n\n --We have no faculties by which to trace any being beyond it.\n\n --The possession of living powers, up to the very moment\n when our faculties cease to be able to trace them, is a\n probability of their continuing.\n\n --We have already survived wonderful changes.\n\n --To live after death is analogous to the course of nature.\n\n\nII. _Presumptions against a future life._\n\n =1.= That death _destroys_ us.\n\n _Ans._ 1. This is an assumption that we are compound and\n material beings, and hence discerptible; which is not true.\n\n 1.) Consciousness is a single, indivisible power, and of\n course the subject of it must be.\n\n 2.) The material body is not ourself.\n\n 3.) We can easily conceive of our having more limbs, or of\n a different kind, or of having more or fewer senses, or of\n having no bodies at all, or of hereafter animating these same\n bodies, remodelled.\n\n 4.) The dissolution of a succession of new and strange\n bodies, would have no tendency to destroy _us_.\n\n _Ans._ 2. Though the absolute simplicity of the living being\n cannot be proved by _experiment_, yet facts lead us so to\n conclude. We lose limbs, &c. Our bodies were once _very_ small,\n but we might, then, have lost part of them. There is a constant\n destruction and renewal going on.\n\n 1.) Thus we see that no certain _bulk_ is necessary to our\n existence, and unless it were proved that there is, and that\n it is larger than an indissoluble atom, there is no reason to\n presume that death destroys us, even if we are discerptible.\n\n 2.) The living agent is not an _internal material organism_,\n which dies with the body. Because\n\n --Our only ground for this presumption is our relation to\n other systems of matter. But we see these are not necessary\n to us.\n\n --It will not do to say that lost portions of the body were\n not _essential_--who is to determine?\n\n --The relation between the living agent, and the most\n essential parts of the body, is only one by which they\n mutually affect each other.\n\n 3.) If we regard our body as made up of organs of sense, we\n come to the same result.\n\n --We see with the eyes, just as we do with glasses. The eye\n is not a _recipient_, any more than a telescope.\n\n --It is not pretended that vision, hearing, &c. can be\n traced clear up to the percipient; but so far as we can\n trace perceptions, the _organ_ does not perceive.\n\n --In dreams we perceive without organs.\n\n --When we lose a limb we do not lose the _directing power_;\n we could move a new one, if it could be made, or a wooden\n one. But the limb cut off has no power of moving.\n\n --Thus, our loss of the _organs_ of perception and motion,\n not being the destruction of the power, there is no\n ground to think that the destruction of other organs or\n instruments would destroy _us_.\n\n _Objection._ These observations apply equally to brutes.\n\n _Ans._ 1. Be it so. Perhaps they are immortal:--may hereafter\n improve: we know not what latent powers they may have.\n\n 1.) The human being at one period looks as little likely to\n make great intellectual attainments; for a long time he has\n capacities for virtue and religion, but cannot use them.\n\n 2.) Many persons go out of the world who never became able\n to exercise these capacities; _e.g._ infants.\n\n _Ans._ 2. If brutes were immortal, it does not prove them to\n be _moral agents_.\n\n 1.) It may be necessary, for aught we know, that there\n should be living creatures not moral agents, nor rational.\n\n 2.) All difficulties as to what would become of them, are\n founded in our ignorance.\n\n =2.= That our souls, though not material, so depend upon the\n bodily structure, that we cannot survive its destruction.\n\n _Ans._ 1. Reason, memory, &c. _do not_ depend on the body,\n as perceptions by the senses do. Death may destroy those\n _instruments_, and yet not destroy the _powers_ of reflection.\n\n _Ans._ 2. Human beings exist, here, in two very different\n states, each having its own laws: sensation and reflection. By\n the first we feel; by the second we reason and will.\n\n 1.) Nothing which we know to be destroyed at death, is\n necessary to reflecting on ideas formerly received.\n\n 2.) Though the senses act like scaffolds, or levers, to\n _bring in_ ideas, yet when once in, we can reflect, &c.\n without their aid.\n\n _Ans._ 3. There are diseases which prove fatal, &c., yet do\n not, in any part of their course, _impair_ the intellect; and\n this indicates that they do not _destroy_ it.\n\n 1.) In the diseases alluded to, persons have their reflective\n power, in full, the very moment before death.\n\n 2.) Now, why should a disease, at a certain degree, utterly\n destroy powers which were not even affected by it, up to that\n point?\n\n =3.= That death at least _suspends_ our reflective powers,\n or interrupts our continuing to exist in the like state of\n reflection which we do now.\n\n _Ans._ There appears so little connection between our powers of\n sensation and our powers of reflection that we cannot presume\n that what might _destroy the former_, could even _suspend the\n latter_.\n\n 1.) We daily see reason, memory, &c. exercised without any\n assistance, that we know of, from our bodies.\n\n 2.) Seeing them in lively exercise to the last, we must infer\n that death is not a discontinuance of their exercise, nor of\n the enjoyments and sufferings of such exercise.\n\n 3.) Our posthumous life may be but a going on, with\n additions. Like the change at our birth--which produced not\n a suspension of the faculties we had before, nor a _total_\n change in our state of life; but a continuance of both, with\n great alterations.\n\n 4.) Death may but at once put us into a _higher_ state of\n life, as our birth did; our relation to bodily organs may be\n the only hinderance to our entering a higher condition of the\n reflective powers.\n\n 5.) Were we even sure that death would suspend our\n intellectual powers, it would not furnish even the lowest\n probability that it would destroy them.\n\n _Objec._ From the analogy of plants.\n\n _Ans._ This furnishes poets with apt illustrations of our\n frailty, but affords no proper analogy. Plants are destitute\n of perception and action, and this is the very matter in\n question.\n\n\nREMARKS.\n\n =1.= It has been shown, that confining ourselves to what we\n know, we see no probability of ever ceasing to be:--it cannot be\n concluded from the reason of the thing:--nor from the analogy of\n nature.\n\n =2.= We are therefore to go upon the belief of a future existence.\n\n =3.= Our going into _new scenes_ and conditions, is just as\n natural as our coming into the world.\n\n =4.= Our condition may naturally be a social one.\n\n =5.= The advantages of it may naturally be bestowed, according to\n some fixed law, in proportion to one\u2019s degrees in virtue.\n\n 1.) Perhaps not so much as now _by society_; but by God\u2019s more\n immediate action.\n\n 2.) Yet this will be no less _natural_, _i.e._ stated, fixed,\n or settled.\n\n 3.) Our notions of what is natural, are enlarged by greater\n knowledge of God and his works.\n\n 4.) There may be some beings in the world, to whom the whole\n of Christianity is as natural as the visible course of nature\n seems to us.\n\n =6.= These probabilities of a future life, though they do not\n satisfy curiosity, answer all the purposes of religion, as well\n as demonstration.\n\n 1.) Even a demonstration of a future state, would not\n demonstrate religion, but would be reconcilable with atheism.\n\n 2.) But as religion implies a future state, any presumption\n against such a state, would be a presumption against religion.\n\n 3.) The foregoing observations remove all presumptions of that\n sort, and prove to a great probability, a fundamental doctrine\n of religion.\n\n\nCHAPTER II.\n\nTHE GOVERNMENT OF GOD BY REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS.\n\nThe question of a future life is rendered momentous by our capacity for\nhappiness and misery.\n\nEspecially if that happiness or misery depends on our present conduct.\n\nWe should feel the deepest solicitude on this subject.\n\nAnd that if there were no proof of a future life and interest, other\nthan the probabilities just discussed.\n\n\nI. _In the present world our pleasures and pains are, to a great\nextent, in our own power._\n\n =1.= We see them to be consequences of our actions.\n\n =2.= And we can _foresee_ these consequences.\n\n =3.= Our desires are not gratified, without the right kind of\n exertion.\n\n =4.= By prudence we may enjoy life; rashness, or even neglect may\n make us miserable.\n\n =5.= Why this is so is another matter.\n\n 1.) It may be impossible to be otherwise.\n\n 2.) Or it may be best on the whole.\n\n 3.) Or God\u2019s plan may be to make only the good happy.\n\n 4.) Or the whole plan may be incomprehensible to us.\n\n _Objec._ It may be said \u201cthis is only the course of nature.\u201d\n\n _Ans._ It is granted: but\n\n 1. The course of nature is but the will of God. We admit\n that God is the natural governor of the world: and must not\n turn round and deny it because his government is _uniform_.\n\n 2. Our natural foresight of the consequences of actions, is\n his appointment.\n\n 3. The consequences themselves, are his appointment.\n\n 4. Our ability to foresee these consequences, is God\u2019s\n _instruction_ how we are to act.\n\n _Objec._ By this reasoning we are instructed to gratify our\n appetites, and such gratification is our reward for so doing.\n\n _Ans._ Certainly not. Foreseen pleasures and pains are proper\n motives to action _in general_; but we may, in particular\n cases, damage ourselves by indulgence. Our eyes are made to\n see with, but not to look at every thing:--for instance the\n sun.\n\nIt follows, from what has been said, that\n\n\nII. _We are, now, actually under God\u2019s government, in the strictest\nsense._\n\n =1.= Admitting that there is a God, it is not so much a matter of\n speculation, as of experience, that he governs us.\n\n =2.= The annexing of pleasures and pains to certain actions, and\n giving notice them, is the very essence of government.\n\n =3.= Whether by direct acts upon us, or by contriving a general\n plan, does not affect the argument.\n\n 1.) If magistrates could make laws which should _execute\n themselves_, their government would be far more perfect than it\n is.\n\n 2.) God\u2019s making fire burn us, is as much an instance of\n government, as if he _directly inflicted_ the burn, whenever we\n touched fire.\n\n =4.= Hence the analogy of nature shows nothing to render\n incredible the Bible doctrine of God\u2019s rewarding or punishing\n according to our actions.\n\n\n_Additional remarks on Punishment._\n\nAs men object chiefly to future punishment, it is proper to show\nfurther that the course of administration, as to _present_ punishment,\nis analogous to what religion teaches as to _the future_.\n\nIndeed they add credibility to it.\n\nAnd ought to raise the most serious apprehension.\n\n\nI. _Circumstances to be observed touching present punishments._\n\n =1.= They often follow acts which produce present pleasure or\n advantage.\n\n =2.= The sufferings often far exceed the pleasure or advantage.\n\n =3.= They often follow remotely.\n\n =4.= After long delay they often come suddenly.\n\n =5.= As those remote effects are not certainly foreseen, they\n may not be thought of at the time; or if so, there is a hope of\n escaping.\n\n =6.= There are opportunities of advantage, which if neglected do\n not recur.\n\n =7.= Though, in some cases, men who have sinned up to a certain\n point, may retrieve their affairs, yet in many cases, reformation\n is of no avail.\n\n =8.= Inconsiderateness is often as disastrous as wilful\n wrong-doing.\n\n =9.= As some punishments by civil government, are capital, so are\n some natural punishments.\n\n 1.) Seem intended to remove the offender out of the way.\n\n 2.) Or as an example to others.\n\n\nII. _These things are not accidental, but proceed from fixed laws._\n\n =1.= They are matters of daily experience.\n\n =2.= Proceed from the general laws, by which the world is\n governed.\n\n\nIII. _They so closely resemble what religion teaches, as to future\npunishment, that both might be expressed in the same words._\n\n_e.g._ Proverbs, ch. i.\n\n The analogy sufficiently answers all objections against the\n Scripture doctrine of future punishment, such as\n\n 1.) That our frailty or temptations annihilate the guilt of\n vice.\n\n 2.) Or the objection from necessity.\n\n 3.) Or that the Almighty cannot be contradicted.\n\n 4.) Or that he cannot be offended.\n\n\nREMARKS.\n\n =1.= Such reflections are terrific, but ought to be stated and\n considered.\n\n =2.= Disregard of a hereafter cannot be justified by any thing\n short of a _demonstration_ of atheism. Even skeptical doctrines\n afford no justification.\n\n =3.= There is no pretence of reason for presuming that the\n licentious will not find it better for them that they had never\n been born.\n\n\nCHAPTER III.\n\nMORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD.\n\nAs the structure of the world shows _intelligence_, so the mode of\ndistributing pleasure and pain, shows government. That is, God\u2019s\n_natural_ government, such as a king exercises over his subjects.\n\nBut this does not, at first sight, determine what is the _moral\ncharacter_ of such government.\n\n\nI. _What is a moral or righteous government?_\n\n =1.= Not mere rewarding and punishing.\n\n =2.= But doing this according to character.\n\n =3.= The perfection of moral government is doing this _exactly_.\n\n _Objec._ God is simply and absolutely benevolent.\n\n _Ans._ Benevolence, infinite in degree, would dispose him\n to produce the greatest possible happiness, regardless of\n behaviour. This would rob God of other attributes; and should\n not be asserted unless it can be proved. And whether it can\n be proved is not the point now in hand.\n\n The question is not whether there may not be, in the\n universe, beings to whom he manifests absolute benevolence,\n which might not be incompatible with justice; but whether he\n treats _us_ so.\n\n =4.= It must be owned to be vastly difficult, in such a\n disordered world, to estimate with exactness the overplus of\n happiness on the side of virtue: and there may be exceptions to\n the rule. But it is far from being doubtful that _on the whole_,\n virtue is happier than vice, in this world.\n\n\nII. _The beginnings of a righteous administration, are seen in nature._\n\n =1.= It has been proved (ch. ii.) that God _governs_: and it is\n reasonable to suppose that he would govern _righteously_.\n\n 1.) Any other rule of government would be harder to account for.\n\n 2.) The Bible doctrine that hereafter the good shall be happy,\n and the wicked miserable, is no more than an expectation that a\n method of government, now begun, shall be carried on.\n\n =2.= The opposite consequences of prudence and rashness, show\n a right constitution of nature; and our ability to foresee and\n control these consequences, shows that we are under moral law.\n\n =3.= God has so constructed society that vice, to a great degree,\n is actually punished by it.\n\n 1.) Without this, society could not exist.\n\n 2.) This is God\u2019s government, through society; and is as\n _natural_, as society.\n\n 3.) Since the course of things is God\u2019s appointment, men are\n unavoidably accountable for their behaviour.\n\n _Objec._ Society often punishes good actions, and rewards\n wickedness.\n\n _Ans._ 1. This is not _necessary_, and consequently not\n natural.\n\n 2. Good actions are never punished by society as _good_, but\n because considered bad.\n\n =4.= By the course of nature, virtue is rewarded, and vice\n punished, _as such_, which proves a moral government; as will\n be seen if we rightly distinguish between actions and their\n qualities.\n\n 1.) An action may produce present gratification though it be\n wrong: in which case the gratification is in the act, not the\n morality of it: in other cases the enjoyment consists wholly in\n the quality of virtuousness.\n\n 2.) Vice is naturally attended with uneasiness, apprehension,\n vexation, remorse, &c.\n\n --This is a very different feeling from that produced by mere\n misfortune.\n\n --Men comfort themselves under misfortune, that it was not\n their own fault.\n\n 3.) Honest and good men are befriended _as such_.\n\n 4.) Injuries are resented as implying fault; and good offices\n are regarded with gratitude on account of the _intention_, even\n when they fail to benefit us.\n\n --This is seen in family government, where children are\n punished for falsehood, fretfulness, &c., though no one is\n hurt.\n\n --And also in civil government, where the absence or presence\n of ill intention goes far in determining the penalty of\n wrong-doing.\n\n 5.) The whole course of the world, in all ages and relations,\n turns much upon approbation and disapprobation.\n\n 6.) The very fact of our having a moral nature, is a proof of\n our being under God\u2019s moral government.\n\n --We are placed in a condition which unavoidably operates on\n our moral nature.\n\n --Hence it arises that reward to virtue and reprobation of\n vice, as such, is a _rule_, never inverted. If it be thought\n that there are instances to the contrary, (which is not so,)\n they are evidently monstrous.\n\n --The _degree_ in which virtue and vice receive proper\n returns, is not the question now, but only the thing itself,\n in some degree.\n\n 7.) It is admitted that virtue sometimes suffers, and vice\n prospers; but this is _disorder_, and not the order of nature.\n\n 8.) It follows, that we have in the government of the world,\n a declaration from God, for virtue and against vice. So far\n as a man is true to virtue, is he on the side of the divine\n administration. Such a man must have a _sense of security_, and\n a hope of _something better_.\n\n =5.= This hope is confirmed by observing that virtue has\n necessary tendencies beyond their present effects.\n\n 1.) These are very obvious with regard to individuals.\n\n 2.) Are as real, though not so patent, in regard to society.\n\n --The power of a society under the direction of virtue, tends\n to prevail over power not so directed, just as power under\n direction of reason, tends to prevail over brute force.\n\n --As this may not be conceded, we will notice how the case\n stands, as to reason:\n\n \u00b7 Length of time, and proper opportunity, are necessary for\n reason to triumph over brutes.\n\n \u00b7 Rational beings, disunited, envious, unjust, and\n treacherous, may be overcome by brutes, uniting themselves\n by instinct: but this would be an inverted order of things.\n\n --A like tendency has virtue to produce superiority.\n\n \u00b7 By making the good of society, the object of every member\n of it.\n\n \u00b7 By making every one industrious in his own sphere.\n\n \u00b7 By uniting all in one bond of veracity and justice.\n\n 3.) If the part of God\u2019s government which we see, and the part\n we do not see, make up one scheme, then we see a _tendency_ in\n virtue to superiority.\n\n 4.) But to _produce_ that superiority there must be\n\n --A force proportioned to the obstacles.\n\n --Sufficient lapse of time.\n\n --A fair field of trial; such as extent of time, adequate\n occasions, and opportunities for the virtuous to unite.\n\n 5.) These things are denied to virtue in this life, so that its\n tendencies, though real, are _hindered_.\n\n 6.) But it may have all requisite advantages hereafter.\n\n --Eternity will be lasting enough.\n\n --Good men will unite; as they cannot do now, scattered over\n the earth, and ignorant of one another.\n\n --Other orders of virtuous beings will join; for the very\n nature of virtue is a bond of union.\n\n 7.) The tendency of such an order of things, so far as seen by\n vicious beings in any part of the universe, would be to the\n amendment of all who were capable of it, and their recovery to\n virtue.\n\n 8.) All this goes to show that the hinderances to virtue are\n contingent, and that its beneficial tendencies are God\u2019s\n declarations in its favor.\n\n 9.) If the preceding considerations are thought to be too\n speculative, we may easily come to the same result by\n reflecting on the supremacy which any earthly nation would\n attain, by entire virtue for many ages.\n\n\nREMARKS.\n\nConsider now the general system of religion. The government of\nthe world is one; it is moral; virtue shall in the end prevail\nover wickedness; and to see the importance and fitness of such an\narrangement we have only to consider what would be the state of things,\nif vice had these advantages, or virtue the contrary.\n\n _Objec._ Why may not things be now going on in other worlds, and\n continue always to go on in this world, in the same mixed and\n disordered state as at present?\n\n _Ans._ We are not proving that God\u2019s moral government is\n _perfect_, or the truth of religion, but only seeing what\n there is in the course of nature, to confirm it, supposing it\n to be known. Were there nothing to judge by, but the present\n distribution of pleasure and pain, we should have no ground\n to conclude that hereafter we should be rewarded or punished\n exactly according to our deserts. But even then there would\n be no indication that vice is better than virtue. Still the\n preceding observations _confirm_ the doctrine of future\n retribution; for,\n\n 1.) They show that the Author of nature is not indifferent to\n virtue and vice.\n\n 2.) That future distributive justice would differ not in\n _kind_, but in degree only, from God\u2019s present government. It\n would be the _effect_, towards which we see the _tendency_.\n\n 3.) That higher rewards and punishments _may be_ hereafter.\n\n 4.) That we should _expect_ it to be so; because the\n tendencies of vice and virtue are immutable, while the\n hinderances are only artificial.\n\n\nSUMMARY.\n\n[This enumerates the steps of the argument, in the foregoing chapter,\nin as condensed a form as possible.]\n\n\nCHAPTER IV.\n\nOF A STATE OF PROBATION.\n\nThe doctrine of probation comprehends several particulars. But the\nmost common notion is that our future interests are _depending_; and\ndepending on _ourselves_. And that we have _opportunities_ for both\ngood and bad conduct, and _temptations_ to each.\n\nThis is not exactly the same as our being under moral government; for\nit implies allurement to evil, and difficulties in being good.\n\nHence needs to be considered by itself.\n\n\n_Doctrine._ THE NATURAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD, IN THIS WORLD, PUTS US ON\nTRIAL AS TO THE THINGS OF THIS WORLD; AND SO IMPLIES, WHAT RELIGION\nTEACHES, THAT HIS MORAL GOVERNMENT PUTS US ON TRIAL AS TO A FUTURE\nWORLD.\n\n\nI. _So far as we are tempted to do what will damage our future temporal\ninterests, so far we are under probation as to those interests._\n\n =1.= The annexing of pleasures and pains to actions, as good or\n bad, and enabling us to foresee their effect, implies that our\n interests, in part at least, depend on ourselves.\n\n =2.= We often _blame_ ourselves and others for evils, as\n resulting from misconduct.\n\n =3.= It is very certain that we often miss possible good, and\n incur evils, not for want of knowing better, but through our\n _fault_.\n\n =4.= Every one speaks of the hazards of young persons, from other\n causes than ignorance.\n\n\nII. _These natural or temporal trials are analogous to our moral and\nreligious trial._\n\n =1.= In both cases, what constitutes the trial, is either in our\n circumstances or in our nature.\n\n 1.) Some would do right but for violent or extraordinary\n temptations.\n\n 2.) Others will _seek_ evil, and go out of their way after\n wicked indulgence, when there are no external temptations.\n\n 3.) But even those who err through temptation, must have that\n within which makes them _susceptible_ of temptation.\n\n 4.) So that we are in a like state of probation with respect to\n both present and future interests.\n\n =2.= If we proceed to observe how mankind behave in both\n capacities, we see the same analogy.\n\n 1.) Some scarcely look beyond the present gratification.\n\n 2.) Some are driven by their passions against their better\n judgment and feeble resolutions.\n\n 3.) Some shamelessly go on in open vice.\n\n 4.) Some persist in wrong-doing, even under strong\n apprehensions of future misery.\n\n =3.= The analogy is no less plain in regard to the influence of\n others upon us.\n\n 1.) Bad example.\n\n 2.) Wrong education.\n\n 3.) Corruptions of religion.\n\n 4.) General prevalence of mistakes as to true happiness.\n\n =4.= In both cases negligence and folly bring difficulty as well\n as vice.\n\n\nIII. _The disadvantages we labor under from our fallen and disordered\nstate, are the same, in relation to both earthly and future interests._\n\nThis disadvantage affords no ground of complaint; for,\n\n =1.= We _may_ manage to pass our days in comfort and peace.\n\n =2.= And so may we obtain the security and comfort of religion.\n\n =3.= We might as well complain that we are not a higher order of\n beings.\n\n\nREMARKS.\n\n =1.= It is thus proved that the state of trial, which religion\n says we are in, is credible; for it exactly corresponds to what\n we see.\n\n 1.) If from birth till death we were in a constant security\n of enjoyment, without care or correctness, it would be a\n presumption against religion.\n\n 2.) It might, if we had no experience, be urged that an\n infinitely good Being would not expose us to the hazard of\n misery. This is indeed a difficulty, and must remain so; but\n still the course of nature is as it is.\n\n 3.) The miseries which we bring on ourselves are no more\n unavoidable than our deportment.\n\n =2.= It has been proved that we are in danger of miscarrying as\n to our interests, both present and future.\n\n =3.= The sum of the whole is, that as we do not have present\n enjoyments and honors forced upon us, in spite of misconduct, so\n this _may_ be the case, as to that chief and final good which\n religion proposes.\n\n\nCHAPTER V.\n\nPROBATION INTENDED FOR MORAL DISCIPLINE AND IMPROVEMENT.\n\nWhy we should be placed in the condition spoken of in the last chapter,\nis a question which cannot be answered. It may be that we could not\nunderstand, if told. And if we could, it might injure us to know, just\nnow. It certainly is consistent with God\u2019s righteous government.\n\nReligion tells us that we are so placed in order to become qualified\nfor a better state.\n\nThis, though a very partial answer to the inquiry _why_ we are so\nplaced, answers an infinitely more important question,--viz.: _What is\nour business here?_\n\n\nI. _We are placed in this state of trial, for our improvement in\nvirtue, as the requisite qualification for future security and\nhappiness._\n\n =1.= Every creature is designed for a particular way of life.\n\n 1.) Happiness depends on the congruity between a creature\u2019s\n nature and its circumstances.\n\n 2.) Man\u2019s character might be so changed as to make him\n _incapable_ of happiness on earth.\n\n 3.) Or he might be placed, without changing his nature, in a\n world where he must be wretched, for want of the proper objects\n to answer to his desires.\n\n 4.) So that without determining what is the future condition of\n good men, we know there must be necessary _qualifications_ to\n make us capable of enjoying it.\n\n =2.= Human beings are so constituted as to become fit for new and\n different conditions.\n\n 1.) We not only acquire ideas, but store them up.\n\n 2.) We can become more expert in any kind of action.\n\n 3.) And can make settled alterations in our tempers.\n\n 4.) We can form _habits_--both bodily and mental.\n\n As these operate in producing radical changes in human\n character, we will look for a moment at the process.\n\n --Neither perceptions, nor knowledge, are habits; though\n necessary to _forming_ them.\n\n --There are habits of perception, however, and habits of\n action: the former are passive, the latter active.\n\n --Habits of body are produced by external acts, and habits of\n mind by the exertion of principles; _i.e._ carrying them out.\n\n --Resolutions to do well are acts, and may _help_ towards\n forming good habits. But _mere_ theorizing, and forming\n pictures in the mind, not only do not help, but may harden\n the mind to a contrary course.\n\n --Passive impressions, by repetition grow weaker. Thus\n familiarity with danger lessens fear.\n\n --Hence active habits may be formed and strengthened, by\n acting according to certain motives or excitements, which\n grow less sensibly felt and less and less felt, as the habit\n strengthens.\n\n \u00b7 Thus the sight of distress excites the passive emotion\n of pity, and the active principle of benevolence. But\n inquiring out cases of distress in order to relieve them,\n causes diminished sensitiveness at the sight of misery, and\n stronger benevolence and aptitude in relieving it.\n\n \u00b7 So admonition, experience, and example, if acted upon,\n produce good; if not, harden.\n\n 5.) The formation of a habit may be imperceptible and even\n inexplicable, but the thing itself is matter of certain\n experience.\n\n 6.) A habit once formed, the action becomes easy and often\n pleasurable: opposite inclinations grow weaker: difficulties\n less: and occasions more frequent.\n\n 7.) Thus, a new character, in several respects, is formed.\n\n =3.= We should not have these capacities for improvement and for\n the reconstruction of character, if it were not necessary.\n\n 1.) They are necessary, even as to this life.\n\n --We are not qualified, at first, for mature life:\n understanding and strength come gradually.\n\n --If we had them in full, at birth, we should at first be\n distracted and bewildered, and our faculties would be of no\n use previous to experience. Ignorant of any employment, we\n could not provide for ourselves.\n\n --So that man is an unformed, unfinished creature, even as\n to this world, till he _acquire_ knowledge, experience, and\n habits.\n\n 2.) Provision is made for our acquiring, in youth, the\n requisite qualities for manhood.\n\n --Children _learn_, from their very birth,\n\n \u00b7 The nature and use of objects.\n\n \u00b7 The subordinations of domestic life.\n\n \u00b7 The rules of life.\n\n --Some of this learning is acquired so insensibly, as to seem\n like instinct, but some requires great care and labor, and\n the doing of things we are averse to.\n\n --According as we act during this formative period, is our\n character formed; and our capacity for various stations in\n society determined.\n\n --Early opportunities lost, cannot be recovered.\n\n 3.) Our state of discipline throughout this life, for another,\n is exactly of the same kind: and comprehended under one general\n law.\n\n --If we could not see how the present discipline fitted us\n for a higher life, it would be no objection.\n\n \u00b7 We do not know how food, sleep, &c. enlarges the\n child\u2019s body; nor would we expect such a result, prior to\n experience.\n\n \u00b7 Nor do children understand the need of exercise,\n temperance, restraint, &c.\n\n --We thus see a general analogy of Providence indicating that\n the present life is preparatory.\n\n =4.= If virtue is a necessary qualification for future happiness,\n then we see our need of the moral culture of our present state.\n\n 1.) Analogy indicates that our future state will be social.\n\n --Nature furnishes no shadow of unreasonableness in the\n Scripture doctrine that this future community will be under\n the more immediate government of God.\n\n --Nor the least proof that its members will not require the\n exercise of veracity, justice, &c. towards each other; and\n that character which _results_ from the practice of such\n virtues.\n\n --Certainly the universe is under moral government; and a\n virtuous character must, in some way, be a condition of\n happiness in that state.\n\n 2.) We are deficient, and in danger of deviating from what is\n right.\n\n --We have desires for outward objects.\n\n --The times, degrees, &c. of gratifying these desires, are,\n of right, subject to the control of the moral principle.\n\n --But that principle neither excites them, nor prevents their\n being excited.\n\n --They may exist, when they cannot be lawfully gratified, or\n gratified at all.\n\n --When the desire exists, and the gratification is unlawful,\n we are tempted.\n\n 3.) The only security is the principle within.\n\n --The strengthening of this lessens the danger.\n\n --It may be strengthened, by discipline and exercise.\n\n \u00b7 Noting examples.\n\n \u00b7 Attending to the right, and not to preference.\n\n \u00b7 Considering our true interests.\n\n --When improved, it becomes, in proportion to its strength,\n our security from the dangers of natural propensions.\n\n --Virtue, become habitual by discipline, is improved virtue;\n and improved virtue must produce increased happiness, if the\n government of the world is moral.\n\n 4.) Even creatures made upright may fall.\n\n --The fall of an upright being, is not accounted for by the\n nature of liberty; for that would only be saying that an\n event happened because it might happen.\n\n --But from the very nature of propensions.\n\n --A finitely perfect being would have propensions\n corresponding to its surroundings; its understanding; and its\n moral sense; and all these in due proportions.\n\n --Such a being would have propensions, though the object\n might not be present, or the indulgence might be contrary to\n its moral sense; and this would have some tendency, however\n small, to induce gratification.\n\n --The tendency would be increased by the frequency of\n occasions; and yet more by the least indulgence, even in\n thought; till, under peculiar conjunctures, it would become\n effect.\n\n --The first transgression might so utterly disorder the\n constitution, and change the proportions of forces, as to\n lead to a repetition of irregularities; and hence to the\n construction of bad habits, and a depraved character.\n\n 5.) On the contrary, a finitely perfect being may attain higher\n virtue, and more security, by obeying the moral principle.\n\n --For the danger would lessen, by the increased\n submissiveness of propensions.\n\n --The moral principle would gain force by exercise.\n\n 6.) Thus vice is not only criminal, but degrading; and virtue\n is not only right, but improving.\n\n --The degree of improvement may be such that the danger of\n sinning may be almost infinitely lessened.\n\n --Yet the security may always be the habits formed in a\n state of discipline; making such a state altogether fit and\n necessary.\n\n 7.) This course of reasoning is vastly stronger when applied to\n fallen and corrupt creatures.\n\n --The upright need improvement; the fallen must be renewed.\n\n --Discipline is expedient for the one; necessary for the\n other; and of a severer sort.\n\n\nII. _The present world is peculiarly fit for such discipline as we\nneed._\n\n =1.= Surrounding evils tend to produce moderation, practical\n knowledge, &c. very different from a mere speculative knowledge\n of our liability to vice and misery.\n\n =2.= Our experience in this world, with right views and practice,\n may leave eternal impressions for good.\n\n =3.= Every act of self-government in the exercise of virtue,\n must, from the very make of our nature, form habits of virtue,\n and a more intense virtuous principle.\n\n =4.= Resolute and persevering resistance to particular and\n violent temptations, is a _continued_ act of virtue, and that in\n a _higher degree_ than if the seduction were transient and weak.\n\n =5.= Self-denial is not essential to virtue, but is almost\n essential to discipline and improvement.\n\n 1.) Because actions materially virtuous, which have no\n difficulty, but agree with our inclinations, may be done merely\n from inclination, and so not be _really_ virtuous.\n\n 2.) But when they are done in face of danger and difficulty,\n virtuousness is increased, and confirmed into a habit.\n\n _Objec._ 1. As our intellectual or physical powers may be\n overtasked, so may our moral.\n\n _Ans._ This may be so in exceptional cases, but it does not\n confute the argument. In general, it holds good. All that is\n intended to be proved is, that this world is _intended_ to be a\n state of improvement, and is _fitted_ for it.\n\n 1.) Some sciences which of themselves are highly improving,\n require a trying measure of attention, which some will not\n submit to.\n\n 2.) It is admitted that this world disciplines many to vice:\n but this viciousness of many is the very thing which makes\n the world a virtuous discipline to good men. The _whole end_\n in placing mankind as they are we know not; but these things\n are evident--the virtues of some are exercised:--and so\n exercised as to be improved: and improved beyond what they\n would be in a perfectly virtuous community.\n\n 3.) That all, or even the generality, do not improve, is no\n proof that their improvement was not _intended_. Of seeds and\n animals not one in a million comes to perfection; yet such\n as do, evidently answer an end for which they were designed.\n The _appearance of waste_ in regard to seeds, &c. is just as\n unaccountable, as the ruin of moral agents.\n\n _Objec._ 2. Rectitude arising from hope and fear, is only the\n discipline of self-love.\n\n _Ans._ Obedience _is_ obedience, though prompted by hope or\n fear: and a _course_ of such obedience, forms a habit of\n it: and distinct habits of various virtues, by repressing\n inclination whenever justice, veracity, &c. require.\n\n Beside, veracity, justice, regard to God\u2019s authority, and\n self-interest, are coincident; and each, separately, a just\n principle. To begin a good life from either of them, and\n persist, produces that very character which corresponds to our\n relations to God, and secures happiness.\n\n _Objec._ 3. The virtues requisite for a state of afflictions,\n and produced by it, are not wanted to qualify us for a state of\n happiness.\n\n _Ans._ Such is not the verdict of experience. Passive\n submission is essential to right character. Prosperity itself\n begets extravagant desires; and imagination may produce as much\n discontent as actual condition. Hence, though we may not need\n _patience_ in heaven, we shall need that _temper_ which is\n formed by patience.\n\n Self-love would always coincide with God\u2019s commands, when\n our interest was rightly understood; but it is liable to\n error. Therefore, HABITS of resignation are necessary, for\n _all_ creatures; and the proper discipline for resignation is\n affliction.\n\n _Objec._ 4. The trouble and danger of such discipline, might have\n been avoided by making us at once, what we are intended to become.\n\n _Ans._ What we are to be, is the effect of what we are to\n do. God\u2019s natural government is arranged not to save us from\n trouble or danger, but to enable and incline us to go through\n them. It is as natural for us to seek means to obtain things,\n as it is to seek the things; and in worldly things we are left\n to our choice, whether to improve our powers and so better our\n condition, or to neglect improvement and so go without the\n advantage.\n\n Analogy, therefore, makes the same arrangement credible, as to\n a future state.\n\n\nIII. _This state of discipline may be necessary for the display of\ncharacter._\n\n =1.= Not to the all-knowing Being, but to his creation, or part\n of it, and in many ways which we know not.\n\n =2.= It may be a _means_ in disposing of men according to\n character.\n\n =3.= And of showing creation that they are so disposed of.\n\n =4.= Such display of character certainly contributes, largely, to\n the general course of things considered in this chapter.\n\n\nCHAPTER VI.\n\nOF NECESSITY AS INFLUENCING CONDUCT.\n\nFatalists have no right to object to Christianity, for they of course\nhold the doctrine to be compatible with what they see in nature.\n\nThe question is, whether it be not equally compatible with what\nChristianity teaches.\n\nTo argue on the supposition of so great an absurdity as necessity, is\npuzzling; and the obscurity and puzzle of the argument must therefore\nbe excused.\n\n\nI. _Necessity does not destroy the proof of an intelligent Author and\nGovernor of the world._\n\n =1.= It does not exclude design and deliberation.\n\n 1.) This is matter of actual experience and consciousness.\n\n --Necessity does not account for the _existence_ of any\n thing, but is only a _circumstance_ relating to its origin.\n Instance the case of a house: the fatalist admits that it had\n a builder, and the only question would be, was he obliged to\n build it as he did?\n\n 2.) It is the same as to the construction of the world. To say\n it exists by necessity must mean it had a maker, who _acted_ by\n necessity: for necessity is only an abstract notion, and can\n _do_ nothing.\n\n 3.) We say God exists by necessity, because we intuitively\n discern that there must be an infinite Being, prior to all\n causes; but we cannot say that _every thing_ so exists.\n The fact that many changes in nature are produced by man\u2019s\n contrivance is a proof of this.\n\n 4.) Thus though the fatalist does not choose to mean by\n necessity _an agent acting necessarily_, he is obliged to mean\n this.\n\n 5.) And it also follows that a thing\u2019s being done by necessity\n does not exclude _design_.\n\n =2.= It does not exclude a belief that we are in a state of\n religion.\n\n 1.) Suppose a fatalist to educate a child on his own\n principles,--viz.: that he cannot do otherwise than he does;\n and is not subject to praise or blame.\n\n (It might be asked, _would_ he, if possessed of common sense,\n so educate his child?)\n\n --The child would be delighted with his freedom; but would\n soon prove a pest, and go to destruction.\n\n --He would meet with checks and rebuffs, which would teach\n him that he _was_ accountable.\n\n --He would, in the end, be convinced either that his doctrine\n was wrong, or that he had reasoned inconclusively upon it,\n and misapplied it.\n\n 2.) To apply fatalism to practice, in any other way, would be\n found equally fallacious: _e.g._ that he need not take care of\n his life.\n\n 3.) No such absurdity follows the doctrine of freedom.\n\n --Reasoning on this ground is justified by all experience.\n\n --The constitution of things is _as if_ we were free.\n\n 4.) If the doctrine of necessity be true, and yet, when we\n _apply it_ to life, always misleads us; how, then, can we be\n sure it would not mislead us with respect to future interests?\n\n 5.) It follows that if there are proofs of religion on the\n supposition of freedom, they are just as conclusive on the\n supposition of necessity.\n\n =3.= It does not refute the notion that God has a will and a\n character.\n\n 1.) It does not hinder _us_ from having a will and a character;\n from being cruel, or benevolent, or just, &c.\n\n 2.) If necessity be plead as the excuse for crime, it equally\n excuses the _punishment_ of crime; for if it destroys the sin\n of the one, it destroys the sin of the other.\n\n 3.) The very assumption of injustice in punishing crime, shows\n that we cannot rid ourselves of the notion of justice and\n injustice.\n\n _Objec._ If necessity be _reconcilable_ with the character of\n God, as portrayed in Christianity, does it not destroy _the\n proof_ that he has that character; and so destroy the proofs of\n religion?\n\n _Ans._ No. Happiness and misery are not our fate, but the\n results of our conduct. God\u2019s government is that of a father\n and a magistrate; and his natural rule of government must be\n veracity and justice. We shall proceed to show that,\n\n\nII. _Necessity does not destroy the proofs of religion._\n\n =1.= It is a plain fact that God rewards and punishes.\n\n 1.) He has given us a moral faculty, by which we discern\n between actions, and approve or disapprove, &c.\n\n 2.) This implies a _rule_, a peculiar _kind_ of rule; _i.e._\n one from which we cannot depart without being self-condemned.\n\n 3.) The dictates of our moral faculty are God\u2019s laws, with\n sanctions. It not only raises a sense of _duty_, but a sense of\n _security_ in obeying, and danger in disobeying; and this is an\n explicit sanction.\n\n 4.) God\u2019s government must conform to the nature he has given\n us; and we must infer that in the upshot happiness will follow\n virtue, and misery vice.\n\n 5.) Hence religious worship is a duty, if only as a means of\n keeping up the sense of this government.\n\n 6.) No objection from necessity can lie against this course of\n proof.\n\n --The conclusion is wholly and directly from facts; not\n from what might appear to us to be _fit_, but from what his\n actions tell us _he wills_.\n\n =2.= Natural religion has external evidence which necessity, if\n true, does not affect.\n\n 1.) Suppose a person convinced of the truths of natural\n religion, but ignorant of history, and of the present state of\n mankind, he would inquire:\n\n --How this religion came?\n\n --How far the belief of it extended?\n\n --If he found that some one had totally propounded it, as a\n deduction of reason, then, though its evidences from reason\n would not be impaired, its history would furnish no further\n proof.\n\n 2.) But such an one would find, on the contrary,\n\n --That essentially it had been professed in all countries.\n\n --And can be traced up through all ages.\n\n --And was not _reasoned out_, but revealed.\n\n 3.) These things are of great weight.\n\n --Showing natural religion to be conformed to the common\n sense of mankind.\n\n --And either that it was revealed, or forces itself upon the\n mind.\n\n --The rude state of the early ages leads to the belief of its\n being revealed, and such is the opinion of the learned.\n\n =3.= Early pretences to revelation indicate some original real\n one from which they were copied.\n\n --The history of revelation is as old as history itself.\n\n --Such a fact is a proof of religion, against which there is\n no presumption.\n\n --And indicates a revelation prior to the examination\n of the book said to contain it; and independent of all\n considerations of its being corrupted, or darkened by fables.\n\n =4.= It is thus apparent that the _external_ evidence of religion\n is considerable; and is not affected by the doctrine of necessity.\n\n\nREMARKS.\n\n 1. The danger of taking custom, &c. for our moral rule.\n\n 1.) We are all liable to prejudice.\n\n 2.) Reason may be impaired, perverted, or disregarded.\n\n 3.) The matter in hand is of infinite moment.\n\n 2. The foregoing observations amount to practical proof.\n\n _Objec._ Probabilities which cannot be confuted, may\n be overbalanced by greater probabilities: much more by\n demonstration. Now, as the doctrine of necessity must be true,\n it cannot be that God governs us as if we were free when he\n knows we are not.\n\n _Ans._ This brings the matter to a point, and the answer is\n not to be evaded,--viz.: that the whole constitution and\n course of things shows this reasoning to be false, be the\n fallacy where it may.\n\n The doctrine of freedom shows where,--viz.: in supposing\n ourselves necessary agents when in fact we are free.\n\n Admitting the doctrine of necessity, the fallacy evidently\n lies in denying that necessary agents are accountable; for\n that they _are_ rewarded and punished is undeniable.\n\nCONCLUSION.--It follows that necessity, if true, neither proves that\nGod will not make his creatures happy or miserable according to\ntheir conduct, nor destroys the proofs that he will do so. That is,\nnecessity, practically, is false.\n\n\nCHAPTER VII.\n\nDIVINE GOVERNMENT A SCHEME IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED.\n\nMoral government, _as a fact_, has now been considered; it remains for\nus to remove objections against its _wisdom and goodness_. A thing\nbeing true does not prove it to be good.\n\nIn arguing as to its truth, analogy could only show it to be credible.\nBut, if a moral government be admitted as a fact, analogy makes it\ncredible that it is a scheme or system, and that man\u2019s comprehension\nof it is necessarily so limited, as to be inadequate to determine its\ninjustice.\n\nThis we shall find to be the case.\n\n\n_Doctrine._ ON THE SUPPOSITION THAT GOD EXERCISES MORAL GOVERNMENT,\nTHE ANALOGY OF NATURE TEACHES THAT IT MUST BE A SCHEME, AND ONE QUITE\nBEYOND OUR COMPREHENSION.\n\n\nI. _The ordering of nature is a scheme; and makes it credible by\nanalogy, that moral government is a scheme._\n\n =1.= The parts curiously correspond to each other; individuals to\n individuals, species to species, events to events; and all these\n both immediate and remote.\n\n =2.= This correspondence embraces all the past, and all the\n future; including all creatures, actions, and events.\n\n 1.) There is no event, which does not depend for its occurrence\n on some further thing, unknown to us; we cannot give the whole\n account of any one thing.\n\n 2.) Things apparently the most insignificant, seem to be\n necessary to others, of the greatest importance.\n\n =3.= If such is God\u2019s natural government, it is credible that\n such is his moral government.\n\n 1.) In fact they are so blended as to make one scheme.\n\n --One is subservient to the other, just as the vegetable\n kingdom subserves the animal, and our animal organization\n subserves our mental.\n\n --Every act of God seems to look beyond the occasion, and to\n have reference to a general plan.\n\n --There is evidently a previous adjustment.\n\n \u00b7 The periods, &c. for trying men.\n\n \u00b7 The instruments of justice.\n\n \u00b7 The kinds of retribution.\n\n 2.) The whole comprises a system, a very small part of which is\n known to us: therefore no objections against any part can be\n insisted on.\n\n 3.) This ignorance is universally acknowledged, except in\n arguing against religion. That it ought to be a valid answer to\n objections against religion, we proceed to show.\n\n --Suppose it to be asserted that all evils might have been\n prevented by repeated interpositions; or that more good might\n have been so produced; which would be the utmost that could\n be said: still,\n\n --Our ignorance would vindicate religion from any objections\n arising from apparent disorders in the world.\n\n --The government of the world might be _good_, even on those\n suppositions; for at most they could but suggest that it\n might be _better_.\n\n --At any rate, they are mere assertions.\n\n --Instances may be alleged, in things much less out of reach,\n of suppositions palpably impossible, which _all_ do not see\n to be so: nor _any, at first sight_.\n\n 4.) It follows that our ignorance is a satisfactory answer to\n all objections against the divine government.\n\n --An objection against an act of Providence, no way connected\n with any other thing, as being unjust, could not be answered\n by our ignorance.\n\n --But when the objection is made against an act related to\n other and unknown acts, then our ignorance is a full answer.\n\n --Some unknown relation, or unknown impossibility, may render\n the act not only good, but good in the highest degree.\n\n\nII. _Consider some particular things, in the natural government of God,\nthe like of which we may infer, by analogy, to be contained in his\nmoral government._\n\n =1.= No ends are accomplished without means.\n\n 1.) Often, means very disagreeable bring the most desirable\n results.\n\n 2.) How means produce ends, is not learned by reason, but\n experience.\n\n 3.) In many cases, before experience, we should have expected\n contrary results.\n\n 4.) Hence we may infer that those things which are objected\n against God\u2019s moral government, produce good.\n\n 5.) It is evident that our not seeing _how_ the means work\n good, or their seeming to have an opposite effect, offers no\n presumption against their fitness to work good.\n\n 6.) They may not only be fit, but the _only_ means of ultimate\n good.\n\n _Objec._ Though our capacity of vice and misery may promote\n virtue, and _our_ suffering for sin be better than if we were\n restrained by force, yet it would have been better if evil had\n not entered the world.\n\n _Ans._ It is granted that though sinful acts may produce\n benefits, to refrain from them would produce more. We have\n curative pains, yet pain is not better than health.\n\n =2.= Natural government is carried on by general laws.\n\n 1.) Nature shows that this is best: all the good we enjoy is\n because there are general laws. They enable us to _forecast_\n for the procurement of good.\n\n 2.) It may not be possible, by general laws, to prevent all\n irregularities, or remedy them.\n\n 3.) Direct interpositions might perhaps remedy many disorders\n arising under them, but this would have bad effects.\n\n --Encouraging improvidence.\n\n --Leaving us no rule of life.\n\n --Every interposition would have _distant_ effects: so that\n we could not guess what would be the _whole_ result.\n\n \u00b7 If it be replied that those distant effects might also be\n corrected by direct interpositions--this is only talking at\n random.\n\n _Objec._ If we are so ignorant as this whole argument supposes,\n we are too ignorant to understand the proofs of religion.\n\n _Ans._ 1. Total ignorance of a subject precludes argument, but\n partial ignorance does not. We may, in various degrees, know a\n man\u2019s character, and the way he is _likely_ to pursue certain\n ends; and yet not know how he _ought_ to act to gain those\n ends. In this case objections to his mode of pursuing ends may\n be answered by our ignorance, though that he _does_ act in a\n certain manner is capable of proof. So we may have evidence\n of God\u2019s character and aims, and yet not be competent judges\n as to his measures. Our ignorance is a good answer to the\n difficulties of religion, but no objection to religion itself.\n\n _Ans._ 2. If our ignorance did invalidate the proofs of\n religion, as well as the objections, yet is it undeniable that\n moral obligations remain unaffected by our ignorance of the\n consequences of obedience or violation. The consequences of\n vice and virtue may not be fully known, yet it is credible that\n they may be such as religion declares: and this credibility is\n an obligation, in point of prudence, to abstain from sin.\n\n _Ans._ 3. Our answers to the objections against religion, are\n _not_ equally valid against the proofs of it.\n\n [Answers rehearsed.]\n\n _Ans._ 4. Our answers, though they may be said to be based\n on our ignorance, are really not so, but on what analogy\n teaches _concerning_ our ignorance,--viz.: that it renders\n us incompetent judges. They are based on experience, and\n what we _do know_; so that to credit religion is to trust to\n experience, and to disregard it is the contrary.\n\n\nCONCLUSION.\n\n =1.= The reasoning of the last chapter leads us to regard this\n life as part of a larger plan of things.\n\n 1.) Whether we are connected with the distant _parts_ of the\n universe, is uncertain; but it is very clear we are connected,\n more or less, with present, past, and future.\n\n 2.) We are evidently in the midst of a scheme, not fixed but\n progressive; and one equally incomprehensible, whether we\n regard the present, past, or future.\n\n =2.= This scheme contains as much that is wonderful as religion\n does: for it certainly would be as wonderful that all nature\n came into existence without a Creator, as that there should be a\n Creator: and as wonderful that the Creator should act without any\n rule or scheme, as that he should act with one; or that he should\n act by a bad rule, rather than a righteous one.\n\n =3.= Our very nature compels us to believe that the will and\n character of the Author of nature, is just and good.\n\n =4.= Whatever be his character, he formed the world as it is, and\n controls it as he does, and has assigned us our part and lot.\n\n =5.= Irrational creatures act their part, and receive their lot,\n without reflection, but creatures endued with reason, can hardly\n avoid reflecting whither we go, and what is the scheme, in the\n midst of which we find ourselves.\n\n[Here follows a recapitulation of the book.]\n\n\nPART II.\n\n\nCHAPTER I.\n\nIMPORTANCE OF CHRISTIANITY.\n\nEvery one must admit that we _need_ a revelation. Few, if any, could\nreason out a system, even of natural religion. If they could, there is\nno probability that they would. Such as might, would still feel the\nwant of revelation. To say that Christianity is superfluous, is as wild\nas to say all are happy.\n\nNo exactness in attending to natural religion can make Christianity of\nsmall importance.\n\nIf Christianity be from God, we must obey, unless we know all his\nreasons for giving it: and also that those reasons no longer exist; at\nleast in our case. This we cannot know.\n\nThe importance of Christianity appears if we regard it\n\n\nI. _As a republication of natural religion._\n\n =1.= It gives the moral system of the universe.\n\n 1.) Free from corruptions; teaching that\n\n --Jehovah created all things.\n\n -- \u201d governs all things.\n\n --Virtue is his law.\n\n --Mankind will be judged according to character.\n\n 2.) It publishes its facts authoritatively.\n\n 3.) With vastly more clearness; e.g. the doctrines of a future\n state: danger of sin: efficacy of repentance.\n\n 4.) With the advantage of a visible church, distinguished from\n the world by peculiar institutions.\n\n _Objec._ The perversions of Christianity, and the little good\n it has done.\n\n _Ans._ 1. Natural religion is no less perverted, and has\n done less good.\n\n 2. The benefits of Christianity are _not_ small.\n\n 3. The evils ascribed to it, are not _its_ effects. Things\n are to be judged by their genuine tendencies.\n\n 4. The light of reason, no more than revelation forces\n acquiescence.\n\n 5.) With the additional advantage that every Christian, is\n bound to instruct and persuade others.\n\n\nII. _As containing truths not discoverable by natural reason._\n\n =1.= A mode of salvation for the ruined.\n\n =2.= Duties unknown before.\n\n =3.= Our relations to the Son and Holy Ghost.\n\n 1.) Hence the form of baptism.\n\n 2.) Pious regards to Christ, and the Holy Ghost, based on our\n relations to them.\n\n =4.= The manner of external worship.\n\n\nIII. _The fearful hazard of neglecting Christianity._\n\n =1.= Those who think natural religion _sufficient_, must admit\n that Christianity is highly _important_.\n\n =2.= Our relations to Christ being made known, our religious\n regard to him is an evident obligation.\n\n =3.= These relations being real, there is no reason to think that\n our neglect of behaving suitably to them, will not be attended\n with the same kind of consequences as follow the neglect of\n duties made known by reason.\n\n =4.= If we are corrupt and depraved, and so unfit for heaven, and\n if we need God\u2019s Holy Spirit to renew our nature, how can it be a\n slight thing whether we make use of the means for obtaining such\n assistance?\n\n =5.= Thus, if Christianity be either true, or merely credible, it\n is most rash and presumptuous to treat it lightly.\n\n\nREMARKS.\n\n =1.= The distinction between positive and moral obligations.\n\n 1.) For moral precepts we can see _the reason_: for positive we\n cannot.\n\n 2.) Moral duties are such _prior_ to command; positive duties\n are such _because_ commanded.\n\n 3.) The manner in which a duty is made known, does not make it\n moral or positive.\n\n =2.= The ground of regarding moral duties as superior to positive.\n\n 1.) Both have the nature of moral commands.\n\n 2.) If the two conflict, we must obey the moral.\n\n --Positive institutions are _means_ to moral ends.\n\n --Ends are more excellent than means.\n\n --Obedience to positive institutions, has no value but as\n proceeding from moral principle.\n\n 3.) Both moral and positive duties are _revealed_, and so are\n on a level; but the moral law is _also_ interwoven with our\n very nature, and so its precepts must prevail when the two\n interfere.\n\n =3.= There is less necessity for determining their relative\n authority, than some suppose.\n\n 1.) Though man is disposed to outward and ritual religion,\n nothing can give us acceptance with God, without moral virtue.\n\n 2.) Scripture always lays stress on moral duties.\n\n 3.) It is a great weakness, though very common, to make light\n of positive institutions, because less important than moral.\n\n --We are bound to obey _all_ God\u2019s commands.\n\n --A precept, merely positive, admitted to be from God,\n creates moral obligation, in the strictest sense.\n\n\nCONCLUSION.\n\nThis account of Christianity shows our great obligation to study the\nScriptures.\n\n\nCHAPTER II.\n\nPRESUMPTIONS AGAINST A REVELATION, CONSIDERED AS MIRACULOUS.\n\nHaving shown the need of revelation, we now examine the presumptions\nagainst it.\n\nThe analogy of nature is generally supposed to afford presumptions\nagainst miracles.\n\nThey are deemed to require stronger evidence than other events.\n\n\nI. _Analogy furnishes no presumptions against the general scheme of\nChristianity._\n\n =1.= It is no presumption against Christianity, that it is not\n the discovery of reason, or of experience.\n\n =2.= Nor is it a presumption against Christianity, that it\n contains things _unlike_ the apparent course of nature.\n\n 1.) We cannot suppose every thing, in the vast universe, to be\n just like what is the course of nature in this little world.\n\n 2.) Even within the present compass of our knowledge, we see\n many things greatly unlike.\n\n =3.= If we choose to call what is unlike our known course of\n things, _miraculous_, still that does not make it _improbable_.\n\n\nII. _There is no presumption against such a revelation, as we should\nnow call miraculous, being made, at the beginning of the world._\n\n =1.= There was then _no_ course of nature, as to this world.\n\n =2.= Whether man _then_ received a revelation involves a question\n not of miracles, but of _fact_.\n\n =3.= Creation was a very different exertion of power from that\n which _rules_ the world, now it _is_ made.\n\n =4.= Whether the power of forming _stopped_ when man was made; or\n went on, and formed a religion for him, is merely a question as\n to the _degree_ or _extent_, to which a power was exerted.\n\n =5.= There is then no presumption from analogy against supposing\n man had a revelation when created.\n\n =6.= All tradition and history teaches that he had, which amounts\n to a real and material proof.\n\n\nIII. _There is no presumption against miracles, or a miraculous\nrevelation, after the course of nature was settled._\n\n =1.= Such a presumption, requires the adduction of some\n _parallel_ case.\n\n =2.= This would require us to know the history of some other\n world.\n\n =3.= Even then, if drawn from only one other world, the\n presumption would be very precarious.\n\n _To be more particular_,\n\n =1.= There is a strong presumption against any truth till it is\n proved--which yet is overcome by almost any proof.\n\n --Hence the question of a presumption against miracles,\n involves only the _degree_ of presumption, (not whether the\n presumption is _peculiar_ to miracles,) and whether that\n degree is such as to render them incredible.\n\n =2.= If we _leave out religion_, we are in total darkness as\n to the cause or circumstances on which the course of nature\n depends.\n\n --Five or six thousand years may have given occasion and\n reasons for miraculous interpositions of Providence.\n\n =3.= _Taking in religion_, there are distinct reasons for\n miracles; to afford additional instruction; to attest the truth\n of instruction.\n\n =4.= Miracles must not be compared with common events, but with\n uncommon; earthquakes, pestilence, &c.\n\n\nCONCLUSION.\n\n 1. There are no analogies to render miracles incredible.\n\n 2. On the contrary, we see good reasons for them.\n\n 3. There are no presumptions against them, _peculiar_ to them,\n as distinguished from other unusual phenomena.\n\n\nCHAPTER III.\n\nOUR INCAPACITY OF JUDGING WHAT SHOULD BE EXPECTED IN A REVELATION FROM\nGOD.\n\nBeside the objectors to the _evidences_ of Christianity, there are many\nwho object to its _nature_. They say it is not full enough: has in it\nfoolish things: gives rise to superstition: subserves tyranny: is not\nuniversally known: not well arranged: figurative language, &c.\n\nIt is granted that if it contained _immoralities_ or _contradictions_\nthey would show it to be false. But other objections against religion,\naside from objections against its evidences, are frivolous: as will now\nbe shown.\n\nLet the student look to the _force_ of the proofs, rather than any\n_consequences_ which may be drawn from them.\n\n\nI. _The Scripture informs us of a scheme of government, in addition to\nthe material laws of the world._\n\n =1.= If both these schemes, the physical and the moral, coincide\n and form one whole, then our inability to criticise the system of\n nature, renders it credible that we are incompetent to criticise\n the system of grace.\n\n =2.= Nature shows many things we should not have expected, prior\n to experience.\n\n =3.= Hence it is altogether likely it would be so in religion.\n\n =4.= If a citizen is incompetent to judge of the propriety of\n the _general_ laws of his government, he is equally incompetent\n to judge when and how far those laws should be suspended, or\n deviated from.\n\n\nII. _We are no better judges of how revelation should be imparted._\n\nWhether to every man, or to some for others; or what mode or degree\nof proof should be given; or whether the knowledge should be given\ngradually or suddenly.\n\n =1.= We are not able to judge how much new knowledge ought to be\n given by revelation.\n\n =2.= Nor how far, nor in what way, God should qualify men to\n transmit any revelation he might make.\n\n =3.= Nor whether the evidence should be certain, probable, or\n doubtful.\n\n =4.= Nor whether all should have the same benefit from it.\n\n =5.= Nor whether it should be in writing, or verbal. If it be\n said that if not in writing it would not have answered its\n purpose: I ask, what purpose? Who knows what purposes would best\n suit God\u2019s _general_ government?\n\n =6.= All which shows it to be absurd to object to particular\n things in revelation as unsuitable.\n\n\nIII. _Hence the only question, concerning the truth of revelation is,\nwhether it is a revelation._\n\n =1.= No obscurities, &c. could overthrow the authority of a\n revelation.\n\n =2.= It can only be overthrown by nullifying the proofs.\n\n =3.= Though the proofs could be shown to be less strong than is\n affirmed, it still should control our conduct.\n\n\nIV. _Modes of arguing, which are perfectly just, in relation to other\nbooks, are not so as to the Bible._\n\n =1.= We are competent judges of common books, but not of\n Scripture.\n\n =2.= Our only inquiry should be to find out the sense.\n\n =3.= In other books, internal improbabilities weaken external\n proof; but in regard to revelation, we scarcely know what are\n improbabilities.\n\n 1.) Those who judge the Scripture by preconceived expectations,\n will imagine they find improbabilities.\n\n 2.) And so they would by thus judging in natural things.\n\n --It would seem very improbable, prior to experience, that\n man should be better able to determine the magnitudes and\n motions of heavenly bodies, than he is to determine the\n causes and cures of disease, which much more nearly concerns\n him.\n\n --Or that we should sometimes hit upon a thing in an instant,\n even when thinking of something else, which we had been\n vainly trying to discover for years.\n\n --Or that language should be so liable to abuse, that every\n man may be a deceiver.\n\n --Or that brute instinct should ever be superior to reason.\n\n\nV. _Such observations apply to almost all objections to Christianity,\nas distinguished from objections against its evidence._\n\nFor instance, the disorderly manner in which some, in the apostolic age\nused their miraculous gifts.\n\n =1.= This does not prove the acts _not_ miraculous.\n\n =2.= The person having any such gift, would have the same power\n over it which he would have over any other ability, and might\n pervert it.\n\n =3.= To say why was he not also endued with prudence, to restrain\n its use, is but saying why did not God give a _higher degree_ of\n miraculous endowment? As to which we are not competent judges.\n\n =4.= God does not confer his _natural_ gifts, (memory, eloquence,\n knowledge, &c.) only on those who are prudent and make the best\n use of them.\n\n =5.= Nor is worldly instruction, by educators, commonly given in\n the happiest manner.\n\n\nVI. _There is a resemblance between religion and nature in several\nother respects._\n\n =1.= In both, common and necessary things, are plain; but to \u201cgo\n on to perfection\u201d in either, requires exact and laborious study.\n\n =2.= The hinderances to both religious and physical knowledge,\n are the same in kind. A more perfect knowledge may be brought\n about,\n\n 1.) By the progress of learning and liberty.\n\n 2.) By students attending to intimations overlooked by the\n generality.\n\n =3.= It is not wonderful that our knowledge of Bible truth should\n be small; for the natural world has laid open to inspection, for\n thousands of years, and yet only lately are any great discoveries\n made.\n\n =4.= Perhaps these scientific discoveries, are to be the means of\n opening and ascertaining Bible truth.\n\n _Objec._ The cases are not parallel; for natural knowledge is\n of no consequence, compared to spiritual.\n\n _Ans._ 1. The cases _are_ parallel; for natural knowledge\n is as important to our natural well-being, as spiritual\n knowledge is to our spiritual well-being.\n\n _Ans._ 2. If the cases were not parallel, there are plenty of\n other analogies, which show that God does not dispense his\n gifts according to _our_ notions of their value.\n\n _Objec._ 2. If Christianity be intended for the recovery of\n men, why not sooner introduced, and more widely diffused?\n\n _Ans._ The objection is just as strong against the natural\n sciences. Nay, if the light of nature and of revelation are\n both from the same source, we might _expect_ that revelation\n would have been introduced and diffused just as it is.\n\n 1.) Remedies for disease are known but to a few, or not\n known at all, nor to any without care and study.\n\n 2.) When proposed by discoverers, they have been treated\n with derision, and the use rejected by thousands whom they\n might have cured.\n\n 3.) The best remedies have been used unskilfully, and so\n made to produce more disease.\n\n 4.) Their benefit may come very slowly.\n\n 5.) In some cases they may be wholly ineffectual.\n\n 6.) They maybe so disagreeable that many will not submit to\n use them, even with the prospect of a cure.\n\n 7.) Sometimes the remedy may be entirely out of reach if we\n were ready to take it.\n\nAll this reasoning may be applied to Christianity.\n\n\nVII. _Having obviated all objections to Christianity, from its\ncontaining things we should not have expected, we will now consider the\nobjections against its morality._\n\n =1.= Reason may judge, as to whether revelation contains things\n contrary to justice, and wisdom, &c. as those attributes are\n taught by natural religion. But no such objections are advanced,\n except such as would equally condemn the constitution of nature.\n\n =2.= There are indeed particular precepts, to particular persons,\n which _would_ be immoral, but for the precept. The precept\n changes the nature of the action.\n\n =3.= None are contrary to immutable morality. We are never\n commanded to cultivate the principles of ingratitude, treachery,\n &c.\n\n =4.= God may command the taking of life or property because these\n are _his_.\n\n =5.= The only real difficulty is, that such commands are liable\n to be perverted by the wicked to their own horrid purposes; and\n to mislead the weak. But such objections do not lie against\n revelation, as such, but against the very notion of _religion as\n a trial_.\n\n =6.= The sum of the whole is, objections against the _scheme_\n of Christianity do not affect its truth; since there are no\n objections against its morality. Hence objections against it,\n aside from its evidences, are frivolous. Objections against the\n _evidence_, will be considered in a subsequent chapter, [_i.e._\n ch. vii.]\n\n\nCHAPTER IV.\n\nCHRISTIANITY A SCHEME IMPERFECTLY UNDERSTOOD.\n\nIn the last chapter it was shown that we might expect, beforehand, that\na revelation would contain strange things, and things liable to great\nobjections.\n\nThis abates the force of such objections, or rather precludes them.\n\nBut it may be said this does not show such objectionable things to be\ngood, or credible.\n\nIt was a sufficient answer [ch. vii. part i.] to objections against the\ncourse of nature, that it was a _scheme_, imperfectly comprehended.\n\nIf Christianity be a scheme, the like objections admit of a like answer.\n\n[In studying this chapter, let chap. vii. part i. be kept in view.]\n\n\nI. _Christianity is a scheme, beyond our comprehension._\n\n =1.= God\u2019s _general_ plan is to conduct things _gradually_, so\n that, finally, every one shall receive what he deserves.\n\n =2.= Christianity is a _particular_ arrangement, under this\n general plan: is a part of it, and conduces to its completion.\n\n =3.= It is itself a complicated and mysterious economy.\n\n 1.) Its arrangements began from the fall of man.\n\n 2.) Various dispensations, patriarchal, prophetic, &c. were\n preparatory to it.\n\n 3.) At a certain juncture in the condition of the world Jesus\n Christ came.\n\n 4.) The mission of the Holy Ghost was part of this economy.\n\n 5.) Christ now presides over it, and will establish the church,\n judge the world, give up the kingdom, &c. &c.\n\n =4.= Of course, we can comprehend but little of such a scheme.\n\n =5.= We plainly see, from what is revealed, that there is very\n much unrevealed.\n\n =6.= Thus it is evident that we are as little capable of judging\n as to the whole system of religion, as we are as to the whole\n system of nature.\n\n\nII. _In both material and spiritual things, means are used to\naccomplish ends._\n\n =1.= Hence a thing may seem foolish to us, because we do not know\n its object and end.\n\n =2.= Its seeming foolish to us, is no proof that it is so.\n\n\nIII. _Christianity is carried on by general laws, no less than nature._\n\n =1.= Why do we say there are _laws of nature_?\n\n 1.) We indeed know some such. But nothing of the laws of many\n things, _e.g._\n\n \u00b7 Pestilence.\n \u00b7 Storms.\n \u00b7 Earthquakes.\n \u00b7 Diversities of human powers.\n \u00b7 Association of ideas.\n\n 2.) Hence we call many things _accidental_, which we know are\n not matters of chance, but are subject to general laws.\n\n 3.) It is a very little way that we can trace things to their\n general laws.\n\n 4.) We attribute many things to such laws, only by analogy.\n\n =2.= Just for the same reasons, we say that miracles comport with\n God\u2019s _general laws of wisdom_. These laws may be unknown to us;\n but no more so than those by which some die as soon as born, or\n live to old age, or have superior understandings, &c.\n\n =3.= We see no more reason to regard the frame and course of\n nature as a scheme, than we have to regard Christianity as such.\n\n 1.) If the first is a scheme, then Christianity, if true, would\n be _likely_ to be a scheme.\n\n 2.) As Christianity is revealed but in part, and is an\n arrangement to accomplish ends, there would of course seem to\n us, in it, irregularities; just as we see in nature.\n\n 3.) Therefore objections against the one, are answered in the\n same manner as objections against the other.\n\n * * * * *\n\nHaving, in a previous chapter, [ch. iii.,] answered objections to\nChristianity _as a matter of fact_, and in this, as a general question\nof _wisdom and goodness_, the next thing is to discuss _objections in\nparticular_.\n\nAs one of these is directed against _the scheme_, as just now\ndescribed, it will be considered here.\n\n _Objec._ Christianity is a roundabout, and perplexed contrivance;\n just such as men, for want of understanding or power, are obliged\n to adopt, in their designs.\n\n _Ans._ 1.) God uses just such complex arrangements in the\n natural world. The mystery is quite as great in nature as in\n grace.\n\n 2.) We do not know what are means, and what are ends.\n\n 3.) The natural world, and its government, are not fixed, but\n progressive.\n\n 4.) Great length of time is required in some changes; _e.g._\n animals, vegetables, geological periods, &c.\n\n 5.) One state of life is a preparation and means for attaining\n another.\n\n 6.) Man is impatient, but Jehovah deliberate.\n\n\nCHAPTER V.\n\nOF A MEDIATOR, AND REDEMPTION BY HIM.\n\nNothing in Christianity is so much objected to as the position assigned\nto Christ; yet nothing is more unjust. The whole world exhibits\nmediation.\n\n\nI. _Our existence, and all its satisfactions, are by the medium of\nothers._\n\n =1.= If so in the natural world, why not in the spiritual?\n\n =2.= The objection therefore is not only against _Christ\u2019s_\n mediation, but _all_ mediation.\n\n\nII. _We cannot know all the ends for which God punishes, nor by whom he\nshould punish._\n\n =1.= Future punishment may be as natural a sequence of sin, as a\n broken limb is of falling from a precipice.\n\n =2.= This is not taking punishment out of the hands of God, and\n giving it to nature; it is only distinguishing ordinary events\n from miraculous.\n\n\nIII. _In natural providence, God has made provision that the bad\nconsequences of actions do not always follow._\n\n =1.= We may say God could have prevented all evil. But we see he\n permits it, and has provided relief, and even sometimes perfect\n remedies for it.\n\n 1.) Thus the bad consequences of trifling on a precipice may be\n prevented by a friend, if we do not reject his assistance.\n\n 2.) We may ourselves do much towards preventing the bad\n consequences of our misdeeds.\n\n 3.) Still more if assisted.\n\n =2.= It might have been perfectly just if it were not so; but\n that it is so, shows compassion, as distinguished from goodness.\n\n =3.= The course of nature affords many instances of such\n compassion.\n\n =4.= Thus analogy sanctions an arrangement, by which the ruinous\n consequences of vice or folly may be averted, at least in some\n cases.\n\n =5.= If the consequences of rash and inconsiderate acts, which\n we scarcely call vicious, are often so serious, we may apprehend\n that the bad consequences will be greater, in proportion as the\n irregularity is greater.\n\n =6.= A dissolute disregard to all religion, if there be a\n religion, is incomparably more reprehensible than the mere\n neglects, imprudencies, &c. of this life.\n\n =7.= As the effects of worldly imprudence and vice are often\n misery, ruin, and even death, no one can say what may be\n the consequences of blasphemy, contempt of God, and final\n impenitence.\n\n =8.= Nor can any one tell, how far the consequences of such great\n wickedness can possibly be prevented, consistently with the\n eternal rule of right.\n\n =9.= Still there would, from analogy, be some hope of room for\n pardon.\n\n\nIV. _There is no probability that any thing we could do alone, would\nentirely prevent the effects of our irregularities._\n\n =1.= We do not know all the reasons for punishment, nor why it\n should be fit to remit punishment.\n\n =2.= Nor do we know all the consequences of vice, and so should\n not know how to prevent them.\n\n =3.= Vice impairs men\u2019s abilities for helping themselves.\n\n =4.= Misconduct makes assistance necessary, which otherwise would\n not have been. Why should not the same things be so, as to our\n future interests?\n\n =5.= In temporal things, behaving well in time to come, does not\n repair old errors, why should it as to future things?\n\n =6.= Were it so in _all cases_ it would be contrary to all our\n notions of government.\n\n =7.= It could not be determined in what degree, or in what cases,\n it would be so, even if we knew it might in _some_ cases.\n\n =8.= The efficacy of repentance, as urged in opposition to\n atonement, is contrary to the general sense of mankind; as shown\n by the prevalence of propitiatory sacrifices.\n\n\nV. _In this state of apprehension, awakened by the light of nature,\nrevelation comes in, and teaches positively, the possibility of pardon\nand safety._\n\n =1.= Confirms our fears as to the unprevented consequences of sin.\n\n =2.= Declares the world to be in a state of ruin.\n\n =3.= That repentance alone will not secure pardon.\n\n =4.= That there is a mode of pardon, by interposition.\n\n =5.= That God\u2019s moral government is compassionate, as well as his\n natural government.\n\n =6.= That he has provided, by the interposition of a mediator, to\n save men.\n\n =7.= All this seems to put man in a strange state of helpless\n degradation. But it is not Christianity which puts him so. All\n philosophy and history show man to be degraded and corrupt.\n\n\nVI. _Scripture, in addition to confirming the dim testimony of the\nlight of nature, reveals a Christ, as mediator and propitiatory\nsacrifice._\n\n =1.= He is \u201c_that prophet_.\u201d\n\n 1.) Declared the will of God.\n\n 2.) Published anew the law of nature.\n\n 3.) Taught with authority.\n\n 4.) Revealed the right manner of worship.\n\n 5.) Revealed the exact use of repentance.\n\n 6.) Revealed future rewards and punishments.\n\n 7.) Set us a perfect example.\n\n =2.= He has a _kingdom_ which is not of this world.\n\n 1.) Founded a church.\n\n 2.) Governs it.\n\n 3.) Of it, all who obey him are members.\n\n 4.) Each of these shall live and reign with him forever.\n\n =3.= He is a propitiatory _sacrifice_.\n\n 1.) How his sacrifice becomes efficacious, we are not exactly\n told.\n\n 2.) Conjectures may be absurd; at least cannot be certain.\n\n 3.) If any complain for want of further instruction, let him\n produce his claim to it.\n\n 4.) Some, because they cannot explain, leave it out of their\n creed; and regard Christ only as a teacher.\n\n 5.) We had better accept the benefit, without disputing about\n how it was procured.\n\n\nVII. _We are not judges, antecedent to revelation, whether a mediator\nwas necessary, nor what should be the whole nature of his office._\n\n =1.= We know not how future punishment would have been inflicted.\n\n =2.= Nor all the reasons why it would be necessary.\n\n =3.= The satisfaction by Christ, does not represent God as\n indifferent whether he punishes the innocent or guilty.\n\n 1.) We see, in this world, the innocent _forced_ to suffer for\n the faults of the guilty.\n\n 2.) But Christ suffered _voluntarily_.\n\n =4.= Though, finally, every one shall receive according to\n his own deserts; yet, during the progress of God\u2019s scheme,\n _vicarious_ sufferings may be necessary.\n\n 1.) God commands us to assist others, though in many cases it\n costs us suffering and toil.\n\n 2.) One person\u2019s sufferings often tend to relieve another.\n\n =5.= Vicarious atonement for sinners, serves to vindicate the\n authority of God\u2019s laws, and to deter men from sin.\n\n =6.= Objections to vicarious suffering are obviously not\n objections to Christianity, but to the whole course of nature.\n\n =7.= The objection, therefore, amounts to nothing more than\n saying that a divine arrangement is not necessary, or fit,\n because the objector does not see it to be so; though he must\n own he is no judge, and _could_ not understand why it should be\n necessary, if it were so!\n\n\nVIII. _We have no reason to expect the same information touching God\u2019s\nconduct, as we have in relation to our own duty._\n\n =1.= God instructs us by experience.\n\n =2.= This experience, though sufficient for our purposes, is an\n infinitely small part of his providence.\n\n =3.= The things not understood involve God\u2019s appointment, and\n Christ\u2019s execution; but what _is required of us_, we are clearly\n informed.\n\n =4.= Even the reasons for Christian precepts are made obvious.\n\n\nCHAPTER VI.\n\nSUPPOSED LACK OF PROOF OF REVELATION, AND ITS WANT OF UNIVERSALITY.\n\nIt has been thought to be a positive argument against revelation, that\nits evidences are not adequate, and that it is not universally known\nand believed.\n\nBut the argument amounts to just this, that God would not bestow on us\nany favor, except in such a mode and degree as we thought best, and did\nexactly the same for everybody else.\n\nSuch a notion, all analogy contradicts.\n\n\nI. _Men act in their most important concerns on doubtful evidence._\n\n =1.= It is often absolutely _impossible_ to say which of two\n modes of acting will give most pleasure or profit.\n\n =2.= If it were possible, we cannot know what changes temper,\n satiety, ill health, &c. might produce, so as to destroy our\n pleasure.\n\n =3.= We cannot foresee what accidents may cut it all off.\n\n =4.= Strong objections and difficulties may attach to the course\n of action we adopt, which yet all would admit ought not to deter\n us.\n\n =5.= We may, after all, be deceived by appearances, or by our\n passions, &c.\n\n =6.= Men think it reasonable to engage in pursuit of advantage,\n even when the probabilities of success are against them.\n\n\nII. _As to the light of Christianity not being universal._\n\n =1.= Temporal good is enjoyed in very different degrees even\n among creatures of the same species.\n\n =2.= Yet it is certain that God governs.\n\n =3.= We may prudently or imprudently use our good things.\n\n =4.= The Jewish religion was not universal.\n\n =5.= If it be _intended_ that Christianity should be a small\n light, shining in a great and wide-spread darkness, it would be\n perfectly uniform with other parts of God\u2019s providence.\n\n =6.= If some have Christianity so corrupted, and interpolated, as\n to cause thoughtful persons to doubt it, as is the case in some\n countries; and if, where it is the purest, some learn much less\n from it than they might, there are manifest parallels in God\u2019s\n natural dispensations.\n\n =7.= No more is expected of any one, than is equitable under his\n circumstances.\n\n =8.= Every one is bound to get rid of his ignorance, as far as he\n can, and to instruct his neighbor.\n\n =9.= If revelation _were_ universal, in extent and degree,\n different understandings, educations, tempers, length of lives,\n and outward advantages, would soon make the knowledge of it as\n different as it is at present.\n\n\nIII. _Practical reflections._\n\n _First._ That the evidence of religion is not such as unavoidably\n to convince all, may be part of our probation.\n\n =1.= It gives scope for a wise or vicious use of our\n understanding. Just as is the case in common affairs.\n\n =2.= Intellectual inattention to so serious a matter, is as\n immoral, as disobedience after conviction of the truth.\n\n _Secondly._ If the evidence is really doubtful, it puts us on\n probation.\n\n =1.= If a man were in doubt whether a certain person had done\n him the greatest favor, or whether his whole temporal interest\n depended on him, he ought not to regard that person as he would\n if there were _no_ reason to think so.\n\n =2.= So if there is only reason to apprehend that Christianity\n _may_ be true, we are as much bound to _examine_, &c. as we\n would be bound to _obey_, if we _knew_ it was true.\n\n =3.= Considering the infinite importance of religion, there is\n not much difference as to what ought to be the mode of life of\n those who are convinced and those who doubt its truth. Their\n hopes and fears are the same in kind, though not in degree; and\n so their obligations are much the same.\n\n =4.= Doubts presuppose _some_ evidence, belief _more_, and\n certainty _more still_. Each state should influence our\n conduct, and does so, in common things.\n\n =5.= It shows a mental defect not to see evidence unless it is\n glaring; and a corrupt heart not to be influenced by it unless\n overpowering.\n\n _Thirdly._ Difficulties as to believing religion, are no more a\n ground of complaint, than difficulties in practising it.\n\n =1.= They constitute a wholesome discipline.\n\n 1.) In allowing an unfair mind to deceive itself.\n\n 2.) In requiring belief and the practice of virtue under some\n uncertainties.\n\n =2.= In the case of some minds, speculative difficulties as\n to the evidence of religion is the _principal_ trial. A full\n conviction of its truth would _constrain_ some to obedience.\n\n _Fourthly._ The difficulties may be _in the objector_ rather than\n in the religion.\n\n =1.= Not sufficiently in earnest to be informed.\n\n =2.= Secretly _wishes_ religion not to be true.\n\n =3.= Looks at objections rather than replies.\n\n =4.= Treats the subject ludicrously.\n\n _Fifthly._ The proof of Christianity is level to common men.\n\n =1.= They are capable of being convinced of the existence of\n God, and of their moral accountability.\n\n =2.= And they can understand the evidence of miracles, and the\n fulfilment of prophecy.\n\n =3.= If they are capable of seeing the difficulty, they are\n capable of understanding the proof.\n\n =4.= If they pick up objections from hearsay, and will not or\n cannot examine them thoroughly, they must remain ignorant, just\n as they do as to the sciences.\n\n _Objec._ Our directions should be too plain to _admit_ of\n doubt; like those of an earthly master.\n\n _Ans._ The earthly master only wants his work done, and is\n careless as to the state of the heart; but as the whole of\n morality consists in the state of the heart, the cases are\n not parallel.\n\n _Finally._ The credibility of our being in a state of probation\n is just as great as the credibility of there being any religion.\n Our probation may be whether we choose to inform ourselves as to\n our duty, and then whether we choose to do it.\n\n Such is exactly the case as to temporal matters. To discern what\n is best often requires difficult consideration, and yet leaves\n doubts: and not reflecting carefully, or not acting even when\n there may be doubt, is often fatal.\n\n\nCHAPTER VII.\n\nPOSITIVE EVIDENCES OF CHRISTIANITY.\n\nHaving considered the objections both to the general scheme of\nChristianity, and to particular doctrines in it, it only remains to\nconsider the positive evidence of its truth; _i.e._ what analogy\nteaches with regard to that evidence.\n\nThere are many evidences of Christianity, beside those from miracles or\nprophecy, which are the principal; embracing a great variety of proofs,\ndirect and collateral, and reaching through all past time. We shall now\nconsider the proofs from MIRACLES and PROPHECY.\n\n\nI. _Miracles._\n\n =1.= Bible history gives the same evidence for the miracles\n described, as for common events.\n\n 1.) The miracles are evidently not put in for ornament, as\n speeches are by historians and poets put into the mouths of\n heroes.\n\n 2.) The accounts of them have been quoted as genuine, by\n various writers, from that day to this.\n\n 3.) These accounts are confirmed by subsequent events; and the\n miracles alone, can account for those events.\n\n 4.) The only fair way of accounting for these statements,\n and their reception in the world, is that the things really\n happened.\n\n 5.) The statements should be admitted till disproved, even if\n doubtful.\n\n =2.= Paul\u2019s Epistles have evidences of genuineness, beyond what\n can attach to mere history.\n\n 1.) _Additional._ His evidence is quite detached. He received\n the gospel not in common with the other apostles, but\n separately, and direct from Christ, _after_ his ascension.\n\n 2.) _Peculiar._ He speaks of Christ\u2019s miracles and those of\n others _incidentally_, as familiar facts, fully believed by\n those to whom he wrote.\n\n =3.= Christianity demands credence on the ground of its miracles,\n and was so received by great numbers, at the time and on the\n spot; which is the case with no other religion.\n\n 1.) Its first converts embraced it on this ground.\n\n 2.) It is not conceivable that they would have done so, at such\n fearful sacrifice, unless fully satisfied of the truth of these\n miracles.\n\n 3.) Such a profession and sacrifices furnish the same kind of\n evidence as if they had testified to the truth of the miracles\n in writing.\n\n 4.) It is real evidence, for they had full opportunity to\n inform themselves.\n\n 5.) It is a sort of evidence _distinct_ from direct history,\n though of the same nature.\n\n 6.) Men are suspicious as well as credulous, and slow to\n believe _against their interests_, as these did.\n\n =4.= It lies upon unbelievers to show why all this array of proof\n is to be rejected; but in such an important concern we shall\n proceed to notice some possible objections.\n\n _Objec._ 1. Enthusiasts make similar sacrifices for idle\n follies.\n\n _Ans._ 1. This objection ignores the distinction between\n opinions and facts. Suffering for an opinion is no proof of\n its truth; but in attestation of observed facts, it is proof.\n\n 2. Enthusiasm _weakens_ testimony, it is true, even as to\n facts; and so does disease, _in particular instances_. But\n when great numbers, not weak, nor negligent, affirm that\n _they_ saw and heard certain things, it is the fullest\n evidence.\n\n 3. To reject testimony on the ground of enthusiasm, requires\n that the things testified be _incredible_; which has not been\n shown, as to religion, but the contrary.\n\n 4. Religion is not the only thing in regard to which\n witnesses are liable to enthusiasm. In common matters, we\n _get at the truth_ through witnesses, though influenced by\n party spirit, custom, humor, romance, &c. &c.\n\n _Objec._ 2. Enthusiasm and knavery may have been combined in the\n apostles and first Christians.\n\n _Ans._ Such a mixture is often seen, and is often reproved in\n Scripture; but not more in religious than in common affairs.\n Men in all matters deceive themselves and others, in every\n degree, yet human testimony is good ground of belief.\n\n _Objec._ 3. Men have been deluded by false miracles.\n\n _Ans._ Not oftener than by other pretences.\n\n _Objec._ 4. Fabulous miracles have historical evidence.\n\n _Ans._ 1. If this were equal to that for Scripture miracles,\n the evidence for the latter would not be _impaired_. The\n objection really amounts to this, that evidence proved not to\n be good, destroys evidence which is good and unconfuted! Or\n to this, that if two men, of equal reputation, testify, in\n _cases not related_ to each other, and one is proved false,\n the other must not be believed!\n\n 2. Nothing can rebut testimony, but proof that the witness is\n incompetent, or misled.\n\n 3. Against all such objections must be set the fact that\n Christianity was too serious a matter to allow the first\n converts to be careless as to its evidence; and also that\n their religion forbid them to deceive others.\n\n\nII. _As to the evidence from prophecy._\n\n =1.= Obscurity as to _part_ of a prophecy does not invalidate it,\n but is, as to us, as if that part were not written, or were lost.\n We may not see the whole prophecy fulfilled, and yet see enough\n fulfilled to perceive in it more than human foresight.\n\n =2.= A _long series_ of prophecies, all applicable to certain\n events, is proof that such events were intended. This answers the\n objection that _particular_ prophecies were not intended to be\n applied as Christians apply them.\n\n Mythological and satirical writings greatly resemble prophecy.\n Now we apply a parable, or fable, or satire, merely from seeing\n it _capable_ of such application.\n\n So if a long series of prophecies be _applicable_ to the present\n state of the world, or to the coming of Christ, it is proof that\n they were so _intended_.\n\n Besides, the ancient Jews, _before_ Christ, applied the\n prophecies to him, just as Christians do now.\n\n =3.= If it could be shown that the prophets did not understand\n their own predictions, or that their prophecies are capable of\n being applied to other events than those to which Christians\n apply them, it would not abate the force of the argument from\n prophecy, even with regard to those instances. For,\n\n 1.) To know the whole meaning of an author we must know the\n whole meaning of his book, but knowing the meaning of a book is\n not knowing the whole mind of the author.\n\n 2.) If the book is a _compilation_, the authors may have\n meanings deeper than the compiler saw. If the prophets spoke\n by inspiration, they are not the authors, but the writers of\n prophecy, and may not have known all that the Divine Spirit\n intended. But the fulfilment of the prophecy shows a foresight\n more than human.\n\n\nREMARK.\n\nThis whole argument is just and real; but it is not expected that those\nwill be satisfied who will not submit to the perplexity and labor\nof understanding it; or who have not modesty and fairness enough to\nallow an argument its due weight; or who wilfully discard the whole\ninvestigation.\n\n\nTHE GENERAL ARGUMENT\n\nWe _now_ proceed to THE GENERAL ARGUMENT embracing both direct and\ncircumstantial evidence. A full discussion would require a volume, and\ncannot be expected here; but _something_ should be said, especially\nas most questions of difficulty, in practical affairs, are settled by\nevidence arising from circumstances which confirm each other.\n\nThe thing asserted is that God has given us a revelation declaring\nhimself to be a moral governor; stating his system of government; and\ndisclosing a plan for the recovery of mankind out of sin, and raising\nthem to perfect and final happiness.\n\n\nI. _Consider this revelation as a history._\n\n =1.= It furnishes an account of the world, as God\u2019s world.\n\n 1.) God\u2019s providence, commands, promises, and threatenings.\n\n 2.) Distinguishes God from idols.\n\n 3.) Describes the condition of religion and of its professors,\n in a world considered as apostate and wicked.\n\n 4.) Political events are related as affecting religion, and not\n for their importance as mere political events.\n\n 5.) The history is continued by prophecy, to the end of the\n world.\n\n =2.= It embraces a vast variety of other topics; natural and\n moral.\n\n 1.) Thus furnishing the largest scope for criticism.\n\n 2.) So that _doubts_ of its truth confirm that truth, for in\n this enlightened age the claims of a book of such a nature\n could be easily and finally shown to be false, if they were so.\n\n 3.) None who believe in natural religion, hold that\n Christianity has been thus confuted.\n\n =3.= It contains a minute account of God\u2019s selecting one nation\n for his peculiar people, and of his dealings with them.\n\n 1.) Interpositions in their behalf.\n\n 2.) Threats of dispersion, &c. if they rebelled.\n\n 3.) Promises of a Messiah as their prince; so clearly as to\n raise a general expectation, &c.\n\n 4.) Foretelling his rejection by them, and that he should be\n the Savior of the Gentiles.\n\n =4.= Describes minutely the arrival of the Messiah, and his\n life and labors; and the result, in the establishment of a new\n religion.\n\n\nII. _As to the authenticity of this history._\n\nSuppose a person ignorant of all history but the Bible, and not\nknowing even that to be true, were to inquire into its evidence of\nauthenticity, he would find,\n\n =1.= That natural religion owes its establishment to _the\n truths_ contained in this book. This no more _disproves_ natural\n religion, than our learning a proposition from Euclid, shows that\n the proposition was not true before Euclid.\n\n =2.= The great antiquity of revelation.\n\n =3.= That its chronology is not contradicted but confirmed by\n known facts.\n\n =4.= That there is nothing in the history itself to awaken\n suspicion of its fidelity.\n\n 1.) Every thing said to be done in any age or country, is\n conformable to the manners of that age and country.\n\n 2.) The characters are all perfectly natural.\n\n 3.) All the domestic and political incidents are credible. Some\n of these, taken alone, seem strange to _some_, in _this_ day;\n but not more so than things now occurring.\n\n 4.) Transcribers may have made errors, but these are not more\n numerous than in other ancient books; and none of them impair\n the narrative.\n\n =5.= That profane authors confirm Scripture accounts.\n\n =6.= That the credibility of the _general_ history, confirms the\n accounts of the miracles, for they are all interwoven, and make\n but one statement.\n\n =7.= That there certainly was and is such a people as the Jews;\n whose form of government was founded on these very books of\n Moses; and whose acknowledgment of the God of the Bible, kept\n them a distinct race.\n\n =8.= That one Jesus, of Jewish extraction, arose at the time\n when the Jews expected a Messiah, was rejected by them, as was\n prophesied, and was received by the Gentiles, as was prophesied.\n\n =9.= That the religion of this Jesus spread till it became the\n religion of the world, notwithstanding every sort of resistance;\n and has continued till now.\n\n =10.= That the Jewish government was destroyed, and the people\n dispersed into all lands; and still for many centuries, continue\n to be a distinct race, professing the law of Moses. If this\n separateness be _accounted for_, in any way, it does not destroy\n the fact that it was _predicted_.\n\n\nCONCLUSION.\n\n =1.= Recapitulation of the preceding ten observations.\n\n =2.= Add the fact that there are obvious appearances in the\n world, aside from the Jews, which correspond to prophetic history.\n\n =3.= These appearances, compared with Bible history, and with\n each other, in _a joint view_, will appear to be of great weight,\n and would impress one who regarded them for the first time, more\n than they do us who have been familiar with them.\n\n =4.= The preceding discussion, though not thorough, amounts to\n proof of something more than human in this matter.\n\n 1.) The sufficiency of these proofs may be denied, but the\n _existence_ of them cannot be.\n\n 2.) The conformity of prophecies to events may be said to be\n accidental, but the _conformity itself_ cannot be denied.\n\n 3.) These collateral proofs may be pronounced fanciful, but it\n cannot be said they are _nothing_. Probabilities may not amount\n to demonstration, but they remain probabilities.\n\n =5.= Those who will set down all seeming completions of prophecy,\n and judge of them by the common rules of evidence, will find that\n _together_ they amount to strong proof. Because probable proofs,\n added together, not only increase evidence, but multiply it.\n\n =6.= It is very well to observe objections; but it should be\n remembered that a mistake on one side is far more dangerous than\n a mistake on the other; and the safest conclusion is the best.\n\n =7.= Religion, like other things, is to be judged by all the\n evidence taken together. Unless _all_ its proofs be overthrown,\n it remains proved. If no proof singly were sufficient, the whole\n taken together might be.\n\n =8.= It is much easier to start an objection, than to comprehend\n the united force of a whole argument.