{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_53622/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_53622","id":"gutenberg_53622","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/53622","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Biographies","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, 1844-1900","Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, 1844-1900 -- Criticism and interpretation","Philosophy"],"text":"WHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT\n\nBy\n\nWILLARD HUNTINGTON WRIGHT\n\n\nI am writing for a race of men which\ndoes not yet exist: for \"the lords of the\nearth.\"  _The Will to Power_\n\n\nNEW YORK\n\nB. W. HUEBSCH\n\n1915\n\n\n\nTO\n\nH. L. MENCKEN\nthe critic who has given the greatest impetus\nto the study of Nietzsche in America\n\n\n\n\n    CONTENTS\n\n    PORTRAIT BUST OF NIETZSCHE BY PROFESSOR\n    KARL DONNDORF, STUTTGART _Frontispiece_\n\n      INTRODUCTION\n        I  BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH\n       II  \"HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN,\" VOLS. I AND II\n      III  \"THE DAWN OF DAY\"\n       IV  \"THE JOYFUL WISDOM\"\n        V  \"THUS SPAKE ZARATHUSTRA\"\n       VI  \"THE ETERNAL RECURRENCE\"\n      VII  \"BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL\"\n     VIII  \"THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS\"\n       IX  \"THE TWILIGHT OF THE IDOLS\"\n        X  \"THE ANTICHRIST\"\n       XI  \"THE WILL TO POWER,\" VOL. I\n      XII  \"THE WILL TO POWER,\" VOL. II\n      BIBLIOGRAPHY\n\n\n\n\nINTRODUCTION\n\n\nIt is no longer possible to ignore the teachings of Friedrich\nNietzsche, or to consider the trend of modern thought without giving\nthe philosopher of the superman a prominent place in the list of\nthinkers who contributed to the store of present-day knowledge. His\npowerful and ruthless mind has had an influence on contemporary\nthought which even now, in the face of all the scholarly books of\nappreciation he has called forth, one is inclined to underestimate.\nNo philosopher since Kant has left so undeniable an imprint on modern\nthought. Even Schopenhauer, whose influence coloured the greater part\nof Europe, made no such widespread impression. Nietzsche has penetrated\ninto both England and America, two countries strangely impervious\nto rigorous philosophic ideals. Not only in ethics and literature\ndo we find the moulding hand of Nietzsche at work, invigorating and\nsolidifying; but in pedagogics and in art, in politics and religion,\nthe influence of his doctrines is to be encountered. The books and\nessays in German elucidating his philosophy constitute a miniature\nlibrary. Nearly as many books and articles have appeared in France,\nand the list of authors of these appreciations include many of\nthe most noted modern scholars. Spain and Italy, likewise, have\ncontributed works to an inquiry into his teachings; and in England\nand America numerous volumes dealing with the philosophy of the\nsuperman have appeared in recent years. In M. A. M\u00fcgge's excellent\nbiography, \"Friedrich Nietzsche: His Life and Work,\" there is appended\na bibliography containing 850 titles, and this list by no means\nincludes all the books and articles devoted to a consideration of this\nphilosopher's doctrines.\n\nIn this regard one should note that this interest is not the result of\na temporary popularity, such as that which has met the philosophical\npieties of Henri Bergson. To the contrary, Nietzsche's renown is\ngaining ground daily among serious-minded scholars, and his adherents\nhave already reached the dimensions of a small army. But despite this\nappreciation there is still current an enormous amount of ignorance\nconcerning his teachings. The very manner in which he wrote tended to\nbring about misunderstandings. Viewed casually and without studious\nconsideration, his books offer many apparent contradictions. His style,\nalways elliptic and aphoristic, lends itself easily to quotation, and\nbecause of the startling and revolutionary nature of his utterances,\nmany excerpts from his earlier works were widely circulated through the\nmediums of magazines and newspapers. These quotations, robbed of their\ncontext, very often gave rise to immature and erroneous judgments, with\nthe result that the true meaning of his philosophy was often turned\ninto false channels. Many of his best-known aphorisms have taken on\nstrange and unearthly meanings, and often the reverse of his gospel has\ngained currency and masqueraded as the original canon.\n\nTo a great extent this misunderstanding has been unavoidable.\nSystematisers, ever eager to bend a philosopher's statements to their\nown ends, have found in Nietzsche's writings much material which, when\ncarefully isolated, substantiated their own conclusions. On the other\nhand, the Christian moralists, sensing in Nietzsche a powerful and\neffective opponent, have attempted to disqualify his ethical system by\npresenting garbled portions of his attacks on Christianity, omitting\nall the qualifying passages. It is impossible, however, to understand\nany of Nietzsche's doctrines unless we consider them in their relation\nto the whole of his teachings.\n\nContrary to the general belief, Nietzsche was not simply a destructive\ncritic and a formulator of impossible and romantic concepts. His\ndoctrine of the superman, which seems to be the principal stumbling\nblock in the way of a rationalistic interpretation of his philosophy,\nis no vague dream unrelated to present humanity. Nor was his chief\nconcern with future generations. Nietzsche devoted his research to\nimmediate conditions and to the origin of those conditions. And--what\nis of greater importance--he left behind him a very positive and\nconsistent system of ethics--a workable and entirely comprehensible\ncode of conduct to meet present-day needs. This system was not\nformulated with the precision which no doubt would have attached to\nit in its final form had he been able to complete the plans he had\noutlined. Yet there are few points in his code of ethics--and they\nare of minor importance--which cannot be found, clearly conceived\nand concisely stated, in the main body of his works. This system of\nconduct embraces every stage of society; and for the rulers to-day--the\npeople for whom Nietzsche directly voiced his teachings--he outlines a\nmethod of outer conduct and a set of inner ideals which meet with every\nmodern condition. His proposed ethical routine is not based on abstract\nreasoning and speculative conclusions. It is a practical code which has\nits foundation implanted in the dominating instincts of the organic\nand inorganic world. It is directly opposed to the prevailing code,\nand has for its ideal the fulness of life itself--life intensified\nto the highest degree, life charged with a maximum of beauty, power,\nenthusiasm, virility, wealth and intoxication. It is the code of\nstrength and courage. Its goal is a race which will possess the hardier\nvirtues of strength, confidence, exuberance and affirmation.\n\nThis ideal has been the source of many misunderstandings, and it is\nthe errors which have arisen from the vicious and inept dissemination\nof his teachings, that I have striven to rectify in the present book.\nI have hoped to accomplish this by presenting the whole of Nietzsche's\nphilosophy, as far as possible, in his own words. This has not been so\ndifficult a matter. His writings, more than those of any other modern\nphilosopher, offer opportunities for such treatment. There is no point\nin his entire system not susceptible to brief and clear quotation.\nFurthermore, his thought developed consistently and logically in\nstraight-away, chronological order, so that at the conclusion of each\nbook we find ourselves just so much further along the route of his\nthinking. Beginning with \"Human, All-Too-Human,\" his first destructive\nvolume, we can trace the gradual and concise pyramiding of his\nteachings, down to the last statement of his cardinal doctrine of will\nas set forth in the notes which comprise the second volume of \"The Will\nto Power.\" Each one of the intervening books embodies new material: it\nis a distinct, yet co-ordinated, division in the great structure of his\nlife's work. These books overlap one another in many instances, and\ndevelop points raised speculatively in former books, but they organise\neach other and lead one surely, if at times circuitously, to the\ncrowning doctrines of his thought.\n\nThe majority of critics have chosen to systematise Nietzsche's\nteachings by separating the ideas in his different books, and by\ndrawing together under specific captions (such as \"religion,\" \"the\nstate,\" \"education,\" etc.,) all the scattered material which relates\nto these different subjects. In many cases they have succeeded in\noffering a very coherent and consistent r\u00e9sum\u00e9 of his thought. But\nNietzsche's doctrines were inherently opposed to such arbitrary\ndividing and arranging, because beneath the various sociological\npoints which fell under his consideration, were two or three general\nmotivating principles which unified the whole of his thought. He did\nnot work from modern institutions back to his doctrines; but, by\nanalysing the conditions out of which these institutions grew, he\narrived at the conclusions which he afterward used in formulating\nnew methods of operation. It was the change in conditions and needs\nbetween ancient and modern times that made him voice the necessity of\nchange between ancient and modern institutions. In other words, his\nadvocacy of new methods for dealing with modern affairs was evolved\nfrom his researches into the origin and history of current methods. For\ninstance, his remarks on religion, society, the state, the individual,\netc., were the outcome of fundamental postulates which he described\nand elucidated in terms of human institutions. Therefore an attempt to\nreach an explanation of the basic doctrines of his philosophy through\nhis _applied_ teachings unconsciously gives rise to the very errors\nwhich the serious critics have sought to overcome: this method focuses\nattention on the _application_ of his doctrines rather than on the\ndoctrines themselves.\n\nTherefore I have taken his writings chronologically, beginning with his\nfirst purely philosophical work--\"Human, All-Too-Human\"--and have\nset down, in his own words, every important conclusion throughout his\nentire works. In this way one may follow Nietzsche throughout every\nstep in the development of his teachings--not only in his abstract\ntheories but also in his application of them. There is not a single\nimportant point in the entire sweep of his thought not contained in\nthese pages. Naturally I have been unable to give any of the arguments\nwhich led to these conclusions. The quotations are in every instance\nno longer than has been necessary to make clear the idea: for the\nprocesses of thought by which these conclusions were reached the\nreader must go direct to the books from which the excerpts are made.\nAlso I have omitted Nietzsche's brilliant analogies and such desultory\ncritical judgments, literary and artistic, as have no direct bearing on\nhis philosophy; and have contented myself with setting down only those\nbare, unelaborated utterances which embody the positive points in his\nthought. By thus letting Nietzsche himself state his doctrines I have\nattempted to make it impossible for anybody who goes carefully through\nthese pages to misunderstand those points which now seem clouded in\nerror.\n\nIn order to facilitate further the research of the student and to make\nclear certain of the more obscure selections, I have preceded each\nchapter with a short account of the book and its contents. In these\nbrief essays, I have reviewed the entire contents of each book, set\ndown the circumstances under which it was written, and attempted to\nweigh its individual importance in relation to the others. Furthermore,\nI have attempted to state briefly certain of the doctrines which\ndid not permit of entirely self-explanatory quotation. And where\nNietzsche indulged in research, such as in tracing the origin of\ncertain motives, or in explaining the steps which led to the acceptance\nof certain doctrines, I have included in these essays an abridged\nexposition of his theories. In short, I have embodied in each chapter\nsuch critical material as I thought would assist the reader to a clear\nunderstanding of each book's contents and relative significance.\n\nThis book is frankly for the beginner--for the student who desires a\nsurvey of Nietzsche's philosophy before entering upon a closer and more\ncareful study of it. In this respect it is meant also as a guide; and I\nhave given the exact location of every quotation so that the reader may\nrefer at once to the main body of Nietzsche's works and ascertain the\npremises and syllogisms which underlie the quoted conclusion.\n\nIn the opening biographical sketch I have refrained from going into\nNietzsche's personality and character, adhering throughout to the\nexternal facts of his life. His personality will be found in the racy,\nvigorous and stimulating utterances I have chosen for quotation, and\nno comments of mine could add colour to the impression thus received.\nIt is difficult to divorce Nietzsche from his work: the man and his\nteachings are inseparable. His style, as well as his philosophy, is\na direct outgrowth of his personality. This is why his gospel is so\npersonal and intimate a one, and so closely bound up in the instincts\nof humanity. There are several good biographies of Nietzsche in\nexistence, and a brief account of the best ones in English will be\nfound in the bibliography at the end of this volume.\n\nIt must not be thought that this book is intended as a final, or\neven complete, commentary on Nietzsche's doctrines. It was written\nand compiled for the purpose of supplying an introductory study,\nand, with that end in view, I have refrained from all technical or\npurely philosophical nomenclature. The object throughout has been to\nstimulate the reader to further study, and if this book does not send\nthe reader sooner or later to the original volumes from which these\nquotations have been made, I shall feel that I have failed somewhat in\nmy enterprise.\n\nThe volumes of Nietzsche's philosophy from which the quotations in this\nbook are taken, comprise the first complete and authorised edition of\nthe works of Nietzsche in English. To the courageous energy of Dr.\nOscar Levy do we owe the fact that Nietzsche's entire writings are\nnow obtainable in English. The translations of these books have, in\nevery instance, been made by competent scholars, and each volume is\nintroduced by an illuminating preface. As this edition now stands,\nit is the most complete and voluminous translation of any foreign\nphilosopher in the English language. The edition is in eighteen\nvolumes, and is published in England by T. N. Foulis, and in America by\nthe Macmillan Company. The volumes and their contents are given below.\n\n    I. \"The Birth of Tragedy,\" translated by William A.\n    Haussmann, B.A., Ph.D., with a biographical introduction\n    by the author's sister; a portrait of Nietzsche, and a\n    facsimile of his manuscript.\n\n    II. \"Early Greek Philosophy and Other Essays,\" translated by\n    Maximilian A. M\u00fcgge, Ph.D. Contents: \"The Greek State,\" \"The\n    Greek Woman,\" \"On Music and Words,\" \"Homer's Contest,\" \"The\n    Relation of Schopenhauer's Philosophy to a German Culture,\"\n    \"Philosophy During the Tragic Age of the Greeks\" and \"On\n    Truth and Falsity in Their Ultramoral Sense.\"\n\n    III. \"The Future of Our Educational Institutions,\"\n    translated by J. M. Kennedy. Besides the titular essay, this\n    volume contains \"Homer and Classical Philology.\"\n\n    IV. \"Thoughts Out of Season,\" Vol. I., translated by Anthony\n    M. Ludovici. Contents: \"David Strauss, the Confessor and the\n    Writer\" and \"Richard Wagner in Bayreuth.\"\n\n    V. \"Thoughts Out of Season,\" Vol. II., translated with\n    introduction by Adrian Collins, M.A. Contents: \"The Use and\n    Abuse of History\" and \"Schopenhauer as Educator.\"\n\n    VI. \"Human, All-Too-Human,\" Vol. I., translated by Helen\n    Zimmern, with introduction by J. M. Kennedy.\n\n    VII. \"Human, All-Too-Human,\" Vol. IL, translated, with\n    introduction, by Paul V. Cohn, B.A.\n\n    VIII. \"The Case of Wagner,\" translated by Anthony M.\n    Ludovici and J. M. Kennedy, with introductions by the\n    translators. Contents: \"The Case of Wagner,\" \"Nietzche\n    _contra_ Wagner,\" \"Selected Aphorisms\" and \"We Philologists.\"\n\n    IX. \"The Dawn of Day,\" translated, with introduction, by J.\n    M. Kennedy.\n\n    X. \"The Joyful Wisdom,\" translated, with introduction, by\n    Thomas Common. The poetry which appears in the appendix\n    under the caption of \"Songs of Prince Free-As-A-Bird,\" is\n    translated by Paul V. Cohn and Maude D. Petre.\n\n    XI. \"Thus Spake Zarathustra,\" revised introduction by Thomas\n    Common, with introduction by Mrs. F\u00f6rster-Nietzsche, and\n    commentary by A. M. Ludovici.\n\n    XII. \"Beyond Good and Evil,\" translated by Helen Zimmern,\n    with introduction by Thomas Common.\n\n    XIII. \"The Genealogy of Morals,\" translated by Horace\n    B. Samuel, M.A., with introductory note. \"People and\n    Countries,\" an added section to this book, is translated by\n    J. M. Kennedy with an editor's note by Dr. Oscar Levy.\n\n    XIV. \"The Will to Power,\" Vol. I., translated, with an\n    introduction, by A. M. Ludovici.\n\n    XV. \"The Will to Power,\" Vol. IL, translated, with an\n    introduction, by A. M. Ludovici.\n\n    XVI. \"The Twilight of the Idols,\" translated, with an\n    introduction, by A. M. Ludovici. Contents: \"The Twilight\n    of the Idols,\" \"The Antichrist,\" \"Eternal Recurrence,\" and\n    \"Explanatory Notes to 'Thus Spake Zarathustra.'\"\n\n    XVII. \"Ecce Homo,\" translated by A. M. Ludovici. Various\n    poetry and epigrams translated by Paul V. Cohn, Herman\n    Scheffauer, Francis Bickley and Dr. G. T. Wrench. In\n    addition this volume contains the music of Nietzsche's \"Hymn\n    to Life\"--words by Lou Salom\u00e9--with an introduction by A.\n    M. Ludovici.\n\n    XVIII. \"Index to Complete Works,\" compiled by Robert Guppy,\n    with vocabulary of foreign quotations occurring in the\n    works of Nietzsche translated by Paul V. Cohn, B.A., and an\n    introductory essay, \"The Nietzsche Movement in England (A\n    Retrospect--A Confession--A Prospect),\" by Dr. Oscar Levy.\n\nThere are in the present volume no quotations from Nietzsche's\n_\"Ecce Homo\"_ or from the pamphlets dealing with Wagner. The former\nwork is an autobiography which, while it throws light on both\nNietzsche's character and his work, is nevertheless outside his purely\nphilosophical writings. And the Wagner documents, though interesting,\nhave little to do with the Nietzschean doctrines, except as showing\nperhaps the result of their application. I have therefore left\nthem intact for the student who wishes to go more deeply into the\nphilosopher's character than I have here attempted.\n\nW. H. W.\n\n\n\n\nWHAT NIETZSCHE TAUGHT\n\n\n\nI\n\n\nBiographical Sketch\n\n\nNietzsche liked to believe that he was of Polish descent. He had a\ngreater admiration for the Poles than for the Germans, and went so far\nas to instigate an investigation by which he hoped to prove beyond\na shadow of a doubt that he was not only Polish but was descended\nfrom the Polish nobility. His efforts, his sister tells us, were not\nentirely successful, although some evidence was turned up which pointed\nto the truth of this theory. Several of the dates in the report,\nhowever, did not accurately tally, and since many of Nietzsche's\npapers containing the results of his genealogical research were lost\nin Turin after his breakdown, the hypothesis of his Polish descent\nconsequently remains somewhat mythical. Nietzsche's theory was that his\ngreat-great-grandfather was a nobleman named Nicki who fled from Poland\nduring the religious wars, as a fugitive under sentence of death, and\ntook with him a young son who afterward changed his name to Nietzsche.\nThere is a romance in this belief which appealed strongly to the\nphilosopher. He saw a genuine grandeur in the fact that his ancestor\nhad become a fugitive for his religious and political opinions. This\nbelief in time became a conviction with him, and in the later years of\nhis life we find him definitely asserting the truth of this family\ntradition.\n\nThe matter, however, one way or the other, is of little consequence,\nfor Nietzsche's mind embodied universal traits: it was uncommonly free\nfrom distinctly national characteristics. All the important facts of\nhis life and of his immediate ancestry are known to us. He was born at\nR\u00f6cken, a little village in the Prussian province of Saxony, on October\n15, 1844. The day was the anniversary of the birth of Friedrich Wilhelm\nIV, King of Prussia, and Nietzsche was christened Friedrich Wilhelm in\nhonour of the event. The coincidence was all the more marked by the\nfact that Nietzsche's father, three years previous, had been tutor to\nthe Altenburg Princesses, in which capacity he had met the sovereign\nand made so favourable an impression that it was by the royal favour he\nwas living at R\u00f6cken. There were two other children in the Nietzsche\nhousehold--a girl born in 1846, and a son born in 1850. The girl\nwas named Therese Elizabeth Alexandra after the Duke of Altenburg's\nthree daughters who had come under her father's tutorship. Afterward\nshe became the philosopher's closest companion and guardian and his\nmost voluminous biographer. The boy Joseph, named after the Duke of\nAltenburg himself, did not survive his first year.\n\nThe longevity and hardiness which marked the stock of Nietzsche's\nancestors does away with the theory, often advanced, that his sickness\nand final mental breakdown were the outcome of hereditary causes.\nOut of his eight great-parents only two failed to reach the age of\nseventy-five, while one reached the age of eighty-six and another\ndid not die until ninety. Both of his grand-fathers attained to\nthe age of seventy, and his maternal grandmother lived until she\nwas past eighty-two. Furthermore, the Nietzsche families for three\ngenerations had been very large and in every instance healthy and\nrobust. Nietzsche's grandmother Nietzsche had twelve children, and his\ngrandmother Oehler had eleven children--both families being strong and\nfree from sickness. Nietzsche himself, so his sister tells us in her\nbiography, was strong and healthy from his earliest childhood until\nmaturity. He participated in outdoor sports such as swimming, skating\nand ball playing, and was characterised by a ruddy complexion which\nin his school days often called forth remarks concerning his evident\nsplendid health. It seems that only one physical defect marked the\nwhole of his younger life--a myopia inherited from his father. This\nimpediment, though slight at first, became rapidly aggravated by the\nconstant use to which he put his eyes in his sedulous application to\nstudy.\n\nNietzsche, the most terrible and devastating critic of Christianity\nand its ideals, was the culmination of two long collateral lines of\ntheologians. His grandfather Nietzsche was a man of many scholarly\nattainments, who, because of his ecclesiastical writings, had received\nthe degree of Doctor of Divinity. His second wife, the mother of\nNietzsche's father, came from a whole family of pastors by the name\nof Krause. Her favourite brother was a preacher in the Cathedral at\nNaumburg; and of the other two one was a Doctor of Divinity and one\na country clergyman. The father of Nietzsche's mother was also a\npastor by the name of Oehler, and had a parsonage in Pobles. Likewise\nNietzsche's father, Karl-Ludwig Nietzsche, was a pastor in the\nLutheran church; but he possessed a greater culture than we are wont\nto associate with the average country clergyman, and was a man looked\nup to and revered by all those who knew him. In fact, his appointment\nto the post at R\u00f6cken was an expression of appreciation paid his\ntalents by the Prussian King. He was thirty-one years of age and had\nbeen married only a year when his son Friedrich was born. Though in\nperfect health, he was not destined to live more than five years after\nthis event, for in 1848 he fell down a flight of stone stairs, and died\nafter a year's invalidism, as a result of concussion of the brain.\n\nThe event cast a decided influence on the Nietzsche household and\naltered completely its plans. After lingering eight months at the\nparsonage, the family left R\u00f6cken and moved to Naumburg-on-the-Saale,\nthere establishing a new domicile in the home of the pastor's mother.\nThe household was composed of the two children, Friedrich and\nElizabeth, their mother, then only twenty-four, their grandmother\nNietzsche, and two maiden sisters of the dead father. This\nestablishment was run on strict and puritanical lines. All the women\nwere of strong theological inclinations. One of the maiden aunts,\nRosalie, devoted herself to Christian benevolent institutions. The\nother aunt, Augusta, was not unlike the paternal grandmother--pious\nand God-fearing and constantly busied with her duties to others. The\nwidowed mother carried on the Christian tradition of the family, and\nnever forgot that she was once the wife of a Lutheran pastor. Daily\nprayers and Biblical readings were fixed practices. The young Friedrich\nwas the pet of the household, and there were secret hopes held by all\nthat he would grow up in the footsteps of his father and become an\nhonoured and respected light in the church. To the realisation of this\nhope, all the efforts and influences of the four women were given.\nSuch was the atmosphere in which the early youth of the author of \"The\nAntichrist\" was nurtured.\n\nSoon after the family's arrival at Naumburg, Friedrich, then only six\nyears old, was sent to a local Municipal Boys' School, in accordance\nwith the educational theories of his grandmother, who believed in\ngregarious education for the very young. But she had failed to count\nupon the unusual character of her grandson, and the attempt to educate\nhim at a municipal institution resulted in failure. His upbringing had\nmade him somewhat priggish and hypersensitive. He was ridiculed by the\nother boys who taunted him with the epithet of \"the little minister.\"\nHe refused to mingle with the riff-raff which composed the larger part\nof the pupils, and held himself isolated and aloof. Consequently,\nbefore the year was up, he was withdrawn from the school and entered in\na private educational institution which prepared the younger students\nfor the Cathedral Grammar School. Here he was in more congenial\nsurroundings. He had for schoolmates two youths whose families were\nfriends of the Nietzsche household--young Wilhelm Pinder and Gustav\nKrug, who later were to influence his youth. Nietzsche remained at this\nschool for three years.\n\nAs a boy Nietzsche was always thoughtful and studious. He was a\ntaciturn child and took long walks in the country alone, preferring\nsolitude to companionship. He was sensitive to a marked degree,\npolite, solicitous of all about him, and inclined to moodiness. As\nsoon as he could write he started a diary in which he included not\nonly the external events of his life but his thoughts and ideas and\nopinions. The pages of this diary, partially preserved, make unique\nand interesting reading. At a very early age he began writing poetry.\nHis verses, though conventional in both theme and metre, reflected a\nknowledge of contemporary prosody unusual in a boy of his years. He had\nample opportunity in his home of hearing good music, and he manifested\na great love for it in very early youth. He devoted much time to\nstudying the piano, and not infrequently tried his hand at composing.\nLater in his life we still find him writing music, and also publishing\nit. In deportment Nietzsche was a model child. He was thoroughly\nimbued with the religious atmosphere of his surroundings, and was\nfar more pious than the average youth of his own age. For a long\nwhile he gave every indication of fulfilling the ecclesiastical hopes\nwhich his family harboured for him. Consequently there was no lack of\nencouragement on the part of his guardians toward his first literary\nefforts which reflected the piety of his nature.\n\nAfter a few years in the Naumburg school, where he distinguished\nhimself as a model student and incidentally impressed the visiting\ninspectors by his quickness and brilliance in answering test\nquestions, Nietzsche took the entrance examinations for the\nwell-known Landes-Schule at Pforta, an institution then noted for\nits fostering and promotion of scientific studies. The vacancy at\nPforta had been offered Nietzsche's mother by the Rector who had heard\nrumours concerning the intellectual gifts of the young \"Fritz.\" The\nexaminations were passed successfully, and in October, 1858, after a\ntearful leave-taking, he entered the Lower Fourth Form. Pforta, at that\ntime, was an institution of considerable eminence, with a tradition\nattaching to it not unlike that of Eton. It was a hot-bed of academic\nculture, and the professors were among the most learned in the country.\nThe school had been founded as a monastery in the twelfth century by\nthe Cistercian monks. In the sixteenth century it had fallen under\nthe rule of the Duke Moritz of Saxony, who turned it into a secular\neducational academy, making way for the advance of the newer ideals.\n\nThe life at Pforta in Nietzsche's day was strict, and we learn that\nthe young philosopher chafed somewhat under the stringent discipline.\nBut in time he accustomed himself to the regulations, and it was not\nlong before we find him actively and interestedly participating in\nthe school life. However, new ideas were fomenting. If outwardly he\nacquiesced to the routine, inwardly he was in a state of revolt. He had\nalready begun to indulge in original thinking, and he felt the lack\nof freedom in communicating his ideas to others. His only confidante\nduring these days was his sister whom he always saw during the holidays\nand on brief leaves of absence. His spare moments were devoted to music\nand literature other than that prescribed by the school curriculum.\nHe resented the fact that one had to think of particular themes\nat specified times, and no doubt caused his good tutor, Professor\nBuddensieg, much uneasiness, for, to judge from his diary, he did not\nkeep to himself the resentment he felt toward the enforcement of the\nirksome and repressive calendar of studies.\n\nThis resentment doubtlessly had much to do with the inauguration of\na society which was called the Germania Club. Wilhelm Pinder and\nGustav Krug, Nietzsche's former school companions at Naumburg, were\nparticipants in its formation; and on the highest ledge of the watch\ntower, overlooking the Saale valley, its object was discussed and\nits inception dedicated and solemnised with a bottle of red wine.\nThis society, while bearing many of the ear-marks of mere youthful\nenthusiasm, formed an important turning point in Nietzsche's life. It\nacted, at a psychological moment, as a safety-valve for the heretical\nideas and aspirations which, up to that time, he had confided only to\nhis sister and his diary. The purpose of the club can best be stated\nin Nietzsche's own words: \"We resolved to found a kind of small club\nwhich would consist of ourselves and a few friends, and the object of\nwhich would be to provide us with a stable and binding organisation,\ndirecting and adding interest to our creative impulses in art and\nliterature; or to put it more plainly, each of us would be pledged to\npresent an original piece of work to the club once a month, either a\npoem, a treatise, an architectural design, or a musical composition,\nupon which each of the others, in a friendly spirit, would have to\npass free and unrestricted criticism. We thus hoped by means of mutual\ncorrection to be able both to stimulate and to chasten our creative\nimpulses.\" It was during one of his lectures before this group of\nyouthful individualists that Nietzsche first expressed his true views\non Christianity--views, which, could they have been overheard by his\ndevoted family, would have brought sorrow to their pious hearts. The\nlist of Nietzsche's contributions to this synod numbered thirty-four,\nand included musical compositions, poems, political orations and\nvarious literary works.\n\nNietzsche remained at Pforta until 1864. He had been confirmed at\nEaster, 1861, and to all outward manifestations retained his religious\nprinciples. His final report states that \"he showed an active and\nlively interest in the Christian doctrine.\" In religion he was given\nthe grade of \"excellent.\" During his later years at Pforta he\nmanifested an interest in the works of Emerson and Shakespeare and\nespecially in the Greek and Latin authors. His dislike for mathematics\nincreased steadily, and his love for Sophocles, \u00c6schylus, Plato and\nthe Greek lyricists \"grew by leaps and bounds.\" His final paper--the\ndeparting thesis which was compulsory for all graduating students--was\na Latin essay on Theognis of Megara, _\"De Theognide Megarensi\"_ Between\nNietzsche and that ancient aristocrat, with his fine contempt for\ndemocracy, there existed many temperamental affinities; and this final\nessay was no less than a foundation on which the young Dionysian later\nbuilt his philosophy of aristocracy. On the 7th of September he left\nPforta.\n\nAfter resting at Naumburg until the middle of October, Nietzsche set\nforth for the University of Bonn. It was here that he came under\nthe guidance of Professor Ritschl, who later was to exert a great\ninfluence over him. Friedrich Wilhelm Ritschl was not only the\nforemost philologist of his time, but a scholar deeply versed in\nclassical literature and rhetoric. It was he who founded the science\nof historical literary criticism as we know it to-day. When he first\nmet Nietzsche his interest in the young man at once became very great,\nand the relationship between them rapidly developed into the warmest\nof friendships. To Ritschl Nietzsche owed many things. It was at the\nformer's house that he became acquainted with many of the leading\nlearned men of the day. And it would be unfair not to credit Ritschl\nwith much of the future philosopher's ardent and lasting interest in\nancient cultures.\n\nAt Bonn Nietzsche entered the collegiate life with unusual zest. He\nbecame a member of the Franconia Student Corps, and participated\nfreely in the drinking bouts which, from what we can learn from his\nletters home, constituted one of the main duties attached to his\nmembership. But this phase of the student life was foreign to his\ntastes, and after brief activities in the r\u00f4le of \"good fellow,\" he\nfound a more spontaneous recreation in attending concerts and the\nbetter class theatres. He privately studied Schumann, and during 1864\nand 1865 his life bore a marked musical stamp.\n\nIt was during Nietzsche's days at Bonn that a decided change came over\nhis religious views. His critical studies in the literature and culture\nof the ancients had done much toward weaning him from the formal and\nalmost literal theological beliefs of his family. The first open breach\nbetween his newer ideals and the established prejudices of his mother\ncame at Easter-time about midway of his course at Bonn. He was home\nfor the holidays, and when the good people were preparing to attend\ncommunion, he suddenly informed them of his decision not to accompany\nthem. Arguments were unavailing. An animated discussion arose in which\nhe firmly defended his attitude; and from that time on there was never\na reconciliation between his religious standpoint and the one held by\nhis family. Two learned ecclesiastics were called into consultation,\nbut they were unable to meet the disquieting arguments of the young\nheretic, and his case was dismissed for the moment on his Aunt\nRosalie's theory that even in the lives of the devoutest Christians\nthere often come periods of doubt, and that during such periods it is\nbest to leave the backslider to his own conscience. Nietzsche, however,\nnever again entered the fold.\n\nCuriously enough it was at this same period that came his revulsion\ntoward the dissipations of student life. He went so far as to attempt\nan imposition of his moral theories on the members of the Franconia,\nbut this attempt at reformation resulted only in his own unpopularity.\nIn his attitude toward duelling--a pastime somewhat over-emphasised at\nBonn--Nietzsche was consistent with his other beliefs. The chivalrous\nside of it appealed to him, although he detested the spirit of it\nfrom the standpoint of the student body. However, he took heroic, if\nunconventional, means to involve himself in a duel lest his position\nbe misconstrued as cowardice. He selected an adversary he thought\nworthy of him, and pleasantly demanded a combat on the field of honour,\nending his request: \"Let us waive all the usual preliminaries.\"\nThe other agreed, and the duel was fought. But the incident merely\nresulted in emphasising Nietzsche's disgust for student life. Says\nhis sister, \"The circumstances which above all aroused my brother's\nwrath was the detestable 'beer materialism' with which he met on\nall sides, and owing to these early experiences in Bonn he for ever\nretained a very deep dislike for smoking, drinking, and the whole of\nso-called 'beer-conviviality.'\" His decision to leave Bonn and enter\nthe University of Leipzig was due to his fondness for Ritschl. In the\ndispute which arose between the two Professors, Jahn and Ritschl,\nNietzsche's friendship for the latter made him a partisan, although he\nheld Jahn in the highest respect; and when Ritschl decided to transfer\nhimself to Leipzig, the young philosopher, along with several of the\nother students, followed him. This was in the autumn of 1865. Nietzsche\nreached Leipzig on the 17th of October, and the next day he presented\nhimself to the Academic Board. It was the centennial anniversary\nof the day when Goethe had entered his name on the register, and\nthe University was celebrating the event. The coincidence delighted\nNietzsche greatly, who regarded it as a good omen for his future at the\nnew institution.\n\nIt was during his residence at Leipzig that there came into his life\ntwo events which were to have a profound and lasting influence on his\nfuture. One of these was his acquaintance with Wagner--an acquaintance\nwhich several years later developed into the strongest friendship of\nhis life. The other event (in many ways more important than the first)\nwas his discovery of Schopenhauer. This discovery is characteristically\ndescribed in a letter to his sister: \"One day I came across this book\nat old Rohn's curiosity shop, and taking it up very gingerly I turned\nover its pages. I know not what demon whispered to me: 'Take this\nbook home with thee.' At all events, contrary to my habit not to be\nhasty in my purchase of books, I took it home. Once in my room I threw\nmyself into the corner of the sofa with my booty, and began to allow\nthat energetic and gloomy genius to work upon my mind. In this book,\nin which every line cried out renunciation, denial, and resignation, I\nsaw a mirror in which I espied the whole world, life and my own mind\ndepicted in frightful grandeur. In this volume the full celestial eye\nof art gazed at me; here I saw illness and recovery, banishment and\nrefuge, heaven and hell. The need of knowing myself, yea, even of\ngnawing at myself, forcibly seized me.\" This book went far in arousing\nthe philosophic faculties of the young philologist, and later he\nwrote many essays, long and short, both in praise and in refutation\nof the great pessimist. That he should at first have subscribed to\nall of Schopenhauer's teachings is natural. Nietzsche was vital and\nsusceptible to enthusiasms. It was in accord with his youthful nature,\nfull of courage and strength, that he should have been seduced to\npessimism.\n\nAt Leipzig Nietzsche accomplished an enormous amount of work: and his\nnature developed in proportion. The life was freer than it had been\nat Pforta or at Bonn. Far from being hampered in the voicings of his\ninner beliefs, he found his environment particularly congenial to\nself-expression. He made numerous friends, principal among them being\nErwin Rohde, who crossed his later life at many points. He showed\na great interest in political, as well as in literary and musical,\nevents; and the war between Prussia and Austria fanned his youthful\nardour to an almost extravagant degree. Twice he offered himself to\nthe authorities, hoping to be permitted to serve as a soldier, but was\nrejected both times on account of his shortsightedness. His interest\nin his studies, however, was in no wise diminished. He read widely in\nEnglish, French, Greek and Latin, and devoted much scholarly research\nto Theognis, Diogenes Laertius, and Democritus. His essay on the\nsubject, _\"De Fontibus Diogenis Laertii\"_ won the first university\nprize, and was later published, with other of his essays on philology,\nin the _Rheinisches Museum._\n\nAt this time the Prussian army found itself in sore need of men, and\nalthough Nietzsche had been exempt from military duties and had failed\nto secure enlistment, he suddenly found himself, in the autumn of 1867,\ncalled upon for compulsory training. A new army regulation had just\nbeen passed requiring all young men, if otherwise physically sound,\nto enter military service even though their eyesight was partially\nimpaired. As a consequence Nietzsche had to leave Leipzig and go into\ntraining. He made an effort to enlist in a Berlin Guard Regiment, but\nwas finally compelled to join the horse artillery at Naumburg. Although\nhe had previously volunteered for service, he now found that the life\nof a soldier was far more irksome and far less romantic than he had\nimagined. He was unhappy and disconsolate, and deplored the slavery\nattached to the life of a mounted artilleryman. He was not destined,\nhowever, to fulfil his arduous military duties to the full term of his\nproscription. Barely a year had gone by when he was thrown from his\nhorse and received what at first was thought a slight strain, but what\nlater turned out to be a serious injury. The pommel of his saddle had\ncompressed his chest, and the inflammation which set in necessitated\nhis permanent withdrawal from service.\n\nFor a long time Nietzsche was under the care of the famous specialist,\nVolkmann, to whom the military doctors had turned him over when\nthey had begun to despair of his recovery. During convalescence, he\nbusied himself with preparations for his coming university year and\nassisted in some intricate indexing for members of the faculty. In\nOctober, 1868, he was able to return to Leipzig and resume his work.\nBut another unexpected event--this one of an advantageous nature and\ndestined to alter his whole future--came in the form of an inquiry\nfrom the University of Bale in Switzerland. The members of that\ninstitution's educational board, attracted by Nietzsche's essays in\nthe _Rheinisches Museum,_ wrote to Ritschl for information regarding\nthe young philologist. Ritschl replied that Nietzsche was a genius and\ncould do whatever he put his mind to. Thus it happened that, although\nonly 24, he was offered the vacant post of Classical Philology at B\u00e2le,\nwithout even being put through the formalities of an examination.\nHowever, he was straightway granted a Doctor's degree by the University\nof Leipzig, and on the 13th of April, 1869, he left Naumburg to assume\nthe duties of his new appointment. His departure marked the passing\nof the Nietzsche household. His grandmother and both the maiden aunts\nwere dead, and because, no doubt, of religious differences, he and his\nmother became estranged. Of that intimately welded family circle, only\nthe deep friendship between Nietzsche and his sister remained.\n\nOn May 28, Nietzsche delivered his inaugural address at B\u00e2le, using\nthe personality of Homer as his subject. The hall was crowded, and the\naddress made a decided impression on both students and faculty. The\nlecture was an unusual one and well off the conventional track. It\ncreated riot a little mild excitement among the professors at Leipzig,\nand the cut-and-dried philologists of that institution were frankly\nscandalised by its boldness. The address, however, was an index to\nNietzsche's character, and, in looking back on it, we can see that it\nunmistakably pointed the way along which the future development of\nhis mind was to take place. At B\u00e2le, the young philologist, despite\nthe people's kindly disposition toward him, suffered from solitude.\nHis classes were small. Although he had made an impassioned plea for\nhis particular science, the interest in philology was slight, and\nhis morning lectures were attended by only eight students. Nietzsche\nwas without a companion with whom he might exchange his ideas and\npersonal thoughts. His only diversion came in the form of occasional\ntrips to neighbouring parts of the country; and the letters he wrote\nto his sister and his former friends were tinged with melancholy.\nBut he was conscientious in his work, and a year later he was given a\nprofessorship.\n\nBefore he could accept this later appointment it had been necessary\nfor him to become a naturalised subject of Switzerland, so that when\nthe Franco-German War of 1870 broke out, he could not serve as a\ncombatant--a fact which caused him keen disappointment. He was able,\nhowever, to secure service as an ambulance attendant in the Hospital\nCorps, and set forth upon his patriotic duties with a glad heart.\nHaving been granted the leave he asked for at the University, he went\nto Erlangen, where he entered for a course of surgery and medicine at\nthe Red Cross Society. After a brief training as a nurse, in which line\nof work he showed remarkable adaptability, he was sent to the seat of\nwar at the head of an ambulance corps. He was untiring in his energies\nand laboured day and night in the midst of the battlefields. But the\noverwork proved too much for him, and he soon reached the limit of\nhis endurance. One day, after long exposure in a cattle truck filled\nwith severely wounded and diseased men, he began to show signs of\nserious illness, and when, after great difficulty, he managed to reach\nErlangen, it was discovered that he was suffering from diphtheria and\nsevere dysentery. Though he had seen but a few weeks' hospital service,\nit was now necessary for him to discontinue his duties entirely. His\nsister tells us that this illness greatly undermined his health, and\nwas the first cause of his subsequent condition. To make matters worse,\nthe slight medical education which he had received in preparation\nfor his ambulance service led him to pursue a fateful course of\nself-doctoring--a practice which he continued to his own detriment\nthroughout the remainder of his life. Nietzsche did not even wait\nuntil he was well before resuming his duties at the University, and\nthis new strain imposed on his already depleted system had much to do\nwith bringing on his final breakdown.\n\nAs a result of the Philistinism which broke out all over Germany at\nthe end of the war, Nietzsche delivered a course of lectures at Bonn,\nwhich he entitled \"On the Future of Our Educational Institutions.\"\nGermany had insisted that her victory was due not only to physical\nbravery but also in a large measure to the superiority of Germanic\nculture and Teutonic ideals. Nietzsche beheld in this snobbish attitude\na very grave danger for his country, and endeavoured in a small way to\nrectify this attitude by a series of lectures. He severely criticised\nthe German educational institutions of the day and went so far as to\ndeny them the great culture which they so ardently claimed. While these\nlectures in no wise stemmed, even locally, the tide of Philistinism\nat which they were aimed, the criticisms contained in them are of the\ngreatest importance in reviewing the development of the philosopher\nhimself. The lectures contained, perhaps unconsciously but none the\nless clearly, many of the elements of that philosophy which later was\nto have so tremendous an influence not only on Germany but on the whole\ncivilised world.\n\nIn the same year, 1872, Nietzsche's first important book appeared. This\nwork, dedicated to Richard Wagner, had been begun in 1869, and was\nfirst called \"The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music.\" When the\nthird edition appeared in 1886 the title was changed to \"The Birth of\nTragedy, or Hellenism and Pessimism,\" and a preface called \"An Attempt\nat Self-Criticism\" was added. In a large measure this book was a\ntribute to Wagner, and was written by Nietzsche in an effort to be of\nimmediate benefit to the musician who at that time was passing through\na period of despondency. Wagner was then living at Tribschen, not far\nfrom B\u00e2le, and Nietzsche's visits to him were frequent. It was during\nthese years that the great friendship between the two men developed.\n\"The Birth of Tragedy,\" however, was not well received by the public.\nMusicians were pleased with it, but philologists in particular\ndeplored its utterances. They looked upon its author as a traitor to\ntheir science for having dared to venture beyond the narrow bounds of\nacademic formalism. One well-known philologist, Wilamowitz-Moellendorf,\nattacked Nietzsche in an ill-humoured pamphlet; and although Erwin\nRohde answered it adequately with another pamphlet, the attack proved\ndetrimental to Nietzsche's standing at Bale. During the following\nwinter term the young philologist was entirely without pupils.\n\nHis mind, however, was now undergoing decided and important changes. He\nwas becoming bolder and surer of himself. New ideals were taking the\nplace of old ones, and in 1873 he began a series of famous pamphlets\nwhich later were put into book form under the title of \"Thoughts Out\nof Season.\" His first attack was upon David Strauss; the second was\ndirected towards the German historians of the day; the third was aimed\nat Schopenhauer; and the fourth was the famous panegyric, \"Richard\nWagner in Bayreuth.\" These essays, together with his work at B\u00e2le,\noccupied him until 1876. Nietzsche was now suffering severely from\nthe malady he carried to his grave, catarrh of the stomach. This was\naccompanied by severe headaches, and during his holidays he alternated\nbetween Switzerland and Italy in an endeavour to recover his health.\nIn the former place he was with Wagner. In Italy, at Sorrento, he met\nDr. Paul R\u00e9e, who, if we are to believe Max Nordau, was the father\nof all Nietzsche's ideas. Credence, however, cannot be given to this\naccusation, for the nucleus of all of his later ideas was undeniably\ncontained in his writings previous to his meeting with R\u00e9e. That R\u00e9e\ninfluenced him to some small extent no one will deny, for it was he who\nturned the young philosopher's attention to the latter day scientists\nof both England and France; and it was shortly after this meeting that\nNietzsche began his first independent philosophical work, \"Human,\nAll-Too-Human.\"\n\nIt was in the year 1876 that his famous friendship with Wagner began\nto cool. Nietzsche had gone to Bayreuth to witness the performance\nof _\"Der Ring des Nibelungen.\"_ Already he had begun to question\nhis own high opinion of the composer, and Bayreuth solidified his\ndoubts. It had been two years since he had seen Wagner, and after a\nbrief conversation, Nietzsche became bitter and disgusted. When he\nfinally went away his revulsion was complete, and one of the greatest\nof historic friendships was at an end. Whatever were the individual\nmerits in the quarrel between these two great contemporaneous men,\nNietzsche's attitude was at least consistent with his innermost ideals.\nHe had admired in Wagner certain definite, revolutionary qualities,\nand when he was convinced, as he had every reason to be, that Wagner\nwas compromising his art for the purpose of popularity, the ideal\nwas broken. He could no longer remain true to himself and also to\nhis friendship for the great composer. \"Parsifal\" was undoubtedly\na decadent work, viewed from the standpoint of Wagner's previous\nperformances. Decadence is simply the inability to create new tissue;\nand when Wagner forswore modern ideas and reverted to the past, it\nattested to an entire change of mental attitude: and no purely \u00e6sthetic\ndoctrine can controvert the fact. Had C\u00e9zanne in later life essayed the\npainting of conventionally posed saints--no matter what his technical\nmeans might have been--his art would have contained the elements of\ndecadence, for an artist's mental attitude cannot be dissevered from\nhis product. This, I believe, was Nietzsche's theory in regard to\nWagner. That the breaking off of this friendship was a great blow to\nthe philosopher we know from his diary and from his letters. In fact,\nhis affection for Wagner, the man, was so great that it was not until\nten years had passed that he could bring himself to write the essay\nwhich he had long had in mind, \"The Fall of Wagner.\"\n\nThe year after the appearance of \"Human, All-Too-Human,\" Nietzsche's\nill-health compelled him to resign his professorship at B\u00e2le. He had a\nsmall income which, together with the three thousand francs retiring\nallowance granted him by the University, permitted him now to travel\nmoderately and to devote his entire time to his literary labours. He\nfirst went to Berne, where he stayed a few weeks. Later he visited\nZ\u00fcrich and then St. Moritz. It was a brief holiday, but the change of\n_locale,_ coupled with the relaxation from work, improved him both in\nphysical health and in spirits. The winter of 1879-80 he spent with his\nmother at Naumburg, his old home; but the climate and the uncongenial\nsurroundings dragged down his health once more, and it was not until\ntoward the following spring, when he went to Venice, that he regained\neven a semblance of his normal condition. Here he was in company with\nPaul R\u00e9e and his life-long friend and disciple, Heinrich K\u00f6selitz,\ncommonly known as Peter Gast. Nietzsche stayed at Venice until October,\nwhen he went to Genoa. The following year appeared \"The Dawn of Day,\"\nhis first book of constructive thinking.\n\nThe remainder of Nietzsche's life up to the time of his final breakdown\nin January, 1889, was spent in a fruitless endeavour to regain his\nundermined health. For eight years, during all of which time he was\nbusily engaged in writing, he sought a climate that would revive\nhim. His summers were spent for the most part in the quiet solitude\nof Sils-Maria, a little Swiss village to which the tourist rarely\nventured. In 1882 he visited Genoa and, with Paul R\u00e9e as companion,\nmade a trip to Monaco. This journey ended disastrously for his health,\nand by his physician's order he made a trip to Messina. Soon after he\nsettled at Grunewald, near Berlin; but the place depressed him, and\nwe find him later in Tautenburg. Again Genoa claimed him for several\nmonths, and then, addicted to chloral, and despondent, he sought relief\nat Rome. But he could not stand the hot weather, and again he visited\nSils-Maria, where, it seems, he was for the time greatly improved.\nIn 1884, we find him again at Naumburg, and a little later at Nice\nand Venice. In the autumn of the same year, he spent several weeks\ntravelling with his sister in Germany, but at the approach of winter,\nhe proceeded to Mentone. In 1885 he again sought the company of Peter\nGast at Venice, and spent the larger part of that year and the next\nat Venice and Nice. The lonely philosopher then paid a short visit to\nLeipzig to be once again with his old friend Rohde. But the years had\nestranged them; their views were now at opposites. Another of his few\nfriends thus lost to him, he immediately returned to Nice. The year\n1886 found him at the Riviera, and in 1887 he was again at Sils-Maria.\nHere he laboured incessantly, travelling to both Venice and Nice in the\nmeantime. In the spring of 1888 he changed his plans and went to Turin.\nThen after his usual summer visit to Sils-Maria, he returned to Turin,\nwhere he remained until the fatal winter of 1888-89. Nietzsche was\nrarely happy during his travels. He was constantly ill and for the most\npart alone, and this perturbed and restless period of his life resolved\nitself into a continuous struggle against melancholy and physical\nsuffering.\n\nDuring these eight years of solitary labour and futile seeking for\nhealth, Nietzsche had written \"Thus Spake Zarathustra,\" \"The Joyful\nWisdom,\" \"Beyond Good and Evil,\" \"The Genealogy of Morals,\" \"The Case\nof Wagner,\" \"The Twilight of the Idols,\" \"The Antichrist,\" _\"Ecce\nHomo\"_ \"Nietzsche _contra_ Wagner,\" and an enormous number of notes\nwhich were to constitute his final and great philosophical work, \"The\nWill to Power.\" The cold reception with which his books met tended to\ndiscourage him and to retard his physical recovery. His \"Zarathustra\"\nwas as greatly misunderstood by the critics as had been his earlier\nvolumes. With the exception of Burckhardt and Taine, the critics were\nunfavourable to \"Beyond Good and Evil.\" \"The Genealogy of Morals\" met\nwith scarcely more friendly a reception, and \"The Case of Wagner,\"\nwhile arousing the ire of the Wagnerians, caused no comment of any kind\nin any other quarter. \"The Twilight of the Idols\" appeared about the\ntime of his breakdown, and \"The Antichrist\" and _\"Ecce Homo\"_ were not\npublished until long after his death. The notes on \"The Will to Power\"\nhave only recently been put together and issued.\n\nThe events during this period of Nietzsche's career were few. Perhaps\nthe most important was his meeting with Miss Lou Salom\u00e9. But even this\nepisode had small bearing on his life, and has been unduly emphasised\nby biographers because of its isolation in an existence outwardly drab\nand uneventful. It was while Nietzsche was at Tautenburg that Paul\nR\u00e9e and another friend, Malvida von Mysenburg, hearing that he was in\nneed of a secretary, sent to him Miss Salom\u00e9, a young Russian Jewess.\nThat it would have been difficult to find a person less suited to the\nphilosopher's needs was borne out by subsequent events. According to\nsome accounts Nietzsche fell mildly in love with her, and was upset\nand irritated by her aloofness. But such a hypothesis is substantiated\nonly by the flimsiest of evidence, and, when we take into consideration\nthe temperamental gulf between these two people, it is highly\nincredible that Nietzsche had any desire to form an alliance with his\namanuensis. The truth of the matter probably is that the philosopher\nwas sadly disappointed in his secretary--if not indeed disgusted with\nher--and, in showing his regret, piqued her to retaliation. In fact,\nwe have a letter from Nietzsche to the young lady which bears out this\ncontention. In any event, we know that their companionship lasted but\na short time and that Miss Salom\u00e9 wrote a most inept and unreliable\nbook on Nietzsche, _\"Friedrich Nietzsche in seinen Werken\"_ published\nin Vienna in 1894. The affair had other painful results. R\u00e9e defended\nhis proteg\u00e9e, and he and Nietzsche became bitter enemies. Nietzsche's\nsister also was dragged into the episode, and quarrelled with both R\u00e9e\nand Miss Salom\u00e9.\n\nShortly after this unpleasant event, Nietzsche, urged by his sister,\nmade a half-hearted attempt to secure a professorship at the\nUniversity of Leipzig, but negotiations for the post fell through,\ndue largely to Nietzsche's own indifference in the matter. Soon after\nthis the philosopher became estranged from his sister because of\nher intention to marry Dr. F\u00f6rster. Nietzsche's opposition to the\nmarriage--an opposition which was supported by his mother--was due\nto several reasons. First, it would necessitate his sister leaving\nhim and accompanying her husband to Paraguay. Secondly, it had been\nrumoured that Dr. F\u00f6rster had severely criticised his books. And\nthirdly, Nietzsche had small respect for Dr. F\u00f6rster himself, who\nwas an impractical idealist and an anti-Semite. However, despite all\nthe family protestations, the marriage took place. Nietzsche was\ndisappointed and brooded over the event, but a year later he became\nreconciled with his sister, and she remained, to the end of his life,\nhis closest friend and companion.\n\nIn January, 1889, an apoplectic fit, which rendered Nietzsche\nunconscious for two days, marked the beginning of the end. His manner\nsuddenly became alarming. He exhibited numerous eccentricities, so\ngrave as to mean but one thing: his mind was seriously affected.\nThere has long been a theory extant that his insanity was of gradual\ngrowth. Nordau holds that he was unbalanced from birth. But there\nis no evidence to substantiate these two theories. For seven years\nNietzsche's physical condition had been improving, and his mind up to\nthe end of 1888 was perfectly clear and gave no indication of what\nhis end would be. During this period his books were thought out in\nhis most clarified manner; in all his intercourse with his friends he\nwas restrained and normal; and his voluminous correspondence showed\nno change either in sentiment or in tone. The theory advanced in some\nquarters that his books, and especially his later ones, were the work\nof a madman, is entirely without foundation. His insanity was sudden;\nit came without warning; and it is puerile to point to his state of\nmind during the last years of his life as a criticism of his work. His\nbooks must stand or fall on internal evidence--and on nothing else.\nJudged from that standpoint they are scrupulously sane.\n\nThe direct cause of Nietzsche's mental breakdown is not known. As a\nmatter of fact, there was probably no direct cause. It was due to a\nnumber of influences--his excessive use of chloral which he took for\ninsomnia, the tremendous strain to which he put his intellect, his\nconstant disappointments and deprivations, his mental solitude, his\nprolonged physical suffering. We know little of his last days before he\nwent insane. He was living alone in Turin and working desperately. Then\nsuddenly to Professor Burckhardt at B\u00e2le he wrote a letter which was\nobviously the work of a madman. \"I am Ferdinand de Lesseps,\" he wrote.\n\"I am Prado. I am Schambige.[1] I have been buried twice this autumn.\"\nThis was the first indication of his insanity. Immediately after he\nwrote a similar letter to his old friend, Professor Overbeck. Other of\nNietzsche's friends received disquieting and indecipherable notes. To\nGeorg Brandes he sent a letter signed \"The Crucified.\" To Peter Gast\nhe wrote, \"Sing me a new song. The world is clear and all the skies\nrejoice.\" To Cosima Wagner: \"Ariadne, I love you.\"\n\nThere was now no doubt of his condition. Overbeck went immediately\nto Turin. He found the philosopher playing wildly on the piano, and\ncrying blasphemies to the empty room. Nietzsche was taken back to B\u00e2le,\nand then placed in a private psychiatric institution at Jena. Here he\nstayed until the following spring when he was permitted to be taken\nto the home of his mother at Naumburg. It was three years later that\nhis sister returned from Paraguay, where her husband had died, and\nNietzsche was sufficiently recovered to meet her when she arrived. But\nthough he lived for another seven years, his mind was irretrievably\nruined. When his mother died in 1897, his sister removed him to a\nvilla at Weimar. There on a great veranda, overlooking the hills and\nthe river valley, he remained until the end, receiving a few of his\nfriends and taking his old delight in music. His sister watched over\nhim tenderly, and though he was never strong enough to resume work,\nhe would often talk of his books. When shown a portrait of Wagner, he\nsaid, \"Him I loved dearly.\" He was all tenderness toward the end. The\nmighty yea-sayer had become as a little child. \"Elizabeth,\" he would\nsay, \"do not cry. Are we not happy?\"\n\nNietzsche died on the 25th of August, 1900, and was buried at R\u00f6cken,\nhis native village.\n\n\n[Footnote 1: Schambige and Prado were two assassins whose exploits were\nthen occupying the French journals.]\n\n\n\n\nII\n\n\n\"Human, All-Too-Human\"\n\nVolumes I and II\n\n\n\"Human, All-Too-Human\" (_\"Menschliches Allzu Menschliches\"_) was\nfirst published in 1878. Previous to this time Nietzsche had devoted\nhimself to a sedulous study of the French philosophers--Pascal,\nLa Rochefoucauld, Vanergues, Montaigne and others--and these men\ninfluenced him in his selection of the aphoristic style as a medium\nfor his thoughts. His serious illness at the time made it impossible\nfor him to attempt any large and co-ordinated philosophical task which\nwould have required sustained thinking and continual physical labour,\nand the detached manner of writing employed by the French thinkers\nfitted in with the intermittent manner in which he was necessitated to\nwork. \"Miscellaneous Maxims and Opinions,\" the second part of \"Human,\nAll-Too-Human,\" appeared the following year; and \"The Wanderer and his\nShadow,\" the third section, was made public in 1880. Six years later\nthese three parts were put together in two volumes under the caption of\nthe original book, and were subtitled \"A Book of Free Spirits.\"\n\nAt that time Nietzsche already had numerous writings to his credit.\n\"The Birth of Tragedy\" (_\"Die Geburt der Trag\u00f6die\"_) was composed\nbetween 1869 and 1871, and issued in January, 1872. It was a treatise\non pessimism and Hellenism, and in it Nietzsche endeavoured to\nascertain the origin of Greek tragedy. In his research he passed over\nmany of the lesser philological discussions which were then occupying\nthe minds of his academic confr\u00e8res, and, mild as was this first\npublished work of his, he suddenly found himself the centre of a\ndiscussion which augured ill for his future at the University of B\u00e2le.\nIn this book he undertook to explain the constant conflict between the\nApollonian and Dionysian ideals, and defined the differences underlying\nthese two great influences in Greek art. Later in his writings we find\nhim applying the theories stated in \"The Birth of Tragedy\" to all human\ntransactions.\n\n\"On the Future of our Educational Institutions\" and \"Homer and\nClassical Philology,\" contained in one volume, were addresses\ndelivered during Nietzsche's professorship of classical philology\nat B\u00e2le University. In these lectures he pointed out the necessity\nof protecting the man of genius, and denied the existence of actual\nculture in the educational institutions of modern Germany, holding that\ntrue culture is only for the higher type of man. He made a plea for an\ninstitution where genuine culture, founded on the ideals of ancient\nGreece, would be harboured for the few who would devote their lives\nto it. Here unquestionably was the faint beginning of his conception\nof the superman. While these lectures dealt only with the educational\ninstitutions of Germany, the criticisms in them may nevertheless be\napplied in a broader sense to the general principles underlying all\nschools. This book is the first visible step in the development of his\nthought.\n\nMore evidences of what was to come later are found in a series of\nessays written during the early seventies, which are now published\nunder the general caption of \"Early Greek Philosophy and Other Essays.\"\nThe seven essays contained in this volume are: \"The Greek State\"\n(1871), in which he attacked the modern conception of labour, and\nadvanced a brief for slavery based on the assumption that without it\ntrue culture cannot exist; \"The Greek Woman\" (1871), an outline of\nNietzsche's ideal of woman; \"On Music and Words\" (1871), an analysis\nof the origins of music and language and a statement of the functions\nof each; \"Homer's Contest\" (1872), a comparison of the ancient and\nmodern individualistic strife, in which was pointed out the necessity\nof competition in any successful commonwealth; \"The Relation of\nSchopenhauer's Philosophy to a German Culture\" (1872), a gay attack\nupon certain phases of German philistinism, with the suggestion that\nSchopenhauer's philosophy would prove an excellent counter-irritant;\n\"Philosophy During the Tragic Age of the Greeks\" (1873), a brilliant\naccount and exposition of those Greek thinkers who preceded Socrates;\nand \"On Truth and Falsity in their Ultramoral Sense\" (1873), a\nrhapsodic refutation of the theory of absolute truth, in which we find\nmany denials of the values attached to current conventions. These\ndenials we are constantly meeting in the major part of Nietzsche's\nlater work.