{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_53395/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_53395","id":"gutenberg_53395","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/53395","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Essays, Letters & Speeches","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Science - Physics","Philosophy","Political science","Science"],"text":"ESSAYS: SCIENTIFIC, POLITICAL, & SPECULATIVE.\n\n BY\n HERBERT SPENCER.\n\n LIBRARY EDITION,\n\n (otherwise fifth thousand,)\n\n _Containing Seven Essays not before Republished,_\n _and various other additions_.\n\n VOL. II.\n\n WILLIAMS AND NORGATE,\n 14, HENRIETTA STREET, COVENT GARDEN, LONDON;\n AND 20, SOUTH FREDERICK STREET, EDINBURGH.\n\n 1891.\n\n\n\n\n LONDON:\n G. NORMAN AND SON, PRINTERS, HART STREET,\n COVENT GARDEN.\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS OF VOL. II.\n\n\n                                                                    PAGE\n THE GENESIS OF SCIENCE                                                1\n\n THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES                                   74\n\n REASONS FOR DISSENTING FROM THE PHILOSOPHY OF M. COMTE              118\n\n ON LAWS IN GENERAL, AND THE ORDER OF THEIR DISCOVERY                145\n\n THE VALUATION OF EVIDENCE                                           161\n\n WHAT IS ELECTRICITY?                                                168\n\n MILL _versus_ HAMILTON\u2014THE TEST OF TRUTH                            188\n\n REPLIES TO CRITICISMS                                               218\n\n PROF. GREEN\u2019S EXPLANATIONS                                          321\n\n THE PHILOSOPHY OF STYLE                                             333\n\n USE AND BEAUTY                                                      370\n\n THE SOURCES OF ARCHITECTURAL TYPES                                  375\n\n GRACEFULNESS                                                        381\n\n PERSONAL BEAUTY                                                     387\n\n THE ORIGIN AND FUNCTION OF MUSIC                                    400\n\n THE PHYSIOLOGY OF LAUGHTER                                          452\n\n                  (_For Index, see Volume III._)\n\n\n\n\n{1}\n\nTHE GENESIS OF SCIENCE.\n\n\n[_First published in_ The British Quarterly Review _for July 1854_.]\n\nThere still prevails among men a vague notion that scientific knowledge\ndiffers in nature from ordinary knowledge. By the Greeks, with whom\nMathematics\u2014literally _things learnt_\u2014was alone considered as knowledge\nproper, the distinction must have been strongly felt; and it has ever\nsince maintained itself in the general mind. Though, considering\nthe contrast between the achievements of science and those of daily\nunmethodic thinking, it is not surprising that such a distinction\nhas been assumed; yet it needs but to rise a little above the common\npoint of view, to see that it is but a superficial distinction. The\nsame faculties are employed in both cases; and in both cases their\nmode of operation is fundamentally the same. If we say that science\nis organized knowledge, we are met by the truth that all knowledge is\norganized in a greater or less degree\u2014that the commonest actions of\nthe household and the field presuppose facts colligated, inferences\ndrawn, results expected; and that the general success of these actions\nproves the data by which they were guided to have been correctly put\ntogether. If, again, we say that science is prevision\u2014is a seeing\nbeforehand\u2014is a knowing in what {2} times, places, combinations,\nor sequences, specified phenomena will be found; we are obliged to\nconfess that the definition includes much that is foreign to science\nin its ordinary acceptation: for example, a child\u2019s knowledge of an\napple. This, as far as it goes, consists in previsions. When a child\nsees a certain form and colours, it knows that if it puts out its\nhand it will have certain impressions of resistance, and roundness,\nand smoothness; and if it bites, a certain taste. And manifestly its\ngeneral acquaintance with surrounding objects is of like nature\u2014is\nmade up of facts concerning them, grouped so that any part of a group\nbeing perceived, the existence of the other facts included in it is\nforeseen. If, once more, we say that science is _exact_ prevision,\nwe still fail to establish the supposed difference. Not only do we\nfind that much of what we call science is not exact, and that some of\nit, as physiology, can never become exact; but we find further, that\nmany of the previsions constituting the common stock alike of wise\nand foolish, _are_ exact. That an unsupported body will fall; that a\nlighted candle will go out when immersed in water; that ice will melt\nwhen thrown on the fire\u2014these, and many like predictions relating to\nthe familiar properties of things, have as high a degree of accuracy as\npredictions are capable of. It is true that the results foreseen are of\na very general character; but it is none the less true that they are\ncorrect as far as they go: and this is all that is requisite to fulfil\nthe definition. There is perfect accordance between the anticipated\nphenomena and the actual ones; and no more than this can be said of the\nhighest achievements of the sciences specially characterized as exact.\n\nSeeing thus that the assumed distinction between scientific knowledge\nand common knowledge cannot be sustained; and yet feeling, as we must,\nthat however impossible it may be to draw a line between them, the two\nare not practically identical; there arises the question\u2014What is the\nrelationship {3} between them? A partial answer to this question may\nbe drawn from the illustrations just given. On reconsidering them, it\nwill be observed that those portions of ordinary knowledge which are\nidentical in character with scientific knowledge, comprehend only such\ncombinations of phenomena as are directly cognizable by the senses,\nand are of simple, invariable nature. That the smoke from a fire which\nshe is lighting will ascend, and that the fire will presently boil\nthe water placed over it, are previsions which the servant-girl makes\nequally well with the most learned physicist; but they are previsions\nconcerning phenomena in constant and direct relation\u2014phenomena that\nfollow visibly and immediately after their antecedents\u2014phenomena of\nwhich the causation is neither remote nor obscure\u2014phenomena which may\nbe predicted by the simplest possible act of reasoning. If, now, we\npass to the previsions constituting science\u2014that an eclipse of the\nmoon will happen at a specified time; that when a barometer is taken\nto the top of a mountain of known height, the mercurial column will\ndescend a stated number of inches; that the poles of a galvanic battery\nimmersed in water will give off, the one an inflammable and the other\nan inflaming gas, in definite ratio\u2014we perceive that the relations\ninvolved are not of a kind habitually presented to our senses. They\ndepend, some of them, on special combinations of causes; and in some of\nthem the connexion between antecedents and consequents is established\nonly by an elaborate series of inferences. A broad distinction,\ntherefore, between scientific knowledge and common knowledge is its\nremoteness from perception. If we regard the cases in their most\ngeneral aspect, we see that the labourer who, on hearing certain notes\nin the adjacent hedge, can describe the particular form and colours\nof the bird making them, and the astronomer who, having calculated a\ntransit of Venus, can delineate the black spot entering on the sun\u2019s\ndisc, as it will appear through the telescope, at a specified hour,\ndo {4} essentially the same thing. Each knows that on fulfilling the\nrequisite conditions, he shall have a preconceived impression\u2014that\nafter a definite series of actions will come a group of sensations of\na foreknown kind. The difference, then, is neither in the fundamental\ncharacter of the mental acts; nor in the correctness of the previsions\naccomplished by them; but in the complexity of the processes required\nto achieve the previsions. Much of our common knowledge is, as far\nas it goes, precise. Science does not increase its precision. What\nthen does it do? It reduces other knowledge to the same degree of\nprecision. That certainty which direct perception gives us respecting\ncoexistences and sequences of the simplest and most accessible kind,\nscience gives us respecting coexistences and sequences, complex in\ntheir dependencies, or inaccessible to immediate observation. In brief,\nregarded from this point of view, science may be called _an extension\nof the perceptions by means of reasoning_.\n\nOn further considering the matter, however, it will perhaps be felt\nthat this definition does not express the whole fact\u2014that inseparable\nas science may be from common knowledge, and completely as we may fill\nup the gap between the simplest previsions of the child and the most\nrecondite ones of the physicist, by interposing a series of previsions\nin which the complexity of reasoning involved is greater and greater,\nthere is yet a difference between the two beyond that above described.\nAnd this is true. But the difference is still not such as enables us to\ndraw the assumed line of demarcation. It is a difference not between\ncommon knowledge and scientific knowledge; but between the successive\nphases of science itself, or knowledge itself\u2014whichever we choose to\ncall it. In its earlier phases science attains only to _certainty_ of\nforesight; in its later phases it further attains to _completeness_.\nWe begin by discovering _a_ relation; we end by discovering _the_\nrelation. Our first achievement is to foretell the _kind_ {5} of\nphenomenon which will occur under specified conditions; our last\nachievement is to foretell not only the kind but the _amount_. Or, to\nreduce the proposition to its most definite form\u2014undeveloped science is\n_qualitative_ prevision; developed science is _quantitative_ prevision.\n\nThis will at once be perceived to express the remaining distinction\nbetween the lower and the higher stages of positive knowledge. The\nprediction that a piece of lead will take more force to lift it\nthan a piece of wood of equal size, exhibits certainty, but not\ncompleteness, of foresight. The kind of effect in which the one body\nwill exceed the other is foreseen; but not the amount by which it will\nexceed. There is qualitative prevision only. On the other hand, the\npredictions that at a stated time two particular planets will be in\nconjunction; that by means of a lever having arms in a given ratio, a\nknown force will raise just so many pounds; that to decompose a given\nquantity of sulphate of iron by carbonate of soda will require so many\ngrains\u2014these predictions show foreknowledge, not only of the nature of\nthe effects to be produced, but of the magnitude, either of the effects\nthemselves, of the agencies producing them, or of the distance in time\nor space at which they will be produced. There is both qualitative\nprovision and quantitative prevision. And this is the unexpressed\ndifference which leads us to consider certain orders of knowledge as\nespecially scientific when contrasted with knowledge in general. Are\nthe phenomena _measurable_? is the test which we unconsciously employ.\nSpace is measurable: hence Geometry. Force and space are measurable:\nhence Statics. Time, force, and space are measurable: hence Dynamics.\nThe invention of the barometer enabled men to extend the principles\nof mechanics to the atmosphere; and Aerostatics existed. When a\nthermometer was devised there arose a science of heat, which was before\nimpossible. Of such external agents as we have found no measures\nbut our sensations {6} we have no sciences. We have no science of\nsmells; nor have we one of tastes. We have a science of the relations\nof sounds differing in pitch, because we have discovered a way to\nmeasure these relations; but we have no science of sounds in respect to\ntheir loudness or their _timbre_, because we have got no measures of\nloudness and _timbre_. Obviously it is this reduction of the sensible\nphenomena it presents, to relations of magnitude, which gives to any\ndivision of knowledge its specially scientific character. Originally\nmen\u2019s knowledge of weights and forces was like their present knowledge\nof smells and tastes\u2014a knowledge not extending beyond that given by\nthe unaided sensations; and it remained so until weighing instruments\nand dynamometers were invented. Before there were hour-glasses and\nclepsydras, most phenomena could be estimated as to their durations\nand intervals, with no greater precision than degrees of hardness can\nbe estimated by the fingers. Until a thermometric scale was contrived,\nmen\u2019s judgments respecting relative amounts of heat stood on the same\nfooting with their present judgments respecting relative amounts of\nsound. And as in these initial stages, with no aids to observation,\nonly the roughest comparisons of cases could be made, and only the most\nmarked differences perceived, it resulted that only the most simple\nlaws of dependence could be ascertained\u2014only those laws which, being\nuncomplicated with others, and not disturbed in their manifestations,\nrequired no niceties of observation to disentangle them. Whence it\nappears not only that in proportion as knowledge becomes quantitative\ndo its previsions become complete as well as certain, but that until\nits assumption of a quantitative character it is necessarily confined\nto the most elementary relations.\n\nMoreover it is to be remarked that while, on the one hand, we\ncan discover the laws of the greater part of phenomena only by\ninvestigating them quantitatively; on the other hand we can extend\nthe range of our quantitative {7} previsions only as fast as we\ndetect the laws of the results we predict. For clearly the ability to\nspecify the magnitude of a result inaccessible to direct measurement,\nimplies knowledge of its mode of dependence on something which can be\nmeasured\u2014implies that we know the particular fact dealt with to be\nan instance of some more general fact. Thus the extent to which our\nquantitative previsions have been carried in any direction, indicates\nthe depth to which our knowledge reaches in that direction. And here,\nas another aspect of the same fact, it may be observed that as we pass\nfrom qualitative to quantitative prevision, we pass from inductive\nscience to deductive science. Science while purely inductive is purely\nqualitative; when inaccurately quantitative it usually consists of\npart induction, part deduction; and it becomes accurately quantitative\nonly when wholly deductive. We do not mean that the deductive and the\nquantitative are coextensive; for there is manifestly much deduction\nthat is qualitative only. We mean that all quantitative prevision is\nreached deductively; and that induction can achieve only qualitative\nprevision.\n\nStill, however, it must not be supposed that these distinctions enable\nus to separate ordinary knowledge from science; much as they seem to\ndo so. While they show in what consists the broad contrast between\nthe extreme forms of the two, they yet lead us to recognize their\nessential identity, and once more prove the difference to be one of\ndegree only. For, on the one hand, much of our common knowledge is\nto some extent quantitative; seeing that the amount of the foreseen\nresult is known within certain wide limits. And, on the other hand,\nthe highest quantitative prevision does not reach the exact truth, but\nonly a near approach to it. Without clocks the savage knows that the\nday is longer in the summer than in the winter; without scales he knows\nthat stone is heavier than flesh; that is, he can foresee respecting\ncertain results that their amounts will exceed these, and be less than\n{8} those\u2014he knows _about_ what they will be. And, with his most\ndelicate instruments and most elaborate calculations, all that the man\nof science can do, is to reduce the difference between the foreseen and\nthe actual results to an unimportant quantity. Moreover, it must be\nborne in mind not only that all the sciences are qualitative in their\nfirst stages,\u2014not only that some of them, as Chemistry, have but lately\nreached the quantitative stage\u2014but that the most advanced sciences\nhave attained to their present power of determining quantities not\npresent to the senses, or not directly measurable, by a slow process\nof improvement extending through thousands of years. So that science\nand the knowledge of the uncultured are alike in the nature of their\nprevisions, widely as they differ in range; they possess a common\nimperfection, though this is immensely greater in the last than in the\nfirst; and the transition from the one to the other has been through a\nseries of steps by which the imperfection has been rendered continually\nless, and the range continually wider.\n\nThese facts, that science and ordinary knowledge are allied in\nnature, and that the one is but a perfected and extended form of the\nother, must necessarily underlie the whole theory of science, its\nprogress, and the relations of its parts to each other. There must be\nincompleteness in any history of the sciences, which, leaving out of\nview the first steps of their genesis, commences with them only when\nthey assume definite forms. There must be grave defects, if not a\ngeneral untruth, in a philosophy of the sciences considered in their\ninterdependence and development, which neglects the inquiry how they\ncame to be distinct sciences, and how they were severally evolved\nout of the chaos of primitive ideas. Not only a direct consideration\nof the matter, but all analogy, goes to show that in the earlier and\nsimpler stages must be sought the key to all subsequent intricacies.\nThe time was when the anatomy and physiology of the human being were\nstudied {9} by themselves\u2014when the adult man was analyzed and the\nrelations of parts and of functions investigated, without reference\neither to the relations exhibited in the embryo or to the homologous\nrelations existing in other creatures. Now, however, it has become\nmanifest that no true conceptions are possible under such conditions.\nAnatomists and physiologists find that the real natures of organs and\ntissues can be ascertained only by tracing their early evolution; and\nthat the affinities between existing genera can be satisfactorily made\nout only by examining the fossil genera to which they are akin. Well,\nis it not clear that the like must be true concerning all things that\nundergo development? Is not science a growth? Has not science, too,\nits embryology? And must not the neglect of its embryology lead to a\nmisunderstanding of the principles of its evolution and of its existing\norganization?\n\nThere are _\u00e0 priori_ reasons, therefore, for doubting the truth of all\nphilosophies of the sciences which tacitly proceed upon the common\nnotion that scientific knowledge and ordinary knowledge are separate;\ninstead of commencing, as they should, by affiliating the one upon the\nother, and showing how it gradually came to be distinguishable from\nthe other. We may expect to find their generalizations essentially\nartificial; and we shall not be deceived. Some illustrations of this\nmay here be fitly introduced, by way of preliminary to a brief sketch\nof the genesis of science from the point of view indicated. And we\ncannot more readily find such illustrations than by glancing at a few\nof the various _classifications_ of the sciences that have from time to\ntime been proposed. To consider all of them would take too much space:\nwe must content ourselves with some of the latest.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nCommencing with those which may be soonest disposed of, let us notice,\nfirst, the arrangement propounded by Oken. An abstract of it runs thus:\u2015\n\n Part I. MATHESIS.\u2014_Pneumatogeny_: Primary Act, Primary\n Consciousness, {10} God, Primary Rest, Time, Polarity, Motion, Man,\n Space, Point, Line, Surface, Globe, Rotation.\u2014_Hylogeny_: Gravity,\n Matter, Ether, Heavenly Bodies, Light, Heat, Fire.\n\n   (He explains that MATHESIS is the doctrine of the whole;\n   _Pneumatogeny_ being the doctrine of immaterial totalities, and\n   _Hylogeny_ that of material totalities.)\n\n Part II. ONTOLOGY.\u2014_Cosmogeny_: Rest, Centre, Motion, Line,\n Planets, Form, Planetary System, Comets.\u2014_St\u00f6chiogeny_: Condensation,\n Simple Matter, Elements, Air, Water, Earth.\u2014_St\u00f6chiology_: Functions\n of the Elements, &c. &c.\u2014_Kingdoms of Nature_: Individuals.\n\n   (He says in explanation that \u2018ONTOLOGY teaches\n   us the phenomena of matter. The first of these are the\n   heavenly bodies comprehended by _Cosmogeny_. These divide\n   into elements.\u2014_St\u00f6chiogeny._ The earth element divides\n   into minerals\u2014_Mineralogy_. These unite into one collective\n   body\u2014_Geogeny_. The whole in singulars is the living, or _Organic_,\n   which again divides into plants and animals. _Biology_, therefore,\n   divides into _Organogeny_, _Phytosophy_, _Zoosophy_.\u2019)\n\n FIRST KINGDOM.\u2014MINERALS. _Mineralogy_,\n _Geology_.\n\n Part III. BIOLOGY.\u2014_Organosophy_, _Phytogeny_,\n _Phyto-physiology_, _Phytology_, _Zoogeny_, _Physiology_, _Zoology_,\n _Psychology_.\n\nA glance over this confused scheme shows that it is an attempt to\nclassify knowledge, not after the order in which it has been, or may\nbe, built up in the human consciousness; but after an assumed order\nof creation. It is a pseudo-scientific cosmogony, akin to those which\nmen have enunciated from the earliest times downwards; and only a\nlittle more respectable. As such it will not be thought worthy of much\nconsideration by those who, like ourselves, hold that experience is\nthe sole origin of knowledge. Otherwise, it might have been needful to\ndwell on the incongruities of the arrangement\u2014to ask how motion can be\ntreated of before space? how there can be rotation without matter to\nrotate? how polarity can be dealt with without involving points and\nlines? But it will serve our present purpose just to indicate a few of\nthe absurdities resulting from the doctrine which Oken seems to hold in\ncommon with Hegel, that \u201cto philosophize on Nature is to re-think the\ngreat thought of Creation.\u201d Here is a sample:\u2015\n\n\u201cMathematics is the universal science; so also is {11}\nPhysio-philosophy, although it is only a part, or rather but a\ncondition of the universe; both are one, or mutually congruent.\n\n\u201cMathematics is, however, a science of mere forms without substance.\nPhysio-philosophy is, therefore, _mathematics endowed with substance_.\u201d\n\nFrom the English point of view it is sufficiently amusing to find such\na dogma not only gravely stated, but stated as an unquestionable truth.\nHere we see the experiences of quantitative relations which men have\ngathered from surrounding bodies and generalized (experiences which\nhad been scarcely at all generalized at the beginning of the historic\nperiod)\u2014we find these generalized experiences, these intellectual\nabstractions, elevated into concrete actualities, projected back\ninto Nature, and considered as the internal frame-work of things\u2014the\nskeleton by which matter is sustained. But this new form of the old\nrealism, is by no means the most startling of the physio-philosophic\nprinciples. We presently read that,\n\n\u201cThe highest mathematical idea, or the fundamental principle of all\nmathematics is the zero = 0.\u201d\u00a0*\u00a0*\u00a0*\n\n\u201cZero is in itself nothing. Mathematics is based upon nothing, and,\n_consequently_, arises out of nothing.\n\n\u201cOut of nothing, _therefore_, it is possible for something to arise;\nfor mathematics, consisting of propositions, is a something in relation\nto 0.\u201d\n\nBy such \u201cconsequentlys\u201d and \u201ctherefores\u201d it is, that men philosophize\nwhen they \u201cre-think the great thought of creation.\u201d By dogmas that\npretend to be reasons, nothing is made to generate mathematics; and by\nclothing mathematics with matter, we have the universe! If now we deny,\nas we _do_ deny, that the highest mathematical idea is the zero\u2014if,\non the other hand, we assert, as we _do_ assert, that the fundamental\nidea underlying all mathematics, is that of equality; the whole of\nOken\u2019s cosmogony disappears. And here, indeed, we may see illustrated,\nthe distinctive peculiarity of the German method of procedure in these\n{12} matters\u2014the bastard _\u00e0 priori_ method, as it may be termed. The\nlegitimate _\u00e0 priori_ method sets out with propositions of which the\nnegation is inconceivable; the _\u00e0 priori_ method as illegitimately\napplied, sets out either with propositions of which the negation is\n_not_ inconceivable, or with propositions like Oken\u2019s, of which the\n_affirmation_ is inconceivable.\n\nIt is needless to proceed further with the analysis; else might we\ndetail the steps by which Oken arrives at the conclusions that \u201cthe\nplanets are coagulated colours, for they are coagulated light\u201d; that\n\u201cthe sphere is the expanded nothing;\u201d that gravity is \u201ca weighty\nnothing, a heavy essence, striving towards a centre;\u201d that \u201cthe earth\nis the identical, water the indifferent, air the different; or the\nfirst the centre, the second the radius, the last the periphery of the\ngeneral globe or of fire.\u201d To comment on them would be nearly as absurd\nas are the propositions themselves. Let us pass on to another of the\nGerman systems of knowledge\u2014that of Hegel.\n\nThe simple fact that Hegel puts Jacob B\u0153hme on a par with Bacon,\nsuffices alone to show that his stand-point is far remote from the one\nusually regarded as scientific: so far remote, indeed, that it is not\neasy to find any common basis on which to found a criticism. Those who\nhold that the mind is moulded into conformity with surrounding things\nby the agency of surrounding things, are necessarily at a loss how to\ndeal with those who, like Schelling and Hegel, assert that surrounding\nthings are solidified mind\u2014that Nature is \u201cpetrified intelligence.\u201d\nHowever, let us briefly glance at Hegel\u2019s classification. He divides\nphilosophy into three parts:\u2015\n\n1. _Logic_, or the science of the idea in itself, the pure idea.\n\n2. _The Philosophy of Nature_, or the science of the idea considered\nunder its other form\u2014of the idea as Nature.\n\n3. _The Philosophy of the Mind_, or the science of the idea in its\nreturn to itself.\n\nOf these, the second is divided into the natural sciences, {13}\ncommonly so-called; so that in its more detailed form the series runs\nthus:\u2014Logic, Mechanics, Physics, Organic Physics, Psychology.\n\nNow, if we believe with Hegel, first, that thought is the true essence\nof man; second, that thought is the essence of the world; and that,\ntherefore, there is nothing but thought; his classification, beginning\nwith the science of pure thought, may be acceptable. But otherwise, it\nis an obvious objection to his arrangement, that thought implies things\nthought of\u2014that there can be no logical forms without the substance of\nexperience\u2014that the science of ideas and the science of things must\nhave a simultaneous origin. Hegel, however, anticipates this objection,\nand, in his obstinate idealism, replies, that the contrary is true. He\naffirms that all contained in the forms, to become something, requires\nto be thought; and that logical forms are the foundations of all things.\n\nIt is not surprising that, starting from such premises, and reasoning\nafter this fashion, Hegel finds his way to strange conclusions. Out\nof _space_ and _time_ he proceeds to build up _motion_, _matter_,\n_repulsion_, _attraction_, _weight_, and _inertia_. He then goes on to\nlogically evolve the solar system. In doing this he widely diverges\nfrom the Newtonian theory; reaches by syllogism the conviction that\nthe planets are the most perfect celestial bodies; and, not being able\nto bring the stars within his theory, says that they are mere formal\nexistences and not living matter, and that as compared with the solar\nsystem they are as little admirable as a cutaneous eruption or a swarm\nof flies.[1] Results so absurd might be left as self-disproved, were\nit not that speculators of this class are not alarmed by any amount\nof incongruity with established beliefs. The only efficient mode of\ntreating systems like this of {14} Hegel, is to show that they are\nself-destructive\u2014that by their first steps they ignore that authority\non which all their subsequent steps depend. If Hegel professes, as he\nmanifestly does, to develop his scheme by reasoning\u2014if he presents\nsuccessive inferences as _necessarily following_ from certain premises;\nhe implies the postulate that a belief which necessarily follows after\ncertain antecedents is a true belief; and did an opponent reply to one\nof his inferences that, though it was impossible to think the opposite,\nyet the opposite was true, he would consider the reply irrational. The\nprocedure, however, which he would thus condemn as destructive of all\nthinking whatever, is just the procedure exhibited in the enunciation\nof his own first principles. Mankind find themselves unable to conceive\nthat there can be thought without things thought of. Hegel, however,\nasserts that there _can_ be thought without things thought of. That\nultimate test of a true proposition\u2014the inability of the human mind\nto conceive the negation of it\u2014which in all the successive steps of\nhis arguments he considers valid, he considers invalid where it suits\nhis convenience to do so; and yet at the same time denies the right\nof an opponent to follow his example. If it is competent for him to\nposit dogmas which are the direct negations of what human consciousness\nrecognizes; then is it also competent for his antagonists to stop him\nat any moment by saying, that though the particular inference he is\ndrawing seems to his mind, and to all minds, necessarily to follow\nfrom the premises, yet it is not true, but the contrary inference is\ntrue. Or, to state the dilemma in another form:\u2014If he sets out with\ninconceivable propositions, then may he with equal propriety make\nall his succeeding propositions inconceivable ones\u2014may at every step\nthroughout his reasoning draw the opposite conclusion to that which\nseems involved.\n\nHegel\u2019s mode of procedure being thus essentially suicidal, the Hegelian\nclassification which depends upon {15} it, falls to the ground. Let us\nconsider next that of M. Comte.\n\nAs all his readers must admit, M. Comte presents us with a scheme of\nthe sciences which, unlike the foregoing ones, demands respectful\nconsideration. Widely as we differ from him, we cheerfully bear witness\nto the largeness of his views, the clearness of his reasoning, and the\nvalue of his speculations as contributing to intellectual progress.\nDid we believe a serial arrangement of the sciences to be possible,\nthat of M. Comte would certainly be the one we should adopt. His\nfundamental propositions are thoroughly intelligible; and, if not true,\nhave a great semblance of truth. His successive steps are logically\nco-ordinated; and he supports his conclusions by a considerable amount\nof evidence\u2014evidence which, so long as it is not critically examined,\nor not met by counter evidence, seems to substantiate his positions.\nBut it only needs to assume that antagonistic attitude which _ought_\nto be assumed towards new doctrines, in the belief that, if true, they\nwill prosper by conquering objectors\u2014it needs but to test his leading\ndoctrines either by other facts than those he cites, or by his own\nfacts differently applied, to show that they will not stand. We will\nproceed thus to deal with the general principle on which he bases his\nhierarchy of the sciences.\n\nIn the condensed translation of the _Positive Philosophy_, by Miss\nMartineau, M. Comte says:\u2014\u201cOur problem is, then, to find the one\n_rational_ order, amongst a host of possible systems.\u201d\u00a0.\u00a0. \u201cThis order\nis determined by the degree of simplicity, or, what comes to the same\nthing, of generality of their phenomena.\u201d And the arrangement he\ndeduces runs thus:\u2014_Mathematics_, _Astronomy_, _Physics_, _Chemistry_,\n_Physiology_, _Social Physics_. This he asserts to be \u201cthe true\n_filiation_ of the sciences.\u201d He asserts further, that the principle\nof progression from a greater to a less degree of generality, \u201cwhich\ngives this order to the whole body of science, arranges the parts of\neach science.\u201d And, {16} finally, he asserts that the gradations\nthus established _\u00e0 priori_ among the sciences and the parts of\neach science, \u201cis in essential conformity with the order which has\nspontaneously taken place among the branches of natural philosophy;\u201d\nor, in other words\u2014corresponds with the order of historic development.\n\nLet us compare these assertions with the facts. That there may be\nperfect fairness, let us make no choice, but take as the field\nfor our comparison, the succeeding section treating of the first\nscience\u2014Mathematics; and let us use none but M. Comte\u2019s own facts,\nand his own admissions. Confining ourselves to this one science, we\nare limited to comparisons between its several parts. M. Comte says,\nthat the parts of each science must be arranged in the order of their\ndecreasing generality; and that this order of decreasing generality\nagrees with the order of historic development. Our inquiry will be,\nthen, whether the history of mathematics confirms this statement.\n\nCarrying out his principle, M. Comte divides Mathematics into \u201cAbstract\nMathematics, or the Calculus (taking the word in its most extended\nsense) and Concrete Mathematics, which is composed of General Geometry\nand of Rational Mechanics.\u201d The subject-matter of the first of these is\n_number_; the subject-matter of the second includes _space_, _time_,\n_motion_, _force_. The one possesses the highest possible degree of\ngenerality; for all things whatever admit of enumeration. The others\nare less general; seeing that there are endless phenomena that are\nnot cognizable either by general geometry or rational mechanics. In\nconformity with the alleged law, therefore, the evolution of the\ncalculus must throughout have preceded the evolution of the concrete\nsub-sciences. Now somewhat awkwardly for him, the first remark M. Comte\nmakes bearing on this point is, that \u201cfrom an historical point of view,\nmathematical analysis _appears to have arisen out of_ the contemplation\nof geometrical and mechanical facts.\u201d True, he goes {17} on to say\nthat, \u201cit is not the less independent of these sciences logically\nspeaking;\u201d for that \u201canalytical ideas are, above all others, universal,\nabstract, and simple; and geometrical conceptions are necessarily\nfounded on them.\u201d We will not take advantage of this last passage to\ncharge M. Comte with teaching, after the fashion of Hegel, that there\ncan be thought without things thought of. We are content simply to\ncompare the assertion, that analysis arose out of the contemplation of\ngeometrical and mechanical facts, with the assertion that geometrical\nconceptions are founded upon analytical ones. Literally interpreted\nthey exactly cancel each other. Interpreted, however, in a liberal\nsense, they imply, what we believe to be demonstrable, that the two\nhad _a simultaneous origin_. The passage is either nonsense, or it is\nan admission that abstract and concrete mathematics are coeval. Thus,\nat the very first step, the alleged congruity between the order of\ngenerality and the order of evolution, does not hold good.\n\nBut may it not be that though abstract and concrete mathematics took\ntheir rise at the same time, the one afterwards developed more rapidly\nthan the other; and has ever since remained in advance of it? No: and\nagain we call M. Comte himself as witness. Fortunately for his argument\nhe has said nothing respecting the early stages of the concrete and\nabstract divisions after their divergence from a common root; otherwise\nthe advent of Algebra long after the Greek geometry had reached a high\ndevelopment, would have been an inconvenient fact for him to deal with.\nBut passing over this, and limiting ourselves to his own statements,\nwe find, at the opening of the next chapter, the admission, that \u201cthe\nhistorical development of the abstract portion of mathematical science\nhas, since the time of Descartes, been for the most part _determined_\nby that of the concrete.\u201d Further on we read respecting algebraic\nfunctions that \u201cmost functions were concrete in their origin\u2014even\nthose which are at present the most purely {18} abstract; and the\nancients discovered only through geometrical definitions elementary\nalgebraic properties of functions to which a numerical value was not\nattached till long afterwards, rendering abstract to us what was\nconcrete to the old geometers.\u201d How do these statements tally with\nhis doctrine? Again, having divided the calculus into algebraic and\narithmetical, M. Comte admits, as perforce he must, that the algebraic\nis more general than the arithmetical; yet he will not say that algebra\npreceded arithmetic in point of time. And again, having divided the\ncalculus of functions into the calculus of direct functions (common\nalgebra) and the calculus of indirect functions (transcendental\nanalysis), he is obliged to speak of this last as possessing a higher\ngenerality than the first; yet it is far more modern. Indeed, by\nimplication, M. Comte himself confesses this incongruity; for he\nsays:\u2014\u201cIt might seem that the transcendental analysis ought to be\nstudied before the ordinary, as it provides the equations which the\nother has to resolve. But though the transcendental _is logically\nindependent of the ordinary_, it is best to follow the usual method of\nstudy, taking the ordinary first.\u201d In all these cases, then, as well as\nat the close of the section where he predicts that mathematicians will\nin time \u201ccreate procedures of a _wider generality_,\u201d M. Comte makes\nadmissions that are diametrically opposed to the alleged law.\n\nIn the succeeding chapters treating of the concrete department of\nmathematics, we find similar contradictions. M. Comte himself names the\ngeometry of the ancients _special_ geometry and that of the moderns\n_general_ geometry. He admits that while \u201cthe ancients studied geometry\nwith reference to the _bodies_ under notice, or specially; the moderns\nstudy it with reference to the _phenomena_ to be considered, or\ngenerally.\u201d He admits that while \u201cthe ancients extracted all they could\nout of one line or surface before passing to another,\u201d \u201cthe moderns,\nsince Descartes, employ themselves on questions {19} which relate to\nany figure whatever.\u201d These facts are the reverse of what, according\nto his theory, they should be. So, too, in mechanics. Before dividing\nit into statics and dynamics, M. Comte treats of the three laws of\n_motion_, and is obliged to do so; for statics, the more _general_ of\nthe two divisions, though it does not involve motion, is impossible\nas a science until the laws of motion are ascertained. Yet the laws\nof motion pertain to dynamics, the more _special_ of the divisions.\nFurther on he points out that after Archimedes, who discovered the\nlaw of equilibrium of the lever, statics made no progress until the\nestablishment of dynamics enabled us to seek \u201cthe conditions of\nequilibrium through the laws of the composition of forces.\u201d And he\nadds\u2014\u201cAt this day _this is the method universally employed_. At the\nfirst glance it does not appear the most rational\u2014dynamics being\nmore complicated than statics, and precedence being natural to the\nsimpler. It would, in fact, be more philosophical to refer dynamics to\nstatics, as has since been done.\u201d Sundry discoveries are afterwards\ndetailed, showing how completely the development of statics has been\nachieved by considering its problems dynamically; and before the close\nof the section M. Comte remarks that \u201cbefore hydrostatics could be\ncomprehended under statics, it was necessary that the abstract theory\nof equilibrium should be made so general as to apply directly to fluids\nas well as solids. This was accomplished when Lagrange supplied, as\nthe basis of the whole of rational mechanics, the single principle of\nvirtual velocities.\u201d In which statement we have two facts directly at\nvariance with M. Comte\u2019s doctrine;\u2014first, that the simpler science,\nstatics, reached its present development only by the aid of the\nprinciple of virtual velocities, which belongs to the more complex\nscience, dynamics; and that this \u201csingle principle\u201d underlying all\nrational mechanics\u2014this _most general form_ which includes alike the\nrelations of statical, {20} hydrostatical, and dynamical forces\u2014was\nreached so late as the time of Lagrange.\n\nThus it is _not_ true that the historical succession of the divisions\nof mathematics has corresponded with the order of decreasing\ngenerality. It is _not_ true that abstract mathematics was evolved\nantecedently to, and independently of, concrete mathematics. It is\n_not_ true that of the subdivisions of abstract mathematics, the\nmore general came before the more special. And it is _not_ true that\nconcrete mathematics, in either of its two sections, began with the\nmost abstract and advanced to the less abstract truths.\n\nIt may be well to mention, parenthetically, that, in defending his\nalleged law of progression from the general to the special, M. Comte\nsomewhere comments upon the two meanings of the word _general_, and\nthe resulting liability to confusion. Without now discussing whether\nthe asserted distinction exists in other cases, it is manifest that\nit does not exist here. In sundry of the instances above quoted, the\nendeavours made by M. Comte himself to disguise, or to explain away,\nthe precedence of the special over the general, clearly indicate that\nthe generality spoken of is of the kind meant by his formula. And it\nneeds but a brief consideration of the matter to show that, even did he\nattempt it, he could not distinguish this generality which, as above\nproved, frequently comes last, from the generality which he says always\ncomes first. For what is the nature of that mental process by which\nobjects, dimensions, weights, times, and the rest, are found capable\nof having their relations expressed numerically? It is the formation\nof certain abstract conceptions of unity, duality, and multiplicity,\nwhich are applicable to all things alike. It is the invention of\ngeneral symbols serving to express the numerical relations of entities,\nwhatever be their special characters. And what is the nature of the\nmental process by which numbers are found capable of having their\nrelations expressed algebraically? It is the same. {21} It is the\nformation of certain abstract conceptions of numerical functions which\nare constant whatever be the magnitudes of the numbers. It is the\ninvention of general symbols serving to express the relations between\nnumbers, as numbers express the relations between things. Just as\narithmetic deals with the common properties of lines, areas, bulks,\nforces, periods; so does algebra deal with the common properties of the\nnumbers which arithmetic presents.\n\nHaving shown that M. Comte\u2019s alleged law of progression does not hold\namong the several parts of the same science, let us see how it agrees\nwith the facts when applied to the separate sciences. \u201cAstronomy,\u201d\nsays M. Comte (_Positive Philosophy_, Book III.), \u201cwas a positive\nscience, in its geometrical aspect, from the earliest days of the\nschool of Alexandria; but Physics, which we are now to consider, had\nno positive character at all till Galileo made his great discoveries\non the fall of heavy bodies.\u201d On this, our comment is simply that\nit is a misrepresentation based upon an arbitrary misuse of words\u2014a\nmere verbal artifice. By choosing to exclude from terrestrial physics\nthose laws of magnitude, motion, and position, which he includes in\ncelestial physics, M. Comte makes it appear that the last owes nothing\nto the first. Not only is this unwarrantable, but it is radically\ninconsistent with his own scheme of divisions. At the outset he\nsays\u2014and as the point is important we quote from the original\u2014\u201cPour\nla _physique inorganique_ nous voyons d\u2019abord, en nous conformant\ntoujours \u00e0 l\u2019ordre de g\u00e9n\u00e9ralit\u00e9 et de d\u00e9pendance des ph\u00e9nom\u00e8nes,\nqu\u2019elle doit \u00eatre partag\u00e9e en deux sections distinctes, suivant qu\u2019elle\nconsid\u00e8re les ph\u00e9nom\u00e8nes g\u00e9n\u00e9raux de l\u2019univers, ou, en particulier,\nceux que pr\u00e9sentent les corps terrestres. D\u2019o\u00f9 la physique c\u00e9leste,\nou l\u2019astronomie, soit g\u00e9om\u00e9trique, soit mechanique; et la physique\nterrestre.\u201d Here then we have _inorganic physics_ clearly divided into\n_celestial physics_ and _terrestrial physics_\u2014the phenomena presented\nby the universe, and the {22} phenomena presented by earthly bodies.\nIf now celestial bodies and terrestrial bodies exhibit sundry leading\nphenomena in common, as they do, how can the generalization of these\ncommon phenomena be considered as pertaining to the one class rather\nthan to the other? If inorganic physics includes geometry (which M.\nComte has made it do by comprehending _geometrical_ astronomy in\nits sub-section, celestial physics); and if its other sub-section,\nterrestrial physics, treats of things having geometrical properties;\nhow can the laws of geometrical relations be excluded from terrestrial\nphysics? Clearly if celestial physics includes the geometry of\nobjects in the heavens, terrestrial physics includes the geometry of\nobjects on the earth. And if terrestrial physics includes terrestrial\ngeometry, while celestial physics includes celestial geometry, then\nthe geometrical part of terrestrial physics precedes the geometrical\npart of celestial physics; seeing that geometry gained its first\nideas from surrounding objects. Until men had learnt geometrical\nrelations from bodies on the earth, it was impossible for them to\nunderstand the geometrical relations of bodies in the heavens. So,\ntoo, with celestial mechanics, which had terrestrial mechanics for its\nparent. The very conception of _force_, which underlies the whole of\nmechanical astronomy, is borrowed from our earthly experiences; and\nthe leading laws of mechanical action as exhibited in scales, levers,\nprojectiles, &c., had to be ascertained before the dynamics of the\nSolar System could be entered upon. What were the laws made use of by\nNewton in working out his grand discovery? The law of falling bodies\ndisclosed by Galileo; that of the composition of forces also disclosed\nby Galileo; and that of centrifugal force found out by Huyghens\u2014all\nof them generalizations of terrestrial physics. Yet, with facts like\nthese before him, M. Comte places astronomy before physics in order\nof evolution! He does not compare the geometrical parts of the two\ntogether, and the mechanical parts of the two {23} together; for this\nwould by no means suit his hypothesis. But he compares the geometrical\npart of the one with the mechanical part of the other, and so gives\na semblance of truth to his position. He is led away by a verbal\nillusion. Had he confined his attention to the things and disregarded\nthe words, he would have seen that before mankind scientifically\nco-ordinated _any one class of phenomena_ displayed in the heavens,\nthey had previously co-ordinated _a parallel class of phenomena_\ndisplayed on the surface of the earth.\n\nWere it needful we could fill a score pages with the incongruities\nof M. Comte\u2019s scheme. But the foregoing samples will suffice. So far\nis his law of evolution of the sciences from being tenable, that, by\nfollowing his example, and arbitrarily ignoring one class of facts,\nit would be possible to present, with great plausibility, just the\nopposite generalization to that which he enunciates. While he asserts\nthat the rational order of the sciences, like the order of their\nhistoric development, \u201cis determined by the degree of simplicity, or,\nwhat comes to the same thing, of generality of their phenomena;\u201d it\nmight contrariwise be asserted that, commencing with the complex and\nthe special, mankind have progressed step by step to a knowledge of\ngreater simplicity and wider generality. So much evidence is there of\nthis as to have drawn from Whewell, in his _History of the Inductive\nSciences_, the remark that \u201cthe reader has already seen repeatedly\nin the course of this history, complex and derivative principles\npresenting themselves to men\u2019s minds before simple and elementary\nones.\u201d Even from M. Comte\u2019s own work, numerous facts, admissions, and\narguments, might be picked out, tending to show this. We have already\nquoted his words in proof that both abstract and concrete mathematics\nhave progressed towards a higher degree of generality, and that he\nlooks forward to a higher generality still. Just to strengthen this\nadverse hypothesis, let us take a further instance. {24} From the\n_particular_ case of the scales, the law of equilibrium of which was\nfamiliar to the earliest nations known, Archimedes advanced to the\nmore _general_ case of the lever of which the arms may or may not be\nequal; the law of equilibrium of which _includes_ that of the scales.\nBy the help of Galileo\u2019s discovery concerning the composition of\nforces, D\u2019Alembert \u201cestablished, for the first time, the equations\nof equilibrium of _any_ system of forces applied to the different\npoints of a solid body\u201d\u2014equations which include all cases of levers\nand an infinity of cases besides. Clearly this is progress towards\na higher generality\u2014towards a knowledge more independent of special\ncircumstances\u2014towards a study of phenomena \u201cthe most disengaged from\nthe incidents of particular cases;\u201d which is M. Comte\u2019s definition\nof \u201cthe most simple phenomena.\u201d Does it not indeed follow from the\nadmitted fact, that mental advance is from the concrete to the\nabstract, from the particular to the general, that the universal and\ntherefore most simple truths are the last to be discovered? Should we\never succeed in reducing all orders of phenomena to some single law\u2014say\nof atomic action, as M. Comte suggests\u2014must not that law answer to his\ntest of being _independent_ of all others, and therefore most simple?\nAnd would not such a law generalize the phenomena of gravity, cohesion,\natomic affinity, and electric repulsion, just as the laws of number\ngeneralize the quantitative phenomena of space, time and force?\n\nThe possibility of saying so much in support of an hypothesis the very\nreverse of M. Comte\u2019s, at once proves that his generalization is only a\nhalf-truth. The fact is that neither proposition is correct by itself;\nand the actuality is expressed only by putting the two together. The\nprogress of science is duplex. It is at once from the special to the\ngeneral, and from the general to the special. It is analytical and\nsynthetical at the same time.\n\nM. Comte himself observes that the evolution of science {25} has been\naccomplished by the division of labour; but he quite misstates the\nmode in which this division of labour has operated. As he describes\nit, it has been simply an arrangement of phenomena into classes, and\nthe study of each class by itself. He does not recognize the effect of\nprogress in each class upon _all_ other classes: he recognizes only\nthe effect on the class succeeding it in his hierarchical scale. Or if\nhe occasionally admits collateral influences and intercommunications,\nhe does it so grudgingly, and so quickly puts the admissions out of\nsight and forgets them, as to leave the impression that, with but\ntrifling exceptions, the sciences aid one another only in the order\nof their alleged succession. The fact is, however, that the division\nof labour in science, like the division of labour in society, and\nlike the \u201cphysiological division of labour\u201d in individual organisms,\nhas been not only a specialization of functions, but a continuous\nhelping of each division by all the others, and of all by each. Every\nparticular class of inquirers has, as it were, secreted its own\nparticular order of truths from the general mass of material which\nobservation accumulates; and all other classes of inquirers have made\nuse of these truths as fast as they were elaborated, with the effect\nof enabling them the better to elaborate each its own order of truths.\nIt was thus in sundry of the cases we have quoted as at variance with\nM. Comte\u2019s doctrine. It was thus with the application of Huyghens\u2019s\noptical discovery to astronomical observation by Galileo. It was thus\nwith the application of the isochronism of the pendulum to the making\nof instruments for measuring intervals, astronomical and other. It was\nthus when the discovery that the refraction and dispersion of light\ndid not follow the same law of variation, affected both astronomy and\nphysiology by giving us achromatic telescopes and microscopes. It\nwas thus when Bradley\u2019s discovery of the aberration of light enabled\nhim to make the first step towards ascertaining the motions of the\nstars. {26} It was thus when Cavendish\u2019s torsion-balance experiment\ndetermined the specific gravity of the Earth, and so gave a datum for\ncalculating the specific gravities of the Sun and Planets. It was\nthus when tables of atmospheric refraction enabled observers to write\ndown the real places of the heavenly bodies instead of their apparent\nplaces. It was thus when the discovery of the different expansibilities\nof metals by heat, gave us the means of correcting our chronometrical\nmeasurements of astronomical periods. It was thus when the lines of\nthe prismatic spectrum were used to distinguish the heavenly bodies\nthat are of like nature with the sun from those which are not. It was\nthus when, as recently, an electro-telegraphic instrument was invented\nfor the more accurate registration of meridional transits. It was\nthus when the difference in the rates of a clock at the equator, and\nnearer the poles, gave data for calculating the oblateness of the\nearth, and accounting for the precession of the equinoxes. It was\nthus\u2014but it is needless to continue. Here, within our own limited\nknowledge of its history, we have named ten additional cases in which\nthe single science of astronomy has owed its advance to sciences\ncoming _after_ it in M. Comte\u2019s series. Not only its minor changes,\nbut its greatest revolutions have been thus determined. Kepler could\nnot have discovered his celebrated laws had it not been for Tycho\nBrahe\u2019s accurate observations; and it was only after some progress\nin physical and chemical science that the improved instruments with\nwhich those observations were made, became possible. The heliocentric\ntheory of the Solar System had to wait until the invention of the\ntelescope before it could be finally established. Nay, even the grand\ndiscovery of all\u2014the law of gravitation\u2014depended for its proof upon\nan operation of physical science, the measurement of a degree on the\nEarth\u2019s surface. So completely, indeed, did it thus depend, that Newton\n_had actually abandoned his hypothesis_ because the {27} length of\na degree, as then stated, brought out wrong results; and it was only\nafter Picart\u2019s more exact measurement was published, that he returned\nto his calculations and proved his great generalization. Now this\nconstant intercommunion which, for brevity\u2019s sake, we have illustrated\nin the case of one science only, has been taking place with all the\nsciences. Throughout the whole course of their evolution there has been\na continuous _consensus_ of the sciences\u2014a _consensus_ exhibiting a\ngeneral correspondence with the _consensus_ of the faculties in each\nphase of mental development; the one being an objective registry of the\nsubjective state of the other.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nFrom our present point of view, then, it becomes obvious that the\nconception of a _serial_ arrangement of the sciences is a vicious one.\nIt is not simply that, as M. Comte admits, such a classification \u201cwill\nalways involve something, if not arbitrary, at least artificial;\u201d it is\nnot, as he would have us believe, that, neglecting minor imperfections\nsuch a classification may be substantially true; but it is that any\ngrouping of the sciences in a succession gives a radically erroneous\nidea of their genesis and their dependencies. There is no \u201cone\n_rational_ order among a host of possible systems.\u201d There is no \u201ctrue\n_filiation_ of the sciences.\u201d The whole hypothesis is fundamentally\nfalse. Indeed, it needs but a glance at its origin to see at once how\nbaseless it is. Why a _series_? What reason have we to suppose that\nthe sciences admit of a _linear_ arrangement? Where is our warrant\nfor assuming that there is some _succession_ in which they can be\nplaced? There is no reason; no warrant. Whence then has arisen the\nsupposition? To use M. Comte\u2019s own phraseology, we should say, it is\na metaphysical conception. It adds another to the cases constantly\noccurring, of the human mind being made the measure of Nature. We are\nobliged to think in sequence; it is a law of our minds that we must\nconsider subjects separately, one after another: _therefore_ {28}\nNature must be serial\u2014_therefore_ the sciences must be classifiable in\na succession. See here the birth of the notion, and the sole evidence\nof its truth. Men have been obliged when arranging in books their\nschemes of education and systems of knowledge, to choose _some_ order\nor other. And from inquiring what is the best order, have fallen into\nthe belief that there is an order which truly represents the facts\u2014have\npersevered in seeking such an order; quite overlooking the previous\nquestion whether it is likely that Nature has consulted the convenience\nof book-making. For German philosophers, who hold that Nature is\n\u201cpetrified intelligence,\u201d and that logical forms are the foundations of\nall things, it is a consistent hypothesis that as thought is serial,\nNature is serial; but that M. Comte, who is so bitter an opponent\nof all anthropomorphism, even in its most evanescent shapes, should\nhave committed the mistake of imposing upon the external world an\narrangement which so obviously springs from a limitation of the human\nconsciousness, is somewhat strange. And it is the more strange when\nwe call to mind how, at the outset, M. Comte remarks that in the\nbeginning \u201c_toutes les sciences sont cultiv\u00e9es simultan\u00e9ment par les\nm\u00eames esprits_;\u201d that this is \u201c_inevitable et m\u00eame indispensable_;\u201d\nand how he further remarks that the different sciences are \u201c_comme les\ndiverses branches d\u2019un tronc unique_.\u201d Were it not accounted for by the\ndistorting influence of a cherished hypothesis, it would be scarcely\npossible to understand how, after recognizing truths like these, M.\nComte should have persisted in attempting to construct \u201c_une \u00e9chelle\nencyclop\u00e9dique_.\u201d\n\nThe metaphor which M. Comte has here so inconsistently used to express\nthe relations of the sciences\u2014branches of one trunk\u2014is an approximation\nto the truth, though not the truth itself. It suggests the facts that\nthe sciences had a common origin; that they have been developing\nsimultaneously; and that they have been from time to time dividing\nand sub-dividing. But it fails to suggest the fact, that the {29}\ndivisions and sub-divisions thus arising do not remain separate, but\nnow and again re-unite in direct and indirect ways. They inosculate;\nthey severally send off and receive connecting growths; and the\nintercommunion has been ever becoming more frequent, more intricate,\nmore widely ramified. There has all along been higher specialization,\nthat there might be a larger generalization; and a deeper analysis,\nthat there might be a better synthesis. Each larger generalization has\nlifted sundry specializations still higher; and each better synthesis\nhas prepared the way for still deeper analysis.\n\nAnd here we may fitly enter upon the task awhile since indicated\u2014a\nsketch of the Genesis of Science, regarded as a gradual outgrowth\nfrom common knowledge\u2014an extension of the perceptions by the aid\nof the reason. We propose to treat it as a psychological process\nhistorically displayed; tracing at the same time the advance from\nqualitative to quantitative prevision; the progress from concrete facts\nto abstract facts, and the application of such abstract facts to the\nanalysis of new orders of concrete facts; the simultaneous advance\nin generalization and specialization; the continually increasing\nsubdivision and reunion of the sciences; and their constantly improving\n_consensus_.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nTo trace out scientific evolution from its deepest roots would, of\ncourse, involve a complete analysis of the mind. For as science is a\ndevelopment of that common knowledge acquired by the unaided senses and\nuncultured reason, so is that common knowledge itself gradually built\nup out of the simplest perceptions. We must, therefore, begin somewhere\nabruptly; and the most appropriate stage to take for our point of\ndeparture will be the adult mind of the savage.\n\nCommencing thus, without a proper preliminary analysis, we are\nnaturally somewhat at a loss how to present, in a satisfactory manner,\nthose fundamental processes of thought out of which science originates.\nPerhaps our argument may {30} be best initiated by the proposition,\nthat all intelligent action whatever depends upon the discerning of\ndistinctions among surrounding things. The condition under which only\nit is possible for any creature to obtain food and avoid danger, is,\nthat it shall be differently affected by different objects\u2014that it\nshall be led to act in one way by one object, and in another way by\nanother. In the lower orders of creatures this condition is fulfilled\nby means of an apparatus which acts automatically. In the higher\norders the actions are partly automatic, partly conscious. And in man\nthey are almost wholly conscious. Throughout, however, there must\nnecessarily exist a certain classification of things according to their\nproperties\u2014a classification which is either organically registered in\nthe system, as in the inferior creation, or is formed by conscious\nexperience, as in ourselves. And it may be further remarked, that the\nextent to which this classification is carried, roughly indicates the\nheight of intelligence\u2014that, while the lowest organisms are able to\ndo little more than discriminate organic from inorganic matter; while\nthe generality of animals carry their classifications no further than\nto a limited number of plants or creatures serving for food, a limited\nnumber of beasts of prey, and a limited number of places and materials;\nthe most degraded of the human race possess a knowledge of the\ndistinctive natures of a great variety of substances, plants, animals,\ntools, persons, &c.; not only as classes but as individuals.\n\nWhat now is the mental process by which classification is effected?\nManifestly it is a recognition of the _likeness_ or _unlikeness_ of\nthings, either in respect of their sizes, colours, forms, weights,\ntextures, tastes, &c., or in respect of their modes of action. By\nsome special mark, sound, or motion, the savage identifies a certain\nfour-legged creature he sees, as one that is good for food, and to\nbe caught in a particular way; or as one that is dangerous; and acts\naccordingly. He has classed together all the creatures that are\n_alike_ in {31} this particular. And manifestly in choosing the wood\nout of which to form his bow, the plant with which to poison his\narrows, the bone from which to make his fish-hooks, he identifies them\nthrough their chief sensible properties as belonging to the general\nclasses, wood, plant, and bone, but distinguishes them as belonging to\nsub-classes by virtue of certain properties in which they are _unlike_\nthe rest of the general classes they belong to; and so forms genera and\nspecies.\n\nAnd here it becomes manifest that not only is classification carried\non by grouping together in the mind things that are _like_; but\nthat classes and sub-classes are formed and arranged according to\nthe _degrees of unlikeness_. Things strongly contrasted are alone\ndistinguished in the lower stages of mental evolution; as may be\nany day observed in an infant. And gradually as the powers of\ndiscrimination increase, the strongly-contrasted classes at first\ndistinguished, come to be each divided into sub-classes, differing\nfrom each other less than the classes differ; and these sub-classes\nare again divided after the same manner. By the continuance of which\nprocess, things are gradually arranged into groups, the members of\nwhich are less and less _unlike_; ending, finally, in groups whose\nmembers differ only as individuals, and not specifically. And thus\nthere tends ultimately to arise the notion of _complete likeness_.\nFor manifestly, it is impossible that groups should continue to be\nsubdivided in virtue of smaller and smaller differences, without there\nbeing a simultaneous approximation to the notion of _no difference_.\n\nLet us next notice that the recognition of likeness and unlikeness,\nwhich underlies classification, and out of which continued\nclassification evolves the idea of complete likeness\u2014let us next notice\nthat it also underlies the process of _naming_, and by consequence\n_language_. For all language consists, at the outset, of symbols\nwhich are as _like_ to the things symbolized as it is practicable to\nmake them. The {32} language of signs is a means of conveying ideas\nby mimicking the actions or peculiarities of the things referred to.\nVerbal language also, in its first stage, is a mode of suggesting\nobjects or acts by imitating the sounds which the objects make, or\nwith which the acts are accompanied. Originally these two languages\nwere used simultaneously. It needs but to watch the gesticulations\nwith which the savage accompanies his speech\u2014to see a Bushman\ndramatizing before an audience his mode of catching game\u2014or to note\nthe extreme paucity of words in primitive vocabularies; to infer that\nin the beginning, attitudes, gestures, and sounds, were all combined\nto produce as good a _likeness_ as possible of the things, animals,\npersons, or events described; and that as the sounds came to be\nunderstood by themselves the gestures fell into disuse: leaving traces,\nhowever, in the manners of the more excitable civilized races. But be\nthis as it may, it suffices simply to observe, how many of the words\ncurrent among barbarous peoples are like the sounds appertaining to the\nthings signified; how many of our own oldest and simplest words have\nthe same peculiarity; how children habitually invent imitative words;\nand how the sign-language spontaneously formed by deaf mutes is based\non imitative actions\u2014to be convinced that the notion of _likeness_\nis that from which the nomenclature of objects takes its rise. Were\nthere space we might go on to point out how this law of likeness is\ntraceable, not only in the origin but in the development of language;\nhow in primitive tongues the plural is made by a duplication of the\nsingular, which is a multiplication of the word to make it _like_ the\nmultiplicity of the things; how the use of metaphor\u2014that prolific\nsource of new words\u2014is a suggesting of ideas which are _like_ the ideas\nto be conveyed in some respect or other; and how, in the copious use\nof simile, fable, and allegory among uncivilized races, we see that\ncomplex conceptions which there is no direct language for, are {33}\nrendered, by presenting known conceptions more or less _like_ them.\n\nThis view is confirmed, and the predominance of this notion of likeness\nin primitive thought further illustrated, by the fact that our system\nof presenting ideas to the eye originated after the same fashion.\nWriting and printing have descended from picture-language. The earliest\nmode of permanently registering a fact was by depicting it on a skin\nand afterwards on a wall; that is\u2014by exhibiting something as _like_\nto the thing to be remembered as it could be made. Gradually as the\npractice grew habitual and extensive, the most frequently repeated\nforms became fixed, and presently abbreviated; and, passing through\nthe hieroglyphic and ideographic phases, the symbols lost all apparent\nrelation to the things signified: just as the majority of our spoken\nwords have done.\n\nObserve, again, that the same thing is true respecting the genesis of\nreasoning. The _likeness_ which is perceived to exist between cases,\nis the essence of all early reasoning and of much of our present\nreasoning. The savage, having by experience discovered a relation\nbetween a certain object and a certain act, infers that the _like_\nrelation will be found in future. And the expressions we use in our\narguments\u2014\u201c_analogy_ implies,\u201d \u201cthe cases are not _parallel_,\u201d \u201cby\n_parity_ of reasoning,\u201d \u201cthere is no _similarity_,\u201d\u2014show how constantly\nthe idea of likeness underlies our ratiocinative processes. Still\nmore clearly will this be seen on recognizing the fact that there is\na close connexion between reasoning and classification; that the two\nhave a common root; and that neither can go on without the other. For\non the one hand, it is a familiar truth that the attributing to a body\nin consequence of some of its properties, all those other properties\nin virtue of which it is referred to a particular class, is an act of\ninference. And, on the other hand, the forming of a generalization\nis the putting together in one class, all those {34} cases which\npresent like relations; while the drawing a deduction is essentially\nthe perception that a particular case belongs to a certain class of\ncases previously generalized. So that as classification is a grouping\ntogether of _like things_; reasoning is a grouping together of _like\nrelations_ among things. Add to which, that while the perfection\ngradually achieved in classification consists in the formation of\ngroups of _objects_ which are _completely alike_; the perfection\ngradually achieved in reasoning consists in the formation of groups of\n_cases_ which are _completely alike_.\n\nOnce more we may contemplate this dominant idea of likeness as\nexhibited in art. All art, civilized as well as savage, consists\nalmost wholly in the making of objects _like_ other objects; either\nas found in Nature, or as produced by previous art. If we trace back\nthe varied art-products now existing, we find that at each stage the\ndivergence from previous patterns is but small when compared with the\nagreement; and in the earliest art the persistency of imitation is yet\nmore conspicuous. The old forms and ornaments and symbols were held\nsacred, and perpetually copied. Indeed, the strong imitative tendency\nnotoriously displayed by the lowest human races\u2014often seeming to be\nhalf automatic, ensures among them a constant reproducing of likenesses\nof things, forms, signs, sounds, actions and whatever else is imitable;\nand we may even suspect that this aboriginal peculiarity is in some way\nconnected with the culture and development of this general conception,\nwhich we have found so deep and wide-spread in its applications.\n\nAnd now let us go on to consider how, by a further unfolding of this\nsame fundamental notion, there is a gradual formation of the first\ngerms of science. This idea of likeness which underlies classification,\nnomenclature, language spoken and written, reasoning, and art; and\nwhich plays so important a part because all acts of intelligence are\nmade {35} possible only by distinguishing among surrounding things, or\ngrouping them into like and unlike;\u2014this idea we shall find to be the\none of which science is the especial product. Already during the stage\nwe have been describing, there has existed _qualitative_ prevision in\nrespect to the commoner phenomena with which savage life is familiar;\nand we have now to inquire how the elements of _quantitative_ prevision\nare evolved. We shall find that they originate by the perfecting of\nthis same idea of likeness\u2014that they have their rise in that conception\nof _complete likeness_ which, as we have seen, necessarily results from\nthe continued process of classification.\n\nFor when the process of classification has been carried as far as it\nis possible for the uncivilized to carry it\u2014when the animal kingdom\nhas been grouped not merely into quadrupeds, birds, fishes, and\ninsects, but each of these divided into kinds\u2014when there come to be\nclasses, in each of which the members differ only as individuals,\nand not specifically; it is clear that there must frequently\noccur an observation of objects which differ so little as to be\nindistinguishable. Among several creatures which the savage has killed\nand carried home, it must often happen that some one, which he wished\nto identify, is so exactly like another that he cannot tell which is\nwhich. Thus, then, there originates the notion of _equality_. The\nthings which among ourselves are called _equal_\u2014whether lines, angles,\nweights, temperatures, sounds or colours\u2014are things which produce in us\nsensations which cannot be distinguished from each other. It is true\nthat we now apply the word _equal_ chiefly to the separate traits or\nrelations which objects exhibit, and not to those combinations of them\nconstituting our conceptions of the objects; but this limitation of\nthe idea has evidently arisen by analysis. That the notion of equality\noriginated as alleged, will, we think, become obvious on remembering\nthat as there were no artificial objects from which it could have been\n{36} abstracted, it must have been abstracted from natural objects;\nand that the various families of the animal kingdom chiefly furnish\nthose natural objects which display the requisite exactitude of\nlikeness.\n\nThe experiences out of which this general idea of equality is evolved,\ngive birth at the same time to a more complex idea of equality; or,\nrather, the process just described generates an idea of equality which\nfurther experience separates into two ideas\u2014_equality of things_ and\n_equality of relations_. While organic forms occasionally exhibit this\nperfection of likeness out of which the notion of simple equality\narises, they more frequently exhibit only that kind of likeness which\nwe call _similarity_; and which is really compound equality. For the\nsimilarity of two creatures of the same species but of different sizes,\nis of the same nature as the similarity of two geometrical figures.\nIn either case, any two parts of the one bear the same ratio to one\nanother, as the homologous parts of the other. Given in a species, the\nproportions found to exist among the bones, and we may, and zoologists\ndo, predict from any one, the dimensions of the rest; just as, when\nknowing the proportions subsisting among the parts of a geometrical\nfigure, we may, from the length of one, calculate the others. And\nif, in the case of similar geometrical figures, the similarity can\nbe established only by proving exactness of proportion among the\nhomologous parts\u2014if we express this relation between two parts in the\none, and the corresponding parts in the other, by the formula A is\nto B as _a_ is to _b_; if we otherwise write this, A to B = _a_ to\n_b_; if, consequently, the fact we prove is that the relation of A to\nB _equals_ the relation of _a_ to _b_; then it is manifest that the\nfundamental conception of similarity is _equality of relations_. With\nthis explanation we shall be understood when we say that the notion\nof equality of relations is the basis of all exact reasoning. Already\nit has been shown that reasoning in general is a recognition {37} of\n_likeness_ of relations; and here we further find that while the notion\nof likeness of things ultimately evolves the idea of simple equality,\nthe notion of likeness of relations evolves the idea of equality of\nrelations: of which the one is the concrete germ of exact science,\nwhile the other is its abstract germ. Those who cannot understand\nhow the recognition of similarity in creatures of the same kind,\ncan have any alliance with reasoning, will get over the difficulty\non remembering that the phenomena among which equality of relations\nis thus perceived, are phenomena of the same order and are present\nto the senses at the same time; while those among which developed\nreason perceives relations, are generally neither of the same order,\nnor simultaneously present. And if, further, they will call to mind\nhow Cuvier and Owen, from a single part of a creature, as a tooth,\nconstruct the rest by a process of reasoning based on this equality of\nrelations, they will see that the two things are intimately connected,\nremote as they at first seem. But we anticipate. What it concerns us\nhere to observe is, that from familiarity with organic forms there\nsimultaneously arose the ideas of _simple equality_, and _equality of\nrelations_.\n\nAt the same time, too, and out of the same mental processes, came\nthe first distinct ideas of _number_. In the earliest stages, the\npresentation of several like objects produced merely an indefinite\nconception of multiplicity; as it still does among Australians, and\nBushmen, and Damaras, when the number presented exceeds three or four.\nWith such a fact before us we may safely infer that the first clear\nnumerical conception was that of duality as contrasted with unity. And\nthis notion of duality must necessarily have grown up side by side\nwith those of likeness and equality; seeing that it is impossible to\nrecognize the likeness of two things without also perceiving that\nthere are two. From the very beginning the conception of number must\nhave been, as it is still, associated with {38} likeness or equality\nof the things numbered; and for the purposes of calculation, an ideal\nequality of the things is assumed. Before any _absolutely true_\nnumerical results can be reached, it is requisite that the units be\n_absolutely equal_. The only way in which we can establish a numerical\nrelationship between things that do not yield us like impressions, is\nto divide them into parts that _do_ yield us like impressions. Two\nunlike magnitudes of extension, force, time, weight, or what not, can\nhave their relative amounts estimated, only by means of some small unit\nthat is contained many times in both; and even if we finally write down\nthe greater one as a unit and the other as a fraction of it, we state,\nin the denominator of the fraction, the number of parts into which\nthe unit must be divided to be comparable with the fraction. It is,\nindeed, true, that by a modern process of abstraction, we occasionally\napply numbers to unequal units, as the furniture at a sale or the\nvarious animals on a farm, simply as so many separate entities; but\nno exact quantitative result can be brought out by calculation with\nunits of this order. And, indeed, it is the distinctive peculiarity\nof the calculus in general, that it proceeds on the hypothesis of\nthat absolute equality of its abstract units, which no real units\npossess; and that the exactness of its results holds only in virtue of\nthis hypothesis. The first ideas of number must necessarily then have\nbeen derived from like or equal magnitudes as seen chiefly in organic\nobjects; and as the like magnitudes most frequently observed were\nmagnitudes of extension, it follows that geometry and arithmetic had a\nsimultaneous origin.\n\nNot only are the first distinct ideas of number co-ordinate with ideas\nof likeness and equality, but the first efforts at numeration display\nthe same relationship. On reading accounts of savage tribes, we find\nthat the method of counting by the fingers, still followed by many\nchildren, is the aboriginal method. Neglecting the several cases {39}\nin which the ability to enumerate does not reach even to the number\nof fingers on one hand, there are many cases in which it does not\nextend beyond ten\u2014the limit of the simple finger notation. The fact\nthat in so many instances, remote, and seemingly unrelated nations,\nhave adopted _ten_ as their basic number; together with the fact that\nin the remaining instances the basic number is either _five_ (the\nfingers of one hand) or _twenty_ (the fingers and toes); of themselves\nshow that the fingers were the original units of numeration. The still\nsurviving use of the word _digit_, as the general name for a figure in\narithmetic, is significant; and it is even said that our word _ten_\n(Sax. tyn; Dutch, tien; German, zehn) means in its primitive expanded\nform _two hands_. So that, originally, to say there were ten things,\nwas to say there were two hands of them. From all which evidence it\nis tolerably clear that the earliest mode of conveying the idea of\na number of things, was by holding up as many fingers as there were\nthings; that is, by using a symbol which was _equal_, in respect of\nmultiplicity, to the group symbolized. For which inference there is,\nindeed, strong confirmation in the statement that our own soldiers\nspontaneously adopted this device in their dealings with the Turks\nduring the Crimean war. And here it should be remarked that in this\nre-combination of the notion of equality with that of multiplicity, by\nwhich the first steps in numeration are effected, we may see one of\nthe earliest of those inosculations between the diverging branches of\nscience, which are afterwards of perpetual occurrence.\n\nAs this observation suggests, it will be well, before tracing the\nmode in which exact science emerges from the inexact judgments of the\nsenses, and showing the non-serial evolution of its divisions, to note\nthe non-serial character of those preliminary processes of which all\nafter development is a continuation. On re-considering them it will\nbe seen that not only are they divergent branches {40} from a common\nroot,\u2014not only are they simultaneous in their growth; but that they\nare mutual aids; and that none can advance without the rest. That\nprogress of classification for which the unfolding of the perceptions\npaves the way, is impossible without a corresponding progress in\nlanguage, by which greater varieties of objects are thinkable and\nexpressible. On the one hand classification cannot be carried far\nwithout names by which to designate the classes; and on the other hand\nlanguage cannot be made faster than things are classified. Again,\nthe multiplication of classes and the consequent narrowing of each\nclass, itself involves a greater likeness among the things classed\ntogether; and the consequent approach towards the notion of complete\nlikeness itself allows classification to be carried higher. Moreover,\nclassification necessarily advances _pari passu_ with rationality\u2014the\nclassification of _things_ with the classification of _relations_.\nFor things that belong to the same class are, by implication, things\nof which the properties and modes of behaviour\u2014the co-existences and\nsequences\u2014are more or less the same; and the recognition of this\nsameness of co-existences and sequences is reasoning. Whence it follows\nthat the advance of classification is necessarily proportionate to the\nadvance of generalizations. Yet further, the notion of _likeness_,\nboth in things and relations, simultaneously evolves by one process of\nculture the ideas of _equality_ of things and _equality_ of relations;\nwhich are the respective bases of exact concrete reasoning and exact\nabstract reasoning\u2014Mathematics and Logic. And once more, this idea of\nequality, in the very process of being formed, necessarily gives origin\nto two series of relations\u2014those of magnitude and those of number; from\nwhich arise geometry and the calculus. Thus the process throughout\nis one of perpetual subdivision and perpetual intercommunication of\nthe divisions. From the very first there has been that _consensus_ of\ndifferent kinds of knowledge, {41} answering to the _consensus_ of the\nintellectual faculties, which, as already said, must exist among the\nsciences.\n\nLet us now go on to observe how, out of the notions of _equality_ and\n_number_, as arrived at in the manner described, there gradually arose\nthe elements of quantitative prevision.\n\nEquality, once having come to be definitely conceived, was recognizable\namong other phenomena than those of magnitude. Being predicable of\nall things producing indistinguishable impressions, there naturally\ngrew up ideas of equality in weights, sounds, colours, &c.; and,\nindeed, it can scarcely be doubted that the occasional experience of\nequal weights, sounds, and colours, had a share in developing the\nabstract conception of equality\u2014that the ideas of equality in sizes,\nrelations, forces, resistances, and sensible properties in general,\nwere evolved during the same stage of mental development. But however\nthis may be, it is clear that as fast as the notion of equality gained\ndefiniteness, so fast did that lowest kind of quantitative prevision\nwhich is achieved without any instrumental aid, become possible. The\nability to estimate, however roughly, the amount of a foreseen result,\nimplies the conception that it will be _equal_ to a certain imagined\nquantity; and the correctness of the estimate will manifestly depend on\nthe precision which the perceptions of sensible equality have reached.\nA savage with a piece of stone in his hand, and another piece lying\nbefore him of greater bulk but of the same kind (sameness of kind\nbeing inferred from the _equality_ of the two in colour and texture)\nknows about what effort he must put forth to raise this other piece;\nand he judges accurately in proportion to the accuracy with which he\nperceives that the one is twice, three times, four times, &c. as large\nas the other; that is\u2014in proportion to the precision of his ideas of\nequality and number. And here let us not omit to notice that even in\nthese vaguest of quantitative previsions, the conception of _equality\nof relations_ is also involved. For it is only in {42} virtue of an\nundefined consciousness that the relation between bulk and weight in\nthe one stone is _equal_ to the relation between bulk and weight in the\nother, that even the roughest approximation can be made.\n\nBut how came the transition from those uncertain perceptions of\nequality which the unaided senses give, to the certain ones with which\nscience deals? It came by placing the things compared in juxtaposition.\nEquality being asserted of things which give us indistinguishable\nimpressions, and no distinct comparison of impressions being possible\nunless they occur in immediate succession, it results that exactness\nof equality is ascertainable in proportion to the closeness of the\ncompared things. Hence the fact that when we wish to judge of two\nshades of colour whether they are alike or not, we place them side by\nside; hence the fact that we cannot, with any precision, say which\nof two allied sounds is the louder, or the higher in pitch, unless\nwe hear the one immediately after the other; hence the fact that to\nestimate the ratio of weights, we take one in each hand, that we may\ncompare their pressures by rapidly alternating in thought from the\none to the other; hence the fact, that in a piece of music, we can\ncontinue to make equal beats when the first beat has been given, but\ncannot ensure commencing with the same length of beat on a future\noccasion; and hence, lastly, the fact, that of all magnitudes, those of\n_linear extension_ are those of which the equality is most precisely\nascertainable, and those to which, by consequence, all others have\nto be reduced. For it is the peculiarity of linear extension that it\nalone allows its magnitudes to be placed in _absolute_ juxtaposition,\nor, rather, in coincident position; it alone can test the equality of\ntwo magnitudes by observing whether they will coalesce, as two equal\nmathematical lines do, when placed between the same points; it alone\ncan test _equality_ by trying whether it will become _identity_.\nHence, then, the fact, that all exact science is reducible, {43} by\nan ultimate analysis, to results measured in equal units of linear\nextension.\n\nStill it remains to be noticed in what manner this determination\nof equality by comparison of linear magnitudes originated. Once\nmore may we perceive that surrounding natural objects supplied the\nneedful lessons. From the beginning there must have been a constant\nexperience of like things placed side by side\u2014men standing and walking\ntogether; animals from the same herd; fish from the same shoal. And the\nceaseless repetition of these experiences could not fail to suggest\nthe observation, that the nearer together any objects were, the more\nvisible became any inequality between them. Hence the obvious device\nof putting in apposition, things of which it was desired to ascertain\nthe relative magnitudes. Hence the idea of _measure_. And here we\nsuddenly come upon a group of facts which afford a solid basis to the\nremainder of our argument; while they also furnish strong evidence in\nsupport of the foregoing speculations. Those who look sceptically on\nthis attempted rehabilitation of early mental development, and who\nthink that the derivation of so many primary notions from organic\nforms is somewhat strained, will perhaps see more probability in the\nhypotheses which have been ventured, on discovering that all measures\nof _extension_ and _force_ originated from the lengths and weights of\norganic bodies, and all measures of _time_ from the periodic phenomena\nof either organic or inorganic bodies.\n\nThus, among linear measures, the cubit of the Hebrews was the _length\nof the forearm_ from the elbow to the end of the middle finger; and\nthe smaller scriptural dimensions are expressed in _hand-breadths_ and\n_spans_. The Egyptian cubit, which was similarly derived, was divided\ninto digits, which were _finger-breadths_; and each finger-breadth was\nmore definitely expressed as being equal to four _grains of barley_\nplaced breadthwise. Other ancient measures were {44} the orgyia or\n_stretch of the arms_, the _pace_, and the _palm_. So persistent has\nbeen the use of these natural units of length in the East, that even\nnow some Arabs mete out cloth by the forearm. So, too, is it with\nEuropean measures. The _foot_ prevails as a dimension throughout\nEurope, and has done so since the time of the Romans, by whom, also, it\nwas used: its lengths in different places varying not much more than\nmen\u2019s feet vary. The heights of horses are still expressed in _hands_.\nThe inch is the length of the terminal joint of _the thumb_; as is\nclearly shown in France, where _pouce_ means both thumb and inch. Then\nwe have the inch divided into three _barley-corns_. So completely,\nindeed, have these organic dimensions served as the substrata of\nmensuration, that it is only by means of them that we can form any\nestimate of some of the ancient distances. For example, the length\nof a degree on the Earth\u2019s surface, as determined by the Arabian\nastronomers shortly after the death of Haroun-al-Raschid, was fifty-six\nof their miles. We know nothing of their mile further than that it was\n4000 cubits; and whether these were sacred cubits or common cubits,\nwould remain doubtful, but that the length of the cubit is given as\ntwenty-seven inches, and each inch defined as the thickness of six\nbarley-grains. Thus one of the earliest measurements of a degree comes\ndown to us in barley-grains. Not only did organic lengths furnish those\napproximate measures which satisfied men\u2019s needs in ruder ages, but\nthey furnished also the standard measures required in later times. One\ninstance occurs in our own history. To remedy the irregularities then\nprevailing, Henry I. commanded that the ulna, or ancient ell, which\nanswers to the modern yard, should be made of the exact length of _his\nown arm_.\n\nMeasures of weight had a kindred derivation. Seeds seem commonly to\nhave supplied the units. The original of the carat used for weighing in\nIndia is _a small bean_. Our own systems, both troy and avoirdupois,\nare derived {45} primarily from wheat-corns. Our smallest weight,\nthe grain is _a grain of wheat_. This is not a speculation; it is an\nhistorically-registered fact. Henry III. enacted that an ounce should\nbe the weight of 640 dry grains of wheat from the middle of the ear.\nAnd as all the other weights are multiples or sub-multiples of this, it\nfollows that the grain of wheat is the basis of our scale. So natural\nis it to use organic bodies as weights, before artificial weights have\nbeen established, or where they are not to be had, that in some of the\nremoter parts of Ireland the people are said to be in the habit, even\nnow, of putting a man into the scales to serve as a measure for heavy\ncommodities.\n\nSimilarly with time. Astronomical periodicity, and the periodicity of\nanimal and vegetable life, are simultaneously used in the first stages\nof progress for estimating epochs. The simplest unit of time, the day,\nnature supplies ready made. The next simplest period, the moneth or\nmonth, is also thrust upon men\u2019s notice by the conspicuous changes\nconstituting a lunation. For larger divisions than these, the phenomena\nof the seasons, and the chief events from time to time occurring, have\nbeen used by early and uncivilized races. Among the Egyptians the\nrising of the Nile served as a mark. The New Zealanders were found to\nbegin their year from the reappearance of the Pleiades above the sea.\nOne of the uses ascribed to birds, by the Greeks, was to indicate the\nseasons by their migrations. Barrow describes the aboriginal Hottentot\nas expressing dates by the number of moons before or after the ripening\nof one of his chief articles of food. He further states that the\nKaffir chronology is kept by the moon, and is registered by notches on\nsticks\u2014the death of a favourite chief, or the gaining of a victory,\nserving for a new era. By which last fact, we are at once reminded\nthat in early history, events are commonly recorded as occurring in\ncertain reigns, and in certain years of certain reigns: a proceeding\nwhich made a king\u2019s reign {46} a rude measure of duration. And, as\nfurther illustrating the tendency to divide time by natural phenomena\nand natural events, it may be noticed that even by our own peasantry\nthe definite divisions of months and years are but little used; and\nthat they habitually refer to occurrences as \u201cbefore sheep-shearing,\u201d\nor \u201cafter harvest,\u201d or \u201cabout the time when the squire died.\u201d It is\nmanifest, therefore, that the approximately equal periods perceived\nin Nature gave the first units of measure for time; as did Nature\u2019s\napproximately equal lengths and weights give the first units of measure\nfor space and force.\n\nIt remains only to observe, that measures of value were similarly\nderived. Barter, in one form or other, is found among all but the\nvery lowest human races. It is obviously based upon the notion of\n_equality of worth_. And as it gradually merges into trade by the\nintroduction of some kind of currency, we find that the _measures of\nworth_, constituting this currency, are organic bodies; in some cases\n_cowries_, in others _cocoa-nuts_, in others _cattle_, in others\n_pigs_; among the American Indians peltry or _skins_, and in Iceland\n_dried fish_.\n\nNotions of exact equality and of measure having been reached, there\narose definite ideas of magnitudes as being multiples one of another;\nwhence the practice of measurement by direct apposition of a measure.\nThe determination of linear extensions by this process can scarcely be\ncalled science, though it is a step towards it; but the determination\nof lengths of time by an analogous process may be considered as one\nof the earliest samples of quantitative prevision. For when it is\nfirst ascertained that the moon completes the cycle of her changes\nin about thirty days\u2014a fact known to most uncivilized tribes that\ncan count beyond the number of their fingers\u2014it is manifest that it\nbecomes possible to say in what number of days any specified phase of\nthe moon will recur; and it is also manifest that this prevision is\neffected by an apposition of two times, after the same manner {47}\nthat linear space is measured by the apposition of two lines. For to\nexpress the moon\u2019s period in days, is to say how many of these units\nof measure are contained in the period to be measured\u2014is to ascertain\nthe distance between two points in time by means of a _scale of days_,\njust as we ascertain the distance between two points in space by a\nscale of feet or inches; and in each case the scale coincides with the\nthing measured\u2014mentally in the one, visibly in the other. So that in\nthis simplest, and perhaps earliest case of quantitative prevision,\nthe phenomena are not only thrust daily upon men\u2019s notice, but Nature\nis, as it were, perpetually repeating that process of measurement by\nobserving which the prevision is effected.\n\nThis fact, that in very early stages of social progress it is known\nthat the moon goes through her changes in nearly thirty days, and\nthat in rather more than twelve moons the seasons return\u2014this fact\nthat chronological astronomy assumes a certain scientific character\neven before geometry does; while it is partly due to the circumstance\nthat the astronomical divisions, day, month, and year, are ready made\nfor us, is partly due to the further circumstances that agricultural\nand other operations were at first regulated astronomically, and that\nfrom the supposed divine nature of the heavenly bodies their motions\ndetermined the periodical religious festivals. As instances of the\none we have the observation of the Egyptians, that the rising of the\nNile corresponded with the heliacal rising of Sirius; the directions\ngiven by Hesiod for reaping and ploughing, according to the positions\nof the Pleiades; and his maxim that \u201cfifty days after the turning of\nthe sun is a seasonable time for beginning a voyage.\u201d As instances of\nthe other, we have the naming of the days after the sun, moon, and\nplanets; the early attempts among Eastern nations to regulate the\ncalendar so that the gods might not be offended by the displacement\nof their sacrifices; and the fixing of the great annual festival of\nthe Peruvians by the position of the sun. {48} In all which facts we\nsee that, at first, science was simply an appliance of religion and\nindustry.\n\nAfter the discoveries that a lunation occupies nearly thirty days, and\nthat some twelve lunations occupy a year\u2014discoveries which we may infer\nwere the earliest, from the fact that existing uncivilized races have\nmade them\u2014we come to the first known astronomical records, which are\nthose of eclipses. The Chaldeans were able to predict these. \u201cThis they\ndid, probably,\u201d says Dr. Whewell in his useful history, from which most\nof the materials we are about to use will be drawn, \u201cby means of their\ncycle of 223 months, or about eighteen years; for, at the end of this\ntime, the eclipses of the moon begin to return, at the same intervals\nand in the same order as at the beginning.\u201d Now this method of\ncalculating eclipses by means of a recurring cycle,\u2014the _Saros_ as they\ncalled it\u2014is a more complex case of prevision by means of coincidence\nof measures. For by what observations must the Chaldeans have\ndiscovered this cycle? Obviously, as Delambre infers, by inspecting\ntheir registers; by comparing the successive intervals; by finding that\nsome of the intervals were alike; by seeing that these equal intervals\nwere eighteen years apart; by discovering that _all_ the intervals\nthat were eighteen years apart were equal; by ascertaining that the\nintervals formed a series which repeated itself, so that if one of the\ncycles of intervals were superposed on another the divisions would fit.\nAnd this being once perceived, it became possible to use the cycle as\na scale of time by which to measure out future periods of recurrence.\nSeeing thus that the process of so predicting eclipses, is in essence\nthe same as that of predicting the moon\u2019s monthly changes by observing\nthe number of days after which they repeat\u2014seeing that the two differ\nonly in the extent and irregularity of the intervals; it is not\ndifficult to understand how such an amount of knowledge should so early\nhave been reached. And we shall be the less surprised on remembering\nthat the only things involved in these {49} previsions were _time_ and\n_number_; and that the time was in a manner self-numbered.\n\nStill, the ability to predict events recurring only after so long\na period as eighteen years, implies a considerable advance in\ncivilization\u2014a considerable development of general knowledge; and we\nhave now to inquire what progress in other sciences accompanied, and\nwas necessary to, these astronomical previsions. In the first place,\nthere must have been a tolerably efficient system of calculation. Mere\nfinger-counting, mere head-reckoning, even with the aid of a decimal\nnotation, could not have sufficed for numbering the days in a year;\nmuch less the years, months, and days between eclipses. Consequently\nthere must have been a mode of registering numbers; probably even a\nsystem of numerals. The earliest numerical records, if we may judge by\nthe practices of the less civilized races now existing, were probably\nkept by notches cut on sticks, or strokes marked on walls; much as\npublic-house scores are kept now. And there is reason to think that\nthe first numerals used were simply groups of straight strokes, as\nsome of the still-extant Roman ones are; leading us to suspect that\nthese groups of strokes were used to represent groups of fingers, as\nthe groups of fingers had been used to represent groups of objects\u2014a\nsupposition harmonizing with the aboriginal practice of picture\nwriting. Be this so or not, however, it is manifest that before the\nChaldeans discovered their _Saros_, they must have had both a set of\nwritten symbols serving for an extensive numeration, and a familiarity\nwith the simpler rules of arithmetic.\n\nNot only must abstract mathematics have made some progress, but\nconcrete mathematics also. It is scarcely possible that the buildings\nbelonging to this era should have been laid out and erected without\nany knowledge of geometry. At any rate, there must have existed that\nelementary geometry which deals with direct {50} measurement\u2014with the\napposition of lines; and it seems that only after the discovery of\nthose simple proceedings, by which right angles are drawn, and relative\npositions fixed, could so regular an architecture be executed. In the\ncase of the other division of concrete mathematics\u2014mechanics, we have\ndefinite evidence of progress. We know that the lever and the inclined\nplane were employed during this period: implying that there was a\nqualitative prevision of their effects, if not a quantitative one.\nBut we know more. We read of weights in the earliest records; and we\nfind weights in ruins of the highest antiquity. Weights imply scales,\nof which we have also mention; and scales involve the primary theorem\nof mechanics in its least complicated form\u2014involve not a qualitative\nbut a quantitative prevision of mechanical effects. And here we may\nnotice how mechanics, in common with the other exact sciences, took\nits rise from the simplest application of the idea of _equality_. For\nthe mechanical proposition which the scales involve, is, that if a\nlever with _equal_ arms, have _equal_ weights suspended from them, the\nweights will remain at _equal_ altitudes. And we may further notice\nhow, in this first step of rational mechanics, we see illustrated the\ntruth awhile since named, that as magnitudes of linear extension are\nthe only ones of which the equality is exactly ascertainable, the\nequalities of other magnitudes have at the outset to be determined by\nmeans of them. For the equality of the weights which balance each other\nin scales, depends on the equality of the arms: we can know that the\nweights are equal only by proving that the arms are equal. And when\nby this means we have obtained a system of weights,\u2014a set of equal\nunits of force and definite multiples of them, then does a science of\nmechanics become possible. Whence, indeed, it follows, that rational\nmechanics could not possibly have any other starting-point than the\nscales.\n\nLet us further remember that during this same period {51} there was\nsome knowledge of chemistry. Sundry of the arts which we know to have\nbeen carried on, were made possible only by a generalized experience\nof the modes in which certain bodies affect each other under special\nconditions. In metallurgy, which was extensively practised, this is\nabundantly illustrated. And we even have evidence that in some cases\nthe knowledge possessed was, in a sense, quantitative. For, as we find\nby analysis that the hard alloy of which the Egyptians made their\ncutting tools, was composed of copper and tin in fixed proportions,\nthere must have been an established prevision that such an alloy\nwas to be obtained only by mixing them in these proportions. It is\ntrue, this was but a simple empirical generalization; but so was the\ngeneralization respecting the recurrence of eclipses; so are the first\ngeneralizations of every science.\n\nRespecting the simultaneous advance of the sciences during this early\nepoch, it remains to point out that even the most complex of them\nmust have made some progress. For under what conditions only were\nthe foregoing developments possible? The conditions furnished by an\nestablished and organized social system. A long continued registry of\neclipses; the building of palaces; the use of scales; the practice of\nmetallurgy\u2014alike imply a settled and populous nation. The existence\nof such a nation not only presupposes laws and some administration of\njustice, which we know existed, but it presupposes successful laws\u2014laws\nconforming in some degree to the conditions of social stability\u2014laws\nenacted because it was found that the actions forbidden by them were\ndangerous to the State. We do not by any means say that all, or even\nthe greater part, of the laws were of this nature; but we do say,\nthat the fundamental ones were. It cannot be denied that the laws\naffecting life and property were such. It cannot be denied that,\nhowever little these were enforced between class and class, they were\nto a considerable extent {52} enforced between members of the same\nclass. It can scarcely be questioned, that the administration of them\nbetween members of the same class was seen by rulers to be necessary\nfor keeping society together. But supposition aside, it is clear that\nthe habitual recognition of these claims in their laws, implied some\nprevision of social phenomena. That same idea of _equality_, which,\nas we have seen, underlies other science, underlies also morals and\nsociology. The conception of justice, which is the primary one in\nmorals; and the administration of justice, which is the vital condition\nto social existence; are impossible without the recognition of a\ncertain likeness in men\u2019s claims, in virtue of their common humanity.\n_Equity_ literally means _equalness_; and if it be admitted that there\nwere even the vaguest ideas of equity in these primitive eras, it must\nbe admitted that there was some appreciation of the equalness of men\u2019s\nliberties to pursue the objects of life\u2014some appreciation, therefore,\nof the essential principle of national equilibrium.\n\nThus in this initial stage of the positive sciences, before geometry\nhad yet done more than evolve a few empirical rules\u2014before mechanics\nhad passed beyond its first theorem\u2014before astronomy had advanced\nfrom its merely chronological phase into the geometrical; the most\ninvolved of the sciences had reached a certain degree of development\u2014a\ndevelopment without which no progress in other sciences was possible.\n\nOnly noting as we pass, how, thus early, we may see that the progress\nof exact science was not only towards an increasing number of\nprevisions, but towards previsions more accurately quantitative\u2014how,\nin astronomy, the recurring period of the moon\u2019s motions was by and\nby more correctly ascertained to be two hundred and thirty-five\nlunations; how Callipus further corrected this Metonic cycle, by\nleaving out a day at the end of every seventy-six years; and how\nthese successive advances implied a {53} longer continued registry\nof observations, and the co-ordination of a greater number of facts;\nlet us go on to inquire how geometrical astronomy took its rise. The\nfirst astronomical instrument was the gnomon. This was not only early\nin use in the East, but it was found among the Mexicans; the sole\nastronomical observations of the Peruvians were made by it; and we\nread that 1100 B.C., the Chinese observed that, at a certain place,\nthe length of the sun\u2019s shadow, at the summer solstice, was to the\nheight of the gnomon, as one and a half to eight. Here again it is\nobservable, both that the instrument is found ready made, and that\nNature is perpetually performing the process of measurement. Any fixed,\nerect object\u2014a column, a pole, the angle of a building\u2014serves for a\ngnomon; and it needs but to notice the changing position of the shadow\nit daily throws, to make the first step in geometrical astronomy. How\nsmall this first step was, may be seen in the fact that the only things\nascertained at the outset were the periods of the summer and winter\nsolstices, which corresponded with the least and greatest lengths of\nthe mid-day shadow; and to fix which, it was needful merely to mark\nthe point to which each day\u2019s shadow reached. And now let it not be\noverlooked that in the observing at what time during the next year this\nextreme limit of the shadow was again reached, and in the inference\nthat the sun had then arrived at the same turning point in his annual\ncourse, we have one of the simplest instances of that combined use of\n_equal magnitudes_ and _equal relations_, by which all exact science,\nall quantitative prevision, is reached. For the relation observed\nwas between the length of the gnomon\u2019s shadow and the sun\u2019s position\nin the heavens; and the inference drawn was that when, next year,\nthe extremity of the shadow came to the same point, he occupied the\nsame place. That is, the ideas involved were, the equality of the\nshadows, and the equality of the relations between {54} shadow and\nsun in successive years. As in the case of the scales, the equality of\nrelations here recognized is of the simplest order. It is not as those\nhabitually dealt with in the higher kinds of scientific reasoning,\nwhich answer to the general type\u2014the relation between two and three\nequals the relation between six and nine; but it follows the type\u2014the\nrelation between two and three equals the relation between two and\nthree: it is a case of not simply _equal_ relations, but _coinciding_\nrelations. And here, indeed, we may see beautifully illustrated how\nthe idea of equal relations takes its rise after the same manner that\nthat of equal magnitudes does. As already shown, the idea of equal\nmagnitudes arose from the observed coincidence of two lengths placed\ntogether; and in this case we have not only two coincident lengths of\nshadows, but two coincident relations between sun and shadows.\n\nFrom the use of the gnomon there naturally grew up the conception of\nangular measurements; and with the advance of geometrical conceptions\ncame the hemisphere of Berosus, the equinoctial armil, the solstitial\narmil, and the quadrant of Ptolemy\u2014all of them employing shadows\nas indices of the sun\u2019s position, but in combination with angular\ndivisions. It is out of the question for us here to trace these details\nof progress. It must suffice to remark that in all of them we may see\nthat notion of equality of relations of a more complex kind, which\nis best illustrated in the astrolabe, an instrument which consisted\n\u201cof circular rims, moveable one within the other, or about poles, and\ncontained circles which were to be brought into the position of the\necliptic, and of a plane passing through the sun and the poles of the\necliptic\u201d\u2014an instrument, therefore, which represented, as by a model,\nthe relative positions of certain imaginary lines and planes in the\nheavens; which was adjusted by putting these representative lines and\nplanes into parallelism with the celestial ones; and which depended\nfor its use on the perception that the relations among these {55}\nrepresentative lines and planes were _equal_ to the relations among\nthose represented. We might go on to point out how the conception\nof the heavens as a revolving hollow sphere, the explanation of the\nmoon\u2019s phases, and indeed all the successive steps taken, involved\nthis same mental process. But we must content ourselves with referring\nto the theory of eccentrics and epicycles, as a further marked\nillustration of it. As first suggested, and as proved by Hipparchus to\nafford an explanation of the leading irregularities in the celestial\nmotions, this theory involved the perception that the progressions,\nretrogressions, and variations of velocity seen in the heavenly bodies,\nmight be reconciled with their assumed uniform movements in circles, by\nsupposing that the earth was not in the centre of their orbits; or by\nsupposing that they revolved in circles whose centres revolved round\nthe earth; or by both. The discovery that this would account for the\nappearances, was the discovery that in certain geometrical diagrams the\nrelations were such, that the uniform motion of points along curves\nconditioned in specified ways, would, when looked at from a particular\nposition, present analogous irregularities; and the calculations of\nHipparchus involved the belief that the relations subsisting among\nthese geometrical curves were _equal_ to the relations subsisting among\nthe celestial orbits.\n\nLeaving here these details of astronomical progress, and the\nphilosophy of it, let us observe how the relatively concrete science\nof geometrical astronomy, having been thus far helped forward by\nthe development of geometry in general, reacted upon geometry,\ncaused it also to advance, and was again assisted by it. Hipparchus,\nbefore making his solar and lunar tables, had to discover rules\nfor calculating the relations between the sides and angles of\ntriangles\u2014_trigonometry_, a subdivision of pure mathematics. Further,\nthe reduction of the doctrine of the sphere to a quantitative form\nneeded for astronomical purposes, required the formation of a\n_spherical trigonometry_, which {56} was also achieved by Hipparchus.\nThus both plane and spherical trigonometry, which are parts of the\nhighly abstract and simple science of extension, remained undeveloped\nuntil the less abstract and more complex science of the celestial\nmotions had need of them. The fact admitted by M. Comte, that since\nDescartes the progress of the abstract division of mathematics has\nbeen determined by that of the concrete division, is paralleled by\nthe still more significant fact that even thus early the progress of\nmathematics was determined by that of astronomy. And here, indeed, we\nsee exemplified the truth, which the subsequent history of science\nfrequently illustrates, that before any more abstract division makes a\nfurther advance, some more concrete division suggests the necessity for\nthat advance\u2014presents the new order of questions to be solved. Before\nastronomy put before Hipparchus the problem of solar tables, there\nwas nothing to raise the question of the relations between lines and\nangles: the subject-matter of trigonometry had not been conceived.\n\nJust incidentally noticing the circumstance that the epoch we are\ndescribing witnessed the evolution of algebra, a comparatively abstract\ndivision of mathematics, by the union of its less abstract divisions,\ngeometry and arithmetic (a fact proved by the earliest extant samples\nof algebra, which are half algebraic, half geometric) we go on to\nobserve that during the era in which mathematics and astronomy were\nthus advancing, rational mechanics made its second step; and something\nwas done towards giving a quantitative form to hydrostatics, optics,\nand acoustics. In each case we shall see how the idea of equality\nunderlies all quantitative prevision; and in what simple forms this\nidea is first applied.\n\nAs already shown, the first theorem established in mechanics was, that\nequal weights suspended from a lever with equal arms would remain in\nequilibrium. Archimedes discovered that a lever with unequal arms was\nin {57} equilibrium when one weight was to its arm as the other arm to\nits weight; that is\u2014when the numerical relation between one weight and\nits arm was _equal_ to the numerical relation between the other arm and\nits weight.\n\nThe first advance made in hydrostatics, which we also owe to\nArchimedes, was the discovery that fluids press _equally_ in all\ndirections; and from this followed the solution of the problem of\nfloating bodies; namely, that they are in equilibrium when the upward\nand downward pressures are _equal_.\n\nIn optics, again, the Greeks found that the angle of incidence is\n_equal_ to the angle of reflection; and their knowledge reached no\nfurther than to such simple deductions from this as their geometry\nsufficed for. In acoustics they ascertained the fact that three strings\nof _equal_ lengths would yield the octave, fifth and fourth, when\nstrained by weights having certain definite ratios; and they did not\nprogress much beyond this. In the one of which cases we see geometry\nused in elucidation of the laws of light; and in the other, geometry\nand arithmetic made to measure certain phenomena of sound.\n\nWhile sundry sciences had thus reached the first stages of quantitative\nprevision, others were progressing in qualitative prevision. It\nmust suffice just to note that some small generalizations were made\nrespecting evaporation, and heat, and electricity, and magnetism,\nwhich, empirical as they were, did not in that respect differ from\nthe first generalizations of every science; that the Greek physicians\nhad made advances in physiology and pathology, which, considering\nthe great imperfection of our present knowledge, are by no means to\nbe despised; that zoology had been so far systematized by Aristotle,\nas, to some extent, enabled him from the presence of certain organs\nto predict the presence of others; that in Aristotle\u2019s _Politics_, is\nshown progress towards a scientific conception of social phenomena,\nand sundry previsions respecting {58} them; and that in the state of\nthe Greek societies, as well as in the writings of Greek philosophers,\nwe may recognize both an increasing clearness in the conception of\nequity and some appreciation of the fact that social stability depends\non the maintenance of equitable relations. Space permitting, we might\ndwell on the causes which retarded the development of some of the\nsciences, as for example, chemistry; showing that relative complexity\nhad nothing to do with it\u2014that the oxidation of a piece of iron is a\nsimpler phenomenon than the recurrence of eclipses, and the discovery\nof carbonic acid less difficult than that of the precession of the\nequinoxes. The relatively slow advance of chemical knowledge might be\nshown to be due, partly to the fact that its phenomena were not daily\nthrust on men\u2019s notice as those of astronomy were; partly to the fact\nthat Nature does not habitually supply the means, and suggest the modes\nof investigation, as in the sciences dealing with time, extension, and\nforce; partly to the fact that the great majority of the materials with\nwhich chemistry deals, instead of being ready to hand, are made known\nonly by the arts in their slow growth; and partly to the fact that even\nwhen known, their chemical properties are not self-exhibited, but have\nto be sought out by experiment.\n\nMerely indicating these considerations, however, let us go on to\ncontemplate the progress and mutual influence of the sciences in\nmodern days; only parenthetically noticing how, on the revival of the\nscientific spirit, the successive stages achieved exhibit the dominance\nof the law hitherto traced\u2014how the primary idea in dynamics, a uniform\nforce, was defined by Galileo to be a force which generates _equal_\nvelocities in _equal_ successive times\u2014how the uniform action of\ngravity was first experimentally determined by showing that the time\nelapsing before a body thrown up, stopped, was _equal_ to the time it\ntook to fall\u2014how the first fact in compound motion which Galileo {59}\nascertained was, that a body projected horizontally, will describe\n_equal_ horizontal spaces in _equal_ times, compounded vertical spaces\ndescribed which increase by equal increments in _equal_ times\u2014how his\ndiscovery respecting the pendulum was, that its oscillations occupy\n_equal_ intervals of time whatever their lengths\u2014how the law which he\nestablished that in any machine the weights that balance each other,\nare reciprocally as their virtual velocities implies that the relation\nof one set of weights to their velocities _equals_ the relation\nof the other set of velocities to their weights;\u2014and how thus his\nachievements consisted in showing the equalities of certain magnitudes\nand relations, whose equalities had not been previously recognized.\n\nAnd now, but only now, physical astronomy became possible. The\nsimple laws of force had been disentangled from those of friction\nand atmospheric resistance by which all their earthly manifestations\nare disguised. Progressing knowledge of _terrestrial physics_ had\ngiven a due insight into these disturbing causes; and, by an effort\nof abstraction, it was perceived that all motion would be uniform\nand rectilinear unless interfered with by external forces. Geometry\nand mechanics having diverged from a common root in men\u2019s sensible\nexperiences, and having, with occasional inosculations, been separately\ndeveloped, the one partly in connexion with astronomy, the other solely\nby analyzing terrestrial movements, now join in the investigations\nof Newton to create a true theory of the celestial motions. And\nhere, also, we have to notice the important fact that, in the very\nprocess of being brought jointly to bear upon astronomical problems,\nthey are themselves raised to a higher phase of development. For it\nwas in dealing with the questions raised by celestial dynamics that\nthe then incipient infinitesimal calculus was unfolded by Newton\nand his continental successors; and it was from inquiries into the\nmechanics of the solar system that the general theorems of mechanics\ncontained in the {60} _Principia_\u2014many of them of purely terrestrial\napplication\u2014took their rise. Thus, as in the case of Hipparchus, the\npresentation of a new order of concrete facts to be analyzed, led to\nthe discovery of new abstract facts; and these abstract facts then\nbecame instruments of access to endless groups of concrete facts\npreviously beyond quantitative treatment.\n\nMeanwhile, physics had been carrying further that progress without\nwhich, as just shown, rational mechanics could not be disentangled.\nIn hydrostatics, Stevinus had extended and applied the discovery of\nArchimedes. Torricelli had proved atmospheric pressure, \u201cby showing\nthat this pressure sustained different liquids at heights inversely\nproportional to their densities;\u201d and Pascal \u201cestablished the necessary\ndiminution of this pressure at increasing heights in the atmosphere\u201d:\ndiscoveries which in part reduced this branch of science to a\nquantitative form. Something had been done by Daniel Bernouilli towards\nthe dynamics of fluids. The thermometer had been invented; and sundry\nsmall generalizations reached by it. Huyghens and Newton had made\nconsiderable progress in optics; Newton had approximately calculated\nthe rate of transmission of sound; and the continental mathematicians\nhad ascertained some of the laws of sonorous vibrations. Magnetism and\nelectricity had been considerably advanced by Gilbert. Chemistry had\ngot as far as the mutual neutralization of acids and alkalies. And\nLeonardo da Vinci had advanced in geology to the conclusion that the\ndeposition of animal remains in marine strata is the origin of fossils.\nOur present purpose does not require that we should give particulars.\nHere it only concerns us to illustrate the _consensus_ subsisting in\nthis stage of growth, and afterwards. Let us look at a few cases.