\n\n =9.= Thus it appears that the positive evidence of revelation\n cannot be destroyed, though it should be lessened.\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII.\n\nOBJECTIONS AGAINST THE ANALOGICAL ARGUMENT.\n\nIf all made up their minds with proper care and candor, there would be\nno need of this chapter. But some do not try to understand what they\ncondemn; and our mode of argument is open to objections, especially in\nthe minds of those who judge without thinking. The chief objections\nwill therefore be considered. They are these:--it does not solve\ndifficulties in revelation to say that there are as great in natural\nreligion:--it will not make men religious to show them that it is\n_as_ important as worldly prudence, for showing that, does not make\nthem prudent:--the justice of God in the system of religion, is not\nproved by showing it is as apparent as in his natural providence:--no\nreasoning from analogy can carry full conviction:--mankind will not\nrenounce present pleasures, for a religion which is not free from\ndoubt. To each of which a reply will now be given.\n\n\nI. _As to requiring a solution of all difficulties._\n\n =1.= This is but resolving to comprehend the nature of God, and\n the whole plan of his government throughout eternity.\n\n =2.= It is always right to argue from what is known, to what is\n disputed. We are constantly so doing. The most eminent physician\n does not understand all diseases, yet we do not despise what he\n does know.\n\n =3.= It is very important to find that objections against\n revelation are just as strong, not only against natural religion,\n but against the course of nature.\n\n\nII. _As to men\u2019s having as little reason for worldly pursuits, as they\nhave for being religious._\n\n =1.= If men can be convinced that they have as much reason to be\n religious as they have to practise worldly prudence, then _there\n is_ a reason for being religious.\n\n =2.= If religion proposes greater than worldly interests, and has\n the same reasons for belief, then it has proportionally a greater\n claim.\n\n =3.= If religion being left doubtful, proves it to be false, then\n doubts as to the success of any worldly pursuit show it to be\n wrong. Yet we constantly act, even in the most important affairs,\n without _certainty_ of being right.\n\n\nIII. _As to the justice and goodness of God in religion._\n\n =1.= Our business is not to vindicate God, but to learn our duty,\n governed as we are; which is a very different thing. It has been\n shown that if we knew all things, present, past, and future, and\n the relations of each thing to all other things, we might see to\n be just and good what now do not seem so: and it is probable we\n should.\n\n =2.= We do not say that objections against God\u2019s justice and\n goodness are removed by showing the like objections against\n natural providence, but that they are not _conclusive_, because\n they apply equally to what we know to be facts.\n\n =3.= The existence of objections does not destroy the evidence\n of facts. The fact for instance that God rewards and punishes,\n though men may think it unjust. Even necessity, plead for human\n acts, does no more to abolish justice than it does injustice.\n\n =4.= Though the reasonableness of Christianity cannot be shown\n from analogy, the truth of it may. The truth of a fact may be\n proved without regard to its quality. The reasonableness of\n obeying Christianity is proved, if we barely prove Christianity\n itself to be possible.\n\n =5.= Though analogy may not show Christian precepts to be good,\n it proves them to be credible.\n\n\nIV. _The analogical argument does not remove doubt._\n\n =1.= What opinion does any man hold, about which there can be no\n doubt? Even the best way of preserving and enjoying this life,\n is not agreed upon. Whether our measures will accomplish our\n objects, is always uncertain; and still more whether the objects,\n if accomplished, will give us happiness. Yet men do not on this\n account refuse to make exertion.\n\n =2.= This objection overlooks the very nature of religion.\n The embracing of it presupposes a certain degree of candor\n and integrity, to try which, and exercise, and improve it, is\n its intention. Just as warning a man of danger, presupposes a\n disposition to avoid danger.\n\n =3.= Religion is a probation, and has evidence enough as such;\n and would not be such, if it compelled assent.\n\n =4.= We never mean by sufficient evidence, such an amount as\n necessarily determines a man to act, but only such as will show\n an action to be prudent.\n\n\nV. _As to the small influence of the analogical argument._\n\n =1.= As just observed, religion is a _test_, and an _exercise_,\n of character; and that some reject it is nothing to our purpose.\n We are inquiring not what sort of creature man is, but what he\n should be. This is each man\u2019s own concern.\n\n =2.= Religion, as a probation, accomplishes its end, whether\n individuals believe or not.\n\n =3.= Even this objection admits that religion has some weight,\n and of course it should have some influence; and if so, there is\n the same reason, though not so strong, for publishing it, that\n there would be, if it were likely to have greater influence.\n\nFURTHER. It must be considered that the reasoning in this treatise is\non the principles of other men, and arguments of the utmost importance\nare omitted, because not universally admitted. Thus as to Fatalism, and\nthe abstract fitness or unfitness of actions. The general argument is\njust a question of fact, and is here so treated. Abstract truths are\nusually advanced as proof; but in this work, only _facts_ are adduced.\nThat the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, is\nan abstract truth: but that they so appear to us, is only a matter of\nfact. That there is such a thing as abstract right and wrong, which\ndetermines the will of God in rewarding and punishing, is an assertion\nof an abstract truth, as well as a fact. Suppose God in this world\nrewarded and punished every man exactly as he obeyed or disobeyed his\nconscience, this would not be an abstract truth, but a fact. And if\nall acknowledged this as a fact, all would not see it to be right. If,\ninstead of his doing it now, we say he will do it hereafter, this too\nis not an abstract truth, but a question of fact. This fact could be\nfully proved on the abstract principles of moral fitness; but without\nthem, there has now been given a _conclusive practical proof_; which\nthough it may be cavilled at, and shown not to amount to demonstration,\ncannot be answered.\n\nHence it may be said as to the force of this treatise,\n\n =1.= To such as are convinced of the truth of revelation, as\n proved on the principles of liberty and moral fitness, it will\n furnish a full confirmation. To such as do not admit those\n principles it is an original proof.\n\n =2.= Those who believe will find objections removed, and\n those who disbelieve will find they have no grounds for their\n scepticism; and a good deal beside.\n\n =3.= Thus though some may think _too much_ is here made of\n analogy, yet there can be no denying that the argument is _real_.\n It confirms _all facts_ to which it can be applied; and of\n many is the only proof. It is strong on the side of religion,\n and ought to be regarded by such as prefer facts to abstract\n reasonings.\n\n\nCONCLUSION.\n\nRecapitulates the general structure and design of the argument, the\nclasses of persons for whose benefit it is particularly adopted, and\ndeclares those who reject Christianity to be wholly without excuse.\n\n\n\n\nAdvertisement prefixed to the First Edition.\n\n\nIf the reader should here meet with any thing which he had not before\nattended to, it will not be in the observations upon the constitution\nand course of nature, these being all obvious, but in the application\nof them; in which, though there is nothing but what appears to me\nof some real weight, and therefore of great importance, yet he will\nobserve several things, which will appear to him of very little, if\nhe can think things to be of little importance, which are of any real\nweight at all, upon such a subject of religion. However, the proper\nforce of the following treatise lies in the whole general analogy\nconsidered together.\n\nIt is come, I know not how to be taken for granted, by many persons,\nthat Christianity is not so much as a subject of inquiry; but that\nit is, now at length, discovered to be fictitious. Accordingly they\ntreat it, as if, in the present age, this were an agreed point among\nall people of discernment; and nothing remained, but to set it up\nas a principal subject of mirth and ridicule, as it were by way of\nreprisals, for its having so long interrupted the pleasures of the\nworld. On the contrary, thus much at least, will be here found, not\ntaken for granted but proved, that any reasonable man, who will\nthoroughly consider the matter, may be as much assured, as he is of his\nown being, that it is not so clear a case, that there is nothing in\nit. There is, I think, strong evidence of its truth; but it is certain\nno one can, upon principles of reason, be satisfied of the contrary.\nThe practical consequence to be drawn from this, is not attended to by\nevery one who is concerned in it.\n\n_May, 1736._\n\n\n\n\nINTRODUCTION.\n\n\nProbable evidence is essentially distinguished from demonstrative by\nthis, that it admits of degrees; and of all variety of them, from the\nhighest moral certainty, to the very lowest presumption. We cannot\nindeed say a thing is probably true upon one very slight presumption\nfor it; because, as there may be probabilities on both sides of a\nquestion, there may be some against it; and though there be not, yet\na slight presumption does not beget that degree of conviction, which\nis implied in saying a thing is probably true. But that the slightest\npossible presumption is of the nature of a probability, appears from\nhence; that such low presumption, often repeated, will amount even\nto moral certainty. Thus a man\u2019s having observed the ebb and flow of\nthe tide to-day, affords some sort of presumption, though the lowest\nimaginable, that it may happen again to-morrow: but the observation of\nthis event for so many days, and months, and ages together, as it has\nbeen observed by mankind, gives us a full assurance that it will.\n\nThat which chiefly constitutes _probability_ is expressed in the word\n_likely_, _i.e._ like some truth,[6] or true event; like it, in itself,\nin its evidence, in some (more or fewer) of its circumstances.[7] For\nwhen we determine a thing to be probably true, suppose that an event\nhas or will come to pass, it is from the mind\u2019s remarking in it a\nlikeness to some other event, which we have observed has come to pass.\nThis observation forms, in numberless daily instances, a presumption,\nopinion, or full conviction, that such event has or will come to pass;\naccording as the observation is, that the like event has sometimes,\nmost commonly, or always, so far as our observation reaches, come to\npass at like distances of time, or place, or upon like occasions. Hence\narises the belief, that a child, if it lives twenty years, will grow\nup to the stature and strength of a man; that food will contribute to\nthe preservation of its life, and the want of it for such a number of\ndays, be its certain destruction. So likewise the rule and measure\nof our hopes and fears concerning the success of our pursuits; our\nexpectations that others will act so and so in such circumstances; and\nour judgment that such actions proceed from such principles; all these\nrely upon our having observed the like to what we hope, fear, expect,\njudge; I say, upon our having observed the like, either with respect to\nothers or ourselves. Thus, the prince[8] who had always lived in a warm\nclimate, naturally concluded in the way of analogy, that there was no\nsuch thing as water\u2019s becoming hard, because he had always observed it\nto be fluid and yielding. We, on the contrary, from analogy conclude,\nthat there is no presumption at all against this: that it is supposable\nthere may be frost in England any given day in January next; probable\nthat there will on some day of the month; and that there is a moral\ncertainty, _i.e._ ground for an expectation without any doubt of it, in\nsome part or other of the winter.\n\nProbable evidence, in its very nature, affords but an imperfect kind\nof information; and is to be considered as relative only to beings\nof limited capacities. For nothing which is the possible object of\nknowledge, whether past, present, or future, can be probable to an\ninfinite intelligence; since it cannot but be discerned absolutely\nas it is in itself, certainly true, or certainly false. But to us,\nprobability is the very guide of life.\n\nFrom these things it follows, that in questions of difficulty, or such\nas are thought so, where more satisfactory evidence cannot be had, or\nis not seen; if the result of examination be, that there appears upon\nthe whole, any even the lowest presumption on one side, and none on\nthe other, or a greater presumption on one side, though in the lowest\ndegree greater; this determines the question, even in matters of\nspeculation. In matters of practice, it will lay us under an absolute\nand formal obligation, in point of prudence and of interest, to act\nupon that presumption or low probability, though it be so low as to\nleave the mind in very great doubt which is the truth. For surely a\nman is as really bound in prudence to do what upon the whole, according\nto the best of his judgment, appears to be for his happiness,[9] as\nwhat he certainly knows to be so.\n\nFurther, in questions of great consequence, a reasonable man will think\nit concerns him to remark lower probabilities and presumptions than\nthese; such as amount to no more than showing one side of a question\nto be as supposable and credible as the other: nay, such even as but\namount to much less than this. For numberless instances might be\nmentioned respecting the common pursuits of life, where a man would\nbe thought, in a literal sense, distracted, who would not act, and\nwith great application too, not only upon an even chance, but upon\nmuch less, and where the probability or chance was greatly against his\nsucceeding.[10]\n\nIt is not my design to inquire further into the nature, the foundation,\nand measure of probability; or whence it proceeds that _likeness_\nshould beget that presumption, opinion, and full conviction, which\nthe human mind is formed to receive from it, and which it does\nnecessarily produce in every one; or to guard against the errors, to\nwhich reasoning from analogy is liable. This belongs to the subject of\nLogic; and is a part of that subject which has not yet been thoroughly\nconsidered. Indeed I shall not take upon me to say, how far the extent,\ncompass, and force, of analogical reasoning, can be reduced to general\nheads and rules; and the whole be formed into a system. But though so\nlittle in this way has been attempted by those who have treated of our\nintellectual powers, and the exercise of them; this does not hinder but\nthat we may be, as we unquestionably are, assured, that analogy is of\nweight, in various degrees, towards determining our judgment and our\npractice. Nor does it in any wise cease to be of weight in those cases,\nbecause persons, either given to dispute, or who require things to be\nstated with greater exactness than our faculties appear to admit of\nin practical matters, may find other cases in which it is not easy to\nsay, whether it be, or be not, of any weight; or instances of seeming\nanalogies, which are really of none. It is enough to the present\npurpose to observe, that this general way of arguing is evidently\nnatural, just, and conclusive. For there is no man can make a question\nbut that the sun will rise to-morrow, and be seen, where it is seen at\nall, in the figure of a circle, and not in that of a square.\n\nHence, namely from analogical reasoning, Origen[11] has with singular\nsagacity observed, that \u201c_he who believes the Scripture to have\nproceeded from him who is the Author of nature, may well expect\nto find the same sort of difficulties in it, as are found in the\nconstitution of nature_.\u201d And in a like way of reflection it may be\nadded, that he who denies the Scripture to have been from God upon\naccount of these difficulties, may, for the very same reason, deny\nthe world to have been formed by him. On the other hand, if there be\nan analogy or likeness between that system of things and dispensation\nof Providence, which _revelation_ informs us of, and that system of\nthings and dispensation of Providence, which _experience_ together with\nreason informs us of, _i.e._ the known course of nature; this is a\npresumption, that they have both the same author and cause; at least so\nfar as to answer objections against the former\u2019s being from God, drawn\nfrom any thing which is analogical or similar to what is in the latter,\nwhich is acknowledged to be from him; for an Author of nature is here\nsupposed.\n\nForming our notions of the constitution and government of the world\nupon reasoning, without foundation for the principles which we assume,\nwhether from the attributes of God, or any thing else, is building\na world upon hypothesis, like Des Cartes. Forming our notions upon\nreasoning from principles which are certain, but applied to cases to\nwhich we have no ground to apply them, (like those who explain the\nstructure of the human body, and the nature of diseases and medicines,\nfrom mere mathematics,) is an error much akin to the former: since what\nis assumed in order to make the reasoning applicable, is Hypothesis.\nBut it must be allowed just, to join abstract reasonings with the\nobservation of facts, and argue from such facts as are known, to\nothers that are like them; from that part of the divine government over\nintelligent creatures which comes under our view, to that larger and\nmore general government over them which is beyond it; and from what is\npresent, to collect what is likely, credible, or not incredible, will\nbe hereafter.\n\nThis method then of concluding and determining being practical, and\nwhat, if we will act at all, we cannot but act upon in the common\npursuits of life; being evidently conclusive, in various degrees,\nproportionable to the degree and exactness of the whole analogy or\nlikeness; and having so great authority for its introduction into the\nsubject of religion, even revealed religion; my design is to apply\nit to that subject in general, both natural and revealed: taking for\nproved, that there is an intelligent Author of nature, and natural\nGovernor of the world. For as there is no presumption against this\nprior to the proof of it: so it has been often proved with accumulated\nevidence; from this argument of analogy and final causes; from abstract\nreasonings; from the most ancient tradition and testimony; and from\nthe general consent of mankind. Nor does it appear, so far as I can\nfind, to be denied by the generality of those who profess themselves\ndissatisfied with the evidence of religion.\n\nAs there are some, who, instead of thus attending to what is in fact\nthe constitution of nature, form their notions of God\u2019s government\nupon hypothesis: so there are others, who indulge themselves in vain\nand idle speculations, how the world might possibly have been framed\notherwise than it is; and upon supposition that things might, in\nimagining that they should, have been disposed and carried on after a\nbetter model, than what appears in the present disposition and conduct\nof them.[12] Suppose now a person of such a turn of mind, to go on with\nhis reveries, till he had at length fixed upon some particular plan\nof nature, as appearing to him the best.--One shall scarce be thought\nguilty of detraction against human understanding, if one should say,\neven beforehand, that the plan which this speculative person would fix\nupon, though he were the wisest of the sons of men, probably would not\nbe the very best, even according to his own notions of _best_; whether\nhe thought that to be so, which afforded occasions and motives for\nthe exercise of the greatest virtue, or which was productive of the\ngreatest happiness, or that these two were necessarily connected, and\nrun up into one and the same plan.\n\nIt may not be amiss, once for all, to see what would be the amount\nof these emendations and imaginary improvements upon the system of\nnature, or how far they would mislead us. It seems there could be no\nstopping, till we came to some such conclusions as these: that all\ncreatures should at first be made as perfect and as happy as they\nwere capable of ever being: that nothing, surely, of hazard or danger\nshould be put upon them to do; some indolent persons would perhaps\nthink nothing at all: or certainly, that effectual care should be\ntaken, that they should, whether necessarily or not, yet eventually\nand in fact, always do what was right and most conducive to happiness;\nwhich would be thought easy for infinite power to effect, either by\nnot giving them any principles which would endanger their going wrong,\nor by laying the right motive of action in every instance before their\nminds in so strong a manner, as would never fail of inducing them to\nact conformably to it: and that the whole method of government by\npunishments should be rejected as absurd; as an awkward roundabout\nmethod of carrying things on; nay, as contrary to a principal purpose,\nfor which it would be supposed creatures were made, namely, happiness.\n\nNow, without considering what is to be said in particular to the\nseveral parts of this train of folly and extravagance, what has been\nabove intimated, is a full direct general answer to it; namely, that\nwe may see beforehand that we have not faculties for this kind of\nspeculation. For though it be admitted that, from the first principles\nof our nature, we unavoidably judge or determine some ends to be\nabsolutely in themselves preferable to others, and that the ends now\nmentioned, or if they run up into one, that this one is absolutely\nthe best; and consequently that we must conclude the ultimate end\ndesigned, in the constitution of nature and conduct of Providence, is\nthe most virtue and happiness possible; yet we are far from being able\nto judge what particular disposition of things would be most friendly\nand assistant to virtue; or what means might be absolutely necessary\nto produce the most happiness in a system of such extent as our own\nworld may be, taking in all that is past and to come, though we should\nsuppose it detached from the whole things. Indeed we are so far from\nbeing able to judge of this, that we are not judges what may be the\nnecessary means of raising and conducting one person to the highest\nperfection and happiness of his nature. Nay, even in the little affairs\nof the present life, we find men of different educations and ranks are\nnot competent judges of the conduct of each other. Our whole nature\nleads us to ascribe all moral perfection to God, and to deny all\nimperfection of him. And this will forever be a practical proof of his\nmoral character, to such as will consider what a practical proof is;\nbecause it is the voice of God speaking in us. Hence we conclude, that\nvirtue must be the happiness, and vice the misery, of every creature;\nand that regularity and order and right cannot but prevail finally in a\nuniverse under his government. But we are in no sort judges, what are\nthe necessary means of accomplishing this end.\n\nLet us then, instead of that idle and not very innocent employment of\nforming imaginary models of a world, and schemes of governing it, turn\nour thoughts to what we experience to be the conduct of nature with\nrespect to intelligent creatures; which may be resolved into general\nlaws or rules of administration, in the same way as many of the laws of\nnature respecting inanimate matter may be collected from experiments.\nLet us compare the known constitution and course of things with what is\nsaid to be the moral system of nature; the acknowledged dispensations\nof Providence, or that government which we find ourselves under, with\nwhat religion teaches us to believe and expect; and see whether they\nare not analogous and of a piece. Upon such a comparison it will, I\nthink, be found that they are very much so: that both may be traced\nup to the same general laws, and resolved into the same principles of\ndivine conduct.\n\nThe analogy here proposed to be considered is of pretty large extent,\nand consists of several parts; in some more, in others less exact.\nIn some few instances perhaps, it may amount to a real practical\nproof; in others not so. Yet in these it is a confirmation of what is\nproved otherwise. It will undeniably show, what too many need to have\nshown them, that the system of religion, both natural and revealed,\nconsidered only as a system, and prior to the proof of it, is not\na subject of ridicule, unless that of nature be so too. And it will\nafford an answer to almost all objections against the system both of\nnatural and revealed religion; though not perhaps an answer in so great\na degree, yet in a very considerable degree an answer to the objections\nagainst the evidence of it: for objections against a proof, and\nobjections against what is said to be proved, the reader will observe\nare different things.\n\nThe divine government of the world, implied in the notion of religion\nin general and of Christianity, contains in it: that mankind is\nappointed to live in a future state;[13] that there every one shall be\nrewarded or punished;[14] rewarded or punished respectively for all\nthat behaviour here, which we comprehend under the words, virtuous\nor vicious, morally good or evil:[15] that our present life is a\nprobation, a state of trial,[16] and of discipline,[17] for that future\none; notwithstanding the objections, which men may fancy they have,\nfrom notions of necessity, against there being any such moral plan as\nthis at all;[18] and whatever objections may appear to lie against\nthe wisdom and goodness of it, as it stands so imperfectly made known\nto us at present:[19] that this world being in a state of apostasy\nand wickedness, and consequently of ruin, and the sense both of their\ncondition and duty being greatly corrupted amongst men, this gave\noccasion for an additional dispensation of Providence; of the utmost\nimportance;[20] proved by miracles;[21] but containing in it many\nthings appearing to us strange, and not to have been expected;[22] a\ndispensation of Providence, which is a scheme or system of things;[23]\ncarried on by the mediation of a divine person, the Messiah, in order\nto the recovery of the world;[24] yet not revealed to all men, nor\nproved with the strongest possible evidence to all those to whom it is\nrevealed; but only to such a part of mankind, and with such particular\nevidence, as the wisdom of God thought fit.[25]\n\nThe design then of the following treatise will be to show, that\nthe several parts principally objected against in this moral and\nChristian dispensation, including its scheme, its publication, and the\nproof which God has afforded us of its truth; that the particular\nparts principally objected against in this whole dispensation, are\nanalogous to what is experienced in the constitution and course of\nnature or Providence; that the chief objections themselves which are\nalleged against the former, are no other than what may be alleged\nwith like justness against the latter, where they are found in fact\nto be inconclusive; and that this argument from analogy is in general\nunanswerable, and undoubtedly of weight on the side of religion,[26]\nnotwithstanding the objections which may seem to lie against it, and\nthe real ground which there may be for difference of opinion, as to\nthe particular degree of weight which is to be laid upon it. This is a\ngeneral account of what may be looked for in the following treatise.\nI shall begin it with that which is the foundation of all our hopes\nand of all our fears; all our hopes and fears, which are of any\nconsideration; I mean a future life.\n\n\n\n\nTHE\n\nANALOGY OF RELIGION.\n\n\n\n\nPART I.\n\nNatural Religion.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I.\n\nA FUTURE LIFE.[27]\n\n\nStrange difficulties have been raised by some concerning personal\nidentity, or the sameness of living agents, implied in the notion of\nour existing now and hereafter, or in any two successive moments;\nwhich, whoever thinks it worth while, may see considered in the first\ndissertation at the end of this treatise. But without regard to any of\nthem here, let us consider what the analogy of nature, and the several\nchanges which we have undergone, and those which we know we may undergo\nwithout being destroyed, suggest, as to the effect which death may, or\nmay not, have upon us; and whether it be not from thence probable, that\nwe may survive this change, and exist in a future state of life and\nperception.\n\nI. From our being born into the present world in the helpless imperfect\nstate of infancy, and having arrived from thence to mature age, we find\nit to be a general law of nature in our own species, that the same\ncreatures, the _same individuals_, should exist in degrees of life and\nperception, with capacities of action, of enjoyment and suffering, in\none period of their being, greatly different from those appointed them\nin another period of it. In other creatures the same law holds. For\nthe difference of their capacities and states of life at their birth\n(to go no higher) and in maturity; the change of worms into flies, and\nthe vast enlargement of their locomotive powers by such change: and\nbirds and insects bursting the shell of their habitation, and by this\nmeans entering into a new world, furnished with new accommodations\nfor them, and finding a new sphere of action assigned them; these are\ninstances of this general law of nature. Thus all the various and\nwonderful transformations of animals are to be taken into consideration\nhere. The states of life in which we ourselves existed formerly, in\nthe womb and in our infancy, are almost as different from our present\nin mature age, as it is possible to conceive any two states or degrees\nof life can be. Therefore that we are to exist hereafter, in a state\nas different (suppose) from our present, as this is from our former,\nis but according to the analogy of nature; according to a natural\norder or appointment of the very same kind, with what we have already\nexperienced.\n\nII. We know we are endued with capacities of action, of happiness\nand misery: for we are conscious of acting, of enjoying pleasure and\nsuffering pain. Now that we have these powers and capacities before\ndeath, is a presumption that we shall retain them through and after\ndeath; indeed a probability of it abundantly sufficient to act upon,\nunless there be some positive reason to think that death is the\ndestruction of those living powers; because there is in every case\na probability, that all things will continue as we experience they\nare, in all respects, except those in which we have some reason to\nthink they will be altered. This is that _kind_[28] of presumption or\nprobability from analogy, expressed in the very word _continuance_,\nwhich seems our only natural reason for believing the course of the\nworld will continue to-morrow, as it has done so far as our experience\nor knowledge of history can carry us back. Nay, it seems our only\nreason for believing, that any one substance now existing will continue\nto exist a moment longer; the self-existent substance only excepted.\nThus if men were assured that the unknown event, death, was not the\ndestruction of our faculties of perception and of action, there would\nbe no apprehension that any other power or event, unconnected with this\nof death, would destroy these faculties just at the instant of each\ncreature\u2019s death; and therefore no doubt but that they would remain\nafter it; which shows the high probability that our living powers will\ncontinue after death, unless there be some ground to think that death\nis their destruction.[29] For, if it would be in a manner certain that\nwe should survive death,[30] provided it were certain that death would\nnot be our destruction, it must be highly probable we shall survive\nit, if there be no ground to think death will be our destruction.\n\nThough I think it must be acknowledged, that prior to the natural and\nmoral proofs of a future life commonly insisted upon, there would arise\na general confused suspicion, that in the great shock and alteration\nwhich we shall undergo by death, we, _i.e._ our living powers, might be\nwholly destroyed; yet even prior to those proofs, there is really no\nparticular distinct ground or reason for this apprehension at all, so\nfar as I can find. If there be, it must arise either from _the reason\nof the thing_, or from _the analogy of nature_.\n\nBut we cannot argue from _the reason of the thing_, that death is the\ndestruction of living agents, because we know not at all what death is\nin itself; but only some of its effects, such as the dissolution of\nflesh, skin, and bones. These effects do in no wise appear to imply the\ndestruction of a living agent. Besides, as we are greatly in the dark,\nupon what the exercise of our living powers depends, so we are wholly\nignorant what the powers themselves depend upon; the powers themselves\nas distinguished, not only from their actual exercise, but also from\nthe present capacity of exercising them; and as opposed to their\ndestruction: for sleep, or certainly a swoon, shows us, not only that\nthese powers exist when they are not exercised, as the passive power of\nmotion does in inanimate matter; but shows also that they exist, when\nthere is no present capacity of exercising them: or that the capacities\nof exercising them for the present, as well as the actual exercise\nof them, may be suspended, and yet the powers themselves remain\nundestroyed. Since then we know not at all upon what the existence of\nour living powers depends, this shows further, there can no probability\nbe collected from the reason of the thing, that death will be their\ndestruction: because their existence may depend upon somewhat in no\ndegree affected by death; upon somewhat quite out of the reach of this\nking of terrors. So that there is nothing more certain, than that _the\nreason of the thing_ shows us no connection between death and the\ndestruction of living agents.\n\nNor can we find any thing throughout the whole _analogy of nature_ to\nafford us even the slightest presumption, that animals ever lose their\nliving powers; much less if it were possible, that they lose them\nby death: for we have no faculties wherewith to trace any beyond or\nthrough it, so as to see what becomes of them. This event removes them\nfrom our view. It destroys the _sensible_ proof, which we had before\ntheir death, of their being possessed of living powers, but does not\nappear to afford the least reason to believe that they are, then, or by\nthat event, deprived of them.\n\nOur knowing that they were possessed of these powers, up to the very\nperiod to which we have faculties capable of tracing them, is itself\na probability of their retaining them beyond it. This is confirmed,\nand a sensible credibility is given to it, by observing the very great\nand astonishing changes which we have experienced; so great, that our\nexistence in another state of life, of perception and of action, will\nbe but according to a method of providential conduct, the like to which\nhas been already exercised even with regard to ourselves; according to\na course of nature, the like to which we have already gone through.\n\nHowever, as one cannot but be greatly sensible, how difficult it is to\nsilence imagination enough to make the voice of reason even distinctly\nheard in this case; as we are accustomed, from our youth up, to indulge\nthat forward, delusive faculty, ever obtruding beyond its sphere;\n(of some assistance indeed to apprehension, but the author of all\nerror,) as we plainly lose ourselves in gross and crude conceptions\nof things, taking for granted that we are acquainted with what indeed\nwe are wholly ignorant of: it may be proper to consider the imaginary\npresumptions, that death will be our destruction, arising from these\nkinds of early and lasting prejudices; and to show how little they\nreally amount to, even though we cannot wholly divest ourselves of\nthem. And,\n\nI. All presumption of death\u2019s being the destruction of living beings,\nmust go upon supposition that they are compounded;[31] and so,\ndiscerptible. But since consciousness is a single and indivisible\npower, it should seem that the subject in which it resides must be so\ntoo. For were the motion of any particle of matter absolutely one and\nindivisible, so as that it should imply a contradiction to suppose\npart of this motion to exist, and part not to exist, _i.e._ part of\nthis matter to move, and part to be at rest, then its power of motion\nwould be indivisible; and so also would the subject in which the power\ninheres, namely, the particle of matter: for if this could be divided\ninto two, one part might be moved and the other at rest, which is\ncontrary to the supposition.\n\nIn like manner it has been argued,[32] and, for any thing appearing\nto the contrary, justly, that since the perception or consciousness,\nwhich we have of our own existence, is indivisible, so as that it\nis a contradiction to suppose one part of it should be here and the\nother there; the perceptive power, or the power of consciousness, is\nindivisible too: and consequently the subject in which it resides,\n_i.e._ the conscious being. Now, upon supposition that the living\nagent each man calls himself, is thus a single being, which there is\nat least no more difficulty in conceiving than in conceiving it to be\na compound, and of which there is the proof now mentioned; it follows,\nthat our organized bodies are no more ourselves or part of ourselves,\nthan any other matter around us. And it is as easy to conceive, how\nmatter, which is no part of ourselves, may be appropriated to us in the\nmanner which our present bodies are; as how we can receive impressions\nfrom, and have power over, any matter. It is as easy to conceive, that\nwe may exist out of bodies, as in them; and that we might have animated\nbodies of any other organs and senses wholly different from these now\ngiven us; and that we may hereafter animate these same or new bodies,\nvariously modified and organized; as to conceive how we can animate\nsuch bodies as our present. And lastly, the dissolution of all these\nseveral organized bodies, supposing ourselves to have successively\nanimated them, would have no more conceivable tendency to destroy\nthe living beings ourselves, or deprive us of living faculties, the\nfaculties of perception and of action, than the dissolution of any\nforeign matter, which we are capable of receiving impressions from, and\nmaking use of, for the common occasions of life.\n\nII. The simplicity and absolute oneness of a living agent cannot,\nfrom the nature of the thing, be properly proved by experimental\nobservations. But as these _fall in_ with the supposition of its\nunity, so they plainly lead us to _conclude_ certainly, that our gross\norganized bodies, with which we perceive objects of sense, and with\nwhich we act, are no part of ourselves; and therefore show us, that we\nhave no reason to believe their destruction to be ours: even without\ndetermining whether our living substance be material or immaterial. For\nwe see by experience, that men may lose their limbs, their organs of\nsense, and even the greatest part of these bodies, and yet remain the\nsame living agents. Persons can trace up the existence of themselves\nto a time, when the bulk of their bodies was extremely small, in\ncomparison of what it is in mature age: and we cannot but think, that\nthey might _then_ have lost a considerable part of that small body,\nand yet have remained the same living agents; as they may now lose\ngreat part of their present body, and remain so. And it is certain,\nthat the bodies of all animals are in a constant flux;[33] from that\nnever-ceasing attrition, which there is in every part of them. Now,\nthings of this kind unavoidably teach us to distinguish, between these\nliving agents ourselves, and large quantities of matter, in which we\nare very nearly interested; since these may be alienated, and actually\nare in a daily course of succession, and changing their owners; whilst\nwe are assured, that each living agent remains one and the same\npermanent being.[34] And this general observation leads us on to the\nfollowing ones.\n\n_First_, That we have no way of determining by experience, what is the\ncertain bulk of the living being each man calls himself: and yet, till\nit be determined that it is larger in bulk than the solid elementary\nparticles of matter, which there is no ground to think any natural\npower can dissolve, there is no sort of reason to think death to be the\ndissolution of it, of the living being, even though it should not be\nabsolutely indiscerptible.\n\n_Secondly_, From our being so nearly related to and interested\nin certain systems of matter, (suppose our flesh and bones,) and\nafterwards ceasing to be at all related to them, the living agents,\nourselves, remaining all this while undestroyed notwithstanding\nsuch alienation; and consequently these systems of matter not being\nourselves, it follows further that we have no ground to conclude any\nother (suppose _internal_) _systems_ of matter, to be the living agents\nourselves; because we can have no ground to conclude this, but from\nour relation to and interest in such other systems of matter: and\ntherefore we can have no reason to conclude what befalls those systems\nof matter at death, to be the destruction of the living agents. We have\nalready several times over, lost a great part or perhaps the whole of\nour body, according to certain common established laws of nature, yet\nwe remain the same living agents. When we shall lose as great a part,\nor the whole, by another common established law of nature, death, why\nmay we not also remain the same? That the alienation has been gradual\nin one case, and in the other will be more at once, does not prove\nany thing to the contrary. We have passed undestroyed through those\nmany and great revolutions of matter, so peculiarly appropriated to us\nourselves; why should we imagine death will be so fatal to us? Nor can\nit be objected, that what is thus alienated or lost, is no part of our\noriginal solid body, but only adventitious matter. Because we may lose\nentire limbs, which must have contained many solid parts and vessels of\nthe original body; or if this be not admitted, we have no proof, that\nany of these solid parts are dissolved or alienated by death. Though\nwe are very nearly related to that extraneous or adventitious matter,\nwhilst it continues united to and distending the several parts of our\nsolid body, yet after all, the relation a person bears to those parts\nof his body, to which he is most nearly related, amounts but to this,\nthat the living agent, and those parts of the body, mutually affect\neach other.[35] The same thing, the same thing in kind though not in\ndegree, may be said of _all foreign_ matter, which gives us ideas, and\nover which we have any power. From these observations the whole ground\nof the imagination is removed, that the dissolution of any matter, is\nthe destruction of a living agent, from the interest he once had in\nsuch matter.\n\n_Thirdly_, If we consider our body somewhat more distinctly, as made\nup of organs and instruments of perception and of motion, it will\nbring us to the same conclusion. Thus the common optical experiments\nshow, and even the observation how sight is assisted by glasses\nshows, that we see with our eyes in the same sense as we see with\nglasses. Nor is there any reason to believe, that we see with them in\nany other sense; any other, I mean, which would lead us to think the\neye itself a percipient. The like is to be said of hearing; and our\nfeeling distant solid matter by means of something in our hand, seems\nan instance of the like kind, as to the subject we are considering.\nAll these are instances of foreign matter, or such as is no part of\nour body, being instrumental in preparing objects for, and conveying\nthem to, the perceiving power, in a manner similar to the manner in\nwhich our organs of sense prepare and convey them. Both are in a like\nway instruments of our receiving such ideas from external objects,\nas the Author of nature appointed those external objects to be the\noccasions of exciting in us. Glasses are evident instances of this;\nnamely of matter which is no part of our body, preparing objects for\nand conveying them towards the perceiving power, in like manner as our\nbodily organs do. And if we see with our eyes only in the same manner\nas we do with glasses, the like may justly be concluded, from analogy,\nof all our other senses. It is not intended, by any thing here said,\nto affirm, that the whole apparatus of vision, or of perception by\nany other sense, can be traced through all its steps, quite up to the\n_living power_ of seeing, or perceiving: but that so far as it can be\ntraced by experimental observations, so far it appears, that our organs\nof sense prepare and convey objects, in order to their being perceived,\nin like manner as foreign matter does, without affording any shadow of\nappearance, that they themselves perceive. And that we have no reason\nto think our organs of sense percipients, is confirmed by instances of\npersons losing some of them, the living beings themselves, their former\noccupiers, remaining unimpaired. It is confirmed also by the experience\nof dreams; by which we find we are at present possessed of a latent,\nand what would be otherwise an unimagined unknown power of perceiving\nsensible objects, in as strong and lively a manner without our external\norgans of sense, as with them.\n\nSo also with regard to our power of moving, or directing motion by will\nand choice; upon the destruction of a limb, this active power evidently\nremains, unlessened; so that the living being, who has suffered this\nloss, would be capable of moving as before, if it had another limb to\nmove with. It can walk by the help of an artificial leg. It can make\nuse of a pole or a lever, to reach towards itself and to move things,\nbeyond the length and the power of its arm; and this it does in the\nsame manner as it reaches and moves, with its natural arm, things\nnearer and of less weight. Nor is there so much as any appearance of\nour limbs being endued with a power of moving or directing themselves;\nthough they are adapted, like the several parts of a machine, to be the\ninstruments of motion to each other; and some parts of the same limb,\nto be instruments of motion to the other parts.\n\nThus a man determines that he will look at an object through a\nmicroscope; or being lame, that he will walk to such a place with a\nstaff, a week hence. His eyes and his feet no more determine in these\ncases, than the microscope and the staff. Nor is there any ground to\nthink they any more put the determination in practice; or that his\neyes are the seers, or his feet the movers, in any other sense than\nas the microscope and the staff are. Upon the whole, then, our organs\nof sense, and our limbs, are certainly _instruments_,[36] which the\nliving persons ourselves make use of to perceive and move with: there\nis not any probability, that they are any more; nor consequently,\nthat we have any other kind of relation to them, than what we have to\nany other foreign matter formed into instruments of perception and\nmotion, suppose into a microscope or a staff; (I say any other kind of\nrelation, for I am not speaking of the degree of it) nor consequently\nis there any probability, that the alienation or dissolution of these\ninstruments, is the destruction of the perceiving and moving agent.\n\nAnd thus our finding that the dissolution of matter, in which living\nbeings were most nearly interested, is not their dissolution; and\nthat the destruction of several of the organs and instruments of\nperception and of motion belonging to them, is not their destruction;\nshows demonstratively, that there is no ground to think that the\ndissolution of any other matter, or destruction of any other organs and\ninstruments, will be the dissolution or destruction of living agents,\nfrom the like kind of relation. And we have no reason to think we stand\nin any other kind of relation to any thing which we find dissolved by\ndeath.\n\nBut it is said, these observations are equally applicable to\nbrutes:[37] and it is thought an insuperable difficulty, that they\nshould be immortal, and by consequence capable of everlasting\nhappiness. Now this manner of expression is both invidious and weak:\nbut the thing intended by it, is really no difficulty at all, either in\nthe way of natural or moral consideration. For 1, Suppose the invidious\nthing, designed in such a manner of expression, were really implied, as\nit is not in the least, in the natural immortality of brutes, namely,\nthat they must arrive at great attainments, and become rational and\nmoral agents; even this would be no difficulty, since we know not what\nlatent powers and capacities they may be endued with. There was once,\nprior to experience, as great presumption against human creatures,\nas there is against the brute creatures, arriving at that degree of\nunderstanding, which we have in mature age. For we can trace up our own\nexistence to the same original with theirs. We find it to be a general\nlaw of nature, that creatures endued with _capacities_ of virtue and\nreligion should be placed in a condition of being, in which they are\naltogether without _the use_ of them, for a considerable length of\ntheir duration; as in infancy and childhood. And great part of the\nhuman species, go out of the present world, before they come to the\nexercise of these capacities in _any_ degree.\n\n2. The natural immortality of brutes does not in the least imply, that\nthey are endued with any latent capacities of a rational or _moral_\nnature. The economy of the universe might require, that there should\nbe living creatures without any capacities of this kind. And all\ndifficulties as to the manner how they are to be disposed of, are so\napparently and wholly founded in our ignorance, that it is wonderful\nthey should be insisted upon by any, but such as are weak enough to\nthink they are acquainted with the whole system of things. There\nis then absolutely nothing at all in this objection, which is so\nrhetorically urged, against the greatest part of the natural proofs\nor presumptions of the immortality of human minds; I say the greatest\npart, for it is less applicable to the following observation, which is\nmore peculiar to mankind.\n\nIII. As it is evident our _present_ powers and capacities of reason,\nmemory, and affection, do not depend upon our gross body in the manner\nin which perception by our organs of sense does; so they do not appear\nto depend upon it at all, in any such manner as to give ground to\nthink, that the dissolution of this body will be the destruction of\nthese our present powers of reflection, as it will of our powers of\nsensation; or to give ground to conclude, even that it will be so much\nas a suspension of the former.\n\nHuman creatures exist at present in two states of life and perception,\ngreatly different from each other; each of which has its own peculiar\nlaws, and its own peculiar enjoyments and sufferings. When any of\nour senses are affected, or appetites gratified with the objects of\nthem, we may be said to exist or live in a state of sensation. When\nnone of our senses are affected or appetites gratified, and yet we\nperceive, and reason, and act, we may be said to exist or live in a\nstate of reflection. Now it is by no means certain, that any thing\nwhich is dissolved by death, is in any way necessary to the living\nbeing, in this its state of reflection, _after_ ideas are gained.\nFor, though, from our present constitution and condition of being,\nour external organs of sense are necessary for conveying in ideas to\nour reflecting powers, as carriages, and levers, and scaffolds are in\narchitecture:[38] yet when these ideas are brought in, we are capable\nof reflecting in the most intense degree, and of enjoying the greatest\npleasure, and feeling the greatest pain, by means of that reflection,\nwithout any assistance from our senses; and without any at all, which\nwe know of, from that body which will be dissolved by death. It does\nnot appear then, that the relation of this gross body to the reflecting\nbeing is, in any degree, necessary to thinking; to intellectual\nenjoyments or sufferings: nor, consequently, that the dissolution or\nalienation of the former by death, will be the destruction of those\npresent powers, which render us capable of this state of reflection.\n\nFurther, there are instances of mortal diseases, which do not at all\naffect our present intellectual powers; and this affords a presumption,\nthat those diseases will not destroy these present powers. Indeed,\nfrom the observations made above,[39] it appears, that there is no\npresumption, from their mutually affecting each other, that the\ndissolution of the body is the destruction of the living agent. By\nthe same reasoning, it must appear too, that there is no presumption,\nfrom their mutually affecting each other, that the dissolution of\nthe body is the destruction of our present reflecting powers: indeed\ninstances of their not affecting each other, afford a presumption of\nthe contrary. Instances of mortal diseases not impairing our present\nreflecting powers, evidently turn our thoughts even from imagining such\ndiseases to be the destruction of them. Several things indeed greatly\naffect all our living powers, and at length suspend the exercise of\nthem; as for instance drowsiness, increasing till it ends in sound\nsleep: and hence we might have imagined it would destroy them, till\nwe found by experience the weakness of this way of judging. But in\nthe diseases now mentioned, there is not so much as this shadow of\nprobability, to lead us to any such conclusion, as to the reflecting\npowers which we have at present. For in those diseases, persons the\nmoment before death appear to be in the highest vigor of life. They\ndiscover apprehension, memory, reason, all entire; the utmost force of\naffection; a sense of character, of shame and honor; and the highest\nmental enjoyments and sufferings, even to the last gasp. These surely\nprove even greater vigor of life than bodily strength does. Now what\npretence is there for thinking, that a progressive disease when arrived\nto such a degree, I mean that degree which is mortal, will destroy\nthose powers, which were not impaired, which were not affected by it,\nduring its whole progress quite up to that degree? And if death by\ndiseases of this kind, is not the destruction of our present reflecting\npowers, it will scarce be thought that death by any other means is.\n\nIt is obvious that this general observation may be carried further.\nThere appears to be so little connection between our bodily powers\nof sensation, and our present powers of reflection, that there is\nno reason to conclude, that death, which destroys the former, does\nso much as _suspend the exercise_ of the latter, or interrupt our\n_continuing_ to exist in the like state of reflection which we do\nnow.[40] For suspension of reason, memory, and the affections which\nthey excite, is no part of the idea of death, nor implied in our notion\nof it. Our daily experiencing these powers to be exercised, without\nany assistance, that we know of, from those bodies which will be\ndissolved by death; and our finding often, that the exercise of them\nis so lively to the last; afford a sensible apprehension, that death\nmay not perhaps be so much as a discontinuance of the exercise of these\npowers, nor of the enjoyments and sufferings which it implies.[41] So\nthat our posthumous life, whatever there may be in it additional to our\npresent, may yet not be beginning entirely anew; but going on. Death\nmay, in some sort and in some respects, answer to our birth; which is\nnot a suspension of the faculties which we had before it, or a _total_\nchange of the state of life in which we existed when in the womb; but a\ncontinuation of both, with such and such great alterations.\n\nNay, for aught we know of ourselves, of our present life and of death,\ndeath may immediately, in the natural course of things, put us into a\nhigher and more enlarged state of life, as our birth does;[42] a state\nin which our capacities; and sphere of perception and of action, may\nbe much greater than at present. For as our relation to our external\norgans of sense, renders us capable of existing in our present state of\nsensation; so it may be the only natural hinderance to our existing,\nimmediately, and of course; in a _higher_ state of reflection. The\ntruth is, reason does not at all show us, in what state death naturally\nleaves us. But were we sure, that it would suspend all our perceptive\nand active powers; yet the suspension of a power and the destruction\nof it, are effects so totally different in kind, as we experience from\nsleep and a swoon, that we cannot in any wise argue from one to the\nother; or conclude even to the lowest degree of probability, that the\nsame kind of force which is sufficient to suspend our faculties, though\nit be increased ever so much, will be sufficient to destroy them.[43]\n\nThese observations together may be sufficient to show, how little\npresumption there is, that death is the destruction of human creatures.\nHowever, there is the shadow of an analogy, which may lead us to\nimagine it,--viz.: the supposed likeness which is observed between the\ndecay of vegetables, and of living creatures. This likeness is indeed\nsufficient to afford the poets very apt allusions to the flowers of\nthe field, in their pictures of the frailty of our present life. But\nin reason, the analogy is so far from holding, that there appears no\nground for the comparison, as to the present question; because one\nof the two subjects compared is wholly void of that, which is the\nprincipal and chief thing in the other; the power of perception and of\naction; which is the only thing we are inquiring about the continuance\nof. So that the destruction of a vegetable, is an event not similar or\nanalogous to the destruction of a living agent.\n\nIf, as was above intimated, leaving off the delusive custom of\nsubstituting imagination in the room of experience, we would confine\nourselves to what we do know and understand; if we would argue only\nfrom that, and from that form our expectations, it would appear at\nfirst sight, that as no probability of living beings ever ceasing to\nbe so, can be concluded from the reason of the thing, so none can be\ncollected from the analogy of nature; because we cannot trace any\nliving beings beyond death. But as we are conscious that we are endued\nwith capacities of perception and of action, and are living persons;\nwhat we are to go upon is, that we shall continue so, till we foresee\nsome accident or event, which will endanger those capacities, or be\nlikely to destroy us: which death does in no wise appear to be.\n\nThus, when we go out of this world, we may pass into new scenes, and\na new state of life and action, just as naturally as we came into the\npresent. And this new state may naturally be a social one.[44] And the\nadvantages of it, advantages, of every kind, may naturally be bestowed,\naccording to some fixed general laws of wisdom, upon every one in\nproportion to the degrees of his virtue. And though the advantages\nof that future natural state should not be bestowed, as these of the\npresent in some measure are, by the will of the society; but entirely\nby his more immediate action, upon whom the whole frame of nature\ndepends: yet this distribution may be just as natural, as their being\ndistributed here by the instrumentality of men. Indeed, though one\nshould allow any confused undetermined sense, which people please to\nput upon the word _natural_, it would be a shortness of thought scarce\ncredible, to imagine, that no system or course of things can be so, but\nonly what we see at present:[45] especially whilst the probability\nof a future life, or the natural immortality of the soul, is admitted\nupon the evidence of reason; because this is really both admitting\nand denying at once, a state of being different from the present to\nbe natural. But the only distinct meaning of that word is, _stated_,\n_fixed_, or _settled_; since what is natural as much requires and\npresupposes an intelligent agent to render it so, _i.e._ to effect it\ncontinually, or at stated times, as what is supernatural or miraculous\ndoes to effect it for once.\n\nHence it must follow, that persons\u2019 notion of what is natural, will be\nenlarged in proportion to their greater knowledge of the works of God,\nand the dispensations of his providence. Nor is there any absurdity in\nsupposing, that there may be beings in the universe, whose capacities,\nand knowledge, and views, may be so extensive, as that the whole\nChristian dispensation may to them appear natural, _i.e._ analogous\nor conformable to God\u2019s dealings with other parts of his creation; as\nnatural as the visible known course of things appears to us. For there\nseems scarce any other possible sense to be put upon the word, but that\nonly in which it is here used; similar, stated, or uniform.\n\nThis credibility of a future life, which has been here insisted upon,\nhow little soever it may satisfy our curiosity, seems to answer all the\npurposes of religion, in like manner as a demonstrative proof would.\nIndeed a proof, even a demonstrative one, of a future life, would not\nbe a proof of religion. For, that we are to live hereafter, is just as\nreconcilable with the scheme of atheism, and as well to be accounted\nfor by it, as that we are now alive is: and therefore nothing can\nbe more absurd than to argue from that scheme, that there can be no\nfuture state. But as religion implies a future state, any presumption\nagainst such a state, is a presumption against religion. The foregoing\nobservations remove all presumptions of that sort, and prove, to a\nvery considerable degree of probability, one fundamental doctrine of\nreligion; which, if believed, would greatly open and dispose the mind\nseriously to attend to the general evidence! of the whole.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II.\n\nTHE GOVERNMENT OF GOD BY REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS.\n\n\nThat which makes the question concerning a future life to be of so\ngreat importance to us, is our capacity of happiness and misery. And\nthat which makes the consideration of it to be of so great importance\nto us, is the supposition of our happiness and misery hereafter\ndepending upon our actions here. Indeed, without this, curiosity\ncould not but sometimes bring a subject, in which we may be so highly\ninterested, to our thoughts; especially upon the mortality of others,\nor the near prospect of our own. But reasonable men would not take\nany further thought about hereafter, than what should happen thus\noccasionally to rise in their minds, if it were certain that our future\ninterest no way depended upon our present behavior; whereas, on the\ncontrary, if there be ground, either from analogy or any thing else, to\nthink it does, then there is reason also for the most active thought\nand solicitude, to secure that interest; to behave so as that we may\nescape that misery, and obtain that happiness, in another life, which\nwe not only suppose ourselves capable of, but which we apprehend also\nis put in our own power. And whether there be ground for this last\napprehension, certainly would deserve to be most seriously considered,\nwere there no other proof of a future life and interest, than that\npresumptive one, which the foregoing observations amount to.\n\nIn the present state, all which we enjoy, and a great part of what\nwe suffer, _is put in our own power_. Pleasure and pain are the\nconsequences of our actions; and we are endued by the Author of our\nnature with capacities of foreseeing these consequences. We find by\nexperience that he does not so much as preserve our lives, exclusive\nof our own care and attention, to provide ourselves with, and to make\nuse of, that sustenance, by which he has appointed our lives shall\nbe preserved; and without which, he has appointed, they shall not be\npreserved. In general we foresee, that the external things, which\nare the objects of our various passions, can neither be obtained nor\nenjoyed, without exerting ourselves in such and such manners: but by\nthus exerting ourselves, we obtain and enjoy these objects, in which\nour natural good consists; or by this means God gives us the possession\nand enjoyment of them. I know not, that we have any one kind or degree\nof enjoyment, but by the means of our own actions. By prudence and\ncare, we may, for the most part, pass our days in tolerable ease and\nquiet: on the contrary, we may, by rashness, ungoverned passion,\nwilfulness, or even by negligence, make ourselves as miserable as ever\nwe please. And many do please to make themselves extremely miserable,\n_i.e._ to do what they know beforehand will render them so. They follow\nthose ways, the fruit of which they know, by instruction, example, and\nexperience, will be disgrace, and poverty, and sickness, and untimely\ndeath. This every one observes to be the general course of things;\nthough it is to be allowed, we cannot find by experience, that _all_\nour sufferings are owing to our own follies.\n\nWhy the Author of nature does not give his creatures promiscuously such\nand such perceptions, without regard to their behavior; why he does\nnot make them happy without the instrumentality of their own actions,\nand prevent their bringing any sufferings upon themselves, is another\nmatter.[46] Perhaps there may be some impossibilities in the nature\nof things, which we are unacquainted with.[47] Or less happiness, it\nmay be, would upon the whole be produced by such a method of conduct,\nthan is by the present. Or perhaps divine goodness, with which, if I\nmistake not, we make very free in our speculations, may not be a bare\nsingle disposition to produce happiness; but a disposition to make the\ngood, the faithful, the honest, happy. Perhaps an infinitely perfect\nmind may be pleased with seeing his creatures behave suitably to the\nnature which he has given them; to the relations which he has placed\nthem in to each other; and to that which they stand in to himself:\nthat relation to himself, which, during their existence, is even\nnecessary,[48] and which is the most important one of all: perhaps,\nI say, an infinitely perfect mind may be pleased with this moral\npiety of moral agents, in and for itself; as well as upon account of\nits being essentially conducive to the happiness of his creation. Or\nthe whole end, for which God made, and thus governs the world, may\nbe utterly beyond the reach of our faculties: there may be somewhat\nin it as impossible for us to have any conception of, as for a blind\nman to have a conception of colors. However this be, it is certain\nmatter of universal experience, that the general method of divine\nadministration is, forewarning us, or giving us capacities to foresee,\nwith more or less clearness, that if we act so and so, we shall have\nsuch enjoyments, if so and so, such sufferings; and giving us those\nenjoyments, and making us feel those sufferings, in consequence of our\nactions.\n\n\u201cBut all this is to be ascribed to the general course of nature,\u201d True.\nThis is the very thing which I am observing. It is to be ascribed to\nthe general course of nature: _i.e._ not surely to the words or ideas,\n_course of nature_; but to Him who appointed it, and put things into\nit; or to a course of operation, from its uniformity or constancy,\ncalled natural;[49] and which necessarily implies an operating agent.\nFor when men find themselves necessitated to confess an Author of\nnature, or that God is the natural governor of the world, they must\nnot deny this again, because his government is uniform. They must not\ndeny that he does things at all, because he does them constantly,[50]\nbecause the effects of his acting are permanent, whether his acting\nbe so or not; though there is no reason to think it is not. In short,\nevery man, in every thing he does, naturally acts upon the forethought\nand apprehension of avoiding evil or obtaining good: and if the natural\ncourse of things be the appointment of God, and our natural faculties\nof knowledge and experience are given us by him, then the good and bad\nconsequences which follow our actions, are his appointment, and our\nforesight of those consequences, is a warning given us by him, how we\nare to act.\n\n\u201cIs the pleasure then, naturally accompanying every particular\ngratification of passion, intended to put us upon gratifying ourselves\nin every such particular instance, and as a reward to us for so doing?\u201d\nNo, certainly. Nor is it to be said, that our eyes were naturally\nintended to give us the sight of each particular object, to which they\ndo or can extend; objects which are destructive of them, or which, for\nany other reason, it may become us to turn our eyes from. Yet there is\nno doubt, but that our eyes were intended for us to see with.[51] So\nneither is there any doubt, but that the foreseen pleasures and pains\nbelonging to the passions, were intended, in general, to induce mankind\nto act in such and such manners.\n\nFrom this general observation, obvious to every one, (that God has\ngiven us to understand, he has appointed satisfaction and delight to be\nthe consequence of our acting in one manner, and pain and uneasiness of\nour acting in another, and of our not acting at all; and that we find\nthese consequences, which we were beforehand informed of, uniformly\nto follow;) we may learn, that we are at present actually under his\ngovernment in the strictest and most proper sense; in such a sense, as\nthat he rewards and punishes us for our actions.\n\nAn Author of nature being supposed, it is not so much a deduction\nof reason, as a matter of experience, that we are thus under his\ngovernment; under his government, in the same sense, as we are under\nthe government of civil magistrates. Because the annexing of pleasure\nto some actions, and pain to others, in our power to do or forbear,\nand giving notice of this appointment beforehand to those whom it\nconcerns, is the proper formal notion of government.\n\nWhether the pleasure or pain which thus follows upon our behavior, be\nowing to the Author of nature\u2019s acting upon us every moment which we\nfeel it; or to his having at once contrived and executed his own part\nin the plan of the world; makes no alteration as to the matter before\nus. For if civil magistrates could make the sanctions of their laws\ntake place, without interposing at all, after they had passed them;\nwithout a trial, and the formalities of an execution: if they were able\nto make their laws _execute themselves_, or every offender to execute\nthem upon himself; we should be just in the same sense under their\ngovernment then, as we are now; but in a much higher degree, and more\nperfect manner.\n\nVain is the ridicule, with which one foresees some persons will divert\nthemselves, upon finding lesser pains considered as instances of divine\npunishment. There is no possibility of answering or evading the general\nthing here intended, without denying all final causes. For final causes\nbeing admitted, the pleasures and pains now mentioned must be admitted\ntoo as instances of them. And if they are; if God annexes delight to\nsome actions, and uneasiness to others, with an apparent design to\ninduce us to act so and so; then he not only dispenses happiness and\nmisery, but also rewards and punishes actions. If, for example, the\npain which we feel, upon doing what tends to the destruction of our\nbodies, suppose upon too near approaches to fire, or upon wounding\nourselves, be appointed by the Author of nature to prevent our doing\nwhat thus tends to our destruction; this is altogether as much an\ninstance of his punishing our actions, and consequently of our being\nunder his government,[52] as declaring by a voice from heaven, that if\nwe acted so, he would inflict such pain upon us; and inflicting it,\nwhether it be greater or less.\n\nThus we find, that the true notion or conception of the Author of\nnature, is that of a master or governor, prior to the consideration\nof his moral attributes. The fact of our case, which we find by\nexperience, is, that he actually exercises dominion or government over\nus at present, by rewarding and punishing us for our actions, in as\nstrict and proper a sense of these words, and even in the same sense,\nas children, servants, subjects, are rewarded and punished by those who\ngovern them.\n\nThus the whole analogy of nature, the whole present course of things,\nmost fully shows, that there is nothing incredible in the general\ndoctrine of religion, that God will reward and punish men for their\nactions hereafter: nothing incredible, I mean, arising out of the\nnotion of rewarding and punishing. For the whole course of nature is\na present instance of his exercising that government over us, which\nimplies in it rewarding and punishing.\n\n * * * * *\n\nAs divine _punishment_ is what men chiefly object against, and are most\nunwilling to allow; it may be proper to mention some circumstances\nin the natural course of punishments at present, which are analogous\nto what religion teaches us concerning a future state of punishment;\nindeed so analogous, that as they add a further credibility to it, so\nthey cannot but raise a most serious apprehension of it in those who\nwill attend to them.\n\nIt has been now observed, that such and such miseries naturally follow\nsuch and such actions of imprudence and wilfulness, as well as actions\nmore commonly and more distinctly considered as vicious; and that\nthese consequences, when they may be foreseen, are properly natural\npunishments annexed to such actions. The general thing here insisted\nupon, is, not that we see a great deal of misery in the world, but a\ngreat deal which men bring upon themselves by their own behavior, which\nthey might have foreseen and avoided. Now the circumstances of these\nnatural punishments, particularly deserving our attention, are such\nas these. Oftentimes they follow, or are inflicted in consequence of,\nactions which procure many present advantages, and are accompanied with\nmuch present pleasure; for instance, sickness and untimely death are\nthe consequence of intemperance, though accompanied with the highest\nmirth, and jollity. These punishments are often much greater, than\nthe advantages or pleasures obtained by the actions, of which they are\nthe punishments or consequences. Though we may imagine a constitution\nof nature, in which these natural punishments, which are in fact to\nfollow, would follow, immediately upon such actions being done, or\nvery soon after; we find on the contrary in our world, that they are\noften delayed a great while, sometimes even till long after the actions\noccasioning them are forgot; so that the constitution of nature is\nsuch, that delay of punishment is no sort nor degree of presumption of\nfinal impunity. After such delay, these natural punishments or miseries\noften come, not by degrees, but suddenly, with violence, and at once;\nhowever, the chief misery often does. As certainty of such distant\nmisery following such actions, is never afforded persons, so perhaps\nduring the actions, they have seldom a distinct, full expectation of\nits following:[53] and many times the case is only thus, that they see\nin general, or may see, the credibility, that intemperance, suppose,\nwill bring after it diseases; civil crimes, civil punishments; when\nyet the real probability often is, that they shall escape; but things\nnotwithstanding take their destined course, and the misery inevitably\nfollows at its appointed time, in very many of these cases. Thus also\nthough youth may be alleged as an excuse for rashness and folly,\nas being naturally thoughtless, and not clearly foreseeing all the\nconsequences of being untractable and profligate, this does not hinder,\nbut that these consequences follow; and are grievously felt, throughout\nthe whole course of mature life. Habits contracted even in that age,\nare often utter ruin: and men\u2019s success in the world, not only in the\ncommon sense of worldly success, but their real happiness and misery,\ndepends, in a great degree, and in various ways, upon the manner in\nwhich they pass their youth; which consequences they for the most\npart neglect to consider, and perhaps seldom can properly be said to\nbelieve, beforehand. In numberless cases, the natural course of things\naffords us opportunities for procuring advantages to ourselves at\ncertain times, which we cannot procure when we will; nor ever recall\nthe opportunities, if we have neglected them. Indeed the general course\nof nature is an example of this. If, during the opportunity of youth,\npersons are indocile and self-willed, they inevitably suffer in their\nfuture life, for want of those acquirements, which they neglected the\nnatural season of attaining. If the husbandman lets seedtime pass\nwithout sowing, the whole year is lost to him beyond recovery. Though\nafter men have been guilty of folly and extravagance _up to a certain\ndegree_, it is often in their power, to retrieve their affairs, to\nrecover their health and character, at least in good measure; yet real\nreformation is in many cases, of no avail at all towards preventing\nthe miseries, poverty, sickness, infamy, naturally annexed to folly\nand extravagance _exceeding that degree_. There is a certain bound to\nimprudence and misbehavior, which being transgressed, there remains no\nplace for repentance in the natural course of things. It is further\nvery much to be remarked, that neglects from inconsiderateness, want\nof attention,[54] not looking about us to see what we have to do, are\noften attended with consequences altogether as dreadful, as any active\nmisbehavior, from the most extravagant passion. And lastly, civil\ngovernment being natural, the punishments of it are so too: and some\nof these punishments are capital; as the effects of a dissolute course\nof pleasure are often mortal. So that many natural punishments are\nfinal[55] to him who incurs them, if considered only in his temporal\ncapacity; and seem inflicted by natural appointment, either to remove\nthe offender out of the way of being further mischievous, or as an\nexample, though frequently a disregarded one, to those who are left\nbehind.\n\nThese things are not what we call accidental, or to be met with only\nnow and then; but they are things of every day\u2019s experience. They\nproceed from general laws, very general ones, by which God governs the\nworld in the natural course of his providence.[56]\n\nAnd they are so analogous, to what religion teaches us concerning the\nfuture punishment of the wicked, so much of a piece with it, that\nboth would naturally be expressed in the very same words, and manner\nof description. In the book of _Proverbs_,[57] for instance, wisdom\nis introduced, as frequenting the most public places of resort, and\nas rejected when she offers herself as the natural appointed guide\nof human life. _How long_, speaking to those who are passing through\nit, _how long, ye simple ones, will ye love folly, and the scorners\ndelight in their scorning, and fools hate knowledge? Turn ye at my\nreproof. Behold, I will pour out my spirit upon you, I will make known\nmy words unto you._ But upon being neglected, _Because I have called,\nand ye refused, I have stretched out my hand, and no man regarded; but\nye have set at nought all my counsel, and would none of my reproof: I\nalso will laugh at your calamity, I will mock when your fear cometh;\nwhen your fear cometh as desolation, and your destruction cometh as a\nwhirlwind; when distress and anguish come upon you. Then shall they\ncall upon me, but I will not answer; they shall seek me early, but they\nshall not find me._ This passage, every one sees, is poetical, and\nsome parts of it are highly figurative; but the meaning is obvious.\nAnd the thing intended is expressed more literally in the following\nwords; _For that they hated knowledge, and did not choose the fear of\nthe Lord----therefore shall they eat of the fruit of their own way,\nand be filled with their own devices. For the security of the simple\nshall slay them, and the prosperity of fools shall destroy them._ The\nwhole passage is so equally applicable to what we experience in the\npresent world, concerning the consequences of men\u2019s actions, and to\nwhat religion teaches us is to be expected in another, that it may be\nquestioned which of the two was principally intended.\n\nIndeed when one has been recollecting the proper proofs of a future\nstate of rewards and punishments, nothing methinks can give one so\nsensible an apprehension of the latter, or representation of it to\nthe mind, as observing, that after the many disregarded checks,\nadmonitions, and warnings, which people meet with in the ways of vice\nand folly and extravagance, warnings from their very nature, from the\nexamples of others, from the lesser inconveniences which they bring\nupon themselves, from the instructions of wise and virtuous men:\nafter these have been long despised, scorned, ridiculed: after the\nchief bad consequences, temporal consequences, of their follies, have\nbeen delayed for a great while, at length they break in irresistibly,\nlike an armed force: repentance is too late to relieve, and can serve\nonly to aggravate their distress, the case is become desperate: and\npoverty and sickness, remorse and anguish, infamy and death, the\neffects of their own doings, overwhelm them beyond possibility of\nremedy or escape. This is an account of what is; in fact, the general\nconstitution of nature.\n\nIt is not in any sort meant, that, according to what appears at present\nof the natural course of things, men are always uniformly punished\nin proportion to their misbehavior. But that there are very many\ninstances of misbehavior punished in the several ways now mentioned,\nand very dreadful instances too; sufficient to show what the laws of\nthe universe may admit, and, if thoroughly considered, sufficient fully\nto answer all objections against the credibility of a future state of\npunishments, from any imaginations, that the frailty of our nature and\nexternal temptations, almost annihilate the guilt of human vices: as\nwell as objections of another sort; from necessity, from suppositions,\nthat the will of an infinite Being cannot be contradicted, or that he\nmust be incapable of offence and provocation.[58]\n\nReflections of this kind are not without their terrors to serious\npersons, even the most free from enthusiasm, and of the greatest\nstrength of mind; but it is fit that things be stated and considered as\nthey really are. There is, in the present age, a certain fearlessness\nwith regard to what may be hereafter under the government of God, which\nnothing but a universally acknowledged demonstration on the side of\natheism can justify; and which makes it quite necessary, that men be\nreminded, and if possible made to feel, that there is no sort of ground\nfor being thus presumptuous, even upon the most sceptical principles.\nFor, may it not be said of any person upon his being born into the\nworld, he may behave so as to be of no service to it, but by being\nmade an example of the woeful effects of vice and folly? That he may,\nas any one may, if he will, incur an infamous execution from the hands\nof civil justice, or in some other course of extravagance shorten his\ndays; or bring upon himself infamy and diseases worse than death? So\nthat it had been better for him, even with regard to the present world,\nthat he had never been born. And is there any pretence of reason for\npeople to think themselves secure, and talk as if they had certain\nproof, that, let them act as licentiously as they will, there can be\nnothing analogous to this, with regard to a future and more general\ninterest, under the providence and government of the same God?\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III.[59]\n\nTHE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD.\n\n\nAs the manifold appearances of design, and of final causes, in the\nconstitution of the world, prove it to be the work of an intelligent\nmind, so the particular final causes of pleasure and pain distributed\namongst his creatures, prove that they are under his government; what\nmay be called his natural government of creatures endued with sense\nand reason. This implies somewhat more than seems usually attended to,\nwhen we speak of God\u2019s natural government of the world. It implies\ngovernment of the very same kind with that which a master exercises\nover his servants, or a civil magistrate over his subjects. These\nlatter instances of final causes, as really prove an intelligent\n_Governor_ of the world, in the sense now mentioned, and before[60]\ndistinctly treated of; as any other instances of final causes prove an\nintelligent _Maker_ of it.\n\nBut this alone does not appear at first sight to determine any thing\ncertainly, concerning the moral character of the Author of nature,\nconsidered in this relation of governor; does not ascertain his\ngovernment to be moral, or prove that he is the righteous Judge of\nthe world. Moral government consists, not in barely rewarding and\npunishing men for their actions, which the most tyrannical may do, but\nin rewarding the righteous, and punishing the wicked: in rendering to\nmen according to their actions, considered as good or evil. And the\n_perfection_ of moral government consists in doing this, with regard\nto all intelligent creatures, in an exact proportion to their personal\nmerits or demerits.\n\nSome men seem to think the only character of the Author of nature to be\nthat of simple absolute benevolence. This, considered as a principle of\naction and infinite in degree, is a disposition to produce the greatest\npossible happiness, without regard to persons\u2019 behavior, otherwise than\nas such regard would produce higher degrees of it. And supposing this\nto be the only character of God, veracity and justice in him would be\nnothing but benevolence conducted by wisdom. Surely this ought not to\nbe asserted, unless it can be proved; for we should speak with cautious\nreverence upon such a subject. Whether it can be proved or no, is not\nthe thing here to be inquired into; but whether in the constitution and\nconduct of the world, a righteous government be not discernibly planned\nout: which necessarily implies a righteous governor. There may possibly\nbe in the creation beings, to whom the Author of nature manifests\nhimself under this most amiable of all characters, this of infinite\nabsolute benevolence; for it is the most amiable, supposing it not, as\nperhaps it is not, incompatible with justice; but he manifests himself\nto us under the character of a righteous governor. He may, consistently\nwith this, be simply and absolutely benevolent, in the sense now\nexplained: but he is (for he has given us a proof in the constitution\nand conduct of the world that he is) a governor over servants, as he\nrewards and punishes us for our actions. And in the constitution and\nconduct of it, he may also have given, besides the reason of the thing,\nand the natural presages of conscience, clear and distinct intimations,\nthat his government is righteous or moral: clear to such as think the\nnature of it deserving their attention, and yet not to every careless\nperson, who casts a transient reflection upon the subject.[61]\n\nIt is particularly to be observed, that the divine government, which\nwe experience ourselves under in the present state, taken alone, is\nallowed not to be the perfection of moral government. Yet this by no\nmeans hinders, but that there may be _somewhat_, be it more or less,\ntruly moral in it. A righteous government may plainly appear to be\ncarried on to some degree, enough to give us the apprehension that it\nshall be completed, or carried on to that degree of perfection which\nreligion teaches us it shall; but which cannot appear, till much more\nof the divine administration be seen, than can be seen in the present\nlife. The design of this chapter is to inquire how far this is the\ncase: how far, over and above the moral nature[62] which God has given\nus, and our natural notion of him as righteous governor of those his\ncreatures, to whom he has given this nature;[63] I say how far besides\nthis, the principles and beginnings of a moral government over the\nworld may be discerned, notwithstanding and amidst all the confusion\nand disorder of it.\n\nOne might mention here, what has been often urged with great force,\nthat, in general, less uneasiness and more satisfaction, are the\nnatural consequences[64] of a virtuous than of a vicious course of\nlife, in the present state, as an instance of a moral government\nestablished in nature; an instance of it collected from experience and\npresent matter of fact.[65] But it must be owned a thing of difficulty\nto weigh and balance pleasures and uneasinesses, each amongst\nthemselves, and also against each other, so as to make an estimate with\nany exactness, of the overplus of happiness on the side of virtue.\nAnd it is not impossible, that, amidst the infinite disorders of the\nworld, there may be exceptions to the happiness of virtue; even with\nregard to persons, whose course of life from their youth up has been\nblameless: and more with regard to those who have gone on for some\ntime in the ways of vice, and have afterwards reformed. For suppose an\ninstance of the latter case; a person with his passions inflamed, his\nnatural faculty of self-government impaired by habits of indulgence,\nand with all his vices about him, like so many harpies, craving their\naccustomed gratification; who can say how long it might be, before\nsuch a person would find more satisfaction in the reasonableness and\npresent good consequences of virtue, than difficulties and self-denial\nin the restraints of it? Experience also shows, that men can to a\ngreat degree, get over their sense of shame, so as that by professing\nthemselves to be without principle, and avowing even direct villany,\nthey can support themselves against the infamy of it. But as the ill\nactions of any one will probably be more talked of, and oftener thrown\nin his way, upon his reformation; so the infamy of them will be much\nmore felt, after the natural sense of virtue and of honor is recovered.\nUneasiness of this kind ought indeed to be put to the account of\nformer vices: yet it will be said they are in part the consequences\nof reformation. Still I am far from allowing it doubtful, whether\nvirtue, upon the whole, be happier than vice in the present world. If\nit were, yet the beginnings of a righteous administration may, beyond\nall question, be found in nature, if we will attentively inquire after\nthem.[66]\n\nI. In whatever manner the notion of God\u2019s moral government over the\nworld might be treated, if it did not appear, whether he were in a\nproper sense our governor at all; yet when it is certain matter of\nexperience, that he does manifest himself to us under the character\nof a governor in the sense explained,[67] it must deserve to be\nconsidered, whether there be not reason to apprehend, that he may be\na righteous or moral governor. Since it appears to be fact, that God\ndoes govern mankind by the method of rewards and punishments, according\nto some settled rules of distribution; it is surely a question to be\nasked, what presumption is there against his _finally_ rewarding and\npunishing them according to this particular rule, namely, as they act\nreasonably, or unreasonably, virtuously or viciously? Rendering men\nhappy or miserable by this rule, certainly falls in, much more falls\nin, with our natural apprehensions and sense of things, than doing\nso by any other rule whatever; since rewarding and punishing actions\nby any other rule, would appear much harder to be accounted for, by\nminds formed as he has formed ours. Be the evidence of religion then\nmore or less clear, the expectation which it raises in us, that the\nrighteous shall, upon the whole, be happy, and the wicked miserable,\ncannot possibly be considered as absurd or chimerical; because it is\nno more than an expectation, that a method of government already begun,\nshall be carried on, the method of rewarding and punishing actions; and\nshall be carried on by a particular rule, which unavoidably appears to\nus at first sight more natural than any other, the rule which we call\ndistributive justice. Nor,\n\nII. Ought it to be entirely passed over, that tranquillity,\nsatisfaction, and external advantages, being the natural consequences\nof prudent management of ourselves, and our affairs; and rashness,\nprofligate negligence, and wilful folly, bringing after them many\ninconveniences and sufferings; these afford instances of a right\nconstitution of nature, as the correction of children, for their\nown sakes, and by way of example, when they run into danger or hurt\nthemselves, is a part of right education.[68] Thus, that God governs\nthe world by general fixed laws, that he has endued us with capacities\nof reflecting upon this constitution of things, and foreseeing the good\nand bad consequences of behavior, plainly implies _some sort_ of moral\ngovernment; since from such a constitution of things it cannot but\nfollow, that prudence and imprudence, which are of the nature of virtue\nand vice,[69] must be, as they are, respectively rewarded and punished.\n\nIII. From the natural course of things, vicious actions are, to a\ngreat degree, actually punished as mischievous to society; and besides\npunishment actually inflicted upon this account, there is also the\nfear and apprehension of it in those persons, whose crimes have\nrendered them obnoxious to it, in case of a discovery; this state of\nfear being often itself a very considerable punishment. The natural\nfear and apprehension of it too, which restrains from such crimes,\nis a declaration of nature against them. It is necessary to the very\nbeing of society, that vices, destructive of it, should be punished\n_as being so_; the vices of falsehood, injustice, cruelty: which\npunishment therefore is as natural as society, and so is an instance\nof a kind of moral government, naturally established, and actually\ntaking place. And, since the certain natural course of things is the\nconduct of providence or the government of God, though carried on by\nthe instrumentality of men, the observation here made amounts to this,\nthat mankind find themselves placed by him in such circumstances, as\nthat they are unavoidably accountable for their behavior; and are often\npunished, and sometimes rewarded, under his government, in the view of\ntheir being mischievous, or eminently beneficial to society.\n\nIf it be objected that good actions and such as are beneficial to\nsociety, are often punished, as in the case of persecution and in other\ncases; and that ill and mischievous actions are often rewarded:[70] it\nmay be answered distinctly, first, that this is in no sort necessary,\nand consequently not natural in the sense in which it is necessary, and\ntherefore natural, that ill or mischievous actions should be punished:\nand in the next place, that good actions are never punished, considered\nas beneficial to society, nor ill actions rewarded, under the view of\ntheir being hurtful to it. So that it stands good, without any thing on\nthe side of vice to be set over against it, that the Author of nature\nhas as truly directed, that vicious actions, considered as mischievous\nto society, should be punished, and put mankind under a _necessity_ of\nthus punishing them, as he has directed and necessitated us to preserve\nour lives by food.\n\nIV. In the natural course of things, virtue _as such_ is actually\nrewarded, and vice _as such_ punished: which seems to afford an\ninstance or example, not only of government, but of moral government,\nbegun and established; moral in the strictest sense, though not in\nthat perfection of degree, which religion teaches us to expect.\nIn order to see this more clearly, we must distinguish between\n_actions_ themselves, and that _quality_ ascribed to them, which we\ncall virtuous or vicious.[71] The gratification itself of every\nnatural passion, must be attended with delight; and acquisitions of\nfortune, however made, are acquisitions of the means or materials of\nenjoyment. An action then, by which any natural passion is gratified,\nor fortune acquired, procures delight or advantage; abstracted from\nall consideration of the morality of such action. Consequently, the\npleasure or advantage in this case, is gained by the action itself, not\nby the morality, the virtuousness or viciousness of it; though it be\nperhaps virtuous or vicious.\n\nTo say that such an action or course of behavior, procured such\npleasure or advantage, or brought on such inconvenience and pain, is\nquite a different thing from saying, that such good or bad effect\nwas owing to the virtue or vice of such action or behavior. In one\ncase, an action abstracted from all moral consideration, produced its\neffect: in the other case, for it will appear that there are such\ncases, the morality of the action under a moral consideration, _i.e._\nthe virtuousness or viciousness of it, produced the effect. Now I say\nvirtue as such, naturally procures considerable advantages to the\nvirtuous, and vice as such, naturally occasions great inconvenience\nand even misery to the vicious, in very many instances. The immediate\neffects of virtue and vice upon the mind and temper, are to be\nmentioned as instances of it. Vice as such is naturally attended with\nsome sort of uneasiness, and not uncommonly, with great disturbance and\napprehension. That inward feeling, which, respecting lesser matters and\nin familiar speech we call being vexed with oneself, and in matters\nof importance and in more serious language, remorse; is an uneasiness\nnaturally arising from an action of a man\u2019s own, reflected upon by\nhimself as wrong, unreasonable, faulty, _i.e._ vicious in greater or\nless degrees: and this manifestly is a different feeling from that\nuneasiness, which arises from a sense of mere loss or harm. What is\nmore common, than to hear a man lamenting an accident or event, and\nadding--but however he has the satisfaction that he cannot blame\nhimself for it; or on the contrary, that he has the uneasiness of\nbeing sensible it was his own doing? Thus also the disturbance and\nfear, which often follow upon a man\u2019s having done an injury, arise\nfrom a sense of his being blameworthy; otherwise there would, in many\ncases, be no ground of disturbance, nor any reason to fear resentment\nor shame. On the other hand, inward security and peace, and a mind\nopen to the several gratifications of life, are the natural attendants\nof innocence and virtue. To which must be added the complacency,\nsatisfaction, and even joy of heart, which accompany the exercise, the\nreal exercise of gratitude, friendship, benevolence.\n\nAnd here, I think, ought to be mentioned the fears of future\npunishment, and peaceful hopes of a better life, in those who fully\nbelieve, or have any serious apprehension of religion: because these\nhopes and fears are present uneasiness and satisfaction to the mind,\nand cannot be got rid of by great part of the world, even by men who\nhave thought most thoroughly upon the subject of religion. And no one\ncan say, how considerable this uneasiness or satisfaction may be, or\nwhat upon the whole it may amount to.[72]\n\nIn the next place comes in the consideration, that all honest and\ngood men are disposed to befriend honest good men as such, and to\ndiscountenance the vicious as such, and do so in some degree; indeed\nin a considerable degree: from which favor and discouragement cannot\nbut arise considerable advantage and inconvenience. Though the\ngenerality of the world have little regard to the morality of their\nown actions, and may be supposed to have less to that of others, when\nthey themselves are not concerned; yet let any one be known to be a\nman of virtue, somehow or other he will be favored and good offices\nwill be done him, from regard to his character, without remote views,\noccasionally, and in some low degree, I think, by the generality of\nthe world, as it happens to come in their way. Public honors too\nand advantages are the natural consequences, and sometimes at least,\nthe consequences in fact, of virtuous actions; of eminent justice,\nfidelity, charity, love to our country, considered in the view of\nbeing virtuous. And sometimes even death itself, often infamy and\nexternal inconveniences, are the public consequences of vice as vice.\nFor instance, the sense which mankind have of tyranny, injustice,\noppression, additional to the mere feeling or fear of misery, has\ndoubtless been instrumental in bringing about revolutions, which make\na figure even in the history of the world. For it is plain, that men\nresent injuries as implying faultiness, and retaliate, not merely\nunder the notion of having received harm, but of having received\nwrong; and they have this resentment in behalf of others, as well as\nof themselves. So likewise even the generality are, in some degree,\ngrateful and disposed to return good offices, not merely because such\na one has been the occasion of good to them, but under the view, that\nsuch good offices implied kind intention and good desert in the doer.\n\nTo all this may be added two or three particular things, which many\npersons will think frivolous; but to me nothing appears so, which at\nall comes in towards determining a question of such importance, as,\nwhether there be or be not, a moral institution of government, in the\nstrictest sense moral, _visibly_ established and begun in nature. The\nparticular things are these: That in domestic government, which is\ndoubtless natural, children and others also are very generally punished\nfor falsehood, injustice, and ill-behavior, as such, and rewarded for\nthe contrary: which are instances of veracity and justice and right\nbehavior, as such, naturally enforced by rewards and punishments, more\nor less considerable. That, though civil government be supposed to take\ncognizance of actions in no other view than as prejudicial to society,\nwithout respect to the immorality of them, yet as such actions are\nimmoral, so the sense which men have of the immorality of them, very\ngreatly contributes, in different ways, to bring offenders to justice.