\n\nIn Volume I of \"Thoughts Out of Season\" we find two essays: \"David\nStrauss, the Confessor and Writer\" (written in 1873), and \"Richard\nWagner at Bayreuth\" (written during the close of 1875 and at the\nbeginning of 1876). The first essay is an attack upon an ex-clerical\nwho set up a philosopher's shop in Nietzsche's day and succeeded in\nsufficiently inflaming the popular mind to secure for himself a wide\nand ardent following. Nietzsche, angered by the effect that Strauss's\nsophistries had upon the German mind, undertook to answer them and\nshow up their spuriousness. In the essay on Richard Wagner, Nietzsche\npraised the composer in no uncertain terms, hailing him as a saviour\nof mankind through the medium of the drama. Nietzsche thought he saw\nin Wagner a kindred spirit, a man free from the narrow dictates of his\ntime, one capable of establishing a new order of things in the realm of\nart. Subsequently the philosopher turned against Wagner and denounced\nhim bitterly for his anti-Hellenic tendencies.\n\nVolume II of \"Thoughts out of Season\" contains \"The Use and Abuse of\nHistory\" and \"Schopenhauer as Educator,\" both written in 1874. In the\nfirst of these essays Nietzsche attacked the study of history which was\nthen the foremost educational fad in Germany. He denied it a place in\nthe curriculum of culture unless it had for its foundation a profound\nknowledge of the causes of history. Also in this essay he made a plea\nfor the individualistic interpretation of history, arguing that the\nevents founded on the activities of majorities are useless to a true\nunderstanding of the fundamentals of racial development. Here again\nwe encounter the foreshadowing of the philosophy of the superman.\nNietzsche paid high tribute to Schopenhauer in his essay \"Schopenhauer\nas Educator.\" Without subscribing unqualifiedly to all the doctrines\nof the great pessimist, he nevertheless allied himself philosophically\nwith Schopenhauer's theory that all logic is an outgrowth of the law of\nself-preservation.\n\nIn the autumn of 1874 Nietzsche wrote a series of brief comments\ndealing with the subject of education. These paragraphs contain\nabout 20,000 words, and were to have constituted, when completed,\nthe fifth part of \"Thoughts Out of Season.\" He never finished them,\nhowever, and they were not published until after his death. These\nfragments appear, under the caption of \"We Philologists,\" at the end\nof the volume entitled \"The Case of Wagner.\" \"We Philologists\" is a\nprotest against the manner in which classical culture was promulgated\nin the universities. It offers a stinging criticism of those German\nprofessors, the philologists, to whom was entrusted the duty of\ndisseminating Greek cultural ideals, and in addition presents a concise\noutline of what genuine Hellenic culture should consist. Nietzsche\nprotests against the filtering of pagan antiquity through Christian\ndoctrines--the method of teaching then in vogue--and insists that such\na form of education entirely misses its aim. Although \"We Philologists\"\nis comparatively of small value to the student of Nietzsche's later\nphilosophy, it is interesting to note that as early as 1874, his\nanti-Christian spirit was already well defined.\n\nThe four essays contained in the two volumes of \"Thoughts out of\nSeason\" and \"We Philologists\" were the first of an intended series\nof pamphlets to be called _\"Unzeitgem\u00e4sse Betrachtungen\"_[1] but the\nseries was never finished. However, the Nietzschean philosophical\nideas had unquestionably begun to take definite form. Already there\nhad been attempts at idealistic and moralistic valuations. There had\nalso been a considerable amount of that preliminary analysis which was\nto form a foundation for the destructive and constructive thoughts of\nlater years. In these essays Nietzsche had already begun to strike his\nbearings, and while they cannot be taken as a part of his philosophical\nscheme, they nevertheless form an excellent introduction for those\nstudents who care to go behind the final expression of his ideas and\nbehold them in embryo.\n\n\"Human, All-Too-Human,\" following two years later, came as a distinct\nsurprise even to Nietzsche's most intimate friends: Wagner especially\nwas horrified at the heresies contained in it. There had not been\nsufficient indications in his earlier writings for one to predict so\ndevastating an arraignment of modern life as was contained in this\nwork. It was a departure, not only in thought but also in manner, from\nall else he had written. The conventional essay form had been set aside\nfor an aphoristic style. Here we find a series of paragraphs varying in\nlength from a few lines to a page or more, each dealing with a separate\nand syllogistically detached idea. The epigram, which was to play\nsuch an important part in all of Nietzsche's writings, is also found\nin abundance. The form in which these two volumes are cast gives the\neffect of a man felling a giant tree with a thousand blows of an axe,\nas distinguished from the method of the man who saws it down gradually\nand continuously.\n\nDespite its muscular and incisive qualities, the manner of this work\nis calm. As a whole it is an excellent example of those writings which\nNietzsche himself has called Apollonian. At times one even feels a\ntentativeness in its utterances not unlike that which attaches to\nthe steps a man takes in a region he knows to be full of quicksands.\nIn this regard it is interesting to note how a certain insecurity at\nthe beginning of the work, which manifests itself in ultra-obscure\npassages, later gives way to a clarity and humour indicative of almost\nwanton temerity. In this book Nietzsche passes from the academician\nto the iconoclast. He bridges the chasm from the doctor of philology\nto the independent thinker. It is the record of the psychological\ntransition of his mind; and this record is evident in both his outlook\nand his habits of expression.\n\nNietzsche, at his birth as a thinker, presents himself as an\narch-nihilist. He realised the necessity of destroying the universe\nbefore an understanding of it was possible, and so the two volumes of\n\"Human, All-Too-Human\" are almost entirely destructive. In this work\nwe have Nietzsche the trail-blazer, the incendiary, the idol-smasher,\nthe pessimist, the devastator. One by one the doctrines and tenets,\nstrengthened by the accumulative acceptance of centuries, go down\nbefore his bludgeon. Piece by piece the universe of reality is\nneutralised by his analyses. Every human transaction, every phase of\nhuman hope and aspiration, is reduced to negation. Ancient and modern\ncultures are dissected unsparingly. Political systems are stripped\nof their integuments and their origins exposed. New valuations are\nattached to the great artists and writers. Many of Nietzsche's most\nfamous definitions grow out of the ruthless inquests he makes in this\nwork.\n\nThis uncompassionate clearing away of accepted values prepared the\nway for the books which were to come. Once having ascertained the\nfoundation on which human actions are built, the path was clear for\nreconstruction and reorganisation. \"Human, All-Too-Human,\" then, was\nthe first indirect voicing of Nietzsche's philosophy. All else had\nbeen mere skirmishing with ideas. Only vaguely and desultorily had\nhis opinions been heretofore voiced. His analysis of history, his\ncriticisms of ancient and modern thought, had actually pried away the\nsuperficial manifestations of existence and given him that insight\ninto the undercurrents of causation which was later to inspire him\nin his work. For this reason we are more conscious of the man than of\nthe philosopher when reading the series of aphorisms which constitute\nthe main body of this document. \"Human, All-Too-Human\" is in the main\nan inquiry into the fundamental reasons for human conduct. Nietzsche\ndevotes his efforts to showing that ideals, when pushed to their\nfinal analysis, reveal a basis in human need. Especially does he\nconcern himself with the causes underlying current moral doctrines.\nHe points out that there is no static and absolute morality, but that\nall moral codes are systems of deportment founded on human conditions\nin accordance with the environmental needs of a people. From this\nhe states the corollary that all morality is subject to alteration,\namendment and abrogation. He asserts the relativity of the terms \"good\"\nand \"evil,\" and denies the justice of any final criticism of right and\nwrong as applied to any human action.\n\nFrom this Nietzsche deduces the formula which is at the bottom of all\nindividualistic philosophy, namely: that what is immoral for one man\nis moral for another, and that the application of any moral code is\nundesirable for the reason that no system of conduct can apply alike\nto all men. Thus any attempt on the part of any one man to direct the\nactions of any other man is in itself an immorality, because it is an\nattempt to hinder and retard the development of the individual. It\nmust not be thought that Nietzsche's arrival at this conclusion is a\ndirect and simple affair based on superficial observation. Nor is it in\nitself the end for which he strives. To the contrary, the conclusion\nis stated mainly by inference. The work he lays out for himself is one\nof analysis, and under his critical scalpel fall religions, political\ninstitutions and nations, as well as individuals. Wherever he finds\na belief whose origin is considered divine, he tears away its surface\ncharacteristics and inquires into it. In every instance he finds a\nhuman ground for it. Going still further, he points out that all\ninstitutions, in order to meet the constantly fluctuating conditions of\nsociety, must subject themselves to change.\n\nA multiplicity of themes comes under Nietzsche's observation in this\nwork. Not only is there a great deal of abstract reasoning but also\na vast amount of brilliant and penetrating criticism of men and\nart. Ancient and modern philosophers, novelists, poets, musicians,\ndramatists, as well as theories of art, literature and music, here come\nunder his careful and acute analysis. There are passages of startling\npoetry interpolated between paragraphs of cynical and destructive\nresearch. Nietzsche reveals himself as a scholar, the philologist, the\nhistorian and the scientist, as well as the thinker. The amount of\ngeneral knowledge he displays in nearly every line of human endeavour\nis astonishing. In his most elaborate processes of ratiocination he is\nalways capable of adhering to authenticated facts. He never side-steps\ninto the purely metaphysical or denies the existence of corporeality\nonce it has been assumed as a hypothesis. He breaks once and for all\nwith the metaphysicians and word-jugglers. Denying all reason in the\nKantian sense, he is always scrupulously reasonable.\n\nAlthough no direct philosophical doctrines are propounded in \"Human,\nAll-Too-Human,\" Nietzsche had undoubtedly outlined in his mind the\nconstructive works which were to come later. However, in reading\nthis work one finds but little indication--and that only obscurely\nhinted at--of the transvaluation of values which was to follow the\ndevaluation. We have no hint, for instance, of the doctrine of the\nsuperman other than an implied ideal of an intellectual aristocracy\nwhich will permit of the highest development; of the individual.\nEvolution beyond the present is mentioned but indirectly. The\nfuture, to this destructive Nietzsche, is non-existent. His eyes are\ncontinually turned toward the past and they shift no further than the\npresent. Only through implication is the Hellenic ideal voiced, and\nthen it is with a certain degree of speculation as to its efficacy in\nmeeting the demands of the modern man. Greek culture is used largely as\na means of comparison, or as an arbitrary premise of his dialectic. The\ndoctrine of eternal recurrence, which was to form one of the bases of\n\"Thus Spake Zarathustra,\" is not even suggested. The \"will to power,\"\nthe anti-Schopenhauerian doctrine, which is the framework on which all\nof Nietzsche's constructive thinking is hung, was, at the time of his\nwriting \"Human, All-Too-Human,\" a hypothesis, vague and undeveloped.\n\n\"Human, All-Too-Human\" is the first work of Nietzsche one should read.\nIn reality it is an elaborate introduction to his later works. In his\nfollowing book, \"The Dawn of Day,\" comes the birth of his philosophy;\nit is the first real battle in his righteous warfare, the first great\nblasphemous assault upon the accepted order of things. But it cannot be\nreadily understood or appreciated unless we have prepared ourselves for\nit.\n\nThe selection of the passages from the present two volumes has been\nextremely difficult, due to their multiplicity of themes and to\nthe heterogeneity of their treatment. It is impossible to create a\nconvincing effect of a razed forest by presenting a picture of an\noccasional fallen tree. Herein has lain my chief difficulty. I have\nbeen able to show only sections of the destruction of human values\nwhich Nietzsche here accomplishes. Furthermore, it has been impossible\nto give any very adequate idea of the vast amount of brilliant\ncriticism of men and art which is to be encountered in these two\nvolumes. All this must be got direct. It has been possible only to\nsuggest it here. Those portions of the books which I have been able to\ncomprehend in these excerpts are necessarily limited to Nietzsche's\nmore important destructive conclusions.\n\n\n[Footnote 1: \"Inopportune Speculations.\"]\n\n\nEXCERPTS FROM \"HUMAN, ALL-TOO-HUMAN\"\n\nEverything _essential_ in human development happened in pre-historic\ntimes, long before those four thousand years which we know something\nof.... 1, 15\n\nEverything has evolved; there are _no eternal facts,_ as there are\nlikewise no absolute truths. 1, 15\n\nIt is probable that the objects of religious, moral, \u00e6sthetic and\nlogical sentiment likewise belong only to the surface of things, while\nman willingly believes that here, at least, he has touched the heart of\nthe world.... 1, 17\n\nNothing could be said of the metaphysical world but that it would be\na different condition, a condition inaccessible and incomprehensible\nto us; it would be a thing of negative qualities. Were the existence\nof such a world ever so well proved, the fact would nevertheless\nremain that it would be precisely the most irrelevant of all forms of\nknowledge.... 1, 21-22\n\nBelief in the freedom of the will is an original error of everything\norganic, as old as the existence of the awakenings of logic in it; the\nbelief in unconditioned substances and similar things is equally a\nprimordial as well as an old error of everything organic. 1, 33\n\nA degree of culture, and assuredly a very high one, is attained when\nman rises above superstitious and religious notions and fears, and,\nfor instance, no longer believes in guardian angels or in original\nsin, and has also ceased to talk of the salvation of his soul,--if he\nhas attained to this degree of freedom, he has still also to overcome\nmetaphysics with the greatest exertion of his intelligence. 1, 35\n\nAway with those wearisomely hackneyed terms Optimism and Pessimism!...\nWe must get rid of both the calumniating and the glorifying conception\nof the world. 1, 43-44\n\n_Error_ has made man so deep, sensitive, and inventive that he has put\nforth such blossoms as religions and arts. Pure knowledge could not\nhave been capable of it. 1, 44-45\n\nThe usual false conclusions of mankind are these: a thing exists,\ntherefore it has a right to exist. Here there is inference from the\nability to live to its suitability; from its suitability to its\nrightfulness. Then: an opinion brings happiness; therefore it is the\ntrue opinion. Its effect is good; therefore it is itself good and true.\n1, 45\n\nEvery belief in the value and worthiness of life is based on vitiated\nthought; it is only possible through the fact that sympathy for the\ngeneral life and suffering of mankind is very weakly developed in the\nindividual. 1, 47-48\n\nScience ... has no consideration for ultimate purposes, any more than\nNature has, but just as the latter occasionally achieves things of the\ngreatest suitableness without intending to do so, so also true science,\nas the _imitator of nature in ideas,_ will occasionally and in many\nways further the usefulness and welfare of man,--_but also without\nintending to do so._ 1, 58\n\nAll single actions are called good or bad without any regard to their\nmotives, but only on account of the useful or injurious consequences\nwhich result for the community. But soon the origin of these\ndistinctions is forgotten, and it is deemed that the qualities \"good\"\nor \"bad\" are contained in the action itself without regard to its\nconsequences.... 1, 59\n\nThe hierarchy of possessions ... is not fixed and equal at all times;\nif any one prefers vengeance to justice he is moral according to the\nstandard of an earlier civilisation, but immoral according to the\npresent one. 1, 63\n\nPeople who are cruel nowadays must be accounted for by us as the grades\nof earlier civilisations which have survived.... 1, 63\n\nCertainly we should _exhibit_ pity, but take good care not to _feel_\nit, for the unfortunate are so _stupid_ that to them the exhibition of\npity is the greatest good in the world. 1, 68\n\nThe thirst for pity is the thirst for self-gratification.... 1, 69\n\nThere must be self-deception in order that this and that may _produce_\ngreat _effects._ For men believe in the truth of everything that is\nvisibly, strongly believed in. 1, 71\n\nOne of the commonest mistakes is this: because some one is truthful and\nhonest towards us, he must speak the truth. 1, 71\n\nWhy do people mostly speak the truth in daily life?... Because ... the\npath of compulsion and authority is surer than that of cunning. 1,72\n\nOne may promise actions, but no sentiments, for these are involuntary.\n1,76\n\nOur crime against criminals lies in the fact that we treat them like\nrascals. 1,79\n\nEvery virtue has its privileges; for example, that of contributing its\nown little fagot to the scaffold of every condemned man. 1, 80\n\nWhy do we over-estimate love to the disadvantage of justice, and say\nthe most beautiful things about it, as if it were something very much\nhigher than the latter? Is it not visibly more stupid than justice?\nCertainly, but precisely for that reason all the _pleasanter_ for every\none. 1, 81\n\nHope,--in reality ... is the worst of all evils, because it prolongs\nthe torments of man. 1, 82\n\nOne will seldom go wrong if one attributes extreme actions to vanity,\naverage ones to habit, and petty ones to fear. 1, 83\n\nReligion is rich in excuses to reply to the demand for suicide, and\nthus it ingratiates itself with those who wish to cling to life. 1,\n85-86\n\nThe injustice of the powerful, which, more than anything else, rouses\nindignation in history, is by no means so great as it appears.... One\nunconsciously takes it for granted that doer and sufferer think and\nfeel alike, and according to this supposition we measure the guilt of\nthe one by the pain of the other. 1, 86-87\n\nWhen virtue has slept, it will arise again all the fresher. 1, 87\n\nWhat a great deal of pleasure morality gives! Only think what a sea of\npleasant tears has been shed over descriptions of noble and unselfish\ndeeds! This charm of life would vanish if the belief in absolute\nirresponsibility Were to obtain supremacy. 1, 90\n\nJustice (equity) has its origin amongst powers which are fairly\nequal.... The character of _exchange_ is the primary character of\njustice.... Because man, according to his intellectual custom, has\n_forgotten_ the original purpose of so-called just and reasonable\nactions, and particularly because for hundreds of years children have\nbeen taught to admire and imitate such actions, the idea has gradually\narisen that such an action is un-egoistic; upon this idea, however, is\nbased the high estimation in which it is held.... 1, 90-91\n\nThe feeling of pleasure on the basis of human relations generally makes\nman better; joy in common, pleasure enjoyed together is increased, it\ngives the individual security, makes him good-tempered, and dispels\nmistrust and envy, for we feel ourselves at ease and see others at\nease. _Similar manifestations of pleasure_ awaken the idea of the same\nsensations, the feeling of being like something; a like effect is\nproduced by common sufferings, the same bad weather, dangers, enemies.\nUpon this foundation is based the oldest alliance, the object of which\nis the mutual obviating and averting of a threatening danger for the\nbenefit of each individual. And thus the social instinct grows out of\npleasure. 1, 97\n\nThe aim of malice is _not_ the suffering of others in itself, but our\nown enjoyment.... 1, 102\n\nIf self-defence is allowed to pass as moral, then almost all\nmanifestations of the so-called immoral egoism must also stand....\n1, 104\n\nHe who is punished does not deserve the punishment, he is only used as\na means of henceforth warning away from certain actions; equally so, he\nwho is rewarded does not merit this reward, he could not act otherwise\nthan he did. 1, 105\n\nBetween good and evil actions there is no difference of species, but at\nmost of degree. Good actions are sublimated evil ones; evil actions are\nvulgarised and stupefied good ones. 1, 108\n\nThe religious cult is based upon the representations of sorcery between\nman and man.... 1, 121\n\nChristianity ... oppressed man and crushed him utterly, sinking him\nas if in deep mire; then into the feeling of absolute depravity it\nsuddenly threw the light of divine mercy, so that the surprised man,\ndazzled by forgiveness, gave a cry of joy and for a moment believed\nthat he bore all heaven within himself. 1, 124\n\nPeople to whom their daily life appears too empty and monotonous easily\ngrow religious; this is comprehensible and excusable, only they have no\nright to demand religious sentiments from those whose daily life is not\nempty and monotonous. 1, 125\n\nNo man _ever_ did a thing which was done only for others and without\nany personal motive.... 1, 134\n\nIn every ascetic morality man worships one part of himself as a God,\nand is obliged, therefore, to diabolise the other parts. 1, 140\n\nWhat is it that we long for at the sight of beauty? We long to be\nbeautiful, we fancy it must bring much happiness with it. But that is a\nmistake. 1, 156\n\nThere is an art of the ugly soul side by side with the art of the\nbeautiful soul.... 1, 157\n\nArtists of representation are especially held to be possessed of\ngenius, but not scientific men. In reality, however, the former\nvaluation and the latter under-valuation are only puerilities of\nreason. 1, 166-167\n\nA good author possesses not only his own intellect, but also that of\nhis friends. 1, 178\n\nTo look upon writing as a regular profession should justly be regarded\nas a form of madness. 1, 181\n\nA conversation with a friend will only bear good fruit of knowledge\nwhen both think only of the matter under consideration and forget that\nthey are friends. 1, 183\n\nComplete praise has a weakening effect. 1, 184\n\nThere will always be a need of bad authors; for they meet the taste of\nreaders of an undeveloped, immature age.... 1, 185\n\nThe born aristocrats of the mind are not in too much of a hurry; their\ncreations appear and fall from the tree on some quiet autumn evening,\nwithout being rashly desired, instigated, or pushed aside by new\nmatter. The unceasing desire to create is vulgar, and betrays envy,\njealousy, and ambition. If a man _is_ something, it is not really\nnecessary for him to do anything--and yet he does a great deal. There\nis a human species higher even than the \"productive\" man.... 1, 189\n\nDeviating natures are of the utmost importance wherever there is to\nbe progress. Every wholesale progress must be preceded by a partial\nweakening. The strongest natures _retain_ the type, the weaker ones\nhelp it to _develop_. 1, 208\n\nIn the knowledge of truth, what really matters is the _possession_ of\nit, not the impulse under which it was sought, the way in which it was\nfound. 1, 210\n\nThe fettered spirit does not take up his position from conviction,\nbut from habit; he is a Christian, for instance, not because he\nhad a comprehension of different creeds and could take his choice;\nhe is an Englishman, not because he decided for England, but he\nfound Christianity and England ready-made and accepted them without\nany reason, just as one who is born in a wine-country becomes a\nwine-drinker. 1, 211\n\nThe restriction of views, which habit has made instinct, leads to what\nis called strength of character. 1, 212-213\n\nThe highest intelligence and the warmest heart cannot exist together\nin one person, and the wise man who passes judgment upon life looks\nbeyond goodness and only regards it as something which is not without\nvalue in the general summing-up of life. The wise man must _oppose_\nthose digressive wishes of unintelligent goodness, because he has an\ninterest in the continuance of his type and in the eventual appearance\nof the highest intellect; at least, he will not advance the founding of\nthe \"perfect State,\" inasmuch as there is only room in it for wearied\nindividuals. 1, 218-219\n\nInterest in Education will acquire great strength only from the moment\nwhen belief in a God and His care is renounced.... An education that no\nlonger believes in miracles must pay attention to three things: first,\nhow much energy is inherited? secondly, by what means can new energy\nbe aroused? thirdly, how can the individual be adapted to so many and\nmanifold claims of culture without being disquieted and destroying his\npersonality,--in short, how can the individual be initiated into the\ncounterpoint of private and public culture, how can he lead the melody\nand at the same time accompany it. 1, 224-225\n\nA higher culture must give man a double brain, two brain-chambers, so\nto speak, one to feel science and the other to feel non-science, which\ncan lie side by side, without confusion, divisible, exclusive; this\nis a necessity of health. In one part lies the source of strength,\nin the other lies the regulator; it must be heated with illusions,\nonesidednesses, passions; and the malicious and dangerous consequences\nof overheating must be averted by the help of conscious Science. 1, 232\n\nSimultaneous things hold together, it is said. A relative dies far\naway, and at the same time we dream about him,--Consequently! But\ncountless relatives die and we do not dream about them.... This species\nof superstition is found again in a refined form in historians and\ndelineators of culture, who usually have a kind of hydrophobic horror\nof all that senseless mixture, in which individual and national life is\nso rich. 1, 235\n\nIt is true that in the spheres of higher culture there must always be\na supremacy, but henceforth this supremacy lies in the hands of the\n_oligarchs of the mind._ In spite of local and political separation\nthey form a cohesive society, whose members _recognise and acknowledge_\neach other, whatever public opinion and the verdicts of review and\nnewspaper writers who influence the masses may circulate in favour\nof or against them. Mental superiority, which formerly divided and\nembittered, nowadays generally _unites._ ... Oligarchs are necessary\nto each other, they are each other's best joy, they understand their\nsigns, but each is nevertheless free, he fights and conquers in _his_\nplace and perishes rather than submit. 1, 243\n\nThe greatest advance that men have made lies in their acquisition of\nthe art to _reason rightly._ 1, 249-250\n\nThe strength and weakness of mental productiveness depend far less on\ninherited talents than on the accompanying amount of _elasticity._\n1, 250\n\nWhoever, in the present day, still derives his development from\nreligious sentiments, and perhaps lives for some length of time\nafterwards in metaphysics and art, has assuredly gone back a\nconsiderable distance and begins his race with other modern men\nunder unfavourable conditions; he apparently loses time and space.\nBut because he stays in those domains where ardour and energy are\nliberated and force flows continuously as a volcanic stream out of an\ninexhaustible source, he goes forward all the more quickly as soon as\nhe has freed himself at the right moment from those dominators....\n1, 252\n\nWhoever wishes to reap happiness and comfort in life should always\navoid higher culture. 1, 255-250\n\nAll mankind is divided, as it was at all times and is still, into\nslaves and freemen; for whoever has not two-thirds of his day for\nhimself is a slave.... 1, 259\n\nIf idleness is really the _beginning_ of all vice, it finds itself,\ntherefore, at least in near neighbourhood of all the virtues; the idle\nman is still a better man than the active. You do not suppose that in\nspeaking of idleness and idlers I am alluding to you, you sluggards?\n1, 260\n\nI believe that every one must have his own opinion about everything\nconcerning which opinions are possible, because he himself is a\npeculiar, unique thing, which assumes towards all other things a new\nand never hitherto existing attitude. 1, 260-261\n\nWhoever earnestly desires to be free will therewith and without any\ncompulsion lose all inclination for faults and vices; he will also be\nmore rarely overcome by anger and vexation. 1, 261-262\n\nYou must have loved religion and art as you loved mother and\nnurse,--otherwise you cannot be wise. But you must be able to see\nbeyond them, to outgrow them; if you remain under their ban you do not\nunderstand them. 1, 264\n\nThe rage for equality may so manifest itself that we seek either to\ndraw all others down to ourselves (by belittling, disregarding, and\ntripping up), or ourselves and all others upwards (by recognition,\nassistance, and congratulation). 1, 268\n\nWe set no special value on the possession of a virtue until we perceive\nthat it is entirely lacking in our adversary. 1, 269\n\nWe forget our pretensions when we are always conscious of being amongst\nmeritorious people; being alone implants presumption in us. The young\nare pretentious, for they associate with their equals, who are all\nciphers but would fain have a great significance. 1, 271\n\nIn warring against stupidity, the most just and gentle of men at last\nbecome brutal. They are thereby, perhaps, taking the proper course for\ndefence; for the most appropriate argument for a stupid brain is the\nclenched fist. But because, as has been said, their character is just\nand gentle, they suffer more by this means of protection than they\ninjure their opponents by it. 1, 284\n\nThe perfect woman is a higher type of humanity than the perfect man,\nand also something much rarer. 1, 295\n\nEvery one bears within him an image of woman, inherited from his\nmother: it determines his attitude towards woman as a whole, whether to\nhonour, despise, or remain generally indifferent to them. 1, 295-296\n\nMothers are readily jealous of the friends of sons who are particularly\nsuccessful. As a rule mother loves _herself_ in her son more than the\nson. 1, 296\n\nIf married couples did not live together, happy marriages would be more\nfrequent. 1, 298\n\nAs a rule women love a distinguished man to the extent that they wish\nto possess him exclusively. They would gladly keep him under lock and\nkey, if their vanity did not forbid, but vanity demands that he should\nalso appear distinguished before others. 1, 299\n\nThose girls who mean to trust exclusively to their youthful charms\nfor their provision in life, and whose cunning is further prompted by\nworldly mothers, have just the same aims as courtesans, only they are\nwiser and less honest. 1, 300\n\nFor goodness' sake let us not give our classical education to girls!\n1, 301\n\nThe intellect of woman manifests itself as perfect mastery, presence\nof mind, and utilisation of all advantages. They transmit it as a\nfundamental quality to their children, and the father adds thereto the\ndarker background of the will. His influence determines as it were\nthe rhythm and harmony with which the new life is to be performed;\nbut its melody is derived from the mother. For those who know how to\nput a thing properly: women have intelligence, men have character and\npassion. This does not contradict the fact that men actually achieve\nso much more with their intelligence: they have deeper and more\npowerful impulses; and it is these which carry their understanding (in\nitself something passive) to such an extent. Women are often silently\nsurprised at the great respect men pay to their character. When,\ntherefore, in the choice of a partner men seek specially for a being\nof deep and strong character, and women for a being of intelligence,\nbrilliancy, and presence of mind, it is plain that at bottom men seek\nfor the ideal man, and women for the ideal woman,--consequently not\nfor the complement but for the completion of their own excellence.\n1, 302-303.\n\nIt is a sign of women's wisdom that they have almost always known how\nto get themselves supported, like drones in a bee-hive. Let us just\nconsider what this meant originally, and why men do not depend upon\nwomen for their support. Of a truth it is because masculine vanity and\nreverence are greater than feminine wisdom; for women have known how to\nsecure for themselves by their subordination the greatest advantage,\nin fact, the upper hand. Even the care of children may originally\nhave been used by the wisdom of women as an excuse for withdrawing\nthemselves as much as possible from work. And at present they still\nunderstand when they are really active (as housekeepers, for instance)\nhow to make a bewildering fuss about it, so that the merit of their\nactivity is usually ten times over-estimated by men. 1, 303\n\nMarriage is a necessary institution for the twenties; a useful, but not\nnecessary, institution for the thirties; for later life it is often\nharmful, and promotes the mental deterioration of the man. 1, 308\n\nMarriage regarded in its highest aspect, as the spiritual friendship\nof two persons of opposite sexes, and accordingly such as is hoped for\nin future, contracted for the purpose of producing and educating a new\ngeneration,--such marriage, which only makes use of the sensual, so to\nspeak, as a rare and occasional means to a higher purpose, will, it is\nto be feared, probably need a natural auxiliary, namely, _concubinage._\nFor if, on the grounds of his health, the wife is also to serve, for\nthe sole satisfaction of the man's sexual needs, a wrong perspective,\nopposed to the aims indicated, will have most influence in the choice\nof a wife. The aims referred to: the production of descendants, will be\naccidental, and their successful education highly improbable. 1, 309\n\nWe always lose through too familiar association with women and friends;\nand sometimes we lose the pearl of of our life thereby. 1, 312\n\nWomen always intrigue privately against the higher souls of their\nhusbands; they want to cheat them out of their future for the sake of a\npainless and comfortable present. 1, 315\n\nIt is laughable when a company of paupers decree the abolition of the\nright of inheritance, and it is not less laughable when childless\npersons labour for the practical law-giving of a country: they have\nnot enough ballast in their ship to sail safely over the ocean of the\nfuture. But it seems equally senseless if a man who has chosen for his\nmission the widest knowledge and estimation of universal existence,\nburdens himself with personal considerations of a family, with the\nsupport, protection, and care of wife and child, and in front of his\ntelescope hangs that gloomy veil through which hardly a ray from the\ndistant firmament can penetrate. Thus 1, too, agree with the opinion\nthat in matters of the highest philosophy all married men are to be\nsuspected. 1, 316\n\nA higher culture can only originate where there are two distinct castes\nof society: that of the working class, and that of the leisured class\nwho are capable of true leisure; or, more strongly expressed, the caste\nof compulsory labour and the caste of free labour. 1, 319\n\nAgainst war it may be said that it makes the victor stupid and the\nvanquished revengeful. In favour of war it may be said that it\nbarbarises in both its above-named results, and thereby makes more\nnatural; it is the sleep or the winter period of culture; man emerges\nfrom it with greater strength for good and for evil. 1, 322\n\nAs regards Socialism, in the eyes of those who always consider higher\nutility, if it is _really_ a rising against their oppressors of\nthose who for centuries have been oppressed and downtrodden, there\nis no problem of _right_ involved (notwithstanding the ridiculous,\neffeminate question, \"How far _ought_ we to grant its demands?\") but\nonly a problem of _power_ (\"How far _can_ we make use of its demands?\")\n1, 322\n\nWell may noble (if not exactly very intelligent) representatives of\nthe governing classes asseverate: \"We will treat men equally and grant\nthem equal rights\"; so far a socialistic mode of thought which is based\non _justice_ is possible; but, as has been said, only within the ranks\nof the governing class, which in this case _practises_ justice with\nsacrifices and abnegations. On the other hand, to _demand_ equality of\nrights, as do the Socialists of the subject caste, is by no means the\noutcome of justice, but of covetousness. If you expose bloody pieces of\nflesh to a beast, and withdraw them again, until it finally begins to\nroar, do you think that roaring implies justice? 1, 326-327\n\nWhen the Socialists point out that the division of property at the\npresent day is the consequence of countless deeds of injustice and\nviolence, and, _in summa,_ repudiate obligation to anything with\nso unrighteous a basis, they only perceive something isolated. The\nentire past of ancient civilisation is built up on violence, slavery,\ndeception, and error; we, however, cannot annul ourselves, the heirs of\nall these conditions, nay, the concrescences of all this past, and are\nnot entitled to demand the withdrawal of a single fragment thereof.\n1, 327\n\nThose who are bent on revolutionising society may be divided into\nthose who seek something for themselves thereby and those who seek\nsomething for their children and grandchildren. The latter are the\nmore dangerous, for they have the belief and the good conscience of\ndisinterestedness. 1, 329\n\nThe fact that we regard the gratification of vanity as of more account\nthan all other forms of well-being (security, position, and pleasures\nof all sorts), is shown to a ludicrous extent by every one wishing for\nthe abolition of slavery and utterly abhorring to put any one into\nthis position.... We protest in the name of the \"dignity of man\"; but,\nexpressed more simply, that is just our darling vanity which feels\nnon-equality, and inferiority in public estimation, to be the hardest\nlot of all. 1, 330\n\nIn all institutions into which the sharp breeze of public criticism\ndoes not penetrate an innocent corruption grows up like a fungus (for\ninstance, in learned bodies and senates). 1, 336\n\nThe belief in a divine regulation of political affairs, in a mystery\nin the existence of the State, is of religious origin: if religion\ndisappears, the State will inevitably lose its old veil of Isis, and\nwill no longer arouse veneration. The sovereignty of the people,\nlooked at closely, serves also to dispel the final fascination and\nsuperstition in the realm of these sentiments; modern democracy is the\nhistorical form of the _decay of the State._ 1, 342\n\nSocialism is the fantastic younger brother of almost decrepit\ndespotism, which it wants to succeed; its efforts are, therefore,\nin the deepest sense reactionary. For it desires such an amount of\nState Power as only despotism has possessed,--indeed, it outdoes\nall the past, in that it aims at the complete annihilation of the\nindividual, whom it deems an unauthorised luxury of nature, which\nis to be improved by it into an appropriate _organ of the general\ncommunity._ Owing to its relationship, it always appears in proximity\nto excessive developments of power, like the old typical socialist,\nPlato, at the court of the Sicilian tyrant; it desires (and under\ncertain circumstances furthers) the C\u00e6sarian despotism of this century,\nbecause, as has been said, it would like to become its heir. But even\nthis inheritance would not suffice for its objects, it requires the\nmost submissive prostration of all citizens before the absolute State,\nsuch as has never yet been realised, and as it can no longer even count\nupon the old religious piety towards the State, but must rather strive\ninvoluntarily and continuously for the abolition thereof,--because\nit strives for the abolition of all existing _States,_--it can only\nhope for existence occasionally, here and there for short periods, by\nmeans of the extremest terrorism. It is therefore silently preparing\nitself for reigns of terror, and drives the word \"justice\" like a nail\ninto the heads of the half-cultured masses in order to deprive them\ncompletely of their understanding (after they had already suffered\nseriously from the half-culture), and to provide them with a good\nconscience for the bad game they are to play. Socialism may serve to\nteach, very brutally and impressively, the danger of all accumulations\nof State power, and may serve so far to inspire distrust of the State\nitself. 1, 343-344\n\nIt is nothing but fanaticism and beautiful soulism to expect very much\n(or even, much only) from humanity when it has forgotten how to wage\nwar. 1, 349\n\nWealth necessarily creates an aristocracy of race, for it permits the\nchoice of the most beautiful women and the engagement of the best\nteachers; it allows a man cleanliness, time for physical exercises,\nand, above all, immunity from dulling physical labour. 1, 351\n\nPublic opinion--private laziness. 1, 354\n\nConvictions are more dangerous enemies of truth than lies. 1, 355\n\nThe unreasonableness of a thing is no argument against its existence,\nbut rather a condition thereof. 1, 361\n\nPeople who talk about their importance to mankind have a feeble\nconscience for common bourgeois rectitude, keeping of contracts,\npromises, etc. 1, 363\n\nThe demand to be loved is the greatest of presumptions. 1, 363\n\nWhen a man roars with laughter he surpasses all the animals by his\nvulgarity. 1, 369\n\nThe first opinion that occurs to us when we are suddenly asked about\nanything is not usually our own, but only the current opinion belonging\nto our caste, position, or family; our own opinions seldom float on the\nsurface. 1, 372\n\nNobody talks more passionately of his rights than he who, in the depths\nof his soul, is doubtful about them. 1, 380.\n\nUnconsciously we seek the principles and opinions which are suited to\nour temperament, so that at last it seems as if these principles and\nopinions had formed our character and given it support and stability,\nwhereas exactly the contrary has taken place. Our thoughts and\njudgments are, apparently, to be taken subsequently as the causes of\nour nature, but as a matter of fact _our_ nature is the cause of our so\nthinking and judging. 1, 384\n\nThe man of unpleasant character, full of distrust, envious of the\nsuccess of fellow-competitors and neighbours, violent and enraged\nat divergent opinions, shows that he belongs to an earlier grade of\nculture, and is, therefore, an atavism; for the way in which he behaves\nto people was right and suitable only for an age of club-law; he is\nan _atavist._ The man of a different character, rich in sympathy,\nwinning friends everywhere, finding all that is growing and becoming\namiable, rejoicing at the honours and successes of others and claiming\nno privilege of solely knowing the truth, but full of a modest\ndistrust,--he is a forerunner who presses upwards towards a higher\nhuman culture. 1, 388\n\nHe who has not passed through different phases of conviction, but\nsticks to the faith in whose net he was first caught, is, under\nall circumstances, just on account of this unchangeableness, a\nrepresentative of _atavistic_ culture.... 1, 400\n\nOpinions evolve out of _passions; indolence of intellect_ allows those\nto congeal into _convictions_. 1, 404\n\nHe who has attained intellectual emancipation to any extent cannot, for\na long time, regard himself otherwise than as a wanderer on the face\nof the earth--and not even as a traveller _towards_ a final goal, for\nthere is no such thing. 1, 405\n\nIf we make it clear to any one that, strictly, he can never speak\nof truth, but only of probability and of its degrees, we generally\ndiscover, from the undisguised joy of our pupil, how greatly men prefer\nthe uncertainty of their intellectual horizon, and how in their heart\nof hearts they hate truth because of its definiteness. 2, 15\n\nWith all that enthusiasts say in favour of their gospel or their master\nthey are defending themselves, however much they comport themselves as\nthe judges and not the accused: because they are involuntarily reminded\nalmost at every moment that they are exceptions and have to assert\ntheir legitimacy. 2, 18\n\nThe belief in truth begins with the doubt of all truths in which one\nhas previously believed. 2, 20\n\nPhilosophic brains will ... be distinguished from others by their\ndisbelief in the metaphysical significance of morality. 2, 29\n\nYou hold that sacrifice is the hallmark of moral action?--Just consider\nwhether in every action that is done with deliberation, in the best as\nin the worst, there be not a sacrifice. 2, 30\n\nIt is more convenient to follow one's conscience than one's\nintelligence, for at every failure conscience finds an excuse and an\nencouragement in itself. That is why there are so many conscientious\nand so few intelligent people. 2, 33\n\nAll moralists are shy, because they know they are confounded with spies\nand traitors, so soon as their penchant is noticed. Besides, they are\ngenerally conscious of being impotent in action, for in the midst of\nwork the motives of their activity almost withdraw their attention from\nthe work. 2, 42\n\nNo one accuses without an underlying notion of punishment and revenge,\neven when he accuses his fate or himself. All complaint is accusation,\nall self-congratulation is praise. Whether we do one or the other, we\nalways make some one responsible. 2, 44\n\nWe must know how to emerge cleaner from unclean conditions, and, if\nnecessary, how to wash ourselves even with dirty water. 2, 44\n\nThe origin of morality may be traced to two ideas: \"The community is\nof more value than the individual,\" and \"The permanent interest is\nto be preferred to the temporary.\" The conclusion drawn is that the\npermanent interest of the community is unconditionally to be set above\nthe temporary interest of the individual, especially his momentary\nwell-being, but also his permanent interest and even the prolongation\nof his existence. 2, 46-47\n\nWe should not shrink from treading the road to a virtue, even when we\nsee clearly that nothing but egotism, and accordingly utility, personal\ncomfort, fear, considerations of health, reputation, or glory, are\nthe impelling motives. These motives are styled ignoble and selfish.\nVery well, but if they stimulate us to some virtue--for example,\nself-denial, dutifulness, order, thrift, measure, and moderation--let\nus listen to them, whatever their epithets may be! 2, 48\n\nThe tendency of a talent towards moral subjects, characters, motives,\ntowards the \"beautiful soul\" of the work of art, is often only a glass\neye put on by the artist who lacks a beautiful soul. 2, 78\n\nArt is above all and meant to embellish life, to make us ourselves\nendurable and if possible agreeable in the eyes of others. With this\ntask in view, art moderates us and holds us in restraint, creates\nforms of intercourse, binds over the uneducated to laws of decency,\ncleanliness, politeness, well-timed speech and silence. Hence art must\nconceal or transfigure everything that is ugly--the painful, terrible,\nand disgusting elements which in spite of every effort will always\nbreak out afresh in accordance with the very origin of human nature.\nArt has to perform this duty especially in regard to the passions and\nspiritual agonies and anxieties, and to cause the significant factor\nto shine through unavoidable or unconquerable ugliness. To this great,\nsuper-great task the so-called art proper, that of works of art, is a\nmere accessory. A man who feels within himself a surplus of such powers\nof embellishment, concealment, and transfiguration will finally seek to\nunburden himself of this surplus in works of art. The same holds good,\nunder special circumstances, of a whole nation. 2, 01-92\n\nOn great minds is bestowed the terrifying all-too-human of their\nnatures, their blindnesses, deformities, and extravagances, so\nthat their more powerful, easily all-too-powerful influence may be\ncontinually held within bounds through the distrust aroused by such\nqualities. 2, 100\n\nOriginal minds are distinguished not by being the first to see a new\nthing, but by seeing the old, well-known thing, which is seen and\noverlooked by every one, as something new. The first discoverer is\nusually that quite ordinary and unintellectual visionary--chance. 2, 105\n\nThe obvious satisfaction of the individual with his own form excites\nimitation and gradually creates the form of the many--that is, fashion.\n2, 107\n\nWho of us could dare to call himself a \"free spirit\" if he could not\nrender homage after his fashion, by taking on his own shoulders a\nportion of that burden of public dislike and abuse, to men to whom this\nname is attached as a reproach? 2, 108\n\nImmediate self-observation is not enough, by a long way, to enable us\nto learn to know ourselves. We need history, for the past continues to\nflow through us in a hundred channels. We ourselves are, after all,\nnothing but our own sensation at every moment of this continued flow.\n2, 117\n\nTo young and fresh barbarian nations ... Christianity is a poison.\n2, 120\n\nFaith, indeed, has up to the present not been able to move real\nmountains, although I do not know who assumed that it could. But it can\nput mountains where there was none. 2, 121\n\nAmong travellers we may distinguish five grades. The first and\nlowest grade is of those who travel and are seen--they become really\ntravelled and are, as it were, blind. Next come those who really see\nthe world. The third class experience the results of their seeing. The\nfourth weave their experience into their life and carry it with them\nhenceforth. Lastly, there are some men of the highest strength who,\nas soon as they have returned home, must finally and necessarily work\nout in their lives and productions all the things seen that they have\nexperienced and incorporated in themselves.--Like these five species\nof travellers, all mankind goes through the whole pilgrimage of life,\nthe lowest as purely passive, the highest as those who act and live out\ntheir lives without keeping back any residue of inner experiences.\n2, 125\n\nTo treat all men with equal good-humour, and to be kind without\ndistinctions of persons, may arise as much from a profound contempt for\nmankind as from an in-grained love of humanity. 2, 127\n\nTowards science women and self-seeking artists entertain a feeling that\nis composed of envy and sentimentality. 2, 134\n\nThe intellectual strength of a woman is best proved by the fact that\nshe offers her own intellect as a sacrifice out of love for a man and\nhis intellect, and that nevertheless in the new domain, which was\npreviously foreign to her nature, a second intellect at once arises as\nan aftergrowth, to which the man's mind impels her. 2, 136\n\nBy women Nature shows how far she has hitherto achieved her task of\nfashioning humanity, by man she shows what she has had overcome, and\nwhat she still proposes to do for humanity. 2, 137\n\nWhence arises the sudden passion of a man for a woman, a passion so\ndeep, so vital? Least of all from sensuality only: but when a man finds\nweakness, need of help, and high spirits united in the same creature,\nhe suffers a sort of overflowing of soul, and is touched and offended\nat the same moment. At this point arises the source of great love.\n2, 140\n\nProfundity of thought belongs to youth, clarity of thought to old age.\n2, 140\n\nThe only remedy against Socialism that still lies in your power is to\navoid provoking Socialism--in other words, to live in moderation and\ncontentment, to prevent as far as possible all lavish display, and to\naid the State as far as possible in its taxing of all superfluities and\nluxuries. 2, 145\n\nOnly a man of intellect should hold property: otherwise property is\ndangerous to the community. For the owner, not knowing how to make use\nof the leisure which his possessions might secure to him, will continue\nto strive after more property.... It excites envy in the poor and\nuncultured--who at bottom always envy culture and see no mask in the\nmask--and gradually paves the way for a social revolution. 2, 147-148\n\nOnly up to a certain point does possession make men feel freer and\nmore independent; one step farther, and possession becomes lord, the\npossessor a slave. 2, 149\n\nThe governments of the great States have two instruments for keeping\nthe people independent, in fear and obedience: a coarser, the army, and\na more refined, the school. 2, 152\n\nTo call a thing good not a day longer than it appears to us good, and\nabove all not a day earlier--that is the only way to keep joy pure.\n2, 158\n\nTo honour and acknowledge even the bad, when it _pleases_ one, and\nto have no conception of how one could be ashamed of being pleased\nthereat, is the mark of sovereignty in things great and small.\n2, 158-159\n\nWhen life has treated us in true robber fashion, and has taken away all\nthat it could of honour, joys, connections, health, and property of\nevery kind, we perhaps discover in the end, after the first shock, that\nwe are richer than before. For now we know for the first time what is\nso peculiarly ours that no robber hand can touch it, and perhaps, after\nall the plunder and devastation, we come forward with the airs of a\nmighty real estate owner. 2, 162\n\nYou rank far below others when you try to establish the exception and\nthey the rule. 2, 167\n\nThe most senile thought ever conceived about men lies in the famous\nsaying, \"The ego is always hateful,\" the most childish in the still\nmore famous saying, \"Love thy neighbour as thyself.\"--With the one\nknowledge of men has ceased, with the other it has not yet begun. 2, 172\n\nYou find your burden of life too heavy? Then you must increase the\nburden of your life. 2, 176\n\nThat the world is _not_ the abstract essence of an eternal\nreasonableness is sufficiently proved by the fact that that _bit of the\nworld_ which we know--I mean our human reason--is none too reasonable.\nAnd if _this_ is not eternally and wholly wise and reasonable, the rest\nof the world will not be so either. 2, 184\n\nThere exists a simulated contempt for all things that mankind actually\nholds most important, for all everyday matters. For instance, we say\n\"we only eat to live\"--an abominable _lie,_ like that which speaks\nof the procreation of children as the real purpose of all sexual\npleasure. Conversely, the reverence for \"the most important things\" is\nhardly ever quite genuine. 2, 185\n\nThe doctrine of free will is an invention of the ruling classes. 2, 190\n\nIf a God created the world, he created man to be his ape, as a\nperpetual source of amusement in the midst of his rather tedious\neternities. 2, 193\n\nThe robber and the man of power who promises to protect a community\nfrom robbers are perhaps at bottom beings of the same mould, save that\nthe latter attains his ends by other means than the former--that is\nto say, through regular imposts paid to him by the community, and no\nlonger through forced contributions. 2, 200\n\nThe sting of conscience, like the gnawing of a dog at a stone, is mere\nfoolishness. 2, 217\n\nRights may be traced to traditions, traditions to momentary agreements.\n2, 217\n\nMorality is primarily a means of preserving the community and saving it\nfrom destruction. Next it is a means of maintaining the community on a\ncertain plane and in a certain degree of benevolence. Its motives are\nfear and hope, and these in a more coarse, rough, and powerful form,\nthe more the propensity towards the perverse, one-sided, and personal\nstill persists. 2, 221\n\nMoral prohibitions, like those of the Decalogue, are only suited to\nages when reason lies vanquished. 2, 223\n\nIt is difficult to explain why pity is so highly prized, just as we\nneed to explain why the unselfish man, who is originally despised or\nfeared as being artful, is praised. 2, 224\n\nThe sum-total of our conscience is all that has regularly been demanded\nof us, without reason, in the days of our childhood, by people whom we\nrespected or feared. 2, 224\n\nEvery word is a preconceived judgment. 2, 225\n\nThe fatalism of the Turk has this fundamental defect, that it contrasts\nman and fate as two distinct things. Man, says this doctrine, may\nstruggle against fate and try to baffle it, but in the end fate will\nalways gain the victory. Hence the most rational course is to resign\noneself or to live as one pleases. As a matter of fact, every man is\nhimself a piece of fate. When he thinks that he is struggling against\nfate in this way, fate is accomplishing its ends even in that struggle.\nThe combat is a fantasy, but so is the resignation in fate--all these\nfantasies are included in fate.--The fear felt by most people of the\ndoctrine that denies the freedom of the will is a fear of the fatalism\nof the Turk. They imagine that man will become weakly resigned and\nwill stand before the future with folded hands, because he cannot\nalter anything of the future. Or that he will give a free rein to his\ncaprices, because the predestined cannot be made worse by that course.\nThe follies of men are as much a piece of fate as are his wise actions,\nand even that fear of belief in fate is a fatality. You yourself, you\npoor timid creature, are that indomitable _Moira,_ which rules even the\nGods; whatever may happen, you are a curse or a blessing, and in any\ncase the fetters wherein the strongest lies bound: in you the whole\nfuture of the human world is predestined, and it is no use for you to\nbe frightened of yourself. 2, 228-229\n\nIn the first era of the higher humanity courage is accounted the most\nnoble virtue, in the next justice, in the third temperance, in the\nfourth wisdom. 2, 230\n\nSuperficial, inexact observation sees contrasts everywhere in nature\n(for instance, \"hot and cold\"), where there are no contrasts, only\ndifferences of degree. 2, 231\n\nOn two hypotheses alone is there any sense in prayer, that not quite\nextinct custom of olden times. It would have to be possible either\nto fix or alter the will of the godhead, and the devotee would have\nto know best himself what he needs and should really desire. Both\nhypotheses, axiomatic and traditional in all other religions, are\ndenied by Christianity. 2, 235-233\n\nDistrust is the touchstone for the gold of certainty. 2, 266\n\nWrath and punishment are our inheritance from the animals. Man does\nnot become of age until he has restored to the animals this gift of\nthe cradle.--Herein lies buried one of the mightiest ideas that men\ncan have, the idea of a progress of all progresses.--Let us go forward\ntogether a few millenniums, my friends! There is still reserved for\nmankind a great deal of joy, the very scent of which has not yet been\nwafted to the men of our day! Indeed, we may promise ourselves this\njoy, nay summon and conjure it up as a necessary thing, so long as the\ndevelopment of human reason does not stand still. Some day we shall no\nlonger be reconciled to the logical sin that lurks in all wrath and\npunishment, whether exercised by the individual or by society--some\nday, when head and heart have learnt to live as near together as they\nnow are far apart. That they no longer stand so far apart as they did\noriginally is fairly palpable from a glance at the whole course of\nhumanity. The individual who can review a life of introspective work\nwill become conscious of the _rapprochement_ arrived at, with a proud\ndelight at the distance he has bridged, in order that he may thereupon\nventure upon more ample hopes. 2, 284-285\n\nNatural death is independent of all reason and is really an irrational\ndeath, in which the pitiable substance of the shell determines how long\nthe kernel is to exist.... 2, 286\n\nThe more fully and thoroughly we live, the more ready we are to\nsacrifice life for a single pleasurable emotion. 2, 288\n\nAll intellectual movements whereby the great may hope to rob and the\nsmall to save, are sure to prosper. 2, 311-312\n\nThe desire for victory and pre-eminence is an ineradicable trait of\nhuman nature, older and more primitive than any respect of or joy in\nequality. 2, 312\n\nIf all alms were given only out of compassion, the whole tribe of\nbeggars would long since have died of starvation.... The greatest of\nalmsgivers is cowardice. 2, 317\n\nThe exertion of power is laborious and demands courage. That is why so\nmany do not assert their most valid rights, because their rights are a\nkind of power, and they are too lazy or too cowardly to exercise them.\n_Indulgence_ and _patience_ are the names given to the virtues that\ncloak these faults. 2, 319-320\n\n\"Stupid as a man,\" say the women; \"Cowardly as a woman,\" say the men.\nStupidity in a woman is unfeminine. 2, 328\n\nAll political work, even with great statesmen, is an improvisation that\ntrusts to luck. 2, 332\n\nThe so-called armed peace that prevails at present in all countries is\na sign of a bellicose disposition, of a disposition that trusts neither\nitself nor its neighbour, and, partly from hate, partly from fear,\nrefuses to lay down its weapons. Better to perish than to hate and\nfear, and twice as far better to perish than to make oneself hated and\nfeared--this must some day become the supreme maxim of every political\ncommunity!... 2, 236\n\nIn order that property may henceforth inspire more confidence and\nbecome more moral, we should keep open all the paths of work for small\nfortunes, but should prevent the effortless and sudden acquisition of\nwealth. Accordingly, we should take all the branches of transport and\ntrade which favour the accumulation of large fortunes--especially,\ntherefore, the money market--out of the hands of private persons or\nprivate companies, and look upon those who own too much, just as upon\nthose who own nothing, as types fraught with danger to the community.\n2, 340\n\nIf we try to determine the value of labour by the amount of time,\nindustry, good or bad will, constraint, inventiveness or laziness,\nhonesty or make-believe bestowed upon it, the valuation can never be a\njust one. For the whole personality would have to be thrown into the\nscale, and this is impossible. 2, 340\n\nThe _exploitation_ of the worker was, as we now understand, a piece\nof folly, a robbery at the expense of the future, a jeopardisation of\nsociety. We almost have the war now, and in any case the expense of\nmaintaining peace, of concluding treaties and winning confidence, will\nhenceforth be very great, because the folly of the exploiters was very\ngreat and long-lasting. 2, 341\n\nThe masses are as far as possible removed from Socialism as a\ndoctrine of altering the acquisition of property. If once they get the\nsteering-wheel into their hands, through great majorities in their\nParliaments, they will attack with progressive taxation the whole\ndominant system of capitalists, merchants, and financiers, and will in\nfact slowly create a middle class which may forget Socialism like a\ndisease that has been overcome. 2, 343\n\nThe Two Principles of the New Life.--_First Principle:_ to arrange\none's life on the most secure and tangible basis, not as hitherto\nupon the most distant, undetermined, and cloudy foundation. _Second\nPrinciple:_ to establish the rank of the nearest and nearer things, and\nof the more and less secure, before one arranges one's life and directs\nit to a final end. 2, 351\n\nThrough the certain prospect of death a precious, fragrant drop of\nfrivolity might be mixed with every day life--and now, you singular\ndruggist-souls, you have made of death a drop of poison, unpleasant to\ntaste, which makes the whole of life hideous. 2, 355\n\nWe speak of Nature, and, in doing so, forget ourselves: we ourselves\nare Nature, _quand m\u00eame_. 2, 356-357\n\nWe should not let ourselves be burnt for our opinions--we are not so\ncertain of them as all that. But we might let ourselves be burnt for\nthe right of possessing and changing our opinions. 2, 358\n\nMan has been bound with many chains, in order that he may forget to\ncomport himself like an animal. And indeed he has become more gentle,\nmore intellectual, more joyous, more meditative than any animal.\nBut now he still suffers from having carried his chains so long,\nfrom having been so long without pure air and free movement--these\nchains, however, are, as I repeat again and again, the ponderous\nand significant errors of moral, religious, and metaphysical ideas.\nOnly when the disease of chains is overcome is the first great goal\nreached--the separation of man from the brute. 2, 362-363\n\n\n\n\nIII\n\n\n\"The Dawn of Day\"\n\n\nThe first work to follow the transitional and preparatory\ncriticism and comment of \"Human, All-Too-Human\" was \"The Dawn of\nDay\" (\"_Morgen-r\u00f6te_\"). Such a treatise dealing with Nietzsche's\nconstructive and analytical thinking, was no doubt expected. No\nman could so effectively rattle the bones of the older gods, could\nso wantonly trample down the tenets strengthened by the teachings\nof centuries, could so ruthlessly annihilate the accepted ethical\nstandards and religious formul\u00e6, unless there existed back of his\nbludgeon a positivity of will which implied creation and construction.\nNietzsche realised the significance of this new book, and at its\ncompletion, early in 1881, sent an urgent letter to his publisher\nrequesting its immediate printing. The publisher, however, failing to\nattach any importance to the document, delayed its issuance until late\nin the summer, at which time its appearance caused no excitement and\nbut little comment.\n\n\"The Dawn of Day\" nevertheless ranks among Nietzsche's best works. Its\ntitle, frankly symbolic, reflects the nature of its contents. It was\nthe beginning of Nietzsche's positive philosophy. In it he begins his\nactual work of reconstruction. Many of its passages form the foundation\nof those later books wherein he augmented and developed his theories.\nHowever, there is here no radical change in his thought. The passages\nare logical sequences to that simple nihilism of prevailing customs\nwhich occupied him in his former essays. In his earliest beginnings\nwe can see evidences of the direction his teachings were to take. His\nbooks up to the last were mainly developments and elaborations of the\nthoughts which were in his mind from the first. Though often vaguely\nconceived and unco-ordinated, these thoughts were the undeniable\nproperty of his own thinking. Although there have been many attempts\nto trace eclectic influences to the men of his time, and especially to\nSchopenhauer, the results of such critical endeavours have been easily\ncontroverted by the plainest of internal evidence. The philosophical\nNietzsche has his roots firmly implanted in the scholastic Nietzsche;\nand though in superficial and non-important phases of his thought he\nchanged from time to time, the most diligent research fails to reveal\ndirect contradictions in any of his fundamental doctrines.\n\nIn \"The Dawn of Day\" Nietzsche goes again into the origin of morality.