\n\nThe theoretic law of the velocity of sound deduced by Newton from\npurely mechanical data, was found wrong by one-sixth. The error\nremained unaccounted for until the {61} time of Laplace, who,\nsuspecting that the heat disengaged by the compression of the\nundulating strata of the air, gave additional elasticity, and so\nproduced the difference, made the needful calculations and found he\nwas right. Thus acoustics was arrested until thermology overtook and\naided it. When Boyle and Marriot had discovered the relation between\nthe densities of gases and the pressures they are subject to; and when\nit thus became possible to calculate the rate of decreasing density\nin the upper parts of the atmosphere; it also became possible to make\napproximate tables of the atmospheric refraction of light. Thus optics,\nand with it astronomy, advanced with barology. After the discovery of\natmospheric pressure had led to the invention of the air-pump by Otto\nGuericke; and after it had become known that evaporation increases in\nrapidity as atmospheric pressure decreases; it became possible for\nLeslie, by evaporation in a vacuum, to produce the greatest cold known;\nand so to extend our knowledge of thermology by showing that there is\nno zero within reach of our researches. When Fourier had determined the\nlaws of conduction of heat, and when the Earth\u2019s temperature had been\nfound to increase below the surface one degree in every forty yards,\nthere were data for inferring the past condition of our globe; the\nvast period it has taken to cool down to its present state; and the\nimmense age of the solar system\u2014a purely astronomical consideration.\nChemistry having advanced sufficiently to supply the needful materials,\nand a physiological experiment having furnished the requisite hint,\nthere came the discovery of galvanic electricity. Galvanism reacting\non chemistry disclosed the metallic bases of the alkalies and earths,\nand inaugurated the electro-chemical theory; in the hands of Oersted\nand Amp\u00e8re it led to the laws of magnetic action; and by its aid\nFaraday has detected significant facts relative to the constitution of\nlight. Brewster\u2019s discoveries respecting double refraction and {62}\ndipolarization proved the essential truth of the classification of\ncrystalline forms according to the number of axes, by showing that\nthe molecular constitution depends on the axes. Now in these and in\nnumerous other cases, the mutual influence of the sciences has been\nquite independent of any supposed hierarchical order. Often, too, their\ninter-actions are more complex than as thus instanced\u2014involve more\nsciences than two. One illustration of this must suffice. We quote it\nin full from the _History of the Inductive Sciences_. In Book XI.,\nchap. II., on \u201cThe Progress of the Electrical Theory,\u201d Dr. Whewell\nwrites:\u2015\n\n \u201cThus at that period, mathematics was behind experiment, and a problem\n was proposed, in which theoretical numerical results were wanted for\n comparison with observation, but could not be accurately obtained;\n as was the case in astronomy also, till the time of the approximate\n solution of the problem of three bodies, and the consequent formation\n of the tables of the moon and planets, on the theory of universal\n gravitation. After some time, electrical theory was relieved from\n this reproach, mainly in consequence of the progress which astronomy\n had occasioned in pure mathematics. About 1801 there appeared in the\n _Bulletin des Sciences_, an exact solution of the problem of the\n distribution of electric fluid on a spheroid, obtained by Biot, by the\n application of the peculiar methods which Laplace had invented for\n the problem of the figure of the planets. And, in 1811, M. Poisson\n applied Laplace\u2019s artifices to the case of two spheres acting upon\n one another in contact, a case to which many of Coulomb\u2019s experiments\n were referrible; and the agreement of the results of theory and\n observation, thus extricated from Coulomb\u2019s numbers obtained above\n forty years previously, was very striking and convincing.\u201d\n\nNot only do the sciences affect each other after this direct manner,\nbut they affect each other indirectly. Where there is no dependence,\nthere is yet analogy\u2014_likeness of relations_; and the discovery of the\nrelations subsisting among one set of phenomena, constantly suggests a\nsearch for similar relations among another set. Thus the established\nfact that the force of gravitation varies inversely as the square\nof the distance, being recognized as a necessary characteristic of\nall influences proceeding from a centre, raised the suspicion that\nheat and light follow the same law; which proved to be the case\u2014a\nsuspicion and a {63} confirmation which were repeated in respect to\nthe electric and magnetic forces. Thus, again, the discovery of the\npolarization of light led to experiments which ended in the discovery\nof the polarization of heat\u2014a discovery that could never have been\nmade without the antecedent one. Thus, too, the known refrangibility\nof light and heat lately produced the inquiry whether sound also is\nnot refrangible; which on trial it turns out to be. In some cases,\nindeed, it is only by the aid of conceptions derived from one class of\nphenomena that hypotheses respecting other classes can be formed. The\ntheory, at one time favoured, that evaporation is a solution of water\nin air, assumed that the relation between water and air is _like_ the\nrelation between water and a dissolved solid; and could never have been\nconceived if relations like that between salt and water had not been\npreviously known. Similarly the received theory of evaporation\u2014that\nit is a diffusion of the particles of the evaporating fluid in virtue\nof their atomic repulsion\u2014could not have been entertained without a\nforegoing experience of magnetic and electric repulsions. So complete\nin recent days has become this _consensus_ among the sciences,\ncaused either by the natural entanglement of their phenomena, or by\nanalogies between the relations of their phenomena, that scarcely any\nconsiderable discovery concerning one order of facts now takes place,\nwithout shortly leading to discoveries concerning other orders.\n\nTo produce a complete conception of this process of scientific\nevolution it would be needful to go back to the beginning, and trace\nin detail the growth of classifications and nomenclatures; and to\nshow how, as subsidiary to science, they have acted upon it while it\nhas reacted upon them. We can only now remark that, on the one hand,\nclassifications and nomenclatures have aided science by subdividing\nthe subject-matter of research, and giving fixity and diffusion to\nthe truths disclosed; and that on the other hand, they have caught\nfrom it that increasing {64} quantitativeness, and that progress from\nconsiderations touching single phenomena to considerations touching the\nrelations among many phenomena, which we have been describing. Of this\nlast influence a few illustrations must be given. In chemistry it is\nseen in the facts that the dividing of matter into the four elements\nwas ostensibly based on the single property of weight, that the\nfirst truly chemical division into acid and alkaline bodies, grouped\ntogether bodies which had not simply one property in common but in\nwhich one property was constantly related to many others, and that the\nclassification now current, places together in the groups _supporters\nof combustion_, _metallic and non-metallic bases_, _acids_, _salts_,\n&c., bodies which are often quite unlike in sensible qualities, but\nwhich are like in the majority of their _relations_ to other bodies. In\nmineralogy again, the first classifications were based on differences\nin aspect, texture, and other physical attributes. Berzelius made two\nattempts at a classification based solely on chemical constitution.\nThat now current recognizes, as far as possible, the _relations_\nbetween physical and chemical characters. In botany the earliest\nclasses formed were _trees_, _shrubs_, and _herbs_: magnitude being the\nbasis of distinction. Dioscorides divided vegetables into _aromatic_,\n_alimentary_, _medicinal_, and _vinous_: a division of chemical\ncharacter. C\u00e6salpinus classified them by the seeds and seed-vessels,\nwhich he preferred because of the _relations_ found to subsist between\nthe character of the fructification and the general character of the\nother parts. While the \u201cnatural system\u201d since developed, carrying out\nthe doctrine of Linn\u00e6us, that \u201cthe natural orders must be formed by\nattention not to one or two, but to _all_ the parts of plants,\u201d bases\nits divisions on like peculiarities which are found to be _constantly\nrelated_ to the greatest number of other like peculiarities. And\nsimilarly in zoology, the successive classifications, from having\nbeen originally determined by external and often {65} subordinate\ncharacters not indicative of the essential nature, have been more and\nmore determined by those internal and fundamental differences, which\nhave uniform _relations_ to the greatest number of other differences.\nNor shall we be surprised at this analogy between the modes of progress\nof positive science and classification, when we bear in mind that\nboth proceed by making generalizations; that both enable us to make\nprevisions, differing only in their precision; and that while the one\ndeals with equal properties, magnitudes, and relations, the other deals\nwith properties and relations which approximate towards equality in\nvarious degrees.\n\nWithout further argument it will, we think, be admitted that the\nsciences are none of them separately evolved\u2014are none of them\nindependent either logically or historically; but that all of them\nhave, in a greater or less degree, required aid and reciprocated it.\nIndeed, it needs but to throw aside hypotheses, and contemplate the\nmixed character of surrounding phenomena, to see at once that these\nnotions of division and succession in the kinds of knowledge are simply\nscientific fictions: good, if regarded merely as aids to study; bad,\nif regarded as representing realities in Nature. No facts whatever are\npresented to our senses uncombined with other facts\u2014no facts whatever\nbut are in some degree disguised by accompanying facts: disguised in\nsuch a manner that all must be partially understood before any one\ncan be understood. If it be said, as by M. Comte, that gravitating\nforce should be treated of before other forces, seeing that all things\nare subject to it, it may on like grounds be said that heat should\nbe first dealt with; seeing that thermal forces are everywhere in\naction. Nay more, it may be urged that the ability of any portion of\nmatter to manifest visible gravitative phenomena depends on its state\nof aggregation, which is determined by heat; that only by the aid\nof thermology can we explain those apparent exceptions to {66} the\ngravitating tendency which are presented by steam and smoke, and so\nestablish its universality; and that, indeed, the very existence of\nthe Solar System in a solid form is just as much a question of heat as\nit is one of gravitation. Take other cases:\u2014All phenomena recognized\nby the eyes, through which only are the data of exact science\nascertainable, are complicated with optical phenomena, and cannot be\nexhaustively known until optical principles are known. The burning of\na candle cannot be explained without involving chemistry, mechanics,\nthermology. Every wind that blows is determined by influences partly\nsolar, partly lunar, partly hygrometric; and implies considerations\nof fluid equilibrium and physical geography. The direction, dip, and\nvariations of the magnetic needle, are facts half terrestrial, half\ncelestial\u2014are caused by earthly forces which have cycles of change\ncorresponding with astronomical periods. The flowing of the gulf-stream\nand the annual migration of icebergs towards the equator, involve in\ntheir explanation the Earth\u2019s rotation and spheroidal form, the laws of\nhydrostatics, the relative densities of cold and warm water, and the\ndoctrines of evaporation. It is no doubt true, as M. Comte says, that\n\u201cour position in the Solar System, and the motions, form, size, and\nequilibrium of the mass of our world among the planets, must be known\nbefore we can understand the phenomena going on at its surface.\u201d But,\nfatally for his hypothesis, it is also true that we must understand\na great part of the phenomena going on at its surface before we can\nknow its position, &c., in the Solar System. It is not simply that, as\nalready shown, those geometrical and mechanical principles by which\ncelestial appearances are explained, were first generalized from\nterrestrial experiences; but it is that even the obtainment of correct\ndata on which to base astronomical generalizations, implies advanced\nterrestrial physics. Until after optics had made considerable advance,\nthe Copernican {67} system remained but a speculation. A single modern\nobservation on a star has to undergo a careful analysis by the combined\naid of various sciences\u2014has to _be digested by the organism of the\nsciences_; which have severally to assimilate their respective parts\nof the observation, before the essential fact it contains is available\nfor the further development of astronomy. It has to be corrected\nnot only for nutation of the Earth\u2019s axis and for precession of the\nequinoxes, but for aberration and for refraction; and the formation of\nthe tables by which refraction is calculated, presupposes knowledge\nof the law of decreasing density in the upper atmospheric strata, of\nthe law of decreasing temperature and the influence of this on the\ndensity, and of hygrometric laws as also affecting density. So that,\nto get materials for further advance, astronomy requires not only the\nindirect aid of the sciences which have presided over the making of\nits improved instruments, but the direct aid of an advanced optics,\nof barology, of thermology, of hygrometry; and if we remember that\nthese delicate observations are in some cases registered electrically,\nand that they are further corrected for the \u201cpersonal equation\u201d\u2014the\ntime elapsing between seeing and registering, which differs with\ndifferent observers\u2014we may even add electricity and psychology. And\nhere, before leaving these illustrations, and especially this last\none, let us not omit to notice how well they exhibit that increasingly\nactive _consensus_ of the sciences which characterizes their advancing\ndevelopment. Besides finding that in these later times a discovery in\none science commonly causes progress in others; besides finding that\na great part of the questions with which modern science deals are\nso mixed as to require the co-operation of many sciences for their\nsolution; we find that, to make a single good observation in the purest\nof the natural sciences, requires the combined aid of half a dozen\nother sciences.\n\nPerhaps the clearest comprehension of the interconnected {68} growth\nof the sciences may be obtained by contemplating that of the arts,\nto which it is strictly analogous, and with which it is bound up.\nMost intelligent persons must have been occasionally struck with\nthe numerous antecedents pre-supposed by one of our processes of\nmanufacture. Let him trace the production of a printed cotton, and\nconsider all that is implied by it. There are the many successive\nimprovements through which the power-looms reached their present\nperfection; there is the steam-engine that drives them, having its\nlong history from Papin downwards; there are the lathes in which its\ncylinder was bored, and the string of ancestral lathes from which those\nlathes proceeded; there is the steam-hammer under which its crank shaft\nwas welded; there are the puddling furnaces, the blast-furnaces, the\ncoal-mines and the iron-mines needful for producing the raw material;\nthere are the slowly improved appliances by which the factory was\nbuilt, and lighted, and ventilated; there are the printing engine,\nand the dye-house, and the colour-laboratory with its stock of\nmaterials from all parts of the world, implying cochineal-culture,\nlogwood-cutting, indigo-growing; there are the implements used by the\nproducers of cotton, the gins by which it is cleaned, the elaborate\nmachines by which it is spun; there are the vessels in which cotton\nis imported, with the building-slips, the rope-yards, the sail-cloth\nfactories, the anchor-forges, needful for making them; and besides\nall these directly necessary antecedents, each of them involving many\nothers, there are the institutions which have developed the requisite\nintelligence, the printing and publishing arrangements which have\nspread the necessary information, the social organization which has\nrendered possible such a complex co-operation of agencies. Further\nanalysis would show that the many arts thus concerned in the economical\nproduction of a child\u2019s frock, have each been brought to its present\nefficiency by slow steps which the other arts have aided; and that from\nthe beginning this reciprocity has been on {69} the increase. It needs\nbut on the one hand to consider how impossible it is for the savage,\neven with ore and coal ready, to produce so simple a thing as an iron\nhatchet; and then to consider, on the other hand, that it would have\nbeen impracticable among ourselves, even a century ago, to raise the\ntubes of the Britannia bridge from lack of the hydraulic press; to see\nhow mutually dependent are the arts, and how all must advance that each\nmay advance. Well, the sciences are involved with each other in just\nthe same manner. They are, in fact, inextricably woven into this same\ncomplex web of the arts; and are only conventionally independent of\nit. Originally the two were one. How to fix the religious festivals;\nwhen to sow; how to weigh commodities; and in what manner to measure\nground; were the purely practical questions out of which arose\nastronomy, mechanics, geometry. Since then there has been a perpetual\ninosculation of the sciences and the arts. Science has been supplying\nart with truer generalizations and more completely quantitative\nprevisions. Art has been supplying science with better materials, and\nmore perfect instruments. And all along the interdependence has been\ngrowing closer, not only between art and science, but among the arts\nthemselves, and among the sciences themselves. How completely the\nanalogy holds throughout, becomes yet clearer when we recognize the\nfact that _the sciences are arts to one another_. If, as occurs in\nalmost every case, the fact to be analyzed by any science, has first\nto be prepared\u2014to be disentangled from disturbing facts by the afore\ndiscovered methods of other sciences; the other sciences so used,\nstand in the position of arts. If, in solving a dynamical problem,\na parallelogram is drawn, of which the sides and diagonal represent\nforces, and by putting magnitudes of extension for magnitudes of force\na measurable relation is established between quantities not else to be\ndealt with; it may be fairly said that geometry plays towards mechanics\nmuch the same part that the fire of the founder plays towards the\nmetal he is going to cast. {70} If, in analyzing the phenomena of the\ncoloured rings surrounding the point of contact between two lenses,\na Newton ascertains by calculation the amount of certain interposed\nspaces, far too minute for actual measurement; he employs the science\nof number for essentially the same purpose as that for which the\nwatchmaker employs tools. If, before calculating the orbit of a comet\nfrom its observed position, the astronomer has to separate all the\nerrors of observation, it is manifest that the refraction-tables, and\nlogarithm-books, and formul\u00e6, which he successively uses, serve him\nmuch as retorts, and filters, and cupels serve the assayer who wishes\nto separate the pure gold from all accompanying ingredients. So close,\nindeed, is the relationship, that it is impossible to say where science\nbegins and art ends. All the instruments of the natural philosopher\nare the products of art; the adjusting one of them for use is an art;\nthere is art in making an observation with one of them; it requires\nart properly to treat the facts ascertained; nay, even the employing\nestablished generalizations to open the way to new generalizations,\nmay be considered as art. In each of these cases previously organized\nknowledge becomes the implement by which new knowledge is got at:\nand whether that previously organized knowledge is embodied in a\ntangible apparatus or in a formula, matters not in so far as its\nessential relation to the new knowledge is concerned. If art is applied\nknowledge, then such portion of a scientific investigation as consists\nof applied knowledge is art. Hence we may even say that as soon as any\nprevision in science passes out of its originally passive state, and\nis employed for reaching other previsions, it passes from theory into\npractice\u2014becomes science in action\u2014becomes art. And after contemplating\nthese facts, we shall the more clearly perceive that as the connexion\nof the arts with each other has been becoming more intimate; as the\nhelp given by sciences to arts and by arts to sciences, has been age by\nage increasing; so the interdependence of the sciences {71} themselves\nhas been ever growing greater, their relations more involved, their\n_consensus_ more active.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIn here ending our sketch of the Genesis of Science, we are conscious\nof having done the subject but scant justice. Two difficulties\nhave stood in our way: one, the having to touch on so many points\nin such small space; the other, the necessity of treating in\nserial arrangement a process which is not serial. Nevertheless, we\nbelieve the evidence assigned suffices to substantiate the leading\npropositions with which we set out. Inquiry into the first stages\nof science confirms the conclusion drawn from analysis of science\nas now existing, that it is not distinct from common knowledge, but\nan outgrowth from it\u2014an extension of perception by means of reason.\nThat more specific characteristic of scientific previsions, which\nwas analytically shown to distinguish them from the previsions of\nuncultured intelligence\u2014their quantitativeness\u2014we also see to have been\nthe characteristic alike of the initial steps in science, and of all\nthe steps succeeding them. The facts and admissions cited in disproof\nof the assertion that the sciences follow one another, both logically\nand historically, in the order of their decreasing generality, have\nbeen enforced by the instances we have met with, showing that a more\ngeneral science as much owes its progress to the presentation of new\nproblems by a more special science, as the more special science owes\nits progress to the solutions which the more general science is thus\nled to attempt\u2014instances, therefore, illustrating the position that\nscientific advance is as much from the special to the general as from\nthe general to the special. Quite in harmony with this position we\nfind to be the admissions that the sciences are as branches of one\ntrunk, and that they were at first cultivated simultaneously. This\nharmony becomes the more marked on finding, as we have done, not\nonly that the sciences have a common root, but that science in {72}\ngeneral has a common root with language, classification, reasoning,\nart; that throughout civilization these have advanced together, acting\nand reacting upon each other just as the separate sciences have done;\nand that thus the development of intelligence in all its divisions\nand sub-divisions has conformed to this same law which we have shown\nthat the sciences conform to. From all which we may perceive that the\nsciences can with no greater propriety be arranged in a succession,\nthan language, classification, reasoning, art, and science, can be\narranged in a succession; that, however needful a succession may be\nfor the convenience of books and catalogues, it must be recognized as\nmerely a convention; and that so far from its being the function of a\nphilosophy of the sciences to establish a hierarchy, it is its function\nto show that the linear arrangements required for literary purposes,\nhave none of them any basis either in Nature or History.\n\nThere is one further remark we must not omit\u2014a remark touching the\nimportance of the question that has been discussed. Topics of this\nabstract nature are commonly slighted as of no practical moment;\nand, doubtless, many will think it of little consequence what theory\nrespecting the genesis of science may be entertained. But the value of\ntruths is often great, in proportion as their generality is wide. And\nit must be so here. A correct theory of the development of the sciences\nmust have an important effect on education; and, through education, on\ncivilization. Much as we differ from him in other respects, we agree\nwith M. Comte in the belief that, rightly conducted, the education of\nthe individual must have a certain correspondence with the evolution\nof the race. No one can contemplate the facts we have cited in\nillustration of the early stages of science, without recognizing the\n_necessity_ of the processes through which those stages were reached\u2014a\nnecessity which, in respect to the leading truths, may likewise be\ntraced in all after stages. This necessity, {73} originating in the\nvery nature of the phenomena to be analyzed and the faculties to be\nemployed, partially applies to the mind of the child as to that of the\nsavage. We say partially, because the correspondence is not special\nbut general only. Were the _environment_ the same in both cases, the\ncorrespondence would be complete. But though the surrounding material\nout of which science is to be organized, is, in many cases, the same\nto the juvenile mind and the aboriginal mind, it is not so throughout;\nas, for instance, in the case of chemistry, the phenomena of which\nare accessible to the one but were inaccessible to the other. Hence,\nin proportion as the environment differs, the course of evolution\nmust differ. After admitting exceptions, however, there remains a\nsubstantial parallelism; and, if so, it is of moment to ascertain what\nreally has been the process of scientific evolution. The establishment\nof an erroneous theory must be disastrous in its educational results;\nwhile the establishment of a true one must be fertile in school-reforms\nand consequent social benefits.\n\n\nENDNOTE TO _THE GENESIS OF SCIENCE_.\n\n[1] It is curious that the author of \u201cThe Plurality of Worlds,\u201d\nwith quite other aims, should have persuaded himself into similar\nconclusions.\n\n\n\n\n{74}\n\nTHE CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES.\n\n\n[_First published as a brochure in April 1864. The preface to the\nsecond edition, published in April 1869, I reproduce because of certain\nfacts contained in it which are not without interest._]\n\nThe first edition of this Essay is not yet out of print. But a proposal\nto translate it into French having been made by Professor R\u00e9thor\u00e9, I\nhave decided to prepare a new edition free from the imperfections which\ncriticism and further thought have disclosed, rather than allow these\nimperfections to be reproduced.\n\nThe occasion has almost tempted me into some amplification. Further\narguments against the classification of M. Comte, and further arguments\nin support of the classification here set forth, have pleaded for\nutterance. But reconsideration has convinced me that it is both\nneedless and useless to say more\u2014needless because those who are not\ncommitted will think the case sufficiently strong as it stands; and\nuseless because to those who are committed, additional reasons will\nseem as inadequate as the original ones. [In the preface to the third\nedition, however, a reason is given for a change of decision on\nthis point at that time made (February 1871): the reason being \u201cthe\npublication of several objections by Prof. Bain in his Logic.\u201d]\n\nThis last conclusion is thrust on me by seeing how little M. Littr\u00e9,\nthe leading expositor of M. Comte, is influenced by fundamental\nobjections the force of which he admits. After quoting one of these,\nhe says, with a candour equally {75} rare and admirable, that he\nhas vainly searched M. Comte\u2019s works and his own mind for an answer.\nNevertheless, he adds\u2014\u201cj\u2019ai r\u00e9ussi, je crois, \u00e0 \u00e9carter l\u2019attaque de M.\nHerbert Spencer, et \u00e0 sauver le fond par des sacrifices indispensables\nmais accessoires.\u201d The sacrifices are these. He abandons M. Comte\u2019s\ndivision of Inorganic Science into Celestial Physics and Terrestrial\nPhysics\u2014a division which, in M. Comte\u2019s scheme, takes precedence of\nall the rest; and he admits that neither logically nor historically\ndoes Astronomy come before Physics, as M. Comte alleges. After making\nthese sacrifices, which most will think too lightly described as\n\u201csacrifices indispensables mais accessoires,\u201d M. Littr\u00e9 proceeds to\nrehabilitate the Comtean classification in a way which he considers\nsatisfactory, but which I do not understand. In short, the proof of\nthese incongruities affects his faith in the Positivist theory of the\nsciences, no more than the faith of a Christian is affected by proof\nthat the Gospels contradict one another.\n\nHere in England I have seen no attempt to meet the criticisms with\nwhich M. Littr\u00e9 thus deals. There has been no reply to the allegation,\nbased on examples, that the several sciences do not develop in the\norder of their decreasing generality; nor to the allegation, based\non M. Comte\u2019s own admissions, that within each science the progress\nis not, as he says it is, from the general to the special; nor to\nthe allegation that the seeming historical precedence of Astronomy\nover Physics in M. Comte\u2019s pages, is based on a verbal ambiguity\u2014a\nmere sleight of words; nor to the allegation, abundantly illustrated,\nthat a progression in an order the reverse of that asserted by M.\nComte may be as well substantiated; nor to various minor allegations\nequally irreconcileable with his scheme. I have met with nothing\nmore than iteration of the statement that the sciences _do_ conform,\nlogically and historically, to the order in which M. Comte places them;\nregardless of the assigned evidence that they _do not_.\n\nUnder these circumstances it is unnecessary for me to {76} say more;\nand I think I am warranted in continuing to hold that the Comtean\nclassification of the sciences is demonstrably untenable.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIn an essay on \u201cThe Genesis of Science,\u201d originally published in 1854,\nI endeavoured to show that the Sciences cannot be rationally arranged\nin serial order. Proof was given that neither the succession in which\nthe Sciences are placed by M. Comte (to a criticism of whose scheme\nthe essay was in part devoted), nor any other succession in which the\nSciences can be placed, represents either their logical dependence or\ntheir historical dependence. To the question\u2014How may their relations be\nrightly expressed? I did not then attempt any answer. This question I\npropose now to consider.\n\nA true classification includes in each class, those objects which have\nmore characteristics in common with one another, than any of them\nhave in common with any objects excluded from the class. Further,\nthe characteristics possessed in common by the colligated objects,\nand not possessed by other objects, involve more numerous dependent\ncharacteristics. These are two sides of the same definition. For things\npossessing the greatest number of attributes in common, are things that\npossess in common those essential attributes on which the rest depend;\nand, conversely, the possession in common of the essential attributes,\nimplies the possession in common of the greatest number of attributes.\nHence, either test may be used as convenience dictates.\n\nIf, then, the Sciences admit of classification at all, it must be by\ngrouping together the like and separating the unlike, as thus defined.\nLet us proceed to do this.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe broadest natural division among the Sciences, is the division\nbetween those which deal with the abstract relations {77} under which\nphenomena are presented to us, and those which deal with the phenomena\nthemselves. Relations of whatever orders, are nearer akin to one\nanother than they are to any objects. Objects of whatever orders, are\nnearer akin to one another than they are to any relations. Whether,\nas some hold, Space and Time are nothing but forms of Thought[2];\nor whether, as I hold myself, they are forms of Things, that have\ngenerated forms of Thought through organized and inherited experience\nof Things; it is equally true that Space and Time are contrasted\nabsolutely with the existences disclosed to us in Space and Time; and\nhence the Sciences which deal exclusively with Space and Time, are\nseparated by the profoundest of all distinctions from the Sciences\nwhich deal with the existences contained in Space and Time. Space is\nthe abstract of all relations of co-existence. Time is the abstract\nof all relations of sequence. And dealing as they do entirely with\nrelations of co-existence and sequence, in their general or special\nforms, Logic and Mathematics form a class of the Sciences more widely\nunlike the rest, than any of the rest are from one another.\n\nThe Sciences which deal with existences themselves, instead of the\nblank forms in which existences are presented to us, admit of a\nsub-division less profound than the division above made, but more\nprofound than any of the divisions among the Sciences individually\nconsidered. They {78} fall into two classes, having quite different\naspects, aims, and methods. Every phenomenon is more or less\ncomposite\u2014is a manifestation of force under several distinct modes.\nHence result two objects of inquiry. We may study the component\nmodes of force separately; or we may study them as co-operating to\ngenerate in this composite phenomenon. On the one hand, neglecting\nall the incidents of particular cases, we may aim to educe the laws\nof each mode of force, when it is uninterfered with. On the other\nhand, the incidents of the particular case being given, we may seek to\ninterpret the entire phenomenon, as a product of the several forces\nsimultaneously in action. The truths reached through the first kind\nof inquiry, though concrete inasmuch as they have actual existences\nfor their subject-matters, are abstract inasmuch as they refer to the\nmodes of existence apart from one another; while the truths reached\nby the second kind of inquiry are properly concrete, inasmuch as they\nformulate the facts in their combined order, as they occur in Nature.\n\nThe Sciences, then, in their main divisions, stand thus:\u2015\n\n SCIENCE is\n\n   that which treats of the forms\n   in which phenomona are known to us;   ABSTRACT SCIENCE\n                                         (Logic and Mathematics)\n\n  that which treats of the phenomena themselves\n\n    in their elements           ABSTRACT-CONCRETE SCIENCE\n                                (Mechanics, Physics, Chemistry, etc.)\n\n    in their totalities         CONCRETE SCIENCE\n                                (Astronomy, Geology, Biology, Psychology,\n                                 Sociology, etc.)\n\nIt is needful to define the words _abstract_ and _concrete_ as thus\nused; since they are sometimes used with other {79} meanings. M.\nComte divides Science into abstract and concrete; but the divisions\nwhich he distinguishes by these names are quite unlike those above\nmade. Instead of regarding some Sciences as wholly abstract, and\nothers as wholly concrete, he regards each Science as having an\nabstract part, and a concrete part. There is, according to him, an\nabstract mathematics and a concrete mathematics\u2014an abstract biology\nand concrete biology. He says:\u2014\u201cIl faut distinguer, par rapport \u00e0\ntous les ordres de ph\u00e9nom\u00e8nes, deux genres de sciences naturelles:\nles unes abstraites, g\u00e9n\u00e9rales, ont pour objet la d\u00e9couverte des lois\nqui r\u00e9gissent les diverses classes de ph\u00e9nom\u00e8nes, en consid\u00e9rant tous\nles cas qu\u2019on peut concevoir; les autres concr\u00e8tes, particuli\u00e8res,\ndescriptives, et qu\u2019on d\u00e9signe quelquefois sous le nom de sciences\nnaturelles proprement dites, consistent dans l\u2019application de ces\nlois a l\u2019histoire effective des diff\u00e9rens \u00eatres existans.\u201d And to\nillustrate the distinction, he names general physiology as abstract,\nand zoology and botany as concrete. Here it is manifest that the words\n_abstract_ and _general_ are used as synonymous. They have, however,\ndifferent meanings; and confusion results from not distinguishing\ntheir meanings. Abstractness means _detachment from_ the incidents of\nparticular cases. Generality means _manifestation in_ numerous cases.\nOn the one hand, the essential nature of some phenomenon is considered,\napart from disguising phenomena. On the other hand, the frequency of\nthe phenomenon, with or without disguising phenomena, is the thing\nconsidered. Among the phenomena presented by numbers, which are purely\nideal, the two coincide; but excluding these, an abstract truth is not\nrealizable to perception in any case of which it is asserted, whereas\na general truth is realizable to perception in every case of which it\nis asserted. Some illustrations will make the distinction clear. Thus\nit is an abstract truth that the angle contained in a semi-circle is\na right angle\u2014abstract in the sense that though it does not hold of\n{80} actually-constructed semi-circles and angles, which are always\ninexact, it holds of the ideal semi-circles and angles abstracted\nfrom real ones; but this is not a general truth, either in the sense\nthat it is commonly manifested in Nature, or in the sense that it is\na space-relation that comprehends many minor space-relations: it is\na quite special space-relation. Again, that the momentum of a body\ncauses it to move in a straight line at a uniform velocity, is an\nabstract-concrete truth\u2014a truth abstracted from certain experiences of\nconcrete phenomena; but it is by no means a general truth: so little\ngenerality has it, that no one fact in Nature displays it. Conversely,\nsurrounding things supply us with hosts of general truths that are not\nin the least abstract. It is a general truth that the planets go round\nthe Sun from West to East\u2014a truth which holds good in several hundred\ncases (including the cases of the planetoids); but this truth is not\nat all abstract, since it is perfectly realized as a concrete fact\nin every one of these cases. Every vertebrate animal whatever, has a\ndouble nervous system; all birds and all mammals are warm-blooded\u2014these\nare general truths, but they are concrete truths: that is to say, every\nvertebrate animal individually presents an entire and unqualified\nmanifestation of this duality of the nervous system; every living bird\nexemplifies absolutely or completely the warm-bloodedness of birds.\nWhat we here call, and rightly call, a general truth, is simply a\nproposition which _sums up_ a number of our actual experiences; and\nnot the expression of a truth _drawn from_ our actual experiences, but\nnever presented to us in any of them. In other words, a general truth\ncolligates a number of particular truths; while an abstract truth\ncolligates no particular truths, but formulates a truth which certain\nphenomena all involve, though it is actually seen in none of them.\n\nLimiting the words to their proper meanings as thus defined, it becomes\nmanifest that the three classes of {81} Sciences above separated,\nare not distinguishable at all by differences in their degrees of\ngenerality. They are all equally general; or rather they are all,\nconsidered as groups, universal. Every object whatever presents at once\nthe subject-matter for each of them. In every fragment of substance\nwe have simultaneously illustrated the abstract truths of relation in\nTime and Space; the abstract-concrete truths in conformity with which\nthe fragment manifests its several modes of force; and the concrete\ntruths resulting from the joint manifestation of these modes of force,\nand which give to the fragment the characters by which it is known as\nsuch or such. Thus these three classes of Sciences severally formulate\ndifferent, but co-extensive, classes of facts. Within each group there\nare truths of greater and less generality: there are general abstract\ntruths, and special abstract truths; general abstract-concrete truths,\nand special abstract-concrete truths; general concrete truths, and\nspecial concrete truths. But while within each class there are groups\nand sub-groups and sub-sub-groups which differ in their degrees of\ngenerality, the classes themselves differ only in their degrees of\nabstractness.[3]\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nLet us pass to the sub-divisions of these classes. The first class is\nseparable into two parts\u2014the one containing universal truths, the other\nnon-universal truths. Dealing {82} wholly with relations apart from\nrelated things, Abstract Science considers first, that which is common\nto all relations whatever; and, second, that which is common to each\norder of relations. Besides the indefinite and variable connexions\nwhich exist among phenomena, as occurring together in Space and Time,\nwe find that there are also definite and invariable connexions\u2014that\nbetween each kind of phenomenon and certain other kinds of phenomena,\nthere exist uniform relations. This is a universal abstract truth\u2014that\nthere is an unchanging order, or fixity of law, in Space and Time.\nWe come next to the several kinds of unchanging order, which, taken\ntogether, form the subjects of the {83} second division of Abstract\nScience. Of this second division, the most general sub-division is\nthat which deals with the natures of the connexions in Space and Time,\nirrespective of the terms connected. The conditions under which we may\npredicate a relation of coincidence or proximity in Space and Time (or\nof non-coincidence or non-proximity) from the subject-matter of Logic.\nHere the natures and amounts of the terms between which the relations\nare {84} asserted (or denied) are of no moment: the propositions\nof Logic are independent of any qualitative or quantitative\nspecification of the related things. The other sub-division has for\nits subject-matter, the relations between terms which are specified\nquantitatively but not qualitatively. The amounts of the related terms,\nirrespective of their natures, are here dealt with; and Mathematics\nis a statement of the laws of quantity considered apart from reality.\nQuantity considered apart from reality, is occupancy of Space or Time;\nand occupancy of Space or Time is measured by units of one or other\norder, but of which the ultimate ones are simply separate places in\nconsciousness, either coexistent or sequent. Among units that are\nunspecified in their natures (extensive, protensive, or intensive), but\nare ideally endowed with existence considered apart from attributes,\nthe quantitative relations that arise, are those most general relations\nexpressed by numbers. Such relations fall into either of two orders,\naccording as the units are considered simply as capable of filling\nseparate places in consciousness, or according as they are considered\nas filling places that are not only separate, but equal. In the one\ncase, we have that indefinite calculus by which numbers of abstract\nexistences, but not sums of abstract existence, are predicable. In the\nother case, we have that definite calculus by which both numbers of\nabstract existences and sums of abstract existence are predicable. Next\ncomes that division of Mathematics which deals with the quantitative\nrelations of magnitudes (or aggregates of units) considered as\ncoexistent, or as occupying Space\u2014the division called Geometry. And\nthen we arrive at relations, the terms of which include both quantities\nof Time and quantities of Space\u2014those in which times are estimated by\nthe units of space traversed at a uniform velocity, and those in which\nequal units of time being given, the spaces traversed with uniform or\nvariable velocities are estimated. {85} These Abstract Sciences,\nwhich are concerned exclusively with relations and with the relations\nof relations, may be grouped as shown in Table I.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nTABLE I.\n\n ABSTRACT SCIENCE.\n\n   Universal law of relation\u2014an expression of the truth that\n   uniformities of connexion obtain among modes of Being, irrespective\n   of any specification of the natures of the uniformities of connexion.\n\n   Laws of relations\n\n     that are qualitative; or that are specified in their natures as\n     relations of coincidence or proximity in Time and Space, but not\n     necessarily in their terms the natures and amount of which are\n     indifferent. (LOGIC.)[4]\n\n     that are quantitative (MATHEMATICS)\n\n       negatively: the terms of the relations being definitely-related\n       sets of positions in space; and the facts predicated being the\n       absences of certain quantities. (_Geometry of Position._[5])\n\n       positively: the terms being magnitudes composed of\n\n         units that are equal only as having independent existences.\n         (_Indefinite Calculus._[6])\n\n         equal units\n\n           the equality of which is not defined as extensive,\n           protensive, or intensive (_Definite Calculus_)\n\n             when their numbers are completely specified (_Arithmetic._)\n\n             when their numbers are specified only\n\n               in their relations (_Algebra._)\n\n               in the relations of their relations. (_Calculus of_\n               _Operations._)\n\n           the equality of which is that of extension\n\n             considered in their relations of coexistence. (_Geometry._)\n\n             considered as traversed in Time\n\n               that is wholly indefinite. (_Kinematics._)\n\n               that is divided into equal units (_Geometry of Motion._[7])\n\nPassing from the Sciences concerned with the ideal or unoccupied\nforms of relations, and turning to the Sciences concerned with\nreal relations, or the relations among realities, we come first to\nthose Sciences which treat of realities, not as they are habitually\nmanifested, but with realities as manifested in their different\nmodes, when these are artificially separated from one another.\nWhile the Abstract Sciences are wholly ideal, relatively to the\nAbstract-Concrete and Concrete Sciences; the Abstract-Concrete Sciences\nare partially ideal, relatively to the Concrete Sciences. Just as\nLogic and Mathematics generalize the laws of relation, qualitative\nand quantitative, apart from related things; so, Mechanics, Physics,\nChemistry generalize the laws of relation which different modes\nof Matter and Motion conform to, when severally disentangled from\nthose actual phenomena in which they are mutually modified. Just as\nthe geometrician formulates the properties of lines and surfaces,\nindependently of the irregularities and thicknesses of lines and\nsurfaces as they really exist; so the physicist and the chemist\nformulate the manifestations of each mode of force, independently of\nthe disturbances in its manifestations which other modes of force cause\nin every actual case. In works on Mechanics, the laws of motion are\nexpressed without reference to friction and resistance of the medium.\nNot what motion ever really is, but what it would be if retarding\nforces were absent, is asserted. If afterwards any retarding force is\ntaken into account, then the effect of this retarding force is dealt\nwith by itself: neglecting the other retarding forces. Consider, again,\nthe generalizations of the physicist respecting molecular motion. The\nlaw that light varies inversely as the square of the distance, is\nabsolutely true only when the radiation {86} goes on from a point\nwithout dimensions, which it never does; and it also assumes that\nthe rays are perfectly straight, which they cannot be unless the\nmedium differs from all actual media in being perfectly homogeneous.\nIf the disturbing effects of changes of media are investigated, the\nformul\u00e6 expressing the refractions take for granted that the new media\nentered are homogeneous; which they never really are. Even when a\ncompound disturbance is allowed for, as when the refraction undergone\nby light in traversing a medium of increasing density, like the\natmosphere, is calculated, the calculation still supposes conditions\nthat are unnaturally simple\u2014it supposes that the atmosphere is not\npervaded by heterogeneous currents, which it always is. Similarly\nwith the inquiries of the chemist. He does not take his substances as\nNature supplies them. Before he proceeds to specify their respective\nproperties, he purifies them\u2014separates from each all trace of every\nother. Before ascertaining the specific gravity of a gas, he has to\nfree this gas from the vapour of water, usually mixed with it. Before\ndescribing the properties of a salt, he guards against any error that\nmay arise from the presence of an uncombined portion of the acid or\nbase. And when he alleges of any element that it has a certain atomic\nweight, and unites with such and such equivalents of other elements,\nhe does not mean that the results thus expressed are exactly the\nresults of any one experiment; but that they are the results which,\nafter averaging many trials, he concludes would be realized if absolute\npurity could be obtained, and if the experiments could be conducted\nwithout loss. His problem is to ascertain the laws of combination of\nmolecules, not as they are actually displayed, but as they would be\ndisplayed in the absence of those minute interferences which cannot\nbe altogether avoided. Thus all Abstract-Concrete Sciences have for\ntheir object, _analytical interpretation_. In every case it is the\naim to decompose the phenomenon, and formulate its {87} components\napart from one another; or some two or three apart from the rest.\nWherever, throughout these Sciences, synthesis is employed, it is for\nthe verification of analysis.[8] The truths elaborated are severally\nasserted, not as truths exhibited by this or that particular object;\nbut as truths universally holding of Matter and Motion in their more\ngeneral or more special forms, considered apart from particular\nobjects, and particular places in space.\n\nThe sub-divisions of this group of Sciences, may be drawn on the\nsame principle as that on which the sub-divisions of the preceding\ngroup were drawn. Phenomena, considered as more or less involved\nmanifestations of force, yield on analysis, certain laws of\nmanifestation which are universal, and other laws of manifestation,\nwhich, being dependent on conditions, are not universal. Hence the\nAbstract-Concrete Sciences are primarily divisible into\u2014the laws of\nforce considered apart from its separate modes, and laws of force\nconsidered under each of its separate modes. And this second division\nof the Abstract-Concrete group, is sub-divisible after a manner\nessentially analogous. It is needless to occupy space by defining\nthese several {88} orders and genera of Sciences. Table II. will\nsufficiently explain their relations.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nTABLE II.\n\n  ABSTRACT-CONCRETE SCIENCE.\n\n    Universal laws of forces (tensions and pressures), as deducible from\n    the persistence of force: the theorems of resolution and composition\n    of forces.\n\n    Laws of forces as manifested by matter\n\n      in masses (MECHANICS)\n\n        that are in equilibrium relatively to other masses\n\n          and are solid. (_Statics._)\n\n          and are fluid. (_Hydrostatics._)\n\n        that are not in equilibrium relatively to other masses\n\n          and are solid. (_Dynamics._)\n\n          and are fluid. (_Hydrodynamics._)\n\n      in molecules (MOLECULAR MECHANICS)\n\n        when in equilibrium: (_Molecular Statics_)\n\n          giving statical properties of matter\n\n            general, as impenetrability or space-occupancy.\n\n            special, as the forms resulting from molecular equilibrium.\n\n          giving statico-dynamical properties of matter (cohesion,\n          elasticity, etc.)\n\n            when solid.\n\n            when liquid.\n\n            when gaseous.\n\n        when not in equilibrium: (_Molecular Dynamics_)\n\n          as resulting in a changed distribution of molecules\n\n            which alters their relative positions homogeneously\n\n              causing increase of volume (expansion, liquefaction,\n              evaporation).\n\n              causing decrease of volume (condensation, solidification,\n              contraction).\n\n            which alters their relative positions heterogeneously\n            (_Chemistry_)\n\n              producing new relations of molecules (new compounds).\n\n              producing new relations of forces (new affinities).\n\n          as resulting in a changed distribution of molecular motion,\n\n            which, by integration, generates sensible motion.\n\n            which, by disintegration, generates insensible motion, under\n            the forms of {_Heat._ _Light._ _Electricity._ _Magnetism._}\n\nWecome now to the third great group. We have done with the Sciences which\nare concerned only with the blank forms of relations under which Being\nis manifested to us. We have left behind the Sciences which, dealing\nwith Being under its universal mode, and its several non-universal\nmodes regarded as independent, treat the terms of its relations as\nsimple and homogeneous; which they never are in Nature. There remain\nthe Sciences which, taking these modes of Being as they are habitually\nconnected with one another, have for the terms of their relations,\nthose heterogeneous combinations of forces that constitute actual\nphenomena. The subject-matter of these Concrete-Sciences is the real,\nas contrasted with the wholly or partially ideal. It is their aim,\nnot to separate and generalize apart the components of all phenomena,\nbut to explain each phenomenon as a product of these components.\nTheir relations are not, like those of the simplest Abstract-Concrete\nSciences, relations between one antecedent and one consequent; nor\nare they, like those of the more involved Abstract-Concrete Sciences,\nrelations between some few antecedents cut off in imagination from\nall others, and some few consequents similarly cut off; but they\nare relations each of which has for its terms a complete plexus of\nantecedents and a complete plexus of consequents. This is manifest in\nthe least involved Concrete Sciences. The astronomer seeks to explain\nthe Solar System. He does not stop short after generalizing the laws\nof planetary movement, such as planetary movement would be did only\na single planet exist; but he solves this abstract-concrete problem,\nas a step towards solving the concrete problem of the planetary\nmovements as affecting one another. In astronomical language, \u201cthe\ntheory of the Moon\u201d means an interpretation of the Moon\u2019s motions, not\nas determined simply by centripetal {89} and centrifugal forces, but\nas perpetually modified by gravitation towards the Earth\u2019s equatorial\nprotuberance, towards the Sun, and even towards Venus: forces daily\nvarying in their amounts and combinations. Nor does the astronomer\nleave off when he has calculated what will be the position of a given\nbody at a given time, allowing for all perturbations; but he goes on to\nconsider the effects produced by reactions on the perturbing masses.\nAnd he further goes on to consider how the mutual perturbations of\nthe planets cause, during a long period, increasing deviations from a\nmean state; and then how compensating perturbations cause continuous\ndecrease of the deviations. That is, the goal towards which he ever\nstrives, is a complete explanation of these complex planetary motions\nin their totality. Similarly with the geologist. He does not take for\nhis problem only those irregularities of the Earth\u2019s crust that are\nworked by denudation; or only those which igneous action causes. He\ndoes not seek simply to understand how sedimentary strata were formed;\nor how faults were produced; or how moraines originated; or how the\nbeds of Alpine lakes were scooped out. But taking into account all\nagencies co-operating in endless and ever-varying combinations, he\naims to interpret the entire structure of the Earth\u2019s crust. If he\nstudies separately the actions of rain, rivers, glaciers, icebergs,\ntides, waves, volcanoes, earthquakes, etc.; he does so that he may be\nbetter able to comprehend their joint actions as factors in geological\nphenomena: the object of his science being to generalize these\nphenomena in all their intricate connexions, as parts of one whole. In\nlike manner Biology is the elaboration of a complete theory of Life, in\neach and all of its involved manifestations. If different aspects of\nits phenomena are investigated apart\u2014if one observer busies himself in\nclassing organisms, another in dissecting them, another in ascertaining\ntheir chemical compositions, another in studying functions, another\nin tracing laws of modification; they are {90} all, consciously or\nunconsciously, helping to work out a solution of vital phenomena in\ntheir entirety, both as displayed by individual organisms and by\norganisms at large. Thus, in these Concrete Sciences, the object is\nthe converse of that which the Abstract-Concrete Sciences propose to\nthemselves. In the one case we have _analytical interpretation_; while\nin the other case we have _synthetical interpretation_. Instead of\nsynthesis being used merely to verify analysis; analysis is here used\nonly to aid synthesis. Not to formulate the factors of phenomena is\nnow the object; but to formulate the phenomena resulting from these\nfactors, under the various conditions which the Universe presents.\n\nThis third class of Sciences, like the other classes, is divisible\ninto the universal and the non-universal. As there are truths which\nhold of all phenomena in their elements; so there are truths which\nhold of all phenomena in their totalities. As force has certain\nultimate laws common to its separate modes of manifestation, so in\nthose combinations of its modes which constitute actual phenomena, we\nfind certain ultimate laws that are conformed to in every case. These\nare the laws of the re-distribution of force. Since we can become\nconscious of a phenomenon only by some change wrought in us, every\nphenomenon necessarily implies re-distribution of force\u2014change in\nthe arrangements of matter and motion. Alike in molecular movements\nand the movements of masses, one great uniformity may be traced.\nA decreasing quantity of motion, sensible or insensible, always\nhas for its concomitant an increasing aggregation of matter; and,\nconversely, an increasing quantity of motion, sensible or insensible,\nhas for its concomitant a decreasing aggregation of matter. Give to\nthe molecules of any mass, more of that insensible motion which we\ncall heat, and the parts of the mass become somewhat less closely\naggregated. Add a further quantity of insensible motion, and the\nmass so far disintegrates as to become {91} liquid. Add still more\ninsensible motion, and the mass disintegrates so completely as to\nbecome gas; which occupies a greater space with every extra quantity\nof insensible motion given to it. On the other hand, every loss of\ninsensible motion by a mass, gaseous, liquid, or solid, is accompanied\nby a progressing integration of the mass. Similarly with sensible\nmotions, be the bodies moved large or small. Augment the velocities\nof the planets, and their orbits will enlarge\u2014the Solar System will\noccupy a wider space. Diminish their velocities, and their orbits will\nlessen\u2014the Solar System will contract, or become more integrated.\nAnd in like manner we see that sensible motions given to bodies on\nthe Earth\u2019s surface involve partial disintegrations of the bodies\nfrom the Earth; while the loss of their motions are accompanied by\ntheir re-integration with the Earth. In all changes we have either an\nintegration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion; or an\nabsorption of motion and concomitant disintegration of matter. And\nwhere, as in living bodies, these processes go on simultaneously, there\nis an integration of matter proportioned to the dissipation of motion,\nand an absorption of motion proportioned to the disintegration of\nmatter. Such, then, are the universal laws of that re-distribution of\nmatter and motion everywhere going on\u2014a re-distribution which results\nin Evolution so long as the aggregation of matter and dispersion of\nmotion predominate; but which results in Dissolution where there is\na predominant aggregation of motion and dispersion of matter. Hence\nwe have a division of Concrete Science which bears towards the other\nConcrete Sciences, a relation like that which the Universal Law of\nRelation bears to Mathematics, and like that which Universal Mechanics\n(composition and resolution of forces) bears to Physics. We have a\ndivision of Concrete Science which generalizes those concomitants\nof this re-distribution that hold good among all orders of concrete\nobjects\u2014a division which explains why, along with a {92} predominating\nintegration of matter and dissipation of motion, there goes a change\nfrom an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity, to a definite, coherent\nheterogeneity; and why a reverse re-distribution of matter and motion,\nis accompanied by a reverse structural change. Passing from this\nuniversal Concrete Science, to the non-universal Concrete Sciences; we\nfind that these are primarily divisible into the science which deals\nwith the re-distributions of matter and motion among masses in space,\nconsequent on their mutual actions as wholes; and the science which\ndeals with the re-distributions of matter and motion consequent on the\nmutual actions of the parts of each mass. And of these equally general\nSciences, this last is re-divisible into the Science which is limited\nto the concomitants of re-distribution among the parts of each mass\nwhen regarded as independent, and the Science which takes into account\nthe molecular motion received by radiation from other masses. But these\nsub-divisions, and their sub-sub-divisions, will be best seen in the\nannexed Table III.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nTABLE III.\n\n CONCRETE SCIENCE.\n\n   Universal laws of the continuous re-distribution of Matter and\n   Motion; which results in Evolution where there is a predominant\n   integration of Matter and dissipation of Motion, and which results\n   in Dissolution where there is a predominant absorption of Motion and\n   disintegration of Matter.\n\n   Laws of the redistributions of Matter and Motion actually going on\n\n     among the celestial bodies in their relations to one another as\n     masses: comprehending (ASTRONOMY)\n\n       the dynamics of our solar system. (_Planetary Astronomy._)\n\n       the dynamics of our stellar universe. (_Sidereal Astronomy._)\n\n     among the molecules of any celestial mass; as caused by\n\n       the actions of these molecules on one another\n       (ASTROGENY)\n\n         resulting in the formation of compound molecules. (_Solar_\n         _Mineralogy._)\n\n         resulting in molecular motions and genesis of radiant\n         forces.[9]\n\n         resulting in movements of gases and liquids. (_Solar_\n         _Meteorology._[10])\n\n       the actions of these molecules on one another, joined with the\n       actions on them of forces radiated by the molecules of other\n       masses: (GEOGENY)\n\n         as exhibited in the planets generally.\n\n         as exhibited in the Earth\n\n           causing composition and of decomposition of inorganic\n           matters. (_Mineralogy._)\n\n           causing re-distributions of gases and liquids.\n           (_Meteorology._)\n\n           causing re-distributions of solids. (_Geology._)\n\n           causing organic phenomena; which are (_Biology_)\n\n             those of structure (_Morphology_)\n\n               general.\n\n               special.\n\n             those of function\n\n               in their internal relations (_Physiology_)\n\n                 general.\n\n                 special.\n\n               in their external relations (_Psychology_)\n\n                 general\n\n                 special\n\n                   separate.\n\n                   combined. (_Sociology._[11])\n\nThat these great groups of Sciences and their respective sub-groups,\nfulfil the definition of a true classification given at the outset, is,\nI think, tolerably manifest. The subjects of inquiry included in each\nprimary division, have essential attributes in common with one another,\nwhich they have not in common with any of the subjects contained in\nthe other primary divisions; and they have, by consequence, a greater\nnumber of attributes in which they are severally like the subjects\nthey are grouped with, and unlike the subjects otherwise grouped.\nBetween Sciences which deal with relations apart from realities, and\nSciences which deal with realities, the distinction is the widest\npossible; since Being, in some or all of its attributes, is common to\nall Sciences of the second class, and excluded from all Sciences of the\nfirst class. And when we divide the Sciences which treat of realities,\ninto those which deal {93} with their component phenomena considered in\nideal separation and those which deal with their component phenomena\nas actually united, we make a profounder distinction than can exist\nbetween the Sciences which deal with one or other order of the\ncomponents, or than can exist between the Sciences which deal with one\nor other order of the things composed. The three groups of Sciences\nmay be briefly defined as\u2014laws of the _forms_; laws of the _factors_;\nlaws of the _products_. When thus defined, it becomes manifest that\nthe groups are so radically unlike in their natures, that there can\nbe no transitions between them; and that any Science belonging to one\nof the groups must be quite incongruous with the Sciences belonging\nto either of the other groups, if transferred. How fundamental are\nthe differences between them, will be further seen on considering\ntheir functions. The first, or abstract group, is _instrumental_ with\nrespect to both the others; and the second, or abstract-concrete group\nis _instrumental_ with respect to the third or concrete group. An\nendeavour to invert these functions will at once show how essential\nis the difference of character. The second and third groups supply\nsubject-matter to the first, and the third supplies subject-matter to\nthe second; but none of the truths which constitute the third group are\nof any use as solvents of the problems presented by the second group;\nand none of the truths which the second group formulates can act as\nsolvents of problems contained in the first group.\n\nConcerning the sub-divisions of these great groups, little remains\nto be added. That each of the groups, being co-extensive with all\nphenomena, contains truths that are universal and others that are not\nuniversal, and that these must be classed apart, is obvious. And that\nthe sub-divisions of the non-universal truths, are to be made according\nto their decreasing generality in something like the manner shown in\nthe Tables, is proved by the fact that {94} when the descriptive\nwords are read from the root to the extremity of any branch, they form\na definition of the Science constituting that branch. That the minor\ndivisions might be otherwise arranged, and that better definitions of\nthem might be given, is highly probable. They are here set down merely\nfor the purpose of showing how this method of classification works out.\n\nI will only further remark that the relations of the Sciences as\nthus represented, are still but imperfectly represented: their\nrelations cannot be truly shown on a plane, but only in space of three\ndimensions. The three groups cannot rightly be put in linear order as\nthey have here been. Since the first stands related to the third, not\nonly indirectly through the second, but also directly\u2014it is directly\ninstrumental with respect to the third, and the third supplies it\ndirectly with subject-matter. Their relations can thus only be truly\nshown by branches diverging from a common root on different sides,\nin such a way that each stands in juxta-position to the other two.\nAnd only by a like mode of arrangement, can the relations among the\nsub-divisions of each group be correctly represented.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe foregoing exposition, highly abstract as it is, will by some\nreaders be less readily followed than a more concrete one. With the\nview of carrying conviction to such I will re-state the case in two\nways: the first of them adapted only to those who accept the doctrine\nof Evolution in its most general form.\n\nWe set out with concentrating nebulous matter. Tracing the\nre-distributions of this, as the rotating contracting spheroid leaves\nbehind successive annuli and as these severally form secondary rotating\nspheroids, we come at length to planets in their early stages. Thus\nfar we consider the phenomena dealt with purely astronomical; and so\nlong as our Earth, regarded as one of these spheroids, {95} was made\nup of gaseous and molten matters only, it presented no data for any\nmore complex Concrete Science. In the lapse of cosmical time a solid\nfilm forms, which, in the course of millions of years, thickens, and,\nin the course of further millions of years, becomes cool enough to\npermit the precipitation, first of various other gaseous compounds,\nand finally of water. Presently, the varying exposure of different\nparts of the spheroid to the Sun\u2019s rays, begins to produce appreciable\neffects; until at length there have arisen meteorological actions, and\nconsequent geological actions, such as those we now know: determined\npartly by the Sun\u2019s heat, partly by the still-retained internal heat\nof the Earth, and partly by the action of the Moon on the ocean? How\nhave we reached these geological phenomena? When did the astronomical\nchanges end and the geological changes begin? It needs but to ask this\nquestion to see that there is no real division between the two. Putting\npre-conceptions aside, we find nothing more than a group of phenomena\ncontinually complicating under the influence of the same original\nfactors; and we see that our conventional division is defensible only\non grounds of convenience. Let us advance a stage. As the Earth\u2019s\nsurface continues to cool, passing through all degrees of temperature\nby infinitesimal gradations, the formation of more and more complex\ninorganic compounds becomes possible. Later, its surface sinks to that\nheat at which the less complex compounds of the kinds called organic\ncan exist; and, finally, the formation of the more complex organic\ncompounds takes place. Chemists now show us that these compounds may\nbe built up synthetically in the laboratory\u2014each stage in ascending\ncomplexity making possible the next higher stage. Hence it is inferable\nthat, in the myriads of laboratories, endlessly diversified in their\nmaterials and conditions, which the Earth\u2019s surface furnished during\nthe myriads of years occupied in passing through these stages of\ntemperature, such successive {96} syntheses were effected; and that\nthe highly complex unstable substance out of which all organisms are\ncomposed, was eventually formed in microscopic portions: from which,\nby continuous integrations and differentiations, the evolution of all\norganisms has proceeded. Where then shall we draw the line between\nGeology and Biology? The synthesis of this most complex compound, is\nbut a continuation of the syntheses by which all simpler compounds were\nformed. The same primary factors have been co-operating with those\nsecondary factors, meteorologic and geologic, previously derived from\nthem. Nowhere do we find a break in the ever-complicating series; for\nthere is a manifest connexion between those movements which various\ncomplex compounds undergo during their isomeric transformations,\nand those changes of form undergone by the protoplasm which we\ndistinguish as living. Strongly contrasted as they eventually\nbecome, biological phenomena are at their root inseparable from\ngeological phenomena\u2014inseparable from the aggregate of transformations\ncontinually wrought in the matters forming the Earth\u2019s surface by the\nphysical forces to which they are exposed. Further stages I need not\nparticularize. The gradual development out of the biological group of\nphenomena, of the more specialized group we class as psychological,\nneeds no illustration. And when we come to the highest psychological\nphenomena, it is clear that since aggregations of human beings may be\ntraced upwards from single wandering families to tribes and nations of\nall sizes and complexities, we pass insensibly from the phenomena of\nindividual human action to those of corporate human action. To resume,\nthen, is it not manifest that in the group of sciences\u2014Astronomy,\nGeology, Biology, Psychology, Sociology, we have a natural group\nthat admits neither of disruption nor change of order? Here there is\nboth a genetic dependence, and a dependence of interpretations. The\nphenomena have arisen in this succession in cosmical {97} time; and\ncomplete scientific interpretation of each group depends on scientific\ninterpretation of the preceding groups. No other science can be thrust\nin anywhere without destroying the continuity. To insert Physics\nbetween Astronomy and Geology, would be to make a break in the history\nof a continuous series of changes; and a like break would be produced\nby inserting Chemistry between Geology and Biology. It is true that\nPhysics and Chemistry are needful as interpreters of these successive\nassemblages of facts; but it does not therefore follow that they are\nthemselves to be placed among these assemblages.\n\nConcrete Science, made up of these five concrete sub-sciences, being\nthus coherent within itself, and separated from all other science,\nthere comes the question\u2014Is all other science similarly coherent within\nitself? or is it traversed by some second division that is equally\ndecided? It is thus traversed. A statical or dynamical theorem, however\nsimple, has always for its subject-matter something that is conceived\nas extended, and as displaying force or forces\u2014as being a seat of\nresistance, or of tension, or of both, and as capable of possessing\nmore or less of _vis viva_. If we examine the simplest proposition of\nStatics, we see that the conception of Force must be joined with the\nconception of Space, before the proposition can be framed in thought;\nand if we similarly examine the simplest proposition in Dynamics,\nwe see that Force, Space, and Time, are its essential elements. The\namounts of the terms are indifferent; and, by reduction of its terms\nbeyond the limits of perception, they are applied to molecules: Molar\nMechanics and Molecular Mechanics are continuous. From questions\nconcerning the relative motions of two or more molecules, Molecular\nMechanics passes to changes of aggregation among many molecules, to\nchanges in the amounts and kinds of the motions possessed by them as\nmembers of an aggregate, and to changes of the motions transferred\nthrough aggregates of them, as those constituting light. {98} Daily\nextending its range of interpretations, it is coming to deal even\nwith the components of each compound molecule on the same principles.\nAnd the unions and disunions of such more or less compound molecules,\nwhich constitute the phenomena of Chemistry, are also being conceived\nas resultant phenomena of essentially kindred natures\u2014the affinities\nof molecules for one another, and their reactions in relation to\nlight, heat, and other modes of force, being regarded as consequent\non the combinations of the various mechanically-determined motions of\ntheir various components. Without at all out-running, however, this\nprogress in the mechanical interpretation of molecular phenomena, it\nsuffices to point out that the indispensable elements in any chemical\nconception are units occupying places in space, and exerting forces on\none another. This, then, is the common character of all these sciences\nwhich we at present group under the names of Mechanics, Physics,\nChemistry. Leaving undiscussed the question whether it is possible to\nconceive of force apart from extended somethings exerting it, we may\nassert, as beyond dispute, that if the conception of force be expelled,\nno science of Mechanics, Physics, or Chemistry remains. Made coherent,\nas these sciences are, by this bond of union, it is impossible to\nthrust among them any other science without breaking their continuity.\nWe cannot place Logic between Molar Mechanics and Molecular Mechanics.\nWe cannot place Mathematics between the group of propositions\nconcerning the behaviour of homogeneous molecules to one another, and\nthe group of propositions concerning the behaviour of heterogeneous\nmolecules to one another (which we call Chemistry). Clearly these two\nsciences lie outside the coherent whole we have contemplated; separated\nfrom it in some radical way.\n\nBy what are they radically separated? By the absence of the conception\nof force through which alone we know objects as existing or acting.\nHowever true it may be {99} that so long as Logic and Mathematics have\nany terms at all, these must be capable of affecting consciousness,\nand, by implication, of exerting force; yet it is the distinctive trait\nof these sciences that not only do their propositions make no reference\nto such force, but, as far as possible, they deliberately ignore it.\nInstead of being, as in all the other sciences, an element that is\nnot only recognized but vital; in Mathematics and Logic, force is an\nelement that is not only not vital, but is studiously not recognized.\nThe terms in which Logic expresses its propositions, are symbols that\ndo not profess to represent things, properties, or powers, of one\nkind more than another; and may equally well stand for the attributes\nbelonging to members of some connected series of ideal curves which\nhave never been drawn, as for so many real objects. And the theorems of\nGeometry, so far from contemplating perceptible lines and surfaces as\nelements in the truths enunciated, consider these truths as becoming\nabsolute only when such lines and surfaces become ideal\u2014only when the\nconception of something exercising force is extruded.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nLet me now make a second re-statement, not implying acceptance of the\ndoctrine of Evolution, but exhibiting with a clearness almost if not\nquite as great, these fundamental distinctions.\n\nThe concrete sciences, taken together or separately, contemplate as\ntheir subject-matters, _aggregates_\u2014either the entire aggregate of\nsensible existences, or some secondary aggregate separable from this\nentire aggregate, or some tertiary aggregate separable from this, and\nso on. Sidereal Astronomy occupies itself with the totality of visible\nmasses distributed through space; which it deals with as made up of\nidentifiable individuals occupying specified places, and severally\nstanding towards one another, towards sub-groups, and towards the\nentire group, in defined ways. Planetary Astronomy, cutting out of this\nall-including aggregate that {100} relatively minute part constituting\nthe Solar System, deals with this as a whole\u2014observes, measures, and\ncalculates the sizes, shapes, distances, motions, of its primary,\nsecondary, and tertiary members; and, taking for its larger inquiries\nthe mutual actions of all these members as parts of a coordinated\nassemblage, takes for its smaller inquiries the actions of each member\nconsidered as an individual, having a set of intrinsic activities that\nare modified by a set of extrinsic activities. Restricting itself to\none of these aggregates, which admits of close examination, Geology\n(using this word in its comprehensive meaning) gives an account of\nterrestrial actions and terrestrial structures, past and present; and,\ntaking for its narrower problems local formations and the agencies\nto which they are due, takes for its larger problems the serial\ntransformations undergone by the entire Earth. The geologist being\noccupied with this cosmically small, but otherwise vast, aggregate,\nthe biologist occupies himself with small aggregates formed out of\nparts of the Earth\u2019s superficial substance, and treats each of these\nas a coordinated whole in its structures and functions; or, when he\ntreats of any particular organ, considers this as a whole made up of\nparts held in a sub-coordination that refers to the coordination of\nthe entire organism. To the psychologist he leaves those specialized\naggregates of functions which adjust the actions of organisms to the\ncomplex activities surrounding them: doing this, not simply because\nthey are a stage higher in speciality, but because they are the\ncounterparts of those aggregated states of consciousness dealt with by\nthe science of Subjective Psychology, which stands entirely apart from\nall other sciences. Finally, the sociologist considers each tribe and\nnation as an aggregate presenting multitudinous phenomena, simultaneous\nand successive, that are held together as parts of one combination.\nThus, in every case, a concrete science deals with a real aggregate\n(or a plurality of real aggregates); and it includes as its {101}\nsubject-matter whatever is to be known of this aggregate in respect\nof its size, shape, motions, density, texture, general arrangement\nof parts, minute structure, chemical composition, temperature, etc.,\ntogether with all the multitudinous changes, material and dynamical,\ngone through by it from the time it begins to exist as an aggregate to\nthe time it ceases to exist as an aggregate.\n\nNo abstract-concrete science makes the remotest attempt to do anything\nof this sort. Taken together, the abstract-concrete sciences give\nan account of the various kinds of _properties_ which aggregates\ndisplay; and each abstract-concrete science concerns itself with a\ncertain order of these properties. By this, the properties common to\nall aggregates are studied and formulated; by that, the properties of\naggregates having special forms, special states of aggregation, etc.;\nand by others, the properties of particular components of aggregates\nwhen dissociated from other components. But by all these sciences the\naggregate, considered as an individual object, is tacitly ignored; and\na property, or a connected set of properties, exclusively occupies\nattention. It matters not to Mechanics whether the moving mass it\nconsiders is a planet or a molecule, a dead stick thrown into the river\nor the living dog that leaps after it: in any case the curve described\nby the moving mass conforms to the same laws. Similarly when the\nphysicist takes for his subject the relation between the changing bulk\nof matter and the changing quantity of molecular motion it contains.\nDealing with the subject generally, he leaves out of consideration the\nkind of matter; and dealing with the subject specially in relation to\nthis or that kind of matter, he ignores the attributes of size and\nform: save in the still more special cases where the effect on form\nis considered, and even then size is ignored. So, too, is it with the\nchemist. A substance he is investigating, never thought of by him\nas distinguished in extension or amount, is not even required to be\nperceptible. A portion of carbon on {102} which he is experimenting,\nmay or may not have been visible under its forms of diamond or\ngraphite or charcoal\u2014this is indifferent. He traces it through various\ndisguises and various combinations\u2014now as united with oxygen to form\nan invisible gas; now as hidden with other elements in such more\ncomplex compounds as ether, and sugar, and oil. By sulphuric acid or\nother agent he precipitates it from these as a coherent cinder, or as\na diffused impalpable powder; and again, by applying heat, forces it\nto disclose itself as an element of animal tissue. Evidently, while\nthus ascertaining the affinities and atomic equivalence of carbon, the\nchemist has nothing to do with any aggregate. He deals with carbon\nin the abstract, as something considered apart from quantity, form,\nappearance, or temporary state of combination; and conceives it as the\npossessor of powers or properties, whence the special phenomena he\ndescribes result: the ascertaining of all these powers or properties\nbeing his sole aim.\n\nFinally, the Abstract Sciences ignore alike aggregates and the powers\nwhich aggregates or their components possess; and occupy themselves\nwith _relations_\u2014either with the relations among aggregates, or among\ntheir parts, or the relations among aggregates and properties, or the\nrelations among properties, or the relations among relations. The\nsame logical formula applies equally well, whether its terms are men\nand their deaths, crystals and their planes of cleavage, or plants\nand their seeds. And how entirely Mathematics concerns itself with\nrelations, we see on remembering that it has just the same expression\nfor the characters of an infinitesimal triangle, as for those of the\ntriangle which has Sirius for its apex and the diameter of the Earth\u2019s\norbit for its base.\n\nI cannot see how these definitions of these groups of sciences can\nbe questioned. It is undeniable that every Concrete Science gives\nan account of an aggregate or of aggregates, inorganic, organic, or\nsuper-organic (a society); {103} and that, not concerning itself\nwith properties of this or that order, it concerns itself with the\nco-ordination of the assembled properties of all orders. It seems to\nme no less certain that an Abstract-Concrete Science gives an account\nof some order of properties, general or special; not caring about the\nother traits of an aggregate displaying them, and not recognizing\naggregates at all further than is implied by discussion of the\nparticular order of properties. And I think it is equally clear that\nan Abstract Science, freeing its propositions, so far as the nature\nof thought permits, from aggregates and properties, occupies itself\nwith relations of co-existence and sequence, as disentangled from\nall particular forms of being and action. If then these three groups\nof sciences are, respectively, accounts of _aggregates_, accounts\nof _properties_, accounts of _relations_, it is manifest that the\ndivisions between them are not simply perfectly clear, but that the\nchasms between them are absolute.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nHere, perhaps more clearly than before, will be seen the untenability\nof the classification made by M. Comte. Already, after setting forth\nin a general way these fundamental distinctions, I have pointed out\nthe incongruities that arise when the sciences, conceived as Abstract,\nAbstract-Concrete, and Concrete, are arranged in the order proposed\nby him. Such incongruities become still more conspicuous if for these\ngeneral names of the groups we substitute the definitions given above.\nThe series will then stand thus:\u2015\n\n MATHEMATICS  An account of _relations_\n                         (including, under Mechanics,\n                         an account of _properties_).\n ASTRONOMY    An account of _aggregates_.\n PHYSICS      An account of _properties_.\n CHEMISTRY    An account of _properties_.\n BIOLOGY      An account of _aggregates_.\n SOCIOLOGY    An account of _aggregates_.\n\nThat those who espouse opposite views see clearly the {104} defects\nin the propositions of their opponents and not those in their own,\nis a trite remark that holds in philosophical discussions as in all\nothers: the parable of the mote and the beam applies as well to men\u2019s\nappreciations of one another\u2019s opinions as to their appreciations of\none another\u2019s natures. Possibly to my positivist friends I exemplify\nthis truth,\u2014just as they exemplify it to me. Those uncommitted to\neither view must decide where the mote exists and where the beam.\nMeanwhile it is clear that one or other of the two views is essentially\nerroneous; and that no qualifications can bring them into harmony.\nEither the sciences admit of no such grouping as that which I have\ndescribed, or they admit of no such serial order as that given by M.\nComte.\n\n\nPOSTSCRIPT REPLYING TO CRITICISMS.\n\nAmong objections made to any doctrine, those which come from avowed\nsupporters of an adverse doctrine must be considered, other things\nequal, as of less weight than those which come from men uncommitted\nto an adverse doctrine, or but partially committed to it. The element\nof prepossession, distinctly present in the one case and in the other\ncase mainly or quite absent, is a well-recognized cause of difference\nin the values of the judgments: supposing the judgments to be otherwise\nfairly comparable. Hence, when it is needful to bring the replies\nwithin a restricted space, a fit course is that of dealing rather with\nindependent criticisms than with criticisms which are really indirect\narguments for an opposite view, previously espoused.\n\nFor this reason I propose here to confine myself substantially,\nthough not absolutely, to the demurrers entered against the foregoing\nclassification by Prof. Bain, in his recent work on Logic. Before\ndealing with the more {105} important of these, let me clear the\nground by disposing of the less important.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIncidentally, while commenting on the view I take respecting the\nposition of Logic, Prof. Bain points out that this, which is the most\nabstract of the sciences, owes much to Psychology, which I place among\nthe Concrete Sciences; and he alleges an incongruity between this\nfact and my statement that the Concrete Sciences are not instrumental\nin disclosing the truths of the Abstract Sciences. Subsequently he\nre-raises this apparent anomaly when saying\u2015\n\n \u201cNor is it possible to justify the placing of Psychology wholly among\n Concrete Sciences. It is a highly analytic science, as Mr. Spencer\n thoroughly knows.\u201d\n\nFor a full reply, given by implication, I must refer Prof. Bain to\n\u00a7 56 of _The Principles of Psychology_, where I have contended that\n\u201cwhile, under its objective aspect, Psychology is to be classed as one\nof the Concrete Sciences which successively decrease in scope as they\nincrease in speciality; under its subjective aspect, Psychology is a\ntotally unique science, independent of, and antithetically opposed to,\nall other sciences whatever.\u201d A pure idealist will not, I suppose,\nrecognize this distinction; but to every one else it must, I should\nthink, be obvious that the science of subjective existences is the\ncorrelative of all the sciences of objective existences; and is as\nabsolutely marked off from them as subject is from object. Objective\nPsychology, which I class among the Concrete Sciences, is purely\nsynthetic, so long as it is limited, like the other sciences, to\nobjective data; though great aid in the interpretation of these data\nis derived from the observed correspondence between the phenomena of\nObjective Psychology as presented in other beings and the phenomena of\nSubjective Psychology as presented in one\u2019s own consciousness. Now it\nis Subjective Psychology only which is analytic, and which affords aid\nin the {106} development of Logic. This being explained, the apparent\nincongruity disappears.\n\nA difficulty raised respecting the manner in which I have expressed the\nnature of Mathematics, may next be dealt with. Prof. Bain writes:\u2015\n\n \u201cIn the first place, objection may be taken to his language, in\n discussing the extreme Abstract Sciences, when he speaks of the _empty_\n _forms_ therein considered. To call Space and Time empty forms, must\n mean that they can be thought of without any concrete embodiment\n whatsoever; that one can think of Time, as a pure abstraction, without\n having in one\u2019s mind any concrete succession. Now, this doctrine is in\n the last degree questionable.\u201d\n\nI quite agree with Prof. Bain that \u201cthis doctrine is in the last\ndegree questionable;\u201d but I do not admit that this doctrine is implied\nby the definition of Abstract Science which I have given. I speak\nof Space and Time as they are dealt with by mathematicians, and as\nit is alone possible for pure Mathematics to deal with them. While\nMathematics habitually uses in its points, lines, and surfaces, certain\nexistences, it habitually deals with these as representing points,\nlines, and surfaces that are ideal; and _its conclusions are true only\non condition that it does this_. Points having dimensions, lines having\nbreadths, planes having thicknesses, are negatived by its definitions.\nUsing, though it does, material representatives of extension, linear,\nsuperficial, or solid, Geometry deliberately ignores their materiality;\nand attends only to the truths of relation they present. Holding with\nProf. Bain, as I do, that our consciousness of Space is disclosed by\nour experiences of Matter\u2014arguing, as I have done in _The Principles\nof Psychology_, that it is a consolidated aggregate of all relations\nof co-existence that have been severally presented by Matter; I\nnevertheless contend that it is possible to dissociate these relations\nfrom Matter to the extent required for formulating them as abstract\ntruths. I contend, too, that this separation is of the kind habitually\nmade in other cases; as, for instance, when the general laws of motion\nare formulated (as M. Comte\u2019s system, among {107} others, formulates\nthem) in such way as to ignore all properties of the bodies dealt\nwith save their powers of taking up, and retaining, and giving out,\nquantities of motion; though these powers are inconceivable apart from\nthe attribute of extension, which is intentionally disregarded.\n\nTaking other of Prof. Bain\u2019s objections, not in the order in which they\nstand but in the order in which they may be most conveniently dealt\nwith, I quote as follows:\u2015\n\n \u201cThe law of the radiation of light (the inverse square of the\n distance) is said by Mr. Spencer to be Abstract-Concrete, while the\n disturbing changes in the medium are not to be mentioned except in a\n Concrete Science of Optics. We need not remark that such a separate\n handling is unknown to science.\u201d\n\nIt is perfectly true that \u201csuch a separate handling is unknown to\nscience.\u201d But, unfortunately for the objection, it is also perfectly\ntrue that no such separate handling is proposed by me, or is implied by\nmy classification. How Prof. Bain can have so missed the meaning of the\nword \u201cconcrete,\u201d as I have used it, I do not understand. After pointing\nout that \u201cno one ever drew the line,\u201d between the Abstract-Concrete\nand the Concrete Sciences, \u201cas I have done it,\u201d he alleges an anomaly\nwhich exists only supposing that I have drawn it where it is ordinarily\ndrawn. He appears inadvertently to have carried with him M. Comte\u2019s\nconception of Optics as a Concrete Science, and, importing it into my\nclassification, debits me with the incongruity. If he will re-read\nthe definition of the Abstract-Concrete Sciences, or study their\nsub-divisions as shown in Table II., he will, I think, see that the\nmost special laws of the redistribution of light, equally with its most\ngeneral laws, are included. And if he will pass to the definition and\nthe tabulation of the Concrete Sciences, he will, I think, see no less\nclearly that Optics cannot be included among them.\n\nProf. Bain considers that I am not justified in classing Chemistry as\nan Abstract-Concrete Science, and excluding from it all consideration\nof the crude forms of the various {108} substances dealt with; and\nhe enforces his dissent by saying that chemists habitually describe\nthe ores and impure mixtures in which the elements, etc., are\nnaturally found. Undoubtedly chemists do this. But do they therefore\nintend to include an account of the ores of a substance, _as a part\nof the science_ which formulates its molecular constitution and the\nconstitutions of all the definite compounds it enters into? I shall be\nvery much surprised if I find that they do. Chemists habitually prefix\nto their works a division treating of Molecular Physics; but they do\nnot therefore claim Molecular Physics as a part of Chemistry. If they\nsimilarly prefix to the chemistry of each substance an outline of its\nmineralogy, I do not think they therefore mean to assert that the\nlast belongs to the first. Chemistry proper, embraces nothing beyond\nan account of the constitutions and modes of action and combining\nproportions of substances that are taken as absolutely pure; and its\ntruths no more recognize impure substances than the truths of Geometry\nrecognize crooked lines.\n\nImmediately after, in criticizing the fundamental distinction I have\nmade between Chemistry and Biology, as Abstract-Concrete and Concrete\nrespectively, Prof. Bain says:\u2015\n\n \u201cBut the objects of Chemistry and the objects of Biology are equally\n concrete, so far as they go; the simple bodies of chemistry, and their\n several compounds, are viewed by the Chemist as concrete wholes, and\n are described by him, not with reference to one factor, but to all\n their factors.\u201d\n\nIssue is here raised in a form convenient for elucidation of the\ngeneral question. It is true that, _for purposes of identification_, a\nchemist gives an account of all the sensible characters of a substance.\nHe sets down its crystalline form, its specific gravity, its power\nof refracting light, its behaviour as magnetic or diamagnetic. But\ndoes he thereby include these phenomena as part of the Science of\nChemistry? It seems to me that the relation between the weight {109}\nof any portion of matter and its bulk, which is ascertained on\nmeasuring its specific gravity, is a physical and not a chemical fact.\nI think, too, that the physicist will claim, as part of his science,\nall investigations touching the refraction of light: be the substance\nproducing this refraction what it may. And the circumstance that the\nchemist may test the magnetic or diamagnetic property of a body, as\na means of ascertaining what it is, or as a means of helping other\nchemists to determine whether they have got before them the same body,\nwill neither be held by the chemist, nor allowed by the physicist, to\nimply a transfer of magnetic phenomena from the domain of the one to\nthat of the other. In brief, though the chemist, in his account of an\nelement or a compound, may refer to certain physical traits associated\nwith its molecular constitution and affinities, he does not by so\ndoing change these into chemical traits. Whatever chemists may put\ninto their books, Chemistry, considered as a science, includes only\nthe phenomena of molecular structures and changes\u2014of compositions and\ndecompositions.[12] I contend, then, that Chemistry does _not_ give an\naccount of anything as a concrete whole, in the same way that Biology\ngives an account of an organism as a concrete whole. This will become\neven more manifest on observing the character of {110} the biological\naccount. All the attributes of an organism are comprehended, from\nthe most general to the most special\u2014from its conspicuous structural\ntraits to its hidden and faint ones; from its outer actions that thrust\nthemselves on the attention, to the minutest sub-divisions of its\nmultitudinous internal functions; from its character as a germ, through\nthe many changes of size, form, organization, and habit, it goes\nthrough until death; from the physical characters of it as a whole,\nto the physical characters of its microscopic cells, and vessels, and\nfibres; from the chemical characters of its substance in general to\nthe chemical characters of each tissue and each secretion\u2014all these,\nwith many others. And not only so, but there is comprehended as the\nideal goal of the science, the _consensus_ of all these phenomena\nin their co-existences and successions, as constituting a coherent\nindividualized group definitely combined in space and in time. It is\nthis recognition of _individuality_ in its subject-matter, that gives\nits concreteness to Biology, as to every other Concrete Science. As\nAstronomy deals with bodies that have their several proper names, or\n(as with the smaller stars) are registered by their positions, and\nconsiders each of them as a distinct individual\u2014as Geology, while dimly\nperceiving in the Moon and nearest planets other groups of geological\nphenomena (which it would deal with as independent wholes, did not\ndistance forbid), occupies itself with that individualized group\npresented by the Earth; so Biology treats either of an individual\ndistinguished from all others, or of parts or products belonging to\nsuch an individual, or of structural or functional traits common to\nmany such individuals that have been observed, and supposed to be\ncommon to others that are like them in most or all of their attributes.\nEvery biological truth connotes a specifically individualized object,\nor a number of specifically individualized objects of the same kind,\nor numbers of different kinds that are severally specific. See, then,\nthe contrast. {111} The truths of the Abstract-Concrete Sciences do\nnot imply specific individuality. Neither Molar Physics, nor Molecular\nPhysics, nor Chemistry, concerns itself with this. The laws of motion\nare expressed without any reference whatever to the sizes or shapes\nof the moving masses; which may be taken indifferently to be suns or\natoms. The relations between contraction and the escape of molecular\nmotion, and between expansion and the absorption of molecular motion,\nare expressed in their general forms without reference to the kind\nof matter; and, if the degree of either that occurs in a particular\nkind of matter is formulated, no note is taken of the quantity of that\nmatter, much less of its individuality. Similarly with Chemistry.\nWhen it inquires into the atomic weight, the molecular structure, the\natomicity, the combining proportions, etc., of a substance, it is\nindifferent whether a grain or a ton be thought of\u2014the conception of\namount is absolutely irrelevant. And so with more special attributes.\nSulphur, considered chemically, is not sulphur under its crystalline\nform, or under its allotropic viscid form, or as a liquid, or as a gas;\nbut it is sulphur considered apart from those attributes of quantity,\nand shape, and state, that give individuality.\n\nProf. Bain objects to the division I have drawn between the Concrete\nScience of Astronomy and that Abstract-Concrete Science which deals\nwith the mutually-modified motions of hypothetical masses in space, as\n\u201cnot a little arbitrary.\u201d He says:\u2015\n\n  \u201cWe can suppose a science to confine itself _solely_ to the\n \u2018factors,\u2019 or the separated elements, and never, on any occasion, to\n combine two into a composite third. This position is intelligible,\n and possibly defensible. For example, in Astronomy, the Law of\n Persistence of Motion in a straight line might be discussed in pure\n ideal separation; and so, the Law of Gravity might be discussed in\n equally pure separation\u2014both under the Abstract-Concrete department\n of Mechanics. It might then be reserved to a _concrete_ department to\n unite these in the explanation of a projectile or of a planet. Such,\n however, is not Mr. Spencer\u2019s boundary line. He allows Theoretical\n Mechanics to make this particular combination, and to arrive at the\n laws of {112} planetary movement, _in the case of a single planet_.\n What he does not allow is, to proceed to the case of two planets,\n mutually disturbing one another, or a planet and a satellite, commonly\n called the \u2018problem of the Three Bodies.\u2019\u201d\n\nIf I held what Prof. Bain supposes me to hold, my position would be\nan absurd one; but he misapprehends me. The misapprehension results\nin part from his having here, as before, used the word \u201cconcrete\u201d\nwith the Comtean meaning, as though it were my meaning; and in part\nfrom the inadequacy of my explanation. I did not in the least mean to\nimply that the Abstract-Concrete Science of Mechanics, when dealing\nwith the motions of bodies in space, is limited to the interpretation\nof planetary movement such as it would be did only a single planet\nexist. It never occurred to me that my words might be so construed.\nAbstract-Concrete problems admit, in fact, of being complicated\nindefinitely, without going in the least beyond the definition. I do\nnot draw the line, as Prof. Bain alleges, between the combination of\ntwo factors and the combination of three, or between the combination\nof any number and any greater number. I draw the line between the\nscience which deals with the theory of the factors, taken singly and\nin combinations of two, three, four, or more, and the science which,\n_giving to these factors the values derived from observations of actual\nobjects, uses the theory to explain actual phenomena_.\n\nIt is true that, in these departments of science, no radical\ndistinction is consistently recognized between theory and the\napplications of theory. As Prof. Bain says:\u2015\n\n \u201cNewton, in the First Book of the Principia, took up the problem of\n the Three Bodies, as applied to the Moon, and worked it to exhaustion.\n So writers on Theoretical Mechanics continue to include the Three\n Bodies, Precession, and the Tides.\u201d\n\nBut, supreme though the authority of Newton may be as a mathematician\nand astronomer, and weighty as are the names of Laplace and Herschel,\nwho in their works have similarly mingled theorems and the explanations\nyielded by them, it does not seem to me that these facts go for\nmuch; {113} unless it can be shown that these writers intended thus\nto enunciate the views at which they had arrived respecting the\nclassification of the sciences. Such a union as that presented in\ntheir works, adopted merely for the sake of convenience, is, in fact,\nthe indication of incomplete development; and has been paralleled in\nsimpler sciences which have afterwards outgrown it. Two conclusive\nillustrations are at hand. The name Geometry, utterly inapplicable by\nits meaning to the science as it now exists, was applicable in that\nfirst stage during which its few truths were taught in preparation\nfor land-measuring and the setting-out of buildings; but, at a\ncomparatively early date, these comparatively simple truths became\nseparated from their applications, and were embodied by the Greek\ngeometers into systems of theory.[13] A like purification is now\ntaking place in another division of the science. In the _G\u00e9om\u00e9trie\nDescriptive_ of Monge, theorems were mixed with their applications\nto projection and plan-drawing. But, since his time, the science and\nthe art have been segregating; and Descriptive Geometry, or, as it\nmay be better termed, the Geometry of Position, is now recognized by\nmathematicians as a far-reaching system of truths, parts of which\nare already embodied in books that make no reference to derived\nmethods available by the architect or the engineer. To meet a\ncounter-illustration that will be cited, I may remark that though, in\nworks on Algebra intended for beginners, the theories of quantitative\nrelations, as treated algebraically, are accompanied by groups of\nproblems to be solved, the subject-matters of these problems are not\nthereby made parts of the Science of Algebra. To say that they are,\nis to say that Algebra includes the conceptions of distances and\nrelative speeds and times, or of weights and bulks and {114} specific\ngravities, or of areas ploughed and days and wages; since these, and\nendless others, may be the terms of its equations. And just in the\nsame way that these concrete problems, solved by its aid, cannot be\nincorporated with the Abstract Science of Algebra; so I contend that\nthe concrete problems of Astronomy, cannot be incorporated with that\ndivision of Abstract-Concrete Science which develops the theory of the\ninter-actions of free bodies that attract one another.\n\nOn this point I find myself at issue, not only with Prof. Bain, but\nalso with Mr. Mill, who contends that:\u2015\n\n \u201cThere _is_ an abstract science of astronomy, namely, the theory of\n gravitation, which would equally agree with and explain the facts of a\n totally different solar system from the one of which our earth forms a\n part. The actual facts of our own system, the dimensions, distances,\n velocities, temperatures, physical constitution, etc., of the sun,\n earth, and planets, are properly the subject of a concrete science,\n similar to natural history; but the concrete is more inseparably\n united to the abstract science than in any other case, since the\n few celestial facts really accessible to us are nearly all required\n for discovering and proving the law of gravitation as an universal\n property of bodies, and have therefore an indispensable place in\n the abstract science as its fundamental data.\u201d\u2014_Auguste Comte and_\n _Positivism_, p. 43.\n\nIn this explanation, Mr. Mill recognizes the fundamental distinction\nbetween the Concrete Science of Astronomy, dealing with the bodies\nactually distributed in space, and a science dealing with hypothetical\nbodies hypothetically distributed in space. Nevertheless, he regards\nthese sciences as not separable; because the second derives from\nthe first the data whence the law of inter-action is derived. But\nthe truth of this premiss, and the legitimacy of this inference,\nmay alike be questioned. The discovery of the law of inter-action\nwas not due primarily, but only secondarily, to observation of the\nheavenly bodies. The conception of an inter-acting force that varies\ninversely as the square of the distance, is an _\u00e0 priori_ conception\nrationally deducible from mechanical and geometrical considerations.\nThough unlike in derivation to the many empirical hypotheses of Kepler\nrespecting planetary orbits and planetary motions, yet it was {115}\nlike the successful among these in its relation to astronomical\nphenomena: it was one of many possible hypotheses, which admitted of\nhaving their consequences worked out and tested; and one which, on\nhaving its implications compared with the results of observation,\nwas found to explain them. In short, the theory of gravitation grew\nout of experiences of terrestrial phenomena; but the verification\nof it was reached through experiences of celestial phenomena.\nPassing now from premiss to inference, I do not see that, even\nwere the alleged parentage substantiated, it would necessitate the\nsupposed inseparability; any more than the descent of Geometry from\nland-measuring necessitates a persistent union of the two. In the case\nof Algebra, as above indicated, the disclosed laws of quantitative\nrelations hold throughout multitudinous orders of phenomena that are\nextremely heterogeneous; and this makes conspicuous the distinction\nbetween the theory and its applications. Here the laws of quantitative\nrelations among masses, distances, velocities, and momenta, being\napplied mainly (though not exclusively) to the concrete cases presented\nby Astronomy, the distinction between the theory and its applications\nis less conspicuous. But, intrinsically, it is as great in the one case\nas in the other.\n\nHow great it is, we shall see on taking an analogy. This is a living\nman, of whom we may know little more than that he is a visible,\ntangible person; or of whom we may know enough to form a voluminous\nbiography. Again, this book tells of a fictitious hero, who, like the\nheroes of old romance, may be an impersonated virtue or vice, or,\nlike a modern hero, one of mixed nature, whose various motives and\nconsequent actions are elaborated into a semblance of reality. But\nno accuracy and completeness of the picture makes this fictitious\npersonage an actual personage, or brings him any nearer to one. Nor\ndoes any meagreness in our knowledge of a real man reduce him any\nnearer to the imaginary being of a novel. To the {116} last, the\ndivision between fiction and biography remains an impassable gulf.\nSo, too, remains the division between the Science dealing with the\ninter-actions of hypothetical bodies in space, and the Science dealing\nwith the inter-actions of existing bodies in space. We may elaborate\nthe first to any degree whatever by the introduction of three, four, or\nany greater number of factors under any number of assumed conditions,\nuntil we symbolize a solar system; but to the last an account of our\nsymbolic solar system is as far from an account of the actual solar\nsystem as fiction is from biography.\n\nEven more obvious, if it be possible, does the radical character\nof this distinction become, on observing that from the simplest\nproposition of General Mechanics we may pass to the most complex\nproposition of Celestial Mechanics, without a break. We take a body\nmoving at a uniform velocity, and commence with the proposition that\nit will continue so to move for ever. Next, we state the law of its\naccelerated motion in the same line, when subject to a uniform force.\nWe further complicate the proposition by supposing the force to\nincrease in consequence of approach towards an attracting body; and we\nmay formulate a series of laws of acceleration, resulting from so many\nassumed laws of increasing attraction (of which the law of gravitation\nis one). Another factor may now be added by supposing the body to have\nmotion in a direction other than that of the attracting body; and we\nmay determine, according to the ratios of the supposed forces, whether\nits course will be hyperbolic, parabolic, elliptical, or circular\u2014we\nmay begin with this hypothetical additional force as infinitesimal, and\nformulate the varying results as it is little by little increased. The\nproblem is complicated a degree more by taking into account the effects\nof a third force, acting in some other direction; and beginning with an\ninfinitesimal amount of this force we may reach any amount. Similarly,\nby introducing factor after factor, {117} each at first insensible in\nproportion to the rest, we arrive, through an infinity of gradations,\nat a combination of any complexity.\n\nThus, then, the Science which deals with the inter-action of\nhypothetical bodies in space, is _absolutely continuous_ with General\nMechanics. We have already seen that it is _absolutely discontinuous_\nwith that account of the heavenly bodies which has been called\nAstronomy from the beginning. When these facts are recognized, it seems\nto me that there cannot remain a doubt respecting its true place in a\nclassification of the Sciences.\n\n\nENDNOTES TO _THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES_.\n\n[2] I have been charged with misrepresenting Kant and misunderstanding\nhim, because I have used the expression \u201cforms of Thought\u201d instead of\n\u201cforms of Intuition.\u201d Elsewhere I have shown that my argument against\nhim remains equally valid when the phrase \u201cforms of Intuition\u201d is used.\nHere I may in the first place add that I did but follow some Kantists\nin saying \u201cforms of Thought,\u201d and I may add in the second place that\nthe objection is superficial and quite irrelevant to the issue. Thought\nwhen broadly used as antithetical to Things includes Intuition: it\ncomprehends in this sense all that is subjective as distinguished from\nall that is objective, and in so doing comprehends Intuition. Nor is\nthis all. There cannot be Intuition without Thought: every act of\nintuition implies an act of classing without which the thing intuited\nis not known as such or such; and every act of classing is an act of\nthought.\n\n[3] Some propositions laid down by M. Littr\u00e9, in his book\u2014_Auguste\nComte et la Philosophie Positive_ (published in 1863), may fitly be\ndealt with here. In the candid and courteous reply he makes to my\nstrictures on the Comtean classification in \u201cThe Genesis of Science,\u201d\nhe endeavours to clear up some of the inconsistencies I pointed out;\nand he does this by drawing a distinction between objective generality\nand subjective generality. He says\u2014\u201cqu\u2019il existe deux ordres de\ng\u00e9n\u00e9ralit\u00e9, l\u2019une objective et dans les choses, l\u2019autre subjective,\nabstraite et dans l\u2019esprit.\u201d This sentence, in which M. Littr\u00e9 makes\nsubjective generality synonymous with abstractness, led me at first\nto conclude that he had in view the same distinction as that which\nI have above explained between generality and abstractness. On\nre-reading the paragraph, however, I found this was not the case. In\na previous sentence he says\u2014\u201cLa biologie a pass\u00e9 de la consid\u00e9ration\ndes organes \u00e0 celles des tissus, plus g\u00e9n\u00e9raux que les organes, et\nde la consid\u00e9ration des tissus \u00e0 celle des \u00e9l\u00e9ments anatomiques,\nplus g\u00e9n\u00e9raux que les tissus. Mais cette g\u00e9n\u00e9ralit\u00e9 croissante est\nsubjective non objective, abstraite non concr\u00e8te.\u201d Here it is manifest\nthat abstract and concrete, are used in senses analogous to those in\nwhich they are used by M. Comte; who, as we have seen, regards general\nphysiology as abstract and zoology and botany as concrete. And it is\nfurther manifest that the word abstract, as thus used, is not used\nin its proper sense. For, as above shown, no such facts as those of\nanatomical structure can be abstract facts; but can only be more or\nless general facts. Nor do I understand M. Littr\u00e9\u2019s point of view\nwhen he regards these more general facts of anatomical structure, as\n_subjectively_ general and not _objectively_ general. The structural\nphenomena presented by any tissue, such as mucous membrane, are more\ngeneral than the phenomena presented by any of the organs which mucous\nmembrane goes to form, simply in the sense that the phenomena peculiar\nto the membrane are repeated in a greater number of instances than\nthe phenomena peculiar to any organ into the composition of which the\nmembrane enters. And, similarly, such facts as have been established\nrespecting the anatomical elements of tissues, are more general than\nthe facts established respecting any particular tissue, in the sense\nthat they are facts which the various parts of organized bodies exhibit\nin a greater number of cases\u2014they are _objectively_ more general; and\nthey can be called _subjectively_ more general only in the sense that\nthe conception corresponds with the phenomena.\n\nLet me endeavour to clear up this point:\u2014There is, as M. Littr\u00e9\ntruly says, a decreasing generality that is objective. If we omit\nthe phenomena of Dissolution, which are changes from the special to\nthe general, all changes which matter undergoes are from the general\nto the special\u2014are changes involving a decreasing generality in the\nunited groups of attributes. This is the progress of _things_. The\nprogress of _thought_, is not only in the same direction, but also\nin the opposite direction. The investigation of Nature discloses an\nincreasing number of specialities; but it simultaneously discloses more\nand more the generalities within which these specialities fall. Take a\ncase. Zoology, while it goes on multiplying the number of its species,\nand getting a more complete knowledge of each species (decreasing\ngenerality); also goes on discovering the common characters by which\nspecies are united into larger groups (increasing generality). Both\nthese are subjective processes; and in this case, both orders of truth\nreached are concrete\u2014formulate the phenomena as actually manifested.\nThe truth that mammals of all kinds have seven cervical vertebr\u00e6 (I\nbelieve there is one exception) is a generalization\u2014a general relation\nin thought answering to a general relation in things. As the existence\nof seven cervical vertebr\u00e6 in each mammal is a concrete fact, the\nstatement of it is a concrete truth, and the statement colligating such\ntruths is not made other than concrete by holding of case after case.\n\nM. Littr\u00e9, recognizing the necessity for some modification of the\nhierarchy of the Sciences, as enunciated by M. Comte, still regards it\nas substantially true; and for proof of its validity, he appeals mainly\nto the essential _constitutions_ of the Sciences. It is unnecessary\nfor me here to meet, in detail, the arguments by which he supports\nthe proposition, that the essential constitutions of the Sciences,\njustify the order in which M. Comte places them. It will suffice to\nrefer to the foregoing pages, and to the pages which are to follow, as\ncontaining the definitions of those fundamental characteristics which\ndemand the grouping of the Sciences in the way I have pointed out. As\nalready shown, and as will be shown still more clearly by and bye, the\nradical differences of constitution among the Sciences, necessitate the\ncolligation of them into the three classes\u2014Abstract, Abstract-Concrete,\nand Concrete. How irreconcilable is M. Comte\u2019s classification with\nthese groups, will be at once apparent on inspection. It stands thus:\u2015\n\n Mathematics\n  (including rational Mechanics),    partly Abstract, partly\n                                       Abstract-Concrete.\n Astronomy                           Concrete.\n Physics                             Abstract-Concrete.\n Chemistry                           Abstract-Concrete.\n Biology                             Concrete.\n Sociology                           Concrete.\n\n[4] This definition includes the laws of relations called necessary,\nbut not those of relations called contingent. These last, in which the\nprobability of an inferred connexion varies with the number of times\nsuch connexion has occurred in experience, are rightly dealt with\nmathematically.\n\n[5] Here, by way of explanation of the term negatively-quantitative,\nit will suffice to instance the proposition that certain three lines\nwill meet in a point, as a negatively-quantitative proposition;\nsince it asserts the absence of any quantity of space between their\nintersections. Similarly, the assertion that certain three points will\nalways fall in a straight line, is negatively-quantitative; since the\nconception of a straight line implies the negation of any lateral\nquantity, or deviation.\n\n[6] Lest the meaning of this division should not be understood, it may\nbe well to name, in illustration, the estimates of the statistician.\nCalculations respecting population, crime, disease, etc., have\nresults which are correct only numerically, and not in respect of the\ntotalities of being or action represented by the numbers.\n\n[7] Perhaps it will be asked\u2014how can there be a Geometry of Motion into\nwhich the conception of Force does not enter? The reply is, that the\ntime-relations and space-relations of Motion may be considered apart\nfrom those of Force, in the same way that the space-relations of Matter\nmay be considered apart from Matter.\n\n[8] I am indebted to Prof. Frankland for reminding me of an objection\nthat may be made to this statement. The production of new compounds\nby synthesis, has of late become an important branch of chemistry.\nAccording to certain known laws of composition, complex substances,\nwhich never before existed, are formed, and fulfil anticipations both\nas to their general properties and as to the proportions of their\nconstituents\u2014as proved by analysis. Here it may be said with truth,\nthat analysis is used to verify synthesis. Nevertheless, the exception\nto the above statement is apparent only,\u2014not real. In so far as the\nproduction of new compounds is carried on merely for the obtainment\nof such new compounds, it is not Science but Art\u2014the application of\npre-established knowledge to the achievement of ends. The proceeding\nis a part of Science, only in so far as it is a means to the better\ninterpretation of the order of Nature. And how does it aid the\ninterpretation? It does it only by verifying the pre-established\nconclusions respecting the laws of molecular combination; or by serving\nfurther to explain them. That is to say, these syntheses, considered\non their scientific side, have simply the purpose of _forwarding the\nanalysis of the laws of chemical combination_.\n\n[9] This must not be supposed to mean chemically-produced forces. The\nmolecular motion here referred to as dissipated in radiations, is the\nequivalent of that sensible motion lost during the integration of the\nmass of molecules, consequent on their mutual gravitation.\n\n[10] Embracing the interpretation of such phenomena as the solar spots,\nthe facul\u00e6 and the coronal flames.\n\n[11] Want of space prevents anything beyond the briefest indication of\nthese subdivisions.\n\n[12] Perhaps some will say that such incidental phenomena as those of\nthe heat and light evolved during chemical changes, are to be included\namong chemical phenomena. I think, however, the physicist will hold\nthat all phenomena of re-distributed molecular motion, no matter how\narising, come within the range of Physics. But whatever difficulty\nthere may be in drawing the line between Physics and Chemistry (and,\nas I have incidentally pointed out in _The Principles of Psychology_,\n\u00a7 55, the two are closely linked by the phenomena of allotropy and\nisomerism), applies equally to the Comtean classification, or to any\nother. And I may further point out that no obstacle hence arises to the\nclassification I am defending. Physics and Chemistry being both grouped\nby me as Abstract-Concrete Sciences, no difficulty in satisfactorily\ndividing them in the least affects the satisfactoriness of the division\nof the great group to which they both belong, from the other two great\ngroups.\n\n[13] It may be said that the mingling of problems and theorems in\nEuclid is not quite consistent with this statement; and it is true that\nwe have, in this mingling, a trace of the earlier form of the science.\nBut it is to be remarked that these problems are all purely abstract,\nand, further, that each of them admits of being expressed as a theorem.\n\n\n\n\n{118}\n\nREASONS FOR DISSENTING FROM THE PHILOSOPHY OF M. COMTE.