\nAnd that entire absence of all crime and guilt in the moral sense, when\nplainly appearing, will almost of course procure, and circumstances of\naggravated guilt prevent, a remission of the penalties annexed to civil\ncrimes, in many cases, though by no means in all.\n\nUpon the whole then, besides the good and bad effects of virtue and\nvice upon men\u2019s own minds, the course of the world does, in some\nmeasure, turn upon the approbation and disapprobation of them as such,\nin others. The sense of well and ill doing, the presages of conscience,\nthe love of good characters and dislike of bad ones, honor, shame,\nresentment, gratitude, all these, considered in themselves, and in\ntheir effects, do afford manifest real instances, of virtue as such\nnaturally favored, and of vice as such discountenanced, more or less,\nin the daily course of human life; in every age, in every relation,\nin every general circumstance of it. That God has given us a moral\nnature,[73] may most justly be urged as a proof of our being under his\nmoral government: but that he has placed us in a condition, which gives\nthis nature, as one may speak, scope to operate, and in which it does\nunavoidably operate; _i.e._ influence mankind to act, so as thus to\nfavor and reward virtue, and discountenance and punish vice, this is\nnot the same, but a further additional proof of his moral government;\nfor it is an instance of it. The first is a proof, that he will finally\nfavor and support virtue effectually: the second is an example of his\nfavoring and supporting it at present, in some degree.\n\nIf a more distinct inquiry be made, whence it arises, that virtue as\nsuch is often rewarded, and vice as such is punished, and this rule\nnever inverted, it will be found to proceed, in part, immediately from\nthe moral nature itself, which God has given us;[74] and also in part,\nfrom his having given us, together with this nature, so great a power\nover each other\u2019s happiness and misery. For, _first_, it is certain,\nthat peace and delight, in some degree and upon some occasions, is\nthe necessary and present effect of virtuous practice; an effect\narising immediately from that constitution of our nature. We are _so\nmade_, that well-doing as such, gives us satisfaction, at least in\nsome instances; ill-doing as such, in none. And, _secondly_, from our\nmoral nature, joined with God\u2019s having put our happiness and misery\nin many respects in each other\u2019s power, it cannot but be, that vice\nas such, some kinds and instances of it at least, will be infamous,\nand men will be disposed to punish it as in itself detestable; and the\nvillain will by no means be able always to avoid feeling that infamy,\nany more than he will be able to escape this further punishment, which\nmankind will be disposed to inflict upon him, under the notion of his\ndeserving it. But there can be nothing on the side of vice, to answer\nthis; because there is nothing in the human mind contradictory, as\nthe logicians speak, to virtue. For virtue consists in a regard to\nwhat is right and reasonable, as being so; in a regard to veracity,\njustice, charity, in themselves: and there is surely no such thing,\nas a like natural regard to falsehood, injustice, cruelty. If it be\nthought, that there are instances of an approbation of vice, as such,\nin itself, and for its own sake, (though it does not appear to me, that\nthere is any such thing at all;) it is evidently monstrous: as much\nso, as the most acknowledged perversion of any passion whatever. Such\ninstances of perversion then being left out, as merely imaginary, or\nat least unnatural; it must follow, from the frame of our nature, and\nfrom our condition, in the respects now described, that vice cannot\nat all be, and virtue cannot but be, favored as such by others, upon\nsome occasions, and happy in itself, in some degree. For what is here\ninsisted upon, is not the _degree_ in which virtue and vice are thus\ndistinguished, but only the thing itself, that they are so in some\ndegree; though the whole good and bad effect of virtue and vice as\nsuch, is not inconsiderable in degree. But that they must be thus\ndistinguished in some degree, is in a manner necessary: it is matter\nof fact of daily experience, even in the greatest confusion of human\naffairs.\n\nIt is not pretended but that, in the natural course of things,\nhappiness and misery appear to be distributed by other rules, than\nonly the personal merit and demerit of characters. They may sometimes\nbe distributed by way of mere discipline. There may be the wisest and\nbest reasons, why the world should be governed by general laws, from\nwhence such promiscuous distribution perhaps must follow; and also\nwhy our happiness and misery should be put in each other\u2019s power, in\nthe degree which they are. And these things, as, in general, they\ncontribute to the rewarding virtue and punishing vice, as such, so\nthey often contribute also, not to the inversion of this, which is\nimpossible, but to the rendering persons prosperous, though wicked;\nafflicted, though righteous; and, which is worse, to the _rewarding\nsome actions_, though vicious, and _punishing other actions_, though\nvirtuous.[75] But all this cannot drown the voice of nature in the\nconduct of Providence, plainly declaring itself for virtue, by way\nof distinction from vice, and preference to it. For our being so\nconstituted as that virtue and vice are thus naturally favored and\ndiscountenanced, rewarded and punished, respectively as such, is\nan intuitive proof of the intent of nature, that it should be so;\notherwise the constitution of our mind, from which it thus immediately\nand directly proceeds, would be absurd. But it cannot be said, because\nvirtuous actions are sometimes punished, and vicious actions rewarded,\nthat nature intended it. For, though this great disorder is brought\nabout, as all actions are, by means of some natural passion; yet _this\nmay be_, as it undoubtedly is, brought about by the perversion of such\npassion, implanted in us for other, and those very good purposes. And\nindeed these other and good purposes, even of every passion, may be\nclearly seen.\n\nWe have then a declaration, in some degree of present effect, from Him\nwho is supreme in nature, which side he is of, or what part he takes;\na declaration for virtue, and against vice. So far therefore as a man\nis true to virtue, to veracity and justice, to equity and charity, and\nthe right of the case, in whatever he is concerned; so far he is on the\nside of the divine administration, and co-operates with it: and from\nhence, to such a man, arises naturally a secret satisfaction and sense\nof security, and implicit hope of somewhat further.\n\nV. This hope is confirmed by the necessary tendencies of virtue,\nwhich, though not of present effect, yet are at present discernible in\nnature; and so afford an instance of somewhat moral in the essential\nconstitution of it. There is, in the nature of things, a tendency in\nvirtue and vice to produce the good and bad effects now mentioned, in\na greater degree than they do in fact produce them. For instance; good\nand bad men would be much more rewarded and punished as such, were it\nnot, that justice is often artificially eluded,[76] that characters are\nnot known, and many, who would thus favor virtue and discourage vice,\nare hindered from doing so, by accidental causes. These tendencies of\nvirtue and vice are obvious with regard to _individuals_. But it may\nrequire more particularly to be considered, that power in a _society_,\nby being under the direction of virtue, naturally increases, and has\na necessary tendency to prevail over opposite power, not under the\ndirection of it; in like manner, as power, by being under the direction\nof reason, increases, and has a tendency to prevail over brute force.\nThere are several brute creatures of equal, and several of superior\nstrength, to that of men; and possibly the sum of the whole strength\nof brutes may be greater than that of mankind; but reason gives us the\nadvantage and superiority over them; and thus man is the acknowledged\ngoverning animal upon the earth. Nor is this superiority considered by\nany as accidental; but as what reason has a tendency, in the nature of\nthe thing, to obtain. And yet perhaps difficulties may be raised about\nthe meaning, as well as the truth, of the assertion, that virtue has\nthe like tendency.\n\nTo obviate these difficulties, let us see more distinctly, how the case\nstands with regard to reason; which is so readily acknowledged to have\nthis advantageous tendency. Suppose then two or three men, of the best\nand most improved understanding, in a desolate open plain, attacked\nby ten times the number of beasts of prey: would their reason secure\nthem the victory in this unequal combat? Power then, though joined\nwith reason, and under its direction, cannot be expected to prevail\nover opposite power, though merely brutal, unless the one bears some\nproportion to the other. Again: put the imaginary case, that rational\nand irrational creatures were of like external shape and manner: it is\ncertain, before there were opportunities for the first to distinguish\neach other, to separate from their adversaries, and to form a union\namong themselves, they might be upon a level, or in several respects\nupon great disadvantage; though united they might be vastly superior:\nsince union is of such efficacy, that ten men united, might be able\nto accomplish, what ten thousand of the same natural strength and\nunderstanding wholly ununited, could not. In this case, brute force\nmight more than maintain its ground against reason, for want of union\namong the rational creatures. Or suppose a number of men to land upon\nan island inhabited only by wild beasts; men who, by the regulations\nof civil government, the inventions of art, and the experience of some\nyears, could they be preserved so long, would be really sufficient to\nsubdue the wild beasts, and to preserve themselves in security from\nthem: yet a conjuncture of accidents might give such advantage to the\nirrational animals as they might at once overpower, and even extirpate,\nthe rational ones. Length of time then, proper scope, and opportunities\nfor reason to exert itself, may be absolutely necessary to its\nprevailing over brute force.\n\nFurther: there are many instances of brutes succeeding in attempts,\nwhich they could not have undertaken, had not their irrational nature\nrendered them incapable of foreseeing the danger of such attempt, or\nthe fury of passion hindered their attending to it: and there are\ninstances of reason and real prudence preventing men\u2019s undertaking\nwhat, it has appeared afterwards, they might have succeeded in by a\nlucky rashness. In certain conjunctures, ignorance and folly, weakness\nand discord, may have their advantages. So that rational animals\nhave not _necessarily_ the superiority over irrational ones; but,\nhow improbable soever it may be, it is evidently possible, that in\nsome globes the latter may be superior. And were the former wholly at\nvariance and disunited, by false self-interest and envy, by treachery\nand injustice, and consequent rage and malice against each other,\nwhilst the latter were firmly united among themselves by instinct, this\nmight greatly contribute to the introducing such an inverted order\nof things. For every one would consider it as inverted: since reason\nhas, in the nature of it, a tendency to prevail over brute force;\nnotwithstanding the possibility it may not prevail, and the necessity,\nwhich there is, of many concurring circumstances to render it prevalent.\n\nNow I say, virtue in a society has a like tendency to procure\nsuperiority and additional power: whether this power be considered\nas the means of security from opposite power, or of obtaining other\nadvantages. It has this tendency, by rendering public good, an object\nand end, to every member of the society; by putting every one upon\nconsideration and diligence, recollection and self-government, both in\norder to see what is the most effectual method, and also in order to\nperform their proper part, for obtaining and preserving it; by uniting\na society within itself, and so increasing its strength; and, which\nis particularly to be mentioned, uniting it by means of veracity and\njustice. For as these last are principal bonds of union, so benevolence\nor public spirit, undirected, unrestrained by them, is, nobody knows\nwhat.\n\nAnd suppose the invisible world, and the invisible dispensations of\nProvidence, to be, in any sort, analogous to what appears: or that both\ntogether make up one uniform scheme, the two parts of which, the part\nwhich we see, and that which is beyond our observation, are analogous\nto each other: then, there must be a like natural tendency in the\nderived power, throughout the universe, under the direction of virtue,\nto prevail in general over that which is not under its direction; as\nthere is in reason, derived reason in the universe, to prevail over\nbrute force.\n\nBut then, in order to the prevalence of virtue, or that it may actually\nproduce, what it has a tendency to produce; the _like concurrences\nare necessary_, as are, to the prevalence of reason. There must be\nsome proportion, between the natural power or force which is, and that\nwhich is not, under the direction of virtue: there must be sufficient\nlength of time; for the complete success of virtue, as of reason,\ncannot, from the nature of the thing, be otherwise than gradual: there\nmust be, as one may speak, a fair field of trial, a stage large and\nextensive enough, proper occasions and opportunities, for the virtuous\nto join together, to exert themselves against lawless force, and to\nreap the fruit of their united labors. Now indeed it is to be hoped,\nthat the disproportion between the good and bad, even here on earth,\nis not so great, but that the former have natural power sufficient\nto their prevailing to a considerable degree, if circumstances would\npermit this power to be united. For, much less, very much less, power\nunder the direction of virtue, would prevail over much greater not\nunder the direction of it.[77] However, good men over the face of\nthe earth cannot unite; because, (among other reasons,) they cannot\nbe sufficiently ascertained of each other\u2019s characters. And the\nknown course of human things, the scene we are now passing through,\nparticularly the shortness of life, denies to virtue its full scope in\nseveral other respects.\n\nThe natural tendency which we have been considering, though real, is\n_hindered_ from being carried into effect in the present state: but\nthese hinderances may be removed in a future one. Virtue, to borrow the\nChristian allusion, is militant here; and various untoward accidents\ncontribute to its being often overborne: but it may combat with\ngreater advantage hereafter, and prevail completely, and enjoy its\nconsequent rewards, in some future states. Neglected as it is, perhaps\nunknown, perhaps despised and oppressed here; there maybe scenes in\neternity, lasting enough, and in every other way adapted, to afford\nit a sufficient sphere of action; and a sufficient sphere for the\nnatural consequences of it to follow in fact. If the soul be naturally\nimmortal, and this state be a progress towards a future one, as\nchildhood is towards mature age, good men may naturally unite, not only\namong themselves, but also with other orders of virtuous creatures,\nin that future state. For virtue, from the very nature of it, is a\nprinciple and bond of union, in some degree, among all who are endued\nwith it, and known to each other; so as that by it, a good man cannot\nbut recommend himself to the favor and protection of all virtuous\nbeings, throughout the whole universe, who can be acquainted with his\ncharacter, and can any way interpose in his behalf in any part of his\nduration.\n\nOne might add, that suppose all this advantageous tendency of virtue\nto become effect, among one or more orders of creatures, in any\ndistant scenes and periods, and to be seen by any orders of vicious\ncreatures, throughout the universal kingdom of God; this happy effect\nof virtue would have a tendency, by way of example, and possibly in\nother ways, to amend those of them who are capable of amendment, and of\nbeing recovered to a just sense of virtue. If our notions of the plan\nof Providence were enlarged in any sort proportionable to what late\ndiscoveries have enlarged our views with respect to the material world,\nrepresentations of this kind would not appear absurd or extravagant.\nThey are not to be taken as intended for a literal delineation of\nwhat is in fact the particular scheme of the universe, which cannot\nbe known without revelation: for suppositions are not to be looked\non as true, because not incredible: but they are mentioned to show,\nthat our finding virtue to be hindered from procuring to itself such\nsuperiority and advantages, is no objection against its having, in the\nessential nature of the thing, a tendency to procure them. And the\nsuppositions now mentioned do plainly show this: for they show, that\nthese hinderances are so far from being necessary, that we ourselves\ncan easily conceive, how they may be removed in future states, and full\nscope be granted to virtue. And all these advantageous tendencies\nof it are to be considered as declarations of God in its favor. This\nhowever is taking a pretty large compass: though it is certain, that,\nas the material world appears to be, in a manner, boundless and\nimmense, there must be _some_ scheme of Providence vast in proportion\nto it.\n\nBut let us return to the earth our habitation; and we shall see this\nhappy tendency of virtue, by imagining an instance not so vast and\nremote: by supposing a kingdom or society of men upon it, perfectly\nvirtuous, for a succession of many ages; to which, if you please, may\nbe given a situation advantageous for universal monarchy. In such\na state, there would be no such thing as faction: but men of the\ngreatest capacity would of course, all along, have the chief direction\nof affairs willingly yielded to them; and they would share it among\nthemselves without envy. Each of these would have the part assigned\nhim, to which his genius was peculiarly adapted; and others, who had\nnot any distinguished genius, would be safe, and think themselves very\nhappy, by being under the protection and guidance of those who had.\nPublic determinations would really be the result of the united wisdom\nof the community: and they would faithfully be executed, by the united\nstrength of it. Some would contribute in a higher way, but all in some\nway, to the public prosperity: and in it, each would enjoy the fruits\nof his own virtue. And as injustice, whether by fraud or force, would\nbe unknown among themselves, so they would be sufficiently secured\nfrom it in their neighbors. For cunning and false self-interest,\nconfederacies in injustice, ever slight, and accompanied with faction\nand intestine treachery; these on one hand would be found mere childish\nfolly and weakness, when set in opposition against wisdom, public\nspirit, union inviolable, and fidelity on the other: allowing both\na sufficient length of years to try their force. Add the general\ninfluence, which such a kingdom would have over the face of the earth,\nby way of example particularly, and the reverence which would be paid\nit. It would plainly be superior to all others, and the world must\ngradually come under its empire; not by means of lawless violence;\nbut partly by what must be allowed to be just conquest; and partly by\nother kingdoms submitting themselves voluntarily to it, throughout a\ncourse of ages, and claiming its protection, one after another, in\nsuccessive exigencies. The head of it would be a universal monarch,\nin another sense than any mortal has yet been; and the Eastern style\nwould be literally applicable to him, _that all people, nations, and\nlanguages should serve him_. And though indeed our knowledge of human\nnature, and the whole history of mankind, show the impossibility,\nwithout some miraculous interposition, that a number of men, here on\nearth, should unite in one society or government, in the fear of God\nand universal practice of virtue; and that such a government should\ncontinue so united for a succession of ages: yet admitting or supposing\nthis, the effect would be as now drawn out. Thus for instance, the\nwonderful power and prosperity promised to the Jewish nation in the\nScripture, would be, in a great measure, the consequence of what is\npredicted of them; that the _people should be all righteous, and\ninherit the land forever_;[78] were we to understand the latter phrase\nof a long continuance only, sufficient to give things time to work. The\npredictions of this kind, for there are many of them, cannot come to\npass, in the present known course of nature; but suppose them come to\npass, and then, the dominion and pre\u00ebminence promised must naturally\nfollow, to a very considerable degree.\n\nConsider now the general system of religion; that the government of\nthe world is uniform, and one, and moral; that virtue and right shall\nfinally have the advantage, and prevail over fraud and lawless force,\nover the deceits as well as the violence of wickedness, under the\nconduct of one supreme governor: and from the observations above made,\nit will appear that God has, by our reason, given us to see a peculiar\nconnection in the several parts of this scheme, and a tendency towards\nthe completion of it, arising out of the very nature of virtue: which\ntendency is to be considered as something moral in the essential\nconstitution of things. If any one should think all this to be of\nlittle importance, I desire him to consider, what he would think, if\nvice had, essentially and in its nature, these advantageous tendencies;\nor if virtue had essentially the contrary ones.\n\nIt may be objected, that notwithstanding all these natural effects and\nnatural tendencies of virtue, yet things may be now going on throughout\nthe universe, and may go on hereafter, in the same mixed way as here at\npresent upon earth: virtue sometimes prosperous, sometimes depressed;\nvice sometimes punished, sometimes successful.\n\nThe answer to which is, that it is not the purpose of this chapter,\nnor of this treatise, properly to prove God\u2019s perfect moral government\nover the world, or the truth of religion; but to observe what there\nis in the constitution and course of nature, to confirm the proper\nproof of it, supposed to be known: and that the weight of the\nforegoing observations to this purpose may be thus distinctly proved.\nPleasure and pain are, to a certain degree, say to a very high degree,\ndistributed among us without any apparent regard to the merit or\ndemerit of characters. And were there nothing else concerning this\nmatter discernible in the constitution and course of nature, there\nwould be no ground from the constitution and course of nature, to hope\nor to fear that men would be rewarded or punished hereafter according\nto their deserts: which, however, it is to be remarked, implies, that\neven then there would be no ground from appearances to think, that vice\nupon the whole would have the advantage, rather than that virtue would.\nThus the proof of a future state of retribution would rest upon the\nusual known arguments for it; which are I think plainly unanswerable;\nand would be so, though there were no additional confirmation of them\nfrom the things above insisted on. But these things are a very strong\nconfirmation of them. For,\n\n_First_, They show that the Author of nature is not indifferent to\nvirtue and vice. They amount to a declaration, from him, determinate\nand not to be evaded, in favor of one, and against the other; such a\ndeclaration, as there is nothing to be set over against or answer, on\nthe part of vice. So that were a man, laying aside the proper proof\nof religion, to determine from the course of nature only, whether it\nwere most probable, that the righteous or the wicked would have the\nadvantage in a future life; there can be no doubt, but that he would\ndetermine the probability to be, that the former would. The course of\nnature then, in the view of it now given, furnishes us with a real\npractical proof of the obligations of religion.\n\n_Secondly_, When, conformably to what religion teaches us, God shall\nreward and punish virtue and vice as such, so as that every one shall,\nupon the whole, have his deserts; this distributive justice will not\nbe a thing different in _kind_, but only in _degree_, from what we\nexperience in his present government. It will be that in _effect_,\ntowards which we now see a _tendency_. It will be no more than the\n_completion_ of that moral government, the _principles and beginning_\nof which have been shown, beyond all dispute, discernible in the\npresent constitution and course of nature.\n\n_Thirdly_, As under the _natural_ government of God, our experience of\nthose kinds and degrees of happiness and misery, which we do experience\nat present, gives just ground to hope for, and to fear, higher degrees\nand other kinds of both in a future state, supposing a future state\nadmitted: so under his _moral_ government our experience, that virtue\nand vice are, in the manners above mentioned, actually rewarded and\npunished at present, in a certain degree, gives just ground to hope and\nto fear, that they _may be_ rewarded and punished in a higher degree\nhereafter. It is acknowledged indeed that this alone is not sufficient\nground to think, that they _actually will be_ rewarded and punished in\na higher degree, rather than in a lower: but then,\n\n_Lastly_, There is sufficient ground to think so, from the good and\nbad tendencies of virtue and vice. For these tendencies are essential,\nand founded in the nature of things: whereas the hinderances to\ntheir becoming effect are, in numberless cases, not necessary, but\nartificial only. Now it may be much more strongly argued, that these\ntendencies, as well as the actual rewards and punishments, of virtue\nand vice, which arise directly out of the nature of things, will\nremain hereafter, than that the accidental hinderances of them will.\nAnd if these hinderances do not remain; those rewards and punishments\ncannot but be carried on much farther towards the perfection of moral\ngovernment: _i.e._ the tendencies of virtue and vice will become\neffect; but when, or where, or in what particular way, cannot be known\nat all, but by revelation.\n\nUpon the whole: there is a kind of moral government implied in God\u2019s\nnatural government:[79] virtue and vice are naturally rewarded and\npunished as beneficial and mischievous to society;[80] and rewarded\nand punished directly as virtue and vice.[81] The notion of a moral\nscheme of government is not fictitious, but natural; for it is\nsuggested to our thoughts by the constitution and course of nature:\nand the execution of this scheme is actually begun, in the instances\nhere mentioned. And these things are to be considered as a declaration\nof the Author of nature, for virtue, and against vice: they give a\ncredibility to the supposition of their being rewarded and punished\nhereafter; and also ground to hope and to fear, that they may be\nrewarded and punished in higher degrees than they are here. All this\nis confirmed, and the argument for religion, from the constitution\nand course of nature, is carried on farther, by observing, that there\nare natural tendencies, and, in innumerable cases, only artificial\nhinderances, to this moral scheme\u2019s being carried on much farther\ntowards perfection, than it is at present.[82]\n\nThe notion then of a moral scheme of government, much more perfect\nthan what is seen, is not a fictitious, but a natural notion; for it\nis suggested to our thoughts, by the essential tendencies of virtue\nand vice. These tendencies are to be considered as intimations, as\nimplicit promises and threatenings, from the Author of nature, of much\ngreater rewards and punishments to follow virtue and vice, than do at\npresent. Indeed, every _natural_ tendency, which is to continue, but\nwhich is hindered from becoming effect by only _accidental_ causes,\naffords a presumption, that such tendency will, some time or other,\nbecome effect: a presumption proportionable in degree to the length of\nthe duration, through which such tendency will continue. From these\nthings together, arises a real presumption, that the moral scheme of\ngovernment established in nature, shall be carried on much farther\ntowards perfection hereafter; and, I think, a presumption that it will\nbe absolutely completed. From these things, joined with the moral\nnature which God has given us, considered as given us by him, arises a\npractical proof[83] that it _will_ be completed: a proof from fact; and\ntherefore a distinct one from that which is deduced from the eternal\nand unalterable relations, the fitness and unfitness of actions.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV.\n\nPROBATION, AS IMPLYING TRIAL, DIFFICULTIES, AND DANGER.[84]\n\n\nThe general doctrine of religion, that our present life is a state of\nprobation for a future one, comprehends under it several particular\nthings, distinct from each other. The first and most common meaning\nof it seems to be, that our future interest is now depending, and\ndepending upon ourselves; that we have scope and opportunities here,\nfor that good and bad behavior, which God will reward and punish\nhereafter; together with temptations to one, as well as inducements\nof reason to the other. And this, in a great measure, is the same as\nsaying, that we are under the moral government of God, and to give\nan account of our actions to him. For the notion of a future account\nand general righteous judgment, implies some sort of temptations\nto what is wrong: otherwise there would be no moral possibility of\ndoing wrong, nor ground for judgment, or discrimination. But there\nis this difference, that the word _probation_ is more distinctly and\nparticularly expressive of allurements to wrong, or difficulties in\nadhering uniformly to what is right, and of the danger of miscarrying\nby such temptations, than the words _moral government_. A state\nof probation then, as thus particularly implying in it trial,\ndifficulties, and danger, may require to be considered distinctly by\nitself.[85]\n\nAs the moral government of God, which religion teaches us, implies\nthat we are in a state of trial with regard to a future world, so\nalso his natural government over us implies that we are in a state of\ntrial, in the like sense, with regard to the present world. Natural\ngovernment by rewards and punishments, as much implies natural trial,\nas moral government does moral trial. The natural government of God\nhere meant,[86] consists in his annexing pleasure to some actions,\nand pain to others, which are in our power to do or forbear, and\ngiving us notice of such appointment, beforehand. This necessarily\nimplies, that he has made our happiness and misery, or our interest, to\ndepend in part upon ourselves. So far as men have temptations to any\ncourse of action, which will probably occasion them greater temporal\ninconvenience and uneasiness, than satisfaction, so far their temporal\ninterest is in danger from themselves; or they are in a state of trial\nwith respect to it. Now people often blame others, and even themselves,\nfor their misconduct in their temporal concerns. And we find many are\ngreatly wanting to themselves, and miss that natural happiness, which\nthey might have obtained in the present life: perhaps every one does\nin some degree. But many run themselves into great inconvenience, and\ninto extreme distress and misery, not through incapacity of knowing\nbetter, and doing better, for themselves, which would be nothing\nto the present purpose, but through their own fault. These things\nnecessarily imply temptation, and danger of miscarrying, in a greater\nor less degree, with respect to our worldly interest or happiness.\nEvery one too, without having religion in his thoughts, speaks of the\nhazards which young people run, upon their setting out in the world:\nhazards from other causes, than merely their ignorance, and unavoidable\naccidents. And some courses of vice, at least, being contrary to men\u2019s\nworldly interest or good; temptations to these must at the same time be\ntemptations to forego our present and our future interest.\n\nThus in our natural or temporal capacity, we are in a state of trial,\n_i.e._ of difficulty and danger, analogous, or like to our moral and\nreligious trial. This will more distinctly appear to any one, who\nthinks it worth while, more distinctly, to consider, what it is which\nconstitutes our trial in both capacities, and to observe, how mankind\nbehave under it.\n\nThat which constitutes this trial, in both these capacities, must be\nsomething either in our external circumstances, or in our nature. For,\non the one hand, persons may be betrayed into wrong behavior upon\nsurprise, or overcome upon any other very singular and extraordinary\nexternal occasions, who would, otherwise, have preserved their\ncharacter of prudence and of virtue: in which cases, every one, in\nspeaking of the wrong behavior of these persons, would impute it to\nsuch particular external circumstances. On the other hand, men who\nhave contracted habits of vice and folly of any kind, or have some\nparticular passions in excess, will seek opportunities, and, as it\nwere, go out of their way, to gratify themselves in these respects,\nat the expense of their wisdom and their virtue; led to it, as every\none would say, not by external temptations, but by such habits and\npassions. And the account of this last case is, that particular\npassions are no more coincident with prudence, or that reasonable\nself-love, the end of which is our worldly interest, than they are\nwith the principle of virtue and religion; but often draw contrary\nways to one, as well as to the other: and so such particular passions\nare as much temptations, to act imprudently with regard to our worldly\ninterest, as to act viciously.[87] When we say, men are misled by\nexternal circumstances of temptation; it cannot but be understood, that\nthere is somewhat within themselves, to render those circumstances\ntemptations, or to render them susceptible of impressions from them.\nSo when we say, they are misled by passions; it is always supposed,\nthat there are occasions, circumstances, and objects, exciting\nthese passions, and affording means for gratifying them. Therefore,\ntemptations from within, and from without, coincide, and mutually imply\neach other. The several external objects of the appetites, passions,\nand affections, being present to the senses, or offering themselves to\nthe mind, and so exciting emotions suitable to their nature; not only\nin cases where they can be gratified consistently with innocence and\nprudence, but also in cases where they cannot, and yet can be gratified\nimprudently and viciously: this as really puts them in danger of\nvoluntarily foregoing their present interest or good, as their future;\nand as really renders self-denial necessary to secure one, as the\nother: _i.e._ we are in a like state of trial with respect to both, by\nthe very same passions, excited by the very same means.\n\nThus mankind having a temporal interest depending upon themselves, and\na prudent course of behavior being necessary to secure it, passions\ninordinately excited, whether by means of example, or by any other\nexternal circumstance, towards such objects, at such times, or in\nsuch degrees, as that they cannot be gratified consistently with\nworldly prudence, are temptations; dangerous, and too often successful\ntemptations, to forego a greater temporal good for a less; _i.e._ to\nforego what is, upon the whole, our temporal interest, for the sake\nof a present gratification. This is a description of our state of\ntrial in our temporal capacity. Substitute now the word _future_ for\n_temporal_, and _virtue_ for _prudence_; and it will be just as proper\na description of our state of trial in our religious capacity; so\nanalogous are they to each other.[88]\n\nIf, from consideration of this our like state of trial in both\ncapacities, we go on to observe farther, how mankind behave under\nit; we shall find there are some, who have so little sense of it,\nthat they scarce look beyond the passing day: they are so taken up\nwith present gratifications, as to have, in a manner, no feeling of\nconsequences, no regard to their future ease or fortune in this life:\nany more than to their happiness in another. Some appear to be blinded\nand deceived by inordinate passion, in their worldly concerns, as\nmuch as in religion. Others are not deceived, but as it were forcibly\ncarried away by the like passions, against their better judgment, and\nfeeble resolutions too of acting better.[89] And there are men, and\ntruly not a few, who shamelessly avow, not their interest, but their\nmere will and pleasure, to be their law of life: and who, in open\ndefiance of every thing reasonable, will go on in a course of vicious\nextravagance, foreseeing, with no remorse and little fear, that it will\nbe their temporal ruin; and some of them, under the apprehension of\nthe consequences of wickedness in another state. To speak in the most\nmoderate way, human creatures are not only continually liable to go\nwrong voluntarily, but we see likewise that they often actually do so,\nwith respect to their temporal interests, as well as with respect to\nreligion.\n\nThus our difficulties and dangers, or our trials in our temporal and\nour religious capacity, as they proceed from the same causes, and have\nthe same effect upon men\u2019s behavior, are evidently analogous, and of\nthe same kind.\n\nIt may be added, that the difficulties and dangers of miscarrying in\nour religious state of trial, are greatly increased, and one is ready\nto think, are in a manner wholly _made_, by the ill behavior of others;\nby a wrong education, wrong in a moral sense, sometimes positively\nvicious; by general bad example; by the dishonest artifices which are\ngot into business of all kinds; and, in very many parts of the world,\nby religion\u2019s being corrupted into superstitions, which indulge men in\ntheir vices. In like manner, the difficulties of conducting ourselves\nprudently in respect to our present interest, and our danger of being\nled aside from pursuing it, are greatly increased, by a foolish\neducation; and, after we come to mature age, by the extravagance and\ncarelessness of others, with whom we have intercourse: and by mistaken\nnotions, very generally prevalent, and taken up from common opinion,\nconcerning temporal happiness, and wherein it consists.\n\nPersons, by their own _negligence_ and _folly_ in temporal affairs, no\nless than by a course of vice, bring themselves into new difficulties,\nand, by habits of indulgence, become less qualified to go through\nthem: and one irregularity after another, embarrasses things to such\na degree, that they know not whereabout they are; and often makes\nthe path of conduct so intricate and perplexed, that it is difficult\nto trace it out; difficult even to determine what is the prudent or\nthe moral part. Thus, for instance, wrong behavior in one stage of\nlife, youth; wrong, I mean considering ourselves only in our temporal\ncapacity, without taking in religion; this, in several ways, increases\nthe difficulties of right behavior in mature age; _i.e._ puts us into\na more disadvantageous state of trial in our temporal capacity.\n\nWe are an inferior part of the creation of God. There are natural\nappearances of our being in a state of degradation.[90] We certainly\nare in a condition, which _does not seem_, by any means, the most\nadvantageous we could imagine or desire, either in our natural or moral\ncapacity, for securing either our present or future interest. However,\nthis condition, low, and careful, and uncertain as it is, does not\nafford any just ground of complaint. For, as men _may_ manage their\ntemporal affairs with prudence, and so pass their days here on earth\nin tolerable ease and satisfaction, by a moderate degree of care: so\nlikewise with regard to religion, there is no more required than what\nthey are well able to do,[91] and what they must be greatly wanting\nto themselves, if they neglect. And for persons to have that put upon\nthem, which they are well able to go through, and no more, we naturally\nconsider as an equitable thing; supposing it done by proper authority.\nNor have we any more reason to complain of it, with regard to the\nAuthor of nature, than of his not having given us advantages belonging\nto other orders of creatures.\n\n[REMARKS.] The thing here insisted upon is, that the state of trial,\nwhich religion teaches us we are in, is rendered credible, by its\nbeing throughout uniform and of a piece with the general conduct of\nProvidence towards us, in all other respects within the compass of our\nknowledge. Indeed if mankind, considered in their natural capacity, as\ninhabitants of this world only, found themselves, from their birth to\ntheir death, in a settled state of security and happiness, without\nany solicitude or thought of their own: or if they were in no danger\nof being brought into inconveniences and distress, by carelessness, or\nthe folly of passion, through bad example, the treachery of others, or\nthe deceitful appearances of things: were this our natural condition,\nthen it might seem strange, and be some presumption against the truth\nof religion, that it represents our future and more general interest,\nas not secure _of course_, but as depending upon our behavior, and\nrequiring recollection and self-government to obtain it. It _then_\nmight be alleged, \u201cWhat you say is our condition, in one respect, is\nnot in any wise of a sort with what we find, by experience, is our\ncondition in another. Our whole present interest is secured to our\nhands, without any solicitude of ours; and why should not our future\ninterest, if we have any such, be so too?\u201d But since, on the contrary,\nthought and consideration, the voluntary denying ourselves many things\nwhich we desire, and a course of behavior, far from being always\nagreeable to us, are absolutely necessary to our acting even a common\ndecent, and common prudent part, so as to pass with any satisfaction\nthrough the _present_ world, and be received upon any tolerable\ngood terms in it: since this is the case, all presumption against\nself-denial and attention being necessary to secure our _higher_\ninterest,[92] is removed.\n\nHad we not experience, it might, perhaps speciously, be urged, that it\nis improbable any thing of hazard and danger should be put upon us by\nan infinite being; when every thing which has hazard and danger in our\nmanner of conception, and will end in error, confusion, and misery,\nis already certain in his foreknowledge. Indeed, why any thing of\nhazard and danger should be put upon such frail creatures as we are,\nmay well be thought a difficulty in speculation; and cannot but be so,\ntill we know the whole, or at least much more of the case. But still\nthe constitution of nature is as it is. Our happiness and misery are\ntrusted to our conduct, and made to depend upon it. Somewhat, and, in\nmany circumstances, a great deal too, is put upon us, either to do,\nor to suffer, as we choose. All the various miseries of life, which\npeople bring upon themselves by negligence and folly, and might have\navoided by proper care, are instances of this: which miseries are,\nbeforehand, just as contingent and undetermined as conduct, and left to\nbe determined by it.\n\nThese observations are an answer[93] to the objections against the\ncredibility of a state of trial, as implying temptations, and real\ndanger of miscarrying with regard to our general interest, under the\nmoral government of God. And they show, that, if we are at all to be\nconsidered in such a capacity, and as having such an interest, the\ngeneral analogy of Providence must lead us to apprehend ourselves in\ndanger of miscarrying, in different degrees, as to this interest, by\nour neglecting to act the proper part belonging to us in that capacity.\nFor we have a present interest under the government of God, which we\nexperience here upon earth. This interest, as it is not forced upon us,\nso neither is it offered to our acceptance, but to our acquisition; and\nin such manner, as that we are in danger of missing it, by means of\ntemptations to neglect, or act contrary to it; and without attention\nand self-denial, we must and do miss it. It is then perfectly credible,\nthat this may be our case, with respect to that chief and final good,\nwhich religion proposes to us.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V.\n\nPROBATION, AS INTENDED FOR MORAL DISCIPLINE AND IMPROVEMENT.\n\n\nFrom the consideration of our being in a probation-state, of so\nmuch difficulty and hazard, naturally arises the question, how we\ncame to be placed in it? But such a general inquiry as this would\nbe found involved in insuperable difficulties. For, though some\nof these difficulties would be lessened, by observing that all\nwickedness is voluntary, as is implied in its very notion; and that\nmany of the miseries of life have apparent good effects: yet, when\nwe consider other circumstances belonging to both, and what must be\nthe consequence of the former in a life to come, it cannot but be\nacknowledged plain folly and presumption, to pretend to give an account\nof the _whole reasons_ of this matter; the whole reasons of our being\nallotted a condition, out of which so much wickedness and misery,\nso circumstanced, would in fact arise. Whether it be not beyond our\nfaculties, not only to find out, but even to understand; or, though we\nshould be supposed capable of understanding it, yet, whether it would\nbe of service or prejudice to us to be informed of it, is impossible\nto say. But as our present condition can in no wise be shown to be\ninconsistent with the perfect moral government of God: so religion\nteaches us we were placed in it, that we might qualify ourselves, by\nthe practice of virtue, for another state which is to follow it. This,\nthough but a partial answer, a very partial one indeed, to the inquiry\nnow mentioned; is yet a more satisfactory answer to another, which is\nof real, and of the utmost importance to us to have answered,--viz.:\nWhat is our business here? The known end then, why we are placed\nin a state of so much affliction, hazard, and difficulty, is, our\nimprovement in virtue and piety, as the requisite qualification for a\nfuture state of security and happiness.\n\nThe beginning of life, considered as an education for mature age in the\npresent world, appears plainly, at first sight, analogous to this our\ntrial for a future one: the former being in our temporal capacity, what\nthe latter is in our religious capacity. Some observations common to\nboth, and a more distinct consideration of each, will more distinctly\nshow the extent and force of the analogy between them; and the\ncredibility, which arises from hence, as well as from the nature of the\nthing, that the present life was intended to be a state of discipline\nfor a future one.\n\nI. Every species of creatures is, we see, designed for a particular\nway of life; to which, the nature, the capacities, temper, and\nqualifications, of each species, are as necessary as their external\ncircumstances. Both come into the notion of such state, or particular\nway of life, and are constituent parts of it. Change a man\u2019s capacities\nor character, to the degree in which it is conceivable they may be\nchanged, and he would be altogether incapable of a human course of\nlife, and human happiness; as incapable, as if, his nature continuing\nunchanged, he were placed in a world, where he had no sphere of action,\nnor any objects to answer his appetites, passions, and affections of\nany sort. One thing is set over against another, as an ancient writer\nexpresses it.[94] Our nature corresponds to our external condition.\nWithout this correspondence, there would be no possibility of any\nsuch thing as human life and happiness: which life and happiness are,\ntherefore, a _result_ from our nature and condition jointly: meaning\nby human life, not living in the literal sense, but the whole complex\nnotion commonly understood by those words. So that without determining\nwhat will be the employment and happiness, the particular life, of\ngood men hereafter; there must be some determinate capacities, some\nnecessary character and qualifications, without which persons cannot\nbut be utterly incapable of it: in like manner, as there must be some,\nwithout which men would be incapable of their present state of life.\n\nII. The constitution of human creatures, and indeed of all creatures\nwhich come under our notice, is such, as that they are capable\nof naturally becoming qualified for states of life, for which\nthey were once wholly unqualified. In imagination we may indeed\nconceive of creatures, incapable of having any of their faculties\nnaturally enlarged, or as being unable naturally to acquire any new\nqualifications. But the faculties of every species known to us, are\nmade for enlargement; for acquirements of experience and habits. We\nfind ourselves, in particular, endued with capacities, not only of\nperceiving ideas, and of knowledge or perceiving truth, but also of\nstoring up ideas and knowledge by memory. We are capable, not only of\nacting, and of having different momentary impressions made upon us;\nbut of getting a new facility in any kind of action, and of settled\nalterations in our temper or character. The power of the two last is\nthe power of habits. But neither the perception of ideas, nor knowledge\nof any sort, are habits; though absolutely necessary to the forming of\nthem. However, apprehension, reason, memory, which are the capacities\nof acquiring knowledge, are greatly improved by exercise. Whether the\nword habit is applicable to all these improvements, and in particular\nhow far the powers of memory and of habits may be powers of the same\nnature, I shall not inquire. But that perceptions come into our minds\nreadily and of course, by means of their having been there before,\nseems a thing of the same sort, as readiness in any particular kind of\naction, proceeding from being accustomed to it. Aptness to recollect\npractical observations, of service in our conduct, is plainly habit in\nmany cases. There are habits of perception, and habits of action. An\ninstance of the former, is our constant and even involuntary readiness,\nin correcting the impressions of our sight concerning magnitudes and\ndistances, so as to substitute judgment in the room of sensation,\nimperceptibly to ourselves. It seems as if all other associations of\nideas not naturally connected, might be called passive habits; as\nproperly as our readiness in understanding languages upon sight, or\nhearing of words. Our readiness in speaking and writing them, are\ninstances of active habits.\n\nFor distinctness, we may consider habits, as belonging to the body,\nor to the mind: and the latter will be explained by the former.\nUnder the former are comprehended all bodily activities or motions,\nwhether graceful or unbecoming, which are owing to use: under the\nlatter, general habits of life and conduct; such as those of obedience\nand submission to authority, or to any particular person; those\nof veracity, justice, and charity; those of attention, industry,\nself-government, envy, revenge. Habits of this latter kind seem\nproduced by repeated acts, as well as the former. And as habits\nbelonging to the body are produced by external _acts_, so habits of the\nmind are produced by the _exertion_ of inward practical principles;\n_i.e._ by carrying them into act, or acting upon them; the principles\nof obedience, of veracity, justice, and charity. Nor can those\nhabits be formed by any external course of action, otherwise than as\nit proceeds from these principles: because it is only these inward\nprinciples exerted, which are strictly acts of obedience, of veracity,\nof justice, and of charity.\n\nSo likewise habits of attention, industry, self-government, are in\nthe same manner acquired by exercise; and habits of envy and revenge\nby indulgence, whether in outward act, or in thought and intention;\n_i.e._ inward act: for such intention is an act. Resolutions to do\nwell, are also properly acts. And endeavoring to enforce upon our own\nminds a practical sense of virtue, or to beget in others that practical\nsense of it, which a man really has himself, is a virtuous act. All\nthese, therefore, may and will contribute towards forming good habits.\nBut going over the theory of virtue in one\u2019s thoughts, talking well,\nand drawing fine pictures, of it; this is so far from necessarily or\ncertainly conducing to form a habit of it, in him who thus employs\nhimself, that it may harden the mind in a contrary course, and render\nit gradually more insensible; _i.e._ form a habit of insensibility\nto all moral considerations. For, from our very faculty of habits,\npassive impressions, by being repeated, grow weaker. Thoughts, by often\npassing through the mind, are felt less sensibly: being accustomed to\ndanger, begets intrepidity, _i.e._ lessens fear; to distress, lessens\nthe passion of pity; to instances of others\u2019 mortality, lessens the\nsensible apprehension of our own.\n\nFrom these two observations together, that practical habits are formed\nand strengthened by repeated acts, and that passive impressions grow\nweaker by being repeated upon us, it must follow, that active habits\nmay be gradually forming and strengthening, by a course of acting\nupon such and such motives and excitements, while these motives and\nexcitements themselves are, by proportionable degrees, growing less\nsensible; _i.e._ are continually less and less sensibly felt, even as\nthe active habits strengthen. And experience confirms this: for active\nprinciples, at the very time that they are less lively in perception\nthan they were, are found to be, somehow, wrought more thoroughly into\nthe temper and character, and become more effectual in influencing\nour practice. The three things just mentioned may afford instances of\nit. Perception of danger is a natural excitement of passive fear, and\nactive caution: and by being inured to danger, habits of the latter are\ngradually wrought, at the same time that the former gradually lessens.\nPerception of distress in others is a natural excitement, passively\nto pity, and actively to relieve it: but let a man set himself to\nattend to, inquire out, and relieve distressed persons, and he cannot\nbut grow less and less sensibly affected with the various miseries of\nlife, with which he must become acquainted; when yet, at the same time,\nbenevolence, considered not as a passion, but as a practical principle\nof action, will strengthen: and while he passively compassionates the\ndistressed less, he will acquire a greater aptitude actively to assist\nand befriend them. So also at the same time that the daily instances of\nmen\u2019s dying around us give us daily a less sensible passive feeling or\napprehension of our own mortality, such instances greatly contribute to\nthe strengthening a practical regard to it in serious men; _i.e._ to\nforming a habit of acting with a constant view to it.\n\nThis seems further to show, that passive impressions made upon our\nminds by admonition, experience, or example, though they may have a\nremote efficacy, and a very great one, towards forming active habits,\nyet can have this efficacy no otherwise than by inducing us to such a\ncourse of action: and that it is not being _affected_ so and so, but\nacting, which forms those habits: only it must be always remembered,\nthat real endeavors to enforce good impressions upon ourselves are a\nspecies of virtuous action. Nor do we know how far it is possible, in\nthe nature of things, that effects should be wrought in us at once,\nequivalent to habits; _i.e._ what is wrought by use and exercise. The\nthing insisted on is, not what may be possible, but what is in fact the\nappointment of nature: which is, that active habits are to be formed\nby exercise. Their progress may be so gradual, as to be imperceptible\nin its steps: it may be hard to explain the faculty, by which we are\ncapable of habits, throughout its several parts; and to trace it up\nto its original, so as to distinguish it from all others in our mind:\nand it seems as if contrary effects were to be ascribed to it. But\nthe thing in general, that our nature is formed to yield to use and\nexercise, in some such manner as this, is matter of certain experience.\n\nThus, by accustoming ourselves to any course of action, we get an\naptness to go on, a facility, readiness, and often pleasure, in it.\nThe inclinations which rendered us averse to it, grow weaker; the\ndifficulties in it, not only the imaginary but the real ones, lessen;\nthe reasons for it offer themselves of course to our thoughts upon all\noccasions; and the least glimpse of them is sufficient to make us go\non, in a course of action, to which we have been accustomed. Practical\nprinciples appear to grow stronger, absolutely in themselves, by\nexercise; as well as relatively, with regard to contrary principles;\nwhich, by being accustomed to submit, do so habitually, and of course.\nThus a new character, in several respects, may be formed; and many\nhabitudes of life, not given by nature, but which nature directs us to\nacquire.\n\nIII. Indeed we may be assured, that we should never have had these\ncapacities of improving by experience, acquired knowledge, and habits,\nhad they not been necessary, and intended to be made use of. And\naccordingly we find them so necessary, and so much intended, that\nwithout them we should be utterly incapable of that which was the end\nfor which we were made, considered in our temporal capacity only: the\nemployments and satisfactions of our mature state of life.\n\nNature does in no wise qualify us wholly, much less at once, for this\nmature state of life. Even maturity of understanding, and bodily\nstrength, not only are arrived at gradually, but are also very much\nowing to the continued exercise of our powers of body and mind from\ninfancy. If we suppose a person brought into the world with both these\nin maturity, as far as this is conceivable, he would plainly at first\nbe as unqualified for the human life of mature age, as an idiot. He\nwould be in a manner distracted, with astonishment, and apprehension,\nand curiosity, and suspense: nor can one guess, how long it would be,\nbefore he would be familiarized to himself and the objects about him,\nenough even to set himself to any thing. It may be questioned too,\nwhether the natural information of his sight and hearing would be of\nany manner of use to him in acting, before experience. And it seems,\nthat men would be strangely headstrong and self-willed, and disposed\nto exert themselves with an impetuosity, which would render society\ninsupportable, and the living in it impracticable, were it not for some\nacquired moderation and self-government, some aptitude and readiness\nin restraining themselves, and concealing their sense of things. Want\nof every thing of this kind which is learnt would render a man as\nincapable of society, as want of language would; or as his natural\nignorance of any of the particular employments of life would render\nhim incapable of providing himself with the common conveniences, or\nsupplying the necessary wants of it. In these respects, and probably\nin many more of which we have no particular notion, mankind is left\nby nature, an unformed, unfinished creature; utterly deficient and\nunqualified, before the acquirement of knowledge, experience, and\nhabits, for that mature state of life, which was the end of his\ncreation, considering him as related only to this world.\n\nBut, as nature has endued us with a power of supplying those\ndeficiencies, by acquired knowledge, experience, and habits; so\nlikewise we are placed in a condition, in infancy, childhood, and\nyouth, fitted for it; fitted for our acquiring those qualifications of\nall sorts, which we stand in need of in mature age. Hence children,\nfrom their very birth, are daily growing acquainted with the objects\nabout them, with the scene in which they are placed, and to have\na future part; and learning something or other, necessary to the\nperformance of it. The subordinations, to which they are accustomed in\ndomestic life, teach them self-government in common behavior abroad,\nand prepare them for subjection and obedience to civil authority.[95]\nWhat passes before their eyes, and daily happens to them, gives them\nexperience, caution against treachery and deceit, together with\nnumberless little rules of action and conduct, which we could not\nlive without; and which are learnt so insensibly and so perfectly, as\nto be mistaken perhaps for instinct, though they are the effect of\nlong experience and exercise; as much so as language, or knowledge in\nparticular business, or the qualifications and behavior belonging to\nthe several ranks and professions. Thus the beginning of our days is\nadapted to be, and is, a state of education in the theory and practice\nof mature life. We are much assisted in it by example, instruction,\nand the care of others; but a great deal is left to ourselves to do.\nAnd of this, as part is done easily and of course; so part requires\ndiligence and care, the voluntary foregoing many things which we\ndesire, and setting ourselves to what we should have no inclination to,\nbut for the necessity or expedience of it. For that labor and industry,\nwhich the station of so many absolutely requires, they would be greatly\nunqualified for, in maturity, as those in other stations would be for\nany other sorts of application; if both were not accustomed to them\nin their youth. And, according as persons behave themselves, in the\ngeneral education which all go through, and in the particular ones\nadapted to particular employments, their character is formed,[96] and\nmade to appear; they recommend themselves more or less; and are capable\nof, and placed in, different stations in society.\n\nThe former part of life, then, is to be considered as an important\nopportunity, which nature puts into our hands; and which, when lost\nis not to be recovered. And our being placed in a state of discipline\nthroughout this life, for another world, is a providential disposition\nof things, exactly of the same kind, as our being placed in a state\nof discipline during childhood, for mature age. Our condition in both\nrespects is uniform and of a piece, and comprehended under one and the\nsame general law of nature.\n\nIf we were not able at all to discern, how or in what way the present\nlife could be our preparation for another; this would be no objection\nagainst the credibility of its being so. We do not discern, how food\nand sleep contribute to the growth of the body; nor could have any\nthought that they would, before we had experience. Nor do children at\nall think, on the one hand, that the sports and exercises, to which\nthey are so much addicted, contribute to their health and growth;\nnor, on the other, of the necessity which there is for their being\nrestrained in them. Nor are they capable of understanding the use of\nmany parts of discipline, which nevertheless they must be made to go\nthrough, in order to qualify them for the business of mature age. Were\nwe not able then to discover, in what respects the present life could\nform us for a future one; yet nothing would be more supposable than\nthat it might, in some respects or other, from the general analogy\nof Providence. And this, for aught I see, might reasonably be said,\neven though we should not take in the consideration of God\u2019s moral\ngovernment over the world. But,\n\nIV. Take in this consideration, and consequently, that the character\nof virtue and piety is a necessary qualification for the future state,\nand then we may distinctly see, how, and in what respects, the present\nlife may be a preparation for it; since we _want, and are capable of,\nimprovement in that character, by moral and religious habits_; and _the\npresent life is fit to be a state of discipline for such improvement_:\nin like manner as we have already observed, how, and in what respects,\ninfancy, childhood, and youth, are a necessary preparation, and a\nnatural state of discipline, for mature age.\n\nNothing which we at present see, would lead us to the thought of a\nsolitary inactive state hereafter. If we judge at all from the analogy\nof nature, we must suppose, according to the Scripture account of\nit, that it will be a community. And there is no shadow of any thing\nunreasonable in conceiving, though there be no analogy for it, that\nthis community will be, as the Scripture represents it, under the more\nimmediate, or, if such an expression may be used, the more sensible\ngovernment of God. Nor is our ignorance, what will be the employments\nof this happy community, nor our consequent ignorance, what particular\nscope or occasion there will be for the exercise of veracity, justice,\nand charity, among the members of it with regard to each other, any\nproof, that there will be no sphere of exercise for those virtues.\nMuch less, if that were possible, is our ignorance any proof, that\nthere will be no occasion for that frame of mind, or character, which\nis formed by the daily practice of those particular virtues here,\nand which is a result from it.[97] This at least must be owned in\ngeneral, that, as the government established in the universe is moral,\nthe character of virtue and piety must, in some way or other, be the\n_condition_ of our happiness or the qualification for it.\n\nFrom what is above observed, concerning our natural power of habits,\nit is easy to see, that we are _capable_ of moral improvement by\ndiscipline. And how greatly we _want_ it, need not be proved to any\none who is acquainted with the great wickedness of mankind; or even\nwith those imperfections, which the best are conscious of. But it is\nnot perhaps distinctly attended to by every one, that the occasion\nwhich human creatures have for discipline, to improve in them this\ncharacter of virtue and piety, is to be traced up higher than to excess\nin the passions, by indulgence and habits of vice. Mankind, and perhaps\nall finite creatures, from the very constitution of their nature,\nbefore habits of virtue, are deficient, and in danger of deviating\nfrom what is right; and therefore stand in need of virtuous habits,\nfor a security against this danger. For, together with the general\nprinciple of moral understanding, we have in our inward frame various\naffections towards particular external objects. These affections\nare naturally, and of right, subject to the government of the moral\nprinciple, as to the occasions upon which they may be gratified; as\nto the times, degrees, and manner, in which the objects of them may\nbe pursued. But the principle of virtue can neither excite them, nor\nprevent their being excited. On the contrary, they are naturally felt,\nwhen the objects of them are present to the mind, not only before all\nconsideration whether they can be obtained by lawful means, but after\nit is found they cannot. The natural objects of affection continue so;\nthe necessaries, conveniences, and pleasures of life, remain naturally\ndesirable, though they cannot be obtained innocently: nay, though\nthey cannot possibly be obtained at all. And when the objects of any\naffection whatever cannot be obtained without unlawful means; but may\nbe obtained by them: such affection, though its being excited, and its\ncontinuing some time in the mind, be as innocent as it is natural and\nnecessary, yet cannot but be conceived to have a _tendency_ to incline\npersons to venture upon such unlawful means: and therefore must be\nconceived as putting them in some danger of it. Now what is the general\nsecurity against this danger, against their actually deviating from\nright? As the danger is, so also must the security be, from within:\nfrom the practical principle of virtue.[98] The strengthening or\nimproving this principle, considered as practical, or as a principle\nof action, will lessen the danger, or increase the security against\nit. And this moral principle is capable of improvement, by proper\ndiscipline and exercise: by recollecting the practical impressions\nwhich example and experience have made upon us: and, instead of\nfollowing humor and mere inclination, by continually attending to the\nequity and right of the case, in whatever we are engaged, be it in\ngreater or less matters; and accustoming ourselves always to act upon\nit, as being itself the just and natural motive of action; and as this\nmoral course of behavior must necessarily, under the divine government,\nbe our final interest. _Thus the principle of virtue, improved into\na habit, of which improvement we are thus capable, will plainly be,\nin proportion to the strength of it, a security against the danger\nwhich finite creatures are in, from the very nature of propension,\nor particular affections._ This way of putting the matter, supposes\nparticular affections to remain in a future state; which it is scarce\npossible to avoid supposing. And if they do; we clearly see, that\nacquired habits of virtue and self-government may be necessary for the\nregulation of them. However, though we were not distinctly to take in\nthis supposition, but to speak only in general; the thing really comes\nto the same. For habits of virtue, thus acquired by discipline, are\nimprovement in virtue: and improvement in virtue must be advancement in\nhappiness, if the government of the universe be moral.\n\nFrom these things we may observe, (and it will further show this\nour natural and original need of being improved by discipline,) how\nit comes to pass, that creatures made upright, fall; and how those\nwho preserve their uprightness, raise themselves by so doing, to a\nmore secure state of virtue. To say that the former is accounted for\nby the nature of liberty, is to say no more, than that an event\u2019s\nactually happening is accounted for by a mere possibility of its\nhappening. But it seems distinctly conceivable from the very nature of\nparticular affections or propensions. For, suppose creatures intended\nfor such a particular state of life, for which such propensions were\nnecessary: suppose them endued with such propensions, together with\nmoral understanding, as well including a practical sense of virtue as\na speculative perception of it; and that all these several principles,\nboth natural and moral, forming an inward constitution of mind, were\nin the most exact proportion possible; _i.e._ in a proportion the most\nexactly adapted to their intended state of life; such creatures would\nbe made upright, or finitely perfect. Now particular propensions, from\ntheir very nature, must be felt, the objects of them being present;\nthough they cannot be gratified at all, or not with the allowance of\nthe moral principle. If they can be gratified without its allowance,\nor by contradicting it, then they must be conceived to have some\ntendency, in how low a degree soever, yet some tendency, to induce\npersons to such forbidden gratification. This tendency, in some one\nparticular propension, may be increased, by the greater frequency of\noccasions naturally exciting it, than of occasions exciting others.\nThe least voluntary indulgence in forbidden circumstances,[99] though\nbut in thought, will increase this wrong tendency; and may increase\nit further, till, peculiar conjunctures perhaps conspiring, it\nbecomes effect; and danger of deviating from right, ends in actual\ndeviation from it; a danger necessarily arising from the very nature of\npropension, and which therefore could not have been prevented, though\nit might have been escaped, or got innocently through. The case would\nbe, as if we were to suppose a straight path marked out for a person,\nin which a certain degree of attention would keep him steady: but if\nhe would not attend, in this degree, any one of a thousand objects,\ncatching his eye, might lead him out of it.\n\nNow it is impossible to say, how much even the first full overt act\nof irregularity might disorder the inward constitution; unsettle the\nadjustments, and alter the proportions, which formed it, and in which\nthe uprightness of its make consisted: but repetition of irregularities\nwould produce habits. Thus the constitution would be spoiled;\nand creatures made upright, become corrupt and depraved in their\nsettled character, proportionably to their repeated irregularities\nin occasional acts,[100] On the contrary, these creatures might\nhave improved and raised themselves, to a higher and more secure\nstate of virtue, by the contrary behavior: by steadily following the\nmoral principle, supposed to be one part of their nature: and thus\n_withstanding_ that unavoidable danger of defection, which necessarily\narose from propension, the other part of it. For, by thus preserving\ntheir integrity for some time, their danger would lessen; since\npropensions, by being inured to submit, would do it more easily and\nof course: and their security against this lessening danger would\nincrease; since the moral principle would gain additional strength\nby exercise: both which things are implied in the notion of virtuous\nhabits.\n\nThus vicious indulgence is not only criminal in itself, but also\ndepraves the inward constitution and character. And virtuous\nself-government is not only right in itself, but also improves the\ninward constitution or character: and may improve it to such a degree,\nthat though we should suppose it impossible for particular affections\nto be absolutely coincident with the moral principle; and consequently\nshould allow, that such creatures as have been above supposed, would\nforever remain defectible, yet their danger of actually deviating from\nright may be almost infinitely lessened, and they fully fortified\nagainst what remains of it; if that may be called danger, against which\nthere is an adequate, effectual security. Still, this their higher\nperfection may continue to consist in habits of virtue formed in a\nstate of discipline, and this their more complete security remain to\nproceed from them.\n\nThus it is plainly conceivable, that creatures without blemish, as they\ncame out of the hands of God, may be in danger of going wrong; and so\nmay stand in need of the security of virtuous habits, additional to the\nmoral principle wrought into their natures by him. That which is the\nground of their danger, or their want of security, maybe considered as\na deficiency in themselves, to which virtuous habits are the natural\nsupply. And as they are naturally capable of being raised and improved\nby discipline, it may be a thing fit and requisite, that they should be\nplaced in circumstances with an eye to it: in circumstances peculiarly\nfitted to be to them a state of discipline for their improvement in\nvirtue.\n\nBut how much more strongly must this hold with respect to those who\nhave corrupted their natures, are fallen from their original rectitude,\nand whose passions are become excessive by repeated violations of\ntheir inward constitution! Upright creatures may want to be improved:\ndepraved creatures want to be renewed. Education and discipline, which\nmay be in all degrees and sorts of gentleness and of severity, are\nexpedient for those: but must be absolutely necessary for these. For\nthese, discipline of the severer sort too, and in the higher degrees\nof it, must be necessary, in order to wear out vicious habits; to\nrecover their primitive strength of self-government, which indulgence\nmust have weakened; to repair, as well as raise into a habit, the moral\nprinciple, in order to their arriving at a secure state of virtuous\nhappiness.\n\nWhoever will consider the thing, may clearly see that the present world\nis _peculiarly fit_ to be a state of discipline for this purpose, to\nsuch as will set themselves to mend and improve. For, the various\ntemptations with which we are surrounded; our experience of the deceits\nof wickedness; having been in many instances led wrong ourselves; the\ngreat viciousness of the world; the infinite disorders consequent upon\nit; our being made acquainted with pain and sorrow, either from our own\nfeeling of it, or from the sight of it in others; these things, though\nsome of them may indeed produce wrong effects upon our minds, yet when\nduly reflected upon, have, all of them, a direct tendency to bring us\nto a settled moderation and reasonableness of temper: the contrary both\nto thoughtless levity, and also to that unrestrained self-will, and\nviolent bent to follow present inclination, which may be observed in\nundisciplined minds.\n\nSuch experience, as the present state affords, of the frailty of our\nnature; of the boundless extravagance of ungoverned passion; of the\npower which an infinite being has over us, by the various capacities\nof misery which he has given us; in short, that kind and degree of\nexperience, which the present state affords us, that the constitution\nof nature is such as to admit the possibility, the danger, and the\nactual event, or creatures losing their innocence and happiness, and\nbecoming vicious and wretched; has a tendency to give us a practical\nsense of things very different from a mere speculative knowledge, that\nwe are liable to vice, and capable of misery. And who knows, whether\nthe security of creatures in the highest and most settled state of\nperfection, may not in part arise, from their having had such a sense\nof things as this, formed, and habitually fixed within them, in some\nstate of probation. And passing through the present world with that\nmoral attention, which is necessary to the acting a right part in it,\nmay leave everlasting impressions of this sort upon our minds.\n\nTo be a little more distinct: allurements to what is wrong,\ndifficulties in the discharge of our duty, our not being able to act a\nuniform right part without some thought and care, and the opportunities\nwhich we have, or imagine we have, of avoiding what we dislike or\nobtaining what we desire, by unlawful means, when we either cannot do\nit at all, or at least not so easily, by lawful ones, these things,\n_i.e._ the snares and temptations of vice, are what render the present\nworld peculiarly fit to be a state of discipline, to those who will\npreserve their integrity: because they render being upon our guard,\nresolution, and the denial of our passions, necessary in order to that\nend. The exercise of such particular recollection, intention of mind,\nand self-government, in the practice of virtue, has, from the make of\nour nature, a peculiar tendency to form habits of virtue; as implying,\nnot only a real, but also a more continued, and a more intense exercise\nof the virtuous principle, or a more constant and a stronger effort of\nvirtue exerted into act. Thus suppose a person to know himself to be\nin particular danger, for some time, of doing any thing wrong, which\nyet he fully resolves not to do; continued recollection and keeping\nupon his guard, in order to make good his resolution, is a _continued_\nexerting of that act of virtue in a _high degree_, which need have\nbeen, and perhaps would have been, only _instantaneous_ and _weak_, had\nthe temptation been so.\n\nIt is indeed ridiculous to assert, that self-denial is essential to\nvirtue and piety:[101] but it would have been nearer the truth, though\nnot strictly the truth itself, to have said, that it is essential to\ndiscipline and improvement. For though actions materially virtuous,\nwhich have no sort of difficulty, but are perfectly agreeable to\nour particular inclinations, may possibly be done only from these\nparticular inclinations, and so may not be any exercise of the\nprinciple of virtue, _i.e._ not be virtuous actions at all; yet, on\nthe contrary, they _may_ be an exercise of that principle: and when\nthey are, they have a tendency to form and fix the habit of virtue.\nBut when the exercise of the virtuous principle is more continued,\noftener repeated, and more intense; as it must be in circumstances of\ndanger, temptation, and difficulty, of any kind and in any degree; this\ntendency is increased proportionably, and a more confirmed habit is the\nconsequence.\n\nThis undoubtedly holds to a certain length: but how far it may hold,\nI know not. Neither our intellectual powers, nor our bodily strength\ncan be improved beyond a certain degree: and both may be overwrought.\nPossibly there may be something analogous to this, with respect to the\nmoral character; which is scarce worth considering. I mention it only,\nlest it should come into some persons\u2019 thoughts, not as an exception to\nthe foregoing observations, which perhaps it is; but as a confutation\nof them, which it is not. And there may be several other exceptions.\nObservations of this kind cannot be supposed to hold minutely, and in\nevery case. It is enough that they hold in general. And these plainly\nhold so far, as that from them may be seen distinctly, (which is all\nthat is intended by them,) that _the present world is peculiarly fit\nto be a state of discipline, for our improvement in virtue and piety_:\nin the same sense as some sciences, by requiring and engaging the\nattention, not to be sure of such persons as will not, but of such as\nwill, set themselves to them, are fit to form the mind to habits of\nattention.\n\nIndeed the present state is so far from proving, in event, a discipline\nof virtue to the generality of men, that on the contrary they seem to\nmake it a discipline of vice. And the viciousness of the world is,\nin different ways, the great temptation which renders it a state of\nvirtuous discipline, in the degree it is, to good men. The whole end,\nand the whole occasion, of mankind\u2019s being placed in such a state as\nthe present, is not pretended to be accounted for. That which appears\namidst the general corruption, is, that there are some persons, who,\nhaving within them the principle of amendment and recovery, attend to\nand follow the notices of virtue and religion, be they more clear or\nmore obscure, which are afforded them; and that the present world is\nnot only an exercise of virtue in these persons, but an exercise of\nit in ways and degrees, peculiarly apt to improve it: apt to improve\nit, in some respects, even beyond what would be, by the exercise of\nit, required in a perfectly virtuous society, or in a society of\nequally imperfect virtue with themselves. But that the present world\ndoes not actually become a state of moral discipline to many, even\nto the generality, _i.e._ that they do not improve or grow better in\nit, cannot be urged as a proof, that it was not intended for moral\ndiscipline, by any who at all observe the analogy of nature. For, of\nthe numerous seeds of vegetables and bodies of animals, which are\nadapted and put in the way to improve to such a point or state of\nnatural maturity and perfection, we do not see perhaps that one in\na million actually does. Far the greatest part of them decay before\nthey are improved to it; and appear to be absolutely destroyed. Yet no\none, who does not deny all final causes, will deny, that those seeds\nand bodies, which do attain to that point of maturity and perfection,\nanswer the end for which they were really designed by nature; and\ntherefore that nature designed them for such perfection. I cannot\nforbear adding, though it is not to the present purpose, that the\n_appearance_ of such an amazing _waste_ in nature, with respect to\nthese seeds and bodies, by foreign causes, is to us as unaccountable,\nas, what is much more terrible, the present and future ruin of so many\nmoral agents by themselves, _i.e._ by vice.\n\nAgainst this whole notion of moral discipline, it may be objected, in\nanother way; that so far as a course of behavior, materially virtuous,\nproceeds from hope and fear, so far it is only a discipline and\nstrengthening of self-love. But doing what God commands, because he\ncommands it, is obedience, though it proceeds from hope or fear. A\ncourse of such obedience will form habits of it. And a constant regard\nto veracity, justice, and charity, may form distinct habits of these\nparticular virtues; and will certainly form habits of self-government,\nand of denying our inclinations, whenever veracity, justice, or charity\nrequires it. Nor is there any foundation for this great nicety, with\nwhich some affect to distinguish in this case, in order to depreciate\nall religion proceeding from hope or fear. For, veracity, justice, and\ncharity, regard to God\u2019s authority, and to our own chief interest, are\nnot only all three coincident; but each of them is, in itself, a just\nand natural motive or principle of action. He who begins a good life\nfrom any one of them, and perseveres in it, as he is already in some\ndegree, so he cannot fail of becoming more and more, of that character\nwhich is correspondent to the constitution of nature as moral; and\nto the relation which God stands in to us as moral governor of it:\nnor consequently can he fail of obtaining that happiness, which this\nconstitution and relation necessarily suppose connected with that\ncharacter.\n\nThese several observations, concerning the active principle of virtue\nand obedience to God\u2019s commands, are applicable to passive submission\nor resignation to his will: which is another essential part of a right\ncharacter, connected with the former, and very much in our power to\nform ourselves to. It may be imagined, that nothing but afflictions\ncan give occasion for or require this virtue; that it can have no\nrespect to, nor be any way necessary to qualify for, a state of perfect\nhappiness: but it is not experience which can make us think thus.\nProsperity itself, while any thing supposed desirable is not ours,\nbegets extravagant and unbounded thoughts. Imagination is altogether as\nmuch a source of discontent, as any thing in our external condition. It\nis indeed true, that there can be no scope for _patience_, when sorrow\nshall be no more; but there may be need of a temper of mind, which\nshall have been formed by patience. For, though self-love, considered\nmerely as an active principle leading us to pursue our chief interest,\ncannot but be uniformly coincident with the principle of obedience to\nGod\u2019s commands, our interest being rightly understood; because this\nobedience, and the pursuit of our own chief interest, must be in every\nease one and the thing: yet it may be questioned, whether self-love,\nconsidered merely as the desire of our own interest or happiness, can,\nfrom its nature, be thus absolutely and uniformly coincident with the\nwill of God; any more than particular affections can:[102] coincident\nin such sort, as not to be liable to be excited upon occasions and in\ndegrees, impossible to be gratified consistently with the constitution\nof things, or the divine appointments. So that _habits_ of resignation\nmay, upon this account, be requisite for all creatures: habits, I\nsay; which signify what is formed by use. However, in general it is\nobvious that both self-love and particular affection in human creatures\nconsidered only as passive feelings, distort and rend the mind; and\ntherefore stand in need of discipline. Now denial of those particular\naffections, in a course of active virtue and obedience to God\u2019s will,\nhas a tendency to moderate them; and seems also to have a tendency\nto habituate the mind, to be easy and satisfied with that degree of\nhappiness which is allotted us, _i.e._ to moderate self-love. But the\nproper discipline for resignation is affliction. A right behavior\nunder that trial; recollecting ourselves so as to consider it in the\nview, in which religion teaches us to consider it, as from the hand of\nGod, receiving it as what he appoints, or thinks proper to permit, in\nhis world and under his government; this will habituate the mind to a\ndutiful submission. Such submission, together with the active principle\nof obedience, make up the temper and character in us, which answers to\nhis sovereignty; and which absolutely belongs to the condition of our\nbeing, as dependent creatures. Nor can it be said, that this is only\nbreaking the mind to a submission to mere power; for mere power may\nbe accidental, and precarious, and usurped: but it is forming within\nourselves the temper of resignation to His rightful authority, who is,\nby nature, supreme over all.\n\nUpon the whole: such a character, and such qualifications, are\nnecessary for a mature state of life in the present world, as nature\nalone does in no wise bestow; but has put it upon us, in great part,\nto acquire, in our progress from one stage of life to another, from\nchildhood to mature age; put it upon us to acquire them, by giving\nus capacities of doing it, and by placing us, in the beginning of\nlife, in a condition fit for it. And this is a general analogy to our\ncondition in the present world, as in a state of moral discipline for\nanother.\n\nIt is in vain to object against the credibility of the present life\u2019s\nbeing intended for this purpose, that all the trouble and the danger\nunavoidably accompanying such discipline, might have been saved us, by\nour being made at once the creatures and the characters, _which we were\nto be_. For we experience, that _what we were to be_, was to be the\neffect of _what we would do_: and that the general conduct of nature\nis, not to save us trouble or danger, but to make us capable of going\nthrough them, and to put it upon us to do so. Acquirements of our own,\nexperience and habits, are the _natural_ supply to our deficiencies,\nand security against our dangers: since it is as plainly natural to\nset ourselves to acquire the qualifications, as the external things,\nwhich we stand in need of. In particular, it is as plainly a general\nlaw of nature, that we should with regard to our temporal interest,\nform and cultivate practical principles within us, by attention, use,\nand discipline, as any thing whatever is a natural law; chiefly in the\nbeginning of life, but also throughout the whole course of it. The\nalternative is left to our choice: either to improve ourselves, and\nbetter our condition; or, in default of such improvement, to remain\ndeficient and wretched. It is therefore perfectly credible, from the\nanalogy of nature, that the same may be our case, with respect to the\nhappiness of a future state, and the qualifications necessary for it.\n\nThere is a third thing, which may seem implied in the present world\u2019s\nbeing a state of probation; that it is a _theatre of action_, for the\nmanifestation of persons\u2019 characters, with respect to a future one:\nnot, to be sure, to an all-knowing Being, but to his creation or part\nof it. This may, perhaps, be only a consequence of our being in a\nstate of probation in the other senses. However, it is not impossible,\nthat men\u2019s showing and making manifest, what is in their heart,\nwhat their real character is, may have respect to a future life, in\nways and manners with which we are not acquainted: particularly it\nmay be a means, (for the Author of nature does not appear to do any\nthing without means,) of their being disposed of suitably to their\ncharacters; and of its being known to the creation, by way of example,\nthat they are thus disposed of. But not to enter upon any conjectural\naccount of this; one may just mention, that the manifestation of\npersons\u2019 characters contributes very much, in various ways, to the\ncarrying on a great part of that general course of nature, respecting\nmankind, which comes under our observation at present. I shall only\nadd, that probation, in both these senses, as well as in that treated\nof in the foregoing chapter, is implied in moral government; since by\npersons\u2019 behavior under it, their characters cannot but be manifested,\nand if they behave well, improved.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI.\n\nTHE OPINION OF NECESSITY, CONSIDERED AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE.\n\n\nThroughout the foregoing treatise it appears, that the condition of\nmankind, considered as inhabitants of this world only, and under the\ngovernment of God which we experience, is greatly analogous to our\ncondition, as designed for another world, or as under that farther\ngovernment, which religion teaches us. If therefore any assert, as a\nfatalist must, that the opinion of universal necessity is reconcilable\nwith the former; there immediately arises a question in the way of\nanalogy, whether he must not also own it to be reconcilable with the\nlatter, _i.e._ with the system of religion itself, and the proof of\nit. The reader then will observe, that the question now before us is\nnot absolute, _i.e._ whether the opinion of fate be reconcilable with\nreligion; but hypothetical, whether, upon supposition of its being\nreconcilable with the constitution of nature, it be not reconcilable\nwith religion also. Or, what pretence a fatalist, not other persons,\nbut a fatalist, has to conclude from his opinion, that there can be no\nsuch thing as religion. And as the puzzle and obscurity, which must\nunavoidably arise from arguing upon so absurd a supposition as that of\nuniversal necessity, will, I fear, easily be seen; it will, I hope, as\neasily be excused.[103]\n\nSince it has been all along taken for granted, as a thing proved, that\nthere is an intelligent Author of nature, or natural Governor of the\nworld; and since an objection may be made against the proof of this,\nfrom the opinion of universal necessity, as it may be supposed, that\nsuch necessity will itself account for the origin and preservation\nof all things; it is requisite, that this objection be distinctly\nanswered; or that it be shown, that a fatality supposed consistent\nwith what we certainly experience, does not destroy the proof of\nan intelligent Author and Governor of nature; before we proceed to\nconsider, whether it destroys the proof of a moral Governor of it, or\nof our being in a state of religion.\n\nWhen it is said by a fatalist, that the whole constitution of nature,\nthe actions of men, every thing, and every mode and circumstance\nof every thing, is necessary, and could not possibly have been\notherwise; it is to be observed, that this necessity does not exclude\ndeliberation, choice, preference, and acting from certain principles,\nand to certain ends: because all this is matter of undoubted\nexperience, acknowledged by all, and what every man may, every moment,\nbe conscious of. Hence it follows, that necessity, alone and of itself,\nis in no sort an account of the constitution of nature, and how things\ncame _to be_ and _to continue_ as they are; but only an account of\nthis _circumstance_ relating to their origin and continuance, that\nthey could not have been otherwise, than they are and have been. The\nassertion, that every thing is by necessity of nature, is not an\nanswer to the question; Whether the world came into being as it is,\nby an intelligent Agent forming it thus, or not: but to quite another\nquestion; Whether it came into being as it is, in that way and manner\nwhich we call _necessarily_, or in that way and manner which we call\n_freely_? For suppose farther, that one who was a fatalist, and one who\nkept to his natural sense of things, and believed himself a free agent,\nwere disputing together, and vindicating their respective opinions;\nand they should happen to instance a house; they would agree that it\nwas built by an architect. Their difference concerning necessity and\nfreedom would occasion no difference of judgment concerning this;\nbut only concerning another matter; whether the architect built it\nnecessarily or freely.\n\nSuppose they should proceed to inquire concerning the constitution\nof nature. In a lax way of speaking, one of them might say, it was\nby necessity; and the other, by freedom: but if they had any meaning\nto their words, as the latter must mean a free agent, so the former\nmust at length be reduced to mean an agent, whether he would say one\nor more, acting by necessity: for abstract notions can do nothing. We\nindeed ascribe to God a necessary existence, uncaused by any agent.\nFor we find within ourselves the idea of infinity, _i.e._ immensity\nand eternity, impossible, even in imagination, to be removed out of\nbeing. We seem to discern intuitively, that there must, and cannot\nbut be, something, external to ourselves, answering this idea, or the\narchetype of it. Hence, (for _this abstract_, as much as any other,\nimplies a _concrete_) we conclude, that there is, and cannot but be,\nan infinite and immense eternal being, existing prior to all design\ncontributing to his existence, and exclusive of it. From the scantiness\nof language, a manner of speaking has been introduced; that necessity\nis the foundation, the reason, the account of the existence of God. But\nit is not alleged, nor can it be at all intended, that _every thing_\nexists as it does, by this kind of necessity: a necessity antecedent in\nnature to design: it cannot, I say, be meant that every thing exists\nas it does, by this kind of necessity, upon several accounts; and\nparticularly because it is admitted, that design, in the actions of\nmen, contributes to many alterations in nature. If any deny this, I\nshall not pretend to reason with them.\n\nFrom these things it follows; _First_, That when a fatalist asserts,\nthat every thing is _by necessity_, he must mean, _by an agent acting\nnecessarily_; he _must_, I say, mean this, for I am very sensible he\nwould not choose to mean it. _Secondly_, That the necessity, by which\nsuch an agent is supposed to act, does not exclude intelligence and\ndesign. So that, were the system of fatality admitted, it would just as\nmuch account for the formation of the world, as for the structure of a\nhouse, and no more. Necessity as much requires and supposes a necessary\nagent, as freedom requires and supposes a free agent, to be the former\nof the world. And the appearances of _design_ and of _final causes_\nin the constitution of nature as really prove this acting agent to be\nan _intelligent designer_, or to act from choice; upon the scheme of\nnecessity, supposed possible, as upon that of freedom.\n\nIt appearing thus, that the notion of necessity does not destroy\nthe proof that there is an intelligent Author of nature and natural\nGovernor of the world; the present question, which the analogy before\nmentioned suggests,[104] and which, I think, it will answer, is this:\nWhether the opinion of necessity, supposed consistent with possibility,\nwith the constitution of the world, and the natural government which\nwe experience exercised over it, destroys all reasonable ground of\nbelief, that we are in a state of religion: or whether that opinion be\nreconcilable with religion; with the system, and the proof of it.\n\nSuppose then a fatalist to educate any one, from his youth up, in his\nown principles; that the child should reason upon them, and conclude,\nthat since he cannot possibly behave otherwise than he does, he is not\na subject of blame or commendation, nor can deserve to be rewarded\nor punished. Imagine him to eradicate the very perceptions of blame\nand commendation out of his mind, by means of this system; to form\nhis temper, and character, and behavior to it; and from it to judge\nof the treatment he was to expect, say, from reasonable men, upon his\ncoming abroad into the world: as the fatalist judges from this system,\nwhat he is to expect from the Author of nature, and with regard to\na future state. I cannot forbear stopping here to ask, whether any\none of common sense would think fit, that a child should be put upon\nthese speculations, and be left to apply them to practice. And a\nman has little pretence to reason, who is not sensible, that we are\nall children in speculations of this kind. However, the child would\ndoubtless be highly delighted to find himself freed from the restraints\nof fear and shame, with which his play-fellows were fettered and\nembarrassed; and highly conceited in his superior knowledge, so far\nbeyond his years. But conceit and vanity would be the least bad part\nof the influence, which these principles must have, when thus reasoned\nand acted upon, during the course of his education. He must either be\nallowed to go on and be the plague of all about him, and himself too,\neven to his own destruction, or else correction must be continually\nmade use of, to supply the want of those natural perceptions of blame\nand commendation, which we have supposed to be removed; and to give\nhim a practical impression, of what he had reasoned himself out of the\nbelief of, that he was in fact an accountable child, and to be punished\nfor doing what he was forbid. It is therefore in reality impossible,\nbut that the correction which he must meet with, in the course of his\neducation, must convince him, that if the scheme he was instructed\nin were not false, yet that he reasoned inconclusively upon it, and\nsomehow or other misapplied it to practice and common life; as what the\nfatalist experiences of the conduct of Providence at present, ought\nin all reason to convince him, that this scheme is misapplied, when\napplied to the subject of religion.[105] But supposing the child\u2019s\ntemper could remain still formed to the system, and his expectation of\nthe treatment he was to have in the world, be regulated by it; so as\nto expect that no reasonable man would blame or punish him, for any\nthing which he should do, because he could not help doing it: upon this\nsupposition it is manifest he would, upon his coming abroad into the\nworld, be insupportable to society, and the treatment which he would\nreceive from it would render it so to him; and he could not fail of\ndoing something very soon, for which he would be delivered over into\nthe hands of civil justice. And thus, in the end, he would be convinced\nof the obligations he was under to his wise instructor.