\nHe carries his analyses further and supports them by additional\nenquiries and by more complicated processes of reasoning. Having\nascertained the place which morals assume in the human scale and\ndetermined their relation to racial necessities, he points out that\ntheir application as permanent and unalterable mandates works havoc in\nany environment save that in which they were conceived. Inasmuch as\nall morality is at bottom but an expression of expediency, it follows\nthat, since the means of expediency change under varying conditions,\nmorality must change to meet the constantly metamorphosing conditions\nof society. And since the conditions of life are never the same in all\nnations, moral codes must likewise adapt themselves to geography in\norder to fulfil their function. The existing code of morals, namely:\nthe Christian doctrine, grew out of conditions which were not only\ndifferent from those in which we live to-day, but in many instances\ndiametrically opposed to them. Nietzsche saw a grave danger in adhering\nto an ethical system which was not relative to the modern man, and\nargues that the result of such a morality would produce effects which\nwould have no intelligent bearing on the racial problems of the present\nday. Knowing the deep-rooted superstition in man regarding the \"divine\"\norigin of moral laws, he undertakes the task of relating all ancient\ncodes to the racial conditions existent at their inception, thus\nconstructing a human origin for them.\n\nChristianity, being the greatest moral force of the day, attracted\nNietzsche's attention the most, and in \"The Dawn of Day\" much space is\ndevoted to a consideration of it. While in tone these paragraphs are\nmilder than those which followed in \"The Antichrist,\" they nevertheless\nare among the profoundest criticisms which Nietzsche made of Nazarene\nmorality. Though only a portion of the aphorisms contained in this work\nare devoted to an evaluation of theological modes of conduct, stumbling\nblocks are thrown in the path of an acceptance of Jewish ethics which\nthe most sapient of modern ecclesiastics have been unable to remove.\nOut of certain aphorisms found here grew \"The Antichrist\" which is the\nmost terrible and effective excoriation that Christianity has ever\ncalled forth. Beginning on page 66 of \"The Dawn of Day\" there appears\none of Nietzsche's most fundamental passages dealing with Christianity.\nIt is called \"The First Christian,\" and is an analysis of the Apostle\nPaul. No theological dialectician has been able to answer it. Here is\nan aphorism so illuminating, so profound, yet so brief, as to dazzle\ncompletely the lay mind.\n\nHowever, Christianity is but one of the subjects dealt with in \"The\nDawn of Day.\" The book covers the whole field of modern morality. Says\nNietzsche in his introduction; \"In this book we find a 'subterrestrial'\nat work, digging, mining, undermining.... I went down into the deepest\ndepths; I tunnelled to the very bottom; I started to investigate and\nunearth an old _faith_ which for thousands of years we philosophers\nused to build on as the safest of all foundations.... I began to\nundermine our _faith in morals.\"_ It is true that from the beginning\nof history there has existed a ruling scale of values determining the\nacts of humanity. Morality implies the domination of certain classes\nwhich, in order to inspire reverence in arbitrary dictates, have\ninvested their codes with an authority other than a human one. Thus\nhas criticism been stifled. Morality has had the means of intimidation\non its side, and has discouraged investigation by exercising severe\npenalties. Consequently morality has accumulated and grown, gathered\npower and swept on without its thinkers, its philosophers or its\nanalysts. Of all the sciences, the science of conduct has been the last\nto attract investigators.\n\nThe vogue of that style of philosophy which was founded on the\ntradition of speculation and honeycombed with presuppositions, did\nnot pass out until the advent of Darwin's evolutionism. But even the\ninauguration of biology and sociology did not entirely eliminate the\nmetaphysical assumption from constructive thinking. The scientists\nthemselves, not excluding Darwin, hesitated to acknowledge the laws of\nnatural selection and of the survival of the fit. Neo-Lamarckism was\nbut one of the reactions against this tough and unpleasant theory.\nAlfred Russel Wallace and, to take an even more significant figure,\nHerbert Spencer, endeavoured to refute the possibility of a biological\nbasis in thought and thus to avoid an acquiescence to the Darwinian\nresearch. John Fiske, an avowed evolutionist, indirectly repudiated\nthe scientific origin of philosophy; and likewise most of the lesser\nthinkers, following the exposition of Darwin's theories, refused to\napply to man the biological laws governing the animal kingdom. Balfour\nand Huxley sensed the incongruities and variances in this new mode\nof thinking, and strove to bridge the chasm between natural science\nand human conduct, and to construct a system of ethics which would\npossess a logical and naturalistic foundation. But in both cases the\nquestion was begged. We find Balfour building up a moral system which,\nwhile it did not deny Darwinism, had for its end the destruction, or\nat least the alteration, of natural laws. And Huxley defines human\nprogress as an overcoming of biological principles. Thus, even in the\nmost materialistic of physio-psychologists, the subjugation of natural\nlaws was the primary thesis. Biology, therefore, instead of being used\nas a basis to further philosophy, was considered an obstacle which\nphilosophy had to overcome.\n\nNietzsche saw that a science of conduct based on natural and\nphysiological laws was a possible and logical thing. And in him, for\nthe first time in the history of philosophical thought, do we find a\nscholarly and at the same time an intellectual critic of authorised\nstandards. The biological point of view was never lost sight of by him.\nIf at times he seemed to abandon it, it was but for a brief period; he\never came back to it. Even his most abstract passages have their feet\nimplanted in the fact that all phenomena are answerable to the law\nof vital fitness. Before the tribunal of biology Nietzsche arraigns\nand tries every phase of his thought, whether it deals with physical\nphenomena, ethical conduct or with abstract reasoning. Philosophy,\nfor centuries divorced from science, is here clothed in the garments\nof scientific experimentation; a relationship is established between\nthese two planes of rationalism and empiricism which have always been\nconsidered by other thinkers as detached and unrelated. Nor does\nNietzsche ally himself, either consciously or unconsciously, with such\nphilosophers as Bruno and Plato (who stood between the scientific\nthinkers on the one hand and the abstract dialecticians on the other),\nand attempt a formulation of a system of thought founded on intuitive\nprocesses. Such poetic conceptions had no fascination for him except\nas they were directly applicable to the problem of the universe. Those\nmen who busied themselves with the mere theory of knowledge he held as\nsupererogatory cobweb-spinners; and even in the realm of metaphysicians\nsuch as Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz, he dallied but casually. His\naim was to relate all thought to determinable values of life.\n\nIn his introduction Nietzsche calls morality the Circe of philosophies,\nand adds: \"For, to what is it due that, from Plato onwards, all the\nphilosophic architects in Europe have built in vain?\" Later beneath\nhis analysis--which never assumes the negative qualities of the\nmetaphysical--the moral phenomenon goes to pieces, not by a few simple\nstrokes, nor yet by the effrontery of cynicism or pessimism, but\nby the most careful and intricate surgery. He points out the great\nheretics of history as examples of the men who, looked at through the\neyes of contemporaries, were \"wicked\" men, but who, under different\nenvironmental circumstances, were considered \"good.\" He denies the\nstatic hypothesis on which morality is built, and postulates the\ntheory that immorality is not without its place in the development\nof the reason. He is constantly attempting to translate the existing\nmoral values into terms of their true nature, not necessarily into\nimmoralities, but into natural unmoralities. The accepted virtues,\nsuch as pity, honesty, faith, obedience, service, loyalty and\nself-sacrifice, are questioned in their relation to racial needs; and\nmodern attitudes toward all human activities are traced to their causes\nand judged as to their influence.\n\nThe research work in the present book differs from that contained in\nprevious volumes. Heretofore Nietzsche indulged in inquiry without\nspeculation; he dealt mainly with generalities. His analyses were along\nbroad lines of human conduct. He confined himself for the most part\nto principles. But in \"The Dawn of Day\" these principles are balanced\nwith existent morality. Specific modes of moral and ethical endeavour\nare weighed against expediency. Nietzsche presents a diagnosis of the\nfundamental nature of society to-day, and discovers many contradictions\nand inconsistencies between modern social needs and those virtues held\nin the highest reverence. He finds that deportmental means made use of\nby weak and subjugated peoples of ancient times to protect themselves\nagainst hostile invaders, are retained and practised to-day by nations\nwhose position has been reversed to one of domination. In short, he\npoints out that certain moralities have, by the alteration of national\nand racial conditions, become irrelevancies. Consequently there is\noften a compromise between ethical beliefs and ethical practices--a\ncompromise made necessary by the demands of social intercourse. Even\nwhen the practice of these ancient moralities is conscientiously\nindulged in, Nietzsche denies their adequacy in coping with modern\nconditions, pointing out specific instances in which necessity and\nhabit are constantly impinging. For instance, the softer virtues of\na democratic and socialistic morality are shown to be desirable only\nin weakened nations where the hardier virtues of egotism, cruelty,\nefficiency, hard-mindedness, selfishness and retaliation would work\ndirectly against preservation.\n\nOut of these conclusions grows a plea for individualism, and out of\nthis individualism the superman can be seen rearing his head above\nthe horizon of present-day humanity. The qualities of this man of the\nfuture are defined, and a finger is pointed along the necessary lines\nof racial culture. Nietzsche's first definite voicing of marriage\nideals follows in the train of the superman's appearance, and the first\ncomments of this philosopher in his criticism of woman are set down.\nIn this latter regard Nietzsche has been unfairly interpreted by those\nwho have considered his attitude toward woman superficially or without\nrelating it to his general theories. It would be well therefore for\nthe student to withhold judgment in this particular until the various\nelements of Nietzsche's philosophical system have been co-ordinated and\nunderstood. Woman plays an important, if small, part in his writings,\nand his passages dealing with women should be carefully weighed in\nconjunction with his theory of the superman.\n\nIn \"The Dawn of Day\" Nietzsche's conception of class distinction is\ndefined and related to his later teachings. Throughout his analyses\nruns a subtle undercurrent of his doctrine, of social segregation\nwhich finds definite expression toward the end of the volume where\nmodern socialism, with its altruism and philanthropy, is traced to\nits birth in Nazarene morality. In place of this present popular form\nof ethics Nietzsche proposes a social r\u00e9gime in which aristocratic\nculture will be set apart from mere utilitarian culture by very\ndefinite boundaries. He argues that not only is this disassociation\nin accord with the instincts of mankind, but that, as a workable\ntheorem, it adequately answers the needs of present conditions. The\nslave-morality and the master-morality which he develops in his later\nworks are defined tentatively and suggested by inference in many of\nthe aphorisms. Out of this conception grew his dominant principle of\nthe \"will to power,\" and in \"The Dawn of Day\" we find this principle\nset forth in adequate definition for the first time, although the\ndevelopment of the idea is left till later. However, Nietzsche makes\nclear its point of divergence from the Schopenhauerian theory of the\n\"will to live\" as well as from the Darwinian theory of the survival of\nthe fittest.\n\nBut it is not alone abstract theory that occupies the pages of this\nbook. Nietzsche is never the mere metaphysician battling in an unreal\nworld. There are few dark closets and secret passageways in his\nthought. Beyond a metaphysical hypothesis he does not go. He adheres to\ndemonstrable formulas, and reasons along lines of strictest reality.\nThe practical man he holds in high esteem, and constantly praises\nthe advance of science. He devotes pages to the blowing to pieces of\nmetaphysical air-castles. But, as I have previously pointed out, he is\nin no sense of the word a materialist; nor is his assumption of the\nworld that of the realists. Life to Nietzsche is an eternal struggle\ntoward--no goal. The lessons the world has to teach are as so much\nfalse doctrine. The meaning of life--the so-called absolute truth--is\nbut a chimera. Intelligence is a process, not an ultimatum. The truth\nis mobile and dual, dependent on varying causes. In accepting the\nmaterial world, Nietzsche does not grant it. In assuming natural laws,\nhe denies them. In his adherence to logic and to the processes of cause\nand effect, he is accepting phantoms and inconsistencies, and yet it is\nalong these lines that the race progresses.\n\nIn \"The Dawn of Day\" Nietzsche makes use of the same aphoristic style\nas that employed in \"Human, All-Too-Human.\" (This broken, staccato\nform he uses throughout the remainder of his works, except in certain\nparts of \"Thus Spake Zarathustra.\") Each paragraph is captioned and\ndeals with a specific phase of morality or with a definite critical\nattitude toward human conduct. Some of these paragraphs are scarcely\na line in length--mere definitions or similes. Others extend over\nseveral pages. But they always pertain to a single idea. Occasionally\nthey are in the form of a brief conversation; at other times they\nare short queries. One of these aphorisms is entitled \"The Battle\nDispensary of the Soul,\" and this is what follows: \"What is the most\nefficacious remedy? Victory.\" That is all--brief, and perhaps, on first\nreading, inconsequent. But study it a moment, and you will find in\nit the nucleus of a great revolutionary doctrine. On the other hand,\nturn to aphorism 142, called \"Sympathy,\" and you will discover several\npages of flashing commentary. Out of the chaos of his style springs\na feeling of plastic form. These brief paragraphs are not detached\nand desultory. They are pyramided on one another, and beneath them\nruns an undercurrent of unified thinking. When the end of the book\nis reached we have a carefully fabricated edifice, and we realise\nthat each paragraph has been some necessary beam or decoration in its\nconstruction.\n\n\nEXCERPTS FROM \"THE DAWN OF DAY\"\n\nMorality is nothing else (and, above all, nothing more) than obedience\nto customs, of whatsoever nature they may be. But customs are simply\nthe traditional way of acting and valuing. Where there is no tradition\nthere is no morality; and the less life is governed by tradition, the\nnarrower the circle of morality. The free man is immoral, because it\nis his _will_ to depend upon himself and not upon tradition: in all\nthe primitive states of humanity \"evil\" is equivalent to \"individual,\"\n\"free,\" \"arbitrary,\" \"unaccustomed,\" \"unforeseen,\" \"incalculable.\" In\nsuch primitive conditions, always measured by this standard, any action\nperformed--_not_ because tradition commands it, but for other reasons\n_(e.g.,_ on account of its individual utility), even for the same\nreasons as had been formerly established by custom--is termed immoral,\nand is felt to be so even by the very man who performs it, for it has\nnot been done out of obedience to tradition. 14-15\n\nPopular medicines and popular morals are closely related, and should\nnot be considered and valued, as is still customary, in so different a\nway: both are most dangerous and make-believe sciences. 19\n\nAll those superior men, who felt themselves irresistibly urged\non to throw off the yoke of some morality or other, had no other\nresource--_if they were not really mad--_than to feign madness, or\nactually to become insane. And this holds good for innovators in every\ndepartment of life, and not only in religion and politics. 21\n\nEvery one who has hitherto overthrown a law of established morality\nhas always at first been considered as a _wicked man:_ but when it\nwas afterwards found impossible to re-establish the law, and people\ngradually became accustomed to the change, the epithet was changed by\nslow degrees. History deals almost exclusively with these _wicked men,_\nwho later on came to be recognised as _good men._ 28\n\nA man who is under the influence of the morality of custom comes\nto despise causes first of all, secondly consequences, and thirdly\nreality, and weaves all his higher feelings (reverence, sublimity,\npride, gratitude, love) _into an imaginary world:_ the so-called higher\nworld. And even to-day we can see the consequences of this: wherever,\nand in whatever fashion, man's feelings are raised, that imaginary\nworld is in evidence. 40\n\nThe history of the moral feelings is entirely different from the\nhistory of moral conceptions. The first-mentioned are powerful before\nthe action, and the latter especially after it, in view of the\nnecessity for making one's self clear in regard to them. 41\n\nTrusting in our feelings simply means obeying our grandfather and\ngrandmother more than the gods within _ourselves:_ our reason and\nexperience. 41\n\nThe same impulse, under the impression of the blame cast upon it by\ncustom, develops into the painful feeling of cowardice, or else the\npleasurable feeling of _humility,_ in case a morality, like that of\nChristianity, has taken it to its heart and called it _good._ 43\n\n_The origin becomes of less significance in proportion as we acquire\ninsight into it;_ whilst things nearest to ourselves, around and\nwithin us, gradually begin to manifest their wealth of colours,\nbeauties, enigmas, and diversity of meaning, of which earlier humanity\nnever dreamed. 52\n\nOnly when man shall have acquired a knowledge of all things will he be\nable to know himself. For things are but the boundaries of man. 53\n\nTo whatever height mankind may have developed--and perhaps in the end\nit will not be so high as when they began!--there is as little prospect\nof their attaining to a higher order as there is for the ant and the\nearwig to enter into kinship with God and eternity at the end of their\ncareer on earth. What is to come will drag behind it that which has\npassed: why should any little star, or even any little species on\nthat star, form an exception to that eternal drama? Away with such\nsentimentalities! 54\n\nThose earnest, able, and just men of profound feelings, who are still\nChristians at heart, owe it to themselves to make one attempt to live\nfor a certain space of time without Christianity! They owe it to\n_their faith_ that they should thus for once take up their abode \"in\nthe wilderness\"--if for no other reason than that of being able to\npronounce on the question as to whether Christianity is needful. 63\n\nChristianity has the instinct of a hunter for finding out all those who\nmay by hook or by crook be driven to despair--only a very small number\nof men can be brought to this despair. Christianity lies in wait for\nsuch as those, and pursues them. 65\n\nThe \"demon\" Eros becomes an object of greater interest to mankind\nthan all the angels and saints put together, thanks to the mysterious\nMumbo-Jumboism of the Church in all things erotic: it is due to the\nChurch that love stories, even in our own time, have become the one\ncommon interest which appeals to all classes of people--with an\nexaggeration which would be incomprehensible to antiquity, and which\nwill not fail to provoke roars of laughter in coming generations. 78\n\nIt is only those who never--or always--attend church that underestimate\nthe dishonesty with which this subject is still dealt in Protestant\npulpits; in what a clumsy fashion the preacher takes advantage of his\nsecurity from interruption; how the Bible is pinched and squeezed; and\nhow the people are made acquainted with every form of _the art of false\nreading._ 85\n\nChristianity wants blindness and frenzy and an eternal swan-song above\nthe waves under which reason has been drowned!... 90\n\nWhat if God were not exactly truth, and if this were proved? And if he\nwere instead of vanity, the desire for power, the ambitious, the fear,\nand the enraptured and terrified folly of mankind?... 93\n\nOne Becomes Moral--but not because one is moral! Submission to morals\nmay be due to slavishness or vanity, egoism or resignation, dismal\nfanaticism or thoughtlessness. It may, again, be an act of despair,\nsuch as submission to the authority of a ruler; but there is nothing\nmoral about it _per se._ 97\n\nMorals are constantly undergoing changes and transformations,\noccasioned by successful crimes. 97\n\nI deny morality in the same way as I deny alchemy, _i.e.,_ I deny its\nhypotheses; but I do not deny that there have been alchemists who\nbelieved in these hypotheses and based their actions upon them. I also\ndeny immorality--not that innumerable people feel immoral, but that\nthere is any true reason why they should feel so, should not, of\ncourse, deny--unless I were a fool--that many actions which are called\nimmoral should be avoided and resisted; and in the same way that many\nwhich are called moral should be performed and encouraged; but I hold\nthat in both cases these actions should be performed from motives other\nthan those which have prevailed up to the present time. We must learn\nanew in order that at last, perhaps very late in the day, we may be\nable to do something more: feel anew. 100\n\nIt is a prejudice to think that morality is more favourable to the\ndevelopment of the reason than immorality. It is erroneous to suppose\nthat the unconscious aim in the development of every conscious being\n(namely, animal, man, humanity, etc.) is its \"great happiness\"; on\nthe contrary, there is a particular and incomparable happiness to be\nattained at every stage of our development, one that is neither high\nnor low, but quite an individual happiness. Evolution does not make\nhappiness its goal; it aims merely at evolution, and nothing else. It\nis only if humanity had a universally recognised goal that we could\npropose to do this or that: for the time being there is no such goal.\nIt follows that the pretensions of morality should not be brought\ninto any relationship with mankind: this would be merely childish and\nirrational. It is quite another thing to recommend a goal to mankind:\nthis goal would then be something that would depend upon our own will\nand pleasure. Provided that mankind in general agreed to adopt such a\ngoal, it could then impose a moral law upon itself, a law which would,\nat all events, be imposed by their own free will. 105\n\nOur duties are the claims which others have upon us. How did they\nacquire these claims? By the fact that they considered us as capable of\nmaking and holding agreements and contracts, by assuming that we were\ntheir like and equals, and by consequently entrusting something to us,\nbringing us up, educating us, and supporting us. 110\n\nMy rights consist of that part of my power which others have not only\nconceded to me, but which they wish to maintain for me. 111\n\nThe desire for distinction is the desire to subject one's neighbor....\n113\n\nOn this mirror--and our intellect is a mirror--something is going on\nthat indicates regularity: a certain thing is each time followed by\nanother certain thing. When we perceive this and wish to give it a\nname, we call it cause and effect,--fools that we are! as if in this\nwe had understood or could understand anything! For, of course, we\nhave seen nothing but the images of causes and effects, and it is just\nthis figurativeness which renders it impossible for us to see a more\nsubstantial relation than that of sequence!... 129\n\nPity, in so far as it actually gives rise to suffering--and this\nmust be our only point of view here--is a weakness, like every other\nindulgence in an injurious emotion. It increases suffering throughout\nthe world, and although here and there a certain amount of suffering\nmay be indirectly diminished or removed altogether as a consequence of\npity, we must not bring forward these occasional consequences, which\nare on the whole insignificant, to justify the nature of pity which, as\nhas already been stated, is prejudicial. Supposing that it prevailed,\neven if only for one day, it would bring humanity to utter ruin. In\nitself the nature of pity is no better than that of any other craving;\nit is only where it is called for and praised--and this happens when\npeople do not understand what is injurious in it, but find in it\na sort of joy--that a good conscience becomes attached to it; it\nis only then that we willingly yield to it, and do not shrink from\nacknowledging it. In other circumstances where it is understood to be\ndangerous, it is looked upon as a weakness; or, as in the case of the\nGreeks, as an unhealthy periodical emotion the danger of which might be\nremoved by temporary and voluntary discharges. 144-145\n\nYou say that the morality of pity is a higher morality than that of\nstoicism? Prove it! But take care not to measure the \"higher\" and\n\"lower\" degrees of morality once more by moral yardsticks; for there\nare no absolute morals. So take your yardstick from somewhere else, and\nbe on your guard!... 149\n\nIf, in accordance with the present definition, only those actions are\nmoral which are done for the sake of others, and for their sake only,\nthen there are no moral actions at all! If, in accordance with another\ndefinition, only those actions are moral which spring from our own free\nwill, then there are no moral actions in this case either! What is it,\nthen, that we designate thus, which certainly exists and wishes as a\nconsequence to be explained? It is the result of a few intellectual\nblunders; and supposing that we were able to free ourselves from these\nerrors, what would then become of \"moral actions\"? It is due to these\nerrors that we have up to the present attributed to certain actions a\nvalue superior to what was theirs in reality: we separated them from\n\"egoistic\" and \"non-free\" actions. When we now set them once more\nin the latter categories, as we must do, we certainly reduce their\nvalue (their own estimate of value) even below its reasonable level,\nbecause \"egoistic\" and \"non-free\" actions have up to the present been\nundervalued owing to that alleged profound and essential difference.\n158-159\n\nIf I were a god, and a benevolent god, the marriages of men would cause\nme more displeasure than anything else. 162\n\nWe ought publicly to declare invalid the vows of lovers, and to refuse\nthem permission to marry: and this because we should treat marriage\nitself much more seriously, so that in cases where it is now contracted\nit would not usually be allowed in future! Are not the majority of\nmarriages such that we should not care to have them witnessed by a\nthird party? And yet this third party is scarcely ever lacking--the\nchild--and he is more than the witness; he is the whipping-boy and\nscapegoat. 163\n\nShame! You wish to form part of a system in which you must be a wheel,\nfully and completely, or risk being crushed by wheels! where it is\nunderstood that each one will be that which his superiors make of\nhim! where the seeking for \"connections\" will form a part of one's\nnatural duties! where no one feels himself offended when he has his\nattention drawn to some one with the remark, \"He may be useful to you\nsome time\"; where people do not feel ashamed of paying a visit to ask\nfor somebody's intercession, and where they do not even suspect that\nby such a voluntary submission to these morals, they are once and for\nall stamped as the common pottery of nature, which others can employ\nor break up of their free will without feeling in any way responsible\nfor doing so,--just as if one were to say, \"People of my type will\nnever be lacking, therefore, do what you will with me! Do not stand on\nceremony!\" 169\n\nIn the glorification of \"work\" and the never-ceasing talk about the\n\"blessing of labour,\" I see the same secret _arri\u00e8re-pens\u00e9e_ as I do\nin the praise bestowed on impersonal acts of a general interest, viz.,\na fear of everything individual. 176\n\nBehind the principle of the present moral fashion: \"Moral actions\nare actions performed out of sympathy for others,\" I see the social\ninstinct of fear, which thus assumes an intellectual disguise.... 177\n\nWhatever may be the influence in high politics of utilitarianism and\nthe vanity of individuals and nations, the sharpest spur which urges\nthem onwards is their need for the feeling of power--a need which rises\nnot only in the souls of princes and rulers, but also gushes forth from\ntime to time from inexhaustible sources in the people. 186\n\nAs the aristocrat is able to preserve the appearance of being possessed\nof a superior physical force which never leaves him, he likewise wishes\nby his aspect of constant serenity and civility of disposition, even in\nthe most trying circumstances, to convey the impression that his mind\nand soul are equal to all dangers and surprises....\n\nThis indisputable happiness of aristocratic culture, based as it\nis on the feeling of superiority, is now beginning to rise to ever\nhigher levels; for now, thanks to the free spirits, it is henceforth\npermissible and not dishonourable for people who have been born and\nreared in aristocratic circles to enter the domain of knowledge, where\nthey may secure more intellectual consecrations and learn chivalric\nservices even higher than those of former times, and where they may\nlook up to that ideal of victorious wisdom which as yet no age has been\nable to set before itself with so good a conscience as the period which\nis about to dawn. 203-205\n\nWhat induces one man to use false weights, another to set his house\non fire after having insured it for more than its value, a third to\ntake part in counterfeiting, while three-fourths of our upper classes\nindulge in legalised fraud, and suffer from the pangs of conscience\nthat follow speculation and dealings on the Stock Exchange: what gives\nrise to all this? It is not real want,--for their existence is by\nno means precarious; perhaps they have even enough to eat and drink\nwithout worrying--but they are urged on day and night by a terrible\nimpatience at seeing their wealth pile up so slowly, and by an equally\nterrible longing and love for these heaps of gold. In this impatience\nand love, however, we see re-appear once more that fanaticism of the\ndesire for power which was stimulated in former times by the belief\nthat we were in the possession of truth, a fanaticism which bore such\nbeautiful names that we could dare to be inhuman with a good conscience\n(burning Jews, heretics, and good books, and exterminating entire\ncultures superior to ours, such as those of Peru and Mexico). The means\nof this desire for power are changed in our day, but the same volcano\nis still smouldering, impatience and intemperate love call for their\nvictims, and what was once done \"for the love of God\" is now done\nfor the love of money, _i.e.,_ for the love of that which at present\naffords us the highest feeling of power and a good conscience. 209-210\n\n\"Enthusiastic sacrifice,\" \"self-immolation\"--these are the catch-words\nof your morality.... In reality ... you only _appear_ to sacrifice\nyourselves; for your imagination turns you into gods and you enjoy\nyourselves as such. 226-227\n\nCeremonies, official robes and court dresses, grave countenances,\nsolemn aspects, the slow pace, involved speech--everything, in short,\nknown as dignity--are all pretences adopted by those who are timid at\nheart: they wish to make themselves feared (themselves or the things\nthey represent). The fearless (_i.e.,_ originally those who naturally\ninspire others with awe) have no need of dignity and ceremonies.... 230\n\nA strange thing, this punishment of ours! It does not purify the\ncriminal; it is not a form of expiation; but, on the contrary, it is\neven more defiling than the crime itself. 235\n\nWhen a vigorous nature has not an inclination towards cruelty, and is\nnot always preoccupied with itself, it involuntarily strives after\ngentleness--this is its distinctive characteristic. Weak natures, on\nthe other hand, have a tendency towards harsh judgments.... 236\n\nKindness has been best developed by the long dissimulation which\nendeavoured to appear as kindness: wherever great power existed\nthe necessity for dissimulation of this nature was recognised--it\ninspires security and confidence, and multiplies the actual sum of\nour physical power. Falsehood, if not actually the mother, is at all\nevents the nurse of kindness. In the same way, honesty has been brought\nto maturity by the need for a semblance of honesty and integrity:\nin hereditary aristocracies. The persistent exercise of such a\ndissimulation ends by bringing about the actual nature of the thing\nitself: the dissimulation in the long run suppresses itself, and organs\nand instincts are the unexpected fruits in this garden of hypocrisy. 242\n\nNeither necessity nor desire, but the love of power, is the demon of\nmankind. You may give men everything possible--health, food, shelter,\nenjoyment--but they are and remain unhappy and capricious, for the\ndemon waits and waits; and must be satisfied. 243\n\nIt is probable that there are no pure races, but only races which have\nbecome purified, and even these are extremely rare. 253\n\nHow many married men have some morning awakened to the fact that their\nyoung wife is dull, although she thinks quite the contrary! not to\nspeak of those wives whose flesh is willing but whose intellect is\nweak! 255\n\nCould there be anything more repugnant than the sentimentality which\nis shown to plants and animals--and this on the part of a creature who\nfrom the very beginning has made such ravages among them as their most\nferocious enemy--and who ends by even claiming affectionate feelings\nfrom his weakened and mutilated victims! Before this kind of \"nature\"\nman must above all be serious, if he is any sort of a thinking being.\n258\n\nAmong cowards it is thought bad form to say anything against bravery,\nfor any expression of this kind would give rise to some contempt; and\nunfeeling people are irritated when anything is said against pity. 259\n\nIt is the most sensual men who find it necessary to avoid women and to\ntorture their bodies. 261\n\nA young man can be most surely corrupted when he is taught to value the\nlike-minded more highly than the differently minded. 262\n\nThe general knowledge of mankind has been furthered to a greater extent\nby fear than by love. 267\n\nThe sum-total of those internal movements which come naturally to men,\nand which they can consequently set in motion readily and gracefully,\nis called the soul--men are looked upon as void of soul when they let\nit be seen that their inward emotions are difficult and painful to\nthem. 268\n\nAll rules have this effect: they distract our attention from the\nfundamental aim of the rule, and make us more thoughtless. 273\n\nWe are most certain to find idealistic theories among unscrupulously\npractical men; for such men stand in need of the lustre of these\ntheories for the sake of their reputation. They adopt them\ninstinctively without by any means feeling hypocritical in doing so--no\nmore hypocritical than Englishmen with their Christianity and their\nSabbath-keeping. 277\n\nIt is not sufficient to prove a case, we must also tempt or raise men\nto it. 278\n\nAsceticism is the proper mode of thinking for those who must extirpate\ntheir carnal instincts, because these are ferocious beasts,--but only\nfor such people! 278\n\nYou refuse to be dissatisfied with yourselves or to suffer from\nyourselves, and this you call your moral tendency! Very well; another\nmay perhaps call it your cowardice! One thing, however, is certain,\nand that is, that you will never take a trip round the world (and you\nyourselves are this world), and you will always remain in yourselves an\naccident and a clod on the face of the earth! 282\n\nThe first effect of happiness is the feeling of power, and this\nfeeling longs to manifest itself, whether towards ourselves or other\nmen, or towards ideas and imaginary beings. Its most common modes of\nmanifestation are making presents, derision, and destruction--all three\nbeing due to a common fundamental instinct. 286\n\nWe approve of marriage in the first place because we are not yet\nacquainted with it, in the second place because we have accustomed\nourselves to it, and in the third place because we have contracted\nit--that is to say, in most cases. And yet nothing has been proved\nthereby in favour of the value of marriage in general. 287\n\nThe criminal who has been found out does not suffer because of the\ncrime he has committed, but because of the shame and annoyance caused\nhim either by some blunder which he has made or by being deprived of\nhis habitual element. 289\n\nWhere our deficiencies are, there also is our enthusiasm. The\nenthusiastic principle \"love your enemies\" had to be invented by the\nJews, the best haters that ever existed; and the finest glorifications\nof chastity have been written by those who in their youth led dissolute\nand licentious lives. 293\n\nWomen turn pale at the thought that their lover may not be worthy of\nthem; Men turn pale at the thought that they may not be worthy of the\nwomen they love. I speak of perfect women, perfect men. 300-301\n\nYou wish to bid farewell to your passion? Very well, but do so without\nhatred against it! Otherwise you have a second passion.--The soul\nof the Christian who has freed himself from sin is generally ruined\nafterwards by the hatred for sin. Just look at the faces of the great\nChristians! they are the faces of great haters. 302\n\nMen have become suffering creatures in consequence of their morals,\nand the sum-total of what they have obtained by those morals is simply\nthe feeling that they are far too good and great for this world, and\nthat they are enjoying merely a transitory existence on it. As yet the\n\"proud sufferer\" is the highest type of mankind. 309-310\n\nRights can only be conferred by one who is in full possession of power.\n317\n\n\"The rule always appears to me to be more interesting than the\nexception\"--whoever thinks thus has made considerable progress in\nknowledge, and is one of the initiated. 319\n\nThrough our love we have become dire offenders against truth, and even\nhabitual dissimulators and thieves, who give out more things as true\nthan seem to us to be true. 337-333\n\nAll the great excellencies of ancient humanity owed their stability to\nthe fact that man was standing side by side with man, and that no woman\nwas allowed to put forward the claim of being the nearest and highest,\nnay even sole object of his love, as the feeling of passion would\nteach. 351\n\nEven if we were mad enough to consider all our opinions as truth, we\nshould nevertheless not wish them alone to exist. I cannot see why we\nshould ask for an autocracy and omnipotence of truth: it is sufficient\nfor me to know that it is a great power. Truth, however, must meet with\nopposition and be able to fight, and we must be able to rest from it at\ntimes in falsehood--otherwise truth will grow tiresome, powerless, and\ninsipid, and will render us equally so. 352-353.\n\nTo hear every day what is said about us, or even to endeavour to\ndiscover what people think about us, will in the end kill even the\nstrongest man. Our neighbours permit us to live only that they may\nexercise a daily claim upon us! They certainly would not tolerate us\nif we wished to claim rights over them, and still less if we wished to\nbe right! In short, let us offer up a sacrifice to the general peace,\nlet us not listen when they speak of us, when they praise us, blame us,\nwish for us, or hope for us--nay, let us not even think of it. 357\n\nHow many really individual actions are left undone merely because\nbefore performing them we perceive or suspect that they will be\nmisunderstood!--those actions, for example, which have some intrinsic\nvalue, both in good and evil. The more highly an age or a nation values\nits individuals, therefore, and the more right and ascendency we accord\nthem, the more will actions of this kind venture to make themselves\nknown, 359-360.\n\nLove wishes to spare the other to whom it devotes itself any feeling\nof strangeness: as a consequence it is permeated with disguise and\nsimulation; it keeps on deceiving continuously, and feigns an equality\nwhich in reality does not exist. And all this is done so instinctively\nthat women who love deny this simulation and constant tender trickery,\nand have even the audacity to assert that love equalises (in other\nwords that it performs a miracle)! 361\n\nTruth in itself is no power at all.... Truth must either attract power\nto its side, or else side with power, for otherwise it will perish\nagain and again. 363\n\nWe should ... take the greatest precautions in regard to everything\nconnected with old age and its judgment upon life.... The reverence\nwhich we feel for an old man, especially if he is an old thinker and\nsage, easily blinds us to the deterioration of his intellect. 368\n\nWe must not make passion an argument for truth. 372\n\nHave you experienced history within yourselves, commotions,\nearthquakes, long and profound sadness, and sudden flashes of\nhappiness? Have you acted foolishly with great and little fools? Have\nyou really undergone the delusions and woe of the good people? and also\nthe woe and the peculiar happiness of the most evil? Then you may speak\nto me of morality, but not otherwise! 376\n\n\"What do I matter?\" is written over the door of the thinker of the\nfuture. 379\n\nThe great man ever remains invisible in the greatest thing that claims\nworship, like some distant star: his victory over power remains without\nwitnesses, and hence also without songs and singers. The hierarchy of\nthe great men in all the past history of the human race has not yet\nbeen determined. 380\n\nWhether what we are looking forward to is a thought or a deed, our\nrelationship to every essential achievement is none other than that\nof pregnancy, and all our vainglorious boasting about \"willing\" and\n\"creating\" should be cast to the winds! True and ideal selfishness\nconsists in always watching over and restraining the soul, so that our\nproductiveness may come to a beautiful termination. ... Still, these\npregnant ones are funny people! Let us therefore dare to be funny also,\nand not reproach others if they must be the same. 384-385\n\nHonest towards ourselves, and to all and everything friendly to us;\nbrave in the face of our enemy; generous towards the vanquished; polite\nat all times: such do the four cardinal virtues wish us to be. 387\n\nThere is no \"eternal justice\" which requires that every fault shall\nbe atoned and paid for,--the belief that such a justice existed was a\nterrible delusion, and useful only to a limited extent; just as it is\nalso a delusion that everything is guilt which is felt as such. It is\nnot the things themselves, but the opinions about things that do not\nexist, which have been such a source of trouble to mankind. 391\n\nWhat is the most efficacious remedy?--Victory. 393\n\nThe snake that cannot cast its skin perishes. So too with those minds\nwhich are prevented from changing their views: they cease to be minds.\n394\n\n\n\n\nIV\n\n\n\"The Joyful Wisdom\"\n\n\nIn 1882 Nietzsche wrote and published \"The Joyful Wisdom\" (\"_La Gay\na Scienza_\"). Although originally intended as a supplement to \"The\nDawn of Day,\" under which title it was to have been issued in a later\nedition of this earlier work, it differs greatly, not only from \"The\nDawn of Day,\" but from everything else Nietzsche ever wrote. The\ndestructive spirit of \"Human, All-Too-Human\" is nowhere to be found in\nit. The revolutionary doctrines of \"The Dawn of Day\" are but vaguely\nechoed. It is a book which shows Nietzsche in a unique and isolated\nmood--a mood which, throughout his whole life did not return to him.\nTemperamentally \"The Joyful Wisdom\" comes nearer being a parallel to\n\"Thus Spake Zarathustra\" than to any of his other writings. But even\nthis comparison goes to pieces when pushed beyond the most superficial\naspects of the two books. Nietzsche was at Naumburg at the time of\nwriting this work. A long-standing stomach malady had suddenly shown\nsigns of leaving him, and the period during which he wrote \"The Joyful\nWisdom\" was one of the happiest of his life. Heretofore a sombre\nseriousness had marked both his thoughts and the expression of them. In\nthe two volumes of \"Human, All-Too-Human\" he had attempted a complete\ndevastation of all codes and ideals. In \"The Dawn of Day\" he waged a\nbitter and serious warfare on modern moral standards and made attempts\nat supplanting them with new dogma. In \"The Joyful Wisdom\" he revealed\nan entirely new phase of his character--a lenient, jovial, almost\nbuoyant attitude toward the world.\n\nAlthough \"The Joyful Wisdom\" may be considered in the light of an\ninterpolation into Nietzsche's philosophical works, the book is\nnevertheless among the most interesting of his output--not so much\nbecause it gives us any additions to the sum of his thinking, but\nbecause it throws a light on the philosopher himself. It may be lifted\nbodily out of his works without leaving a gap in the development of\nhis doctrines, but it cannot be set aside without closing up a very\nimportant and significant facet in the man's nature. Unfortunately\nNietzsche is looked upon as a man who was entirely consumed with\nrancour and hatred--a man unconscious of the comic side of existence--a\nthinker with whom pessimism was chronic. But this is only a half\ntruth, a conclusion founded on partial evidence. Nietzsche's very\nearnestness at times defeated his own ends. \"The Joyful Wisdom\" is one\nof the most fundamentally hilarious books ever written. It deals with\nlife as a supreme bit of humour. Yet there is little in it to provoke\nlaughter. Nietzsche's humour is deeper than the externals. One finds\nno superficial jesting here, no smartness, no transient buffoonery.\nThe book is a glorification of that subtle joy which accompanies the\nexperiencing of knowledge. In order to catch its spirit it is necessary\nthat one be familiar with the serious and formulating Nietzsche, for\non his most serious doctrines is founded that attitude which makes\n\"The Joyful Wisdom\" hilarious. Once familiar with Nietzsche's earlier\nwritings one may read the present book with a feeling of exhilaration\nunlike that produced by his more manifestly solemn writings.\n\nHowever, despite the buoyancy of this document, it is, beneath the\nsurface, as serious as anything Nietzsche has ever written. His\nconception of the world and his assumption of the underlying aspects of\nexistence are founded on deeply conceived formulas. It must be borne\nin mind that Nietzsche's thought is in a large measure personal, that\nthe development of his doctrines is due to very definite biographical\ncauses and to the flux and reflux of his own emotions. His system is\nnot a spontaneous and complete conception, the sudden fruit of his\nentire research given to the world in a unified body. To the contrary,\nit is an amassing of data, a constant building up of ideas. No one book\ncontains his entire teachings, logically thought out and carefully\norganised. Rather is his philosophy an intricate structure which begins\nwith his earliest essays and does not reach completion until the end\nof \"The Will to Power.\" Each book has some specific place in his\nthought: each book assumes a position relative to all the rest. Thus in\n\"The Joyful Wisdom\" we have the turning point between the denying and\ndestructive Nietzsche and the asserting and fashioning Nietzsche. Says\nhe in the fourth and most important section called \"Sanctus Januarius\":\n_\"Amor fati:[1]_ let that henceforth be my love! I do not want to wage\nwar with the ugly. I do not want to accuse, I do not want even to\naccuse the accusers. _Looking aside,_ let that be my sole negation!\nAnd all in all, to sum up: I wish to be at any time hereafter only a\nyea-sayer!\"\n\nIn \"The Joyful Wisdom\" begins Nietzsche's almost fanatical joy in\nlife. Here, too, we encounter for the first time the symbol of the\ndance. Nietzsche constantly makes use of this figure in his later\nwritings. Especially in \"Thus Spake Zarathustra\" does he exhort his\nreaders to indulge themselves in dancing. The blasphemies and hatreds\ncharacteristic of the philosopher in his more solemn moods are\nnowhere discernible in this new book. It is therefore of considerable\nimportance to the student in forming a just estimate of Nietzsche. Here\nthe hater has departed; the idol-smasher has laid down his weapons;\nthe analyst has become the satyr; the logician has turned poet; the\nblasphemer has become the child. Only occasionally does the pendulum\nswing toward the sombre Apollonian pole: the Dionysian ideal of joy is\ndominant. The month of January inspired the book, and Nietzsche says\nin his _Ecce Homo_ that it was the most wonderful month of January he\nhad ever spent. This spirit of gaiety was to remain with him in some\ndegree throughout the remainder of his life. He realised that his\npreparatory work was completed. He saw his way clear to forge ahead\nas his doctrines led him; and his exuberance no doubt grew out of the\nsatisfaction he took in this prospect.\n\nAlthough the contents of \"The Joyful Wisdom\" are not inherently a\npart of Nietzsche's philosophy, but only detached applications of his\ntheories--ideas which floated to the surface of his doctrines--the\nmaterial encountered here is of wide and varied interest. There are\ncriticisms of German and Southern culture; valuations of modern\nauthors; views on the developments of art; theories of music; analyses\nof Schopenhauer and an explanation of his vogue; judgments of the\nancient and the modern theatre; excursions into philological fields;\narraignments of contemporary classicism; doctrines of creative\nartistry; personal paragraphs on mental culture, politics and commerce.\n... The book is, in fact, more critical than philosophical.\n\nNietzsche never entirely dissevered himself from his time and\nfrom the habits, both of thought and action, which characterised\nhis contemporaries. From his first academic essays to his last\ntransvaluation of values, he remained the patient and analytical\nobserver of the life about him. For this reason it has been argued\namong disciples of \"pure\" thinking that he was not, in the strictest\nsense of the word, a \"philosopher,\" but rather a critically\nintellectual force. This diagnosis might carry weight had not\nNietzsche avowedly built his philosophical structure on a repudiation\nof abstract thinking. This misunderstanding of him arose from the\nadherents of rational thinking overlooking the fact that, where the\nolder philosophers had detached themselves from reality because of the\ninstability of natural hypotheses, Nietzsche re-established human bases\non which he founded his syllogisms. Therefore one should not attempt\nto divorce the purely critical from the purely philosophical in his\nwritings. Even in a book so frankly critical as \"The Joyful Wisdom\"\nthere is a directing force of theoretical unity.\n\nThis is especially true of the third section. This division is made up\nalmost entirely of comments on men and affairs, short analyses of human\nattitudes, desultory excursions into the sociological, brief remarks on\nman's emotional nature, apothegms dealing with human attributes, bits\nof racy philosophical gossip, religious and scientific maxims, and the\nlike. Sometimes these observations are cynical, sometimes gracious,\nsometimes bitter, sometimes buoyant, sometimes merely witty. But all\nof them are welded together by a profound conception of humanity.\n\nThe most stimulating division of the book is the fourth, in which\nNietzsche's good humour is at its height. This section is a\nglorification of victory and of all those hardy qualities which go\ninto the perfecting of the individual. Nietzsche reverses Schiller's\nfamous doctrine expressed in \"_Die Braut von Messina_\": \"Life is not of\nall good the highest.\" He sees no good over and beyond that of human\nrelationships. The normal instincts to him are the ones which affirm\nlife; the abnormal instincts are those which deny it. The former are\nsummed up in the ethics of Greece under the sway of Dionysus; the\nlatter are epitomised in the Christian religion.\n\nThe fifth book, called \"We Fearless Ones,\" and the appendix of \"Songs\nof Prince Free-as-a-Bird\" were written four years later than the other\nmaterial and added with an introduction in a later edition of the book.\nThese addenda, while less specific and of a more dialectic nature than\nthe preceding parts, are in spirit manifestly the same as the rest of\nthe book.\n\nIn \"The Joyful Wisdom\" we have again an aphoristic style of writing,\nalthough it has become keener and more sure of itself since \"Human,\nAll-Too-Human\" and \"The Dawn of Day.\" In making selections from this\nbook I have chosen those passages which are more general in tone. The\nconnection between the various aphorisms is here even slighter than\nis Nietzsche's wont, and for that reason no attempt has been made to\npresent a continuous perception of the work. However, the excerpts\nwhich follow, though of a less popular nature, are more intimately\nrelated to his thoughts than the ones omitted, and consequently are of\nmore interest to the student.\n\n\n[Footnote 1: Love of (one's) destiny.]\n\n\nEXCERPTS FROM \"THE JOYFUL WISDOM\"\n\nWhether I look with a good or an evil eye upon men, I find them always\nat one problem, each and all of them: to do that which conduces to the\nconservation of the human species. 31\n\nTo laugh at oneself as one would have to laugh in order to laugh _out\nof the veriest truth,_--to do this the best have not hitherto had\nenough of the sense of truth, and the most endowed have had far too\nlittle genius! There is perhaps still a future even for laughter! 32\n\nThe ignoble nature is distinguished by the fact that it keeps its\nadvantage steadily in view, and that this thought of the end and\nadvantage is even stronger than its strongest impulse: not to be\ntempted to inexpedient activities by its impulses--that is its\nwisdom and inspiration. In comparison with the ignoble nature the\nhigher nature is more irrational:--for the noble, magnanimous, and\nself-sacrificing person succumbs in fact to his impulses, and in his\nbest moments his reason _lapses_ altogether. 37\n\nThe strongest and most evil spirits have hitherto advanced mankind the\nmost: they always rekindled the sleeping passions--all orderly arranged\nsociety lulls the passions to sleep. 39\n\nThe lust of property and love: what different associations each of\nthese ideas evokes!--and yet it might be the same impulse twice named.\n51\n\nThe poison by which the weaker nature is destroyed is strengthening to\nthe strong individual--and he does not call it poison. 56-57\n\nThe virtues of a man are called _good,_ not in respect of the results\nthey have for himself, but in respect of the results which we expect\ntherefrom for ourselves and for society.... The praise of the virtues\nis the praise of something which is privately injurious to the\nindividual; it is praise of impulses which deprive man of his noblest\nself-love, and the power to take the best care of himself.... The\n\"neighbour\" praises unselfishness because _he profits by it!_ If the\nneighbour were \"unselfishly\" disposed himself, he would reject that\ndestruction of power, that injury for _his advantage,_ he would thwart\nsuch inclinations in their origin, and above all he would manifest his\nunselfishness just by _not giving it a good name!_ 58-60\n\nLiving--that is to be cruel and inexorable towards all that becomes\nweak and old in ourselves, and not only in ourselves. 68\n\nIt is probable that the manufacturers and great magnates of commerce\nhave hitherto lacked too much all those forms and attributes of a\n_superior race,_ which alone make persons interesting; if they had\nhad the nobility of the newly-born in their looks and bearing, there\nwould perhaps have been no socialism in the masses of the people. For\nthese are really ready for _slavery_ of every kind, provided that\nthe superior class above them constantly shows itself legitimately\nsuperior, and _born_ to command--by its noble presence! 78\n\nWhen one continually prohibits the expression of the passions as\nsomething to be left to the \"vulgar,\" to coarser, bourgeois, and\npeasant natures--that is, when one does not want to suppress the\npassions themselves, but only their language and demeanour, one\nnevertheless realises _therewith_ just what one does not want: the\nsuppression of the passions themselves, or at least their weakening and\nalteration.... 83\n\nIn magnanimity there is the same amount of egoism as in revenge....\n86-87\n\nWhere bad eyesight can no longer see the evil impulse as such,\non account of its refinement,--there man sets up the kingdom of\ngoodness.... 88\n\nTo become the advocate of the rule--that may perhaps be the ultimate\nform and refinement in which nobility of character will reveal itself\non earth. 90\n\nWomen are all skilful in exaggerating their weaknesses, indeed they are\ninventive in weaknesses, so as to seem quite fragile ornaments to which\neven a grain of dust does harm; their existence is meant to bring home\nto man's mind his coarseness, and to appeal to his conscience. 101\n\nThere is something quite astonishing and extraordinary in the education\nof women of the higher class; indeed, there is perhaps nothing more\nparadoxical. All the world is agreed to educate them with as much\nignorance as possible _in erotics,_ and to inspire their soul with a\nprofound shame of such things, and the extremest impatience and horror\nat the suggestion of them. It is really here only that all the \"honour\"\nof women is at stake; what would one not forgive in them in other\nrespects! But here they are intended to remain ignorant to the very\nbackbone:--they are intended to have neither eyes, ears, words, nor\nthoughts for this, their \"wickedness\"; indeed knowledge here is already\nevil. And then! To be hurled as with an awful thunderbolt into reality\nand knowledge with marriage--and indeed by him whom they most love and\nesteem: to have to encounter love and shame in contradiction, yea, to\nhave to feel rapture, abandonment, duty, sympathy, and fright at the\nunexpected proximity of God and animal, and whatever else besides! all\nat once!--There, in fact, a psychic entanglement has been effected\nwhich is quite unequalled! Even the sympathetic curiosity of the wisest\ndiscerner of men does not suffice to divine how this or that woman\ngets along with the solution of this enigma and the enigma of this\nsolution; what dreadful, far-reaching suspicions must awaken thereby\nin the poor unhinged soul; and forsooth, how the ultimate philosophy\nand scepticism of the woman casts anchor at this point!--Afterwards the\nsame profound silence as before: and often even a silence to herself,\na shutting of her eyes to herself.--Young wives on that account make\ngreat efforts to appear superficial and thoughtless; the most ingenious\nof them simulate a kind of impudence.--Wives easily feel their husbands\nas a question-mark to their honour, and their children as an apology or\natonement,--they require children, and wish for them in quite another\nspirit than a husband wishes for them.--In short, one cannot be gentle\nenough towards women! 104-105\n\nOf what consequence is all our art in artistic products, if that higher\nart, the art of the festival, be lost by us? 124\n\nThe best thing I could say in honour of Shakespeare, _the man,_ is that\nhe believed in Brutus and cast not a shadow of suspicion on the kind of\nvirtue which Brutus represents! 131\n\nWe must rest from ourselves occasionally by contemplating and looking\ndown upon ourselves, and by laughing or weeping _over_ ourselves from\nan artistic remoteness: we must discover the _hero,_ and likewise the\n_fool,_ that is hidden in our passion for knowledge; we must now and\nthen be joyful in our folly, that we may continue to be joyful in our\nwisdom! And just because we are heavy and serious men in our ultimate\ndepth, and are rather weights than men, there is nothing that does us\nso much good as the _fool's cap and bells:_ we need them in presence of\nourselves--we need all arrogant, soaring, dancing, mocking, childish\nand blessed Art, in order not to lose the _free dominion over things_\nwhich our ideal demands of us. 146\n\nThe general character of the world ... is to all eternity chaos;\nnot by the absence of necessity, but in the sense of the absence of\norder, structure, form, beauty, wisdom, and whatever else our \u00e6sthetic\nhumanities are called. Judged by our reason, the unlucky casts are far\noftenest the rule, the exceptions are not the secret purpose; and the\nwhole musical box repeats eternally its air, which can never be called\na melody,--and finally the very expression, \"unlucky cast\" is already\nan anthropomorphising which involves blame. But how could we presume to\nblame or praise the universe! Let us be on our guard against ascribing\nto it heartlessness and unreason, or their opposites; it is neither\nperfect, nor beautiful, nor noble; nor does it seek to be anything of\nthe kind, it does not at all attempt to imitate man! It is altogether\nunaffected by our \u00e6sthetic and moral judgments! Neither has it any\nself-preservative instinct, nor instinct at all; it also knows no law.\nLet us be on our guard against saying that there are laws in nature.\nThere are only necessities: there is no one who commands, no one who\nobeys, no one who transgresses. When you know that there is no design,\nyou know also that there is no chance: for it is only where there is a\nworld of design that the word \"chance\" has a meaning. Let us be on our\nguard against saying that death is contrary to life. The living being\nis only a species of dead being, and a very rare species.--Let us be on\nour guard against thinking that the world eternally creates the new.\nThere are no eternally enduring substances; matter is just another such\nerror as the God of the Eleatics. 152-153.\n\nMan has been reared by his errors: firstly, he saw himself always\nimperfect; secondly, he attributed to himself imaginary qualities;\nthirdly, he felt himself in a false position in relation to the animals\nand nature; fourthly, he always devised new tables of values, and\naccepted them for a time as eternal and unconditioned, so that at one\ntime this, and at another time that human impulse or state stood first,\nand was ennobled in consequence. When one has deducted the effect of\nthese four errors, one has also deducted humanity, humaneness, and\n\"human dignity.\" 160\n\nMorality is the herd-instinct in the individual. 161\n\nThere is no such thing as health in itself, and all attempts to define\na thing in that way have lamentably failed. It is necessary to know thy\naim, thy horizon, thy powers, thy impulses, thy errors, and especially\nthe ideals and fantasies of thy soul, in order to determine _what_\nhealth implies even for thy _body._ 163\n\nMystical explanations are regarded as profound; the truth is that they\ndo not even go the length of being superficial. 169\n\nI set the following propositions against those of Schopenhauer\n--Firstly, in order that Will may arise, an idea of pleasure and pain\nis necessary. Secondly, that a vigorous excitation may be felt as\npleasure or pain, is the affair of the interpreting intellect, which,\nto be sure, operates thereby for the most part unconsciously to us,\nand one and the same excitation _may_ be interpreted as pleasure\nor pain. Thirdly, it is only in an intellectual being that there is\npleasure, displeasure and Will; the immense majority of organisms have\nnothing of the kind. 171\n\nPrayer has been devised for such men as have never any thoughts of\ntheir own, and to whom an elevation of the soul is unknown, or passes\nunnoticed. 171\n\nSin, as it is at present felt wherever Christianity prevails or has\nprevailed, is a Jewish feeling and a Jewish invention. 174\n\nA Jesus Christ was only possible in a Jewish landscape--I mean in one\nover which the gloomy and sublime thunder-cloud of the angry Jehovah\nhung continually. 176\n\nWhere there is ruling there are masses: where there are masses there is\nneed of slavery. Where there is slavery the individuals are but few,\nand have the instincts and conscience of the herd opposed to them. 183\n\nWe love the _grandeur_ of Nature and have discovered it; that is\nbecause human grandeur is lacking in our minds. 186\n\nEgoism is the _perspective_ law of our sentiment, according to which\nthe near appears large and momentous, while in the distance the\nmagnitude and importance of all things diminish. 187\n\nHe who knows that he is profound strives for clearness; he who would\nlike to appear profound to the multitude strives for obscurity. The\nmultitude thinks everything profound of which it cannot see the bottom;\nit is so timid and goes so unwillingly into the water. 190\n\nThoughts are the shadows of our sentiments--always, however, obscurer,\nemptier, and simpler. 192\n\n**To laugh means to love mischief, but with a good conscience. 196\n\nVirtue gives happiness and a state of blessedness only to those who\nhave a strong faith in their virtue:--not, however, to the more refined\nsouls whose virtue consists of a profound distrust of themselves and\nof all virtue. After all, therefore, it is \"faith that saves\" here\nalso!--and be it well observed, not _virtue_! 198\n\nAlthough the most intelligent judges of the witches, and even the\nwitches themselves, were convinced of the guilt of witchcraft, the\nguilt, nevertheless, was not there. So it is with all guilt. 205\n\nIt makes me happy to see that men do not want to think at all of the\nidea of death! I would fain do something to make the idea of life even\na hundred times _more worthy of their attention._ 215-216\n\nI greet all the signs indicating that a more manly and warlike age is\ncommencing, which will, above all, bring heroism again into honour!\nFor it has to prepare the way for a yet higher age, and gather the\nforce which the latter will one day require,--the age which will carry\nheroism into knowledge, and _wage war_ for the sake of ideas and their\nconsequences. 218-219\n\nThey are disagreeable to me, those men in whom every natural\ninclination forthwith becomes a disease, something disfiguring, or\neven disgraceful. _They_ have seduced us to the opinion that the\ninclinations and impulses of men are evil; _they_ are the cause of our\ngreat injustice to our own nature, and to all nature! There are enough\nof men who _may_ yield to their impulses gracefully and carelessly: but\nthey do not do so, for fear of that imaginary \"evil thing\" in nature!\n_That is the cause_ why there is so little nobility to be found among\nmen: the indication of which will always be to have no fear of oneself,\nto expect nothing disgraceful from oneself, to fly without hesitation\nwhithersoever we are impelled--we free-born birds! Wherever we come,\nthere will always be freedom and sunshine around us. 229\n\nEvery one knows at present that the ability to endure contradiction is\na high indication of culture. Some people even know that the higher man\ncourts opposition, and provokes it, so as to get a cue to his hitherto\nunknown partiality. But the _ability_ to contradict, the attainment of\n_good_ conscience in hostility to the accustomed, the traditional and\nthe hallowed,--that is more than both the above-named abilities, and is\nthe really great, new and astonishing thing in our culture, the step of\nall steps of the emancipated intellect: who knows that? 232\n\nIn the main all those moral systems are distasteful to me which say:\n\"Do not do this! Renounce! Overcome thyself!