\n\n\n[_Originally published in April 1864 as an appendix to the foregoing\nessay._]\n\nWhile the preceding pages were passing through the press, there\nappeared in the _Revue des Deux Mondes_ for February 15th, 1864, an\narticle on a late work of mine\u2014_First Principles_. To M. Auguste\nLaugel, the writer of the article, I am much indebted for the careful\nexposition he has made of some of the leading views set forth in that\nwork; and for the catholic and sympathetic spirit in which he has dealt\nwith them. In one respect, however, M. Laugel conveys to his readers\nan erroneous impression\u2014an impression doubtless derived from what\nappears to him adequate evidence, and doubtless expressed in perfect\nsincerity. M. Laugel describes me as being, in part, a follower of\nM. Comte. After describing the influence of M. Comte as traceable in\nthe works of some other English writers, naming especially Mr. Mill\nand Mr. Buckle, he goes on to say that this influence, though not\navowed, is easily recognizable in the work he is about to make known;\nand in several places throughout his review, there are remarks having\nthe same implication. I greatly regret having to take exception to\nanything said by a critic so candid and so able. But the _Revue des\nDeux Mondes_ {119} circulates widely in England, as well as elsewhere;\nand finding that there exists in some minds, both here and in America,\nan impression similar to that entertained by M. Laugel\u2014an impression\nlikely to be confirmed by his statement\u2014it appears to me needful to\nmeet it.\n\nTwo causes of quite different kinds, have conspired to diffuse the\nerroneous belief that M. Comte is an accepted exponent of scientific\nopinion. His bitterest foes and his closest friends, have unconsciously\njoined in propagating it. On the one hand, M. Comte having designated\nby the term \u201cPositive Philosophy\u201d all that definitely-established\nknowledge which men of science have been gradually organizing into\na coherent body of doctrine; and having habitually placed this in\nopposition to the incoherent body of doctrine defended by theologians;\nit has become the habit of the theological party to think of the\nantagonist scientific party, under the title of \u201cpositivists.\u201d And\nthus, from the habit of calling them \u201cpositivists,\u201d there has grown\nup the assumption that they call themselves \u201cpositivists,\u201d and that\nthey are disciples of M. Comte. On the other hand, those who have\naccepted M. Comte\u2019s system, and believe it to be the philosophy of the\nfuture, have naturally been prone to see everywhere the signs of its\nprogress; and wherever they have found opinions in harmony with it,\nhave ascribed these opinions to the influence of its originator. It\nis always the tendency of discipleship to magnify the effects of the\nmaster\u2019s teachings; and to credit the master with all the doctrines he\nteaches. In the minds of his followers, M. Comte\u2019s name is associated\nwith scientific thinking, which, in many cases, they first understood\nfrom his exposition of it. Influenced as they inevitably are by this\nassociation of ideas, they are reminded of M. Comte wherever they meet\nwith thinking which corresponds, in some marked way, to M. Comte\u2019s\ndescription of scientific thinking; and hence are apt to imagine him\nas introducing into other minds, the {120} conceptions which he\nintroduced into their minds. Such impressions are, however, in most\ncases quite unwarranted. That M. Comte has given a general exposition\nof the doctrine and method elaborated by Science, is true. But it\nis not true that the holders of this doctrine and followers of this\nmethod, are disciples of M. Comte. Neither their modes of inquiry\nnor their views concerning human knowledge in its nature and limits,\nare appreciably different from what they were before. If they are\n\u201cpositivists,\u201d it is in the sense that all men of science have been\nmore or less consistently \u201cpositivists;\u201d and the applicability of M.\nComte\u2019s title to them, no more makes them his disciples, than does its\napplicability to men of science who lived and died before M. Comte\nwrote, make these his disciples. M. Comte himself by no means claims\nthat which some of his adherents are apt, by implication, to claim\nfor him. He says:\u2014\u201cIl y a, sans doute, beaucoup d\u2019analogie entre ma\n_philosophie positive_ et ce que les savans anglais entendent, depuis\nNewton surtout, par _philosophie naturelle_;\u201d (see _Avertissement_) and\nfurther on he indicates the \u201cgrand mouvement imprim\u00e9 \u00e0 l\u2019esprit humain,\nil y a deux si\u00e8cles, par l\u2019action combin\u00e9e des pr\u00e9ceptes de Bacon,\ndes conceptions de Descartes, et des d\u00e9couvertes de Galil\u00e9e, comme le\nmoment o\u00f9 l\u2019esprit de la philosophie positive a commenc\u00e9 \u00e0 se prononcer\ndans le monde.\u201d That is to say, the general mode of thought and way of\ninterpreting phenomena, which M. Comte calls \u201cPositive Philosophy,\u201d he\nrecognizes as having been growing for two centuries; as having reached,\nwhen he wrote, a marked development; and as being the heritage of all\nmen of science.\n\nThat which M. Comte proposed to do, was to give scientific thought\nand method a more definite embodiment and organization; and to apply\nit to the interpretation of classes of phenomena not previously dealt\nwith in a scientific manner. The conception was a great one; and the\nendeavour to work it out was worthy of sympathy and {121} applause.\nSome such conception was entertained by Bacon. He, too, aimed at the\norganization of the sciences; he, too, held that \u201cPhysics is the mother\nof all the sciences;\u201d he, too, held that the sciences can be advanced\nonly by combining them, and saw the nature of the required combination;\nhe, too, held that moral and civil philosophy could not flourish when\nseparated from their roots in natural philosophy; and thus he, too,\nhad some idea of a social science growing out of physical science.\nBut the state of knowledge in his day prevented any advance beyond\nthe general conception: indeed, it was marvellous that he should have\nadvanced so far. Instead of a vague, undefined conception, M. Comte has\npresented the world with a defined and highly-elaborated conception.\nIn working out this conception he has shown remarkable breadth of\nview, great originality, immense fertility of thought, unusual powers\nof generalization. Considered apart from the question of its truth,\nhis system of Positive Philosophy is a vast achievement. But after\naccording to M. Comte high admiration for his conception, for his\neffort to realize it, and for the faculty he has shown in the effort to\nrealize it, there remains the inquiry\u2014Has he succeeded? A thinker who\nre-organizes the scientific method and knowledge of his age, and whose\nre-organization is accepted by his successors, may rightly be said\nto have such successors for his disciples. But successors who accept\nthis method and knowledge of his age, _minus_ his re-organization,\nare certainly not his disciples. How then stands the case with M.\nComte? There are some few who receive his doctrines with but little\nreservation; and these are his disciples truly so called. There are\nothers who regard with approval certain of his leading doctrines,\nbut not the rest: these we may distinguish as partial adherents.\nThere are others who reject all his distinctive doctrines; and these\nmust be classed as his antagonists. The members of this class stand\nsubstantially in the same position as they would {122} have done had\nhe not written. Declining his re-organization of scientific doctrine,\nthey possess this scientific doctrine in its pre-existing state, as\nthe common heritage bequeathed by the past to the present; and their\nadhesion to this scientific doctrine in no sense implicates them with\nM. Comte. In this class stand the great body of men of science. And in\nthis class I stand myself.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nComing thus to the personal part of the question, let me first specify\nthose great general principles on which M. Comte is at one with\npreceding thinkers; and on which I am at one with M. Comte.\n\nAll knowledge is from experience, holds M. Comte; and this I also\nhold\u2014hold it, indeed, in a wider sense than M. Comte; since, not\nonly do I believe that all the ideas acquired by individuals, and\nconsequently all the ideas transmitted by past generations, are thus\nderived; but I also contend that the very faculties by which they are\nacquired, are the products of accumulated and organized experiences\nreceived by ancestral races of beings (see _Principles of Psychology_).\nBut the doctrine that all knowledge is from experience, is not\noriginated by M. Comte; nor is it claimed by him. He himself says\u2014\u201cTous\nles bons esprits r\u00e9p\u00e8tent, depuis Bacon, qu\u2019il n\u2019y a de connaissances\nr\u00e9elles que celles qui reposent sur des faits observ\u00e9s.\u201d And the\nelaboration and definite establishment of this doctrine, has been the\nspecial characteristic of the English school of Psychology. Nor am I\naware that M. Comte, accepting this doctrine, has done anything to\nmake it more certain, or give it greater definiteness. Indeed it was\nimpossible for him to do so; since he repudiates that part of mental\nscience by which alone this doctrine can be proved.\n\nIt is a further belief of M. Comte, that all knowledge is phenomenal\nor relative; and in this belief I entirely agree. But no one alleges\nthat the relativity of all knowledge was first enunciated by M. Comte.\nAmong others who have {123} more or less consistently held this truth,\nSir William Hamilton enumerates, Protagoras, Aristotle, St. Augustin,\nBoethius, Averroes, Albertus Magnus, Gerson, Leo Hebr\u00e6us, Melancthon,\nScaliger, Francis Piccolomini, Giordano Bruno, Campanella, Bacon,\nSpinoza, Newton, Kant. And Sir William Hamilton, in his \u201cPhilosophy of\nthe Unconditioned,\u201d first published in 1829, has given a scientific\ndemonstration of this belief. Receiving it in common with other\nthinkers, from preceding thinkers, M. Comte has not, to my knowledge,\nadvanced this belief. Nor indeed could he advance it, for the reason\nalready given\u2014he denies the possibility of that analysis of thought\nwhich discloses the relativity of all cognition.\n\nM. Comte reprobates the interpretation of different classes of\nphenomena by assigning metaphysical entities as their causes; and I\ncoincide in the opinion that the assumption of such separate entities,\nthough convenient, if not indeed necessary, for purposes of thought,\nis, scientifically considered, illegitimate. This opinion is, in fact,\na corollary from the last; and must stand or fall with it. But like the\nlast it has been held with more or less consistency for generations. M.\nComte himself quotes Newton\u2019s favorite saying\u2014\u201cO! Physics, beware of\nMetaphysics!\u201d Neither to this doctrine, any more than to the preceding\ndoctrines, has M. Comte given a firmer basis. He has simply reasserted\nit; and it was out of the question for him to do more. In this case, as\nin the others, his denial of subjective psychology debarred him from\nproving that these metaphysical entities are mere symbolic conceptions\nwhich do not admit of verification.\n\nLastly, M. Comte believes in invariable natural laws\u2014absolute\nuniformities of relation among phenomena. But very many before him\nhave believed in them too. Long familiar even beyond the bounds of the\nscientific world, the proposition that there is an unchanging order in\nthings, has, within the scientific world, held, for generations, the\n{124} position of an established postulate: by some men of science\nrecognized only as holding of inorganic phenomena; but recognized\nby other men of science, as universal. And M. Comte, accepting this\ndoctrine from the past, has left it substantially as it was. Though\nhe has asserted new uniformities, I do not think scientific men will\nadmit that he has so demonstrated them, as to make the induction\nmore certain; nor has he deductively established the doctrine, by\nshowing that uniformity of relation is a necessary corollary from the\npersistence of force, as may readily be shown.\n\nThese, then, are the pre-established general truths with which M.\nComte sets out\u2014truths which cannot be regarded as distinctive of his\nphilosophy. \u201cBut why,\u201d it will perhaps be asked, \u201cis it needful to\npoint out this; seeing that no instructed reader supposes these truths\nto be peculiar to M. Comte?\u201d I reply that though no disciple of M.\nComte would deliberately claim them for him; and though no theological\nantagonist at all familiar with science and philosophy, supposes M.\nComte to be the first propounder of them; yet there is so strong a\ntendency to associate any doctrines with the name of a conspicuous\nrecent exponent of them, that false impressions are produced, even in\nspite of better knowledge. Of the need for making this reclamation,\ndefinite proof is at hand. In the No. of the _Revue des Deux Mondes_\nnamed at the commencement, may be found, on p. 936, the words\u2014\u201cToute\nreligion, comme toute philosophie, a la pr\u00e9tention de donner une\nexplication de l\u2019univers. La philosophie qui s\u2019appelle _positive_ se\ndistingue de toutes les philosophies et de toutes les religions en\nce qu\u2019elle a renonc\u00e9 \u00e0 cette ambition de l\u2019esprit humain;\u201d and the\nremainder of the paragraph is devoted to explaining the doctrine of the\nrelativity of knowledge. The next paragraph begins\u2014\u201cTout imbu de ces\nid\u00e9es, que nous exposons sans les discuter pour le moment, M. Spencer\ndivise, etc.\u201d Now this is one of those collocations of ideas {125}\nwhich tends to create, or to strengthen, the erroneous impression I\nwould dissipate. I do not for a moment suppose that M. Laugel intended\nto say that these ideas which he describes as ideas of the \u201cPositive\nPhilosophy,\u201d are peculiarly the ideas of M. Comte. But little as he\nprobably intended it, his expressions suggest this conception. In the\nminds of both disciples and antagonists, \u201cthe Positive Philosophy\u201d\nmeans the philosophy of M. Comte; and to be imbued with the ideas\nof \u201cthe Positive Philosophy\u201d means to be imbued with the ideas of\nM. Comte\u2014to have received these ideas from M. Comte. After what has\nbeen said above, I need scarcely repeat that the conception thus\ninadvertently suggested, is a wrong one. M. Comte\u2019s brief enunciations\nof these general truths, gave me no clearer apprehensions of them than\nI had before. Such clarifications of ideas on these ultimate questions,\nas I can trace to any particular teacher, I owe to Sir William Hamilton.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nFrom the principles which M. Comte held in common with many preceding\nand contemporary thinkers, let us pass now to the principles that are\ndistinctive of his system. Just as entirely as I agree with M. Comte\non those cardinal doctrines which we jointly inherit; so entirely do I\ndisagree with him on those cardinal doctrines which he propounds, and\nwhich determine the organization of his philosophy. The best way of\nshowing this will be to compare, side by side, the\u2015\n\n _Propositions held by M. Comte._     _Propositions which I hold._\n\n \u201c.\u00a0.\u00a0. chacune de nos conceptions    The progress of our conceptions,\n principales, chaque branche          and of each branch of knowledge,\n de nos connaissances, passe          is from beginning to end\n successivement par trois \u00e9tats       intrinsically alike. There are not\n th\u00e9oriques diff\u00e9rens: l\u2019\u00e9tat         three methods of philosophizing\n th\u00e9ologique, ou fictif; l\u2019\u00e9tat       radically opposed; but one method\n m\u00e9taphysique, ou abstrait;           of philosophizing which remains,\n l\u2019\u00e9tat scientifique, ou positif.     in essence, the same. At first,\n En d\u2019autres termes, l\u2019esprit         and to the last, the conceived\n humain, par sa nature, emploie       causal agencies of phenomena,\n successivement dans chacune de       have a degree of generality\n ses recherches trois m\u00e9thodes de     corresponding {126} to the width\n philosopher, dont le caract\u00e8re       of the generalizations which\n est essentiellement diff\u00e9rent et     experiences have determined; and\n m\u00eame radicalement oppos\u00e9: d\u2019abord    they change just as gradually\n la m\u00e9thode th\u00e9ologique, ensuite      as experiences accumulate. The\n la m\u00e9thode m\u00e9taphysique, et enfin    integration of causal agencies,\n la m\u00e9thode positive.\u201d _Cours de_      originally thought of as\n _Philosophie Positive_, 1830, Vol.    multitudinous and local, but\n i. p. 3.                             finally believed to be one and\n                                      universal, is a process which\n                                      involves the passing through all\n                                      intermediate steps between these\n                                      extremes; and any appearance of\n                                      stages can be but superficial.\n                                      Supposed concrete and individual\n                                      causal agencies, coalesce in\n                                      the mind as fast as groups of\n                                      phenomena are assimilated, or seen\n                                      to be similarly caused. Along\n                                      with their coalescence, comes\n                                      a greater extension of their\n                                      individualities, and a concomitant\n                                      loss of distinctness in their\n                                      individualities. Gradually, by\n                                      continuance of such coalescences,\n                                      causal agencies become, in\n                                      thought, diffused and indefinite.\n                                      And eventually, without any change\n                                      in the nature of the process,\n                                      there is reached the consciousness\n                                      of a universal causal agency,\n                                      which cannot be conceived.[14]\n\n \u201cLe syst\u00e8me th\u00e9ologique est          As the progress of thought is\n parvenu \u00e0 la plus haute perfection   one, so is the end one. There\n dont il soit susceptible,            are not three possible terminal\n quand il a substitu\u00e9 l\u2019action        conceptions; but only a single\n providentielle d\u2019un \u00eatre unique au   terminal conception. When\n jeu vari\u00e9 des nombreuses divinit\u00e9s   the theological idea of the\n ind\u00e9pendantes qui avaient \u00e9t\u00e9        providential action of one being,\n imagin\u00e9es primitivement. De m\u00eame,    is developed to its ultimate\n le dernier terme du syst\u00e8me          form, by the absorption of all\n metaphysique consiste \u00e0 concevoir,   independent secondary agencies,\n au lieu des diff\u00e9rentes entit\u00e9s      it becomes the conception of a\n particuli\u00e8res, une seule grande      being immanent in all phenomena;\n entit\u00e9 g\u00e9n\u00e9rale, la _nature_,        and the reduction of it to\n envisag\u00e9e comme la source            this {127} state, implies the\n unique de tous les ph\u00e9nom\u00e8nes.       fading-away, in thought, of all\n Pareillement, la perfection du       those anthropomorphic attributes\n syst\u00e8me positif, vers laquelle       by which the aboriginal idea\n il tend sans cesse, quoiqu\u2019il        was distinguished. The alleged\n soit tr\u00e8s-probable qu\u2019il ne doive    last term of the metaphysical\n jamais l\u2019atteindre, serait de        system\u2014the conception of a\n pouvoir se repr\u00e9senter tous les      single great general entity,\n divers ph\u00e9nom\u00e8nes observables        _nature_, as the source of all\n comme des cas particuliers d\u2019un      phenomena\u2014is a conception\n seul fait g\u00e9n\u00e9ral, tel que celui     identical with the previous one:\n de la gravitation, par exemple.\u201d     the consciousness of a single\n p. 5.                                source which, in coming to be\n                                      regarded as universal, ceases\n                                      to be regarded as conceivable,\n                                      differs in nothing but name from\n                                      the consciousness of one being,\n                                      manifested in all phenomena. And\n                                      similarly, that which is described\n                                      as the ideal state of science\u2014the\n                                      power to represent all observable\n                                      phenomena as particular cases\n                                      of a single general fact,\n                                      implies the postulating of some\n                                      ultimate existence of which this\n                                      single fact is alleged; and the\n                                      postulating of this ultimate\n                                      existence, involves a state of\n                                      consciousness indistinguishable\n                                      from the other two.\n\n \u201c.\u00a0.\u00a0. la perfection du syst\u00e8me      Though along with the extension\n positif, vers laquelle il tend       of generalizations, and\n sans cesse, quoiqu\u2019il soit           concomitant integration of\n tr\u00e8s-probable, qu\u2019il ne doive        conceived causal agencies, the\n jamais l\u2019atteindre, serait de        conceptions of causal agencies\n pouvoir se repr\u00e9senter tous les      grow more indefinite; and though\n divers ph\u00e9nom\u00e8nes observables        as they gradually coalesce into\n comme des cas particuliers d\u2019un      a universal causal agency,\n seul fait general, p. 5.\u00a0.\u00a0.\u00a0.\u00a0.\u00a0.   they cease to be representable\n consid\u00e9rant comme absolument         in thought, and are no longer\n inaccessible, et vide de sens        supposed to be comprehensible;\n pour nous la recherche de ce         yet the consciousness of _cause_\n qu\u2019on appelle les _causes_, soit     remains as dominant to the last\n premi\u00e8res, soit finales.\u201d p. 14.     as it was at first; and can never\n                                      be got rid of. The consciousness\n                                      of cause can be abolished only\n                                      by abolishing consciousness\n                                      itself.[15] (_First Principles_, \u00a7\n                                      26.) {128}\n\n \u201cCe n\u2019est pas aux lecteurs de cet    Ideas do not govern and\n ouvrage que je croirai jamais        overthrow the world: the world\n devoir prouver que les id\u00e9es         is governed or overthrown by\n gouvernent et bouleversent le        feelings, to which ideas serve\n monde, ou, en d\u2019autres termes, que   only as guides. The social\n tout le m\u00e9canisme social repose      mechanism does not rest finally\n finalement sur des opinions. Ils     on opinions; but almost wholly\n savent surtout que la grande         on character. Not intellectual\n crise politique et morale des        anarchy, but moral antagonism, is\n soci\u00e9t\u00e9s actuelles tient, en         the cause of political crises.\n derni\u00e8re analyse, \u00e0 l\u2019anarchie       All social phenomena are produced\n intellectuelle.\u201d p. 48.[16]           by the totality of human emotions\n                                      and beliefs; of which the emotions\n                                      are mainly pre-determined,\n                                      while the beliefs are mainly\n                                      post-determined. Men\u2019s desires\n                                      are chiefly inherited; but their\n                                      beliefs are chiefly acquired,\n                                      and depend on surrounding\n                                      conditions; and the most important\n                                      surrounding conditions depend\n                                      on the social state which the\n                                      prevalent desires have produced.\n                                      The social state at any time\n                                      existing, is the resultant of all\n                                      the ambitions, self-interests,\n                                      fears, reverences, indignations,\n                                      sympathies, etc., of ancestral\n                                      citizens and existing citizens.\n                                      The ideas current in this social\n                                      state, must, on the average, be\n                                      congruous with the feelings of\n                                      citizens; and therefore, on the\n                                      average, with the social state\n                                      these feelings have produced.\n                                      Ideas wholly foreign to this\n                                      social state {129} cannot be\n                                      evolved, and if introduced from\n                                      without, cannot get accepted\u2014or,\n                                      if accepted, die out when the\n                                      temporary phase of feeling which\n                                      caused their acceptance, ends.\n                                      Hence, though advanced ideas when\n                                      once established, act on society\n                                      and aid its further advance;\n                                      yet the establishment of such\n                                      ideas depends on the fitness of\n                                      the society for receiving them.\n                                      Practically, the popular character\n                                      and the social state, determine\n                                      what ideas shall be current;\n                                      instead of the current ideas\n                                      determining the social state and\n                                      the character. The modification\n                                      of men\u2019s moral natures, caused\n                                      by the continuous discipline of\n                                      social life, which adapts them\n                                      more and more to social relations,\n                                      is therefore the chief proximate\n                                      cause of social progress. (_Social_\n                                      _Statics_, chap. xxx.)\n\n \u201c.\u00a0.\u00a0. je ne dois pas n\u00e9gliger       The order in which the\n d\u2019indiquer d\u2019avance, comme une       generalizations of science are\n propri\u00e9t\u00e9 essentielle de l\u2019\u00e9chelle   established, is determined by\n encyclop\u00e9dique que je vais           the frequency and impressiveness\n proposer, sa conformit\u00e9 g\u00e9n\u00e9rale     with which different classes\n avec l\u2019ensemble de l\u2019histoire        of relations are repeated in\n scientifique; en ce sens, que,       conscious experience; and this\n malgr\u00e9 la simultan\u00e9it\u00e9 r\u00e9elle et     depends, partly on _the directness_\n continue du d\u00e9veloppement des        _with which personal welfare_\n diff\u00e9rentes sciences, celles qui     _is affected_; partly on _the_\n seront class\u00e9es comme ant\u00e9rieures    _conspicuousness of one or both the_\n seront, en effet, plus anciennes     _phenomena between which a relation_\n et constamment plus avanc\u00e9es         _is to be perceived_; partly on\n que celles pr\u00e9sent\u00e9es comme          _the absolute frequency with which_\n post\u00e9rieures.\u201d p. 84. . .            _the relations occur_; partly on\n  . . . . . . \u201cCet ordre est          their _relative frequency of_\n d\u00e9termin\u00e9 par le degr\u00e9 de            _occurrence_; partly on their\n simplicit\u00e9, ou, ce qui revient au    _degree of simplicity_; and partly\n m\u00eame, par le degr\u00e9 de g\u00e9n\u00e9ralit\u00e9     on their _degree of abstractness_.\n des ph\u00e9nom\u00e8nes.\u201d p. 87.              (_First Principles_, 1st ed., \u00a7\n                                      36; or otherwise see \u201c_Essay on_\n                                      _Laws in General and the Order of_\n                                      _their Discovery_.\u201d)\n\n \u201cEn r\u00e9sultat d\u00e9finitif, la           The sciences as arranged in this\n math\u00e9matique, l\u2019astronomie,          succession specified by M. Comte,\n la physique, la chimie, la           _do not_ logically conform to the\n physiologie, et la physique          natural and invariable hierarchy\n sociale; telle est la formule        of phenomena; and {130} there\n encyclop\u00e9dique qui, parmi            is no serial order whatever in\n le tr\u00e8s-grand nombre de              which they can be placed, which\n classifications que comportent les   represents either their logical\n six sciences fondamentales, est      dependence or the dependence\n seule logiquement conforme \u00e0 la      of phenomena. (See _Genesis of\n hi\u00e9rarchie naturelle et invariable   Science_, and foregoing Essay.)\n des ph\u00e9nom\u00e8nes.\u201d[17] p. 115.\n\n \u201cOn con\u00e7oit, en effet, que l\u2019\u00e9tude   The historical development of\n rationelle de chaque science         the sciences _has not_ taken\n fondamentale exigeant la culture     place in this serial order; nor\n pr\u00e9alable de toutes celles qui la    in any other serial order. There\n pr\u00e9c\u00e8dent dans notre hi\u00e9rarchie      is no \u201ctrue _filiation_ of the\n encyclop\u00e9dique, n\u2019a pu faire de      sciences.\u201d From the beginning,\n progr\u00e8s r\u00e9els et prendre son         the abstract sciences, the\n v\u00e9ritable caract\u00e8re, qu\u2019 apr\u00e8s un    abstract-concrete sciences, and\n grand d\u00e9veloppement des sciences     the concrete sciences, have\n ant\u00e9rieures relatives \u00e0 des          progressed together: the first\n ph\u00e9nom\u00e8nes plus g\u00e9n\u00e9raux, plus       solving problems which the second\n abstraits, moins compliqu\u00e9s, et      and third presented, and growing\n ind\u00e9pendans des autres. C\u2019est done   only by the solution of the\n dans cet ordre que la progression,   problems; and the second similarly\n quoique simultan\u00e9e, a d\u00fb avoir       growing by joining the first\n lieu.\u201d p. 100.                       in solving the problems of the\n                                      third. All along there has been\n                                      a continuous action and reaction\n                                      between the three great classes\n                                      of sciences\u2014an advance from\n                                      concrete facts to abstract facts,\n                                      and then an application of such\n                                      abstract facts to the analysis of\n                                      new orders of concrete facts. (See\n                                      _Genesis of Science_.)\n\nSuch then are the organizing principles of M. Comte\u2019s philosophy and\nmy reasons for rejecting them. Leaving out of his \u201c_Exposition_\u201d those\npre-established general {131} doctrines which are the common property\nof modern thinkers; these are the general doctrines which remain\u2014these\nare the doctrines which fundamentally distinguish his system. From\nevery one of them I dissent. To each proposition I oppose either a\nwidely-different proposition, or a direct negation; and I not only\ndo it now, but have done it from the time when I became acquainted\nwith his writings. The rejection of his cardinal principles should, I\nthink, alone suffice; but there are sundry other views of his, some of\nthem largely characterizing his system, which I equally reject. Let us\nglance at them.\n\n How organic beings have              This inquiry, I believe, admits\n originated, is an inquiry which      of answer, and will be answered.\n M. Comte deprecates as a useless     That division of Biology which\n speculation: asserting, as he        concerns itself with the origin of\n does, that species are immutable.    species, I hold to be the supreme\n                                      division, to which all others are\n                                      subsidiary. For on the verdict\n                                      of Biology on this matter, must\n                                      wholly depend our conception of\n                                      human nature, past, present, and\n                                      future; our theory of the mind;\n                                      and our theory of society.\n\n M. Comte contends that of what is    I have very emphatically expressed\n commonly known as mental science,    my belief in a subjective science\n all that most important part         of the mind, by writing a\n which consists of the subjective     _Principles of Psychology_, one\n analysis of our ideas, is an         half of which is subjective.\n impossibility.\n\n M. Comte\u2019s ideal of society          That form of society towards which\n is one in which _government_         we is are progressing, I hold\n developed to the greatest            to be one in which _government_\n extent\u2014in which class-functions     will be reduced to the smallest\n are far more under conscious         amount possible, and _freedom_\n public regulation than now\u2014in       increased to the greatest amount\n which hierarchical organization      possible\u2014one in which human\n with unquestioned authority          nature will have become so moulded\n shall guide everything\u2014in which     by social discipline into fitness\n the individual life shall be         for the social state, that it will\n subordinated in the greatest         need little external restraint,\n degree to the social life.           but will be self-restrained\u2014one\n                                      in which the citizen will tolerate\n                                      no interference with his freedom,\n                                      save that which maintains the\n                                      equal freedom of others\u2014one in\n                                      which the spontaneous {132}\n                                      co-operation which has developed\n                                      our industrial system, and is now\n                                      developing it with increasing\n                                      rapidity, will produce agencies\n                                      for the discharge of nearly all\n                                      social functions, and will leave\n                                      to the primary governmental agency\n                                      nothing beyond the function of\n                                      maintaining those conditions\n                                      to free action, which make\n                                      such spontaneous co-operation\n                                      possible\u2014one in which individual\n                                      life will thus be pushed to the\n                                      greatest extent consistent with\n                                      social life; and in which social\n                                      life will have no other end than\n                                      to maintain the completest sphere\n                                      for individual life.\n\n M. Comte, not including in his       I conceive, on the other hand,\n philosophy the consciousness of      that the object of religious\n a cause manifested to us in all      sentiment will ever continue\n phenomena, and yet holding that      to be, that which it has ever\n there must be a religion, which      been\u2014the unknown source of\n must have an object, takes for his   things. While the _forms_ under\n object\u2014Humanity. \u201cThis Collective    which men are conscious of the\n Life (of Society) is in Comte\u2019s      unknown source of things, may\n system the _\u00catre Supr\u00eame_; the       fade away, the _substance_ of\n only one we can _know_ therefore     the consciousness is permanent.\n the only one we can worship.\u201d        Beginning with causal agents\n                                      conceived as imperfectly known;\n                                      progressing to causal agents\n                                      conceived as less known and less\n                                      knowable; and coming at last to\n                                      a universal causal agent posited\n                                      as not to be known at all; the\n                                      religious sentiment must ever\n                                      continue to occupy itself with\n                                      this universal causal agent.\n                                      Having in the course of evolution\n                                      come to have for its object\n                                      of contemplation the Infinite\n                                      Unknowable, the religious\n                                      sentiment can never again (unless\n                                      by retrogression) take a Finite\n                                      Knowable, like Humanity, for its\n                                      object of contemplation.\n\nHere, then, are sundry other points, all of them important, and the\nlast two supremely important, on which I am diametrically opposed to\nM. Comte; and did space permit, I could add many others. Radically\ndiffering from him as I thus do, in everything distinctive of his\nphilosophy; and having invariably expressed my dissent, {133} publicly\nand privately, from the time I became acquainted with his writings;\nit may be imagined that I have been not a little startled to find\nmyself classed as one of the same school. That any who are acquainted\nwith my writings, should suppose I have any general sympathy with M.\nComte, save that implied by preferring proved facts to superstitions,\nastonishes me.\n\nIt is true that, disagreeing with M. Comte, though I do, in all those\nfundamental views that are peculiar to him, I agree with him in\nsundry minor views. The doctrine that the education of the individual\nshould accord in mode and arrangement with the education of mankind,\nconsidered historically, I have cited from him; and have endeavoured to\nenforce it. I entirely concur in his opinion that there requires a new\norder of scientific men, whose function shall be that of co-ordinating\nthe results arrived at by the rest. To him, I believe, I am indebted\nfor the conception of a social _consensus_; and when the time comes for\ndealing with this conception, I shall state my indebtedness. And I also\nadopt his word, Sociology. There are, I believe, in the part of his\nwritings which I have read, various incidental thoughts of great depth\nand value; and I doubt not that were I to read more of his writings, I\nshould find others.[18] It is very probable, too, that I have said (as\nI am told I have) some things which M. Comte had already said. It would\nbe difficult, I believe, to find two men who had no opinions in common.\nAnd it would be extremely strange if two men, starting from the same\ngeneral doctrines established by modern science, should traverse some\nof the same fields of inquiry, without their lines of thought having\nany points of intersection. But {134} none of these minor agreements\ncan be of much weight in comparison with the fundamental disagreements\nabove specified. Leaving out of view that general community which we\nboth have with the scientific thought of the age, the differences\nbetween us are essential, while the correspondences are non-essential.\nAnd I venture to think that kinship must be determined by essentials,\nand not by non-essentials.[19]\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nJoined with the ambiguous use of the phrase \u201cPositive Philosophy,\u201d\nwhich has led to a classing with M. Comte of many men who either ignore\nor reject his distinctive principles, there has been one special\ncircumstance that has tended to originate and maintain this classing in\nmy own case. The assumption of some relationship between M. Comte and\nmyself, was unavoidably raised by the title of my first book\u2014_Social\nStatics_. When that book was published, I was unaware that this title\nhad been before used: had I known the fact, I should certainly have\nadopted an alternative title which I had in view.[20] If, however,\ninstead of {135} the title, the work itself be considered, its\nirrelation to the philosophy of M. Comte becomes abundantly manifest.\nThere is decisive testimony on this point. In the _North British\nReview_ for August, 1851, a reviewer of _Social Statics_ says\u2015\n\n \u201cThe title of this work, however, is a complete misnomer. According to\n all analogy, the phrase \u201cSocial Statics\u201d should be used only in some\n such sense as that in which, as we have already explained, it is used\n by Comte, namely as designating a branch of inquiry whose end it is to\n ascertain the laws of social equilibrium or order, as distinct ideally\n from those of social movement or progress. Of this Mr. Spencer does\n not seem to have had the slightest notion, but to have chosen the name\n for his work only as a means of indicating vaguely that it proposed to\n treat of social concerns in a scientific manner.\u201d\u2014p. 321.\n\nRespecting M. Comte\u2019s application of the words _statics_ and _dynamics_\nto social phenomena, now that I know what it is, I will only say\nthat while I perfectly understand how, by a defensible extension\nof their mathematical meanings, the one may be used to indicate\nsocial _functions in balance_, and the other social _functions out\nof balance_, I am quite at a loss to understand how the phenomena of\n_structure_ can be included in the one any more than in the other. But\nthe two things which here concern me, are, first, to point out that I\nhad not \u201cthe slightest notion\u201d of giving Social Statics the meaning\nwhich M. Comte gave it; and, second, to explain the meaning which I\ndid give it. The units of any aggregate of matter, are in equilibrium\nwhen they severally act and re-act on one another on all sides with\nequal forces. A state of change among them implies that there are\nforces exercised by some that are not counterbalanced by like forces\nexercised by others; and a state of rest implies the absence of such\nuncounterbalanced {136} forces\u2014implies, if the units are homogeneous,\nequal distances among them\u2014implies a maintenance of their respective\nspheres of molecular motion. Similarly among the units of a society,\nthe fundamental condition to equilibrium, is, that the restraining\nforces which the units exercise on each other, shall be balanced. If\nthe spheres of action of some units are diminished by extension of the\nspheres of action of others, there necessarily results an unbalanced\nforce which tends to produce political change in the relations\nof individuals; and the tendency to change can cease, only when\nindividuals cease to aggress on each other\u2019s spheres of action\u2014only\nwhen there is maintained that law of equal freedom, which it was\nthe purpose of _Social Statics_ to enforce in all its consequences.\nBesides this totally-unlike conception of what constitutes Social\nStatics, the work to which I applied that title, is fundamentally at\nvariance with M. Comte\u2019s teachings in almost everything. So far from\nalleging, as M. Comte does, that society is to be re-organized by\nphilosophy; it alleges that society is to be re-organized only by the\naccumulated effects of habit on character. Its aim is not the increase\nof authoritative control over citizens, but the decrease of it. A more\npronounced individualism, instead of a more pronounced nationalism, is\nits ideal. So profoundly is my political creed at variance with the\ncreed of M. Comte, that, unless I am misinformed, it has been instanced\nby a leading English disciple of M. Comte as the creed to which he\nhas the greatest aversion. One point of coincidence, however, is\nrecognizable. The analogy between an individual organism and a social\norganism, which was held by Plato and by Hobbes, is asserted in _Social\nStatics,_ as it is in the _Sociology_ of M. Comte. Very rightly, M.\nComte has made this analogy the cardinal idea of this division of\nhis philosophy. In _Social Statics_, the aim of which is essentially\nethical, this analogy is pointed out incidentally, to enforce certain\nethical considerations; and is there obviously suggested partly by the\ndefinition of life which {137} Coleridge derived from Schelling, and\npartly by the generalizations of physiologists there referred to (chap.\nxxx. \u00a7\u00a7. 12, 13, 16). Excepting this incidental agreement, however,\nthe contents of _Social Statics_ are so entirely antagonistic to the\nphilosophy of M. Comte, that, but for the title, the work would never,\nI think, have raised the remembrance of him\u2014unless, indeed, by the\nassociation of opposites.[21]\n\nAnd now let me point out that which really _has_ exercised a profound\ninfluence over my course of thought. The truth which Harvey\u2019s\nembryological inquiries first dimly indicated, which was afterwards\nmore clearly perceived by Wolff, and which was put into a definite\nshape by Von Baer\u2014the truth that all organic development is a change\nfrom a state of homogeneity to a state of heterogeneity\u2014this it is from\nwhich very many of the conclusions which I now hold, have indirectly\nresulted. In _Social Statics_, there is everywhere manifested a\ndominant belief in the evolution of man and of society. There is also\nmanifested the belief that this evolution is in both cases determined\nby the incidence of conditions\u2014the actions of circumstances. And\nthere is further, in the sections already referred to, a recognition\nof the fact that organic and social evolutions, conform to the same\nlaw. Falling amid beliefs in evolutions of various orders, everywhere\ndetermined by natural causes (beliefs {138} again displayed in the\n_Theory of Population_ and in the _Principles of Psychology_); the\nformula of Von Baer set up a process of organization. The extension\nof it to other kinds of phenomena than those of individual and social\nbodies, is traceable through successive stages. It may be seen in the\nlast paragraph of an essay on \u201cThe Philosophy of Style,\u201d published in\nOctober, 1852; again in an essay on \u201cManners and Fashion,\u201d published\nin April, 1854; and then, in a comparatively advanced form, in an\nessay on \u201cProgress: its Law and Cause,\u201d published in April, 1857.\nAfterwards, there came the recognition of the need for modifying Von\nBaer\u2019s formula by including the trait of increasing definiteness; next\nthe inquiry into those general laws of force from which this universal\ntransformation necessarily results; next the deduction of these from\nthe ultimate law of the persistence of force; next the perception that\nthere is everywhere a process of Dissolution complementary to that of\nEvolution; and, finally, the determination of the conditions (specified\nin the foregoing essay) under which Evolution and Dissolution\nrespectively occur. The filiation of these results is, I think,\ntolerably manifest. The process has been one of continuous development,\nset up by the addition of Von Baer\u2019s law to a number of ideas that were\nin harmony with it. And I am not conscious of any other influences by\nwhich the process has been affected.\n\nIt is possible, however, that there may have been influences of which\nI am not conscious; and my opposition to M. Comte\u2019s system may have\nbeen one of them. The presentation of antagonistic thoughts, often\nproduces greater definiteness and development of one\u2019s own thoughts. It\nis probable that the doctrines set forth in the essay on \u201cThe Genesis\nof Science,\u201d might never have been reached, had not my dissent from M.\nComte\u2019s conception, led me to work them out; and but for this, I might\nnot have arrived at the classification of the sciences exhibited in the\nforegoing essay. Possibly there are other cases in which the stimulus\nof {139} repugnance to M. Comte\u2019s views, may have aided in elaborating\nmy own views; though I cannot call to mind any other cases.\n\nLet it by no means be supposed from all I have said, that I do not\nregard M. Comte\u2019s speculations as of value. True or untrue, his system\nas a whole, has doubtless produced important and salutary revolutions\nof thought in many minds; and will doubtless do so in many more.\nDoubtless, too, not a few of those who dissent from his general\nviews, have been healthfully stimulated by consideration of them. The\npresentation of scientific knowledge and method as a whole, whether\nrightly or wrongly co-ordinated, cannot have failed greatly to widen\nthe conceptions of most of his readers. And he has done especial\nservice by familiarizing men with the idea of a social science, based\non the other sciences. Beyond which benefits resulting from the general\ncharacter and scope of his philosophy, I believe that there are\nscattered through his pages many large ideas that are valuable not only\nas stimuli, but for their actual truth.\n\nIt has been by no means an agreeable task to make these personal\nexplanations; but it has seemed to me a task not to be avoided.\nDiffering so profoundly as I do from M. Comte on all fundamental\ndoctrines, save those which we inherit in common from the past; it\nhas become needful to dissipate the impression that I agree with\nhim\u2014needful to show that a large part of what is currently known as\n\u201cpositive philosophy,\u201d is not \u201cpositive philosophy\u201d in the sense of\nbeing peculiarly M. Comte\u2019s philosophy; and to show that beyond that\nportion of the so-called \u201cpositive philosophy\u201d which is not peculiar to\nhim, I dissent from it.\n\nAnd now at the close, as at the outset, let me express my great regret\nthat these explanations should have been called forth by the statements\nof a critic who has treated me so liberally. Nothing will, I fear,\nprevent the foregoing pages from appearing like a very ungracious\nresponse to M. Laugel\u2019s sympathetically-written review. I can only\nhope that the gravity of the question at issue, in so far as it {140}\nconcerns myself, may be taken in mitigation, if not as a sufficient\napology.\n\n\nNOTE.\n\n _The preceding pages originally formed the second portion of a_\n _pamphlet entitled_ The Classification of the Sciences: to which are\n added Reasons for dissenting from the Philosophy of M. Comte, _which\n was first published in 1864. For some time past this pamphlet has been\n included in the third volume of my_ Essays, &c., _and has been no\n longer accessible in a separate form. There has recently been diffused\n afresh, the misconception which originally led me to exhibit my entire\n rejection of those views of M. Comte, which essentially distinguish\n his system from other systems; and the motives which then prompted me\n to publish the reasons for this rejection, now prompt me to put them\n within the reach of all who care to inquire about the matter. The\n Appendix, presenting an outline of the leading propositions of the\n Synthetic Philosophy, will further aid the reader in forming a correct\n judgment_.\n\n _Oct. 7, 1884._\n\n\nAPPENDIX A.\n\nSome fourteen or more years ago, an American friend requested me, with\na view to a certain use which he named, to furnish him with a succinct\nstatement of the cardinal principles developed in the successive works\nI had published and in those I was intending to publish. This statement\nI here reproduce. Having been written solely for an expository purpose,\nand without thought of M. Comte and his system, it will serve better\nthan a statement now drawn up since it is not open to the suspicion of\nbeing adapted to the occasion.[22]\n\n \u201c1. Throughout the universe in general and in detail, there is an\n unceasing redistribution of matter and motion.\n\n \u201c2. This redistribution constitutes evolution where there is a {141}\n predominant integration of matter and dissipation of motion, and\n constitutes dissolution where there is a predominant absorption of\n motion and disintegration of matter.\n\n \u201c3. Evolution is simple when the process of integration, or the\n formation of a coherent aggregate, proceeds uncomplicated by other\n processes.\n\n \u201c4. Evolution is compound when, along with this primary change from\n an incoherent to a coherent state, there go on secondary changes due\n to differences in the circumstances of the different parts of the\n aggregate.\n\n \u201c5. These secondary changes constitute a transformation of the\n homogeneous into the heterogeneous\u2014a transformation which, like the\n first, is exhibited in the universe as a whole and in all (or nearly\n all) its details: in the aggregate of stars and nebulae; in the\n planetary system; in the earth as an inorganic mass; in each organism,\n vegetal or animal (Von Baer\u2019s law); in the aggregate of organisms\n throughout geologic time; in the mind; in society; in all products of\n social activity.\n\n \u201c6. The process of integration, acting locally as well as generally,\n combines with the process of differentiation to render this change\n not simply from homogeneity to heterogeneity, but from an indefinite\n homogeneity to a definite heterogeneity; and this trait of increasing\n definiteness, which accompanies the trait of increasing heterogeneity,\n is, like it, exhibited in the totality of things and in all its\n divisions and sub-divisions down to the minutest.\n\n \u201c7. Along with this redistribution of the matter composing any\n evolving aggregate, there goes on a redistribution of the retained\n motion of its components in relation to one another: this also\n becomes, step by step, more definitely heterogeneous.\n\n \u201c8. In the absence of a homogeneity that is infinite and absolute,\n that redistribution of which evolution is one phase, is inevitable.\n The causes which necessitate it are these:\u2015\n\n \u201c9. The instability of the homogeneous, which is consequent upon the\n different exposures of the different parts of any limited aggregate to\n incident forces. The transformations hence resulting are complicated\n by\u2015\n\n \u201c10. The multiplication of effects. Every mass and part of a mass\n on which a force falls, sub-divides and differentiates that force,\n which thereupon proceeds to work a variety of changes; and each\n of these becomes the parent of similarly-multiplying changes: the\n multiplication of them becoming greater in proportion as the aggregate\n becomes more heterogeneous. And these two causes of increasing\n differentiations are furthered by\u2015\n\n \u201c11. Segregation, which is a process tending ever to separate unlike\n units and to bring together like units\u2014so serving continually to\n sharpen, or make definite, differentiations otherwise caused.\n\n \u201c12. Equilibration is the final result of these transformations which\n an evolving aggregate undergoes. The changes go on until there is\n reached an equilibrium between the forces which all parts of the\n aggregate are exposed to and the forces these parts oppose to them.\n Equilibration may pass through a transition stage of balanced motions\n (as in a planetary system) or of {142} balanced functions (as in a\n living body) on the way to ultimate equilibrium; but the state of rest\n in inorganic bodies, or death in organic bodies, is the necessary\n limit of the changes constituting evolution.\n\n \u201c13. Dissolution is the counter-change which sooner or later every\n evolved aggregate undergoes. Remaining exposed to surrounding\n forces that are unequilibrated, each aggregate is ever liable to\n be dissipated by the increase, gradual or sudden, of its contained\n motion; and its dissipation, quickly undergone by bodies lately\n animate and slowly undergone by inanimate masses, remains to be\n undergone at an indefinitely remote period by each planetary and\n stellar mass, which, since an indefinitely distant period in the past,\n has been slowly evolving: the cycle of its transformations being thus\n completed.\n\n \u201c14. This rhythm of evolution and dissolution, completing itself\n during short periods in small aggregates, and in the vast aggregates\n distributed through space completing itself in periods which are\n immeasurable by human thought, is, so far as we can see, universal and\n eternal\u2014each alternating phase of the process predominating now in\n this region of space and now in that, as local conditions determine.\n\n \u201c15. All these phenomena, from their great features down to their\n minutest details, are necessary results of the persistence of force,\n under its forms of matter and motion. Given these as distributed\n through space, and their quantities being unchangeable, either\n by increase or decrease, there inevitably result the continuous\n redistributions distinguishable as evolution and dissolution, as well\n as all those special traits above enumerated.\n\n \u201c16. That which persists unchanging in quantity but ever changing in\n form, under these sensible appearances which the universe presents\n to us, transcends human knowledge and conception\u2014is an unknown and\n unknowable power, which we are obliged to recognize as without limit\n in space and without beginning or end in time.\u201d\n\nThese successive paragraphs set forth in the most abstract way, that\nprocess of transformation going on throughout the Cosmos as a whole,\nand in each larger or smaller portion of it. In _First Principles_ the\nstatements contained in these paragraphs are elaborated, explained, and\nillustrated; and in subsequent volumes of the series, the purpose has\nbeen to interpret the several great groups of phenomena, Astronomical,\nGeological (both postponed), Biological, Psychological, Sociological,\nand Ethical, in conformity with these general laws of Evolution which\n_First Principles_ enunciates.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIf it can be shown that any one of the above propositions has been\nadopted from, or has been suggested by, the {143} Positive Philosophy,\nthere will be evidence that the Synthetic Philosophy is to that extent\nindebted to it. Or if there can be quoted any expressed conviction of\nM. Comte, that the factors producing changes of all kinds, inorganic\nand organic, co-operate everywhere throughout the Cosmos in the\nsame general way, and everywhere work metamorphoses having the same\nessential traits, a much more decided indebtedness may reasonably be\nsupposed.\n\nSo far as I know it, however, the Positive Philosophy contains none of\nthe special ideas above enumerated, nor any of the more general ideas\nthey involve.\n\n\nAPPENDIX B.\n\nOn pp. 119 and 120, I have pointed out that the followers of M. Comte,\nswayed by the spirit of discipleship, habitually ascribe to him a great\ndeal which was the common inheritance of the scientific world before\nhe wrote, and to which he himself laid no claim. Kindred remarks have\nsince been made by others, both in England and in France\u2014the one by Mr.\nMill, and the other by M. Fouill\u00e9e. Mr. Mill says:\u2015\n\n \u201cThe foundation of M. Comte\u2019s philosophy is thus in no way peculiar\n to him, but the general property of the age, however far as yet from\n being universally accepted even by thoughtful minds. The philosophy\n called Positive is not a recent invention of M. Comte, but a simple\n adherence to the traditions of all the great scientific minds whose\n discoveries have made the human race what it is. M. Comte has never\n presented it in any other light. But he has made the doctrine his own\n by his manner of treating it.\u201d\u2014_Auguste Comte and Positivism_, pp. 8,\n 9.\n\nIn his _Histoire de la Philosophie_, 1875, M. Alfred Fouill\u00e9e writes:\u2015\n\n \u201cSaint-Simon voulut successivement organiser la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 \u00e0 l\u2019aide de\n la science (pr\u00e9tention d\u2019o\u00f9 sortit le positivisme) puis \u00e0 l\u2019aide de\n l\u2019industrie, et enfin \u00e0 l\u2019aide d\u2019une religion nouvelle, capable de\n \u2018forcer chacun de ses membres \u00e0 suivre le pr\u00e9cepte de l\u2019amour du\n prochain.\u2019\u201d\u2014p. 428.\n\n \u201cLes doctrines sociales de Saint-Simon, jointes au naturalisme\n de Cabanis et de Broussais, donn\u00e8rent naissance au \u2018positivisme\u2019\n d\u2019Auguste Comte. {144} Ce dernier, comme Saint-Simon, voit dans la\n science sociale ou \u2018sociologie\u2019 le terme et le but de toutes les\n recherches scientifiques.\u201d\u2014p. 422.\n\n \u201cA cette m\u00e9thode Auguste Comte ajouta des vues historiques, qu\u2019il\n croyait enti\u00e8rement originales, sur les trois \u00e9tats par o\u00f9 passe\n n\u00e9cessairement selon lui la connaissance humaine: \u00e9tat th\u00e9ologique,\n \u00e9tat m\u00e9taphysique, et \u00e9tat scientifique. Le germe de cette th\u00e9orie\n \u00e9tait d\u00e9j\u00e0 dans Turgot.\u201d\u2014p. 424.\n\n \u201cEn somme, Auguste Comte a eu le m\u00e9rite d\u2019insister sur les m\u00e9thodes\n qui conviennent aux sciences de la nature; mais il faut avouer que ces\n m\u00e9thodes \u00e9taient connues bien avant lui.\u201d\u2014p. 425.\n\n\nENDNOTES TO _REASONS FOR DISSENTING FROM THE PHILOSOPHY OF M. COMTE_.\n\n[14] A clear illustration of this process, is furnished by the\nrecent mental integration of Heat, Light, Electricity, etc., as\nmodes of molecular motion. If we go a step back, we see that the\nmodern conception of Electricity, resulted from the integration in\nconsciousness, of the two forms of it involved in the galvanic battery\nand in the electric-machine. And going back to a still earlier stage,\nwe see how the conception of statical electricity, arose by the\ncoalescence in thought, of the previously-separate forces manifested\nin rubbed amber, in rubbed glass, and in lightning. With such\nillustrations before him, no one can, I think, doubt that the process\nhas been the same from the beginning.\n\n[15] Possibly it will be said that M. Comte himself admits that what\nhe calls the perfection of the positive system, will probably never be\nreached; and that what he condemns is the inquiry into the _natures_ of\ncauses and not the general recognition of cause. To the first of these\nallegations I reply that, as I understand M. Comte, the obstacle to the\nperfect realization of the positive philosophy is the impossibility\nof carrying generalization so far as to reduce all particular facts\nto cases of one general fact\u2014not the impossibility of excluding the\nconsciousness of cause. And to the second allegation I reply that the\nessential principle of his philosophy is an avowed ignoring of cause\naltogether. For if it is not, _what becomes of his alleged distinction\nbetween the perfection of the positive system and the perfection of\nthe metaphysical system_? And here let me point out that, by affirming\nexactly the opposite to that which M. Comte thus affirms, I am excluded\nfrom the positive school. If his own definition of positivism is to\nbe taken, then, as I hold that what he defines as positivism is an\nabsolute impossibility, it is clear that I cannot be what he calls a\npositivist.\n\n[16] A friendly critic alleges that M. Comte is not fairly represented\nby this quotation, and that he is blamed by his biographer, M. Littr\u00e9,\nfor his too-great insistance on feeling as a motor of humanity. If in\nhis \u201cPositive Politics,\u201d which I presume is here referred to, M. Comte\nabandons his original position, so much the better. But I am here\ndealing with what is known as \u201cthe Positive Philosophy;\u201d and that the\npassage above quoted does not misrepresent it, is proved by the fact\nthat this doctrine is re-asserted at the commencement of the Sociology.\n\n[17] In 1885, during a controversy with one of M. Comte\u2019s English\ndisciples, I was blamed for speaking \u201cof Comte as making six sciences,\u201d\nand was told that \u201cin all Comte\u2019s works, except the first, he makes\nseven sciences.\u201d As I was dealing with The Positive Philosophy, I\nthought I could not do better than give the foregoing extract from the\n_Cours de Philosophie Positive_; and it did not occur to me that I was\ncalled upon to see whether, in any of his later voluminous works, M.\nComte had made a different statement. My opponent, however, enlarged\non this \u201cblunder,\u201d as he politely called it: apparently oblivious of\nthe fact that if it was a blunder on my part to speak of Comte as\nrecognizing six sciences when in his later days he recognized seven, it\nwas a much more serious blunder on the part of Comte himself to have\nlong overlooked the seventh.\n\n[18] M. Comte\u2019s \u201cExposition\u201d I read in the original in 1852; and in two\nor three other places have referred to the original to get his exact\nwords. The Inorganic Physics, and the first chapter of the Biology, I\nread in Miss Martineau\u2019s condensed translation, when it appeared. The\nrest of M. Comte\u2019s views I know only through Mr. Lewes\u2019s outline, and\nthrough incidental references.\n\n[19] In his work, _Auguste Comte et la Philosophie Positive_ (1863),\nM. Littr\u00e9 defending the Comtean classification of the sciences from\nthe criticism I made upon it in the \u201cGenesis of Science,\u201d deals with\nme wholly as an antagonist. The chapter he devotes to his reply, opens\nby placing me in direct opposition to the English adherents of Comte,\nnamed in the preceding chapter.\n\n[20] I believed at the time, and have never doubted until now, that the\nchoice of this title was absolutely independent of its previous use by\nM. Comte. While writing these pages, I have found reason to think the\ncontrary. On referring to _Social Statics_, to see what were my views\nof social evolution in 1850, when M. Comte was to me but a name, I met\nwith the following sentence:\u2014\u201cSocial philosophy may be aptly divided\n(as political economy has been) into statics and dynamics\u201d (ch. xxx. \u00a7\n1). This I remembered to be a reference to a division which I had seen\nin the Political Economy of Mr. Mill. But why had I not mentioned Mr.\nMill\u2019s name? On referring to the first edition of his work, I found,\nat the opening of Book iv., this sentence:\u2014\u201cThe three preceding parts\ninclude as detailed a view as the limits of this treatise permit, of\nwhat, by a happy generalization of a mathematical phrase, has been\ncalled the Statics of the subject.\u201d Here was the solution of the\nquestion. The division had not been made by Mr. Mill, but by some\nwriter (on Political Economy I supposed) who was not named by him; and\nwhom I did not know. It is now manifest, however, that while I supposed\nI was giving a more extended use to this division, I was but returning\nto the original use which Mr. Mill had limited to his special topic.\nAnother thing is, I think, tolerably manifest. As I evidently wished\nto point out my obligation to some unknown political economist, whose\ndivision I thought I was extending, I should have named him had I known\nwho he was. And in that case should not have put this extension of the\ndivision as though it were new.\n\n[21] Let me add that the conception developed in _Social Statics_,\ndates back to a series of letters on the \u201cProper Sphere of Government,\u201d\npublished in the _Nonconformist_ newspaper in the latter half of\n1842, and republished as a pamphlet in 1843. In these letters will\nbe found, along with many crude ideas, the same belief in the\nconformity of social phenomena to unvariable laws; the same belief\nin human progression as determined by such laws; the same belief in\nthe moral modification of men as caused by social discipline; the\nsame belief in the tendency of social arrangements \u201cof themselves to\nassume a condition of _stable_ equilibrium;\u201d the same repudiation\nof state-control over various departments of social life; the\nsame limitation of state-action to the maintenance of equitable\nrelations among citizens. The writing of _Social Statics_ arose from\na dissatisfaction with the basis on which the doctrines set forth\nin those letters were placed: the second half of that work is an\nelaboration of these doctrines; and the first half a statement of the\nprinciples from which they are deducible.\n\n[22] Published many years since in America, this statement was\nrepublished in England eight years since. See _Athen\u00e6um_ for July 22nd,\n1882.\n\n\n\n\n{145}\n\nON LAWS IN GENERAL, AND THE ORDER OF THEIR DISCOVERY.\n\n\n[_The following was contained in the first edition of_ First\nPrinciples. _I omitted it from the re-organized second edition,\nbecause it did not form an essential part of the new structure. As it\nis referred to in the foregoing pages, and as its general argument is\ngermane to the contents of those pages, I have thought well to insert\nit here. Moreover, though I hope eventually to incorporate it in that\ndivision of the_ Principles of Sociology _which treats of Intellectual\nProgress, yet as it must be long before it can thus re-appear in its\npermanent place, and as, should I not get so far in the execution of\nmy undertaking, it may never thus re-appear at all, it seems proper\nto make it more accessible than it is at present. The first and last\nsections, which served to link it into the argument of the work to\nwhich it originally belonged, are omitted. The rest has been carefully\nrevised, and in some parts considerably altered._]\n\nThe recognition of Law being the recognition of uniformity of relations\namong phenomena, it follows that the order in which different groups\nof phenomena are reduced to law, must depend on the frequency with\nwhich the uniform relations they severally display are distinctly\nexperienced. At any given stage of progress, those {146} uniformities\nwill be best known with which men\u2019s minds have been oftenest and\nmost strongly impressed. In proportion partly to the number of times\na relation has been presented to consciousness (not merely to the\nsenses), and in proportion partly to the vividness with which the terms\nof the relation have been cognized, will be the degree in which the\nconstancy of connexion is perceived.\n\nThe succession in which relations are generalized being thus\ndetermined, there result certain derivative principles to which this\nsuccession must more immediately and obviously conform.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The first\nis _the directness with which personal welfare is affected_. While,\namong surrounding things, many do not appreciably influence us in any\nway, some produce pleasures and some pains, in various degrees; and\nmanifestly, those things of which the actions on the organism for\ngood or evil are most decided, will, _c\u00e6teris paribus_, be those of\nwhich the laws of action are earliest observed.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Second comes _the\nconspicuousness of one or both phenomena between which a relation is\nto be perceived_. On every side are phenomena so concealed as to be\ndetected only by close observation; others not obtrusive enough to\nattract notice; others which moderately solicit the attention; others\nso imposing or vivid as to force themselves on consciousness; and,\nsupposing conditions to be the same, these last will of course be\namong the first to have their relations generalized.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0In the third\nplace, we have _the absolute frequency with which the relations occur_.\nThere are coexistences and sequences of all degrees of commonness,\nfrom those which are ever present to those which are extremely rare;\nand manifestly, the rare coexistences and sequences, as well as the\nsequences which are very long in taking place, will not be reduced to\nlaw so soon as those which are familiar and rapid.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Fourthly has\nto be added _the relative frequency of occurrence_. Many events and\nappearances are limited to certain times or certain places, or both;\n{147} and, as a relation which does not exist within the environment\nof an observer cannot be perceived by him, however common it may be\nelsewhere or in another age, we have to take account of the surrounding\nphysical circumstances, as well as of the state of society, of the\narts, and of the sciences\u2014all of which affect the frequency with which\ncertain groups of facts are observable.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The fifth corollary to be\nnoticed is, that the succession in which different classes of relations\nare reduced to law, depends in part on their _simplicity_. Phenomena\npresenting great composition of causes or conditions, have their\nessential relations so masked, that it requires accumulated experiences\nto impress upon consciousness the true connexions of antecedents and\nconsequents they involve. Hence, other things equal, the progress of\ngeneralization will be from the simple to the complex; and this it is\nwhich M. Comte has wrongly asserted to be the sole regulative principle\nof the progress.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Sixth comes _the degree of concreteness, or absence\nof abstractness_. Concrete relations are the earliest acquisitions.\nSuch analyses of them as separate the essential connexions from their\ndisguising accompaniments, necessarily come later. The analyses of the\nconnexions, always more or less compound, into their elements then\nbecomes possible. And so on continually, until the highest and most\nabstract truths have been reached.\n\nThese, then, are the several derivative principles. The frequency\nand vividness with which uniform relations are repeated in conscious\nexperience, determining the recognition of their uniformity, and this\nfrequency and vividness depending on the above conditions, it follows\nthat the order in which different classes of facts are generalized,\nmust depend on the extent to which the above conditions are fulfilled\nin each class. Let us mark how the facts harmonize with this\nconclusion: taking first a few that elucidate the general truth, and\nafterwards some that {148} exemplify the special truths which we here\nsee follow from it.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe relations earliest known as uniformities, are those subsisting\namong the common properties of matter\u2014tangibility, visibility,\ncohesion, weight, etc. We have no trace of a time when the resistance\noffered by an object was regarded as caused by the will of the object;\nor when the pressure of a body on the hand holding it, was ascribed to\nthe agency of a living being. And accordingly, these are the relations\nof which we are oftenest conscious: being, as they are, objectively\nfrequent, conspicuous, simple, concrete, and of immediate personal\nconcern.\n\nSimilarly with the ordinary phenomena of motion. The fall of a mass on\nthe withdrawal of its support, is a sequence which directly affects\nbodily welfare, is conspicuous, simple, concrete, and very often\nrepeated. Hence it is one of the uniformities recognized before the\ndawn of tradition. We know of no era when ordinary movements due to\nterrestrial gravitation were attributed to volition. Only when the\nrelation is obscured, as where the withdrawal of a support is not\nobvious, or, as in the case of an a\u00ebrolite, where the antecedent of\nthe descent is unperceived, do we find the conception of personal\nagency.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0On the other hand, motions of intrinsically the same order\nas that of a falling stone\u2014those of the heavenly bodies\u2014long remain\nungeneralized; and until their uniformity is seen, and indeed for a\nlong time after, are construed as results of will. This difference\nis clearly not dependent on comparative complexity or abstractness,\nsince the motion of a planet in an ellipse of slight eccentricity,\nis as simple and concrete a phenomenon as the motion of a projected\narrow in an ellipse of extreme eccentricity indistinguishable from a\nparabola. But the antecedents are not conspicuous; the sequences are\nof long duration; and they are not often repeated. And that these are\nthe causes of their slow {149} reduction to law, we see in the fact\nthat they are severally generalized in the order of their frequency and\nconspicuousness\u2014the moon\u2019s monthly cycle, the sun\u2019s annual change, the\nperiods of the inferior planets, the periods of the superior planets.\n\nWhile astronomical sequences were still ascribed to volition,\ncertain terrestrial sequences of a different kind, but some of them\nequally without complication, were interpreted in like manner. The\nsolidification of water at a low temperature, is a phenomenon that is\nsimple, concrete, and of much personal concern. But it is neither so\nfrequent as those which we see are earliest generalized, nor is the\npresence of the antecedent so manifest. Though in all but tropical\nclimates, mid-winter displays the relation between cold and freezing\nwith tolerable constancy; yet, during the spring and autumn, the\noccasional appearance of ice in the mornings has no very obvious\nconnexion with coldness of the weather. Sensation being so inaccurate a\nmeasure, it is not possible for the savage to experience the definite\nrelation between a temperature of 32\u00b0 and the congealing of water;\nand hence the long continued belief in personal agency. Similarly,\nbut still more clearly, with the winds. The absence of regularity and\nthe inconspicuousness of the antecedents, allowed the mythological\nexplanation to survive for a great period.\n\nDuring the era in which the uniformity of many quite simple inorganic\nrelations was still unrecognized, certain organic relations,\nintrinsically very complex and special, were generalized. The\nconstant coexistence of feathers and a beak, of four legs with an\ninternal bony framework, are facts which were, and are, familiar\nto every savage. Did a savage find a bird with teeth, or a mammal\nclothed with feathers, he would be as much surprised as an instructed\nnaturalist. Now these uniformities of organic structure thus early\nperceived, are of exactly the same kind as those more numerous ones\nlater established by biology. The constant {150} coexistence of\nmammary glands with two occipital condyles to the skull, of vertebr\u00e6\nwith teeth lodged in sockets, of frontal horns with the habit of\nrumination, are generalizations as purely empirical as those known to\nthe aboriginal hunter. The botanist cannot in the least understand\nthe complex relation between papilionaceous flowers and seeds borne\nin flattened pods: he knows these and like connexions simply in the\nsame way that the barbarian knows the connexions between particular\nleaves and particular kinds of wood. But the fact that sundry of the\nuniform relations which chiefly make up the organic sciences, were\nvery early recognized, is due to the high degrees of vividness and\nfrequency with which they were presented to consciousness. Though the\nconnexion between the sounds characteristic of a certain bird, and the\npossession of edible flesh, is extremely involved, yet the two terms\nof the relation are conspicuous, often recur in experience, and a\nknowledge of their connexion has a direct bearing on personal welfare.\nMeanwhile innumerable relations of the same order, which are displayed\nwith even greater frequency by surrounding plants and animals, remain\nfor thousands of years unrecognized, if they are unobtrusive or of no\napparent moment.\n\nWhen, passing from this primitive stage to a more advanced stage, we\ntrace the discovery of those less familiar uniformities which mainly\nconstitute what is distinguished as Science, we find the succession\nin which knowledge of them is reached, to be still determined in the\nsame manner. This will become obvious on contemplating separately the\ninfluence of each derivative condition.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nHow relations that have immediate bearings on the maintenance of life,\nare, other things equal, fixed in the mind before those which have no\nimmediate bearings, the history of Science abundantly illustrates. The\nhabits of existing uncivilized races, who fix times by moons and barter\nso many of one article for so many of another, show {151} us that\nconceptions of equality and number, which are the germs of mathematical\nscience, were developed under the immediate pressure of personal\nwants; and it can scarcely be doubted that those laws of numerical\nrelations which are embodied in the rules of arithmetic, were first\nbrought to light through the practice of mercantile exchange. Similarly\nwith geometry. The derivation of the word shows us that it originally\nincluded only certain methods of partitioning ground and laying out\nbuildings. The properties of the scales and the lever, involving the\nfirst principle in mechanics, were early generalized under the stimulus\nof commercial and architectural needs. To fix the times of religious\nfestivals and agricultural operations, were the motives which led\nto the establishment of the simpler astronomic periods. Such small\nknowledge of chemical relations as was involved in ancient metallurgy,\nwas manifestly obtained in seeking how to improve tools and weapons.\nIn the alchemy of later times, we see how greatly an intense hope of\nprivate benefit contributed to the disclosure of a certain class of\nuniformities. Nor is our own age barren of illustrations. \u201cHere,\u201d says\nHumboldt, when in Guiana, \u201cas in many parts in Europe, the sciences\nare thought worthy to occupy the mind, only so far as they confer some\nimmediate and practical benefit on society.\u201d \u201cHow is it possible to\nbelieve,\u201d said a missionary to him, \u201cthat you have left your country\nto come to be devoured by mosquitoes on this river, and to measure\nlands that are not your own?\u201d Our coasts furnish like instances.\nEvery sea-side naturalist knows how great is the contempt with which\nfishermen regard the collection of objects for the microscope or\naquarium. Their incredulity as to the possible value of such things is\nso great, that they can scarcely be induced even by bribes to preserve\nthe refuse of their nets. Nay, we need not go for evidence beyond daily\ntable-talk. The demand for \u201cpractical science\u201d\u2014for a knowledge that\ncan be brought to bear on the business of {152} life\u2014joined to the\nridicule commonly vented on scientific pursuits having no obvious uses,\nsuffice to show that the order in which laws are discovered greatly\ndepends on the directness with which knowledge of them affects our\nwelfare.\n\nThat, when all other conditions are the same, obtrusive relations\nwill be generalized before unobtrusive ones, is so nearly a truism\nthat examples appear almost superfluous. If it be admitted that by\nthe aboriginal man, as by the child, the co-existent properties of\nlarge surrounding objects are noticed before those of minute objects,\nand that the external relations which bodies present are generalized\nbefore their internal relations, it must be admitted that in subsequent\nstages of progress, the comparative conspicuousness of relations\nhas greatly affected the order in which they were recognized as\nuniform. Hence it happened that after the establishment of those very\nmanifest sequences constituting a lunation, and those less manifest\nones marking a year, and those still less manifest ones marking the\nplanetary periods, astronomy occupied itself with such inconspicuous\nsequences as those displayed in the repeating cycle of lunar eclipses,\nand those which suggested the theory of epicycles and eccentrics;\nwhile modern astronomy deals with still more inconspicuous sequences,\nsome of which, as the planetary rotations, are nevertheless the\nsimplest which the heavens present. In physics, the early use of\ncanoes implied an empirical knowledge of certain hydrostatic relations\nthat are intrinsically more complex than sundry static relations\nnot empirically known; but these hydrostatic relations were thrust\nupon observation. Or, if we compare the solution of the problem of\nspecific gravity by Archimedes with the discovery of atmospheric\npressure by Torricelli (the two involving mechanical relations of\nthe same class), we perceive that the much earlier occurrence of the\nfirst than the last was determined, neither by a difference in their\nbearings on personal welfare, nor by a difference in the frequency\nwith {153} which illustrations of them came under observation, nor\nby relative simplicity; but by the greater obtrusiveness of the\nconnexion between antecedent and consequent in the one case than in\nthe other. Among miscellaneous illustrations, it may be pointed out\nthat the connexions between lightning and thunder, and between rain and\nclouds, were recognized long before others of the same order, simply\nbecause they thrust themselves on the attention. Or the long-delayed\ndiscovery of the microscopic forms of life, with all the phenomena\nthey present, may be named as very clearly showing how certain groups\nof relations not ordinarily perceptible, though in other respects\nlike long-familiar relations, have to wait until changed conditions\nrender them perceptible. But, without further details, it needs only to\nconsider the inquiries which now occupy the electrician, the chemist,\nthe physiologist, to see that science has advanced, and is advancing,\nfrom the more conspicuous phenomena to the less conspicuous ones.\n\nHow the degree of absolute frequency of a relation affects the\nrecognition of its uniformity, we see in contrasting certain biological\nfacts. The connexion between death and bodily injury, constantly\ndisplayed not only in men but in all inferior creatures, came to be\nrecognized as an instance of natural causation while yet deaths from\ndiseases or from some of them continued to be thought supernatural.\nAmong diseases themselves, it is observable that unusual ones were\nregarded as of demoniacal origin during ages when the more frequent\nwere ascribed to ordinary causes: a truth paralleled among our own\npeasantry, who by the use of charms show a lingering superstition with\nrespect to rare disorders, which they do not show with respect to\ncommon ones, such as colds. Passing to physical illustrations, we may\nnote that within the historic period whirlpools were accounted for by\nthe agency of water-spirits; but we do not find that within the same\nperiod the disappearance of water on exposure either to the sun or to\nartificial heat was {154} interpreted in an analogous way: though a\nmore marvellous occurrence, and a more complex one, its great frequency\nled to the early recognition of it as a natural uniformity. Rainbows\nand comets do not differ much in conspicuousness, and a rainbow is\nintrinsically the more involved phenomenon; but chiefly because of\ntheir far greater commonness, rainbows were perceived to have a direct\ndependence on sun and rain while yet comets were regarded as signs of\ndivine wrath.\n\nThat races living inland must long have remained ignorant of the daily\nand monthly sequences of the tides, and that tropical races could\nnot early have comprehended the phenomena of northern winters, are\nextreme illustrations of the influence which relative frequency has\non the recognition of uniformities. Animals which, where they are\nindigenous, call forth no surprise by their structures or habits,\nbecause these are so familiar, when taken to countries where they\nhave never been seen, are looked at with an astonishment approaching\nto awe\u2014are even thought supernatural: a fact which will suggest\nnumerous others that show how the localization of phenomena shares\nin controlling the order in which they are reduced to law. Not only\nhowever does their localization in space affect the progression,\nbut also their localization in time. Facts which are rarely if ever\nmanifested in one era, are rendered very frequent in another, simply\nthrough the changes wrought by civilization. The lever, of which\nthe properties are illustrated in the use of sticks and weapons, is\nvaguely understood by every savage\u2014on applying it in a certain way he\nrightly anticipates certain effects; but the wheel-and-axle, pulley,\nand screw, cannot have their powers either empirically or rationally\nknown till the advance of the arts has more or less familiarized them.\nThrough those various means of exploration which we have inherited\nand added to, we have become acquainted with a vast range of chemical\nrelations that were relatively {155} non-existent to the primitive\nman. To highly-developed industries we owe both the substances and\nthe appliances that have disclosed to us countless uniformities which\nour ancestors had no opportunity of seeing. These and like instances,\nshow that the accumulated materials, and processes, and products,\nwhich characterize the environments of complex societies, greatly\nincrease the accessibility of various classes of relations; and by\nthus multiplying the experiences of them, or making them relatively\nfrequent, facilitate the generalization of them. Moreover, various\nclasses of phenomena presented by society itself, as for instance\nthose which political economy formulates, become relatively frequent,\nand therefore recognizable, in advanced social states; while in less\nadvanced ones they are either too rarely displayed to have their\nrelations perceived, or, as in the least advanced ones, are not\ndisplayed at all.\n\nThat, where no other circumstances interfere, the order in which\ndifferent uniformities are established varies as their complexity, is\nmanifest. The geometry of straight lines was understood before the\ngeometry of curved lines; the properties of the circle before the\nproperties of the ellipse, parabola, and hyperbola; and the equations\nof curves of single curvature were ascertained before those of curves\nof double curvature. Plane trigonometry comes in order of time and\nsimplicity before spherical trigonometry; and the mensuration of\nplane surfaces and solids before the mensuration of curved surfaces\nand solids. Similarly with mechanics: the laws of simple motion were\ngeneralized before those of compound motion; and those of rectilinear\nmotion before those of curvilinear motion. The properties of\nequal-armed levers or scales, were understood before those of levers\nwith unequal arms; and the law of the inclined plane was formulated\nearlier than that of the screw, which involves it. In chemistry the\nprogress has been from the simple inorganic compounds to the more\ninvolved or organic compounds. And where, as in the higher sciences,\nthe conditions of the exploration are {156} more complicated, we still\nmay trace relative complexity as determining the order of discovery\nwhere other things are equal.\n\nThe progression from concrete relations to abstract relations, and from\nthe less abstract to the more abstract, is equally obvious. Numeration,\nwhich in its primary form concerned itself only with groups of actual\nobjects, came earlier than simple arithmetic; the rules of which deal\nwith numbers apart from objects. Arithmetic, limited in its sphere\nto concrete numerical relations, is alike earlier and less abstract\nthan Algebra, which deals with the relations of these relations. And\nin like manner, the Calculus of Operations comes after Algebra, both\nin order of evolution and in order of abstractness. In Mechanics, the\nmore concrete relations of forces exhibited in the lever, inclined\nplane, etc., were understood before the more abstract relations\nexpressed in the laws of resolution and composition of forces; and\nlater than the three abstract laws of motion as formulated by Newton\ncame the still more abstract law of inertia. Similarly with Physics and\nChemistry, there has been an advance from truths entangled in all the\nspecialities of particular facts and particular classes of facts, to\ntruths disentangled from the disguising incidents under which they are\nmanifested\u2014to truths of a higher abstractness.\n\nBrief and rude as is this sketch of a mental development which has been\nlong and complicated, I venture to think it shows inductively what\nwas deductively inferred, that the order in which separate groups of\nuniformities are recognized, depends not on one circumstance but on\nseveral circumstances. The various classes of relations are generalized\nin a certain succession, not solely because of one particular kind\nof difference in their natures; but also because they are variously\nplaced in time and in space, variously open to observation, and\nvariously related to our own constitutions: our perception of them\nbeing influenced by all these conditions in endless combinations. The\ncomparative degrees {157} of importance, of obtrusiveness, of absolute\nfrequency, of relative frequency, of simplicity, of concreteness, are\nevery one of them factors; and from their unions in proportions that\nare never twice alike, there results a highly complex process of mental\nevolution. But while it is thus manifest that the proximate causes of\nthe succession in which relations are reduced to law, are numerous and\ninvolved; it is also manifest that there is one ultimate cause to which\nthese proximate causes are subordinate. As the several circumstances\nthat determine the early or late recognition of uniformities are\ncircumstances that determine the number and strength of the impressions\nwhich these uniformities make on the mind, it follows that the\nprogression conforms to a certain fundamental principle of psychology.\nWe see _a posteriori_, what we concluded _\u00e0 priori_, that the order\nin which relations are generalized, depends on the frequency and\nimpressiveness with which they are repeated in conscious experience.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nHaving roughly analyzed the progress of the past, let us take advantage\nof the light thus thrown on the present, and consider what is implied\nrespecting the future.\n\nNote, first, that the likelihood of the universality of Law has\nbeen ever growing greater. Out of the countless coexistences and\nsequences with which mankind are environed, they have been continually\ntransferring some from the group whose order was supposed to be\narbitrary, to the group whose order is known to be uniform. And\nmanifestly, as fast as the relations which are unreduced to law become\nfewer, the probability that among them there are some which do not\nconform to law, becomes less. To put the argument numerically\u2014It is\nclear that when out of surrounding phenomena a hundred of several kinds\nhave been found to occur in constant connexions, there arises a slight\npresumption that all phenomena occur in constant connexions. When\nuniformity has been established in a thousand cases, more varied {158}\nin their kinds, the presumption gains strength. And when the known\ncases of uniformity amount to millions, including many of each variety,\nit becomes an ordinary induction that uniformity exists everywhere.\n\nSilently and insensibly their experiences have been pressing men on\ntowards the conclusion thus drawn. Not out of a conscious regard\nfor these reasons, but from a habit of thought which these reasons\nformulate and justify, all minds have been advancing towards a belief\nin the constancy of surrounding coexistences and sequences. Familiarity\nwith concrete uniformities has generated the abstract conception of\nuniformity\u2014the idea of _Law_; and this idea has been in successive\ngenerations slowly gaining fixity and clearness. Especially has it\nbeen thus among those whose knowledge of natural phenomena is the\nmost extensive\u2014men of science. The mathematician, the physicist,\nthe astronomer, the chemist, severally acquainted with the vast\naccumulations of uniformities established by their predecessors, and\nthemselves daily adding new ones as well as verifying the old, acquire\na far stronger faith in law than is ordinarily possessed. With them\nthis faith, ceasing to be merely passive, becomes an active stimulus\nto inquiry. Wherever there exist phenomena of which the dependence\nis not yet ascertained, these most cultivated intellects, impelled\nby the conviction that here too there is some invariable connexion,\nproceed to observe, compare, and experiment; and when they discover\nthe law to which the phenomena conform, as they eventually do, their\ngeneral belief in the universality of law is further strengthened. So\noverwhelming is the evidence, and such the effect of this discipline,\nthat to the advanced student of Nature, the proposition that there\nare lawless phenomena has become not only incredible but almost\ninconceivable.\n\nThis habitual recognition of law which already distinguishes modern\nthought from ancient thought, must spread among men at large. The\nfulfilment of fresh predictions that are made possible by every new\nstep, and the further {159} command gained over Nature\u2019s forces, prove\nto the uninitiated the validity of scientific generalizations and the\ndoctrine they illustrate. Widening education is daily diffusing among\nthe mass of men that knowledge of these generalizations which has been\nhitherto confined to the few. And as fast as this diffusion goes on,\nthe belief of the scientific must become the belief of the world at\nlarge.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThat law is universal, will become an irresistible conclusion when\nit is perceived that _the progress in the discovery of laws itself\nconforms to law_; and when this perception makes it clear why certain\ngroups of phenomena have been reduced to law, while other groups are\nstill unreduced. When it is seen that the order in which uniformities\nare recognized, must depend on the frequency and vividness with\nwhich they are repeated in conscious experience; when it is seen\nthat, as a matter of fact, the most common, important, conspicuous,\nconcrete, and simple, uniformities were the earliest recognized,\nbecause they were experienced oftenest and most distinctly; it will\nby implication be seen that long after the great mass of phenomena\nhave been generalized, there must remain phenomena which, from their\nrareness, or unobtrusiveness, or seeming unimportance, or complexity,\nor abstractness, are still ungeneralized.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Thus will be furnished a\nsolution to a difficulty sometimes raised. When it is asked why the\nuniversality of law is not already fully established, there will be the\nanswer that the directions in which it is not yet established are those\nin which its establishment must necessarily be latest. That state of\nthings which is inferable beforehand, is just the state which we find\nto exist. If such coexistences and sequences as those of Biology and\nSociology are not yet reduced to law, the presumption is, not that they\nare irreducible to law, but that their laws elude our present means\nof exploration. Having long ago proved uniformity throughout all the\nlower classes of relations, and having been step by step proving {160}\nuniformity throughout classes of relations successively higher and\nhigher, if we have not yet succeeded with the highest classes, it may\nbe fairly concluded that our powers are at fault, rather than that the\nuniformity does not exist. And unless we make the absurd assumption\nthat the process of generalization, now going on with unexampled\nrapidity, has reached its limit, and will suddenly cease, we must infer\nthat ultimately mankind will discover a constant order even among the\nmost involved and obscure phenomena.\n\n\n\n\n{161}\n\nTHE VALUATION OF EVIDENCE.\n\n\n[_First published in_ The Leader _for June 25, 1853._]\n\nWith Spirit-rappings and Table-movings still the rage, and with the\nbelief in Spontaneous Combustion still unextinguished, it seems\ndesirable that something should be said in justification of that\ngeneral scepticism with which the philosophical meet the alleged\nwonders that periodically turn the heads of the nation. Nothing less\nthan a bulky octavo would be needed to contain all that might be\nwritten on the matter; and unfortunately such an octavo, when written,\nwould be little read by those most requiring it. A brief hint or two,\nhowever, may find listeners among them.\n\n\u201cI tell you I saw it myself,\u201d is the so-thought conclusive assertion\nwith which many a controversy is abruptly ended. Commonly those who\nmake this assertion think that after it nothing remains to be urged;\nand they are astonished at the unreasonableness of those who still\nwithhold their belief. Though they reject many tales of witchcraft,\nmany ghost stories whose marvels were attested by eye-witnesses\u2014though\nthey have repeatedly seen stage-conjurors seem to do things which they\ndo not believe were really done\u2014though they have heard of the Automaton\nChess-player and the Invisible Girl, and have perhaps seen explanations\nof the modes in which the public were deluded by {162} them\u2014though in\nall these cases they know that the facts were other than the spectators\nsupposed them to be; yet they cannot imagine that their own perceptions\nhave been vitiated by influences like those which vitiated the\nperceptions of others. Or, to put the thing more charitably and perhaps\nmore truly, they forget that such vitiations are constantly occurring.\n\nTo observe correctly, though commonly thought very easy, every man\nof science knows to be difficult. Our faculties are liable to report\nfalsely from two opposite causes\u2014the presence of hypothesis, and the\nabsence of hypothesis. To the dangers arising from one or other of\nthese, every observation we make is exposed; and between the two it is\nhard to see any fact _quite_ truly. A few illustrations of the extreme\ndistortions arising from the one cause, and the extreme inaccuracy\nconsequent on the other, will justify this seeming paradox.\n\nNearly every one is familiar with the myth prevalent on our sea-coasts,\nrespecting the Barnacle Goose. The popular belief was, and indeed is\nstill in some places, that the fruits on branches which hang into the\nsea become changed into shell-covered creatures called barnacles, found\nincrusting these submerged branches; and further, that these barnacles\nare in process of time transformed into the birds known as barnacle\ngeese. This belief was not confined to the vulgar; it was received\namong naturalists. Nor was it with them simply an adopted rumour. It\nwas based on observations which were recorded and approved by the\nhighest scientific authorities, and published with their countenance.\nIn a paper contained in the _Philosophical Transactions_, Sir Robert\nMoray says:\u2014\u201cIn every shell that I opened\u00a0.\u00a0.\u00a0. there appeared nothing\nwanting, as to the external parts, for making up a perfect sea-fowl;\nthe little bill like that of a goose, the eyes marked, the head, neck,\nbreast, wings, tail, and feet formed, the feathers everywhere perfectly\nshaped and blackish coloured, and the feet like those of other {163}\nwaterfowl, to my best remembrance.\u201d Now this myth respecting the\nbarnacle goose has been exploded for some century and a half. To a\nmodern zoologist who examines one of these cirrhipeds, as the barnacles\nare called, it seems scarcely credible that it could ever have been\nthought a chick; and what Sir Robert Moray could have taken for \u201chead,\nneck, breast, wings, tail, feet, and feathers,\u201d he cannot imagine.\nUnder the influence of a pre-conception, here is a man of education\ndescribing as \u201ca perfect sea-fowl\u201d what is now known to be a modified\ncrustacean\u2014a creature belonging to a remote part of the animal kingdom.\n\nA still more remarkable instance of perverted observation exists\nin an old book entitled _Metamorphosis Naturalis_, &c., published\nat Middleburgh in 1662. This work, in which is attempted for the\nfirst time a detailed account of insect-transformations, contains\nnumerous illustrative plates, in which are represented the various\nstages of evolution\u2014larva, pupa, and imago. Those who have any\nknowledge of Entomology will recollect that the chrysalises of all our\ncommon butterflies exhibit at the anterior end a number of pointed\nprojections, producing an irregular outline. Have they ever observed\nin this outline a resemblance to a man\u2019s face? For myself, I can say\nthat though in early days I kept brood after brood of butterfly larv\u00e6\nthrough all their changes, I never perceived any such likeness; nor\ncan I see it now. Nevertheless, in the plates of this _Metamorphosis\nNaturalis_, each chrysalis has its projections so modified as to\nrepresent a burlesque human head\u2014the respective species having\ndifferent profiles given them. Whether the author was a believer\nin metempsychosis, and thought he saw in the chrysalis a disguised\nhumanity; or whether, swayed by the false analogy which Butler makes\nso much of, between the change from chrysalis to butterfly and that\nfrom mortality to immortality, he considered the chrysalis as typical\nof man; does not appear. Here, however, is the fact, that influenced\nby some {164} pre-conception or other, he has made his drawings quite\ndifferent from the actual forms. It is not that he simply thinks this\nresemblance exists\u2014it is not that he merely says he can see it; but his\npreconception so possesses him as to swerve his pencil, and make him\nproduce representations laughably unlike the realities.\n\nThese, which are extreme cases of distorted perceptions, differ only\nin degree from the distorted perceptions of daily life; and so strong\nis the distorting influence that even the man of science cannot escape\nits effects. Every microscopist knows that if they have conflicting\ntheories respecting its nature, two observers shall look through\nthe same instrument at the same object, and give quite different\ndescriptions of its appearance.\n\nFrom the dangers of hypothesis let us now turn to the dangers of no\nhypothesis. Little recognized as is the fact, it is nevertheless\ntrue that we cannot make the commonest observation correctly without\nbeforehand having some notion of what we are to observe. You are asked\nto listen to a faint sound, and you find that without a pre-conception\nof the _kind_ of sound you are to hear, you cannot hear it. Provided\nthat it is not strong, an unusual flavour in your food may pass quite\nunperceived, unless some one draws attention to it, when you taste it\ndistinctly. After knowing him for years, you shall suddenly discover\nthat your friend\u2019s nose is slightly awry, and wonder that you never\nremarked it before. Still more striking becomes this inability when\nthe facts to be observed are complex. Of a hundred people who listen\nto the dying vibrations of a church bell, almost all fail to perceive\nthe harmonics, and assert the sound to be simple. Scarcely any one\nwho has not practised drawing, sees, when in the street, that all\nthe horizontal lines in the walls, windows, shutters, roofs, seem\nto converge to one point in the distance: a fact which, after a few\nlessons in perspective, becomes visible enough.\n\nPerhaps I cannot more clearly illustrate this necessity for {165}\nhypothesis as a condition to accurate perception, than by narrating a\nportion of my own experience relative to the colours of shadows.\n\nIndian ink was the pigment which, during boyhood, I invariably\nused for shading. Ask any one who has received no culture in art,\nor who has given no thought to it, of what colour a shadow is, and\nthe unhesitating reply will be\u2014black. This is uniformly the creed\nof the uninitiated; and in this creed I undoubtingly remained till\nabout eighteen. Happening, at that age, to come much in contact with\nan amateur artist, I was told, to my great surprise, that shadows\nare not black but of a neutral tint. This, to me, novel doctrine, I\nstrenuously resisted. I have a pretty distinct recollection of denying\nit point blank, and quoting all my experience in support of the denial.\nI remember, too, that the controversy lasted over a considerable\nperiod; and that it was only after my friend had repeatedly drawn my\nattention to instances in Nature, that I finally gave in. Though I must\npreviously have seen myriads of shadows, yet in consequence of the fact\nthat very generally the tint approaches to black, I had been unable,\nin the absence of hypothesis, to perceive that in many cases it is\ndistinctly not black.\n\nI continued to hold this amended doctrine for some years. It is true\nthat from time to time I observed that the tone of the neutral tint\nvaried considerably in different shadows; but still the divergencies\nwere not such as to shake my faith in the dogma. By-and-bye, however,\nin a popular work on Optics, I met with the statement that the colour\nof a shadow is always the complement of the colour of the light casting\nit. Not seeing the wherefore of this alleged law, which seemed moreover\nto conflict with my established belief, I was led to study the matter\nas a question of causation. _Why_ are shadows coloured? and what\ndetermines the colour? were the queries that suggested themselves. In\nseeking answers, it soon became manifest {166} that as a space in\nshadow is a space from which the _direct_ light alone is excluded, and\ninto which the _indirect_ light (namely, that reflected by surrounding\nobjects, by the clouds and by the sky) continues to fall, the colour\nof a shadow must partake of the colour of everything that can either\nradiate or reflect light into it. Hence, the colour of a shadow must\nbe _the average colour of the diffused light;_ and must vary, as that\nvaries, with the colours of all surrounding things. Thus was at once\nexplained the inconstancy I had already noticed; and I presently\nrecognized in Nature that which the theory implies\u2014namely, that a\nshadow may have any colour whatever, according to circumstances. Under\na clear sky, and with no trees, hedges, houses, or other objects at\nhand, shadows are of a pure blue. During a red sunset, mixture of the\nyellow light from the upper part of the western sky with the blue light\nfrom the eastern sky, produces green shadows. Go near to a gas-lamp on\na moonlight night, and a pencil-case placed at right angles to a piece\nof paper will be found to cast a purple-blue shadow and a yellow-grey\nshadow, produced by the gas and the moon respectively. And there are\nconditions it would take too long here to describe, under which two\nparts of the same shadow are differently coloured. All which facts\nbecame obvious to me as soon as I knew that they must exist.\n\nHere, then, respecting certain simple phenomena that are hourly\nvisible, are three successive convictions; each of them based on years\nof observation; each of them held with unhesitating confidence; and\nyet only one\u2014as I now believe\u2014true. But for the help of an hypothesis,\nI should probably have remained in the common belief that shadows are\nblack. And but for the help of another hypothesis, I should probably\nhave remained in the half-true belief that they are neutral tint.\n\nIs it not clear, therefore, that to observe correctly is by no means\neasy? On the one hand, a pre-conception, makes {167} us liable to\nsee things not quite as they are, but as we think them. On the other\nhand, in the absence of a pre-conception, we are liable to pass over\nmuch that we ought to see. Yet we must have either a pre-conception\nor no pre-conception. Evidently, then, all our observations, save\nthose guided by true theories already reached, are in danger of either\ndistortion or incompleteness.\n\nIt remains but to remark, that if our observations are imperfect in\ncases like the foregoing, where the things seen are persistent, and\nmay be again and again looked at or continuously contemplated; how\nmuch more imperfect must they be where the things seen are complex\nprocesses, changes, or actions, each presenting successive phases,\nwhich, if not truly observed at the moments they severally occur,\ncan never be truly observed at all! Here the chances of error become\nimmensely multiplied. And when, in addition, there exists some moral\nexcitement,\u2014when, as in these Spirit-rapping and Table-turning\nexperiments, the intellect is partially paralysed by fear or wonder\ncorrect observation becomes next to an impossibility.\n\n\n\n\n{168}\n\nWHAT IS ELECTRICITY?\n\n\n[_First published in_ The Reader _for November 19, 1864._]\n\nProbably few, if any, competent physicists have, of late years, used\nthe term \u201celectric fluid\u201d in any other than a conventional sense.\nWhen distinguishing electricity into the two kinds, \u201cpositive\u201d and\n\u201cnegative,\u201d or \u201cvitreous\u201d and \u201cresinous,\u201d they have used the ideas\nsuggested by these names merely as convenient symbols, and not as\nrepresentatives of different entities. And, now that heat and light are\nproved to be modes of motion, it has become obvious that all the allied\nmanifestations of force must be modes of motion.\n\nWhat is the particular mode of motion which constitutes electricity,\nthus becomes the question. That it is some kind of molecular vibration,\ndifferent from the molecular vibrations which luminous bodies give off,\nis, I presume, taken for granted by all who bring to the consideration\nof the matter a knowledge of recent discoveries. Beyond those simple\noscillations of molecules from which light and heat result, may we not\nsuspect that there will, in some cases, arise compound oscillations?\nLet us consider whether the conditions under which electricity arises\nare not such as to generate compound oscillations; and whether the\nphenomena of electricity are not such as must result from compound\noscillations.\n\nThe universal antecedent to the production of electricity {169} is the\nimmediate or mediate contact of heterogeneous substances\u2014substances\nthat are heterogeneous either in their molecular constitutions, or in\ntheir molecular states. If, then, electricity is some mode of molecular\nmotion, and if, whenever it is produced, the contact of substances\nhaving unlike molecules or molecules in unlike states, is the\nantecedent, there seems thrust upon us the conclusion that electricity\nresults from some mutual action of molecules whose motions are unlike.\n\nWhat must be that mutual action of molecules having unlike motions,\nwhich, as we see, is the universal antecedent of electrical\ndisturbance? The answer to this question does not seem difficult to\nreach, if we take the simplest case\u2014the case of contact-electricity.\nWhen two pieces of metal of the same kind, and at the same temperature,\nare applied to one another, there is no electrical excitation; but, if\nthe metals applied to one another be of different kinds, there is a\ngenesis of electricity. This, which has been regarded as an anomalous\nfact\u2014a fact so anomalous that it has been much disputed because\napparently at variance with every hypothesis\u2014is a fact to which an\ninterpretation is at once supplied by the hypothesis that electricity\nresults from the mutual disturbances of unlike molecular motions.\nFor if, on the one hand, we have homogeneous metals in contact,\ntheir respective molecules, oscillating synchronously, will give and\ntake any forces which they impress on one another without producing\noscillations of new orders. But if, on the other hand, the molecules\nof the one mass have periods of oscillation different from those of\nthe other mass, their mutual impacts will not agree with the period\nof oscillation of either, but will generate a new rhythm, differing\nfrom, and much slower than, that of either. The production of what\nare called \u201cbeats\u201d in acoustics, will best illustrate this. It is a\nfamiliar fact that two strings vibrating at different rates, from\ntime to time concur in sending off a\u00ebrial waves in the {170} same\ndirection at the same instant: that then, their vibrations getting\nmore and more out of correspondence, they send off their a\u00ebrial waves\nin the same direction at exactly intermediate instants; and presently,\ncoming once more into correspondence, they again generate coinciding\nwaves. So that when their periods of vibration differ but little,\nand when consequently it takes an appreciable time to complete their\nalternations of agreement and disagreement, there results an audible\nalternation in the sound\u2014a succession of pulses of louder and feebler\nsound. In other words, besides the primary, simple, and rapid series\nof waves, constituting the two sounds themselves, there is a series\nof slow compound waves, resulting from their repeated conflicts and\nconcurrences. Now if, instead of the two strings communicating their\nvibrations to the air, each communicated its vibrations to the other,\nwe should have just the same alternation of concurrent and conflicting\npulses. And if each of the two strings was combined with an aggregate\nof others like itself, in such way that it communicated to its\nneighbours both its normal and its abnormal vibrations, it is clear\nthat through each aggregate of strings there would be propagated one of\nthese compound waves of oscillation, in addition to their simple rapid\noscillations. This illustration will, I think, make it manifest that\nwhen a mass of molecules which have a certain period of vibration, is\nplaced in contact with a mass of molecules which have another period\nof vibration, there must result an alternation of coincidences and\nantagonisms in the molecular motions, such as will make the molecules\nalternately increase and decrease one another\u2019s motions. There will\nbe instants at which they are moving in the same direction, and\nintervening instants at which they are moving in opposite directions;\nwhence will arise periods of greatest and least deviations from their\nordinary motions. And these greatest and least deviations, being\ncommunicated to neighbouring molecules, and passed on by them {171} to\nthe next, will result in waves of perturbation propagated throughout\neach mass.\n\nLet us now ask what will be the mutual relations of these waves. Action\nand reaction being equal and opposite, it must happen that whatever\neffect a molecule of the mass A produces upon an adjacent molecule of\nthe mass B, must be accompanied by an equivalent reverse effect upon\nitself. If a molecule of the mass A is at any instant moving in such\nway as to impress on a molecule of the mass B an additional momentum\nin any given direction, then the momentum of the molecule of A, in\nthat direction, will be diminished to an equal amount. That is to say,\nto any wave of increased motion propagated through the molecules of\nB, there must be a reactive wave of decreased motion propagated in\nthe opposite direction through the molecules of A. See, then, the two\nsignificant facts. Any _addition_ of motion, which at one of these\nalternate periods is given by the molecules of A to the molecules of\nB, must be propagated through the molecules of B in a direction _away\nfrom_ A; and simultaneously there must be a _subtraction_ from the\nmotion of the molecules of A, which will be propagated through them\nin a direction _away from_ B. To every wave of _excess_ sent through\nthe one mass, there will be a corresponding wave of _defect_ sent\nthrough the other; and these _positive_ and _negative_ waves will be\nexactly coincident in their times, and exactly equal in their amounts.\nWhence it follows that if these waves, proceeding from the surface of\ncontact through the two masses in contrary directions, are brought into\nrelation, they will neutralize each other. Action and reaction being\nequal and opposite, these _plus_ and _minus_ molecular motions will\ncancel if they are added together; and there will be a restoration of\nequilibrium.\n\nThese positive and negative waves of perturbation will travel\nthrough the two masses of molecules with great facility. It is now\nan established truth that molecules {172} absorb, in the increase\nof their own vibrations, those rhythmical impulses or waves which\nhave periodic times the same as their own; but that they cannot thus\nabsorb successive impulses that have periodic times different from\ntheir own. Hence these differential undulations, being very long\nundulations in comparison with those of the molecules themselves, will\nreadily pass through the masses of molecules, or be _conducted_ by\nthem. Further observe that, if the two masses of molecules continue\njoined, these positive and negative differential waves travelling away\nfrom the surface of contact in opposite directions, and severally\narriving at the outer surfaces of the two masses, will be reflected\nfrom these; and, travelling back again toward the surface of contact,\nwill there meet and neutralize one another. Hence no current will be\nproduced along a wire joining the outer surfaces of the masses; since\nneutralization will be more readily effected by this return of the\nwaves through the masses themselves. But, though no external current\narises, the masses will continue in what we call opposite electric\nstates; as a delicate electrometer shows that they do. And further,\nif they are parted, the positive and negative waves which have the\ninstant before been propagated through them respectively, remaining\nunneutralized, the masses will display their opposite electric states\nin a more conspicuous way. The residual positive and negative waves\nwill then neutralize each other along any conductor that is placed\nbetween them, seeing that the _plus_ waves communicated from the one\nmass to the conductor, meeting with the _minus_ waves communicated from\nthe other, and being mutually cancelled as they meet, the conductor\nwill become a line of least resistance to the waves of each mass.\n\nLet us pass now to the allied phenomena of thermo-electricity. Suppose\nthese two masses of metal to be heated at their surfaces of contact:\nthe forms of the {173} masses being such that their surfaces of\ncontact can be considerably heated without their remoter parts being\nmuch heated. What will happen? Prof. Tyndall has shown, in the cases\nof various gases and liquids, that, other things equal, when molecules\nhave given to them more of the insensible motion which we call heat,\nthere is no alteration in their periods of oscillation, but an\nincrease in the amplitudes of their oscillations: the molecules make\nwider excursions in the same times. Assuming that it is the same in\nsolids, it will follow that, when the two metals are heated at their\nsurfaces of contact, the result will be the same as before in respect\nof the natures and intervals of the differential waves. There will be\na change, however, in the strengths of these waves. For, if the two\norders of molecules have severally given to them increased quantities\nof motion, the perturbations which they impress on each other will\nalso be increased. These stronger positive and negative waves of\ndifferential motion will, as before, travel through either mass away\nfrom the surfaces of contact\u2014that is, toward the cold extremities of\nthe masses. From these cold extremities they will, as before, rebound\ntoward the surfaces of contact; and, as before, will tend thus to\nequilibriate each other. But they will meet with resistance in thus\ntravelling back. It is a well-ascertained fact that raising the\ntemperatures of metals decreases their conducting powers. Hence, if\nthe two cold ends of the masses be connected by some other mass whose\nmolecules can take on with facility these differential undulations\u2014that\nis, if the two ends be joined by a conductor, the positive and negative\nwaves will meet and neutralize one another along this conductor,\ninstead of being reflected back to the surfaces of contact. In other\nwords, there will be established a current along the wire joining the\ntwo cold ends of the metallic masses.\n\nCarried a step further, this reasoning affords us an explanation of the\nthermo-electric pile. If a number of {174} these bars of different\nmetals, as antimony and bismuth, are soldered together, end to end,\nin alternate order, AB, AB, AB, etc., then, so long as they remain\ncold, there is no manifestation of an electric current; or, if all the\njoints are equally heated, there is no manifestation of an electric\ncurrent beyond that which would arise from any relative coolness of\nthe two ends of the compound bar. But if alternate joints are heated,\nan electric current is produced in a wire joining the two ends of the\ncompound bar\u2014a current that is intense in proportion to the number of\npairs. What is the cause of this? Clearly, so long as all the joints\nare of the same temperature, the differential waves propagated from\neach joint toward the two adjacent joints will be equal and opposite to\nthose from the adjacent joints, and no disturbance will be shown. But\nif alternate joints are heated, the positive and negative differential\nwaves propagated away from them will be stronger than those propagated\nfrom the other joints. Hence, if the joint of bar A with bar B be\nheated, the other end of the bar B, which is joined to A2, not being\nheated, will receive a stronger differential wave than it sends back.\nIn addition to the wave which its molecules would otherwise induce in\nthe molecules of A2, there is an effect which it conducts from A1;\nand this extra impulse propagated to the other end of B2 is added to\nthe impulse which its heated molecules would otherwise give to the\nmolecules of A3; and so on throughout the series. The waves being added\ntogether, become more violent, and the current through the wire joining\nthe extremities of the series, more intense.