\n\nSuppose this scheme of fatality, in any other way, applied to practice,\nsuch practical application of it will be found equally absurd; equally\nfallacious in a practical sense. For instance, that if a man be\ndestined to live such a time, he shall live to it, though he take no\ncare of his own preservation; or if he be destined to die before that\ntime, no care can prevent it, therefore all care about preserving one\u2019s\nlife is to be neglected: which is the fallacy instanced in by the\nancients. On the contrary, none of these practical absurdities can be\ndrawn from reasoning, upon the supposition that we are free; but all\nsuch reasoning with regard to the common affairs of life is justified\nby experience. Therefore, though it were admitted that this opinion of\nnecessity were _speculatively_ true; yet, with regard to practice, it\nis as if it were false, so far as our experience reaches: that is, to\nthe whole of our present life. For, the constitution of the present\nworld, and the condition in which we are actually placed, is, as if we\nwere free. And it may perhaps justly be concluded, that since the whole\nprocess of action, through every step of it, suspense, deliberation,\ninclining one way, determining, and at last doing as we determine, is\nas if we were free, therefore we are so.[106]\n\nThe thing here insisted upon is, that under the present natural\ngovernment of the world, we find we are treated and dealt with, as if\nwe were free, prior to all consideration whether we are so or not.\nWere this opinion therefore of necessity admitted to be ever so true;\nyet such is in fact our condition and the natural course of things,\nthat whenever we apply it to life and practice, this application of\nit always misleads us, and cannot but mislead us, in a most dreadful\nmanner, with regard to our present interest. How then can people think\nthemselves so very secure, that the same application of the same\nopinion may not mislead them also, in some analogous manner, with\nrespect to a future, a more general, and more important interest? For,\nreligion being a practical subject; and the analogy of nature showing\nus, that we have not faculties to apply this opinion, were it a true\none, to practical subjects; whenever we do apply it to the subject of\nreligion, and thence conclude, that we are free from its obligations,\nit is plain this conclusion cannot be depended upon. There will still\nremain just reason to think, whatever appearances are, that we deceive\nourselves; in somewhat of a like manner, as when people fancy they can\ndraw contradictory conclusions from the idea of infinity.\n\nFrom these things together, the attentive reader will see it follows,\nthat if upon supposition of freedom the evidence of religion be\nconclusive, it remains so, upon supposition of necessity, because the\nnotion of necessity is not applicable to practical subjects: _i.e._\nwith respect to them, is as if it were not true. Nor does this contain\nany reflection upon reason, but only upon what is unreasonable. For\nto pretend to act upon reason, in opposition to practical principles,\nwhich the Author of our nature gave us to act upon; and to pretend\nto apply our reason to subjects, with regard to which, our own short\nviews, and even our experience, will show us, it cannot be depended\nupon; and such, at best, the subject of necessity must be; this is\nvanity, conceit, and unreasonableness.\n\nBut this is not all. We find within ourselves a will, and are conscious\nof a character. Now if this, in us, be reconcilable with fate, it\nis reconcilable with it in the Author of nature. Besides, natural\ngovernment and final causes imply a character and a will in the\nGovernor and Designer;[107] a will concerning the creatures whom he\ngoverns. The Author of nature then being certainly of some character or\nother, notwithstanding necessity; it is evident this necessity is as\nreconcilable with the particular character of benevolence, veracity,\nand justice, in him, which attributes are the foundation of religion,\nas with any other character: since we find this necessity no more\nhinders _men_ from being benevolent, than cruel; true, than faithless;\njust, than unjust; or, if the fatalist pleases, what we call unjust. It\nis said indeed, that what, upon supposition of freedom, would be just\npunishment, upon supposition of necessity, becomes manifestly unjust:\nbecause it is punishment inflicted for doing that which persons could\nnot avoid doing. As if the necessity, which is supposed to destroy the\ninjustice of murder, for instance, would not also destroy the injustice\nof punishing it! However, as little to the purpose as this objection\nis in itself, it is very much to the purpose to observe from it, how\nthe notions of justice and injustice remain, even while we endeavor to\nsuppose them removed; how they force themselves upon the mind, even\nwhile we are making suppositions destructive of them: for there is not,\nperhaps, a man in the world, but would be ready to make this objection\nat first thought.\n\nBut though it is most evident, that universal necessity, if it be\nreconcilable with any thing, is reconcilable with that character in\nthe Author of nature, which is the foundation of religion; \u201cYet, does\nit not plainly destroy the _proof_ that he is of that character, and\nconsequently the proof of religion?\u201d By no means. For we find, that\nhappiness and misery are not our _fate_, in any such sense as not to be\nthe consequences of our behavior; but that they are the consequences\nof it.[108] We find God exercises the same kind of government over us,\nwhich a father exercises over his children, and a civil magistrate over\nhis subjects. Now, whatever becomes of abstract questions concerning\nliberty and necessity, it evidently appears to us, that veracity\nand justice must be the natural rule and measure of exercising this\nauthority or government, to a Being who can have no competitions, or\ninterfering of interests, with his creatures and his subjects.\n\nBut as the doctrine of liberty, though we experience its truth, may be\nperplexed with difficulties, which run up into the most abstruse of\nall speculations; and as the opinion of necessity seems to be the very\nbasis upon which infidelity grounds itself; it may be of some use to\noffer a more particular proof of the obligations of religion, which may\ndistinctly be shown not to be destroyed by this opinion.\n\nThe proof from final causes of an intelligent Author of nature is\nnot affected by the opinion of necessity; supposing necessity a\nthing possible in itself, and reconcilable with the constitution of\nthings.[109] It is a matter of fact, independent on this or any other\nspeculation, that he governs the world by the method of rewards and\npunishments:[110] and also that he hath given us a moral faculty, by\nwhich we distinguish between actions, and approve some as virtuous\nand of good desert, and disapprove others as vicious and of ill\ndesert.[111] This moral discernment implies, in the notion of it, a\nrule of action, and a rule of a very peculiar kind: for it carries\nin it authority and a right of direction; authority in such a sense,\nas that we cannot depart from it without being self-condemned.[112]\nAnd that the dictates of this moral faculty, which are by nature a\nrule to us, are moreover the laws of God, laws in a sense including\nsanctions; may be thus proved. Consciousness of a rule or guide of\naction, in creatures who are capable of considering it as given them\nby their Maker, not only raises immediately a sense of duty, but also\na sense of security in following it, and of danger in deviating from\nit. A direction of the Author of nature, given to creatures capable of\nlooking upon it as such, is plainly a command from him: and a command\nfrom him necessarily includes in it, at least, an implicit promise in\ncase of obedience, or threatening in case of disobedience. But then the\nsense or perception of good and ill desert,[113] which is contained\nin the moral discernment, renders the sanction explicit, and makes it\nappear, as one may say, expressed. For since his method of government\nis to reward and punish actions, his having annexed to some actions an\ninseparable sense of good desert, and to others of ill, this surely\namounts to declaring, upon whom his punishments shall be inflicted, and\nhis rewards be bestowed. He must have given us this discernment and\nsense of things, as a presentiment of what is to be hereafter: that is,\nby way of information beforehand, what we are finally to expect in this\nworld. There is then most evident ground to think, that the government\nof God, upon the whole, will be found to correspond to the nature which\nhe has given us: and that, in the upshot and issue of things, happiness\nand misery shall, in fact and event, be made to follow virtue and vice\nrespectively; as he has already, in so peculiar a manner, associated\nthe ideas of them in our minds. And hence might easily be deduced the\nobligations of religious worship, were it only to be considered as a\nmeans of preserving upon our minds a sense of this moral government\nof God, and securing our obedience to it: which yet is an extremely\nimperfect view of that most important duty.\n\nNo objection from necessity can lie against this general proof of\nreligion. None against the proposition reasoned upon, that we have\nsuch a moral faculty and discernment; because this is a mere matter of\nfact, a thing of experience, that human kind is thus constituted: none\nagainst the conclusion; because it is immediate and wholly from this\nfact. For the conclusion, that God will finally reward the righteous\nand punish the wicked, is not here drawn, from its appearing to us\nfit[114] that _he should_; but from its appearing, that he has told\nus, _he will_. And this he hath certainly told us, in the promise\nand threatening, which it hath been observed the notion of a command\nimplies, and the sense of good and ill desert which he has given us,\nmore distinctly expresses. This reasoning from fact is confirmed, and\nin some degree even verified, by other facts; by the natural tendencies\nof virtue and of vice;[115] and by this, that God, in the natural\ncourse of his providence, punishes vicious actions as mischievous to\nsociety; and also vicious actions as such in the strictest sense.[116]\nSo that the general proof of religion is unanswerably real, even upon\nthe wild supposition which we are arguing upon.\n\nIt must be observed further, that natural religion has, besides this,\nan external evidence; which the doctrine of necessity, if it could be\ntrue, would not affect. For suppose a person, by the observations and\nreasoning above, or by any other, convinced of the truth of religion;\nthat there is a God, who made the world, who is the moral governor\nand judge of mankind, and will upon the whole deal with every one\naccording to his works: I say, suppose a person convinced of this by\nreason, but to know nothing at all of antiquity, or the present state\nof mankind: it would be natural for such a one to be inquisitive, what\nwas the history of this system of doctrine; at what time, and in what\nmanner, it came first into the world; and whether it were believed\nby any considerable part of it. Were he upon inquiry to find, that\na particular person, in a late age, first of all proposed it, as a\ndeduction of reason, and that mankind were before wholly ignorant of\nit; then, though its evidence from reason would remain, there would\nbe no additional probability of its truth, from the account of its\ndiscovery.\n\nBut instead of this being the fact, he would find, on the contrary,\nwhat could not but afford him a very strong confirmation of its truth:\n_First_, That somewhat of this system, with more or fewer additions and\nalterations, hath been professed in all ages and countries, of which\nwe have any certain information relating to this matter. _Secondly_,\nThat it is certain historical fact, so far as we can trace things up,\nthat this whole system of belief, that there is one God, the creator\nand moral governor of the world, and that mankind is in a state of\nreligion, was received in the first ages. And _Thirdly_, That as\nthere is no hint or intimation in history, that this system was first\nreasoned out; so there is express historical or traditional evidence,\nas ancient as history, that it was taught first by revelation.\n\nNow these things must be allowed to be of great weight. The first of\nthem, general consent, shows this system to be conformable to the\ncommon sense of mankind. The second, namely, that religion was believed\nin the first ages of the world, especially as it does not appear that\nthere were then any superstitious or false additions to it, cannot\nbut be a further confirmation of its truth. For it is a proof of\nthis alternative: either that it came into the world by revelation;\nor that it is natural, obvious, and forces itself upon the mind. The\nformer of these is the conclusion of learned men. And whoever will\nconsider, how unapt for speculation rude and uncultivated minds are,\nwill, perhaps from hence alone, be strongly inclined to believe it the\ntruth. And as it is shown in the second part[117] of this treatise,\nthat there is nothing of such peculiar presumption against a revelation\nin the beginning of the world, as there is supposed to be against\nsubsequent ones; a sceptic could not, I think, give any account, which\nwould appear more probable even to himself, of the early pretences to\nrevelation; than by supposing some real original one, from whence they\nwere copied.\n\nAnd the third thing above mentioned, that there is express historical\nor traditional evidence, as ancient as history, of the system of\nreligion being taught mankind by revelation, this must be admitted as\nsome degree of real proof, that it was so taught. For why should not\nthe most ancient tradition be admitted as some additional proof of a\nfact, against which there is no presumption? This proof is mentioned\nhere, because it has its weight to show, that religion came into\nthe world by revelation, prior to all consideration of the proper\nauthority of any book supposed to contain it; and even prior to all\nconsideration, whether the revelation itself be uncorruptly handed\ndown, or mixed and darkened with fables. Thus the historical account,\nwhich we have of the origin of religion, taking in all circumstances,\nis a real confirmation of its truth, no way affected by the opinion of\nnecessity. And the _external_ evidence, even of natural religion, is by\nno means inconsiderable.\n\nIt is carefully to be observed, and ought to be recollected after\nall proofs of virtue and religion, which are only general, that as\nspeculative reason may be neglected, prejudiced, and deceived, so also\nmay our moral understanding be impaired and perverted, and the dictates\nof it not impartially attended to. This indeed proves nothing against\nthe reality of our speculative or practical faculties of perception?\nagainst their being intended by nature, to inform us in the theory\nof things, and instruct us how we are to behave, and what we are to\nexpect in consequence of our behavior. Yet our liableness, in the\ndegree we are liable, to prejudice and perversion, is a most serious\nadmonition to us to be upon our guard, with respect to what is of such\nconsequence, as our determinations concerning virtue and religion;\nand particularly not to take custom, and fashion, and slight notions\nof honor, or imaginations of present ease, use, and convenience to\nmankind, for the only moral rule.[118]\n\nThe foregoing observations, drawn from the nature of the thing, and\nthe history of religion, amount, _when taken together_, to a real\npractical proof of it, not to be confuted: such a proof as, considering\nthe infinite importance of the thing, I apprehend, would be admitted\nfully sufficient, in reason, to influence the actions of men, who act\nupon thought and reflection, if it were admitted that there is no proof\nof the contrary. But it may be said; \u201cThere are many probabilities,\nwhich cannot indeed be confuted; _i.e._ shown to be no probabilities,\nand yet may be overbalanced by greater probabilities, on the other\nside; much more by demonstration. And there is no occasion to object\nagainst particular arguments alleged for an opinion, when the opinion\nitself may be clearly shown to be false, without meddling with such\narguments at all, but leaving them just as they are.[119] Now the\nmethod of government by rewards and punishments, and especially\nrewarding and punishing good and ill desert as such respectively, must\ngo upon supposition, that we are free and not necessary agents. And\nit is incredible, that the Author of nature should govern us upon a\nsupposition as true, which he knows to be false; and therefore absurd\nto think, he will reward or punish us for our actions hereafter;\nespecially that he will do it under the notion, that they are of good\nor ill desert.\u201d\n\nHere then the matter is brought to a point. And the answer is full,\nand not to be evaded,--viz.: that the whole constitution and course\nof things, the whole analogy of Providence, shows beyond possibility\nof doubt, that the conclusion from this reasoning is false; wherever\nthe fallacy lies. The doctrine of freedom indeed clearly shows where:\nin supposing ourselves necessary, when in truth we are free agents.\nBut, upon the supposition of necessity, the fallacy lies in taking for\ngranted, that it is incredible necessary agents should be rewarded\nand punished. That, somehow or other, the conclusion now mentioned\nis false, is most certain. For it is fact, that God does govern even\nbrute creatures by the method of rewards and punishments, in the\nnatural course of things. Men are rewarded and punished for their\nactions, punished for actions mischievous to society as being so,\npunished for vicious actions as such; by the natural instrumentality\nof each other, under the present conduct of Providence. Nay, even\nthe affection of gratitude, and the passion of resentment, and the\nrewards and punishments following from them, which in general are to be\nconsidered as natural, _i.e._ from the Author of nature; these rewards\nand punishments, being _naturally_[120] annexed to actions considered\nas implying good intention and good desert, ill intention and ill\ndesert; these natural rewards and punishments, I say, are as much a\ncontradiction to the conclusion above, and show its falsehood, as a\nmore exact and complete rewarding and punishing of good and ill desert\nas such. So that if it be incredible, that necessary agents should be\nthus rewarded and punished; then, men are not necessary but free; since\nit is matter of fact, that they are thus rewarded and punished. If,\non the contrary, which is the supposition we have been arguing upon,\nit be insisted that men are necessary agents; then, there is nothing\nincredible in the further supposition of necessary agents being thus\nrewarded and punished: since we ourselves are thus dealt with.\n\nFrom the whole therefore it must follow, that a necessity supposed\npossible, and reconcilable with the constitution of things, does in no\nsort prove that the Author of Nature will not, nor destroy the proof\nthat he will, finally and upon the whole, in his eternal government,\nrender his creatures happy or miserable, by some means or other, as\nthey behave well or ill. Or, to express this conclusion in words\nconformable to the title of the chapter, the analogy of nature shows\nus, that the opinion of necessity, considered as practical, is false.\nAnd if necessity, upon the supposition above mentioned, doth not\ndestroy the proof of natural religion, it evidently makes no alteration\nin the proof of revealed.\n\nFrom these things likewise we may learn, in what sense to understand\nthat general assertion, that the opinion of necessity is essentially\ndestructive of all religion. First, in a practical sense; that by this\nnotion, atheistical men pretend to satisfy and encourage themselves\nin vice, and justify to others their disregard to all religion. And\nsecondly, in the strictest sense; that it is a contradiction to\nthe whole constitution of nature, and to what we may every moment\nexperience in ourselves, and so overturns every thing. But by no means\nis this assertion to be understood, as if necessity, supposing it could\npossibly be reconciled with the constitution of things, and with what\nwe experience, were not also reconcilable with religion: for upon this\nsupposition, it demonstrably is so.[121]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII.\n\nTHE GOVERNMENT OF GOD, CONSIDERED AS A SCHEME OR CONSTITUTION,\nIMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED.\n\n\nThough it be acknowledged, as it cannot but be, that the analogy of\nnature gives a strong credibility to the general doctrine of religion,\nand to the several particular things contained in it, considered as so\nmany matters of fact; and likewise that it shows this credibility not\nto be destroyed by any notions of necessity: still, objections may be\ninsisted upon, against the wisdom, equity, and goodness of the divine\ngovernment implied in the notion of religion, and against the method\nby which this government is conducted; to which objections analogy\ncan be no direct answer. For the credibility, or the certain truth,\nof a matter of fact, does not immediately prove any thing concerning\nthe wisdom or goodness of it; and analogy can do no more, immediately\nor directly, than show such and such things to be true or credible,\nconsidered only as matters of fact. But if, upon supposition of a\nmoral constitution of nature and a moral government over it, analogy\nsuggests and makes it credible, that this government must be a scheme,\nsystem, or constitution of government, as distinguished from a number\nof single unconnected acts of distributive justice and goodness; and\nlikewise, that it must be a scheme, so imperfectly comprehended, and\nof such a sort in other respects, as to afford a direct general answer\nto all objections against the justice and goodness of it: then analogy\nis, remotely, of great service in answering those objections; both by\nsuggesting the answer, and showing it to be a credible one.\n\nNow this, upon inquiry, will be found to be the case. For, _First_,\nUpon supposition that God exercises a moral government over the\nworld, the analogy of his natural government suggests and makes it\ncredible, that his moral government _must_ be a scheme, quite beyond\nour comprehension: and this affords a general answer to all objections\nagainst the justice and goodness of it. _Secondly_, A more distinct\nobservation of some particular things contained in God\u2019s scheme of\nnatural government, the like things being supposed, by analogy, to be\ncontained in his moral government, will further show, how little weight\nis to be laid upon these objections.\n\nI. Upon supposition that God exercises a moral government over the\nworld, the analogy of his natural government suggests and makes\nit credible, that his moral government must be a scheme, quite\nbeyond our comprehension; and this affords a general answer to\nall objections against the justice and goodness of it. It is most\nobvious, analogy renders it highly credible, that, upon supposition\nof a moral government, it must be a scheme. For the world, and the\nwhole natural government of it, appears to be so: to be a scheme,\nsystem, or constitution, whose parts correspond to each other, and\nto a whole, as really as any work of art, or as any particular model\nof a civil constitution and government. In this great scheme of the\nnatural world, individuals have various peculiar relations to other\nindividuals of their own species. Whole species are, we find, variously\nrelated to other species, upon this earth. Nor do we know, how much\nfurther these kinds of relations may extend. And, as there is not any\naction or natural event, which we are acquainted with, so single and\nunconnected, as not to have a respect to some other actions and events;\nso possibly each of them, when it has not an immediate, may yet have\na remote, natural relation to other actions and events, much beyond\nthe compass of this present world. There seems indeed nothing, from\nwhence we can so much as make a conjecture, whether all creatures,\nactions, and events, throughout the whole of nature, have relations to\neach other But, as it is obvious, that all events have future unknown\nconsequences; so if we trace any event, as far as we can, into what is\nconnected with it, we shall find, that if it were not connected with\nsomething further in nature, unknown to us, something both past and\npresent, such event could not possibly have been at all. Nor can we\ngive the whole account of any one thing whatever; of all its causes,\nends, and necessary adjuncts; those adjuncts, I mean, without which\nit could not have been. By this most astonishing connection, these\nreciprocal correspondences and mutual relations, every thing which we\nsee in the course of nature is actually brought about. Things seemingly\nthe most insignificant imaginable, are perpetually observed to be\nnecessary conditions to other things of the greatest importance; so\nthat any one thing whatever, may for aught we know to the contrary, be\na necessary condition to any other.\n\nThe natural world then, and natural government of it, being such an\nincomprehensible scheme; so incomprehensible, that a man must, really\nin the literal sense, know nothing at all, who is not sensible of\nhis ignorance in it; this immediately suggests, and strongly shows\nthe credibility, that the moral world and government of it may be so\ntoo.[122] Indeed the natural and moral constitution and government of\nthe world are so connected, as to make up together but one scheme:\nand it is highly probable, that the first is formed and carried on\nmerely in subserviency to the latter; as the vegetable world is for the\nanimal, and organized bodies for minds. But the thing intended here is,\nwithout inquiring how far the administration of the natural world is\nsubordinate to that of the moral, only to observe the credibility, that\none should be analogous or similar to the other: that therefore every\nact of divine justice and goodness may be supposed to look much beyond\nitself, and its immediate object; may have some reference to other\nparts of God\u2019s moral administration, and to a general moral plan; and\nthat every circumstance of this his moral government may be adjusted\nbeforehand with a view to the whole of it. For example: the determined\nlength of time, and the degrees and ways, in which virtue is to remain\nin a state of warfare and discipline, and in which wickedness is\npermitted to have its progress; the times appointed for the execution\nof justice; the appointed instruments of it; the kinds of rewards and\npunishments, and the manners of their distribution; all particular\ninstances of divine justice and goodness, and every circumstance of\nthem, may have such respects to each other, as to make up altogether\na whole, connected and related in all its parts; a scheme or system,\nwhich is as properly such, as the natural world is, and of the like\nkind. Supposing this to be the case, it is most evident, that we are\nnot competent judges of this scheme, from the small parts of it which\ncome within our view in the present life: therefore no objections\nagainst any of these parts can be insisted upon by reasonable men.[123]\n\nThis our ignorance, and the consequence here drawn from it, are\nuniversally acknowledged upon _other_ occasions; and though scarce\ndenied, yet are universally forgot, when persons come to argue against\nreligion. And it is not perhaps easy, even for the most reasonable\nmen, always to bear in mind the degree of our ignorance, and make due\nallowances for it. Upon these accounts, it may not be useless to go a\nlittle further, in order to show more distinctly, how just an answer\nour ignorance is, to objections against the scheme of Providence.\nSuppose then a person boldly to assert,[124] that the things complained\nof, the origin and continuance of evil, might easily have been\nprevented by repeated interpositions;[125] interpositions so guarded\nand circumstanced, as would preclude all mischief arising from them.\nOr, if this were impracticable, that a _scheme_ of government is itself\nan imperfection, since more good might have been produced, without any\nscheme, system, or constitution at all, by continued single unrelated\nacts of distributive justice and goodness; because these would have\noccasioned no irregularities. Farther than this, it is presumed, the\nobjections will not be carried. Yet the answer is obvious: that were\nthese assertions true, still the observations above, concerning our\nignorance in the scheme of divine government and the consequence drawn\nfrom it, would hold, in great measure; enough to vindicate religion,\nagainst all objections from the disorders of the present state. Were\nthese assertions true, yet the government of the world might be just\nand good notwithstanding; for, at the most, they would infer nothing\nmore than that it might have been better. But they are mere arbitrary\nassertions; no man being sufficiently acquainted with the possibilities\nof things, to bring any proof of them to the lowest degree of\nprobability. For however possible what is asserted may seem, yet many\ninstances may be alleged, in things much less out of our reach, of\nsuppositions absolutely impossible, and reducible to the most palpable\nself contradictions, which, not every one would perceive to be such;\nnor perhaps any one, at first sight suspect.\n\nFrom these things, it is easy to see distinctly, how our ignorance,\nas it is the common, so it is really a satisfactory answer, to all\nobjections against the justice and goodness of Providence. If a man,\ncontemplating any one providential dispensation, which had no relation\nto any others, should object, that he discerned in it a disregard to\njustice, or a deficiency of goodness; nothing would be less an answer\nto such objection, than our ignorance in other parts of providence,\nor in the possibilities of things, no way related to what he was\ncontemplating. But when we know not but the part objected against may\nbe relative to other parts unknown to us; and when we are unacquainted\nwith what is, in the nature of the thing, practicable in the case\nbefore us; then our ignorance is a satisfactory answer; because, some\nunknown relation, or some unknown impossibility, may render what is\nobjected against, just and good; nay good in the highest practicable\ndegree.\n\nII. How little weight is to be laid upon such objections, will further\nappear, by a more distinct observation of some particular things\ncontained in the natural government of God, the like to which may be\nsupposed, from analogy, to be contained in his moral government.\n\n_First_, As in the scheme of the natural world, no ends appear to be\naccomplished without means: so we find that means very undesirable,\noften conduce to bring about ends in such a measure desirable, as\ngreatly to overbalance the disagreeableness of the means. And in cases\nwhere such means are conducive to such ends, it is not reason, but\n_experience_, which shows us, that they are thus conducive. Experience\nalso shows many means to be conducive and necessary to accomplish ends,\nwhich means, before experience, we should have thought, would have\nhad even a contrary tendency. From these observations relating to the\nnatural scheme of the world, the moral being supposed analogous to\nit, arises a great credibility, that the putting our misery in each\nother\u2019s power to the degree it is, and making men liable to vice to the\ndegree we are; and in general, that those things which are objected\nagainst the moral scheme of Providence, may be, upon the whole,\nfriendly and assistant to virtue, and productive of an overbalance of\nhappiness: _i.e._ the things objected against may be means, by which\nan overbalance of good, will in the end, be found produced. And from\nthe same observations, it appears to be no presumption against this,\nthat we do not, if indeed we do not, see those means to have any\nsuch tendency, or that they seem to us to have a contrary one. Thus\nthose things, which we call irregularities, may not be so at all;\nbecause they may be means of accomplishing wise and good ends more\nconsiderable. It may be added, as above, that they may also be the\nonly means, by which these wise and good ends are capable of being\naccomplished.\n\nIt may be proper to add, in order to obviate an absurd and wicked\nconclusion from any of these observations, that though the constitution\nof our nature, from whence we are capable of vice and misery, may, as\nit undoubtedly does, contribute to the perfection and happiness of\nthe world; and though the actual permission of evil may be beneficial\nto it: (_i.e._ it would have been more mischievous, not that a wicked\nperson had himself abstained from his own wickedness, but that any\none had forcibly prevented it, than that it was permitted:) yet\nnotwithstanding, it might have been much better for the world, if this\nvery evil had never been done. Nay it is most clearly conceivable, that\nthe very commission of wickedness may be beneficial to the world, and\nyet, that it would be infinitely more beneficial for men to refrain\nfrom it. For thus, in the wise and good constitution of the natural\nworld, there are disorders which bring their own cures; diseases, which\nare themselves remedies. Many a man would have died, had it not been\nfor the gout or a fever; yet it would be thought madness to assert,\nthat sickness is a better or more perfect state than health; though the\nlike, with regard to the moral world, has been asserted.\n\n_Secondly_, The natural government of the world is carried on by\ngeneral laws. For this there may be wise and good reasons: the wisest\nand best, for aught we know to the contrary. And that there are such\nreasons, is suggested to our thoughts by the analogy of nature; by our\nbeing made to experience good ends to be accomplished, as indeed all\nthe good which we enjoy is accomplished, by this means,--viz.: that the\nlaws, by which the world is governed, are general. We have scarce any\nkind of enjoyments, but what we are, in some way or other, instrumental\nin procuring ourselves, by acting in a manner which we _foresee_ likely\nto procure them: now this foresight could not be at all, were not the\ngovernment of the world carried on by general laws. And though, for\naught we know to the contrary, every single case may be, at length,\nfound to have been provided for even by these: yet to prevent all\nirregularities, or remedy them as they arise, by the wisest and best\ngeneral laws, may be impossible in the nature of things; as we see it\nis absolutely impossible in civil government.\n\nBut then we are ready to think, that, the constitution of nature\nremaining as it is, and the course of things being permitted to go\non, in other respects, as it does, there might be interpositions to\nprevent irregularities; though they could not have been prevented, or\nremedied by any general laws. There would indeed be reason to wish,\nwhich, by-the-way, is very different from a right to claim, that all\nirregularities were prevented or remedied by present interpositions,\nif these interpositions would have no other effect than this. But it\nis plain they would have some visible and immediate _bad_ effects:\nfor instance, they would encourage idleness and negligence; and they\nwould render doubtful the natural rule of life, which is ascertained by\nthis very thing, that the course of the world is carried on by general\nlaws. And further, it is certain they would have _distant_ effects,\nand very great ones too; by means of the wonderful connections before\nmentioned.[126] So that we cannot so much as guess, what would be the\nwhole result of the interpositions desired. It may be said, any bad\nresult might be prevented by further interpositions, whenever there was\noccasion for them: but this again is talking quite at random, and in\nthe dark.[127]\n\nUpon the whole then, we see wise reasons, why the course of the world\nshould be carried on by general laws, and good ends accomplished by\nthis means: and for aught we know, there may be the wisest reasons\nfor it, and the best ends accomplished by it. We have no ground to\nbelieve, that all irregularities could be remedied as they arise, or\ncould have been precluded, by general laws. We find that interpositions\nwould produce evil, and prevent good: and, for aught we know, they\nwould produce greater evil than they would prevent; and prevent greater\ngood than they would produce. And if this be the case, then the not\ninterposing is so far from being a ground of complaint, that it is an\ninstance of goodness. This is intelligible and sufficient: and going\nfurther, seems beyond the utmost reach of our faculties.\n\nIt may be said, that \u201cafter all, these supposed impossibilities and\nrelations are what we are unacquainted with; and we must judge of\nreligion, as of other things, by what we do know, and look upon the\nrest as nothing: or however, that the answers here given to what is\nobjected against religion, may equally be made use of to invalidate the\nproof of it; since their stress lies so very much upon our ignorance.\u201d\nBut,\n\n_First_, Though total ignorance in any matter does indeed equally\ndestroy, or rather preclude, all proof concerning it, and objections\nagainst it; yet partial ignorance does not. For we may in any degree be\nconvinced, that a person is of such a character, and consequently will\npursue such ends; though we are greatly ignorant, what is the proper\nway of acting, in order the most effectually to obtain those ends: and\nin this case, objections against his manner of acting, as seemingly\nnot conducive to obtain them, might be answered by our ignorance;\nthough the proof that such ends were intended, might not at all be\ninvalidated by it. Thus, the proof of religion is a proof of the moral\ncharacter of God, and consequently that his government is moral, and\nthat every one upon the whole shall receive according to his deserts; a\nproof that this is the designed end of his government. But we are not\ncompetent judges, what is the proper way of acting, in order the most\neffectually to accomplish this end.[128] Therefore our ignorance is an\nanswer to objections against the conduct of Providence, in permitting\nirregularities, as seeming contradictory to this end. Now, since it\nis so obvious, that our ignorance may be a satisfactory answer to\nobjections against a thing, and yet not affect the proof of it; till it\ncan be shown, it is frivolous to assert, that our ignorance invalidates\nthe proof of religion, as it does the objections against it.\n\n_Secondly_, Suppose unknown impossibilities, and unknown relations,\nmight justly be urged to invalidate the proof of religion, as well as\nto answer objections against it; and that, in consequence of this,\nthe proof of it were doubtful. Still, let the assertion be despised,\nor let it be ridiculed, it is undeniably true, that moral obligations\nwould remain certain, though it were not certain what would, upon the\nwhole, be the consequences of observing or violating them. For, these\nobligations arise, immediately and necessarily, from the judgment of\nour own mind, unless perverted, which we cannot violate without being\nself-condemned. And they would be certain too, from considerations\nof interest. For though it were doubtful, what will be the future\nconsequences of virtue and vice; yet it is, however, credible, that\nthey may have those consequences, which religion teaches us they will:\nand this credibility is a certain[129] obligation in point of prudence,\nto abstain from all wickedness, and to live in the conscientious\npractice of all that is good.\n\n_Thirdly_, The answers above given to the objections against religion\ncannot be made use of to invalidate the proof of it. For, upon\nsuspicion that God exercises a moral government over the world, analogy\ndoes most strongly lead us to conclude, that this moral government must\nbe a scheme, or constitution, beyond our comprehension. A thousand\nparticular analogies show us, that parts of such a scheme, from their\nrelation to other parts, may conduce to accomplish ends, which we\nshould have thought they had no tendency to accomplish: nay ends, which\nbefore experience, we should have thought such parts were contradictory\nto, and had a tendency to prevent. Therefore all these analogies show,\nthat the way of arguing made use of in objecting against religion is\ndelusive: because they show it is not at all incredible, that, could we\ncomprehend the whole, we should find the permission of the disorders\nobjected against to be consistent with justice and goodness; and even\nto be instances of them. Now this is not applicable to the proof of\nreligion, as it is to the objections against it;[130] and therefore\ncannot invalidate that proof, as it does these objections.\n\n_Lastly_, From the observation now made, it is easy to see, that the\nanswers above given to the objections against Providence, though,\nin a general way of speaking, they may be said to be taken from our\nignorance; yet are by no means taken merely from that, but from\nsomething which analogy shows us concerning it. For analogy shows us\npositively, that our ignorance in the possibilities of things, and the\nvarious relations in nature, renders us incompetent judges, and leads\nus to false conclusions, in cases similar to this, in which we pretend\nto judge and to object. So that the things above insisted upon are not\nmere suppositions of unknown impossibilities and relations: but they\nare suggested to our thoughts, and even forced upon the observation\nof serious men, and rendered credible too, by the analogy of nature.\nTherefore to take these things into the account, is to judge by\nexperience and what we do know: and it is not judging so, to take no\nnotice of them.\n\n\nCONCLUSION.\n\nThe observations of the last chapter lead us to consider this little\nscene of human life, in which we are so busily engaged, as having a\nreference, of some sort or other, to a much larger plan of things.\nWhether we are, any way, related to the more distant parts of the\nboundless universe, into which we are brought, is altogether uncertain.\nBut it is evident, that the course of things, which comes within\nour view, is connected with some things, past, present, and future,\nbeyond it.[131] So that we are placed, as one may speak, in the middle\nof a scheme, not fixed but progressive, every way incomprehensible:\nincomprehensible, in a manner equally, with respect to what has\nbeen, what now is, and what shall be. This scheme cannot but contain\nin it some things as wonderful, and as much beyond our thought and\nconception,[132] as any thing in that of religion. For, will any man in\nhis senses say, that it is less difficult to conceive, how the world\ncame to be and to continue as it is, without, than with, an intelligent\nAuthor and Governor of it? Or, admitting an intelligent Governor of\nit, that there is some other rule of government more natural, and of\neasier conception, than that which we call moral? Indeed, without an\nintelligent Author and Governor of nature, no account at all can be\ngiven, how this universe, or the part of it particularly in which we\nare concerned, came to be, and the course of it to be carried on, as it\nis: nor any, of its general end and design, without a moral governor of\nit. That there is an intelligent Author of nature, and natural Governor\nof the world, is a principle gone upon in the foregoing treatise; as\nproved, and generally known, and confessed to be proved. And the very\nnotion of an intelligent Author of nature, proved by particular final\ncauses, implies a will and a character.[133]\n\nNow, as our whole nature, the nature which he has given us, leads us to\nconclude his will and character to be moral, just, and good: so we can\nscarce in imagination conceive, what it can be otherwise. However, in\nconsequence of this his will and character, whatever it be, he formed\nthe universe as it is, and carries on the course of it as he does,\nrather than in any other manner; and has assigned to us, and to all\nliving creatures, a part and a lot in it. Irrational creatures act this\ntheir part, and enjoy and undergo the pleasures and the pains allotted\nthem, without any reflection. But one would think it impossible, that\ncreatures endued with reason could avoid reflecting sometimes upon all\nthis; reflecting, if not from whence we came, yet, at least, whither\nwe are going; and what the mysterious scheme, in the midst of which\nwe find ourselves, will, at length, come out and produce: a scheme in\nwhich it is certain we are highly interested, and in which we may be\ninterested even beyond conception.[134]\n\nFor many things prove it palpably absurd to conclude, that we shall\ncease to be, at death. Particular analogies do most sensibly show us,\nthat there is nothing to be thought strange, in our being to exist in\nanother state of life. And that we are now living beings, affords a\nstrong probability that we shall _continue_ so; unless there be some\npositive ground, and there is none from reason or analogy, to think\ndeath will destroy us. Were a persuasion of this kind ever so well\ngrounded, there would, surely, be little reason to take pleasure in it.\nIndeed it can have no other ground, than some such imagination, as that\nof our gross bodies being ourselves; which is contrary to experience.\nExperience too most clearly shows us the folly of concluding, from\nthe body and the living agent affecting each other mutually, that the\ndissolution of the former is the destruction of the latter. And there\nare remarkable instances of their _not_ affecting each other, which\nlead us to a contrary conclusion. The supposition, then, which in all\nreason we are to go upon, is, that our living nature will _continue_\nafter death. And it is infinitely unreasonable to form an institution\nof life, or to act, upon any other supposition.\n\nAll expectation of immortality, whether more or less certain, opens\nan unbounded prospect to our hopes and our fears: since we see the\nconstitution of nature is such, as to admit of misery, as well as to be\nproductive of happiness, and experience ourselves to partake of both\nin some degree; and since we cannot but know, what higher degrees of\nboth we are capable of. And there is no presumption against believing\nfurther, that our future interest depends upon our present behavior:\nfor we see our present interest doth; and that the happiness and\nmisery, which are naturally annexed to our actions, very frequently do\nnot follow, till long after the actions are done, to which they are\nrespectively annexed. So that were speculation to leave us uncertain,\nwhether it were likely, that the Author of nature, in giving happiness\nand misery to his creatures, hath regard to their actions or not, yet,\nsince we find by experience that he hath such regard, the whole sense\nof things which he has given us, plainly leads us, at once and without\nany elaborate inquiries, to think that it may, indeed must, be to good\nactions chiefly that he hath annexed happiness, and to bad actions\nmisery; or that he will, upon the whole, reward those who do well, and\npunish those who do evil.\n\nTo confirm this from the constitution of the world, it has been\nobserved, that some sort of moral government is necessarily implied\nin that natural government of God, which we experience ourselves\nunder; that good and bad actions, at present, are naturally rewarded\nand punished, not only as beneficial and mischievous to society, but\nalso as virtuous and vicious: and that there is, in the very nature\nof the thing, a tendency to their being rewarded and punished in a\nmuch higher degree than they are at present. And though this higher\ndegree of distributive justice, which nature thus points out and leads\ntowards, is prevented for a time from taking place; it is by obstacles,\nwhich the state of this world unhappily throws in its way, and which\ntherefore are in their nature temporary. Now, as these things in the\nnatural conduct of Providence are observable on the side of virtue;\nso there is nothing to be set against them on the side of vice. A\nmoral scheme of government then is visibly established, and, in some\ndegree, carried into execution: and this, together with the essential\ntendencies of virtue and vice duly considered, naturally raise in us an\napprehension, that it will be carried on further towards perfection in\na future state, and that every one shall there receive according to his\ndeserts.\n\nAnd if this be so, then our future and general interest, under the\nmoral government of God, is appointed to depend upon our behavior;\nnotwithstanding the difficulty, which this may occasion, of securing\nit, and the danger of losing it: just in the same manner as our\ntemporal interest, under his natural government, is appointed to depend\nupon our behavior; notwithstanding the like difficulty and danger.\nFor, from our original constitution, and that of the world which we\ninhabit, we are naturally trusted with ourselves; with our own conduct\nand our own interest. And from the same constitution of nature,\nespecially joined with that course of things which is owing to men,\nwe have temptations to be unfaithful in this trust; to forfeit this\ninterest, to neglect it, and run ourselves into misery and ruin. From\nthese temptations arise the difficulties of behaving so as to secure\nour temporal interest, and the hazard of behaving so as to miscarry in\nit. There is therefore nothing incredible in supposing there may be the\nlike difficulty and hazard with regard to that chief and final good,\nwhich religion lays before us.\n\nThe whole account, how it came to pass that we were placed in such a\ncondition as this, must indeed be beyond our comprehension. But it is\nin part accounted for by what religion teaches us, that the character\nof virtue and piety must be a necessary qualification for a future\nstate of security and happiness, under the moral government of God; in\nlike manner, as some certain qualifications or other are necessary for\nevery particular condition of life, under his natural government: and\nthat the present state was intended to be a school of discipline, for\nimproving in ourselves that character. Now this intention of nature\nis rendered highly credible by observing; that we are plainly made\nfor improvement of all kinds; that it is a general appointment of\nProvidence, that we cultivate practical principles, and form within\nourselves habits of action, in order to become fit for what we were\nwholly unfit for before; that in particular, childhood and youth is\nnaturally appointed to be a state of discipline for mature age; and\nthat the present world is peculiarly fitted for a state of moral\ndiscipline. And, whereas objections are urged against the whole notion\nof moral government and a probationary state, from the opinion of\nnecessity; it has been shown, that God has given us the evidence, as\nit were, of experience, that all objections against religion, on this\nhead, are vain and delusive. He has also, in his natural government,\nsuggested an answer to all our short-sighted objections, against the\nequity and goodness of his moral government; and in general he has\nexemplified to us the latter by the former.\n\nThese things, which it is to be remembered, are matters of fact, ought,\nin all common sense, to awaken mankind; to induce them to consider\nin earnest their condition, and what they have to do. It is absurd,\nabsurd to the degree of being ridiculous, if the subject were not of so\nserious a kind, for men to think themselves secure in a vicious life;\nor even in that immoral thoughtlessness, into which far the greatest\npart of them are fallen. The credibility of religion, arising from\nexperience and facts here considered, is fully sufficient, in reason,\nto engage them to live in the general practice of all virtue and piety;\nunder the serious apprehension, though it should be mixed with some\ndoubt,[135] of a righteous administration established in nature, and\na future judgment in consequence of it: especially when we consider,\nhow very questionable it is, whether any thing at all can be gained\nby vice,[136] how unquestionably little as well as precarious, the\npleasures and profits of it are at the best, and how soon they must\nbe parted with at the longest. For, in the deliberations of reason,\nconcerning what we are to pursue and what to avoid, as temptations\nto any thing from mere passion are supposed out of the case, so\ninducements to vice, from cool expectations of pleasure and interest so\nsmall and uncertain and short, are really so insignificant, as, in the\nview of reason to be almost nothing in _themselves_; and in comparison\nwith the importance of religion they quite disappear and are lost.\n\nMere passion may indeed be alleged, though not as a reason, yet as\nan excuse, for a vicious course of life. And how sorry an excuse it\nis, will be manifest by observing, that we are placed in a condition\nin which we are unavoidably inured to govern our passions, by being\nnecessitated to govern them: and to lay ourselves under the same kind\nof restraints, and as great ones too, from temporal regards, as virtue\nand piety, in the ordinary course of things, require. The plea of\nungovernable passion then, on the side of vice, is the poorest of all\nthings; for it is no reason, and a poor excuse. The proper _motives_ to\nreligion are the proper _proofs_ of it, from our moral nature, from the\npresages of conscience, and our natural apprehension of God under the\ncharacter of a righteous Governor and Judge: a nature, and conscience,\nand apprehension, given us by him; and from the confirmation of the\ndictates of reason, by _life and immortality brought to light by\nthe Gospel; and the wrath of God revealed from heaven against all\nungodliness and unrighteousness of men_.\n\n\nEND OF THE FIRST PART.\n\n\n\n\nPART II.\n\nRevealed Religion.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I.\n\nTHE IMPORTANCE OF CHRISTIANITY.[137]\n\n\nSome persons, upon pretence of the sufficiency of the light of nature,\navowedly reject all revelation, as in its very notion incredible,\nand what must be fictitious. And indeed it is certain, no revelation\nwould have been given, had the light of nature been sufficient in\nsuch a sense, as to render one not wanted and useless. But no man,\nin seriousness and simplicity of mind, can possibly think it so, who\nconsiders the state of religion in the heathen world before revelation,\nand its present state in those places which have borrowed no light\nfrom it: particularly the doubtfulness of some of the greatest men,\nconcerning things of the utmost importance, as well as the natural\ninattention and ignorance of mankind in general. It is impossible to\nsay, who would have been able to have reasoned out that whole system,\nwhich we call Natural Religion, in its genuine simplicity, clear of\nsuperstition: but there is certainly no ground to affirm that the\ngenerality could. If they could, there is no sort of probability that\nthey would. Admitting there were, they would highly want a standing\nadmonition to remind them of it, and inculcate it upon them.\n\nAnd further, were they as much disposed to attend to religion, as the\nbetter sort of men are; yet even upon this supposition, there would\nbe various occasions for supernatural instruction and assistance, and\nthe greatest advantages might be afforded by them.[138] So that to say\nrevelation is a thing superfluous, what there was no need of, and what\ncan be of no service, is, I think, to talk quite wildly and at random.\nNor would it be more extravagant to affirm, that mankind is so entirely\nat ease in the present state, and life so completely happy, that it\nis a contradiction to suppose our condition capable of being, in any\nrespect, better.\n\nThere are other persons, not to be ranked with these, who seem to\nbe getting into a way of neglecting, and as it were, overlooking\nrevelation, as of small importance provided natural religion be kept\nto. With little regard either to the evidence of the former, or to\nthe objections against it, and even upon supposition of its truth;\n\u201cthe only design of it,\u201d say they, \u201cmust be, to establish a belief of\nthe moral system of nature, and to enforce the practice of natural\npiety and virtue. The belief and practice of these were, perhaps, much\npromoted by the first publication of Christianity: but whether they\nare believed and practised, upon the evidence and motives of nature\nor of revelation, is no great matter,\u201d[139] This way of considering\nrevelation, though it is not the same with the former, yet borders\nnearly upon it, and very much, at length runs up into it: and requires\nto be particularly considered, with regard to the persons who seem\nto be getting into this way. The consideration of it will likewise\nfurther show the extravagance of the former opinion, and the truth of\nthe observations in answer to it, just mentioned. And an inquiry into\nthe importance of Christianity, cannot be an improper introduction to a\ntreatise concerning the credibility of it.\n\nNow, if God has given a revelation to mankind, and commanded those\nthings which are commanded in Christianity; it is evident, at first\nsight, that it cannot in any wise be an indifferent matter, whether\nwe obey or disobey those commands: unless we are certainly assured,\nthat we know all the reasons for them, and that all those reasons are\nnow ceased, with regard to mankind in general, or to ourselves in\nparticular. It is absolutely impossible we can be assured of this.[140]\nFor our ignorance of these reasons proves nothing in the case: since\nthe whole analogy of nature shows, what is indeed in itself evident,\nthat there may be infinite reasons for things, with which we are not\nacquainted.\n\nBut the importance of Christianity will more distinctly appear, by\nconsidering it more distinctly: _First_, as a republication, and\nexternal institution, of natural or essential religion, adapted to the\npresent circumstances of mankind, and intended to promote natural piety\nand virtue: _Secondly_, as containing an account of a dispensation of\nthings, not discoverable by reason, in consequence of which several\ndistinct precepts are enjoined us. For though natural religion is the\nfoundation and principal part of Christianity, it is not in any sense\nthe whole of it.\n\nI. Christianity is a republication of Natural religion. It instructs\nmankind in the moral system of the world: that it is the work of an\ninfinitely perfect Being, and under his government, that virtue is\nhis law, and that he will finally judge mankind in righteousness,\nand render to all according to their works, in a future state. And,\nwhich is very material, it teaches natural religion in its genuine\nsimplicity; free from those superstitions, with which it was totally\ncorrupted, and under which it was in a manner lost.\n\nRevelation is, further, an _authoritative_ publication of natural\nreligion, and so affords the evidence of testimony for the truth of\nit. Indeed the miracles and prophecies recorded in Scripture, were\nintended to prove a particular dispensation of Providence, _i.e._ the\nredemption of the world by the Messiah: but this does not hinder, but\nthat they may also prove God\u2019s general providence over the world, as\nour moral governor and judge. And they evidently do prove it; because\nthis character of the Author of nature, is necessarily connected with\nand implied in that particular revealed dispensation of things: it is\nlikewise continually taught expressly, and insisted upon, by those\npersons who wrought the miracles and delivered the prophecies. So\nthat indeed natural religion seems as much proved by the Scripture\nrevelation, as it would have been, had the design of revelation been\nnothing else than to prove it.\n\nBut it may possibly be disputed, how far miracles can prove natural\nreligion; and notable objections may be urged against this proof of it,\nconsidered as a matter of speculation: but considered as a practical\nthing, there can be none. For suppose a person to teach natural\nreligion to a nation, who bid lived in total ignorance or forgetfulness\nof it; and to declare that he was commissioned by God so to do; suppose\nhim, in proof of his commission, to foretell things future, which no\nhuman foresight could have guessed at; to divide the sea with a word;\nfeed great multitudes with bread from heaven; cure all manner of\ndiseases; and raise the dead, even himself, to life; would not this\ngive additional credibility to his teaching, a credibility beyond what\nthat of a common man would have; and be an authoritative publication of\nthe law of nature, _i.e._ a new proof of it? It would be a practical\none, of the strongest kind, perhaps, which human creatures are capable\nof having given them. The Law of Moses then, and the Gospel of Christ,\nare authoritative publications of the religion of nature; they afford\na proof of God\u2019s general providence, as moral Governor of the world,\nas well as of his particular dispensations of providence towards sinful\ncreatures, revealed in the Law and the Gospel. As they are the only\nevidence of the latter, so they are an additional evidence of the\nformer.\n\nTo show this further, let us suppose a man of the greatest and most\nimproved capacity, who had never heard of revelation, convinced upon\nthe whole, notwithstanding the disorders of the world, that it was\nunder the direction and moral government of an infinitely perfect\nBeing; but ready to question, whether he were not got beyond the reach\nof his faculties: suppose him brought, by this suspicion, into great\ndanger of being carried away by the universal bad example of almost\nevery one around him, who appeared to have no sense, no practical\nsense at least, of these things: and this, perhaps, would be as\nadvantageous a situation with regard to religion, as nature alone\never placed any man in. What a confirmation now must it be to such a\nperson, all at once, to find, that this moral system of things was\nrevealed to mankind, in the name of that infinite Being, whom he had\nfrom principles of reason believed in: and that the publishers of the\nrevelation proved their commission from him, by making it appear, that\nhe had intrusted them with a power of suspending and changing the\ngeneral laws of nature.\n\nNor must it by any means be omitted, for it is a thing of the utmost\nimportance, that life and immortality are eminently brought to light\nby the Gospel. The great doctrines of a future state, the danger of a\ncourse of wickedness[141] and the efficacy of repentance, are not only\nconfirmed in the Gospel, but are taught, especially the last is, with a\ndegree of light, to which that of nature is but darkness.\n\nFurther. As Christianity served these ends and purposes, when it was\nfirst published, by the miraculous publication itself, so it was\nintended to serve the same purposes in future ages, by means of the\nsettlement of a visible church:[142] of a society, distinguished from\ncommon ones, and from the rest of the world, by peculiar religious\ninstitutions; by an instituted method of instruction, and an instituted\nform of external religion. Miraculous powers were given to the first\npreachers of Christianity, in order to their introducing it into the\nworld: a visible church was established, in order to continue it, and\ncarry it on successively throughout all ages. Had only Moses and the\nprophets, Christ and his apostles, taught, and by miracles proved,\nreligion to their contemporaries; the benefits of their instructions\nwould have reached but a small part of mankind. Christianity must\nhave been, in a great degree, sunk and forgot in a very few ages. To\nprevent this, appears to have been one reason why a visible church was\ninstituted; to be like a city upon a hill, a standing memorial to the\nworld of the duty which we owe our Maker: to call men continually,\nboth by example and instruction, to attend to it, and, by the form\nof religion, ever before their eyes, remind them of the reality; to\nbe the repository of the oracles of God; to hold up the light of\nrevelation in aid to that of nature, and to propagate it, throughout\nall generations, to the end of the world--the light of revelation,\nconsidered here in no other view, than as designed to enforce natural\nreligion. And in proportion as Christianity is professed and taught in\nthe world, religion, natural or essential religion, is thus distinctly\nand advantageously laid before mankind, and brought again and again to\ntheir thoughts, as a matter of infinite importance.\n\nA visible church has also a further tendency to promote natural\nreligion, as being an instituted method of education, originally\nintended to be of peculiar advantage to those who conform to it. For\none end of the institution was, that, by admonition and reproof, as\nwell as instruction, by a general regular discipline, and public\nexercises of religion, _the body of Christ_, as the Scripture speaks,\nshould be _edified_; _i.e._ trained up in piety and virtue for a higher\nand better state. This settlement, then, appearing thus beneficial,\ntending in the nature of the thing to answer, and, in some degree,\nactually answering, those ends, it is to be remembered, that the very\nnotion of it implies positive institutions; for the visibility of the\nchurch consists in them. Take away every thing of this kind, and you\nlose the very notion itself. So that if the things now mentioned are\nadvantages, the reason and importance of positive institutions in\ngeneral is most obvious; since without them these advantages could not\nbe secured to the world. And it is mere idle wantonness, to insist upon\nknowing the reasons, _why_ such particular ones were fixed upon rather\nthan others.\n\nThe benefit arising from this supernatural assistance, which\nChristianity affords to natural religion, is what some persons are very\nslow in apprehending. And yet it is a thing distinct in itself, and a\nvery plain obvious one. For will any in good earnest really say, that\nthe bulk of mankind in the heathen world were in as advantageous a\nsituation, with regard to natural religion, as they are now among us:\nthat it was laid before them, and enforced upon them, in a manner as\ndistinct, and as much tending to influence their practice?\n\nThe objections against all this, from the perversion of Christianity,\nand from the supposition of its having had but little good influence,\nhowever innocently they may be proposed, cannot be insisted upon as\nconclusive, upon any principles, but such as lead to downright Atheism;\nbecause the manifestation of the law of nature by reason, which, upon\nall principles of Theism, must have been from God, has been perverted\nand rendered ineffectual in the same manner. It may indeed, I think,\ntruly be said, that the good effects of Christianity have not been\nsmall; nor its supposed ill effects, any effects at all of it, properly\nspeaking. Perhaps, too, the things done have been aggravated; and if\nnot, Christianity hath been often only a pretence, and the same evils\nin the main would have been done upon some other pretence. However,\ngreat and shocking as the corruptions and abuses of it have really\nbeen, they cannot be insisted upon as arguments against it, upon\nprinciples of Theism. For one cannot proceed one step in reasoning upon\nnatural religion, any more than upon Christianity, without laying it\ndown as a first principle, that the dispensations of Providence are not\nto be judged of by their perversions, but by their genuine tendencies:\nnot by what they do actually seem to effect, but by what they would\neffect if mankind did their part; that part which is justly put and\nleft upon them. It is altogether as much the language of one as of the\nother: _He that is unjust, let him be unjust still: and he that is\nholy, let him be holy still._[143] The light of reason does not, any\nmore than that of revelation, force men to submit to its authority;\nboth admonish them of what they ought to do and avoid, together with\nthe consequences of each; and after this, leave them at full liberty\nto act just as they please, till the appointed time of judgment.\nEvery moment\u2019s experience shows, that this is God\u2019s general rule of\ngovernment.[144]\n\nTo return then: Christianity being a promulgation of the law of nature;\nbeing moreover an authoritative promulgation of it; with new light,\nand other circumstances of peculiar advantage, adapted to the wants of\nmankind; these things fully show its importance.\n\nIt is to be observed further, that as the nature of the case requires,\nso all Christians are commanded to contribute, by their profession\nof Christianity, to preserve it in the world, and render it such\na promulgation and enforcement of religion. For it is the very\nscheme of the Gospel, that each Christian should, in his degree,\ncontribute towards continuing and carrying it on: all by uniting in\nthe public profession and external practice of Christianity; some by\ninstructing, by having the oversight and taking care of this religious\ncommunity, the church of God. Now this further shows the importance of\nChristianity; and, which is what I chiefly intend, its importance in a\npractical sense: or the high obligations we are under, to take it into\nour most serious consideration; and the danger there must necessarily\nbe, not only in treating it despitefully, which I am not now speaking\nof, but in disregarding and neglecting it. For this is neglecting to\ndo what is expressly enjoined us, for continuing those benefits to the\nworld, and transmitting them down to future times. And all this holds,\neven though the only thing to be considered in Christianity were its\nsubserviency to natural religion.\n\nII. Christianity is to be considered in a further view; as containing\nan account of a dispensation of things, not at all discoverable by\nreason, in consequence of which several distinct precepts are enjoined\nus. Christianity is not only an external institution of natural\nreligion, and a new promulgation of God\u2019s general providence, as\nrighteous governor and judge of the world; but it contains also a\nrevelation of a particular dispensation of Providence, carrying on by\nhis Son and Spirit, for the recovery and salvation of mankind, who are\nrepresented in Scripture to be in a state of ruin. And in consequence\nof this revelation being made, we are commanded _to be baptized_, not\nonly _in the name of the Father_, but also, _of the Son_, _and of the\nHoly Ghost_: and other obligations of duty, unknown before, to the Son\nand the Holy Ghost, are revealed. Now the importance of these duties\nmay be judged of, by observing that they arise, not from positive\ncommand merely, but also from the offices which appear, from Scripture,\nto belong to those divine persons in the Gospel dispensation; or from\nthe relations, which we are there informed, they stand in to us. By\n_reason_ is revealed the relation, which God the Father stands in to\nus. Hence arises the obligation of duty which we are under to him. In\n_Scripture_ are revealed the relations, which the Son and Holy Spirit\nstand in to us. Hence arise the obligations of duty;[145] which we are\nunder to them. The truth of the case, as one may speak, in each of\nthese three respects being admitted: that God is the governor of the\nworld, upon the evidence of reason; that Christ is the mediator between\nGod and man, and the Holy Ghost our guide and sanctifier, upon the\nevidence of revelation: the truth of the case, I say, in each of these\nrespects being admitted, it is no more a question, why it should be\ncommanded, that we be baptized in the name of the Son and of the Holy\nGhost, than that we be baptized in the name of the Father. This matter\nseems to require to be more fully stated.[146]\n\nLet it be remembered then, that religion comes under the twofold\nconsideration of internal and external: for the latter is as real a\npart of religion, of true religion, as the former. Now, when religion\nis considered under the first notion, as an inward principle, to be\nexerted in such and such inward acts of the mind and heart, the essence\nof natural religion may be said to consist in religious regards to\n_God the Father Almighty_: and the essence of revealed religion, as\ndistinguished from natural, to consist in religious regards to _the\nSon_, and to _the Holy Ghost_. The obligation we are under, of paying\nthese religious regards to each of these divine persons respectively,\narises from the respective relations which they each stand in to us.\nHow these relations are made known, whether by reason or revelation,\nmakes no alteration in the case: because the duties arise out of the\nrelations themselves, not out of the manner in which we are informed\nof them. The Son and Spirit have each his proper office in that great\ndispensation of Providence, the redemption of the world; the one our\nMediator, the other our Sanctifier. Does not then the duty of religious\nregards to both these divine persons, as immediately arise to the view\nof reason, out of the very nature of these offices and relations; as\nthe good-will and kind intention, which we owe to our fellow-creatures,\narise out of the common relations between us and them? But it will be\nasked, \u201cWhat are the inward religious regards, appearing thus obviously\ndue to the Son and Holy Spirit; as arising, not merely from command in\nScripture, but from the very nature of the revealed relations, which\nthey stand in to us?\u201d I answer, the religious regards of reverence,\nhonor, love, trust, gratitude, fear, hope.\n\nIn what external manner this inward worship is to be expressed, is a\nmatter of pure revealed command, as perhaps the external manner, in\nwhich God the Father is to be worshipped, may be more so than we are\nready to think. But the worship, the internal worship itself, to the\nSon and Holy Ghost, is no further matter of pure revealed command, than\nas the relations they stand in to us are matter of pure revelation: for\nthe relations being known, the obligations to such internal worship\nare obligations of reason, arising out of those relations themselves.\nIn short, the history of the gospel as immediately shows us the reason\nof these obligations, as it shows us the meaning of the words, Son and\nHoly Ghost.\n\nIf this account of the Christian religion be just, those persons who\ncan speak lightly of it, as of little consequence, provided natural\nreligion be kept to, plainly forget, that Christianity, even what is\npeculiarly so called, as distinguished from natural religion, has yet\nsomewhat very important, even of a moral nature. For the office of\nour Lord being made known, and the relation he stands in to us, the\nobligation of religious regards to him is plainly moral, as much as\ncharity to mankind is; since this obligation arises, before external\ncommand, immediately out of that his office and relation itself. Those\npersons appear to forget, that revelation is to be considered, as\ninforming us of somewhat new, in the state of mankind,[147] and in\nthe government of the world: as acquainting us with some relations we\nstand in, which could not otherwise have been known. These relations\nbeing real (though before revelation we could be under no obligations\nfrom them, yet upon their being revealed), there is no reason to think,\nbut that neglect of behaving suitably to them will be attended with\nthe same kind of consequences under God\u2019s government, as neglecting to\nbehave suitably to any other relations, made known to us by reason.\nIgnorance, whether unavoidable or voluntary, so far as we can possibly\nsee, will just as much, and just as little, excuse in one case as in\nthe other: the ignorance being supposed equally unavoidable, or equally\nvoluntary, in both cases.\n\nIf therefore Christ be indeed the mediator between God and man, _i.e._\nif Christianity be true; if he be indeed our Lord, our Savior, and our\nGod, no one can say, what may follow, not only the obstinate, but\nthe careless disregard to him, in those high relations. Nay, no one\ncan say, what may follow such disregard, even in the way of natural\nconsequence.[148] For, as the natural consequences of vice in this\nlife are doubtless to be considered as judicial punishments inflicted\nby God, so for aught we know, the judicial punishments of the future\nlife may be, in a like way or a like sense, the natural consequence of\nvice:[149] of men\u2019s violating or disregarding the relations which God\nhas placed them in here, and made known to them.\n\nIf mankind are corrupted and depraved in their moral character, and\nso are unfit for that state, which Christ is gone to prepare for his\ndisciples; and if the assistance of God\u2019s Spirit be necessary to renew\ntheir nature, in the degree requisite to their being qualified for\nthat state; (all which is implied in the express, though figurative\ndeclaration, _Except a man be born of the Spirit, he cannot enter\ninto the kingdom of God_:[150]) supposing this, is it possible any\nserious person can think it a slight matter, whether or no he makes\nuse of the means, expressly commanded by God, for obtaining this\ndivine assistance? Especially since the whole analogy of nature shows,\nthat we are not to expect any benefits, without making use of the\nappointed means for obtaining or enjoying them. Now reason shows us\nnothing, of the particular immediate means of obtaining either temporal\nor spiritual benefits. This therefore we must learn, either from\nexperience or revelation. And experience, the present case does not\nadmit of.\n\nThe conclusion from all this evidently is, that Christianity being\nsupposed either true or credible, it is unspeakable irreverence, and\nreally the most presumptuous rashness, to treat it as a light matter.\nIt can never justly be esteemed of little consequence, till it be\npositively supposed false. Nor do I know a higher and more important\nobligation which we are under, than that of examining most seriously\ninto its evidence, supposing its credibility; and of embracing it, upon\nsupposition of its truth.\n\nThe two following deductions may be proper to be added, in order to\nillustrate the foregoing observations, and to prevent their being\nmistaken.\n\n_First_, Hence we may clearly see, where lies the distinction between\nwhat is positive and what is moral in religion. Moral _precepts_, are\nprecepts the reasons of which we see: positive _precepts_, are precepts\nthe reasons of which we do not see.[151] Moral _duties_ arise out of\nthe nature of the case itself, prior to external command. Positive\n_duties_ do not arise out of the nature of the case, but from external\ncommand; nor would they be duties at all, were it not for such command,\nreceived from Him whose creatures and subjects we are. But the manner\nin which the nature of the case or the fact of the relation, is made\nknown, this doth not denominate any duty either positive or moral. That\nwe be baptized in the name of the Father is as much a positive duty, as\nthat we be baptized in the name of the Son, because both arise equally\nfrom revealed command: though the relation which we stand in to God\nthe Father is made known to us by reason, and the relation we stand\nin to Christ, by revelation only. On the other hand, the dispensation\nof the Gospel being admitted, gratitude as immediately becomes due to\nChrist, from his being the voluntary minister of this dispensation,\nas it is due to God the Father, from his being the fountain of all\ngood; though the first is made known to us by revelation only, the\nsecond by reason. Hence also we may see, and, for distinctness\u2019 sake,\nit may be worth mentioning, that positive institutions come under a\ntwofold consideration. They are either institutions founded on natural\nreligion, as baptism in the name of the Father; (though this has also a\nparticular reference to the gospel dispensation, for it is in the name\nof God, as the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ:) or they are external\ninstitutions founded on revealed religion; as baptism in the name of\nthe Son; and of the Holy Ghost.\n\n_Secondly_, From the distinction between what is moral and what is\npositive in religion, appears the ground of that peculiar preference,\nwhich the Scripture teaches us to be due to the former.\n\nThe reason of positive institutions in general, is very obvious;\nthough we should not see the reason, why particular ones are pitched\nupon rather than others. Whoever, therefore, instead of cavilling at\nwords, will attend to the thing itself, may clearly see, that positive\ninstitutions in general, as distinguished from this or that particular\none, have the nature of moral commands; since the reasons of them\nappear. Thus, for instance, the _external_ worship of God is a moral\nduty, though no particular mode of it be so. Care then is to be taken,\nwhen a comparison is made between positive and moral duties, that they\nbe compared no further than as they are different; no further than as\nthe former are positive, or arise out of mere external command, the\nreasons of which we are not acquainted with; and as the latter are\nmoral, or arise out of the apparent reason of the case, without such\nexternal command. Unless this caution be observed, we shall run into\nendless confusion.\n\nNow this being premised, suppose two standing precepts enjoined by the\nsame authority; that, in certain conjunctures, it is impossible to\nobey both; that the former is moral, _i.e._ a precept of which we see\nthe reasons, and that they hold in the particular case before us; but\nthat the latter is positive, _i.e._ a precept of which we do not see\nthe reasons: it is indisputable that our obligations are to obey the\nformer; because there is an apparent reason for this preference, and\nnone against it. Further, positive institutions, all those I suppose\nwhich Christianity enjoins, are means to a moral end: and the end must\nbe acknowledged more excellent than the means.[152] Nor is observance\nof these institutions any religious obedience at all, or of any value,\notherwise than as it proceeds from a moral principle. This seems to\nbe the strict logical way of stating and determining this matter;\nbut will, perhaps, be found less applicable to practice, than may be\nthought at first sight.\n\nTherefore, in a more practical, though more lax way of consideration,\nand taking the words, _moral law_ and _positive institutions_, in\nthe popular sense, I add, that the whole moral law is as much matter\nof revealed command, as positive institutions are: for the Scripture\nenjoins every moral virtue. In this respect then they are both upon\na level. But the moral law is, moreover, written upon our hearts;\ninterwoven into our very nature. And this is a plain intimation of the\nAuthor of it, which is to be preferred, when they interfere.\n\nBut there is not altogether so much necessity for the determination of\nthis question, as some persons seem to think. Nor are we left to reason\nalone to determine it. For, _First_, Though mankind have, in all ages,\nbeen greatly prone to place their religion in peculiar positive rites,\nby way of equivalent for obedience to moral precepts; yet, without\nmaking any comparison at all between them, and consequently without\ndetermining which is to have the preference, the nature of the thing\nabundantly shows all notions of that kind to be utterly subversive of\ntrue religion, as they are, moreover, contrary to the whole general\ntenor of Scripture; and likewise to the most express particular\ndeclarations of it, that nothing can render us accepted of God, without\nmoral virtue.\n\n_Secondly_, Upon the occasion of mentioning together positive and moral\nduties, the Scripture always puts the stress of religion upon the\nlatter, and never upon the former. This, though no sort of allowance\nto neglect the former, when they do not interfere with the latter,\nis yet a plain intimation, that when they do, the latter are to be\npreferred. And as mankind are for placing the stress of their religion\nanywhere, rather than upon virtue; lest both the reason of the thing,\nand the general spirit of Christianity, appearing in the intimation\nnow mentioned, should be ineffectual against this prevalent folly,\nour Lord himself, from whose command alone the obligation of positive\ninstitutions arises, has taken occasion to make the comparison between\nthem and moral precepts; when the Pharisees censured him, for _eating\nwith publicans and sinners_; and also when they censured his disciples,\nfor _plucking the ears of corn on the Sabbath day_. Upon this\ncomparison, he has determined expressly, and in form, which shall have\nthe preference when they interfere. And by delivering his authoritative\ndetermination in a proverbial manner of expression, he has made it\ngeneral: _I will have mercy, and not sacrifice_.[153] The propriety of\nthe word _proverbial_, is not the thing insisted upon: though I think\nthe manner of speaking is to be called so. But that the manner of\nspeaking very remarkably renders the determination general, is surely\nindisputable. For, had it been said only, that God preferred mercy to\nthe rigid observance of the Sabbath, even then, by parity of reason,\nmost justly might we have argued, that he preferred mercy likewise,\nto the observance of other ritual institutions; and in general, moral\nduties, to positive ones. And thus the determination would have been\ngeneral; though its being so were inferred and not expressed. But as\nthe passage really stands in the Gospel, it is much stronger. For\nthe sense and the very literal words of our Lord\u2019s answer, are as\napplicable to any other instance of a comparison, between positive and\nmoral duties, as to that upon which they were spoken. And if, in case\nof competition, mercy is to be preferred to positive institutions,\nit will scarce be thought, that justice is to give place to them. It\nis remarkable too, that, as the words are a quotation from the Old\nTestament, they are introduced, on both the forementioned occasions,\nwith a declaration, that the Pharisees did not understand the meaning\nof them. This, I say, is very remarkable. For, since it is scarce\npossible, for the most ignorant person, not to understand the literal\nsense of the passage in the prophet;[154] and since understanding\nthe literal sense would not have prevented their _condemning the\nguiltless_,[155] it can hardly be doubted, that the thing which our\nLord really intended in that declaration was, that the Pharisees had\nnot learned from it, as they might, wherein the _general_ spirit of\nreligion consists: that it consists in moral piety and virtue, as\ndistinguished from ritual observances. However, it is certain we may\nlearn this from his divine application of the passage, in the Gospel.\n\nBut, as it is one of the peculiar weaknesses of human nature, when,\nupon a comparison of two things, one is found to be of greater\nimportance than the other, to consider this other as of scarce any\nimportance at all: it is highly necessary that we remind ourselves, how\ngreat presumption it is, to make light of any institutions of divine\nappointment; that our obligations to obey all God\u2019s commands whatever\nare absolute and indispensable; and that commands merely positive,\nadmitted to be from him, lay us under a moral obligation to obey them:\nan obligation moral in the strictest and most proper sense.\n\nTo these things I cannot forbear adding, that the account now given of\nChristianity most strongly shows and enforces upon us the obligation\nof searching the Scriptures, in order to see, what the scheme of\nrevelation really is; instead of determining beforehand, from reason,\nwhat the scheme of it must be.[156] Indeed if in revelation there be\nfound any passages, the seeming meaning of which is contrary to natural\nreligion; we may most certainly conclude, such seeming meaning not to\nbe the real one.[157] But it is not any degree of a presumption against\nan interpretation of Scripture, that such interpretation contains a\ndoctrine, which the light of nature cannot discover;[158] or a precept,\nwhich the law of nature does not oblige to.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II.\n\nSUPPOSED PRESUMPTION AGAINST A REVELATION CONSIDERED AS MIRACULOUS.\n\n\nHaving shown the importance of the Christian revelation, and the\nobligations which we are under seriously to attend to it, upon\nsupposition of its truth, or its credibility, the next thing in\norder, is to consider the supposed presumptions against revelation in\ngeneral; which shall be the subject of this chapter: and the objections\nagainst the Christian in particular, which shall be the subject of\nsome following ones.[159] For it seems the most natural method, to\nremove the prejudices against Christianity, before we proceed to the\nconsideration of the positive evidence for it, and the objections\nagainst that evidence.[160]\n\nIt is, I think, commonly supposed, that there is some peculiar\npresumption, from the analogy of nature, against the Christian scheme\nof things, at least against miracles; so as that stronger evidence\nis necessary to prove the truth and reality of them, than would be\nsufficient to convince us of other events, or matters of fact. Indeed\nthe consideration of this supposed presumption cannot but be thought\nvery insignificant, by many persons. Yet, as it belongs to the subject\nof this treatise; so it may tend to open the mind, and remove some\nprejudices, however needless the consideration of it be, upon its own\naccount.\n\nI. I find no appearance of a presumption, from the analogy of nature,\nagainst the _general scheme_ of Christianity, that God created\nand invisibly governs the world by Jesus Christ; and by him also\nwill hereafter judge it in righteousness, _i.e._ render to every\none according to his works; and that good men are under the secret\ninfluence of his Spirit. Whether these things are, or are not, to\nbe called miraculous, is perhaps only a question about words; or\nhowever, is of no moment in the case. If the analogy of nature raises\nany presumption against this general scheme of Christianity, it must\nbe, either because it is not discoverable by reason or experience; or\nelse, because it is unlike that course of nature, which is. But analogy\nraises no presumption against the truth of this scheme, upon either of\nthese accounts.\n\n_First_, There is no presumption, from analogy, against the truth\nof it, upon account of its not being discoverable by reason or\nexperience. Suppose one who never heard of revelation, of the most\nimproved understanding, and acquainted with our whole system of natural\nphilosophy and natural religion; such a one could not but be sensible,\nthat it was but a very small part of the natural and moral system\nof the universe, which he was acquainted with. He could not but be\nsensible, that there must be innumerable things, in the dispensations\nof Providence past, in the invisible government over the world at\npresent carrying on, and in what is to come; of which he was wholly\nignorant,[161] and which could not be discovered without revelation.\nWhether the scheme of nature be, in the strictest sense, infinite or\nnot; it is evidently vast, even beyond all possible imagination. And\ndoubtless that part of it, which is open to our view, is but as a point\nin comparison of the whole plan of Providence, reaching throughout\neternity past and future; in comparison of what is even now going on,\nin the remote parts of the boundless universe, nay, in comparison of\nthe whole scheme of this world. And therefore, that things lie beyond\nthe natural reach of our faculties, is no sort of presumption against\nthe truth and reality of them; because it is certain, there are\ninnumerable things, in the constitution and government of the universe,\nwhich are thus beyond the natural reach of our faculties.\n\n_Secondly_, Analogy raises no presumption against any of the things\ncontained in this general doctrine of Scripture now mentioned, upon\naccount of their being unlike the known course of nature. For there is\nno presumption at all from analogy, that the _whole_ course of things,\nor divine government naturally unknown to us, and _every thing_ in it,\nis like to any thing in that which is known; and therefore no peculiar\npresumption against any thing in the former, upon account of its being\nunlike to any thing in the latter. And in the constitution and natural\ngovernment of the world, as well as in the moral government of it, we\nsee things, in a great degree, unlike one another: and therefore ought\nnot to wonder at such unlikeness between things visible and invisible.\nHowever, the scheme of Christianity is by no means entirely unlike the\nscheme of nature; as will appear in the following part of this treatise.\n\nThe notion of a miracle, considered as a proof of a divine mission,\nhas been stated with great exactness by divines; and is, I think,\nsufficiently understood by every one. There are also invisible\nmiracles,[162] the Incarnation of Christ, for instance, which, being\nsecret, cannot be alleged as a proof of such a mission; but require\nthemselves to be proved by visible miracles. Revelation itself too\nis miraculous; and miracles are the proof of it; and the supposed\npresumption against these shall presently be considered. All which I\nhave been observing here is, that, whether we choose to call every\nthing in the dispensations of Providence, not discoverable without\nrevelation, nor like the known course of things, miraculous; and\nwhether the general Christian dispensation now mentioned is to be\ncalled so, or not; the foregoing observations seem certainly to show,\nthat there is no presumption against it from the analogy of nature.\n\nII. There is no presumption, from analogy, against some operations,\nwhich we should now call miraculous; particularly none against a\nrevelation at the beginning of the world: nothing of such presumption\nagainst it, as is supposed to be implied or expressed in the word,\n_miraculous_.[163] A miracle, in its very notion, is relative to a\ncourse of nature; and implies something different from it, considered\nas being so. Now, either there was no course of nature at the time\nwhich we are speaking of; or if there were, we are not acquainted what\nthe course of nature is, upon the first peopling of worlds. Therefore\nthe question, whether mankind had a revelation made to them at _that_\ntime, is to be considered, not as a question concerning a miracle, but\nas a common question of fact. And we have the like reason, be it more\nor less, to admit the report of tradition, concerning this question,\nand concerning common matters of fact of the same antiquity; for\ninstance, what part of the earth was first peopled.\n\nOr thus: When mankind was first placed in this state, there was a power\nexerted, totally different from the present course of nature. Now,\nwhether this power, thus wholly different from the present course of\nnature, (for we cannot properly apply to it the word _miraculous_;)\nwhether this power _stopped_ immediately after it had made man, or\nwent on, and exerted itself further in giving him a revelation, is a\nquestion of the same kind, as whether an ordinary power exerted itself\nin such a particular _degree_ and manner, or not.\n\nOr suppose the power exerted in the formation of the world be\nconsidered as miraculous, or rather, be called by that name; the\ncase will not be different: since it must be acknowledged, that such\na power was exerted. For supposing it acknowledged, that our Savior\nspent some years in a course of working miracles:[164] there is no\nmore presumption, worth mentioning, against his having exerted this\nmiraculous power, in a certain degree greater, than in a certain degree\nless; in one or two more instances, than in one or two fewer; in this,\nthan in another manner.\n\nIt is evident then, that there can be no peculiar presumption, from the\nanalogy of nature, against supposing a revelation, when man was first\nplaced upon earth.[165]\n\nAdd, that there does not appear the least intimation in history or\ntradition, that religion was first reasoned out: but the whole of\nhistory and tradition makes for the other side, that it came into the\nworld by revelation. Indeed the state of religion, in the first ages of\nwhich we have any account, seems to suppose and imply, that this was\nthe original of it among mankind.[166] And these reflections together,\nwithout taking in the peculiar authority of Scripture, amount to real\nand a very material degree of evidence, that there was a revelation\nat the beginning of the world. Now this, as it is a confirmation of\nnatural religion, and therefore mentioned in the former part of this\ntreatise;[167] so likewise it has a tendency to remove any prejudices\nagainst a subsequent revelation.\n\nIII. But still it may be objected, that there is some peculiar\npresumption, from analogy, against miracles; particularly against\nrevelation, after the settlement and during the continuance of a course\nof nature.\n\nNow with regard to this supposed presumption, it is to be observed in\ngeneral, that before we can have ground for raising what can, with\nany propriety, be called an _argument_ from analogy, for or against\nrevelation considered as something miraculous, we must be acquainted\nwith a similar or parallel case. But the history of some other world,\nseemingly in like circumstances with our own, is no more than a\nparallel case: and therefore nothing short of this can be so. Yet,\ncould we come at a presumptive proof, for or against a revelation, from\nbeing informed, whether such world had one, or not; such a proof, being\ndrawn from one single instance only, must be infinitely precarious.\nMore particularly:\n\n_First_, There is a very strong presumption against common speculative\ntruths, and against the most ordinary facts, before the proof[168]\nof them; which yet is overcome by almost any proof. There is a\npresumption of millions to one, against the story of C\u00e6sar, or\nof any other man. For suppose a number of common facts so and so\ncircumstanced, of which we had no kind of proof, should happen to come\ninto one\u2019s thoughts; every one would, without any possible doubt,\nconclude them to be false. And the like may be said of a single\ncommon fact. Hence it appears, that the question of importance, as\nto the matter before us, is, concerning the _degree_ of the peculiar\npresumption supposed against miracles; not whether there be any\npeculiar presumption at all against them. For, if there be the\npresumption of millions to one, against the most common facts; what\ncan a small presumption, additional to this, amount to, though it be\npeculiar? It cannot be estimated, and is as nothing. The only material\nquestion is, whether there be any such presumptions against miracles,\nas to render them in any sort incredible.\n\n_Secondly_, If we leave out the consideration of religion, we are\nin such total darkness, upon what causes, occasions, reasons, or\ncircumstances, the present course of nature depends; that there does\nnot appear any improbability for or against supposing, that five or\nsix thousand years may have given scope[169] for causes, occasions,\nreasons, or circumstances, from whence miraculous interpositions may\nhave arisen. And from this, joined with the foregoing observation, it\nwill follow, that there must be a presumption, beyond all comparison\ngreater, against the _particular_ common facts just now instanced in,\nthan against miracles _in general_; before any evidence of either.\n\n_Thirdly_, Take in the consideration of religion, or the moral\nsystem of the world, and then we see distinct particular reasons for\nmiracles: to afford mankind instruction additional to that of nature,\nand to attest the truth of it. This gives a real credibility to the\nsupposition, that it might be part of the original plan of things, that\nthere should be miraculous interpositions.\n\n_Lastly_, Miracles must not be compared to common natural events, or to\nevents which, though uncommon, are similar to what we daily experience:\nbut to the extraordinary phenomena of nature. And then the comparison\nwill be between the presumption against miracles, and the presumption\nagainst such uncommon appearances, suppose, as comets, and against\nthere being any such powers in nature as magnetism and electricity,\nso contrary to the properties of other bodies not endued with these\npowers. And before any one can determine, whether there be any peculiar\npresumption against miracles, more than against other extraordinary\nthings; he must consider, what, upon first hearing, would be the\npresumption against the last mentioned appearances and powers, to a\nperson acquainted only with the daily, monthly, and annual course of\nnature respecting this earth, and with those common powers of matter\nwhich we every day see.\n\nUpon all this I conclude; that there certainly is no such presumption\nagainst miracles, as to render them in any wise incredible: that,\non the contrary, our being able to discern reasons for them, gives\na positive credibility to the history of them, in cases where those\nreasons hold: and that it is by no means certain, that there is any\n_peculiar_ presumption at all, from analogy, even in the lowest degree,\nagainst miracles, as distinguished from other extraordinary phenomena:\nthough it is not worth while to perplex the reader with inquiries into\nthe abstract nature of evidence, in order to determine a question,\nwhich, without such inquiries, we see[170] is of no importance.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III.\n\nOUR INCAPACITY OF JUDGING, WHAT WERE TO BE EXPECTED IN A REVELATION;\nAND THE CREDIBILITY, FROM ANALOGY, THAT IT MUST CONTAIN THINGS LIABLE\nTO OBJECTIONS.\n\n\nBesides the objections against the _evidence_ for Christianity, many\nare alleged against the _scheme_ of it; against the whole manner\nin which it is put and left with the world; as well as against\nseveral particular relations in Scripture: objections drawn from\nthe deficiencies of revelation: from things in it appearing to men\n_foolishness_;[171] from its containing matters of offence, which have\nled, and it must have been foreseen would lead, into strange enthusiasm\nand superstition, and be made to serve the purposes of tyranny and\nwickedness; from its not being universal; and, which is a thing of the\nsame kind, from its evidence not being so convincing and satisfactory\nas it might have been: for this last is sometimes turned into a\npositive argument against its truth.[172]\n\nIt would be tedious, indeed impossible, to enumerate the several\nparticulars comprehended under the objections here referred to; they\nbeing so various, according to the different fancies of men. There\nare persons who think it a strong objection against the authority\nof Scripture, that it is not composed by rules of art, agreed\nupon by critics, for polite and correct writing. And the scorn is\ninexpressible, with which some of the prophetic parts of Scripture are\ntreated: partly through the rashness of interpreters; but very much\nalso, on account of the hieroglyphical and figurative language, in\nwhich they are left us.