\" On the other hand I am\nfavourable to those moral systems which stimulate me to do something,\nand to do it again from morning till evening, and dream of it at\nnight, and think of nothing else but to do it _well,_ as well as it is\npossible for _me_ alone!... 238\n\nIn pain there is as much wisdom as in pleasure: like the latter it\nis one of the best self-preservatives of a species. Were it not so,\npain would long ago have been done away with; that it is hurtful is no\nargument against it, for to be hurtful is its very essence. 247\n\nOne form of honesty has always been lacking among founders of religions\nand their kin:--they have never made their experiences a matter of the\nintellectual conscience. ... But we who are different, who are thirsty\nfor reason, want to look as carefully into our experiences, as in the\ncase of a scientific experiment, hour by hour, day by day! We ourselves\nwant to be our own experiments, and our own subjects of experiment. 248\n\nLet us no longer think so much about punishing, blaming, improving!\nWe shall seldom be able to alter an individual, and if we should\nsucceed in doing so, something else may also succeed, perhaps unawares:\n_we_ may have been altered by him! Let us rather see to it that our\nown influence on _all that is to come_ outweighs and overweighs his\ninfluence! Let us not struggle in direct conflict!--all blaming,\npunishing, and desire to improve comes under this category. 249\n\nWho could know how to laugh well and live well, who did not first\nunderstand the full meaning of war and victory? 250\n\nThat delightful animal, man, seems to lose his good-humour whenever he\nthinks well; he becomes \"serious\"! And \"where there is laughing and\ngaiety, thinking cannot be worth anything:\"--so speaks the prejudice of\nthis serious animal against all \"Joyful Wisdom.\" 252-253\n\nIf you had thought more acutely, observed more accurately, and had\nlearned more, you would no longer under all circumstances call this\nand that your \"duty\" and your \"conscience\": the knowledge _how moral\njudgments have in general always originated,_ would make you tired of\nthese pathetic words.... 261\n\nWe _would seek to become what we are,_--the new, the unique, the\nincomparable, making laws for ourselves and creating ourselves! And for\nthis purpose we must become the best students and discoverers of all\nthe laws and necessities in the world. We must be _physicists_ in order\nto be _creators_ in that sense,--whereas hitherto all appreciations and\nideals have been based on _ignorance_ of physics, or in _contradiction_\nto it. 203\n\nOur \"benefactors\" lower our value and volition more than our enemies.\n265\n\nIt is always a _metaphysical belief_ on which our belief in science\nrests,--and that even we knowing ones of to-day, the godless and\nanti-metaphysical, still take _our_ fire from the conflagration kindled\nby a belief a millennium old, the Christian belief, which was also the\nbelief of Plato, that God is truth, that the truth is divine. 279\n\nBelief is always most desired, most pressingly needed where there\nis a lack of will: for the will, as emotion of command, is the\ndistinguishing characteristic of sovereignty and power. That is to say,\nthe less a person knows how to command, the more urgent is his desire\nfor one who commands, who commands sternly,--a God, a prince, a caste,\na physician, a confessor, a dogma, a party conscience. 286\n\nTo seek self-preservation merely, is the expression of a state of\ndistress, or of limitation of the true, fundamental instinct of life,\nwhich aims at the _extension of power,_ and with this in view often\nenough calls in question self-preservation and sacrifices it. 289\n\nThe subtlety and strength of consciousness are always in proportion\nto the _capacity for communication_ of a man (or an animal), the\ncapacity for communication in its turn being in proportion to the\n_necessity for_ communication. ... _Consciousness generally has only\nbeen developed under the pressure of the necessity for communication,_\n--that from the first it has been necessary and useful only between man\nand man (especially between those commanding and those obeying), and\nhas only developed in proportion to its utility. 296-297\n\nThe Church is under all circumstances a _nobler_ institution than the\nState. 314\n\nIt seems to me one of my most essential steps and advances that I have\nlearned to distinguish the cause of the action generally from the\ncause of action in a particular manner, say, in this direction, with\nthis aim. The first kind of cause is a quantum of stored-up force,\nwhich waits to be used in some manner, for some purpose; the second\nkind of cause, on the contrary, is something quite unimportant in\ncomparison with the first, an insignificant hazard for the most part,\nin conformity with which the quantum of force in question \"discharges\"\nitself in some unique and definite manner: the lucifer-match in\nrelation to the barrel of gunpowder. 317\n\nI will never admit that we should speak of _equal_ rights in the love\nof man and woman: there are no such equal rights. The reason is that\nman and woman understand something different by the term love,--and it\nbelongs to the conditions of love in both sexes that the one sex does\n_not_ presuppose the same feeling, the same conception of \"love,\" in\nthe other sex. What woman understands by love is clear enough: complete\nsurrender (not merely devotion) of soul and body, without any motive,\nwithout any reservation, rather with shame and terror at the thought\nof a devotion restricted by clauses or associated with conditions. In\nthis absence of conditions her love is precisely a _faith:_ woman has\nno other.--Man, when he loves a woman, _wants_ precisely this love from\nher; he is consequently, as regards himself, furthest removed from the\nprerequisites of feminine love; granted, however, that there should\nalso be men to whom on their side the demand for complete devotion is\nnot unfamiliar,--well, they are really--not men. A man who loves like\na woman becomes thereby a slave: a woman, however, who loves like a\nwoman becomes thereby a _more perfect_ woman.... Woman wants to be\ntaken and accepted as a possession, she wishes to be merged in the\nconceptions of \"possession\" and \"possessed\"; consequently she wants\none who _takes,_ who does not offer and give himself away, but who\nreversely is rather to be made richer in \"himself\"--by the increase\nof power, happiness and faith which the woman herself gives to him.\nWoman gives herself, man takes her.--I do not think one will get over\nthis natural contrast by any social contract, or with the very best\nwill to do justice, however desirable it may be to avoid bringing the\nsevere, frightful, enigmatical, and unmoral elements of this antagonism\nconstantly before our eyes. For love, regarded as complete, great,\nand full, is nature, and as nature, is to all eternity something\n\"unmoral.\"--_Fidelity_ is accordingly included in woman's love, it\nfollows from the definition thereof; with man fidelity _may_ readily\nresult in consequence of his love, perhaps as gratitude or idiosyncrasy\nof taste, and so-called elective affinity, but it does not belong\nto the _essence_ of his love--and indeed so little, that one might\nalmost be entitled to speak of a natural opposition between love and\nfidelity in man, whose love is just a desire to possess, and _not_ a\nrenunciation and giving away; the desire to possess, however, comes to\nan end every time with the possession. 321-323\n\nEverything that is thought, versified, painted and composed, yea, even\nbuilt and moulded, belongs either to monologic art, or to art before\nwitnesses. Under the latter there is also to be included the apparently\nmonologic art which involves the belief in God, the whole lyric of\nprayer; because for a pious man there is no solitude,--we, the godless,\nhave been the first to devise this invention. 328\n\nA \"scientific\" interpretation of the world as you understand it might\nconsequently still be one of the _stupidest,_ that is to say, the most\ndestitute of significance, of all possible world-interpretations....\nAn essentially mechanical world would be an essentially _meaningless\nWorld!_ 339-340\n\nWe, the new, the nameless, the hard-to-understand, we firstlings of a\nyet untried future--we require for a new end also a new means, namely,\na new healthiness, stronger, sharper, tougher, bolder and merrier than\nany healthiness hitherto. 351\n\nAnother ideal runs on before us, a strange, tempting ideal, full of\ndanger, to which we should not like to persuade any one, because we\ndo not so readily acknowledge any one's _right thereto:_ the ideal\nof a spirit who plays naively (that is to say involuntarily and from\noverflowing abundance and power) with everything that has hitherto been\ncalled holy, good, inviolable, divine; to whom the loftiest conception\nwhich the people have reasonably made their measure of value, would\nalready imply danger, ruin, abasement, or at least relaxation,\nblindness, or temporary self-forgetfulness; the ideal of a humanly\nsuperhuman welfare and benevolence, which may often enough appear\n_inhuman._ ... 352-353\n\n\n\n\nV\n\n\n\"Thus Spake Zarathustra\"\n\n\nHe student of Nietzsche can well afford to leave the reading of \"Thus\nSpake Zarathustra\" _(\"Also Sprach Zarathustra\")_ until he has prepared\nhimself for the task by studying Nietzsche's other and less obscure\nbooks. In both its conception and execution it differs markedly from\nall the works which preceded and followed it. It is written in an\narchaic and poetical style, and in many places is purposely obscure.\nNietzsche did not intend it for the general public, and the fourth part\nwas not published until seven years after its completion. It would\nhave been better had \"Zarathustra\" been withheld from the presses\nuntil Nietzsche's other works had gained a wider recognition, for\nit unfortunately lays itself open to all manner of misunderstanding\nand misinterpretation. In fact, it is impossible to read \"Thus Spake\nZarathustra\" comprehendingly until several of the other books of this\nphilosopher, such as \"The Dawn of Day,\" \"The Genealogy of Morals\" and\n\"Beyond Good and Evil,\" have been consumed and assimilated.\n\nUnfortunately this book, because of the attractive medium of its\nstyle, was one of the first to fall into the hands of English speaking\npeople. For many years it was the principal source of the many\nfalse accusations against Nietzsche which gained wide circulation.\nThe figures of speech contained in it and the numerous parables\nwhich are used to set forth its ideas lend themselves all too\neasily to falsities of judgment and erroneous evaluations. Reading\nthe book unpreparedly one may find what appear to be unexplainable\ncontradictions and ethical sophistries. Above all, one may wrongly\nsense the absence of that higher ethical virtue which is denied\nNietzsche in quarters where he is least understood, but which every\nclose student of his works knows to form the basis of his thought.\n\nNietzsche began the writing of \"Thus Spake Zarathustra\" early in the\nyear 1883, and he did not finish it until the middle of February,\n1885. The actual conception of the book came much before this time\neven, as far back as the summer of 1881. This is when the idea of\neternal recurrence first took possession of him. At once he began\nmaking notes, using this idea as the basis of Zarathustra's teachings.\nAt this time Nietzsche was just recovering from a siege of ill health\nwhich had extended over many years, and no doubt the buoyant and\nrhapsodic form in which he conceived this work was due to his sudden\nacquisition of bodily health. The first part was written in ten days,\nthe second part a few months later, and the third part in the autumn of\nthe same year. But it was not until after a lapse of eighteen months\nthat the fourth and last section was completed. Because of this long\ninterval we see a radical difference between the first three parts of\nthe book and the last part. The language remains very much the same\nthroughout--spectacular, poetic and symbolic--but the form is changed.\nThe epigrammatic and non-sequacious mandates give way to a long\nconnected parable. The psalmodie brevity of the utterances of the first\nthree sections is supplanted by description and narrative. A story\nruns through the entire fourth part; and it is in the obscurities of\nthis fable, rather than in any specific statements, that we must seek\nthe gist of Nietzsche's doctrines. This would be an impossible task\nwere we not more or less familiar with his other books. Yet, once we\nunderstand the general trend of his thought, we can penetrate at once\nto the meanings hidden in the fantastic divagations of his story and\ncan understand the dithyrambic utterances of both Zarathustra and the\n\"higher men\" in the cave.\n\n\"Thus Spake Zarathustra\" is unique for the reason that there are few\npoints in Nietzsche's system of ethic--and for the most part they are\nthe unimportant ones--which we cannot find somewhere in its pages. But\ndo not think that one can grasp an idea of the sweep of his entire\nthought merely by reading this book. Even in the most simply worded and\nmost lucidly phrased passages one would find difficulty in following\nthe steps in his philosophy, unless there had been considerable\npreparatory study. To be sure, there are numerous isolated epigrams\nand bits of observation which are easily understood, but their mere\nisolation very often robs them of the true meaning they hold when\nrelated to the other precepts. The very literalness with which these\npassages have been taken by those who have read \"Zarathustra\" before\nstudying any of the other works of Nietzsche, accounts in a large\nmeasure for the ignorance in which he is held even by those who profess\nto have read him and understood him. A philosophy such as his, the\noutposts of which are so far removed from the routine of our present\nsocial life, is naturally hampered by the restricted connotation of\ncurrent words--even those technical words used to express abstract and\ninfinite things. For this reason it is inevitable that false meanings\nshould attach to many of his statements, and that misunderstandings\nshould arise in quarters where there does not exist a previous general\nknowledge of the co-ordinated structure of his teachings. This general\nknowledge cannot be gained from \"Thus Spake Zarathustra.\" Many of its\npages are entirely without significance to the reader not already\nacquainted with Nietzsche's thought. And much of its nomenclature is\nmeaningless without the explanations to be found in the main body of\nhis work.\n\nFor the reader, however, who picks up this book after having equipped\nhimself for an understanding of it, there is much of fascination and\nstimulation. Nietzsche regarded it as his most intimate and personal,\nand therefore his most important, work. He even had plans for two\nmore parts which were to be included in it. But these were never\nfinished. The indifference with which the book was received, even\nby those on whose sympathy and understanding he had most counted,\nreacted unfavourably upon him. It is nevertheless, just as it stands,\none of the most remarkable pieces of philosophic literature of modern\ntimes. Its form alone makes it unique. Instead of stating his beliefs\ndirectly and without circumlocution, as was always his method both\nbefore and after the writing of this book, Nietzsche chose for his\nmouthpiece a poet and philosopher borrowed from the Persians, namely:\nZoroaster. This sage of the ancients was used as a symbol of the higher\nman. Into his mouth were put Nietzsche's own ideas in the form of\nparables, admonitions, exhortations and discourses. The wanderings and\nexperiences of this Zoroaster are chronicled, and each event in his\nlife embodies a meaning in direct accord with the Nietzschean system of\nconduct.\n\nBecause of the Persian origin of Zoroaster one might imagine that\ninfluences of Persian philosophy would be discoverable in the teachings\nof this nomadic poet. But with the name all similarity between the\nspokesman and his doctrines ends. Nietzsche's choice of Zoroaster\nas his mouthpiece grew out of his early admiration for the Persians\nwho, he declared, \"were the first to take a broad and comprehensive\nview of history.\" As we see Zoroaster in this book we recognise him\nat once as none other than Nietzsche himself; and the experiences\nthrough which he goes in his wanderings are but picturesquely stated\naccounts of Nietzsche's own sufferings, raptures, aspirations and\ndisappointments. To those familiar with Nietzsche's life, many of the\ncharacters introduced in the book will be recognised as portraitures of\nmen whose lives crossed that of the philosopher. Likewise, many of the\nparables and fables are thinly disguised accounts of the incidents in\nhis own life. In the last part of the book we find Nietzsche creating\na fantastic poet to represent Wagner, and holding him up to severe and\nuncompromising criticism.\n\nZoroaster, as he appears in this book, is an itinerant law-giver\nand prophet who seeks the waste places of the earth, the mountains,\nplains and sea shores, avoiding mankind and carrying with him two\nsymbolic animals, an eagle and a snake. At the end of his wanderings\nhe discovers a lion which is for him the sign that his journey is\ndrawing to a close, for this lion represents all that is best and\nmost powerful in nature. The book is comprised of the discourses and\nsermons which Zoroaster delivers from day to day to the occasional\ndisciples and unbelievers who cross the path of his wanderings. There\nare conversations between him and his accompanying animals; and in the\nlast part of the book he gathers together in his cave a number of men\nrepresenting types of the higher man and talks with them. In all his\ndiscourses he makes use of a rhapsodic and poetic style, not unlike\nthat found in the Psalms of David. The text telling of Zoroaster's\nwanderings and experiences is cast in the manner of the early religious\nbooks of the Orientals.\n\n\"Thus Spake Zarathustra\" was the first book to follow \"Human,\nAll-Too-Human,\" \"The Dawn of Day\" and \"The Joyful Wisdom,\" and many of\nNietzsche's constructive ideas are presented here for the first time.\nPart I is more lucid and can be more easily understood than the parts\nwhich follow. In it Nietzsche designates the classes of humanity and\ndifferentiates between them. His three famous metamorphoses of the\nspirit--symbolised by the camel, the lion and the child--are stated\nand explained. Here we find the philosopher's most widely quoted\npassages pertaining to marriage and child-bearing; his doctrine of\nwar and peace; and those passages wherein he reverses the beatitudes.\nThe passions and preferences of the individual are criticised in\ntheir relation to the higher man, and the more obvious instincts are\nanalysed. Nietzsche outlines methods of conduct, and dissects the\nactions and attitudes of his disciples, praising them or blaming them\nin accordance with his own values. He presents an illuminating analysis\nof charity, and outlines in his chapter, \"The Bestowing Virtue,\" the\nconditions under which it may become a means to existence. He poses\nthe problem of relative morality, and suggests the lines along which\nhis thesis will be developed at a later date. The superman is defined\nbriefly but with a completeness sufficient for us to sense his relation\nto the philosophical scheme of which he is a part. The conception of\nthe superman was founded on Darwin's doctrine of organic evolution,\nand Nietzsche seeks to bring this superman about by the application\nof the law of natural selection and by giving the law of the survival\nof the fittest an open field for operation. Here, too, we have the\nstatement of Nietzsche's racial ideal: the highest exemplars of the\nrace, and not a standardized goal, is the aim of his philosophy.\n\nIn Part II the doctrine of the will to power is clearly set forth in\nits framework. The chapter wherein this appears--\"Self-Surpassing\"--is\nmerely a brief exposition founded on observation. The development of\nthis idea is not to be found until toward the end of Nietzsche's life;\nbut that the theory was clearly conceived in his mind is evidenced by\nthe fact that it is constantly being applied throughout the remainder\nof his works. In its present form it is no more than a statement, but\nso clearly is it presented that one is able to grasp its significance\nand to determine in just what manner it differed from the Darwinian\nand Spencerian doctrines. In this same section are contained many\npersonal chapters, including an excoriation of his early critics, a\ncomparison between himself and Schopenhauer, an account of his early\nanti-scholastic warfare, a criticism of modern scientific methods, a\nreference to his friendship with Wagner, and an expression of regret at\nthe misunderstanding which greeted his earlier works. One of the final\nchapters offers a definition of \"profundity\" which goes deep into the\nvery undercurrents of his philosophy.\n\nThe most important material to be found in the book is encountered\nin Part III. Under the caption, \"The Old and the New Tables,\" we\nhave an important summing up of the principal teachings in the\nNietzschean philosophical scheme. Here also we meet the doctrine of\neternal recurrence which, as I have said, generated the conception\nof this book. Its present statement is limited to a few tentative\nspeculations; later on it was developed and set forth with greater\nforce and certainty. But despite the fact that in his autobiography\nNietzsche calls this speculative philosophic doctrine \"the highest of\nall possible formul\u00e6 of a Yea-saying philosophy,\" too much importance\nmust not be attached to it in its relation to his writings. In the\nfirst place it was by no means new with him: he himself reconnoitred\na bit in one of his early essays looking for its possible origin. And\nin the second place it had little influence on his main doctrine of\nthe superman. Although he spent considerable time and space in its\nelucidation, it never became an integral part of any of his teachings.\nRather was it something superimposed on his other formul\u00e6--a condition\nintroduced into the actualities of his conception of the universe. I am\ninclined to think that he flirted with this idea of recurrence largely\nbecause it was the most disheartening obstacle he could conceive in\nthe path of the superman; and as no obstacle was too great to be faced\ntriumphantly by this man of the future, he imposed this condition of\neternal recurrence upon him as an ultimate test of fortitude. This idea\nwould have added the final touch of futility to ambition, and Nietzsche\ncould not conceive of true greatness in man unless futility was at\nthe bottom of all ambitions. However, it is possible to eliminate\nthe entire idea of eternal recurrence from Nietzsche's work without\naltering fundamentally any of his main teachings, for it is, in his\nvery conception of it, a deputy condition of existence.\n\nPart IV, the narrative section, answers the query often raised: For\nwhom is Nietzsche's philosophy intended? It does away once and for all\nwith the assumption of certain critics that his writings were for all\nclasses. In fact, this assumption, constantly posited by scholars--even\nthose who claim to possess an intimate knowledge of Nietzsche's\nwork--is nowhere borne out in his text. As far back as \"Thoughts out of\nSeason\" the reverse of this supposition was inferentially stated; and\nin \"The Antichrist\" and \"The Will to Power\" we have definite denials\nthat his doctrines were intended for every one. Yet one is constantly\nencountering critical refutations of his philosophy based on the theory\nthat he addressed his teachings to all men. Nothing could be further\nfrom the truth. He held no vision of a race of supermen: a millennium\nfounded on the exertion of power was neither his aim nor his hope.\nHis philosophy was entirely aristocratic. It was a system of ethics\ndesigned for the masters of the race; and his books were gifts for\nthe intelligent man alone. Locke, Rousseau and Hume are often brought\nforward by critics as answers to his attempts at transvaluation; but\na close inspection of Nietzsche's definition of slave-morality, which\nwas an important factor in his ethical scheme, will show that it is\npossible to accept the philosophy of the superman without abrogating\nthe softer ethics of these three other thinkers. Nietzsche's stand in\nregard to his audience is made obvious in the fable of Zarathustra. The\npoet-philosopher experiences the instinct for pity, but on going out\ninto the world, he recognises this instinct as pertaining only to the\n\"higher men.\" When he finds numerous of these men in danger from the\nignorance of the populace and from the restrictions of environment,\nhe leads them to his cave, and there, isolated from the inferior man,\ndiscourses with them on the problems of life and points out to them\nthe course they must take in order to bring about the superman.\n\nBecause of the nature of the book it is extremely difficult to select\ndetached passages from it which will give an entirely adequate idea of\nits contents. Often a single philosophical point will be contained in\na long parable, and the only way to present that point in Nietzsche's\nown words would have been to embody the whole parable in this chapter.\nThat, of course, would have been impossible. Therefore, many of the\nideas set forth in the book have not been included in the following\nexcerpts. Part IV does not lend itself at all to mutilation, and I have\nbeen unable to take anything save a few general passages from this\nsection. However, \"Thus Spake Zarathustra\" is not a book to which one\nshould go to become familiar with Nietzsche's teachings. When one sits\ndown to read it, my advice is that the notes of Mr. Anthony M. Ludovici\nwhich are to be found in the appendix of the standard English edition,\nbe followed closely.\n\n\nEXCERPTS FROM \"THUS SPAKE ZARATHUSTRA\"\n\n_I teach you the Superman.._. Man is something that is to be surpassed.\n6\n\nWhat is the ape to man? A laughing-stock, a thing of shame. And just\nthe same shall man be to the Superman: a laughing-stock, a thing of\nshame. 6\n\nYe have made your way from the worm to man, and much within you is\nstill worm. Once were ye apes, and even yet man is more of an ape than\nany of the apes. 7\n\nI conjure you, my brethren, _remain true to the earth._ and believe not\nthose who speak unto you of super-earthly hopes! Poisoners are they,\nwhether they know it or not. 7\n\nTo blaspheme the earth is now the dreadfulest sin.... 7\n\nMan is a rope stretched between the animal and the Superman--a rope\nover an abyss. 9\n\nWhat is great in man is that he is a bridge and not a goal.... 9\n\nI tell you: one must still have chaos in one, to give birth to a\ndancing star.... 12\n\nThree metamorphoses of the spirit do I designate to you: how the spirit\nbecometh a camel, the camel a lion, and the lion at last a child.\n\nMany heavy things are there for the spirit, the strong load-bearing\nspirit in which reverence dwelleth: for the heavy and the heaviest\nlongeth its strength.\n\nWhat is heavy? so asketh the load-bearing spirit; then kneeleth it down\nlike the camel, and wanteth to be well laden.\n\nWhat is the heaviest thing, ye heroes? asketh the load-bearing spirit,\nthat I may take it upon me and rejoice in my strength.\n\nIs it not this: To humiliate oneself in order to mortify one's pride?\nTo exhibit one's folly in order to mock at one's wisdom?\n\nOr is it this: To desert our cause when it celebrateth its triumph? To\nascend high mountains to tempt the tempter?\n\nOr is it this: To feed on the acorns and grass of knowledge, and for\nthe sake of truth to suffer hunger of soul?\n\nOr is it this: To be sick and dismiss comforters, and make friends of\nthe deaf, who never hear thy requests?\n\nOr is it this: To go into foul water when it is the water of truth, and\nnot disclaim cold frogs and hot toads?\n\nOr is it this: To love those who despise us, and give one's hand to the\nphantom when it is going to frighten us?\n\nAll these heaviest things the load-bearing spirit taketh upon itself:\nand like the camel, which, when laden, hasteneth into the wilderness,\nso hasteneth the spirit into its wilderness.\n\nBut in the loneliest wilderness happeneth the second metamorphosis:\nhere the spirit becometh a lion; freedom will it capture, and lordship\nin its own wilderness.\n\nIts last Lord it here seeketh: hostile will it be to him, and to its\nlast God; for victory will it struggle with the great dragon.\n\nWhat is the great dragon which the spirit is no longer inclined to call\nLord and God? \"Thou shalt,\" is the great dragon called. But the spirit\nof the lion saith, \"I will.\"\n\n\"Thou shalt,\" lieth in its path, sparkling with gold--a scale-covered\nbeast; and on every scale glittereth golden, \"Thou shalt!\"\n\nThe values of a thousand years glitter on those scales, and\nthus speaketh the mightiest of all dragons: \"All the values of\nthings--glitter on me.\"\n\n\"All values have already been created, and all created values--do I\nrepresent. Verily, there shall be no 'I will' any more.\" Thus speaketh\nthe dragon.\n\nMy brethren, wherefore is there need of the lion in the spirit? Why\nsufficeth not the beast of burden, which renounceth and is reverent?\n\nTo create new values--that, even the lion cannot yet accomplish: but to\ncreate itself freedom for new creating--that can the might of the lion\ndo.\n\nTo create itself freedom, and give a holy Nay even unto duty: for\nthat, my brethren, there is need of the lion.\n\nTo assume the right to new values--that is the most formidable\nassumption for a load-bearing and reverent spirit. Verily, unto such a\nspirit it is preying, and the work of a beast of prey.\n\nAs its holiest, it once loved \"Thou shalt\": now is it forced to find\nillusion and arbitrariness even in the holiest things, that it may\ncapture freedom from its love: the lion is needed for this capture.\n\nBut tell me, my brethren, what the child can do, which even the lion\ncould not do? Why hath the preying lion still to become a child?\n\nInnocence is the child, and forgetfulness, a new beginning, a game, a\nself-rolling wheel, a first movement, a holy Yea.\n\nAye, for the game of creating, my brethren, there is needed a holy Yea\nunto life: _its own_ will, willeth now the spirit; _his own_ world\nwinneth the world's outcast.\n\nThree metamorphoses of the spirit have I designated to you: how the\nspirit became a camel, the camel a lion, and the lion at last a child.\n25-27\n\nA new pride ... teach I unto men: no longer to thrust the head into the\nsand of celestial things, but to carry it freely, a terrestrial head,\nwhich giveth meaning to the earth!\n\nA new will teach I unto men: to choose that path which man hath\nfollowed blindly, and to approve of it--and no longer to slink aside\nfrom it, like the sick and perishing!\n\nThe sick and perishing--it was they who despised the body and the\nearth, and invented the heavenly world, and the redeeming blood-drops;\nbut even those sweet and sad poisons they borrowed from the body and\nthe earth! 33-34\n\nThe awakened one, the knowing one, saith: \"Body am I entirely, and\nnothing more; and soul is only the name of something in the body.\" 35\n\nThe body is a big sagacity, a plurality with one sense, a war and a\npeace, a flock and a shepherd.\n\nAn instrument of thy body is also thy little sagacity, my brother,\nwhich thou callest \"spirit\"--a little instrument and plaything of thy\nbig sagacity.\n\nInstruments and playthings are sense and spirit: behind them there\nis still the Self. The Self seeketh with the eyes of the senses, it\nhearkeneth also with the ears of the spirit. 36\n\nBehind thy thoughts and feelings, my brother, there is a mighty lord,\nan unknown sage--it is called Self; it dwelleth in thy body, it is thy\nbody. 36\n\nWhen thou hast a virtue, and it is thine own virtue, thou hast it in\ncommon with no one. 38\n\nIf thou be fortunate, then wilt thou have one virtue and no more: thus\ngoest thou easier over the bridge. 39\n\n\"Enemy\" shall ye say but not \"villain,\" \"invalid\" shall ye say but not\n\"wretch,\" \"fool\" shall ye say but not \"sinner.\" 41\n\nOf all that is written, I love only what a person hath written with his\nblood. Write with blood, and thou wilt find that blood is spirit. 43\n\nYe look aloft when ye long for exaltation; and I look downward because\nI am exalted.\n\nWho among you can at the same time laugh and be exalted?\n\nHe who climbeth on the highest mountains, laugheth at all tragic plays\nand tragic realities.\n\nCourageous, unconcerned, scornful, coercive--so wisdom wisheth us; she\nis a woman, and ever loveth a warrior. 44\n\nIt is true we love life; not because we are wont to live, but because\nwe are wont to love. 44\n\nI should only believe in a God that would know how to dance. 45\n\nNot by wrath, but by laughter, do we slay. Come, let us slay the spirit\nof gravity! 45\n\nFull is the earth of the superfluous; marred is life by the\nmany-too-many. May they be decoyed out of this life by the \"life\neternal\"! 49\n\nYe are not great enough not to know of hatred and envy. Then be great\nenough not to be ashamed of them! 51\n\nYe shall love peace as a means to new wars--and the short peace more\nthan the long.\n\nYou I advise not to work, but to fight. You, I advise not to peace, but\nto victory. Let your work be a fight, let your peace be a victory! 52\n\nYe say it is the good cause which halloweth even war? I say unto you:\nit is the good war which halloweth every cause. 52\n\n\"What is good?\" ye ask. To be brave is good. 52\n\nYe shall only have enemies to be hated, but not enemies to be despised.\nYe must be proud of your enemies; then, the successes of your enemies\nare also your successes. 53\n\nA state is called the coldest of all cold monsters. Coldly lieth it\nalso; and this lie creepeth from its mouth: \"I, the state, am the\npeople.\" 54\n\nJust see these superfluous ones! They steal the works of the inventors\nand the treasures of the wise. Culture, they call their theft--and\neverything becometh sickness and trouble unto them! 56\n\nAround the devisers of new values revolveth the world:--invisibly it\nrevolveth. But around the actors revolve the people and the glory: such\nis the course of things. 58\n\nWould that ye were perfect--at least as animals! But to animals\nbelongeth innocence. 61\n\nChastity is a virtue with some, but with many almost a vice. 61\n\nTo whom chastity is difficult, it is to be dissuaded: lest it become\nthe road to hell--to filth and lust of soul. 62\n\nIf one would have a friend, then must one also be willing to wage war\nfor him: and in order to wage war, one must be _capable_ of being an\nenemy. 63\n\nIn one's friend one shall have one's best enemy. Thou shalt be closest\nunto him with thy heart when thou withstandest him. 63\n\nArt thou a slave? Then thou canst not be a friend. Art thou a tyrant?\nThen thou canst not have friends.\n\nFar too long hath there been a slave and a tyrant concealed in woman.\nOn that account woman is not yet capable of friendship: she knoweth\nonly love.\n\nIn woman's love there is injustice and blindness to all she doth\nnot love. And even in woman's conscious love, there is still always\nsurprise and lightning and night, along with the light. 65\n\nValues did man only assign to things in order to maintain himself--he\ncreated only the significance of things, a human significance!\nTherefore, calleth he himself \"man,\" that is, the valuator. 67\n\nA thousand goals have there been hitherto, for a thousand peoples have\nthere been. Only the fetter for the thousand necks is still lacking;\nthere is lacking the one goal. As yet humanity hath not a goal. 69\n\nDo I advise you to neighbour-love? Rather do I advise you to\nneighbour-flight and to furthest love!\n\nHigher than love to your neighbour is love to the furthest and future\nones; higher still than love to men, is love to things and phantoms.\n\nThe phantom that runneth on before thee, my brother, is fairer than\nthou; why dost thou not give unto it thy flesh and thy bones?... 69\n\nArt thou one _entitled_ to escape from a yoke? Many a one hath cast\naway his final worth when he hath cast away his servitude.\n\nFree from what? What doth that matter to Zarathustra! Clearly, however,\nshall thine eye show unto me: free _for what?_ 71\n\nEverything in woman is a riddle, and everything in woman hath one\nsolution--it is called pregnancy.\n\nMan is for woman, a means: the purpose is always the child. But what is\nwoman for man?\n\nTwo different things wanteth the true man: danger and diversion.\nTherefore wanteth he woman, as the most dangerous plaything.\n\nMan shall be trained for war, and woman for the recreation of the\nwarrior: all else is folly.\n\nTwo sweet fruits--these the warrior liketh not. Therefore liketh he\nwoman;--bitter is ever the sweetest woman.\n\nBetter than man doth woman understand children, but man is more\nchildish than woman.\n\nIn the true man there is a child hidden: it wanteth to play. Up then,\nye women, and discover the child in man!\n\nA plaything let woman be, pure and fine like the precious stone,\nillumined with the virtues of a world not yet come.\n\nLet the beam of a star shine in your love! Let your hope say: \"May I\nbear the Superman!\"\n\nIn your love let there be valour! With your love shall ye assail him\nwho inspireth you with fear!\n\nIn your love be your honour! Little doth woman understand otherwise\nabout honour. But let this be your honour: always to love more than ye\nare loved, and never be the second.\n\nLet man fear woman when she loveth: then maketh she every sacrifice,\nand everything else she regardeth as worthless.\n\nLet man fear woman when she hateth: for man in his innermost soul is\nmerely evil; woman, however, is mean.\n\nWhom hateth woman most?--Thus spake the iron to the loadstone: \"I hate\nthee most, because thou attractest, but art too weak to draw unto thee.\"\n\nThe happiness of man is, \"I will.\" The happiness of woman is, \"He\nwill.\" 76\n\nThou goest to women? Do not forget thy whip! 77\n\nWhen ... ye have an enemy, then return him not good for evil: for that\nwould abash him. But prove that he hath done something good to you.\n\nAnd rather be angry than abash any one! And when ye are cursed, it\npleaseth me not that ye should then desire to bless. Rather curse a\nlittle also! 78\n\nTell me: where find we justice, which is love with seeing eyes? 78\n\nThou art young, and desirest child and marriage. But I ask thee: Art\nthou a man entitled to desire a child? Art thou the victorious one, the\nself-conqueror, the ruler of thy passions, the master of thy virtues?\nThus do I ask thee.\n\nOr doth the animal speak in thy wish, and necessity? Or isolation? Or\ndiscord in thee?\n\nI would have thy victory and freedom long for a child. Living monuments\nshalt thou build to thy victory and emancipation.\n\nBeyond thyself shalt thou build. But first of all must thou be built\nthyself, rectangular in body and soul. 79\n\nMarriage: so call I the will of the twain to create the one that is\nmore than those who created it. 80\n\nThat which the many-too-many call marriage, those superfluous ones--ah,\nwhat shall I call it?\n\nAh, the poverty of soul in the twain! Ah, the filth of soul in the\ntwain! Ah, the pitiable self-complacency in the twain!\n\nMarriage they call it all; and they say their marriages are made in\nheaven.\n\nWell, I do not like it, that heaven of the superfluous; No, I do not\nlike them, those animals tangled in the heavenly toils!\n\nFar from me also be the God who limpeth thither to bless what he hath\nnot matched!\n\nLaugh not at such marriages! What child hath not had reason to weep\nover its parents? 80\n\nEvery one regardeth dying as a great matter: but as yet death is not\na festival. Not yet have people learned to inaugurate the finest\nfestivals. 82\n\nMy death, praise I unto you, the voluntary death, which cometh unto me\nbecause I want it.\n\nAnd when shall I want it?--He that hath a goal and an heir, wanteth\ndeath at the right time for the goal and the heir. 83\n\nIt is your thirst to become sacrifices and gifts yourselves: and\ntherefore have ye the thirst to accumulate all riches in your soul.\n\nInsatiably striveth your soul for treasures and jewels, because your\nvirtue is insatiable in desiring to bestow.\n\nYe constrain all things to flow towards you and into you, so that they\nshall flow back again out of your fountain as the gifts of your love.\n\nVerily, an appropriator of all values must such bestowing love become;\nbut healthy and holy, call I this selfishness. 86\n\nWhen ye are exalted above praise and blame, and your will would command\nall things, as a loving one's will: there is the origin of your virtue.\n87\n\nRemain true to the earth, my brethren, with the power of your virtue!\nLet your bestowing love and your knowledge be devoted to be the meaning\nof the earth! Thus do I pray and conjure you.\n\nLet it not fly away from the earthly and beat against eternal walls\nwith its wings! 88\n\nThe man of knowledge must be able not only to love his enemies, but\nalso to hate his friends. 90\n\nOnce did people say God, when they looked out upon distant seas; now,\nhowever, have I taught you to say, Superman. 98\n\nCould ye _conceive_ a God?--But let this mean Will to Truth unto you,\nthat everything be transformed into the humanly conceivable, the\nhumanly visible, the humanly sensible! Your own discernment shall ye\nfollow out to the end! 99\n\nCreating--that is the great salvation from suffering, and life's\nalleviation. But for the creator to appear, suffering itself is needed,\nand much transformation. 100\n\nWhat would there be to create if there were--? Gods! 101\n\nMan himself is to the discerning one: the animal with red cheeks. 102\n\nVerily, I like them not, the merciful ones, whose bliss is in their\npity: too destitute are they of bashfulness.\n\nIf I must be pitiful, I dislike to be called so; and if I be so, it is\npreferably at a distance. 102\n\nSince humanity came into being, man hath enjoyed himself too little:\nthat alone, my brethren, is our original sin! 103\n\nGreat obligations do not make grateful, but revengeful; and when a\nsmall kindness is not forgotten, it becometh a gnawing worm. 103\n\nThe sting of conscience teacheth one to sting. 103\n\nAh, where in the world have there been greater follies than with the\npitiful? And what in the world hath caused more suffering than the\nfollies of the pitiful?\n\nWoe unto all loving ones who have not an elevation which is above their\npity!\n\nThus spake the devil unto me, once a time: \"Even God hath his hell: it\nis his love for man.\" 105\n\nAll great love is above all its pity: for it seeketh--to create what is\nloved!\n\n\"Myself do I offer unto my love, _and my neighbour as myself\"_--such is\nthe language of all creators. 105\n\n\"Here are priests: but although they are mine enemies, pass them\nquietly and with sleeping swords!\"\n\nEven among them there are heroes; many of them have suffered too\nmuch:--so they want to make others suffer.\n\nBad enemies are they: nothing is more revengeful than their meekness.\n106\n\nWhen a person goeth through fire for his teaching--what doth that\nprove! It is more, verily, when out of one's own burning cometh one's\nown teaching! 108\n\nThat _your_ very Self be in your action, as the mother is in the child:\nlet that be _your_ formula of virtue! 112\n\nLife is a well of delight; but where the rabble also drink, there all\nfountains are poisoned. 113\n\nYe who make the soul giddy, ye preachers of _equality!_ Tarantulas are\nye unto me, and secretly revengeful ones! 116\n\nYe preachers of equality, the tyrant-frenzy of impotence crieth thus\nin you for \"equality\": your most secret tyrant-longings disguise\nthemselves thus in virtue-words!\n\nFretted conceit and suppressed envy--perhaps your fathers' conceit and\nenvy: in you break they forth as flame and frenzy of vengeance. 117\n\nDistrust all in whom the impulse to punish is powerful!\n\nThey are people of bad race and lineage; out of their countenances peer\nthe hangman and the sleuth-hound.\n\nDistrust all those who talk much of their justice! Verily, in their\nsouls not only honey is lacking.\n\nAnd when they call themselves \"the good and just,\" forget not, that for\nthem to be Pharisees, nothing is lacking but--power! 118\n\nWith these preachers of equality will I not be mixed up and confounded.\nFor thus speaketh justice _unto me:_ \"Men are not equal.\"\n\nAnd neither shall they become so! 118\n\nGood and evil, and rich and poor, and high and low, and all names of\nvalues: weapons shall they be, and sounding signs, that life must again\nand again surpass itself! 119\n\nSteadfast and beautiful, let us also be enemies, my friends I Divinely\nwill we strive _against_ one another! 120\n\nHungry, fierce, lonesome, God-forsaken: so doth the lion-will wish\nitself.\n\nFree from the happiness of slaves, redeemed from Deities and\nadorations, fearless and fear-inspiring, grand and lonesome: so is the\nwill of the conscientious. 122\n\nWherever I found a living thing, there found I Will to Power; and even\nin the will of the servant found I the will to be master.\n\nThat to the stronger the weaker shall serve--thereto persuadeth he his\nwill who would be master over a still weaker one. That delight alone he\nis unwilling to forego.\n\nAnd as the lesser surrendereth himself to the greater that he may have\ndelight and power over the least of all, so doth even the greatest\nsurrender himself, and staketh--life, for the sake of power.\n\nIt is the surrender of the greatest to run risk and danger, and play\ndice for death. 136\n\nGood and evil which would be everlasting--it doth not exist! Of its own\naccord must it ever surpass itself anew. 137\n\nHe who hath to be a creator in good and evil--verily, he hath first to\nbe a destroyer, and break values in pieces. 138\n\nYe tell me, friends, that there is to be no dispute about taste and\ntasting? But all life is a dispute about taste and tasting.\n\nTaste: that is weight at the same time, and scales and weigher; and\nalas for every living thing that would live without dispute about\nweight and scales and weigher! 139\n\nAlien to me, and a mockery, are the present-day men, to whom of late my\nheart impelled me; and exiled am I from fatherlands and motherlands.\n\nThus do I love only my _children's land,_ the undiscovered in the\nremotest sea: for it do I bid my sails search and search.\n\nUnto my children will I make amends for being the child of my fathers:\nand unto all the future--for _this_ present-day! 145\n\nWhere is innocence? Where there is will to procreation. And he who\nseeketh to create beyond himself, hath for me the purest will.\n\nWhere is beauty? Where I _must will_ with my whole Will; where I will\nlove and perish, that an image may not remain merely an image.\n\nLoving and perishing: these have rhymed from eternity. Will to love:\nthat is to be ready also for death. 147\n\nDare only to believe in yourselves--in yourselves and in your inward\nparts! He who doth not believe in himself always lieth. 147\n\nAll Gods are poets-symbolisations, poet-sophistications! 153\n\n\"Freedom\" ye all roar most eagerly: but I have unlearned the belief in\n\"great events,\" when there is much roaring and smoke about them.\n\nAnd believe me, friend Hollaballoo! The greatest events--are not our\nnoisiest, but our stillest hours.\n\nNot around the inventors of new noise, but around the inventors of new\nvalues, doth the world revolve: _inaudibly_ it revolveth. 158\n\nTo redeem what is past, and to transform every \"It was\" into \"Thus\nwould have it!\"--that only do I call redemption! 168\n\n_The spirit of revenge:_ my friends, that hath hitherto been man's best\ncontemplation; and where there was suffering, it was claimed there was\nalways penalty.\n\n\"Penalty,\" so calleth itself revenge. With a lying word it feigneth a\ngood conscience. 169\n\nThis is my first manly prudence, that I allow myself to be deceived,\nso as not to be on my guard against deceivers. 172\n\nHe who would not languish amongst men, must learn to drink out of all\nglasses; and he who would keep clean amongst men, must know how to wash\nhimself even with dirty water. 172\n\nVerily, there is still a future even for evil! And the warmest south is\nstill undiscovered by man.\n\nHow many things are now called the worst wickedness, which are only\ntwelve feet broad and three months long! Some day, however, will\ngreater dragons come into the world.\n\nFor that the Superman may not lack his dragon, the superdragon that\nis worthy of him, there must still much warm sun glow on moist virgin\nforests!\n\nOut of your wild cats must tigers have evolved, and out of your\npoison-toads, crocodiles: for the good hunter shall have a good hunt!\n\nAnd verily, ye good and just! In you there is much to be laughed at,\nand especially your fear of what hath hitherto been called \"the devil\"!\n\nSo alien are ye in your souls to what is great, that to you the\nSuperman would be _frightful_ in his goodness!\n\nAnd ye wise and knowing ones, ye would flee from the solar-glow of the\nwisdom in which the Superman joyfully batheth his nakedness!\n\nYe highest men who have come within my ken! this is my doubt of you,\nand my secret laughter: I suspect ye would call my Superman--a devil!\n\nAh, I became tired of those highest and best ones: from their \"height\"\ndid I long to be up, out, and away to the Superman!\n\nA horror came over me when I saw those best ones naked: then there grew\nfor me the pinions to soar away into distant futures.\n\nInto more distant futures, into more southern souths than ever artist\ndreamed of: thither, where Gods are ashamed of all clothes!\n\nBut disguised do I want to see _you,_ ye neighbours and fellowmen, and\nwell-attired and vain and estimable, as \"the good and just\";--\n\nAnd disguised will I myself sit amongst you--that I may _mistake_ you\nand myself: for that is my last manly prudence. 174-175\n\nHe who would become a child must surmount even his youth. 178\n\nThou goest the way to thy greatness: here shall no one steal after\nthee! Thy foot itself hath effaced the path behind thee, and over it\nstandeth written: Impossibility. 184\n\nFrom the gateway, This Moment, there runneth a long eternal lane\n_backwards:_ behind us lieth an eternity.\n\nMust not whatever _can_ run its course of all things, have already run\nalong that lane? Must not whatever _can_ happen of all things have\nalready happened, resulted, and gone by?\n\nAnd if everything have already existed, what thinkest thou, dwarf, of\nThis Moment? Must not this gateway also--have already existed?\n\nAnd are not all things closely bound together in such wise that This\nMoment draweth all coming things after it? _Consequently_--itself also?\n\nFor whatever _can_ run its course of all things, also in this long lane\n_outward--must_ it once more run!--\n\nAnd this slow spider which creepeth in the moonlight, and this\nmoonlight itself, and thou and I in this gateway whispering together,\nwhispering of eternal things--must we not all have already existed? 186\n\nAnd must we not return and run in that other lane out before us, that\nlong weird lane--must we not eternally return? 190-191\n\nAll things are baptised at the font of eternity, and beyond good and\nevil; good and evil themselves, however, are but fugitive shadows and\ndamp afflictions and passing clouds.\n\nVerily, it is a blessing and not a blasphemy when I teach that \"above\nall things there standeth, the heaven of chance, the heaven of\ninnocence, the heaven of hazard, the heaven of wantonness.\"\n\n\"Of Hazard\"--that is the oldest nobility in the world; that gave I back\nto all things; I emancipated them from bondage under purpose.\n\nThis freedom and celestial serenity did I put like an azure bell above\nall things, when I taught that over them and through them, no \"eternal\nwill\"--willeth.\n\nThis wantonness and folly did I put in place of that will, when I\ntaught that \"In everything there is one thing impossible--rationality!\"\n201\n\nI pass through this people and keep mine eyes open: they do not forgive\nme for not envying their virtues.\n\nThey bite at me, because I say unto them that for small people, small\nvirtues are necessary--and because it is hard for me to understand that\nsmall people are _necessary!_ 203\n\nOnly he who is man enough, will--_save the woman_ in woman. 205\n\nSo much kindness, so much weakness do I see. So much justice and pity,\nso much weakness.\n\nRound, fair, and considerate are they to one another, as grains of sand\nare round, fair, and considerate to grains of sand.\n\nModestly to embrace a small happiness--that do they call \"submission\"!\nand at the same time they peer modestly after a new small happiness.\n\nIn their hearts they want simply one thing most of all: that no one\nhurt them. Thus do they anticipate every one's wishes and do well unto\nevery one.\n\nThat, however, is _cowardice,_ though it be called \"virtue.\"\n\nAnd when they chance to speak harshly, those small people, then do _I_\nhear therein only their hoarseness--every draught of air maketh them\nhoarse.\n\nShrewd indeed are they, their virtues have shrewd fingers. But they\nlack fists: their fingers do not know how to creep behind fists.\n\nVirtue for them is what maketh modest and tame: therewith have they\nmade the wolf a dog, and man himself man's best domestic animal.\n\n\"We set our chair in the _midst_\"--so saith their smirking unto\nme--\"and as far from dying gladiators as from satisfied swine.\"\n\nThat, however, is--_mediocrity,_ though it be called moderation. 206\n\nThose teachers of submission! Wherever there is aught puny, or\nsickly, or scabby, there do they creep like lice; and only my disgust\npreventeth me from cracking them. 207\n\nToo tender, too yielding: so is your soil! But for a tree to become\n_great,_ it seeketh to twine hard roots around hard rocks! 208\n\nDo ever what ye will--but first be such as _can will._ 208\n\nLove ever your neighbour as yourselves--but first be such as _love\nthemselves._ 208\n\nOut of love alone shall my contempt and my warning bird take wing; but\nnot out of the swamp! 216\n\nIn indulging and pitying lay ever my greatest danger; and all human\nhubbub wisheth to be indulged and tolerated. 226\n\nHe who liveth amongst the good--pity teacheth him to lie. Pity maketh\nstifling air for all free souls. For the stupidity of the good is\nunfathomable. 227\n\nVoluptuousness: to free hearts, a thing innocent and free, the\ngarden-happiness of the earth, all the future's thanks overflow to the\npresent.\n\nVoluptuousness: only to the withered a sweet poison; to the\nlion-willed, however, the great cordial, and the reverently saved wine\nof wines.\n\nVoluptuousness: the great symbolic happiness of a higher happiness and\nhighest hope. For to many is marriage promised, and more than marriage.\n\nTo many that are more unknown to each other than man and woman:--and\nwho hath fully understood _have unknown_ to each other are man and\nwoman!\n\nVoluptuousness:--but I will have hedges around my thoughts, and even\naround my words, lest swine and libertine should break into my gardens!\n230\n\nPassion for power: the earthquake which breaketh and upbreaketh all\nthat is rotten and hollow; the rolling, rumbling, punitive demolisher\nof whited sepulchres; the flashing interrogative-sign beside premature\nanswers.\n\nPassion for power: before whose glance man creepeth and croucheth and\ndrudgeth, and becometh lower than the serpent and the swine:--until at\nlast great contempt crieth out of him,--\n\nPassion for power: the terrible teacher of great contempt, which\npreacheth to their face to cities and empires: \"Away with thee!\"--until\na voice crieth out of themselves: \"Away with _me!_\"\n\nPassion for power: which; however, mounteth alluringly even to the pure\nand lonesome, and up to self-satisfied elevations, glowing like a love\nthat painteth purple felicities alluringly on earthly heavens.\n\nPassion for power: but who would call it _passion,_ when the height\nlongeth to stoop for power! Verily, nothing sick or diseased is there\nin such longing and descending!\n\nThat the lonesome height may not for ever remain lonesome and\nself-sufficing: that the mountains may come to the valleys and the\nwinds of the heights to the plains:\n\nOh, who could find the right prenomen and honouring name for such\nlonging! \"Bestowing virtue\"--thus did Zarathustra once name the\nunnamable.\n\nAnd then it happened also,--and verily, it happened for the first\ntime!--that his word blessed _selfishness,_ the wholesome, healthy\nselfishness, that springeth from the powerful soul:--\n\nFrom the powerful soul, to which the high body appertaineth, the\nhandsome, triumphing, refreshing body, around which everything becometh\na mirror:\n\nThe pliant, persuasive body, the dancer, whose symbol and epitome is\nthe self-enjoying soul. Of such bodies and souls the self-enjoyment\ncalleth itself \"virtue.\" 232\n\nHe who wisheth to become light, and be a bird, must love himself:--thus\ndo I teach.\n\nNot, to be sure, with the love of the sick and infected, for with them\nstinketh even self-love!\n\nOne must learn to love oneself--thus do I teach--with a wholesome and\nhealthy love: that one may endure to be with oneself, and not go roving\nabout.\n\nSuch roving about christeneth itself \"brotherly love\"; with these words\nhath there hitherto been the best lying and dissembling, and especially\nby those who have been burdensome to every one.\n\nAnd verily, it is no commandment for to-day and to-morrow to _learn_ to\nlove oneself. Rather is it of all arts the finest, subtlest, last and\npatientest. 235\n\n_No one yet knoweth_ what is good and bad:--unless it be the creating\none!\n\nIt is he however createth man's goal, and giveth to the earth its\nmeaning and its future: he only _effecteth_ it _that_ aught is good and\nbad. 240\n\nMan is a bridge and not a goal. 241\n\n_Be not considerate of thy neighbour!_ Man is something that must be\nsurpassed. 243\n\nHe who cannot command himself shall obey. And many a one _can_ command\nhimself, but still sorely lacketh self-obedience! 243\n\nHe who is of the populace wisheth to live gratuitously; we others,\nhowever, to whom life hath given itself--we are ever considering\n_what_ we can best give _in return!_ 243\n\nOne should not wish to enjoy where one doth not contribute to the\nenjoyment. And one should not _wish_ to enjoy! 243\n\n\"Thou shalt not rob! Thou shalt not slay!\"--such precepts were once\ncalled holy; before them did one bow the knee and the head, and took\noff one's shoes.\n\nBut I ask you: Where have there ever been better robbers and slayers in\nthe world than such holy precepts?\n\nIs there not even in all life--robbing and slaying? And for such\nprecepts to be called holy, was not _truth_ itself thereby--slain? 246\n\nLet it not be your honour henceforth whence ye come, but whither ye go!\nYour Will and your feet which seek to surpass you--let these be your\nnew honour! 248\n\nThe best shall rule, the best also _willeth_ to rule! And where the\nteaching is different, there--the best _is lacking._ 257\n\nThus would I have man and woman: fit for war, the one, fit for\nmaternity, the other; both, however, fit for dancing with head and legs.\n\nAnd lost be the day to us in which a measure hath not been danced. And\nfalse be every truth which hath not had laughter along with it! 257\n\nThe stupidity of the good is unfathomably wise.\n\nThe good _must_ crucify him who deviseth his own virtue! That _is_ the\ntruth!\n\nThe second one, however, who discovered their country--the country,\nheart and soil of the good and just,--it was he who asked: \"Whom do\nthey hate most?\"\n\nThe _creator,_ hate they most, him who breaketh the tables and old\nvalues, the breaker,--him they call the law-breaker.\n\nFor the good--they _cannot_ create; they are always the beginning of\nthe end:--\n\nThey crucify him who writeth new values on new tables, they sacrifice\n_unto themselves_ the future--they crucify the whole human future! 260\n\nThis new table, O my brethren, put I up over you: _Become hard!_ 262\n\nEverything goeth, everything returneth; eternally rolleth the wheel\nof existence. Everything dieth, everything blossometh forth again;\neternally runneth on the year of existence.\n\nEverything breaketh, everything is integrated anew; eternally buildeth\nitself the same house of existence. All things separate, all things\nagain greet one another; eternally true to itself remaineth the ring of\nexistence.\n\nEvery moment beginneth existence, around every \"Here\" rolleth the ball\n\"There.\" The middle is everywhere. 266\n\nFor man his baddest is necessary for his best.\n\nThat all that is baddest is the best _power,_ and the hardest stone for\nthe highest creator; and that man must become better _and_ badder:--267\n\nThe plexus of causes returneth in which I am intertwined,--it will\nagain create me! I myself pertain to the causes of the eternal return.\n\nI come again with this sun, with this earth, with this eagle, with this\nserpent--_not_ to a new life, or a better life, or a similar life:\n\nI come again eternally to this identical and selfsame life, in its\ngreatest and its smallest, to teach again the eternal return of all\nthings,--\n\nTo speak again the word of the great noontide of earth and man, to\nannounce again to man the Superman. 270-271\n\n\"Ye higher men,\"--so blinketh the populace--\"there are no higher men,\nwe are all equal; man is man, before God--we are all equal!\"\n\nBefore God!--Now, however, this God hath died. Before the populace,\nhowever, we will not be equal. Ye higher men, away from the\nmarket-place! 351\n\nHave a good distrust to-day, ye higher men, ye enheartened ones! Ye\nopen-hearted ones! And keep your reasons secret! For this to-day is\nthat of the populace.\n\nWhat the populace once learned to believe without reasons, who\ncould--refute it to them by means of reasons?\n\nAnd on the market-place one convinceth with gestures. But reasons make\nthe populace distrustful.\n\nAnd when truth hath once triumphed there, then ask yourselves with good\ndistrust: \"What strong error hath fought for it?\" 355\n\nUnlearn, I pray you, this \"for,\" ye creating ones: your very virtue\nwisheth you to have naught to do with \"for\" and \"on account of\" and\n\"because.\" Against these false little words shall ye stop your ears.\n\n\"For one's neighbour,\" is the virtue only of the petty people: there it\nis said \"like and like\" and \"hand washeth hand\":--they have neither the\nright nor the power for _your_ self-seeking! 356-357\n\nWhat hath hitherto been the greatest sin here on earth? Was it not the\nword of him who said: \"Woe unto them that laugh now!\"\n\nDid he himself find no cause for laughter on the earth? Then he sought\nbadly. A child even findeth cause for it. 359-360\n\n\n\n\nVI\n\n\n\"The Eternal Recurrence\"\n\n\nHe following excerpts from Nietzsche's notes relating to eternal\nrecurrence are set down here merely as supplementary passages to \"Thus\nSpake Zarathustra,\" in which book this doctrine of the eternally\nrecurring irrationality of all things first made its appearance.\nNietzsche's notations on this subject were undoubtedly written in the\nlatter part of 1881, when the idea of Zarathustra first came to him.\nThey were not published, however, until years later, and now form a\nsection of Volume XVI of Nietzsche's complete works in English, along\nwith \"The Twilight of the Idols,\" \"The Antichrist\" and some explanatory\nnotes on \"Thus Spake Zarathustra.\" This is the only material in\nNietzsche's writings which I have not put in chronological order,\nand my reason for placing these extracts here, and not between \"The\nDawn of Day\" and \"The Joyful Wisdom,\" is due to the fact that after\nconceiving this doctrine and making notes pertaining to it, Nietzsche\nput the idea aside and wrote \"The Joyful Wisdom\" in which this doctrine\nwas not embodied. Not until \"Thus Spake Zarathustra\" appeared did he\nmake use of this principle of recurrence, and inasmuch as this was the\nfirst published statement of it, I have placed that book first and have\nfollowed it with these explanatory notes.\n\nAnother section of Nietzsche's works also deals with eternal\nrecurrence, namely: the last part of the second volume of \"The Will to\nPower.\" But here too we find but fragmentary jottings which contain\nno material not found in the present quotations. It is true that\nNietzsche intended to elaborate these notes, but even had he done so I\ndoubt if this doctrine would have assumed a different aspect from the\none it at present possesses, or would have become more closely allied\nwith the main structure of his thought; for, even though it is not\nfully elucidated in its present form, it at least is complete in its\nconclusions.\n\nIn my introduction to the quotations from \"Thus Spake Zarathustra\"\nin the preceding chapter will be found a statement relating to this\ndoctrine, in which I have endeavoured to point out just what influence\nit had on Nietzsche's philosophy, and to offer an explanation for its\nappearance in his thought.\n\nA reading of the following notes is not at all necessary for an\nunderstanding of the Nietzschean ethic, and I have placed these\npassages here solely for the student to whom every phase of Nietzsche's\nphilosophy is of interest.\n\n\nEXCERPTS FROM \"THE ETERNAL RECURRENCE\"\n\nThe extent of universal energy is limited; it is not \"infinite\": we\nshould beware of such excesses in our concepts! Consequently the number\nof states, changes, combinations, and evolutions of this energy,\nalthough it may be enormous and practically incalculable, is at any\nrate definite and not unlimited. The time, however, in which this\nuniversal energy works its changes is infinite--that is to say, energy\nremains eternally the same and is eternally active:--at this moment an\ninfinity has already elapsed, that is to say, every possible evolution\nmust already have taken place. Consequently the present process of\nevolution must be a repetition, as was also the one before it, as will\nalso be the one which will follow. And so on forwards and backwards!\nInasmuch as the entire state of all forces continually returns,\neverything has existed an infinite number of times. 237\n\nEnergy remains constant and does not require to be infinite. It is\neternally active but it is no longer able eternally to create new\nforms, it must repeat itself: that is my conclusion. 238\n\nThe energy of the universe can only have a given number of possible\nqualities. 238\n\nThe assumption that the universe is an organism contradicts the very\nessence of the organic. 239\n\nWe are forced to conclude: (1) either that the universe began\nits activity at a given moment of time and will end in a similar\nfashion,--but the beginning of activity is absurd; if a state of\nequilibrium had been reached it: would have persisted to all eternity;\n(2) or there is no such thing as an endless number of them which\ncontinually recurs: activity is eternal, the number of the products and\nstates of energy is limited. 239\n\nThe last physical state of energy which we can imagine must necessarily\nbe the first also. The absorption of energy in latent energy must be\nthe cause of the production of the most vital energy. For a highly\npositive state must follow a negative state. Space like matter is a\nsubjective form, time is not. The notion of space first arose from the\nassumption that space could be empty. But there is no such thing as\nempty space. Everything is energy. 240\n\nAnything like a static state of energy in general is impossible. If\nstability were possible it would already have been reached. 241\n\nPhysics supposes that energy may be divided up: but every one of its\npossibilities must first be adjusted to reality. There can therefore\nbe no question of dividing energy into equal parts; in every one of\nits states it manifests a certain quality, and qualities cannot be\nsubdivided: hence a state of equilibrium in energy is impossible. 241\n\nIf equilibrium were possible it would already have been reached.--And\nif this momentary state has already existed then that which bore\nit and the previous one also would likewise have existed and so on\nbackwards,--and from this it follows that it has already existed not\nonly twice but three times,--just as it will exist again not only twice\nbut three times,--in fact an infinite number of times backwards and\nforwards. That is to say, the whole process of Becoming consists of a\nrepetition of a definite number of precisely similar states. 