\n\nThis interpretation of the facts of thermo-electricity will probably\nbe met by the objection that there are, in some cases, thermo-electric\ncurrents developed between masses of metal of the same kind, and even\nbetween different parts of the same mass. It may be urged that, if\nunlikeness between the rates of vibration of molecules in contact\n{175} is the cause of these electric disturbances; then, heat ought\nnot to produce any electric disturbances when the molecules are of the\nsame kind; since heat does not change the periodic times of molecular\nvibrations. This objection, which seems at first sight a serious one,\nintroduces us to a confirmation. For where the masses of molecules\nare homogeneous in all other respects, difference of temperature\ndoes _not_ generate any thermo-electric current. The junction of hot\nwith cold mercury sets up no electric excitement. In all cases where\nthermo-electricity is generated between metals of the same kind, there\nis evidence of heterogeneity in their molecular structures\u2014either one\nhas been hammered and the other not, or one is annealed and the other\nunannealed. And where the current is between different parts of the\nsame mass, there are differences in the crystalline states of the\nparts, or differences between the ways in which the parts have cooled\nafter being cast. That is to say, there is proof that the molecules in\nthe two masses, or in different parts of the same mass, are in unlike\nrelations to their neighbours\u2014are in unlike states of tension. Now,\nhowever true it may be that molecules of the same kind vibrate at the\nsame rate, whatever may be their temperature, it is obviously true so\nlong only as their motions are not modified by restraining forces. If\nmolecules of the same kind are in one mass arranged into that state\nwhich constitutes crystallization, while in another mass they are not\nthus bound together; or if in the one their molecular relations have\nbeen modified by hammering, and in the other not; the differences\nin the restraints under which they respectively vibrate will affect\ntheir rates of vibration. And if their rates of vibration are rendered\nunequal, then the alleged cause of electrical disturbance comes into\nexistence.\n\nTo sum up, may it not be said that by some such action alone can the\nphenomena of electricity be explained; {176} and that some such\naction must inevitably arise under the conditions? On the one hand\nelectricity, being a mode of motion, implies the transformation of some\npre\u00ebxisting motion\u2014implies, also, a transformation such that there are\ntwo new kinds of motion simultaneously generated, equal and opposite in\ntheir directions\u2014implies, further, that these differ in being _plus_\nand _minus_, and being therefore capable of neutralizing each other.\nOn the other hand, in the above cases, molecular motion is the only\nsource of motion that can be assigned; and this molecular motion seems\ncalculated, under the circumstances, to produce effects like those\nwitnessed. Molecules vibrating at different rates cannot be brought in\njuxtaposition without affecting one another\u2019s motions. They must affect\none another\u2019s motions by periodically adding to, or deducting from one\nanother\u2019s motions; and any excess of motion which those of the one\norder receive, must be accompanied by an equivalent defect of motion in\nthose of the other order. When such molecules are units of aggregates\nplaced in contact, they must pass on these perturbations to their\nneighbours. And so, from the surface of contact, there must be waves of\nexcessive and defective molecular motion, equal in their amounts, and\nopposite in their directions\u2014waves which must exactly compensate one\nanother when brought into relation.\n\nI have here dealt only with electrical phenomena of the simplest\nkind. Hereafter I may possibly endeavour to show how this hypothesis\nfurnishes interpretations of other forms of Electricity.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nPOSTSCRIPT (1873).\u2014During the nine years which have elapsed since the\nforegoing essay was published, I have found myself no nearer to such\nallied interpretations of other forms of Electricity. Though, from time\nto time, I have recurred to the subject, in the hope of fulfilling the\n{177} expectation raised by the closing sentence, yet no clue has\nencouraged me to pursue the speculation. Only now, when republication\nof the essay in a permanent form once more brings the question before\nme, does there occur a thought which appears worth setting down.\n\nThe union of two different ideas, not before placed side by side, has\ngenerated this thought. In the first number of the _Principles of\nBiology_, issued in January 1863, and dealing, among other \u201cData of\nBiology,\u201d with organic matter and the effects of forces upon it, I\nventured to speculate about the molecular actions concerned in organic\nchanges, and, among others, those by which light enables plants to take\nthe carbon from carbonic acid (\u00a7 13). Pointing out that the ability\nof heat to decompose compound molecules, is generally proportionate\nto the difference between the atomic weights of their component\nelements, and assuming that components having widely-unlike atomic\nweights, have widely-unlike motions, and are therefore affected by\nwidely-unlike undulations; the inference drawn was, that in proportion\nas the rhythms of its components differ, a compound molecule will\nbe unstable in presence of strong etherial undulations acting upon\none component more than on the other or others: their movements thus\nbeing rendered so incongruous that they can no longer hold together.\nIt was argued, further, that a tolerably-stable compound molecule\nmay, if exposed to strong etherial undulations especially disturbing\none of its components, be decomposed when in presence of some unlike\nmolecule having components whose times of oscillation differ less from\nthose of this disturbed component. And a parallel was drawn between\nthe de-oxidation of metals by carbon when exposed to the longer\nundulations in a furnace, and the de-carbonization of carbonic acid by\nhydrogen, &c., when exposed to the shorter undulations in a plant\u2019s\nleaves. These ideas I recall chiefly for the purpose of presenting\nclearly the conception of a compound molecule as containing {178}\ndiversely-moving components\u2014components having independent and unlike\noscillations, in addition to the oscillation of the whole molecule\nformed by them. The legitimacy of this conception may, I suppose, be\nassumed. The beautiful experiments by which Prof. Tyndall has proved\nthat light decomposes the vapours of certain compounds, illustrates\nthis ability which the elements of a compound molecule have, severally\nto take up etherial undulations corresponding to their own; and thus\nto have their individual movements so increased as to cause disruption\nof the compound molecule. This, at least, is the interpretation\nwhich Prof. Tyndall puts on the facts; and I presume that he puts a\nkindred interpretation upon the facts he has disclosed respecting the\nmarvellous power possessed by complex-moleculed vapours to absorb\nheat\u2014the interpretation, namely, that the thermal undulations are,\nin such vapours, taken up in augmenting the movements within each\nmolecule, rather than in augmenting the movements of the molecules as\nwholes.\n\nBut now, assuming this to be a true conception of compound molecules\nand the effects produced on them by etherial undulations, there\npresents itself the question\u2014What will be the effects produced by\ncompound molecules on one another? How will the elements of one\ncompound molecule have their rhythmical motions affected by proximity\nto the elements of an unlike compound molecule? May we not suspect\nthat effects will be produced on one another, not only by the unlike\nmolecules as wholes, but also certain other, and partially-independent,\neffects by their components on one another; and that there will so\nbe generated some specialized form of molecular motion? Throughout\nthe speculation set forth in the foregoing essay, the supposition is\nthat the molecules are those of juxtaposed metals\u2014molecules which,\nwhether absolutely simple or not, are relatively simple; and these\nare regarded as producing on one another\u2019s movements perturbations\nof a relatively-simple kind, which admit of being transferred from\nmolecule {179} to molecule throughout each mass. In trying to carry\nfurther this interpretation, it had not occurred to me until now,\nto consider the perturbations produced on one another by compound\nmolecules: taking into consideration, not merely the capacity each\nhas for affecting the other as a whole, but the capacity which the\nconstituents of each individually have for affecting the individual\nconstituents of the other. If an individual constituent of a compound\nmolecule can, by the successive impacts of etherial undulations, have\nthe amplitudes of its oscillations so increased as to detach it; we can\nscarcely doubt that an individual constituent of a compound molecule\nmay affect an individual constituent of an unlike compound molecule\nnear it: their respective oscillations perturbing one another apart\nfrom the perturbation produced on one another by the compound molecules\nas wholes. And it seems inferable that the secondary perturbation thus\narising, will, like the primary perturbation, be such that the action\nand reaction, equal and opposite in their amounts, will produce equal\nand opposite deviations in the molecular movements. From this there\nappear to be several corollaries.\n\nIf a compound molecule, having a slow rhythm as a whole in addition\nto the more rapid rhythms of its members, has the power of taking\nup much of that motion we call heat in the increase of its internal\nmovements, and to a corresponding degree takes up less in the increase\nof its movements as a whole; then may we not infer that the like will\nhold when other kinds of forces are brought to bear on it? May we\nnot anticipate that when a mass of compound molecules of one kind is\nmade to act upon a mass of compound molecules of another kind (say by\nfriction), the molecular effects mutually produced, partly in agitating\nthe molecules as wholes, and partly in agitating their components\nrelatively to one another, will become less of the first and more of\nthe last, in proportion as the molecules progress in compositeness?\n\nA further implication suggests itself. While much of the {180} force\nmutually exercised will thus go to increase the motion within each\nof the compound molecules that immediately act on one another, it\nappears inferable that relatively little of this intestinal motion\nwill be communicated to other molecules. The excesses of oscillation\ngiven to individual members of a large cluster, will not be readily\npassed on to homologous members of adjacent large clusters; since they\nmust be relatively far apart. Whatever motion is transferred, must be\ntransferred by waves of the intervening etherial medium; and the power\nof these must decrease rapidly as the distance increases. Obviously\nsuch difficulty of transfer must, for this reason, become great when\nthe molecules become highly compounded.\n\nAt the same time will it not follow that such augmentations of\nmovement caused in individual members of a cluster, not being readily\ntransmissible to homologous members of adjacent clusters, will\naccumulate? The more composite molecules become, the more possible\nwill it be for individual components of them to be violently affected\nby individual components of different composite molecules near\nthem\u2014the more possible will it be for their mutual perturbations to\nprogressively increase?\n\nAnd now let us consider how these inferences bear on the interpretation\nof Statical Electricity\u2014the form of Electricity most unlike the form\nabove dealt with.\n\nThe substances which exhibit most conspicuously the phenomena of\nstatical electricity are distinguished either by the chemical\ncomplexity of their molecules, or else by the compositeness of their\nmolecules produced allotropically or isomerically, or else by both.\nThe simple substances electrically excited by friction, as carbon and\nsulphur, are those having several allotropic states\u2014those capable of\nforming multiple molecules. The conchoidal fracture of the diamond and\nof roll-sulphur, suggest some colloidal form of aggregation, regarded\nby Prof. Graham as a form in which the molecules are united into {181}\nrelatively-large groups.[23] In such compound inorganic substances as\nglass, we have, besides the chemical complexity, this same conchoidal\nfracture which, along with other evidence, shows glass to be a colloid;\nand the colloidal form of molecule is to be similarly inferred as\ncharacterizing resin, amber, &c. That dry animal substances, such as\nsilk and hair, are formed of extremely-large molecules, we have clear\nproof; since these, chemically complex in a high degree, also have\ntheir components united in high multiples. It needs but to name the\nfact that non-electric and conducting substances, such as the metals,\nacids, water, &c., have relatively-simple molecules, to make it clear\nthat the capacity for developing statical electricity depends in some\nway upon the presence of molecules of highly composite kinds. And\nthere is even still more conclusive proof than that yielded by the\ncontrast between these groups\u2014the proof furnished by the fact that\nthe same substance may be a conductor or a non-conductor, according\nto its form of molecular aggregation. Thus selenium when crystalline\nis a conductor, but when in that allotropic state called amorphous,\nor non-crystalline, it is a good non-conductor. That is, accepting\nProf. Graham\u2019s interpretation of these states, when its molecules are\narranged simply, it is a conductor, but when they are compounded into\nlarge groups it is a non-conductor, and, by implication, an electric.\n\nSo far, then, the _\u00e0 priori_ inference that a peculiar form of\nmolecular perturbation will result when two unlike substances, one of\nwhich or each of which consists of {182} highly-compounded molecules,\nare made to act on one another, is justified _a posteriori_. And now,\ninstead of asking generally what will happen, let us ask what may\nbe inferred to happen in a special case. A piece of glass is rubbed\nby silk. The large colloidal molecules forming the surface of each,\nare made to disturb one another. This is an inference about which\nthere will, I suppose, be no dispute; since it is that assumed in\nthe now-established doctrine of the correlation of heat and motion.\nBesides the effect which, as wholes the molecules mutually produce,\nthere is the effect produced on one another by certain of their\ncomponents. Such of these as have times of oscillation which differ,\nbut not very widely, generate mutual perturbations that are equal and\nopposite. Could these perturbations be readily propagated away from\nthe surface of contact through either mass, the effect would quickly\ndissipate, as in the case of metals; but, for the reason given above,\nthese perturbations cannot be transferred with ease to the homologous\nmembers of the compound molecules behind. Hence the mechanical force\nof the friction, transformed into the molecular movements of these\nsuperficial constituent molecules, exists in them as _intense_ mutual\nperturbations, which, unable to diffuse, are limited to the surfaces,\nand, indeed, to those parts of the surfaces that have acted on one\nanother. In other words, the two surfaces become charged with two equal\nand opposite molecular perturbations\u2014perturbations which, cancelling\none another if the surfaces are kept in contact, cannot do this if\nthe surfaces are parted; but can then cancel one another only if a\nconductor is interposed.\n\nLet me briefly point out some apparent agreements between the\ncorollaries from this hypothesis, and the observed phenomena.\n\nWe have, first, an interpretation of the fact, otherwise seeming so\nanomalous, that this form of electrical excitement is _superficial_.\nThat there should be a mode of {183} activity limited to the surface\nof a substance, is difficult to understand in the absence of some\nconception of the kind suggested.\n\nWe have an explanation of the truth, insisted on by Faraday, that\nthere can be no charge of one kind of electricity obtained, without\na corresponding charge of the opposite kind. For it is a necessary\nimplication of the hypothesis above set forth, that no molecular\nperturbation of the nature described, can be produced, without there\nbeing simultaneously produced a counter-perturbation exactly equal to\nit.\n\nMay we not also say that some insight is afforded into the phenomena\nof induction? In the cases thus far considered, the two surfaces\nelectrified by the mutual perturbations of their molecules, are\nsupposed to be in contact. Since, however, apparent contact is not\nactual contact, we must, even in this case, assume that the mutual\nperturbation is effected through an intervening stratum of ether. To\ninterpret induction, then, we have first to conceive this stratum\nof ether to be greatly increased in thickness; and then to ask what\nwill happen if the molecules of one surface, in this state of extreme\ninternal perturbation, act on the molecules of a surface near it.\nWhether the stratum of ether is so thin as to be inappreciable to our\nsenses, or whether it is wide enough to be conspicuous, it must still\nhappen that if through it the mutual perturbations are conveyed in the\none case, they will be conveyed in the other; and hence a surface which\nis already the seat of these molecular perturbations of one order, will\ninduce perturbations of a counter order in the molecules of an adjacent\nsurface.\n\nIn additional justification of the hypothesis, I will only point out\nthat voltaic electricity seems to admit of a kindred interpretation.\nFor any molecular re-arrangement, such as occurs in a chemical\ndecomposition and recombination, implies that the movements of\nthe {184} molecules concerned are mutually perturbed; and their\nperturbations must conform to the general law already described: the\nmolecules must derange one another\u2019s motions in equal and opposite\nways, and so must generate _plus_ and _minus_ derangements that cancel\nwhen brought into relation.\n\nOf course I suggest this view simply as one occurring to an outsider.\nUnquestionably it presents difficulties; as, for instance, that no\nmanifest explanation is yielded by it of electric attractions and\nrepulsions. And there are doubtless objections not obvious to me that\nwill at once strike those to whom the facts are more familiar. The\nhypothesis must be regarded as speculative; and as set down on the\nchance that it may be worth consideration.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nSince the foregoing postscript was put in type, I have received\ncriticisms upon it, oral and written, from several leading electricians\nand physicists; and I have profited by them to amend parts of the\nexposition. While I have remained without endorsements of the\nhypothesis, the objections raised have not been such as to make clear\nits untenability.\n\nOn one point an addition seems needful to exclude a misconstruction\napt to arise. The description of the mutually-produced molecular\nperturbations, opposite in their kinds, as resulting in waves that are\npropagated away from the place of disturbance, and that cancel when\nbrought into relation, is met by the criticism that waves, proceeding\nin opposite directions and meeting, do not mutually cancel, but,\npassing one another, proceed onwards. There are, however, two respects\nin which the parallelism does not hold, between the waves referred\nto and the waves I have described, which perhaps cannot rightly be\ncalled waves. The waves referred to, as those on the surface of a\nliquid, {185} are such that each consists of two opposite deviations\nfrom a mean state. Each shows excess and defect. A series of them is\na series of _plus_ and _minus_ divergences; and if two such series\nmeet one another, they do not cancel. But there is no analogy between\nthis case and a case in which the whole effect propagated in one\ndirection is a _plus_ motion, and the whole effect propagated in the\nopposite direction is a _minus_ motion\u2014that is, _plus_ and _minus_\nchanges in other motions. These, if equal in amount, will cancel when\nthey meet. If one is a continual addition to motion in a certain\ndirection, and the other a corresponding subtraction from motion in\nthat direction, the two, when added together, must produce zero. From\nanother point of view the absence of parallelism between the two\ncases may be equally well seen. Waves of the kinds instanced as not\ncancelling one another, are waves produced by some force foreign to\nthe medium exhibiting them\u2014an extrinsic force. Hence, proceeding from\nthe place of initiation, they are necessarily, considered in their\ntotalities, _positive_ in whatever directions they travel; and hence,\ntoo, when conducted round so as to meet, an exaggerated perturbation\nwill result. But in the simplest of the cases here dealt with (that\nof contact-electricity) the perturbation is not of extrinsic origin,\nbut of intrinsic origin. There is no external activity at the expense\nof which the quantity of motion in the disturbed matter is positively\nincreased. The activity, being such only as is internally possessed,\ncan generate no more motion than already exists; and therefore whatever\ngain of motion arises anywhere in the molecules must be at the cost of\nan equal loss elsewhere. Here perturbation cannot be a _plus_ motion\nin all directions from the place of initiation; but any _plus_ motion\ncontinually generated can result only from an equal and opposite\n_minus_ motion continually generated; and the mutual cancelling becomes\na corollary from the mutual genesis.\n\nIn the course of the discussions which I have had, the {186} following\nway of presenting the argument has occurred to me.\n\n1. Two homogeneous bodies are rubbed together and there results heat:\nthe interpretation being that the molar motion is transformed into\nmolecular motion. Here motion produces motion\u2014the _form_ only being\nchanged.\n\n2. Now of the two bodies one is replaced by a body unlike in nature to\nthe other, and they are again rubbed. Again a certain amount of heat\nis produced: some of the molar motion is, as before, transformed into\nmolecular motion. But, at the same time, another part of the molar\nmotion is changed into\u2014what? Surely not a fluid, a substance, a thing.\nIt cannot be that what in the first case produces a change of _state_,\nin the second case produces an _entity_. And in the second case itself,\nit cannot be that while part of the original motion becomes changed\ninto another species of motion, part of it becomes changed into a\nspecies of matter.\n\n3. Must we not say, then, that if, when the two bodies rubbed are\nhomogeneous, sensible motion is transformed into insensible motion,\nwhen they are heterogeneous, sensible motion must still be transformed\ninto insensible motion: such difference of nature as this insensible\nmotion has, being consequent on the difference of nature between the\ntwo kinds of molecules acting on one another?\n\n4. If, when the two masses are homogeneous, those molecules which\ncompose the two rubbed surfaces disturb one another, and increase one\nanother\u2019s oscillations; then, when the two masses are heterogeneous,\nthose molecules forming the two rubbed surfaces must also disturb one\nanother in some way\u2014increase one another\u2019s agitations.\n\n5. If, when the two sets of molecules are alike in kind, the mutual\ndisturbance is such that they simply increase the amplitudes of one\nanother\u2019s oscillations, and do this because their times correspond;\nthen, must it not be {187} that when they are unlike in kind, the\nmutual disturbance will involve a differential action consequent on the\nunlikeness of their motions? Must not the discord of the oscillations\nproduce a result which cannot be produced when the oscillations are\nconcordant\u2014a compound form of molecular motion?\n\n6. If masses of relatively-simple molecules, placed in apposition\nand made to act on one another, cause such effects; then must we not\nsay that effects of the same class, but of a different order, will\nbe caused by the mutual actions, not of the molecules as wholes,\nbut of their constituents? If the rubbed surfaces severally consist\nof highly-compounded molecules\u2014each containing, it may be, several\nhundreds of minor molecules, united into a definitely-arranged cluster;\nthen, while the molecules as wholes affect one another\u2019s motions,\nmust we not infer that the constituents of the one class will affect\nthe constituents of the other class in their motions? While the\nmolecules as wholes increase one another\u2019s oscillations, or derange one\nanother\u2019s oscillations, or both, the components of them cannot be so\nstably arranged that members of the one group are wholly inoperative\non members of the other group. And if they are operative, then there\nmust be a compound form of molecular motion which arises when masses\nof highly-compounded molecules of unlike kinds, are made to act on one\nanother.\n\nWith this series of propositions and questions, I leave the suggestion\nto its fate; merely remarking that, setting out with the principles\nof molecular physics now accepted, it seems difficult to avoid the\nimplication that some actions of the kinds described take place, and\nthat there result from them some classes of phenomena\u2014phenomena which,\nif not those we call electrical, remain to be identified.\n\n\nENDNOTE TO _WHAT IS ELECTRICITY?_.\n\n[23] Though conchoidal fracture may not be conclusive proof of\ncolloidality, yet colloidal substances hard enough for fracture always\ndisplay it. Respecting roll-sulphur I may say that though in a few\ndays after it is made, it changes from its original state to a state\nin which it consists of minute crystals of another kind irregularly\nmassed, yet there is reason for suspecting that these have a matrix\nof amorphous sulphur. I learn from Dr. Frankland that, when sublimed,\nsulphur aggregates partly into minute crystals and partly into an\namorphous powder distinguished by insolubility.\n\n\n\n\n{188}\n\nMILL _versus_ HAMILTON\u2014THE TEST OF TRUTH.\n\n\n[_First published in_ The Fortnightly Review _for July 1865._]\n\nBritish speculation, to which, the chief initial ideas and established\ntruths of Modern Philosophy are due, is no longer dormant. By his\n_System of Logic_, Mr. Mill probably did more than any other writer to\nre-awaken it. And to the great service he thus rendered some twenty\nyears ago, he now adds by his _Examination of Sir William Hamilton\u2019s\nPhilosophy_\u2014a work which, taking the views of Sir William Hamilton\nas texts, reconsiders sundry ultimate questions that still remain\nunsettled.\n\nAmong these questions is one of much importance which has already\nbeen the subject of controversy between Mr. Mill and others; and this\nquestion I propose to discuss afresh. Before doing so, however, it will\nbe desirable to glance at two cardinal doctrines of the Hamiltonian\nphilosophy from which Mr. Mill shows reasons for dissenting\u2014desirable,\nbecause comment on them will elucidate what is to follow.\n\nIn his fifth chapter, Mr. Mill points out that \u201cwhat is rejected as\nknowledge by Sir William Hamilton,\u201d is \u201cbrought back by him under the\nname of belief.\u201d The quotations justify this description of Sir W.\nHamilton\u2019s position, and warrant the assertion that the relativity\nof {189} knowledge was held by him but nominally. His inconsistency\nmay, I think, be traced to the use of the word \u201cbelief\u201d in two quite\ndifferent senses. We commonly say we \u201cbelieve\u201d a thing for which\nwe can assign preponderating evidence, or concerning which we have\nreceived some indefinable impression. We _believe_ that the next\nHouse of Commons will not abolish Church-rates; or we _believe_ that\na person on whose face we look is good-natured. That is, when we can\ngive confessedly-inadequate proofs or no proofs at all for the things\nwe think, we call them \u201cbeliefs.\u201d And it is the peculiarity of these\nbeliefs, as contrasted with cognitions, that their connexions with\nantecedent states of consciousness may be easily severed, instead of\nbeing difficult to sever. But, unhappily, the word \u201cbelief\u201d is also\napplied to each of those temporarily or permanently indissoluble\nconnexions in consciousness, for the acceptance of which the only\nwarrant is that it cannot be got rid of. Saying that I feel a pain,\nor hear a sound, or see one line to be longer than another, is saying\nthat there has occurred in me a certain change of state; and it is\nimpossible for me to give a stronger evidence of this fact than that\nit is present to my mind. Every argument, too, is resolvable into\nsuccessive affections of consciousness which have no warrants beyond\nthemselves. When asked why I assert some mediately known truth, as\nthat the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, I\nfind that the proof may be decomposed into steps, each of which is an\nimmediate consciousness that certain two quantities or two relations\nare equal or unequal\u2014a consciousness for which no further evidence is\nassignable than that it exists in me. Nor, on finally getting down to\nsome axiom underlying the whole fabric of demonstration, can I say\nmore than that it is a truth of which I am immediately conscious.\nBut now observe the confusion that has arisen. The immense majority\nof truths which we accept as beyond doubt, and from which our notion\nof unquestionable truth is abstracted, {190} have this other trait\nin common\u2014they are severally established by affiliation on deeper\ntruths. These two characters have become so associated, that one\nseems to imply the other. For each truth of geometry we are able\nto assign some wider truth in which it is involved; for that wider\ntruth we are able, if required, to assign some still wider; and so\non. This being the general nature of the demonstration by which exact\nknowledge is established, there has arisen the illusion that knowledge\nso established is knowledge of higher validity than that immediate\nknowledge which has nothing deeper to rest on. The habit of asking for\nproof, and having proof given, in all these multitudinous cases, has\nproduced the implication that proof may be asked for those ultimate\ndicta of consciousness into which all proof is resolvable. And then,\nbecause no proof of these can be given, there arises the vague feeling\nthat they are akin to other things of which no proof can be given\u2014that\nthey are uncertain\u2014that they have unsatisfactory bases. This feeling\nis strengthened by the accompanying misuse of words. \u201cBelief\u201d having,\nas above pointed out, become the name of an impression for which we\ncan give only a confessedly-inadequate reason, or no reason at all; it\nhappens that when pushed hard respecting the warrant for any ultimate\ndictum of consciousness, we say, in the absence of all assignable\nreason, that we _believe_ it. Thus the two opposite poles of knowledge\ngo under the same name; and by the reverse connotations of this name,\nas used for the most coherent and least coherent relations of thought,\nprofound misconceptions have been generated. Here, it seems to me, is\nthe source of Sir William Hamilton\u2019s error. Classing as \u201cbeliefs\u201d those\ndirect, undecomposable dicta of consciousness which transcend proof,\nhe asserts that these are of higher authority than knowledge (meaning\nby knowledge that for which reasons can be given); and in asserting\nthis he is fully justified. But when he claims equal authority for\nthose affections of consciousness which {191} go under the same name\nof \u201cbeliefs,\u201d but differ in being extremely-indirect affections of\nconsciousness, or not definite affections of consciousness at all, the\nclaim cannot be admitted. By his own showing, no positive cognition\nanswering to the word \u201cinfinite\u201d exists; while, contrariwise, those\ncognitions which he rightly holds to be above question, are not only\npositive, but have the peculiarity that they cannot be suppressed. How,\nthen, can the two be grouped together as of like degrees of validity?\n\nNearly allied in nature to this, is another Hamiltonian doctrine, which\nMr. Mill effectively combats. I refer to the corollary respecting\nnoumenal existence which Sir William Hamilton draws from the law of\nthe Excluded Middle, or, as it might be more intelligibly called, the\nlaw of the Alternative Necessity. A thing must either exist or not\nexist\u2014must have a certain attribute or not have it: there is no third\npossibility. This is a postulate of all thought; and in so far as it is\nalleged of phenomenal existence, no one calls it in question. But Sir\nWilliam Hamilton, applying the formula beyond the limits of thought,\ndraws from it certain conclusions respecting things as they are, apart\nfrom our consciousness. He says, for example, that though we cannot\nconceive Space as infinite or as finite, yet, \u201con the principle of the\nExcluded Middle, one or other must be admitted.\u201d This inference Mr.\nMill shows good reason for rejecting. His argument may be supplemented\nby another, which at once suggests itself if from the words of Sir\nWilliam Hamilton\u2019s propositions we pass to the thoughts for which\nthey are supposed to stand. When remembering a certain thing as in\na certain place, the place and the thing are mentally represented\ntogether; while to think of the non-existence of the thing in that\nplace, implies a consciousness in which the place is represented but\nnot the thing. Similarly, if, instead of thinking of an object as\ncolourless, we think of it as having colour, the change consists in the\naddition to the {192} concept of an element that was before absent\nfrom it\u2014the object cannot be thought of first as red and then as not\nred, without one component of the thought being expelled from the\nmind by another. The doctrine of the Excluded Middle, then, is simply\na generalization of the universal experience that some mental states\nare directly destructive of other states. It formulates a certain\nabsolutely-constant law, that no positive mode of consciousness can\noccur without excluding a correlative negative mode; and that the\nnegative mode cannot occur without excluding the correlative positive\nmode: the antithesis of positive and negative, being, indeed, merely an\nexpression of this experience. Hence it follows that if consciousness\nis not in one of the two modes, it must be in the other. But now,\nunder what conditions only can this law of consciousness hold? It can\nhold only so long as there are positive states of consciousness which\ncan exclude the negative states, and which the negative states can in\ntheir turn exclude. If we are not concerned with positive states of\nconsciousness at all, no such mutual exclusion takes place, and the\nlaw of the Alternative Necessity does not apply. Here, then, is the\nflaw in Sir William Hamilton\u2019s proposition. That Space must be infinite\nor finite, are alternatives of which we are not obliged to regard one\nas necessary; seeing that we have no state of consciousness answering\nto either of these words as applied to the totality of Space, and\ntherefore no exclusion of two antagonist states of consciousness by one\nanother. Both alternatives being unthinkable, the proposition should be\nput thus: Space is either\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0or is\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0; neither of which can\nbe conceived, but one of which must be true. In this, as in some other\ncases, Sir William Hamilton continues to work out the forms of thought\nwhen they no longer contain any substance; and, of course, reaches\nnothing more than verbal conclusions.\n\nEnding here these comments on doctrines of Sir William {193} Hamilton,\nwhich Mr. Mill rejects on grounds that will be generally recognized\nas valid, let me now pass to a doctrine, partly held by Sir William\nHamilton, and held by others in ways variously qualified and variously\nextended\u2014a doctrine which, I think, may be successfully defended\nagainst Mr. Mill\u2019s attack.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIn the fourth and fifth editions of his _Logic_, Mr. Mill treats, at\nconsiderable length, the question\u2014Is inconceivability an evidence\nof untruth?\u2014replying to criticisms previously made on his reasons\nfor asserting that it is not. The chief answers which he there\nmakes to these criticisms, turn upon the interpretation of the word\n_inconceivable_. This word he considers is used as the equivalent of\nthe word _unbelievable_; and, translating it thus, readily disposes of\nsundry arguments brought against him. Whether any others who have used\nthese words in philosophical discussion, have made them synonymous, I\ndo not know; but that they are so used in those reasonings of my own\nwhich Mr. Mill combats, I was not conscious, and was surprised to find\nalleged. It is now manifest that I had not adequately guarded myself\nagainst the misconstruction which is liable to arise from the double\nmeaning of the word _belief_\u2014a word which, we have seen, is used for\nthe most coherent and the least coherent connexions in consciousness,\nbecause they have the common character that no reason is assignable for\nthem. Throughout the argument to which Mr. Mill replies, the word is\nused by me only in the first of these senses. The \u201cinvariably existent\nbeliefs,\u201d the \u201cindestructible beliefs,\u201d are the indissoluble connexions\nin consciousness\u2014never the dissoluble ones. But _unbelievable_ implies\nthe dissoluble ones. By association with the other and more general\nmeaning of the word _belief_, the word _unbelievable_ suggests cases\nin which the proposition admits of being represented in thought,\nthough it may be with difficulty; and in which, consequently, the\ncounter-proposition admits of being {194} decomposed. To be quite\nsure of our ground, let us define and illustrate the meanings of\n_inconceivable_ and _unbelievable._ An inconceivable proposition\nis one of which the terms cannot, by any effort, be brought before\nconsciousness in that relation which the proposition asserts between\nthem\u2014a proposition of which the subject and the predicate offer\nan insurmountable resistance to union in thought. An unbelievable\nproposition is one which admits of being framed in thought, but is\nso much at variance with experience that its terms cannot be put in\nthe alleged relation without effort. Thus, it is unbelievable that\na cannon-ball fired from England should reach America; but it is\nnot inconceivable. Conversely, it is inconceivable that one side of\na triangle is equal to the sum of the other two sides\u2014not simply\nunbelievable. The two sides cannot be represented in consciousness\nas becoming equal in their joint length to the third side, without\nthe representation of a triangle being destroyed; and the concept of\na triangle cannot be framed without a simultaneous destruction of\na concept in which these magnitudes are represented as equal. That\nis to say, the subject and predicate cannot be united in the same\nintuition\u2014the proposition is unthinkable. It is in this sense only that\nI have used the word inconceivable; and only when rigorously restricted\nto this sense do I regard the test of inconceivableness as having any\nvalue.\n\nI had concluded that when this explanation was made, Mr. Mill\u2019s reasons\nfor dissent would be removed. Passages in his recently-published\nvolume, however, show that, even restricting the use of the word\ninconceivable to the meaning here specified, he still denies that\na proposition is proved to be true by the inconceivableness of its\nnegation. To meet, within any moderate compass, all the issues which\nhave grown out of the controversy, is difficult. Before passing to the\nessential question, however, I will endeavour to clear the ground of\ncertain minor questions.\n\nDescribing Sir William Hamilton\u2019s doctrine respecting {195} the\nultimate facts of consciousness, or those which are above proof, Mr.\nMill writes:\n\n\u201cThe only condition he requires is that we be not able to \u2018reduce it\n[a fact of this class] to a generalization from experience.\u2019 This\ncondition is realized by its possessing the \u2018character of necessity.\u2019\n\u2018It must be impossible not to think it. In fact, by its necessity\nalone can we recognize it as an original datum of intelligence, and\ndistinguish it from any mere result of generalization and custom.\u2019 In\nthis Sir William Hamilton is at one with the whole of his own section\nof the philosophical world; with Reid, with Stewart, with Cousin, with\nWhewell, we may add, with Kant, and even with Mr. Herbert Spencer. The\ntest by which they all decide a belief to be a part of our primitive\nconsciousness\u2014an original intuition of the mind\u2014is the necessity of\nthinking it. Their proof that we must always, from the beginning, have\nhad the belief, is the impossibility of getting rid of it now. This\nargument, applied to any of the disputed questions of philosophy,\nis doubly illegitimate: neither the major nor the minor premise is\nadmissible. For in the first place, the very fact that the question\nis disputed, disproves the alleged impossibility. Those against whom\nit is needful to defend the belief which is affirmed to be necessary,\nare unmistakable examples that it is not necessary\u00a0.\u00a0.\u00a0.\u00a0. These\nphilosophers, therefore, and among them Sir William Hamilton, mistake\naltogether the true conditions of psychological investigation, when,\ninstead of proving a belief to be an original fact of consciousness by\nshowing that it could not have been acquired, they conclude that it\nwas not acquired, for the reason, often false, and never sufficiently\nsubstantiated, that our consciousness cannot get rid of it now.\u201d\n\nThis representation, in so far as it concerns my own views, has\nsomewhat puzzled me. Considering that I have avowed a general agreement\nwith Mr. Mill in the doctrine that all knowledge is from experience,\nand have defended {196} the test of inconceivableness on the very\nground that it expresses \u201cthe net result of our experiences up to\nthe present time\u201d (_Principles of Psychology_, \u00a7 430)\u2014considering\nthat, so far from asserting the distinction quoted from Sir William\nHamilton, I have aimed to abolish such distinction\u2014considering that I\nhave endeavoured to show how all our conceptions, even down to those\nof Space and Time, are \u201cacquired\u201d\u2014considering that I have sought\nto interpret forms of thought (and by implication all intuitions)\nas products of organized and inherited experiences (_Principles of\nPsychology_, \u00a7 208); I am taken aback at finding myself classed as\nin the above paragraph. Leaving the personal question, however, let\nme pass to the assertion that the difference of opinion respecting\nthe test of necessity itself disproves the validity of the test. Two\nissues are here involved. First, if a particular proposition is by\nsome accepted as a necessary belief, but by one or more denied to be\na necessary belief, is the validity of the test of necessity thereby\ndisproved in respect of that particular proposition? Second, if the\nvalidity of the test is disproved in respect of that particular\nproposition, does it therefore follow that the test cannot be depended\non in other cases?\u2014does it follow that there are no beliefs universally\naccepted as necessary, and in respect of which the test of necessity is\nvalid? Each of these questions may, I think, be rightly answered in the\nnegative.\n\nIn alleging that if a belief is said by some to be necessary, but by\nothers to be not necessary, the test of necessity is thereby shown\nto be no test, Mr. Mill tacitly assumes that all men have powers of\nintrospection enabling them in all cases to say what consciousness\ntestifies; whereas a great proportion of men are incapable of correctly\ninterpreting consciousness in any but its simplest modes, and even\nthe remainder are liable to mistake for dicta of consciousness what\nprove on closer examination not to be its dicta. Take the case of an\narithmetical blunder. {197} A boy adds up a column of figures, and\nbrings out a wrong total. Again he does it and again errs. His master\nasks him to go through the process aloud, and then hears him say \u201c35\nand 9 are 46\u201d\u2014an error which he had repeated on each occasion. Now\nwithout discussing the mental act through which we know that 35 and 9\nare 44, and through which we recognize the necessity of this relation,\nit is clear that the boy\u2019s misinterpretation of consciousness, leading\nhim tacitly to deny this necessity by asserting that \u201c35 and 9 are\n46,\u201d cannot be held to prove that the relation is not necessary. This,\nand kindred misjudgments daily made by accountants, merely show that\nthere is a liability to overlook what are necessary connexions in our\nthoughts, and to assume as necessary others which are not. In these and\nhosts of cases, men do not distinctly translate into their equivalent\nstates of consciousness the words they use. This negligence is with\nmany so habitual, that they are unaware that they have not clearly\nrepresented to themselves the propositions they assert; and are then\napt, quite sincerely though erroneously, to assert that they can think\nthings which it is really impossible to think.\n\nBut supposing it to be true that whenever a particular belief is\nalleged to be necessary, the existence of some who profess themselves\nable to believe otherwise, proves that this belief is not necessary;\nmust it be therefore admitted that the test of necessity is invalid?\nI think not. Men may mistake for necessary, certain beliefs which are\nnot necessary; and yet it may remain true that there _are_ necessary\nbeliefs, and that the necessity of such beliefs is our warrant for\nthem. Were conclusions thus tested proved to be wrong in a hundred\ncases, it would not follow that the test is an invalid one; any more\nthan it would follow from a hundred errors in the use of a logical\nformula, that the logical formula is invalid. If from the premise that\nall horned animals ruminate, it were inferred that the rhinoceros,\nbeing a horned animal, ruminates; the error would {198} furnish no\nargument against the worth of syllogisms in general\u2014whatever their\nworth may be. Daily there are thousands of erroneous deductions which,\nby those who draw them, are supposed to be warranted by the data\nfrom which they draw them; but no multiplication of such erroneous\ndeductions is regarded as proving that there are no deductions truly\ndrawn, and that the drawing of deductions is illegitimate. In these\ncases, as in the case to which they are here paralleled, the only thing\nshown is the need for verification of data and criticism of the acts of\nconsciousness.\n\n\u201cThis argument,\u201d says Mr. Mill, referring to the argument of necessity,\n\u201capplied to any of the disputed questions of philosophy, is doubly\nillegitimate;\u00a0.\u00a0.\u00a0. the very fact that the question is disputed,\ndisproves the alleged impossibility.\u201d Besides the foregoing replies\nto this, there is another. Granting that there have been appeals\nillegitimately made to this test\u2014granting that there are many questions\ntoo complex to be settled by it, which men have nevertheless proposed\nto settle by it, and have consequently got into controversy; it may\nyet be truly asserted that in respect of all, or almost all, questions\nlegitimately brought to judgment by this test, there is _no_ dispute\nabout the answer. From the earliest times on record down to our own,\nmen have not changed their beliefs concerning the truths of number. The\naxiom that if equals be added to unequals the sums are unequal, was\nheld by the Greeks no less than by ourselves, as a direct verdict of\nconsciousness, from which there is no escape and no appeal. Each of the\npropositions of Euclid appears to us absolutely beyond doubt as it did\nto them. Each step in each demonstration we accept, as they accepted\nit, because we immediately see that the alleged relation is as alleged,\nand that it is impossible to conceive it otherwise.\n\n[Illustration]\n\nBut how are legitimate appeals to the test to be distinguished? The\nanswer is not difficult to find. Mr. Mill {199} cites the belief\nin the antipodes as having been rejected by the Greeks because\ninconceivable, but as being held by ourselves to be both conceivable\nand true. He has before given this instance, and I have before objected\nto it (_Principles of Psychology_, \u00a7 428), for the reason that the\nstates of consciousness involved in the judgment are too complex to\nadmit of any trustworthy verdict being given. An illustration will\nshow the difference between a legitimate appeal to the test and an\nillegitimate appeal to it. A and B are two lines. How is it decided\nthat they are equal or not equal? No way is open but that of comparing\nthe two impressions they make on consciousness. I know them to be\nunequal by an immediate act, if the difference is great, or if, though\nonly moderately different, they are close together; and supposing the\ndifference is but slight, I decide the question by putting the lines\nin apposition when they are movable, or by carrying a movable line\nfrom one to the other if they are fixed. But in any case, I obtain\nin consciousness the testimony that the impression produced by the\none line differs from that produced by the other. Of this difference\nI can give no further evidence than that I am conscious of it, and\nfind it impossible, while contemplating the lines, to get rid of\nthe consciousness. The proposition that the lines are unequal is a\nproposition of which the negation is inconceivable. But now suppose it\nis asked whether B and C are equal; or whether C and D are equal. No\npositive answer is possible. Instead of its being {200} inconceivable\nthat B is longer than C, or equal to it, or shorter, it is conceivable\nthat it is any one of the three. Here an appeal to the direct verdict\nof consciousness is illegitimate, because on transferring the\nattention from B to C, or C to D, the changes in the other elements\nof the impressions so entangle the elements to be compared, as to\nprevent them from being put in apposition. If the question of relative\nlength is to be determined, it must be by rectification of the bent\nline; and this is done through a series of steps, each one of which\ninvolves an immediate judgment akin to that by which A and B are\ncompared. Now as here, so in other cases, it is only simple percepts\nor concepts respecting the relations of which immediate consciousness\ncan satisfactorily testify; and as here, so in other cases, it is by\nresolution into such simple percepts and concepts, that true judgments\nrespecting complex percepts and concepts are reached. That things which\nare equal to the same thing are equal to one another, is a fact which\ncan be known by direct comparison of actual or ideal relations, and can\nbe known in no other way: the proposition is one of which the negation\nis inconceivable, and is rightly asserted on that warrant. But that\nthe square of the hypothenuse of a right-angled triangle equals the\nsum of the squares of the other two sides, cannot be known immediately\nby comparison of two states of consciousness. Here the truth can be\nreached only mediately, through a series of simple judgments respecting\nthe likenesses or unlikenesses of certain relations: each of which\njudgments is essentially of the same kind as that by which the above\naxiom is known, and has the same warrant. Thus it becomes apparent\nthat the fallacious result of the test of necessity which Mr. Mill\ninstances, is due to a misapplication of the test.\n\nThese preliminary explanations have served to make clear the question\nat issue. Let us now pass to the essence of it.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nMetaphysical reasoning is usually vitiated by some covert {201}\n_petitio principii_. Either the thing to be proved or the thing to be\ndisproved, is tacitly assumed to be true in the course of the proof\nor disproof. It is thus with the argument of Idealism. Though the\nconclusion reached is that Mind and Ideas are the only existences; yet\nthe steps by which this conclusion is reached, take for granted that\nexternal objects have just the kind of independent existence which is\neventually denied. If that extension which the Idealist contends is\nmerely an affection of consciousness, has nothing out of consciousness\nanswering to it; then, in each of his propositions concerning\nextension, the word should always mean an affection of consciousness\nand nothing more. But if wherever he speaks of distances and dimensions\nwe write ideas of distances and dimensions, his propositions are\nreduced to nonsense. So, too, is it with Scepticism. The resolution\nof all knowledge into \u201cimpressions\u201d and \u201cideas,\u201d is effected by an\nanalysis which assumes at every step an objective reality producing\nthe impressions and the subjective reality receiving them. The\nreasoning becomes impossible if the existence of object and subject\nbe not admitted at the outset. Agree with the Sceptic\u2019s doubt, and\nthen propose to revise his argument so that it may harmonize with his\ndoubt. Of the two alternatives between which he halts, assume, first,\nthe reality of object and subject. His argument is practicable; whether\nvalid or not. Now assume that object and subject do not exist. He\ncannot stir a step toward his conclusion\u2014nay, he cannot even state his\nconclusion; for the word \u201cimpression\u201d cannot be translated into thought\nwithout assuming a thing impressing and a thing impressed.\n\nThough Empiricism, as at present understood, is not thus suicidal, it\nis open to an analogous criticism on its method, similarly telling\nagainst the validity of its inference. It proposes to account for our\nso-called necessary beliefs, as well as all our other beliefs; and to\ndo this without postulating any one belief as necessary. Bringing {202}\nforward abundant evidence that the connexions among our states of\nconsciousness are determined by our experiences\u2014that two experiences\nfrequently recurring together in consciousness, become so coherent\nthat one strongly suggests the other, and that when their joint\nrecurrence is perpetual and invariable, the connexion between them\nbecomes indissoluble; it argues that the indissolubility, so produced,\nis all that we mean by necessity. And then it seeks to explain each\nof our so-called necessary beliefs as thus originated. Now could pure\nEmpiricism reach this analysis and its subsequent synthesis without\ntaking any thing for granted, its arguments would be unobjectionable.\nBut it cannot do this. Examine its phraseology, and there arises the\nquestion, Experiences of _what_? Translate the word into thought,\nand it clearly involves something more than states of mind and the\nconnexions among them. For if it does not, then the hypothesis is that\nstates of mind are generated by the experiences of states of mind;\nand if the inquiry be pursued, this ends with initial states of mind\nwhich are not accounted for\u2014the hypothesis fails. Evidently, there is\ntacitly assumed something beyond the mind by which the \u201cexperiences\u201d\nare produced\u2014something in which exist the objective relations to\nwhich the subjective relations correspond\u2014an external world. Refuse\nthus to explain the word \u201cexperiences,\u201d and the hypothesis becomes\nmeaningless. But now, having thus postulated an external reality as\nthe indispensable foundation of its reasonings, pure Empiricism can\nsubsequently neither prove nor disprove its postulate. An attempt to\ndisprove it, or to give it any other meaning than that originally\ninvolved, is suicidal; and an attempt to establish it by inference is\nreasoning in a circle. What then are we to say of this proposition\non which Empiricism rests? Is it a necessary belief, or is it not?\nIf necessary, the hypothesis in its pure form is abandoned. If not\nnecessary\u2014if not posited {203} _\u00e0 priori_ as absolutely certain\u2014then\nthe hypothesis rests on an uncertainty; and the whole fabric of its\nargument is unstable. More than this is true. Besides the insecurity\nimplied by building on a foundation that is confessedly not beyond\nquestion, there is the much greater insecurity implied by raising\nproposition upon proposition of which each is confessedly not beyond\nquestion. For to say that there are no necessary truths, is to say\nthat each successive inference is not necessarily involved in its\npremises\u2014is an empirical judgment\u2014a judgment not certainly true. Hence,\napplying rigorously its own doctrine, we find that pure Empiricism,\nstarting from an uncertainty and progressing through a series of\nuncertainties, cannot claim much certainty for its conclusions.\n\nDoubtless, it may be replied that any theory of human knowledge\nmust set out with assumptions\u2014either permanent or provisional; and\nthat the validity of these assumptions is to be determined by the\nresults reached through them. But that such assumptions may be made\nlegitimately, two things are required. In the first place they must\nnot be multiplied step after step as occasion requires; otherwise\nthe conclusion reached might as well be assumed at once. And in the\nsecond place, the fact that they _are_ assumptions must not be lost\nsight of: the conclusions drawn must not be put forward as though they\nhave a certainty which the premises have not. Now pure Empiricism, in\ncommon with other theories of knowledge, is open to the criticism, that\nit neglects thus avowedly to recognize the nature of those primary\nassumptions which it lays down as provisionally valid, if it denies\nthat they can be necessarily valid. And it is open to the further\ncriticism, that it goes on at every step in its argument making\nassumptions which it neglects to specify as provisional; since they,\ntoo, cannot be known as necessary. Until it has assigned some warrant\nfor its original datum and for each of its subsequent inferences, or\nelse has {204} acknowledged them all to be but hypothetical, it may be\nstopped either at the outset or at any stage in its argument. Against\nevery \u201cbecause\u201d and every \u201ctherefore,\u201d an opponent may enter a caveat,\nuntil he is told why it is asserted: contending, as he may, that if\nthis inference is not necessary he is not bound to accept it; and that\nif it is necessary it must be openly declared to be necessary, and some\ntest must be assigned by which it is distinguished from propositions\nthat are not necessary.\n\nThese considerations will, I think, make it obvious that the first step\nin a metaphysical argument, rightly carried on, must be an examination\nof propositions for the purpose of ascertaining what character is\ncommon to those which we call unquestionably true, and is implied by\nasserting their unquestionable truth. Further, to carry on this inquiry\nlegitimately, we must restrict our analysis rigorously to states of\nconsciousness considered in their relations to one another: wholly\nignoring any thing beyond consciousness to which these states and their\nrelations may be supposed to refer. For if, before we have ascertained\nby comparing propositions what is the trait that leads us to class some\nof them as certainly true, we avowedly or tacitly take for granted\nthe existence of something beyond consciousness; then, a particular\nproposition is assumed to be certainly true before we have ascertained\nwhat is the distinctive character of the propositions which we call\ncertainly true, and the analysis is vitiated. If we cannot transcend\nconsciousness\u2014if, therefore, what we know as truth must be some mental\nstate, or some combination of mental states; it must be possible for\nus to say in what way we distinguish this state or these states. The\ndefinition of truth must be expressible in terms of consciousness;\nand, indeed, cannot otherwise be expressed if consciousness cannot be\ntranscended. Clearly, then, the metaphysician\u2019s first step must be to\nshut out from his investigation every thing but what is subjective;\nnot taking for granted the {205} existence of any thing objective\ncorresponding to his ideas, until he has ascertained what property of\nhis ideas it is which he predicates by calling them true. Let us note\nthe result if he does this.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe words of a proposition are the signs of certain states of\nconsciousness; and the thing alleged by a proposition is the connexion\nor disconnexion of the states of consciousness signified. When thinking\nis carried on with precision\u2014when the mental states which we call\nwords, are translated into the mental states they symbolize (which\nthey very frequently are not)\u2014thinking a proposition consists in the\noccurrence together in consciousness of the subject and predicate. \u201cThe\nbird was brown,\u201d is a proposition which implies the union in thought\nof a particular attribute with a group of other attributes. When the\ninquirer compares various propositions thus rendered into states of\nconsciousness, he finds that they differ very greatly in respect of\nthe facility with which the states of consciousness are connected and\ndisconnected. The mental state known as _brown_ may be united with\nthose mental states which make up the figure known as _bird_, without\nappreciable effort, or may be separated from them without appreciable\neffort: the bird may easily be thought of as black, or green, or\nyellow. Contrariwise, such an assertion as \u201cThe ice was hot,\u201d is one\nto which he finds much difficulty in making his mind respond. The\nelements of the proposition cannot be put together in thought without\ngreat resistance. Between those other states of consciousness which\nthe word _ice_ connotes, and the state of consciousness named _cold_,\nthere is an extremely strong cohesion\u2014a cohesion measured by the\nresistance to be overcome in thinking of the ice as _hot_. Further, he\nfinds that in many cases the states of consciousness grouped together\ncannot be separated at all. The idea of pressure cannot be disconnected\nfrom the idea of something occupying space. Motion cannot be thought\n{206} of without an object that moves being at the same time thought\nof. And then, besides these connexions in consciousness which remain\nabsolute under all circumstances, there are others which remain\nabsolute under special circumstances. Between the elements of those\nmore vivid states of consciousness which the inquirer distinguishes\nas perceptions, he finds that there is a temporarily-indissoluble\ncohesion. Though when there arises in him that comparatively faint\nstate of consciousness which he calls the idea of a book, he can easily\nthink of the book as red, or brown, or green; yet when he has that much\nstronger consciousness which he calls seeing a book, he finds that so\nlong as there continue certain accompanying states of consciousness\nwhich he calls the conditions to perception, those several states of\nconsciousness which make up the perception cannot be disunited\u2014he\ncannot think of the book as red, or green, or brown; but finds that,\nalong with a certain figure, there absolutely coheres a certain colour.\n\nStill shutting himself up within these limits, let us suppose the\ninquirer to ask himself what he thinks about these various degrees\nof cohesion among his states of consciousness\u2014how he names them, and\nhow he behaves toward them. If there comes, no matter whence, the\nproposition\u2014\u201cThe bird was brown,\u201d subject and predicate answering\nto these words spring up together in consciousness; and if there\nis no opposing proposition, he unites the specified and implied\nattributes without effort, and believes the proposition. If, however,\nthe proposition is\u2014\u201cThe bird was necessarily brown,\u201d he makes an\nexperiment like those above described, and finding that he can separate\nthe attribute of brownness, and can think of the bird as green or\nyellow, he does not admit that the bird was necessarily brown. When\nsuch a proposition as \u201cThe ice was cold\u201d arises in him, the elements\nof the thought behave as before; and so long as no test is applied,\nthe union of the consciousness of cold with the {207} accompanying\nstates of consciousness, seems to be of the same nature as the union\nbetween those answering to the words _brown_ and _bird_. But should\nthe proposition be changed into\u2014\u201cThe ice was necessarily cold,\u201d\nquite a different result happens from that which happened in the\nprevious case. The ideas answering to subject and predicate are here\nso coherent, that in the absence of careful examination they might\npass as inseparable, and the proposition be accepted. But suppose\nthe proposition is deliberately tested by trying whether ice can be\nthought of as not cold. Great resistance is offered in consciousness\nto this. Still, by an effort, he can imagine water to have its\ntemperature of congelation higher than blood heat; and can so think\nof congealed water as hot instead of cold. Now the extremely strong\ncohesion of states of consciousness, thus experimentally proved by\nthe difficulty of separating them, he finds to be what he calls a\nstrong belief. Once more, in response to the words\u2014\u201cAlong with motion\nthere is something that moves,\u201d he represents to himself a moving\nbody; and, until he tries an experiment upon it, he may suppose the\nelements of the representation to be united in the same way as those\nof the representations instanced above. But supposing the proposition\nis modified into\u2014\u201cAlong with motion there is necessarily something\nthat moves,\u201d the response made in thought to these words, discloses\nthe fact that the states of consciousness called up in this case are\nindissolubly connected in the way alleged. He discovers this by trying\nto conceive the negation of the proposition\u2014by trying to think of\nmotion as _not_ having along with it something that moves; and his\ninability to conceive this negation is the obverse of his inability\nto tear asunder the states of consciousness which constitute the\naffirmation. Those propositions which survive this strain, are the\npropositions he distinguishes as necessary. Whether or not he means any\nthing else by this word, he evidently means that in his consciousness\nthe connexions {208} they predicate are, so far as he can ascertain,\nunalterable. The bare fact is that he submits to them because he has\nno choice. They rule his thoughts whether he will or not. Leaving out\nall questions concerning the origin of these connexions\u2014all theories\nconcerning their significations, there remains in the inquirer the\nconsciousness that certain of his states of consciousness are so welded\ntogether that all other links in the chain of consciousness yield\nbefore these give way.\n\nContinuing rigorously to exclude everything beyond consciousness, let\nhim now ask himself what he means by reasoning? what is the essential\nnature of an argument? what is the peculiarity of a conclusion?\nAnalysis soon shows him that reasoning is the formation of a coherent\nseries of states of consciousness. He has found that the thoughts\nexpressed by propositions, vary in the cohesions of their subjects and\npredicates; and he finds that at every step in an argument, carefully\ncarried on, he tests the strengths of all the connexions asserted and\nimplied. He considers whether the object named really does belong to\nthe class in which it is included\u2014tries whether he can think of it as\n_not_ like the things it is said to be like. He considers whether the\nattribute alleged is really possessed by all members of the class\u2014tries\nto think of some member of the class that has _not_ the attribute\u2014And\nhe admits the proposition only on finding, by this criticism, that\nthere is a greater degree of cohesion in thought between its elements,\nthan between the elements of the counter-proposition. Thus testing\nthe strength of each link in the argument, he at length reaches the\nconclusion, which he tests in the same way. If he accepts it, he does\nso because the argument has established in him an indirect cohesion\nbetween states of consciousness that were not directly coherent,\nor not so coherent directly as the argument makes them indirectly.\nBut he accepts it only supposing that the connexion between the two\nstates of consciousness {209} composing it, is not resisted by\nsome stronger counter-connexion. If there happens to be an opposing\nargument, of which the component thoughts are felt, when tested, to be\nmore coherent; or if, in the absence of an opposing argument, there\nexists an apposing conclusion, of which the elements have some direct\ncohesion greater than that which the proffered argument indirectly\ngives; then the conclusion reached by this argument is not admitted.\nThus, a discussion in consciousness proves to be simply a trial of\nstrength between different connexions in consciousness\u2014a systematized\nstruggle serving to determine which are the least coherent states\nof consciousness. And the result of the struggle is, that the least\ncoherent states of consciousness separate, while the most coherent\nremain together\u2014form a proposition of which the predicate persists in\nrising up in the mind along with its subject\u2014constitute one of the\nconnexions in thought which is distinguished as something known, or as\nsomething believed, according to its strength.\n\nWhat corollary may the inquirer draw, or rather what corollary must\nhe draw, on pushing the analysis to its limit? If there are any\nindissoluble connexions, he is compelled to accept them. If certain\nstates of consciousness absolutely cohere in certain ways, he is\nobliged to think them in those ways. The proposition is an identical\none. To say that they are necessities of thought is merely another way\nof saying that their elements cannot be torn asunder. No reasoning\ncan give to these absolute cohesions in thought any better warrant;\nsince all reasoning, being a process of testing cohesions, is itself\ncarried on by accepting the absolute cohesions; and can, in the last\nresort, do nothing more than present some absolute cohesions in\njustification of others\u2014an act which unwarrantably assumes in the\nabsolute cohesions it offers, a greater value than is allowed to the\nabsolute cohesions it would justify. Here, then, the inquirer comes\ndown to an {210} ultimate mental uniformity\u2014a universal law of his\nthinking. How completely his thought is subordinated to this law,\nis shown by the fact that he cannot even represent to himself the\npossibility of any other law. To suppose the connexions among his\nstates of consciousness to be otherwise determined, is to suppose a\nsmaller force overcoming a greater\u2014a proposition which may be expressed\nin words but cannot be rendered into ideas. No matter what he calls\nthese indestructible relations, no matter what he supposes to be their\nmeanings, he is completely fettered by them. Their indestructibility\nis the proof to him that his consciousness is imprisoned within them;\nand supposing any of them to be in some way destroyed, he perceives\nthat indestructibility would still be the distinctive character of the\nbounds that remained\u2014the test of those which he must continue to think.\n\nThese results the inquirer arrives at without assuming any other\nexistence than that of his own consciousness. They postulate nothing\nabout mind or matter, subject or object. They leave wholly untouched\nthe questions\u2014what does consciousness imply? and how is thought\ngenerated? There is not involved in the analysis any hypothesis\nrespecting the origin of these relations between thoughts\u2014how there\ncome to be feeble cohesions, strong cohesions, and absolute cohesions.\nWhatever some of the terms used may have seemed to connote, it will be\nfound, on examining each step, that nothing is essentially involved\nbeyond states of mind and the connexions among them, which are\nthemselves other states of mind. Thus far, the argument is not vitiated\nby any _petitio principii_.\n\nShould the inquirer enter upon the question, How are these facts to\nbe explained? he must consider how any further investigation is to\nbe conducted, and what is the possible degree of validity of its\nconclusions. Remembering that he cannot transcend consciousness, he\nsees that anything in the shape of an interpretation must be {211}\nsubordinate to the laws of consciousness. Every hypothesis he\nentertains in trying to explain himself to himself, being an hypothesis\nwhich can be dealt with by him only in terms of his mental states, it\nfollows that any process of explanation must itself be carried on by\ntesting the cohesions among mental states, and accepting the absolute\ncohesions. His conclusions, therefore, reached only by repeated\nrecognitions of this test of absolute cohesion, can never have any\nhigher validity than this test. It matters not what name he gives to a\nconclusion\u2014whether he calls it a belief, a theory, a fact, or a truth.\nThese words can be themselves only names for certain relations among\nhis states of consciousness. Any secondary meanings which he ascribes\nto them must also be meanings expressed in terms of consciousness, and\ntherefore subordinate to the laws of consciousness. Hence he has no\nappeal from this ultimate dictum; and seeing this, he sees that the\nonly possible further achievement is the reconciliation of the dicta\nof consciousness with one another\u2014the bringing all other dicta of\nconsciousness into harmony with this ultimate dictum.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nHere, then, the inquirer discovers a warrant higher than that\nwhich any argument can give, for asserting an objective existence.\nMysterious as seems the consciousness of something which is yet out of\nconsciousness, he finds that he alleges the reality of this something\nin virtue of the ultimate law\u2014he is obliged to think it. There is\nan indissoluble cohesion between each of those vivid and definite\nstates of consciousness which he calls a sensation, and an indefinable\nconsciousness which stands for a mode of being beyond sensation, and\nseparate from himself. When grasping his fork and putting food into\nhis mouth, he is wholly unable to expel from his mind the notion of\nsomething which resists the force he is conscious of using; and he\ncannot suppress the nascent thought of an independent existence keeping\napart his tongue and palate, and giving {212} him that sensation\nof taste which he is unable to generate in consciousness by his own\nactivity. Though self-criticism shows him that he cannot know what\nthis is which lies outside of him; and though he may infer that not\nbeing able to say what it is, it is a fiction; he discovers that such\nself-criticism utterly fails to extinguish the consciousness of it as\na reality. Any conclusion into which he argues himself, that there\nis no objective existence connected with these subjective states,\nproves to be a mere verbal conclusion to which his thoughts will not\nrespond. The relation survives every effort to destroy it\u2014is proved\nby experiment, repeated no matter how often, to be one of which the\nnegation is inconceivable; and therefore one having supreme authority.\nIn vain he endeavours to give it any greater authority by reasoning;\nfor whichever of the two alternatives he sets out with, leaves him at\nthe end just where he started. If, knowing nothing more than his own\nstates of consciousness, he declines to acknowledge any thing beyond\nconsciousness until it is proved, he may go on reasoning for ever\nwithout getting any further; since the perpetual elaboration of states\nof consciousness out of states of consciousness, can never produce\nanything more than states of consciousness. If, contrariwise, he\npostulates external existence, and considers it as merely postulated,\nthen the whole fabric of his argument, standing upon this postulate,\nhas no greater validity than the postulate gives it, _minus_ the\npossible invalidity of the argument itself. The case must not be\nconfounded with those cases in which an hypothesis, or provisional\nassumption, is eventually proved true by its agreement with facts; for\nin these cases the facts with which it is found to agree, are facts\nknown in some other way than through the hypothesis: a calculated\neclipse of the moon serves as a verification of the hypothesis of\ngravitation, because its occurrence is observable without taking for\ngranted the hypothesis of gravitation. But when the external world\n{213} is postulated, and it is supposed that the validity of the\npostulate may be shown by the explanation of mental phenomena which\nit furnishes, the vice is, that the process of verification is itself\npossible only by assuming the thing to be proved.\n\nBut now, recognizing the indissoluble cohesion between the\nconsciousness of _self_ and an unknown _not-self_, as constituting a\ndictum of consciousness which he is both compelled to accept and is\njustified by analysis in accepting, it is competent for the inquirer\nto consider whether, setting out with this dictum, he can base on\nit a satisfactory explanation of what he calls knowledge. He finds\nsuch an explanation possible. The hypothesis that the more or less\ncoherent relations among his states of consciousness, are generated\nby experience of the more or less constant relations in something\nbeyond his consciousness, furnishes him with solutions of numerous\nfacts of consciousness: not, however, of all, if he assumes that\nthis adjustment of inner to outer relations has resulted from his\nown experiences alone. Nevertheless, if he allows himself to suppose\nthat this moulding of thoughts into correspondence with things, has\nbeen going on through countless preceding generations; and that the\neffects of experiences have been inherited in the shape of modified\norganic structures; then he is able to interpret all the phenomena. It\nbecomes possible to understand how these persistent cohesions among\nstates of consciousness, are themselves the products of often-repeated\nexperiences; and that even what are known as \u201cforms of thought,\u201d\nare but the absolute internal uniformities generated by infinite\nrepetitions of absolute external uniformities. It becomes possible also\nto understand how, in the course of organizing of these multiplying\nand widening experiences, there may arise partially-wrong connexions\nin thought, answering to limited converse with things; and that these\nconnexions in thought, temporarily taken for indissoluble ones, may\nafterwards be made dissoluble by presentation {214} of external\nrelations at variance with them. But even when this occurs, it can\nafford no ground for questioning the test of indissolubility; since the\nprocess by which some connexion previously accepted as indissoluble,\nis broken, is simply the establishment of some antagonistic connexion,\nwhich proves, on a trial of strength, to be the stronger\u2014which remains\nindissoluble when pitted against the other, while the other gives way.\nAnd this leaves the test just where it was; showing only that there is\na liability to error as to what _are_ indissoluble connexions. From\nthe very beginning, therefore, to the very end of the explanation,\neven down to the criticism of its conclusions and the discovery of its\nerrors, the validity of this test must be postulated. Whence it is\nmanifest, as before said, that the whole business of explanation can\nbe nothing more than that of bringing all other dicta of consciousness\ninto harmony with this ultimate dictum.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nTo the positive justification of a proposition, may be added that\nnegative justification which is derived from the untenability of the\ncounter-proposition. When describing the attitude of pure Empiricism,\nsome indications that its counter-proposition is untenable were given;\nbut it will be well here to state, more specifically, the fundamental\nobjections to which it is open.\n\nIf the ultimate test of truth is not that here alleged, then what\nis the ultimate test of truth? And if there is no ultimate test of\ntruth, then what is the warrant for accepting certain propositions\nand rejecting others? An opponent who denies the validity of this\ntest, may legitimately decline to furnish any test himself, so long\nas he does not affirm any thing to be true; but if he affirms some\nthings to be true and others to be not true, his warrant for doing\nso may fairly be demanded. Let us glance at the possible response to\nthe demand. If asked why he holds it to be unquestionably true that\ntwo quantities which differ {215} in unequal degrees from a third\nquantity are themselves unequal, two replies seem open to him: he may\nsay that this is an ultimate fact of consciousness, or that it is an\ninduction from personal experiences. The reply that it is an ultimate\nfact of consciousness, raises the question, How is an ultimate fact\nof consciousness distinguished? All beliefs, all conclusions, all\nimaginations even, are facts of consciousness; and if some are to\nbe accepted as beyond question because ultimate, while others are\nnot to be accepted as beyond question because not ultimate, there\ncomes the inevitable inquiry respecting the test of ultimacy. On the\nother hand, the reply that this truth is known only by induction from\npersonal experiences, suggests the query\u2014On what warrant are personal\nexperiences asserted? The testimony of experience is given only through\nmemory; and its worth depends wholly on the trustworthiness of memory.\nIs it, then, that the trustworthiness of memory is less open to doubt\nthan the immediate consciousness that two quantities must be unequal if\nthey differ from a third quantity in unequal degrees? This can scarcely\nbe alleged. Memory is notoriously uncertain. We sometimes suppose\nourselves to have said things which it turns out we did not say; and\nwe often forget seeing things which it is proved we did see. We speak\nof many passages of our lives as seeming like dreams; and can vaguely\nimagine the whole past to be an illusion. We can go much further toward\nconceiving that our recollections do not answer to any actualities,\nthan we can go toward conceiving the non-existence of Space. But even\nsupposing the deliverances of memory to be above criticism, the most\nthat can be said for the experiences to which memory testifies, is that\nwe are obliged to think we have had them\u2014cannot conceive the negation\nof the proposition that we have had them; and to say this is to assign\nthe warrant which is repudiated.\n\nA further counter-criticism may be made. Throughout the argument\nof pure Empiricism, it is tacitly assumed that {216} there may be\na Philosophy in which nothing is asserted but what is proved. It\nproposes to admit into the coherent fabric of its conclusions, no\nconclusion that is incapable of being established by evidence; and\nit thus takes for granted that not only may all derivative truths be\nproved, but also that proof may be given of the truths from which\nthey are derived, down to the very deepest. The result of thus\nrefusing to recognize some fundamental unproved truth, is simply to\nleave its fabric of conclusions without a base. The giving proof of\nany special proposition, is the assimilation of it to some class of\npropositions known to be true. If any doubt arises respecting the\ngeneral proposition which is cited in justification of this special\nproposition, the course is to show that this general proposition\nis deducible from a proposition or propositions of still greater\ngenerality; and if pressed for proof of each such still more general\nproposition, the only resource is to repeat the process. Is this\nprocess endless? If so, nothing can be proved\u2014the whole series of\npropositions depends on some unassignable proposition. Has the\nprocess an end? If so, there must eventually be reached a widest\nproposition\u2014one which cannot be justified by showing that it is\nincluded by any wider\u2014one which cannot be proved. Or to put the\nargument otherwise: Every inference depends on premises; every premise,\nif it admits of proof, depends on other premises; and if the proof of\nthe proof be continually demanded, it must either end in an unproved\npremise, or in the acknowledgment that there cannot be reached any\npremise on which the entire series of proofs depends. Hence Philosophy,\nif it does not avowedly stand on some datum underlying reason, must\nacknowledge that it has nothing on which to stand.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe expression of divergence from Mr. Mill on this fundamental\nquestion, I have undertaken with reluctance, only on finding it\nneedful, both on personal and on general {217} grounds, that his\nstatements and arguments should be met. For two reasons, especially,\nI regret having thus to contend against the doctrine of one whose\nagreement I should value more than that of any other thinker. In the\nfirst place, the difference is, I believe, superficial rather than\nsubstantial; for it is in the interests of the Experience-Hypothesis\nthat Mr. Mill opposes the alleged criterion of truth; while it is as\nharmonizing with the Experience-Hypothesis, and reconciling it with\nall the facts, that I defend this criterion. In the second place, this\nlengthened exposition of a single point of difference, unaccompanied\nby an exposition of the numerous points of concurrence, unavoidably\nproduces an appearance of dissent very far greater than that which\nexists. Mr. Mill, however, whose unswerving allegiance to truth is on\nall occasions so conspicuously displayed, will fully recognize the\njustification for this utterance of disagreement on a matter of such\nprofound importance, philosophically considered; and will not require\nany apology for the entire freedom with which I have criticised his\nviews while seeking to substantiate my own.\n\n\n\n\n{218}\n\nREPLIES TO CRITICISMS.\n\n\n[_First published in_ The Fortnightly Review _for November and December\n1873._]\n\nWhen made by a competent reader, an objection usually implies one\nof two things. Either the statement to which he demurs is wholly or\npartially untrue; or, if true, it is presented in such a way as to\npermit misapprehension. A need for some change or addition is in any\ncase shown.\n\nNot recognizing the errors alleged, but thinking rather that\nmisapprehensions cause the dissent of those who have attacked the\nmetaphysico-theological doctrines held by me, I propose here to meet,\nby explanations and arguments, the chief objections urged: partly with\nthe view of justifying these doctrines, and partly with the view of\nguarding against the wrong interpretations which it appears are apt to\nbe made.\n\nThe pages of a periodical intended for general reading may be thought\nscarcely fitted for the treatment of these highly abstract questions.\nThere is now, however, so considerable a class interested in them,\nand they are so deeply involved with the great changes of opinion in\nprogress, that I have ventured to hope for readers outside the circle\nof those who occupy themselves with philosophy.\n\nOf course the criticisms to be noticed I have selected, {219} either\nbecause of their intrinsic force, or because they come from men whose\npositions or reputations give them weight. To meet more than a few of\nmy opponents is out of the question.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nLet me begin with a criticism contained in the sermon preached by the\nRev. Principal Caird before the British Association, on the occasion\nof its meeting in Edinburgh, in August, 1871. Expressed with a\ncourtesy which, happily, is now less rare than of yore in theological\ncontroversy, Dr. Caird\u2019s objection might, I think, be admitted without\ninvolving essential change in the conclusion demurred to; while it\nmight be shown to tell with greater force against the conclusions of\nthinkers classed as orthodox, Sir W. Hamilton and Dean Mansel, than\nagainst my own. Describing this as set forth by me, Dr. Caird says:\u2015\n\n \u201cHis thesis is that the provinces of science and religion are\n distinguished from each other as the known from the unknown and\n unknowable. This thesis is maintained mainly on a critical examination\n of the nature of human intelligence, in which the writer adopts and\n carries to its extreme logical results the doctrine of the relativity\n of human knowledge which, propounded by Kant, has been reproduced with\n special application to theology by a famous school of philosophers\n in this country. From the very nature of human intelligence, it\n is attempted to be shown that it can only know what is finite and\n relative, and that therefore the absolute and infinite the human mind\n is, by an inherent and insuperable disability, debarred from knowing.\n .\u00a0.\u00a0.\u00a0. May it not be asked, for one thing, whether in the assertion,\n as the result of an examination of the human intellect, that it\n is incapable of knowing what lies beyond the finite, there is not\n involved an obvious self-contradiction? The examination of the mind\n can be conducted only by the mind, and if the instrument be, as is\n alleged, limited and defective, the result of the inquiry must partake\n of that defectiveness. Again, does not the knowledge of a limit imply\n already the power to transcend it? In affirming that human science\n is incapable of crossing the bounds of the finite world, is it not a\n necessary presupposition that you who so affirm have crossed these\n bounds?\u201d\n\nThat this objection is one I am not disinclined to recognize, will\nbe inferred when I state that it is one I have myself raised. While\npreparing the second edition of the {220} _Principles of Psychology_,\nI found, among my memoranda, a note which still bore the wafers by\nwhich it had been attached to the original manuscript (unless, indeed,\nit had been transferred from the MS. of _First Principles_, which its\nallusion seems to imply). It was this:\u2015\n\n \u201cI may here remark in passing that the several reasonings,\n including the one above quoted, by which Sir William Hamilton would\n demonstrate the pure relativity of our knowledge\u2014reasonings which\n clearly establish many important truths, and with which in the\n main I agree\u2014are yet capable of being turned against himself, when\n he definitely concludes that it is impossible for us to know the\n absolute. For to positively assert that the absolute cannot be known,\n is in a certain sense to assert a _knowledge_ of it\u2014is to _know_ it\n as _unknowable_. To affirm that human intelligence is confined to the\n conditioned, is to put an _absolute limit_ to human intelligence,\n and implies _absolute knowledge_. It seems to me that the \u2018learned\n ignorance\u2019 with which philosophy ends, must be carried a step further;\n and instead of positively saying that the absolute is unknowable, we\n must say that we cannot tell whether it is knowable or not.\u201d\n\nWhy I omitted this note I cannot now remember. Possibly it was because\nre-consideration disclosed a reply to the contained objection. For\nwhile it is true that the intellect cannot prove its own competence,\nsince it must postulate its own competence in the course of the\nproof, and so beg the question; yet it does not follow that it cannot\nprove its own incompetence respecting questions of certain kinds. Its\ninability in respect of such questions has two conceivable causes.\nIt may be that the deliverances of Reason in general are invalid, in\nwhich case the incompetence of Reason to solve questions of a certain\nclass is implied by its general incompetence; or it may be that the\ndeliverances of Reason, valid within a certain range, themselves end\nin the conclusion that Reason is incapable beyond that range. So that\nwhile there can be no proof of competence, because competence is\npostulated in each step of the demonstration, there may be proof of\nincompetence either (1) if the successive deliverances forming the\nsteps of the demonstration, by severally evolving contradictions, show\ntheir untrustworthiness, or (2) if, being trustworthy, {221} they\nlead to the result that on certain questions Reason cannot give any\ndeliverance.\n\nReason leads both inductively and deductively to the conclusion\nthat the sphere of Reason is limited. Inductively, this conclusion\nexpresses the result of countless futile attempts to transcend\nthis sphere\u2014attempts to understand Matter, Motion, Space, Time,\nForce, in their ultimate natures\u2014attempts which, bringing us always\nto alternative impossibilities of thought, warrant the inference\nthat such attempts will continue to fail, as they have hitherto\nfailed. Deductively, this conclusion expresses the result of mental\nanalysis, which shows us that the product of thought is in all cases\na relation, identified as such or such; that the process of thought\nis the identification and classing of relations; that therefore Being\nin itself, out of relation, is unthinkable, as not admitting of\nbeing brought within the form of thought. That is to say, deduction\nexplains that failure of Reason established as an induction from many\nexperiments. And to call in question the ability of Reason to give this\nverdict against itself in respect of these transcendent problems, is to\ncall in question its ability to draw valid conclusions from premises;\nwhich is to assert a general incompetence necessarily inclusive of the\nspecial incompetence.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nClosely connected with the foregoing, is a criticism from Dr. Mansel,\non which I may here make some comments. In a note to his _Philosophy of\nthe Conditioned_ p. 39, he says:\u2015\n\n \u201cMr. Herbert Spencer, in his work on _First Principles_, endeavours\n to press Sir W. Hamilton into the service of Pantheism and Positivism\n together\u201d [a somewhat strange assertion, by the way, considering that\n I reject them both], \u201cby adopting the negative portion only of his\n philosophy\u2014in which, in common with many other writers, he declares\n the absolute to be inconceivable by the mere intellect,\u2014and rejecting\n the positive portions, in which he most emphatically maintains that\n the belief in a personal God is imperatively demanded by the facts\n of our moral and emotional consciousness. .\u00a0.\u00a0.\u00a0. Sir W. Hamilton\u2019s\n fundamental principle is, that consciousness {222} must be accepted\n entire, and that the moral and religious feelings, which are the\n primary source of our belief in a personal God, are in no way\n invalidated by the merely negative inferences which have deluded men\n into the assumption of an impersonal absolute. .\u00a0.\u00a0.\u00a0. Mr. Spencer, on\n the other hand, takes these negative inferences as the only basis of\n religion, and abandons Hamilton\u2019s great principle of the distinction\n between knowledge and belief.\u201d\n\nPutting these statements in the order most convenient for discussion, I\nwill deal first with the last of them. Instead of saying what he does,\nDr. Mansel should have said that I decline to follow Sir W. Hamilton\nin confounding two distinct, and indeed radically-opposed, meanings\nof the word _belief_. This word \u201cis habitually applied to dicta of\nconsciousness for which no proof can be assigned: both those which\nare unprovable because they underlie all proof, and those which are\nunprovable because of the absence of evidence.\u201d[24] In the pages of the\n_Fortnightly Review_ for July, 1865, I exhibited this distinction as\nfollows:\u2015\n\n \u201cWe commonly say we \u2018believe\u2019 a thing for which we can assign some\n preponderating evidence, or concerning which we have received some\n indefinable impression. We _believe_ that the next House of Commons\n will not abolish Church-rates; or we _believe_ that a person on\n whose face we look is good-natured. That is, when we can give\n confessedly-inadequate proofs, or no proofs at all, for the things\n we think, we call them \u2018beliefs.\u2019 And it is the peculiarity of these\n beliefs, as contrasted with cognitions, that their connexions with\n antecedent states of consciousness may be easily severed, instead of\n being difficult to sever. But unhappily, the word \u2018belief\u2019 is also\n applied to each of those temporarily or permanently indissoluble\n connexions in consciousness, for the acceptance of which the only\n warrant is that it cannot be got rid of. Saying that I feel a pain,\n or hear a sound, or see one line to be longer than another, is saying\n that there has occurred in me a certain change of state; and it is\n impossible for me to give a stronger evidence of this fact than that\n it is present to my mind. .\u00a0.\u00a0.\u00a0. \u2018Belief\u2019 having, as above pointed\n out, become the name of an impression for which we can give only a\n confessedly-inadequate reason, or no reason at all; it happens that\n when pushed hard respecting the warrant for any ultimate dictum of\n consciousness, we say, in the absence of all assignable reason, that\n we _believe_ it. Thus the two opposite poles of knowledge go under the\n same name; and by the reverse connotations of this name, as used for\n the most coherent and least coherent relations of thought, profound\n misconceptions have been generated.\u201d\n\nNow that the belief which the moral and religious {223} feelings are\nsaid to yield of a personal God, is not one of the beliefs which are\nunprovable because they underlie all proof, is obvious. It needs but to\nremember that in works on Natural Theology, the existence of a personal\nGod is _inferred_ from these moral and religious feelings, to show that\nit is not contained in these feelings themselves, or joined with them\nas an inseparable intuition. It is not a belief like the beliefs which\nI now have that this is daylight, and that there is open space before\nme\u2014beliefs which cannot be proved because they are of equal simplicity\nwith, and of no less certainty than, each step in a demonstration. Were\nit a belief of this most certain kind, argument would be superfluous:\nall races of men and every individual would have the belief in an\ninexpugnable form. Hence it is manifest that, confusing the two very\ndifferent states of consciousness called beliefs, Sir W. Hamilton\nascribes to the second a certainty that belongs only to the first.\n\nAgain, neither Sir W. Hamilton nor Dr. Mansel has enabled us to\ndistinguish those \u201cfacts of our moral and emotional consciousness\u201d\nwhich imperatively demand the belief in a personal God, from those\nfacts of our (or of men\u2019s) \u201cmoral and emotional consciousness\u201d which,\nin those having them, imperatively demand beliefs that Sir W. Hamilton\nwould regard as untrue. A New Zealand chief, discovering his wife\nin an infidelity, killed the man; the wife then killed herself that\nshe might join her lover in the other world; and the chief thereupon\nkilled himself that he might go after them to defeat this intention.\nThese two acts of suicide furnish tolerably strong evidence that these\nNew Zealanders believed in another world to which, they could go at\nwill, and fulfil their desires as they did here. If they were asked\nthe justification for this belief, and if the arguments by which they\nsought to establish it were not admitted, they might still fall back\non emotional {224} consciousness as yielding them an unshakeable\nfoundation for it. I do not see why a Fiji Islander, adopting the\nHamiltonian argument, should not justify by it his conviction that\nafter being buried alive, his life in the other world, forthwith\ncommencing at the age he has reached in this, will similarly supply\nhim with the joys of conquest and the gratifications of cannibalism.\nThat he has a conviction to this effect stronger than the religious\nconvictions current among civilized people, is proved by the fact that\nhe goes to be buried alive quite willingly. And as we may presume that\nhis conviction is not the outcome of a demonstration, it must be the\noutcome of some state of feeling\u2014some \u201cemotional consciousness.\u201d Why,\nthen, should he not assign the \u201cfacts\u201d of his \u201cemotional consciousness\u201d\nas \u201cimperatively demanding\u201d this belief? Manifestly, this principle\nthat \u201cconsciousness must be accepted entire,\u201d either obliges us to\naccept as true the superstitions of all mankind, or else obliges us to\nsay that the consciousness of a certain limited class of cultivated\npeople is alone meant. If things are to be believed simply because\nthe facts of emotional consciousness imperatively demand the beliefs,\nI do not see why the actual existence of a ghost in a house, is not\ninevitably implied by the intense fear of it that is aroused in the\nchild or the servant.\n\nLastly, and chiefly, I have to deal with Dr. Mansel\u2019s statement that\n\u201cMr. Spencer, on the other hand, takes these negative inferences as\nthe only basis of religion.\u201d This statement is exactly the reverse\nof the truth; since I have contended, against Hamilton and against\nhim, that the consciousness of that which is manifested to us through\nphenomena is _positive_, and not _negative_, as they allege, and that\nthis positive consciousness supplies an indestructible basis for the\nreligious sentiment (_First Principles_, \u00a7 26). Instead of giving here\npassages to show this, I may fitly quote the statement and opinion of a\n{225} foreign theologian. M. le pasteur Grotz, of the Reformed Church\nat Nismes, writes thus:\u2015\n\n \u201cLa science serait-elle done par nature ennemie de la religion? pour\n \u00eatre religieux, faut-il proscrire la science?\u2014C\u2019est la science,\n la science exp\u00e9rimentale qui va maintenant parler en faveur de la\n religion; c\u2019est elle qui, par la bouche de l\u2019un des penseurs .\u00a0.\u00a0. de\n notre \u00e9poque, M. Herbert Spencer, va r\u00e9pondre \u00e0 la fois \u00e0 M. Vacherot\n et \u00e0 M. Comte.\u201d\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n \u201cIci, M. Spencer discute la th\u00e9orie de l\u2019_inconditionn\u00e9_; entendez\n par ce mot: Dieu. Le philosophie \u00e9cossais, Hamilton, et son disciple,\n M. Mansel, disent comme nos positivistes fran\u00e7ais: \u2018Nous ne pouvons\n affirmer l\u2019existence positive de quoi que ce soit au del\u00e0 des\n ph\u00e9nom\u00e8nes.\u2019 Seulement, Hamilton et son disciple se s\u00e9parent de nos\n compatriotes en faisant intervenir une \u2018r\u00e9v\u00e9lation merveilleuse\u2019 qui\n nous fait croire \u00e0 l\u2019existence de l\u2019inconditionn\u00e9, et gr\u00e2ce \u00e0 cette\n r\u00e9v\u00e9lation vraiment merveilleuse, toute l\u2019orthodoxie revient. Est-il\n vrai que nous ne puissions rien affirmer au del\u00e0 des ph\u00e9nom\u00e8nes? M.\n Spencer d\u00e9clare qu\u2019il y a dans cette assertion une grave erreur. Le\n c\u00f4t\u00e9 logique, dit-il fort justement, n\u2019est pas le seul; il y a aussi\n le c\u00f4t\u00e9 psychologique, et, selon nous, il prouve que l\u2019existence\n positive de l\u2019absolu est une donn\u00e9e n\u00e9cessaire de la conscience.\u201d\n\n \u201cL\u00e0 est la base de l\u2019accord entre la religion et la science. Dans un\n chapitre .\u00a0.\u00a0.\u00a0. intitul\u00e9 _R\u00e9conciliation_, M. Spencer etablit et\n d\u00e9veloppe cet accord sur son v\u00e9ritable terrain.\u201d\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n \u201cM. Spencer, en restant sur le terrain de la logique et de la\n psychologie, et sans recourir \u00e0 une intervention surnaturelle, a\n \u00e9tabli la legitimit\u00e9, la n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 et l\u2019eternelle dur\u00e9e du sentiment\n religieux et de la religion.\u201d[25]\n\nI turn next to what has been said by Dr. Shadworth H. Hodgson, in his\nessay on \u201cThe Future of Metaphysic,\u201d published in the _Contemporary\nReview_ for November, 1872. Remarking only, with respect to the\nagreements he expresses in certain views of mine, that I value them\nas coming from a thinker of subtlety and independence, I will confine\nmyself here to his disagreements. Dr. Hodgson, before giving his own\nview, briefly describes and criticizes the views of Hegel and Comte,\nwith both of whom he partly agrees and partly disagrees, and then {226}\nproceeds to criticize the view set forth by me. After a preliminary\nbrief statement of my position, to the wording of which I demur, he\ngoes on to say:\u2015\n\n \u201cIn his _First Principles_, Part I, second ed., there is a chapter\n headed \u2018Ultimate Scientific Ideas,\u2019 in which he enumerates six such\n ideas or groups of ideas, and attempts to show that they are entirely\n incomprehensible. The six are:\u20141. Space and Time. 2. Matter. 3. Rest\n and Motion. 4. Force. 5. Consciousness. 6. The Soul, or the Ego. Now\n to enter at length into all of these would be an undertaking too large\n for the present occasion; but I will take the first of the six, and\n endeavour to show in its case the entire untenability of Mr. Spencer\u2019s\n view; and since the same arguments may be employed against the rest, I\n shall be content that my case against them should be held to fail if\n my case should fail in respect to Space and Time.\u201d\n\nI willingly join issue with Dr. Hodgson on these terms; and proceed\nto examine, one by one, the several arguments he uses to show the\ninvalidity of my conclusions. Following his criticisms in the order\nhe has chosen, I begin with the sentence following that which I have\njust quoted. The first part of it runs thus:\u2014\u201cThe metaphysical view of\nSpace and Time is, that they are elements in all phenomena, whether the\nphenomena are presentations or representations.\u201d\n\nWhether, by \u201cthe metaphysical view,\u201d is here meant the view of Kant,\nwhether it means Dr. Hodgson\u2019s own view, or whether the expression has\na more general meaning, I have simply to reply that the metaphysical\nview is incorrect. Dealing with the Kantian version of this doctrine,\nthat Space is a form of intuition, I have pointed out that only with\ncertain classes of phenomena is Space united indissolubly; that Kant\nhabitually considers phenomena belonging to the visual and tactual\ngroups, with which the consciousness of space is inseparably joined,\nand overlooks groups with which it is not inseparably joined. Though\nin the adult, perception of sound has certain space-implications,\nmostly, if not wholly, acquired by individual experience; and though it\nwould seem from the instructive experiments of Mr. Spalding, that in\ncreatures born with nervous systems much more organized than our own\nare at birth, {227} there is some innate perception of the side from\nwhich a sound comes; yet it is demonstrable that the space-implications\nof sound are not originally given with the sensation as its form\nof intuition. Bearing in mind the Kantian doctrine, that Space is\nthe form of sensuous intuitions not only as _presented_ but also as\n_represented_, let us examine critically our musical ideas. As I have\nelsewhere suggested to the reader\u2015\n\n \u201cLet him observe what happens when some melody takes possession of\n his imagination. Its tones and cadences go on repeating themselves\n apart from any space-consciousness\u2014they are not localized. He may or\n may not be reminded of the place where he heard them\u2014this association\n is incidental only. Having observed this, he will see that such\n space-implications as sounds have, are learnt in the course of\n individual experience, and are not given with the sounds themselves.\n Indeed, if we refer to the Kantian definition of form, we get a simple\n and conclusive proof of this. Kant says form is \u2018that which effects\n that the content of the ph\u00e6nomenon can be arranged under certain\n relations.\u2019 How then can the content of the phenomenon we call sound\n be arranged? Its parts can be arranged in order of sequence\u2014that is,\n in Time. But there is no possibility of arranging its parts in order\n of coexistence\u2014that is, in Space. And it is just the same with odour.\n Whoever thinks that sound and odour have Space for their form of\n intuition, may convince himself to the contrary by trying to find the\n right and left sides of a sound, or to imagine an odour turned the\n other way upwards.\u201d\u2014_Principles of Psychology_, \u00a7 399.\u2014Note.\n\nAs I thus dissent, not I think without good reason, from \u201cthe\nmetaphysical view of Space and Time\u201d as \u201celements in all phenomena,\u201d\nit will naturally be expected that I dissent from the first criticism\nwhich Dr. Hodgson proceeds to deduce from it. Dealing first with the\narguments I have used to show the incomprehensibility of Space and\nTime, if we consider them as objective, and stating in other words the\nconclusion I draw, that \u201cas Space and Time cannot be either nonentities\nnor the attributes of entities, we have no choice but to consider them\nas entities.\u201d Dr. Hodgson continues:\u2015\n\n  \u201cSo far good. Secondly, he argues that they cannot be represented\n in thought as such real existences, because \u2018to be conceived at\n all, a thing must be conceived as having attributes.\u2019 Now here the\n metaphysical doctrine enables us to conceive them as real existences,\n and rebuts the argument for {228} their inconceivability; for the\n other element, the material element, the feeling or quality occupying\n Space and Time stands in the place and performs the function of the\n required attributes, composing together with the space and time which\n is occupied the empirical phenomena of perception. So far as this\n argument of Mr. Spencer goes, then, we are entitled to say that his\n case for the inconceivability of Space and Time as real existences is\n not made out.\u201d\n\nWhether the fault is in me or not I cannot say, but I fail to see\nthat my argument is thus rebutted. On the contrary, it appears to me\nsubstantially conceded. What kind of entity is that which can exist\nonly when occupied by something else? Dr. Hodgson\u2019s own argument is\na tacit assertion that Space _by itself_ cannot be conceived as an\nexistence; and this is all that I have alleged.\n\nDr. Hodgson deals next with the further argument, familiar to all\nreaders, which I have added as showing the insurmountable difficulty\nin the way of conceiving Space and Time as objective entities; namely,\nthat \u201call entities which we actually know as such are limited. .\u00a0.\u00a0.\nBut of Space and Time we cannot assert either limitation, or the\nabsence of limitation.\u201d Without quoting at length the reasons Dr.\nHodgson gives for distinguishing between Space as _per_ceived and Space\nas _con_ceived, it will suffice if I quote his own statement of the\nresult to which they bring him: \u201cSo that Space and Time as perceived\nare not finite, but infinite, as conceived are not infinite, but\nfinite.\u201d\n\nMost readers will, I think, be startled by the assertion that\nconception is less extensive in range than perception; but, without\ndwelling on this, I will content myself by asking in what case Space\nis perceived as infinite? Surely Dr. Hodgson does not mean to say that\nhe can perceive the whole surrounding Space at once\u2014that the Space\nbehind is united in perception with the Space in front. Yet this is\nthe necessary implication of his words. Taking his statement less\nliterally, however, and not dwelling on the fact that in perception\nSpace is habitually bounded by objects more or less distant, let\nus test his {229} assertion under the most favourable conditions.\nSupposing the eye directed upwards towards a clear sky; is not the\nspace then perceived, laterally limited? The visual area, restricted\nby the visual apertures, cannot include in perception even 180\u00b0 from\nside to side, and is still more confined in a direction at right angles\nto this. Even in the third direction, to which alone Dr. Hodgson\nevidently refers, it cannot properly be said that it is infinite in\nperception. Look at a position in the sky a thousand miles off. Now\nlook at a position a million miles off. What is the difference in\nperception? Nothing. How then can an infinite distance be perceived\nwhen these immensely-unlike finite distances cannot be perceived as\ndiffering from one another, or from an infinite distance? Dr. Hodgson\nhas used the wrong word. Instead of saying that Space as perceived is\ninfinite, he should have said that, in perception, Space is finite in\ntwo dimensions, and becomes _indefinite_ in the third when this becomes\ngreat.\n\nI now come to the paragraph beginning \u201cMr. Spencer then turns to\nthe second or subjective hypothesis, that of Kant.\u201d This paragraph\nis somewhat difficult to deal with, because in it my reasoning is\ncriticized both from the Kantian point of view and from Dr. Hodgson\u2019s\nown point of view. Dissenting from Kant\u2019s view, Dr. Hodgson says, \u201cI\nhold that both Space and Time and Feeling, or the material element, are\nequally and alike subjective, equally and alike objective.\u201d As I cannot\nunderstand this, I am unable to deal with those arguments against me\nwhich Dr. Hodgson bases upon it, and must limit myself to that which he\nurges on behalf of Kant. He says:\u2015\n\n  \u201cBut I think that Mr. Spencer\u2019s representation of Kant\u2019s view is\n very incorrect; he seems to be misled by the large term non-ego. Kant\n held that Space and Time were _in their origin_ subjective, but when\n applied to the non-ego resulted in phenomena, and were the formal\n element in those phenomena, among which some were phenomena of the\n internal sense or ego, others of the external sense or non-ego. The\n non-ego to which the forms of Space and Time did not apply and did not\n belong, was the Ding-an-sich, not the {230} phenomenal non-ego. Hence\n the objective existence of Space and Time in phenomena, but not in the\n Ding-an-sich, is a consistent and necessary consequence of Kant\u2019s view\n of their subjective origin.\u201d\n\nIf I have misunderstood Kant, as thus alleged, then my comment must be\nthat I credited him with an hypothesis less objectionable than that\nwhich he held. I supposed his view to be that Space, as a form of\nintuition belonging to the _ego_, is imposed by it on the _non-ego_\n(by which I understood the thing in itself) in the act of intuition.\nBut now the Kantian doctrine is said to be that Space, originating in\nthe _ego_, when applied to the _non-ego_, results in phenomena (the\n_non-ego_ meant being, in that case, necessarily the Ding-an-sich, or\nthing in itself); and that the phenomena so resulting become objective\nexistences along with the Space given to them by the subject. The\nsubject having imposed Space as a form on the primordial object,\nor thing in itself, and so created phenomena, this Space thereupon\nbecomes an objective existence, independent of both the subject and the\noriginal thing in itself! To Dr. Hodgson this may seem a more tenable\nposition than that which I ascribed to Kant; but to me it seems only a\nmultiplication of inconceivabilities. I am content to leave it as it\nstands: not feeling my reasons for rejecting the Kantian hypothesis\nmuch weakened.[26]\n\nThe remaining reply which Dr. Hodgson makes runs thus:\u2015\n\n  \u201cBut Mr. Spencer has a second argument to prove this\n inconceivability. It is this:\u2014\u2018If Space and Time are forms of\n thought, they can never be {231} thought of; since it is impossible\n for anything to be at once the _form_ of thought and the _matter_ of\n thought.\u2019 .\u00a0.\u00a0.\u00a0. An instance will show the fallacy best. Syllogism is\n usually held to be a form of thought. Would it be any argument for the\n inconceivability of syllogisms to say, they cannot be at once the form\n and the matter of thought? Can we not syllogize about syllogism? Or,\n more plainly still,\u2014no dog can bite himself, for it is impossible to\n be at once the thing that bites and the thing that is bitten.\u201d\n\nHad Dr. Hodgson quoted the whole of the passage from which he takes\nthe above sentence; or had he considered it in conjunction with the\nKantian doctrine to which it refers (namely, that Space survives in\nconsciousness when all contents are expelled, which implies that\nthen Space is the thing with which consciousness is occupied, or the\n_object_ of consciousness), he would have seen that his reply has none\nof the cogency he supposes. If, taking his first illustration, he will\nask himself whether it is possible to \u201csyllogize about syllogism,\u201d when\nsyllogism has no content whatever, symbolic or other\u2014has nonentity to\nserve for major, nonentity for minor, and nonentity for conclusion;\nhe will, I think, see that syllogism, considered as surviving terms\nof every kind, cannot be syllogized about: the \u201cpure form\u201d of reason\n(supposing it to be syllogism, which it is not) if absolutely\ndischarged of all it contains, cannot be represented in thought, and\ntherefore cannot be reasoned about. Following Dr. Hodgson to his second\nillustration, I must express my surprise that a metaphysician of his\nacuteness should have used it. For an illustration to have any value,\nthe relation between the terms of the analogous case {232} must have\nsome parallelism to the relation between the terms of the case with\nwhich it is compared. Does Dr. Hodgson really think that the relation\nbetween a dog and the part of himself which he bites, is like the\nrelation between _matter_ and _form_? Suppose the dog bites his tail.\nNow the dog, as biting, stands, according to Dr. Hodgson, for the form\nas the containing mental faculty; and the tail, as bitten, stands for\nthis mental faculty as contained. Now suppose the dog loses his tail.\nCan the faculty as containing and the faculty as contained be separated\nin the same way? Does the mental form when deprived of all content,\neven itself (granting that it can be its own content), continue to\nexist in the same way that a dog continues to exist when he has lost\nhis tail? Even had this illustration been applicable, I should scarcely\nhave expected Dr. Hodgson to remain satisfied with it. I should have\nthought he would prefer to meet my argument directly, rather than\nindirectly. Why has he not shown the invalidity of the reasoning used\nin the _Principles of Psychology_ (\u00a7 399, 2nd ed.)? Having there quoted\nthe statement of Kant, that \u201cSpace and Time are not merely forms of\nsensuous intuition, but _intuitions_ themselves;\u201d I have written\u2015\n\n \u201cIf we inquire more closely, this irreconcilability becomes still\n clearer. Kant says:\u2014\u2018That which in the ph\u00e6nomenon corresponds to\n the sensation, I term its _matter_; but that which effects that the\n content of the phenomenon can be arranged under certain relations, I\n call its _form_.\u2019 Carrying with us this definition of form, as \u2018that\n which effects that the content .\u00a0.\u00a0.\u00a0. can be arranged under certain\n relations,\u2019 let us return to the case in which the intuition of Space\n is the intuition which occupies consciousness. Can the content of this\n intuition \u2018be arranged under certain relations\u2019 or not? It can be so\n arranged, or rather, it _is_ so arranged. Space cannot be thought of\n save as having parts, near and remote, in this direction or the other.\n Hence, if that is the form of a thing \u2018which effects that the content\n .\u00a0.\u00a0.\u00a0. can be arranged under certain relations,\u2019 it follows that\n when the content of consciousness is the intuition of Space, which\n has \u2018parts that can be arranged under certain relations,\u2019 there must\n be a form of that intuition. What is it? Kant does not tell us\u2014does\n not appear to perceive that there must be such a form; and could\n not have perceived this without abandoning his hypothesis that the\n space-intuition is primordial.\u201d\n\nNow when Dr. Hodgson has shown me how that \u201cwhich {233} effects that\nthe content .\u00a0.\u00a0.\u00a0. can be arranged under certain relations,\u201d may also\nbe that which effects its own arrangement under the same relations, I\nshall be ready to surrender my position; but until then, no analogy\ndrawn from the ability of a dog to bite himself will weigh much with me.\n\nHaving, as he considers, disposed of the reasons given by me for\nconcluding that, considered in themselves, \u201cSpace and Time are\nwholly incomprehensible\u201d (he continually uses on my behalf the word\n\u201cinconceivable,\u201d which, by its unfit connotations, gives a wrong aspect\nto my position), Dr. Hodgson goes on to say:-\n\n \u201cYet Mr. Spencer proceeds to use these inconceivable ideas as the\n basis of his philosophy. For mark, it is Space and Time as we know\n them, the actual and phenomenal Space and Time, to which all these\n inconceivabilities attach. Mr. Spencer\u2019s result, ought, therefore,\n logically to be\u2014Scepticism. What is his actual result? Ontology. And\n how so? Why, instead of rejecting Space and Time as the inconceivable\n things he has tried to demonstrate them to be, he substitutes for them\n an Unknowable, a something which they really are, though we cannot\n know it, and rejects that, instead of them, from knowledge.\u201d\n\nThis statement has caused me no little astonishment. That having\nbefore him the volume from which he quotes, so competent a reader\nshould have so completely missed the meaning of the passages (\u00a7 26)\nalready referred to, in which I have contended against Hamilton and\nMansel, makes me almost despair of being understood by any ordinary\nreader. In that section I have, in the first place, contended that\nthe consciousness of an Ultimate Reality, though not capable of being\nmade a thought, properly so called, because not capable of being\nbrought within limits, nevertheless remains as a consciousness that is\n_positive_: is not rendered _negative_ by the negations of limits. I\nhave pointed out that\u2015\n\n  \u201cThe error, (very naturally fallen into by philosophers intent\n on demonstrating the limits and conditions of consciousness),\n consists in assuming that consciousness contains _nothing but_\n limits and conditions; to the entire neglect of that which is\n limited and conditioned. It is forgotten that there is something\n which alike forms the raw material of definite thought and remains\n after the definiteness which thinking gave to it has been {234}\n destroyed\u201d\u2014something which \u201cever persists in us as the body of a\n thought to which we can give no shape.\u201d\n\nThis _positive_ element of consciousness it is which, \u201cat once\nnecessarily indefinite and necessarily indestructible,\u201d I regard as\nthe consciousness of the Unknowable Reality. Yet Dr. Hodgson says \u201cMr.\nSpencer proceeds to use these inconceivable ideas as the basis of his\nphilosophy:\u201d implying that such basis consists of negations, instead\nof consisting of that which persists _notwithstanding the negation of\nlimits_. And then, beyond this perversion, or almost inversion, of\nmeaning, he conveys the notion that I take as the basis of philosophy,\nthe \u201cinconceivable ideas\u201d \u201cor self-contradictory notions\u201d which result\nwhen we endeavour to comprehend Space and Time. He speaks of me as\nproposing to evolve substance out of form, or rather, out of the\nnegations of forms\u2014gives his readers no conception that the _Power_\nmanifested to us is that which I regard as the Unknowable, while\nwhat we call Space and Time answer to the unknowable _nexus_ of its\nmanifestations. And yet the chapter from which I quote, and still more\nthe chapter which follows it, makes this clear\u2014as clear, at least, as I\ncan make it by carefully-worded statements and re-statements.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nPhilosophical systems, like theological ones, following the law of\nevolution in general, severally become in course of time more rigid,\nwhile becoming more complex and more definite; and they similarly\nbecome less alterable\u2014resist all compromise, and have to be replaced by\nthe more plastic systems that descend from them.\n\nIt is thus with pure Empiricism and pure Transcendentalism. Down to\nthe present time disciples of Locke have continued to hold that all\nmental phenomena are interpretable as results of accumulated individual\nexperiences; and, by criticism, have been led simply to elaborate\ntheir interpretations\u2014ignoring the proofs of inadequacy. On the other\nhand, disciples of Kant, {235} asserting this inadequacy, and led\nby perception of it to adopt an antagonist theory, have persisted in\ndefending that theory under a form presenting fatal inconsistencies.\nAnd then, when there is offered a mode of reconciliation, the spirit\nof no-compromise is displayed: each side continuing to claim the whole\ntruth. After it has been pointed out that all the obstacles in the way\nof the experiential doctrine disappear if the effects of ancestral\nexperiences are joined with the effects of individual experiences, the\nold form of the doctrine is still adhered to. And meanwhile Kantists\npersist in asserting that the _ego_ is born with intuitional forms\nwhich are wholly independent of anything in the _non-ego_, after it\nhas been shown that the innateness of these intuitional forms may be\nso understood as to escape the insurmountable difficulties of the\nhypothesis as originally expressed.\n\nI am led to say this by reading the remarks concerning my own views,\nmade with an urbanity I hope to imitate, by Professor Max M\u00fcller, in a\nlecture delivered at the Royal Institution in March, 1873.