\n\nSome of the principal things of this sort shall be particularly\nconsidered in the following chapters. But my design at present is to\nobserve in general, with respect to this whole way of arguing, that,\nupon supposition of a revelation, it is highly credible beforehand,\nthat we should be incompetent judges of it to a great degree: and\nthat it would contain many things appearing to us liable to great\nobjections; in case we judge of it otherwise, than by the analogy\nof nature. Therefore, though objections against the _evidence_ of\nChristianity are most seriously to be considered, yet objections\nagainst Christianity itself are, in a great measure, frivolous: almost\nall objections against it, excepting those which are alleged against\nthe particular proofs of its coming from God. I express myself with\ncaution, lest I should be mistaken to vilify reason; which is indeed\nthe only faculty we have wherewith to judge concerning any thing, even\nrevelation itself: or be misunderstood to assert, that a supposed\nrevelation cannot be proved false, from internal characters. For, it\nmay contain clear immoralities or contradictions; and either of these\nwould prove it false. Nor will I take upon me to affirm, that nothing\nelse can possibly render any supposed revelation incredible. Yet still\nthe observation above, is, I think, true beyond doubt; that objections\nagainst Christianity, as distinguished from objections against its\nevidence, are frivolous. To make out this, is the general design of the\npresent chapter.\n\nWith regard to the whole of it, I cannot but particularly wish, that\nthe _proofs_ might be attended to; rather than the assertions cavilled\nat, upon account of any unacceptable _consequences_, real or supposed,\nwhich may be drawn from them. For, after all, that which is true, must\nbe admitted, though it should show us the shortness of our faculties:\nand that we are in no wise judges of many things, of which we are apt\nto think ourselves very competent ones. Nor will this be any objection\nwith reasonable men; at least upon second thought it will not be any\nobjection with such, against the justness of the following observations.\n\nAs God governs the world and instructs his creatures, according to\ncertain laws or rules, in the known course of nature; known by reason\ntogether with experience: so the Scripture informs us of a scheme of\ndivine Providence, additional to this. It relates, that God has, by\nrevelation, instructed men in things concerning his government, which\nthey could not otherwise have known; and reminded them of things, which\nthey might otherwise know; and attested the truth of the whole by\nmiracles. Now if the natural and the revealed dispensation of things\nare both from God, if they coincide with each other, and together\nmake up one scheme of Providence; our being incompetent judges of\none, must render it credible, that we may be incompetent judges also\nof the other. Upon experience, the acknowledged constitution and\ncourse of nature is found to be greatly different from what, before\nexperience, would have been expected; and such as, men fancy, there lie\ngreat objections against. This renders it beforehand highly credible,\nthat they may find the revealed dispensation likewise, if they judge\nof it as they do of the constitution of nature, very different from\nexpectations formed beforehand; and liable, in appearance, to great\nobjections: objections against the scheme itself, and against the\ndegrees and manners of the miraculous interpositions by which it was\nattested and carried on. Thus, suppose a prince to govern his dominions\nin the wisest manner possible, by common known laws; and that upon\nsome exigencies he should suspend these laws; and govern, in several\ninstances, in a different manner. If one of his subjects were not a\ncompetent judge beforehand, by what common rules the government should\nor would be carried on; it could not be expected, that the same person\nwould be a competent judge, in what exigencies, or in what manner, or\nto what degree, those laws commonly observed would be suspended or\ndeviated from. If he were not a judge of the wisdom of the ordinary\nadministration, there is no reason to think he would be a judge of the\nwisdom of the extraordinary. If he thought he had objections against\nthe former; doubtless, it is highly supposable, he might think also,\nthat he had objections against the latter. And thus, as we fall into\ninfinite follies and mistakes, whenever we pretend, otherwise than from\nexperience and analogy, to judge of the constitution and course of\nnature; it is evidently supposable beforehand, that we should fall into\nas great, in pretending to judge in like manner concerning revelation.\nNor is there any more ground to expect that this latter should appear\nto us clear of objections, than that the former should.\n\nThese observations, relating to the whole of Christianity, are\napplicable to inspiration in particular. As we are in no sort judges\nbeforehand, by what laws or rules, in what degree, or by what means,\nit were to have been expected, that God would naturally instruct\nus; so upon supposition of his affording us light and instruction\nby revelation, additional to what he has afforded us by reason and\nexperience, we are in no sort judges, by what methods, and in what\nproportion, it were to be expected that this supernatural light and\ninstruction would be afforded us. We know not beforehand, what degree\nor kind of natural information it were to be expected God would afford\nmen, each by his own reason and experience: nor how far he would enable\nand effectually dispose them to communicate it, whatever it should\nbe, to each other; nor whether the evidence of it would be certain,\nhighly probable, or doubtful; nor whether it would be given with equal\nclearness and conviction to all. Nor could we guess, upon any good\nground I mean, whether natural knowledge, or even the faculty itself,\nby which we are capable of attaining it, reason, would be given us at\nonce, or gradually.\n\nIn like manner, we are wholly ignorant, what degree of new knowledge,\nit were to be expected, God would give mankind by revelation, upon\nsupposition of his affording one: or how far, or in what way, he would\ninterpose miraculously, to qualify them, to whom he should originally\nmake the revelation, for communicating the knowledge given by it; and\nto secure their doing it to the age in which they should live; and to\nsecure its being transmitted to posterity. We are equally ignorant,\nwhether the evidence of it would be certain or highly probable, or\ndoubtful:[173] or whether all who should have any degree of instruction\nfrom it, and any degree of evidence of its truth, would have the\nsame: or whether the scheme would be revealed at once, or unfolded\ngradually.[174] Nay we are not in any sort able to judge, whether\nit were to have been expected, that the revelation should have been\ncommitted to writing; or left to be handed down, and consequently\ncorrupted, by verbal tradition, and at length sunk under it, if mankind\nso pleased, and during such time as they are permitted, in the degree\nthey evidently are, to act as they will.\n\nBut it may be said, \u201cthat a revelation in some of the above-mentioned\ncircumstances, one, for instance, which was not committed to writing,\nand thus secured against danger of corruption, would not have answered\nits purpose.\u201d I ask, what purpose? It would not have answered all the\npurposes, which it has now answered, and in the same degree: but it\nwould have answered others, or the same in different degrees. And which\nof these were the purposes of God, and best fell in with his general\ngovernment, we could not at all have determined beforehand.\n\nNow since we have no principles of reason, upon which to judge\nbeforehand, how it were to be expected that revelation should have been\nleft, or what was most suitable to the divine plan of government, in\nany of the forementioned respects; it must be quite frivolous to object\nafterwards as to any of them, against its being left in one way, rather\nthan another: for this would be to object against things, upon account\nof their being different from expectations, which has been shown to be\nwithout reason.\n\nThus we see, that the only question concerning the truth of\nChristianity is, whether it be a real revelation; not whether it be\nattended with every circumstance which we should have looked for: and\nconcerning the authority of Scripture, whether it be what it claims to\nbe; not whether it be a book of such sort, and so promulged, as weak\nmen are apt to fancy a book containing a divine revelation should be.\nTherefore, neither obscurity, nor seeming inaccuracy of style, nor\nvarious readings, nor early disputes about the authors of particular\nparts, nor any other things of the like kind, though they had been\nmuch more considerable in degree than they are, could overthrow the\nauthority of the Scripture: unless the prophets, apostles, or our Lord,\nhad promised, that the book containing the divine revelation should be\nexempt from those things. Nor indeed can any objections overthrow such\na kind of revelation as the Christian claims to be, (since there are\nno objections against the morality of it,[175]) but such as can show,\nthat there is no proof of miracles wrought originally in attestation\nof it; no appearance of any thing miraculous in its obtaining in the\nworld; nor any of prophecy, that is, of events foretold, which human\nsagacity could not foresee. If it can be shown, that the proof alleged\nfor all these is absolutely none at all, then is revelation overturned.\nBut were it allowed, that the proof of any one or all of them is lower\nthan is allowed; yet, whilst _any_ proof of them remains, revelation\nwill stand upon much the same foot it does at present, as to all the\npurposes of life and practice, and ought to have the like influence\nupon our behavior.\n\nFrom the foregoing observations too, it will follow, and those who\nwill thoroughly examine into revelation will find it worth remarking,\nthat there are several ways of arguing, which though just with regard\nto other writings, are not applicable to Scripture: at least not to\nits prophetic parts. We cannot argue, for instance, that such and such\ncannot be the sense or intent of a passage of Scripture, for, if it\nhad, it would have been expressed more plainly, or represented under\na more apt figure or hieroglyphic. Yet we may justly argue thus, with\nrespect to common books. And the reason of this difference is very\nevident. In Scripture we are not competent judges, as we are in common\nbooks, how plainly it were to have been expected, that the sense should\nhave been expressed, or under how apt an image figured. The only\nquestion is, what appearance there is, that this _is_ the sense; and\nscarce at all, how much more determinately or accurately it might have\nbeen expressed or figured.[176]\n\n\u201cBut is it not self-evident, that internal improbabilities of all kinds\nweaken external probable proof?\u201d Doubtless. But to what practical\npurpose can this be alleged here, when it has been proved before,[177]\nthat real internal improbabilities, which rise even to moral certainty,\nare overcome by the most ordinary testimony; and when it now has been\nmade to appear, that we scarce know what are improbabilities, as to the\nmatter we are here considering: as it will further appear from what\nfollows.\n\nFrom the observations made above it is manifest, that we are not in any\nsort competent judges, what supernatural instruction were to have been\nexpected; and it is self-evident, that the objections of an incompetent\njudgment must be frivolous. Yet it may be proper to go one step\nfurther, and observe, that if men will be regardless of these things,\nand pretend to judge of the Scripture by preconceived expectations; the\nanalogy of nature shows beforehand, not only that it is highly credible\nthey may, but also probable that they will, imagine they have strong\nobjections against it, however really unexceptionable. For so, prior\nto experience, they would think they had, against the circumstances,\nand degrees, and the whole manner of that instruction, which is\nafforded by the ordinary course of nature. Were the instruction which\nGod affords to brute creatures by instincts and mere propensions, and\nto mankind by these together with reason, matter of probable proof,\nand not of certain observation: it would be rejected as incredible,\nin many instances of it, only upon account of the means by which this\ninstruction is given, the seeming disproportions, the limitations,\nnecessary conditions, and circumstances of it. For instance: would it\nnot have been thought highly improbable, that men should have been so\nmuch more capable of discovering, even to certainty, the general laws\nof matter, and the magnitudes, paths, and revolutions, of heavenly\nbodies; than the occasions and cures of distempers, and many other\nthings in which human life seems so much more nearly concerned, than in\nastronomy? How capricious and irregular a way of information would it\nbe said; is that of _invention_, by means of which nature instructs us\nin matters of science, and in many things, upon which the affairs of\nthe world greatly depend: that a man should, by this faculty, be made\nacquainted with a thing in an instant, (when perhaps he is thinking of\nsomething else,) which he has in vain been searching after, it may be,\nfor years.\n\nSo likewise the imperfections attending the only method, by which\nnature enables and directs us to communicate our thoughts to each\nother, are innumerable. Language is, in its very nature, inadequate,\nambiguous, liable to infinite abuse, even from negligence; and so\nliable to it from design, that every man can deceive and betray by\nit. And, to mention but one instance more; that brutes, without\nreason, should act, in many respects, with a sagacity and foresight\nvastly greater than what men have in those respects, would be thought\nimpossible. Yet it is certain they do act with such superior foresight:\nwhether it be their own, indeed, is another question. From these\nthings, it is highly credible beforehand, that upon supposition that\nGod should afford men some additional instruction by revelation,\nit would be with circumstances, in manners, degrees, and respects,\nagainst the credibility of which we should be apt to fancy we had great\nobjections. Nor are the objections against the Scripture, nor against\nChristianity in general, at all more or greater, than the analogy of\nnature would beforehand--not perhaps give ground to _expect_; (for the\nanalogy may not be sufficient, in some cases, to ground an expectation\nupon;) but no more nor greater, than analogy would show it, beforehand,\nto be supposable and _credible_, that there might seem to lie against\nrevelation.\n\nBy applying these general observations to a particular objection, it\nwill be more distinctly seen, how they are applicable to others of the\nlike kind; and indeed to almost all objections against Christianity,\nas distinguished from objections against its evidence. It appears\nfrom Scripture, that, as it was not unusual in the apostolic age, for\npersons, upon their conversion to Christianity, to be endued with\nmiraculous gifts; so, some of those persons exercised these gifts in\na strangely irregular and disorderly manner;[178] and this is made an\nobjection against their being really miraculous. Now the foregoing\nobservations quite remove this objection, how considerable soever it\nmay appear at first sight. For, consider a person endued with any of\nthese gifts, for instance that of tongues: it is to be supposed, that\nhe had the same power over this miraculous gift, as he would have had\nover it, had it been the effect of habit, of study and use, as it\nordinarily is; or the same power over it, as he had over any other\nnatural endowment. Consequently, he would use it in the same manner as\nhe did any other; either regularly, and upon proper occasions only, or\nirregularly, and upon improper ones: according to his sense of decency,\nand his character of prudence.[179] Where then is the objection? Why,\nif this miraculous power was indeed given to the world to propagate\nChristianity, and attest the truth of it, we might, it seems, have\nexpected, that other sort of persons should have been chosen to be\ninvested with it; or that these should, at the same time, have been\nendued with prudence; or that they should have been continually\nrestrained and directed in the exercise of it: _i.e._ that God should\nhave miraculously interposed, if at all, in a different manner, or\nhigher degree. But, from the observations made above, it is undeniably\nevident, that we are not judges in what degrees and manners it were to\nhave been expected he should miraculously interpose; upon supposition\nof his doing it in some degree and manner. Nor, in the natural course\nof Providence, are superior gifts of memory, eloquence, knowledge, and\nother talents of great influence, conferred only on persons of prudence\nand decency, or such as are disposed to make the properest use of\nthem. Nor is the instruction and admonition naturally afforded us for\nthe conduct of life, particularly in our education, commonly given in\na manner the most suited to recommend it; but often with circumstances\napt to prejudice us against such instruction.\n\nOne might go on to add, there is a great resemblance between the light\nof nature and of revelation, in several other respects. Practical\nChristianity, or that faith and behavior which renders a man a\nChristian, is a plain and obvious thing: like the common rules of\nconduct, with respect to ordinary temporal affairs. The more distinct\nand particular knowledge of those things, the study of which the\napostle calls _going on unto perfection_,[180] and of the prophetic\nparts of revelation, like many parts of natural and even civil\nknowledge, may require very exact thought, and careful consideration.\nThe hinderances too, of natural, and of supernatural light and\nknowledge, have been of the same kind. And as it is owned the whole\nscheme of Scripture is not yet understood; so, if it ever comes to be\nunderstood, before the _restitution of all things_,[181] and without\nmiraculous interpositions, it must be in the same way as natural\nknowledge is come at: by the continuance and progress of learning and\nof liberty;[182] and by particular persons attending to, comparing, and\npursuing, intimations scattered up and down it, which are overlooked\nand disregarded by the generality of the world. For this is the way in\nwhich all improvements are made; by thoughtful men\u2019s tracing on obscure\nhints, dropped us by nature as it were, accidentally, or which seem to\ncome into our minds by chance. Nor is it at all incredible, that a book\nwhich has been so long in the possession of mankind, should contain\nmany truths as yet undiscovered. For, all the same phenomena, and the\nsame faculties of investigation, from which such great discoveries\nin natural knowledge have been made in the present and last age, were\nequally in the possession of mankind, several thousand years before.\nAnd possibly it might be intended, that events, as they come to pass,\nshould open and ascertain the meaning of several parts of Scripture.\n\nIt may be objected, that this analogy fails in a material respect:\nfor that natural knowledge is of little or no consequence. But I have\nbeen speaking of the general instruction which nature does or does not\nafford us. And besides, some parts of natural knowledge, in the more\ncommon restrained sense of the words, are of the greatest consequence\nto the ease and convenience of life. But suppose the analogy did, as it\ndoes not, fail in this respect; yet it might be abundantly supplied,\nfrom the whole constitution and course of nature: which shows, that God\ndoes not dispense his gifts according to _our_ notions of the advantage\nand consequence they would be of to us. And this in general, with his\nmethod of dispensing knowledge in particular, would together make out\nan analogy full to the point before us.\n\nBut it may be objected still further and more generally; \u201cThe Scripture\nrepresents the world as in a state of ruin, and Christianity as an\nexpedient to recover it, to help in these respects where nature fails:\nin particular, to supply the deficiencies of natural light. Is it\ncredible then, that so many ages should have been let pass, before a\nmatter of such a sort, of so great and so general importance, was made\nknown to mankind; and then that it should be made known to so small a\npart of them? Is it conceivable, that this supply should be so very\ndeficient, should have the like obscurity and doubtfulness, be liable\nto the like perversions, in short, lie open to all the like objections,\nas the light of nature itself?\u201d[183]\n\nWithout determining how far this, in fact, is so, I answer; it is\nby no means incredible, that it might be so, if the light of nature\nand of revelation be from the same hand. Men are naturally liable to\ndiseases: for which God, in his good providence, has provided natural\nremedies.[184] But remedies existing in nature have been unknown\nto mankind for many ages; are known but to few now; probably many\nvaluable ones are not known yet. Great has been and is the obscurity\nand difficulty, in the nature and application of them. Circumstances\n_seem_ often to make them very improper, where they are absolutely\nnecessary. It is after long labor and study, and many unsuccessful\nendeavors, that they are brought to be as useful as they are; after\nhigh contempt and absolute rejection of the most useful we have; and\nafter disputes and doubts, which have seemed to be endless. The best\nremedies too, when unskilfully, much more when dishonestly applied, may\nproduce new diseases; and with the rightest application the success of\nthem is often doubtful. In many cases they are not effectual: where\nthey are, it is often very slowly: and the application of them, and the\nnecessary regimen accompanying it, is not uncommonly so disagreeable,\nthat some will not submit to them; and satisfy themselves with the\nexcuse, that if they would, it is not certain whether it would be\nsuccessful. And many persons, who labor under diseases, for which there\nare known natural remedies, are not so happy as to be always, if ever,\nin the way of them. In a word, the remedies which nature has provided\nfor diseases are neither certain, perfect, nor universal. And indeed\nthe same principles of arguing, which would lead us to conclude, that\nthey must be so, would lead us likewise to conclude, that there could\nbe no occasion for them; _i.e._ that there could be no diseases at all.\nAnd therefore our experience that there are diseases, shows that it is\ncredible beforehand, upon supposition nature has provided remedies for\nthem, that these remedies may be, as by experience we find they are,\nneither certain, nor perfect, nor universal; because it shows, that the\nprinciples upon which we should expect the contrary are fallacious.\n\nAnd now, what is the just consequence from all these things? Not\nthat reason is no judge of what is offered to us as being of divine\nrevelation. For this would be to infer that we are unable to judge\nof any thing, because we are unable to judge of all things. Reason\ncan, and it ought to judge, not only of the meaning, but also of the\nmorality and the evidence of revelation.\n\n_First_, It is the province of reason to judge of the morality of\nthe Scripture; _i.e._ not whether it contains things different from\nwhat we should have expected from a wise, just, and good Being; (for\nobjections from hence have been now obviated:) but whether it contains\nthings plainly contradictory to wisdom, justice, or goodness; to what\nthe light of nature teaches us of God. And I know nothing of this sort\nobjected against Scripture, excepting such objections as are formed\nupon suppositions, which would equally conclude, that the constitution\nof nature is contradictory to wisdom, justice, or goodness; which\nmost certainly it is not. There are, indeed, some particular precepts\nin Scripture, given to particular persons, requiring actions, which\nwould be immoral and vicious, were it not for such precepts. But it is\neasy to see, that all these are of such a kind, as that the precept\nchanges the whole nature of the case and of the action; and both\nconstitutes and shows that not to be unjust or immoral, which, prior\nto the precept, must have appeared and really been so: which may well\nbe, since none of these precepts are contrary to immutable morality.\nIf it were commanded, to cultivate the _principles_, and act from the\nspirit of treachery, ingratitude, cruelty; the command would not alter\nthe nature of the case or of the action, in any of these instances.\nBut it is quite otherwise in precepts, which require only the doing an\n_external action_: for instance, taking away the property, or life of\nany. For men have no right, either to life or property, but what arises\nsolely from the grant of God. When this grant is revoked, they cease\nto have any right at all in either: and when this revocation is made\nknown, as surely it is possible it may be, it must cease to be unjust\nto deprive them of either. And though a course of external acts, which\nwithout command would be immoral, must make an immoral habit; yet a few\ndetached commands have no such natural tendency. I thought proper to\nsay thus much of the few Scripture precepts, which require, not vicious\nactions, but actions which would have been vicious, but for such\nprecepts; because they are sometimes weakly urged as immoral, and great\nweight is laid upon objections drawn from them.\n\nTo me there seems no difficulty at all in these precepts, but what\narises from their being offences: _i.e._ from their being liable to be\nperverted, as indeed they are, by wicked designing men, to serve the\nmost horrid purposes; and perhaps to mislead the weak and enthusiastic.\nAnd objections from this head are not objections against revelation;\nbut against the whole notion of religion, as a trial: and against the\ngeneral constitution of nature.\n\n_Secondly_, Reason is able to judge, and must, of the evidence of\nrevelation, and of the objections urged against that evidence: which\nshall be the subject of a following chapter.[185]\n\nThe consequence of the foregoing observations is, that the question\nupon which the truth of Christianity depends, is scarcely at all\nwhat objections there are against its scheme, since there are none\nagainst the morality of it, but _what objections there are against its\nevidence_; or, _what proof there remains of it, after due allowances\nare made for the objections against that proof_: because it has been\nshown, that the _objections against Christianity, as distinguished\nfrom objections against its evidence, are frivolous_. For surely very\nlittle weight, if any at all, is to be laid upon a way of arguing and\nobjecting, which, when applied to the general constitution of nature,\nexperience shows not to be conclusive: and such, I think, is the whole\nway of objecting treated of throughout this chapter. It is resolvable\ninto principles, and goes upon suppositions, which mislead us to think,\nthat the Author of nature would not act, as we experience he does; or\nwould act, in such and such cases, as we experience he does not in like\ncases. But the unreasonableness of this way of objecting will appear\nyet more evidently from hence, that the chief things thus objected\nagainst are justified, as shall be further shown,[186] by distinct,\nparticular, and full analogies, in the constitution and course of\nnature.\n\nIt is to be remembered, that, as frivolous as objections of the\nforegoing sort against revelation are, yet, when a supposed revelation\nis more consistent with itself, and has a more general and uniform\ntendency to promote virtue, than, all circumstances considered, could\nhave been expected from enthusiasm and political views, this is a\npresumptive proof of its not proceeding from them, and so of its truth:\nbecause we are competent judges, what might have been expected from\nenthusiasm and political views.[187]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV.\n\nCHRISTIANITY, CONSIDERED AS A SCHEME OR CONSTITUTION, IMPERFECTLY\nCOMPREHENDED.\n\n\nAs hath been now shown,[188] the analogy of nature renders it highly\ncredible beforehand, that, supposing a revelation to be made, it must\ncontain many things very different from what we should have expected,\nand such as appear open to great objections: and that this observation,\nin good measure, takes off the force of those objections, or rather\nprecludes them. It may be alleged, that this is a very partial answer\nto such objections, or a very unsatisfactory way of obviating them:\nbecause it does not show at all, that the things objected against\ncan be wise, just, and good; much less, that it is credible they are\nso. It will therefore be proper to show this distinctly; by applying\nto these objections against the wisdom, justice, and goodness of\nChristianity, the answer above[189] given to the like objections\nagainst the constitution of nature: before we consider the particular\nanalogies in the latter, to the particular things objected against in\nthe former. Now that which affords a sufficient answer to objections\nagainst the wisdom, justice, and goodness of the constitution of\nnature, is its being a constitution, a system, or scheme, imperfectly\ncomprehended;[190] a scheme in which means are made use of to\naccomplish ends; and which is carried on by general laws. For from\nthese things it has been proved, not only to be possible, but also\nto be credible, that those things which are objected against may be\nconsistent with wisdom, justice, and goodness; nay, may be instances\nof them: and even that the constitution and government of nature may\nbe perfect in the highest possible degree. If Christianity then be\na scheme, and of the like kind; it is evident, the like objections\nagainst it must admit of the like answer. And,\n\nI. Christianity is a scheme, quite beyond our comprehension.\n\nThe moral government of God is exercised, by gradually conducting\nthings so in the course of his providence, that every one, at\nlength and upon the whole, shall receive according to his deserts;\nand neither fraud nor violence, but truth and right, shall finally\nprevail. Christianity is a particular scheme under this general plan of\nProvidence, and a part of it, conducive to its completion, with regard\nto mankind: consisting itself also of various parts, and a mysterious\neconomy, which has been carrying on from the time the world came into\nits present wretched state, and is still carrying on, for its recovery,\nby a divine person, the Messiah; who is to _gather together in one the\nchildren of God, that are scattered abroad_,[191] and establish _an\neverlasting kingdom, wherein dwelleth righteousness_.[192] In order to\nit; after various manifestations of things, relating to this great and\ngeneral scheme of Providence, through a succession of many ages: (For\n_the Spirit of Christ which was in the prophets, testified beforehand\nhis sufferings, and the glory that should follow: unto whom it was\nrevealed, that not unto themselves, but unto us they did minister the\nthings which are now reported unto us by them that have preached the\nGospel; which things the angels desire to look into_:[193])--after\nvarious dispensations looking forward and preparatory to, this final\nsalvation: _in the fulness of time_, when infinite wisdom thought fit;\nHe, _being in the form of God,--made himself of no reputation, and took\nupon him the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of men:\nand being found in fashion as a man, he humbled himself, and became\nobedient to death, even the death of the cross. Wherefore God also hath\nhighly exalted him, and given him a name, which is above every name:\nthat at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of things in heaven,\nand things in the earth, and things under the earth: and that every\ntongue should confess, that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God\nthe Father._[194] Parts likewise of this economy are the miraculous\nmission of the Holy Ghost, and his ordinary assistances given to good\nmen:[195] the invisible government, which Christ at present exercises\nover his church: that which he himself refers to in these words: _In\nmy Father\u2019s house are many mansions--I go to prepare a place for\nyou_:[196] and his future return to _judge the world in righteousness_,\nand completely re-establish the kingdom of God. _For the Father judgeth\nno man; but hath committed all judgment unto the Son: that all men\nshould honor the Son, even as they honor the Father._[197] _All power\nis given unto him in heaven and in earth._[198] _And he must reign,\ntill he hath put all enemies under his feet. Then cometh the end, when\nhe shall have delivered up the kingdom to God, even the Father; when\nhe shall have put down all rule, and all authority and power. And\nwhen all things shall be subdued unto him, then shall the Son also\nhimself be subject unto him that put all things under him, that God\nmay be all in all._[199] Surely little need be said to show, that this\nsystem, or scheme of things, is but imperfectly comprehended by us. The\nScripture expressly asserts it to be so. And indeed one cannot read a\npassage relating to this _great mystery of godliness_,[200] but what\nimmediately runs up into something which shows us our ignorance in it;\nas every thing in nature shows us our ignorance in the constitution\nof nature. And whoever will seriously consider that part of the\nChristian scheme, which is revealed in Scripture, will find so much\nmore unrevealed, as will convince him, that, to all the purposes of\njudging and objecting, we know as little of it, as of the constitution\nof nature. Our ignorance, therefore, is as much an answer to our\nobjections against the perfection of one, as against the perfection of\nthe other.[201]\n\nII. It is obvious too, that in the Christian dispensation, as much as\nin the natural scheme of things, means are made use of to accomplish\nends.\n\nThe observation of this furnishes us with the same answer, to\nobjections against the perfection of Christianity, as to objections\nof the like kind, against the constitution of nature. It shows the\ncredibility, that the things objected against, how _foolish_[202]\nsoever they appear to men, may be the very best means of accomplishing\nthe very best ends. And their appearing _foolishness_ is no presumption\nagainst this, in a scheme so greatly beyond our comprehension.[203]\n\nIII. The credibility, that the Christian dispensation may have been,\nall along, carried on by general laws,[204] no less than the course of\nnature, may require to be more distinctly made out.\n\nConsider then, upon _what ground_ it is we say, that the whole common\ncourse of nature is carried on according to general fore-ordained laws.\nWe know indeed several of the general laws of matter; and a great\npart of the natural behavior of living agents is reducible to general\nlaws. But we know in a manner nothing, by what laws, storms, tempests,\nearthquakes, famine, pestilence, become the instruments of destruction\nto mankind. And the laws by which persons born into the world at such\na time and place are of such capacities, geniuses, tempers; the laws\nby which thoughts come into our mind, in a multitude of cases; and by\nwhich innumerable things happen, of the greatest influence upon the\naffairs and state of the world. These laws are so wholly unknown to us,\nthat we call the events which come to pass by them, accidental; though\nall reasonable men know certainly, that there cannot, in reality, be\nany such thing as chance; and conclude that the things which have this\nappearance are the result of general laws, and may be reduced to them.\nIt is but an exceeding little way, and in but a very few respects, that\nwe can trace up the natural course of things before us, to general\nlaws. It is only from analogy, that we conclude the whole of it to be\ncapable of being reduced to them: only from our seeing that part is so.\nIt is from our finding, that the course of nature, in some respects and\nso far, goes on by general laws, that we conclude this of the rest.\n\nIf that be a just ground for such a conclusion, it is a just ground\nalso, if not to conclude, yet to apprehend, to render it supposable\nand credible, which is sufficient for answering objections, that God\u2019s\nmiraculous interpositions may have been, all along in like manner,\nby _general_ laws of wisdom. Thus, that miraculous powers should be\nexerted, at such times, upon such occasions, in such degrees and\nmanners, and with regard to such persons, rather than others; that\nthe affairs of the world, being permitted to go on in their natural\ncourse so far, should, just at such a point, have a new direction given\nthem by miraculous interpositions; that these interpositions should\nbe exactly in such degrees and respects only; all this may have been\nby general laws. These laws are indeed unknown to us: but no more\nunknown than the laws from whence it is, that some die as soon as\nthey are born, and others live to extreme old age; that one man is so\nsuperior to another in understanding; with innumerable more things,\nwhich, as was before observed, we cannot reduce to any laws or rules,\nthough it is taken for granted, they are as much reducible to general\nones, as gravitation. If the revealed dispensations of Providence,\nand miraculous interpositions, be by general laws, as well as God\u2019s\nordinary government in the course of nature, made known by reason and\nexperience; there is no more reason to expect that every exigence, as\nit arises, should be provided for by these general laws or miraculous\ninterpositions, than that every exigence in nature should be, by the\ngeneral laws of nature. Yet there might be wise and good reasons, why\nmiraculous interpositions should be by general laws; and why these laws\nshould not be broken in upon, or deviated from, by other miracles.\n\nUpon the whole then, the appearance of deficiencies and irregularities\nin nature is owing to its being a scheme but in part made known, and\nof such a certain particular kind in other respects. We see no more\nreason why the frame and course of nature should be such a scheme, than\nwhy Christianity should. And that the former is such a scheme, renders\nit credible, that the latter, upon supposition of its truth, may be\nso too. And as it is manifest, that Christianity is a scheme revealed\nbut in part, and a scheme in which means are made use of to accomplish\nends, like to that of nature: so the credibility, that it may have\nbeen all along carried on by general laws, no less than the course of\nnature, has been distinctly proved. From all this it is beforehand\ncredible that there might, I think probable that there would, be the\nlike appearance of deficiencies and irregularities in Christianity,\nas in nature: _i.e._ that Christianity would be liable to the like\nobjections, as the frame of nature. And these objections are answered\nby these observations concerning Christianity; as the like objections\nagainst the frame of nature are answered by the like observations\nconcerning the frame of nature.\n\n * * * * *\n\nThe objections against Christianity, considered as a matter of\nfact,[205] having, in general, been obviated in the preceding chapter;\nand the same, considered as made against the wisdom and goodness of it,\nhaving been obviated in this: the next thing, according to the method\nproposed, is to show, that the principal objections, in particular,\nagainst Christianity, may be answered, by particular and full analogies\nin nature. And as one of them is made against the whole scheme of it\ntogether, as just now described, I choose to consider it here, rather\nthan in a distinct chapter by itself.\n\nThe thing objected against this scheme of the gospel is, \u201cthat\nit seems to suppose God was reduced to the necessity of a long\nseries of intricate means, in order to accomplish his ends, the\nrecovery and salvation of the world: in like sort as men, for want\nof understanding or power, not being able to come at their ends\ndirectly, are forced to go roundabout ways, and make use of many\nperplexed contrivances to arrive at them,\u201d Now every thing which we\nsee shows the folly of this, considered as an objection against the\ntruth of Christianity. For, according to our manner of conception,\nGod makes use of variety of means, what we often think tedious ones,\nin the natural course of providence, for the accomplishment of all\nhis ends. Indeed it is certain there is somewhat in this matter quite\nbeyond our comprehension: but the mystery is as great in nature as in\nChristianity. We know what we ourselves aim at, as final ends: and\nwhat courses we take, merely as means conducing to those ends. But we\nare greatly ignorant how far things are considered by the Author of\nnature, under the single notion of means and ends; so as that it may be\nsaid, this is merely an end, and that merely a means, in his regard.\nAnd whether there be not some peculiar absurdity in our very manner of\nconception, concerning this matter, something contradictory arising\nfrom our extremely imperfect views of things, it is impossible to say.\n\nHowever, this much is manifest, that the whole natural world and\ngovernment of it, is a scheme or system; not a fixed, but a progressive\none: a scheme in which the operation of various means takes up a\ngreat length of time, before the ends they tend to can be attained.\nThe change of seasons, the ripening of fruits, the very history of a\nflower, are instances of this: and so is human life. Thus vegetable\nbodies, and those of animals, though possibly formed at once, yet\ngrow up by degrees to a mature state. And thus rational agents, who\nanimate these latter bodies, are naturally directed to form each his\nown manners and character, by the gradual gaining of knowledge and\nexperience, and by a long course of action. Our existence is not only\nsuccessive, as it must be of necessity; but one state of our life and\nbeing is appointed by God, to be a preparation for another; and that\nto be the means of attaining to another succeeding one: infancy to\nchildhood; childhood to youth; youth to mature age. Men are impatient,\nand for precipitating things: but the Author of nature appears\ndeliberate throughout his operations; accomplishing his natural ends by\nslow successive steps.[206] And there is a plan of things beforehand\nlaid out, which, from the nature of it, requires various systems of\nmeans, as well as length of time, in order to the carrying on its\nseveral parts into execution.\n\nThus, in the daily course of natural providence, God operates in the\nvery same manner, as in the dispensation of Christianity; making one\nthing subservient to another; this, to something further; and so on,\nthrough a progressive series of means, which extend, both backward and\nforward, beyond our utmost view. Of this manner of operation, every\nthing we see in the course of nature is as much an instance, as any\npart of the Christian dispensation.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V.\n\nTHE PARTICULAR SYSTEM OF CHRISTIANITY; THE APPOINTMENT OF A MEDIATOR,\nAND THE REDEMPTION OF THE WORLD BY HIM.\n\n\nThere is not, I think, any thing relating to Christianity, which has\nbeen more objected against, than the mediation of Christ, in some\nor other of its parts. Yet upon thorough consideration, there seems\nnothing less justly liable to it.[207] For,\n\nI. The whole analogy of nature removes all imagined presumption against\nthe general notion of _a Mediator between God and man_.[208] For we\nfind all living creatures are brought into the world, and their life\nin infancy is preserved, by the instrumentality of others: and every\nsatisfaction of it, some way or other, is bestowed by the like means.\nSo that the visible government, which God exercises over the world, is\nby the instrumentality and mediation of others. How far his invisible\ngovernment be or be not so, it is impossible to determine at all by\nreason. The supposition, that part of it is so, appears, to say the\nleast, altogether as credible, as the contrary. There is then no sort\nof objection, from the light of nature, against the general notion of a\nmediator between God and man, considered as a doctrine of Christianity,\nor as an appointment in this dispensation: since we find by experience,\nthat God does appoint mediators, to be the instruments of good and evil\nto us: the instruments of his justice and his mercy. And the objection\nhere referred to is urged, not against mediation in that high, eminent,\nand peculiar sense, in which Christ is our mediator; but absolutely\nagainst the whole notion itself of a mediator at all.\n\nII. As we must suppose, that the world is under the proper moral\ngovernment of God, or in a state of religion, before we can enter into\nconsideration of the revealed doctrine, concerning the redemption of\nit by Christ: so that supposition is here to be distinctly noticed.\nNow the divine moral government which religion teaches us, implies\nthat the consequence of vice shall be misery, in some future state, by\nthe righteous judgment of God. That such consequent punishment shall\ntake effect by his appointment, is necessarily implied. But, as it\nis not in any sort to be supposed, that we are made acquainted with\nall the ends or reasons, for which it is fit that future punishments\nshould be inflicted, or why God has appointed such and such consequent\nmisery to follow vice; and as we are altogether in the dark, how or in\nwhat manner it shall follow, by what immediate occasions, or by the\ninstrumentality of what means; so there is no absurdity in supposing\nit may follow in a way analogous to that in which many miseries\nfollow such and such courses of action at present; poverty, sickness,\ninfamy, untimely death by diseases, death from the hands of civil\njustice. There is no absurdity in supposing future punishment may\nfollow wickedness _of course_, as we speak, or in the way of natural\nconsequence from God\u2019s original constitution of the world; from the\nnature he has given us, and from the condition in which he places us;\nor in a like manner, as a person rashly trifling upon a precipice,\nin the way of natural consequence, falls down; in the way of natural\nconsequence of this, breaks his limbs, and in the way of natural\nconsequence, without help, perishes.\n\nSome good men may perhaps be offended with hearing it spoken of as a\nsupposable thing that future punishments of wickedness may be in the\nway of natural consequence: as if this were taking the execution of\njustice out of the hands of God, and giving it to nature. But they\nshould remember, that when things come to pass according to the course\nof nature, this does not hinder them from being his doing, who is\nthe God of nature: and that the Scripture ascribes those punishments\nto divine justice, which are known to be natural; and which must be\ncalled so, when distinguished from such as are miraculous. After all,\nthis supposition, or rather this way of speaking, is here made use\nof only by way of illustration of the subject before us. For since it\nmust be admitted, that the future punishment of wickedness is not a\nmatter of arbitrary appointment, but of reason, equity, and justice; it\ncomes for aught I see, to the same thing, whether it is supposed to be\ninflicted in a way analogous to that in which the temporal punishments\nof vice and folly are inflicted, or in any other way. And though there\nwere a difference, it is allowable, in the present case, to make this\nsupposition, plainly not an incredible one, that future punishment may\nfollow wickedness in the way of natural consequence, or according to\nsome general laws of government already established in the universe.\n\nIII. Upon this supposition, or even without it, we may observe\nsomewhat, much to the present purpose, in the constitution of nature or\nappointments of Providence: the provision which is made, that all the\nbad natural consequences of men\u2019s actions should not always actually\nfollow; or that such bad consequences, as, according to the settled\ncourse of things, would inevitably have followed if not prevented,\nshould, in certain degrees, be prevented. We are apt presumptuously to\nimagine, that the world might have been so constituted, as that there\nwould not have been any such thing as misery or evil. On the contrary\nwe find the Author of nature permits it: but then he has provided\nreliefs, and in many cases perfect remedies for it, after some pains\nand difficulties; reliefs and remedies even for that evil, which is the\nfruit of our own misconduct; and which, in the course of nature, would\nhave continued, and ended in our destruction, but for such remedies.\nAnd this is an instance both of severity and of indulgence, in the\nconstitution of nature. Thus all the bad consequences, now mentioned,\nof a man\u2019s trifling upon a precipice, might be prevented. And though\nall were not, yet some of them might, by proper interposition, if not\nrejected:[209] by another\u2019s coming to the rash man\u2019s relief, with his\nown laying hold on that relief, in such sort as the case required.\nPersons may do a great deal themselves towards preventing the bad\nconsequences of their follies: and more may be done by themselves,\ntogether with the assistance of others their fellow-creatures; which\nassistance nature requires and prompts us to. This is the general\nconstitution of the world.\n\nNow suppose it had been so constituted, that after such actions were\ndone, as were foreseen naturally to draw after them misery to the doer,\nit should have been no more in human power to have prevented that\nnaturally consequent misery, in any instance, than it is in all: no\none can say, whether such a more severe constitution of things might\nnot yet have been really good. But, on the contrary, provision being\nmade by nature, that we may and do, to so great degree, prevent the bad\nnatural effects of our follies; this may be called mercy or compassion\nin the original constitution of the world: compassion, as distinguished\nfrom goodness in general. And, the whole known constitution and\ncourse of things affording us instances of such compassion, it would\nbe according to the analogy of nature, to hope, that however ruinous\nthe natural consequences of vice might be, from the general laws of\nGod\u2019s government over the universe; yet provision might be made,\npossibly might have been originally made, for preventing those ruinous\nconsequences from inevitably following: at least from following\nuniversally, and in all cases.\n\nMany, I am sensible, will wonder at finding this made a question, or\nspoken of as in any degree doubtful. The generality of mankind are so\nfar from having that awful sense of things, which the present state of\nvice and misery and darkness seems to make but reasonable, that they\nhave scarce any apprehension or thought at all about this matter, any\nway: and some serious persons may have spoken unadvisedly concerning\nit. But let us observe, what we experience to be, and what, from\nthe very constitution of nature cannot but be, the consequences of\nirregular and disorderly behavior: even of such rashness, wilfulness,\nneglects, as we scarce call vicious. Now it is natural to apprehend,\nthat the bad consequences of irregularity will be greater, in\nproportion as the irregularity is so. And there is no comparison\nbetween these irregularities, and the greater instances of vice, or\na dissolute profligate disregard to all religion; if there be any\nthing at all in religion. For consider what it is for creatures, moral\nagents, presumptuously to introduce that confusion and misery into the\nkingdom of God, which mankind have in fact introduced: to blaspheme the\nSovereign Lord of all; to contemn his authority; to be injurious, to\nthe degree they are, to their fellow-creatures, the creatures of God.\nAdd that the effects of vice in the present world are often extreme\nmisery, irretrievable ruin, and even death: and upon putting all this\ntogether, it will appear, that as no one can say, in what degree fatal\nthe unprevented consequences of vice may be, according to the general\nrule of divine government; so it is by no means intuitively certain,\nhow far these consequences could possibly, in the nature of the thing,\nbe prevented, consistently with the eternal rule of right, or with what\nis, in fact, the moral constitution of nature. However, there would be\nlarge ground to hope, that the universal government was not so severely\nstrict, but that there was room for pardon, or for having those penal\nconsequences prevented. Yet,\n\nIV. There seems no probability, that any thing we could do would\nalone and of itself prevent them: prevent their following, or being\ninflicted. But one would think at least, it were impossible that\nthe contrary should be thought certain. For we are not acquainted\nwith the whole of the case. We are not informed of all the reasons,\nwhich render it fit that future punishments should be inflicted: and\ntherefore cannot know, whether any thing we could do would make such\nan alteration, as to render it fit that they should be remitted. We\ndo not know what the whole natural or appointed consequences of vice\nare; nor in what way they would follow, if not prevented: and therefore\ncan in no sort say, whether we could do any thing which would be\nsufficient to prevent them. Our ignorance being thus manifest, let\nus recollect the analogy of nature or Providence. For, though this\nmay be but a slight ground to raise a positive opinion upon, in this\nmatter; yet it is sufficient to answer a mere arbitrary assertion,\nwithout any kind of evidence, urged by way of objection against a\ndoctrine, the proof of which is not reason, but revelation. Consider\nthen: people ruin their fortunes by extravagance; they bring diseases\nupon themselves by excess; they incur the penalties of civil laws;\nand surely civil government is natural; will sorrow for these follies\npast, and behaving well for the future, alone and of itself prevent\nthe natural consequences of them? On the contrary, men\u2019s natural\nabilities of helping themselves are often impaired; or if not, yet they\nare forced to be beholden to the assistance of others, upon several\naccounts, and in different ways; assistance which they would have had\nno occasion for, had it not been for their misconduct; but which, in\nthe disadvantageous condition they have reduced themselves to, is\nabsolutely necessary to their recovery, and retrieving their affairs.\nSince this is our case, considering ourselves merely as inhabitants of\nthis world, and as having a temporal interest here, under the natural\ngovernment of God, which however has a great deal moral in it; why is\nit not supposable that this may be our case also, in our more important\ncapacity, as under his perfect moral government, and having a more\ngeneral and future interest depending?[210] If we have misbehaved in\nthis higher capacity, and rendered ourselves obnoxious to the future\npunishment, which God has annexed to vice: it is plainly credible, that\nbehaving well for the time to come may be--not useless, God forbid--but\nwholly insufficient, alone and of itself, to prevent that punishment:\nor to put us in the condition which we should have been in, had we\npreserved our innocence.\n\nThough we ought to reason with all reverence, whenever we reason\nconcerning the divine conduct: yet it may be added, that it is clearly\ncontrary to all our notions of government, as well as to what is,\nin fact, the general constitution of nature, to suppose, that doing\nwell for the future should, in all cases, prevent all the judicial\nbad consequences of having done evil, or all the punishment annexed\nto disobedience. We have manifestly nothing from whence to determine,\nin what degree, and in what cases, reformation would prevent this\npunishment, even supposing that it would in some. And though the\nefficacy of repentance itself alone, to prevent what mankind had\nrendered themselves obnoxious to, and recover what they had forfeited,\nis now insisted upon, in opposition to Christianity; yet, by the\ngeneral prevalence of propitiatory sacrifices over the heathen world,\nthis notion of repentance alone being sufficient to expiate guilt,\nappears to be contrary to the general sense of mankind.[211]\n\nUpon the whole then; had the laws, the general laws of God\u2019s government\nbeen permitted to operate, without any interposition in our behalf,\nthe future punishment, for aught we know to the contrary, or have any\nreason to think, must inevitably have followed, notwithstanding any\nthing we could have done to prevent it.\n\nV. In this darkness, or this light of nature, call it which you\nplease, revelation comes in; and confirms every doubting fear, which\ncould enter into the heart of man, concerning the future unprevented\nconsequence of wickedness. It supposes the world to be in a state\nof ruin (a supposition which seems the very ground of the Christian\ndispensation; and which, if not provable by reason, yet is in no\nwise contrary to it;) and teaches us too, that the rules of divine\ngovernment are such, as not to admit of pardon immediately and\ndirectly upon repentance, or by the sole efficacy of it. But teaches\nat the same time, what nature might justly have hoped, that the moral\ngovernment of the universe was not so rigid, but that there was room\nfor an interposition, to avert the fatal consequences of vice; which\ntherefore, by this means, does admit of pardon. Revelation teaches us,\nthat the unknown laws of God\u2019s more general government, no less than\nthe particular laws by which we experience he governs us at present,\nare compassionate,[212] as well as good in the more general notion of\ngoodness: and that he hath mercifully provided, that there should be\nan interposition to prevent the destruction of human kind; whatever\nthat destruction unprevented would have been. _God so loved the world,\nthat he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth_, not, to\nbe sure, in a speculative, but in a practical sense, _that whosoever\nbelieveth in him, should not perish_:[213] gave his Son in the same\nway of goodness to the world, as he affords particular persons the\nfriendly assistance of their fellow-creatures, when, without it, their\ntemporal ruin would be the certain consequence of their follies: in the\nsame way of goodness, I say, though in a transcendent and infinitely\nhigher degree. And the Son of God _loved us, and gave himself for us_,\nwith a love, which he himself compares to that of human friendship:\nthough, in this case, all comparisons must fall infinitely short of\nthe thing intended to be illustrated by them. He interposed in such\na manner as was necessary and effectual to prevent that execution of\njustice upon sinners, which God had appointed should otherwise have\nbeen executed upon them; or in such a manner, as to prevent that\npunishment from actually following, which, according to the general\nlaws of divine government, must have followed the sins of the world,\nhad it not been for such interposition.[214]\n\nIf any thing here said should appear, upon first thought, inconsistent\nwith divine goodness; a second, I am persuaded, will entirely remove\nthat appearance. For were we to suppose the constitution of things to\nbe such, as that the whole creation must have perished, had it not\nbeen for something, which God had appointed should be, in order to\nprevent that ruin: even this supposition would not be inconsistent, in\nany degree, with the most absolutely perfect goodness. Still it may\nbe thought, that this whole manner of treating the subject before us\nsupposes mankind to be naturally in a very strange state. And truly so\nit does. But it is not Christianity which has put us into this state.\nWhoever will consider the manifold miseries, and the extreme wickedness\nof the world; that the best have great wrongnesses within themselves,\nwhich they complain of, and endeavor to amend; but that the generality\ngrow more profligate and corrupt with age; that even moralists thought\nthe present state to be a state of punishment: and, that the earth our\nhabitation has the appearances of being a ruin: whoever, I say, will\nconsider all these, and some other obvious things, will think he has\nlittle reason to object against the Scripture account, that mankind is\nin a state of degradation; against this being _the fact_: how difficult\nsoever he may think it to account for, or even to form a distinct\nconception of the occasions and circumstances of it. But that the\ncrime of our first parents was the occasion of our being placed in a\nmore disadvantageous condition, is a thing throughout and particularly\nanalogous to what we see in the daily course of natural providence; as\nthe recovery of the world by the interposition of Christ has been shown\nto be so in general.\n\nVI. The particular manner in which Christ interposed in the redemption\nof the world, or his office as _Mediator_, in the largest sense,\n_between God and man_, is thus represented to us in the Scripture.\n_He is the light of the world_;[215] the revealer of the will of God\nin the most eminent sense. He is a propitiatory sacrifice;[216] _the\nLamb of God_:[217] and, as he voluntarily offered himself up, he is\nstyled our High Priest.[218] And, which seems of peculiar weight, he is\ndescribed beforehand in the Old Testament, under the same characters\nof a priest, and an expiatory victim.[219] And whereas it is objected,\nthat all this is merely by way of allusion to the sacrifices of\nthe Mosaic law, the Apostle on the contrary affirms, that the _law\nwas a shadow of good things to come, and not the very image of the\nthings_:[220] and that _the priests that offer gifts according to the\nlaw--serve unto the example and shadow of heavenly things, as Moses was\nadmonished of God, when he was about to make the tabernacle. For see,\nsaith he, that thou make all things according to the pattern showed to\nthee in the mount_;[221] _i.e._ the Levitical priesthood was a shadow\nof the priesthood of Christ; in like manner as the tabernacle made by\nMoses was according to that showed him in the mount. The priesthood of\nChrist, and the tabernacle in the mount, were the originals; of the\nformer of which the Levitical priesthood was a type; and of the latter\nthe tabernacle made by Moses was a copy. The doctrine of this epistle\nthen plainly is, that the legal sacrifices were allusions to the great\nand final atonement to be made by the blood of Christ; and not that\nthis was an allusion to those. Nor can any thing be more express and\ndeterminate than the following passage. _It is not possible that the\nblood of bulls and of goats should take away sin. Wherefore when he\ncometh into the world, he saith, Sacrifice and offering_, _i.e._ of\nbulls and of goats, _thou wouldest not, but a body hast thou prepared\nme. Lo! I come to do thy will, O God. By which will we are sanctified.,\nthrough the offering of the body of Jesus Christ once for all._[222]\nAnd to add one passage more of the like kind: _Christ was once offered\nto bear the sins of many: and unto them that look for him shall he\nappear the second time, without sin_; _i.e._ without bearing sin,\nas he did at his first coming, by being an offering for it; without\nhaving our _iniquities_ again _laid upon him_, without being any more\na sin-offering:--_unto them, that look for him shall he appear the\nsecond time, without sin, unto salvation_.[223] Nor do the inspired\nwriters at all confine themselves to this manner of speaking concerning\nthe satisfaction of Christ; but declare an efficacy in what he did and\nsuffered for us, additional to and beyond mere instruction, example,\nand government, in great variety of expression: _That Jesus should\ndie for that nation_, the Jews: _and not for that nation only, but\nthat also_, plainly by the efficacy of his death, _he should gather\ntogether in one the children of God that were scattered abroad_:[224]\nthat _he suffered for sins, the just for the unjust_:[225] that _he\ngave his life, himself, a ransom_:[226] that _we are bought, bought\nwith a price_:[227] that _he redeemed us with his blood: redeemed us\nfrom the curse of the law, being made a curse for us_:[228] that he\nis our _advocate_, _intercessor_, and _propitiation_:[229] that _he\nwas made perfect_, or consummate, _through sufferings; and being_ thus\n_made perfect, he became the author of salvation_:[230] that _God was\nin Christ reconciling the world to himself; by the death of his Son, by\nthe cross; not imputing their trespasses unto them_:[231] and lastly,\nthat _through death he destroyed him that had the power of death_.[232]\nChrist having thus _humbled himself, and become obedient to death, even\nthe death of the cross; God also hath highly exalted him, and given\nhim a name, which is above every name: hath given all things into his\nhands: hath committed all judgment unto him; that all men should honor\nthe Son, even as they honor the Father_.[233] For, _worthy is the Lamb\nthat was slain, to receive power, and riches, and wisdom, and strength,\nand honor, and glory, and blessing. And every creature which is in\nheaven, and on the earth, heard I, saying, Blessing, and honor, and\nglory, and power, be unto him that sitteth upon the throne, and unto\nthe Lamb forever and ever._[234]\n\nThese passages of Scripture seem to comprehend and express the chief\nparts of Christ\u2019s office, as Mediator between God and man, so far, I\nmean, as the nature of this his office is revealed; and it is usually\ntreated of by divines under three heads.\n\n_First_, He was, by way of eminence, the Prophet: _that Prophet that\nshould come into the world_,[235] to declare the divine will. He\npublished anew the law of nature, which men had corrupted; and the very\nknowledge of which, to some degree, was lost among them. He taught\nmankind, taught us authoritatively, to _live soberly, righteously, and\ngodly in this present world_, in expectation of the future judgment\nof God. He confirmed the truth of this moral system of nature, and\ngave us additional evidence of it; the evidence of testimony.[236] He\ndistinctly revealed the manner, in which God would be worshipped, the\nefficacy of repentance, and the rewards and punishments of a future\nlife. Thus he was a prophet in a sense in which no other ever was. To\nwhich is to be added, that he set us a perfect _example, that we should\nfollow his steps_.\n\n_Secondly_, He has a _kingdom which is not of this world_. He founded\na Church, to be to mankind a standing memorial of religion, and\ninvitation to it; which he promised to be with always even to the\nend. He exercises an invisible government over it, himself, and by\nhis Spirit: over that part of it which is militant here on earth, a\ngovernment of discipline, _for the perfecting of the saints, for the\nedifying his body: till we all come in the unity of the faith, and of\nthe knowledge of the Son of God, unto a perfect man, unto the measure\nof the stature of the fulness of Christ_.[237] Of this Church, all\npersons scattered over the world, who live in obedience to his laws,\nare members. For these he is _gone to prepare a place, and will come\nagain to receive them unto himself, that where he is, there they may be\nalso; and reign with him forever and ever_:[238] and likewise _to take\nvengeance on them that know not God, and obey not his Gospel_.[239]\n\nAgainst these parts of Christ\u2019s office I find no objections, but what\nare fully obviated in the beginning of this chapter.\n\n_Lastly_, Christ offered himself a propitiatory sacrifice, and made\natonement for the sins of the world; which is mentioned last, in regard\nto what is objected against it. Sacrifices of expiation were commanded\nthe Jews, and obtained among most other nations, from tradition, whose\noriginal probably was revelation. And they were continually repeated,\nboth occasionally, and at the returns of stated times: and made up\ngreat part of the external religion of mankind. _But now once in the\nend of the world Christ appeared to put away sin by the sacrifice of\nhimself._[240] This sacrifice was, in the highest degree and with the\nmost extensive influence, of that efficacy for obtaining pardon of sin,\nwhich the heathens may be supposed to have thought their sacrifices to\nhave been, and which the Jewish sacrifices really were in some degree,\nand with regard to some persons.[241]\n\nHow and in what particular _way_ it had this efficacy, there are not\nwanting persons who have endeavored to explain: but I do not find that\nthe Scripture has explained it. We seem to be very much in the dark\nconcerning the manner in which the ancients understood atonement to be\nmade, _i.e._ pardon to be obtained by sacrifices. And if the Scripture\nhas, as surely it has, left this matter of the satisfaction of Christ\nmysterious, left somewhat in it unrevealed, all conjectures about it\nmust be, if not evidently absurd, yet at least uncertain. Nor has any\none reason to complain for want of further information, unless he can\nshow his claim to it.\n\nSome have endeavored to explain the efficacy of what Christ has\ndone and suffered for us, beyond what the Scripture has authorized:\nothers, probably because they could not explain it, have been for\ntaking it away, and confining his office as Redeemer of the world,\nto his instruction, example, and government of the church. Whereas\nthe doctrine of the Gospel appears to be, not only that he taught the\nefficacy of repentance, but rendered it of the efficacy of which it\nis, by what he did and suffered for us: that he obtained for us the\nbenefit of having our repentance accepted unto eternal life: not only\nthat he revealed to sinners, that they were in a capacity of salvation,\nand how they might obtain it; but moreover that he put them into this\ncapacity of salvation, by what he did and suffered for them; put us\ninto a capacity of escaping future punishment, and obtaining future\nhappiness. And it is our wisdom thankfully to accept the benefit, by\nperforming the conditions, upon which it is offered, on our part,\nwithout disputing how it was procured on his. For,\n\nVII. Since we neither know by what means punishment in a future state\nwould have followed wickedness in this: nor in what manner it would\nhave been inflicted, had it not been prevented; nor all the reasons\nwhy its infliction would have been needful, nor the particular nature\nof that state of happiness, which Christ is gone to prepare for his\ndisciples: and since we are ignorant how far any thing which we could\ndo, would, alone and of itself, have been effectual to prevent that\npunishment to which we were obnoxious, and recover that happiness which\nwe had forfeited; it is most evident we are not judges, antecedently\nto revelation, whether a mediator was or was not necessary, to obtain\nthose ends: to prevent that future punishment, and bring mankind to\nthe final happiness of their nature. For the very same reasons, upon\nsupposition of the necessity of a mediator, we are no more judges,\nantecedently to revelation, of the whole nature of his office, or\nof the several parts of which it consists; or of what was fit and\nrequisite to be assigned him, in order to accomplish the ends of divine\nProvidence in the appointment. Hence it follows, that to object against\nthe expediency or usefulness of particular things, revealed to have\nbeen done or suffered by him, because we do not see how they were\nconducive to those ends, is highly absurd. Yet nothing is more common\nto be met with, than this absurdity. If it be acknowledged beforehand,\nthat we are not judges in the case, it is evident that no objection\ncan, with any shadow of reason, be urged against any particular part of\nChrist\u2019s mediatorial office revealed in Scripture, till it can be shown\npositively not to be requisite or conducive to the ends proposed to be\naccomplished; or that it is in itself unreasonable.\n\nThere is one objection made against the satisfaction of Christ, which\nlooks to be of this positive kind: that the doctrine of his being\nappointed to suffer for the sins of the world, represents God as being\nindifferent whether he punished the innocent or the guilty. Now from\nthe foregoing observations we may see the extreme slightness of all\nsuch objections; and (though it is most certain all who make them _do\nnot see_ the consequence) that they conclude altogether as much against\nGod\u2019s whole original constitution of nature, and the whole daily\ncourse of divine Providence in the government of the world, (_i.e._\nagainst the whole scheme of Theism and the whole notion of religion,)\nas against Christianity. For the world is a constitution or system,\nwhose parts have a mutual reference to each other: and there is a\nscheme of things gradually carrying on, called the course of nature,\nto the carrying on of which God has appointed us, in various ways,\nto contribute. And when, in the daily course of natural providence,\nit is appointed that innocent people should suffer for the faults\nof the guilty, this is liable to the very same objection, as the\ninstance we are now considering. The infinitely greater importance of\nthat appointment of Christianity, which is objected against, does not\nhinder but it may be, as it plainly is, an appointment of the very same\n_kind_, with what the world affords us daily examples of. Nay, if there\nwere any force at all in the objection, it would be stronger, in one\nrespect, against natural providence, than against Christianity: because\nunder the former we are in many cases commanded, and even necessitated\nwhether we will or no, to suffer for the faults of others; whereas the\nsufferings of Christ were voluntary.\n\nThe world\u2019s being under the righteous government of God does indeed\nimply, that finally, and upon the whole, every one shall receive\naccording to his personal deserts: and the general doctrine of the\nwhole Scripture is, that this shall be the completion of the divine\ngovernment. But during the progress, and, for aught we know, even in\norder to the completion of this moral scheme, vicarious punishments may\nbe fit, and absolutely necessary. Men by their follies run themselves\ninto extreme distress; into difficulties which would be absolutely\nfatal to them, were it not for the interposition and assistance of\nothers. God commands by the law of nature, that we afford them this\nassistance, in many cases where we cannot do it without very great\npains, and labor, and sufferings to ourselves. We see in what variety\nof ways one person\u2019s sufferings contribute to the relief of another:\nand how, or by what particular means, this comes to pass, or follows,\nfrom the constitution and laws of nature, which came under our notice:\nand, being familiarized to it, men are not shocked with it. So that the\nreason of their insisting upon objections of the foregoing kind against\nthe satisfaction of Christ is, either that they do not consider God\u2019s\nsettled and uniform appointments as his appointments at all; or else\nthey forget that vicarious punishment is a providential appointment\nof every day\u2019s experience. And then, from their being unacquainted\nwith the more general laws of nature or divine government over the\nworld, and not seeing how the sufferings of Christ could contribute\nto the redemption of it, unless by arbitrary and tyrannical will,\nthey conclude his sufferings could not contribute to it any other\nway. And yet, what has been often alleged in justification of this\ndoctrine, even from the apparent natural tendency of this method of\nour redemption; its tendency to vindicate the authority of God\u2019s laws,\nand deter his creatures from sin; this has never yet been answered,\nand is I think plainly unanswerable: though I am far from thinking it\nan account of the whole of the case. But, without taking this into\nconsideration, it abundantly appears, from the observations above made,\nthat this objection is not an objection against Christianity, but\nagainst the whole general constitution of nature. And if it were to be\nconsidered as an objection against Christianity, or considering it as\nit is, an objection against the constitution of nature; it amounts to\nno more in conclusion than this, that a divine appointment cannot be\nnecessary or expedient, because the objector does not discern it to be\nso: though he must own that the nature of the case is such, as renders\nhim incapable of judging, whether it be so or not; or of seeing it to\nbe necessary, though it were so!\n\nIt is indeed a matter of great patience to reasonable men, to find\npeople arguing in this manner: objecting against the credibility of\nsuch particular things revealed in Scripture, that they do not see\nthe necessity or expediency of them. For though it is highly right,\nand the most pious exercise of our understanding, to inquire with due\nreverence into the ends and reasons of God\u2019s dispensations: yet when\nthose reasons are concealed, to argue from our ignorance, that such\ndispensations cannot be from God, is infinitely absurd. The presumption\nof this kind of objections seems almost lost in the folly of them. And\nthe folly of them is yet greater, when they are urged, as usually they\nare, against things in Christianity analogous or like to those natural\ndispensations of Providence, which are matter of experience. Let reason\nbe kept to: and if any part of the Scripture account of the redemption\nof the world by Christ can be shown to be really contrary to it, let\nthe Scripture, in the name of God, be given up. But let not such poor\ncreatures as we are, go on objecting against an infinite scheme, that\nwe do not see the necessity or usefulness of all its parts, and call\nthis reasoning; and, which still further heightens the absurdity in the\npresent case, parts which we are not actively concerned in. For it may\nbe worth mentioning,\n\n_Lastly_, That not only the reason of the thing, but the whole\nanalogy of nature, should teach us, not to expect to have the like\ninformation concerning the divine conduct, as concerning our own duty.\nGod instructs us by experience, (for it is not reason, but experience\nwhich instructs us,) what good or bad consequences will follow from\nour acting in such and such manners: and by this he directs us how we\nare to behave ourselves. But, though we are sufficiently instructed\nfor the common purposes of life: yet it is but an almost infinitely\nsmall part of natural providence, which we are at all let into.\nThe case is the same with regard to revelation. The doctrine of a\nmediator between God and man, against which it is objected, that the\nexpediency of some things in it is not understood, relates only to\nwhat was done on God\u2019s part in the appointment, and on the Mediator\u2019s\nin the execution of it. For what is _required of us_, in consequence\nof this gracious dispensation, is another subject, in which none can\ncomplain for want of information. The constitution of the world, and\nGod\u2019s natural government over it, is all mystery, as much as the\nChristian dispensation. Yet under the first he has given men all\nthings pertaining to life; and under the other all things pertaining\nunto godliness. And it may be added, that there is nothing hard to be\naccounted for in any of the common precepts of Christianity: though\nif there were, surely a divine command is abundantly sufficient to\nlay us under the strongest obligations to obedience. But the fact is,\nthat the reasons of all the Christian precepts are evident. Positive\ninstitutions are manifestly necessary to keep up and propagate religion\namong mankind. And our duty to Christ, the internal and external\nworship of him; this part of the religion of the Gospel manifestly\narises out of what he has done and suffered, his authority and\ndominion, and the relation which he is revealed to stand in to us.[242]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI.\n\nTHE WANT OF UNIVERSALITY IN REVELATION; AND THE SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN\nTHE PROOF OF IT.\n\n\nIt has been thought by some persons, that if the evidence of revelation\nappears doubtful, this itself turns into a positive argument against\nit: because it cannot be supposed, that, if it were true, it would\nbe left to subsist upon doubtful evidence. And the objection against\nrevelation from its not being universal is often insisted upon as of\ngreat weight.\n\nThe weakness of these opinions may be shown, by observing the\nsuppositions on which they are founded: which are really such as these;\nthat it cannot be thought God would have bestowed any favor at all\nupon us, unless in the degree which we think he might, and which, we\nimagine, would be most to our particular advantage; and also that it\ncannot be thought he would bestow a favor upon any, unless he bestowed\nthe same upon all; suppositions, which we find contradicted, not by\na few instances in God\u2019s natural government of the world, but by the\ngeneral analogy of nature together.\n\nPersons who speak of the evidence of religion as doubtful, and of this\nsupposed doubtfulness as a positive argument against it, should be\nput upon considering, what that evidence is, which they act upon with\nregard to their temporal interests. It is not only extremely difficult,\nbut in many cases absolutely impossible, to balance pleasure and pain,\nsatisfaction and uneasiness, so as to be able to say on which side\nis the overplus. There are the like difficulties and impossibilities\nin making the due allowances for a change of temper and taste, for\nsatiety, disgusts, ill health: any of which render men incapable of\nenjoying, after they have obtained what they most eagerly desired.\nNumberless too are the accidents, besides that one of untimely death,\nwhich may even probably disappoint the best-concerted schemes: and\nstrong objections are often seen to lie against them, not to be removed\nor answered, but which seem overbalanced by reasons on the other side;\nso as that the certain difficulties and dangers of the pursuit are, by\nevery one; thought justly disregarded, upon account of the appearing\ngreater advantages in case of success, though there be but little\nprobability of it. Lastly, every one observes our liableness, if we be\nnot upon our guard, to be deceived by the falsehood of men, and the\nfalse appearances of things: and this danger must be greatly increased,\nif there be a strong bias within, suppose from indulged passion, to\nfavor the deceit. Hence arises that great uncertainty and doubtfulness\nof proof, _wherein_ our temporal interest really consists; what are the\nmost probable _means_ of attaining it; and whether those means will\neventually be _successful_. And numberless instances there are, in the\ndaily course of life, in which all men think it reasonable to engage in\npursuits, though the probability is greatly against succeeding; and to\nmake such provision for themselves, as it is supposable they may have\noccasion for, though the plain acknowledged probability is, that they\nnever shall.\n\nThose who think the objection against revelation, from its light not\nbeing universal, to be of weight,[243] should observe, that the Author\nof nature, in numberless instances, bestows that upon some, which he\ndoes not upon others, who seem equally to stand in need of it. Indeed\nhe appears to bestow all his gifts with the most promiscuous variety\namong creatures of the same species: health and strength, capacities\nof prudence and of knowledge, means of improvement, riches, and all\nexternal advantages. As there are not any two men found, of exactly\nlike shape and features; so it is probable there are not any two, of\nan exactly like constitution, temper, and situation, with regard to\nthe goods and evils of life. Yet, notwithstanding these uncertainties\nand varieties, God does exercise a natural government over the world;\nand there is such a thing as a prudent and imprudent institution of\nlife, with regard to our health and our affairs, under that his natural\ngovernment.\n\nAs neither the Jewish nor Christian revelation have been universal; and\nas they have been afforded to a greater or less part of the world,\nat different times; so likewise at different times, both revelations\nhave had different degrees of evidence. The Jews who lived during the\nsuccession of prophets, that is, from Moses till after the Captivity,\nhad higher evidence of the truth of their religion, than those had,\nwho lived in the interval between the last-mentioned period, and the\ncoming of Christ. And the first Christians had higher evidence of the\nmiracles wrought in attestation of Christianity, than what we have now.\nThey had also a strong presumptive proof of the truth of it, perhaps of\nmuch greater force, in way of argument, than many think, of which we\nhave very little remaining; I mean the presumptive proof of its truth,\nfrom the influence which it had upon the lives of the generality of its\nprofessors. And we, or future ages, may possibly have a proof of it,\nwhich they could not have, from the conformity between the prophetic\nhistory, and the state of the world[244] and of Christianity.\n\nAnd further: if we were to suppose the evidence, which some have of\nreligion, to amount to little more than seeing that it _may_ be true;\nbut that they remain in great doubts and uncertainties about both its\nevidence and its nature, and great perplexities concerning the rule\nof life: others to have a _full conviction_ of the truth of religion,\nwith a distinct knowledge of their duty; and others severally to have\nall the intermediate degrees of religious light and evidence, which\nlie between these two--if we put the case, that for the present, it\nwas intended that revelation should be no more than a small light,\nin the midst of a world greatly overspread, notwithstanding it, with\nignorance and darkness: that certain glimmerings of this light should\nextend, and be directed, to remote distances, in such a manner as\nthat those who really partook of it should not discern whence it\noriginally came: that some in a nearer situation to it should have\nits light obscured, and, in different ways and degrees, intercepted:\nand that others should be placed within its clearer influence, and\nbe much more enlivened, cheered, and directed by it; but yet that\neven to these it should be no more than a _light shining in a dark\nplace_: all this would be perfectly uniform, and of a piece with the\nconduct of Providence, in the distribution of its other blessings. If\nthe fact of the case really were, that some have received no light\nat all from the Scripture; as many ages and countries in the heathen\nworld: that others, though they have, by means of it, had essential or\nnatural religion enforced upon their consciences, yet have never had\nthe genuine Scripture revelation, with its real evidence, proposed to\ntheir consideration; and the ancient Persians and modern Mahometans\nmay possibly be instances of people in a situation somewhat like to\nthis; that others, though they have had the Scripture laid before them\nas of divine revelation, yet have had it with the system and evidence\nof Christianity so interpolated, the system so corrupted, the evidence\nso blended with false miracles, as to leave the mind in the utmost\ndoubtfulness and uncertainty about the whole; which may be the state\nof some thoughtful men, in most of those nations who call themselves\nChristian: and lastly, that others have had Christianity offered to\nthem in its genuine simplicity, and with its proper evidence, as\npersons in countries and churches of civil and of Christian liberty;\nbut that even these persons are left in great ignorance in many\nrespects, and have by no means light afforded them enough to satisfy\ntheir curiosity, but only to regulate their life, to teach them their\nduty, and encourage them in the careful discharge of it. I say, if we\nwere to suppose this somewhat of a general true account of the degrees\nof moral and religious light and evidence, which were intended to be\nafforded mankind, and of what has actually been and is their situation,\nin their moral and religious capacity; there would be nothing in all\nthis ignorance, doubtfulness, and uncertainty, in all these varieties,\nand supposed disadvantages of some in comparison of others, respecting\nreligion, but may be paralleled by manifest analogies in the natural\ndispensations of Providence at present, considering ourselves merely in\nour temporal capacity.\n\nNor is there any thing shocking in all this, or which would seem to\nbear hard upon the moral administration in nature, if we would really\nkeep in mind, that every one shall be dealt equitably with: instead of\nforgetting this, or explaining it away, after it is acknowledged in\nwords. All shadow of injustice, and indeed all harsh appearances, in\nthis various economy of Providence, would be lost, if we would keep\nin mind, that every merciful allowance shall be made, and no more be\nrequired of any one, than what might have been equitably expected of\nhim, from the circumstances in which he was placed; and not what might\nhave been expected, had he been placed in other circumstances: _i.e._\nin Scripture language, that every man shall be _accepted according to\nwhat he had, not according to what he had not_.[245] This however does\nnot by any means imply, that all persons\u2019 condition here is equally\nadvantageous with respect to futurity. And Providence\u2019s designing to\nplace some in greater darkness with respect to religious knowledge,\nis no more a reason why they should not endeavor to get out of that\ndarkness, and others to bring them out of it, than why ignorant and\nslow people in matters of other knowledge should not endeavor to learn,\nor should not be instructed.\n\nIt is not unreasonable to suppose, that the same wise and good\nprinciple, whatever it was, which disposed the Author of nature to\nmake different kinds and orders of creatures, disposed him also to\nplace creatures of like kinds in different situations. And that the\nsame principle which disposed him to make creatures of different\nmoral capacities, disposed him also to place creatures of like moral\ncapacities in different religious situations; and even the same\ncreatures, in different periods of their being. The account or reason\nof this is also most probably the account why the constitution of\nthings is such, as that creatures of moral natures or capacities, for a\nconsiderable part of that duration in which they are living agents, are\nnot at all subjects of morality and religion; but grow up to be so, and\ngrow up to be so more and more, gradually from childhood to mature age.\n\nWhat, in particular, is the account or reason of these things, we must\nbe greatly in the dark, were it only that we know so very little even\nof our own case. Our present state may possibly be the consequence\nof something past, of which we are wholly ignorant: as it has a\nreference to somewhat to come, of which we know scarce any more than\nis necessary for practice. A system or constitution, in its notion,\nimplies variety; and so complicated a one as this world, very great\nvariety. So that were revelation universal, yet, from men\u2019s different\ncapacities of understanding, from the different lengths of their lives,\ntheir different educations and other external circumstances, and from\ntheir difference of temper and bodily constitution, their religious\nsituations would be widely different, and the disadvantage of some in\ncomparison of others, perhaps, altogether as much as at present. The\ntrue account, whatever it be, why mankind, or such a part of mankind,\nare placed in this condition of ignorance, must be supposed also the\ntrue account of our further ignorance, in not knowing the reasons why,\nor whence it is, that they are placed in this condition.\n\nThe following practical reflections may deserve the serious\nconsideration of those persons, who think the circumstances of mankind\nor their own, in the forementioned respects, a ground of complaint.\n\n_First_, The evidence of religion not appearing obvious, may constitute\none particular part of some men\u2019s trial in the religious sense: as\nit gives scope, for a virtuous exercise, or vicious neglect of their\nunderstanding, in examining or not examining into that evidence. There\nseems no possible reason to be given, why we may not be in a state\nof moral probation, with regard to the exercise of our understanding\nupon the subject of religion, as we are with regard to our behavior\nin common affairs. The former is as much a thing within our power and\nchoice as the latter. And I suppose it is to be laid down for certain,\nthat the same character, the same inward principle, which, after a man\nis convinced of the truth of religion, renders him obedient to the\nprecepts of it, would, were he not thus convinced, set him about an\nexamination of it, upon its system and evidence being offered to his\nthoughts: and that in the latter state his examination would be with an\nimpartiality, seriousness, and solicitude, proportionable to what his\nobedience is in the former. And as inattention, negligence, want of all\nserious concern, about a matter of such a nature and such importance,\nwhen offered to men\u2019s consideration, is, before a distinct conviction\nof its truth, as real depravity and dissoluteness, as neglect of\nreligious practice after such conviction: so active solicitude about\nit, and fair impartial consideration of its evidence before such\nconviction, is as really an exercise of a morally right temper; as\nis religious practice after. Thus, that religion is not intuitively\ntrue, but a matter of deduction and inference; that a conviction of its\ntruth is not forced upon every one, but left to be, by some, collected\nwith heedful attention to premises; this as much constitutes religious\nprobation, as much affords sphere, scope, opportunity, for right\nand wrong behavior, as any thing whatever does. And their manner of\ntreating this subject, when laid before them, shows what is in their\nheart, and is an exertion of it.\n\n_Secondly_, It appears to be a thing as evident, though it is not so\nmuch attended to, that if, upon consideration of religion, the evidence\nof it should seem to any persons doubtful, in the highest supposable\ndegree; even this doubtful evidence will, however, put them into a\n_general state of probation_ in the moral and religious sense. For,\nsuppose a man to be really in doubt, whether such a person had not done\nhim the greatest favor; or, whether his whole temporal interest did not\ndepend upon that person; no one, who had any sense of gratitude and of\nprudence, could possibly consider himself in the same situation, with\nregard to such person, as if he had no such doubt. In truth, it is\nas just to say, that certainty and doubt are the same, as to say the\nsituations now mentioned would leave a man as entirely at liberty in\npoint of gratitude or prudence, as he would be, were he certain he had\nreceived no favor from such person; or that he no way depended upon\nhim. Thus, though the evidence of religion which is afforded to some\nmen should be little more than they are given to see, the system of\nChristianity, or religion in general, to be supposable and credible;\nthis ought in all reason to beget a serious practical apprehension,\nthat it _may_ be true. And even this will afford matter of exercise\nfor religious suspense and deliberation, for moral resolution and\nself-government; because the apprehension that religion may be true\ndoes as really lay men under obligations, as a full conviction that\nit is true. It gives occasion and motives to consider further the\nimportant subject; to preserve attentively upon their minds a general\nimplicit sense that they may be under divine moral government, an\nawful solicitude about religion, whether natural or revealed. Such\napprehension ought to turn men\u2019s eyes to every degree of new light\nwhich may be had, from whatever side it comes; and induce them to\nrefrain, in the mean time, from all immoralities, and live in the\nconscientious practice of every common virtue. Especially are they\nbound to keep at the greatest distance from all dissolute profaneness,\nfor this the very nature of the case forbids; and to treat with highest\nreverence a matter, upon which their own whole interest and being,\nand the fate of nature, depend. This behavior, and an active endeavor\nto maintain within themselves this temper, is the business, the duty,\nand the wisdom of those persons, who complain of the doubtfulness of\nreligion: is what they are under the most proper obligations to. And\nsuch behavior is an exertion of, and has a tendency to improve in\nthem, that character, which the practice of all the several duties of\nreligion, from a full conviction of its truth, is an exertion of, and\nhas a tendency to improve in others: others, I say, to whom God has\nafforded such conviction. Nay, considering the infinite importance\nof religion, revealed as well as natural, I think it may be said in\ngeneral, that whoever will weigh the matter thoroughly may see, there\nis not near so much difference, as is commonly imagined, between what\nought in reason to be the rule of life, to those persons who are\nfully convinced of its truth, and to those who have only a serious\ndoubting apprehension, that it may be true. Their hopes, and fears, and\nobligations, will be in various degrees: but, as the subject-matter\nof their hopes and fears is the same, so the subject-matter of their\nobligations, what they are bound to do and to refrain from, is not so\nvery unlike.\n\nIt is to be observed further, that, from a character of understanding,\nor a situation of influence in the world, some persons have it in their\npower to do infinitely more harm or good, by setting an example of\nprofaneness and avowed disregard to all religion, or, on the contrary,\nof a serious, though perhaps doubting, apprehension of its truth, and\nof a reverent regard to it under this doubtfulness; than they can do,\nby acting well or ill in all the _common intercourses_ among mankind.\nConsequently they are most highly accountable for a behavior, which,\nthey may easily foresee, is of such importance, and in which there\nis most plainly a right and a wrong; even admitting the evidence of\nreligion to be as doubtful as is pretended.\n\nThe ground of these observations, and that which renders them just\nand true, is, that doubting necessarily implies _some_ degree of\nevidence for that, of which we doubt. For no person would be in doubt\nconcerning the truth of a number of facts so and so circumstanced,\nwhich should accidentally come into his thoughts, and of which he had\nno evidence at all. And though in the case of an even chance, and\nwhere consequently we were in doubt, we should in common language say,\nthat we had no evidence at all for either side; yet that situation\nof things, which renders it an even chance and no more, that such an\nevent will happen, renders this case equivalent to all others, where\nthere is such evidence on both sides of a question,[246] as leaves\nthe mind in doubt concerning the truth. Indeed in all these cases,\nthere is no more evidence on one side than on the other; but there is\n(what is equivalent to) much more for either, than for the truth of a\nnumber of facts, which come into one\u2019s thoughts at random. Thus, in\nall these cases, doubt as much presupposes evidence, in lower degrees,\nas belief presupposes higher, and certainty higher still. Any one,\nwho will a little attend to the nature of evidence, will easily carry\nthis observation on, and see, that between no evidence at all, and\nthat degree of it which affords ground of doubt, there are as many\nintermediate degrees, as there are, between that degree which is the\nground of doubt, and demonstration. And though we have not faculties\nto distinguish these degrees of evidence with any sort of exactness;\nyet, in proportion as they are discerned, they ought to influence\nour practice. It is as real an imperfection in the moral character,\nnot to be influenced in practice by a lower degree of evidence when\ndiscerned, as it is in the understanding, not to discern it. And as,\nin all subjects which men consider, they discern the lower as well\nas higher degrees of evidence, proportionably to their capacity of\nunderstanding; so, in practical subjects, they are influenced in\npractice, by the lower as well as higher degrees of it, proportionably\nto their fairness and honesty. And as, in proportion to defects in the\nunderstanding, men are unapt to see lower degrees of evidence, are in\ndanger of overlooking evidence when it is not glaring, and are easily\nimposed upon in such cases; so, in proportion to the corruption of\nthe heart, they seem capable of satisfying themselves with having no\nregard in practice to evidence acknowledged to be real, if it be not\noverbearing. From these things it must follow, that doubting concerning\nreligion implies such a degree of evidence for it, as, joined with\nthe consideration of its importance, unquestionably lays men under the\nobligations before mentioned, to have a dutiful regard to it in all\ntheir behavior.