242\n\nImaginic matter, even though in most cases it may once have\nbeen organic, can have stored up no experience as it is always\nwithout a past! If the reverse were the case a repetition would be\nimpossible--for then matter would for ever be producing new qualities\nwith new pasts. 247\n\nLet us guard against believing that the universe has a tendency to\nattain to certain forms, or that it aims at becoming more beautiful,\nmore perfect, more complicated! All that is anthropomorphism! 248\n\nOur whole world consists of the ashes of an incalculable number of\nliving creatures: and even if living matter is ever so little compared\nwith the whole, everything has already been transformed into life once\nbefore and thus the process goes on. If we grant eternal time we must\nassume the eternal change of matter. 249\n\nThe world of energy suffers no diminution: otherwise with eternal\ntime it would have grown weak and finally have perished altogether.\nThe world of energy suffers no stationary state, otherwise this would\nalready have been reached, and the clock of the universe would be at\na standstill. The world of energy does not therefore reach a state of\nequilibrium; for no instant in its career has it had rest; its energy\nand its movement have been the same for all time. Whatever state this\nworld could have reached must ere now have been attained, and not only\nonce but an incalculable number of times. 249\n\nMy doctrine is: Live so that thou mayest desire to live again,--that\nis thy duty,--for in any case thou wilt live again! He unto whom\nstriving is the greatest happiness, let him strive; he unto whom peace\nis the greatest happiness, let him rest; he unto whom subordination,\nfollowing, obedience, is the greatest happiness, let him obey. 251\n\nThe mightiest of all thoughts absorbs a good deal, of energy which\nformerly stood at the disposal of other aspirations, and in this way\nit exercises a modifying influence; it creates new laws of motion in\nenergy, though no new energy. 252\n\nYe fancy that ye will have a long rest ere your second birth takes\nplace,--but do not deceive yourselves! 'Twixt your last moment of\nconsciousness and the first ray of the dawn of your new life no time\nwill elapse,--as a flash of lightning will the space go by, even though\nliving creatures think it is millions of years.... 253\n\nAre ye now prepared? Ye must have experienced every form of\nscepticism and ye must have wallowed with voluptuousness in ice-cold\nbaths,--otherwise ye have no right to this thought; I wish to protect\nmyself against those who gush over anything! I would defend my\ndoctrine in advance. It must be the religion of the freest, most\ncheerful and most sublime souls, a delightful pastureland somewhere\nbetween golden ice and a pure heaven! 256\n\n\n\n\nVII\n\n\n\"Beyond Good and Evil\"\n\n\nDouble purpose animated Nietzsche in his writing of \"Beyond Good and\nEvil\" _(\"Jenseits von Gut und B\u00f6se\")._ It is at once an explanation\nand an elucidation of \"Thus Spake Zarathustra,\" and a preparatory book\nfor his greatest and most important work, \"The Will to Power.\" In it\nNietzsche attempts to define the relative terms of \"good\" and \"evil,\"\nand to draw a line of distinction between immorality and unmorality.\nHe saw the inconsistencies evolved in the attempt to harmonise an\nancient moral code with the needs of modern life, and recognised the\ncompromises which were constantly being made between moral theory and\nsocial practice. His object was to establish a relationship between\nmorality and necessity, and to formulate a workable basis for human\nconduct. Consequently \"Beyond Good and Evil\" is one of his most\nimportant contributions to a new system of ethics, and touches on many\nof the deepest principles of his philosophy. As it stands, it is by\nno means a complete expression of Nietzsche's doctrines, but it is\nsufficiently profound and suggestive to be of valuable service in an\nunderstanding of his later works. The book was begun in the summer of\n1885 and finished the following winter. Again there was difficulty with\npublishers, and finally the book was issued at the author's own expense\nin the autumn of 1886.\n\nNietzsche opens \"Beyond Good and Evil\" with a long chapter headed\n\"Prejudices of Philosophers,\" in which he outlines the course to be\ntaken by his dialectic. The exposition is accomplished by two methods:\nfirst, by an analysis and a refutation of the systems of thinking\nmade use of by antecedent doctrinaires, and secondly, by defining the\nhypotheses on which his own philosophy is built. This chapter is a\nmost important one, setting forth, as it does, the _rationale_ of his\ndoctrine of the will to power. It has been impossible to make extracts\nof any unified sequence from this chapter because of its intricate and\ncompact reasoning, and the student would do well to read it in its\nentirety. It establishes Nietzsche's philosophic position and presents\na closely knit explanation of the course pursued in the following\nchapters. The relativity of all truth--the hypothesis so often assumed\nin his previous work--Nietzsche here defends by analogy and argument.\nUsing other leading forms of philosophy as a ground for exploration, he\nquestions the absolutism of truth and shows wherein lies the difficulty\nof a final definition. Here we become conscious of that plasticity\nof mind which was the dominating quality of his thinking. It is not,\nhowever, that form of plasticity which on inspection resolves itself\ninto amorphic and unstable reasoning, but a logical, almost scientific,\nmethod of valuing. The mercurial habits of the metaphysicians who deny\nabsolutism are nowhere discernible in Nietzsche's thought. His mind is\ndefinite without being static. The basis of his argumentation is what\none might call floating. It rises and falls with the human tide of\ncausation; yet the structure built upon it remains at all times upright\nand unchanged.\n\nNietzsche points out that the numerous \"logical\" conclusions of\nphilosophers have been for the most part _a priori_ propositions, the\nresults of prejudices or desires, and that the syllogistic structures\nreared to them came as explanations and defences, rather than as\ndialectic preambles. In their adopting a hypothetical truth as a\npremise, he sees only the advocacy for a point of view, arguing that\nin order to erect a system of logic the initial thesis must be proved.\nTherefore he questions the fundamental worth of certainty as opposed\nto uncertainty, and of truth as opposed to falsity, thus striking at\nthe very foundations reared by those philosophers who have assumed,\nwithout substantiation, that only certainty and truth are valuable.\nNietzsche calls these absolutists astute defenders of prejudices, and\ncharacterises the verbalistic prestidigitation of Kant as a highly\ndeveloped form of prejudice-defending. Spinoza, with his mathematical\nsystem of reasoning, likewise falls in the category of those thinkers\nwho first assume conclusions and then prepare explanations for them\nby a process of inverted reasoning. Nietzsche proceeds to pose the\ninstinctive functions against conscious thinking. He asserts that the\nchannels taken by thought are defined by the thinker's nature, and that\neven logic is influenced by physiological considerations. The whole\nfabric of philosophic thought is held up to the light of immediate\nnecessity.\n\nGoing further, he inquires into the \"impulse to knowledge.\" He finds\nthat a specific purpose has always been the actuating force of any\nphilosophy, and that consequently philosophy, even in its most abstract\nform, has had a residuum of autobiography in it. In fine, that\nphilosophy, far from being a search, has been an aim toward a definite\npreconceived result. The moral or ethical impulse, being always\nimperious, has not infrequently resulted in philosophising, and in all\nsuch cases knowledge has been used as an instrument. Thus knowledge\nwhich led to a philosophical conclusion has been the outgrowth of\na personal instinct. In those cases where an impersonal \"impulse\nto knowledge\" may have existed, it has led, not into philosophical\nchannels, but into practical and often commercial activities. The\nscholar has ever remained personal in his quest for philosophical\nformulas. In Kant's \"Table of Categories,\" wherein that philosopher\nclaimed to have found the faculty of synthetic judgment _a priori,_\nNietzsche finds only a circle of reasoning which begins and ends in\npersonal instinct. And in Kant's discovery of a new moral faculty,\nNietzsche sees only sophistical invention, and accounts for its\nwidespread acceptance by the moral state of the Germans at that period.\nIgnoring the _possibility_ of synthetic judgments _a priori,_ Nietzsche\nadvances the query as to their _necessity,_ and lays stress on the\nimpracticability of truth without _belief._ The inherent falsity or\ntruth of a proposition has no bearing on philosophical doctrines so\nlong as a contrary belief is present, a belief such as we exert toward\nthe illusions of the world of reality when we make practical use of\nthat world's perspective.\n\nThe schemes of personal philosophy, such, for instance, as we find in\nSchopenhauer, are dealt with by Nietzsche in a single paragraph: \"When\nI analyse the process that is expressed in the sentence, 'I think,' I\nfind a whole series of daring assertions, the argumentative proof of\nwhich would be difficult, perhaps impossible: for instance, that it is\nI who think, that there must necessarily be something that thinks,\nthat thinking is an activity and operation on the part of a being who\nis thought of as a cause, that there is an 'ego,' and finally, that\nit is already determined what is to be designated by thinking--that I\n_know_ what thinking is. For if I had not already decided within myself\nwhat it is, by what standard could I determine whether that which is\njust happening is not perhaps 'willing' or 'feeling'? In short, the\nassertion 'I think,' assumes that I _compare_ my state at the present\nmoment with other states of myself which I know, in order to determine\nwhat it is: on account of this retrospective connection with further\n'knowledge,' it has at any rate no immediate certainty for me.\" Thus\nthe smug materialistic philosopher finds himself necessitated to fall\nback on purely metaphysical explanations for answers to the questions\narising out of his definition of truth.\n\nLocke falls under a critical survey in this chapter. In answer to\nthis thinker's theory regarding the origin of ideas, Nietzsche names\nthe great cycles of philosophical systems and calls attention to the\nsimilarity of processes in such cycles. Furthermore, he shows that the\nfoundations of all previous philosophies are discoverable in the new\nstyles of contemporaneous thought. And in those national schools of\nphilosophy conceived in languages which stem from the same origin, he\nfinds an undeniable resemblance. All of which leads to a conclusion\nincompatible with Locke's theory. Nietzsche attacks the conclusions\nof the physicists, denying them any place in philosophy because\ntheir research consists solely in interpretations of natural laws in\naccordance with their own prejudices and beliefs. The theories which\nmight be deduced from natural phenomena are not discoverable in their\ndoctrines; their activities have consisted in twisting natural events\nto suit preconceived valuations.\n\nFinally Nietzsche inquires into the habits and practices of\npsychologists. Not even among these workers does he find a basis for\nphilosophy. Psychology, he argues, has been guided, not by a detached\nand lofty desire to ascertain truth in its relation to the human\nmind, but by prejudices and fears grounded in moral considerations.\nHe finds a constant desire on the part of experimenters to account\nfor \"good\" impulses as distinguished from \"bad\" ones. And in this\ndesire lies the superimposing of moral prejudices on a science which,\nmore than all others, deals with problems farthest removed from\nmoral influences. These prejudices in psychology, as well as in all\nbranches of philosophy, are the obstacles which stand in the way of any\ndeep penetration into the motives beneath human conduct. Nietzsche,\nin his analyses and criticisms, is not solely destructive: he is\nsubterraneously constructing his own philosophical system founded\non the will to power. This phrase is used many times in the careful\nresearch of the first chapter. As the book proceeds, this doctrine\ndevelops.\n\nNietzsche's best definition of what he calls the \"free spirit,\" namely:\nthe thinking man, the intellectual aristocrat, the philosopher and\nruler, is contained in the twenty-six pages of the second chapter of\n\"Beyond Good and Evil.\" In a series of paragraphs--longer than is\nNietzsche's wont--the leading characteristics of this superior man\nare described. The \"free spirit,\" however, must not be confused with\nthe superman. The former is the \"bridge\" which the present-day man\nmust cross in the process of surpassing himself. In the delineation\nand analysis of him, as presented to us here, we can glimpse his most\nsalient mental features. Heretofore, as in \"Thus Spake Zarathustra,\"\nhe has been but partially and provisionally defined. Now his instincts\nand desires, his habits and activities are outlined. Furthermore, we\nare given an explanation of his relation to the inferior man and to\nthe organisms of his environment. The chapter is an important one,\nfor at many points it is a subtle elucidation of many of Nietzsche's\ndominant philosophic principles. By inference, the differences of class\ndistinction are strictly drawn. The slave-morality _(sklavmoral)_ and\nthe master-morality (_herrenmoral_), though as yet undefined, are\nbalanced against each other; and the deportmental standards of the\nmasters and slaves are defined by way of differentiating between these\ntwo opposing human factions. While the serving class is constantly\nmanifesting its need of a guiding dogma, the ruling class is constantly\napproaching the state wherein the arbitrary moral mandates are denied.\nNietzsche sees a new order of philosophers appearing--men who will\nstand beyond good and evil, who will be not only free spirits, \"but\nsomething more, higher, greater, and fundamentally different.\" In\ndescribing these men of the future, of which the present free men are\nthe heralds and forerunners, Nietzsche establishes an individualistic\nideal which he develops fully in later chapters.\n\nA keen and far-reaching analysis of the various aspects assumed by\nreligious faith constitutes a third section of \"Beyond Good and Evil.\"\nThough touching upon various influences of Christianity, this section\nis more general in its religious scope than even \"The Antichrist,\"\nmany indications of which are to be found here. This chapter has to\ndo with the numerous inner experiences of man, which are directly\nor indirectly attributable to religious doctrines. The origin of the\ninstinct for faith itself is sought, and the results of this faith are\nbalanced against the needs of the individuals and of the race. The\nrelation between religious ecstasy and sensuality; the attempt on the\npart of religious practitioners to arrive at a negation of the will;\nthe transition from religious gratitude to fear; the psychology at the\nbottom of saint-worship;--to problems such as these Nietzsche devotes\nhis energies in his inquiry of the religious mood. The geographical\nconsiderations which enter into the character and intensity of\nreligious faith form an important basis for study; and the differences\nbetween Comte's sociology and Sainte-Beuve's anti-Jesuit utterances are\nexplained from a standpoint of national influences. Nietzsche examines\nthe many phases of atheism and the principal anti-Christian tendencies\nof all philosophy since Descartes. There is an illuminating exposition\nof the important stages in religious cruelty and of the motives\nunderlying the various forms of religious sacrifices. Again we run upon\nthe doctrine of eternal recurrence, but here, as elsewhere, it may be\nregarded, not as a basic element in Nietzsche's philosophical scheme,\nbut as a by-product of his thought. Nietzsche emphasises the necessity\nof idleness in all religious lives, and shows how the adherence to the\nreligious mood works against the activities, both of mind and of body,\nwhich make for the highest efficiency.\n\nA very important phase of Nietzsche's teaching is contained in this\ncriticism of the religious life. The detractors of the Nietzschean\ndoctrine, almost without exception, base their judgments on the\nassumption that the universal acceptation of his theories would result\nin social chaos. As I have pointed out before, Nietzsche desired\nno such general adoption of his beliefs. In his bitterest diatribes\nagainst Christianity, his object was not to shake the faith of the\ngreat majority of mankind in their idols. He sought merely to free\nthe strong men from the restrictions of a religion which fitted the\nneeds of only the weaker members of society. He neither hoped nor\ndesired to wean the mass of humanity from Christianity or any similar\ndogmatic comfort. On the contrary, he denounced those superficial\natheists who endeavoured to weaken the foundations of religion. He\nsaw the positive necessity of such religions as a basis for his slave\nmorality, and in the present chapter he exhorts the rulers to preserve\nthe religious faith of the serving classes, and to use it as a means\nof government--as an instrument in the work of disciplining and\neducating. In paragraph 61 he says: \"The selecting and disciplining\ninfluence--destructive as well as creative and fashioning--which can\nbe exercised by means of religion is manifold and varied, according to\nthe sort of people placed under its spell and protection.\" Not only is\nthis an expression of the utilitarian value of religious formulas, but\na definite voicing of one of the main factors in his philosophy. His\nentire system of ethics is built on the complete disseverance of the\ndominating class and the serving class; and his doctrine of \"beyond\ngood and evil\" should be considered only as it pertains to the superior\nman. To apply it to all classes would be to reduce Nietzsche's whole\nsystem of ethics to impracticability, and therefore to an absurdity.\n\nPassing from a consideration of the religious mood, Nietzsche enters a\nbroader sphere of ethical research, and endeavours to trace the history\nand development of morals. He accuses the philosophers of having\navoided the real problem of morality, namely: the testing of the faith\nand motives which lie beneath moral beliefs. This is the task he sets\nfor himself, and in his chapter, \"The Natural History of Morals,\" he\nmakes an examination of moral origins--an examination which is extended\ninto an exhaustive treatise in \"The Genealogy of Morals.\" However, his\ndissection here is carried out on a broader and far more general scale\nthan in his previous books, such as \"Human, All-Too-Human\" and \"The\nDawn of Day.\" Heretofore he had confined himself to codes and systems,\nto _acts_ of morality and immorality, to judgments of conducts. In\n\"Beyond Good and Evil\" he treats of moral prejudices as forces working\nhand in hand with human progress. In addition, there is a definite\nattitude of constructive thinking here which is absent from his earlier\nwork. He outlines the course to be taken by the men of the future, and\npoints to the results which have accrued from the moralities of modern\nnations. He offers the will to power in place of the older \"will to\nbelief,\" and characterises the foundations of acceptance for all moral\ncodes as \"fictions\" and \"premature hypotheses.\" He defines the racial\nideals which have grown up out of moral influences, and, applying them\nto the needs of the present day, finds them inadequate and dangerous.\nThe conclusion to which his observations and analyses point is that,\nunless the rulers of the race take a stand beyond the outposts of good\nand evil and govern on a basis of expediency divorced from all moral\ninfluences, the individual is in constant danger of being lowered to\nthe level of the gregarious conscience.\n\nIn the chapter, \"We Scholars,\" Nietzsche continues his definition\nof the philosopher, whom he holds to be the highest type of man.\nBesides being a mere description of the intellectual traits of this\n\"free spirit,\" the chapter is also an exposition of the shortcomings\nof those modern men who pose as philosophers. In the path of these\nnew thinkers Nietzsche sees many difficulties both from within and\nfrom without, and points out methods whereby these obstacles may be\novercome. Also the man of science and the man of genius are analyzed\nand weighed as to their relative importance in the community. In\nfact, we have here Nietzsche's most concise and complete definition\nof the individuals upon whom rests the burden of progress. These\nvaluations of the intellectual leaders are important to the student,\nfor by one's understanding them, along with the reasons for such\nvaluations, a comprehension of the ensuing volumes is facilitated.\nNietzsche hereby establishes the qualities of those entitled to the\nmaster-morality code; and, by thus drawing the line of demarcation in\nhumanity, he defines at the same time that class whose constitutions\nand predispositions demand the slave-morality. In addition, he affixes,\naccording to his philosophical formula, a scale of values to such\nmental attributes as objectivity, power to will, scepticism, positivity\nand constraint.\n\nImportant material touching on many of the fundamental points of\nNietzsche's philosophy is embodied in the chapter entitled \"Our\nVirtues.\" The more general inquiries into conduct and the research\nalong the broader lines of ethics are supplanted by inquiries into\nspecific moral attributes. The current virtues are questioned, and\ntheir historical significance is determined. The value of such virtues\nis tested in their relation to different types of men. Sacrifice,\nsympathy, brotherly love, service, loyalty, altruism and similar ideals\nof conduct are examined, and the results of such virtues are shown\nto be incompatible with the demands of modern social intercourse.\nNietzsche poses against these virtues the sterner and more rigid\nforms of conduct, pointing out wherein they meet with the present\nrequirements of human progress. The chapter is a preparation for his\nestablishment of a new morality and also an explanation of the dual\nethical code which is one of the main pillars in his philosophical\nstructure. Before presenting his precept of a dual morality, Nietzsche\nendeavours to determine woman's place in the political and social\nscheme, and points out the necessity, not only of individual feminine\nfunctioning, but of the preservation of a distinct polarity in sexual\nrelationship.\n\nIn the final chapter many of Nietzsche's philosophical ideas take\ndefinite shape. The doctrine of slave-morality and master-morality,\nprepared for and partially defined in preceding chapters, is here\ndirectly set forth, and those virtues and attitudes which constitute\nthe \"nobility\" of the master class are specifically defined. Nietzsche\ndesignates the duty of his aristocracy, and segregates the human\nattributes according to the rank of individuals. The Dionysian ideal,\nwhich underlies all the books that follow \"Beyond Good and Evil,\"\nreceives its first direct exposition and application. The hardier\nhuman traits such as egotism, cruelty, arrogance, retaliation and\nappropriation are given ascendency over the softer virtues such\nas sympathy, charity, forgiveness, loyalty and humility, and are\npronounced necessary constituents in the moral code of a natural\naristocracy. At this point is begun the transvaluation of values which\nwas to have been completed in \"The Will to Power.\" The student should\nread carefully this chapter, for it is an introduction as well as an\nexplanation for what follows, and was written with that purpose in\nview.\n\n\nEXCERPTS FROM \"BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL\"\n\n_To recognise untruth as a condition of life:_ that is certainly to\nimpugn the traditional ideas of value in a dangerous manner, and a\nphilosophy which ventures to do so, has thereby alone placed itself\nbeyond good and evil. 9\n\nPsychologists should bethink themselves before putting down the\ninstinct of self-preservation as the cardinal instinct of an organic\nbeing. A living thing seeks above all to _discharge its strength_--life\nitself is _Will to Power;_ self-preservation is only one of the\nindirect and most frequent _results_ thereof. 20\n\nIt is the business of the very few to be independent; it is the\nprivilege of the strong. And whoever attempts it, even with the best\nright, but without being _obliged_ to do so, proves that he is probably\nnot only strong, but also daring beyond measure. 43\n\nThe virtues of the common man would perhaps mean vice and weakness in a\nphilosopher; it might be possible for a highly developed man, supposing\nhim to degenerate and go to ruin, to acquire qualities thereby alone,\nfor the sake of which he would have to be honoured as a saint in the\nlower world into which he had sunk. 44\n\nBooks for the general reader are always ill-smelling books, the odour\nof paltry people clings to them. Where the populace eat and drink, and\neven where they reverence, it is accustomed to stink. One should not go\ninto churches if one wishes to breathe pure air. 44\n\n\"Will\" can naturally only operate on \"will\"--and not on \"matter\"\n(not on \"nerves,\" for instance): in short, the hypothesis must be\nhazarded, whether will does not operate on will wherever \"effects\" are\nrecognised--and whether all mechanical action, inasmuch as a power\noperates therein, is not just the power of will, the effect of will.\nGranted, finally, that we succeed in explaining our entire instinctive\nlife as the development and ramification of one fundamental form of\nwill--namely, the Will to Power, as _my_ thesis puts it; granted that\nall organic functions could be traced back to this Will to Power, and\nthat the solution of the problem of generation and nutrition--it is one\nproblem--could also be found therein: one would thus have acquired the\nright to define _all_ active force unequivocally as _Will to Power._\nThe world seen from within, the world defined and designated according\nto its \"intelligible character\"--it would simply be \"Will to Power,\"\nand nothing else. 52\n\nHappiness and virtue are no arguments. It is willingly forgotten,\nhowever, even on the part of thoughtful minds, that to make unhappy\nand to make bad are just as little counter-arguments. A thing could be\n_true,_ although it were in the highest degree injurious and dangerous;\nindeed, the fundamental constitution of existence might be such that\none succumbed by a full knowledge of it--so that the strength of a mind\nmight be measured by the amount of \"truth\" it could endure--or to speak\nmore plainly, by the extent to which it _required_ truth attenuated,\nveiled, sweetened, damped, and falsified. 53-54\n\nEverything that is profound loves the mask; the profoundest things have\na hatred even of figure and likeness. Should not the _contrary_ only be\nthe right disguise for the shame of a God to go about in? 54-55\n\nOne must renounce the bad taste of wishing to agree with many people.\n\"Good\" is no longer good when one's neighbour takes it into his mouth.\nAnd how could there be a \"common good.\" The expression contradicts\nitself; that which can be common is always of small value. In the end\nthings must be as they are and have always been--the great things\nremain for the great, the abysses for the profound, the delicacies and\nthrills for the refined, and, to sum up shortly, everything rare for\nthe rare. 57-58\n\nIn every country of Europe, and the same in America, there is at\npresent ... a very narrow, prepossessed, enchained class of spirits....\nBriefly and regrettably, they belong to the _levellers,_ these wrongly\nnamed \"free spirits\"--as glib-tongued and scribe-fingered slaves of\nthe democratic taste and its \"modern ideas\"; all of them men without\nsolitude, without personal solitude, blunt honest fellows to whom\nneither courage nor honourable conduct ought to be denied; only, they\nare not free, and are ludicrously superficial, especially in their\ninnate partiality for seeing the cause of almost _all_ human misery\nand failure in the old forms in which society has hitherto existed--a\nnotion which happily inverts the truth entirely. 53-59\n\nWe believe that severity, violence, slavery, danger in the street and\nin the heart, secrecy, stoicism, tempter's art and revelry of every\nkind,--that everything wicked, terrible, tyrannical, predatory, and\nserpentine in man, serves as well for the elevation of the human\nspecies as its opposite.... 59\n\nThe Christian faith from the beginning, is sacrifice: the sacrifice of\nall freedom, all pride, all self-confidence of spirit; it is at the\nsame time subjection, self-derision, and self-mutilation. 65\n\nThe mightiest men have hitherto always bowed reverently before\nthe saint, as the enigma of self-subjugation and utter voluntary\nprivation.--Why did they thus bow? They divined in him--and as it were\nbehind the questionableness of his frail and wretched appearance--the\nsuperior force which wished to test itself by such a subjugation; the\nstrength and love of power, and knew how to honour it: they honoured\nsomething in themselves when they honoured the saint.... The mighty\nones of the world learned to have a new fear before him, they divined\na new power, a strange, still unconquered enemy:--it was the \"Will to\nPower\" which obliged them to halt before the saint. 70-71\n\nPerhaps the most solemn conceptions that have caused the most fighting\nand suffering, the conceptions \"God\" and \"sin,\" will one day seem to us\nof no more importance than a child's plaything or a child's pain seems\nto an old man.... 75\n\nTo love mankind _for God's sake_--this has so far been the noblest and\nremotest sentiment to which mankind has attained. 79\n\nFor those who are strong and independent, destined and trained\nto command, in whom the judgment and skill of a ruling race is\nincorporated, religion is an additional means for overcoming, betraying\nand surrendering to the former the conscience of the latter, their\ninmost heart, which would fain escape obedience. 80\n\nAsceticism and Puritanism are almost indispensable means of educating\nand ennobling a race which seeks to rise above its hereditary baseness\nand work itself upward to future supremacy. And finally, to ordinary\nmen, to the majority of the people, who exist for service and general\nutility, and are only so far entitled to exist, religion gives\ninvaluable contentedness with their lot and condition, peace of heart,\nennoblement of obedience, additional social happiness and sympathy,\nwith something of transfiguration and embellishment, something of\njustification of all the commonplaceness, all the meanness, all the\nsemi-animal poverty of their souls. 81\n\n\"Knowledge for its own sake\"--that is the last snare laid by morality:\nwe are thereby completely entangled in morals once more. 85\n\nHe who attains his ideal, precisely thereby surpasses it. 86\n\nSympathy for all--would be harshness and tyranny for _thee,_ my good\nneighbour! 88\n\nTo be ashamed of one's immorality is a step on the ladder at the end of\nwhich one is ashamed also of one's morality. 89\n\nA discerning one might easily regard himself at present as the\nanimalisation of God. 90\n\nNot their love of humanity, but the impotence of their love, prevents\nthe Christians of to-day--burning us. 91\n\nThere is no such thing as moral phenomena, but only a moral\ninterpretation of phenomena. 91\n\nThe criminal is often enough not equal to his deed: he extenuates and\nmaligns it. 91\n\nThe great epochs of our life are at the points when we gain courage to\nrebaptise our badness as the best in us. 92\n\nIt is a curious thing that God learned Greek when he wished to turn\nauthor--and that he did not learn it better. 93\n\nEven concubinage has been corrupted--by marriage. 93\n\nA nation is a detour of nature to arrive at six or seven great\nmen--Yes, and then to get round them. 94\n\nFrom the senses originate all trustworthiness, all good conscience, all\nevidence of truth. 95\n\nOur vanity would like what we do best to pass precisely for what is\nmost difficult to us.--Concerning the origin of many systems of morals.\n96\n\nWhen a woman has scholarly inclinations there is generally something\nwrong with her sexual nature. Barrenness itself conduces to a certain\nvirility of taste; man, indeed, if I may say so, is \"the barren\nanimal.\" 96\n\nThat which an age considers evil is usually an unseasonable echo of\nwhat was formerly considered good--the atavism of an old ideal. 97\n\nWhat is done out of love always takes place beyond good and evil. 98\n\nObjection, evasion, joyous distrust, and love of irony are signs of\nhealth; everything absolute belongs to pathology. 98\n\nThe Jews---a people \"born for slavery,\" as Tacitus and the whole\nancient world say of them; \"the chosen people among the nations,\" as\nthey themselves say and believe--the Jews performed the miracle of the\ninversion of valuations, by means of which life on earth obtained a\nnew and dangerous charm for a couple of millenniums. Their prophets\nfused into one the expressions \"rich,\" \"godless,\" \"wicked,\" \"violent,\"\n\"sensual,\" and for the first time coined the word \"world\" as a term of\nreproach. In this inversion of valuations (in which is also included\nthe use of the word \"poor\" as synonymous with \"saint\" and \"friend\") the\nsignificance of the Jewish people is to be found; it is with _them_\nthat the _slave-insurrection in morals_ commences. 117\n\nThe beast of prey and the man of prey (for instance, C\u00e6sar Borgia) are\nfundamentally misunderstood, \"nature\" is misunderstood, so long as one\nseeks a \"morbidness\" in the constitution of these healthiest of all\ntropical monsters and growths.... 118\n\nAll the systems of morals which address themselves to individuals\nwith a view to their \"happiness,\" as it is called--what else are they\nbut suggestions for behaviour adapted to the degree of _danger_ from\nthemselves in which the individuals live; recipes for their passions,\ntheir good and bad propensities in so far as such have the Will to\nPower and would like to play the master; small and great expediencies\nand elaborations, permeated with the musty odour of old family\nmedicines and old-wife wisdom; all of them grotesque and absurd in\ntheir form--because they address themselves to \"all,\" because they\ngeneralise where generalisation is not authorised; all of them speaking\nunconditionally, and taking themselves unconditionally; all of them\nflavoured not merely with one grain of salt, but rather endurable only,\nand sometimes even seductive, when they are over-spiced and begin to\nsmell dangerously, especially of \"the other world.\" 118-119\n\nIn view ... of the fact that obedience has been most practised and\nfostered among mankind hitherto, one may reasonably suppose that,\ngenerally speaking, the need thereof is now innate in every one, as a\nkind of _formal conscience._... 120\n\nThe history of the influence of Napoleon is almost the history of\nthe higher happiness to which the entire century has attained in its\nworthiest individuals and periods. 121\n\nAs long as the utility which determines moral estimates is only\ngregarious utility, as long as the preservation of the community is\nonly kept in view, and the immoral is sought precisely and exclusively\nin what seems dangerous to the maintenance of the community, there can\nbe no \"morality of love to one's neighbour.\" 123\n\n\"Love of our neighbour,\" is always a secondary matter, partly\nconventional and arbitrarily manifested in relation to our _fear of our\nneighbour._ 123\n\nEverything that elevates the individual above the herd, and is a\nsource of fear to the neighbour, is henceforth called _evil;_ the\ntolerant, unassuming, self-adapting, self-equalising disposition, the\n_mediocrity_ of desires, attains to moral distinction and honour. 125\n\nThe _democratic_ movement is the inheritance of the Christian movement.\n127\n\nWe, who regard the democratic movement, not only as a degenerating\nform of political organisation, but as equivalent to a degenerating,\na waning type of man, as involving his mediocrising and depreciation:\nwhere have _we_ to fix our hopes? In _new philosophers_--there is no\nother alternative: in minds strong and original enough to initiate\nopposite estimates of value, to transvalue and invert \"eternal\nvaluations\"; in forerunners, in men of the future, who in the present\nshall fix the constraints and fasten the knots which will compel\nmillenniums to take _new_ paths. To teach men the future of humanity\nas his _will,_ as depending on human will, and to make preparation\nfor vast hazardous enterprises and collective attempts in rearing and\neducating, in order thereby to put an end to the frightful rule of\nfolly and chance which has hitherto gone by the name of \"history\" (the\nfolly of the \"greatest number\" is only its last form)--for that purpose\na new type of philosophers and commanders will some time or other be\nneeded, at the very idea of which everything that has existed in the\nway of occult, terrible, and benevolent beings might look pale and\ndwarfed. 128-129\n\nThe _universal degeneracy of mankind_ to the level of the \"man of the\nfuture\"--as idealised by the socialistic fools and shallow-pates--this\ndegeneracy and dwarfing of man to an absolutely gregarious animal (or\nas they call it, to a man of \"free society\"), this brutalising of man\ninto a pigmy with equal rights and claims, is undoubtedly _possible!_\nHe who has thought out this possibility to its ultimate conclusion\nknows _another_ loathing unknown to the rest of mankind--and perhaps\nalso a new _mission!_ 130-131\n\nSupposing ... that in the picture of the philosophers of the future,\nsome trait suggests the question whether they must not perhaps be\nsceptics in the last-mentioned sense, something in them would only\nbe designated thereby--and _not_ they themselves. With equal right\nthey might call themselves critics; and assuredly they will be men of\nexperiments.... They will be _sterner_ (and perhaps not always towards\nthemselves only) ... they will not deal with the \"truth\" in order that\nit may \"please\" them, or \"elevate\" and \"inspire\" them--they will rather\nhave little faith in _\"truth\"_ bringing with it such revels for the\nfeelings. They will smile, those rigorous spirits, when any one says in\ntheir presence: \"that thought elevates me, why should it not be true?\"\nor; \"that artist enlarges me, why should he not be great?\" Perhaps they\nwill not only have a smile, but a genuine disgust for all that is thus\nrapturous, idealistic, feminine and hermaphroditic; and if any one\ncould look into their inmost heart, he would not easily find therein\nthe intention to reconcile \"Christian sentiments\" with \"antique taste,\"\nor even with \"modern parliamentarism\" (the kind of reconciliation\nnecessarily found even amongst philosophers in our very uncertain and\nconsequently very conciliatory century). Critical discipline, and every\nhabit that conduces to purity and rigour in intellectual matters,\nwill not only be demanded from themselves by these philosophers of\nthe future; they may even make a display thereof as their special\nadornment--nevertheless they will not want to be called critics on\nthat account. It will seem to them no small indignity to philosophy to\nhave it decreed, as is so welcome nowadays, that \"philosophy itself is\ncriticism and critical science--and nothing else whatever!\" 149-151\n\n_The real philosophers ... are commanders and law-givers;_ they say:\n\"Thus _shall_ it be.\" They determine first the Whither and the Why of\nmankind, and thereby set aside the previous labour of all philosophical\nworkers, and all subjugators of the past--they grasp at the future with\na creative hand, and whatever is and was, becomes for them thereby a\nmeans, an instrument, and a hammer. Their \"knowing\" is _creating,_\ntheir creating is a law-giving, their will to truth is--_Will to\nTower._... 52\n\nAt present ... when throughout Europe the herding animal alone\nattains to honours, and dispenses honours, when \"equality of right\"\ncan too readily be transformed into equality in wrong: I mean to say\ninto general war against everything rare, strange, and privileged,\nagainst the higher man, the higher soul, the higher duty, the higher\nresponsibility, the creative plenipotence and lordliness--at present\nit belongs to the conception of \"greatness\" to be noble, to wish to be\napart, to be capable of being different, to stand alone, to have to\nlive by personal initiative; and the philosopher will betray something\nof his own ideal when he asserts: \"He shall be the greatest who can\nbe the most solitary, the most concealed, the most divergent, the man\nbeyond good and evil, the master of his virtues, and of superabundance\nof will; precisely this shall be called _greatness:_ as diversified as\ncan be entire, as ample as can be full.\" 154-155\n\nMorality as attitude is opposed to our taste nowadays. This is _also_\nan advance, as it was an advance in our fathers that religion as an\nattitude finally became opposed to their taste.... 161\n\nThe practice of judging and condemning morally is the favourite revenge\nof the intellectually shallow on those who are less so.... 162\n\nWhoever has really offered sacrifice knows that he wanted and obtained\nsomething for it--perhaps something from himself for something from\nhimself; that he relinquished here in order to have more there, perhaps\nin general to be more, or even feel himself \"more.\" 164\n\nWherever sympathy (fellow-suffering) is preached nowadays ... let the\npsychologist have his ears open: through all the vanity, through all\nthe noise which is natural to these preachers (as to all preachers), he\nwill hear a hoarse, groaning, genuine note of _self-contempt._ 65\n\nWe are prepared as no other age has ever been for a carnival in the\ngrand style, for the most spiritual festival-laughter and arrogance,\nfor the transcendental height of supreme folly and Aristophanic\nridicule of the world. Perhaps we are still discovering the domain\nof our _invention_ just here, the domain where even we can still be\noriginal, probably as parodists of the world's history and as God's\nMerry-Andrews,--perhaps, though nothing else of the present have a\nfuture, our _laughter_ itself may have a future! 168\n\nThe discipline of suffering, of _great_ suffering--know ye not that\nit is only _this_ discipline that has produced all the elevations of\nhumanity hitherto? 171\n\nIt is desirable that as few people as possible should reflect upon\nmorals, and consequently it is _very_ desirable that morals should not\nsome day become interesting! 174\n\nNot one of those ponderous, conscience-stricken herding-animals (who\nundertake to advocate the cause of egoism as conducive to the general\nwelfare) wants to have any knowledge or inkling of the facts that the\n\"general welfare\" is no ideal, no goal, no notion that can be at all\ngrasped, but is only a nostrum,--that what is fair to one _may not_\nat all be fair to another, that the requirement of one morality for\nall is really a detriment to higher men, in short, that there is a\n_distinction of rank_ between man and man, and consequently between\nmorality and morality. 175\n\nThat which constitutes the painful delight of tragedy is cruelty; that\nwhich operates agreeably in so-called tragic sympathy, and at the basis\neven of everything sublime, up to the highest and most delicate thrills\nof metaphysics, obtains its sweetness solely from the intermingled\ningredient of cruelty. 177\n\nEnlightenment hitherto has fortunately been men's affair, men's\ngift--we remained therewith \"among ourselves\"; and in the end,\nin view of all that women write about \"woman,\" we may well have\nconsiderable doubt as to whether woman really _desires_ enlightenment\nabout herself--and _can_ desire it. If woman does not thereby seek a\nnew _ornament_ for herself--I believe ornamentation belongs to the\neternally feminine?--why, then, she wishes to make herself feared;\nperhaps she thereby wishes to get the mastery. But she does not _want_\ntruth--what does woman care for truth. From the very first nothing is\nmore foreign, more repugnant, or more hostile to woman than truth--her\ngreat art is falsehood, her chief concern is appearance and beauty. 183\n\nIt betrays corruption of the instincts--apart from the fact that it\nbetrays bad taste--when a woman refers to Madame Roland, or Madame\nde Sta\u00ebl, or Monsieur George Sand, as though something were proved\nthereby in _favour_ of \"woman as she is.\" Among men, these are the\nthree _comical_ women as they are--nothing more--and just the best\ninvoluntary _counter-arguments_ against feminine emancipation and\nautonomy. 184\n\nStupidity in the kitchen; woman as cook; the terrible thoughtlessness\nwith which the feeding of the family and the master of the house is\nmanaged. Woman does not understand what food _means,_ and she insists\non being cook. If woman had been a thinking creature, she should\ncertainly, as cook for thousands of years, have discovered the most\nimportant physiological facts, and should likewise have got possession\nof the healing art. Through bad female cooks--through the entire lack\nof reason in the kitchen--the development of mankind has been longest\nretarded and most interfered with. 184-185\n\nTo be mistaken in the fundamental problem of \"man and woman,\" to deny\nhere the profoundest antagonism and the necessity for an eternally\nhostile tension, to dream here perhaps of equal rights, equal\ntraining, equal claims and obligations: that is a _typical_ sign of\nshallow-mindedness; and a thinker who has proved himself shallow at\nthis dangerous spot--shallow in instinct--may generally be regarded\nas suspicious, nay more, as betrayed, as discovered: he will probably\nprove too \"short\" for all fundamental questions of life, future as well\nas present, and will be unable to descend into _any_ of the depths. On\nthe other hand, a man who has depth of spirit as well as of desires,\nand has also the depth of benevolence which is capable of severity and\nharshness, and easily confounded with them, can only think of woman as\nOrientals do: he must conceive of her as a possession, as confinable\nproperty, as a being predestined for service and accomplishing her\nmission therein.... 186-187\n\nThe weaker sex has in no previous age been treated with so much respect\nby men as at present--this belongs to the tendency and fundamental\ntaste of democracy, in the same way as disrespectfulness to old\nage--what wonder is it that abuse should be immediately made of this\nrespect? They want more, they learn to make claims, the tribute of\nrespect is at last felt to be well-nigh galling.... 187\n\nWherever the industrial spirit has triumphed over the military\nand aristocratic spirit, woman strives for the economic and legal\nindependence of a clerk: \"woman as clerkess\" is inscribed on the portal\nof the modern society which is in course of formation. While she\nthus appropriates new rights, aspires to be \"master,\" and inscribes\n\"progress\" of woman on her flags and banners, the very opposite\nrealises itself with terrible obviousness: _woman retrogrades._ Since\nthe French Revolution the influence of woman in Europe has _declined_\nin proportion as she has increased her rights and claims; and the\n\"emancipation of woman,\" in so far as it is desired and demanded by\nwomen themselves (and not only by masculine shallow-pates), thus proves\nto be a remarkable symptom of the increased weakening and deadening of\nthe most womanly instincts. There is _stupidity_ in this movement, an\nalmost masculine stupidity, of which a well-reared woman--who is always\na sensible woman--might be heartily ashamed. 187-188\n\nEvery elevation of the type \"man,\" has hitherto been the work of an\naristocratic society--and so will it always be--a society believing in\na long scale of gradations of rank and differences of worth among human\nbeings, and requiring slavery in some form or other. 223\n\nThe essential thing ... in a good and healthy aristocracy is that it\nshould _not_ regard itself as a function either of the kingship or\nthe commonwealth, but as the _significance_ and highest justification\nthereof--that it should therefore accept with a good conscience the\nsacrifice of a legion of individuals, who, _for its sake,_ must be\nsuppressed and reduced to imperfect men, to slaves and instruments.\nIts fundamental belief must be precisely that society is _not_ allowed\nto exist for its own sake, but only as a foundation and scaffolding,\nby means of which a select class of beings may be able to elevate\nthemselves to their higher duties, and in general to a higher\n_existence._... 225\n\nLife itself is _essentially_ appropriation, injury, conquest of the\nstrange and weak, suppression, severity, obtrusion of peculiar forms,\nincorporation, and at the least, putting it mildest, exploitation....\n226\n\nPeople now rave everywhere, even under the guise of science, about\ncoming conditions of society in which \"the exploiting character\" is to\nbe absent:--that sounds to my ears as if they promised to invent a mode\nof life which should refrain from all organic functions. \"Exploitation\"\ndoes not belong to a depraved, or imperfect and primitive society;\nit belongs to the _nature_ of the living being as a primary organic\nfunction; it is a consequence of the intrinsic Will to Power, which is\nprecisely the Will to Life. 226\n\nIn a tour through the many finer and coarser moralities which have\nhitherto prevailed or still prevail on the earth, I found certain\ntraits recurring regularly together and connected with one another,\nuntil finally two primary types revealed themselves to me, and a\nradical distinction was brought to light. There is _master-morality_\nand _slave-morality;_--I would at once add, however, that in all higher\nand mixed civilisations, there are also attempts at the reconciliation\nof the two moralities; but one finds still oftener the confusion\nand mutual misunderstanding of them, indeed, sometimes their close\njuxtaposition--even in the same man, within one soul. 227\n\nThe noble type of man regards _himself_ as a determiner of values;\nhe does not require to be approved of; he passes the judgment: \"What\nis injurious to me is injurious in itself\"; he knows that it is he\nhimself only who confers honour on things; he is a _creator_ of\nvalues. He honours whatever he recognises in himself: such morality\nis self-glorification. In the foreground there is the feeling of\nplenitude, of power, which seeks to overflow, the happiness of high\ntension, the conscientiousness of a wealth which would fain give\nand bestow:--the noble man also helps the unfortunate, but not--or\nscarcely--out of pity, but rather from an impulse generated by the\nsuperabundance of power. The noble man honours in himself the powerful\none, him also who has power over himself, who knows how to speak and\nhow to keep silence, who takes pleasure in subjecting himself to\nseverity and hardness, and has reverence for all that is severe and\nhard. 229\n\nA morality of the ruling class ... is ... especially foreign and\nirritating to present-day taste in the sternness of its principle\nthat one has duties only to one's equals; that one may act towards\nbeings of a lower rank, towards all that is foreign, just as seems\ngood to one, or \"as the heart desires,\" and in any case \"beyond good\nand evil\": it is here that sympathy and similar sentiments can have a\nplace. The ability and obligation to exercise prolonged gratitude and\nprolonged revenge--both only within the circle of equals,--artfulness\nin retaliation, _raffinement_ of the idea in friendship, a certain\nnecessity to have enemies as outlets for the emotions of envy,\nquarrelsomeness, arrogance--in fact, in order to be a good _friend:_\nall these are typical characteristics of the noble morality. 229-230\n\nSlave-morality is essentially the morality of utility. Here is the seat\nof the origin of the famous antithesis \"good\" and \"_evil\":_--power\nand dangerousness are assumed to reside in the evil, a certain\ndreadfulness, subtlety, and strength, which do not admit of being\ndespised. According to slave-morality, therefore, the \"evil\" man\narouses fear; according to master-morality, it is precisely the \"good\"\nman who arouses fear and seeks to arouse it, while the bad man is\nregarded as the despicable being. The contrast attains its maximum\nwhen, in accordance with the logical consequences of slave-morality,\na shade of depreciation--it may be slight and well-intentioned--at\nlast attaches itself even to the \"good\" man of this morality; because,\naccording to the servile mode of thought, the good man must in any\ncase be the _safe_ man: he is good-natured, easily deceived, perhaps a\nlittle stupid, _un bonhomme._ Everywhere that slave-morality gains the\nascendency, language shows a tendency to approximate the significations\nof the words \"good\" and \"stupid.\"--A last fundamental difference: the\ndesire for _freedom,_ the instinct for happiness and the refinements\nof the feeling of liberty belong as necessarily to slave-morals and\nmorality, as artifice and enthusiasm in reverence and devotion are the\nregular symptoms of an aristocratic mode of thinking and estimating.\n231\n\nA _species_ originates, and a type becomes established and strong in\nthe long struggle with essentially constant _unfavourable_ conditions.\nOn the other hand, it is known by the experience of breeders that\nspecies which receive superabundant nourishment, and in general a\nsurplus of protection and care, immediately tend in the most marked way\nto develop variations, and are fertile in prodigies and monstrosities\n(also in monstrous vices). 234\n\nI submit that egoism belongs to the essence of a noble soul, I mean\nthe unalterable belief that to a being such as \"we,\" other beings must\nnaturally be in subjection, and have to sacrifice themselves. 240\n\nWoman would like to believe that love can do _everything_--it is the\n_superstition_ peculiar to her. Alas, he who knows the heart finds\nout how poor, helpless, pretentious, and blundering even the best and\ndeepest love is--he finds that it rather _destroys_ than saves! 246\n\nSigns of nobility: never to think of lowering our duties to the rank\nof duties for everybody; to be unwilling to renounce or to share our\nresponsibilities; to count our prerogatives, and the exercise of them,\namong our _duties._ 249\n\nA man strives after great things, looks upon every one whom he\nencounters on his way either as a means of advance, or a delay and\nhindrance--or as a temporary resting-place. 249\n\nIf one wishes to praise at all, it is a delicate and at the same time a\nnoble self-control, to praise only where one _does not_ agree.... 254\n\nAll society makes one somehow, somewhere, or sometimes--\"commonplace.\"\n254-255\n\n_The noble soul has reverence for itself._ 256\n\nA man who can conduct a case, carry out a resolution, remain true to\nan opinion, keep hold of a woman, punish and overthrow insolence; a\nman who has his indignation and his sword, and to whom the weak, the\nsuffering, the oppressed, and even the animals willingly submit and\nnaturally belong; in short, a man who is a _master_ by nature--when\nsuch a man has sympathy, well, _that_ sympathy has value! 259\n\nI would even allow myself to rank philosophers according to the quality\nof their laughing--up to those who are capable of _golden_ laughter.\n260\n\n\n\n\nVIII\n\n\n\"The Genealogy of Morals\"\n\n\n(\"_Zur Genealogie der Moral_\") was written by Nietzsche primarily as an\nelaboration and elucidation of the philosophic points which were merely\nsketched in \"Beyond Good and Evil.\" This former work had met with small\nsuccess, and the critics, failing to understand its doctrines, read\nconverse meanings in it. One critic hailed Nietzsche at once as an\nanarchist, and this review went far in actuating him in drawing up the\nthree essays which comprise the present book. As will be remembered,\nseveral of Nietzsche's most important principles were stated and\noutlined in \"Beyond Good and Evil,\" especially his doctrine of\nslave-morality and master-morality. Now he undertakes to develop this\nproposition, as well as many others which he set forth provisionally\nin his earlier work. This new polemic may be looked upon both as a\ncompleting of former works and as a further preparation for \"The Will\nto Power.\" The book, a comparatively brief one (it contains barely\n40,000 words), was written in a period of about two weeks during the\nearly part of 1887. In July the manuscript was sent to the publisher,\nbut was recalled for revisions and addenda; and most of Nietzsche's\nsummer was devoted to correcting it. Later that same year the book\nappeared; and thereby its author acquired another friendly reader,\nGeorg Brandes, to whom, more than to any other critic, Nietzsche owes\nhis early recognition.\n\nThe style of \"The Genealogy of Morals\" is less aphoristic than any\nof the books which immediately preceded or followed it. Few new\ndoctrines are propounded in it; and since it was for the most part\nan analytic commentary on what had gone before, its expositional\nneeds were best met by Nietzsche's earlier style of writing. I have\nspoken before of the desultory and sporadic manner in which Nietzsche\nwas necessitated to present his philosophy. Nowhere is his method\nof work better exemplified than in this new work. Nearly every one\nof his books overlaps another. Propositions are sketchily stated in\none essay, which receive elucidation only in future volumes. \"Beyond\nGood and Evil\" was a commentary on \"Thus Spake Zarathustra\"; \"The\nGenealogy of Morals\" is a commentary on the newly propounded theses in\n\"Beyond Good and Evil\" and is in addition an elaboration of many of\nthe ideas which took birth as far back as \"Human, All-Too-Human.\" Out\nof \"The Genealogy of Morals\" in turn grew \"The Antichrist\" which dealt\nspecifically with the theological phase of the former's discussion\nof general morals. And all of these books were but preparations for\n\"The Will to Power.\" For this reason it is difficult to acquire a\ncomplete understanding of Nietzsche's philosophy unless one follows\nit consecutively and chronologically. The book at present under\ndiscussion is a most valuable one from an academic standpoint, for,\nwhile it may not set forth any new and important doctrines, it goes\ndeep into the origins and history of moral concepts, and explains many\nof the important conclusions in Nietzsche's moral code. It brings more\nand more into prominence the main pillars of his ethical system and\nexplains at length the steps in the syllogism which led to his doctrine\nof master-morality. It ascertains the origin of the concept of sin, and\ndescribes the racial deterioration which has followed in the train of\nChristian ideals.\n\nIn many ways this book is the profoundest of all the writings Nietzsche\nleft us. For the first time he separates theological and moral\nprejudices and traces them to different origins. This is one of the\nmost important steps taken by him. By so doing he became an explorer\nof entirely new fields. The moral historians and psychologists who\npreceded him had considered moral precepts and Christian injunctions\nas stemming from the same source: their genealogies had led them to\nthe same common spring. Nietzsche entered the search with new methods.\nHe applied the philologie test to all moral values. He brought to his\ntask, in addition to a historical sense, what he calls \"an innate\nfaculty of psychological discrimination _par excellence._\" He posed the\nfollowing questions, and endeavoured to answer them by inquiring into\nthe minutest aspects of historical conditions: \"Under what conditions\ndid Man invent for himself those judgments of value, 'good' and 'evil'?\n_And what intrinsic value do they possess in themselves?_ Have they\nup to the present hindered or advanced human well-being\"? Are they a\nsymptom of the distress, impoverishment, and degeneration of Human\nLife? Or, conversely, is it in them that is manifested the fulness, the\nstrength, and the will of Life, its courage, its self-confidence, its\nfuture?\" In his research, Nietzsche first questioned the value of pity.\nHe found it to be a symptom of modern civilisation--a quality held in\ncontempt by the older philosophers, even by such widely dissimilar\nminds as Plato, Spinoza, La Rochefoucauld and Kant--but a quality\ngiven high place by the more modern thinkers. Despite the seemingly\napparent isolation of the problem of pity-morality, Nietzsche saw that\nin truth it was a question which underlay all other moral propositions;\nand, using it as a ground-work for his research, he began to question\nthe utility of all those values held as \"good,\" to apply the qualities\nof the \"good man\" to the needs of civilisation, and to inquire into the\nresults left upon the race by the \"bad man.\"\n\nSo great was the misunderstanding which attached to his phrase, \"beyond\ngood and evil,\" and so persistently was this phrase interpreted in\nits narrow sense of \"beyond good and bad,\" that he felt the necessity\nof drawing the line of distinction between these two diametrically\nopposed conceptions and of explaining the origin of each. His first\nessay in \"The Genealogy of Morals\" is devoted to this task. At the\noutset he devotes considerable space criticising the methods and\nconclusions of former genealogists of morals, especially of the English\npsychologists who attribute an _intrinsic_ merit to altruism because\nat one time altruism possessed a utilitarian value. Herbert Spencer's\ntheory that \"good\" is the same as \"purposive\" brings from Nietzsche a\nprotest founded on the contention that because a thing was at one time\nuseful, and therefore \"good,\" it does not follow that the thing is good\n_in itself._ By the etymology of the descriptive words of morality,\nNietzsche traces the history of modern moral attributes through class\ndistinctions to their origin in the instincts of the \"nobles\" and the\n\"vulgarians.\" He shows the relationship between the Latin _bonus_ and\nthe \"warrior,\" by deriving _bonus_ from _duonus. Bellum,_ he shows,\nequals _duellum_ which equals _duen-lum,_ in which word _duonus_\nis contained. Likewise, he points out the aristocratic origin of\n\"happiness\"--a quality arising from an abundance of energy and the\nconsciousness of power.\n\n\"Good and evil,\" according to Nietzsche, is a sign of slave-morality;\nwhile \"good and bad\" represents the qualities in the master-morality.\nThe one stands for the adopted qualities of the subservient races; the\nother embodies the natural functioning of dominating races. The origin\nof the \"good\" in these two instances is by no means the same. In the\nstrong man \"good\" represented an entirely different condition than the\n\"good\" in the resentful and weak man; and these two \"goods\" arose out\nof different causes. The one was spontaneous and natural--inherent in\nthe individual of strength: the other was a manufactured condition, an\noptional selection of qualities to soften and ameliorate the conditions\nof existence. \"Evil\" and \"bad,\" by the same token, became attributes\noriginating in widely separated sources. The \"evil\" of the weak man was\nany condition which worked against the manufactured ideals of goodness,\nwhich brought about unhappiness--it was the beginning of the conception\nof a slave-morality, a term applied to all enemies. The \"bad\" of the\nstrong man was the concept which grew directly out of his feeling for\n\"good,\" and which had no application to another individual. Thus the\nideas of \"good\" and \"bad\" are directly inherited from the nobles of the\nrace, and these ideas included within themselves the tendency toward\nestablishing social distinctions.\n\nThe second section of \"The Genealogy of Morals,\" called \"'Guilt,' 'Bad\nConscience,' and the Like,\" is another important document, the reading\nof which is almost imperative for the student who would understand the\nprocesses of thought which led to Nietzsche's philosophic conclusions.\nIn this essay Nietzsche traces the origin of sin to debt, thereby\ndisagreeing with all the genealogists of morals who preceded him. He\nstarts with the birth of memory in man and with the corresponding will\nto forgetfulness, showing that out of these two mental qualities was\nborn responsibility. Out of responsibility in turn grew the function of\npromising and the accepting of promises, which at once made possible\nbetween individuals the relationship of \"debtor\" and \"creditor.\" As\nsoon as this relationship was established, one man had rights over\nanother. The creditor could exact payment from the debtor, either in\nthe form of material equivalent or by inflicting an injury in which\nwas contained the sensation of satisfaction. Thus the creditor had the\nright to punish in cases where actual repayment was impossible. And in\nthis idea of punishment began not only class distinction but primitive\nlaw. Later, when the power to punish was transferred into the hands\nof the community, the law of contract came into existence. Here, says\nNietzsche, we find the cradle of the whole moral world of the ideas of\n\"guilt,\" \"conscience,\" and \"duty\"; and adds, \"Their commencement, like\nthe commencement of all great things in the world, is thoroughly and\ncontinuously saturated in blood.\"\n\nCarrying out the principle underlying the relationship of debtor and\ncreditor we arrive at the formation of the community. In return for\nprotection and for communal advantages the individual pledged his good\nbehaviour. When he violated this contract with the community, the\ncommunity, in the guise of the defrauded creditor, took its revenge, or\nexacted its payment, from the debtor, the criminal. And, as was the\ncase in early history, the community deprived the violator of future\nadvantages and protection. The debtor was divested of all rights, even\nof mercy, for then there were no degrees in law-breaking. Primitive law\nwas martial law. Says Nietzsche, \"This shows why war itself (counting\nthe sacrificial cult of war) has produced all the forms under which\npunishment has manifested itself in history.\" Later, as the community\ngathered strength, the offences of the individual debtors were looked\nupon as less serious. Out of its security grew leniency toward the\noffender: the penal code became mitigated, and, as in all powerful\nnations to-day, the criminal was protected. Only when there was a\nconsciousness of weakness in a community did the acts of individual\noffenders take on an exaggerated seriousness, and under such conditions\nthe law was consequently harshest. Thus, justice and the infliction of\nlegal penalties are direct outgrowths of the primitive relation of debt\nbetween individuals. Herein we have the origin of guilt.\n\nNietzsche attempts an elaborate analysis of the history of punishment,\nin an effort to ascertain its true meaning, its relation to guilt\nand to the community, and its final effects on both the individual\nand society. It has been impossible to present the sequence of this\nanalysis by direct excerpts from his own words, due to the close,\nsynthetic manner in which he has made his research. Therefore I offer\nthe following brief exposition of pages 88 to 99 inclusive, in which he\nexamines the causes and effects of punishment. To begin with, Nietzsche\ndisassociates the \"origin\" and the \"end\" of punishment, and regards\nthem as two separate and distinct problems. He argues that the final\nutility of a thing, in the sense that revenge and deterrence are the\nfinal utilities of punishment, is in all cases opposed to the origin of\nthat thing; that every force or principle is constantly being put to\nnew purposes by forces greater than itself, thus making it impossible\nto determine its inception by the end for which it is used. Therefore\nthe \"function\" of punishing was not conceived with a view to punishing,\nbut may have been employed for any number of ends, according as a will\nto power has overcome that function and made use of it for its own\npurpose: in short; punishment, like any organ or custom or \"thing,\"\nhas passed through a series of new interpretations and adjustments and\nmeanings--and is _not_ a direct and logical _progress as_ to an end.