[27] Before\ndealing with the criticisms contained in this lecture, I must enter a\ndemurrer against that interpretation of my views by which Professor Max\nM\u00fcller makes it appear that they are more allied to those of Kant than\nto those of Locke. He says:\u2015\n\n  \u201cWhether the pre-historic genesis of these congenital dispositions\n or inherited necessities of thought, as suggested by Mr. Herbert\n Spencer, be right or wrong, does not signify for the purpose which\n Kant had in view. In admitting that there is something in our mind,\n which is not the result of our own _\u00e0 posteriori_ experience, Mr.\n Herbert Spencer is a thorough Kantian, and we shall see that he is\n a Kantian in other respects too. If it could be proved that nervous\n modifications, accumulated from generation to generation, could result\n in nervous structures that are fixed in proportion as the outer\n relations to which they answer are fixed, we, as followers of Kant,\n should only have to put in the place of Kant\u2019s intuitions of Space\n and Time \u2018the constant space-relations expressed in definite nervous\n structures, congenitally framed to act in definite ways, and incapable\n of acting in any other {236} way.\u2019 If Mr. Herbert Spencer had not\n misunderstood the exact meaning of what Kant calls the intuitions of\n Space and Time, he would have perceived that, barring his theory of\n the pre-historic origin of these intuitions, he was quite at one with\n Kant.\u201d\n\nOn this passage let me remark, first, that the word \u201cpre-historic,\u201d\nordinarily employed only in respect to human history, is misleading\nwhen applied to the history of Life in general; and his use of it\nleaves me in some doubt whether Professor Max M\u00fcller has rightly\nconceived the hypothesis he refers to.\n\nMy second comment is, that the description of me as \u201cquite at one with\nKant,\u201d \u201c_barring_\u201d the \u201ctheory of the prehistoric origin of these\nintuitions,\u201d curiously implies that it is a matter of comparative\nindifference whether the forms of thought are held to be _naturally\ngenerated_ by intercourse between the organism and its environing\nrelations, during the evolution of the lowest into the highest types,\nor whether such forms are held to be _supernaturally given_ to the\nhuman mind, and are independent both of environing relations and of\nancestral minds. But now, addressing myself to the essential point, I\nmust meet the statement that I have \u201cmisunderstood the exact meaning\nof what Kant calls the intuitions of Space and Time,\u201d by saying that\nI think Professor Max M\u00fcller has overlooked certain passages which\njustify my interpretation, and render his interpretation untenable.\nFor Kant says \u201cSpace is _nothing else_ than the form of all phenomena\nof the external sense;\u201d further, he says that \u201cTime is _nothing but_\nthe form of our internal intuition;\u201d and, to repeat words I have used\nelsewhere, \u201cHe distinctly shuts out the supposition that there are\nforms of the _non-ego_ to which these forms of the _ego_ correspond,\nby saying that \u2018Space is not a conception which has been derived from\noutward experiences.\u2019\u201d Now so far from being in harmony with, these\nstatements are in direct contradiction to, the view which I hold; and\nseem to me absolutely irreconcilable with it. How can it be said that,\n\u201cbarring\u201d a difference represented as trivial, I am {237} \u201cquite at\none with Kant,\u201d when I contend that these subjective forms of intuition\nare moulded into correspondence with, and therefore derived from, some\nobjective form or _nexus_, and therefore dependent upon it; while the\nKantian hypothesis is that these subjective forms are not derived from\nthe object, but pre-exist in the subject\u2014are imposed by the _ego_ on\nthe _non-ego_. It seems to me that not only do Kant\u2019s words, as above\ngiven, exclude the view which I hold, but also that Kant could not\nconsistently have held any such view. Rightly recognizing, as he did,\nthese forms of intuition as innate, he was, from his stand-point,\n_obliged_ to regard them as imposed on the matter of intuition in the\nact of intuition. In the absence of the hypothesis that intelligence\nhas been evolved, it was _not possible_ for him to regard these\nsubjective forms as having been derived from objective forms.\n\nA disciple of Locke might, I think, say that the Evolution-view of\nour consciousness of Space and Time is essentially Lockian, with\nmore truth than Professor Max M\u00fcller can represent it as essentially\nKantian. The Evolution-view is completely experiential. It differs\nfrom the original view of the experientialists by containing a great\nextension of that view. With the relatively-small effects of individual\nexperiences, it joins the relatively-vast effects of the experiences of\nantecedent individuals. But the view of Kant is avowedly and absolutely\nunexperiential. Surely this makes the predominance of kinship manifest.\n\nIn Professor Max M\u00fcller\u2019s replies to my criticisms on Kant, I cannot\nsee greater validity than in this affiliation to which I have demurred.\nOne of his arguments is that which Dr. Hodgson has used, and which I\nhave already answered; and I think that the others, when compared with\nthe passages of the _Principles of Psychology_ which they concern, will\nnot be found adequate. I refer to them here {238} chiefly for the\npurpose of pointing out that when he speaks of me as bringing \u201cthree\narguments against Kant\u2019s view,\u201d he understates the number. Let me close\nwhat I have to say on this disputed question, by quoting the summary of\nreasons I have given for rejecting the Kantian hypothesis:\u2015\n\n \u201cKant tells us that Space is the form of all external intuition; which\n is not true. He tells us that the consciousness of Space continues\n when the consciousness of all things contained in it is suppressed;\n which is also not true. From these alleged facts he _infers_ that\n Space is an _\u00e0 priori_ form of intuition. I say _infers_, because this\n conclusion is not presented in necessary union with the premises,\n in the same way that the consciousness of duality is necessarily\n presented along with the consciousness of inequality; but it is a\n conclusion voluntarily drawn for the purpose of explaining the alleged\n facts. And then that we may accept this conclusion, which is not\n necessarily presented along with these alleged facts which are not\n true, we are obliged to affirm several propositions which cannot be\n rendered into thought. When Space is itself contemplated, we have\n to conceive it as at once the form of intuition and the matter of\n intuition; which is impossible. We have to unite that which we are\n conscious of as Space with that which we are conscious of as the\n _ego_, and contemplate the one as a property of the other; which is\n impossible. We have at the same time to disunite that which we are\n conscious of as Space, from that which we are conscious of as the\n _non-ego,_ and contemplate the one as separate from the other; which\n is also impossible. Further, this hypothesis that Space is \u201cnothing\n else\u201d than a form of intuition belonging wholly to the _ego_, commits\n us to one of the two alternatives, that the _non-ego_ is formless or\n that its form produces absolutely no effect upon the _ego_; both of\n which alternatives involve us in impossibilities of thought.\u201d\u2014_Prin.\n of Psy.,_ \u00a7 399.\n\nObjections of another, though allied, class have been made in a review\nof the _Principles of Psychology_ by Mr. H. Sidgwick\u2014a critic whose\nremarks on questions of mental philosophy always deserve respectful\nconsideration.\n\nMr. Sidgwick\u2019s chief aim is to show what he calls \u201cthe mazy\ninconsistency of his [my] metaphysical results.\u201d More specifically, he\nexpresses thus the proposition he seeks to justify\u2014\u201cHis view of the\nsubject appears to have a fundamental incoherence, which shows itself\nin various ways on the surface of his exposition, but of which the root\nlies {239} much deeper, in his inability to harmonise different lines\nof thought.\u201d\n\nBefore dealing with the reasons given for this judgment, let me say\nthat, in addition to the value which candid criticisms have as showing\nwhere more explanation is needed, they are almost indispensable as\nrevealing to a writer incongruities he had not perceived. Especially\nwhere, as in this case, the subject-matter has many aspects, and\nwhere the words supplied by our language are so inadequate in number\nthat, to avoid cumbrous circumlocution, they have to be used in\nsenses that vary according to the context, it is extremely difficult\nto avoid imperfections of statement. But while I acknowledge sundry\nsuch imperfections and the resulting incongruities, I cannot see\nthat these are, as Mr. Sidgwick says, fundamental. Contrariwise,\ntheir superficiality seems to me proved by the fact that they may be\nrectified without otherwise altering the expositions in which they\noccur. Here is an instance.\n\nMr. Sidgwick points out that, when treating of the \u201cData of\nPsychology,\u201d I have said (in \u00a7 56) that, though we reach inferentially\n\u201cthe belief that mind and nervous action are the subjective and\nobjective faces of the same thing, we remain utterly incapable of\nseeing, and even of imagining, how the two are related\u201d (I quote\nthe passage more fully than he does). He then goes on to show that\nin the \u201cSpecial Synthesis,\u201d where I have sketched the evolution of\nIntelligence under its objective aspect, as displayed in the processes\nby which beings of various grades adjust themselves to surrounding\nactions, I \u201cspeak as if\u201d we could see how consciousness \u201cnaturally\narises at a particular stage\u201d of nervous action. The chapter he here\nrefers to is one describing that \u201cdifferentiation of the psychical\nfrom the physical life\u201d which accompanies advancing organization, and\nmore especially advancing development of the nervous system. In it I\nhave shown {240} that, while the changes constituting physical life\ncontinue to be characterized by the _simultaneity_ with which all\nkinds of them go on throughout the organism, the changes constituting\npsychical life, arising as the nervous system develops, become\ngradually more distinguished by their _seriality_. And I have said that\nas nervous integration advances, \u201cthere must result an unbroken series\nof these changes\u2014there must arise a consciousness.\u201d Now I admit that\nhere is an apparent inconsistency. I ought to have said that \u201cthere\nmust result an unbroken series of these changes,\u201d which, taking place\nin the nervous system of a highly-organized creature, gives coherence\nto its conduct; and along with which we assume a consciousness,\nbecause consciousness goes along with coherent conduct in ourselves.\nIf Mr. Sidgwick will substitute this statement for the statement as it\nstands, he will see that the arguments and conclusions remain intact.\nA survey of the chapter as a whole, proves that its aim is not in the\nleast to explain how nervous changes, considered as waves of molecular\nmotion, become the feelings constituting consciousness; but that,\ncontemplating the facts objectively in living creatures at large, it\npoints out the cardinal distinction between vital actions in general,\nand those particular vital actions which, in a creature displaying\nthem, lead us to speak of it as intelligent. It is shown that the rise\nof such actions becomes marked in proportion as the changes taking\nplace in the part called the nervous system, are made more and more\ndistinctly serial, by union in a supreme centre of co-ordination. The\nintroduction of the word consciousness, arises in the effort to show\nwhat fundamental character there is in these particular physiological\nchanges which is _parallel to_ a fundamental character in the\npsychological changes.\n\nAnother instance of the way in which Mr. Sidgwick evolves an\nincongruity which he considers fundamental, out of what I should have\nthought he would see is a {241} defective expression, I will give in\nhis own words. Speaking of a certain view of mine, he says:\u2015\n\n \u201cHe tells us that \u2018logic .\u00a0.\u00a0. contemplates in its propositions\n certain connexions predicated, which are necessarily involved with\n certain other connexions given: _regarding all these connexions as\n existing in the non-ego_\u2014not, it may be, under the form in which\n we know them, but in some form.\u2019 But in \u00a7 473, where Mr. Spencer\n illustrates by a diagram his \u2018Transfigured Realism,\u2019 the view seems\n to be this: although we cannot say that the real non-ego resembles\n our notion of it in \u2018its elements, relations, or laws,\u2019 we can say\n that \u2018a change in the objective reality causes in the subjective state\n a change exactly answering to it\u2014so answering as to _constitute a\n cognition of it_.\u2019 Here the \u2018something beyond consciousness\u2019 is no\n longer said to be unknown, as its effect in consciousness \u2018constitutes\n a cognition of it.\u2019\u201d\n\nThis apparent inconsistency, marked by the italics, would not\nhave existed if, instead of \u201ca cognition of it,\u201d I had said, as I\nought to have said, \u201c_what we call_ a cognition of it\u201d\u2014that is, a\nrelative cognition as distinguished from an absolute cognition. In\nordinary language we speak of as cognitions, those connexions in\nthought which so guide us in our dealings with things, that actual\nexperience verifies ideal anticipation: marking off, by opposed words,\nthose connexions in thought which _mis_-guide us. The difference\nbetween accepting a cognition as relatively true and accepting\nit as absolutely true, will be clearly shown by an illustration.\nThere is no direct resemblance whatever between the sizes, forms,\ncolours, and arrangements, of the figures in an account-book, and the\nmoneys or goods, debts or credits, represented by them; and yet the\nforms and arrangements of the written symbols, are such as answer\nin a perfectly-exact way to stocks of various commodities and to\nvarious kinds of transactions. Hence we say, figuratively, that the\naccount-book will \u201ctell us\u201d all about these stocks and transactions.\nSimilarly, the diagram Mr. Sidgwick refers to, suggests a way in which\nsymbols, registered in us by objects, may have forms and arrangements\nwholly unlike their objective causes and the _nexus_ among those\ncauses, while yet they are so related as to guide us correctly in\nour transactions {242} with those objective causes, and, _in that\nsense_, constitute cognitions of them; though they no more constitute\ncognitions in the absolute sense, than do the guiding symbols in the\naccount-book constitute cognitions of the things to which they refer.\nSo repeatedly is this view implied throughout the _Principles of\nPsychology_, that I am surprised to find a laxity of expression raising\nthe suspicion that I entertain any other.\n\nTo follow Mr. Sidgwick through sundry criticisms of like kind,\nwhich may be similarly met, would take more space than I can here\nafford. I must restrict myself now to the alleged \u201cfundamental\nincoherence\u201d of which he thinks these inconsistencies are signs. I\nrefer to that reconciliation of Realism and Idealism considered by\nhim as an impossible compromise. A difficulty is habitually felt in\naccepting a coalition after long conflict. Whoever has espoused one\nof two antagonist views, and, in defending it, has gained a certain\ncomprehension of the opposite view, becomes accustomed to regard these\nas the only alternatives, and is puzzled by an hypothesis which is at\nonce both and neither. Yet, since it turns out in nearly all cases\nthat, of conflicting doctrines, each contains an element of truth, and\nthat controversy ends by combination of their respective half-truths,\nthere is _a priori_ probability on the side of an hypothesis which\nqualifies Realism by Idealism.\n\nMr. Sidgwick expresses his astonishment, or rather bespeaks that of his\nreaders, because, while I accept Idealistic criticisms, I nevertheless\ndefend the fundamental intuition of Common Sense; and, as he puts\nit, \u201cfires his [my] argument full in the face of Kant, Mill, and\n\u2018metaphysicians\u2019 generally.\u201d\n\n  \u201cHe tells us that \u2018metaphysicians\u2019 illegitimately assume that\n \u2018beliefs reached through complex intellectual processes,\u2019 are more\n valid than \u2018beliefs reached through simple intellectual processes;\u2019\n that the common language they use refuses to express their hypotheses,\n and thus their reasoning inevitably implies the common notions which\n they repudiate; that the belief of Realism has the advantage of\n \u2018priority,\u2019 \u2018simplicity,\u2019 \u2018distinctness.\u2019 {243} But surely this prior,\n simple, distinctly affirmed belief is that of what Mr. Spencer terms\n \u2018crude Realism\u2019, the belief that the non-ego is _per se_ extended,\n solid, even coloured (if not resonant and odorous). This is what\n common language implies; and the argument by which Mr. Spencer proves\n the relativity of feelings and relations, still more the subtle and\n complicated analysis by which he resolves our notion of extension into\n an aggregate of feelings and transitions of feeling, lead us away from\n our original simple belief\u2014that (_e.g._) the green grass we see exists\n out of consciousness as we see it\u2014just as much as the reasonings of\n Idealism, Scepticism, or Kantism.\u201d\n\nOn the face of it the anomaly seems great; but I should have thought\nthat after reading the chapter on \u201cTransfigured Realism,\u201d a critic of\nMr. Sidgwick\u2019s acuteness would have seen the solution of it. He has\noverlooked an essential distinction. All which my argument implies is\nthat the direct intuition of Realism must be held of superior authority\nto the arguments of Anti-Realism, _where their deliverances cannot\nbe reconciled_. The one point on which their deliverances cannot be\nreconciled, is the existence of an objective reality. But while,\nagainst this intuition of Realism, I hold the arguments of Anti-Realism\nto be powerless, because they cannot be carried on without postulating\nthat which they end by denying; yet, having admitted objective\nexistence as a necessary postulate, it is possible to make valid\ncriticisms upon all those judgments which Crude Realism joins with\nthis primordial judgment: it is possible to show that a transfigured\ninterpretation of properties and relations, is more tenable than the\noriginal interpretation.\n\nTo elucidate the matter, let us take the most familiar case in which\nthe indirect judgments of Reason correct the direct judgments of Common\nSense. The direct judgment of Common Sense is that the Sun moves round\nthe Earth. In course of time, Reason, finding some facts at variance\nwith this, begins to doubt; and, eventually, hits upon an hypothesis\nwhich explains the anomalies, but which denies this apparently-certain\n_dictum_ of Common Sense. What is the reconciliation? It consists in\nshowing {244} to Common Sense that the new interpretation equally\nwell corresponds with direct intuition, while it avoids all the\ndifficulties. Common Sense is reminded that the apparent motion of\nan object may be due either to its actual motion or to the motion of\nthe observer; and that there are terrestrial experiences in which the\nobserver thinks an object he looks at is moving, when the motion is in\nhimself. Extending the conception thus given, Reason shows that if the\nEarth revolves on its axis, there will result that apparent motion of\nthe Sun which Common Sense interpreted into an actual motion of the\nSun; and the common-sense observer thereupon becomes able to think\nof sunrise and sunset as due to his position as spectator on a vast\nrevolving globe. Now if the astronomer, setting out by recognizing\nthese celestial appearances, and proceeding to evolve the various\nanomalies following from the common-sense interpretation of them, had\ndrawn the conclusion that there externally exist no Sun and no motion\nat all, he would have done what Idealists do; and his arguments would\nhave been equally powerless against the intuition of Common Sense. But\nhe does nothing of the kind. He accepts the intuition of Common Sense\nrespecting the reality of the Sun and of the motion; but replaces the\nold interpretation of the motion by a new interpretation reconcilable\nwith all the facts.\n\nEveryone must see that here, acceptance of the inexpugnable element\nin the common-sense judgment, by no means involves acceptance of the\naccompanying judgments; and I contend that the like discrimination must\nbe made in the case we are considering. It does not follow that while,\nagainst the consciousness which Crude Realism has of an objective\nreality, the arguments of Anti-Realism are futile, they are therefore\nfutile against the conceptions which Crude Realism forms of the\nobjective reality. If Anti-Realism can show that, granting an objective\nreality, the interpretation of Crude Realism contains insuperable {245}\ndifficulties, the process is quite legitimate. And, its primordial\nintuition remaining unshaken, Realism may, on reconsideration, be\nenabled to frame a new conception which harmonizes all the facts.\n\nTo show that there is not here the \u201cmazy inconsistency\u201d alleged, let\nus take the case of sound as interpreted by Crude Realism, and as\nre-interpreted by Transfigured Realism. Crude Realism assumes the\nsound present in consciousness to exist as such beyond consciousness.\nAnti-Realism proves the inadmissibility of this assumption in sundry\nways (all of which, however, set out by talking of sounding bodies\nbeyond consciousness, just as Realism talks of them); and then\nAnti-Realism concludes that we know of no existence save the sound as a\nmode of consciousness: which conclusion, and all kindred conclusions,\nI contend are vicious\u2014first, because all the words used connote an\nobjective activity; second, because the arguments are impossible\nwithout postulating at the outset an objective activity; and third,\nbecause no one of the intuitions out of which the arguments are built,\nis of equal validity with the single intuition of Realism that an\nobjective activity exists. But now the Transfigured Realism which\nMr. Sidgwick thinks \u201chas all the serious incongruity of an intense\nmetaphysical dream,\u201d neither affirms the untenable conception of Crude\nRealism, nor, like Anti-Realism, draws unthinkable conclusions by\nsuicidal arguments; but, accepting that which is essential in Crude\nRealism, and admitting the difficulties which Anti-Realism insists\nupon, reconciles matters by a re-interpretation analogous to that\nwhich an astronomer makes of the solar motion. Continuing all along\nto recognize an objective activity which Crude Realism calls sound,\nit shows that the answering sensation is produced by a succession of\nseparate impacts which, if made slowly, may be separately identified,\nand which will, if progressively increased in rapidity, produce tones\nhigher and higher in pitch. It {246} shows by other experiments that\nsounding bodies are in states of vibration, and that the vibrations\nmay be made visible. And it concludes that the objective activity\nis not what it subjectively seems, but is proximately interpretable\nas a succession of a\u00ebrial waves. Thus Crude Realism is shown that\nwhile there unquestionably exists an objective activity corresponding\nto the sensation known as sound, yet the facts are not explicable\non the original supposition that this is like the sensation; while\nthey are explicable by conceiving it as a rhythmical mechanical\naction. Eventually this re-interpretation, joined with kindred\nreinterpretations of other sensations, comes to be itself further\ntransfigured by analysis of its terms, and re-expression of them in\nterms of molecular motion; but, however abstract the interpretation\nultimately reached, the objective activity continues to be postulated:\nthe primordial judgment of Crude Realism remains unchanged, though it\nhas to change the rest of its judgments.\n\nIn another part of his argument, however, Mr. Sidgwick implies that\nI have no right to use those conceptions of objective existence by\nwhich this compromise is effected. Quoting sundry passages to show\nthat while I hold the criticisms of the Idealist to be impossible\nwithout \u201ctacitly or avowedly postulating an unknown something beyond\nconsciousness,\u201d I yet admit that \u201cour states of consciousness are the\nonly things we can know;\u201d he goes on to argue that I am radically\ninconsistent, because, in interpreting the phenomena of consciousness,\nI continually postulate, not an unknown something, but a something\nof which I speak in ordinary terms, as though its ascribed physical\ncharacters really exist as such, instead of being, as I admit they are,\nsynthetic states of my consciousness. His objection, if I understand\nit, is that for the purposes of Objective Psychology I apparently\nprofess to know Matter and Motion in the ordinary realistic way; while,\nas a result of subjective analysis, I reach the conclusion that {247}\nit is impossible to have that knowledge of objective existence which\nRealism supposes we have. Doubtless there seems here to be what he\ncalls \u201ca fundamental incoherence.\u201d But I think it exists, not between\nmy two expositions, but between the two consciousnesses of subjective\nand objective existence, which we cannot suppress and yet cannot put\ninto definite forms. The alleged incoherence I take to be but another\nname for the inscrutability of the relation between subjective feeling\nand its objective correlate which is not feeling\u2014an inscrutability\nwhich meets us at the bottom of all our analyses. An exposition of this\ninscrutability I have elsewhere summed up thus:\u2015\n\n \u201cSee, then, our predicament. We can think of Matter only in terms\n of Mind. We can think of Mind only in terms of Matter. When we have\n pushed our explorations of the first to the uttermost limit, we are\n referred to the second for a final answer; and when we have got the\n final answer of the second, we are referred back to the first for an\n interpretation of it. We find the value of _x_ in terms of _y_; then\n we find the value of _y_ in terms of _x_; and so on we may continue\n for ever without coming nearer to a solution.\u201d\u2014_Prin. of Psy._ \u00a7 272.\n\nCarrying a little further this simile, will, I think, show where lies\nthe insuperable difficulty felt by Mr. Sidgwick. Taking _x_ and _y_\nas the subjective and objective activities, unknown in their natures\nand known only as phenomenally manifested; and recognizing the fact\nthat every state of consciousness implies, immediately or remotely,\nthe action of object on subject or subject on object, or both; we\nmay say that every state of consciousness will be symbolized by some\nmodification of xy\u2014the phenomenally-known product of the two unknown\nfactors. In other words, _xy\u2032_, _x\u2032y_, _x\u2032y\u2032_, _x\u2033y\u2032_, _x\u2032y\u2033_, &c.,\n&c., will represent all perceptions and thoughts. Suppose, now,\nthat these are thoughts about the object; composing some hypothesis\nrespecting its characters as analyzed by physicists. Clearly, all\nsuch thoughts, be they about shapes, resistances, momenta, molecules,\nmolecular motions, or what not, will contain forms of the subjective\nactivity _x_. Now let the thoughts {248} be concerning mental\nprocesses. It must similarly happen that some mode of the unknown\nobjective activity _y_, will be in every case a component. Now suppose\nthat the problem is the genesis of mental phenomena; and that, in\nthe course of the inquiry, bodily organization and the functions of\nthe nervous system are brought into the explanation. It will happen,\nas before, that these, considered as objective, have to be described\nand thought about in modes of _xy_. And when by the actions of such\na nervous system, conceived objectively in modes of _xy_, and acted\nupon by physical forces which are conceived in other modes of _xy_, we\nendeavour to explain the genesis of sensations, perceptions, and ideas,\nwhich we can think of only in other modes of _xy,_ we find that all our\nfactors, and therefore all our interpretations, contain the two unknown\nterms, and that no interpretation is imaginable that will not contain\nthe two unknown terms.\n\nWhat is the defence for this apparently-circular process? Simply that\nit is a process of establishing _congruity_ among our symbols. It is\nfinding a mode of so symbolizing the unknown activities, subjective\nand objective, and so operating with our symbols, that all our acts\nmay be rightly guided\u2014guided, that is, in such ways that we can\nanticipate, when, where, and in what quantity some one of our symbols,\nor some combination of our symbols, will be found. Mr. Sidgwick\u2019s\ndifficulty arises, I think, from having insufficiently borne in mind\nthe statements made at the outset, in \u201cThe Data of Philosophy,\u201d that\nsuch conceptions as \u201care vital, or cannot be separated from the rest\nwithout mental dissolution, must be assumed as true _provisionally_;\u201d\nthat \u201cthere is no mode of establishing the validity of any belief\nexcept that of showing its entire _congruity_ with all other beliefs;\u201d\nand that \u201cPhilosophy, compelled to make those fundamental assumptions\nwithout which thought is impossible, has to justify them by showing\ntheir _congruity_ with all other dicta of consciousness.\u201d In {249}\npursuance of this distinctly-avowed mode of procedure, I assume\nprovisionally, an objective activity and a subjective activity, and\ncertain general forms and modes (Space, Time, Matter, Motion, Force),\nwhich the subjective activity, operated on by the objective activity,\nascribes to it, and which I suppose to correspond in some way to\nunknown forms and modes of the objective activity. These provisional\nassumptions, having been carried out to all their consequences, and\nthese consequences proved to be congruous with one another and with\nthe original assumptions, these original assumptions are justified.\nAnd if, finally, I assert, as I have repeatedly asserted, that the\nterms in which I express my assumptions and carry on my operations\nare but symbolic, and that all I have done is to show that by certain\nways of symbolizing, perfect harmony results\u2014invariable agreement\nbetween the symbols in which I frame my expectations, and the symbols\nwhich occur in experience\u2014I cannot be blamed for incoherence. On the\ncontrary, it seems to me that my method is the most coherent that\ncan be devised. Lastly, should it be said that this regarding of\neverything constituting experience and thought as symbolic, has a very\nshadowy aspect; I reply that these which I speak of as symbols, are\nreal relatively to our consciousness; and are symbolic only in their\nrelation to the Ultimate Reality.\n\nThat these explanations will make clear the coherence of views\nwhich before seemed \u201cfundamentally incoherent,\u201d I feel by no means\ncertain; since, as I did not perceive the difficulties presented by\nthe exposition as at first made, I may similarly fail to perceive\nthe difficulties in this explanation. Originally, I had intended to\ncomplete the _Principles of Psychology_ by a division showing how\nthe results reached in the preceding divisions, physiological and\npsychological, analytic and synthetic, subjective and objective,\nharmonize with one another, and are but different aspects of the same\naggregate of phenomena. But the work was already {250} bulky; and\nI concluded that this division might be dispensed with, because the\ncongruities to be pointed out were sufficiently obvious. So little was\nI conscious of the alleged \u201cinability to harmonize different lines of\nthought.\u201d Mr. Sidgwick\u2019s perplexities, however, show me that such an\nexposition of concords is needful.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nI have reserved to the last, one of the first objections made to the\nmetaphysico-theological doctrine set forth in _First Principles_, and\nimplied in the several volumes that have succeeded it. It was urged by\nan able metaphysician, the Rev. James Martineau, in an essay entitled\n\u201cScience, Nescience, and Faith;\u201d and, effective against my argument as\nit stands, shows the need for some development of my argument. That\nMr. Martineau\u2019s criticism may be understood, I must quote the passages\nit concerns. Continuing the reasoning employed against Hamilton and\nMansel, to show that our consciousness of that which transcends\nknowledge is _positive_, and not, as they allege, _negative_, I have\nsaid:\u2015\n\n  \u201cStill more manifest will this truth become when it is observed that\n our conception of the Relative itself disappears, if our conception\n of the Absolute is a pure negation. It is admitted, or rather it is\n contended, by the writers I have quoted above, that contradictories\n can be known only in relation to each other\u2014that Equality, for\n instance, is unthinkable apart from its correlative Inequality; and\n that thus the Relative can itself be conceived only by opposition\n to the Non-relative. It is also admitted, or rather contended, that\n the consciousness of a relation implies a consciousness of both\n the related members. If we are required to conceive the relation\n between the Relative and Non-relative without being conscious of\n both, \u2018we are in fact\u2019 (to quote the words of Mr. Mansel differently\n applied) \u2018required to compare that of which we are conscious with\n that of which we are not conscious; the comparison itself being an\n act of consciousness, and only possible through the consciousness of\n both its objects.\u2019 What, then, becomes of the assertion that, \u2018the\n Absolute is conceived merely by a negation of conceivability,\u2019 or\n as \u2018the mere absence of the conditions under which consciousness is\n possible?\u2019 If the Non-relative or Absolute, is present in thought only\n as a mere negation, then the relation between it and the Relative\n becomes unthinkable, because one of the terms of the relation is\n absent from consciousness. {251} And if this relation is unthinkable,\n then is the Relative itself unthinkable, for want of its antithesis:\n whence results the disappearance of all thought whatever.\u201d\u2014_First\n Principles_, \u00a7 26.\n\nOn this argument Mr. Martineau comments as follows; first re-stating it\nin other words:\u2015\n\n \u201cTake away its antithetic term, and the relative, thrown into\n isolation, is set up as absolute, and disappears from thought. It\n is indispensable therefore to uphold the Absolute in existence,\n as condition of the relative sphere which constitutes our whole\n intellectual domain. Be it so: but when saved on this plea,\u2014to\n preserve the balance and interdependence of two _co_-relatives,\u2014the\n \u2018Absolute\u2019 is absolute no more; it is reduced to a term of relation:\n it loses therefore its exile from thought: its disqualification is\n cancelled: and the alleged nescience is discharged.\n\n \u201cSo, the same law of thought which warrants the existence, dissolves\n the inscrutableness, of the Absolute.\u201d\u2014_Essays, Philosophical and_\n _Theological_ pp. 186\u20137.\n\nI admit this to be a telling rejoinder; and one which can be met only\nwhen the meanings of the words, as I have used them, are carefully\ndiscriminated, and the implications of the doctrine fully traced out.\nWe will begin by clearing the ground of minor misconceptions.\n\nFirst, let it be observed that though I have used the word Absolute\nas the equivalent of Non-relative, because it is used in the passages\nquoted from the writers I am contending against; yet I have myself\nchosen for the purposes of my argument, the name Non-relative, and I\ndo not necessarily commit myself to any propositions respecting the\nAbsolute, considered as that which includes both Subject and Object.\nThe Non-relative as spoken of by me, is to be understood rather as\nthe totality of Being _minus_ that which constitutes the individual\nconsciousness, present to us under forms of Relation. Did I use the\nword in some Hegelian sense, as comprehensive of that which thinks and\nthat which is thought about, and did I propose to treat of the order of\nthings, not as phenomenally manifested but as noumenally proceeding,\nthe objection would be fatal. But the aim being simply to formulate\nthe order of things as present under relative forms, the antithetical\nNon-relative here named as {252} implied by the conception of the\nRelative, is that which, in any act of thought, is outside of and\nbeyond it, rather than that which is inclusive of it. Further, it\nshould be observed that this Non-relative, spoken of as a necessary\ncomplement to the Relative, is not spoken of as a conception but as a\n_consciousness_; and I have in sundry passages distinguished between\nthose modes of consciousness which, having limits, and constituting\nthought proper, are subject to the laws of thought, and the mode of\nconsciousness which persists when the removal of limits is carried to\nthe uttermost, and when distinct thought consequently ceases.\n\nThis opens the way to the reply here to be made to Mr. Martineau\u2019s\ncriticism\u2014namely, that while by the necessities of thought the Relative\nimplies a Non-relative; and while, to think of this antithesis\ncompletely, requires that the Non-relative shall be made a conception\nproper; yet, for the vague thought which is alone in this case\npossible, it suffices that the Non-relative shall be present as a\nconsciousness which though undefined is positive. Let us observe what\nnecessarily happens when thought is employed on this ultimate question.\n\nIn a preceding part of the argument criticized, I have, in various\nways, aimed to show that, alike when we analyze the product of\nthought and when we analyze the process of thought, we are brought\nto the conclusion that invariably \u201ca thought involves _relation_,\n_difference_, _likeness_;\u201d and that even from the very nature of Life\nitself, we may evolve the conclusion that \u201cthinking being relationing,\nno thought can ever express more than relations.\u201d What, now, must\nhappen if thought, having this law, occupies itself with the final\nmystery? Always implying terms in relation, thought implies that\nboth terms shall be more or less defined; and as fast as one of them\nbecomes indefinite, the relation also becomes indefinite, and thought\nbecomes indistinct. Take the {253} case of magnitudes. I think of an\ninch; I think of a foot; and having tolerably-definite ideas of the\ntwo, I have a tolerably-definite idea of the relation between them.\nI substitute for the foot a mile; and being able to represent a mile\nmuch less definitely, I cannot so definitely think of the relation\nbetween an inch and a mile\u2014cannot distinguish it in thought from the\nrelation between an inch and two miles, as clearly as I can distinguish\nin thought the relation between an inch and one foot from the relation\nbetween an inch and two feet. And now if I endeavour to think of the\nrelation between an inch and the 240,000 miles from here to the Moon,\nor the relation between an inch and the 93,000,000 miles from here to\nthe Sun, I find that while these distances, practically inconceivable,\nhave become little more than numbers to which I frame no answering\nideas, so, too, has the relation between an inch and either of them\nbecome practically inconceivable. Evidently then this partial failure\nin the process of forming thought-relations, which happens even with\nfinite magnitudes when one of them is immense, passes into complete\nfailure when one of them cannot be brought within any limits. The\nrelation itself becomes unrepresentable at the same time that one of\nits terms becomes unrepresentable. Nevertheless, in this case it is to\nbe observed that the almost-blank form of relation preserves a certain\nqualitative character. It is still distinguishable as belonging to the\nconsciousness of extensions, not to the consciousnesses of forces or\ndurations; and in so far remains a vaguely-identifiable relation. But\nnow suppose we ask what happens when one term of the relation has not\nsimply magnitude having no known limits, and duration of which neither\nbeginning nor end is cognizable, but is also an existence not to be\ndefined? In other words, what must happen if one term of the relation\nis not only quantitatively but also qualitatively unrepresentable?\nClearly in this case the {254} relation does not simply cease to\nbe thinkable except as a relation of a certain class, but it lapses\ncompletely. When one of the terms becomes wholly unknowable, the\nlaw of thought can no longer be conformed to; both because one term\ncannot be present, and because relation itself cannot be framed. That\nis to say, the law of thought that contradictories can be known only\nin relation to each other, no longer holds when thought attempts to\ntranscend the Relative; and yet, when it attempts to transcend the\nRelative, it must make the attempt in conformity with its law\u2014must\nin some dim mode of consciousness posit a Non-relative, and, in some\nsimilarly dim mode of consciousness, a relation between it and the\nRelative. In brief then, to Mr. Martineau\u2019s objection I reply, that\nthe insoluble difficulties he indicates arise here, as elsewhere, when\nthought is applied to that which transcends the sphere of thought;\nand that just as when we try to pass beyond phenomenal manifestations\nto the Ultimate Reality manifested, we have to symbolize it out of\nsuch materials as the phenomenal manifestations give us; so we have\nsimultaneously to symbolize the connexion between this Ultimate Reality\nand its manifestations, as somehow allied to the connexions among\nthe phenomenal manifestations themselves. The truth Mr. Martineau\u2019s\ncriticism adumbrates, is that the law of thought fails where the\nelements of thought fail; and this is a conclusion quite conformable\nto the general view I defend. Still holding the validity of my\nargument against Hamilton and Mansel, that in pursuance of their own\nprinciple the Relative is not at all thinkable _as such_, unless in\ncontradistinction to some existence posited, however vaguely, as\nthe other term of a relation, conceived however indefinitely; it\nis consistent on my part to hold that in this effort which thought\ninevitably makes to pass beyond its sphere, not only does the product\nof thought become a dim symbol of a product, but the process of thought\nbecomes a dim {255} symbol of a process; and hence any predicament\ninferable from the law of thought cannot be asserted.\n\nI may fitly close this reply by a counter-criticism. To the direct\ndefence of a proposition, may be added the indirect defence which\nresults from showing the untenability of an alternative proposition.\nThis criticism on the doctrine of an Unknowable Existence manifested\nto us in phenomena, Mr. Martineau makes in the interests of the\ndoctrine held by him, that this existence is, to a considerable\ndegree, knowable. We are quite at one in holding that there is an\nindestructible consciousness of Power behind Appearance; but whereas\nI contend that this Power cannot be brought within the forms of\nthought, Mr. Martineau contends that there can be consistently ascribed\ncertain attributes of personality\u2014not, indeed, human characteristics\nso concrete as were ascribed in past times; but still, human\ncharacteristics of the more abstract and higher class. His general\ndoctrine is this:\u2014Regarding Matter as independently existing; regarding\nas also independently existing, those primary qualities of Body \u201cwhich\nare inseparable from the very idea of Body, and may be evolved _a\npriori_ from the consideration of it as solid extension or extended\nsolidity;\u201d and saying that to this class \u201cbelong Triple Dimension,\nDivisibility, Incompressibility;\u201d he goes on to assert that as these\u2015\n\n  \u201ccannot absent themselves from Body, they have a reality coeval with\n it, and belong eternally to the material datum objective to God: and\n his mode of activity with regard to them must be similar to that which\n alone we can think of his directing upon the relations of Space, viz.\n not Volitional, to cause them, but Intellectual, to think them out.\n The Secondary Qualities, on the other hand, having no logical tie to\n the Primary, but being appended to them as contingent facts, cannot\n be referred to any deductive thought, but remain over as products of\n pure Inventive Reason and Determining Will. This sphere of cognition,\n _a posteriori_ to us,\u2014where we cannot move a step alone but have\n submissively to wait upon experience, is precisely the realm of Divine\n originality: and we are most sequacious where He is most free. While\n on this Secondary field His Mind and ours are thus contrasted, they\n meet in resemblance again upon the Primary: for the evolutions of\n deductive Reason there is but one track possible to all intelligences;\n no {256} _merum arbitrium_ can interchange the false and true, or make\n more than one geometry, one scheme of pure Physics, for all worlds:\n and the Omnipotent Architect Himself, in realizing the Kosmical\n conception, in shaping the orbits out of immensity and determining\n seasons out of eternity, could but follow the laws of curvature,\n measure, and proportion.\u201d\u2014_Essays, Philosophical and Theological_, pp.\n 163\u20134.\n\nBefore the major criticism which I propose to make on this hypothesis,\nlet me make a minor one. Not only of space-relations, but also of\nprimary physical properties, Mr. Martineau asserts the necessity: not\na necessity to our minds simply, but an ontological necessity. What\nis true for human thought, is, in respect of these, true absolutely:\n\u201cthe laws of curvature, measure, and proportion,\u201d as we know them, are\nunchangeable even by Divine power; as are also the Divisibility and\nIncompressibility of Matter. But if, in these cases, Mr. Martineau\nholds that a necessity in thought implies an answering necessity in\nthings, why does he refrain from saying the like in other cases?\nWhy, if he tacitly asserts it in respect of space-relations and the\nstatical attributes of Body, does he not also assert it in respect of\nthe dynamical attributes of Body? The laws conformed to by that mode\nof force now distinguished as \u201cenergy,\u201d are as much necessary to our\nthought as are the laws of space-relations. The axioms of Mechanics\nlie on the same plane with the axioms of pure Mathematics. Now if\nMr. Martineau admits this\u2014if he admits, as he must, the corollary\nthat there can be no such manifestation of energy as that displayed\nin the motion of a planet, save at the expense of equivalent energy\nwhich pre-existed\u2014if he draws the further necessary corollary that\nthe direction of a motion cannot be changed by any action, without an\nequal reaction in an opposite direction on something acting\u2014if he bears\nin mind that this holds not only of all visible motions, celestial\nand terrestrial, but that those activities of Body which affect us as\nsecondary properties, are also known only through other forms of {257}\nenergy, which are equivalents of mechanical energy and conform to\nthese same laws\u2014and if, lastly, he infers that none of these derivative\nenergies can have given to them their characters and directions,\nsave by pre-existing forces, statical and dynamical, conditioned in\nspecial ways; what becomes of that \u201crealm of Divine originality\u201d which\nMr. Martineau describes as remaining within the realm of necessity?\nConsistently carried out, his argument implies a universally-inevitable\norder, in which volition can have no such place as that he alleges.\n\nNot pushing Mr. Martineau\u2019s reasoning to this conclusion, so entirely\nat variance with the one he draws, but accepting his statement just\nas it stands, let us consider the solution it offers us. We are left\nby it without any explanation of Space and Time; we are not helped\nin conceiving the origin of Matter; and there is afforded us no\nidea how Matter came to have its primary attributes. All these are\ntacitly assumed to exist uncreated. Creative activity is represented\nas under the restrictions imposed by mathematical necessities, and\nas having for _datum_ (mark the word) a substance which, in respect\nof certain characters, defies modification. But surely this is not\nan interpretation of the mystery of things. The mystery is simply\nrelegated to a remoter region, respecting which no inquiry is to be\nmade. But the inquiry _must_ be made. After every such solution there\narises afresh the question\u2014what is the origin and nature of that which\nimposes these limits on creative power? what is the primary God which\ndominates over this secondary God? For, clearly, if the \u201cOmnipotent\nArchitect himself\u201d (to use Mr. Martineau\u2019s somewhat inconsistent name)\nis powerless to change the \u201cmaterial datum objective\u201d to him, and\npowerless to change the conditions under which it exists, and under\nwhich he works, there is obviously implied a power to which he is\nsubject. So that in Mr. Martineau\u2019s doctrine also, there is an Ultimate\n{258} Unknowable; and it differs from the doctrine he opposes, only by\nintercalating a partially Knowable between this and the wholly Knowable.\n\nFinding, as explained above, that this interpretation is not consistent\nwith itself; and finding, as just shown, that it leaves the essential\nmystery unsolved; I do not see that it has an advantage over the\ndoctrine of the Unknowable in its unqualified shape. There cannot,\nI think, be more than temporary rest in a proximate solution which\ntakes for its basis the ultimately insoluble. Just as thought cannot\nbe prevented from passing beyond Appearance, and trying to conceive\nthe Cause behind; so, following out the interpretation Mr. Martineau\noffers, thought cannot be prevented from asking what Cause it is\nwhich restricts the Cause he assigns. And if we must admit that the\nquestion under this eventual form cannot be answered, may we not as\nwell confess that the question under its immediate form cannot be\nanswered? Is it not better candidly to acknowledge the incompetence of\nour intelligence, rather than to persist in calling that an explanation\nwhich does but disguise the inexplicable? Whatever answer each may\ngive to this question, he cannot rightly blame those who, finding in\nthemselves an indestructible consciousness of an ultimate Cause, whence\nproceed alike what we call the Material Universe and what we call Mind,\nrefrain from affirming anything respecting it; because they find it as\ninscrutable in nature as it is inconceivable in extent and duration.\n\n\nPOSTSCRIPT.\u2014With the concluding paragraph of the foregoing article, I\nhad hoped to end, for a long time, all controversial writing; and, if\nthe article had been published entire in the November number of the\n_Fortnightly_, as originally intended, the need for any addition would\nnot have been pressing. But while it was in the printer\u2019s {259} hands,\ntwo criticisms, more elaborate than those dealt with above, made their\nappearance; and now that the postponed publication of this latter half\nof the article affords the opportunity, I cannot, without risking\nmisinterpretations, leave these criticisms unnoticed.\n\nEspecially do I feel called upon by courtesy to make some response\nto one who, in the _Quarterly Review_ for October, 1873, has dealt\nwith me in a spirit which, though largely antagonistic, is not wholly\nunsympathetic; and who manifestly aims to estimate justly the views he\nopposes. In the space at my disposal, I cannot of course follow him\nthrough all the objections he has urged. I must content myself with\nbrief comments on the two propositions he undertakes to establish. His\nenunciation of these runs thus:\u2015\n\n \u201cWe would especially direct attention to two points, to both of which\n we are confident objections may be made; and although Mr. Spencer has\n himself doubtless considered such objections (and they may well have\n struck many of his readers also), we nevertheless do not observe that\n he has anywhere noticed or provided for them.\n\n \u201cThe two points we so select are:\u2015\n\n \u201c(1) _That his system involves the denial of all truth._\n\n \u201c(2) _That it is radically and necessarily opposed to all sound\n principles of morals._\u201d\n\nOn this passage, ending in these two startling assertions, let me\nfirst remark that I am wholly without this consciousness the reviewer\nascribes to me. Remembering that I have expended some little labour in\ndeveloping what I conceive to be a system of truths, I am surprised\nby the supposition that \u201cthe denial of all truth\u201d is an implication\nwhich I am \u201cdoubtless\u201d aware may be alleged against this system.\nRemembering, too, that by its programme this system is shown to close\nwith two volumes on _The Principles of Morality_, the statement that it\nis \u201cnecessarily opposed to all sound principles of morals,\u201d naturally\nastonishes me; and still more the statement that I am doubtless\nconscious it may be so regarded. Saying thus much by way of repudiating\nthat latent scepticism {260} attributed to me by the reviewer, I\nproceed to consider what he says in proof of these propositions.\n\nOn those seeming incongruities of Transfigured Realism commented on\nby him, I need say no more than I have already said in reply to Mr.\nSidgwick; by whom also they have been alleged. I will limit myself\nto the corollary he draws from the doctrine of the Relativity of\nKnowledge, as held by me. Rightly pointing out that I hold this in\ncommon with \u201cMessrs. Mill, Lewes, Bain, and Huxley;\u201d but not adding, as\nhe should have done, that I hold it in common with Hamilton, Mansel,\nand the long list of predecessors through whom Hamilton traced it;\nthe reviewer proceeds to infer from this doctrine of relativity that\nno absolute truth of any kind can be asserted\u2014not even the absolute\ntruth of the doctrine of relativity itself. And then he leaves it to be\nsupposed by his readers, that this inference tells especially against\nthe system he is criticizing. If, however, the reviewer\u2019s inference is\nvalid, this \u201cdenial of all truth\u201d must be charged against the doctrines\nof thinkers called orthodox, as well as against the doctrines of those\nmany philosophers, from Aristotle down to Kant, who have said the same\nthing. But now I go further, and reply that against that form of the\ndoctrine of relativity held by me, this allegation cannot be made with\nthe same effect as it can against preceding forms of the doctrine. For\nI diverge from other relativists in asserting that the existence of a\nnon-relative is not only a positive deliverance of consciousness, but a\ndeliverance transcending in certainty all others whatever; and is one\nwithout which the doctrine of relativity cannot be framed in thought. I\nhave urged that \u201cunless a real Non-relative or Absolute be postulated,\nthe Relative itself becomes absolute; and so brings the argument to a\ncontradiction;\u201d[28] and elsewhere I have described this consciousness\nof a Non-relative manifested to us through the Relative as {261}\n\u201cdeeper than demonstration\u2014deeper even than definite cognition\u2014deep\nas the very nature of mind;\u201d[29] which seems to me to be saying as\nemphatically as possible that, while all other truths may be held as\nrelative, this truth must be held as absolute. Yet, strangely enough,\nthough contending thus against the pure relativists, and holding\nwith the reviewer, that \u201cevery asserter of such a [purely-relative]\nphilosophy must be in the position of a man who saws across the branch\nof a tree on which he actually sits, at a point between himself\nand the trunk,\u201d[30] I am singled out by him as though this were my\nown predicament! So far, then, from admitting that the view I hold\n\u201cinvolves the denial of all truth,\u201d I assert that, having at the outset\nposited the co-existence of subject and object as a deliverance of\nconsciousness which precedes all reasoning;[31] having subsequently\nshown, analytically, that this postulate is in every way verified,[32]\nand that in its absence the proof of relativity is impossible; my view\nis distinguished by an exactly-opposite trait.\n\nThe justification of his second proposition the reviewer commences by\nsaying that\u2014\u201cIn the first place the process of Evolution, as understood\nby Mr. Spencer, compels him to be at one with Mr. Darwin in his denial\nof the existence of any fundamental and essential distinction between\nDuty and Pleasure.\u201d Following this by a statement respecting the\ngenesis of moral sentiments as understood by me (which is extremely\nunlike the one I have given in the _Principles of Psychology_, \u00a7 215,\n\u00a7\u00a7 503\u2013512, and \u00a7\u00a7 524\u2013532), the reviewer goes on to say that \u201cWe yield\nwith much reluctance to the necessity of affirming that Mr. Spencer\ngives no evidence of ever having acquired a knowledge of the meaning of\nthe term \u2018morality,\u2019 according to the true sense of the word.\u201d\n\nJust noting that, as shown by the context, the assertion {262} thus\nmade is made against all those who hold the Doctrine of Evolution in\nits unqualified form, I reply that in so far as it concerns me, it\nis one the reviewer would scarcely have made had he more carefully\nexamined the evidence: not limiting himself to those works of mine\nnamed at the head of his article. And I cannot but think that had the\nspirit of fairness which he evidently strives to maintain, been fully\nawake when these passages were written, he would have seen that, before\nmaking so serious an allegation, wider inquiry was needful. If he had\nsimply said that, given the doctrine of mental evolution as held by me,\nhe failed to see how moral principles are to be established, I should\nnot have objected; provided he had also said that I believe they can be\nestablished, and had pointed out what I hold to be their bases. As it\nis, however, he has so presented his own inference from my premises,\nas to make it seem an inference which I also must draw from my\npremises. Quite a different and much more secure foundation for moral\nprinciples is alleged by me, than that afforded by moral sentiments and\nconceptions; which he refers to as though they formed the sole basis of\nthe ethical conclusions I hold. While the reviewer contends that \u201cMr.\nSpencer\u2019s moral system is even yet more profoundly defective, as it\ndenies any objective distinction between right and wrong in any being,\nwhether men are or are not responsible for their actions;\u201d I contend,\ncontrariwise, that it is distinguished from other moral systems by\nasserting the objectivity of the distinction, and by endeavouring to\nshow that the subjective distinction is derived from the objective\ndistinction. In my first work, _Social Statics_, published twenty-three\nyears ago, the essential thesis is that, apart from their warrant as\nalleged Divine injunctions, and apart from their authority as moral\nintuitions, the principles of justice are primarily deducible from the\nlaws of life as carried on under social conditions. I argued throughout\nthat these principles so derived have {263} a supreme authority, to\nwhich considerations of immediate expediency must yield; and I was for\nthis reason classed by Mr. Mill as an anti-utilitarian. More recently,\nin a letter drawn from me by this misapprehension of Mr. Mill, and\nafterwards published by Professor Bain in his _Mental and Moral\nScience_, I have re-stated this position. Already, in an explanatory\narticle entitled _Morals and Moral Sentiments_, published in the\n_Fortnightly Review_ for April, 1871, I have quoted passages from that\nletter; and here, considering the gravity of the assertions made by the\n_Quarterly_ reviewer, I hope to be excused for re-quoting them:\u2015\n\n \u201cMorality, properly so called\u2014the science of right conduct\u2014has for\n its object to determine _how_ and _why_ certain modes of conduct are\n detrimental, and certain other modes beneficial. These good and bad\n results cannot be accidental, but must be necessary consequences of\n the constitution of things; and I conceive it to be the business of\n Moral Science to deduce from the laws of life and the conditions\n of existence, what kinds of action necessarily tend to produce\n happiness, and what kinds to produce unhappiness. Having done this,\n its deductions are to be recognized as laws of conduct; and are to\n be conformed to irrespective of a direct estimation of happiness or\n misery.\u201d\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n \u201cIf it is true that pure rectitude prescribes a system of things\n far too good for men as they are, it is not less true that mere\n expediency does not of itself tend to establish a system of things\n any better than that which exists. While absolute morality owes to\n expediency the checks which prevent it from rushing into Utopian\n absurdities, expediency is indebted to absolute morality for all\n stimulus to improvement. Granted that we are chiefly interested in\n ascertaining what is _relatively right_, it still follows that we must\n first consider what is _absolutely right_; since the one conception\n presupposes the other.\u201d\n\nAnd the comment I then made on these passages I may make now, that\n\u201cI do not see how there could well be a more emphatic assertion that\nthere exists a primary basis of morals independent of, and in a sense\nantecedent to, that which is furnished by experiences of utility; and\nconsequently independent of, and in a sense antecedent to, those moral\nsentiments which I conceive to be generated by such experiences.\u201d I\nwill only add that, had my beliefs been directly opposite to those I\nhave enunciated, {264} the reviewer might, I think, have found good\nreasons for his assertion. If, instead of demurring to the doctrine\n\u201cthat greatest happiness should be the _immediate_ aim of man,\u201d[33] I\nhad endorsed that doctrine\u2014if, instead of explaining and justifying \u201ca\nbelief in the special sacredness of these highest principles, and a\nsense of the supreme authority of the altruistic sentiments answering\nto them,\u201d[34] I had denied the sacredness and the supreme authority\u2014if,\ninstead of saying of the wise man that \u201cthe highest truth he sees he\nwill fearlessly utter; knowing that, let what may come of it, he is\nthus playing his right part in the world,\u201d[35] I had said that the wise\nman will _not_ do this; the reviewer might with truth have described me\nas not understanding \u201cthe term \u2018morality\u2019 according to the true sense\nof the word.\u201d And he might then have inferred that the Doctrine of\nEvolution as I hold it, implies denial of the \u201cdistinction between Duty\nand Pleasure.\u201d But as it is, I think the evidence will not generally be\nheld to warrant his assertion.\n\nI quite agree with the reviewer that the prevalence of a philosophy\n\u201cis no mere question of speculative interest, but is one of the\nhighest practical importance.\u201d I join him, too, in the belief that\n\u201ccalamitous social and political changes\u201d may be the outcome of a\nmistaken philosophy. Moreover, writing as he does under the conviction\nthat there can be no standard of right and wrong save one derived from\na Revelation interpreted by an Infallible Authority, I can conceive\nthe alarm with which he regards so radically opposed a system. Though\nI could have wished that the sense of justice he generally displays\nhad prevented him from ignoring the evidence I have above given, I can\nunderstand how, from his point of view, the Doctrine of Evolution,\nas I understand it, \u201cseems absolutely fatal {265} to every germ of\nmorality,\u201d and \u201centirely negatives every form of religion.\u201d But I am\nunable to understand that modified Doctrine of Evolution which the\nreviewer hints at as an alternative. For, little as the reader would\nanticipate it after these expressions of profound dissent, the reviewer\ndisplays such an amount of agreement as to suggest that the system he\nis criticizing might be converted, \u201crapidly and without violence, into\nan \u2018allotropic state,\u2019 in which its conspicuous characters would be\nstartlingly diverse from those that it exhibits at present.\u201d May I,\nusing a different figure, suggest a different transformation, having a\nsubjective instead of an objective character? As in a stereoscope, the\ntwo views representing diverse aspects, often yield at first a jumble\nof conflicting impressions, but, after a time, suddenly combine into a\nsingle whole which stands out quite clearly; so, may it not be that the\nseemingly-inconsistent Idealism and Realism dwelt on by the reviewer,\nas well as the other seemingly-fundamental incongruities he is struck\nby, will, under more persistent contemplation, unite as complementary\nsides of the same thing?\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nMy excuse for devoting some space to a criticism of so entirely\ndifferent a kind as that contained in the _British Quarterly Review_\nfor October, 1873, must be that, under the circumstances, I cannot let\nit pass unnoticed without seeming to admit its validity.\n\nSaying that my books should be dealt with by specialists, and tacitly\nannouncing himself as an expert in Physics, the reviewer takes me to\ntask both for errors in the statement of physical principles and for\nerroneous reasoning in physics. That he discovers no mistakes I do not\nsay. It would be marvellous if in such a multitude of propositions,\naveraging a dozen per page, I had made all criticism-proof. Some\nare inadvertencies which I should have been obliged to the reviewer\nfor pointing out as such, but which he prefers to {266} instance\nas proving my ignorance. In other cases, taking advantage of an\nimperfection of statement, he proceeds to instruct me about matters\nwhich either the context, or passages in the same volume, show to be\nquite familiar to me. Here is a sample of his criticisms belonging to\nthis class:\u2015\n\n \u201cNor should we counsel a man to venture upon physical speculations\n who converts the proposition \u2018_heat is insensible motion_\u2019 into\n \u2018_insensible motion is heat_,\u2019 and hence concludes that when a force\n is applied to a mass so large that no motion is seen to result from\n it, or when, as in the case of sound, motion gets so dispersed that it\n becomes insensible, it turns to heat.\u201d\n\nRespecting the first of the two statements contained in this sentence,\nI will observe that the reader, if not misled by the quotation-marks\ninto the supposition that I have made, in so many words, the assertion\nthat \u201cinsensible motion is heat,\u201d will at any rate infer that this\nassertion is distinctly involved in the passage named. And he will\ninfer that the reviewer would never have charged me with such an absurd\nbelief, if there was before him evidence proving that I have no such\nbelief. What will the reader say, then, when he learns, not simply that\nthere is no such statement, and not simply that on the page referred\nto, which I have ascertained to be the one intended, there is no such\nimplication visible, even to an expert (and I have put the question to\none); but when he further learns that in other passages, the fact that\nheat is one only of the modes of insensible motion is distinctly stated\n(see _First Prin_. \u00a7\u00a7 66, 68, 171); and when he learns that elsewhere I\nhave specified the several forms of insensible motion? If the reviewer,\nwho looks so diligently for flaws as to search an essay in a volume he\nis not reviewing to find one term of an incongruity, had sought with\nequal diligence to learn what I thought about insensible motion, he\nwould have found in the _Classification of the Sciences_, Table II.,\nthat insensible motion is described by me as having the forms of Heat,\nLight, Electricity, Magnetism. Even had there been in {267} the place\nhe names, an unquestionable implication of the belief which he ascribes\nto me, fairness might have led him to regard it as an oversight when\nhe found it at variance with statements I have elsewhere made. What\nthen is to be thought of him when, in the place named, no such belief\nis manifest; either to an ordinary reader or to a specially-instructed\nreader?\n\nNo less significant is the state of mind betrayed in the second clause\nof the reviewer\u2019s sentence. By representing me as saying that when\nthe motion constituting sound \u201cgets so dispersed that it becomes\ninsensible, it turns to heat,\u201d does he intend to represent me as\nthinking that when sound-undulations become too weak to be audible,\nthey become heat-undulations? If so, I reply that the passage he refers\nto has no such meaning. Does he then allege that some part of the force\ndiffused in sound-waves is expended in generating electricity, by\nthe friction of heterogeneous substances (which, however, eventually\nlapses from this special form of molecular motion in that general\nform constituting heat); and that I ought to have thus qualified my\nstatement? If so, he would have had me commit a piece of scientific\npedantry hindering the argument. If he does not mean either of these\nthings, what does he mean? Does he contest the truth of the hypothesis\nwhich enabled Laplace to correct Newton\u2019s estimate of the velocity\nof sound\u2014the hypothesis that heat is evolved by the compression each\nsound-wave produces in the air? Does he deny that the heat so generated\nis at the expense of so much wave-motion lost? Does he question the\ninference that some of the motion embodied in each wave is from instant\nto instant dissipated, partly in this way and partly in the heat\nevolved by fluid friction? Can he show any reason for doubting that\nwhen the sound-waves have become too feeble to affect our senses, their\nmotion still continues to undergo this transformation and diminution\nuntil it is all lost? If not, why does he implicitly deny that {268}\nthe molar motion constituting sound, eventually disappears in\nproducing the molecular motion constituting heat?[36]\n\nI will dwell no longer on the exclusively-personal questions raised\nby the reviewer\u2019s statements; but, leaving the reader to judge of the\nrest of my \u201cstupendous mistakes\u201d by the one I have dealt with, I will\nturn to a question worthy to occupy some space, as having an impersonal\ninterest\u2014the question, namely, respecting the nature of the warrant we\nhave for asserting ultimate physical truths. The contempt which, as a\nphysicist, the reviewer expresses for the metaphysical exploration of\nphysical ideas, I will pass over with the remark that every physical\nquestion, probed to the bottom, opens into a metaphysical one; and that\nI should have thought the controversy now going on among chemists,\nrespecting the legitimacy of the atomic hypothesis, might have\nshown him as much. On his erroneous statement that I use the phrase\n\u201cPersistence of Force\u201d as an equivalent for the now-generally-accepted\nphrase \u201cConservation of Energy,\u201d I will observe only that, had he not\nbeen in so great a hurry to find inconsistencies, he would have seen\nwhy, for the purposes of my argument, {269} I intentionally use the\nword Force: Force being the generic word, including both that species\nknown as Energy, and that species by which Matter occupies space and\nmaintains its integrity\u2014a species which, whatever may be its relation\nto Energy, and however clearly recognized as a necessary _datum_ by\nthe theory of Energy, is not otherwise considered in that theory. I\nwill confine myself to the proposition, disputed at great length by the\nreviewer, that our cognition of the Persistence of Force is _a priori_.\nHe relies much on the authority of Professor Tait, whom he twice quotes\nto the effect that\u2015\n\n \u201cNatural philosophy is an experimental, and not an intuitive science.\n No _\u00e0 priori_ reasoning can conduct us demonstratively to a single\n physical truth.\u201d\n\nWere I to take a hypercritical attitude, I might dwell on the fact that\nProfessor Tait leaves the extent of his proposition somewhat doubtful,\nby speaking of \u201cNatural philosophy\u201d as _one_ science. Were I to follow\nfurther the reviewer\u2019s example, I might point out that \u201cNatural\nphilosophy,\u201d in that Newtonian acceptation adopted by Professor\nTait, includes Astronomy; and, going on to ask what astronomical\n\u201cexperiments\u201d those are which conduct us to astronomical truths, I\nmight then \u201ccounsel\u201d the reviewer not to depend on the authority of one\nwho (to use the reviewer\u2019s polite language) \u201cblunders\u201d by confounding\nexperiment and observation. I will not, however, thus infer from\nProfessor Tait\u2019s imperfection of statement that he is unaware of the\ndifference between the two; and shall rate his authority as of no less\nvalue than I should, had he been more accurate in his expression.\nRespecting that authority I shall simply remark that, if the question\nhad to be settled by the authority of any physicist, the authority of\nMayer, who is diametrically opposed to Prof. Tait on this point, and\nwho has been specially honoured, both by the Royal Society and by the\nFrench Institute, might well counter-weigh his, if not out-weigh it.\nI am not aware, {270} however, that the question is one in Physics.\nIt seems to me a question respecting the nature of proof. And, without\ndoubting Professor Tait\u2019s competence in Logic and Psychology, I should\ndecline to abide by his judgment on such a question, even were there no\nopposite judgment given by a physicist, certainly of not less eminence.\n\nAuthority aside, however, let us discuss the matter on its merits.\nIn the _Treatise on Natural Philosophy_, by Profs. Thomson and Tait,\n\u00a7 243 (1st ed.), I read that \u201cas we shall show in our chapter on\n\u2018Experience,\u2019 physical axioms are axiomatic to those only who have\nsufficient knowledge of the action of physical causes to enable them\nto see at once their necessary truth.\u201d In this I agree entirely.\nIt is in Physics, as it is in Mathematics, that before necessary\ntruths can be grasped, there must be gained by individual experience,\nsuch familiarity with the elements of the thoughts to be framed,\nthat propositions about those elements may be mentally represented\nwith distinctness. Tell a child that things which are equal to\nthe same thing are equal to one another, and the child, lacking a\nsufficiently-abstract notion of equality, and lacking, too, the\nneedful practice in comparing relations, will fail to grasp the axiom.\nSimilarly, a rustic, never having thought much about forces and their\nresults, cannot form a definite conception answering to the axiom that\naction and reaction are equal and opposite. In the last case as in\nthe first, ideas of the terms and their relations require to be made,\nby practice in thinking, so vivid that the involved truths may be\nmentally seen. But when the individual experiences have been multiplied\nenough to produce distinctness in the representations of the elements\ndealt with; then, in the one case as in the other, those mental forms\ngenerated by ancestral experiences, cannot be occupied by the elements\nof one of these ultimate truths without perception of its necessity.\nIf Professor Tait does not admit this, what {271} does he mean by\nspeaking of \u201cphysical _axioms_,\u201d and by saying that the cultured are\nenabled \u201cto see _at once_ their _necessary_ truth?\u201d\n\nAgain, if there are no physical truths which must be classed as _a\npriori_, I ask why Professor Tait joins Sir W. Thomson in accepting\nas bases for Physics, Newton\u2019s Laws of Motion? Though Newton gives\nillustrations of prolonged motion in bodies that are little resisted,\nhe gives no _proof_ that a body in motion will continue moving, if\nuninterfered with, in the same direction at the same velocity; nor,\non turning to the enunciation of this law quoted in the above-named\nwork, do I find that Professor Tait does more than exemplify it by\nfacts which can themselves be asserted only by taking the law for\ngranted. Does Professor Tait deny that the first law of motion is a\nphysical truth? If so, what does he call it? Does he admit it to be\na physical truth, and, denying that it is _a priori_, assert that it\nis established _a posteriori_\u2014that is, by conscious induction from\nobservation and experiment? If so, what is the inductive reasoning\nwhich can establish it? Let us glance at the several conceivable\narguments which we must suppose him to rely on.\n\nA body set in motion soon ceases to move if it encounters much\nfriction, or much resistance from the bodies struck. If less of its\nenergy is expended in moving, or otherwise affecting, other bodies, or\nin overcoming friction, its motion continues longer. And it continues\nlongest when, as over smooth ice, it meets with the smallest amount\nof obstruction. May we then, proceeding by the method of concomitant\nvariations, infer that were it wholly unobstructed its motion would\ncontinue undiminished? If so, we assume that the diminution of its\nmotion observed in experience, is proportionate to the amount of\nenergy abstracted from it in producing other motion, either molar or\nmolecular. We assume that no variation has taken place in its rate,\nsave that caused by deductions in moving other matter; for if {272}\nits motion be supposed to have otherwise varied, the conclusion that\nthe differences in the distances travelled result from differences\nin the obstructions met with, is vitiated. Thus the truth to be\nestablished is already taken for granted in the premises. Nor is the\nquestion begged in this way only. In every case where it is remarked\nthat a body stops the sooner, the more it is obstructed by other bodies\nor media, the law of inertia is assumed to hold in the obstructing\nbodies or media. The very conception of greater or less retardation\nso caused, implies the belief that there can be no retardations\nwithout proportionate retarding causes; which is itself the assumption\notherwise expressed in the first law of motion.\n\nAgain, let us suppose that instead of inexact observations made on the\nmovements occurring in daily experience, we make exact experiments on\nmovements specially arranged to yield measured results; what is the\npostulate underlying every experiment? Uniform velocity is defined as\nmotion through equal spaces in equal times. How do we measure equal\ntimes? By an instrument which can be inferred to mark equal times\nonly if the oscillations of the pendulum are isochronous; which they\ncan be proved to be only if the first and second laws of motion are\ngranted. That is to say, the proposed experimental proof of the first\nlaw, assumes not only the truth of the first law, but of that which\nProfessor Tait agrees with Newton in regarding as a second law. Is it\nsaid that the ultimate time-measure referred to is the motion of the\nEarth round its axis, through equal angles in equal times? Then the\nobvious rejoinder is that the assertion of this, similarly involves an\nassertion of the truth to be proved; since the undiminished rotatory\nmovement of the Earth is itself a corollary from the first law of\nmotion. Is it alleged that this axial movement of the Earth through\nequal angles in equal times, is ascertainable by reference to the\nstars? I answer that a developed system of Astronomy, leading through\ncomplex {273} reasonings to the conclusion that the Earth rotates, is,\nin that case, supposed to be needful before there can be established\na law of motion which this system of Astronomy itself postulates. For\neven should it be said that the Newtonian theory of the Solar System is\nnot necessarily pre-supposed, but only the Copernican; still, the proof\nof this assumes that a body at rest (a star being taken as such) will\ncontinue at rest; which is a part of the first law of motion, regarded\nby Newton as not more self-evident than the remaining part.\n\nNot a little remarkable, indeed, is the oversight made by Professor\nTait, in asserting that \u201cno _a priori_ reasoning can conduct us\ndemonstratively to a single physical truth,\u201d when he has before him\nthe fact that the system of physical truths constituting Newton\u2019s\n_Principia_, which he has joined Sir William Thomson in editing, is\nestablished by _a priori_ reasoning. That there can be no change\nwithout a cause, or, in the words of Mayer, that \u201ca force cannot become\nnothing, and just as little can a force be produced from nothing,\u201d is\nthat ultimate dictum of consciousness on which all physical science\nrests. It is involved alike in the assertion that a body at rest will\ncontinue at rest, in the assertion that a body in motion must continue\nto move at the same velocity in the same line if no force acts on it,\nand in the assertion that any divergent motion given to it must be\nproportionate to the deflecting force; and it is also involved in the\naxiom that action and reaction are equal and opposite.\n\nThe reviewer\u2019s doctrine, in support of which he cites against me the\nauthority of Professor Tait, illustrates in Physics that same error\nof the inductive philosophy which, in Metaphysics, I have pointed out\nelsewhere (_Principles of Psychology_, Part VII.). It is a doctrine\nimplying that we can go on for ever asking the proof of the proof,\nwithout finally coming to any deepest cognition which is unproved\nand unprovable. That this is an untenable doctrine, I need {274}\nnot say more to show. Nor, indeed, would saying more to show it be\nlikely to have any effect, in so far at least as the reviewer is\nconcerned; seeing that he thinks I am \u201cignorant of the very nature of\nthe principles\u201d of which I am speaking, and seeing that my notions of\nscientific reasoning \u201cremind\u201d him \u201cof the Ptolemists,\u201d who argued that\nthe heavenly bodies must move in circles because the circle is the most\nperfect figure.[37]\n\nNot to try the reader\u2019s patience further, I will end by pointing out\nthat, even were the reviewer\u2019s criticisms all valid, they would leave\nunshaken the theory he contends against. Though one of his sentences\n(p. 480) raises the expectation that he is about to assault, and\ngreatly to damage, the bases of the system contained in the second part\nof _First Principles_, yet all those propositions which constitute the\nbases, he leaves, not only uninjured, but even untouched,\u2014contenting\nhimself with trying to show (with what success we have seen) that the\nfundamental one is an _a posteriori_ truth and not an _a priori_ truth.\nAgainst the general Doctrine of Evolution, considered as an induction\nfrom all classes of concrete phenomena, he utters not a word; nor does\nhe utter a word to disprove any one of those laws of the redistribution\nof matter and motion, by {275} which the process of Evolution is\ndeductively interpreted. Respecting the law of the Instability of\nthe Homogeneous, he says no more than to quarrel with one of the\nillustrations. He makes no criticism on the law of the Multiplication\nof Effects. The law of Segregation he does not even mention. Nor does\nhe mention the law of Equilibration. Further, he urges nothing against\nthe statement that these general laws are severally deducible from the\nultimate law of the Persistence of Force. Lastly, he does not deny the\nPersistence of Force; but only differs respecting the nature of our\nwarrant for asserting it. Beyond pointing out, here a cracked brick and\nthere a quoin set askew, he merely makes a futile attempt to show that\nthe foundation is not natural rock, but concrete.\n\nFrom his objections I may, indeed, derive much satisfaction. That a\ncompetent critic, obviously anxious to do all the mischief he can, and\nnot over-scrupulous about the means he uses, has done so little, may be\ntaken as evidence that the fabric of conclusions attacked will not be\nreadily overthrown.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIn the _British Quarterly Review_ for January, 1874, the writer of the\narticle I have dealt with above, makes a rejoinder. It is of the kind\nwhich might have been anticipated. There are men to whom the discovery\nthat they have done injustice is painful. After proof of having wrongly\nascribed to another such a nonsensical belief as that insensible\nmotion is heat because heat is insensible motion, some would express\nregret. Not so my reviewer. Having by forced interpretations debited\nme with an absurdity, he makes no apology; but, with an air implying\nthat he had all along done this, he attacks the allegation I had\nreally made\u2014an allegation which is at least so far from an absurdity,\nthat he describes it only as not justified by \u201cthe present state\nof science.\u201d And here, having incidentally referred to this point,\nI may as well, before {276} proceeding, deal with his substituted\ncharge at the same time that I further exemplify his method. Probably\nmost of those who see the _British Quarterly_, will be favourably\nimpressed by the confidence of his assertion; but those who compare\nmy statement with his travesty of it, and who compare both with some\nauthoritative exposition, will be otherwise impressed. To his statement\nthat I conclude \u201cthat friction must ultimately transform _all_ [the\nitalics are his] the energy of a sound into heat,\u201d I reply that it is\nglaringly untrue: I have named friction as a second cause only. And\nwhen he pooh-poohs the effect of compression because it is \u201cmerely\nmomentary,\u201d is he aware of the meaning of his words? Will he deny that,\nfrom first to last, during the interval of condensation, heat is being\ngenerated? Will he deny to the air the power of radiating such heat? He\nwill not venture to do so. Take then the interval of condensation as\none-thousandth of a second. I ask him to inform those whom he professes\nto instruct, what is the probable number of heat-waves which have\nescaped in this interval. Must they not be numbered by thousands of\nmillions? In fact, by his \u201cmerely momentary,\u201d he actually assumes that\nwhat is momentary in relation to our time-measures, is momentary in\nrelation to the escape of ethereal undulations!\n\nLet me now proceed more systematically, and examine his rejoinder point\nby point. It sets out thus:\u2015\n\n \u201cIn the notice of Mr. Spencer\u2019s works that appeared in the last number\n of this _Review_, we had occasion to point out that he held mistaken\n notions of the most fundamental generalizations of dynamics; that he\n had shown an ignorance of the nature of proof in his treatment of the\n Newtonian Law; that he had used phrases such as the Persistence of\n Force in various and inconsistent significations; and more especially\n that he had put forth proofs logically faulty in his endeavour to\n demonstrate certain physical propositions by _\u00e0 priori_ methods, and\n to show that such proofs must exist. To this article Mr. Spencer has\n replied in the December number of the _Fortnightly Review_. His reply\n leaves every one of the above positions unassailed.\u201d\n\nIn my \u201cReplies to Criticisms,\u201d which, as it was, trespassed unduly on\nthe pages of the _Fortnightly Review_, I singled {277} out from those\nof his allegations which touched me personally, one that might be\nbriefly dealt with as an example; and I stated that, passing over other\npersonal questions, as not interesting to the general reader, I should\ndevote the small space available to an impersonal one. Notwithstanding\nthis, the reviewer, in the foregoing paragraph, enumerates his chief\npositions; asserts that I have not assailed any of them (which is\nuntrue); and then leads his readers to the belief that I have not\nassailed them because they are unassailable.\n\nLeaving this misbelief to be dealt with presently, I continue my\ncomments on his rejoinder. After referring to the passage I have quoted\nfrom Prof. Tait\u2019s statement about physical axioms, and after indicating\nthe nature of my criticism, the reviewer says:\u2015\n\n \u201cHad Mr. Spencer, however, read the sentence that follows it, we\n doubt whether we should have heard aught of this quotation. It is\n \u2018Without further remark we shall give Newton\u2019s Three Laws; it being\n remembered that as the properties of matter might have been such as\n to render a totally different set of laws axiomatic, _these laws must\n be considered as resting on convictions drawn from observation and\n experiment and not on intuitive perception_.\u2019 This not only shows that\n the term \u2018axiomatic\u2019 is used in the previous sentence in a sense that\n does not exclude an inductive origin, but it leaves us indebted to\n Mr. Spencer for the discovery of the clearest and most authoritative\n expression of disapproval of his views respecting the nature of the\n Laws of Motion.\u201d\n\nLet us analyze this \u201cauthoritative expression.\u201d It contains several\nstartling implications, the disclosure of which the reader will find\nnot uninteresting. Consider, first, what is implied by framing the\nthought that \u201cthe properties of matter might have been such as to\nrender a totally different set of laws axiomatic.\u201d I will not stop to\nmake the inquiry whether matter having properties fundamentally unlike\nits present ones, can be conceived; though such an inquiry, leading\nto the conclusion that no conception of the kind is possible, would\nshow that the proposition is merely a verbal one. It will suffice if\nI examine the nature of this proposition that \u201cthe properties of\nmatter _might have been_\u201d {278} other than they are. Does it express\nan experimentally-ascertained truth? If so, I invite Prof. Tait to\ndescribe the experiments. Is it an intuition? If so, then along with\ndoubt of an intuitive belief concerning things _as they are_, there\ngoes confidence in an intuitive belief concerning things _as they are\nnot_. Is it an hypothesis? If so, the implication is that a cognition\nof which the negation is inconceivable (for an axiom is such) may be\ndiscredited by inference from that which is not a cognition at all,\nbut simply a supposition. Does the reviewer admit that no conclusion\ncan have a validity greater than is possessed by its premises? or\nwill he say that the trustworthiness of cognitions increases in\nproportion as they are the more inferential? Be his answer what it\nmay, I shall take it as unquestionable that nothing concluded can\nhave a warrant higher than that from which it is concluded, though\nit may have a lower. Now the elements of the proposition before us\nare these:\u2014_As_ \u201cthe properties of matter might have been such as\nto render a totally different set of laws axiomatic\u201d [_therefore_]\n\u201cthese laws [now in force] must be considered as resting .\u00a0.\u00a0. not on\nintuitive perception:\u201d that is, the intuitions in which these laws\nare recognized, must not be held authoritative. Here the cognition\nposited as premiss, is that the properties of matter might have been\nother than they are; and the conclusion is that our intuitions relative\nto existing properties are uncertain. Hence, if this conclusion is\nvalid, it is valid because the cognition or intuition respecting\nwhat might have been, is more trustworthy than the cognition or\nintuition respecting what is! Scepticism respecting the deliverances\nof consciousness about things as they are, is based upon faith in a\ndeliverance of consciousness about things as they are not!\n\nI go on to remark that this \u201cauthoritative expression of disapproval\u201d\nby which I am supposed to be silenced, even were its allegation as\nvalid as it is fallacious, would leave {279} wholly untouched the real\nissue. I pointed out how Prof. Tait\u2019s denial that any physical truths\ncould be reached _a priori_, was contradicted by his own statement\nrespecting physical axioms. The question thus raised the reviewer\nevades, and substitutes another with which I have just dealt. Now I\nbring forward again the evaded question.\n\nIn the passage I quoted, Prof. Tait, besides speaking of physical\n\u201c_axioms_,\u201d says of them that due familiarity with physical phenomena\ngives the power of seeing \u201c_at once_\u201d \u201ctheir _necessary_ truth.\u201d These\nlast words, which express his conception of an axiom, express also the\nusual conception. An axiom is defined as a \u201cself-evident truth,\u201d or a\ntruth that is seen _at once_; and the definition otherwise worded is\u2014a\n\u201ctruth so evident _at first sight_, that no process of reasoning or\ndemonstration can make it plainer.\u201d Now I contend that Prof. Tait, by\nthus committing himself to a definition of physical axioms identical\nwith that which is given of mathematical axioms, tacitly admits that\nthey have the same _a priori_ character; and I further contend that no\nsuch nature as that which he describes physical axioms to have, can be\nacquired by experiment or observation during the life of an individual.\nAxioms, if defined as truths of which the _necessity_ is at once seen,\nare thereby defined as truths of which the negation is inconceivable;\nand the familiar contrast between them and the truths established by\nindividual experiences, is that these last never become such that their\nnegations are inconceivable, however multitudinous the experiences may\nbe. Thousands of times has the sportsman heard the report that follows\nthe flash from his gun, but still he can imagine the flash as occurring\nsilently; and countless daily experiments on the burning of coal, leave\nhim able to conceive coal as remaining in the fire without ignition.\nSo that the \u201cconvictions drawn from observation and experiment\u201d during\na single life, can never acquire that character which Prof. Tait\nadmits physical axioms to have: in other words, physical axioms cannot\nbe {280} derived from personal observation and experiment. Thus,\notherwise applying the reviewer\u2019s words, I \u201cdoubt whether we should\nhave heard aught of this quotation\u201d to which he calls my attention,\nhad he studied the matter more closely; and he \u201cleaves us indebted to\u201d\nhim \u201cfor the discovery of\u201d a passage which serves to make clearer the\nuntenability of the doctrine he so dogmatically affirms.\n\nI turn now to what the reviewer says concerning the special arguments\nI used to show that the first law of motion cannot be proved\nexperimentally. After a bare enunciation of my positions, he says:\u2015\n\n \u201cOn the utterly erroneous character of these statements we do not\n care to dwell, we wish simply to call our reader\u2019s attention to the\n conclusion arrived at. Is that a disproof of the possibility of an\n inductive proof? We thought that every tolerably educated man was\n aware that the proof of a scientific law _consisted in_ showing that\n _by_ assuming its truth, we could explain the observed phenomena.\u201d\n\nProbably the reviewer expects his readers to conclude that he could\neasily dispose of the statements referred to if he tried. Among\nscientific men, however, this cavalier passing over of my arguments\nwill perhaps be ascribed to another cause. I will give him my reason\nfor saying this. Those arguments, read in proof by one of the most\neminent physicists, and by a specially-honoured mathematician,\nhad their entire concurrence; and I have since had from another\nmathematician, standing among the very first, such qualified agreement\nas is implied in saying that the first law of motion cannot be\nproved by terrestrial observations (which is in large measure what\nI undertook to show in the paragraphs which the reviewer passes\nover so contemptuously). But his last sentence, telling us what he\nthought \u201cevery tolerably educated man was aware\u201d of, is the one which\nchiefly demands attention. In it he uses the word _law_\u2014a word which,\nconveniently wide in meaning, suits his purpose remarkably well. But\nwe are here speaking of physical _axioms_. The question is whether\nthe justification of a physical {281} axiom consists in showing that\nby assuming its truth, we can explain the observed phenomena. If it\ndoes, then all distinction between hypothesis and axiom disappears.\nMathematical axioms, for which there is no other definition than\nthat which Prof. Tait gives of physical axioms, must stand on the\nsame footing. Henceforth we must hold that our warrant for asserting\nthat \u201cthings which are equal to the same thing are equal to one\nanother,\u201d consists in the observed truth of the geometrical and other\npropositions deducible from it and the associated axioms\u2014the _observed_\ntruth, mind; for the fabric of deductions yields none of the required\nwarrant until these deductions have been tested by measurement. When we\nhave described squares on the three sides of a right-angled triangle,\ncut them out in paper, and, by weighing them, have found that the one\non the hypothenuse balances the other two; then we have got a fact\nwhich, joined with other facts similarly ascertained, justifies us in\nasserting that things which are equal to the same thing are equal to\none another! Even as it stands, this implication will not, I think, be\nreadily accepted; but we shall find that its unacceptability becomes\nstill more conspicuous when the analysis is pursued to the end.\n\nContinuing his argument to show that the laws of motion have no _a\npriori_ warrant, the reviewer says:\u2015\n\n \u201cMr. Spencer asserts that Newton gave no proof of the Laws of Motion.\n The whole of the _Principia_ was the proof, and the fact that, taken\n as a system, these laws account for the lunar and planetary motions,\n is the warrant on which they chiefly rest to this day.\u201d\n\nI have first to point out that here, as before, the reviewer escapes\nby raising a new issue. I did not ask what he thinks about the\n_Principia_, and the proof of the laws of motion by it; nor did I ask\nwhether others at this day, hold the assertion of these laws to be\njustified mainly by the evidence the Solar System affords. I asked what\nNewton thought. The reviewer had represented the belief that the second\nlaw of motion is knowable _a priori_, as too {282} absurd even for\nme openly to enunciate. I pointed out that since Newton enunciates it\nopenly under the title of an axiom, and offers no proof whatever of it,\nhe did explicitly what I am blamed for doing implicitly. And thereupon\nI invited the reviewer to say what he thought of Newton. Instead of\nanswering, he gives me his opinion to the effect that the laws of\nmotion are proved true by the truth of the _Principia_ deduced from\nthem. Of this hereafter. My present purpose is to show that Newton did\nnot say this, and gave every indication of thinking the contrary. He\ndoes not call the laws of motion \u201chypotheses;\u201d he calls them \u201caxioms.\u201d\nHe does not say that he assumes them to be true _provisionally_; and\nthat the warrant for accepting them as actually true, will be found in\nthe astronomically-proved truth of the deductions. He lays them down\njust as mathematical axioms are laid down\u2014posits them as truths to be\naccepted _a priori_, from which follow consequences that must therefore\nbe accepted. And though the reviewer thinks this an untenable position,\nI am quite content to range myself with Newton in thinking it a tenable\none\u2014if, indeed, I may say so without undervaluing the reviewer\u2019s\njudgment. But now, having shown that the reviewer evaded the issue I\nraised, which it was inconvenient for him to meet, I pass to the issue\nhe substitutes for it. I will first deal with it after the methods of\nordinary logic, before dealing with it after the methods of what may be\ncalled transcendental logic.\n\nTo establish the truth of a proposition postulated, by showing that\nthe deductions from it are true, requires that the truth of the\ndeductions shall be shown in some way that does not directly or\nindirectly assume the truth of the proposition postulated. If, setting\nout with the axioms of Euclid, we deduce the truths that \u201cthe angle\nin a semi-circle is a right angle,\u201d and that \u201cthe opposite angles of\nany quadrilateral figure described in a circle, are together equal\nto two right angles,\u201d and so forth; and if, because {283} these\npropositions are true, we say that the axioms are true, we are guilty\nof a _petitio principii_. I do not mean simply that if these various\npropositions are taken as true on the strength of the demonstrations\ngiven, the reasoning is circular, because the demonstrations assume the\naxioms; but I mean more\u2014I mean that any supposed _experimental_ proof\nof these propositions by measurement, itself assumes the axioms to be\njustified. For even when the supposed experimental proof consists in\nshowing that some two lines demonstrated by reason to be equal, are\nequal when tested in perception, the axiom that things which are equal\nto the same thing are equal to one another, is taken for granted. The\nequality of the two lines can be ascertained only by carrying from\nthe one to the other, some measure (either a moveable marked line\nor the space between the points of compasses), and by assuming that\nthe two lines are equal to one another, because they are severally\nequal to this measure. The ultimate truths of mathematics, then,\ncannot be established by any experimental proof that the deductions\nfrom them are true; since the supposed experimental proof takes them\nfor granted. The same thing holds of ultimate physical truths. For\nthe alleged _a posteriori_ proof of these truths, has a vice exactly\nanalogous to the vice I have just indicated. Every evidence yielded\nby astronomy that the axioms called \u201cthe laws of motion\u201d are true,\nresolves itself into a fulfilled prevision that some celestial body or\nbodies, will be seen in a specified place, or in specified places, in\nthe heavens, at some assigned time. Now the day, hour, and minute of\nthis verifying observation, can be fixed only on the assumption that\nthe Earth\u2019s motion in its orbit and its motion round its axis, continue\nundiminished. Mark, then, the parallelism. One who chose to deny that\nthings which are equal to the same thing are equal to one another,\ncould never have it proved to him by showing the truth of deduced\npropositions; since the testing process would in {284} every case\nassume that which he denied. Similarly, one who refused to admit that\nmotion, uninterfered with, continues in the same straight line at the\nsame velocity, could not have it proved to him by the fulfilment of an\nastronomical prediction; because he would say that both the spectator\u2019s\nposition in space, and the position of the event in time, were those\nalleged, only if the Earth\u2019s motions of translation and rotation\nwere undiminished, which was the very thing he called in question.\nEvidently such a sceptic might object that the seeming fulfilment of\nthe prediction, say a transit of Venus, may be effected by various\ncombinations of the changing positions of Venus, of the Earth, and of\nthe spectator on the Earth. The appearances may occur as anticipated,\nthough Venus is at some other place than the calculated one; provided\nthe Earth also is at some other place, and the spectator\u2019s position on\nthe Earth is different. And if the first law of motion is not assumed,\nit must be admitted that the Earth and the spectator _may_ occupy these\nother places at the predicted time: supposing that in the absence of\nthe first law, this predicted time can be ascertained, which it cannot.\nThus the testing process inevitably begs the question.\n\nThat the perfect congruity of all astronomical observations with all\ndeductions from \u201cthe laws of motion,\u201d gives coherence to this group\nof intuitions and perceptions, and so furnishes a warrant for the\nentire aggregate of them which it would not have were any of them at\nvariance, is unquestionable. But it does not therefore follow that\nastronomical observations can furnish a test for _each individual\nassumption_, out of the many which are simultaneously made. I will not\ndwell on the fact that the process of verification assumes the validity\nof the assumptions on which acts of reasoning proceed; for the reply\nmay be that these are shown to be valid apart from astronomy. Nor will\nI insist that the assumptions underlying mathematical inferences,\ngeometrical and {285} numerical, are involved; since it may be said\nthat these are justifiable separately by our terrestrial experiences.\nBut, passing over all else that is taken for granted, it suffices to\npoint out that, in making every astronomical prediction, the three\nlaws of motion and the law of gravitation are _all_ assumed; that if\nthe first law of motion is to be held proved by the fulfilment of\nthe prediction, it can be so only by taking for granted that the two\nother laws of motion and the law of gravitation are true; and that\nnon-fulfilment of the prediction would not disprove the first law of\nmotion, since the error might be in one or other of the three remaining\nassumptions. Similarly with the second law: the astronomical proof of\nit depends on the truth of the accompanying assumptions. So that the\nwarrants for the assumptions A, B, C, and D, are respectively such\nthat A, B, and C being taken as trustworthy, prove the validity of D;\nD being thus proved valid, joins C, and B, in giving a character to\nA; and so throughout. The result is that everything comes out right\nif they happen to be all true; but if one of them is false, it may\ndestroy the characters of the other three, though these are in reality\nexact. Clearly, then, astronomical prediction and observation can never\ntest any one of the premises by itself. They can only justify the\nentire aggregate of premises, mathematical and physical, joined with\nthe entire aggregate of reasoning processes leading from premises to\nconclusions.\n\nI now recall the reviewer\u2019s \u201cthought,\u201d uttered in his habitual manner,\n\u201cthat every tolerably educated man was aware that the proof of a\nscientific law _consisted in_ showing that _by_ assuming its truth,\nwe could explain the observed phenomena.\u201d Having from the point of\nview of ordinary logic dealt with this theory of proof as applied by\nthe reviewer, I proceed to deal with it from the point of view of\ntranscendental logic, as I have myself applied it. And here I have to\ncharge the reviewer with either being ignorant of, or else deliberately\nignoring, a cardinal {286} doctrine of the System of Philosophy he\nprofesses to review\u2014a doctrine set forth not in those four volumes of\nit which he seems never to have looked into; but in the one volume of\nit he has partially dealt with. For this principle which, in respect\nto scientific belief, he enunciates for my instruction, is one which,\nin _First Principles_, I have enunciated in respect to all beliefs\nwhatever. In the chapter on the \u201cData of Philosophy,\u201d where I have\ninquired into the legitimacy of our modes of procedure, and where I\nhave pointed out that there are certain ultimate conceptions without\nwhich the intellect can no more stir \u201cthan the body can stir without\nhelp of its limbs,\u201d I have inquired how their validity or invalidity is\nto be shown; and I have gone on to reply that\u2015\n\n \u201cThose of them which are vital, or cannot be severed from the rest\n without mental dissolution, must be assumed as true _provisionally_\n .\u00a0.\u00a0.\u00a0. leaving the assumption of their unquestionableness to be\n justified by the results.\n\n \u201c\u00a7 40. How is it to be justified by the results? As any other\n assumption is justified\u2014by ascertaining that all the conclusions\n deducible from it, correspond with the facts as directly observed\u2014by\n showing the agreement between the experiences it leads us to\n anticipate, and the actual experiences. There is no mode of\n establishing the validity of any belief, except that of showing its\n entire congruity with all other beliefs.\u201d\n\nProceeding avowedly and rigorously on this principle, I have next\ninquired what is the fundamental _process_ of thought by which this\ncongruity is to be determined, and what is the fundamental _product_ of\nthought yielded by this process. This fundamental product I have shown\nto be the coexistence of subject and object; and then, describing this\nas a postulate to be justified by \u201cits subsequently-proved congruity\nwith every result of experience, direct and indirect,\u201d I have gone on\nto say that \u201cthe two divisions of self and not-self, are re-divisible\ninto certain most general forms, the reality of which Science, as\nwell as Common Sense, from moment to moment assumes.\u201d Nor is this\nall. Having thus assumed, _only provisionally_, this deepest of all\nintuitions, far transcending an axiom in self-evidence, I {287} have,\nafter drawing deductions occupying four volumes, deliberately gone\nback to the assumption (_Prin. of Psy.,_ \u00a7 386). After quoting the\npassage in which the principle was laid down, and after reminding the\nreader that the deductions drawn had been found congruous with one\nanother; I have pointed out that it still remained to ascertain whether\nthis primordial assumption was congruous with all the deductions;\nand have thereupon proceeded, throughout eighteen chapters, to show\nthe congruity. And yet having before him the volumes in which this\nprinciple is set forth with a distinctness, and acted upon with a\ndeliberation, which I believe are nowhere paralleled, the reviewer\nenunciates for my benefit this principle of which he \u201cthought that\nevery tolerably educated man was aware\u201d! He enunciates it as applying\nto limited groups of beliefs, to which it does not apply; and shuts his\neyes to the fact that I have avowedly and systematically acted upon it\nin respect to the entire aggregate of our beliefs (axioms included) for\nwhich it furnishes the ultimate justification!\n\nHere I must add another elucidatory statement, which would have been\nneedless had the reviewer read that which he criticizes. His argument\nproceeds throughout on the assumption that I understand _a priori_\ntruths after the ancient manner, as truths independent of experience;\nand he shows this more tacitly, where he \u201ctrusts\u201d that he is \u201cattacking\none of the last attempts to deduce the laws of nature from our inner\nconsciousness.\u201d Manifestly, a leading thesis of one of the works\nhe professes to review, is entirely unknown to him\u2014the thesis that\nforms of thought, and consequently the intuitions which those forms\nof thought involve, result entirely from the effects of experiences,\norganized and inherited. With the _Principles of Psychology_ before\nhim, not only does he seem unaware that it contains this doctrine, but\nthough this doctrine, set forth in its first edition published nearly\ntwenty years ago, has gained {288} considerable currency, he seems\nnever to have heard of it. The implication of this doctrine is, not\nthat the \u201claws of nature\u201d are deducible from \u201cour inner consciousness,\u201d\nbut that our consciousness has a pre-established correspondence\nwith such of those laws (simple, perpetually presented, and never\nnegatived) as have, in the course of practically-infinite ancestral\nexperiences, registered themselves in our nervous structure. Had he\ntaken the trouble to acquaint himself with this doctrine, he would\nhave learned that the intuitions of axiomatic truths are regarded by\nme as latent in the inherited brain, just as bodily reflex actions are\nlatent in the inherited nervous centres of a lower order; that such\nlatent intuitions are made potentially more distinct by the greater\ndefiniteness of structure due to individual action and culture; and\nthat thus, axiomatic truths, having a warrant entirely _a posteriori_\nfor the race, have for the individual a warrant which, substantially\n_a priori_, is made complete _a posteriori_. And he would then have\nlearned that as, during evolution, Thought has been moulded into\nincreasing correspondence with Things; and as such correspondence,\ntolerably complete in respect of the simple, ever-present, and\ninvariable relations, as those of space, has made considerable advance\nin respect of the primary dynamical relations; the assertion that\nthe resulting intuitions are authoritative, is the assertion that\nthe simplest uniformities of nature, as experienced throughout an\nimmeasurable past, are better known than they are as experienced during\nan individual life. All which conceptions, however, being, as it seems,\nunheard of by the reviewer, he regards my trust in these primordial\nintuitions as like that of the Ptolemists in their fancies about\nperfection!\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThus far my chief antagonists, passive if not active, have been Prof.\nTait and, by implication, Sir William Thomson, {289} his coadjutor\nin the work quoted against me\u2014men of standing, and the last of them\nof world-wide reputation as a mathematician and physicist. Partly\nbecause the opinions of such men demand attention, I have dealt with\nthe questions raised at some length; and partly, also, because the\norigin and consequent warrant of physical axioms are questions of\ngeneral and permanent interest. The reviewer, who by citing against me\nthese authorities has gained for some of his criticisms consideration\nthey would otherwise not deserve, I must, in respect of his other\ncriticisms, deal with very briefly. Because, for reasons sufficiently\nindicated, I did not assail sundry of his statements, he has reiterated\nthem as unassailable. I will here add no more than is needful to show\nhow groundless is his assumption.\n\nWhat the reviewer says on the metaphysical aspects of the propositions\nwe distinguish as physical, need not detain us long. His account of my\nexposition of \u201cUltimate Scientific Ideas,\u201d he closes by saying of me\nthat \u201che is not content with less than showing that all our fundamental\nconceptions are inconceivable.\u201d Whether the reviewer knows what he\nmeans by an inconceivable conception, I cannot tell. It will suffice to\nsay that I have attempted no such remarkable feat as that described. My\nattempt has been to show that objective activities, together with their\nobjective forms, are inconceivable by us\u2014that such symbolic conceptions\nof them as we frame, and are obliged to use, are proved, by the\nalternative contradictions which a final analysis of them discloses, to\nhave no likeness to the realities. But the proposition that objective\nexistence cannot be rendered in terms of subjective existence, the\nreviewer thinks adequately expressed by saying that \u201cour fundamental\nconceptions\u201d (subjective products) \u201care inconceivable\u201d (cannot be\nframed by subjective processes)! Giving this as a sample from which\nmay be judged his fitness for discussing these ultimate questions, I\npass over his physico-metaphysical criticisms, and proceed at once to\n{290} those which his special discipline may be assumed to render more\nworthy of attention.\n\nQuoting a passage relative to the law that \u201call central forces vary\ninversely as the squares of the distances,\u201d he derides the assertion\nthat \u201cthis law is not simply an empirical one, but one deducible\nmathematically from the relations of space\u2014one of which the negation\nis inconceivable.\u201d Now whether this statement can or cannot be fully\njustified, it has at any rate none of that absurdity alleged by the\nreviewer. When he puts the question\u2014\u201cWhence does he [do I] get this?\u201d\nhe invites the suspicion that his mind is not characterized by much\nexcursiveness. It seems never to have occurred to him that, if rays\nlike those of light radiate in straight lines from a centre, the number\nof them falling on any given area of a sphere described from that\ncentre, will diminish as the square of the distance increases, because\nthe surfaces of spheres vary as the squares of their radii. For, if\nthis has occurred to him, why does he ask whence I get the inference?\nThe inference is so simple a one as naturally to be recognized by those\nwhose thoughts go a little beyond their lessons in geometry.[38] If the\nreviewer means to ask, whence I get the implied assumption that central\nforces act only in straight lines, I reply that this assumption has a\nwarrant akin to that of Newton\u2019s first axiom, that a moving body will\ncontinue moving in a straight line unless interfered with. For that the\nforce exerted by one centre on another should act in a curved line,\nimplies the conception of some second force, complicating the direct\neffect of the first. And, even could a central force be truly conceived\nas acting in lines not straight, the _average_ {291} distribution of\nits effects upon the inner surface of the surrounding sphere, would\nstill follow the same law. Thus, whether or not the law be accepted on\n_a priori_ grounds, the assumed absurdity of representing it to have _a\npriori_ grounds, is not very obvious. Respecting this statement of mine\nthe reviewer goes on to say\u2015\n\n \u201cThis is a wisdom far higher than that possessed by the discoverer\n of the great law of attraction, who was led to consider it from no\n cogitations on the relations of space, but from observations of the\n movements of the planets; and who was so far from rising to that\n clearness of view of the truth of his great discovery, which is\n expressed by the phrase, \u2018its negation is inconceivable,\u2019 that he\n actually abandoned it for a time, because (through an error in his\n estimate of the earth\u2019s diameter) it did not seem fully to account for\n the motion of the moon.\u201d\n\nTo the first clause in this sentence, I have simply to give a direct\ndenial; and to assert that neither Newton\u2019s \u201cobservations of the\nmovements of the planets\u201d nor other such observations continued by all\nastronomers for all time, would yield \u201cthe great law of attraction.\u201d\nContrariwise, I contend that when the reviewer says, by implication,\nthat Newton had no antecedent hypothesis respecting the cause of the\nplanetary motions, he (the reviewer) is not only going beyond his\npossible knowledge, but he is asserting that which even a rudimentary\nacquaintance with the process of discovery, might have shown him was\nimpossible. Without framing, beforehand, the supposition that there\nwas at work an attractive force varying inversely as the square of the\ndistance, no such comparison of observations as that which led to the\nestablishment of the theory of gravitation could have been made. On the\nsecond clause of the sentence, in which the reviewer volunteers for my\nbenefit the information that Newton \u201cactually abandoned\u201d his hypothesis\nfor a while because it did not bring out right results, I have first\nto tell him that, in an early number of the very periodical containing\nhis article,[39] I cited this fact {292} (using these same words)\nat a time when he was at school, or before he went there.[40] I have\nnext to assert that this fact is irrelevant; and that Newton, while\nprobably seeing it to be a necessary implication of geometrical laws\nthat central forces vary inversely as the squares of the distances,\ndid not see it to be a necessary implication of any laws, geometrical\nor dynamical, that there exists a force by which the celestial bodies\naffect one another; and therefore doubtless saw that there was no _a\npriori_ warrant for the doctrine of gravitation. The reviewer, however,\naiming to substitute for my \u201cconfused notions\u201d his own clear ones,\nwishes me to identify the proposition\u2014Central forces vary inversely\nas the squares of the distances\u2014with the proposition\u2014There exists a\ncosmical attractive force which varies inversely as the squares of\nthe distances. But I decline to identify them; and I suspect that a\nconsiderable distinction between them was recognized by Newton. Lastly,\napart from all this, I have to point out that even had Newton thought\nthe existence of an attractive force throughout space was an _a priori_\ntruth, as well as the law of variation of such a force if it existed;\nhe would still, naturally enough, pause before asserting gravitation\nand its law, when he found his deductions did not correspond with the\nfacts. To suppose otherwise, is to ascribe to him a rashness which no\ndisciplined man of science could be guilty of.\n\nSee, then, the critical capacity variously exhibited in the space\nof a single sentence. The reviewer, quite erroneously, thinks that\nobservations unguided by hypotheses suffice for physical discoveries.\nHe seems unaware that, on _a priori_ grounds, the law of the inverse\nsquare had been suspected as the law of some cosmical force, before\nNewton. He asserts, without warrant, that no such _a priori_ conception\npreceded, in Newton\u2019s mind, his observations and {293} calculations.\nHe confounds the law of variation of a force, with the existence of a\nforce varying according to that law. And he concludes that Newton could\nhave had no _a priori_ conception of the law of variation, because he\ndid not assert the existence of a force varying according to this law\nin defiance of the evidence as then presented to him!\n\nNow that I have analyzed, with these results, the first of his\ncriticisms, the reader will neither expect me to waste time in\nsimilarly dealing with the rest _seriatim_, nor will he wish to have\nhis own time occupied in following the analysis. To the evidence thus\nfurnished of the reviewer\u2019s fitness for the task he undertakes, it will\nsuffice if I add an illustration or two of the _animus_ which leads\nhim to make grave imputations on trivial grounds, and to ignore the\nevidence which contradicts his interpretations.\n\nBecause I have spoken of a balanced system, like that formed by the sun\nand planets, as having the \u201cpeculiarity, that though the constituents\nof the system have relative movements, the system, as a whole, has no\nmovement,\u201d he unhesitatingly assumes me to be unaware that in a system\nof bodies whose movements are not balanced, it is equally true that the\ncentre of gravity remains constant. Ignorance of a general principle in\ndynamics is alleged against me solely because of this colloquial use\nof the word \u201cpeculiarity,\u201d where I should have used a word (and there\nis no word perfectly fit) free from the implication of exclusiveness.\nIf the reviewer were to assert that arrogance is a \u201cpeculiarity\u201d of\ncritics; and if I were thereupon to charge him with entire ignorance of\nmankind, many of whom besides critics are arrogant, he would rightly\nsay that my conclusion was a very large one to draw from so small a\npremise.\n\nTo this example of strained inference I will join an example of what\nseems like deliberate misconstruction. From one of my essays (not among\nthe works he professes to deal with) the reviewer, to strengthen his\nattack, brings {294} a strange mistake; which, even without inquiry,\nany fair-minded reader would see must be an oversight. A statement true\nof a single body acted on by a tractive force, I have inadvertently\npluralized: being so possessed by another aspect of the question, as to\noverlook the obvious fact that with a plurality of bodies the statement\nbecame untrue. Not only, however, does the reviewer ignore various\nevidences furnished by the works before him, that I could not really\nthink what I had there said, but he ignores a direct contradiction\ncontained in the paragraph succeeding that from which he quotes. So\nthat the case stands thus:\u2014On two adjacent pages I have made two\nopposite statements, both of which I cannot be supposed to believe. One\nof them is right; and this the reviewer assumes I do not believe. One\nof them is glaringly wrong; and this the reviewer assumes I do believe.\nWhy he made this choice no one who reads his criticism will fail to see.\n\nEven had his judgments more authority than is given to them by his\nmathematical honours, this brief characterization would, I think,\nsuffice. Perhaps already, in rebutting the assumption that I did not\nanswer his allegations because they were unanswerable, I have ascribed\nto them an unmerited importance. For the rest, suggesting that their\nvalue may be measured by the value of that above dealt with as a\nsample, I leave them to be answered by the works they are directed\nagainst.