\n\n_Thirdly_, The difficulties in which the evidence of religion is\ninvolved, which some complain of, is no more a just ground of\ncomplaint, than the external circumstances of temptation, which others\nare placed in; or than difficulties in the practice of it, after a full\nconviction of its truth. Temptations render our state a more improving\nstate of discipline,[247] than it would be otherwise: as they give\noccasion for a more attentive exercise of the virtuous principle, which\nconfirms and strengthens it more, than an easier or less attentive\nexercise of it could. Speculative difficulties are, in this respect, of\nthe very same nature with these external temptations. For the evidence\nof religion not appearing obvious, is to some persons a temptation to\nreject it, without any consideration at all; and therefore requires\nsuch an attentive exercise of the virtuous principle, seriously to\nconsider that evidence, as there would be no occasion for, but for such\ntemptation. And the supposed doubtfulness of its evidence, after it has\nbeen in some sort considered, affords opportunity to an unfair mind\nof explaining away, and deceitfully hiding from itself, that evidence\nwhich it might see; and also for men\u2019s encouraging themselves in vice,\nfrom hopes of impunity, though they do clearly see thus much at least,\nthat these hopes are uncertain. In like manner the common temptation\nto many instances of folly, which end in temporal infamy and ruin,\nis the ground for hope of not being detected, and of escaping with\nimpunity; _i.e._ the doubtfulness of the proof beforehand, that such\nfoolish behavior will thus end in infamy and ruin. On the contrary,\nsupposed doubtfulness in the evidence of religion calls for a more\ncareful and attentive exercise of the virtuous principle, in fairly\nyielding themselves up to the proper influence of any real evidence,\nthough doubtful; and in practising conscientiously all virtue, though\nunder some uncertainty, whether the government in the universe may\nnot possibly be such, as that vice may escape with impunity. And in\ngeneral, temptation, meaning by this word the lesser allurements to\nwrong and difficulties in the discharge of our duty, as well as the\ngreater ones; temptation, I say, as such and of every kind and degree,\nas it calls forth some virtuous efforts, additional to what would\notherwise have been wanting, cannot but be an additional discipline\nand improvement of virtue, as well as probation of it in the other\nsenses of that word.[248] So that the very same account is to be given,\nwhy the evidence of religion should be left in such a manner, as to\nrequire, in some, an attentive, solicitous, perhaps painful exercise of\ntheir understanding about it; as why others should be placed in such\ncircumstances, as that the practice of its common duties, after a full\nconviction of the truth of it, should require attention, solicitude,\nand pains: or, why appearing doubtfulness should be permitted to\nafford matter of temptation to some; as why external difficulties\nand allurements should be permitted to afford matter of temptation\nto others. The same account also is to be given, why some should be\nexercised with temptations of both these kinds; as why others should be\nexercised with the latter in such very high degrees, as some have been,\nparticularly as the primitive Christians were.\n\nNor does there appear any absurdity in supposing, that the speculative\ndifficulties, in which the evidence of religion is involved, may make\neven the principal part of some persons\u2019 trial. For as the chief\ntemptations of the generality of the world are the ordinary motives\nto injustice, or unrestrained pleasure, or to live in the neglect of\nreligion, from that frame of mind which renders many persons almost\nwithout feeling as to any thing distant, or which is not the object of\ntheir senses; so there are other persons without this shallowness of\ntemper, persons of a deeper sense as to what is invisible and future;\nwho not only see, but have a general practical feeling, that what is to\ncome will be present, and that things are not less real for their not\nbeing the objects of sense; and who, from their natural constitution of\nbody and of temper, and from their external condition, may have small\ntemptations to behave ill, small difficulty in behaving well, in the\ncommon course of life. Now when these latter persons have a distinct\nfull conviction of me truth of religion, without any possible doubts\nor difficulties, the practice of it is to them unavoidable, unless\nthey do a constant violence to their own minds; and religion is scarce\nany more a discipline to them, than it is to creatures in a state\nof perfection. Yet these persons may possibly stand in need of moral\ndiscipline and exercise, in a higher degree than they would have by\nsuch an easy practice of religion. Or it may be requisite, for reasons\nunknown to us, that they should give some further manifestation[249]\nwhat is their moral character, to the creation of God, than such\na practice of it would be. Thus in the great variety of religious\nsituations in which men are placed, what constitutes, what chiefly and\npeculiarly constitutes, the probation, in all senses, of some persons,\nmay be the difficulties in which the evidence of religion is involved:\nand their principal and distinguished trial may be, how they will\nbehave under and with respect to these difficulties. Circumstances in\nmen\u2019s situation in their temporal capacity, analogous in good measure\nto this respecting religion, are to be observed. We find some persons\nare placed in such a situation in the world, as that their chief\ndifficulty with regard to conduct, is not the doing what is prudent\nwhen it is known; for this, in numberless cases, is as easy as the\ncontrary: but to some the principal exercise is, recollection and being\nupon their guard against deceits, the deceits suppose of those about\nthem; against false appearances of reason and prudence. To persons in\nsome situations, the principal exercise with respect to conduct is,\nattention in order to inform themselves what is proper, what is really\nthe reasonable and prudent part to act.\n\n[_Fourthly._] As I have hitherto gone upon supposition, that men\u2019s\ndissatisfaction with the evidence of religion is not owing to their\nneglects or prejudices; it must be added, on the other hand, in all\ncommon reason, and as what the truth of the case plainly requires\nshould be added, that such dissatisfaction possibly may be owing to\nthose, possibly may be men\u2019s own fault. For,\n\nIf there are any persons, who never set themselves heartily and in\nearnest to be informed in religion: if there are any, who secretly\nwish it may not prove true; and are less attentive to evidence than to\ndifficulties, and more to objections than to what is said in answer to\nthem: these persons will scarce be thought in a likely way of seeing\nthe evidence of religion, though it were most certainly true, and\ncapable of being ever so fully proved. If any accustom themselves to\nconsider this subject in the way of mirth and sport: if they attend\nto forms and representations, and inadequate manners of expression,\ninstead of the real things intended by them: (for signs often can be\nno more than inadequately expressive of the things signified:) or if\nthey substitute human errors in the room of divine truth; why may\nnot all, or any of these things, hinder some men from seeing that\nevidence, which really is seen by others; as a like turn of mind, with\nrespect to matters of common speculation and practice, does, we find\nby experience, hinder them from attaining that knowledge and right\nunderstanding, in matters of common speculation and practice, which\nmore fair and attentive minds attain to? And the effect will be the\nsame, whether their neglect of seriously considering the evidence of\nreligion, and their indirect behavior with regard to it, proceed from\nmere carelessness, or from the grosser vices; or whether it be owing\nto this, that forms and figurative manners of expression, as well as\nerrors, administer occasions of ridicule, when the things intended, and\nthe truth itself, would not. Men may indulge a ludicrous turn so far\nas to lose all sense of conduct and prudence in worldly affairs, and\neven, as it seems, to impair their faculty of reason. And in general,\nlevity, carelessness, passion, and prejudice _do_ hinder us from being\nrightly informed, with respect to common things: and they _may_, in\nlike manner, and perhaps, in some further providential manner, with\nrespect to moral and religious subjects: may hinder evidence from being\nlaid before us, and from being seen when it is. The Scripture[250]\ndoes declare, that every one _shall not understand_. And it makes no\ndifference, by what providential conduct this comes to pass: whether\nthe evidence of Christianity was, originally and with design, put and\nleft so, as that those who are desirous of evading moral obligations\nshould not see it; and that honest-minded persons should: or, whether\nit comes to pass by any other means.\n\nFurther: [_Fifthly._] The general proof of natural religion and of\nChristianity does, I think, lie level to common men: even those, the\ngreatest part of whose time, from childhood to old age, is taken\nup with providing for themselves and their families the common\nconveniences, perhaps necessaries, of life: those I mean, of this\nrank, who ever think at all of asking after proof, or attending to it.\nCommon men, were they as much in earnest about religion, as about their\ntemporal affairs, are capable of being convinced upon real evidence,\nthat there is a God who governs the world: and they feel themselves to\nbe of a moral nature, and accountable creatures. And as Christianity\nentirely falls in with this their natural sense of things, so they are\ncapable, not only of being persuaded, but of being made to see, that\nthere is evidence of miracles wrought in attestation of it, and many\nappearing completions of prophecy.\n\nThis proof, though real and conclusive, is liable to objections,\nand may be run up into difficulties; which however persons who are\ncapable not only of talking of, but of really seeing, are capable\nalso of seeing through: _i.e._ not of clearing up and answering them,\nso as to satisfy their curiosity, for of such knowledge we are not\ncapable with respect to any one thing in nature; but capable of seeing\nthat the proof is not lost in these difficulties, or destroyed by\nthese objections. But then a thorough examination into religion with\nregard to these objections, which cannot be the business of every\nman, is a matter of pretty large compass, and, from the nature of it,\nrequires some knowledge, as well as time and attention; to see, how\nthe evidence comes out, upon balancing one thing with another, and\nwhat, upon the whole, is the amount of it. If persons who pick up\nthese objections from others, and take for granted they are of weight,\nupon the word of those from whom they received them, or, by often\nretailing of them, come to see or fancy they see them to be of weight;\nwill not prepare themselves for such an examination, with a competent\ndegree of knowledge; or will not give that time and attention to the\nsubject, which, from the nature of it, is necessary for attaining such\ninformation: in this case, they must remain in doubtfulness, ignorance,\nor error: in the same way as they must, with regard to common\nsciences, and matters of common life, if they neglect the necessary\nmeans of being informed in them.\n\nPerhaps it will still be objected, that if a prince or common master\nwere to send directions to a servant, he would take care, that they\nshould always bear the certain marks, who they came from, and that\ntheir sense should be always plain: so as that there should be no\npossible doubt if he could help it, concerning the authority or meaning\nof them. The proper answer to all this kind of objections is, that,\nwherever the fallacy lies, it is even certain we cannot argue thus with\nrespect to Him who is the Governor of the world: and that he does not\nafford us such information, with respect to our temporal affairs and\ninterests, experience abundantly shows.\n\nHowever, there is a full answer to this objection, from the very nature\nof religion. The reason why a prince would give his directions in this\nplain manner is, that he absolutely desires an external action done,\nwithout concerning himself with the motive or principle upon which it\nis done: _i.e._ he regards only the external event, or the thing\u2019s\nbeing done; and not at all, properly speaking, the doing of it, or the\naction. Whereas the whole of morality and religion consisting merely in\naction itself, there is no sort of parallel between the cases. But if\nthe prince be supposed to regard only the action; _i.e._ only to desire\nto exercise, or in any sense prove, the understanding or loyalty of a\nservant; he would not always give his orders in such a plain manner.\nIt may be proper to add, that the will of God, respecting morality and\nreligion, may be considered either as absolute, or as only conditional.\nIf it be absolute, it can only be thus, that we should act virtuously\nin such given circumstances; not that we should be brought to act\nso, by this changing of our circumstances. And if God\u2019s will be thus\nabsolute, then it is in our power, in the highest and strictest sense,\nto do or to contradict his will; which is a most weighty consideration.\nOr his will may be considered only as conditional, that if we act\nso and so, we shall be rewarded: if otherwise, punished: of which\nconditional will of the Author of nature, the whole constitution of it\naffords most certain instances.\n\nUpon the whole: that we are in a state of religion necessarily\nimplies, that we are in a state of probation: and the credibility\nof our being at all in such a state being admitted, there seems no\npeculiar difficulty in supposing our probation to be, just as it\nis, in those respects which are above objected against. There seems\nno pretence, from _the reason of the thing_, to say, that the trial\ncannot equitably be any thing, but whether persons will act suitably\nto certain information, or such as admits no room for doubt; so as\nthat there can be no danger of miscarriage, but either from their not\nattending to what they certainly know, or from overbearing passion\nhurrying them on to act contrary to it. For, since ignorance and doubt,\nafford scope for probation in all senses, as really as intuitive\nconviction or certainty; and since the two former are to be put to\nthe same account as difficulties in practice; men\u2019s moral probation\nmay also be, whether they will take due care to inform themselves by\nimpartial consideration, and afterwards whether they will act as the\ncase requires, upon the evidence which they have, however doubtful.\nAnd this, we find by _experience_, is frequently our probation,[251]\nin our temporal capacity. For, the information which we want with\nregard to our worldly interests is by no means always given us of\ncourse, without any care of our own. And we are greatly liable to\nself-deceit from inward secret prejudices, and also to the deceits of\nothers. So that to be able to judge what is the prudent part, often\nrequires much and difficult consideration. Then after we have judged\nthe very best we can, the evidence upon which we must act, if we will\nlive and act at all, is perpetually doubtful to a very high degree.\nAnd the constitution and course of the world in fact is such, as that\nwant of impartial consideration what we have to do, and venturing\nupon extravagant courses because it is doubtful what will be the\nconsequence, are often naturally, _i.e._ providentially, altogether\nas fatal, as misconduct occasioned by heedless inattention to what we\ncertainly know, or disregarding it from overbearing passion.\n\nSeveral of the observations here made may well seem strange, perhaps\nunintelligible, to many good men. But if the persons for whose sake\nthey are made think so, (persons who object as above, and throw off all\nregard to religion under pretence of want of evidence;) I desire them\nto consider again, whether their thinking so be owing to any thing\nunintelligible in these observations, or to their own not having such\na sense of religion and serious solicitude about it, as even their\nstate of scepticism does in all reason require? It ought to be forced\nupon the reflection of these persons, that our nature and condition\nnecessarily require us, in the daily course of life, to act upon\nevidence much lower than what is commonly called probable: to guard,\nnot only against what we fully believe will, but also against what we\nthink it supposable may, happen; and to engage in pursuits when the\nprobability is greatly against success, if it even be credible, that\npossibly we may succeed in them.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII.\n\nTHE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE FOR CHRISTIANITY.\n\n\nThe presumptions against revelation, and objections against the general\nscheme of Christianity, and particular things relating to it, being\nremoved, there remains to be considered, what positive evidence we\nhave for the truth of it; chiefly in order to see, what the analogy\nof nature suggests with regard to that evidence, and the objections\nagainst it: or to see what is, and is allowed to be, the plain\nnatural rule of judgment and of action, in our temporal concerns, in\ncases where we have the same kind of evidence, and the same kind of\nobjections against it, that we have in the case before us.\n\nIn the evidence of Christianity there seem to be several things of\ngreat weight, not reducible to the head, either of miracles, or the\ncompletion of prophecy, in the common acceptation of the words. But\nthese two are its direct and fundamental proofs: and those other\nthings, however considerable they are, yet ought never to be urged\napart from its direct proofs, but always to be joined with them. Thus\nthe evidence of Christianity will be a long series of things, reaching,\nas it seems, from the beginning of the world to the present time, of\ngreat variety and compass, taking in both the direct and also the\ncollateral, proofs, and making up, all of them together, one argument.\nThe conviction arising from this kind of proof may be compared to\nwhat they call _the effect_, in architecture or other works of art;\na result from a great number of things, so and so disposed, and taken\ninto one view. I shall therefore, _first_, make some observations\nrelating to miracles, and the appearing completions of prophecy; and\nconsider what analogy suggests, in answer to the objections brought\nagainst this evidence. And, _secondly_, I shall endeavor to give some\naccount of the general argument now mentioned, consisting both of the\ndirect and collateral evidence, considered as making up one argument:\nthis being the kind of proof, upon which we determine most questions\nof difficulty, concerning common facts, alleged to have happened, or\nseeming likely to happen; especially questions relating to conduct.\n\n_First_, I shall make some observations upon the direct proof of\nChristianity from miracles and prophecy, and upon the objections\nalleged against it.[252]\n\nI. Now the following observations relating to the _historical evidence\nof miracles_ wrought in attestation of Christianity appear to be of\ngreat weight.\n\n1. The Old Testament affords us the same historical evidence of the\nmiracles of Moses and of the prophets, as of the common civil history\nof Moses and the kings of Israel; or, as of the affairs of the Jewish\nnation. And the _Gospels_ and _the Acts_ afford us the same historical\nevidence of the miracles of Christ and the apostles, as of the common\nmatters related in them. This indeed could not have been affirmed by\nany reasonable man, if the authors of these books, like many other\nhistorians, had appeared to aim at an entertaining manner of writing,\nand hence interspersed miracles in their works, at proper distances\nand upon proper occasions. These might have animated a dull relation,\namused the reader, and engaged his attention. And the same account\nwould naturally have been given of them, as of the speeches and\ndescriptions given by such authors: the same account, in a manner, as\nis to be given, why the poets make use of wonders and prodigies. But\nthe facts, both miraculous and natural, in Scripture, are related in\nplain unadorned narratives, and both of them appear, in all respects,\nto stand upon the same foot of historical evidence.[253]\n\nFurther: some parts of Scripture, containing an account of miracles\nfully sufficient to prove the truth of Christianity, are quoted as\ngenuine, from the age in which they are said to be written, down to\nthe present: and no other parts of them, material in the present\nquestion, are omitted to be quoted in such manner, as to afford any\nsort of proof of their not being genuine. And, as common history, when\ncalled in question in any instance, may often be greatly confirmed by\ncontemporary or subsequent events more known and acknowledged; and as\nthe common Scripture history, like many others, is thus confirmed;\nso likewise is the miraculous history of it, not only in particular\ninstances, but in general. For, the establishment of the Jewish and\nChristian religions, which were events contemporary with the miracles\nrelated to be wrought in attestation of both, or subsequent to them,\nthese events are just what we should have _expected_, upon supposition\nsuch miracles were really wrought to attest the truth of those\nreligions. These miracles are a satisfactory account of those events:\nof which no other satisfactory account can be given; nor any account at\nall, but what is merely imaginary and invented.\n\nIt is to be added, that the most obvious, the most easy and direct\naccount of this history, how it came to be written, and to be received\nin the world as a true history, is that it really is so; nor can\nany other account of it be easy and direct. Now, though an account,\nnot at all obvious, but very far-fetched and indirect, may be and\noften is, the true account of a matter, yet it cannot be admitted on\nthe authority of its being asserted. Mere guess, supposition, and\npossibility, when opposed to historical evidence, prove nothing, but\nthat historical evidence is not demonstrative.\n\nThe just consequence from all this, I think is, that the Scripture\nhistory in general is to be admitted as an authentic genuine history,\ntill something positive be alleged sufficient to invalidate it. No\nman will deny the consequence to be, that it cannot be rejected, or\nthrown by as of no authority, till it can be proved to be of none; even\nthough the evidence now mentioned for its authority were doubtful. This\nevidence may be confronted by historical evidence on the other side,\nif there be any: or general incredibility in the things related, or\ninconsistence in the general turn of the history, would prove it to be\nof no authority. But since, upon the face of the matter, upon a first\nand general view, the _appearance_ is, that it is an authentic history,\nit cannot be determined to be fictitious, without some proof that it is\nso. The following observations in support of these, and coincident with\nthem, will greatly confirm the historical evidence for the truth of\nChristianity.\n\n2. The Epistles of Paul, from the nature of epistolary writing, and\nmoreover from several of them being written, not to particular persons\nbut to churches, carry in them evidences of their being genuine, beyond\nwhat can be in a mere historical narrative, left to the world at\nlarge. This evidence,[254] joined with that which they have in common\nwith the rest of the New Testament, seems not to leave so much as any\nparticular pretence for denying their genuineness, considered as an\nordinary matter of fact, or of criticism: I say _particular_ pretence,\nfor _denying_ it; because any single fact, of such a kind and such\nantiquity, may have _general doubts_ raised concerning it, from the\nvery nature of human affairs and human testimony. There is also to be\nmentioned a distinct and particular evidence of the genuineness of the\nepistle chiefly referred to here, the first to the Corinthians; from\nthe manner in which it is quoted by Clemens Romanus, in an epistle of\nhis own to that church.[255] Now these epistles afford a proof of\nChristianity, detached from all others, which is, I think, a thing of\nweight; and also a proof of a nature and kind peculiar to itself. For,\n\nIn them the author declares, that he received the Gospel in general,\nand the institution of the Communion in particular, not from the rest\nof the apostles, or jointly together with them, but alone, from Christ\nhimself; whom he declares likewise, conformably to the history in the\nActs, that he saw after his ascension.[256] So that the testimony of\nPaul is to be considered, as detached from that of the rest of the\napostles.\n\nHe declares further, that he was endued with a power of working\nmiracles, as what was publicly known to those very people, speaks of\nfrequent and great variety of miraculous gifts as then subsisting in\nthose very churches, to which he was writing; which he was reproving\nfor several irregularities, and where he had personal opposers. He\nmentions these gifts incidentally, in the most easy manner, and without\neffort; by way of reproof to those who had them, for their indecent\nuse of them; and by way of depreciating them, in comparison of moral\nvirtues. In short he speaks to these churches, of these miraculous\npowers, in the manner any one would speak to another of a thing, which\nwas as familiar, and as much known in common to them both, as any thing\nin the world.[257] And this, as hath been observed by several persons,\nis surely a very considerable thing.\n\n3. It is an acknowledged historical fact, that Christianity offered\nitself to the world, and demanded to be received, upon the allegation,\n(_i.e._ as unbelievers would speak, upon the pretence,) of miracles,\npublicly wrought to attest the truth of it, in such an age; and\nthat it was actually received by great numbers in that very age,\nand upon the professed belief of the reality of these miracles. And\nChristianity, including the dispensation of the Old Testament, seems\ndistinguished by this from all other religions. I mean, that this\ndoes not _appear_ to be the case with regard to any other; for surely\nit will not be supposed to lie upon any person, to prove by positive\nhistorical evidence, that it was not. It does in no sort appear that\nMahometanism was first received in the world upon the foot of supposed\nmiracles,[258] _i.e._ public ones:[259] for, as revelation is itself\nmiraculous, all pretence to it must necessarily imply some pretence\nof miracles. And it is a known fact, that it was immediately, at the\nvery first, propagated by other means. And as particular institutions,\nwhether in Paganism or Popery, said to be confirmed by miracles _after_\nthose institutions had obtained, are not to the purpose: so, were there\nwhat might be called historical proof, that any of them were introduced\nby a supposed divine command, believed to be attested by miracles;\nthese would not be in any wise parallel. For single things of this sort\nare easy to be accounted for, after parties are formed, and have power\nin their hands; and the leaders of them are in veneration with the\nmultitude; and political interests are blended with religious claims,\nand religious distinctions. But _before_ any thing of this kind, for a\nfew persons, and those of the lowest rank, all at once, to bring over\nsuch great numbers to a new religion, and get it to be received upon\nthe particular evidence of miracles; this is quite another thing.\n\nI think it will be allowed by any fair adversary, that the fact\nnow mentioned, taking in all the circumstances, is peculiar to\nthe Christian religion. However, the fact itself is allowed, that\nChristianity obtained, _i.e._ was professed to be received in the\nworld, upon the belief of miracles, immediately in the age in which\nit is said those miracles were wrought: or that this is what its\nfirst converts would have alleged, as the reason for their embracing\nit. It is not to be supposed that such numbers of men, in the most\ndistant parts of the world, should forsake the religion of their\ncountry, in which they had been educated; separate themselves from\ntheir friends, particularly in their festival shows and solemnities,\nto which the common people are so greatly addicted, and which were of\na nature to engage them much more, than any thing of that sort among\nus: and embrace a religion, which could not but expose them to many\ninconveniences, and indeed must have been a giving up the world in a\ngreat degree, even from the very first, and before the empire engaged\nin form against them: it cannot be supposed, that such numbers should\nmake so great, and to say the least, so inconvenient a change in their\nwhole institution of life, unless they were really convinced of the\ntruth of those miracles, upon the knowledge or belief of which they\nprofessed to make it. And it will, I suppose, readily be acknowledged,\nthat the generality of the first converts to Christianity must have\nbelieved them: that as by becoming Christians they declared to the\nworld, they were satisfied of the truth of those miracles; so this\ndeclaration was to be credited. And this their testimony is the same\nkind of evidence for those miracles, as if they had put it in writing,\nand these writings had come down to us. And it is real evidence,\nbecause it is of facts, which they had capacity and full opportunity to\ninform themselves of.\n\nIt is also distinct from the direct or express historical evidence,\nthough it is of the same kind: and would be allowed to be distinct in\nall cases. For were a fact expressly related by one or more ancient\nhistorians, and disputed in after ages; that this fact is acknowledged\nto have been _believed_ by great numbers of the age in which the\nhistorian says it was done, would be allowed an additional proof of\nsuch fact, quite distinct from the express testimony of the historian.\nThe credulity of mankind is acknowledged: and the suspicions of mankind\nought to be acknowledged too; and their backwardness even to believe,\nand greater still to practise, what makes against their interest. And\nit must particularly be remembered, that education, and prejudice, and\nauthority, were against Christianity, in the age I am speaking of. So\nthat the immediate conversion of such numbers is a real presumption\nof somewhat more than human in this matter.[260] I say presumption,\nfor it is not alleged as a proof alone and by itself. Nor need any one\nof the things mentioned in this chapter be considered as a proof by\nitself: and yet all of them together may be one of the strongest.[261]\n\nUpon the whole: as there is large historical evidence, both direct and\ncircumstantial, of miracles wrought in attestation of Christianity,\ncollected by those who have writ upon the subject; it lies upon\nunbelievers to show why this evidence is not to be credited. This way\nof speaking is, I think, just; and what persons who write in defence\nof religion naturally fall into. Yet, in a matter of such unspeakable\nimportance, the proper question is, not whom it lies upon, according to\nthe rules of argument, to maintain or confute objections: but whether\nthere really are any, against this evidence, sufficient, in reason, to\ndestroy the credit of it. However, unbelievers seem to take upon them\nthe part of showing that there are.\n\nThey allege, that numberless enthusiastic people, in different ages\nand countries, expose themselves to the same difficulties which the\nprimitive Christians did; and are ready to give up their lives for the\nmost idle follies imaginable. It is not very clear, to what purpose\nthis objection is brought. For surely, every one, in every case, must\ndistinguish between opinions and facts. And though testimony is no\nproof of enthusiastic opinions, or of any _opinion_ at all; yet it\nis allowed, in all other cases, to be a proof of _facts_. A person\u2019s\nlaying down his life in attestation of facts or of opinions, is the\nstrongest proof of his believing them. And if the apostles and their\ncontemporaries did believe the facts, in attestation of which they\nexposed themselves to sufferings and death; this their belief, or\nrather knowledge, must be a proof of those facts: for they were such\nas came under the observation of their senses. And though it is not of\nequal weight, yet it is of weight, that the martyrs of the next age,\nnotwithstanding they were not eye-witnesses of those facts, as were\nthe apostles and their contemporaries, had, however, full opportunity\nto inform themselves whether they were true or not, and gave equal\nproof of their believing them to be true.\n\nBut enthusiasm, it is said, greatly weakens the evidence of testimony\neven for facts, in matters relating to religion: some seem to think it\ntotally and absolutely destroys the evidence of testimony upon this\nsubject. The powers of enthusiasm, and of diseases too, which operate\nin a like manner, are indeed very wonderful, in particular instances.\nBut if great numbers of men, not appearing in any peculiar degree weak,\nnor under any peculiar suspicion of negligence, affirm that they saw\nand heard such things plainly, with their eyes and their ears, and are\nadmitted to be in earnest; such testimony is evidence of the strongest\nkind we can have, for any matter of fact. Possibly it may be overcome,\nstrong as it is, by incredibility in the things thus attested, or by\ncontrary testimony. And in an instance where one thought it was so\novercome, it might be just to consider, how far such evidence could be\naccounted for by enthusiasm; for it seems as if no other imaginable\naccount were to be given of it. But till such incredibility be shown,\nor contrary testimony produced, it cannot surely be expected, that so\nfar-fetched, so indirect and wonderful an account of such testimony, as\nthat of enthusiasm must be; an account so strange, that the generality\nof mankind can scarce be made to understand what is meant by it; it\ncannot, I say, be expected that such an account will be admitted of\nsuch evidence; when there is this direct, easy, and obvious account of\nit, that people really saw and heard a thing not incredible, which they\naffirm, sincerely and with full assurance, they did see and hear.\n\nGranting then that enthusiasm is not (strictly speaking) an absurd,\nbut a possible account of such testimony, it is manifest, that the\nvery mention of it goes upon the previous supposition, that the things\nso attested are incredible: and therefore need not be considered,\ntill they are shown to be so. Much less need it be considered, after\nthe contrary has been proved. And I think it has been proved, to full\nsatisfaction, that there is no incredibility in a revelation, in\ngeneral; or in such a one as the Christian, in particular. However, as\nreligion is supposed peculiarly liable to enthusiasm, it may just be\nobserved, that prejudices almost without number, and without name,\nsuch as romance, affection, humor, a desire to engage attention, or\nto surprise, party spirit, custom, little competitions, unaccountable\nlikings and dislikings; these influence men strongly in common matters.\nAnd as these prejudices are often scarce know a or reflected upon\nby the persons themselves who are influenced by them, they are to\nbe considered as influences of a like kind to enthusiasm. Yet human\ntestimony, in common matters, is naturally and justly believed,\nnotwithstanding.\n\nIt is intimated further, in a more refined way of observation, that\nthough it should be proved, that the apostles and first Christians\ncould not, in some respects, be deceived themselves, and in other\nrespects, cannot be thought to have intended to impose upon the world,\nyet it will not follow that their general testimony is to be believed,\nthough truly handed down to us: because they might still in part,\n_i.e._ in other respects, be deceived themselves, and in part also\ndesignedly impose upon others; which, it is added, is a thing very\ncredible, from that mixture of real enthusiasm, and real knavery, to be\nmet with in the same characters.[262]\n\nI must confess, I think the matter of fact contained in this\nobservation upon mankind is not to be denied; and that something\nvery much akin to it is often supposed in Scripture as a very common\ncase, and most severely reproved. But it were to have been expected,\nthat persons capable of applying this observation as applied in\nthe objection, might also frequently have met with the like mixed\ncharacter, in instances where religion was quite out of the case.\nThe thing plainly is, that mankind are naturally endued with reason,\nor a capacity of distinguishing between truth and falsehood; and as\nnaturally they are endued with veracity, or a regard to truth in what\nthey say: but from many occasions they are liable to be prejudiced and\nbiassed and deceived themselves, and capable of intending to deceive\nothers, in every degree: insomuch that, as we are all liable to be\ndeceived by prejudice, so likewise it seems to be not an uncommon\nthing, for persons who, from their regard to truth, would not invent\na lie entirely without any foundation at all, to propagate it with\nheightening circumstances, after it is once invented and set a-going.\nAnd others, though they would not _propagate_ a lie, yet, which is a\nlower degree of falsehood, will let it pass without contradiction. But\nnotwithstanding all this, _human testimony_ remains still a natural\nground of assent; and this assent a natural principle of action.\n\nIt is objected further, that however it has happened, the _fact_\nis, that mankind have, in different ages, been strangely deluded\nwith pretences to miracles and wonders. But it is by no means to be\nadmitted, that they have been oftener, or are at all more liable to be\ndeceived by these than by other pretences.\n\nIt is added, that there is a very considerable degree of historical\nevidence for miracles, which are, on all hands, acknowledged to be\nfabulous. But suppose there were even _the like_ historical evidence\nfor these, to what there is for those alleged in proof of Christianity,\nwhich yet is in no wise allowed, but suppose this; the consequence\nwould not be, that the evidence of the latter is not to be admitted.\nNor is there a man in the world, who in common cases, would conclude\nthus. For what would such a conclusion really amount to but this, that\nevidence, confuted by contrary evidence, or any way overbalanced,\ndestroys the credibility of other evidence, neither confuted nor\noverbalanced? To argue that because there is, if there were, like\nevidence from testimony, for miracles acknowledged false, as for those\nin attestation of Christianity, therefore the evidence in the latter\ncase is not to be credited; this is the same as to argue, that if two\nmen of equally good reputation had given evidence in different cases\nno way connected, and one of them had been convicted of perjury, this\nconfuted the testimony of the other!\n\nUpon the whole then, the general observation, that human creatures\nare so liable to be deceived, from enthusiasm in religion, and\nprinciples equivalent to enthusiasm in common matters, and in both from\nnegligence; and that they are so capable of dishonestly endeavoring\nto deceive others; this does indeed weaken the evidence of testimony\nin all cases, but does not destroy it in any. And these things will\nappear, to different men, to weaken the evidence of testimony, in\ndifferent degrees: in degrees proportionable to the observations they\nhave made, or the notions they have any way taken up, concerning the\nweakness and negligence and dishonesty of mankind; or concerning the\npowers of enthusiasm, and prejudices equivalent to it. But it seems\nto me, that people do not know what they say, who affirm these things\nto destroy the evidence from testimony which we have, of the truth of\nChristianity. Nothing can destroy the evidence of testimony in any\ncase, but a proof or probability, that persons are not competent judges\nof the facts to which they give testimony; or that they are actually\nunder some indirect influence in giving it, in such particular case.\nTill this be made out, the _natural_ laws of human actions require,\nthat testimony be admitted. It can never be sufficient to overthrow\ndirect historical evidence, indolently to say, that there are so many\nprinciples, from whence men are liable to be deceived themselves,\nand disposed to deceive others, especially in matters of religion,\nthat one knows not what to believe. And it is surprising persons can\nhelp reflecting, that this very manner of speaking supposes they are\nnot satisfied that there is nothing in the evidence, of which they\nspeak thus; or that they can avoid observing, if they do make this\nreflection, that it is on such a subject, a very material one.[263]\n\nOver against all these objections is to be set the _importance_ of\nChristianity, as what must have engaged the attention of its first\nconverts, so as to have rendered them less liable to be deceived from\ncarelessness, than they would in common matters; and likewise the\nstrong _obligations to veracity_, which their religion laid them under:\nso that the first and most obvious presumption is, that they could not\nbe deceived themselves nor deceive others. And this presumption, in\nthis degree, is peculiar to the testimony we have been considering.\n\nIn argument, assertions are nothing in themselves, and have an air of\npositiveness which sometimes is not very easy: yet they are necessary,\nand necessary to be repeated; in order to connect a discourse, and\ndistinctly to lay before the view of the reader, what is proposed\nto be proved, and what is left as proved. Now the conclusion from\nthe foregoing observations is, I think, beyond all doubt, this:\nthat unbelievers must be forced to admit the external evidence for\nChristianity, _i.e._ the proof of miracles wrought to attest it, to be\nof real weight and very considerable; though they cannot allow it to\nbe sufficient, to convince them of the reality of those miracles. And\nas they must, in all reason, admit this; so it seems to me, that upon\nconsideration they would, in fact, admit it; those of them, I mean, who\nknow any thing at all of the matter; in like manner as persons, in many\ncases, own they see strong evidence from testimony, for the truth of\nthings, which yet they cannot be convinced are true: cases, suppose,\nwhere there is contrary testimony; or things which they think, whether\nwith or without reason, to be incredible. But there is no testimony\ncontrary to that which we have been considering: and it has been fully\nproved, that there is no incredibility in Christianity in general, or\nin any part of it.\n\nII. As to the evidence for Christianity from prophecy, I shall only\nmake some few general observations, which are suggested by the analogy\nof nature; _i.e._ by the acknowledged natural rules of judging in\ncommon matters, concerning evidence of a like kind to this from\nprophecy.\n\n1. The obscurity or unintelligibleness of one part of a prophecy does\nnot, in any degree, invalidate the proof of foresight, arising from\nthe appearing completion of those other parts, which are understood.\nFor the case is evidently the same, as if those parts which are not\nunderstood were lost, or not written at all, or written in an unknown\ntongue. Whether this observation be commonly attended to or not, it is\nso evident, that one can scarce bring oneself to set down an instance\nin common matters, to exemplify it. However, suppose a writing, partly\nin cipher, and partly in plain words at length; and that in the part\none understood, there appeared mention of several known facts; it would\nnever come into any man\u2019s thoughts to imagine, that if he understood\nthe whole, perhaps he might find, that those facts were not in reality\nknown by the writer. Indeed, both in this example and in the thing\nintended to be exemplified by it, our not understanding the whole (the\nwhole, suppose, of a sentence or a paragraph) might sometimes occasion\na doubt, whether one understood the literal meaning of such a part: but\nthis comes under another consideration.\n\nFor the same reason, though a man should be incapable, for want of\nlearning, or opportunities of inquiry, or from not having turned\nhis studies this way, even so much as to judge whether particular\nprophecies have been throughout completely fulfilled; yet he may see,\nin general, that they have been fulfilled to such a degree, as, upon\nvery good ground, to be convinced of foresight more than human in such\nprophecies, and of such events being intended by them. For the same\nreason also, though, by means of the deficiencies in civil history,\nand the different accounts of historians, the most learned should not\nbe able to make out to satisfaction, that such parts of the prophetic\nhistory have been minutely and throughout fulfilled; yet a very strong\n_proof of foresight_ may arise, from that general completion of them,\nwhich is made out. As much perhaps, as the giver of prophecy intended\nshould ever be afforded by such parts of prophecy.\n\n2. A long series of prophecy being applicable to such and such events,\nis itself a proof that it was intended of them: as the rules by which\nwe naturally judge and determine, in common cases parallel to this,\nwill show.[264] This observation I make in answer to the common\nobjection against the application of the prophecies, that, considering\neach of them distinctly by itself, it does not at all appear, that they\nwere intended of those particular events to which they are applied by\nChristians; and therefore it is to be supposed, that if they meant any\nthing, they were intended of other events unknown to us, and not of\nthese at all.\n\nNow there are two kinds of writing, which bear a great resemblance to\nprophecy, with respect to the matter before us: the mythological, and\nthe satirical, where the satire is to a certain degree concealed. And\na man might be assured, that he understood what an author intended by\na fable or parable related without any application or moral, merely\nfrom seeing it to be easily capable of such application, and that such\na moral might naturally be deduced from it. And he might be fully\nassured, that such persons and events were intended in a satirical\nwriting, merely from its being applicable to them. And, agreeable to\nthe last observation, he might be in a good measure satisfied of it,\nthough he were not enough informed in affairs, or in the story of such\npersons to understand half the satire. For, his satisfaction that\nhe understood the meaning, the intended meaning, of these writings,\nwould be greater or less in proportion as he saw the general turn\nof them to be capable of such application; and in proportion to the\nnumber of particular things capable of it. And thus, if a long series\nof prophecy is applicable to the present state of the church, and to\nthe political situations of the kingdoms of the world, some thousand\nyears after these prophecies were delivered; and a long series of\nprophecy delivered before the coming of Christ is applicable to him;\nthese things are in themselves a proof, that the prophetic history was\nintended of him, and of those events: in proportion as the general turn\nof it is capable of such application, and to the number and variety of\nparticular prophecies capable of it. And though, in all just way of\nconsideration, the obvious completion of prophecies is to be allowed to\nbe thus explanatory of, and to determine, their meaning; yet it is to\nbe remembered further, that the ancient Jews applied the prophecies to\na Messiah before his coming,[265] in much the same manner as Christians\ndo now: and that the primitive Christians interpreted the prophecies\nrespecting the state of the church and of the world in the last ages,\nin the sense which the event seems to confirm and verify. From these\nthings it may be made appear:\n\n3. That the showing even to a high probability, if that could be,\nthat the prophets thought of some other events, in such and such\npredictions, and not those which Christians allege to be completions\nof those predictions; or that such and such prophecies are capable of\nbeing applied to other events than those, to which Christians apply\nthem--that this would not confute or destroy the force of the argument\nfrom prophecy, even with regard to those very instances. For, observe\nhow this matter really is. If one knew such a person to be the sole\nauthor of such a book, and was certainly assured, or satisfied to any\ndegree, that one knew the whole of what he intended in it; one should\nbe assured or satisfied to such degree, that one knew the whole\nmeaning of that book: for the meaning of a book is nothing but the\nmeaning of the author. But if one knew a person to have _compiled_ a\nbook out of memoirs, which he received from another, of vastly superior\nknowledge in the subject of it, especially if it were a book full\nof great intricacies and difficulties; it would in no wise follow,\nthat one knew the whole meaning of the book, from knowing the whole\nmeaning of the compiler: for the original author of them, might have,\nand there would be no presumption, in many cases, against supposing\nhim to have, some further meaning than the compiler saw. To say then\nthat the Scriptures, and the things contained in them, can have no\nother or further meaning than those persons had, who first recited or\nwrote them, is evidently saying, that those persons were the original,\nproper, and sole authors of those books, _i.e._ that they are not\ninspired: which is absurd, while the authority of these books is under\nexamination; _i.e._ till you have determined they are of no divine\nauthority at all. Till this be determined, it must in all reason be\nsupposed, not indeed that they have, (for this is taking for granted\nthat they are inspired;) but that they may have, some further meaning\nthan what the compilers saw or understood. And, upon this supposition,\nit is supposable also, that this further meaning may be fulfilled.\n\nEvents corresponding to prophecies, interpreted in a different meaning\nfrom that, in which the prophets are supposed to have understood them;\naffords in a manner, the same proof, that this different sense was\noriginally intended, as it would have afforded, if the prophets had\nnot understood their predictions in the sense it is supposed they did:\nbecause there is no presumption of _their_ sense of them being the\nwhole sense of them. And it has been already shown, that the apparent\ncompletions of prophecy must be allowed to be explanatory of its\nmeaning. So that the question is, whether a series of prophecy has\nbeen fulfilled, in a natural or proper, _i.e._ in any real sense of\nthe words of it. For such completion is equally a proof of foresight\nmore than human, whether the prophets are, or are not, supposed to have\nunderstood it in a different sense. I say, supposed: for, though I\nthink it clear, that the prophets did not understand the full meaning\nof their predictions, it is another question, how far they thought they\ndid; and in what sense they understood them.\n\nHence may be seen, to how little purpose those persons busy themselves,\nwho endeavor to prove, that the prophetic history is applicable to\nevents of the age in which it was written, or of ages before it.\nTo have proved this, before there was any appearance of a further\ncompletion of it, might have answered some purpose; for it might have\nprevented the expectation of any such further completion. Thus could\nPorphyry have shown, that some principal parts of the book of Daniel,\nfor instance the seventh verse of the seventh chapter, which the\nChristians interpreted of the latter ages, was applicable to events,\nwhich happened before or about the age of Antiochus Epiphanes; this\nmight have prevented them from expecting any further completion of\nit. And, unless there was then, as I think there must have been,\nexternal evidence concerning that book, more than is come down to\nus; such a discovery might have been a stumbling-block in the way\nof Christianity itself: considering the authority which our Savior\nhas given to the book of Daniel, and how much the general scheme of\nChristianity presupposes the truth of it. But even this discovery,\nhad there been any such,[266] would be of very little weight with\nreasonable men now; if this passage, thus applicable to events before\nthe age of Porphyry, appears to be applicable also to events, which\nsucceeded the dissolution of the Roman empire. I mention this, not at\nall as intending to insinuate, that the division of this empire into\nten parts, for it plainly was divided into about that number, were,\nalone and by itself, of any moment in verifying the prophetic history:\nbut only as an example of the thing I am speaking of. Thus upon the\nwhole, the matter of inquiry evidently must be, as above put, Whether\nthe prophecies are applicable to Christ, and to the present state of\nthe world, and of the church; applicable in such a degree, as to imply\nforesight: not whether they are _capable_ of any other application.\nThough I know no pretence for saying the general turn of them is\ncapable of any other.\n\nThese observations are, I think, just, and the evidence referred to\nin them real: though there may be people who will not accept of such\nimperfect information from Scripture. Some too have not integrity and\nregard enough to truth, to attend to evidence, which keeps the mind\nin doubt, perhaps perplexity, and which is much of a different sort\nfrom what they expected. It plainly requires a degree of modesty and\nfairness, beyond what every one has, for a man to say, not to the world\nbut to himself, that there is a real appearance of great weight in this\nmatter, though he is not able thoroughly to satisfy himself about it;\nbut that it shall have its influence upon him, in proportion to its\napparent reality and weight. It is much more easy, and more falls in\nwith the negligence, presumption, and wilfulness of the generality, to\ndetermine at once, with a decisive air, There is nothing in it. The\nprejudices arising from that absolute contempt and scorn, with which\nthis evidence is treated in the world, I do not mention. For what can\nbe said to persons, who are weak enough in their understandings to\nthink this any presumption against it; or, if they do not, are yet weak\nenough in their temper to be influenced by such prejudices, upon such a\nsubject?\n\n_Secondly_, I shall endeavor to give some account of the general\nargument for the truth of Christianity, consisting both of the direct\nand circumstantial evidence considered as making up one argument. To\nstate and examine this argument fully, would be a work much beyond the\ncompass of this whole treatise; nor is so much as a proper abridgment\nof it to be expected here. Yet the present subject requires to have\nsome brief account of it given. For it is the kind of evidence, upon\nwhich most questions of difficulty, in common practice, are determined:\nevidence arising from various coincidences, which support and confirm\neach other, and in this manner prove, with more or less certainty, the\npoint under consideration. I choose to do it also: First, because it\nseems to be of the greatest importance, and not duly attended to by\nevery one, that the proof of revelation is not some direct and express\nthings only, but a great variety of circumstantial things also; and\nthat though each of these direct and circumstantial things is indeed\nto be considered separately, yet they are afterwards to be joined\ntogether; for that the proper force of the evidence consists in the\nresult of those several things, considered in their respects to each\nother, and united into one view. In the next place, because it seems\nto me, that the matters of fact here set down, which are acknowledged\nby unbelievers, must be acknowledged by them also to contain together\na degree of evidence of great weight, if they could be brought to\nlay these several things before themselves distinctly, and then with\nattention consider them together; instead of that cursory thought of\nthem, to which we are familiarized. For being familiarized to the\ncursory thought of things as really hinders the weight of them from\nbeing seen, as from having its due influence upon practice.\n\nThe thing asserted, and the truth of which is to be inquired into,\nis this: That over and above our reason and affections, which God\nhas given us for the information of our judgment and the conduct\nof our lives, he has also, by external revelation, given us an\naccount of himself and his moral government over the world, implying\na future state of rewards and punishments; _i.e._ hath revealed\nthe system of natural religion: (for natural religion may be\nexternally[267] revealed by God, as the ignorant may be taught it by\ntheir fellow-creatures)--that God, I say, has given us the evidence\nof revelation, as well as the evidence of reason, to ascertain this\nmoral system; together with an account of a particular dispensation of\nProvidence, which reason could no way have discovered, and a particular\ninstitution of religion founded on it, for the recovery of mankind out\nof their present wretched condition, and raising them to the perfection\nand final happiness of their nature.\n\nThis revelation, whether real or supposed, may be considered as wholly\nhistorical. For prophecy is nothing but the history of events before\nthey come to pass; doctrines also are matters of fact; and precepts\ncome under the same notion. The general design of Scripture, which\ncontains in it this revelation, thus considered as historical, may be\nsaid to be, to give us an account of the world in this one single view,\nas God\u2019s world: by which it appears essentially distinguished from all\nother books, so far as I have found, except such as are copied from\nit. It begins with an account of God\u2019s creation of the world, in order\nto ascertain, and distinguish from all others, who is the object of\nour worship, by what he has done: in order to ascertain, who he is,\nconcerning whose providence, commands, promises, and threatenings,\nthis sacred book, all along, treats; [viz.] the Maker and Proprietor\nof the world, he whose creatures we are, the God of nature: in order\nlikewise to distinguish him from the idols of the nations, which are\neither imaginary beings, _i.e._ no beings at all; or else part of that\ncreation, the historical relation of which is here given. And John, not\nimprobably with an eye to this Mosaic account of the creation, begins\nhis Gospel with an account of our Savior\u2019s pre-existence, and that _all\nthings were made by him; and without him, was not any thing made that\nwas made_:[268] agreeably to the doctrine of Paul, that _God created\nall things by Jesus Christ_.[269] This being premised, the Scripture,\ntaken together, seems to profess to contain a kind of an abridgment of\nthe history of the world, in the view just now mentioned: that is, a\ngeneral account of the condition of religion and its professors, during\nthe continuance of that apostasy from God, and state of wickedness,\nwhich it everywhere supposes the world to lie in. And this account\nof the state of religion carries with it some brief account of the\npolitical state of things, as religion is affected by it. Revelation\nindeed considers the common affairs of this world, and what is going\non in it, as a mere scene of distraction; and cannot be supposed to\nconcern itself with foretelling at what time Rome, or Babylon, or\nGreece, or any particular place, should be the most conspicuous seat\nof that tyranny and dissoluteness, which all places equally aspire\nto be; cannot, I say, be supposed to give any account of this wild\nscene for its own sake. But it seems to contain some very general\naccount of the chief governments of the world, as the general state of\nreligion has been, is, or shall be, affected by them, from the first\ntransgression, and during the whole interval of the world\u2019s continuing\nin its present state, to a certain future period, spoken of both in\nthe Old and New Testament, very distinctly, and in great variety of\nexpression: _The times of the restitution of all things_:[270] when\n_the mystery of God shall be finished, as he hath declared to his\nservants the prophets_:[271] when _the God of heaven shall set up a\nkingdom, which shall never be destroyed: and the kingdom shall not be\nleft to other people_,[272] as it is represented to be during this\napostasy, but _judgment shall be given to the saints_,[273] and _they\nshall reign_:[274] _and the kingdom and dominion, and the greatness of\nthe kingdom under the whole heaven, shall be given to the people of the\nsaints of the Most High_.[275]\n\nUpon this general view of the Scripture, I would remark, how great a\nlength of time the whole relation takes up, near six thousand years\nof which are past; and how great a variety of things it treats of;\nthe natural and moral system or history of the world, including the\ntime when it was formed, all contained in the very first book, and\nevidently written in a rude and unlearned age; and in subsequent\nbooks, the various common and prophetic history, and the particular\ndispensation of Christianity. Now all this together gives the largest\nscope for criticism; and for the confutation of what is capable of\nbeing confuted, either from reason, or from common history, or from\nany inconsistence in its several parts. And it deserves, I think, to\nbe mentioned, that whereas some imagine the supposed doubtfulness of\nthe evidence for revelation implies a positive argument that it is not\ntrue; it appears, on the contrary, to imply a positive argument that\nit is true. For, could any common relation of such antiquity, extent,\nand variety (for in these things the stress of what I am now observing\nlies) be proposed to the examination of the world: that it could not,\nin an age of knowledge and liberty, be confuted, or shown to have\nnothing in it, to the satisfaction of reasonable men; would be thought\na strong presumptive proof of its truth. Indeed it must be a _proof_\nof it, just in proportion to the probability, that if it were false,\nit might be shown to be so: which, I think, is scarce pretended to be\nshown, but upon principles and in ways of arguing, which have been\nclearly obviated.[276] Nor does it at all appear, that any set of men,\nwho believe natural religion, are of the opinion, that Christianity has\nbeen thus confuted. But to proceed:\n\nTogether with the moral system of the world, the Old Testament contains\na chronological account of the beginning of it, and from thence, an\nunbroken genealogy of mankind for many ages before common history\nbegins; and carried on as much farther as to make up a continued\nthread of history, of the length of between three and four thousand\nyears. It contains an account of God\u2019s making a covenant with a\nparticular nation, that they should be his people, and he would be\ntheir God, in a peculiar sense; of his often interposing miraculously\nin their affairs; giving them the promise, and long after, the\npossession, of a particular country; assuring them of the greatest\nnational prosperity in it, if they would worship him, in opposition\nto the idols which the rest of the world worshipped, and obey his\ncommands; and threatening them with unexampled punishments if they\ndisobeyed him, and fell into the general idolatry: insomuch that\nthis one nation should continue to be the observation and the wonder\nof all the world. It declares particularly, that _God would scatter\nthem among all people, from one end of the earth unto the other_; but\nthat _when they should return unto the Lord their God, he would have\ncompassion upon them, and gather them from all the nations, whither he\nhad scattered them_: that _Israel should be saved in the Lord, with an\neverlasting salvation; and not be ashamed or confounded world without\nend_.[277] And as some of these promises are conditional, others are as\nabsolute as any thing can be expressed: that the time should come, when\n_the people should be all righteous, and inherit the land forever_:\nthat _though God would make a full end of all nations whither he had\nscattered them, yet would he not make a full end of them_: that _he\nwould bring again the captivity of his people Israel, and plant them\nupon their land, and they should be no more pulled up out of their\nland_: that _the seed of Israel should not cease from being a nation\nforever_.[278] It foretells, that God would raise them up a particular\nperson, in whom all his promises should finally be fulfilled; the\nMessiah, who should be, in a high and eminent sense, their anointed\nPrince and Savior. This was foretold in such a manner, as raised a\ngeneral expectation of such a person in the nation, as appears from\nthe New Testament, and is an acknowledged fact; an expectation of his\ncoming at such a particular time, before any one appeared claiming to\nbe that person, and when there was no ground for such an expectation,\nbut from the prophecies: which expectation, therefore, must in all\nreason be presumed to be explanatory of those prophecies, if there were\nany doubt about their meaning. It seems moreover to foretell, that this\nperson should be rejected by the nation to whom he had been so long\npromised, though he was so much desired by them.[279] And it expressly\nforetells, that he should be the Savior of the Gentiles; and that the\ncompletion of the scheme contained in this book, and then begun, and in\nits progress, should be something so great, that in comparison with it,\nthe restoration of the Jews alone would be but of small account. _It is\na light thing that thou shouldest be my servant to raise up the tribes\nof Jacob, and to restore the preserved of Israel: I will also give thee\nfor a light to the Gentiles, that thou mayest be for salvation unto the\nend of the earth._ And, _In the last days, the mountain of the Lord\u2019s\nhouse shall be established in the top of the mountains, and shall be\nexalted above the hills; and all nations shall flow into it--for out of\nZion shall go forth the law, and the word of the Lord from Jerusalem.\nAnd he shall judge among the nations--and the Lord alone shall be\nexalted in that day, and the idols he shall utterly abolish._[280]\n\nThe Scripture further contains an account, that at the time the Messiah\nwas expected, a person rose up in this nation, claiming to be that\nMessiah, to be the person to whom all the prophecies referred, and in\nwhom they should center: that he spent some years in a continued course\nof miraculous works; and endued his immediate disciples and followers\nwith a power of doing the same, as a proof of the truth of that\nreligion, which he commissioned them to publish: that invested with\nthis authority and power, they made numerous converts in the remotest\ncountries, and settled and established his religion in the world; to\nthe end of which the Scripture professes to give a prophetic account of\nthe state of this religion among mankind.[281]\n\nLet us now suppose a person utterly ignorant of history, to have all\nthis related to him out of the Scripture. Or suppose such an one,\nhaving the Scripture put into his hands, to remark these things in\nit, not knowing but that the whole, even its civil history, as well\nas the other parts of it, might be, from beginning to end, an entire\ninvention; and to ask, What truth was in it, and whether the revelation\nhere related was real, or a fiction? And, instead of a direct answer,\nsuppose him, all at once, to be told the following confessed facts; and\nthen to unite them into one view.\n\nLet him first be told, in how great a degree the profession and\nestablishment of natural religion, the belief that there is one God\nto be worshipped, that virtue is his law, and that mankind shall be\nrewarded and punished hereafter, as they obey and disobey it here; in\nhow very great a degree, I say, the profession and establishment of\nthis moral system in the world is owing to the revelation, whether\nreal or supposed, contained in this book: the establishment of this\nmoral system, even in those countries which do not acknowledge the\nproper authority of the Scripture.[282] Let him be told also, what\nnumber of nations do acknowledge its proper authority. Let him then\ntake in the consideration, of what importance religion is to mankind.\nAnd upon these things he might, I think, truly observe, that this\nsupposed revelation\u2019s obtaining and being received in the world, with\nall the circumstances and effects of it, considered together as one\nevent, is the most conspicuous and important event in the history of\nmankind: that a book of this nature, and thus promulged and recommended\nto our consideration, demands, as if by a voice from heaven, to have\nits claims most seriously examined; and that, before such examination,\nto treat it with any kind of scoffing and ridicule, is an offence\nagainst natural piety. It is to be remembered, that how much soever\nthe establishment of natural religion in the world is owing to the\nScripture revelation, this does not destroy the proof of religion from\nreason, any more than the proof of Euclid\u2019s Elements is destroyed, by\na man\u2019s knowing or thinking, that he should never have seen the truth\nof the several propositions contained in it, nor had those propositions\ncome into his thoughts, but for that mathematician.\n\nLet such a person as we are speaking of be, in the next place,\ninformed of the acknowledged antiquity of the first parts of this book;\nand that its chronology, its account of the time when the earth, and\nthe several parts of it, were first peopled with human creatures, is\nno way contradicted, but is really confirmed, by the natural and civil\nhistory of the world, collected from common historians, from the state\nof the earth, and from the late invention of arts and sciences.\n\nAnd as the Scripture contains an unbroken thread of common and civil\nhistory, from the creation to the captivity, for between three and\nfour thousand years; let the person we are speaking of be told, in the\nnext place, that this general history, as it is not contradicted, but\nconfirmed by profane history[283] as much as there would be reason\nto expect, upon supposition of its truth; so there is nothing in the\nwhole history _itself_, to give any reasonable ground of suspicion\nof its not being, in the general, a faithful and literally true\ngenealogy of men, and series of things. I speak here only of the common\nScripture history, or of the course of ordinary events related in it,\nas distinguished from miracles, and from the prophetic history. In\nall the Scripture narrations of this kind, following events arise out\nof foregoing ones, as in all other histories. There appears nothing\nrelated as done in any age, not conformable to the manners of that\nage: nothing in the account of a succeeding age, which one would say\ncould not be true, or was improbable, from the account of things in the\npreceding one. There is nothing in the characters, which would raise a\nthought of their being feigned; but all the internal marks imaginable\nof their being real. It is to be added also, that mere genealogies,\nbare narratives of the number of years, which persons called by such\nand such names lived, do not carry the face of fiction; perhaps do\ncarry some presumption of veracity: and all unadorned narratives, which\nhave nothing to surprise, may be thought to carry somewhat of the like\npresumption too. And the domestic and the political history is plainly\ncredible. There may be incidents in Scripture, which, taken alone in\nthe naked way they are told, may appear strange; especially to persons\nof other manners, temper, education: but there are also incidents of\nundoubted truth, in many or most persons\u2019 lives, which, in the same\ncircumstances, would appear to the full as strange.[284] There may be\nmistakes of transcribers, there may be other real or seeming mistakes,\nnot easy to be particularly accounted for: but there are certainly\nno more things of this kind in the Scripture, than what were to have\nbeen expected in books of such antiquity; and nothing, in any wise,\nsufficient to discredit the general narrative.\n\nNow, that a history, claiming to commence from the creation, and\nextending in one continued series, through so great a length of time,\nand variety of events, should have such appearances of reality and\ntruth in its whole contexture, is surely a very remarkable circumstance\nin its favor. And as all this is applicable to the common history\nof the New Testament, so there is a further credibility, and a very\nhigh one, given to it by profane authors: many of these writing of\nthe same times, and confirming the truth of customs and events, which\nare incidentally as well as more purposely mentioned in it. And this\ncredibility of the common Scripture-history, gives some credibility\nto its miraculous history: especially as this is interwoven with the\ncommon, so as that they imply each other, and both together make up one\nrelation.\n\nLet it then be more particularly observed to this person, that it is an\nacknowledged matter of fact, which is indeed implied in the foregoing\nobservation, that there was such a nation as the Jews, of the greatest\nantiquity, whose government and general polity was founded on the law,\nhere related to be given them by Moses as from heaven: that natural\nreligion, with rites additional yet no way contrary to it, was their\nestablished religion, which cannot be said of the Gentile world: and\nthat their very being as a nation, depended upon their acknowledgment\nof one God, the God of the universe. For, suppose in their captivity in\nBabylon, they had gone over to the religion of their conquerors, there\nwould have remained no bond of union, to keep them a distinct people.\nAnd while they were under their own kings, in their own country, a\ntotal apostasy from God would have been the dissolution of their whole\ngovernment. They in such a sense nationally acknowledged and worshipped\nthe Maker of heaven and earth, when the rest of the world were sunk in\nidolatry, as rendered them, in fact, the peculiar people of God. This\nremarkable establishment and preservation of natural religion among\nthem, seems to add peculiar credibility to the historical evidence for\nthe miracles of Moses and the prophets. Because these miracles are a\nfull satisfactory account of this event, which plainly needs to be\naccounted for, and cannot be otherwise.\n\nLet this person, supposed wholly ignorant of history, be acquainted\nfurther, that one claiming to be the Messiah, of Jewish extraction,\nrose up at the time when this nation, from the prophecies above\nmentioned, expected the Messiah: that he was rejected, as it seemed\nto have been foretold he should, by the body of the people, under the\ndirection of their rulers: that in the course of a very few years, he\nwas believed on and acknowledged as the promised Messiah, by great\nnumbers among the Gentiles, agreeably to the prophecies of Scripture,\nyet not upon the evidence of prophecy, but of miracles,[285] of which\nmiracles we have also strong historical evidence; (by which I mean here\nno more than must be acknowledged by unbelievers; for let pious frauds\nand follies be admitted to weaken, it is absurd to say they destroy\nour evidence of miracles wrought in proof of Christianity:)[286] that\nthis religion approving itself to the reason of mankind, and carrying\nits own evidence with it, so far as reason is a judge of its system,\nand being no way contrary to reason in those parts of it which require\nto be believed upon the mere authority of its Author; that this\nreligion, I say, gradually spread and supported itself for some hundred\nyears, not only without any assistance from temporal power, but under\nconstant discouragements, and often the bitterest persecutions from\nit; and then became the religion of the world: that in the mean time\nthe Jewish nation and government were destroyed in a very remarkable\nmanner, and the people carried away captive and dispersed through the\nmost distant countries; in which state of dispersion they have remained\nfifteen hundred years: and that they remain a numerous people, united\namong themselves, and distinguished from the rest of the world, as they\nwere in the days of Moses, by the profession of his law; and everywhere\nlooked upon in a manner, which one scarce knows how distinctly to\nexpress, but in the words of the prophetic account of it, given so\nmany ages before it came to pass: _Thou shalt become an astonishment,\na proverb, and a byword, among all nations whither the Lord shall lead\nthee_.[287]\n\nThe appearance of a standing miracle, in the Jews remaining a distinct\npeople in their dispersion, and the confirmation which this event\nappears to give to the truth of revelation, may be thought to be\nanswered, by their religion\u2019s forbidding them intermarriages with those\nof other nations, and prescribing them many peculiarities in their\nfood, by which they are debarred from incorporating with the people in\nwhose countries they live. This is not, I think, a satisfactory account\nof that which it pretends to account for. But what does it pretend to\naccount for? The correspondence between this event and the prophecies;\nor the coincidence of both, with a long dispensation of Providence,\nof a peculiar nature, towards that people? No. It is only the event\nitself, which is offered to be thus accounted for: which single event,\ntaken alone, abstracted from all such correspondence and coincidence,\nperhaps would not have appeared miraculous: but that correspondence\nand coincidence may be so, though the event itself be supposed not.\nThus the concurrence of our Saviour\u2019s being born at Bethlehem, with a\nlong foregoing series of prophecy and other coincidences, is doubtless\nmiraculous; the series of prophecy, and other coincidences, and the\nevent, being admitted: though the event itself appears to have been\nbrought about in a natural way; of which, however, no one can be\ncertain.\n\nAs several of these events seem, in some degree expressly, to have\nverified the prophetic history already, so likewise they may be\nconsidered further, as having a peculiar aspect towards the full\ncompletion of it; as affording some presumption that the whole of it\nshall, one time or other, be fulfilled. Thus, that the Jews have been\nso wonderfully preserved in their long and wide dispersion; which is\nindeed the direct fulfilling of some prophecies, but is now mentioned\nonly as looking forward to somewhat yet to come: that natural religion\ncame forth from Judea, and spread, in the degree it has done over\nthe world, before lost in idolatry; which, together with some other\nthings, have distinguished that very place, in like manner as the\npeople of it are distinguished: that this great change of religion over\nthe earth was brought about under the profession and acknowledgment,\nthat Jesus was the promised Messiah: things of this kind naturally\nturn the thoughts of serious men towards the full completion of the\nprophetic history, concerning the final restoration of that people;\nconcerning the establishment of the everlasting kingdom among them, the\nkingdom of the Messiah; and the future state of the world, under this\nsacred government. Such circumstances and events, compared with these\nprophecies, though no completions of them, yet would not, I think,\nbe spoken of as nothing in the argument, by a person upon his first\nbeing informed of them. They fall in with the prophetic history of\nthings still future, give it some additional credibility, and have the\nappearance of being somewhat in order to the full completion of it.\n\nIndeed it requires a good degree of knowledge, and great calmness and\nconsideration, to be able to judge thoroughly of the evidence for the\ntruth of Christianity, from that part of the prophetic history which\nrelates to the situation of the kingdoms of the world, and to the state\nof the church, from the establishment of Christianity to the present\ntime. But it appears from a general view of it, to be very material.\nAnd those persons who have thoroughly examined it, and some of them\nwere men of the coolest tempers, greatest capacities, and least liable\nto imputations of prejudice, insist upon it as determinately conclusive.\n\n[CONCLUSION.] Suppose now a person quite ignorant of history, first\nto recollect the passages above mentioned out of Scripture, without\nknowing but that the whole was a late fiction, then to be informed\nof the correspondent facts now mentioned, and to unite them all into\none view: that the profession and establishment of natural religion\nin the world is greatly owing, in different ways, to this book, and\nthe supposed revelation which it contains; that it is acknowledged to\nbe of the earliest antiquity; that its chronology and common history\nare entirely credible; that this ancient nation, the Jews, of whom it\nchiefly treats, appear to have been, in fact, the people of God, in a\ndistinguished sense; that, as there was a national expectation among\nthem, raised from the prophecies, of a Messiah to appear at such a\ntime, so one at this time appeared claiming to be that Messiah; that\nhe was rejected by this nation, but received by the Gentiles, not upon\nthe evidence of prophecy, but of miracles; that the religion he taught\nsupported itself under the greatest difficulties, gained ground, and\nat length became the religion of the world; that in the mean time the\nJewish polity was utterly destroyed, and the nation dispersed over the\nface of the earth; that notwithstanding this, they have remained a\ndistinct numerous people for so many centuries, even to this day; which\nnot only appears to be the express completion of several prophecies\nconcerning them, but also renders it, as one may speak, a visible and\neasy possibility that the promises made to them as a nation, may yet be\nfulfilled.\n\nTo these acknowledged truths, let the person we have been supposing\nadd, as I think he ought, whether every one will allow it or no, the\nobvious appearances which there are, of the state of the world, in\nother respects besides what relates to the Jews, and of the Christian\nchurch, having so long answered, and still answering to the prophetic\nhistory. Suppose, I say, these facts set over against the things before\nmentioned out of the Scripture, and seriously compared with them;\nthe joint view of both together must, I think, appear of very great\nweight to a considerate reasonable person: of much greater indeed, upon\nhaving them first laid before him, than is easy for us, who are so\nfamiliarized to them, to conceive, without some particular attention\nfor that purpose.\n\nAll these things, and the several particulars contained under them,\nrequire to be distinctly and most thoroughly examined into; that the\nweight of each may be judged of, upon such examination, and such\nconclusion drawn, as results from their _united force_. But this has\nnot been attempted here. I have gone no further than to show, that the\ngeneral imperfect view of them now given, the confessed historical\nevidence for miracles, and the many obvious appearing completions of\nprophecy, together with the collateral things[288] here mentioned, and\nthere are several others of the like sort; that all this together,\nwhich, being fact, must be acknowledged by unbelievers, amounts to\nreal evidence of somewhat more than human in this matter: evidence\nmuch more important, than careless men, who have been accustomed\nonly to transient and partial views of it, can imagine; and indeed\nabundantly sufficient to act upon. And these things, I apprehend, must\nbe acknowledged by unbelievers. For though they may say, that the\nhistorical evidence of miracles wrought in attestation of Christianity,\nis not sufficient to convince them, that such miracles were really\nwrought: they cannot deny, that there is such historical evidence,\nit being a known matter of fact that there is. They may say, the\nconformity between the prophecies and events is by accident: but there\nare many instances in which such conformity itself cannot be denied.\nThey may say, with regard to such kind of collateral things as those\nabove mentioned, that any odd accidental events, without meaning, will\nhave a meaning found in them by fanciful people: and that such as are\nfanciful in any one certain way, will make out a thousand coincidences,\nwhich seem to favor their peculiar follies. Men, I say, may talk\nthus: but no one who is serious, can possibly think these things to\nbe nothing, if he considers the importance of collateral things, and\neven of lesser circumstances, in the evidence of probability, as\ndistinguished in nature, from the evidence of demonstration. In many\ncases indeed it seems to require the truest judgment, to determine with\nexactness the weight of circumstantial evidence: but it is very often\naltogether as convincing, as that which is the most express and direct.\n\nThis general view of the evidence for Christianity, considered as\nmaking one argument, may also serve to recommend to serious persons,\nto set down every thing which they think may be of any real weight at\nall in proof of it, and particularly the many seeming completions of\nprophecy: and they will find, that, judging by the natural rules, by\nwhich we judge of probable evidence in common matters, they amount to\na much higher degree of proof, upon such a _joint review_, than could\nbe supposed upon considering them separately, at different times;\nhow strong soever the proof might before appear to them, upon such\nseparate views of it. For probable proofs, by being added, not only\n_increase_ the evidence, but _multiply_ it.[289] Nor should I dissuade\nany one from setting down, what he thought made for the contrary\nside. But then it is to be remembered, not in order to influence his\njudgment, but his practice, that a mistake on one side may be, in its\nconsequences, much more dangerous, than a mistake on the other. And\nwhat course is most safe, and what most dangerous, will be thought a\nvery material consideration, when we deliberate, not concerning events,\nbut concerning conduct in our temporal affairs. To be influenced by\nthis consideration in our judgment, to believe or disbelieve upon it,\nis indeed as much prejudice, as any thing whatever. And, like other\nprejudices, it operates contrary ways, in different men; for some are\ninclined to believe what they hope, and others what they fear. And\nit is manifest unreasonableness to apply to men\u2019s passions in order\nto gain their assent. But in deliberations concerning conduct, there\nis nothing which reason more requires to be taken into the account,\nthan the importance of it. For, suppose it doubtful, what would be the\nconsequence of acting in this, or in the contrary manner: still, that\ntaking one side could be attended with little or no bad consequence,\nand taking the other might be attended with the greatest, must appear,\nto unprejudiced reason, of the highest moment towards determining how\nwe are to act. The truth of our religion, like the truth of common\nmatters, is to be judged of by all the evidence taken together.\nAnd unless the whole series of things which may be alleged in this\nargument, and every particular thing in it, can reasonably be supposed\nto have been by accident (for here the stress of the argument for\nChristianity lies); then is the truth of it proved: in like manner, as\nif in any common case, numerous events acknowledged, were to be alleged\nin proof of any other event disputed; the truth of the disputed event\nwould be proved, not only if any one of the acknowledged ones did of\nitself clearly imply it, but, though no one of them singly did so, if\nthe whole of the acknowledged events taken together could not in reason\nbe supposed to have happened, unless the disputed one were true.\n\nIt is obvious, how much advantage the nature of this evidence gives\nto those persons who attack Christianity, especially in conversation.\nFor it is easy to show, in a short and lively manner, that such and\nsuch things are liable to objection, that this and another thing is of\nlittle weight in itself; but impossible to show, in like manner, the\nunited force of the whole argument in one view.\n\nLastly, as it has been made appear, that there is no presumption\nagainst a revelation as miraculous; that the general scheme of\nChristianity, and the principal parts of it, are conformable to the\nexperienced constitution of things, and the whole perfectly credible:\nso the account now given of the positive evidence for it, shows, that\nthis evidence is such, as, from the nature of it, cannot be destroyed,\nthough it should be lessened.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII.\n\nOBJECTIONS AGAINST ARGUING FROM THE ANALOGY OF NATURE, TO RELIGION.\n\n\nIf every one would consider, with such attention as they are bound,\neven in point of morality, to consider, what they judge and give\ncharacters of; the occasion of this chapter would be, in some good\nmeasure at least, superseded. But since this is not to be expected;\nfor some we find do not concern themselves to understand even what\nthey write against: since this treatise, in common with most others,\nlies open to objections, which may appear very material to thoughtful\nmen at first sight; and, besides that, seems peculiarly liable to the\nobjections of such as can judge without thinking, and of such as can\ncensure without judging; it may not be amiss to set down the chief of\nthese objections which occur to me, and consider them to their hands.\nThey are such as these:\n\n\u201cThat it is a poor thing to solve difficulties in revelation, by\nsaying, that there are the same in natural religion; when what is\nwanting is to clear both of them of these their common, as well as\nother their respective, difficulties; that it is a strange way indeed\nof convincing men of the obligations of religion, to show them,\nthat they have as little reason for their worldly pursuits: and a\nstrange way of vindicating the justice and goodness of the Author of\nnature, and of removing the objections against both, to which the\nsystem of religion lies open, to show, that the like objections lie\nagainst natural providence; a way of answering objections against\nreligion, without so much as pretending to make out, that the\nsystem of it, or the particular things in it objected against, are\nreasonable--especially, perhaps some may be inattentive enough to add,\nmust this be thought strange, when it is confessed that analogy is no\nanswer to such objections: that when this sort of reasoning is carried\nto the utmost length it can be imagined capable of, it will yet leave\nthe mind in a very unsatisfied state; and that it must be unaccountable\nignorance of mankind, to imagine they will be prevailed with to forego\ntheir present interests and pleasures, from regard to religion, upon\ndoubtful evidence.\u201d\n\nNow, as plausible as this way of talking may appear, that appearance\nwill be found in a great measure owing to half views, which show but\npart of an object, yet show that indistinctly, and to undeterminate\nlanguage. By these means weak men are often deceived by others, and\nludicrous men, by themselves. And even those, who are serious and\nconsiderate, cannot always readily disentangle, and at once clearly see\nthrough the perplexities, in which subjects themselves are involved;\nand which are heightened by the deficiencies and the abuse of words. To\nthis latter sort of persons, the following reply to each part of this\nobjection severally, may be of some assistance; as it may also tend a\nlittle to stop and silence others.\n\n_First_, The thing wanted, _i.e._ what men require, is to have _all_\ndifficulties cleared. And this is, or at least for any thing we know\nto the contrary, it may be, the same as requiring to comprehend the\ndivine nature, and the whole plan of Providence from everlasting to\neverlasting! But it hath always been allowed to argue from what is\nacknowledged, to what is disputed. And it is in no other sense a poor\nthing, to argue from natural religion to revealed, in the manner\nfound fault with, than it is to argue in numberless other ways of\nprobable deduction and inference, in matters of conduct, which we are\ncontinually reduced to the necessity of doing. Indeed the epithet\n_poor_ may be applied, I fear as properly, to great part or the whole\nof human life, as it is to the things mentioned in the objection. Is it\nnot a poor thing, for a physician to have so little knowledge in the\ncure of diseases, as even the most eminent have? To act upon conjecture\nand guess, where the life of man is concerned? Undoubtedly it is: but\nnot in comparison of having no skill at all in that useful art, and\nbeing obliged to act wholly in the dark.\n\nFurther: since it is as unreasonable, as it is common, to urge\nobjections against revelation, which are of equal weight against\nnatural religion; and those who do this, if they are not confused\nthemselves, deal unfairly with others, in making it seem that they are\narguing only against revelation, or particular doctrines of it, when\nin reality they are arguing against moral providence; it is a thing\nof consequence to show, that such objections are as much levelled\nagainst natural religion, as against revealed. Objections, which are\nequally applicable to both, are properly speaking answered, by its\nbeing shown that they are so, provided the former be admitted to be\ntrue. And without taking in the consideration how distinctly this is\nadmitted, it is plainly very material to observe, that as the things\nobjected against in natural religion are of the same kind with what is\ncertain matter of experience in the course of providence, and in the\ninformation which God affords us concerning our temporal interest under\nhis government; so the objections against the system of Christianity,\nand the evidence of it, are of the very same kind with those which are\nmade against the system and evidence of natural religion. However, the\nreader upon review may see, that most of the analogies insisted upon,\neven in the latter part of this treatise, do not necessarily require to\nhave more taken for granted than is in the former; [viz.] that there is\nan Author of nature, or natural Governor of the world: and Christianity\nis vindicated, not from its analogy to natural religion, but chiefly\nfrom its analogy to the experienced constitution of nature.\n\n_Secondly_, Religion is a practical thing, and consists in such a\ndeterminate course of life, as what, there is reason to think, is\ncommanded by the Author of nature, and will, upon the whole, be our\nhappiness under his government. If men can be convinced, that they\nhave the like reason to believe this, as to believe that taking care\nof their temporal affairs will be to their advantage; such conviction\ncannot but be an argument to them for the practice of religion.\nAnd if there be really any reason for believing one of these, and\nendeavoring to preserve life, and secure ourselves the necessaries\nand conveniences of it; then there is reason also for believing the\nother, and endeavoring to secure the interest it proposes to us. And\nif the interest, which religion proposes to us, be infinitely greater\nthan our whole temporal interest; then there must be proportionably\ngreater reason for endeavoring to secure one, than the other; since, by\nthe supposition, the probability of our securing one is equal to the\nprobability of our securing the other. This seems plainly unanswerable,\nand has a tendency to influence fair minds, who consider what our\ncondition really is, or upon what evidence we are naturally appointed\nto act; and who are disposed to acquiesce in the terms upon which we\nlive, and attend to and follow that practical instruction, whatever it\nbe, which is afforded us.\n\nBut the chief and proper force of the argument referred to in the\nobjection, lies in another place. The proof of religion, it is said, is\ninvolved in such inextricable difficulties, as to render it doubtful;\nand that it cannot be supposed that if it were true, it would be left\nupon doubtful evidence. Here then, over and above the force of each\nparticular difficulty or objection, these difficulties and objections\ntaken together are turned into a positive argument against the truth\nof religion; which argument would stand thus. If religion were true,\nit would not be left doubtful, and open to objections to the degree\nin which it is: therefore that it is thus left, not only renders the\nevidence of it weak, and lessens its force, in proportion to the weight\nof such objections, but also shows it to be false, or is a general\npresumption of its being so. Now the observation, that from the natural\nconstitution and course of things, we must in our temporal concerns,\nalmost continually, and even in matters of great consequence, act upon\nevidence of a like kind and degree to the evidence of religion, is an\nanswer to this argument. Because it shows, that it is according to the\nconduct and character of the Author of nature to appoint we should act\nupon evidence like to that, which this argument presumes he cannot be\nsupposed to appoint we should act upon: it is an instance, a general\none, made up of numerous particular ones, of somewhat in his dealing\nwith us, similar to what is said to be incredible. As the force of this\nanswer lies merely in the parallel, which there is between the evidence\nfor religion and for our temporal conduct; the answer is equally just\nand conclusive, whether the parallel be made out, by showing the\nevidence of the former to be higher, or the evidence of the latter to\nbe lower.\n\n_Thirdly_, The design of this treatise is not to vindicate the\ncharacter of God, but to show the obligations of men: it is not to\njustify his providence, but to show what belongs to us to do. These are\ntwo subjects, and ought not to be confounded. Though they may at length\nrun up into each other, yet observations may immediately tend to make\nout the latter, which do not appear, by any immediate connection, to\nthe purpose of the former; which is less our concern, than many seem to\nthink. For, first,\n\nIt is not necessary we should justify the dispensations of Providence\nagainst objections, any farther than to show, that the things objected\nagainst may, for aught we know, be consistent with justice and\ngoodness. Suppose then, that there are things in the system of this\nworld, and plan of Providence relating to it, which taken alone would\nbe unjust: yet it has been shown unanswerably, that if we could take\nin the reference, which these things may have to other things, present\npast and to come; to the whole scheme, which the things objected\nagainst are parts of; these very things might, for aught we know, be\nfound to be, not only consistent with justice, but instances of it.\nIndeed it has been shown, by the analogy of what we see, not only\npossible that this may be the case, but credible that it is. And thus\nobjections, drawn from such things, are answered, and Providence is\nvindicated, as far as religion makes its vindication necessary.\n\nHence it appears, Secondly, that objections against the Divine justice\nand goodness are not endeavored to be _removed_, by showing that the\nlike objections, allowed to be really conclusive, lie against natural\nprovidence: but those objections being supposed and shown not to be\n_conclusive_, the things objected against, considered as matters of\nfact, are farther shown to be credible, from their conformity to the\nconstitution of nature; for instance, that God will reward and punish\nmen for their actions hereafter, from the observation, that he does\nreward and punish them for their actions here. And this, I apprehend,\nis of weight.\n\nThirdly, it would be of weight, even though those objections were\nnot answered. For, there being the proof of religion above set down;\nand religion implying several facts; for instance again, the fact\nlast mentioned, that God will reward and punish men for their actions\nhereafter; the observation, that his present method of government is by\nrewards and punishments, shows that future fact not to be incredible:\nwhatever objections men may think they have against it, as unjust or\nunmerciful, according to their notions of justice and mercy; or as\nimprobable from their belief of necessity. I say, _as improbable_: for\nit is evident no objection against it, _as unjust_, can be urged from\nnecessity; since this notion as much destroys injustice, as it does\njustice.\n\nFourthly, Though objections against the reasonableness of the system of\nreligion cannot indeed be answered without entering into consideration\nof its reasonableness; yet objections against the credibility or\ntruth of it may. Because the system of it is reducible into what is\nproperly matter of fact: and the truth, the probable truth of facts,\nmay be shown without consideration of their reasonableness. Nor is it\nnecessary, though, in some cases and respects, it is highly useful and\nproper, yet it is not necessary, to give a proof of the reasonableness\nof every precept enjoined us, and of every particular dispensation\nof Providence, which comes into the system of religion. Indeed the\nmore thoroughly a person of a right disposition is convinced of the\nperfection of the Divine nature and conduct, the farther he will\nadvance towards that perfection of religion, which John[290] speaks\nof.[291] But the general obligations of religion are fully made out, by\nproving the reasonableness of the practice of it. And that the practice\nof religion _is_ reasonable, may be shown, though no more could be\nproved, than that the system of it _may be_ so, for aught we know to\nthe contrary: and even without entering into the distinct consideration\nof this.\n\nFifthly, It is easy to see, that though the analogy of nature is not\nan immediate answer to objections against the wisdom, the justice, or\ngoodness, of any doctrine or precept of religion; yet it may be, as it\nis, an immediate and direct answer to what is really intended by such\nobjections; which is, to show that the things objected against are\nincredible.\n\n_Fourthly_, It is most readily acknowledged, that the foregoing\ntreatise is by no means satisfactory; very far indeed from it: but so\nwould any natural institution of life appear, if reduced into a system,\ntogether with its evidence. Leaving religion out of the case, men are\ndivided in their opinions, whether our pleasures overbalance our pains:\nand whether it be, or be not, eligible to live in this world.[292] And\nwere all such controversies settled, which perhaps, in speculation,\nwould be found involved in great difficulties; and were it determined\nupon the evidence of reason, as nature has determined it to our hands,\nthat life is to be preserved: still, the rules which God has been\npleased to afford us, for escaping the miseries of it, and obtaining\nits satisfactions, the rules, for instance, of preserving health, and\nrecovering it when lost, are not only fallible and precarious, but\nvery far from being exact. Nor are we informed by nature, as to future\ncontingencies and accidents, so as to render it at all certain, what\nis the best method of managing our affairs. What will be the success\nof our temporal pursuits, in the common sense of the word success, is\nhighly doubtful. And what will be the success of them in the proper\nsense of the word; _i.e._ what happiness or enjoyment we shall obtain\nby them, is doubtful in a much higher degree. Indeed the unsatisfactory\nnature of the evidence, with which we are obliged to take up, in the\ndaily course of life, is scarce to be expressed. Yet men do not throw\naway life, or disregard the interests of it, upon account of this\ndoubtfulness. The evidence of religion then being admitted real, those\nwho object against it, as not satisfactory, _i.e._ as not being what\nthey wish it, plainly forget the very condition of our being: for\nsatisfaction, in this sense, does not belong to such a creature as man.