\n\nHaving established this point, Nietzsche endeavours to determine\nthe utilisation to which the custom of punishment has been put--to\nascertain the meaning which has been interpreted into it. He finds\nthat even in modern times not one but many uses have been made of\npunishment, and that in ancient times so diverse have been the\nutilisations of punishment that it is impossible to define them all.\nIn fact, one cannot determine the _precise reason_ for punishment. To\nemphasise this point, Nietzsche gives a long list of possible meanings.\nTaking up the more popular _supposed_ utilities of punishment at the\npresent time--such as creating in the wrong-doer the consciousness of\nguilt, which is supposed to evolve into conscience and remorse--he\nshows wherein punishment fails in its object. Against this theory\nof the creation of remorse, he advances psychology and shows that,\nto the contrary, punishment numbs and hardens. He argues also that\npunishment for the purpose of making the wrong-doer conscious of the\nintrinsic reprehensibility of his crime, fails because the very act for\nwhich he is chastened is practised in the service of justice and is\ncalled \"good.\" Eliminating thus the _supposed_ effects of punishment,\nNietzsche arrives at the conclusion (included in the excerpts at\nthe end of this chapter) that punishment makes only for caution and\nsecrecy, and is therefore detrimental.\n\nIn his analysis of the origin of the \"bad conscience,\" Nietzsche lends\nhimself to quotation. Therefore I have been able to present in his own\nwords a fair _resume_ of the course pursued by him in his examination\nof the history of conscience. This particular branch of his research\nis carried into the formation of the \"State\" which, according to him,\ngrew out of \"a herd of blonde beasts.\" The older theory of the state,\nnamely: that it originated in the adoption of a contract, is set aside\nas untenable when dealing with a peoples who possessed conquerors or\nmasters. These masters, argues Nietzsche, had no need of contracts.\nBy using the \"bad conscience\" as a ground for inquiry, the causes for\nthe existence of altruism are shown to be included in the self-cruelty\nwhich followed in the wake of the instinct for freedom. (This last\npoint is developed fully in the discussion of ascetic ideals which\nis found at the end of the book now under consideration.) Nietzsche\ntraces the birth of deities back along the lines of credit and debt.\nFirst came the fear of ancestors. Then followed the obligation to\nancestors. At length the sacrifice to ancestors marked the beginning\nof a conception of duty (debt) to the supernatural. The ancestors of\npowerful nations in time became heroes, and finally evolved into gods.\nLater monotheism came as a natural consequence, and God became the\ncreditor. In the expiation of sin, as symbolised in the crucifixion\nof Christianity, we have this same relationship of debtor and\ncreditor carried out into a more complex form through the avenues of\nself-torture.\n\nThe most important essay in \"The Genealogy of Morals\" is the last,\ncalled \"What is the Meaning of Ascetic Ideals?\" Nietzsche examines\nthis question in relation to the artist, to the philosopher, to the\npriest, and to the race generally. In his examination of the problem in\nregard to artists he uses Wagner as a basis of inquiry, comparing the\ntwo phases of Wagner's art--the Parsifalian and the ante-Parsifalian.\nArtists, asserts Nietzsche, need a support of constituted authority;\nthey are unable to stand alone--\"standing alone is opposed to their\ndeepest instincts\"--and so they make use of asceticism as a rampart,\nas building material, to give their work authority. In his application\nof the ascetic ideal to philosophers, Nietzsche presents the cases\nof Schopenhauer and Kant, and concludes that asceticism in such\ninstances is used as an escape from torture--a means to recreation\nand happiness. With the philosopher the ideal of asceticism is not\na denial of existence. Rather is it an affirmation of existence. It\npermits him freedom of the intellect. It relieves him of the numerous\nobligations of life. Furthermore, the philosophic spirit, in order to\nestablish itself, found it necessary to disguise itself as \"one of the\n_previously fixed_ types of the contemplative man,\" as a priest or\nsoothsayer. Only in such a religious masquerade was philosophy taken\nwith any seriousness or reverence.\n\nThe history of asceticism in the priest I have been able to set forth\nwith a certain degree of completeness in Nietzsche's own words.\nThe priest was the sick physician who administered to the needs of\na sick populace. His was the mission of mitigating suffering and\nof performing every kind of consolation. Wherein he failed, says\nNietzsche, was in not going to the source, the cause, of suffering, but\nin dealing merely with its manifestations. These manifestations were\nthe result of physiological depressions which prevailed at intervals\namong portions of the population. These depressions were the outgrowth\nof diverse causes, such as long wars, emigration to unsuitable\nclimates, wrong diet, miscegenation on a large scale, disease, etc.\nAccording to Nietzsche the cure for such physiological phenomena can\nbe found only in the realm of moral psychology, for here the origin\nis considered and administered to by disciplinary systems grounded in\ntrue knowledge. But the method employed by the priest was far from\nscientific. He combated these depressions by reducing the consciousness\nof life itself to the lowest possible degree--that is, by a doctrine\nof asceticism, of self-abnegation, equanimity, self-hypnotism. By\nthus minimising the consciousness of life, these depressions took on\nmore and more the aspect of normality. The effects of this treatment,\nhowever, were transient, for the starving of the physical desires and\nthe abstinence from exercising the physical impulses paved the way for\nall manner of mental disorders, excesses and insanity. Herein lies\nNietzsche's explanation for religious ecstasies, hallucinations, and\nsensual outbursts.\n\nAnother form of treatment devised by the ascetic priests for a\ndepressed people gave birth to the \"blessedness\" which, under the\nChristian code, attaches to work. These priests attempted to turn the\nattention of the people from their suffering by the establishment of\nmechanical activity, namely: work, routine and obedience. The sick man\nforgot himself in the labour which had received sanctification. The\npriests also combated depression by permitting pleasure through the\ncreation and production of joy. That is, they set men to helping and\ncomforting each other, by instilling in them the notion of brotherly\nlove. Thereby the community mutually strengthened itself, and at the\nsame time it reaped the joy of service which had been sanctioned by the\npriests. Out of this last method sprang many of the Christian virtues,\nespecially those which benefit others rather than oneself.\n\nSuch methods as these--devitalisation, labour, brotherly love--are\ncalled by Nietzsche the \"innocent\" prescriptions in the fight against\ndepression. The \"guilty\" ones are far different, and are embodied in\nthe one method: the production of emotional excess. This, the priests\nunderstood, was the most efficacious manner in overcoming protracted\ndepression and pain. Confronted by the query: By what means can this\nemotional excess be produced? they made use of \"the whole pack of\nhounds that rage in the human kennel\"--rage, fear, lust, revenge, hope,\ndespair, cruelty and the like. And once these emotional excesses became\nestablished, the priests, when asked by the \"patients\" for a \"cause\" of\ntheir suffering, declared it to be within the man himself, in his own\nguiltiness. Thus was the sick man turned into a sinner. Here originated\nalso the conception of suffering as a _state of punishment,_ the fear\nof retribution, the iniquitous conscience, and the hope of redemption.\nNietzsche goes further, and shows the racial and individual decadence\nwhich has followed in the train of this system of treatment. Dr. Oscar\nLevy says with justice that this last essay, considered in the light\nwhich it throws upon the attitude of the ecclesiast to the man of\nresentment and misfortune, \"is one of the most valuable contributions\nto sacerdotal psychology.\"\n\n\nEXCERPTS FROM \"THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS\"\n\nThe pathos of nobility and distance,... the chronic and despotic\n_esprit de corps_ and fundamental instinct of a higher dominant race\ncoming into association with a meaner race, an \"under race,\" this is\nthe origin of the antitheses of good and bad. 20\n\nThe knightly-aristocratic \"values\" are based on a careful cult of the\nphysical, on a flowering, rich, and even effervescing healthiness,\nthat goes considerably beyond what is necessary for maintaining life,\non war, adventure, the chase, the dance, the tourney--on everything,\nin fact, which is contained in strong, free, and joyous action. The\npriestly aristocratic mode of valuation is--we have seen--based on\nother hypotheses: it is bad enough for this class when it is a question\nof war! Yet the priests are, as is notorious, _the worst enemies_--why?\nBecause they are the weakest. 29\n\nThe slave-morality requires as the condition of its existence an\nexternal and objective world, to employ physiological terminology,\nit requires objective stimuli to be of action at all--its action is\nfundamentally a reaction. The contrary is the case when we come to the\naristocrat's system of values: it acts and grows spontaneously, it\nmerely seeks its antithesis in order to pronounce a more grateful and\nexultant \"yes\" to its own self.... 35\n\nThe aristocratic man conceives the root idea \"good\" spontaneously and\nstraight away, that is to say, out of himself, and from that material\nthen creates for himself a concept of \"bad\"! This \"bad\" of aristocratic\norigin and that \"evil\" out of the cauldron of unsatisfied hatred--the\nformer an imitation, an \"extra,\" an additional nuance; the latter, on\nthe other hand, the original, the beginning, the essential act in the\nconception of a slave-morality--these two words \"bad\" and \"evil,\" how\ngreat a difference do they mark in spite of the fact that they have an\nidentical contrary in the idea \"good.\" 39\n\nIt is impossible not to recognise at the core of all these aristocratic\nraces the beast of prey; the magnificent _blonde brute,_ avidly\nrampant for spoil and victory; this hidden core needed an outlet from\ntime to time, the beast must get loose again, must return into the\nwilderness--the Roman, Arabic, German, and Japanese nobility, the\nHomeric heroes, the Scandinavian Vikings, are all alike in this need.\nIt is the aristocratic races who have left the idea \"Barbarian\" on all\nthe tracks in which they have marched; nay, a consciousness of this\nvery barbarianism, and even a pride in it, manifests itself even in\ntheir highest civilisation. 40\n\nWhat produces to-day our repulsion towards \"man\"?--for we _suffer_\nfrom \"man,\" there is no doubt about it. It is not fear; it is rather\nthat we have nothing more to fear from men; it is that the worm \"man\"\nis in the foreground and pullulates; it is that the \"tame man,\" the\nwretched mediocre and unedifying creature, has learnt to consider\nhimself a goal and a pinnacle, an inner meaning, an historic principle,\na \"higher man.\" ... 42-43\n\nIn the dwarfing and levelling of the European man lurks _our_ greatest\nperil, for it is this outlook which fatigues--we see to-day nothing\nwhich wishes to be greater, we surmise that the process is always\nstill backwards, still backwards towards something more attenuated,\nmore inoffensive, more cunning, more comfortable, more mediocre, more\nindifferent, more Chinese, more Christian. 44\n\nTo require of strength that it should _not_ express itself as strength,\nthat it should not be a wish to overpower, a wish to overthrow, a wish\nto become master, a thirst for enemies and antagonisms and triumphs, is\njust as absurd as to require of weakness that it should express itself\nas strength. A quantum of force is just such a quantum of movement,\nwill, action. 45\n\nThe impotence which requites not, is turned to \"goodness,\" craven\nbaseness to meekness, submission to those whom one hates, to obedience\n(namely, obedience to one of whom they say that he ordered this\nsubmission--they call him God). The inoffensive character of the weak,\nthe very cowardice in which he is rich, his standing at the door, his\nforced necessity of waiting, gain here fine names, such as \"patience,\"\nwhich is also called \"virtue\"; not being able to avenge one's self, is\ncalled not wishing to avenge one's self, perhaps even forgiveness. 48\n\nThey are miserable, there is no doubt about it, all these whisperers\nand counterfeiters in the corners, although they try to get warm by\ncrouching close to each other, but they tell me that their misery is\na favour and distinction given to them by God, just as one beats the\ndogs one likes best; that perhaps this misery is also a preparation, a\nprobation, a training; that perhaps it is still more something which\nwill one day be compensated and paid back with a tremendous interest in\ngold, nay in happiness. This they call \"Blessedness.\" 45-49\n\nThe two _opposing values_ \"good and bad,\" \"good and evil,\" have fought\na dreadful, thousand-year fight in the world, and though indubitably\nthe second value has been for a long time in the preponderance, there\nare not wanting places where the fortune of the fight is still\nundecisive. It can almost be said that in the meanwhile the fight\nreaches a higher and higher level, and that in the meanwhile it has\nbecome more and more intense, and always more and more psychological;\nso that nowadays there is perhaps no more decisive mark of the _higher\nnature,_ of the more psychological nature, than to be in that sense\nself-contradictory, and to be actually still a battle-ground for those\ntwo opposites. The symbol of this fight, written in a writing which\nhas remained worthy of perusal throughout the course of history up to\nthe present time, is called \"Rome against Jud\u00e6a, Jud\u00e6a against Rome.\"\nHitherto there has been no greater event than _that_ fight, the putting\nof _that_ question, _that_ deadly antagonism. Rome found in the Jew\nthe incarnation of the unnatural, as though it were its diametrically\nopposed monstrosity, and in Rome the Jew was held to be _convicted of\nhatred_ of the whole human race: and rightly so, in so far as it is\nright to link the well-being and the future of the human race to the\nunconditional mastery of the aristocratic values, of the Roman values.\nWhat, conversely, did the Jews feel against Rome? One can surmise it\nfrom a thousand symptoms, but it is sufficient to carry one's mind\nback to the Johannian Apocalypse, that most obscene of all the written\noutbursts, which has revenge on its conscience. 53-54\n\n_Beyond Good and Evil_--at any rate that is not the same as \"Beyond\nGood and Bad.\" 57\n\nThe proud knowledge of the extraordinary privilege of _responsibility,_\nthe consciousness of this rare freedom, of this power over himself and\nover fate, has sunk right down to his innermost depths, and has become\nan instinct, a dominating instinct--what name will he give to it, to\nthis dominating instinct if he needs to have a word for it? But there\nis no doubt about it--the sovereign man calls it his _conscience._ 65\n\nHave these current genealogists of morals ever allowed themselves to\nhave even the vaguest notion, for instance, that the cardinal moral\nidea of \"ought\" originates from the very material idea of \"owe\"? Or\nthat punishment developed as a _retaliation_ absolutely independently\nof any preliminary hypothesis of the freedom or determination of the\nwill?--And this to such an extent, that a _high_ degree of civilisation\nwas always first necessary for the animal man to begin to make those\nmuch more primitive distinctions of \"intentional,\" \"negligent,\"\n\"accidental,\" \"responsible,\" and their contraries, and apply them\nin the assessing of punishment. That idea--\"the wrong-doer deserves\npunishment _because_ he might have acted otherwise,\" in spite of the\nfact that it is nowadays so cheap, obvious, natural, and inevitable,\nand that it has had to serve as an illustration of the way in which\nthe sentiment of justice appeared on earth is in point of fact\nan exceedingly late, and even refined form of human judgment and\ninference; the placing of this idea back at the beginning of the world\nis simply a clumsy violation of the principles of primitive psychology.\n69\n\nThe sight of suffering does one good, the infliction of suffering does\none more good--this is a hard maxim, but none the less a fundamental\nmaxim, old, powerful, and \"human, all-too-human\"; one, moreover, to\nwhich perhaps even the apes as well would subscribe: for it is said\nthat in inventing bizarre cruelties they are giving abundant proof\nof their future humanity, to which, as it were, they are playing\nthe prelude. Without cruelty, no feast: so teaches the oldest and\nlongest history of man--and in punishment too is there so much of the\n_festive._ 75\n\nThe darkening of the heavens over man has always increased in\nproportion to the growth of man's shame _before man._The tired\npessimistic outlook, the mistrust of the riddle of life, the icy\nnegation of disgusted ennui, all those are not the signs of the _most\nevil_ age of the human race: much rather do they come first to the\nlight of day, as the swamp-flowers, which they are, when the swamp to\nwhich they belong comes into existence--I mean the diseased refinement\nand moralisation, thanks to which the \"animal man\" has at last learnt\nto be ashamed of all his instincts. 75\n\nThe curve of human sensibilities to pain seems indeed to sink in an\nextraordinary and almost sudden fashion, as soon as one has passed the\nupper ten thousand or ten millions of over-civilised humanity, and I\npersonally have no doubt that, by comparison with one painful night\npassed by one single hysterical chit of a cultured woman, the suffering\nof all the animals taken together who have been put to the question of\nthe knife, so as to give scientific answers, are simply negligible.\n76-77\n\nMan ... arrived at the great generalisation \"everything has its price,\n_all_ can be paid for,\" the oldest and most na\u00efve moral canon of\n_justice_ the beginning of all \"kindness,\" of all \"equity,\" of all\n\"goodwill,\" of all \"objectivity\" in the world. 80\n\nThe self-destruction of Justice! we know the pretty name it calls\nitself--_Grace!_ it remains, as is obvious, the privilege of the\nstrongest, better still, their super-law. 83-84\n\nThe aggressive man has at all times enjoyed the stronger, bolder, more\naristocratic, and also _freer_ outlook, the _better_ conscience. On\nthe other hand, we already surmise who it really is that has on his\nconscience the invention of the \"bad conscience,\"--the resentful man! 86\n\nTo talk of intrinsic right and intrinsic wrong is absolutely\nnonsensical; intrinsically, an injury, an oppression, an exploitation,\nan annihilation can be nothing wrong, inasmuch as life is _essentially_\n(that is, in its cardinal functions) something which functions by\ninjuring, oppressing, exploiting, and annihilating, and is absolutely\ninconceivable without such a character. 88\n\nEvildoers have throughout thousands of years felt when overtaken by\npunishment _exactly like Spinoza,_ on the subject of their \"offence\":\n\"here is something which went wrong contrary to my anticipation,\n_not_ I ought not to have done this.\"--They submitted themselves\nto punishment, just as one submits one's self to a disease, to a\nmisfortune, or to death, with that stubborn and resigned fatalism which\ngives the Russians, for instance, even nowadays, the advantage over\nus Westerners, in the handling of life. If at that period there was\na critique of action, the criterion was prudence: the real _effect_\nof punishment is unquestionably chiefly to be found in a sharpening\nof the sense of prudence, in a lengthening of the memory, in a will\nto adopt more of a policy of caution, suspicion, and secrecy; in the\nrecognition that there are many things which are unquestionably beyond\none's capacity; in a kind of improvement in self-criticism. The broad\neffects which can be obtained by punishment in man and beast, are the\nincrease of fear, the sharpening of the sense of cunning, the mastery\nof the desires: so it is that punishment _tames_ man, but does not make\nhim \"better\"--it would be more correct even to go so far as to assert\nthe contrary. 99\n\nAll instincts which do not find a vent without, _turn inwards_--this is\nwhat I mean by the growing \"internalisation\" of man: consequently we\nhave the first growth in man, of what subsequently was called his soul.\nThe whole inner world, originally as thin as if it had been stretched\nbetween two layers of skin, burst apart and expanded proportionately,\nand obtained depth, breadth, and height, when man's external outlet\nbecame _obstructed._ These terrible bulwarks, with which the social\norganisation protected itself against the old instincts of freedom\n(punishments belong pre-eminently to these bulwarks), brought it\nabout that all those instincts of wild, free, prowling man became\nturned backwards _against man himself._ Enmity, cruelty, the delight\nin persecution, in surprises, change, destruction--the turning all\nthese instincts against their own possessors: this is the origin of\nthe \"bad conscience.\" It was man, who, lacking external enemies and\nobstacles, and imprisoned as he was in the oppressive narrowness and\nmonotony of custom, in his own impatience lacerated, persecuted,\ngnawed, frightened, and ill-treated himself; it was this animal in the\nhands of the tamer, which beat itself against the bars of its cage; it\nwas this being who, pining and yearning for that desert home of which\nit had been deprived, was compelled to create out of its own self, an\nadventure, a torture-chamber, a hazardous and perilous desert--it was\nthis fool, this homesick and desperate prisoner--who invented the \"bad\nconscience.\" 100-101\n\nA herd of blonde beasts of prey, a race of conquerors and masters,\nwhich with all its warlike organisation and all its organising power\npounces with its terrible claws on a population, in numbers possibly\ntremendously superior, but as yet formless, as yet nomad. Such is\nthe origin of the \"State.\" That fantastic theory that makes it\nbegin with a contract is, I think, disposed of. He who can command,\nhe who is a master by \"nature,\" he who comes on the scene forceful\nin deed and gesture--what has he to do with contracts? Such beings\ndefy calculation, they come like fate, without cause, reason, notice,\nexcuse, they are there like the lightning is there, too terrible, too\nsudden, too convincing, too \"different,\" to be personally even hated.\nTheir work is an instinctive creating and impressing of forms, they are\nthe most involuntary, unconscious artists that there are.... 103\n\nIt is only the bad conscience, only the will for self-abuse, that\nprovides the necessary conditions for the existence of altruism as a\n_value._ 105\n\nThe feeling of owing a debt to the deity has grown continuously for\nseveral centuries, always in the same proportion in which the idea\nof God and the consciousness of God have grown and become exalted\namong mankind. (The whole history of ethnic fights, victories,\nreconciliations, amalgamations, everything, in fact, which precedes\nthe eventual classing of all the social elements in each great race\nsynthesis, are mirrored in the hotch-potch genealogy of their gods, in\nthe legends of their fights, victories, and reconciliations, Progress\ntowards universal empires invariably means progress towards universal\ndeities; despotism, with its subjugation of the independent nobility,\nalways paves the way for some system or other of monotheism.) The\nappearance of the Christian god, as the record god up to this time, has\nfor that very reason brought equally into the world the record amount\nof guilt consciousness. 109\n\nThis is a kind of madness of the will in the sphere of psychological\ncruelty which is absolutely unparalleled:--man's _will_ to find\nhimself guilty and blameworthy to the point of inexpiability, his\n_will_ to think of himself as punished, without the punishment ever\nbeing able to balance the guilt, his _will_ to infect and to poison\nthe fundamental basis of the universe with the problem of punishment\nand guilt, in order to cut off once and for all any escape out of this\nlabyrinth of \"fixed ideas,\" his will for rearing an ideal--that of the\n\"holy God\"--face to face with which he can have tangible proof of his\nown unworthiness. Alas for this mad melancholy beast man! 112-113\n\nWhat is the meaning of ascetic ideals? In artists, nothing, or too\nmuch; in philosophers and scholars, a kind of \"flair\" and instinct for\nthe conditions most favourable to advanced intellectualism; in women,\nat best an _additional_ seductive fascination, a little _morbidezza_\non a fine piece of flesh, the angelhood of a fat, pretty animal; in\nphysiological failures and whiners (in the _majority_ of mortals),\nan attempt to pose as \"too good\" for this world, a holy form of\ndebauchery, their chief weapon, in the battle with lingering pain and\nennui; in priests, the actual priestly faith, their best engine of\npower, and also the supreme authority for power; in saints, finally a\npretext for hibernation, their _novissima gloria cupido,_ their peace\nin nothingness (\"God\"), their form of madness. 121\n\nAll good things were once bad things; from every original sin has grown\nan original virtue. Marriage, for example, seemed for a long time a sin\nagainst the rights of the community; a man formerly paid a fine for the\ninsolence of claiming one woman to himself. 144-145\n\nThe soft, benevolent yielding, sympathetic feelings--eventually valued\nso highly that they almost become \"intrinsic values,\" were for a very\nlong time actually despised by their possessors; gentleness was then a\nsubject for shame, just as hardness is now. 145\n\n_The ascetic ideal springs from the prophylactic and self-preservative\ninstincts which mark a decadent life,_ which seeks by every means in\nits power to maintain its position and fight for its existence; it\npoints to a partial physiological depression and exhaustion, against\nwhich the most profound and intact life-instincts fight ceaselessly\nwith new weapons and discoveries. The ascetic ideal is such a weapon:\nits position is consequently exactly the reverse of that which the\nworshippers of the ideal imagine--life struggles in it and through it\nwith death and _against_ death; the ascetic ideal is a dodge for the\n_preservation_ of life. 154\n\nThe ascetic priest is the incarnate wish for an existence of another\nkind, an existence on another plane,--he is, in fact, the highest\npoint of this wish, its official ecstasy and passion: but it is the\nvery _power_ of this wish which is the fetter that binds him here; it\nis just that which makes him into a tool that must labour to create\nmore favourable conditions for earthly existence, for existence on the\nhuman plane--it is with this very _power_ that he keeps the whole herd\nof failures, distortions, abortions, unfortunates, _sufferers from\nthemselves_ of every kind, fast to existence, while he as the herdsman\ngoes instinctively on in front. 154-155\n\nThe _sick_ are the great danger of man, _not_ the evil, _not_ the\n\"beasts of prey.\" They who are from the outset botched, oppressed,\nbroken, those are they, the weakest are they, who most undermine the\nlife beneath the feet of man, who instil the most dangerous venom and\nscepticism into our trust in life, in man, in ourselves. 157\n\nPreventing the sick making the healthy sick ... this ought to be our\nsupreme object in the world--but for this it is above all essential\nthat the healthy should remain _separated_ from the sick, that they\nshould even guard themselves from the look of the sick, that they\nshould not even associate with the sick. Or may it, perchance, be their\nmission to be nurses or doctors? But they could not mistake or disown\n_their_ mission more grossly--the higher _must_ not degrade itself to\nbe the tool of the lower, the pathos of distance must to all eternity\nkeep their missions also separate. The right of the happy to existence,\nthe right of bells with a full tone over the discordant cracked bells,\nis verily a thousand times greater: they alone are the _sureties_ of\nthe future, they alone are _bound_ to man's future. 160-161\n\nThe ascetic priest must be accepted by us as the predestined saviour,\nherdsman, and champion of the sick herd: thereby do we first understand\nhis awful historic mission. 162\n\n\"I suffer: it must be somebody's fault\"--so thinks every sick sheep.\nBut his herdsman, the ascetic priest, says to him, \"Quite so, my sheep,\nit must be the fault of some one; but thou thyself art that some one,\nit is all the fault of thyself alone--_it is the fault of thyself alone\nagainst thyself\":_ that is bold enough, false enough, but one thing is\nat least attained; thereby, as I have said, the course of resentment\nis--_diverted_. 165\n\nAll sick and diseased people strive instinctively after a\nherd-organisation, out of a desire to shake off their sense of\noppressive discomfort and weakness; the ascetic priest divines this\ninstinct and promotes it; wherever a herd exists it is the instinct\nof weakness which has wished for the herd, and the cleverness of the\npriests which has organised it, for, mark this: by an equally natural\nnecessity the strong strive as much for _isolation_ as the weak for\n_union:_ when the former bind themselves it is only with a view to an\naggressive joint action and joint satisfaction of their Will for Power,\nmuch against the wishes of their individual consciences; the latter,\non the contrary, range themselves together with positive _delight_ in\nsuch a muster--their instincts are as much gratified thereby as the\ninstincts of the \"born master\" (that is the solitary beast-of-prey\nspecies of man) are disturbed and wounded to the quick by organisation.\n176-177\n\nThe keynote by which the ascetic priest was enabled to get every kind\nof agonising and ecstatic music to play on the fibres of the human\nsoul--was, as every one knows, the exploitation of the feeling of\n_\"guilt.\"_ 182\n\nThe ascetic ideal and its sublime moral cult, this most ingenious,\nreckless, and perilous syst\u00e9matisation of all methods of emotional\nexcess, is writ large in a dreadful and unforgettable fashion on the\nwhole history of man, and unfortunately not only on history. I was\nscarcely able to put forward any other element which attacked the\n_health_ and race efficiency of Europeans with more destructive power\nthan did this ideal; it can be dubbed, without exaggeration, _the real\nfatality_ in the history of the health of the European man. 186-187\n\nThe ascetic ideal has corrupted not only health and taste, there are\nalso third, fourth, fifth, and sixth things which it has corrupted--I\nshall take care not to go through the catalogue (when should I get to\nthe end?). 190\n\nThe periods in a nation in which the learned man comes into prominence;\nthey are the periods of exhaustion, often of sunset, of decay--the\neffervescing strength, the confidence of life, the confidence in the\nfuture are no more. The preponderance of the mandarins never signifies\nany good, any more than does the advent of democracy, or arbitration\ninstead of war, equal rights for women, the religion of pity, and all\nthe other symptoms of declining life. 200\n\nThe ascetic ideal simply means this: that something _was lacking,_\nthat a tremendous _void_ encircled man--he did not know how to justify\nhimself, to explain himself, to affirm himself, he _suffered_ from the\nproblem of his own meaning. He suffered also in other ways, he was\nin the main a _diseased_ animal; but his problem was not suffering\nitself, but the lack of an answer to that crying question, \"_To what\npurpose_ do we suffer?\" Man, the bravest animal and the one most inured\nto suffering, does _not_ repudiate suffering in itself: he _wills_ it,\nhe even seeks it out, provided that he is shown a meaning for it, a\n_purpose_ of suffering was the curse which till then lay spread over\nhumanity--_and the ascetic ideal gave it a meaning!_ It was up till\nthen the only meaning; but any meaning is better than no meaning;\nthe ascetic ideal was in that connection the _\"faute de mieux\" par\nexcellence_ that existed at that time. In that ideal suffering _found\nan explanation;_ the tremendous gap seemed filled; the door to all\nsuicidal Nihilism was closed. The explanation--there is no doubt about\nit--brought in its train new suffering, deeper, more penetrating, more\nvenomous, gnawing more brutally into life: it brought all suffering\nunder the perspective of _guilt;_ but in spite of all that--man was\n_saved_ thereby, he had _a meaning,_ and from henceforth was no more\nlike a leaf in the wind, a shuttlecock, of chance, of nonsense, he\ncould now \"will\" something--absolutely immaterial to what end, to what\npurpose, with that means he wished: _the will itself was saved._ It\nis absolutely impossible to disguise _what_ in point of fact is made\nclear by every complete will that has taken its direction from the\nascetic ideal: this hate of the human, and even more of the animal,\nand more still of the material, this horror of the senses, of reason\nitself, this fear of happiness and beauty, this desire to get right\naway from all illusion, change, growth, death, wishing and even\ndesiring--all this means--let us have the courage to grasp it--a will\nfor Nothingness, a will opposed to life, a repudiation of the most\nfundamental conditions of life, but it is and remains _a will!_--and\nto say at the end that which I said at the beginning--man will wish\n_Nothingness_ rather than not wish _at all._ 210-211\n\n\n\n\nIX\n\n\n\"The Twilight of the Idols\"\n\n\nNietzsche followed \"The Genealogy of Morals\" with \"The Case of Wagner,\"\nthat famous pamphlet in which he excoriated the creator of Parsifal.\nImmediately after the publication of this attack, he began work on\nwhat was to be still another preparatory book for \"The Will to Power.\"\nFor its title he first chose \"Idle Hours of a Psychologist.\" The book,\na brief one, was already on the presses when he changed the caption\nto _\"G\u00f6tzend\u00e4mmerung\"_--\"The Twilight of the Idols\"--a titular\nparody on Wagner's _\"G\u00f6tterd\u00e4mmerung\"_ For a subtitle he appended a\ncharacteristically Nietzschean phrase--\"How to Philosophise with the\nHammer.\" The writing of this work was done with great rapidity: it was\naccomplished in but a few days during August, 1888. In September it\nwas sent to the publisher, but during its printing Nietzsche added a\nchapter headed \"What the Germans Lack,\" and several aphorisms to the\nsection called \"Skirmishes in a War with the Age.\" In January, 1889,\nthe book appeared.\n\nNietzsche was then stricken with his fatal illness, and this was the\nlast book of his to appear during his lifetime. \"The Antichrist\" was\nalready finished, having been written in the fall of 1888 immediately\nafter the completion of \"The Twilight of the Idols.\" _\"Ecce Homo\"_\nhis autobiography, was written in October, 1888; and during December\nNietzsche again gave his attention to Wagner, drafting \"Nietzsche\n_contra_ Wagner,\" a pamphlet made up entirely of excerpts from his\nearlier writings. This work, intended to supplement \"The Case of\nWagner,\" was not published until 1895, although it had been printed\nand corrected before the author's final breakdown. \"The Antichrist\"\nappeared at the same time as this second Wagner document, while _\"Ecce\nHomo\"_ was withheld from publication until 1908. \"The Twilight of the\nIdols\" sold 9,000 copies, but Nietzsche's mind was too clouded to\nknow or care that at last he was coming into his own, that the public\nwhich had denied him so long had finally begun to open its eyes to his\ngreatness.\n\nIn many ways \"The Twilight of the Idols\" is one of Nietzsche's most\nbrilliant books. Being more compact, it consequently possesses a\ngreater degree of precision and clarity than is found in his more\nanalytical writings. It is not, however, a treatise to which one may\ngo without considerable preparation. With the exception of \"Thus\nSpake Zarathustra,\" it demands more on the part of the reader than\nany of Nietzsche's other books. It is, for the most part, composed\nof conclusions and comments which grow directly out of the laborious\nethical research of his preceding volumes, and presupposes in the\nstudent an enormous amount of reading, not only of Nietzsche's own\nwritings but of philosophical works in general. But once equipped with\nthis preparation, one will find more of contemporary interest in it\nthan in the closely organised books such as \"Beyond Good and Evil\"\nand \"The Genealogy of Morals.\" There are few points in Nietzsche's\nphilosophy not found here. For a compact expression of his entire\nteaching I know of no better book to which one might turn. Nietzsche\nhimself, to judge from a passage in his _\"Ecce Homo\"_ intended this\nbook as a statement of his whole ethical system. He probably meant\nthat it should present _in toto_ the principal data of his foregoing\nstudies, in order that the reader might be familiar with all the steps\nin his philosophy before setting forth upon the formidable doctrines\nof \"The Will to Power.\" Obviously, therefore, it is not a book for\nbeginners. Being expositional rather than argumentative, it is open\nto misunderstanding and misinterpretation. It contains apparent\ncontradictions which might confuse the student who has not followed\nNietzsche in the successive points which led to his conclusions, and\nwho is unfamiliar with the exact definitions attached to certain words\nrelating to human conduct.\n\nOther qualities of a misleading nature are to be encountered in this\nbook. Many of the paragraphs have about them an air of mere cleverness,\nalthough in reality they embody profound concepts. The reader ignorant\nof the inner seriousness of Nietzsche will accept these passages only\nat their surface value. Of the forty-four short epigrams which comprise\nthe opening chapter, I have appended but three, for fear they would be\njudged solely by their superficial characteristics. Many of the other\naphorisms throughout the book lend themselves all too easily to the\nsame narrow judgment.\n\nAgain, \"The Problem of Socrates,\" the second division of the book,\nbecause of its profundity, presents many difficulties to the unprepared\nstudent. Here is a criticism of the Socratic ideals which requires,\nin order that it be intelligently grasped, not only a wide general\nknowledge, but also a specific training in the uprooting of prejudices\nand of traditional ethical conceptions--such a training as can be\nacquired only by a close study of Nietzsche's own destructive works.\nThe explanation of Socrates's power, the condemnation of that ancient\nphilosopher's subtle glorification of the _canaille,_ the reasons\nfor his secret fascination, and the interpretation of his whole\nmental progress culminating in his death--all this is profound and\ncategorical criticism which has its roots in the very fundamentals of\nNietzsche's philosophy. But because it is so deep-rooted, it therefore\npresents a wide and all-inclusive vista of that philosophy from which\nit stems. Furthermore, this criticism of Socrates poses a specific\nproblem which can be answered only by resorting to the doctrines which\nunderlie Nietzsche's entire thought. In like manner the chapter,\n\"Reason in Philosophy,\" is understandable only in the light of those\ninvestigations set forth in \"Beyond Good and Evil.\"\n\nUnder the caption, \"The Four Great Errors,\" Nietzsche uproots a series\nof correlated beliefs which have the accumulated impetus of centuries\nof acceptance behind them. These \"errors,\" as stated, are (1) the\nerror of the confusion of cause and effect, (2) the error of false\ncausality, (3) the error of imaginary causes, and (4) the error of\nfree will. The eradication of these errors is necessary for a complete\nacceptance of Nietzsche's philosophy. But unless one is familiar with\nthe vast amount of criticism which has led up to the present discussion\nof them, one will experience difficulty in following the subtly drawn\narguments and analogies presented against them. To demonstrate briefly\nthe specific application of the first error, namely: the confusion of\ncause and effect, I offer an analogy stated in the passage. We know\nthat Christian morality teaches us that a people perish through vice\nand luxury--that is to say, that these two conditions are _causes_ of\nracial degeneration. Nietzsche's contention to the contrary is that\nwhen a nation is approaching physiological degeneration, vice and\nluxury result in the guise of stimuli adopted by exhausted natures.\nBy this it can be seen how the Christian conscience is developed by\na misunderstanding of causes; and it can also be seen how this error\nmay affect the very foundation on which morality is built. I am here\nstating merely the conclusion: for the reasons leading up to this\nconclusion one must go to the book direct.\n\nNietzsche denies the embodiment of the motive of an action in the\n\"inner facts of consciousness\" where, so we have been taught by\npsychologists and physicists, the responsibilities of conduct are\ncontained. The will itself, he argues, is not a motivating force;\nrather is it an effect of other deeper causes. This is what he\ndiscusses in his paragraphs dealing with the second error of false\ncausality. In his criticism of the third error relating to imaginary\ncauses, he points to the comfort we obtain by attributing a certain\nunexplained fact to a familiar cause--by tracing it to a commonplace\nsource--thereby doing away with its seeming mystery. Thus ordinary\nmaladies or afflictions, or, to carry the case into moral regions,\nmisfortunes and unaccountable strokes of fate, are explained by finding\ntrite and plausible reasons for their existence. As a consequence\nthe habit of postulating causes becomes a fixed mental habit. In the\ngreat majority of cases, and especially in the domain of morality and\nreligion, the causes are false, inasmuch as the operation of finding\nthem depends on the mental characteristics of the searcher. The error\nof free will Nietzsche attributes to the theologians' attempt to make\nmankind responsible for its acts and therefore amenable to punishment.\nI have been able to present his own words in explanation of this\nerror, and they will be found at the end of this chapter--41-42 and 43.\n\nIn \"Skirmishes in a War with the Age,\" the longest section in the\nbook, Nietzsche gives us much brilliant and incisive criticism of men,\nart and human attributes. He is here at his best, both in clarity of\nmind and in his manner of expression. This passage, one of the last\nthings to come from his pen, contains the full ripeness of his nature,\nand is a portion of his work which no student can afford to overlook.\nIt contains the whole of the Nietzschean philosophy applied to the\nconditions of his age. Because it is not a direct voicing of his\ndoctrines it does not lend itself to mutilation except where it touches\non principles of conduct and abstract aspects of morality. Many of the\nmost widely read passages of all of Nietzsche's work are contained in\nit. But here again, as in the case of \"Thus Spake Zarathustra,\" one\nregrets that the surface brilliance of its style attracted readers in\nEngland and America before these nations were acquainted with the books\nwhich came before. The casual reader, unfamiliar with the principles\nunderlying Nietzsche's ethic, will see only a bold and satanic\nflippancy in his definition of Zola--\"the love of stinking,\" or in his\ncharacterisation of George Sand as \"the cow with plenty of beautiful\nmilk,\" or in his bracketing of \"tea-grocers, Christians, cows, women,\nEnglishmen and other democrats.\" Yet it is significant that Nietzsche\ndid not venture upon these remarks until he had the great bulk of his\nlife's work behind him.\n\nIn this chapter are discussions of Renan, Sainte-Beuve, George Eliot,\nGeorge Sand, Emerson, Carlyle, Darwin, Schopenhauer, Goethe and other\nfamous men and women. In the short essays devoted to these writers\nwe have, however, more than mere detached valuations. Beneath all the\ncriticisms is a _rationale_ of judgment based on definite philosophical\ndoctrines. This same basis of appreciation is present in the discussion\nof art and artists, to which subjects many pages are devoted. In fact,\n\"The Twilight of the Idols\" contains most of the art theories and\n\u00e6sthetic doctrines which Nietzsche advanced. He defines the psychology\nof the artist, and draws the line between the two concepts, Apollonian\nand Dionysian, as applied to art. He analyses the meaning of beauty\nand ugliness, and endeavours to show in what manner the conceptions of\nthese qualities are related to the racial instincts. He also inquires\ninto the doctrine of _\"l'art pour l'art\"_ and points out wherein it\nfails in its purpose. A valuable explanation of \"genius\" is put forth\nin the theory that the accumulative power of generations breaks forth\nin the great men of a nation, and that these great men mark the end of\nan age, as in the case of the Renaissance.\n\nThe most significant brief essay in this section is an answer made\nto certain critics who, in reviewing \"Beyond Good and Evil,\" claimed\na superiority for the present age over the older civilisations.\nNietzsche calls this essay \"Have We Become Moral?\" and proceeds to make\ncomparisons of contemporaneous virtues with those of the ancients.\nHe denies that to-day, without our decrepit humanitarianism and our\ndoctrines of weakness, we would be able to withstand, either nervously\nor muscularly, the conditions that prevailed during the Renaissance.\nHe points out that our morals are those of senility, and that we\nhave deteriorated, physically as well as mentally, as a result of\nan adherence to a code of morality invented to meet the needs of a\nweak and impoverished people. Our virtues, he says, are determined\nand stimulated by our weakness, so that we have come to admire the\nmoralities of the slave, the most prominent among which is the doctrine\nof equality. In the decline of all the positive forces of life\nNietzsche sees only racial decadence. In this regard it is important\nto take note of one of the passages relative to the discussion of this\ndecadence, namely: the one wherein he characterises the anarchist as\n\"the mouthpiece of the decaying strata of society.\" The appellation of\n\"anarchist\" has not infrequently been applied to Nietzsche himself by\nthose who have read him superficially or whose acquaintance with him\nhas been the result of distorted hearsay. I know of no better analysis\nof anarchistic motives or of no keener dissection of anarchistic\nweakness than is set forth here. Nor do I know of any better answer to\nthose critics who have accused Nietzsche of anarchy, than the criticism\ncontained in this passage.\n\nIn a final chapter, under the caption of \"Things I Owe to the\nAncients,\" Nietzsche outlines the inspirational source of many of his\ndoctrines and literary habits. This chapter is important only to the\nstudent who wishes to go to the remoter influences in Nietzsche's\nwritings, and for that reason I have omitted from the following\nexcerpts any quotation from it.\n\n\nEXCERPTS FROM \"THE TWILIGHT OF THE IDOLS\"\n\nMan thinks woman profound--why? Because he can never fathom her depths.\nWoman is not even shallow. 5\n\nThe trodden worm curls up. This testifies to its caution. It thus\nreduces its chances of being trodden upon again. In the language of\nmorality: Humility. 5-6\n\nThe Church combats passion by means of excision of all kinds: its\npractise, its \"remedy,\" is _castration._ It never inquires \"how can a\ndesire be spiritualised, beautified, deified?\"--In all ages it has laid\nthe weight of discipline in the process of extirpation (the extirpation\nof sensuality, pride, lust of dominion, lust of property, and\nrevenge).--But to attack the passions at their roots, means attacking\nlife itself at its source: the method of the Church is hostile to life.\n27\n\nOnly degenerates find radical methods indispensable: weakness of will,\nor more strictly speaking, the inability not to react to a stimulus,\nis in itself simply another form of degeneracy. Radical and mortal\nhostility to sensuality, remains a suspicious symptom: it justifies\none in being suspicious of the general state of one who goes to such\nextremes. 27\n\nA man is productive only in so far as he is rich in contrasted\ninstincts; he can remain young only on condition that his soul does not\nbegin to take things easy and to yearn for peace. 28-29\n\nAll naturalism is morality--that is to say, every sound morality is\nruled by a life instinct--any one of the laws of life is fulfilled by\nthe definite canon \"thou shalt,\" \"thou shalt not,\" and any sort of\nobstacle or hostile element in the road of life is thus cleared away.\nConversely, the morality which is antagonistic to nature--that is to\nsay, almost every morality that has been taught, honoured and preached\nhitherto, is directed precisely against the life-instincts.... 30\n\nMorality, as it has been understood hitherto, is the instinct of\ndegeneration itself, which converts itself into an imperative: it says:\n\"Perish!\" It is the death sentence of men who are already doomed. 31\n\nMorality, in so far it condemns _per se,_ and _not_ out of any aim,\nconsideration or motive of life, is a specific error, for which no one\nshould feel any mercy, a degenerate idiosyncrasy, that has done an\nunutterable amount of harm. 32\n\nEvery mistake is in every sense the sequel to degeneration of the\ninstincts to disintegration of the will. This is almost the definition\nof evil. 35\n\nMorality and religion are completely and utterly parts of the\npsychology of error: in every particular case cause and effect are\nconfounded. 41\n\nAt present we no longer have any mercy upon the concept \"free-will\":\nwe know only too well what it is--the most egregious theological trick\nthat has ever existed for the purpose of making mankind \"responsible\"\nin a theological manner--that is to say, to make mankind dependent upon\ntheologians. 41\n\nThe doctrine of the will was invented principally for the purpose of\npunishment,--that is to say, with the intention of tracing guilt. The\nwhole of ancient psychology, or the psychology of the will, is the\noutcome of the fact that its originators, who were the priests at the\nhead of ancient communities, wanted to create for themselves a right to\nadminister punishments--or the right for God to do so. Men were thought\nof as \"free\" in order that they might be held guilty.... 42\n\nThe fact that no one shall any longer be made responsible, that the\nnature of existence may not be traced to a _causa prima,_ that the\nworld is an entity neither as a sensorium nor as a spirit--_this alone\nis the great deliverance,_--thus alone is the innocence of Becoming\nrestored. ... The concept \"God\" has been the greatest objection to\nexistence hitherto.... We deny God, we deny responsibility in God: thus\nalone do we save the world. 43\n\nMoral judgment has this in common with the religious one, that\nit believes in realities which are not real. Morality is only an\ninterpretation of certain phenomena: or more strictly speaking, a\nmisinterpretation of them. Moral judgment, like the religious one,\nbelongs to a stage of ignorance in which even the concept of reality,\nthe distinction between real and imagined things, is still lacking....\n44\n\nIn the early years of the Middle Ages, during which the Church was\nmost distinctly and above all a menagerie, the most beautiful examples\nof the \"blond beast\" were hunted down in all directions,--the noble\nGermans, for instance, were \"improved.\" But what did this \"improved\"\nGerman, who had been lured to the monastery look like after the\nprocess? He looked like a caricature of man, like an abortion: he had\nbecome a \"sinner,\" he was caged up, he had been imprisoned behind a\nhost of appalling notions. He now lay there, sick, wretched, malevolent\neven toward himself: full of hate for the instincts of life, full of\nsuspicion in regard to all that is still strong and happy. In short\na \"Christian.\" In physiological terms: in a fight with an animal,\nthe only way of making it weak may be to make it sick. The Church\nunderstood this: it ruined man, it made him weak,--but it laid claim to\nhaving \"improved\" him. 45-46\n\nAll means which have been used heretofore with the object of making man\nmoral, were through and through immoral. 49\n\n_My impossible people_--Seneca, or the toreador of virtue.--Rousseau,\nor the return to nature, _in impuris naturalibus._--Schiller, or\nthe Moral Trumpeter of S\u00e4ckingen.--Dante, or the hy\u00e6na that writes\npoetry in tombs.--Kant, or _cant_ as an intelligible character.--Victor\nHugo, or the lighthouse on the sea of nonsense.--Liszt, or the\nschool of racing--after women.--George Sand, or _lactea ubertas,_\nin plain English: the cow with plenty beautiful milk.--Michelet,\nor enthusiasm in its shirt sleeves.--Carlyle, or Pessimism after\nundigested meals.--John Stuart Mill, or offensive lucidity.--The\nbrothers Goncourt, or the two Ajaxes fighting with Homer. Music by\nOffenbach.--Zola, or the love of stinking. 60\n\nFor art to be possible at all--that is to say, in order that an\n\u00e6sthetic mode of action and of observation may exist, a certain\npreliminary physiological state is indispensable: ecstasy. This state\nof ecstasy must first have intensified the susceptibility of the whole\nmachine: otherwise, no art is possible. All kinds of ecstasy, however\ndifferently produced, have this power to create art, and above all\nthe state dependent upon sexual excitement--this most venerable and\nprimitive form of ecstasy. The same applies to that ecstasy which is\nthe outcome of all great desires, all strong passions; the ecstasy of\nthe feast, of the arena, of the act of bravery, of victory, of all\nextreme action; the ecstasy of cruelty; the ecstasy of destruction;\nthe ecstasy following upon certain meteorological influences, as for\ninstance that of springtime, or upon the use of narcotics; and finally\nthe ecstasy of will, that ecstasy which results from accumulated and\nsurging will-power. 68-68\n\nWhat is the meaning of the antithetical concepts _Apollonian_ and\n_Dionysian_ which I have introduced into the vocabulary of \u00c6sthetic, as\nrepresenting two distinct modes of ecstasy?--Apollonian ecstasy acts\nabove all as a force stimulating the eye, so that it acquires the power\nof vision. The painter, the sculptor, the epic poet are essentially\nvisionaries. In the Dionysian state, on the other hand, the whole\nsystem of passions is stimulated and intensified, so that it discharges\nitself by all the means of expression at once, and vents all its power\nof representation, of imitation, of transfiguration, of transformation,\ntogether with every kind of mimicry and histrionic display at the same\ntime. 67-68\n\nAs to the famous \"struggle for existence,\" it seems to me, for the\npresent, to be more of an assumption than a fact. It does occur, but\nas an exception. The general condition of life is not one of want or\nfamine, but rather of riches, of lavish luxuriance, and even of absurd\nprodigality,--where there is a struggle, it is a struggle for power. 71\n\nThe most intellectual men, provided they are also the most courageous,\nexperience the most excruciating tragedies: but on that very account\nthey honour life, because it confronts them with its more formidable\nantagonism. 73\n\nWhen the anarchist, as the mouthpiece of the decaying strata of\nsociety, raises his voice in splendid indignation for \"right,\"\n\"justice,\" \"equal rights,\" he is only groaning under the burden of his\nignorance, which cannot understand _why_ he actually suffers,--what his\npoverty consists of--the poverty of life. 86\n\nTo bewail one's lot is always despicable: it is always the outcome\nof weakness. Whether one ascribes one's afflictions to others or to\n_one's self,_ it is all the same. The socialist does the former, the\nChristian, for instance, does the latter. That which is common to both\nattitudes, or rather that which is equally ignoble in them both, is the\nfact that somebody must be to _blame_ if one suffers--in short that the\nsufferer drugs himself with the honey of revenge to allay his anguish.\n86\n\nWhy a Beyond, if it be not a means of splashing mud over a \"Here,\" over\nthis world? 87\n\nAn \"altruistic\" morality, a morality under which selfishness withers,\nis in all circumstances a bad sign. This is true of individuals and\nabove all of nations. The best are lacking when selfishness begins to\nbe lacking. Instinctively to select that which is harmful to one, to be\n_lured_ by \"disinterested\" motives,--these things almost provide the\nformula for decadence. \"Not to have one's own interests at heart\"--this\nis simply a moral fig-leaf concealing a very different fact, a\nphysiological one, to wit:--\"I no longer know how to find what is to\nmy interest.\"... Disintegration of the instincts!--All is up with man\nwhen he becomes altruistic. 87\n\nOne should die proudly when it is no longer possible to live proudly.\nDeath should be chosen freely,--death at the right time, faced clearly\nand joyfully and embraced while one is surrounded by one's children\nand other witnesses. It should be affected in such a way that a proper\nfarewell is still possible, that he who is about to take leave of us\nis still _himself,_ and really capable not only of valuing what he has\nachieved and willed in life, but also of _summing-up_ the value of life\nitself. Everything precisely the opposite of the ghastly comedy which\nChristianity has made of the hour of death. We should never forgive\nChristianity for having so abused the weakness of the dying man as to\ndo violence to his conscience, or for having used his manner of dying\nas a means of valuing both man and his past!--In spite of all cowardly\nprejudices, it is our duty, in this respect, above all to reinstate\nthe proper--that is to say, the physiological, aspect of so-called\n_natural_ death, which after all is perfectly \"unnatural\" and nothing\nelse than suicide. One never perishes through anybody's fault but\none's own. The only thing is that the death which takes place in the\nmost contemptible circumstances, the death that is not free, the death\nwhich occurs at the wrong time, is the death of a coward. Out of the\nvery love one bears to life, one should wish death to be different\nfrom this--that is to say, free, deliberate, and neither a matter of\nchance nor of surprise. Finally let me whisper a word of advice to our\nfriends the pessimists and all other decadents. We have not the power\nto prevent ourselves from being born: but this error--for sometimes it\nis an error--can be rectified if we choose. The man who does away with\nhimself performs the most estimable of deeds: he almost deserves to\nlive for having done so. 88-89\n\nThe decline of the instincts of hostility and of those instincts\nthat arouse suspicion,--for this if anything is what constitutes our\nprogress--is only one of the results manifested by the general decline\nin _vitality:_ it requires a hundred times more trouble and caution\nto live such a dependent and senile existence. In such circumstances\neverybody gives everybody else a helping hand, and, to a certain\nextent, everybody is either an invalid or an invalid's attendant.\nThis is then called \"virtue\": among those men who knew a different\nlife--that is to say, a fuller, more prodigal, more superabundant\nsort of life, it might have been called by another name,--possibly\n\"cowardice,\" or \"vileness,\" or \"old woman's morality.\" 91-92\n\nAges should be measured according to their _positive forces;_--valued\nby this standard that prodigal and fateful age of the Renaissance,\nappears as the last _great_ age, while we moderns with our anxious\ncare of ourselves and love of our neighbours, with all our unassuming\nvirtues of industry, equity, and scientific method--with our lust of\ncollection, of economy and of mechanism--represent a _weak_ age. 93\n\nLiberalism, or, in plain English, the _transformation of mankind into\ncattle._ 94\n\nFreedom is the will to be responsible for ourselves. It is to\npreserve the distance which separates us from other men. To grow more\nindifferent to hardship, to severity, to privation, and even to life\nitself. To be ready to sacrifice men for one's cause, one's self\nincluded. Freedom denotes that the virile instincts which rejoice in\nwar and in victory, prevail over other instincts; for instance, over\nthe instincts of \"happiness.\" The man who has won his freedom, and how\nmuch more so, therefore, the spirit that has won his freedom, tramples\nruthlessly upon that contemptible kind of comfort which tea-grocers,\nChristians, cows, women, Englishmen and other democrats worship in\ntheir dreams. The free man is a _warrior._ 94-95\n\nBy showing ever more and more favour to _love-marriages,_ the very\nfoundation of matrimony, that which alone makes it an institution, has\nbeen undermined. No institution ever has been nor ever will be built\nupon an idiosyncrasy; as I say, marriage cannot be based upon \"love.\"\n97-98\n\nThe mere fact that there is such a thing as the question of the\nworking-man is due to stupidity, or at bottom to degenerate instincts\nwhich are the cause of all the stupidity of modern times. Concerning\ncertain things _no questions ought to be put:_ the first imperative\nprinciple of instinct. For the life of me I cannot see what people\nwant to do with the working-man of Europe; now that they have made a\nquestion of him. He is far too comfortable to cease from questioning,\never more and more, and with ever less modesty. After all, he has\nthe majority on his side. There is now not the slightest hope that\nan unassuming and contented sort of man, after the style of the\nChinaman, will come into being in this quarter: and this would have\nbeen the reasonable course, it was even a dire necessity. What has\nbeen done? Everything has been done with the view of nipping the\nvery pre-requisite of this accomplishment in the bud,--with the most\nfrivolous thoughtlessness those self-same instincts by means of which\na working-class becomes possible, and _tolerable_ even to its members\nthemselves, have been destroyed root and branch. The working-man has\nbeen declared fit for military service; he has been granted the right\nof combination, and of franchise: can it be wondered at that he already\nregards his condition as one of distress (expressed morally, as an\ninjustice)? But, again I ask, what do people want? If they desire a\ncertain end, then they should desire the means thereto. If they will\nhave slaves, then it is madness to educate them to be masters. 98-99\n\nGreat men, like great ages, are explosive material, in which a\nstupendous amount of power is accumulated; the first conditions of\ntheir existence are always historical and physiological; they are the\noutcome of the fact that for long ages energy has been collected,\nhoarded up, saved up and preserved for their use, and that no explosion\nhas taken place. When the tension in the bulk has become sufficiently\nexcessive, the most fortuitous stimulus suffices in order to call\n\"genius,\" \"great deeds,\" and momentous fate into the world. 101-102\n\nThe criminal type is the type of the strong man and unfavourable\nconditions, a strong man made sick. He lacks the wild and savage\nstate, a form of nature and existence which is freer and more\ndangerous, in which everything that constitutes the shield and the\nsword in the instinct of the strong man, takes a place by right.\nSociety puts a ban upon his virtues; the most spirited instincts\ninherent in him immediately become involved with the depressing\npassions, with suspicion, fear and dishonour. But this is almost the\nrecipe for physiological degeneration. When a man has to do that\nwhich he is best suited to do, which he is most fond of doing, not\nonly clandestinely, but also with long suspense, caution and ruse, he\nbecomes an\u00e6mic; and inasmuch as he is always having to pay for his\ninstincts in the form of danger, persecution and fatalities, even his\nfeelings begin to turn against these instincts--he begins to regard\nthem as fatal. It is society, our tame, mediocre, castrated society,\nin which an untutored son of nature who comes to us from his mountains\nor from his adventures at sea, must necessarily degenerate into a\ncriminal. Or almost necessarily: for there are cases in which such a\nman shows himself to be stronger than society: the Corsican Napoleon is\nthe most celebrated case of this. 103-104\n\nAs long as the _priest_ represented the highest type of man, every\nvaluable kind of man was depreciated.... The time is coming--this I\nguarantee--when he will pass as the _lowest_ type, as our Chandala, as\nthe falsest and most disreputable kind of man. 105\n\nEverything good is an inheritance: that which is not inherited is\nimperfect, it is simply a beginning. 107\n\nChristianity with its contempt of the body is the greatest mishap that\nhas ever befallen mankind. 108\n\nI also speak of a \"return to nature,\" although it is not a process of\ngoing back but of going up--up into lofty, free and even terrible\nnature and naturalness; such a nature as can play with great tasks and\n_may_ play with them. 108\n\nThe doctrine of equality!... But there is no more deadly poison than\nthis for it _seems_ to proceed from the very lips of justice, whereas\nin reality it draws the curtain down on all justice.... \"To equals\nequality, to unequals inequality\"--that would be the real speech of\njustice and that which follows from it. \"Never make unequal things\nequal.\" The fact that so much horror and blood are associated with this\ndoctrine of equality, has lent this \"modern idea\" _par excellence_ such\na halo of fire and glory, that the Revolution as a drama has misled\neven the most noble minds. 108-109\n\n\n\n\nX\n\n\n\"The Antichrist\" (\"_Der Antichrist_\") was written in September, 1888,\nwork evidently having been begun on it as soon as \"The Twilight of the\nIdols\" had been sent to the publisher. Its composition could not have\noccupied more than a few weeks at most, for the former book was not\ndespatched until September 7, and the present work was completed before\nOctober. At this time Nietzsche was working at high pressure. He must\nhave had some presentiment of his impending breakdown for he filled in\nevery available minute with ardent and rapid writing. The fall of 1888\nwas the most prolific period of his life. No less than four books \"The\nTwilight of the Idols,\" \"The Antichrist,\" \"Nietzsche _contra_ Wagner\"\nand _\"Ecce Homo\"_--were completed by him between the late summer and\nthe first of the year; and in addition to this he made many notes for\nhis future volumes and read and corrected a considerable amount of\nproofs. \"The Antichrist,\" however, though completed in 1888, was not\npublished until the end of 1894, six years after he had laid aside his\nwork forever, and at a time when his mind was too darkened to know or\ncare about the circumstances of its issuance. It appeared in Vol. XIII\nof _Nietzsches Werke_ which, although published at the close of 1894,\nbore the date of the following year.\n\n\"The Antichrist\" which, like \"Beyond Good and Evil,\" \"The Genealogy of\nMorals\" and \"The Twilight of the Idols,\" forms a part of Nietzsche's\nfinal philosophic scheme, was intended--to judge from the evidence\ncontained in his notebooks--as the first division of a work to be\nentitled \"The Trans valuation of All Values\" (\"_Die Umwertung Aller\nWerte_\"). In fact this title and also \"The Will to Power\" were\nconsidered alternately for his _magnum opus_ which he intended writing\nafter the completion of \"The Transvaluation of All Values.\" He finally\ndecided on the latter title for his great work, although he used the\nformer caption as a subtitle. The complete outline for the volumes\nwhich were to be called \"The Transvaluation of All Values\" and which\nwere to be incorporated in his final general plan, is as follows:\n\n1. \"The Antichrist. An Attempted Criticism of Christianity.