\n\nHere I end. The foregoing pages, while serving, I think, the more\nimportant purpose of making clearer the relations of physical axioms\nto physical knowledge, incidentally justify the assertion that the\nreviewer\u2019s charges of fallacious reasoning and ignorance of the\nnature of proof, recoil on himself. When, in his confident way, he\nundertakes to teach me the nature of our warrant for scientific\nbeliefs, ignoring absolutely the inquiry contained in _Principles of\nPsychology_, concerning the relative values of direct intuitions and\nreasoned conclusions, he lays himself open to {295} a sarcasm which\nis sufficiently obvious. And when a certain ultimate principle of\njustification for our beliefs, set forth and acted upon in the _System\nof Synthetic Philosophy_ more distinctly than in any other work, is\nenunciated by him for my instruction, as one which he \u201cthought that\nevery tolerably educated man was aware\u201d of, his course is one for\nwhich I find no fit epithet in the vocabulary I permit myself to\nuse. That in some cases he has shown eagerness to found charges on\nmisinterpretations little less than deliberate, has been sufficiently\nshown; as also that, in other cases, his own failure to discriminate\nis made the ground for ascribing to me beliefs that are manifestly\nuntenable. Save in the single case of a statement respecting collisions\nof bodies, made by me without the needful qualification, I am not\naware of any errors he detects, except errors of oversight or those\narising from imperfect expression and inadequate exposition. When he\nunhesitatingly puts the worst constructions on these, it cannot be\nbecause his own exactness is such that no other constructions occur\nto him; for he displays an unusual capacity for inadvertencies, and\nmust have had many experiences showing him how much he might be\nwronged by illiberal interpretations of them. One who in twenty-three\nprofessed extracts makes fifteen mistakes\u2014words omitted, or added,\nor substituted\u2014should not need reminding how largely mere oversight\nmay raise suspicion of something worse. One who shows his notions of\naccurate statement by asserting that as I substitute \u201cpersistence\u201d\nfor \u201cconservation,\u201d I therefore identify Persistence of _Force_\nwith Conservation of _Energy_, and debits me with the resulting\nincongruities\u2014one who, in pursuance of this error, confounds a\nspecial principle with the general principle it is said to imply, and\nthereupon describes a wider principle as being included in a narrower\n(p. 481)\u2014one who speaks of our \u201cinner consciousness\u201d (p. 488), so\nasserting, by implication, that we have an outer consciousness\u2014one\nwho {296} talks of an inconceivable conception; ought surely to be\naware how readily lax expressions may be turned into proofs of absurd\nopinions. And one who, in the space of a few pages, falls into so many\nsolecisms, ought to be vividly conscious that a whole volume thus\nwritten would furnish multitudinous statements from which a critic,\nmoved by a spirit like his own, might evolve abundant absurdities;\nsupplying ample occasion for blazoning the tops of pages with insulting\nwords.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n[_A letter, drawn from_ Prof. Tait _by the foregoing criticisms, and\npublished by him in_ Nature, _initiated a controversy carried on in\nthat periodical between March 26th and June 18th, 1874. Partly in\njustification of my position, and partly as tending to make clearer the\nnature and origin of physical axioms, I append certain portions of the\ncorrespondence, with some additional explanations and comments. For the\npurpose of elucidation I prefix the theses I have maintained._] {297}\n\n\nTHESES.\n\n1. _If A produces B, then 2\u202fA will produce 2\u202fB._\n\n This is the blank form of causal relation quantitatively considered,\n when the causes and effects are simple\u2014that is, are unimpeded by other\n causes and uncomplicated by other effects; and whenever two or more\n causes co-operate, there is no possibility of determining the relation\n between the compound cause and the compound effect except by assuming\n that between each co-operating cause and its separate effect there\n exists this same quantitative relation.\n\n2. _This truth holds whatever the natures of the simple causes and\nsimple effects; and is an_ a priori _assumption made in conducting every\nexperiment and in reasoning from it._\n\n Every process of weighing, every chemical analysis, every physical\n investigation, proceeds on this truth without assigning warrant for\n it; and in allowing for the effect of any minor cause that interferes\n with the major cause, this same truth is assumed.\n\n3. _When A is an impressed force and B the produced motion, then the\ngeneral truth that if A produces B, 2\u202fA will produce 2\u202fB, becomes the\nmore special truth called the Second Law of Motion._\n\n Newton\u2019s amplified statement of this Law is:\u2014\u201cIf any force generates\n a motion, a double force will generate double the motion, a triple\n force triple the motion, whether that force be impressed altogether\n and at once, or gradually and successively.\u201d And his further clause,\n asserting that this law holds whether the directions of the forces\n are or are not the same, asserts a proportionality between each\n force and its produced motion, such as we have seen to be invariably\n assumed between each cause and its separate effect, when there are\n co-operating causes.\n\n4. _This Law may be affirmed, without specification of the modes in\nwhich the impressed force and the resulting motion are to be estimated._\n\n Newton\u2019s statement is abstract. Taking for granted right modes of\n measurement, it asserts that the alteration of motion (rightly\n measured) is proportional to the impressed force (rightly measured).\n\n5. _No_ a posteriori _proof of the general ultimate physical truth (or\nof this more special truth it includes) is possible; because every\nsupposed process of verification assumes it._\n\nThese, cleared from entanglements, are the theses held by me, and\ndefended in the following pages. {298}\n\n\nAPPENDIX A.\n\n(_From_ Nature, _April 16, 1874._)\n\nAbsence from town has delayed what further remarks I have to make\nrespecting the disputed origin of physical axioms.\n\nThe particular physical axiom in connection with which the general\nquestion was raised, was the Second Law of Motion. It stands in the\n_Principia_ as follows:\u2015\n\n \u201c_The alteration of motion is ever proportional to the motive force\n impressed; and is made in the direction of the right line in which\n that force is impressed._\n\n \u201cIf any force generates a motion, a double force will generate double\n the motion, a triple force triple the motion, whether that force be\n impressed altogether and at once, or gradually and successively. And\n this motion (being always directed the same way with the generating\n force), if the body moved before, is added to or subducted from\n the former motion, according as they directly conspire with or are\n directly contrary to each other; or obliquely joined, when they\n are oblique, so as to produce a new motion compounded from the\n determination of both.\u201d\n\nAs this, like each of the other Laws of Motion, is called an axiom;[41]\nas the paragraph appended to it is simply an amplification, or\nre-statement in a more concrete form; as there are no facts named\nas bases of induction, nor any justifying experiment; and as Newton\nproceeds forthwith to draw deductions; it was a legitimate inference\nthat he regarded this truth as _a priori_. My statement to this effect\nwas based on the contents of the _Principia_ itself; and I think I\nwas warranted in assuming that the nature of the Laws of Motion, as\nconceived by Newton, was to be thence inferred.\n\nThe passages quoted by the _British Quarterly_ Reviewer from Newton\u2019s\ncorrespondence, which were unknown to me, show that this was not\nNewton\u2019s conception of them. Thus far, then, my opponent has the best\nof the {299} argument. Several qualifying considerations have to be\nset down, however.\n\n(1) Clearly, the statements contained in the _Principia_ do not convey\nNewton\u2019s conception; otherwise there would have been no need for his\nexplanations. The passages quoted prove that he wished to exclude these\ncardinal truths from the class of hypotheses, which he said he did not\nmake; and to do this he had to define them.\n\n(2) By calling them \u201caxioms,\u201d and by yet describing them as principles\n\u201c_deduced_ from phenomena,\u201d he makes it manifest that he gives the word\n\u201caxiom\u201d a sense widely unlike the sense in which it is usually accepted.\n\n(3) Further, the quotations fail to warrant the statement that the\nLaws of Motion are proved true by the truth of the _Principia_. For\nif the fulfilment of astronomical predictions made in pursuance of\nthe _Principia_, is held to be the evidence \u201con which they chiefly\nrest to this day,\u201d then, until thus justified, they are unquestionably\nhypotheses. Yet Newton says they are not hypotheses.\n\nNewton\u2019s view may be found without seeking for it in his letters: it\nis contained in the _Principia_ itself. The scholium to Corollary VI.\nbegins thus:\u2015\n\n \u201cHitherto I have laid down such principles as have been received by\n mathematicians, and are _confirmed_ by abundance of experiments. By\n the two first Laws and the two first Corollaries, Galileo discovered\n that the descent of bodies observed the duplicate ratio of the time,\n and that the motion of projectiles was in the curve of a parabola;\n experience _agreeing_ with both,\u201d &c.\n\nNow as this passage precedes the deductions constituting the\n_Principia_, it shows conclusively, in the first place, that Newton did\nnot think \u201cthe whole of the _Principia_ was the proof\u201d of the Laws of\nMotion, though the Reviewer asserts that it is. Further, by the words I\nhave italicised, Newton implicitly describes Galileo as having asserted\nthese Laws of Motion, if not as gratuitous hypotheses (which he says\nthey are not), then as _a priori_ intuitions. For a proposition which\nis _confirmed_ by {300} experiment, and which is said to _agree_ with\nexperience, must have been entertained before the alleged verifications\ncould be reached. And as before he made his experiments on falling\nbodies and projectiles, Galileo had no facts serving as an inductive\nbasis for the Second Law of Motion, the law could not have been arrived\nat by induction.\n\nLet me end what I have to say on this vexed question by adding\na further reason to those I have already given, for saying that\nphysical axioms cannot be established experimentally. The belief in\ntheir experimental establishment rests on the tacit assumption that\nexperiments can be made, and conclusions drawn from them, without any\ntruths being postulated. It is forgotten that there is a foundation\nof pre-conceptions without which the perceptions and inferences of\nthe physicist cannot stand\u2014_pre-conceptions which are the products\nof simpler experiences than those yielded by consciously-made\nexperiments_. Passing over the many which do not immediately concern\nus, I will name only that which does,\u2014the exact quantitative relation\n[of proportionality] between cause and effect. It is taken by the\nchemist as a truth needing no proof, that if two volumes of hydrogen\nunite with one volume of oxygen to form a certain quantity of water,\nfour volumes of hydrogen uniting with two volumes of oxygen will\nform double the quantity of water. If a cubic foot of ice at 32\u00b0\nis liquefied by a specified quantity of heat, it is taken to be\nunquestionable that three times the quantity of heat will liquefy three\ncubic feet. And similarly with mechanical forces, the unhesitating\nassumption is that if one unit of force acting in a given direction\nproduces a certain result, two units will produce twice the result.\nEvery process of measurement in a physical experiment takes this for\ngranted; as we see in one of the simplest of them\u2014the process of\nweighing. If a measured quantity of metal, gravitating towards the\nEarth, counterbalances a quantity of some other substance, the truth\npostulated in every act {301} of weighing is, that any multiple of\nsuch weight will counterbalance an equi-multiple of such substance.\nThat is to say, each unit of force is assumed to work its equivalent\nof effect in the direction in which it acts. Now this is nothing else\nthan the assumption which the Second Law of Motion expresses in respect\nto effects of another kind. \u201cIf any force generates a motion, a double\nforce will generate a double motion,\u201d &c., &c.; and when carried on\nto the composition of motions, the law is, similarly, the assertion\nthat any other force, acting in any other direction, will similarly\nproduce in that direction a proportionate motion. So that the law\nsimply asserts the exact equivalence [or proportionality] of causes\nand effects of this particular class, while all physical experiments\n_assume_ this exact equivalence [or proportionality] among causes and\neffects of all classes. Hence, the proposal to prove the Laws of Motion\nexperimentally, is the proposal to make a wider assumption for the\npurpose of justifying one of the narrower assumptions included in it.\n\nReduced to its briefest form, the argument is this:\u2014If definite\nquantitative relations [of proportionality] between causes and effects\nbe assumed _a priori_, then, the Second Law of Motion is an immediate\ncorollary. If there are not definite quantitative relations [of\nproportionality] between causes and effects, all the conclusions drawn\nfrom physical experiments are invalid. And further, in the absence of\nthis _a priori_ assumption of equivalence, the quantified conclusion\nfrom any experiment may be denied, and any other quantification of the\nconclusion asserted.[42]\n\n HERBERT SPENCER.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nEntire misconstruction of the view expressed above, {302} having been\nshown by a new assailant, who announced himself as also \u201cA Senior\nWrangler,\u201d Mr. James Collier [my secretary at that time] wrote on my\nbehalf an explanatory letter, published in _Nature_ for May 21, 1874,\nfrom which the following passages are extracts:\u2015\n\n\u201cThe cue may be taken from an experience described in Mr. Spencer\u2019s\n_Principles of Psychology_ (\u00a7 468, note), where it is shown that\nwhen with one hand we pull the other, we have in the feeling of\ntension produced in the limb pulled, a measure of the reaction that\nis equivalent to the action of the other limb. Both terms of the\nrelation of cause and effect are in this case present to consciousness\nas muscular tensions, which are our symbols of forces in general.\nWhile no motion is produced they are felt to be equal, so far as the\nsensations can serve to measure equality; and when excess of tension is\nfelt in the one arm, motion is experienced in the other. Here, as in\nthe examples about to be given, the relation between cause and effect,\nthough numerically indefinite, is definite in the respect that every\nadditional increment of cause produces an additional increment of\neffect; and it is out of this and similar experiences that the idea of\nthe relation of proportionality grows and becomes organic.\n\n\u201cA child, when biting his food, discovers that the harder he bites the\ndeeper is the indentation; in other words, that the more force applied,\nthe greater the effect. If he tears an object with his teeth, he finds\nthat the more he pulls the more the thing yields. Let him press against\nsomething soft, as his own person, or his clothes, or a lump of clay,\nand he sees that the part or object pressed yields little or much,\naccording to the amount of the muscular strain. He can bend a stick\nthe more completely the more force he applies. Any elastic object, as\na piece of india-rubber or a catapult, can be stretched the farther\nthe harder he pulls. If he tries to push a small body, there is little\nresistance and it is easy to move; but he finds that a {303} big body\npresents greater resistance and is harder to move. The experience\nis precisely similar if he attempts to lift a big body and a little\none; or if he raises a limb, with or without any object attached to\nit. He throws a stone: if it is light, little exertion propels it a\nconsiderable distance; if very heavy, great exertion only a short\ndistance. So, also, if he jumps, a slight effort raises him to a short\nheight, a greater effort to a greater height. By blowing with his mouth\nhe sees that he can move small objects, or the surface of his morning\u2019s\nmilk, gently or violently according as the blast is weak or strong. And\nit is the same with sounds: with a slight strain on the vocal organs he\nproduces a murmur; with great strain he can raise a shout.\n\n\u201cThe experiences these propositions record all implicate the same\nconsciousness\u2014the notion of proportionality between force applied and\nresult produced; and it is out of this latent consciousness that the\naxiom of the perfect quantitative equivalence of the relations between\ncause and effect is evolved. To show how rigorous, how irreversible,\nthis consciousness becomes, take a boy and suggest to him the following\nstatements:\u2014Can he not break a string he has, by pulling? tell him\nto double it, and then he will break it. He cannot bend or break a\nparticular stick: let him make less effort and he will succeed. He is\nunable to raise a heavy weight: tell him he errs by using too much\nforce. He can\u2019t push over a small chest: he will find it easier to\nupset a larger one. By blowing hard he cannot move a given object: if\nhe blows lightly, he will move it. By great exertion he cannot make\nhimself audible at a distance: but he will make himself heard with\nless exertion at a greater distance. Tell him to do all or any of\nthese, and of course he fails. The propositions are unthinkable, and\ntheir unthinkableness shows that the consciousness which yields them\nis irreversible. These, then, are preconceptions, properly so called,\nwhich have {304} grown unconsciously out of the earliest experiences,\nbeginning with those of the sucking infant, which are perpetually\nconfirmed by fresh experiences, and which have at last become organized\nin the mental structure.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\u201cMr. Spencer\u2019s argument appears to be briefly this:\u20141. There are\nnumberless experiences unconsciously acquired and unconsciously\naccumulated during the early life of the individual (in harmony\nwith the acquisitions of all ancestral individuals) which yield the\npreconception, long anteceding anything like conscious physical\nexperiments, that physical causes and effects vary together\nquantitatively. This is gained from all orders of physical experiences,\nand forms a universal preconception respecting them, which the\nphysicist or other man of Science brings with him to his experiments.\n\n\u201c2. Mr. Spencer showed in three cases\u2014chemical, physical, and\nmechanical\u2014that this preconception, so brought, was tacitly involved\nin the conception which the experimenter drew from the results of his\nexperiments.\n\n\u201c3. Having indicated this universal preconception, and illustrated\nits presence in these special conceptions, Mr. Spencer goes on to say\nthat it is involved also in the special conception of the relation\nbetween force and motion, as formulated in the \u2018Second Law of Motion.\u2019\nHe asserts that this is simply one case out of the numberless cases\nin which all these consciously-reasoned conclusions rest upon the\nunconsciously-formed conclusions that precede reasoning. Mr. Spencer\nalleges that as it has become impossible for a boy to think that\nby a smaller effort he can jump higher, and for a shopman to think\nthat smaller weights will outbalance greater quantities, and for the\nphysicist to think that he will get increased effects from diminished\ncauses, so it is impossible to think that \u2018alteration of motion\u2019 is not\n\u2018proportional to the motive force impressed.\u2019 And he maintains that\nthis is, in fact, a {305} latent implication of unconsciously-organized\nexperiences, just as much as those which the experimenter necessarily\npostulates.\u201d\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nTo meet further misinterpretations, a second letter was written by Mr.\nCollier and published in _Nature_ for June 4, 1874. The following are\npassages from it:\u2015\n\n\u201cHaving but limited space, and assuming that the requisite\nqualifications would be made by unbiased readers, I passed over all\nthose details of the child\u2019s experiences which would have been required\nin a full exposition. Of course I was aware that in the bending of a\nstick the visible effect does not increase in the same ratio as the\nforce applied; and hardly needed the \u2018Senior Wrangler\u2019 to tell me\nthat the resistance to a body moving through a fluid increases in a\nhigher ratio than the velocity. It was taken for granted that he, and\nthose who think with him, would see that out of all these experiences,\nin some of which the causes and effects are simple, and in others\nof which they are complex, there grows the consciousness that the\nproportionality is the more distinct the simpler the antecedents and\nconsequents. This is part of the preconception which the physicist\nbrings with him and acts upon. Perhaps it is within the \u2018Senior\nWrangler\u2019s\u2019 knowledge of physical exploration, that when the physicist\nfinds a result not bearing that ratio to its assigned cause which the\ntwo were ascertained in other cases to have, he immediately assumes the\npresence of some perturbing cause or causes, which modify the ratio.\nThere is, in fact, no physical determination made by any experimenter\nwhich does not assume, as an _a priori_ necessity, that there cannot\nbe a deviation from proportion without the presence of such additional\ncause.\n\n\u201cReturning to the general issue, perhaps the \u2018Senior Wrangler\u2019 will\npay some respect to the judgment of one {306} who was a Senior\nWrangler too, and a great deal more\u2014who was distinguished not only\nas a mathematician but as an astronomer, a physicist, and also as an\ninquirer into the methods of science: I mean Sir John Herschel. In his\n_Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy_, he says:\u2015\n\n \u201c\u2018When we would lay down general rules for guiding and facilitating\n our search, among a great mass of assembled facts, for their common\n cause, we must have regard to the characters of that relation which we\n intend by cause and effect.\u2019\n\n\u201cOf these \u2018characters\u2019 he sets down the third and fourth in the\nfollowing terms:\u2015\n\n \u201c\u2018Increase or diminution of the effect, with the increased or\n diminished intensity of the cause, in cases which admit of increase\n and diminution.\u2019\n\n \u201c\u2018Proportionality of the effect to its cause in all cases of _direct\n unimpeded_ action.\u2019\n\n\u201cObserve that, in Sir J. Herschel\u2019s view, these are \u2018characters\u2019 of\nthe relation of cause and effect to be accepted as \u2018general rules for\n_guiding_ and facilitating our search\u2019 among physical phenomena\u2014truths\nthat must be taken for granted _before_ the search, not truths derived\n_from_ the search. Clearly, the \u2018proportionality of the effect to its\ncause in all cases of direct and unimpeded action\u2019 is here taken as\n_a priori_. Sir J. Herschel would, therefore, have asserted, with Mr.\nSpencer, that the Second Law of Motion is _a priori_; since this is one\nof the cases of the \u2018proportionality of the effect to its cause.\u2019\n\n\u201cAnd now let the \u2018Senior Wrangler\u2019 do what Sir J. Herschel has not done\nor thought of doing\u2014_prove_ the proportionality of cause and effect.\nNeither he, nor any other of Mr. Spencer\u2019s opponents, has made the\nsmallest attempt to deal with this main issue. Mr. Spencer alleges\nthat this cognition of proportionality is _a priori_: not in the old\nsense, but in the sense that it grows out of experiences that precede\nreasoning. His opponents, following Prof. Tait in the assertion that\nPhysics is a purely experimental science, containing, therefore, no _a\npriori_ truths, affirm that this {307} cognition is _a posteriori_\u2014a\nproduct of conscious induction. Let us hear what are the experiments.\nIt is required to establish the truth that there is proportionality\nbetween causes and effects, _by a process which nowhere assumes_ that\nif one unit of force produces a certain unit of effect, two units of\nsuch force will produce two units of such effect. Until the \u2018Senior\nWrangler\u2019 has done this he has left Mr. Spencer\u2019s position untouched.\u201d\n\n\nAPPENDIX B.\n\n[After publication of the letters from which the foregoing are\nreproduced, there appeared in _Nature_ certain rejoinders containing\nmisrepresentations even more extreme than those preceding them.\nThere resulted a direct correspondence with two of the writers\u2014Mr.\nRobert B. Hayward, of Harrow, and Mr. J. F. Moulton, my original\nassailant, the author of the article in the _British Quarterly Review_.\nThis correspondence, in which I demanded from these gentlemen the\njustifications for their statements, formed part of this Appendix in\nits pamphlet form, as distributed among those who are competent to\njudge of the questions at issue. It is needless to give permanence\nto the replies and rejoinders. The character of Mr. Moulton\u2019s\nallegations, quite congruous with those I have exposed in the \u201cReplies\nto Criticisms,\u201d may be inferred from one of the sentences closing my\nreply\u2014\u201cWonderful to relate, my inductive proof that proportionality [of\ncause and effect] is taken for granted, he cites as my inductive proof\nof proportionality itself!\u201d The result of the interchange of letters\nwith Mr. Hayward, was to make it clear that \u201cthe thing I assert is not\nreally disputed; and the thing disputed, I have nowhere asserted.\u201d\nWhile, however, the controversial part of the correspondence may fitly\ndisappear, {308} I retain an expository part embodied in the following\nletter to Mr. Hayward.]\n\n\n 38, Queen\u2019s Gardens, Bayswater,\n June 21st, 1874.\n\nSIR,\u2014Herewith I send you a copy of your letter with my interposed\ncomments. I think those comments will make it clear to you that I\nhave not committed myself to three different definitions of our\nconsciousness of the Second Law of Motion.\n\nAs others may still feel a difficulty such as you seem to have felt,\nin understanding that which familiarity has made me regard as simple,\nI will endeavour, by a synthetic exposition, to make clear the way in\nwhich these later and more complex products of organized experiences\nstand related to earlier and simpler products. To make this exposition\neasier to follow, I will take first our Space-consciousness and the\nderived conceptions.\n\nOn the hypothesis of Evolution, the Space-consciousness results from\norganized motor, tactual, and visual experiences. In the _Principles\nof Psychology_, \u00a7\u00a7 326\u2013346, I have described in detail what I conceive\nto have been its genesis. Such Space-consciousness so generated,\nis one possessed in greater or less degree by all creatures of any\nintelligence; becoming wider, and more definite, according to the\ndegree of mental evolution which converse with the environment has\nproduced. How deeply registered the external relations have become in\nthe internal structure, is shown by the facts that the decapitated\nfrog pushes away with one or both legs the scalpel applied to the hind\npart of its body, and that the chick, as soon as it has recovered from\nthe exhaustion of escaping from the egg, performs correctly-guided\nactions (accompanied by consciousness of distance and direction) in\npicking up grains. Ascending at once to such organized and inherited\nSpace-consciousness as exists in the child, and which from moment\nto moment {309} it is making more complete by its own experiences\n(aiding the development of its nervous system into the finished\ntype of the adult, by the same exercises which similarly aid the\ndevelopment of its muscular system), we have to observe that, along\nwith increasingly-definite ideas of distance and direction, it gains\nunawares certain more special ideas of geometrical relations. Take\none group of these. Every time it spreads open its fingers it sees\nincrease of the angles between them, going along with increase of the\ndistances between the finger-tips. In opening wide apart its own legs,\nand in seeing others walk, it has continually before it the relation\nbetween increase or decrease of base in a triangle having equal sides,\nand increase or decrease of the angle included by those sides. [The\nrelation impressed on it being simply that of _concomitant variation_:\nI do not speak of any more definite relation, which, indeed, is\nunthinkable by the young.] It does not observe these facts in such way\nas to be conscious that it has observed them; but they are so impressed\nupon it as to establish a rigid association between certain mental\nstates. Various of its activities disclose space-relations of this\nclass more definitely. The drawing of a bow exhibits them in another\nway and with somewhat greater precision; and when, instead of the ends\nof a bow, capable of approaching one another, the points of attachment\nare fixed and the string elastic, the connexion between increasing\nlength in the sides of an isosceles triangle and increasing acuteness\nof the included angle, is still more forced upon the attention; though\nit still does not rise into a conscious cognition. This is what I\nmean by an \u201cunconsciously-formed preconception.\u201d When, in course of\ntime, the child, growing into the boy, draws diagrams on paper, and,\namong other things, draws isosceles triangles, the truth that, the\nbase being the same, the angle at the apex becomes more acute as the\nsides lengthen, is still more definitely displayed to him; and when\nhis attention is drawn to this relation he finds that he {310} cannot\nthink of it as being otherwise. If he imagines the lengths of the sides\nto change, he cannot exclude the consciousness of the correlative\nchange in the angle; and presently, when his mental power is\nsufficiently developed, he perceives that if he continues to lengthen\nthe sides in imagination, the lines approach parallelism as the angle\napproaches zero: yielding a conception of the relations of parallel\nlines. Here the consciousness has risen into the stage of definite\nconception. But, manifestly, the definite conception so reached is\nbut a finishing of the preconceptions previously reached, and would\nhave been impossible in their absence; and these unconsciously-formed\npreconceptions would similarly have been impossible in the absence of\nthe still earlier consciousnesses of distance, direction, relative\nposition, embodied in the consciousness of Space. The whole evolution\nis one; the arrival at the distinct conception is the growing up to an\nultimate definiteness and complexity; and it can no more be reached\nwithout passing through the earlier stages of indefinite consciousness,\nthan the adult bodily structure can be reached without passing through\nthe structures of the embryo, the infant, and the child.[43]\n\nThrough a parallel evolution arises, first the vague {311}\nconsciousness of forces as exerted by self and surrounding things;\npresently, some discrimination in respect of their amounts as related\nto their effects; later, an association formed unawares between\ngreatness of quantity in the two, and between smallness of quantity in\nthe two; later still, a tacit assumption of proportionality, though\nwithout a distinct consciousness that the assumption has been made;\nand, finally, a rising of this assumption into definite recognition,\nas a truth necessarily holding where the forces are simple. Throughout\nits life every creature has, _within the actions of its moving parts_,\nforces and motions conforming to the Laws of Motion. {312} If it has\na nervous system, the differences among the muscular tensions and the\nmovements initiated, register themselves in a vague way in that nervous\nsystem. As the nervous system develops, along with more developed\nlimbs, there are at once more numerous different experiences .\u00a0.\u00a0.\nof momentum generated, of connected actions and reactions (as when\nan animal tears the food which it holds with its paws); and, at the\nsame time, there are, in its more developed nervous system, increased\npowers of appreciating and registering these differences. All the\nresulting connexions in consciousness, though unknowingly formed and\nunknowingly entertained, are ever present as guides to action: witness\nthe proportion between the effort an animal makes and the distance\nit means to spring; or witness the delicate adjustments of muscular\nstrains to changes of motion, made by a swallow catching flies or a\nhawk swooping on its quarry. Manifestly, then, these experiences,\norganized during the earlier stages of mental evolution, form a body of\nconsciousnesses, not formulated into cognitions, nor present even as\npreconceptions, but nevertheless present as a mass of associations _in\nwhich the truths of relation between force and motion are potentially\npresent_. On ascending to human beings of the uncultured sort, we reach\na stage at which some nascent generalization of these experiences\noccur. The savage has not expressed to himself the truth that if he\nwants to propel his spear further he must use more force; nor does\nthe rustic put into a distinct thought the truth that to raise double\nthe weight he must put forth twice the effort; but in each there is\na tacit assumption to this effect, as becomes manifest on calling it\nin question. So that, in respect of these and other simple mechanical\nactions, there exist unconsciously-formed preconceptions. And just as\nthe geometrical truths presented in a rude way by the relations among\nsurrounding objects, are not overtly recognized until there is some\nfamiliarity with straight lines, and diagrams made of them; {313}\nso, until linear measures, long used, have led to the equal-armed\nlever, or scales, and thus to the notion of equal units of force, this\nmechanical preconception cannot rise into definiteness. Nor after it\nhas risen into definiteness does it for a long time reach the form of\na consciously-held cognition; for neither the village huxter nor the\nmore cultivated druggist in the town, recognizes the general abstract\ntruth that, when uninterfered with, equi-multiples of causes and their\neffects are necessarily connected. But now observe that this truth,\nacted upon with more or less distinct consciousness of it by the man\nof science, and perfected by him through analysis and abstraction,\nis thus perfected only as the last step in its evolution. This\ndefinite cognition is but the finished form of a consciousness long in\npreparation\u2014a consciousness the body of which is present in the brute,\ntakes some shape in the primitive man, reaches greater definiteness in\nthe semi-civilized, becomes afterwards an assumption distinct though\nnot formulated, and takes its final development only as it rises into\na consciously-accepted axiom. Just as there is a continuous evolution\nof the nervous system, so is there a continuous evolution of the\nconsciousness accompanying its action. Just as the one grows in volume,\ncomplexity, and definiteness, so does the other. And just as necessary\nas the earlier stages are to the later in the one case, are they in\nthe other. To suppose that the finished conceptions of science can\nexist without the unfinished common knowledge which precedes them,\nor this without still earlier mental acquisitions, is the same thing\nas to suppose that we can have the correct judgments of the adult\nwithout passing through the crude judgments of the youth, the narrow,\nincoherent ones of the child, and the vague, feeble ones of the infant.\nSo far is it from being true that the view of physical axioms held by\nme, is one which bases cognitions on some other source than experience,\nit asserts experience to be the only possible source of these, as of\nother cognitions; but it asserts, further, that {314} not simply is\nthe consciously-acquired experience of present actions needful, but\nthat _for the very possibility of gaining this_ we are indebted to the\naccumulated experiences of all past actions. Not I, but my antagonists,\nare really chargeable with accepting the ancient _a priori_ view;\nsince, without any explanation of them or justification of them, they\nposit as unquestionable the assumptions underlying every experiment\nand the conclusion drawn from it. The belief in physical causation,\nassumed from moment to moment as necessary in every experiment and\nin all reasoning from it, is a belief which, if not justified by the\nhypothesis above set forth, is tacitly asserted as an _a priori_\nbelief. Contrariwise, my own position is one which affiliates all such\nbeliefs upon experiences acquired during the whole past; which alleges\nthose experiences as the only warrant for them; which asserts that\nduring the converse between the mind and its environment, necessary\nconnexions in Thought, such as those concerning Space, have resulted\nfrom infinite experiences of corresponding necessary connexions in\nThings; and that, similarly, out of perpetual converse with the Forces\nmanifested to us in Space, there has been a progressive establishment\nof internal relations answering to external relations, in such wise\nthat there finally emerge as physical axioms, certain necessities of\nThought which answer to necessities in Things.\n\nI need scarcely say that I have taken the trouble of making my comments\non your letter, and of writing this further exposition, with a view to\ntheir ulterior use.\n\n I am, &c.,\n HERBERT SPENCER.\n\n\nAPPENDIX C.\n\nSUMMARY OF RESULTS.\n\nThose who deny a general doctrine enunciated by Mayer as the basis\nof his reasonings, habitually assumed by Faraday {315} as a guiding\nprinciple in drawing his conclusions, distinctly held by Helmholtz,\nand tacitly implied by Sir John Herschel\u2014those, I say, who deny this\ngeneral doctrine and even deride it, should be prepared with clear\nand strong reasons for doing this. Having been attacked, not in the\nmost temperate manner, for enunciating this doctrine and its necessary\nimplications in a specific form, I have demanded such reasons. Observe\nthe responses to the demand.\n\n 1. The _British Quarterly_ Reviewer\n quoted for my instruction the _dictum_ of\n Professor Tait, that \u201cNatural Philosophy\n is an experimental, and not an intuitive\n science. No _\u00e0 priori_ reasoning can\n conduct us demonstratively to a single\n physical truth.\u201d Thereupon I inquired\n what Professor Tait meant \u201cby speaking of\n \u2018physical _axioms_,\u2019 and by saying that\n the cultured are enabled \u2018to see _at once_\n their _necessary_ truth?\u2019\u201d\u00a0.\u00a0.\u00a0.               No reply.\n\n 2. Instead of an answer to the question,\n how this intuition of necessity can be\n alleged by Professor Tait consistently with\n his other doctrine, the Reviewer quotes,\n as though it disposed of my question,\n Professor Tait\u2019s statement that \u201cas the\n properties of matter might have been\n such as to render a totally different\n set of laws axiomatic, _these laws_ [of\n motion] _must be considered as resting_\n _on convictions drawn from observation_\n _and experiment, and not on intuitive_\n _perception._\u201d Whereupon I inquired how\n Professor Tait knows that \u201cthe properties\n of matter _might have been_\u201d other {316}\n than they are. I asked how it happened\n that his intuition concerning things\n _as they are not_, is so certain that,\n by inference from it, he discredits our\n intuitions concerning things _as they_\n _are_\u00a0.\u00a0.\u00a0.                                     No reply: Professor\n                                                Tait told, _\u00e0 propos_\n                                                of my question, a\n                                                story of which no one\n                                                could discover the\n                                                application; but,\n                                                otherwise, declined to\n                                                answer. Nor was any\n                                                answer given by his\n                                                disciple.\n\n 3. Further, I asked how it happened\n that Professor Tait accepted as bases\n for Physics, Newton\u2019s Laws of Motion;\n which were illustrated but not _proved_\n by Newton, and of which no _proofs_\n are supplied by Professor Tait, in the\n _Treatise on Natural Philosophy_. I went on\n to examine what conceivable _a posteriori_\n warrant there can be if there is no warrant\n _a priori_; and I pointed out that neither\n from terrestrial nor from celestial\n phenomena can the First Law of Motion be\n deduced without a _petitio principii_\u00a0.\u00a0.\u00a0.    No reply: the Reviewer\n                                                characterized my\n                                                reasoning as \u201cutterly\n                                                erroneous\u201d (therein\n                                                differing entirely from\n                                                two {317} eminent\n                                                authorities who read it\n                                                in proof); but beyond\n                                                so characterizing it he\n                                                said nothing.\n\n 4. To my assertion that Newton gave no\n proof of the Laws of Motion, the Reviewer\n rejoined that \u201cthe whole of the _Principia_\n was the proof.\u201d On which my comment was\n that Newton called them \u201caxioms,\u201d and that\n axioms are not commonly supposed to be\n proved by deductions from them\u00a0.\u00a0.\u00a0.           The Reviewer quotes\n                                                from one of Newton\u2019s\n                                                letters a passage\n                                                showing that though\n                                                he called the Laws\n                                                of Motion \u201caxioms,\u201d\n                                                he regarded them as\n                                                principles \u201cmade\n                                                general by induction;\u201d\n                                                and that therefore he\n                                                could not have regarded\n                                                them as _a priori_.\n\n 5. In rejoinder, I pointed out that\n whatever conception Newton may have had\n of these \u201caxioms,\u201d he explicitly and\n distinctly excluded them from the class\n of \u201chypotheses.\u201d Hence I inferred that\n he did not regard the whole of the {318}\n _Principia_ as the proof, which the\n Reviewer says it is; since an assumption\n made at the outset, to be afterwards\n justified by the results of assuming it, is\n an \u201chypothesis\u201d\u00a0.\u00a0.\u00a0.                          No reply.\n\n 6. Authority aside, I examined on its\n merits the assertion that the Laws of\n Motion are, or can be, proved true by\n the ascertained truth of astronomical\n predictions; and showed that the process of\n verification itself assumed those Laws.        No reply.\n\n 7. To make still clearer the fact that\n ultimate physical truths are, and must\n be, accepted as _a priori_, I pointed out\n that in every experiment the physicist\n tacitly assumes a relation between cause\n and effect, such that, if one unit of cause\n produces its unit of effect, two units of\n the cause will produce two units of the\n effect; and I argued that this general\n assumption included the special assumption\n asserted in the Second Law of Motion.\u00a0.\u00a0.\u00a0.    No reply: that is to\n                                                say, no endeavour to\n                                                show the untruth of\n                                                this statement, but a\n                                                quibble based on my\n                                                omission of the word\n                                                \u201cproportionality\u201d in\n                                                places where it was\n                                                implied, though not\n                                                stated.\n\n 8. Attention was drawn to a passage {319}\n from Sir John Herschel\u2019s _Discourse on the_\n _Study of Natural Philosophy_, in which the\n \u201cproportionality of the effect to its cause\n in all cases of _direct unimpeded_ action\u201d\n is included by him among \u201cthe characters\n of that relation which we intend by cause\n and effect;\u201d and in which this assumption\n of proportionality is set down as one\n _preceding_ physical exploration, and not\n as one to be established by it\u00a0.\u00a0.\u00a0.           No reply.\n\n 9. Lastly, a challenge to prove this\n proportionality. \u201cIt is required to\n establish the truth that there is\n proportionality between causes and effects,\n _by a process which nowhere assumes_\n that if one unit of force produces a\n certain unit of effect, two units of such\n force will produce two units of such\n effect.\u201d\u00a0.\u00a0.\u00a0.                                 No reply.\n\nThus on all these essential points my three mathematical opponents\nallow judgment to go against them by default. The attention of readers\nhas been drawn off from the main issues by the discussion of side\nissues. Fundamental questions have been evaded, and new questions of\nsubordinate kinds raised.\n\nWhat is the implication? One who is able to reach and to carry the\ncentral position of his antagonist, does not spend his strength on\nsmall outposts. If he declines to assault the stronghold, it must be\nbecause he sees it to be impregnable.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe trouble I have thus taken to meet criticisms and dissipate\nmisapprehensions, I have taken because the attack {320} made on\nthe special doctrine defended, is part of an attack on the ultimate\ndoctrine underlying the deductive part of _First Principles_\u2014the\ndoctrine that the quantity of existence is unchangeable. I agree with\nSir W. Hamilton that our consciousness of the necessity of causation,\nresults from the impossibility of conceiving the totality of Being to\nincrease or decrease. The proportionality of cause and effect is an\nimplication: denial of it involves the assertion that some quantity\nof cause has disappeared without effect, or some quantity of effect\nhas arisen without cause. I have asserted the _a priori_ character\nof the Second Law of Motion, _under the abstract form in which it is\nexpressed_, simply because this, too, is an implication, somewhat more\nremote, of the same ultimate truth. And my sole reason for insisting\non the validity of these intuitions, is that, on the hypothesis of\nEvolution, absolute uniformities in things have produced absolute\nuniformities in thoughts; and that necessary thoughts represent\ninfinitely-larger accumulations of experiences than are formed by the\nobservations, experiments, and reasonings of any single life.\n\n\nENDNOTES TO _REPLIES TO CRITICISMS_.\n\n[24] _Principles of Psychology_, Second Edition, \u00a7 425, note.\n\n[25] _Le Sentiment Religieux_, par A. Grotz. Paris, J. Cherbuliez, 1870.\n\n[26] Instead of describing me as misunderstanding Kant on this point,\nDr. Hodgson should have described Kant as having, in successive\nsentences, so changed the meanings of the words he uses, as to make\neither interpretation possible. At the outset of his _Critique of\nPure Reason_, he says:\u2014\u201cThe effect of an object upon the faculty of\nrepresentation, so far as we are affected by the said object, is\nsensation. That sort of intuition which relates to an object by means\nof sensation, is called an empirical intuition. The undetermined\nobject of an empirical intuition, is called _ph\u00e6nomenon_. That which\nin the ph\u00e6nomenon corresponds to the sensation, I term its _matter_;\u201d\n[here, remembering the definition just given of phenomenon, objective\nexistence is manifestly referred to] \u201cbut that which effects that the\ncontent of the ph\u00e6nomenon can be arranged under certain relations, I\ncall its _form_\u201d [so that _form_, as here applied, refers to objective\nexistence]. \u201cBut that in which our sensations are merely arranged, and\nby which they are susceptible of assuming a certain form, cannot be\nitself sensation.\u201d [In which sentence the word _form_ obviously refers\nto subjective existence.] At the outset, the \u2018phenomenon\u2019 and the\n\u2018sensation\u2019 are distinguished as objective and subjective respectively;\nand then, in the closing sentences, the _form_ is spoken of in\nconnexion first with the one and then with the other, as though they\nwere the same.\n\n[27] See _Fraser\u2019s Magazine_ for May, 1873.\n\n[28] _First Principles_, \u00a7 26.\n\n[29] _Ibid._ \u00a7 76 (1st ed.)\n\n[30] Compare _Principles of Psychology_, \u00a7\u00a7 88, 95, 391, 401, 406.\n\n[31] _First Principles_, \u00a7\u00a7 39\u201345.\n\n[32] _Principles of Psychology_, part vii.\n\n[33] _Social Statics_, chap. iii.\n\n[34] _Principles of Psychology_, \u00a7 531.\n\n[35] _First Principles_, \u00a7 34.\n\n[36] Only after the foregoing paragraphs were written, did the remark\nof a distinguished friend show me how certain words were misconstrued\nby the reviewer in a way that had never occurred to me as possible. In\nthe passage referred to, I have said that sound-waves \u201cfinally die away\nin generating thermal undulations that radiate into space;\u201d meaning,\nof course, that the force embodied in the sound-waves is finally\n_exhausted_ in generating thermal undulations. In common speech, the\ndying-away of a prolonged sound, as that of a church-bell, includes\nits gradual diminution as well as its final cessation. But rather\nthan suppose I gave to the words this ordinary meaning, the reviewer\nsupposes me to believe, not simply that the _longitudinal_ waves of\nair can pass, _without discontinuity_, into the _transverse_ waves\nof ether, but he also debits me with the belief that the one order\nof waves, having lengths measurable in feet, and rates expressed in\nhundreds per second, can, _by mere enfeeblement_, pass into the other\norder of waves, having lengths of some fifty thousand to the inch, and\nrates expressed in many billions per second! Why he preferred so to\ninterpret my words, and that, too, in the face of contrary implications\nelsewhere (instance \u00a7 100), will, however, be manifest to every one who\nreads his criticisms.\n\n[37] Other examples of these amenities of controversy, in which I\ndecline to imitate my reviewer, have already been given. What occasions\nhe supplies me for imitation, were I minded to take advantage of\nthem, an instance will show. Pointing out an implication of certain\nreasonings of mine, he suggests that it is too absurd even for me to\navow explicitly; saying:\u2014\u201cWe scarcely think that even Mr. Spencer\nwill venture to claim as a datum of consciousness the Second Law of\nMotion, with its attendant complexities of component velocities, &c.\u201d\nNow any one who turns to Newton\u2019s _Principia,_ will find that to the\nenunciation of the Second Law of Motion, nothing whatever is appended\nbut an amplified re-statement\u2014there is not even an illustration, much\nless a proof. And from this law, this axiom, this immediate intuition\nor \u201cdatum of consciousness,\u201d Newton proceeds forthwith to draw those\ncorollaries respecting the composition of forces which underlie all\ndynamics. What, then, must be thought of Newton, who explicitly assumes\nthat which the reviewer thinks it absurd to assume implicitly?\n\n[38] That I am certainly not singular in this view, is shown to me,\neven while I write, by the just-issued work of Prof. Jevons on the\n_Principles of Science: a Treatise on Logic and Scientific Method_. In\nvol. ii., p. 141, Prof. Jevons remarks respecting the law of variation\nof the attractive force, that it \u201cis doubtless connected at this point\nwith the primary properties of space itself, and is so far conformable\nto our necessary ideas.\u201d\n\n[39] See Essay on \u201cThe Genesis of Science,\u201d in the _British Quarterly\nReview_ for July, 1854, p. 127.\n\n[40] I do not say this at random. The reviewer, who has sought rather\nto make known than to conceal his identity, took his degree in 1868.\n\n[41] It is true that in Newton\u2019s time, \u201caxiom\u201d had not the same\nrigorously defined meaning as now; but it suffices for my argument\nthat, _standing unproved_ as a basis for physical deductions, it bears\njust the same relation to them that a mathematical axiom does to\nmathematical deductions.\n\n[42] The above letter, written after absence at Easter had involved a\nweek\u2019s delay, and written somewhat hurriedly to prevent the delay of\na second week, was less carefully revised than it should have been.\nThe words in square brackets, obviously implied by the reasoning, and\nspecifically implied by the illustrations, were not in the letter as\noriginally published.\n\n[43] Here, in explaining the genesis of special space-intuitions, I\nhave singled out a group of experiences which, in _Nature_, May 28, Mr.\nHayward had chosen as illustrating the absurdity of supposing that the\nscientific conception of proportionality could be reached as alleged.\nHe said:\u2015\n\n \u201cIt is hardly a parody of Mr. Collier\u2019s remarks to say:\u2014\u2018A child\n discovers that the greater the angle between his legs the greater the\n distance between his feet, an experience which implicates the notion\n of proportionality between the angle of a triangle and its opposite\n side;\u2019 a preconception, as it appears to me, with just as good a basis\n as that whose formation Mr. Collier illustrates, but one which, as I\n need hardly add, is soon corrected by a conscious study of geometry or\n by actual measurement.\u201d\n\nI am indebted to Mr. Hayward for giving this instance. It conveniently\nserves two purposes. It serves to exemplify the connexion between the\ncrude preconceptions unconsciously formed by earlier experiences, and\nthe conceptions consciously evolved out of them by the help of later\nexperiences, when the requisite powers of analysis and abstraction\nhave been reached. And at the same time it serves to show the failure\nof my opponents to understand how, in the genesis of intelligence,\nthe scientific conception of exact proportionality develops from the\ncrude, vague, and inaccurate preconception. For while the notion of\nproportionality acquired by the child in Mr. Hayward\u2019s example, is\nnot true, it is an approximation towards one which _is_ true, and\none which is reached when its more developed intelligence is brought\ncritically to bear on the facts. Eventually it is discovered that the\nangle is not proportional to the subtending side, but to the subtending\narc; and this is discovered _in the process of disentangling a simple\nrelation from other relations which complicate and disguise it_.\nBetween the angle and the arc there is exact proportionality, for\nthe reason that only one set of directly-connected space-relations\nare concerned: the distance of the subtending arc from the subtended\nangle, remains constant\u2014there is no change in the relation between the\nincreasing angle and the increasing arc; and therefore the two vary\ntogether in direct proportion. But it is otherwise with the subtending\nside. The parts of this stand in different relations of distance from\nthe subtended angle; and as the line is lengthened, each added part\ndiffers from the preceding parts in its distance from the angle. That\nis to say, one set of simple directly-connected geometrical relations,\nis here involved with another set; and the relation between the side\nand the angle is such that the law of relative increase involves the\nco-operation of two sets of factors. Now the distinguishing the true\nproportionality (between the angle and the arc) from the relation\nwhich simulates proportionality (between the angle and the side) is\njust that process of final development of exact conceptions, which\nI assert to be the finishing step of all the preceding development;\nand to be impossible in its absence. And the truth to which my\nassailants shut their eyes, is that, just as among these conceptions of\nspace-relations, the conception of exact proportionality can be reached\nonly by evolution from the crude notion of proportionality, formed\nbefore reasoning begins; so, among the force-relations, the conception\nof proportionality finally reached, when simple causes and their\neffects are disentangled by analytical intelligence, can be reached\nonly by evolution of the crude notion of proportionality, established\nas a preconception by early experiences which reinforce ancestral\nexperiences.\n\n\n\n\n{321}\n\nPROF. GREEN\u2019S EXPLANATIONS.\n\n\n[_From the_ Contemporary Review _for Feb. 1881. It would not have\noccurred to me to reproduce this essay, had it not been that there has\nlately been a reproduction of the essay to which it replies. But as\nMr. Nettleship, in his editorial capacity, has given a permanent shape\nto Professor Green\u2019s unscrupulous criticism, I am obliged to give a\npermanent shape to the pages which show its unscrupulousness._]\n\nDreary at best, metaphysical controversy becomes especially dreary\nwhen it runs into rejoinders and re-rejoinders; and hence I feel some\nhesitation in inflicting, even upon those readers of the _Contemporary_\nwho are interested in metaphysical questions, anything further\nconcerning Prof. Green\u2019s criticism, Mr. Hodgson\u2019s reply to it, and\nProf. Green\u2019s explanations. Still, it appears to me that I can now\nhardly let the matter pass without saying something in justification\nof the views attacked by Prof. Green; or, rather, in disproof of the\nallegations he makes against them.\n\nI did not, when Prof. Green\u2019s two articles appeared, think it needful\nto notice them: my wish to avoid hindrance to my work, being supported\npartly by the thought that very few would read a discussion so\ndifficult to follow, and partly by the thought that, of the few who\ndid read it, most would be those whose knowledge of _The Principles\nof Psychology_ enabled them to see how unlike the argument {322} I\nhave used is the representation of it given by Prof. Green, and how\ninapplicable his animadversions therefore are. This last belief was, I\nfind, quite erroneous; and I ought to have known better than to form\nit. Experience might have shown me that readers habitually assume a\ncritic\u2019s version of an author\u2019s statement to be the true version, and\nthat they rarely take the trouble to see whether the meaning ascribed\nto a detached passage is the meaning which it bears when taken with\nthe context. Moreover, I should have remembered that in the absence of\ndisproofs it is habitually assumed that criticisms are valid; and that\ninability rather than pre-occupation prevents the author from replying.\nI ought not, therefore, to have been surprised to learn, as I did\nfrom the first paragraph of Mr. Hodgson\u2019s article, that Prof. Green\u2019s\ncriticisms had met with considerable acceptance.\n\nI am much indebted to Mr. Hodgson for undertaking the defence of my\nviews; and after reading Prof. Green\u2019s rejoinder, it seems to me that\nMr. Hodgson\u2019s chief allegations remain outstanding. I cannot here, of\ncourse, follow the controversy point by point. I propose to deal simply\nwith the main issues.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nAt the close of his answer, Prof. Green refers to \u201ctwo other\nmisapprehensions of a more general nature, which he [Mr. Hodgson]\nalleges against me at the outset of his article.\u201d Not admitting these,\nProf. Green postpones replies for the present; though by what replies\nhe can show his apprehensions to be true ones, I do not see. Further\nmisapprehensions of a general nature, which stand as preliminaries to\nhis criticisms, may here be instanced, as serving, I think, to show\nthat those criticisms are misdirected.\n\nFrom _The Principles of Psychology_ Prof. Green quotes the following\nsentences:\u2015\n\n  \u201cThe relation between these, as antithetically opposed divisions of\n the {323} entire assemblage of manifestations of the Unknowable, was\n our datum. The fabric of conclusions built upon it must be unstable\n if this datum can be proved either untrue or doubtful. Should the\n idealist be right, the doctrine of evolution is a dream.\u201d\n\nAnd on these sentences he comments thus:\u2015\n\n \u201cTo those who have humbly accepted the doctrine of evolution as a\n valuable formulation of our knowledge of animal life, but at the same\n time think of themselves as \u2018idealists,\u2019 this statement may at first\n cause some uneasiness. On examination, however, they will find in the\n first place that when Mr. Spencer in such a connection speaks of the\n doctrine of evolution, he is thinking chiefly of its application to\n the explanation of knowledge\u2014an application at least not necessarily\n admitted in the acceptance of it as a theory of animal life.\u201d[44]\n\nFrom which it appears that Prof. Green\u2019s conception of Evolution is\nthat popular conception in which it is identified with that set forth\nin _The Origin of Species_. That my conception of Evolution, referred\nto in the passage he quotes, is a widely different one, would have been\nperceived by him had he referred to the exposition of it contained in\n_First Principles_. My meaning in the passage he quotes is, that since\nEvolution, as I conceive it, is, under certain conditions, the result\nof that universal redistribution of matter and motion which is, and\never has been, going on; and since, during those phases of it which are\ndistinguishable as astronomic and geologic, the implication is that no\nlife, still less consciousness (under any such form as is known to us),\nexisted; there is necessarily implied by the theory of Evolution, a\nmode of Being independent of, and antecedent to, the mode of Being we\nnow call consciousness. And I implied that, consequently, this theory\nmust be a dream, if either ideas are the only existences, or if, as\nProf. Green appears to think, the object exists only by correlation\nwith the subject. How necessary is this more general view as a basis\nfor my psychological view, and how erroneous is a criticism which\nignores it, will be seen on observing that by ignoring it, I am made\nto appear profoundly inconsistent where {324} otherwise there is no\ninconsistency. Prof. Green says that my doctrine\u2015\n\n \u201cascribes to the object, which in truth is nothing without the\n subject, an independent reality, and then supposes it gradually to\n produce certain qualities in the subject, of which the existence is in\n truth necessary to the possibility of those qualities in the object\n which are supposed to produce them.\u201d[45]\n\nOn which my comment is that, ascribing, as I do, \u201can independent\nreality\u201d to the object, and denying that the object is \u201cnothing without\nthe subject,\u201d my doctrine, though wholly inconsistent with that of\nProfessor Green, is wholly consistent with itself. Had he rightly\nconceived the doctrine of Transfigured Realism (_Prin. of Psy._ \u00a7\n473), Prof. Green would have seen that while I hold that the qualities\nof object and subject, as present to consciousness, being resultants\nof the co-operation of object and subject, exist only through their\nco-operation, and, in common with all resultants, must be unlike their\nfactors; yet that there pre-exist those factors, and that without them\nno resultants can exist.\n\nEqually fundamental is another preliminary misconception which Prof.\nGreen exhibits. He says\u2015\n\n \u201cWe should be sorry to believe that Mr. Spencer and Mr. Lewes regard\n the relation between consciousness and the world as corresponding to\n that between two bodies, of which one is inside the other; but apart\n from some such crude imagination it does not appear, &c.\u201d\n\nNow since I deliberately accept, and have expounded at great\nlength, this view which Professor Green does not ascribe to me,\nbecause he would be \u201csorry to believe\u201d I entertain such a \u201ccrude\nimagination\u201d\u2014since this view is everywhere posited by the doctrine\nof Psychological Evolution as I have set it forth; I am astonished\nat finding it supposed that I hold some other view. Considering that\nParts II. III. and IV. of the _Principles of Psychology_ are occupied\nwith tracing out mental Evolution as a result of converse between\norganism and environment; and {325} considering that throughout Part\nV. the interpretations, analytical instead of synthetical, pre-suppose\nfrom moment to moment a surrounding world and an included organism;\nI cannot imagine a stranger assumption than that I do not believe\nthe relationship between consciousness and the world to be that of\ninclusion of the one by the other. I am aware that Prof. Green does\nnot regard me as a coherent thinker; but I scarcely expected he would\nascribe to me an incoherence so extreme that in Part VI. I abandon the\nfundamental assumption on which all the preceding parts stand, and\nadopt some other. And I should the less have expected so extreme an\nincoherence to be ascribed to me, considering that throughout Part VI.\nthis same belief is tacitly implied as part of that realistic belief\nwhich it is the aim of its argument to explain and justify. Here,\nhowever, the fact of chief significance is, that as Professor Green\nwould be \u201csorry to believe\u201d I hold the view named, and refrains from\nascribing to me so \u201ccrude an imagination,\u201d it is to be concluded that\nhis arguments are directed against some other view which he supposes\nme to hold. If so, one of two conclusions is inevitable. Either his\ncriticisms are valid against this other view which he tacitly ascribes\nto me, or they are not. If he admits them to be invalid on the\nassumption that I hold this other view, the matter ends. If he holds\nthem to be valid on the assumption that I hold this other view, then\nthey must be invalid against the absolutely-different view which I\nactually hold; and again the matter ends.\n\nEven were I to leave off here, I might, I think, say that the\ninapplicability of Prof. Green\u2019s arguments is sufficiently shown;\nbut it may be desirable to point out that beyond these general\nmisapprehensions, by which they are vitiated, there are special\nmisapprehensions. Much to my surprise, considering the careful\npreliminary explanation I have given, he has failed to understand\nthe mental attitude assumed by me when describing the synthesis\nof experiences {326} against which he more especially urges his\nobjections. In chapters entitled \u201cPartial Differentiation of Subject\nand Object,\u201d \u201cCompleted Differentiation of Subject and Object,\u201d and\n\u201cDeveloped Conception of the Object,\u201d I have endeavoured, as these\ntitles imply, to trace up the gradual establishment of this fundamental\nantithesis in a developing intelligence. It appeared to me, and still\nappears, that for coherent thinking there must be excluded at the\noutset, not only whatever implies acquired knowledge of objective\nexistence, but also whatever implies acquired knowledge of subjective\nexistence. At the close of the chapter preceding those just named, as\nwell as in _First Principles_, where this process of differentiation\nwas more briefly indicated, I recognized, and emphatically enlarged\nupon, the difficulty of carrying out such an inquiry: pointing out that\nin any attempts we make to observe the way in which subject and object\nbecome distinguished, we inevitably use those faculties and conceptions\nwhich have grown up while the differentiation of the two has been going\non. In trying to discern the initial stages of the process, we carry\nwith us all the products which belong to the final stage, and cannot\nfree ourselves from them. In _First Principles_ (\u00a7 43) I have pointed\nout that the words _impressions_ and _ideas_, the term _sensation_, the\nphrase _state of consciousness,_ severally involve large systems of\nbeliefs; and that if we allow ourselves to recognize their connotations\nwe inevitably reason circularly. And in the closing sentence of the\nchapter preceding those above named, I have said\u2015\n\n \u201cThough in every illustration taken we shall have tacitly to posit an\n external existence, and in every reference to states of consciousness\n we shall have to posit an internal existence which has these states;\n yet, as before, we must ignore these implications.\u201d\n\nI should have thought that, with all these cautions before him, Prof.\nGreen would not have fallen into the error of supposing that in the\nargument thereupon commenced, the phrase \u201cstates of consciousness\u201d is\nused with all its ordinary implications. I should have thought that,\nas in {327} a note appended to the outset of the argument I have\nreferred to the parallel argument in _First Principles_, where I have\nused the phrase \u201cmanifestations of existence\u201d instead of \u201cstates of\nconsciousness,\u201d as the least objectionable; and as the argument in the\n_Psychology_ is definitely described in this note as a re-statement in\na different form of the argument in _First Principles_; he would have\nseen that in the phrase \u201cstates of consciousness,\u201d as used throughout\nthis chapter, was to be included no more meaning than was included in\nthe phrase \u201cmanifestations of existence.\u201d[46] I should have thought\nhe would have seen that the purpose of the chapter was passively to\nwatch, with no greater intelligence than is implied in watching, how\nthe manifestations or states, vivid and faint, comport themselves:\nexcluding all thought of their meanings\u2014all interpretations of them.\nNevertheless, Prof. Green charges me with having, at the outset of the\nexamination, invalidated my argument by implying, in the terms I use,\ncertain products of developed consciousness.[47] He contends that my\ndivision of the \u201cstates of consciousness,\u201d or, as I elsewhere term\nthem, \u201cmanifestations of existence,\u201d into vivid and faint, is vitiated\nfrom the first by including along with the vivid ones those faint ones\nneedful to constitute them perceptions, in the ordinary sense of the\nword. Because, describing all I passively watch, I speak of a distant\n{328} head-land, of waves, of boats, &c, he actually supposes me to be\nspeaking of those developed cognitions under which these are classed as\nsuch and such objects. What would he have me do? It is impossible to\ngive any such account of the process as I have attempted, without using\nnames for things and actions. The various manifestations, vivid and\nfaint, which in the case described impose themselves on my receptivity,\nmust be indicated in some way; and the words indicating them inevitably\ncarry with them their respective connotations. What more can I do than\nwarn the reader that all these connotations must be ignored, and that\nattention must be paid exclusively to the manifestations themselves,\nand the modes in which they comport themselves. At the stage described\nin this \u201cpartial differentiation,\u201d while I suppose myself as yet\nunconscious of my own individuality and of a world as separate from it,\nthe obvious implication is, that what I name \u201cstates of consciousness,\u201d\nbecause this is the current term for them, are to have no\ninterpretations whatever put upon them; but that their characters and\nmodes of behaviour are to be observed, as they might be while yet there\nhad been none of that organization of experiences which makes things\nknown in the ordinary sense. It is true that, thus misinterpreting me\nin December, Prof. Green, writing again in March, puts into the mouth\nof an imagined advocate the true statement of my view;[48] though he\n(Prof. Green) then proceeds to deny that I can mean what this imagined\nadvocate rightly says I mean: taking occasion to allege that I use the\nphrase \u201cstates of consciousness\u201d \u201cto give a philosophical character\u201d to\nwhat would else seem \u201cwritten too much after the fashion of a newspaper\ncorrespondent.\u201d[49] Even, however, had he admitted that intended\nmeaning which he sees, but denies, the rectification would have been\nsomewhat unsatisfactory, coming three months after various {329}\nabsurdities, based on his misinterpretation, had been ascribed to me.\n\nBut the most serious allegation made by Mr. Hodgson against Prof.\nGreen, and which I here repeat, is that he habitually says I regard\nthe object as constituted by \u201cthe aggregate of vivid states of\nconsciousness,\u201d in face of the conspicuous fact that I identify the\nobject with the _nexus_ of this aggregate. In his defence Prof. Green\nsays\u2015\n\n \u201cIf I had made any attempt to show that Mr. Spencer believes\n the object to be no more than an aggregate of vivid states of\n consciousness, Mr. Hodgson\u2019s complaint, that I ignore certain passages\n in which a contrary persuasion is stated, would have been to the\n purpose.\u201d\n\nLet us look at the facts. Treating of the relation between my view and\nthe idealistic and sceptical views, he imagines addresses made to me by\nBerkeley and Hume. \u201c\u2018You agree with me,\u2019 Berkeley might say, \u2018that when\nwe speak of the external world we are speaking of certain lively ideas\nconnected in a certain manner;\u2019\u201d[50] and this identification of the\nworld with ideas, I am tacitly represented as accepting. Again, Hume is\nsupposed to say to me\u2014\u201cYou agree with me that what we call the world\nis a series of impressions;\u201d[51] and here, as before, I am supposed\nsilently to acquiesce in this as a true statement of my view. Similarly\nthroughout his argument, Prof. Green continually states or implies that\nthe object is, in my belief, constituted by the vivid aggregate of\nstates of consciousness. At the outset of his second article,[52] he\nsays of me:\u2014\u201cHe there\u201d [in the _Principles of Psychology_] \u201cidentifies\nthe object with a certain aggregate of vivid states of consciousness,\nwhich he makes out to be independent of another aggregate, consisting\nof faint states, and identified with the subject.\u201d And admitting that\nhe thus describes my view, he nevertheless alleges that he does not\nmisrepresent me, because, as he says,[53] \u201cthere is scarcely a page of\nmy article in {330} which Mr. Spencer\u2019s conviction of the externality\nand independence of the object, in the various forms in which it is\nstated by him, is not referred to.\u201d But what if it is referred to\nin the process of showing that the externality and independence of\nthe object is utterly inconsistent with the conception of it as an\naggregate of vivid states of consciousness? What if I am continually\nmade to seem thus absolutely inconsistent, by omitting the fact that\nnot the aggregate of vivid states itself is conceived by me as the\nobject, but the _nexus_ binding it together?\n\nA single brief example will typify Prof. Green\u2019s general method of\nprocedure. On page 40 of his first article he says\u2014\u201cAnd in the sequel\nthe \u2018separation of themselves\u2019 on the part of states of consciousness\n\u2018into two great aggregates, vivid and faint,\u2019 is spoken of as a\n\u2018differentiation between the antithetical existences we call object and\nsubject.\u2019 If words mean anything, then, Mr. Spencer plainly makes the\n\u2018object\u2019 an aggregate of conscious states.\u201d But in the entire passage\nfrom which these words of mine are quoted, which he gives at the bottom\nof the page, a careful reader will observe a word (_omitted_ from Prof.\nGreen\u2019s quotation in the text), which quite changes the meaning. I have\ndescribed the result, not as \u201ca differentiation,\u201d but as \u201ca _partial_\ndifferentiation.\u201d Now, to use Prof. Green\u2019s expression, \u201cif words mean\nanything,\u201d a partial differentiation cannot have the same sense as a\ncomplete differentiation. If the \u2018\u2019object\u2019 has been already constituted\nby this partial differentiation, what does the \u2018object\u2019 become when the\ndifferentiation is completed? Clearly, \u201cif words mean anything,\u201d then,\nhad Prof. Green not omitted the word \u201cpartial,\u201d it would have been\nmanifest that the aggregate of vivid states was _not_ alleged to be the\nobject. The mode of treatment which we here see in little, exemplifies\nProf. Green\u2019s mode of treatment at large. Throughout his two articles\nhe criticizes detached portions, and ascribes to them meanings {331}\nquite different from those which they have when joined with the rest.\n\nWith the simplicity of \u201ca raw undergraduate\u201d (to some of whose views\nProf. Green compares some of mine) I had assumed that an argument\nrunning through three chapters would not be supposed to have its\nconclusion expressed in the first; but now, after the professorial\nlesson I have received, my simplicity will be decreased, and I shall\nbe aware that a critic may deal with that which is avowedly partial,\nas though it were entire, and may treat as though it were already\ndeveloped, a conception which the titles of the chapters before him\nshow is yet but incipient.\n\nHere I leave the matter, and if anything more is said, shall let it\npass. Controversy must be cut short, or work must be left undone. I can\nbut suggest that metaphysical readers will do well to make their own\ninterpretations of my views, rather than to accept without inquiry all\nthe interpretations offered them.\n\n\nPOSTSCRIPT.\u2014From a note appended by Mr. Nettleship to his republished\nversions of Prof. Green\u2019s articles, it appears that, after the\nforegoing pages were published by me, Prof. Green wrote to the editor\nof the _Contemporary Review_, saying:\u2015\n\n \u201cWhile I cannot honestly retract anything in the substance of what I\n then wrote, there are expressions in the article which I very much\n regret, so far as they might be taken to imply want of personal\n respect for Mr. Spencer. For reasons sufficiently given in my reply to\n Mr. Hodgson, I cannot plead guilty to the charge of misrepresentation\n which Mr. Spencer repeats; but on reading my first article again in\n cold blood I found that I had allowed controversial heat to betray\n me into the use of language which was unbecoming\u2014especially on the\n part of an unknown writer (not even then a \u2018professor\u2019) assailing a\n veteran philosopher. I make this acknowledgment merely for my own\n satisfaction, not under the impression that it can at all concern Mr.\n Spencer\u201d (vol. i., p. 541).\n\nPossibly some of Prof. Green\u2019s adherents will ask how, after he\nhas stated that he cannot honestly retract, and that {332} he is\nnot guilty of misrepresentation, I can describe his criticism as\nunscrupulous. My reply is that a critic who persists in saying that\nwhich, on the face of it, is dishonest, and then avers that he cannot\nhonestly do otherwise, does not thereby prove his honesty, but\ncontrariwise. One who deliberately omits from his quotation the word\n\u201cpartial,\u201d and then treats, as though it were complete, that which\nis avowedly incomplete\u2014one who, in dealing with an argument which\nruns through three chapters, recognizes only the first of them\u2014one\nwho persists in thinking it proper to do this after the consequent\ndistortions of statement have been pointed out to him; is one who,\nif not knowingly dishonest, is lacking in due perception of right\nand wrong in controversy. The only other possible supposition which\noccurs to me, is that such a proceeding is a natural sequence of the\nphilosophy to which he adheres. Of course, if Being and non-Being are\nthe same, then representation and misrepresentation are the same.\n\nI may add that there is a curious kinship between the ideas implied by\nthe letter above quoted and its implied sentiments. Prof. Green says\nthat his apology for unbecoming language he makes merely for his \u201cown\nsatisfaction.\u201d He does not calm his qualms of conscience by indicating\nhis regret to those who read this unbecoming language; nor does he\nexpress his regret to me, against whom it was vented; but he expresses\nhis regret to the editor of the _Contemporary Review_! So that a public\ninsult to A is supposed to be cancelled by a private apology to B!\nHere is more Hegelian thinking; or rather, here is Hegelian feeling\ncongruous with Hegelian thinking.\n\n\nENDNOTES TO _PROF. GREEN\u2019S EXPLANATIONS_.\n\n[44] _Contemporary Review_, December, 1877, p. 35.\n\n[45] _Contemporary Review_, December, 1877, p. 37\n\n[46] If I am asked why here I used the phrase \u201cstates of consciousness\u201d\nrather than \u201cmanifestations of existence,\u201d though I had previously\npreferred the last to the first, I give as my reason the desire\nto maintain continuity of language with the preceding chapter,\n\u201cThe Dynamics of Consciousness.\u201d In that chapter an examination\nof consciousness had been made with the view of ascertaining what\nprinciple of cohesion determines our beliefs, as preliminary to\nobserving how this principle operates in establishing the beliefs\nin subject and object. But on proceeding to do this, the phrase\n\u201cstate of consciousness\u201d was supposed, like the phrase \u201cmanifestation\nof existence,\u201d not to be used as anything more than a name by\nwhich to distinguish this or that form of being, as an undeveloped\nreceptivity would become aware of it, while yet self and not-self were\nundistinguished.\n\n[47] _Contemporary Review_, December, 1877, pp. 49, 50.\n\n[48] _Contemporary Review_, March, 1878, p. 753.\n\n[49] _Ibid._, March, 1878, p. 755.\n\n[50] _Contemporary Review_, December, 1877, p. 44.\n\n[51] _Ibid._, December, 1877, p. 44.\n\n[52] _Ibid._, March, 1878, p. 745.\n\n[53] _Ibid._, January, 1881, p. 115.\n\n\n\n\n{333}\n\nTHE PHILOSOPHY OF STYLE.\n\n\n[_First published in_ The Westminster Review _for October 1852._]\n\nCommenting on the seeming incongruity between his father\u2019s\nargumentative powers and his ignorance of formal logic, Tristram\nShandy says:\u2014\u201cIt was a matter of just wonder with my worthy tutor,\nand two or three fellows of that learned society, that a man who knew\nnot so much as the names of his tools, should be able to work after\nthat fashion with them.\u201d Sterne\u2019s implied conclusion that a knowledge\nof the principles of reasoning neither makes, nor is essential to,\na good reasoner, is doubtless true. Thus, too, is it with grammar.\nAs Dr. Latham, condemning the usual school-drill in Lindley Murray,\nrightly remarks:\u2014\u201cGross vulgarity is a fault to be prevented; but the\nproper prevention is to be got from habit\u2014not rules.\u201d Similarly, good\ncomposition is far less dependent on acquaintance with its laws, than\non practice and natural aptitude. A clear head, a quick imagination,\nand a sensitive ear, will go far towards making all rhetorical precepts\nneedless. And where there exists any mental flaw\u2014where there is a\ndeficient verbal memory, or an inadequate sense of logical dependence,\nor but little perception of order, or a lack of constructive ingenuity;\nno amount of instruction will insure good writing. Nevertheless, _some_\nresult may be expected from a familiarity {334} with the principles of\nstyle. The endeavour to conform to laws may tell, though slowly. And\nif in no other way, yet, as facilitating revision, a knowledge of the\nthing to be achieved\u2014a clear idea of what constitutes a beauty, and\nwhat a blemish\u2014cannot fail to be of service.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nNo general theory of expression seems yet to have been enunciated. The\nmaxims contained in works on composition and rhetoric, are presented\nin an unorganized form. Standing as isolated dogmas\u2014as empirical\ngeneralizations, they are neither so clearly apprehended, nor so much\nrespected, as they would be were they deduced from some simple first\nprinciple. We are told that \u201cbrevity is the soul of wit.\u201d We hear\nstyles condemned as verbose or involved. Blair says that every needless\npart of a sentence \u201cinterrupts the description and clogs the image;\u201d\nand again, that \u201clong sentences fatigue the reader\u2019s attention.\u201d It is\nremarked by Lord Kaimes that, \u201cto give the utmost force to a period,\nit ought, if possible, to be closed with the word that makes the\ngreatest figure.\u201d Avoidance of parentheses, and the use of Saxon words\nin preference to those of Latin origin, are often insisted upon. But,\nhowever influential the precepts thus dogmatically expressed, they\nwould be much more influential if reduced to something like scientific\nordination. In this as in other cases, conviction is strengthened when\nwe understand the _why_. And we may be sure that recognition of the\ngeneral principle from which the rules of composition result, will not\nonly bring them home to us with greater force, but will disclose other\nrules of like origin.\n\nOn seeking for some clue to the law underlying these current maxims,\nwe may see implied in many of them, the importance of economizing the\nreader\u2019s or hearer\u2019s attention. To so present ideas that they may be\napprehended with the least possible mental effort, is the desideratum\ntowards which most of the rules above quoted point. When we {335}\ncondemn writing that is wordy, or confused, or intricate\u2014when we\npraise this style as easy, and blame that as fatiguing, we consciously\nor unconsciously assume this desideratum as our standard of judgment.\nRegarding language as an apparatus of symbols for conveying thought,\nwe may say that, as in a mechanical apparatus, the more simple and the\nbetter arranged its parts, the greater will be the effect produced.\nIn either case, whatever force is absorbed by the machine is deducted\nfrom the result. A reader or listener has at each moment but a limited\namount of mental power available. To recognize and interpret the\nsymbols presented to him, requires part of this power; to arrange and\ncombine the images suggested by them requires a further part; and only\nthat part which remains can be used for framing the thought expressed.\nHence, the more time and attention it takes to receive and understand\neach sentence, the less time and attention can be given to the\ncontained idea; and the less vividly will that idea be conceived. How\ntruly language must be regarded as a hindrance to thought, though the\nnecessary instrument of it, we shall clearly perceive on remembering\nthe comparative force with which simple ideas are communicated by\nsigns. To say, \u201cLeave the room,\u201d is less expressive than to point\nto the door. Placing a finger on the lips is more forcible than\nwhispering, \u201cDo not speak.\u201d A beck of the hand is better than, \u201cCome\nhere.\u201d No phrase can convey the idea of surprise so vividly as opening\nthe eyes and raising the eyebrows. A shrug of the shoulders would\nlose much by translation into words. Again, it may be remarked that\nwhen oral language is employed, the strongest effects are produced by\ninterjections, which condense entire sentences into syllables. And\nin other cases, where custom allows us to express thoughts by single\nwords, as in _Beware_, _Heigho_, _Fudge_, much force would be lost by\nexpanding them into specific propositions. Hence, carrying out the\nmetaphor that {336} language is the vehicle of thought, we may say\nthat in all cases the friction and inertia of the vehicle deduct from\nits efficiency; and that in composition, the chief thing to be done,\nis, to reduce the friction and inertia to the smallest amounts. Let\nus then inquire whether economy of the recipient\u2019s attention is not\nthe secret of effect, alike in the right choice and collocation of\nwords, in the best arrangement of clauses in a sentence, in the proper\norder of its principal and subordinate propositions, in the judicious\nuse of simile, metaphor, and other figures of speech, and even in the\nrhythmical sequence of syllables.\n\nThe greater forcibleness of Saxon English, or rather non-Latin English,\nfirst claims our attention. The several special reasons assignable\nfor this may all be reduced to the general reason\u2014economy. The most\nimportant of them is early association. A child\u2019s vocabulary is\nalmost wholly Saxon. He says, _I have_, not _I possess_\u2014_I wish_,\nnot _I desire_; he does not _reflect_, he _thinks_; he does not beg\nfor _amusement_, but for _play_; he calls things _nice_ or _nasty_,\nnot _pleasant_ or _disagreeable_. The synonyms learned in after\nyears, never become so closely, so organically, connected with the\nideas signified, as do these original words used in childhood; the\nassociation remains less strong. But in what does a strong association\nbetween a word and an idea differ from a weak one? Essentially in the\ngreater ease and rapidity of the suggestive action. Both of two words,\nif they be strictly synonymous, eventually call up the same image.\nThe expression\u2014It is _acid_, must in the end give rise to the same\nthought as\u2014It is _sour_; but because the term _acid_ was learnt later\nin life, and has not been so often followed by the ideal sensation\nsymbolized, it does not so readily arouse that ideal sensation as the\nterm _sour_. If we remember how slowly the meanings follow unfamiliar\nwords in another language, and how increasing familiarity with them\nbrings greater rapidity and ease of comprehension; and if we consider\nthat the {337} like effect must have resulted from using the words of\nour mother tongue from childhood upwards; we shall clearly see that the\nearliest learnt and oftenest used words, will, other things equal, call\nup images with less loss of time and energy than their later learnt\nequivalents.\n\nThe further superiority possessed by Saxon English in its comparative\nbrevity, obviously comes under the same generalization. If it be an\nadvantage to express an idea in the smallest number of words, then\nit must be an advantage to express it in the smallest number of\nsyllables. If circuitous phrases and needless expletives distract\nthe attention and diminish the strength of the impression produced,\nthen so, too, must surplus articulations. A certain effort, though\ncommonly an inappreciable one, is required to recognize every vowel\nand consonant. If, as all know, it is tiresome to listen to an\nindistinct speaker, or to read an ill-written manuscript; and if, as\nwe cannot doubt, the fatigue is a cumulative result of the attention\nneeded to catch successive syllables; it follows that attention is\nin such cases absorbed by each syllable. And this being so when the\nsyllables are difficult of recognition, it will be so too, though\nin a less degree, when the recognition of them is easy. Hence, the\nshortness of Saxon words becomes a reason for their greater force. One\nqualification, however, must not be overlooked. A word which embodies\nthe most important part of the idea to be conveyed, especially when\nemotion is to be produced, may often with advantage be a polysyllabic\nword. Thus it seems more forcible to say\u2014\u201cIt is _magnificent_,\u201d\nthan\u2014\u201cIt is _grand_.\u201d The word _vast_ is not so powerful a one as\n_stupendous_. Calling a thing _nasty_ is not so effective as calling\nit _disgusting_. There seem to be several causes for this exceptional\nsuperiority of certain long words. We may ascribe it partly to the\nfact that a voluminous, mouth-filling epithet is, by its very size,\nsuggestive of largeness or strength, as is shown by the pomposity of\nsesquipedalian verbiage; and when great power or {338} intensity has\nto be suggested, this association of ideas aids the effect. A further\ncause may be that a word of several syllables admits of more emphatic\narticulation; and as emphatic articulation is a sign of emotion,\nthe unusual impressiveness of the thing named is implied by it. Yet\nanother cause is that a long word (of which the latter syllables\nare generally inferred as soon as the first are spoken) allows the\nhearer\u2019s consciousness more time to dwell on the quality predicated;\nand where, as in the above cases, it is to this predicated quality that\nthe entire attention is called, an advantage results from keeping it\nbefore the mind for an appreciable interval. To make our generalization\nquite correct we must therefore say, that while in certain sentences\nexpressing feeling, the word which more especially implies that\nfeeling may often with advantage be a many-syllabled one; in the\nimmense majority of cases, each word, serving but as a step to the\nidea embodied by the whole sentence, should, if possible, be a single\nsyllable.\n\nOnce more, that frequent cause of strength in Saxon and other primitive\nwords\u2014their onomatop\u0153ia, may be similarly resolved into the more\ngeneral cause. Both those directly imitative, as _splash_,_bang_,\n_whiz_, _roar_, &c., and those analogically imitative, as _rough_,\n_smooth_, _keen_, _blunt_, _thin_, _hard_, _crag_, &c., have a greater\nor less likeness to the things symbolized; and by making on the ears\nimpressions allied to the ideas to be called up, they save part of the\neffort needed to call up such ideas, and leave more attention for the\nideas themselves.\n\nEconomy of the recipient\u2019s mental energy may be assigned, too, as a\nmanifest cause for the superiority of specific over generic words.\nThat concrete terms produce more vivid impressions than abstract\nones, and should, when possible, be used instead, is a current maxim\nof composition. As Dr. Campbell says, \u201cThe more general the terms\nare, the picture is the fainter; the more special {339} they are, the\nbrighter.\u201d When aiming at effect we should avoid such a sentence as:\n\n\u2015\u2015 When the manners, customs, and amusements of a nation are cruel and\nbarbarous, the regulations of their penal code will be severe.\n\nAnd in place of it we should write:\n\n\u2015\u2015 When men delight in battles, bull-fights, and combats of gladiators,\nwill they punish by hanging, burning, and the rack.\n\nThis superiority of specific expressions is clearly due to a saving\nof the effort required to translate words into thoughts. As we do not\nthink in generals but in particulars\u2014as, whenever any class of things\nis named, we represent it to ourselves by calling to mind individual\nmembers of the class; it follows that when a general word is used, the\nhearer or reader has to choose from his stock of images, one or more,\nby which he may figure to himself the whole group. In doing this,\nsome delay must arise\u2014some force be expended; and if, by employing\na specific term, an appropriate image can be at once suggested, an\neconomy is achieved, and a more vivid impression produced.\n\nTurning now from the choice of words to their sequence, we find the\nsame principle hold good. We have _a priori_ reasons for believing that\nthere is some one order of words by which every proposition may be more\neffectively expressed than by any other; and that this order is the\none which presents the elements of the proposition in the succession\nin which they may be most readily put together. As in a narrative, the\nevents should be stated in such sequence that the mind may not have to\ngo backwards and forwards in order to rightly connect them; as in a\ngroup of sentences, the arrangement should be such that each of them\nmay be understood as it comes, without waiting for subsequent ones; so\nin every sentence, the sequence of words should be that which suggests\nthe constituents of the thought in the order most convenient for\nbuilding it {340} up. Duly to enforce this truth, and to prepare the\nway for applications of it, we must analyze the mental act by which the\nmeaning of a series of words is apprehended.\n\nWe cannot more simply do this than by considering the proper\ncollocation of substantive and adjective. Is it better to place the\nadjective before the substantive, or the substantive before the\nadjective? Ought we to say with the French\u2014_un cheval noir_; or to say\nas we do\u2014a black horse? Probably, most persons of culture will say\nthat one order is as good as the other. Alive to the bias produced by\nhabit, they will ascribe to that the preference they feel for our own\nform of expression. They will expect those educated in the use of the\nopposite form to have an equal preference for that. And thus they will\nconclude that neither of these instinctive judgments is of any worth.\nThere is, however, a psychological ground for deciding in favour of the\nEnglish custom. If \u201ca horse black\u201d be the arrangement, then immediately\non the utterance of the word \u201chorse,\u201d there arises, or tends to arise,\nin the mind, an idea answering to that word; and as there has been\nnothing to indicate what _kind_ of horse, any image of a horse suggests\nitself. Very likely, however, the image will be that of a brown horse:\nbrown horses being the most familiar. The result is that when the word\n\u201cblack\u201d is added, a check is given to the process of thought. Either\nthe picture of a brown horse already present to the imagination has to\nbe suppressed, and the picture of a black one summoned in its place;\nor else, if the picture of a brown horse be yet unformed, the tendency\nto form it has to be stopped. Whichever is the case, some hindrance\nresults. But if, on the other hand, \u201ca black horse\u201d be the expression\nused, no mistake can be made. The word \u201cblack,\u201d indicating an abstract\nquality, arouses no definite idea. It simply prepares the mind for\nconceiving some object of that colour; and the attention is kept\nsuspended until that object is known. If, then, by {341} precedence of\nthe adjective, the idea is always conveyed rightly, whereas precedence\nof the substantive is apt to produce a misconception; it follows that\nthe one gives the mind less trouble than the other, and is therefore\nmore forcible.\n\nPossibly it will be objected that the adjective and substantive come\nso close together, that practically they may be considered as uttered\nat the same moment; and that on hearing the phrase, \u201ca horse black,\u201d\nthere is not time to imagine a wrongly coloured horse before the word\n\u201cblack\u201d follows to prevent it. It must be owned that it is not easy\nto decide by introspection whether this is so or not. But there are\nfacts collaterally implying that it is not. Our ability to anticipate\nthe words yet unspoken is one of them. If the ideas of the hearer\nlingered behind the expressions of the speaker, as the objection\nassumes, he could hardly foresee the end of a sentence by the time it\nwas half delivered; yet this constantly happens. Were the supposition\ntrue, the mind, instead of anticipating, would fall more and more\nin arrear. If the meanings of words are not realized as fast as the\nwords are uttered, then the loss of time over each word must entail an\naccumulation of delays and leave a hearer entirely behind. But whether\nthe force of these replies be or be not admitted, it will scarcely be\ndenied that the right formation of a picture must be facilitated by\npresenting its elements in the order in which they are wanted; even\nthough the mind should do nothing until it has received them all.\n\nWhat is here said respecting the succession of the adjective and\nsubstantive is applicable, by change of terms, to the adverb and verb.\nAnd without further explanation, it will be manifest, that in the use\nof prepositions and other particles, most languages spontaneously\nconform with more or less completeness to this law.\n\nOn similarly analyzing sentence considered as vehicles for entire\npropositions, we find not only that the same principle holds good,\nbut that the advantage of respecting {342} it becomes marked. In the\narrangement of predicate and subject, for example, we are at once shown\nthat as the predicate determines the aspect under which the subject is\nto be conceived, it should be placed first; and the striking effect\nproduced by so placing it becomes comprehensible. Take the often-quoted\ncontrast between\u2014\u201cGreat is Diana of the Ephesians,\u201d and\u2014\u201cDiana of\nthe Ephesians is great.\u201d When the first arrangement is used, the\nutterance of the word \u201cgreat,\u201d arousing vague associations of an\nimposing nature prepares the imagination to clothe with high attributes\nwhatever follows; and when the words, \u201cDiana of the Ephesians\u201d are\nheard, appropriate imagery already nascent in thought, is used in the\nformation of the picture: the mind being thus led directly, and without\nerror, to the intended impression. But when the reverse order is\nfollowed, the idea, \u201cDiana of the Ephesians,\u201d is formed with no special\nreference to greatness; and when the words, \u201cis great,\u201d are added,\nit has to be formed afresh; whence arises a loss of mental energy,\nand a corresponding diminution of effect. The following verse from\nColeridge\u2019s \u201cAncient Mariner,\u201d though incomplete as a sentence, well\nillustrates the same truth.\n\n \u201c_Alone, alone, all, all alone,_\n  _Alone on a wide wide sea!_\n  _And never a saint took pity on_\n  _My soul in agony.\u201d_\n\nOf course the principle equally applies when the predicate is a\nverb or a participle. And as effect is gained by placing first all\nwords indicating the quality, conduct, or condition of the subject,\nit follows that the copula also should have precedence. It is true,\nthat the general habit of our language resists this arrangement of\npredicate, copula, and subject; but we may readily find instances of\nthe additional force gained by conforming to it. Thus in the line from\n\u201cJulius C\u00e6sar\u201d\u2015\n\n \u201cThen _burst_ his mighty heart,\u201d\n\npriority is given to a word embodying both predicate and {343} copula.\nIn a passage contained in Sir W. Scott\u2019s \u201cMarmion,\u201d the like order is\nsystematically employed with great effect:\n\n \u201cThe Border slogan rent the sky!\n _A Home! a Gordon! was_ the cry;\n _Loud were_ the clanging blows;\n _Advanced,\u2014forced back,\u2014now low, now high,_\n   The pennon sunk and rose;\n As _bends_ the bark\u2019s mast in the gale\n When _rent are_ rigging, shrouds, and sail,\n   It waver\u2019d \u2019mid the foes.\u201d\n\nPursuing the principle further, it is obvious that for producing the\ngreatest effect, not only should the main divisions of a sentence\nobserve this sequence, but the sub-divisions of these should have\ntheir parts similarly arranged. In nearly all cases, the predicate\nis accompanied by some limit or qualification called its complement.\nCommonly, also, the circumstances of the subject, which form its\ncomplement, have to be specified. And as these qualifications and\ncircumstances must determine the mode in which the acts and things\nthey belong to are conceived, precedence should be given to them. Lord\nKaimes notices the fact that this order is preferable; though without\ngiving the reason. He says:\u2014\u201cWhen a circumstance is placed at the\nbeginning of the period, or near the beginning, the transition from\nit to the principal subject is agreeable: is like ascending or going\nupward.\u201d A sentence arranged in illustration of this will be desirable.\nHere is one:\n\n\u2015\u2015 Whatever it may be in theory, it is clear that in practice the\nFrench idea of liberty is\u2014the right of every man to be master of the\nrest.\n\nIn this case, were the first two clauses, up to the word \u201cpractice\u201d\ninclusive, which qualify the subject, to be placed at the end instead\nof the beginning, much of the force would be lost; as thus:\n\n\u2015\u2015 The French idea of liberty is\u2014the right of every man to be master of\nthe rest; in practice at least, if not in theory.\n\nSimilarly with respect to the conditions under which any {344} fact is\npredicated. Observe in the following example the effect of putting them\nlast:\n\n\u2015\u2015 How immense would be the stimulus to progress, were the honour now\ngiven to wealth and title given exclusively to high achievements and\nintrinsic worth!\n\nAnd then observe the superior effect of putting them first:\n\n\u2015\u2015 Were the honour now given to wealth and title given exclusively\nto high achievements and intrinsic worth, how immense would be the\nstimulus to progress!\n\nThe effect of giving priority to the complement of the predicate, as\nwell as the predicate itself, is finely displayed in the opening of\n\u201cHyperion:\u201d\n\n \u201c_Deep in the shady sadness of a vale_\n  _Far sunken from the healthy breath of morn,_\n  _Far from the fiery noon, and eve\u2019s one star,_\n  _Sat_ grey-haired Saturn, quiet as a stone.\u201d\n\nHere we see, not only that the predicate \u201csat\u201d precedes the subject\n\u201cSaturn,\u201d and that the three lines in italics, constituting the\ncomplement of the predicate, come before it; but that in the structure\nof this complement also, the same order is followed: each line being\nso composed that the qualifying words are placed before the words\nsuggesting concrete images.\n\nThe right succession of the principal and subordinate propositions\nin a sentence depends on the same law. Regard for economy of the\nrecipient\u2019s attention, which, as we find, determines the best order\nfor the subject, copula, predicate, and their complements, dictates\nthat the subordinate proposition shall precede the principal one, when\nthe sentence includes two. Containing, as the subordinate proposition\ndoes, some qualifying or explanatory idea, its priority prevents\nmisconception of the principal one; and therefore saves the mental\neffort needed to correct such misconception. This will be seen in the\nannexed example.\n\n\u2015\u2015 The secrecy once maintained in respect to the parliamentary debates,\nis still thought needful in diplomacy; and diplomacy being secret,\nEngland may any day be {345} unawares betrayed by its ministers into\na war costing a hundred thousand lives, and hundreds of millions of\ntreasure: yet the English pique themselves on being a self-governed\npeople.\n\nThe two subordinate propositions, ending with the semicolon and colon\nrespectively, almost wholly determine the meaning of the principal\nproposition with which the sentence concludes; and the effect would be\nlost were they placed last instead of first.\n\nFrom this general principle of right arrangement may also be inferred\nthe proper order of those minor divisions into which the major\ndivisions of sentences may be decomposed. In every sentence of any\ncomplexity the complement to the subject contains several clauses,\nand that to the predicate several others; and these may be arranged\nin greater or less conformity to the law of easy apprehension. Of\ncourse with these, as with the larger members, the succession should be\nfrom the less specific to the more specific\u2014from the abstract to the\nconcrete.\n\nNow however we must notice a further condition to be fulfilled in the\nproper construction of a sentence; but still a condition dictated by\nthe same general principle with the other: the condition, namely,\nthat the words or the expressions which refer to the most nearly\nconnected thoughts shall be brought the closest together. Evidently\nthe single words, the minor clauses, and the leading divisions of\nevery proposition, severally qualify each other. The longer the time\nthat elapses between the mention of any qualifying member and the\nmember qualified, the longer must the mind be exerted in carrying\nforward the qualifying member ready for use. And the more numerous the\nqualifications to be simultaneously remembered and rightly applied,\nthe greater will be the mental power expended, and the smaller the\neffect produced. Hence, other things equal, force will be gained by\nso arranging the members of a sentence that these suspensions shall\nat any moment be the fewest in {346} number; and shall also be of\nthe shortest duration. The following is an instance of defective\ncombination.\n\n\u2015\u2015 A modern newspaper-statement, though probably true, would be laughed\nat, if quoted in a book as testimony; but the letter of a court gossip\nis thought good historical evidence, if written some centuries ago.\n\nA re-arrangement of this, in accordance with the principle indicated\nabove, will be found to increase the effect. Thus:\n\n\u2015\u2015 Though probably true, a modern newspaper-statement quoted in a book\nas testimony, would be laughed at; but the letter of a court gossip, if\nwritten some centuries ago, is thought good historical evidence.\n\nBy making this change, some of the suspensions are avoided and\nothers shortened; while there is less liability to produce premature\nconceptions. The passage quoted below from \u201cParadise Lost\u201d affords a\nfine instance of a sentence well arranged; alike in the priority of the\nsubordinate members, in the avoidance of long and numerous suspensions,\nand in the correspondence between the sequence of the clauses and the\nsequence of the phenomena described, which, by the way, is a further\nprerequisite to easy apprehension, and therefore to effect.\n\n                   \u201cAs when a prowling wolf,\n Whom hunger drives to seek new haunt for prey,\n Watching where shepherds pen their flocks at eve,\n In hurdled cotes amid the field secure,\n Leaps o\u2019er the fence with ease into the fold:\n Or as a thief, bent to unhoard the cash\n Of some rich burgher, whose substantial doors,\n Cross-barr\u2019d and bolted fast, fear no assault,\n In at the window climbs, or o\u2019er the tiles:\n So clomb the first grand Thief into God\u2019s fold;\n So since into his Church lewd hirelings climb.\u201d\n\nThe habitual use of sentences in which all or most of the descriptive\nand limiting elements precede those described and limited, gives rise\nto what is called the inverted style: a title which is, however, by no\nmeans confined to this {347} structure, but is often used where the\norder of the words is simply unusual. A more appropriate title would be\nthe _direct style_, as contrasted with the other, or _indirect style_:\nthe peculiarity of the one being, that it conveys each thought step by\nstep with little liability to error; and of the other, that it conveys\neach thought by a series of approximations, which successively correct\nthe erroneous preconceptions that have been raised.\n\nThe superiority of the direct over the indirect form of sentence,\nimplied by the several conclusions above drawn, must not, however, be\naffirmed without reservation. Though, up to a certain point, it is well\nfor the qualifying clauses of a proposition to precede those qualified;\nyet, as carrying forward each qualifying clause costs some mental\neffort, it follows that when the number of them and the time they are\ncarried become great, we reach a limit beyond which more is lost than\nis gained. Other things equal, the arrangement should be such that no\nconcrete image shall be suggested until the materials out of which it\nis to be framed have been presented. And yet, as lately pointed out,\nother things equal, the fewer the materials to be held at once, and the\nshorter the distance they have to be borne, the better. Hence in some\ncases it becomes a question whether most mental effort will be entailed\nby the many and long suspensions, or by the correction of successive\nmisconceptions.\n\nThis question may sometimes be decided by considering the capacity\nof the persons addressed. A greater grasp of mind is required for\nthe ready apprehension of thoughts expressed in the direct manner,\nwhere the sentences are anywise intricate. To recollect a number of\npreliminaries stated in elucidation of a coming idea, and to apply\nthem all to the formation of it when suggested, demands a good memory\nand considerable power of concentration. To one possessing these, the\ndirect method will mostly seem the best; while to one deficient in\nthem it will seem the worst. {348} Just as it may cost a strong man\nless effort to carry a hundred-weight from place to place at once,\nthan by a stone at a time; so, to an active mind it may be easier to\nbear along all the qualifications of an idea and at once rightly form\nit when named, than to first imperfectly conceive such idea, and then\ncarry back to it, one by one, the details and limitations afterwards\nmentioned. While conversely, as for a boy the only possible mode of\ntransferring a hundred-weight, is that of taking it in portions;\nso, for a weak mind, the only possible mode of forming a compound\nconception may be that of building it up by carrying separately its\nseveral parts.\n\nThat the indirect method\u2014the method of conveying the meaning by\na series of approximations\u2014is best fitted for the uncultivated,\nmay indeed be inferred from their habitual use of it. The form\nof expression adopted by the savage, as in\u2014\u201cWater, give me,\u201d is\nthe simplest type of this arrangement. In pleonasms, which are\ncomparatively prevalent among the uneducated, the same essential\nstructure is seen; as, for instance in\u2014\u201cThe men, they were there.\u201d\nAgain, the old possessive case\u2014\u201cThe king, his crown,\u201d conforms to\nthe like order of thought. Moreover, the fact that the indirect mode\nis called the natural one, implies that it is the one spontaneously\nemployed by the common people; that is\u2014the one easiest for\nundisciplined minds.\n\nThere are many cases, however, in which neither the direct nor the\nindirect mode is the best; but in which an intermediate mode is\npreferable to both. When the number of circumstances and qualifications\nto be included in the sentence is great, the judicious course is\nneither to enumerate them all before introducing the idea to which they\nbelong, nor to put this idea first and let it be remodelled to agree\nwith the particulars afterwards mentioned; but to do a little of each.\nIt is desirable to avoid so extremely indirect an arrangement as the\nfollowing:\u2015\n\n\u2015\u2015 \u201cWe came to our journey\u2019s end, at last, with no {349} small\ndifficulty, after much fatigue, through deep roads, and bad weather.\u201d\n\nYet to transform this into an entirely direct sentence would be\nunadvisable; as witness:\u2015\n\n\u2015\u2015 At last, with no small difficulty, after much fatigue, through deep\nroads, and bad weather, we came to our journey\u2019s end.\n\nDr. Whately, from whom we quote the first of these two arrangements,\nproposes this construction:\u2015\n\n\u2015\u2015 \u201cAt last, after much fatigue, through deep roads and bad weather, we\ncame, with no small difficulty, to our journey\u2019s end.\u201d\n\nHere by introducing the words \u201cwe came\u201d a little earlier in the\nsentence, the labour of carrying forward so many particulars is\ndiminished, and the subsequent qualification \u201cwith no small difficulty\u201d\nentails an addition to the thought that is easily made. But a\nfurther improvement may be effected by putting the words \u201cwe came\u201d\nstill earlier; especially if at the same time the qualifications be\nrearranged in conformity with the principle already explained, that\nthe more abstract elements of the thought should come before the more\nconcrete. Observe the result of making these two changes:\n\n\u2015\u2015 At last, with no small difficulty, and after much fatigue, we came,\nthrough deep roads and bad weather, to our journey\u2019s end.\n\nThis reads with comparative smoothness; that is\u2014with less hindrance\nfrom suspensions and reconstructions of thought.\n\nIt should be further remarked, that even when addressing vigorous\nintellects, the direct mode is unfit for communicating ideas of a\ncomplex or abstract character. So long as the mind has not much to\ndo, it may be well able to grasp all the preparatory clauses of a\nsentence, and to use them effectively; but if some subtlety in the\nargument absorb the attention it may happen that the mind, doubly {350}\nstrained, will break down, and allow the elements of the thought to\nlapse into confusion.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nLet us pass now to figures of speech. In them we may equally discern\nthe same general law of effect. Implied in rules given for the\nchoice and right use of them, we shall find the same fundamental\nrequirement\u2014economy of attention. It is indeed chiefly because they so\nwell subserve this requirement, that figures of speech are employed.\n\nLet us begin with the figure called Synecdoche. The advantage sometimes\ngained by putting a part for the whole, is due to the more convenient,\nor more vivid, presentation of the idea. If, instead of writing \u201ca\nfleet of ten ships,\u201d we write \u201ca fleet of ten _sail_,\u201d the picture\nof a group of vessels at sea is more readily suggested; and is so\nbecause the sails constitute the most conspicuous parts of vessels so\ncircumstanced. To say, \u201cAll _hands_ to the pumps,\u201d is better than to\nsay, \u201cAll _men_ to the pumps;\u201d as it calls up a picture of the men in\nthe special attitude intended, and so saves effort. Bringing \u201c_grey\nhairs_ with sorrow to the grave,\u201d is another expression, the effect of\nwhich has the same cause.\n\nThe effectiveness of Metonymy may be similarly accounted for. \u201cThe low\nmorality of _the bar_,\u201d is a phrase both more brief and significant\nthan the literal one it stands for. A belief in the ultimate supremacy\nof intelligence over brute force, is conveyed in a more concrete form,\nand therefore more representable form, if we substitute _the pen_ and\n_the sword_ for the two abstract terms. To say, \u201cBeware of drinking!\u201d\nis less effective than to say, \u201cBeware of _the bottle_!\u201d and is so,\nclearly because it calls up a less specific image.\n\nThe Simile is in many cases used chiefly with a view to ornament; but\nwhenever it increases the _force_ of a passage, it does so by being an\neconomy. Here is an instance.\n\n\u2015\u2015 The illusion that great men and great events came {351} oftener\nin early times than they come now, is due partly to historical\nperspective. As in a range of equidistant columns, the furthest off\nseem the closest; so, the conspicuous objects of the past seem more\nthickly clustered the more remote they are.\n\nTo express literally the thought thus conveyed, would take many\nsentences; and the first elements of the picture would become faint\nwhile the imagination was busy in adding the others. But by the help of\na comparison much of the effort otherwise required is saved.\n\nConcerning the position of the Simile,[54] it needs only to\nremark, that what has been said about the order of the adjective\nand substantive, predicate and subject, principal and subordinate\npropositions, &c., is applicable here. As whatever qualifies should\nprecede whatever is qualified, force will generally be gained by\nplacing the simile before the object or act to which it is applied.\nThat this arrangement is the best, may be seen in the following passage\nfrom the \u201cLady of the Lake:\u201d\u2015\n\n \u201cAs wreath of snow, on mountain breast,\n Slides from the rock that gave it rest,\n Poor Ellen glided from her stay,\n And at the monarch\u2019s feet she lay.\u201d\n\nInverting these couplets will be found to diminish the effect\nconsiderably. There are cases, however, even where the simile is a\nsimple one, in which it may with advantage be placed last; as in these\nlines from Alexander Smith\u2019s \u201cLife Drama:\u201d\u2015\n\n             \u201cI see the future stretch\n All dark and barren as a rainy sea.\u201d\n\nThe reason for this seems to be, that so abstract an idea as that\nattaching to the word \u201cfuture,\u201d does not present {352} itself to the\nmind in any definite form; and hence the subsequent arrival at the\nsimile entails no reconstruction of the thought.\n\nSuch however are not the only cases in which this order is the more\nforcible. As putting the simile first is advantageous only when it is\ncarried forward in the mind to assist in forming an image of the object\nor act; it must happen that if, from length or complexity, it cannot be\nso carried forward, the advantage is not gained. The annexed sonnet, by\nColeridge, is defective from this cause.\n\n \u201cAs when a child, on some long winter\u2019s night,\n Affrighted, clinging to its grandam\u2019s knees,\n With eager wond\u2019ring and perturb\u2019d delight\n Listens strange tales of fearful dark decrees,\n Mutter\u2019d to wretch by necromantic spell;\n Or of those hags who at the witching time\n Of murky midnight, ride the air sublime,\n And mingle foul embrace with fiends of hell;\n Cold horror drinks its blood! Anon the tear\n More gentle starts, to hear the beldame tell\n Of pretty babes, that lov\u2019d each other dear,\n Murder\u2019d by cruel uncle\u2019s mandate fell:\n Ev\u2019n such the shiv\u2019ring joys thy tones impart,\n Ev\u2019n so, thou, Siddons, meltest my sad heart.\u201d\n\nHere, from the lapse of time and accumulation of circumstances,\nthe first member of the comparison is forgotten before the second\nis reached; and requires re-reading. Had the main idea been first\nmentioned, less effort would have been required to retain it, and to\nmodify the conception of it into harmony with the illustrative ideas,\nthan to remember the illustrative ideas, and refer back to them for\nhelp in forming the final image.\n\nThe superiority of the Metaphor to the Simile is ascribed by Dr.\nWhately to the fact that \u201call men are more gratified at catching the\nresemblance for themselves, than in having it pointed out to them.\u201d But\nafter what has been said, the great economy it achieves will seem the\nmore probable cause. Lear\u2019s exclamation\u2015\n\n \u201cIngratitude! thou marble-hearted fiend,\u201d {353}\n\nwould lose part of its effect were it changed into\u2015\n\n \u201cIngratitude! thou fiend with heart like marble;\u201d\n\nand the loss would result partly from the position of the simile and\npartly from the extra number of words required. When the comparison is\nan involved one, the greater force of the metaphor, due to its relative\nbrevity, becomes much more conspicuous. If, drawing an analogy between\nmental and physical phenomena, we say,\n\n\u2015\u2015 As, in passing through a crystal, beams of white light are\ndecomposed into the colours of the rainbow; so, in traversing the\nsoul of the poet, the colourless rays of truth are transformed into\nbrightly-tinted poetry;\u2015\u2015 it is clear that in receiving the two sets\nof words expressing the two halves of the comparison, and in carrying\nthe meaning of the one to help in interpreting the other, considerable\nattention is absorbed. Most of this is saved by putting the comparison\nin a metaphorical form, thus:\u2015\n\n\u2015\u2015 The white light of truth, in traversing the many-sided transparent\nsoul of the poet, is refracted into iris-hued poetry. How much is\nconveyed in a few words by using Metaphor, and how vivid the effect\nconsequently produced, is everywhere shown. From \u201cA Life Drama\u201d may be\nquoted the phrase,\n\n \u201cI spear\u2019d him with a jest,\u201d\n\nas a fine instance among the many which that poem contains. A passage\nin the \u201cPrometheus Unbound,\u201d of Shelley, displays the power of the\nmetaphor to great advantage.\n\n       \u201cMethought among the lawns together\n We wandered, underneath the young gray dawn,\n And multitudes of dense white fleecy clouds\n Were wandering in thick flocks along the mountains\n _Shepherded_ by the slow unwilling wind.\u201d\n\nThis last expression is remarkable for the distinctness with which it\ncalls up the features of the scene; bringing the mind by a bound to the\ndesired conception.\n\nBut a limit is put to the advantageous use of Metaphor, {354} by the\ncondition that it must be simple enough to be understood from a hint.\nEvidently, if there be any obscurity in the meaning or application of\nit, no economy of attention will be achieved; but rather the reverse.\nHence, when the comparison is complex, it is better to put it in the\nform of a Simile. There is, however, a species of figure, sometimes\nclassed under Allegory, but which might well be called Compound\nMetaphor, that enables us to retain the brevity of the metaphorical\nform even where the analogy is intricate. This is done by indicating\nthe application of the figure at the outset, and then leaving the\nreader or hearer to continue the parallel. Emerson has employed it with\ngreat effect in the first of his _Lectures on the Times_.\n\n \u201cThe main interest which any aspects of the Times can have for us, is\n the great spirit which gazes through them, the light which they can\n shed on the wonderful questions, What are we? and Whither do we tend?\n We do not wish to be deceived. Here we drift, like white sail across\n the wild ocean, now bright on the wave, now darkling in the trough of\n the sea; but from what port did we sail? Who knows? Or to what port\n are we bound? Who knows? There is no one to tell us but such poor\n weather-tossed mariners as ourselves, whom we speak as we pass, or who\n have hoisted some signal, or floated to us some letter in a bottle\n from afar. But what know they more than we? They also found themselves\n on this wondrous sea. No; from the older sailors nothing. Over all\n their speaking-trumpets the gray sea and the loud winds answer\u2014Not in\n us; not in Time.\u201d\n\nThe division of Simile from Metaphor is by no means definite. Between\nthe one extreme in which the two elements of the comparison are\ndetailed at full length and the analogy pointed out, and the other\nextreme in which the comparison is implied instead of stated, come\nintermediate forms, in which the comparison is partly stated and partly\nimplied. For instance:\u2015\n\n\u2015\u2015 Astonished at the performances of the English plough, the Hindoos\npaint it, set it up, and worship it; thus turning a tool into an idol.\nLinguists do the same with language.\u2014Here there is an evident advantage\nin leaving the reader or hearer to complete the figure. And generally\nthese {355} intermediate forms are good in proportion as they do this;\nprovided the mode of completion be obvious.\n\nPassing over much that may be said of like purport on Hyperbole,\nPersonification, Apostrophe, &c., let us close our remarks on\nconstruction by a typical example of effective expression. The general\nprinciple which has been enunciated is that, other things equal, the\nforce of a verbal form or arrangement is great, in proportion as the\nmental effort demanded from the recipient is small. The corollaries\nfrom this general principle have been severally illustrated. But\nthough conformity now to this and now to that requirement has been\nexemplified, no case of entire conformity has yet been quoted. It is\nindeed difficult to find one; for the English idiom does not commonly\npermit the order which theory dictates. A few, however, occur in\nOssian. Here is one:\u2015\n\n \u201cLike autumn\u2019s dark storms pouring from two echoing hills, towards\n each other approached the heroes. Like two deep streams from high\n rocks meeting, mixing, roaring on the plain: loud, rough, and dark in\n battle meet Lochlin and Inisfail. *\u00a0*\u00a0* As the noise of the troubled\n ocean when roll the waves on high; as the last peal of the thunder of\n heaven; such is the din of war.