\n\nAnd, what is more material, they forget also the very nature of\nreligion. For, religion presupposes, in all those who will embrace it,\na certain degree of integrity and honesty; which it was intended to try\nwhether men have or not, and to exercise in such as have it, in order\nto its improvement. Religion presupposes this as much, and in the same\nsense, as speaking to a man presupposes he understands the language in\nwhich you speak; or as warning a man of any danger presupposes that he\nhath such a regard to himself, as that he will endeavor to avoid it.\nTherefore the question is not at all, Whether the evidence of religion\nbe satisfactory; but Whether it be, in reason, sufficient to prove and\ndiscipline that virtue, which it presupposes. Now the evidence of it is\nfully sufficient for all those purposes of _probation_; how far soever\nit is from being satisfactory, as to the purposes of _curiosity_, or\nany other: and indeed it answers the purposes of the former in several\nrespects, which it would not do, if it were as overpowering as is\nrequired. Besides, whether the motives or the evidence for any course\nof action be satisfactory, meaning here, by that word, what satisfies\na man that such a course of action will in event be for his good; this\nneed never be, and I think, strictly speaking, never is, the practical\nquestion in common matters. The practical question in all cases is,\nWhether the evidence for a course of action be such as, taking in all\ncircumstances, makes the faculty within us, which is the guide and\njudge of conduct,[293] determine that course of action to be prudent.\nIndeed, satisfaction that it will be for our interest or happiness,\nabundantly determines an action to be prudent: but evidence almost\ninfinitely lower than this, determines actions to be so too; even in\nthe conduct of every day.\n\n_Fifthly_, As to the objection concerning the influence which this\nargument, or any part of it, may, or may not be expected to have upon\nmen; I observe, as above, that religion being intended for a trial[294]\nand exercise of the morality of every person\u2019s character, who is a\nsubject of it; and there being, as I have shown, such evidence for\nit, as is sufficient, in reason, to influence men to embrace it: to\nobject, that it is not to be imagined mankind will be influenced by\nsuch evidence, is nothing to the purpose of the foregoing treatise. For\nthe purpose of it is not to inquire, what sort of creatures mankind\nare; but what the light and knowledge, which is afforded them, requires\nthey should be: to show how, in reason, they ought to behave; not how,\nin fact, they will behave. This depends upon themselves, and is their\nown concern; the personal concern of each man in particular. How little\nregard the generality have to it, experience indeed does too fully\nshow. But religion, considered as a probation, has had its end upon\nall persons, to whom it has been proposed with evidence sufficient in\nreason to influence their practice: for by this means they have been\nput into a state of probation; let them behave as they will in it.\nThus, not only revelation, but reason also, teaches us, that by the\nevidence of religion being laid before men, the designs of Providence\nare carrying on, not only with regard to those who will be influenced\nby it, but likewise with regard to those who will not. Lastly, the\nobjection here referred to, allows the thing insisted upon in this\ntreatise to be of _some_ weight; and if so, it may be hoped it will\nhave some influence. And if there be a probability that it will have\nany at all, there is the same reason in kind, though not in degree,\nto lay it before men, as there would be, if it were likely to have a\ngreater influence.\n\nFurther, I desire it may be considered, with respect to the whole of\nthe foregoing objections, that in this treatise I have argued upon\nthe principles of others,[295] not my own: and have omitted what I\nthink true, and of the utmost importance, because by others thought\nunintelligible, or not true. Thus I have argued upon the principles of\nthe fatalists, which I do not believe: and have omitted a thing of the\nutmost importance which I do believe,--[viz.] the moral fitness and\nunfitness of actions, prior to all will whatever; which as certainly\ndetermine the divine _conduct_, as speculative truth and falsehood\nnecessarily determine the divine _judgment_. Indeed the principle of\nliberty, and that of moral fitness, so force themselves upon the mind,\nthat moralists, ancient as well as modern, have formed their language\nupon it. And probably it may appear in mine, though I have endeavored\nto avoid it; and, in order to avoid it, have sometimes been obliged to\nexpress myself in a manner, which will appear strange to such as do not\nobserve the reason for it. But the general argument here pursued, does\nnot at all suppose, or proceed upon these principles.\n\nNow, these two abstract principles of liberty and moral fitness being\nomitted, religion can be considered in no other view, than merely as\na question of fact: and in this view it is here considered. It is\nobvious, that Christianity, and the proof of it, are both historical.\nEven natural religion is, properly, a matter of fact. For, that there\nis a righteous Governor of the world, is so: and this proposition\ncontains the general system of natural religion. But then, several\nabstract truths, and in particular those two principles, are usually\ntaken into consideration in the proof of it: whereas it is here treated\nof only as a matter of fact. To explain this; That the three angles of\na triangle are equal to two right ones, is an abstract truth; but that\nthey appear so to our mind, is only a matter of fact. This last must\nhave been admitted, if any thing was, by those ancient sceptics, who\nwould not admit the former: but pretended to doubt, whether there were\nany such thing as truth, or whether we could certainly depend upon our\nfaculties of understanding for the knowledge of it in any case.\n\nThe assertion that there is, in the nature of things, an original\nstandard of right and wrong in actions, independent upon all will, but\nwhich unalterably determines the will of God, to exercise that moral\ngovernment over the world, which religion teaches, (_i.e._ finally\nand upon the whole to reward and punish men respectively as they act\nright or wrong;) contains an abstract truth, as well as matter of fact.\nBut suppose that in the present state, every man without exception,\nwas rewarded and punished, in exact proportion as he followed or\ntransgressed that sense of right and wrong, which God has implanted\nin his nature: this would not be at all an abstract truth, but only a\nmatter of fact. And though this fact were acknowledged by every one,\nyet the same difficulties might be raised as now are, concerning the\nabstract questions of liberty and moral fitness. And we should have a\nproof, even the certain one of experience, that the government of the\nworld was perfectly moral, without taking in the consideration of those\nquestions: and this proof would remain, in what way soever they were\ndetermined.\n\nThus, God having given mankind a moral faculty, the object of which\nis actions, and which naturally approves some actions as right, and\nof good desert, and condemns others as wrong, and of ill desert; that\nhe will, finally and upon the whole, reward the former and punish the\nlatter, is not an assertion of an abstract truth, but of what is as\nmere a fact, as his doing so at present would be. This future fact I\nhave not, indeed, proved with the force with which it might be proved,\nfrom the principles of liberty and moral fitness; but without them\nhave given a really conclusive practical proof of it, which is greatly\nstrengthened by the general analogy of nature; a proof easily cavilled\nat, easily shown not to be demonstrative, (and it is not offered as\nsuch;) but impossible, I think, to be evaded, or answered. Thus the\nobligations of religion are made out, exclusive of the questions\nconcerning liberty and moral fitness; which have been perplexed with\ndifficulties and abstruse reasonings, as every thing may.\n\nHence therefore may be observed distinctly, what is the force of this\ntreatise. It will be, to such as are convinced of religion upon the\nproof arising out of the two last mentioned principles, an _additional_\nproof and confirmation of it: to such as do not admit those principles,\nan _original_ proof of it,[296] and a confirmation of that proof. Those\nwho believe, will here find the scheme of Christianity cleared of\nobjections, and the evidence of it in a peculiar manner strengthened.\nThose who do not believe will at least be shown the absurdity of all\nattempts to prove Christianity false, the plain undoubted credibility\nof it; and, I hope, a good deal more.\n\nThus, though some perhaps may seriously think, that analogy, as here\nurged, has too great stress laid upon it; and ridicule, unanswerable\nridicule, may be applied, to show the argument from it in a\ndisadvantageous light; yet there can be no question, but that it is\na real one. For religion, both natural and revealed, implying in it\nnumerous facts; analogy, being a _confirmation_ of all facts to which\nit can be applied, and the _only proof_ of most, cannot but be admitted\nby every one to be a material thing, and truly of weight on the side of\nreligion, both natural and revealed. And it ought to be particularly\nregarded by such as profess to follow nature, and to be less satisfied\nwith abstract reasonings.\n\n\n\n\nCONCLUSION.\n\n\nWhatever account may be given of the strange inattention and disregard,\nin some ages and countries, to a matter of such importance as religion;\nit would, before experience, be incredible, that there should be the\nlike disregard in those, who have had the moral system of the world\nlaid before them, as it is by Christianity, and often inculcated upon\nthem: because this moral system carries in it a good degree of evidence\nfor its truth, upon its being barely proposed to our thoughts. There\nis no need of abstruse reasonings and distinctions, to convince an\nunprejudiced understanding, that there is a God who made and governs\nthe world, and will judge it in righteousness; though they may be\nnecessary to answer abstruse difficulties, when once such are raised:\nwhen the very meaning of those words, which express most intelligibly\nthe general doctrine of religion, is pretended to be uncertain; and\nthe clear truth of the thing itself is obscured by the intricacies of\nspeculation. To an unprejudiced mind, ten thousand thousand instances\nof design cannot but prove a designer. And it is intuitively manifest,\nthat _creatures_ ought to live under a dutiful sense of their Maker;\nand that justice and charity must be his laws, to creatures whom he has\nmade social, and placed in society.\n\nThe truth of revealed religion, peculiarly so called, is not indeed\nself-evident, but requires external proof, in order to its being\nreceived. Yet inattention, among us, to revealed religion, will\nbe found to imply the same dissolute immoral temper of mind, as\ninattention to natural religion: because, when both are laid before\nus, in the manner they are in Christian countries of liberty, our\nobligations to inquire into both, and to embrace both upon supposition\nof their truth, are obligations of the same nature. Revelation claims\nto be the voice of God: and our obligation to attend to his voice is\nsurely moral, in all cases. And as it is insisted, that its evidence\nis conclusive, upon thorough consideration of it; so it offers itself\nwith obvious appearances of having something more than human in it,\nand therefore in all reason requires to have its claims most seriously\nexamined into.\n\nIt is to be added, that though light and knowledge, in what manner\nsoever afforded, is equally from God; yet a miraculous revelation\nhas a peculiar tendency, from the first principles of our nature, to\nawaken mankind, and inspire them with reverence and awe. And this\nis a peculiar obligation, to attend to what claims to be so, with\nsuch appearances of truth. It is therefore most certain, that our\nobligations to inquire seriously into the evidence of Christianity,\nand, upon supposition of its truth, to embrace it, are of the utmost\nimportance, and moral in the highest and most proper sense. Let us then\nsuppose, that the evidence of religion in general, and of Christianity,\nhas been seriously inquired into, by all reasonable men among us. Yet\nwe find many professedly to reject both, upon speculative principles of\ninfidelity. All of them do not content themselves with a bare neglect\nof religion, and enjoying their imaginary freedom from its restraints.\nSome go much beyond this. They deride God\u2019s moral government over\nthe world. They renounce his protection, and defy his justice. They\nridicule and vilify Christianity, and blaspheme the author of it; and\ntake all occasions to manifest scorn and contempt of revelation. This\namounts to an active setting themselves against religion; to what\nmay be considered as a positive principle of irreligion, which they\ncultivate within themselves; and, whether they intend this effect\nor not, render habitual, as a good man does the contrary principle.\nOthers, who are not chargeable with all this profligateness, yet are in\navowed opposition to religion, as if discovered to be groundless.\n\nNow admitting, which is the supposition we go upon, that these persons\nact upon what they think principles of reason, (and otherwise they are\nnot to be argued with,) it is really inconceivable, that they should\nimagine they clearly see the whole evidence of it, considered in\nitself, to be nothing at all: nor do they pretend this. They are far\nindeed from having a just notion of its evidence: but they would not\nsay its evidence was nothing, if they thought the system of it, with\nall its circumstances, were credible, like other matters of science or\nhistory. Their manner of treating it must proceed, either from such\nkind of objections against all religion, as have been answered or\nobviated in the former part of this treatise; or else from objections,\nand difficulties, supposed more peculiar to Christianity. Thus, they\nentertain prejudices against the whole notion of a revelation, and\nmiraculous interpositions. They find things in Scripture, whether in\nincidental passages, or in the general scheme of it, which appear to\nthem unreasonable. They take for granted, that if Christianity were\ntrue, the light of it must have been more general, and the evidence\nof it more satisfactory, or rather overpowering: that it must and\nwould have been, in some way, otherwise put and left, than it is. Now\nthis is not imagining they see the evidence itself to be nothing,\nor inconsiderable; but quite another thing. It is being fortified\n_against_ the evidence, in some degree acknowledged, by thinking they\nsee the system of Christianity, or something which appears to them\nnecessarily connected with it, to be incredible or false; fortified\nagainst that evidence, which might otherwise make great impression\nupon them. Or, lastly, if any of these persons are, upon the whole, in\ndoubt concerning the truth of Christianity; their behavior seems owing\nto their taking for granted, through strange inattention, that such\ndoubting is, in a manner, the same thing as being certain against it.\n\nTo these persons, and to this state of opinion concerning religion,\nthe foregoing treatise is adapted. For, all the general objections\nagainst the moral system of nature having been obviated, it is\nshown, that there is not any peculiar presumption at all against\nChristianity, considered either as not discoverable by reason, or as\nunlike to what is so discovered; nor any, worth mentioning, against\nit as miraculous, if any at all; none, certainly, which can render\nit in the least incredible. It is shown, that, upon supposition of\na divine revelation, the analogy of nature renders it beforehand\nhighly credible, I think probable, that many things in it must appear\nliable to great objections; and that we must be incompetent judges of\nit, to a great degree. This observation is, I think, unquestionably\ntrue, and of the very utmost importance. But it is urged, as I hope\nit will be understood, with great caution not to vilify the faculty\nof reason, which is _the candle of the Lord within us_;[297] though\nit can afford no light, where it does not shine; nor judge, where\nit has no principles to judge upon. The objections here spoken of,\nbeing first answered in the view of objections against Christianity\nas a matter of fact, are in the next place considered as urged more\nimmediately against the wisdom, justice, and goodness of the Christian\ndispensation. And it is fully made out, that they admit of exactly the\nlike answer, in every respect, to what the like objections against\nthe constitution of nature admit of: that, as partial views give the\nappearance of wrong to things, which, upon further consideration\nand knowledge of their relations to other things, are found just\nand good; so it is perfectly credible, that the things objected\nagainst the wisdom and goodness of the Christian dispensation, may\nbe rendered instances of wisdom and goodness, by their reference to\nother things beyond our view. Because Christianity is a scheme as much\nabove our comprehension, as that of nature; and like that, a scheme\nin which means are made use of to accomplish ends, and which, as is\nmost credible, may be carried on by general laws. And it ought to be\nattended to, that this is not an answer taken merely or chiefly from\nour ignorance: but from something positive, which our observation shows\nus. For, to like objections, the like answer is experienced to be just,\nin numberless parallel cases.\n\nThe objections against the Christian dispensation, and the method\nby which it is carried on, having been thus obviated, in general,\nand together; the chief of them are considered distinctly, and the\nparticular things objected to are shown credible, by their perfect\nanalogy, each apart, to the constitution of nature. Thus, if man be\nfallen from his primitive state, and to be restored, and infinite\nwisdom and power engages in accomplishing our recovery: it were to have\nbeen expected, it is said, that this should have been effected at once;\nand not by such a long series of means, and such a various economy of\npersons and things; one dispensation preparatory to another, this to\na further one, and so on through an indefinite number of ages, before\nthe end of the scheme proposed can be completely accomplished; a scheme\nconducted by infinite wisdom, and executed by almighty power. But now,\non the contrary, our finding that every thing in the constitution and\ncourse of nature is thus carried on, shows such expectations concerning\nrevelation to be highly unreasonable; and is a satisfactory answer to\nthem, when urged as objections against the credibility, that the great\nscheme of Providence in the redemption of the world may be of this\nkind, and to be accomplished in this manner.\n\nAs to the particular method of our redemption, the appointment of a\nMediator between God and man: this has been shown to be most obviously\nanalogous to the general conduct of nature, _i.e._ the God of nature,\nin appointing others to be the instruments of his mercy, as we\nexperience in the daily course of Providence. The condition of this\nworld, which the doctrine of our redemption by Christ presupposes, so\nmuch falls in with natural appearances, that heathen moralists inferred\nit from those appearances: inferred that human nature was fallen from\nits original rectitude, and in consequence of this, degraded from its\nprimitive happiness. However this opinion came into the world, these\nappearances kept up the tradition, and confirmed the belief of it.\nAnd as it was the general opinion under the light of nature, that\nrepentance and reformation, alone and by itself, was not sufficient to\ndo away sin, and procure a full remission of the penalties annexed to\nit; and as the reason of the thing does not at all lead to any such\nconclusion; so every day\u2019s experience shows us, that reformation is\nnot, in any sort, sufficient to prevent the present disadvantages and\nmiseries, which, in the natural course of things, God has annexed to\nfolly and extravagance.\n\nYet there may be ground to think, that the punishments, which, by\nthe general laws of divine government, are annexed to vice, may be\nprevented: that provision may have been, even originally, made, that\nthey should be prevented by some means or other, though they could not\nby reformation alone. For we have daily instances of _such mercy_, in\nthe general conduct of nature: compassion provided for misery,[298]\nmedicines for diseases, friends against enemies. There is provision\nmade, in the original constitution of the world, that much of the\nnatural bad consequences of our follies, which persons themselves\nalone cannot prevent, may be prevented by the assistance of others;\nassistance which nature enables, and disposes, and appoints them to\nafford. By a method of goodness analogous to this, when the world lay\nin wickedness, and consequently in ruin, _God so loved the world, that\nhe gave his only-begotten Son_ to save it: and _he being made perfect\nby suffering, became the author of eternal salvation to all them that\nobey him_.[299] Indeed neither reason nor analogy would lead us to\nthink, in particular, that the interposition of Christ, in the manner\nin which he did interpose, would be of that efficacy for recovery\nof the world, which the Scripture teaches us it was. But neither\nwould reason nor analogy lead us to think, that other particular\nmeans would be of the efficacy, which experience shows they are, in\nnumberless instances. Therefore, as the case before us does not admit\nof experience; so, that neither reason nor analogy can show how, or\nin what particular way, the interposition of Christ, as revealed in\nScripture, is of that efficacy, which it is there represented to be;\nthis is no kind nor degree of presumption against its being really of\nthat efficacy.\n\nFurther: the objections against Christianity, from the light of it not\nbeing universal, nor its evidence so strong as might possibly be given,\nhave been answered by the general analogy of nature. That God has made\nsuch variety of creatures, is indeed an answer to the former: but that\nhe dispenses his gifts in such variety, both of degrees and kinds,\namong creatures of the same species, and even to the same individuals\nat different times; is a more obvious and full answer to it. And it is\nso far from being the method of Providence in other cases, to afford us\nsuch overbearing evidence, as some require in proof of Christianity;\nthat on the contrary, the evidence upon which we are naturally\nappointed to act in common matters, throughout a very great part of\nlife, is doubtful in a high degree. And admitting the fact, that God\nhas afforded to some no more than doubtful evidence of religion; the\nsame account may be given of it, as of difficulties and temptations\nwith regard to practice. But as it is not impossible,[300] surely,\nthat this alleged doubtfulness may be men\u2019s own fault; it deserves\ntheir most serious consideration, whether it be not so. However, it is\ncertain, that doubting implies a _degree_ of evidence for that of which\nwe doubt: and that this degree of evidence as really lays us under\nobligations as demonstrative evidence.\n\nThe whole of religion then is throughout credible: nor is there, I\nthink, any thing, relating to the revealed dispensation of things, more\ndifferent from the experienced constitution and course of nature, than\nsome parts of the constitution of nature are from other parts of it.\nIf so, the only question which remains is, What positive evidence can\nbe alleged for the truth of Christianity? This too in general has been\nconsidered, and the objections against it estimated. Deduct, therefore,\nwhat is to be deducted from that evidence, upon account of any weight\nwhich may be thought to remain in these objections, after what the\nanalogy of nature has suggested in answer to them: and then consider,\nwhat are the practical consequences from all this upon the most\nsceptical principles one can argue upon (for I am writing to persons\nwho entertain these principles): and upon such consideration it will be\nobvious, that immorality, as little excuse as it admits of in itself,\nis greatly aggravated, in persons who have been made acquainted with\nChristianity, whether they believe it or not: because the moral system\nof nature, or natural religion, which Christianity lays before us,\napproves itself, almost intuitively, to a reasonable mind, upon seeing\nit proposed.\n\nIn the next place, with regard to Christianity, it will be observed\nthat there is a middle between a full satisfaction of the truth of it,\nand a satisfaction of the contrary. The middle state of mind between\nthese two consists in a serious apprehension, that it may be true,\njoined with doubt whether it is so. And this, upon the best judgment\nI am able to make, is as far towards speculative infidelity, as any\nsceptic can at all be supposed to go, who has had true Christianity,\nwith the proper evidences of it, laid before him, and has in any\ntolerable measure considered them. For I would not be mistaken to\ncomprehend all who have ever heard of it; because it seems evident,\nthat in many countries called Christian, neither Christianity nor\nits evidence, is fairly laid before men. And in places where both\nare, there appear to be some who have very little attended to either,\nand who reject Christianity with a scorn proportionate to their\ninattention; and yet are by no means without understanding in other\nmatters. Now it has been shown, that a serious apprehension that\nChristianity may be true, lays persons under the strictest obligations\nof a serious regard to it, throughout the whole of their life; a regard\nnot the same exactly, but in many respects nearly the same with what a\nfull conviction of its truth would lay them under.\n\n_Lastly_, it will appear, that blasphemy and profaneness, with\nregard to Christianity, are absolutely without excuse. There is no\ntemptation to it, but from the wantonness of vanity or mirth; and\nthose, considering the infinite importance of the subject, are no such\ntemptations as to afford any excuse for it. If this be a just account\nof things, and yet men can go on to vilify or disregard Christianity,\nwhich is to talk and act as if they had a demonstration of its\nfalsehood, there is no reason to think they would alter their behavior\nto any purpose, though there were a demonstration of its truth.\n\n\n\n\nDISSERTATIONS.\n\nOF PERSONAL IDENTITY.\n\nOF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE.\n\n\nAdvertisement.\n\nIn the first copy of these papers, I had inserted the two following\ndissertations into the chapters, on _a Future Life_, and on the _Moral\nGovernment of God_; with which they are closely connected. But as these\ndo not directly fall under the _title_ of the foregoing treatise, and\nwould have kept the subject of it too long out of sight, it seems more\nproper to place them by themselves.\n\n\n\n\nDISSERTATION I.\n\nPersonal Identity.\n\n\nWhether we are to live in a future state, as it is the most important\nquestion which can possibly be asked, so it is the most intelligible\none which can be expressed in language. Yet strange perplexities have\nbeen raised about the meaning of that identity or sameness of person,\nwhich is implied in the notion of our living now and hereafter, or in\nany two successive moments. And the solution of these difficulties hath\nbeen stranger than the difficulties themselves. For, personal identity\nhas been explained so by some, as to render the inquiry concerning a\nfuture life of no consequence at all to us the persons who are making\nit. And though few men can be misled by such subtleties; yet it may be\nproper to consider them a little.\n\nWhen it is asked _wherein_ personal identity consists, the answer\nshould be the same, as if it were asked wherein consists similitude,\nor equality; that all attempts to define would but perplex it. Yet\nthere is no difficulty at all in ascertaining _the idea_. For as,\nupon two triangles being compared or viewed together, there arises to\nthe mind the idea of similitude; or upon twice two and four, the idea\nof equality: so likewise, upon comparing the consciousness of one\u2019s\nself, or one\u2019s own existence, in any two moments, there as immediately\narises to the mind the idea of personal identity. And as the two former\ncomparisons not only give us the ideas of similitude and equality;\nbut also show us that two triangles are alike, and twice two and four\nare equal: so the latter comparison not only gives us the idea of\npersonal identity, but also shows us the identity of ourselves in those\ntwo moments; the present, suppose, and that immediately past; or the\npresent, and that a month, a year, or twenty years past. In other\nwords, by reflecting upon that which is myself now, and that which was\nmyself twenty years ago, I discern they are not two, but one and the\nsame self.\n\nBut though consciousness of what is past does thus ascertain our\npersonal identity to ourselves, yet to say, that it _makes_ personal\nidentity, or is necessary to our being the same persons, is to say,\nthat a person has not existed a single moment, nor done one action, but\nwhat he can remember; indeed none but what he reflects upon. And one\nshould really think it self-evident, that consciousness of personal\nidentity presupposes, and therefore cannot constitute, personal\nidentity; any more than knowledge, in any other case, can constitute\ntruth, which it presupposes.\n\nThis wonderful mistake may possibly have arisen from hence; that to be\nendued with consciousness is inseparable from the idea of a person, or\nintelligent being. For, this might be expressed inaccurately thus, that\nconsciousness makes personality: and from hence it might be concluded\nto make personal identity. But though present consciousness of what we\nat present do and feel is necessary to our being the persons we _now\nare_; yet present consciousness of past actions or feelings is not\nnecessary to our being the same persons who performed those actions, or\n_once had_ those feelings.\n\nThe inquiry, what makes vegetables the same, in the common acceptation\nof the word, does not appear to have any relation to this of personal\nidentity: because, the word _same_, when applied to them and to a\nperson, is not only applied to different subjects, but it is also\nused in different senses. For when a man swears to the same tree,\nas having stood fifty years in the same place, he means only the\nsame as to all the purposes of property, and uses of common life;\nand not that the tree has been all that time the same, in the strict\nphilosophical sense of the word. For he does not know, whether any one\nparticle of the present tree be the same with any one particle of the\ntree which stood in the same place fifty years ago. And if they have\nnot one common particle of matter, they cannot be the same tree in\nthe proper philosophic sense of the word _same_: it being evidently\na contradiction in terms, to say they are, when no part of their\nsubstance, and no one of their properties is the same: no part of their\nsubstance, by the supposition; no one of their properties, because it\nis allowed, that the same property cannot be transferred from one\nsubstance to another. Therefore when we say the identity of sameness of\na plant consists in a continuation of the same life, communicated under\nthe same organization, to a number of particles of matter, whether the\nsame or not; the word _same_, when applied to life and to organization,\ncannot possibly be understood to signify, what it signifies in this\nvery sentence, when applied to matter. In a loose and popular sense\nthen, the life and the organization and the plant are justly said to\nbe the same, notwithstanding the perpetual change of the parts. But in\nstrict and philosophical language, no man, no being, no mode of being,\nno any thing, can be the same with that, with which it has indeed\nnothing the same. Now sameness is used in this latter sense, when\napplied to persons. The identity of these, therefore, cannot subsist\nwith diversity of substance.\n\nThe thing here considered, and as I think, demonstratively determined,\nis proposed by Mr. Locke in these words, _Whether it_; _i.e._ the same\nself or person, _be the same identical substance_? And he has suggested\nwhat is a much better answer to the question, than that which he gives\nit in form. For he defines person, _a thinking intelligent being_,\n&c., and personal identity, _the sameness of a rational being_.[301]\nThe question then is, whether the same rational being is the same\nsubstance: which needs no answer, because being and substance, in\nthis place, stand for the same idea. The ground of the doubt, whether\nthe same person be the same substance, is said to be this; that the\nconsciousness of our own existence, in youth and in old age, or in any\ntwo joint successive moments, is not the _same individual action_,[302]\n_i.e._ not the same consciousness, but different successive\nconsciousnesses. Now it is strange that this should have occasioned\nsuch perplexities. For it is surely conceivable, that a person may have\na capacity of knowing some object or other to be the same now, which\nit was when he contemplated it formerly: yet in this case, where, by\nthe supposition, the object is perceived to be the same, the perception\nof it in any two moments cannot be one and the same perception. And\nthus, though the successive consciousnesses, which we have of our own\nexistence, are not the same, yet are they consciousnesses of one and\nthe same thing or object; of the same person, self, or living agent.\nThe person, of whose existence the consciousness is felt now, and was\nfelt an hour or a year ago, is discerned to be; not two persons, but\none and the same person; and therefore is one and the same.\n\nMr. Locke\u2019s observations upon this subject appear hasty: and he seems\nto profess himself dissatisfied with suppositions, which he has made\nrelating to it.[303] But some of those hasty observations have been\ncarried to a strange length by others; whose notion, when traced\nand examined to the bottom, amounts, I think, to this:[304] \u201cThat\npersonality is not a permanent, but a transient thing: that it lives\nand dies, begins and ends continually: that no one can any more remain\none and the same person two moments together, than two successive\nmoments can be one and the same moment: that our substance is indeed\ncontinually changing; but whether this be so or not, is, it seems,\nnothing to the purpose; since it is not substance, but consciousness\nalone, which constitutes personality: which consciousness, being\nsuccessive, cannot be the same in any two moments, nor consequently\nthe personality constituted by it.\u201d Hence it must follow, that it is\na fallacy upon ourselves, to charge our present selves with any thing\nwe did, or to imagine our present selves interested in any thing which\nbefell us yesterday; or that our present self will be interested in\nwhat will befall us to-morrow: since our present self is not, in\nreality, the same with the self of yesterday, but another like self or\nperson coming in its room, and mistaken for it; to which another self\nwill succeed to-morrow. This, I say, must follow. For if the self or\nperson of to-day, and that of to-morrow, are not the same, but only\nlike persons; the person of to-day is really no more interested in what\nwill befall the person of to-morrow, than in what will befall any other\nperson.\n\nIt may be thought, perhaps, that this is not a just representation of\nthe opinion we are speaking of: because those who maintain it allow,\nthat a person is the same as far back as his remembrance reaches.\nIndeed they use the words, _identity_, and _same person_. Nor will\nlanguage permit these words to be laid aside; since if they were, there\nmust be I know not what ridiculous periphrasis substituted in the\nroom of them. But they cannot, _consistently with themselves_, mean,\nthat the person is really the same. For it is self-evident, that the\npersonality cannot be really the same, if, as they expressly assert,\nthat in which it consists is not the same. And as, consistently with\nthemselves, they cannot, so, I think it appears, they do not _mean_,\nthat the person is _really_ the same, but only that he is so in a\nfictitious sense: in such a sense only as they assert, for this they do\nassert, that any number of persons whatever may be the same person. The\nbare unfolding this notion, and laying it thus naked and open, seems\nthe best confutation of it. However, since great stress is said to be\nput upon it, I add the following things.\n\n_First_, This notion is absolutely contradictory to that certain\nconviction, which necessarily and every moment rises within us, when we\nturn our thoughts upon ourselves, when we reflect upon what is past,\nand look forward upon what is to come. All imagination of a daily\nchange of that living agent which each man calls himself, for another,\nor of any such change throughout our whole present life, is entirely\nborne down by our natural sense of things. Nor is it possible for a\nperson in his wits to alter his conduct, with regard to his health or\naffairs, from a suspicion, that, though he should live to-morrow, he\nshould not, however, be the same person he is to-day. Yet, if it be\nreasonable to act, with respect to a future life, upon the notion that\npersonality is transient, it is reasonable to act upon it, with respect\nto the present. Here then is a notion equally applicable to religion\nand to temporal concerns. Every one sees and feels the inexpressible\nabsurdity of it in the latter case; therefore, if any can take up with\nit in the former, this cannot proceed from the reason of the thing, but\nmust be owing to inward unfairness, and secret corruption of heart.\n\n_Secondly_, It is not an idea, or abstract notion, or quality, but a\n_being_ only, which is capable of life and action, of happiness and\nmisery. Now all beings confessedly continue the same, during the whole\ntime of their existence. Consider then a living being now existing, and\nwhich has existed for any time alive. This living being must have done\nand suffered and enjoyed, what it has done and suffered and enjoyed\nformerly, (this living being, I say, and not another) as really as it\ndoes and suffers and enjoys, what it does and suffers and enjoys this\ninstant. All these successive actions, enjoyments, and sufferings, are\nactions, enjoyments, and sufferings, of the same living being. And they\nare so, prior to all consideration of its remembering or forgetting:\nsince remembering or forgetting can make no alteration in the truth of\npast matter of fact. And suppose this being endued with limited powers\nof knowledge and memory, there is no more difficulty in conceiving it\nto have a power of knowing itself to be the same living being which it\nwas some time ago, of remembering some of its actions, sufferings, and\nenjoyments, and forgetting others, than in conceiving it to know or\nremember or forget any thing else.\n\n_Thirdly_, Every person is _conscious_, that he is now the same person\nor self he was as far back as his remembrance reaches: since when any\none reflects upon a past action of his own, he is just as certain\nof the person who did that action, namely, himself who now reflects\nupon it, as he is certain that the action was done at all. Nay, very\noften a person\u2019s assurance of an action having been done, of which he\nis absolutely assured, arises wholly from the consciousness that he\nhimself did it. This he, person, or self, must either be a substance,\nor the property of some substance. If he, a person, be a substance;\nthen consciousness that he is the same person is consciousness that\nhe is the same substance. If the person, or he, be the property of\na substance, still consciousness that he is the same property is as\ncertain a proof that his substance remains the same, as consciousness\nthat he remains the same substance would be; since the same property\ncannot be transferred from one substance to another.\n\nBut though we are thus certain, that we are the same agents, living\nbeings, or substances, now, which we were as far back as our\nremembrance reaches; yet it is asked, whether we may not possibly\nbe deceived in it? And this question may be asked at the end of any\ndemonstration whatever: because it is a question concerning the truth\nof perception by memory. He who can doubt, whether perception by memory\ncan in this case be depended upon, may doubt also, whether perception\nby deduction and reasoning, which also include memory, or indeed\nwhether intuitive perception can. Here then we can go no further. For\nit is ridiculous to attempt to prove the truth of those perceptions,\nwhose truth we can no otherwise prove, than by other perceptions of\nexactly the same kind with them, and which there is just the same\nground to suspect; or to attempt to prove the truth of our faculties,\nwhich can no otherwise be proved, than by the use or means of those\nvery suspected faculties themselves.[305]\n\n\n\n\nDISSERTATION II.\n\nThe Nature of Virtue.\n\n\nThat which renders beings capable of moral government, is their having\na moral nature, and moral faculties of perception and of action.\nBrute creatures are impressed and actuated by various instincts and\npropensions: so also are we. But additional to this, we have a capacity\nof reflecting upon actions and characters, and making them an object to\nour thought: and on doing this, we naturally and unavoidably approve\nsome actions, under the peculiar view of their being virtuous and of\ngood desert; and disapprove others, as vicious and of ill desert.\nThat we have this moral approving and disapproving[306] faculty, is\ncertain from our experiencing it in ourselves, and recognising it in\neach other. It appears from our exercising it unavoidably, in the\napprobation and disapprobation even of feigned characters; from the\nwords right and wrong, odious and amiable, base and worthy, with many\nothers of like signification in all languages applied to actions and\ncharacters: from the many written systems of morals which suppose it,\nsince it cannot be imagined, that all these authors, throughout all\nthese treatises, had absolutely no meaning at all to their words, or a\nmeaning merely chimerical: from our natural sense of gratitude, which,\nimplies a distinction between merely being the instrument of good, and\nintending it: from the distinction every one makes between injury and\nmere harm, which, Hobbes says, is peculiar to mankind; and between\ninjury and just punishment, a distinction plainly natural, prior to the\nconsideration of human laws.\n\nIt is manifest that great part of common language, and of common\nbehavior over the world, is formed upon supposition of such a moral\nfaculty; whether called conscience, moral reason, moral sense, or\ndivine reason; whether considered as a sentiment of the understanding,\nor as a perception of the heart; or, which seems the truth, as\nincluding both. Nor is it at all doubtful in the general, what course\nof action this faculty, or practical discerning power within us,\napproves and what it disapproves. For, as much as it has been disputed\nwherein virtue consists, or whatever ground for doubt there may be\nabout particulars; yet, in general, there is in reality a universally\nacknowledged standard of it. It is that, which all ages and all\ncountries have made profession of in public: it is that, which every\nman you meet puts on the show of: it is that, which the primary and\nfundamental laws of all civil constitutions over the face of the earth\nmake it their business and endeavor to enforce the practice of upon\nmankind: namely, justice, veracity, and regard to common good. It being\nmanifest then, in general, that we have such a faculty or discernment\nas this, it may be of use to remark some things more distinctly\nconcerning it.\n\n_First_, It ought to be observed, that the object of this faculty\nis actions,[307] comprehending under that name active or practical\nprinciples: those principles from which men would act, if occasions\nand circumstances gave them power; and which, when fixed and habitual\nin any person, we call his character. It does not appear, that brutes\nhave the least reflex sense of actions, as distinguished from events:\nor that will and design, which constitute the very nature of actions\nas such, are at all an object to their perception. But to ours they\nare: and they are the object, and the only one, of the approving and\ndisapproving faculty. Acting, conduct, behavior, abstracted from all\nregard to what is in fact and event the consequence of it, is itself\nthe natural object of the moral discernment; as speculative truth\nand falsehood is of speculative reason. Intention of such and such\nconsequences, is indeed, always included; for it is part of the action\nitself: but though the intended good or bad consequences do not follow,\nwe have exactly the same sense of the _action_, as if they did. In\nlike manner we think well or ill of characters, abstracted from all\nconsideration of the good or the evil, which persons of such characters\nhave it actually in their power to do. We never, in the moral way,\napplaud or blame either ourselves or others, for what we enjoy or what\nwe suffer, or for having impressions made upon us, which we consider\nas altogether out of our power: but only for what we do or would have\ndone, had it been in our power: or for what we leave undone, which we\nmight have done, or would have left undone, though we could have done.\n\n_Secondly_, Our sense or discernment of actions as morally good or\nevil, implies in it a sense or discernment of them as of good or ill\ndesert. It may be difficult to explain this perception, so as to\nanswer all the questions which may be asked concerning it: but every\none speaks of such and such actions as deserving punishment; and it is\nnot, I suppose, pretended, that they have absolutely no meaning at all\nto the expression. Now the meaning plainly is not, that we conceive\nit for the good of society, that the doer of such actions should be\nmade to suffer. For if, unhappily, it were resolved, that a man, who\nby some innocent action, was infected with the plague, should be left\nto perish, lest, by other people\u2019s coming near him, the infection\nshould spread; no one would say he _deserved_ this treatment. Innocence\nand ill desert are inconsistent ideas. Ill desert always supposes\nguilt: and if one be no part of the other, yet they are evidently and\nnaturally connected in our mind. The sight of a man in misery raises\nour compassion towards him; and if this misery be inflicted on him by\nanother, our indignation against the author of it. But when we are\ninformed, that the sufferer is a villain, and is punished only for\nhis treachery or cruelty; our compassion exceedingly lessens, and in\nmany instances our indignation wholly subsides. Now what produces\nthis effect is the conception of that in the sufferer, which we call\nill desert. Upon considering then, or viewing together, our notion of\nvice and that of misery, there results a third, that of ill desert.\nAnd thus there is in human creatures an association of the two ideas,\nnatural and moral evil, wickedness and punishment. If this association\nwere merely artificial or accidental, it were nothing: but being most\nunquestionably natural, it greatly concerns us to attend to it, instead\nof endeavoring to explain it away.\n\nIt may be observed further, concerning our perception of good and\nof ill desert, that the former is very weak with respect to common\ninstances of virtue. One reason of which may be, that it does not\nappear to a spectator, how far such instances of virtue proceed from\na virtuous principle, or in what degree this principle is prevalent:\nsince a very weak regard to virtue may be sufficient to make men act\nwell in many common instances. On the other hand, our perception of ill\ndesert in vicious actions lessens, in proportion to the temptations men\nare thought to have had to such vices. For, vice in human creatures\nconsisting chiefly in the absence or want of the virtuous principle;\nthough a man be overcome, suppose by tortures, it does not from thence\nappear to what degree the virtuous principle was wanting. All that\nappears is, that he had it not in such a degree, as to prevail over\nthe temptation; but possibly he had it in a degree, which would have\nrendered him proof against common temptations.\n\n_Thirdly_, Our perception of vice and ill desert arises from, and is\nthe result of, a comparison of actions with the nature and capacities\nof the agent. For the mere neglect of doing what we ought to do, would,\nin many cases, be determined by all men to be in the highest degree\nvicious. This determination must arise from such comparison, and be the\nresult of it; because such neglect would not be vicious in creatures\nof other natures and capacities, as brutes. It is the same also with\nrespect to positive vices, or such as consist in doing what we ought\nnot. For every one has a different sense of harm done by an idiot,\nmadman, or child, and by one of mature and common understanding; though\nthe action of both, including the intention, which is part of the\naction, be the same: as it may be, since idiots and madmen, as well as\nchildren, are capable not only of doing mischief but also of intending\nit. Now this difference must arise from somewhat discerned in the\nnature or capacities of one, which renders the action vicious; and the\nwant of which, in the other, renders the same action innocent or less\nvicious: and this plainly supposes a comparison, whether reflected upon\nor not, between the action and capacities of the agent, previous to our\ndetermining an action to be vicious. Hence arises a proper application\nof the epithets, incongruous, unsuitable, disproportionate, unfit, to\nactions which our moral faculty determines to be vicious.\n\n_Fourthly_, It deserves to be considered, whether men are more at\nliberty, in point of morals, to make themselves miserable without\nreason, than to make other people so: or dissolutely to neglect their\nown greater good, for the sake of a present lesser gratification, than\nthey are to neglect the good of others, whom nature has committed to\ntheir care. It would seem, that a due concern about our own interest\nor happiness, and a reasonable endeavor to secure and promote it,\n(which is, I think, very much the meaning of the word prudence,\nin our language;) it would seem, that this is virtue, and the\ncontrary behavior faulty and blamable; since, in the calmest way of\nreflection, we approve of the first, and condemn the other conduct,\nboth in ourselves and others. This approbation and disapprobation\nare altogether different from mere desire of our own, or of their\nhappiness, and from sorrow upon missing it. For the object or occasion\nof this last kind of perception is satisfaction or uneasiness: whereas\nthe object of the first is active behavior. In one case, what our\nthoughts fix upon is our condition: in the other, our conduct.\n\nIt is true indeed, that nature has not given us so sensible a\ndisapprobation of imprudence and folly, either in _ourselves_ or\n_others_, as of falsehood, injustice, and cruelty: I suppose, because\nthat constant habitual sense of private interest and good, which we\nalways carry about with us, renders such sensible disapprobation less\nnecessary, less wanting, to keep us from imprudently neglecting our own\nhappiness, and foolishly injuring ourselves, than it is necessary and\nwanting to keep us from injuring others; to whose good we cannot have\nso strong and constant a regard: and also because imprudence and folly,\nappearing to bring its own punishment more immediately and constantly\nthan injurious behavior, it less needs the additional punishment,\nwhich would be inflicted upon it by others, had they the same sensible\nindignation against it, as against injustice, and fraud, and cruelty.\nBesides, unhappiness being in itself the natural object of compassion,\nthe unhappiness which people bring upon themselves, though it be\nwilfully, excites in us some pity for them; and this of course lessens\nour displeasure against them. Still it is matter of experience, that we\nare formed so as to reflect very severely upon the greater instances of\nimprudent neglect and foolish rashness, both in ourselves and others.\nIn instances of this kind, men often say of themselves with remorse,\nand of others with some indignation, that they deserved to suffer such\ncalamities, because they brought them upon themselves, and would not\ntake warning. Particularly when persons come to poverty and distress by\na long course of extravagance, and after frequent admonitions, though\nwithout falsehood or injustice; we plainly, do not regard such people\nas alike objects of compassion with those, who are brought into the\nsame condition by unavoidable accidents. From these things it appears,\nthat prudence is a species of virtue, and folly of vice: meaning by\n_folly_, something quite different from mere incapacity; a thoughtless\nwant of that regard and attention to our own happiness, which we had\ncapacity for. And this the word properly includes; and, as it seems, in\nits usual acceptation: for we scarcely apply it to brute creatures.\n\nHowever, if any person be disposed to dispute the matter, I shall very\nwillingly give him up the words virtue and vice, as not applicable to\nprudence and folly: but must insist, that the faculty within us, which\nis the judge of actions, approves of prudent actions, and disapproves\nimprudent ones: I say prudent and imprudent _actions_ as such, and\nconsidered distinctly from the happiness or misery which they occasion.\nAnd by the way, this observation may help to determine what justness\nthere is in the objection against religion, that it teaches us to be\ninterested and selfish.\n\n_Fifthly_, Without inquiring how far, and in what sense, virtue is\nresolvable into benevolence, and vice into the want of it; it may\nbe proper to observe, that benevolence, and the want of it, singly\nconsidered, are in no sort the _whole_, of virtue and vice. For if\nthis were the case, in the review of one\u2019s own character, or that of\nothers, our moral understanding and moral sense would be indifferent\nto every thing, but the degrees in which benevolence prevailed, and\nthe degrees in which it was wanting. That is, we should neither approve\nof benevolence to some persons rather than to others, nor disapprove\ninjustice and falsehood upon any other account, than merely as an\noverbalance of happiness was foreseen likely to be produced by the\nfirst, and of misery by the second. On the contrary, suppose two men\ncompetitors for any thing whatever, which would be of equal advantage\nto each of them; though nothing indeed would be more impertinent,\nthan for a stranger to busy himself to get one of them preferred\nto the other; yet such endeavor would be virtue, in behalf of a\nfriend or benefactor, abstracted from all consideration of distant\nconsequences: as that examples of gratitude, and the cultivation of\nfriendship, would be of general good to the world. Again, suppose one\nman should, by fraud or violence, take from another the fruit of his\nlabor, with intent to give it to a third, who he thought would have as\nmuch pleasure from it as would balance the pleasure which the first\npossessor would have had in the enjoyment, and his vexation in the\nloss of it; suppose also that no bad consequences would follow: yet\nsuch an action would surely be vicious. Nay further, were treachery,\nviolence, and injustice, no otherwise vicious, than as foreseen likely\nto produce an overbalance of misery to society; then, if in any case a\nman could procure to himself as great advantage by an act of injustice,\nas the whole foreseen inconvenience, likely to be brought upon others\nby it, would amount to; such a piece of injustice would not be faulty\nor vicious at all: because it would be no more than, in any other case,\nfor a man to prefer his own satisfaction to another\u2019s, in equal degrees.\n\nThe fact, then, appears to be, that we are _constituted_ so as to\ncondemn falsehood, unprovoked violence, injustice, and to approve\nof benevolence to some preferably to others, abstracted from all\nconsideration, which conduct is likeliest to produce an overbalance of\nhappiness or misery. Therefore, were the Author of nature to propose\nnothing to himself as an end but the production of happiness, were\nhis moral character merely that of benevolence; yet ours is not so.\nUpon that supposition indeed, the only reason of his giving us the\nabove mentioned approbation of benevolence to some persons rather\nthan others, and disapprobation of falsehood, unprovoked violence,\nand injustice, must be, that he foresaw this constitution of our\nnature would produce more happiness, than forming us with a temper of\nmere general benevolence. But still, since this is our constitution,\nfalsehood, violence, injustice, must be vice in us; and benevolence to\nsome, preferably to others, virtue; abstracted from all consideration\nof the overbalance of evil or good, which they may appear likely to\nproduce.\n\nNow if human creatures are endued with such a moral nature as we have\nbeen explaining, or with a moral faculty, the natural object of which\nis actions: moral government must consist in rendering them happy and\nunhappy, in rewarding and punishing them, as they follow, neglect, or\ndepart from, the moral rule of action interwoven in their nature, or\nsuggested and enforced by this moral faculty;[308] in rewarding and\npunishing them upon account of their so doing.\n\nI am not sensible that I have, in this fifth observation, contradicted\nwhat any author designed to assert. But some of great and distinguished\nmerit, have, I think, expressed themselves in a manner, which may\noccasion some danger, to careless readers, of imagining the whole of\nvirtue to consist in singly aiming, according to the best of their\njudgment, at promoting the happiness of mankind in the present state;\nand the whole of vice, in doing what they foresee, or might foresee,\nis likely to produce an overbalance of unhappiness in it: than which\nmistakes, none can be conceived more terrible. For it is certain, that\nsome of the most shocking instances of injustice, adultery, murder,\nperjury, and even of persecution, may, in many supposable cases, not\nhave the appearance of being likely to produce an overbalance of\nmisery in the present state; perhaps sometimes may have the contrary\nappearance.\n\nThis reflection might easily be carried on, but I forbear. The\nhappiness of the world is the concern of Him who is the lord and the\nproprietor of it: nor do we know what we are about, when we endeavor\nto promote the good of mankind in any ways, but those which he has\ndirected; that is indeed in all ways not contrary to veracity and\njustice. I speak thus upon supposition of persons really endeavoring,\nin some sort, to do good without regard to these. But the truth seems\nto be; that such supposed endeavors proceed, almost always, from\nambition, the spirit of party, or some indirect principle, concealed\nperhaps in great measure from persons themselves. And though it is our\nbusiness and our duty to endeavor, within the bounds of veracity and\njustice, to contribute to the ease, convenience, and even cheerfulness\nand diversion of our fellow-creatures: yet, from our short views, it is\ngreatly uncertain, whether this endeavor will, in particular instances,\nproduce an overbalance of happiness upon the whole; since so many and\ndistant things must come into the account. And that which makes it our\nduty is, that there is some appearance that it will, and no positive\nappearance sufficient to balance this, on the contrary side; and also,\nthat such benevolent endeavor is a cultivation of that most excellent\nof all virtuous principles, the active principle of benevolence.\n\nHowever, though veracity, as well as justice, is to be our rule of\nlife; it must be added, otherwise a snare will be laid in the way of\nsome plain men, that the use of common forms of speech, generally\nunderstood, cannot be falsehood; and in general, that there can be no\ndesigned falsehood, without designing to deceive. It must likewise be\nobserved, that in numberless cases, a man may be under the strictest\nobligations to what he foresees will deceive, without his intending it.\nFor it is impossible not to foresee, that the words and actions of men,\nin different ranks and employments, and of different educations, will\nperpetually be mistaken by each other. And it cannot but be so, while\nthey will judge with the utmost carelessness, as they daily do, of what\nthey are not, perhaps, enough informed to be competent judges of, even\nthough they considered it with great attention.\n\n\n\n\nFOOTNOTES\n\n\n[1] Among these were _Jones_, author of the admirable Treatise on the\nCanon of the New Testament: _Lardner_, _Maddox_, _Chandler_, Archbishop\n_Secker_, &c.\n\n[2] Sermon at Spittle, on Abraham\u2019s trial.\n\n[3] Among them were CUDWORTH, born 1617; \u201cIntel. Syst. of the\nUniverse:\u201d BOYLE, 1626; \u201cThings above Reason:\u201d STILLINGFLEET, 1635;\n\u201cLetters to a Deist:\u201d Sir I. NEWTON, 1642; \u201cObservations on Prophecy:\u201d\nLESLIE, 1650; \u201cShort Method with Deists:\u201d LOWTH, 1661, Vindic. of\nthe Divine Author of the Bible: KING, 1669; \u201cOrigin of Evil:\u201d SAM.\nCLARK, 1675; \u201cEvidences of Nat. and Rev. Religion:\u201d WATERLAND, 1683;\n\u201cScripture Vindicated:\u201d LARDNER, 1684; \u201cCredibility of Gospel History:\u201d\nLELAND, 1691; \u201cView of Deistical Writers,\u201d and \u201cAdvantage and Necessity\nof Rev.:\u201d CHANDLER, 1693; \u201cDefinition of Christianity,\u201d on \u201cProphecy,\u201d\n&c.: WARBURTON, 1698; \u201cDivine Leg. of Moses;\u201d Bishop NEWTON, 1704; \u201cOn\nthe Prophecies:\u201d WATSON, 1737; \u201cApology for Christianity,\u201d (against\nGibbon,) and also \u201cApology for the Bible,\u201d (against Paine.)\n\n[4] MCINTOSH: \u201cProgress of Ethical Philosophy.\u201d\n\n[5] BROUGHAM: \u201cDisc. on Nat. Theology.\u201d\n\n[6] Verisimile.\n\n[7] [These three ways of being \u201clike,\u201d are very distinct from each\nother. The first is equivalent to a logical induction. The second\nproduces belief, because the same evidence made us believe in a similar\ncase. The third is just an analogy, in the popular sense of the term.]\n\n[8] The story is told by Mr. Locke in the Chapter of Probability.\n\n[9] [This is good common sense, and men always act thus if prudent.\nBut it is not enough thus to act in the matter of salvation. \u201cHe that\n_believeth_ not shall be damned:\u201d Mark xvi. 16. \u201cHe that _believeth_\nhath everlasting life:\u201d John iii. 36. \u201cWith the heart man _believeth_\nunto righteousness:\u201d Rom. x. 10. Belief is part of the sinner\u2019s _duty_\nin submitting himself to God; and not merely a question of prudence.]\n\n[10] See Part II. chap. vi.\n\n[11] Philocal. p. 23, Ed. Cant.\n\n[12] [Some of these speculations, carried to the full measure of\nabsurdity and impiety, may be found in Bayle\u2019s great \u201cHistorical and\nCritical Dictionary.\u201d See as instances, the articles ORIGEN, MANICH\u00c6US,\nPAULICIANS.]\n\n[13] Ch. i.\n\n[14] Ch. ii.\n\n[15] Ch. iii.\n\n[16] Ch. iv.\n\n[17] Ch. v.\n\n[18] Ch. vi.\n\n[19] Ch. vii.\n\n[20] Part II. Ch. i.\n\n[21] Ch. ii.\n\n[22] Ch. iii.\n\n[23] Ch. iv.\n\n[24] Ch. v.\n\n[25] Ch. vi. vii.\n\n[26] Ch. viii.\n\n[27] [This chapter Dr. Chalmers regards as the least satisfactory in\nthe book: not because lacking in just analogies, but because infected\nwith the obscure metaphysics of that age. His reasoning, however, only\nserves to show that B. has perhaps made too much of the argument from\nthe indivisibility of consciousness; and by no means that he does not\nfairly use it.\n\nWe certainly cannot object that the subject of identity is not\nmade plain. Who has explained identity, or motion, or cohesion, or\ncrystallization, or any thing? Locke goes squarely at the subject of\npersonal identity, (see Essay, ch. 27,) but has rendered us small aid.\nHis definition is, \u201cExistence itself, which determines a being of any\nsort, to a particular time and place, incommunicable to two beings of\nthe same kind.\u201d I had rather define it \u201cthe uninterrupted continuance\nof being.\u201d What ceases to exist, cannot again exist: for then it would\nexist after it had ceased to exist, and would have existed before it\nexisted. Locke makes _consciousness_ to constitute identity, and argues\nthat a man and a person are not the same; and that hence if I kill a\nman, but was not conscious of what I did, or have utterly forgotten,\nI am not the same person. Watts shows up this notion of Locke very\nludicrously.\n\nButler, in his \u201cDissertation,\u201d urges that consciousness _presupposes_\nidentity, as knowledge presupposes truth. On Locke\u2019s theory, no person\nwould have existed any earlier than the period to which his memory\nextends. We cannot suppose the soul made up of many consciousnesses,\nnor could memory, if material, spread itself over successive years of\nlife.]\n\n[28] I say _kind_ of presumption or probability; for I do not mean to\naffirm that there is the same _degree_ of conviction, that our living\npowers will continue after death, as there is, that our substances will.\n\n[29] _Destruction of living powers_, is a manner of expression\nunavoidably ambiguous; and may signify either _the destruction of a\nliving being, so as that the same living being shall be incapable of\never perceiving or acting again at all_; or _the destruction of those\nmeans and instruments by which it is capable of its present life, of\nits present state of perception and of action_. It is here used in the\nformer sense. When it is used in the latter, the epithet _present_ is\nadded. The loss of a man\u2019s eye is a destruction of living powers in the\nlatter sense. But we have no reason to think the destruction of living\npowers, in the former sense, to be possible. We have no more reason to\nthink a being endued with living powers, ever loses them during its\nwhole existence, than to believe that a stone ever acquires them.\n\n[30] [The next paragraph indicates that Butler does not, as Chalmers\nthinks, consider this argument as \u201chanding us over to an absolute\ndemonstration.\u201d It just places all arguments for and against the soul\u2019s\nfuture life, in that balanced condition, which leaves us to learn the\nfact from revelation, free from presumptions _against_ its truth. This\nview of the case entirely relieves the objection as to the future life\nof brutes; and shows how entirely we must rely on revelation, as to the\nfuture, both of man and beast.]\n\n[31] [Dodwell had published a book, in which he argues that human\nsouls are not _naturally_ immortal, but become so, by the power of the\nHoly Ghost, in regeneration. Dr. Clarke replied. The controversy was\ncontinued by Collins. Dr. C. wrote four tracts on the subject.\n\nThese \u201cpresumptions\u201d form the base of materialism, and hence the denial\nof a future state. Surely, thoughts and feelings, if material, have\nextension. But can any one conceive of love a foot long, or anger\nan inch thick? How superior to the gloomy mists of modern infidels\nhave even pagans been! Cicero makes Cato say, \u201cThe soul is a simple,\nuncompounded substance, without parts or mixture: it cannot be divided,\nand so cannot perish.\u201d And in another place, \u201cI never could believe\nthat the soul lost its senses by escaping from senseless matter; or\nthat such a release will not enlarge and improve its powers;\u201d and\nagain, \u201cI am persuaded that I shall only begin truly to live, when I\ncease to live in this world,\u201d Xenophon reports Cyrus as saying, in his\nlast moments, \u201cO my sons! do not imagine that when death has taken me\nfrom you, I shall cease to exist.\u201d]\n\n[32] See Dr. Clarke\u2019s Letter to Mr. Dodwell, and the defences of it.\n\n[33] [As every particle of our bodies is changed within seven years,\nan average life would take us through many such changes. If the mind\nchanges with the body, it would be unjust for an old man to be made to\nsuffer for the sins of his youth. To escape this, the materialist is\ndriven to affirm that _the whole_ is not altered, though every particle\nbe changed.\n\nThis argument from the constant flux is irresistible. It proves our\nidentity, and that matter and mind are not the same. Does it not\nalso destroy all presumption that the Ego cannot exist without this\nparticular body?]\n\n[34] See Dissertation I.\n\n[35] [The mind affects the body, as much as the body does the mind.\nLove, anger, &c. quicken the circulation; fear checks it; terror may\nstop it altogether. Mania is as often produced by moral, as by physical\ncauses, and hence of late moral means are resorted to for cure. The\nbrain of a maniac, seldom shows, on dissection, any derangement. But\nthis does not prove that there was no _functional_ derangement.]\n\n[36] [\u201cS. What shall we say, then, of the shoemaker? That he cuts with\nhis instrument only, or with his hands also? A. With his hands also.\nS. Does he use his eyes also, in making shoes? A. Yes. S. But are we\nagreed that he who uses, and what he uses, are different? A. Yes. S.\nThe shoemaker, then, and harper, are different from the hands and eyes\nthey use? A. It appears so. S. Does a man then _use_ his whole body? A.\nCertainly. S. But he who uses, and that which he uses are different.\nA. Yes. S. A man then is something different from his own body.\u201d PLAT.\nALCIBI. PRIM. p. 129, D. Stallb. Ed.\n\n\u201cIt may easily be perceived that the _mind_ both sees and hears, and\nnot those parts which are, so to speak, windows of the mind.\u201d \u201cNeither\nare we bodies; nor do I, while speaking this to thee, speak to thy\nbody.\u201d \u201cWhatever is done by thy mind, is done by thee.\u201d CICERO, Tusc.\nDisput. I. 20, 46 and 22, 52.\n\n\u201cThe mind of each man is the man; not that figure which may be pointed\nout with the finger.\u201d CIC., de Rep. b. 6, s. 24.]\n\n[37] [Butler\u2019s argument, if advanced for _proof_ would prove too much,\nnot only as to brutes but as to man; for it would prove pre-existence.\nAnd this is really the tenet, (_i.e._ transmigration,) of those who\narrive at the doctrine of immortality only by philosophy. Philosophy\ncannot establish the doctrine of a future state, nor can it afford any\npresumptions _against_ either a future or a pre-existent state.\n\nNothing is gained by insisting that reason teaches the true doctrine\nof the soul; any more than there would be by insisting that by it\nwe learned the doctrine of a trinity, or atonement. Philosophy does\nteach that He who can _create_, under infinite diversity of forms, can\n_sustain_ existence, in any mode he pleases.\n\nThe reader who chooses to look further into the discussion as to\nthe immortality of brutes, will find it spread out in POLIGNAC\u2019S\nAnti-Lucretius, and still more in BAYLE\u2019S Dictionary, under the\narticles PEREIRA, and RORARIUS. The topic is also discussed in DES\nCARTES on the Passions: BAXTER on The Nature of the Soul: HUME\u2019S\nEssays, Essay 9: SEARCH\u2019S Light of Nature: CHEYNE\u2019S Philosophical\nPrinciples: WAGSTAFF on the Immortality of Brutes: EDWARDS\u2019 Critical\nand Philosophical Exercitations: WATT\u2019S Essays, Essay 9: COLLIBER\u2019S\nEnquiry: LOCKE on the Understanding, b. 2, ch. ix.: DITTON on the\nResurrection: WILLIS De Anima Brut\u00e6.]\n\n[38] [It is as absurd to suppose that a brain thinks, as that an eye\nsees, or a finger feels. The eye no more sees, than the telescope or\nspectacles. If the _nerve_ be paralyzed, there is no vision, though\nthe eye be perfect. A few words spoken or read, may at once deprive of\nsight, or knock a person down.\n\nThe mind sometimes survives the body. Swift, utterly helpless from\npalsy, retained his faculties. In some, the body survives the mind.\nMORGAGNI, HALLER, BONNET, and others, have proved that there is no\npart of the brain, not even the pineal gland, which has not been found\ndestroyed by disease, where there had been no hallucination of mind,\nnor any suspicion of such disease, during life.]\n\n[39] Pp. 84, 85.\n\n[40] [We are told by sceptics that \u201cmind is the result of a curious and\ncomplicated organization.\u201d A mere jumble of words! But were the mind\nmaterial, there is no evidence that death would destroy it: for we do\nnot see that death has any power over matter. The body remains the very\nsame as it does in a swoon, till _chemical_ changes begin.]\n\n[41] There are three distinct questions, relating to a future life,\nhere considered: Whether death be the destruction of living agents;\nif not, Whether it be the destruction of their _present_ powers of\nreflection, as it certainly is the destruction of their present\npowers of sensation; and if not, Whether it be the suspension, or\ndiscontinuance of the exercise of these present reflecting powers. Now,\nif there be no reason to believe the last, there will be, if that were\npossible, less for the next, and less still for the first.\n\n[42] This, according to Strabo, was the opinion of the Brachmans,\n\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03af\u03b6\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03b4\u1f74 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd\u03b8\u03ac\u03b4\u03b5 \u03b2\u03af\u03bf\u03bd, \u1f61\u03c2 \u1f02\u03bd \u1f00\u03ba\u03bc\u1f74\u03bd \u03ba\u03c5\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9\u00b7\n\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b8\u03ac\u03bd\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd, \u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f44\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b2\u03af\u03bf\u03bd, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b5\u1f50\u03b4\u03b1\u03af\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b1 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2\n\u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c3\u03bf\u03c6\u03ae\u03c3\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u00b7 Lib. xv. p. 1039, Ed. Amst. 1707. [\u201cFor they think that\nthe present life is like that of those who are just ready to be born;\nand that death is a birth into the real life, and a happy one to those\nwho have practised philosophy.\u201d] To which opinion perhaps Antoninus may\nallude in these words, \u1f61\u03c2 \u03bd\u1fe6\u03bd \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2, \u03c0\u03cc\u03c4\u03b5 \u1f14\u03bc\u03b2\u03c1\u03c5\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03ba \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b3\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2\n\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03b3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03c2 \u03c3\u03bf\u03c5 \u1f10\u03be\u03ad\u03bb\u03b8\u1fc3, \u03bf\u1f55\u03c4\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f10\u03ba\u03b4\u03ad\u03c7\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9, \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f65\u03c1\u03b1\u03bd \u1f72\u03bd \u1f97 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03ac\u03c1\u03b9\u03cc\u03bd\n\u03c3\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u1f10\u03bb\u03cd\u03c4\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5 \u1f10\u03ba\u03c0\u03b5\u03c3\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9. Lib. ix. c. 3. [As this last passage\nmay, by some, be thought indelicate, it is left untranslated.]\n\n[43] [The _increase_ of a force in any direction, cannot of itself\n_change_ that direction. An arrow shot from a bow, towards an object,\ndoes not aim at some other object, by being shot with more force.]\n\n[44] [Our nature will _always_ be ours, or we should cease to be\nourselves, and become something else. And this nature is _social_.\nEvery one feels, at least sometimes, that he is not complete in himself\nfor the production of happiness; and so looks round for that which\nmay fit his wants, and supply what he cannot produce from within.\nHence amusements, of a thousand kinds, are resorted to, and still\nmore, society. Society is a want of the mind; as food is of the body.\nSociety, such as perfectly suits our real nature, and calls out, in a\nright manner, its every attribute, would secure our perfect happiness.\nBut Such society must include God.]\n\n[45] See Part II. chap. ii. and Part II. chap. iv.\n\n[46] [Objections and difficulties belong to all subjects, in _some_\nof their bearings. Ingenious and uncandid men may start others, which\ncare and candor may remove. It is therefore no proof of weakness in a\ndoctrine, that it is attacked with objections, both real and merely\nplausible. Error has been spread by two opposite means:--a dogmatic\ninsisting on doubtful points, and an unteachable cavilling at certain\ntruth.]\n\n[47] Part I. chap. vii.\n\n[48] [Our relation to God is \u201ceven necessary,\u201d because we are his\ncreatures: so that the relation must endure so long as we endure. But\nour relations to other creatures are contingent, and may be changed or\nabrogated.]\n\n[49] Pp. 93, 94.\n\n[50] [\u201cThe terms nature, and power of nature, and course of nature,\nare but empty words, and merely mean that a thing occurs usually or\nfrequently. The raising of a human body out of the earth we call a\nmiracle, the generation of one in the ordinary way we call natural, for\nno other reason than because one is usual the other unusual. Did men\nusually rise out of the earth like corn we should call that natural.\u201d\nDr. CLARKE, Controv. with Leibnitz.]\n\n[51] [That man consists of parts, is evident; and the use of each part,\nand of the whole man, is open to investigation. In examining any part\nwe learn what it _is_, and what it is _to do_: _e.g._ the eye, the\nhand, the heart. So of mental faculties; memory is to preserve ideas,\nshame to deter us from things shameful, compassion to induce us to\nrelieve distress. In observing our whole make, we may see an ultimate\ndesign,--viz.: not particular animal gratifications, but intellectual\nand moral improvement, and happiness by that means. If this be our end,\nit is our duty. To disregard it, must bring punishment; for shame,\nanguish, remorse, are by the laws of mind, the sequences of sin.\n\nSee LAW\u2019S Notes on King\u2019s Origin of Evil.]\n\n[52] [It is almost amazing that philosophy, because it discovers the\nlaws of matter, should be placed in antagonism with the Bible which\nreveals a superintending Providence. The Bible itself teaches this very\nresult of philosophy,--viz.: that the world is governed by _general\nlaws_. See Prov. viii. 29: Job. xxxviii. 12, 24, 31, 33: Ps. cxix. 90,\n91: Jer. xxxi. 35, and xxxiii. 25.]\n\n[53] See Part II. chap. vi.\n\n[54] Part II. chap. vi.\n\n[55] The general consideration of a future state of punishment, most\nevidently belongs to the subject of natural religion. But if any of\nthese reflections should be thought to relate more peculiarly to this\ndoctrine, as taught in Scripture, the reader is desired to observe,\nthat Gentile writers, both moralists and poets, speak of the future\npunishment of the wicked, both as to the duration and degree of it,\nin a like manner of expression and of description, as the Scripture\ndoes. So that all which can positively be asserted to be matter of mere\nrevelation, with regard to this doctrine, seems to be, that the great\ndistinction between the righteous and the wicked, shall be made at the\nend of this world; that each shall _then_ receive according to his\ndeserts. Reason did, as it well might, conclude that it should, finally\nand upon the whole, be well with the righteous, and ill with the\nwicked: but it could not be determined upon any principles of reason,\nwhether human creatures might not have been appointed to pass through\nother states of life and being, before that distributive justice should\nfinally and effectually take place. Revelation teaches us, that the\nnext state of things after the present is appointed for the execution\nof this justice; that it shall be no longer delayed; but _the mystery\nof God_, the great mystery of his suffering vice and confusion to\nprevail, _shall then be finished_; and he will _take to him his great\npower and will reign_, by rendering to every one according to his works.\n\n[56] [Our language furnishes no finer specimens of the argument\nanalogical. Butler here seizes the very points, which are most\nplausible and most insisted on, as showing the harshness and\nunreasonableness of Christianity; and overthrows them at a stroke by\nsimply directing attention to the same things, in the universally\nobserved course of nature.]\n\n[57] Chap. i.\n\n[58] See chaps. iv. and vi.\n\n[59] [This chapter, more than any other, carries the force of\npositive argument. If in this world, we have _proofs_ that God is\na moral governor, then in order to evince that we shall be under\nmoral government _hereafter_, we have only to supply an intermediate\nconsideration,--viz.: that God, as such, must be unchangeable. The\nargument, as just remarked, assumes a substantive form, because\nadmitted facts, as to this world, exhibiting the very _principles_ on\nwhich God\u2019s government goes at present, compel us not only to _suppose_\nthat the principles of God will remain, but to _believe_ so.]\n\n[60] Chap. ii.\n\n[61] The objections against religion, from the evidence of it not\nbeing universal, nor so strong as might possibly have been, may be\nurged against natural religion, as well as against revealed. And\ntherefore the consideration of them belongs to the first part of this\ntreatise, as well as the second. But as these objections are chiefly\nurged against revealed religion, I choose to consider them in the\nsecond part. And the answer to them there, ch. vi., as urged against\nChristianity, being almost equally applicable to them as urged against\nthe religion of nature; to avoid repetition, the reader is referred to\nthat chapter.\n\n[62] Dissertation II.\n\n[63] Chap. vi.\n\n[64] See Lord Shaftesbury\u2019s Inquiry concerning Virtue, Part II.\n\n[65] [At the foundation of moral improvement, lies the conviction\nthat what is right, is our happiness, no less than our duty. This\nagain is based upon a conviction that God governs justly; and has all\npower over us for good or evil. As creation is full of the evidences\nof _design_, so is Providence. And as the human mind shows, in its\nstructure, the most exquisite marks of design, so the government of\nmind shows a final object for all our faculties. Among the attributes\nof mind we observe, conspicuous, a disposition to seek ends, lay plans,\nand sacrifice present indulgence to future and greater good: and a\nfacility in learning how to subordinate one thing to another, so as\nto secure success in our plans. This, with conscience to approve or\ndisapprove our modes, constitutes an evident _adaptedness_ to a moral\ngovernment on the part of God; and would be worse than superfluous, if\nthere be no such government. Every rule of action, deduced by reason\nfrom the light of nature, may fairly be regarded as God\u2019s law; and the\ninconveniences resulting from wrong actions, are God\u2019s retributions.\nThese retributions, felt or observed, are divine teachings, saying,\nemphatically, if you act thus you shall receive thus. We do actually\nso judge, in relation to physics. Every rule of motion, distance,\ngravitation, heat, electricity, &c. &c., is received as God\u2019s law; and\nwe would deem it insane to act in opposition.]\n\n[66] [Consult CAPP on the Gov. of God: TWISSE Vindici\u00e6 Prov. Dei:\nWITTICHII Excre. Theol.: DWIGHT\u2019S Theol.: MARTINIUS de Gubernatione\nMundi: LIEFCHILD on Providence: MORTON on do.: SHERLOCK on do.:\nRUTHERFORD on do.: and the Sermons of Thos. Leland, Porteus, Topping,\nHunt, Davies, Horseley, South, Wisheart, Seed, Collings, and Doddridge.]\n\n[67] Chap. ii.\n\n[68] [In the structure of man, physical and mental, we find no\ncontrivances for disease or pain, so that in general those who conform\nto the laws of their being, enjoy happiness; and suffering is chiefly\nthe result of our own conduct. But, as without revelation we could only\nlearn the evil of vice, by its effects, and would often learn it too\nlate to retrieve our affairs, or our souls\u2019 peace, God has in mercy\ngiven forth his teachings, by which, _beforehand_, we may know the\neffects of actions.]\n\n[69] See Dissertation II.\n\n[70] [It was contended by MANDEVILLE in his \u201c_Fable of the Bees_,\u201d\nthat private vices, as luxury for instance, are often conducive to the\nwell-being of society. This idea is fully refuted by WARBURTON, Divine\nLegation of Moses, b. 1: BERKELEY, Minute Philosopher, Dial. 2: and by\nBROWN, Characteristics, Ess. 2.]\n\n[71] [A strong illustration of this distinction is seen in the\n\u201cdelivering up\u201d of our Savior to be crucified. As to the mere act of\ndelivering up, we find it referred, =1.= To God the Father, John iii.\n16: Acts ii. 23: Rom. viii. 32. =2.= To Christ himself, Eph. v. 2, and\nv. 25, &c. In this last passage it is literally _delivered himself_.\n=3.= To the Jewish rulers, Luke xx. 20: Mark xii. 12. =4.= To Pontius\nPilate, Matt. xxvii. 26: Mark xv. 15: John xix. 6. =5.= To Judas, Matt.\nxxvi. 15: Zec. xi. 12.\n\nAs to the _mere act_, Judas and Pilate did just what God the Father,\nand our Lord Jesus did. But how infinitely unlike the _qualities_ of\nthe act!]\n\n[72] [\u201cWhen one supposes he is about to die, there comes over him a\nfear and anxiety about things in regard to which he felt none before.\nFor the stories which are told about _Hades_, that such, as have\npractised wrong, must there suffer punishment, although made light of\nfor a while, these torment the soul lest they should be true. But he\nwho is conscious of innocence, has a pleasant and good hope, which will\nsupport old age.\u201d PLATO, Respub. i. s. 5.]\n\n[73] See Dissertation II.\n\n[74] [Aside from revelation, our ideas of the divine attributes must\nbe derived from a knowledge of our own. Among these is our moral\nsense, which constrains us to consider right and wrong as an immutable\ndistinction, and moral worth as our highest excellence. Hence we\nascribe perfect virtue to God. It does not follow from such reasoning,\nthat we form a Deity after our own conceptions, for it is but the\nargument _a fortiori_, \u201cHe that formed the eye, shall he not see? He\nthat teacheth man knowledge, shall he not know?\u201d Ps. xciv. 9. We do not\nconceive of a Deity who sees just as we do; but that _he sees_, for he\nmakes sight. So we infer that he has moral attributes, because we have\nthem, from him.\n\nThis point is not sufficiently pressed upon infidels. They readily\nacknowledge God\u2019s physical attributes, because the argument is\naddressed to their _understanding_, but deny his moral ones, because\ntheir _hearts_ are hardened through the deceitfulness of sin.]\n\n[75] [It is easy to see that the occasional disadvantages of virtue,\nare no less conducive to moral excellence, than its being generally\nadvantageous. In view of its general advantages, we are virtuous with a\nproper and commanded view to our instinctive desire for happiness. In\nface of its disadvantages, we cultivate virtue for its own sake.]\n\n[76] [The common remark, \u201cvirtue brings its own reward,\u201d is true\nonly with qualifications. The apostles, as to _this_ life, were the\nmost miserable of men: (1 Cor. xv. 9.) Virtue does not _always_\nbring earthly rewards. The grand support of the good is drawn from\nconsiderations of that future state which the infidel denies. Observe,\n1. We cannot suppose that God would so construct man, as that his\nprincipal comfort and reward for virtue, is a delusion. 2. Very good\npersons are often beset with painful doubts and fears, as to their\nfuture safety. Would God allow such doubts, if the expectation of\nfuture happiness were the _only_ reward of virtue? 3. This reward, at\nbest, is private; but for the encouragement of virtue, it must have\n_obvious_ triumphs.\n\nOn the other hand, bad men grow callous to the rebukes of conscience,\nso that great sinners suffer less from remorse than small ones, and\nwhat is worse, owe their tranquillity to their guilt. Again, he who\nkills a good man, wholly _deprives_ him of his only reward, if this\nlife alone gives it. And the villain who kills himself, escapes his\nonly punishment.\n\nVirtuous persons, in the strong language of ROBERT HALL,[A] would be\n\u201cthe _only_ persons who are wholly disappointed of their object; the\nonly persons who (by a fatal and irreparable mistake), expecting an\nimaginary happiness in an imaginary world, lose their only opportunity\nof enjoying those present pleasures, of which others avail themselves;\ndooming themselves to grasp at shadows, while they neglect the\nsubstance, and harassed with a perpetual struggle against their natural\npropensities and passions, and all in vain!\u201d\n\n[A] Sermon on the Vanity of Man.]\n\n[77] [Because, so soon as any community, or collection of persons,\nconclude a man to be wholly vicious in his course, and without any\nrestraint of conscience, he is at once shorn of his influence, and will\nsoon be stripped of all power of mischief. On the other hand, we see\nthe might of virtue unarmed with power, in Luther, in Roger Williams,\nin Wm. Penn, and innumerable other instances.]\n\n[78] Isa. lx. 21.\n\n[79] P. 109.\n\n[80] P. 110, &c.\n\n[81] P. 111, &c.\n\n[82] P. 118, &c.\n\n[83] See this proof drawn out briefly, ch. vi.\n\n[84] [This chapter is one of many attempts to account for the\nmixture of suffering and enjoyment in this world; and demands close\nexamination both of its theory and its arguments. The student may\nconsult, as he has opportunity, MUS\u00c6I Disput.: HOLTZSFUSII Disp. de\nLapsu Prim. Hominum: SELDEN de Laps. Angelorum: STAPFERI Inst.: WITSII\nEconom. F\u0153d.: BATE\u2019S Harmony of the Divine Attrib.: CALCOTT on the\nFall: SHUCKFORD on the Creation of Man: MANTON\u2019S Sermons: SOUTH\u2019S\ndo.: TOPLADY\u2019S do.: PEARSON on the Creed: LE CLERC\u2019S Diss.: HENLY\u2019S\nDissert.: KENNICOTT on the Tree of Life: and FABRICIUS de Primo Peccato\nAngelorum Lapsorum.]\n\n[85] [The _evils_ of life, are not to be regarded as entering,\nnecessarily, into God\u2019s plan of probation; and they are not here so\npresented. The Scriptures show that _all_ suffering is either punitive,\nor castigatory. Man at first was to be tried by temptations, not by\nsufferings.]\n\n[86] Chap. ii.\n\n[87] See Sermons preached at the _Rolle_, 1726, 2d ed. p. 205, &c.\nPref. p. 25, &c. Serm. p. 21, &c.\n\n[88] [\u201cIf we persist in our objection, notwithstanding these analogies,\nthen should we conclude, either that we are under the regimen of an\nunrighteous Deity, or that there is no Deity at all.\u201d--Dr. CHALMERS.]\n\n[89] [Shall _we_ be of such? Shall we forget or disregard the great\nfact that when death has transferred us to other conditions, we, our\nproper selves, will remain? No longer, indeed, united with flesh and\nblood, surrounded with houses, lands, business, or enjoyments, such as\nthe present, _but still ourselves_. Still with wants to be supplied,\ndesires to be gratified, and capacities to be employed and developed!]\n\n[90] Part II. chap. v.\n\n[91] [This is one of those passages, remarked on in our introduction,\nas a statement not properly explained or guarded. We cannot suppose the\nauthor, to have overlooked the great fact of man\u2019s fall and corruption.\nThat the argument properly considered, stands good, is the verdict of\nsuch a man as CHALMERS. After speaking of human helplessness in matters\nof religion, he says, \u201cThere is nothing in this [helplessness] to break\nthe analogies on which to found the negative vindication that forms\nthe great and undoubted achievement of this volume. The analogy lies\nhere:--that if a man wills to obtain prosperity in this life, he may,\nif observant of the rules which experience and wisdom prescribe, in\ngeneral, make it good. And if he wills to attain blessedness in the\nnext life, he shall, if observant of what religion prescribes, most\ncertainly make it good; in conformity with the declaration, \u2018he that\nseeketh findeth.\u2019\u201d]\n\n[92] [It comes to this:--good things, in this life, are not forced\nupon us; for we may refuse them, or turn any of them into evils. Nor\nare they offered for our mere acceptance: but only as the _results_ of\nself-control and pains-taking. So is it, as to heaven.]\n\n[93] [They _are_ an answer, but a cavil remains,--viz.: \u201cthe difference\nbetween temporal and eternal things, is so vast that the cases are not\nanalogous.\u201d Fairly considered, the cases are analogous, differing only\nin _degree_, and not at all in principle. What would be wrong on a\ngreat scale, is wrong on a small one.\n\nPerhaps the analogy may be pressed further. As the happiness and life\nof some animals, may be sacrificed for the benefit of man, why may\nnot the happiness and life of some men, be sacrificed for the good of\ninnumerable beings of a higher order, who witness the affairs of this\nearth? It would but be securing \u201cthe greatest good of the greatest\nnumber.\u201d No analogies could _teach_ this, for analogies of course teach\nnothing. But if the Scriptures contained this doctrine, immensely more\nrepugnant than that which our author is here defending, would analogy\noffer repellant presumptions?]\n\n[94] [That is, the son of Sirac, who says, \u201cAll things are double,\none against another; and He hath made nothing imperfect: one thing\nestablished the good of another:\u201d Ecclesiasticus xlii. 24.]\n\n[95] [Consult MILLMAN\u2019S Hist. of Christ, vol. i.: PRIESTLEY\u2019S\nInstitutes of Nat. and Rev. Rel., vol. i. ch. i.: and WHATELY\u2019S Pol.\nEcon., sec. 5.]\n\n[96] [We are too apt to overlook the effect of actions on the actor;\n(which is often the chief effect) in improving or impairing his\nown powers. A razor used to cut wood or stone, is not only put to\nan improper use, but spoiled for the use which is proper. But this\nis a faint illustration. The razor may be sharpened again; but how\nshall we restore a blunted sensibility, an enfeebled judgment, or a\nvitiated appetite? Our wrong-doing inflicts worse results on ourselves\nthan on our victims; and the evil may spread disaster over our whole\nfuture. Hence the young make a fatal blunder when they suppose that an\noccasional indulgence in impropriety may be compatible with general\nwelfare, and improvement. Instead of balancing the pros and cons of a\nparticular act, in the scale of utility or pleasure, they should mark\nwell its effects on themselves. See the description of how an upright\nbeing may fall; in a subsequent part of this chapter.]\n\n[97] [\u201cIt might seem, at first sight, that if our state hereafter\npresented no temptations to falsehood, injustice, &c., our habit of\nindulging these vices here would be no disqualification for such\na state; and our forming the contrary habits no qualification.\nBut _habits_ of veracity, justice, &c. are not merely securities\nagainst temptations to the contrary, but needful for conserving the\n_principles_ of love of truth, justice, &c. As our happiness depends\nupon _the ratio_ between our circumstances and our dispositions, our\nhappiness, in a state where things are ordered so as to give no scope\nfor the practice of falsehood, injustice, &c., _must depend on our\nhaving formed a love for their opposites_. Besides, the circumstances\nof the future life may be such as only to remove temptations from\ncharacters formed by such moral discipline as we undergo in this life,\nand not all things that could be temptations to any one.\u201d--PROF.\nFITZGERALD.]\n\n[98] It may be thought, that a sense of interest would as effectually\nrestrain creatures from doing wrong. But if by a _sense of interest_\nis meant a speculative conviction or belief, that such and such\nindulgence would occasion them greater uneasiness, upon the whole, than\nsatisfaction; it is contrary to present experience to say, that this\nsense of interest is sufficient to restrain them from thus indulging\nthemselves. And if by a _sense of interest_ is meant a practical regard\nto what is upon the whole our happiness; this is not only coincident\nwith the principle of virtue or moral rectitude, but is a part of the\nidea itself. And it is evident this reasonable self-love wants to\nbe improved, as really as any principle in our nature. For we daily\nsee it overmatched, not only by the more boisterous passions, but by\ncuriosity, shame, love of imitation, by any thing, even indolence:\nespecially if the interest, the temporal interest, suppose, which\nis the end of such self-love, be at a distance. So greatly are\nprofligate men mistaken, when they affirm they are wholly governed\nby interestedness and self-love; and so little cause is there for\nmoralists to disclaim this principle.--See p. 131.\n\n[99] [Discipline is mainly promoted by a careful regard to acts of\nsmall individual moment. The subjecting of trivial acts to moral\nconsiderations, is the sure, and the only mode of self-culture.\nThese acts are embryo habits, and we may often see clearly the moral\ncharacter of a habit, when the single act seems indifferent. Thus\nviewed, the importance of single acts will seldom seem small. A single\ncigar, one glass of wine for convivial purposes, one story told with\nexaggerations, may change the complexion of our character, and of our\nwhole destiny!\n\nIt is doing or refusing to do, from a law-abiding regard to\nconsequences, that constitutes self-discipline. Papists wholly err\nin teaching the repression of bodily desires as in itself virtuous.\nIndulgence may be either an obstacle or an aid to moral progress,\naccording to our reason for indulgence. When we can repress an appetite\nor passion whenever indulgence would be wrong, its mastery over us is\nbroken; and when the passions and appetites act rightly, from force\nof virtuous habit, without direct volition, discipline is complete.\nAscetic acts are only useful as _means_, and so long as they are\n_ascetic_ (askesis) are proofs of imperfect obedience. Discipline is\ngood only _as_ discipline; and when complete, changes from a struggle\nbetween principle and inclination, to a spontaneous habit, and\npermanent mental peace.]\n\n[100] [Chalmers objects to this hypothetical fall of man, that it wants\nharmony with the Scripture account. But I do not see the force of the\nobjection. Butler _of course_ does not copy the Scripture account, for\nhe would then depart from the aim and nature of his book. The Bible\nsays man fell _suddenly_, no less in his state than in his character.\nButler says that we could not reason out _how much_ disorder and\ndamage would ensue from the first sin: and in saying this, avoids any\nincongruity with the Mosaic account, which tells us how much. What B.\nsays of the formation of habit, by repeated transgressions, certainly\ncannot be gainsayed.\n\nAdam \u201cdied,\u201d the very day he ate the forbidden fruit. The sinner\n\u201clives\u201d the very day he believes on the only-begotten Son of God.\nIncrease of guilt, or growth in grace are predicable in both instances.\nIn both also there is an instant transition into a new relationship\nwith God.]\n\n[101] [A forced or reluctant obedience is wholly incompatible with\nearthly happiness; but may, in the highest degree promote our _future_\nhappiness. It will not _long_ mar our happiness, even here; because\nbeing based on principle, and established by habit, it will, in process\nof time, be superseded by prompt and pleasurable submission. Thus a\nperson _habitually_ virtuous, is hardly conscious of self-denial; a\nfact noticed by Aristotle. \u201cHe who abstains from bodily pleasures and\ndelights, is virtuous in this very abstinence; but he who is troubled\nby it is undisciplined.\u201d Ethic. Nic. ii. 3.]\n\n[102] P. 145.\n\n[103] [The student should learn to distinguish between the _kinds_\nof necessity. There is--1. \u201cLogical necessity,\u201d which requires the\nadmission of a consequent to a premise 2. \u201cMoral necessity,\u201d which\nrequires means in order to ends. \u201cPhysical necessity,\u201d which is the\ncompulsory connection of sequences to antecedents, in the material\nworld. 4. \u201cMetaphysical necessity,\u201d which belongs to God only, as\nexisting eternally and immutably. All these exist and operate, and by\nthem we govern ourselves.\n\nBut there are various other kinds of necessity, erroneous and\npernicious, which may be grouped under two heads:--1. \u201cAtheistic,\u201d\nsometimes called the Democritic, which ascribes all things to the\nmechanical laws of matter. 2. \u201cTheistic,\u201d which admits the existence of\nGod, but denies to him moral character, and makes him the arbitrary and\nonly agent in the universe, and creatures not responsible. See COLLINGS\non Providence, PRICE\u2019S Dissertations, RUTHERFORD on Providence,\nCHARNOCK\u2019S Sermons, and WHATELY\u2019S Logic.]\n\n[104] P. 157.\n\n[105] P. 158.\n\n[106] [HUME says, \u201cthough man, in truth, is a necessary agent, having\nall his actions determined by fixed and immutable laws, yet, this being\nconcealed from him, he acts with the conviction of being a free agent.\u201d\n\nWhich is the same as to say that God intended to conceal from men an\nimportant fact, involving the whole subject of right and wrong, but Mr.\nHume found him out!]\n\n[107] By _will_ and _character_ is meant that which, in speaking of\nmen, we should express, not only by these words, but also by the words\n_temper_, _taste_, _dispositions_, _practical principles_: _that whole\nframe of mind, from whence we act in one manner rather than another_.