\" (\"_Der\nAntichrist: Versuch einer Kritik des Christenthums._\")\n\n2. \"The Free Spirit. A Criticism of Philosophy as a Nihilistic\nMovement.\" (\"_Der freie Geist: Kritik der Philosophie als einer\nnihilistischen Bewegung_\")\n\n3. \"The Immoralist. A Criticism of the Most Fatal Species of Ignorance,\nMorality.\" (\"_Der Immoralist: Kritik der verh\u00e4ngnissvollsten Art von\nUnwissenheit, der Moral_\")\n\n4. \"Dionysus, the Philosophy of Eternal Recurrence.\" (\"_Dionysus,\nPhilosophie der ewigen Wiederkunft_\")\n\nBut Nietzsche did not finish this task, although \"The Antichrist\" is\nin the form in which he intended it to be published. Nevertheless, it\nmust be considered merely as a fragment of a much more extensive plan.\nThough Nietzsche was far from being the first, he yet was the most\neffective critic who ever waged war against Christianity. This was due\nto the fact that he went about his destructive work from an entirely\nnew angle. Before him there had been many competent anti-Christian\nwriters and scientists. Even during his own time there was a large and\nloud school of atheists at work undermining the foundations of Nazarene\nmorality. With the methods of his predecessors and contemporaries,\nhowever, he had nothing in common. He saw that, despite the scientific\ndenial of the miracles of Christianity and the biological opposition\nto the origin of Christian history, the theologian was always able to\nreply to the denial of Christian truth with the counter-argument of\nChristian practicability. Thus, while the reasoning of such men as\nDarwin, Huxley and Spencer held good so far as the scientific aspects\nof Christianity went, the results of Christianity were not involved.\nThe church, meeting the onslaughts of the \"higher criticism,\" denied\nthe necessity of a literal belief in the Gospels, and asserted that,\nwhile all the anti-Christian critics might be accurate in their purely\nscientific and logical conclusions, Christianity itself as a workable\ncode was still efficient and deserving of consideration as the most\nperfect system of conduct the world had ever known. Nietzsche therefore\ndid not go into the field already ploughed by Voltaire, Hume, Huxley,\nSpencer, Paine and a host of lesser \"free thinkers.\" The preliminary\nbattles in the great warfare against Christianity had already been won,\nand he saw the futility of proceeding along historical and scientific\nlines. Consequently he turned his attention to a consideration of\nthe _effects_ of Christian morality upon the race, to an inquiry\ninto the _causes_ of pity-morality, and to a comparison of moral\ncodes in their relation to the needs of humanity. Whether or not the\norigins of Christianity conformed to biological laws did not concern\nhim, although he assumed as his hypothesis the conclusions of the\nscientific investigators. The only way of determining the merits and\ndemerits of the Christian code, he argued, was to ascertain the actual\nresults of its application, and to compare these with the results which\nhad accrued from the application of hardier and healthier codes. To\nthis investigation Nietzsche devotes practically the whole of \"The\nAntichrist,\" although there are a few analytical passages relating to\nthe early dissemination of Jewish ethics. But with these passages the\nstudent need not seriously concern himself. They are speculative and\nnon-essential.\n\nNietzsche's criticism of the effects of Christian virtues, however,\ndid not begin in \"The Antichrist,\" although this book is the final\nflowering of those anti-Christian ideas which cropped up continually\nthroughout his entire work. This religious antipathy was present even\nin his early academic essays, and in \"Human, All-Too-Human\" we find him\nwell launched upon his campaign. No book of his, with the exception of\nhis unfinished pamphlet, \"The Eternal Recurrence,\" is free from this\ncriticism. But one will find all his earlier conclusions and arguments\ndrawn together in a compact and complete whole in the present volume.\n\nNietzsche's accusation against Christianity, reduced to a few words,\nis that it works against the higher development of the individual;\nthat, being a religion of weakness, it fails to meet the requirements\nof the modern man; in short, that it is _dangerous._ This conclusion\nis founded on the principle of biological monism. Nietzsche assumes\nDarwin's law of the struggle for existence, and argues that the\nChristian virtues oppose not only this law but the law of natural\nselection as well. By this opposition the race has been weakened,\nfor self-sacrifice, the basis of Christian morality, detracts from\nthe power of the individual and consequently lessens his chances for\nexistence. Furthermore, the Christian ideal in itself is opposed to\nprogress and all that progress entails, such as science and research.\nKnowledge of any kind tends to make man more independent, and thereby\nreduces his need for theological supervision. As a result of the\npassing over of power from the strong to the weak, in accordance with\nthe morality of Christianity, the strength of the race as a whole is\ndepleted. Furthermore, such a procedure is in direct opposition to\nthe laws of nature, and so long as man lives in a natural environment\nthe only way to insure progress is to conform to the conditions of\nthat environment. Nietzsche therefore makes a plea for the adoption\nof other than Christian standards--standards compatible with the laws\nof existence. He points out that already the race has been almost\nirremediably weakened by its adherence to anti-natural doctrines,\nthat each day of Christian activity is another step in the complete\ndegeneration of man. And he asserts that the only reason the race\nhas maintained its power as long as it has is because the stronger\nmembers of society, despite their voiced belief, do not live up to the\nChristian code, but are continually compromising with it.\n\nThe problem of the origin of Christianity interests Nietzsche, because\nhe sees in it an explanation of the results which it wished to\naccomplish. Christianity, says he, can be understood only in relation\nto the soil out of which it grew. When the Jewish people, subjugated\nand in a position of slavery, were confronted with the danger of\nextermination at the hands of a stronger people, they invented a system\nof conduct which would insure their continued existence. They realised\nthat the adherence to such virtues as retaliation, aggressiveness,\ninitiative, cruelty, arrogance and the like would mean death; the\nstronger nations would not have countenanced such qualities in a weak\nand depleted nation. As a result the Jews replaced retaliation with\n\"long suffering,\" aggressiveness with peacefulness, cruelty with\nkindness, and arrogance with humility. These _negative_ virtues took\nthe place of positive virtues, and were turned into \"beatitudes.\"\nBy thus \"turning the other cheek\" and \"forgiving one's enemies,\"\ninstead of resenting persecution and attempting to avenge the wrongs\nperpetrated against them, they were able to prolong life. This system\nof conduct, says Nietzsche, was a direct falsification of all natural\nconditions and a perversion of all healthy instincts. It was the\nmorality of an impoverished and subservient people, and was adopted by\nthe Jews only when they had been stripped of their power.\n\nNietzsche presents a psychological history of Israel as an example of\nthe process by which natural values were denaturalised. The God of\nIsrael was Jehovah. He was the expression of the nation's consciousness\nof power, of joy and of hope. Victory and salvation were expected\nfrom him: he was the God of justice. The Assyrians and internal\nanarchy changed the conditions of Israel. Jehovah was no longer able\nto bring victory to his people, and consequently the nature of this\nGod was changed. In the hands of the priest he became a weapon, and\nunhappiness was interpreted as punishment for \"sins.\" Jehovah became a\nmoral dictator, and consequently morality among the Israelites ceased\nto be an expression of the conditions of life and became an abstract\ntheory opposed to life. Nor did the Jewish priesthood stop at this. It\ninterpreted the whole of history with a view to showing that all sin\nagainst Jehovah led to punishment and that all pious worship of Jehovah\nresulted in reward. A moral order of the universe was thus substituted\nfor a natural one. To bolster up this theory a \"revelation\" became\nnecessary. Accordingly a \"stupendous literary fraud\" was perpetrated,\nand the \"holy scriptures\" were \"discovered\" and foisted upon the\npeople. The priests, avid for power, made themselves indispensable\nby attributing to the will of God all those acts they desired of the\npeople. Repentance, namely: submission to the priests, was inaugurated.\nThus Christianity, hostile to all reality and power, gained its footing.\n\nThe psychology of Christ, as set forth in \"The Antichrist,\" and the\nuse made of his doctrines by those who directly followed him, form an\nimportant part of Nietzsche's argument against Christian morality.\nChrist's doctrine, according to Nietzsche, was one of immediacy. It\nwas a mode of conduct and not, according to the present Christian\nconception, a preparation for a future world. Christ was a simple\nheretic in his rebellion against the existing political order. He\nrepresented a reactionary mode of existence---a system of conduct which\nsaid Nay to life, a code of inaction and non-interference. His death on\nthe cross was meant as a supreme example and proof of this doctrine.\nIt remained for his disciples to attach other meanings to it. Loving\nChrist as they did, and consequently blinded by that love, they were\nunable to forgive his execution at the hands of the State. At the same\ntime they were unprepared to follow his example and to give their\nown lives to the cause of his teachings. A feeling of revenge sprang\nup in them, and they endeavoured to find an excuse for his death. To\nwhat was it attributable? And the answer they found, says Nietzsche,\nwas \"dominant Judaism, its ruling class.\" For the moment they failed\nto realise that the \"Kingdom of God,\" as preached by Christ, was an\nearthly thing, something contained within the individual; and after the\ncrucifixion it was necessary for them either to follow Christ's example\nor to interpret his death, a voluntary one, as a promise of future\nhappiness, that is, to translate his _practical_ doctrine into symbolic\nterms. They unhesitatingly chose the latter.\n\nIn their search for an explanation as to how God could have allowed\nhis \"son\" to be executed, they fell upon the theory that Christ's\ndeath was a sacrifice for their sins, an expiation for their guilt.\nFrom that time on, says Nietzsche, \"there was gradually imported into\nthe type of the Saviour the doctrine of the Last Judgment, and of the\n'second coming,' the doctrine of sacrificial death, and the doctrine of\n_Resurrection,_ by means of which the whole concept 'blessedness,' the\nentire and only reality of the gospel, is conjured away--in favour of\na state _after_ death.\" St. Paul then rationalised the conception by\nintroducing into it the doctrine of personal immortality by means of\nhaving Christ rise from the dead; and he preached this immortality as\na reward for virtue. Thus, asserts Nietzsche, Christ's effort toward a\nBuddhistic movement of peace, \"toward real and _not_ merely promised\n_happiness on earth\"_ was controverted by his posterity. Nothing of\nChrist's original doctrine remained, once Paul, the forger, set to work\nto twist it to his own ends. Paul went further and by changing and\nfalsifying it turned all Jewish history into a _prophecy_ for his own\nteachings. Thus the whole doctrine of Christ, the true meaning of his\ndeath and the realities which he taught, were altered and distorted. In\nshort, Christ's life was used as a means for furthering the religion of\nPaul, who gave to it the name of Christianity.\n\nA most important part of \"The Antichrist\" is that passage wherein\nNietzsche defines his order of castes. Every healthy society, says he,\nfalls naturally into three separate and distinct types. These classes\ncondition one another and \"gravitate differently in the psychological\nsense.\" Each type has its own work, its own duties, its own emotions,\nits own compensations and mastership. The first class, comprising the\nrulers, is distinguished by its intellectual superiority. It devolves\nupon this class \"to represent happiness, beauty and goodness on earth.\"\nThe members of this superior class are in the minority, but they are\nnevertheless the creators of values. \"Their delight is self-mastery:\nwith them asceticism becomes a second nature, a need, an instinct. They\nregard a difficult task as their privilege; to play with burdens which\ncrush their fellows is to them a _recreation.\"_ They are at once the\nmost honourable, cheerful and gracious of all men. The second class\nis composed of those who relieve the first class of their duties and\nexecute the will of the rulers. They are the guardians of the law, the\nmerchants and professional men, the warriors and the judges. In brief,\nthey are the executors of the race. The third class is made up of\nthe workers, the lowest order of man--those destined for menial and\ndisagreeable tasks. \"The fact,\" says Nietzsche, \"that one is publicly\nuseful, a wheel, a function, presupposes a certain natural destiny: it\nis not _society,_ but the only kind of _happiness_ of which the great\nmajority are capable, that makes them intelligent machines. For the\nmediocre it is a joy to be mediocre; in them mastery in one thing, a\nspecialty, is a natural instinct.\" The conception of these classes\ncontains the nucleus of Nietzsche's doctrine. It embodies his whole\nidea of a natural aristocracy as opposed to the spurious European\naristocracy of the present day, wherein the rulers are in reality\nmerely members of the second class.\n\nThe charge is constantly brought against Nietzsche by the ecclesiastic\ndialecticians that his criticism of Christianity is fraught with the\nvery nihilism against which he so eloquently argues. There is perhaps\na slight basis for such a contention if we confine ourselves strictly\nto those of his utterances against the Jewish morality which appear in\nhis previous books. But in \"The Antichrist\" this does not hold true\neven in the slightest manner. Nietzsche is constantly supplanting modes\nof action for every Christian virtue he denies. He is as constructive\nas he is destructive. \"The Antichrist\" contains, not only a complete\ndenial of all Christian morality, but a statement of a new and\nconsistent system of ethics based on the research of all his works.\n\n\nEXCERPTS FROM \"THE ANTICHRIST\"\n\nWhat is good? All that enhances the feeling of power, the Will to\nPower, and power itself in man. What is bad?--All that proceeds from\nweakness. What is happiness?--The feeling that power is _increasing,-_\nthat resistance has been overcome.\n\nNot contentment, but more power; not peace at any price, but war; not\nvirtue, but efficiency (virtue in the Renaissance sense, _virtu,_\nfree from all moralic acid). The weak and botched shall perish: first\nprinciple of our humanity. And they ought even to be helped to perish.\n\nWhat is more harmful than any vice?--Practical sympathy with all the\nbotched and the weak--Christianity. 128\n\nWe must not deck out and adorn Christianity: it has waged a deadly\nwar upon this _higher_ type of man, it has set a ban upon all the\nfundamental instincts of this type, and has distilled evil and the\ndevil himself out of these instincts:--the strong man as the typical\npariah, the villain. Christianity has sided with everything weak, low,\nand botched; it has made an ideal out of _antagonism_ against all the\nself-preservative instincts of strong life: it has corrupted even the\nreason of the strongest intellects, by teaching that the highest values\nof intellectuality are sinful, misleading and full of temptations. 130\n\nI call an animal, a species, an individual corrupt, when it loses its\ninstincts, when it selects and _prefers_ that which is detrimental to\nit. 131\n\nLife itself, to my mind, is nothing more nor less than the instinct of\ngrowth, of permanence, of accumulating forces, of power: where the will\nto power is lacking, degeneration sets in. 131\n\nPity is opposed to the tonic passions which enhance the energy of the\nfeeling of life: its action is depressing. A man loses power when he\npities. By means of pity the drain on strength which suffering itself\nalready introduces into the world is multiplied a thousandfold. 131\n\nOn the whole, pity thwarts the law of development which is the law of\nselection. It preserves that which is ripe for death, it fights in\nfavour of the disinherited and the condemned of life. 131-132\n\nThis depressing and infectious instinct thwarts those instincts\nwhich aim at the preservation and enhancement of the value of life:\nby _multiplying_ misery quite as much as by preserving all that is\nmiserable, it is the principal agent in promoting decadence. 132\n\nThat which a theologian considers true, _must_ of necessity be false:\nthis furnishes almost the criterion of truth. It is his most profound\nself-preservative instinct which forbids reality ever to attain to\nhonour in any way, or even to raise its voice. Whithersoever the\ninfluence of the theologian extends, _valuations_ are topsy-turvy, and\nthe concepts \"true\" and \"false\" have necessarily changed places: that\nwhich is most deleterious to life, is here called \"true,\" that which\nenhances it, elevates it, says Yea to it, justifies it and renders it\ntriumphant, is called \"false.\" 135\n\nWhat is there that destroys a man more speedily than to work, think,\nfeel, as an automaton of \"duty,\" without internal promptings, without\na profound personal predilection, without joy? This is the recipe _par\nexcellence_ of decadence and even of idiocy. 137\n\nIn Christianity, neither morality nor religion comes in touch at\nall with reality. Nothing but imaginary _causes_ (God, the soul,\nthe ego, spirit, free will--or even non-free will); nothing but\nimaginary _effects_ (sin, salvation, grace, punishment, forgiveness\nof sins). Imaginary beings are supposed to have intercourse (God,\nspirits, souls); imaginary Natural History (anthropocentric: total\nlack of the notion, \"natural causes\"); an imaginary _psychology_\n(nothing but misunderstandings of self, interpretations of pleasant or\nunpleasant general feelings; for instance of the states of the _nervus\nsympathicus,_ with the help of the sign language of a religio-moral\nidiosyncrasy,--repentance, pangs of conscience, the temptation of the\ndevil, the presence of God); an imaginary teleology (the Kingdom of\nGod, the Last Judgment, Everlasting Life). 141-142\n\nA proud people requires a God, unto whom it can _sacrifice_ things....\nReligion, when restricted to these principles, is a form of gratitude.\nA man is grateful for his own existence; for this he must have a\nGod.--Such a God must be able to profit and to injure him, he must be\nable to act the friend and the foe. He must be esteemed for his good as\nwell as for his evil qualities. 143\n\nWhen a people is on the road to ruin; when it feels its belief in\na future, its hope of freedom vanishing for ever; when it becomes\nconscious of submission as the most useful quality, and of the virtues\nof the submissive as self-preservative measures, then its God must also\nmodify himself. He then becomes a tremulous and unassuming sneak; he\ncounsels \"peace of the soul,\" the cessation of all hatred, leniency\nand \"love\" even towards friend and foe. He is for ever moralising,\nhe crawls into the heart of every private virtue, becomes a God for\neverybody. 143\n\nThe Christian concept of God--God as the deity of the sick, God as a\nspider, God as a spirit--is one of the most corrupt concepts of God\nthat has ever been attained on earth. Maybe it represents the low-water\nmark in the evolutionary ebb of the godlike type. God degenerated into\nthe _contradiction of life,_ instead of being its transfiguration and\neternal Yea! With God war is declared on life, nature, and the will to\nlife! God is the formula for every calumny of this world and for every\nlie concerning a beyond! 146\n\nChristianity aims at mastering _beasts of prey;_ its expedient is to\nmake them _ill,_--to render feeble is the Christian recipe for taming,\nfor \"civilisation.\" 151\n\nIf _faith_ is above all necessary, then reason, knowledge, and\nscientific research must be brought into evil repute: the road to\ntruth becomes the _forbidden_ road.--Strong _hope_ is a much greater\nstimulant of life than any single realised joy could be. Sufferers\nmust be sustained by a hope which no actuality can contradict,--and\nwhich cannot ever be realised: the hope of another world. (Precisely on\naccount of this power that hope has of making the unhappy linger on,\nthe Greeks regarded it as the evil of evils, as the most _mischievous_\nevil: it remained behind in Pandora's box.) In order that _love_ may\nbe possible, God must be a person. In order that the lowest instincts\nmay also make their voices heard God must be young. For the ardour of\nthe women a beautiful saint, and for the ardour of the men a Virgin\nMary has to be pressed into the foreground. All this on condition that\nChristianity wishes to rule over a certain soil, on which Aphrodisiac\nor Adonis cults had already determined the _notion_ of a cult. To\ninsist upon _chastity_ only intensifies the vehemence and profundity of\nthe religious instinct--it makes the cult warmer, more enthusiastic,\nmore soulful.--Love is the state in which man sees things most widely\ndifferent from what they are. The force of illusion reaches its zenith\nhere, as likewise the sweetening and transfiguring power. When a man is\nin love he endures more than at other times; he submits to everything.\nThe thing was to discover a religion in which it was possible to love:\nby this means the worst in life is overcome--it is no longer even\nseen.--So much for three Christian virtues Faith, Hope, and Charity: I\ncall them the three Christian _precautionary measures._ 152-153\n\nWhat is Jewish morality, what is Christian morality? Chance robbed of\nits innocence; unhappiness polluted with the idea of \"sin\"; well being\ninterpreted as a danger, as a \"temptation\"; physiological indisposition\npoisoned by means of the cankerworm of conscience. 157-158\n\nWhat does a \"moral order of the universe\" mean? That once and for all\nthere is such a thing as will of God which determines what man has to\ndo and what he has to leave undone; that the value of a people or of\nan individual is measured according to how much or how little the one\nor the other obeys the will of God; that in the destinies of a people\nor of an individual, the will of God shows itself dominant, that is to\nsay it punishes or rewards according to the degree of obedience. In the\nplace of this miserable falsehood _reality_ says: a parasitical type of\nman, who can flourish only at the cost of all the healthy elements of\nlife, the priest abuses the name of God: he calls that state of affairs\nin which the priest determines the value of things \"the Kingdom of\nGod\"; he calls the means whereby such a state of affairs is attained or\nmaintained, \"the Will of God\"; with cold-blooded cynicism he measures\npeoples, ages and individuals according to whether they favour or\noppose the ascendency of the priesthood. 158-159\n\nI fail to see against whom was directed the insurrection of which\nrightly or _wrongly_ Jesus is understood to have been the promoter, if\nit were not directed against the Jewish church. 162\n\nThis saintly anarchist who called the lowest of the low, the outcasts\nand \"sinners,\" the Chandala of Judaism, to revolt against the\nestablished order of things (and in language which, if the gospels are\nto be trusted, would get one sent to Siberia even to-day)--this man was\na political criminal in so far as political criminals were possible in\na community so absurdly non-political. This brought him to the cross:\nthe proof of this is the inscription found thereon. He died for _his_\nsins--and no matter how often the contrary has been asserted there is\nabsolutely nothing to show that he died for the sins of others. 162-163\n\n_The instinctive hatred of reality_ is the outcome of an extreme\nsusceptibility to pain and to irritation, which can no longer endure to\nbe \"touched\" at all, because every sensation strikes too deep.\n\n_The instinctive exclusion of all aversion, of all hostility, of all\nboundaries and distances in feeling,_ is the outcome of an extreme\nsusceptibility to pain and to irritation, which regards all resistance,\nall compulsory resistance as insufferable _anguish_(--that is to say,\nas harmful, as _deprecated_ by the self-preservative instinct), and\nwhich knows blessedness (happiness) only when it is no longer obliged\nto offer resistance to anybody, either evil or detrimental,--love as\nthe only ultimate possibility of life....\n\nThese are the two _physiological realities_ upon which and out of which\nthe doctrine of salvation has grown. 166\n\nWith a little terminological laxity Jesus might be called a \"free\nspirit\"--he cares not a jot for anything that is established: the\nword _killeth,_ everything fixed _killeth._ The idea, _experience,\n\"life\"_ as he alone knows it, is, according to him, opposed to every\nkind of word, formula, law, faith and dogma. He speaks only of the\ninnermost things: \"life\" or \"truth\" or \"light,\" is his expression for\nthe innermost things,--everything else the whole of reality, the whole\nof nature, language even, has only the value of a sign, of a simile for\nhim. 169-170\n\nThe whole psychology of the \"gospels\" lacks the concept of guilt and\npunishment, as also that of reward. \"Sin,\" any sort of aloofness\nbetween God and man, is done away with,--_this is precisely what\nconstitutes the \"glad tidings.\"_ Eternal bliss is not promised, it is\nnot bound up with certain conditions; it is the only reality--the rest\nconsists only of signs wherewith to speak about it....\n\nThe results of such a state project themselves into a new practice\nof life, the actual evangelical practice. It is not a \"faith\" which\ndistinguishes himself by means of a _different_ mode of action.... 171\n\nThe life of the Saviour was naught else than this practice,--neither\nwas his death. He no longer required any formul\u00e6, any rites for his\nrelations with God--not even prayer. He has done with all the Jewish\nteaching of repentance and of atonement; he alone knows the _mode_ of\nlife which makes one feel \"divine,\" \"saved,\" \"evangelical,\" and at all\ntimes a \"child of God.\" Not \"repentance,\" not \"prayer and forgiveness\"\nare the roads to God: the _evangelical mode of life alone_ leads to\nGod, it _is_ \"God.\"--That which the gospels abolished was the Judaism\nof the concepts \"sin,\" \"forgiveness of sin,\" \"faith,\" \"salvation\nthrough faith,\"--the whole doctrine of the Jewish church was denied by\nthe \"glad tidings.\"\n\nThe profound instinct of how one must live in order to feel \"in\nHeaven,\" in order to feel \"eternal,\" while in every other respect\none feels by _no_ means \"in Heaven\": this alone is the psychological\nreality of \"Salvation.\"--A new life and _not_ a new faith.... 171-172\n\nThis \"messenger of glad tidings\" died as he lived and as he\ntaught--_not_ in order \"to save mankind,\" but in order to show how one\nought to live. It was a mode of life that he bequeathed to mankind: his\nbehaviour before his judges, his attitude towards his executioners, his\naccusers, and all kinds of calumny and scorn,--his demeanour on the\n_cross._ 174\n\nThe history of Christianity--from the death on the cross onwards--is\nthe history of a gradual and ever coarser misunderstanding of an\noriginal symbolism. 175\n\n\"The world\" to Christianity means that a man is a soldier, a judge,\na patriot, that he defends himself, that he values his honour, that\nhe desires his own advantage, that he is _proud._ ... The conduct of\nevery moment, every instinct, every valuation that leads to a deed, is\nat present anti-Christian: what an _abortion of falsehood_ modern man\nmust be, in order to be able _without a blush_ still to call himself a\nChristian! 178\n\nThe very word \"Christianity\" is a misunderstanding,--truth to tell,\nthere never was more than one Christian, and he _died_ on the Cross.\nThe \"gospel\" _died_ on the cross. That which thenceforward was called\n\"gospel\" was the reverse of that \"gospel\" that Christ had lived: it\nwas \"evil tidings,\" a _dysangel._ It is false to the point of nonsense\nto see in \"faith,\" in the faith in salvation through Christ, the\ndistinguishing trait of the Christian; the only thing that is Christian\nis the Christian mode of existence, a life such as he led who died on\nthe Cross.... To this day a life of this kind is still possible; for\ncertain men, it is even necessary: genuine, primitive Christianity\nwill be possible in all ages.... _Not_ a faith, but a course of action.\n173-179\n\nTo regard a man like St.-Paul as honest (a man whose home was the\nvery headquarters of Stoical enlightenment) when he devises a proof\nof the continued existence of the Saviour out of a hallucination; or\neven to believe him when he declares that he had this hallucination,\nwould amount to foolishness on the part of a psychologist: St.-Paul\ndesired the end, consequently he also desired the means.... Even what\nhe himself did not believe, was believed in by the idiots among whom\nhe spread _his_ doctrine.--What he wanted was power; with St.-Paul the\npriest again aspired to power. 185\n\nWhen the centre of gravity of life is laid, _not_ in life, but in a\nbeyond--in _nonentity,_ life is utterly robbed of its balance. The\ngreat lie of personal immortality destroys all reason, all nature in\nthe instincts,--everything in the instincts that is beneficent, that\npromotes life and that is a guarantee of the future, henceforward\naroused suspicion. The very meaning of life is now construed as the\neffort to live in such a way that life no longer has any point.... Why\nshow any public spirit? Why be grateful for one's origin and one's\nforebears? Why collaborate with one's fellows, and be confident? Why\nbe concerned about the general weal or strive after it?... All these\nthings are merely so many \"temptations,\" so many deviations from the\n\"straight path.\" \"One thing only is necessary\" ... that everybody, as\nan \"immortal soul,\" should have equal rank, that in the totality of\nbeings, the \"salvation\" of each individual may lay claim to eternal\nimportance, that insignificant bigots and three-quarter-lunatics may\nhave the right to suppose that the laws of nature may be persistently\n_broken_ on their account,--any such magnification of every kind\nof selfishness to infinity, to _insolence,_ cannot be branded with\nsufficient contempt. And yet it is to this miserable flattery of\npersonal vanity that Christianity owed its _triumph,--_by this means\nit lured all the bungled and the botched, all revolting and revolted\npeople, all abortions, the whole of the refuse and offal of humanity,\nover to its side. 185-186\n\nWith Christianity, the art of feeling holy lies, which constitutes\nthe whole of Judaism, reaches its final mastership, thanks to many\ncenturies of Jewish and most thoroughly serious training and practice.\n188\n\nOnly read the gospels as books calculated to seduce by means of\nmorality--morality is appropriated by these petty people,--they know\nwhat morality can do! The best way of leading mankind by the nose\nis with morality! The fact is that the most conscious _conceit_ of\npeople who believe themselves to be _chosen,_ here simulates modesty:\nin this way they, the Christian community, the \"good and the just\"\nplace themselves once and for all on a certain side, the side \"of\nTruth\"--and the rest of mankind, \"the world\" on the other.... This\nwas the most fatal kind of megalomania that had ever yet existed on\nearth; insignificant little abortions of bigots and liars began to lay\nsole claim to the concepts \"God,\" \"Truth,\" \"Light,\" \"Spirit,\" \"Love,\"\n\"Wisdom,\" \"Life,\" as if these things were, so to speak, synonyms of\nthemselves, in order to fence themselves off from \"the world\"; little\nultra-Jews, ripe for every kind of madhouse, twisted values round in\norder to suit themselves, just as if the Christian, alone, were the\nmeaning, the salt, the standard and even the _\"ultimate tribunal\"_ of\nall the rest of mankind. 189-190\n\nOne does well to put on one's gloves when reading the New Testament.\nThe proximity of so much pitch almost defiles one. We should feel just\nas little inclined to hobnob with \"the first Christians\" as with Polish\nJews: not that we need explain our objections.... They simply smell\nbad.--In vain have I sought for a single sympathetic feature in the New\nTestament; there is not a trace of freedom, kindliness, openheartedness\nand honesty to be found in it. Humaneness has not even made a start\nin this book, while _cleanly_ instincts are entirely absent from\nit.... Only evil instincts are to be found in the New Testament, it\nshows no sign of courage, these people lack even the courage of these\nevil instincts. All is cowardice, all is a closing of one's eyes and\nself-deception. Every book becomes clean, after one has just read the\nNew Testament. 193-194\n\nIn the whole of the New Testament only _one_ figure appears which we\ncannot help respecting. Pilate, the Roman Governor. To take a Jewish\nquarrel _seriously_ was a thing he could not get himself to do. One\nJew more or less--what did it matter?... The noble scorn of a Roman,\nin whose presence the word \"truth\" had been shamelessly abused,\nhas enriched the New Testament with the only saying which _is of\nvalue,_--and this saying is not only the criticism, but actually the\nshattering of that Testament: \"What is truth!\" 195-196\n\nNo one is either a philologist or a doctor, who is not also an\n_Antichrist._ As a philologist, for instance, a man sees _behind_ the\n\"holy books\" as a doctor he sees _behind_ the physiological rottenness\nof the typical Christian. The Doctor says \"incurable,\" the philologist\nsays \"forgery.\" 197\n\nThe priest knows only one great danger, and that is science,--the\nhealthy concept of cause and effect. But, on the whole, science\nflourishes only in happy conditions,--a man must have time, he must\nalso have superfluous mental energy in order to \"pursue knowledge.\"\n... _\"Consequently_ man must be made unhappy,\"--this has been the\nargument of the priest of all ages.--You have already divined what, in\naccordance with such a manner of arguing, must first have come into the\nworld:--\"sin.\"... The notion of guilt and punishment, the whole \"moral\norder of the universe,\" was invented against science. 199\n\nThe notion of guilt and punishment, including the doctrine of \"grace,\"\nof \"salvation\" and of \"forgiveness\"--all lies through and through\nwithout a shred of psychological reality--were invented in order to\ndestroy man's _sense of causality:_ they are an attack with the fist,\nwith the knife, with honesty in hate and love! But one actuated by the\nmost cowardly, most crafty, and most ignoble instincts! A _priest's_\nattack! A _parasite's_ attack! A vampyrism of pale subterranean\nleeches! 200\n\n\"Faith saveth; _therefore_ it is true.\"--It might be objected here that\nit is precisely salvation which is not probed but only _promised;_\nsalvation is bound up with the condition \"faith,\"--one _shall_ be\nsaved, _because_ one has faith.... But how prove _that_ that which the\npriest promises to the faithful really will take place, to wit: the\n\"Beyond\" which defies all demonstration?--The assumed \"proof of power\"\nis at bottom once again only a belief in the fact that the effect which\nfaith promises will not fail to take place. In a formula: \"I believe\nthat faith saveth;--_consequently_ it is true.\"--But with this we are\nat the end of our tether. 201\n\nHoliness in itself is simply a symptom of an impoverished, enervated\nand incurably deteriorated body! 203-204\n\nChristianity is built upon the rancour of the sick; its instinct\nis directed _against_ the sound, against health. Everything\nwell-constituted, proud, high-spirited, and beautiful is offensive to\nits ears and eyes. 204\n\n\"Faith\" simply means the refusal to know what is true. 205\n\nThe conclusion which all idiots, women and common people come to, that\nthere must be something in a cause for which some one lays down his\nlife (or which, as in the case of primitive Christianity, provokes an\nepidemic of sacrifices),--this conclusion put a tremendous check upon\nall investigation, upon the spirit of investigation and of caution.\nMartyrs have _harmed_ the cause of truth. 208\n\nConvictions are prisons. They never see far enough, they do not\nlook down from a sufficient height: but in order to have any say\nin questions of value and non-value, a man must see five hundred\nconvictions _beneath_ him--_behind_ him.... A spirit who desires great\nthings, and who also desires the means thereto, is necessarily a\nsceptic. Freedom from every kind of conviction _belongs_ to strength,\nto the _ability_ to open one's eyes freely. 209-210\n\nWhom do I hate most among the rabble, the Chandala apostles, who\nundermine the working man's instinct, his happiness and his feeling of\ncontentedness with his insignificant existence,--who make him envious,\nand who teach him revenge.... The wrong never lies in unequal rights;\nit lies in the claim to equal rights. 220\n\nThe Christian and the anarchist are both decadents; they are both\nincapable of acting in any other way than disintegratingly, poisonously\nand witheringly, like _bloodsuckers;_ they are both actuated by an\ninstinct of _mortal hatred_ of everything that stands erect, that is\ngreat, that is lasting, and that is a guarantee of the future. 221-222\n\nChristianity destroyed the harvest we might have reaped from the\nculture of antiquity, later it also destroyed our harvest of the\nculture of Islam. The wonderful Moorish world of Spanish culture, which\nin its essence is more closely related to _us,_ and which appeals\nmore to our sense and taste than Rome and Greece, was _trampled to\ndeath_(--I do not say by what kind of feet), why?--because it owed its\norigin to noble, to manly instincts, because it said yea to life, even\nthat life so full of the race, and refined luxuries of the Moors! 226\n\nI condemn Christianity and confront it with the most terrible\naccusation that an accuser has ever had in his mouth. To my mind\nit is the greatest of all conceivable corruptions, it has had the\nwill to the last imaginable corruption. The Christian Church allowed\nnothing to escape from its corruption; it converted every value\ninto its opposite, every truth into a lie, and every honest impulse\ninto an ignominy of the soul. Let any one dare to speak to me of\nits humanitarian blessings! To _abolish_ any sort of distress was\nopposed to its profoundest interests; its very existence depended\non states of distress; it created states of distress in order to\nmake itself immortal.... The cancer germ of sin, for instance:\nthe Church was the first to enrich mankind with this misery!--The\n\"equality of souls before God,\" this falsehood, this _pretext_ for\nthe _rancunes_ of all the base-minded, this anarchist bomb of a\nconcept, which has ultimately become the revolution, the modern\nidea, the principle of decay of the whole of social order,--this is\n_Christian_ dynamite.... The \"humanitarian\" blessings of Christianity!\nTo breed a self-contradiction, an art of self-profanation, a will\nto lie at any price, an aversion, a contempt of all good and honest\ninstincts out of _humanitas!_ Is this what you call the blessings of\nChristianity?--Parasitism as the only method of the Church; sucking\nall the blood, all the love, all the hope of life out of mankind with\nan\u00e6mic and sacred ideals. A \"Beyond\" as the will to deny all reality;\nthe cross as the trade-mark of the most subterranean form of conspiracy\nthat has ever existed,--against health, beauty, well-constitutedness,\nbravery, intellect, kindliness of soul, _against Life itself...._\n\nThis eternal accusation against Christianity I would fain write on all\nwalls, wherever there are walls,--I have letters with which I can make\neven the blind see.... I call Christianity the one great curse, the one\nenormous and innermost perversion, the one great instinct of revenge,\nfor which no means are too venomous, too underhand, too underground and\ntoo _petty,_--I call it the one immortal blemish of mankind.... 230-231\n\n\n\n\nXI\n\n\n\"The Will to Power\"\n\nVolume I\n\n\nAll the evidences of what was to be Nietzsche's final and complete\nphilosophical work in four volumes, are contained in two volumes\nof desultory and often highly condensed notes which were recently\nissued under the single caption of \"The Will to Power\" _(\"Die Wille\nzur Macht\")._ On this culminating work Nietzsche had laboured from\n1883 until his final breakdown. He made two plans for \"The Will to\nPower\"--one in 1886 and the other in 1887. As the 1887 plan was the\none ultimately adhered to, there seems no reason to hesitate about\naccepting it as the right one. The titles of the four books which\ncomprised this final work as it stands to-day are \"European Nihilism,\"\n\"A Criticism of the Highest Values that Have Prevailed Hitherto,\"\n\"The Principles of a New Valuation\" and \"Discipline and Breeding.\"\nThese headings are according to the last plan made at Nice in 1887,\nand although, as I stated in the preceding chapter, there was some\nhesitation between the general title of \"The Will to Power\" and \"The\nTransvaluation of All Values,\" \"The Antichrist,\" which fell under the\nlatter heading, must not be considered as forming a part of \"The Will\nto Power.\" However, \"The Antichrist\" and also \"Beyond Good and Evil,\"\n\"The Genealogy of Morals\" and \"The Twilight of the Idols,\" are closely\nrelated in thought to \"The Will to Power.\" This fact is borne out not\nonly by internal evidence, by the manner in which the books overlap,\nand by the constant redistribution of titles which sometimes prove\nthe unity of the last phase of his thought, but also by the testimony\nof those who had Nietzsche's confidence and could watch him at close\nquarters.\n\nNietzsche intended to embody in the four books of \"The Will to Power\"\nthe entire sweep of his philosophical teachings. This work was to be\na summary, not only in statement but also in analysis, of his ethical\nsystem. His preceding books had been replete in repetitions, and lacked\nboth organisation and sequence. His health was such that he could\nwork only sporadically and in short shifts, with the result that he\nwas constantly trying to crowd an enormous amount of material into a\nshort space. He was able to deal with but one point at a time, and, as\nhis working period was frequently too short to develop that point as\nfully as he desired, we find him constantly going back over old ground,\naltering his syllogisms, making addenda, interpolating analogies, and\nin numerous other ways changing and clarifying what he had previously\nwritten. \"The Will to Power\" was to be, then, a colossal organisation\nof all his writings, with every step intact, and every conclusion in\nits place. And throughout the four volumes emphasis was to be put on\nhis motivating doctrine, the will to power, an oppositional theory to\nDarwin's theory of struggle for mere existence. But although we have\ntwo large volumes of notes, these jottings lack in a large degree the\nco-ordination which would have characterised them had Nietzsche been\nable to carry out his plan.\n\nThe notes of these two books are the work of many years, and the\nputting together of them for publication has been done without any\nattempt to alter their original text. They are just as Nietzsche\nleft them--in some cases completed and closely argued paragraphs, in\nothers mere notations and memoranda, elliptic and unelaborated. It is\npossible, however, to gain a very adequate idea of what was to be the\ncontents of this final work, due to the copiousness of the material\nat hand. From the time of finishing \"Thus Spake Zarathustra\" to 1889,\nNietzsche was constantly making notes for his great work, and there\nis no phase of his thought which is not touched upon in these two\nremaining volumes. By following their pages closely, in the light\nof his foregoing works, one gets a very definite impression of the\nsynthesis of his thoughts. Especially true is this of the second volume\nof \"The Will to Power,\" for it is here that his cardinal doctrine is\nmost strongly and consistently emphasised and its relationship to all\nhuman relationships most concisely drawn. Because of this fact I have\nchosen to consider the two volumes separately. The first volume is full\nof material more or less familiar to those who have followed Nietzsche\nin his earlier works. The notes are, in the majority of cases,\nelaborations and explanations of doctrines contained in those books\nwhich followed \"Thus Spake Zarathustra.\" As such they are important.\n\nThe first volume is divided into two sections--\"European Nihilism\" and\n\"A Criticism of the Highest Values that Have Prevailed Hitherto.\" Two\nsubdivisions are found under section one--\"Nihilism\" and \"Concerning\nthe History of European Nihilism.\" In this first subdivision Nietzsche\ndefines Nihilism and attempts to trace its origin. He states that it\nis an outcome of the valuations and interpretations of existence\nwhich have formerly prevailed, namely: the result of the doctrines of\nChristianity. For our adherence to Christian morality, Nietzsche says,\nwe must pay dearly: by this adherence we are losing our equilibrium\nand are on the verge of adopting opposite valuations--those consisting\nof Nihilistic elements. He defines the Nihilistic movement as an\nexpression of decadence, and declares that this decadence is spreading\nthroughout all our modern institutions. Under his second subdivision,\nhe explains that modern gloominess is a result of the \"slow advance\nand rise of the middle and lower classes,\" and asserts that this\ngloominess is accompanied by moral hypocrisy and the decadent virtues\nof sympathy and pity. In this connection he denies that the nineteenth\ncentury shows an improvement over the sixteenth. No better analysis\nof the effects of Christian morality on modern man is to be found in\nany of Nietzsche's writings than in this treatise of Nihilism; and a\nclose study of this analysis will greatly help one in grasping the full\nsignificance of the doctrine of the will to power. Although the notes\nin this book are the least satisfactory of all the portions of \"The\nWill to Power,\" being both tentative and incomplete, I have been able\nto select enough definite statements from them to give an adequate idea\nof both Nietzsche's theories and conclusions in regard to Nihilism.\n\nIn the second section of Volume I, \"A Criticism of the Highest Values\nThat Have Prevailed Hitherto,\" the notes are fuller and more closely\norganised. This is due to the fact that the ground covered by them\nis in the main the same ground covered by \"The Antichrist,\" \"The\nGenealogy of Morals\" and \"Beyond Good and Evil.\" In fact, there is\nin these notes much repetition of passages to be found in the three\nprevious volumes. The first subdivision of this second section is\ncalled \"Criticism of Religion,\" and there is little material in it\nwhich does not appear in \"The Antichrist.\" Even in the manner of\nexpression there exists so strong a similarity that I am inclined to\nthink Nietzsche used these notes in composing his famous philippic\nagainst Christianity. Consequently I have made but few quotations from\nthis division, choosing in each instance only such passages as do not\npossess a direct parallel in his earlier work. We find here the same\ninquiry into the origin of religions, the same analysis of Christian\nideals, the same history of Christian doctrines, and the same argument\nagainst the dissemination of Christian faiths as are contained in \"The\nAntichrist.\" However, these present notes are sufficiently different\nfrom this previous book to interest the thorough student, and there\nare occasional speculations advanced which are not to be encountered\nelsewhere in Nietzsche's writings. For the casual reader, however,\nthere is little of new interest in this subdivision.\n\nThe same criticism holds true to a large extent when we come to the\nsecond subdivision of the second section \"A Criticism of Morality.\" In\n\"The Genealogy of Morals\" we have a discussion of practically all the\nsubjects considered in the present notes, such as the origin of moral\nvaluations, the basis of conscience, the influence of the herd, the\ndominance of virtue, the slander of the so-called evil man, and the\nsignificance of such words as \"improving\" and \"elevating.\" However,\nthere is sufficient new material in these notes to warrant a reading,\nfor although, despite a few exceptions, there are no new issues posed,\ncertain points which were put forth only in a speculative and abridged\nmanner in earlier books, are here enlarged upon. This is especially\ntrue in regard to the doctrine of rank. Nietzsche has been accused of\nadvocating only an individualistic morality. But the truth is that he\nadvanced two codes. He preached a morality for the herd, a definite\nsystem which suited the needs of the serving classes. For the superior\nindividuals, on the other hand, he taught another code, one which\nfitted and met the needs of the rulers. The herd morality has always\nsought to create and maintain a single type of mediocre man. Nietzsche\npreached the necessity of the superior, as well as the inferior, type\nof man; and in his present notes he goes into this doctrine more fully\nthan heretofore. Furthermore, he makes clear his stand in regard to\nthe weak. On page 291 he states, \"I have declared war against the\nan\u00e6mic Christian ideal (together with what is closely related to it),\nnot because I want to annihilate it, but only to put an end to its\n_tyranny_ and clear the way for other _ideals,_ for _more robust_\nideals.\" It has been stated, even in quarters where we have a right\nto look for more intelligent criticism, that Nietzsche favoured the\ncomplete elimination of the weak and incompetent. No such advocacy is\nto be found in his teachings. To the contrary, as will be seen from the\nabove quotation, he preached only against the _dominance_ of the weak.\nHe resented their supremacy over the intelligent man. Their existence,\nhe maintained, was a most necessary thing. This belief is insisted upon\nin many places, and one should bear the point in mind when reading the\ncriticisms of socialism to be found throughout the present volume.\n\nAnother new point to be found in these notes relates to the immoral\nmethods used by the disseminators of morals. From the passages in\nwhich these new points are raised I have taken the quotations which\nfollow at the end of this chapter.\n\nIn the third and last subdivision of this second section, \"Criticism\nof Philosophy,\" we have an extension of Chapter I in \"Beyond Good\nand Evil,\" \"Prejudices of Philosophers,\" and of the two chapters in\n\"The Twilight of the Idols\"--\"The Problem of Socrates\" and \"Reason\nin Philosophy.\" The notes (excepting a few pages of general remarks)\noccupy themselves with a criticism of Greek philosophy and with\nan analysis of philosophical truths and errors. These notes touch\nonly indirectly on Nietzsche's doctrines, and may be looked upon as\nexplanations of his intellectual methods.\n\nDespite their fragmentariness, the notes in this volume, as I have\nsaid, permit one to gain an adequate idea of Nietzsche's purpose. In\nmaking my excerpts from this book, I have chosen those passages which\nwill throw new light upon his philosophy rather than those statements\nof conclusions which have been previously encountered.\n\n\nEXCERPTS FROM \"THE WILL TO POWER\" volume I\n\nWhat does Nihilism mean?--_That the highest values are losing their\nvalue._ 8\n\nThorough Nihilism is the conviction that life is absurd, in the\nlight of the highest values already discovered; it also includes the\nview that we have not the smallest right to assume the existence of\ntranscendental objects or things in themselves, which would be either\ndivine or morality incarnate.\n\nThis view is the result of fully developed \"truthfulness\": therefore a\nconsequence of the belief in morality. 8\n\n_Moral valuations are condemnations, negations; morality is the\nabdication of the will to live._ 12\n\nAll values with which we have tried, hitherto, to lend the world\nsome worth, from our point of view, and with which we have therefore\n_deprived it of all worth_ (once these values have been shown to be\ninapplicable)--all these values, are, psychologically, the results of\ncertain views of utility, established for the purpose of maintaining\nand increasing the dominion of certain communities: but falsely\nprojected into the nature of things. It is always man's _exaggerated\ningenuousness_ to regard himself as the sense and measure of all\nthings. 15\n\nEvery purely _moral_ valuation (as, for instance, the Buddhistic)\n_terminates in Nihilism:_ Europe must expect the same thing! It is\nsupposed that one can get along with a morality bereft of a religious\nbackground; but in this direction the road to Nihilism is opened. 19\n\nNihilism is not only a meditating over the \"in vain\"--not only the\nbelief that everything deserves to perish; but one actually puts one's\nshoulder to the plough; _one destroys._ 22\n\nThe time is coming when we shall have to pay for having been\n_Christians_ for two thousand years: we are losing the equilibrium\nwhich enables us to live--for a long while we shall not know in what\ndirection we are travelling. We are hurling ourselves headlong into the\n_opposite_ valuations, with that degree of energy which could only have\nbeen engendered in man by an _overvaluation_ of himself.\n\nNow, everything is false from the root, words and nothing but words,\nconfused, feeble, or overstrained. 25\n\nModern Pessimism is an expression of the uselessness only of the\n_modern_ world, not of the world and existence as such. 29\n\nThe \"preponderance of _pain over pleasure_\" or the reverse (Hedonism);\nboth of these doctrines are already signposts to Nihilism....\n\nFor here, in both cases, no other final purpose is sought than the\nphenomenon pleasure or pain. 29\n\n\"Life is not worth living\"; \"Resignation\"; \"what is the good of\ntears?\"--this is a feeble and sentimental attitude of mind. 29-30\n\nPeople have not yet seen what is so terribly obvious--namely, that\nPessimism is not a problem but a _symptom,_--that the term ought to be\nreplaced by \"Nihilism,\"--that the question, \"to be or not to be,\" is\nitself an illness, a sign of degeneracy, an idiosyncrasy.\n\nThe Nihilistic movement is only an expression of physiological\ndecadence. 32\n\n_Decay, decline,_ and _waste,_ are, _per se,_ in no way open to\nobjection; they are the natural consequences of life and vital growth.\nThe phenomenon of decadence is just as necessary to life as advance or\nprogress is: we are not in a position which enables us to _suppress_\nit. On the contrary, reason _would have it retain its rights._\n\nIt is disgraceful on the part of socialist-theorists to argue that\ncircumstances and social combinations could be devised which would put\nan end to all vice, illness, crime, prostitution, and poverty.... But\nthat is tantamount to condemning _Life._ 33\n\nDecadence itself is not a thing _that can be withstood:_ it is\nabsolutely necessary and is proper to all ages and all peoples.\nThat which must be withstood, and by all means in our power, is the\nspreading of the contagion among the sound parts of the organism. 33-34\n\nAll those things which heretofore have been regarded as the _causes of\ndegeneration,_ are really its effects. 34\n\nIf Nature have no pity on the degenerate, it is not therefore immoral:\nthe growth of physiological and moral evils in the human race, is\nrather the _result of morbid and unnatural morality._ 44\n\nThe whole of our sociology knows no other instinct than that of the\nherd, _i.e.,_ of a _multitude of mere ciphers_--of which every cipher\nhas \"equal rights,\" and where it is a virtue to be--naught. 45\n\nNihilism is a sign that the botched and bungled have no longer any\nconsolation, that they destroy in order to be destroyed, that, having\nbeen deprived of morality, they no longer have any reason to \"resign\nthemselves,\" that they take up their stand on the territory of the\nopposite principle, and _will also exercise power_ themselves, by\ncompelling the powerful to become their hangmen. 52\n\nOur age, with its indiscriminate endeavours to mitigate distress, to\nhonour it, and to wage war in advance with unpleasant possibilities, is\nan age of the _poor._ 57\n\nOverwork, curiosity and sympathy--our _modern vices._ 64\n\nChristianity, revolution, the abolition of slavery, equal rights,\nphilanthropy, love of peace, justice, truth: all these big words are\nonly valuable in a struggle, as banners: not as realities, but as\n_showwords,_ for something quite different (yea, even quite opposed to\nwhat they mean!). 68\n\nThe nineteenth century shows no advance whatever on the sixteenth:\nand the German spirit of 1888 is an example of a backward movement\nwhen compared with that of 1788.... Mankind does not advance, it does\nnot even exist. The aspect of the whole is much more like that of a\nhuge experimenting workshop where some things in all ages succeed,\nwhile an incalculable number of things fail; where all order, logic,\nco-ordination, and responsibility is lacking. How dare we blink the\nfact that the rise of Christianity is a decadent movement?--that the\nGerman Reformation was a recrudescence of Christian barbarism?--that\nthe Revolution destroyed the instinct for an organisation of society on\na large scale?... Man is not an example of progress as compared with\nanimals: the tender son of culture is an abortion compared with the\nArab or the Corsican; the Chinaman is a more successful type--that is\nto say, richer in sustaining power than the European. 72-73\n\nI know best why man is the only animal that laughs: he alone suffers\nso excruciatingly that he was _compelled_ to invent laughter. The\nunhappiest and most melancholy animal is, as might have been expected,\nthe most cheerful. 74\n\nSocialism--or the _tyranny_ of the meanest and the most\nbrainless,--that is to say, the superficial, the envious, and the\nmummers, brought to its zenith,--is, as a matter of fact, the logical\nconclusion of \"modern ideas\" and their latent anarchy: but in the\ngenial atmosphere of democratic well-being the capacity for forming\nresolutions or even for coming _to an end_ at all, is paralysed. Men\nwill follow--but no longer their reason. That is why socialism is on\nthe whole a hopelessly bitter affair: and there is nothing more amusing\nthan to observe the discord between the poisonous and desperate faces\nof present-day socialists--and what wretched and nonsensical feelings\ndoes not their style reveal to us!--and the childish lamblike happiness\nof their hopes and desires. 102\n\nThis is the teaching which life itself preaches to all living things:\nthe morality of Development. To have and to wish to have more, in a\nword, Growth--that is life itself. In the teaching of socialism \"a will\nto the denial of life\" is but poorly concealed: botched men and races\nthey must be who have devised a teaching of this sort. 102\n\n_Spiritual enlightenment_ is an unfailing means of making men\nuncertain, weak of will, and needful of succour and support; in short,\nof developing the herding instincts in them. 105\n\nWhen the _feeling of power_ suddenly seizes and overwhelms a man,--and\nthis takes place in the case of all the great passions,--a doubt arises\nin him concerning his own person: he dare not think himself the cause\nof this astonishing sensation--and thus he posits a stronger person, a\nGodhead as its cause, 114-115\n\nReligion has lowered the concept \"man\"; its ultimate conclusion is\nthat all goodness, greatness, and truth are superhuman, and are only\nobtainable by the grace of God. 116\n\n_In short:_ what is the price paid for the _improvement_ supposed to\nbe due to morality?--The unhinging of _reason,_ the reduction of all\nmotives to fear and hope (punishment and reward); _dependence_ upon the\ntutelage of priests, and upon a formulary exactitude which is supposed\nto express a divine will; the implantation of a \"conscience\" which\nestablishes a false science in the place of experience and experiment:\nas though all one had to do or had not to do were predetermined--a kind\nof contraction of the seeking and striving spirit;--_in short:_ the\nworst _mutilation_ of man that can be imagined, and it is pretended\nthat \"the good man\" is the result. 122-123\n\nPaganism is that which says yea to all that is natural, it is\ninnocence in being natural, \"naturalness.\" _Christianity_ is that which\nsays no to all that is natural, it is a certain lack of dignity in\nbeing natural; hostility to Nature. 127\n\n_Christianity_ is a degenerative movement, consisting of all kinds of\ndecaying and excremental elements: it is _not_ the expression of the\ndownfall of a race, it is, from the root, an agglomeration of all the\nmorbid elements which are mutually attractive and which gravitate to\none another.\n\nIt is therefore _not_ a national religion, _not_ determined by race: it\nappeals to the disinherited everywhere; it consists of a foundation of\nresentment against all that is successful and dominant: it is in need\nof a symbol which represents the damnation of everything successful and\ndominant. It is opposed to every form of _intellectual_ movement, to\nall philosophy: it takes up the cudgels for idiots, and utters a curse\nupon all intellect. Resentment against those who are gifted, learned,\nintellectually independent: in all these it suspects the element of\nsuccess and domination. 130\n\nAll Christian \"truth,\" is idle falsehood and deception, and is\nprecisely the reverse of that which was at the bottom of the first\nChristian movement. 133\n\nTo be really Christian would mean to be absolutely indifferent to\ndogmas, cults, priests, church, and theology. 133\n\nA God who died for our sins, salvation through faith, resurrection\nafter death--all these things are the counterfeit coins of\nreal-Christianity, for which that pernicious blockhead Paul must be\nheld responsible. 138\n\nChristianity has, from the first, always transformed the symbolical\ninto crude realities:\n\n(1) The antitheses \"true life\" and \"false life\" were misunderstood and\nchanged into \"life here\" and \"life beyond.\"\n\n(2) The notion \"eternal life,\" as opposed to the personal life which is\nephemeral, is translated into \"personal immortality\";\n\n(3) The process of fraternising by means of sharing the same food and\ndrink, after the Hebrew-Arabian manner, is interpreted as the \"miracle\nof transubstantiation.\"\n\n(4) \"Resurrection\" which was intended to mean the entrance to the \"true\nlife,\" in the sense of being intellectually \"born again,\" becomes an\nhistorical contingency, supposed to take place at some moment after\ndeath;\n\n(5) The teaching of the Son of man as the \"Son of God,\"--that is to\nsay, the life-relationship between man and God,--becomes the \"second\nperson of the Trinity,\" and thus the filial relationship of every\nman--even the lowest--to God, is _done away with;_\n\n(6) Salvation through faith (that is to say, that there is no other way\nto this filial relationship to God save through the _practice of life_\ntaught by Christ) becomes transformed into the belief that there is a\nmiraculous way of _atoning_ for all _sin;_ though not through our own\nendeavours, but by means of Christ:\n\nFor all these purposes, \"Christ on the Cross\" had to be interpreted\nafresh. The _death_ itself would certainly not be the principal feature\nof the event ... it was only another sign pointing to the way in which\none should behave towards the authorities and the laws of the world\n_--that one was not to defend oneself--this was the exemplary life._\n139-140\n\nThe Gospel is the announcement that the road to happiness lies open for\nthe lowly and the poor--that all one has to do is to emancipate one's\nself from all institutions, traditions, and the tutelage of the higher\nclasses. Thus Christianity is no more than the _typical teaching of\nSocialists._\n\nProperty, acquisitions, mother-country, status and rank, tribunals,\nthe police, the State, the Church, Education, Art, militarism: all\nthese are so many obstacles in the way of happiness, so many mistakes,\nsnares, and devil's artifices, on which the Gospel passes sentence--all\nthis is typical of socialistic doctrines.\n\nBehind all this there is the outburst, the explosion of a concentrated\nloathing of the \"masters\"--the instinct which discerns the happiness of\nfreedom after such long oppression. 173-174\n\nChristianity is a denaturalisation of gregarious morality: under the\npower of the most complete misapprehensions and self-deceptions.\nDemocracy is a more natural form of it, and less sown with falsehood.\nIt is a fact that the oppressed, the low, and whole mob of slaves and\nhalf-castes, _will prevail._\n\nFirst step: they make themselves free--they detach themselves, at\nfirst in fancy only; they recognise each other; they make themselves\nparamount.\n\nSecond step: they enter the lists, they demand acknowledgment, equal\nrights, \"Justice.\"\n\nThird step: they demand privileges (they draw the representatives of\npower over to their side).\n\nFourth step: they _alone_ want all power, and they _have_ it. 177\n\nWhen and where has any man, _of any note at all,_ resembled the\nChristian ideal?--at least in the eyes of those who are psychologists\nand triers of the heart and reins. Look at all Plutarch's heroes! 180\n\nThe _higher_ man distinguishes himself from the _lower_ by his\nfearlessness and his readiness to challenge misfortune: it is a\nsign of _degeneration_ when eudemonistic values begin to prevail\n(physiological fatigue and enfeeblement of will-power). Christianity,\nwith its prospect of \"blessedness,\" is the typical attitude of mind of\na suffering and impoverished species of man. Abundant strength will be\nactive, will suffer, and will go under. 182\n\nAll ideals are dangerous; because they lower and brand realities; they\nare all poisons. 183\n\nThese \"conditions of salvation\" of which the Christian is conscious are\nmerely variations of the same diseased state--the interpretation of an\nattack of epilepsy by means of a particular formula which is provided,\n_not_ by science, but by religious mania. 190\n\n_A pang of conscience_ in a man is a sign that his character is not\nyet equal to his _deed._ There is such a thing as a pang of conscience\nafter _good deeds:_ in this case it is their unfamiliarity, their\nincompatibility with an old environment. 192\n\nWe immoralists prefer to disbelieve in \"faults.\" We believe that all\ndeeds, of what kind soever, are identically the same at root; just as\ndeeds which turn _against_ us may be useful from an economical point\nof view, and even _generally desirable._ In certain individual cases,\nwe admit that we might well have been _spared_ a given action; the\ncircumstances alone predisposed us in its favour. Which of us, if\n_favoured_ by circumstances, would not already have committed every\npossible crime? ... That is why, one should never say: \"Thou shouldst\nnever have done such and such a thing,\" but only: \"How strange it\nis that I have not done such and such a thing hundreds of times\nalready!\"--As a matter of fact, only a very small number of acts are\n_typical_ acts and real epitomes of a personality, and seeing what a\nsmall number of people really are personalities, a single act very\nrarely characterises a man. Acts are mostly dictated by circumstances;\nthey are superficial or merely reflex movements performed in response\nto a stimulus, long before the depths of our beings are affected or\nconsulted in the matter. 192-193.