\u201d\n\nExcept in the position of the verb in the first two similes, the\ntheoretically best arrangement is fully carried out in each of these\nsentences. The simile comes before the qualified image, the adjectives\nbefore the substantives, the predicate and copula before the subject,\nand their respective complements before them. That the passage is\nbombastic proves nothing; or rather, proves our case. For what is\nbombast but a force of expression too great for the magnitude of the\nideas embodied? All that may rightly be inferred is, that only in rare\ncases should _all_ the conditions to effective expression be fulfilled.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nA more complex application of the theory may now be {356} made. Not\nonly in the structures of sentences, and the uses of figures of speech,\nmay we trace economy of the recipient\u2019s mental energy as the cause of\nforce; but we may trace this same cause in the successful choice and\narrangement of the minor images out of which some large thought is to\nbe built. To select from a scene or event described, those elements\nwhich carry many others with them; and so, by saying a few things but\nsuggesting many, to abridge the description; is the secret of producing\na vivid impression. An extract from Tennyson\u2019s \u201cMariana\u201d will well\nillustrate this.\n\n \u201cAll day within the dreamy house,\n The doors upon their hinges creaked,\n The blue fly sung in the pane; the mouse\n Behind the mouldering wainscot shriek\u2019d,\n Or from the crevice peer\u2019d about.\u201d\n\nThe several circumstances here specified bring with them many\nappropriate associations. When alone the creaking of a distant door\nis much more obtrusive than when talking to friends. Our attention\nis rarely drawn by the buzzing of a fly in the window, save when\neverything is still. While the inmates are moving about the house,\nmice usually keep silence; and it is only when extreme quietness\nreigns that they peep from their retreats. Hence each of the facts\nmentioned, presupposing various others, calls up these with more or\nless distinctness; and revives the feeling of dull solitude with\nwhich they are connected in our experience. Were all of them detailed\ninstead of suggested, the mental energies would be so frittered away\nin attending that little impression of dreariness would be produced.\nSimilarly in other cases. In the choice of component ideas, as in the\nchoice of expressions, the aim must be to convey the greatest quantity\nof thoughts with the smallest quantity of words.\n\nThe same principle may sometimes be advantageously carried yet further,\nby indirectly suggesting some entirely {357} distinct thought in\naddition to the one expressed. Thus if we say,\n\n\u2015\u2015 The head of a good classic is as full of ancient myths, as that of\na servant-girl of ghost stories; it is manifest that besides the fact\nasserted, there is an implied opinion respecting the small value of\nmuch that passes as classical learning; and as this implied opinion\nis recognized much sooner than it can be put into words, there is\ngain in omitting it. In other cases, again, great effect is produced\nby an overt omission; provided the nature of the idea left out is\nobvious. A good instance occurs in _Heroes and Hero-worship_. After\ndescribing the way in which Burns was sacrificed to the idle curiosity\nof lion-hunters\u2014people who sought to amuse themselves, and who got\ntheir amusement while \u201cthe Hero\u2019s life went for it!\u201d Carlyle suggests a\nparallel thus:\u2015\n\n\u201cRichter says, in the Island of Sumatra there is a kind of\n\u2018Light-chafers,\u2019 large Fire-flies, which people stick upon spits, and\nilluminate the ways with at night. Persons of condition can thus travel\nwith a pleasant radiance, which they much admire. Great honour to the\nFire-flies! But\u2014!\u2014\u201d\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nBefore inquiring whether the law of effect thus far traced, explains\nthe impressiveness of poetry as compared with prose, it will be needful\nto notice some causes of force in expression which had not yet been\nmentioned. These are not, properly speaking, additional causes; but\nrather secondary ones, originating from those already specified.\nOne is that mental excitement spontaneously prompts those forms of\nspeech which have been pointed out as the most effective. \u201cOut with\nhim!\u201d \u201cAway with him!\u201d are the cries of angry citizens at a disturbed\nmeeting. A voyager, describing a terrible storm he had witnessed, would\nrise to some such climax as\u2014\u201cCrack went the ropes, and down came the\nmast.\u201d Astonishment {358} may be heard expressed in the phrase\u2014\u201cNever\nwas there such a sight!\u201d All of which sentences are constructed after\nthe direct type. Again, there is the fact that excited persons are\ngiven to figures of speech. The vituperation of the vulgar abounds with\nthem. \u201cBeast,\u201d \u201cbrute,\u201d \u201cgallows rogue,\u201d \u201ccut-throat villain,\u201d these,\nand like metaphors or metaphorical epithets, call to mind a street\nquarrel. Further, it may be noticed that extreme brevity is a trait\nof passionate language. The sentences are generally incomplete; and\nfrequently important words are left to be gathered from the context.\nGreat admiration does not vent itself in a precise proposition, as\u2014\u201cIt\nis beautiful;\u201d but in the simple exclamation,\u2014\u201cBeautiful!\u201d He who, when\nreading a lawyer\u2019s letter, should say, \u201cVile rascal!\u201d would be thought\nangry; while, \u201cHe is a vile rascal,\u201d would imply comparative coolness.\nThus alike in the order of the words, in the frequent use of figures,\nand in extreme conciseness, the natural utterances of excitement\nconform to the theoretical conditions to forcible expression.\n\nHence such forms of speech acquire a secondary strength from\nassociation. Having, in daily intercourse, heard them in connection\nwith vivid mental impressions; and having been accustomed to meet with\nthem in writing of unusual power; they come to have in themselves\na species of force. The emotions that have from time to time been\nproduced by the strong thoughts wrapped up in these forms, are\npartially aroused by the forms themselves. These create a preparatory\nsympathy; and when the striking ideas looked for are reached, they are\nthe more vividly pictured.\n\nThe continuous use of words and forms that are alike forcible in\nthemselves and forcible from their associations, produces the\nimpressive species of composition which we call poetry. The poet\nhabitually adopts those symbols of thought, and those methods of\nusing them, which instinct {359} and analysis agree in choosing as\nmost effective. On turning back to the various specimens which have\nbeen quoted, it will be seen that the direct or inverted form of\nsentence predominates in them; and that to a degree inadmissible in\nprose. Not only in the frequency, but in what is termed the violence\nof the inversions, may this distinction be remarked. The abundant\nuse of figures, again, exhibits the same truth. Metaphors, similes,\nhyperboles, and personifications, are the poet\u2019s colours, which he has\nliberty to employ almost without limit. We characterize as \u201cpoetical\u201d\nthe prose which uses these appliances of language with frequency;\nand condemn it as \u201cover florid\u201d or \u201caffected\u201d long before they occur\nwith the profusion allowed in verse. Once more, in brevity\u2014the other\nrequisite of forcible expression which theory points out and emotion\nspontaneously fulfils\u2014poetical phraseology differs from ordinary\nphraseology. Imperfect periods are frequent; elisions are perpetual;\nand many minor words which would be deemed essential in prose, are\ndispensed with.\n\nThus poetry is especially impressive partly because it conforms to\nall the laws of effective speech, and partly because in so doing\nit imitates the natural utterances of excitement. While the matter\nembodied is idealized emotion, the vehicle is the idealized language\nof emotion. As the musical composer catches the cadences in which our\nfeelings of joy and sympathy, grief and despair, vent themselves,\nand out of these germs evolves melodies suggesting higher phases of\nthese feelings; so, the poet develops from the typical expressions in\nwhich men utter passion and sentiment, those choice forms of verbal\ncombination in which concentrated passion and sentiment may be fitly\npresented.\n\nThere is one peculiarity of poetry conducing much to its effect\u2014the\npeculiarity which is indeed usually thought its characteristic\none\u2014still remaining to be considered: we {360} mean its rhythmical\nstructure. This, improbable though it seems, will be found to come\nunder the same generalization with the others. Like each of them, it\nis an idealization of the natural language of emotion, which is not\nuncommonly more or less metrical if the emotion be not too violent; and\nlike each of them it economizes the reader\u2019s or hearer\u2019s attention. In\nthe peculiar tone and manner we adopt in uttering versified language,\nmay be discerned its relationship to the feelings; and the pleasure\nwhich its measured movement gives, is ascribable to the comparative\nease with which words metrically arranged can be recognized. This last\nposition will not be at once admitted; but explanation will justify it.\nIf, as we have seen, there is an expenditure of mental energy in so\nlistening to verbal articulations as to identify the words, or in that\nsilent repetition of them which goes on in reading, then, any mode of\nso combining words as to present a regular recurrence of certain traits\nwhich can be anticipated, will diminish that strain on the attention\nentailed by the total irregularity of prose. Just as the body, when\nreceiving a series of varying concussions, must keep its muscles ready\nto meet the most violent of them, as not knowing when such may come;\nso, the mind when receiving unarranged articulations, must keep its\nperceptive faculties active enough to recognize the least easily caught\nsounds. And as, if the concussions recur in a definite order, the body\nmay husband its forces by adjusting the resistance needful for each\nconcussion; so, if the syllables be rhythmically arranged, the mind may\neconomize its energies by anticipating the attention required for each\nsyllable. Far-fetched though this idea will be thought, introspection\ncountenances it. That we _do_ take advantage of metrical language to\nadjust our perceptive faculties to the expected articulations, is clear\nfrom the fact that we are balked by halting versification. Much as at\nthe bottom of a flight of stairs, a step more or less than we counted\nupon gives us a {361} shock; so, too, does a misplaced accent or a\nsupernumerary syllable. In the one case, we _know_ that there is an\nerroneous pre-adjustment; and we can scarcely doubt that there is one\nin the other. But if we habitually pre-adjust our perceptions to the\nmeasured movement of verse, the physical analogy above given renders\nit probable that by so doing we economize attention; and hence that\nmetrical language is more effective than prose, because it enables us\nto do this.\n\nWere there space, it might be worth while to inquire whether the\npleasure we take in rhyme, and also that which we take in euphony, are\nnot partly ascribable to the same general cause.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nA few paragraphs only, can be devoted to a second division of our\nsubject. To pursue in detail the laws of effect, as applying to the\nlarger features of composition, would carry us beyond our limits. But\nwe may briefly indicate a further aspect of the general principle\nhitherto traced, and hint a few of its wider applications.\n\nThus far, we have considered only those causes of force in language\nwhich depend on economy of the mental _energies_. We have now to\nglance at those which depend on economy of the mental _sensibilities_.\nQuestionable though this division may be as a psychological one, it\nwill serve roughly to indicate the remaining field of investigation.\nIt will suggest that besides considering the extent to which any\nfaculty or group of faculties is tasked in receiving a form of words\nand constructing its contained idea, we have to consider the state\nin which this faculty or group of faculties is left; and how the\nreception of subsequent sentences and images will be influenced by\nthat state. Without going fully into so wide a topic as the action\nof faculties and its reactive effects, it will suffice to recall\nthe fact that every faculty is exhausted by exercise. {362} This\ngeneralization, which our bodily experiences force upon us, and which\nin daily speech is recognized as true of the mind as a whole, is true\nof each mental power, from the simplest of the senses to the most\ncomplex of the sentiments. If we hold a flower to the nose for long,\nwe become insensible to its scent. We say of a brilliant flash of\nlightning that it blinds us; which means that our eyes have for a time\nlost their ability to appreciate light. After eating honey, we are\napt to think our tea is without sugar. The phrase \u201ca deafening roar,\u201d\nimplies that men find a very loud sound temporarily incapacitates them\nfor hearing faint sounds. To a hand which has for some time carried\na heavy body, small bodies afterwards lifted seem to have lost their\nweight. Now, the truth thus exemplified, may be traced throughout.\nAlike of the reflective faculties, the imagination, the perceptions\nof the beautiful, the ludicrous, the sublime, it may be shown that\naction exhausts; and that in proportion as the action is violent the\nsubsequent prostration is great.\n\nEqually throughout the whole nature, may be traced the law that\nexercised faculties are ever tending to resume their original states.\nNot only after continued rest, do they regain their full powers\u2014not\nonly are brief cessations in the demands on them followed by partial\nre-invigoration; but even while they are in action, the resulting\nexhaustion is ever being neutralized. The processes of waste and\nrepair go on together. Hence with faculties habitually exercised\u2014as\nthe senses of all persons, or the muscles of any one who is strong\u2014it\nhappens that, during moderate activity, the repair is so nearly equal\nto the waste, that the diminution of power is scarcely appreciable.\nIt is only when effort has been long continued, or has been violent,\nthat repair becomes so far in arrear of waste as to cause a perceptible\nenfeeblement. In all cases, however, when, by the action of a faculty,\nwaste has been incurred, _some_ lapse {363} of time must take place\nbefore full efficiency can be reacquired; and this time must be long in\nproportion as the waste has been great.\n\nKeeping in mind these general truths, we shall be in a condition\nto understand certain causes of effect in composition now to be\nconsidered. Every perception received, and every conception framed,\nentailing some amount of waste in the nervous system, and the\nefficiency of the faculties employed being for a time, though often\nbut momentarily, diminished; the resulting partial inability affects\nthe acts of perception and conception that immediately succeed. Hence\nthe vividness with which images are pictured must, in many cases,\ndepend on the order of their presentation; even when one order is as\nconvenient to the understanding as the other. Sundry facts illustrate\nthis truth, and are explained by it: instance climax and anti-climax.\nThe marked effect obtained by placing last the most striking of any\nseries of ideas, and the weakness\u2014often the ludicrous weakness\u2014produced\nby reversing this arrangement, depends on the general law indicated.\nAs immediately after looking at the sun we cannot perceive the light\nof a fire, while by looking at the fire first and the sun afterwards\nwe can perceive both; so, after receiving a brilliant, or weighty, or\nterrible thought, we cannot properly appreciate a less brilliant, less\nweighty, or less terrible one, though by reversing the order, we can\nappreciate each. In Antithesis, again, the like truth is exemplified.\nThe opposition of two thoughts which are the reverse of each other in\nsome prominent trait, insures an impressive effect; and does this by\ngiving a momentary relaxation to the faculties addressed. If, after a\nseries of ordinary images exciting in a moderate degree to the emotion\nof reverence, or approbation, or beauty, the mind has presented to\nit an insignificant, or unworthy, or ugly image; the structure which\nyields the emotion of reverence, or approbation, or beauty, having for\nthe time nothing to do, tends to resume {364} its full power; and\nwill immediately afterwards appreciate anything vast, admirable, or\nbeautiful better than it would otherwise do. Conversely, where the idea\nof absurdity due to extreme insignificance is to be produced, it may be\nintensified by placing it after something impressive; especially if the\nform of phrase implies that something still more impressive is coming.\nA good illustration of the effect gained by thus presenting a petty\nidea to a consciousness which has not yet recovered from the shock of\nan exciting one, occurs in a sketch by Balzac. His hero writes to a\nmistress who has cooled towards him, the following letter:\u2015\n\n \u201cMadame,\u2014Votre conduite m\u2019\u00e9tonne autant qu\u2019elle m\u2019afflige. Non\n contente de me d\u00e9chirer le c\u0153ur par vos d\u00e9dains, vous avez\n l\u2019ind\u00e9licatesse de me retenir une brosse \u00e0 dents, que mes moyens\n ne me permettent pas de remplacer, mes propri\u00e9t\u00e9s \u00e9tant grev\u00e9es\n d\u2019hypoth\u00e8ques au del\u00e0 de leur valeur.\n\n \u201cAdieu, trop belle et trop ingrate amie! Puissions-nous nous revoir\n dans un monde meilleur!\n                                                   \u201cCHARLES-EDOUARD.\u201d\n\nThus the phenomena of Climax, Antithesis, and Anticlimax, alike result\nfrom this general principle. Improbable as these momentary variations\nin susceptibility may seem, we cannot doubt their occurrence when we\ncontemplate the analogous variations in the susceptibility of the\nsenses. Every one knows that a patch of black on a white ground looks\nblacker, and a patch of white on a black ground looks whiter, than\nelsewhere. As the blackness and the whiteness are really the same,\nthe only assignable cause, is a difference in their actions upon us,\ndependent on the different states of our faculties. The effect is due\nto a visual antithesis.\n\nBut this extension of the general principle of economy\u2014this further\ncondition to effective composition, that the sensitiveness of the\nfaculties must be husbanded\u2014includes much more than has been yet\nhinted. Not only does it follow that certain arrangements and certain\njuxtapositions of connected ideas are best; but also that some modes\nof dividing and presenting a subject will be more striking {365} than\nothers, irrespective of logical cohesion. We are shown why we must\nprogress from the less interesting to the more interesting; alike in\nthe composition as a whole, and in each successive portion. At the\nsame time, the indicated requirement negatives long continuity of\nthe same kind of thought, or repeated production of like effects.\nIt warns us against the error committed by Pope in his poems and by\nBacon in his essays\u2014the error of constantly employing forcible forms\nof expression. As the easiest posture by and by becomes fatiguing,\nand is with pleasure exchanged for one less easy; so, the most\nperfectly-constructed sentences unceasingly used must cause weariness,\nand relief will be given by using those of inferior kinds. Further,\nwe may infer not only that we ought to avoid generally combining our\nwords in one manner, however good, or working out our figures and\nillustrations in one way, however telling; but that we ought to avoid\nanything like uniform adherence to the wider conditions of effect. We\nshould not make every division of our subject progress in interest; we\nshould not always rise to a climax. As we saw that in single sentences\nit is but rarely allowable to fulfil all the conditions to strength;\nso, in the larger sections of a composition we must not often conform\nentirely to the principles indicated. We must subordinate the component\neffects to the total effect.\n\nThe species of composition which the law we have traced out indicates\nas the perfect one, is the one which genius tends naturally to produce.\nAs we found that the kinds of sentence which are theoretically best,\nare those commonly employed by superior minds, and by inferior minds\nwhen temporarily exalted; so, we shall find that the ideal form for a\npoem, essay, or fiction, is that which the ideal writer would evolve\nspontaneously. One in whom the powers of expression fully responded\nto the state of feeling, would unconsciously use that variety in the\nmode {366} of presenting his thoughts, which Art demands. Constant\nemployment of one species of phraseology implies an undeveloped\nlinguistic faculty. To have a specific style is to be poor in speech.\nIf we remember that in the far past, men had only nouns and verbs to\nconvey their ideas with, and that from then to now the progress has\nbeen towards more numerous implements of thought, and towards greater\ncomplexity and variety in their combinations; we may infer that, in the\nuse of sentences, we are at present much what the primitive man was\nin the use of words; and that a continuance of the process which has\nhitherto gone on, must produce increasing heterogeneity in our modes\nof expression. As now, in a fine nature, the play of the features, the\ntones of the voice and its cadences, vary in harmony with every thought\nuttered; so, in one possessed of fully-developed powers of language,\nthe mould in which each combination of words is cast will vary with,\nand be appropriate to, the mental state. That a perfectly-endowed man\nmust unconsciously write in all styles, we may infer from considering\nhow styles originate. Why is Johnson pompous, Goldsmith simple? Why is\none author abrupt, another involved, another concise? Evidently in each\ncase the habitual mode of utterance depends on the habitual balance of\nthe nature. The dominant feelings have by use trained the intellect to\nrepresent them. But while long habit has made it do this efficiently,\nit remains, from lack of practice, unable to do the like for the less\nactive feelings; and when these are excited, the usual verbal forms\nundergo but slight modifications. But let the ability of the intellect\nto represent the mental state be complete, and this fixity of style\nwill disappear. The perfect writer will be now rhythmical and now\nirregular; here his language will be plain and there ornate; sometimes\nhis sentences will be balanced and at other times unsymmetrical; for\na while there will be considerable sameness, and then again great\nvariety. His mode of {367} expression naturally responding to his\nthought and emotion, there will flow from his pen a composition\nchanging as the aspects of his subject change. He will thus without\neffort conform to what we have seen to be the laws of effect. And\nwhile his work presents to the reader that variety needful to prevent\ncontinuous exertion of the same faculties, it will also answer to the\ndescription of all highly-organized products both of man and nature. It\nwill be, not a series of like parts simply placed in juxtaposition, but\none whole made up of unlike parts that are mutually dependent.\n\n\nPOSTSCRIPT.\u2014The conclusion that because of their comparative brevity\nand because of those stronger associations formed by more frequent\nuse, words of Old-English origin are preferable to words derived from\nLatin or Greek, should be taken with two qualifications, which it seems\nneedful to add here.\n\nIn some cases the word furnished by our original tongue, and the\ncorresponding word directly or indirectly derived from Latin, though\nnominally equivalents, are not actually such; and the word of Latin\norigin, by certain extra connotations it has acquired, may be the more\nexpressive. For instance, we have no word of native origin which can\nbe advantageously substituted for the word \u201cgrand.\u201d No such words as\n\u201cbig\u201d or \u201cgreat,\u201d which connote little more than superiority in size\nor quantity, can be used instead: they do not imply that qualitative\nsuperiority which is associated with the idea of grandeur. As adopted\ninto our own language, the word \u201cgrand\u201d has been differentiated from\n\u201cgreat\u201d by habitual use in those cases where the greatness has an\n\u00e6sthetic superiority. In this case, then, a word of Latin origin\nis better than its nearest equivalent of native origin, because by\nuse it has acquired an additional meaning. And here, too, we may\nconveniently {368} note the fact that the greater brevity of a word\ndoes not invariably conduce to greater force. Where the word, instead\nof being one conveying a subordinate component of the idea the sentence\nexpresses, is one conveying the central element of the idea, on\nwhich the attention may with advantage rest a moment, a longer word\nis sometimes better than a shorter word. Thus it may be held that\nthe sentence\u2014\u201cIt is grand\u201d is not so effective as the sentence\u2014\u201cIt\nis magnificent.\u201d Besides the fact that here greater length of the\nword favours a longer dwelling on the essential part of the thought,\nthere is the fact that its greater length, aided by its division\ninto syllables, gives opportunity for a cadence appropriate to the\nfeeling produced by the thing characterized. By an ascent of the voice\non the syllable \u201cnif,\u201d and an utterance of this syllable, not only\nin a higher note, but with greater emphasis than the preceding or\nsucceeding syllables, there is implied that emotion which contemplation\nof the object produces; and the emotion thus implied is, by sympathy,\ncommunicated. One may say that in the case of these two words, if the\nimposingness is alone to be considered, the word \u201cmagnificent\u201d may with\nadvantage be employed; but if the sentence expresses a proposition\nin which, not the imposingness itself, but something _about_ the\nimposingness, is to be expressed, then the word \u201cgrand\u201d is preferable.\n\nThe second qualification above referred to, concerns the superiority\nof words derived from Latin or Greek, in cases where more or less\nabstract ideas have to be expressed. In such cases it is undesirable\nto use words having concrete associations; for such words, by the very\nvividness with which they call up thoughts of particular objects or\nparticular actions, impede the formation of conceptions which refer,\nnot to particular objects and actions, but to general truths concerning\nobjects or actions of kinds that are more or less various. Thus, such\nan expression as \u201cthe colligation of facts\u201d is better for philosophical\npurposes than such {369} an expression as \u201cthe tying together of\nfacts.\u201d This last expression cannot be used without suggesting the\nthought of a bundle of material things bound up by a string or cord\u2014a\nthought which, in so far as the materiality of its components is\nconcerned, conflicts with the conception to be suggested. Though it is\ntrue that when its derivation is remembered, \u201ccolligation\u201d raises the\nsame thought, yet, as the thought is not so promptly or irresistibly\nraised, it stands less in the way of the abstract conception with which\nattention should be exclusively occupied.\n\n\nENDNOTE TO _THE PHILOSOPHY OF STYLE_.\n\n[54] Properly the term \u201csimile\u201d is applicable only to the entire\nfigure, including the two things compared and the comparison drawn\nbetween them. But as there exists no name for the illustrative member\nof the figure, there seems no alternative but to employ \u201csimile\u201d to\nexpress this also. The context will in each case show in which sense\nthe word is used.\n\n\n\n\n{370}\n\nUSE AND BEAUTY.\n\n\n[_First published in_ The Leader _for January 3, 1852._]\n\nIn one of his essays, Emerson remarks, that what Nature at one time\nprovides for use, she afterwards turns to ornament; and he cites in\nillustration the structure of a sea-shell, in which the parts that have\nfor a while formed the mouth are at the next season of growth left\nbehind, and become decorative nodes and spines.\n\nIgnoring the implied teleology, which does not here concern us, it has\noften occurred to me that this same remark might be extended to the\nprogress of Humanity. Here, too, the appliances of one era serve as\nembellishments to the next. Equally in institutions, creeds, customs,\nand superstitions, we may trace this evolution of beauty out of what\nwas once purely utilitarian.\n\nThe contrast between the feeling with which we regard portions of the\nEarth\u2019s surface still left in their original state, and the feeling\nwith which the savage regarded them, is an instance that comes first\nin order of time. If any one walking over Hampstead Heath, will note\nhow strongly its picturesqueness is brought out by contrast with\nthe surrounding cultivated fields and the masses of houses lying\nin the distance; and will further reflect that, had this irregular\ngorse-covered surface extended on all sides to the horizon, it {371}\nwould have looked dreary and prosaic rather than pleasing; he will\nsee that to the primitive man a country so clothed presented no beauty\nat all. To him it was merely a haunt of wild animals, and a ground\nout of which roots might be dug. What have become for us places of\nrelaxation and enjoyment\u2014places for afternoon strolls and for gathering\nflowers\u2014were his places for labour and food, probably arousing in his\nmind none but utilitarian associations.\n\nRuined castles afford obvious instances of this metamorphosis of the\nuseful into the beautiful. To feudal barons and their retainers,\nsecurity was the chief, if not the only end, sought in choosing the\nsites and styles of their strongholds. Probably they aimed as little at\nthe picturesque as do the builders of cheap brick houses in our modern\ntowns. Yet what were erected for shelter and safety, and what in those\nearly days fulfilled an important function in the social economy, have\nnow assumed a purely ornamental character. They serve as scenes for\npicnics; pictures of them decorate our drawing-rooms; and each supplies\nits surrounding districts with legends for Christmas Eve.\n\nOn following out the train of thought suggested by this last\nillustration, we may see that not only do the material exuvi\u00e6 of past\nsocial states become the ornaments of our landscapes; but that past\nhabits, manners, and arrangements, serve as ornamental elements in\nour literature. The tyrannies which, to the serfs who bore them, were\nharsh and dreary facts; the feuds which, to those who took part in\nthem, were very practical life-and-death affairs; the mailed, moated,\nsentinelled security which was irksome to the nobles who needed it; the\nimprisonments, and tortures, and escapes, which were stern and quite\nprosaic realities to all concerned in them; have become to us material\nfor romantic tales\u2014material which, when woven into Ivanhoes and\nMarmions, serves for amusement in leisure hours, and becomes poetical\nby contrast with our daily lives.\n\nThus, also, is it with extinct creeds. Stonehenge, which {372} in the\nhands of the Druids had a governmental influence over men, is in our\nday a place for antiquarian excursions; and its attendant priests are\nworked up into an opera. Greek sculptures, preserved for their beauty\nin our galleries of art, and copied for the decoration of pleasure\ngrounds and entrance halls, once lived in men\u2019s minds as gods demanding\nobedience; as did also the grotesque idols that now amuse the visitors\nto our museums.\n\nEqually marked is this change of function in the case of minor\nsuperstitions. The fairy lore, which in past times was matter of\ngrave belief, and held sway over people\u2019s conduct, have since been\ntransformed into ornament for _A Midsummer Night\u2019s Dream_, _The\nTempest_, _The Fairy Queen,_ and endless small tales and poems; and\nstill affords subjects for children\u2019s story-books, themes for ballets,\nand plots for Planch\u00e9\u2019s burlesques. Gnomes, and genii, and afrits,\nlosing their terrors, give piquancy to the woodcuts in our illustrated\nedition of the _Arabian Nights_. While ghost-stories, and tales\nof magic and witchcraft, after serving to amuse boys and girls in\ntheir leisure hours, become matter for jocose allusions that enliven\ntea-table conversation.\n\nEven our serious literature and our speeches are relieved by ornaments\ndrawn from such sources. A Greek myth is often used as a parallel by\nwhich to vary the monotony of some grave argument. The lecturer breaks\nthe dead level of his practical discourse by illustrations drawn from\nbygone customs, events, or beliefs. And metaphors, similarly derived,\ngive brilliancy to political orations, and to _Times_ leading articles.\n\nIndeed, on careful inquiry, I think it will be found that we turn to\npurposes of beauty most byegone phenomena which are at all conspicuous.\nThe busts of great men in our libraries, and their tombs in our\nchurches; the once useful but now purely ornamental heraldic symbols;\nthe monks, nuns, and convents, which give interest to a certain class\nof novels; the bronze medi\u00e6val soldiers used for {373} embellishing\ndrawing-rooms; the gilt Apollos which recline on time-pieces; the\nnarratives that serve as plots for our great dramas; and the events\nthat afford subjects for historical pictures;\u2014these and such like\nillustrations of the metamorphosis of the useful into the beautiful,\nare so numerous as to suggest that, did we search diligently enough,\nwe should find that in some place, or under some circumstance, nearly\nevery notable product of the past has assumed a decorative character.\n\nAnd here the mention of historical pictures reminds me that an\ninference may be drawn from all this, bearing directly on the practice\nof art. It has of late years been a frequent criticism upon our\nhistorical painters, that they err in choosing their subjects from\nthe past; and that, would they found a genuine and vital school, they\nmust render on canvas the life and deeds and aims of our own time. If,\nhowever, there be any significance in the foregoing facts, it seems\ndoubtful whether this criticism is a just one. For if it be the course\nof things that what has performed some active function in society\nduring one era, becomes available for ornament in a subsequent one; it\nalmost follows that, conversely, whatever is performing some active\nfunction now, or has very recently performed one, does not possess the\nornamental character; and is, consequently, inapplicable to any purpose\nof which beauty is the aim, or of which it is a needful ingredient.\n\nStill more reasonable will this conclusion appear, when we consider\nthe nature of this process by which the useful is changed into the\nornamental. An essential pre-requisite to all beauty is _contrast_.\nTo obtain artistic effect, light must be put in juxtaposition with\nshade, bright colours with dull colours, a fretted surface with a plain\none. _Forte_ passages in music must have _piano_ passages to relieve\nthem; concerted pieces need interspersing with solos; and rich chords\nmust not be continuously repeated. In the drama we demand contrast\nof characters, of scenes, of sentiment, of {374} style. In prose\ncomposition an eloquent passage should have a comparatively plain\nsetting; and in poems great effect is obtained by occasional change\nof versification. This general principle will, I think, explain the\ntransformation of the bygone useful into the present beautiful. It\nis by virtue of their contrast with our present modes of life, that\npast modes of life look interesting and romantic. Just as a picnic,\nwhich is a temporary return to an aboriginal condition, derives, from\nits unfamiliarity, a certain poetry which it would not have were it\nhabitual; so, everything ancient gains, from its relative novelty to\nus, an element of interest. Gradually as, by the growth of society, we\nleave behind the customs, manners, arrangements, and all the products,\nmaterial and mental, of a bygone age\u2014gradually as we recede from these\nso far that there arises a conspicuous difference between them and\nthose we are familiar with; so gradually do they begin to assume to us\na poetical aspect, and become applicable for ornament. And hence it\nfollows that things and events which are close to us, and which are\naccompanied by associations of ideas not markedly contrasted with our\nordinary associations, are _relatively_ inappropriate for purposes\nof art. I say relatively because an incident of modern life or even\nof daily life may acquire adequate fitness for art purposes by an\nunusualness of some other kind than that due to unlikeness between past\nand present.\n\n\n\n\n{375}\n\nTHE SOURCES OF ARCHITECTURAL TYPES.\n\n\n[_First published in_ The Leader _for October 23, 1852._]\n\nWhen lately looking through the gallery of the Old Water-Colour\nSociety, I was struck with the incongruity produced by putting regular\narchitecture into irregular scenery. In one case, where the artist had\nintroduced a symmetrical Grecian edifice into a mountainous and wild\nlandscape, the discordant effect was particularly marked. \u201cHow very\nunpicturesque,\u201d said a lady to her friend, as they passed; showing that\nI was not alone in my opinion. Her phrase, however, set me speculating.\nWhy unpicturesque? Picturesque means, like a picture\u2014like what men\nchoose for pictures. Why then should this be not fit for a picture?\n\nThinking the matter over, it seemed to me that the artist had sinned\nagainst that harmony of sentiment which is essential to a good picture.\nWhen the other constituents of a landscape have irregular forms, any\nartificial structure introduced should have an irregular form, that\nit may seem _part_ of the landscape. The same general character must\npervade it and the surrounding objects; otherwise it, and the scene\namid which it stands, become not _one_ thing but _two_ things; and\nwe say that it looks out of place. Or, speaking psychologically,\nthe associated ideas called {376} up by a building with its wings,\nwindows, columns, and all its parts symmetrically disposed, differ\nwidely from the ideas associated with an unsymmetrical landscape; and\nthe one set of ideas tends to banish the other.\n\nPursuing the train of thought, sundry illustrative facts came to mind.\nI remembered that a castle, which is usually more irregular in outline\nthan any other kind of building, pleases us most when seated amid\ncrags and precipices; while a castle on a plain seems incongruous.\nThe partly-regular and partly-irregular forms of our old farm-houses,\nand our gabled gothic manors and abbeys, appear quite in harmony\nwith an undulating, wooded country. In towns we prefer symmetrical\narchitecture; and in towns it produces in us no feeling of incongruity,\nbecause all surrounding things\u2014men, horses, vehicles\u2014are symmetrical\nalso.\n\nAnd here I was reminded of a notion that has frequently recurred to me;\nnamely, that there is some relationship between the several kinds of\narchitecture and the several classes of natural objects. Buildings in\nthe Greek and Roman styles seem, in virtue of their symmetry, to take\ntheir type from animal life. In the partially-irregular Gothic, ideas\nderived from the vegetable world appear to predominate. And wholly\nirregular buildings, such as castles, may be considered as having\ninorganic forms for their basis.\n\nWhimsical as this speculation looks at first sight, it is countenanced\nby numerous facts. The connexion between symmetrical architecture and\nanimal forms, may be inferred from the _kind_ of symmetry we expect,\nand are satisfied with, in regular buildings. In a Greek temple we\nrequire that the front shall be symmetrical in itself, and that the two\nflanks shall be alike; but we do not look for uniformity between the\nflanks and the front, nor between the front and the back. The identity\nof this symmetry with that found in animals is obvious. Again, why is\nit that a {377} building making any pretensions to symmetry displeases\nus if not quite symmetrical? Probably the reply will be\u2014Because we\nsee that the designer\u2019s idea is not fully carried out; and that\nhence our love of completeness is offended. But then there come the\nfurther questions\u2014How do we know that the architect\u2019s conception was\nsymmetrical? Whence comes this notion of symmetry which we have, and\nwhich we attribute to him? Unless we fall back upon the old doctrine\nof innate ideas, we must admit that the idea of bi-lateral symmetry is\nderived from without; and to admit this is to admit that it is derived\nfrom the higher animals.\n\nThat there is some relationship between Gothic architecture and vegetal\nforms is generally admitted. The often-remarked similarity between a\ngroined nave and an avenue of trees with interlacing branches, shows\nthat the fact has forced itself on observation. It is not only in\nthis, however, that the kinship is seen. It is seen still better in\nthe essential characteristic of Gothic; namely, what is termed its\n_aspiring_ tendency. That predominance of vertical lines which so\nstrongly distinguishes Gothic from other styles, is the most marked\npeculiarity of trees, when compared with animals or rocks. A tall\nGothic tower, with its elongated apertures and clusters of thin\nprojections running from bottom to top, suggests a vague idea of growth.\n\nOf the alleged connexion between inorganic forms and the wholly\nirregular and the castellated styles of building, we have, I think,\nsome proof in the fact that when an edifice is irregular, the _more_\nirregular it is the more it pleases us. I see no way of accounting for\nthis fact, save by supposing that the greater the irregularity the more\nstrongly are we reminded of the inorganic forms typified, and the more\nvividly are aroused the agreeable ideas of rugged and romantic scenery\nassociated with those forms.\n\nFurther evidence of these relationships of styles of {378}\narchitecture to classes of natural objects, is supplied by the\nkinds of decoration they respectively present. The public buildings\nof Greece, while characterized in their outlines by the bi-lateral\nsymmetry seen in the higher animals, have their pediments and\nentablatures covered with sculptured men and beasts. Egyptian temples\nand Assyrian palaces, similarly symmetrical in their general plan, are\nsimilarly ornamented on their walls and at their doors. In Gothic,\nagain, with its grove-like ranges of clustered columns, we find rich\nfoliated ornaments abundantly employed. And accompanying the totally\nirregular, inorganic outlines of old castles, we see neither vegetal\nnor animal decorations. The bare, rock-like walls are surmounted by\nbattlements, consisting of almost plain blocks, which remind us of the\nprojections on the edge of a rugged cliff.\n\nBut perhaps the most significant fact is the harmony observable between\neach type of architecture and the scenes in which it is indigenous.\nFor what is the explanation of this harmony, unless it be that\nthe predominant character of surrounding things has, in some way,\ndetermined the mode of building adopted?\n\nThat the harmony exists is clear. Equally in the cases of Egypt,\nAssyria, Greece, and Rome, town life preceded the construction of the\nsymmetrical buildings that have come down to us. And town life is one\nin which, as already observed, the majority of familiar objects are\nsymmetrical. We habitually feel the naturalness of this association.\nAmid the fields, a formal house, with a central door flanked by equal\nnumbers of windows to right and left, strikes us as unrural\u2014looks as\nthough transplanted from a street; and we cannot look at one of those\nstuccoed villas, with mock-windows arranged to balance the real ones,\nwithout being reminded of the suburban residence of a retired tradesman.\n\nIn styles indigenous in the country, we not only find {379} the\ngeneral irregularity characteristic of surrounding things, but we may\ntrace some kinship between each kind of irregularity and the local\ncircumstances. We see the broken rocky masses amid which castles are\noften placed, mirrored in their stern, inorganic forms. In abbeys, and\nsuch-like buildings, which are commonly found in sheltered districts,\nwe find no such violent dislocations of masses and outlines; and the\nnakedness appropriate to the fortress is replaced by decorations\nreflecting the neighbouring woods. Between a Swiss cottage and a Swiss\nview there is an evident relationship. The angular roof, so bold and\nso disproportionately large when compared to other roofs, reminds one\nof the adjacent mountain peaks; and the broad overhanging eaves have\na sweep and inclination like those of the lower branches of a pine\ntree. Consider, too, the apparent kinship between the flat roofs that\nprevail in Eastern cities, interspersed with occasional minarets, and\nthe plains that commonly surround them, dotted here and there by palm\ntrees. Contemplate a picture of one of these places, and you are struck\nby the predominance of horizontal lines, and their harmony with the\nwide stretch of the landscape.\n\nThat the congruity here pointed out should hold in every case must\nnot be expected. The Pyramids, for example, do not seem to come\nunder this generalization. Their repeated horizontal lines do indeed\nconform to the flatness of the neighbouring desert; but their general\ncontour seems to have no adjacent analogue. Considering, however,\nthat migrating races, carrying their architectural systems with them,\nwould naturally produce buildings having no relationship to their new\nlocalities; and that it is not always possible to distinguish styles\nwhich are indigenous, from those which are naturalized; numerous\nanomalies must be looked for.\n\nThe general idea above illustrated will perhaps be somewhat\nmisinterpreted. Possibly some will take the {380} proposition to\nbe that men _intentionally_ gave to their buildings the leading\ncharacteristics of neighbouring objects. But this is not what is\nmeant. I do not suppose that they did so in times past, any more\nthan they do so now. The hypothesis is, that in their choice of\nforms men are unconsciously influenced by the forms encircling them.\nThat flat-roofed, symmetrical architecture should have originated\nin the East, among pastoral tribes surrounded by their herds and by\nwide plains, seems to imply that the builders were swayed by the\nhorizontality and symmetry to which they were habituated. And the\nharmony which we have found to exist in other cases between indigenous\nstyles and their localities, implies the general action of like\ninfluences. Indeed, on considering the matter psychologically, I do\nnot see how it could well be otherwise. For as all conceptions must be\nmade up of images, and parts of images, received through the senses;\nand as imagination will most readily run in the direction of habitual\nperceptions; it follows that the characteristic which predominates in\nhabitual perceptions must impress itself on designs.\n\n\n\n\n{381}\n\nGRACEFULNESS.\n\n\n[_First published in_ The Leader _for December 25, 1852._]\n\nWe do not ascribe gracefulness to cart-horses, tortoises, and\nhippopotami, in all of which the powers of movement are relatively\ninferior; but we ascribe it to greyhounds, antelopes, race-horses, all\nof which have highly efficient locomotive organs. What, then, is this\ndistinctive peculiarity of structure and action which we call Grace?\n\nOne night while watching a dancer, and inwardly condemning her _tours\nde force_ as barbarisms which would be hissed, were not people such\ncowards as always to applaud what they think it the fashion to applaud,\nI remarked that the truly graceful motions occasionally introduced,\nwere those performed with comparatively little effort. After calling to\nmind sundry confirmatory facts, I presently concluded that grace, as\napplied to motion, describes motion that is effected with economy of\nforce; grace, as applied to animal forms, describes forms capable of\nthis economy; grace, as applied to postures, describes postures which\nmay be maintained with this economy; and grace, as applied to inanimate\nobjects, describes such as exhibit certain analogies to these attitudes\nand forms.\n\nThat this generalization, if not the whole truth, contains at least a\nlarge part of it, will, I think, become obvious, on {382} considering\nhow habitually we couple the words _easy_ and _graceful_; and still\nmore, on calling to mind some of the facts on which this association\nis based. The attitude of a soldier, drawing himself bolt upright when\nhis serjeant shouts \u201cattention,\u201d is more remote from gracefulness than\nwhen he relaxes at the words \u201cstand at ease.\u201d The _gauche_ visitor\nsitting stiffly on the edge of his chair, and his self-possessed host,\nwhose limbs and body dispose themselves as convenience dictates, are\ncontrasts as much in effort as in elegance. When standing, we commonly\neconomise power by throwing the weight chiefly on one leg, which we\nstraighten to make it serve as a column, while we relax the other; and\nto the same end, we allow the head to lean somewhat on one side. Both\nthese attitudes are imitated in sculpture as elements of grace.\n\nTurning from attitudes to movements, current remarks will be found to\nimply the same relationship. No one praises as graceful, a walk that\nis irregular or jerking, and so displays waste of power; no one sees\nany beauty in the waddle of a fat man, or the trembling steps of an\ninvalid, in both of which effort is visible. But the style of walking\nwe admire is moderate in velocity, perfectly rhythmical, unaccompanied\nby violent swinging of the arms, and giving us the impression that\nthere is no conscious exertion, while there is no force thrown away.\nIn dancing, again, the prevailing difficulty\u2014the proper disposal of\nthe arms\u2014well illustrates the same truth. Those who fail in overcoming\nthis difficulty give the spectator the impression that their arms are\na trouble to them; they are held stiffly in some meaningless attitude,\nat an obvious expense of power; they are checked from swinging in the\ndirections in which they would naturally swing; or they are so moved\nthat, instead of helping to maintain the equilibrium, they endanger it.\nA good dancer, on the contrary, makes us feel that, so far from the\narms being in the way, they are of great use. Each {383} motion of\nthem, while it seems naturally to result from a previous motion of the\nbody, is turned to some advantage. We perceive that it has facilitated\ninstead of hindered the general action; or, in other words\u2014that an\neconomy of effort has been achieved. Any one wishing to distinctly\nrealize this fact, may readily do so by studying the action of the\narms in walking. Let him place his arms close to his sides, and there\nkeep them, while walking with some rapidity. He will unavoidably fall\ninto a backward and forward motion of the shoulders, of a wriggling,\nungraceful character. After persevering in this for a space, until he\nfinds that the action is not only ungraceful but fatiguing, let him\nallow his arms to swing as usual. The wriggling of the shoulders will\ncease; the body will move equably forward; and comparative ease will\nbe felt. On analyzing this fact, he may perceive that the backward\nmotion of each arm is simultaneous with the forward motion of the\ncorresponding leg. If he will attend to his muscular sensations, he\nwill find that this backward swing of the arm is a counterbalance to\nthe forward swing of the leg; and that it is easier to produce this\ncounterbalance by moving the arm than by contorting the body, as he\notherwise must do.[55]\n\nThe action of the arms in walking being thus understood, it will be\nmanifest that the graceful employment of them in dancing is simply a\ncomplication of the same thing; and that a good dancer is one having so\nacute a muscular perception as at once to feel in what direction the\narms {384} should be moved to counterbalance any motion of the body or\nlegs.\n\nThis connexion between gracefulness and economy of force, will be\nmost clearly recognized by those who skate. They will remember that\nall early attempts, and especially the first timid experiments\nin figure-skating, are alike awkward and fatiguing; and that the\nacquirement of skill is also the acquirement of ease. The requisite\nconfidence, and a due command of the feet having been obtained, those\ntwistings of the trunk and gyrations of the arms, previously used to\nmaintain the balance, are found needless. The body is allowed to follow\nwithout control the impulse given to it; the arms to swing where they\nwill; and it is clearly felt that the graceful way of performing any\nevolution is the way that costs least effort. Spectators can scarcely\nfail to see the same fact, if they look for it.\n\nThe reference to skating suggests that graceful motion might be defined\nas motion in curved lines. Certainly, straight and zig-zag movements\nare excluded from the conception. The sudden stoppages which angular\nmovements imply, are its antithesis; for a leading trait of grace is\ncontinuity, flowingness. It will be found, however, that this is merely\nanother aspect of the same truth; and that motion in curved lines is\neconomical motion. Given certain successive positions to be assumed by\na limb, then if it be moved in a straight line to the first of these\npositions, suddenly arrested, and then moved in another direction\nstraight to the second position, and so on, it is clear that at each\narrest, the momentum previously given to the limb must be destroyed at\na certain cost of force, {385} and a new momentum given to it at a\nfurther cost of force; whereas, if, instead of arresting the limb at\nits first position, its motion be allowed to continue, and a lateral\nforce be impressed to make it diverge towards the second position, a\ncurvilinear motion is the necessary result; and by making use of the\noriginal momentum, force is economized.\n\nIf the truth of these conclusions respecting graceful movements be\nadmitted, it cannot, I think, be doubted, that graceful form is that\nkind of form which implies relatively small effort required for\nself-support, and relatively small effort required for movement. Were\nit otherwise, there would arise the incongruity that graceful form\nwould either not be associated at all with graceful movement, or that\nthe one would habitually occur in the absence of the other; both which\nalternatives being at variance with our experience, we must conclude\nthat there exists the relationship indicated. Any one hesitating to\nadmit this, will, I think, do so no longer on remembering that the\nanimals which we consider graceful, are those so slight in build as\nnot to be burdened by their own weight, and those noted for fleetness\nand agility; while those we class as ungraceful, are those which are\nalike cumbrous and have the faculty of locomotion but little developed.\nIn the case of the greyhound, especially, we see that the particular\nmodification of the canine type in which economy of weight is the most\nconspicuous, and in which the facility of muscular motion has been\nbrought to the greatest perfection, is the one which we call most\ngraceful.\n\nHow trees and inanimate objects should come to have this epithet\napplied to them, seems less obvious. But remembrance of the fact\nthat we commonly, and perhaps unavoidably, regard all objects under\na certain anthropomorphic aspect, will help us to understand it. The\nstiff branch of an oak tree standing out at right angles to the trunk,\ngives us a vague notion of great force expended to {386} keep it in\nthat position; and we call it ungraceful, under the same feeling that\nwe call the holding out an arm at right angles to the body ungraceful.\nConversely, the lax drooping boughs of a weeping-willow are vaguely\nassociated with limbs in attitudes requiring little effort to maintain\nthem; and the term graceful, by which we describe these, we apply by\nmetaphor to the boughs of the willow.\n\nI may as well here venture the hypothesis, that the idea of Grace as\ndisplayed by other beings, has its subjective basis in Sympathy. The\nsame faculty which makes us shudder on seeing another in danger\u2014which\nsometimes causes motions of our own limbs on seeing another struggle\nor fall, gives us a vague participation in all the muscular sensations\nwhich those around us are experiencing. When their motions are violent\nor awkward, we feel in a slight degree the disagreeable sensations\nwhich we should have were they our own. When they are easy, we\nsympathize with the pleasant sensations they imply in those exhibiting\nthem.\n\n\nENDNOTE TO _GRACEFULNESS_.\n\n[55] A parallel fact, further elucidating this, is supplied by a\nlocomotive engine. On looking at the driving wheel, there will be\nfound, besides the boss to which the connecting rod is attached, a\ncorresponding mass of metal on the opposite side of the wheel, and\nequidistant from the centre; or, if the engine be one having inside\ncylinders, then, on looking between the spokes of the driving-wheel,\nit will be seen that against each crank is a block of iron, similar\nto it in size, but projecting from the axle in the reverse direction.\nEvidently, being placed on opposite sides of the centre of motion, each\ncrank and its counterbalance move in opposite directions relatively to\nthe axle; and by so doing, neutralize each other\u2019s perturbing effects,\nand permit a smooth rotation. This relationship which exists between\nthe motions of the counterbalance and the crank, is analogous to that\nwhich exists between the motions of the arms and legs in walking; and\nin the early days of railway-locomotion, before these counterbalance\nweights were used, locomotive driving-wheels were subject to violent\noscillations, analogous to those jerkings of the shoulders which arise\nwhen we walk fast without moving our arms.\n\n\n\n\n{387}\n\nPERSONAL BEAUTY.\n\n\n[_First published in_ The Leader _for April 15, and May 13, 1854._]\n\n\nIt is a common opinion that beauty of character and beauty of aspect\nare unrelated. I have never been able to reconcile myself to this\nopinion. Indeed, even those who hold it do so in an incomplete sense;\nfor notwithstanding their theory they continue to manifest surprise\nwhen they find a mean deed committed by one of noble countenance\u2014a fact\nimplying that underneath their professed induction lies a still living\nconviction at variance with it.\n\nWhence this conviction? How is it that a belief in the connexion\nbetween worth and beauty primarily exists in all? It cannot be innate.\nMust it not, then, be from early experiences? And must it not be that\nin those who continue to believe in this connexion, spite of their\nreasonings, the early and wide experiences outweigh the later and\nexceptional ones?\n\nThose who do not admit the relationship between mental and facial\nbeauty, usually remark that the true connexion is between character\nand expression. While they doubt, or rather deny, that the _permanent_\nforms of the features are {388} in any way indices of the forms of\nthe mind, they assert that the _transitory_ forms of the features are\nsuch indices. These positions seem scarcely consistent. For may we\nnot say that the transitory forms, by perpetual repetition, register\nthemselves on the face, and _produce_ permanent forms? Does not an\nhabitual frown by-and-by leave ineffaceable marks on the brow? Is not\na chronic scornfulness presently followed by a modified set in the\nangles of the mouth? Does not that compression of the lips significant\nof great determination, often stereotype itself; and so give a changed\nform to the lower part of the face? And if there be any truth in the\ndoctrine of hereditary transmission, must there not be a tendency to\nthe re-appearance of these modifications as new types of feature in the\noffspring? In brief, may we not say that _expression is feature in the\nmaking_; and that if expression means something, the form of feature\nproduced by it means something?\n\nPossibly it will be urged, in reply, that changes of expression affect\nonly the muscles and skin of the face; that the permanent marks they\nproduce can extend but to these; that, nevertheless, the beauty of\na face is mainly dependent upon the form of its bony framework;\nthat hence, in this chief respect, there cannot take place such\nmodifications as those described; and that, therefore, the relationship\nof aspect to character, while it may hold in the details, does not hold\nin the generals.\n\nThe rejoinder is, that the framework of the face _is_ modified by\nmodifications in the tissues which cover it. It is an established\ndoctrine in physiology, that throughout the skeleton the greater\nor less development of bones is dependent on the greater or less\ndevelopment of the attached muscles; that is, on the exercise of them.\nHence, permanent changes in the muscular adjustments of the face will\nbe followed by permanent changes in its osseous structure.\n\nNot to dwell in general statements, however, let me cite cases in which\nthe connexion between organic ugliness and {389} mental inferiority,\nand the converse connexion between organic beauty and comparative\nperfection of mind, are distinctly traceable.\n\nIt will be admitted that the projecting jaw, characteristic of the\nlower human races, is a facial defect\u2014is a trait which no sculptor\nwould give to an ideal bust. At the same time, it is a fact that\nprominence of jaw is associated in the mammalia generally with\ncomparative lack of intelligence. This relationship, it is true, does\nnot hold uniformly. It is not a direct but an indirect one; and is thus\nliable to be disturbed. Nevertheless, it holds among the higher tribes;\nand on inquiry we shall see why it holds. In conformity with the law\nthat organs develop in proportion as they are exercised, the jaws are\nrelatively large where the demands made on them are great; and diminish\nin size as their functions become less numerous and less onerous. Now,\nin the lower mammals the jaws are the sole organs of manipulation\u2014are\nused not only for mastication, but for seizing, carrying, gnawing, and,\nindeed, for everything save locomotion, which is the solitary office\nperformed by the limbs. Advancing upwards, we find that the fore-limbs\nbegin to aid the jaws, and gradually to relieve them of part of their\nduties. Some creatures use them for burrowing; some, as the felines,\nfor striking; many, to keep steady the prey they are tearing; and\nwhen we arrive at the monkeys, whose fore-limbs possess such power\nof prehension that objects can not only be seized, but carried and\npulled to pieces by them, we see that the jaws have fewer functions.\nAccompanying this series of changes, we see a double change in the form\nof the head. The increased complexity of the limbs, the greater variety\nof actions they perform, and the more numerous perceptions they give,\nimply a greater development of the brain and of its bony envelope. At\nthe same time, the size of the jaws has diminished in correspondence\nwith the diminution of their functions. And by this simultaneous\nprotrusion of the upper part of the cranium {390} and recession of its\nlower part, what is called the _facial angle_ has increased.\n\nWell, these co-ordinate changes in functions and forms have continued\nduring the civilization of the human race. On contrasting the European\nand the Papuan, we see that what the one cuts in two with knife and\nfork, the other tears with his jaws; what the one softens by cooking,\nthe other eats in its hard, raw state; the bones which the one\nutilises by stewing, the other gnaws; and for sundry of the mechanical\nmanipulations which the one has tools for, the other uses his teeth.\nFrom the Bushman state upwards, there has been a gradual increase\nin the complexity of our appliances. We not only use our hands to\nsave our jaws, but we make implements to save our hands; and in our\nengine-factories may be found implements for the making of implements.\nThis progression in the arts of life has had intellectual progression\nfor its necessary correlative. Each new complication requires a new\nincrement of intelligence for its production; and the daily use of\nit develops the intelligence still further. Thus that simultaneous\nprotrusion of the brain and recession of the jaws, which among lower\nanimals has accompanied increase of skill and sagacity, has continued\nduring the advance of Humanity from barbarism to civilization; and has\nbeen, throughout, the result of a discipline involving increase of\nmental power. And so it becomes manifest that there exists an organic\nrelationship between that protuberance of the jaws which we consider\nugly, and a certain inferiority of nature.\n\nAgain, that lateral jutting-out of the cheek-bones, which similarly\ncharacterizes the lower races of men, and which is similarly thought\nby us a detraction from beauty, is similarly related to lower habits\nand lower intelligence. The chief agents in closing the jaws are the\ntemporal muscles; and these are consequently the chief active agents\nin biting and mastication. In proportion as the jaws have much work,\nand correspondingly large size, must the temporal muscles {391} be\nmassive. But the temporal muscles pass between the skull and the\nzygomatic arches, or lateral parts of the cheek-bones. Consequently,\nwhere the temporal muscles are massive, the spaces between the\nzygomatic arches and the skull must be great; and the lateral\nprojection of the zygomatic arches great also, as we see it in the\nuncivilized and partially civilized races. Like large jaws, therefore,\nof which it is an accompaniment, excessive size of the cheek-bones is\nboth an ugliness and an index of imperfection.\n\nCertain other defects of feature, between which and mental defects it\nis not thus easy to trace the connexion, may yet be fairly presumed\nto have such connexion in virtue of their constant co-existence with\nthe foregoing ones: alike in the uncivilized races and in the young\nof the civilized races. Peculiarities of face which we find regularly\nassociated with those just shown to be significant of intellectual\ninferiority, and which like them disappear as barbarism grows into\ncivilization, may reasonably be concluded to have like them a\npsychological meaning. Thus is it with depression of the bridge of the\nnose; which is a characteristic both of barbarians and of our babes,\npossessed by them in common with the higher quadrumana. Thus, also,\nis it with that forward opening of the nostrils, which renders them\nconspicuous in a front view of the face\u2014a trait alike of infants,\nsavages, and apes. And the same may be said of wide-spread al\u00e6 to\nthe nose, of great width between the eyes, of long mouth, of large\nmouth,\u2014indeed of all those leading peculiarities of feature which are\nby general consent called ugly.\n\nAnd then mark how, conversely, the type of face usually admitted to\nbe the most beautiful, is one that possesses opposite peculiarities.\nIn the ideal Greek head, the forehead projects so much, and the jaws\nrecede so much, as to render the facial angle larger than we ever find\nit in fact. The cheek-bones are so small as scarcely to be traceable.\nThe bridge of the nose is so high as to be almost or quite in {392}\na line with the forehead. The al\u00e6 of the nose join the face with but\nlittle obliquity. In the front view the nostrils are almost invisible.\nThe mouth is small, and the upper lip short and deeply concave. The\nouter angles of the eyes, instead of keeping the horizontal line, as\nis usual, or being directed upwards, as in the Mongolian type, are\ndirected slightly downwards. And the form of the brow indicates an\nunusually large frontal sinus\u2014a characteristic entirely absent in\nchildren, in the lowest of the human races, and in the allied genera of\nthe _primates_.\n\nIf, then, recession of the forehead, protuberance of the jaws, and\nlargeness of the cheek-bones, three leading elements of ugliness,\nare demonstrably indicative of mental inferiority\u2014if such other\nfacial defects as great width between the eyes, flatness of the nose,\nspreading of its al\u00e6, frontward opening of the nostrils, length of\nthe mouth, and largeness of the lips, are habitually associated with\nthese, and disappear along with them as intelligence increases, both\nin the race and in the individual; is it not a fair inference that\nall such faulty traits of feature signify deficiencies of mind? If,\nfurther, our ideal of human beauty is characterized not simply by the\nabsence of these traits, but by the presence of opposite ones\u2014if this\nideal, as found in sculptures of the Greek gods, has been used to\nrepresent superhuman power and intelligence\u2014and if the race so using\nit were themselves distinguished by a mental superiority, which, if\nwe consider their disadvantages, produced results unparalleled; have\nwe not yet stronger reasons for concluding that the chief components\nof beauty and ugliness are severally connected with perfection and\nimperfection of mental nature? And when, lastly, we remember that\nthe variations of feature constituting expression are confessedly\nsignificant of character\u2014when we remember that these tend by repetition\nto organize themselves, to affect not only the skin and muscles\nbut the bones of the face, and to be transmitted to offspring\u2014when\nwe thus find that there is a {393} psychological meaning alike in\neach passing adjustment of the features, in the marks that habitual\nadjustments leave, in the marks inherited from ancestors, and in\nthose main outlines of the facial bones and integuments indicating\nthe type or race; are we not almost forced to the conclusion that all\nforms of feature are related to forms of mind, and that we consider\nthem admirable or otherwise according as the traits of nature they\nimply are admirable or otherwise? In the extremes the relationship is\ndemonstrable. That transitory aspects of face accompany transitory\nmental states, and that we consider these aspects ugly or beautiful\naccording as the mental states they accompany are ugly or beautiful,\nno one doubts. That those permanent and most marked aspects of face\ndependent on the bony framework, accompany those permanent and\nmost marked mental states which express themselves in barbarism\nand civilization; and that we consider as beautiful those which\naccompany mental superiority, and as ugly those which accompany mental\ninferiority, is equally certain. And if this connexion unquestionably\nholds in the extremes\u2014if, as judged by average facts, and by our\nhalf-instinctive convictions, it also holds more or less visibly in\nintermediate cases, it becomes an almost irresistible induction, that\nthe aspects which please us are the outward correlatives of inward\nperfections, while the aspects which displease us are the outward\ncorrelatives of inward imperfections.\n\nI am quite aware that when tested in detail this induction seems not\nto be borne out. I know that there are often grand natures behind\nplain faces; and that fine countenances frequently hide small souls.\nBut these anomalies do not destroy the general truth of the law, any\nmore than the perturbations of planets destroy the general ellipticity\nof their orbits. Some of them, indeed, may be readily accounted for.\nThere are many faces spoiled by the misproportion of features that are\nin themselves good; others, by defects of skin, which, though they\nindicate defects of {394} visceral constitution, have no relationship\nto the higher parts of the nature. Moreover the facts that have been\nassigned afford reason for thinking that the leading elements of facial\nbeauty are not directly associated with _moral_ characteristics, but\nwith _intellectual_ ones\u2014are the results of long-continued civilized\nhabits, long cessation of domestic barbarism, long culture of the\nmanipulative powers; and so may co-exist with emotional traits not at\nall admirable. It is true that the highest intellectual manifestations\nimply a good balance of the higher feelings; but it is also true that\ngreat quickness, great sagacity in ordinary affairs, great practical\nskill, can be possessed without these, and very frequently are so. The\nprevalent beauty of the Italians, co-existing though it does with a\nlow moral state, becomes, on this hypothesis, reconcileable with the\ngeneral induction; as do also many of the anomalies we see around us.\n\nThere is, however, a more satisfactory explanation to be offered than\nany of these\u2014an explanation which I think renders it possible to admit\nthe seeming contradictions which the detailed facts present, and yet\nto hold by the theory. But as more space will be required for showing\nthis than can here be spared, I must defer going further until next\nweek. In the meantime, my own conviction may be expressed in a formula\nin which I have often before uttered it:\u2014The saying that beauty is but\nskin-deep, is but a skin-deep saying.\n\n\nII.\n\nAll the civilized races, and probably also the uncivilized ones, are\nof mixed origin; and, as a consequence, have physical and mental\nconstitutions in which are mingled several aboriginal constitutions\nmore or less differing from each other. This heterogeneity of\nconstitution seems to me the chief cause of the incongruities between\naspect and nature which we daily meet with. Given a pure race, subject\nto constant conditions of climate, food, and habits {395} of life,\nand there is reason to believe that between external appearance and\ninternal structure there will be a constant connexion. Unite this race\nwith another equally pure, but adapted to different conditions and\nhaving a correspondingly different physique, face, and mind, and there\nwill occur in the descendants, not a homogeneous mean between the two\nconstitutions, but a seemingly irregular combination of characteristics\nof the one with characteristics of the other\u2014one feature traceable to\nthis race, a second to that, and a third uniting the attributes of\nboth; while in disposition and intellect there will be found a like\nmedley of the two originals.\n\nThe fact that the forms and qualities of any offspring are not a mean\nbetween the forms and qualities of its parents, but a mixture of\nthem, is illustrated in every family. The features and peculiarities\nof a child are separately referred by observers to father and mother\nrespectively\u2014nose and mouth to this side; colour of the hair and eyes\nto that\u2014this moral peculiarity to the first; this intellectual one to\nthe second\u2014and so with contour and idiosyncrasies of body. Manifestly\nif each organ or faculty in a child was an average of the two\ndevelopments of such organ or faculty in the parents, it would follow\nthat all brothers and sisters should be alike; or should, at any rate,\ndiffer no more than their parents differed from year to year. So far\nhowever, from finding this to be the case, we find not only that great\nirregularities are produced by mixture of traits, but that there is no\nconstancy in the mode of mixture, or the extent of variation produced\nby it.\n\nThis imperfect union of parental constitutions in the constitutions of\noffspring, is still more clearly illustrated by the re-appearance of\npeculiarities traceable to bygone generations. Forms, dispositions,\nand diseases, possessed by distant progenitors, habitually come out\nfrom time to time in descendants. Some single feature, or some solitary\ntendency, will again and again show itself, after being apparently\nlost. It is notoriously thus with gout, scrofula, {396} and insanity.\nOn some of the monumental brasses in our old churches are engraved\nheads having traits still persistent in the same families. Wherever,\nas in portrait galleries, a register of ancestral faces has been kept,\nthe same fact is more or less apparent. The pertinacity with which\nparticular characteristics re-produce themselves is well exemplified\nin America, where traces of negro blood can be detected in the finger\nnails, when no longer visible in the complexion. Among breeders of\nanimals it is well known that, after several generations in which no\nvisible modifications were traceable, the effects of a cross will\nsuddenly make their appearance. In all which facts we see the general\ntruth that an organism produced from two organisms constitutionally\ndifferent, is not a homogeneous mean; but is made up of components,\ntaken in variable ways and proportions from the originals.\n\nIn a recent number of the _Quarterly Journal of the Agricultural\nSociety_ were published some facts respecting the mixture of French\nand English races of sheep, bearing collaterally on this point. Sundry\nattempts had been made to improve the poor French breeds by our fine\nEnglish ones. For a long time these attempts failed. The hybrids bore\nno trace of their English male ancestry; but were as dwarfed and\npoverty-stricken as their French dams. Eventually the cause of failure\nwas found to lie in the relative heterogeneity and homogeneity of the\ntwo constitutions. The superior English sheep were of mixed race; the\nFrench sheep, though inferior, were of pure race; and the compound,\nimperfectly co-ordinated constitution of the one could not maintain\nitself against the simple and completely balanced constitution of the\nother. This, at first an hypothesis, was presently demonstrated. French\nsheep of mixed constitution having been obtained by uniting two of the\npure French breeds, it was found that these hybrid French sheep, when\nunited with the English ones, produced a cross in which the English\ncharacteristics were duly {397} displayed. Now, this inability of a\nmixed constitution to stand its ground against an unmixed one, quite\naccords with the above induction. An unmixed constitution is one in\nwhich all the organs are exactly fitted to each other\u2014are perfectly\nbalanced: the system as a whole, is in stable equilibrium. A mixed\nconstitution, on the contrary, being made up of organs belonging to\ntwo separate sets, cannot have them in exact fitness\u2014cannot have them\nperfectly balanced; and a system in comparatively unstable equilibrium\nresults. But in proportion to the stability of the equilibrium will be\nthe power to resist disturbing forces. Hence, when two constitutions,\nin stable and unstable equilibrium respectively, become disturbing\nforces to each other, the unstable one will be overthrown, and the\nstable one will assert itself unchanged.\n\nThe imperfect co-ordination of parts in a mixed constitution, and this\nconsequent instability of its equilibrium, are intimately connected\nwith the vexed question of genera, species, and varieties; and, with a\nview partly to the intrinsic interest of this question, and partly to\nthe further elucidation of the topic in hand, I must again digress.\n\nThe current physiological test of distinct species is the production\nof a non-prolific hybrid. The ability of the offspring to reproduce\nitself is held to indicate that its parents are of the same species,\nhowever widely they may differ in appearance; and its inability\nto do this is taken as proof that, nearly allied as its parents\nmay seem, they are distinct in kind. Of late, however, facts have\nbeen accumulating that tend more and more to throw doubt on this\ngeneralization. Cattle-breeders have established it as a general\nfact, that the offspring of two different breeds of sheep or oxen\ndwindle away in a few generations if allied with themselves; and\nthat a good result can be obtained only by mixing them with one or\nother of the original breeds\u2014a fact implying that what is true of\nso-called species, is, under a modified form, true of varieties also.\n{398} The same phenomena are observable in the mixtures of different\nraces of men. They, too, it is alleged, cannot maintain themselves as\nseparate varieties; but die out unless there is intermarriage with\nthe originals. In brief, it seems that the hybrids produced from two\ndistinct races of organisms may die out in the first, second, third,\nfourth, fifth, &c., generation, according as the constitutional\ndifference of the races is greater or less. Now, the experience of\nthe French sheep-breeders, above-quoted, suggests a rationale of\nthese various results. For if it be true that an organism produced\nby two unlike organisms is not a mean between them, but a mixture of\nparts of the one with parts of the other\u2014if it be true that these\nparts belonging to two different sets are of necessity imperfectly\nco-ordinated; then it becomes manifest that in proportion as the\ndifference between the parent organisms is greater or less, the\ndefects of co-ordination in the offspring will be greater or less.\nWhence it follows that, according to the degree of organic incongruity\nbetween the parents, we may have every gradation in the offspring,\nfrom a combination of parts so incongruous that it will not work at\nall, up to a combination complete enough to subsist permanently as a\nrace. And this is just what we find in fact. Between organisms widely\ndiffering in character, no intermediate organism is possible. When\nthe difference is less, a non-prolific hybrid is produced\u2014an organism\nso ill co-ordinated as to be capable only of incomplete life. When\nthe difference is still less, there results an organism capable of\nreproducing itself; but not of bequeathing to its offspring complete\nconstitutions. And as the degrees of difference are further diminished,\nthe incompleteness of constitution is longer and longer in making its\nappearance; until we come to those varieties of the same species which\ndiffer so slightly that their offspring are as permanent as themselves.\nEven in these, however, the organic equilibrium seems less perfect;\nas is illustrated {399} in the case I have quoted. And in connexion\nwith this inference, it would be interesting to inquire whether pure\nconstitutions are not superior to mixed ones, in their power of\nmaintaining the balance of vital functions under disturbing conditions.\nIs it not a fact, that the pure breeds are _hardier_ than the mixed\nones? Are not the mixed ones, though superior in size, less capable of\nresisting unfavourable influences\u2014extremes of temperature, bad food,\n&c.? And is not the like true of mankind?\n\nReturning to the topic in hand, it is manifest that these facts\nand reasonings serve further to enforce the general truth, that\nthe offspring of two organisms not identical in constitution is a\nheterogeneous mixture of the two, and not a homogeneous mean between\nthem.\n\nIf, then, bearing in mind this truth, we remember the composite\ncharacter of the civilized races\u2014the mingling in ourselves, for\nexample, of Celt, Saxon, Norman, Dane, with sprinklings of other\ntribes; if we consider the complications of constitution that have\narisen from the unions of these, not in any uniform manner, but with\nutter irregularity; and if we recollect that the incongruities thus\nproduced pervade the whole nature, mental and bodily\u2014nervous tissue\nand other tissues; we shall see that there must exist in all of us an\nimperfect correspondence between parts of the organism that are really\nrelated; and that as one manifestation of this, there must be more or\nless of discrepancy between the features and those parts of the nervous\nsystem with which they have a physiological connexion.\n\nIf this be so, then the difficulties which stand in the way of the\nbelief that beauty of character is related to beauty of face are\nconsiderably diminished. It becomes possible to admit that plainness\nmay co-exist with nobility of nature, and fine features with baseness;\nand yet to hold that mental and facial perfection are fundamentally\nconnected, and will, when the present causes of incongruity have worked\nthemselves out, be ever found united.\n\n\n\n\n{400}\n\nTHE ORIGIN AND FUNCTION OF MUSIC.\n\n\n[_First published in_ Fraser\u2019s Magazine _for October 1857._]\n\nWhen Carlo, standing, chained to his kennel, sees his master in the\ndistance, a slight motion of the tail indicates his but faint hope that\nhe is about to be let out. A much more decided wagging of the tail,\npassing by-and-by into lateral undulations of the body, follows his\nmaster\u2019s nearer approach. When hands are laid on his collar, and he\nknows that he is really to have an outing, his jumping and wriggling\nare such that it is by no means easy to loose his fastenings. And when\nhe finds himself actually free, his joy expends itself in bounds, in\npirouettes, and in scourings hither and thither at the top of his\nspeed. Puss, too, by erecting her tail, and by every time raising her\nback to meet the caressing hand of her mistress, similarly expresses\nher gratification by certain muscular actions; as likewise do the\nparrot by awkward dancings on his perch, and the canary by hopping and\nfluttering about his cage with unwonted rapidity. Under emotions of an\nopposite kind, animals equally display muscular excitement. The enraged\nlion lashes his sides with his tail, knits his brows, protrudes his\nclaws. The cat sets up her back; the dog retracts his upper lip; the\nhorse throws back his ears. And in the struggles of creatures in pain,\nwe see that a like relation {401} holds between excitement of the\nmuscles and excitement of the nerves of sensation.\n\nIn ourselves, distinguished from lower creatures by feelings alike more\npowerful and more varied, parallel facts are at once more conspicuous\nand more numerous. Let us look at them in groups. We shall find that\npleasurable sensations and painful sensations, pleasurable emotions\nand painful emotions, all tend to produce active demonstrations in\nproportion to their intensity.\n\nIn children, and even in adults who are not restrained by regard for\nappearances, a highly agreeable taste is followed by a smacking of the\nlips. An infant will laugh and bound in its nurse\u2019s arms at the sight\nof a brilliant colour or the hearing of a new sound. People are apt to\nbeat time with head or feet to music which particularly pleases them.\nIn a sensitive person an agreeable perfume will produce a smile; and\nsmiles will be seen on the faces of a crowd gazing at some splendid\nburst of fireworks. Even the pleasant sensation of warmth felt on\ngetting to the fireside out of a winter\u2019s storm, will similarly express\nitself in the face.\n\nPainful sensations, being mostly far more intense than pleasurable\nones, cause muscular actions of much more decided kinds. A sudden\ntwinge produces a convulsive start of the whole body. A pain less\nviolent, but continuous, is accompanied by a knitting of the brows, a\nsetting of the teeth or biting of the lip, and a contraction of the\nfeatures generally. Under a persistent pain of a severer kind, other\nmuscular actions are added: the body is swayed to and fro; the hands\nclench anything they can lay hold of; and should the agony rise still\nhigher, the sufferer rolls about on the floor almost convulsed.\n\nThough more varied, the natural language of the pleasurable emotions\ncomes within the same generalization. A smile, which is the commonest\nexpression of gratified feeling, is a contraction of certain facial\nmuscles; and when the smile broadens into a laugh, we see a more\nviolent and {402} more general muscular excitement produced by an\nintenser gratification. Rubbing together of the hands, and that other\nmotion which Hood describes as the washing of \u201chands with invisible\nsoap in imperceptible water,\u201d have like implications. Children\nmay often be seen to \u201cjump for joy,\u201d Even in adults of excitable\ntemperament, an action approaching to it is sometimes witnessed. And\ndancing has all the world through been regarded as natural to an\nelevated state of minds. Many of the special emotions show themselves\nin special muscular actions. The gratification resulting from success,\nraises the head and gives firmness to the gait. A hearty grasp of the\nhand is currently taken as indicative of friendship. Under a gush of\naffection the mother clasps her child to her breast, feeling as though\nshe could squeeze it to death. And so in sundry other cases. Even in\nthat brightening of the eye with which good news is received we may\ntrace the same truth; for this sparkling appearance is due to an extra\ncontraction of the muscle which raises the eyelid, and so allows more\nlight to fall upon, and be reflected from, the wet surface of the\neyeball.\n\nThe bodily indications of painful emotion are equally numerous, and\nstill more vehement. Discontent is shown by raised eyebrows and\nwrinkled forehead; disgust by a curl of the lip, offence by a pout.\nThe impatient man beats a tattoo with his fingers on the table, swings\nhis pendant leg with increasing rapidity, gives needless pokings to\nthe fire, and presently paces with hasty strides about the room. In\ngreat grief there is wringing of the hands, and even tearing of the\nhair. An angry child stamps, or rolls on its back and kicks its heels\nin the air; and in manhood, anger, first showing itself in frowns, in\ndistended nostrils, in compressed lips, goes on to produce grinding of\nthe teeth, clenching of the fingers, blows of the fist on the table,\nand perhaps ends in a violent attack on the offending person, or in\nthrowing about and breaking the furniture. From {403} that pursing of\nthe mouth indicative of slight displeasure, up to the frantic struggles\nof the maniac, we find that mental irritation tends to vent itself in\nbodily activity.\n\nAll feelings, then\u2014sensations or emotions, pleasurable or painful\u2014have\nthis common characteristic, that they are muscular stimuli. Not\nforgetting the few apparently exceptional cases in which emotions\nexceeding a certain intensity produce prostration, we may set it down\nas a general law, that alike in man and animals, there is a direct\nconnexion between feeling and movement; the last growing more vehement\nas the first grows more intense. Were it allowable here to treat the\nmatter scientifically, we might trace this general law down to the\nprinciple known among physiologists as that of _reflex action_.[56]\nWithout doing this, however, the above numerous instances justify the\ngeneralization that every kind of mental excitement ends in excitement\nof the muscles; and that the two preserve a more or less constant ratio\nto each other.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\u201cBut what has all this to do with _The Origin and Function of Music_?\u201d\nasks the reader. Very much, as we shall presently see. All music is\noriginally vocal. All vocal sounds are produced by the agency of\ncertain muscles. These muscles, in common with those of the body at\nlarge, are excited to contraction by pleasurable and painful feelings.\nAnd therefore it is that feelings demonstrate themselves in sounds as\nwell as in movements. Therefore it is that Carlo barks as well as leaps\nwhen he is let out\u2014that puss purrs as well as erects her tail\u2014that the\ncanary chirps as well as flutters. Therefore it is that the angry lion\nroars while he lashes his sides, and the dog growls while he retracts\nhis lip. Therefore it is that the maimed animal not only struggles, but\nhowls. And it is from this cause that in human beings bodily suffering\nexpresses itself not only in {404} contortions, but in shrieks and\ngroans\u2014that in anger, and fear, and grief, the gesticulations are\naccompanied by shouts and screams\u2014that delightful sensations are\nfollowed by exclamations\u2014and that we hear screams of joy and shouts of\nexultation.\n\nWe have here, then, a principle underlying all vocal phenomena;\nincluding those of vocal music, and by consequence those of music in\ngeneral. The muscles that move the chest, larynx, and vocal chords,\ncontracting like other muscles in proportion to the intensity of the\nfeelings; every different contraction of these muscles involving,\nas it does, a different adjustment of the vocal organs; every\ndifferent adjustment of the vocal organs causing a change in the sound\nemitted;\u2014it follows that variations of voice are the physiological\nresults of variations of feeling. It follows that each inflection or\nmodulation is the natural outcome of some passing emotion or sensation;\nand it follows that the explanation of all kinds of vocal expression,\nmust be sought in this general relation between mental and muscular\nexcitements. Let us, then, see whether we cannot thus account for the\nchief peculiarities in the utterance of the feelings: grouping these\npeculiarities under the heads of _loudness_, _quality or timbre_,\n_pitch_, _intervals_, and _rate of variation_.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nBetween the lungs and the organs of voice, there is much the same\nrelation as between the bellows of an organ and its pipes. And as the\nloudness of the sound given out by an organ-pipe increases with the\nstrength of the blast from the bellows; so, other things equal, the\nloudness of a vocal sound increases with the strength of the blast\nfrom the lungs. But the expulsion of air from the lungs is effected by\ncertain muscles of the chest and abdomen. The force with which these\nmuscles contract, is proportionate to the intensity of the feeling\nexperienced. Hence, _a priori_, loud sounds will be the habitual\nresults of strong feelings. That they are so we have daily proof. The\npain which {405} if moderate, can be borne silently, causes outcries\nif it becomes extreme. While a slight vexation makes a child whimper,\na fit of passion calls forth a howl that disturbs the neighbourhood.\nWhen the voices in an adjacent room become unusually audible, we infer\nanger, or surprise, or joy. Loudness of applause is significant of\ngreat approbation; and with uproarious mirth we associate the idea of\nhigh enjoyment. Commencing with the silence of apathy, we find that\nthe utterances grow louder as the sensations or emotions, whether\npleasurable or painful, grow stronger.\n\nThat different _qualities_ of voice accompany different mental states,\nand that under states of excitement the tones are more sonorous than\nusual, is another general fact admitting of a parallel explanation.\nThe sounds of common conversation have but little resonance; those\nof strong feeling have much more. Under rising ill temper the voice\nacquires a metallic ring. In accordance with her constant mood, the\nordinary speech of a virago has a piercing quality quite opposite to\nthat softness indicative of placidity. A ringing laugh marks joyous\ntemperament. Grief, unburdening itself, uses tones approaching in\n_timbre_ to those of chanting; and in his most pathetic passages\nan eloquent speaker similarly falls into tones more vibratory than\nthose common to him. Now any one may readily convince himself that\nresonant vocal sounds can be produced only by a certain muscular effort\nadditional to that ordinarily needed. If after uttering a word in his\nspeaking voice, the reader, without changing the pitch or the loudness,\nwill _sing_ this word, he will perceive that before he can sing it,\nhe has to alter the adjustment of the vocal organs; to do which a\ncertain force must be used; and by putting his fingers on that external\nprominence marking the top of the larynx, he will have further evidence\nthat to produce a sonorous tone the organs must be drawn out of their\nusual position. Thus, then, the fact that the tones of excited feeling\nare more vibratory than those of common {406} conversation, is another\ninstance of the connexion between mental excitement and muscular\nexcitement. The speaking voice, the recitative voice, and the singing\nvoice, severally exemplify one general principle.\n\nThat the _pitch_ of the voice varies according to the action of the\nvocal muscles, scarcely needs saying. All know that the middle notes,\nin which they converse, are made without appreciable effort; and all\nknow that to make either very high notes or very low notes requires\nconsiderable effort. In either ascending or descending from the pitch\nof ordinary speech, we are conscious of increasing muscular strain,\nwhich, at each extreme of the register, becomes painful. Hence it\nfollows from our general principle, that while indifference or calmness\nwill use the medium tones, the tones used during excitement will be\neither above or below them; and will rise higher and higher, or fall\nlower and lower, as the feelings grow stronger. This physiological\ndeduction we also find to be in harmony with familiar facts. The\nhabitual sufferer utters his complaints in a voice raised considerably\nabove the natural key; and agonizing pain vents itself in either\nshrieks or groans\u2014in very high or very low notes. Beginning at his\ntalking pitch, the cry of the disappointed urchin grows more shrill as\nit grows louder. The \u201cOh!\u201d of astonishment or delight, begins several\nnotes below the middle voice, and descends still lower. Anger expresses\nitself in high tones, or else in \u201ccurses not loud but _deep_.\u201d Deep\ntones, too, are always used in uttering strong reproaches. Such an\nexclamation as \u201cBeware!\u201d if made dramatically\u2014that is, if made with a\nshow of feeling\u2014must be many notes lower than ordinary. Further, we\nhave groans of disapprobation, groans of horror, groans of remorse. And\nextreme joy and fear are alike accompanied by shrill outcries.\n\nNearly allied to the subject of pitch, is that of _intervals_; and\nthe explanation of them carries our argument a step {407} further.\nWhile calm speech is comparatively monotonous, emotion makes use of\nfifths, octaves, and even wider intervals. Listen to any one narrating\nor repeating something in which he has no interest, and his voice will\nnot wander more than two or three notes above or below his medium\nnote, and that by small steps; but when he comes to some exciting\nevent he will be heard not only to use the higher and lower notes of\nhis register, but to go from one to the other by larger leaps. Being\nunable in print to imitate these traits of feeling, we feel some\ndifficulty in fully conveying them to the reader. But we may suggest\na few remembrances which will perhaps call to mind a sufficiency of\nothers. If two men living in the same place, and frequently seeing\none another, meet, say at a public assembly, any phrase with which\none accosts the other\u2014as \u201cHallo, are you here?\u201d\u2014will have an ordinary\nintonation. But if one of them, after a long absence, has unexpectedly\nreturned, the expression of surprise with which his friend greets\nhim\u2014\u201cHallo! how came you here?\u201d\u2014will be uttered in much more strongly\ncontrasted tones. The two syllables of the word \u201cHallo\u201d will be, the\none much higher and the other much lower than before; and the rest of\nthe sentence will similarly ascend and descend by longer steps. Again,\nif, supposing her maid to be in an adjoining room, the mistress of the\nhouse calls \u201cMary,\u201d the two syllables of the name will be spoken in an\nascending interval of a third. If Mary does not reply, the call will\nbe repeated probably in a descending fifth; implying the slightest\nshade of annoyance at Mary\u2019s inattention. Should Mary still make no\nanswer, the increasing annoyance will show itself by the use of a\ndescending octave on the next repetition of the call. And supposing the\nsilence to continue, the lady, if not of a very even temper, will show\nher irritation at Mary\u2019s seemingly intentional negligence by finally\ncalling her in tones still more widely contrasted\u2014the first syllable\n{408} being higher and the last lower than before. Now, these and\nanalogous facts, which the reader will readily accumulate, clearly\nconform to the law laid down. For to make large intervals requires\nmore muscular action than to make small ones. But not only is the\n_extent_ of vocal intervals thus explicable as due to the relation\nbetween nervous and muscular excitement, but also, in some degree,\ntheir _direction_, as ascending or descending. The middle notes being\nthose which demand no appreciable effort of muscular adjustment;\nand the effort becoming greater as we either ascend or descend; it\nfollows that a departure from the middle notes in either direction\nwill mark increasing emotion; while a return towards the middle notes\nwill mark decreasing emotion. Hence it happens that an enthusiastic\nperson, uttering such a sentence as\u2014\u201cIt was the most splendid sight I\never saw!\u201d will ascend to the first syllable of the word \u201csplendid,\u201d\nand thence will descend: the word \u201csplendid\u201d marking the climax of\nthe feeling produced by the recollection. Hence, again, it happens\nthat, under some extreme vexation produced by another\u2019s stupidity,\nan irascible man, exclaiming\u2014\u201cWhat a confounded fool the fellow is!\u201d\nwill begin somewhat below his middle voice, and descending to the word\n\u201cfool,\u201d which he will utter in one of his deepest notes, will then\nascend. And it may be remarked, that the word \u201cfool\u201d will not only\nbe deeper and louder than the rest, but will also have more emphasis\nof articulation\u2014another mode in which muscular excitement is shown.\nThere is some danger, however, in giving instances like this; seeing\nthat as the mode of rendering will vary according to the intensity of\nthe feeling which the reader feigns to himself, the right cadence may\nnot be hit upon. With single words there is less difficulty. Thus the\n\u201cIndeed!\u201d with which a surprising fact is received, mostly begins on\nthe middle note of the voice, and rises with the second syllable; or,\nif disapprobation as well as astonishment is felt, the {409} first\nsyllable will be below the middle note, and the second lower still.\nConversely, the word \u201cAlas!\u201d which marks not the rise of a paroxysm\nof grief, but its decline, is uttered in a cadence descending towards\nthe middle note; or, if the first syllable is in the lower part of\nthe register, the second ascends towards the middle note. In the\n\u201cHeigh-ho!\u201d expressive of mental or muscular prostration, we may see\nthe same truth; and if the cadence appropriate to it be inverted, the\nabsurdity of the effect clearly shows how the meaning of intervals is\ndependent on the principle we have been illustrating.\n\nThe remaining characteristic of emotional speech which we have to\nnotice, is that of _variability of pitch_. It is scarcely possible here\nto convey adequate ideas of this more complex manifestation. We must\nbe content with simply indicating some occasions on which it may be\nobserved. On a meeting of friends, for instance\u2014as when there arrives\na party of much-wished-for visitors\u2014the voices of all will be heard to\nundergo changes of pitch not only greater but much more numerous than\nusual. If a speaker at a public meeting is interrupted by some squabble\namong those he is addressing, his comparatively level tones will be\nin marked contrast with the rapidly changing ones of the disputants.\nAnd among children, whose feelings are less under control than those\nof adults, this peculiarity is still more decided. During a scene of\ncomplaint and recrimination between two excitable little girls, the\nvoices may be heard to run up and down the gamut several times in\neach sentence. In such cases we once more recognize the same law: for\nmuscular excitement is shown not only in strength of contraction, but\nalso in the rapidity with which different muscular adjustments succeed\none another.\n\nThus we find all the leading vocal phenomena to have a physiological\nbasis. They are so many manifestations of the general law that feeling\nis a stimulus to muscular {410} action\u2014a law conformed to throughout\nthe whole economy, not of man only, but of every sensitive creature\u2014a\nlaw, therefore, which lies deep in the nature of animal organization.\nThe expressiveness of these various modifications of voice is therefore\ninnate. Each of us, from babyhood upwards, has been spontaneously\nmaking them, when under the various sensations and emotions by which\nthey are produced. Having been conscious of each feeling at the same\ntime that we heard ourselves make the consequent sound, we have\nacquired an established association of ideas between such sound and\nthe feeling which caused it. When the like sound is made by another,\nwe ascribe the like feeling to him; and by a further consequence we\nnot only ascribe to him that feeling, but have a certain degree of it\naroused in ourselves: for to become conscious of the feeling which\nanother is experiencing, is to have that feeling awakened in our own\nconsciousness, which is the same thing as experiencing the feeling.\nThus these various modifications of voice become not only a language\nthrough which we understand the emotions of others, but also the means\nof exciting our sympathy with such emotions.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nHave we not here, then, adequate data for a theory of music? These\nvocal peculiarities which indicate excited feeling, _are those which\nespecially distinguish song from ordinary speech_. Every one of the\nalterations of voice which we have found to be a physiological result\nof pain or pleasure, _is carried to an extreme in vocal music_. For\ninstance, we saw that, in virtue of the general relation between mental\nand muscular excitement, one characteristic of passionate utterance is\n_loudness_. Well, its comparative loudness is one of the distinctive\nmarks of song as contrasted with the speech of daily life. Though\nthere are _piano_ passages in contrast with the _forte_ passages, yet\nthe average loudness of the singing voice is much greater than {411}\nthat of the speaking voice; and further, the _forte_ passages of an\nair are those intended to represent the climax of its emotion. We\nnext saw that the tones in which emotion expresses itself, are, in\nconformity with this same law, of a more sonorous _timbre_ than those\nof calm conversation. Here, too, song displays a still higher degree\nof the peculiarity; for the singing tone is the most resonant we can\nmake. Again, it was shown that, from a like cause, mental excitement\nvents itself in the higher and lower notes of the register; using the\nmiddle notes but seldom. And it scarcely needs saying that vocal music\nis still more distinguished by its comparative neglect of the notes in\nwhich we talk, and its habitual use of those above or below them; and,\nmoreover, that its most passionate effects are commonly produced at\nthe two extremities of its scale, but especially at the upper one. A\nyet further trait of strong feeling, similarly accounted for, was the\nhabitual employment of larger intervals than are employed in common\nconverse. This trait, also, every ballad and _aria_ systematically\nelaborates: add to which, that the direction of these intervals, which,\nas diverging from or converging towards the medium tones, we found to\nbe physiologically expressive of increasing or decreasing emotion,\nmay be observed to have in music like meanings. Once more, it was\npointed out that not only extreme but also rapid variations of pitch,\nare characteristic of mental excitement; and once more we see in the\nquick changes of every melody, that song carries the characteristic as\nfar, if not farther. Thus, in respect alike of _loudness_, _timbre_,\n_pitch_, _intervals_, and _rate of variation_, song employs and\nexaggerates the natural language of the emotions;\u2014it arises from a\nsystematic combination of those vocal peculiarities which are the\nphysiological effects of acute pleasure and pain.\n\nBesides these chief characteristics of song as distinguished from\ncommon speech, there are sundry minor ones {412} similarly explicable\nas due to the relation between mental and muscular excitement; and\nbefore proceeding further, these should be briefly noticed. Thus,\ncertain passions, and perhaps all passions when pushed to an extreme,\nproduce (probably through their influence over the action of the heart)\nan effect the reverse of that which has been described: they cause a\nphysical prostration, one symptom of which is a general relaxation\nof the muscles, and a consequent trembling. We have the trembling of\nanger, of fear, of hope, of joy; and the vocal muscles being implicated\nwith the rest, the voice too becomes tremulous. Now, in singing,\nthis tremulousness of voice is effectively used by some vocalists in\npathetic passages; sometimes, indeed, because of its effectiveness,\ntoo much used by them\u2014as by Tamberlik, for instance. Again, there\nis a mode of musical execution known as the _staccato_, appropriate\nto energetic passages\u2014to passages expressive of exhilaration, of\nresolution, of confidence. The action of the vocal muscles which\nproduces this staccato style, is analogous to the muscular action which\nproduces the sharp, decisive, energetic movements of body indicating\nthese states of mind; and therefore it is that the staccato style\nhas the meaning we ascribe to it. Conversely, slurred intervals are\nexpressive of gentler and less active feelings; and are so because they\nimply the smaller muscular vivacity due to a lower mental energy. The\ndifference of effect resulting from difference of _time_ in music, is\nalso attributable to this same law. Already it has been pointed out\nthat the more frequent changes of pitch which ordinarily result from\npassion, are imitated and developed in song; and here we have to add,\nthat the various rates of such changes, appropriate to the different\nstyles of music, are further traits having the same derivation. The\nslowest movements, _largo_ and _adagio_, are used where such depressing\nemotions as grief, or such unexciting emotions as reverence, are to be\nportrayed; while the more rapid movements, _andante_, {413} _allegro_,\n_presto_, represent successively increasing degrees of mental vivacity;\nand do this because they imply that muscular activity which flows\nfrom this mental vivacity. Even the _rhythm_, which forms a remaining\ndistinction between song and speech, may not improbably have a kindred\ncause. Why the actions excited by strong feeling should tend to become\nrhythmical, is not obvious; but that they do so there are divers\nevidences. There is the swaying of the body to and fro under pain or\ngrief, of the leg under impatience or agitation. Dancing, too, is a\nrhythmical action natural to elevated emotion. That under excitement\nspeech acquires a certain rhythm, we may occasionally perceive in the\nhighest efforts of an orator. In poetry, which is a form of speech used\nfor the better expression of emotional ideas, we have this rhythmical\ntendency developed. And when we bear in mind that dancing, poetry, and\nmusic are connate\u2014are originally constituent parts of the same thing,\nit becomes clear that the measured movement common to them all implies\na rhythmical action of the whole system, the vocal apparatus included;\nand that so the rhythm of music is a more subtle and complex result of\nthis relation between mental and muscular excitement.\n\nBut it is time to end this analysis, which possibly we have already\ncarried too far. It is not to be supposed that the more special\npeculiarities of musical expression are to be definitely explained.\nThough probably they may all in some way conform to the principle that\nhas been worked out, it is impracticable to trace that principle in its\nmore ramified applications. Nor is it needful to our argument that it\nshould be so traced. The foregoing facts sufficiently prove that what\nwe regard as the distinctive traits of song, are simply the traits\nof emotional speech intensified and systematized. In respect of its\ngeneral characteristics, we think it has been made clear that vocal\nmusic, and by {414} consequence all music, is an idealization of the\nnatural language of passion.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nAs far as it goes, the scanty evidence furnished by history confirms\nthis conclusion. Note first the fact (not properly an historical one,\nbut fitly grouped with such) that the dance-chants of savage tribes\nare very monotonous; and in virtue of their monotony are more nearly\nallied to ordinary speech than are the songs of civilized races.\nJoining with this the fact that there are still extant among boatmen\nand others in the East, ancient chants of a like monotonous character,\nwe may infer that vocal music originally diverged from emotional speech\nin a gradual, unobtrusive manner; and this is the inference to which\nour argument points. From the characters of the intervals the same\nconclusion may be drawn.\n\n \u201cThe songs of savages in the lowest scale of civilization are\n generally confined to the compass of few notes, seldom extending\n beyond the interval of the _fifth_. Sometimes, however, a sudden\n transition into the octave occurs, especially in sudden exclamations,\n or where a word naturally dictates an emphatic raising of the\n voice. The _fifth_ especially plays a prominent part in primitive\n vocal music. .\u00a0.\u00a0. But it must not be supposed that each interval\n is distinctly intoned: on the contrary, in the transition from one\n interval to another, all the intermediate intervals are slightly\n touched in a way somewhat similar to a violinist drawing his finger\n rapidly over the string from one note to another to connect them;\n and as the intervals themselves are seldom clearly defined, it will\n easily be understood how nearly impossible it is to write down such\n songs in our notation so as to convey a correct idea of their natural\n effect.\u201d[57]\n\nFurther evidence to the same effect is supplied by Greek history.\nThe early poems of the Greeks\u2014which, be it remembered, were sacred\nlegends embodied in that rhythmical, metaphorical language which strong\nfeeling excites\u2014were not recited, but chanted: the tones and cadences\n{415} were made musical by the same influences which made the speech\npoetical. By those who have investigated the matter, this chanting\nis believed to have been not what we call singing, but nearly allied\nto our recitative\u2014nearly allied but simpler. Several facts conspire\nto show this. The earliest stringed instruments had sometimes four,\nsometimes five strings: Egyptian frescoes delineate some of the simpler\nharps as thus constituted, and there are kindred representations of\nthe lyres and allied instruments of the Assyrians, Hebrews, Greeks and\nRomans. That the earliest Greek lyre had but four strings, and that the\nrecitative of the poet was uttered in unison with its sounds, Neumann\nfinds definite proof in a verse ascribed to Terpander, celebrating his\nintroduction of the seven-stringed lyre:\u2015\n\n \u201cThe four-ton\u00e8d hymns now rejecting,\n   And yearning for songs new and sweet,\n With seven strings softly vibrating,\n   The lyre anon shall we greet.\u201d\n\nHence it follows that the primitive recitative was simpler than our\nmodern recitative, and, as such, much less remote from common speech\nthan our own singing is. For recitative, or musical recitation, is in\nall respects intermediate between speech and song. Its average effects\nare not so _loud_ as those of song. Its tones are less sonorous in\n_timbre_ than those of song. Commonly it diverges to a smaller extent\nfrom the middle notes\u2014uses notes neither so high nor so low in _pitch_.\nThe _intervals_ habitual to it are neither so wide nor so varied. Its\n_rate of variation_ is not so rapid. And at the same time that its\nprimary _rhythm_ is less decided, it has none of that secondary rhythm\nproduced by recurrence of the same or parallel musical phrases, which\nis one of the marked characteristics of song. Thus, then, we may not\nonly infer, from the evidence furnished by existing barbarous tribes,\nthat the vocal music of pre-historic times was emotional speech very\nslightly exalted; but we see that the earliest vocal music of which we\nhave {416} any account, differed much less from emotional speech than\ndoes the vocal music of our days.\n\nThat recitative\u2014beyond which, by the way, the Chinese and Hindoos\nseem never to have advanced\u2014grew naturally out of the modulations and\ncadences of strong feeling, we have indeed current evidence. There are\neven now to be met with occasions on which strong feeling vents itself\nin this form. Whoever has been present when a meeting of Quakers was\naddressed by one of their number (whose practice it is to speak only\nunder the influence of religious emotion), must have been struck by\nthe quite unusual tones, like those of a subdued chant, in which the\naddress was made. On passing a chapel in Wales during service, the\nraised and sing-song voice of the preacher draws the attention. It is\nclear, too, that the intoning used in churches is representative of\nthis mental state; and has been adopted on account of the congruity\nbetween it and the contrition, supplication, or reverence, verbally\nexpressed.\n\nAnd if, as we have good reason to believe, recitative arose by degrees\nout of emotional speech, it becomes manifest that by a continuance\nof the same process song has arisen out of recitative. Just as, from\nthe orations and legends of savages, expressed in the metaphorical,\nallegorical style natural to them, there sprung epic poetry, out of\nwhich lyric poetry was afterwards developed; so, from the exalted\ntones and cadences in which such orations and legends were delivered,\ncame the chant or recitative music, from which lyrical music has since\ngrown up. And there has not only thus been a simultaneous and parallel\ngenesis, but there has been reached a parallelism of results. For\nlyrical poetry differs from epic poetry, just as lyrical music differs\nfrom recitative: each still further intensifies the natural language\nof the emotions. Lyrical poetry is more metaphorical, more hyperbolic,\nmore elliptical, and adds the rhythm of lines to the rhythm of feet;\njust as lyrical music is louder, more sonorous, more extreme in its\n{417} intervals, and adds the rhythm of phrases to the rhythm of\nbars. And the known fact that out of epic poetry the stronger passions\ndeveloped lyrical poetry as their appropriate vehicle, strengthens the\ninference that they similarly developed lyrical music out of recitative.\n\nNor indeed are we without evidences of the transition. It needs but\nto listen to an opera to hear the leading gradations. Between the\ncomparatively level recitative of ordinary dialogue, the more varied\nrecitative with wider intervals and higher tones used in exciting\nscenes, the still more musical recitative which preludes an air, and\nthe air itself, the successive steps are but small; and the fact that\namong airs themselves gradations of like nature may be traced, further\nconfirms the conclusion that the highest form of vocal music was\narrived at by degrees.\n\nWe have some clue to the influences which have induced this\ndevelopment; and may roughly conceive the process of it. As the\ntones, intervals, and cadences of strong emotion were the elements\nout of which song was elaborated; so, we may expect to find that\nstill stronger emotion produced the elaboration; and we have evidence\nimplying this. Musical composers are men of acute sensibilities. The\nLife of Mozart depicts him as one of intensely active affections\nand highly impressionable temperament. Various anecdotes represent\nBeethoven as very susceptible and very passionate. Mendelssohn is\ndescribed by those who knew him as having been full of fine feeling.\nAnd the almost incredible sensitiveness of Chopin has been illustrated\nin the memoirs of George Sand. An unusually emotional nature being thus\nthe general characteristic of musical composers, we have in it just\nthe agency required for the development of recitative and song. Any\ncause of excitement will generate just those exaggerations which we\nhave found to distinguish the lower vocal music from emotional speech,\nand the higher vocal music from the lower. Thus it becomes credible\nthat the four-toned recitative of the {418} early Greek poets (like\nall poets, nearly allied to composers in the comparative intensity of\ntheir feelings), was really nothing more than the slightly exaggerated\nemotional speech natural to them, which grew by frequent use into\nan organized form. And we may infer that the accumulated agency of\nsubsequent poet-musicians, inheriting and adding to the products of\nthose who went before them, sufficed, in the course of many centuries,\nto develope this simple four-toned recitative into a vocal music having\ngreat complexity and range.\n\nNot only may we so understand how more sonorous tones, greater extremes\nof pitch, and wider intervals, were gradually introduced; but also how\nthere arose a greater variety and complexity of musical expression.\nFor this same passionate, enthusiastic temperament, which leads the\nmusical composer to express the feelings possessed by others as well as\nhimself, in more marked cadences than they would use, also leads him to\ngive musical utterance to feelings which they either do not experience,\nor experience in but slight degrees. And thus we may in some measure\nunderstand how it happens that music not only so strongly excites\nour more familiar feelings, but also produces feelings we never had\nbefore\u2014arouses dormant sentiments of which we do not know the meaning;\nor, as Richter says\u2014tells us of things we have not seen and shall not\nsee.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIndirect evidences of several kinds remain to be briefly pointed\nout. One of them is the difficulty, not to say impossibility, of\notherwise accounting for the expressiveness of music. Whence comes\nit that special combinations of notes should have special effects\nupon our emotions?\u2014that one should give us a feeling of exhilaration,\nanother of melancholy, another of affection, another of reverence?\nIs it that these special combinations have intrinsic meanings apart\nfrom the human constitution?\u2014that a certain number of a\u00ebrial waves\nper second, followed by a certain other {419} number, in the nature\nof things signify grief, while in the reverse order they signify\njoy; and similarly with all other intervals, phrases, and cadences?\nFew will be so irrational as to think this. Is it, then, that the\nmeanings of these special combinations are conventional only?\u2014that\nwe learn their implications, as we do those of words, by observing\nhow others understand them? This is an hypothesis not only devoid of\nevidence, but directly opposed to the experience of every one; and\nit is excluded by the fact that children, unconventionalised though\nthey are, show great susceptibility to music. How, then, are musical\neffects to be explained? If the theory above set forth be accepted,\nthe difficulty disappears. If music, taking for its raw material the\nvarious modifications of voice which are the physiological results of\nexcited feeling, intensifies, combines, and complicates them\u2014if it\nexaggerates the loudness, the resonance, the pitch, the intervals,\nand the variability, which, in virtue of an organic law, are the\ncharacteristics of passionate speech\u2014if, by carrying out these further,\nmore consistently, more unitedly, and more sustainedly,it produces\nan idealized language of emotion; then its power over us becomes\ncomprehensible. But in the absence of this theory the expressiveness of\nmusic appears inexplicable.\n\nAgain, the preference we feel for certain qualities of sound presents\na like difficulty, admitting only of a like solution. It is generally\nagreed that the tones of the human voice are more pleasing than any\nothers. If music takes its rise from the modulations of the human voice\nunder emotion, it is a natural consequence that the tones of that voice\nappeal to our feelings more than any others, and are considered more\nbeautiful than any others. But deny that music has this origin, and the\nonly alternative is the untenable one that the vibrations proceeding\nfrom a vocalist\u2019s throat are, objectively considered, of a higher order\nthan those from a horn or a violin.\n\nOnce more, the question\u2014How is the expressiveness of {420} music to be\notherwise accounted for? may be supplemented by the question\u2014How is the\ngenesis of music to be otherwise accounted for? That music is a product\nof civilization, is manifest; for though some of the lowest savages\nhave their dance-chants, these are of a kind scarcely to be dignified\nby the title musical: at most, they supply but the vaguest rudiment\nof music, properly so called. And if music has been by slow steps\ndeveloped in the course of civilization, it must have been developed\nout of something. If, then, its origin is not that above alleged, what\nis its origin?\n\nThus we find that the negative evidence confirms the positive, and\nthat, taken together, they furnish strong proof. We have seen that\nthere is a physiological relation, common to man and all animals,\nbetween feeling and muscular action; that as vocal sounds are produced\nby muscular action, there is a consequent physiological relation\nbetween feeling and vocal sounds; that all the modifications of voice\nexpressive of feeling are the direct results of this physiological\nrelation; that music, adopting all these modifications, intensifies\nthem more and more as it ascends to its higher and higher forms;\nthat, from the ancient epic poet chanting his verses, down to the\nmodern musical composer, men of unusually strong feelings prone to\nexpress them in extreme forms, have been naturally the agents of these\nsuccessive intensifications; and that so there has little by little\narisen a wide divergence between this idealized language of emotion\nand its natural language: to which direct evidence we have just added\nthe indirect\u2014that on no other tenable hypothesis can either the\nexpressiveness of music or the genesis of music be explained.