\n\n[108] Chap. ii.\n\n[109] P. 157, &c.\n\n[110] Chap. ii.\n\n[111] Dissert. II.\n\n[112] Serm. 2, at the _Rolls_.\n\n[113] Dissert. II.\n\n[114] However, I am far from intending to deny, that the will of God\nis determined, by what is fit, by the right and reason of the case;\nthough one chooses to decline matters of such abstract speculation,\nand to speak with caution when one does speak of them. But if it be\nintelligible to say, that _it is fit and reasonable for every one to\nconsult his own happiness_, then _fitness of action, or the right and\nreason of the case_, is an intelligible manner of speaking. And it\nseems as inconceivable, to suppose God to approve one course of action,\nor one end, preferably to another, which yet his acting at all from\ndesign implies that he does, without supposing somewhat prior in that\nend, to be the ground of the preference; as to suppose him to discern\nan abstract proposition to be true, without supposing somewhat prior in\nit, to be the ground of the discernment. It doth not therefore appear,\nthat moral right is any more relative to perception, than abstract\ntruth is; or that it is any more improper to speak of the fitness and\nlightness of actions and ends, as founded in the nature of things, than\nto speak of abstract truth, as thus founded.\n\n[115] P. 118.\n\n[116] P. 110, &c.\n\n[117] Chap. ii.\n\n[118] Dissertation II.\n\n[119] Pp. 68, 71.\n\n[120] Serm. 8th, at the _Rolls_.\n\n[121] [Consult, in favor of the doctrine of necessity, atheistical\nwriters generally; such as Fichte, Hegel, D\u2019Holback, Comte, Crousse,\nMartineau, Leroux, and Holyoake--also, BELSHAM\u2019S Essays, COLLINS on\nLiberty, CROMBIE on Phil. Necessity, HOBBES\u2019 Liberty and Necessity, and\nLeviathan, PRIESTLEY on Liberty, HARTLEY on Man, and EDWARDS on the\nWill.\n\nAgainst the doctrine, see BEATTIE\u2019S Works, Part 2; Replies to Hobbes\nby BRAMHALL and LAWSON; Replies to Priestley by PALMER and BRYANT;\nGROVE on Liberty; CLARKE\u2019S Sermons at the Boyle Lectures; GIBB\u2019S\nContemplations; KING\u2019S Origin of Evil; REID on the Mind; WATTS on\nLiberty; HARRIS\u2019 Boyle Lectures; JACKSON\u2019S Defence; BUTTERWORTH on\nMoral Government.]\n\n[122] [MAIMONIDES makes use of the following similitude. \u201cSuppose one\nof good understanding, whose mother had died soon after he was born to\nbe brought up on an island, where he saw no human being but his father\nnor the female of any beast. This person when grown up inquires how men\nare produced. He is told that they are bred in the womb of one of the\nsame species and that while in the womb we are very small and there\nmove and are nourished. The young man inquires whether when thus in\nthe womb we did not eat, and drink, and breathe, as we do now, and is\nanswered, No. Then he denies it, and offers demonstration that it could\nnot be so. For says he, if either of us cease to breathe our life is\ngone; and how could we have lived close shut up in a womb for months?\nSo if we cease to eat and drink, we die, and how could the child live\nso for months? and thus he satisfies himself that it is _impossible_\nman should come into existence in such a manner.\u201d]\n\n[123] [Let us imagine a person to be taken to view some great\nhistorical painting, before which hangs a thick curtain. The attendant\nraises the curtain a few inches. Can the spectator, from the unmeaning\nstrip of foreground, derive any conception of the figures yet\nconcealed? Much less is he able to criticize their proportions, or\nbeauty, or perspective, or even the design of the artist? The small\nfragment of a tree, or flower, or animal, or building, may seem quite\nunmeaning and even ugly, though the whole would present beauty,\nfitness, or grandeur. Now the portion of God\u2019s dominions within our\nsurvey, is as utterly insignificant, compared to the universe, and its\ninterminable duration, as, an atom compared to a planet or a man\u2019s age\nto eternity.\n\nThe concluding observations of this chapter, abundantly remove every\ndifficulty as to such ignorance being as valid against the _proofs_ of\nreligion, as it is against _objections_ to it.]\n\n[124] [No truly philosophical mind can be arrogant; because the\nwider the range of thought, the greater are the discoveries of our\nignorance. The young student may well hesitate to decide points, on\nwhich the profoundest thinkers take opposite sides, and when conscious\nof inability intrust himself to the guidance of those whose lives are\nbest.]\n\n[125] Pp. 177, 178.\n\n[126] P. 173, &c.\n\n[127] P. 175.\n\n[128] Pp. 72, 73.\n\n[129] P. 68, and Part II. chap. vi.\n\n[130] Serm. at the _Rolls_, p. 312, 2d ed.\n\n[131] P. 172, &c.\n\n[132] See Part II. ch. ii.\n\n[133] P. 173.\n\n[134] [The remainder of this chapter is a recapitulation of the whole\nargument from the beginning; and should be carefully conned.]\n\n[135] Part II. ch. vi.\n\n[136] P. 108.\n\n[137] [There is a slight indication in this chapter that Butler falls\ninto the old plan of settling the necessity of Christianity, before\ndetermining its truth. Paley discards this order of arrangement,\nin his very first sentence; and with good reason. The necessity of\nrevelation is an abstraction; the proofs of it are patent facts. To\nhold in abeyance the credentials presented by Christianity, till\nwe first satisfy ourselves that God could or would make any such\nannouncements, is unphilosophical and irreverent. This chapter\ndiscusses the _importance_ rather than the necessity of revelation; and\nso is a fitting commencement of the discussion. Every truth disclosed\nin revelation, over and above the truths which natural religion\nfurnishes, proves the _necessity_ of revelation, if we would know any\nthing of _such_ truths. And it is such truths which constitute the very\npeculiarities of revelation, and teach the _way of salvation_, for the\nsinful and helpless.]\n\n[138] [No one can read the writings of the great sages of antiquity\nwithout a full and sad conviction that in relation to the character\nof God, the sinfulness of man, the future state, and the rules of\nliving, those prime points on which we need knowledge, they were\nalmost profoundly ignorant. See on this point, LELAND\u2019S Adv. and\nNecess.: CHALMERS\u2019 Nat. Theol.: MCCOSH\u2019S Div. Gov.: PASCAL\u2019S Thoughts:\nWARBURTON\u2019S Div. Legation.]\n\n[139] Invenis multos----propterea nolle fieri Christianos, quia quasi\nsufficiunt sibi de bona vita sua. Bene vivere opus est, ait. Quid\nmihi pr\u00e6cepturus est Christus? Ut bene vivam? Jam bene vivo. Quid\nmihi necessarius est Christus; nullum homicidium, nullum furtum,\nnullam rapinam facio, res alienas non concupisco, nullo adulterio\ncontaminor? Nam inveniatur in vita mea aliquid quod reprehendatur, et\nqui reprehenderit faciat Christianum. _Aug. in Psal._ xxxi. [You find\nmany who refuse to become Christians, because they feel sufficient of\nthemselves to lead a good life. \u201cWe ought to live well.\u201d says one.\n\u201cWhat will Christ teach me? To live well? I do live well, what need\nthen have I of Christ? I commit no murder, no theft, no robbery. I\ncovet no man\u2019s goods, and am polluted by no adultery. Let some one\nfind in me any thing to censure, and he who can do so, may make me a\nChristian.\u201d]\n\n[140] [The true mode of distinguishing a temporary, local, or\nindividual command from such as are of universal and perpetual\nobligation, is well laid down by WAYLAND, _Mor. Sci._ ch. ix. sec. 2.]\n\n[141] [Natural religion shows us the danger of sin; but not the\ninfinite danger of eternal retribution, and the hopelessness of\nrestoration after death. And as to the efficacy of repentance, it\nrather opposes that doctrine than teaches it. At least it does not\nteach that repentance may be accepted, so as not only to cancel guilt,\nbut restore to the favor of God.]\n\n[142] [\u201cChristianity was left with Christians, to be transmitted, in\nlike manner as the religion of nature had been left, with mankind in\ngeneral. There was however this difference that by an institution\nof external religion with a standing ministry for instruction and\ndiscipline, it pleased God to unite Christiana into _visible churches_,\nand all along to preserve them over a great part of the world, and thus\nperpetuate a general publication of the Gospel.\u201d BUTLER\u2019S sermon before\nthe Soc. for Prop. the Gospel. He goes on to show, in that discourse,\nthat these churches, however corrupt any may become, are repositories\nfor the written oracles of God, and so carry the antidote to their\nheresies.]\n\n[143] Rev. xxii. 11.\n\n[144] [\u201cIt is no real objection to this, though it may seem so at first\nsight, to say that since Christianity is a _remedial_ system, designed\nto obviate those very evils which have been produced by the neglect\nand abuse of the light of nature, it ought not to be _liable_ to the\nsame perversions. Because--1. Christianity is not designed primarily\nto remedy the defects of _nature_, but of an unnatural state of ruin\ninto which men were brought by _the Fall_. And 2. It is remedial of\nthe defects of nature in a _great degree_, by its giving additional\nadvantages. 3. It might be impossible that it should be remedial in a\ngreater degree than it is, without destroying man\u2019s free agency; which\nwould be to destroy its own end, the practice of virtue.\u201d--FITZGERALD\u2019S\nNotes.]\n\n[145] [CHALMERS (Nat. Theol., b. v. ch. iv.) makes this very plain.\nHe shows the _ethics_ of natural religion to be one thing and\nits _objects_ another. Natural religion discloses no Redeemer or\nSanctifier; but it teaches how we should regard such a person, if\nthere be one. It teaches love and conformity to such a being by the\n_relation_ in which we of course stand to him. How we are to _express_\nthat love and obedience it cannot teach.]\n\n[146] See The Nature, Obligation, and Efficacy, of the Christian\nSacraments, &c., [by WATERLAND,] and COLLIBER of Revealed Religion, as\nthere quoted.\n\n[147] [If Christianity were but \u201ca republication of natural religion,\u201d\nor as Tindall says, \u201cas old as creation,\u201d why do deists oppose it? It\ndoes indeed republish natural religion, but it adds stupendous truths\nbeside. If it gave us no new light, no new motives, it would be but a\ntremendous curse, making us all the more responsible, and none the more\ninstructed or secure.]\n\n[148] P. 94.\n\n[149] Ch. v.\n\n[150] John iii. 5.\n\n[151] This is the distinction between moral and positive precepts\nconsidered respectively as such. But yet, since the latter have\nsomewhat of a moral nature, we may see the reason of them, considered\nin this view. Moral and positive precepts are in some respects alike,\nin other respects different. So far as they are alike, we discern the\nreasons of both; so far as they are different, we discern the reasons\nof the former, but not of the latter. See p. 189, &c.\n\n[152] [Without offering the least objection to what is here said of\nthe comparative value of moral and positive institutions, it should\nnot be overlooked that sometimes, obedience to a positive rite is more\nindicative of an obedient spirit, than obedience to a moral rule. The\nlatter is urged by its intrinsic propriety, over and above the command,\nand appeals to several of our finer impulses. The former rests singly\non our reverence for the will of God. There are many who would repel a\ntemptation to steal, or to lie, who yet are insensible to the duty of\nbaptism or the Lord\u2019s supper.]\n\n[153] Matt. ix. 13, and xii. 7.\n\n[154] Hosea vi. 6.\n\n[155] See Matt. xii. 7.\n\n[156] See ch. iii.\n\n[157] [Dr. ANGUS judiciously remarks on this sentence, \u201cThis sentiment,\nas understood by Butler, is just, but very liable to abuse. Clearly,\nthe Bible must be so interpreted as to agree with _all_ known truth,\nwhether of natural religion or natural science. At the same time, to\ncorrect the theology of the Bible by the theology of nature, as finite\nand guilty men understand it, may involve the rejection of Bible\ntheology entirely; and of the very light and teaching it was intended\nto supply. The converse of Butler\u2019s statement is equally true, and even\nmore important. If in natural theology there be found any facts, the\nseeming lesson of which is contrary to revealed religion, such seeming\nlesson is not the real one.\u201d Practically, it will be found that seeming\nmeanings of Scripture, really erroneous, are corrected by other parts\nof Scripture itself. I understand Butler as only affirming that we\nmust interpret Scripture according to immutable principles, and _known\ntruth_. The infidel rejects it for not conforming to his _assumed\nhypothesis_.]\n\n[158] P. 203.\n\n[159] Chaps. iii., iv., v., vi.\n\n[160] Chap. vii.\n\n[161] P. 172.\n\n[162] [Papists urge that the actual conversion of the bread and wine\nin the Eucharist is an invisible miracle. But an invisible miracle is\nsuch because wrought under circumstances which _exclude_ examination:\nwhile transubstantiation _invites_ and _facilitates_ examination. It is\nwrought publicly, and constantly, and yet cannot be discovered to be a\nmiracle. Indeed it supposes the working of a second miracle, to make\nthe first invisible.]\n\n[163] [Paley shows conclusively that a denial of miracles leads not\nonly to a denial of revelation, but a denial of the existence of God,\nall of whose extraordinary acts are necessarily miraculous.]\n\n[164] [WHATELY, in his _Logic_, b. iii., has shown the folly of the\nDeistical attempts to explain our Savior\u2019s miracles as mere natural\nevents. Having labored to show this of some _one_ of the miracles, they\nthen do so as to _another_, and thence infer that _all_ were accidental\nconjunctures of natural circumstances. He says, they might as well\nargue \u201cthat because it is not improbable one may throw sixes once in a\nhundred throws, therefore it is no more improbable that one may throw\nsixes a hundred times running.\u201d\n\nFITZGERALD says, \u201cthe improbability of a whole series of strange\nnatural events, taking place unaccountably, one after another, amounts\nto a far greater improbability than is involved in the admission of\nmiracles.\u201d]\n\n[165] [That man, at first, must have had supernatural _instructions_,\nor in other words some revelations, is shown by Archbishop WHATELY in\nhis \u201cOrigin of Civilization.\u201d Rev. SAMUEL STANHOPE SMITH expresses\nhis conviction, both from reason and history, that man in his savage\nstate could not even have preserved life without instruction from his\nCreator.]\n\n[166] [The maintenance by the Jews, of a system of pure Theism, through\nso many and so rude ages, without being superior, or even equal to\ntheir neighbors, in science and civilization, can only be accounted for\non the presumption of a revelation.]\n\n[167] P. 166, &c.\n\n[168] [MILLS (Logic, chap. 24, \u00a7 5,) points out what he deems a mistake\nof \u201csome of the writers against Hume on Miracles,\u201d in confounding\nthe improbability of an event, before its occurrence, with the\nimprobability afterwards; that is, considering them equal in degree.\nHe fully proves that the great Laplace fell into this error, and the\nstudent should consult the passage.\n\nProf. FITZGERALD holds Butler to have fallen into the mistake adverted\nto by Mills; and quotes the latter author in a way which seems to make\nhim say that such is his opinion also. I do not so understand Mills,\nnor do I see that Butler has confounded these meanings; but the very\ncontrary. He expressly affirms, and most truly, that the strongest\npresumption may lie against \u201cthe most ordinary facts _before the proof_\nwhich yet is overcome by almost any proof.\u201d Butler\u2019s position here, may\nbe thus illustrated. Suppose a hundred numbers to be put in a box, and\nit is proposed to draw out the number 42. Now there are 99 chances to 1\nagainst drawing that, or any other _given_ number. But suppose a child\ntells you he put the hundred numbers into a box, and drew out one, and\nit proved to be 42; you at once believe, for that was as likely to come\nas any other.\n\nThe proof of Christianity from prophecy becomes amazingly strong, thus\nviewed. There are many predictions, for instance that Christ should be\nborn at a certain time, and place, and under certain very particular\ncircumstances. The probabilities against such a _conjuncture_ of events\nare almost infinite; yet they happened exactly as foretold.]\n\n[169] [For instance, a mass of ice or snow, may imperceptibly\naccumulate for an age, and then suddenly fall and overwhelm a village.\nOr a planet, or comet, may have been gradually nearing our earth for a\nmillion of years, without producing, _as yet_, any effect on our orbit;\nbut in process of time, its proximity may work great changes in our\ncondition.]\n\n[170] P. 208.\n\n[171] 1 Cor. i. 28.\n\n[172] See Chap. vi.\n\n[173] See Chap. vi.\n\n[174] [See note, page 218.]\n\n[175] P. 220.\n\n[176] [It is not to be understood that Butler would not have the\nordinary rules of interpretation applied to the Holy Scriptures.\nBecause the interpretation, \u201cif not gathered _out_ of the words,\nmust be brought _into_ them.\u201d We cannot interpret them as if we knew\nbeforehand, what the Holy Ghost meant to say; as SPINOZA proposes to\ndo, in his Philosophia Scriptur\u00e6 Interpretes. The student will do well\nto consult BENSON\u2019S Hulsean Lectures on Scripture Difficulties: KING\u2019S\nMorsels of Criticism: STORR, Exertationes Exeget.: MICHAELIS, Introd.\nad. Nov. Test.: and FEATLEY\u2019S Key.]\n\n[177] Pp. 207, 208.\n\n[178] [See 1 Cor. xii. 1-10: xiii. 1: and xiv. 1-19.]\n\n[179] [\u201cThe power of healing, or working miracles, is, during the\nwhole course of its operation, one continued arrest or diversion of\nthe general laws of matter and motion. It was therefore fit that this\npower should be given occasionally. But the _speaking with tongues_,\nwhen once the gift was conferred, became thenceforth a natural\npower; just as the free use of members of the body, after being\nrestored, by miracle, to the exercise of their natural functions.\nIn healing, the apostles are to be considered as the workers of a\nmiracle; in speaking strange tongues, as persons on whom a miracle is\nperformed.\u201d--WARBURTON, Doct. of Grace, b. i. ch. iii.]\n\n[180] Heb. vi. 1.\n\n[181] Acts iii. 21.\n\n[182] [The doctrine of \u201cdevelopment\u201d has of late been popular in\nsome quarters. Butler here shows the only _safe_ notion we may\nentertain on that subject. \u201cExact thought, and careful consideration\u201d\nmay show us how to confute specious heresies, expound embarrassing\npassages, dissipate painful doubts, and remove many prejudices or\nmisapprehensions. But revelation is complete as it stands.\n\nWe may hope for progress in theology as in other sciences; not in\nthe development of new facts or faith, as Papists and Socinians\npretend, but in the increase of sound wisdom, aided by a more perfect\ninterpretation of God\u2019s word.]\n\n[183] Chap. vi.\n\n[184] Chap. v.\n\n[185] Chap. vii.\n\n[186] Chap. iv. latter part, and v. vi.\n\n[187] [This pregnant paragraph should receive very full attention.\nWe know much of men, little of God. What men are likely to do, or\nsay, in certain circumstances, is often very clear; and generally may\nbe guessed at. But what God would do or say in new contingencies,\nwho shall attempt to prescribe or predict? We are poorly qualified\nto assert that such and such declarations could not have come from\ninfinite wisdom; but we are quite competent to affirm that such and\nsuch things could not have come from human contrivance or enthusiasm.]\n\n[188] In the foregoing chapter.\n\n[189] Part I, ch. vii., to which this all along refers.\n\n[190] [\u201cIt is the last step of reason to know there is an infinity of\nthings which surpass it.\u201d--PASCAL. \u201cThe wall of adamant which bounds\nhuman inquiry, has scarcely ever been discovered by any adventurer,\ntill he was aroused by the shock that drove him back.\u201d--Sir JAS.\nMACKINTOSH. \u201cOf the dark parts of revelation there are two sorts:\none which may be cleared up by the studious; the other which will\nalways reside within the shadow of God\u2019s throne where it would be\nimpiety to intrude.\u201d--WARBURTON. \u201cA Christianity without mystery is as\nunphilosophical as it is unscriptural.\u201d--ANGUS.]\n\n[191] John xi. 52.\n\n[192] 2 Peter iii. 13.\n\n[193] 1 Peter i. 11, 12.\n\n[194] Phil. ii. [6-11.]\n\n[195] [The influences of the Holy Spirit are not only \u201cgiven to good\nmen,\u201d but are sent upon many who live unmindful of eternity, quickening\ntheir consciences, enlightening their understandings and arresting\ntheir passions, and thus it is they are converted unto the truth in\nChrist.]\n\n[196] John xiv. 2.\n\n[197] John v. 22, 23.\n\n[198] Matt. xxviii. 18.\n\n[199] 1 Cor. xv. 28.\n\n[200] 1 Tim. iii. 16.\n\n[201] P. 174, &c.\n\n[202] 1 Cor. i. [18-25.]\n\n[203] Pp. 178, 179.\n\n[204] Pp. 180, 181.\n\n[205] P. 172, &c.\n\n[206] [\u201cProvidence hurries not himself to display to-day the\nconsequence of the principle he yesterday announced. He will draw it\nout in the lapse of ages Even according to our reasoning logic is none\nthe less sure, because it is slow.\u201d--GUIZOT on Civilization, Lect. I.\n\nHow impressively is this sentiment sustained by modern geology, and\nastronomy!]\n\n[207] [\u201cPhilosophers make shameful and dangerous mistakes, when they\njudge of the Divine economy. He cannot, they tell us, act thus,\nit would be contrary to his wisdom, or his justice, &c. But while\nthey make these peremptory assertions they show themselves to be\nunacquainted with the fundamental rules of their own science, and\nwith the origin of all late improvements. True philosophy would begin\nthe other way, with observing the constitution of the world, how God\nhas made us, and in what circumstances he has placed us, and _then_\nfrom what he has done, form a sure judgment what he would do. Thus\nmight they learn \u2018the invisible things of God from those which are\nclearly seen\u2019 the things which are not accomplished from those which\nare.\u201d--POWELL\u2019S _Use and Abuse of Philosophy_.]\n\n[208] 1 Tim. ii. 5.\n\n[209] [The interposition of a man of known probity and worth often\nsaves the thoughtless or the guilty from punishment. Mediation is seen\nin a thousand forms in the arrangements of social life; and the common\nsense of all mankind approves of it. The release of the offending, by\nthe intercession of the good, and all the benefits of advice, caution,\nexample, instruction, persuasion, and authority, are instances of\nmediation.]\n\n[210] [MR. NEWMAN notices a distinction between the facts of\nrevelation, and its principles; and considers the argument from analogy\nmore concerned with its principles than with its facts. \u201cThe revealed\nfacts are special and singular, from the nature of the case, but the\nrevealed principles are common to all the works of God; and if the\nAuthor of nature be the author of grace, it may be expected that the\nprinciples displayed in them will be the same, and form a connecting\nlink between them. In this identity of _principle_, lies the analogy\nof natural and revealed religion, in Butler\u2019s sense of the word. The\nIncarnation is a fact, and cannot be paralleled by any thing in nature:\nthe doctrine of mediation is a principle, and is abundantly exemplified\nin nature.\u201d--_Essay on Developments._]\n\n[211] [The student will find the inadequacy of repentance to cancel\nguilt, beautifully exhibited by WAYLAND, Mor. Science: MAGEE,\nAtonement: HOWE, Living Temple.]\n\n[212] P. 232, &c.\n\n[213] John iii. 16.\n\n[214] It cannot, I suppose, be imagined, even by the most cursory\nreader, that it is, in any sort, affirmed or implied in any thing\nsaid in this chapter, that none can have the benefit of the general\nredemption, but such as have the advantage of being made acquainted\nwith it in the present life. But it may be needful to mention, that\nseveral questions, which have been brought into the subject before\nus, and determined, are not in the least entered into here, questions\nwhich have been, I fear, rashly determined, and perhaps with equal\nrashness contrary ways. For instance, whether God could have saved\nthe world by other means than the death of Christ, consistently with\nthe general laws of his government. And had not Christ come into the\nworld, what would have been the future condition of the better sort of\nmen; those just persons over the face of the earth, for whom Manasses\nin his prayer[A] asserts, repentance was not appointed. The meaning of\nthe first of these questions is greatly ambiguous: and neither of them\ncan properly be answered, without going upon that infinitely absurd\nsupposition, that we know the whole of the case. And perhaps the very\ninquiry, _What would have followed, if God had not done as he has_, may\nhave in it some very great impropriety: and ought not to be carried\non any further than is necessary to help our partial and inadequate\nconceptions of things.\n\n[A] [The \u201cprayer of Manasses\u201d is one of the apocryphal books of the Old\nTestament, which next precedes \u201cMaccabees.\u201d]\n\n[215] John i., and viii. 12.\n\n[216] Rom. iii. 25, v. 11: 1 Cor. v. 7: Eph. v. 2: 1 John ii. 2: Matt\nxxvi. 28.\n\n[217] John i. 29, 36, and throughout the book of Revelation.\n\n[218] Throughout the epistle to the Hebrews.\n\n[219] Isa. liii.: Dan. ix. 24: Ps. cx. 4.\n\n[220] Heb. x. 1.\n\n[221] Heb. viii. 4, 5.\n\n[222] Heb. x. 4, 5, 7, 9, 10.\n\n[223] Heb. ix. 28.\n\n[224] John xi. 51, 52.\n\n[225] 1 Pet. iii. 18.\n\n[226] Matt. xx. 28: Mark x. 45: 1 Tim. ii. 6.\n\n[227] 2 Pet. ii. 1: Rev. xiv. 4: 1 Cor. vi. 20.\n\n[228] 1 Pet. i. 19: Rev. v. 9: Gal. iii. 13.\n\n[229] Heb. vii. 25: 1 John ii. 1, 2.\n\n[230] Heb. ii. 10.: v. 9.\n\n[231] 2 Cor. v. 19: Rom. v. 10: Eph. ii. 16.\n\n[232] Heb. ii. 14. See also a remarkable passage in the book of Job,\nxxxiii. 24.\n\n[233] Phil. ii. 8, 9: John iii. 35, and v. 22, 23.\n\n[234] Rev. v. 12, 13.\n\n[235] John vi. 14.\n\n[236] P. 188, &c.\n\n[237] Eph. iv. 12, 13.\n\n[238] John xiv. 2, 3: Rev. iii. 21, and xi. 15.\n\n[239] 2 Thess. i. 8.\n\n[240] Heb. ix. 26.\n\n[241] [Consult MAGEE, on Atonement: STAPFERI Institutiones: TURRETIN,\nDe Satisfactione: CHALMERS, Discourses: OWEN, Satis. of Christ.]\n\n[242] P. 194, &c.\n\n[243] [This objection is ably urged by TINDALL. The answer of our\nauthor is complete. We should remember, that twice in the history of\nmankind, revelation _has been_ universal. The first pair, and the\noccupants of the ark, comprised the whole population. But how soon was\nlight rejected! Christianity is universal, in nature and intention; is\nto become so in fact; and according to a very probable construction of\nprophecy, will continue to be universal, for three hundred and sixty\nthousand years.]\n\n[244] [May not this be a principal object of the Apocalypse? As the\nbook of Daniel furnished a constant and powerful support to the faith\nof the Jew, by the constant development of prophecy, so the Apocalypse,\nrightly studied must powerfully, and through all time, support the\nfaith of the Christian by the continual unfolding and verification of\nits predictions.]\n\n[245] 2 Cor. viii. 12.\n\n[246] Introduction.\n\n[247] Part I. chap. v.\n\n[248] Part I. chap. iv. and pp. 156, 157.\n\n[249] Pp. 156, 157.\n\n[250] Dan. xii. 10. See also Isa. xxix. 13, 14: Matt. vi. 23, and\nxi. 25, and xiii. 11, 12: John iii. 19, and v. 44: 1 Cor. ii. 14,\nand 2 Cor. iv. 4: 2 Tim. iii. 13; and that affectionate as well as\nauthoritative admonition, so very many times inculcated, _He that\nhath ears to hear, let him hear_. Grotius saw so strongly the thing\nintended in these and other passages of Scripture of the like sense,\nas to say, that the proof given us of Christianity was less than it\nmight have been, for this very purpose: _Ut ita sermo Evangelii tanquam\nlapis esset Lydius ad quem ingenia sanabilia explorarentur_. De Ver.\nR. C. lib. ii. [So that the Gospel should be a touchstone, to test the\nhonesty of men\u2019s dispositions.]\n\n[251] Pp. 100, 257, &c.\n\n[252] [See WITSII Meletemeta, Diss. IV.: PFAFII Disput.: CAMPBELL on\nMiracles: DOUGLASS\u2019 Criterion: FARMER\u2019S Dissertations: PALEY\u2019S Evid.:\nTAYLOR\u2019S Apol. of Ben Mordecai: TUCKER\u2019S Light of Nat.: WATSON\u2019S\nTracts, vol. iv.: JORTIN\u2019S Sermons: Bp. FLEETWOOD\u2019S Essays: BOYLE\nLectures: LARDNER\u2019S Credibility.]\n\n[253] [\u201cThe miracles of the Jewish historian, are intimately connected\nwith all the civil affairs, and make a necessary and inseparable\npart. The whole history is founded in them; it consists of little\nelse; and if it were not a history of them, it would be a history of\nnothing.\u201d--BOLINGBROKE, Posthumous Works, vol. iii. p. 279.]\n\n[254] [An admirable work on this recondite mode of proving the truth\nof the New Testament narrative, is PALEY\u2019S Hor\u00e6 Paulin\u00e6. The same\ndepartment of evidence is ably handled by BIRK, in his Hor\u00e6 Evangelic\u00e6,\nand Hor\u00e6 Apostolic\u00e6: GRAVES on the Pentateuch: and BLUNT in his\n\u201cUndesigned Coincidences both of the Old and New Testament.\u201d GROTIUS,\nDe Veritate, has some excellent passages on the same subject.]\n\n[255] [Clem. Rom. Ep. 1. c. 47.] CLEMENT, who is here quoted, lived in\nthe first century, and is mentioned Phil. iv. 3. His epistle to the\nCorinthians, written in Greek, contains the passage here referred to,\nwhich may be thus translated: \u201cTake the letter of the blessed Paul\nthe Apostle. What did he write to you, in the first beginning of the\nGospel? Truly he sent you a divinely inspired letter about himself, and\nCephas, and Apollos.\u201d\n\n[256] Gal. i.: 1 Cor. xi. 23, &c.: 1 Cor. xv. 8.\n\n[257] Rom. xv. 19: 1 Cor. xii. 8, 9, 10-28, &c., and xiii. 1, 2, 8, and\nthe whole 14th chapter: 2 Cor. xii. 12, 13: Gal. iii. 2, 5.\n\n[258] See the Koran, chap. xiii. and chap. xvii.\n\n[259] [MAHOMET expressly declares that he worked no _public_ miracles\nin confirmation of his mission, \u201cbecause the former nations have\ncharged them with imposture.\u201d He claims, however, to have had private\nmiraculous assurances of his mission, and most preposterous they were.\n\nWHATELY, in his Christian Evidences, has handled this aspect of\nmiracles with great ability. See also PALEY\u2019S Evidences, sec. 3: and\nGIBBON\u2019S Decline and Fall, chap. 1.]\n\n[260] [ALEXANDER, in his Evidences, and several other writers have\nplaced this argument in a very convincing light. ARNOBIUS, one of the\nearliest Christian writers, asks, \u201cShall we say that the men of those\ntimes were inconsiderate, deceitful, stupid, and brutish enough to\nfeign having seen what they never saw? and that when they might have\nlived in peace and comfort, they chose gratuitous hatred and obloquy?\u201d\n\nThe _rejection_ of Christianity by so many in the first age was the\nresult of the continued action of personal and hereditary prejudice\nand depravity, capable of resisting any supposable evidence. The\n_reception_ of Christianity by multitudes, under the same evidences,\nand to their immediate personal damage, shows strongly that there was\nenough evidence to produce those effects. Thus the rejection by some\ndoes not countervail the acceptance by others.]\n\n[261] P. 294, &c.\n\n[262] [Compare BUTLER\u2019S Sermons; on Balaam, and on Self-deceit.]\n\n[263] See the foregoing chapter.\n\n[264] [\u201cWhenever a general scheme is known to be pursued by a writer,\nthat scheme becomes the true key in the hands of his reader, for\nunlocking the meaning of particular parts, which would otherwise not\nbe seen clearly to refer to such scheme. The inspired writers had one\ncommon and predominant scheme in view, which was to _bear testimony to\nJesus_. Whatever passages occur in their writings, which bear an apt\nand easy resemblance to the history of Jesus, may, or rather must in\nall reasonable construction, be applied to him.\u201d--HURD on the Proph.,\np. 117.]\n\n[265] [Consult on this point, GULICK, Theologia Prophetica: VITRINGA,\nObservationes: HENGSTENBURG, Christologia: HORSLEY\u2019S Tracts and\nSermons: KING\u2019S Morsels of Criticism: WAUGH\u2019S Dissertations: LYALL\u2019S\nProp\u0153dia Prophetica.]\n\n[266] It appears that Porphyry did nothing worth mentioning in this\nway. For Jerome on the place says: _Duas posteriores bestias--in uno\nMacedonum regno ponit_. And as to the ten kings; _Decem reges enumerat,\nqui fuerunt s\u00e6vissimi: ipsosque reges non unius ponit regni, verbi\ngratia, Macedoni\u00e6, Syri\u00e6, Asi\u00e6, et \u00c6gypti; sed de diversis regnis unum\nefficit regum ordinem_. [\u201cThe two latter beasts he places in one of the\nMacedonian kingdoms.\u201d \u201cHe reckons up ten kings who had been excessively\ncruel and these not kings of one country, as Macedonia, for instance,\nor Syria, or Asia, or Egypt; but makes up his set of kings out of\ndifferent kingdoms.\u201d] In this way of interpretation, any thing may be\nmade of any thing.\n\n[267] P. 189, &c.\n\n[268] John i. 3.\n\n[269] Eph. iii. 9.\n\n[270] Acts iii. 21.\n\n[271] Rev. x. 7.\n\n[272] Dan. ii. 44.\n\n[273] Dan. vii. 22.\n\n[274] Rev. xi. 17, 18; xx. 6.\n\n[275] Dan. vii. 27.\n\n[276] Chap. ii. iii. &c.\n\n[277] Deut. xxviii. 64; xxx. 2, 3: Isa. xlv. 17.\n\n[278] Isa. lx. 21: Jer. xxx. 11; xlvi. 28: Amos ix. 14, 15: Jer. xxxi.\n36.\n\n[279] Isa. viii. 14, 15; xlix. 5; chap. liii.: Mal. i. 10, 11, and\nchap. iii.\n\n[280] Isa. xlix. 6, chap. ii., chap, xi., chap. lvi. 7: Mal. i. 11. To\nwhich must be added, the other prophecies of the like kind, several in\nthe New Testament, and very many in the Old; which describe what shall\nbe the completion of the revealed plan of Providence.\n\n[281] [See DAVIDSON\u2019S Disc. on Proph.: BLANEY on Daniel\u2019s LXX. Weeks:\nHURD\u2019S Introd. to the Study of Proph.: JORTIN\u2019S Ser. at Boyle Lect.:\nFULLER\u2019S Gosp. its own Witness, part ii.: WAUGH\u2019S Diss.: APTHORPE\u2019S\nDiscourses.]\n\n[282] P. 250.\n\n[283] [Hundreds of instances might be adduced, in which profane\nhistorians corroborate the statements of the Scriptures. The following\nare merely specimens: DIODORUS SICULUS, STRABO, TACITUS, PLINY, and\nSOLINUS, speak of the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah. The lives of\nDavid and Solomon are given in the remains of the PH\u0152NICIAN ANNALS,\nin DAMASCENUS, and EUPOLEMUS. MENANDER describes the carrying away of\nthe Ten Tribes by Salmanasor. SUETONIUS, TACITUS, PLINY the younger,\nand NUMENIUS, speak of Jesus Christ. His miracles are owned by\nCELSUS, PORPHYRY, JULIAN, and Jewish writers opposed to Christianity.\nSUETONIUS, TACITUS, PLINY, JULIAN, and others describe his being put\nto death; and TACITUS says that many were put to death for adhering\nto his religion. PHLEGON mentions the miracles of Peter; and Paul is\nenumerated among eminent authors, in a fragment of LONGINUS.]\n\n[284] [This thought is elaborated with skill by WHATELY in his\n\u201c_Historic Doubts_.\u201d He takes up all the popular infidel objections\nas to the life of Christ, and applies them with undiminished or even\nincreased force against the evidences that such a man as Buonaparte\never existed.\n\nJOHNSON in a lively sally once said--\u201c\u2018It is easy to be on the negative\nside. I deny that Canada is taken. The French are a much more numerous\npeople than we; and it is not likely they would allow us to take it.\u2019\n\u2018But the Government have announced the fact.\u2019 \u2018Very true. But the\nministry have put us to an enormous expense by the war in America, and\nit is their interest to persuade us that we have got something for\nour money.\u2019 \u2018But the fact is confirmed by thousands who were at the\ntaking of it.\u2019 \u2018Aye, but these men have an interest in deceiving us:\nthey don\u2019t want you should think the French have beat them. Now suppose\nyou go over and find it so, that would only satisfy yourself; for\nwhen you come back we will not believe you. We will say you have been\nbribed.\u2019\u201d--BOSWELL.]\n\n[285] P. 267, &c.\n\n[286] P. 270, &c.\n\n[287] Deut. xxviii. 37.\n\n[288] All the particular things mentioned in this chapter, not\nreducible to the head of certain miracles, or determinate completions\nof prophecy. See p. 263.\n\n[289] [Butler states this argument with more than his usual brevity,\nand its force is not seen without reflection. \u201cIf contrivance or\naccident could have given to Christianity _any_ of its apparent\ntestimonies, its miracles, its prophecies, its morals, its propagation,\nor [the character of] its founder, there could be no room to believe,\nor even imagine, that _all_ these appearances of great credibility,\ncould be _united together_, by any such means. If successful craft\ncould have contrived its public miracles, or the pretence of them,\nit requires another reach of craft, to adopt its prophecies to the\nsame object. Further, it required not only a different, but a totally\nopposite art to conceive and promulgate its admirable morals. Again,\nits propagation, in defiance of the powers and terrors of the world,\nimplied still other qualities of action. Lastly, the model of the life\nof its founder, is a work of such originality and wisdom, as could be\nthe offspring only of consummate powers of invention, or rather never\ncould have been _devised_, but must have come from real life. The\nhypothesis sinks under its incredibility. Each of these suppositions of\ncontrivance, being arbitrary and unsupported, the climax of them is an\nextravagance.\u201d--DAVISON, on Prophecy.]\n\n[290] 1 John iv. 18.--[\u201cThere is no fear in love,\u201d &c.]\n\n[291] [Obedience from dread, if it continue to be the only motive,\nprecludes advance toward perfection; for \u201cHe that feareth is not\nmade perfect in love.\u201d But obedience from a discernment of the\nreasonableness and beneficence of religion, and of the perfections of\nits Author, increases love till it \u201ccasteth out fear.\u201d]\n\n[292] [See a discussion of this subject, in BAYLE\u2019S Historical and\nBiographical Dictionary: art. XENOPHANES: notes D, E, F, G.]\n\n[293] See Dissertation II.\n\n[294] [It is remarked by DEAN FITZGERALD, that \u201cIt is not inconceivable\nthat the Almighty should apply such a test of men\u2019s candor and\nfidelity, as should require them first to act upon a thing as true,\nbefore they were so fully satisfied of its truth as to leave no doubt\nremaining. Such a course of action might be the appointed, and for all\nwe know, the only possible way of overcoming habits of thought and\nfeeling, repugnant to the belief demanded, so that a fixed religious\nfaith might be the reward, as it were, of a sincere course of prudent\nbehavior.\u201d]\n\n[295] By _arguing upon the principles of others_, the reader will\nobserve is meant, not proving any thing _from_ those principles, but\n_notwithstanding_ them. Thus religion is proved, not _from_ the opinion\nof necessity; which is absurd: but, _notwithstanding_ or _even though_\nthat opinion were admitted to be true.\n\n[296] P. 141, &c.\n\n[297] Prov. xx. 27.\n\n[298] Serm. at the _Rolls_, p. 106.\n\n[299] John iii. 16: Heb. v. 9.\n\n[300] P. 258, &c.\n\n[301] Locke\u2019s Works, vol. i. p. 146.\n\n[302] Locke, pp. 146, 147.\n\n[303] Locke, p. 152.\n\n[304] See an answer to Dr. Clarke\u2019s Third Defence of his Letter to Mr.\nPodwell, 2d edit. p. 44, 56, &c.\n\n[305] [\u201cOne is continually reminded throughout this dissertation, of\nwhat is called _The common-sense school_ of Scotch metaphysicians. Nor\ncan there be any doubt that REID, in particular, was largely indebted\nto Butler, of whose writings he was a diligent student, for forming\nthat sober and manly character of understanding which is, I think, his\ngreat merit.\u201d--FITZGERALD.]\n\n[306] This way of speaking is taken from Epictetus,[A] and is made\nuse of as seeming the most full, and least liable to cavil. And\nthe moral faculty may be understood to have these two epithets,\n\u03b4\u03bf\u03ba\u03b9\u03bc\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74 and \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03b4\u03bf\u03ba\u03b9\u03bc\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f74 [applauding and condemning] upon a\ndouble account; because, upon a survey of actions, whether before or\nafter they are done, it determines them to be good or evil; and also\nbecause it determines itself to be the guide of action and of life,\nin contradistinction from all other faculties, or natural principles\nof action; in the very same manner as speculative reason _directly_\nand naturally judges of speculative truth and falsehood: and at the\nsame time is attended with a consciousness upon _reflection_, that the\nnatural right to judge of them belongs to it.\n\n[A] Arr. Epict. lib. i. cap. i.\n\n[307] \u039f\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72 \u1f21 \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f74 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03af\u03b1--\u1f10\u03bd \u03c0\u03b5\u03af\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u1f10\u03bd\u03b5\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u03af\u1fb3, [Virtue and vice\nare not in feeling, but in action,] M. Anton, lib. ix. 16. Virtutis\nlaus omnis in actione consistit. [The whole praise of virtue, depends\non action.] Cic. Off. lib. i. cap. 6.\n\n[308] P. 145.\n\n\n\n\nINDEX TO PART I.\n\nREFERENCES TO THE EDITOR\u2019S NOTES ARE IN BRACKETS.\n\n\n Abstract reasonings may mislead, 162\n fitness of things, _note_ 166\n\n Actions\n distinguished from their qualities, 111\n manifest character, 156\n rewarded and punished, 98\n this world a theater of, 156\n what sort exercise virtue, 152\n\n Active and passive impressions, 140\n\n Advantages of virtue, 113\n may never recur, 101\n\n Affections, excited by objects, 145\n need control, 166\n part of our constitution, 147\n\n Affliction, a discipline, 150\n chiefly of our own making, 100\n\n Agent, the living, not compounded, 81\n\n Alienation of parts of our body, 84\n\n All things made double, 137\n\n Allurements, use of, 151\n\n Analogy\n answers objections as to a present state of trial, 135\n as to modes of existence, 78\n carrying the force of positive argument, [105\n deals only with facts, 171\n indicates future punishment, 101\n may amount to proof, 168\n objections which it cannot answer, 171\n the only proof of some things, 79\n\n Antiquity of religion, 167\n\n Atheists not argued with, in this treatise, 181\n\n\n Beginnings of a righteous government seen on earth, 107\n\n Bible, teaches the existence of general laws, [99\n\n Bodies\n not necessary to us, 82\n not ourselves, 83\n only instruments, 85, 86\n their solid elements, 88\n\n Bodily and mental habits, 134\n\n Brain, does not think, [89\n\n Brahminical notion of death, 92\n\n Brutes,\n are they immortal?, [88\n may have greater strength than man, 119\n under man\u2019s control, 119\n\n\n Capacities,\n state of in infancy, 88\n not destroyed by death, 89\n not dependent on the body, 79\n\n Causes and ends incomprehensible, 172\n\n Changes compatible with identity, 78, 83\n\n Character\n manifested by probation, 156\n not given but acquired, 155\n what it means, _note_ 163\n\n Conscience,\n how it acts, 164\n implies government, 115\n a rule, 164\n authority, 164\n future retribution, 165\n may be impaired, 168\n perverted, 168\n\n Consciousness an indiscerptible entity, 82\n presupposes identity, [77\n\n Consequences\n may sometimes be avoided, 102\n may be foreseen, 98\n show a moral government, 98\n\n Course of nature constant, 97\n\n Creatures finitely perfect, 147\n may fall, 148\n have each a way of life, 137\n\n\n Danger of wrong doing, how increased, 132\n\n Death\n and birth similar, 91\n enlarges our sphere, 92\n has no power over matter, [91\n is not a suspension of our powers, 91\n is not our destruction, 80\n what it is, 80\n\n Decay of vegetables, inference from, 92\n\n Definitions of identity, 77\n\n Delivering up of the Lord Jesus Christ, [111\n\n Destruction of seeds, 153\n\n Different states of human existence, 89\n\n Difficulties belong to all subjects, [96\n exercise the virtuous principle, 152\n\n Disadvantages of virtue temporary, 126\n\n Discipline, its true nature and use, [148\n\n Disease not destructive to the soul, 90\n sometimes remedial, 177\n\n Disorder produced by sin, 148\n\n Distress excites passive pity and active relief, 140\n\n Distributive justice a natural rule, 110\n\n Divine government a scheme, CHAP. VII.\n\n Domestic government, 114\n\n Dreams, what they prove, 86\n\n\n Earthly satisfactions attainable, 183\n\n Effects of actions on the actor, [143\n\n Ends often produced by unlikely means, 180\n\n Enjoyments in our own power to a great degree, 95\n\n Error, how spread, [96\n\n Evidence of natural religion, 166\n\n Evil, may possibly be useful, 177\n its possible origin, 147\n not a necessary part of probation, [128\n\n Exceptions to the happiness of virtue, 108\n\n Experience indispensable, 141\n\n\n Faculties, human, not perfect at first, 141\n\n Fall of man, 133, [148\n\n Fallacy in fatalism, 169\n\n Fallen creatures require discipline, 150\n\n Fatalism,--see _Necessity_.\n\n Fear a proper motive to obedience, 154\n\n Folly, destructive, as well as crime, 132\n\n Formal notion of government, 99\n\n Foundation of moral improvement, [108\n\n Future advantages, how proportioned, 93\n\n Future existence probable, CHAP. I.\n of brutes, [79\n\n Future interest dependent on conduct, 95\n\n Future life,\n a solemn subject, 95\n not an inactive condition, 144\n reconcilable with atheism, 94\n this life preparatory to it, CHAP. V.\n\n Future punishment credible, 103\n\n Future retribution, how proved, 125\n\n Future state\n different from the present, 78\n brings us into new scenes, 93\n may have temptations, [145\n social, 144\n will not require such virtues as does the present life, 154\n\n\n General laws\n govern the world, 177, [99\n produce punishment, 103\n wisdom of them, 178\n\n General method of God\u2019s government, 97\n\n General system of religion, 124\n\n Gradual improvement, a wise arrangement, 141, 142\n\n GOD\n an intelligent governor, 106\n determined by what is fit, [166\n governs by human instruments, 111\n governs justly, [108\n has a will and a character, 163\n his aims incomprehensible, 97\n his attributes inferred from our own, [115\n his general government, 97\n his government just and good, 176\n his indirect commands, 165\n moral government of, CHAP. III.\n natural \u201d , \u201d II.\n necessarily existent, 159\n not indifferent to human actions, 125\n not simply benevolent, 106\n rewards and punishes, 169\n the only necessary being, 159\n\n Good actions, how punished, 111\n\n Good habits necessary even to the virtuous, 149\n\n Good men befriended as such, 112\n cannot now all unite, 121\n\n Good not forced upon us, [134\n\n Government,\n civil, an ordinance of God, 111\n considered as a scheme, CHAP. VII.\n of God, CHAP. II.\n not perfected in this world, 107\n the formal notion of it, 98\n the perfection of, 106\n\n\n Habits,\n how formed, &c., 139\n necessary to us hereafter, [145\n of resignation, 155\n often ruinous, 101\n of virtue an improvement in virtue, 147\n passive, 138\n shape the character, 141\n\n Happiness\n not always the _immediate_ reward of virtue, 108\n not given promiscuously, 138\n requisites for, 137\n the result of virtue, 118\n\n Helplessness of man, [138\n\n Higher degrees of retribution probable, 127\n\n Hinderances to virtue, 121\n\n History of religion, 169\n\n Honest men befriend the honest, 112\n\n Hope and fear appeal to self-love, 153\n are just principles of action, 154\n\n Human life preparatory, 144\n\n Hume\u2019s wonderful discovery, [162\n\n Human powers may be overtasked, 152\n\n\n Identity\n does not depend on the sameness of the body, 83\n of living agents, 77, 78\n not explicable, [77\n\n Ignorance\n acknowledged on all subjects but religion, 174\n answers objections, 175\n the argument from, 180\n total, destroys proof, 178\n\n Illustration of the modification of an action by its intention, [111\n\n Imagination a source of discontent, 154\n produces much error, 81\n\n Immortality of brutes, 88\n\n Improvement\n by discipline, 144\n by habit, 147\n of our faculties gradual, 141\n wisdom of this, 142\n\n Incomprehensibility of God\u2019s plans, 97\n\n Inconsiderateness destructive, 102\n\n Inferiority of brute force, 119\n\n Infidelity unjustifiable, 105\n\n Insignificance of our knowledge, [174\n\n Interest coincident with virtue, 154\n not a sufficient restraint, _note_ 146\n\n Interpositions to prevent irregularities, 177\n would produce evil, 178\n\n Intentional good rewarded, 114\n\n Irregularities perhaps unavoidable, 177\n seeming may not be such, 176\n\n Inward peace attends virtue, 112\n\n\n Kingdom, idea of a perfect, 123\n\n Knowledge of man insignificant, [174\n\n\n Liberty does not account for the fall, 147\n implied in our present condition, 162\n\n Life a probation, 128\n one part of it preparatory to another, [142\n what is it intended for, 137\n\n Living agent not subject to death, 79\n\n Living powers, see _Death_.\n\n Locke on human identity, [77\n\n\n Maimonides, his similitude, [173\n\n Man\n an inferior part of creation, 133\n a system of parts, [98\n by nature social, [93\n capable of improvement, 145\n connected with present, past, and future, 181\n dealt with as if free, 162\n has a moral nature, 115\n his fall not accounted for by his free agency, 147\n his helplessness, [138\n knows nothing fully, 173\n may become qualified for new states, 137\n not a competent judge of God\u2019s schemes, 174\n requires moral culture, 145\n\n Mania often produced by moral causes, [85\n\n Materialism, its philosophical absurdity, [81\n\n Matter and mind not the same, [83\n affect each other, 85\n\n Means\n learned by experience, 176\n man not a competent judge of the fitness of them, 178\n not always agreeable, 176\n\n Men often miss possible temporal good, 129\n\n Men\u2019s temporal interests greatly depend on themselves, 131\n\n Might of unarmed virtue, [121\n\n Mind\n influenced by the passions, 131\n is the man, [87\n its effects on the body, [85\n may survive the body, [89\n the only real percipient, 85\n uses the body as an instrument, [87\n\n Miracles, properly speaking, not unnatural, 94\n\n Miseries as contingent as conduct, 135\n generally are avoidable, 100\n\n Mixture of suffering and enjoyment in this world, [128\n\n Moral and natural government of God similar to each other, 184\n\n Moral attributes of God may be inferred from our own, [115\n\n Moral discipline, CHAP. V.\n\n Moral government of God, CHAP. III.\n\n Moral improvement, basis of, [108\n\n Moral world, its apparent irregularities, 176\n\n Mystery of God, finished, _note_ 102\n\n\n Natural, the true meaning of the word, 94\n\n Natural government of God, CHAP. II.\n\n Natural religion,\n its evidences not affected by the doctrine of necessity, 166\n proof of, 166\n teaches the doctrine of punishment, 102\n\n Necessary agents may be punished, 169\n\n Necessary bulk of one\u2019s self, 84\n\n Necessary existence of God, 159\n\n Necessary tendencies of virtue, 118\n\n Negligence and folly disastrous, 132\n\n Necessity\n consigns us to a fallacy, 169\n contradicts the constitution of nature, 170\n destroys no proof of religion, 170\n different kinds of, [157\n does not exclude design, 160\n doctrine of, CHAP. VI.\n not an agent, 159\n not applicable to practice, 163\n not in conflict with religion, 160\n our condition indicates freedom, 162\n reconcilable with religion, 168\n the doctrine absurd, 157\n what it means, 158\n writers for and against, [170\n\n New scenes in the next world, 93\n\n\n Obedience, reluctant, useful, [152\n\n Objections,\n against a proof and against a thing to be proved, 179\n against the scheme of Providence, 174\n analogy of plants, 92\n Christianity not universal, 169\n course of nature, 97\n destruction of seeds, 153\n difference between temporal and eternal things, [135\n discipline might have been avoided, 156\n God simply benevolent, 106\n good and evil may be mixed in the next world, 124\n gratification of appetites natural and proper, 98\n ignorance, the argument from invalidates the proof of religion, 178\n immortality of brutes, 87\n incredible that necessary agents should be punished, 169\n irregularities of the moral world, 176\n necessity destroys the proof of religion, 165\n our powers may be overtasked, 152\n probabilities may be overbalanced by probabilities, 169\n punishments are only natural events, 99\n rectitude arising from hope and fear, sordid, 153\n rewards and punishments, 95\n sin need not have entered the world, 177\n society punishes good actions, 111\n special interpositions might prevent evil, 177, 178\n to the doctrine of necessity, CHAP. VI.\n to the doctrine of future punishments, 100-103\n virtue sometimes punished, 111\n virtues of the present life not wanted hereafter, 154\n world disciplines some to vice, 153\n\n Obligation certain, when proofs are not, 179\n\n Occasional disadvantages of virtue, 117\n\n Occasional indulgences in wrong-doing awfully dangerous, [143\n\n One period of life preparatory to another, [142\n\n Opportunities once lost irrecoverable, 143\n\n Organs of sense mere instruments, 89\n\n Our moral nature proves a moral government, 115\n\n\n Pain, no contrivance for it in man, [110\n\n Partial ignorance does not destroy proof, 178\n\n Passions\n carry away the judgment, 131\n make our condition one of trial, 130\n may account for the fall of man, 147\n may be excited where gratification is impossible or unlawful, 146\n may remain in a future state, 147\n should be subject to the moral principle, 145\n the bare excitement of, not criminal, 145\n but dangerous, 146\n\n Passive habits, 138\n\n Passive impressions weakened by repetition, 139\n\n Passive submission essential, 155\n\n Peace of the virtuous, 112\n\n Perception, instruments of, 85\n possible without instruments, 86\n\n Perfection of moral government, 106, 107\n of an earthly kingdom, 123\n\n Persecution unnatural, 111\n\n Philosophy never arrogant, [174\n what it cannot teach, [87\n\n Pleasure\n not a sufficient reason for action, 98\n and pain mostly depend on ourselves, 95\n the distribution indicates moral government, 105\n\n Powers\n may be improved by exercise, 138\n may be overtasked, 152\n may exist and not be exercised, 80\n no reason for supposing that death will destroy them, 81\n\n Practical proof, what, 168\n\n Present existence unaccounted for by atheism, 94\n\n Presumptions that death will destroy us, 81\n that it will suspend our existence, 91\n\n Presumptuousness unjustifiable, 105\n\n Private vices not public benefits, [111\n\n Probabilities in favor of religion may be overbalanced by\n probabilities against it, 169\n\n Probation, CHAP. IV.\n applies to the present life as well as the future, 130\n does not necessarily imply suffering, [128\n implies allurements, 129\n is more than moral government, 128\n requires severe discipline, 150\n\n Proofs of natural religion, 166\n of religion not affected by the doctrine of necessity, 160\n\n Propensions necessarily create temptations, 146\n are excited by their appropriate objects, 147\n\n Proper gratification of the appetites, 98\n\n Prosperity of a virtuous community, 123\n may beget discontent, 154\n\n Providence, objections to God\u2019s, 140, 174\n\n Public spirit a fruit of virtue, 120\n\n Punishment\n an alarming subject, 105\n especially considered, 100\n greater hereafter than now, 127\n in a future state credible, 103, 125\n is God\u2019s voice of instruction, [108\n is sometimes capital, 102\n not unjust, 163\n often long delayed, 101\n often overtakes suddenly, 101\n of virtuous actions, 111\n religious and natural similar, 100\n results from folly as well as crime, 132\n the result of general laws, 103\n\n\n Quotations.\n Aristotle, [152\n Chalmers, [131, 138, 148\n Cicero, [82, 86\n Clarke, [97\n Fitzgerald, [145\n Robert Hall, [118\n Hume, [162\n Maimonides, [173\n Mandeville, [111\n Plato, [87, 113\n Son of Sirac, [137\n Strabo, [92\n\n\n Rashness, consequences of, 96\n\n Reason\n an incompetent judge of means, 178\n gives power over brute force, 119\n needs experience, 141\n not dependent on bodily powers, 89\n requires a fair opportunity, 119-121\n\n Recapitulation of the whole argument, 180\n\n Rectitude, is self-interest a proper motive to it?, 153\n\n References to other authors.\n Bates, [128\n Baxter, [88\n Bayle, [88\n Beattie, [170\n Belsham, [170\n Berkeley, [111\n Bonnett, [89\n Bramhall, [171\n Brown, [111\n Bryant, [171\n Butterworth, [107\n Calcott, [128\n Capp, [109\n Chalmers, [77, 79, 148\n Charnock, [158\n Cheyne, [88\n Clarke, 82, [81, 97, 171\n Colliber, [88\n Collings, [158, 170\n Compte, [170\n Crombie, [170\n Crouse, [170\n Davies, [109\n D\u2019Holbach, [170\n Descartes, [88\n Ditton, [88\n Doddridge, [109\n Dodwell, [81\n Dwight, [109\n Edwards, [88, 170\n Fabricius, [128\n Fichte, [170\n Gibbs, [171\n Grove, [171\n Haller, [89\n Harris, [171\n Hartley, [170\n Hegel, [170\n Henly, [128\n Hobbes, [170\n Holtzfusius, [128\n Holyoake, [170\n Horseley, [109\n Hume, [88\n Hunt, [109\n Jackson, [171\n Konnicott, [128\n King, [98, 171\n Law, [98\n Lawson, [171\n Le Clerc, [128\n Leland, [109\n Leroux, [170\n Liefchild, [109\n Locke, [88\n Manton, [128\n Martineau, [170\n Martinius, [119\n Milman, [142\n Morgagni, [89\n Morton, [109\n Mus\u00e6us, [128\n Palmer, [171\n Pearson, [128\n Polignac, [88\n Porteus, [109\n Price, [158\n Priestley, [142, 170\n Reid, [170\n Rutherford, [109, 158\n Search, [88\n Seed, [109\n Selden, [128\n Shaftesbury, 108\n Sherlock, [109\n Shuckford, [128\n Son of Sirac, [137\n South, [109, 128\n Stapfer, [128\n Strabo, 92\n Toplady, [128\n Topping, [109\n Twisse, [109\n Wagstaff, [88\n Warburton, [111\n Watts, [77, 88, 171\n Whately, [142, 158\n Willis, [88\n Wisheart, [109\n Witsius, [128\n Wittichius, [109\n\n Reflection not dependent on sensation, 91\n\n Reformation is attended with discomfort, 108\n may not prevent penalties, 102\n\n Relation between us and our bodies, 85\n\n Relations of things, limitless, 173\n\n Religion\n a question of fact, 165\n historical evidence of, 168\n professed in all ages, 167\n its proofs not affected by the doctrine of necessity, 170\n nor by our ignorance, 178\n\n Reluctant obedience profitable, [152\n\n Remedies often very disagreeable, 176\n\n Repentance may be too late, 104\n\n Requisites to the superiority of reason, 119\n of virtue, 120, 121\n\n Resentment of injuries, 114\n\n Resignation\n a temper consonant with God\u2019s sovereignty, 155\n essential to virtue, 154\n the fruit of affliction, 155\n the habit necessary hereafter, 155\n\n Retributions are divine teachings, [108\n\n Revelation,\n antiquity of, 167\n not improbable, 167\n not universal, _note_ 107\n\n Rewards and punishments, how distributed, 126\n\n\n Satisfactions of virtue, 108\n\n Scheme of God incomprehensible, 172\n\n Self-denial, its relations to present happiness, 134\n not essential to piety, 152\n\n Self-discipline, what, [148\n\n Self-love\n a just principle of action, 154\n appealed to, 153\n how moderated and disciplined, 155\n not a sufficient restraint, _note_ 146\n reasonable and safe, 130\n\n Sensation not necessary to reflection, 91\n\n Senses not percipients, 85\n\n Severe discipline necessary, 150\n\n Similitude of a historical painting, [174\n\n Simplicity of the living agent, 83\n\n Sin, why not kept out of the world, 177\n\n Skepticism does not justify irreligion, 105\n\n Social, our nature essentially such, [93\n\n Society\n must punish vice, 110\n natural and necessary, [93\n sometimes punishes the good, 111\n\n Soul\n a simple substance, 82\n not destroyed with the body, 79\n not naturally immortal, [81\n\n Souls of brutes, 88\n\n Special interpositions of Providence, 177, 178\n\n Stages of existence, 78\n\n State of probation, CHAP. IV.\n\n State of discipline and improvement, CHAP. V.\n\n Submissive temper necessary, 155\n\n Subordinations exceedingly beneficial, 142\n\n Subserviencies in nature, 173\n\n Sufferings may be avoided, 95\n not necessary to the cultivation of virtue, [128\n\n\n Temporal and religious probation similar, 132\n\n Temptations\n increased by bad examples, 132\n and by former errors, 132\n intended for our improvement, 136\n involve probation, 129\n may improve or injure us, 153\n security against their evils, 146\n sources of, to upright beings, 147\n the necessary result of propensions, 146\n\n Tendencies of virtue, 118\n hindered, 121\n essential, not accidental, 126\n\n Terms \u201cnature\u201d and \u201ccourse of nature\u201d, [97\n\n Theorizing no aid to virtue, 139\n\n Thoughtlessness often fatal, 101\n\n Transmigration of souls, [87\n\n Trials\n manifest character, 156\n may exist in a future state, 147\n produced by our propensions, 131\n qualify for a better state, 144\n unreasonable ones are not inflicted, 133\n why we are subjected to them, 136\n\n\n Ultimate design of man, [98\n\n Understanding may be perverted, 168\n\n Uneasiness produced by former sins, 109\n\n Union of good beings, 122\n\n Unjustifiableness of religious indifference, 105\n\n Upright creatures may fall, 147\n need good habits, 149\n\n Universe and its government immense, 123\n\n\n Vice\n actually punished by society 110, 111\n must produce uneasiness, 112\n never rewarded as such, 116\n not only criminal but depraving, 149\n often increased by trials, 153\n punished as such, 114\n\n Vicious men lose their influence, [121\n\n Virtue\n a bond of union, 122\n as such, rewarded on earth, 111\n \u201cbrings its own reward\u201d, [118\n has occasional disadvantages, [117\n hinderances accidental, 121\n how and why rewarded, 111\n improved by trials, 151\n its benefits to a community, 123\n natural, not vice, 116\n not always rewarded in this life, 108\n on the whole happier than vice, 113\n secures peace, 112\n tendencies essential, 126\n tends to give power, 118, [121\n\n Virtuous beings need virtuous habits, 149\n\n Virtuous habits a security, 147\n how formed, 139\n improve virtue, 147\n necessary in a future state, [145\n\n Voice of nature is for virtue, 117\n\n\n Waste of seeds, 153\n\n Wickedness may produce some benefits, 177\n voluntary, 136\n\n Will and character\n of God, how determined, _note_ 166\n what they mean, _note_ 163\n\n Wonderful discovery of Hume, [162\n\n World\n a system of subordinations, 173\n a theater for the manifestation of character, 156\n disciplines some to vice, 153\n fitted for man\u2019s discipline, 150\n governed by fixed laws, 110\n\n\n Youth\n a determining period, 101\n if lost, not to be recovered, 143\n its beneficial subordinations, 142\n\n\n\n\nINDEX TO PART II.\n\nREFERENCES TO THE EDITOR\u2019S NOTES ARE IN BRACKETS\n\n\n A common absurdity, 243\n\n Abstract truth distinguished from facts, 305, [186\n\n Absurdity of some objections to Christianity, 245\n\n Abuse of our natural endowments, 217\n\n Accidental, what events are so called, 226\n\n Accountability gradually increases, 251\n\n Actions,\n definition of, in morals, 261\n distinguished from things done, 261\n their bad consequences sometimes escaped, 232\n virtue and vice consist in them, 261\n\n Advantage, as proper a consideration in religion as in temporal\n affairs, 298\n variously bestowed, 249, 312\n\n Analogy\n a confirmation of all facts to which it can be applied, 306\n affords no argument against the scheme of Christianity, 203\n nor against miracles, 203\n answers presumptions against miracles, 207\n does not prove the wisdom of God, 301\n does not teach that the _whole_ of God\u2019s government is like that on\n earth, 204\n easily cavilled at, but unanswerable, 306\n between natural information and that derived from inspiration, 212\n between the remedies of nature and those of grace, 219\n between the gospel and human discoveries, 219\n between the light of nature and of revelation, 218\n between the use of natural gifts, and miraculous, 217\n between the government of God and that of a human master, 261\n its small influence on men, 303\n how used in this treatise, 306\n may show our duty, but not the design of the requirement, 246\n objections to this mode of arguing, CHAP. VIII.\n shows that there may be infinite reasons for things, with which we\n are not acquainted, 188\n the only ground for some of our knowledge, 306\n\n Antidote to heresies, [191\n\n Apocalypse, its principal object, [249\n\n Appearances of men and things deceptive, 248\n\n Arguments proper as to human writings, are not so as to Scripture, 214\n\n Atonement,\n how held by the ancients, 241\n makes the innocent suffer for the guilty, 243\n\n Author of nature taken for granted, 298\n\n Authoritativeness of revelation, 189\n\n\n Baptism\n a test of obedience, [199\n commanded and important, 194\n why the form of words, 194\n\n Bible, how to be interpreted, [202, 215\n\n Brutes, their great sagacity, 216\n\n Boundary of human inquiry, [223\n\n\n Candor necessary in judging of Christianity, 302\n\n Chance, really no such thing, 226\n\n Characters drawn in Scripture evidently unfeigned, 287\n\n Christ\n a mediator, CHAP. V.\n a prophet, 240\n a priest and king, 241\n his history, as given in Scripture, 285\n his pre-existence taught, 282\n his satisfaction, 239\n his sufferings voluntary, 243\n manner of his interposition, 238\n not merely a teacher and example, 242\n offered himself a propitiatory sacrifice, 241\n\n Christianity\n a fearful curse, if it give no more light than natural religion, [196\n a question of fact, 301\n a remedial system, [193\n an authoritative republication of the religion of nature, 188, 189\n a particular scheme under a general plan, 194, 224\n a scheme imperfectly comprehended, CHAP. IV.\n a scheme revealed but in part, 226\n brings life and immortality to light, 190\n could not possibly be a contrivance, [222, 294\n demands attention, if barely probable, 253\n has evidences besides miracles and prophecy, 263\n in what degree remedial, [193\n is a real revelation, 213\n is conformable to the constitution of things, 295\n its benefits require the use of means, 197\n its establishment and prevalence, the most conspicuous and important\n event in history, 286\n its evidences, CHAP. VII.\n its good effects not small, 192\n its precepts plain and obvious, 218\n its proof historical, 304\n its proofs liable to objection, 260\n men bound to examine its evidence, 197\n miracles and prophecy its direct and fundamental proofs, 263\n must have mysteries, [223\n no objection to the morality of it, 214, 220, 222\n not merely a republication of natural religion, [196\n not primarily designed to remedy the defects of nature, [193\n not the discovery of reason, 188\n objections to its evidence, 210\n objections to its nature, 210\n offered to some in a corrupt state, 250\n prescribes new duties, 194\n preserves natural religion in the world, 191\n propagated against all obstructions, [294\n rashness of treating it lightly, 194, 196, 197\n requires means to accomplish ends, 225\n reveals a particular dispensation of Providence, 194\n reveals important facts, 196\n some of its dark parts may be cleared up, others cannot, [223\n teaches more than natural religion, 194\n the evils ascribed to it, are not its evils, 192\n the one great question concerning it, 213, 214\n the only religion professedly confirmed by miracles, 268\n to be transmitted by Christians, [190\n universal, in nature and intention, [248\n what alone could disprove it, 295\n why not remedial to a greater degree, 193\n why not sooner promulgated, 219\n\n Christians\n bound to spread Christianity, 190\n primitive, their testimony, 267\n\n Church\n men bound to support it, 193\n preserves a knowledge of religion, 191\n visible, its design, 190, 191\n\n Circumstantial evidences of Christianity, 263, 281\n often as convincing as direct testimony, 294\n\n Clemens Romanus, testimony of, 266\n his letter to the Corinthians, [266\n\n Climax of infidel extravagance, [294\n\n Coincidence of natural and revealed religion, 211, 218\n\n Coincidences of Scripture, 266\n\n Comparison, how it may mislead us, 201\n\n Compassion distinct from goodness, 233\n visible in the constitution of the world, 233\n\n Consequences of infidelity; more dangerous than those of faith, 294\n of sin, often averted, 233\n\n Conversational objections to revelation, 295\n\n Conversion, how produced, [225\n\n Course of nature\n different from what we might have supposed, previous to experience, 211\n none at the beginning, 205\n our total darkness as to its causes, 208\n\n Creation\n Mosaic account of, referred to by John, 282\n a different exertion of power from government, 205\n why Scripture describes it, 281\n\n Creatures of like moral qualities placed in different religious\n situations, 251\n\n Credulity of mankind acknowledged, 269\n\n Cumulative proof of Christianity, [207\n\n\n Daniel\n his book had more evidence of authenticity than has come to us, 279\n his predictions a support of Jewish faith, [249\n quoted by Christ, 279\n\n Dark parts of revelation, [223\n\n Degrees of evidence have degrees of weight, 255\n require nice examination, 258\n\n Deistical explanation of Christ\u2019s miracles, [206\n\n Deists, why do they oppose Christianity, [196\n\n Depravity of man obvious, 238\n doctrine of, [218\n\n Desert of good and ill, the notion of, 305\n\n Development, of truth, 218\n modern, doctrine of, [218\n\n Differences of religious advantages may have like reasons as those for\n different temporal advantages, 251\n would remain if revelation were universal, 252\n\n Difficulties\n absurdity of requiring them to be all removed, 297\n as to the evidence of religion, analogous to those attending the\n practice of it, 256\n cannot be solved by analogy, 296\n speculative, may be the chief trials of some, 257\n the discernment which can see them, might suffice to see through\n them, 260\n\n Direct and circumstantial evidence must be taken together, 280\n\n Diseases of body and mind, analogous as to their remedies, 220\n\n Disobedience, without possible excuse, 253\n\n Dispensations, preparatory one to another, 310\n\n Disregard of religion a great profligacy, 233\n\n Distinction between moral and positive obligation, 198, [198\n between acts and principles, [235\n between temporary, individual, and universal commands, [188\n\n Doubt\n affords scope for probation, 262\n exercises our virtuous principles, 256\n implies some evidence, 252, 254, 283\n involves some obligation, 263\n puts us upon probation, 253\n\n Doubtful evidence should have _some_ influence, 255\n\n Duties arising from revealed relations, 195\n moral and positive, 194\n\n\n Earth, its appearances confirm Scripture, 238\n\n Effect of Adam\u2019s transgression, 238\n of combined probabilities, 294, [294\n\n Efficacy of repentance, [190\n not taught by the light of nature, 190\n\n End, God\u2019s not known, 246\n\n Enthusiasm\n is not peculiar to religion, 272\n impairs no testimony for Christianity, 271\n may often weaken testimony, 271\n sometimes mixed with knavery, 272\n the absence of all sign of it in Christianity, a presumptive proof\n in its favor, 222\n will not account for the spread of Christianity, 270\n\n Enthusiasts make as great sacrifices as Christians, 270\n\n Epistles of Paul, proof from, 266\n\n Eternal retribution not taught by natural religion, [190\n\n Ethics of natural religion distinguished from its objects, [194\n\n Events expound Scripture, 219\n\n Evidence\n of Christianity impregnable, 295\n collateral and direct to be viewed together, 294\n from miracles and prophecy, 267\n imperfect, should yet influence practice in proportion to its\n degree, 255\n of circumstances may be most direct, 294\n of religion, open to all, 260\n of religion, the same in kind as that which controls us in\n temporal things, 258\n much lower than satisfactory often determines us, 303\n not only increased but multiplied by a combination of\n probabilities, 294, [294\n reason the proper judge of, 221\n requires careful sifting, 256\n candor in judging, 302, [303\n safety always in admitting it, 294\n why liable to objection, 257\n\n Evil, remedies provided for it, 219, 232\n\n Exaggeration practised by many who will not lie, 272\n\n External manner of heart worship, 195\n\n Experience\n affords no presumption against Christianity, 203\n corroborates Christian doctrines, 245\n teaches the effects of actions, 246\n\n Extravagance of some objections, 187, 188\n\n\n Facts\n analogy the only proof of some, 306\n distinguished from abstract truths, 305\n of revelation distinguished from its principles, [235\n\n Fall of man, assumed as a fact, 236\n confirmed by appearances, 238\n\n Falsehood, its degrees and inducements, 272\n\n False miracles have deceived many, 273\n have some historic evidence, 273\n\n Fatalists, their principles argued upon, 304\n\n Fear cast out by love, [301\n\n Fitness, moral, 304, 305\n\n Flippant objections to Christianity, 295\n\n Folly, a real vice, 280\n\n Foresight of brutes, 216\n\n Future punishments,\n all the reasons for them not known, 234\n not arbitrarily appointed, 232\n natural sequences, 231, 232\n rendered credible by temporal punishments, 300\n\n\n Genealogy of mankind given in Scripture, 283\n\n General laws\n a wise arrangement, 227\n do not render miracles incredible, 227\n control the Christian dispensation, 226\n few events can be traced up to them, 226\n miracles may be their results, 226, 227\n the ground of believing there are such, 226\n things called accidental governed by them, 226\n\n Geology, its impressive lessons, [229\n\n GOD\n a master giving laws, 261\n all his reasons for giving a command must be certainly known, and\n known to have passed away, before we can safely disregard it, 188\n duties towards him as the Father, 194, 195\n governs by mediation, 230\n his government shows compassion, 233\n progressive, 229\n his means and ends we cannot distinguish, 228\n his providence, objections to it idle, 300, 301\n his reasons not assigned, 246\n his will, as absolute or conditional, 261\n how he would act in contingencies, unknown, [222\n how to be worshipped, a pure matter of revelation, 195\n instructs us by experience, 211, 246\n little known, [222\n not indifferent as to who suffer, 243\n reveals our duties, not his plans, 246\n the real author of the prophecies, 276\n\n Good and evil unequally distributed, 248\n\n Government of God sometimes, apparently, tardy in its results, 224, 225\n\n Gradual growth of causes, [208\n\n\n Happiness not always secured by well-laid schemes, 247\n\n Hazard of neglecting Christianity, 262\n\n Heathen world, condition of, 186, 250\n\n Hieroglyphic and figurative language of Scripture, 210\n\n Hinderances to natural and spiritual knowledge similar, 218\n\n History\n of miracles, 264\n of the Jews confirmed by their condition, 289, 290\n of the origin of religion, 206\n furnishes no parallel to revelation, 207\n prophecy is history anticipated, 281\n Scripture, has not been invalidated, 283\n\n Holy Spirit, its operations on the heart, [225\n\n Human contrivance unequal to some things, [222\n\n Human life, in what sense it may be called poor, 297\n\n Human testimony, reliable notwithstanding the prevalence of\n falsehood, 273\n\n\n Identity of principle between natural and revealed religion, [235\n\n Ignorance\n of heathen writers, [187\n of other worlds, forbids objections to Christianity on the ground\n of miracles, 207\n of the laws of miracles, not greater than of natural laws, 256\n of the reason of our present condition, 251\n much of it our own fault, 259\n\n Imagination may fancy unreal coincidences, 293\n\n Immorality not authorized in Scripture, 221, 222\n\n Impassable limit to human knowledge, [223\n\n Imperceptible accumulation of forces, [208\n\n Imperfect knowledge, better than acting in the dark, 297\n\n Imperfection of language, 216\n\n Importance of revelation, CHAP. I.\n an abstraction, [186\n precludes the idea that the first witnesses were careless, 274\n\n Improbability before and after an event, [207\n of the Deistical theory greater than that of miracles, [206\n\n Inadequacy of repentance, [236\n\n Inattention to religion, real depravity, 252, 307\n prevents convincement, 258\n\n Incarnation an invisible miracle, 204\n cannot be paralleled, [235\n\n Influence of the Holy Ghost, [225\n of the analogical argument, 303\n\n Innocent sometimes suffer for the guilty, 243\n\n Inspiration, the proper kind and extent of it not discoverable by\n reason, 212\n not to be interpreted like other writings, 212\n\n Inspired writers, key to their meaning, [276\n their one great scheme, [276\n show a foresight more than human, 278, 279\n\n Instruction from God to savages, [206\n\n Intercession by the good for the bad, [232\n\n Interest, temporal, not always apparent, 302\n\n Interpositions of men for each other, [232\n\n Internal improbabilities weaken external proof, 215\n\n Interpretation of Scripture, [215\n\n Irregularity, really no such thing, 226\n whence the appearance of, 227\n\n Irregularities of men, consequences proportioned to magnitude, 233\n\n Irreligion an aggravated sin, 233\n especially in persons in high standing, 254\n not justifiable on any pretence, 256, 312\n\n Invention an irregular way of information, 216\n\n Invisible miracles, [204\n things of God, how learned, [230\n\n\n Jews\n God\u2019s dealing with them, 290\n their continuance, a standing miracle, 290\n their history confirmed by facts, 291\n their system of Theism, [206\n\n Jewish miracles, a part of civil history, [265\n\n John, his allusion to Christ, in the beginning of his gospel, 282\n his doctrine agrees with that of Paul, 282\n\n\n Kingdom of Christ on earth, 241\n\n Knowledge\n profound, not necessary to piety, 218\n scientific and religious, have the same difficulties, 218\n\n Knowledge of Scripture, improved in the same way as knowledge of the\n sciences, 218\n unequally distributed, 249\n\n\n Language necessarily ambiguous, 216\n of the prophecies, often figurative, 210\n\n Laplace, error of, [207\n\n Levity destructive to religious influence, 259\n\n Liberty\n belief of our, unavoidable, 304\n of the will, not discussed, _note_ 304\n necessary to the progress of knowledge, 218\n the principle so natural that language is formed on it, 304\n\n Life\n future, brought to light by the gospel, 190\n may be taken away by command, 221\n not thrown away because success is uncertain, 302\n whether desirable or not, 301\n\n Light of nature\n displayed in the Scriptures, 188\n does not teach our future condition, 190\n favors the doctrine of a Mediator, 230\n has left the greatest heathen in doubt, 186\n\n Ludicrous turn, danger of, 259\n\n\n Mahometanism not received on the footing of miracles, [268\n\n Mahometans and ancient Persians, how situated as to revelation, 250\n\n Man\n accepted according to what he hath, 251\n his circumstances no ground of complaint, 252\n his obligation to study the Scriptures, 202, 262\n must be renewed, 197\n\n Manasses, prayer of, [237\n\n Manner of worship a matter of pure revelation, 195\n\n Martyrs\n could not have been impostors, 272\n had full knowledge of facts, 269, 271\n the full force of their testimony, 269\n their obligations to veracity, 274\n were not enthusiasts, 271\n\n Means as related to ends, 225\n\n Mediation seen everywhere, 230\n exemplified in social life, [232\n\n Mediator,\n appointment of, CHAP. V.\n the notion of, natural, 230\n the Scripture doctrine of, 238-240\n whether one was necessary, 243\n why most objected to, 243\n\n Medium between full satisfaction of a truth and full satisfaction to\n the contrary, 313\n\n Memory, eloquence, &c. imprudently used, 217\n\n Men apt to be deluded by pretences, 273\n their conduct may be guessed at, [222\n\n Mercy seen in the constitution of the world, 233\n\n Messiah came at the expected time, 285\n his mission, 224\n\n Minuteness of predictions touching Christ, 207\n\n Miracles\n admitted evidence for such as are false does not impair the evidence\n of Christian, 273\n contrary to the course of nature?, 206\n denying them leads to Atheism, [205\n disorderly use of, 217\n distinct reasons for them, 208\n large historical evidence for their truth, 270\n manner in which related, 264\n no argument of analogy against them, 205-207\n none parallel to those of Scripture, 207\n not mere embellishments, 264\n not to be compared to common events, 209\n nowise incredible, 209\n occasions for them likely to arise in the course of ages, 208\n of the Old Testament, inseparable from history, [265\n operate by general laws, 226\n Pagan and Popish, were wrought _after_ those systems had obtained, 268\n peculiar to the Jewish and Christian religions, 268\n received as genuine from the first, 268, 269\n regulated by general laws, 227\n satisfactorily account for the existence of Christianity, 265\n should be compared to uncommon events, 209\n the credentials of Christianity, 267\n the evidence of their truth at first, 249\n the question of their truth only one of _degree_ in point of\n evidence, 208\n the only satisfactory account of some events, 265\n the real nature of presumptions against them, 208\n the term a relative one, 205\n their direct proof of Christianity, 264\n their evidence the same as that for common facts, 264\n their force as proofs, 189\n visible and invisible, 204, [204\n what evidence arises from their having been accepted as true by the\n first Christians, 268\n writers upon, [264, 268\n\n Miraculous power\n creation not properly an act of, 205\n misused by some, 217, 267\n pretences of, have deluded some, 273\n why bestowed, 190\n\n Misconduct creates need of assistance, 235\n\n Mistake of some of Hume\u2019s opponents, 207\n\n Mistakes of philosophers dangerous, [230\n of transcribers, &c., 228\n\n Modern geology, lesson from, [229\n\n Moral action, the nature of, 261\n an action becomes such by command, [221\n\n Moral duties. See _Positive_.\n\n Moral faculty, its object, 305\n\n Moral government. See _Government_.\n\n Moral precepts. See _Positive_.\n\n Moral system revealed to mankind, 190\n\n Morality of Scripture, reason a judge of, 220\n\n Mysteries to be expected in revelation, 223, 224\n as many in nature as in Scripture, 246\n\n Mystery of godliness, 225\n\n Mythological writings resemble prophecy, 276\n\n\n Narratives of Scripture unadorned, 228\n\n Natural consequences of vice are judicial punishments, 197\n and spiritual things analogous in importance, 219\n endowments often abused, 217\n\n Natural light compared to revelation, 218\n\n Natural religion\n and revealed, coincide, 211\n as much perverted as Christianity, 192\n could not have been reasoned out, 192\n discloses no Redeemer, [194\n its ethics and objects distinguished, [194\n its light wholly insufficient, 187\n might be authenticated by miracles, 190\n moral system of, 187\n taught and confirmed by Christianity, 188, 286, 292\n what it does not teach, [190, 194\n\n Nature carried on by uniform laws, 226\n implies the agency of God, 231\n its light insufficient, 186\n\n Nature and obligation of sacraments, _note_ 195\n\n Necessity of revelation, [186\n\n Negligence prevents the recognition of truth, 258\n wholly inexcusable, 197\n\n\n Obedience from dread, [301\n or disobedience, an important matter, 188\n to a positive rite, especially indicative of piety, 199\n\n Objections\n to certain precepts of Scripture, as immoral, 221\n to prophecy, from its obscurity, 275\n to revelation, are of equal weight against natural religion, 97\n to the analogical argument, as such, CHAP. VIII.\n to the distribution of good and evil, 248-250\n to the doctrine of mediation, CHAP. V.\n to the evidence for miracles, CHAP. II.\n to the unequal distribution of religious knowledge, 249\n\n Objections to Christianity\n as a matter of fact, 301\n as a remedial system, [193, 219\n as a roundabout, perplexed contrivance, 228\n as deficient in point of truth, 247\n as a scheme, 209\n as mysterious, [223\n as to its wisdom and goodness, CHAP. IV.\n as unimportant, CHAP. I.\n atonement makes the innocent suffer for the guilty, 227, 243\n contains things unlike the course of nature, 204\n does not remove difficulties, [223\n has been perverted, 192\n has been productive of evils, 192\n has internal improbabilities, 225-227\n disclosed to the world so recently, 219\n disorderly use of miraculous gifts, 227\n has small influence, 192, 303\n if true would not be left doubtful, 299\n is not satisfactory, 260, 261\n its doctrine of mediation, CHAP. V.\n its external proof weakened by internal improbabilities, 215\n its lack of evidence, CHAP. VI.\n its late introduction, 219\n may be advanced flippantly, but cannot be so answered, 295\n natural things too unimportant to furnish analogies in its favor, 219\n not just and good, CHAP. IV.\n not necessary, 147\n not universal, CHAP. VI., 248\n slowly developed, 219\n some of its precepts immoral, 221\n sufficiency of natural religion, 187\n vicarious sufferings, 245\n\n Obligation arises from the bare supposableness of Christianity, 253, 262\n\n Obligations to God arising out of relationship, 196\n\n Obscurity in part of a prophecy, does not impair the evidence of\n foresight, 275\n\n Offenders often shielded by friends, [232\n\n Offices of Christ as a mediator, 238-240\n\n Opinions must be distinguished from facts, 270\n\n Ordinary rules of interpretation, [215\n\n\n Pagan and Popish miracles easily accounted for, 268\n\n Parables show what the author intended, 276\n\n Partial views give an appearance of wrong, 309\n\n Passion hinders correct judgment, 259\n\n Paul, his separate testimony, 266\n how he received the gospel, 267\n summary of his testimony, 267\n\n Perfection of religion, what? CHAP. VIII.\n\n Persons for whom this treatise is written, 309\n\n Philosophy, its true mode of proceeding, [230\n\n Piety superior to ritual observances, 201\n\n Pleasures and pains, which overbalance? 301\n\n Political events, how mentioned in Scripture, 282\n\n Popish doctrine of a miracle at the Eucharist, [204\n\n Popular conversational objections, 295\n\n Porphyry\u2019s mode of interpretation frivolous, _note_ 279\n objections to the book of Daniel, 279\n\n Positive evidence of Christianity, CHAP. VII.\n\n Positive institutions\n belong to the notion of a church, 192\n lay us under the strictest obligation, 202\n means to moral ends, 199\n men disposed to depend on them, 200\n necessary to keep up and propagate religion, 246\n not to be made light of, 201\n not to supersede moral obedience, 200\n the reason of them often obvious, 198\n two modes of viewing them, 198\n\n Positive precepts compared with moral, 198, 201\n create moral obligations, 221\n\n Power of healing, [217\n\n Practice should be influenced by probability, 254\n\n Predictions of Christ very numerous and minute, 207, 208\n\n Prejudice a hinderance to knowledge, 258\n a mark of weakness, 280\n as hostile to truth as enthusiasm, 272\n operates contrary ways, 294\n\n Preservation of the Jews as a distinct race, 291\n\n Presumptions\n against miracles, 205\n against revelation as miraculous, CHAP. II.\n none against the _general scheme_ of Christianity, 203\n none peculiar to miracles, 207\n strong, overcome by weak proof, 207, [207\n\n Priesthood of Christ, 238\n Jewish, typical of Christ, 239\n\n Principles argued upon in this treatise, 304\n\n Progressions in our existence, 229\n\n Progress in theology probable, [218\n\n Probable proofs, by being added, not only increase evidence, but\n multiply it, 294\n\n Probability should influence practice, 254\n\n Profane history corroborates Scripture statements, 287\n\n Proofs of Christianity\n a touchstone of honesty, [259\n level to common men, 260\n some important ones omitted in this treatise, and why, 304\n why not more plain, 261\n\n Prophecy\n a joint review of prophecies furnishes a far stronger proof than\n examination in detail, 294\n a series of, being applicable to certain events, is proof that it\n was intended of them, 276\n compared to compiled memoirs, 278\n created the expectation of a Messiah, 284\n confirmed by appearances, 292\n evidence from, 275\n expressed in figurative language, 275\n how understood by ancient Jews, 277\n in relation to the Jews, 284\n is history anticipated, 281\n its obscurity, 275\n its proofs amazingly strong, [207\n may not _always_ have been understood by the writer, 278\n proves foresight, 276, 279\n sometimes obscured by interpreters, 210\n summary of, concerning Christ, 284\n use of, to future ages, 249\n writers upon, 277, 285\n\n Prophet, Christ a, 240\n\n Prophets\n not the _authors_ of what they wrote, 278\n their sense of their predictions not necessarily the whole\n sense, 278\n whether they had in view the events which Christians consider\n fulfilments, 277\n\n Proverbial, use of the word, 201\n\n Providence, never hasty, [229\n objections to it useless, 300, 301\n the course of, progressive, 229\n\n Province of reason, 220\n\n Prudence, its best plans often frustrated, 247\n often requires us to act with uncertain prospect of success, 247, 248\n\n Punishment\n follows wickedness, _of course_, 231\n instances of vicarious, 244\n not always avoided by reformation, 235\n not promiscuously inflicted, 243\n provision made for escaping it, 232, 311\n we cannot of ourselves escape it, 234\n we cannot know why such and such are inflicted, 231\n\n\n Quotations\n Angus, [202, 223\n Augustine, _note_ 187\n Arnobius, [269\n Clemens Romanus, [266\n Davidson, [294\n Fitzgerald, [303\n Grotius, [259\n Guizot, [229\n Hurd, [276\n Dr. Johnson, [288\n Mahomet, [268\n Powell, [230\n Warburton, [217, 223\n Whately, [206\n\n\n Rashness of interpreters, 210\n of treating religion lightly, 197\n\n Reason\n could not have invented Christianity, 206\n could not ascertain the power of penitence, 194\n discovers our relation to God the Father, 194\n but not our relation to the Son and Holy Ghost, 194, 196\n its limits very narrow, [223\n its proper province, 220\n must have right principles, 220\n needs the aid of experience in judging of the consequences of\n actions, 246\n not sufficient to construct a system of natural religion free\n from superstition, 186\n our only faculty for judging even revelation, 210\n requires the importance of a question to be taken into account, 295\n teaches nothing of the certain means of either temporal or spiritual\n good, 197\n very incompetent to judge what a revelation ought to be, 210-212\n\n Reasoning by analogy to any extent, leaves the mind unsatisfied, 296\n\n Redemption\n agreeable to our natural notions, 235\n analogous to natural remedies, 232\n conjectures about it must be uncertain, 242\n mode of, not discoverable by reason, 243\n men not competent judges of its plan, 243\n on whom are its benefits, _note_ 237\n Scripture account of, 239, 240\n we should be thankful for it, without disputing how it was\n procured, 242\n\n References to other authors\n Alexander, [269\n Apthorpe, [285\n Bayle, [301\n Benson, [215\n Birk, [266\n Blaney, [285\n Blunt, [266\n Bolingbroke, [265\n Boswell, [288\n Boyle, [264\n Butler, [190, 272\n Campbell, [264\n Celsus, [287\n Chalmers, [187, 194, 242\n Colliber, 195\n Damascenus, [287\n Davidson, [285\n Diodorus Siculus, [287\n Eupolemus, [287\n Featley, [215\n Fitzgerald, [193, 206, 207\n Fleetwood, [264\n Fuller, [285\n Gibbon, [268\n Graves, [266\n Grotius, [266\n Gulick, [277\n Hengstenburg, [277\n Horseley, [277\n Howe, [236\n Hurd, [285\n Jortin, [264, 285\n Julian, [257\n King, [215, 277\n Lardner, [264\n Leland, [187\n Longinus, [287\n Lyall, [277\n McCosh, [187\n Mackintosh, [223\n Magee, [236, 242\n Manasses, [237\n Menander, [287\n Michaelis, [215\n Mills, [207\n Newman, [235\n Numenius, [287\n Owen, [242\n Paley, [205, 266, 268\n Pascal, [187, 223\n Pfaffius, [264\n Phlegon, [287\n Ph\u0153nician Annals, [287\n Pliny, [287\n Porphyry, 279, [287\n Samuel Stanhope Smith, [206\n Solinus, [287\n Spinoza, [215\n Stapfer, [242\n Storr, [215\n Strabo, [287\n Suetonius, [287\n Tacitus, [287\n Taylor, [264\n Tindall, [196, 248\n Tucker, [264\n Turretin, [242\n Vitringa, [276\n Warburton, [187\n Waterland, [195\n Watson, [264\n Waugh, [277, 285\n Wayland, [188, 236\n Whately, [206, 268, 288\n Witsius, [264\n\n Reformation does not always preclude punishment, 235\n\n Regard due to the Son and Holy Spirit, 195\n\n Regard to God as Creator, the essence of natural religion, 195\n\n Rejection of Christ by many, at first, the argument from it, [269\n foretold, 285\n\n Relations, being learned, duties are perceived, 194\n\n Relations of man to Deity, 194\n to the Son and Holy Ghost, 195\n\n Religion\n a practical thing, 298\n a question of fact, 301, 304\n affords particular reasons for miracles, 208\n confirmed by the establishment of a church, 191\n considered as external and internal, 195\n doubt of its evidence does not release from moral obligation, 254\n has its end on all persons to whom proposed, 303, [303\n if true, why susceptible of any possible doubt? 299\n its acceptance safe, 295\n its general spirit intimated, 200, 201\n its great importance, 254\n its introduction into the world, 206\n its reasonableness fully shown, if it can only be proved that it _may_\n be reasonable, 301\n its very nature overlooked by those who insist that it should have\n overwhelming evidence, 302\n may be true, though doubtful, 299\n must be judged by its evidences _taken together_, 294\n not a thing reasoned out, 206\n not equally taught to all men, 206\n objections to it removed by analogy, 300\n presupposes candor in those who examine it, 256, 302, [303\n reason may judge of its morality, 220\n reasonable, for aught which can be shown to the contrary, 301\n the perception of, 302\n the view of it taken in this treatise, 299\n the evidence for it may be lessened, but cannot be destroyed, 295\n why its evidences are allowed to admit of doubt, 249, 253, 299\n\n Relief for evils provided, 232\n\n Remedial nature of Christianity, [193\n\n Remedies\n provided in nature, 219, 232\n may be unskilfully used, 220\n show the compassion of God, 233\n and also his strictness, 234\n\n Repentance\n cannot cancel guilt, 236, [236\n general sense of mankind on the subject, 236\n its efficacy not taught by natural religion, [190\n its efficacy taught in the Scriptures, 190\n not sufficient to preclude disaster, 234, 235\n\n Revelation\n a particular part of a great plan, 224\n accounts for the Theism of the Jews, [206\n at the beginning of the world, would not be miraculous, 205\n cannot be neglected with impunity, 260-262\n considered as miraculous, CHAP. II.\n considered historically, 281\n difference between its facts and its principles, [235\n discovers new relations, and so new duties, 194\n distinguished from natural religion, 195\n does not compel assent, 253\n has twice been universal, [248\n how it could be overturned, 214\n its disclosures, of course, could not have been anticipated, 211, 212\n its measure of evidence puts us on probation, 253\n its facts necessarily singular, [235\n no more different from the course of nature than some parts of the\n course of nature are different from other parts, 312\n necessary, CHAP. I.\n republishes and confirms natural religion, 188, 189\n nothing incredible in it, 271\n teaches that God\u2019s laws are compassionate, 236\n the use of unwritten revelation, 213\n what is to be expected in revelation, 210, 212\n\n Reverence for the will of God, [199\n\n Ridicule of Scripture\n an offence against natural piety, 286\n easier than examination, 259\n the great weakness of being influenced by it, 280\n\n Roman Empire mentioned, 279\n\n Rules for health very fallible and inexact, 302\n of Biblical interpretation, [215\n\n\n Sacrifices\n commanded, 241\n expiatory, 239\n how the ancients regarded them, 242\n learned by the heathen from tradition, 241\n really efficacious, 242\n the prevalence of, 236\n\n Sacrifice of Christ\n an objection to it, 243\n _how_ efficacious, not taught, 242\n proper and real, 239-241\n puts us into a capacity for salvation, 242\n voluntary, 244\n\n Safety an important consideration in judging, 294\n\n Satirical writings, how understood, 276, 277\n\n Scheme of nature, vast, 204\n progressive, 229\n\n Scheme of providence, if understood, would justify facts which are\n objected to, 300\n\n Schemes, the best may be disconcerted, 247\n\n Science confirms Scripture history, 287\n\n Scorn of prophetic diction, 210\n\n Scripture\n announces a general restoration of things, 282\n antiquity of, 287\n characters evidently not feigned, 287\n confirmed by profane authors, 288\n confirmed by the state of the earth, 287\n considered historically, 281\n contains an abridged history of the world, 282\n exposed to criticism, 283\n expounded by itself, [202\n gives a history of this world as God\u2019s world, 281\n gives an account of civil governments only as they affected\n religion, 282\n has internal evidence of truth, 287\n history genuine, 265\n how distinguished from other books, 281-283\n how to be interpreted, [202\n if false could be shown to be so, 283\n includes a history of thousands of years, 283\n includes the chronology of nearly four thousand years, 284\n its authority the great question, not its contents, 214\n its chronicles confirmed by history, 287\n its evidences comprise a series of things of great variety and reaching\n to the beginning of time, 263\n its evidences not intended to be overpowering, 253\n its great proofs are miracles and prophecy, 264\n its relation to miracles only to be accounted for on the supposition\n of their truth, 265\n its strangeness not surprising, 288\n its style objected to, 210\n its truth must be judged of by the evidence _taken together_, 295\n may contain things not yet discovered, 218\n miracles, their first reception, 265\n naturalness of its statements, 287\n not composed by rules of art, 210\n nothing improbable related in any part, 287\n not to be judged by preconceived expectation, 215\n not to be judged exactly as other books, 214\n ordinary rules of interpretation, [215\n our duty to search it, 202, 262\n precepts, some give offence, 210\n reveals our relation to the Son and Holy Spirit, 194\n the possibility of its truth demands investigation, 258\n truths not discoverable by reason, 203\n variety of topics introduced, 283\n written in a rude age, 283\n why it describes creation, 282\n\n Searching the Scriptures a great duty, 202\n\n Self-deceit, our liability to it, 262\n\n Serious apprehension may comport with doubt, 313\n\n Shameful mistakes of philosophers, [230\n\n Similarity of objections to religion and nature, 298\n\n Sincerity of belief proved by dying for it, 270\n\n Skepticism no justification of irreligion, 253\n\n Sorrow cannot of itself restore abused benefits, 234\n\n Speaking with tongues, [217\n\n Speculative difficulties similar to external temptations, 256\n the chief trial of some, 257, 259\n\n Spread of Christianity unaccountable if it were an imposture, 290\n\n Standing ministry, what for, [191\n\n Strangeness of some Scripture events, 288\n\n Stupidity of the martyrs, if insincere, [269\n\n Subserviences, the world a system of, 229\n\n Success, temporal, always uncertain, 302\n\n Suffering, ignorance does not prevent it either in temporal or spiritual\n things, 196\n\n Sufferings of Christ vindicate God\u2019s law, 244\n of the early Christians, 269\n\n Sufficiency of light of nature pretended, 186\n\n Summary of Jewish history, 284\n of the historical evidence of Scripture, 292\n\n Supernatural instructions necessary from the first, [206\n\n\n Temporal interests not always discerned, 247, 248\n managed by prudent persons on the very principles proposed by religion\n as to spiritual interests, 298, 299\n\n Temporal interests often decided by considerations which fall short of\n demonstration, 299\n\n Temporary commands, distinguished from perpetual, [188\n\n Temptation\n a wholesome discipline, 256\n earthly and spiritual similar, 256\n calls forth virtuous effort, 257\n\n Testimony\n can be destroyed only by counter-testimony, or by the incompetency of\n the witness, 274\n for miracles not mentioned in Scripture, does not impair the testimony\n for those there recorded, 273\n of Paul, separate and independent, 266\n of profane authors to the truth of Scripture history, [287\n of the first Christians, 269, 271\n must be judged candidly, [259\n none counter to Christianity, 275\n slight, overcomes strong presumptions, 208\n unconfuted, must be admitted, 273\n value of, lessened by enthusiasm, 271\n\n Theism of the Jews accounted for, [206\n\n Theology of the Bible, not to be corrected, [202\n\n Things which it is unreasonable to dispute, 307\n\n Thoughtlessness of men, 233\n\n Tradition teaches that there was a revelation at the beginning, 205\n of the fall of man, 311\n\n Transubstantiation, [205\n\n Trial by speculative difficulties, analogous to other trials, 256\n\n True philosophy inductive, [230\n\n Truth of Christianity proved, unless the whole of its history and\n influence can be accounted for by accident, 295\n\n Truth, how developed, [218\n the, of an event may be fully proved, though no _one_ of sundry proofs\n may be complete, 295\n whether there is any such thing, denied by skeptics, 305\n\n Twofold effect of the analogical argument, 305\n\n\n Unbelievers, acknowledgment of, 289\n cannot deny a conformity between prophecy and events, 293\n\n Understanding, its right use, 245\n\n Undesigned coincidences in Bible history, [266\n\n Undeterminate language deceives many, 297\n\n Unequal distribution of religious knowledge, 249\n\n Unfair dealing of objectors, 297\n\n Unreasonableness of applying to passion for guidance, 295\n\n Unsatisfactory evidence, men often obliged to act upon it, 302\n\n\n Variety in the distribution of God\u2019s gifts, 249, 312\n\n Vastness of the scheme of nature, 204\n\n Veracity of the first Christians, 274\n\n Vicarious punishments witnessed every day, 244\n deter from sin, 245\n\n Vice\n appointed to be punished, 231\n blinds men to just evidence, 255\n its effects in the present world, 234\n its natural consequences are God\u2019s judicial inflictions, 197\n its real enormity, 234\n not palliated by any supposed lack of evidence for religion, 255\n\n Vindication of religion by analogy impossible, 296\n of the character of God, not attempted in this treatise, 299, 300\n\n\n Way of salvation for the helpless, [186\n\n Will of GOD, as absolute or conditional, 261\n\n World, wickedness of, 238\n\n Worship, mode of, a matter of pure revelation, 195\n\n Writers\n on the atonement, [242\n Christian sacraments, [195\n miracles, [264, 268\n necessity of revelation, [187\n prophecy, [277-285\n Scripture difficulties, [215\n undesigned coincidences, [266\n\nTHE END.","title":"The Analogy of Religion to the Constitution and Course of Nature: To which are added two brief dissertations: I. On personal identity. II. On the nature of virtue.","tradition":"scripture-revelation","translated_text":null,"word_count":144759}