\n\nExperience teaches us that, in every case in which a man has elevated\nhimself to any great extent above the average of his fellows, every\nhigh degree of _power_ always involves a corresponding degree of\n_freedom_ from Good and Evil as also from \"true\" and \"false,\" and\ncannot take into account what goodness dictates. 200\n\nWhat is Christian \"virtue\" and \"love of men,\" if not precisely this\nmutual assistance with a view to survival, this solidarity of the weak,\nthis thwarting of selection? What is Christian altruism, if it is not\nthe mob-egotism of the weak which divines that, if everybody looks\nafter everybody else, every individual will be preserved for a longer\nperiod of time?... He who does not consider this attitude of mind\nas _immoral,_ as a crime against life, himself belongs to the sickly\ncrowd, and also shares their instincts.... Genuine love of mankind\nexacts sacrifice for the good of the species--it is hard, full of\nself-control, because it needs human sacrifices. 203\n\nWhat deserves the most rigorous condemnation, is the ambiguous and\ncowardly infirmity of purpose of a religion like _Christianity,_--or\nrather like the _Church,--_which, instead of recommending death and\nself-destruction, actually protects all the botched and bungled, and\nencourages them to propagate their kind. 204\n\nLet us see what the \"genuine Christian\" does of all the things which\nhis instincts forbid him to do:--he covers beauty, pride, riches,\nself-reliance, brilliancy, knowledge, and power with suspicion and\n_mud_--in short, _all culture:_ his object is to deprive the latter of\nits _clean conscience._ 200\n\nWhat is it we combat in Christianity? That it aims at destroying\nthe strong, at breaking their spirit, at exploiting their moments\nof weariness and debility, at converting their proud assurance\ninto anxiety and conscience-trouble; that it knows how to poison\nthe noblest instincts and to infect them with disease, until their\nstrength, their will to power, turns inwards, against themselves--until\nthe strong perish through their excessive self-contempt and\nself-immolation. 209\n\nAll virtues should be looked upon as physiological _conditions._ 213\n\nFormerly it was said of every form of morality, \"Ye shall know them by\ntheir fruits.\" I say of every form of morality: \"It is a fruit, and\nfrom it I learn the _Soil_ out of which it grew.\" 214\n\nMy leading doctrine is this: _there are no moral phenomena, but only a\nmoral interpretation of phenomena. The origin of this interpretation\nitself lies beyond the pale of morality._ 214\n\nThe whole of morality of Europe is based upon the values _which are\nuseful to the herd._ 228\n\nThe herd regards the _exception,_ whether it be above or beneath its\ngeneral level, as something which is antagonistic and dangerous to\nitself. Their trick in dealing with the exceptions above them, the\nstrong, the mighty, the wise, and the fruitful, is to persuade them to\nbecome guardians, herdsmen, and watchmen--in fact, to become their\n_head-servants:_ thus they convert a danger into a thing which is\nuseful. 231\n\nMy teaching is this, that the herd seeks to maintain and preserve one\ntype of man, and that it defends itself on two sides--that is to say,\nagainst those which are decadents from its ranks (criminals, etc.), and\nagainst those who rise superior to its dead level. 236\n\nMy philosophy aims at a new _order of rank: not_ at an individualistic\nmorality. The spirit of the herd should rule within the herd--but not\nbeyond it: the leaders of the herd require a fundamentally different\nvaluation for their actions. 237\n\nConscience condemns an action because that action has been condemned\nfor a long period of time: all conscience does is to imitate: it\ndoes not create values. That which first led to the condemnation of\ncertain actions, was _not_ conscience: but the knowledge of (or the\nprejudice against) its consequences.... The approbation of conscience,\nthe feeling of well-being, of \"inner peace,\" is of the same order of\nemotions as the artist's joy over his work--it proves nothing. 242\n\n_By what means does a virtue attain to power?_--With precisely the same\nmeans as a political party: slander, suspicion, the undermining of\nopposing virtues that happen to be already in power, the changing of\ntheir names, systematic persecution and scorn; in short, _by means of\nacts of general \"immorality.\"_ 252\n\nCruelty has become transformed and elevated into tragic pity, so that\nwe no longer recognise it as such. The same has happened to the love\nof the sexes which has become amour-passion; the slavish attitude of\nmind appears as Christian obedience; wretchedness becomes humility; the\ndisease of the _nervus sympathicus,_ for instance, is eulogised as\nPessimism, Pascalism, or Carlylism, etc. 253\n\nThe qualities which constitute the strength of an _opposing race_ or\nclass are declared to be the most evil and pernicious things it has:\nfor by means of them it may be harmful to us. 255\n\nI recognise virtue in that: (1) it does not insist upon being\nrecognised; (2) it does not presuppose the existence of virtue\neverywhere, but precisely something else; (3) it does _not suffer_\nfrom the absence of virtue, but regards it rather as a relation of\nperspective which throws virtue into relief: it does not proclaim\nitself; (4) it makes no propaganda; (5) it allows no one to pose as\njudge because it is always a personal virtue; (6) it does precisely\nwhat is generally _forbidden:_ virtue as I understand it is the actual\n_vetitum_ within all gregarious legislation; (7) in short, I recognise\nvirtue in that it is in the Renaissance style--_virtu_--free from all\nmoralic acid. 258\n\nLust of property, lust of power, laziness, simplicity, fear; all these\nthings are interested in virtue; that is why it stands so securely. 261\n\nVice is a somewhat arbitrary epitome of certain effects resulting\nfrom physiological degeneracy. A general proposition such as that\nwhich Christianity teaches, namely, \"Man is evil,\" would be justified\nprovided one were justified in regarding a given type of degenerate\nman as normal. But this may be an exaggeration. Of course, wherever\nChristianity prospers and prevails, the proposition holds good: for\nthen the existence of an unhealthy soil--of a degenerate territory--is\ndemonstrated. 269\n\nIt is difficult to have sufficient respect for man, when one sees how\nhe understands the art of fighting his way, of enduring, of turning\ncircumstances to his own advantage, and of overthrowing opponents; but\nwhen he is seen in the light of his _desires,_ he is the most absurd of\nall animals. 269\n\nAs to the whole socialistic ideal: it is nothing but a blockheaded\nmisunderstanding of the Christian moral ideal. 275\n\nAn ideal which is striving to prevail or to assert itself endeavours to\nfurther its purpose (a) by laying claim to a _spurious_ origin; (b) by\nassuming a relationship between itself and the powerful ideals already\nexisting; (c) by means of the thrill produced by mystery, as though an\nunquestionable power were manifesting itself; (d) by the slander of\nits opponents' ideals; (e) by a lying teaching of the advantages which\nfollow in its wake, for instance: happiness, spiritual peace, general\npeace, or even the assistance of a mighty God. 278\n\nMy view: all the forces and instincts which are the source of life\nare lying beneath the _ban of morality:_ morality is the life-denying\ninstinct. Morality must be annihilated if life is to be emancipated. 278\n\nEvery one's desire is that there should be no other teaching and\nvaluation of things than those by means of which he himself succeeds.\nThus the _fundamental tendency_ of the _weak_ and _mediocre_ of all\ntimes, has been to _enfeeble the strong and to reduce them to the\nlevel of the weak: their chief weapon in this process_ was the _moral\nprinciple._ The attitude of the strong towards the weak is branded as\nevil; the highest states of the strong become bad bywords. 279\n\nEvery small community (or individual), finding itself involved in\na struggle, strives to convince itself of this: \"Good taste, good\njudgment, and virtue are ours.\" War urges people to this exaggerated\nself-esteem. 281\n\nWhatever kind of eccentric ideal one may have (whether as a\n\"Christian,\" a \"free-spirit,\" an \"immoralist,\" or a German\nImperialist), one should try to avoid insisting upon its being _the_\nideal; for, by so doing, it is deprived of all its privileged nature.\nOne should have an ideal as a distinction; one should not propagate it,\nand thus level one's self down to the rest of mankind. 281\n\nReal heroism consists, _not_ in fighting under the banner of\nself-sacrifice, submission and disinterestedness, but in _not fighting\nat all_.... \"I am thus: I will be thus--and you can go to the devil!\"\n282\n\nModest, industrious, benevolent, and temperate: thus you would that\nmen were?--that _good men_ were? But such men I can only conceive as\nslaves, the slaves of the future. 289\n\nIndustry, modesty, benevolence, temperance, are just so many\n_obstacles_ in the way of _sovereign sentiments,_ of great _ingenuity,_\nof an heroic purpose, of noble existence for one's self. 290\n\nI have declared war against the an\u00e6mic Christian ideal (together with\nwhat is closely related to it), not because I want to annihilate it,\nbut only to put an end to its _tyranny_ and clear the way for other\n_ideals,_ for _more robust_ ideals. 291\n\nIf one does good merely out of pity, it is one's self and not one's\nneighbour that one is succouring. 294\n\n\"One is continually promoting the interests of one's _'ego'_ at the\ncost of other people\"; \"Living consists in living at the cost of\nothers\"--he who has not grasped this fact, has not taken the first step\ntowards truth to himself. 294\n\nA morality and a religion of \"love,\" the _curbing_ of the\nself-affirming spirit, and a doctrine encouraging patience,\nresignation, helpfulness, and co-operation in word and deed may be of\nthe highest value within the confines of such classes, even in the\neyes of their rulers: for it restrains the feelings of rivalry, of\nresentment, and of envy,--feelings which are only too natural in the\nbungled and the botched,--and it even deifies them under the ideal of\nhumility, of obedience, of slave-life, of being-ruled, of poverty,\nof illness, and of lowliness. This explains why the ruling classes\n(or races) and individuals of all ages have always upheld the cult of\nunselfishness, the gospel of the lowly and of \"God on the Cross.\" 296\n\nThe _hatred of egoism,_ whether it be one's own (as in the case of the\nSocialists) appears as a valuation reached under the predominance of\nrevenge; and also as an act of prudence on the part of the preservative\ninstinct of the suffering, in the form of an increase in their feelings\nof co-operation and unity.... At bottom, the discharge of resentment\nwhich takes place in the act of judging, rejecting, and punishing\negoism (one's own or that of others) is still a self-preservative\nmeasure on the part of the bungled and the botched. In short: the cult\nof altruism is merely a particular form of egoism, which regularly\nappears under certain definite physiological circumstances.\n\nWhen the Socialist, with righteous indignation, cries for \"justice,\"\n\"rights,\" \"equal rights,\" it only shows that he is oppressed by his\ninadequate culture, and is unable to understand why he suffers: he\nalso finds pleasure in crying;--if he were more at ease he would take\njolly good care not to cry in that way: in that case he would seek his\npleasure elsewhere. The same holds good of the Christian: he curses,\ncondemns, and slanders the \"world\"--and does not even except himself.\nBut that is no reason for taking him seriously. In both cases we are\nin the presence of invalids who feel better for crying, and who find\nrelief in slander. 298\n\nI value a man according to the _quantum of power and fulness of his\nwill;_ not according to the enfeeblement and moribund state thereof. I\nconsider that a philosophy which _teaches_ the denial of will is both\ndefamatory and slanderous.... I test the _power_ of a _will_ according\nto the amount of resistance it can offer and the amount of pain and\ntorture it can endure and know how to turn to its own advantage; I\ndo not point to the evil and pain of existence with the finger of\nreproach, but rather entertain the hope that life may one day be more\nevil and more full of suffering than it has ever been. 304\n\nMy ultimate conclusion is, that the real man represents a much higher\nvalue than the \"desirable\" man of any ideal that has ever existed\nhitherto; that all \"desiderata\" in regard to mankind have been\nabsurd and dangerous dissipations by means of which a particular\nkind of man has sought to establish his measures of preservation\nand of growth as a law for all; that every \"desideratum\" of this\nkind which has been made to dominate has _reduced_ man's worth, his\nstrength, and his trust in the future; that the indigence and mediocre\nintellectuality of man becomes most apparent, even to-day, when he\nreveals a _desire;_ that man's ability to fix values has hitherto been\ndeveloped too inadequately to do justice to the actual, not merely to\nthe \"desirable,\" _worth of man;_ that, up to the present, ideals have\nreally been the power which has most slandered man and power, the\npoisonous fumes which have hung over reality, and which have _seduced\nmen to yearn for nonentity_.... 311\n\nOne must be very immoral in order to _make people moral by deeds._ The\nmoralist's means are the most terrible that have ever been used; he\nwho has not the courage to be an immoralist in deeds may be fit for\nanything else, but not for the duties of a moralist. 314\n\nThe priests of all ages have always pretended that they wished to\n\"improve.\"... But we, of another persuasion, would laugh if a\nlion-tamer ever wished to speak to us of his \"improved\" animals. As a\nrule, the taming of a beast is only achieved by deteriorating it: even\nthe moral man is not a better man; he is rather a weaker member of his\nspecies. 319\n\nUp to the present, morality has developed at the _cost_ of: the\nruling classes and their specific instincts, the well-constituted and\n_beautiful_ natures, the independent and privileged classes in all\nrespects.\n\nMorality, then, is a sort of counter-movement opposing Nature's\nendeavours to arrive at a _higher type._ Its effects are: mistrust\nof life in general (in so far as its tendencies are felt to be\nimmoral),--hostility towards the senses (inasmuch as the highest values\nare felt to be opposed to the higher instincts).--Degeneration and\nself-destruction of \"higher natures,\" because it is precisely in them\nthat the conflict becomes _conscious._321\n\nSuppose the _strong_ were masters in all respects, even in valuing:\nlet us try and think what their attitude would be towards illness,\nsuffering, and sacrifice. Self-contempt on the part of the weak would\nbe the result: they would do their utmost to disappear and to extirpate\ntheir kind. And would this be desirable?--should we really like a world\nin which the subtlety, the consideration, the intellectuality, the\n_plasticity_--in fact, the whole influence of the weak--was lacking?\n... 323\n\nUnder \"Spiritual freedom\" I understand something very definite: it is\na state in which one is a hundred times superior to philosophers and\nother disciples of \"truth\" in one's severity towards one's self, in\none's uprightness, in one's courage, and in one's absolute will to say\nnay even when it is dangerous to say nay. I regard the philosophers\nthat have appeared heretofore as _contemptible libertines_ hiding\nbehind the petticoats of the female \"Truth.\" 384\n\n\n\n\nXII\n\n\n\"The Will to Power\"\n\nVolume II\n\n\nThe second volume of \"The Will to Power,\" even in its present\nfragmentary form, is the most important of Nietzsche's works. It\ndraws together under one cover many of the leading doctrines voiced\nin his principal constructive books, and in addition states them in\nterms of his fundamental postulate--the will to power. In Volume I\nof this work we had the application of this doctrine to morality,\nreligion and philosophy. In the present book it is applied to science,\nnature, society, breeding and art. The notes are more analytical than\nin the former volume; and the subject-matter is in itself of greater\nimportance, being more directly concerned with the exposition of\nNietzsche's main theory. Volume II is also fuller and more homogeneous,\nand contains much new material. So compact is its organisation that\none is able to gain a very adequate idea of the purpose which animated\nNietzsche at the time of making these notes.\n\nThe will to power, the principle which Nietzsche held to be the\nelementary expression of life, must be understood in order for one to\ncomprehend the Nietzschean system of ethics. Throughout all the books\nwhich followed \"The Joyful Wisdom\" we have indirect references to it\nand conclusions based on its assumption as a hypothesis. And, although\nit was never definitely and finally defined until the publication of\nthe notes comprising \"The Will to Power,\" it nevertheless was the\nactuating motive in all Nietzsche's constructive writings. Simply\nstated, the will to power is the biological instinct to maintenance,\npersistence and development. Nietzsche holds that Darwin's universal\nlaw of the instinct to mere survival is a misinterpretation of the\nforces at work in life. He points out that existence is a condition--a\nmedium of action--and by no means an end. It is true that only the\nfittest survive in nature as a result of the tendency to exist; but\nthis theory does not account for the activities which take place after\nexistence has been assured. In order to explain these activities\nNietzsche advances the theory of the will to power and tests all\nactions by it. It will be seen that by this theory the universal law\nof Darwin is by no means abrogated, but rather is it explained and\ndeveloped.\n\nIn the operation of Darwin's biological law there are many forces\nat work. That is to say, once the fact of existence is established,\nnumerous forces can be found at work within the limits of existence.\nWe know that the forces of nature--acting within the medium of\nexistence which is an _a priori_ condition--are rarely unified and\ndirected toward the same result. In short, they are not reciprocal.\nTo the contrary, they work more often against each other--they are\nantagonistic. Immediately a war of forces takes place; and it is this\nwar that constitutes all action in nature. A force in nature directed\nat another force calls forth a resistance and counter-force; and this\ninstinct to act and to resist is in itself a will to act. Otherwise,\ninertia would be the condition of life, once mere existence was assured\nby the fittest. But life is not inert. Even when certain organisms\nhave accomplished the victory for existence, and are no longer moved by\na necessity to struggle for mere being, the will to action persists;\nand this will to action, according to Nietzsche, is the will for power,\nfor in every clash of forces, there is an attempt on the part of each\nforce to overcome and resist the antagonistic one. The greater the\naction, the greater the antagonism. Hence, this tendency in all forces\nto _persist_ is at bottom a tendency of self-assertion, of overcoming\ncounter-forces, of augmenting individual power. Wherever this will to\npersist is found, Nietzsche argues that the will to act is present; and\nthere can be no will to act without a will to power, because the very\ndesire for existence and development is a desire for power.\n\nThis, in brief, is Nietzsche's doctrine applied to the organic and\ninorganic world. In its application to the ideological world, the\nreasoning is not changed. In ideas Nietzsche finds this same will to\npower. But in them it is the reflection of the principle inherent\nin the material world. There is no will inherent in ideas. This\nassumption of a reflected will to power in the ideological world is\none of Nietzsche's most important concepts, for it makes all ideas the\noutgrowth of ourselves, and therefore dependent on natural laws. It\ndoes away with the conception of supernatural power and with the old\nphilosophical belief that ideas are superior forces to those of the\norganic and inorganic world. Nietzsche once and for all disposes of the\ntheory that there is anything more powerful than force, and by thus\ndoing away with this belief, he rationalises all ideas and puts thought\non a tangible and stable basis. In the opening section of the present\nbook where he applies the will to power to scientific research, the\nwhole of this new theory is made clear, and I advise the student to\nread well this section, for I have been unable to present as clear and\ncomplete an expositional statement of it in Nietzsche's own words as I\nwould have liked to do, owing to the close and interrelated manner in\nwhich these notes were written.\n\nVolume II of \"The Will to Power\" is in two books. The first is called\n\"The Principles of a New Valuation\"; the second, \"Discipline and\nBreeding.\" The first book is divided into four sections--\"The Will\nto Power in Science,\" \"The Will to Power in Nature,\" \"The Will to\nPower as Exemplified in Society and in the Individual\" and \"The Will\nto Power in Art.\" The second book has three divisions--\"The Order of\nRank,\" \"Dionysus\" and \"Eternal Recurrence.\" Of the first section of\nBook One, \"The Will to Power in Science,\" I have already spoken. In\nthis section Nietzsche shows how arbitrary a thing science is, and how\nclosely related are its conclusions to the instinct of the scientists,\nnamely: the instinct of the will to power. Scientists, he holds, are\nconfronted by the necessity of translating all phenomena into terms\ncompatible with the struggle for persistence and maintenance. A fact\nin nature unaccounted for is a danger, an obstacle to the complete\nmastery of natural conditions. Consequently the scientist, directed\nand influenced by his will to power, invents explanations which will\nbring all facts under his jurisdiction and control, and will thereby\nincrease his feeling of power. As a result, the great facts of life\nare looked upon as of secondary importance to their explanations, and\nscience becomes, not an intelligent search for knowledge, but a system\nof interpretations tending to increase the feeling of mastery in the\nmen directly connected with it. Thus the law of the will to power, as\nmanifest in the organic and inorganic world, becomes the dominating\ninstinct in the ideological world as well.\n\nIt is well to speak here of truth as Nietzsche conceived it. We have\nseen how he denied its absolutism and declared it to be relative. But\nin his present work he goes further and contends that the feeling of\nthe increase of power is the determining factor in truth. If, as we\nhave seen, the \"truths\" of science are merely those interpretations\nwhich grow out of the scientists' will to power, then truth itself must\nbe the outgrowth of this instinct. That which makes for the growth and\ndevelopment of the individual--or in other words, that which increases\nthe feeling of strength--is necessarily the truth. From this it is easy\nto deduce the conclusion that in many instances truth is a reversal of\nfacts, for preservation very often consists in an adherence to actual\nfalsity. Thus, the false causality of certain phenomena--the outcome of\nlogic engendered by a will to power--has not infrequently masqueraded\nas truth. Nietzsche holds that this doctrine contains the only possible\ndefinition of truth; and in this doctrine we find an explanation for\nmany of the apparent paradoxes in his teachings when the matter of\ntruth and falsity are under discussion.\n\nThe second part of the first book relates to the will to power in\nnature, and contains the most complete and lucid explanation of\nNietzsche's basic theory to be found anywhere in his writings.\nThis section opens with an argument against a purely mechanical\ninterpretation of the world, and a refutation of the physicists'\nconcept of \"energy.\" The chemical and physical laws, the atomic\ntheory and the mechanical concept of movement, he characterises as\n\"inventions\" on the part of scientists and researchers for the purpose\nof understanding natural phenomena and therefore of increasing their\nfeeling of power. The apparent sequence of phenomena which constitutes\n\"law\" is, according to Nietzsche, only a \"relation of power between\ntwo or more forces\"--a matter of interdependence, a process wherein\nthe \"procession of moments do _not_ determine each other after the\nmanner of cause and effect.\" In these observations we see the process\nof reasoning with which Nietzsche refutes the current methods of\nascertaining facts and the manner in which he introduces the principle\nof will to power into the phenomena of nature.\n\nIt is in this section that Nietzsche discusses at length the points\nof divergence between his life principle and that of Darwin. And it\nis here also that he treats of the psychology of pleasure and pain in\ntheir relation to the will to power. This latter statement is of great\nimportance in an understanding of the instincts of life as he taught\nthem, for it denies both pleasure and pain a place in the determining\nof acts. They are both, according to him, but accompanying factors,\nnever causes, and are but second-rate valuations derived from a\ndominating value. He denies that man struggles for happiness. To the\ncontrary, he holds that all expansion and growth and resistance--in\nshort, all movement--is related to states of pain, and that, although\nthe modern man is master of the forces of nature and of himself, he\nis no happier than the primeval man. Why, then, does man struggle for\nknowledge and growth, knowing that it does not bring happiness? Not for\nexistence, because existence is already assured him. But for power,\nfor the feeling of increased mastery. Thus Nietzsche answers the two\ncommon explanations of man's will to action--the need for being and\nthe desire for happiness--by his doctrine of the will to power.\n\nThe entire teaching of Nietzsche in regard to classes and to the\nnecessity of divergent moral codes to meet the needs of higher and\nlower castes, is contained in the third part of the first book. Here\nagain he emphasises the need of two codes and makes clear his stand\nin relation to the superior individual. As I have pointed out in\npreceding chapters, Nietzsche did not attempt to do away with the\nmorality of the inferior classes. He saw that some such religious\nbelief as Christianity was imperative for them. His fight was against\nits application to all classes, against its dominance. I mention this\npoint again because it is the basis of the greatest misunderstanding\nof Nietzsche's philosophy. Part III is written for the higher man, and\nif this viewpoint is assumed on the part of the reader, there will\nbe no confusion as to doctrines encountered. The statements in this\nsection are in effect similar to those to be found in Nietzsche's\nprevious works, but in every instance in the present case they are\ndirectly related to the will to power. Because of this they possess a\nsignificance which does not attach to them in antecedent volumes.\n\nThe whole of Nietzsche's art theories are to be found in Part IV,\n\"The Will to Power in Art.\" It is not merely a system of \u00e6sthetics\nthat occupies the pages under this section, for Nietzsche never\ndivorces art from life itself; and the artist, according to him, is\nthe superior type, the creator of values. The concepts of beauty and\nugliness are the outgrowths of an overflow of Dionysian power; and\nit is to the great artists of the past, the instinctive higher men,\nthat we owe our current concepts. The principle here is the dominant\none in Nietzsche's philosophy in relation to valuing:--_to the few\nindividuals of the race are we indebted for the world of values._ To\nthe student who wishes to go deeply into Nietzsche's ideas of art and\nhis conception of the artist, and to know in just what manner the\nDionysian and Apollonian figure in his theories, I unhesitatingly\nrecommend Anthony M. Ludovici's book, \"Nietzsche and Art.\"\n\nThe first section of the second book in this volume contains some of\nNietzsche's finest writing. Its title, \"The Order of Rank,\" explains in\na large measure what material comprises it. It is a description of the\nvarious degrees of man, and a statement of the attributes which belong\nto each. No better definition of the different classes of men is to\nbe found anywhere in this philosopher's writings. One part is devoted\nto a consideration of the strong and the weak, and the way in which\nthey react on one another; another part deals with \"the noble man\"\nand contains (in Aphorism 943) a list of the characteristics of the\nnoble man, unfortunately too long a list to be quoted in the present\nchapter; another part defines \"the lords of the earth\"; another part\ndelineates \"the great man,\" and enumerates his specific qualities;\nand still another part treats of \"the highest man as law-giver of the\nfuture.\" This section, however, is not a mere series of detached and\nisolated definitions, but an important summary of the ethical code\nwhich Nietzsche advanced as a result of his application of the doctrine\nof the will to power to the order of individual rank.\n\nThe two remaining sections--\"Dionysus\" and \"Eternal Recurrence\"--are\nshort, and fail to touch on new ground. There are a few robust and\nheroic passages in the former section which summarise Nietzsche's\ndefinitions of Apollonian and Dionysian; but in the latter section\nthere is nothing not found in the pamphlet called \"The Eternal\nRecurrence\" and in \"Thus Spake Zarathustra.\" I do not doubt that\nNietzsche had every intention of elaborating this last section, for\nhe considered the principle of recurrence a most important one in his\nphilosophy. But, as it stands, it is but a few pages in length and in\nno way touches upon his other philosophical doctrines. If importance it\nhad in the philosophy of the superman, that importance was never shown\neither by Nietzsche or by his critics.\n\nHowever, let us not overlook the importance of the doctrine of the\nwill to power either in its relation to Nietzsche's writings or in its\napplication to ourselves. By this doctrine the philosopher wished to\nmake mankind realise its great dormant power. The insistence on the\nhuman basis of all things was no more than a call to arms--an attempt\nto instil courage in men who had attributed all great phenomena to\nsupernatural forces and had therefore acquiesced before them instead\nof having endeavoured to conquer them. Nietzsche's object was to make\nman surer of himself, to infuse him with pride, to imbue him with more\ndaring, to awaken him to a full realisation of his possibilities.\nThis, in brief, is the teaching of the will to power reduced to its\nimmediate influences. In this doctrine is preached a new virility.\nNot the sedentary virility of compromise, but the virility which is\nborn of struggle and suffering, which is a sign of one's great love\nof living. Nietzsche offered a new set of vital ideals to supplant\nthe decadent ones which now govern us. Resolute faith, the power of\naffirmation, initiative, pride, courage and fearlessness--these are the\nrewards in the exercise of the will to power. The strength of great\nlove and the vitality of great deeds, as well as the possibility of\nrare and vigorous growth, lie within this doctrine of will. Its object\nis to give back to us the life we have lost--the life of beauty and\nplenitude, of strength and exuberance.\n\n\nEXCERPTS FROM \"THE WILL TO POWER\" volume II\n\nFor hundreds of years, pleasure and pain have been represented as the\n_motives_ for every action. Upon reflection, however, we are bound to\nconcede that everything would have proceeded in exactly the same way,\naccording to precisely the same sequence of cause and effect, if the\nstates \"pleasure\" and \"pain\" had been entirely absent. 8-9\n\nThe _measure_ of the desire for knowledge depends upon the extent to\nwhich _the Will to Power_ grows in a certain species: a species gets a\ngrasp of a given amount of reality, _in order to master it, in order to\nenlist that amount in its service._ 12\n\nIt is our needs that _interpret the world;_ our instincts and their\nimpulses for and against. Every instinct is a sort of thirst for\npower.... 13\n\nThat a belief, however useful it may be for the preservation of a\nspecies, has nothing to do with the truth, may be seen from the fact\nthat we _must_ believe in time, space, and motion, without feeling\nourselves compelled to regard them as absolute realities. 16\n\n_Truth is that hind of error_ without which a certain species of living\nbeing cannot exist. 20\n\nIn the formation of reason, logic, and the categories, it was a _need_\nin us that was the determining power: not the need \"to know,\" but\nto classify, to schematise, for the purpose of intelligibility and\ncalculation. 29\n\nLogic is the attempt on our part to understand the actual world\naccording to a scheme of Being devised by ourselves; or, more exactly,\nit is our attempt at making the actual world more calculable and more\nsusceptible to formulation, for our own purposes.... 33\n\n\"Truth\" is the will to be master over the manifold sensations that\nreach consciousness; it is the will to _classify_ phenomena according\nto definite categories. In this way we start out with a belief in the\n\"true nature\" of things (we regard phenomena as real).\n\nThe character of the world in the process of Becoming _is not\nsusceptible of formulation;_ it is \"false\" and \"contradicts itself.\"\n_Knowledge_ and the process of evolution exclude each other.\n_Consequently,_ knowledge must be something else; it must be preceded\nby a will to make things knowable, a kind of Becoming in itself must\ncreate the _impression_ of _Being._ 33-34.\n\n_The chief error of psychologists:_ they regard the indistinct idea\nas of a lower _kind_ than the _distinct;_ but that which keeps at a\ndistance from our consciousness and which is therefore _obscure, may_\non that very account be quite clear in itself. _The fact that a thing\nbecomes obscure is a question of the perspective of consciousness._ 42\n\nThe criterion of truth lies in the enhancement of the feeling of power.\n49\n\nLogic was intended to be a method of facilitating thought: _a means of\nexpression,_--not truth.... Later on it got to _act_ like truth.... 50\n\nIn a world which was essentially false, truthfulness would be an\n_anti-natural tendency:_ its only purpose would be to provide a means\nof attaining to a _higher degree of falsity._ 51\n\nWe have absolutely no experience concerning _cause;_ viewed\npsychologically we derive the whole concept from the subjective\nconviction, that _we_ ourselves are causes. 55\n\n\"Truth\" is not something which is present and which has to be found and\ndiscovered; it is something _which has to be created_ and which _gives_\nits name _to a process,_ or, better still, to the Will to overpower,\nwhich in itself has no purpose.... 60\n\nThe absolute is even an absurd concept: an \"absolute mode of existence\"\nis nonsense, the concept \"being,\" \"thing,\" is always _relative_ to us.\n\nThe trouble is that, owing to the old antithesis \"apparent\" and \"real,\"\nthe correlative valuations \"little value\" and \"absolute value\" have\nbeen spread abroad. 83\n\nMan seeks \"the truth\": a world that does not contradict itself, that\ndoes not deceive, that does not change, a _real_ world--a world in\nwhich there is no suffering: contradiction, deception, variability--the\ncauses of suffering. He does not doubt that there is such a thing as a\nworld as it ought to be; he would fain find a road to it.... Obviously,\nthe will to truth is _merely_ the longing for a _stable world._\n\nThe senses deceive; reason corrects the errors: _therefore,_ it was\nconcluded, reason is the road to a static state; the most _spiritual_\nideas must be nearest to the \"real world.\" 88\n\nThe degree of a man's will-power may be measured from the extent to\nwhich he can dispense with the meaning in things, from the extent to\nwhich he is able to endure a world without meaning: _because he himself\narranges a small portion of it._ 90\n\nThere is no such thing as an established fact, everything fluctuates,\neverything is intangible, yielding; after all, the most lasting of all\nthings are our opinions. 103\n\nThat the _worth of the world_ lies in our interpretations (that perhaps\nyet other interpretations are possible somewhere, besides mankind's);\nthat the interpretations made hitherto were perspective valuations,\nby means of which we were able to survive in life, _i. e._ in the Will\nto Power and in the growth of power; that every _elevation of man_\ninvolves the overcoming of narrower interpretations; that every higher\ndegree of strength or power attained, brings new views in its train,\nand teaches a belief in new horizons--these doctrines lie scattered\nthrough all my works. 107\n\nThe triumphant concept _\"energy\"_ with which our physicists created God\nand the world, needs yet to be completer: it must be given an inner\nwill which I characterise as the \"Will to Power\"--that is to say, as an\ninsatiable desire to manifest power; or the application and exercise of\npower as a creative instinct, etc.... 110\n\nThe unalterable sequence of certain phenomena does not prove any \"law,\"\nbut a relation of power between two or more forces. 115\n\nA quantum of power is characterised by the effect it produces and\nthe influence it resists. The adiaphoric state which would be\nthinkable in itself, is entirely lacking. It is essentially a will to\nviolence and a will to defend one's self against violence. It is not\nself-preservation: every atom exercises its influence over the whole of\nexistence--it is thought out of existence if one thinks this radiation\nof will-power away. That is why I call it a quantum of \"Will to Power.\"\n... 117-118\n\nMy idea is that every specific body strives to become master of all\nspace, and to extend its power (its will to power), and to thrust\nback everything that resists it. But inasmuch as it is continually\nmeeting the same endeavours on the part of other bodies, it concludes\nby coming to terms with those (by \"combining\" with those) which are\nsufficiently related to it--_and thus they conspire together for\npower._ And the process continues. 121\n\nThe influence of \"environment\" is nonsensically _over-rated_ in Darwin:\nthe essential factor in the process of life is precisely the tremendous\ninner power to shape and to create forms, which merely _uses, exploits_\n\"environment.\" 127\n\nThe _feeling of being surcharged,_ the feeling accompanying an\n_increase in strength,_ quite apart from the utility of the struggle,\nis the actual _progress:_ from these feelings the will to war is first\nderived. 128\n\nA living thing seeks above all to _discharge_ its strength:\n_\"self-preservation\"_ is only one of the results thereof.... 128\n\nThe most fundamental and most primeval activity of a protoplasm cannot\nbe ascribed to a will to self-preservation, for it absorbs an amount\nof material which is absurdly out of proportion with the needs of its\npreservation: and what is more, it does _not_ \"preserve itself\" in the\nprocess, but actually falls to _pieces ..._. The instinct which rules\nhere, must account for this total absence in the organism of a desire\nto preserve itself.\n\nThe will to power can manifest itself only against _obstacles:_ it\ntherefore goes in search of what resists it--this is the primitive\ntendency of the protoplasm when it extends its _pseudopodia_ and feels\nabout it. The act of appropriation and assimilation is, above all,\nthe result of an additional building and rebuilding, until at last\nthe subjected creature has become completely a part of the superior\ncreature's sphere of power, and has increased the latter.... 130\n\nWhy is all _activity,_ even that of a _sense,_ associated with\npleasure? Because, before the activity was possible, an obstacle or a\nburden was done away with. Or, rather, because all action is a process\nof overcoming, of becoming master of, and of _increasing_ the _feeling\nof power?_ 135\n\nMan is _not_ only an individual, but the continuation of collective\norganic life in one definite line. The fact that _man_ survives,\nproves that a certain species of interpretations (even though it still\nbe added to) has also survived; that, as a system, this method of\ninterpreting has not changed. 152\n\nThe fundamental phenomena: _innumerable individuals are sacrificed for\nthe sake of a few,_ in order to make the few possible.--One must not\nallow one's self to be deceived; the case is the same with _peoples_\nand _races:_ they produce the \"body\" for the generation of isolated and\nvaluable _individuals,_ who continue the great process. 153\n\nLife is _not_ the continuous adjustment of internal relations to\nexternal relations, but will to power, which, proceeding from inside,\nsubjugates and incorporates an ever-increasing quantity of \"external\"\nphenomena. 153-154\n\nMan as a species is not progressing. Higher specimens are indeed\nattained; but they do not survive. The general level of the species is\nnot raised.... Man as a species does not represent any sort of progress\ncompared with any other animal. 157\n\nThe domestication (culture) of man does not sink very deep. When it\ndoes sink far below the skin it immediately becomes degeneration (type:\nthe Christian). The \"wild\" man (or, in moral terminology, the _evil_\nman) is a reversion to Nature--and, in a certain sense, he represents a\nrecovery, a _cure_ from the effects of \"culture.\"... 158\n\nThe strong always have to be upheld against the weak; and the\nwell-constituted against the ill-constituted, the healthy against\nthe sick and physiologically botched. If we drew our morals from\nreality, they would read thus: the mediocre are more valuable than the\nexceptional creatures, and the decadent than the mediocre; the will to\nnonentity prevails over the will to life.... 159\n\nThat species show an ascending tendency, is the most nonsensical\nassertion that has ever been made: until now they have only manifested\na dead level. There is nothing whatever to prove that the higher\norganisms have developed from the lower. 160\n\nMan as he has appeared up to the present is the embryo of the man\nof the future; _all_ the formative powers which are to produce the\nlatter, already lie in the former: and owing to the fact that they are\nenormous, the more _promising for the future_ the modern individual\nhappens to be, the more _suffering_ falls to his lot. 161\n\nThe will to power is the primitive motive force out of which all other\nmotives have been derived. 162\n\nFrom a psychological point of view the idea of \"cause\" is our feeling\nof power in the act which is called willing--our concept \"effect\" is\nthe superstition that this feeling of power is itself the force which\nmoves things.... 163\n\nLife as an individual case (a hypothesis which may be applied to\nexistence in general) strives after the maximum feeling of power; life\nis essentially a striving after more power; striving itself is only a\nstraining after more power; the most fundamental and innermost thing\nof all is this will. 165\n\nMan does not seek happiness and does not avoid unhappiness. Everybody\nknows the famous prejudices I here contradict. Pleasure and pain are\nmere results, mere accompanying phenomena--that which every man, which\nevery tiny particle of a living organism will have, is an increase of\npower. In striving after this, pleasure and pain are encountered; it is\nowing to that will that the organism seeks opposition and requires that\nwhich stands in its way.... Pain as the hindrance of its will to power\nis therefore a normal feature, a natural ingredient of every organic\nphenomenon; man does not avoid it; on the contrary, he is constantly\nin need of it; every triumph, every feeling of pleasure, every event\npresupposes an obstacle overcome. 172\n\nMan is now master of the forces of nature, and master too of his own\nwild and unbridled feelings (the passions have followed suit, and have\nlearned to become useful)--in comparison with primeval man, the man of\nto-day represents an enormous quantum of power, but not an increase\nin happiness. How can one maintain, then, that he has striven after\nhappiness? 174\n\n\"God\" is the culminating moment: life is an eternal process of deifying\nand undeifying. _But withal there is no zenith of values,_ but only a\nzenith of _power._ 181\n\nMan has one terrible and fundamental wish; he desires power, and this\nimpulse, which is called freedom, must be the longest restrained. Hence\nethics has instinctively aimed at such an education as shall restrain\nthe desire for power; thus our morality slanders the would-be tyrant,\nand glorifies charity, patriotism, and the ambition of the herd. 186\n\nWhen the instincts of a society ultimately make it give up war and\nrenounce conquest, it is decadent: it is ripe for democracy and the\nrule of shopkeepers. 189\n\nThe maintenance of the military State is the last means of adhering to\nthe great tradition of the past; or, where it has been lost, to revive\nit. By means of it the superior or strong type of man is preserved, and\nall institutions and ideas which perpetuate enmity and order of rank in\nStates such as national feeling, protective tariffs, etc., may on that\naccount seem justified. 190\n\n_Concerning the future of marriage._--A supertax on inherited property,\na longer term of military service for bachelors of a certain minimum\nage within the community.\n\nPrivileges of all sorts for fathers who lavish boys upon the world, and\nperhaps plural votes as well.\n\nA medical certificate as a condition of any marriage, endorsed by the\nparochial authorities, in which a series of questions addressed to the\nparties and the medical officers must be answered (\"family histories\").\n\nAs a counter-agent to prostitution, or as its ennoblement, I would\nrecommend leasehold marriages (to last for a term of years or months),\nwith adequate provision for the children.\n\nEvery marriage to be warranted and sanctioned by a certain number of\ngood men and true, of the parish, as a parochial obligation. 193\n\nSociety ... should in many cases actually prevent the act of\nprocreation, and may, without any regard for rank, descent, or\nintellect, hold in readiness the most rigorous forms of compulsion\nand restriction, and, under certain circumstances, have recourse to\ncastration. 194\n\nThe idea of punishment ought to be reduced to the concept of the\nsuppression of revolt, a weapon against the vanquished (by means of\nlong or short terms of imprisonment). But punishment should not be\nassociated in any way with contempt. A criminal is at all events a man\nwho has set his life, his honour, his freedom at stake; he is therefore\na man of courage. Neither should punishment be regarded as penance or\nretribution, as though there were some recognised rate of exchange\nbetween crime and punishment. Punishment does not purify, simply\nbecause crime does not sully. 198\n\nShould not the punishment fit the crime? 200\n\n\"The will to power\" is so loathed in democratic ages that the whole of\nthe psychology of these ages seems directed towards its belittlement\nand slander. 205\n\nI am opposed to Socialism because it dreams ingenuously of \"goodness,\ntruth, beauty, and equal rights\" (anarchy pursues the same ideal, but\nin a more brutal fashion).\n\nI am opposed to parliamentary government and the power of the press,\nbecause they are the means whereby cattle become masters. 206\n\nThe idea of a higher order of man is hated much more profoundly than\nmonarchs themselves. Hatred of aristocracy always uses hatred of\nmonarchy as a mask. 207\n\nUtility and pleasure are slave theories of life. \"The blessing of work\"\nis an ennobling phrase for slaves. Incapacity for leisure. 208\n\nThere is no such thing as a right to live, a right to work, or a right\nto be happy: in this respect man is no different from the meanest worm.\n208\n\n_Fundamental errors:_ to regard the herd as an aim instead of the\nindividual! The herd is only a means and nothing _more! _ But\nnowadays people are trying to understand _the herd_ as they would an\nindividual, and to confer higher rights upon it than upon isolated\npersonalities. In addition to this, all that makes for gregariousness,\n_e.g.,_ sympathy, is regarded as the _more valuable_ side of our\nnatures. 214-215\n\n_The will to power_ appears:--\n\n    (a) Among the oppressed and slaves of all kinds, in the form\n    of will to _\"freedom\":_ the mere fact of breaking loose from\n    something seems to be an end in itself (in a religio-moral\n    sense: \"One is only answerable to one's own conscience\";\n    \"evangelical freedom,\" etc., etc.).\n\n    (b) In the case of a stronger species, ascending to power,\n    in the form of the will to overpower. If this fails, then\n    it shrinks to the \"will to justice\"--that is to say, to\n    the will to the same measure of rights as the ruling caste\n    possesses.\n\n    (c) In the case of the strongest, richest, most independent,\n    and most courageous, in the form of \"love of humanity,\" of\n    \"love of the people,\" of the \"gospel,\" of \"truth,\" of \"God,\"\n    of \"pity,\" of \"self-sacrifice,\" etc., etc.; in the form of\n    overpowering, of deeds of capture, of imposing service on\n    some one, of an instinctive reckoning of one's self as part\n    of a great mass of power to which one attempts to give a\n    direction: the hero, the prophet, the C\u00e6sar, the Saviour,\n    the bell-wether. 220-221\n\n_Individualism_ is a modest and still unconscious form of will to\npower; with it a single human unit seems to think it sufficient to free\nhimself from the preponderating power of society (or of the State or\nChurch). He does not set himself up in opposition as a _personality,_\nbut merely as a unit; he represents the rights of all other individuals\nas against the whole. That is to say, he instinctively places himself\non a level with every other unit: what he combats he does not combat as\na person, but as a representative of units against a mass. 227\n\nThere are no such things as moral actions: they are purely imaginary.\nNot only is it impossible to demonstrate their existence (a fact\nwhich Kant and Christianity, for instance, both acknowledge)--but\nthey are not even possible. Owing to psychological misunderstanding,\nman invented an _opposite_ to the instinctive impulses of life, and\nbelieved that a new species of instinct was thereby discovered: a\n_primum mobile_ was postulated which does not exist at all. According\nto the valuation which gave rise to the antithesis \"moral\" and\n\"immoral,\" one should say: _There is nothing else on earth but immoral\nintentions and actions._\n\nThe whole differentiation, \"moral\" and \"immoral,\" arises from the\nassumption that both moral and immoral actions are the result of a\nspontaneous will--in short, that such a will exists; or in other words,\nthat moral judgments can only hold good with regard to intuitions and\nactions _that are free._ But this whole order of actions and intentions\nis purely imaginary: the only world to which the moral standard could\nbe applied does not exist at all: _there is no such thing as a moral or\nan immoral action._ 230-231\n\nThere are two conditions in which art manifests itself in man even as\na force of nature, and disposes of him whether he consent or not: it\nmay be as a constraint to visionary states, or it may be an orgiastic\nimpulse. 240\n\n_Sexuality, intoxication, cruelty;_ all these belong to the oldest\n_festal joys_ of mankind, they also preponderate in budding artists. 243\n\nThe desire for art and beauty is an indirect longing for the ecstasy\nof sexual desire, which gets communicated to the brain. 248\n\nAll art works as a _tonic;_ it increases strength, it kindles desire\n(_i.e.,_ the feeling of strength), it excites all the more subtle\nrecollections of intoxication.... 252\n\nThe inartistic states are: objectivity, reflection, suspension of the\nwill.... The inartistic states are: those which impoverish, which\nsubtract, which bleach, under which life suffers--the Christian. 257\n\nWould any link be missing in the whole chain of science and art, if\nwoman, if woman's work, were excluded from it? Let us acknowledge the\nexception--it proves the rule--that woman is capable of perfection in\neverything which does not constitute a work: in letters, in memoirs, in\nthe most intricate handiwork--in short, in everything which is not a\ncraft.... 260-261\n\nA man is an artist to the extent to which he regards everything\nthat inartistic people call \"form\" as the actual substance, as the\n\"principal\" thing. 261\n\nThe essential feature in art is its power of perfecting existence,\nits production of perfection and plenitude; art is essentially the\naffirmation, the blessing, and the deification of existence.... 263\n\nThe greatness of an artist is not to be measured by the beautiful\nfeelings which he evokes: let this belief be left to the girls. It\nshould be measured according to the extent to which he approaches the\ngrand style, according to the extent to which he is capable of the\ngrand style. This style and great passion have this in common--that\nthey scorn to please; that they forget to persuade: that they command;\nthat they will.... To become master of the chaos which is in one; to\ncompel one's inner chaos to assume form; to become consistent, simple,\nunequivocal, mathematical, law--this is the great ambition here. 277\n\nA preference for questionable and terrible things is a symptom of\nstrength; whereas the taste for pretty and charming trifles is\ncharacteristic of the weak and the delicate. 287\n\nArt is the great means of making life possible, the great seducer to\nlife, the great stimulus of life.\n\nArt is the only superior counter-agent to all will to the denial of\nlife; it is _par excellence_ the anti-Christian, the anti-Buddhistic,\nthe anti-Nihilistic force. 290\n\nQuanta of power alone determine rank and distinguish rank: nothing else\ndoes. 295\n\nIt is necessary for _higher_ men to declare war upon the masses! In\nall directions mediocre people are joining hands in order to make\nthemselves masters. Everything that pampers, that softens, and that\nbrings the \"people\" or \"woman\" to the front, operates in favour of\nuniversal suffrage--that is to say, the dominion of _inferior_ men. 297\n\nWoman has always conspired with decadent types,--the priests, for\ninstance,--against the \"mighty,\" against the \"strong,\" against _men._\nWomen avail themselves of children for the cult of piety, pity, and\nlove:--the _mother_ stands as the symbol of _convincing_ altruism. 300\n\nIt is _necessary_ to show _that a counter-movement is inevitably\nassociated_ with any increasingly economical consumption of men\nand mankind, and with an ever more closely involved \"machinery\" of\ninterests and services. I call this counter-movement the _separation\nof the luxurious surplus of mankind:_ by means of it a stronger kind,\na higher type, must come to light, which has other conditions for its\norigin and for its maintenance than the average man. My concept, my\nmetaphor for this type is, as you know, the word \"Superman.\" 305\n\nReaders are beginning to see what I am combating--namely, _economic_\noptimism: as if the general welfare of everybody must necessarily\nincrease with the growing self-sacrifice of everybody. The very reverse\nseems to me to be the case, _the self-sacrifice of everybody amounts to\na collective loss;_ man becomes _inferior_--so that nobody knows what\nend this monstrous purpose has served. 306-307\n\n_The root of all evil:_ that the slave morality of modesty, chastity,\nselfishness, and absolute obedience should have triumphed. Dominating\nnatures were thus condemned (1) to hypocrisy, (2) to qualms of\nconscience,--creative natures regarded themselves as rebels against\nGod, uncertain and hemmed in by eternal values. 309\n\nThat which _men of power and will are able to demand of themselves_\ngives them the standard for what they may also allow themselves. Such\nnatures are the very opposite of the _vicious_ and the _unbridled:_\nalthough under certain circumstances they may perpetrate deeds for\nwhich an inferior man would be convicted of vice and intemperance.\n\nIn this respect the concept, _\"all men are equal before God\"_ does\nan extraordinary amount of harm; actions and attitudes of mind were\nforbidden which belonged to the prerogative of the strong alone, just\nas if they were in themselves unworthy of man. All the tendencies of\nstrong men were brought into disrepute by the fact that the defensive\nweapons of the most weak (even of those who were weakest towards\nthemselves) were established as a standard of valuation. 311\n\n_The degeneration of the ruler and of the ruling classes_ has been the\ncause of all the great disorders in history! 312\n\nThe solitary type should not be valued from the standpoint of the\ngregarious type, or _vice versa._ 320\n\nWho would dare to disgust the mediocre of their mediocrity! As\nyou observe, I do precisely the reverse: every step away from\nmediocrity--thus do I teach--leads to _immorality._ 324\n\nWhat I combat: that an exceptional form should make war upon the\nrule--instead of understanding that the continued existence of the rule\nis the first condition of the value of the exception. 325\n\nOne should not suppose the mission of a higher species to be the\n_leading_ of inferior men (as Comte does, for instance); but the\ninferior should be regarded as the _foundation_ upon which a higher\nspecies may live their higher life--upon which alone they _can stand._\n329\n\nMy consolation is, that the nature of man is _evil,_ and this\nguarantees his _strength!_ 332\n\nThere is no true scholar who has not the instincts of a true soldier\nin his veins. To be able to command and to be able to obey in a proud\nfashion; to keep one's place in rank and file, and yet to be ready at\nany moment to lead; to prefer danger to comfort; not to weigh what is\npermitted and what is forbidden in a tradesman's balance; to be more\nhostile to pettiness, slyness, and parasitism than to wickedness. What\nis it that one _learns_ in a hard school?--to _obey_ and to _command._\n335\n\n_The means by which a strong species maintains itself:--_\n\nIt grants itself the right of exceptional actions, as a test of the\npower of self-control and of freedom.\n\nIt abandons itself to states in which a man is not allowed to be\nanything else than a barbarian.\n\nIt tries to acquire strength of will by every kind of asceticism.\n\nIt is not expansive; it practises silence; it is cautious in regard to\nall charms.\n\nIt learns to obey in such a way that obedience provides a test of\nself-maintenance. Casuistry is carried to its highest pitch in regard\nto points of honour.\n\nIt never argues, \"What is sauce for the goose is sauce for the\ngander\"--but conversely! it regards reward, and the ability to repay,\nas a privilege, as a distinction.\n\nIt does not covet _other_ people's virtues. 341\n\nThe _blind yielding_ to a passion, whether it be generosity, pity, or\nhostility, is the cause of the greatest evil. Greatness of character\ndoes not consist in not possessing these passions--on the contrary, a\nman should possess them to a terrible degree: but he should lead them\nby the bridle.... 346\n\nEducation: essentially a means of _ruining_ exceptions in favour of the\nrule. Culture: essentially the means of directing taste against the\nexceptions in favour of the mediocre. 349\n\n_What is noble?_--The fact that one is constantly forced to be playing\na part. That one is constantly searching for situations in which one\nis forced to put on airs. That one leaves happiness to the _greatest\nnumber:_ the happiness which consists of inner peacefulness, of virtue,\nof comfort, and of Anglo-angelic-back-parlour-smugness, \u00e0 la Spencer.\nThat one instinctively seeks for heavy responsibilities. That one knows\nhow to create enemies everywhere, at a pinch even in one's self. That\none contradicts the _greatest number,_ not in words at all, but by\ncontinually behaving differently from them. 357\n\nThe first thing that must be done is to rear a _new kind_ of man in\nwhom the duration of the necessary will and the necessary instincts\nis guaranteed for many generations. This must be a new kind of ruling\nspecies and caste--this ought to be quite as clear as the somewhat\nlengthy and not easily expressed consequences of this thought. The aim\nshould be to prepare a _transvaluation of values_ for a particularly\nstrong kind of man, most highly gifted in intellect and will, and,\nto his end, slowly and cautiously to liberate in him a whole host of\nslandered instincts hitherto held in check.... 363-364\n\nThe revolution, confusion, and distress of whole peoples is in my\nopinion of less importance than _the misfortunes which attend great\nindividuals in their development._ We must not allow ourselves to be\ndeceived: the many misfortunes of all these small folk do not together\nconstitute a sum-total, except in the feelings of _mighty_ men. 369\n\nThe greatest men may also perhaps have great virtues, but then they\nalso have the opposites of these virtues. I believe that it is\nprecisely out of the presence of these opposites and of the feelings\nthey suscitate, that the great man arises,--for the great man is the\nbroad arch which spans two banks lying far apart. 370\n\nIn _great men_ we find the specific qualities of life in their highest\nmanifestation: injustice, falsehood, exploitation. But inasmuch as\ntheir effect has always been _overwhelming,_ their essential nature has\nbeen most thoroughly misunderstood, and interpreted as goodness. 370-371\n\nWe must _not_ make men \"better,\" we must _not_ talk to them about\nmorality in any form as if \"morality in itself,\" or an ideal kind\nof man in general, could be taken for granted; but we must _create\ncircumstances_ in which _stronger men are necessary,_ such as for\ntheir part will require a morality (or, better still: a bodily and\nspiritual discipline) which makes men strong, and upon which they will\nconsequently insist! 379\n\nWe must not separate greatness of soul from intellectual greatness.\nFor the former involves _independence;_ but without intellectual\ngreatness independence should not be allowed; all it does is to create\ndisasters even in its lust of well-doing and of practising \"justice.\"\nInferior spirits _must_ obey, consequently they cannot be possessed of\ngreatness. 380\n\nI teach that there are higher and lower men, and that a single\nindividual may under certain circumstances justify whole millenniums of\nexistence--that is to say, a wealthier, more gifted, greater, and more\ncomplete man, as compared with innumerable imperfect and fragmentary\nmen. 386\n\nHe who _determines_ values and leads the will of millenniums, and does\nthis by leading the highest natures--he _is the highest man._ 386\n\nWe should attain to such a height, to such a lofty eagle's ledge, in\nour observation, as to be able to understand that everything happens,\n_just as it ought to happen:_ and that all \"imperfection,\" and the pain\nit brings, belong to all that which is most eminently desirable. 389\n\n_Pleasure_ appears with the feeling of power.\n\n_Happiness_ means that power and triumph have entered into our\nconsciousness.\n\n_Progress_ is the strengthening of the type, the ability to exercise\ngreat will-power: everything else is a misunderstanding and a danger.\n403\n\nMan is a combination of the _beast and the superbeast:_ higher man a\ncombination of the monster and the superman: these opposites belong\nto each other. With every degree of a man's growth towards greatness\nand loftiness, he also grows downwards into the depths and into the\nterrible:... 405\n\nThe word _\"Dionysian\"_ expresses: a constraint to unity, a soaring\nabove personality, the commonplace, society, reality, and above the\nabyss of the _ephemeral;_ the passionately painful sensation of\nsuperabundance, in darker, fuller, and more fluctuating conditions;\nan ecstatic saying of yea to the collective character of existence,\nas that which remains the same, and equally mighty and blissful\nthroughout all change; the great pantheistic sympathy with pleasure\nand pain, which declares even the most terrible and most questionable\nqualities of existence good, and sanctifies them; the eternal will to\nprocreation, to fruitfulness, and to recurrence; the feeling of unity\nin regard to the necessity of creating and annihilating. 415-416\n\nAt this point I set up the Dionysus of the Greeks: the religious\naffirmation of Life, of the whole of Life, not of denied and partial\nLife.... 420\n\nGod on the Cross is a curse upon Life, a signpost directing people to\ndeliver themselves from it;--Dionysus cut into pieces is a promise of\nLife: it will be for ever born anew, and rise afresh from destruction.\n421\n\n\n\n\nBIBLIOGRAPHY\n\n\nIn the following list no attempt has been made at completion. I have\nset down only the important and more useful works concerning Nietzsche\nand his philosophy, and have further limited myself to such volumes\nas are in English. I have omitted entirely the large number of essays\non Nietzsche which have appeared in magazines, as well as those books\nwhich embody only the various Nietzschean ideas.\n\n\nEXPOSITIONAL BOOKS\n\nTHE PHILOSOPHY OF FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, by H. L. Mencken. A brilliantly\nwritten and extensive exposition of Nietzsche's thought, including an\naccount of the philosopher's life, a discussion of his origins, a reply\nto his critics, and a chapter on how to study him. Mr. Mencken's book,\nthough untechnical, is comprehensive, concise and admirably conceived.\nIt constitutes one of the most valuable Nietzschean commentaries in\nEnglish.\n\nFRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE: HIS LIFE AND WORK, by M. A. M\u00fcgge. A large and\nscholarly treatise of special value to the philosophical student. This\nwork, a pioneer one, is somewhat ponderous and uninteresting, but none\nthe less exhaustive; and contains a bibliography consisting of 850\ntitles.\n\nTHE PHILOSOPHY OF NIETZSCHE, by Georges H. Chatterton-Hill. A\nsuggestive, academic study of the main points in the Nietzschean\nethic. This book is too technical in places to appeal strongly to the\nbeginner, but is invaluable as supplementary reading.\n\nTHE QUINTESSENCE OF NIETZSCHE, by J. M. Kennedy. An interesting and\nunassuming survey of Nietzsche's work, abounding with quotations.\n\nNIETZSCHE: HIS LIFE AND WORKS, by Anthony M. Ludovici. Mr. Ludovici\nis the translator of many of Nietzsche's works into English, and has\ncontributed to Dr. Levy's edition several prefaces and many explanatory\nnotes. His book is complete and authoritative.\n\nOther adequate commentaries are: THE GOSPEL OF SUPERMAN, by Henri\nLichtenberger, translated from the French by J. M. Kennedy; FRIEDRICH\nNIETZSCHE, by A. R. Orage; NIETZSCHE AS CRITIC, PHILOSOPHER, POET AND\nPROPHET, by Thomas Common; THE PHILOSOPHY OF FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE,\nby Grace Neal Dolson; and FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, by Georg Brandes,\ntranslated by A. G. Chater.\n\n\nBIOGRAPHIES\n\nTHE LIFE OF NIETZSCHE, by Frau F\u00f6rster-Nietzsche. This work, in two\nvolumes, is the standard biography of Nietzsche, written by his sister.\nThough elaborate in detail and replete in personal correspondence and\npapers, it is not all that might be hoped for. One's devoted sister\ndoes not always make the most penetrating biographer.\n\nTHE LIFE OF FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, by Daniel Hal\u00e9vy, translated from the\nFrench by J. M. Hone. M. Hal\u00e9vy has founded his work on that of Frau\nF\u00f6rster-Nietzsche; and while his version improves on its model at many\npoints, it is in places supposititious and over-drawn, and is conceived\nin too ironical a vein.\n\nUnfortunately there is no adequate biography of Nietzsche in\nexistence. Nor is there likely to be one, inasmuch as all the papers\nand data necessary for such an undertaking are in the possession of\nNietzsche's sister.\n\n\nBOOKS OF SELECTIONS\n\nTHE GIST OF NIETZSCHE, by H. L. Mencken.\n\nNIETZSCHE IN OUTLINE AND APHORISM, by A. R. Orage.\n\nNIETZSCHE: HIS MAXIMS, by J. M. Kennedy.","title":"What Nietzsche Taught","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":90537}