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nAnd now, what is the _function_ of music? Has music any effect beyond\nthe immediate pleasure it produces? Analogy suggests that it has. The\nenjoyments of a good dinner do not end with themselves, but minister to\nbodily well-being. Though people do not marry with a view to maintain\nthe race, yet the passions which impel them to marry secure its {421}\nmaintenance. Parental affection is a feeling which, while it conduces\nto parental happiness, ensures the nurture of offspring. Men love to\naccumulate property, often without thought of the benefits it produces;\nbut in pursuing the pleasure of acquisition they indirectly open the\nway to other pleasures. The wish for public approval impels all of\nus to do many things which we should otherwise not do,\u2014to undertake\ngreat labours, face great dangers, and habitually rule ourselves in\nways that smooth social intercourse; so that, in gratifying our love\nof approbation we subserve divers ulterior purposes. And, generally,\nour nature is such that in fulfilling each desire, we in some way\nfacilitate fulfilment of the rest. But the love of music seems to exist\nfor its own sake. The delights of melody and harmony do not obviously\nminister to the welfare either of the individual or of society. May we\nnot suspect, however, that this exception is apparent only? Is it not\na rational inquiry\u2014What are the indirect benefits which accrue from\nmusic, in addition to the direct pleasure it gives?\n\nBut that it would take us too far out of our track, we should prelude\nthis inquiry by illustrating at some length a certain general law\nof progress;\u2014the law that alike in occupations, sciences, arts, the\ndivisions which had a common root, but by gradual divergence have\nbecome distinct, and are now being separately developed, are not truly\nindependent, but severally act and react on one another to their mutual\nadvancement. Merely hinting thus much, however, by way of showing that\nthere are many analogies to justify us, we go on to express the opinion\nthat there exists a relationship of this kind between music and speech.\n\nAll speech is compounded of two elements, the words and the tones in\nwhich they are uttered\u2014the signs of ideas and the signs of feelings.\nWhile certain articulations express the thought, certain modulations\nexpress the more or less of pain or pleasure which the thought gives.\nUsing the word _cadence_ in an unusually extended sense, as {422}\ncomprehending all variations of voice, we may say that _cadence is the\ncommentary of the emotions upon the propositions of the intellect_.\nThis duality of spoken language, though not formally recognized, is\nrecognized in practice by every one; and every one knows that very\noften more weight attaches to the tones than to the words. Daily\nexperience supplies cases in which the same sentence of disapproval\nwill be understood as meaning little or meaning much, according to the\nvocal inflections which accompany it; and daily experience supplies\nstill more striking cases in which words and tones are in direct\ncontradiction\u2014the first expressing consent, while the last express\nreluctance; and the last being believed rather than the first.\n\nThese two distinct but interwoven elements of speech have been\nundergoing a simultaneous development. We know that in the course of\ncivilization words have been multiplied, new parts of speech have been\nintroduced, sentences have grown more varied and complex; and we may\nfairly infer that during the same time new modifications of voice have\ncome into use, fresh intervals have been adopted, and cadences have\nbecome more elaborate. For while, on the one hand, it is absurd to\nsuppose that, along with the undeveloped verbal forms of barbarism,\nthere existed developed vocal inflections; it is, on the other hand,\nnecessary to suppose that, along with the higher and more numerous\nverbal forms needed to convey the multiplied and complicated ideas of\ncivilized life, there have grown up those more involved changes of\nvoice which express the feelings proper to such ideas. If intellectual\nlanguage is a growth, so also, without doubt, is emotional language a\ngrowth.\n\nNow, the hypothesis which we have hinted above, is that, beyond the\ndirect pleasure which it gives, music has the indirect effect of\ndeveloping this language of the emotions. Having its root, as we\nhave endeavoured to show, in those tones, intervals, and cadences of\nspeech which express {423} feeling\u2014arising by the combination and\nintensifying of these, and coming finally to have an embodiment of its\nown; music has all along been reacting upon speech, and increasing\nits power of rendering emotion. The use in recitative and song of\ninflections more expressive than ordinary ones, must from the beginning\nhave tended to develope the ordinary ones. The complex musical phrases\nby which composers have conveyed complex emotions, may rationally\nbe supposed to influence us in making those involved cadences of\nconversation by which we convey our subtler thoughts and feelings. If\nthe cultivation of music has any effect on the mind, what more natural\neffect is there than this of developing our perception of the meanings\nof qualities, and modulations of voice; and giving us a correspondingly\nincreased power of using them? Just as chemistry, arising out of\nthe processes of metallurgy and the industrial arts, and gradually\ngrowing into an independent study, has now become an aid to all kinds\nof production\u2014just as physiology, originating from medicine and once\nsubordinate to it, but latterly pursued for its own sake, is in our day\ncoming to be the science on which the progress of medicine depends;\u2014so,\nmusic, having its root in emotional language, and gradually evolved\nfrom it, has ever been reacting upon and further advancing it.\n\nIt will scarcely be expected that much direct evidence in support of\nthis conclusion can be given. The facts are of a kind which it is\ndifficult to measure, and of which we have no records. Some suggestive\ntraits, however, are to be noted. May we not say, for instance, that\nthe Italians, among whom modern music was earliest cultivated, and who\nhave more especially excelled in melody (the division of music with\nwhich our argument is chiefly concerned)\u2014may we not say that these\nItalians speak in more varied and expressive inflections and cadences\nthan any other people? On the other hand, may we not say that, confined\nalmost exclusively as they have hitherto been to their national {424}\nairs, and therefore accustomed to but a limited range of musical\nexpression, the Scotch are unusually monotonous in the intervals and\nmodulations of their speech? And again, do we not find among different\nclasses of the same nation, differences that have like implications?\nThe gentleman and the clown stand in decided contrast with respect to\nvariety of intonation. Listen to the conversation of a servant-girl,\nand then to that of a refined lady, and the more delicate and complex\nchanges of voice used by the latter will be conspicuous. Now, without\ngoing so far as to say that out of all the differences of culture to\nwhich the upper and lower classes are subjected, difference of musical\nculture is that to which alone this difference of speech is ascribable;\nyet we may fairly say that there seems a much more obvious connexion of\ncause and effect between these than between any others. Thus, while the\ninductive evidence to which we can appeal is but scanty and vague, yet\nwhat there is favours our position.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nProbably most will think that the function here assigned to music is\none of very little moment. But reflection may lead them to a contrary\nconviction. In its bearings upon human happiness, this emotional\nlanguage which musical culture develops and refines, is only second in\nimportance to the language of the intellect; perhaps not even second\nto it. For these modifications of voice produced by feelings, are the\nmeans of exciting like feelings in others. Joined with gestures and\nexpressions of face, they give life to the otherwise dead words in\nwhich the intellect utters its ideas; and so enable the hearer not only\nto _understand_ the state of mind they accompany, but to _partake_ of\nthat state. In short, they are the chief media of _sympathy_. And if we\nconsider how much both our general welfare and our immediate pleasures\ndepend on sympathy, we shall recognize the importance of whatever makes\nthis sympathy greater. If we bear in mind that by their fellow-feeling\nmen are led {425} to behave justly and kindly to one another\u2014that\nthe difference between the cruelty of the barbarous and the humanity\nof the civilized, results from the increase of fellow-feeling; if we\nbear in mind that this faculty which makes us sharers in the joys and\nsorrows of others, is the basis of all the higher affections; if we\nbear in mind how much our direct gratifications are intensified by\nsympathy,\u2014how, at the theatre, the concert, the picture gallery, we\nlose half our enjoyment if we have no one to enjoy with us;\u2014we shall\nsee that the agencies which communicate it can scarcely be overrated\nin value. The tendency of civilization is to repress the antagonistic\nelements of our characters and to develope the social ones\u2014to curb\nour purely selfish desires and exercise our unselfish ones\u2014to replace\nprivate gratifications by gratifications resulting from, or involving,\nthe pleasures of others. And while, by this adaptation to the social\nstate, the sympathetic side of our nature is being unfolded, there\nis simultaneously growing up a language of sympathetic intercourse\u2014a\nlanguage through which we communicate to others the happiness we feel,\nand are made sharers in their happiness. This double process, of which\nthe effects are already appreciable, must go on to an extent of which\nwe can as yet have no adequate conception. The habitual concealment of\nour feelings diminishing, as it must, in proportion as our feelings\nbecome such as do not demand concealment, the exhibition of them will\nbecome more vivid than we now dare allow it to be; and this implies\na more expressive emotional language. At the same time, feelings\nof higher and more complex kinds, as yet experienced only by the\ncultivated few, will become general; and there will be a corresponding\ndevelopment of the emotional language into more involved forms. Just as\nthere has silently grown up a language of ideas, which, rude as it at\nfirst was, now enables us to convey with precision the most subtle and\ncomplicated thoughts; so, there is still silently growing up a language\nof feelings, which, notwithstanding its present {426} imperfection, we\nmay expect will ultimately enable men vividly and completely to impress\non each other the emotions which they experience from moment to moment.\n\nThus if, as we have endeavoured to show, it is the function of music to\nfacilitate the development of this emotional language, we may regard\nmusic as an aid to the achievement of that higher happiness which it\nindistinctly shadows forth. Those vague feelings of unexperienced\nfelicity which music arouses\u2014those indefinite impressions of an unknown\nideal life which it calls up, may be considered as a prophecy, the\nfulfilment of which music itself aids. The strange capacity which we\nhave for being affected by melody and harmony, may be taken to imply\nboth that it is within the possibilities of our nature to realize those\nintenser delights they dimly suggest, and that they are in some way\nconcerned in the realization of them. If so the power and the meaning\nof music become comprehensible; but otherwise they are a mystery.\n\nWe will only add that, if the probability of these corollaries be\nadmitted, then music must take rank as the highest of the fine arts\u2014as\nthe one which, more than any other, ministers to human welfare. And\nthus, even leaving out of view the immediate gratifications it is\nhourly giving, we cannot too much applaud that musical culture which is\nbecoming one of the characteristics of our age.\n\n\nPOSTSCRIPT.\n\nAn opponent, or partial opponent, of high authority, whose views were\npublished some fourteen years after the above essay, must here be\nanswered: I mean Mr. Darwin. Diligent and careful as an observer beyond\nnaturalists in general, and still more beyond those who are untrained\nin research, his judgment on a question which must be {427} decided by\ninduction is one to be received with great respect. I think, however,\nexamination will show that in this instance Mr. Darwin\u2019s observations\nare inadequate, and his reasonings upon them inconclusive. Swayed\nby his doctrine of sexual selection, he has leaned towards the view\nthat music had its origin in the expression of amatory feeling, and\nhas been led to over-estimate such evidence as he thinks favours that\nview, while ignoring the difficulties in its way, and the large amount\nof evidence supporting another view. Before considering the special\nreasons for dissenting from his hypothesis, let us look at the most\ngeneral reasons.\n\nThe interpretation of music which Mr. Darwin gives, agrees with my own\nin supposing music to be developed from vocal noises; but differs in\nsupposing a particular class of vocal noises to have originated it\u2014the\namatory class. I have aimed to show that music has its germs in the\nsounds which the voice emits under excitement, and eventually gains\nthis or that character according to the kind of excitement; whereas\nMr. Darwin argues that music arises from those sounds which the male\nmakes during the excitements of courtship, that they are consciously\nmade to charm the female, and that from the resulting combinations of\nsounds arise not love-music only but music in general. That certain\ntones of voice and cadences having some likeness of nature are\nspontaneously used to express grief, others to express joy, others to\nexpress affection, and others to express triumph or martial ardour, is\nundeniable. According to the view I have set forth, the whole body of\nthese vocal manifestations of emotion form the root of music. According\nto Mr. Darwin\u2019s view, the sounds which are prompted by the amatory\nfeeling only, having originated musical utterance, there are derived\nfrom these all the other varieties of musical utterance which aim to\nexpress other kinds of feeling. This roundabout derivation has, I\nthink, less probability than the direct derivation. {428}\n\nThis antithesis and its implications will perhaps be more clearly\nunderstood on looking at the facts under their nervo-muscular aspect.\nMr. Darwin recognizes the truth of the doctrine with which the\nforegoing essay sets out, that feeling discharges itself in action:\nsaying of the air-breathing vertebrata that\u2015\n\n \u201cWhen the primeval members of this class were strongly excited and\n their muscles violently contracted, purposeless sounds would almost\n certainly have been produced; and these, if they proved in any way\n serviceable, might readily have been modified or intensified by the\n preservation of properly adapted variations.\u201d (_The Descent of Man_,\n vol. ii., p. 331.)\n\nBut though this passage recognizes the general relation between\nfeelings and those muscular contractions which cause sounds, it does so\ninadequately; since it ignores, on the one hand, those loudest sounds\nwhich accompany intense sensations\u2014the shrieks and groans of bodily\nagony; while, on the other hand, it ignores those multitudinous sounds\nnot produced \u201cunder the excitement of love, rage, and jealousy,\u201d but\nwhich accompany ordinary amounts of feelings, various in their kinds.\nAnd it is because he does not bear in mind how large a proportion of\nvocal noises are caused by other excitements, that Mr. Darwin thinks \u201ca\nstrong case can be made out, that the vocal organs were primarily used\nand perfected in relation to the propagation of the species\u201d (p. 330).\n\nCertainly the animals around us yield but few facts countenancing his\nview. The cooing of pigeons may, indeed, be named in its support; and\nit may be contended that caterwauling furnishes evidence; though I\ndoubt whether the sounds are made by the male to charm the female. But\nthe howling of dogs has no relation to sexual excitements; nor has\ntheir barking, which is used to express emotion of almost any kind.\nPigs grunt sometimes through pleasurable expectation, sometimes during\nthe gratifications of eating, sometimes from a general content while\nseeking about for food. The bleatings of sheep, again, occur under the\npromptings of various feelings, usually of no great {429} intensity:\nsocial and maternal rather than sexual. The like holds with the lowing\nof cattle. Nor is it otherwise with poultry. The quacking of ducks\nindicates general satisfaction, and the screams occasionally vented by\na flock of geese seem rather to express a wave of social excitement\nthan anything else. Save after laying an egg, when the sounds have\nthe character of triumph, the cluckings of a hen show content; and on\nvarious occasions cock-crowing apparently implies good spirits only.\nIn all cases an overflow of nervous energy has to find vent; and while\nin some cases it leads to wagging of the tail, in others it leads to\ncontraction of the vocal muscles. That this relation holds, not of one\nkind of feeling, but of many kinds, is a truth which seems to me at\nvariance with the view \u201cthat the vocal organs were primarily used and\nperfected in relation to the propagation of the species.\u201d\n\nThe hypothesis that music had its origin in the amatory sounds made\nby the male to charm the female, has the support of the popular idea\nthat the singing of birds constitutes a kind of courtship\u2014an idea\nadopted by Mr. Darwin when he says that \u201cthe male pours forth his\nfull volume of song, in rivalry with other males, for the sake of\ncaptivating the female.\u201d Usually, Mr. Darwin does not accept without\ncriticism and verification, the beliefs he finds current; but in this\ncase he seems to have done so. Even cursory observation suffices to\ndissipate this belief, initiated, I suppose, by poets. In preparation\nfor dealing with the matter I have made memoranda concerning various\nsongbirds, dating back to 1883. On the 7th of February of that year I\nheard a lark singing several times; and, still more remarkably, during\nthe mild winter of 1884 I saw one soar, and heard it sing, on the\n10th January. Yet the lark does not pair till March. Having heard the\nredbreast near the close of August, 1888, I noted the continuance of\nits song all through the autumn and winter, up to Christmas {430} eve,\nChristmas day, the 29th of December, and again on the 18th January,\n1889. How common is the singing of the thrush during mild weather in\nwinter, everyone must have observed. The presence of thrushes behind my\nhouse has led to the making of notes on this point. The male sang in\nNovember, 1889; I noted the song again on Christmas eve, again on the\n13th January, 1890, and from time to time all through the rest of that\nmonth. I heard little of his song in February, which is the pairing\nseason; and none at all, save a few notes early in the morning, during\nthe period of rearing the young. But now that, in the middle of May,\nthe young, reared in a nest in my garden, have sometime since flown,\nhe has recommenced singing vociferously at intervals throughout the\nday; and doubtless, in conformity with what I have observed elsewhere,\nwill go on singing till July. How marked is the direct relation between\nsinging and the conditions which cause high spirits, is perhaps best\nshown by a fact I noted on the 4th December, 1888, when, the day being\nnot only mild but bright, the copses on Holmwood Common, Dorking,\nwere vocal just as on a spring day, with a chorus of birds of various\nkinds\u2014robins, thrushes, chaffinches, linnets, and sundry others of\nwhich I did not know the names. Ornithological works furnish verifying\nstatements. Wood states that the hedge-sparrow continues \u201cto sing\nthroughout a large portion of the year, and only ceasing during the\ntime of the ordinary moult.\u201d The song of the blackcap, he says, \u201cis\nhardly suspended throughout the year;\u201d and of caged birds which sing\ncontinuously, save when moulting, he names the grosbeak, the linnet,\nthe goldfinch, and the siskin.\n\nI think these facts show that the popular idea adopted by Mr. Darwin\nis untenable. What then is the true interpretation? Simply that like\nthe whistling and humming of tunes by boys and men, the singing of\nbirds results from overflow of energy\u2014an overflow which in both cases\n{431} ceases under depressing conditions. The relation between\ncourtship and singing, so far as it can be shown to hold, is not a\nrelation of cause and effect, but a relation of concomitance: the two\nare simultaneous results of the same cause. Throughout the animal\nkingdom at large, the commencement of reproduction is associated with\nan excess of those absorbed materials needful for self-maintenance;\nand with a consequent ability to devote a part to the maintenance of\nthe species. This constitutional state is one with which there goes a\ntendency to superfluous expenditure in various forms of action\u2014unusual\nvivacity of every kind, including vocal vivacity. While we thus see\nwhy pairing and singing come to be associated, we also see why there\nis singing at other times when the feeding and weather are favourable;\nand why, in some cases, as in those of the thrush and the robin, there\nis more singing after the breeding season than before or during the\nbreeding season. We are shown, too, why these birds, and especially the\nthrush, so often sing in the winter: the supply of worms on lawns and\nin gardens being habitually utilized by both, and thrushes having the\nfurther advantage that they are strong enough to break the shells of\nthe hybernating snails: this last ability being connected with the fact\nthat thrushes and blackbirds are the first among the singing birds to\nbuild. It remains only to add that the alleged singing of males against\none another with the view of charming the females is open to parallel\ncriticisms. How far this competition happens during the pairing season\nI have not observed, but it certainly happens out of the pairing\nseason. I have several times heard blackbirds singing alternately in\nJune. But the most conspicuous instance is supplied by the redbreasts.\nThese habitually sing against one another during the autumn months:\nreply and rejoinder being commonly continued for five minutes at a time.\n\nEven did the evidence support the popular view, adopted {432} by Mr.\nDarwin, that the singing of birds is a kind of courtship\u2014even were\nthere good proof, instead of much disproof, that a bird\u2019s song is a\ndeveloped form of the sexual sounds made by the male to charm the\nfemale; the conclusion would, I think, do little towards justifying\nthe belief that human music has had a kindred origin. For, in the\nfirst place, the bird-type in general, developed as it is out of\nthe reptilian type, is very remotely related to that type of the\n_Vertebrata_ which ascends to Man as its highest exemplar; and, in the\nsecond place, song-birds belong, with but few exceptions, to the single\norder of _Insessores_\u2014one order only, of the many orders constituting\nthe class. So that, if the _Vertebrata_ at large be represented by a\ntree, of which Man is the topmost twig, then it is at a considerable\ndistance down the trunk that there diverges the branch from which\nthe bird-type is derived; and the group of singing-birds forms but a\nterminal sub-division of this branch\u2014lies far out of the ascending\nline which ends in Man. To give appreciable support to Mr. Darwin\u2019s\nview, we ought to find vocal manifestations of the amatory feeling\nbecoming more pronounced as we ascend along that particular line of\ninferior _Vertebrata_ out of which Man has arisen. Just as we find\nother traits which pre-figure human traits (instance arms and hands\nadapted for grasping) becoming more marked as we approach Man; so\nshould we find, becoming more marked, this sexual use of the voice,\nwhich is supposed to end in human song. But we do not find this. The\nSouth-American monkeys (\u201cthe Howlers,\u201d as they are sometimes called),\nwhich, in chorus, make the woods resound for hours together with their\n\u201cdreadful concert,\u201d appear, according to Rengger, to be prompted by\nno other desire than that of making a noise. Mr. Darwin admits, too,\nthat this is generally the case with the gibbons: the only exception\nhe is inclined to make being in the case of _Hylobates agilis_, which,\non the testimony of Mr. Waterhouse, he says ascends and descends the\nscale by {433} half-tones.[58] This comparatively musical set of\nsounds, he thinks, may be used to charm the female; though there is no\nevidence forthcoming that this is the case. When we remember that in\nthe forms nearest to the human\u2014the chimpanzees and the gorilla\u2014there is\nnothing which approaches even thus far towards musical utterance, we\nsee that the hypothesis has next to none of that support which ought to\nbe forthcoming. Indeed in his _Descent of Man_, vol. ii., p. 332, Mr.\nDarwin himself says:\u2014\u201cIt is a surprising fact that we have not as yet\nany good evidence that these organs are used by male mammals to charm\nthe females:\u201d an admission which amounts to something like a surrender.\n\nEven more marked is the absence of proof when we come to the human\nrace itself\u2014or rather, not absence of proof but presence of disproof.\nHere, from the _Descriptive Sociology_, where the authorities will be\nfound under the respective heads, I quote a number of testimonies of\ntravellers concerning primitive music: commencing with those referring\nto the lowest races.\n\n\u201cThe songs of the natives [of Australia] .\u00a0.\u00a0. are chiefly made on\nthe spur of the moment, and refer to something that has struck the\nattention at the time.\u201d \u201cThe Watchandies seeing me much interested\nin the genus Eucalyptus soon composed a song on this subject.\u201d The\nFuegians are fond of music and generally sing in their boats, doubtless\nkeeping time, as many primitive peoples do. \u201cThe principal subject\nof the songs of the Araucanians is the exploits of their heroes:\u201d\nwhen at work their \u201csong was simple, referring mostly to their\nlabour,\u201d and was the same \u201cfor every {434} occasion, whether the\nburden of the song be joy or sorrow.\u201d The Greenlanders sing of \u201ctheir\nexploits in the chase\u201d and \u201cchant the deeds of their ancestors.\u201d \u201cThe\nIndians of the Upper Mississippi vocalize an incident, as\u2014\u2018They have\nbrought us a fat dog,\u2019:\u201d then the chorus goes on for a minute. Of\nother North-American Indians we read\u2014\u201cthe air which the women sang\nwas pleasing .\u00a0.\u00a0. the men first gave out the words, which formed\na consummate glorification of themselves.\u201d Among the Carriers (of\nNorth America) there are professed composers, who \u201cturn their talent\nto good account on the occasion of a feast, when new airs are in\ngreat request.\u201d Of the New Zealanders we read:\u2014\u201cThe singing of such\ncompositions [laments] resembles cathedral chanting.\u201d \u201cPassing events\nare described by extemporaneous songs, which are preserved when good.\u201d\n\u201cWhen men worked together appropriate airs were sung.\u201d When presenting\na meal to travellers, women would chant\u2014\u201cWhat shall be our food? shell\nfish and fern-root, that is the root of the earth.\u201d Among the Sandwich\nIslanders \u201cmost of the traditions of remarkable events in their history\nare preserved in songs.\u201d When taught reading they could not \u201crecite a\nlesson without chanting or singing it.\u201d Cook found the Tahitians had\nitinerant musicians who gave narrative chants quite unpremeditated. \u201cA\nSamoan can hardly put his paddle in the water without striking up some\nchant.\u201d A chief of the Kyans, \u201cTamawan, jumped up and while standing\nburst out into an extempore song, in which Sir James Brooke and myself,\nand last not least the wonderful steamer, was mentioned with warm\neulogies.\u201d In East Africa \u201cthe fisherman will accompany his paddle,\nthe porter his trudge, and the housewife her task of rubbing down\ngrain, with song.\u201d In singing, the East African \u201ccontents himself with\nimprovising a few words without sense or rhyme and repeats them till\nthey nauseate,\u201d Among the Dahomans any incident \u201cfrom the arrival of\na stranger to an {435} earthquake\u201d is turned into a song. When rowing,\nthe Coast-negroes sing \u201ceither a description of some love intrigue or\nthe praise of some woman celebrated for her beauty.\u201d In Loango \u201cthe\nwomen as they till the field make it echo with their rustic songs.\u201d\nPark says of the Bambarran\u2014\u201cthey lightened their labours by songs,\none of which was composed extempore; for I was myself the subject of\nit.\u201d \u201cIn some parts of Africa nothing is done except to the sound of\nmusic.\u201d \u201cThey are very expert in adapting the subjects of these songs\nto current events.\u201d The Malays \u201camuse all their leisure hours .\u00a0.\u00a0.\nwith the repetition of songs, which are for the most part proverbs\nillustrated. .\u00a0.\u00a0. Some that they rehearse in a kind of recitative\nat their _bimbangs_ or feasts are historical love-tales.\u201d A Sumatran\nmaiden will sometimes begin a tender song and be answered by one of the\nyoung men. The ballads of the Kamtschadales are \u201cinspired apparently by\ngrief, love, or domestic feeling;\u201d and their music conveys \u201ca sensation\nof sorrow and vague, unavailing regret.\u201d Of their love-songs it is said\n\u201cthe women generally compose them.\u201d A Kirghiz \u201csinger sits on one knee\nand sings in an unnatural tone of voice, his lay being usually of an\namorous character.\u201d Of the Yakuts we are told \u201ctheir style of singing\nis monotonous .\u00a0.\u00a0. their songs described the beauty of the landscape\nin terms which appeared to me exaggerated.\u201d\n\nIn these statements, which, omitting repetitions, are all which the\n_Descriptive Sociology_ contains relevant to the issue, several\nstriking facts are manifest. Among the lowest races the only musical\nutterances named are those which refer to the incidents of the\nmoment, and seem prompted by feelings which those incidents produce.\nThe derivation of song or chant from emotional speech in general,\nthus suggested, is similarly suggested by the habits of many higher\nraces; for they, too, show us that the musically-expressed feelings\nrelevant to the immediate occasion, or to past occasions, are feelings\nof various kinds: now of simple good {436} spirits and now of joy\nor triumph\u2014now of surprise, praise, admiration, and now of sorrow,\nmelancholy, regret. Only among certain of the more advanced races, as\nthe semi-civilized Malays and peoples of Northern Asia, do we read of\nlove-songs; and then, strange to say, these are mentioned as mostly\ncoming, not from men, but from women. Out of all the testimonies there\nis not one which tells of a love-song spontaneously commenced by a man\nto charm a woman. Entirely absent among the rudest types and many of\nthe more developed types, amatory musical utterance, where first found,\nis found under a form opposite to that which Mr. Darwin\u2019s hypothesis\nimplies; and we have to seek among civilized peoples before we meet, in\nserenades and the like, music of the kind which, according to his view,\nshould be the earliest.[59]\n\nEven were his view countenanced by the facts, there would remain\nunexplained the process by which sexually-excited sounds have been\nevolved into music. In the foregoing essay I have indicated the various\nqualities, relations, and combinations of tones, spontaneously prompted\nby emotions of all kinds, which exhibit, in undeveloped forms, the\ntraits of recitative and melody. To have reduced his hypothesis to a\nshape admitting of comparison, Mr. Darwin should have shown that the\nsounds excited by sexual emotions possess these same traits; and, to\nhave proved that his hypothesis is the more tenable, should have shown\nthat they possess these same traits in a greater degree. But he has not\nattempted to do this. He has simply suggested that instead of having\nits roots in the vocal sounds caused by feelings of all kinds, music\nhas its roots in the vocal {437} sounds caused by the amatory feeling\nonly: giving no reason why the effects of the feelings at large should\nbe ignored, and the effects of one particular feeling alone recognized.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nNineteen years after my essay on \u201cThe Origin and Function of Music\u201d was\npublished, Mr. Edmund Gurney criticized it in an article which made its\nappearance in the _Fortnightly Review_ for July 1876. Absorption in\nmore important work prevented me from replying. Though, some ten years\nago, I thought of defending my views against those of Mr. Darwin and\nMr. Gurney, the occurrence of Mr. Darwin\u2019s death obliged me to postpone\nfor a time any discussion of his views; and then, the more recent\nunfortunate death of Mr. Gurney caused a further postponement. I must\nnow, however, say that which seems needful, though there is no longer\nany possibility of a rejoinder from him.\n\nSome parts of Mr. Gurney\u2019s criticism I have already answered by\nimplication; for he adopts the hypothesis that music originated in\nthe vocal utterances prompted by sexual feeling. To the reasons above\ngiven for rejecting this hypothesis, I will add here, what I might have\nadded above, that it is at variance with one of the fundamental laws of\nevolution. All development proceeds from the general to the special.\nFirst there appear those traits which a thing has in common with many\nother things; then those traits which it has in common with a smaller\nclass of things; and so on until there eventually arise those traits\nwhich distinguish it from everything else. The genesis which I have\ndescribed conforms to this fundamental law. It posits the antecedent\nfact that feeling in general produces muscular contraction in general;\nand the less general fact that feeling in general produces, among other\nmuscular contractions, those which move the respiratory and vocal\napparatus. With these it joins the still less general fact that sounds\nindicative of feelings vary in sundry {438} respects according to the\nintensity of the feelings; and then enumerates the still less general\nfacts which show us the kinship between the vocal manifestations of\nfeeling and the characters of vocal music: the implication being that\nthere has gone on a progressive specialization. But the view which\nMr. Gurney adopts from Mr. Darwin is that from the special actions\nproducing the special sounds accompanying sexual excitement, were\nevolved those various actions producing the various sounds which\naccompany all other feelings. Vocal expression of a particular emotion\ncame first, and from this proceeded vocal expressions of emotions in\ngeneral: the order of evolution was reversed.\n\nTo deficient knowledge of the laws of evolution are due sundry of Mr.\nGurney\u2019s objections. He makes a cardinal error in assuming that a more\nevolved thing is distinguished from less evolved things in respect\nof _all_ the various traits of evolution; whereas, very generally, a\nhigher degree of evolution in some or most respects, is accompanied\nby an equal or lower degree of evolution in other respects. On the\naverage, increase of locomotive power goes along with advance of\nevolution; and yet numerous mammals are more fleet than man. The stage\nof development is largely indicated by degree of intelligence; and\nyet the more intelligent parrot is inferior in vision, in speed, and\nin destructive appliances, to the less-intelligent hawk. The contrast\nbetween birds and mammals well illustrates the general truth. A\nbird\u2019s skeleton diverges more widely from the skeleton of the lower\nvertebrates in respect of heterogeneity than does the skeleton of a\nmammal; and the bird has a more developed respiratory system, as well\nas a higher temperature of blood, and a superior power of locomotion.\nNevertheless, many mammals in respect of bulk, in respect of various\nappliances (especially for prehension), and in respect of intelligence,\nare more evolved than birds. Thus it is obviously a mistake to assume\nthat whatever is more {439} highly evolved in general character is\nmore highly evolved in every trait.\n\nOf Mr. Gurney\u2019s several objections which are based on this mistake here\nis an example. He says\u2014\u201cLoudness though a frequent is by no means a\nuniversal or essential element, either of song or of emotional speech\u201d\n(p. 107). Under one of its aspects this criticism is self-destructive;\nfor if, though both relatively loud in most cases, song and emotional\nspeech are both characterized by the occasional use of subdued tones,\nthen this is a further point of kinship between them\u2014a kinship which\nMr. Gurney seeks to disprove. Under its other aspect this criticism\nimplies the above-described misconception. If in a song, or rather\nin some part or parts of a song, the trait of loudness is absent,\nwhile the other traits of developed emotional utterance are present,\nit simply illustrates the truth that the traits of a highly-evolved\nproduct are frequently not all present together.\n\nA like answer is at hand to the next objection he makes. It runs thus:\u2015\n\n \u201cIn the recitative which he [Mr. Spencer] himself considers naturally\n and historically a step between speech and song, the rapid variation\n of pitch is impossible, and such recitative is distinguished from the\n tones even of common speech precisely by being more monotonous\u201d (p.\n 108).\n\nBut Mr. Gurney overlooks the fact that while, in recitative, some\ntraits of developed emotional utterance are not present, two of its\ntraits are present. One is that greater resonance of tone, caused by\ngreater contraction of the vocal chords, which distinguishes it from\nordinary speech. The other is the relative elevation of pitch, or\ndivergence from the medium tones of voice: a trait similarly implying\ngreater strain of certain vocal muscles, resulting from stronger\nfeeling.\n\nAnother difficulty raised by Mr. Gurney he would probably not have set\ndown had he been aware that one character of musical utterance which\nhe thinks {440} distinctive, is a character of all phenomena into\nwhich motion enters as a factor. He says:\u2014\u201cNow no one can suppose that\nthe sense of rhythm can be derived from emotional speech\u201d (p. 110).\nHad he referred to the chapter on \u201cThe Rhythm of Motion\u201d in _First\nPrinciples_, he would have seen that, in common with inorganic actions,\nall organic actions are completely or partially rhythmical\u2014from\nappetite and sleep to inspirations and heart-beats; from the winking\nof the eyes to the contractions of the intestines; from the motions\nof the legs to discharges through the nerves. Having contemplated\nsuch facts he would have seen that the rhythmical tendency which is\nperfectly displayed in musical utterance, is imperfectly displayed in\nemotional speech. Just as under emotion we see swayings of the body and\nwringings of the hands, so do we see contractions of the vocal organs\nwhich are now stronger and now weaker. Surely it is manifest that the\nutterances of passion, far from being monotonous, are characterized by\nrapidly-recurring ascents and descents of tone and by rapidly-recurring\nemphases: there is rhythm, though it is an irregular rhythm.\n\nWant of knowledge of the principles of evolution has, in another place,\nled Mr. Gurney to represent as an objection what is in reality a\nverification. He says:\u2015\n\n \u201cMusic is distinguished from emotional speech in that it proceeds not\n only by fixed degrees in time, but by fixed degrees in the scale. This\n is a constant quality through all the immense quantity of embryo and\n developed scale-systems that have been used; whereas the transitions\n of pitch which mark emotional affections of voice are, as Helmholtz\n has pointed out, of a gliding character\u201d (p. 113).\n\nHad Mr. Gurney known that evolution in all cases is from the indefinite\nto the definite, he would have seen that as a matter of course the\ngradations of emotional speech must be indefinite in comparison with\nthe gradations of developed music. Progress from the one to the\nother is in part _constituted_ by increasing definiteness in the\ntime-intervals and increasing definiteness in the tone-intervals.\nWere it {441} otherwise, the hypothesis I have set forth would lack\none of its evidences. To his allegation that not only the \u201cdeveloped\nscale-systems\u201d but also the \u201cembryo\u201d scale-systems are definite, it\nmay obviously be replied that the mere existence of any scale-system\ncapable of being written down, implies that the earlier stage of\nthe progress has already been passed through. To have risen to a\nscale-system is to have become definite; and until a scale-system has\nbeen reached vocal phrases cannot have been recorded. Moreover had Mr.\nGurney remembered that there are many people with musical perceptions\nso imperfect that when making their merely recognizable, and sometimes\nhardly recognizable, attempts to whistle or hum melodies, they show\nhow vague are their appreciations of musical intervals, he would have\nseen reason for doubting his assumption that definite scales were\nreached all at once. The fact that in what we call bad ears there\nare all degrees of imperfection, joined with the fact that where the\nimperfection is not great practice may remedy it, suffice of themselves\nto show that definite perceptions of musical intervals were reached by\ndegrees.\n\nSome of Mr. Gurney\u2019s objections are strangely insubstantial. Here is an\nexample:\u2015\n\n \u201cThe fact is that song, which moreover in our time is but a limited\n branch of music, is perpetually making conscious efforts; for\n instance, the most peaceful melody may be a considerable strain to a\n soprano voice, if sung in a very high register: while speech continues\n to obey in a natural way the physiological laws of emotion\u201d (p. 117).\n\nThat in exaggerating and emphasizing the traits of emotional speech,\nthe singer should be led to make \u201cconscious efforts\u201d is surely natural\nenough. What would Mr. Gurney have said of dancing? He would scarcely\nhave denied that saltatory movements often result spontaneously from\nexcited feeling; and he could hardly have doubted that primitive\ndancing arose as a systematized form of such movements. Would he\nhave considered the belief that stage-dancing is evolved from these\nspontaneous movements {442} to be negatived by the fact that a\nstage-dancer\u2019s bounds and gyrations are made with \u201cconscious efforts\u201d?\n\nIn his elaborate work on _The Power of Sound_, Mr. Gurney, repeating in\nother forms the objections I have above dealt with, adds to them some\nothers. One of these, which appears at first sight to have much weight,\nI must not pass by. He thus expresses it.\n\n \u201cAny one may convince himself that not only are the intervals used\n in emotional speech very large, twelve diatonic notes being quite an\n ordinary skip, but that he uses extremes of both high and low pitch\n with his speaking voice, which, if he tries to dwell on them and make\n them resonant, will be found to lie beyond the compass of his singing\n voice\u201d (p. 479).\n\nNow the part of my hypothesis which Mr. Gurney here combats is that,\nas in emotional speech so in song, feeling, by causing muscular\ncontractions, causes divergencies from the middle tones of the voice,\nwhich become wider as it increases; and that this fact supports the\nbelief that song is developed from emotional speech. To this Mr.\nGurney thinks it a conclusive answer that higher notes are used by the\nspeaking voice than by the singing voice. But if, as his words imply,\nthere is a physical impediment to the production of notes in the one\nvoice as high as those in the other, then my argument is justified if,\nin either voice, extremes of feeling are shown by extremes of pitch.\nIf, for example, the celebrated _ut de poitrine_ with which Tamberlik\nbrought down the house in one of the scenes of William Tell, was\nrecognized as expressing the greatest intensity of martial patriotism,\nmy position is warranted, even though in his speaking voice he could\nhave produced a still higher note.\n\nOf answers to Mr. Gurney\u2019s objections the two most effective are\nsuggested by the passage in which he sums up his conclusions. Here are\nhis words.\n\n  \u201cIt is enough to recall how every consideration tended to the same\n result; that the oak grew from the acorn; that the musical faculty\n and pleasure, which have to do with music and nothing else, are the\n representatives and {443} linear descendants of a faculty and pleasure\n which were musical and nothing else; and that, however rudely and\n tentatively applied to speech, Music was a _separate order_\u201d (p. 492).\n\nThus, then, it is implied that the true germs of music stand towards\ndeveloped music as the acorn to the oak. Now suppose we ask\u2014How many\ntraits of the oak are to be found in the acorn? Next to none. And then\nsuppose we ask\u2014How many traits of music are to be found in the tones of\nemotional speech? Very many. Yet while Mr. Gurney thinks that music had\nits origin in something which might have been as unlike it as the acorn\nis unlike the oak, he rejects the theory that it had its origin in\nsomething as much like it as the cadences of emotional speech; and he\ndoes this because there are sundry differences between the characters\nof speech-cadences and the characters of music. In the one case he\ntacitly assumes a great unlikeness between germ and product; while\nin the other case he objects because germ and product are not in all\nrespects similar!\n\nI may end by pointing out how extremely improbable, _a priori_, is Mr.\nGurney\u2019s conception. He admits, as perforce he must, that emotional\nspeech has various traits in common with recitative and song\u2014relatively\ngreater resonance, relatively greater loudness, more marked divergences\nfrom medium tones, the use of the extremes of pitch in signifying the\nextremes of feeling, and so on. But, denying that the one is derived\nfrom the others, he implies that these kindred groups of traits have\nhad independent origins. Two sets of peculiarities in the use of the\nvoice which show various kinships, have nothing to do with one another!\nI think it merely requires to put the proposition in this shape to see\nhow incredible it is.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nSundry objections to the views contained in the essay on \u201cThe Origin\nand Function of Music,\u201d have arisen from misconception of its scope.\nAn endeavour to explain the _origin_ of music, has been dealt with\nas though it were a theory of music in its entirety. An hypothesis\n{444} concerning the rudiments has been rejected because it did not\naccount for everything contained in the developed product. To preclude\nthis misapprehension for the future, and to show how much more is\ncomprehended in a theory of music than I professed to deal with, let me\nenumerate the several components of musical effect. They may properly\nbe divided into _sensational_, _perceptional_, and _emotional_.\n\nThat the sensational pleasure is distinguishable from the other\npleasures which music yields, will not be questioned. A sweet sound\nis agreeable in itself, when heard out of relation to other sounds.\nTones of various _timbres_, too, are severally appreciated as having\ntheir special beauties. Of further elements in the sensational pleasure\nhave to be named those which result from certain congruities between\nnotes and immediately succeeding notes. This pleasure, like the primary\npleasure which fine quality yields, appears to have a purely physical\nbasis. We know that the agreeableness of simultaneous tones depends\npartly on the relative frequency of recurring correspondences of the\nvibrations producing them, and partly on the relative infrequency\nof beats, and we may suspect that there is a kindred cause for the\nagreeableness of successive tones; since the auditory apparatus which\nhas been at one instant vibrating in a particular manner, will take\nup certain succeeding vibrations more readily than others. Evidently\nit is a question of the _degree_ of congruity; for the most congruous\nvibrations, those of the octaves, yield less pleasure when heard in\nsuccession than those of which the congruity is not so great. To\nobtain the greatest pleasure in this and other things, there requires\nboth likeness and difference. Recognition of this fact introduces us\nto the next element of sensational pleasure\u2014that due to contrast;\nincluding contrast of pitch, of loudness, and of _timbre_. In this\ncase, as in other cases, the disagreeableness caused by frequent\nrepetition of the same sensation (here literally called \u201cmonotony\u201d)\nresults from the exhaustion which any single {445} nervous agent\nundergoes from perpetual stimulation; and contrast gives pleasure\nbecause it implies action of an agent which has had rest. It follows\nthat much of the sensational pleasure to be obtained from music depends\non such adjustments of sounds as bring into play, without conflict,\nmany nervous elements: exercising all and not overexerting any. We\nmust not overlook a concomitant effect. With the agreeable sensation\nis joined a faint emotion of an agreeable kind. Beyond the simple\ndefinite pleasure yielded by a sweet tone, there is a vague, diffused\npleasure. As indicated in the _Principles of Psychology_ (\u00a7 537),\neach nervous excitation produces reverberation throughout the nervous\nsystem at large; and probably this indefinite emotional pleasure is\na consequence. Doubtless some shape is given to it by association.\nBut after observing how much there is in common between the diffused\nfeeling aroused by smelling at a deliciously scented flower and that\naroused by listening to a sweet tone, it will, I think, be perceived\nthat the more general cause predominates.\n\nThe division between the sensational effects and the perceptional\neffects is of course indefinite. As above implied, part of the\nsensational pleasure depends on the relation between each tone and the\nsucceeding tone; and hence this pleasure gradually merges into that\nwhich arises from perceiving the structural connexions between the\nphrases and between the larger parts of musical compositions. Much\nof the gratification given by a melody consists in the consciousness\nof the relations between each group of sounds heard and the groups\nof sounds held in memory as having just passed, as well as those\nrepresented as about to come. In many cases the passage listened\nto would not be regarded as having any beauty were it not for its\nremembered connexions with passages in the immediate past and the\nimmediate future. If, for example, from the first movement of\nBeethoven\u2019s Funeral-March sonata the first five notes are detached,\nthey appear to be meaningless; {446} but if, the movement being known,\nthey are joined with imaginations of the anticipated phrases, they\nimmediately acquire meaning and beauty. Indefinable as are the causes\nof this perceptional pleasure in many cases, some causes of it are\ndefinable. Symmetry is one. A chief element in melodic effect results\nfrom repetitions of phrases which are either identical, or differ\nonly in pitch, or differ only in minor variations: there being in the\nfirst case the pleasure derived from perception of complete likeness,\nand in the other cases the greater pleasure derived from perception\nof likeness with difference\u2014a perception which is more involved, and\ntherefore exercises a greater number of nervous agents. Next comes, as\na source of gratification, the consciousness of pronounced unlikeness\nor contrast; such as that between passages above the middle tones and\npassages below, or as that between ascending phrases and descending\nphrases. And then we rise to larger contrasts; as when, the first theme\nin a melody having been elaborated, there is introduced another having\na certain kinship though in many respects different, after which there\nis a return to the first theme: a structure which yields more extensive\nand more complex perceptions of both differences and likenesses. But\nwhile perceptional pleasures include much that is of the highest, they\nalso include much that is of the lowest. A certain kind of interest, if\nnot of beauty, is producible by the likenesses and contrasts of musical\nphrases which are intrinsically meaningless or even ugly. A familiar\nexperience exemplifies this. If a piece of paper is folded and on one\nside of the crease there is drawn an irregular line in ink, which,\nby closing the paper, is blotted on the opposite side of the crease,\nthere results a figure which, in virtue of its symmetry, has some\nbeauty; no matter how entirely without beauty the two lines themselves\nmay be. Similarly, some interest results from the parallelism of\nmusical phrases, notwithstanding utter lack of interest in the\nphrases themselves. The kind of interest {447} resulting from such\nparallelisms, and from many contrasts, irrespective of any intrinsic\nworth in their components, is that which is most appreciated by the\nmusically-uncultured, and gives popularity to miserable drawing-room\nballads and vulgar music-hall songs.\n\nThe remaining element of musical effect consists in the idealized\nrendering of emotion. This, as I have sought to show, is the primitive\nelement, and will ever continue to be the vital element; for if \u201cmelody\nis the soul of music,\u201d then expression is the soul of melody\u2014the\nsoul without which it is mechanical and meaningless, whatever may\nbe the merit of its form. This primitive element may with tolerable\nclearness be distinguished from the other elements, and may coexist\nwith them in various degrees: in some cases being the predominant\nelement. Anyone who, in analytical mood, listens to such a song as\n_Robert, toi que j\u2019aime_, cannot, I think, fail to perceive that its\neffectiveness depends on the way in which it exalts and intensifies\nthe traits of passionate utterance. No doubt as music develops, the\nemotional element (which affects structure chiefly through the forms\nof phrases) is increasingly complicated with, and obscured by, the\nperceptional element; which both modifies these phrases and unites them\ninto symmetrical and contrasted combinations. But though the groups\nof notes which emotion prompts admit of elaboration into structures\nthat have additional charms due to artfully-arranged contrasts and\nrepetitions, the essential element is liable to be thus submerged in\nthe non-essential. Only in melodies of high types, such as the _Addio_\nof Mozart and _Adelaide_ of Beethoven, do we see the two requirements\nsimultaneously fulfilled. Musical genius is shown in achieving the\ndecorative beauty without losing the beauty of emotional meaning.\n\nIt goes without saying that there must be otherwise accounted for\nthat relatively modern element in musical effect which has now almost\noutgrown in importance the {448} other elements\u2014I mean harmony. This\ncannot be affiliated on the natural language of emotion; since, in\nsuch language, limited to successive tones, there cannot originate\nthe effects wrought by simultaneous tones. Dependent as harmony is on\nrelations among rates of aerial pulses, its primary basis is purely\nmechanical; and its secondary basis lies in the compound vibrations\nwhich certain combinations of mechanical rhythms cause in the\nauditory apparatus. The resulting pleasure must, therefore, be due\nto nervous excitations of kinds which, by their congruity, exalt one\nanother; and thus generate a larger volume of agreeable sensation. A\nfurther pleasure of sensational origin which harmony yields is due to\ncontrapuntal effects. Skilful counterpoint has the general character\nthat it does not repeat in immediate succession similar combinations of\ntones and similar directions of change; and by thus avoiding temporary\nover-tax of the nervous structures brought into action, keeps them in\nbetter condition for subsequent action. Absence of regard for this\nrequirement characterizes the music of Gluck, of whom Handel said\u2014\u201cHe\nknows no more counterpoint than my cook;\u201d and it is this disregard\nwhich produces its cloying character. Respecting the effects of harmony\nI will add only that the vague emotional accompaniment to the sensation\nproduced by a single sweet tone, is paralleled by the stronger\nemotional accompaniment to the more voluminous and complex sensation\nproduced by a fine chord. Clearly this vague emotion forms a large\ncomponent in the pleasure which harmony gives.\n\nWhile thus recognizing, and indeed emphasizing, the fact that of many\ntraits of developed music my hypothesis respecting the origin of music\nyields no explanation, let me point out that this hypothesis gains a\nfurther general support from its conformity to the law of evolution.\nProgressive integration is seen in the immense contrast between the\nsmall combinations of tones constituting a cadence of grief, or anger,\nor triumph, and the vast combinations of {449} tones, simultaneous\nand successive, constituting an oratorio. Great advance in coherence\nbecomes manifest when, from the lax unions among the sounds in which\nfeeling spontaneously expresses itself, or even from those few musical\nphrases which constitute a simple air, we pass to those elaborate\ncompositions in which portions small and large are tied together into\nextended organic wholes. On comparing the unpremeditated inflexions\nof the voice in emotional speech, vague in tones and times, with\nthose premeditated ones which the musician arranges for stage or\nconcert room, in which the divisions of time are exactly measured, the\nsuccessive intervals precise, and the harmonies adjusted to a nicety,\nwe observe in the last a far higher definiteness. And immense progress\nin heterogeneity is seen on putting side by side the monotonous chants\nof savages with the musical compositions familiar to us; each of which\nis relatively heterogeneous within itself, and the assemblage of which\nforms an immeasurably heterogeneous aggregate.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nStrong support for the theory enunciated in this essay, and defended\nin the foregoing paragraphs, is furnished by the testimonies of two\ntravellers in Hungary, given in works published in 1878 and 1888\nrespectively. Here is an extract from the first of the two.\n\n \u201cMusic is an instinct with these Hungarian gipsies. They play by\n ear, and with a marvellous precision, not surpassed by musicians\n who have been subject to the most careful training. .\u00a0.\u00a0. The airs\n they play are most frequently compositions of their own, and are in\n character quite peculiar.\u00a0.\u00a0. I heard on this occasion one of the\n gipsy airs which made an indelible impression on my mind; it seemed\n to me the thrilling utterance of a people\u2019s history. There was the\n low wail of sorrow, of troubled passionate grief, stirring the heart\n to restlessness, then the sense of turmoil and defeat; but upon this\n breaks suddenly a wild burst of exultation, of rapturous joy\u2014a triumph\n achieved, which hurries you along with it in resistless sympathy.\n The excitable Hungarians can literally become intoxicated with this\n music\u2014and no wonder. You cannot reason upon it, or explain it, but its\n strains compel you to sensations of despair and joy, of exultation\n and excitement, as though under the influence of some potent\n charm.\u201d\u2014_Round about the Carpathians_, by Andrew F. Crosse, pp. 11,\n 12. {450}\n\n\nStill more graphic and startling is the description given by a more\nrecent traveller, E. Gerard.\n\n  \u201cDevoid of printed notes, the Tzigane is not forced to divide his\n attention between a sheet of paper and his instrument, and there is\n consequently nothing to detract from the utter abandonment with which\n he absorbs himself in his playing. He seems to be sunk in an inner\n world of his own; the instrument sobs and moans in his hands, and is\n pressed tight against his heart as though it had grown and taken root\n there. This is the true moment of inspiration, to which he rarely\n gives way, and then only in the privacy of an intimate circle, never\n before a numerous and unsympathetic audience. Himself spell-bound by\n the power of the tones he evokes, his head gradually sinking lower\n and lower over the instrument, the body bent forward in an attitude\n of rapt attention, and his ear seeming to hearken to far-off ghostly\n strains audible to himself alone, the untaught Tzigane achieves a\n perfection of expression unattainable by mere professional training.\n\n This power of identification with his music is the real secret of\n the Tzigane\u2019s influence over his audience. Inspired and carried away\n by his own strains, he must perforce carry his hearers with him as\n well; and the Hungarian listener throws himself heart and soul into\n this species of musical intoxication, which to him is the greatest\n delight on earth. There is a proverb which says, \u2018The Hungarian only\n requires a gipsy fiddler and a glass of water in order to make him\n quite drunk;\u2019 and, indeed, intoxication is the only word fittingly to\n describe the state of exaltation into which I have seen a Hungarian\n audience thrown by a gipsy band.\n\n Sometimes, under the combined influence of music and wine, the\n Tziganes become like creatures possessed; the wild cries and stamps of\n an equally excited audience only stimulate them to greater exertions.\n The whole atmosphere seems tossed by billows of passionate harmony;\n we seem to catch sight of the electric sparks of inspiration flying\n through the air. It is then that the Tzigane player gives forth\n everything that is secretly lurking within him\u2014fierce anger, childish\n wailings, presumptuous exaltation, brooding melancholy, and passionate\n despair; and at such moments, as a Hungarian writer has said, one\n could readily believe in his power of drawing down the angels from\n heaven into hell!\n\n Listen how another Hungarian has here described the effect of their\n music:\u2014\u2018How it rushes through the veins like electric fire! How it\n penetrates straight to the soul! In soft plaintive minor tones the\n _adagio_ opens with a slow rhythmical movement: it is a sighing\n and longing of unsatisfied aspirations; a craving for undiscovered\n happiness; the lover\u2019s yearning for the object of his affection; the\n expression of mourning for lost joys, for happy days gone for ever;\n then abruptly changing to a major key, the tones get faster and more\n agitated; and from the whirlpool of harmony the melody gradually\n detaches itself, alternately drowned in the foam of overbreaking\n waves, to reappear floating on the surface with undulating\n motion\u2014collecting as it were fresh power for a renewed burst of fury.\n But {451} quickly as the storm came it is gone again, and the music\n relapses into the melancholy yearnings of heretofore.\u2019\u201d _The Land\n beyond the Forest_, vol. II, pp. 122\u20134. Lond. 1888.\n\nAfter the evidence thus furnished, argument is almost superfluous. The\norigin of music as the developed language of emotion seems to be no\nlonger an inference but simply a description of the fact.\n\n\nENDNOTES TO _THE ORIGIN AND FUNCTION OF MUSIC_.\n\n[56] Those who seek information on this point may find it in an\ninteresting tract by Mr. Alexander Bain, on _Animal Instinct and\nIntelligence_.\n\n[57] _The Music of the Most Ancient Nations, &c._, by Carl Engel. This\nquotation is not contained in my essay as originally published, nor\nin the version of it first reproduced in 1858. Herr Engel\u2019s work was\nissued in 1864, seven years after the date of the essay.\n\n[58] It is far more probable that the ascents and descents made by\nthis gibbon consisted of indefinitely-slurred tones. To suppose that\neach was a series of definite semi-tones strains belief to breaking\npoint; considering that among human beings the great majority, even of\nthose who have good ears, are unable to go up or down the chromatic\nscale without being taught to do so. The achievement is one requiring\nconsiderable practice; and that such an achievement should be\nspontaneous on the part of a monkey is incredible.\n\n[59] After the above paragraphs had been sent to the printers I\nreceived from an American anthropologist, the Rev. Owen Dorsey, some\nessays containing kindred evidence. Of over three dozen songs and\nchants of the Omaha, Ponka, and other Indians, in some cases given\nwith music and in other cases without, there are but five which have\nany reference to amatory feeling; and while in these the expression of\namatory feeling comes from women, nothing more than derision of them\ncomes from men.\n\n\n\n\n{452}\n\nTHE PHYSIOLOGY OF LAUGHTER.\n\n\n[_First published in_ Macmillan\u2019s Magazine _for March 1860._]\n\nWhy do we smile when a child puts on a man\u2019s hat? or what induces us\nto laugh on reading that the corpulent Gibbon was unable to rise from\nhis knees after making a tender declaration? The usual reply to such\nquestions is, that laughter results from a perception of incongruity.\nEven were there not, on this reply, the obvious criticism that laughter\noften occurs from extreme pleasure or from mere vivacity, there would\nstill remain the real problem\u2014How comes a sense of the incongruous\nto be followed by these peculiar bodily actions? Some have alleged\nthat laughter is due to the pleasure of a relative self-elevation,\nwhich we feel on seeing the humiliation of others. But this theory,\nwhatever portion of truth it may contain, is, in the first place, open\nto the fatal objection that there are various humiliations to others\nwhich produce in us anything but laughter; and, in the second place,\nit does not apply to the many instances in which no one\u2019s dignity is\nimplicated: as when we laugh at a good pun. Moreover, like the other,\nit is merely a generalization of certain conditions to laughter;\nand not an explanation of the odd movements which occur under these\nconditions. Why, when greatly delighted, or impressed with certain\nunexpected contrasts {453} of ideas, should there be a contraction\nof particular facial muscles and particular muscles of the chest and\nabdomen? Such answer to this question as may be possible, can be\nrendered only by physiology.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nEvery child has made the attempt to hold the foot still while it\nis tickled, and has failed; and there is scarcely any one who has\nnot vainly tried to avoid winking when a hand has been suddenly\npassed before the eyes. These examples of muscular movements which\noccur independently of the will, or in spite of it, illustrate\nwhat physiologists call reflex-action; as likewise do sneezing and\ncoughing. To this class of cases, in which involuntary motions are\naccompanied by sensations, has to be added another class of cases, in\nwhich involuntary motions are unaccompanied by sensations:\u2014instance\nthe pulsations of the heart; the contractions of the stomach during\ndigestion. Further, the majority of seemingly-voluntary acts in such\ncreatures as insects, worms, molluscs, are considered by physiologists\nto be as purely automatic as is the dilatation or closure of the iris\nunder variations in the quantity of light; and similarly exemplify the\nlaw, that an impression on the end of an afferent nerve is conveyed\nto some ganglionic centre, and is thence usually reflected along an\nefferent nerve to one or more muscles which it causes to contract.\n\nIn a modified form this principle holds with voluntary acts. Nervous\nexcitation always _tends_ to beget muscular motion; and when it rises\nto a certain intensity always does beget it. Not only in reflex\nactions, whether with or without sensation, do we see that special\nnerves, when raised to states of tension, discharge themselves on\nspecial muscles with which they are indirectly connected; but those\nexternal actions through which we read the feelings of others, show us\nthat, under any considerable tension, the nervous system in general\ndischarges itself on the muscular system in general: either with or\nwithout the {454} guidance of the will. The shivering produced by\ncold implies irregular muscular contractions, which, though at first\nonly partly involuntary, become, when the cold is extreme, almost\nwholly involuntary. When you have severely burnt your finger it is very\ndifficult to preserve a dignified composure: contortion of face, or\nmovement of limb, is pretty sure to follow. If a man receives good news\nwith neither facial change nor bodily motion, it is inferred that he\nis not much pleased, or that he has extraordinary self-control: either\ninference implying that joy almost universally produces contraction\nof the muscles, and so, alters the expression, or attitude, or both.\nAnd when we hear of the feats of strength which men have performed\nwhen their lives were at stake\u2014when we read how, in the energy of\ndespair, even paralyzed patients have regained for a time the use of\ntheir limbs; we see still more clearly the relation between nervous\nand muscular excitements. It becomes manifest both that emotions and\nsensations tend to generate bodily movements, and that the movements\nare violent in proportion as the emotions or sensations are intense.[60]\n\nThis, however, is not the sole direction in which nervous excitement\nexpends itself. Viscera as well as muscles may receive the discharge.\nThat the heart and blood-vessels (which, indeed, being all contractile,\nmay in a restricted sense be classed with the muscular system) are\nquickly affected by pleasures and pains, we have daily proved to\nus. Every sensation of any acuteness accelerates the pulse; and how\nsensitive the heart is to emotions, is testified by the familiar\nexpressions which use heart and feeling as convertible terms. Similarly\nwith the digestive organs. Without detailing the various ways in which\nthese may be influenced by our mental states, it suffices to mention\nthe marked benefits derived by dyspeptics, as well as other invalids,\nfrom cheerful society, welcome news, {455} change of scene, to show\nhow pleasurable feeling stimulates the viscera in general into greater\nactivity.\n\nThere is still another direction in which any excited portion of the\nnervous system may discharge itself; and a direction in which it\nusually does discharge itself when the excitement is not strong. It\nmay pass on the stimulus to some other portion of the nervous system.\nThis is what occurs in quiet thinking and feeling. The successive\nstates which constitute consciousness, result from this. Sensations\nexcite ideas and emotions; these in their turns arouse other ideas\nand emotions; and so on continuously. That is to say, the tension\nexisting in particular nerve-centres, or groups of nerve-centres, when\nthey yield us certain sensations, ideas, or emotions, generates an\nequivalent tension in some other nervous structures, with which there\nis a connexion: the flow of energy passing on, the one idea or feeling\ndies in producing the next.\n\nThus, then, while we are totally unable to comprehend how the\nexcitement of certain nerve-centres should generate feeling\u2014while, in\nthe production of consciousness by physical agents acting on physical\nstructures, we come to a mystery never to be solved; it is yet quite\npossible for us to know by observation what are the successive forms\nwhich this mystery may take. We see that there are three channels along\nwhich nerve-centres in a state of tension may discharge themselves; or\nrather, I should say, three classes of channels. They may pass on the\nexcitement to other nerve-centres that have no direct connexions with\nthe bodily members, and may so cause other feelings and ideas; or they\nmay pass on the excitement to one or more motor nerves, and so cause\nmuscular contractions; or they may pass on the excitement to nerves\nwhich supply the viscera, and may so stimulate one or more of these.\n\nFor simplicity\u2019s sake I have described these as alternative routes,\none or other of which any current of nerve-force must take; thereby,\nas it may be thought, implying that {456} such current will be\nexclusively confined to some one of them. But this is by no means the\ncase. Rarely, if ever, does it happen that a state of nervous tension,\npresent to consciousness as a feeling, expends itself in one direction\nonly. Very generally it may be observed to expend itself in two; and\nit is probable that the discharge is never absolutely absent from any\none of the three. There is, however, variety in the _proportions_ in\nwhich the discharge is divided among these different channels under\ndifferent circumstances. In a man whose fear impels him to run, the\nmental tension generated is only in part transformed into a muscular\nstimulus: there is a surplus which causes a rapid current of ideas. An\nagreeable state of feeling produced, say by praise, is not wholly used\nup in arousing the succeeding phase of the feeling and the new ideas\nappropriate to it; but a certain portion overflows into the visceral\nnervous system, increasing the action of the heart and facilitating\ndigestion. And here we come upon a class of considerations and facts\nwhich open the way to a solution of our special problem.\n\nFor, starting with the truth that at any moment the existing quantity\nof liberated nerve-force which in an inscrutable way produces in us\nthe state we call feeling, _must_ expend itself in some direction, it\nfollows that, if of the several channels it may take, one is wholly or\npartially closed, more must be taken by the others; or that if two are\nclosed, the discharge along the remaining one must be more intense; and\nthat, conversely, should anything determine an unusual efflux in one\ndirection, there will be a diminished efflux in other directions.\n\nDaily experience illustrates these conclusions. It is commonly remarked\nthat the suppression of external signs of feeling, makes feeling more\nintense. The deepest grief is silent grief. Why? Because the nervous\nexcitement not discharged in muscular action, discharges itself\nin other nervous excitements\u2014arouses more numerous and more {457}\nremote associations of melancholy ideas, and so increases the mass\nof feelings. People who conceal their anger are habitually found to\nbe more revengeful than those who explode in loud speech and vehement\naction. Why? Because, as before, the emotion is reflected back,\naccumulates, and intensifies. Similarly, men who, as proved by their\npowers of representation, have the keenest appreciation of the comic,\nare usually able to do and say the most ludicrous things with perfect\ngravity.\n\nOn the other hand, all are familiar with the truth that bodily activity\ndeadens emotion. Under great irritation we get relief by walking about\nrapidly. Extreme effort in the bootless attempt to achieve a desired\nend, greatly diminishes the intensity of the desire. Those who are\nforced to exert themselves after misfortunes, do not suffer nearly\nso much as those who remain quiescent. If any one wishes to check\nintellectual excitement, he cannot choose a more efficient method\nthan running till he is exhausted. Moreover, these cases, in which\nthe production of feeling and thought is hindered by determining the\nnervous energy towards bodily movements, have their counterparts in\nthe cases in which bodily movements are hindered by extra absorption\nof nervous energy in sudden thoughts and feelings. If, when walking,\nthere flashes on you an idea that creates great surprise, hope, or\nalarm, you stop; or if sitting cross-legged, swinging your pendent\nfoot, the movement is at once arrested. From the viscera, too, intense\nmental action abstracts energy. Joy, disappointment, anxiety, or any\nmoral perturbation rising to a great height, destroys appetite; or, if\nfood has been taken, arrests digestion; and even a purely intellectual\nactivity, when extreme, does the like.\n\nFacts, then, bear out these _a priori_ inferences, that the nervous\nexcitement at any moment present to consciousness as feeling, must\nexpend itself in some way or other; that of the three classes of\nchannels open to it, it must {458} take one, two, or more, according\nto circumstances; that the closure or obstruction of one, must increase\nthe discharge through the others; and, conversely, that if, to answer\nsome demand, the efflux of nervous energy in one direction is unusually\ngreat, there must be a corresponding decrease of the efflux in other\ndirections. Setting out from these premises, let us now see what\ninterpretation is to be put on the phenomena of laughter.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThat laughter is a form of muscular excitement, and so illustrates\nthe general law that feeling passing a certain pitch habitually vents\nitself in bodily action, scarcely needs pointing out. It perhaps needs\npointing out, however, that strong feeling of almost any kind produces\nthis result. It is not a sense of the ludicrous, only, which does it;\nnor are the various forms of joyous emotion the sole additional causes.\nWe have, besides, the sardonic laughter and the hysterical laughter\nwhich result from mental distress; to which must be added certain\nsensations, as tickling, and, according to Mr. Bain, cold, and some\nkinds of acute pain.\n\nStrong feeling, mental or physical, being, then, the general cause of\nlaughter, we have to note that the muscular actions constituting it\nare distinguished from most others by this, that they are purposeless.\nIn general, bodily motions that are prompted by feelings are directed\nto special ends; as when we try to escape a danger, or struggle to\nsecure a gratification. But the movements of chest and limbs which\nwe make when laughing have no object. And now remark that these\nquasi-convulsive contractions of the muscles, having no object, but\nbeing results of an uncontrolled discharge of energy, we may see whence\narise their special characters\u2014how it happens that certain classes of\nmuscles are affected first, and then certain other classes. For an\noverflow of nerve-force undirected by any motive, will manifestly take\nfirst the {459} most habitual routes; and if these do not suffice,\nwill next overflow into the less habitual ones. Well, it is through the\norgans of speech that feeling passes into movement with the greatest\nfrequency. The jaws, tongue, and lips are used not only to express\nstrong irritation or gratification, but that very moderate flow of\nmental energy which accompanies ordinary conversation, finds its chief\nvent through this channel. Hence it happens that certain muscles round\nthe mouth, small and easy to move, are the first to contract under\npleasurable emotion. The class of muscles which, next after those of\narticulation, are most constantly set in action (or extra action, let\nus say) by feelings of all kinds, are those of respiration. Under\npleasurable or painful sensations we breathe more rapidly: possibly\nas a consequence of the increased demand for oxygenated blood. The\nsensations that accompany exertion also bring on hard breathing; which\nhere more evidently responds to the physiological needs. And emotions,\ntoo, agreeable and disagreeable, both, at first, excite respiration;\nthough the last subsequently depress it. That is to say, of the bodily\nmuscles, the respiratory are more constantly implicated than any others\nin those various acts which our feelings impel us to; and, hence,\nwhen there occurs an undirected discharge of nervous energy into the\nmuscular system, it happens that, if the quantity be considerable, it\nconvulses not only certain of the articulatory and vocal muscles, but\nalso those which expel air from the lungs. Should the feeling to be\nexpended be still greater in amount\u2014too great to find vent in these\nclasses of muscles\u2014another class comes into play. The upper limbs are\nset in motion. Children frequently clap their hands in glee; by some\nadults the hands are rubbed together; and others, under still greater\nintensity of delight, slap their knees and sway their bodies backwards\nand forwards. Last of all, when the other channels for the escape of\nthe surplus nerve-force have been filled to {460} overflowing, a yet\nfurther and less-used group of muscles is spasmodically affected: the\nhead is thrown back and the spine bent inwards\u2014there is a slight degree\nof what medical men call opisthotonos. Thus, then, without contending\nthat the phenomena of laughter in all their details are to be so\naccounted for, we see that in their _ensemble_ they conform to these\ngeneral principles:\u2014that feeling excites to muscular action; that when\nthe muscular action is unguided by a purpose the muscles first affected\nare those which feeling most habitually stimulates; and that as the\nfeeling to be expended increases in quantity it excites an increasing\nnumber of muscles, in a succession determined by the relative frequency\nwith which they respond to the regulated dictates of feeling. To which\nas a qualifying and complicating factor must be added the relative\nsizes of the muscles; since, other things equal, the smaller muscles\nwill be moved more readily than the larger.\n\nThere still, however, remains the question with which we set out.\nThe explanation here given applies only to the laughter produced\nby acute pleasure or pain: it does not apply to the laughter which\nfollows certain perceptions of incongruity. It is an insufficient\nexplanation that in these cases, laughter is a result of the pleasure\nwe take in escaping from the restraint of grave feelings. That this\nis a part-cause is true. Doubtless very often, as Mr. Bain says, \u201cit\nis the coerced form of seriousness and solemnity without the reality\nthat gives us that stiff position from which a contact with triviality\nor vulgarity relieves us, to our uproarious delight,\u201d And in so far\nas mirth is caused by the gush of agreeable feeling which follows\nthe cessation of unpleasant mental strain, it further illustrates\nthe general principle above set forth. But no explanation is thus\nafforded of the mirth which ensues when the short silence between the\n_andante_ and _allegro_ in one of Beethoven\u2019s symphonies, is broken by\na loud sneeze. In this, and hosts of like cases, the mental tension\nis not coerced but {461} spontaneous\u2014not disagreeable but agreeable;\nand the coming impressions to which attention is directed, promise a\ngratification which few, if any, desire to escape. Hence, when the\nunlucky sneeze occurs, it cannot be that the laughter of the audience\nis due simply to the release from an irksome attitude of mind: some\nother cause must be sought.\n\nThis cause we shall arrive at by carrying our analysis a step further.\nWe have but to consider the quantity of feeling which exists under such\ncircumstances, and then to ask what are the conditions determining the\ndirection of its discharge, to reach a solution. Take a case. You are\nsitting in a theatre, absorbed in the progress of an interesting drama.\nSome climax has been reached which has aroused your sympathies\u2014say, a\nreconciliation between the hero and heroine, after long and painful\nmisunderstanding. The feelings excited by this scene are not of a kind\nfrom which you seek relief; but are, on the contrary, a grateful relief\nfrom the painful feelings with which you have witnessed the previous\nestrangement. Moreover, the sentiments these fictitious personages\nhave for the moment inspired you with, are not such as would lead you\nto rejoice in any indignity offered to them; but rather, such as would\nmake you resent the indignity. And now, while you are contemplating the\nreconciliation with a pleasurable sympathy, there appears from behind\nthe scenes a tame kid, which, having stared round at the audience,\nwalks up to the lovers and sniffs at them. You cannot help joining\nin the roar which greets this _contretemps_. Inexplicable as is this\nirresistible burst on the hypothesis of a pleasure in escaping from\nmental restraint; or on the hypothesis of a pleasure from relative\nincrease of self-importance, when witnessing the humiliation of\nothers; it is readily explicable if we consider what, in such a case,\nmust become of the feeling that existed at the moment the incongruity\narose. A large mass of emotion had been produced; or, to speak in\nphysiological language, a large portion of the nervous {462} system\nwas in a state of tension. There was also great expectation with\nrespect to the further evolution of the scene\u2014a quantity of vague,\nnascent thought and emotion, into which the existing quantity of\nthought and emotion was about to pass. Had there been no interruption,\nthe body of new ideas and feelings next excited, would have sufficed to\nabsorb the whole of the liberated nervous energy. But now, this large\namount of nervous energy, instead of being allowed to expend itself\nin producing an equivalent amount of the new thoughts and emotions\nwhich were nascent, is suddenly checked in its flow. The channels\nalong which the discharge was about to take place, are closed. The new\nchannel opened\u2014that afforded by the appearance and proceedings of the\nkid\u2014is a small one; the ideas and feelings suggested are not numerous\nand massive enough to carry off the nervous energy to be expended. The\nexcess must therefore discharge itself in some other direction; and in\nthe way already explained, there results an efflux through the motor\nnerves to various classes of the muscles, producing the half-convulsive\nactions we term laughter.\n\nThis explanation is in harmony with the fact that when, among several\npersons who witness the same ludicrous occurrence, there are some\nwho do not laugh, it is because there has arisen in them an emotion\nnot participated in by the rest, and which is sufficiently massive\nto absorb all the nascent excitement. Among the spectators of an\nawkward tumble, those who preserve their gravity are those in whom\nthere is excited a degree of sympathy with the sufferer, sufficiently\ngreat to serve as an outlet for the feeling which the occurrence had\nturned out of its previous course. Sometimes anger carries off the\narrested current; and so prevents laughter. An instance of this was\nlately furnished me by a friend who had been witnessing the feats at\nFranconi\u2019s. A tremendous leap had just been made by an acrobat over a\nnumber of horses. The clown, seemingly envious of this success, made\nostentatious preparation for doing the like; {463} and then, taking\nthe preliminary run with immense energy, stopped short on reaching the\nfirst horse, and pretended to wipe some dust from its haunches. In most\nof the spectators, merriment was excited; but in my friend, wound up by\nthe expectation of the coming leap to a state of great nervous tension,\nthe effect of the baulk was to produce indignation. Experience thus\nproves what the theory implies; namely, that the discharge of arrested\nfeelings into the muscular system, takes place only in the absence\nof other adequate channels\u2014does not take place if there arise other\nfeelings equal in amount to those arrested.\n\nEvidence still more conclusive is at hand. If we contrast the\nincongruities which produce laughter with those which do not, we\nsee that in the non-ludicrous ones the unexpected feeling aroused,\nthough wholly different in kind, is not less in quantity or intensity.\nAmong incongruities which may excite anything but a laugh, Mr. Bain\ninstances\u2014\u201cA decrepit man under a heavy burden, five loaves and two\nfishes among a multitude, and all unfitness and gross disproportion;\nan instrument out of tune, a fly in ointment, snow in May, Archimedes\nstudying geometry in a siege, and all discordant things; a wolf in\nsheep\u2019s clothing, a breach of bargain, and falsehood in general; the\nmultitude taking the law in their own hands, and everything of the\nnature of disorder; a corpse at a feast, parental cruelty, filial\ningratitude, and whatever is unnatural; the entire catalogue of\nthe vanities given by Solomon, are all incongruous, but they cause\nfeelings of pain, anger, sadness, loathing, rather than mirth.\u201d Now in\nthese cases, where the totally unlike state of consciousness suddenly\nproduced, is not inferior in mass to the preceding one, the conditions\nto laughter are not fulfilled. As above shown, laughter naturally\nresults only when consciousness is unawares transferred from great\nthings to small\u2014only when there is what we may call a _descending_\nincongruity.\n\nAnd now observe, finally, the fact, alike inferable _a priori_ {464}\nand illustrated in experience, that an _ascending_ incongruity not\nonly fails to cause laughter, but works on the muscular system an\neffect of the reverse kind. When after something very insignificant\nthere arises without anticipation something very great, the emotion we\ncall wonder results; and this emotion is accompanied not by contraction\nof the muscles, but by relaxation of them. In children and country\npeople, that falling of the jaw which occurs on witnessing an imposing\nand unexpected change, exemplifies this effect. Persons wonder-struck\nat the production of a striking result by a seemingly-inadequate cause,\nare frequently described as unconsciously dropping the things they held\nin their hands. Such are just the effects to be anticipated. After\nan average state of consciousness, absorbing but a small quantity of\nnervous energy, is aroused without notice, a strong emotion of awe,\nterror, or admiration; joined with the astonishment due to an apparent\nwant of adequate causation. This new state of consciousness demands\nfar more nervous energy than that which it has suddenly replaced; and\nthis increased absorption of nervous energy in mental changes, involves\na temporary diminution of the outflow in other directions: whence the\npendent jaw and the relaxing grasp.\n\nOne further observation is worth making. Among the several sets of\nchannels into which surplus feeling might be discharged, was named\nthe nervous system of the viscera. The sudden overflow of an arrested\nmental excitement, which, as we have seen, results from a descending\nincongruity, must doubtless stimulate not only the muscular system, as\nwe see it does, but also the internal organs: the heart and stomach\nmust come in for a share of the discharge. And thus there seems to be\na good physiological basis for the popular notion that mirth-creating\nexcitement facilitates digestion.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThough, in doing so, I go beyond the boundaries of the {465} immediate\ntopic, I may fitly point out that the method of inquiry here followed,\nopens the way to interpretation of various phenomena besides those of\nlaughter. To show the importance of pursuing it, I will indicate the\nexplanation it furnishes of another familiar class of facts.\n\nAll know how generally a large amount of emotion disturbs the action of\nthe intellect, and interferes with the power of expression. A speech\ndelivered with great facility to tables and chairs, is by no means so\neasily delivered to an audience. Every schoolboy can testify that his\ntrepidation, when standing before a master, has often disabled him\nfrom repeating a lesson which he had duly learnt. In explanation of\nthis we commonly say that the attention is distracted\u2014that the proper\ntrain of ideas is broken by the intrusion of ideas that are irrelevant.\nBut the question is, in what manner does unusual emotion produce this\neffect; and we are here supplied with a tolerably obvious answer. The\nrepetition of a lesson, or set speech previously thought out, implies\nthe flow of a very moderate amount of nervous excitement through a\ncomparatively narrow channel. The thing to be done is simply to call\nup in succession certain previously-arranged ideas\u2014a process in which\nno great amount of mental energy is expended. Hence, when there is a\nlarge quantity of emotion, which must be discharged in some direction\nor other; and when, as usually happens, the restricted series of\nintellectual actions to be gone through, does not suffice to carry\nit off; there result discharges along other channels besides the one\nprescribed: there are aroused various ideas foreign to the train of\nthought to be pursued; and these tend to exclude from consciousness\nthose which should occupy it.\n\nAnd now observe the meaning of those bodily actions spontaneously set\nup under these circumstances. The schoolboy saying his lesson, commonly\nhas his fingers actively engaged\u2014perhaps in twisting about a broken\npen, or perhaps in squeezing the angle of his jacket; and if told to\nkeep his {466} hands still, he soon again falls into the same or a\nsimilar trick. Many anecdotes are current of public speakers having\nincurable automatic actions of this class: barristers who perpetually\nwound and unwound pieces of tape; members of parliament ever putting\non and taking off their spectacles. So long as such movements are\nunconscious, they facilitate the mental actions. At least this seems\na fair inference from the fact that confusion frequently results from\nputting a stop to them: witness the case narrated by Sir Walter Scott\nof his school-fellow, who became unable to say his lesson after the\nremoval of the waistcoat button which he habitually fingered while in\nclass. But why do they facilitate the mental actions? Clearly because\nthey draw off a portion of the surplus nervous excitement. If, as above\nexplained, the quantity of mental energy generated is greater than can\nfind vent along the narrow channel of thought that is open to it; and\nif, in consequence, it is apt to produce confusion by rushing into\nother channels of thought; then, by allowing it an exit through the\nmotor nerves into the muscular system, the pressure is diminished, and\nirrelevant ideas are less likely to intrude on consciousness.\n\nThis further illustration will, I think, justify the position that\nsomething may be achieved by pursuing in other cases this kind of\npsychological inquiry. A complete explanation of the phenomena,\nrequires us to trace out _all_ the consequences of any given state of\nconsciousness; and we cannot do this without studying the effects,\nbodily and mental, as varying in quantity at one another\u2019s expense. We\nshould probably learn much if in every case we asked\u2014Where is all the\nnervous energy gone?\n\n\nENDNOTE TO _THE PHYSIOLOGY OF LAUGHTER_.\n\n[60] For numerous illustrations see essay on \u201cThe Origin and Function\nof Music.\u201d\n\nEND OF VOL. II.\n\n\n\n\nMR. HERBERT SPENCER\u2019S WORKS.\n\n\n_A SYSTEM OF SYNTHETIC PHILOSOPHY._\n\n\n _8th Thousand._\n (WITH AN APPENDIX DEALING WITH CRITICISMS.)\n In one vol. 8vo, cloth, price 16s.,\n FIRST PRINCIPLES.\n\nCONTENTS.\n\nPART I.\u2014THE UNKNOWABLE.\n\n 1. Religion and Science.\n 2. Ultimate Religious Ideas.\n 3. Ultimate Scientific Ideas.\n 4. The Relativity of All Knowledge.\n 5. The Reconciliation.\n\nPART II.\u2014THE KNOWABLE.\n\n 1. Philosophy Defined\n 2. The Data of Philosophy.\n 3. Space, Time, Matter, Motion, and Force.\n 4. The Indestructibility of Matter.\n 5. The Continuity of Motion.\n 6. The Persistence of Force.\n 7. The Persistence of Relations among Forces.\n 8. The Transformation and Equivalence of Forces.\n 9. The Direction of Motion.\n 10. The Rhythm of Motion.\n 11. Recapitulation, Criticism, and Recommencement.\n 12. Evolution and Dissolution.\n 13. Simple and Compound Evolution.\n 14. The Law of Evolution.\n 15. The Law of Evolution, continued.\n 16. The Law of Evolution, continued.\n 17. The Law of Evolution, concluded.\n 18. The Interpretation of Evolution.\n 19. The Instability of the Homogeneous.\n 20. The Multiplication of Effects.\n 21. Segregation.\n 22. Equilibration.\n 23. Dissolution.\n 24. Summary and Conclusion.\n\n\n _4th Thousand._\n In two vols. 8vo, cloth, price 34s.\n THE PRINCIPLES OF BIOLOGY.\n\nCONTENTS OF VOL. I.\n\nPART I.\u2014THE DATA OF BIOLOGY.\n\n 1. Organic Matter.\n 2. The Actions of Forces on Organic Matter.\n 3. The Re-actions of Organic Matter on Forces.\n 4. Proximate Definition of Life.\n 5. The Correspondence between Life and its Circumstances.\n 6. The Degree of Life varies as the Degree of Correspondence.\n 7. The Scope of Biology.\n\nPART II.\u2014THE INDUCTIONS OF BIOLOGY.\n\n 1. Growth.\n 2. Development.\n 3. Function.\n 4. Waste and Repair.\n 5. Adaptation.\n 6. Individuality.\n 7. Genesis.\n 8. Heredity.\n 9. Variation.\n 10. Genesis, Heredity, and Variation.\n 11. Classification.\n 12. Distribution.\n\nPART III.\u2014THE EVOLUTION OF LIFE.\n\n 1. Preliminary.\n 2. General Aspects of the Special-Creation-Hypothesis.\n 3. General Aspects of the Evolution-Hypothesis.\n 4. The Arguments from Classification.\n 5. The Arguments from Embryology.\n 6. The Arguments from Morphology.\n 7. The Arguments from Distribution.\n 8. How is Organic Evolution caused?\n 9. External Factors.\n 10. Internal Factors.\n 11. Direct Equilibration.\n 12. Indirect Equilibration.\n 13. The Co-operation of the Factors.\n 14. The Convergence of the Evidences.\n\nAPPENDIX.\n\n The Spontaneous-Generation Question.\n\nCONTENTS OF VOL. II.\n\nPART IV.\u2014MORPHOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT.\n\n 1. The Problems of Morphology.\n 2. The Morphological Composition of Plants.\n 3. The Morphological Composition of Plants, continued.\n 4. The Morphological Composition of Animals.\n 5. The Morphological Composition of Animals, continued.\n 6. Morphological Differentiation in Plants.\n 7. The General Shapes of Plants.\n 8. The Shapes of Branches.\n 9. The Shapes of Leaves.\n 10. The Shapes of Flowers.\n 11. The Shapes of Vegetal Cells.\n 12. Changes of Shape otherwise caused.\n 13. Morphological Differentiation in Animals.\n 14. The General Shapes of Animals.\n 15. The Shapes of Vertebrate Skeletons.\n 16. The Shapes of Animal Cells.\n 17. Summary of Morphological Development.\n\nPART V.\u2014PHYSIOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT.\n\n 1. The Problems of Physiology.\n\n 2. Differentiations between the Outer and Inner Tissues of Plants.\n\n 3. Differentiations among the Outer Tissues of Plants.\n\n 4. Differentiations among the Inner Tissues of Plants.\n\n 5. Physiological Integration in Plants.\n\n 6. Differentiations between the Outer and Inner Tissues of Animals.\n\n 7. Differentiations among the Outer Tissues of Animals.\n\n 8. Differentiations among the Inner Tissues of Animals.\n\n 9. Physiological Integration in Animals.\n\n 10. Summary of Physiological Development.\n\nPART VI.\u2014LAWS OF MULTIPLICATION.\n\n 1. The Factors.\n\n 2. _\u00c0 Priori_ Principle.\n\n 3. Obverse _\u00e0 priori_ Principle.\n\n 4. Difficulties of Inductive Verification.\n\n 5. Antagonism between Growth and Asexual Genesis.\n\n 6. Antagonism between Growth and Sexual Genesis.\n\n 7. Antagonism between Development and Genesis, Asexual and Sexual.\n\n 8. Antagonism between Expenditure and Genesis.\n\n 9. Coincidence between high Nutrition and Genesis.\n\n 10. Specialities of these Relations.\n\n 11. Interpretation and Qualification.\n\n 12. Multiplication of the Human Race.\n\n 13. Human Evolution in the Future.\n\nAPPENDIX.\n\n A Criticism on Professor Owen\u2019s Theory of the Vertebrate Skeleton.\n\n On Circulation and the Formation of Wood in Plants.\n\n\n _5th Thousand._\n (WITH AN ADDITIONAL PART.)\n In two vols. 8vo, cloth, price 36s.,\n THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.\n\nCONTENTS OF VOL. I.\n\nPART I.\u2014THE DATA OF PSYCHOLOGY.\n\n 1. The Nervous System.\n 2. The Structure of the Nervous System.\n 3. The Functions of the Nervous System.\n 4. The Conditions essential to Nervous Action.\n 5. Nervous Stimulation and Nervous Discharge.\n 6. \u00c6stho-Physiology.\n\nPART II.\u2014THE INDUCTIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY.\n\n 1. The Substance of Mind.\n 2. The Composition of Mind.\n 3. The Relativity of Feelings.\n 4. The Relativity of Relations between Feelings.\n 5. The Revivability of Feelings.\n 6. The Revivability of Relations between Feelings.\n 7. The Associability of Feelings.\n 8. The Associability of Relations between Feelings.\n 9. Pleasures and Pains.\n\nPART III.\u2014GENERAL SYNTHESIS.\n\n 1. Life and Mind as Correspondence.\n 2. The Correspondence as Direct and Homogeneous.\n 3. The Correspondence as Direct but Heterogeneous.\n 4. The Correspondence as extending in Space.\n 5. The Correspondence as extending in Time.\n 6. The Correspondence as increasing in Speciality.\n 7. The Correspondence as increasing in Generality.\n 8. The Correspondence as increasing in Complexity.\n 9. The Co-ordination of Correspondences.\n 10. The Integration of Correspondences.\n 11. The Correspondences in their Totality.\n\nPART IV.\u2014SPECIAL SYNTHESIS.\n\n 1. The Nature of Intelligence.\n 2. The Law of Intelligence.\n 3. The Growth of Intelligence.\n 4. Reflex Action.\n 5. Instinct.\n 6. Memory.\n 7. Reason.\n 8. The Feelings.\n 9. The Will.\n\nPART V.\u2014PHYSICAL SYNTHESIS.\n\n 1. A Further Interpretation Needed.\n 2. The Genesis of Nerves.\n 3. The Genesis of Simple Nervous Systems.\n 4. The Genesis of Compound Nervous Systems.\n 5. The Genesis of Doubly-Compound Nervous Systems.\n 6. Functions as Related to these Structures.\n 7. Psychical Laws as thus Interpreted.\n 8. Evidence from Normal Variations.\n 9. Evidence from Abnormal Variations.\n 10. Results.\n\nAPPENDIX.\n\n On the Action of An\u00e6sthetics and Narcotics.\n\nCONTENTS OF VOL. II.\n\nPART VI.\u2014SPECIAL ANALYSIS.\n\n 1. Limitation of the Subject.\n\n 2. Compound Quantitative Reasoning.\n\n 3. Compound Quantitative Reasoning, continued.\n\n 4. Imperfect and Simple Quantitative Reasoning.\n\n 5. Quantitative Reasoning in General.\n\n 6. Perfect Qualitative Reasoning.\n\n 7. Imperfect Qualitative Reasoning.\n\n 8. Reasoning in General.\n\n 9. Classification, Naming, and Recognition.\n\n 10. The Perception of Special Objects.\n\n 11. The Perception of Body as presenting Dynamical, Statico-Dynamical,\n and Statical Attributes.\n\n 12. The Perception of Body as presenting Statico-Dynamical and\n Statical Attributes.\n\n 13. The Perception of Body as presenting Statical Attributes.\n\n 14. The Perception of Space.\n\n 15. The Perception of Time.\n\n 16. The Perception of Motion.\n\n 17. The Perception of Resistance.\n\n 18. Perception in General.\n\n 19. The Relations of Similarity and Dissimilarity.\n\n 20. The Relations of Cointension and Non-Cointension.\n\n 21. The Relations of Coextension and Non-Coextension.\n\n 22. The Relations of Coexistence and Non-Coexistence.\n\n 23. The Relations of Connature and Non-Connature.\n\n 24. The Relations of Likeness and Unlikeness.\n\n 25. The Relation of Sequence.\n\n 26. Consciousness in General.\n\n 27. Results.\n\nPART VII.\u2014GENERAL ANALYSIS.\n\n 1. The Final Question.\n 2. The Assumption of Metaphysicians.\n 3. The Words of Metaphysicians.\n 4. The Reasonings of Metaphysicians.\n 5. Negative Justification of Realism.\n 6. Argument from Priority.\n 7. The Argument from Simplicity.\n 8. The Argument from Distinctness.\n 9. A Criterion Wanted.\n 10. Propositions qualitatively distinguished.\n 11. The Universal Postulate.\n 12. The test of Relative Validity.\n 13. Its Corollaries.\n 14. Positive Justification of Realism.\n 15. The Dynamics of Consciousness.\n 16. Partial Differentiation of Subject and Object.\n 17. Completed Differentiation of Subject and Object.\n 18. Developed Conception of the Object.\n 19. Transfigured Realism.\n\nPART VIII.\u2014CONGRUITIES.\n\n 1. Preliminary.\n 2. Co-ordination of Data and Inductions.\n 3. Co-ordination of Syntheses.\n 4. Co-ordination of Special Analyses.\n 5. Co-ordination of General Analyses.\n 6. Final Comparison.\n\nPART IX.\u2014COROLLARIES.\n\n 1. Special Psychology.\n 2. Classification.\n 3. Development of Conceptions.\n 4. Language of the Emotions.\n 5. Sociality and Sympathy.\n 6. Egoistic Sentiments.\n 7. Ego-Altruistic Sentiments.\n 8. Altruistic Sentiments.\n 9. \u00c6sthetic Sentiments.\n\n\n _3rd Edition, revised and enlarged._\n In 8vo., cloth, price 21s., Vol. I. of\n THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY.\n\nCONTENTS.\n\nPART I.\u2014THE DATA OF SOCIOLOGY.\n\n 1. Super-Organic Evolution.\n\n 2. The Factors of Social Phenomena.\n\n 3. Original External Factors.\n\n 4. Original Internal Factors.\n\n 5. The Primitive Man\u2014Physical.\n\n 6. The Primitive Man\u2014Emotional.\n\n 7. The Primitive Man\u2014Intellectual.\n\n 8. Primitive Ideas.\n\n 9. The Ideas of the Animate and the Inanimate.\n\n 10. The Ideas of Sleep and Dreams.\n\n 11. The Ideas of Swoon, Apoplexy, Catelepsy, Ecstacy, and other forms\n of Insensibility.\n\n 12. The Ideas of Death and Resurrection.\n\n 13. The Ideas of Souls, Ghosts, Spirits, Demons.\n\n 14. The Ideas of Another Life.\n\n 15. The Ideas of Another World.\n\n 16. The Ideas of Supernatural Agents.\n\n 17. Supernatural Agents as causing Epilepsy and Convulsive Actions,\n Delirium and Insanity, Disease and Death.\n\n 18. Inspiration, Divination, Exorcism, and Sorcery.\n\n 19. Sacred Places, Temples, and Altars; Sacrifice, Fasting, and\n Propitiation; Praise and Prayer.\n\n 20. Ancestor-Worship in General.\n\n 21. Idol-Worship and Fetich-Worship.\n\n 22. Animal-Worship.\n\n 23. Plant-Worship.\n\n 24. Nature-Worship.\n\n 25. Deities.\n\n 26. The Primitive Theory of Things.\n\n 27. The Scope of Sociology.\n\nPART II.\u2014THE INDUCTIONS OF SOCIOLOGY.\n\n 1. What is a Society?\n 2. A Society is an Organism.\n 3. Social Growth.\n 4. Social Structures.\n 5. Social Functions.\n 6. Systems of Organs.\n 7. The Sustaining System.\n 8. The Distributing System.\n 9. The Regulating System.\n 10. Social Types and Constitutions.\n 11. Social Metamorphoses.\n 12. Qualifications and Summary.\n\nPART III.\u2014THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS.\n\n 1. The Maintenance of Species.\n\n 2. The Diverse Interests of the Species, of the Parents, and of the\n Offspring.\n\n 3. Primitive Relations of the Sexes.\n\n 4. Exogamy and Endogamy.\n\n 5. Promiscuity.\n\n 6. Polyandry.\n\n 7. Polygyny.\n\n 8. Monogamy.\n\n 9. The Family.\n\n 10. The _Status_ of Women.\n\n 11. The _Status_ of Children.\n\n 12. Domestic Retrospect and Prospect.\n\n\n _2nd Thousand._\n In 8vo, cloth, price 18s. Vol. II of\n THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY.\n\n (_Containing the two following divisions, which may still_\n _be had separately._)\n\n\n In one vol. 8vo, cloth, price 7s.,\n CEREMONIAL INSTITUTIONS.\n\nCONTENTS.\n\n 1. Ceremony in General.\n 2. Trophies.\n 3. Mutilations.\n 4. Presents.\n 5. Visits.\n 6. Obeisances.\n 7. Forms of Address.\n 8. Titles.\n 9. Badges and Costumes.\n 10. Further Class-Distinctions.\n 11. Fashion.\n 12. Ceremonial Retrospect and Prospect.\n\n\n In one vol. 8vo, cloth, price 12s.\n POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS.\n\nCONTENTS.\n\n 1. Preliminary.\n 2. Political Organization in General.\n 3. Political Integration.\n 4. Political Differentiation.\n 5. Political Forms and Forces.\n 6. Political Heads\u2014Chiefs, Kings, etc.\n 7. Compound Political Heads.\n 8. Consultative Bodies.\n 9. Representative Bodies.\n 10. Ministries.\n 11. Local Governing Agencies.\n 12. Military Systems.\n 13. Judicial Systems.\n 14. Laws.\n 15. Property.\n 16. Revenue.\n 17. The Militant Type of Society.\n 18. The Industrial Type of Society.\n 19. Political Retrospect and Prospect.\n\n\n _2nd Thousand._\n In one vol. 8vo., cloth, price 5_s._\n ECCLESIASTICAL INSTITUTIONS.\n\n(_Being Part VI. of the PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY._)\n\nCONTENTS.\n\n 1. The Religious Idea.\n 2. Medicine-men and Priests.\n 3. Priestly Duties of Descendants.\n 4. Eldest Male Descendants as Quasi-Priests.\n 5. The Ruler as Priest.\n 6. The Rise of a Priesthood.\n 7. Polytheistic and Monotheistic Priesthoods.\n 8. Ecclesiastical Hierarchies.\n 9. An Ecclesiastical System as a Social Bond.\n 10. The Military Functions of Priests.\n 11. The Civil Functions of Priests.\n 12. Church and State.\n 13. Nonconformity.\n 14. The Moral Influences of Priesthoods.\n 15. Ecclesiastical Retrospect and Prospect.\n 16. Religious Retrospect and Prospect.\n\n\n _5th Thousand._\n\n WITH AN APPENDIX, CONTAINING AN ADDITIONAL CHAPTER, AND\n REPLIES TO CRITICISMS.\n\n In one vol. 8vo, cloth, price 8s.,\n\n THE DATA OF ETHICS.\n\n(_Being Part I. of the PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS._)\n\nCONTENTS.\n\n 1. Conduct in General.\n 2. The Evolution of Conduct.\n 3. Good and Bad Conduct.\n 4. Ways of Judging Conduct.\n 5. The Physical View.\n 6. The Biological View.\n 7. The Psychological View.\n 8. The Sociological View.\n 9. Criticisms and Explanations.\n 10. The Relativity of Pains and Pleasures.\n 11. Egoism _versus_ Altruism.\n 12. Altruism _versus_ Egoism.\n 13. Trial and Compromise.\n 14. Conciliation.\n 15. Absolute Ethics and Relative Ethics.\n 16. The Scope of Ethics.\n\n\n_OTHER WORKS._\n\n\n _5th Thousand._\n In one vol. 8vo, cloth, price 6s.,\n EDUCATION:\n INTELLECTUAL, MORAL, AND PHYSICAL.\n\nCONTENTS.\n\n 1. What Knowledge is of most Worth?\n 2. Intellectual Education.\n 3. Moral Education.\n 4. Physical Education.\n\n\n _Also, 20th and 21st Thousand,_\n _A CHEAP EDITION OF THE FOREGOING WORK._\n\nIn one vol. crown 8vo, price 2s. 6d.\n\n\n _Library Edition (the 9th), with a Postscript._\n In one vol., price 10s. 6d.,\n THE STUDY OF SOCIOLOGY.\n\nCONTENTS.\n\n 1. Our Need of it.\n 2. Is there a Social Science?\n 3. Nature of the Social Science.\n 4. Difficulties of the Social Science.\n 5. Objective Difficulties.\n 6. Subjective Difficulties\u2014Intellectual.\n 7. Subjective Difficulties\u2014Emotional.\n 8. The Educational Bias.\n 9. The Bias of Patriotism.\n 10. The Class-Bias.\n 11. The Political Bias.\n 12. The Theological Bias.\n 13. Discipline.\n 14. Preparation in Biology.\n 15. Preparation in Psychology.\n 16. Conclusion.\n     Postscript.\n\n\n _10th Thousand._\n In wrapper, 1s., in cloth, better paper, 2s. 6d.\n THE MAN _VERSUS_ THE STATE.\n\nCONTENTS.\n\n 1. The New Toryism.\n 2. The Coming Slavery.\n 3. The Sins of Legislators.\n 4. The Great Political Superstition.\n    Postscript.\n\n\n _4th Thousand._\n In two vols. 8vo, cloth, price 16s.,\n ESSAYS:\n SCIENTIFIC, POLITICAL, AND SPECULATIVE.\n\nCONTENTS OF VOL. I.\n\n 1. Progress: its Law and Cause.\n 2. Manners and Fashion.\n 3. The Genesis of Science.\n 4. The Physiology of Laughter.\n 5. The Origin and Function of Music.\n 6. The Nebular Hypothesis.\n 7. Bain on the Emotions and the Will.\n 8. Illogical Geology.\n 9. The Development Hypothesis.\n 10. The Social Organism.\n 11. Use and Beauty.\n 12. The Sources of Architectural Types.\n 13. The Use of Anthropomorphism.\n\nCONTENTS OF VOL. II.\n\n 1. The Philosophy of Style.\n 2. Over-Legislation.\n 3. The Morals of Trade.\n 4. Personal Beauty.\n 5. Representative Government.\n 6. Prison Ethics.\n 7. Railway Morals and Railway Policy.\n 8. Gracefulness.\n 9. State-Tamperings with Money and Banks.\n 10. Parliamentary Reform: the Dangers and the Safeguards.\n 11. Mill _versus_ Hamilton\u2014the Test of Truth.\n\n\n _3rd Edition._\n In one vol. 8vo., price 8s.,\n THIRD SERIES OF\n ESSAYS:\n\nCONTENTS.\n\n 1. The Classification of the Sciences (with a Postscript, replying to\n Criticisms).\n\n 2. Reasons for Dissenting from the Philosophy of M. Comte.\n\n 3. Laws in General.\n\n 4. The Origin of Animal-Worship.\n\n 5. Specialized Administration.\n\n 6. \u201cThe Collective Wisdom.\u201d\n\n 7. Political Fetichism.\n\n 8. What is Electricity?\n\n 9. The Constitution of the Sun.\n\n 10. Mr. Martineau on Evolution.\n\n 11. Replies to Criticisms.\n\n 12. Transcendental Physiology.\n\n 13. The Comparative Psychology of Man.\n\n\n Price 2s. 6d.,\n THE FACTORS OF ORGANIC EVOLUTION.\n\n\n DESCRIPTIVE SOCIOLOGY; OR GROUPS OF SOCIOLOGICAL FACTS, CLASSIFIED AND\n ARRANGED BY HERBERT SPENCER,\n\nCOMPILED AND ABSTRACTED BY\n\nDAVID DUNCAN, M.A., Professor of Logic, &c., in the Presidency College,\nMadras; RICHARD SCHEPPIG, Ph.D.; and JAMES COLLIER.\n\nEXTRACT FROM THE PROVISIONAL PREFACE.\n\nSomething to introduce the work of which an instalment is annexed,\nseems needful, in anticipation of the time when completion of a volume\nwill give occasion for a Permanent Preface.\n\nIn preparation for _The Principles of Sociology_, requiring as bases of\ninduction large accumulations of data, fitly arranged for comparison,\nI, some twelve years ago, commenced, by proxy, the collection and\norganization of facts presented by societies of different types,\npast and present; being fortunate enough to secure the services of\ngentlemen competent to carry on the process in the way I wished.\nThough this classified compilation of materials was entered upon\nsolely to facilitate my own work; yet, after having brought the mode\nof classification to a satisfactory form, and after having had some\nof the Tables filled up, I decided to have the undertaking executed\nwith a view to publication; the facts collected and arranged for easy\nreference and convenient study of their relations, being so presented,\napart from hypothesis, as to aid all students of Social Science in\ntesting such conclusions as they have drawn and in drawing others.\n\nThe Work consists of three large Divisions. Each comprises a set\nof Tables exhibiting the facts as abstracted and classified, and a\nmass of quotations and abridged abstracts otherwise classified, on\nwhich the statements contained in the Tables are based. The condensed\nstatements, arranged after a uniform manner, give, in each Table or\nsuccession of Tables, the phenomena of all orders which each society\npresents\u2014constitute an account of its morphology, its physiology, and\n(if a society having a known history) its development. On the other\nhand, the collected Extracts, serving as authorities for the statements\nin the Tables, are (or, rather will be, when the Work is complete)\nclassified primarily according to the kinds of phenomena to which they\nrefer, and secondarily according to the societies exhibiting these\nphenomena; so that each kind of phenomenon as it is displayed in all\nsocieties, may be separately studied with convenience.\n\nIn further explanation I may say that the classified compilations and\ndigests of materials to be thus brought together under the title of\n_Descriptive Sociology_, are intended to supply the student of Social\nScience with data, standing towards his conclusions in a relation like\nthat in which accounts of the structures and functions of different\ntypes of animals stand to the conclusions of the biologist. Until there\nhad been such systematic descriptions of different kinds of organisms,\nas made it possible to compare the connexions, and forms, and actions,\nand modes of origin, of their parts, the Science of Life could make no\nprogress. And in like manner, before there can be reached in Sociology,\ngeneralizations having a certainty making them worthy to be called\nscientific, there must be definite accounts of the institutions and\nactions of societies of various types, and in various stages of\nevolution, so arranged as to furnish the means of readily ascertaining\nwhat social phenomena are habitually associated.\n\nRespecting the tabulation, devised for the purpose of exhibiting social\nphenomena in a convenient way, I may explain that the primary aim\nhas been so to present them that their relations of simultaneity and\nsuccession may be seen at one view. As used for delineating uncivilized\nsocieties, concerning which we have no records, the tabular form\nserves only to display the various social traits as they are found to\nco-exist. But as used for delineating societies having known histories,\nthe tabular form is so employed as to exhibit not only the connexions\nof phenomena existing at the same time, but also the connexions of\nphenomena that succeed one another. By reading horizontally across a\nTable at any period, there may be gained a knowledge of the traits of\nall orders displayed by the society at that period; while by reading\ndown each column, there may be gained a knowledge of the modifications\nwhich each trait, structural or functional, underwent during successive\nperiods.\n\nOf course, the tabular form fulfils these purposes but approximately.\nTo preserve complete simultaneity in the statements of facts, as read\nfrom side to side of the Tables, has proved impracticable; here much\nhad to be inserted, and there little; so that complete correspondence\nin time could not be maintained. Moreover, it has not been possible\nto carry out the mode of classification in a theoretically-complete\nmanner, by increasing the number of columns as the classes of facts\nmultiply in the course of Civilization. To represent truly the progress\nof things, each column should divide and sub-divide in successive ages,\nso as to indicate the successive differentiations of the phenomena.\nBut typographical difficulties have negatived this: a great deal has\nhad to be left in a form which must be accepted simply as the least\nunsatisfactory.\n\nThe three Divisions constituting the entire work, comprehend three\ngroups of societies:\u2014(1) _Uncivilized Societies_; (2) _Civilized\nSocieties\u2014Extinct or Decayed_; (3) _Civilized Societies\u2014Recent or Still\nFlourishing_. These divisions have at present reached the following\nstages:\u2015\n\nDIVISION I.\u2014_Uncivilized Societies._ Commenced in 1867 by the gentleman\nI first engaged, Mr. DAVID DUNCAN, M.A. (now Professor of Logic,\n&c., in the Presidency College, Madras), and continued by him since\nhe left England, this part of the work is complete. It contains four\nparts, including \u201cTypes of Lowest Races,\u201d the \u201cNegrito Races,\u201d the\n\u201cMalayo-Polynesian Races,\u201d the \u201cAfrican Races,\u201d the \u201cAsiatic Races,\u201d\nand the \u201cAmerican Races.\u201d\n\nDIVISION II.\u2014_Civilized Societies\u2014Extinct or Decayed._ On this part of\nthe work Dr. RICHARD SCHEPPIG has been engaged since January, 1872. The\nfirst instalment, including the four Ancient American Civilizations,\nwas issued in March, 1874. A second instalment, containing \u201cHebrews and\nPh\u0153nicians,\u201d will shortly be issued.\n\nDIVISION III.\u2014_Civilized Societies\u2014Recent or Still Flourishing._ Of\nthis Division the first instalment, prepared by Mr. JAMES COLLIER, of\nSt. Andrew\u2019s and Edinburgh Universities, was issued in August, 1873.\nThis presents the English Civilization. It covers seven consecutive\nTables; and the Extracts occupy seventy pages folio. The next part,\npresenting in a still more extensive form the French Civilization, is\nnow in the press.\n\nThe successive parts belonging to these several Divisions, issued at\nintervals, are composed of different numbers of Tables and different\nnumbers of Pages. The Uncivilized Societies occupy four parts, each\ncontaining a dozen or more Tables, with their accompanying Extracts.\nOf the Division comprising Extinct Civilized Societies, the first part\ncontains four, and the second contains two. While of Existing Civilized\nSocieties, the records of which are so much more extensive, each\noccupies a single part.\n\n H. S.\n _March, 1880._\n\n\n _In Royal Folio, Price 18s._,\n No. I.\n English.\n\nCOMPILED AND ABSTRACTED\n\nBY\n\nJAMES COLLIER.\n\n\n _In Royal Folio, Price 16s._,\n No. II.\n Mexicans, Central Americans, Chibchas,\n and Peruvians.\n\nCOMPILED AND ABSTRACTED\n\nBY\n\nRICHARD SCHEPPIG, PH.D.\n\n\n _In Royal Folio, Price 18s._,\n No. III.\n Lowest Races, Negrito Races, and\n Malayo-Polynesian Races.\n\nCOMPILED AND ABSTRACTED\n\nBY\n\nPROF. DUNCAN, M.A.\n\nTYPES OF LOWEST RACES.\n\n Fuegians.\n Andamanese.\n Veddahs.\n Australians.\n\nNEGRITO RACES.\n\n Tasmanians.\n New Caledonians, etc.\n New Guinea People.\n Fijians.\n\nMALAYO-POLYNESIAN RACES.\n\n Sandwich Islanders.\n Tahitians.\n Tongans.\n Samoans.\n New Zealanders.\n Dyaks.\n Javans.\n Sumatrans.\n Malagasy.\n\n\n _In Royal Folio, Price 16s._,\n No. IV.\n African Races.\n\nCOMPILED AND ABSTRACTED\n\nBY\n\nPROF. DUNCAN, M.A.\n\n Bushmen.\n Hottentots.\n Damaras.\n Bechuanas.\n Kaffirs.\n East Africans.\n Congo People.\n Coast Negroes.\n Inland Negroes.\n Dahomans.\n Ashantis.\n Fulahs.\n Abyssinians.\n\n\n _In Royal Folio, Price 18s._,\n No. V.\n Asiatic Races.\n\nCOMPILED AND ABSTRACTED\n\nBY\n\nPROF. DUNCAN, M.A.\n\n Arabs.\n Todas.\n Khonds.\n Gonds.\n Bhils.\n Santals.\n Karens.\n Kukis.\n Nagas.\n Bodo and Dhimals.\n Mishmis.\n Kirghiz.\n Kalmucks.\n Ostyaks.\n Kamtschadales.\n\n\n _In Royal Folio, Price 18s._,\n No. VI.\n American Races.\n\nCOMPILED AND ABSTRACTED\n\nBY\n\nPROF. DUNCAN, M.A.\n\n Esquimaux.\n Chinooks.\n Snakes.\n Comanches.\n Iroquois.\n Chippewayans.\n Chippewas.\n Dakotas.\n Mandans.\n Creeks.\n Guiana Tribes.\n Caribs.\n Brazilians.\n Uaup\u00e9s.\n Abipones.\n Patagonians.\n Araucanians.\n\n\n _In Royal Folio, Price 21s._,\n No. VII.\n Hebrews and Ph\u0153nicians.\n\nCOMPILED AND ABSTRACTED\n\nBY\n\nRICHARD SCHEPPIG, PH.D.\n\n\n _In Royal Folio, Price 30s._,\n No. VIII.\n French.\n\nCOMPILED AND ABSTRACTED\n\nBY\n\nJAMES COLLIER.\n\n\nMR. HERBERT SPENCER\u2019S WORKS.\n\n_A SYSTEM OF SYNTHETIC PHILOSOPHY._\n\n FIRST PRINCIPLES                       16_s._\n\n PRINCIPLES OF BIOLOGY. 2 vols.         34_s._\n\n PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. 2 vols.      36_s._\n\n PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY, Vol. I.       21_s._\n\n          DITTO           Vol. II.      18_s._\n\n(_This Volume includes the two following Works, which are at present\npublished separately._)\n\n CEREMONIAL INSTITUTIONS                 7_s._\n\n POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS                 12_s._\n\n ECCLESIASTICAL INSTITUTIONS             5_s._\n\n THE DATA OF ETHICS                      8_s._\n\n\n_OTHER WORKS._\n\n THE STUDY OF SOCIOLOGY           10_s._ 6_d._\n\n EDUCATION                               6_s._\n\n   DITTO      _Cheap Edition_      2_s._ 6_d._\n\n ESSAYS. 2 vols.                        16_s._\n\n ESSAYS (Third Series)                   8_s._\n\n THE MAN _versus_ THE STATE        2_s._ 6_d._\n\n     DITTO       _Cheap Edition_         1_s._\n\n REASONS FOR DISSENTING FROM THE\n     PHILOSOPHY OF M. COMTE              6_d._\n\n THE FACTORS OF ORGANIC EVOLUTION  2_s._ 6_d._\n\n[For particulars see end of the volume.]\n\nWILLIAMS AND NORGATE,\n\n14, HENRIETTA STREET, COVENT GARDEN, LONDON.\n\n\n ALSO MR. SPENCER\u2019S\n _DESCRIPTIVE SOCIOLOGY_,\n\nCOMPILED AND ABSTRACTED BY\n\nPROF. DUNCAN, DR. SCHEPPIG, & MR. COLLIER.\n\nFOLIO, BOARDS.\n\n 1. ENGLISH                              18_s._\n\n 2. ANCIENT AMERICAN RACES               16_s._\n\n 3. LOWEST RACES, NEGRITOS, POLYNESIANS 18_s._\n\n 4. AFRICAN RACES                        16_s._\n\n 5. ASIATIC RACES                        18_s._\n\n 6. AMERICAN RACES                       18_s._\n\n 7. HEBREWS AND PH\u0152NICIANS               21_s._\n\n 8. FRENCH                               30_s._\n\n[For particulars see end of the volume.]\n\nWILLIAMS AND NORGATE,\n\n14, HENRIETTA STREET, COVENT GARDEN, LONDON.\n\nHarrison & Sons, Printers, St. Martin\u2019s Lane.\n\n\n\n\nTRANSCRIBER\u2019S NOTE\n\nThis is Volume II (1891) of Spencer\u2019s three volume series of Essays.\nVolume I (1891) has been published by Project Gutenberg as ebook 29869.\nVolume III (1904) is (ca 2016 October) in preparation at Project\nGutenberg Distributed Proofreaders. Volume III contains an index for\nall three volumes. Original page scans are available from archive.org.\n\nOriginal spelling and grammar are generally retained, with a few\nexceptions noted below. Original italics _look like this_. Footnotes\nwere renumbered 1\u201360, changed to endnotes, and moved to the ends of the\nappropriate essays. Original printed page numbers look like this: {35}.\n\nPage 84. Table I, originally printed on an unnumbered page between\npages 84 and 85, has been moved to page 85, and recast as a nested list\nso as to function well in ebook format. In particular, large curly\nbrackets \u201c{\u201d intended to combine information on more than one line have\nbeen eliminated. Table II, printed between pages 88 and 89 has been\ntreated similarly, and moved to page 88. Table III, printed between\npages 92 and 93 has been moved to page 92 and treated similarly.\n\nPage 125\u2013130. In the comparison of Compte\u2019s and Spencer\u2019s propositions,\nthe two columns of the table were rewrapped into equal widths, to fit\na 72 character limit per line. This removes the original printed line\nper line correspondence, if any such was implied, but the original\narrangement of the paragraphs is retained. The table of paragraphs\non pp. 131\u2013132 was treated in the same way. On page 126, the phrase\n\u201cest essentiellement diff\u00e9rent m\u00eame radicalement oppos\u00e9\u201d, clearly\nmissing something in the original printed book, was changed to \u201cest\nessentiellement diff\u00e9rent et m\u00eame radicalement oppos\u00e9\u201d.\n\nPage 192. The large white spaces in the clause \u201cSpace is\neither\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0or is\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0;\u201d are retained from the printed book.","title":"Essays: Scientific, Political, & Speculative; Vol. 2 of 3: Library Edition (1891), Containing Seven Essays not before Republished, and Various other Additions.","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":159055}